Summa Theologiae Tertia Pars, 1-59 (Latin-English Opera Omnia) [1 ed.] 1623400120, 9781623400125

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Saint Thomas Aquinas

Summa Theologiae Tertia Pars, 1–59

Translated by Fr. Laurence Shapcote, op

Summa Theologiae Volume 19 Latin/English Edition of the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas

Aquinas Institute, Inc. Green Bay, Wisconsin 2017

This printing was funded in part by donations made in memory of: Marcus Berquist, Rose Johanna Trumbull, John and Mary Deignan, Thomas and Eleanor Sullivan, Ann C. Arcidi, and Fr. John T. Feeney and his sister Mary This printing was also made possible by donations from Kevin Bergdorf, Patricia Lynch, Josh and Holly Harnisch, and by donations made in honor of the Studentate Community of the Dominican Province of St. Albert the Great, USA, Fr. Brian McMaster, Dr. Brian Cutter, and in gratitude to the Very Rev. Romanus Cessario, op, stm

Published with the ecclesiastical approval of The Most Reverend Paul D. Etienne, dd, stl Bishop of Cheyenne Given on July 16, 2015

Copyright © 2017 Aquinas Institute, Inc. 240 E Falcon Hill Way Green Bay, WI 54302 www.TheAquinasInstitute.org Printed in the United States of America

Thomas Aquinas, St., 1225?–1274 Summa Theologiae Tertia Pars, 1–59 / Saint Thomas Aquinas; edited by The Aquinas Institute; translated by Fr. Laurence Shapcote, O.P. p. cm. ISBN 978-1-62340-212-9 1. Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, 1225?–1274 — Summa theologiae — Tertia Pars — 1–59. 2. Catholic Church — Doctrines — Early works to 1800. 3. Theology, Doctrinal — Early works to 1800. I. Title. II. Series BX1749.T512 2015 230΄.2--dc23

2012953833

Notes on the Text

Latin Text of St. Thomas The Latin text used in this volume is based on the Leonine Edition, transcribed and revised by The Aquinas Institute.

English Translation of St. Thomas The English translation of the Summa Theologiae was prepared by Fr. Laurence Shapcote, op (1864–1947), of the English Dominican Province. It has been edited and revised by The Aquinas Institute.

The Aquinas Institute requests your assistance in the continued perfection of these texts. If you discover any errors, please send us a note by email: [email protected]

Dedicated with love to Our Lady of Mt. Carmel

Contents Prologue Question 1 – The Fitness of the Incarnation 1. Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate? ................................................................................3 2. Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race that the Word of God should become incarnate?............................................................................................................................................ 5 3. Whether, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate? ...............................................................8 4. Whether God became incarnate in order to take away actual sin, rather than to take away original sin? ........10 5. Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate in the beginning of the human race? .....................12 6. Whether the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world? ................................................14

Question 2 – The Mode of Union of the Word Incarnate 1. Whether the union of the Incarnate Word took place in the nature?................................................................17 2. Whether the union of the Incarnate Word took place in the person? ...............................................................20 3. Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the suppositum or hypostasis?..................................22 4. Whether the person of Christ is composite? .....................................................................................................24 5. Whether in Christ there is any union of soul and body?...................................................................................25 6. Whether the human nature was united to the Word of God accidentally? .......................................................27 7. Whether the union of the Divine nature and the human is anything created? .................................................31 8. Whether union is the same as assumption?.......................................................................................................32 9. Whether the union of the two natures in Christ is the greatest of all unions? ..................................................33 10. Whether the union of the Incarnation took place by grace? ...........................................................................34 11. Whether any merits preceded the union of the Incarnation?..........................................................................36 12. Whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ?...........................................................................37

Question 3 – The Mode of Union on the Part of the Person Assuming 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Whether it is befitting for a Divine Person to assume a created nature? ...........................................................41 Whether it is befitting to the Divine Nature to assume?....................................................................................42 Whether the nature abstracted from the personality can assume?....................................................................44 Whether one person without another can assume a created nature? ................................................................45 Whether any other Divine Person could have assumed human nature, beside the Person of the Son? ............46 Whether two Divine Persons can assume one and the same individual nature?...............................................48 Whether one Divine Person can assume two human natures?..........................................................................49 Whether it was more fitting that the Person of the Son should assume human nature rather than the Father or Holy Spirit?....................................................................................................................... 52

Question 4 – The Mode of Union on the Part of the Human Nature 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether human nature was more assumable by the Son of God than any other nature?.................................55 Whether the Son of God assumed a person?.....................................................................................................57 Whether the Divine Person assumed a man? ....................................................................................................58 Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature abstracted from all individuals? ...................59 Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature in all individuals? .........................................61 Whether it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature of the stock of Adam? .............................62

Question 5 – The Parts of Human Nature Which Were Assumed 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body? .........................................................................65 Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a carnal or earthly body?......................................................67 Whether the Son of God assumed a soul? .........................................................................................................68 Whether the Son of God assumed a human mind or intellect?.........................................................................70

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Question 6 – The Order of Assumption 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul? .......................................................73 Whether the Son of God assumed a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind?......................................75 Whether the soul was assumed before the flesh by the Son of God? .................................................................76 Whether the flesh of Christ was assumed by the Word before being united to the soul?..................................78 Whether the whole human nature was assumed through the medium of the parts? ........................................79 Whether the Son of God assumed human nature through the medium of grace? ............................................80

Question 7 – The Grace of Christ as an Individual Man 1. Whether in the soul assumed by the Word there was any habitual grace? ........................................................83 2. Whether in Christ there were virtues?...............................................................................................................85 3. Whether in Christ there was faith?....................................................................................................................86 4. Whether in Christ there was hope? ...................................................................................................................87 5. Whether in Christ there were the gifts?.............................................................................................................89 6. Whether in Christ there was the gift of fear?.....................................................................................................90 7. Whether the gratuitous graces were in Christ?..................................................................................................91 8. Whether in Christ there was the gift of prophecy? ............................................................................................92 9. Whether in Christ there was the fullness of grace? ...........................................................................................94 10. Whether the fullness of grace is proper to Christ? ..........................................................................................95 11. Whether the grace of Christ is infinite? ...........................................................................................................97 12. Whether the grace of Christ could increase? ...................................................................................................99 13. Whether the habitual grace of Christ followed after the union?....................................................................100

Question 8 – The Grace of Christ, as He is the Head of the Church 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Whether Christ, as man, is the head of the Church? .......................................................................................103 Whether Christ is the head of men as to their bodies?....................................................................................105 Whether Christ is the head of all men? ...........................................................................................................106 Whether Christ, as man, is the head of the angels? .........................................................................................108 Whether the grace of Christ, as head of the Church, is the same as his habitual grace, inasmuch as he is man? .................................................................................................................................109 6. Whether it is proper to Christ to be head of the Church? ...............................................................................111 7. Whether the devil is the head of all the wicked? .............................................................................................112 8. Whether Antichrist may be called the head of the wicked? ............................................................................114

Question 9 – Christ’s Knowledge in General 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether Christ had any knowledge besides the Divine? ................................................................................117 Whether Christ had the knowledge which the blessed or comprehensors have? ............................................119 Whether Christ had an infused knowledge, besides beatific knowledge? .......................................................120 Whether Christ had any empiric and acquired knowledge? ...........................................................................122

Question 10 – The Beatific Knowledge of Christ’s Soul 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether the soul of Christ comprehended the Word or the Divine Essence? ................................................125 Whether the Son of God knew all things in the Word?...................................................................................126 Whether the soul of Christ can know the infinite in the Word?......................................................................129 Whether the soul of Christ sees the Word more clearly than does any other creature? ..................................131

Question 11 – The Knowledge Imprinted or Infused in the Soul of Christ 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether by this knowledge Christ knew all things? .......................................................................................133 Whether Christ could understand by this knowledge by not turning to phantasms? .....................................135 Whether the soul of Christ had this knowlege by way of comparison?...........................................................136 Whether in Christ this knowledge was greater than in the Angels?................................................................137 Whether this knowledge was habitual in Christ? ............................................................................................138 Whether in the soul of Christ there was but one habit of knowledge? ............................................................140

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Question 12 – The Acquired or Empiric Knowledge of Christ’s Soul 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether Christ knew all things by this knowledge? .......................................................................................143 Whether Christ advanced in this knowledge? .................................................................................................144 Whether Christ learned anything from man? .................................................................................................146 Whether Christ received knowledge from the angels? ....................................................................................147

Question 13 – The Power of Christ’s Soul 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence?................................................................................................149 Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures? .......................151 Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to his own body? ..................................................153 Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence as regards the execution of his will? ........................................155

Question 14 – The Defects of Body Assumed by the Son of God 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether the Son of God in human nature ought to have assumed defects of body?......................................157 Whether Christ was of necessity subject to these defects?...............................................................................159 Whether Christ contracted these defects? .......................................................................................................160 Whether Christ ought to have assumed all the bodily defects of men?...........................................................162

Question 15 – The Defects of Soul Assumed by Christ 1. Whether there was sin in Christ? ....................................................................................................................165 2. Whether there was the fomes of sin in Christ? ................................................................................................167 3. Whether in Christ there was ignorance? .........................................................................................................169 4. Whether Christ’s soul was passible? ................................................................................................................170 5. Whether there was true sensible pain in Christ? .............................................................................................172 6. Whether there was sorrow in Christ? ..............................................................................................................173 7. Whether there was fear in Christ? ...................................................................................................................175 8. Whether there was wonder in Christ? .............................................................................................................176 9. Whether there was anger in Christ? ................................................................................................................177 10. Whether Christ was at once a wayfarer and a comprehensor? ......................................................................178

Question 16 – Christ in His Being and Becoming 1. Whether this is true: “God is man”? ................................................................................................................181 2. Whether this is true: “man is God”? ................................................................................................................184 3. Whether Christ can be called a lordly man?....................................................................................................185 4. Whether what belongs to the human nature can be predicated of God? ........................................................187 5. Whether what belongs to the human nature can be predicated of the Divine Nature?...................................188 6. Whether this is true: “God was made man”? ...................................................................................................190 7. Whether this is true: “man was made God”?...................................................................................................191 8. Whether this is true: “Christ is a creature”?.....................................................................................................193 9. Whether this man, i.e., Christ, began to be?....................................................................................................194 10. Whether this is true: “Christ as man is a creature”? ......................................................................................196 11. Whether this is true: “Christ as man is God”? ...............................................................................................197 12. Whether Christ as man is a hypostasis or person? ........................................................................................198

Question 17 – Christ’s Unity of Being 1. Whether Christ is one or two?.........................................................................................................................201 2. Whether there is only one being in Christ? .....................................................................................................204

Question 18 – Christ’s Unity of Will 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether there are two wills in Christ, one divine and the other human?.......................................................207 Whether in Christ there was a will of sensuality besides the will of reason? ...................................................209 Whether in Christ there were two wills as regards the reason? .......................................................................211 Whether there was free-will in Christ?............................................................................................................212 Whether the human will of Christ willed anything except what God wills? ...................................................213 Whether there was contrariety of wills in Christ? ...........................................................................................215

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Question 19 – The Unity of Christ’s Operation 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether in Christ there is only one operation of the godhead and manhood? ..............................................219 Whether in Christ there are several human operations? .................................................................................223 Whether the human action of Christ could be meritorious to him? ...............................................................224 Whether Christ could merit for others? ..........................................................................................................226

Question 20 – Christ’s Subjection to the Father 1. Whether we may say that Christ is subject to the Father? ...............................................................................229 2. Whether Christ is subject to himself? .............................................................................................................231

Question 21 – Christ’s Prayer 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether it is becoming of Christ to pray?.......................................................................................................235 Whether it pertains to Christ to pray according to his sensuality?..................................................................236 Whether it was fitting that Christ should pray for himself? ............................................................................238 Whether Christ’s prayer was always heard?.....................................................................................................239

Question 22 – The Priesthood of Christ 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether it is fitting that Christ should be a priest?.........................................................................................243 Whether Christ was himself both priest and victim? ......................................................................................245 Whether the effect of Christ’s priesthood is the expiation of sins? ..................................................................246 Whether the effect of the priesthood of Christ pertained not only to others, but also to himself? .................248 Whether the priesthood of Christ endures for ever? .......................................................................................249 Whether the priesthood of Christ was according to the order of Melchisedech?............................................251

Question 23 – Adoption as Befitting to Christ 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether it is fitting that God should adopt sons? ...........................................................................................253 Whether it is fitting that the whole Trinity should adopt?...............................................................................254 Whether it is proper to the rational nature to be adopted? .............................................................................256 Whether Christ as man is the adopted Son of God?........................................................................................257

Question 24 – The Predestination of Christ 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether it is befitting that Christ should be predestined? ..............................................................................259 Whether this proposition is false: “Christ as man was predestined to be the Son of God”? ..............................261 Whether Christ’s predestination is the exemplar of ours? ...............................................................................263 Whether Christ’s predestination is the cause of ours? .....................................................................................264

Question 25 – The Adoration of Christ 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether Christ’s humanity and Godhead are to be adored with the same adoration? ...................................267 Whether Christ’s humanity should be adored with the adoration of latria?....................................................269 Whether the image of Christ should be adored with the adoration of latria? .................................................270 Whether Christ’s cross should be worshipped with the adoration of latria? ...................................................272 Whether the Mother of God should be worshipped with the adoration of latria? ..........................................274 Whether any kind of worship is due to the relics of the saints?.......................................................................275

Question 26 – Christ as Called the Mediator of God and Man 1. Whether it is proper to Christ to be the mediator of God and man? ..............................................................277 2. Whether Christ, as man, is the mediator of God and men? ............................................................................279

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Question 27 – The Sanctification of the Blessed Virgin 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before her birth from the womb? ................................................281 Whether the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before animation?........................................................................283 Whether the Blessed Virgin was cleansed from the infection of the fomes? ...................................................285 Whether by being sanctified in the womb the Blessed Virgin was preserved from all actual sin? ..................288 Whether, by her sanctification in the womb, the Blessed Virgin received the fullness of grace?.....................290 Whether after Christ, it was proper to the Blessed Virgin to be sanctified in the womb? ...............................292

Question 28 – The Virginity of the Mother of God 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether the Mother of God was a virgin in conceiving Christ? .....................................................................295 Whether Christ’s Mother was a virgin in his birth?.........................................................................................298 Whether Christ’s Mother remained a virgin after his birth?............................................................................300 Whether the Mother of God took a vow of virginity? .....................................................................................303

Question 29 – The Espousals of the Mother of God 1. Whether Christ should have been born of an espoused virgin? ......................................................................305 2. Whether there was a true marriage between Mary and Joseph? .....................................................................308

Question 30 – The Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether it was necessary to announce to the Blessed Virgin that which was to be done in her? ...................311 Whether the Annunciation should have been made by an angel to the Blessed Virgin?.................................312 Whether the angel of the Annunciation should have appeared to the Virgin in a bodily vision? ...................314 Whether the Annunciation took place in becoming order? ............................................................................316

Question 31 – The Matter from Which the Savior’s Body was Conceived 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Whether the flesh of Christ was derived from Adam? ....................................................................................319 Whether Christ took flesh of the seed of David? .............................................................................................320 Whether Christ’s genealogy is suitably traced by the Evangelists? ..................................................................322 Whether the matter of Christ’s body should have been taken from a woman? ...............................................327 Whether the flesh of Christ was conceived of the Virgin’s purest blood? ........................................................329 Whether Christ’s body was in Adam and the other patriarchs, as to something signate? ...............................331 Whether Christ’s flesh in the patriarchs was infected by sin?..........................................................................333 Whether Christ paid tithes in Abraham’s loins? ..............................................................................................334

Question 32 – The Active Principle in Christ’s Conception 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether the accomplishment of Christ’s conception should be attributed to the Holy Spirit?.......................337 Whether it should be said that Christ was conceived of the Holy Spirit? ........................................................339 Whether the Holy Spirit should be called Christ’s father in respect of his humanity? ....................................341 Whether the Blessed Virgin cooperated actively in the conception of Christ’s body?.....................................342

Question 33 – The Mode and Order of Christ’s Conception 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether Christ’s body was formed in the first instant of its conception? .......................................................345 Whether Christ’s body was animated in the first instant of its conception?....................................................347 Whether Christ’s flesh was first of all conceived and afterwards assumed?.....................................................349 Whether Christ’s conception was natural? ......................................................................................................350

Question 34 – The Perfection of the Child Conceived 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether Christ was sanctified in the first instant of his conception? .............................................................353 Whether Christ as man had the use of free-will in the first instant of his conception? ...................................354 Whether Christ could merit in the first instant of his conception? .................................................................356 Whether Christ was a perfect comprehensor in the first instant of his conception? .......................................357

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Question 35 – Christ’s Nativity 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Whether nativity regards the nature rather than the person? .........................................................................359 Whether a temporal nativity should be attributed to Christ?..........................................................................360 Whether the Blessed Virgin can be called Christ’s Mother in respect of his temporal nativity? .....................362 Whether the Blessed Virgin should be called the Mother of God?..................................................................363 Whether there are two filiations in Christ? .....................................................................................................365 Whether Christ was born without his Mother suffering?................................................................................367 Whether Christ should have been born in Bethlehem? ..................................................................................369 Whether Christ was born at a fitting time? .....................................................................................................370

Question 36 – The Manifestation of the Newly Born Christ 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Whether Christ’s birth should have been made known to all? ........................................................................373 Whether Christ’s birth should have been made known to some?....................................................................374 Whether those to whom Christ’s birth was made known were suitably chosen? ............................................376 Whether Christ himself should have made his birth known? .........................................................................378 Whether Christ’s birth should have been manifested by means of the angels and the star?............................379 Whether Christ’s birth was made known in a becoming order?......................................................................382 Whether the star which appeared to the Magi belonged to the heavenly system? ..........................................384 Whether it was becoming that the Magi should come to adore Christ and pay homage to him? ...................386

Question 37 – Christ’s Circumcision 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether Christ should have been circumcised? .............................................................................................389 Whether a suitable name was given to Christ? ................................................................................................390 Whether Christ was becomingly presented in the Temple? ............................................................................392 Whether it was fitting that the Mother of God should go to the Temple to be purified?.................................395

Question 38 – The Baptism of John 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether it was fitting that John should baptize?.............................................................................................397 Whether the baptism of John was from God? .................................................................................................398 Whether grace was given in the baptism of John?...........................................................................................400 Whether Christ alone should have been baptized with the baptism of John? .................................................401 Whether John’s baptism should have ceased after Christ was baptized? .........................................................402 Whether those who had been baptized with John’s baptism had to be baptized with the baptism of Christ? 403

Question 39 – The Baptizing of Christ 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether it was fitting that Christ should be baptized? ...................................................................................407 Whether it was fitting for Christ to be baptized with John’s baptism?.............................................................408 Whether Christ was baptized at a fitting time? ...............................................................................................409 Whether Christ should have been baptized in the Jordan? .............................................................................411 Whether the heavens should have been opened unto Christ at his baptism?..................................................412 Whether it is fitting to say that when Christ was baptized the Holy Spirit came down on him in the form of a dove?....................................................................................................................................415 7. Whether the dove in which the Holy Spirit appeared was real? ......................................................................418 8. Whether it was becoming, when Christ was baptized, that the Father’s voice should be heard, bearing witness to the Son? ...........................................................................................................................419

Question 40 – Christ’s Manner of Life 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether Christ should have associated with men, or led a solitary life? ........................................................421 Whether it was becoming that Christ should lead an austere life in this world?.............................................423 Whether Christ should have led a life of poverty in this world? .....................................................................425 Whether Christ conformed his conduct to the law?........................................................................................427

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Question 41 – Christ’s Temptation 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether it was becoming that Christ should be tempted?..............................................................................431 Whether Christ should have been tempted in the desert?...............................................................................433 Whether Christ’s temptation should have taken place after his fast?...............................................................434 Whether the mode and order of the temptation were becoming?...................................................................436

Question 42 – Christ’s Doctrine 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether Christ should have preached not only to the Jews, but also to the Gentiles?....................................441 Whether Christ should have preached to the Jews without offending them?..................................................443 Whether Christ should have taught all things openly?....................................................................................444 Whether Christ should have committed his doctrine to writing? ...................................................................446

Question 43 – The Miracles Worked by Christ, in General 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether Christ should have worked miracles? ...............................................................................................449 Whether Christ worked miracles by Divine power?........................................................................................450 Whether Christ began to work miracles when he changed water into wine at the marriage feast? ................452 Whether the miracles which Christ worked were a sufficient proof of his Godhead?.....................................453

Question 44 – Christ’s Miracles Considered Specifically 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether those miracles were fitting which Christ worked in spiritual substances?........................................457 Whether it was fitting that Christ should work miracles in the heavenly bodies?...........................................460 Whether Christ worked miracles fittingly on men? ........................................................................................463 Whether Christ worked miracles fittingly on irrational creatures? .................................................................467

Question 45 – Christ’s Transfiguration 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether it was fitting that Christ should be transfigured?..............................................................................471 Whether this clarity was the clarity of glory? ..................................................................................................472 Whether the witnesses of the transfiguration were fittingly chosen? ..............................................................474 Whether the testimony of the Father’s voice, saying, “this is my beloved Son,” was fittingly added? ..............476

Question 46 – The Passion of Christ 1. Whether it was necessary for Christ to suffer for the deliverance of the human race?....................................479 2. Whether there was any other possible way of human deliverance besides the Passion of Christ? ..................481 3. Whether there was any more suitable way of delivering the human race than by Christ’s Passion? ...............483 4. Whether Christ ought to have suffered on the cross?......................................................................................485 5. Whether Christ endured all sufferings?...........................................................................................................487 6. Whether the pain of Christ’s Passion was greater than all other pains? ..........................................................489 7. Whether Christ suffered in his whole soul?.....................................................................................................492 8. Whether Christ’s entire soul enjoyed blessed fruition during the Passion?.....................................................494 9. Whether Christ suffered at a suitable time?.....................................................................................................495 10. Whether Christ suffered in a suitable place? .................................................................................................498 11. Whether it was fitting for Christ to be crucified with thieves? ......................................................................500 12. Whether Christ’s Passion is to be attributed to his Godhead? .......................................................................502

Question 47 – The Efficient Cause of Christ’s Passion 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether Christ was slain by another or by himself?.......................................................................................505 Whether Christ died out of obedience?...........................................................................................................506 Whether God the Father delivered up Christ to the Passion? .........................................................................508 Whether it was fitting for Christ to suffer at the hands of the Gentiles?..........................................................510 Whether Christ’s persecutors knew who he was? ............................................................................................511 Whether the sin of those who crucified Christ was most grievous? ................................................................513

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Question 48 – The Efficiency of Christ’s Passion 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation by way of merit? ........................................................515 Whether Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation by way of atonement?................................................516 Whether Christ’s Passion operated by way of sacrifice? ..................................................................................517 Whether Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation by way of redemption? ..............................................519 Whether it is proper to Christ to be the Redeemer?........................................................................................521 Whether Christ’s passion brought about our salvation efficiently?..................................................................522

Question 49 – The Effects of Christ’s Passion 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether we were delivered from sin through Christ’s Passion?......................................................................525 Whether we were delivered from the devil’s power through Christ’s Passion?................................................527 Whether men were freed from the punishment of sin through Christ’s Passion? ...........................................528 Whether we were reconciled to God through Christ’s Passion? ......................................................................530 Whether Christ opened the gate of heaven to us by his Passion?....................................................................531 Whether by his Passion Christ merited to be exalted? ....................................................................................533

Question 50 – The Death of Christ 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether it was fitting that Christ should die?.................................................................................................535 Whether the Godhead was separated from the flesh when Christ died?.........................................................536 Whether in Christ’s death there was a severance between his Godhead and his soul?....................................538 Whether Christ was a man during the three days of his death? ......................................................................540 Whether Christ’s was identically the same body living and dead? ..................................................................541 Whether Christ’s death conduced in any way to our salvation? ......................................................................543

Question 51 – Christ’s Burial 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether it was fitting for Christ to be buried?................................................................................................545 Whether Christ was buried in a becoming manner?.......................................................................................546 Whether Christ’s body was reduced to dust in the tomb? ...............................................................................548 Whether Christ was in the tomb only one day and two nights?......................................................................550

Question 52 – Christ’s Descent into Hell 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Whether it was fitting for Christ to descend into hell? ....................................................................................553 Whether Christ went down into the hell of the lost?.......................................................................................555 Whether the whole Christ was in hell? ............................................................................................................557 Whether Christ made any stay in hell?............................................................................................................558 Whether Christ descending into hell delivered the holy Fathers from thence?...............................................559 Whether Christ delivered any of the lost from hell?........................................................................................561 Whether the children who died in original sin were delivered by Christ’s descent? .......................................563 Whether Christ by his descent into hell delivered souls from Purgatory? ......................................................564

Question 53 – Christ’s Resurrection 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether it was necessary for Christ to rise again? ..........................................................................................567 Whether it was fitting for Christ to rise again on the third day? .....................................................................569 Whether Christ was the first to rise from the Dead? .......................................................................................571 Whether Christ was the cause of his own Resurrection?.................................................................................573

Question 54 – The Quality of Christ Rising Again 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether Christ had a true body after his Resurrection? .................................................................................575 Whether Christ’s body rose glorified? .............................................................................................................577 Whether Christ’s body rose again entire? ........................................................................................................579 Whether Christ’s body ought to have risen with its scars? ..............................................................................580

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Question 55 – The Manifestation of the Resurrection 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether Christ’s Resurrection ought to have been manifested to all? ............................................................583 Whether it was fitting that the disciples should see him rise again?................................................................585 Whether Christ ought to have lived constantly with his disciples after the Resurrection?..............................586 Whether Christ should have appeared to the disciples in another shape? ......................................................589 Whether Christ should have demonstrated the truth of his resurrection by proofs? ......................................590 Whether the proofs which Christ made use of manifested sufficiently the truth of his Resurrection? ...........592

Question 56 – The Causality of Christ’s Resurrection 1. Whether Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of the Resurrection of our bodies? ..............................................597 2. Whether Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of souls? ........................................................599

Question 57 – The Ascension of Christ 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether it was fitting for Christ to ascend into heaven?.................................................................................603 Whether Christ’s Ascension into heaven belonged to him according to his divine nature?............................605 Whether Christ ascended by his own power? .................................................................................................607 Whether Christ ascended above all the heavens? ............................................................................................609 Whether Christ’s body ascended above every spiritual creature?....................................................................610 Whether Christ’s ascension is the cause of our salvation? ...............................................................................611

Question 58 – Christ’s Sitting at the Right Hand of the Father 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether it is fitting that Christ should sit at the right hand of God the Father?.............................................615 Whether it belongs to Christ as God to sit at the right hand of the Father? ....................................................616 Whether it belongs to Christ as man to sit at the right hand of the Father?....................................................617 Whether it is proper to Christ to sit at the right hand of the Father? ..............................................................619

Question 59 – Christ’s Judiciary Power 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Whether judiciary power is to be specially attributed to Christ? ....................................................................623 Whether judiciary power belongs to Christ as man?.......................................................................................625 Whether Christ acquired his judiciary power by his merits? ..........................................................................627 Whether judiciary power belongs to Christ with respect to all human affairs?...............................................628 Whether after the Judgment that takes place in the present time, there remains yet another General Judgment?........................................................................................................................................630 6. Whether Christ’s judiciary power extends to the angels? ................................................................................632

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Summa Theologiae Tertia Pars, 1–59

Prologue Quia salvator noster dominus Iesus Christus, teste Angelo, populum suum salvum faciens a peccatis eorum, viam veritatis nobis in seipso demonstravit, per quam ad beatitudinem immortalis vitae resurgendo pervenire possimus, necesse est ut, ad consummationem totius theologici negotii, post considerationem ultimi finis humanae vitae et virtutum ac vitiorum, de ipso omnium salvatore ac beneficiis eius humano generi praestitis nostra consideratio subsequatur. Circa quam, primo considerandum occurrit de ipso salvatore; secundo, de sacramentis eius, quibus salutem consequimur; tertio, de fine immortalis vitae, ad quem per ipsum resurgendo pervenimus. Circa primum duplex consideratio occurrit, prima est de ipso incarnationis mysterio, secundum quod Deus pro nostra salute factus est homo; secunda de his quae per ipsum salvatorem nostrum, idest Deum incarnatum, sunt acta et passa.

Forasmuch as our Savior the Lord Jesus Christ, in order to save His people from their sins (Matt 1:21), as the angel announced, showed unto us in His own Person the way of truth, whereby we may attain to the bliss of eternal life by rising again, it is necessary, in order to complete the work of theology, that after considering the last end of human life, and the virtues and vices, there should follow the consideration of the Savior of all, and of the benefits bestowed by Him on the human race. Concerning this we must consider (1) the Savior Himself; (2) the sacraments by which we attain to our salvation; (3) the end of immortal life to which we attain by the resurrection. Concerning the first, a double consideration occurs: the first, about the mystery of the Incarnation itself, whereby God was made man for our salvation; the second, about such things as were done and suffered by our Savior—i.e., God incarnate.

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Question 1 The Fitness of the Incarnation Circa primum tria consideranda occurrunt, primo Concerning the first, three things occur to be considquidem, de convenientia incarnationis ipsius; secundo, ered: first, the fitness of the Incarnation; second, the mode de modo unionis verbi incarnati; tertio, de his quae con- of union of the Word Incarnate; third, what follows this sequuntur ad hanc unionem. union. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum conveniens fuerit Deum incarnari. (1) Whether it was fitting for God to become incarnate? Secundo, utrum fuerit necessarium ad reparationem (2) Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the humani generis. human race? Tertio, utrum, si non fuisset peccatum, Deus (3) Whether if there had been no sin God would have incarnatus fuisset. become incarnate? Quarto, utrum principalius sit incarnatus ad (4) Whether He became incarnate to take away tollendum originale peccatum quam actuale. original sin rather than actual? Quinto, utrum conveniens fuerit Deum incarnari a (5) Whether it was fitting for God to become incarnate principio mundi. from the beginning of the world? Sexto, utrum eius incarnatio differri debuerit usque (6) Whether His Incarnation ought to have been in finem mundi. deferred to the end of the world?

Article 1 Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Deum incarnari. Cum enim Deus ab aeterno sit ipsa essentia bonitatis, sic optimum est ipsum esse sicut ab aeterno fuit. Sed Deus ab aeterno fuit absque omni carne. Ergo convenientissimum est ipsum non esse carni unitum. Non ergo fuit conveniens Deum incarnari. Obj. 2: Further, it is not fitting to unite things that are infinitely apart, even as it would not be a fitting union if one were to paint a figure in which the neck of a horse was joined to the head of a man. But God and flesh are infinitely apart; since God is most simple, and flesh is most composite—especially human flesh. Therefore it was not fitting that God should be united to human flesh. Praeterea, sic distat corpus a summo spiritu sicut malitia a summa bonitate. Sed omnino esset inconveniens quod Deus, qui est summa bonitas, malitiam assumeret. Ergo non est conveniens quod summus spiritus increatus corpus assumeret. Praeterea, inconveniens est ut qui excedit magna, contineatur in minimo; et cui imminet cura magnorum, ad parva se transferat. Sed Deum, qui totius mundi curam gerit, tota universitas capere non sufficit. Ergo videtur inconveniens quod intra corpusculum vagientis infantiae lateat cui parum putatur universitas; et tandiu a

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for God to become incarnate. Since God from all eternity is the very essence of goodness, it was best for Him to be as He had been from all eternity. But from all eternity He had been without flesh. Therefore it was most fitting for Him not to be united to flesh. Therefore it was not fitting for God to become incarnate. Obj. 2: Further, it is not fitting to unite things that are infinitely apart, even as it would not be a fitting union if one were to paint a figure in which the neck of a horse was joined to the head of a man. But God and flesh are infinitely apart; since God is most simple, and flesh is most composite—especially human flesh. Therefore it was not fitting that God should be united to human flesh. Obj. 3: Further, a body is as distant from the highest spirit as evil is from the highest good. But it was wholly unfitting that God, Who is the highest good, should assume evil. Therefore it was not fitting that the highest uncreated spirit should assume a body. Obj. 4: Further, it is not becoming that He Who surpassed the greatest things should be contained in the least, and He upon Whom rests the care of great things should leave them for lesser things. But God—Who takes care of the whole world—the whole universe of things cannot contain. Therefore it would seem unfitting that He should be hid

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sedibus suis absit ille regnator, atque ad unum corpuscu- under the frail body of a babe in swathing bands, in comparilum totius mundi cura transferatur; ut Volusianus scribit son with Whom the whole universe is accounted as little; and ad Augustinum. that this Prince should quit His throne for so long, and transfer the government of the whole world to so frail a body, as Volusianus writes to Augustine (Ep. cxxxv). Sed contra, illud videtur esse convenientissimum On the contrary, It would seem most fitting that by ut per visibilia monstrentur invisibilia Dei, ad hoc enim visible things the invisible things of God should be made totus mundus est factus, ut patet per illud apostoli, Rom. known; for to this end was the whole world made, as is clear I, invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, con- from the word of the Apostle (Rom 1:20): For the invisible spiciuntur. Sed sicut Damascenus dicit, in principio III things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the libri, per incarnationis mysterium monstratur simul bo- things that are made. But, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. nitas et sapientia et iustitia et potentia Dei vel virtus, iii, 1), by the mystery of the Incarnation are made known at bonitas quidem, quoniam non despexit proprii plasma- once the goodness, the wisdom, the justice, and the power tis infirmitatem; iustitia vero, quoniam non alium facit or might of God—His goodness, for He did not despise the vincere tyrannum, neque vi eripit ex morte hominem; sa- weakness of His own handiwork; His justice, since, on man’s pientia vero, quoniam invenit difficillimi decentissimam defeat, He caused the tyrant to be overcome by none other solutionem; potentia vero, sive virtus, infinita, quia nihil than man, and yet He did not snatch men forcibly from death; est maius quam Deum fieri hominem. Ergo conveniens His wisdom, for He found a suitable discharge for a most fuit Deum incarnari. heavy debt; His power, or infinite might, for there is nothing greater than for God to become incarnate . . . Respondeo dicendum quod unicuique rei conveI answer that, To each thing, that is befitting which niens est illud quod competit sibi secundum rationem belongs to it by reason of its very nature; thus, to reason bepropriae naturae, sicut homini conveniens est ratiocina- fits man, since this belongs to him because he is of a rari quia hoc convenit sibi inquantum est rationalis secun- tional nature. But the very nature of God is goodness, as dum suam naturam. Ipsa autem natura Dei est bonitas, is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i). Hence, what belongs ut patet per Dionysium, I cap. de Div. Nom. Unde qui- to the essence of goodness befits God. But it belongs to the dquid pertinet ad rationem boni, conveniens est Deo. essence of goodness to communicate itself to others, as is Pertinet autem ad rationem boni ut se aliis communi- plain from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Hence it belongs to cet, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Un- the essence of the highest good to communicate itself in the de ad rationem summi boni pertinet quod summo modo highest manner to the creature, and this is brought about se creaturae communicet. Quod quidem maxime fit per chiefly by His so joining created nature to Himself that one hoc quod naturam creatam sic sibi coniungit ut una per- Person is made up of these three—the Word, a soul and flesh, sona fiat ex tribus, verbo, anima et carne, sicut dicit Au- as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii). Hence it is manifest that it gustinus, XIII de Trin. Unde manifestum est quod con- was fitting that God should become incarnate. veniens fuit Deum incarnari. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod incarnationis myReply Obj. 1: The mystery of the Incarnation was not sterium non est impletum per hoc quod Deus sit aliquo completed through God being changed in any way from modo a suo statu immutatus in quo ab aeterno non fuit, the state in which He had been from eternity, but through sed per hoc quod novo modo creaturae se univit, vel po- His having united Himself to the creature in a new way, or tius eam sibi. Est autem conveniens ut creatura, quae se- rather through having united it to Himself. But it is fitting cundum rationem sui mutabilis est, non semper eodem that a creature which by nature is mutable, should not almodo se habeat. Et ideo, sicut creatura, cum prius non ways be in one way. And therefore, as the creature began to esset, in esse producta est, convenienter, cum prius non be, although it had not been before, so likewise, not having esset unita Deo, postmodum fuit ei unita. been previously united to God in Person, it was afterwards united to Him. Ad secundum dicendum quod uniri Deo in unitate Reply Obj. 2: To be united to God in unity of perpersonae non fuit conveniens carni humanae secundum son was not fitting to human flesh, according to its natuconditionem suae naturae, quia hoc erat supra dignita- ral endowments, since it was above its dignity; nevertheless, tem ipsius. Conveniens tamen fuit Deo, secundum infi- it was fitting that God, by reason of His infinite goodness, nitam excellentiam bonitatis eius, ut sibi eam uniret pro should unite it to Himself for man’s salvation. salute humana. Ad tertium dicendum quod quaelibet alia conditio Reply Obj. 3: Every mode of being wherein any creasecundum quam quaecumque creatura differt a creatore, ture whatsoever differs from the Creator has been estaba Dei sapientia est instituta, et ad Dei bonitatem ordina- lished by God’s wisdom, and is ordained to God’s goodness.

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ta, Deus enim propter suam bonitatem, cum sit increatus, immobilis, incorporeus, produxit creaturas mobiles et corporeas; et similiter malum poenae a Dei iustitia est introductum propter gloriam Dei. Malum vero culpae committitur per recessum ab arte divinae sapientiae et ab ordine divinae bonitatis. Et ideo conveniens esse potuit assumere naturam creatam, mutabilem, corpoream et poenalitati subiectam, non autem fuit conveniens ei assumere malum culpae. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus respondet, in epistola ad Volusianum, non habet hoc Christiana doctrina, quod ita sit Deus infusus carni humanae ut curam gubernandae universitatis vel deseruerit vel amiserit, vel ad illud corpusculum quasi contractam transtulerit, hominum est iste sensus nihil nisi corpus valentium cogitare. Deus autem non mole, sed virtute magnus est, unde magnitudo virtutis eius nullas in angusto sentit angustias. Non est ergo incredibile, ut verbum hominis transiens simul auditur a multis et a singulis totum, quod verbum Dei permanens simul ubique sit totum. Unde nullum inconveniens sequitur, Deo incarnato.

Q. 1, A. 2

For God, Who is uncreated, immutable, and incorporeal, produced mutable and corporeal creatures for His own goodness. And so also the evil of punishment was established by God’s justice for God’s glory. But evil of fault is committed by withdrawing from the art of the Divine wisdom and from the order of the Divine goodness. And therefore it could be fitting to God to assume a nature created, mutable, corporeal, and subject to penalty, but it did not become Him to assume the evil of fault. Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine replies (Ep. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): The Christian doctrine nowhere holds that God was so joined to human flesh as either to desert or lose, or to transfer and as it were, contract within this frail body, the care of governing the universe. This is the thought of men unable to see anything but corporeal things . . . God is great not in mass, but in might. Hence the greatness of His might feels no straits in narrow surroundings. Nor, if the passing word of a man is heard at once by many, and wholly by each, is it incredible that the abiding Word of God should be everywhere at once? Hence nothing unfitting arises from God becoming incarnate.

Article 2 Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race that the Word of God should become incarnate? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit necessarium ad reparationem humani generis verbum Dei incarnari. Verbo enim Dei, cum sit Deus perfectus, ut in primo habitum est, nihil virtutis per carnem assumptam accrevit. Si ergo verbum Dei incarnatum naturam reparavit, etiam absque carnis assumptione eam potuit reparare. Praeterea, ad reparationem humanae naturae, quae per peccatum collapsa erat, nihil aliud requiri videbatur quam quod homo satisfaceret pro peccato. Non enim Deus ab homine requirere plus debet quam possit, et, cum pronior sit ad miserendum quam ad puniendum, sicut homini imputat actum peccati, ita etiam videtur quod ei imputet ad deletionem peccati actum contrarium. Non ergo fuit necessarium ad reparationem humanae naturae verbum Dei incarnari. Praeterea, ad salutem hominis praecipue pertinet ut Deum revereatur, unde dicitur Malach. I, si ego dominus, ubi timor meus? Si pater, ubi honor meus? Sed ex hoc ipso homines Deum magis reverentur quod eum considerant super omnia elevatum, et ab hominum sensibus remotum, unde in Psalmo dicitur, excelsus super omnes gentes dominus, et super caelos gloria eius; et postea subditur, quis sicut dominus Deus noster? Quod ad reve-

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for the reparation of the human race that the Word of God should become incarnate. For since the Word of God is perfect God, as has been said (I, Q. 4, AA. 1, 2), no power was added to Him by the assumption of flesh. Therefore, if the incarnate Word of God restored human nature, He could also have restored it without assuming flesh. Obj. 2: Further, for the restoration of human nature, which had fallen through sin, nothing more is required than that man should satisfy for sin. Now man can satisfy, as it would seem, for sin; for God cannot require from man more than man can do, and since He is more inclined to be merciful than to punish, as He lays the act of sin to man’s charge, so He ought to credit him with the contrary act. Therefore it was not necessary for the restoration of human nature that the Word of God should become incarnate. Obj. 3: Further, to revere God pertains especially to man’s salvation; hence it is written (Mal 1:6): If, then, I be a father, where is my honor? and if I be a master, where is my fear? But men revere God the more by considering Him as elevated above all, and far beyond man’s senses, hence (Ps 112:4) it is written: The Lord is high above all nations, and His glory above the heavens; and farther on: Who is as the Lord our God? which pertains to reverence. Therefore it

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rentiam pertinet. Ergo videtur non convenire humanae saluti quod Deus nobis similis fieret per carnis assumptionem. Sed contra, illud per quod humanum genus liberatur a perditione, est necessarium ad humanam salutem. Sed mysterium divinae incarnationis est huiusmodi, secundum illud Ioan. III, sic Deus dilexit mundum ut filium suum unigenitum daret, ut omnis qui credit in ipsum non pereat, sed habeat vitam aeternam. Ergo necesse fuit ad humanam salutem Deum incarnari. Respondeo dicendum quod ad finem aliquem dicitur aliquid esse necessarium dupliciter, uno modo, sine quo aliquid esse non potest, sicut cibus est necessarius ad conservationem humanae vitae; alio modo, per quod melius et convenientius pervenitur ad finem, sicut equus necessarius est ad iter. Primo modo Deum incarnari non fuit necessarium ad reparationem humanae naturae, Deus enim per suam omnipotentem virtutem poterat humanam naturam multis aliis modis reparare. Secundo autem modo necessarium fuit Deum incarnari ad humanae naturae reparationem. Unde dicit Augustinus, XIII de Trin., ostendamus non alium modum possibilem Deo defuisse, cuius potestati omnia aequaliter subiacent, sed sanandae miseriae nostrae convenientiorem alium modum non fuisse. Et hoc quidem considerari potest quantum ad promotionem hominis in bono. Primo quidem, quantum ad fidem, quae magis certificatur ex hoc quod ipsi Deo loquenti credit. Unde Augustinus dicit, XI de Civ. Dei, ut homo fidentius ambularet ad veritatem, ipsa veritas, Dei filius, homine assumpto, constituit atque fundavit fidem. Secundo, quantum ad spem, quae per hoc maxime erigitur. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., nihil tam necessarium fuit ad erigendam spem nostram quam ut demonstraretur nobis quantum diligeret nos Deus. Quid vero huius rei isto indicio manifestius, quam ut Dei filius naturae nostrae dignatus est inire consortium? Tertio, quantum ad caritatem, quae maxime per hoc excitatur. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de catechizandis rudibus, quae maior causa est adventus domini, nisi ut ostenderet Deus dilectionem suam in nobis? Et postea subdit, si amare pigebat, saltem reamare non pigeat. Quarto, quantum ad rectam operationem, in qua nobis exemplum se praebuit. Unde Augustinus dicit, in quodam sermone de nativitate domini, homo sequendus non erat, qui videri poterat, Deus sequendus erat, qui videri non poterat. Ut ergo exhiberetur homini et qui ab homine videretur, et quem homo sequeretur, Deus factus est homo. Quinto, quantum ad plenam participationem divinitatis, quae vere est hominis beatitudo, et finis humanae vitae. Et hoc collatum est nobis per Christi humanitatem, dicit enim Augustinus, in quodam sermone de Nativ. domini, factus est Deus homo, ut homo fieret Deus.

IIIae

would seem unfitting to man’s salvation that God should be made like unto us by assuming flesh. On the contrary, What frees the human race from perdition is necessary for the salvation of man. But the mystery of the Incarnation is such; according to John 3:16: God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting. Therefore it was necessary for man’s salvation that God should become incarnate. I answer that, A thing is said to be necessary for a certain end in two ways. First, when the end cannot be without it; as food is necessary for the preservation of human life. Second, when the end is attained better and more conveniently, as a horse is necessary for a journey. In the first way it was not necessary that God should become incarnate for the restoration of human nature. For God with His omnipotent power could have restored human nature in many other ways. But in the second way it was necessary that God should become incarnate for the restoration of human nature. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 10): We shall also show that other ways were not wanting to God, to Whose power all things are equally subject; but that there was not a more fitting way of healing our misery. Now this may be viewed with respect to our furtherance in good. First, with regard to faith, which is made more certain by believing God Himself Who speaks; hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 2): In order that man might journey more trustfully toward the truth, the Truth itself, the Son of God, having assumed human nature, established and founded faith. Second, with regard to hope, which is thereby greatly strengthened; hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): Nothing was so necessary for raising our hope as to show us how deeply God loved us. And what could afford us a stronger proof of this than that the Son of God should become a partner with us of human nature? Third, with regard to charity, which is greatly enkindled by this; hence Augustine says (De Catech. Rudib. iv): What greater cause is there of the Lord’s coming than to show God’s love for us? And he afterwards adds: If we have been slow to love, at least let us hasten to love in return. Fourth, with regard to well-doing, in which He set us an example; hence Augustine says in a sermon (xxii de Temp.): Man who might be seen was not to be followed; but God was to be followed, Who could not be seen. And therefore God was made man, that He Who might be seen by man, and Whom man might follow, might be shown to man. Fifth, with regard to the full participation of the Divinity, which is the true bliss of man and end of human life; and this is bestowed upon us by Christ’s humanity; for Augustine says in a sermon (xiii de Temp.): God was made man, that man might be made God.

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Similiter etiam hoc utile fuit ad remotionem mali. Primo enim per hoc homo instruitur ne sibi Diabolum praeferat, et eum veneretur, qui est auctor peccati. Unde dicit Augustinus, XIII de Trin., quando sic Deo coniungi potuit humana natura ut fieret una persona, superbi illi maligni spiritus non ideo se audeant homini praeponere quia non habent carnem. Secundo, quia per hoc instruimur quanta sit dignitas humanae naturae, ne eam inquinemus peccando. Unde dicit Augustinus, in libro de vera religione, demonstravit nobis Deus quam excelsum locum inter creaturas habeat humana natura, in hoc quod hominibus in vero homine apparuit. Et Leo Papa dicit, in sermone de nativitate, agnosce, o Christiane, dignitatem tuam, et divinae consors factus naturae, noli in veterem vilitatem degeneri conversatione redire. Tertio quia, ad praesumptionem hominis tollendam, gratia Dei, nullis meritis praecedentibus, in homine Christo nobis commendatur, ut dicitur XIII de Trinitate. Quarto, quia superbia hominis, quae maximum impedimentum est ne inhaereatur Deo per tantam Dei humilitatem redargui potest atque sanari, ut Augustinus dicit ibidem. Quinto, ad liberandum hominem a servitute. Quod quidem, ut Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., fieri debuit sic ut Diabolus iustitia hominis Iesu Christi superaretur, quod factum est Christo satisfaciente pro nobis. Homo autem purus satisfacere non poterat pro toto humano genere; Deus autem satisfacere non debebat; unde oportebat Deum et hominem esse Iesum Christum. Unde et Leo Papa dicit, in sermone de Nativ., suscipitur a virtute infirmitas, a maiestate humilitas, ut, quod nostris remediis congruebat, unus atque idem Dei et hominum mediator et mori ex uno, et resurgere posset ex altero. Nisi enim esset verus Deus, non afferret remedium, nisi esset homo verus, non praeberet exemplum. Sunt autem et aliae plurimae utilitates quae consecutae sunt, supra comprehensionem sensus humani. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit secundum primum modum necessarii, sine quo ad finem perveniri non potest. Ad secundum dicendum quod aliqua satisfactio potest dici sufficiens dupliciter. Uno modo, perfecte, quia est condigna per quandam adaequationem ad recompensationem commissae culpae. Et sic hominis puri satisfactio sufficiens esse non potuit, quia tota natura humana erat per peccatum corrupta; nec bonum alicuius personae, vel etiam plurium, poterat per aequiparantiam totius naturae detrimentum recompensare. Tum etiam quia peccatum contra Deum commissum quandam infinitatem habet ex infinitate divinae maiestatis, tanto enim offensa est gravior, quanto maior est ille in quem delinquitur. Unde oportuit, ad condignam satisfactionem, ut actio satisfacientis haberet efficaciam infinitam, ut puta Dei et hominis existens. Alio modo potest dici satisfactio sufficiens imperfecte, scilicet secundum ac-

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So also was this useful for our withdrawal from evil. First, because man is taught by it not to prefer the devil to himself, nor to honor him who is the author of sin; hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): Since human nature is so united to God as to become one person, let not these proud spirits dare to prefer themselves to man, because they have no bodies. Second, because we are thereby taught how great is man’s dignity, lest we should sully it with sin; hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xvi): God has proved to us how high a place human nature holds amongst creatures, inasmuch as He appeared to men as a true man. And Pope Leo says in a sermon on the Nativity (xxi): Learn, O Christian, thy worth; and being made a partner of the Divine nature, refuse to return by evil deeds to your former worthlessness. Third, because, in order to do away with man’s presumption, the grace of God is commended in Jesus Christ, though no merits of ours went before, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17). Fourth, because man’s pride, which is the greatest stumbling-block to our clinging to God, can be convinced and cured by humility so great, as Augustine says in the same place. Fifth, in order to free man from the thraldom of sin, which, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 13), ought to be done in such a way that the devil should be overcome by the justice of the man Jesus Christ, and this was done by Christ satisfying for us. Now a mere man could not have satisfied for the whole human race, and God was not bound to satisfy; hence it behooved Jesus Christ to be both God and man. Hence Pope Leo says in the same sermon: Weakness is assumed by strength, lowliness by majesty, mortality by eternity, in order that one and the same Mediator of God and men might die in one and rise in the other—for this was our fitting remedy. Unless He was God, He would not have brought a remedy; and unless He was man, He would not have set an example. And there are very many other advantages which accrued, above man’s apprehension. Reply Obj. 1: This reason has to do with the first kind of necessity, without which we cannot attain to the end. Reply Obj. 2: Satisfaction may be said to be sufficient in two ways—first, perfectly, inasmuch as it is condign, being adequate to make good the fault committed, and in this way the satisfaction of a mere man cannot be sufficient for sin, both because the whole of human nature has been corrupted by sin, whereas the goodness of any person or persons could not make up adequately for the harm done to the whole of the nature; and also because a sin committed against God has a kind of infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, because the greater the person we offend, the more grievous the offense. Hence for condign satisfaction it was necessary that the act of the one satisfying should have an infinite efficiency, as being of God and man. Second, man’s satisfaction may be termed sufficient, imperfectly—i.e., in the acceptation of him who is content with

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ceptationem eius qui est ea contentus, quamvis non sit condigna. Et hoc modo satisfactio puri hominis est sufficiens. Et quia omne imperfectum praesupponit aliquid perfectum, a quo sustentetur, inde est quod omnis puri hominis satisfactio efficaciam habet a satisfactione Christi. Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus, assumendo carnem, suam maiestatem non minuit, et per consequens non minuitur ratio reverentiae ad ipsum. Quae augetur per augmentum cognitionis ipsius. Ex hoc autem quod nobis appropinquare voluit per carnis assumptionem, magis nos ad se cognoscendum attraxit.

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it, even though it is not condign, and in this way the satisfaction of a mere man is sufficient. And forasmuch as every imperfect presupposes some perfect thing, by which it is sustained, hence it is that satisfaction of every mere man has its efficiency from the satisfaction of Christ. Reply Obj. 3: By taking flesh, God did not lessen His majesty; and in consequence did not lessen the reason for reverencing Him, which is increased by the increase of knowledge of Him. But, on the contrary, inasmuch as He wished to draw nigh to us by taking flesh, He greatly drew us to know Him.

Article 3 Whether, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod, si homo non peccasset, nihilominus Deus incarnatus fuisset. Manente enim causa, manet effectus. Sed sicut Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., alia multa sunt cogitanda in Christi incarnatione praeter absolutionem a peccato, de quibus dictum est. Ergo, etiam si homo non peccasset, Deus incarnatus fuisset. Praeterea, ad omnipotentiam divinae virtutis pertinet ut opera sua perficiat, et se manifestet per aliquem infinitum effectum. Sed nulla pura creatura potest dici infinitus effectus, cum sit finita per suam essentiam. In solo autem opere incarnationis videtur praecipue manifestari infinitus effectus divinae potentiae, per hoc quod in infinitum distantia coniunguntur, inquantum factum est quod homo esset Deus. In quo etiam opere maxime videtur perfici universum, per hoc quod ultima creatura, scilicet homo, primo principio coniungitur, scilicet Deo. Ergo, etiam si homo non peccasset, Deus incarnatus fuisset. Praeterea, humana natura per peccatum non est facta capacior gratiae. Sed post peccatum capax est gratiae unionis, quae est maxima gratia. Ergo, si homo non peccasset, humana natura huius gratiae capax fuisset. Nec Deus subtraxisset naturae humanae bonum cuius capax erat. Ergo, si homo non peccasset, Deus incarnatus fuisset. Praeterea, praedestinatio Dei est aeterna. Sed dicitur, Rom. I, de Christo, quod praedestinatus est filius Dei in virtute. Ergo etiam ante peccatum necessarium erat filium Dei incarnari, ad hoc quod Dei praedestinatio impleretur. Praeterea, incarnationis mysterium est primo homini revelatum, ut patet per hoc quod dixit, hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis, etc., quod apostolus dicit esse magnum sacramentum in Christo et Ecclesia, ut patet Ephes. V. Sed

Objection 1: It would seem that if man had not sinned, God would still have become incarnate. For the cause remaining, the effect also remains. But as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): Many other things are to be considered in the Incarnation of Christ besides absolution from sin; and these were discussed above (A. 2). Therefore if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate. Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to the omnipotence of the Divine power to perfect His works, and to manifest Himself by some infinite effect. But no mere creature can be called an infinite effect, since it is finite of its very essence. Now, seemingly, in the work of the Incarnation alone is an infinite effect of the Divine power manifested in a special manner by which power things infinitely distant are united, inasmuch as it has been brought about that man is God. And in this work especially the universe would seem to be perfected, inasmuch as the last creature—viz. man—is united to the first principle—viz. God. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate. Obj. 3: Further, human nature has not been made more capable of grace by sin. But after sin it is capable of the grace of union, which is the greatest grace. Therefore, if man had not sinned, human nature would have been capable of this grace; nor would God have withheld from human nature any good it was capable of. Therefore, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate. Obj. 4: Further, God’s predestination is eternal. But it is said of Christ (Rom 1:4): Who was predestined the Son of God in power. Therefore, even before sin, it was necessary that the Son of God should become incarnate, in order to fulfill God’s predestination. Obj. 5: Further, the mystery of the Incarnation was revealed to the first man, as is plain from Gen. 2:23. This now is bone of my bones, etc. which the Apostle says is a great sacrament . . . in Christ and in the Church, as is plain from

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homo non potuit esse praescius sui casus, eadem ratione qua nec Angelus, ut Augustinus probat, super Gen. ad Litt. Ergo, etiam si homo non peccasset, Deus incarnatus fuisset. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis Dom., exponens illud quod habetur Luc. XIX, venit filius hominis quaerere et salvum facere quod perierat, si homo non peccasset, filius hominis non venisset. Et I ad Tim. I, super illud verbum, Christus venit in hunc mundum ut peccatores salvos faceret, dicit Glossa, nulla causa veniendi fuit Christo domino, nisi peccatores salvos facere. Tolle morbos, tolle vulnera, et nulla medicinae est causa.

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Eph. 5:32. But man could not be fore-conscious of his fall, for the same reason that the angels could not, as Augustine proves (Gen ad lit. xi, 18). Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. viii, 2), expounding what is set down in Luke 19:10, For the Son of Man is come to seek and to save that which was lost; Therefore, if man had not sinned, the Son of Man would not have come. And on 1 Tim. 1:15, Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners, a gloss says, There was no cause of Christ’s coming into the world, except to save sinners. Take away diseases, take away wounds, and there is no need of medicine. I answer that, There are different opinions about this question. For some say that even if man had not sinned, the Son of Man would have become incarnate. Others assert the contrary, and seemingly our assent ought rather to be given to this opinion. For such things as spring from God’s will, and beyond the creature’s due, can be made known to us only through being revealed in the Sacred Scripture, in which the Divine Will is made known to us. Hence, since everywhere in the Sacred Scripture the sin of the first man is assigned as the reason of the Incarnation, it is more in accordance with this to say that the work of the Incarnation was ordained by God as a remedy for sin; so that, had sin not existed, the Incarnation would not have been. And yet the power of God is not limited to this; even had sin not existed, God could have become incarnate. Reply Obj. 1: All the other causes which are assigned in the preceding article have to do with a remedy for sin. For if man had not sinned, he would have been endowed with the light of Divine wisdom, and would have been perfected by God with the righteousness of justice in order to know and carry out everything needful. But because man, on deserting God, had stooped to corporeal things, it was necessary that God should take flesh, and by corporeal things should afford him the remedy of salvation. Hence, on John 1:14, And the Word was made flesh, St. Augustine says (Tract. ii): Flesh had blinded thee, flesh heals thee; for Christ came and overthrew the vices of the flesh. Reply Obj. 2: The infinity of Divine power is shown in the mode of production of things from nothing. Again, it suffices for the perfection of the universe that the creature be ordained in a natural manner to God as to an end. But that a creature should be united to God in person exceeds the limits of the perfection of nature. Reply Obj. 3: A double capability may be remarked in human nature: one, in respect of the order of natural power, and this is always fulfilled by God, Who apportions to each according to its natural capability; the other in respect to the order of the Divine power, which all creatures implicitly obey; and the capability we speak of pertains to this. But God does not fulfill all such capabilities, otherwise God

Respondeo dicendum quod aliqui circa hoc diversimode opinantur. Quidam enim dicunt quod, etiam si homo non peccasset, Dei filius fuisset incarnatus. Alii vero contrarium asserunt. Quorum assertioni magis assentiendum videtur. Ea enim quae ex sola Dei voluntate proveniunt, supra omne debitum creaturae, nobis innotescere non possunt nisi quatenus in sacra Scriptura traduntur, per quam divina voluntas innotescit. Unde, cum in sacra Scriptura ubique incarnationis ratio ex peccato primi hominis assignetur, convenientius dicitur incarnationis opus ordinatum esse a Deo in remedium peccati, ita quod, peccato non existente, incarnatio non fuisset. Quamvis potentia Dei ad hoc non limitetur, potuisset enim, etiam peccato non existente, Deus incarnari. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes aliae causae quae sunt assignatae, pertinent ad remedium peccati. Si enim homo non peccasset, perfusus fuisset lumine divinae sapientiae, et iustitiae rectitudine perfectus a Deo, ad omnia necessaria cognoscenda. Sed quia homo, deserto Deo, ad corporalia collapsus erat, conveniens fuit ut Deus, carne assumpta, etiam per corporalia ei salutis remedium exhiberet. Unde dicit Augustinus, super illud Ioan. I cap., verbum caro factum est, caro te obcaecaverat, caro te sanat, quoniam sic venit Christus ut de carne vitia carnis exstingueret. Ad secundum dicendum quod in ipso modo productionis rerum ex nihilo divina virtus infinita ostenditur. Ad perfectionem etiam universi sufficit quod naturali modo creatura ordinetur sic in Deum sicut in finem. Hoc autem excedit limites perfectionis naturae, ut creatura uniatur Deo in persona. Ad tertium dicendum quod duplex capacitas attendi potest in humana natura. Una quidem secundum ordinem potentiae naturalis. Quae a Deo semper impletur, qui dat unicuique rei secundum suam capacitatem naturalem. Alia vero secundum ordinem divinae potentiae, cui omnis creatura obedit ad nutum. Et ad hoc pertinet ista capacitas. Non autem Deus omnem talem

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capacitatem naturae replet, alioquin, Deus non posset facere in creatura nisi quod facit; quod falsum est, ut in primo habitum est. Nihil autem prohibet ad aliquid maius humanam naturam productam esse post peccatum, Deus enim permittit mala fieri ut inde aliquid melius eliciat. Unde dicitur Rom. V, ubi abundavit iniquitas, superabundavit et gratia. Unde et in benedictione cerei paschalis dicitur, o felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere redemptorem. Ad quartum dicendum quod praedestinatio praesupponit praescientiam futurorum. Et ideo, sicut Deus praedestinat salutem alicuius hominis per orationem aliorum implendam, ita etiam praedestinavit opus incarnationis in remedium humani peccati. Ad quintum dicendum quod nihil prohibet alicui revelari effectus cui non revelatur causa. Potuit ergo primo homini revelari incarnationis mysterium sine hoc quod esset praescius sui casus, non enim quicumque cognoscit effectum, cognoscit et causam.

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could do only what He has done in creatures, and this is false, as stated above (I, Q. 105, A. 6). But there is no reason why human nature should not have been raised to something greater after sin. For God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater good therefrom; hence it is written (Rom 5:20): Where sin abounded, grace did more abound. Hence, too, in the blessing of the Paschal candle, we say: O happy fault, that merited such and so great a Redeemer! Reply Obj. 4: Predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of future things; and hence, as God predestines the salvation of anyone to be brought about by the prayers of others, so also He predestined the work of the Incarnation to be the remedy of human sin. Reply Obj. 5: Nothing prevents an effect from being revealed to one to whom the cause is not revealed. Hence, the mystery of the Incarnation could be revealed to the first man without his being fore-conscious of his fall. For not everyone who knows the effect knows the cause.

Article 4 Whether God became incarnate in order to take away actual sin, rather than to take away original sin? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus principalius incarnatus fuerit in remedium actualium peccatorum quam in remedium originalis peccati. Quanto enim peccatum est gravius, tanto magis humanae saluti adversatur, propter quam Deus est incarnatus. Sed peccatum actuale est gravius quam originale peccatum, minima enim poena debetur originali peccato, ut Augustinus dicit, contra Iulianum. Ergo principalius incarnatio Christi ordinatur ad deletionem actualium peccatorum. Praeterea, peccato originali non debetur poena sensus, sed solum poena damni, ut in secundo habitum est. Sed Christus venit pro satisfactione peccatorum poenam sensus pati in cruce, non autem poenam damni, quia nullum defectum habuit divinae visionis aut fruitionis. Ergo principalius venit ad deletionem peccati actualis quam originalis. Praeterea, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, in II de compunctione cordis, hic est affectus servi fidelis, ut beneficia domini sui quae communiter omnibus data sunt, quasi sibi soli praestita reputet, quasi enim de se solo loquens Paulus ita scribit, ad Galat. II, dilexit me, et tradidit semetipsum pro me. Sed propria peccata nostra sunt actualia, originale enim est commune peccatum. Ergo hunc affectum debemus habere, ut aestimemus eum principaliter propter actualia peccata venisse.

Objection 1: It would seem that God became incarnate as a remedy for actual sins rather than for original sin. For the more grievous the sin, the more it runs counter to man’s salvation, for which God became incarnate. But actual sin is more grievous than original sin; for the lightest punishment is due to original sin, as Augustine says (Contra Julian. v, 11). Therefore the Incarnation of Christ is chiefly directed to taking away actual sins.

Obj. 2: Further, pain of sense is not due to original sin, but merely pain of loss, as has been shown (I-II, Q. 87, A. 5). But Christ came to suffer the pain of sense on the Cross in satisfaction for sins—and not the pain of loss, for He had no defect of either the beatific vision or fruition. Therefore He came in order to take away actual sin rather than original sin. Obj. 3: Further, as Chrysostom says (De Compunctione Cordis ii, 3): This must be the mind of the faithful servant, to account the benefits of his Lord, which have been bestowed on all alike, as though they were bestowed on himself alone. For as if speaking of himself alone, Paul writes to the Galatians 2:20: ‘Christ . . . loved me and delivered Himself for me.’ But our individual sins are actual sins; for original sin is the common sin. Therefore we ought to have this conviction, so as to believe that He has come chiefly for actual sins.

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Q. 1, A. 4

Sed contra est quod Ioan. I dicitur, ecce agnus Dei, On the contrary, It is written (John 1:29): Behold the ecce qui tollit peccata mundi. Lamb of God, behold Him Who taketh away the sins of the world. Respondeo dicendum quod certum est Christum I answer that, It is certain that Christ came into this venisse in hunc mundum non solum ad delendum il- world not only to take away that sin which is handed on lud peccatum quod traductum est originaliter in poste- originally to posterity, but also in order to take away all sins ros, sed etiam ad deletionem omnium peccatorum quae subsequently added to it; not that all are taken away (and postmodum superaddita sunt, non quod omnia delean- this is from men’s fault, inasmuch as they do not adhere tur (quod est propter defectum hominum, qui Christo to Christ, according to John 3:19: The light is come into the non inhaerent, secundum illud Ioan. III, venit lux in world, and men loved darkness rather than the light), but bemundum, et dilexerunt homines magis tenebras quam cause He offered what was sufficient for blotting out all sins. lucem), sed quia ipse exhibuit quod sufficiens fuit ad Hence it is written (Rom 5:15–16): But not as the offense, so omnem deletionem. Unde dicitur Rom. V, non sicut de- also the gift . . . For judgment indeed was by one unto conlictum, sic et donum, nam iudicium ex uno in condemna- demnation, but grace is of many offenses unto justification. tionem, gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem. Tanto autem principalius ad alicuius peccati deletioMoreover, the more grievous the sin, the more particunem Christus venit, quanto illud peccatum maius est. larly did Christ come to blot it out. But greater is said in two Dicitur autem maius aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, in- ways: in one way intensively, as a more intense whiteness is tensive, sicut est maior albedo quae est intensior. Et per said to be greater, and in this way actual sin is greater than hunc modum maius est peccatum actuale quam origina- original sin; for it has more of the nature of voluntary, as has le, quia plus habet de ratione voluntarii, ut in secundo been shown (I-II, Q. 81, A. 1). In another way a thing is said dictum est. Alio modo dicitur aliquid maius extensive, to be greater extensively, as whiteness on a greater surface is sicut dicitur maior albedo quae est in maiori superficie. said to be greater; and in this way original sin, whereby the Et hoc modo peccatum originale, per quod totum genus whole human race is infected, is greater than any actual sin, humanum inficitur, est maius quolibet peccato actuali, which is proper to one person. And in this respect Christ quod est proprium singularis personae. Et quantum ad came principally to take away original sin, inasmuch as the hoc, Christus principalius venit ad tollendum origina- good of the race is a more Divine thing than the good of an le peccatum, inquantum bonum gentis divinius est quam individual, as is said Ethic. i, 2. bonum unius, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit Reply Obj. 1: This reason looks to the intensive greatde intensiva magnitudine peccati. ness of sin. Ad secundum dicendum quod peccato originali in Reply Obj. 2: In the future award the pain of sense will futura retributione non debetur poena sensus, poenali- not be meted out to original sin. Yet the penalties, such as tates tamen quas sensibiliter in hac vita patimur, sicut fa- hunger, thirst, death, and the like, which we suffer sensibly mem, sitim, mortem et alia huiusmodi, ex peccato ori- in this life flow from original sin. And hence Christ, in orginali procedunt. Et ideo Christus, ut plene pro peccato der to satisfy fully for original sin, wished to suffer sensible originali satisfaceret, voluit sensibilem dolorem pati, ut pain, that He might consume death and the like in Himself. mortem et alia huiusmodi in seipso consummaret. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus Reply Obj. 3: Chrysostom says (De Compunctione ibidem inducit, verba illa dicebat apostolus, non quasi di- Cordis ii, 6): The Apostle used these words, not as if wishminuere volens amplissima et per orbem terrarum diffu- ing to diminish Christ’s gifts, ample as they are, and spreadsa Christi munera, sed ut pro omnibus se solum indica- ing throughout the whole world, but that he might account ret obnoxium. Quid enim interest si et aliis praestitit, cum himself alone the occasion of them. For what does it matter quae tibi sunt praestita ita integra sunt et ita perfecta qua- that they are given to others, if what are given to you are as si nulli alii ex his aliquid fuerit praestitum? Ex hoc ergo complete and perfect as if none of them were given to another quod aliquis debet sibi reputare beneficia Christi prae- than yourself? And hence, although a man ought to account stita esse, non debet existimare quod non sint praesti- Christ’s gifts as given to himself, yet he ought not to conta aliis. Et ideo non excluditur quin principalius venerit sider them not to be given to others. And thus we do not abolere peccatum totius naturae quam peccatum unius exclude that He came to wipe away the sin of the whole napersonae. Sed illud peccatum commune ita perfecte cu- ture rather than the sin of one person. But the sin of the naratum est in unoquoque ac si in eo solo esset curatum. Et ture is as perfectly healed in each one as if it were healed in praeterea, propter unionem caritatis, totum quod omni- him alone. Hence, on account of the union of charity, what bus est impensum, unusquisque debet sibi adscribere. is vouchsafed to all ought to be accounted his own by each one.

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Article 5 Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate in the beginning of the human race? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod conveniens fuisset Deum incarnari a principio humani generis. Incarnationis enim opus ex immensitate divinae caritatis processit, secundum illud Ephes. II, Deus, qui dives est in misericordia, propter nimiam caritatem suam qua dilexit nos, cum essemus mortui peccatis, convivificavit nos in Christo. Sed caritas non tardat subvenire amico necessitatem patienti, secundum illud Prov. III, ne dicas amico tuo, vade et revertere, cras dabo tibi; cum statim possis dare. Ergo Deus incarnationis opus differre non debuit, sed statim a principio per suam incarnationem humano generi subvenire. Praeterea, I Tim. I dicitur, Christus venit in hunc mundum peccatores salvos facere. Sed plures salvati fuissent si a principio humani generis Deus incarnatus fuisset, plurimi enim, ignorantes Deum, in suo peccato perierunt in diversis saeculis. Ergo convenientius fuisset quod a principio humani generis Deus incarnatus fuisset. Praeterea, opus gratiae non est minus ordinatum quam opus naturae. Sed natura initium sumit a perfectis, ut dicit Boetius, in libro de consolatione. Ergo opus gratiae debuit a principio esse perfectum. Sed in opere incarnationis consideratur perfectio gratiae, secundum illud, verbum caro factum est, et postea subditur, plenum gratiae et veritatis. Ergo Christus a principio humani generis debuit incarnari. Sed contra est quod dicitur Galat. IV, at ubi venit plenitudo temporis, misit Deus filium suum, factum ex muliere, ubi dicit Glossa quod plenitudo temporis est quod praefinitum fuit a Deo patre quando mitteret filium suum. Sed Deus sua sapientia omnia definivit. Ergo convenientissimo tempore Deus est incarnatus. Et sic non fuit conveniens quod a principio humani generis Deus incarnaretur. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum opus incarnationis principaliter ordinetur ad reparationem naturae humanae per peccati abolitionem manifestum est quod non fuit conveniens a principio humani generis, ante peccatum, Deum incarnatum fuisse, non enim datur medicina nisi iam infirmis. Unde ipse dominus dicit, Matth. IX, non est opus valentibus medicus, sed male habentibus, non enim veni vocare iustos, sed peccatores. Sed non etiam statim post peccatum conveniens fuit Deum incarnari. Primo quidem, propter conditionem humani peccati, quod ex superbia provenerat, unde eo modo erat homo liberandus ut, humiliatus, recognosceret se liberatore indigere. Unde super illud Galat. III, or-

Objection 1: It would seem that it was fitting that God should become incarnate in the beginning of the human race. For the work of the Incarnation sprang from the immensity of Divine charity, according to Eph. 2:4, 5: But God (Who is rich in mercy), for His exceeding charity wherewith He loved us . . . even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together in Christ. But charity does not tarry in bringing assistance to a friend who is suffering need, according to Prov. 3:28: Say not to thy friend: Go, and come again, and tomorrow I will give to thee, when thou canst give at present. Therefore God ought not to have put off the work of the Incarnation, but ought thereby to have brought relief to the human race from the beginning. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (1 Tim 1:15): Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners. But more would have been saved had God become incarnate at the beginning of the human race; for in the various centuries very many, through not knowing God, perished in their sin. Therefore it was fitting that God should become incarnate at the beginning of the human race. Obj. 3: Further, the work of grace is not less orderly than the work of nature. But nature takes its rise with the more perfect, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii). Therefore the work of Christ ought to have been perfect from the beginning. But in the work of the Incarnation we see the perfection of grace, according to John 1:14: The Word was made flesh; and afterwards it is added: Full of grace and truth. Therefore Christ ought to have become incarnate at the beginning of the human race. On the contrary, It is written (Gal 4:4): But when the fullness of the time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the law: upon which a gloss says that the fullness of the time is when it was decreed by God the Father to send His Son. But God decreed everything by His wisdom. Therefore God became incarnate at the most fitting time; and it was not fitting that God should become incarnate at the beginning of the human race. I answer that, Since the work of the Incarnation is principally ordained to the restoration of the human race by blotting out sin, it is manifest that it was not fitting for God to become incarnate at the beginning of the human race before sin. For medicine is given only to the sick. Hence our Lord Himself says (Matt 9:12, 13): They that are in health need not a physician, but they that are ill . . . For I am not come to call the just, but sinners. Nor was it fitting that God should become incarnate immediately after sin. First, on account of the manner of man’s sin, which had come of pride; hence man was to be liberated in such a manner that he might be humbled, and see how he stood in need of a deliverer. Hence on the words in

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dinata per Angelos in manu mediatoris, dicit Glossa, magno consilio factum est ut, post hominis casum, non illico Dei filius mitteretur. Reliquit enim Deus prius hominem in libertate arbitrii, in lege naturali, ut sic vires naturae suae cognosceret. Ubi cum deficeret, legem accepit. Qua data, invaluit morbus, non legis, sed naturae vitio, ut ita, cognita sua infirmitate, clamaret ad medicum, et gratiae quaereret auxilium. Secundo, propter ordinem promotionis in bonum, secundum quem ab imperfecto ad perfectum proceditur. Unde apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XV, non prius quod spirituale est, sed quod animale, deinde quod spirituale. Primus homo de terra, terrenus, secundus homo de caelo, caelestis. Tertio, propter dignitatem ipsius verbi incarnati. Quia super illud Galat. IV, ubi venit plenitudo temporis, dicit Glossa, quanto maior iudex veniebat, tanto praeconum series longior praecedere debebat. Quarto, ne fervor fidei temporis prolixitate tepesceret. Quia circa finem mundi refrigescet caritas multorum, et Luc. XVIII dicitur, cum filius hominis veniet, putasne inveniet fidem super terram? Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caritas non differt amico subvenire, salva tamen negotiorum opportunitate et personarum conditione. Si enim medicus statim a principio aegritudinis medicinam daret infirmo, minus proficeret, vel magis laederet quam iuvaret. Et ideo etiam dominus non statim incarnationis remedium humano generi exhibuit, ne illud contemneret ex superbia, si prius suam infirmitatem non cognosceret. Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus ad hoc respondet, in libro de sex quaestionibus Paganorum, dicens, qu. II, quod tunc voluit Christus hominibus apparere, et apud eos praedicari suam doctrinam, quando et ubi sciebat esse qui in eum fuerant credituri. His enim temporibus, et his in locis, tales homines in eius praedicatione futuros esse sciebat quales, non quidem omnes, sed tamen multi in eius corporali praesentia fuerunt, qui nec in eum, suscitatis mortuis, credere voluerunt. Sed hanc responsionem reprobans idem Augustinus dicit, in libro de perseverantia, nunquid possumus dicere Tyrios aut Sidonios, talibus apud se virtutibus factis, credere noluisse, aut credituros non fuisse si fierent, cum ipse dominus eis attestetur quod acturi essent magnae humilitatis poenitentiam, si in eis facta essent divinarum illa signa virtutum? Proinde, ut ipse solvens subdit, sicut apostolus ait, non est volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis Dei, qui his quos praevidit, si apud eos facta essent, suis miraculis credituros, quibus voluit subvenit, aliis autem non subvenit, de quibus in sua praedestinatione, occulte quidem sed iuste, aliud iudicavit.

Q. 1, A. 5

Gal. 3:19, Being ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator, a gloss says: With great wisdom was it so ordered that the Son of Man should not be sent immediately after man’s fall. For first of all God left man under the natural law, with the freedom of his will, in order that he might know his natural strength; and when he failed in it, he received the law; whereupon, by the fault, not of the law, but of his nature, the disease gained strength; so that having recognized his infirmity he might cry out for a physician, and beseech the aid of grace. Second, on account of the order of furtherance in good, whereby we proceed from imperfection to perfection. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor 15:46, 47): Yet that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; afterwards that which is spiritual . . . The first man was of the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly. Third, on account of the dignity of the incarnate Word, for on the words (Gal 4:4), But when the fullness of the time was come, a gloss says: The greater the judge who was coming, the more numerous was the band of heralds who ought to have preceded him. Fourth, lest the fervor of faith should cool by the length of time, for the charity of many will grow cold at the end of the world. Hence (Luke 18:8) it is written: But yet the Son of Man, when He cometh, shall He find think you, faith on earth? Reply Obj. 1: Charity does not put off bringing assistance to a friend: always bearing in mind the circumstances as well as the state of the persons. For if the physician were to give the medicine at the very outset of the ailment, it would do less good, and would hurt rather than benefit. And hence the Lord did not bestow upon the human race the remedy of the Incarnation in the beginning, lest they should despise it through pride, if they did not already recognize their disease. Reply Obj. 2: Augustine replies to this (De Sex Quest. Pagan., Ep. cii), saying (Q. 2) that Christ wished to appear to man and to have His doctrine preached to them when and where He knew those were who would believe in Him. But in such times and places as His Gospel was not preached He foresaw that not all, indeed, but many would so bear themselves towards His preaching as not to believe in His corporeal presence, even were He to raise the dead. But the same Augustine, taking exception to this reply in his book (De Perseverantia ix), says: How can we say the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon would not believe when such great wonders were wrought in their midst, or would not have believed had they been wrought, when God Himself bears witness that they would have done penance with great humility if these signs of Divine power had been wrought in their midst? And he adds in answer (De Perseverantia xi): Hence, as the Apostle says (Rom 9:16), ‘it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy’; Who (succors whom He will of) those who, as He foresaw, would believe in His miracles if wrought amongst them, (while others) He suc-

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Ita misericordiam eius in his qui liberantur, et veritatem in cors not, having judged them in His predestination secretly his qui puniuntur sine dubitatione credamus. yet justly. Therefore let us unshrinkingly believe His mercy to be with those who are set free, and His truth with those who are condemned. Ad tertium dicendum quod perfectum est prius Reply Obj. 3: Perfection is prior to imperfection, both imperfecto, in diversis quidem, tempore et natura, opor- in time and nature, in things that are different (for what tet enim quod perfectum sit quod alia ad perfectionem brings others to perfection must itself be perfect); but in adducit, sed in uno et eodem imperfectum est prius one and the same, imperfection is prior in time though postempore, etsi sit posterius natura. Sic ergo imperfectio- terior in nature. And thus the eternal perfection of God prenem naturae humanae duratione praecedit aeterna Dei cedes in duration the imperfection of human nature; but perfectio, sed sequitur ipsam consummata perfectio in the latter’s ultimate perfection in union with God follows. unione ad Deum.

Article 6 Whether the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod incarnationis opus differri debuerit usque in finem mundi. Dicitur enim in Psalmo, senectus mea in misericordia uberi, idest, in novissimo, ut Glossa dicit. Sed tempus incarnationis est maxime tempus misericordiae, secundum illud Psalmi, quoniam venit tempus miserendi eius. Ergo incarnatio debuit differri usque in finem mundi. Praeterea, sicut dictum est, perfectum, in eodem, tempore est posterius imperfecto. Ergo id quod est maxime perfectum, debet esse ultimo in tempore. Sed summa perfectio humanae naturae est in unione ad verbum, quia in Christo complacuit omnem plenitudinem divinitatis inhabitare, ut apostolus dicit, Coloss. I. Ergo incarnatio debuit differri usque in finem mundi. Praeterea, non est conveniens fieri per duo quod per unum fieri potest. Sed unus Christi adventus sufficere poterat ad salutem humanae naturae, qui erit in fine mundi. Ergo non oportuit quod antea veniret per incarnationem. Et ita incarnatio differri debuit usque in finem mundi. Sed contra est quod dicitur Habacuc III, in medio annorum notum facies. Non ergo debuit incarnationis mysterium, per quod mundo innotuit, usque in finem mundi differri. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut non fuit conveniens Deum incarnari a principio mundi, ita non fuit conveniens quod incarnatio differretur usque in finem mundi. Quod quidem apparet, primo, ex unione divinae et humanae naturae. Sicut enim dictum est, perfectum uno modo tempore praecedit imperfectum, in eo enim quod de imperfecto fit perfectum, imperfectum tempore praecedit perfectum; in eo vero quod est perfectionis causa efficiens, perfectum tempore praecedit imperfectum. In opere autem incarnationis utrumque concurrit.

Objection 1: It would seem that the work of the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world. For it is written (Ps 91:11): My old age in plentiful mercy—i.e., in the last days, as a gloss says. But the time of the Incarnation is especially the time of mercy, according to Ps. 101:14: For it is time to have mercy on it. Therefore the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world. Obj. 2: Further, as has been said (A. 5, ad 3), in the same subject, perfection is subsequent in time to imperfection. Therefore, what is most perfect ought to be the very last in time. But the highest perfection of human nature is in the union with the Word, because in Christ it hath pleased the Father that all the fullness of the Godhead should dwell, as the Apostle says (Col 1:19, and 2:9). Therefore the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world. Obj. 3: Further, what can be done by one ought not to be done by two. But the one coming of Christ at the end of the world was sufficient for the salvation of human nature. Therefore it was not necessary for Him to come beforehand in His Incarnation; and hence the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world. On the contrary, It is written (Hab. 3:2): In the midst of the years Thou shalt make it known. Therefore the mystery of the Incarnation which was made known to the world ought not to have been put off till the end of the world. I answer that, As it was not fitting that God should become incarnate at the beginning of the world, so also it was not fitting that the Incarnation should be put off till the end of the world. And this is shown first from the union of the Divine and human nature. For, as it has been said (A. 5, ad 3), perfection precedes imperfection in time in one way, and contrariwise in another way imperfection precedes perfection. For in that which is made perfect from being imperfect, imperfection precedes perfection in time, whereas in that which is the efficient cause of perfection,

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Quia natura humana in ipsa incarnatione est perducta ad summam perfectionem, et ideo non decuit quod a principio humani generis incarnatio facta fuisset. Sed ipsum verbum incarnatum est perfectionis humanae causa efficiens, secundum illud Ioan. I, de plenitudine eius omnes accepimus, et ideo non debuit incarnationis opus usque in finem mundi differri. Sed perfectio gloriae, ad quam perducenda est ultimo natura humana per verbum incarnatum, erit in fine mundi.

Secundo, ex effectu humanae salutis. Ut enim dicitur in libro de quaest. Nov. et Vet. Test., in potestate dantis est quando vel quantum velit misereri. Venit ergo quando et subveniri debere scivit, et gratum futurum beneficium. Cum enim languore quodam humani generis obsolescere coepisset cognitio Dei inter homines et mores immutarentur, eligere dignatus est Abraham, in quo forma esset renovatae notitiae Dei et morum. Et cum adhuc reverentia segnior esset, postea per Moysen legem litteris dedit. Et quia eam gentes spreverunt non se subiicientes ei, neque hi qui acceperunt servaverunt, motus misericordia dominus misit filium suum, qui, data omnibus remissione peccatorum, Deo patri illos iustificatos offerret. Si autem hoc remedium differretur usque in finem mundi, totaliter Dei notitia et reverentia et morum honestas abolita fuisset in terris. Tertio apparet quod hoc non fuisset conveniens ad manifestationem divinae virtutis, quae pluribus modis homines salvavit, non solum per fidem futuri, sed etiam per fidem praesentis et praeteriti. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Glossa illa exponit de misericordia perducente ad gloriam. Si tamen referatur ad misericordiam exhibitam humano generi per incarnationem Christi, sciendum est quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro Retractationum, tempus incarnationis potest comparari iuventuti humani generis, propter vigorem fervoremque fidei, quae per dilectionem operatur, senectuti autem, quae est sexta aetas, propter numerum temporum, quia Christus venit in sexta aetate. Et quamvis in corpore non possit esse simul iuventus et senectus, potest tamen simul esse in anima, illa propter alacritatem, ista propter gravitatem. Et ideo in libro octogintatrium quaest., alicubi dixit Augustinus quod non oportuit divinitus venire magistrum, cuius imitatione humanum genus in mores optimos formaretur, nisi tempore iuventutis alibi autem dixit Christum in sexta aetate humani generis, tanquam in senectute, venisse. Ad secundum dicendum quod opus incarnationis non solum est considerandum ut terminus motus de imperfecto ad perfectum, sed ut principium perfectionis in humana natura, ut dictum est.

Q. 1, A. 6

perfection precedes imperfection in time. Now in the work of the Incarnation both concur; for by the Incarnation human nature is raised to its highest perfection; and in this way it was not becoming that the Incarnation should take place at the beginning of the human race. And the Word incarnate is the efficient cause of the perfection of human nature, according to John 1:16: Of His fullness we have all received; and hence the work of the Incarnation ought not to have been put off till the end of the world. But the perfection of glory to which human nature is to be finally raised by the Word Incarnate will be at the end of the world. Second, from the effect of man’s salvation; for, as is said Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 83, it is in the power of the Giver to have pity when, or as much as, He wills. Hence He came when He knew it was fitting to succor, and when His boons would be welcome. For when by the feebleness of the human race men’s knowledge of God began to grow dim and their morals lax, He was pleased to choose Abraham as a standard of the restored knowledge of God and of holy living; and later on when reverence grew weaker, He gave the law to Moses in writing; and because the gentiles despised it and would not take it upon themselves, and they who received it would not keep it, being touched with pity, God sent His Son, to grant to all remission of their sin and to offer them, justified, to God the Father. But if this remedy had been put off till the end of the world, all knowledge and reverence of God and all uprightness of morals would have been swept away from the earth. Third, this appears fitting to the manifestation of the Divine power, which has saved men in several ways—not only by faith in some future thing, but also by faith in something present and past. Reply Obj. 1: This gloss has in view the mercy of God, which leads us to glory. Nevertheless, if it is referred to the mercy shown the human race by the Incarnation of Christ, we must reflect that, as Augustine says (Retract. i), the time of the Incarnation may be compared to the youth of the human race, on account of the strength and fervor of faith, which works by charity; and to old age—i.e., the sixth age— on account of the number of centuries, for Christ came in the sixth age. And although youth and old age cannot be together in a body, yet they can be together in a soul, the former on account of quickness, the latter on account of gravity. And hence Augustine says elsewhere (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 44) that it was not becoming that the Master by Whose imitation the human race was to be formed to the highest virtue should come from heaven, save in the time of youth. But in another work (De Gen. cont. Manich. i, 23) he says: that Christ came in the sixth age—i.e., in the old age—of the human race. Reply Obj. 2: The work of the Incarnation is to be viewed not as merely the terminus of a movement from imperfection to perfection, but also as a principle of perfection to human nature, as has been said.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super illud Ioan., non misit Deus filium suum in mundum ut iudicet mundum, duo sunt Christi adventus, primus quidem, ut remittat peccata; secundus, ut iudicet. Si enim hoc non fecisset, universi simul perditi essent, omnes enim peccaverunt, et egent gloria Dei. Unde patet quod non debuit adventum misericordiae differre usque in finem mundi.

IIIae

Reply Obj. 3: As Chrysostom says on John 3:11, For God sent not His Son into the world to judge the world (Hom. xxviii): There are two comings of Christ: the first, for the remission of sins; the second, to judge the world. For if He had not done so, all would have perished together, since all have sinned and need the glory of God. Hence it is plain that He ought not to have put off the coming in mercy till the end of the world.

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Question 2 The Mode of Union of the Word Incarnate Deinde considerandum est de modo unionis verbi Now we must consider the mode of union of the Incarincarnati. Et primo quantum ad ipsam unionem; secun- nate Word; and, first, the union itself; second, the Person do, quantum ad personam assumentem; tertio, quantum assuming; third, the nature assumed. ad naturam assumptam. Circa primum quaeruntur duodecim. Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: Primo, utrum unio verbi incarnati sit facta in (1) Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took natura. place in the nature? Secundo, utrum sit facta in persona. (2) Whether it took place in the Person? Tertio, utrum sit facta in supposito vel hypostasi. (3) Whether it took place in the suppositum or hypostasis? Quarto, utrum persona vel hypostasis Christi post (4) Whether the Person or hypostasis of Christ is incarnationem sit composita. composite after the Incarnation? Quinto, utrum sit facta aliqua unio animae et (5) Whether any union of body and soul took place in corporis in Christo. Christ? Sexto, utrum natura humana fuerit unita verbo (6) Whether the human nature was united to the Word accidentaliter. accidentally? Septimo, utrum ipsa unio sit aliquid creatum. (7) Whether the union itself is something created? Octavo, utrum sit idem quod assumptio. (8) Whether it is the same as assumption? Nono, utrum sit maxima unionum. (9) Whether the union of the two natures is the greatest union? Decimo, utrum unio duarum naturarum in Christo (10) Whether the union of the two natures in Christ fuerit facta per gratiam. was brought about by grace? Undecimo, utrum eam aliqua merita praecesserint. (11) Whether any merits preceded it? Duodecimo, utrum aliqua gratia fuerit homini (12) Whether the grace of union was natural to the Christo naturalis. man Christ?

Article 1 Whether the union of the Incarnate Word took place in the nature? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio verbi incarnati sit facta in una natura. Dicit enim Cyrillus, et inducitur in gestis Concilii Chalcedonensis, non oportet intelligere duas naturas, sed unam naturam Dei verbi incarnatam. Quod quidem non fieret nisi unio esset in natura. Ergo unio verbi incarnati facta est in natura. Praeterea, Athanasius dicit, sicut anima rationalis et caro conveniunt in constitutione humanae naturae, sic Deus et homo conveniunt in constitutione alicuius unius naturae. Ergo facta est unio in natura. Praeterea, duarum naturarum una non denominatur ex altera nisi aliquo modo in invicem transmutentur. Sed divina natura et humana in Christo ab invicem denominantur, dicit enim Cyrillus divinam naturam esse incarnatam; et Gregorius Nazianzenus dicit naturam

Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature. For Cyril says (he is quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part ii, act. 1): We must understand not two natures, but one incarnate nature of the Word of God; and this could not be unless the union took place in the nature. Therefore the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature. Obj. 2: Further, Athanasius says that, as the rational soul and the flesh together form the human nature, so God and man together form a certain one nature; therefore the union took place in the nature. Obj. 3: Further, of two natures one is not denominated by the other unless they are to some extent mutually transmuted. But the Divine and human natures in Christ are denominated one by the other; for Cyril says (quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part ii, act. 1) that the Di-

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humanam esse deificatam; ut patet per Damascenum. vine nature is incarnate; and Gregory Nazianzen says (Ep. Ergo ex duabus naturis videtur esse facta una natura. i ad Cledon.) that the human nature is deified, as appears from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 6, 11). Therefore from two natures one seems to have resulted. Sed contra est quod dicitur in determinatione On the contrary, It is said in the declaration of the Concilii Chalcedonensis, confitemur in novissimis diebus Council of Chalcedon: We confess that in these latter times filium Dei unigenitum inconfuse, immutabiliter, indivise, the only-begotten Son of God appeared in two natures, withinseparabiliter agnoscendum, nusquam sublata differen- out confusion, without change, without division, without septia naturarum propter unionem. Ergo unio non est facta aration—the distinction of natures not having been taken in natura. away by the union. Therefore the union did not take place in the nature. Respondeo dicendum quod ad huius quaestionis I answer that, To make this question clear we must evidentiam, oportet considerare quid sit natura. Scien- consider what is nature. Now it is to be observed that the dum est igitur quod nomen naturae a nascendo est word nature comes from nativity. Hence this word was used dictum vel sumptum. Unde primo est impositum hoc first of all to signify the begetting of living beings, which nomen ad significandum generationem viventium, quae is called birth or sprouting forth, the word natura meannativitas vel pullulatio dicitur, ut dicatur natura qua- ing, as it were, nascitura. Afterwards this word nature was si nascitura. Deinde translatum est nomen naturae ad taken to signify the principle of this begetting; and because significandum principium huius generationis. Et quia in living things the principle of generation is an intrinsic principium generationis in rebus viventibus est intrin- principle, this word nature was further employed to signify secum, ulterius derivatum est nomen naturae ad si- any intrinsic principle of motion: thus the Philosopher says gnificandum quodlibet principium intrinsecum motus, (Phys. ii) that nature is the principle of motion in that in secundum quod philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod which it is essentially and not accidentally. Now this princinatura est principium motus in eo in quo est per se et non ple is either form or matter. Hence sometimes form is called secundum accidens. Hoc autem principium vel forma nature, and sometimes matter. And because the end of natest, vel materia. Unde quandoque natura dicitur forma, ural generation, in that which is generated, is the essence quandoque vero materia. Et quia finis generationis na- of the species, which the definition signifies, this essence of turalis est, in eo quod generatur, essentia speciei, quam the species is called the nature. And thus Boethius defines significat definitio, inde est quod huiusmodi essentia spe- nature (De Duab. Nat.): Nature is what informs a thing with ciei vocatur etiam natura. Et hoc modo Boetius naturam its specific difference,—i.e., which perfects the specific defidefinit, in libro de duabus naturis, dicens, natura est nition. But we are now speaking of nature as it signifies the unamquamque rem informans specifica differentia, quae essence, or the what-it-is, or the quiddity of the species. scilicet complet definitionem speciei. Sic ergo nunc loquimur de natura, secundum quod Now, if we take nature in this way, it is impossible that natura significat essentiam, vel quod quid est, sive quid- the union of the Incarnate Word took place in the nature. ditatem speciei. Hoc autem modo accipiendo naturam, For one thing is made of two or more in three ways. First, impossibile est unionem verbi incarnati esse factam in from two complete things which remain in their perfecnatura. Tripliciter enim aliquid unum ex duobus vel plu- tion. This can only happen to those whose form is comribus constituitur. Uno modo, ex duobus perfectis inte- position, order, or figure, as a heap is made up of many gris remanentibus. Quod quidem fieri non potest nisi in stones brought together without any order, but solely with his quorum forma est compositio, vel ordo, vel figura, juxtaposition; and a house is made of stones and beams arsicut ex multis lapidibus absque aliquo ordine adunatis ranged in order, and fashioned to a figure. And in this way per solam compositionem fit acervus; ex lapidibus au- some said the union was by manner of confusion (which tem et lignis secundum aliquem ordinem dispositis, et is without order) or by manner of commensuration (which etiam ad aliquam figuram redactis, fit domus. Et secun- is with order). But this cannot be. First, because neither dum hoc, posuerunt aliqui unionem esse per modum composition nor order nor figure is a substantial form, but confusionis, quae scilicet est sine ordine; vel commen- accidental; and hence it would follow that the union of surationis, quae est cum ordine. Sed hoc non potest es- the Incarnation was not essential, but accidental, which se. Primo quidem, quia compositio, ordo vel figura non will be disproved later on (A. 6). Second, because thereby est forma substantialis, sed accidentalis. Et sic sequeretur we should not have an absolute unity, but relative only, quod unio incarnationis non esset per se, sed per acci- for there remain several things actually. Third, because the dens, quod infra improbabitur. Secundo, quia ex huius- form of such is not a nature, but an art, as the form of

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modi non fit unum simpliciter, sed secundum quid, remanent enim plura actu. Tertio, quia forma talium non est natura, sed magis ars, sicut forma domus. Et sic non constitueretur una natura in Christo, ut ipsi volunt. Alio modo fit aliquid ex perfectis, sed transmutatis, sicut ex elementis fit mixtum. Et sic aliqui dixerunt unionem incarnationis esse factam per modum complexionis. Sed hoc non potest esse. Primo quidem, quia natura divina est omnino immutabilis, ut in prima parte dictum est. Unde nec ipsa potest converti in aliud, cum sit incorruptibilis, nec aliud in ipsam, cum ipsa sit ingenerabilis. Secundo, quia id quod est commixtum, nulli miscibilium est idem specie, differt enim caro a quolibet elementorum specie. Et sic Christus nec esset eiusdem naturae cum patre, nec cum matre. Tertio, quia ex his quae plurimum distant non potest fieri commixtio, solvitur enim species unius eorum, puta si quis guttam aquae amphorae vini apponat. Et secundum hoc, cum natura divina in infinitum excedat humanam, non potest esse mixtio, sed remanebit sola natura divina.

Tertio modo fit aliquid ex aliquibus non permutatis, sed imperfectis, sicut ex anima et corpore fit homo; et similiter ex diversis membris. Sed hoc dici non potest de incarnationis mysterio. Primo quidem, quia utraque natura est secundum suam rationem perfecta, divina scilicet et humana. Secundo, quia divina et humana natura non possunt constituere aliquid per modum partium quantitativarum, sicut membra constituunt corpus, quia natura divina est incorporea. Neque per modum formae et materiae, quia divina natura non potest esse forma alicuius, praesertim corporei. Sequeretur etiam quod species resultans esset communicabilis pluribus, et ita essent plures Christi. Tertio, quia Christus neque esset humanae naturae, neque divinae, differentia enim addita variat speciem, sicut unitas in numeris, sicut dicitur in VIII Metaphys. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa auctoritas Cyrilli exponitur in quinta synodo sic, si quis, unam naturam Dei verbi incarnatam dicens, non sic accipit sicut patres docuerunt, quia ex divina natura et humana unione secundum subsistentiam facta, sed ex talibus vocibus naturam unam sive substantiam divinitatis et carnis Christi introducere conatur, talis anathema sit. Non ergo sensus est quod in incarnatione ex duabus naturis sit una natura constituta, sed quia una natura Dei verbi carnem univit in persona. Ad secundum dicendum quod ex anima et corpore constituitur in unoquoque nostrum duplex unitas, naturae, et personae. Naturae quidem, secundum quod anima unitur corpori, formaliter perficiens ipsum, ut ex

Q. 2, A. 1

a house; and thus one nature would not be constituted in Christ, as they wish.

Second, one thing is made up of several things, perfect but changed, as a mixture is made up of its elements; and in this way some have said that the union of the Incarnation was brought about by manner of combination. But this cannot be. First, because the Divine Nature is altogether immutable, as has been said (I, Q. 9, AA. 1, 2), hence neither can it be changed into something else, since it is incorruptible; nor can anything else be changed into it, for it cannot be generated. Second, because what is mixed is of the same species with none of the elements; for flesh differs in species from any of its elements. And thus Christ would be of the same nature neither with His Father nor with His Mother. Third, because there can be no mingling of things widely apart; for the species of one of them is absorbed, e.g., if we were to put a drop of water in a flagon of wine. And hence, since the Divine Nature infinitely exceeds the human nature, there could be no mixture, but the Divine Nature alone would remain. Third, a thing is made up of things not mixed nor changed, but imperfect; as man is made up of soul and body, and likewise of diverse members. But this cannot be said of the mystery of the Incarnation. First, because each nature, i.e., the Divine and the human, has its specific perfection. Second, because the Divine and human natures cannot constitute anything after the manner of quantitative parts, as the members make up the body; for the Divine Nature is incorporeal; nor after the manner of form and matter, for the Divine Nature cannot be the form of anything, especially of anything corporeal, since it would follow that the species resulting therefrom would be communicable to several, and thus there would be several Christs. Third, because Christ would exist neither in human nature nor in the Divine Nature: since any added difference varies the species, as unity varies number, as is said (Metaph. viii, text. 10). Reply Obj. 1: This authority of Cyril is expounded in the Fifth Synod (i.e., Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 8) thus: If anyone proclaiming one nature of the Word of God to be incarnate does not receive it as the Fathers taught, viz. that from the Divine and human natures (a union in subsistence having taken place) one Christ results, but endeavors from these words to introduce one nature or substance of the Divinity and flesh of Christ, let such a one be anathema. Hence the sense is not that from two natures one results; but that the Nature of the Word of God united flesh to Itself in Person. Reply Obj. 2: From the soul and body a double unity, viz. of nature and person—results in each individual—of nature inasmuch as the soul is united to the body, and formally perfects it, so that one nature springs from the two as

19

Q. 2, A. 2

Incarnation

duabus fiat una natura, sicut ex actu et potentia, vel materia et forma. Et quantum ad hoc non attenditur similitudo, quia natura divina non potest esse corporis forma, ut in primo probatum est. Unitas vero personae constituitur ex eis inquantum est unus aliquis subsistens in carne et anima. Et quantum ad hoc attenditur similitudo, unus enim Christus subsistit in divina natura et humana. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Damascenus dicit, natura divina dicitur incarnata, quia est unita carni personaliter non quod sit in naturam carnis conversa. Similiter etiam caro dicitur deificata, ut ipse dicit, non per conversionem, sed per unionem ad verbum, salvis suis proprietatibus, ut intelligatur caro deificata quia facta est Dei verbi caro, non quia facta sit Deus.

IIIae

from act and potentiality or from matter and form. But the comparison is not in this sense, for the Divine Nature cannot be the form of a body, as was proved (I, Q. 3, A. 8). Unity of person results from them, however, inasmuch as there is an individual subsisting in flesh and soul; and herein lies the likeness, for the one Christ subsists in the Divine and human natures. Reply Obj. 3: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6, 11), the Divine Nature is said to be incarnate because It is united to flesh personally, and not that It is changed into flesh. So likewise the flesh is said to be deified, as he also says (De Fide Orth. 15, 17), not by change, but by union with the Word, its natural properties still remaining, and hence it may be considered as deified, inasmuch as it becomes the flesh of the Word of God, but not that it becomes God.

Article 2 Whether the union of the Incarnate Word took place in the person? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio verbi incarnati non sit facta in persona. Persona enim Dei non est aliud a natura ipsius, ut habitum est in primo. Si ergo unio non est in natura, sequitur quod non sit facta in persona. Praeterea, natura humana non est minoris dignitatis in Christo quam in nobis. Personalitas autem ad dignitatem pertinet, ut in primo habitum est. Cum ergo natura humana in nobis propriam personalitatem habeat, multo magis habuit propriam personalitatem in Christo. Praeterea, sicut Boetius dicit, in libro de duabus naturis, persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia. Sed verbum Dei assumpsit naturam humanam individuam, natura enim universalis non sistit secundum se, sed in nuda contemplatione consideratur, ut Damascenus dicit. Ergo humana natura habet suam personalitatem. Non ergo videtur quod sit facta unio in persona. Sed contra est quod in Chalcedonensi synodo legitur, non in duas personas partitum aut divisum, sed unum et eundem filium unigenitum dominum nostrum Iesum Christum confitemur. Ergo facta est unio verbi in persona. Respondeo dicendum quod persona aliud significat quam natura. Natura enim significat essentiam speciei, quam significat definitio. Et si quidem his quae ad rationem speciei pertinent nihil aliud adiunctum inveniri posset, nulla necessitas esset distinguendi naturam a supposito naturae, quod est individuum subsistens in natura illa, quia unumquodque individuum subsistens in natura aliqua esset omnino idem cum sua natura.

Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnate Word did not take place in the person. For the Person of God is not distinct from His Nature, as we said (I, Q. 39, A. 1). If, therefore, the union did not take place in the nature, it follows that it did not take place in the person. Obj. 2: Further, Christ’s human nature has no less dignity than ours. But personality belongs to dignity, as was stated above (I, Q. 29, A. 3, ad 2). Hence, since our human nature has its proper personality, much more reason was there that Christ’s should have its proper personality. Obj. 3: Further, as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), a person is an individual substance of rational nature. But the Word of God assumed an individual human nature, for universal human nature does not exist of itself, but is the object of pure thought, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11). Therefore the human nature of Christ has its personality. Hence it does not seem that the union took place in the person. On the contrary, We read in the Synod of Chalcedon (Part ii, act. 5): We confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is not parted or divided into two persons, but is one and the same Only-Begotten Son and Word of God. Therefore the union took place in the person. I answer that, Person has a different meaning from nature. For nature, as has been said (A. 1), designates the specific essence which is signified by the definition. And if nothing was found to be added to what belongs to the notion of the species, there would be no need to distinguish the nature from the suppositum of the nature (which is the individual subsisting in this nature), because every individual subsisting in a nature would be altogether one with its

20

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Mode of Union of the Word Incarnate

Contingit autem in quibusdam rebus subsistentibus inveniri aliquid quod non pertinet ad rationem speciei, scilicet accidentia et principia individuantia, sicut maxime apparet in his quae sunt ex materia et forma composita. Et ideo in talibus etiam secundum rem differt natura et suppositum, non quasi omnino aliqua separata, sed quia in supposito includitur ipsa natura speciei, et superadduntur quaedam alia quae sunt praeter rationem speciei. Unde suppositum significatur ut totum, habens naturam sicut partem formalem et perfectivam sui. Et propter hoc in compositis ex materia et forma natura non praedicatur de supposito, non enim dicimus quod hic homo sit sua humanitas. Si qua vero res est in qua omnino nihil est aliud praeter rationem speciei vel naturae suae, sicut est in Deo, ibi non est aliud secundum rem suppositum et natura, sed solum secundum rationem intelligendi, quia natura dicitur secundum quod est essentia quaedam; eadem vero dicitur suppositum secundum quod est subsistens. Et quod est dictum de supposito, intelligendum est de persona in creatura rationali vel intellectuali, quia nihil aliud est persona quam rationalis naturae individua substantia, secundum Boetium. Omne igitur quod inest alicui personae, sive pertineat ad naturam eius sive non, unitur ei in persona. Si ergo humana natura verbo Dei non unitur in persona, nullo modo ei unitur. Et sic totaliter tollitur incarnationis fides, quod est subruere totam fidem Christianam. Quia igitur verbum habet naturam humanam sibi unitam, non autem ad suam naturam divinam pertinentem consequens est quod unio sit facta in persona verbi, non autem in natura. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet in Deo non sit aliud secundum rem natura et persona, differt tamen secundum modum significandi, sicut dictum est, quia persona significat per modum subsistentis. Et quia natura humana sic unitur verbo ut verbum in ea subsistat, non autem ut aliquid addatur ei ad rationem suae naturae, vel ut eius natura in aliquid transmutetur, ideo unio facta est in persona, non in natura. Ad secundum dicendum quod personalitas necessario intantum pertinet ad dignitatem alicuius rei et perfectionem, inquantum ad dignitatem et perfectionem eius pertinet quod per se existat, quod in nomine personae intelligitur. Dignius autem est alicui quod existat in aliquo se digniori, quam quod existat per se. Et ideo ex hoc ipso humana natura dignior est in Christo quam in nobis, quia in nobis, quasi per se existens, propriam personalitatem habet in Christo autem existit in persona verbi. Sicut etiam esse completivum speciei pertinet ad dignitatem formae, tamen sensitivum nobilius est in homine, propter coniunctionem ad nobiliorem formam completivam, quam sit in bruto animali, in quo est forma completiva.

Q. 2, A. 2

nature. Now in certain subsisting things we happen to find what does not belong to the notion of the species, viz. accidents and individuating principles, which appears chiefly in such as are composed of matter and form. Hence in such as these the nature and the suppositum really differ; not indeed as if they were wholly separate, but because the suppositum includes the nature, and in addition certain other things outside the notion of the species. Hence the suppositum is taken to be a whole which has the nature as its formal part to perfect it; and consequently in such as are composed of matter and form the nature is not predicated of the suppositum, for we do not say that this man is his manhood. But if there is a thing in which there is nothing outside the species or its nature (as in God), the suppositum and the nature are not really distinct in it, but only in our way of thinking, inasmuch it is called nature as it is an essence, and a suppositum as it is subsisting. And what is said of a suppositum is to be applied to a person in rational or intellectual creatures; for a person is nothing else than an individual substance of rational nature, according to Boethius. Therefore, whatever adheres to a person is united to it in person, whether it belongs to its nature or not. Hence, if the human nature is not united to God the Word in person, it is nowise united to Him; and thus belief in the Incarnation is altogether done away with, and Christian faith wholly overturned. Therefore, inasmuch as the Word has a human nature united to Him, which does not belong to His Divine Nature, it follows that the union took place in the Person of the Word, and not in the nature.

Reply Obj. 1: Although in God Nature and Person are not really distinct, yet they have distinct meanings, as was said above, inasmuch as person signifies after the manner of something subsisting. And because human nature is united to the Word, so that the Word subsists in it, and not so that His Nature receives therefrom any addition or change, it follows that the union of human nature to the Word of God took place in the person, and not in the nature. Reply Obj. 2: Personality pertains of necessity to the dignity of a thing, and to its perfection so far as it pertains to the dignity and perfection of that thing to exist by itself (which is understood by the word person). Now it is a greater dignity to exist in something nobler than oneself than to exist by oneself. Hence the human nature of Christ has a greater dignity than ours, from this very fact that in us, being existent by itself, it has its own personality, but in Christ it exists in the Person of the Word. For to perfect the species belongs to the dignity of a form, yet the sensitive part in man, on account of its union with the nobler form which perfects the species, is more noble than in brutes, where it is itself the form which perfects.

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Q. 2, A. 3

Incarnation

Ad tertium dicendum quod Dei verbum non assumpsit naturam humanam in universali, sed in atomo, idest in individuo, sicut Damascenus dicit, alioquin oporteret quod cuilibet homini conveniret esse Dei verbum, sicut convenit Christo. Sciendum est tamen quod non quodlibet individuum in genere substantiae, etiam in rationali natura, habet rationem personae, sed solum illud quod per se existit, non autem illud quod existit in alio perfectiori. Unde manus Socratis, quamvis sit quoddam individuum, non est tamen persona, quia non per se existit, sed in quodam perfectiori, scilicet in suo toto. Et hoc etiam potest significari in hoc quod persona dicitur substantia individua, non enim manus est substantia completa, sed pars substantiae. Licet igitur humana natura sit individuum quoddam in genere substantiae, quia tamen non per se separatim existit, sed in quodam perfectiori, scilicet in persona Dei verbi, consequens est quod non habeat personalitatem propriam. Et ideo facta est unio in persona.

IIIae

Reply Obj. 3: The Word of God did not assume human nature in general, but ‘in atomo’—that is, in an individual— as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) otherwise every man would be the Word of God, even as Christ was. Yet we must bear in mind that not every individual in the genus of substance, even in rational nature, is a person, but that alone which exists by itself, and not that which exists in some more perfect thing. Hence the hand of Socrates, although it is a kind of individual, is not a person, because it does not exist by itself, but in something more perfect, viz. in the whole. And hence, too, this is signified by a person being defined as an individual substance, for the hand is not a complete substance, but part of a substance. Therefore, although this human nature is a kind of individual in the genus of substance, it has not its own personality, because it does not exist separately, but in something more perfect, viz. in the Person of the Word. Therefore the union took place in the person.

Article 3 Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the suppositum or hypostasis? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio verbi incarnati non sit facta in supposito, sive in hypostasi. Dicit enim Augustinus, in Enchirid., divina substantia et humana utrumque est unus Dei filius, sed aliud propter verbum, et aliud propter hominem. Leo Papa etiam dicit, in epistola ad Flavianum, unum horum coruscat miraculis, et aliud succumbit iniuriis. Sed omne quod est aliud et aliud, differt supposito. Ergo unio verbi incarnati non est facta in supposito. Praeterea, hypostasis nihil est aliud quam substantia particularis, ut Boetius dicit, in libro de duabus naturis. Manifestum est autem quod in Christo est quaedam alia substantia particularis praeter hypostasim verbi, scilicet corpus et anima et compositum ex eis. Ergo in Christo est alia hypostasis praeter hypostasim verbi Dei. Praeterea, hypostasis verbi non continetur in aliquo genere, neque sub specie, ut patet ex his quae in prima parte dicta sunt. Sed Christus, secundum quod est factus homo, continetur sub specie humana, dicit enim Dionysius, I cap. de Div. Nom., intra nostram factus est naturam qui omnem ordinem secundum omnem naturam supersubstantialiter excedit. Non autem continetur sub specie humana nisi sit hypostasis quaedam humanae speciei. Ergo in Christo est alia hypostasis praeter hypostasim verbi Dei. Et sic idem quod prius.

Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Word Incarnate did not take place in the suppositum or hypostasis. For Augustine says (Enchiridion xxxv, xxxviii): Both the Divine and human substance are one Son of God, but they are one thing (aliud) by reason of the Word and another thing (aliud) by reason of the man. And Pope Leo says in his letter to Flavian (Ep. xxviii): One of these is glorious with miracles, the other succumbs under injuries. But one (aliud) and the other (aliud) differ in suppositum. Therefore the union of the Word Incarnate did not take place in the suppositum. Obj. 2: Further, hypostasis is nothing more than a particular substance, as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.). But it is plain that in Christ there is another particular substance beyond the hypostasis of the Word, viz. the body and the soul and the resultant of these. Therefore there is another hypostasis in Him besides the hypostasis of the Word. Obj. 3: Further, the hypostasis of the Word is not included in any genus or species, as is plain from the First Part (Q. 3, A. 5). But Christ, inasmuch as He is made man, is contained under the species of man; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): Within the limits of our nature He came, Who far surpasses the whole order of nature supersubstantially. Now nothing is contained under the human species unless it be a hypostasis of the human species. Therefore in Christ there is another hypostasis besides the hypostasis of the Word of God; and hence the same conclusion follows as above.

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Mode of Union of the Word Incarnate

Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, in domino nostro Iesu Christo duas naturas cognoscimus, unam autem hypostasim. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam, ignorantes habitudinem hypostasis ad personam, licet concederent in Christo unam solam personam, posuerunt tamen aliam hypostasim Dei et aliam hominis, ac si unio sit facta in persona, non in hypostasi. Quod quidem apparet erroneum tripliciter. Primo, ex hoc quod persona supra hypostasim non addit nisi determinatam naturam, scilicet rationalem; secundum quod Boetius dicit, in libro de duabus naturis, quod persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia. Et ideo idem est attribuere propriam hypostasim humanae naturae in Christo, et propriam personam. Quod intelligentes sancti patres, utrumque in Concilio quinto, apud Constantinopolim celebrato, damnaverunt, dicentes, si quis introducere conetur in mysterio Christi duas subsistentias seu duas personas, talis anathema sit, nec enim adiectionem personae vel subsistentiae suscepit sancta Trinitas, incarnato uno de sancta Trinitate, Deo verbo. Subsistentia autem idem est quod res subsistens, quod est proprium hypostasis, ut patet per Boetium, in libro de duabus naturis. Secundo quia, si detur quod persona aliquid addat supra hypostasim in quo possit fieri unio, hoc nihil est aliud quam proprietas ad dignitatem pertinens, secundum quod a quibusdam dicitur quod persona est hypostasis proprietate distincta ad dignitatem pertinente. Si ergo facta sit unio in persona et non in hypostasi, consequens erit quod non sit facta unio nisi secundum dignitatem quandam. Et hoc est, approbante synodo Ephesina, damnatum a Cyrillo sub his verbis, si quis in uno Christo dividit subsistentias post adunationem, sola copulans eas coniunctione quae secundum dignitatem vel auctoritatem est vel secundum potentiam, et non magis concursu secundum adunationem naturalem, anathema sit. Tertio, quia tantum hypostasis est cui attribuuntur operationes et proprietates naturae, et ea etiam quae ad naturae rationem pertinent in concreto, dicimus enim quod hic homo ratiocinatur, et est risibilis, et est animal rationale. Et hac ratione hic homo dicitur esse suppositum, quia scilicet supponitur his quae ad hominem pertinent, eorum praedicationem recipiens. Si ergo sit alia hypostasis in Christo praeter hypostasim verbi, sequetur quod de aliquo alio quam de verbo verificentur ea quae sunt hominis, puta esse natum de virgine, passum, crucifixum et sepultum. Et hoc etiam damnatum est, approbante Concilio Ephesino, sub his verbis, si quis personis duabus vel subsistentiis eas quae sunt in evangelicis et apostolicis Scripturis impartitur voces, aut de Christo a sanctis dictas, aut ab ipso de se; et quasdam quidem velut homini praeter illud ex Deo verbum specialiter intellecto applicat, quasdam vero, velut Deo decibiles, soli ex Deo patre verbo, anathema sit. Sic igitur patet esse haeresim ab olim damnatam dicere

Q. 2, A. 3

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3, 4, 5): In our Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures and one hypostasis. I answer that, Some who did not know the relation of hypostasis to person, although granting that there is but one person in Christ, held, nevertheless, that there is one hypostasis of God and another of man, and hence that the union took place in the person and not in the hypostasis. Now this, for three reasons, is clearly erroneous. First, because person only adds to hypostasis a determinate nature, viz. rational, according to what Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), a person is an individual substance of rational nature; and hence it is the same to attribute to the human nature in Christ a proper hypostasis and a proper person. And the holy Fathers, seeing this, condemned both in the Fifth Council held at Constantinople, saying: If anyone seeks to introduce into the mystery of the Incarnation two subsistences or two persons, let him be anathema. For by the incarnation of one of the Holy Trinity, God the Word, the Holy Trinity received no augment of person or subsistence. Now subsistence is the same as the subsisting thing, which is proper to hypostasis, as is plain from Boethius (De Duab. Nat.). Second, because if it is granted that person adds to hypostasis something in which the union can take place, this something is nothing else than a property pertaining to dignity; according as it is said by some that a person is a hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity. If, therefore, the union took place in the person and not in the hypostasis, it follows that the union only took place in regard to some dignity. And this is what Cyril, with the approval of the Council of Ephesus (part iii, can. 3), condemned in these terms: If anyone after the uniting divides the subsistences in the one Christ, only joining them in a union of dignity or authority or power, and not rather in a concourse of natural union, let him be anathema. Third, because to the hypostasis alone are attributed the operations and the natural properties, and whatever belongs to the nature in the concrete; for we say that this man reasons, and is risible, and is a rational animal. So likewise this man is said to be a suppositum, because he underlies (supponitur) whatever belongs to man and receives its predication. Therefore, if there is any hypostasis in Christ besides the hypostasis of the Word, it follows that whatever pertains to man is verified of some other than the Word, e.g., that He was born of a Virgin, suffered, was crucified, was buried. And this, too, was condemned with the approval of the Council of Ephesus (part iii, can. 4) in these words: If anyone ascribes to two persons or subsistences such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the saints, or by Himself of Himself, and, moreover, applies some of them to the man, taken as distinct from the Word of God, and some of them (as if they could be used of God alone) only to the Word of God the Father, let him be anathema. Therefore it is plainly a heresy condemned long since by the Church to say

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Q. 2, A. 4

Incarnation

quod in Christo sunt duae hypostases vel duo supposita, sive quod unio non sit facta in hypostasi vel supposito. Unde in eadem synodo legitur, si quis non confitetur carni secundum subsistentiam unitum ex Deo patre verbum, unumque esse Christum cum sua carne, eundem scilicet Deum et hominem, anathema sit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut accidentalis differentia facit alterum, ita differentia essentialis facit aliud. Manifestum est autem quod alteritas, quae provenit ex differentia accidentali, potest ad eandem hypostasim vel suppositum in rebus creatis pertinere, eo quod idem numero potest diversis accidentibus subesse, non autem contingit in rebus creatis quod idem numero subsistere possit diversis essentiis vel naturis. Unde sicut quod dicitur alterum et alterum in creaturis, non significat diversitatem suppositi, sed solum diversitatem formarum accidentalium; ita quod Christus dicitur aliud et aliud, non importat diversitatem suppositi sive hypostasis, sed diversitatem naturarum. Unde Gregorius Nazianzenus dicit, in epistola ad Chelidonium, aliud et aliud sunt ea ex quibus salvator est, non alius autem et alius. Dico vero aliud et aliud e contrario quam in Trinitate habet. Ibi enim alius et alius dicimus, ut non subsistentias confundamus, non aliud autem et aliud. Ad secundum dicendum quod hypostasis significat substantiam particularem non quocumque modo, sed prout est in suo complemento. Secundum vero quod venit in unionem alicuius magis completi, non dicitur hypostasis, sicut manus aut pes. Et similiter humana natura in Christo, quamvis sit substantia particularis, quia tamen venit in unionem cuiusdam completi, scilicet totius Christi prout est Deus et homo, non potest dici hypostasis vel suppositum, sed illud completum ad quod concurrit, dicitur esse hypostasis vel suppositum. Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam in rebus creatis res aliqua singularis non ponitur in genere vel specie ratione eius quod pertinet ad eius individuationem, sed ratione naturae, quae secundum formam determinatur, cum individuatio magis sit secundum materiam in rebus compositis. Sic igitur dicendum est quod Christus est in specie humana ratione naturae assumptae, non ratione ipsius hypostasis.

IIIae

that in Christ there are two hypostases, or two supposita, or that the union did not take place in the hypostasis or suppositum. Hence in the same Synod (can. 2) it is said: If anyone does not confess that the Word was united to flesh in subsistence, and that Christ with His flesh is both—to wit, God and man—let him be anathema. Reply Obj. 1: As accidental difference makes a thing other (alterum), so essential difference makes another thing (aliud). Now it is plain that the otherness which springs from accidental difference may pertain to the same hypostasis or suppositum in created things, since the same thing numerically can underlie different accidents. But it does not happen in created things that the same numerically can subsist in diverse essences or natures. Hence just as when we speak of otherness in regard to creatures we do not signify diversity of suppositum, but only diversity of accidental forms, so likewise when Christ is said to be one thing or another thing, we do not imply diversity of suppositum or hypostasis, but diversity of nature. Hence Gregory Nazianzen says in a letter to Chelidonius (Ep. ci): In the Savior we may find one thing and another, yet He is not one person and another. And I say ‘one thing and another’; whereas, on the contrary, in the Trinity we say one Person and another (so as not to confuse the subsistences), but not one thing and another. Reply Obj. 2: Hypostasis signifies a particular substance, not in every way, but as it is in its completeness. Yet as it is in union with something more complete, it is not said to be a hypostasis, as a hand or a foot. So likewise the human nature in Christ, although it is a particular substance, nevertheless cannot be called a hypostasis or suppositum, seeing that it is in union with a completed thing, viz. the whole Christ, as He is God and man. But the complete being with which it concurs is said to be a hypostasis or suppositum. Reply Obj. 3: In created things a singular thing is placed in a genus or species, not on account of what belongs to its individuation, but on account of its nature, which springs from its form, and in composite things individuation is taken more from matter. Hence we say that Christ is in the human species by reason of the nature assumed, and not by reason of the hypostasis.

Article 4 Whether the person of Christ is composite? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod perObjection 1: It would seem that the Person of Christ is sona Christi non sit composita. Persona enim Christi not composite. For the Person of Christ is naught else than non est aliud quam persona vel hypostasis verbi, ut ex the Person or hypostasis of the Word, as appears from what dictis patet. Sed in verbo non est aliud persona et natu- has been said (A. 2). But in the Word, Person and Nature do

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Q. 2, A. 5

ra, ut patet ex his quae dicta sunt in prima parte. Cum not differ, as appears from First Part (Q. 39, A. 1). Therefore ergo natura verbi sit simplex, ut in primo ostensum est, since the Nature of the Word is simple, as was shown above impossibile est quod persona Christi sit composita. (I, Q. 3, A. 7), it is impossible that the Person of Christ be composite. Praeterea, omnis compositio videtur esse ex parObj. 2: Further, all composition requires parts. But the tibus. Sed divina natura non potest habere rationem Divine Nature is incompatible with the notion of a part, for partis, quia omnis pars habet rationem imperfecti. Er- every part implicates the notion of imperfection. Therefore go impossibile est quod persona Christi sit composita ex it is impossible that the Person of Christ be composed of duabus naturis. two natures. Praeterea, quod componitur ex aliquibus, videtur Obj. 3: Further, what is composed of others would seem esse homogeneum eis, sicut ex corporibus non compo- to be homogeneous with them, as from bodies only a body nitur nisi corpus. Si igitur ex duabus naturis aliquid sit can be composed. Therefore if there is anything in Christ in Christo compositum, consequens erit quod illud non composed of the two natures, it follows that this will not be erit persona, sed natura. Et sic in Christo erit facta unio a person but a nature; and hence the union in Christ will in natura. Quod est contra praedicta. take place in the nature, which is contrary to A. 2. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, III libro, in On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, domino Iesu Christo duas naturas cognoscimus, unam au- 3, 4, 5), In the Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures, tem hypostasim, ex utrisque compositam. but one hypostasis composed from both. Respondeo dicendum quod persona sive hypostaI answer that, The Person or hypostasis of Christ sis Christi dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, se- may be viewed in two ways. First as it is in itself, and thus cundum id quod est in se. Et sic est omnino simplex, it is altogether simple, even as the Nature of the Word. Secsicut et natura verbi. Alio modo, secundum rationem ond, in the aspect of person or hypostasis to which it bepersonae vel hypostasis, ad quam pertinet subsistere in longs to subsist in a nature; and thus the Person of Christ aliqua natura. Et secundum hoc, persona Christi subsi- subsists in two natures. Hence though there is one subsiststit in duabus naturis. Unde, licet sit ibi unum subsistens, ing being in Him, yet there are different aspects of subsisest tamen ibi alia et alia ratio subsistendi. Et sic dicitur tence, and hence He is said to be a composite person, insopersona composita, inquantum unum duobus subsistit. much as one being subsists in two. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. And thereby the solution to the first is clear. Ad secundum dicendum quod illa compositio perReply Obj. 2: This composition of a person from nasonae ex naturis non dicitur esse ratione partium, sed tures is not so called on account of parts, but by reason of potius ratione numeri, sicut omne illud in quo duo con- number, even as that in which two things concur may be veniunt, potest dici ex eis compositum. said to be composed of them. Ad tertium dicendum quod non in omni composiReply Obj. 3: It is not verified in every composition, tione hoc verificatur quod illud quod componitur sit ho- that the thing composed is homogeneous with its compomogeneum componentibus, sed solum in partibus con- nent parts, but only in the parts of a continuous thing; for tinui; nam continuum non componitur nisi ex continuis. the continuous is composed solely of continuous parts. But Animal vero componitur ex anima et corpore, quorum an animal is composed of soul and body, and neither of neutrum est animal. these is an animal.

Article 5 Whether in Christ there is any union of soul and body? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit unio animae et corporis. Ex unione enim animae et corporis in nobis causatur persona vel hypostasis hominis. Si ergo anima et corpus fuerunt in Christo unita, sequitur quod fuerit ex unione eorum aliqua hypostasis constituta. Non autem hypostasis verbi Dei, quae est aeterna. Ergo in Christo erit aliqua persona vel hypostasis praeter hypostasim verbi. Quod est contra praedicta.

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no union of soul and body. For from the union of soul and body in us a person or a human hypostasis is caused. Hence if the soul and body were united in Christ, it follows that a hypostasis resulted from their union. But this was not the hypostasis of God the Word, for It is eternal. Therefore in Christ there would be a person or hypostasis besides the hypostasis of the Word, which is contrary to AA. 2, 3.

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Praeterea, ex unione animae et corporis constituitur natura humanae speciei. Damascenus autem dicit, in III libro, quod in domino nostro Iesu Christo non est communem speciem accipere. Ergo in eo non est facta compositio animae et corporis. Praeterea, anima non coniungitur corpori nisi ut vivificet ipsum. Sed corpus Christi poterat vivificari ab ipso verbo Dei, quod est fons et principium vitae. Ergo in Christo non fuit unio animae et corporis. Sed contra est quod corpus non dicitur animatum nisi ex unione animae. Sed corpus Christi dicitur animatum, secundum illud quod Ecclesia cantat, animatum corpus assumens, de virgine nasci dignatus est. Ergo in Christo fuit unio animae et corporis. Respondeo dicendum quod Christus dicitur homo univoce cum hominibus aliis, utpote eiusdem speciei existens, secundum illud apostoli, Philipp. II, in similitudinem hominum factus. Pertinet autem ad rationem speciei humanae quod anima corpori uniatur, non enim forma constituit speciem nisi per hoc quod sit actus materiae; et hoc est ad quod generatio terminatur, per quam natura speciem intendit. Unde necesse est dicere quod in Christo fuerit anima unita corpori, et contrarium est haereticum, utpote derogans veritati humanitatis Christi. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex hac ratione moti fuerunt illi qui negaverunt unionem animae et corporis in Christo, ne per hoc scilicet cogerentur personam novam aut hypostasim in Christo inducere; quia videbant quod in puris hominibus ex unione animae ad corpus constituitur persona. Sed hoc ideo in puris hominibus accidit quia anima et corpus sic in eis coniunguntur ut per se existant. Sed in Christo uniuntur ad invicem ut adiuncta alteri principaliori quod subsistit in natura ex eis composita. Et propter hoc ex unione animae et corporis in Christo non constituitur nova hypostasis seu persona, sed advenit ipsum coniunctum personae seu hypostasi praeexistenti. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod sit minoris efficaciae unio animae et corporis in Christo quam in nobis. Quia ipsa coniunctio ad nobilius non adimit virtutem aut dignitatem, sed auget, sicut anima sensitiva in animalibus constituit speciem, quia consideratur ut ultima forma; non autem in hominibus, quamvis in eis sit nobilior et virtuosior; et hoc per adiunctionem ulterioris et nobilioris perfectionis animae rationalis, ut etiam supra dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum Damasceni potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, ut referatur ad humanam naturam. Quae quidem non habet rationem communis speciei secundum quod est in uno solo individuo, sed secundum quod est abstracta ab omni individuo, prout in nuda contemplatione consideratur; vel secundum quod est in omnibus individuis. Filius autem

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Obj. 2: Further, from the union of soul and body results the nature of the human species. But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3), that we must not conceive a common species in the Lord Jesus Christ. Therefore there was no union of soul and body in Him. Obj. 3: Further, the soul is united to the body for the sole purpose of quickening it. But the body of Christ could be quickened by the Word of God Himself, seeing He is the fount and principle of life. Therefore in Christ there was no union of soul and body. On the contrary, The body is not said to be animated save from its union with the soul. Now the body of Christ is said to be animated, as the Church chants: Taking an animate body, He deigned to be born of a Virgin. Therefore in Christ there was a union of soul and body. I answer that, Christ is called a man univocally with other men, as being of the same species, according to the Apostle (Phil 2:7), being made in the likeness of a man. Now it belongs essentially to the human species that the soul be united to the body, for the form does not constitute the species, except inasmuch as it becomes the act of matter, and this is the terminus of generation through which nature intends the species. Hence it must be said that in Christ the soul was united to the body; and the contrary is heretical, since it destroys the truth of Christ’s humanity. Reply Obj. 1: This would seem to be the reason which was of weight with such as denied the union of the soul and body in Christ, viz. lest they should thereby be forced to admit a second person or hypostasis in Christ, since they saw that the union of soul and body in mere men resulted in a person. But this happens in mere men because the soul and body are so united in them as to exist by themselves. But in Christ they are united together, so as to be united to something higher, which subsists in the nature composed of them. And hence from the union of the soul and body in Christ a new hypostasis or person does not result, but what is composed of them is united to the already existing hypostasis or Person. Nor does it therefore follow that the union of the soul and body in Christ is of less effect than in us, for its union with something nobler does not lessen but increases its virtue and worth; just as the sensitive soul in animals constitutes the species, as being considered the ultimate form, yet it does not do so in man, although it is of greater effect and dignity, and this because of its union with a further and nobler perfection, viz. the rational soul, as has been said above (A. 2, ad 2). Reply Obj. 2: This saying of Damascene may be taken in two ways: First, as referring to human nature, which, as it is in one individual alone, has not the nature of a common species, but only inasmuch as either it is abstracted from every individual, and considered in itself by the mind, or according as it is in all individuals. Now the Son of God did not assume human nature as it exists in the pure thought

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Dei non assumpsit humanam naturam prout est in sola consideratione intellectus, quia sic non assumpsisset ipsam rem humanae naturae. Nisi forte diceretur quod humana natura esset quaedam idea separata, sicut Platonici posuerunt hominem sine materia. Sed tunc filius Dei non assumpsisset carnem, contra id quod dicitur Luc. ult., spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere. Similiter etiam non potest dici quod filius Dei assumpsit humanam naturam prout est in omnibus individuis eiusdem speciei, quia sic omnes homines assumpsisset. Relinquitur ergo, ut Damascenus postea dicit in eodem libro, quod assumpserit naturam humanam in atomo, idest in individuo, non quidem in alio individuo, quod sit suppositum vel hypostasis illius naturae, quam in persona filii Dei. Alio modo potest intelligi dictum Damasceni ut non referatur ad naturam humanam, quasi ex unione animae et corporis non resultet una communis natura, quae est humana, sed est referendum ad unionem duarum naturarum, divinae scilicet et humanae, ex quibus non componitur aliquid tertium, quod sit quaedam natura communis; quia sic illud esset natum praedicari de pluribus. Et hoc ibi intendit. Unde subdit, neque enim generatus est, neque unquam generabitur alius Christus, ex deitate et humanitate, in deitate et humanitate, Deus perfectus, idem et homo perfectus. Ad tertium dicendum quod duplex est principium vitae corporalis. Unum quidem effectivum. Et hoc modo verbum Dei est principium omnis vitae. Alio modo est aliquid principium vitae formaliter. Cum enim vivere viventibus sit esse, ut dicit philosophus, in II de anima; sicut unumquodque formaliter est per suam formam, ita corpus vivit per animam. Et hoc modo non potuit corpus vivere per verbum, quod non potest esse corporis forma.

Q. 2, A. 6

of the intellect, since in this way He would not have assumed human nature in reality, unless it be said that human nature is a separate idea, just as the Platonists conceived of man without matter. But in this way the Son of God would not have assumed flesh, contrary to what is written (Luke 24:39), A spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see Me to have. Neither can it be said that the Son of God assumed human nature as it is in all the individuals of the same species, otherwise He would have assumed all men. Therefore it remains, as Damascene says further on (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that He assumed human nature in atomo, i.e., in an individual; not, indeed, in another individual which is a suppositum or a person of that nature, but in the Person of the Son of God. Second, this saying of Damascene may be taken not as referring to human nature, as if from the union of soul and body one common nature (viz. human) did not result, but as referring to the union of the two natures Divine and human: which do not combine so as to form a third something that becomes a common nature, for in this way it would become predicable of many, and this is what he is aiming at, since he adds: For there was not generated, neither will there ever be generated, another Christ, Who from the Godhead and manhood, and in the Godhead and manhood, is perfect God and perfect man. Reply Obj. 3: There are two principles of corporeal life: one the effective principle, and in this way the Word of God is the principle of all life; the other, the formal principle of life, for since in living things to be is to live, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), just as everything is formally by its form, so likewise the body lives by the soul: in this way a body could not live by the Word, Which cannot be the form of a body.

Article 6 Whether the human nature was united to the Word of God accidentally? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod humana natura fuerit unita verbo Dei accidentaliter. Dicit enim apostolus, Philipp. II, de filio Dei, quod habitu inventus est ut homo. Sed habitus accidentaliter advenit ei cuius est, sive accipiatur habitus prout est unum de decem generibus; sive prout est species qualitatis. Ergo humana natura accidentaliter unita est filio Dei. Praeterea, omne quod advenit alicui post esse completum, advenit ei accidentaliter, hoc enim dicimus accidens quod potest alicui et adesse et abesse praeter subiecti corruptionem. Sed natura humana advenit ex tempore filio Dei habenti esse perfectum ab aeterno. Ergo advenit ei accidentaliter.

Objection 1: It would seem that the human nature was united to the Word of God accidentally. For the Apostle says (Phil 2:7) of the Son of God, that He was in habit found as a man. But habit is accidentally associated with that to which it pertains, whether habit be taken for one of the ten predicaments or as a species of quality. Therefore human nature is accidentally united to the Son of God. Obj. 2: Further, whatever comes to a thing that is complete in being comes to it accidentally, for an accident is said to be what can come or go without the subject being corrupted. But human nature came to Christ in time, Who had perfect being from eternity. Therefore it came to Him accidentally.

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Praeterea, quidquid non pertinet ad naturam seu essentiam alicuius rei, est accidens eius, quia omne quod est vel est substantia, vel est accidens. Sed humana natura non pertinet ad essentiam vel naturam filii Dei divinam, quia non est facta unio in natura, ut supra dictum est. Ergo oportet quod natura humana accidentaliter filio Dei advenerit. Praeterea, instrumentum accidentaliter advenit. Sed natura humana in Christo fuit divinitatis instrumentum, dicit enim Damascenus, in III libro, quod caro Christi instrumentum divinitatis existit. Ergo videtur quod humana natura fuerit filio Dei unita accidentaliter. Sed contra est quod illud quod accidentaliter praedicatur, non praedicat aliquid, sed quantum vel quale vel aliquo modo se habens si igitur humana natura accidentaliter adveniret, cum dicitur Christus esse homo, non praedicaretur aliquid, sed quale aut quantum aut aliquo modo se habens. Quod est contra decretalem Alexandri Papae dicentis, cum Christus sit perfectus Deus et perfectus homo, qua temeritate audent quidam dicere quod Christus, secundum quod est homo, non est aliquid? Respondeo dicendum quod, ad huius quaestionis evidentiam, sciendum est quod circa mysterium unionis duarum naturarum in Christo, duplex haeresis insurrexit. Una quidem confundentium naturas, sicut Eutychetis et Dioscori, qui posuerunt quod ex duabus naturis est constituta una natura; ita quod confitentur Christum esse ex duabus naturis, quasi ante unionem distinctis; non autem in duabus naturis, quasi post unionem naturarum distinctione cessante. Alia vero fuit haeresis Nestorii et Theodori Mopsuesteni separantium personas. Posuerunt enim aliam esse personam filii Dei, et filii hominis. Quas dicebant sibi invicem esse unitas, primo quidem, secundum inhabitationem, inquantum scilicet verbum Dei habitavit in illo homine sicut in templo. Secundo, secundum unitatem affectus, inquantum scilicet voluntas illius hominis est semper conformis voluntati Dei. Tertio modo, secundum operationem, prout scilicet dicebant hominem illum esse Dei verbi instrumentum. Quarto, secundum dignitatem honoris, prout omnis honor qui exhibetur filio Dei, exhibetur filio hominis, propter coniunctionem ad filium Dei. Quinto, secundum aequivocationem, idest secundum communicationem nominum, prout scilicet dicimus illum hominem esse Deum et filium Dei. Manifestum est autem omnes istos modos accidentalem unionem importare. Quidam autem posteriores magistri, putantes se has haereses declinare, in eas per ignorantiam inciderunt. Quidam enim eorum concesserunt unam Christi personam, sed posuerunt duas hypostases, sive duo supposita; dicentes hominem quendam, compositum ex anima et corpore, a principio suae conceptionis esse assumptum a Dei verbo. Et haec est prima opinio quam Magi-

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Obj. 3: Further, whatever does not pertain to the nature or the essence of a thing is its accident, for whatever is, is either a substance or an accident. But human nature does not pertain to the Divine Essence or Nature of the Son of God, for the union did not take place in the nature, as was said above (A. 1). Hence the human nature must have accrued accidentally to the Son of God. Obj. 4: Further, an instrument accrues accidentally. But the human nature was the instrument of the Godhead in Christ, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 15), that the flesh of Christ is the instrument of the Godhead. Therefore it seems that the human nature was united to the Son of God accidentally. On the contrary, Whatever is predicated accidentally, predicates, not substance, but quantity, or quality, or some other mode of being. If therefore the human nature accrues accidentally, when we say Christ is man, we do not predicate substance, but quality or quantity, or some other mode of being, which is contrary to the Decretal of Pope Alexander III, who says (Conc. Later. iii): Since Christ is perfect God and perfect man, what foolhardiness have some to dare to affirm that Christ as man is not a substance? I answer that, In evidence of this question we must know that two heresies have arisen with regard to the mystery of the union of the two natures in Christ. The first confused the natures, as Eutyches and Dioscorus, who held that from the two natures one nature resulted, so that they confessed Christ to be from two natures (which were distinct before the union), but not in two natures (the distinction of nature coming to an end after the union). The second was the heresy of Nestorius and Theodore of Mopsuestia, who separated the persons. For they held the Person of the Son of God to be distinct from the Person of the Son of man, and said these were mutually united: first, by indwelling, inasmuch as the Word of God dwelt in the man, as in a temple; second, by unity of intention, inasmuch as the will of the man was always in agreement with the will of the Word of God; third, by operation, inasmuch as they said the man was the instrument of the Word of God; fourth, by greatness of honor, inasmuch as all honor shown to the Son of God was equally shown to the Son of man, on account of His union with the Son of God; fifth, by equivocation, i.e., communication of names, inasmuch as we say that this man is God and the Son of God. Now it is plain that these modes imply an accidental union.

But some more recent masters, thinking to avoid these heresies, through ignorance fell into them. For some conceded one person in Christ, but maintained two hypostases, or two supposita, saying that a man, composed of body and soul, was from the beginning of his conception assumed by the Word of God. And this is the first opinion set down by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6). But others desirous of keeping

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ster ponit in sexta distinctione tertii libri sententiarum. Alii vero, volentes servare unitatem personae, posuerunt Christi animam non esse corpori unitam, sed haec duo, separata ab invicem, esse unita verbo accidentaliter, ut sic non cresceret numerus personarum. Et haec est tertia opinio quam Magister ibidem ponit. Utraque autem harum opinionum incidit in haeresim Nestorii. Prima quidem, quia idem est ponere duas hypostases vel duo supposita in Christo, quod ponere duas personas, ut supra dictum est. Et si fiat vis in nomine personae, considerandum est quod etiam Nestorius utebatur unitate personae, propter unitatem dignitatis et honoris. Unde et quinta synodus definit anathema eum qui dicit unam personam secundum dignitatem, honorem et adorationem, sicut Theodorus et Nestorius insanientes conscripserunt. Alia vero opinio incidit in errorem Nestorii quantum ad hoc, quod posuit unionem accidentalem. Non enim differt dicere quod verbum Dei unitum est homini Christo secundum inhabitationem sicut in templo suo, sicut dicebat Nestorius; et dicere quod unitum fuit verbum homini secundum induitionem sicut vestimento, sicut dicit tertia opinio. Quae etiam dicit peius aliquid quam Nestorius, quod anima et corpus non sunt unita. Fides autem Catholica, medium tenens inter praedictas positiones, neque dicit esse unionem factam Dei et hominis secundum essentiam vel naturam; neque etiam secundum accidens; sed medio modo, secundum subsistentiam seu hypostasim. Unde in quinta synodo legitur, cum multis modis unitas intelligatur, qui iniquitatem Apollinarii et Eutychetis sequuntur, interemptionem eorum quae convenerunt colentes, (idest, interimentes utramque naturam), unionem secundum confusionem dicunt; Theodori autem et Nestorii sequaces, divisione gaudentes, affectualem unitatem introducunt, sancta vero Dei Ecclesia, utriusque perfidiae impietatem reiiciens unionem Dei verbi ad carnem secundum compositionem confitetur, quod est secundum subsistentiam. Sic igitur patet quod secunda trium opinionum quas Magister ponit, quae asserit unam hypostasim Dei et hominis, non est dicenda opinio, sed sententia Catholicae fidei. Similiter etiam prima opinio, quae ponit duas hypostases; et tertia, quae ponit unionem accidentalem; non sunt dicendae opiniones, sed haereses in Conciliis ab Ecclesia damnatae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Damascenus dicit, in III libro, non necesse autem omnifariam et indefective assimilari exempla, quod enim in omnibus simile, idem utique erit, et non exemplum. Et maxime in divinis, impossibile enim simile exemplum invenire et in theologia, idest in deitate personarum, et in dispensatione, idest in mysterio incarnationis. Humana igitur natura in Christo assimilatur habitui, idest vestimento, non quidem quantum ad accidentalem unionem, sed quan-

Q. 2, A. 6

the unity of person, held that the soul of Christ was not united to the body, but that these two were mutually separate, and were united to the Word accidentally, so that the number of persons might not be increased. And this is the third opinion which the Master sets down (Sent. iii, D, 6). But both of these opinions fall into the heresy of Nestorius; the first, indeed, because to maintain two hypostases or supposita in Christ is the same as to maintain two persons, as was shown above (A. 3). And if stress is laid on the word person, we must have in mind that even Nestorius spoke of unity of person on account of the unity of dignity and honor. Hence the fifth Council (Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 5) directs an anathema against such a one as holds one person in dignity, honor and adoration, as Theodore and Nestorius foolishly wrote. But the other opinion falls into the error of Nestorius by maintaining an accidental union. For there is no difference in saying that the Word of God is united to the Man Christ by indwelling, as in His temple (as Nestorius said), or by putting on man, as a garment, which is the third opinion; rather it says something worse than Nestorius—to wit, that the soul and body are not united. Now the Catholic faith, holding the mean between the aforesaid positions, does not affirm that the union of God and man took place in the essence or nature, nor yet in something accidental, but midway, in a subsistence or hypostasis. Hence in the fifth Council (Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 5) we read: Since the unity may be understood in many ways, those who follow the impiety of Apollinaris and Eutyches, professing the destruction of what came together (i.e., destroying both natures), confess a union by mingling; but the followers of Theodore and Nestorius, maintaining division, introduce a union of purpose. But the Holy Church of God, rejecting the impiety of both these treasons, confesses a union of the Word of God with flesh, by composition, which is in subsistence. Therefore it is plain that the second of the three opinions, mentioned by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6), which holds one hypostasis of God and man, is not to be called an opinion, but an article of Catholic faith. So likewise the first opinion which holds two hypostases, and the third which holds an accidental union, are not to be styled opinions, but heresies condemned by the Church in Councils. Reply Obj. 1: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26): Examples need not be wholly and at all points similar, for what is wholly similar is the same, and not an example, and especially in Divine things, for it is impossible to find a wholly similar example in the Theology, i.e., in the Godhead of Persons, and in the Dispensation, i.e., the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence the human nature in Christ is likened to a habit, i.e., a garment, not indeed in regard to accidental union, but inasmuch as the Word is seen by the human na-

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tum ad hoc, quod verbum videtur per humanam naturam, sicut homo per vestimentum. Et etiam quantum ad hoc, quod vestimentum mutatur, quia scilicet formatur secundum figuram eius qui induit ipsum, qui a sua forma non mutatur propter vestimentum, et similiter humana natura assumpta a verbo Dei est meliorata, ipsum autem verbum Dei non est mutatum; ut exponit Augustinus, in libro octogintatrium quaestionum. Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod advenit post esse completum, accidentaliter advenit, nisi trahatur in communionem illius esse completi. Sicut in resurrectione corpus adveniet animae praeexistenti, non tamen accidentaliter, quia ad idem esse assumetur, ut scilicet corpus habeat esse vitale per animam. Non est autem sic de albedine, quia aliud est esse albi, et aliud esse hominis cui advenit albedo. Verbum autem Dei ab aeterno esse completum habuit secundum hypostasim sive personam, ex tempore autem advenit ei natura humana, non quasi assumpta ad unum esse prout est naturae, sicut corpus assumitur ad esse animae; sed ad unum esse prout est hypostasis vel personae. Et ideo humana natura non unitur accidentaliter filio Dei.

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ture, as a man by his garment, and also inasmuch as the garment is changed, for it is shaped according to the figure of him who puts it on, and yet he is not changed from his form on account of the garment. So likewise the human nature assumed by the Word of God is ennobled, but the Word of God is not changed, as Augustine says (Qq. 83, qu. 73).

Reply Obj. 2: Whatever accrues after the completion of the being comes accidentally, unless it be taken into communion with the complete being, just as in the resurrection the body comes to the soul which pre-exists, yet not accidentally, because it is assumed unto the same being, so that the body has vital being through the soul; but it is not so with whiteness, for the being of whiteness is other than the being of man to which whiteness comes. But the Word of God from all eternity had complete being in hypostasis or person; while in time the human nature accrued to it, not as if it were assumed unto one being inasmuch as this is of the nature (even as the body is assumed to the being of the soul), but to one being inasmuch as this is of the hypostasis or person. Hence the human nature is not accidentally united to the Son of God. Ad tertium dicendum quod accidens dividitur Reply Obj. 3: Accident is divided against substance. contra substantiam. Substantia autem, ut patet V Meta- Now substance, as is plain from Metaph. v, 25, is taken in phys., dupliciter dicitur, uno modo, essentia sive natu- two ways: first, for essence or nature; second, for supposira; alio modo, pro supposito sive hypostasi. Unde suffi- tum or hypostasis—hence the union having taken place in cit ad hoc quod non sit unio accidentalis, quod sit facta the hypostasis, is enough to show that it is not an accidental unio secundum hypostasim, licet non sit facta unio se- union, although the union did not take place in the nature.

cundum naturam. Ad quartum dicendum quod non omne quod assumitur ut instrumentum, pertinet ad hypostasim assumentis, sicut patet de securi et gladio nihil tamen prohibet illud quod assumitur ad unitatem hypostasis, se habere ut instrumentum, sicut corpus hominis vel membra eius. Nestorius igitur posuit quod natura humana est assumpta a verbo solum per modum instrumenti, non autem ad unitatem hypostasis. Et ideo non concedebat quod homo ille vere esset filius Dei, sed instrumentum eius. Unde Cyrillus dicit, in epistola ad monachos Aegypti, hunc Emanuelem, idest Christum, non tanquam instrumenti officio sumptum dicit Scriptura, sed tanquam Deum vere humanatum, idest hominem factum. Damascenus autem posuit naturam humanam in Christo esse sicut instrumentum ad unitatem hypostasis pertinens.

Reply Obj. 4: Not everything that is assumed as an instrument pertains to the hypostasis of the one who assumes, as is plain in the case of a saw or a sword; yet nothing prevents what is assumed into the unity of the hypostasis from being as an instrument, even as the body of man or his members. Hence Nestorius held that the human nature was assumed by the Word merely as an instrument, and not into the unity of the hypostasis. And therefore he did not concede that the man was really the Son of God, but His instrument. Hence Cyril says (Epist. ad Monach. Aegyptii): The Scripture does not affirm that this Emmanuel, i.e., Christ, was assumed for the office of an instrument, but as God truly humanized, i.e., made man. But Damascene held that the human nature in Christ is an instrument belonging to the unity of the hypostasis.

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Q. 2, A. 7

Article 7 Whether the union of the Divine nature and the human is anything created? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio divinae et humanae naturae non sit aliquid creatum. Nihil enim in Deo creatum potest esse, quia quidquid est in Deo, Deus est. Sed unio est in Deo, quia ipse Deus est humanae naturae unitus. Ergo videtur quod unio non sit aliquid creatum. Praeterea, finis est potissimum in unoquoque. Sed finis unionis est divina hypostasis sive persona, ad quam terminata est unio. Ergo videtur quod huiusmodi unio maxime debeat iudicari secundum conditionem divinae hypostasis. Quae non est aliquid creatum. Ergo nec ipsa unio est aliquid creatum. Preaterea, propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis. Sed homo dicitur esse creator propter unionem. Ergo multo magis ipsa unio non est aliquid creatum, sed creator. Sed contra est, quod incipit esse ex tempore, est creatum. Sed unio illa non fuit ab aeterno, sed incoepit esse ex tempore. Ergo unio est aliquid creatum. Respondeo dicendum quod unio de qua loquimur est relatio quaedam quae consideratur inter divinam naturam et humanam, secundum quod conveniunt in una persona filii Dei. Sicut autem in prima parte dictum est, omnis relatio quae consideratur inter Deum et creaturam, realiter quidem est in creatura, per cuius mutationem talis relatio innascitur, non autem est realiter in Deo, sed secundum rationem tantum, quia non nascitur secundum mutationem Dei. Sic igitur dicendum est quod haec unio de qua loquimur, non est in Deo realiter, sed secundum rationem tantum in humana autem natura, quae creatura quaedam est, est realiter. Et ideo oportet dicere quod sit quoddam creatum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod haec unio non est in Deo realiter sed solum secundum rationem tantum, dicitur enim Deus unitus creaturae ex hoc quod creatura unita est ei, absque Dei mutatione. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio relationis, sicut et motus dependet ex fine vel termino, sed esse eius dependet ex subiecto. Et quia unio talis non habet esse reale nisi in natura creata, ut dictum est, consequens est quod habeat esse creatum. Ad tertium dicendum quod homo dicitur et est Deus propter unionem inquantum terminatur ad hypostasim divinam. Non tamen sequitur quod ipsa unio sit creator vel Deus, quia quod aliquid dicatur creatum, hoc magis respicit esse ipsius quam relationem.

Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Divine and human natures is not anything created. For there can be nothing created in God, because whatever is in God is God. But the union is in God, for God Himself is united to human nature. Therefore it seems that the union is not anything created. Obj. 2: Further, the end holds first place in everything. But the end of the union is the Divine hypostasis or Person in which the union is terminated. Therefore it seems that this union ought chiefly to be judged with reference to the dignity of the Divine hypostasis, which is not anything created. Therefore the union is nothing created. Obj. 3: Further, That which is the cause of a thing being such is still more so (Poster. i). But man is said to be the Creator on account of the union. Therefore much more is the union itself nothing created, but the Creator. On the contrary, Whatever has a beginning in time is created. Now this union was not from eternity, but began in time. Therefore the union is something created. I answer that, The union of which we are speaking is a relation which we consider between the Divine and the human nature, inasmuch as they come together in one Person of the Son of God. Now, as was said above (I, Q. 13, A. 7), every relation which we consider between God and the creature is really in the creature, by whose change the relation is brought into being; whereas it is not really in God, but only in our way of thinking, since it does not arise from any change in God. And hence we must say that the union of which we are speaking is not really in God, except only in our way of thinking; but in the human nature, which is a creature, it is really. Therefore we must say it is something created. Reply Obj. 1: This union is not really in God, but only in our way of thinking, for God is said to be united to a creature inasmuch as the creature is really united to God without any change in Him. Reply Obj. 2: The specific nature of a relation, as of motion, depends on the subject. And since this union has its being nowhere save in a created nature, as was said above, it follows that it has a created being. Reply Obj. 3: A man is called Creator and is God because of the union, inasmuch as it is terminated in the Divine hypostasis; yet it does not follow that the union itself is the Creator or God, because that a thing is said to be created regards its being rather than its relation.

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Article 8 Whether union is the same as assumption? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod idem sit unio quod assumptio. Relationes enim, sicut et motus, specificantur secundum terminum. Sed idem est terminus assumptionis et unionis, scilicet divina hypostasis. Ergo videtur quod non differant unio et assumptio. Praeterea, in mysterio incarnationis idem videtur esse uniens et assumens, unitum et assumptum. Sed unio et assumptio videntur sequi actionem et passionem unientis et uniti, vel assumentis et assumpti. Ergo videtur idem esse unio quod assumptio. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in III libro, aliud est unio, aliud incarnatio. Nam unio solam demonstrat copulationem, ad quid autem facta est, non adhuc. Incarnatio autem et humanatio determinant ad quem sit facta copulatio. Sed similiter assumptio non determinat ad quem facta sit copulatio. Ergo videtur idem esse unio et assumptio. Sed contra est quod divina natura dicitur unita, non autem assumpta. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, unio importat relationem divinae naturae et humanae secundum quod conveniunt in una persona. Omnis autem relatio quae incipit esse ex tempore, ex aliqua mutatione causatur. Mutatio autem consistit in actione et passione. Sic igitur dicendum est quod prima et principalis differentia inter unionem et assumptionem est quod unio importat ipsam relationem, assumptio autem actionem secundum quam dicitur aliquis assumens, vel passionem secundum quam dicitur aliquid assumptum. Ex hac autem differentia accipitur secundo alia differentia. Nam assumptio dicitur sicut in fieri, unio autem sicut in facto esse. Et ideo uniens dicitur esse unitum, assumens autem non dicitur esse assumptum. Natura enim humana significatur ut in termino assumptionis ad hypostasim divinam per hoc quod dicitur homo, unde vere dicimus quod filius Dei, qui est uniens sibi humanam naturam, est homo. Sed humana natura in se considerata, idest in abstracto, significatur ut assumpta, non autem dicimus quod filius Dei sit humana natura. Ex eodem etiam sequitur tertia differentia, quod relatio, praecipue aequiparantiae, non magis se habet ad unum extremum quam ad aliud; actio autem et passio diversimode se habent ad agens et patiens, et ad diversos terminos. Et ideo assumptio determinat terminum et a quo et ad quem, dicitur enim assumptio quasi ab alio ad se sumptio, unio autem nihil horum determinat. Unde indifferenter dicitur quod humana natura est unita divinae, et e converso. Non autem dicitur divina natura assumpta ab humana, sed e converso, quia humana natura adiuncta est ad per-

Objection 1: It would seem that union is the same as assumption. For relations, as motions, are specified by their termini. Now the term of assumption and union is one and the same, viz. the Divine hypostasis. Therefore it seems that union and assumption are not different. Obj. 2: Further, in the mystery of the Incarnation the same thing seems to be what unites and what assumes, and what is united and what is assumed. But union and assumption seem to follow the action and passion of the thing uniting and the united, of the thing assuming and the assumed. Therefore union seems to be the same as assumption. Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11): Union is one thing, incarnation is another; for union demands mere copulation, and leaves unsaid the end of the copulation; but incarnation and humanation determine the end of copulation. But likewise assumption does not determine the end of copulation. Therefore it seems that union is the same as assumption. On the contrary, The Divine Nature is said to be united, not assumed. I answer that, As was stated above (A. 7), union implies a certain relation of the Divine Nature and the human, according as they come together in one Person. Now all relations which begin in time are brought about by some change; and change consists in action and passion. Hence the first and principal difference between assumption and union must be said to be that union implies the relation: whereas assumption implies the action, whereby someone is said to assume, or the passion, whereby something is said to be assumed. Now from this difference another second difference arises, for assumption implies becoming, whereas union implies having become, and therefore the thing uniting is said to be united, but the thing assuming is not said to be assumed. For the human nature is taken to be in the terminus of assumption unto the Divine hypostasis when man is spoken of; and hence we can truly say that the Son of God, Who unites human nature unto Himself, is man. But human nature, considered in itself, i.e., in the abstract, is viewed as assumed; and we do not say the Son of God is human nature. From this same follows a third difference, which is that a relation, especially one of equiparance, is no more to one extreme than to the other, whereas action and passion bear themselves differently to the agent and the patient, and to different termini. And hence assumption determines the term whence and the term whither; for assumption means a taking to oneself from another. But union determines none of these things. Hence it may be said indifferently that the human nature is united with the Divine, or conversely. But the Divine Nature is not said to be assumed by the human, but conversely, because the hu-

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sonalitatem divinam, ut scilicet persona divina in humana natura subsistat. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod unio et assumptio non eodem modo se habent ad terminum, sed diversimode, sicut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod uniens et assumens non omnino sunt idem. Nam omnis persona assumens est uniens, non autem e converso. Nam persona patris univit naturam humanam filio, non autem sibi et ideo dicitur uniens, non assumens. Et similiter non est idem unitum et assumptum. Nam divina natura dicitur unita, non assumpta. Ad tertium dicendum quod assumptio determinat cui facta est copulatio ex parte assumentis, inquantum assumptio dicitur quasi ad se sumptio. Sed incarnatio et humanatio ex parte assumpti, quod est caro, vel natura humana. Et ideo assumptio differt ratione et ab unione, et ab incarnatione seu humanatione.

Q. 2, A. 9

man nature is joined to the Divine personality, so that the Divine Person subsists in human nature. Reply Obj. 1: Union and assumption have not the same relation to the term, but a different relation, as was said above. Reply Obj. 2: What unites and what assumes are not the same. For whatsoever Person assumes unites, and not conversely. For the Person of the Father united the human nature to the Son, but not to Himself; and hence He is said to unite and not to assume. So likewise the united and the assumed are not identical, for the Divine Nature is said to be united, but not assumed. Reply Obj. 3: Assumption determines with whom the union is made on the part of the one assuming, inasmuch as assumption means taking unto oneself (ad se sumere), whereas incarnation and humanation (determine with whom the union is made) on the part of the thing assumed, which is flesh or human nature. And thus assumption differs logically both from union and from incarnation or humanation.

Article 9 Whether the union of the two natures in Christ is the greatest of all unions? Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio duarum naturarum non sit maxima unionum. Unitum enim deficit in ratione unitatis ab eo quod est unum, eo quod unitum dicitur per participationem, unum autem per essentiam. Sed in rebus creatis aliquid dicitur esse simpliciter unum, sicut praecipue patet de ipsa unitate quae est principium numeri. Ergo huiusmodi unio de qua loquimur, non importat maximam unitatem. Praeterea, quanto ea quae uniuntur magis distant, tanto minor est unio. Sed ea quae secundum hanc unionem uniuntur, maxime distant, scilicet natura divina et humana, distant enim in infinitum. Ergo huiusmodi est minima unio. Praeterea, per unionem aliquid fit unum. Sed ex unione animae et corporis in nobis fit aliquid unum in persona et natura, ex unione autem divinae et humanae naturae fit aliquid unum solum in persona. Ergo maior est unio animae ad corpus quam divinae naturae ad humanam. Et sic unio de qua loquimur, non importat maximam unitatem. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., quod homo potius est in filio quam filius in patre. Filius autem est in patre per unitatem essentiae, homo autem est in filio per unionem incarnationis. Ergo maior est unio incarnationis quam unitas divinae essentiae. Quae tamen est maxima unitatum. Et sic, per consequens, unio incarnationis importat maximam unitatem.

Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the two natures in Christ is not the greatest of all unions. For what is united falls short of the unity of what is one, since what is united is by participation, but one is by essence. Now in created things there are some that are simply one, as is shown especially in unity itself, which is the principle of number. Therefore the union of which we are speaking does not imply the greatest of all unions. Obj. 2: Further, the greater the distance between things united, the less the union. Now, the things united by this union are most distant—namely, the Divine and human natures; for they are infinitely apart. Therefore their union is the least of all. Obj. 3: Further, from union there results one. But from the union of soul and body in us there arises what is one in person and nature; whereas from the union of the Divine and human nature there results what is one in person only. Therefore the union of soul and body is greater than that of the Divine and human natures; and hence the union of which we speak does not imply the greatest unity. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 10) that man is in the Son of God, more than the Son in the Father. But the Son is in the Father by unity of essence, and man is in the Son by the union of the Incarnation. Therefore the union of the Incarnation is greater than the unity of the Divine Essence, which nevertheless is the greatest union; and thus the union of the Incarnation implies the greatest unity.

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Respondeo dicendum quod unio importat coniunctionem aliquorum in aliquo uno. Potest ergo unio incarnationis dupliciter accipi, uno modo, ex parte eorum quae coniunguntur; et alio modo, ex parte eius in quo coniunguntur. Et ex hac parte huiusmodi unio habet praeeminentiam inter alias uniones, nam unitas personae divinae, in qua uniuntur duae naturae, est maxima. Non autem habet praeeminentiam ex parte eorum quae coniunguntur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod unitas personae divinae est maior quam unitas numeralis, quae scilicet est principium numeri. Nam unitas divinae personae est unitas per se subsistens, non recepta in aliquo per participationem, est etiam in se completa, habens in se quidquid pertinet ad rationem unitatis. Et ideo non competit sibi ratio partis, sicut unitati numerali, quae est pars numeri, et quae participatur in rebus numeratis. Et ideo quantum ad hoc unio incarnationis praeeminet unitati numerali, ratione scilicet unitatis personae. Non autem ratione naturae humanae, quae non est ipsa unitas personae divinae, sed est ei unita.

IIIae

I answer that, Union implies the joining of several in some one thing. Therefore the union of the Incarnation may be taken in two ways: first, in regard to the things united; second, in regard to that in which they are united. And in this regard this union has a pre-eminence over other unions; for the unity of the Divine Person, in which the two natures are united, is the greatest. But it has no preeminence in regard to the things united.

Reply Obj. 1: The unity of the Divine Person is greater than numerical unity, which is the principle of number. For the unity of a Divine Person is an uncreated and selfsubsisting unity, not received into another by participation. Also, it is complete in itself, having in itself whatever pertains to the nature of unity; and therefore it is not compatible with the nature of a part, as in numerical unity, which is a part of number, and which is shared in by the things numbered. And hence in this respect the union of the Incarnation is higher than numerical unity by reason of the unity of the Divine Person, and not by reason of the human nature, which is not the unity of the Divine Person, but is united to it. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit Reply Obj. 2: This reason regards the things united, ex parte coniunctorum, non autem ex parte personae in and not the Person in Whom the union takes place.

qua est facta unio. Ad tertium dicendum quod unitas divinae personae est maior unitas quam unitas et personae et naturae in nobis. Et ideo unio incarnationis est maior quam unio animae et corporis in nobis. Quia vero id quod in contrarium obiicitur falsum supponit, scilicet quod maior sit unio incarnationis quam unitas personarum divinarum in essentia, dicendum est ad auctoritatem Augustini quod humana natura non est magis in filio Dei quam filius Dei in patre sed multo minus, sed ipse homo, quantum ad aliquid, est magis in filio quam filius in patre; inquantum scilicet idem supponitur in hoc quod dico homo, prout sumitur pro Christo, et in hoc quod dico, filius Dei; non autem idem est suppositum patris et filii.

Reply Obj. 3: The unity of the Divine Person is greater than the unity of person and nature in us; and hence the union of the Incarnation is greater than the union of soul and body in us. And because what is urged in the argument on the contrary rests upon what is untrue—namely, that the union of the Incarnation is greater than the unity of the Divine Persons in Essence—we must say to the authority of Augustine that the human nature is not more in the Son of God than the Son of God in the Father, but much less. But the man in some respects is more in the Son than the Son in the Father—namely, inasmuch as the same suppositum is signified when I say man, meaning Christ, and when I say Son of God; whereas it is not the same suppositum of Father and Son.

Article 10 Whether the union of the Incarnation took place by grace? Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio incarnationis non sit per gratiam. Gratia enim est accidens quoddam, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Sed unio humanae naturae ad divinam non est facta per accidens, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo videtur quod unio incarnationis non sit facta per gratiam. Praeterea, gratiae subiectum est anima. Sed sicut dicitur Coloss. II, in Christo habitavit plenitudo divinita-

Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnation did not take place by grace. For grace is an accident, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 110, A. 2). But the union of the human nature to the Divine did not take place accidentally, as was shown above (A. 6). Therefore it seems that the union of the Incarnation did not take place by grace. Obj. 2: Further, the subject of grace is the soul. But it is written (Col 2:9): In Christ dwelleth all the fullness of the

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tis corporaliter. Ergo videtur quod illa unio non sit facta per gratiam. Praeterea, quilibet sanctus Deo unitur per gratiam. Si igitur unio incarnationis fuit per gratiam, videtur quod non aliter dicatur Christus esse Deus quam alii sancti homines. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praedest. sanctorum, ea gratia fit ab initio fidei suae homo quicumque Christianus, qua gratia homo ille ab initio suo factus est Christus. Sed homo ille factus est Christus per unionem ad divinam naturam. Ergo unio illa fuit per gratiam. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in secunda parte dictum est, gratia dupliciter dicitur, uno modo, ipsa voluntas Dei gratis aliquid dantis; alio modo, ipsum gratuitum donum Dei. Indiget autem humana natura gratuita Dei voluntate ad hoc quod elevetur in Deum, cum hoc sit supra facultatem naturae suae. Elevatur autem humana natura in Deum dupliciter. Uno modo, per operationem, qua scilicet sancti cognoscunt et amant Deum. Alio modo, per esse personale, qui quidem modus est singularis Christo, in quo humana natura assumpta est ad hoc quod sit personae filii Dei. Manifestum est autem quod ad perfectionem operationis requiritur quod potentia sit perfecta per habitum, sed quod natura habeat esse in supposito suo, non fit mediante aliquo habitu. Sic igitur dicendum est quod, si gratia accipiatur ipsa Dei voluntas gratis aliquid faciens, vel gratum seu acceptum aliquem habens, unio incarnationis facta est per gratiam, sicut et unio sanctorum ad Deum per cognitionem et amorem. Si vero gratia dicatur ipsum gratuitum Dei donum, sic ipsum quod est humanam naturam esse unitam personae divinae, potest dici quaedam gratia, inquantum nullis praecedentibus meritis hoc est factum, non autem ita quod sit aliqua gratia habitualis qua mediante talis unio fiat. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod gratia quae est accidens, est quaedam similitudo divinitatis participata in homine. Per incarnationem autem humana natura non dicitur participasse similitudinem aliquam divinae naturae, sed dicitur esse coniuncta ipsi naturae divinae in persona filii. Maius autem est ipsa res quam similitudo eius participata. Ad secundum dicendum quod gratia habitualis est solum in anima, sed gratia, idest gratuitum Dei donum quod est uniri divinae personae, pertinet ad totam naturam humanam, quae componitur ex anima et corpore. Et per hunc modum dicitur plenitudo divinitatis in Christo corporaliter habitasse, quia est unita divina natura non solum animae, sed etiam corpori. Quamvis etiam possit dici quod dicitur habitasse in Christo corporaliter, idest non umbraliter, sicut habitavit in sacramentis veteris legis, de quibus ibidem subditur quod sunt umbra futurorum, corpus autem est Christus, prout

Q. 2, A. 10

Godhead corporeally. Therefore it seems that this union did not take place by grace. Obj. 3: Further, every saint is united to God by grace. If, therefore, the union of the Incarnation was by grace, it would seem that Christ is said to be God no more than other holy men. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. xv): By the same grace every man is made a Christian, from the beginning of his faith, as this man from His beginning was made Christ. But this man became Christ by union with the Divine Nature. Therefore this union was by grace. I answer that, As was said above (I-II, Q. 110, A. 1), grace is taken in two ways:—first, as the will of God gratuitously bestowing something; second, as the free gift of God. Now human nature stands in need of the gratuitous will of God in order to be lifted up to God, since this is above its natural capability. Moreover, human nature is lifted up to God in two ways: first, by operation, as the saints know and love God; second, by personal being, and this mode belongs exclusively to Christ, in Whom human nature is assumed so as to be in the Person of the Son of God. But it is plain that for the perfection of operation the power needs to be perfected by a habit, whereas that a nature has being in its own suppositum does not take place by means of a habit. And hence we must say that if grace be understood as the will of God gratuitously doing something or reputing anything as well-pleasing or acceptable to Him, the union of the Incarnation took place by grace, even as the union of the saints with God by knowledge and love. But if grace be taken as the free gift of God, then the fact that the human nature is united to the Divine Person may be called a grace, inasmuch as it took place without being preceded by any merits—but not as though there were an habitual grace, by means of which the union took place. Reply Obj. 1: The grace which is an accident is a certain likeness of the Divinity participated by man. But by the Incarnation human nature is not said to have participated a likeness of the Divine nature, but is said to be united to the Divine Nature itself in the Person of the Son. Now the thing itself is greater than a participated likeness of it. Reply Obj. 2: Habitual grace is only in the soul; but the grace, i.e., the free gift of God, of being united to the Divine Person belongs to the whole human nature, which is composed of soul and body. And hence it is said that the fullness of the Godhead dwelt corporeally in Christ because the Divine Nature is united not merely to the soul, but to the body also. Although it may also be said that it dwelt in Christ corporeally, i.e., not as in a shadow, as it dwelt in the sacraments of the old law, of which it is said in the same place (Col 2:17) that they are the shadow of things to come but the body is Christ, inasmuch as the body is opposed

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Q. 2, A. 11

Incarnation

scilicet corpus contra umbram dividitur. Dicunt etiam quidam quod divinitas dicitur in Christo habitasse corporaliter, scilicet tribus modis, sicut corpus habet tres dimensiones, uno modo, per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam, sicut in ceteris creaturis; alio modo, per gratiam gratum facientem, sicut in sanctis tertio modo, per unionem personalem, quod est proprium sibi. Unde patet responsio ad tertium, quia scilicet unio incarnationis non est facta solum per gratiam habitualem, sicut alii sancti uniuntur Deo; sed secundum subsistentiam, sive personam.

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to the shadow. And some say that the Godhead is said to have dwelt in Christ corporeally, i.e., in three ways, just as a body has three dimensions: first, by essence, presence, and power, as in other creatures; second, by sanctifying grace, as in the saints; third, by personal union, which is proper to Christ. Hence the reply to the third is manifest, viz. because the union of the Incarnation did not take place by habitual grace alone, but in subsistence or person.

Article 11 Whether any merits preceded the union of the Incarnation? Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unio incarnationis fuerit aliqua merita subsecuta. Quia super illud Psalmi, fiat misericordia tua, domine, super nos, quemadmodum speravimus in te, dicit Glossa, hic insinuatur desiderium prophetae de incarnatione, et meritum impletionis. Ergo incarnatio cadit sub merito. Praeterea, quicumque meretur aliquid, meretur illud sine quo illud haberi non potest. Sed antiqui patres merebantur vitam aeternam, ad quam pervenire non poterant nisi per incarnationem, dicit enim Gregorius, in libro Moral., hi qui ante Christi adventum in hunc mundum venerunt, quantamlibet iustitiae virtutem haberent, ex corporibus educti in sinum caelestis patriae statim recipi nullo modo poterant, quia nondum ille venerat qui iustorum animas in perpetua sede collocaret. Ergo videtur quod meruerint incarnationem. Praeterea, de beata virgine cantatur quod dominum omnium meruit portare, quod quidem factum est per incarnationem. Ergo incarnatio cadit sub merito. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praedest. sanctorum, quisquis in capite nostro praecedentia merita singularis illius generationis invenerit, ipse in nobis, membris eius, praecedentia merita multiplicatae regenerationis inquirat. Sed nulla merita praecesserunt regenerationem nostram secundum illud Tit. III, non ex operibus iustitiae quae fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit per lavacrum regenerationis. Ergo nec illam Christi generationem aliqua merita praecesserunt. Respondeo dicendum quod, quantum ad ipsum Christum, manifestum est ex praemissis quod nulla eius merita potuerunt praecedere unionem. Non enim ponimus quod ante fuerit purus homo, et postea per meritum bonae vitae obtinuerit esse filius Dei, sicut posuit Photi-

Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnation followed upon certain merits, because upon Ps. 32:22, Let Thy mercy, O Lord, be upon us, as we have hoped in thee, a gloss says: Here the prophet’s desire for the Incarnation and its merited fulfilment are hinted at. Therefore the Incarnation falls under merit. Obj. 2: Further, whoever merits anything merits that without which it cannot be. But the ancient Fathers merited eternal life, to which they were able to attain only by the Incarnation; for Gregory says (Moral. xiii): Those who came into this world before Christ’s coming, whatsoever eminency of righteousness they may have had, could not, on being divested of the body, at once be admitted into the bosom of the heavenly country, seeing that He had not as yet come Who, by His own descending, should place the souls of the righteous in their everlasting seat. Therefore it would seem that they merited the Incarnation. Obj. 3: Further, of the Blessed Virgin it is sung that she merited to bear the Lord of all, and this took place through the Incarnation. Therefore the Incarnation falls under merit. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. xv): Whoever can find merits preceding the singular generation of our Head, may also find merits preceding the repeated regeneration of us His members. But no merits preceded our regeneration, according to Titus 3:5: Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us, by the laver of regeneration. Therefore no merits preceded the generation of Christ.

I answer that, With regard to Christ Himself, it is clear from the above (A. 10) that no merits of His could have preceded the union. For we do not hold that He was first of all a mere man, and that afterwards by the merits of a good life it was granted Him to become the Son of God, as

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nus, sed ponimus quod a principio suae conceptionis ille homo vere fuerit filius Dei, utpote non habens aliam hypostasim quam filium Dei, secundum illud Luc. I, quod ex te nascetur sanctum, vocabitur filius Dei. Et ideo omnis operatio illius hominis subsecuta est unionem. Unde nulla eius operatio potuit esse meritum unionis. Sed neque etiam opera cuiuscumque alterius hominis potuerunt esse meritoria huius unionis ex condigno. Primo quidem, quia opera meritoria hominis proprie ordinantur ad beatitudinem, quae est virtutis praemium, et consistit in plena Dei fruitione. Unio autem incarnationis, cum sit in esse personali, transcendit unionem mentis beatae ad Deum, quae est per actum fruentis. Et ita non potest cadere sub merito. Secundo, quia gratia non potest cadere sub merito, quia est merendi principium. Unde multo minus incarnatio cadit sub merito, quae est principium gratiae, secundum illud Ioan. I, gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum facta est. Tertio, quia incarnatio Christi est reformativa totius humanae naturae. Et ideo non cadit sub merito alicuius hominis singularis, quia bonum alicuius puri hominis non potest esse causa boni totius naturae. Ex congruo tamen meruerunt sancti patres incarnationem, desiderando et petendo. Congruum enim erat ut Deus exaudiret eos qui ei obediebant.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. Ad secundum dicendum hoc esse falsum, quod sub merito cadat omne illud sine quo praemium esse non potest. Quaedam enim sunt quae non solum requiruntur ad praemium, sed etiam praeexiguntur ad meritum, sicut divina bonitas et eius gratia, et ipsa hominis natura. Et similiter incarnationis mysterium est principium merendi, quia de plenitudine Christi omnes accepimus, ut dicitur Ioan. I. Ad tertium dicendum quod beata virgo dicitur meruisse portare dominum Iesum Christum, non quia meruit Deum incarnari, sed quia meruit, ex gratia sibi data, illum puritatis et sanctitatis gradum ut congrue posset esse mater Dei.

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Photinus held; but we hold that from the beginning of His conception this man was truly the Son of God, seeing that He had no other hypostasis but that of the Son of God, according to Luke 1:35: The Holy which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God. And hence every operation of this man followed the union. Therefore no operation of His could have been meritorious of the union. Neither could the needs of any other man whatsoever have merited this union condignly: first, because the meritorious works of man are properly ordained to beatitude, which is the reward of virtue, and consists in the full enjoyment of God. Whereas the union of the Incarnation, inasmuch as it is in the personal being, transcends the union of the beatified mind with God, which is by the act of the soul in fruition; and therefore it cannot fall under merit. Second, because grace cannot fall under merit, for the principle of merit does not fall under merit; and therefore neither does grace, for it is the principle of merit. Hence, still less does the Incarnation fall under merit, since it is the principle of grace, according to John 1:17: Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. Third, because the Incarnation is for the reformation of the entire human nature, and therefore it does not fall under the merit of any individual man, since the goodness of a mere man cannot be the cause of the good of the entire nature. Yet the holy Fathers merited the Incarnation congruously by desiring and beseeching; for it was becoming that God should harken to those who obeyed Him. And thereby the reply to the First Objection is manifest. Reply Obj. 2: It is false that under merit falls everything without which there can be no reward. For there is something pre-required not merely for reward, but also for merit, as the Divine goodness and grace and the very nature of man. And again, the mystery of the Incarnation is the principle of merit, because of His fullness we all have received (John 1:16). Reply Obj. 3: The Blessed Virgin is said to have merited to bear the Lord of all; not that she merited His Incarnation, but because by the grace bestowed upon her she merited that grade of purity and holiness, which fitted her to be the Mother of God.

Article 12 Whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ? Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Objection 1: It would seem that the grace of union gratia unionis non fuerit Christo homini naturalis. Unio was not natural to the man Christ. For the union of the Inenim incarnationis non est facta in natura, sed in perso- carnation did not take place in the nature, but in the Person, na, ut supra dictum est. Sed unumquodque denomina- as was said above (A. 2). Now a thing is denominated from

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tur a termino. Ergo gratia illa magis debet dici personalis quam naturalis. Praeterea, gratia dividitur contra naturam, sicut gratuita, quae sunt a Deo, distinguuntur contra naturalia, quae sunt a principio intrinseco. Sed eorum quae ex opposito dividuntur, unum non denominatur ab alio. Ergo gratia Christi non est ei naturalis. Praeterea, naturale dicitur quod est secundum naturam. Sed gratia unionis non est naturalis Christo secundum naturam divinam, quia sic conveniret etiam aliis personis. Neque etiam naturalis est ei secundum naturam humanam, quia sic conveniret omnibus hominibus qui sunt eiusdem naturae cum ipso. Ergo videtur quod nullo modo gratia unionis sit Christo naturalis. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., in naturae humanae susceptione fit quodammodo ipsa gratia illi homini naturalis, qua nullum possit admittere peccatum. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in V Metaphys., natura uno modo dicitur ipsa nativitas, alio modo essentia rei. Unde naturale potest aliquid dici dupliciter. Uno modo, quod est tantum ex principiis essentialibus rei, sicut igni naturale est sursum ferri. Alio modo dicitur esse homini naturale quod ab ipsa nativitate habet, secundum illud Ephes. II, eramus natura filii irae; et Sap. XII, nequam est natio eorum, et naturalis malitia ipsorum. Gratia igitur Christi, sive unionis sive habitualis, non potest dici naturalis quasi causata ex principiis naturae humanae in ipso, quamvis possit dici naturalis quasi proveniens in naturam humanam Christi causante divina natura ipsius. Dicitur autem naturalis utraque gratia in Christo inquantum eam a nativitate habuit, quia ab initio conceptionis fuit natura humana divinae personae unita, et anima eius fuit munere gratiae repleta. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet unio non sit facta in natura, est tamen causata ex virtute divinae naturae, quae est vere natura Christi. Et etiam convenit Christo a principio nativitatis. Ad secundum dicendum quod non secundum idem dicitur gratia, et naturalis. Sed gratia quidem dicitur inquantum non est ex merito, naturalis autem dicitur inquantum est ex virtute divinae naturae in humanitate Christi ab eius nativitate. Ad tertium dicendum quod gratia unionis non est naturalis Christo secundum humanam naturam, quasi ex principiis humanae naturae causata. Et ideo non oportet quod conveniat omnibus hominibus. Est tamen naturalis ei secundum humanam naturam, propter proprietatem nativitatis ipsius, prout sic conceptus est ex spiritu sancto ut esset idem naturalis filius Dei et hominis. Secundum vero divinam naturam est ei naturalis, inquantum divina natura est principium activum huius

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its terminus. Therefore this grace ought rather to be called personal than natural. Obj. 2: Further, grace is divided against nature, even as gratuitous things, which are from God, are distinguished from natural things, which are from an intrinsic principle. But if things are divided in opposition to one another, one is not denominated by the other. Therefore the grace of Christ was not natural to Him. Obj. 3: Further, natural is that which is according to nature. But the grace of union is not natural to Christ in regard to the Divine Nature, otherwise it would belong to the other Persons; nor is it natural to Him according to the human nature, otherwise it would belong to all men, since they are of the same nature as He. Therefore it would seem that the grace of union is nowise natural to Christ. On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): In the assumption of human nature, grace itself became somewhat natural to that man, so as to leave no room for sin in Him. I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 5), nature designates, in one way, nativity; in another, the essence of a thing. Hence natural may be taken in two ways: first, for what is only from the essential principles of a thing, as it is natural to fire to be carried up; second, we call natural to man what he has had from his birth, according to Eph. 2:3: We were by nature children of wrath; and Wis. 12:10: They were a wicked generation, and their malice natural. Therefore the grace of Christ, whether of union or habitual, cannot be called natural as if caused by the principles of the human nature of Christ, although it may be called natural, as if coming to the human nature of Christ by the causality of His Divine Nature. But these two kinds of grace are said to be natural to Christ, inasmuch as He had them from His nativity, since from the beginning of His conception the human nature was united to the Divine Person, and His soul was filled with the gift of grace. Reply Obj. 1: Although the union did not take place in the nature, yet it was caused by the power of the Divine Nature, which is truly the nature of Christ, and it, moreover, belonged to Christ from the beginning of His nativity. Reply Obj. 2: The union is not said to be grace and natural in the same respect; for it is called grace inasmuch as it is not from merit; and it is said to be natural inasmuch as by the power of the Divine Nature it was in the humanity of Christ from His nativity. Reply Obj. 3: The grace of union is not natural to Christ according to His human nature, as if it were caused by the principles of the human nature, and hence it need not belong to all men. Nevertheless, it is natural to Him in regard to the human nature on account of the property of His birth, seeing that He was conceived by the Holy Spirit, so that He might be the natural Son of God and of man. But it is natural to Him in regard to the Divine Nature, inasmuch as the Divine Nature is the active principle of this

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gratiae. Et hoc convenit toti Trinitati, scilicet huius gra- grace; and this belongs to the whole Trinity—to wit, to be tiae esse activum principium. the active principle of this grace.

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Question 3 The Mode of Union on the Part of the Person Assuming Deinde considerandum est de unione ex parte persoWe must now consider the union on the part of the Pernae assumentis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. son assuming, and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum assumere conveniat personae divinae. (1) Whether to assume is befitting to a Divine Person? Secundo, utrum conveniat naturae divinae. (2) Whether it is befitting to the Divine Nature? Tertio, utrum natura possit assumere, abstracta (3) Whether the Nature abstracted from the personalitate. Personality can assume? Quarto, utrum una persona possit assumere sine (4) Whether one Person can assume without another? alia. Quinto, utrum quaelibet persona possit assumere. (5) Whether each Person can assume? Sexto, utrum plures personae possint assumere (6) Whether several Persons can assume one individual unam naturam numero. nature? Septimo, utrum una persona possit assumere duas (7) Whether one Person can assume two individual naturas numero. natures? Octavo, utrum magis fuerit conveniens de persona (8) Whether it was more fitting for the Person of the filii quod assumpsit humanam naturam, quam Son of God to assume human nature than for de alia persona divina. another Divine Person?

Article 1 Whether it is befitting for a Divine Person to assume a created nature? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod personae divinae non conveniat assumere naturam creatam. Persona enim divina significat aliquid maxime perfectum. Perfectum autem est cui non potest fieri additio. Cum igitur assumere sit quasi ad se sumere, ita quod assumptum addatur assumenti, videtur quod personae divinae non conveniat assumere naturam creatam. Praeterea, illud ad quod aliquid assumitur, communicatur quodammodo ei quod in ipsum assumitur, sicut dignitas communicatur ei qui in dignitatem assumitur. Sed de ratione personae est quod sit incommunicabilis, ut in prima parte dictum est. Ergo personae divinae non convenit assumere, quod est ad se sumere. Praeterea, persona constituitur per naturam. Sed inconveniens est quod constitutum assumat constituens, quia effectus non agit in suam causam. Ergo personae non convenit assumere naturam. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de fide ad Petrum, formam, idest naturam servi in suam accepit Deus ille, scilicet unigenitus, personam. Sed Deus unigenitus est persona. Ergo personae competit accipere naturam, quod est assumere.

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not befitting to a Divine Person to assume a created nature. For a Divine Person signifies something most perfect. Now no addition can be made to what is perfect. Therefore, since to assume is to take to oneself, and consequently what is assumed is added to the one who assumes, it does not seem to be befitting to a Divine Person to assume a created nature. Obj. 2: Further, that to which anything is assumed is communicated in some degree to what is assumed to it, just as dignity is communicated to whosoever is assumed to a dignity. But it is of the nature of a person to be incommunicable, as was said above (I, Q. 29, A. 1). Therefore it is not befitting to a Divine Person to assume, i.e., to take to Himself. Obj. 3: Further, person is constituted by nature. But it is repugnant that the thing constituted should assume the constituent, since the effect does not act on its cause. Hence it is not befitting to a Person to assume a nature. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Fide ad Petrum ii): This God, i.e., the only-Begotten one, took the form, i.e., the nature, of a servant to His own Person. But the only-Begotten God is a Person. Therefore it is befitting to a Person to take, i.e., to assume a nature.

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Respondeo dicendum quod in verbo assumptionis duo importantur, videlicet principium actus, et terminus, dicitur enim assumere quasi ad se aliquid sumere. Huius autem assumptionis persona est et principium et terminus. Principium quidem, quia personae proprie competit agere, huiusmodi autem sumptio carnis per actionem divinam facta est. Similiter etiam persona est huius sumptionis terminus, quia, sicut supra dictum est, unio facta est in persona, non in natura. Et sic patet quod propriissime competit personae assumere naturam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum persona divina sit infinita, non potest ei fieri additio. Unde Cyrillus dicit, in epistola synodali Ephesini Concilii, non secundum coappositionem coniunctionis intelligimus modum. Sicut etiam in unione hominis ad Deum quae est per gratiam adoptionis, non additur aliquid Deo, sed id quod divinum est apponitur homini. Unde non Deus, sed homo perficitur. Ad secundum dicendum quod persona dicitur incommunicabilis inquantum non potest de pluribus suppositis praedicari. Nihil tamen prohibet plura de persona praedicari. Unde non est contra rationem personae sic communicari ut subsistat in pluribus naturis. Quia etiam in personam creatam possunt plures naturae concurrere accidentaliter, sicut in persona unius hominis invenitur quantitas et qualitas. Hoc autem est proprium divinae personae, propter eius infinitatem, ut fiat in ea concursus naturarum, non quidem accidentaliter, sed secundum subsistentiam. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, natura humana non constituit personam divinam simpliciter, sed constituit eam secundum quod denominatur a tali natura. Non enim ex natura humana habet filius Dei quod sit simpliciter, cum fuerit ab aeterno, sed solum quod sit homo. Sed secundum naturam divinam constituitur persona divina simpliciter. Unde persona divina non dicitur assumere divinam naturam, sed humanam.

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I answer that, In the word assumption are implied two things, viz. the principle and the term of the act, for to assume is to take something to oneself. Now of this assumption a Person is both the principle and the term. The principle—because it properly belongs to a person to act, and this assuming of flesh took place by the Divine action. Likewise a Person is the term of this assumption, because, as was said above (Q. 2, AA. 1, 2), the union took place in the Person, and not in the nature. Hence it is plain that to assume a nature is most properly befitting to a Person. Reply Obj. 1: Since the Divine Person is infinite, no addition can be made to it: Hence Cyril says: We do not conceive the mode of conjunction to be according to addition; just as in the union of man with God, nothing is added to God by the grace of adoption, but what is Divine is united to man; hence, not God but man is perfected.

Reply Obj. 2: A Divine Person is said to be incommunicable inasmuch as It cannot be predicated of several supposita, but nothing prevents several things being predicated of the Person. Hence it is not contrary to the nature of person to be communicated so as to subsist in several natures, for even in a created person several natures may concur accidentally, as in the person of one man we find quantity and quality. But this is proper to a Divine Person, on account of its infinity, that there should be a concourse of natures in it, not accidentally, but in subsistence. Reply Obj. 3: As was said above (Q. 2, A. 1), the human nature constitutes a Divine Person, not simply, but forasmuch as the Person is denominated from such a nature. For human nature does not make the Son of Man to be simply, since He was from eternity, but only to be man. It is by the Divine Nature that a Divine Person is constituted simply. Hence the Divine Person is not said to assume the Divine Nature, but to assume the human nature.

Article 2 Whether it is befitting to the Divine Nature to assume? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod naturae divinae non conveniat assumere. Quia, sicut dictum est assumere dicitur quasi ad se sumere. Sed natura divina non sumpsit ad se humanam naturam, quia non est facta unio in natura, sed in persona, sicut supra dictum est. Ergo naturae divinae non competit assumere naturam humanam. Praeterea, natura divina communis est tribus personis. Si igitur naturae convenit assumere, sequitur quod

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not befitting to the Divine Nature to assume. Because, as was said above (A. 1), to assume is to take to oneself. But the Divine Nature did not take to Itself human nature, for the union did not take place in the nature, as was said above (Q. 2, AA. 1, 3). Hence it is not befitting to the Divine Nature to assume human nature. Obj. 2: Further, the Divine Nature is common to the three Persons. If, therefore, it is befitting to the Divine Na-

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conveniat tribus personis et ita pater assumpsit huma- ture to assume, it consequently is befitting to the three Pernam naturam, sicut et filius. Quod est erroneum. sons; and thus the Father assumed human nature even as the Son, which is erroneous. Praeterea, assumere est agere. Agere autem conObj. 3: Further, to assume is to act. But to act befits a venit personae, non naturae, quae magis significatur ut person, not a nature, which is rather taken to be the principrincipium quo agens agit. Ergo assumere non convenit ple by which the agent acts. Therefore to assume is not benaturae. fitting to the nature. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de On the contrary, Augustine says (De Fide ad fide ad Petrum, illa natura quae semper genita manet ex Petrum ii): That nature which remains eternally begotten of patre, idest, quae est per generationem aeternam accepta the Father (i.e., which is received from the Father by eternal a patre, naturam nostram sine peccato suscepit. generation) took our nature free of sin from His Mother. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, in I answer that, As was said above (A. 1), in the word verbo assumptionis duo significantur, scilicet princi- assumption two things are signified—to wit, the principle pium actionis, et terminus eius. Esse autem assump- and the term of the action. Now to be the principle of the tionis principium convenit naturae divinae secundum assumption belongs to the Divine Nature in itself, because seipsam, quia eius virtute assumptio facta est. Sed es- the assumption took place by Its power; but to be the term se terminum assumptionis non convenit naturae divinae of the assumption does not belong to the Divine Nature secundum seipsam, sed ratione personae in qua consi- in itself, but by reason of the Person in Whom It is conderatur. Et ideo primo quidem et propriissime perso- sidered to be. Hence a Person is primarily and more propna dicitur assumere, secundario autem potest dici quod erly said to assume, but it may be said secondarily that the etiam natura assumit naturam ad sui personam. Et se- Nature assumed a nature to Its Person. And after the same cundum etiam hunc modum dicitur natura incarnata, manner the Nature is also said to be incarnate, not that it non quasi sit in carnem conversa; sed quia naturam car- is changed to flesh, but that it assumed the nature of flesh. nis assumpsit. Unde dicit Damascenus, dicimus naturam Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6): Following the Dei incarnatam esse, secundum beatos Athanasium et Cy- blessed Athanasius and Cyril we say that the Nature of God rillum. is incarnate. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ly se est reciproReply Obj. 1: Oneself is reciprocal, and points to the cum, et refert idem suppositum. Natura autem divina same suppositum. But the Divine Nature is not a distinct non differt supposito a persona verbi. Et ideo, inquan- suppositum from the Person of the Word. Hence, inasmuch tum natura divina sumit naturam humanam ad perso- as the Divine Nature took human nature to the Person of nam verbi, dicitur eam ad se sumere. Sed quamvis pa- the Word, It is said to take it to Itself. But although the Fater assumat naturam humanam ad personam verbi, non ther takes human nature to the Person of the Word, He did tamen propter hoc sumit eam ad se, quia non est idem not thereby take it to Himself, for the suppositum of the Fasuppositum patris et verbi. Et ideo non potest dici pro- ther and the Son is not one, and hence it cannot properly be prie quod pater assumat naturam humanam. said that the Father assumes human nature. Ad secundum dicendum quod id quod convenit diReply Obj. 2: What is befitting to the Divine Nature in vinae naturae secundum se, convenit tribus personis, si- Itself is befitting to the three Persons, as goodness, wisdom, cut bonitas, sapientia et huiusmodi. Sed assumere con- and the like. But to assume belongs to It by reason of the venit ei ratione personae verbi, sicut dictum est. Et ideo Person of the Word, as was said above, and hence it is befitsoli illi personae convenit. ting to that Person alone. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut in Deo idem est Reply Obj. 3: As in God what is and whereby it is are quod est et quo est, ita etiam in eo idem est quod agit the same, so likewise in Him what acts and whereby it acts et quo agit, quia unumquodque agit inquantum est ens. are the same, since everything acts, inasmuch as it is a beUnde natura divina et est id quo Deus agit, et est ipse ing. Hence the Divine Nature is both that whereby God Deus agens. acts, and the very God Who acts.

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Article 3 Whether the nature abstracted from the personality can assume? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod, abstracta personalitate per intellectum, natura non possit assumere. Dictum est enim quod naturae convenit assumere ratione personae. Sed quod convenit alicui ratione alicuius, remoto eo, non potest ei convenire, sicut corpus, quod est visibile ratione coloris, sine colore videri non potest. Ergo, abstracta personalitate per intellectum, natura assumere non potest. Praeterea, assumptio importat terminum unionis, ut dictum est. Sed unio non potest fieri in natura, sed solum in persona. Ergo, abstracta personalitate, natura divina non potest assumere. Praeterea, in prima parte dictum est quod in divinis, abstracta personalitate, nihil manet. Sed assumens est aliquid. Ergo, abstracta personalitate, non potest divina natura assumere. Sed contra est quod in divinis personalitas dicitur proprietas personalis, quae est triplex, scilicet paternitas, processio et filiatio, ut in prima parte dictum est. Sed, remotis his per intellectum, adhuc remanet Dei omnipotentia, per quam est facta incarnatio, sicut Angelus dixit, Luc. I, non erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum. Ergo videtur quod, etiam remota personalitate, natura divina possit assumere. Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus dupliciter se habet ad divina uno modo, ut cognoscat Deum sicuti est. Et sic impossibile est quod circumscribatur per intellectum aliquid a Deo quod aliud remaneat, quia totum quod est in Deo est unum, salva distinctione personarum; quarum tamen una tollitur, sublata alia, quia distinguuntur solum relationibus, quas oportet esse simul. Alio modo se habet intellectus ad divina, non quidem quasi cognoscens Deum ut est, sed per modum suum, scilicet multipliciter et divisim id quod in Deo est unum. Et per hunc modum potest intellectus noster intelligere bonitatem et sapientiam divinam, et alia huiusmodi, quae dicuntur essentialia attributa, non intellecta paternitate vel filiatione, quae dicuntur personalitates. Et secundum hoc, abstracta personalitate per intellectum, possumus adhuc intelligere naturam assumentem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia in divinis idem est quo est et quod est, quidquid eorum quae attribuuntur Deo in abstracto secundum se consideretur, aliis circumscriptis, erit aliquid subsistens, et per consequens persona, cum sit in natura intellectuali. Sicut igitur nunc, positis proprietatibus personalibus in Deo, dicimus tres personas, ita, exclusis per intellectum proprietatibus personalibus, remanebit in consideratione nostra natura divina ut subsistens, et ut persona. Et

Objection 1: It would seem that if we abstract the Personality by our mind, the Nature cannot assume. For it was said above (A. 1) that it belongs to the Nature to assume by reason of the Person. But what belongs to one by reason of another cannot belong to it if the other is removed; as a body, which is visible by reason of color, without color cannot be seen. Hence if the Personality be mentally abstracted, the Nature cannot assume. Obj. 2: Further, assumption implies the term of union, as was said above (A. 1). But the union cannot take place in the nature, but only in the Person. Therefore, if the Personality be abstracted, the Divine Nature cannot assume. Obj. 3: Further, it has been said above (I, Q. 40, A. 3) that in the Godhead if the Personality is abstracted, nothing remains. But the one who assumes is something. Therefore, if the Personality is abstracted, the Divine Nature cannot assume. On the contrary, In the Godhead Personality signifies a personal property; and this is threefold, viz. Paternity, Filiation and Procession, as was said above (I, Q. 30, A. 2). Now if we mentally abstract these, there still remains the omnipotence of God, by which the Incarnation was wrought, as the angel says (Luke 1:37): No word shall be impossible with God. Therefore it seems that if the Personality be removed, the Divine Nature can still assume. I answer that, The intellect stands in two ways towards God. First, to know God as He is, and in this manner it is impossible for the intellect to circumscribe something in God and leave the rest, for all that is in God is one, except the distinction of Persons; and as regards these, if one is removed the other is taken away, since they are distinguished by relations only which must be together at the same time. Second, the intellect stands towards God, not indeed as knowing God as He is, but in its own way, i.e., understanding manifoldly and separately what in God is one: and in this way our intellect can understand the Divine goodness and wisdom, and the like, which are called essential attributes, without understanding Paternity or Filiation, which are called Personalities. And hence if we abstract Personality by our intellect, we may still understand the Nature assuming. Reply Obj. 1: Because in God what is, and whereby it is, are one, if any one of the things which are attributed to God in the abstract is considered in itself, abstracted from all else, it will still be something subsisting, and consequently a Person, since it is an intellectual nature. Hence just as we now say three Persons, on account of holding three personal properties, so likewise if we mentally exclude the personal properties there will still remain in our thought the Divine Nature as subsisting and as a Person.

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per hunc modum potest intelligi quod assumat naturam humanam ratione suae subsistentiae vel personalitatis. Ad secundum dicendum quod, etiam circumscriptis per intellectum personalitatibus trium personarum, remanebit in intellectu una personalitas Dei, ut Iudaei intelligunt, ad quam poterit terminari assumptio, sicut nunc dicimus eam terminari ad personam verbi. Ad tertium dicendum quod, abstracta personalitate per intellectum, dicitur nihil remanere per modum resolutionis, quasi aliud sit quod subiicitur relationi, et aliud ipsa relatio, quia quidquid consideratur in Deo, consideratur ut suppositum subsistens. Potest tamen aliquid eorum quae dicuntur de Deo intelligi sine alio, non per modum resolutionis, sed per modum iam dictum.

Q. 3, A. 4

And in this way It may be understood to assume human nature by reason of Its subsistence or Personality. Reply Obj. 2: Even if the personal properties of the three Persons are abstracted by our mind, nevertheless there will remain in our thoughts the one Personality of God, as the Jews consider. And the assumption can be terminated in It, as we now say it is terminated in the Person of the Word. Reply Obj. 3: If we mentally abstract the Personality, it is said that nothing remains by way of resolution, i.e., as if the subject of the relation and the relation itself were distinct because all we can think of in God is considered as a subsisting suppositum. However, some of the things predicated of God can be understood without others, not by way of resolution, but by the way mentioned above.

Article 4 Whether one person without another can assume a created nature? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod una persona non possit assumere naturam creatam, alia non assumente. Indivisa enim sunt opera Trinitatis, ut dicit Augustinus, in Enchirid., sicut enim trium personarum est una essentia, ita una operatio. Sed assumere est operatio quaedam. Ergo non potest convenire uni personae divinae quin conveniat alii. Praeterea, sicut dicimus personam filii incarnatam, ita et naturam, tota enim divina natura in una suarum hypostasum incarnata est, ut dicit Damascenus, in III libro. Sed natura communis est tribus personis. Ergo et assumptio. Praeterea, sicut humana natura in Christo assumpta est a Deo, ita etiam et homines per gratiam assumuntur ab ipso, secundum illud Rom. XIV, Deus illum assumpsit. Sed haec assumptio communiter pertinet ad omnes personas. Ergo et prima. Sed contra est quod Dionysius, II cap. de Div. Nom., incarnationis mysterium dicit pertinere ad discretam theologiam, secundum quam scilicet aliquid distinctum dicitur de divinis personis. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, assumptio duo importat, scilicet actum assumentis, et terminum assumptionis. Actus autem assumentis procedit ex divina virtute, quae communis est tribus personis, sed terminus assumptionis est persona, sicut dictum est. Et ideo id quod est actionis in assumptione, commune est tribus personis, sed id quod pertinet ad rationem termini, convenit ita uni personae quod non alii. Tres enim personae fecerunt ut humana natura uniretur uni personae filii.

Objection 1: It would seem that one Person cannot assume a created nature without another assuming it. For the works of the Trinity are inseparable, as Augustine says (Enchiridion xxxviii). But as the three Persons have one essence, so likewise They have one operation. Now to assume is an operation. Therefore it cannot belong to one without belonging to another. Obj. 2: Further, as we say the Person of the Son became incarnate, so also did the Nature; for the whole Divine Nature became incarnate in one of Its hypostases, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6). But the Nature is common to the three Persons. Therefore the assumption is. Obj. 3: Further, as the human nature in Christ is assumed by God, so likewise are men assumed by Him through grace, according to Rom. 14:3: God hath taken him to Him. But this assumption pertains to all the Persons; therefore the first also. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that the mystery of the Incarnation pertains to discrete theology, i.e., according to which something distinct is said of the Divine Persons. I answer that, As was said above (A. 1), assumption implies two things, viz. the act of assuming and the term of assumption. Now the act of assumption proceeds from the Divine power, which is common to the three Persons, but the term of the assumption is a Person, as stated above (A. 2). Hence what has to do with action in the assumption is common to the three Persons; but what pertains to the nature of term belongs to one Person in such a manner as not to belong to another; for the three Persons caused the human nature to be united to the one Person of the Son.

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Incarnation

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit ex parte operationis. Et sequeretur conclusio si solam illam operationem importaret absque termino, qui est persona. Ad secundum dicendum quod natura dicitur incarnata, sicut et assumens, ratione personae ad quam terminata est unio, sicut dictum est, non autem prout est communis tribus personis. Dicitur autem tota natura divina incarnata, non quia sit incarnata in omnibus personis, sed quia nihil deest de perfectione divinae naturae personae incarnatae.

IIIae

Reply Obj. 1: This reason regards the operation, and the conclusion would follow if it implied this operation only, without the term, which is a Person.

Reply Obj. 2: The Nature is said to be incarnate, and to assume by reason of the Person in Whom the union is terminated, as stated above (AA. 1, 2), and not as it is common to the three Persons. Now the whole Divine Nature is said to be incarnate; not that It is incarnate in all the Persons, but inasmuch as nothing is wanting to the perfection of the Divine Nature of the Person incarnate, as Damascene explains there. Ad tertium dicendum quod assumptio quae fit per Reply Obj. 3: The assumption which takes place by the gratiam adoptionis, terminatur ad quandam participa- grace of adoption is terminated in a certain participation of tionem divinae naturae secundum assimilationem ad the Divine Nature, by an assimilation to Its goodness, acbonitatem illius, secundum illud II Pet. I, ut divinae con- cording to 2 Pet. 1:4: That you may be made partakers of the sortes naturae, et cetera. Et ideo huiusmodi assumptio Divine Nature; and hence this assumption is common to the communis est tribus personis et ex parte principii et ex three Persons, in regard to the principle and the term. But parte termini. Sed assumptio quae est per gratiam unio- the assumption which is by the grace of union is common nis, est communis ex parte principii, non autem ex parte on the part of the principle, but not on the part of the term, termini, ut dictum est. as was said above.

Article 5 Whether any other Divine Person could have assumed human nature, beside the Person of the Son? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla alia persona divina potuit humanam naturam assumere, praeter personam filii. Per huiusmodi enim assumptionem factum est quod Deus sit filius hominis. Sed inconveniens esset quod esse filium conveniret patri vel spiritui sancto, hoc enim vergeret in confusionem divinarum personarum. Ergo pater et Spiritus Sanctus carnem assumere non possent. Praeterea, per incarnationem divinam homines sunt assecuti adoptionem filiorum, secundum illud Rom. VIII, non accepistis spiritum servitutis iterum in timore, sed spiritum adoptionis filiorum. Sed filiatio adoptiva est participata similitudo filiationis naturalis, quae non convenit nec patri nec spiritui sancto, unde dicitur Rom. VIII, quos praescivit et praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis filii sui. Ergo videtur quod nulla alia persona potuit incarnari praeter personam filii.

Objection 1: It would seem that no other Divine Person could have assumed human nature except the Person of the Son. For by this assumption it has been brought about that God is the Son of Man. But it was not becoming that either the Father or the Holy Spirit should be said to be a Son; for this would tend to the confusion of the Divine Persons. Therefore the Father and Holy Spirit could not have assumed flesh. Obj. 2: Further, by the Divine Incarnation men have come into possession of the adoption of sons, according to Rom. 8:15: For you have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear, but the spirit of adoption of sons. But sonship by adoption is a participated likeness of natural sonship which does not belong to the Father nor the Holy Spirit; hence it is said (Rom 8:29): For whom He foreknew He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son. Therefore it seems that no other Person except the Person of the Son could have become incarnate. Praeterea, filius dicitur missus, et genitus nativiObj. 3: Further, the Son is said to be sent and to be betate temporali, secundum quod incarnatus est. Sed patri gotten by the temporal nativity, inasmuch as He became innon convenit mitti, qui est innascibilis, ut in prima parte carnate. But it does not belong to the Father to be sent, for habitum est. Ergo saltem persona patris non potuit in- He is innascible, as was said above (I, Q. 32, A. 3; First Part, carnari. Q. 43, A. 4). Therefore at least the Person of the Father cannot become incarnate.

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Q. 3, A. 5

Sed contra, quidquid potest filius, potest pater, On the contrary, Whatever the Son can do, so can alioquin, non esset eadem potentia trium. Sed filius po- the Father and the Holy Spirit, otherwise the power of the tuit incarnari. Ergo similiter pater et Spiritus Sanctus. three Persons would not be one. But the Son was able to become incarnate. Therefore the Father and the Holy Spirit were able to become incarnate. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, asI answer that, As was said above (AA. 1, 2, 4), assumptio duo importat, scilicet ipsum actum assumen- sumption implies two things, viz. the act of the one assumtis, et terminum assumptionis. Principium autem actus ing and the term of the assumption. Now the principle of est virtus divina, terminus autem est persona. Virtus au- the act is the Divine power, and the term is a Person. But tem divina communiter et indifferenter se habet ad om- the Divine power is indifferently and commonly in all the nes personas. Eadem etiam est communis ratio perso- Persons. Moreover, the nature of Personality is common to nalitatis in tribus personis, licet proprietates personales all the Persons, although the personal properties are differsint differentes. Quandocumque autem virtus aliqua in- ent. Now whenever a power regards several things indifferdifferenter se habet ad plura, potest ad quodlibet eorum ently, it can terminate its action in any of them indifferently, suam actionem terminare, sicut patet in potentiis ratio- as is plain in rational powers, which regard opposites, and nalibus, quae se habent ad opposita, quorum utrumque can do either of them. Therefore the Divine power could agere possunt. Sic ergo divina virtus potuit naturam hu- have united human nature to the Person of the Father or of manam unire vel personae patris vel spiritus sancti, sicut the Holy Spirit, as It united it to the Person of the Son. And univit eam personae filii. Et ideo dicendum est quod pa- hence we must say that the Father or the Holy Spirit could ter vel Spiritus Sanctus potuit carnem assumere, sicut et have assumed flesh even as the Son. filius. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod filiatio temporalis, Reply Obj. 1: The temporal sonship, whereby Christ is qua Christus dicitur filius hominis, non constituit perso- said to be the Son of Man, does not constitute His Person, as nam ipsius, sicut filiatio aeterna, sed est quiddam conse- does the eternal Sonship; but is something following upon quens nativitatem temporalem. Unde, si per hunc mo- the temporal nativity. Hence, if the name of son were transdum nomen filiationis ad patrem vel spiritum sanctum ferred to the Father or the Holy Spirit in this manner, there transferretur, nulla sequeretur confusio divinarum per- would be no confusion of the Divine Persons. sonarum. Ad secundum dicendum quod filiatio adoptiva est Reply Obj. 2: Adoptive sonship is a certain participaquaedam participata similitudo filiationis naturalis; sed tion of natural sonship; but it takes place in us, by approfit in nobis appropriate a patre, qui est principium natu- priation, by the Father, Who is the principle of natural sonralis filiationis; et per donum spiritus sancti, qui est amor ship, and by the gift of the Holy Spirit, Who is the love of patris et filii; secundum illud Galat. IV, misit Deus spiri- the Father and Son, according to Gal. 4:6: God hath sent the tum filii sui in corda nostra, clamantem, abba, pater. Et Spirit of His Son into your hearts crying, Abba, Father. And ideo sicut, filio incarnato, adoptivam filiationem accipi- therefore, even as by the Incarnation of the Son we receive mus ad similitudinem naturalis filiationis eius; ita, patre adoptive sonship in the likeness of His natural sonship, so incarnato, adoptivam filiationem reciperemus ab eo tan- likewise, had the Father become incarnate, we should have quam a principio naturalis filiationis; et a spiritu sancto, received adoptive sonship from Him, as from the principle tanquam a nexu communi patris et filii. of the natural sonship, and from the Holy Spirit as from the common bond of Father and Son. Ad tertium dicendum quod patri convenit esse inReply Obj. 3: It belongs to the Father to be innascible nascibilem secundum nativitatem aeternam, quod non as to eternal birth, and the temporal birth would not deexcluderet nativitas temporalis. Mitti autem dicitur filius stroy this. But the Son of God is said to be sent in regard secundum incarnationem, eo quod est ab illo, sine quo to the Incarnation, inasmuch as He is from another, withincarnatio non sufficeret ad rationem missionis. out which the Incarnation would not suffice for the nature of mission.

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Q. 3, A. 6

Incarnation

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Article 6 Whether two Divine Persons can assume one and the same individual nature? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod duae personae divinae non possunt assumere unam et eandem numero naturam. Hoc enim supposito aut essent unus homo, vel plures. Sed non plures, sicut enim una natura divina in pluribus personis non patitur esse plures deos, ita una humana natura in pluribus personis non patitur esse plures homines. Similiter etiam non possent esse unus homo, quia unus homo est iste homo, qui demonstrat unam personam; et sic tolleretur distinctio trium personarum divinarum, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo duae aut tres personae possunt accipere unam naturam humanam. Praeterea, assumptio terminatur ad unitatem personae, ut dictum est. Sed non est una persona patris et filii et spiritus sancti. Ergo non possunt tres personae assumere unam naturam humanam. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in III libro, et Augustinus, in I de Trin., quod ex incarnatione filii Dei consequitur quod quidquid dicitur de filio Dei, dicitur de filio hominis, et e converso. Si ergo tres personae assumerent unam naturam humanam, sequitur quod quidquid dicitur de qualibet trium personarum, diceretur de illo homine, et e converso ea quae dicerentur de illo homine, possent dici de qualibet trium personarum. Sic ergo id quod est proprium patris, scilicet generare filium ab aeterno, diceretur de illo homine, et per consequens diceretur de filio Dei, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo est possibile quod tres personae divinae assumant unam naturam humanam. Sed contra, persona incarnata subsistit in duabus naturis, divina scilicet et humana. Sed tres personae possunt subsistere in una natura divina. Ergo etiam possunt subsistere in una natura humana, ita scilicet quod sit una natura humana a tribus personis assumpta. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ex unione animae et corporis in Christo non fit neque nova persona neque hypostasis, sed fit una natura assumpta in personam vel hypostasim divinam. Quod quidem non fit per potentiam naturae humanae, sed per potentiam personae divinae. Est autem talis divinarum personarum conditio quod una earum non excludit aliam a communione eiusdem naturae, sed solum a communione eiusdem personae. Quia igitur in mysterio incarnationis tota ratio facti est potentia facientis, ut Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Volusianum; magis est circa hoc iudicandum secundum conditionem personae assumentis quam secundum conditionem naturae humanae assumptae. Sic igitur non est impossibile divinis personis ut duae vel tres assumant unam naturam humanam. Esset tamen impossibile ut assumerent unam hyposta-

Objection 1: It would seem that two Divine Persons cannot assume one and the same individual nature. For, this being granted, there would either be several men or one. But not several, for just as one Divine Nature in several Persons does not make several gods, so one human nature in several persons does not make several men. Nor would there be only one man, for one man is this man, which signifies one person; and hence the distinction of three Divine Persons would be destroyed, which cannot be allowed. Therefore neither two nor three Persons can take one human nature. Obj. 2: Further, the assumption is terminated in the unity of Person, as has been said above (A. 2). But the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not one Person. Therefore the three Persons cannot assume one human nature. Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3, 4), and Augustine (De Trin. i, 11, 12, 13), that from the Incarnation of God the Son it follows that whatever is said of the Son of God is said of the Son of Man, and conversely. Hence, if three Persons were to assume one human nature, it would follow that whatever is said of each of the three Persons would be said of the man; and conversely, what was said of the man could be said of each of the three Persons. Therefore what is proper to the Father, viz. to beget the Son, would be said of the man, and consequently would be said of the Son of God; and this could not be. Therefore it is impossible that the three Persons should assume one human nature. On the contrary, The Incarnate Person subsists in two natures. But the three Persons can subsist in one Divine Nature. Therefore they can also subsist in one human nature in such a way that the human nature be assumed by the three Persons. I answer that, As was said above (Q. 2, A. 5, ad 1), by the union of the soul and body in Christ neither a new person is made nor a new hypostasis, but one human nature is assumed to the Divine Person or hypostasis, which, indeed, does not take place by the power of the human nature, but by the power of the Divine Person. Now such is the characteristic of the Divine Persons that one does not exclude another from communicating in the same nature, but only in the same Person. Hence, since in the mystery of the Incarnation the whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii), we must judge of it in regard to the quality of the Divine Person assuming, and not according to the quality of the human nature assumed. Therefore it is not impossible that two or three Divine Persons should assume one human nature, but it would be impossible for them to assume one human

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sim vel unam personam humanam, sicut Anselmus dicit, in libro de conceptu virginali, quod plures personae non possunt assumere unum eundemque hominem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, hac positione facta, quod scilicet tres personae assumerent unam humanam naturam, verum esset dicere quod tres personae essent unus homo, propter unam humanam naturam, sicut nunc verum est dicere quod sunt unus Deus, propter unam divinam naturam. Nec ly unus importat unitatem personae, sed unitatem in natura humana. Non enim posset argui ex hoc quod tres personae sunt unus homo, quod essent unus simpliciter, nihil enim prohibet dicere quod homines qui sunt plures simpliciter, sint unus quantum ad aliquid, puta unus populus; sicut Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., diversum est natura spiritus hominis et spiritus Dei, sed inhaerendo fit unus spiritus, secundum illud I Cor. VI, qui adhaeret Deo, unus spiritus est. Ad secundum dicendum quod, illa positione facta, humana natura esset assumpta in unitate non unius personae, sed in unitate singularum personarum, ita scilicet quod, sicut divina natura habet naturalem unitatem cum singulis personis, ita natura humana haberet unitatem cum singulis per assumptionem. Ad tertium dicendum quod circa mysterium incarnationis fuit communicatio proprietatum pertinentium ad naturam, quia quaecumque conveniunt naturae, possunt praedicari de persona subsistente in natura illa, cuiuscumque naturae nomine significetur. Praedicta ergo positione facta, de persona patris poterunt praedicari et ea quae sunt humanae naturae, et ea quae sunt divinae, et similiter de persona filii et spiritus sancti. Non autem illud quod conveniret personae patris ratione propriae personae, posset attribui personae filii aut spiritus sancti, propter distinctionem personarum, quae remaneret. Posset ergo dici quod, sicut pater est ingenitus, ita homo esset ingenitus, secundum quod ly homo supponeret pro persona patris. Si quis autem ulterius procederet, homo est ingenitus, filius est homo, ergo filius est ingenitus, esset fallacia figurae dictionis vel accidentis. Sicut et nunc dicimus Deum esse ingenitum, quia pater est ingenitus, nec tamen possumus concludere quod filius sit ingenitus, quamvis sit Deus.

Q. 3, A. 7

hypostasis or person; thus Anselm says in the book De Concep. Virg. (Cur Deus Homo ii, 9), that several Persons cannot assume one and the same man to unity of Person. Reply Obj. 1: In the hypothesis that three Persons assume one human nature, it would be true to say that the three Persons were one man, because of the one human nature. For just as it is now true to say the three Persons are one God on account of the one Divine Nature, so it would be true to say they are one man on account of the one human nature. Nor would one imply unity of person, but unity in human nature; for it could not be argued that because the three Persons were one man they were one simply. For nothing hinders our saying that men, who are many simply, are in some respect one, e.g., one people, and as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 3): The Spirit of God and the spirit of man are by nature different, but by inherence one spirit results, according to 1 Cor. 6:17: He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit. Reply Obj. 2: In this supposition the human nature would be assumed to the unity, not indeed of one Person, but to the unity of each Person, so that even as the Divine Nature has a natural unity with each Person, so also the human nature would have a unity with each Person by assumption. Reply Obj. 3: In the mystery of the Incarnation, there results a communication of the properties belonging to the nature, because whatever belongs to the nature can be predicated of the Person subsisting in that nature, no matter to which of the natures it may apply. Hence in this hypothesis, of the Person of the Father may be predicated what belongs to the human nature and what belongs to the Divine; and likewise of the Person of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. But what belongs to the Person of the Father by reason of His own Person could not be attributed to the Person of the Son or Holy Spirit on account of the distinction of Persons which would still remain. Therefore it might be said that as the Father was unbegotten, so the man was unbegotten, inasmuch as man stood for the Person of the Father. But if one were to go on to say, The man is unbegotten; the Son is man; therefore the Son is unbegotten, it would be the fallacy of figure of speech or of accident; even as we now say God is unbegotten, because the Father is unbegotten, yet we cannot conclude that the Son is unbegotten, although He is God.

Article 7 Whether one Divine Person can assume two human natures? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod una Objection 1: It would seem that one Divine Person persona divina non possit assumere duas naturas hu- cannot assume two human natures. For the nature assumed manas. Natura enim assumpta in mysterio incarnatio- in the mystery of the Incarnation has no other suppositum nis non habet aliud suppositum praeter suppositum per- than the suppositum of the Divine Person, as is plain from

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Q. 3, A. 7

Incarnation

sonae divinae, ut ex supra dictis patet. Si ergo ponatur esse una persona divina assumens duas humanas naturas, esset unum suppositum duarum naturarum eiusdem speciei. Quod videtur implicare contradictionem, non enim natura unius speciei multiplicatur nisi secundum distinctionem suppositorum. Praeterea, hac suppositione facta, non posset dici quod persona divina incarnata esset unus homo, quia non haberet unam naturam humanam. Similiter etiam non posset dici quod essent plures homines, quia plures homines sunt supposito distincti, et ibi esset unum tantum suppositum. Ergo praedicta positio esset omnino impossibilis. Praeterea, in incarnationis mysterio tota divina natura est unita toti naturae assumptae, idest cuilibet parti eius, est enim Christus perfectus Deus et perfectus homo, totus Deus et totus homo, ut Damascenus dicit, in III libro. Sed duae humanae naturae non possent totaliter sibi invicem uniri, quia oporteret quod anima unius esset unita corpori alterius, et quod etiam duo corpora essent simul, quod etiam confusionem induceret naturarum. Non ergo est possibile quod persona divina duas humanas naturas assumeret. Sed contra est quod quidquid potest pater, potest filius. Sed pater post incarnationem filii, potest assumere naturam humanam aliam numero ab ea quam filius assumpsit, in nullo enim per incarnationem filii est diminuta potentia patris vel filii. Ergo videtur quod filius, post incarnationem, possit aliam humanam naturam assumere, praeter eam quam assumpsit. Respondeo dicendum quod id quod potest in unum et non in amplius, habet potentiam limitatam ad unum. Potentia autem divinae personae est infinita, nec potest limitari ad aliquid creatum. Unde non est dicendum quod persona divina ita assumpserit unam naturam humanam quod non potuerit assumere aliam. Videretur enim ex hoc sequi quod personalitas divinae naturae esset ita comprehensa per unam humanam naturam quod ad eius personalitatem alia assumi non possit. Quod est impossibile, non enim increatum a creato comprehendi potest. Patet ergo quod, sive consideremus personam divinam secundum virtutem, quae est principium unionis; sive secundum suam personalitatem, quae est terminus unionis, oportet dicere quod persona divina, praeter naturam humanam quam assumpsit possit aliam numero naturam humanam assumere. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod natura creata perficitur in sua ratione per formam, quae multiplicatur secundum divisionem materiae. Et ideo, si compositio formae et materiae constituat novum suppositum, consequens est quod natura multiplicetur secundum multiplicationem suppositorum. Sed in mysterio incarnationis unio formae et materiae, idest animae et corporis, non constituit novum suppositum, ut supra dictum est.

IIIae

what has been stated above (Q. 2, AA. 3, 6). Therefore, if we suppose one Person to assume two human natures, there would be one suppositum of two natures of the same species; which would seem to imply a contradiction, for the nature of one species is only multiplied by distinct supposita. Obj. 2: Further, in this hypothesis it could not be said that the Divine Person incarnate was one man, seeing that He would not have one human nature; neither could it be said that there were several, for several men have distinct supposita, whereas in this case there would be only one suppositum. Therefore the aforesaid hypothesis is impossible. Obj. 3: Further, in the mystery of the Incarnation the whole Divine Nature is united to the whole nature assumed, i.e., to every part of it, for Christ is perfect God and perfect man, complete God and complete man, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 7). But two human natures cannot be wholly united together, inasmuch as the soul of one would be united to the body of the other; and, again, two bodies would be together, which would give rise to confusion of natures. Therefore it is not possible for one Divine Person to assume two human natures. On the contrary, Whatever the Father can do, that also can the Son do. But after the Incarnation the Father can still assume a human nature distinct from that which the Son has assumed; for in nothing is the power of the Father or the Son lessened by the Incarnation of the Son. Therefore it seems that after the Incarnation the Son can assume another human nature distinct from the one He has assumed. I answer that, What has power for one thing, and no more, has a power limited to one. Now the power of a Divine Person is infinite, nor can it be limited by any created thing. Hence it may not be said that a Divine Person so assumed one human nature as to be unable to assume another. For it would seem to follow from this that the Personality of the Divine Nature was so comprehended by one human nature as to be unable to assume another to its Personality; and this is impossible, for the Uncreated cannot be comprehended by any creature. Hence it is plain that, whether we consider the Divine Person in regard to His power, which is the principle of the union, or in regard to His Personality, which is the term of the union, it has to be said that the Divine Person, over and beyond the human nature which He has assumed, can assume another distinct human nature. Reply Obj. 1: A created nature is completed in its essentials by its form, which is multiplied according to the division of matter. And hence, if the composition of matter and form constitutes a new suppositum, the consequence is that the nature is multiplied by the multiplication of supposita. But in the mystery of the Incarnation the union of form and matter, i.e., of soul and body, does not constitute a new suppositum, as was said above (A. 6). Hence there can

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Et ideo posset esse multitudo secundum numerum ex parte naturae, propter divisionem materiae, absque distinctione suppositorum. Ad secundum dicendum quod posset videri quod, praedicta positione facta, consequeretur quod essent duo homines, propter duas naturas, absque hoc quod essent ibi duo supposita, sicut e converso tres personae dicerentur unus homo, propter unam naturam humanam assumptam, ut supra dictum est. Sed hoc non videtur esse verum. Quia nominibus est utendum secundum quod sunt ad significandum imposita. Quod quidem est ex consideratione eorum quae apud nos sunt. Et ideo oportet, circa modum significandi et consignificandi, considerare ea quae apud nos sunt. In quibus nunquam nomen ab aliqua forma impositum pluraliter dicitur nisi propter pluralitatem suppositorum, homo enim qui est duobus vestimentis indutus, non dicitur duo vestiti, sed unus vestitus duobus vestimentis; et qui habet duas qualitates, dicitur singulariter aliqualis secundum duas qualitates. Natura autem assumpta quantum ad aliquid se habet per modum indumenti, licet non sit similitudo quantum ad omnia, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo, si persona divina assumeret duas naturas humanas, propter unitatem suppositi diceretur unus homo habens duas naturas humanas. Contingit autem quod plures homines dicuntur unus populus, propter hoc quod conveniunt in aliquo uno, non autem propter unitatem suppositi. Et similiter, si duae personae divinae assumerent unam numero humanam naturam, dicerentur unus homo, ut supra dictum est, non propter unitatem suppositi, sed inquantum conveniunt in aliquo uno. Ad tertium dicendum quod divina et humana natura non eodem ordine se habent ad unam divinam personam, sed per prius comparatur ad ipsam divina natura, utpote quae est unum cum ea ab aeterno; sed natura humana comparatur ad personam divinam per posterius, utpote assumpta ex tempore a divina persona, non quidem ad hoc quod natura sit ipsa persona, sed quod persona in natura subsistat filius enim Dei est sua deitas, sed non est sua humanitas. Et ideo ad hoc quod natura humana assumatur a divina persona, relinquitur quod divina natura unione personali uniatur toti naturae assumptae, idest secundum omnes partes eius. Sed duarum naturarum assumptarum esset uniformis habitudo ad personam divinam, nec una assumeret aliam. Unde non oporteret quod una earum totaliter alteri uniretur, idest, omnes partes unius omnibus partibus alterius.

Q. 3, A. 7

be a numerical multitude on the part of the nature, on account of the division of matter, without distinction of supposita. Reply Obj. 2: It might seem possible to reply that in such a hypothesis it would follow that there were two men by reason of the two natures, just as, on the contrary, the three Persons would be called one man, on account of the one nature assumed, as was said above (A. 6, ad 1). But this does not seem to be true; because we must use words according to the purpose of their signification, which is in relation to our surroundings. Consequently, in order to judge of a word’s signification or co-signification, we must consider the things which are around us, in which a word derived from some form is never used in the plural unless there are several supposita. For a man who has on two garments is not said to be two persons clothed, but one clothed with two garments; and whoever has two qualities is designated in the singular as such by reason of the two qualities. Now the assumed nature is, as it were, a garment, although this similitude does not fit at all points, as has been said above (Q. 2, A. 6, ad 1). And hence, if the Divine Person were to assume two human natures, He would be called, on account of the unity of suppositum, one man having two human natures. Now many men are said to be one people, inasmuch as they have some one thing in common, and not on account of the unity of suppositum. So likewise, if two Divine Persons were to assume one singular human nature, they would be said to be one man, as stated (A. 6, ad 1), not from the unity of suppositum, but because they have some one thing in common. Reply Obj. 3: The Divine and human natures do not bear the same relation to the one Divine Person, but the Divine Nature is related first of all thereto, inasmuch as It is one with It from eternity; and afterwards the human nature is related to the Divine Person, inasmuch as it is assumed by the Divine Person in time, not indeed that the nature is the Person, but that the Person of God subsists in human nature. For the Son of God is His Godhead, but is not His manhood. And hence, in order that the human nature may be assumed by the Divine Person, the Divine Nature must be united by a personal union with the whole nature assumed, i.e., in all its parts. Now in the two natures assumed there would be a uniform relation to the Divine Person, nor would one assume the other. Hence it would not be necessary for one of them to be altogether united to the other, i.e., all the parts of one with all the parts of the other.

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Q. 3, A. 8

Incarnation

IIIae

Article 8 Whether it was more fitting that the Person of the Son should assume human nature rather than the Father or Holy Spirit? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit magis conveniens filium Dei incarnari quam patrem vel spiritum sanctum. Per mysterium enim incarnationis homines ad veram Dei cognitionem sunt perducti, secundum illud Ioan. XVIII, in hoc natus sum, et ad hoc veni in mundum, ut testimonium perhiberem veritati. Sed ex hoc quod persona filii Dei est incarnata, multi impediti fuerunt a vera Dei cognitione, ea quae dicuntur de filio secundum humanam naturam referentes ad ipsam filii personam, sicut Arius, qui posuit inaequalitatem personarum propter hoc quod dicitur Ioan. XIV, pater maior me est, qui quidem error non provenisset si persona patris incarnata fuisset; nullus enim existimasset patrem filio minorem. Magis ergo videtur conveniens fuisse quod persona patris incarnaretur quam persona filii. Praeterea, incarnationis effectus videtur esse recreatio quaedam humanae naturae, secundum illud Galat. ult., in Christo Iesu neque circumcisio aliquid valet neque praeputium, sed nova creatura. Sed potentia creandi appropriatur patri. Ergo magis decuisset patrem incarnari quam filium. Praeterea, incarnatio ordinatur ad remissionem peccatorum, secundum illud Matth. I, vocabis nomen eius Iesum, ipse enim salvum faciet populum suum a peccatis eorum. Remissio autem peccatorum attribuitur spiritui sancto, secundum illud Ioan. XX, accipite spiritum sanctum, quorum remiseritis peccata, remittentur eis. Ergo magis congruebat personam spiritus sancti incarnari quam personam filii. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, in mysterio incarnationis manifestata est sapientia et virtus Dei, sapientia quidem, quia invenit difficillimi solutionem pretii valde decentissimam; virtus autem, quia victum fecit rursus victorem. Sed virtus et sapientia appropriantur filio, secundum illud I Cor. I, Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam. Ergo conveniens fuit personam filii incarnari. Respondeo dicendum quod convenientissimum fuit personam filii incarnari. Primo quidem, ex parte unionis. Convenienter enim ea quae sunt similia, uniuntur. Ipsius autem personae filii, qui est verbum Dei, attenditur, uno quidem modo, communis convenientia ad totam creaturam. Quia verbum artificis, idest conceptus eius, est similitudo exemplaris eorum quae ab artifice fiunt. Unde verbum Dei, quod est aeternus conceptus eius, est similitudo exemplaris totius creaturae. Et ideo, sicut per participationem huius similitudinis creaturae

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not more fitting that the Son of God should become incarnate than the Father or the Holy Spirit. For by the mystery of the Incarnation men are led to the true knowledge of God, according to John 18:37: For this was I born, and for this came I into the world, to give testimony to the truth. But by the Person of the Son of God becoming incarnate many have been kept back from the true knowledge of God, since they referred to the very Person of the Son what was said of the Son in His human nature, as Arius, who held an inequality of Persons, according to what is said (John 14:28): The Father is greater than I. Now this error would not have arisen if the Person of the Father had become incarnate, for no one would have taken the Father to be less than the Son. Hence it seems fitting that the Person of the Father, rather than the Person of the Son, should have become incarnate. Obj. 2: Further, the effect of the Incarnation would seem to be, as it were, a second creation of human nature, according to Gal. 6:15: For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature. But the power of creation is appropriated to the Father. Therefore it would have been more becoming to the Father than to the Son to become incarnate. Obj. 3: Further, the Incarnation is ordained to the remission of sins, according to Matt. 1:21: Thou shalt call His name Jesus. For He shall save His people from their sins. Now the remission of sins is attributed to the Holy Spirit according to John 20:22, 23: Receive ye the Holy Spirit. Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them. Therefore it became the Person of the Holy Spirit rather than the Person of the Son to become incarnate. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 1): In the mystery of the Incarnation the wisdom and power of God are made known: the wisdom, for He found a most suitable discharge for a most heavy debt; the power, for He made the conquered conquer. But power and wisdom are appropriated to the Son, according to 1 Cor. 1:24: Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God. Therefore it was fitting that the Person of the Son should become incarnate. I answer that, It was most fitting that the Person of the Son should become incarnate. First, on the part of the union; for such as are similar are fittingly united. Now the Person of the Son, Who is the Word of God, has a certain common agreement with all creatures, because the word of the craftsman, i.e., his concept, is an exemplar likeness of whatever is made by him. Hence the Word of God, Who is His eternal concept, is the exemplar likeness of all creatures. And therefore as creatures are established in their proper species, though movably, by the participation of this like-

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sunt in propriis speciebus institutae, sed mobiliter; ita per unionem verbi ad creaturam non participativam sed personalem, conveniens fuit reparari creaturam in ordine ad aeternam et immobilem perfectionem, nam et artifex per formam artis conceptam qua artificiatum condidit, ipsum, si collapsum fuerit, restaurat. Alio modo, habet convenientiam specialiter cum humana natura, ex eo quod verbum est conceptus aeternae sapientiae a qua omnis sapientia hominum derivatur. Et ideo homo per hoc in sapientia proficit, quae est propria eius perfectio prout est rationalis, quod participat verbum Dei, sicut discipulus instruitur per hoc quod recipit verbum magistri. Unde et Eccli. I dicitur, fons sapientiae verbum Dei in excelsis. Et ideo, ad consummatam hominis perfectionem, conveniens fuit ut ipsum verbum Dei humanae naturae personaliter uniretur. Secundo potest accipi ratio huius congruentiae ex fine unionis, qui est impletio praedestinationis, eorum scilicet qui praeordinati sunt ad hereditatem caelestem, quae non debetur nisi filiis, secundum illud Rom. VIII, filii et heredes. Et ideo congruum fuit ut per eum qui est filius naturalis, homines participarent similitudinem huius filiationis secundum adoptionem, sicut apostolus ibidem dicit, quos praescivit et praedestinavit conformes fieri imagini filii eius. Tertio potest accipi ratio huius congruentiae ex peccato primi parentis, cui per incarnationem remedium adhibetur. Peccavit enim primus homo appetendo scientiam, ut patet ex verbis serpentis promittentis homini scientiam boni et mali. Unde conveniens fuit ut per verbum verae sapientiae homo reduceretur in Deum, qui per inordinatum appetitum scientiae recesserat a Deo. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil est quo humana malitia non posset abuti, quando etiam ipsa Dei bonitate abutitur, secundum illud Rom. II, an divitias bonitatis eius contemnis? Unde et, si persona patris fuisset incarnata, potuisset ex hoc homo alicuius erroris occasionem assumere, quasi filius sufficere non potuisset ad humanam naturam reparandam. Ad secundum dicendum quod prima rerum creatio facta est a potentia Dei patris per verbum. Unde et recreatio per verbum fieri debuit a potentia Dei patris, ut recreatio creationi responderet, secundum illud II Cor. V, Deus erat in Christo mundum reconcilians sibi.

Ad tertium dicendum quod spiritus sancti proprium est quod sit donum patris et filii. Remissio autem peccatorum fit per spiritum sanctum tanquam per donum Dei. Et ideo convenientius fuit ad iustificationem hominum quod incarnaretur filius, cuius Spiritus Sanctus est donum.

Q. 3, A. 8

ness, so by the non-participated and personal union of the Word with a creature, it was fitting that the creature should be restored in order to its eternal and unchangeable perfection; for the craftsman by the intelligible form of his art, whereby he fashioned his handiwork, restores it when it has fallen into ruin. Moreover, He has a particular agreement with human nature, since the Word is a concept of the eternal Wisdom, from Whom all man’s wisdom is derived. And hence man is perfected in wisdom (which is his proper perfection, as he is rational) by participating the Word of God, as the disciple is instructed by receiving the word of his master. Hence it is said (Sir 1:5): The Word of God on high is the fountain of wisdom. And hence for the consummate perfection of man it was fitting that the very Word of God should be personally united to human nature. Second, the reason of this fitness may be taken from the end of the union, which is the fulfilling of predestination, i.e., of such as are preordained to the heavenly inheritance, which is bestowed only on sons, according to Rom. 8:17: If sons, heirs also. Hence it was fitting that by Him Who is the natural Son, men should share this likeness of sonship by adoption, as the Apostle says in the same chapter (Rom 8:29): For whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son. Third, the reason for this fitness may be taken from the sin of our first parent, for which the Incarnation supplied the remedy. For the first man sinned by seeking knowledge, as is plain from the words of the serpent, promising to man the knowledge of good and evil. Hence it was fitting that by the Word of true knowledge man might be led back to God, having wandered from God through an inordinate thirst for knowledge. Reply Obj. 1: There is nothing which human malice cannot abuse, since it even abuses God’s goodness, according to Rom. 2:4: Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness? Hence, even if the Person of the Father had become incarnate, men would have been capable of finding an occasion of error, just as though the Son were not able to restore human nature. Reply Obj. 2: The first creation of things was made by the power of God the Father through the Word; hence the second creation ought to have been brought about through the Word, by the power of God the Father, in order that restoration should correspond to creation according to 2 Cor. 5:19: For God indeed was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself. Reply Obj. 3: To be the gift of the Father and the Son is proper to the Holy Spirit. But the remission of sins is caused by the Holy Spirit, as by the gift of God. And hence it was more fitting to man’s justification that the Son should become incarnate, Whose gift the Holy Spirit is.

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Question 4 The Mode of Union on the Part of the Human Nature Deinde considerandum est de unione ex parte assumpti. Circa quod primo considerandum occurrit de his quae sunt a verbo Dei assumpta; secundo, de coassumptis, quae sunt perfectiones et defectus. Assumpsit autem filius Dei humanam naturam, et partes eius. Unde circa primum triplex consideratio occurrit, prima est, quantum ad ipsam naturam humanam; secunda est, quantum ad partes ipsius; tertia, quantum ad ordinem assumptionis. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum humana natura fuerit magis assumptibilis a filio Dei quam aliqua alia natura. Secundo, utrum assumpserit personam. Tertio, utrum assumpserit hominem. Quarto, utrum fuisset conveniens quod assumpsisset humanam naturam a singularibus separatam. Quinto, utrum fuerit conveniens quod assumpsisset humanam naturam in omnibus singularibus. Sexto, utrum fuerit conveniens quod assumeret humanam naturam in aliquo homine ex stirpe Adae progenito.

We must now consider the union on the part of what was assumed. About which we must consider first what things were assumed by the Word of God; second, what were co-assumed, whether perfections or defects. Now the Son of God assumed human nature and its parts. Hence a threefold consideration arises. First, with regard to the nature; second, with regard to its parts; third, with regard to the order of the assumption. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether human nature was more capable of being assumed than any other nature? (2) Whether He assumed a person? (3) Whether He assumed a man? (4) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature abstracted from all individuals? (5) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature in all its individuals? (6) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature in any man begotten of the stock of Adam?

Article 1 Whether human nature was more assumable by the Son of God than any other nature? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod humana natura non fuerit magis assumptibilis a filio Dei quam quaelibet alia natura. Dicit enim Augustinus, in epistola ad Volusianum, in rebus mirabiliter factis tota ratio facti est potentia facientis. Sed potentia Dei facientis incarnationem, quae est opus maxime mirabile, non limitatur ad unam naturam, cum potentia Dei sit infinita. Ergo natura humana non est magis assumptibilis a Deo quam aliqua alia creatura. Praeterea, similitudo est ratio faciens ad congruitatem incarnationis divinae personae, ut supra dictum est. Sed sicut in natura rationali invenitur similitudo imaginis, ita in natura irrationali invenitur similitudo vestigii. Ergo creatura irrationalis assumptibilis fuit, sicut humana natura. Praeterea, in natura angelica invenitur expressior Dei similitudo quam in natura humana, sicut Gregorius dicit, in homilia de centum ovibus, introducens illud Ezech. XXVIII, tu signaculum similitudinis. Invenitur

Objection 1: It would seem that human nature is not more capable of being assumed by the Son of God than any other nature. For Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii): In deeds wrought miraculously the whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer. Now the power of God Who wrought the Incarnation, which is a most miraculous work, is not limited to one nature, since the power of God is infinite. Therefore human nature is not more capable of being assumed than any other creature. Obj. 2: Further, likeness is the foundation of the fittingness of the Incarnation of the Divine Person, as above stated (Q. 3, A. 8). But as in rational creatures we find the likeness of image, so in irrational creatures we find the image of trace. Therefore the irrational creature was as capable of assumption as human nature. Obj. 3: Further, in the angelic nature we find a more perfect likeness than in human nature, as Gregory says: (Hom. de Cent. Ovib.; xxxiv in Ev.), where he introduces Ezech. 28:12: Thou wast the seal of resemblance. And sin is

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Q. 4, A. 1

Incarnation

etiam in Angelo peccatum, sicut in homine, secundum illud Iob IV, in Angelis suis reperit pravitatem. Ergo natura angelica fuit ita assumptibilis sicut natura hominis. Praeterea, cum Deo competat summa perfectio, tanto magis est Deo aliquid simile, quanto est magis perfectum. Sed totum universum est magis perfectum quam partes eius, inter quas est humana natura. Ergo totum universum est magis assumptibile quam humana natura. Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. VIII, ex ore sapientiae genitae, deliciae meae esse cum filiis hominum. Et ita videtur esse quaedam congruentia unionis filii Dei ad humanam naturam. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid assumptibile dicitur quasi aptum assumi a divina persona. Quae quidem aptitudo non potest intelligi secundum potentiam passivam naturalem, quae non se extendit ad id quod transcendit ordinem naturalem, quem transcendit unio personalis creaturae ad Deum. Unde relinquitur quod assumptibile aliquid dicatur secundum congruentiam ad unionem praedictam. Quae quidem congruentia attenditur secundum duo in humana natura, scilicet secundum eius dignitatem; et necessitatem. Secundum dignitatem quidem, quia humana natura, inquantum est rationalis et intellectualis, nata est contingere aliqualiter ipsum verbum per suam operationem, cognoscendo scilicet et amando ipsum. Secundum necessitatem autem, quia indigebat reparatione, cum subiaceret originali peccato. Haec autem duo soli humanae naturae conveniunt, nam creaturae irrationali deest congruitas dignitatis; naturae autem angelicae deest congruitas praedictae necessitatis. Unde relinquitur quod sola natura humana sit assumptibilis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod creaturae denominantur aliquales ex eo quod competit eis secundum proprias causas, non autem ex eo quod convenit eis secundum primas causas et universales, sicut dicimus aliquem morbum esse incurabilem, non quia non potest curari a Deo, sed quia per propria principia subiecti curari non potest. Sic ergo dicitur aliqua creatura non esse assumptibilis, non ad subtrahendum aliquid divinae potentiae, sed ad ostendendum conditionem creaturae quae ad hoc aptitudinem non habet. Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo imaginis attenditur in natura humana secundum quod est capax Dei, scilicet ipsum attingendo propria operatione cognitionis et amoris. Similitudo autem vestigii attenditur solum secundum repraesentationem aliquam ex impressione divina in creatura existentem, non autem ex eo quod creatura irrationalis, in qua est sola talis similitudo possit ad Deum attingere per solam suam operationem. Quod autem deficit a minori, non habet congruitatem ad id quod est maius, sicut corpus quod non est aptum perfici anima sensitiva, multo minus est aptum perfici ani-

IIIae

found in angels, even as in man, according to Job 4:18: And in His angels He found wickedness. Therefore the angelic nature was as capable of assumption as the nature of man. Obj. 4: Further, since the highest perfection belongs to God, the more like to God a thing is, the more perfect it is. But the whole universe is more perfect than its parts, amongst which is human nature. Therefore the whole universe is more capable of being assumed than human nature. On the contrary, It is said (Prov 8:31) by the mouth of Begotten Wisdom: My delights were to be with the children of men; and hence there would seem some fitness in the union of the Son of God with human nature. I answer that, A thing is said to be assumable as being capable of being assumed by a Divine Person, and this capability cannot be taken with reference to the natural passive power, which does not extend to what transcends the natural order, as the personal union of a creature with God transcends it. Hence it follows that a thing is said to be assumable according to some fitness for such a union. Now this fitness in human nature may be taken from two things, viz. according to its dignity, and according to its need. According to its dignity, because human nature, as being rational and intellectual, was made for attaining to the Word to some extent by its operation, viz. by knowing and loving Him. According to its need—because it stood in need of restoration, having fallen under original sin. Now these two things belong to human nature alone. For in the irrational creature the fitness of dignity is wanting, and in the angelic nature the aforesaid fitness of need is wanting. Hence it follows that only human nature was assumable.

Reply Obj. 1: Creatures are said to be such with reference to their proper causes, not with reference to what belongs to them from their first and universal causes; thus we call a disease incurable, not that it cannot be cured by God, but that it cannot be cured by the proper principles of the subject. Therefore a creature is said to be not assumable, not as if we withdrew anything from the power of God, but in order to show the condition of the creature, which has no capability for this. Reply Obj. 2: The likeness of image is found in human nature, forasmuch as it is capable of God, viz. by attaining to Him through its own operation of knowledge and love. But the likeness of trace regards only a representation by Divine impression, existing in the creature, and does not imply that the irrational creature, in which such a likeness is, can attain to God by its own operation alone. For what does not come up to the less, has no fitness for the greater; as a body which is not fitted to be perfected by a sensitive soul is much less fitted for an intellectual soul. Now much greater and more perfect is the union with God in personal

56

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ma intellectiva. Multo autem est maior et perfectior unio ad Deum secundum esse personale quam quae est secundum operationem. Et ideo creatura irrationalis, quae deficit ab unione ad Deum per operationem, non habet congruitatem ut uniatur ei secundum esse personale. Ad tertium dicendum quod quidam dicunt Angelum non esse assumptibilem, quia a principio suae creationis est in sua personalitate perfectus, cum non subiaceat generationi et corruptioni. Unde non potuisset in unitatem divinae personae assumi nisi eius personalitas destrueretur, quod neque convenit incorruptibilitati naturae eius; neque bonitati assumentis, ad quam non pertinet quod aliquid perfectionis in creatura assumpta corrumpat. Sed hoc non videtur totaliter excludere congruitatem assumptionis angelicae naturae. Potest enim Deus producendo novam angelicam naturam, copulare eam sibi in unitate personae, et sic nihil praeexistens ibi corrumperetur. Sed, sicut dictum est, deest congruitas ex parte necessitatis, quia, etsi natura angelica in aliquibus peccato subiaceat, est tamen eius peccatum irremediabile ut in prima parte habitum est. Ad quartum dicendum quod perfectio universi non est perfectio unius personae vel suppositi, sed eius quod est unum sub positione vel ordine. Cuius plurimae partes non sunt assumptibiles, ut dictum est. Unde relinquitur quod solum natura humana sit assumptibilis.

Q. 4, A. 2

being than the union by operation. And hence the irrational creature which falls short of the union with God by operation has no fitness to be united with Him in personal being. Reply Obj. 3: Some say that angels are not assumable, since they are perfect in their personality from the beginning of their creation, inasmuch as they are not subject to generation and corruption; hence they cannot be assumed to the unity of a Divine Person, unless their personality be destroyed, and this does not befit the incorruptibility of their nature nor the goodness of the one assuming, to Whom it does not belong to corrupt any perfection in the creature assumed. But this would not seem totally to disprove the fitness of the angelic nature for being assumed. For God by producing a new angelic nature could join it to Himself in unity of Person, and in this way nothing preexisting would be corrupted in it. But as was said above, there is wanting the fitness of need, because, although the angelic nature in some is the subject of sin, their sin is irremediable, as stated above (I, Q. 64, A. 2). Reply Obj. 4: The perfection of the universe is not the perfection of one person or suppositum, but of something which is one by position or order, whereof very many parts are not capable of assumption, as was said above. Hence it follows that only human nature is capable of being assumed.

Article 2 Whether the Son of God assumed a person? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei assumpserit personam. Dicit enim Damascenus, in III libro, quod filius Dei assumpsit humanam naturam in atomo, idest, in individuo. Sed individuum rationalis naturae est persona, ut patet per Boetium, in libro de duabus naturis. Ergo filius Dei personam assumpsit. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit quod filius Dei assumpsit ea quae in natura nostra plantavit. Plantavit autem ibi personalitatem. Ergo filius Dei assumpsit personam. Praeterea, nihil consumitur nisi quod est. Sed Innocentius III dicit, in quadam decretali, quod persona Dei consumpsit personam hominis. Ergo videtur quod persona hominis fuit prius assumpta. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de fide ad Petrum, quod Deus naturam hominis assumpsit, non personam. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid dicitur assumi ex eo quod ad aliquid sumitur. Unde illud quod assumitur oportet praeintelligi assumptioni, sicut id quod movetur localiter praeintelligitur ipsi motui. Persona autem

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God assumed a person. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that the Son of God assumed human nature in atomo, i.e., in an individual. But an individual in rational nature is a person, as is plain from Boethius (De Duab. Nat.). Therefore the Son of God assumed a person. Obj. 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that the Son of God assumed what He had sown in our nature. But He sowed our personality there. Therefore the Son of God assumed a person. Obj. 3: Further, nothing is absorbed unless it exist. But Innocent III says in a Decretal that the Person of God absorbed the person of man. Therefore it would seem that the person of man existed previous to its being assumed. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Fide ad Petrum ii) that God assumed the nature, not the person, of man. I answer that, A thing is said to be assumed inasmuch as it is taken into another. Hence, what is assumed must be presupposed to the assumption, as what is moved locally is presupposed to the motion. Now a person in hu-

57

Q. 4, A. 3

Incarnation

non praeintelligitur in humana natura assumptioni, sed magis se habet ut terminus assumptionis, ut supra dictum est. Si enim praeintelligeretur, vel oporteret quod corrumperetur, et sic frustra esset assumpta. Vel quod remaneret post unionem, et sic essent duae personae, una assumens et alia assumpta; quod est erroneum, ut supra ostensum est. Unde relinquitur quod nullo modo filius Dei assumpsit humanam personam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod naturam humanam assumpsit filius Dei in atomo, idest, in individuo quod non est aliud a supposito increato quod est persona filii Dei. Unde non sequitur quod persona sit assumpta. Ad secundum dicendum quod naturae assumptae non deest propria personalitas propter defectum alicuius quod ad perfectionem humanae naturae pertineat, sed propter additionem alicuius quod est supra humanam naturam, quod est unio ad divinam personam. Ad tertium dicendum quod consumptio ibi non importat destructionem alicuius quod prius fuerat, sed impeditionem eius quod aliter esse posset. Si enim humana natura non esset assumpta a divina persona, natura humana propriam personalitatem haberet. Et pro tanto dicitur persona consumpsisse personam, licet improprie, quia persona divina sua unione impedivit ne humana natura propriam personalitatem haberet.

IIIae

man nature is not presupposed to assumption; rather, it is the term of the assumption, as was said (Q. 3, AA. 1, 2). For if it were presupposed, it must either have been corrupted—in which case it was useless; or it remains after the union—and thus there would be two persons, one assuming and the other assumed, which is false, as was shown above (Q. 2, A. 6). Hence it follows that the Son of God nowise assumed a human person. Reply Obj. 1: The Son of God assumed human nature in atomo, i.e., in an individual, which is no other than the uncreated suppositum, the Person of the Son of God. Hence it does not follow that a person was assumed. Reply Obj. 2: Its proper personality is not wanting to the nature assumed through the loss of anything pertaining to the perfection of the human nature but through the addition of something which is above human nature, viz. the union with a Divine Person. Reply Obj. 3: Absorption does not here imply the destruction of anything pre-existing, but the hindering what might otherwise have been. For if the human nature had not been assumed by a Divine Person, the human nature would have had its own personality; and in this way is it said, although improperly, that the Person absorbed the person, inasmuch as the Divine Person by His union hindered the human nature from having its personality.

Article 3 Whether the Divine Person assumed a man? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod persona divina assumpserit hominem. Dicitur enim in Psalmo, beatus quem elegisti et assumpsisti, quod Glossa exponit de Christo. Et Augustinus dicit, in libro de agone Christiano, filius Dei hominem assumpsit, et in illo humana perpessus est. Praeterea, hoc nomen homo significat naturam humanam. Sed filius Dei assumpsit humanam naturam. Ergo assumpsit hominem. Praeterea, filius Dei est homo. Sed non est homo quem non assumpsit quia sic esset pari ratione Petrus, vel quilibet alius homo. Ergo est homo quem assumpsit. Sed contra est auctoritas Felicis Papae et martyris, quae introducitur in Ephesina synodo, credimus in dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, de virgine Maria natum quia ipse est Dei sempiternus filius et verbum, et non homo a Deo assumptus, ut alter sit praeter illum. Neque enim hominem assumpsit Dei filius ut alter sit praeter ipsum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, id quod assumitur non est terminus assumptionis, sed assumptioni praeintelligitur. Dictum est autem quod in-

Objection 1: It would seem that the Divine Person assumed a man. For it is written (Ps 64:5): Blessed is he whom Thou hast chosen and taken to Thee, which a gloss expounds of Christ; and Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xi): The Son of God assumed a man, and in him bore things human. Obj. 2: Further, the word man signifies a human nature. But the Son of God assumed a human nature. Therefore He assumed a man. Obj. 3: Further, the Son of God is a man. But He is not one of the men He did not assume, for with equal reason He would be Peter or any other man. Therefore He is the man whom He assumed. On the contrary, Is the authority of Felix, Pope and Martyr, which is quoted by the Council of Ephesus: We believe in our Lord Jesus Christ, born of the Virgin Mary, because He is the Eternal Son and Word of God, and not a man assumed by God, in such sort that there is another besides Him. For the Son of God did not assume a man, so that there be another besides Him. I answer that, As has been said above (A. 2), what is assumed is not the term of the assumption, but is presupposed to the assumption. Now it was said (Q. 3, AA. 1, 2)

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Mode of Union on the Part of the Human Nature

dividuum in quo assumitur natura humana, non est aliud quam divina persona, quae est terminus assumptionis. Hoc autem nomen homo significat humanam naturam prout est nata in supposito esse, quia, ut dicit Damascenus, sicut hoc nomen Deus significat eum qui habet divinam naturam, ita hoc nomen homo significat eum qui habet humanam naturam. Et ideo non est proprie dictum quod filius Dei assumpsit hominem, supponendo, sicut rei veritas se habet, quod in Christo sit unum suppositum et una hypostasis. Sed secundum illos qui ponunt in Christo duas hypostases vel duo supposita, convenienter et proprie dici posset quod filius Dei hominem assumpsisset. Unde et prima opinio quae ponitur sexta distinctione tertii libri sententiarum concedit hominem esse assumptum. Sed illa opinio erronea est, ut supra ostensum est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi locutiones non sunt extendendae, tanquam propriae, sed pie sunt exponendae, ubicumque a sacris doctoribus ponuntur; ut dicamus hominem assumptum, quia eius natura est assumpta; et quia assumptio terminata est ad hoc quod filius Dei sit homo. Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc nomen homo significat naturam humanam in concreto, prout scilicet est in aliquo supposito. Et ideo, sicut non possumus dicere quod suppositum sit assumptum, ita non possumus dicere quod homo sit assumptus. Ad tertium dicendum quod filius Dei non est homo quem assumpsit; sed cuius naturam assumpsit.

Q. 4, A. 4

that the individual to Whom the human nature is assumed is none other than the Divine Person, Who is the term of the assumption. Now this word man signifies human nature, as it is in a suppositum, because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4, 11), this word God signifies Him Who has human nature. And hence it cannot properly be said that the Son assumed a man, granted (as it must be, in fact) that in Christ there is but one suppositum and one hypostasis. But according to such as hold that there are two hypostases or two supposita in Christ, it may fittingly and properly be said that the Son of God assumed a man. Hence the first opinion quoted in Sent. iii, D. 6, grants that a man was assumed. But this opinion is erroneous, as was said above (Q. 2, A. 6).

Reply Obj. 1: These phrases are not to be taken too literally, but are to be loyally explained, wherever they are used by holy doctors; so as to say that a man was assumed, inasmuch as his nature was assumed; and because the assumption terminated in this—that the Son of God is man. Reply Obj. 2: The word man signifies human nature in the concrete, inasmuch as it is in a suppositum; and hence, since we cannot say a suppositum was assumed, so we cannot say a man was assumed. Reply Obj. 3: The Son of God is not the man whom He assumed, but the man whose nature He assumed.

Article 4 Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature abstracted from all individuals? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei debuit assumere naturam humanam abstractam ab omnibus individuis. Assumptio enim naturae humanae facta est ad communem omnium hominum salutem, unde dicitur I Tim. IV, de Christo, quod est salvator omnium hominum, maxime fidelium. Sed natura prout est in individuis, recedit a sua communitate. Ergo filius Dei debuit humanam naturam assumere prout est ab omnibus individuis abstracta. Praeterea, in omnibus quod nobilissimum est Deo est attribuendum. Sed in unoquoque genere id quod est per se potissimum est. Ergo filius Dei debuit assumere per se hominem. Quod quidem, secundum Platonicos, est humana natura ab individuis separata. Hanc ergo debuit filius Dei assumere. Praeterea, natura humana non est assumpta a filio Dei prout significatur in concreto per hoc nomen homo, ut dictum est. Sic autem significatur prout est in singula-

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature abstracted from all individuals. For the assumption of human nature took place for the common salvation of all men; hence it is said of Christ (1 Tim 4:10) that He is the Savior of all men, especially of the faithful. But nature as it is in individuals withdraws from its universality. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature as it is abstracted from all individuals. Obj. 2: Further, what is noblest in all things ought to be attributed to God. But in every genus what is of itself is best. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed selfexisting (per se) man, which, according to Platonists, is human nature abstracted from its individuals. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed this. Obj. 3: Further, human nature was not assumed by the Son of God in the concrete as is signified by the word man, as was said above (A. 3). Now in this way it signifies human

59

Q. 4, A. 4

Incarnation

IIIae

ribus, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo filius Dei assumpsit huma- nature as it is in individuals, as is plain from what has been nam naturam prout est ab individuis separata. said (A. 3). Therefore the Son of God assumed human nature as it is separated from individuals. Sed contra est quod dicit Damascenus, in III liOn the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, bro, Dei verbum incarnatum neque eam quae nuda con- 11): God the Word Incarnate did not assume a nature which templatione consideratur naturam assumpsit. Non enim exists in pure thought; for this would have been no Incarnaincarnatio hoc, sed deceptio, et fictio incarnationis. Sed tion, but a false and fictitious Incarnation. But human nature natura humana prout est a singularibus separata vel ab- as it is separated or abstracted from individuals is taken to stracta, in nuda contemplatione cogitatur, quia secundum be a pure conception, since it does not exist in itself, as Damseipsam non subsistit, ut idem Damascenus dicit. Ergo ascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11). Therefore the Son of God filius Dei non assumpsit humanam naturam secundum did not assume human nature, as it is separated from indiquod est a singularibus separata. viduals. Respondeo dicendum quod natura hominis, vel I answer that, The nature of man or of any other sencuiuscumque alterius rei sensibilis, praeter esse quod in sible thing, beyond the being which it has in individuals, singularibus habet, dupliciter potest intelligi, uno mo- may be taken in two ways: first, as if it had being of itself, do, quasi per seipsam esse habeat praeter materiam, si- away from matter, as the Platonists held; second, as existcut Platonici posuerunt; alio modo, sicut in intellectu ing in an intellect either human or Divine. Now it cannot existens, vel humano vel divino. Per se quidem subsiste- subsist of itself, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, 26, re non potest, ut philosophus probat, in VII Metaphys., 27, 29, 51), because sensible matter belongs to the specific quia ad naturam speciei rerum sensibilium pertinet ma- nature of sensible things, and is placed in its definition, as teria sensibilis, quae ponitur in eius definitione; sicut flesh and bones in the definition of man. Hence human nacarnes et ossa in definitione hominis. Unde non potest ture cannot be without sensible matter. Nevertheless, if huesse quod natura humana sit praeter materiam sensibi- man nature were subsistent in this way, it would not be fitlem. Si tamen esset hoc modo subsistens natura huma- ting that it should be assumed by the Word of God. First, na, non fuisset conveniens ut a verbo Dei assumeretur. because this assumption is terminated in a Person, and it is Primo quidem, quia assumptio ista terminatur ad per- contrary to the nature of a common form to be thus indisonam. Hoc autem est contra rationem formae commu- vidualized in a person. Second, because to a common nanis, ut sic in persona individuetur. Secundo, quia naturae ture can only be attributed common and universal operacommuni non possunt attribui nisi operationes commu- tions, according to which man neither merits nor demerits, nes et universales, secundum quas homo nec meretur whereas, on the contrary, the assumption took place in ornec demeretur, cum tamen illa assumptio ad hoc facta sit der that the Son of God, having assumed our nature, might ut filius Dei in natura assumpta nobis mereretur. Tertio merit for us. Third, because a nature so existing would not quia natura sic existens non est sensibilis, sed intelligi- be sensible, but intelligible. But the Son of God assumed bilis. Filius autem Dei assumpsit humanam naturam ut human nature in order to show Himself in men’s sight, achominibus in ea visibilis appareret, secundum illud Ba- cording to Baruch 3:38: Afterwards He was seen upon earth, ruch III, post haec in terris visus est, et cum hominibus and conversed with men. conversatus est. Similiter etiam non potuit assumi natura humana a Likewise, neither could human nature have been asfilio Dei secundum quod est in intellectu divino. Quia sumed by the Son of God, as it is in the Divine intellect, sic nihil aliud esset quam natura divina, et per hunc mo- since it would be none other than the Divine Nature; and, dum, ab aeterno esset in filio Dei humana natura. Simi- according to this, human nature would be in the Son of God liter non convenit dicere quod filius Dei assumpserit hu- from eternity. Neither can we say that the Son of God asmanam naturam prout est in intellectu humano. Quia sumed human nature as it is in a human intellect, for this hoc nihil aliud esset quam si intelligeretur assumere na- would mean nothing else but that He is understood to asturam humanam. Et sic, si non assumeret eam in rerum sume a human nature; and thus if He did not assume it in natura, esset intellectus falsus. Nec aliud esset quam fic- reality, this would be a false understanding; nor would this tio quaedam incarnationis, ut Damascenus dicit. assumption of the human nature be anything but a fictitious Incarnation, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod filius Dei incarnaReply Obj. 1: The incarnate Son of God is the common tus est communis omnium salvator, non communitate Savior of all, not by a generic or specific community, such as generis vel speciei, quae attribuitur naturae ab individuis is attributed to the nature separated from the individuals, separatae, sed communitate causae, prout filius Dei in- but by a community of cause, whereby the incarnate Son of carnatus est universalis causa salutis humanae. God is the universal cause of human salvation.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod per se homo non invenitur in rerum natura ita quod sit praeter singularia, sicut Platonici posuerunt. Quamvis quidam dicant quod Plato non intellexit hominem separatum esse nisi in intellectu divino. Et sic non oportuit quod assumeretur a verbo, cum ab aeterno sibi affuerit. Ad tertium dicendum quod natura humana, quamvis non sit assumpta in concreto ut suppositum praeintelligatur assumptioni, sic tamen assumpta est in individuo, quia assumpta est ut sit in individuo.

Q. 4, A. 5

Reply Obj. 2: Self-existing (per se) man is not to be found in nature in such a way as to be outside the singular, as the Platonists held, although some say Plato believed that the separate man was only in the Divine intellect. And hence it was not necessary for it to be assumed by the Word, since it had been with Him from eternity. Reply Obj. 3: Although human nature was not assumed in the concrete, as if the suppositum were presupposed to the assumption, nevertheless it is assumed in an individual, since it is assumed so as to be in an individual.

Article 5 Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature in all individuals? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei humanam naturam assumere debuit in omnibus individuis. Id enim quod primo et per se assumptum est, est natura humana. Sed quod convenit per se alicui naturae, convenit omnibus in eadem natura existentibus. Ergo conveniens fuit ut natura humana assumeretur a Dei verbo in omnibus suppositis. Praeterea, incarnatio divina processit ex divina caritate, ideo dicitur Ioan. III, sic Deus dilexit mundum ut filium suum unigenitum daret. Sed caritas facit ut aliquis se communicet amicis quantum possibile est. Possibile autem fuit filio Dei ut plures naturas hominum assumeret, ut supra dictum est, et, eadem ratione, omnes. Ergo conveniens fuit ut filius Dei assumeret naturam in omnibus suis suppositis. Praeterea, sapiens operator perficit opus suum breviori via qua potest. Sed brevior via fuisset si omnes homines assumpti fuissent ad naturalem filiationem, quam quod per unum filium naturalem multi in adoptionem filiorum adducantur, ut dicitur Galat. IV. Ergo natura humana debuit a filio Dei assumi in omnibus suppositis. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod filius Dei non assumpsit humanam naturam quae in specie consideratur, neque enim omnes hypostases eius assumpsit. Respondeo dicendum quod non fuit conveniens quod humana natura in omnibus suis suppositis a verbo assumeretur. Primo quidem, quia tolleretur multitudo suppositorum humanae naturae, quae est ei connaturalis. Cum enim in natura assumpta non sit considerare aliud suppositum praeter personam assumentem, ut supra dictum est; si non esset natura humana nisi assumpta, sequeretur quod non esset nisi unum suppositum humanae naturae, quod est persona assumens. Secundo, quia hoc derogaret dignitati filii Dei incarnati, prout est primogenitus in multis fratribus secundum humanam

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature in all individuals. For what is assumed first and by itself is human nature. But what belongs essentially to a nature belongs to all who exist in the nature. Therefore it was fitting that human nature should be assumed by the Word of God in all its supposita. Obj. 2: Further, the Divine Incarnation proceeded from Divine Love; hence it is written (John 3:16): God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son. But love makes us give ourselves to our friends as much as we can, and it was possible for the Son of God to assume several human natures, as was said above (Q. 3, A. 7), and with equal reason all. Hence it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature in all its supposita. Obj. 3: Further, a skillful workman completes his work in the shortest manner possible. But it would have been a shorter way if all men had been assumed to the natural sonship than for one natural Son to lead many to the adoption of sons, as is written Gal. 4:5 (cf. Heb. 2:10). Therefore human nature ought to have been assumed by God in all its supposita. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that the Son of God did not assume human nature as a species, nor did He assume all its hypostases. I answer that, It was unfitting for human nature to be assumed by the Word in all its supposita. First, because the multitude of supposita of human nature, which are natural to it, would have been taken away. For since we must not see any other suppositum in the assumed nature, except the Person assuming, as was said above (A. 3), if there was no human nature except what was assumed, it would follow that there was but one suppositum of human nature, which is the Person assuming. Second, because this would have been derogatory to the dignity of the incarnate Son of God, as He is the First-born of many brethren, according to

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Q. 4, A. 6

Incarnation

naturam, sicut est primogenitus omnis creaturae secundum divinam. Essent enim tunc omnes homines aequalis dignitatis. Tertio, quia conveniens fuit quod, sicut unum suppositum divinum est incarnatum, ita unam solam naturam humanam assumeret, ut ex utraque parte unitas inveniatur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod assumi convenit secundum se humanae naturae, quia scilicet non convenit ei ratione personae, sicut naturae divinae convenit assumere ratione personae. Non autem quia convenit ei secundum se sicut pertinens ad principia essentialia eius, vel sicut naturalis eius proprietas, per quem modum conveniret omnibus eius suppositis. Ad secundum dicendum quod dilectio Dei ad homines manifestatur non solum in ipsa assumptione humanae naturae, sed praecipue per ea quae passus est in natura humana pro aliis hominibus, secundum illud Rom. V, commendat autem Deus suam caritatem in nobis, quia, cum inimici essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est. Quod locum non haberet si in omnibus hominibus naturam humanam assumpsisset. Ad tertium dicendum quod ad brevitatem viae quam sapiens operator observat, pertinet quod non faciat per multa quod sufficienter potest fieri per unum. Et ideo convenientissimum fuit quod per unum hominem alii omnes salvarentur.

IIIae

the human nature, even as He is the First-born of all creatures according to the Divine, for then all men would be of equal dignity. Third, because it is fitting that as one Divine suppositum is incarnate, so He should assume one human nature, so that on both sides unity might be found. Reply Obj. 1: To be assumed belongs to the human nature of itself, because it does not belong to it by reason of a person, as it belongs to the Divine Nature to assume by reason of the Person; not, however, that it belongs to it of itself as if belonging to its essential principles, or as its natural property in which manner it would belong to all its supposita. Reply Obj. 2: The love of God to men is shown not merely in the assumption of human nature, but especially in what He suffered in human nature for other men, according to Rom. 5:8: But God commendeth His charity towards us; because when as yet we were sinners . . . Christ died for us, which would not have taken place had He assumed human nature in all its supposita. Reply Obj. 3: In order to shorten the way, which every skillful workman does, what can be done by one must not be done by many. Hence it was most fitting that by one man all the rest should be saved.

Article 6 Whether it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature of the stock of Adam? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit conveniens ut filius Dei humanam naturam assumeret ex stirpe Adae. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Heb. VII, decebat ut esset nobis pontifex segregatus a peccatoribus. Sed magis esset a peccatoribus segregatus si non assumpsisset humanam naturam ex stirpe Adae peccatoris. Ergo videtur quod non debuit de stirpe Adae naturam humanam assumere. Praeterea, in quolibet genere nobilius est principium eo quod est ex principio. Si igitur assumere voluit humanam naturam, magis debuit eam assumere in ipso Adam. Praeterea, gentiles fuerunt magis peccatores quam Iudaei, ut dicit Glossa, Galat. II, super illud, nos natura Iudaei, non ex gentibus peccatores. Si ergo ex peccatoribus naturam humanam assumere voluit, debuit eam magis assumere ex gentilibus quam ex stirpe Abrahae, qui fuit iustus. Sed contra est quod Luc. III generatio domini reducitur usque ad Adam. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin., poterat Deus hominem aliunde suscipere,

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature of the stock of Adam, for the Apostle says (Heb 7:26): For it was fitting that we should have such a high priest . . . separated from sinners. But He would have been still further separated from sinners had He not assumed human nature of the stock of Adam, a sinner. Hence it seems that He ought not to have assumed human nature of the stock of Adam. Obj. 2: Further, in every genus the principle is nobler than what is from the principle. Hence, if He wished to assume human nature, He ought to have assumed it in Adam himself. Obj. 3: Further, the Gentiles were greater sinners than the Jews, as a gloss says on Gal. 2:15: For we by nature are Jews, and not of the Gentiles, sinners. Hence, if He wished to assume human nature from sinners, He ought rather to have assumed it from the Gentiles than from the stock of Abraham, who was just. On the contrary, (Luke 3), the genealogy of our Lord is traced back to Adam. I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 18): God was able to assume human nature elsewhere than from

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Mode of Union on the Part of the Human Nature

non de genere illius Adae qui suo peccato obligavit genus humanum. Sed melius iudicavit et de ipso quod victum fuerat genere assumere hominem Deus, per quem generis humani vinceret inimicum. Et hoc propter tria. Primo quidem, quia hoc videtur ad iustitiam pertinere, ut ille satisfaciat qui peccavit. Et ideo de natura per ipsum corrupta debuit assumi id per quod satisfactio erat implenda pro tota natura. Secundo, hoc etiam pertinet ad maiorem hominis dignitatem, dum ex illo genere victor Diaboli nascitur quod per Diabolum fuerat victum. Tertio, quia per hoc etiam Dei potentia magis ostenditur, dum de natura corrupta et infirma assumpsit id quod in tantam virtutem et dignitatem est promotum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus debuit esse a peccatoribus segregatus quantum ad culpam, quam venerat destruere, non quantum ad naturam, quam venerat salvare; secundum quam debuit per omnia fratribus assimilari, ut idem apostolus dicit, Heb. II. Et in hoc etiam mirabilior est eius innocentia, quod de massa peccato subiecta natura assumpta tantam habuit puritatem. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, oportuit eum qui peccata venerat tollere, esse a peccatoribus segregatum quantum ad culpam, cui Adam subiacuit, et quem Christus a suo delicto eduxit, ut dicitur Sap. X. Oportebat autem eum qui mundare omnes venerat, non esse mundandum, sicut et in quolibet genere motus primum movens est immobile secundum illum motum, sicut primum alterans est inalterabile. Et ideo non fuit conveniens ut assumeret humanam naturam in ipso Adam. Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia Christus debebat esse maxime a peccatoribus segregatus quantum ad culpam, quasi summam innocentiae obtinens, conveniens fuit ut a primo peccatore usque ad Christum perveniretur mediantibus quibusdam iustis, in quibus perfulgerent quaedam insignia futurae sanctitatis. Propter hoc etiam in populo ex quo Christus erat nasciturus instituit Deus quaedam sanctitatis signa, quae incoeperunt in Abraham, qui primus promissionem accepit de Christo, et circumcisionem in signum foederis consummandi, ut dicitur Gen. XVII.

Q. 4, A. 6

the stock of Adam, who by his sin had fettered the whole human race; yet God judged it better to assume human nature from the vanquished race, and thus to vanquish the enemy of the human race. And this for three reasons: First, because it would seem to belong to justice that he who sinned should make amends; and hence that from the nature which he had corrupted should be assumed that whereby satisfaction was to be made for the whole nature. Second, it pertains to man’s greater dignity that the conqueror of the devil should spring from the stock conquered by the devil. Third, because God’s power is thereby made more manifest, since, from a corrupt and weakened nature, He assumed that which was raised to such might and glory. Reply Obj. 1: Christ ought to be separated from sinners as regards sin, which He came to overthrow, and not as regards nature which He came to save, and in which it behooved Him in all things to be made like to His brethren, as the Apostle says (Heb 2:17). And in this is His innocence the more wonderful, seeing that though assumed from a mass tainted by sin, His nature was endowed with such purity. Reply Obj. 2: As was said above (ad 1) it behooved Him Who came to take away sins to be separated from sinners as regards sin, to which Adam was subject, whom Christ brought out of his sin, as is written (Wis 10:2). For it behooved Him Who came to cleanse all, not to need cleansing Himself; just as in every genus of motion the first mover is immovable as regards that motion, and the first to alter is itself unalterable. Hence it was not fitting that He should assume human nature in Adam himself. Reply Obj. 3: Since Christ ought especially to be separated from sinners as regards sin, and to possess the highest innocence, it was fitting that between the first sinner and Christ some just men should stand midway, in whom certain forecasts of (His) future holiness should shine forth. And hence, even in the people from whom Christ was to be born, God appointed signs of holiness, which began in Abraham, who was the first to receive the promise of Christ, and circumcision, as a sign that the covenant should be kept, as is written (Gen 17:11).

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Question 5 The Parts of Human Nature Which Were Assumed Deinde considerandum est de assumptione partium We must now consider the assumption of the parts of humanae naturae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. human nature; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum filius Dei debuerit assumere verum (1) Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a corpus. true body? Secundo, utrum assumere debuerit corpus (2) Whether He ought to have assumed an earthly terrenum, scilicet carnem et sanguinem. body, i.e., one of flesh and blood? Tertio, utrum assumpserit animam. (3) Whether He ought to have assumed a soul? Quarto, utrum assumere debuerit intellectum. (4) Whether He ought to have assumed an intellect?

Article 1 Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei non assumpserit verum corpus. Dicitur enim Philipp. II quod in similitudinem hominum factus est. Sed quod est secundum veritatem, non dicitur esse secundum similitudinem. Ergo filius Dei non assumpsit verum corpus. Praeterea, assumptio corporis in nullo derogavit dignitati divinitatis, dicit enim Leo Papa, in sermone de nativitate, quod nec inferiorem naturam consumpsit glorificatio, nec superiorem minuit assumptio. Sed hoc ad dignitatem Dei pertinet quod sit omnino a corpore separatus. Ergo videtur quod per assumptionem non fuerit Deus corpori unitus. Praeterea, signa debent respondere signatis. Sed apparitiones veteris testamenti, quae fuerunt signa et figurae apparitionis Christi, non fuerunt secundum corporis veritatem, sed secundum imaginariam visionem, sicut patet Isaiae VI, vidi dominum sedentem, et cetera. Ergo videtur quod etiam apparitio filii Dei in mundum non fuerit secundum corporis veritatem, sed solum secundum imaginationem. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octogintatrium quaest., si phantasma fuit corpus Christi, fefellit Christus. Et si fefellit, veritas non est. Est autem veritas Christus. Ergo non phantasma fuit corpus eius. Et sic patet quod verum corpus assumpsit. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in libro de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, natus est Dei filius non putative, quasi imaginatum corpus habens, sed corpus verum. Et huius ratio triplex potest assignari. Quarum prima est ex ratione humanae naturae, ad quam pertinet verum corpus habere. Supposito igitur ex praemissis

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a true body. For it is written (Phil 2:7), that He was made in the likeness of men. But what is something in truth is not said to be in the likeness thereof. Therefore the Son of God did not assume a true body. Obj. 2: Further, the assumption of a body in no way diminishes the dignity of the Godhead; for Pope Leo says (Serm. de Nativ.) that the glorification did not absorb the lesser nature, nor did the assumption lessen the higher. But it pertains to the dignity of God to be altogether separated from bodies. Therefore it seems that by the assumption God was not united to a body. Obj. 3: Further, signs ought to correspond to the realities. But the apparitions of the Old Testament which were signs of the manifestation of Christ were not in a real body, but by visions in the imagination, as is plain from Isa. 60:1: I saw the Lord sitting, etc. Hence it would seem that the apparition of the Son of God in the world was not in a real body, but only in imagination. On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 13): If the body of Christ was a phantom, Christ deceived us, and if He deceived us, He is not the Truth. But Christ is the Truth. Therefore His body was not a phantom. Hence it is plain that He assumed a true body. I answer that, As is said (De Eccles. Dogm. ii): The Son of God was not born in appearance only, as if He had an imaginary body; but His body was real. The proof of this is threefold. First, from the essence of human nature to which it pertains to have a true body. Therefore granted, as already proved (Q. 4, A. 1), that it was fitting for the Son of God

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Incarnation

quod conveniens fuerit filium Dei assumere humanam naturam, consequens est quod verum corpus assumpserit. Secunda ratio sumi potest ex his quae in mysterio incarnationis sunt acta. Si enim non fuit verum corpus eius sed phantasticum, ergo nec veram mortem sustinuit; nec aliquid eorum quae de eo Evangelistae narrant, secundum veritatem gessit, sed solum secundum apparentiam quandam. Et sic etiam sequitur quod non fuit vera salus hominis subsecuta, oportet enim effectum causae proportionari. Tertia ratio potest sumi ex ipsa dignitate personae assumentis, quae cum sit veritas, non decuit ut in opere eius aliqua fictio esset. Unde et dominus hunc errorem per seipsum excludere dignatus est, Luc. ult., cum discipuli, conturbati et conterriti, putabant se spiritum videre, et non verum corpus, et ideo se eis palpandum praebuit, dicens, palpate et videte, quia spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod similitudo illa exprimit veritatem humanae naturae in Christo, per modum quo omnes qui vere in humana natura existunt, similes specie esse dicuntur. Non autem intelligitur similitudo phantastica. Ad cuius evidentiam, apostolus subiungit quod factus est obediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis, quod fieri non potuisset si fuisset sola similitudo phantastica. Ad secundum dicendum quod per hoc quod filius Dei verum corpus assumpsit, in nullo est eius dignitas diminuta. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de fide ad Petrum, exinanivit seipsum, formam servi accipiens, ut fieret servus, sed formae Dei plenitudinem non amisit. Non enim filius Dei sic assumpsit verum corpus ut forma corporis fieret, quod repugnat divinae simplicitati et puritati, hoc enim esset assumere corpus in unitate naturae, quod est impossibile, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed, salva distinctione naturae, assumpsit in unitate personae. Ad tertium dicendum quod figura respondere debet quantum ad similitudinem, non quantum ad rei veritatem, si enim per omnia esset similitudo, iam non esset signum, sed ipsa res, ut Damascenus dicit, in III libro. Conveniens igitur fuit ut apparitiones veteris testamenti essent secundum apparentiam tantum, quasi figurae, apparitio autem filii Dei in mundo esset secundum corporis veritatem, quasi res figurata sive signata per illas figuras. Unde apostolus, Coloss. II, quae sunt umbra futurorum, corpus autem Christi.

IIIae

to assume human nature, He must consequently have assumed a real body. The second reason is taken from what was done in the mystery of the Incarnation. For if His body was not real but imaginary, He neither underwent a real death, nor of those things which the Evangelists recount of Him, did He do any in very truth, but only in appearance; and hence it would also follow that the real salvation of man has not taken place; since the effect must be proportionate to the cause. The third reason is taken from the dignity of the Person assuming, Whom it did not become to have anything fictitious in His work, since He is the Truth. Hence our Lord Himself deigned to refute this error (Luke 24:37, 39), when the disciples, troubled and frighted, supposed that they saw a spirit, and not a true body; wherefore He offered Himself to their touch, saying: Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have. Reply Obj. 1: This likeness indicates the truth of the human nature in Christ—just as all that truly exist in human nature are said to be like in species—and not a mere imaginary likeness. In proof of this the Apostle subjoins (Phil 2:8) that He became obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross; which would have been impossible, had it been only an imaginary likeness. Reply Obj. 2: By assuming a true body the dignity of the Son of God is nowise lessened. Hence Augustine says (De Fide ad Petrum ii): He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, that He might become a servant; yet did He not lose the fullness of the form of God. For the Son of God assumed a true body, not so as to become the form of a body, which is repugnant to the Divine simplicity and purity—for this would be to assume a body to the unity of the nature, which is impossible, as is plain from what has been stated above (Q. 2, A. 1): but, the natures remaining distinct, He assumed a body to the unity of Person. Reply Obj. 3: The figure ought to correspond to the reality as regards the likeness and not as regards the truth of the thing. For if they were alike in all points, it would no longer be a likeness but the reality itself, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26). Hence it was more fitting that the apparitions of the old Testament should be in appearance only, being figures; and that the apparition of the Son of God in the world should be in a real body, being the thing prefigured by these figures. Hence the Apostle says (Col 2:17): Which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ’s.

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Q. 5, A. 2

Article 2 Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a carnal or earthly body? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non habuerit corpus carnale, sive terrestre, sed caeleste. Dicit enim apostolus, I Cor. XV, primus homo de terra, terrenus, secundus homo de caelo, caelestis. Sed primus homo, scilicet Adam, fuit de terra quantum ad corpus, ut patet Gen. II. Ergo etiam secundus homo, scilicet Christus, fuit de caelo quantum ad corpus. Praeterea, I Cor. XV dicitur, caro et sanguis regnum Dei non possidebunt. Sed regnum Dei principaliter est in Christo. Ergo in ipso non est caro et sanguis, sed magis corpus caeleste. Praeterea, omne quod est optimum est Deo attribuendum. Sed inter omnia corpora corpus nobilissimum est caeleste. Ergo tale corpus debuit Christus assumere. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit Luc. ult., spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere. Caro autem et ossa non sunt ex materia caelestis corporis, sed ex inferioribus elementis. Ergo corpus Christi non fuit corpus caeleste, sed carneum et terrenum. Respondeo dicendum quod eisdem rationibus apparet quare corpus Christi non debuit esse caeleste, quibus ostensum est quod non debuit esse phantasticum. Primo enim, sicut non salvaretur veritas humanae naturae in Christo si corpus eius esset phantasticum, ut posuit Manichaeus; ita etiam non salvaretur si poneretur caeleste, sicut posuit Valentinus. Cum enim forma hominis sit quaedam res naturalis, requirit determinatam materiam, scilicet carnes et ossa, quae in hominis definitione poni oportet, ut patet per philosophum, in VII Metaphys. Secundo, quia hoc etiam derogaret veritati eorum quae Christus in corpore gessit. Cum enim corpus caeleste sit impassibile et incorruptibile, ut probatur in I de caelo, si filius Dei corpus caeleste assumpsisset, non vere esuriisset nec sitiisset, nec etiam passionem et mortem sustinuisset. Tertio, etiam hoc derogat veritati divinae. Cum enim filius Dei se ostenderet hominibus quasi corpus carneum et terrenum habens, fuisset falsa demonstratio si corpus caeleste habuisset. Et ideo in libro de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus dicitur, natus est filius Dei carnem ex virginis corpore trahens, et non de caelo secum afferens. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus dicitur dupliciter de caelo descendisse. Uno modo, ratione divinae naturae, non ita quod divina natura esse in caelo defecerit; sed quia in infimis novo modo esse coepit, scilicet secundum naturam assumptam; secundum illud Ioan. III, nemo ascendit in caelum nisi qui descendit de caelo, filius hominis, qui est in caelo.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ had not a carnal or earthly, but a heavenly body. For the Apostle says (1 Cor 15:41): The first man was of the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly. But the first man, i.e., Adam, was of the earth as regards his body, as is plain from Gen. 1. Therefore the second man, i.e., Christ, was of heaven as regards the body. Obj. 2: Further, it is said (1 Cor 15:50): Flesh and blood shall not possess the kingdom of God. But the kingdom of God is in Christ chiefly. Therefore there is no flesh or blood in Him, but rather a heavenly body. Obj. 3: Further, whatever is best is to be attributed to God. But of all bodies a heavenly body is the best. Therefore it behooved Christ to assume such a body. On the contrary, our Lord says (Luke 24:39): A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have. Now flesh and bones are not of the matter of heavenly bodies, but are composed of the inferior elements. Therefore the body of Christ was not a heavenly, but a carnal and earthly body. I answer that, By the reasons which proved that the body of Christ was not an imaginary one, it may also be shown that it was not a heavenly body. First, because even as the truth of the human nature of Christ would not have been maintained had His body been an imaginary one, such as Manes supposed, so likewise it would not have been maintained if we supposed, as did Valentine, that it was a heavenly body. For since the form of man is a natural thing, it requires determinate matter, to wit, flesh and bones, which must be placed in the definition of man, as is plain from the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 39). Second, because this would lessen the truth of such things as Christ did in the body. For since a heavenly body is impassible and incorruptible, as is proved De Coelo i, 20, if the Son of God had assumed a heavenly body, He would not have truly hungered or thirsted, nor would he have undergone His passion and death. Third, this would have detracted from God’s truthfulness. For since the Son of God showed Himself to men, as if He had a carnal and earthly body, the manifestation would have been false, had He had a heavenly body. Hence (De Eccles. Dogm. ii) it is said: The Son of God was born, taking flesh of the Virgin’s body, and not bringing it with Him from heaven. Reply Obj. 1: Christ is said in two ways to have come down from heaven. First, as regards His Divine Nature; not indeed that the Divine Nature ceased to be in heaven, but inasmuch as He began to be here below in a new way, viz. by His assumed nature, according to John 3:13: No man hath ascended into heaven, but He that descended from heaven, the Son of Man, Who is in heaven.

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Q. 5, A. 3

Incarnation

Alio modo, ratione corporis, non quia ipsum corpus Christi secundum suam substantiam de caelo descenderit; sed quia virtute caelesti, idest spiritus sancti, est eius corpus formatum. Unde Augustinus dicit, ad Orosium, exponens auctoritatem inductam, caelestem dico Christum, quia non ex humano conceptus est semine. Et hoc etiam modo Hilarius exponit, in libro de Trinitate. Ad secundum dicendum quod caro et sanguis non accipiuntur ibi pro substantia carnis et sanguinis, sed pro corruptione carnis et sanguinis. Quae quidem in Christo non fuit quantum ad culpam. Fuit tamen ad tempus quantum ad poenam, ut opus nostrae redemptionis expleret. Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc ipsum ad maximam Dei gloriam pertinet quod corpus infirmum et terrenum ad tantam sublimitatem provehit. Unde in synodo Ephesina legitur verbum sancti Theophili dicentis, qualiter artificum optimi non pretiosis tantum materiebus artem ostendentes in admiratione sunt, sed, vilissimum lutum et terram dissolutam plerumque assumentes, suae disciplinae demonstrantes virtutem, multo magis laudantur; ita omnium optimus artifex, Dei verbum, non aliquam pretiosam materiam corporis caelestis apprehendens ad nos venit, sed in luto magnitudinem suae artis ostendit.

IIIae

Second, as regards His body, not indeed that the very substance of the body of Christ descended from heaven, but that His body was formed by a heavenly power, i.e., by the Holy Spirit. Hence Augustine, explaining the authority quoted, says (Ad Orosium): I call Christ a heavenly man because He was not conceived of human seed. And Hilary expounds it in the same way (De Trin. x). Reply Obj. 2: Flesh and blood are not taken here for the substance of flesh and blood, but for the corruption of flesh, which was not in Christ as far as it was sinful; but as far as it was a punishment; thus, for a time, it was in Christ, that He might carry through the work of our redemption. Reply Obj. 3: It pertains to the greatest glory of God to have raised a weak and earthly body to such sublimity. Hence in the General Council of Ephesus (P. II, Act. I) we read the saying of St. Theophilus: Just as the best workmen are esteemed not merely for displaying their skill in precious materials, but very often because by making use of the poorest clay and commonest earth, they show the power of their craft; so the best of all workmen, the Word of God, did not come down to us by taking a heavenly body of some most precious matter, but showed the greatness of His skill in clay.

Article 3 Whether the Son of God assumed a soul? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei animam non assumpserit. Ioannes enim, incarnationis mysterium tradens, dixit, verbum caro factum est, nulla facta de anima mentione. Non autem dicitur caro factum eo quod sit in carnem conversum, sed quia carnem assumpsit. Non ergo videtur assumpsisse animam. Praeterea, anima necessaria est corpori ad hoc quod per eam vivificetur. Sed ad hoc non fuit necessaria corpori Christi, ut videtur, quia ipsum Dei verbum est, de quo in Psalmo, domine, apud te est fons vitae. Superfluum igitur fuisset animam adesse, verbo praesente. Deus autem et natura nihil frustra faciunt, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in I de caelo. Ergo videtur quod filius Dei animam non assumpsit. Praeterea, ex unione animae ad corpus constituitur natura communis, quae est species humana. In domino autem Iesu Christo non est communem speciem accipere, ut Damascenus dicit, in III libro. Non igitur assumpsit animam. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de agone Christiano non eos audiamus qui solum corpus hu-

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul. For John has said, teaching the mystery of the Incarnation (John 1:14): The Word was made flesh— no mention being made of a soul. Now it is not said that the Word was made flesh as if changed to flesh, but because He assumed flesh. Therefore He seems not to have assumed a soul. Obj. 2: Further, a soul is necessary to the body, in order to quicken it. But this was not necessary for the body of Christ, as it would seem, for of the Word of God it is written (Ps 35:10): Lord, with Thee is the fountain of life. Therefore it would seem altogether superfluous for the soul to be there, when the Word was present. But God and nature do nothing uselessly, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 32; ii, 56). Therefore the Word would seem not to have assumed a soul. Obj. 3: Further, by the union of soul and body is constituted the common nature, which is the human species. But in the Lord Jesus Christ we are not to look for a common species, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3). Therefore He did not assume a soul. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xxi): Let us not hearken to such as say that only a human

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manum dicunt esse susceptum a verbo Dei; et sic audiunt quod dictum est, verbum caro factum est, ut negent illum hominem vel animam, vel aliquid hominis habuisse nisi carnem solam. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de haeresibus, opinio primo fuit Arii, et postea Apollinaris, quod filius Dei solam carnem assumpserit, absque anima, ponentes quod verbum fuerit carni loco animae. Ex quo sequebatur quod in Christo non fuerunt duae naturae, sed una tantum, ex anima enim et carne una natura humana constituitur. Sed haec positio stare non potest, propter tria. Primo quidem, quia repugnat auctoritati Scripturae, in qua dominus de sua anima facit mentionem, Matth. XXVI, tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem; et Ioan. X, potestatem habeo ponendi animam meam. Sed ad hoc respondebat Apollinaris quod in his verbis anima metaphorice sumitur, per quem modum in veteri testamento Dei anima commemoratur, Isaiae I, Calendas vestras et solemnitates odivit anima mea. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus, in libro octogintatrium quaest., Evangelistae in evangelica narratione narrant quod miratus est Iesus, et iratus, et contristatus, et quod esuriit. Quae quidem ita demonstrant eum veram animam habuisse, sicut ex hoc quod comedit et dormivit et fatigatus est, demonstratur habuisse verum corpus humanum. Alioquin, si et haec ad metaphoram referantur, cum similia legantur in veteri testamento de Deo, peribit fides evangelicae narrationis. Aliud est enim quod prophetice nuntiatur in figuris, aliud quod secundum rerum proprietatem ab Evangelistis historice scribitur. Secundo, derogat praedictus error utilitati incarnationis, quae est liberatio hominis. Ut enim argumentatur Augustinus, in libro contra Felicianum, si, accepta carne, filius Dei animam omisit, aut, innoxiam sciens, medicinae indigentem non credidit; aut, a se alienam putans, redemptionis beneficio non donavit; aut, ex toto insanabilem iudicans, curare nequivit; aut ut vilem, et quae nullis usibus apta videretur, abiecit. Horum duo blasphemiam important in Deum. Quomodo enim dicetur omnipotens, si curare non potuit desperatam? Aut quomodo omnium Deus, si non ipse fecit animam nostram? Duobus vero aliis, in uno animae causa nescitur, in altero meritum non tenetur. Aut intelligere causam putandus est animae qui eam, ad accipiendum legem habitu insitae rationis instructam, a peccato voluntariae transgressionis nititur separare? Aut quomodo eius generositatem novit qui ignobilitatis vitio dicit despectam? Si originem attendas, pretiosior est animae substantia, si transgressionis culpam, propter intelligentiam peior est causa. Ego autem Christum et perfectam sapientiam scio, et piissimam esse non dubito, quorum primo, meliorem et prudentiae capacem non despexit; secundo, eam quae magis fuerat vulnerata, suscepit. Tertio vero, haec positio est contra ipsam incarnationis veritatem. Caro enim et ceterae partes hominis per animam spe-

Q. 5, A. 3

body was assumed by the Word of God; and take ‘the Word was made flesh’ to mean that the man had no soul nor any other part of a man, save flesh. I answer that, As Augustine says (De Haeres. 69, 55), it was first of all the opinion of Arius and then of Apollinaris that the Son of God assumed only flesh, without a soul, holding that the Word took the place of a soul to the body. And consequently it followed that there were not two natures in Christ, but only one; for from a soul and body one human nature is constituted. But this opinion cannot hold, for three reasons. First, because it is counter to the authority of Scripture, in which our Lord makes mention of His soul, Matt. 26:38: My soul is sorrowful even unto death; and John 10:18: I have power to lay down My soul. But to this Apollinaris replied that in these words soul is taken metaphorically, in which way mention is made in the Old Testament of the soul of God (Isa 1:14): My soul hateth your new moons and your solemnities. But, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80), the Evangelists relate how Jesus wondered, was angered, sad, and hungry. Now these show that He had a true soul, just as that He ate, slept and was weary shows that He had a true human body: otherwise, if these things are a metaphor, because the like are said of God in the Old Testament, the trustworthiness of the Gospel story is undermined. For it is one thing that things were foretold in a figure, and another that historical events were related in very truth by the Evangelists. Second, this error lessens the utility of the Incarnation, which is man’s liberation. For Augustine argues thus (Contra Felician. xiii): If the Son of God in taking flesh passed over the soul, either He knew its sinlessness, and trusted it did not need a remedy; or He considered it unsuitable to Him, and did not bestow on it the boon of redemption; or He reckoned it altogether incurable, and was unable to heal it; or He cast it off as worthless and seemingly unfit for any use. Now two of these reasons imply a blasphemy against God. For how shall we call Him omnipotent, if He is unable to heal what is beyond hope? Or God of all, if He has not made our soul. And as regards the other two reasons, in one the cause of the soul is ignored, and in the other no place is given to merit. Is He to be considered to understand the cause of the soul, Who seeks to separate it from the sin of wilfull transgression, enabled as it is to receive the law by the endowment of the habit of reason? Or how can His generosity be known to any one who says it was despised on account of its ignoble sinfulness? If you look at its origin, the substance of the soul is more precious than the body, but if at the sin of transgression, on account of its intelligence it is worse than the body. Now I know and declare that Christ is perfect wisdom, nor have I any doubt that He is most loving; and because of the first of these He did not despise what was better and more capable of prudence; and because of the second He protected what was most wounded. Third, this position is against the truth of the Incarnation. For flesh and the

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ciem sortiuntur. Unde, recedente anima, non est os aut other parts of man receive their species through the soul. caro nisi aequivoce, ut patet per philosophum, II de ani- Hence, if the soul is absent, there are no bones nor flesh, ma et VII Metaphys. except equivocally, as is plain from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9; Metaph. vii, 34). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cum dicitur, verReply Obj. 1: When we say, The Word was made flesh, bum caro factum est, caro ponitur pro toto homine, ac si flesh is taken for the whole man, as if we were to say, The diceret, verbum homo factum est, sicut Isaiae XL dicitur, Word was made man, as Isa. 40:5: All flesh together shall videbit omnis caro salutare Dei nostri. Ideo autem totus see that the mouth of the Lord hath spoken. And the whole homo per carnem significatur, quia, ut dicitur in aucto- man is signified by flesh, because, as is said in the authorritate inducta, quia per carnem filius Dei visibilis appar- ity quoted, the Son of God became visible by flesh; hence uit, unde subditur et vidimus gloriam eius. Vel ideo quia, it is subjoined: And we saw His glory. Or because, as Auut Augustinus dicit, in libro octogintatrium quaest. in to- gustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80), in all that union the Word ta illa unitate susceptionis principale verbum est, extrema is the highest, and flesh the last and lowest. Hence, wishing autem atque ultima caro. Volens itaque Evangelista com- to commend the love of God’s humility to us, the Evangelist mendare pro nobis dilectionem humilitatis Dei, verbum et mentioned the Word and flesh, leaving the soul on one side, carnem nominavit, omittens animam, quae est verbo in- since it is less than the Word and nobler than flesh. Again, ferior, carne praestantior. Rationabile etiam fuit ut nomi- it was reasonable to mention flesh, which, as being farther naret carnem, quae, propter hoc quod magis distat a ver- away from the Word, was less assumable, as it would seem. bo, minus assumptibilis videbatur. Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum est fons viReply Obj. 2: The Word is the fountain of life, as the tae sicut prima causa vitae effectiva. Sed anima est prin- first effective cause of life; but the soul is the principle of the cipium vitae corpori tanquam forma ipsius. Forma au- life of the body, as its form. Now the form is the effect of the tem est effectus agentis. Unde ex praesentia verbi magis agent. Hence from the presence of the Word it might rather concludi posset quod corpus esset animatum, sicut ex have been concluded that the body was animated, just as praesentia ignis concludi potest quod corpus cui ignis from the presence of fire it may be concluded that the body, adhaeret, sit calidum. in which fire adheres, is warm. Ad tertium dicendum quod non est inconveniens, Reply Obj. 3: It is not unfitting, indeed it is necessary immo necessarium dicere quod in Christo fuit natura to say that in Christ there was a nature which was constiquae constituitur per animam corpori advenientem. Da- tuted by the soul coming to the body. But Damascene demascenus autem negat in domino Iesu Christo esse com- nied that in Jesus Christ there was a common species, i.e., munem speciem quasi aliquid tertium resultans ex unio- a third something resulting from the Godhead and the hune divinitatis et humanitatis. manity.

Article 4 Whether the Son of God assumed a human mind or intellect? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei non assumpsit mentem humanam, sive intellectum. Ubi enim est praesentia rei, non requiritur eius imago. Sed homo secundum mentem est ad imaginem Dei, ut dicit Augustinus, in libro de Trinit. Cum ergo in Christo fuerit praesentia ipsius divini verbi, non oportuit ibi esse mentem humanam. Praeterea, maior lux offuscat minorem. Sed verbum Dei, quod est lux illuminans omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum, ut dicitur Ioan. I, comparatur ad mentem sicut lux maior ad minorem, quia et ipsa mens quaedam lux est, quasi lucerna illuminata a prima luce, Proverb. X, lucerna domini spiraculum hominis. Ergo in Christo, qui est verbum Dei, non fuit necessarium esse mentem humanam.

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a human mind or intellect. For where a thing is present, its image is not required. But man is made to God’s image, as regards his mind, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 3, 6). Hence, since in Christ there was the presence of the Divine Word itself, there was no need of a human mind. Obj. 2: Further, the greater light dims the lesser. But the Word of God, Who is the light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world, as is written John 1:9, is compared to the mind as the greater light to the lesser; since our mind is a light, being as it were a lamp enkindled by the First Light (Prov 20:27): The spirit of a man is the lamp of the Lord. Therefore in Christ Who is the Word of God, there is no need of a human mind.

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Praeterea, assumptio humanae naturae a Dei verbo dicitur eius incarnatio. Sed intellectus, sive mens humana, neque est caro neque est actus carnis, quia nullius corporis actus est, ut probatur in III de anima. Ergo videtur quod filius Dei humanam mentem non assumpserit. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de fide ad Petrum, firmissime tene, et nullatenus dubites, Christum, filium Dei, habentem nostri generis carnem et animam rationalem. Qui de carne sua dicit, palpate et videte, quia spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere, Luc. ult. Animam quoque se ostendit habere, dicens, ego pono animam meam, et iterum sumo eam, Ioan. X. Intellectum quoque se ostendit habere, dicens, discite a me, quia mitis sum et humilis corde, Matth. XI. Et de ipso per prophetam dominus dicit, ecce intelliget puer meus, Isaiae LII. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de haeresibus, Apollinaristae de anima Christi a Catholica Ecclesia dissenserunt, dicentes, sicut Ariani, Christum carnem solam sine anima suscepisse. In qua quaestione testimoniis evangelicis victi, mentem defuisse animae Christi dixerunt, sed pro hac ipsum verbum in ea fuisse. Sed haec positio eisdem rationibus convincitur sicut et praedicta. Primo enim, hoc adversatur narrationi evangelicae, quae commemorat eum fuisse miratum, ut patet Matth. VIII. Admiratio autem absque ratione esse non potest, quia importat collationem effectus ad causam; dum scilicet aliquis videt effectum cuius causam ignorat, et quaerit, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Secundo, repugnat utilitati incarnationis, quae est iustificatio hominis a peccato. Anima enim humana non est capax peccati, nec gratiae iustificantis, nisi per mentem. Unde praecipue oportuit mentem humanam assumi. Unde Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod Dei verbum assumpsit corpus et animam intellectualem et rationalem, et postea subdit, totus toti unitus est, ut toti mihi salutem gratificet idest, gratis faciat, quod enim inassumptibile est, incurabile est. Tertio, hoc repugnat veritati incarnationis. Cum enim corpus proportionetur animae sicut materia propriae formae, non est vera caro humana quae non est perfecta anima humana, scilicet rationali et ideo, si Christus animam sine mente habuisset, non habuisset veram carnem humanam, sed carnem bestialem, quia per solam mentem anima nostra differt ab anima bestiali. Unde dicit Augustinus, in libro octogintatrium quaest., quod secundum hunc errorem sequeretur quod filius Dei beluam quandam cum figura humani corporis suscepisset. Quod iterum repugnat veritati divinae, quae nullam patitur fictionis falsitatem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, ubi est ipsa res per sui praesentiam non requiritur eius imago ad hoc quod suppleat locum rei, sicut, ubi erat imperator, milites non venerabantur eius imaginem. Sed tamen requi-

Q. 5, A. 4

Obj. 3: Further, the assumption of human nature by the Word of God is called His Incarnation. But the intellect or human mind is nothing carnal, either in its substance or in its act, for it is not the act of a body, as is proved De Anima iii, 6. Hence it would seem that the Son of God did not assume a human mind. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Fide ad Petrum xiv): Firmly hold and nowise doubt that Christ the Son of God has true flesh and a rational soul of the same kind as ours, since of His flesh He says (Luke 24:39): ‘Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have.’ And He proves that He has a soul, saying (John 17): ‘I lay down My soul that I may take it again.’ And He proves that He has an intellect, saying (Matt 11:29): ‘Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart.’ And God says of Him by the prophet (Isa 52:13): ‘Behold my servant shall understand.’ I answer that, As Augustine says (De Haeres. 49, 50), the Apollinarists thought differently from the Catholic Church concerning the soul of Christ, saying with the Arians, that Christ took flesh alone, without a soul; and on being overcome on this point by the Gospel witness, they went on to say that the mind was wanting to Christ’s soul, but that the Word supplied its place. But this position is refuted by the same arguments as the preceding. First, because it runs counter to the Gospel story, which relates how He marveled (as is plain from Matt. 8:10). Now marveling cannot be without reason, since it implies the collation of effect and cause, i.e., inasmuch as when we see an effect and are ignorant of its cause, we seek to know it, as is said Metaph. i, 2. Second, it is inconsistent with the purpose of the Incarnation, which is the justification of man from sin. For the human soul is not capable of sin nor of justifying grace except through the mind. Hence it was especially necessary for the mind to be assumed. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that the Word of God assumed a body and an intellectual and rational soul, and adds afterwards: The whole was united to the whole, that He might bestow salvation on me wholly; for what was not assumed is not curable. Third, it is against the truth of the Incarnation. For since the body is proportioned to the soul as matter to its proper form, it is not truly human flesh if it is not perfected by human, i.e., a rational soul. And hence if Christ had had a soul without a mind, He would not have had true human flesh, but irrational flesh, since our soul differs from an animal soul by the mind alone. Hence Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80) that from this error it would have followed that the Son of God took an animal with the form of a human body, which, again, is against the Divine truth, which cannot suffer any fictitious untruth. Reply Obj. 1: Where a thing is by its presence, its image is not required to supply the place of the thing, as where the emperor is the soldiers do not pay homage to his image. Yet the image of a thing is required together with its pres-

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ritur cum praesentia rei imago ipsius ut perficiatur ex ipsa rei praesentia, sicut imago in cera perficitur per impressionem sigilli, et imago hominis resultat in speculo per eius praesentiam. Unde, ad perficiendam humanam mentem, necessarium fuit quod eam sibi verbum Dei univit. Ad secundum dicendum quod lux maior evacuat lucem minorem alterius corporis illuminantis, non tamen evacuat, sed perficit lucem corporis illuminati. Ad praesentiam enim solis stellarum lux obscuratur, sed aeris lumen perficitur. Intellectus autem seu mens hominis est quasi lux illuminata a luce divini verbi. Et ideo per lucem divini verbi non evacuatur mens hominis, sed magis perficitur. Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet potentia intellectiva non sit alicuius corporis actus, ipsa tamen essentia animae humanae, quae est forma corporis, requiritur quod sit nobilior, ad hoc quod habeat potentiam intelligendi. Et ideo necesse est ut corpus melius dispositum ei respondeat.

IIIae

ence, that it may be perfected by the presence of the thing, just as the image in the wax is perfected by the impression of the seal, and as the image of man is reflected in the mirror by his presence. Hence in order to perfect the human mind it was necessary that the Word should unite it to Himself. Reply Obj. 2: The greater light dims the lesser light of another luminous body; but it does not dim, rather it perfects the light of the body illuminated—at the presence of the sun the light of the stars is put out, but the light of the air is perfected. Now the intellect or mind of man is, as it were, a light lit up by the light of the Divine Word; and hence by the presence of the Word the mind of man is perfected rather than overshadowed. Reply Obj. 3: Although the intellective power is not the act of a body, nevertheless the essence of the human soul, which is the form of the body, requires that it should be more noble, in order that it may have the power of understanding; and hence it is necessary that a better disposed body should correspond to it.

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Question 6 The Order of Assumption Deinde considerandum est de ordine assumptionis We must now consider the order of the foregoing aspraedictae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. sumption, and under this head there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum filius Dei assumpserit carnem (1) Whether the Son of God assumed flesh through the mediante anima. medium of the soul? Secundo, utrum assumpserit animam mediante (2) Whether He assumed the soul through the medium spiritu, sive mente. of the spirit or mind? Tertio, utrum anima Christi fuerit prius assumpta a (3) Whether the soul was assumed previous to the verbo quam caro. flesh? Quarto, utrum caro fuerit prius a verbo assumpta (4) Whether the flesh of Christ was assumed by the quam animae unita. Word previous to being united to the soul? Quinto, utrum tota humana natura sit assumpta (5) Whether the whole human nature was assumed mediantibus partibus. through the medium of the parts? Sexto, utrum sit assumpta mediante gratia. (6) Whether it was assumed through the medium of grace?

Article 1 Whether the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei non assumpserit carnem mediante anima. Perfectior enim est modus quo filius Dei unitur humanae naturae et partibus eius, quam quo est in omnibus creaturis. Sed in creaturis est immediate per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam. Ergo multo magis filius Dei unitur carni, et non mediante anima. Praeterea, anima et caro unita sunt Dei verbo in unitate hypostasis seu personae. Sed corpus immediate pertinet ad personam sive hypostasim hominis, sicut et anima. Quinimmo magis videtur se de propinquo habere ad hypostasim hominis corpus, quod est materia quam anima, quae est forma, quia principium individuationis, quae importatur in nomine hypostasis, videtur esse materia. Ergo filius Dei non assumpsit carnem mediante anima. Praeterea, remoto medio, separantur ea quae per medium coniunguntur, sicut, remota superficie, cessaret color a corpore, qui inest corpori per superficiem. Sed, separata per mortem anima, adhuc remanet unio verbi ad carnem, quod infra patebit. Ergo verbum non coniungitur carni mediante anima.

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume flesh through the medium of the soul. For the mode in which the Son of God is united to human nature and its parts, is more perfect than the mode whereby He is in all creatures. But He is in all creatures immediately by essence, power and presence. Much more, therefore, is the Son of God united to flesh, and without the medium of the soul. Obj. 2: Further, the soul and flesh are united to the Word of God in unity of hypostasis or person. But the body pertains immediately to the human hypostasis or person, even as the soul. Indeed, the human body, since it is matter, would rather seem to be nearer the hypostasis than the soul, which is a form, since the principle of individuation, which is implied in the word hypostasis, would seem to be matter. Hence the Son of God did not assume flesh through the medium of the soul. Obj. 3: Further, take away the medium and you separate what were joined by the medium; for example, if the surface be removed color would leave the body, since it adheres to the body through the medium of the surface. But though the soul was separated from the body by death, yet there still remained the union of the Word to the flesh, as will be shown (Q. 50, AA. 2, 3). Hence the Word was not joined to flesh through the medium of the soul.

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Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Volusianum, ipsa magnitudo divinae virtutis animam sibi rationalem, et per eandem corpus humanum, totumque omnino hominem, in melius mutandum, coaptavit. Respondeo dicendum quod medium dicitur respectu principii et finis. Unde, sicut principium et finis important ordinem, ita et medium. Est autem duplex ordo, unus quidem temporis; alius autem naturae. Secundum autem ordinem temporis, non dicitur in mysterio incarnationis aliquid medium, quia totam naturam humanam simul sibi Dei verbum univit, ut infra patebit. Ordo autem naturae inter aliqua potest attendi dupliciter, uno modo, secundum dignitatis gradum, sicut dicimus Angelos esse medios inter homines et Deum; alio modo, secundum rationem causalitatis, sicut dicimus mediam causam existere inter primam causam et ultimum effectum. Et hic secundus ordo aliquo modo consequitur primum, sicut enim dicit Dionysius, XIII cap. Cael. Hier., Deus per substantias magis propinquas agit in ea quae sunt magis remota. Si ergo attendamus gradum dignitatis, anima media invenitur inter Deum et carnem. Et secundum hoc, potest dici quod filius Dei univit sibi carnem mediante anima. Sed secundum ordinem causalitatis, ipsa anima est aliqualiter causa carnis uniendae filio Dei. Non enim esset assumptibilis nisi per ordinem quem habet ad animam rationalem, secundum quam habet quod sit caro humana, dictum est enim supra quod natura humana prae ceteris est assumptibilis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod duplex ordo considerari potest inter creaturam et Deum. Unus quidem, secundum quod creaturae causantur a Deo et dependent ab ipso sicut a principio sui esse. Et sic, propter infinitatem suae virtutis, Deus immediate attingit quamlibet rem, causando et conservando. Et ad hoc pertinet quod Deus immediate est in omnibus per essentiam, potentiam et praesentiam. Alius autem ordo est secundum quod res reducuntur in Deum sicut in finem. Et quantum ad hoc, invenitur medium inter creaturam et Deum, quia inferiores creaturae reducuntur in Deum per superiores, ut dicit Dionysius, in libro Caelest. Hier. Et ad hunc ordinem pertinet assumptio humanae naturae a verbo Dei quod est terminus assumptionis. Et ideo per animam unitur carni. Ad secundum dicendum quod, si hypostasis verbi Dei constitueretur simpliciter per naturam humanam, sequeretur quod corpus esset ei vicinius, cum sit materia, quae est individuationis principium, sicut et anima, quae est forma specifica, propinquius se habet ad naturam humanam. Sed quia hypostasis est prior et altior quam humana natura, tanto id quod est in humana natura propinquius se habet, quanto est altius. Et ideo propinquior est verbo Dei anima quam corpus. Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse causam alicuius quantum ad aptitudinem et con-

IIIae

On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvi): The greatness of the Divine power fitted to itself a rational soul, and through it a human body, so as to raise the whole man to something higher. I answer that, A medium is in reference to a beginning and an end. Hence as beginning and end imply order, so also does a medium. Now there is a twofold order: one, of time; the other, of nature. But in the mystery of the Incarnation nothing is said to be a medium in the order of time, for the Word of God united the whole human nature to Himself at the same time, as will appear (Q. 30, A. 3). An order of nature between things may be taken in two ways: first, as regards rank of dignity, as we say the angels are midway between man and God; second, as regards the idea of causality, as we say a cause is midway between the first cause and the last effect. And this second order follows the first to some extent; for as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiii), God acts upon the more remote substances through the less remote. Hence if we consider the rank of dignity, the soul is found to be midway between God and flesh; and in this way it may be said that the Son of God united flesh to Himself, through the medium of the soul. But even according to the order of causality the soul is to some extent the cause of flesh being united to the Son of God. For the flesh would not have been assumable, except by its relation to the rational soul, through which it becomes human flesh. For it was said above (Q. 4, A. 1) that human nature was assumable before all others. Reply Obj. 1: We may consider a twofold order between creatures and God: the first is by reason of creatures being caused by God and depending on Him as on the principle of their being; and thus on account of the infinitude of His power God touches each thing immediately, by causing and preserving it, and so it is that God is in all things by essence, presence and power. But the second order is by reason of things being directed to God as to their end; and it is here that there is a medium between the creature and God, since lower creatures are directed to God by higher, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v); and to this order pertains the assumption of human nature by the Word of God, Who is the term of the assumption; and hence it is united to flesh through the soul. Reply Obj. 2: If the hypostasis of the Word of God were constituted simply by human nature, it would follow that the body was nearest to it, since it is matter which is the principle of individuation; even as the soul, being the specific form, would be nearer the human nature. But because the hypostasis of the Word is prior to and more exalted than the human nature, the more exalted any part of the human nature is, the nearer it is to the hypostasis of the Word. And hence the soul is nearer the Word of God than the body is. Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents one thing being the cause of the aptitude and congruity of another, and yet if it

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gruitatem, quo tamen remoto, id non tollitur, quia, etsi fieri alicuius dependeat ex aliquo, postquam tamen est in facto esse, ab eo non dependet. Sicut, si inter aliquos amicitia causaretur aliquo mediante, eo recedente adhuc amicitia remanet, et si aliqua in matrimonium ducitur propter pulchritudinem, quae facit congruitatem in muliere ad copulam coniugalem, tamen, cessante pulchritudine, adhuc durat copula coniugalis. Et similiter, separata anima, remanet unio verbi Dei ad carnem.

Q. 6, A. 2

be taken away the other remains; because although a thing’s becoming may depend on another, yet when it is in being it no longer depends on it, just as a friendship brought about by some other may endure when the latter has gone; or as a woman is taken in marriage on account of her beauty, which makes a woman’s fittingness for the marriage tie, yet when her beauty passes away, the marriage tie still remains. So likewise, when the soul was separated, the union of the Word with flesh still endured.

Article 2 Whether the Son of God assumed a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei non assumpsit animam mediante spiritu. Idem enim non cadit medium inter ipsum et aliquid aliud. Sed spiritus, sive mens, non est aliud in essentia ab ipsa anima, ut in prima parte dictum est. Ergo filius Dei non assumpsit animam mediante spiritu, sive mente. Praeterea, id quo mediante facta est assumptio, videtur magis assumptibile. Sed spiritus, sive mens, non est magis assumptibilis quam anima, quod patet ex hoc quod spiritus angelici non sunt assumptibiles, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod filius Dei non assumpserit animam mediante spiritu. Praeterea, posterius assumitur a primo mediante priori. Sed anima nominat ipsam essentiam, quae est prior naturaliter quam ipsa potentia eius quae est mens. Ergo videtur quod filius Dei non assumpserit animam mediante spiritu vel mente. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de agone Christiano, invisibilis et incommutabilis veritas per spiritum animam, et per animam corpus accepit. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, filius Dei dicitur assumpsisse carnem anima mediante, tum propter ordinem dignitatis, tum etiam propter congruitatem assumptionis. Utrumque autem horum invenitur si comparemus intellectum, qui spiritus dicitur, ad ceteras animae partes. Non enim anima est assumptibilis secundum congruitatem nisi per hoc quod est capax Dei, ad imaginem eius existens, quod est secundum mentem, quae spiritus dicitur, secundum illud Ephes. IV, renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae. Similiter etiam intellectus, inter ceteras partes animae, est superior et dignior et Deo similior. Et ideo, ut Damascenus dicit, in III libro, unitum est carni per medium intellectum verbum Dei, intellectus enim est quod est animae purissimum; sed et Deus est intellectus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si intellectus non sit aliud ab anima secundum essentiam, distinguitur ta-

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind. For nothing is a medium between itself and another. But the spirit is nothing else in essence but the soul itself, as was said above (I, Q. 77, A. 1, ad 1). Therefore the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind. Obj. 2: Further, what is the medium of the assumption is itself more assumable. But the spirit or mind is not more assumable than the soul; which is plain from the fact that angelic spirits are not assumable, as was said above (Q. 4, A. 1). Hence it seems that the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit. Obj. 3: Further, that which comes later is assumed by the first through the medium of what comes before. But the soul implies the very essence, which naturally comes before its power—the mind. Therefore it would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xviii): The invisible and unchangeable Truth took a soul by means of the spirit, and a body by means of the soul. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the Son of God is said to have assumed flesh through the medium of the soul, on account of the order of dignity, and the congruity of the assumption. Now both these may be applied to the intellect, which is called the spirit, if we compare it with the other parts of the soul. For the soul is assumed congruously only inasmuch as it has a capacity for God, being in His likeness: which is in respect of the mind that is called the spirit, according to Eph. 4:23: Be renewed in the spirit of your mind. So, too, the intellect is the highest and noblest of the parts of the soul, and the most like to God, and hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that the Word of God is united to flesh through the medium of the intellect; for the intellect is the purest part of the soul, God Himself being an intellect. Reply Obj. 1: Although the intellect is not distinct from the soul in essence, it is distinct from the other parts

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Q. 6, A. 3

Incarnation

men ab aliis partibus animae secundum rationem potentiae. Et secundum hoc competit sibi ratio medii. Ad secundum dicendum quod spiritui angelico non deest congruitas ad assumptionem propter defectum dignitatis, sed propter irreparabilitatem casus. Quod non potest dici de spiritu humano, ut patet ex his quae in prima parte dicta sunt. Ad tertium dicendum quod anima inter quam et Dei verbum ponitur medium intellectus, non accipitur pro essentia animae, quae est omnibus potentiis communis, sed pro potentiis inferioribus, quae sunt omni animae communes.

IIIae

of the soul as a power; and it is in this way that it has the nature of a medium. Reply Obj. 2: Fitness for assumption is wanting to the angelic spirits, not from any lack of dignity, but because of the irremediableness of their fall, which cannot be said of the human spirit, as is clear from what has been said above (I, Q. 62, A. 8; First Part, Q. 64, A. 2). Reply Obj. 3: The soul, between which and the Word of God the intellect is said to be a medium, does not stand for the essence of the soul, which is common to all the powers, but for the lower powers, which are common to every soul.

Article 3 Whether the soul was assumed before the flesh by the Son of God? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi fuerit prius assumpta a verbo quam caro. Filius enim Dei assumpsit carnem mediante anima, ut dictum est. Sed prius pervenitur ad medium quam ad extremum. Ergo filius Dei prius assumpsit animam quam corpus. Praeterea, anima Christi est dignior Angelis, secundum illud Psalmi, adorate eum, omnes Angeli eius. Sed Angeli creati sunt a principio, ut in primo habitum est. Ergo et anima Christi. Quae non fuit ante creata quam assumpta, dicit enim Damascenus, in III libro, quod nunquam neque anima neque corpus Christi propriam habuerunt hypostasim praeter verbi hypostasim. Ergo videtur quod anima fuerit ante assumpta quam caro, quae est concepta in utero virginali. Praeterea, Ioan. I dicitur, vidimus eum plenum gratiae et veritatis, et postea sequitur, de plenitudine eius omnes accepimus, idest, omnes fideles quocumque tempore, ut Chrysostomus exponit. Hoc autem non esset nisi Christus habuisset plenitudinem gratiae et veritatis ante omnes sanctos qui fuerunt ab origine mundi, quia causa non est posterior causato. Cum ergo plenitudo gratiae et veritatis fuerit in anima Christi ex unione ad verbum, secundum illud quod ibidem dicitur, vidimus gloriam eius quasi unigeniti a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis; consequens videtur quod a principio mundi anima Christi fuisset a verbo Dei assumpta.

Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in IV libro, non, ut quidam mentiuntur, ante eam quae est ex virgine incarnationem, intellectus est unitus Deo verbo, et ex tunc vocatus est Christus. Respondeo dicendum quod Origenes posuit omnes animas a principio fuisse creatas, inter quas etiam po-

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ was assumed before the flesh by the Word. For the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul, as was said above (A. 1). Now the medium is reached before the end. Therefore the Son of God assumed the soul before the body. Obj. 2: Further, the soul of Christ is nobler than the angels, according to Ps. 96:8: Adore Him, all you His angels. But the angels were created in the beginning, as was said above (I, Q. 46, A. 3). Therefore the soul of Christ also (was created in the beginning). But it was not created before it was assumed, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2, 3, 9), that neither the soul nor the body of Christ ever had any hypostasis save the hypostasis of the Word. Therefore it would seem that the soul was assumed before the flesh, which was conceived in the womb of the Virgin. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (John 1:14): We saw His glory full of grace and truth, and it is added afterwards that of His fullness we have all received (John 1:16), i.e., all the faithful of all time, as Chrysostom expounds it (Hom. xiii in Joan.). Now this could not have been unless the soul of Christ had all fullness of grace and truth before all the saints, who were from the beginning of the world, for the cause is not subsequent to the effect. Hence since the fullness of grace and truth was in the soul of Christ from union with the Word, according to what is written in the same place: We saw His glory, the glory as it were of the Onlybegotten of the Father, full of grace and truth, it would seem in consequence that from the beginning of the world the soul of Christ was assumed by the Word of God. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 6): The intellect was not, as some untruthfully say, united to the true God, and henceforth called Christ, before the Incarnation which was of the Virgin. I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon i, 7, 8; ii, 8) maintained that all souls, amongst which he placed Christ’s soul,

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Order of Assumption

Q. 6, A. 3

suit animam Christi creatam. Sed hoc quidem est inconveniens, scilicet, si ponatur quod fuerit tunc creata sed non statim verbo unita, quia sequeretur quod anima illa habuisset aliquando propriam subsistentiam sine verbo. Et sic, cum fuisset a verbo assumpta, vel non esset facta unio secundum substinentiam; vel corrupta fuisset subsistentia animae praeexistens. Similiter etiam est inconveniens si ponatur quod anima illa fuerit a principio verbo unita, et postmodum in utero virginis incarnata. Quia sic eius anima non videretur eiusdem esse naturae cum nostris, quae simul creantur dum corporibus infunduntur. Unde Leo Papa dicit, in epistola ad Iulianum, quod non alterius naturae erat caro quam nostra, nec alio illi quam ceteris hominibus est anima inspirata principio.

were created in the beginning. But this is not fitting, if we suppose that it was first of all created, but not at once joined to the Word, since it would follow that this soul once had its proper subsistence without the Word; and thus, since it was assumed by the Word, either the union did not take place in the subsistence, or the pre-existing subsistence of the soul was corrupted. So likewise it is not fitting to suppose that this soul was united to the Word from the beginning, and that it afterwards became incarnate in the womb of the Virgin; for thus His soul would not seem to be of the same nature as ours, which are created at the same time that they are infused into bodies. Hence Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Julian. xxxv) that Christ’s flesh was not of a different nature to ours, nor was a different soul infused into it in the beginning than into other men. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dicReply Obj. 1: As was said above (A. 1), the soul of tum est, anima Christi dicitur esse medium in unione Christ is said to be the medium in the union of the flesh carnis ad verbum secundum ordinem naturae. Non au- with the Word, in the order of nature; but it does not foltem oportet ex hoc quod fuerit medium ex ordine tem- low from this that it was the medium in the order of time.

poris. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Leo Papa in eadem epistola, dicit, anima Christi excellit non diversitate generis, sed sublimitate virtutis. Est enim eiusdem generis cum nostris animabus, sed excellit etiam Angelos secundum plenitudinem gratiae et veritatis. Modus autem incarnationis respondet animae secundum proprietatem sui generis, ex quo habet, cum sit corporis forma, ut creetur simul dum corpori infunditur et unitur. Quod non competit Angelis, quia sunt substantiae omnino a corporibus absolutae. Ad tertium dicendum quod de plenitudine Christi omnes homines accipiunt secundum fidem quam habent in ipsum, dicitur enim Rom. III, quod iustitia Dei est per fidem Iesu Christi in omnes et super omnes qui credunt in ipsum. Sicut autem nos in ipsum credimus ut incarnatum, ita antiqui crediderunt in ipsum ut nasciturum, habentes enim eundem spiritum credimus, ut dicitur II Cor. IV. Habet autem fides quae est in Christum virtutem iustificandi ex proposito gratiae Dei, secundum illud Rom. IV, ei qui non operatur, credenti autem in eum qui iustificat impium, fides reputatur ad iustitiam secundum propositum gratiae Dei. Unde, quia hoc propositum est aeternum, nihil prohibet per fidem Iesu Christi aliquos iustificari antequam eius anima esset plena gratia et veritate.

Reply Obj. 2: As Pope Leo says in the same Epistle, Christ’s soul excels our soul not by diversity of genus, but by sublimity of power; for it is of the same genus as our souls, yet excels even the angels in fullness of grace and truth. But the mode of creation is in harmony with the generic property of the soul; and since it is the form of the body, it is consequently created at the same time that it is infused into and united with the body; which does not happen to angels, since they are substances entirely free from matter. Reply Obj. 3: Of the fullness of Christ all men receive according to the faith they have in Him; for it is written (Rom 3:22) that the justice of God is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe in Him. Now just as we believe in Him as already born; so the ancients believed in Him as about to be born, since having the same spirit of faith . . . we also believe, as it is written (2 Cor 4:13). But the faith which is in Christ has the power of justifying by reason of the purpose of the grace of God, according to Rom. 4:5: But to him that worketh not, yet believeth in Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice according to the purpose of the grace of God. Hence because this purpose is eternal, there is nothing to hinder some from being justified by the faith of Jesus Christ, even before His soul was full of grace and truth.

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Q. 6, A. 4

Incarnation

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Article 4 Whether the flesh of Christ was assumed by the Word before being united to the soul? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caro Christi fuit primo a verbo assumpta quam animae unita. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de fide ad Petrum, firmissime tene, et nullatenus dubites, non carnem Christi sine divinitate conceptam in utero virginis antequam susciperetur a verbo. Sed caro Christi videtur prius fuisse concepta quam animae rationali unita, quia materialis dispositio prius est in via generationis quam forma completiva. Ergo prius fuit caro Christi assumpta quam animae unita. Praeterea, sicut anima est pars naturae humanae, ita et corpus. Sed anima humana non habuit aliud principium sui esse in Christo quam in aliis hominibus, ut patet ex auctoritate Leonis Papae supra inducta. Ergo videtur quod nec corpus Christi aliter habuit principium essendi quam in nobis. Sed in nobis ante concipitur caro quam adveniat anima rationalis. Ergo etiam ita fuit in Christo. Et sic caro prius fuit a verbo assumpta quam animae unita. Praeterea, sicut dicitur in libro de causis, causa prima plus influit in causatum, et prius unitur ei quam causa secunda. Sed anima Christi comparatur ad verbum sicut causa secunda ad primam. Prius ergo verbum est unitum carni quam anima. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, simul Dei verbi caro, simul caro animata, rationalis et intellectualis. Non ergo unio verbi ad carnem praecessit unionem ad animam. Respondeo dicendum quod caro humana est assumptibilis a verbo secundum ordinem quem habet ad animam rationalem sicut ad propriam formam. Hunc autem ordinem non habet antequam anima rationalis ei adveniat, quia simul dum aliqua materia fit propria alicuius formae, recipit illam formam; unde in eodem instanti terminatur alteratio in quo introducitur forma substantialis. Et inde est quod caro non debuit ante assumi quam esset caro humana, quod factum est anima rationali adveniente. Sicut igitur anima non est prius assumpta quam caro, quia contra naturam animae est ut prius sit quam corpori uniatur; ita caro non debuit prius assumi quam anima, quia non prius est caro humana quam habeat animam rationalem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caro humana sortitur esse per animam. Et ideo ante adventum animae non est caro humana, sed potest esse dispositio ad carnem humanam. In conceptione tamen Christi Spiritus Sanctus, qui est agens infinitae virtutis, simul et materiam disposuit et ad perfectum perduxit.

Objection 1: It would seem that the flesh of Christ was assumed by the Word before being united to the soul. For Augustine says (De Fide ad Petrum xviii): Most firmly hold, and nowise doubt that the flesh of Christ was not conceived in the womb of the Virgin without the Godhead before it was assumed by the Word. But the flesh of Christ would seem to have been conceived before being united to the rational soul, because matter or disposition is prior to the completive form in order of generation. Therefore the flesh of Christ was assumed before being united to the soul. Obj. 2: Further, as the soul is a part of human nature, so is the body. But the human soul in Christ had no other principle of being than in other men, as is clear from the authority of Pope Leo, quoted above (A. 3). Therefore it would seem that the body of Christ had no other principle of being than we have. But in us the body is begotten before the rational soul comes to it. Therefore it was the same in Christ; and thus the flesh was assumed by the Word before being united to the soul. Obj. 3: Further, as is said (De Causis), the first cause excels the second in bringing about the effect, and precedes it in its union with the effect. But the soul of Christ is compared to the Word as a second cause to a first. Hence the Word was united to the flesh before it was to the soul. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2): At the same time the Word of God was made flesh, and flesh was united to a rational and intellectual soul. Therefore the union of the Word with the flesh did not precede the union with the soul. I answer that, The human flesh is assumable by the Word on account of the order which it has to the rational soul as to its proper form. Now it has not this order before the rational soul comes to it, because when any matter becomes proper to any form, at the same time it receives that form; hence the alteration is terminated at the same instant in which the substantial form is introduced. And hence it is that the flesh ought not to have been assumed before it was human flesh; and this happened when the rational soul came to it. Therefore since the soul was not assumed before the flesh, inasmuch as it is against the nature of the soul to be before it is united to the body, so likewise the flesh ought not to have been assumed before the soul, since it is not human flesh before it has a rational soul. Reply Obj. 1: Human flesh depends upon the soul for its being; and hence, before the coming of the soul, there is no human flesh, but there may be a disposition towards human flesh. Yet in the conception of Christ, the Holy Spirit, Who is an agent of infinite might, disposed the matter and brought it to its perfection at the same time.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod forma actu dat speciem, materia autem, quantum est de se, est in potentia ad speciem. Et ideo contra rationem formae esset quod praeexisteret naturae speciei, quae perficitur per unionem eius ad materiam, non autem est contra naturam materiae quod praeexistat naturae speciei. Et ideo dissimilitudo quae est inter originem nostram et originem Christi secundum hoc quod caro nostra prius concipitur quam animetur, non autem caro Christi, est secundum id quod praecedit naturae complementum, sicut et quod nos concipimur ex semine viri, non autem Christus. Sed differentia quae esset quantum ad originem animae, redundaret in diversitatem naturae. Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum Dei per prius intelligitur unitum carni quam anima per modum communem quo est in ceteris creaturis per essentiam, potentiam et praesentiam, prius tamen dico, non tempore, sed natura. Prius enim intelligitur caro ut quoddam ens, quod habet a verbo, quam ut animata, quod habet ab anima. Sed unione personali prius secundum intellectum oportet quod caro uniatur animae quam verbo, quia ex unione ad animam habet quod sit unibilis verbo in persona; praesertim quia persona non invenitur nisi in rationali natura.

Q. 6, A. 5

Reply Obj. 2: The form actually gives the species; but the matter in itself is in potentiality to the species. And hence it would be against the nature of a form to exist before the specific nature. And therefore the dissimilarity between our origin and Christ’s origin, inasmuch as we are conceived before being animated, and Christ’s flesh is not, is by reason of what precedes the perfection of the nature, viz. that we are conceived from the seed of man, and Christ is not. But a difference which would be with reference to the origin of the soul, would bespeak a diversity of nature.

Reply Obj. 3: The Word of God is understood to be united to the flesh before the soul by the common mode whereby He is in the rest of creatures by essence, power, and presence. Yet I say before, not in time, but in nature; for the flesh is understood as a being, which it has from the Word, before it is understood as animated, which it has from the soul. But by the personal union we understand the flesh as united to the soul before it is united to the Word, for it is from its union with the soul that it is capable of being united to the Word in Person; especially since a person is found only in the rational nature.

Article 5 Whether the whole human nature was assumed through the medium of the parts? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei assumpserit totam naturam humanam mediantibus partibus. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de agone Christiano, quod invisibilis et incommutabilis veritas per spiritum animam, per animam corpus, et sic totum hominem assumpsit. Sed spiritus, anima et corpus sunt partes totius hominis. Ergo totum hominem assumpsit mediantibus partibus. Praeterea, ideo Dei filius carnem assumpsit mediante anima, quia anima est Deo similior quam corpus. Sed partes humanae naturae, cum sint simpliciores videntur esse similiores ei, qui est simplicissimus, quam totum. Ergo assumpsit totum mediantibus partibus. Praeterea, totum resultat ex unione partium. Sed unio intelligitur ut terminus assumptionis, partes autem praeintelliguntur assumptioni. Ergo assumpsit totum per partes. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, in domino Iesu Christo non partes partium intuemur, sed quae proxime componuntur, idest deitatem et humanitatem. Humanitas autem est quoddam totum, quod com-

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God assumed the whole human nature through the medium of its parts. For Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xviii) that the invisible and unchangeable Truth assumed the soul through the medium of the spirit, and the body through the medium of the soul, and in this way the whole man. But the spirit, soul, and body are parts of the whole man. Therefore He assumed all, through the medium of the parts. Obj. 2: Further, the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul because the soul is more like to God than the body. But the parts of human nature, since they are simpler than the body, would seem to be more like to God, Who is most simple, than the whole. Therefore He assumed the whole through the medium of the parts. Obj. 3: Further, the whole results from the union of parts. But the union is taken to be the term of the assumption, and the parts are presupposed to the assumption. Therefore He assumed the whole by the parts. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 16): In our Lord Jesus Christ we do not behold parts of parts, but such as are immediately joined, i.e., the Godhead and the manhood. Now the humanity is a whole, which is composed

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Q. 6, A. 6

Incarnation

ponitur ex anima et corpore sicut ex partibus. Ergo filius Dei assumpsit partes mediante toto. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum dicitur aliquid medium in assumptione incarnationis, non designatur ordo temporis, quia simul facta est assumptio totius et omnium partium. Ostensum est enim quod simul anima et corpus sunt ad invicem unita ad constituendam naturam humanam in verbo. Designatur autem ibi ordo naturae. Unde per id quod est prius natura, assumitur id quod est posterius. Est autem aliquid prius in natura dupliciter, uno modo ex parte agentis, alio modo ex parte materiae; hae enim duae causae praeexistunt rei. Ex parte quidem agentis, est simpliciter primum id quod primo cadit in eius intentione, sed secundum quid est primum illud a quo incipit eius operatio, et hoc ideo, quia intentio est prior operatione. Ex parte vero materiae, est prius illud quod prius existit in transmutatione materiae. In incarnatione autem oportet maxime attendere ordinem qui est ex parte agentis, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Volusianum, in talibus rebus tota ratio facti est potentia facientis. Manifestum est autem quod secundum intentionem facientis prius est completum quam incompletum, et per consequens, totum quam partes. Et ideo dicendum est quod verbum Dei assumpsit partes humanae naturae mediante toto. Sicut enim corpus assumpsit propter ordinem quem habet ad animam rationalem, ita assumpsit corpus et animam propter ordinem quem habent ad humanam naturam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex verbis illis nihil datur intelligi nisi quod verbum, assumendo partes humanae naturae, assumpsit totam humanam naturam. Et sic assumptio partium prior est in via operationis intellectu, non tempore. Assumptio autem naturae est prior in via intentionis, quod est esse prius simpliciter, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus ita est simplex quod etiam est perfectissimus. Et ideo totum est magis simile Deo quam partes, inquantum est perfectius. Ad tertium dicendum quod unio personalis est ad quam terminatur assumptio, non autem unio naturae, quae resultat ex coniunctione partium.

IIIae

of soul and body, as parts. Therefore the Son of God assumed the parts through the medium of the whole. I answer that, When anything is said to be a medium in the assumption of the Incarnation, we do not signify order of time, because the assumption of the whole and the parts was simultaneous. For it has been shown (AA. 3, 4) that the soul and body were mutually united at the same time in order to constitute the human nature of the Word. But it is order of nature that is signified. Hence by what is prior in nature, that is assumed which is posterior in nature. Now a thing is prior in nature in two ways: First on the part of the agent, second on the part of the matter; for these two causes precede the thing. On the part of the agent—that is simply first, which is first included in his intention; but that is relatively first, with which his operation begins—and this because the intention is prior to the operation. On the part of the matter—that is first which exists first in the transmutation of the matter. Now in the Incarnation the order depending on the agent must be particularly considered, because, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii), in such things the whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer. But it is manifest that, according to the intention of the doer, what is complete is prior to what is incomplete, and, consequently, the whole to the parts. Hence it must be said that the Word of God assumed the parts of human nature, through the medium of the whole; for even as He assumed the body on account of its relation to the rational soul, so likewise He assumed a body and soul on account of their relation to human nature. Reply Obj. 1: From these words nothing may be gathered, except that the Word, by assuming the parts of human nature, assumed the whole human nature. And thus the assumption of parts is prior in the order of the intellect, if we consider the operation, but not in order of time; whereas the assumption of the nature is prior if we consider the intention: and this is to be simply first, as was said above. Reply Obj. 2: God is so simple that He is also most perfect; and hence the whole is more like to God than the parts, inasmuch as it is more perfect. Reply Obj. 3: It is a personal union wherein the assumption is terminated, not a union of nature, which springs from a conjunction of parts.

Article 6 Whether the Son of God assumed human nature through the medium of grace? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei assumpserit humanam naturam mediante gratia. Per gratiam enim unimur Deo. Sed humana natura in Christo maxime fuit unita. Ergo illa unio facta fuit per gratiam.

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God assumed human nature through the medium of grace. For by grace we are united to God. But the human nature in Christ was most closely united to God. Therefore the union took place by grace.

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Praeterea, sicut corpus vivit per animam, quae est eius perfectio, ita anima per gratiam. Sed humana natura redditur congrua ad assumptionem per animam, ut dictum est. Ergo et anima redditur congrua ad assumptionem per gratiam. Ergo filius Dei assumpsit animam mediante gratia. Praeterea, Augustinus, XV de Trin., dicit quod verbum incarnatum est sicut verbum nostrum in voce. Sed verbum nostrum unitur voci mediante spiritu. Ergo verbum Dei unitur carni mediante spiritu sancto, et ita mediante gratia, quae spiritui sancto attribuitur, secundum illud I ad Cor. XII, divisiones gratiarum sunt, idem autem spiritus. Sed contra est quod gratia est quoddam accidens animae, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Unio autem verbi ad humanam naturam est facta secundum subsistentiam, et non secundum accidens ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo natura humana non est assumpta mediante gratia. Respondeo dicendum quod in Christo ponitur gratia unionis, et gratia habitualis. Gratia ergo non potest intelligi ut medium in assumptione humanae naturae, sive loquamur de gratia unionis, sive de gratia habituali. Gratia enim unionis est ipsum esse personale quod gratis divinitus datur humanae naturae in persona verbi, quod quidem est terminus assumptionis. Gratia autem habitualis pertinens ad specialem sanctitatem illius hominis, est effectus quidam consequens unionem, secundum illud Ioan. I, vidimus gloriam eius quasi unigeniti a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis; per quod datur intelligi quod hoc ipso quod ille homo est unigenitus a patre, quod habet per unionem, habet plenitudinem gratiae et veritatis. Si vero intelligatur gratia ipsa voluntas Dei aliquid gratis faciens vel donans, sic unio facta est per gratiam, non sicut per medium, sed sicut per causam efficientem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod unio nostra ad Deum est per operationem, inquantum scilicet eum cognoscimus et amamus. Et ideo talis unio est per gratiam habitualem, inquantum operatio perfecta procedit ab habitu. Sed unio naturae humanae ad verbum Dei est secundum esse personale, quod non dependet ab aliquo habitu, sed immediate ab ipsa natura. Ad secundum dicendum quod anima est perfectio substantialis corporis, gratia vero est perfectio animae accidentalis. Et ideo gratia non potest ordinare animam ad unionem personalem, quae non est accidentalis, sicut anima corpus. Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum nostrum unitur voci mediante spiritu, non quidem sicut medio formali, sed sicut per medium movens, nam ex verbo concepto interius procedit spiritus, ex quo formatur vox. Et similiter ex verbo aeterno procedit Spiritus Sanctus, qui formavit corpus Christi ut infra patebit. Non autem ex

Q. 6, A. 6

Obj. 2: Further, as the body lives by the soul, which is its perfection, so does the soul by grace. But the human nature was fitted for the assumption by the soul. Therefore the Son of God assumed the soul through the medium of grace.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 11) that the incarnate Word is like our spoken word. But our word is united to our speech by means of breathing (spiritus). Therefore the Word of God is united to flesh by means of the Holy Spirit, and hence by means of grace, which is attributed to the Holy Spirit, according to 1 Cor. 12:4: Now there are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit. On the contrary, Grace is an accident in the soul, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 110, A. 2). Now the union of the Word with human nature took place in the subsistence, and not accidentally, as was shown above (Q. 2, A. 6). Therefore the human nature was not assumed by means of grace. I answer that, In Christ there was the grace of union and habitual grace. Therefore grace cannot be taken to be the medium of the assumption of the human nature, whether we speak of the grace of union or of habitual grace. For the grace of union is the personal being that is given gratis from above to the human nature in the Person of the Word, and is the term of the assumption. Whereas the habitual grace pertaining to the spiritual holiness of the man is an effect following the union, according to John 1:14: We saw His glory . . . as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth—by which we are given to understand that because this Man (as a result of the union) is the Only-begotten of the Father, He is full of grace and truth. But if by grace we understand the will of God doing or bestowing something gratis, the union took place by grace, not as a means, but as the efficient cause. Reply Obj. 1: Our union with God is by operation, inasmuch as we know and love Him; and hence this union is by habitual grace, inasmuch as a perfect operation proceeds from a habit. Now the union of the human nature with the Word of God is in personal being, which depends not on any habit, but on the nature itself. Reply Obj. 2: The soul is the substantial perfection of the body; grace is but an accidental perfection of the soul. Hence grace cannot ordain the soul to personal union, which is not accidental, as the soul ordains the body. Reply Obj. 3: Our word is united to our speech, by means of breathing (spiritus), not as a formal medium, but as a moving medium. For from the word conceived within, the breathing proceeds, from which the speech is formed. And similarly from the eternal Word proceeds the Holy Spirit, Who formed the body of Christ, as will be shown

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hoc sequitur quod gratia spiritus sancti sit formale me- (Q. 32, A. 1). But it does not follow from this that the grace dium in unione praedicta. of the Holy Spirit is the formal medium in the aforesaid union.

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Question 7 The Grace of Christ as an Individual Man Deinde considerandum est de coassumptis a filio Dei in humana natura. Et primo, de his quae pertinent ad perfectionem; secundo, de his quae pertinent ad defectum. Circa primum consideranda sunt tria, primo, de gratia Christi; secundo, de scientia eius; tertio, de potentia ipsius. De gratia autem Christi considerandum est dupliciter, primo quidem, de gratia eius secundum quod est singularis homo; secundo, de gratia eius secundum quod est caput Ecclesiae. Nam de gratia unionis iam dictum est. Circa primum quaeruntur tredecim. Primo, utrum in anima Christi sit aliqua gratia habitualis. Secundo, utrum in Christo fuerint virtutes. Tertio, utrum in eo fuerit fides. Quarto, utrum fuerit in eo spes. Quinto, utrum in Christo fuerint dona. Sexto, utrum in Christo fuerit timoris donum. Septimo, utrum in Christo fuerint gratiae gratis datae. Octavo, utrum in Christo fuerit prophetia. Nono, utrum in eo fuerit plenitudo gratiae. Decimo, utrum talis plenitudo sit propria Christi. Undecimo, utrum Christi gratia sit infinita. Duodecimo, utrum potuerit augeri. Tertiodecimo, qualiter haec gratia se habeat ad unionem.

We must now consider such things as were co-assumed by the Son of God in human nature; and first what belongs to perfection; second, what belongs to defect. Concerning the first, there are three points of consideration: (1) The grace of Christ; (2) His knowledge; (3) His power. With regard to His grace we must consider two things: (1) His grace as He is an individual man; (2) His grace as He is the Head of the Church. Of the grace of union we have already spoken (Q. 2). Under the first head there are thirteen points of inquiry: (1) Whether in the soul of Christ there was any habitual grace? (2) Whether in Christ there were virtues? (3) Whether He had faith? (4) Whether He had hope? (5) Whether in Christ there were the gifts? (6) Whether in Christ there was the gift of fear? (7) Whether in Christ there were any gratuitous graces? (8) Whether in Christ there was prophecy? (9) Whether there was the fullness of grace in Him? (10) Whether such fullness was proper to Christ? (11) Whether the grace of Christ was infinite? (12) Whether it could have been increased? (13) How this grace stood towards the union?

Article 1 Whether in the soul assumed by the Word there was any habitual grace? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in anima assumpta a verbo non fuerit gratia habitualis. Gratia enim est quaedam participatio divinitatis in creatura rationali, secundum illud II Pet. I, per quem magna et pretiosa nobis promissa donavit, ut divinae simus consortes naturae. Christus autem Deus est non participative, sed secundum veritatem. Ergo in eo non fuit gratia habitualis. Praeterea, gratia ad hoc est necessaria homini ut per eam bene operetur, secundum illud I Cor. XV, abundantius omnibus laboravi, non autem ego, sed gratia Dei mecum; et etiam ad hoc quod homo consequatur vitam

Objection 1: It would seem there was no habitual grace in the soul assumed by the Word. For grace is a certain partaking of the Godhead by the rational creature, according to 2 Pet. 1:4: By Whom He hath given us most great and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature. Now Christ is God not by participation, but in truth. Therefore there was no habitual grace in Him. Obj. 2: Further, grace is necessary to man, that he may operate well, according to 1 Cor. 15:10: I have labored more abundantly than all they; yet not I, but the grace of God with me; and in order that he may reach eternal life, according

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aeternam, secundum illud Rom. VI, gratia Dei vita aeterna. Sed Christo, ex hoc solo quod erat naturalis filius Dei, debebatur hereditas vitae aeterna. Ex hoc etiam quod erat verbum, per quod facta sunt omnia, aderat ei facultas omnia bona operandi. Non igitur secundum humanam naturam indigebat alia gratia nisi unione ad verbum. Praeterea, illud quod operatur per modum instrumenti, non indiget habitu ad proprias operationes, sed habitus fundatur in principali agente. Humana autem natura in Christo fuit sicut instrumentum deitatis, ut dicit Damascenus, in III libro. Ergo in Christo non debuit esse aliqua gratia habitualis. Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae XI, requiescet super eum spiritus domini, qui quidem esse in homine dicitur per gratiam habitualem, ut in prima parte dictum est. Ergo in Christo fuit gratia habitualis. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere in Christo gratiam habitualem, propter tria. Primo quidem, propter unionem animae illius ad verbum Dei. Quanto enim aliquod receptivum propinquius est causae influenti, tanto magis participat de influentia ipsius. Influxus autem gratiae est a Deo, secundum illud Psalmi, gratiam et gloriam dabit dominus. Et ideo maxime fuit conveniens ut anima illa reciperet influxum divinae gratiae. Secundo, propter nobilitatem illius animae, cuius operationes oportebat propinquissime attingere ad Deum per cognitionem et amorem. Ad quod necesse est elevari humanam naturam per gratiam. Tertio, propter habitudinem ipsius Christi ad genus humanum. Christus enim, inquantum homo, est mediator Dei et hominum, ut dicitur I Tim. II. Et ideo oportebat quod haberet gratiam etiam in alios redundantem, secundum illud Ioan. I, de plenitudine eius omnes accepimus, gratiam pro gratia. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus est verus Deus secundum personam et naturam divinam. Sed quia cum unitate personae remanet distinctio naturarum, ut ex supra dictis patet, anima Christi non est per suam essentiam divina. Unde oportet quod fiat divina per participationem, quae est secundum gratiam. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christo, secundum quod est naturalis filius Dei, debetur hereditas aeterna, quae est ipsa beatitudo increata, per increatum actum cognitionis et amoris Dei, eundem scilicet quo pater cognoscit et amat seipsum. Cuius actus anima capax non erat, propter differentiam naturae. Unde oportebat quod attingeret ad Deum per actum fruitionis creatum. Qui quidem esse non potest nisi per gratiam. Similiter etiam, inquantum est verbum Dei, habuit facultatem omnia bene operandi operatione divina. Sed quia, praeter operationem divinam, oportet ponere operationem humanam, ut infra patebit; oportuit in eo esse habitua-

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to Rom. 6:23: The grace of God (is) life everlasting. Now the inheritance of everlasting life was due to Christ by the mere fact of His being the natural Son of God; and by the fact of His being the Word, by Whom all things were made, He had the power of doing all things well. Therefore His human nature needed no further grace beyond union with the Word. Obj. 3: Further, what operates as an instrument does not need a habit for its own operations, since habits are rooted in the principal agent. Now the human nature in Christ was as the instrument of the Godhead, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 15). Therefore there was no need of habitual grace in Christ. On the contrary, It is written (Isa 11:2): The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him—which (Spirit), indeed, is said to be in man by habitual grace, as was said above (I, Q. 8, A. 3; Q. 43, AA. 3, 6). Therefore there was habitual grace in Christ. I answer that, It is necessary to suppose habitual grace in Christ for three reasons. First, on account of the union of His soul with the Word of God. For the nearer any recipient is to an inflowing cause, the more does it partake of its influence. Now the influx of grace is from God, according to Ps. 83:12: The Lord will give grace and glory. And hence it was most fitting that His soul should receive the influx of Divine grace. Second, on account of the dignity of this soul, whose operations were to attain so closely to God by knowledge and love, to which it is necessary for human nature to be raised by grace. Third, on account of the relation of Christ to the human race. For Christ, as man, is the Mediator of God and men, as is written, 1 Tim. 2:5; and hence it behooved Him to have grace which would overflow upon others, according to John 1:16: And of His fullness we have all received, and grace for grace.

Reply Obj. 1: Christ is the true God in Divine Person and Nature. Yet because together with unity of person there remains distinction of natures, as stated above (Q. 2, AA. 1, 2), the soul of Christ is not essentially Divine. Hence it behooves it to be Divine by participation, which is by grace. Reply Obj. 2: To Christ, inasmuch as He is the natural Son of God, is due an eternal inheritance, which is the uncreated beatitude through the uncreated act of knowledge and love of God, i.e., the same whereby the Father knows and loves Himself. Now the soul was not capable of this act, on account of the difference of natures. Hence it behooved it to attain to God by a created act of fruition which could not be without grace. Likewise, inasmuch as He was the Word of God, He had the power of doing all things well by the Divine operation. And because it is necessary to admit a human operation, distinct from the Divine operation, as will be shown (Q. 19, A. 1), it was necessary for Him to

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lem gratiam, per quam huiusmodi operatio in eo esset perfecta. Ad tertium dicendum quod humanitas Christi est instrumentum divinitatis, non quidem sicut instrumentum inanimatum, quod nullo modo agit sed solum agitur, sed tanquam instrumentum animatum anima rationali, quod ita agit quod etiam agitur. Et ideo, ad convenientiam actionis, oportuit eum habere gratiam habitualem.

Q. 7, A. 2

have habitual grace, whereby this operation might be perfect in Him. Reply Obj. 3: The humanity of Christ is the instrument of the Godhead—not, indeed, an inanimate instrument, which nowise acts, but is merely acted upon; but an instrument animated by a rational soul, which is so acted upon as to act. And hence the nature of the action demanded that he should have habitual grace.

Article 2 Whether in Christ there were virtues? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerint virtutes. Christus enim habuit abundantiam gratiae. Sed gratia sufficit ad omnia recte agendum, secundum illud II Cor. XII, sufficit tibi gratia mea. Ergo in Christo non fuerunt virtutes. Praeterea, secundum philosophum, VII Ethic., virtus dividitur contra quendam heroicum sive divinum habitum, qui attribuitur hominibus divinis. Hoc autem maxime convenit Christo. Ergo Christus non habuit virtutes, sed aliquid altius virtute. Praeterea, sicut in secunda parte dictum est, virtutes omnes simul habentur. Sed Christo non fuit conveniens habere simul omnes virtutes, sicut patet de liberalitate et magnificentia, quae habent actum suum circa divitias, quas Christus contempsit, secundum illud Matth. VIII, filius hominis non habet ubi caput suum reclinet. Temperantia etiam et continentia sunt circa concupiscentias pravas, quae in Christo non fuerunt. Ergo Christus non habuit virtutes. Sed contra est quod super illud Psalmi, sed in lege domini voluntas eius, dicit Glossa, hic ostenditur Christus plenus omni bono. Sed bona qualitas mentis est virtus. Ergo Christus fuit plenus omni virtute. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in secunda parte habitum est, sicut gratia respicit essentiam animae, ita virtus respicit eius potentiam. Unde oportet quod, sicut potentiae animae derivantur ab eius essentia, ita virtutes sunt quaedam derivationes gratiae. Quanto autem aliquod principium est perfectius, tanto magis imprimit suos effectus. Unde, cum gratia Christi fuerit perfectissima, consequens est quod ex ipsa processerint virtutes ad perficiendum singulas potentias animae, quantum ad omnes animae actus. Et ita Christus habuit omnes virtutes. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod gratia sufficit homini quantum ad omnia quibus ordinatur ad beatitudinem. Horum tamen quaedam perficit gratia immediate

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there were no virtues. For Christ had the plenitude of grace. Now grace is sufficient for every good act, according to 2 Cor. 12:9: My grace is sufficient for thee. Therefore there were no virtues in Christ. Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1), virtue is contrasted with a certain heroic or godlike habit which is attributed to godlike men. But this belongs chiefly to Christ. Therefore Christ had not virtues, but something higher than virtue. Obj. 3: Further, as was said above (I-II, Q. 65, AA. 1, 2), all the virtues are bound together. But it was not becoming for Christ to have all the virtues, as is clear in the case of liberality and magnificence, for these have to do with riches, which Christ spurned, according to Matt. 8:20: The Son of man hath not where to lay His head. Temperance and continence also regard wicked desires, from which Christ was free. Therefore Christ had not the virtues. On the contrary, on Ps. 1:2, But His will is in the law of the Lord, a gloss says: This refers to Christ, Who is full of all good. But a good quality of the mind is a virtue. Therefore Christ was full of all virtue. I answer that, As was said above (I-II, Q. 110, AA. 3, 4), as grace regards the essence of the soul, so does virtue regard its power. Hence it is necessary that as the powers of the soul flow from its essence, so do the virtues flow from grace. Now the more perfect a principle is, the more it impresses its effects. Hence, since the grace of Christ was most perfect, there flowed from it, in consequence, the virtues which perfect the several powers of the soul for all the soul’s acts; and thus Christ had all the virtues.

Reply Obj. 1: Grace suffices a man for all whereby he is ordained to beatitude; nevertheless, it effects some of these by itself—as to make him pleasing to God, and the like; and

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per seipsam, sicut gratum facere Deo, et alia huiusmodi, quaedam autem mediantibus virtutibus, quae ex gratia procedunt. Ad secundum dicendum quod habitus ille heroicus vel divinus non differt a virtute communiter dicta nisi secundum perfectiorem modum, inquantum scilicet aliquis est dispositus ad bonum quodam altiori modo quam communiter omnibus competat. Unde per hoc non ostenditur quod Christus non habuit virtutes, sed quod habuit eas perfectissime, ultra communem modum. Sicut etiam Plotinus posuit quendam sublimem modum virtutum, quas esse dixit purgati animi. Ad tertium dicendum quod liberalitas et magnificentia commendantur circa divitias inquantum aliquis non tantum appretiatur divitias quod velit eas retinere praetermittendo id quod fieri oportet. Ille autem minime divitias appretiatur qui penitus eas contemnit et abiicit propter perfectionis amorem. Et ideo in hoc ipso quod Christus omnes divitias contempsit, ostendit in se summum gradum liberalitatis et magnificentiae. Licet etiam liberalitatis actum exercuerit, secundum quod sibi conveniens erat faciendo pauperibus erogari quae sibi dabantur, unde, cum dominus dixit Iudae, Ioan. XIII, quod facis, fac citius, discipuli intellexerunt dominum mandasse quod egenis aliquid daret. Concupiscentias autem pravas Christus omnino non habuit, sicut infra patebit. Propter hoc tamen non excluditur quin habuerit temperantiam, quae tanto perfectior est in homine quanto magis pravis concupiscentiis caret. Unde, secundum philosophum, in VII Ethic., temperatus in hoc differt a continente, quod temperatus non habet pravas concupiscentias, quas continens patitur. Unde, sic accipiendo continentiam sicut philosophus accipit, ex hoc ipso quod Christus habuit omnem virtutem, non habuit continentiam, quae non est virtus, sed aliquid minus virtute.

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some others through the medium of the virtues which proceed from grace. Reply Obj. 2: A heroic or godlike habit only differs from virtue commonly so called by a more perfect mode, inasmuch as one is disposed to good in a higher way than is common to all. Hence it is not hereby proved that Christ had not the virtues, but that He had them most perfectly beyond the common mode. In this sense Plotinus gave to a certain sublime degree of virtue the name of virtue of the purified soul (cf. I-II, Q. 61, A. 5). Reply Obj. 3: Liberality and magnificence are praiseworthy in regard to riches, inasmuch as anyone does not esteem wealth to the extent of wishing to retain it, so as to forego what ought to be done. But he esteems them least who wholly despises them, and casts them aside for love of perfection. And hence by altogether contemning all riches, Christ showed the highest kind of liberality and magnificence; although He also performed the act of liberality, as far as it became Him, by causing to be distributed to the poor what was given to Himself. Hence, when our Lord said to Judas (John 13:21), That which thou dost do quickly, the disciples understood our Lord to have ordered him to give something to the poor. But Christ had no evil desires whatever, as will be shown (Q. 15, AA. 1, 2); yet He was not thereby prevented from having temperance, which is the more perfect in man, as he is without evil desires. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9), the temperate man differs from the continent in this—that the temperate has not the evil desires which the continent suffers. Hence, taking continence in this sense, as the Philosopher takes it, Christ, from the very fact that He had all virtue, had not continence, since it is not a virtue, but something less than virtue.

Article 3 Whether in Christ there was faith? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo fuerit fides. Fides enim est nobilior virtus quam virtutes morales, puta temperantia et liberalitas. Huiusmodi autem virtutes fuerunt in Christo, ut dictum est. Multum ergo magis fuit in eo fides. Praeterea, Christus non docuit virtutes quas ipse non habuit, secundum illud Act. I, coepit Iesus facere et docere. Sed de Christo dicitur, Heb. XII, quod est auctor et consummator fidei. Ergo in eo maxime fuit fides.

Objection 1: It would seem that there was faith in Christ. For faith is a nobler virtue than the moral virtues, e.g., temperance and liberality. Now these were in Christ, as stated above (A. 2). Much more, therefore, was there faith in Him. Obj. 2: Further, Christ did not teach virtues which He had not Himself, according to Acts 1:1: Jesus began to do and to teach. But of Christ it is said (Heb 12:2) that He is the author and finisher of our faith. Therefore there was faith in Him before all others. Praeterea, quidquid est imperfectionis excluditur Obj. 3: Further, everything imperfect is excluded from a beatis. Sed in beatis est fides, nam super illud Rom. I, the blessed. But in the blessed there is faith; for on

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iustitia Dei revelatur in eo ex fide in fidem, dicit Glossa, de fide verborum et spei in fidem rerum et speciei. Ergo videtur quod etiam in Christo fuerit fides, cum nihil imperfectionis importet. Sed contra est quod dicitur Heb. XI, quod fides est argumentum non apparentium. Sed Christo nihil fuit non apparens, secundum illud quod dixit ei Petrus, Ioan. ult., tu omnia nosti. Ergo in Christo non fuit fides. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in secunda parte dictum est, obiectum fidei est res divina non visa. Habitus autem virtutis, sicut et quilibet alius, recipit speciem ab obiecto. Et ideo, excluso quod res divina non sit visa, excluditur ratio fidei. Christus autem in primo instanti suae conceptionis plene vidit Deum per essentiam, ut infra patebit. Unde fides in eo esse non potuit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod fides est nobilior virtutibus moralibus, quia est circa nobiliorem materiam, sed tamen importat quendam defectum in comparatione ad illam materiam, qui defectus in Christo non fuit. Et ideo non potuit in eo esse fides, licet fuerint in eo virtutes morales, quae in sui ratione huiusmodi defectum non important per comparationem ad suas materias. Ad secundum dicendum quod meritum fidei consistit in hoc quod homo, ex obedientia Dei, assentit istis quae non videt, secundum illud Rom. I, ad obediendum fidei in omnibus gentibus pro nomine eius. Obedientiam autem ad Deum plenissime habuit Christus, secundum illud Philipp. II, factus est obediens usque ad mortem. Et sic nihil ad meritum pertinens docuit quod ipse excellentius non impleret. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Glossa ibidem dicit, fides proprie est qua creduntur quae non videntur. Sed fides quae est rerum visarum, improprie dicitur, et secundum quandam similitudinem, quantum ad certitudinem aut firmitatem adhaesionis.

Q. 7, A. 4

Rom. 1:17, the justice of God is revealed therein from faith to faith, a gloss says: From the faith of words and hope to the faith of things and sight. Therefore it would seem that in Christ also there was faith, since it implies nothing imperfect. On the contrary, It is written (Heb 11:1): Faith is the evidence of things that appear not. But there was nothing that did not appear to Christ, according to what Peter said to Him (John 21:17): Thou knowest all things. Therefore there was no faith in Christ. I answer that, As was said above (II-II, Q. 1, A. 4), the object of faith is a Divine thing not seen. Now the habit of virtue, as every other habit, takes its species from the object. Hence, if we deny that the Divine thing was not seen, we exclude the very essence of faith. Now from the first moment of His conception Christ saw God’s Essence fully, as will be made clear (Q. 34, A. 1). Hence there could be no faith in Him. Reply Obj. 1: Faith is a nobler virtue than the moral virtues, seeing that it has to do with nobler matter; nevertheless, it implies a certain defect with regard to that matter; and this defect was not in Christ. And hence there could be no faith in Him, although the moral virtues were in Him, since in their nature they imply no defect with regard to their matter. Reply Obj. 2: The merit of faith consists in this—that man through obedience assents to what things he does not see, according to Rom. 1:5: For obedience to the faith in all nations for His name. Now Christ had most perfect obedience to God, according to Phil. 2:8: Becoming obedient unto death. And hence He taught nothing pertaining to merit which He did not fulfill more perfectly Himself. Reply Obj. 3: As a gloss says in the same place, faith is that whereby such things as are not seen are believed. But faith in things seen is improperly so called, and only after a certain similitude with regard to the certainty and firmness of the assent.

Article 4 Whether in Christ there was hope? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo fuerit spes. Dicitur enim in Psalmo ex persona Christi, secundum Glossam, in te, domine, speravi. Sed virtus spei est qua homo sperat in Deum. Ergo virtus spei fuit in Christo. Praeterea, spes est expectatio futurae beatitudinis, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Sed Christus aliquid

Objection 1: It would seem that there was hope in Christ. For it is said in the Person of Christ (Ps 30:1): In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped. But the virtue of hope is that whereby a man hopes in God. Therefore the virtue of hope was in Christ. Obj. 2: Further, hope is the expectation of the bliss to come, as was shown above (II-II, Q. 17, A. 5, ad 3). But

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expectabat ad beatitudinem pertinens, videlicet gloriam Christ awaited something pertaining to bliss, viz. the glocorporis. Ergo videtur quod in eo fuit spes. rifying of His body. Therefore it seems there was hope in Him. Praeterea, unusquisque potest sperare id quod ad Obj. 3: Further, everyone may hope for what pertains to eius perfectionem pertinet, si sit futurum. Sed aliquid his perfection, if it has yet to come. But there was something erat futurum quod ad perfectionem Christi pertinet, se- still to come pertaining to Christ’s perfection, according to cundum illud Ephes. IV, ad consummationem sancto- Eph. 4:12: For the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the rum, in opus ministerii, in aedificationem corporis Chri- ministry, for the building up of the body of Christ. Hence it sti. Ergo videtur quod Christo competebat habere spem. seems that it befitted Christ to have hope. Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. VIII, quod videt On the contrary, It is written (Rom 8:24): What a quis, quid sperat? Et sic patet quod, sicut fides est de non man seeth, why doth he hope for? Thus it is clear that as faith visis, ita et spes. Sed fides non fuit in Christo, sicut dic- is of the unseen, so also is hope. But there was no faith in tum est. Ergo nec spes. Christ, as was said above (A. 1): neither, consequently, was there hope. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut de ratione fidei I answer that, As it is of the nature of faith that one est quod aliquis assentiat his quae non videt, ita de ra- assents to what one sees not, so is it of the nature of hope tione spei est quod aliquis expectet id quod nondum ha- that one expects what as yet one has not; and as faith, forasbet. Et sicut fides, inquantum est virtus theologica, non much as it is a theological virtue, does not regard everyest de quocumque non viso, sed solum de Deo, ita etiam thing unseen, but only God; so likewise hope, as a theospes, inquantum est virtus theologica, habet pro obiecto logical virtue, has God Himself for its object, the fruition ipsam Dei fruitionem, quam principaliter homo expec- of Whom man chiefly expects by the virtue of hope; yet, in tat per spei virtutem. Sed ex consequenti ille qui habet consequence, whoever has the virtue of hope may expect virtutem spei, potest etiam in aliis divinum auxilium ex- the Divine aid in other things, even as he who has the virtue pectare, sicut et ille qui habet virtutem fidei, non solum of faith believes God not only in Divine things, but even in credit Deo de rebus divinis, sed de quibuscumque aliis whatsoever is divinely revealed. Now from the beginning of sibi divinitus revelatis. Christus autem a principio suae His conception Christ had the Divine fruition fully, as will conceptionis plene habuit fruitionem divinam, ut infra be shown (Q. 34, A. 4), and hence he had not the virtue dicetur. Et ideo virtutem spei non habuit. Habuit tamen of hope. Nevertheless He had hope as regards such things spem respectu aliquorum quae nondum erat adeptus, li- as He did not yet possess, although He had not faith with cet non habuit fidem respectu quorumcumque. Quia, li- regard to anything; because, although He knew all things cet plene cognosceret omnia, per quod totaliter fides ex- fully, wherefore faith was altogether wanting to Him, nevcludebatur ab eo, non tamen adhuc plene habebat omnia ertheless He did not as yet fully possess all that pertained quae ad eius perfectionem pertinebant, puta immortali- to His perfection, viz. immortality and glory of the body, tatem et gloriam corporis, quam poterat sperare. which He could hope for. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc non dicitur de Reply Obj. 1: This is said of Christ with reference to Christo secundum spem quae est virtus theologica, sed hope, not as a theological virtue, but inasmuch as He hoped eo quod quaedam alia speravit nondum habita, sicut dic- for some other things not yet possessed, as was said above. tum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod gloria corporis non Reply Obj. 2: The glory of the body does not pertain to pertinet ad beatitudinem sicut in quo principaliter bea- beatitude as being that in which beatitude principally contitudo consistat, sed per quandam redundantiam a glo- sists, but by a certain outpouring from the soul’s glory, as ria animae, ut in secunda parte dictum est. Unde spes, was said above (I-II, Q. 4, A. 6). Hence hope, as a theologisecundum quod est virtus theologica, non respicit beati- cal virtue, does not regard the bliss of the body but the soul’s tudinem corporis, sed beatitudinem animae, quae in di- bliss, which consists in the Divine fruition. vina fruitione consistit. Ad tertium dicendum quod aedificatio Ecclesiae Reply Obj. 3: The building up of the church by the per conversionem fidelium non pertinet ad perfectio- conversion of the faithful does not pertain to the perfection nem Christi qua in se perfectus est, sed secundum quod of Christ, whereby He is perfect in Himself, but inasmuch alios ad participationem suae perfectionis inducit. Et as it leads others to a share of His perfection. And because quia spes dicitur proprie respectu alicuius quod expecta- hope properly regards what is expected by him who hopes, tur ab ipso sperante habendum, non proprie potest dici the virtue of hope cannot properly be said to be in Christ, quod virtus spei Christo conveniat ratione inducta. because of the aforesaid reason.

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Article 5 Whether in Christ there were the gifts? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerint dona. Sicut enim communiter dicitur, dona dantur in adiutorium virtutum. Sed id quod est in se perfectum, non indiget exteriori auxilio. Cum igitur in Christo fuerint virtutes perfectae, videtur quod in eo non fuerunt dona. Praeterea, non videtur esse eiusdem dare dona et recipere, quia dare est habentis, accipere autem non habentis. Sed Christo convenit dare dona, secundum illud Psalmi, dedit dona hominibus. Ergo Christo non convenit accipere dona spiritus sancti. Praeterea, quatuor dona videntur pertinere ad contemplationem viae scilicet sapientia, scientia, intellectus et consilium, quod pertinet ad prudentiam, unde et philosophus, in VI Ethic., numerat ista inter virtutes intellectuales. Sed Christus habuit contemplationem patriae. Ergo non habuit huiusmodi dona. Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae IV, apprehendent septem mulieres virum unum, Glossa, idest, septem dona spiritus sancti Christum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in secunda parte dictum est, dona proprie sunt quaedam perfectiones potentiarum animae secundum quod sunt natae moveri a spiritu sancto. Manifestum est autem quod anima Christi perfectissime a spiritu sancto movebatur secundum illud Luc. IV, Iesus, plenus spiritu sancto, regressus est a Iordane, et agebatur a spiritu in desertum. Unde manifestum est quod in Christo fuerunt excellentissime dona.

Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts were not in Christ. For, as is commonly said, the gifts are given to help the virtues. But what is perfect in itself does not need an exterior help. Therefore, since the virtues of Christ were perfect, it seems there were no gifts in Him. Obj. 2: Further, to give and to receive gifts would not seem to belong to the same; since to give pertains to one who has, and to receive pertains to one who has not. But it belongs to Christ to give gifts according to Ps. 67:19. Thou hast given gifts to men. Therefore it was not becoming that Christ should receive gifts of the Holy Spirit. Obj. 3: Further, four gifts would seem to pertain to the contemplation of earth, viz. wisdom, knowledge, understanding, and counsel which pertains to prudence; hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3) enumerates these with the intellectual virtues. But Christ had the contemplation of heaven. Therefore He had not these gifts. On the contrary, It is written (Isa 4:1): Seven women shall take hold of one man: on which a gloss says: That is, the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit shall take hold of Christ. I answer that, As was said above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 1), the gifts, properly, are certain perfections of the soul’s powers, inasmuch as these have a natural aptitude to be moved by the Holy Spirit. It is clear, however, that the soul of Christ is perfectly moved by the Holy Spirit, according to Luke 4:1: And Jesus, being full of the Holy Spirit, returned from the Jordan, and was led by the Spirit into the desert. Hence it is manifest that in Christ the gifts were in a pre-eminent degree. Reply Obj. 1: What is perfect in the order of its nature needs to be helped by something of a higher nature; as man, however perfect, needs to be helped by God. And in this way the virtues, which perfect the powers of the soul, as they are controlled by reason, no matter how perfect they are, need to be helped by the gifts, which perfect the soul’s powers, inasmuch as these are moved by the Holy Spirit. Reply Obj. 2: Christ is not a recipient and a giver of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, in the same respect; for He gives them as God and receives them as man. Hence Gregory says (Moral. ii) that the Holy Spirit never quitted the human nature of Christ, from Whose Divine nature He proceedeth.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud quod est perfectum secundum ordinem suae naturae, indiget adiuvari ab eo quod est altioris naturae, sicut homo, quantumcumque perfectus, indiget adiuvari a Deo. Et hoc modo virtutes indigent adiuvari per dona, quae perficiunt potentias animae secundum quod sunt motae a spiritu sancto. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus non secundum idem est recipiens et dans dona spiritus sancti, sed dat secundum quod Deus, et accipit secundum quod homo. Unde Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., quod Spiritus Sanctus humanitatem Christi nunquam deseruit, ex cuius divinitate procedit. Ad tertium dicendum quod in Christo non solum Reply Obj. 3: In Christ there was not only heavenly fuit cognitio patriae, sed etiam cognitio viae, ut infra di- knowledge, but also earthly knowledge, as will be said cetur. Et tamen etiam in patria sunt per aliquem modum (Q. 15, A. 10). And yet even in heaven the gifts of the Holy dona spiritus sancti, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Spirit will still exist, in a certain manner, as was said above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 6).

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Article 6 Whether in Christ there was the gift of fear? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuit donum timoris. Spes enim potior videtur quam timor, nam spei obiectum est bonum, timoris vero malum, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Sed in Christo non fuit virtus spei, ut supra habitum est. Ergo etiam non fuit in eo donum timoris. Praeterea, dono timoris timet aliquis vel separationem a Deo, quod pertinet ad timorem castum; vel puniri ab ipso, quod pertinet ad timorem servilem; ut Augustinus dicit, super canonicam Ioan. Sed Christus non timuit separari a Deo per peccatum, neque puniri ab eo propter culpam suam, quia impossibile erat eum peccare, ut infra dicetur; timor autem non est de impossibili. Ergo in Christo non fuit donum timoris. Praeterea, I Ioan. IV dicitur, perfecta caritas foras mittit timorem. Sed in Christo fuit perfectissima caritas, secundum illud Ephes. III, supereminentem scientiae caritatem Christi. Ergo in Christo non fuit donum timoris. Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae XI, replebit eum spiritus timoris domini. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in secunda parte dictum est, timor respicit duo obiecta, quorum unum est malum terribile; aliud est ille cuius potestate malum potest inferri, sicut aliquis timet regem inquantum habet potestatem occidendi. Non autem timeretur ille qui habet potestatem, nisi haberet quandam eminentiam potestatis, cui de facili resisti non possit, ea enim quae in promptu habemus repellere, non timemus. Et sic patet quod aliquis non timetur nisi propter suam eminentiam. Sic igitur dicendum est quod in Christo fuit timor Dei, non quidem secundum quod respicit malum separationis a Deo per culpam; nec secundum quod respicit malum punitionis pro culpa; sed secundum quod respicit ipsam divinam eminentiam, prout scilicet anima Christi quodam affectu reverentiae movebatur in Deum, a spiritu sancto acta. Unde Heb. V dicitur quod in omnibus exauditus est pro sua reverentia. Hunc enim affectum reverentiae ad Deum Christus, secundum quod homo, prae ceteris habuit pleniorem. Et ideo ei attribuit Scriptura plenitudinem timoris domini. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod habitus virtutum et donorum proprie et per se respiciunt bonum, malum autem ex consequenti, pertinet enim ad rationem virtutis ut opus bonum reddat, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Et ideo de ratione doni timoris non est illud malum quod respicit timor, sed eminentia illius boni, scilicet divini, cuius potestate aliquod malum infligi potest. Spes autem, secundum quod est virtus, respicit non solum actorem boni, sed etiam ipsum bonum inquantum est non habitum.

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the gift of fear. For hope would seem to be stronger than fear; since the object of hope is goodness, and of fear, evil, as was said above (I-II, Q. 40, A. 1; I-II, Q. 42, A. 1). But in Christ there was not the virtue of hope, as was said above (A. 4). Hence, likewise, there was not the gift of fear in Him. Obj. 2: Further, by the gift of fear we fear either to be separated from God, which pertains to chaste fear—or to be punished by Him, which pertains to servile fear, as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. ix). But Christ did not fear being separated from God by sin, nor being punished by Him on account of a fault, since it was impossible for Him to sin, as will be said (Q. 15, AA. 1, 2). Now fear is not of the impossible. Therefore in Christ there was not the gift of fear. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (1 John 4:18) that perfect charity casteth out fear. But in Christ there was most perfect charity, according to Eph. 3:19: The charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge. Therefore in Christ there was not the gift of fear. On the contrary, It is written (Isa 11:3): And He shall be filled with the spirit of the fear of the Lord. I answer that, As was said above (I-II, Q. 42, A. 1), fear regards two objects, one of which is an evil causing terror; the other is that by whose power an evil can be inflicted, as we fear the king inasmuch as he has the power of putting to death. Now whoever can hurt would not be feared unless he had a certain greatness of might, to which resistance could not easily be offered; for what we easily repel we do not fear. And hence it is plain that no one is feared except for some pre-eminence. And in this way it is said that in Christ there was the fear of God, not indeed as it regards the evil of separation from God by fault, nor as it regards the evil of punishment for fault; but inasmuch as it regards the Divine pre-eminence, on account of which the soul of Christ, led by the Holy Spirit, was borne towards God in an act of reverence. Hence it is said (Heb 5:7) that in all things he was heard for his reverence. For Christ as man had this act of reverence towards God in a fuller sense and beyond all others. And hence Scripture attributes to Him the fullness of the fear of the Lord. Reply Obj. 1: The habits of virtues and gifts regard goodness properly and of themselves; but evil, consequently; since it pertains to the nature of virtue to render acts good, as is said Ethic. ii, 6. And hence the nature of the gift of fear regards not that evil which fear is concerned with, but the pre-eminence of that goodness, viz. of God, by Whose power evil may be inflicted. On the other hand, hope, as a virtue, regards not only the author of good, but even the good itself, as far as it is not yet possessed. And

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Et ideo Christo, quia iam habebat perfectum beatitudinis bonum, non attribuitur virtus spei, sed donum timoris. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de timore secundum quod respicit obiectum quod est malum. Ad tertium dicendum quod perfecta caritas foras mittit timorem servilem, qui respicit principaliter poenam. Sic autem timor non fuit in Christo.

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hence to Christ, Who already possessed the perfect good of beatitude, we do not attribute the virtue of hope, but we do attribute the gift of fear. Reply Obj. 2: This reason is based on fear in so far as it regards the evil object. Reply Obj. 3: Perfect charity casts out servile fear, which principally regards punishment. But this kind of fear was not in Christ.

Article 7 Whether the gratuitous graces were in Christ? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerint gratiae gratis datae. Ei enim qui habet aliquid secundum plenitudinem, non competit illud habere secundum participationem. Sed Christus habuit gratiam secundum plenitudinem, secundum illud Ioan. I, plenum gratiae et veritatis. Gratiae autem gratis datae videntur esse quaedam participationes divisim et particulariter diversis attributae, secundum illud I Cor. XII, divisiones gratiarum sunt. Ergo videtur quod in Christo non fuerint gratiae gratis datae. Praeterea, quod debetur alicui, non videtur esse gratis ei datum. Sed debitum erat homini Christo quod sermone sapientiae et scientiae abundaret, et potens esset in virtutibus faciendis, et alia huiusmodi quae pertinent ad gratias gratis datas, cum ipse sit Dei virtus et Dei sapientia, ut dicitur I Cor. I. Ergo Christo non fuit conveniens habere gratias gratis datas. Praeterea, gratiae gratis datae ordinantur ad utilitatem fidelium, secundum illud I Cor. XII, unicuique datur manifestatio spiritus ad utilitatem. Non autem videtur ad utilitatem pertinere habitus, aut quaecumque dispositio, si homo non utatur, secundum illud Eccli. XX, sapientia abscondita, et thesaurus invisus, quae utilitas in utrisque? Christus autem non legitur usus fuisse omnibus gratiis gratis datis, praesertim quantum ad genera linguarum. Non ergo in Christo fuerunt omnes gratiae gratis datae. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Dardanum, quod sicut in capite sunt omnes sensus, ita in Christo fuerunt omnes gratiae. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in secunda parte habitum est, gratiae gratis datae ordinantur ad fidei et spiritualis doctrinae manifestationem. Oportet autem eum qui docet, habere ea per quae sua doctrina manifestetur, aliter sua doctrina esset inutilis. Spiritualis autem doctrinae et fidei primus et principalis doctor est Christus, secundum illud Heb. II, cum initium accepisset enuntiari a domino, per eos qui audierunt in nos con-

Objection 1: It would seem that the gratuitous graces were not in Christ. For whoever has anything in its fullness, to him it does not pertain to have it by participation. Now Christ has grace in its fullness, according to John 1:14: Full of grace and truth. But the gratuitous graces would seem to be certain participations, bestowed distributively and particularly upon diverse subjects, according to 1 Cor. 12:4: Now there are diversities of graces. Therefore it would seem that there were no gratuitous graces in Christ. Obj. 2: Further, what is due to anyone would not seem to be gratuitously bestowed on him. But it was due to the man Christ that He should abound in the word of wisdom and knowledge, and to be mighty in doing wonderful works and the like, all of which pertain to gratuitous graces: since He is the power of God and the wisdom of God, as is written 1 Cor. 1:24. Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to have the gratuitous graces. Obj. 3: Further, gratuitous graces are ordained to the benefit of the faithful. But it does not seem that a habit which a man does not use is for the benefit of others, according to Ecclus. 20:32: Wisdom that is hid and treasure that is not seen: what profit is there in them both? Now we do not read that Christ made use of these gratuitously given graces, especially as regards the gift of tongues. Therefore not all the gratuitous graces were in Christ.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Dardan. cclxxxvii) that as in the head are all the senses, so in Christ were all the graces. I answer that, As was said above (I-II, Q. 111, AA. 1, 4), the gratuitous graces are ordained for the manifestation of faith and spiritual doctrine. For it behooves him who teaches to have the means of making his doctrine clear; otherwise his doctrine would be useless. Now Christ is the first and chief teacher of spiritual doctrine and faith, according to Heb. 2:3, 4: Which having begun to be declared by the Lord was confirmed unto us by them that heard Him, God

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firmata est, contestante Deo signis et prodigiis, et cetera. Unde manifestum est quod in Christo fuerunt excellentissime omnes gratiae gratis datae, sicut in primo et principali doctore fidei. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut gratia gratum faciens ordinatur ad actus meritorios tam interiores quam exteriores, ita gratia gratis data ordinatur ad quosdam actus exteriores fidei manifestativos, sicut est operatio miraculorum, et alia huiusmodi. In utraque autem gratia Christus plenitudinem habuit, inquantum enim divinitati unita erat eius anima, plenam efficaciam habebat ad omnes praedictos actus perficiendos. Sed alii sancti, qui moventur a Deo sicut instrumenta non unita, sed separata particulariter efficaciam recipiunt ad hos vel illos actus perficiendos. Et ideo in aliis sanctis huiusmodi gratiae dividuntur, non autem in Christo. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus dicitur Dei virtus et Dei sapientia, inquantum est aeternus Dei filius. Sic autem non competit sibi habere gratiam, sed potius esse gratiae largitorem. Competit autem sibi gratiam habere secundum humanam naturam. Ad tertium dicendum quod donum linguarum datum est apostolis quia mittebantur ad docendas omnes gentes. Christus autem in una sola Iudaeorum gente voluit personaliter praedicare, secundum quod ipse dicit, Matth. XV, non sum missus nisi ad oves quae perierunt domus Israel; et apostolus dicit, Rom. XV, dico Iesum Christum ministrum fuisse circumcisionis. Et ideo non oportuit quod loqueretur pluribus linguis. Nec tamen defuit ei omnium linguarum notitia, cum etiam occulta cordium non essent ei abscondita, ut infra dicetur, quorum voces quaecumque sunt signa. Nec tamen inutiliter hanc notitiam habuit, sicut non inutiliter habet habitum qui eo non utitur quando non est opportunum.

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also bearing them witness by signs and wonders. Hence it is clear that all the gratuitous graces were most excellently in Christ, as in the first and chief teacher of the faith. Reply Obj. 1: As sanctifying grace is ordained to meritorious acts both interior and exterior, so likewise gratuitous grace is ordained to certain exterior acts manifestive of the faith, as the working of miracles, and the like. Now of both these graces Christ had the fullness, since inasmuch as His soul was united to the Godhead, He had the perfect power of effecting all these acts. But other saints who are moved by God as separated and not united instruments, receive power in a particular manner in order to bring about this or that act. And hence in other saints these graces are divided, but not in Christ. Reply Obj. 2: Christ is said to be the power of God and the wisdom of God, inasmuch as He is the Eternal Son of God. But in this respect it does not pertain to Him to have grace, but rather to be the bestower of grace; but it pertains to Him in His human nature to have grace. Reply Obj. 3: The gift of tongues was bestowed on the apostles, because they were sent to teach all nations; but Christ wished to preach personally only in the one nation of the Jews, as He Himself says (Matt 15:24): I was not sent but to the sheep that are lost of the house of Israel; and the Apostle says (Rom 15:8): I say that Christ Jesus was minister of the circumcision. And hence it was not necessary for Him to speak several languages. Yet a knowledge of all languages was not wanting to Him, since even the secrets of hearts, of which all words are signs, were not hidden from Him, as will be shown (Q. 10, A. 2). Nor was this knowledge uselessly possessed, just as it is not useless to have a habit, which we do not use when there is no occasion.

Article 8 Whether in Christ there was the gift of prophecy? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit prophetia. Prophetia enim importat quandam obscuram et imperfectam notitiam, secundum illud Num. XII, si quis fuerit inter vos propheta domini, per somnium aut in visione loquar ad eum. Sed Christus habuit plenam et perfectam notitiam, multo magis quam Moyses, de quo ibi subditur quod palam, et non per aenigmata Deum vidit. Non ergo debet in Christo poni prophetia. Praeterea, sicut fides est eorum quae non videntur, et spes eorum quae non habentur, ita prophetia est eorum quae non sunt praesentia, sed distant, nam propheta dicitur quasi procul fans. Sed in Christo non po-

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the gift of prophecy. For prophecy implies a certain obscure and imperfect knowledge, according to Num. 12:6: If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream. But Christ had full and unveiled knowledge, much more than Moses, of whom it is subjoined that plainly and not by riddles and figures doth he see God (Num 6:8). Therefore we ought not to admit prophecy in Christ. Obj. 2: Further, as faith has to do with what is not seen, and hope with what is not possessed, so prophecy has to do with what is not present, but distant; for a prophet means, as it were, a teller of far-off things. But in Christ there could

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nitur fides neque spes, ut supra dictum est. Ergo etiam prophetia non debet poni in Christo. Praeterea, propheta est inferioris ordinis quam Angelus, unde et de Moyse, qui fuit supremus prophetarum, ut dictum est in secunda parte, Act. VII dicitur quod locutus est cum Angelo in solitudine. Sed Christus non est minoratus ab Angelis secundum notitiam animae, sed solum secundum corporis passionem, ut dicitur Heb. II. Ergo videtur quod Christus non fuit propheta. Sed contra est quod de eo dicitur, Deut. XVIII, prophetam suscitabit vobis Deus de fratribus vestris. Et ipse de se dicit, Matth. XIII et Ioan. IV, non est propheta sine honore nisi in patria sua. Respondeo dicendum quod propheta dicitur quasi procul fans, vel procul videns, inquantum scilicet cognoscit et loquitur ea quae sunt procul ab hominum sensibus; sicut etiam Augustinus dicit, XVI contra Faustum. Est autem considerandum quod non potest dici aliquis propheta ex hoc quod cognoscit et annuntiat ea quae sunt aliis procul, cum quibus ipse non est. Et hoc manifestum est secundum locum et secundum tempus. Si enim aliquis in Gallia existens cognosceret et annuntiaret aliis in Gallia existentibus ea quae tunc in Syria agerentur, propheticum esset, sicut Elisaeus ad Giezi dixit IV Reg. V, quomodo vir descenderat de curru et occurrerat ei. Si vero aliquis in Syria existens ea quae sunt ibi annuntiaret non esset hoc propheticum. Et idem apparet secundum tempus. Propheticum enim fuit quod Isaias praenuntiavit quod Cyrus, Persarum rex, templum Dei esset reaedificaturus, ut patet Isaiae XLIV, non autem fuit propheticum quod Esdras hoc scripsit, cuius tempore factum est. Si igitur Deus aut Angeli, vel etiam beati, cognoscunt et annuntiant ea quae sunt procul a nostra notitia, non pertinet ad prophetiam, quia in nullo nostrum statum attingunt. Christus autem ante passionem nostrum statum attingebat, inquantum non solum erat comprehensor, sed etiam viator. Et ideo propheticum erat quod ea quae erant procul ab aliorum viatorum notitia, et cognoscebat et annuntiabat. Et hac ratione dicitur in eo fuisse prophetia. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per illa verba non ostenditur esse de ratione prophetiae aenigmatica cognitio, quae scilicet est per somnium et in visione, sed ostenditur comparatio aliorum prophetarum, qui per somnium et in visione perceperunt divina, ad Moysen, qui palam et non per aenigmata Deum vidit; qui tamen propheta est dictus, secundum illud Deut. ult., non surrexit ultra propheta in Israel sicut Moyses. Potest tamen dici quod, etsi Christus habuit plenam et apertam notitiam quantum ad partem intellectivam, habuit tamen in parte

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be neither faith nor hope, as was said above (AA. 3, 4). Hence prophecy also ought not to be admitted in Christ. Obj. 3: Further, a prophet is in an inferior order to an angel; hence Moses, who was the greatest of the prophets, as was said above (II-II, Q. 174, A. 4) is said (Acts 7:38) to have spoken with an angel in the desert. But Christ was made lower than the angels, not as to the knowledge of His soul, but only as regards the sufferings of His body, as is shown Heb. 2:9. Therefore it seems that Christ was not a prophet. On the contrary, It is written of Him (Deut 18:15): Thy God will raise up to thee a prophet of thy nation and of thy brethren, and He says of Himself (Matt 13:57; John 4:44): A prophet is not without honor, save in his own country. I answer that, A prophet means, as it were, a teller or seer of far-off things, inasmuch as he knows and announces what things are far from men’s senses, as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xvi, 18). Now we must bear in mind that no one can be called a prophet for knowing and announcing what is distant from others, with whom he is not. And this is clear in regard to place and time. For if anyone living in France were to know and announce to others living in France what things were transpiring in Syria, it would be prophetical, as Eliseus told Giezi (4 Kgs 5:26) how the man had leaped down from his chariot to meet him. But if anyone living in Syria were to announce what things were there, it would not be prophetical. And the same appears in regard to time. For it was prophetical of Isaias to announce that Cyrus, King of the Persians, would rebuild the temple of God, as is clear from Isa. 44:28. But it was not prophetical of Esdras to write it, in whose time it took place. Hence if God or angels, or even the blessed, know and announce what is beyond our knowing, this does not pertain to prophecy, since they nowise touch our state. Now Christ before His passion touched our state, inasmuch as He was not merely a comprehensor, but a wayfarer. Hence it was prophetical in Him to know and announce what was beyond the knowledge of other wayfarers: and for this reason He is called a prophet.

Reply Obj. 1: These words do not prove that enigmatical knowledge, viz. by dream and vision, belongs to the nature of prophecy; but the comparison is drawn between other prophets, who saw Divine things in dreams and visions, and Moses, who saw God plainly and not by riddles, and who yet is called a prophet, according to Deut. 24:10: And there arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses. Nevertheless it may be said that although Christ had full and unveiled knowledge as regards the intellective part, yet in the imaginative part He had certain similitudes, in which

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imaginativa quasdam similitudines, in quibus etiam poterat speculari divina, inquantum non solum erat comprehensor, sed etiam viator. Ad secundum dicendum quod fides est eorum quae non videntur ab ipso credente. Similiter spes est eorum quae non habentur ab ipso sperante. Sed prophetia est eorum quae sunt procul a communi hominum sensu, cum quibus propheta conversatur et communicat in statu viae. Et ideo fides et spes repugnant perfectioni beatitudinis Christi, non autem prophetia. Ad tertium dicendum quod Angelus, cum sit comprehensor, est supra prophetam qui est purus viator, non autem supra Christum, qui simul fuit viator et comprehensor.

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Divine things could be viewed, inasmuch as He was not only a comprehensor, but a wayfarer. Reply Obj. 2: Faith regards such things as are unseen by him who believes; and hope, too, is of such things as are not possessed by the one who hopes; but prophecy is of such things as are beyond the sense of men, with whom the prophet dwells and converses in this state of life. And hence faith and hope are repugnant to the perfection of Christ’s beatitude; but prophecy is not. Reply Obj. 3: Angels, being comprehensors, are above prophets, who are merely wayfarers; but not above Christ, Who was both a comprehensor and a wayfarer.

Article 9 Whether in Christ there was the fullness of grace? Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit in Christo gratiae plenitudo. A gratia enim derivantur virtutes, ut in secunda parte dictum est. Sed in Christo non fuerunt omnes virtutes, non enim fuit in eo fides neque spes, ut ostensum est. Ergo in Christo non fuit gratiae plenitudo. Praeterea, sicut patet ex his quae in secunda parte dicta sunt, gratia dividitur in operantem et cooperantem. Operans autem gratia dicitur per quam iustificatur impius. Quod quidem non habuit locum in Christo, qui nunquam subiacuit alicui peccato. Ergo in Christo non fuit plenitudo gratiae. Praeterea, Iac. I dicitur, omne datum optimum, et omne donum perfectum, de sursum est, descendens a patre luminum. Sed quod descendit, habetur particulariter, et non plene. Ergo nulla creatura, nec etiam anima Christi, potest habere plenitudinem donorum gratiae. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. I, vidimus eum plenum gratiae et veritatis. Respondeo dicendum quod plene dicitur haberi quod totaliter et perfecte habetur. Totalitas autem et perfectio potest attendi dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad quantitatem eius intensivam, puta si dicam aliquem plene habere albedinem, si habeat eam quantumcumque nata est haberi. Alio modo, secundum virtutem, puta si aliquis dicatur plene habere vitam, quia habet eam secundum omnes effectus vel opera vitae. Et sic plene habet vitam homo, non autem brutum animal, vel planta. Utroque autem modo Christus habuit gratiae plenitudinem. Primo quidem, quia habuit eam in summo, secundum perfectissimum modum qui potest haberi. Et hoc quidem apparet primo, ex propinquitate animae Christi ad causam gratiae. Dictum est enim quod, quanto aliquod receptivum propinquius est causae influenti, abun-

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the fullness of grace. For the virtues flow from grace, as was said above (I-II, Q. 110, A. 4). But in Christ there were not all the virtues; for there was neither faith nor hope in Him, as was shown above (AA. 3, 4). Therefore in Christ there was not the fullness of grace. Obj. 2: Further, as is plain from what was said above (I-II, Q. 111, A. 2), grace is divided into operating and cooperating. Now operating grace signifies that whereby the ungodly is justified, which has no place in Christ, Who never lay under any sin. Therefore in Christ there was not the fullness of grace. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Jas 1:17): Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights. But what comes thus is possessed partially, and not fully. Therefore no creature, not even the soul of Christ, can have the fullness of the gifts of grace. On the contrary, It is written (John 1:14): We saw His glory full of grace and truth. I answer that, To have fully is to have wholly and perfectly. Now totality and perfection can be taken in two ways: First as regards their intensive quantity; for instance, I may say that some man has whiteness fully, because he has as much of it as can naturally be in him; second, as regards power; for instance, if anyone be said to have life fully, inasmuch as he has it in all the effects or works of life; and thus man has life fully, but senseless animals or plants have not. Now in both these ways Christ has the fullness of grace. First, since He has grace in its highest degree, in the most perfect way it can be had. And this appears, first, from the nearness of Christ’s soul to the cause of grace. For it was said above (A. 1) that the nearer a recipient is to the inflowing cause, the more it receives. And hence the soul of Christ, which is more closely united to God than all other

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dantius recipit. Et ideo anima Christi, quae propinquius coniungitur Deo inter omnes creaturas rationales, recipit maximam influentiam gratiae eius. Secundo, ex comparatione eius ad effectum. Sic enim recipiebat anima Christi gratiam ut ex ea quodammodo transfunderetur in alios. Et ideo oportuit quod haberet maximam gratiam, sicut ignis, qui est causa caloris in omnibus calidis, est maxime calidus. Similiter etiam quantum ad virtutem gratiae, plene habuit gratiam, quia habuit eam ad omnes operationes vel effectus gratiae. Et hoc ideo, quia conferebatur ei gratia tanquam cuidam universali principio in genere habentium gratias. Virtus autem primi principii alicuius generis universaliter se extendit ad omnes effectus illius generis, sicut sol, qui est universalis causa generationis, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., eius virtus se extendit ad omnia quae sub generatione cadunt. Et sic secunda plenitudo gratiae attenditur in Christo, inquantum se extendit eius gratia ad omnes gratiae effectus, qui sunt virtutes et dona et alia huiusmodi. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod fides et spes nominant effectus gratiae cum quodam defectu qui est ex parte recipientis gratiam, inquantum scilicet fides est de non visis, et spes de non habitis. Unde non oportet quod in Christo, qui est auctor gratiae, fuerint defectus quos important fides et spes. Sed quidquid est perfectionis in fide et spe, est in Christo multo perfectius. Sicut in igne non sunt omnes modi caloris defectivi ex defectu subiecti, sed quidquid pertinet ad perfectionem caloris. Ad secundum dicendum quod ad gratiam operantem per se pertinet facere iustum, sed quod iustum faciat ex impio, hoc accidit ei ex parte subiecti, in quo peccatum invenitur. Anima Christi igitur iustificata est per gratiam operantem, inquantum per eam facta est iusta et sancta a principio suae conceptionis, non quod ante fuerit peccatrix, aut etiam non iusta.

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rational creatures, receives the greatest outpouring of His grace. Second, in His relation to the effect. For the soul of Christ so received grace, that, in a manner, it is poured out from it upon others. And hence it behooved Him to have the greatest grace; as fire which is the cause of heat in other hot things, is of all things the hottest.

Likewise, as regards the virtue of grace, He had grace fully, since He had it for all the operations and effects of grace; and this, because grace was bestowed on Him, as upon a universal principle in the genus of such as have grace. Now the virtue of the first principle of a genus universally extends itself to all the effects of that genus; thus the force of the sun, which is the universal cause of generation, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), extends to all things that come under generation. Hence the second fullness of grace is seen in Christ inasmuch as His grace extends to all the effects of grace, which are the virtues, gifts, and the like. Reply Obj. 1: Faith and hope signify effects of grace with certain defects on the part of the recipient of grace, inasmuch as faith is of the unseen, and hope of what is not yet possessed. Hence it was not necessary that in Christ, Who is the author of grace, there should be any defects such as faith and hope imply; but whatever perfection is in faith and hope was in Christ most perfectly; as in fire there are not all the modes of heat which are defective by the subject’s defect, but whatever belongs to the perfection of heat. Reply Obj. 2: It pertains essentially to operating grace to justify; but that it makes the ungodly to be just is accidental to it on the part of the subject, in which sin is found. Therefore the soul of Christ was justified by operating grace, inasmuch as it was rendered just and holy by it from the beginning of His conception; not that it was until then sinful, or even not just.

Article 10 Whether the fullness of grace is proper to Christ? Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod plenitudo gratiae non sit propria Christi. Quod enim est proprium alicui, sibi soli convenit. Sed esse plenum gratia quibusdam aliis attribuitur, dicitur enim, Luc. I, beatae virgini, ave, gratia plena, dominus tecum; dicitur etiam, Act. VI, Stephanus autem plenus gratia et fortitudine. Ergo plenitudo gratiae non est propria Christi. Praeterea, id quod potest communicari aliis per Christum, non videtur proprium Christo. Sed plenitudo gratiae potest communicari per Christum aliis, dicit enim apostolus, Ephes. III, ut impleamini in omnem ple-

Objection 1: It would seem that the fullness of grace is not proper to Christ. For what is proper to anyone belongs to him alone. But to be full of grace is attributed to some others; for it was said to the Blessed Virgin (Luke 1:28): Hail, full of grace, the Lord is with you; and again it is written (Acts 6:8): Stephen, full of grace and fortitude. Therefore the fullness of grace is not proper to Christ. Obj. 2: Further, what can be communicated to others through Christ does not seem to be proper to Christ. But the fullness of grace can be communicated to others through Christ, since the Apostle says (Eph 3:19): That you

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nitudinem Dei. Ergo plenitudo gratiae non est propria Christo. Praeterea, status viae videtur proportionari statui patriae. Sed in statu patriae erit quaedam plenitudo, quia in illa caelesti patria, ubi est plenitudo omnis boni, licet quaedam data sint excellenter, nihil tamen possidetur singulariter ut patet per Gregorium, in homilia de centum ovibus. Ergo in statu viae gratiae plenitudo habetur a singulis hominibus. Et ita plenitudo gratiae non est propria Christo.

Sed contra est quod plenitudo gratiae attribuitur Christo inquantum est unigenitus a patre, secundum illud Ioan. I, vidimus eum, quasi unigenitum a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis. Sed esse unigenitum a patre est proprium Christo. Ergo et sibi proprium est esse plenum gratiae et veritatis. Respondeo dicendum quod plenitudo gratiae potest attendi dupliciter, uno modo, ex parte ipsius gratiae; alio modo, ex parte habentis gratiam. Ex parte quidem ipsius gratiae, dicitur esse plenitudo ex eo quod aliquis pertingit ad summum gratiae et quantum ad essentiam et quantum ad virtutem, quia scilicet habet gratiam et in maxima excellentia qua potest haberi, et in maxima extensione ad omnes gratiae effectus. Et talis gratiae plenitudo est propria Christo. Ex parte vero subiecti, dicitur gratiae plenitudo quando aliquis habet plene gratiam secundum suam conditionem, sive secundum intensionem, prout in eo est intensa gratia usque ad terminum praefixum ei a Deo, secundum illud Ephes. IV, unicuique nostrum data est gratia secundum mensuram donationis Christi; sive etiam secundum virtutem, inquantum scilicet habet facultatem gratiae ad omnia quae pertinent ad suum statum sive officium, sicut apostolus dicebat, Ephes. III, mihi autem, omnium sanctorum minimo, data est gratia haec, illuminare homines, et cetera. Et talis gratiae plenitudo non est propria Christo, sed communicatur aliis per Christum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod beata virgo dicitur gratia plena, non ex parte ipsius gratiae, quia non habuit gratiam in summa excellentia qua potest haberi, nec ad omnes effectus gratiae, sed dicitur fuisse plena gratiae per comparationem ad ipsam, quia scilicet habebat gratiam sufficientem ad statum illum ad quem erat electa a Deo, ut scilicet esset mater Dei. Et similiter Stephanus dicitur plenus gratia, quia habebat gratiam sufficientem ad hoc quod esset idoneus minister et testis Dei, ad quod erat electus. Et eadem ratione dicendum est de aliis. Harum tamen plenitudinum una est plenior alia, secundum quod aliquis est divinitus praeordinatus ad altiorem vel inferiorem statum. Ad secundum dicendum quod apostolus ibi loquitur de illa plenitudine gratiae quae accipitur ex parte su-

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may be filled unto all the fullness of God. Therefore the fullness of grace is not proper to Christ. Obj. 3: Further, the state of the wayfarer seems to be proportioned to the state of the comprehensor. But in the state of the comprehensor there will be a certain fullness, since in our heavenly country with its fullness of all good, although some things are bestowed in a pre-eminent way, yet nothing is possessed singularly, as is clear from Gregory (Hom. De Cent. Ovib.; xxxiv in Ev.). Therefore in the state of the comprehensor the fullness of grace is possessed by everyone, and hence the fullness of grace is not proper to Christ. On the contrary, The fullness of grace is attributed to Christ inasmuch as He is the Only-begotten of the Father, according to John 1:14: We saw His glory as it were . . . the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. But to be the Only-begotten of the Father is proper to Christ. Therefore it is proper to Him to be full of grace and truth. I answer that, The fullness of grace may be taken in two ways: First, on the part of grace itself, or second on the part of the one who has grace. Now on the part of grace itself there is said to be the fullness of grace when the limit of grace is attained, as to essence and power, inasmuch as grace is possessed in its highest possible excellence and in its greatest possible extension to all its effects. And this fullness of grace is proper to Christ. But on the part of the subject there is said to be the fullness of grace when anyone fully possesses grace according to his condition—whether as regards intensity, by reason of grace being intense in him, to the limit assigned by God, according to Eph. 4:7: But to every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ—or as regards power, by reason of a man having the help of grace for all that belongs to his office or state, as the Apostle says (Eph 3:8): To me, the least of all the saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men. And this fullness of grace is not proper to Christ, but is communicated to others by Christ.

Reply Obj. 1: The Blessed Virgin is said to be full of grace, not on the part of grace itself—since she had not grace in its greatest possible excellence—nor for all the effects of grace; but she is said to be full of grace in reference to herself, i.e., inasmuch as she had sufficient grace for the state to which God had chosen her, i.e., to be the mother of His Only-begotten. So, too, Stephen is said to be full of grace, since he had sufficient grace to be a fit minister and witness of God, to which office he had been called. And the same must be said of others. Of these fulnesses one is greater than another, according as one is divinely preordained to a higher or lower state. Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle is there speaking of that fullness which has reference to the subject, in comparison

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biecti, in comparatione ad id ad quod homo est divinitus praeordinatus. Quod quidem est vel aliquid commune, ad quod praeordinantur omnes sancti, vel aliquid speciale, quod pertinet ad excellentiam aliquorum. Et secundum hoc, quaedam plenitudo gratiae est omnibus sanctis communis, ut scilicet habeant gratiam sufficientem ad merendum vitam aeternam, quae in plena Dei fruitione consistit. Et hanc plenitudinem optat apostolus fidelibus quibus scribit. Ad tertium dicendum quod illa dona quae sunt communia in patria, scilicet visio, comprehensio et fruitio, et alia huiusmodi, habent quaedam dona sibi correspondentia in statu viae, quae etiam sunt communia sanctis. Sunt tamen quaedam praerogativae sanctorum, in patria et in via, quae non habentur ab omnibus.

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with what man is divinely pre-ordained to; and this is either something in common, to which all the saints are preordained, or something special, which pertains to the preeminence of some. And in this manner a certain fullness of grace is common to all the saints, viz. to have grace enough to merit eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of God. And this is the fullness of grace which the Apostle desires for the faithful to whom he writes. Reply Obj. 3: These gifts which are in common in heaven, viz.: vision, possession and fruition, and the like, have certain gifts corresponding to them in this life which are also common to all the saints. Yet there are certain prerogatives of saints, both in heaven and on earth, which are not possessed by all.

Article 11 Whether the grace of Christ is infinite? Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia Christi sit infinita. Omne enim immensum est infinitum. Sed gratia Christi est immensa, dicitur enim Ioan. III, non enim ad mensuram dat Deus spiritum, scilicet Christo. Ergo gratia Christi est infinita. Praeterea, effectus infinitus demonstrat virtutem infinitam, quae non potest fundari nisi in essentia infinita. Sed effectus gratiae Christi est infinitus, extendit enim se ad salutem totius humani generis; ipse enim est propitiatio pro peccatis totius mundi, ut dicitur I Ioan. II. Ergo gratia Christi est infinita. Praeterea, omne finitum per additionem potest pervenire ad quantitatem cuiuscumque rei finitae. Si ergo gratia Christi est finita, posset alterius hominis gratia tantum crescere quod perveniret ad aequalitatem gratiae Christi. Contra quod dicitur Iob XXVIII, non adaequabitur ei aurum vel vitrum, secundum quod Gregorius ibi exponit. Ergo gratia Christi est infinita. Sed contra est quod gratia Christi est quiddam creatum in anima. Sed omne creatum est finitum, secundum illud Sap. XI, omnia in numero, pondere et mensura disposuisti. Ergo gratia Christi non est infinita. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, in Christo potest duplex gratia considerari. Una quidem est gratia unionis quae, sicut supra dictum est, est ipsum uniri personaliter filio Dei, quod est gratis concessum humanae naturae. Et hanc gratiam constat esse infinitam, secundum quod ipsa persona verbi est infinita. Alia vero est gratia habitualis. Quae quidem potest dupliciter considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod est quoddam ens. Et sic necesse est quod sit ens fini-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s grace is infinite. For everything immeasurable is infinite. But the grace of Christ is immeasurable; since it is written (John 3:34): For God doth not give the Spirit by measure to His Son, namely Christ. Therefore the grace of Christ is infinite. Obj. 2: Further, an infinite effect betokens an infinite power which can only spring from an infinite essence. But the effect of Christ’s grace is infinite, since it extends to the salvation of the whole human race; for He is the propitiation for our sins . . . and for those of the whole world, as is said (1 John 2:2). Therefore the grace of Christ is infinite. Obj. 3: Further, every finite thing by addition can attain to the quantity of any other finite thing. Therefore if the grace of Christ is finite the grace of any other man could increase to such an extent as to reach to an equality with Christ’s grace, against what is written (Job 28:17): Gold nor crystal cannot equal it, as Gregory expounds it (Moral. xviii). Therefore the grace of Christ is infinite. On the contrary, Grace is something created in the soul. But every created thing is finite, according to Wis. 11:21: Thou hast ordered all things in measure and number and weight. Therefore the grace of Christ is not infinite. I answer that, As was made clear above (Q. 2, A. 10), a twofold grace may be considered in Christ; the first being the grace of union, which, as was said (Q. 6, A. 6), is for Him to be personally united to the Son of God, which union has been bestowed gratis on the human nature; and it is clear that this grace is infinite, as the Person of God is infinite. The second is habitual grace; which may be taken in two ways: first as a being, and in this way it must be a finite being, since it is in the soul of Christ, as in a subject,

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tum. Est enim in anima Christi sicut in subiecto. Anima autem Christi est creatura quaedam, habens capacitatem finitam. Unde esse gratiae, cum non excedat suum subiectum, non potest esse infinitum. Alio modo potest considerari secundum propriam rationem gratiae. Et sic gratia ipsa potest dici infinita, eo quod non limitatur, quia scilicet habet quidquid potest pertinere ad rationem gratiae, et non datur ei secundum aliquam certam mensuram id quod ad rationem gratiae pertinet; eo quod, secundum propositum gratiae Dei, cuius est gratiam mensurare, gratia confertur animae Christi sicut cuidam universali principio gratificationis in humana natura, secundum illud Ephes. I, gratificavit nos in dilecto filio suo. Sicut si dicamus lucem solis esse infinitam, non quidem secundum suum esse, sed secundum rationem lucis, quia habet quidquid potest ad rationem lucis pertinere. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod id quod dicitur, pater non ad mensuram dat spiritum filio, uno modo exponitur de dono quod Deus pater ab aeterno dedit filio, scilicet divinam naturam, quae est donum infinitum. Unde quaedam Glossa dicit, ibidem, ut tantus sit filius quantus et pater. Alio modo, potest referri ad donum quod datum est humanae naturae, ut uniatur divinae personae, quod est donum infinitum. Unde Glossa dicit ibidem, sicut pater plenum et perfectum genuit verbum, sic plenum et perfectum est unitum humanae naturae. Tertio modo, potest referri ad gratiam habitualem, inquantum gratia Christi se extendit ad omnia quae sunt gratiae. Unde Augustinus, hoc exponens, dicit, mensura quaedam divisio donorum est, alii enim datur per spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae. Sed Christus, qui dat, non ad mensuram accepit. Ad secundum dicendum quod gratia Christi habet infinitum effectum tum propter infinitatem praedictam gratiae; tum propter unitatem divinae personae, cui anima Christi est unita. Ad tertium dicendum quod minus per augmentum potest pervenire ad quantitatem maioris in his quae habent quantitatem unius rationis. Sed gratia alterius hominis comparatur ad gratiam Christi sicut quaedam virtus particularis ad universalem. Unde sicut virtus ignis, quantumcumque crescat, non potest adaequari virtuti solis; ita gratia alterius hominis, quantumcumque crescat, non potest adaequari gratiae Christi.

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and Christ’s soul is a creature having a finite capacity; hence the being of grace cannot be infinite, since it cannot exceed its subject. Second it may be viewed in its specific nature of grace; and thus the grace of Christ can be termed infinite, since it is not limited, i.e., it has whatsoever can pertain to the nature of grace, and what pertains to the nature of grace is not bestowed on Him in a fixed measure; seeing that according to the purpose of God to Whom it pertains to measure grace, it is bestowed on Christ’s soul as on a universal principle for bestowing grace on human nature, according to Eph. 1:5, 6, He hath graced us in His beloved Son; thus we might say that the light of the sun is infinite, not indeed in being, but in the nature of light, as having whatever can pertain to the nature of light.

Reply Obj. 1: When it is said that the Father doth not give the Spirit by measure, it may be expounded of the gift which God the Father from all eternity gave the Son, viz. the Divine Nature, which is an infinite gift. Hence the comment of a certain gloss: So that the Son may be as great as the Father is. Or again, it may be referred to the gift which is given the human nature, to be united to the Divine Person, and this also is an infinite gift. Hence a gloss says on this text: As the Father begot a full and perfect Word, it is united thus full and perfect to human nature. Third, it may be referred to habitual grace, inasmuch as the grace of Christ extends to whatever belongs to grace. Hence Augustine expounding this (Tract. xiv in Joan.) says: The division of the gifts is a measurement. For to one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge. But Christ the giver does not receive by measure. Reply Obj. 2: The grace of Christ has an infinite effect, both because of the aforesaid infinity of grace, and because of the unity of the Divine Person, to Whom Christ’s soul is united. Reply Obj. 3: The lesser can attain by augment to the quantity of the greater, when both have the same kind of quantity. But the grace of any man is compared to the grace of Christ as a particular to a universal power; hence as the force of fire, no matter how much it increases, can never equal the sun’s strength, so the grace of a man, no matter how much it increases, can never equal the grace of Christ.

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Q. 7, A. 12

Article 12 Whether the grace of Christ could increase? Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia Christi potuerit augeri. Omni enim finito potest fieri additio. Sed gratia Christi finita fuit, ut dictum est. Ergo potuit augeri. Praeterea, augmentum gratiae fit per virtutem divinam, secundum illud II Cor. IX, potens est Deus omnem gratiam abundare facere in vobis. Sed virtus divina, cum sit infinita, nullo termino coarctatur. Ergo videtur quod gratia Christi potuerit esse maior. Praeterea, Luc. II dicitur quod puer Iesus proficiebat aetate, sapientia et gratia apud Deum et homines. Ergo gratia Christi potuit augeri. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. I, vidimus eum, quasi unigenitum a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis. Sed nihil potest esse aut intelligi maius quam quod aliquis sit unigenitus a patre. Ergo non potest esse, vel etiam intelligi, maior gratia quam illa qua Christus fuit plenus. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquam formam non posse augeri contingit dupliciter, uno modo, ex parte ipsius subiecti; alio modo, ex parte illius formae. Ex parte quidem subiecti, quando subiectum attingit ad ultimum in participatione ipsius formae secundum suum modum sicut si dicatur quod aer non potest crescere in caliditate, quando pertingit ad ultimum gradum caloris qui potest salvari in natura aeris; licet possit esse maior calor in rerum natura, qui est calor ignis. Ex parte autem formae excluditur possibilitas augmenti quando aliquod subiectum attingit ad ultimam perfectionem qua potest talis forma haberi, sicut si dicamus quod calor ignis non potest augeri, quia non potest esse perfectior gradus caloris quam ille ad quem pertingit ignis. Sicut autem aliarum formarum est ex divina sapientia determinata propria mensura, ita et gratiae, secundum illud Sap. XI, omnia in numero, pondere et mensura disposuisti. Mensura autem unicuique formae praefigitur per comparationem ad suum finem, sicut non est maior gravitas quam gravitas terrae, quia non potest esse inferior locus loco terrae. Finis autem gratiae est unio creaturae rationalis ad Deum. Non potest autem esse, nec intelligi, maior unio creaturae rationalis ad Deum quam quae est in persona. Et ideo gratia Christi pertingit usque ad summam mensuram gratiae. Sic ergo manifestum est quod gratia Christi non potuit augeri ex parte ipsius gratiae. Sed neque ex parte ipsius subiecti. Quia Christus, secundum quod homo, a primo instanti suae conceptionis fuit verus et plenus comprehensor. Unde in eo non potuit esse gratiae augmentum, sicut nec in aliis beatis, quorum gratia augeri non potest, eo quod sunt in termino. Hominum vero qui sunt pure viatores, gratia potest augeri et ex par-

Objection 1: It would seem that the grace of Christ could increase. For to every finite thing addition can be made. But the grace of Christ was finite. Therefore it could increase. Obj. 2: Further, it is by Divine power that grace is increased, according to 2 Cor. 9:8: And God is able to make all grace abound in you. But the Divine power, being infinite, is confined by no limits. Therefore it seems that the grace of Christ could have been greater. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Luke 2:52) that the child Jesus advanced in wisdom and age and grace with God and men. Therefore the grace of Christ could increase. On the contrary, It is written (John 1:14): We saw His glory as it were . . . the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. But nothing can be or can be thought greater than that anyone should be the Only-begotten of the Father. Therefore no greater grace can be or can be thought than that of which Christ was full. I answer that, For a form to be incapable of increase happens in two ways: First on the part of the subject; second, on the part of the form itself. On the part of the subject, indeed, when the subject reaches the utmost limit wherein it partakes of this form, after its own manner, e.g., if we say that air cannot increase in heat, when it has reached the utmost limit of heat which can exist in the nature of air, although there may be greater heat in actual existence, viz. the heat of fire. But on the part of the form, the possibility of increase is excluded when a subject reaches the utmost perfection which this form can have by nature, e.g., if we say the heat of fire cannot be increased because there cannot be a more perfect grade of heat than that to which fire attains. Now the proper measure of grace, like that of other forms, is determined by the Divine wisdom, according to Wis. 11:21: Thou hast ordered all things in number, weight and measure. And it is with reference to its end that a measure is set to every form, as there is no greater gravity than that of the earth, because there is no lower place than that of the earth. Now the end of grace is the union of the rational creature with God. But there can neither be nor be thought a greater union of the rational creature with God than that which is in the Person. And hence the grace of Christ reached the highest measure of grace. Hence it is clear that the grace of Christ cannot be increased on the part of grace. But neither can it be increased on the part of the subject, since Christ as man was a true and full comprehensor from the first instant of His conception. Hence there could have been no increase of grace in Him, as there could be none in the rest of the blessed, whose grace could not increase, seeing that they have reached their last end. But as regards men who are

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te formae, quia non attingunt summum gratiae gradum, wholly wayfarers, their grace can be increased not merely et ex parte subiecti, quia nondum pervenerunt ad termi- on the part of the form, since they have not attained the num. highest degree of grace, but also on the part of the subject, since they have not yet attained their end. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si loquamur de Reply Obj. 1: If we speak of mathematical quantity, quantitatibus mathematicae, cuilibet finitae quantitati addition can be made to any finite quantity, since there is potest fieri additio, quia ex parte quantitatis finitae non nothing on the part of finite quantity which is repugnant est aliquid quod repugnet additioni. Si vero loquamur de to addition. But if we speak of natural quantity, there may quantitate naturali, sic potest esse repugnantia ex par- be repugnance on the part of the form to which a deterte formae, cui debetur determinata quantitas, sicut et mined quantity is due, even as other accidents are deteralia accidentia determinata. Unde philosophus dicit II de mined. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 41) that anima, quod omnium natura constantium est terminus et there is naturally a term of all things, and a fixed limit of ratio magnitudinis et augmenti. Et inde est quod quanti- magnitude and increase. And hence to the quantity of the tati totius caeli non potest fieri additio. Multo igitur ma- whole there can be no addition. And still more must we gis in ipsis formis consideratur aliquis terminus, ultra suppose a term in the forms themselves, beyond which they quem non transgrediuntur. Et propter hoc, non oportuit may not go. Hence it is not necessary that addition should quod gratiae Christi posset fieri additio, quamvis sit fini- be capable of being made to Christ’s grace, although it is fita secundum sui essentiam. nite in its essence. Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet virtus divina Reply Obj. 2: Although the Divine power can make posset facere aliquid maius et melius quam sit habitualis something greater and better than the habitual grace of gratia Christi, non tamen posset facere quod ordinaretur Christ, yet it could not make it to be ordained to anything ad aliquid maius quam sit unio personalis ad filium uni- greater than the personal union with the Only-begotten genitum a patre, cui unioni sufficienter correspondet ta- Son of the Father; and to this union, by the purpose of the lis mensura gratiae secundum definitionem divinae sa- Divine wisdom, the measure of grace is sufficient. pientiae. Ad tertium dicendum quod in sapientia et gratia Reply Obj. 3: Anyone may increase in wisdom and aliquis potest proficere dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum grace in two ways. First inasmuch as the very habits of wisipsos habitus sapientiae et gratiae augmentatos. Et sic dom and grace are increased; and in this way Christ did Christus in eis non proficiebat. Alio modo, secundum ef- not increase. Second, as regards the effects, i.e., inasmuch fectus, inquantum scilicet aliquis sapientiora et virtuo- as they do wiser and greater works; and in this way Christ siora opera facit. Et sic Christus proficiebat sapientia et increased in wisdom and grace even as in age, since in the gratia, sicut et aetate, quia secundum processum aeta- course of time He did more perfect works, to prove Himtis perfectiora opera faciebat, ut se verum hominem de- self true man, both in the things of God, and in the things monstraret, et in his quae sunt ad Deum et in his quae of man. sunt ad homines.

Article 13 Whether the habitual grace of Christ followed after the union? Ad decimumtertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia habitualis in Christo non subsequatur unionem. Idem enim non sequitur ad seipsum. Sed haec gratia habitualis videtur eadem esse cum gratia unionis, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Praedest. sanctorum, ea gratia fit ab initio fidei suae homo quicumque Christianus, qua gratia homo ille ab initio suo factus est Christus; quorum duorum primum pertinet ad gratiam habitualem, secundum ad gratiam unionis. Ergo videtur quod gratia habitualis non subsequatur unionem. Praeterea, dispositio praecedit perfectionem tempore, vel saltem intellectu. Sed gratia habitualis videtur esse sicut quaedam dispositio humanae naturae ad

Objection 1: It would seem that the habitual grace did not follow after the union. For nothing follows itself. But this habitual grace seems to be the same as the grace of union; for Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv): Every man becomes a Christian from the beginning of his belief, by the same grace whereby this Man from His beginning became Christ; and of these two the first pertains to habitual grace and the second to the grace of union. Therefore it would seem that habitual grace did not follow upon the union. Obj. 2: Further, disposition precedes perfection, if not in time, at least in thought. But the habitual grace seems to be a disposition in human nature for the personal union.

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unionem personalem. Ergo videtur quod gratia habitualis non subsequatur unionem, sed magis praecedat. Praeterea, commune est prius proprio. Sed gratia habitualis est communis Christo et aliis hominibus, gratia autem unionis est propria Christo. Ergo prior est, secundum intellectum, gratia habitualis quam ipsa unio. Non ergo sequitur eam. Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae XLII, ecce servus meus, suscipiam eum, et postea sequitur, dedi spiritum meum super eum, quod quidem ad donum gratiae habitualis pertinet. Unde relinquitur quod susceptio naturae humanae in unione personae praecedat gratiam habitualem in Christo. Respondeo dicendum quod unio humanae naturae ad divinam personam, quam supra diximus esse ipsam gratiam unionis, praecedit gratiam habitualem in Christo, non ordine temporis, sed naturae et intellectus. Et hoc triplici ratione. Primo quidem, secundum ordinem principiorum utriusque. Principium enim unionis est persona filii assumens humanam naturam, quae secundum hoc dicitur missa esse in mundum quod humanam naturam assumpsit. Principium autem gratiae habitualis, quae cum caritate datur, est Spiritus Sanctus, qui secundum hoc dicitur mitti quod per caritatem mentem inhabitat. Missio autem filii, secundum ordinem naturae, prior est missione spiritus sancti, sicut ordine naturae Spiritus Sanctus procedit a filio et a patre dilectio. Unde et unio personalis, secundum quam intelligitur missio filii, est prior, ordine naturae, gratia habituali, secundum quam intelligitur missio spiritus sancti. Secundo, accipitur ratio huius ordinis ex habitudine gratiae ad suam causam. Gratia enim causatur in homine ex praesentia divinitatis, sicut lumen in aere ex praesentia solis, unde dicitur Ezech. XLIII, gloria Dei Israel ingrediebatur per viam Orientalem, et terra splendebat a maiestate eius. Praesentia autem Dei in Christo intelligitur secundum unionem humanae naturae ad divinam personam. Unde gratia habitualis Christi intelligitur ut consequens hanc unionem, sicut splendor solem. Tertia ratio huius ordinis assumi potest ex fine gratiae. Ordinatur enim ad bene agendum. Actiones autem sunt suppositorum et individuorum. Unde actio, et per consequens gratia ad ipsam ordinans, praesupponit hypostasim operantem. Hypostasis autem non praesupponitur in humana natura ante unionem, ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo gratia unionis, secundum intellectum, praecedit gratiam habitualem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ibi gratiam nominat gratuitam Dei voluntatem gratis beneficia largientem. Et propter hoc eadem gratia dicit hominem quemcumque fieri Christianum qua gratia factus est Christus homo, quia utrumque gratuita Dei voluntate, absque meritis, factum est.

Q. 7, A. 13

Therefore it seems that the habitual grace did not follow but rather preceded the union. Obj. 3: Further, the common precedes the proper. But habitual grace is common to Christ and other men; and the grace of union is proper to Christ. Therefore habitual grace is prior in thought to the union. Therefore it does not follow it. On the contrary, It is written (Isa 42:1): Behold my servant, I will uphold Him . . . and farther on: I have given My Spirit upon Him; and this pertains to the gift of habitual grace. Hence it remains that the assumption of human nature to the unity of the Person preceded the habitual grace of Christ. I answer that, The union of the human nature with the Divine Person, which, as we have said above (Q. 2, A. 10; Q. 6, A. 6), is the grace of union, precedes the habitual grace of Christ, not in order of time, but by nature and in thought; and this for a triple reason: First, with reference to the order of the principles of both. For the principle of the union is the Person of the Son assuming human nature, Who is said to be sent into the world, inasmuch as He assumed human nature; but the principle of habitual grace, which is given with charity, is the Holy Spirit, Who is said to be sent inasmuch as He dwells in the mind by charity. Now the mission of the Son is prior, in the order of nature, to the mission of the Holy Spirit, even as in the order of nature the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, and love from wisdom. Hence the personal union, according to which the mission of the Son took place, is prior in the order of nature to habitual grace, according to which the mission of the Holy Spirit takes place. Second, the reason of this order may be taken from the relation of grace to its cause. For grace is caused in man by the presence of the Godhead, as light in the air by the presence of the sun. Hence it is written (Ezek 43:2): The glory of the God of Israel came in by the way of the east . . . and the earth shone with His majesty. But the presence of God in Christ is by the union of human nature with the Divine Person. Hence the habitual grace of Christ is understood to follow this union, as light follows the sun. Third, the reason of this order can be taken from the end of grace, since it is ordained to acting rightly, and action belongs to the suppositum and the individual. Hence action and, in consequence, grace ordaining thereto, presuppose the hypostasis which operates. Now the hypostasis did not exist in the human nature before the union, as is clear from Q. 4, A. 2. Therefore the grace of union precedes, in thought, habitual grace. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine here means by grace the gratuitous will of God, bestowing benefits gratis; and hence every man is said to be made a Christian by the same grace whereby a Man became Christ, since both take place by the gratuitous will of God without merits.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dispositio in via generationis praecedit perfectionem ad quam disposuit in his quae successive perficiuntur, ita naturaliter perfectionem sequitur quam aliquis iam consecutus est, sicut calor, qui fuit dispositio ad formam ignis, est effectus profluens a forma ignis iam praeexistentis. Humana autem natura in Christo unita est personae verbi a principio absque successione. Unde gratia habitualis non intelligitur ut praecedens unionem, sed ut consequens eam, sicut quaedam proprietas naturalis. Unde et Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod gratia est quodammodo Christo homini naturalis. Ad tertium dicendum quod commune est prius proprio si utrumque sit unius generis, sed in his quae sunt diversorum generum, nihil prohibet proprium prius esse communi. Gratia autem unionis non est in genere gratiae habitualis, sed est super omne genus, sicut et ipsa divina persona. Unde hoc proprium nihil prohibet esse prius communi, quia non se habet per additionem ad commune, sed potius est principium et origo eius quod commune est.

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Reply Obj. 2: As disposition in the order of generation precedes the perfection to which it disposes, in such things as are gradually perfected; so it naturally follows the perfection which one has already obtained; as heat, which was a disposition to the form of fire, is an effect flowing from the form of already existing fire. Now the human nature in Christ is united to the Person of the Word from the beginning without succession. Hence habitual grace is not understood to have preceded the union, but to have followed it; as a natural property. Hence, as Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): Grace is in a manner natural to the Man Christ. Reply Obj. 3: The common precedes the proper, when both are of the same genus; but when they are of diverse genera, there is nothing to prevent the proper being prior to the common. Now the grace of union is not in the same genus as habitual grace; but is above all genera even as the Divine Person Himself. Hence there is nothing to prevent this proper from being before the common since it does not result from something being added to the common, but is rather the principle and source of that which is common.

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Question 8 The Grace of Christ, as He is the Head of the Church Deinde considerandum est de gratia Christi secunWe must now consider the grace of Christ as the Head dum quod est caput Ecclesiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur of the Church; and under this head there are eight points of octo. inquiry: Primo, utrum Christus sit caput Ecclesiae. (1) Whether Christ is the Head of the Church? Secundo, utrum sit caput hominum quantum ad (2) Whether He is the Head of men as regards their corpus, vel solum quantum ad animas. bodies or only as regards their souls? Tertio, utrum sit caput omnium hominum. (3) Whether He is the Head of all men? Quarto, utrum sit caput Angelorum. (4) Whether He is the Head of the angels? Quinto, utrum gratia secundum quam est caput (5) Whether the grace of Christ as Head of the Church Ecclesiae, sit eadem cum habituali eius is the same as His habitual grace as an individual secundum quod est quidam homo singularis. man? Sexto, utrum esse caput Ecclesiae sit proprium (6) Whether to be Head of the Church is proper to Christo. Christ? Septimo, utrum Diabolus sit caput omnium (7) Whether the devil is the head of all the wicked? malorum. Octavo, utrum Antichristus etiam possit dici caput (8) Whether Antichrist can be called the head of all the omnium malorum. wicked?

Article 1 Whether Christ, as man, is the head of the Church? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christo, secundum quod est homo, non competat esse caput Ecclesiae. Caput enim influit sensum et motum in membra. Sensus autem et motus spiritualis, qui est per gratiam, non influitur nobis a Christo homine, quia, sicut dicit Augustinus, in XV de Trin., nec etiam Christus, secundum quod est homo, dat spiritum sanctum, sed solum inquantum est Deus. Ergo ei, secundum quod est homo, non competit esse caput Ecclesiae. Praeterea, capitis non videtur esse aliud caput. Sed Christi, secundum quod est homo, caput est Deus, secundum illud I Cor. XI, caput Christi Deus. Ergo ipse Christus non est caput. Praeterea, caput in homine est quoddam particulare membrum influentiam recipiens a corde. Sed Christus est universale principium totius Ecclesiae. Ergo non est Ecclesiae caput. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ephes. I, ipsum dedit caput super omnem Ecclesiam. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut tota Ecclesia dicitur unum corpus mysticum per similitudinem ad naturale corpus hominis, quod secundum diversa membra habet diversos actus, ut apostolus docet, Rom. XII et I Cor. XII; ita Christus dicitur caput Ecclesiae secun-

Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to Christ as man to be Head of the Church. For the head imparts sense and motion to the members. Now spiritual sense and motion which are by grace, are not imparted to us by the Man Christ, because, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 12; xv, 24), not even Christ, as man, but only as God, bestows the Holy Spirit. Therefore it does not belong to Him as man to be Head of the Church. Obj. 2: Further, it is not fitting for the head to have a head. But God is the Head of Christ, as man, according to 1 Cor. 11:3, The Head of Christ is God. Therefore Christ Himself is not a head. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the head of a man is a particular member, receiving an influx from the heart. But Christ is the universal principle of the whole Church. Therefore He is not the Head of the Church. On the contrary, It is written (Eph 1:22): And He . . . hath made Him head over all the Church. I answer that, As the whole Church is termed one mystic body from its likeness to the natural body of a man, which in diverse members has diverse acts, as the Apostle teaches (Rom 12; 1 Cor 12), so likewise Christ is called the Head of the Church from a likeness with the human head,

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dum similitudinem humani capitis. In quo tria possumus considerare, scilicet ordinem, perfectionem et virtutem. Ordinem, quia caput est prima pars hominis, incipiendo a superiori. Et inde est quod omne principium consuevit vocari caput, secundum illud Ierem. II, ad omne caput viae posuisti lupanar tibi. Perfectionem autem, quia in capite vigent omnes sensus et interiores et exteriores, cum in ceteris membris sit solus tactus. Et inde est quod dicitur Isaiae IX, senex et honorabilis ipse est caput. Virtutem vero, quia virtus et motus ceterorum membrorum, et gubernatio eorum in suis actibus, est a capite, propter vim sensitivam et motivam ibi dominantem. Unde et rector dicitur caput populi, secundum illud I Reg. XV, cum esses parvulus in oculis tuis, caput in tribubus Israel factus es. Haec autem tria competunt Christo spiritualiter. Primo enim, secundum propinquitatem ad Deum gratia eius altior et prior est, etsi non tempore, quia omnes alii acceperunt gratiam per respectum ad gratiam ipsius, secundum illud Rom. VIII, quos praescivit, hos et praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis filii sui, ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus. Secundo vero, perfectionem habet quantum ad plenitudinem omnium gratiarum, secundum illud Ioan. I, vidimus eum plenum gratiae et veritatis, ut supra ostensum est. Tertio, virtutem habuit influendi gratiam in omnia membra Ecclesiae, secundum illud Ioan. I, de plenitudine eius omnes accepimus. Et sic patet quod convenienter dicitur Christus caput Ecclesiae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dare gratiam aut spiritum sanctum convenit Christo secundum quod Deus, auctoritative, sed instrumentaliter ei convenit secundum quod est homo, inquantum scilicet eius humanitas fuit instrumentum divinitatis eius. Et ita actiones ipsius ex virtute divinitatis fuerunt nobis salutiferae, utpote gratiam in nobis causantes, et per meritum et per efficientiam quandam. Augustinus autem negat Christum, secundum quod est homo, dare spiritum sanctum per auctoritatem. Instrumentaliter autem, sive ministerialiter, etiam alii sancti dicuntur dare spiritum sanctum, secundum illud Galat. III, qui tribuit vobis spiritum sanctum, et cetera. Ad secundum dicendum quod in metaphoricis locutionibus non oportet attendi similitudinem quantum ad omnia, sic enim non esset similitudo, sed rei veritas. Capitis igitur naturalis non est caput aliud, quia corpus humanum non est pars alterius corporis. Sed corpus similitudinarie dictum, idest aliqua multitudo ordinata, est pars alterius multitudinis, sicut multitudo domestica est pars multitudinis civilis. Et ideo paterfamilias, qui est caput multitudinis domesticae, habet super se caput rectorem civitatis. Et per hunc modum nihil prohibet caput Christi esse Deum, cum tamen ipse sit caput Ecclesiae. Ad tertium dicendum quod caput habet manifestam eminentiam respectu exteriorum membrorum, sed

IIIae

in which we may consider three things, viz. order, perfection, and power. Order, indeed; for the head is the first part of man, beginning from the higher part; and hence it is that every principle is usually called a head according to Ezech. 16:25: At every head of the way, thou hast set up a sign of thy prostitution. Perfection, inasmuch as in the head dwell all the senses, both interior and exterior, whereas in the other members there is only touch, and hence it is said (Isa 9:15): The aged and honorable, he is the head. Power, because the power and movement of the other members, together with the direction of them in their acts, is from the head, by reason of the sensitive and motive power there ruling; hence the ruler is called the head of a people, according to 1 Kings 15:17: When thou wast a little one in thy own eyes, wast thou not made the head of the tribes of Israel? Now these three things belong spiritually to Christ. First, on account of His nearness to God His grace is the highest and first, though not in time, since all have received grace on account of His grace, according to Rom. 8:29: For whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son; that He might be the first-born amongst many brethren. Second, He had perfection as regards the fullness of all graces, according to John 1:14, We saw His glory . . . full of grace and truth, as was shown (Q. 7, A. 9). Third, He has the power of bestowing grace on all the members of the Church, according to John 1:16: Of His fullness we have all received. And thus it is plain that Christ is fittingly called the Head of the Church. Reply Obj. 1: To give grace or the Holy Spirit belongs to Christ as He is God, authoritatively; but instrumentally it belongs also to Him as man, inasmuch as His manhood is the instrument of His Godhead. And hence by the power of the Godhead His actions were beneficial, i.e., by causing grace in us, both meritoriously and efficiently. But Augustine denies that Christ as man gives the Holy Spirit authoritatively. Even other saints are said to give the Holy Spirit instrumentally, or ministerially, according to Gal. 3:5: He . . . who giveth to you the Spirit.

Reply Obj. 2: In metaphorical speech we must not expect a likeness in all respects; for thus there would be not likeness but identity. Accordingly a natural head has not another head because one human body is not part of another; but a metaphorical body, i.e., an ordered multitude, is part of another multitude as the domestic multitude is part of the civil multitude; and hence the father who is head of the domestic multitude has a head above him, i.e., the civil governor. And hence there is no reason why God should not be the Head of Christ, although Christ Himself is Head of the Church. Reply Obj. 3: The head has a manifest pre-eminence over the other exterior members; but the heart has a cer-

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cor habet quandam influentiam occultam. Et ideo cordi comparatur Spiritus Sanctus, qui invisibiliter Ecclesiam vivificat et unit, capiti comparatur Christus, secundum visibilem naturam, qua homo hominibus praefertur.

Q. 8, A. 2

tain hidden influence. And hence the Holy Spirit is likened to the heart, since He invisibly quickens and unifies the Church; but Christ is likened to the Head in His visible nature in which man is set over man.

Article 2 Whether Christ is the head of men as to their bodies? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non sit caput hominum quantum ad corpora. Christus enim dicitur caput Ecclesiae inquantum influit spiritualem sensum et motum gratiae in Ecclesiam. Sed huius spiritualis sensus et motus capax non est corpus. Ergo non est caput hominum secundum corpora. Praeterea, secundum corpora communicamus cum brutis. Si ergo Christus esset caput hominum quantum ad corpora, sequeretur quod etiam esset caput brutorum animalium. Quod est inconveniens. Praeterea, Christus corpus suum ab aliis hominibus traxit, ut patet Matth. I et Luc. III. Sed caput est primum inter cetera membra, ut dictum est. Ergo Christus non est caput Ecclesiae quantum ad corpora. Sed contra est quod dicitur Philipp. III, reformabit corpus humilitatis nostrae, configuratum corpori claritatis suae. Respondeo dicendum quod corpus humanum habet naturalem ordinem ad animam rationalem, quae est propria forma eius et motor. Et inquantum quidem est forma eius, recipit ab anima vitam et ceteras proprietates convenientes humano corpori secundum suam speciem. Inquantum vero anima est motor corporis, corpus instrumentaliter servit animae. Sic ergo dicendum quod habet vim influendi Christi humanitas inquantum est coniuncta Dei verbo, cui corpus unitur per animam, ut supra dictum est. Unde tota Christi humanitas, secundum scilicet animam et corpus, influit in homines et quantum ad animam et quantum ad corpus, sed principaliter quantum ad animam; secundario quantum ad corpus. Uno modo, inquantum membra corporis exhibentur arma iustitiae in anima existenti per Christum, ut apostolus dicit, Rom. VI. Alio modo, inquantum vita gloriae ab anima derivatur ad corpus, secundum illud Rom. VIII, qui suscitavit Iesum a mortuis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra, propter inhabitantem spiritum eius in vobis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensus spiritualis gratiae non pervenit quidem ad corpus primo et principaliter, sed secundario et instrumentaliter, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod corpus animalis bruti nullam habitudinem habet ad animam rationalem, sicut habet corpus humanum. Et ideo non est simile.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not the Head of men as to their bodies. For Christ is said to be the Head of the Church inasmuch as He bestows spiritual sense and the movement of grace on the Church. But a body is not capable of this spiritual sense and movement. Therefore Christ is not the Head of men as regards their bodies. Obj. 2: Further, we share bodies with the brutes. If therefore Christ was the Head of men as to their bodies, it would follow that He was the Head of brute animals; and this is not fitting. Obj. 3: Further, Christ took His body from other men, as is clear from Matt. 1 and Luke 3. But the head is the first of the members, as was said above (A. 1, ad 3). Therefore Christ is not the Head of the Church as regards bodies. On the contrary, It is written (Phil 3:21): Who will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of His glory. I answer that, The human body has a natural relation to the rational soul, which is its proper form and motor. Inasmuch as the soul is its form, it receives from the soul life and the other properties which belong specifically to man; but inasmuch as the soul is its motor, the body serves the soul instrumentally. Therefore we must hold that the manhood of Christ had the power of influence, inasmuch as it is united to the Word of God, to Whom His body is united through the soul, as stated above (Q. 6, A. 1). Hence the whole manhood of Christ, i.e., according to soul and body, influences all, both in soul and body; but principally the soul, and secondarily the body. First, inasmuch as the members of the body are presented as instruments of justice in the soul that lives through Christ, as the Apostle says (Rom 6:13). Second, inasmuch as the life of glory flows from the soul on to the body, according to Rom. 8:11: He that raised up Jesus from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in you.

Reply Obj. 1: The spiritual sense of grace does not reach to the body first and principally, but secondarily and instrumentally, as was said above. Reply Obj. 2: The body of an animal has no relation to a rational soul, as the human body has. Hence there is no parity.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet Christus traxerit Reply Obj. 3: Although Christ drew the matter of His materiam corporis ab aliis hominibus, vitam tamen im- body from other men, yet all draw from Him the immortal mortalem corporis omnes homines trahunt ab ipso, se- life of their body, according to 1 Cor. 15:22: And as in Adam cundum illud I Cor. XV, sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive. ita in Christo omnes vivificabuntur.

Article 3 Whether Christ is the head of all men? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non sit caput omnium hominum. Caput enim non habet relationem nisi ad membra sui corporis. Infideles autem nullo modo sunt membra Ecclesiae, quae est corpus Christi, ut dicitur Ephes. I. Ergo Christus non est caput omnium hominum. Praeterea, apostolus dicit, Ephes. V, quod Christus tradidit semetipsum pro Ecclesia, ut ipse sibi exhiberet Ecclesiam gloriosam, non habentem maculam aut rugam aut aliquid huiusmodi. Sed multi sunt, etiam fideles, in quibus invenitur macula aut ruga peccati. Ergo nec erit omnium fidelium Christus caput. Praeterea, sacramenta veteris legis comparantur ad Christum sicut umbra ad corpus, ut dicitur Coloss. II. Sed patres veteris testamenti sacramentis illis suo tempore serviebant, secundum illud Heb. VIII, exemplari et umbrae deserviunt caelestium. Non ergo pertinebant ad corpus Christi. Et ita Christus non est caput omnium hominum. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Tim. IV, salvator omnium est, et maxime fidelium. Et I Ioan. II, ipse est propitiatio pro peccatis nostris, non autem pro nostris tantum, sed etiam pro totius mundi. Salvare autem homines, aut propitiatorem esse pro peccatis eorum, competit Christo secundum quod est caput. Ergo Christus est caput omnium hominum. Respondeo dicendum quod haec est differentia inter corpus hominis naturale et corpus Ecclesiae mysticum, quod membra corporis naturalis sunt omnia simul, membra autem corporis mystici non sunt omnia simul, neque quantum ad esse naturae, quia corpus Ecclesiae constituitur ex hominibus qui fuerunt a principio mundi usque ad finem ipsius; neque etiam quantum ad esse gratiae, quia eorum etiam qui sunt in uno tempore, quidam gratia carent postmodum habituri, aliis eam iam habentibus. Sic igitur membra corporis mystici non solum accipiuntur secundum quod sunt in actu, sed etiam secundum quod sunt in potentia. Quaedam tamen sunt in potentia quae nunquam reducuntur ad actum, quaedam vero quae quandoque reducuntur ad actum, secundum hunc triplicem gradum, quorum unus est per fidem, secundus per caritatem viae, tertius per fruitionem pa-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not the Head of all men. For the head has no relation except to the members of its body. Now the unbaptized are nowise members of the Church which is the body of Christ, as it is written (Eph 1:23). Therefore Christ is not the Head of all men. Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle writes to the Ephesians (5:25, 27): Christ delivered Himself up for the Church that He might present it to Himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing. But there are many of the faithful in whom is found the spot or the wrinkle of sin. Therefore Christ is not the Head of all the faithful. Obj. 3: Further, the sacraments of the Old Law are compared to Christ as the shadow to the body, as is written (Col 2:17). But the fathers of the Old Testament in their day served unto these sacraments, according to Heb. 8:5: Who serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things. Hence they did not pertain to Christ’s body, and therefore Christ is not the Head of all men. On the contrary, It is written: Who is the Savior of all men, especially of the faithful (1 Tim 4:10), and, He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world (1 John 2:2). Now to save men and to be a propitiation for their sins belongs to Christ as Head. Therefore Christ is the Head of all men. I answer that, This is the difference between the natural body of man and the Church’s mystical body, that the members of the natural body are all together, and the members of the mystical are not all together—neither as regards their natural being, since the body of the Church is made up of the men who have been from the beginning of the world until its end—nor as regards their supernatural being, since, of those who are at any one time, some there are who are without grace, yet will afterwards obtain it, and some have it already. We must therefore consider the members of the mystical body not only as they are in act, but as they are in potentiality. Nevertheless, some are in potentiality who will never be reduced to act, and some are reduced at some time to act; and this according to the triple class, of which the first is by faith, the second by the charity of this life, the third by the fruition of the life to come. Hence

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triae. Sic ergo dicendum est quod, accipiendo generaliter secundum totum tempus mundi, Christus est caput omnium hominum, sed secundum diversos gradus. Primo enim et principaliter est caput eorum qui actu uniuntur sibi per gloriam. Secundo, eorum qui actu uniuntur sibi per caritatem. Tertio, eorum qui actu uniuntur sibi per fidem. Quarto vero, eorum qui sibi uniuntur solum potentia nondum ad actum reducta, quae tamen est ad actum reducenda, secundum divinam praedestinationem. Quinto vero, eorum qui in potentia sibi sunt uniti quae nunquam reducetur ad actum, sicut homines in hoc mundo viventes qui non sunt praedestinati. Qui tamen, ex hoc mundo recedentes, totaliter desinunt esse membra Christi, quia iam nec sunt in potentia ut Christo uniantur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illi qui sunt infideles, etsi actu non sint de Ecclesia, sunt tamen in potentia. Quae quidem potentia in duobus fundatur, primo quidem et principaliter, in virtute Christi, quae sufficiens est ad salutem totius humani generis; secundario, in arbitrii libertate. Ad secundum dicendum quod esse Ecclesiam gloriosam, non habentem maculam neque rugam, est ultimus finis, ad quem perducimur per passionem Christi. Unde hoc erit in statu patriae, non autem in statu viae, in quo, si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, nosmetipsos seducimus, ut dicitur I Ioan. I. Sunt tamen quaedam, scilicet mortalia, quibus carent illi qui sunt membra Christi per actualem unionem caritatis. Qui vero his peccatis subduntur, non sunt membra Christi actualiter, sed potentialiter, nisi forte imperfecte, per fidem informem, quae unit Christo secundum quid et non simpliciter ut scilicet per Christum homo assequatur vitam gratiae; fides enim sine operibus mortua est, ut dicitur Iac. II. Percipiunt tamen tales a Christo quendam actum vitae, qui est credere, sicut si membrum mortificatum moveatur aliqualiter ab homine. Ad tertium dicendum quod sancti patres non insistebant sacramentis legalibus tanquam quibusdam rebus, sed sicut imaginibus et umbris futurorum. Idem autem est motus in imaginem, inquantum est imago, et in rem, ut patet per philosophum, in libro de memoria et reminiscentia. Et ideo antiqui patres, servando legalia sacramenta, ferebantur in Christum per fidem et dilectionem eandem qua et nos in ipsum ferimur. Et ita patres antiqui pertinebant ad idem corpus Ecclesiae ad quod nos pertinemus.

Q. 8, A. 3

we must say that if we take the whole time of the world in general, Christ is the Head of all men, but diversely. For, first and principally, He is the Head of such as are united to Him by glory; second, of those who are actually united to Him by charity; third, of those who are actually united to Him by faith; fourth, of those who are united to Him merely in potentiality, which is not yet reduced to act, yet will be reduced to act according to Divine predestination; fifth, of those who are united to Him in potentiality, which will never be reduced to act; such are those men existing in the world, who are not predestined, who, however, on their departure from this world, wholly cease to be members of Christ, as being no longer in potentiality to be united to Christ. Reply Obj. 1: Those who are unbaptized, though not actually in the Church, are in the Church potentially. And this potentiality is rooted in two things—first and principally, in the power of Christ, which is sufficient for the salvation of the whole human race; second, in free-will. Reply Obj. 2: To be a glorious Church not having spot or wrinkle is the ultimate end to which we are brought by the Passion of Christ. Hence this will be in heaven, and not on earth, in which if we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, as is written (1 John 1:8). Nevertheless, there are some, viz. mortal, sins from which they are free who are members of Christ by the actual union of charity; but such as are tainted with these sins are not members of Christ actually, but potentially; except, perhaps, imperfectly, by formless faith, which unites to God, relatively but not simply, viz. so that through Christ man partake of the life of grace. For, as is written (Jas 2:20): Faith without works is dead. Yet such as these receive from Christ a certain vital act, i.e., to believe, as if a lifeless limb were moved by a man to some extent. Reply Obj. 3: The holy Fathers made use of the legal sacraments, not as realities, but as images and shadows of what was to come. Now it is the same motion to an image as image, and to the reality, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Memor. et Remin. ii). Hence the ancient Fathers, by observing the legal sacraments, were borne to Christ by the same faith and love whereby we also are borne to Him, and hence the ancient Fathers belong to the same Church as we.

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Article 4 Whether Christ, as man, is the head of the angels? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus, secundum quod homo, non sit caput Angelorum. Caput enim et membra sunt unius naturae. Sed Christus, secundum quod homo, non est conformis in natura cum Angelis, sed solum cum hominibus, quia, ut dicitur Heb. II, nusquam Angelos apprehendit, sed semen Abrahae apprehendit. Ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, non est caput Angelorum. Praeterea, illorum Christus est caput qui pertinent ad Ecclesiam, quae est corpus eius, ut dicitur Ephes. I. Sed Angeli non pertinent ad Ecclesiam, nam Ecclesia est congregatio fidelium; fides autem non est in Angelis; non enim ambulant per fidem, sed per speciem, alioquin peregrinarentur a domino, secundum quod apostolus argumentatur, II Cor. V. Ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, non est caput Angelorum. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., quod sicut verbum quod erat a principio apud patrem, vivificat animas, ita verbum caro factum vivificat corpora, quibus Angeli carent. Sed verbum caro factum est Christus secundum quod homo. Ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, non influit vitam Angelis. Et ita, secundum quod homo, non est caput Angelorum. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Coloss. II, qui est caput omnis principatus et potestatis. Et eadem ratio est de Angelis aliorum ordinum. Ergo Christus est caput Angelorum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ubi est unum corpus, necesse est ponere unum caput. Unum autem corpus similitudinarie dicitur una multitudo ordinata in unum secundum distinctos actus sive officia. Manifestum est autem quod ad unum finem, qui est gloria divinae fruitionis, ordinantur et homines et Angeli. Unde corpus Ecclesiae mysticum non solum consistit ex hominibus, sed etiam ex Angelis. Totius autem huius multitudinis Christus est caput, quia propinquius se habet ad Deum, et perfectius participat dona ipsius, non solum quam homines, sed etiam quam Angeli; et de eius influentia non solum homines recipiunt, sed etiam Angeli. Dicitur enim Ephes. I, quod constituit eum, scilicet Christum Deus pater, ad dexteram suam in caelestibus, supra omnem principatum et potestatem et virtutem et dominationem, et omne nomen quod nominatur non solum in hoc saeculo, sed etiam in futuro, et omnia subiecit sub pedibus eius. Et ideo Christus non solum est caput hominum, sed etiam Angelorum. Unde Matth. IV legitur quod accesserunt Angeli et ministrabant ei. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod influentia Christi super omnes homines principaliter quidem est quantum ad animas, secundum quas homines conveniunt cum

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as man is not the head of the angels. For the head and members are of one nature. But Christ as man is not of the same nature with the angels, but only with men, since, as is written (Heb 2:16): For nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold. Therefore Christ as man is not the head of the angels. Obj. 2: Further, Christ is the head of such as belong to the Church, which is His Body, as is written (Eph 1:23). But the angels do not belong to the Church. For the Church is the congregation of the faithful: and in the angels there is no faith, for they do not walk by faith but by sight, otherwise they would be absent from the Lord, as the Apostle argues (2 Cor 5:6, 7). Therefore Christ as man is not head of the angels. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Tract. xix; xxiii in Joan.), that as the Word which was in the beginning with the Father quickens souls, so the Word made flesh quickens bodies, which angels lack. But the Word made flesh is Christ as man. Therefore Christ as man does not give life to angels, and hence as man He is not the head of the angels. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Col 2:10), Who is the head of all Principality and Power, and the same reason holds good with the other orders of angels. Therefore Christ is the Head of the angels. I answer that, As was said above (A. 1, ad 2), where there is one body we must allow that there is one head. Now a multitude ordained to one end, with distinct acts and duties, may be metaphorically called one body. But it is manifest that both men and angels are ordained to one end, which is the glory of the Divine fruition. Hence the mystical body of the Church consists not only of men but of angels. Now of all this multitude Christ is the Head, since He is nearer God, and shares His gifts more fully, not only than man, but even than angels; and of His influence not only men but even angels partake, since it is written (Eph 1:20–22): that God the Father set Him, namely Christ, on His right hand in the heavenly places, above all Principality and Power and Virtue and Dominion and every name that is named not only in this world, but also in that which is to come. And He hath subjected all things under His feet. Therefore Christ is not only the Head of men, but of angels. Hence we read (Matt 4:11) that angels came and ministered to Him. Reply Obj. 1: Christ’s influence over men is chiefly with regard to their souls; wherein men agree with angels in generic nature, though not in specific nature. By reason of

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Angelis in natura generis, licet non in natura speciei. Et huius conformitatis ratione Christus potest dici caput Angelorum, licet deficiat conformitas quantum ad corpora. Ad secundum dicendum quod Ecclesia secundum statum viae est congregatio fidelium, sed secundum statum patriae est congregatio comprehendentium. Christus autem non solum fuit viator, sed etiam comprehensor. Et ideo non solum fidelium, sed etiam comprehendentium est caput, utpote plenissime habens gratiam et gloriam. Ad tertium dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur secundum quandam assimilationem causae ad effectum, prout scilicet res corporalis agit in corpora, et res spiritualis in res spirituales. Tamen humanitas Christi, ex virtute spiritualis naturae, scilicet divinae, potest aliquid causare non solum in spiritibus hominum, sed etiam in spiritibus Angelorum, propter maximam coniunctionem eius ad Deum, scilicet secundum unionem personalem.

Q. 8, A. 5

this agreement Christ can be said to be the Head of the angels, although the agreement falls short as regards the body.

Reply Obj. 2: The Church, on earth, is the congregation of the faithful; but, in heaven, it is the congregation of comprehensors. Now Christ was not merely a wayfarer, but a comprehensor. And therefore He is the Head not merely of the faithful, but of comprehensors, as having grace and glory most fully. Reply Obj. 3: Augustine here uses the similitude of cause and effect, i.e., inasmuch as corporeal things act on bodies, and spiritual things on spiritual things. Nevertheless, the humanity of Christ, by virtue of the spiritual nature, i.e., the Divine, can cause something not only in the spirits of men, but also in the spirits of angels, on account of its most close conjunction with God, i.e., by personal union.

Article 5 Whether the grace of Christ, as head of the Church, is the same as his habitual grace, inasmuch as he is man? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit eadem gratia qua Christus est caput Ecclesiae, cum gratia singulari illius hominis. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. V, si unius delicto multi mortui sunt, multo magis gratia Dei et donum in gratia unius hominis Iesu Christi in plures abundavit. Sed aliud est peccatum actuale ipsius Adae, et aliud peccatum originale, quod traduxit in posteros. Ergo alia est gratia personalis, quae est propria ipsius Christi, et alia est gratia eius inquantum est caput Ecclesiae, quae ab ipso ad alios derivatur. Praeterea, habitus distinguuntur secundum actus. Sed ad alium actum ordinatur in Christo gratia eius personalis, scilicet ad sanctificationem illius animae, et ad alium actum ordinatur gratia capitis, scilicet ad sanctificandum alios. Ergo alia est gratia personalis ipsius Christi, et alia est gratia eius inquantum est caput Ecclesiae. Praeterea, sicut supra dictum est, in Christo distinguitur triplex gratia, scilicet gratia unionis, gratia capitis, et gratia singularis illius hominis. Sed gratia singularis Christi est alia a gratia unionis. Ergo est etiam alia a gratia capitis. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. I, de plenitudine eius omnes accepimus. Secundum hoc autem est caput nostrum, quod ab eo accipimus. Ergo secundum hoc quod habet plenitudinem gratiae, est caput nostrum. Plenitudinem autem gratiae habuit secundum quod per-

Objection 1: It would seem that the grace whereby Christ is Head of the Church and the individual grace of the Man are not the same. For the Apostle says (Rom 5:15): If by the offense of one many died, much more the grace of God and the gift, by the grace of one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many. But the actual sin of Adam is distinct from original sin which he transmitted to his posterity. Hence the personal grace which is proper to Christ is distinct from His grace, inasmuch as He is the Head of the Church, which flows to others from Him. Obj. 2: Further, habits are distinguished by acts. But the personal grace of Christ is ordained to one act, viz. the sanctification of His soul; and the capital grace is ordained to another, viz. to sanctifying others. Therefore the personal grace of Christ is distinct from His grace as He is the Head of the Church. Obj. 3: Further, as was said above (Q. 6, A. 6), in Christ we distinguish a threefold grace, viz. the grace of union, capital grace, and the individual grace of the Man. Now the individual grace of Christ is distinct from the grace of union. Therefore it is also distinct from the capital grace. On the contrary, It is written (John 1:16): Of His fullness we all have received. Now He is our Head, inasmuch as we receive from Him. Therefore He is our Head, inasmuch as He has the fullness of grace. Now He had the fullness of grace, inasmuch as personal grace was in Him in its

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fecte fuit in illo gratia personalis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo secundum gratiam personalem est caput nostrum. Et ita non est alia gratia capitis, et alia gratia personalis. Respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque agit inquantum est ens actu. Oportet autem quod sit idem actu quo aliquid est actu, et quo agit, et sic idem est calor quo ignis est calidus, et quo calefacit. Non tamen omnis actus quo aliquid est actu, sufficit ad hoc quod sit principium agendi in alia, cum enim agens sit praestantius patiente, ut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., et philosophus, in III de anima, oportet quod agens in alia habeat actum secundum eminentiam quandam. Dictum est autem supra quod in anima Christi recepta est gratia secundum maximam eminentiam. Et ideo ex eminentia gratiae quam accepit, competit sibi quod gratia illa ad alios derivetur. Quod pertinet ad rationem capitis. Et ideo eadem est secundum essentiam gratia personalis qua anima Christi est iustificata, et gratia eius secundum quam est caput Ecclesiae iustificans alios, differt tamen secundum rationem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccatum originale in Adam, quod est peccatum naturae, derivatum est a peccato actuali ipsius, quod est peccatum personale, quia in eo persona corrupit naturam; qua corruptione mediante, peccatum primi hominis derivatur ad posteros, secundum quod natura corrupta corrumpit personam. Sed gratia non derivatur a Christo in nos mediante natura humana, sed per solam personalem actionem ipsius Christi. Unde non oportet in Christo distinguere duplicem gratiam, quarum una respondeat naturae, alia personae, sicut in Adam distinguitur peccatum naturae et personae. Ad secundum dicendum quod diversi actus quorum unus est ratio et causa alterius, non diversificant habitum. Actus autem personalis gratiae, qui est sanctum facere formaliter habentem, est ratio iustificationis aliorum, quae pertinet ad gratiam capitis. Et inde est quod per huiusmodi differentiam non diversificatur essentia habitus. Ad tertium dicendum quod gratia personalis et gratia capitis ordinantur ad aliquem actum, gratia autem unionis non ordinatur ad actum, sed ad esse personale. Et ideo gratia personalis et gratia capitis conveniunt in essentia habitus, non autem gratia unionis. Quamvis gratia personalis possit quodammodo dici gratia unionis, prout facit congruitatem quandam ad unionem. Et secundum hoc, una per essentiam est gratia unionis et gratia capitis et gratia singularis personae, sed differens sola ratione.

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perfection, as was said above (Q. 7, A. 9). Hence His capital and personal grace are not distinct. I answer that, Since everything acts inasmuch as it is a being in act, it must be the same act whereby it is in act and whereby it acts, as it is the same heat whereby fire is hot and whereby it heats. Yet not every act whereby anything is in act suffices for its being the principle of acting upon others. For since the agent is nobler than the patient, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 16) and the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 19), the agent must act on others by reason of a certain pre-eminence. Now it was said above (A. 1; Q. 7, A. 9) that grace was received by the soul of Christ in the highest way; and therefore from this pre-eminence of grace which He received, it is from Him that this grace is bestowed on others—and this belongs to the nature of head. Hence the personal grace, whereby the soul of Christ is justified, is essentially the same as His grace, as He is the Head of the Church, and justifies others; but there is a distinction of reason between them. Reply Obj. 1: Original sin in Adam, which is a sin of the nature, is derived from his actual sin, which is a personal sin, because in him the person corrupted the nature; and by means of this corruption the sin of the first man is transmitted to posterity, inasmuch as the corrupt nature corrupts the person. Now grace is not vouchsafed us by means of human nature, but solely by the personal action of Christ Himself. Hence we must not distinguish a twofold grace in Christ, one corresponding to the nature, the other to the person as in Adam we distinguish the sin of the nature and of the person. Reply Obj. 2: Different acts, one of which is the reason and the cause of the other, do not diversify a habit. Now the act of the personal grace which is formally to sanctify its subject, is the reason of the justification of others, which pertains to capital grace. Hence it is that the essence of the habit is not diversified by this difference. Reply Obj. 3: Personal and capital grace are ordained to an act; but the grace of union is not ordained to an act, but to the personal being. Hence the personal and the capital grace agree in the essence of the habit; but the grace of union does not, although the personal grace can be called in a manner the grace of union, inasmuch as it brings about a fitness for the union; and thus the grace of union, the capital, and the personal grace are one in essence, though there is a distinction of reason between them.

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Q. 8, A. 6

Article 6 Whether it is proper to Christ to be head of the Church? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse caput Ecclesiae non sit proprium Christo. Dicitur enim I Reg. XV, cum esses parvulus in oculis tuis, caput in tribubus Israel factus es. Sed una est Ecclesia in novo et in veteri testamento. Ergo videtur quod, eadem ratione, alius homo praeter Christum potest esse caput Ecclesiae. Praeterea, ex hoc Christus dicitur caput Ecclesiae quod gratiam influit Ecclesiae membris. Sed etiam ad alios pertinet gratiam aliis praebere, secundum illud Ephes. IV, omnis sermo malus ab ore vestro non procedat, sed si quis bonus est ad aedificationem fidei, ut det gratiam audientibus. Ergo videtur quod etiam alii quam Christo competat esse caput Ecclesiae. Praeterea, Christus, ex eo quod praeest Ecclesiae, non solum dicitur caput, sed etiam pastor et fundamentum Ecclesiae. Sed non soli sibi Christus retinuit nomen pastoris, secundum illud I Pet. V, cum apparuerit princeps pastorum, percipietis immarcescibilem gloriae coronam. Nec etiam nomen fundamenti, secundum illud Apoc. XXI, murus civitatis habens fundamenta duodecim. Ergo videtur quod nec etiam nomen capitis sibi soli retinuerit. Sed contra est quod dicitur Coloss. II, caput Ecclesiae est ex quo corpus, per nexus et coniunctiones subministratum et constructum, crescit in augmentum Dei. Sed hoc soli Christo convenit. Ergo solus Christus est caput Ecclesiae. Respondeo dicendum quod caput in alia membra influit dupliciter. Uno modo, quodam intrinseco influxu, prout virtus motiva et sensitiva a capite derivatur ad cetera membra. Alio modo, secundum exteriorem quandam gubernationem, prout scilicet secundum visum et alios sensus, qui in capite radicantur, dirigitur homo in exterioribus actibus. Interior autem effluxus gratiae non est ab aliquo nisi a solo Christo, cuius humanitas, ex hoc quod est divinitati adiuncta, habet virtutem iustificandi. Sed influxus in membra Ecclesiae quantum ad exteriorem gubernationem, potest aliis convenire. Et secundum hoc, aliqui alii possunt dici capita Ecclesiae, secundum illud Amos VI, optimates capita populorum. Differenter tamen a Christo. Primo quidem, quantum ad hoc, quod Christus est caput omnium eorum qui ad Ecclesiam pertinent secundum omnem locum et tempus et statum, alii autem homines dicuntur capita secundum quaedam specialia loca, sicut episcopi suarum Ecclesiarum; vel etiam secundum determinatum tempus, sicut Papa est caput totius Ecclesiae, scilicet tempore sui pontificatus; et secundum determinatum statum, prout scilicet sunt in statu viatoris. Alio modo, secundum quod

Objection 1: It seems that it is not proper to Christ to be Head of the Church. For it is written (1 Kgs 15:17): When thou wast a little one in thy own eyes, wast thou not made the head of the tribes of Israel? Now there is but one Church in the New and the Old Testament. Therefore it seems that with equal reason any other man than Christ might be head of the Church. Obj. 2: Further, Christ is called Head of the Church from His bestowing grace on the Church’s members. But it belongs to others also to grant grace to others, according to Eph. 4:29: Let no evil speech proceed from your mouth; but that which is good to the edification of faith, that it may administer grace to the hearers. Therefore it seems to belong also to others than Christ to be head of the Church. Obj. 3: Further, Christ by His ruling over the Church is not only called Head, but also Shepherd and Foundation. Now Christ did not retain for Himself alone the name of Shepherd, according to 1 Pet. 5:4, And when the prince of pastors shall appear, you shall receive a never-fading crown of glory; nor the name of Foundation, according to Apoc. 21:14: And the wall of the city had twelve foundations. Therefore it seems that He did not also retain the name of Head for Himself alone. On the contrary, It is written (Col 2:19): The head of the Church is that from which the whole body, by joints and bands being supplied with nourishment and compacted, groweth unto the increase of God. But this belongs only to Christ. Therefore Christ alone is Head of the Church. I answer that, The head influences the other members in two ways. First, by a certain intrinsic influence, inasmuch as motive and sensitive force flow from the head to the other members; second, by a certain exterior guidance, inasmuch as by sight and the senses, which are rooted in the head, man is guided in his exterior acts. Now the interior influx of grace is from no one save Christ, Whose manhood, through its union with the Godhead, has the power of justifying; but the influence over the members of the Church, as regards their exterior guidance, can belong to others; and in this way others may be called heads of the Church, according to Amos 6:1, Ye great men, heads of the people; differently, however, from Christ. First, inasmuch as Christ is the Head of all who pertain to the Church in every place and time and state; but all other men are called heads with reference to certain special places, as bishops of their Churches. Or with reference to a determined time as the Pope is the head of the whole Church, viz. during the time of his Pontificate, and with reference to a determined state, inasmuch as they are in the state of wayfarers. Second, because Christ is the Head of the Church by His own power and authority; while others are called heads, as tak-

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Christus est caput Ecclesiae propria virtute et auctoritate, alii vero dicuntur capita inquantum vicem gerunt Christi; secundum illud II Cor. II, nam et ego, quod donavi, si quid donavi, propter vos, in persona Christi; et II Cor. V, pro Christo legatione fungimur, tanquam Deo exhortante per nos. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum illud intelligitur secundum quod ratio capitis consideratur ex exteriori gubernatione, prout rex dicitur caput regni sui. Ad secundum dicendum quod homo non dat gratiam interius influendo sed exterius persuadendo ad ea quae sunt gratiae. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, super Ioan., si praepositi Ecclesiae pastores sunt, quomodo unus pastor est, nisi quia sunt illi omnes unius membra pastoris? Et similiter alii possunt dici fundamenta et capita, inquantum sunt unius capitis et fundamenti membra. Et tamen, sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, quod pastor est, dedit membris suis, ostium vero se nemo nostrum dicit; hoc sibi ipse proprium tenuit. Et hoc ideo quia in ostio importatur principalis auctoritas, inquantum ostium est per quod omnes ingrediuntur in domum, et ipse solus Christus est per quem accessum habemus in gratiam istam in qua stamus. Per alia vero nomina praedicta potest importari auctoritas non solum principalis, sed etiam secundaria.

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ing Christ’s place, according to 2 Cor. 2:10, For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes I have done it in the person of Christ, and 2 Cor. 5:20, For Christ therefore we are ambassadors, God, as it were, exhorting by us. Reply Obj. 1: The word head is employed in that passage in regard to exterior government; as a king is said to be the head of his kingdom. Reply Obj. 2: Man does not distribute grace by interior influx, but by exteriorly persuading to the effects of grace. Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Tract. xlvi in Joan.): If the rulers of the Church are Shepherds, how is there one Shepherd, except that all these are members of one Shepherd? So likewise others may be called foundations and heads, inasmuch as they are members of the one Head and Foundation. Nevertheless, as Augustine says (Tract. xlvii), He gave to His members to be shepherds; yet none of us calleth himself the Door. He kept this for Himself alone. And this because by door is implied the principal authority, inasmuch as it is by the door that all enter the house; and it is Christ alone by Whom also we have access . . . into this grace, wherein we stand (Rom 5:2); but by the other names above-mentioned there may be implied not merely the principal but also the secondary authority.

Article 7 Whether the devil is the head of all the wicked? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus non sit caput malorum. Ad rationem enim capitis pertinet quod influat sensum et motum in membra, ut dicit quaedam Glossa, ad Ephes. I, super illud, ipsum dedit caput, et cetera. Sed Diabolus non habet virtutem influendi malitiam peccati, quod ex voluntate peccantis procedit. Ergo Diabolus non potest dici caput malorum. Praeterea, per quodlibet peccatum fit homo malus. Sed non omnia peccata sunt a Diabolo. Quod quidem manifestum est de peccatis Daemonum, qui non ex persuasione alterius peccaverunt. Similiter etiam nec omne peccatum hominis ex Diabolo procedit, dicitur enim in libro de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, non omnes cogitationes nostrae malae semper Diaboli instinctu excitantur, sed aliquoties ex motu arbitrii nostri emergunt. Ergo Diabolus non est caput omnium malorum. Praeterea, unum caput uni corpori praeficitur. Sed tota multitudo malorum non videtur habere aliquid in quo uniantur, quia malum malo contingit esse contrarium; contingit enim ex diversis defectibus, ut Dionysius

Objection 1: It would seem that the devil is not the head of the wicked. For it belongs to the head to diffuse sense and movement into the members, as a gloss says, on Eph. 1:22, And made Him head, etc. But the devil has no power of spreading the evil of sin, which proceeds from the will of the sinner. Therefore the devil cannot be called the head of the wicked. Obj. 2: Further, by every sin a man is made evil. But not every sin is from the devil; and this is plain as regards the demons, who did not sin through the persuasion of another; so likewise not every sin of man proceeds from the devil, for it is said (De Eccles. Dogm. lxxxii): Not all our wicked thoughts are always raised up by the suggestion of the devil; but sometimes they spring from the movement of our will. Therefore the devil is not the head of all the wicked. Obj. 3: Further, one head is placed on one body. But the whole multitude of the wicked do not seem to have anything in which they are united, for evil is contrary to evil and springs from diverse defects, as Dionysius says (Div.

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dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo Diabolus non potest dici caput omnium malorum. Sed contra est quod, super illud Iob XVIII, memoria illius pereat de terra, dicit Glossa, de unoquoque iniquo dicitur ut ad caput, idest Diabolum, revertatur. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, caput non solum interius influit membris, sed etiam exterius gubernat, eorum actus dirigendo ad aliquem finem. Sic igitur potest dici aliquis caput alicuius multitudinis vel secundum utrumque, scilicet secundum interiorem influxum et exteriorem gubernationem, et sic est Christus caput Ecclesiae, ut dictum est. Vel secundum solam exteriorem gubernationem, et sic quilibet princeps vel praelatus est caput multitudinis sibi subiectae. Et per hunc modum dicitur Diabolus caput omnium malorum, nam, ut dicitur Iob XLI, ipse est rex super omnes filios superbiae. Pertinet autem ad gubernatorem ut eos quos gubernat ad suum finem perducat. Finis autem Diaboli est aversio rationalis creaturae a Deo, unde a principio hominem ab obedientia divini praecepti removere tentavit. Ipsa autem aversio a Deo habet rationem finis inquantum appetitur sub specie libertatis, secundum illud Ierem. II, a saeculo confregisti iugum, rupisti vincula, dixisti, non serviam. Inquantum igitur ad hunc finem aliqui adducuntur peccando, sub Diaboli regimine et gubernatione cadunt. Et ex hoc dicitur eorum caput. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet Diabolus non influat interius rationali menti, tamen suggerendo inducit ad malum. Ad secundum dicendum quod gubernator non semper suggerit singulis ut eius voluntati obediant, sed proponit omnibus signum suae voluntatis, ad cuius sequelam aliqui excitantur inducti, alii sponte propria, sicut patet in duce exercitus, cuius vexillum sequuntur milites etiam nullo persuadente. Sic igitur primum peccatum Diaboli, qui ab initio peccat, ut dicitur I Ioan. III, propositum est omnibus ad sequendum, quod quidam imitantur per suggestionem ipsius, quidam propria sponte absque ulla suggestione. Et secundum hoc, omnium malorum caput est Diabolus, inquantum illum imitantur, secundum illud Sap. II, invidia Diaboli mors introivit in orbem terrarum, imitantur autem illum qui sunt ex parte illius. Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia peccata conveniunt in aversione a Deo, licet ad invicem differant secundum conversionem ad diversa commutabilia bona.

Q. 8, A. 7

Nom. iv). Therefore the devil cannot be called the head of all the wicked. On the contrary, A gloss on Job 18:17, Let the memory of him perish from the earth, says: This is said of every evil one, yet so as to be referred to the head, i.e., the devil. I answer that, As was said above (A. 6), the head not only influences the members interiorly, but also governs them exteriorly, directing their actions to an end. Hence it may be said that anyone is the head of a multitude, either as regards both, i.e., by interior influence and exterior governance, and thus Christ is the Head of the Church, as was stated (A. 6); or as regards exterior governance, and thus every prince or prelate is head of the multitude subject to him. And in this way the devil is head of all the wicked. For, as is written (Job 41:25): He is king over all the children of pride. Now it belongs to a governor to lead those whom he governs to their end. But the end of the devil is the aversion of the rational creature from God; hence from the beginning he has endeavored to lead man from obeying the Divine precept. But aversion from God has the nature of an end, inasmuch as it is sought for under the appearance of liberty, according to Jer. 2:20: Of old time thou hast broken my yoke, thou hast burst my bands, and thou saidst, ‘I will not serve.’ Hence, inasmuch as some are brought to this end by sinning, they fall under the rule and government of the devil, and therefore he is called their head. Reply Obj. 1: Although the devil does not influence the rational mind interiorly, yet he beguiles it to evil by persuasion. Reply Obj. 2: A governor does not always suggest to his subjects to obey his will; but proposes to all the sign of his will, in consequence of which some are incited by inducement, and some of their own free-will, as is plain in the leader of an army, whose standard all the soldiers follow, though no one persuades them. Therefore in the same way, the first sin of the devil, who sinneth from the beginning (1 John 3:8), is held out to all to be followed, and some imitate at his suggestion, and some of their own will without any suggestion. And hence the devil is the head of all the wicked, inasmuch as they imitate Him, according to Wis. 2:24, 25: By the envy of the devil, death came into the world. And they follow him that are of his side. Reply Obj. 3: All sins agree in aversion from God, although they differ by conversion to different changeable goods.

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Article 8 Whether Antichrist may be called the head of the wicked? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Antichristus non sit caput malorum. Unius enim corporis non sunt diversa capita. Sed Diabolus est caput multitudinis malorum. Non ergo Antichristus est eorum caput. Praeterea, Antichristus est membrum Diaboli. Sed caput distinguitur a membris. Ergo Antichristus non est caput malorum. Praeterea, caput habet influentiam in membra. Sed Antichristus nullam habet influentiam in malos homines qui eum praecesserunt. Ergo Antichristus non est caput malorum. Sed contra est quod Iob XXI, super illud, interrogate quemlibet de viatoribus, dicit Glossa, dum de omnium malorum corpore loqueretur, subito ad omnium iniquorum caput, Antichristum, verba convertit. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in capite naturali tria inveniuntur, scilicet ordo, perfectio et virtus influendi. Quantum ergo ad ordinem temporis, non dicitur esse Antichristus caput malorum, quasi eius peccatum praecesserit, sicut praecessit peccatum Diaboli. Similiter etiam non dicitur esse malorum caput propter virtutem influendi. Si enim aliquos sui temporis ad malum sit conversurus, exterius inducendo; non tamen illi qui ante eum fuerunt, ab ipso sunt in malitiam inducti, nec eius malitiam sunt imitati. Unde secundum hoc non posset dici caput omnium malorum, sed aliquorum. Relinquitur igitur quod dicatur caput omnium malorum propter malitiae perfectionem. Unde super illud II Thess. II, ostendens se tanquam sit Deus, dicit Glossa, sicut in Christo omnis plenitudo divinitatis inhabitavit, ita in Antichristo plenitudo omnis malitiae, non quidem ita quod humanitas eius sit assumpta a Diabolo in unitate personae, sicut humanitas Christi a filio Dei; sed quia Diabolus malitiam suam eminentius ei influit suggerendo quam omnibus aliis. Et secundum hoc, omnes alii mali qui praecesserunt sunt quasi quaedam figura Antichristi, secundum illud II Thess. II, mysterium iam operatur iniquitatis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Diabolus et Antichristus non sunt duo capita, sed unum, quia Antichristus dicitur esse caput inquantum plenissime invenitur in eo impressa malitia Diaboli. Unde super illud II Thess. II, ostendens se tanquam sit Deus, dicit Glossa, in ipso erit caput omnium malorum, scilicet Diabolus, qui est rex super omnes filios superbiae. Non autem dicitur in eo esse per unionem personalem; nec per intrinsecam habitationem, quia sola Trinitas menti illabitur, ut dicitur in libro de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, sed per malitiae effectum.

Objection 1: It would seem that Antichrist is not the head of the wicked. For there are not several heads of one body. But the devil is the head of the multitude of the wicked. Therefore Antichrist is not their head. Obj. 2: Further, Antichrist is a member of the devil. Now the head is distinguished from the members. Therefore Antichrist is not the head of the wicked. Obj. 3: Further, the head has an influence over the members. But Antichrist has no influence over the wicked who have preceded him. Therefore Antichrist is not the head of the wicked. On the contrary, A gloss on Job 21:29, Ask any of them that go by the way, says: Whilst he was speaking of the body of all the wicked, suddenly he turned his speech to Antichrist the head of all evil-doers. I answer that, As was said above (A. 1), in the head are found three things: order, perfection, and the power of influencing. But as regards the order of the body, Antichrist is not said to be the head of the wicked as if his sin had preceded, as the sin of the devil preceded. So likewise he is not called the head of the wicked from the power of influencing, although he will pervert some in his day by exterior persuasion; nevertheless those who were before him were not beguiled into wickedness by him nor have imitated his wickedness. Hence he cannot be called the head of all the wicked in this way, but of some. Therefore it remains to be said that he is the head of all the wicked by reason of the perfection of his wickedness. Hence, on 2 Thess. 2:4, Showing himself as if he were God, a gloss says: As in Christ dwelt the fullness of the Godhead, so in Antichrist the fullness of all wickedness. Not indeed as if his humanity were assumed by the devil into unity of person, as the humanity of Christ by the Son of God; but that the devil by suggestion infuses his wickedness more copiously into him than into all others. And in this way all the wicked who have gone before are signs of Antichrist, according to 2 Thess. 2:7, For the mystery of iniquity already worketh. Reply Obj. 1: The devil and Antichrist are not two heads, but one; since Antichrist is called the head, inasmuch as the wickedness of the devil is most fully impressed on him. Hence, on 2 Thess. 2:4, Showing himself as if he were God, a gloss says: The head of all the wicked, namely the devil, who is king over all the children of pride will be in him. Now he is said to be in him not by personal union, nor by indwelling, since the Trinity alone dwells in the mind (as is said De Eccles. Dogm. lxxxiii), but by the effect of wickedness.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut caput Christi est Deus, et tamen ipse est caput Ecclesiae, ut supra dictum est; ita Antichristus est membrum Diaboli, et tamen ipse est caput malorum. Ad tertium dicendum quod Antichristus non dicitur caput omnium malorum propter similitudinem influentiae, sed propter similitudinem perfectionis. In eo enim Diabolus quasi malitiam suam ducet ad caput, per modum quo dicitur aliquis ad caput propositum suum ducere, cum illud perfecerit.

Q. 8, A. 8

Reply Obj. 2: As the head of Christ is God, and yet He is the Head of the Church, as was said above (A. 1, ad 2), so likewise Antichrist is a member of the devil and yet is head of the wicked. Reply Obj. 3: Antichrist is said to be the head of all the wicked not by a likeness of influence, but by a likeness of perfection. For in him the devil, as it were, brings his wickedness to a head, in the same way that anyone is said to bring his purpose to a head when he executes it.

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Question 9 Christ’s Knowledge in General Deinde considerandum est de scientia Christi. CirWe must now consider Christ’s knowledge; concerning ca quam duo consideranda sunt, primo, quam scientiam which the consideration will be twofold. First, of Christ’s Christus habuerit; secundo, de unaquaque scientiarum knowledge in general; second, of each particular kind of ipsius. knowledge He had. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum Christus habuerit aliquam scientiam (1) Whether Christ had any knowledge besides the praeter divinam. Divine? Secundo, utrum habuerit scientiam quam habent (2) Whether He had the knowledge which the blessed beati vel comprehensores. or comprehensors have? Tertio, utrum habuerit scientiam inditam vel (3) Whether He had an imprinted or infused infusam. knowledge? Quarto, utrum habuerit aliquam scientiam (4) Whether He had any acquired knowledge? acquisitam.

Article 1 Whether Christ had any knowledge besides the Divine? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit aliqua scientia praeter divinam. Ad hoc enim necessaria est scientia ut per eam aliqua cognoscantur. Sed Christus per scientiam divinam cognoscebat omnia. Superfluum igitur fuisset quod in eo esset quaedam alia scientia. Praeterea, lux minor per maiorem offuscatur. Sed omnis scientia creata comparatur ad scientiam Dei increatam sicut lux minor ad maiorem. Ergo in Christo non refulsit alia scientia quam divina. Praeterea, unio humanae naturae ad divinam facta est in persona, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ponitur autem in Christo, secundum quosdam, quaedam scientia unionis, per quam scilicet Christus ea quae ad mysterium incarnationis pertinent plenius scivit quam aliquis alius. Cum ergo unio personalis contineat duas naturas, videtur quod in Christo non sint duae scientiae, sed una tantum scientia pertinens ad utramque naturam. Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de incarnatione, Deus in carne perfectionem humanae naturae assumpsit, suscepit sensum hominis, sed non sensum carnis inflatum. Sed ad sensum hominis pertinet scientia creata. Ergo in eo fuit alia scientia praeter divinam. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, filius Dei humanam naturam integram assumpsit, idest, non corpus solum, sed etiam animam; non solum sensitivam, sed etiam rationalem. Et ideo oportuit quod

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no knowledge except the Divine. For knowledge is necessary that things may be known thereby. But by His Divine knowledge Christ knew all things. Therefore any other knowledge would have been superfluous in Him. Obj. 2: Further, the lesser light is dimmed by the greater. But all created knowledge in comparison with the uncreated knowledge of God is as the lesser to the greater light. Therefore there shone in Christ no other knowledge except the Divine. Obj. 3: Further, the union of the human nature with the Divine took place in the Person, as is clear from Q. 2, A. 2. Now, according to some there is in Christ a certain knowledge of the union, whereby Christ knew what belongs to the mystery of the Incarnation more fully than anyone else. Hence, since the personal union contains two natures, it would seem that there are not two knowledges in Christ, but one only, pertaining to both natures. On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Incarnat. vii): God assumed the perfection of human nature in the flesh; He took upon Himself the sense of man, but not the swollen sense of the flesh. But created knowledge pertains to the sense of man. Therefore in Christ there was created knowledge. I answer that, As said above (Q. 5), the Son of God assumed an entire human nature, i.e., not only a body, but also a soul, and not only a sensitive, but also a rational soul. And therefore it behooved Him to have created knowledge,

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Incarnation

haberet scientiam creatam, propter tria. Primo quidem, propter animae perfectionem. Anima enim, secundum se considerata, est in potentia ad intelligibilia cognoscenda, est enim sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum; et tamen possibile est in ea scribi, propter intellectum possibilem, in quo est omnia fieri, ut dicitur in III de anima. Quod autem est in potentia, est imperfectum nisi reducatur ad actum. Non autem fuit conveniens ut filius Dei humanam naturam imperfectam assumeret, sed perfectam, utpote qua mediante, totum humanum genus erat ad perfectum reducendum. Et ideo oportuit quod anima Christi esset perfecta per aliquam scientiam, quae esset proprie perfectio eius. Et ideo oportuit in Christo esse aliquam scientiam praeter scientiam divinam. Alioquin anima Christi esset imperfectior omnibus animabus aliorum hominum. Secundo quia, cum quaelibet res sit propter suam operationem, ut dicitur in II de caelo et mundo, frustra haberet Christus animam intellectualem, si non intelligeret secundum illam. Quod pertinet ad scientiam creatam. Tertio, quia aliqua scientia creata pertinet ad animae humanae naturam, scilicet illa per quam naturaliter cognoscimus prima principia, scientiam enim hic large accipimus pro qualibet cognitione intellectus humani. Nihil autem naturalium Christo defuit, quia totam humanam naturam suscepit, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo in sexta synodo damnata est positio negantium in Christo duas esse scientias, vel duas sapientias. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus cognovit omnia per scientiam divinam operatione increata, quae est ipsa Dei essentia, Dei enim intelligere est sua substantia, ut probatur in XII Metaphys. Unde hic actus non potuit esse animae humanae Christi, cum sit alterius naturae. Si igitur non fuisset in anima Christi alia scientia praeter divinam, nihil cognovisset. Et ita frustra fuisset assumpta, cum res sit propter suam operationem.

Ad secundum dicendum quod, si duo lumina accipiantur eiusdem ordinis, minus offuscatur per maius, sicut lumen solis offuscat lumen candelae, quorum utrumque accipitur in ordine illuminantis. Sed si accipiatur maius in ordine illuminantis et minus in ordine illuminati, minus lumen non offuscatur per maius, sed magis augetur, sicut lumen aeris per lumen solis. Et hoc modo lumen scientiae non offuscatur, sed clarescit in anima Christi per lumen scientiae divinae, quae est lux vera illuminans omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum, ut dicitur Ioan. I. Ad tertium dicendum quod, ex parte unitorum, ponitur scientia in Christo et quantum ad naturam divinam et quantum ad humanam, ita quod per unionem, secundum quam est eadem hypostasis Dei et hominis, id

IIIae

for three reasons. First, on account of the soul’s perfection. For the soul, considered in itself, is in potentiality to knowing intelligible things; since it is like a tablet on which nothing is written, and yet it may be written upon through the possible intellect, whereby it may become all things, as is said De Anima iii, 18. Now what is in potentiality is imperfect unless reduced to act. But it was fitting that the Son of God should assume, not an imperfect, but a perfect human nature, since the whole human race was to be brought back to perfection by its means. Hence it behooved the soul of Christ to be perfected by a knowledge, which would be its proper perfection. And therefore it was necessary that there should be another knowledge in Christ besides the Divine knowledge, otherwise the soul of Christ would have been more imperfect than the souls of the rest of men. Second, because, since everything is on account of its operation, as stated De Coelo ii, 17, Christ would have had an intellective soul to no purpose if He had not understood by it; and this pertains to created knowledge. Third, because some created knowledge pertains to the nature of the human soul, viz. that whereby we naturally know first principles; since we are here taking knowledge for any cognition of the human intellect. Now nothing natural was wanting to Christ, since He took the whole human nature, as stated above (Q. 5). And hence the Sixth Council condemned the opinion of those who denied that in Christ there are two knowledges or wisdoms. Reply Obj. 1: Christ knew all things with the Divine knowledge by an uncreated operation which is the very Essence of God; since God’s understanding is His substance, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. xii, text. 39). Hence this act could not belong to the human soul of Christ, seeing that it belongs to another nature. Therefore, if there had been no other knowledge in the soul of Christ, it would have known nothing; and thus it would have been assumed to no purpose, since everything is on account of its operation. Reply Obj. 2: If the two lights are supposed to be in the same order, the lesser is dimmed by the greater, as the light of the sun dims the light of a candle, both being in the class of illuminants. But if we suppose two lights, one of which is in the class of illuminants and the other in the class of the illuminated, the lesser light is not dimmed by the greater, but rather is strengthened, as the light of the air by the light of the sun. And in this manner the light of knowledge is not dimmed, but rather is heightened in the soul of Christ by the light of the Divine knowledge, which is the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world, as is written John 1:9. Reply Obj. 3: On the part of what are united we hold there is a knowledge in Christ, both as to His Divine and as to His human nature; so that, by reason of the union whereby there is one hypostasis of God and man, the things

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quod est Dei attribuitur homini, et id quod est hominis attribuitur Deo, ut supra dictum est. Sed ex parte ipsius unionis non potest poni in Christo aliqua scientia. Nam unio illa est ad esse personale, scientia autem non convenit personae nisi ratione alicuius naturae.

Q. 9, A. 2

of God are attributed to man, and the things of man are attributed to God, as was said above (Q. 3, AA. 1, 6). But on the part of the union itself we cannot admit any knowledge in Christ. For this union is in personal being, and knowledge belongs to person only by reason of a nature.

Article 2 Whether Christ had the knowledge which the blessed or comprehensors have? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit scientia beatorum vel comprehensorum. Scientia enim beatorum est per participationem divini luminis, secundum illud Psalmi, in lumine tuo videbimus lumen. Sed Christus non habuit lumen divinum tanquam participatum, sed ipsam divinitatem in se habuit substantialiter manentem, secundum illud Coloss. II, in ipso habitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter. Ergo in ipso non fuit scientia beatorum. Praeterea, scientia beatorum eos beatos facit, secundum illud Ioan. XVII, haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te, verum Deum, et quem misisti, Iesum Christum. Sed homo ille fuit beatus ex hoc ipso quod fuit Deo unitus in persona, secundum illud Psalmi, beatus quem elegisti et assumpsisti. Non ergo oportet ponere in ipso scientiam beatorum. Praeterea, duplex scientia homini competit, una secundum suam naturam; alia supra suam naturam. Scientia autem beatorum, quae in divina visione consistit, non est secundum naturam hominis, sed supra eius naturam. In Christo autem fuit alia supernaturalis scientia multo fortior et altior, scilicet scientia divina. Non igitur oportuit in Christo esse scientiam beatorum. Sed contra, scientia beatorum in Dei visione vel cognitione consistit. Sed ipse plene cognovit Deum, etiam secundum quod homo, secundum illud Ioan. VIII, scio eum, et sermonem eius servo. Ergo in Christo fuit scientia beatorum. Respondeo dicendum quod illud quod est in potentia, reducitur in actum per id quod est actu, oportet enim esse calidum id per quod alia calefiunt. Homo autem est in potentia ad scientiam beatorum, quae in visione Dei consistit, et ad eam ordinatur sicut ad finem, est enim creatura rationalis capax illius beatae cognitionis, inquantum est ad imaginem Dei. Ad hunc autem finem beatitudinis homines reducuntur per Christi humanitatem, secundum illud Heb. II, decebat eum propter quem omnia et per quem omnia, qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat, auctorem salutis eorum per passionem consummari. Et ideo oportuit quod cognitio ipsa in Dei visione consistens excellentissime Christo homini con-

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the knowledge of the blessed or comprehensors. For the knowledge of the blessed is a participation of Divine light, according to Ps. 35:10: In Thy light we shall see light. Now Christ had not a participated light, but He had the Godhead Itself substantially abiding in Him, according to Col. 2:9: For in Him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead corporeally. Therefore in Christ there was not the knowledge of the blessed. Obj. 2: Further, the knowledge of the blessed makes them blessed, according to John 17:3: This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent. But this Man was blessed through being united to God in person, according to Ps. 64:5: Blessed is He Whom Thou hast chosen and taken to Thee. Therefore it is not necessary to suppose the knowledge of the blessed in Him. Obj. 3: Further, to man belongs a double knowledge— one by nature, one above nature. Now the knowledge of the blessed, which consists in the vision of God, is not natural to man, but above his nature. But in Christ there was another and much higher supernatural knowledge, i.e., the Divine knowledge. Therefore there was no need of the knowledge of the blessed in Christ. On the contrary, The knowledge of the blessed consists in the knowledge of God. But He knew God fully, even as He was man, according to John 8:55: I do know Him, and do keep His word. Therefore in Christ there was the knowledge of the blessed. I answer that, What is in potentiality is reduced to act by what is in act; for that whereby things are heated must itself be hot. Now man is in potentiality to the knowledge of the blessed, which consists in the vision of God; and is ordained to it as to an end; since the rational creature is capable of that blessed knowledge, inasmuch as he is made in the image of God. Now men are brought to this end of beatitude by the humanity of Christ, according to Heb. 2:10: For it became Him, for Whom are all things, and by Whom are all things, Who had brought many children unto glory, to perfect the author of their salvation by His passion. And hence it was necessary that the beatific knowledge, which consists in the vision of God, should belong

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Incarnation

veniret, quia semper causam oportet esse potiorem causato. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod divinitas unita est humanitati Christi secundum personam, et non secundum naturam vel essentiam, sed cum unitate personae remanet distinctio naturarum. Et ideo anima Christi, quae est pars humanae naturae, per aliquod lumen participatum a natura divina perfecta est ad scientiam beatam, qua Deus per essentiam videtur. Ad secundum dicendum quod ex ipsa unione homo ille est beatus beatitudine increata, sicut ex unione est Deus. Sed praeter beatitudinem increatam, oportuit in natura humana Christi esse quandam beatitudinem creatam, per quam anima eius in ultimo fine humanae naturae constitueretur. Ad tertium dicendum quod visio seu scientia beata est quodammodo supra naturam animae rationalis, inquantum scilicet propria virtute ad eam pervenire non potest. Alio vero modo est secundum naturam ipsius, inquantum scilicet per naturam suam est capax eius, prout scilicet ad imaginem Dei facta est, ut supra dictum est. Sed scientia increata est omnibus modis supra naturam animae humanae.

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to Christ pre-eminently, since the cause ought always to be more efficacious than the effect. Reply Obj. 1: The Godhead is united to the manhood of Christ in Person, not in essence or nature; yet with the unity of Person remains the distinction of natures. And therefore the soul of Christ, which is a part of human nature, through a light participated from the Divine Nature, is perfected with the beatific knowledge whereby it sees God in essence. Reply Obj. 2: By the union this Man is blessed with the uncreated beatitude, even as by the union He is God; yet besides the uncreated beatitude it was necessary that there should be in the human nature of Christ a created beatitude, whereby His soul was established in the last end of human nature. Reply Obj. 3: The beatific vision and knowledge are to some extent above the nature of the rational soul, inasmuch as it cannot reach it of its own strength; but in another way it is in accordance with its nature, inasmuch as it is capable of it by nature, having been made to the likeness of God, as stated above. But the uncreated knowledge is in every way above the nature of the human soul.

Article 3 Whether Christ had an infused knowledge, besides beatific knowledge? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non sit alia scientia indita, praeter scientiam beatam. Omnis enim alia scientia creata comparatur ad scientiam beatam sicut imperfectum ad perfectum. Sed, praesente perfecta cognitione, excluditur cognitio imperfecta, sicut manifesta visio faciei excludit aenigmaticam visionem fidei ut patet I Cor. XIII. Cum igitur in Christo fuerit scientia beata, ut dictum est, videtur quod non potuerit in eo alia esse scientia indita.

Objection 1: It would seem that there was not in Christ another infused knowledge besides the beatific knowledge. For all other knowledge compared to the beatific knowledge is like imperfect to perfect. But imperfect knowledge is removed by the presence of perfect knowledge, as the clear face-to-face vision removes the enigmatical vision of faith, as is plain from 1 Cor. 13:10, 12. Since, therefore, in Christ there was the beatific knowledge, as stated above (A. 2), it would seem that there could not be any other imprinted knowledge. Obj. 2: Further, an imperfect mode of cognition disposes towards a more perfect, as opinion, the result of dialectical syllogisms, disposes towards science, which results from demonstrative syllogisms. Now, when perfection is reached, there is no further need of the disposition, even as on reaching the end motion is no longer necessary. Hence, since every created cognition is compared to beatific cognition, as imperfect to perfect and as disposition to its term, it seems that since Christ had beatific knowledge, it was not necessary for Him to have any other knowledge.

Praeterea, imperfectior modus cognitionis disponit ad perfectiorem sicut opinio, quae est per syllogismum dialecticum, disponit ad scientiam, quae est per syllogismum demonstrativum. Habita autem perfectione, non est ulterius necessaria dispositio, sicut, habito termino, non est necessarius motus. Cum igitur cognitio quaecumque alia creata comparetur ad cognitionem beatam sicut imperfectum ad perfectum, et sicut dispositio ad terminum, videtur quod, cum Christus habuerit cognitionem beatam, quod non fuerit ei necessarium habere aliam cognitionem. Praeterea, sicut materia corporalis est in potentia Obj. 3: Further, as corporeal matter is in potentiality to ad formam sensibilem, ita intellectus possibilis est in po- sensible forms, so the possible intellect is in potentiality to tentia ad formam intelligibilem. Sed materia corporalis intelligible forms. Now corporeal matter cannot receive two non potest simul recipere duas formas sensibiles, unam forms at once, one more perfect and the other less perfect.

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perfectiorem et aliam minus perfectam. Ergo nec anima potest simul recipere duplicem scientiam, unam perfectiorem et aliam minus perfectam. Et sic idem quod prius. Sed contra est quod dicitur Coloss. II, quod in Christo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, decebat quod natura humana assumpta a verbo Dei, imperfecta non esset. Omne autem quod est in potentia, est imperfectum nisi reducatur ad actum. Intellectus autem possibilis humanus est in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia. Reducitur autem ad actum per species intelligibiles, quae sunt formae quaedam completivae ipsius, ut patet ex his quae dicuntur in III de anima. Et ideo oportet in Christo scientiam ponere inditam, inquantum per verbum Dei animae Christi, sibi personaliter unitae, impressae sunt species intelligibiles ad omnia ad quae est intellectus possibilis in potentia, sicut etiam per verbum Dei impressae sunt species intelligibiles menti angelicae in principio creationis rerum, ut patet per Augustinum, super Gen. ad Litt. Et ideo, sicut in Angelis, secundum eundem Augustinum, ponitur duplex cognitio, una scilicet matutina, per quam cognoscunt res in verbo, et alia vespertina, per quam cognoscunt res in propria natura per species sibi inditas; ita, praeter scientiam divinam increatam, est in Christo, secundum eius animam, scientia beata, qua cognoscit verbum et res in verbo; et scientia indita sive infusa, per quam cognoscit res in propria natura per species intelligibiles humanae menti proportionatas. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod visio imperfecta fidei in sui ratione includit oppositum manifestae visionis, eo quod de ratione fidei est ut sit de non visis, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Sed cognitio quae est per species inditas, non includit aliquid oppositum cognitionis beatae. Et ideo non est eadem ratio utrobique. Ad secundum dicendum quod dispositio se habet ad perfectionem dupliciter, uno modo, sicut via ducens in perfectionem; alio modo, sicut effectus a perfectione procedens. Per calorem enim disponitur materia ad suscipiendum formam ignis, qua tamen adveniente, calor non cessat, sed remanet quasi quidam effectus talis formae. Et similiter opinio, ex syllogismo dialectico causata, est via ad scientiam, quae per demonstrationem acquiritur, qua tamen acquisita, potest remanere cognitio quae est per syllogismum dialecticum, quasi consequens scientiam demonstrativam quae est per causam; quia ille qui cognoscit causam, ex hoc etiam magis potest cognoscere signa probabilia, ex quibus procedit dialecticus syllogismus. Et similiter in Christo simul cum scientia beatitudinis manet scientia indita, non quasi via ad beatitudinem, sed quasi per beatitudinem confirmata.

Q. 9, A. 3

Therefore neither can the soul receive a double knowledge at once, one more perfect and the other less perfect; and hence the same conclusion as above. On the contrary, It is written (Col 2:3) that in Christ are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), it was fitting that the human nature assumed by the Word of God should not be imperfect. Now everything in potentiality is imperfect unless it be reduced to act. But the passive intellect of man is in potentiality to all intelligible things, and it is reduced to act by intelligible species, which are its completive forms, as is plain from what is said De Anima iii, 32, 38. And hence we must admit in the soul of Christ an infused knowledge, inasmuch as the Word of God imprinted upon the soul of Christ, which is personally united to Him, intelligible species of all things to which the possible intellect is in potentiality; even as in the beginning of the creation of things, the Word of God imprinted intelligible species upon the angelic mind, as is clear from Augustine (Gen ad lit. ii, 8). And therefore, even as in the angels, according to Augustine (Gen ad lit. iv, 22, 24, 30), there is a double knowledge—one the morning knowledge, whereby they know things in the Word; the other the evening knowledge, whereby they know things in their proper natures by infused species; so likewise, besides the Divine and uncreated knowledge in Christ, there is in His soul a beatific knowledge, whereby He knows the Word, and things in the Word; and an infused or imprinted knowledge, whereby He knows things in their proper nature by intelligible species proportioned to the human mind. Reply Obj. 1: The imperfect vision of faith is essentially opposed to manifest vision, seeing that it is of the essence of faith to have reference to the unseen, as was said above (II-II, Q. 1, A. 4). But cognition by infused species includes no opposition to beatific cognition. Therefore there is no parity. Reply Obj. 2: Disposition is referred to perfection in two ways: first, as a way leading to perfection; second, as an effect proceeding from perfection; thus matter is disposed by heat to receive the form of fire, and, when this comes, the heat does not cease, but remains as an effect of this form. So, too, opinion caused by a dialectical syllogism is a way to knowledge, which is acquired by demonstration, yet, when this has been acquired, there may still remain the knowledge gained by the dialectical syllogism, following, so to say, the demonstrative knowledge, which is based on the cause, since he who knows the cause is thereby enabled the better to understand the probable signs from which dialectical syllogisms proceed. So likewise in Christ, together with the beatific knowledge, there still remains infused knowledge, not as a way to beatitude, but as strengthened by beatitude.

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Incarnation

Ad tertium dicendum quod cognitio beata non fit per speciem quae sit similitudo divinae essentiae, vel eorum quae in divina essentia cognoscuntur, ut patet ex his quae in prima parte dicta sunt, sed talis cognitio est ipsius divinae essentiae immediate, per hoc quod ipsa essentia divina unitur menti beatae sicut intelligibile intelligenti. Quae quidem essentia divina est forma excedens proportionem cuiuslibet creaturae. Unde nihil prohibet quin, cum hac forma superexcedente, simul insint rationali menti species intelligibiles proportionatae suae naturae.

IIIae

Reply Obj. 3: The beatific knowledge is not by a species, that is a similitude of the Divine Essence, or of whatever is known in the Divine Essence, as is plain from what has been said in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 2); but it is a knowledge of the Divine Essence immediately, inasmuch as the Divine Essence itself is united to the beatified mind as an intelligible to an intelligent being; and the Divine Essence is a form exceeding the capacity of any creature whatsoever. Hence, together with this super-exceeding form, there is nothing to hinder from being in the rational mind, intelligible species, proportioned to its nature.

Article 4 Whether Christ had any empiric and acquired knowledge? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit aliqua scientia experimentalis acquisita. Quidquid enim Christo conveniens fuit, excellentissime habuit. Sed Christus non habuit excellentissime scientiam acquisitam, non enim institit studio litterarum, quo perfectissime scientia acquiritur; dicitur enim Ioan. VII, mirabantur Iudaei, dicentes, quomodo hic litteras scit, cum non didicerit? Ergo videtur quod in Christo non fuerit aliqua scientia acquisita. Praeterea, ei quod est plenum, non potest aliquid superaddi. Sed potentia animae Christi fuit impleta per species intelligibiles divinitus inditas, ut dictum est. Non ergo potuerunt supervenire eius animae aliquae species acquisitae. Praeterea, in eo qui iam habitum scientiae habet, per ea quae a sensu accipit, non acquiritur novus habitus, quia sic duae formae eiusdem speciei simul essent in eodem, sed habitus qui prius inerat, confirmatur et augetur. Cum ergo Christus habuerit habitum scientiae inditae, non videtur quod per ea quae sensu percepit, aliquam aliam scientiam acquisierit. Sed contra est quod Heb. V dicitur, cum esset filius Dei, didicit ex his quae passus est, obedientiam, Glossa, idest, expertus est. Fuit ergo in Christo aliqua experimentalis scientia, quae est scientia acquisita. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, nihil eorum quae Deus in nostra natura plantavit, defuit humanae naturae assumptae a verbo Dei. Manifestum est autem quod in humana natura Deus plantavit non solum intellectum possibilem, sed etiam intellectum agentem. Unde necesse est dicere quod in anima Christi non solum intellectus possibilis, sed etiam intellectus agens fuerit. Si autem in aliis Deus et natura nihil frustra fecerunt, ut philosophus dicit, in I de caelo et mundo,

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no empiric and acquired knowledge. For whatever befitted Christ, He had most perfectly. Now Christ did not possess acquired knowledge most perfectly, since He did not devote Himself to the study of letters, by which knowledge is acquired in its perfection; for it is said (John 7:15): The Jews wondered, saying: How doth this Man know letters, having never learned? Therefore it seems that in Christ there was no acquired knowledge. Obj. 2: Further, nothing can be added to what is full. But the power of Christ’s soul was filled with intelligible species divinely infused, as was said above (A. 3). Therefore no acquired species could accrue to His soul. Obj. 3: Further, he who already has the habit of knowledge, acquires no new habit through what he receives from the senses (otherwise two forms of the same species would be in the same thing together); but the habit which previously existed is strengthened and increased. Therefore, since Christ had the habit of infused knowledge, it does not seem that He acquired a new knowledge through what He perceived by the senses. On the contrary, It is written (Heb 5:8): Whereas . . . He was the Son of God, He learned obedience by the things which He suffered, i.e., experienced, says a gloss. Therefore there was in the soul of Christ an empiric knowledge, which is acquired knowledge. I answer that, As is plain from A. 1, nothing that God planted in our nature was wanting to the human nature assumed by the Word of God. Now it is manifest that God planted in human nature not only a passive, but an active intellect. Hence it is necessary to say that in the soul of Christ there was not merely a passive, but also an active intellect. But if in other things God and nature make nothing in vain, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 31; ii, 59), still less in the soul of Christ is there anything in vain. Now

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multo minus in anima Christi aliquid fuit frustra. Frustra autem est quod non habet propriam operationem, cum omnis res sit propter suam operationem, ut dicitur in II de caelo et mundo. Propria autem operatio intellectus agentis est facere species intelligibiles actu, abstrahendo eas a phantasmatibus, unde dicitur in III de anima quod intellectus agens est quo est omnia facere. Sic igitur necesse est dicere quod in Christo fuerunt aliquae species intelligibiles per actionem intellectus agentis in intellectu possibili eius receptae. Quod est esse in ipso scientiam acquisitam, quam quidam experimentalem nominant. Et ideo, quamvis aliter alibi scripserim, dicendum est in Christo scientiam acquisitam fuisse. Quae proprie est scientia secundum modum humanum, non solum ex parte recipientis subiecti, sed etiam ex parte causae agentis, nam talis scientia ponitur in Christo secundum lumen intellectus agentis, quod est humanae naturae connaturale. Scientia autem infusa attribuitur animae humanae secundum lumen desuper infusum, qui modus cognoscendi est proportionatus naturae angelicae. Scientia vero beata, per quam ipsa Dei essentia videtur, est propria et connaturalis soli Deo, ut in prima parte dictum est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum duplex sit modus acquirendi scientiam, scilicet inveniendo et addiscendo, modus qui est per inventionem est praecipuus, modus autem qui est per disciplinam est secundarius. Unde dicitur in I Ethic., ille quidem est optimus qui omnia per seipsum intelligit, bonus autem et ille qui bene dicenti obediet. Et ideo Christo magis competebat habere scientiam acquisitam per inventionem quam per disciplinam, praesertim cum ipse daretur a Deo omnibus in doctorem, secundum illud Ioel II, laetamini in domino Deo vestro, quia dedit vobis doctorem iustitiae. Ad secundum dicendum quod humana mens duplicem habet respectum. Unum quidem ad superiora. Et secundum hunc respectum, anima Christi fuit plena per scientiam inditam. Alius autem respectus eius est ad inferiora, idest ad phantasmata, quae sunt nata movere mentem humanam per virtutem intellectus agentis. Oportuit autem quod etiam secundum hunc respectum anima Christi scientia impleretur, non quin prima plenitudo menti humanae sufficeret secundum seipsam; sed oportebat eam perfici etiam secundum comparationem ad phantasmata. Ad tertium dicendum quod alia ratio est de habitu acquisito, et de habitu infuso. Nam habitus scientiae acquiritur per comparationem humanae mentis ad phantasmata, unde secundum eandem rationem non potest alius habitus iterato acquiri. Sed habitus scientiae infusae est alterius rationis, utpote a superiori descendens in animam, non secundum proportionem phantasmatum. Et ideo non est eadem ratio de utroque habitu.

Q. 9, A. 4

what has not its proper operation is useless, as is said in De Coelo ii, 17. Now the proper operation of the active intellect is to make intelligible species in act, by abstracting them from phantasms; hence, it is said (De Anima iii, 18) that the active intellect is that whereby everything is made actual. And thus it is necessary to say that in Christ there were intelligible species received in the passive intellect by the action of the active intellect—which means that there was acquired knowledge in Him, which some call empiric. And hence, although I wrote differently (Sent. iii, D, xiv, A. 3; D, xviii, A. 3), it must be said that in Christ there was acquired knowledge, which is properly knowledge in a human fashion, both as regards the subject receiving and as regards the active cause. For such knowledge springs from Christ’s active intellect, which is natural to the human soul. But infused knowledge is attributed to the soul, on account of a light infused from on high, and this manner of knowing is proportioned to the angelic nature. But the beatific knowledge, whereby the very Essence of God is seen, is proper and natural to God alone, as was said in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 4).

Reply Obj. 1: Since there is a twofold way of acquiring knowledge—by discovery and by being taught—the way of discovery is the higher, and the way of being taught is secondary. Hence it is said (Ethic. i, 4): He indeed is the best who knows everything by himself: yet he is good who obeys him that speaks aright. And hence it was more fitting for Christ to possess a knowledge acquired by discovery than by being taught, especially since He was given to be the Teacher of all, according to Joel 2:23: Be joyful in the Lord your God, because He hath given you a Teacher of justice. Reply Obj. 2: The human mind has two relations—one to higher things, and in this respect the soul of Christ was full of the infused knowledge. The other relation is to lower things, i.e., to phantasms, which naturally move the human mind by virtue of the active intellect. Now it was necessary that even in this respect the soul of Christ should be filled with knowledge, not that the first fullness was insufficient for the human mind in itself, but that it behooved it to be also perfected with regard to phantasms.

Reply Obj. 3: Acquired and infused habits are not to be classed together; for the habit of knowledge is acquired by the relation of the human mind to phantasms; hence, another habit of the same kind cannot be again acquired. But the habit of infused knowledge is of a different nature, as coming down to the soul from on high, and not from phantasms. And hence there is no parity between these habits.

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Question 10 The Beatific Knowledge of Christ’s Soul Deinde considerandum est de qualibet praedictarum scientiarum. Sed quia de scientia divina dictum est in prima parte, restat nunc videre de aliis, primo, de scientia beata; secundo, de scientia indita; tertio, de scientia acquisita. Sed quia de scientia beata, quae in Dei visione consistit, plura dicta sunt in prima parte, ideo hic sola illa videntur dicenda quae pertinent ad animam Christi. Circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum anima Christi comprehenderit verbum, sive divinam essentiam. Secundo, utrum cognoverit omnia in verbo. Tertio, utrum anima Christi in verbo cognoverit infinita. Quarto, utrum videat verbum, vel divinam essentiam, clarius qualibet alia creatura.

Now we must consider each of the aforesaid knowledges. Since, however, we have treated of the Divine knowledge in the First Part (Q. 14), it now remains to speak of the three others: (1) of the beatific knowledge; (2) of the infused knowledge; (3) of the acquired knowledge. But again, because much has been said in the First Part (Q. 12) of the beatific knowledge, which consists in the vision of God, we shall speak here only of such things as belong properly to the soul of Christ. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the soul of Christ comprehended the Word or the Divine Essence? (2) Whether it knew all things in the Word? (3) Whether the soul of Christ knew the infinite in the Word? (4) Whether it saw the Word or the Divine Essence clearer than did any other creature?

Article 1 Whether the soul of Christ comprehended the Word or the Divine Essence? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi comprehenderit et comprehendat verbum, sive divinam essentiam. Dicit enim Isidorus quod Trinitas sibi soli nota est, et homini assumpto. Igitur homo assumptus communicat cum sancta Trinitate in illa notitia sui quae est sanctae Trinitatis propria. Huiusmodi autem est notitia comprehensionis. Ergo anima Christi comprehendit divinam essentiam. Praeterea, magis est uniri Deo secundum esse personale quam secundum visionem. Sed, sicut Damascenus dicit, in III libro, tota divinitas, in una personarum, est unita humanae naturae in Christo. Multo igitur magis tota natura divina videtur ab anima Christi. Et ita videtur quod anima Christi comprehendat divinam essentiam. Preaterea, illud quod convenit filio Dei per naturam, convenit filio hominis per gratiam, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Trinitate. Sed comprehendere divinam essentiam competit filio Dei per naturam. Ergo filio hominis competit per gratiam. Et ita videtur quod anima Christi per gratiam verbum comprehendat. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octogintatrium quaest., quod se comprehendit, finitum est

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ comprehended and comprehends the Word or Divine Essence. For Isidore says (De Summo Bono i, 3) that the Trinity is known only to Itself and to the Man assumed. Therefore the Man assumed communicates with the Holy Trinity in that knowledge of Itself which is proper to the Trinity. Now this is the knowledge of comprehension. Therefore the soul of Christ comprehends the Divine Essence. Obj. 2: Further, to be united to God in personal being is greater than to be united by vision. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6), the whole Godhead in one Person is united to the human nature in Christ. Therefore much more is the whole Divine Nature seen by the soul of Christ; and hence it would seem that the soul of Christ comprehended the Divine Essence. Obj. 3: Further, what belongs by nature to the Son of God belongs by grace to the Son of Man, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 13). But to comprehend the Divine Essence belongs by nature to the Son of God. Therefore it belongs by grace to the Son of Man; and thus it seems that the soul of Christ comprehended the Divine Essence by grace. On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 14): Whatsoever comprehends itself is finite to itself. But the

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sibi. Sed essentia divina non est finita in comparatione ad animam Christi, cum in infinitum eam excedat. Ergo anima Christi non comprehendit verbum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, sic facta est unio naturarum in persona Christi quod tamen proprietas utriusque naturae inconfusa permansit, ita scilicet quod increatum mansit increatum, et creatum mansit infra limites creaturae, sicut Damascenus dicit, in III libro. Est autem impossibile quod aliqua creatura comprehendat divinam essentiam, sicut in prima parte dictum est, eo quod infinitum non comprehenditur a finito. Et ideo dicendum quod anima Christi nullo modo comprehendit divinam essentiam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo assumptus connumeratur divinae Trinitati in sui cognitione, non ratione comprehensionis, sed ratione cuiusdam excellentissimae cognitionis prae ceteris creaturis. Ad secundum dicendum quod nec etiam in unione quae est secundum esse personale, natura humana comprehendit verbum Dei, sive naturam divinam, quae quamvis tota unita fuerit humanae naturae in una persona filii, non tamen fuit tota virtus divinitatis ab humana natura quasi circumscripta. Unde Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Volusianum, scire te volo non hoc Christianam habere doctrinam, quod ita Deus infusus sit carni ut curam gubernandae universitatis vel deseruerit vel amiserit, vel ad illud corpusculum quasi contractam collectamque transtulerit. Et similiter anima Christi totam essentiam Dei videt, non tamen eam comprehendit, quia non totaliter eam videt, idest, non ita perfecte sicut visibilis est, ut in prima parte expositum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum illud Augustini est intelligendum de gratia unionis, secundum quam omnia quae dicuntur de filio Dei secundum naturam divinam, dicuntur de filio hominis, propter identitatem suppositi. Et secundum hoc, vere potest dici quod filius hominis est comprehensor divinae essentiae, non quidem secundum animam, sed secundum divinam naturam. Per quem etiam modum potest dici quod filius hominis est creator.

IIIae

Divine Essence is not finite with respect to the soul of Christ, since It infinitely exceeds it. Therefore the soul of Christ does not comprehend the Word. I answer that, As is plain from Q. 2, AA. 1, 6, the union of the two natures in the Person of Christ took place in such a way that the properties of both natures remained unconfused, i.e., the uncreated remained uncreated, and the created remained within the limits of the creature, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3, 4). Now it is impossible for any creature to comprehend the Divine Essence, as was shown in the First Part (Q. 12, AA. 1, 4, 7), seeing that the infinite is not comprehended by the finite. And hence it must be said that the soul of Christ nowise comprehends the Divine Essence. Reply Obj. 1: The Man assumed is reckoned with the Divine Trinity in the knowledge of Itself, not indeed as regards comprehension, but by reason of a certain most excellent knowledge above the rest of creatures. Reply Obj. 2: Not even in the union by personal being does the human nature comprehend the Word of God or the Divine Nature, for although it was wholly united to the human nature in the one Person of the Son, yet the whole power of the Godhead was not circumscribed by the human nature. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): I would have you know that it is not the Christian doctrine that God was united to flesh in such a manner as to quit or lose the care of the world’s government, neither did He narrow or reduce it when He transferred it to that little body. So likewise the soul of Christ sees the whole Essence of God, yet does not comprehend It; since it does not see It totally, i.e., not as perfectly as It is knowable, as was said in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 7). Reply Obj. 3: This saying of Augustine is to be understood of the grace of union, by reason of which all that is said of the Son of God in His Divine Nature is also said of the Son of Man on account of the identity of suppositum. And in this way it may be said that the Son of Man is a comprehensor of the Divine Essence, not indeed by His soul, but in His Divine Nature; even as we may also say that the Son of Man is the Creator.

Article 2 Whether the Son of God knew all things in the Word? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi in verbo non cognoscat omnia. Dicitur enim Marci XIII, de die autem illa nemo scit, neque Angeli in caelo neque filius, nisi pater. Non igitur omnia scit in verbo. Praeterea, quanto aliquis perfectius cognoscit aliquod principium, tanto plura in illo principio cognoscit.

Obj. 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ does not know all things in the Word. For it is written (Mark 13:32): But of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven nor the Son, but the Father. Therefore He does not know all things in the Word. Obj. 2: Further, the more perfectly anyone knows a principle the more he knows in the principle. But God sees

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Sed Deus perfectius videt essentiam suam quam anima Christi. Ergo plura cognoscit in verbo quam anima Christi. Non ergo anima Christi in verbo cognoscit omnia. Praeterea, quantitas scientiae attenditur secundum quantitatem scibilium. Si ergo anima Christi sciret in verbo omnia quae scit verbum, sequeretur quod scientia animae Christi aequaretur scientiae divinae, creatum videlicet increato. Quod est impossibile.

Q. 10, A. 2

His Essence more perfectly than the soul of Christ does. Therefore He knows more than the soul of Christ knows in the Word. Therefore the soul of Christ does not know all things in the Word. Obj. 3: Further, the extent depends on the number of things known. If, therefore, the soul of Christ knew in the Word all that the Word knows, it would follow that the knowledge of the soul of Christ would equal the Divine knowledge, i.e., the created would equal the uncreated, which is impossible. On the contrary, on Apoc. 5:12, The Lamb that was slain is worthy to receive . . . divinity and wisdom, a gloss says, i.e., the knowledge of all things. I answer that, When it is inquired whether Christ knows all things in the Word, all things may be taken in two ways: First, properly, to stand for all that in any way whatsoever is, will be, or was done, said, or thought, by whomsoever and at any time. And in this way it must be said that the soul of Christ knows all things in the Word. For every created intellect knows in the Word, not all simply, but so many more things the more perfectly it sees the Word. Yet no beatified intellect fails to know in the Word whatever pertains to itself. Now to Christ and to His dignity all things to some extent belong, inasmuch as all things are subject to Him. Moreover, He has been appointed Judge of all by God, because He is the Son of Man, as is said John 5:27; and therefore the soul of Christ knows in the Word all things existing in whatever time, and the thoughts of men, of which He is the Judge, so that what is said of Him (John 2:25), For He knew what was in man, can be understood not merely of the Divine knowledge, but also of His soul’s knowledge, which it had in the Word. Second, all things may be taken widely, as extending not merely to such things as are in act at some time, but even to such things as are in potentiality, and never have been nor ever will be reduced to act. Now some of these are in the Divine power alone, and not all of these does the soul of Christ know in the Word. For this would be to comprehend all that God could do, which would be to comprehend the Divine power, and, consequently, the Divine Essence. For every power is known from the knowledge of all it can do. Some, however, are not only in the power of God, but also in the power of the creature; and all of these the soul of Christ knows in the Word; for it comprehends in the Word the essence of every creature, and, consequently, its power and virtue, and all things that are in the power of the creature.

Sed contra est quod, super illud Apoc. V, dignus est agnus qui occisus est accipere divinitatem et scientiam, Glossa dicit, idest, omnium cognitionem. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum quaeritur an Christus cognoscat omnia in verbo, dicendum est quod ly omnia potest dupliciter accipi. Uno modo, proprie, ut distribuat pro omnibus quae quocumque modo sunt vel erunt vel fuerunt, vel facta vel dicta vel cogitata a quocumque, secundum quodcumque tempus. Et sic dicendum est quod anima Christi in verbo cognoscit omnia. Unusquisque enim intellectus creatus in verbo cognoscit, non quidem omnia simpliciter, sed tanto plura quanto perfectius videt verbum, nulli tamen intellectui beato deest quin cognoscat in verbo omnia quae ad ipsum spectant. Ad Christum autem, et ad eius dignitatem, spectant quodammodo omnia, inquantum ei subiecta sunt omnia. Ipse est etiam omnium iudex constitutus a Deo, quia filius hominis est, ut dicitur Ioan. V. Et ideo anima Christi in verbo cognoscit omnia existentia secundum quodcumque tempus, et etiam hominum cogitatus, quorum est iudex, ita quod de eo dicitur, Ioan. II, ipse enim sciebat quid esset in homine; quod potest intelligi non solum quantum ad scientiam divinam, sed etiam quantum ad scientiam animae eius quam habet in verbo. Alio modo ly omnia potest accipi magis large, ut extendatur non solum ad omnia quae sunt actu secundum quodcumque tempus, sed etiam ad omnia quaecumque sunt in potentia nunquam reducta ad actum. Horum autem quaedam sunt solum in potentia divina. Et huiusmodi non omnia cognoscit in verbo anima Christi. Hoc enim esset comprehendere omnia quae Deus potest facere, quod esset comprehendere divinam virtutem, et per consequens divinam essentiam; virtus enim quaelibet cognoscitur per cognitionem eorum in quae potest. Quaedam vero sunt non solum in potentia divina, sed etiam in potentia creaturae. Et huiusmodi omnia cognoscit anima Christi in verbo. Comprehendit enim in verbo omnis creaturae essentiam, et per consequens potentiam et virtutem, et omnia quae sunt in potentia creaturae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud verbum inReply Obj. 1: Arius and Eunomius understood this tellexerunt Arius et Eunomius, non quantum ad scien- saying, not of the knowledge of the soul, which they did not tiam animae, quam in Christo non ponebant, ut supra hold to be in Christ, as was said above (Q. 9, A. 1), but of dictum est, sed quantum ad divinam cognitionem filii, the Divine knowledge of the Son, Whom they held to be

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quem ponebant esse minorem patre quantum ad scientiam. Sed istud stare non potest. Quia per verbum Dei facta sunt omnia, ut dicitur Ioan. I, et, inter alia, facta sunt etiam per ipsum omnia tempora. Nihil autem per ipsum factum est quod ab eo ignoretur. Dicitur ergo nescire diem et horam iudicii, quia non facit scire, interrogatus enim ab apostolis super hoc, Act. I, hoc eis noluit revelare. Sicut e contrario legitur Gen. XXII, nunc cognovi quod timeas Deum, idest, nunc cognoscere feci. Dicitur autem pater scire, eo quod huiusmodi cognitionem tradidit filio. Unde in hoc ipso quod dicitur, nisi pater, datur intelligi quod filius cognoscat, non solum quantum ad divinam naturam, sed etiam quantum ad humanam. Quia, ut Chrysostomus argumentatur, si Christo homini datum est ut sciat qualiter oporteat iudicare, quod est maius; multo magis datum est ei scire quod est minus, scilicet tempus iudicii. Origenes tamen hoc exponit de Christo secundum corpus eius, quod est Ecclesia, quae hoc ipsum tempus ignorat. Quidam autem dicunt hoc esse intelligendum de filio Dei adoptivo, non de naturali. Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus perfectius cognoscit suam essentiam quam anima Christi, quia eam comprehendit. Et ideo cognoscit omnia non solum quae sunt in actu secundum quodcumque tempus, quae dicitur cognoscere scientia visionis; sed etiam omnia quaecumque ipse potest facere, quae dicitur cognoscere per simplicem intelligentiam, ut in primo habitum est. Scit ergo anima Christi omnia quae Deus in seipso cognoscit per scientiam visionis, non tamen omnia quae Deus in seipso cognoscit per scientiam simplicis intelligentiae. Et ita plura scit Deus in seipso quam anima Christi. Ad tertium dicendum quod quantitas scientiae non solum attenditur secundum numerum scibilium, sed etiam secundum claritatem cognitionis. Quamvis igitur scientia animae Christi quam habet in verbo, parificetur scientiae visionis quam Deus habet in seipso quantum ad numerum scibilium; scientia tamen Dei excedit in infinitum, quantum ad claritatem cognitionis, scientiam animae Christi. Quia lumen increatum divini intellectus in infinitum excedit lumen creatum quodcumque receptum in anima Christi, non solum quantum ad modum cognoscendi, sed etiam quantum ad numerum scibilium, ut dictum est.

IIIae

less than the Father as regards knowledge. But this will not stand, since all things were made by the Word of God, as is said John 1:3, and, amongst other things, all times were made by Him. Now He is not ignorant of anything that was made by Him. He is said, therefore, not to know the day and the hour of the Judgment, for that He does not make it known, since, on being asked by the apostles (Acts 1:7), He was unwilling to reveal it; and, on the contrary, we read (Gen 22:12): Now I know that thou fearest God, i.e., Now I have made thee know. But the Father is said to know, because He imparted this knowledge to the Son. Hence, by saying but the Father, we are given to understand that the Son knows, not merely in the Divine Nature, but also in the human, because, as Chrysostom argues (Hom. lxxviii in Matth.), if it is given to Christ as man to know how to judge—which is greater— much more is it given to Him to know the less, viz. the time of Judgment. Origen, however (in Matth. Tract. xxx), expounds it of His body, which is the Church, which is ignorant of this time. Lastly, some say this is to be understood of the adoptive, and not of the natural Son of God. Reply Obj. 2: God knows His Essence so much the more perfectly than the soul of Christ, as He comprehends it. And hence He knows all things, not merely whatever are in act at any time, which things He is said to know by knowledge of vision, but also what ever He Himself can do, which He is said to know by simple intelligence, as was shown in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 9). Therefore the soul of Christ knows all things that God knows in Himself by the knowledge of vision, but not all that God knows in Himself by knowledge of simple intelligence; and thus in Himself God knows many more things than the soul of Christ. Reply Obj. 3: The extent of knowledge depends not merely on the number of knowable things, but also on the clearness of the knowledge. Therefore, although the knowledge of the soul of Christ which He has in the Word is equal to the knowledge of vision as regards the number of things known, nevertheless the knowledge of God infinitely exceeds the knowledge of the soul of Christ in clearness of cognition, since the uncreated light of the Divine intellect infinitely exceeds any created light received by the soul of Christ; although, absolutely speaking, the Divine knowledge exceeds the knowledge of the soul of Christ, not only as regards the mode of knowing, but also as regards the number of things known, as was stated above.

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Beatific Knowledge of Christ’s Soul

Q. 10, A. 3

Article 3 Whether the soul of Christ can know the infinite in the Word? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi non possit cognoscere infinita in verbo. Quod enim infinitum cognoscatur, repugnat definitioni infiniti, prout dicitur in III Physic. quod infinitum est cuius quantitatem accipientibus semper est aliquid extra accipere. Impossibile autem est definitionem a definito separari, quia hoc esset contradictoria esse simul. Ergo impossibile est quod anima Christi sciat infinita. Praeterea, infinitorum scientia est infinita. Sed scientia animae Christi non potest esse infinita, est enim capacitas eius finita, cum sit creatura. Non ergo anima Christi potest cognoscere infinita. Praeterea, infinito non potest esse aliquid maius. Sed plura continentur in scientia divina, absolute loquendo, quam in scientia animae Christi, ut dictum est. Ergo anima Christi non cognoscit infinita. Sed contra, anima Christi cognoscit totam suam potentiam, et omnia in quae potest. Potest autem in emundationem infinitorum peccatorum, secundum illud I Ioan. II, ipse est propitiatio pro peccatis nostris, non autem pro nostris tantum, sed etiam totius mundi. Ergo anima Christi cognoscit infinita. Respondeo dicendum quod scientia non est nisi entis, eo quod ens et verum convertuntur. Dupliciter autem dicitur aliquid ens, uno modo, simpliciter, quod scilicet est ens actu; alio modo, secundum quid, quod scilicet est ens in potentia. Et quia, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys., unumquodque cognoscitur secundum quod est actu, non autem secundum quod est in potentia, scientia primo et principaliter respicit ens actu. Secundario autem respicit ens in potentia, quod quidem non secundum seipsum cognoscibile est, sed secundum quod cognoscitur illud in cuius potentia existit. Quantum igitur ad primum modum scientiae, anima Christi non scit infinita. Quia non sunt infinita in actu, etiam si accipiantur omnia quaecumque sunt in actu secundum quodcumque tempus, eo quod status generationis et corruptionis non durat in infinitum; unde est certus numerus non solum eorum quae sunt absque generatione et corruptione, sed etiam generabilium et corruptibilium. Quantum vero ad alium modum sciendi, anima Christi in verbo scit infinita. Scit enim, ut dictum est, omnia quae sunt in potentia creaturae. Unde, cum in potentia creaturae sint infinita, per hunc modum scit infinita, quasi quadam scientia simplicis intelligentiae, non autem scientia visionis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod infinitum, sicut in prima parte dictum est, dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, se-

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ cannot know the infinite in the Word. For that the infinite should be known is repugnant to the definition of the infinite which (Phys. iii, 63) is said to be that from which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken. But it is impossible for the definition to be separated from the thing defined, since this would mean that contradictories exist together. Therefore it is impossible that the soul of Christ knows the infinite. Obj. 2: Further, the knowledge of the infinite is infinite. But the knowledge of the soul of Christ cannot be infinite, because its capacity is finite, since it is created. Therefore the soul of Christ cannot know the infinite. Obj. 3: Further, there can be nothing greater than the infinite. But more is contained in the Divine knowledge, absolutely speaking, than in the knowledge of Christ’s soul, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore the soul of Christ does not know the infinite. On the contrary, The soul of Christ knows all its power and all it can do. Now it can cleanse infinite sins, according to 1 John 2:2: He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world. Therefore the soul of Christ knows the infinite. I answer that, Knowledge regards only being, since being and truth are convertible. Now a thing is said to be a being in two ways: First, simply, i.e., whatever is a being in act; second, relatively, i.e., whatever is a being in potentiality. And because, as is said Metaph. ix, 20, everything is known as it is in act, and not as it is in potentiality, knowledge primarily and essentially regards being in act, and secondarily regards being in potentiality, which is not knowable of itself, but inasmuch as that in whose power it exists is known. Hence, with regard to the first mode of knowledge, the soul of Christ does not know the infinite. Because there is not an infinite number in act, even though we were to reckon all that are in act at any time whatsoever, since the state of generation and corruption will not last for ever: consequently there is a certain number not only of things lacking generation and corruption, but also of things capable of generation and corruption. But with regard to the other mode of knowing, the soul of Christ knows infinite things in the Word, for it knows, as stated above (A. 2), all that is in the power of the creature. Hence, since in the power of the creature there is an infinite number of things, it knows the infinite, as it were, by a certain knowledge of simple intelligence, and not by a knowledge of vision. Reply Obj. 1: As we said in the First Part (Q. 8, A. 1), the infinite is taken in two ways. First, on the part of a form,

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cundum rationem formae. Et sic dicitur infinitum negative, scilicet id quod est forma vel actus non limitatus per materiam vel subiectum in quo recipiatur. Et huiusmodi infinitum, quantum est de se, est maxime cognoscibile, propter perfectionem actus, licet non sit comprehensibile a potentia finita creaturae, sic enim dicitur Deus infinitus. Et tale infinitum anima Christi cognoscit, licet non comprehendat. Alio modo dicitur infinitum secundum potentiam materiae. Quod quidem dicitur privative, ex hoc scilicet quod non habet formam quam natum est habere. Et per hunc modum dicitur infinitum in quantitate. Tale autem infinitum ex sui ratione est ignotum, quia scilicet est quasi materia cum privatione formae, ut dicitur in III Physic.; omnis autem cognitio est per formam vel actum. Sic igitur, si huiusmodi infinitum cognosci debeat secundum modum ipsius cogniti, impossibile est quod cognoscatur, est enim modus ipsius ut accipiatur pars eius post partem, ut dicitur in III Physic. Et hoc modo verum est quod eius quantitatem accipientibus, scilicet parte accepta post partem, semper est aliquid extra accipere. Sed sicut materialia possunt accipi ab intellectu immaterialiter, et multa unite, ita infinita possunt accipi ab intellectu non per modum infiniti, sed quasi finite, ut sic ea quae sunt in seipsis infinita, sint intellectui cognoscentis finita. Et hoc modo anima Christi scit infinita, inquantum scilicet scit ea, non discurrendo per singula, sed in aliquo uno; puta in aliqua creatura in cuius potentia praeexistunt infinita; et principaliter in ipso verbo. Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse infinitum uno modo quod est alio modo finitum, sicut si imaginemur in quantitatibus superficiem quae sit secundum longitudinem infinita secundum latitudinem autem finita. Sic igitur, si essent infiniti homines numero, haberent quidem infinita esse secundum aliquid, scilicet secundum multitudinem, secundum tamen rationem essentiae non haberent infinitatem, eo quod omnis essentia esset limitata sub ratione unius speciei. Sed illud quod est simpliciter infinitum secundum essentiae rationem, est Deus, ut in prima parte dictum est, proprium autem obiectum intellectus est quod quid est, ut dicitur in III de anima, ad quod pertinet ratio speciei. Sic igitur anima Christi, propter hoc quod habet capacitatem finitam, id quod est simpliciter infinitum secundum essentiam, scilicet Deum, attingit quidem, sed non comprehendit, ut dictum est. Id autem infinitum quod in creaturis est in potentia, potest comprehendi ab anima Christi, quia comparatur ad ipsam secundum essentiae rationem, ex qua parte infinitatem non habet. Nam etiam intellectus noster intelligit universale, puta naturam generis vel speciei, quod quodammodo habet infinitatem, inquantum potest de infinitis praedicari. Ad tertium dicendum quod id quod est infinitum omnibus modis, non potest esse nisi unum, unde et philosophus dicit, in I de caelo et mundo, quod quia cor-

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and thus we have the negatively infinite, i.e., a form or act not limited by being received into matter or a subject; and this infinite of itself is most knowable on account of the perfection of the act, although it is not comprehensible by the finite power of the creature; for thus God is said to be infinite. And this infinite the soul of Christ knows, yet does not comprehend. Second, there is the infinite as regards matter, which is taken privatively, i.e., inasmuch as it has not the form it ought naturally to have, and in this way we have infinite in quantity. Now such an infinite of itself, is unknown: inasmuch as it is, as it were, matter with privation of form as is said Phys. iii, 65. But all knowledge is by form or act. Therefore if this infinite is to be known according to its mode of being, it cannot be known. For its mode is that part be taken after part, as is said Phys. iii, 62, 63. And in this way it is true that, if we take something from it, i.e., taking part after part, there always remains something to be taken. But as material things can be received by the intellect immaterially, and many things unitedly, so can infinite things be received by the intellect, not after the manner of infinite, but finitely; and thus what are in themselves infinite are, in the intellect of the knower, finite. And in this way the soul of Christ knows an infinite number of things, inasmuch as it knows them not by discoursing from one to another, but in a certain unity, i.e., in any creature in whose potentiality infinite things exist, and principally in the Word Himself.

Reply Obj. 2: There is nothing to hinder a thing from being infinite in one way and finite in another, as when in quantities we imagine a surface infinite in length and finite in breadth. Hence, if there were an infinite number of men, they would have a relative infinity, i.e., in multitude; but, as regards the essence, they would be finite, since the essence of all would be limited to one specific nature. But what is simply infinite in its essence is God, as was said in the First Part (Q. 7, A. 2). Now the proper object of the intellect is what a thing is, as is said De Anima iii, 26, to which pertains the notion of the species. And thus the soul of Christ, since it has a finite capacity, attains to, but does not comprehend, what is simply infinite in essence, as stated above (A. 1). But the infinite in potentiality which is in creatures can be comprehended by the soul of Christ, since it is compared to that soul according to its essence, in which respect it is not infinite. For even our intellect understands a universal—for example, the nature of a genus or species, which in a manner has infinity, inasmuch as it can be predicated of an infinite number.

Reply Obj. 3: That which is infinite in every way can be but one. Hence the Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 2, 3) that, since bodies have dimensions in every part, there can-

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pus est ad omnem partem dimensionatum, impossibile est plura esse corpora infinita. Si tamen aliquid esset infinitum uno modo tantum, nihil prohiberet esse plura talia infinita, sicut si intelligeremus plures lineas infinitas secundum longitudinem protractas in aliqua superficie finita secundum latitudinem. Quia igitur infinitum non est substantia quaedam, sed accidit rebus quae dicuntur infinitae, ut dicitur in III Physic.; sicut infinitum multiplicatur secundum diversa subiecta, ita necesse est quod proprietas infiniti multiplicetur, ita quod conveniat unicuique eorum secundum illud subiectum. Est autem quaedam proprietas infiniti quod infinito non sit aliquid maius. Sic igitur, si accipiamus unam lineam infinitam, in illa non est aliquid maius infinito. Et similiter, si accipiamus quamcumque aliarum linearum infinitarum, manifestum est quod uniuscuiusque earum partes sunt infinitae. Oportet igitur quod omnibus illis infinitis non sit aliquid maius in illa linea, tamen in alia linea et in tertia erunt plures partes, etiam infinitae, praeter istas. Et hoc etiam videmus in numeris accidere, nam species numerorum parium sunt infinitae, et similiter species numerorum imparium; et tamen numeri et pares et impares sunt plures quam pares. Sic igitur dicendum quod infinito simpliciter quoad omnia, nihil est maius, infinito autem secundum aliquid determinatum, non est aliquid maius in illo ordine, potest tamen accipi aliquid maius extra illum ordinem. Per hunc igitur modum infinita sunt in potentia creaturae, et tamen plura sunt in potentia Dei quam in potentia creaturae. Et similiter anima Christi scit infinita scientia simplicis intelligentiae, plura tamen scit Deus secundum hunc intelligentiae modum.

Q. 10, A. 4

not be several infinite bodies. Yet if anything were infinite in one way only, nothing would hinder the existence of several such infinite things; as if we were to suppose several lines of infinite length drawn on a surface of finite breadth. Hence, because infinitude is not a substance, but is accidental to things that are said to be infinite, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, 37, 38); as the infinite is multiplied by different subjects, so, too, a property of the infinite must be multiplied, in such a way that it belongs to each of them according to that particular subject. Now it is a property of the infinite that nothing is greater than it. Hence, if we take one infinite line, there is nothing greater in it than the infinite; so, too, if we take any one of other infinite lines, it is plain that each has infinite parts. Therefore of necessity in this particular line there is nothing greater than all these infinite parts; yet in another or a third line there will be more infinite parts besides these. We observe this in numbers also, for the species of even numbers are infinite, and likewise the species of odd numbers are infinite; yet there are more even and odd numbers than even. And thus it must be said that nothing is greater than the simply and in every way infinite; but than the infinite which is limited in some respect, nothing is greater in that order; yet we may suppose something greater outside that order. In this way, therefore, there are infinite things in the potentiality of the creature, and yet there are more in the power of God than in the potentiality of the creature. So, too, the soul of Christ knows infinite things by the knowledge of simple intelligence; yet God knows more by this manner of knowledge or understanding.

Article 4 Whether the soul of Christ sees the Word more clearly than does any other creature? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi non perfectius videat verbum quam quaelibet alia creatura. Perfectio enim cognitionis est secundum medium cognoscendi, sicut perfectior est cognitio quae habetur per medium syllogismi demonstrativi, quam quae habetur per medium syllogismi dialectici. Sed omnes beati vident verbum immediate per ipsam divinam essentiam, ut in prima parte dictum est. Ergo anima Christi non perfectius videt verbum quam quaelibet alia creatura. Praeterea, perfectio visionis non excedit potentiam visivam. Sed potentia rationalis animae, qualis est anima Christi, est infra potentiam intellectivam Angeli, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. Cael. Hier. Ergo anima Christi non perfectius videt verbum quam Angeli.

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ does not see the Word more perfectly than does any other creature. For the perfection of knowledge depends upon the medium of knowing; as the knowledge we have by means of a demonstrative syllogism is more perfect than that which we have by means of a probable syllogism. But all the blessed see the Word immediately in the Divine Essence Itself, as was said in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 2). Therefore the soul of Christ does not see the Word more perfectly than any other creature. Obj. 2: Further, the perfection of vision does not exceed the power of seeing. But the rational power of a soul such as is the soul of Christ is below the intellective power of an angel, as is plain from Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the soul of Christ did not see the Word more perfectly than the angels.

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Praeterea, Deus in infinitum perfectius videt verbum suum quam anima. Sunt ergo infiniti gradus medii inter modum quo Deus videt verbum suum, et inter modum quo anima Christi videt ipsum. Ergo non est asserendum quod anima Christi perfectius videat verbum, vel essentiam divinam, quam quaelibet alia creatura. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Ephes. I, quod Deus constituit Christum in caelestibus super omnem principatum et potestatem et virtutem et dominationem, et omne nomen quod nominatur, non solum in hoc saeculo, sed etiam in futuro. Sed in caelesti gloria tanto aliquis est superior quanto perfectius cognoscit Deum. Ergo anima Christi perfectius videt Deum quam quaevis alia creatura. Respondeo dicendum quod divinae essentiae visio convenit omnibus beatis secundum participationem luminis derivati ad eos a fonte verbi Dei, secundum illud Eccli. I, fons sapientiae verbum Dei in excelsis. Huic autem verbo Dei propinquius coniungitur anima Christi, quae est unita verbo in persona, quam quaevis alia creatura. Et ideo plenius recipit influentiam luminis in quo Deus videtur ab ipso verbo, quam quaecumque alia creatura. Et ideo prae ceteris creaturis perfectius videt ipsam primam veritatem, quae est Dei essentia. Et ideo dicitur Ioan. I, vidimus gloriam eius, quasi unigeniti a patre, plenum non solum gratiae, sed etiam veritatis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod perfectio cognitionis, quantum est ex parte cogniti, attenditur secundum medium, sed quantum est ex parte cognoscentis, attenditur secundum potentiam vel habitum. Et inde est quod etiam inter homines per unum medium unus perfectius cognoscit aliquam conclusionem quam alius. Et per hunc modum anima Christi, quae abundantiori impletur lumine, perfectius cognoscit divinam essentiam quam alii beati, licet omnes Dei essentiam videant per seipsam. Ad secundum dicendum quod visio divinae essentiae excedit naturalem potentiam cuiuslibet creaturae, ut in prima parte dictum est. Et ideo gradus in ipso attenduntur magis secundum ordinem gratiae, in quo Christus est excellentissimus, quam secundum ordinem naturae, secundum quem natura angelica praefertur humanae. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est de gratia quod non potest esse maior gratia quam gratia Christi per respectum ad unionem verbi, idem etiam dicendum est de perfectione divinae visionis, licet, absolute considerando, possit aliquis gradus esse sublimior secundum infinitatem divinae potentiae.

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Obj. 3: Further, God sees His Word infinitely more perfectly than does the soul of Christ. Hence there are infinite possible mediate degrees between the manner in which God sees His Word, and the manner in which the soul of Christ sees the Word. Therefore we cannot assert that the soul of Christ sees the Word or the Divine Essence more perfectly than does every other creature. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph 1:20, 21) that God set Christ on His right hand in the heavenly places, above all principality and power and virtue and dominion and every name that is named not only in this world, but also in that which is to come. But in that heavenly glory the higher anyone is the more perfectly does he know God. Therefore the soul of Christ sees God more perfectly than does any other creature. I answer that, The vision of the Divine Essence is granted to all the blessed by a partaking of the Divine light which is shed upon them from the fountain of the Word of God, according to Ecclus. 1:5: The Word of God on high is the fountain of Wisdom. Now the soul of Christ, since it is united to the Word in person, is more closely joined to the Word of God than any other creature. Hence it more fully receives the light in which God is seen from the Word Himself than any other creature. And therefore more perfectly than the rest of creatures it sees the First Truth itself, which is the Essence of God; hence it is written (John 1:14): And we saw His glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father, full not only of grace but also of truth. Reply Obj. 1: Perfection of knowledge, on the part of the thing known, depends on the medium; but as regards the knower, it depends on the power or habit. And hence it is that even amongst men one sees a conclusion in a medium more perfectly than another does. And in this way the soul of Christ, which is filled with a more abundant light, knows the Divine Essence more perfectly than do the other blessed, although all see the Divine Essence in itself.

Reply Obj. 2: The vision of the Divine Essence exceeds the natural power of any creature, as was said in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 4). And hence the degrees thereof depend rather on the order of grace in which Christ is supreme, than on the order of nature, in which the angelic nature is placed before the human. Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 7, A. 12), there cannot be a greater grace than the grace of Christ with respect to the union with the Word; and the same is to be said of the perfection of the Divine vision; although, absolutely speaking, there could be a higher and more sublime degree by the infinity of the Divine power.

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Question 11 The Knowledge Imprinted or Infused in the Soul of Christ Deinde considerandum est de scientia indita vel inWe must now consider the knowledge imprinted or infusa animae Christi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. fused in the soul of Christ, and under this head there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum per hanc scientiam Christus sciat (1) Whether Christ knows all things by this omnia. knowledge? Secundo, utrum hac scientia uti potuerit non (2) Whether, not turning to phantasms, He could use convertendo se ad phantasmata. this knowledge? Tertio, utrum haec scientia fuerit collativa. (3) Whether this knowledge was collative? Quarto, de comparatione huius scientiae ad (4) Of the comparison of this knowledge with the scientiam angelicam. angelic knowledge; Quinto, utrum fuerit scientia habitualis. (5) Whether it was a habitual knowledge? Sexto, utrum fuerit distincta per diversos habitus. (6) Whether it was distinguished by various habits?

Article 1 Whether by this knowledge Christ knew all things? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod secundum hanc scientiam Christus non cognoverit omnia. Haec enim scientia indita est Christo ad perfectionem potentiae intellectus eius. Sed intellectus possibilis animae humanae non videtur esse in potentia ad omnia simpliciter, sed ad illa sola in quae potest reduci in actum per intellectum agentem, qui est proprium activum ipsius, quae quidem sunt cognoscibilia secundum rationem naturalem. Ergo secundum hanc scientiam non cognovit ea quae naturalem rationem excedunt. Praeterea, phantasmata se habent ad intellectum humanum sicut colores ad visum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed non pertinet ad perfectionem virtutis visivae cognoscere ea quae sunt omnino absque colore. Ergo neque ad perfectionem intellectus humani pertinet cognoscere ea quorum non possunt esse phantasmata, sicut sunt substantiae separatae. Sic igitur, cum huiusmodi scientia fuerit in Christo ad perfectionem animae intellectivae ipsius, videtur quod per huiusmodi scientiam non cognoverit substantias separatas. Praeterea, ad perfectionem intellectus non pertinet cognoscere singularia. Videtur igitur quod per huiusmodi scientiam anima Christi non cognoverit singularia. Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae XI, quod replebit eum spiritus sapientiae et intellectus, scientiae et consilii, sub quibus comprehenduntur omnia cognoscibilia. Nam ad sapientiam pertinet cognitio divinorum omnium; ad intellectum autem pertinet cognitio om-

Objection 1: It would seem that by this knowledge Christ did not know all things. For this knowledge is imprinted upon Christ for the perfection of the passive intellect. Now the passive intellect of the human soul does not seem to be in potentiality to all things simply, but only to those things with regard to which it can be reduced to act by the active intellect, which is its proper motor; and these are knowable by natural reason. Therefore by this knowledge Christ did not know what exceeded the natural reason. Obj. 2: Further, phantasms are to the human intellect as colors to sight, as is said De Anima iii, 18, 31, 39. But it does not pertain to the perfection of the power of seeing to know what is without color. Therefore it does not pertain to the perfection of human intellect to know things of which there are no phantasms, such as separate substances. Hence, since this knowledge was in Christ for the perfection of His intellective soul, it seems that by this knowledge He did not know separate substances. Obj. 3: Further, it does not belong to the perfection of the intellect to know singulars. Hence it would seem that by this knowledge the soul of Christ did not know singulars. On the contrary, It is written (Isa 11:2) that the Spirit of wisdom and understanding, of knowledge and counsel shall fill Him, under which are included all that may be known; for the knowledge of all Divine things belongs to wisdom, the knowledge of all immaterial things to under-

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nium immaterialium; ad scientiam autem pertinet cognitio omnium conclusionum; ad consilium autem cognitio omnium agibilium. Ergo videtur quod Christus, secundum scientiam sibi inditam per spiritum sanctum, habuerit omnium cognitionem. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut prius dictum est, conveniens fuit ut anima Christo per omnia esset perfecta, per hoc quod omnis eius potentialitas sit reducta ad actum. Est autem considerandum quod in anima humana, sicut in qualibet creatura, consideratur duplex potentia passiva, una quidem per comparationem ad agens naturale; alia vero per comparationem ad agens primum, qui potest quamlibet creaturam reducere in actum aliquem altiorem, in quem non reducitur per agens naturale; et haec consuevit vocari potentia obedientiae in creatura. Utraque autem potentia animae Christi fuit reducta in actum secundum hanc scientiam divinitus inditam. Et ideo secundum eam anima Christi primo quidem cognovit quaecumque ab homine cognosci possunt per virtutem luminis intellectus agentis, sicut sunt quaecumque pertinent ad scientias humanas. Secundo vero per hanc scientiam cognovit Christus omnia illa quae per revelationem divinam hominibus innotescunt, sive pertineant ad donum sapientiae, sive ad donum prophetiae, sive ad quodcumque donum spiritus sancti. Omnia enim ista abundantius et plenius ceteris cognovit anima Christi. Ipsam tamen Dei essentiam per hanc scientiam non cognovit, sed solum per primam, de qua supra dictum est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de actione naturali animae intellectivae, quae scilicet est per comparationem ad agens naturale, quod est intellectus agens. Ad secundum dicendum quod anima humana in statu huius vitae, quando quodammodo est ad corpus obligata, ut sine phantasmate intelligere non possit, non potest intelligere substantias separatas. Sed post statum huius vitae, anima separata poterit aliqualiter substantias separatas per seipsam cognoscere, ut in prima parte dictum est. Et hoc praecipue manifestum est circa animas beatorum. Christus autem, ante passionem, non solum fuit viator, sed etiam comprehensor. Unde anima eius poterat cognoscere substantias separatas, per modum quo cognoscit anima separata. Ad tertium dicendum quod cognitio singularium non pertinet ad perfectionem animae intellectivae secundum cognitionem speculativam, pertinet tamen ad perfectionem eius secundum cognitionem practicam, quae non perficitur absque cognitione singularium, in quibus est operatio, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Unde ad prudentiam requiritur memoria praeteritorum, cognitio praesentium, et providentia futurorum, ut Tullius dicit,

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standing, the knowledge of all conclusions to knowledge (scientia), the knowledge of all practical things to counsel. Hence it would seem that by this knowledge Christ had the knowledge of all things. I answer that, As was said above (Q. 9, A. 1), it was fitting that the soul of Christ should be wholly perfected by having each of its powers reduced to act. Now it must be borne in mind that in the human soul, as in every creature, there is a double passive power: one in comparison with a natural agent; the other in comparison with the first agent, which can reduce any creature to a higher act than a natural agent can reduce it, and this is usually called the obediential power of a creature. Now both powers of Christ’s soul were reduced to act by this divinely imprinted knowledge. And hence, by it the soul of Christ knew: First, whatever can be known by force of a man’s active intellect, e.g., whatever pertains to human sciences; second, by this knowledge Christ knew all things made known to man by Divine revelation, whether they belong to the gift of wisdom or the gift of prophecy, or any other gift of the Holy Spirit; since the soul of Christ knew these things more fully and completely than others. Yet He did not know the Essence of God by this knowledge, but by the first alone, of which we spoke above (Q. 10).

Reply Obj. 1: This reason refers to the natural power of an intellective soul in comparison with its natural agent, which is the active intellect. Reply Obj. 2: The human soul in the state of this life, since it is somewhat fettered by the body, so as to be unable to understand without phantasms, cannot understand separate substances. But after the state of this life the separated soul will be able, in a measure, to know separate substances by itself, as was said in the First Part (Q. 89, AA. 1, 2), and this is especially clear as regards the souls of the blessed. Now before His Passion, Christ was not merely a wayfarer but also a comprehensor; hence His soul could know separate substances in the same way that a separated soul could. Reply Obj. 3: The knowledge of singulars pertains to the perfection of the intellective soul, not in speculative knowledge, but in practical knowledge, which is imperfect without the knowledge of singulars, in which operations exist, as is said Ethic. vi, 7. Hence for prudence are required the remembrance of past things, knowledge of present things, and foresight of future things, as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Therefore, since Christ had the fullness of

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Q. 11, A. 2

in sua rhetorica. Quia igitur Christus habuit plenitudi- prudence by the gift of counsel, He consequently knew all nem prudentiae, secundum donum consilii, consequens singular things—present, past, and future. est quod cognovit omnia singularia praeterita, praesentia et futura.

Article 2 Whether Christ could understand by this knowledge by not turning to phantasms? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi non potuerit intelligere secundum hanc scientiam nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata. Phantasmata enim comparantur ad animam intellectivam sicut colores ad visum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed potentia visiva Christi non potuit exire in actum nisi convertendo se ad colores. Ergo etiam neque anima eius intellectiva potuit aliquid intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata. Praeterea, anima Christi est eiusdem naturae cum animabus nostris, alioquin ipse non esset eiusdem speciei nobiscum; contra id quod apostolus dicit, Philipp. II, quod est in similitudinem hominum factus. Sed anima nostra non potest intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata. Ergo nec etiam anima Christi. Praeterea, sensus dati sunt homini ut deserviant intellectui. Si igitur anima Christi intelligere potuit absque conversione ad phantasmata, quae per sensus accipiuntur, sequeretur quod sensus frustra fuissent in anima Christi, quod est inconveniens. Videtur igitur quod anima Christi non potuerit intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata. Sed contra est quod anima Christi cognovit quaedam quae per phantasmata cognosci non possunt, scilicet substantias separatas. Potuit igitur intelligere non convertendo se ad phantasmata. Respondeo dicendum quod Christus in statu ante passionem fuit simul viator et comprehensor, ut infra magis patebit. Et praecipue quidem conditiones viatoris habuit ex parte corporis, inquantum fuit passibile, conditiones vero comprehensoris maxime habuit ex parte animae intellectivae. Est autem haec conditio animae comprehensoris, ut nullo modo subdatur suo corpori aut ab eo dependeat, sed totaliter ei dominetur, unde et post resurrectionem ex anima gloria redundabit in corpus. Ex hoc autem anima hominis viatoris indiget ad phantasmata converti, quod est corpori obligata, et quodammodo ei subiecta et ab eo dependens. Et ideo animae beatae, et ante resurrectionem et post, intelligere possunt absque conversione ad phantasmata. Et hoc quidem oportet dicere de anima Christi, quae plene habuit facultatem comprehensoris. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod similitudo illa quam philosophus ponit, non attenditur quantum ad

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ could not understand by this knowledge except by turning to phantasms, because, as is stated De Anima iii, 18, 31, 39, phantasms are compared to man’s intellective soul as colors to sight. But Christ’s power of seeing could not become actual save by turning to colors. Therefore His intellective soul could understand nothing except by turning to phantasms.

Obj. 2: Further, Christ’s soul is of the same nature as ours. otherwise He would not be of the same species as we, contrary to what the Apostle says (Phil 2:7) . . . being made in the likeness of men. But our soul cannot understand except by turning to phantasms. Hence, neither can Christ’s soul otherwise understand. Obj. 3: Further, senses are given to man to help his intellect. Hence, if the soul of Christ could understand without turning to phantasms, which arise in the senses, it would follow that in the soul of Christ the senses were useless, which is not fitting. Therefore it seems that the soul of Christ can only understand by turning to phantasms. On the contrary, The soul of Christ knew certain things which could not be known by the senses, viz. separate substances. Therefore it could understand without turning to phantasms. I answer that, In the state before His Passion Christ was at the same time a wayfarer and a comprehensor, as will be more clearly shown (Q. 15, A. 10). Especially had He the conditions of a wayfarer on the part of the body, inasmuch as it was passible; but the conditions of a comprehensor He had chiefly on the part of the soul. Now this is the condition of the soul of a comprehensor, viz. that it is nowise subject to its body, or dependent upon it, but wholly dominates it. Hence after the resurrection glory will flow from the soul to the body. But the soul of man on earth needs to turn to phantasms, because it is fettered by the body and in a measure subject to and dependent upon it. And hence the blessed both before and after the resurrection can understand without turning to phantasms. And this must be said of the soul of Christ, which had fully the capabilities of a comprehensor. Reply Obj. 1: This likeness which the Philosopher asserts is not with regard to everything. For it is manifest that

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omnia. Manifestum est enim quod finis potentiae visivae est cognoscere colores, finis autem potentiae intellectivae non est cognoscere phantasmata, sed cognoscere species intelligibiles, quas apprehendit a phantasmatibus et in phantasmatibus, secundum statum praesentis vitae. Est igitur similitudo quantum ad hoc ad quod aspicit utraque potentia, non autem quantum ad hoc in quod utriusque potentiae conditio terminatur. Nihil autem prohibet, secundum diversos status, ex diversis rem aliquam ad suum finem tendere, finis autem proprius alicuius rei semper est unus. Et ideo, licet visus nihil cognoscat absque colore, intellectus tamen, secundum aliquem statum, potest cognoscere absque phantasmate, sed non absque specie intelligibili. Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet anima Christi fuerit eiusdem naturae cum animabus nostris, habuit tamen aliquem statum quem animae nostrae non habent nunc in re, sed solum in spe, scilicet statum comprehensionis. Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet anima Christi potuerit intelligere non convertendo se ad phantasmata, poterat tamen intelligere se ad phantasmata convertendo. Et ideo sensus non fuerunt frustra in ipso, praesertim cum sensus non dentur homini solum ad scientiam intellectivam, sed etiam ad necessitatem vitae animalis.

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the end of the power of seeing is to know colors; but the end of the intellective power is not to know phantasms, but to know intelligible species, which it apprehends from and in phantasms, according to the state of the present life. Therefore there is a likeness in respect of what both powers regard, but not in respect of that in which the condition of both powers is terminated. Now nothing prevents a thing in different states from reaching its end by different ways: albeit there is never but one proper end of a thing. Hence, although the sight knows nothing without color; nevertheless in a certain state the intellect can know without phantasms, but not without intelligible species.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the soul of Christ was of the same nature as our souls, yet it had a state which our souls have not yet in fact, but only in hope, i.e., the state of comprehension. Reply Obj. 3: Although the soul of Christ could understand without turning to phantasms, yet it could also understand by turning to phantasms. Hence the senses were not useless in Him; especially as the senses are not afforded to man solely for intellectual knowledge, but for the need of animal life.

Article 3 Whether the soul of Christ had this knowlege by way of comparison? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi non habuit hanc scientiam per modum collationis. Dicit enim Damascenus, in III libro, in Christo non dicimus consilium neque electionem. Non autem removentur haec a Christo nisi inquantum important collationem et discursum. Ergo videtur quod in Christo non fuerit scientia collativa vel discursiva. Praeterea, homo indiget collatione et discursu rationis ad inquirenda ea quae ignorat. Sed anima Christi cognovit omnia, ut supra dictum est. Non igitur fuit in eo scientia discursiva vel collativa.

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had not this knowledge by way of comparison. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14): We do not uphold counsel or choice in Christ. Now these things are withheld from Christ only inasmuch as they imply comparison and discursion. Therefore it seems that there was no collative or discursive knowledge in Christ. Obj. 2: Further, man needs comparison and discursion of reason in order to find out the unknown. But the soul of Christ knew everything, as was said above (Q. 10, A. 2). Hence there was no discursive or collative knowledge in Him. Praeterea, scientia animae Christi se habuit per Obj. 3: Further, the knowledge in Christ’s soul was like modum comprehensorum, qui Angelis conformantur, ut that of comprehensors, who are likened to the angels, acdicitur Matth. XXII. Sed in Angelis non est scientia di- cording to Matt. 22:30. Now there is no collative or disscursiva seu collativa, ut patet per Dionysium, VII cap. cursive knowledge in the angels, as Dionysius shows (Div. de Div. Nom. Non ergo in anima Christi fuit scientia di- Nom. vii). Therefore there was no discursive or collative scursiva seu collativa. knowledge in the soul of Christ. Sed contra, Christus habuit animam rationalem, On the contrary, Christ had a rational soul, as was ut supra habitum est. Propria autem operatio animae ra- shown (Q. 5, A. 4). Now the proper operation of a ratiotionalis est conferre et discurrere ab uno in aliud. Ergo nal soul consists in comparison and discursion from one in Christo fuit scientia discursiva vel collativa. thing to another. Therefore there was collative and discursive knowledge in Christ.

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Respondeo dicendum quod aliqua scientia potest esse discursiva vel collativa dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad scientiae acquisitionem, sicut accidit in nobis, qui procedimus ad cognoscendum unum per aliud, sicut effectus per causas, et e converso. Et hoc modo scientia animae Christi non fuit discursiva vel collativa, quia haec scientia de qua nunc loquimur, fuit sibi divinitus indita, non per investigationem rationis acquisita. Alio modo potest dici scientia discursiva vel collativa quantum ad usum, sicut scientes interdum ex causis concludunt effectus, non ut de novo addiscant, sed volentes uti scientia quam iam habent. Et hoc modo scientia animae Christi poterat esse collativa et discursiva, poterat enim ex uno aliud concludere, sicut sibi placebat. Sicut, Matth. XVII, cum dominus quaesivisset a Petro a quibus reges terrae tributum acciperent, a filiis suis an ab alienis, Petro respondente quod ab alienis, conclusit, ergo liberi sunt filii. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod a Christo excluditur consilium quod est cum dubitatione, et per consequens electio, quae in sui ratione tale consilium includit. Non autem a Christo excluditur usus consiliandi. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de discursu et collatione prout ordinatur ad scientiam acquirendam. Ad tertium dicendum quod beati conformantur Angelis quantum ad dona gratiarum, manet tamen differentia quae est secundum naturam. Et ideo uti collatione et discursu est connaturale animabus beatorum, non autem Angelis.

Q. 11, A. 4

I answer that, Knowledge may be discursive or collative in two ways. First, in the acquisition of the knowledge, as happens to us, who proceed from one thing to the knowledge of another, as from causes to effects, and conversely. And in this way the knowledge in Christ’s soul was not discursive or collative, since this knowledge which we are now considering was divinely infused, and not acquired by a process of reasoning. Second, knowledge may be called discursive or collative in use; as at times those who know, reason from cause to effect, not in order to learn anew, but wishing to use the knowledge they have. And in this way the knowledge in Christ’s soul could be collative or discursive; since it could conclude one thing from another, as it pleased, as in Matt. 17:24, 25, when our Lord asked Peter: Of whom do the kings of the earth receive tribute, of their own children, or of strangers? On Peter replying: Of strangers, He concluded: Then the children are free. Reply Obj. 1: From Christ is excluded that counsel which is with doubt, and consequently choice, which essentially includes such counsel; but the practice of using counsel is not excluded from Christ. Reply Obj. 2: This reason rests upon discursion and comparison, as used to acquire knowledge. Reply Obj. 3: The blessed are likened to the angels in the gifts of graces; yet there still remains the difference of natures. And hence to use comparison and discursion is connatural to the souls of the blessed, but not to angels.

Article 4 Whether in Christ this knowledge was greater than in the Angels? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo huiusmodi scientia fuerit minor quam in Angelis. Perfectio enim proportionatur perfectibili. Sed anima humana, secundum ordinem naturae, est infra naturam angelicam. Cum igitur scientia de qua nunc loquimur, sit indita animae Christi ad perfectionem ipsius, videtur quod huiusmodi scientia fuerit infra scientiam qua perficitur natura angelica. Praeterea, scientia animae Christi fuit aliquo modo collativa et discursiva, quod non potest dici de scientia Angelorum. Ergo scientia animae Christi fuit inferior scientia Angelorum. Praeterea, quanto aliqua scientia est magis immaterialis, tanto est potior. Sed scientia Angelorum est immaterialior quam scientia animae Christi, quia anima Christi est actus corporis et habet conversionem

Objection 1: It would seem that this knowledge was not greater in Christ than in the angels. For perfection is proportioned to the thing perfected. But the human soul in the order of nature is below the angelic nature. Therefore since the knowledge we are now speaking of is imprinted upon Christ’s soul for its perfection, it seems that this knowledge is less than the knowledge by which the angelic nature is perfected. Obj. 2: Further, the knowledge of Christ’s soul was in a measure comparative and discursive, which cannot be said of the angelic knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of Christ’s soul was less than the knowledge of the angels. Obj. 3: Further, the more immaterial knowledge is, the greater it is. But the knowledge of the angels is more immaterial than the knowledge of Christ’s soul, since the soul of Christ is the act of a body, and turns to phantasms, which

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ad phantasmata, quod de Angelis dici non potest. Ergo scientia Angelorum est potior quam scientia animae Christi. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Heb. II, eum qui modico quam Angeli minoratus est, videmus Iesum, propter passionem mortis, gloria et honore coronatum. Ex quo apparet quod propter solam passionem mortis dicatur Christus ab Angelis minoratus. Non ergo propter scientiam. Respondeo dicendum quod scientia indita animae Christi potest considerari dupliciter, uno modo, secundum id quod habuit a causa influente; alio modo, secundum id quod habuit ex subiecto recipiente. Quantum igitur ad primum, scientia indita animae Christi fuit excellentior quam scientia Angelorum, et quantum ad multitudinem cognitorum, et quantum ad scientiae certitudinem, quia lumen spirituale quod est inditum animae Christi, est multo excellentius quam lumen quod pertinet ad naturam angelicam. Quantum autem ad secundum, scientia indita animae Christi est infra scientiam angelicam, scilicet quantum ad modum cognoscendi qui est naturalis animae humanae, qui scilicet est per conversionem ad phantasmata et per collationem et discursum. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.

IIIae

cannot be said of the angels. Therefore the knowledge of angels is greater than the knowledge of Christ’s soul. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb 2:9): For we see Jesus, Who was made a little lower than the angels, for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honor; from which it is plain that Christ is said to be lower than the angels only in regard to the suffering of death. And hence, not in knowledge. I answer that, The knowledge imprinted on Christ’s soul may be looked at in two ways: First, as regards what it has from the inflowing cause; second, as regards what it has from the subject receiving it. Now with regard to the first, the knowledge imprinted upon the soul of Christ was more excellent than the knowledge of the angels, both in the number of things known and in the certainty of the knowledge; since the spiritual light, which is imprinted on the soul of Christ, is much more excellent than the light which pertains to the angelic nature. But as regards the second, the knowledge imprinted on the soul of Christ is less than the angelic knowledge, in the manner of knowing that is natural to the human soul, i.e., by turning to phantasms, and by comparison and discursion. And hereby the reply to the objections is made clear.

Article 5 Whether this knowledge was habitual in Christ? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit habitualis scientia. Dictum est enim quod animam Christi decuit maxima perfectio. Sed maior est perfectio scientiae existentis in actu quam praeexistentis in habitu. Ergo conveniens fuisse videtur quod omnia sciret in actu. Ergo non habuit habitualem scientiam. Praeterea, cum habitus ordinetur ad actum, frustra videtur esse habitualis scientia quae nunquam in actum reducitur. Cum autem Christus sciverit omnia, sicut iam dictum est, non potuisset omnia illa actu considerare unum post aliud cognoscendo, quia infinita non est enumerando pertransire. Frustra ergo fuisset in eo scientia habitualis, quod est inconveniens. Habuit igitur actualem scientiam omnium quae scivit, et non habitualem. Praeterea, scientia habitualis est quaedam perfectio scientis. Perfectio autem est nobilior perfectibili. Si igitur in anima Christi fuit aliquis habitus scientiae creatus, sequeretur quod aliquid creatum esset nobilius anima Christi. Non igitur in anima Christi fuit scientia habitualis.

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no habitual knowledge. For it has been said (Q. 9, A. 1) that the highest perfection of knowledge befitted Christ’s soul. But the perfection of an actually existing knowledge is greater than that of a potentially or habitually existing knowledge. Therefore it was fitting for Him to know all things actually. Therefore He had not habitual knowledge. Obj. 2: Further, since habits are ordained to acts, a habitual knowledge which is never reduced to act would seem useless. Now, since Christ knew all things, as was said (Q. 10, A. 2), He could not have considered all things actually, thinking over one after another, since the infinite cannot be passed over by enumeration. Therefore habitual knowledge would have been useless in Him—which is unfitting. Therefore He had an actual and not a habitual knowledge of what He knew. Obj. 3: Further, habitual knowledge is a perfection of the knower. But perfection is more noble than the thing perfected. If, therefore, in the soul of Christ there was any created habit of knowledge, it would follow that this created thing was nobler than the soul of Christ. Therefore there was no habitual knowledge in Christ’s soul.

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Q. 11, A. 5

Sed contra, scientia Christi de qua nunc loquimur, On the contrary, The knowledge of Christ we are univoca fuit scientiae nostrae, sicut et anima eius fuit now speaking about was univocal with our knowledge, unius speciei cum anima nostra. Sed scientia nostra est even as His soul was of the same species as ours. But our in genere habitus. Ergo et scientia Christi fuit habitualis. knowledge is in the genus of habit. Therefore the knowledge of Christ was habitual. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, I answer that, As stated above (A. 4), the mode of modus huius scientiae inditae animae Christi fuit conve- the knowledge impressed on the soul of Christ befitted the niens ipsi subiecto recipienti, nam receptum est in reci- subject receiving it. For the received is in the recipient after piente per modum recipientis. Est autem hic modus con- the mode of the recipient. Now the connatural mode of the naturalis animae humanae, ut quandoque sit intellectus human soul is that it should understand sometimes actuactu, quandoque in potentia. Medium autem inter pu- ally, and sometimes potentially. But the medium between a ram potentiam et actum completum est habitus. Eius- pure power and a completed act is a habit: and the extremes dem autem generis est medium et extrema. Et sic patet and medium are of the same genus. Thus it is plain that it is quod modus connaturalis animae humanae est ut reci- the connatural mode of the human soul to receive knowlpiat scientiam per modum habitus. Et ideo dicendum est edge as a habit. Hence it must be said that the knowledge quod scientia indita animae Christi fuit habitualis, pote- imprinted on the soul of Christ was habitual, for He could rat enim ea uti quando volebat. use it when He pleased. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in anima ChriReply Obj. 1: In Christ’s soul there was a twofold sti fuit duplex cognitio, et utraque suo modo perfectis- knowledge—each most perfect of its kind: the first exceedsima. Una quidem excedens modum naturae humanae, ing the mode of human nature, as by it He saw the Essence qua scilicet vidit Dei essentiam et alia in ipsa. Et haec of God and other things in It, and this was the most perfect, fuit perfectissima simpliciter. Et talis cognitio non fuit simply. Nor was this knowledge habitual, but actual with habitualis, sed actualis respectu omnium quae hoc mo- respect to everything He knew in this way. But the second do cognovit. Alia autem cognitio fuit in Christo secun- knowledge was in Christ in a manner proportioned to hudum modum proportionatum humanae naturae, prout man nature, i.e., inasmuch as He knew things by species discilicet cognovit res per species sibi divinitus inditas, vinely imprinted upon Him, and of this knowledge we are de qua cognitione nunc loquimur. Et haec cognitio non now speaking. Now this knowledge was not most perfect, fuit simpliciter perfectissima, sed perfectissima in gene- simply, but merely in the genus of human knowledge; hence re humanae cognitionis. Unde non oportuit quod sem- it did not behoove it to be always in act. per esset in actu. Ad secundum dicendum quod habitus reducitur in Reply Obj. 2: Habits are reduced to act by the comactum ad imperium voluntatis, nam habitus est quo quis mand of the will, since a habit is that with which we act agit cum voluerit. Voluntas autem se habet ad infinita in- when we wish. Now the will is indeterminate in regard to indeterminate. Et tamen hoc non est frustra, licet non in finite things. Yet it is not useless, even when it does not acomnia actualiter tendat, dummodo tendat actualiter in tually tend to all; provided it actually tends to everything in id quod convenit loco et tempori. Et ideo etiam habi- fitting place and time. And hence neither is a habit useless, tus non est frustra, licet non omnia reducantur in actum even if all that it extends to is not reduced to act; provided quae habitui subiacent, dummodo reducatur in actum id that that which befits the due end of the will be reduced to quod congruit ad debitum finem voluntatis secundum act according as the matter in hand and the time require. exigentiam negotiorum et temporis. Ad tertium dicendum quod bonum et ens dupliciReply Obj. 3: Goodness and being are taken in two ter dicitur. Uno modo, simpliciter. Et sic bonum et ens ways: First, simply; and thus a substance, which subsists in dicitur substantia, quae in suo esse et in sua bonitate its being and goodness, is a good and a being; second, being subsistit. Alio modo dicitur ens et bonum secundum and goodness are taken relatively, and in this way an acciquid. Et hoc modo dicitur ens accidens, non quia ipsum dent is a being and a good, not that it has being and goodhabeat esse et bonitatem, sed quia eo subiectum est ens ness, but that its subject is a being and a good. And hence et bonum. Sic igitur scientia habitualis non est simplici- habitual knowledge is not simply better or more excellent ter melior aut dignior quam anima Christi, sed secun- than the soul of Christ; but relatively, since the whole gooddum quid, nam tota bonitas habitualis scientiae cedit in ness of habitual knowledge is added to the goodness of the bonitatem subiecti. subject.

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Article 6 Whether in the soul of Christ there was but one habit of knowledge? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in anima Christi non fuerit nisi unus habitus scientiae. Quanto enim scientia est perfectior, tanto est magis unita, unde et Angeli superiores per formas magis universales cognoscunt, ut in prima parte dictum est. Sed scientia Christi fuit perfectissima. Ergo fuit maxime una. Non ergo fuit distincta per plures habitus. Praeterea, fides nostra derivatur a scientia Christi, unde dicitur Heb. XII, aspicientes in auctorem fidei et consummatorem, Iesum. Sed unus est habitus fidei de omnibus credibilibus, ut in secunda parte dictum est. Ergo multo magis in Christo non fuit nisi unus habitus scientiae. Praeterea, scientiae distinguuntur secundum diversas rationes scibilium. Sed anima Christi omnia scivit secundum unam rationem, scilicet secundum lumen divinitus infusum. Ergo in Christo fuit tantum unus habitus scientiae. Sed contra est quod Zach. III dicitur quod super lapidem unum, idest Christum, sunt septem oculi. Per oculum autem scientia intelligitur. Ergo videtur quod in Christo fuerunt plures habitus scientiae. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, scientia indita animae Christi habuit modum connaturalem animae humanae. Est autem connaturale animae humanae ut recipiat species in minori universalitate quam Angeli, ita scilicet quod diversas naturas specificas per diversas intelligibiles species cognoscat. Ex hoc autem contingit quod in nobis sunt diversi habitus scientiarum, quia sunt diversa scibilium genera, inquantum scilicet ea quae reducuntur in unum genus, eodem habitu scientiae cognoscuntur; sicut dicitur in I Poster. quod una scientia est quae est unius generis subiecti. Et ideo scientia indita animae Christi fuit distincta secundum diversos habitus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, scientia animae Christi est perfectissima, et excedens scientiam Angelorum, quantum ad id quod consideratur in ea ex parte Dei influentis, est tamen infra scientiam angelicam quantum ad modum recipientis. Et ad huiusmodi modum pertinet quod scientia illa per multos habitus distinguatur, quasi per species magis particulares existens. Ad secundum dicendum quod fides nostra innititur primae veritati. Et ideo Christus est auctor fidei nostrae secundum divinam scientiam, quae est simpliciter una. Ad tertium dicendum quod lumen divinitus infusum est ratio intelligendi communis ea quae divinitus revelantur, sicut et lumen intellectus eorum quae natu-

Objection 1: It would seem that in the soul of Christ there was only one habit of knowledge. For the more perfect knowledge is, the more united it is; hence the higher angels understand by the more universal forms, as was said in the First Part (Q. 55, A. 3). Now Christ’s knowledge was most perfect. Therefore it was most one. Therefore it was not distinguished by several habits. Obj. 2: Further, our faith is derived from Christ’s knowledge; hence it is written (Heb 12:2): Looking on Jesus the author and finisher of faith. But there is only one habit of faith about all things believed, as was said in the Second Part (II-II, Q. 4, A. 6). Much more, therefore, was there only one habit of knowledge in Christ. Obj. 3: Further, knowledge is distinguished by the diverse formalities of knowable things. But the soul of Christ knew everything under one formality, i.e., by a divinely infused light. Therefore in Christ there was only one habit of knowledge. On the contrary, It is written (Zech 3:9) that on one stone, i.e., Christ, there are seven eyes. Now by the eye is understood knowledge. Therefore it would seem that in Christ there were several habits of knowledge. I answer that, As stated above (AA. 4, 5), the knowledge imprinted on Christ’s soul has a mode connatural to a human soul. Now it is connatural to a human soul to receive species of a lesser universality than the angels receive; so that it knows different specific natures by different intelligible species. But it so happens that we have different habits of knowledge, because there are different classes of knowable things, inasmuch as what are in one genus are known by one habit; thus it is said (Poster. i, 42) that one science is of one class of object. And hence the knowledge imprinted on Christ’s soul was distinguished by different habits.

Reply Obj. 1: As was said (A. 4), the knowledge of Christ’s soul is most perfect, and exceeds the knowledge of angels with regard to what is in it on the part of God’s gift; but it is below the angelic knowledge as regards the mode of the recipient. And it pertains to this mode that this knowledge is distinguished by various habits, inasmuch as it regards more particular species. Reply Obj. 2: Our faith rests upon the First Truth; and hence Christ is the author of our faith by the Divine knowledge, which is simply one. Reply Obj. 3: The divinely infused light is the common formality for understanding what is divinely revealed, as the light of the active intellect is with regard to what is

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raliter cognoscuntur. Et ideo oportuit in anima Christi species singularum rerum ponere ad cognoscendum cognitione propria unumquodque. Et secundum hoc, oportuit esse diversos habitus scientiae in anima Christi, ut dictum est.

Q. 11, A. 6

naturally known. Hence, in the soul of Christ there must be the proper species of singular things, in order to know each with proper knowledge; and in this way there must be diverse habits of knowledge in Christ’s soul, as stated above.

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Question 12 The Acquired or Empiric Knowledge of Christ’s Soul Deinde considerandum est de scientia animae ChriWe must now consider the acquired or empiric knowlsti acquisita vel experimentali. Et circa hoc quaeruntur edge of Christ’s soul; and under this head there are four quatuor. points of inquiry: Primo, utrum secundum hanc scientiam Christus (1) Whether Christ knew all things by this knowledge? cognoverit omnia. Secundo, utrum in hac scientia profecerit. (2) Whether He advanced in this knowledge? Tertio, utrum aliquid ab homine didicerit. (3) Whether He learned anything from man? Quarto, utrum acceperit aliquid ab Angelis. (4) Whether He received anything from angels?

Article 1 Whether Christ knew all things by this knowledge? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod secundum hanc scientiam Christus non omnia cognovit. Huiusmodi enim scientia per experientiam acquiritur. Sed Christus non omnia expertus est. Non igitur omnia secundum hanc scientiam scivit. Praeterea, scientiam acquirit homo per sensum. Sed non omnia sensibilia sensibus corporalibus Christi fuerunt subiecta. Non igitur secundum hanc scientiam omnia cognovit. Praeterea, quantitas scientiae attenditur secundum scibilia. Si igitur secundum hanc scientiam Christus omnia scivisset, esset in eo scientia acquisita aequalis scientiae infusae et scientiae beatae, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo secundum hanc scientiam Christus omnia scivit. Sed contra est quod nihil imperfectum fuit in Christo quantum ad animam. Fuisset autem imperfecta haec eius scientia, si secundum eam non scivisset omnia, quia imperfectum est cui potest fieri additio. Ergo secundum hanc scientiam Christus omnia scivit. Respondeo dicendum quod scientia acquisita ponitur in anima Christi, ut supra dictum est, propter convenientiam intellectus agentis, ne eius actio sit otiosa, qua facit intelligibilia actu, sicut etiam scientia indita vel infusa ponitur in anima Christi ad perfectionem intellectus possibilis. Sicut autem intellectus possibilis est quo est omnia fieri, ita intellectus agens est quo est omnia facere, ut dicitur in III de anima. Et ideo, sicut per scientiam inditam scivit anima Christi omnia illa ad quae intellectus possibilis est quocumque modo in potentia, ita per scientiam acquisitam scivit omnia illa quae possunt sciri per actionem intellectus agentis.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not know everything by this knowledge. For this knowledge is acquired by experience. But Christ did not experience everything. Therefore He did not know everything by this knowledge. Obj. 2: Further, man acquires knowledge through the senses. But not all sensible things were subjected to Christ’s bodily senses. Therefore Christ did not know everything by this knowledge. Obj. 3: Further, the extent of knowledge depends on the things knowable. Therefore if Christ knew all things by this knowledge, His acquired knowledge would have been equal to His infused and beatific knowledge; which is not fitting. Therefore Christ did not know all things by this knowledge. On the contrary, Nothing imperfect was in Christ’s soul. Now this knowledge of His would have been imperfect if He had not known all things by it, since the imperfect is that to which addition may be made. Hence Christ knew all things by this knowledge. I answer that, Acquired knowledge is held to be in Christ’s soul, as we have said (Q. 9, A. 4), by reason of the active intellect, lest its action, which is to make things actually intelligible, should be wanting; even as imprinted or infused knowledge is held to be in Christ’s soul for the perfection of the passive intellect. Now as the passive intellect is that by which all things are in potentiality, so the active intellect is that by which all are in act, as is said De Anima iii, 18. And hence, as the soul of Christ knew by infused knowledge all things to which the passive intellect is in any way in potentiality, so by acquired knowledge it knew whatever can be known by the action of the active intellect.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod scientia rerum acquiri potest non solum per experientiam ipsarum, sed etiam per experientiam quarundam aliarum rerum, cum ex virtute luminis intellectus agentis possit homo procedere ad intelligendum effectus per causas, et causas per effectus, et similia per similia, et contraria per contraria. Sic igitur, licet Christus non fuerit omnia expertus, ex his tamen quae expertus est, in omnium devenit notitiam. Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet corporalibus sensibus Christi non fuerint subiecta omnia sensibilia, fuerunt tamen sensibus eius subiecta aliqua sensibilia ex quibus, propter excellentissimam vim rationis eius, potuit in aliorum notitiam devenire per modum praedictum. Sicut, videndo corpora caelestia, potuit comprehendere eorum virtutes, et effectus quos habent in istis inferioribus, qui eius sensibus non subiacebant. Et, eadem ratione, ex quibuscumque aliis in aliorum notitiam devenire potuit. Ad tertium dicendum quod secundum istam scientiam anima Christi non simpliciter cognovit omnia, sed illa omnia quae per lumen intellectus agentis hominis sunt cognoscibilia. Unde per hanc scientiam non cognovit essentias substantiarum separatarum; nec etiam singularia praeterita vel futura. Quae tamen cognovit per scientiam inditam, ut supra dictum est.

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Reply Obj. 1: The knowledge of things may be acquired not merely by experiencing the things themselves, but by experiencing other things; since by virtue of the light of the active intellect man can go on to understand effects from causes, and causes from effects, like from like, contrary from contrary. Therefore Christ, though He did not experience all things, came to the knowledge of all things from what He did experience. Reply Obj. 2: Although all sensible things were not subjected to Christ’s bodily senses, yet other sensible things were subjected to His senses; and from this He could come to know other things by the most excellent force of His reason, in the manner described in the previous reply; just as in seeing heavenly bodies He could comprehend their powers and the effects they have upon things here below, which were not subjected to His senses; and for the same reason, from any other things whatsoever, He could come to the knowledge of yet other things. Reply Obj. 3: By this knowledge the soul of Christ did not know all things simply, but all such as are knowable by the light of man’s active intellect. Hence by this knowledge He did not know the essences of separate substances, nor past, present, or future singulars, which, nevertheless, He knew by infused knowledge, as was said above (Q. 11).

Article 2 Whether Christ advanced in this knowledge? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod secundum hanc scientiam Christus non profecerit. Sicut enim secundum scientiam beatitudinis vel secundum scientiam infusam Christus cognovit omnia, ita secundum hanc scientiam acquisitam, ut ex dictis patet. Sed secundum illas scientias non profecit. Ergo nec secundum istam. Praeterea, proficere est imperfecti, quia perfectum additionem non recipit. Sed in Christo non est ponere scientiam imperfectam. Ergo secundum hanc scientiam Christus non profecit. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, qui proficere dicunt Christum sapientia et gratia ut additamentum suscipientem, non venerantur unionem. Non venerari autem unionem est impium. Ergo impium est dicere quod scientia eius additamentum acceperit.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not advance in this knowledge. For even as Christ knew all things by His beatific and His infused knowledge, so also did He by this acquired knowledge, as is plain from what has been said (A. 1). But He did not advance in these knowledges. Therefore neither in this.

Obj. 2: Further, to advance belongs to the imperfect, since the perfect cannot be added to. Now we cannot suppose an imperfect knowledge in Christ. Therefore Christ did not advance in this knowledge. Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 22): Whoever say that Christ advanced in wisdom and grace, as if receiving additional sensations, do not venerate the union which is in hypostasis. But it is impious not to venerate this union. Therefore it is impious to say that His knowledge received increase. Sed contra est quod habetur Luc. II, quod Iesus On the contrary, It is written (Luke 2:52): Jesus adproficiebat sapientia et aetate et gratia, apud Deum et ho- vanced in wisdom and age and grace with God and men; and mines. Et Ambrosius dicit quod proficiebat secundum sa- Ambrose says (De Incar. Dom. vii) that He advanced in hupientiam humanam. Humana autem sapientia est quae man wisdom. Now human wisdom is that which is acquired

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humano modo acquiritur, scilicet per lumen intellectus agentis. Ergo Christus secundum hanc scientiam profecit. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est profectus scientiae. Unus quidem secundum essentiam, prout scilicet ipse habitus scientiae augetur. Alius autem secundum effectum, puta si aliquis, secundum eundem et aequalem scientiae habitum, primo minora aliis demonstret, et postea maiora et subtiliora. Hoc autem secundo modo, manifestum est quod Christus in scientia et gratia profecit, sicut et in aetate, quia scilicet, secundum augmentum aetatis, opera maiora faciebat, quae maiorem sapientiam et gratiam demonstrabant. Sed quantum ad ipsum habitum scientiae, manifestum est quod habitus scientiae infusae in eo non est augmentatus, cum a principio plenarie sibi fuerit omnis scientia infusa. Et multo minus scientia beata in eo augeri potuit. De scientia autem divina quod non possit augeri, supra in prima parte dictum est. Si igitur, praeter habitum scientiae infusum, non sit in anima Christi habitus aliquis scientiae acquisitae, ut quibusdam videtur, et mihi aliquando visum est; nulla scientia in Christo augmentata fuit secundum suam essentiam, sed solum per experientiam, idest per conversionem specierum intelligibilium inditarum ad phantasmata. Et secundum hoc, dicunt quod scientia Christi profecit secundum experientiam, convertendo scilicet species intelligibiles inditas ad ea quae de novo per sensum accepit. Sed quia inconveniens videtur quod aliqua naturalis actio intelligibilis Christo deesset, cum extrahere species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus sit quaedam naturalis actio hominis secundum intellectum agentem, conveniens videtur hanc etiam actionem in Christo ponere. Et ex hoc sequitur quod in anima Christi aliquis habitus scientiae fuit qui per huiusmodi abstractionem specierum potuerit augmentari, ex hoc scilicet quod intellectus agens, post primas species intelligibiles abstractas a phantasmatibus, poterat etiam alias abstrahere. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod tam scientia infusa animae Christi, quam scientia beata, fuit effectus agentis infinitae virtutis, qui potest simul totum operari, et ita in neutra scientia Christus profecit, sed a principio habuit eam perfectam. Sed scientia acquisita est tantum ab intellectu agente, qui non simul totum operatur, sed successive. Et ideo secundum hanc scientiam Christus non a principio scivit omnia, sed paulatim et post aliquod tempus, scilicet in perfecta aetate. Quod patet ex hoc quod Evangelista simul dicit eum profecisse scientia et aetate. Ad secundum dicendum quod haec etiam scientia in Christo fuit semper perfecta secundum tempus, licet non fuerit perfecta simpliciter et secundum naturam. Et ideo potuit habere augmentum.

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in a human manner, i.e., by the light of the active intellect. Therefore Christ advanced in this knowledge. I answer that, There is a twofold advancement in knowledge: one in essence, inasmuch as the habit of knowledge is increased; the other in effect—e.g., if someone were with one and the same habit of knowledge to prove to someone else some minor truths at first, and afterwards greater and more subtle conclusions. Now in this second way it is plain that Christ advanced in knowledge and grace, even as in age, since as His age increased He wrought greater deeds, and showed greater knowledge and grace. But as regards the habit of knowledge, it is plain that His habit of infused knowledge did not increase, since from the beginning He had perfect infused knowledge of all things; and still less could His beatific knowledge increase; in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 15), we have already said that His Divine knowledge could not increase. Therefore, if in the soul of Christ there was no habit of acquired knowledge, beyond the habit of infused knowledge, as appears to some, and sometime appeared to me (Sent. iii, D, xiv), no knowledge in Christ increased in essence, but merely by experience, i.e., by comparing the infused intelligible species with phantasms. And in this way they maintain that Christ’s knowledge grew in experience, e.g., by comparing the infused intelligible species with what He received through the senses for the first time. But because it seems unfitting that any natural intelligible action should be wanting to Christ, and because to extract intelligible species from phantasms is a natural action of man’s active intellect, it seems becoming to place even this action in Christ. And it follows from this that in the soul of Christ there was a habit of knowledge which could increase by this abstraction of species; inasmuch as the active intellect, after abstracting the first intelligible species from phantasms, could abstract others, and others again. Reply Obj. 1: Both the infused knowledge and the beatific knowledge of Christ’s soul were the effects of an agent of infinite power, which could produce the whole at once; and thus in neither knowledge did Christ advance; since from the beginning He had them perfectly. But the acquired knowledge of Christ is caused by the active intellect which does not produce the whole at once, but successively; and hence by this knowledge Christ did not know everything from the beginning, but step by step, and after a time, i.e., in His perfect age; and this is plain from what the Evangelist says, viz. that He increased in knowledge and age together. Reply Obj. 2: Even this knowledge was always perfect for the time being, although it was not always perfect, simply and in comparison to the nature; hence it could increase.

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Incarnation

Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum Damasceni intelligitur quantum ad illos qui dicunt simpliciter factam fuisse additionem scientiae Christi, scilicet secundum quamcumque eius scientiam; et praecipue secundum infusam, quae causatur in anima Christi ex unione ad verbum. Non autem intelligitur de augmento scientiae quae ex naturali agente causatur.

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Reply Obj. 3: This saying of Damascene regards those who say absolutely that addition was made to Christ’s knowledge, i.e., as regards any knowledge of His, and especially as regards the infused knowledge which is caused in Christ’s soul by union with the Word; but it does not regard the increase of knowledge caused by the natural agent.

Article 3 Whether Christ learned anything from man? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus aliquid ab hominibus didicerit. Dicitur enim Luc. II quod invenerunt eum in templo in medio doctorum, interrogantem illos et respondentem. Interrogare vero et respondere est addiscentis. Ergo Christus ab hominibus aliquid didicit. Praeterea, acquirere scientiam ab homine docente videtur esse nobilius quam acquirere a sensibus, quia in anima hominis docentis sunt species intelligibiles in actu, in rebus autem sensibilibus sunt species intelligibiles solum in potentia. Sed Christus accipiebat scientiam experimentalem ex rebus sensibilibus, ut dictum est. Ergo multo magis poterat accipere scientiam addiscendo ab hominibus. Praeterea, Christus secundum scientiam experimentalem a principio non omnia scivit, sed in ea profecit, ut dictum est. Sed quilibet audiens sermonem significativum alicuius, potest addiscere quod nescit. Ergo Christus potuit ab hominibus aliqua addiscere quae secundum hanc scientiam nesciebat. Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae LV, ecce, testem populis dedi eum, ducem ac praeceptorem gentibus. Praeceptoris autem non est doceri, sed docere. Ergo Christus non accepit aliquam scientiam per doctrinam alicuius hominis. Respondeo dicendum quod in quolibet genere id quod est primum movens non movetur secundum illam speciem motus, sicut primum alterans non alteratur. Christus autem constitutus est caput Ecclesiae, quinimmo omnium hominum, ut supra dictum est, ut non solum omnes homines per ipsum gratiam acciperent, sed etiam ut omnes ab eo doctrinam veritatis reciperent. Unde ipse dicit, Ioan. XVIII, in hoc natus sum, et ad hoc veni in mundum, ut testimonium perhibeam veritati. Et ideo non fuit conveniens eius dignitati ut a quocumque hominum doceretur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Origenes dicit, super Luc., dominus interrogabat, non ut aliquid disceret, sed ut interrogatus erudiret. Ex uno quippe doctrinae fonte manat et interrogare et respondere sapienter.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ learned something from man. For it is written (Luke 2:46, 47) that They found Him in the temple in the midst of the doctors, hearing them, and asking them questions. But to ask questions and to reply pertains to a learner. Therefore Christ learned something from man. Obj. 2: Further, to acquire knowledge from a man’s teaching seems more noble than to acquire it from sensible things, since in the soul of the man who teaches the intelligible species are in act; but in sensible things the intelligible species are only in potentiality. Now Christ received empiric knowledge from sensible things, as stated above (A. 2). Much more, therefore, could He receive knowledge by learning from men. Obj. 3: Further, by empiric knowledge Christ did not know everything from the beginning, but advanced in it, as was said above (A. 2). But anyone hearing words which mean something, may learn something he does not know. Therefore Christ could learn from men something He did not know by this knowledge. On the contrary, It is written (Is 55:4): Behold, I have given Him for a witness to the people, for a leader and a master to the Gentiles. Now a master is not taught, but teaches. Therefore Christ did not receive any knowledge by the teaching of any man. I answer that, In every genus that which is the first mover is not moved according to the same species of movement; just as the first alterative is not itself altered. Now Christ is established by God the Head of the Church—yea, of all men, as was said above (Q. 8, A. 3), so that not only all might receive grace through Him, but that all might receive the doctrine of Truth from Him. Hence He Himself says (John 18:37): For this was I born, and for this came I into the world; that I should give testimony to the truth. And thus it did not befit His dignity that He should be taught by any man. Reply Obj. 1: As Origen says (Hom. xix in Luc.): Our Lord asked questions not in order to learn anything, but in order to teach by questioning. For from the same well of knowledge came the question and the wise reply. Hence the Gospel

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Unde et ibidem in Evangelio sequitur quod stupebant omnes qui eum audiebant super prudentia et responsis eius. Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui addiscit ab homine non accipit inmediate scientiam a speciebus intelligibilibus quae sunt in mente ipsius, sed mediantibus sensibilibus vocibus, tanquam signis intellectualium conceptionum. Sicut autem voces ab homine formatae sunt signa intellectualis scientiae ipsius, ita creaturae a Deo conditae sunt signa sapientiae eius, unde Eccli. I dicitur quod Deus effudit sapientiam suam super omnia opera sua. Sicut igitur dignius est doceri a Deo quam ab homine, ita dignius est accipere scientiam per sensibiles creaturas quam per hominis doctrinam. Ad tertium dicendum quod Iesus proficiebat in scientia experimentali sicut etiam in aetate, ut dictum est. Sicut autem aetas opportuna requiritur ad hoc quod homo accipiat scientiam per inventionem, ita etiam ad hoc quod accipiat scientiam per disciplinam. Dominus autem nihil fecit quod non congrueret eius aetati. Et ideo audiendis doctrinae sermonibus non accommodavit auditum nisi illo tempore quo poterat etiam per viam experientiae talem scientiae gradum attigisse. Unde Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., duodecimo anno aetatis suae dignatus est homines interrogare in terra, quia, iuxta rationis usum, doctrinae sermo non suppetit nisi in aetate perfecta.

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goes on to say that all that heard Him were astonished at His wisdom and His answers. Reply Obj. 2: Whoever learns from man does not receive knowledge immediately from the intelligible species which are in his mind, but through sensible words, which are signs of intelligible concepts. Now as words formed by a man are signs of his intellectual knowledge; so are creatures, formed by God, signs of His wisdom. Hence it is written (Sir 1:10) that God poured wisdom out upon all His works. Hence, just as it is better to be taught by God than by man, so it is better to receive our knowledge from sensible creatures and not by man’s teaching. Reply Obj. 3: Jesus advanced in empiric knowledge, as in age, as stated above (A. 2). Now as a fitting age is required for a man to acquire knowledge by discovery, so also that he may acquire it by being taught. But our Lord did nothing unbecoming to His age; and hence He did not give ear to hearing the lessons of doctrine until such time as He was able to have reached that grade of knowledge by way of experience. Hence Gregory says (Sup. Ezech. Lib. i, Hom. ii): In the twelfth year of His age He deigned to question men on earth, since in the course of reason, the word of doctrine is not vouchsafed before the age of perfection.

Article 4 Whether Christ received knowledge from the angels? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus ab Angelis scientiam acceperit. Dicitur enim Luc. XXII quod apparuit Christo Angelus de caelo confortans eum. Sed confortatio fit per verba exhortatoria docentis, secundum illud Iob IV, ecce, docuisti plurimos, et manus lassas roborasti, vacillantes confirmaverunt sermones tui. Ergo Christus ab Angelis doctus est. Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, IV cap. Cael. Hier., video enim quod et ipse Iesus, supercaelestium substantiarum supersubstantialis substantia, ad nostram intransmutabiliter veniens, obedienter subiicitur patris et Dei per Angelos formationibus. Videtur igitur quod ipse Christus ordinationi legis divinae subiici voluerit, per quam homines, mediantibus Angelis, erudiuntur. Praeterea, sicut corpus humanum naturali ordine subiicitur corporibus caelestibus, ita etiam humana mens angelicis mentibus. Sed corpus Christi subiectum fuit impressionibus caelestium corporum, passus

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ received knowledge from the angels. For it is written (Luke 22:43) that there appeared to Him an angel from heaven, strengthening Him. But we are strengthened by the comforting words of a teacher, according to Job 4:3, 4: Behold thou hast taught many and hast strengthened the weary hand. Thy words have confirmed them that were staggering. Therefore Christ was taught by angels. Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): For I see that even Jesus—the super-substantial substance of supercelestial substances—when without change He took our substance upon Himself, was subject in obedience to the instructions of the Father and God by the angels. Hence it seems that even Christ wished to be subject to the ordinations of the Divine law, whereby men, by means of angels, are taught. Obj. 3: Further, as in the natural order the human body is subject to the celestial bodies, so likewise is the human mind to angelic minds. Now Christ’s body was subject to the impressions of the heavenly bodies, for He felt the heat

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est enim calorem in aestate et frigus in hieme, sicut et alias humanas passiones. Ergo et eius mens humana subiacebat illuminationibus supercaelestium spirituum. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, VII cap. Cael. Hier., quod supremi Angeli ad ipsum Iesum quaestionem faciunt, et ipsius divinae operationis pro nobis scientiam discunt, et eas ipse Iesus sine medio docet. Non est autem eiusdem docere et doceri. Ergo Christus non accepit scientiam ab Angelis. Respondeo dicendum quod anima humana, sicut media inter substantias spirituales et res corporales existit, ita duobus modis nata est perfici, uno quidem modo, per scientiam acceptam ex rebus sensibilibus; alio modo, per scientiam inditam sive impressam ex illuminatione spiritualium substantiarum. Utroque autem modo anima Christi fuit perfecta, ex sensibilibus quidem, secundum scientiam experimentalem, ad quam quidem non requiritur lumen angelicum, sed sufficit lumen intellectus agentis; ex impressione vero superiori, secundum scientiam infusam, quam est immediate adeptus a Deo. Sicut enim supra communem modum creaturae anima illa unita est verbo in unitate personae, ita, supra communem modum hominum, immediate ab ipso Dei verbo repleta est scientia et gratia, non autem mediantibus Angelis, qui etiam ex influentia verbi rerum scientiam in sui principio acceperunt, sicut in II libro super Gen. ad Litt. Augustinus dicit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa confortatio Angeli non fuit per modum instructionis, sed ad demonstrandum proprietatem humanae naturae. Unde Beda dicit, super Luc., in documento utriusque naturae, et Angeli ei ministrasse, et eum confortasse dicuntur. Creator enim suae creaturae non eguit praesidio, sed, homo factus, sicut propter nos tristis est, ita propter nos confortatur; ut scilicet in nobis fides incarnationis ipsius confirmetur. Ad secundum dicendum quod Dionysius dicit Christum angelicis formationibus fuisse subiectum, non ratione sui ipsius, sed ratione eorum quae circa eius incarnationem agebantur, et circa ministrationem in infantili aetate constituti. Unde ibidem subdit quod per medios Angelos nuntiatur Ioseph a patre dispensata Iesu ad Aegyptum recessio, et rursum ad Iudaeam de Aegypto traductio. Ad tertium dicendum quod filius Dei assumpsit corpus passibile, ut infra dicetur, sed animam perfectam scientia et gratia. Et ideo corpus eius fuit convenienter subiectum impressioni caelestium corporum, anima vero eius non fuit subiecta impressioni caelestium spirituum.

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in summer and the cold in winter, and other human passions. Therefore His human mind was subject to the illuminations of supercelestial spirits. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the highest angels question Jesus, and learn the knowledge of His Divine work, and of the flesh assumed for us; and Jesus teaches them directly. Now to teach and to be taught do not belong to the same. Therefore Christ did not receive knowledge from the angels. I answer that, Since the human soul is midway between spiritual substances and corporeal things, it is perfected naturally in two ways. First by knowledge received from sensible things; second, by knowledge imprinted or infused by the illumination of spiritual substances. Now in both these ways the soul of Christ was perfected; first by empirical knowledge of sensible things, for which there is no need of angelic light, since the light of the active intellect suffices; second, by the higher impression of infused knowledge, which He received directly from God. For as His soul was united to the Word above the common mode, in unity of person, so above the common manner of men was it filled with knowledge and grace by the Word of God Himself; and not by the medium of angels, who in their beginning received the knowledge of things by the influence of the Word, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. ii, 8).

Reply Obj. 1: This strengthening by the angel was for the purpose not of instructing Him, but of proving the truth of His human nature. Hence Bede says (on Luke 22:43): In testimony of both natures are the angels said to have ministered to Him and to have strengthened Him. For the Creator did not need help from His creature; but having become man, even as it was for our sake that He was sad, so was it for our sake that He was strengthened, i.e., in order that our faith in the Incarnation might be strengthened. Reply Obj. 2: Dionysius says that Christ was subject to the angelic instructions, not by reason of Himself, but by reason of what happened at His Incarnation, and as regards the care of Him whilst He was a child. Hence in the same place he adds that Jesus’ withdrawal to Egypt decreed by the Father is announced to Joseph by angels, and again His return to Judaea from Egypt. Reply Obj. 3: The Son of God assumed a passible body, as will be said hereafter (Q. 14, A. 1), and a soul perfect in knowledge and grace (Q. 14, A. 1, ad 1; A. 4). Hence His body was rightly subject to the impression of heavenly bodies; but His soul was not subject to the impression of heavenly spirits.

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Question 13 The Power of Christ’s Soul Deinde considerandum est de potentia animae ChriWe must now consider the power of Christ’s soul; and sti. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. under this head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum habuerit omnipotentiam simpliciter (1) Whether He had omnipotence simply? secundo, utrum habuerit omnipotentiam respectu (2) Whether He had omnipotence with regard to corporalium creaturarum. corporeal creatures? Tertio, utrum habuerit omnipotentiam respectu (3) Whether He had omnipotence with regard to His proprii corporis. own body? Quarto, utrum habuerit omnipotentiam respectu (4) Whether He had omnipotence as regards the executionis propriae voluntatis. execution of His own will?

Article 1 Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi habuit omnipotentiam. Dicit enim Ambrosius, super Luc., potentiam quam Dei filius naturaliter habet, homo erat ex tempore accepturus. Sed hoc praecipue videtur esse secundum animam, quae est potior pars hominis. Cum ergo filius Dei ab aeterno omnipotentiam habuerit, videtur quod anima Christi ex tempore omnipotentiam acceperit. Praeterea, sicut potentia Dei est infinita, sic et eius scientia. Sed anima Christi habet omnium scientiam eorum quae scit Deus quodammodo, ut supra dictum est. Ergo etiam habet omnem potentiam. Et ita est omnipotens. Praeterea, anima Christi habet omnem scientiam. Sed scientiarum quaedam est practica, quaedam speculativa. Ergo habet eorum quae scit scientiam practicam, ut scilicet sciat facere ea quae scit. Et sic videtur quod omnia facere possit. Sed contra est, quod proprium est Dei, non potest alicui creaturae convenire. Sed proprium est Dei esse omnipotentem, secundum illud Exodi XV, iste Deus meus, et glorificabo eum; et postea subditur, omnipotens nomen eius. Ergo anima Christi, cum sit creatura, non habet omnipotentiam. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in mysterio incarnationis ita facta est unio in persona quod tamen remansit distinctio naturarum, utraque scilicet natura retinente id quod sibi est proprium. Potentia autem activa cuiuslibet rei sequitur formam ipsius, quae est principium agendi. Forma autem vel est ipsa natura rei, sicut in simplicibus, vel est constituens ipsam rei naturam, sicut in his quae sunt composita ex materia et for-

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had omnipotence. For Ambrose says on Luke 1:32: The power which the Son of God had naturally, the Man was about to receive in time. Now this would seem to regard the soul principally, since it is the chief part of man. Hence since the Son of God had omnipotence from all eternity, it would seem that the soul of Christ received omnipotence in time. Obj. 2: Further, as the power of God is infinite, so is His knowledge. But the soul of Christ in a manner had the knowledge of all that God knows, as was said above (Q. 10, A. 2). Therefore He had all power; and thus He was omnipotent. Obj. 3: Further, the soul of Christ has all knowledge. Now knowledge is either practical or speculative. Therefore He has a practical knowledge of what He knows, i.e., He knew how to do what He knows; and thus it seems that He can do all things. On the contrary, What is proper to God cannot belong to any creature. But it is proper to God to be omnipotent, according to Ex. 15:2, 3: He is my God and I will glorify Him, and further on, Almighty is His name. Therefore the soul of Christ, as being a creature, has not omnipotence. I answer that, As was said above (Q. 2, A. 1; Q. 10, A. 1), in the mystery of the Incarnation the union in person so took place that there still remained the distinction of natures, each nature still retaining what belonged to it. Now the active principle of a thing follows its form, which is the principle of action. But the form is either the very nature of the thing, as in simple things; or is the constituent of the nature of the thing; as in such as are composed of mat-

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ma. Unde manifestum est quod potentia activa cuiuslibet rei consequitur naturam ipsius. Et per hunc modum omnipotentia consequenter se habet ad divinam naturam. Quia enim natura divina est ipsum esse Dei incircumscriptum, ut patet per Dionysium, V cap. de Div. Nom., inde est quod habet potentiam activam respectu omnium quae possunt habere rationem entis, quod est habere omnipotentiam, sicut et quaelibet alia res habet potentiam activam respectu eorum ad quae se extendit perfectio suae naturae, sicut calidum ad calefaciendum. Cum igitur anima Christi sit pars humanae naturae, impossibile est quod habeat omnipotentiam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo accepit ex tempore omnipotentiam quam filius Dei habuit ab aeterno, per ipsam unionem personae, ex qua factum est ut, sicut homo dicitur Deus, ita dicatur omnipotens, non quasi sit alia omnipotentia hominis quam filii Dei sicut nec alia deitas; sed eo quod est una persona Dei et hominis. Ad secundum dicendum quod alia ratio est de scientia, et de potentia activa, sicut quidam dicunt. Nam potentia activa consequitur ipsam naturam rei, eo quod actio consideratur ut egrediens ab agente. Scientia autem non semper habetur per ipsam essentiam scientis, sed potest haberi per assimilationem scientis ad res scitas secundum similitudines susceptas. Sed haec ratio non videtur sufficere. Quia sicut aliquis potest cognoscere per similitudinem susceptam ab alio, ita etiam potest agere per formam ab alio susceptam, sicut aqua vel ferrum calefacit per calorem susceptum ab igne. Non igitur per hoc prohibetur quin, sicut anima Christi per similitudines omnium rerum sibi a Deo inditas potest omnia cognoscere, ita per easdem similitudines possit ea facere. Est ergo ulterius considerandum quod id quod a superiori natura in inferiori recipitur, habetur per inferiorem modum, non enim calor in eadem perfectione et virtute recipitur ab aqua qua est in igne. Quia igitur anima Christi inferioris naturae est quam divina natura, similitudines rerum non recipiuntur in ipsa anima Christi secundum eandem perfectionem et virtutem secundum quam sunt in natura divina. Et inde est quod scientia animae Christi est inferior scientia divina, quantum ad modum cognoscendi, quia Deus perfectius cognoscit quam anima Christi; et etiam quantum ad numerum scitorum, quia anima Christi non cognoscit omnes res quas Deus potest facere, quae tamen Deus cognoscit scientia simplicis intelligentiae; licet cognoscat omnia praesentia, praeterita et futura, quae Deus cognoscit scientia visionis. Et similiter similitudines rerum animae Christi inditae non adaequant virtutem divinam in agendo, ut scilicet possint omnia agere quae Deus potest; vel etiam eo modo agere sicut Deus agit, qui agit per virtutem infinitam, cuius creatura non est capax. Nulla autem res est

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ter and form. Hence it is manifest that the active principle of a thing follows its nature. And it is in this way that omnipotence flows, so to say, from the Divine Nature. For since the Divine Nature is the very uncircumscribed Being of God, as is plain from Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), it has an active power over everything that can have the nature of being; and this is to have omnipotence; just as every other thing has an active power over such things as the perfection of its nature extends to; as what is hot gives heat. Therefore since the soul of Christ is a part of human nature, it cannot possibly have omnipotence. Reply Obj. 1: By union with the Person, the Man receives omnipotence in time, which the Son of God had from eternity; the result of which union is that as the Man is said to be God, so is He said to be omnipotent; not that the omnipotence of the Man is distinct (as neither is His Godhead) from that of the Son of God, but because there is one Person of God and man. Reply Obj. 2: According to some, knowledge and active power are not in the same ratio; for an active power flows from the very nature of the thing, inasmuch as action is considered to come forth from the agent; but knowledge is not always possessed by the very essence or form of the knower, since it may be had by assimilation of the knower to the thing known by the aid of received similitudes. But this reason seems not to suffice, because even as we may understand by a likeness obtained from another, so also may we act by a form obtained from another, as water or iron heats, by heat borrowed from fire. Hence there would be no reason why the soul of Christ, as it can know all things by the similitudes of all things impressed upon it by God, cannot do these things by the same similitudes. It has, therefore, to be further considered that what is received in the lower nature from the higher is possessed in an inferior manner; for heat is not received by water in the perfection and strength it had in fire. Therefore, since the soul of Christ is of an inferior nature to the Divine Nature, the similitudes of things are not received in the soul of Christ in the perfection and strength they had in the Divine Nature. And hence it is that the knowledge of Christ’s soul is inferior to Divine knowledge as regards the manner of knowing, for God knows (things) more perfectly than the soul of Christ; and also as regards the number of things known, since the soul of Christ does not know all that God can do, and these God knows by the knowledge of simple intelligence; although it knows all things present, past, and future, which God knows by the knowledge of vision. So, too, the similitudes of things infused into Christ’s soul do not equal the Divine power in acting, i.e., so as to do all that God can do, or to do in the same manner as God does, Who acts with an infinite might whereof the creature is not capable. Now there is no thing, to know which in

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ad cuius cognitionem aliqualiter habendam requiratur virtus infinita, licet aliquis modus cognoscendi sit virtutis infinitae, quaedam tamen sunt quae non possunt fieri nisi a virtute infinita sicut creatio et alia huiusmodi, ut patet ex his quae in prima parte dicta sunt. Et ideo anima Christi, cum sit creatura et virtutis finitae, potest quidem omnia cognoscere, sed non per omnem modum, non autem potest omnia facere, quod pertinet ad rationem omnipotentiae et inter cetera, manifestum est quod non potest creare seipsam. Ad tertium dicendum quod anima Christi habuit et scientiam practicam et speculativam, non tamen oportet quod omnium illorum habeat scientiam practicam quorum habuit scientiam speculativam. Ad scientiam enim speculativam habendam sufficit sola conformitas vel assimilatio scientis ad rem scitam, ad scientiam autem practicam requiritur quod formae rerum quae sunt in intellectu sint factivae. Plus autem est habere formam et imprimere formam habitam in alterum, quam solum habere formam, sicut plus est lucere et illuminare quam solum lucere. Et inde est quod anima Christi habet quidem speculativam scientiam creandi, scit enim qualiter Deus creat, sed non habet huius modi scientiam practicam, quia non habet scientiam creationis factivam.

Q. 13, A. 2

some way an infinite power is needed, although a certain kind of knowledge belongs to an infinite power; yet there are things which can be done only by an infinite power, as creation and the like, as is plain from what has been said in the First Part (Q. 45). Hence Christ’s soul which, being a creature, is finite in might, can know, indeed, all things, but not in every way; yet it cannot do all things, which pertains to the nature of omnipotence; and, amongst other things, it is clear it cannot create itself. Reply Obj. 3: Christ’s soul has practical and speculative knowledge; yet it is not necessary that it should have practical knowledge of those things of which it has speculative knowledge. Because for speculative knowledge a mere conformity or assimilation of the knower to the thing known suffices; whereas for practical knowledge it is required that the forms of the things in the intellect should be operative. Now to have a form and to impress this form upon something else is more than merely to have the form; as to be lightsome and to enlighten is more than merely to be lightsome. Hence the soul of Christ has a speculative knowledge of creation (for it knows the mode of God’s creation), but it has no practical knowledge of this mode, since it has no knowledge operative of creation.

Article 2 Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi habeat omnipotentiam respectu immutationis creaturarum. Dicit enim ipse Matth. ult., data est mihi omnis potestas in caelo et in terra. Sed nomine caeli et terrae intelligitur omnis creatura, ut patet cum dicitur, Gen. I, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. Ergo videtur quod anima Christi habeat omnipotentiam respectu immutationis creaturarum. Praeterea, anima Christi est perfectior qualibet creatura. Sed quaelibet creatura potest moveri ab aliqua alia creatura, dicit enim Augustinus, in III de Trin., quod sicut corpora grossiora et inferiora per subtiliora et potentiora quodam ordine reguntur, ita omnia corpora per spiritum vitae rationalem; et spiritus vitae rationalis desertor atque peccator per spiritum vitae rationalem, pium et iustum. Anima autem Christi etiam ipsos supremos spiritus movet, illuminando eos, ut dicit Dionysius, VII cap. Cael. Hier. Ergo videtur quod anima Christi habeat omnipotentiam respectu immutationis creaturarum. Praeterea, anima Christi habuit plenissime gratiam miraculorum seu virtutum, sicut et ceteras gratias. Sed omnis immutatio creaturae potest ad gratiam mira-

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures. For He Himself says (Matt 28:18): All power is given to Me in heaven and on earth. Now by the words heaven and earth are meant all creatures, as is plain from Gen. 1:1: In the beginning God created heaven and earth. Therefore it seems that the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures. Obj. 2: Further, the soul of Christ is the most perfect of all creatures. But every creature can be moved by another creature; for Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that even as the denser and lower bodies are ruled in a fixed way by the subtler and stronger bodies; so are all bodies by the spirit of life, and the irrational spirit of life by the rational spirit of life, and the truant and sinful rational spirit of life by the rational, loyal, and righteous spirit of life. But the soul of Christ moves even the highest spirits, enlightening them, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore it seems that the soul of Christ has omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures. Obj. 3: Further, Christ’s soul had in its highest degree the grace of miracles or works of might. But every transmutation of the creature can belong to the grace of miracles;

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culorum pertinere, cum etiam miraculose caelestia corpora a suo ordine immutata fuerint, sicut probat Dionysius, in epistola ad Polycarpum. Ergo anima Christi habuit omnipotentiam respectu immutationis creaturarum. Sed contra est quod eiusdem est transmutare creaturas cuius est conservare eas. Sed hoc est solius Dei, secundum illud Heb. I, portans omnia verbo virtutis suae. Ergo solius Dei est habere omnipotentiam respectu immutationis creaturarum. Non ergo hoc convenit animae Christi. Respondeo dicendum quod hic duplici distinctione est opus. Quarum prima est ex parte transmutationis creaturarum, quae triplex est. Una quidem est naturalis, quae scilicet fit a proprio agente secundum ordinem naturae. Alia vero est miraculosa, quae fit ab agente supernaturali, supra consuetum ordinem et cursum naturae, sicut resuscitatio mortuorum. Tertia autem est secundum quod omnis creatura vertibilis est in nihil. Secunda autem distinctio est accipienda ex parte animae Christi, quae dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, secundum propriam naturam et virtutem, sive naturalem sive gratuitam. Alio modo, prout est instrumentum verbi Dei sibi personaliter uniti. Si ergo loquamur de anima Christi secundum propriam naturam et virtutem, sive naturalem sive gratuitam, potentiam habuit ad illos effectus faciendos qui sunt animae convenientes, puta ad gubernandum corpus, et ad disponendum actus humanos; et etiam ad illuminandum, per gratiae et scientiae plenitudinem, omnes creaturas rationales ab eius perfectione deficientes, per modum quo hoc est conveniens creaturae rationali. Si autem loquamur de anima Christi secundum quod est instrumentum verbi sibi uniti, sic habuit instrumentalem virtutem ad omnes immutationes miraculosas faciendas ordinabiles ad incarnationis finem, qui est instaurare omnia, sive quae in caelis sive quae in terris sunt. Immutationes vero creaturarum secundum quod sunt vertibiles in nihil, correspondent creationi rerum, prout scilicet producuntur ex nihilo. Et ideo, sicut solus Deus potest creare, ita solus potest creaturas in nihilum redigere, qui etiam solus eas in esse conservat, ne in nihilum decidant. Sic ergo dicendum est quod anima Christi non habet omnipotentiam respectu immutationis creaturarum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Hieronymus, illi potestas data est qui paulo ante crucifixus et sepultus in tumulo, qui postea resurrexit, idest, Christo secundum quod homo. Dicitur autem sibi omnis potestas data ratione unionis, per quam factum est ut homo esset omnipotens, ut supra dictum est. Et quamvis hoc ante resurrectionem innotuerit Angelis, post resurrectionem innotuit omnibus hominibus, ut Remigius dicit. Tunc autem dicuntur res fieri, quando innotescunt.

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since even the heavenly bodies were miraculously changed from their course, as Dionysius proves (Ep. ad Polycarp). Therefore Christ’s soul had omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures. On the contrary, To transmute creatures belongs to Him Who preserves them. Now this belongs to God alone, according to Heb. 1:3: Upholding all things by the word of His power. Therefore God alone has omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures. Therefore this does not belong to Christ’s soul. I answer that, Two distinctions are here needed. Of these the first is with respect to the transmutation of creatures, which is three-fold. The first is natural, being brought about by the proper agent naturally; the second is miraculous, being brought about by a supernatural agent above the wonted order and course of nature, as to raise the dead; the third is inasmuch as every creature may be brought to nothing. The second distinction has to do with Christ’s soul, which may be looked at in two ways: first in its proper nature and with its power of nature or of grace; second, as it is the instrument of the Word of God, personally united to Him. Therefore if we speak of the soul of Christ in its proper nature and with its power of nature or of grace, it had power to cause those effects proper to a soul (e.g., to rule the body and direct human acts, and also, by the fullness of grace and knowledge to enlighten all rational creatures falling short of its perfection), in a manner befitting a rational creature. But if we speak of the soul of Christ as it is the instrument of the Word united to Him, it had an instrumental power to effect all the miraculous transmutations ordainable to the end of the Incarnation, which is to re-establish all things that are in heaven and on earth. But the transmutation of creatures, inasmuch as they may be brought to nothing, corresponds to their creation, whereby they were brought from nothing. And hence even as God alone can create, so, too, He alone can bring creatures to nothing, and He alone upholds them in being, lest they fall back to nothing. And thus it must be said that the soul of Christ had not omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures.

Reply Obj. 1: As Jerome says (on the text quoted): Power is given Him, i.e., to Christ as man, Who a little while before was crucified, buried in the tomb, and afterwards rose again. But all power is said to have been given Him, by reason of the union whereby it was brought about that a Man was omnipotent, as was said above (A. 1, ad 1). And although this was made known to the angels before the Resurrection, yet after the Resurrection it was made known to all men, as Remigius says (cf. Catena Aurea). Now, things

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Et ideo post resurrectionem dominus dicit sibi potesta- are said to happen when they are made known. Hence aftem esse datam in caelo et in terra. ter the Resurrection our Lord says that all power is given to Him in heaven and on earth. Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet omnis creatura Reply Obj. 2: Although every creature is transmutable sit mutabilis ab alia creatura, praeter supremum Ange- by some other creature, except, indeed, the highest angel, lum, qui tamen potest illuminari ab anima Christi; non and even it can be enlightened by Christ’s soul; yet not every tamen omnis immutatio quae potest fieri circa creatu- transmutation that can be made in a creature can be made ram, potest fieri a creatura; sed quaedam immutationes by a creature; since some transmutations can be made by possunt fieri a solo Deo. Quaecumque tamen immuta- God alone. Yet all transmutations that can be made in creationes creaturarum possunt fieri per creaturas, possunt tures can be made by the soul of Christ, as the instrument etiam fieri per animam Christi secundum quod est in- of the Word, but not in its proper nature and power, since strumentum verbi. Non autem secundum propriam na- some of these transmutations pertain to the soul neither in turam et virtutem, quia quaedam huiusmodi immuta- the order of nature nor in the order of grace. tionum non pertinent ad animam, neque quantum ad ordinem naturae neque quantum ad ordinem gratiae. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est in Reply Obj. 3: As was said in the Second Part (Q. 178, secunda parte, gratia virtutum, seu miraculorum, datur A. 1, ad 1), the grace of mighty works or miracles is given animae alicuius sancti, non ut propria virtute eius, sed ut to the soul of a saint, so that these miracles are wrought not per virtutem divinam huiusmodi miracula fiant. Et haec by his own, but by Divine power. Now this grace was bequidem gratia excellentissime data est animae Christi, ut stowed on Christ’s soul most excellently, i.e., not only that scilicet non solum ipse miracula faceret, sed etiam hanc He might work miracles, but also that He might commugratiam in alios transfunderet. Unde dicitur, Matth. X, nicate this grace to others. Hence it is written (Matt 10:1) quod, convocatis duodecim discipulis, dedit illis potesta- that, having called His twelve disciples together, He gave them tem spirituum immundorum, ut eiicerent eos; et curarent power over unclean spirits, to cast them out, and to heal all omnem languorem et omnem infirmitatem. manner of diseases, and all manner of infirmities.

Article 3 Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to his own body? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi habuerit omnipotentiam respectu proprii corporis. Dicit enim Damascenus, in III libro, quod omnia naturalia fuerunt Christo voluntaria, volens enim esurivit, volens sitivit, volens timuit, volens mortuus est. Sed ex hoc Deus dicitur omnipotens quia omnia quaecumque voluit, fecit. Ergo videtur quod anima Christi habuit omnipotentiam respectu naturalium operationum proprii corporis. Praeterea, in Christo fuit perfectius humana natura quam in Adam, in quo, secundum originalem iustitiam quam habuit in statu innocentiae, corpus habebat omnino subiectum animae, ut nihil in corpore posset accidere contra animae voluntatem. Ergo multo magis anima Christi habuit omnipotentiam respectu sui corporis. Praeterea, ad imaginationem animae naturaliter corpus immutatur; et tanto magis, quanto anima fuerit fortioris imaginationis; ut in prima parte habitum est. Sed anima Christi habuit virtutem perfectissimam, et quantum ad imaginationem, et quantum ad alias vires.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s soul had omnipotence with regard to His own body. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 20, 23) that all natural things were voluntary to Christ; He willed to hunger, He willed to thirst, He willed to fear, He willed to die. Now God is called omnipotent because He hath done all things whatsoever He would (Ps 113:11). Therefore it seems that Christ’s soul had omnipotence with regard to the natural operations of the body. Obj. 2: Further, human nature was more perfect in Christ than in Adam, who had a body entirely subject to the soul, so that nothing could happen to the body against the will of the soul—and this on account of the original justice which it had in the state of innocence. Much more, therefore, had Christ’s soul omnipotence with regard to His body. Obj. 3: Further, the body is naturally changed by the imaginations of the soul; and so much more changed, the stronger the soul’s imagination, as was said in the First Part (Q. 117, A. 3, ad 3). Now the soul of Christ had most perfect strength as regards both the imagination and the other

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Ergo anima Christi fuit omnipotens in respectu ad corpus proprium. Sed contra est quod dicitur Heb. II, quod debuit per omnia fratribus assimilari, et praecipue in his quae pertinent ad conditionem humanae naturae. Sed ad conditionem humanae naturae pertinet quod valetudo corporis, et eius nutritio et augmentum, imperio rationis, seu voluntati, non subdantur, quia naturalia soli Deo, qui est auctor naturae, subduntur. Ergo nec in Christo subdebantur. Non igitur anima Christi fuit omnipotens respectu proprii corporis. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, anima Christi potest dupliciter considerari. Uno modo, secundum propriam virtutem et naturam. Et hoc modo, sicut non poterat immutare exteriora corpora a cursu et ordine naturae, ita etiam non poterat immutare proprium corpus a naturali dispositione, quia anima, secundum propriam naturam, habet determinatam proportionem ad suum corpus. Alio modo potest considerari anima Christi secundum quod est instrumentum unitum verbo Dei in persona. Et sic subdebatur eius potestati totaliter omnis dispositio proprii corporis. Quia tamen virtus actionis non proprie attribuitur instrumento, sed principali agenti, talis omnipotentia attribuitur magis ipsi verbo Dei quam animae Christi. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum Damasceni est intelligendum quantum ad voluntatem divinam Christi. Quia, sicut ipse in praecedenti capitulo dicit, beneplacito divinae voluntatis permittebatur carni pati et operari quae propria. Ad secundum dicendum quod non pertinebat hoc ad originalem iustitiam quam Adam habuit in statu innocentiae, quod anima hominis haberet virtutem transmutandi corpus proprium in quamcumque formam, sed quod posset ipsum conservare absque nocumento. Et hanc etiam virtutem Christus assumere potuisset, si voluisset. Sed, cum sint tres status hominum, scilicet innocentiae culpae et gloriae; sicut de statu gloriae assumpsit comprehensionem, et de statu innocentiae immunitatem a peccato, ita et de statu culpae assumpsit necessitatem subiacendi poenalitatibus huius vitae, ut infra dicetur. Ad tertium dicendum quod imaginationi, si fortis fuerit, naturaliter obedit corpus quantum ad aliqua. Puta quantum ad casum de trabe in alto posita; quia imaginatio nata est esse principium motus localis, ut dicitur in III de anima. Similiter etiam quantum ad alterationem quae est secundum calorem et frigus, et alia consequentia, eo quod ex imaginatione consequenter natae sunt consequi passiones animae, secundum quas movetur cor, et sic per commotionem spirituum totum corpus alteratur. Aliae vero dispositiones corpo-

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powers. Therefore the soul of Christ was omnipotent with regard to His own body. On the contrary, It is written (Heb 2:17) that it behooved Him in all things to be made like unto His brethren, and especially as regards what belongs to the condition of human nature. But it belongs to the condition of human nature that the health of the body and its nourishment and growth are not subject to the bidding of reason or will, since natural things are subject to God alone Who is the author of nature. Therefore they were not subject in Christ. Therefore Christ’s soul was not omnipotent with regard to His own body. I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), Christ’s soul may be viewed in two ways. First, in its proper nature and power; and in this way, as it was incapable of making exterior bodies swerve from the course and order of nature, so, too, was it incapable of changing its own body from its natural disposition, since the soul, of its own nature, has a determinate relation to its body. Second, Christ’s soul may be viewed as an instrument united in person to God’s Word; and thus every disposition of His own body was wholly subject to His power. Nevertheless, since the power of an action is not properly attributed to the instrument, but to the principal agent, this omnipotence is attributed to the Word of God rather than to Christ’s soul. Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Damascene refers to the Divine will of Christ, since, as he says in the preceding chapter (De Fide Orth. xix, 14, 15), it was by the consent of the Divine will that the flesh was allowed to suffer and do what was proper to it. Reply Obj. 2: It was no part of the original justice which Adam had in the state of innocence that a man’s soul should have the power of changing his own body to any form, but that it should keep it from any hurt. Yet Christ could have assumed even this power if He had wished. But since man has three states—viz. innocence, sin, and glory, even as from the state of glory He assumed comprehension and from the state of innocence, freedom from sin—so also from the state of sin did He assume the necessity of being under the penalties of this life, as will be said (Q. 14, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 3: If the imagination be strong, the body obeys naturally in some things, e.g., as regards falling from a beam set on high, since the imagination was formed to be a principle of local motion, as is said De Anima iii, 9, 10. So, too, as regards alteration in heat and cold, and their consequences; for the passions of the soul, wherewith the heart is moved, naturally follow the imagination, and thus by commotion of the spirits the whole body is altered. But the other corporeal dispositions which have no natural relation to the imagination are not transmuted by the imagination, how-

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rales, quae non habent naturalem ordinem ad imagina- ever strong it is, e.g., the shape of the hand, or foot, or such tionem, non transmutantur ab imaginatione, quantum- like. cumque sit fortis, puta figura manus vel pedis, vel aliquid simile.

Article 4 Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence as regards the execution of his will? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi non habuerit omnipotentiam respectu executionis propriae voluntatis. Dicitur enim Marc. VII quod, ingressus domum, neminem voluit scire sed non potuit latere. Non ergo potuit exequi in omnibus propositum suae voluntatis. Praeterea, praeceptum est signum voluntatis, ut in prima parte dictum est. Sed dominus quaedam facienda praecepit quorum contraria acciderunt, dicitur enim Matth. IX quod caecis illuminatis comminatus est Iesus, dicens, videte ne aliquis sciat, illi autem egressi diffamaverunt illum per totam terram illam. Non ergo in omnibus potuit exequi propositum suae voluntatis. Praeterea, id quod aliquis potest facere, non petit ab alio. Sed dominus petivit a patre, orando, illud quod fieri volebat, dicitur enim Luc. VI quod exivit in montem orare, et erat pernoctans in oratione Dei. Ergo non potuit exequi in omnibus propositum suae voluntatis. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de quaest. Nov. et Vet. Test., impossibile est ut salvatoris voluntas non impleatur, nec potest velle quod scit fieri non debere. Respondeo dicendum quod anima Christi dupliciter aliquid voluit. Uno modo, quasi per se implendum. Et sic, dicendum est quod quidquid voluit, potuit. Non enim conveniret sapientiae eius ut aliquid vellet per se facere quod suae voluntati non subiaceret. Alio modo voluit aliquid ut implendum virtute divina, sicut resuscitationem proprii corporis, et alia huiusmodi miraculosa opera. Quae quidem non poterat propria virtute, sed secundum quod erat instrumentum divinitatis, ut dictum est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de quaest. Nov. et Vet. Test., quod factum est, hoc voluisse dicendus est Christus. Advertendum est enim quod illud in finibus gestum est gentilium, quibus adhuc tempus praedicandi non erat. Ultro tamen venientes ad fidem non suscipere invidiae erat. A suis ergo noluit praedicari, requiri autem se voluit. Et ita factum est. Vel potest dici quod haec voluntas Christi non fuit de eo quod per eum fiendum erat, sed de eo quod erat fiendum per alios, quod non subiacebat humanae voluntati

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had not omnipotence as regards the execution of His own will. For it is written (Mark 7:24) that entering into a house, He would that no man should know it, and He could not be hid. Therefore He could not carry out the purpose of His will in all things. Obj. 2: Further, a command is a sign of will, as was said in the First Part (Q. 19, A. 12). But our Lord commanded certain things to be done, and the contrary came to pass, for it is written (Matt 9:30, 31) that Jesus strictly charged them whose eyes had been opened, saying: See that no man know this. But they going out spread His fame abroad in all that country. Therefore He could not carry out the purpose of His will in everything. Obj. 3: Further, a man does not ask from another for what he can do himself. But our Lord besought the Father, praying for what He wished to be done, for it is written (Luke 6:12): He went out into a mountain to pray, and He passed the whole night in the prayer of God. Therefore He could not carry out the purpose of His will in all things. On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test., qu. 77): It is impossible for the will of the Savior not to be fulfilled: nor is it possible for Him to will what He knows ought not to come to pass. I answer that, Christ’s soul willed things in two ways. First, what was to be brought about by Himself; and it must be said that He was capable of whatever He willed thus, since it would not befit His wisdom if He willed to do anything of Himself that was not subject to His will. Second, He wished things to be brought about by the Divine power, as the resurrection of His own body and such like miraculous deeds, which He could not effect by His own power, except as the instrument of the Godhead, as was said above (A. 2). Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test., qu. 77): What came to pass, this Christ must be said to have willed. For it must be remarked that this happened in the country of the Gentiles, to whom it was not yet time to preach. Yet it would have been invidious not to welcome such as came spontaneously for the faith. Hence He did not wish to be heralded by His own, and yet He wished to be sought; and so it came to pass. Or it may be said that this will of Christ was not with regard to what was to be carried out by it, but with regard to what was to be done by others, which did

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ipsius. Unde in epistola Agathonis Papae, quae est recepta in sexta synodo, legitur, ergone ille omnium conditor ac redemptor, in terris latere volens, non potuit, nisi hoc ad humanam eius voluntatem, quam temporaliter dignatus est assumere, redigatur? Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Gregorius, XIX Moral., per hoc quod dominus praecepit taceri virtutes suas, servis suis se sequentibus exemplum dedit, ut ipsi quidem virtutes suas occultari desiderent, et tamen, ut alii eorum exemplo proficiant, prodantur inviti. Sic ergo praeceptum illud designabat voluntatem ipsius qua humanam gloriam refugiebat, secundum illud Ioan. VIII, ego gloriam meam non quaero. Volebat tamen absolute, praesertim secundum divinam voluntatem, ut publicaretur miraculum factum, propter aliorum utilitatem. Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus orabat etiam pro his quae virtute divina fienda erant, et pro his etiam quae humana voluntate erat facturus. Quia virtus et operatio animae Christi dependebat a Deo, qui operatur in omnibus velle et perficere, ut dicitur Philipp. II.

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not come under His human will. Hence in the letter of Pope Agatho, which was approved in the Sixth Council, we read: When He, the Creator and Redeemer of all, wished to be hid and could not, must not this be referred only to His human will which He deigned to assume in time? Reply Obj. 2: As Gregory says (Moral. xix), by the fact that Our Lord charged His mighty works to be kept secret, He gave an example to His servants coming after Him that they should wish their miracles to be hidden; and yet, that others may profit by their example, they are made public against their will. And thus this command signified His will to fly from human glory, according to John 8:50, I seek not My own glory. Yet He wished absolutely, and especially by His Divine will, that the miracle wrought should be published for the good of others. Reply Obj. 3: Christ prayed both for things that were to be brought about by the Divine power, and for what He Himself was to do by His human will, since the power and operation of Christ’s soul depended on God, Who works in all, both to will and to accomplish (Phil 2:13).

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Question 14 The Defects of Body Assumed by the Son of God Deinde considerandum est de defectibus quos ChriWe must now consider the defects Christ assumed in stus in humana natura assumpsit. Et primo, de defecti- the human nature; and first, of the defects of body; second, bus corporis; secundo, de defectibus animae. of the defects of soul. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum filius Dei assumere debuerit in (1) Whether the Son of God should have assumed in humana natura corporis defectus. human nature defects of body? Secundo, utrum assumpserit necessitatem his (2) Whether He assumed the obligation of being defectibus subiacendi. subject to these defects? Tertio, utrum hos defectus contraxerit. (3) Whether He contracted these defects? Quarto, utrum omnes huiusmodi defectus (4) Whether He assumed all these defects? assumpserit.

Article 1 Whether the Son of God in human nature ought to have assumed defects of body? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei non debuit assumere naturam humanam cum corporis defectibus. Sicut enim anima unita est verbo Dei personaliter, ita et corpus. Sed anima Christi habuit omnimodam perfectionem, et quantum ad gratiam et quantum ad scientiam, ut supra dictum est. Ergo etiam corpus eius debuit esse omnibus modis perfectum, nullum in se habens defectum. Praeterea, anima Christi videbat verbum Dei ea visione qua beati vident, ut supra dictum est, et sic anima Christi erat beata. Sed ex beatitudine animae glorificatur corpus, dicit enim Augustinus, in epistola ad Dioscorum, tam potenti natura Deus fecit animam ut ex eius plenissima beatitudine redundet etiam in inferiorem naturam, quae est corpus, non beatitudo, quae fruentis et intelligentis est propria, sed plenitudo sanitatis, idest incorruptionis vigor. Corpus igitur Christi fuit incorruptibile, et absque omni defectu. Praeterea, poena consequitur culpam. Sed in Christo non fuit aliqua culpa, secundum illud I Pet. II, qui peccatum non fecit. Ergo nec defectus corporales, qui sunt poenales, in eo esse debuerunt. Praeterea, nullus sapiens assumit id quod impedit illum a proprio fine. Sed per huiusmodi defectus corporales multipliciter videtur impediri finis incarnationis. Primo quidem, quia propter huiusmodi infirmitates homines ab eius cognitione impediebantur, secundum illud Isaiae LIII, desideravimus eum; despectum et novissimum virorum, virum dolorum et scientem infirmitatem,

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God ought not to have assumed human nature with defects of body. For as His soul is personally united to the Word of God, so also is His body. But the soul of Christ had every perfection, both of grace and truth, as was said above (Q. 7, A. 9; Q. 9, seqq.). Hence, His body also ought to have been in every way perfect, not having any imperfection in it. Obj. 2: Further, the soul of Christ saw the Word of God by the vision wherein the blessed see, as was said above (Q. 9, A. 2), and thus the soul of Christ was blessed. Now by the beatification of the soul the body is glorified; since, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dios. cxviii), God made the soul of a nature so strong that from the fullness of its blessedness there pours over even into the lower nature (i.e., the body), not indeed the bliss proper to the beatific fruition and vision, but the fullness of health (i.e., the vigor of incorruptibility). Therefore the body of Christ was incorruptible and without any defect. Obj. 3: Further, penalty is the consequence of fault. But there was no fault in Christ, according to 1 Pet. 2:22: Who did no guile. Therefore defects of body, which are penalties, ought not to have been in Him. Obj. 4: Further, no reasonable man assumes what keeps him from his proper end. But by such like bodily defects, the end of the Incarnation seems to be hindered in many ways. First, because by these infirmities men were kept back from knowing Him, according to Isa. 53:2, 3: There was no sightliness that we should be desirous of Him. Despised and the most abject of men, a man of sorrows and acquainted

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et quasi absconditus est vultus eius et despectus; unde nec reputavimus eum. Secundo, quia sanctorum patrum desiderium non videtur impleri, ex quorum persona dicitur Isaiae li, consurge, consurge, induere fortitudinem, brachium domini. Tertio, quia congruentius per fortitudinem quam per infirmitatem videbatur potestas Diaboli posse superari, et humana infirmitas posse sanari. Non ergo videtur conveniens fuisse quod filius Dei humanam naturam assumpserit cum corporalibus infirmitatibus sive defectibus. Sed contra est quod dicitur Heb. II, in eo in quo passus est ipse et tentatus, potens est et eis qui tentantur auxiliari. Sed ad hoc venit ut nos adiuvaret, unde et David dicebat, levavi oculos meos in montes, unde veniet auxilium mihi. Ergo conveniens fuit quod filius Dei carnem assumpserit humanis infirmitatibus subiacentem, ut in ea posset pati et tentari, et sic auxilium nobis ferre. Respondeo dicendum conveniens fuisse corpus assumptum a filio Dei humanis infirmitatibus et defectibus subiacere, et praecipue propter tria. Primo quidem, quia ad hoc filius Dei, carne assumpta, venit in mundum, ut pro peccato humani generis satisfaceret. Unus autem pro peccato alterius satisfacit dum poenam peccato alterius debitam in seipsum suscipit. Huiusmodi autem defectus corporales, scilicet mors, fames et sitis, et huiusmodi, sunt poena peccati, quod est in mundum per Adam introductum, secundum illud Rom. V, per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors. Unde conveniens fuit, quantum ad finem incarnationis, quod huiusmodi poenalitates in nostra carne susciperet, vice nostra, secundum illud Isaiae LIII, vere languores nostros ipse tulit. Secundo, propter fidem incarnationis adstruendam. Cum enim natura humana non aliter esset nota hominibus nisi prout huiusmodi corporalibus defectibus subiacet, si sine his defectibus filius Dei naturam humanam assumpsisset, videretur non fuisse verus homo, nec veram carnem habuisse, sed phantasticam, ut Manichaei dixerunt. Et ideo, ut dicitur Philipp. II, exinanivit semetipsum, formam servi accipiens, in similitudinem hominum factus et habitu inventus ut homo. Unde et Thomas per aspectum vulnerum ad fidem est revocatus, ut dicitur Ioan. XX. Tertio, propter exemplum patientiae, quod nobis exhibet passiones et defectus humanos fortiter tolerando. Unde dicitur Heb. XII, sustinuit a peccatoribus adversus semetipsum contradictionem, ut non fatigemini, animis vestris deficientes. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod satisfactio pro peccato alterius habet quidem quasi materiam poenas quas aliquis pro peccato alterius sustinet, sed pro principio habet habitum animae ex quo inclinatur ad volendum satisfacere pro alio, et ex quo satisfactio efficaciam habet; non enim esset satisfactio efficax nisi ex caritate procederet, ut infra dicetur. Et ideo oportuit animam

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with infirmity, and His look was, as it were, hidden and despised, whereupon we esteemed Him not. Second, because the desire of the Fathers would not seem to be fulfilled, in whose person it is written (Isa 51:9): Arise, arise, put on Thy strength, O Thou Arm of the Lord. Third, because it would seem more fitting for the devil’s power to be overcome and man’s weakness healed, by strength than by weakness. Therefore it does not seem to have been fitting that the Son of God assumed human nature with infirmities or defects of body. On the contrary, It is written (Heb 2:18): For in that, wherein He Himself hath suffered and been tempted, He is able to succor them also that are tempted. Now He came to succor us. Hence David said of Him (Ps 120:1): I have lifted up my eyes to the mountains, from whence help shall come to me. Therefore it was fitting for the Son of God to assume flesh subject to human infirmities, in order to suffer and be tempted in it and so bring succor to us. I answer that, It was fitting for the body assumed by the Son of God to be subject to human infirmities and defects; and especially for three reasons. First, because it was in order to satisfy for the sin of the human race that the Son of God, having taken flesh, came into the world. Now one satisfies for another’s sin by taking on himself the punishment due to the sin of the other. But these bodily defects, to wit, death, hunger, thirst, and the like, are the punishment of sin, which was brought into the world by Adam, according to Rom. 5:12: By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death. Hence it was useful for the end of the Incarnation that He should assume these penalties in our flesh and in our stead, according to Isa. 53:4, Surely He hath borne our infirmities. Second, in order to cause belief in the Incarnation. For since human nature is known to men only as it is subject to these defects, if the Son of God had assumed human nature without these defects, He would not have seemed to be true man, nor to have true, but imaginary, flesh, as the Manicheans held. And so, as is said, Phil. 2:7: He . . . emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man. Hence, Thomas, by the sight of His wounds, was recalled to the faith, as related John 20:26. Third, in order to show us an example of patience by valiantly bearing up against human passibility and defects. Hence it is said (Heb 12:3) that He endured such opposition from sinners against Himself, that you be not wearied, fainting in your minds.

Reply Obj. 1: The penalties one suffers for another’s sin are the matter, as it were, of the satisfaction for that sin; but the principle is the habit of soul, whereby one is inclined to wish to satisfy for another, and from which the satisfaction has its efficacy, for satisfaction would not be efficacious unless it proceeded from charity, as will be explained (Supp., Q. 14, A. 2). Hence, it behooved the soul of Christ to be per-

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Christi perfectam esse quantum ad habitus scientiarum et virtutum, ut haberet facultatem satisfaciendi, et quod corpus eius subiectum esset infirmitatibus, ut ei satisfactionis materia non deesset. Ad secundum dicendum quod, secundum naturalem habitudinem quae est inter animam et corpus, ex gloria animae redundat gloria ad corpus, sed haec naturalis habitudo in Christo subiacebat voluntati divinitatis ipsius, ex qua factum est ut beatitudo remaneret in anima et non derivaretur ad corpus, sed caro pateretur quae conveniunt naturae passibili; secundum illud quod dicit Damascenus, quod beneplacito divinae voluntatis permittebatur carni pati et operari quae propria. Ad tertium dicendum quod poena semper sequitur culpam, actualem vel originalem, quandoque quidem eius qui punitur; quandoque autem alterius, pro quo ille qui patitur poenas satisfacit. Et sic accidit in Christo, secundum illud Isaiae LIII, ipse vulneratus est propter iniquitates nostras; attritus est propter scelera nostra. Ad quartum dicendum quod infirmitas assumpta a Christo non impedivit finem incarnationis, sed maxime promovit, ut dictum est. Et quamvis per huiusmodi infirmitates absconderetur eius divinitas, manifestabatur tamen humanitas, quae est via ad divinitatem perveniendi, secundum illud Rom. V, accessum habemus ad Deum per Iesum Christum. Desiderabant autem antiqui patres in Christo, non quidem fortitudinem corporalem, sed spiritualem, per quam et Diabolum vicit et humanam infirmitatem sanavit.

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fect as regards the habit of knowledge and virtue, in order to have the power of satisfying; but His body was subject to infirmities, that the matter of satisfaction should not be wanting. Reply Obj. 2: From the natural relationship which is between the soul and the body, glory flows into the body from the soul’s glory. Yet this natural relationship in Christ was subject to the will of His Godhead, and thereby it came to pass that the beatitude remained in the soul, and did not flow into the body; but the flesh suffered what belongs to a passible nature; thus Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 15) that, it was by the consent of the Divine will that the flesh was allowed to suffer and do what belonged to it. Reply Obj. 3: Punishment always follows sin actual or original, sometimes of the one punished, sometimes of the one for whom he who suffers the punishment satisfies. And so it was with Christ, according to Isa. 53:5: He was wounded for our iniquities, He was bruised for our sins.

Reply Obj. 4: The infirmity assumed by Christ did not impede, but greatly furthered the end of the Incarnation, as above stated. And although these infirmities concealed His Godhead, they made known His Manhood, which is the way of coming to the Godhead, according to Rom. 5:1, 2: By Jesus Christ we have access to God. Moreover, the ancient Fathers did not desire bodily strength in Christ, but spiritual strength, wherewith He vanquished the devil and healed human weakness.

Article 2 Whether Christ was of necessity subject to these defects? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non ex necessitate his defectibus subiacuerit. Dicitur enim Isaiae LIII, oblatus est quia ipse voluit, et loquitur de oblatione ad passionem. Sed voluntas opponitur necessitati. Ergo Christus non ex necessitate subiacuit corporis defectibus. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in III libro, nihil coactum in Christo consideratur, sed omnia voluntaria. Sed quod est voluntarium, non est necessarium. Ergo huiusmodi defectus non fuerunt ex necessitate in Christo. Praeterea, necessitas infertur ab aliquo potentiori. Sed nulla creatura est potentior quam anima Christi, ad quam pertinebat proprium corpus conservare. Ergo huiusmodi defectus seu infirmitates non fuerunt in Christo ex necessitate. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VIII, misit Deus filium suum in similitudinem carnis peccati.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not of necessity subject to these defects. For it is written (Isa 53:7): He was offered because it was His own will; and the prophet is speaking of the offering of the Passion. But will is opposed to necessity. Therefore Christ was not of necessity subject to bodily defects. Obj. 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 20): Nothing obligatory is seen in Christ: all is voluntary. Now what is voluntary is not necessary. Therefore these defects were not of necessity in Christ. Obj. 3: Further, necessity is induced by something more powerful. But no creature is more powerful than the soul of Christ, to which it pertained to preserve its own body. Therefore these defects were not of necessity in Christ. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom 8:3) that God sent His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh. Now it is

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Sed conditio carnis peccati est quod habeat necessitatem moriendi, et sustinendi alias huiusmodi passiones. Ergo talis necessitas sustinendi hos defectus fuit in carne Christi. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est necessitas. Una quidem coactionis, quae fit ab agente extrinseco. Et haec quidem necessitas contrariatur et naturae et voluntati, quorum utrumque est principium intrinsecum. Alia autem est necessitas naturalis, quae consequitur principia naturalia, puta formam, sicut necessarium est ignem calefacere; vel materiam, sicut necessarium est corpus ex contrariis compositum dissolvi. Secundum igitur hanc necessitatem quae consequitur materiam, corpus Christi subiectum fuit necessitati mortis, et aliorum huiusmodi defectuum. Quia, sicut dictum est, beneplacito divinae voluntatis Christi carni permittebatur agere et pati quae propria, haec autem necessitas causatur ex principiis humanae carnis, ut dictum est. Si autem loquamur de necessitate coactionis secundum quod repugnat naturae corporali, sic iterum corpus Christi, secundum conditionem propriae naturae, necessitati subiacuit et clavi perforantis et flagelli percutientis. Secundum vero quod necessitas talis repugnat voluntati, manifestum est quod in Christo non fuit necessitas horum defectuum, nec per respectum ad voluntatem divinam; nec per respectum ad voluntatem humanam Christi absolute, prout sequitur rationem deliberativam; sed solum secundum naturalem motum voluntatis, prout scilicet naturaliter refugit mortem et corporis nocumenta. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus dicitur oblatus quia voluit, et voluntate divina, et voluntate humana deliberata, licet mors esset contra naturalem motum voluntatis humanae, ut dicit Damascenus. Ad secundum patet responsio ex dictis. Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil fuit potentius quam anima Christi absolute, nihil tamen prohibet aliquid fuisse potentius quantum ad hunc effectum; sicut clavus ad perforandum. Et hoc dico secundum quod anima Christi consideratur secundum propriam naturam et virtutem.

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a condition of sinful flesh to be under the necessity of dying, and suffering other like passions. Therefore the necessity of suffering these defects was in Christ’s flesh. I answer that, Necessity is twofold. One is a necessity of constraint, brought about by an external agent; and this necessity is contrary to both nature and will, since these flow from an internal principle. The other is natural necessity, resulting from the natural principles—either the form (as it is necessary for fire to heat), or the matter (as it is necessary for a body composed of contraries to be dissolved). Hence, with this necessity, which results from the matter, Christ’s body was subject to the necessity of death and other like defects, since, as was said (A. 1, ad 2), it was by the consent of the Divine will that the flesh was allowed to do and suffer what belonged to it. And this necessity results from the principles of human nature, as was said above in this article. But if we speak of necessity of constraint, as repugnant to the bodily nature, thus again was Christ’s body in its own natural condition subject to necessity in regard to the nail that pierced and the scourge that struck. Yet inasmuch as such necessity is repugnant to the will, it is clear that in Christ these defects were not of necessity as regards either the Divine will, or the human will of Christ considered absolutely, as following the deliberation of reason; but only as regards the natural movement of the will, inasmuch as it naturally shrinks from death and bodily hurt.

Reply Obj. 1: Christ is said to be offered because it was His own will, i.e., Divine will and deliberate human will; although death was contrary to the natural movement of His human will, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23, 24). Reply Obj. 2: This is plain from what has been said. Reply Obj. 3: Nothing was more powerful than Christ’s soul, absolutely; yet there was nothing to hinder a thing being more powerful in regard to this or that effect, as a nail for piercing. And this I say, insofar as Christ’s soul is considered in its own proper nature and power.

Article 3 Whether Christ contracted these defects? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus defectus corporales contraxit. Illud enim contrahere dicimur quod simul cum natura ex origine trahimus. Sed Christus simul cum natura humana defectus et infirmitates corporales per suam originem traxit a matre, cuius caro huiusmodi defectibus subiacebat. Ergo videtur quod hos defectus contraxit.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ contracted bodily defects. For we are said to contract what we derive with our nature from birth. But Christ, together with human nature, derived His bodily defects and infirmities through His birth from His mother, whose flesh was subject to these defects. Therefore it seems that He contracted these defects.

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Praeterea, illud quod ex principiis naturae causatur, simul cum natura trahitur, et ita contrahitur. Sed huiusmodi poenalitates causantur ex principiis naturae humanae. Ergo eas Christus contraxit. Praeterea, secundum huiusmodi defectus Christus aliis hominibus similatur ut dicitur Heb. II. Sed alii homines huiusmodi defectus contraxerunt. Ergo videtur quod etiam Christus huiusmodi defectus contraxit. Sed contra est quod huiusmodi defectus contrahuntur ex peccato, secundum illud Rom. V, per unum hominem peccatum intravit in hunc mundum, et per peccatum mors. Sed in Christo non habuit locum peccatum. Ergo huiusmodi defectus Christus non contraxit. Respondeo dicendum quod in verbo contrahendi intelligitur ordo effectus ad causam, ut scilicet illud dicatur contrahi quod simul cum sua causa ex necessitate trahitur. Causa autem mortis et horum defectuum in humana natura est peccatum, quia per peccatum mors intravit in mundum, ut dicitur Rom. V. Et ideo illi proprie dicuntur hos defectus contrahere qui ex debito peccati hos defectus incurrunt. Christus autem hos defectus non habuit ex debito peccati, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, exponens illud Ioan. III, qui de sursum venit, super omnes est, de sursum venit Christus, idest de altitudine humanae naturae, quam habuit ante peccatum primi hominis. Accepit enim naturam humanam absque peccato in illa puritate in qua erat in statu innocentiae. Et simili modo potuisset assumere humanam naturam absque defectibus. Sic igitur patet quod Christus non contraxit hos defectus, quasi ex debito peccati eos suscipiens, sed ex propria voluntate. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caro virginis concepta fuit in originali peccato, et ideo hos defectus contraxit. Sed caro Christi ex virgine assumpsit naturam absque culpa. Et similiter potuisset naturam assumere absque poena, sed voluit suscipere poenam propter opus nostrae redemptionis implendum, sicut dictum est. Et ideo habuit huiusmodi defectus, non contrahendo, sed voluntarie assumendo. Ad secundum dicendum quod causa mortis et aliorum corporalium defectuum in humana natura est duplex. Una quidem remota, quae accipitur ex parte principiorum materialium humani corporis, inquantum est ex contrariis compositum. Sed haec causa impediebatur per originalem iustitiam. Et ideo proxima causa mortis et aliorum defectuum est peccatum, per quod est subtracta originalis iustitia. Et propter hoc, quia Christus fuit sine peccato, dicitur non contraxisse huiusmodi defectus, sed voluntarie assumpsisse. Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus in huiusmodi defectibus assimilatus est aliis hominibus quantum ad qualitatem defectuum, non autem quantum ad causam. Et ideo non contraxit huiusmodi defectus, sicut et alii.

Q. 14, A. 3

Obj. 2: Further, what is caused by the principles of nature is derived together with nature, and hence is contracted. Now these penalties are caused by the principles of human nature. Therefore Christ contracted them. Obj. 3: Further, Christ is likened to other men in these defects, as is written Heb. 2:17. But other men contract these defects. Therefore it seems that Christ contracted these defects. On the contrary, These defects are contracted through sin, according to Rom. 5:12: By one man sin entered into this world and by sin, death. Now sin had no place in Christ. Therefore Christ did not contract these defects. I answer that, In the verb to contract is understood the relation of effect to cause, i.e., that is said to be contracted which is derived of necessity together with its cause. Now the cause of death and such like defects in human nature is sin, since by sin death entered into this world, according to Rom. 5:12. And hence they who incur these defects, as due to sin, are properly said to contract them. Now Christ had not these defects, as due to sin, since, as Augustine, expounding John 3:31, He that cometh from above, is above all, says: Christ came from above, i.e., from the height of human nature, which it had before the fall of the first man. For He received human nature without sin, in the purity which it had in the state of innocence. In the same way He might have assumed human nature without defects. Thus it is clear that Christ did not contract these defects as if taking them upon Himself as due to sin, but by His own will.

Reply Obj. 1: The flesh of the Virgin was conceived in original sin, and therefore contracted these defects. But from the Virgin, Christ’s flesh assumed the nature without sin, and He might likewise have assumed the nature without its penalties. But He wished to bear its penalties in order to carry out the work of our redemption, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore He had these defects—not that He contracted them, but that He assumed them. Reply Obj. 2: The cause of death and other corporeal defects of human nature is twofold: the first is remote, and results from the material principles of the human body, inasmuch as it is made up of contraries. But this cause was held in check by original justice. Hence the proximate cause of death and other defects is sin, whereby original justice is withdrawn. And thus, because Christ was without sin, He is said not to have contracted these defects, but to have assumed them. Reply Obj. 3: Christ was made like to other men in the quality and not in the cause of these defects; and hence, unlike others, He did not contract them.

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Article 4 Whether Christ ought to have assumed all the bodily defects of men? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus omnes defectus corporales hominum assumere debuit. Dicit enim Damascenus, quod est inassumptibile, est incurabile. Sed Christus venerat omnes defectus nostros curare. Ergo omnes defectus nostros assumere debuit. Praeterea, dictum est quod ad hoc quod Christus pro nobis satisfaceret, debuit habere habitus perfectivos in anima et defectus in corpore. Sed ipse ex parte animae assumpsit plenitudinem omnis gratiae. Ergo ex parte corporis debuit assumere omnes defectus. Praeterea, inter omnes defectus corporales praecipuum locum tenet mors. Sed Christus mortem assumpsit. Ergo multo magis omnes defectus alios assumere debuit. Sed contra est quod contraria non possunt simul fieri in eodem. Sed quaedam infirmitates sunt sibi ipsis contrariae, utpote ex contrariis principiis causatae. Ergo non potuit esse quod Christus omnes infirmitates humanas assumeret. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, Christus humanos defectus assumpsit ad satisfaciendum pro peccato humanae naturae, ad quod requirebatur quod perfectionem scientiae et gratiae haberet in anima. Illos igitur defectus Christus assumere debuit qui consequuntur ex peccato communi totius naturae, nec tamen repugnant perfectioni scientiae et gratiae. Sic igitur non fuit conveniens ut omnes defectus seu infirmitates humanas assumeret. Sunt enim quidam defectus qui repugnant perfectioni scientiae et gratiae, sicut ignorantia, pronitas ad malum, et difficultas ad bonum. Quidam autem defectus sunt qui non consequuntur communiter totam humanam naturam propter peccatum primi parentis, sed causantur in aliquibus hominibus ex quibusdam particularibus causis, sicut lepra et morbus caducus et alia huiusmodi. Qui quidem defectus quandoque causantur ex culpa hominis, puta ex inordinatione victus, quandoque autem ex defectu virtutis formativae. Quorum neutrum convenit Christo, quia caro eius de spiritu sancto concepta est, qui est infinitae sapientiae et virtutis, errare et deficere non valens; et ipse nihil inordinatum in regimine suae vitae exercuit. Sunt autem tertii defectus qui in omnibus hominibus communiter inveniuntur ex peccato primi parentis, sicut mors, fames, sitis, et alia huiusmodi. Et hos defectus omnes Christus suscepit. Quos Damascenus vocat naturales et indetractibiles passiones, naturales quidem, quia consequuntur communiter totam humanam naturam; indetractibiles quidem, quia defectum scientiae et gratiae non important.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ ought to have assumed all the bodily defects of men. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6, 18): What is unassumable is incurable. But Christ came to cure all our defects. Therefore He ought to have assumed all our defects. Obj. 2: Further it was said (A. 1), that in order to satisfy for us, Christ ought to have had perfective habits of soul and defects of body. Now as regards the soul, He assumed the fullness of all grace. Therefore as regards the body, He ought to have assumed all defects. Obj. 3: Further, amongst all bodily defects death holds the chief place. Now Christ assumed death. Much more, therefore, ought He to have assumed other defects. On the contrary, Contraries cannot take place simultaneously in the same. Now some infirmities are contrary to each other, being caused by contrary principles. Hence it could not be that Christ assumed all human infirmities. I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 2), Christ assumed human defects in order to satisfy for the sin of human nature, and for this it was necessary for Him to have the fullness of knowledge and grace in His soul. Hence Christ ought to have assumed those defects which flow from the common sin of the whole nature, yet are not incompatible with the perfection of knowledge and grace. And thus it was not fitting for Him to assume all human defects or infirmities. For there are some defects that are incompatible with the perfection of knowledge and grace, as ignorance, a proneness towards evil, and a difficulty in well-doing. Some other defects do not flow from the whole of human nature in common on account of the sin of our first parent, but are caused in some men by certain particular causes, as leprosy, epilepsy, and the like; and these defects are sometimes brought about by the fault of the man, e.g., from inordinate eating; sometimes by a defect in the formative power. Now neither of these pertains to Christ, since His flesh was conceived of the Holy Spirit, Who has infinite wisdom and power, and cannot err or fail; and He Himself did nothing wrong in the order of His life. But there are some third defects, to be found amongst all men in common, by reason of the sin of our first parent, as death, hunger, thirst, and the like; and all these defects Christ assumed, which Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 11; iii, 20) calls natural and indetractible passions —natural, as following all human nature in common; indetractible, as implying no defect of knowledge or grace.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes particulares defectus hominum causantur ex corruptibilitate et passibilitate corporis, superadditis quibusdam particularibus causis. Et ideo, dum Christus curavit passibilitatem et corruptibilitatem corporis nostri per hoc quod eam assumpsit, ex consequenti omnes alios defectus curavit. Ad secundum dicendum quod plenitudo omnis gratiae et scientiae animae Christi secundum se debebatur, ex hoc ipso quod erat a verbo Dei assumpta. Et ideo absolute omnem plenitudinem sapientiae et gratiae Christus assumpsit. Sed defectus nostros dispensative assumpsit, ut pro peccato nostro satisfaceret, non quia ei secundum se competerent. Et ideo non oportuit quod omnes assumeret, sed solum illos qui sufficiebant ad satisfaciendum pro peccato totius humanae naturae. Ad tertium dicendum quod mors in omnes homines devenit ex peccato primi parentis, non autem quidam alii defectus, licet sint morte minores. Unde non est similis ratio.

Q. 14, A. 4

Reply Obj. 1: All particular defects of men are caused by the corruptibility and passibility of the body, some particular causes being added; and hence, since Christ healed the passibility and corruptibility of our body by assuming it, He consequently healed all other defects.

Reply Obj. 2: The fullness of all grace and knowledge was due to Christ’s soul of itself, from the fact of its being assumed by the Word of God; and hence Christ assumed all the fullness of knowledge and wisdom absolutely. But He assumed our defects economically, in order to satisfy for our sin, and not that they belonged to Him of Himself. Hence it was not necessary for Him to assume them all, but only such as sufficed to satisfy for the sin of the whole nature. Reply Obj. 3: Death comes to all men from the sin of our first parent; but not other defects, although they are less than death. Hence there is no parity.

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Question 15 The Defects of Soul Assumed by Christ Deinde considerandum est de defectibus pertinentiWe must now consider the defects pertaining to the bus ad animam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur decem. soul; and under this head there are ten points of inquiry: Primo, utrum in Christo fuerit peccatum. (1) Whether there was sin in Christ? Secundo, utrum in eo fuerit fomes peccati. (2) Whether there was the fomes of sin in Him? Tertio, utrum in eo fuerit ignorantia. (3) Whether there was ignorance? Quarto, utrum anima eius fuerit passibilis. (4) Whether His soul was passible? Quinto, utrum in eo fuerit dolor sensibilis. (5) Whether in Him there was sensible pain? Sexto, utrum in eo fuerit tristitia. (6) Whether there was sorrow? Septimo, utrum in eo fuerit timor. (7) Whether there was fear? Octavo, utrum in eo fuerit admiratio. (8) Whether there was wonder? Nono, utrum in eo fuerit ira. (9) Whether there was anger? Decimo, utrum simul fuerit viator et comprehensor. (10) Whether He was at once wayfarer and comprehensor?

Article 1 Whether there was sin in Christ? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo fuerit peccatum. Dicitur enim in Psalmo, Deus, Deus meus, ut quid dereliquisti? Longe a salute mea verba delictorum meorum. Haec autem verba dicuntur ex persona ipsius Christi, ut patet ex hoc quod ipse ea in cruce protulit. Ergo videtur quod in Christo fuerint delicta. Praeterea, Rom. V dicit apostolus quod in Adam omnes peccaverunt, scilicet quia in eo originaliter fuerunt. Sed etiam Christus originaliter fuit in Adam. Ergo in eo peccavit. Praeterea, apostolus dicit, Heb. II, quod in eo in quo Christus passus est et tentatus, potens est et his qui tentantur auxiliari. Sed maxime indigebamus auxilio eius contra peccatum. Ergo videtur quod in eo fuerit peccatum. Praeterea, II Cor. V dicitur quod Deus eum qui non noverat peccatum, scilicet Christum, pro nobis fecit peccatum. Sed illud vere est quod a Deo factum est. Ergo in Christo vere fuit peccatum. Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de agone Christiano, in homine Christo se nobis ad exemplum praebuit filius Dei. Sed homo indiget exemplo non solum ad recte vivendum, sed etiam ad hoc quod poeniteat de peccatis. Ergo videtur quod in Christo debuit esse peccatum, ut, de peccatis poenitendo, poenitentiae nobis daret exemplum.

Objection 1: It would seem that there was sin in Christ. For it is written (Ps 21:2): O God, My God . . . why hast Thou forsaken Me? Far from My salvation are the words of My sins. Now these words are said in the person of Christ Himself, as appears from His having uttered them on the cross. Therefore it would seem that in Christ there were sins. Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom 5:12) that in Adam all have sinned—namely, because all were in Adam by origin. Now Christ also was in Adam by origin. Therefore He sinned in him. Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Heb 2:18) that in that, wherein He Himself hath suffered and been tempted, He is able to succor them also that are tempted. Now above all do we require His help against sin. Therefore it seems that there was sin in Him. Obj. 4: Further, it is written (2 Cor 5:21) that Him that knew no sin (i.e., Christ), for us God hath made sin. But that really is, which has been made by God. Therefore there was really sin in Christ. Obj. 5: Further, as Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xi), in the man Christ the Son of God gave Himself to us as a pattern of living. Now man needs a pattern not merely of right living, but also of repentance for sin. Therefore it seems that in Christ there ought to have been sin, that He might repent of His sin, and thus afford us a pattern of repentance.

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Sed contra est quod ipse dicit, Ioan. VIII, quis ex vobis arguet me de peccato? Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Christus suscepit defectus nostros ut pro nobis satisfaceret; et veritatem humanae naturae comprobaret; et ut nobis exemplum virtutis fieret. Secundum quae tria manifestum est quod defectum peccati assumere non debuit. Primo enim, peccatum nihil operatur ad satisfactionem, quinimmo virtutem satisfactionis impedit; quia, ut dicitur Eccli. XXXIV, dona iniquorum non probat altissimus. Similiter etiam ex peccato non demonstratur veritas humanae naturae, quia peccatum non pertinet ad humanam naturam, cuius Deus est causa; sed magis est contra naturam per seminationem Diaboli introductum, ut Damascenus dicit. Tertio, peccando exempla virtutum praebere non potuit, cum peccatum contrarietur virtuti. Et ideo Christus nullo modo assumpsit defectum peccati, nec originalis nec actualis, secundum illud quod dicitur I Pet. II, qui peccatum non fecit, nec inventus est dolus in ore eius. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Damascenus dicit, in III libro, dicitur aliquid de Christo, uno modo, secundum proprietatem naturalem et hypostaticam, sicut dicitur quod factus est homo, et quod pro nobis passus est; alio modo, secundum proprietatem personalem et habitudinalem, prout scilicet aliqua dicuntur de ipso in persona nostra quae sibi secundum se nullo modo conveniunt. Unde et inter septem regulas Tichonii, quas ponit Augustinus in III de Doct. Christ., prima ponitur de domino et eius corpore, cum scilicet Christi et Ecclesiae una persona aestimatur. Et secundum hoc, Christus ex persona membrorum suorum loquens dicit, verba delictorum meorum, non quod in ipso capite delicta fuerint. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, X super Gen. ad Litt., non omni modo Christus fuit in Adam, et in aliis patribus, quo nos ibi fuimus. Nos enim fuimus in Adam secundum rationem seminalem, et secundum corpulentam substantiam, quia scilicet, ut ipse ibidem dicit, cum sit in semine et visibilis corpulentia et invisibilis ratio, utrumque cucurrit ex Adam. Sed Christus visibilem carnis substantiam de carne virginis sumpsit, ratio vero conceptionis eius non a semine virili, sed longe aliter, ac desuper venit. Unde non fuit in Adam secundum seminalem rationem, sed solum secundum corpulentam substantiam. Et ideo Christus non accepit active ab Adam naturam humanam, sed solum materialiter, active vero a spiritu sancto, sicut et ipse Adam materialiter sumpsit corpus ex limo terrae, active autem a Deo. Et propter hoc Christus non peccavit in Adam, in quo fuit solum secundum materiam. Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus sua tentatione et passione nobis auxilium tulit pro nobis satisfaciendo. Sed peccatum non cooperatur ad satisfactionem, sed

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On the contrary, He Himself says (John 8:46): Which of you shall convince Me of sin? I answer that, As was said above (Q. 14, A. 1), Christ assumed our defects that He might satisfy for us, that He might prove the truth of His human nature, and that He might become an example of virtue to us. Now it is plain that by reason of these three things He ought not to have assumed the defect of sin. First, because sin nowise works our satisfaction; rather, it impedes the power of satisfying, since, as it is written (Sir 34:23), The Most High approveth not the gifts of the wicked. Second, the truth of His human nature is not proved by sin, since sin does not belong to human nature, whereof God is the cause; but rather has been sown in it against its nature by the devil, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 20). Third, because by sinning He could afford no example of virtue, since sin is opposed to virtue. Hence Christ nowise assumed the defect of sin—either original or actual—according to what is written (1 Pet 2:22): Who did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth. Reply Obj. 1: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 25), things are said of Christ, first, with reference to His natural and hypostatic property, as when it is said that God became man, and that He suffered for us; second, with reference to His personal and relative property, when things are said of Him in our person which nowise belong to Him of Himself. Hence, in the seven rules of Tichonius which Augustine quotes in De Doctr. Christ. iii, 31, the first regards Our Lord and His Body, since Christ and His Church are taken as one person. And thus Christ, speaking in the person of His members, says (Ps 21:2): The words of My sins— not that there were any sins in the Head.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Gen ad lit. x, 20), Christ was in Adam and the other fathers not altogether as we were. For we were in Adam as regards both seminal virtue and bodily substance, since, as he goes on to say: As in the seed there is a visible bulk and an invisible virtue, both have come from Adam. Now Christ took the visible substance of His flesh from the Virgin’s flesh; but the virtue of His conception did not spring from the seed of man, but far otherwise—from on high. Hence He was not in Adam according to seminal virtue, but only according to bodily substance. And therefore Christ did not receive human nature from Adam actively, but only materially—and from the Holy Spirit actively; even as Adam received his body materially from the slime of the earth—actively from God. And thus Christ did not sin in Adam, in whom He was only as regards His matter. Reply Obj. 3: In His temptation and passion Christ has succored us by satisfying for us. Now sin does not further satisfaction, but hinders it, as has been said. Hence, it be-

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magis ipsam impedit, ut dictum est. Et ideo non oportuit ut peccatum in se haberet, sed quod omnino esset purus a peccato, alioquin, poena quam sustinuit fuisset sibi debita pro peccato proprio. Ad quartum dicendum quod Deus fecit Christum peccatum, non quidem ut in se peccatum haberet, sed quia fecit eum hostiam pro peccato, sicut Osee IV dicitur, peccata populi mei comedent, scilicet sacerdotes, qui secundum legem comedebant hostias pro peccato oblatas. Et secundum hunc modum dicitur Isaiae LIII, quod dominus posuit in eo iniquitates omnium nostrum, quia scilicet eum tradidit ut esset hostia pro peccatis omnium hominum. Vel, fecit eum peccatum, idest, habentem similitudinem carnis peccati, ut dicitur Rom. VIII. Et hoc propter corpus passibile et mortale quod assumpsit. Ad quintum dicendum quod poenitens laudabile exemplum dare potest, non ex eo quod peccavit, sed in hoc quod voluntarie poenam sustinet pro peccato. Unde Christus dedit maximum exemplum poenitentibus, dum non pro peccato proprio, sed pro peccatis aliorum voluit poenam subire.

Q. 15, A. 2

hooved Him not to have sin, but to be wholly free from sin; otherwise the punishment He bore would have been due to Him for His own sin. Reply Obj. 4: God made Christ sin—not, indeed, in such sort that He had sin, but that He made Him a sacrifice for sin: even as it is written (Hos 4:8): They shall eat the sins of My people—they, i.e., the priests, who by the law ate the sacrifices offered for sin. And in that way it is written (Isa 53:6) that the Lord hath laid on Him the iniquity of us all (i.e., He gave Him up to be a victim for the sins of all men); or He made Him sin (i.e., made Him to have the likeness of sinful flesh), as is written (Rom 8:3), and this on account of the passible and mortal body He assumed. Reply Obj. 5: A penitent can give a praiseworthy example, not by having sinned, but by freely bearing the punishment of sin. And hence Christ set the highest example to penitents, since He willingly bore the punishment, not of His own sin, but of the sins of others.

Article 2 Whether there was the fomes of sin in Christ? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo fuerit fomes peccati. Ab eodem enim principio derivatur fomes peccati, et passibilitas corporis sive mortalitas, scilicet ex subtractione originalis iustitiae, per quam simul inferiores vires animae subdebantur rationi, et corpus animae. Sed in Christo fuit passibilitas corporis et mortalitas. Ergo etiam in eo fuit fomes peccati. Praeterea, sicut Damascenus dicit, in III libro, beneplacito divinae voluntatis permittebatur caro Christi pati et operari quae propria. Sed proprium est carni ut concupiscat delectabilia sibi. Cum ergo nihil aliud sit fomes quam concupiscentia, ut dicitur in Glossa, Rom. VII, videtur quod in Christo fuerit fomes peccati. Praeterea, ratione fomitis caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, ut dicitur Galat. V. Sed tanto spiritus ostenditur esse fortior et magis dignus corona, quanto magis super hostem, scilicet concupiscentiam carnis, dominatur, secundum illud II Tim. II, non coronabitur nisi qui legitime certaverit. Christus autem habuit fortissimum et victoriosissimum spiritum, et maxime dignum corona, secundum illud Apoc. VI, data est ei corona, et exivit vincens, ut vinceret. Videtur ergo quod in Christo debuerit esse maxime fomes peccati.

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was the fomes of sin. For the fomes of sin, and the passibility and mortality of the body spring from the same principle, to wit, from the withdrawal of original justice, whereby the inferior powers of the soul were subject to the reason, and the body to the soul. Now passibility and mortality of body were in Christ. Therefore there was also the fomes of sin. Obj. 2: Further, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 19), it was by consent of the Divine will that the flesh of Christ was allowed to suffer and do what belonged to it. But it is proper to the flesh to lust after its pleasures. Now since the fomes of sin is nothing more than concupiscence, as the gloss says on Rom. 7:8, it seems that in Christ there was the fomes of sin. Obj. 3: Further, it is by reason of the fomes of sin that the flesh lusteth against the spirit, as is written (Gal 5:17). But the spirit is shown to be so much the stronger and worthier to be crowned according as the more completely it overcomes its enemy—to wit, the concupiscence of the flesh, according to 2 Tim. 2:5, he is not crowned except he strive lawfully. Now Christ had a most valiant and conquering spirit, and one most worthy of a crown, according to Apoc. 6:2: There was a crown given Him, and He went forth conquering that He might conquer. Therefore it would especially seem that the fomes of sin ought to have been in Christ.

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Q. 15, A. 2

Incarnation

Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. I, quod in ea natum est, de spiritu sancto est. Sed Spiritus Sanctus excludit peccatum, et inclinationem peccati, quae importatur nomine fomitis. Ergo in Christo non fuit fomes peccati. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Christus perfectissime habuit gratiam et omnes virtutes. Virtus autem moralis quae est in irrationali parte animae, eam facit rationi esse subiectam, et tanto magis quanto perfectior fuerit virtus, sicut temperantia concupiscibilem, et fortitudo et mansuetudo irascibilem, ut in secunda parte dictum est. Ad rationem autem fomitis pertinet inclinatio sensualis appetitus in id quod est contra rationem. Sic igitur patet quod, quanto virtus fuerit magis in aliquo perfecta, tanto magis debilitatur in eo vis fomitis. Cum igitur in Christo fuerit virtus secundum perfectissimum gradum, consequens est quod in eo fomes peccati non fuerit, cum etiam iste defectus non sit ordinabilis ad satisfaciendum, sed potius inclinat ad contrarium satisfactioni. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod inferiores vires pertinentes ad sensibilem appetitum, naturaliter sunt obedibiles rationi, non autem vires corporales, vel humorum corporalium, vel etiam ipsius animae vegetabilis, ut patet in I Ethic. Et ideo perfectio virtutis, quae est secundum rationem rectam, non excludit passibilitatem corporis, excludit autem fomitem peccati, cuius ratio consistit in resistentia sensibilis appetitus ad rationem. Ad secundum dicendum quod caro naturaliter concupiscit id quod est sibi delectabile, concupiscentia appetitus sensitivi, sed caro hominis, qui est animal rationale, hoc concupiscit secundum modum et ordinem rationis. Et hoc modo caro Christi, concupiscentia appetitus sensitivi, naturaliter appetebat escam et potum et somnum, et alia huiusmodi quae secundum rationem rectam appetuntur, ut patet per Damascenum, in III libro. Ex hoc autem non sequitur quod in Christo fuerit fomes peccati, qui importat concupiscentiam delectabilium praeter ordinem rationis. Ad tertium dicendum quod fortitudo spiritus aliqualis ostenditur ex hoc quod resistit concupiscentiae carnis sibi contrariantis, sed maior fortitudo spiritus ostenditur si per eius virtutem totaliter comprimatur, ne contra spiritum concupiscere possit. Et ideo hoc competebat Christo, cuius spiritus summum gradum fortitudinis attigerat. Et licet non sustinuerit impugnationem interiorem ex parte fomitis, sustinuit tamen exteriorem impugnationem ex parte mundi et Diaboli, quos superando victoriae coronam promeruit.

IIIae

On the contrary, It is written (Matt 1:20): That which is conceived in her is of the Holy Spirit. Now the Holy Spirit drives out sin and the inclination to sin, which is implied in the word fomes. Therefore in Christ there ought not to have been the fomes of sin. I answer that, As was said above (Q. 7, AA. 2, 9), Christ had grace and all the virtues most perfectly. Now moral virtues, which are in the irrational part of the soul, make it subject to reason, and so much the more as the virtue is more perfect; thus, temperance controls the concupiscible appetite, fortitude and meekness the irascible appetite, as was said in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 56, A. 4). But there belongs to the very nature of the fomes of sin an inclination of the sensual appetite to what is contrary to reason. And hence it is plain that the more perfect the virtues are in any man, the weaker the fomes of sin becomes in him. Hence, since in Christ the virtues were in their highest degree, the fomes of sin was nowise in Him; inasmuch, also, as this defect cannot be ordained to satisfaction, but rather inclined to what is contrary to satisfaction. Reply Obj. 1: The inferior powers pertaining to the sensitive appetite have a natural capacity to be obedient to reason; but not the bodily powers, nor those of the bodily humors, nor those of the vegetative soul, as is made plain Ethic. i, 13. And hence perfection of virtue, which is in accordance with right reason, does not exclude passibility of body; yet it excludes the fomes of sin, the nature of which consists in the resistance of the sensitive appetite to reason. Reply Obj. 2: The flesh naturally seeks what is pleasing to it by the concupiscence of the sensitive appetite; but the flesh of man, who is a rational animal, seeks this after the manner and order of reason. And thus with the concupiscence of the sensitive appetite Christ’s flesh naturally sought food, drink, and sleep, and all else that is sought in right reason, as is plain from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 14). Yet it does not therefore follow that in Christ there was the fomes of sin, for this implies the lust after pleasurable things against the order of reason. Reply Obj. 3: The spirit gives evidence of fortitude to some extent by resisting that concupiscence of the flesh which is opposed to it; yet a greater fortitude of spirit is shown, if by its strength the flesh is thoroughly overcome, so as to be incapable of lusting against the spirit. And hence this belonged to Christ, whose spirit reached the highest degree of fortitude. And although He suffered no internal assault on the part of the fomes of sin, He sustained an external assault on the part of the world and the devil, and won the crown of victory by overcoming them.

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Q. 15, A. 3

Article 3 Whether in Christ there was ignorance? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo fuerit ignorantia. Illud enim vere fuit in Christo quod sibi competit secundum humanam naturam, licet non competat secundum divinam, sicut passio et mors. Sed ignorantia convenit Christo secundum humanam naturam, dicit enim Damascenus, in III libro, quod ignorantem et servilem assumpsit naturam. Ergo ignorantia vere fuit in Christo. Praeterea, aliquis dicitur ignorans per notitiae defectum. Sed aliqua notitia defuit Christo, dicit enim apostolus, II Cor. V, eum qui non novit peccatum, pro nobis peccatum fecit. Ergo in Christo fuit ignorantia. Praeterea, Isaiae VIII dicitur, antequam sciat puer vocare patrem suum et matrem suam, auferetur fortitudo Damasci. Puer autem ille est Christus. Ergo in Christo fuit aliquarum rerum ignorantia. Sed contra, ignorantia per ignorantiam non tollitur. Christus autem ad hoc venit ut ignorantias nostras auferret, venit enim ut illuminaret his qui in tenebris et in umbra mortis sedent. Ergo in Christo ignorantia non fuit. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in Christo fuit plenitudo gratiae et virtutis, ita in ipso fuit plenitudo omnis scientiae, ut ex praemissis patet. Sicut autem in Christo plenitudo gratiae et virtutis excludit peccati fomitem, ita plenitudo scientiae excludit ignorantiam, quae scientiae opponitur. Unde, sicut in Christo non fuit fomes peccati, ita non fuit in eo ignorantia. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod natura a Christo assumpta potest dupliciter considerari. Uno modo, secundum rationem suae speciei. Et secundum hoc dicit Damascenus eam esse ignorantem et servilem. Unde subdit, nam serva est quidem hominis natura eius qui fecit ipsam, Dei, et non habet futurorum cognitionem. Alio modo potest considerari secundum illud quod habet ex unione ad hypostasim divinam, ex qua habet plenitudinem scientiae et gratiae, secundum illud Ioan. I, vidimus eum, quasi unigenitum a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis. Et hoc modo natura humana in Christo ignorantiam non habuit. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus dicitur non novisse peccatum, quia nescivit per experientiam. Scivit autem per simplicem notitiam. Ad tertium dicendum quod propheta ibi loquitur de humana Christi scientia. Dicit ergo, antequam sciat puer, scilicet secundum humanitatem, vocare patrem suum, Ioseph, qui pater fuit putative, et matrem suam, scilicet Mariam, auferetur fortitudo Damasci. Quod non

Objection 1: It would seem that there was ignorance in Christ. For that is truly in Christ which belongs to Him in His human nature, although it does not belong to Him in His Divine Nature, as suffering and death. But ignorance belongs to Christ in His human nature; for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 21) that He assumed an ignorant and enslaved nature. Therefore ignorance was truly in Christ. Obj. 2: Further, one is said to be ignorant through defect of knowledge. Now some kind of knowledge was wanting to Christ, for the Apostle says (2 Cor 5:21) Him that knew no sin, for us He hath made sin. Therefore there was ignorance in Christ. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Isa 8:4): For before the child know to call his Father and his mother, the strength of Damascus . . . shall be taken away. Therefore in Christ there was ignorance of certain things. On the contrary, Ignorance is not taken away by ignorance. But Christ came to take away our ignorance; for He came to enlighten them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death (Luke 1:79). Therefore there was no ignorance in Christ. I answer that, As there was the fullness of grace and virtue in Christ, so too there was the fullness of all knowledge, as is plain from what has been said above (Q. 7, A. 9; Q. 9). Now as the fullness of grace and virtue in Christ excluded the fomes of sin, so the fullness of knowledge excluded ignorance, which is opposed to knowledge. Hence, even as the fomes of sin was not in Christ, neither was there ignorance in Him. Reply Obj. 1: The nature assumed by Christ may be viewed in two ways. First, in its specific nature, and thus Damascene calls it ignorant and enslaved; hence he adds: For man’s nature is a slave of Him (i.e., God) Who made it; and it has no knowledge of future things. Second, it may be considered with regard to what it has from its union with the Divine hypostasis, from which it has the fullness of knowledge and grace, according to John 1:14: We saw His glory as it were the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth; and in this way the human nature in Christ was not affected with ignorance. Reply Obj. 2: Christ is said not to have known sin, because He did not know it by experience; but He knew it by simple cognition. Reply Obj. 3: The prophet is speaking in this passage of the human knowledge of Christ; thus he says: Before the Child (i.e., in His human nature) know to call His father (i.e., Joseph, who was His reputed father), and His mother (i.e., Mary), the strength of Damascus . . . shall be taken

169

Q. 15, A. 4

Incarnation

est sic intelligendum quasi aliquando fuerit homo et hoc nesciverit, sed, antequam sciat, idest, antequam fiat homo scientiam habens humanam, auferetur vel, ad litteram, fortitudo Damasci et spolia Samariae, per regem Assyriorum; vel, spiritualiter, quia, nondum natus, populum suum sola invocatione salvabit, ut Glossa Hieronymi exponit. Augustinus tamen, in sermone de Epiph., dicit hoc esse completum in adoratione magorum. Ait enim, antequam per humanam carnem humana verba proferret, accepit virtutem Damasci, scilicet divitias, in quibus Damascus praesumebat in divitiis autem principatus auro defertur. Spolia vero Samariae iidem ipsi erant. Samaria namque pro idololatria ponitur, illic enim populus ad idola colenda conversus est. Haec ergo prima spolia puer idololatriae detraxit. Et secundum hoc intelligitur, antequam sciat puer, idest, antequam ostendat se scire.

IIIae

away. Nor are we to understand this as if He had been some time a man without knowing it; but before He know (i.e., before He is a man having human knowledge)—literally, the strength of Damascus and the spoils of Samaria shall be taken away by the King of the Assyrians—or spiritually, before His birth He will save His people solely by invocation, as a gloss expounds it. Augustine however (Serm. xxxii de Temp.) says that this was fulfilled in the adoration of the Magi. For he says: Before He uttered human words in human flesh, He received the strength of Damascus, i.e., the riches which Damascus vaunted (for in riches the first place is given to gold). They themselves were the spoils of Samaria. Because Samaria is taken to signify idolatry; since this people, having turned away from the Lord, turned to the worship of idols. Hence these were the first spoils which the child took from the domination of idolatry. And in this way before the child know may be taken to mean before he show himself to know.

Article 4 Whether Christ’s soul was passible? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi non fuerit passibilis. Nihil enim patitur nisi a fortiori, quia agens est praestantius patiente, ut patet per Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt.; et per philosophum, in III de anima. Sed nulla creatura fuit praestantior quam anima Christi. Ergo anima Christi non potuit ab aliqua creatura pati. Et ita non fuit passibilis, frustra enim fuisset in eo potentia patiendi, si a nullo pati potuisset. Praeterea, Tullius in libro de Tusculan. quaest., dicit quod passiones animae sunt quaedam aegritudines. Sed in anima Christi non fuit aliqua aegritudo, nam aegritudo animae sequitur peccatum, ut patet per illud Psalmi, sana animam meam, quia peccavi tibi. Ergo in Christo non fuerunt animae passiones. Praeterea, passiones animae videntur idem esse cum fomite peccati, unde apostolus, Rom. VII, vocat eas passiones peccatorum. Sed in Christo non fuit fomes peccati, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod non fuerint in eo animae passiones. Et ita anima Christi non fuit passibilis. Sed contra est quod in Psalmo dicitur ex persona Christi, repleta est malis anima mea, non quidem peccatis, sed humanis malis, idest doloribus, ut Glossa ibidem exponit. Sic igitur anima Christi fuit passibilis. Respondeo dicendum quod animam in corpore constitutam contingit pati dupliciter, uno modo passione corporali; alio modo, passione animali. Passione quidem corporali patitur per corporis laesionem. Cum

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ was not passible. For nothing suffers except by reason of something stronger; since the agent is greater than the patient, as is clear from Augustine (Gen ad lit. xii, 16), and from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5). Now no creature was stronger than Christ’s soul. Therefore Christ’s soul could not suffer at the hands of any creature; and hence it was not passible; for its capability of suffering would have been to no purpose if it could not have suffered at the hands of anything. Obj. 2: Further, Tully (De Tusc. Quaes. iii) says that the soul’s passions are ailments. But Christ’s soul had no ailment; for the soul’s ailment results from sin, as is plain from Ps. 40:5: Heal my soul, for I have sinned against Thee. Therefore in Christ’s soul there were no passions. Obj. 3: Further, the soul’s passions would seem to be the same as the fomes of sin, hence the Apostle (Rom 7:5) calls them the passions of sins. Now the fomes of sin was not in Christ, as was said (A. 2). Therefore it seems that there were no passions in His soul; and hence His soul was not passible. On the contrary, It is written (Ps 87:4) in the person of Christ: My soul is filled with evils—not sins, indeed, but human evils, i.e., pains, as a gloss expounds it. Hence the soul of Christ was passible. I answer that, A soul placed in a body may suffer in two ways: first with a bodily passion; second, with an animal passion. It suffers with a bodily passion through bodily hurt; for since the soul is the form of the body, soul and

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enim anima sit forma corporis, consequens est quod unum sit esse animae et corporis, et ideo, corpore perturbato per aliquam corpoream passionem, necesse est quod anima per accidens perturbetur, scilicet quantum ad esse quod habet in corpore. Quia igitur corpus Christi fuit passibile et mortale, ut supra habitum est, necesse fuit ut etiam anima eius hoc modo passibilis esset. Passione autem animali pati dicitur anima secundum operationem quae vel est propria animae, vel est principalius animae quam corporis. Et quamvis etiam secundum intelligere et sentire dicatur hoc modo anima aliquid pati, tamen, sicut in secunda parte dictum est, propriissime dicuntur passiones animae affectiones appetitus sensitivi, quae in Christo fuerunt, sicut et cetera quae ad naturam hominis pertinent. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, ipse dominus, in forma servi agere vitam dignatus, humanitus adhibuit eas, ubi adhibendas esse iudicavit. Neque enim in quo verum erat hominis corpus et verus hominis animus, falsus erat humanus affectus. Sciendum tamen quod huiusmodi passiones aliter fuerunt in Christo quam in nobis, quantum ad tria. Primo quidem, quantum ad obiectum. Quia in nobis plerumque huiusmodi passiones feruntur ad illicita, quod in Christo non fuit. Secundo, quantum ad principium. Quia huiusmodi passiones frequenter in nobis praeveniunt iudicium rationis, sed in Christo omnes motus sensitivi appetitus oriebantur secundum dispositionem rationis. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod hos motus, certissimae dispensationis gratia, ita cum voluit Christus suscepit animo humano, sicut cum voluit factus est homo. Tertio, quantum ad effectum. Quia in nobis quandoque huiusmodi motus non sistunt in appetitu sensitivo, sed trahunt rationem. Quod in Christo non fuit, quia motus naturaliter humanae carni convenientes sic ex eius dispositione in appetitu sensitivo manebant quod ratio ex his nullo modo impediebatur facere quae conveniebant. Unde Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., quod dominus noster, ut veritatem assumpti probaret hominis, vere quidem contristatus est, sed, ne passio in animo illius dominaretur, per propassionem dicitur quod coepit contristari, ut passio perfecta intelligatur quando animo, idest rationi, dominatur; propassio autem, quando est inchoata in appetitu sensitivo, sed ulterius non se extendit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima Christi poterat quidem resistere passionibus, ut non ei supervenirent, praesertim virtute divina. Sed propria voluntate se passionibus subiiciebat, tam corporalibus quam animalibus. Ad secundum dicendum quod Tullius ibi loquitur secundum opinionem Stoicorum, qui non vocabant passiones quoscumque motus appetitus sensitivi, sed solum inordinatos. Tales autem passiones manifestum est in Christo non fuisse.

Q. 15, A. 4

body have but one being; and hence, when the body is disturbed by any bodily passion, the soul, too, must be disturbed, i.e., in the being which it has in the body. Therefore, since Christ’s body was passible and mortal, as was said above (Q. 14, A. 2), His soul also was of necessity passible in like manner. But the soul suffers with an animal passion, in its operations—either in such as are proper to the soul, or in such as are of the soul more than of the body. And although the soul is said to suffer in this way through sensation and intelligence, as was said in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 22, A. 3; I-II, Q. 41, A. 1); nevertheless the affections of the sensitive appetite are most properly called passions of the soul. Now these were in Christ, even as all else pertaining to man’s nature. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9): Our Lord having deigned to live in the form of a servant, took these upon Himself whenever He judged they ought to be assumed; for there was no false human affection in Him Who had a true body and a true human soul. Nevertheless we must know that the passions were in Christ otherwise than in us, in three ways. First, as regards the object, since in us these passions very often tend towards what is unlawful, but not so in Christ. Second, as regards the principle, since these passions in us frequently forestall the judgment of reason; but in Christ all movements of the sensitive appetite sprang from the disposition of the reason. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9), that Christ assumed these movements, in His human soul, by an unfailing dispensation, when He willed; even as He became man when He willed. Third, as regards the effect, because in us these movements, at times, do not remain in the sensitive appetite, but deflect the reason; but not so in Christ, since by His disposition the movements that are naturally becoming to human flesh so remained in the sensitive appetite that the reason was nowise hindered in doing what was right. Hence Jerome says (on Matt. 26:37) that Our Lord, in order to prove the reality of the assumed manhood, ‘was sorrowful’ in very deed; yet lest a passion should hold sway over His soul, it is by a propassion that He is said to have ‘begun to grow sorrowful and to be sad’; so that it is a perfect passion when it dominates the soul, i.e., the reason; and a propassion when it has its beginning in the sensitive appetite, but goes no further. Reply Obj. 1: The soul of Christ could have prevented these passions from coming upon it, and especially by the Divine power; yet of His own will He subjected Himself to these corporeal and animal passions. Reply Obj. 2: Tully is speaking there according to the opinions of the Stoics, who did not give the name of passions to all, but only to the disorderly movements of the sensitive appetite. Now, it is manifest that passions like these were not in Christ.

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Q. 15, A. 5

Incarnation

IIIae

Ad tertium dicendum quod passiones peccatorum Reply Obj. 3: The passions of sins are movements of the sunt motus appetitus sensitivi in illicita tendentes. Quod sensitive appetite that tend to unlawful things; and these non fuit in Christo, sicut nec fomes peccati. were not in Christ, as neither was the fomes of sin.

Article 5 Whether there was true sensible pain in Christ? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit verus dolor sensibilis. Dicit enim Hilarius, in X de Trin., cum pro Christo mori vita sit, quid ipse in mortis sacramento doluisse aestimandus est, qui pro se morientibus vitam rependit? Et infra dicit, unigenitus Deus hominem verum, non deficiens a se Deo, sumpsit, in quo, quamvis aut ictus incideret, aut vulnus descenderet, aut nodi concurrerent, aut suspensio elevaret, afferrent quidem haec impetum passionis, non tamen dolorem inferrent. Non igitur in Christo fuit verus dolor. Praeterea, hoc proprium videtur esse carni in peccato conceptae, quod necessitati doloris subiaceat. Sed caro Christi non est cum peccato concepta, sed ex spiritu sancto in utero virginali. Non ergo subiacuit necessitati patiendi dolorem. Praeterea, delectatio contemplationis divinorum diminuit sensum doloris, unde et martyres in passionibus suis tolerabilius dolorem sustinuerunt ex consideratione divini amoris. Sed anima Christi summe delectabatur in contemplatione Dei, quem per essentiam videbat, ut supra dictum est. Non ergo poterat sentire aliquem dolorem. Sed contra est quod Isaiae LIII dicitur, vere languores nostros ipse tulit, et dolores nostros ipse portavit. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut patet ex his quae in secunda parte dicta sunt, ad veritatem doloris sensibilis requiritur laesio corporis et sensus laesionis. Corpus autem Christi laedi poterat, quia erat passibile et mortale, ut supra habitum est. Nec defuit ei sensus laesionis, cum anima Christi perfecte haberet omnes potentias naturales. Unde nulli dubium debet esse quin in Christo fuerit verus dolor. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in omnibus illis verbis, et similibus Hilarius a carne Christi non veritatem doloris, sed necessitatem excludere intendit. Unde post praemissa verba subdit, neque enim, cum sitivit aut esurivit aut flevit, bibisse dominus aut manducasse aut doluisse monstratus est, sed ad demonstrandam corporis veritatem corporis consuetudo suscepta est, ita ut, naturae nostrae consuetudine, consuetudini sit corporis satisfactum. Vel, cum potum aut cibum accepit, non se necessitati corporis, sed consuetudini tribuit. Et accepit necessitatem per comparationem ad causam primam horum defec-

Objection 1: It would seem that there was no true sensible pain in Christ. For Hilary says (De Trin. x): Since with Christ to die was life, what pain may He be supposed to have suffered in the mystery of His death, Who bestows life on such as die for Him? And further on he says: The Only-begotten assumed human nature, not ceasing to be God; and although blows struck Him and wounds were inflicted on Him, and scourges fell upon Him, and the cross lifted Him up, yet these wrought in deed the vehemence of the passion, but brought no pain; as a dart piercing the water. Hence there was no true pain in Christ. Obj. 2: Further, it would seem to be proper to flesh conceived in original sin, to be subject to the necessity of pain. But the flesh of Christ was not conceived in sin, but of the Holy Spirit in the Virgin’s womb. Therefore it lay under no necessity of suffering pain. Obj. 3: Further, the delight of the contemplation of Divine things dulls the sense of pain; hence the martyrs in their passions bore up more bravely by thinking of the Divine love. But Christ’s soul was in the perfect enjoyment of contemplating God, Whom He saw in essence, as was said above (Q. 9, A. 2). Therefore He could feel no pain. On the contrary, It is written (Isa 53:4): Surely He hath borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows. I answer that, As is plain from what has been said in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 35, A. 7), for true bodily pain are required bodily hurt and the sense of hurt. Now Christ’s body was able to be hurt, since it was passible and mortal, as above stated (Q. 14, AA. 1, 2); neither was the sense of hurt wanting to it, since Christ’s soul possessed perfectly all natural powers. Therefore no one should doubt but that in Christ there was true pain. Reply Obj. 1: In all these and similar words, Hilary does not intend to exclude the reality of the pain, but the necessity of it. Hence after the foregoing he adds: Nor, when He thirsted, or hungered, or wept, was the Lord seen to drink, or eat, or grieve. But in order to prove the reality of the body, the body’s customs were assumed, so that the custom of our body was atoned for by the custom of our nature. Or when He took drink or food, He acceded, not to the body’s necessity, but to its custom. And he uses the word necessity in reference to the first cause of these defects, which is sin, as above stated (Q. 14, AA. 1, 3), so that Christ’s flesh is said not to have

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tuum, quae est peccatum, ut supra dictum est, ut scilicet ea ratione dicatur caro Christi non subiacuisse necessitati horum defectuum, quia non fuit in ea peccatum. Unde subdit, habuit enim, scilicet Christus, corpus, sed originis suae proprium, neque ex vitiis humanae conceptionis existens, sed in formam corporis nostri, virtutis suae potestate, subsistens. Quantum tamen ad causam propinquam horum defectuum, quae est compositio contrariorum, caro Christi subiacuit necessitati horum defectuum, ut supra habitum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod caro in peccato concepta subiacet dolori non solum ex necessitate naturalium principiorum, sed etiam ex necessitate reatus peccati. Quae quidem necessitas in Christo non fuit, sed solum necessitas naturalium principiorum. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtute divinitatis Christi dispensative sic beatitudo in anima continebatur quod non derivabatur ad corpus, ut eius passibilitas et mortalitas tolleretur. Et, eadem ratione, delectatio contemplationis sic continebatur in mente quod non derivabatur ad vires sensibiles, ut per hoc dolor sensibilis excluderetur.

Q. 15, A. 6

lain under the necessity of these defects, in the sense that there was no sin in it. Hence he adds: For He (i.e., Christ) had a body—one proper to His origin, which did not exist through the unholiness of our conception, but subsisted in the form of our body by the strength of His power. But as regards the proximate cause of these defects, which is composition of contraries, the flesh of Christ lay under the necessity of these defects, as was said above (Q. 14, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2: Flesh conceived in sin is subject to pain, not merely on account of the necessity of its natural principles, but from the necessity of the guilt of sin. Now this necessity was not in Christ; but only the necessity of natural principles. Reply Obj. 3: As was said above (Q. 14, A. 1, ad 2), by the power of the Godhead of Christ the beatitude was economically kept in the soul, so as not to overflow into the body, lest His passibility and mortality should be taken away; and for the same reason the delight of contemplation was so kept in the mind as not to overflow into the sensitive powers, lest sensible pain should thereby be prevented.

Article 6 Whether there was sorrow in Christ? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit tristitia. Dicitur enim de Christo, Isaiae XLII, non erit tristis neque turbulentus. Praeterea, Proverb. XII dicitur, non contristabit iustum quidquid ei acciderit. Et huius rationem Stoici assignabant, quia nullus tristatur nisi de amissione bonorum suorum, iustus autem non reputat bona sua nisi iustitiam et virtutem, quas non potest amittere. Alioquin, subiaceret iustus fortunae, si pro amissione bonorum fortunae tristaretur. Sed Christus fuit maxime iustus, secundum illud Ierem. XXIII. Hoc est nomen quod vocabunt eum, dominus iustus noster. Ergo in eo non fuit tristitia. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod omnis tristitia est malum et fugiendum. Sed nullum malum vel fugiendum fuit in Christo. Ergo in Christo non fuit tristitia. Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, tristitia est de his quae nobis nolentibus accidunt. Sed nihil passus est Christus contra suam voluntatem, dicitur enim Isaiae LIII, oblatus est quia ipse voluit. Ergo in Christo non fuit tristitia. Sed contra est quod dicit dominus, Matth. XXVI, tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem. Et Ambrosius di-

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no sorrow. For it is written of Christ (Isa 42:4): He shall not be sad nor troublesome. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov 12:21): Whatever shall befall the just man, it shall not make him sad. And the reason of this the Stoics asserted to be that no one is saddened save by the loss of his goods. Now the just man esteems only justice and virtue as his goods, and these he cannot lose; otherwise the just man would be subject to fortune if he was saddened by the loss of the goods fortune has given him. But Christ was most just, according to Jer. 23:6: This is the name that they shall call Him: The Lord, our just one. Therefore there was no sorrow in Him. Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 13, 14) that all sorrow is evil, and to be shunned. But in Christ there was no evil to be shunned. Therefore there was no sorrow in Christ. Obj. 4: Furthermore, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): Sorrow regards the things we suffer unwillingly. But Christ suffered nothing against His will, for it is written (Isa 53:7): He was offered because it was His own will. Hence there was no sorrow in Christ. On the contrary, Our Lord said (Matt 26:38): My soul is sorrowful even unto death. And Ambrose says (De

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cit, II de Trin., ut homo, tristitiam habuit, suscepit enim tristitiam meam. Confidenter tristitiam nomino, qui crucem praedico. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, delectatio divinae contemplationis ita per dispensationem divinae virtutis retinebatur in mente Christi quod non derivabatur ad vires sensitivas, ut per hoc dolor sensibilis excluderetur. Sicut autem dolor sensibilis est in appetitu sensitivo, ita et tristitia, sed est differentia secundum motivum, sive obiectum. Nam obiectum et motivum doloris est laesio sensu tactus percepta, sicut cum aliquis vulneratur. Obiectum autem et motivum tristitiae est nocivum seu malum interius apprehensum, sive per rationem sive per imaginationem, sicut in secunda parte habitum est, sicut cum aliquis tristatur de amissione gratiae vel pecuniae. Potuit autem anima Christi interius apprehendere aliquid ut nocivum, et quantum ad se, sicut passio et mors eius fuit, et quantum ad alios, sicut peccatum discipulorum, vel etiam Iudaeorum occidentium ipsum. Et ideo, sicut in Christo potuit esse verus dolor, ita in eo potuit esse vera tristitia, alio tamen modo quam in nobis est, secundum illa tria quae sunt assignata supra, cum communiter de Christi passione loqueremur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod tristitia removetur a Christo secundum passionem perfectam, fuit tamen in eo initiata, secundum propassionem. Unde dicitur Matth. XXVI, coepit contristari et moestus esse. Aliud enim est contristari, aliud incipere contristari, ut Hieronymus ibidem dicit. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, pro tribus perturbationibus, scilicet cupiditate, laetitia et timore, Stoici tres eupathias, idest bonas passiones, in anima sapientis posuerunt, scilicet pro cupiditate voluntatem, pro laetitia gaudium, pro metu cautionem. Sed pro tristitia negaverunt aliquid posse esse in animo sapientis, quia tristitia est de malo quod iam accidit; nullum autem malum aestimant posse accidere sapienti. Et hoc ideo est quia non credebant aliquid esse bonum nisi honestum, quod homines bonos facit; nec aliquid esse malum nisi inhonestum, per quod homines mali fiunt. Quamvis autem honestum sit principale hominis bonum, et inhonestum principale hominis malum, quia haec pertinent ad ipsam rationem, quae est principalis in homine; sunt tamen quaedam secundaria hominis bona, quae pertinent ad ipsum corpus, vel ad exteriores res corpori deservientes. Et secundum hoc, potest in animo sapientis esse tristitia, quantum ad appetitum sensitivum, secundum apprehensionem huiusmodi malorum, non tamen ita quod ista tristitia perturbet rationem. Et secundum hoc etiam intelligitur quod non contristabit iustum quidquid ei acciderit, quia scilicet ex nullo accidente eius ratio perturbatur. Et secundum hoc tristitia fuit in Christo, secundum propassionem, non secundum passionem.

IIIae

Trin. ii.) that as a man He had sorrow; for He bore my sorrow. I call it sorrow, fearlessly, since I preach the cross. I answer that, As was said above (A. 5, ad 3), by Divine dispensation the joy of contemplation remained in Christ’s mind so as not to overflow into the sensitive powers, and thereby shut out sensible pain. Now even as sensible pain is in the sensitive appetite, so also is sorrow. But there is a difference of motive or object; for the object and motive of pain is hurt perceived by the sense of touch, as when anyone is wounded; but the object and motive of sorrow is anything hurtful or evil interiorly, apprehended by the reason or the imagination, as was said in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 35, AA. 2, 7), as when anyone grieves over the loss of grace or money. Now Christ’s soul could apprehend things as hurtful either to Himself, as His passion and death—or to others, as the sin of His disciples, or of the Jews that killed Him. And hence, as there could be true pain in Christ, so too could there be true sorrow; otherwise, indeed, than in us, in the three ways above stated (A. 4), when we were speaking of the passions of Christ’s soul in general.

Reply Obj. 1: Sorrow was not in Christ, as a perfect passion; yet it was inchoatively in Him as a propassion. Hence it is written (Matt 26:37): He began to grow sorrowful and to be sad. For it is one thing to be sorrowful and another to grow sorrowful, as Jerome says, on this text. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), for the three passions—desire, joy, and fear—the Stoics held three eupatheias i.e., good passions, in the soul of the wise man, viz. for desire, will—for joy, delight—for fear, caution. But as regards sorrow, they denied it could be in the soul of the wise man, for sorrow regards evil already present, and they thought that no evil could befall a wise man; and for this reason, because they believed that only the virtuous is good, since it makes men good, and that nothing is evil, except what is sinful, whereby men become wicked. Now although what is virtuous is man’s chief good, and what is sinful is man’s chief evil, since these pertain to reason which is supreme in man, yet there are certain secondary goods of man, which pertain to the body, or to the exterior things that minister to the body. And hence in the soul of the wise man there may be sorrow in the sensitive appetite by his apprehending these evils; without this sorrow disturbing the reason. And in this way are we to understand that whatsoever shall befall the just man, it shall not make him sad, because his reason is troubled by no misfortune. And thus Christ’s sorrow was a propassion, and not a passion.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod omnis tristitia est malum poenae, non tamen semper est malum culpae, sed solum quando ex inordinato affectu procedit. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, cum rectam rationem sequantur istae affectiones, et quando et ubi oportet adhibentur, quis eas tunc morbidas aut vitiosas passiones audeat dicere? Ad quartum dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse contrarium voluntati secundum se quod tamen est volitum ratione finis ad quem ordinatur, sicut medicina amara non est secundum se volita, sed solum secundum quod ordinatur ad sanitatem. Et hoc modo mors Christi et eius passio fuit, secundum se considerata, involuntaria et tristitiam causans, licet fuerit voluntaria in ordine ad finem, qui est redemptio humani generis.

Q. 15, A. 7

Reply Obj. 3: All sorrow is an evil of punishment; but it is not always an evil of fault, except only when it proceeds from an inordinate affection. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9): Whenever these affections follow reason, and are caused when and where needed, who will dare to call them diseases or vicious passions? Reply Obj. 4: There is no reason why a thing may not of itself be contrary to the will, and yet be willed by reason of the end, to which it is ordained, as bitter medicine is not of itself desired, but only as it is ordained to health. And thus Christ’s death and passion were of themselves involuntary, and caused sorrow, although they were voluntary as ordained to the end, which is the redemption of the human race.

Article 7 Whether there was fear in Christ? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit timor. Dicitur enim Proverb. XXVII, iustus, quasi leo confidens, absque terrore erit. Sed Christus fuit maxime iustus. Ergo in Christo non fuit aliquis timor. Praeterea, Hilarius dicit, X de Trin., interrogo eos qui hoc existimant an ratione subsistat ut mori timuerit qui, omnem ab apostolis mortis timorem expellens, ad gloriam eos sit martyrii exhortatus. Non ergo in Christo rationabile est fuisse timorem. Praeterea, timor non videtur esse nisi de malo quod non potest homo vitare. Sed Christus poterat vitare et malum poenae, quod passus est; et malum culpae, quod aliis accidit. Ergo in Christo non fuit aliquis timor. Sed contra est quod dicitur Marc. XIV, coepit Iesus taedere et pavere. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut tristitia causatur ex apprehensione mali praesentis, ita etiam timor causatur ex apprehensione mali futuri. Apprehensio autem mali futuri, si omnimodam certitudinem habeat, non inducit timorem. Unde philosophus dicit, in II Rhet., quod timor non est nisi ubi est aliqua spes evadendi, nam quando nulla spes est evadendi, apprehenditur malum ut praesens; et sic magis causat tristitiam quam timorem. Sic igitur timor potest considerari quantum ad duo. Uno modo, quantum ad hoc quod appetitus sensitivus naturaliter refugit corporis laesionem, et per tristitiam, si sit praesens; et per timorem, si sit futura. Et hoc modo timor fuit in Christo, sicut et tristitia. Alio modo po-

Objection 1: It would seem that there was no fear in Christ. For it is written (Prov 28:1): The just, bold as a lion, shall be without dread. But Christ was most just. Therefore there was no fear in Christ. Obj. 2: Further, Hilary says (De Trin. x): I ask those who think thus, does it stand to reason that He should dread to die, Who by expelling all dread of death from the Apostles, encouraged them to the glory of martyrdom? Therefore it is unreasonable that there should be fear in Christ. Obj. 3: Further, fear seems only to regard what a man cannot avoid. Now Christ could have avoided both the evil of punishment which He endured, and the evil of fault which befell others. Therefore there was no fear in Christ. On the contrary, It is written (Mark 4:33): Jesus began to fear and to be heavy. I answer that, As sorrow is caused by the apprehension of a present evil, so also is fear caused by the apprehension of a future evil. Now the apprehension of a future evil, if the evil be quite certain, does not arouse fear. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that we do not fear a thing unless there is some hope of avoiding it. For when there is no hope of avoiding it the evil is considered present, and thus it causes sorrow rather than fear. Hence fear may be considered in two ways. First, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite naturally shrinks from bodily hurt, by sorrow if it is present, and by fear if it is future; and thus fear was in Christ, even as sorrow. Second, fear may be considered in the uncertainty of the future event, as when at night we are frightened at a

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test considerari secundum incertitudinem futuri adventus, sicut quando nocte timemus ex aliquo sonitu quasi ignorantes quid hoc sit. Et quantum ad hoc, timor non fuit in Christo, ut Damascenus dicit, in III libro. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iustus dicitur esse absque terrore, secundum quod terror importat perfectam passionem, avertentem hominem a bono quod est rationis. Et sic timor non fuit in Christo sed solum secundum propassionem. Et ideo dicitur quod coepit Iesus pavere et taedere, quasi secundum propassionem, ut Hieronymus exponit. Ad secundum dicendum quod Hilarius eo modo excludit a Christo timorem quo excludit tristitiam, scilicet quoad necessitatem timendi. Sed tamen, ad comprobandam veritatem humanae naturae, voluntarie timorem assumpsit, sicut et tristitiam. Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet Christus potuerit vitare mala futura secundum virtutem divinitatis, erant tamen inevitabilia, vel non de facili vitabilia, secundum infirmitatem carnis.

IIIae

sound, not knowing what it is; and in this way there was no fear in Christ, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23).

Reply Obj. 1: The just man is said to be without dread, in so far as dread implies a perfect passion drawing man from what reason dictates. And thus fear was not in Christ, but only as a propassion. Hence it is said (Mark 14:33) that Jesus began to fear and to be heavy, with a propassion, as Jerome expounds (Matt 26:37). Reply Obj. 2: Hilary excludes fear from Christ in the same way that he excludes sorrow, i.e., as regards the necessity of fearing. And yet to show the reality of His human nature, He voluntarily assumed fear, even as sorrow. Reply Obj. 3: Although Christ could have avoided future evils by the power of His Godhead, yet they were unavoidable, or not easily avoidable by the weakness of the flesh.

Article 8 Whether there was wonder in Christ? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit admiratio. Dicit enim philosophus, in I Metaphys., quod admiratio causatur ex hoc quod aliquis videt effectum et ignorat causam, et sic admirari non est nisi ignorantis. Sed in Christo non fuit ignorantia, ut dictum est. Ergo in Christo non fuit admiratio. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod admiratio est timor ex magna imaginatione, et ideo philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod magnanimus non est admirativus. Sed Christus fuit maxime magnanimus. Ergo in Christo non fuit admiratio. Praeterea, nullus admiratur de eo quod ipse facere potest. Sed Christus facere potuit quidquid magnum erat in rebus. Ergo videtur quod de nullo admirabatur. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. VIII, audiens Iesus, scilicet verba centurionis, miratus est. Respondeo dicendum quod admiratio proprie est de novo aliquo insolito. In Christo autem non poterat esse aliquid novum et insolitum quantum ad scientiam divinam; neque etiam quantum ad scientiam humanam qua cognoscebat res in verbo; vel qua cognoscebat res per species inditas. Potuit tamen esse aliquid sibi novum et insolitum secundum scientiam experimentalem, secundum quam sibi poterant quotidie aliqua nova occurrere. Et ideo, si loquimur de Christo quantum ad scientiam divinam et scientiam beatam, vel etiam infusam, non fuit in Christo admiratio. Si autem loquamur de eo

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no wonder. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2) that wonder results when we see an effect without knowing its cause; and thus wonder belongs only to the ignorant. Now there was no ignorance in Christ, as was said (A. 3). Therefore there was no wonder in Christ. Obj. 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that wonder is fear springing from the imagination of something great; and hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the magnanimous man does not wonder. But Christ was most magnanimous. Therefore there was no wonder in Christ. Obj. 3: Further, no man wonders at what he himself can do. Now Christ could do whatsoever was great. Therefore it seems that He wondered at nothing. On the contrary, It is written (Matt 8:10): Jesus hearing this, i.e., the words of the centurion, marveled. I answer that, Wonder properly regards what is new and unwonted. Now there could be nothing new and unwonted as regards Christ’s Divine knowledge, whereby He saw things in the Word; nor as regards the human knowledge, whereby He saw things by infused species. Yet things could be new and unwonted with regard to His empiric knowledge, in regard to which new things could occur to Him day by day. Hence, if we speak of Christ with respect to His Divine knowledge, and His beatific and even His infused knowledge, there was no wonder in Christ. But if we speak of Him with respect to empiric knowledge, wonder

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quantum ad scientiam experimentalem, sic admiratio in eo esse potuit. Et assumpsit hunc affectum ad nostram instructionem, ut scilicet doceat esse mirandum quod etiam ipse mirabatur. Unde Augustinus dicit, in I super Gen. contra Manich., quod miratur dominus, nobis mirandum esse significat, quibus adhuc opus est sic moveri. Omnes ergo tales motus eius non perturbati animi signa sunt, sed docentis magisterium. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet Christus nihil ignoret, poterat tamen de novo aliquid occurrere experimentali eius scientiae, ex quo admiratio causaretur. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus admirabatur de fide centurionis non ea ratione quod esset magna quantum ad ipsum, sed quia erat magna quantum ad alios. Ad tertium dicendum quod ipse poterat facere omnia secundum virtutem divinam, secundum quam in eo admiratio non erat, sed solum secundum humanam scientiam experimentalem, ut dictum est.

Q. 15, A. 9

could be in Him; and He assumed this affection for our instruction, i.e., in order to teach us to wonder at what He Himself wondered at. Hence Augustine says (Super Gen. Cont. Manich. i, 8): Our Lord wondered in order to show us that we, who still need to be so affected, must wonder. Hence all these emotions are not signs of a disturbed mind, but of a master teaching. Reply Obj. 1: Although Christ was ignorant of nothing, yet new things might occur to His empiric knowledge, and thus wonder would be caused. Reply Obj. 2: Christ did not marvel at the Centurion’s faith as if it was great with respect to Himself, but because it was great with respect to others. Reply Obj. 3: He could do all things by the Divine power, for with respect to this there was no wonder in Him, but only with respect to His human empiric knowledge, as was said above.

Article 9 Whether there was anger in Christ? Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit ira. Dicitur enim Iac. I, ira enim viri iustitiam Dei non operatur. Sed quidquid fuit in Christo ad iustitiam Dei pertinuit, ipse enim factus est nobis iustitia a Deo, ut dicitur I Cor. I. Ergo videtur quod in Christo non fuerit ira. Praeterea, ira mansuetudini opponitur, ut patet in IV Ethic. Sed Christus fuit maxime mansuetus. Ergo in Christo non fuit ira. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in V Moral., quod ira per vitium excaecat oculum mentis; ira vero per zelum ipsum turbat. Sed in Christo mentis oculus non fuit neque excaecatus neque turbatus. Ergo in Christo non fuit ira per vitium, nec ira per zelum. Sed contra est quod Ioan. II dicitur de eo esse impletum quod in Psalmo legitur, zelus domus tuae comedit me. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in secunda parte dictum est, ira est effectus tristitiae. Ex tristitia enim alicui illata consequitur in eo, circa sensitivam partem, appetitus repellendi illatam iniuriam vel sibi vel aliis. Et sic ira est passio composita ex tristitia et appetitu vindictae. Dictum est autem quod in Christo tristitia esse potuit. Appetitus etiam vindictae quandoque est cum peccato, quando scilicet aliquis vindictam quaerit sibi absque ordine rationis. Et sic ira in Christo esse non potuit, hoc enim dicitur ira per vitium. Quandoque vero talis appetitus est sine peccato, immo est laudabilis, puta cum ali-

Objection 1: It would seem that there was no anger in Christ. For it is written (Jas 1:20): The anger of man worketh not the justice of God. Now whatever was in Christ pertained to the justice of God, since of Him it is written (1 Cor 1:30): For He of God is made unto us . . . justice. Therefore it seems that there was no anger in Christ. Obj. 2: Further, anger is opposed to meekness, as is plain from Ethic. iv, 5. But Christ was most meek. Therefore there was no anger in Him. Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that anger that comes of evil blinds the eye of the mind, but anger that comes of zeal disturbs it. Now the mind’s eye in Christ was neither blinded nor disturbed. Therefore in Christ there was neither sinful anger nor zealous anger. On the contrary, It is written (John 2:17) that the words of Ps. 58:10, the zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up, were fulfilled in Him. I answer that, As was said in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 46, A. 3, ad 3, and II-II, Q. 158, A. 2, ad 3), anger is an effect of sorrow. For when sorrow is inflicted upon someone, there arises within him a desire of the sensitive appetite to repel this injury brought upon himself or others. Hence anger is a passion composed of sorrow and the desire of revenge. Now it was said (A. 6) that sorrow could be in Christ. As to the desire of revenge it is sometimes with sin, i.e., when anyone seeks revenge beyond the order of reason: and in this way anger could not be in Christ, for this kind of anger is sinful. Sometimes, however, this desire is without

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quis appetit vindictam secundum ordinem iustitiae. Et hoc vocatur ira per zelum, dicit enim Augustinus, super Ioan., quod zelo domus Dei comeditur qui omnia perversa quae videt cupit emendare; et, si emendare non possit, tolerat et gemit. Et talis ira fuit in Christo. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Gregorius, in V Moral., ira dupliciter se habet in homine. Quandoque enim praevenit rationem, et trahit eam secum ad operandum. Et tunc proprie ira dicitur operari, nam operatio attribuitur principali agenti. Et secundum hoc intelligitur quod ira viri iustitiam Dei non operatur. Quandoque vero ira sequitur rationem, et est quasi instrumentum ipsius. Et tunc operatio, quae est iustitiae, non attribuitur irae, sed rationi. Ad secundum dicendum quod ira quae transgreditur ordinem rationis mansuetudini opponitur, non autem ira quae est moderata, ad medium reducta per rationem. Nam mansuetudo medium tenet in ira. Ad tertium dicendum quod in nobis, secundum naturalem ordinem, potentiae animae mutuo se impediunt, ita scilicet quod, cum unius potentiae operatio fuerit intensa, alterius operatio debilitetur. Et ex hoc procedit quod motus irae etiam si sit secundum rationem moderatus, utcumque impedit oculum animae contemplantis. Sed in Christo, per moderationem divinae virtutis, unicuique potentiae permittebatur agere quod erat ei proprium, ita quod una potentia ex alia non impediebatur. Et ideo, sicut delectatio mentis contemplantis non impediebat tristitiam vel dolorem inferioris partis, ita etiam e converso passiones inferioris partis in nullo impediebant actum rationis.

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sin—nay, is praiseworthy, e.g., when anyone seeks revenge according to justice, and this is zealous anger. For Augustine says (on John 2:17) that he is eaten up by zeal for the house of God, who seeks to better whatever He sees to be evil in it, and if he cannot right it, bears with it and sighs. Such was the anger that was in Christ. Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Moral. v), anger is in man in two ways—sometimes it forestalls reason, and causes it to operate, and in this way it is properly said to work, for operations are attributed to the principal agent. It is in this way that we must understand that the anger of man worketh not the justice of God. Sometimes anger follows reason, and is, as it were, its instrument, and then the operation, which pertains to justice, is not attributed to anger but to reason. Reply Obj. 2: It is the anger which outsteps the bounds of reason that is opposed to meekness, and not the anger which is controlled and brought within its proper bounds by reason, for meekness holds the mean in anger. Reply Obj. 3: In us the natural order is that the soul’s powers mutually impede each other, i.e., if the operation of one power is intense, the operation of the other is weakened. This is the reason why any movement whatsoever of anger, even if it be tempered by reason, dims the mind’s eye of him who contemplates. But in Christ, by control of the Divine power, every faculty was allowed to do what was proper to it, and one power was not impeded by another. Hence, as the joy of His mind in contemplation did not impede the sorrow or pain of the inferior part, so, conversely, the passions of the inferior part no-wise impeded the act of reason.

Article 10 Whether Christ was at once a wayfarer and a comprehensor? Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non fuerit simul viator et comprehensor. Viatori enim competit moveri ad finem beatitudinis, comprehensori autem competit in fine quiescere. Sed non potest simul eidem convenire quod moveatur ad finem, et quod quiescat in fine. Ergo non potuit simul esse quod Christus esset viator et comprehensor. Praeterea, moveri ad beatitudinem, aut eam obtinere, non competit homini secundum corpus, sed secundum animam. Unde Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Dioscorum, quod ad inferiorem naturam, quae est corpus, redundat ab anima non beatitudo, quae propria est fruentis et intelligentis. Sed Christus, licet haberet corpus

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not at once a wayfarer and a comprehensor. For it belongs to a wayfarer to be moving toward the end of beatitude, and to a comprehensor it belongs to be resting in the end. Now to be moving towards the end and to be resting in the end cannot belong to the same. Therefore Christ could not be at once wayfarer and comprehensor. Obj. 2: Further, to tend to beatitude, or to obtain it, does not pertain to man’s body, but to his soul; hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dios. cxviii) that upon the inferior nature, which is the body, there overflows, not indeed the beatitude which belongs to such as enjoy and understand, the fullness of health, i.e., the vigor of incorruption. Now although Christ

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passibile, tamen secundum mentem plene Deo fruebatur. Non ergo Christus fuit viator, sed purus comprehensor. Praeterea, sancti, quorum animae sunt in caelo et corpora in sepulcris, fruuntur quidem beatitudine secundum animam, quamvis eorum corpora morti subiaceant, et tamen non dicuntur viatores, sed solum comprehensores. Ergo, pari ratione, licet corpus Christi fuerit mortale, quia tamen mens eius Deo fruebatur, videtur quod fuerit purus comprehensor, et nullo modo viator. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ierem. XIV, quasi colonus futurus es in terra, et quasi viator declinans ad manendum. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquis dicitur viator ex eo quod tendit in beatitudinem, comprehensor autem dicitur ex hoc quod iam beatitudinem obtinet, secundum illud I Cor. IX, sic currite ut comprehendatis; et Philipp. III, sequor autem, si quo modo comprehendam. Hominis autem beatitudo perfecta consistit in anima et corpore, ut in secunda parte habitum est, in anima quidem, quantum ad id quod est ei proprium, secundum quod mens videt et fruitur Deo; in corpore vero, secundum quod corpus resurget spirituale, et in virtute et in gloria et in incorruptione, ut dicitur I Cor. XV. Christus autem, ante passionem, secundum mentem plene videbat Deum, et sic habebat beatitudinem quantum ad id quod est proprium animae. Sed quantum ad alia deerat ei beatitudo, quia et anima eius erat passibilis, et corpus passibile et mortale, ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo simul erat comprehensor, inquantum habebat beatitudinem animae propriam, et simul viator, inquantum tendebat in beatitudinem secundum id quod ei de beatitudine deerat. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod impossibile est moveri ad finem et quiescere in fine secundum idem. Sed secundum diversa nihil prohibet hoc, sicut aliquis homo simul est sciens quantum ad ea quae iam novit, et addiscens quantum ad ea quae nondum novit. Ad secundum dicendum quod beatitudo principaliter et proprie consistit in anima secundum mentem, secundario tamen, et quasi instrumentaliter, requiruntur ad beatitudinem corporis bona; sicut philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod exteriora bona organice deserviunt beatitudini. Ad tertium dicendum quod non est eadem ratio de animabus sanctorum defunctorum et de Christo, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia animae sanctorum non sunt passibiles, sicut fuit anima Christi. Secundo, quia corpora non agunt aliquid per quod in beatitudinem tendant, sicut Christus, secundum corporis passiones, in beatitudinem tendebat quantum ad gloriam corporis.

Q. 15, A. 10

had a passible body, He fully enjoyed God in His mind. Therefore Christ was not a wayfarer but a comprehensor. Obj. 3: Further, the Saints, whose souls are in heaven and whose bodies are in the tomb, enjoy beatitude in their souls, although their bodies are subject to death, yet they are called not wayfarers, but only comprehensors. Hence, with equal reason, would it seem that Christ was a pure comprehensor and nowise a wayfarer, since His mind enjoyed God although His body was mortal. On the contrary, It is written (Jer 14:8): Why wilt Thou be as a stranger in the land, and as a wayfaring man turning in to lodge? I answer that, A man is called a wayfarer from tending to beatitude, and a comprehensor from having already obtained beatitude, according to 1 Cor. 9:24: So run that you may comprehend; and Phil. 3:12: I follow after, if by any means I may comprehend. Now man’s perfect beatitude consists in both soul and body, as stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 4, A. 6). In the soul, as regards what is proper to it, inasmuch as the mind sees and enjoys God; in the body, inasmuch as the body will rise spiritual in power and glory and incorruption, as is written 1 Cor. 15:42. Now before His passion Christ’s mind saw God fully, and thus He had beatitude as far as it regards what is proper to the soul; but beatitude was wanting with regard to all else, since His soul was passible, and His body both passible and mortal, as is clear from the above (A. 4; Q. 14, AA. 1, 2). Hence He was at once comprehensor, inasmuch as He had the beatitude proper to the soul, and at the same time wayfarer, inasmuch as He was tending to beatitude, as regards what was wanting to His beatitude. Reply Obj. 1: It is impossible to be moving towards the end and resting in the end, in the same respect; but there is nothing against this under a different respect—as when a man is at once acquainted with what he already knows, and yet is a learner with regard to what he does not know. Reply Obj. 2: Beatitude principally and properly belongs to the soul with regard to the mind, yet secondarily and, so to say, instrumentally, bodily goods are required for beatitude; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8), that exterior goods minister organically to beatitude. Reply Obj. 3: There is no parity between the soul of a saint and of Christ, for two reasons: first, because the souls of saints are not passible, as Christ’s soul was; second, because their bodies do nothing by which they tend to beatitude, as Christ by His bodily sufferings tended to beatitude as regards the glory of His body.

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Question 16 Christ in His Being and Becoming Deinde considerandum est de his quae consequuntur unionem. Et primo, quantum ad ea quae conveniunt Christo secundum se; secundo, de his quae conveniunt Christo per comparationem ad Deum patrem; tertio, de his quae conveniunt Christo quantum ad nos. Circa primum duplex consideratio occurrit, primo quidem, de his quae conveniunt Christo secundum esse et fieri; secundo, de his quae conveniunt Christo secundum rationem unitatis. Circa primum quaeruntur duodecim. Primo, utrum haec sit vera, Deus est homo. Secundo, utrum haec sit vera, homo est Deus. Tertio, utrum Christus possit dici homo dominicus. Quarto, utrum ea quae conveniunt filio hominis, possint praedicari de filio Dei, et e converso. Quinto, utrum ea quae conveniunt filio hominis, possint praedicari de divina natura; et de humana ea quae conveniunt filio Dei. Sexto, utrum haec sit vera, filius Dei factus est homo. Septimo, utrum haec sit vera, homo factus est Deus. Octavo, utrum haec sit vera, Christus est creatura. Nono, utrum haec sit vera, iste homo, demonstrato Christo, incoepit esse, vel, fuerit semper. Decimo, utrum haec sit vera, Christus, secundum quod homo, est creatura. Undecimo, utrum haec sit vera, Christus, secundum quod homo, est Deus. Duodecimo, utrum haec sit vera, Christus, secundum quod homo, est hypostasis vel persona.

We must now consider the consequences of the union; and first as to what belongs to Christ in Himself; second, as to what belongs to Christ in relation with His Father; third, as to what belongs to Christ in relation to us. Concerning the first, there occurs a double consideration. The first is about such things as belong to Christ in being and becoming; the second regards such things as belong to Christ by reason of unity. Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether this is true: God is man? (2) Whether this is true: Man is God? (3) Whether Christ may be called a lordly man? (4) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the Son of God, and conversely? (5) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the Divine Nature, and what belongs to the Son of God of the human nature? (6) Whether this is true: The Son of God was made man? (7) Whether this is true: Man became God? (8) Whether this is true: Christ is a creature? (9) Whether this is true: This man, pointing out Christ, began to be? or always was? (10) Whether this is true: Christ as man is a creature? (11) Whether this is true: Christ as man is God? (12) Whether this is true: Christ as man is a hypostasis or person?

Article 1 Whether this is true: “God is man”? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod haec sit falsa, Deus est homo. Omnis enim propositio affirmativa in materia aliqua remota est falsa. Sed haec propositio, Deus est homo, est in materia remota, quia formae significatae per subiectum et praedicatum sunt maxime distantes. Cum ergo praedicta propositio sit affirmativa, videtur quod sit falsa. Praeterea, magis conveniunt tres personae ad invicem quam humana natura et divina. Sed in mysterio Trinitatis una persona non praedicatur de alia, non enim

Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: God is man. For every affirmative proposition of remote matter is false. Now this proposition, God is man, is on remote matter, since the forms signified by the subject and predicate are most widely apart. Therefore, since the aforesaid proposition is affirmative, it would seem to be false. Obj. 2: Further, the three Divine Persons are in greater mutual agreement than the human nature and the Divine. But in the mystery of the Incarnation one Person is not

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dicimus quod pater est filius, vel e converso. Ergo vide- predicated of another; for we do not say that the Father is tur quod nec humana natura possit praedicari de Deo, ut the Son, or conversely. Therefore it seems that the human dicatur quod Deus est homo. nature ought not to be predicated of God by saying that God is man. Praeterea, Athanasius dicit quod, sicut anima et Obj. 3: Further, Athanasius says (Symb. Fid.) that, as caro unus est homo, ita Deus et homo unus est Christus. the soul and the flesh are one man, so are God and man one Sed haec est falsa, anima est corpus. Ergo et haec est fal- Christ. But this is false: The soul is the body. Therefore this sa, Deus est homo. also is false: God is man. Praeterea, sicut in prima parte habitum est, quod Obj. 4: Further, it was said in the First Part (Q. 39, A. 4) praedicatur de Deo non relative sed absolute, convenit that what is predicated of God not relatively but absolutely, toti Trinitati et singulis personis. Sed hoc nomen homo belongs to the whole Trinity and to each of the Persons. But non est relativum, sed absolutum. Si ergo vere praedica- this word man is not relative, but absolute. Hence, if it is tur de Deo, sequitur quod tota Trinitas et quaelibet per- predicated of God, it would follow that the whole Trinity sona sit homo. Quod patet esse falsum. and each of the Persons is man; and this is clearly false. Sed contra est quod dicitur Philipp. II, qui, cum in On the contrary, It is written (Phil 2:6, 7): Who beforma Dei esset, exinanivit semetipsum, formam servi ac- ing in the form of God . . . emptied Himself, taking the form cipiens, in similitudinem hominum factus et habitu inven- of a servant, being made in the likeness of man, and in habit tus ut homo. Et sic ille qui est in forma Dei, est homo. Sed found as a man; and thus He Who is in the form of God is ille qui est in forma Dei, est Deus. Ergo Deus est homo. man. Now He Who is in the form of God is God. Therefore God is man. Respondeo dicendum quod ista propositio, Deus I answer that, This proposition God is man, is adest homo, ab omnibus Christianis conceditur, non ta- mitted by all Christians, yet not in the same way by all. men ab omnibus secundum eandem rationem. Quidam For some admit the proposition, but not in the proper acenim hanc propositionem concedunt non secundum ceptation of the terms. Thus the Manicheans say the Word propriam acceptionem horum terminorum. Nam Ma- of God is man, not indeed true, but fictitious man, inasnichaei verbum Dei dicunt esse hominem, non quidem much as they say that the Son of God assumed an imagiverum, sed similitudinarium, inquantum dicunt filium nary body, and thus God is called man as a bronze figure is Dei corpus phantasticum assumpsisse, ut sic dicatur called man if it has the figure of a man. So, too, those who Deus esse homo sicut cuprum figuratum dicitur homo, held that Christ’s body and soul were not united, could not quia habet similitudinem hominis. Similiter etiam illi say that God is true man, but that He is figuratively called qui posuerunt quod in Christo anima et corpus non fue- man by reason of the parts. Now both these opinions were runt unita, non posuerunt quod Deus sit verus homo, disproved above (Q. 2, A. 5; Q. 5, A. 1). sed quod dicatur homo figurative, ratione partium. Sed utraque harum opinionum supra improbata est. Alii vero e converso ponunt veritatem ex parte hoSome, on the contrary, hold the reality on the part of minis, sed negant veritatem ex parte Dei. Dicunt enim man, but deny the reality on the part of God. For they say Christum, qui est Deus homo, esse Deum, non natu- that Christ, Who is God and man, is God not naturally, raliter, sed participative, scilicet per gratiam, sicut et but by participation, i.e., by grace; even as all other holy omnes sancti viri dicuntur dii, excellentius tamen Chri- men are called gods—Christ being more excellently so than stus prae aliis, propter gratiam abundantiorem. Et se- the rest, on account of His more abundant grace. And thus, cundum hoc, cum dicitur, Deus est homo, ly Deus non when it is said that God is man, God does not stand for the supponit verum et naturalem Deum. Et haec est haere- true and natural God. And this is the heresy of Photinus, sis Photini, quae supra improbata est. Alii vero conce- which was disproved above (Q. 2, AA. 10, 11). But some addunt hanc propositionem cum veritate utriusque termi- mit this proposition, together with the reality of both terms, ni, ponentes Christum et verum Deum esse et verum holding that Christ is true God and true man; yet they do hominem, sed tamen veritatem praedicationis non sal- not preserve the truth of the predication. For they say that vant. Dicunt enim quod homo praedicatur de Deo per man is predicated of God by reason of a certain conjuncquandam coniunctionem, vel dignitatis, vel auctorita- tion either of dignity, or of authority, or of affection or intis, vel etiam affectionis aut inhabitationis. Et sic posuit dwelling. It was thus that Nestorius held God to be man— Nestorius Deum esse hominem, ut per hoc nihil aliud si- nothing further being meant than that God is joined to gnificetur quam quod Deus est homini coniunctus tali man by such a conjunction that man is dwelt in by God, coniunctione quod homo inhabitetur a Deo, et unia- and united to Him in affection, and in a share of the Ditur ei secundum affectum, et secundum participationem vine authority and honor. And into the same error fall those auctoritatis et honoris divini. Et in similem errorem in- who suppose two supposita or hypostases in Christ, since

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cidunt qui ponunt duas hypostases vel duo supposita in Christo. Quia non est possibile intelligi quod duorum quae sunt secundum suppositum vel hypostasim distincta, unum proprie praedicetur de alio, sed solum secundum quandam figurativam locutionem, inquantum in aliquo coniunguntur; puta si dicamus Petrum esse Ioannem, quia habent aliquam coniunctionem ad invicem. Et hae etiam opiniones supra reprobatae sunt. Unde, supponendo, secundum veritatem Catholicae fidei, quod vera natura divina unita est cum vera natura humana, non solum in persona, sed etiam in supposito vel hypostasi, dicimus esse veram hanc propositionem et propriam, Deus est homo, non solum propter veritatem terminorum, quia scilicet Christus est verus Deus et verus homo; sed etiam propter veritatem praedicationis. Nomen enim significans naturam communem in concreto potest supponere pro quolibet contentorum in natura communi, sicut hoc nomen homo potest supponere pro quolibet homine singulari. Et ita hoc nomen Deus, ex ipso modo suae significationis, potest supponere pro persona filii Dei, ut in prima parte habitum est. De quolibet autem supposito alicuius naturae potest vere et proprie praedicari nomen significans illam naturam in concreto, sicut de Socrate et Platone proprie et vere praedicatur homo. Quia ergo persona filii Dei, pro qua supponit hoc nomen Deus, est suppositum naturae humanae, vere et proprie hoc nomen homo potest praedicari de hoc nomine Deus, secundum quod supponit pro persona filii Dei. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quando formae diversae non possunt convenire in unum suppositum, tunc oportet quod propositio sit in materia remota cuius subiectum significat unam illarum formarum, et praedicatum aliam. Sed quando duae formae possunt convenire in unum suppositum, non est materia remota, sed naturalis vel contingens, sicut cum dico, album est musicum. Natura autem divina et humana, quamvis sint maxime distantes, tamen conveniunt per incarnationis mysterium in uno supposito, cui neutra illarum inest per accidens, sed secundum se. Et ideo haec propositio, Deus est homo, non est neque in materia remota neque in materia contingenti, sed in materia naturali. Et praedicatur homo de Deo, non per accidens, sed per se, sicut de sua hypostasi, non quidem ratione formae significatae per hoc nomen Deus; sed ratione suppositi, quod est hypostasis humanae naturae. Ad secundum dicendum quod tres personae divinae conveniunt in natura, distinguuntur tamen in supposito, et ideo non praedicantur de invicem. In mysterio autem incarnationis naturae quidem, quia distinctae sunt, de invicem non praedicantur secundum quod significantur in abstracto, non enim natura divina est humana, sed quia conveniunt in supposito, praedicantur de invicem in concreto.

Q. 16, A. 1

it is impossible to understand how, of two things distinct in suppositum or hypostasis, one can be properly predicated of the other: unless merely by a figurative expression, inasmuch as they are united in something, as if we were to say that Peter is John because they are somehow mutually joined together. And these opinions also were disproved above (Q. 2, AA. 3, 6). Hence, supposing the truth of the Catholic belief, that the true Divine Nature is united with true human nature not only in person, but also in suppositum or hypostasis; we say that this proposition is true and proper, God is man— not only by the truth of its terms, i.e., because Christ is true God and true man, but by the truth of the predication. For a word signifying the common nature in the concrete may stand for all contained in the common nature, as this word man may stand for any individual man. And thus this word God, from its very mode of signification, may stand for the Person of the Son of God, as was said in the First Part (Q. 39, A. 4). Now of every suppositum of any nature we may truly and properly predicate a word signifying that nature in the concrete, as man may properly and truly be predicated of Socrates and Plato. Hence, since the Person of the Son of God for Whom this word God stands, is a suppositum of human nature this word man may be truly and properly predicated of this word God, as it stands for the Person of the Son of God.

Reply Obj. 1: When different forms cannot come together in one suppositum, the proposition is necessarily in remote matter, the subject signifying one form and the predicate another. But when two forms can come together in one suppositum, the matter is not remote, but natural or contingent, as when I say: Something white is musical. Now the Divine and human natures, although most widely apart, nevertheless come together by the mystery of the Incarnation in one suppositum, in which neither exists accidentally, but essentially. Hence this proposition is neither in remote nor in contingent, but in natural matter; and man is not predicated of God accidentally, but essentially, as being predicated of its hypostasis—not, indeed, by reason of the form signified by this word God, but by reason of the suppositum, which is a hypostasis of human nature.

Reply Obj. 2: The three Divine Persons agree in one Nature, and are distinguished in suppositum; and hence they are not predicated one of another. But in the mystery of the Incarnation the natures, being distinct, are not predicated one of the other, in the abstract. For the Divine Nature is not the human nature. But because they agree in suppositum, they are predicated of each other in the concrete.

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Incarnation

Ad tertium dicendum quod anima et caro significantur ut in abstracto, sicut divinitas et humanitas. In concreto vero dicuntur animatum et carneum, sive corporeum, sicut ex alia parte Deus et homo. Unde utrobique abstractum non praedicatur de abstracto, sed solum concretum de concreto. Ad quartum dicendum quod hoc nomen homo praedicatur de Deo ratione unionis in persona, quae quidem unio relationem importat. Et ideo non sequitur regulam eorum nominum quae absolute praedicantur de Deo ab aeterno.

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Reply Obj. 3: Soul and flesh are taken in the abstract, even as Godhead and manhood; but in the concrete we say animate and carnal or corporeal, as, on the other hand, God and man. Hence in both cases the abstract is not predicated of the abstract, but only the concrete of the concrete. Reply Obj. 4: This word man is predicated of God, because of the union in person, and this union implies a relation. Hence it does not follow the rule of those words which are absolutely predicated of God from eternity.

Article 2 Whether this is true: “man is God”? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod haec sit falsa, homo est Deus. Deus enim est nomen incommunicabile. Sed Sap. XIV reprehenduntur idololatrae de hoc quod istud nomen Deus, quod est incommunicabile, lignis et lapidibus imposuerunt. Ergo pari ratione, videtur esse inconveniens quod hoc nomen Deus praedicetur de homine. Praeterea, quidquid praedicatur de praedicato, praedicatur de subiecto. Sed haec est vera, Deus est pater, vel, Deus est Trinitas. Si ergo haec sit vera, homo est Deus; videtur etiam quod haec sit vera, homo est pater, vel, homo est Trinitas. Quas quidem patet esse falsas. Ergo et primam. Praeterea, in Psalmo dicitur, non erit in te Deus recens. Sed homo est quiddam recens, non enim Christus semper fuit homo. Ergo haec est falsa, homo est Deus. Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. IX, ex quibus est Christus secundum carnem, qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula. Sed Christus secundum carnem est homo. Ergo haec est vera, homo est Deus. Respondeo dicendum quod, supposita veritate utriusque naturae, divinae scilicet et humanae, et unione in persona et hypostasi, haec est vera et propria, homo est Deus, sicut et ista, Deus est homo. Hoc enim nomen homo potest supponere pro qualibet hypostasi humanae naturae, et ita potest supponere pro persona filii, quam dicimus esse hypostasim humanae naturae. Manifestum est autem quod de persona filii Dei vere et proprie praedicatur hoc nomen Deus, ut in prima parte habitum est. Unde relinquitur quod haec sit vera et propria, homo est Deus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod idololatrae attribuebant nomen deitatis lapidibus et lignis secundum quod in sua natura considerantur, quia putabant in illis aliquid numinis esse. Nos autem non attribuimus no-

Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: Man is God. For God is an incommunicable name; hence (Wis 13:10; 14:21) idolaters are rebuked for giving the name of God, which is incommunicable, to wood and stones. Hence with equal reason does it seem unbecoming that this word God should be predicated of man. Obj. 2: Further, whatever is predicated of the predicate may be predicated of the subject. But this is true: God is the Father, or God is the Trinity. Therefore, if it is true that Man is God, it seems that this also is true: Man is the Father, or Man is the Trinity. But these are false. Therefore the first is false. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Ps 80:10): There shall be no new God in thee. But man is something new; for Christ was not always man. Therefore this is false: Man is God. On the contrary, It is written (Rom 9:5): Of whom is Christ according to the flesh, Who is over all things, God blessed for ever. Now Christ, according to the flesh, is man. Therefore this is true: Man is God. I answer that, Granted the reality of both natures, i.e., Divine and human, and of the union in person and hypostasis, this is true and proper: Man is God, even as this: God is man. For this word man may stand for any hypostasis of human nature; and thus it may stand for the Person of the Son of God, Whom we say is a hypostasis of human nature. Now it is manifest that the word God is truly and properly predicated of the Person of the Son of God, as was said in the First Part (Q. 39, A. 4). Hence it remains that this is true and proper: Man is God. Reply Obj. 1: Idolaters attributed the name of the Deity to stones and wood, considered in their own nature, because they thought there was something divine in them. But we do not attribute the name of the Deity to the man

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men deitatis homini secundum humanam naturam, sed secundum suppositum aeternum, quod est etiam per unionem suppositum humanae naturae, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc nomen pater praedicatur de hoc nomine Deus secundum quod hoc nomen Deus supponit pro persona patris. Sic autem non praedicatur de persona filii, quia persona filii non est persona patris. Et per consequens non oportet quod hoc nomen pater praedicetur de hoc nomine homo, de quo praedicatur hoc nomen Deus, inquantum scilicet homo supponit pro persona filii. Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet humana natura in Christo sit quiddam recens, tamen suppositum humanae naturae non est recens, sed aeternum. Et quia hoc nomen Deus non praedicatur de homine ratione humanae naturae, sed ratione suppositi, non sequitur quod ponamus Deum recentem. Sequeretur autem si poneremus quod homo supponit suppositum creatum, secundum quod oportet dicere eos qui in Christo ponunt duo supposita.

Q. 16, A. 3

in His human nature, but in the eternal suppositum, which by union is a suppositum of human nature, as stated above. Reply Obj. 2: This word Father is predicated of this word God, inasmuch as this word God stands for the Person of the Father. And in this way it is not predicated of the Person of the Son, because the Person of the Son is not the Person of the Father. And, consequently, it is not necessary that this word Father be predicated of this word Man, of which the Word God is predicated, inasmuch as Man stands for the Person of the Son. Reply Obj. 3: Although the human nature in Christ is something new, yet the suppositum of the human nature is not new, but eternal. And because this word God is predicated of man not on account of the human nature, but by reason of the suppositum, it does not follow that we assert a new God. But this would follow, if we held that Man stands for a created suppositum: even as must be said by those who assert that there are two supposita in Christ.

Article 3 Whether Christ can be called a lordly man? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus possit dici homo dominicus. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octogintatrium quaest., monendum est ut illa bona expectentur quae fuerunt in illo homine dominico. Loquitur autem de Christo. Ergo videtur quod Christus sit homo dominicus. Praeterea, sicut dominium convenit Christo ratione divinae naturae, ita etiam humanitas pertinet ad humanam naturam. Sed Deus dicitur humanatus, ut patet per Damascenum, in III libro, ubi dicit quod humanatio eam quae ad hominem copulationem demonstrat. Ergo pari ratione, potest demonstrative dici quod homo ille sit dominicus. Praeterea, sicut dominicus denominative dicitur a domino, ita divinus dicitur denominative a Deo. Sed Dionysius Christum nominat divinissimum Iesum. Ergo, pari ratione, potest dici quod Christus sit homo dominicus. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro Retract., non video utrum recte dicatur homo dominicus Iesus Christus, cum sit utique dominus. Respondeo dicendum quod sicut, supra dictum est, cum dicitur homo Christus Iesus, designatur suppositum aeternum, quod est persona filii Dei, propter hoc quod unum suppositum est utriusque naturae. De persona autem filii Dei praedicatur Deus et dominus essentialiter. Et ideo non debet praedicari denominative; quia

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ can be called a lordly man. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that we are to be counseled to hope for the goods that were in the Lordly Man; and he is speaking of Christ. Therefore it seems that Christ was a lordly man. Obj. 2: Further, as lordship belongs to Christ by reason of His Divine Nature, so does manhood belong to the human nature. Now God is said to be humanized, as is plain from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 11), where he says that being humanized manifests the conjunction with man. Hence with like reason may it be said denominatively that this man is lordly. Obj. 3: Further, as lordly is derived from lord, so is Divine derived from Deus. But Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iv) calls Christ the most Divine Jesus. Therefore with like reason may Christ be called a lordly man. On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 19): I do not see that we may rightly call Jesus Christ a lordly man, since He is the Lord Himself. I answer that, As was said above (A. 2, ad 3), when we say the Man Christ Jesus, we signify the eternal suppositum, which is the Person of the Son of God, because there is only one suppositum of both natures. Now God and Lord are predicated essentially of the Son of God; and hence they ought not to be predicated denominatively, since this

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Incarnation

hoc derogat veritati unionis. Unde, cum dominicus dicatur denominative a domino, non potest vere et proprie dici quod homo ille sit dominicus, sed magis quod sit dominus. Si autem per hoc quod dicitur homo Christus Iesus, designaretur suppositum aliquod creatum, secundum illos qui ponunt in Christo duo supposita, posset dici homo ille dominicus, inquantum sumitur ad participationem honoris divini; sicut Nestoriani posuerunt. Et hoc etiam modo humana natura non dicitur essentialiter dea, sed deificata, non quidem per conversionem ipsius in divinam naturam, sed per coniunctionem ad divinam naturam in una hypostasi; ut patet per Damascenum, in III libro. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus illa verba, et similia, retractat in libro Retractationum. Unde post praedicta verba libri Retractationum subdit, hoc ubicumque dixi, scilicet quod Christus Iesus sit homo dominicus, dixisse me nollem. Postea quippe vidi non esse dicendum, quamvis nonnulla ratione posset defendi, quia scilicet posset aliquis dicere quod dicitur homo dominicus ratione humanae naturae, quam significat hoc nomen homo, non autem ratione suppositi. Ad secundum dicendum quod illud unum suppositum quod est divinae et humanae naturae, primo quidem fuit divinae naturae, scilicet ab aeterno, postea autem ex tempore per incarnationem factum est suppositum humanae naturae. Et hac ratione dicitur humanatum, non quia assumpserit hominem; sed quia assumpsit humanam naturam. Non autem sic est e converso quod suppositum humanae naturae assumpserit divinam naturam. Unde non potest dici homo deificatus, vel dominicus. Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc nomen divinum consuevit praedicari etiam de his de quibus praedicatur essentialiter hoc nomen Deus, dicimus enim quod divina essentia est Deus, ratione identitatis; et quod essentia est Dei sive divina, propter diversum modum significandi; et verbum divinum, cum tamen verbum sit Deus. Et similiter dicimus personam divinam, sicut et personam Platonis, propter diversum modum significandi. Sed dominicus non dicitur de his de quibus dominus praedicatur, non enim consuevit dici quod aliquis homo qui est dominus, sit dominicus. Sed illud quod qualitercumque est domini, dominicum dicitur, sicut dominica voluntas vel dominica manus, vel dominica possessio. Et ideo ipse homo Christus, qui est dominus, non potest dici dominicus, sed potest caro eius dici dominica caro, et passio eius potest dici dominica passio.

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is derogatory to the truth of the union. Hence, since we say lordly denominatively from lord, it cannot truly and properly be said that this Man is lordly, but rather that He is Lord. But if, when we say the Man Christ Jesus, we mean a created suppositum, as those who assert two supposita in Christ, this man might be called lordly, inasmuch as he is assumed to a participation of Divine honor, as the Nestorians said. And, even in this way, the human nature is not called divine by essence, but deified—not, indeed, by its being converted into the Divine Nature, but by its conjunction with the Divine Nature in one hypostasis, as is plain from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 11, 17). Reply Obj. 1: Augustine retracts these and the like words (Retract. i, 19); hence, after the foregoing words (Retract. i, 19), he adds: Wherever I have said this, viz. that Christ Jesus is a lordly man, I wish it unsaid, having afterwards seen that it ought not to be said although it may be defended with some reason, i.e., because one might say that He was called a lordly man by reason of the human nature, which this word man signifies, and not by reason of the suppositum. Reply Obj. 2: This one suppositum, which is of the human and Divine natures, was first of the Divine Nature, i.e., from eternity. Afterwards in time it was made a suppositum of human nature by the Incarnation. And for this reason it is said to be humanized—not that it assumed a man, but that it assumed human nature. But the converse of this is not true, viz. that a suppositum of human nature assumed the Divine Nature; hence we may not say a deified or lordly man. Reply Obj. 3: This word Divine is wont to be predicated even of things of which the word God is predicated essentially; thus we say that the Divine Essence is God, by reason of identity; and that the Essence belongs to God, or is Divine, on account of the different way of signifying; and we speak of the Divine Word, though the Word is God. So, too, we say a Divine Person, just as we say the person of Plato, on account of its different mode of signification. But lordly is not predicated of those of which lord is predicated; for we are not wont to call a man who is a lord, lordly; but whatsoever belongs to a lord is called lordly, as the lordly will, or the lordly hand, or the lordly possession. And hence the man Christ, Who is our Lord, cannot be called lordly; yet His flesh can be called lordly flesh and His passion the lordly passion.

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Q. 16, A. 4

Article 4 Whether what belongs to the human nature can be predicated of God? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae sunt humanae naturae, de Deo dici non possint. Impossibile est enim opposita de eodem praedicari. Sed ea quae sunt humanae naturae, sunt contraria his quae sunt propria Dei, Deus enim est increatus, immutabilis et aeternus; ad humanam autem naturam pertinet ut sit creata, temporalis et mutabilis. Non ergo ea quae sunt naturae humanae, possunt dici de Deo. Praeterea, attribuere Deo ea quae ad defectum pertinent, videtur derogare divino honori, et ad blasphemiam pertinere. Sed ea quae sunt humanae naturae, defectum quendam continent, sicut mori, pati, et alia huiusmodi. Ergo videtur quod nullo modo ea quae sunt humanae naturae, possint dici de Deo. Praeterea, assumi convenit humanae naturae. Non autem hoc convenit Deo. Non ergo ea quae sunt humanae naturae, de Deo dici possunt. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod Deus suscepit ea quae sunt carnis idiomata, idest proprietates, dum Deus passibilis nominatur, et Deus gloriae crucifixus est. Respondeo dicendum quod de hac quaestione diversitas fuit inter Nestorianos et Catholicos. Nestoriani enim voces quae dicuntur de Christo dividere volebant hoc modo, ut ea quae pertinent ad humanam naturam, non dicerentur de Deo; nec ea quae pertinent ad divinam naturam, dicerentur de homine. Unde Nestorius dixit, si quis Dei verbo passiones tentat tribuere, anathema sit. Si qua vero nomina sunt quae pertinere possunt ad utramque naturam, de talibus praedicabant ea quae sunt utriusque naturae, sicut hoc nomen Christus, vel dominus. Unde concedebant Christum esse natum de virgine, et fuisse ab aeterno, non tamen concedebant vel Deum natum de virgine, vel hominem ab aeterno fuisse. Catholici vero posuerunt huiusmodi quae dicuntur de Christo, sive secundum divinam naturam sive secundum humanam, dici posse tam de Deo quam de homine. Unde Cyrillus dixit, si quis duabus personis seu substantiis, idest hypostasibus, eas quae in evangelicis et apostolicis sunt conscriptionibus dividit voces, vel ea quae de Christo a sanctis dicuntur, vel ab ipso Christo de semetipso; et aliquas quidem ex his homini applicandas crediderit, aliquas soli verbo deputaverit, anathema sit. Et huius ratio est quia, cum sit eadem hypostasis utriusque naturae, eadem hypostasis supponitur nomine utriusque naturae. Sive ergo dicatur homo, sive Deus, supponitur hypostasis divinae et humanae naturae. Et ideo de homine dici possunt ea quae sunt divinae naturae, et de Deo possunt dici ea quae sunt humanae naturae.

Objection 1: It would seem that what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of God. For contrary things cannot be said of the same. Now, what belongs to human nature is contrary to what is proper to God, since God is uncreated, immutable, and eternal, and it belongs to the human nature to be created temporal and mutable. Therefore what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of God. Obj. 2: Further, to attribute to God what is defective seems to be derogatory to the Divine honor, and to be a blasphemy. Now what pertains to the human nature contains a kind of defect, as to suffer, to die, and the like. Hence it seems that what pertains to the human nature can nowise be said of God. Obj. 3: Further, to be assumed pertains to the human nature; yet it does not pertain to God. Therefore what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of God. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that God assumed the idioms, i.e., the properties, of flesh, since God is said to be passible, and the God of glory was crucified. I answer that, On this question there was a difference of opinion between Nestorians and Catholics. The Nestorians wished to divide words predicated of Christ, in this way, viz. that such as pertained to human nature should not be predicated of God, and that such as pertained to the Divine Nature should not be predicated of the Man. Hence Nestorius said: If anyone attempt to attribute sufferings to the Word, let him be anathema. But if there are any words applicable to both natures, of them they predicated what pertained to both natures, as Christ or Lord. Hence they granted that Christ was born of a Virgin, and that He was from eternity; but they did not say that God was born of a virgin, or that the Man was from eternity. Catholics on the other hand maintained that words which are said of Christ either in His Divine or in His human nature may be said either of God or of man. Hence Cyril says: If anyone ascribes to two persons or substances, i.e., hypostases, such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the Saints, or by Himself of Himself, and believes that some are to be applied to the Man, and apportions some to the Word alone—let him be anathema. And the reason of this is that, since there is one hypostasis of both natures, the same hypostasis is signified by the name of either nature. Thus whether we say man or God, the hypostasis of Divine and human nature is signified. And hence, of the Man may be said what belongs to the Divine Nature, as of a hypostasis of the Divine Nature; and of God may be said what belongs to the human nature, as of a hypostasis of human nature.

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Incarnation

Sciendum tamen quod in propositione in qua aliquid de aliquo praedicatur, non solum attenditur quid sit illud de quo praedicatur praedicatum, sed etiam secundum quid de illo praedicetur. Quamvis igitur non distinguantur ea quae praedicantur de Christo, distinguuntur tamen quantum ad id secundum quod utrumque praedicatur. Nam ea quae sunt divinae naturae, praedicantur de Christo secundum divinam naturam, ea autem quae sunt humanae naturae, praedicantur de eo secundum humanam naturam. Unde Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., distinguamus quod in Scripturis sonat secundum formam Dei et quod secundum formam servi. Et infra, quid propter quid, et quid secundum quid dicatur, prudens et diligens et pius lector intelligit.

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Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that in a proposition in which something is predicated of another, we must not merely consider what the predicate is predicated of, but also the reason of its being predicated. Thus, although we do not distinguish things predicated of Christ, yet we distinguish that by reason of which they are predicated, since those things that belong to the Divine Nature are predicated of Christ in His Divine Nature, and those that belong to the human nature are predicated of Christ in His human nature. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. i, 11): We must distinguish what is said by Scripture in reference to the form of God, wherein He is equal to the Father, and what in reference to the form of a servant, wherein He is less than the Father: and further on he says (De Trin. i, 13): The prudent, careful, and devout reader will discern the reason and point of view of what is said. Reply Obj. 1: It is impossible for contraries to be predicated of the same in the same respects, but nothing prevents their being predicated of the same in different aspects. And thus contraries are predicated of Christ, not in the same, but in different natures. Reply Obj. 2: If the things pertaining to defect were attributed to God in His Divine Nature, it would be a blasphemy, since it would be derogatory to His honor. But there is no kind of wrong done to God if they are attributed to Him in His assumed nature. Hence in a discourse of the Council of Ephesus it is said: God accounts nothing a wrong which is the occasion of man’s salvation. For no lowliness that He assumed for us injures that Nature which can be subject to no injury, yet makes lower things Its own, to save our nature. Therefore, since these lowly and worthless things do no harm to the Divine Nature, but bring about our salvation, how dost thou maintain that what was the cause of our salvation was the occasion of harm to God?

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod opposita praedicari de eodem secundum idem est impossibile, sed secundum diversa, nihil prohibet. Et hoc modo opposita praedicantur de Christo, non secundum idem, sed secundum diversas naturas. Ad secundum dicendum quod, si ea quae ad defectum pertinent Deo attribuantur secundum divinam naturam, esset blasphemia, quasi pertinens ad diminutionem honoris ipsius, non autem pertinet ad Dei iniuriam si attribuantur ei secundum naturam assumptam. Unde in quodam sermone Ephesini Concilii dicitur, nihil putat Deus iniuriam quod est occasio salutis hominibus, nihil enim abiectorum quae elegit propter nos, iniuriam facit illi naturae quae non potest esse subiecta iniuriis, propria vero facit inferiora ut salvet naturam nostram. Quando ergo quae abiecta et vilia sunt Dei naturam non iniuriantur, sed salutem hominibus operantur, quomodo dicis ea quae causa nostrae salutis sunt, iniuriae occasionem Deo fuisse? Ad tertium dicendum quod assumi convenit huReply Obj. 3: To be assumed pertains to human namanae naturae non ratione suppositi, sed ratione sui ip- ture, not in its suppositum, but in itself; and thus it does not sius. Et ideo non convenit Deo. belong to God.

Article 5 Whether what belongs to the human nature can be predicated of the Divine Nature? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae sunt humanae naturae, possint dici de natura divina. Ea enim quae sunt humanae naturae, praedicantur de filio Dei, et de Deo. Sed Deus est sua natura. Ergo ea quae sunt naturae humanae, possunt praedicari de divina natura. Praeterea, caro pertinet ad naturam humanam. Sed, sicut dicit Damascenus, in III libro, dicimus naturam verbi incarnatam esse, secundum beatos Athanasium

Objection 1: It would seem that what belongs to the human nature can be said of the Divine Nature. For what belongs to the human nature is predicated of the Son of God, and of God. But God is His own Nature. Therefore, what belongs to the human nature may be predicated of the Divine Nature. Obj. 2: Further, the flesh pertains to human nature. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6), we say, after the blessed Athanasius and Cyril, that the Nature of the Word

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et Cyrillum. Ergo videtur quod, pari ratione, ea quae sunt was incarnate. Therefore it would seem with equal reason humanae naturae, possint dici de divina natura. that what belongs to the human nature may be said of the Divine Nature. Praeterea, ea quae sunt divinae naturae, conveObj. 3: Further, what belongs to the Divine Nature beniunt humanae naturae in Christo, sicut cognoscere fu- longs to Christ’s human nature; such as to know future tura, et habere salutiferam virtutem. Ergo videtur quod, things and to possess saving power. Therefore it would pari ratione ea, quae sunt humanae naturae, possint dici seem with equal reason that what belongs to the human de divina natura. may be said of the Divine Nature. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, deitatem quidem dicentes, non nominamus de ea quae hu- 4): When we mention the Godhead we do not predicate of it manitatis idiomata, idest proprietates, non enim dicimus the idioms, i.e., the properties, of the humanity; for we do not deitatem passibilem vel creabilem. Deitas autem est divi- say that the Godhead is passible or creatable. Now the Godna natura. Ergo ea quae sunt humanae naturae, non pos- head is the Divine Nature. Therefore what is proper to the sunt dici de divina natura. human nature cannot be said of the Divine Nature. Respondeo dicendum quod ea quae sunt proprie I answer that, What belongs to one cannot be said unius, non possunt vere de aliquo praedicari nisi de eo of another, unless they are both the same; thus risible can quod est idem illi, sicut risibile non convenit nisi ei quod be predicated only of man. Now in the mystery of the Inest homo. In mysterio autem incarnationis non est ea- carnation the Divine and human natures are not the same; dem divina natura et humana, sed est eadem hypostasis but the hypostasis of the two natures is the same. And hence utriusque naturae. Et ideo ea quae sunt unius naturae, what belongs to one nature cannot be predicated of the non possunt de alia praedicari, secundum quod in ab- other if they are taken in the abstract. Now concrete words stracto significantur. Nomina vero concreta supponunt stand for the hypostasis of the nature; and hence of conhypostasim naturae. Et ideo indifferenter praedicari pos- crete words we may predicate indifferently what belongs to sunt ea quae ad utramque naturam pertinent, de nomi- either nature—whether the word of which they are predinibus concretis sive, illud nomen de quo dicuntur det in- cated refers to both natures, as the word Christ, by which telligere utramque naturam, sicut hoc nomen Christus is signified both the Godhead anointing and the manhood in quo intelligitur et divinitas ungens et humanitas unc- anointed; or to the Divine Nature alone, as this word God or ta; sive solum divinam naturam, sicut hoc nomen Deus, the Son of God; or to the manhood alone, as this word Man vel filius Dei; sive solum naturam humanam, sicut hoc or Jesus. Hence Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Palaest. cxxiv): It is nomen homo, vel Iesus. Unde Leo Papa dicit, in episto- of no consequence from what substance we name Christ; bela ad Palaestinos, non interest ex qua Christus substantia cause since the unity of person remains inseparably, one and nominetur, cum inseparabiliter manente unitate personae, the same is altogether Son of Man by His flesh, and altogether idem sit et totus hominis filius propter carnem, et totus Dei Son of God by the Godhead which He has with the Father. filius propter unam cum patre divinitatem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in divinis realiter Reply Obj. 1: In God, Person and Nature are really est idem persona cum natura, et ratione huius identita- the same; and by reason of this identity the Divine Nature tis, divina natura praedicatur de filio Dei. Non tamen est is predicated of the Son of God. Nevertheless, its mode of idem modus significandi. Et ideo quaedam dicuntur de predication is different; and hence certain things are said filio Dei quae non dicuntur de divina natura, sicut dici- of the Son of God which are not said of the Divine Nature; mus quod filius Dei est genitus, non tamen dicimus quod thus we say that the Son of God is born, yet we do not say divina natura sit genita, ut in prima parte habitum est. that the Divine Nature is born; as was said in the First Part Et similiter in mysterio incarnationis dicimus quod filius (Q. 39, A. 5). So, too, in the mystery of the Incarnation we Dei est passus, non autem dicimus quod natura divina sit say that the Son of God suffered, yet we do not say that the passa. Divine Nature suffered. Ad secundum dicendum quod incarnatio magis Reply Obj. 2: Incarnation implies union with flesh, importat unionem ad carnem quam carnis proprieta- rather than any property of flesh. Now in Christ each natem. Utraque autem natura est in Christo unita alteri in ture is united to the other in person; and by reason of this persona, ratione cuius unionis et natura divina dicitur union the Divine Nature is said to be incarnate and the huincarnata, et humana natura deificata, ut supra dictum man nature deified, as stated above (Q. 2, A. 1, ad 3). est. Ad tertium dicendum quod ea quae sunt divinae Reply Obj. 3: What belongs to the Divine Nature is naturae, dicuntur de humana natura, non secundum predicated of the human nature—not, indeed, as it belongs quod essentialiter competunt divinae naturae, sed se- essentially to the Divine Nature, but as it is participated by cundum quod participative derivantur ad humanam na- the human nature. Hence, whatever cannot be participated

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turam. Unde ea quae participari non possunt a natura humana, sicut esse increatum aut omnipotentem, nullo modo de humana natura dicuntur. Divina autem natura nihil participative recipit ab humana natura. Et ideo ea quae sunt humanae naturae, nullo modo possunt dici de divina.

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by the human nature (as to be uncreated and omnipotent), is nowise predicated of the human nature. But the Divine Nature received nothing by participation from the human nature; and hence what belongs to the human nature can nowise be predicated of the Divine Nature.

Article 6 Whether this is true: “God was made man”? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod haec sit falsa, Deus factus est homo. Cum enim homo significet substantiam, fieri hominem est fieri simpliciter. Sed haec est falsa, Deus factus est simpliciter. Ergo haec est falsa, Deus factus est homo. Praeterea, fieri hominem est mutari. Sed Deus non potest esse subiectum mutationis, secundum illud Malach. III, ego dominus, et non mutor. Ergo videtur quod haec sit falsa, Deus factus est homo. Praeterea, homo, secundum quod de Christo dicitur, supponit personam filii Dei. Sed haec est falsa, Deus factus est persona filii Dei. Ergo haec est falsa, Deus factus est homo. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. I, verbum caro factum est. Et sicut Athanasius dicit, in epistola ad Epictetum, quod dixit verbum caro factum est, simile est ac si diceretur, homo factus est. Respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque dicitur esse factum illud quod de novo incipit praedicari de ipso. Esse autem hominem vere praedicatur de Deo, sicut dictum est, ita tamen quod non convenit Deo esse hominem ab aeterno, sed ex tempore per assumptionem humanae naturae. Et ideo haec est vera, Deus factus est homo. Diversimode tamen intelligitur a diversis, sicut et haec, Deus est homo, ut supra dictum est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod fieri hominem est fieri simpliciter in omnibus his in quibus humana natura incipit esse in supposito de novo creato. Deus autem dicitur factus homo ex eo quod humana natura incoepit esse in supposito divinae naturae ab aeterno praeexistente. Et ideo Deum fieri hominem non est Deum fieri simpliciter. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, fieri importat quod aliquid praedicetur de novo de altero. Unde quandocumque aliquid de novo praedicatur de altero cum mutatione eius de quo dicitur, tunc fieri est mutari. Et hoc convenit omnibus quae absolute dicuntur, non enim potest albedo aut magnitudo de novo advenire alicui nisi per hoc quod de novo mutatur ad albedinem vel magnitudinem. Ea vero quae relative dicuntur, possunt de novo praedicari de aliquo absque eius mutatione, sicut homo de novo fit dexter absque sua

Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: God was made man. For since man signifies a substance, to be made man is to be made simply. But this is false: God was made simply. Therefore this is false: God was made man. Obj. 2: Further, to be made man is to be changed. But God cannot be the subject of change, according to Malachi 3:6: I am the Lord, and I change not. Hence this is false: God was made man. Obj. 3: Further, man as predicated of Christ stands for the Person of the Son of God. But this is false: God was made the Person of the Son of God. Therefore this is false: God was made man. On the contrary, It is written (John 1:14): The Word was made flesh: and as Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epictetum), when he said, ‘The Word was made flesh,’ it is as if it were said that God was made man. I answer that, A thing is said to be made that which begins to be predicated of it for the first time. Now to be man is truly predicated of God, as stated above (A. 1), yet in such sort that it pertains to God to be man, not from eternity, but from the time of His assuming human nature. Hence, this is true, God was made man; though it is understood differently by some: even as this, God is man, as we said above (A. 1). Reply Obj. 1: To be made man is to be made simply, in all those in whom human nature begins to be in a newly created suppositum. But God is said to have been made man, inasmuch as the human nature began to be in an eternally pre-existing suppositum of the Divine Nature. And hence for God to be made man does not mean that God was made simply. Reply Obj. 2: As stated above, to be made implies that something is newly predicated of another. Hence, whenever anything is predicated of another, and there is a change in that of which it is predicated, then to be made is to be changed; and this takes place in whatever is predicated absolutely, for whiteness or greatness cannot newly affect anything, unless it be newly changed to whiteness or greatness. But whatever is predicated relatively can be newly predicated of anything without its change, as a man may be made to be on the right side without being changed and merely

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mutatione, per motum illius qui fit ei sinister. Unde in talibus non oportet omne quod dicitur fieri, esse mutatum, quia hoc potest accidere per mutationem alterius. Et per hunc modum Deo dicimus, domine, refugium factus es nobis. Esse autem hominem convenit Deo ratione unionis, quae est relatio quaedam. Et ideo esse hominem praedicatur de novo de Deo absque eius mutatione, per mutationem humanae naturae, quae assumitur in divinam personam. Et ideo, cum dicitur, Deus factus est homo, non intelligitur aliqua mutatio ex parte Dei, sed solum ex parte humanae naturae. Ad tertium dicendum quod homo supponit personam filii Dei, non nudam, sed prout subsistit in humana natura. Et quamvis haec sit falsa, Deus factus est persona filii, est tamen haec vera, Deus factus est homo, ex eo quod unitus est humanae naturae.

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by the change of him on whose left side he was. Hence in such cases, not all that is said to be made is changed, since it may happen by the change of something else. And it is thus we say of God: Lord, Thou art made our refuge (Ps 89:1). Now to be man belongs to God by reason of the union, which is a relation. And hence to be man is newly predicated of God without any change in Him, by a change in the human nature, which is assumed to a Divine Person. And hence, when it is said, God was made man, we understand no change on the part of God, but only on the part of the human nature. Reply Obj. 3: Man stands not for the bare Person of the Son of God, but inasmuch as it subsists in human nature. Hence, although this is false, God was made the Person of the Son of God, yet this is true: God was made man by being united to human nature.

Article 7 Whether this is true: “man was made God”? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod haec sit vera, homo factus est Deus. Dicitur enim Rom. I, quod ante promiserat per prophetas suos in Scripturis sanctis de filio suo, qui factus est ei ex semine David secundum carnem. Sed Christus secundum quod homo est ex semine David secundum carnem. Ergo homo factus est filius Dei. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., talis erat illa susceptio quae Deum hominem faceret, et hominem Deum. Sed ratione illius susceptionis haec est vera, Deus factus est homo. Ergo similiter haec est vera, homo factus est Deus. Praeterea, Gregorius Nazianzenus dicit, in epistola ad Chelidonium, Deus quidem humanatus est, homo autem deificatus, vel quomodolibet aliter nominaverit. Sed Deus ea ratione dicitur humanatus, quia est homo factus. Ergo homo ea ratione dicitur deificatus, quia est factus Deus. Et ita haec est vera, homo factus est Deus. Praeterea, cum dicitur, Deus factus est homo, subiectum factionis vel unitionis non est Deus, sed humana natura, quam significat hoc nomen homo. Sed illud videtur esse subiectum factionis cui factio attribuitur. Ergo haec magis est vera, homo factus est Deus, quam ista, Deus factus est homo. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, non hominem deificatum dicimus, sed Deum humanatum. Idem autem est fieri Deum quod deificari. Ergo haec est falsa, homo factus est Deus. Respondeo dicendum quod propositio ista, homo factus est Deus, tripliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, ita quod hoc participium factus determinet absolute vel subiectum, vel praedicatum. Et in hoc sensu est falsa,

Objection 1: It would seem that this is true: Man was made God. For it is written (Rom 1:2, 3): Which He had promised before by His prophets in the holy Scriptures, concerning His Son Who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh. Now Christ, as man, is of the seed of David according to the flesh. Therefore man was made the Son of God. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 13) that such was this assumption, which made God man, and man God. But by reason of this assumption this is true: God was made man. Therefore, in like manner, this is true: Man was made God. Obj. 3: Further, Gregory Nazianzen says (Ep. ad Chelid. ci): God was humanized and man was deified, or whatever else one may like to call it. Now God is said to be humanized by being made man. Therefore with equal reason man is said to be deified by being made God; and thus it is true that Man was made God. Obj. 4: Further, when it is said that God was made man, the subject of the making or uniting is not God, but human nature, which the word man signifies. Now that seems to be the subject of the making, to which the making is attributed. Hence Man was made God is truer than God was made man. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2): We do not say that man was deified, but that God was humanized. Now to be made God is the same as to be deified. Hence this is false: Man was made God. I answer that, This proposition, Man was made God, may be understood in three ways. First, so that the participle made absolutely determines either the subject or the predicate; and in this sense it is false, since neither the Man

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quia neque homo ille de quo praedicatur est factus, neque Deus est factus, ut infra dicetur. Et sub eodem sensu haec est falsa, Deus factus est homo. Sed sub hoc sensu non quaeritur hic de istis propositionibus. Alio modo potest intelligi ut ly factus determinet compositionem, ut sit sensus, homo factus est Deus, idest, factum est ut homo sit Deus. Et sub hoc sensu utraque est vera, et, homo factus est Deus, et, Deus factus est homo. Sed hic non est proprius sensus harum locutionum, nisi forte intelligatur quod ly homo non habeat personalem suppositionem, sed simplicem. Licet enim hic homo non sit factus Deus, quia hoc suppositum, persona filii Dei, ab aeterno fuit Deus, tamen homo, communiter loquendo, non semper fuit Deus. Tertio modo, proprie intelligitur, secundum quod hoc participium factus ponit fieri circa hominem in respectu ad Deum sicut ad terminum factionis. Et in hoc sensu, supposito quod in Christo sit eadem persona et hypostasis et suppositum Dei et hominis, ut supra ostensum est, ista propositio falsa est. Quia cum dicitur, homo factus est Deus, ly homo habet personalem suppositionem, non enim esse Deum verificatur de homine ratione humanae naturae, sed ratione sui suppositi. Suppositum autem illud humanae naturae de quo verificatur esse Deum, est idem quod hypostasis seu persona filii Dei, quae semper fuit Deus. Unde non potest dici quod iste homo incoepit esse Deus, vel quod fiat Deus, aut quod factus sit Deus. Si vero esset alia persona vel hypostasis Dei et hominis, ita quod esse Deum praedicaretur de homine, et e converso per quandam coniunctionem suppositorum, vel dignitatis personalis, vel affectionis, vel inhabitationis, ut Nestoriani dixerunt, tunc pari ratione posset dici quod homo factus est Deus, idest coniunctus Deo, sicut et quod Deus factus est homo, idest coniunctus homini. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in verbis illis apostoli hoc relativum qui, quod refert pro persona filii, non debet intelligi ex parte praedicati, quasi aliquis existens ex semine David secundum carnem sit factus filius Dei, in quo sensu obiectio procedebat, sed debet intelligi ex parte subiecti, ut sit sensus quod filius Dei factus est ei, (scilicet ad honorem patris, ut Glossa exponit) existens ex semine David secundum carnem; ac si diceret, filius Dei habens carnem ex semine David ad honorem Dei.

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of Whom it is predicated was made, nor is God made, as will be said (AA. 8, 9). And in the same sense this is false: God was made man. But it is not of this sense that we are now speaking. Second, it may be so understood that the word made determines the composition, with this meaning: Man was made God, i.e., it was brought about that Man is God. And in this sense both are true, viz. that Man was made God and that God was made Man. But this is not the proper sense of these phrases; unless, indeed, we are to understand that man has not a personal but a simple supposition. For although this man was not made God, because this suppositum, viz. the Person of the Son of God, was eternally God, yet man, speaking commonly, was not always God. Third, properly understood, this participle made attaches making to man with relation to God, as the term of the making. And in this sense, granted that the Person or hypostasis in Christ are the same as the suppositum of God and Man, as was shown (Q. 2, AA. 2, 3), this proposition is false, because, when it is said, Man was made God, man has a personal suppositum: because, to be God is not verified of the Man in His human nature, but in His suppositum. Now the suppositum of human nature, of Whom to be God is verified, is the same as the hypostasis or Person of the Son of God, Who was always God. Hence it cannot be said that this Man began to be God, or is made God, or that He was made God.

But if there were a different hypostasis of God and man, so that to be God was predicated of the man, and, conversely, by reason of a certain conjunction of supposita, or of personal dignity, or of affection or indwelling, as the Nestorians said, then with equal reason might it be said that Man was made God, i.e., joined to God, and that God was made Man, i.e., joined to man. Reply Obj. 1: In these words of the Apostle the relative Who which refers to the Person of the Son of God ought not to be considered as affecting the predicate, as if someone already existing of the seed of David according to the flesh was made the Son of God—and it is in this sense that the objection takes it. But it ought to be taken as affecting the subject, with this meaning—that the Son of God was made to Him, ‘namely to the honor of the Father,’ as a gloss expounds it, being of the seed of David according to the flesh, as if to say the Son of God having flesh of the seed of David to the honor of God. Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum Augustini Reply Obj. 2: This saying of Augustine is to be taken in est intelligendum in illo sensu, secundum quod ex illa the sense that by the assumption that took place in the Insusceptione incarnationis factum est ut homo esset Deus carnation it was brought about that Man is God and God is et Deus esset homo. In quo sensu ambae locutiones sunt Man; and in this sense both sayings are true as stated above.

verae, ut dictum est. Et similiter dicendum est ad tertium, nam deificaThe same is to be said in reply to the third, since to be ri idem est quod fieri Deum. deified is the same as to be made God. Ad quartum dicendum quod terminus in subiecReply Obj. 4: A term placed in the subject is taken mato positus tenetur materialiter, idest pro supposito, posi- terially, i.e., for the suppositum; placed in the predicate it

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tus vero in praedicato, tenetur formaliter, idest pro natura significata. Et ideo cum dicitur, homo factus est Deus, ipsum fieri non attribuitur humanae naturae, sed supposito humanae naturae, quod est ab aeterno Deus, et ideo non convenit ei fieri Deum. Cum autem dicitur, Deus factus est homo, factio intelligitur terminari ad ipsam humanam naturam. Et ideo, proprie loquendo, haec est vera, Deus factus est homo, sed haec est falsa, homo factus est Deus. Sicut, si Socrates, cum prius fuerit homo, postea factus est albus, demonstrato Socrate, haec est vera, hic homo hodie factus est albus; haec tamen est falsa, hoc album hodie factum est homo. Si tamen ex parte subiecti poneretur aliquod nomen significans naturam humanam in abstracto, posset hoc modo significari ut subiectum factionis, puta si dicatur quod natura humana facta est filii Dei.

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is taken formally, i.e., for the nature signified. Hence when it is said that Man was made God, the being made is not attributed to the human nature but to the suppositum of the human nature, Which is God from eternity, and hence it does not befit Him to be made God. But when it is said that God was made Man, the making is taken to be terminated in the human nature. Hence, properly speaking, this is true: God was made Man, and this is false: Man was made God; even as if Socrates, who was already a man, were made white, and were pointed out, this would be true: This man was made white today, and this would be false; This white thing was made man today. Nevertheless, if on the part of the subject there is added some word signifying human nature in the abstract, it might be taken in this way for the subject of the making, e.g., if it were said that human nature was made the Son of God’s.

Article 8 Whether this is true: “Christ is a creature”? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod haec sit vera, Christus est creatura. Dicit enim Leo Papa, nova et inaudita conventio, Deus qui est et erat, fit creatura. Sed illud potest praedicari de Christo quod filius Dei factus est per incarnationem. Ergo haec est vera, Christus est creatura. Praeterea, proprietates utriusque naturae possunt praedicari de hypostasi communi utriusque naturae, quocumque nomine significetur, ut supra dictum est. Sed proprietas humanae naturae est esse creaturam, sicut proprietas divinae naturae est esse creatorem. Ergo utrumque potest dici de Christo, scilicet quod sit creatura; et quod sit increatus et creator. Praeterea, principalior pars hominis est anima quam corpus. Sed Christus ratione corporis, quod de virgine traxit, dicitur simpliciter esse natus de virgine. Ergo ratione animae, quae creata est a Deo, debet simpliciter dici quod Christus sit creatura. Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de Trin., nunquid dicto factus est Christus? Nunquid mandato creatus est Christus? Quasi dicat, non. Unde subdit, quomodo autem creatura in Deo esse potest? Etenim Deus naturae simplicis est, non coniunctae. Ergo haec non est concedenda, Christus est creatura. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Hieronymus dicit, ex verbis inordinate prolatis incurritur haeresis. Unde cum haereticis nec nomina debemus habere communia, ne eorum errori favere videamur. Ariani autem haeretici Christum dixerunt esse creaturam, et minorem patre, non solum ratione humanae naturae, sed etiam ratione divinae personae. Et ideo non est absolute dicendum quod Christus sit creatura, vel minor patre, sed cum de-

Objection 1: It would seem that this is true: Christ is a creature. For Pope Leo says: A new and unheard of covenant: God Who is and was, is made a creature. Now we may predicate of Christ whatever the Son of God became by the Incarnation. Therefore this is true; Christ is a creature. Obj. 2: Further, the properties of both natures may be predicated of the common hypostasis of both natures, no matter by what word they are signified, as stated above (A. 5). But it is the property of human nature to be created, as it is the property of the Divine Nature to be Creator. Hence both may be said of Christ, viz. that He is a creature and that he is uncreated and Creator. Obj. 3: Further, the principal part of a man is the soul rather than the body. But Christ, by reason of the body which He took from the Virgin, is said simply to be born of the Virgin. Therefore by reason of the soul which is created by God, it ought simply to be said that He is a creature. On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Trin. i): Was Christ made by a word? Was Christ created by a command? as if to say: No! Hence he adds: How can there be a creature in God? For God has a simple not a composite Nature. Therefore it must not be granted that Christ is a creature. I answer that, As Jerome says, words spoken amiss lead to heresy; hence with us and heretics the very words ought not to be in common, lest we seem to countenance their error. Now the Arian heretics said that Christ was a creature and less than the Father, not only in His human nature, but even in His Divine Person. And hence we must not say absolutely that Christ is a creature or less than the Father; but with a qualification, viz. in His human nature.

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terminatione, scilicet, secundum humanam naturam. Ea vero de quibus suspicari non potest quod divinae personae conveniant secundum seipsam, possunt simpliciter dici de Christo ratione humanae naturae, sicut simpliciter dicimus Christum esse passum, mortuum et sepultum. Sicut etiam in rebus corporalibus et humanis, ea quae in dubitationem venire possunt an conveniant toti vel parti, si insunt alicui parti, non attribuimus toti simpliciter, idest sine determinatione, non enim dicimus quod Aethiops est albus, sed quod est albus secundum dentem. Dicimus autem absque determinatione quod est Crispus, quia hoc non potest ei convenire nisi secundum capillos. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquando sancti doctores, causa brevitatis determinatione omissa, nomine creaturae utuntur circa Christum. Est tamen in eorum dictis subintelligenda. Ad secundum dicendum quod omnes proprietates humanae naturae, sicut et divinae, possunt aliqualiter dici de Christo. Unde et Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod Christus, qui Deus et homo dicitur, creabilis est et increabilis, et partibilis et impartibilis. Sed tamen illa quae dubitationem habent circa alterutram naturam, non sunt dicenda absque determinatione. Unde et ipse postea alibi subdit, ipsa una hypostasis, scilicet Christi, et increata est deitate, et creata est humanitate. Sicut et e converso non esset dicendum sine determinatione quod Christus est incorporeus, vel impassibilis, ad evitandum errorem Manichaei, qui posuit Christum verum corpus non habuisse, nec vere passum esse, sed dicendum est cum determinatione quod Christus secundum deitatem est incorporeus et impassibilis. Ad tertium dicendum quod de nativitate ex virgine nulla dubitatio potest esse quod conveniat personae filii Dei, sicut potest esse de creatione. Et ideo non est similis ratio utrobique.

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But such things as could not be considered to belong to the Divine Person in Itself may be predicated simply of Christ by reason of His human nature; thus we say simply that Christ suffered, died and was buried: even as in corporeal and human beings, things of which we may doubt whether they belong to the whole or the part, if they are observed to exist in a part, are not predicated of the whole simply, i.e., without qualification, for we do not say that the Ethiopian is white but that he is white as regards his teeth; but we say without qualification that he is curly, since this can only belong to him as regards his hair.

Reply Obj. 1: Sometimes, for the sake of brevity, the holy doctors use the word creature of Christ, without any qualifying term; we should however take as understood the qualification, as man. Reply Obj. 2: All the properties of the human, just as of the Divine Nature, may be predicated equally of Christ. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that Christ Who God and Man, is called created and uncreated, passible and impassible. Nevertheless things of which we may doubt to what nature they belong, are not to be predicated without a qualification. Hence he afterwards adds (De Fide Orth. iv, 5) that the one hypostasis, i.e., of Christ, is uncreated in its Godhead and created in its manhood: even so conversely, we may not say without qualification, Christ is incorporeal or impassible; in order to avoid the error of Manes, who held that Christ had not a true body, nor truly suffered, but we must say, with a qualification, that Christ was incorporeal and impassible in His Godhead. Reply Obj. 3: There can be no doubt how the birth from the Virgin applies to the Person of the Son of God, as there can be in the case of creation; and hence there is no parity.

Article 9 Whether this man, i.e., Christ, began to be? Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ille homo, demonstrato Christo, incoeperit esse. Dicit enim Augustinus, super Ioan., priusquam mundus esset, nec nos eramus, nec ipse mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Iesus. Sed illud quod non semper fuit, incoepit esse. Ergo ille homo, demonstrato Christo, incoepit esse. Praeterea, Christus incoepit esse homo. Sed esse hominem est esse simpliciter. Ergo ille homo incoepit esse simpliciter.

Objection 1: It would seem that this Man, i.e., Christ, began to be. For Augustine says (Tract. cv in Joan.) that before the world was, neither were we, nor the Mediator of God and men—the Man Jesus Christ. But what was not always, has begun to be. Therefore this Man, i.e., Christ, began to be. Obj. 2: Further, Christ began to be Man. But to be man is to be simply. Therefore this man began to be, simply.

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Praeterea, homo importat suppositum humanae naturae. Sed Christus non fuit semper suppositum humanae naturae. Ergo homo ille incoepit esse. Sed contra est quod dicitur Heb. ult., Iesus Christus heri et hodie, ipse et in saecula. Respondeo dicendum quod non est dicendum quod ille homo, demonstrato Christo, incoeperit esse, si nihil addatur. Et hoc duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia locutio est simpliciter falsa, secundum sententiam Catholicae fidei, qua ponimus in Christo unum suppositum et unam hypostasim, sicut et unam personam. Secundum hoc enim oportet quod in hoc quod dicitur, ille homo, demonstrato Christo, designetur suppositum aeternum, cuius aeternitati repugnat incipere esse. Unde haec est falsa, hic homo incoepit esse. Nec obstat quod incipere esse convenit humanae naturae, quae significatur per hoc nomen homo, quia terminus in subiecto positus non tenetur formaliter pro natura, sed magis materialiter pro supposito, ut supra dictum est. Secundo quia, etiam si esset vera, non tamen esset ea utendum absque determinatione, ad evitandum haeresim Arii, qui, sicut personae filii Dei attribuit quod esset creatura et quod esset minor patre, ita attribuit ei quod esse incoeperat, dicens quod erat quando non erat. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa est intelligenda cum determinatione, ut si dicamus quod homo Christus Iesus non fuit antequam mundus esset, secundum humanitatem. Ad secundum dicendum quod cum hoc verbo incoepit non sequitur argumentum ab inferiori ad superius, non enim sequitur, hoc incoepit esse album, ergo incoepit esse coloratum. Et hoc ideo quia incipere importat nunc esse et non prius, non autem sequitur, hoc non erat prius album, ergo non erat prius coloratum. Esse autem simpliciter est superius ad esse hominem. Unde non sequitur, Christus incoepit esse homo, ergo incoepit esse. Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc nomen homo, secundum quod accipitur pro Christo, licet significet humanam naturam, quae incoepit esse, tamen supponit suppositum aeternum, quod esse non incoepit. Et ideo, quia, secundum quod ponitur in subiecto, tenetur pro supposito, secundum autem quod ponitur in praedicato, refertur ad naturam, et ideo haec est falsa, homo Christus incoepit esse; sed haec est vera, Christus incoepit esse homo.

Q. 16, A. 9

Obj. 3: Further, man implies a suppositum of human nature. But Christ was not always a suppositum of human nature. Therefore this Man began to be. On the contrary, It is written (Heb 13:8): Jesus Christ yesterday and today: and the same for ever. I answer that, We must not say that this Man— pointing to Christ—began to be, unless we add something. And this for a twofold reason. First, for this proposition is simply false, in the judgment of the Catholic Faith, which affirms that in Christ there is one suppositum and one hypostasis, as also one Person. For according to this, when we say this Man, pointing to Christ, the eternal suppositum is necessarily meant, with Whose eternity a beginning in time is incompatible. Hence this is false: This Man began to be. Nor does it matter that to begin to be refers to the human nature, which is signified by this word man; because the term placed in the subject is not taken formally so as to signify the nature, but is taken materially so as to signify the suppositum, as was said (A. 1, ad 4). Second, because even if this proposition were true, it ought not to be made use of without qualification; in order to avoid the heresy of Arius, who, since he pretended that the Person of the Son of God is a creature, and less than the Father, so he maintained that He began to be, saying there was a time when He was not. Reply Obj. 1: The words quoted must be qualified, i.e., we must say that the Man Jesus Christ was not, before the world was, in His humanity. Reply Obj. 2: With this word begin we cannot argue from the lower species to the higher. For it does not follow if this began to be white, that therefore it began to be colored. And this because to begin implies being now and not heretofore: for it does not follow if this was not white hitherto that therefore it was not colored hitherto. Now, to be simply is higher than to be man. Hence this does not follow: Christ began to be Man—therefore He began to be. Reply Obj. 3: This word Man, as it is taken for Christ, although it signifies the human nature, which began to be, nevertheless signifies the eternal suppositum which did not begin to be. Hence, since it signifies the suppositum when placed in the subject, and refers to the nature when placed in the predicate, therefore this is false: The Man Christ began to be: but this is true: Christ began to be Man.

195

Q. 16, A. 10

Incarnation

IIIae

Article 10 Whether this is true: “Christ as man is a creature”? Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod haec sit falsa, Christus, secundum quod homo, est creatura; vel, incoepit esse. Nihil enim in Christo est creatum nisi humana natura. Sed haec est falsa, Christus, secundum quod homo, est humana natura. Ergo etiam haec est falsa, Christus, secundum quod homo, est creatura. Praeterea, praedicatum magis praedicatur de termino in reduplicatione posito quam de ipso subiecto propositionis, sicut, si dicatur, corpus, secundum quod coloratum, est visibile, sequitur quod coloratum sit visibile. Sed haec non est absolute, sicut dictum est, concedenda, homo Christus est creatura. Ergo etiam neque haec, Christus, secundum quod homo, est creatura. Praeterea, quidquid praedicatur de quocumque homine secundum quod homo, praedicatur de eo per se et simpliciter, idem enim est per se, et secundum quod ipsum, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Sed haec est falsa, Christus est per se et simpliciter creatura. Ergo etiam haec est falsa, Christus, secundum quod homo, est creatura. Sed contra, omne quod est, vel est creator vel creatura. Sed haec est falsa, Christus, secundum quod homo, est creator. Ergo haec est vera, Christus, secundum quod homo, est creatura. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum dicitur, Christus secundum quod homo, hoc nomen homo potest resumi in reduplicatione vel ratione suppositi, vel ratione naturae. Si quidem resumatur ratione suppositi, cum suppositum humanae naturae in Christo sit aeternum et increatum, haec erit falsa, Christus, secundum quod homo, est creatura. Si vero resumatur ratione humanae naturae, sic est vera, quia ratione humanae naturae, sive secundum humanam naturam, convenit sibi esse creaturam, ut supra dictum est. Sciendum tamen quod nomen sic resumptum in reduplicatione magis proprie tenetur pro natura quam pro supposito, resumitur enim in vi praedicati, quod tenetur formaliter; idem enim est dictu, Christus secundum quod homo, ac si diceretur, Christus secundum quod est homo. Et ideo haec est magis concedenda quam neganda, Christus, secundum quod homo, est creatura. Si tamen adderetur aliquid per quod pertraheretur ad suppositum, esset propositio magis neganda quam concedenda, puta si diceretur, Christus, secundum quod hic homo, est creatura. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet Christus non sit humana natura, est tamen habens humanam naturam. Nomen autem creaturae natum est praedicari non solum de abstractis, sed etiam de concretis, dicimus enim quod humanitas est creatura, et quod homo est creatura.

Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: Christ as Man is a creature, or began to be. For nothing in Christ is created except the human nature. But this is false: Christ as Man is the human nature. Therefore this is also false; Christ as Man is a creature. Obj. 2: Further, the predicate is predicated of the term placed in reduplication, rather than of the subject of the proposition; as when I say: A body as colored is visible, it follows that the colored is visible. But as stated (AA. 8, 9) we must not absolutely grant that the Man Christ is a creature; nor consequently that Christ as Man is a creature. Obj. 3: Further, whatever is predicated of a man as man is predicated of him per se and simply, for per se is the same as inasmuch as itself, as is said Metaph. v, text. 23. But this is false: Christ as Man is per se and simply a creature. Hence this, too, is false; Christ as Man is a creature. On the contrary, Whatever is, is either Creator or creature. But this is false: Christ as Man is Creator. Therefore this is true: Christ as Man is a creature. I answer that, When we say Christ as Man this word man may be added in the reduplication, either by reason of the suppositum or by reason of the nature. If it be added by reason of the suppositum, since the suppositum of the human nature in Christ is eternal and uncreated, this will be false: Christ as Man is a creature. But if it be added by reason of the human nature, it is true, since by reason of the human nature or in the human nature, it belongs to Him to be a creature, as was said (A. 8). It must however be borne in mind that the term covered by the reduplication signifies the nature rather than the suppositum, since it is added as a predicate, which is taken formally, for it is the same to say Christ as Man and to say Christ as He is a Man. Hence this is to be granted rather than denied: Christ as Man is a creature. But if something further be added whereby the term covered by the reduplication is attracted to the suppositum, this proposition is to be denied rather than granted, for instance were one to say: Christ as ‘this’ Man is a creature. Reply Obj. 1: Although Christ is not the human nature, He has human nature. Now the word creature is naturally predicated not only of abstract, but also of concrete things; since we say that manhood is a creature and that man is a creature.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod ly homo, secundum quod ponitur in subiecto, magis respicit suppositum, secundum autem quod ponitur in reduplicatione, magis respicit naturam, ut dictum est. Et quia natura est creata, suppositum vero increatum, ideo, licet non concedatur ista simpliciter, iste homo est creatura, conceditur tamen ista, Christus, secundum quod homo, est creatura. Ad tertium dicendum quod cuilibet homini qui est suppositum solius naturae humanae, competit quod non habeat esse nisi secundum naturam humanam. Et ideo de quolibet tali supposito sequitur, si secundum quod est homo est creatura, quod sit creatura simpliciter. Sed Christus non solum est suppositum humanae naturae, sed etiam divinae, secundum quam habet esse increatum. Et ideo non sequitur, si secundum quod homo est creatura, quod simpliciter sit creatura.

Q. 16, A. 11

Reply Obj. 2: Man as placed in the subject refers to the suppositum—and as placed in the reduplication refers to the nature, as was stated above. And because the nature is created and the suppositum uncreated, therefore, although it is not granted that this man is a creature, yet it is granted that Christ as Man is a creature. Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to every man who is a suppositum of human nature alone to have his being only in human nature. Hence of every such suppositum it follows that if it is a creature as man, it is a creature simply. But Christ is a suppositum not merely of human nature, but also of the Divine Nature, in which He has an uncreated being. Hence it does not follow that, if He is a creature as Man, He is a creature simply.

Article 11 Whether this is true: “Christ as man is God”? Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus, secundum quod homo, sit Deus. Christus enim est Deus per gratiam unionis. Sed Christus, secundum quod homo, habet gratiam unionis. Ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, est Deus. Praeterea, dimittere peccata est proprium Dei, secundum illud Isaiae XLIII, ego ipse sum qui deleo iniquitates tuas propter me. Sed Christus, secundum quod homo, dimittit peccata, secundum illud Matth. IX, ut autem sciatis quod filius hominis habet potestatem in terra dimittendi peccata, et cetera. Ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, est Deus. Praeterea, Christus non est homo communis, sed est iste homo particularis. Sed Christus, secundum quod est iste homo, est Deus, quia in isto homine designatur suppositum aeternum, quod naturaliter est Deus. Ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, est Deus. Sed contra, illud quod convenit Christo secundum quod homo, convenit cuilibet homini. Si ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, est Deus, sequitur quod omnis homo sit Deus. Quod patet esse falsum. Respondeo dicendum quod iste terminus homo, in reduplicatione positus, potest dupliciter accipi. Uno modo, quantum ad naturam. Et sic non est verum quod, secundum quod homo, sit Deus, quia humana natura est distincta a divina secundum differentiam naturae. Alio modo potest accipi ratione suppositi. Et sic, cum suppositum naturae humanae in Christo sit persona filii Dei, cui per se convenit esse Deum, verum est quod Christus, secundum quod homo, sit Deus. Quia tamen terminus in reduplicatione positus magis proprie tenetur pro na-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ, as Man, is God. For Christ is God by the grace of union. But Christ, as Man, has the grace of union. Therefore Christ as Man is God. Obj. 2: Further, to forgive sins is proper to God, according to Isa. 43:25: I am He that blot out thy iniquities for My own sake. But Christ as Man forgives sin, according to Matt. 9:6: But that you may know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins, etc. Therefore Christ as Man is God. Obj. 3: Further, Christ is not Man in common, but is this particular Man. Now Christ, as this Man, is God, since by this Man we signify the eternal suppositum which is God naturally. Therefore Christ as Man is God. On the contrary, Whatever belongs to Christ as Man belongs to every man. Now, if Christ as Man is God, it follows that every man is God—which is clearly false. I answer that, This term man when placed in the reduplication may be taken in two ways. First as referring to the nature; and in this way it is not true that Christ as Man is God, because the human nature is distinct from the Divine by a difference of nature. Second it may be taken as referring to the suppositum; and in this way, since the suppositum of the human nature in Christ is the Person of the Son of God, to Whom it essentially belongs to be God, it is true that Christ, as Man, is God. Nevertheless because the term placed in the reduplication signifies the nature rather

197

Q. 16, A. 12

Incarnation

tura quam pro supposito, ut supra dictum est, ideo magis est ista neganda, Christus, secundum quod homo, est Deus, quam sit affirmanda. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non secundum idem convenit alicui moveri ad aliquid, et esse illud, nam moveri convenit alicui ratione materiae vel subiecti, esse autem in actu ratione formae. Et similiter non secundum idem convenit Christo ordinari ad hoc quod sit Deus per gratiam unionis, et esse Deum, sed convenit primum sibi secundum humanam naturam; secundum vero secundum divinam. Et ideo haec est vera, Christus secundum quod homo, habet gratiam unionis, non tamen ista, Christus, secundum quod homo, est Deus. Ad secundum dicendum quod filius hominis habet in terra potestatem dimittendi peccata, non virtute humanae naturae, sed divinae, in qua quidem divina natura consistit potestas dimittendi peccata per auctoritatem; in humana autem natura consistit instrumentaliter et per ministerium. Unde Chrysostomus, super Matth., hoc exponens, dicit, signanter dixit, in terra dimittendi peccata, ut ostenderet quod humanae naturae potestatem divinitatis univit indivisibili unione. Quia, etsi factus est homo, tamen Dei verbum permansit. Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum dicitur iste homo, pronomen demonstrativum trahit hoc nomen homo ad suppositum. Et ideo magis est haec vera, Christus, secundum quod iste homo, est Deus, quam ista, Christus, secundum quod homo, est Deus.

IIIae

than the suppositum, as stated above (A. 10), hence this is to be denied rather than granted: Christ as Man is God. Reply Obj. 1: It is not with regard to the same, that a thing moves towards, and that it is, something; for to move belongs to a thing because of its matter or subject—and to be in act belongs to it because of its form. So too it is not with regard to the same, that it belongs to Christ to be ordained to be God by the grace of union, and to be God. For the first belongs to Him in His human nature, and the second, in His Divine Nature. Hence this is true: Christ as Man has the grace of union; yet not this: Christ as Man is God. Reply Obj. 2: The Son of Man has on earth the power of forgiving sins, not by virtue of the human nature, but by virtue of the Divine Nature, in which Divine Nature resides the power of forgiving sins authoritatively; whereas in the human nature it resides instrumentally and ministerially. Hence Chrysostom expounding this passage says: He said pointedly ‘on earth to forgive sins,’ in order to show that by an indivisible union He united human nature to the power of the Godhead, since although He was made Man, yet He remained the Word of God. Reply Obj. 3: When we say this man, the demonstrative pronoun this attracts man to the suppositum; and hence Christ as this Man, is God, is a truer proposition than Christ as Man is God.

Article 12 Whether Christ as man is a hypostasis or person? Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus, secundum quod homo, sit hypostasis vel persona. Illud enim quod convenit cuilibet homini, convenit Christo secundum quod est homo, est enim aliis hominibus similis, secundum illud Philipp. II, in similitudinem hominum factus. Sed omnis homo est persona. Ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona. Praeterea, Christus, secundum quod homo, est substantia rationalis naturae. Non autem substantia universalis. Ergo substantia individua. Sed nihil aliud est persona quam rationalis naturae individua substantia, ut dicit Boetius, in libro de duabus naturis. Ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona. Praeterea, Christus, secundum quod homo, est res humanae naturae, et suppositum et hypostasis eiusdem naturae. Sed omnis hypostasis et suppositum et res naturae humanae est persona. Ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as Man is a hypostasis or person. For what belongs to every man belongs to Christ as Man, since He is like other men according to Phil. 2:7: Being made in the likeness of men. But every man is a person. Therefore Christ as Man is a person.

Obj. 2: Further, Christ as Man is a substance of rational nature. But He is not a universal substance: therefore He is an individual substance. Now a person is nothing else than an individual substance of rational nature; as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.). Therefore Christ as Man is a person. Obj. 3: Further, Christ as Man is a being of human nature, and a suppositum and a hypostasis of the same nature. But every hypostasis and suppositum and being of human nature is a person. Therefore Christ as Man is a person.

198

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Sed contra, Christus, secundum quod homo, non est persona aeterna. Si ergo, secundum quod homo, sit persona, sequetur quod in Christo sint personae duae, una temporalis et alia aeterna. Quod est erroneum, ut supra dictum est. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, iste terminus homo, in reduplicatione positus, potest accipi vel ratione suppositi, vel ratione naturae. Cum ergo dicitur, Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona, si accipiatur ratione suppositi, manifestum est quod Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona, quia suppositum humanae naturae nihil est aliud quam persona filii Dei. Si autem accipiatur ratione naturae, sic potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, quod intelligatur quod naturae humanae competat esse in aliqua persona. Et hoc etiam modo verum est, omne enim quod subsistit in humana natura, est persona. Alio modo potest intelligi ut naturae humanae in Christo propria personalitas debeatur, causata ex principiis humanae naturae. Et sic Christus, secundum quod homo, non est persona, quia humana natura non est per se seorsum existens a divina natura, quod requirit ratio personae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omni homini convenit esse personam secundum quod omne subsistens in humana natura est persona. Sed hoc est proprium homini Christo, quod persona subsistens in humana natura eius non sit causata ex principiis humanae naturae, sed sit aeterna. Et ideo uno modo est persona secundum quod homo, alio modo non, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod substantia individua quae ponitur in definitione personae, importat substantiam completam per se subsistentem separatim ab aliis. Alioquin, manus hominis posset dici persona cum sit substantia quaedam individua, quia tamen est substantia individua sicut in alio existens, non potest dici persona. Et eadem ratione nec natura humana in Christo, quae tamen potest dici individuum vel singulare quoddam.

Q. 16, A. 12

On the contrary, Christ as Man is not an eternal person. Therefore if Christ as Man is a person it would follow that in Christ there are two persons—one temporal and the other eternal, which is erroneous, as was said above (Q. 2, A. 6; Q. 4, A. 2). I answer that, As was said (AA. 10, 11), the term Man placed in the reduplication may refer either to the suppositum or to the nature. Hence when it is said: Christ as Man is a person, if it is taken as referring to the suppositum, it is clear that Christ as Man is a person, since the suppositum of human nature is nothing else than the Person of the Son of God. But if it be taken as referring to the nature, it may be understood in two ways. First, we may so understand it as if it belonged to human nature to be in a person, and in this way it is true, for whatever subsists in human nature is a person. Second it may be taken that in Christ a proper personality, caused by the principles of the human nature, is due to the human nature; and in this way Christ as Man is not a person, since the human nature does not exist of itself apart from the Divine Nature, and yet the notion of person requires this.

Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to every man to be a person, inasmuch as everything subsisting in human nature is a person. Now this is proper to the Man Christ that the Person subsisting in His human nature is not caused by the principles of the human nature, but is eternal. Hence in one way He is a person, as Man; and in another way He is not, as stated above. Reply Obj. 2: The individual substance, which is included in the definition of a person, implies a complete substance subsisting of itself and separate from all else; otherwise, a man’s hand might be called a person, since it is an individual substance; nevertheless, because it is an individual substance existing in something else, it cannot be called a person; nor, for the same reason, can the human nature in Christ, although it may be called something individual and singular. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut persona signifiReply Obj. 3: As a person signifies something comcat quid completum et per se subsistens in natura ratio- plete and self-subsisting in rational nature, so a hypostasis, nali, ita hypostasis, suppositum et res naturae in genere suppositum, and being of nature in the genus of substance, substantiae significant quiddam per se subsistens. Unde, signify something that subsists of itself. Hence, as human sicut humana natura non est per se seorsum a persona fi- nature is not of itself a person apart from the Person of the lii, ita etiam non est per se hypostasis vel suppositum vel Son of God, so likewise it is not of itself a hypostasis or supres naturae. Et ideo in sensu in quo negatur ista, Chri- positum or a being of nature. Hence in the sense in which stus, secundum quod homo, est persona, oportet etiam we deny that Christ as Man is a person we must deny all the negari omnes alias. other propositions.

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Question 17 Christ’s Unity of Being Deinde considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad unitatem in Christo in communi. Nam de his quae pertinent ad unitatem vel pluralitatem in speciali, suis locis determinandum est, sicut supra determinatum est quod in Christo non una est tantum scientia; et infra determinabitur quod in Christo non una est tantum nativitas. Considerandum est ergo primo, de unitate Christi quantum ad esse; secundo, quantum ad velle; tertio, quantum ad operari. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum Christus sit unum vel duo. Secundo, utrum in Christo sit tantum unum esse.

We must now consider what pertains to Christ’s unity in common. For, in their proper place, we must consider what pertains to unity and plurality in detail: thus we concluded (Q. 9) that there is not only one knowledge in Christ, and it will be concluded hereafter (Q. 35, A. 2) that there is not only one nativity in Christ. Hence we must consider Christ’s unity (1) of being; (2) of will; (3) of operation. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ is one or two? (2) Whether there is only one being in Christ?

Article 1 Whether Christ is one or two? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non sit unum, sed duo. Dicit enim Augustinus, in I de Trin., quia forma Dei accepit formam servi, utrumque Deus, propter accipientem Deum, utrumque homo, propter acceptum hominem. Sed utrumque dici non potest ubi non sunt duo. Ergo Christus est duo. Praeterea, ubicumque est aliud et aliud, ibi sunt duo. Sed Christus est aliud et aliud, dicit enim Augustinus, in Enchirid., cum in forma Dei esset, formam servi accepit, utrumque unus, sed aliud propter verbum, aliud propter hominem. Ergo Christus est duo. Praeterea, Christus non est tantum homo, quia, si purus homo esset, non esset Deus. Ergo est aliquid aliud quam homo. Et ita in Christo est aliud et aliud. Ergo Christus est duo. Praeterea, Christus est aliquid quod est pater, et est aliquid quod non est pater. Ergo Christus est aliquid et aliquid. Ergo Christus est duo. Praeterea, sicut in mysterio Trinitatis sunt tres personae in una natura, ita in mysterio incarnationis sunt duae naturae in una persona. Sed propter unitatem naturae, non obstante distinctione personae, pater et filius sunt unum, secundum illud Ioan. X, ego et pater unum sumus. Ergo, non obstante unitate personae, propter dualitatem naturarum Christus est duo.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not one, but two. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): Because the form of God took the form of a servant, both are God by reason of God Who assumed, yet both are Man by reason of the man assumed. Now both may only be said when there are two. Therefore Christ is two. Obj. 2: Further, where there is one thing and another there are two. Now Christ is one thing and another; for Augustine says (Enchiridion xxxv): Being in the form of God . . . He took the form of a servant . . . being both in one; but He was one of these as Word, and the other as man. Therefore Christ is two. Obj. 3: Further, Christ is not only man; for, if He were a mere man, He would not be God. Therefore He is something else than man, and thus in Christ there is one thing and another. Therefore Christ is two. Obj. 4: Further, Christ is something that the Father is, and something that the Father is not. Therefore Christ is one thing and another. Therefore Christ is two. Obj. 5: Further, as in the mystery of the Trinity there are three Persons in one Nature, so in the mystery of the Incarnation there are two natures in one Person. But on account of the unity of the Nature, notwithstanding the distinction of Person, the Father and Son are one, according to John 10:30: I and the Father are one. Therefore, notwithstanding the unity of Person, Christ is two on account of the duality of nature.

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Q. 17, A. 1

Incarnation

Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III Physic., quod unum et duo denominative dicuntur. Sed Christus habet dualitatem naturarum. Ergo Christus est duo. Praeterea, sicut forma accidentalis facit alterum, ita forma substantialis aliud, ut Porphyrius dicit. Sed in Christo sunt duae naturae substantiales, humana scilicet et divina. Ergo Christus est aliud et aliud. Ergo Christus est duo. Sed contra est quod Boetius dicit, in libro de duabus naturis, omne quod est, inquantum est, unum est. Sed Christum esse confitemur. Ergo Christus est unum. Respondeo dicendum quod natura, secundum se considerata, prout in abstracto significatur, non vere potest praedicari de supposito seu persona nisi in Deo, in quo non differt quod est et quo est, ut in prima parte habitum est. In Christo autem cum sint duae naturae, divina scilicet et humana, altera earum, scilicet divina, potest de eo praedicari et in abstracto et in concreto, dicimus enim quod filius Dei, qui supponitur in hoc nomine Christus, est divina natura, et est Deus. Sed humana natura non potest praedicari de Christo secundum se in abstracto, sed solum in concreto, prout scilicet significatur in supposito. Non enim vere potest dici quod Christus sit humana natura, quia natura humana non est nata praedicari de suo supposito, dicitur autem quod Christus est homo, sicut et quod Christus est Deus. Deus autem significat habentem deitatem, et homo significat habentem humanitatem. Aliter tamen habens humanitatem significatur per hoc nomen homo, et aliter per hoc nomen Iesus, vel Petrus. Nam hoc nomen homo importat habentem humanitatem indistincte, sicut et hoc nomen Deus indistincte importat habentem deitatem. Hoc tamen nomen Petrus, vel Iesus, importat distincte habentem humanitatem, scilicet sub determinatis individualibus proprietatibus, sicut et hoc nomen filius Dei importat habentem deitatem sub determinata proprietate personali. Numerus autem dualitatis in Christo ponitur circa ipsas naturas. Et ideo, si ambae naturae in abstracto praedicarentur de Christo, sequeretur quod Christus esset duo. Sed quia duae naturae non praedicantur de Christo nisi prout significantur in supposito, oportet secundum rationem suppositi praedicari de Christo unum vel duo. Quidam autem posuerunt in Christo duo supposita, sed unam personam, quae quidem videtur se habere, secundum eorum opinionem, tanquam suppositum completum ultima completione. Et ideo, quia ponebant in Christo duo supposita, dicebant Christum esse duo neutraliter; sed quia ponebant unam personam, dicebant Christum esse unum masculine, nam neutrum genus designat quiddam informe et imperfectum; genus autem masculinum designat quiddam formatum et perfectum. Nestoriani autem, ponentes in Christo duas per-

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Obj. 6: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text. 18) that one and two are predicated denominatively. Now Christ has a duality of nature. Therefore Christ is two. Obj. 7: Further, as accidental form makes a thing otherwise (alterum) so does substantial form make another thing (aliud) as Porphyry says (Praedic.). Now in Christ there are two substantial natures, the human and the Divine. Therefore Christ is one thing and another. Therefore Christ is two. On the contrary, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.): Whatever is, inasmuch as it is, is one. But we confess that Christ is. Therefore Christ is one. I answer that, Nature, considered in itself, as it is used in the abstract, cannot truly be predicated of the suppositum or person, except in God, in Whom what it is and whereby it is do not differ, as stated in the First Part (Q. 29, A. 4, ad 1). But in Christ, since there are two natures, viz. the Divine and the human, one of them, viz. the Divine, may be predicated of Him both in the abstract and in the concrete, for we say that the Son of God, Who is signified by the word Christ, is the Divine Nature and is God. But the human nature cannot be predicated of Christ in the abstract, but only in the concrete, i.e., as it is signified by the suppositum. For we cannot truly say that Christ is human nature, because human nature is not naturally predicated of its suppositum. But we say that Christ is a man, even as Christ is God. Now God signifies one having the Godhead, and man signifies one having manhood. Yet one having manhood is differently signified by the word man and by the word Jesus or Peter. For this word man implies one having manhood indistinctly, even as the word God implies indistinctly one having the Godhead; but the word Peter or Jesus implies one having manhood distinctly, i.e., with its determinate individual properties, as Son of God implies one having the Godhead under a determinate personal property. Now the dual number is placed in Christ with regard to the natures. Hence, if both the natures were predicated in the abstract of Christ, it would follow that Christ is two. But because the two natures are not predicated of Christ, except as they are signified in the suppositum, it must be by reason of the suppositum that one or two be predicated of Christ.

Now some placed two supposita in Christ, and one Person, which, in their opinion, would seem to be the suppositum completed with its final completion. Hence, since they placed two supposita in Christ, they said that God is two, in the neuter. But because they asserted one Person, they said that Christ is one, in the masculine, for the neuter gender signifies something unformed and imperfect, whereas the masculine signifies something formed and perfect. On the other hand, the Nestorians, who asserted two Persons in Christ, said that Christ is two not only in the neuter, but

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sonas, dicebant Christum non solum esse duo neutraliter, sed etiam duos masculine. Quia vero nos ponimus in Christo unam personam et unum suppositum, ut ex praedictis patet, sequitur quod dicamus quod non solum Christus est unus masculine, sed etiam est unum neutraliter. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum illud Augustini non est sic intelligendum quod ly utrumque teneatur ex parte praedicati, quasi dicat quod Christus sit utrumque, sed tenetur ex parte subiecti. Et tunc ly utrumque ponitur, non quasi pro duobus suppositis, sed pro duobus nominibus significantibus duas naturas in concreto. Possum enim dicere quod utrumque, scilicet Deus et homo, est Deus, propter accipientem Deum, et utrumque scilicet Deus et homo, est homo, propter acceptum hominem. Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur, Christus est aliud et aliud locutio est exponenda ut sit sensus, habens aliam et aliam naturam. Et hoc modo exponit Augustinus in libro contra Felicianum, ubi, cum dixisset, in mediatore Dei et hominum aliud Dei filius, aliud hominis filius subdit, aliud, inquam, pro discretione substantiae, non alius, pro unitate personae. Et Gregorius Nazianzenus, in epistola ad Chelidonium, si oportet compendiose dicere, aliud quidem et aliud ea ex quibus salvator est, siquidem non idem est invisibile visibili, et quod absque tempore ei quod sub tempore. Non autem alius et alius absit. Haec enim ambo unum. Ad tertium dicendum quod haec est falsa, Christus est tantum homo, quia non excludit aliud suppositum, sed aliam naturam, eo quod termini in praedicato positi tenentur formaliter. Si vero adderetur aliquid per quod traheretur ad suppositum, esset vera locutio, puta, Christus est tantum id quod est homo. Non tamen sequeretur quod sit aliquid aliud quam homo, quia ly aliud, cum sit relativum diversitatis substantiae, proprie refertur ad suppositum, sicut et omnia relativa facientia personalem relationem. Sequitur autem, ergo habet aliam naturam. Ad quartum dicendum quod, cum dicitur, Christus est aliquid quod est pater, ly aliquid tenetur pro natura divina, quae etiam in abstracto praedicatur de patre et filio. Sed cum dicitur, Christus est aliquid quod non est pater, ly aliquid tenetur non pro ipsa natura humana secundum quod significatur in abstracto, sed secundum quod significatur in concreto; non quidem secundum suppositum distinctum, sed secundum suppositum indistinctum; prout scilicet substat naturae, non autem proprietatibus individuantibus. Et ideo non sequitur quod Christus sit aliud et aliud, vel quod sit duo, quia suppositum humanae naturae in Christo quod est persona filii Dei, non ponit in numerum cum natura divina, quae praedicatur de patre et filio.

Q. 17, A. 1

also in the masculine. But since we maintain one person and one suppositum in Christ, as is clear from Q. 2, AA. 2, 3, it follows that we say that Christ is one not merely in the masculine, but also in the neuter.

Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Augustine is not to be taken as if both referred to the predicate, so as to mean that Christ is both; but it refers to the subject. And thus both does not stand for two supposita, but for two words signifying two natures in the concrete. For I can say that both, viz. God and Man, are God on account of God Who assumes; and both, viz. God and Man, are Man on account of the man assumed.

Reply Obj. 2: When it is said that Christ is one thing and another, this saying is to be explained in this sense— having this nature and another. And it is in this way that Augustine explains it (Contra Felic. xi), where, after saying, In the mediator of God and man, the Son of God is one thing, and the Son of Man another, he adds: I say another thing by reason of the difference of substance, and not another thing by reason of the unity of person. Hence Gregory Nazianzen says (Ep. ad Chelid. ci): If we must speak briefly, that of which the Savior is, is one thing and another; thus the invisible is not the same as the visible; and what is without time is not the same as what is in time. Yet they are not one and another: far from it; for both these are one. Reply Obj. 3: This is false, Christ is only man; because it does not exclude another suppositum, but another nature, since terms placed in the predicate are taken formally. But if anything is added whereby it is drawn to the suppositum, it would be a true proposition—for instance, Christ is only that which is man. Nevertheless, it would not follow that He is any other thing than man, because another thing, inasmuch as it refers to a diversity of substance, properly refers to the suppositum, even as all relative things bearing a personal relation. But it does follow: Therefore He has another nature. Reply Obj. 4: When it is said, Christ is something that the Father is; something signifies the Divine Nature, which is predicated even in the abstract of the Father and Son. But when it is said: Christ is something that is not the Father; something signifies, not the human nature as it is in the abstract, but as it is in the concrete; not, indeed, in a distinct, but in an indistinct suppositum, i.e., inasmuch as it underlies the nature and not the individuating properties. Hence it does not follow that Christ is one thing and another, or that He is two, since the suppositum of the human nature in Christ, which is the Person of the Son of God, does not reckon numerically with the Divine Nature, which is predicated of the Father and Son.

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Q. 17, A. 2

Incarnation

Ad quintum dicendum quod in mysterio divinae Trinitatis natura divina praedicatur in abstracto de tribus personis, et ideo simpliciter potest dici quod tres personae sint unum. Sed in mysterio incarnationis non praedicantur ambae naturae in abstracto de Christo, et ideo non potest simpliciter dici quod Christus sit duo. Ad sextum dicendum quod duo dicitur quasi habens dualitatem, non quidem in aliquo alio, sed in ipso de quo duo praedicantur. Fit autem praedicatio de supposito, quod importatur per hoc nomen Christus. Quamvis igitur Christus habeat dualitatem naturarum, quia tamen non habet dualitatem suppositorum, non potest dici esse duo. Ad septimum dicendum quod alterum importat diversitatem accidentis, et ideo diversitas accidentis sufficit ad hoc quod aliquid simpliciter dicatur alterum. Sed aliud importat diversitatem substantiae. Substantia autem dicitur non solum natura, sed etiam suppositum, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Et ideo diversitas naturae non sufficit ad hoc quod aliquid simpliciter dicatur aliud, nisi adsit diversitas secundum suppositum. Sed diversitas naturae facit aliud secundum quid, scilicet secundum naturam, si non adsit diversitas suppositi.

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Reply Obj. 5: In the mystery of the Divine Trinity the Divine Nature is predicated, even in the abstract of the three Persons; hence it may be said simply that the three Persons are one. But in the mystery of the Incarnation both natures are not predicated in the abstract of Christ; hence it cannot be said simply that Christ is two. Reply Obj. 6: Two signifies what has duality, not in another, but in the same thing of which two is predicated. Now what is predicated is said of the suppositum, which is implied by the word Christ. Hence, although Christ has duality of nature, yet, because He has not duality of suppositum, it cannot be said that Christ is two. Reply Obj. 7: Otherwise implies diversity of accident. Hence diversity of accident suffices for anything to be called otherwise simply. But another thing implies diversity of substance. Now not merely the nature, but also the suppositum is said to be a substance, as is said Metaph. v, text. 15. Hence diversity of nature does not suffice for anything to be called another thing simply, unless there is diversity of suppositum. But diversity of nature makes another thing relatively, i.e., in nature, if there is no diversity of suppositum.

Article 2 Whether there is only one being in Christ? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non sit tantum unum esse, sed duo. Dicit enim Damascenus, in III libro, quod ea quae consequuntur naturam in Christo duplicantur. Sed esse consequitur naturam, esse enim est a forma. Ergo in Christo sunt duo esse. Praeterea, esse filii Dei est ipsa divina natura, et est aeternum. Esse autem hominis Christi non est divina natura, sed est esse temporale. Ergo in Christo non est tantum unum esse. Praeterea, in Trinitate, quamvis sint tres personae, est tamen unum esse, propter unitatem naturae. Sed in Christo sunt duae naturae, quamvis sit una persona. Ergo in Christo non est unum esse tantum, sed duo. Praeterea, in Christo anima dat aliquod esse corpori, cum sit forma eius. Sed non dat sibi esse divinum, cum sit increatum. Ergo in Christo est aliud esse praeter esse divinum. Et sic in Christo non est tantum unum esse. Sed contra, unumquodque, secundum quod dicitur ens, dicitur unum, quia unum et ens convertuntur. Si ergo in Christo duo essent esse, et non tantum unum, Christus esset duo, et non unum.

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there is not merely one being, but two. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 13) that whatever follows the nature is doubled in Christ. But being follows the nature, for being is from the form. Hence in Christ there are two beings. Obj. 2: Further, the being of the Son of God is the Divine Nature itself, and is eternal: whereas the being of the Man Christ is not the Divine Nature, but is a temporal being. Therefore there is not only one being in Christ. Obj. 3: Further, in the Trinity, although there are three Persons, yet on account of the unity of nature there is only one being. But in Christ there are two natures, though there is one Person. Therefore in Christ there is not only one being. Obj. 4: Further, in Christ the soul gives some being to the body, since it is its form. But it does not give the Divine being, since this is uncreated. Therefore in Christ there is another being besides the Divine being; and thus in Christ there is not only one being. On the contrary, Everything is said to be a being, inasmuch as it is one, for one and being are convertible. Therefore, if there were two beings in Christ, and not one only, Christ would be two, and not one.

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Respondeo dicendum quod, quia in Christo sunt duae naturae et una hypostasis, necesse est quod ea quae ad naturam pertinent in Christo sint duo, quae autem pertinent ad hypostasim in Christo sint unum tantum. Esse autem pertinet ad hypostasim et ad naturam, ad hypostasim quidem sicut ad id quod habet esse; ad naturam autem sicut ad id quo aliquid habet esse; natura enim significatur per modum formae, quae dicitur ens ex eo quod ea aliquid est, sicut albedine est aliquid album, et humanitate est aliquis homo. Est autem considerandum quod, si aliqua forma vel natura est quae non pertineat ad esse personale hypostasis subsistentis, illud esse non dicitur esse illius personae simpliciter, sed secundum quid, sicut esse album est esse Socratis, non inquantum est Socrates, sed inquantum est albus. Et huiusmodi esse nihil prohibet multiplicari in una hypostasi vel persona, aliud enim est esse quo Socrates est albus, et quo Socrates est musicus. Sed illud esse quod pertinet ad ipsam hypostasim vel personam secundum se impossibile est in una hypostasi vel persona multiplicari, quia impossibile est quod unius rei non sit unum esse. Si igitur humana natura adveniret filio Dei, non hypostatice vel personaliter, sed accidentaliter, sicut quidam posuerunt, oporteret ponere in Christo duo esse, unum quidem secundum quod est Deus; aliud autem secundum quod est homo. Sicut in Socrate ponitur aliud esse secundum quod est albus, aliud secundum quod est homo, quia esse album non pertinet ad ipsum esse personale Socratis. Esse autem capitatum, et esse corporeum, et esse animatum, totum pertinet ad unam personam Socratis, et ideo ex omnibus his non fit nisi unum esse in Socrate. Et si contingeret quod, post constitutionem personae Socratis, advenirent Socrati manus vel pedes vel oculi, sicut accidit in caeco nato, ex his non accresceret Socrati aliud esse, sed solum relatio quaedam ad huiusmodi, quia scilicet diceretur esse non solum secundum ea quae prius habebat, sed etiam secundum ea quae postmodum sibi adveniunt. Sic igitur, cum humana natura coniungatur filio Dei hypostatice vel personaliter, ut supra dictum est, et non accidentaliter, consequens est quod secundum humanam naturam non adveniat sibi novum esse personale, sed solum nova habitudo esse personalis praeexistentis ad naturam humanam, ut scilicet persona illa iam dicatur subsistere, non solum secundum naturam divinam, sed etiam humanam.

Q. 17, A. 2

I answer that, Because in Christ there are two natures and one hypostasis, it follows that things belonging to the nature in Christ must be two; and that those belonging to the hypostasis in Christ must be only one. Now being pertains both to the nature and to the hypostasis; to the hypostasis as to that which has being—and to the nature as to that whereby it has being. For nature is taken after the manner of a form, which is said to be a being because something is by it; as by whiteness a thing is white, and by manhood a thing is man. Now it must be borne in mind that if there is a form or nature which does not pertain to the personal being of the subsisting hypostasis, this being is not said to belong to the person simply, but relatively; as to be white is the being of Socrates, not as he is Socrates, but inasmuch as he is white. And there is no reason why this being should not be multiplied in one hypostasis or person; for the being whereby Socrates is white is distinct from the being whereby he is a musician. But the being which belongs to the very hypostasis or person in itself cannot possibly be multiplied in one hypostasis or person, since it is impossible that there should not be one being for one thing. If, therefore, the human nature accrued to the Son of God, not hypostatically or personally, but accidentally, as some maintained, it would be necessary to assert two beings in Christ—one, inasmuch as He is God—the other, inasmuch as He is Man; even as in Socrates we place one being inasmuch as he is white, and another inasmuch as he is a man, since being white does not pertain to the personal being of Socrates. But being possessed of a head, being corporeal, being animated—all these pertain to the one person of Socrates, and hence there arises from these only the one being of Socrates. And if it so happened that after the person of Socrates was constituted there accrued to him hands or feet or eyes, as happened to him who was born blind, no new being would be thereby added to Socrates, but only a relation to these, i.e., inasmuch as he would be said to be, not only with reference to what he had previously, but also with reference to what accrued to him afterwards. And thus, since the human nature is united to the Son of God, hypostatically or personally as was said above (Q. 2, AA. 5, 6), and not accidentally, it follows that by the human nature there accrued to Him no new personal being, but only a new relation of the pre-existing personal being to the human nature, in such a way that the Person is said to subsist not merely in the Divine, but also in the human nature. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod esse consequitur Reply Obj. 1: Being is consequent upon nature, not naturam, non sicut habentem esse, sed sicut qua aliquid as upon that which has being, but as upon that whereby a est, personam autem, sive hypostasim, consequitur si- thing is: whereas it is consequent upon person or hypostacut habentem esse. Et ideo magis retinet unitatem secun- sis, as upon that which has being. Hence it has unity from dum unitatem hypostasis, quam habeat dualitatem se- the unity of hypostasis, rather than duality from the duality cundum dualitatem naturae. of the nature. Ad secundum dicendum quod illud esse aeternum Reply Obj. 2: The eternal being of the Son of God, filii Dei quod est divina natura, fit esse hominis, inquan- which is the Divine Nature, becomes the being of man,

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Q. 17, A. 2

Incarnation

tum humana natura assumitur a filio Dei in unitate personae. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut in prima parte dictum est, quia persona divina est idem cum natura, in personis divinis non est aliud esse personae praeter esse naturae, et ideo tres personae non habent nisi unum esse. Haberent autem triplex esse, si in eis esset aliud esse personae, et aliud esse naturae. Ad quartum dicendum quod anima in Christo dat esse corpori inquantum facit ipsum actu animatum, quod est dare ei complementum naturae et speciei. Sed si intelligatur corpus perfectum per animam absque hypostasi habente utrumque, hoc totum compositum ex anima et corpore, prout significatur nomine humanitatis, non significatur ut quod est, sed ut quo aliquid est. Et ideo ipsum esse est personae subsistentis, secundum quod habet habitudinem ad talem naturam, cuius habitudinis causa est anima inquantum perficit humanam naturam informando corpus.

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inasmuch as the human nature is assumed by the Son of God to unity of Person. Reply Obj. 3: As was said in the First Part (Q. 50, A. 2, ad 3; Q. 75, A. 5, ad 4), since the Divine Person is the same as the Nature, there is no distinction in the Divine Persons between the being of the Person and the being of the Nature, and, consequently, the three Persons have only one being. But they would have a triple being if the being of the Person were distinct in them from the being of the Nature. Reply Obj. 4: In Christ the soul gives being to the body, inasmuch as it makes it actually animated, which is to give it the complement of its nature and species. But if we consider the body perfected by the soul, without the hypostasis having both—this whole, composed of soul and body, as signified by the word humanity, does not signify what is, but whereby it is. Hence being belongs to the subsisting person, inasmuch as it has a relation to such a nature, and of this relation the soul is the cause, inasmuch as it perfects human nature by informing the body.

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Question 18 Christ’s Unity of Will Deinde considerandum est de unitate quantum ad We must now consider unity as regards the will; and unvoluntatem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. der this head there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum in Christo sit alia voluntas divina, et (1) Whether the Divine will and the human are distinct alia humana. in Christ? Secundo, utrum in humana natura Christi sit alia (2) Whether in Christ’s human nature the will of voluntas sensualitatis, et alia rationis. sensuality is distinct from the will of reason? Tertio, utrum in Christo fuerint ex parte rationis (3) Whether as regards the reason there were several plures voluntates. wills in Christ? Quarto, utrum in Christo fuerit liberum arbitrium. (4) Whether there was free-will in Christ? Quinto, utrum humana voluntas Christi fuerit (5) Whether Christ’s human will was always omnino conformis divinae voluntati in volito. conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed? Sexto, utrum in Christo fuerit aliqua contrarietas (6) Whether there was any contrariety of wills in voluntatum. Christ?

Article 1 Whether there are two wills in Christ, one divine and the other human? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non sint duae voluntates, una divina et alia humana. Voluntas enim est primum movens et imperans in unoquoque volente. Sed in Christo primum movens et imperans fuit voluntas divina, quia omnia humana in Christo movebantur secundum voluntatem divinam. Ergo videtur quod in Christo non fuerit nisi una voluntas, scilicet divina. Praeterea, instrumentum non movetur propria voluntate, sed voluntate moventis. Sed natura humana in Christo fuit instrumentum divinitatis eius. Ergo natura humana in Christo non movebatur propria voluntate, sed divina. Praeterea, illud solum multiplicatur in Christo quod pertinet ad naturam. Voluntas autem non videtur ad naturam pertinere, quia ea quae sunt naturalia, sunt ex necessitate; quod autem est voluntarium, non est necessarium. Ergo voluntas est una tantum in Christo. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod aliqualiter velle non est naturae, sed nostrae intelligentiae scilicet personalis. Sed omnis voluntas est aliqualis voluntas, quia non est in genere quod non est in aliqua eius specie. Ergo omnis voluntas ad personam pertinet. Sed in Christo fuit tantum et est una persona. Ergo in Christo est tantum una voluntas. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Luc. XXII, pater, si vis, transfer calicem istum a me. Veruntamen non mea voluntas, sed tua fiat. Quod inducens Ambrosius,

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there are not two wills, one Divine, the other human. For the will is the first mover and first commander in whoever wills. But in Christ the first mover and commander was the Divine will, since in Christ everything human was moved by the Divine will. Hence it seems that in Christ there was only one will, viz. the Divine. Obj. 2: Further, an instrument is not moved by its own will but by the will of its mover. Now the human nature of Christ was the instrument of His Godhead. Hence the human nature of Christ was not moved by its own will, but by the Divine will. Obj. 3: Further, that alone is multiplied in Christ which belongs to the nature. But the will does not seem to pertain to nature: for natural things are of necessity; whereas what is voluntary is not of necessity. Therefore there is but one will in Christ. Obj. 4: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) that to will in this or that way belongs not to our nature but to our intellect, i.e., our personal intellect. But every will is this or that will, since there is nothing in a genus which is not at the same time in some one of its species. Therefore all will belongs to the person. But in Christ there was and is but one person. Therefore in Christ there is only one will. On the contrary, our Lord says (Luke 22:42): Father, if Thou wilt, remove this chalice from Me. But yet not My will but Thine be done. And Ambrose, quoting this to the Em-

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Q. 18, A. 1

Incarnation

in libro ad Gratianum imperatorem, dicit, sicut susceperat voluntatem meam, suscepit tristitiam meam. Et, super Lucam, dicit, voluntatem suam ad hominem retulit, patris, ad divinitatem. Voluntas enim hominis est temporalis, voluntas divinitatis aeterna. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt in Christo esse unam solam voluntatem, sed ad hoc ponendum diversimode moti esse videntur. Apollinaris enim non posuit animam intellectualem in Christo, sed quod verbum esset loco animae, vel etiam loco intellectus. Unde, cum voluntas sit in ratione, ut philosophus dicit, in III de anima, sequebatur quod in Christo non esset voluntas humana, et ita in eo non esset nisi una voluntas. Et similiter Eutyches, et omnes qui posuerunt unam naturam compositam in Christo, cogebantur ponere unam voluntatem in eo. Nestorius etiam, qui posuit unionem Dei et hominis esse factam solum secundum affectum et voluntatem, posuit unam voluntatem in Christo. Postmodum vero Macarius Antiochenus patriarcha, et Cyrus Alexandrinus, et Sergius Constantinopolitanus, et quidam eorum sequaces, posuerunt in Christo unam voluntatem, quamvis ponerent duas naturas in Christo secundum hypostasim unitas, quia opinabantur quod humana natura in Christo nunquam movebatur proprio motu, sed solum secundum quod erat mota a divinitate, ut patet in epistola synodica Agathonis Papae. Et ideo in sexta synodo, apud Constantinopolim celebrata, determinatum est oportere dici quod in Christo sint duae voluntates, ubi sic legitur, iuxta quod olim prophetae de Christo, et ipse nos erudivit, et sanctorum patrum nobis tradidit symbolum, duas voluntates naturales in eo, et duas naturales operationes praedicamus. Et hoc necessarium fuit dici. Manifestum est enim quod filius Dei assumpsit humanam naturam perfectam, ut supra ostensum est. Ad perfectionem autem humanae naturae pertinet voluntas, quae est naturalis eius potentia, sicut et intellectus, ut patet ex his quae in prima parte dicta sunt. Unde necesse est dicere quod filius Dei humanam voluntatem assumpserit in natura humana. Per assumptionem autem humanae naturae nullam diminutionem passus est filius Dei in his quae pertinent ad divinam naturam, cui competit voluntatem habere, ut in prima parte habitum est. Unde necesse est dicere quod in Christo sint duae voluntates, una scilicet divina et alia humana. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quidquid fuit in humana natura Christi, movebatur nutu divinae voluntatis, non tamen sequitur quod in Christo non fuerit motus voluntatis proprius naturae humanae. Quia etiam aliorum sanctorum piae voluntates moventur secundum voluntatem Dei, quae operatur in eis et velle et perficere, ut dicitur Philipp. II. Licet enim voluntas non possit interius moveri ab aliqua creatura, interius tamen movetur a Deo, ut in prima parte dictum est. Et sic etiam Christus secundum voluntatem humanam sequebatur volun-

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peror Gratian (De Fide ii, 7) says: As He assumed my will, He assumed my sorrow; and on Luke 22:42 he says: His will, He refers to the Man—the Father’s, to the Godhead. For the will of man is temporal, and the will of the Godhead eternal. I answer that, Some placed only one will in Christ; but they seem to have had different motives for holding this. For Apollinaris did not hold an intellectual soul in Christ, but maintained that the Word was in place of the soul, or even in place of the intellect. Hence since the will is in the reason, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9), it followed that in Christ there was no human will; and thus there was only one will in Him. So, too, Eutyches and all who held one composite nature in Christ were forced to place one will in Him. Nestorius, too, who maintained that the union of God and man was one of affection and will, held only one will in Christ. But later on, Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch, Cyrus of Alexandria, and Sergius of Constantinople and some of their followers, held that there is one will in Christ, although they held that in Christ there are two natures united in a hypostasis; because they believed that Christ’s human nature never moved with its own motion, but only inasmuch as it was moved by the Godhead, as is plain from the synodical letter of Pope Agatho.

And hence in the sixth Council held at Constantinople it was decreed that it must be said that there are two wills in Christ, in the following passage: In accordance with what the Prophets of old taught us concerning Christ, and as He taught us Himself, and the Symbol of the Holy Fathers has handed down to us, we confess two natural wills in Him and two natural operations. And this much it was necessary to say. For it is manifest that the Son of God assumed a perfect human nature, as was shown above (Q. 5; Q. 9, A. 1). Now the will pertains to the perfection of human nature, being one of its natural powers, even as the intellect, as was stated in the First Part (QQ. 79, 80). Hence we must say that the Son of God assumed a human will, together with human nature. Now by the assumption of human nature the Son of God suffered no diminution of what pertains to His Divine Nature, to which it belongs to have a will, as was said in the First Part (Q. 19, A. 1). Hence it must be said that there are two wills in Christ, i.e., one human, the other Divine. Reply Obj. 1: Whatever was in the human nature of Christ was moved at the bidding of the Divine will; yet it does not follow that in Christ there was no movement of the will proper to human nature, for the good wills of other saints are moved by God’s will, Who worketh in them both to will and to accomplish, as is written Phil. 2:13. For although the will cannot be inwardly moved by any creature, yet it can be moved inwardly by God, as was said in the First Part (Q. 105, A. 4). And thus, too, Christ by His human will followed the Divine will according to Ps. 39:9; That I should

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tatem divinam, secundum illud Psalmi, ut facerem voluntatem tuam, Deus meus, volui. Unde Augustinus dicit, contra Maximinum, ubi dixit filius patri, non quod ego volo, sed quod tu vis, quid te adiuvat quod tua verba subiungis, et dicis, ostendit vere suam voluntatem subiectam suo genitori, quasi nos negemus hominis voluntatem voluntati Dei debere esse subiectam? Ad secundum dicendum quod proprium est instrumenti quod moveatur a principali agente, diversimode tamen, secundum proprietatem naturae ipsius. Nam instrumentum inanimatum, sicut securis aut serra, movetur ab artifice per motum solum corporalem. Instrumentum vero animatum anima sensibili movetur per appetitum sensitivum, sicut equus a sessore. Instrumentum vero animatum anima rationali movetur per voluntatem eius, sicut per imperium domini movetur servus ad aliquid agendum, qui quidem servus est sicut instrumentum animatum, ut philosophus dicit, in I Politic. Sic ergo natura humana in Christo fuit instrumentum divinitatis ut moveretur per propriam voluntatem. Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsa potentia voluntatis est naturalis, et consequitur naturam ex necessitate. Sed motus vel actus potentiae, qui etiam voluntas dicitur, quandoque quidem est naturalis et necessarius, puta respectu felicitatis; quandoque autem ex libero arbitrio rationis proveniens, et non necessarius neque naturalis; sicut patet ex his quae in secunda parte dicta sunt. Et tamen etiam ipsa ratio, quae est principium huius motus, est naturalis. Et ideo, praeter voluntatem divinam, oportet in Christo ponere voluntatem humanam, non solum prout est potentia naturalis, aut prout est motus naturalis, sed etiam prout est motus rationalis. Ad quartum dicendum quod per hoc quod dicitur aliqualiter velle, designatur determinatus modus volendi. Determinatus autem modus ponitur circa ipsam rem cuius est modus. Unde, cum voluntas pertineat ad naturam, ipsum etiam quod est aliqualiter velle, pertinet ad naturam, non secundum quod est absolute considerata, sed secundum quod est in tali hypostasi. Unde etiam voluntas humana Christi habuit quendam determinatum modum ex eo quod fuit in hypostasi divina, ut scilicet moveretur semper secundum nutum divinae voluntatis.

Q. 18, A. 2

do Thy will, O my God, I have desired it. Hence Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 20): Where the Son says to the Father, ‘Not what I will, but what Thou willest,’ what do you gain by adding your own words and saying ‘He shows that His will was truly subject to His Father,’ as if we denied that man’s will ought to be subject to God’s will? Reply Obj. 2: It is proper to an instrument to be moved by the principal agent, yet diversely, according to the property of its nature. For an inanimate instrument, as an axe or a saw, is moved by the craftsman with only a corporeal movement; but an instrument animated by a sensitive soul is moved by the sensitive appetite, as a horse by its rider; and an instrument animated with a rational soul is moved by its will, as by the command of his lord the servant is moved to act, the servant being like an animate instrument, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2, 4; Ethic. viii, 11). And hence it was in this manner that the human nature of Christ was the instrument of the Godhead, and was moved by its own will. Reply Obj. 3: The power of the will is natural, and necessarily follows upon the nature; but the movement or act of this power—which is also called will—is sometimes natural and necessary, e.g., with respect to beatitude; and sometimes springs from free-will and is neither necessary nor natural, as is plain from what has been stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 10, AA. 1, 2). And yet even reason itself, which is the principle of this movement, is natural. Hence besides the Divine will it is necessary to place in Christ a human will, not merely as a natural power, or a natural movement, but even as a rational movement. Reply Obj. 4: When we say to will in a certain way, we signify a determinate mode of willing. Now a determinate mode regards the thing of which it is the mode. Hence since the will pertains to the nature, to will in a certain way belongs to the nature, not indeed considered absolutely, but as it is in the hypostasis. Hence the human will of Christ had a determinate mode from the fact of being in a Divine hypostasis, i.e., it was always moved in accordance with the bidding of the Divine will.

Article 2 Whether in Christ there was a will of sensuality besides the will of reason? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no Christo non fuerit aliqua voluntas sensualitatis, praeter will of sensuality besides the will of reason. For the Philosorationis voluntatem. Dicit enim philosophus, in III de pher says (De Anima iii, text. 42) that the will is in the anima, quod voluntas in ratione est, in sensitivo autem reason, and in the sensitive appetite are the irascible and con-

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Incarnation

appetitu est irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Sed sensualitas significat appetitum sensitivum. Ergo non fuit in Christo voluntas sensualitatis. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, XII de Trin., sensualitas significatur per serpentem. Sed nihil serpentinum fuit in Christo, habuit enim similitudinem animalis venenosi sine veneno, ut dicit Augustinus, super illud Ioan. III, sicut exaltavit Moyses serpentem in deserto. Ergo in Christo non fuit voluntas sensualitatis. Praeterea, voluntas sequitur naturam, ut dictum est. Sed in Christo non fuit nisi una natura praeter divinam. Ergo in Christo non fuit nisi una voluntas humana. Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, in II ad Gratianum imperatorem, mea est voluntas quam suam dixit, quia, ut homo, suscepit tristitiam meam, ex quo datur intelligi quod tristitia pertineat ad humanam voluntatem in Christo. Sed tristitia pertinet ad sensualitatem, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Ergo videtur quod in Christo sit voluntas sensualitatis, praeter voluntatem rationis. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, filius Dei humanam naturam assumpsit cum omnibus quae pertinent ad perfectionem ipsius naturae. In humana autem natura includitur etiam natura animalis, sicut in specie includitur genus. Unde oportet quod filius Dei cum humana natura assumpserit etiam ea quae pertinent ad perfectionem naturae animalis. Inter quae est appetitus sensitivus, qui sensualitas dicitur. Et ideo oportet dicere quod in Christo fuit sensualis appetitus, sive sensualitas. Sciendum est autem quod sensualitas, sive sensualis appetitus, inquantum est natus obedire rationi, dicitur rationale per participationem, ut patet per philosophum, in I Ethic. Et quia voluntas est in ratione, ut dictum est, pari ratione potest dici quod sensualitas sit voluntas per participationem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de voluntate essentialiter dicta, quae non est nisi in parte intellectiva. Sed voluntas participative dicta potest esse in parte sensitiva, inquantum obedit rationi. Ad secundum dicendum quod sensualitas significatur per serpentem, non quantum ad naturam sensualitatis, quam Christus assumpsit, sed quantum ad corruptionem fomitis, quae in Christo non fuit. Ad tertium dicendum quod, ubi est unum propter alterum, ibi tantum unum esse videtur, sicut superficies, quae est visibilis per colorem, est unum visibile cum colore. Et similiter, quia sensualitas non dicitur voluntas nisi quia participat voluntatem rationis, sicut est una natura humana in Christo, ita etiam ponitur una voluntas humana in Christo.

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cupiscible parts. Now sensuality signifies the sensitive appetite. Hence in Christ there was no will of sensuality. Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12, 13) the sensuality is signified by the serpent. But there was nothing serpent-like in Christ; for He had the likeness of a venomous animal without the venom, as Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 32). Hence in Christ there was no will of sensuality. Obj. 3: Further, will is consequent upon nature, as was said (A. 1). But in Christ there was only one nature besides the Divine. Hence in Christ there was only one human will. On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 7): Mine is the will which He calls His own; because as Man He assumed my sorrow. From this we are given to understand that sorrow pertains to the human will of Christ. Now sorrow pertains to the sensuality, as was said in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 25, A. 1). Therefore, seemingly, in Christ there is a will of sensuality besides the will of reason. I answer that, As was said (Q. 9, A. 1), the Son of God assumed human nature together with everything pertaining to the perfection of human nature. Now in human nature is included animal nature, as the genus in its species. Hence the Son of God must have assumed together with the human nature whatever belongs to animal nature; one of which things is the sensitive appetite, which is called the sensuality. Consequently it must be allowed that in Christ there was a sensual appetite, or sensuality. But it must be borne in mind that sensuality or the sensual appetite, inasmuch as it naturally obeys reason, is said to be rational by participation, as is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13). And because the will is in the reason, as stated above, it may equally be said that the sensuality is a will by participation. Reply Obj. 1: This argument is based on the will, essentially so called, which is only in the intellectual part; but the will by participation can be in the sensitive part, inasmuch as it obeys reason. Reply Obj. 2: The sensuality is signified by the serpent—not as regards the nature of the sensuality, which Christ assumed, but as regards the corruption of the fomes, which was not in Christ. Reply Obj. 3: Where there is one thing on account of another, there seems to be only one (Aristotle, Topic. iii); thus a surface which is visible by color is one visible thing with the color. So, too, because the sensuality is called the will, only because it partakes of the rational will, there is said to be but one human will in Christ, even as there is but one human nature.

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Q. 18, A. 3

Article 3 Whether in Christ there were two wills as regards the reason? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo fuerunt duae voluntates quantum ad rationem. Dicit enim Damascenus, in II libro, quod duplex est hominis voluntas, naturalis, quae vocatur thelesis; et rationalis, quae vocatur bulesis. Sed Christus in humana natura habuit quidquid ad perfectionem humanae naturae pertinet. Ergo utraque praedictarum voluntatum fuit in Christo. Praeterea, vis appetitiva diversificatur in homine secundum diversitatem virtutis apprehensivae, et ideo, secundum differentiam sensus et intellectus, diversificatur in homine appetitus sensitivus et intellectivus. Sed similiter quantum ad apprehensionem hominis ponitur differentia rationis et intellectus, quorum utrumque fuit in Christo. Ergo fuit in eo duplex voluntas, una intellectualis, et alia rationalis. Praeterea, a quibusdam ponitur in Christo voluntas pietatis. Quae non potest poni nisi ex parte rationis. Ergo in Christo ex parte rationis sunt plures voluntates. Sed contra est quod in quolibet ordine est unum primum movens. Sed voluntas est primum movens in genere humanorum actuum. Ergo in uno homine non est nisi una voluntas proprie dicta, quae est voluntas rationis. Christus autem est unus homo. Ergo in Christo est tantum una voluntas humana. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, voluntas quandoque accipitur pro potentia, et quandoque pro actu. Si ergo voluntas accipiatur pro actu, sic oportet in Christo ex parte rationis ponere duas voluntates, idest, duas species actuum voluntatis. Voluntas enim, ut in secunda parte dictum est, et est finis, et est eorum quae sunt ad finem, et alio modo fertur in utrumque. Nam in finem fertur simpliciter et absolute, sicut in id quod est secundum se bonum, in id autem quod est ad finem, fertur cum quadam comparatione, secundum quod habet bonitatem ex ordine ad aliud. Et ideo alterius rationis est actus voluntatis secundum quod fertur in aliquid secundum se volitum, ut sanitas, quod a Damasceno vocatur thelesis, idest simplex voluntas, et a magistris vocatur voluntas ut natura, et alterius rationis est actus voluntatis secundum quod fertur in aliquid quod est volitum solum ex ordine ad alterum, sicut est sumptio medicinae, quem quidem voluntatis actum Damascenus vocat bulesim, idest consiliativam voluntatem, a magistris autem vocatur voluntas ut ratio. Haec autem diversitas actus non diversificat potentiam, quia uterque actus attenditur ad unam rationem communem obiecti, quod est bonum. Et ideo dicendum est quod, si loqua-

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there were two wills as regards the reason. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that there is a double will in man, viz. the natural will which is called thelesis, and the rational will which is called boulesis. Now Christ in His human nature had whatever belongs to the perfection of human nature. Hence both the foregoing wills were in Christ. Obj. 2: Further, the appetitive power is diversified in man by the difference of the apprehensive power, and hence according to the difference of sense and intellect is the difference of sensitive and intellective appetite in man. But in the same way as regards man’s apprehension, we hold the difference of reason and intellect; both of which were in Christ. Therefore there was a double will in Him, one intellectual and the other rational. Obj. 3: Further, some ascribe to Christ a will of piety, which can only be on the part of reason. Therefore in Christ on the part of reason there are several wills. On the contrary, In every order there is one first mover. But the will is the first mover in the genus of human acts. Therefore in one man there is only one will, properly speaking, which is the will of reason. But Christ is one man. Therefore in Christ there is only one human will. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), the will is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the act. Hence if the will is taken for the act, it is necessary to place two wills, i.e., two species of acts of the will in Christ on the part of the reason. For the will, as was said in the I-II, Q. 8, AA. 2, 3, regards both the end and the means; and is affected differently towards both. For towards the end it is borne simply and absolutely, as towards what is good in itself; but towards the means it is borne under a certain relation, as the goodness of the means depends on something else. Hence the act of the will, inasmuch as it is drawn to anything desired of itself, as health, which act is called by Damascene thelesis—i.e., simple will, and by the masters will as nature, is different from the act of the will as it is drawn to anything that is desired only in order to something else, as to take medicine; and this act of the will Damascene calls boulesis—i.e., counseling will, and the masters, will as reason. But this diversity of acts does not diversify the power, since both acts regard the one common ratio of the object, which is goodness. Hence we must say that if we are speaking of the power of the will, in Christ there is but one human will, essentially so called and not by participation; but if we are speaking of the will as an act, we thus dis-

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Q. 18, A. 4

Incarnation

mur de potentia voluntatis, in Christo est una sola voluntas humana essentialiter et non participative dicta. Si vero loquamur de voluntate quae est actus, sic distinguitur in Christo voluntas quae est ut natura, quae dicitur thelesis; et voluntas ut ratio, quae dicitur bulesis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illae voluntates non diversificantur secundum potentiam, sed solum secundum differentiam actus, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam intellectus et ratio non sunt diversae potentiae, ut in prima parte dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod voluntas pietatis non videtur esse aliud quam voluntas quae consideratur ut natura, inquantum scilicet refugit alienum malum absolute consideratum.

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tinguish in Christ a will as nature, which is called thelesis, and a will as reason, which is called boulesis.

Reply Obj. 1: These two wills do not diversify the power but only the act, as we have said. Reply Obj. 2: The intellect and the reason are not distinct powers, as was said in the First Part (Q. 79, A. 8). Reply Obj. 3: The will of piety would not seem to be distinct from the will considered as nature, inasmuch as it shrinks from another’s evil, absolutely considered.

Article 4 Whether there was free-will in Christ? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non fuerit liberum arbitrium. Dicit enim Damascenus, in III libro, gnomen autem (idest sententiam, vel mentem, vel cogitationem) et proaeresin (idest electionem) in domino dicere impossibile est, si proprie loqui volumus. Maxime autem in his quae sunt fidei est proprie loquendum. Ergo in Christo non fuit electio. Et per consequens nec liberum arbitrium, cuius actus est electio. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod electio est appetitus praeconsiliati. Sed consilium non videtur fuisse in Christo, quia non consiliamur de quibus certi sumus; Christus autem certitudinem habuit de omnibus. Ergo in Christo non fuit electio. Et sic, nec liberum arbitrium. Praeterea, liberum arbitrium se habet ad utrumque. Sed voluntas Christi fuit determinata ad bonum, quia non potuit peccare, sicut supra dictum est. Ergo in Christo non fuit liberum arbitrium. Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae VII, butyrum et mel comedet, ut sciat reprobare malum et eligere bonum, quod est actus liberi arbitrii. Ergo in Christo fuit liberum arbitrium. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in Christo fuit duplex actus voluntatis, unus quidem quo eius voluntas ferebatur in aliquid sicut secundum se volitum, quod pertinet ad rationem finis; alius autem secundum quem eius voluntas ferebatur in aliquid per ordinem ad aliud, quod pertinet ad rationem eius quod est ad finem. Differt autem, ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., electio a voluntate in hoc, quod voluntas, per se loquendo, est ipsius finis; electio autem eorum quae sunt ad finem. Et sic simplex voluntas est idem quod voluntas ut natura, electio autem est idem quod voluntas ut ra-

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no free-will. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) that gnome, i.e., opinion, thinking or cogitation, and proairesis, i.e., choice, cannot possibly be attributed to our Lord, if we wish to speak with propriety. But in the things of faith especially we must speak with propriety. Therefore there was no choice in Christ and consequently no free-will, of which choice is the act. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is a desire of something after taking counsel. Now counsel does not appear to be in Christ, because we do not take counsel concerning such things as we are certain of. But Christ was certain of everything. Hence there was no counsel and consequently no free-will in Christ. Obj. 3: Further, free-will is indifferent. But Christ’s will was determined to good, since He could not sin; as stated above (Q. 15, AA. 1, 2). Hence there was no free-will in Christ. On the contrary, It is written (Isa 7:15): He shall eat butter and honey, that He may know to refuse the evil and to choose the good, which is an act of the free-will. Therefore there was free-will in Christ. I answer that, As was said above (A. 3), there was a twofold act of the will in Christ; one whereby He was drawn to anything willed in itself, which implies the nature of an end; the other whereby His will was drawn to anything willed on account of its being ordained to another—which pertains to the nature of means. Now, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) choice differs from will in this, that will of itself regards the end, while choice regards the means. And thus simple will is the same as the will as nature; but choice is the same as the will as reason, and is the proper act of free-will, as was said in the First Part (Q. 83, A. 3). Hence,

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tio, et est proprius actus liberi arbitrii, ut in prima parte dictum est. Et ideo, cum in Christo ponatur voluntas ut ratio, necesse est ibi ponere electionem, et per consequens liberum arbitrium, cuius actus est electio, ut in prima parte habitum est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Damascenus excludit a Christo electionem secundum quod intelligit in nomine electionis importari dubitationem. Sed tamen dubitatio non est de necessitate electionis, quia etiam Deo competit eligere, secundum illud Ephes. I, elegit nos in ipso ante mundi constitutionem; cum tamen in Deo nulla sit dubitatio. Accidit autem dubitatio electioni, inquantum est in natura ignorante. Et idem dicendum est de aliis de quibus fit mentio in auctoritate praedicta. Ad secundum dicendum quod electio praesupponit consilium, non tamen sequitur ex consilio nisi iam determinato per iudicium; illud enim quod iudicamus agendum post inquisitionem consilii, eligimus, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et ideo, si aliquid iudicetur ut agendum absque dubitatione et inquisitione praecedente, hoc sufficit ad electionem. Et sic patet quod dubitatio, sive inquisitio, non per se pertinet ad electionem, sed solum secundum quod est in natura ignorante. Ad tertium dicendum quod voluntas Christi, licet sit determinata ad bonum, non tamen est determinata ad hoc vel illud bonum. Et ideo pertinebat ad Christum eligere per liberum arbitrium confirmatum in bono, sicut ad beatos.

Q. 18, A. 5

since will as reason is placed in Christ, we must also place choice, and consequently free-will, whose act is choice, as was said in the First Part (Q. 83, A. 3; I-II, Q. 13, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1: Damascene excludes choice from Christ, in so far as he considers that doubt is implied in the word choice. Nevertheless doubt is not necessary to choice, since it belongs even to God Himself to choose, according to Eph. 1:4: He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world, although in God there is no doubt. Yet doubt is accidental to choice when it is in an ignorant nature. We may also say the same of whatever else is mentioned in the passage quoted. Reply Obj. 2: Choice presupposes counsel; yet it follows counsel only as determined by judgment. For what we judge to be done, we choose, after the inquiry of counsel, as is stated (Ethic. iii, 2, 3). Hence if anything is judged necessary to be done, without any preceding doubt or inquiry, this suffices for choice. Therefore it is plain that doubt or inquiry belong to choice not essentially, but only when it is in an ignorant nature. Reply Obj. 3: The will of Christ, though determined to good, is not determined to this or that good. Hence it pertains to Christ, even as to the blessed, to choose with a freewill confirmed in good.

Article 5 Whether the human will of Christ willed anything except what God wills? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas humana in Christo non voluerit aliud quam quod Deus vult. Dicitur enim in Psalmo, ex persona Christi, ut facerem voluntatem tuam, Deus meus, volui. Sed ille qui vult voluntatem alicuius facere, vult quod ille vult. Ergo videtur quod voluntas humana Christi nihil aliud voluerit quam voluntas ipsius divina. Praeterea, anima Christi habuit perfectissimam caritatem, quae etiam comprehensionem nostrae scientiae excedit, secundum illud Ephes. III, supereminentem scientiae caritatem Christi. Sed caritatis est facere quod homo idem velit quod Deus, unde et philosophus, in IX Ethic., dicit quod unum de amicabilibus est eadem velle et eligere. Ergo voluntas humana in Christo nihil aliud voluit quam divina. Praeterea, Christus fuit verus comprehensor. Sed sancti qui sunt comprehensores in patria, nihil aliud volunt quam quod Deus vult. Alioquin, non essent beati, quia non haberent quidquid vellent, beatus enim est qui habet quidquid vult et nihil mali vult, ut dicit Augu-

Objection 1: It would seem that the human will in Christ did not will anything except what God willed. For it is written (Ps 39:9) in the person of Christ: That I should do Thy will: O my God, I have desired it. Now he who desires to do another’s will, wills what the other wills. Hence it seems that Christ’s human will willed nothing but what was willed by His Divine will. Obj. 2: Further, Christ’s soul had most perfect charity, which, indeed, surpasses the comprehension of all our knowledge, according to Eph. 3:19, the charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge. Now charity makes men will what God wills; hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that one mark of friendship is to will and choose the same. Therefore the human will in Christ willed nothing else than was willed by His Divine will. Obj. 3: Further, Christ was a true comprehensor. But the Saints who are comprehensors in heaven will only what God wills, otherwise they would not be happy, because they would not obtain whatever they will, for blessed is he who has what he wills, and wills nothing amiss, as Augustine

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stinus, in libro de Trin. Ergo Christus nihil aliud voluit secundum voluntatem humanam quam quod voluit voluntas divina. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, contra Maximinum, in hoc quod Christus ait, non quod ego volo, sed quod tu, aliud se ostendit voluisse quam pater. Quod nisi humano corde non posset, cum infirmitatem nostram in suum, non divinum, sed humanum transfiguraret affectum. Respondeo dicendum quod sicut dictum est, in Christo secundum humanam naturam ponitur multiplex voluntas, scilicet voluntas sensualitatis, quae participative voluntas dicitur; et voluntas rationalis, sive consideretur per modum naturae, sive per modum rationis. Dictum est autem supra quod, ex quadam dispensatione, filius Dei, ante suam passionem, permittebat carni agere et pati quae sunt ei propria. Et similiter permittebat omnibus viribus animae agere quae propria. Manifestum est autem quod voluntas sensualitatis refugit naturaliter dolores sensibiles et corporis laesionem. Similiter etiam voluntas ut natura repudiat ea quae naturae sunt contraria, et quae sunt secundum se mala, puta mortem et alia huiusmodi. Haec tamen quandoque voluntas per modum rationis eligere potest ex ordine ad finem, sicut etiam in aliquo puro homine sensualitas eius, et etiam voluntas absolute considerata, refugit ustionem, quam voluntas secundum rationem elegit propter finem sanitatis. Voluntas autem Dei erat ut Christus dolores et passiones et mortem pateretur, non quod ista essent a Deo volita secundum se, sed ex ordine ad finem humanae salutis. Unde patet quod Christus, secundum voluntatem sensualitatis, et secundum voluntatem rationis quae consideratur per modum naturae, aliud poterat velle quam Deus. Sed secundum voluntatem quae est per modum rationis, semper idem volebat quod Deus. Quod patet ex hoc ipso quod dicit, non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu. Volebat enim, secundum rationis voluntatem, divinam voluntatem impleri, quamvis aliud dicat se velle secundum aliam eius voluntatem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus volebat ut voluntas patris impleretur, non autem secundum voluntatem sensualitatis cuius motus non se extendit usque ad voluntatem Dei; neque per voluntatem quae consideratur per modum naturae, quae fertur in aliqua obiecta absolute considerata, et non in ordine ad divinam voluntatem. Ad secundum dicendum quod conformitas voluntatis humanae ad voluntatem divinam attenditur secundum voluntatem rationis, secundum quam etiam voluntates amicorum concordant, inquantum scilicet ratio considerat aliquod volitum in ordine ad voluntatem amici. Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus simul fuit comprehensor et viator, inquantum scilicet per mentem

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says (De Trin. xiii, 5). Hence in His human will Christ wills nothing else than does the Divine will. On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 20): When Christ says ‘Not what I will, but what Thou wilt’ He shows Himself to have willed something else than did His Father; and this could only have been by His human heart, since He did not transfigure our weakness into His Divine but into His human will. I answer that, As was said (AA. 2, 3), in Christ according to His human nature there is a twofold will, viz. the will of sensuality, which is called will by participation, and the rational will, whether considered after the manner of nature, or after the manner of reason. Now it was said above (Q. 13, A. 3, ad 1; Q. 14, A. 1, ad 2) that by a certain dispensation the Son of God before His Passion allowed His flesh to do and suffer what belonged to it. And in like manner He allowed all the powers of His soul to do what belonged to them. Now it is clear that the will of sensuality naturally shrinks from sensible pains and bodily hurt. In like manner, the will as nature turns from what is against nature and what is evil in itself, as death and the like; yet the will as reason may at time choose these things in relation to an end, as in a mere man the sensuality and the will absolutely considered shrink from burning, which, nevertheless, the will as reason may choose for the sake of health. Now it was the will of God that Christ should undergo pain, suffering, and death, not that these of themselves were willed by God, but for the sake of man’s salvation. Hence it is plain that in His will of sensuality and in His rational will considered as nature, Christ could will what God did not; but in His will as reason He always willed the same as God, which appears from what He says (Matt 26:39): Not as I will, but as Thou wilt. For He willed in His reason that the Divine will should be fulfilled although He said that He willed something else by another will.

Reply Obj. 1: By His rational will Christ willed the Divine will to be fulfilled; but not by His will of sensuality, the movement of which does not extend to the will of God— nor by His will considered as nature which regards things absolutely considered and not in relation to the Divine will.

Reply Obj. 2: The conformity of the human will to the Divine regards the will of reason: according to which the wills even of friends agree, inasmuch as reason considers something willed in its relation to the will of a friend.

Reply Obj. 3: Christ was at once comprehensor and wayfarer, inasmuch as He was enjoying God in His mind

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fruebatur Deo, et habebat carnem passibilem. Et ideo ex and had a passible body. Hence things repugnant to His parte carnis passibilis poterat in eo aliquid accidere quod natural will and to His sensitive appetite could happen to repugnaret naturali voluntati ipsius, et etiam appetitui Him in His passible flesh. sensitivo.

Article 6 Whether there was contrariety of wills in Christ? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo fuerit contrarietas voluntatum. Contrarietas enim voluntatum attenditur secundum contrarietatem obiectorum, sicut et contrarietas motuum attenditur secundum contrarietatem terminorum, ut patet per philosophum, in V Physic. Sed Christus secundum diversas voluntates contraria volebat, nam secundum voluntatem divinam volebat mortem, quam refugiebat secundum voluntatem humanam. Unde Athanasius dicit, in libro adversus Apollinarium, quando Christus dixit, pater si possibile est, transeat a me calix iste, et tamen non mea, sed tua voluntas fiat, et iterum, spiritus promptus est, caro autem infirma, duas voluntates hic ostendit, humanam, quae propter infirmitatem carnis refugiebat passionem; et divinam eius, promptam ad passionem. Ergo in Christo fuit contrarietas voluntatum. Praeterea, Galat. V dicitur quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem. Est igitur contrarietas voluntatum quando spiritus concupiscit unum, et caro aliud. Sed hoc fuit in Christo, nam per voluntatem caritatis, quam Spiritus Sanctus in eius mente faciebat, volebat passionem, secundum illud Isaiae LIII, oblatus est quia ipse voluit; secundum autem carnem, passionem refugiebat. Ergo erat in eo contrarietas voluntatum. Praeterea, Luc. XXII dicitur quod, factus in agonia, prolixius orabat. Sed agonia videtur importare quandam impugnationem animi in contraria tendentis. Ergo videtur quod in Christo fuerit contrarietas voluntatis. Sed contra est quod in determinatione sextae synodi dicitur, praedicamus duas naturales voluntates, non contrarias, iuxta quod impii asserunt haeretici; sed sequentem humanam eius voluntatem, et non resistentem vel reluctantem, sed potius subiectam divinae eius atque omnipotenti voluntati. Respondeo dicendum quod contrarietas non potest esse nisi oppositio attendatur in eodem et secundum idem. Si autem secundum diversa, et in diversis existat diversitas, non sufficit hoc ad rationem contrarietatis, sicut nec ad rationem contradictionis, puta quod homo sit pulcher aut sanus secundum manum, et non secundum pedem. Ad hoc igitur quod sit contrarietas voluntatum in aliquo, requiritur, primo quidem, quod secundum idem attendatur diversitas voluntatum. Si enim unius

Objection 1: It would seem that there was contrariety of wills in Christ. For contrariety of wills regards contrariety of objects, as contrariety of movements springs from contrariety of termini, as is plain from the Philosopher (Phys. v, text. 49, seq.). Now Christ in His different wills wished contrary things. For in His Divine will He wished for death, from which He shrank in His human will, hence Athanasius says: When Christ says ‘Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from Me; yet not My will, but Thine be done,’ and again, ‘The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh weak,’ He denotes two wills—the human, which through the weakness of the flesh shrank from the passion—and His Divine will eager for the passion. Hence there was contrariety of wills in Christ.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Gal 5:17) that the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh. Now when the spirit desires one thing, and the flesh another, there is contrariety of wills. But this was in Christ; for by the will of charity which the Holy Spirit was causing in His mind, He willed the passion, according to Isa. 53:7: He was offered because it was His own will, yet in His flesh He shrank from the passion. Therefore there was contrariety of wills in Him. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Luke 22:43) that being in an agony, He prayed the longer. Now agony seems to imply a certain struggle in a soul drawn to contrary things. Hence it seems that there was contrariety of will in Christ. On the contrary, In the decisions of the Sixth Council it is said: We confess two natural wills, not in opposition, as evil-minded heretics assert, but following His human will, and neither withstanding nor striving against, but rather being subject to, His Divine and omnipotent will. I answer that, Contrariety can exist only where there is opposition in the same and as regards the same. For if the diversity exists as regards diverse things, and in diverse subjects, this would not suffice for the nature of contrariety, nor even for the nature of contradiction, e.g., if a man were well formed or healthy as regards his hand, but not as regards his foot. Hence for there to be contrariety of wills in anyone it is necessary, first, that the diversity of wills should regard the same. For if the will of one regards the doing of some-

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voluntas sit de aliquo fiendo secundum quandam rationem universalem, et alterius voluntas sit de eodem non fiendo secundum quandam rationem particularem, non est omnino contrarietas voluntatum. Puta, si rex vult suspendi latronem in bonum reipublicae, et aliquis eius consanguineus velit eum non suspendi propter amorem privatum, non erit contrarietas voluntatis, nisi forte se in tantum extendat voluntas boni privati ut bonum publicum velit impedire ut conservetur bonum privatum; tunc enim secundum idem attenderetur repugnantia voluntatum. Secundo autem requiritur ad contrarietatem voluntatis, quod sit circa eandem voluntatem. Si enim homo vult unum secundum appetitum intellectus, et aliud secundum appetitum sensitivum, non est hic aliqua contrarietas, nisi forte appetitus sensitivus in tantum praevaleat quod vel immutet vel saltem retardet appetitum rationis; sic enim iam ad ipsam voluntatem rationis perveniet aliquid de motu contrario appetitus sensitivi. Sic igitur dicendum est quod, licet voluntas naturalis et voluntas sensualitatis in Christo aliquid aliud voluerit quam divina voluntas et voluntas rationis ipsius, non tamen fuit ibi aliqua contrarietas voluntatum. Primo quidem, quia neque voluntas eius naturalis, neque voluntas sensualitatis, repudiabat illam rationem secundum quam divina voluntas, et voluntas rationis humanae in Christo, passionem volebant. Volebat enim voluntas absoluta in Christo salutem humani generis, sed eius non erat velle hoc in ordine ad aliud. Motus autem sensualitatis ad hoc se extendere non valebat. Secundo, quia neque voluntas divina, neque voluntas rationis in Christo, impediebatur aut retardabatur per voluntatem naturalem, aut per appetitum sensualitatis. Similiter autem nec e converso voluntas divina, vel voluntas rationis in Christo, refugiebat aut retardabat motum voluntatis naturalis humanae, et motum sensualitatis in Christo. Placebat enim Christo secundum voluntatem divinam, et secundum voluntatem rationis, ut voluntas naturalis in ipso et voluntas sensualitatis secundum ordinem suae naturae moverentur. Unde patet quod in Christo nulla fuerit repugnantia vel contrarietas voluntatum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod aliqua voluntas humana in Christo aliud volebat quam eius voluntas divina, procedebat ex ipsa voluntate divina, cuius beneplacito natura humana propriis motibus movebatur in Christo, ut Damascenus dicit. Ad secundum dicendum quod in nobis per concupiscentiam carnis impeditur aut retardatur concupiscentia spiritus, quod in Christo non fuit. Et ideo in Christo non fuit contrarietas carnis ad spiritum, sicut in nobis. Ad tertium dicendum quod agonia non fuit in Christo quantum ad partem animae rationalem, secundum quod importat concertationem voluntatum ex

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thing with reference to some universal reason, and the will of another regards the not doing the same with reference to some particular reason, there is not complete contrariety of will, e.g., when a judge wishes a brigand to be hanged for the good of the commonwealth, and one of the latter’s kindred wishes him not to be hanged on account of a private love, there is no contrariety of wills; unless, indeed, the desire of the private good went so far as to wish to hinder the public good for the private good—in that case the opposition of wills would regard the same. Second, for contrariety of wills it is necessary that it should be in the same will. For if a man wishes one thing with his rational appetite, and wishes another thing with his sensitive appetite, there is no contrariety, unless the sensitive appetite so far prevailed as to change or at least keep back the rational appetite; for in this case something of the contrary movement of the sensitive appetite would reach the rational will. And hence it must be said that although the natural and the sensitive will in Christ wished what the Divine will did not wish, yet there was no contrariety of wills in Him. First, because neither the natural will nor the will of sensuality rejected the reason for which the Divine will and the will of the human reason in Christ wished the passion. For the absolute will of Christ wished the salvation of the human race, although it did not pertain to it to will this for the sake of something further; but the movement of sensuality could nowise extend so far. Second, because neither the Divine will nor the will of reason in Christ was impeded or retarded by the natural will or the appetite of sensuality. So, too, on the other hand, neither the Divine will nor the will of reason in Christ shrank from or retarded the movement of the natural human will and the movement of the sensuality in Christ. For it pleased Christ, in His Divine will, and in His will of reason, that His natural will and will of sensuality should be moved according to the order of their nature. Hence it is clear that in Christ there was no opposition or contrariety of wills.

Reply Obj. 1: The fact of any will in Christ willing something else than did the Divine will, proceeded from the Divine will, by whose permission the human nature in Christ was moved by its proper movements, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15, 18, 19). Reply Obj. 2: In us the desires of the spirit are impeded or retarded by the desires of the flesh: this did not occur in Christ. Hence in Christ there was no contrariety of flesh and spirit, as in us. Reply Obj. 3: The agony in Christ was not in the rational soul, in as far as it implies a struggle in the will arising from a diversity of motives, as when anyone, on his rea-

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diversitate rationum procedentem, puta cum aliquis secundum quod ratio considerat unum, vult hoc, et secundum quod considerat aliud, vult contrarium. Hoc enim contingit propter debilitatem rationis, quae non potest diiudicare quid sit simpliciter melius. Quod in Christo non fuit, quia per suam rationem iudicabat simpliciter esse melius quod per eius passionem impleretur voluntas divina circa salutem generis humani. Fuit tamen in Christo agonia quantum ad partem sensitivam, secundum quod importat timorem infortunii imminentis, ut dicit Damascenus, in III libro.

Q. 18, A. 6

son considering one, wishes one thing, and on its considering another, wishes the contrary. For this springs from the weakness of the reason, which is unable to judge which is the best simply. Now this did not occur in Christ, since by His reason He judged it best that the Divine will regarding the salvation of the human race should be fulfilled by His passion. Nevertheless, there was an agony in Christ as regards the sensitive part, inasmuch as it implied a dread of coming trial, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15; iii, 18, 23).

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Question 19 The Unity of Christ’s Operation Deinde considerandum est de unitate operationis We must now consider the unity of Christ’s operation; Christi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. and under this head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum in Christo sit una operatio divinitatis (1) Whether in Christ there was one or several et humanitatis, vel plures. operations of the Godhead and Manhood? Secundo, utrum in Christo sint plures operationes (2) Whether in Christ there were several operations of secundum humanam naturam. the human nature? Tertio, utrum Christus secundum humanam (3) Whether Christ by His human operation merited operationem aliquid sibi meruerit. anything for Himself? Quarto, utrum per eam aliquid meruerit nobis. (4) Whether He merited anything for us by it?

Article 1 Whether in Christ there is only one operation of the godhead and manhood? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo sit tantum una operatio divinitatis et humanitatis. Dicit enim Dionysius, II cap. de Div. Nom., discreta autem est benignissima circa nos Dei operatio per hoc quod, secundum nos, ex nobis, integre vereque humanatum est verbum quod est supra substantiam, et operari et pati quaecumque humanae eius divinaeque operationi congruunt, ubi unam operationem nominat humanam et divinam, quae in Graeco dicitur theandrica, idest deivirilis. Videtur igitur esse una operatio composita in Christo. Praeterea, principalis agentis et instrumenti est una sola operatio. Sed humana natura in Christo fuit instrumentum divinae, ut supra dictum est. Ergo eadem operatio est divinae et humanae naturae in Christo.

Praeterea, cum in Christo duae naturae in una hypostasi vel persona sint, necesse est unum et idem esse quod pertinet ad hypostasim vel personam. Sed operatio pertinet ad hypostasim vel personam, nihil enim operatur nisi suppositum subsistens; unde et, secundum philosophum, actus sunt singularium. Ergo in Christo est una et eadem operatio divinitatis et humanitatis. Praeterea, sicuti esse est hypostasis subsistentis, ita etiam et operari. Sed propter unitatem hypostasis est in Christo unum esse, ut supra dictum est. Ergo et propter eandem unitatem est in Christo una operatio. Praeterea, ubi est unum operatum, ibi est una operatio. Sed idem operatum erat divinitatis et humani-

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there is but one operation of the Godhead and the Manhood. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): The most loving operation of God is made manifest to us by the supersubstantial Word having taken flesh integrally and truly, and having operated and suffered whatsoever befits His human and Divine operation. But he here mentions only one human and Divine operation, which is written in Greek theandrike, i.e., Godmanlike. Hence it seems that there is but one composite operation in Christ. Obj. 2: Further, there is but one operation of the principal and instrumental agent. Now the human nature in Christ was the instrument of the Divine, as was said above (Q. 7, A. 1, ad 3; Q. 8, A. 1, ad 1; Q. 18, A. 1, ad 2). Hence the operations of the Divine and human natures in Christ are the same. Obj. 3: Further, since in Christ there are two natures in one hypostasis or person, whatever pertains to the hypostasis or person is one and the same. But operation pertains to the hypostasis or person, for it is only a subsisting suppositum that operates; hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1), acts belong to singulars. Hence in Christ there is only one operation of the Godhead and the Manhood. Obj. 4: Further, as being belongs to a subsisting hypostasis, so also does operation. But on account of the unity of hypostasis there is only one being in Christ (Q. 17, A. 2). Hence, on account of the same unity, there is one operation in Christ. Obj. 5: Further, as being belongs to a sub-operated there is one operation. But the same thing was operated by

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tatis, sicut sanatio leprosi, vel suscitatio mortui. Ergo vi- the Godhead and the Manhood, as the healing of the lepdetur quod in Christo sit una tantum operatio divinitatis ers or the raising of the dead. Hence it seems that in Christ et humanitatis. there is but one operation of the Godhead and the Manhood. Sed contra est quod Ambrosius, in II libro ad GraOn the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 8): How tianum imperatorem, dicit, quem ad modum eadem ope- can the same operation spring from different powers? Cannot ratio diversae est potestatis? Nunquid sic potest minor que- the lesser operate as the greater? And can there be one operamadmodum maior operari? Aut una operatio potest esse tion where there are different substances? ubi diversa est substantia? Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, I answer that, As was said above (Q. 18, A. 1), the haeretici qui posuerunt in Christo unam voluntatem, aforesaid heretics who placed one will in Christ placed one posuerunt etiam in ipso unam operationem. Et ut eorum operation in Christ. Now in order better to understand opinio erronea melius intelligatur, considerandum est their erroneous opinion, we must bear in mind that wherquod, ubicumque sunt plura agentia ordinata, inferius ever there are several mutually ordained agents, the infemovetur a superiori, sicut in homine corpus movetur ab rior is moved by the superior, as in man the body is moved anima, et inferiores vires a ratione. Sic igitur actiones et by the soul and the lower powers by the reason. And thus motus inferioris principii sunt magis operata quaedam the actions and movements of the inferior principle are quam operationes, id autem quod pertinet ad supremum things operated rather than operations. Now what pertains principium, est proprie operatio. Puta si dicamus in ho- to the highest principle is properly the operation; thus we mine quod ambulare, quod est pedum, et palpare, quod say of man that to walk, which belongs to the feet, and to est manuum, sunt quaedam hominis operata, quorum touch, which belongs to the hand, are things operated by unum operatur anima per pedes, aliud per manus, et the man—one of which is operated by the soul through quia est eadem anima operans per utrumque, ex parte the feet, the other through the hands. And because it is ipsius operantis, quod est primum principium movens, the same soul that operates in both cases, there is only one est una et indifferens operatio; ex parte autem ipsorum indifferent operation, on the part of the thing operating, operatorum differentia invenitur. Sicut autem in homine which is the first moving principle; but difference is found puro corpus movetur ab anima, et appetitus sensitivus on the part of what is operated. Now, as in a mere man a rationali, ita in domino Iesu Christo humana natura the body is moved by the soul, and the sensitive by the ramovebatur et regebatur a divina. Et ideo dicebant quod tional appetite, so in the Lord Jesus Christ the human naeadem est operatio et indifferens ex parte ipsius divini- ture is moved and ruled by the Divine. Hence they said that tatis operantis sunt tamen diversa operata, inquantum there is one indifferent operation on the part of the Godscilicet divinitas Christi aliud agebat per seipsam, sicut head operating, but diverse things operated, inasmuch as quod portabat omnia verbo virtutis suae; aliud autem per the Godhead of Christ did one thing by Itself, as to uphold naturam humanam, sicut quod corporaliter ambulabat. all things by the word of His power—and another thing Unde in sexta synodo inducuntur verba Severi haereti- by His human nature, as to walk in body. Hence the Sixth ci sic dicentis, ea quae agebantur et operabantur ab uno Council quotes the words of Severus the heretic, who said: Christo, multum differunt. Quaedam enim sunt Deo de- What things were done and wrought by the one Christ, difcibilia, quaedam humana. Veluti, corporaliter vadere su- fer greatly; for some are becoming to God, and some are huper terram profecto humanum est, cruribus vero vexatis, man, as to walk bodily on the earth is indeed human, but et ambulare super terram penitus non valentibus, sanum to give hale steps to sickly limbs, wholly unable to walk on gressum donare Deo decibile est. Sed unum, scilicet incar- the ground, is becoming to God. Yet one, i.e., the Incarnate natum verbum, hoc et illud operatum est et nequaquam Word, wrought one and the other—neither was this from one hoc quidem huius, hoc vero huius est naturae. Neque, eo nature, and that from another; nor can we justly affirm that quod diversa sunt operamenta, ideo duas operatrices na- because there are distinct things operated there are therefore turas atque formas iuste definiemus. two operating natures and forms. Sed in hoc decipiebantur. Quia actio eius quod moBut herein they were deceived, for what is moved by anvetur ab altero, est duplex, una quidem quam habet se- other has a twofold action—one which it has from its own cundum propriam formam; alia autem quam habet se- form—the other, which it has inasmuch as it is moved by cundum quod movetur ab alio. Sicut securis operatio another; thus the operation of an axe of itself is to cleave; secundum propriam formam est incisio, secundum au- but inasmuch as it is moved by the craftsman, its operation tem quod movetur ab artifice, operatio eius est face- is to make benches. Hence the operation which belongs to re scamnum. Operatio igitur quae est alicuius rei se- a thing by its form is proper to it, nor does it belong to the cundum suam formam, est propria eius; nec pertinet ad mover, except in so far as he makes use of this kind of thing moventem, nisi secundum quod utitur huiusmodi re ad for his work: thus to heat is the proper operation of fire,

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suam operationem, sicut calefacere est propria operatio ignis; non autem fabri, nisi quatenus utitur igne ad calefaciendum ferrum. Sed illa operatio quae est rei solum secundum quod movetur ab alio, non est alia praeter operationem moventis ipsum, sicut facere scamnum non est seorsum operatio securis ab operatione artificis. Et ideo, ubicumque movens et motum habent diversas formas seu virtutes operativas, ibi oportet quod sit alia propria operatio moventis, et alia propria operatio moti, licet motum participet operationem moventis, et movens utatur operatione moti, et sic utrumque agit cum communione alterius. Sic igitur in Christo humana natura habet propriam formam et virtutem per quam operatur et similiter divina. Unde et humana natura habet propriam operationem distinctam ab operatione divina, et e converso. Et tamen divina natura utitur operatione naturae humanae sicut operatione sui instrumenti, et similiter humana natura participat operationem divinae naturae, sicut instrumentum participat operationem principalis agentis. Et hoc est quod dicit Leo Papa, in epistola ad Flavianum agit utraque forma, scilicet tam natura divina quam humana in Christo, cum alterius communione, quod proprium est, verbo scilicet operante quod verbi est, et carne exequente quod carnis est. Si vero esset una tantum operatio divinitatis et humanitatis in Christo, oporteret dicere vel quod humana natura non haberet propriam formam et virtutem (de divina enim hoc dici est impossibile), ex quo sequeretur quod in Christo esset tantum divina operatio, vel oporteret dicere quod ex virtute divina et humana esset conflata in Christo una virtus. Quorum utrumque est impossibile, nam per primum horum ponitur natura humana in Christo esse imperfecta; per secundum vero ponitur confusio naturarum. Et ideo rationabiliter in sexta synodo haec opinio est condemnata, in cuius determinatione dicitur, duas naturales operationes indivise, inconvertibiliter, inconfuse, inseparabiliter, in eodem domino Iesu Christo, vero Deo nostro, glorificamus, hoc est, divinam operationem et humanam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Dionysius ponit in Christo operationem theandricam, idest divinamvirilem, vel divinamhumanam, non per aliquam confusionem operationum seu virtutum utriusque naturae, sed per hoc quod divina operatio eius utitur humana eius operatione, et humana operatio participat virtutem divinae operationis. Unde, sicut ipse dicit in quadam epistola, super hominem operabatur ea quae sunt hominis, quod monstrat virgo supernaturaliter concipiens, et aqua terrenorum pedum sustinens gravitatem. Manifestum est enim quod concipi est humanae naturae, similiter et ambulare, sed utrumque fuit in Christo supernaturaliter. Et similiter divina operabatur humanitus, sicut cum sanavit leprosum tangendo. Unde in eadem epistola subdit,

Q. 19, A. 1

but not of a smith, except in so far as he makes use of fire for heating iron. But the operation which belongs to the thing, as moved by another, is not distinct from the operation of the mover; thus to make a bench is not the work of the axe independently of the workman. Hence, wheresoever the mover and the moved have different forms or operative faculties, there must the operation of the mover and the proper operation of the moved be distinct; although the moved shares in the operation of the mover, and the mover makes use of the operation of the moved, and, consequently, each acts in communion with the other. Therefore in Christ the human nature has its proper form and power whereby it acts; and so has the Divine. Hence the human nature has its proper operation distinct from the Divine, and conversely. Nevertheless, the Divine Nature makes use of the operation of the human nature, as of the operation of its instrument; and in the same way the human nature shares in the operation of the Divine Nature, as an instrument shares in the operation of the principal agent. And this is what Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Flavian. xxviii): Both forms (i.e., both the Divine and the human nature in Christ) do what is proper to each in union with the other, i.e., the Word operates what belongs to the Word, and the flesh carries out what belongs to flesh. But if there were only one operation of the Godhead and manhood in Christ, it would be necessary to say either that the human nature had not its proper form and power (for this could not possibly be said of the Divine), whence it would follow that in Christ there was only the Divine operation; or it would be necessary to say that from the Divine and human power there was made up one power. Now both of these are impossible. For by the first the human nature in Christ is supposed to be imperfect; and by the second a confusion of the natures is supposed. Hence it is with reason that the Sixth Council (Acts 18) condemned this opinion, and decreed as follows: We confess two natural, indivisible, unconvertible, unconfused, and inseparable operations in the same Lord Jesus Christ our true God; i.e., the Divine operation and the human operation. Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius places in Christ a theandric, i.e., a God-manlike or Divino-human, operation not by any confusion of the operations or powers of both natures, but inasmuch as His Divine operation employs the human, and His human operation shares in the power of the Divine. Hence, as he says in a certain epistle (Ad Caium iv), what is of man He works beyond man; and this is shown by the Virgin conceiving supernaturally and by the unstable waters bearing up the weight of bodily feet. Now it is clear that to be begotten belongs to human nature, and likewise to walk; yet both were in Christ supernaturally. So, too, He wrought Divine things humanly, as when He healed the leper with a touch. Hence in the same epistle he adds: He performed Divine works not as God does, and human works not as man

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sed, Deo homine facto, nova quadam Dei et hominis operatione. Quod autem intelligat duas esse operationes in Christo, unam divinae naturae, aliam autem humanae, patet ex his quae dicit in II cap. de Div. Nom., ubi dicit quod his, quae pertinent ad humanam eius operationem, pater et Spiritus Sanctus nulla ratione communicant, nisi quis dixerit secundum benignissimam et misericordem voluntatem, inquantum scilicet pater et Spiritus Sanctus ex sua misericordia voluerunt Christum agere et pati humana. Addit autem, et omnem sublimissimam et ineffabilem Dei operationem quam operatus est secundum nos factus incommutabilis eo quod Deus et Dei verbum. Sic igitur patet quod alia est eius operatio humana, in qua pater et Spiritus Sanctus non communicant nisi secundum acceptationem misericordiae suae, et alia est eius operatio inquantum est Dei verbum, in qua communicant pater et Spiritus Sanctus. Ad secundum dicendum quod instrumentum dicitur aliquid ex eo quod movetur a principali agente, quod tamen, praeter hoc, potest habere propriam operationem secundum suam formam, ut de igne dictum est. Sic igitur actio instrumenti inquantum est instrumentum, non est alia ab actione principalis agentis, potest tamen habere aliam operationem prout est res quaedam. Sic igitur operatio quae est humanae naturae in Christo, inquantum est instrumentum divinitatis, non est alia ab operatione divinitatis, non enim est alia salvatio qua salvat humanitas Christi, et divinitas eius. Habet tamen humana natura in Christo, inquantum est natura quaedam, quandam propriam operationem praeter divinam, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod operari est hypostasis subsistentis, sed secundum formam et naturam, a qua operatio speciem recipit. Et ideo a diversitate formarum seu naturarum est diversa species operationum, sed ab unitate hypostasis est unitas secundum numerum quantum ad operationem speciei. Sicut ignis habet duas operationes specie differentes, scilicet illuminare et calefacere, secundum differentiam lucis et caloris, et tamen est una numero illuminatio ignis semel illuminantis. Et similiter in Christo oportet quod sint duae operationes specie differentes, secundum eius duas naturas, quaelibet tamen operationum est una numero in Christo, semel facta, sicut una ambulatio et una sanatio. Ad quartum dicendum quod esse et operari est personae a natura, aliter tamen et aliter. Nam esse pertinet ad ipsam constitutionem personae, et sic quantum ad hoc se habet in ratione termini. Et ideo unitas personae requirit unitatem ipsius esse completi et personalis. Sed operatio est quidam effectus personae secundum aliquam formam vel naturam. Unde pluralitas operationum non praeiudicat unitati personali.

IIIae

does, but, God having been made man, by a new operation of God and man. Now, that he understood two operations in Christ, one of the Divine and the other of the human nature, is clear from what he says, Div. Nom. ii: Whatever pertains to His human operation the Father and the Holy Spirit no-wise share in, except, as one might say, by their most gracious and merciful will, i.e., inasmuch as the Father and the Holy Spirit in their mercy wished Christ to do and to suffer human things. And he adds: He is truly the unchangeable God, and God’s Word by the sublime and unspeakable operation of God, which, being made man for us, He wrought. Hence it is clear that the human operation, in which the Father and the Holy Spirit do not share, except by Their merciful consent, is distinct from His operation, as the Word of God, wherein the Father and the Holy Spirit share.

Reply Obj. 2: The instrument is said to act through being moved by the principal agent; and yet, besides this, it can have its proper operation through its own form, as stated above of fire. And hence the action of the instrument as instrument is not distinct from the action of the principal agent; yet it may have another operation, inasmuch as it is a thing. Hence the operation of Christ’s human nature, as the instrument of the Godhead, is not distinct from the operation of the Godhead; for the salvation wherewith the manhood of Christ saves us and that wherewith His Godhead saves us are not distinct; nevertheless, the human nature in Christ, inasmuch as it is a certain nature, has a proper operation distinct from the Divine, as stated above. Reply Obj. 3: To operate belongs to a subsisting hypostasis; in accordance, however, with the form and nature from which the operation receives its species. Hence from the diversity of forms or natures spring the diverse species of operations, but from the unity of hypostasis springs the numerical unity as regards the operation of the species: thus fire has two operations specifically different, namely, to illuminate and to heat, from the difference of light and heat, and yet the illumination of the fire that illuminates at one and the same time is numerically one. So, likewise, in Christ there are necessarily two specifically different operations by reason of His two natures; nevertheless, each of the operations at one and the same time is numerically one, as one walking and one healing. Reply Obj. 4: Being and operation belong to the person by reason of the nature; yet in a different manner. For being belongs to the very constitution of the person, and in this respect it has the nature of a term; consequently, unity of person requires unity of the complete and personal being. But operation is an effect of the person by reason of a form or nature. Hence plurality of operations is not incompatible with personal unity.

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Ad quintum dicendum quod aliud est proprium operatum operationis divinae, et operationis humanae in Christo, sicut operatum proprium divinae operationis est sanatio leprosi, operatum autem proprium humanae naturae est eius contactus. Concurrunt tamen ambae operationes ad unum operatum secundum quod una natura agit cum communione alterius, ut dictum est.

Q. 19, A. 2

Reply Obj. 5: The proper work of the Divine operation is different from the proper work of the human operation. Thus to heal a leper is a proper work of the Divine operation, but to touch him is the proper work of the human operation. Now both these operations concur in one work, inasmuch as one nature acts in union with the other.

Article 2 Whether in Christ there are several human operations? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo sint plures humanae operationes. Christus enim, inquantum homo, communicat cum plantis in natura nutritiva, cum animalibus autem in natura sensitiva, cum Angelis vero in natura intellectiva, sicut et ceteri homines. Sed alia est operatio plantae inquantum est planta, et alia animalis inquantum est animal. Ergo Christus, inquantum est homo, habet plures operationes. Praeterea, potentiae et habitus distinguuntur secundum actus. Sed in anima Christi fuerunt diversae potentiae et diversi habitus. Ergo diversae operationes. Praeterea, instrumenta debent esse proportionata operationibus. Corpus autem humanum habet diversa membra differentia secundum formam. Ergo diversis operationibus accommodata. Sunt igitur in Christo diversae operationes secundum humanam naturam. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, operatio sequitur naturam. Sed in Christo est tantum una humana natura. Ergo in Christo fuit tantum una operatio humana. Respondeo dicendum quod, quia homo est id quod est secundum rationem, illa operatio dicitur esse simpliciter humana quae a ratione procedit per voluntatem, quae est rationis appetitus. Si qua autem operatio est in homine quae non procedit a ratione et voluntate, non est simpliciter operatio humana, sed convenit homini secundum aliquam partem humanae naturae, quandoque quidem secundum ipsam naturam elementi corporalis, sicut ferri deorsum; quandoque vero secundum virtutem animae vegetabilis, sicut nutriri et augeri; quandoque vero secundum partem sensitivam, sicut videre et audire, imaginari et memorari, concupiscere et irasci. Inter quas operationes est differentia. Nam operationes animae sensitivae sunt aliqualiter obedientes rationi, et ideo sunt aliqualiter rationales et humanae, inquantum scilicet obediunt rationi, ut patet per philosophum, in I Ethic. Operationes vero quae sequuntur animam vegetabilem, vel etiam naturam elementalis corporis, non subiiciuntur rationi, unde nullo modo sunt rationales, nec humanae simpliciter, sed solum secundum partem

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there are several human operations. For Christ as man communicates with plants by His nutritive soul, with the brutes by His sensitive soul, and with the angels by His intellective soul, even as other men do. Now the operations of a plant as plant and of an animal as animal are different. Therefore Christ as man has several operations. Obj. 2: Further, powers and habits are distinguished by their acts. Now in Christ’s soul there were diverse powers and habits; therefore also diverse operations. Obj. 3: Further, instruments ought to be proportioned to their operations. Now the human body has diverse members of different form, and consequently fitted to diverse operations. Therefore in Christ there are diverse operations in the human nature. On the contrary, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 15), operation is consequent upon the nature. But in Christ there is only one human nature. Therefore in Christ there is only one human operation. I answer that, Since it is by his reason that man is what he is; that operation is called human simply, which proceeds from the reason through the will, which is the rational appetite. Now if there is any operation in man which does not proceed from the reason and the will, it is not simply a human operation, but belongs to man by reason of some part of human nature—sometimes by reason of the nature of elementary bodies, as to be borne downwards— sometimes by reason of the force of the vegetative soul, as to be nourished, and to grow—sometimes by reason of the sensitive part, as to see and hear, to imagine and remember, to desire and to be angry. Now between these operations there is a difference. For the operations of the sensitive soul are to some extent obedient to reason, and consequently they are somewhat rational and human inasmuch as they obey reason, as is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13). But the operations that spring from the vegetative soul, or from the nature of elemental bodies, are not subject to reason; consequently they are nowise rational; nor simply human, but only as regards a part of human nature. Now it

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humanae naturae. Dictum est autem supra quod quando agens inferius agit per propriam formam, tunc est alia operatio inferioris agentis et superioris, quando vero agens inferius non agit nisi secundum quod est motum a superiori agente, tunc est eadem operatio superioris agentis et inferioris. Sic igitur in quocumque homine puro alia est operatio elementalis et animae vegetabilis ab operatione voluntatis, quae est proprie humana. Similiter etiam operatio animae sensitivae quantum ad id quod non movetur a ratione, sed quantum ad id quod movetur a ratione, est eadem operatio partis sensitivae et rationalis. Ipsius autem animae rationalis est una operatio, si attendamus ad ipsum principium operationis, quod est ratio vel voluntas, diversificatur autem secundum respectum ad diversa obiecta; quam quidem diversitatem aliqui appellaverunt diversitatem operatorum, magis quam operationum, iudicantes de unitate operationis solum ex parte operativi principii; sic enim nunc quaeritur de unitate vel pluralitate operationum in Christo. Sic igitur in quolibet puro homine est tantum una operatio quae proprie humana dicitur, praeter quam tamen sunt in homine puro quaedam aliae operationes, quae non sunt proprie humanae, sicut dictum est. Sed in homine Iesu Christo nullus erat motus sensitivae partis qui non esset ordinatus a ratione. Ipsae etiam operationes naturales et corporales aliqualiter ad eius voluntatem pertinebant, inquantum voluntatis eius erat ut caro eius ageret et pateretur quae sunt sibi propria, ut dictum est supra. Et ideo multo magis est una operatio in Christo quam in quocumque alio homine. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod operatio partis sensitivae et nutritivae non est proprie humana, sicut dictum est. Et tamen in Christo huiusmodi operationes fuerunt magis humanae quam in aliis. Ad secundum dicendum quod potentiae et habitus diversificantur per comparationem ad obiecta, et ideo diversitas operationum hoc modo respondet diversis potentiis et habitibus sicut etiam respondet diversis obiectis. Talem autem diversitatem operationum non intendimus excludere ab humanitate Christi, sicut nec eam quae est secundum aliud tempus, sed solum illam quae est secundum primum principium activum, ut dictum est.

IIIae

was said (A. 1) that when a subordinate agent acts by its own form, the operations of the inferior and of the superior agent are distinct; but when the inferior agent acts only as moved by the superior agent, then the operation of the superior and the inferior agent is one. And hence in every mere man the operations of the elemental body and of the vegetative soul are distinct from the will’s operation, which is properly human; so likewise the operations of the sensitive soul inasmuch as it is not moved by reason; but inasmuch as it is moved by reason, the operations of the sensitive and the rational part are the same. Now there is but one operation of the rational part if we consider the principle of the operation, which is the reason and the will; but the operations are many if we consider their relationship to various objects. And there were some who called this a diversity of things operated rather than of operations, judging the unity of the operation solely from the operative principle. And it is in this respect that we are now considering the unity and plurality of operations in Christ. Hence in every mere man there is but one operation, which is properly called human; but besides this there are in a mere man certain other operations, which are not strictly human, as was said above. But in the Man Jesus Christ there was no motion of the sensitive part which was not ordered by reason. Even the natural and bodily operations pertained in some respects to His will, inasmuch as it was His will that His flesh should do and suffer what belonged to it, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 5). Much more, therefore, is there one operation in Christ, than in any other man whatsoever. Reply Obj. 1: The operations of the sensitive and nutritive parts are not strictly human, as stated above; yet in Christ these operations were more human than in others. Reply Obj. 2: Powers and habits are diversified by comparison with their objects. Hence in this way the diversity of operations corresponds to the diverse powers and habits, as likewise to the diverse objects. Now we do not wish to exclude this diversity of operations from Christ’s humanity, nor that which springs from a diversity of time, but only that which regards the first active principle, as was said above.

Article 3 Whether the human action of Christ could be meritorious to him? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod actio Objection 1: It would seem that the human action humana Christi non potuit ei esse meritoria. Christus of Christ could not be meritorious to Him. For before His enim ante mortem fuit comprehensor, sicut et modo est. death Christ was a comprehensor even as He is now. But

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Sed comprehensoris non est mereri, caritas enim comprehensoris pertinet ad praemium beatitudinis, cum secundum eam attendatur fruitio; unde non videtur esse principium merendi, cum non sit idem meritum et praemium. Ergo Christus ante passionem non merebatur, sicut nec modo meretur. Praeterea, nullus meretur id quod est sibi debitum. Sed ex hoc quod Christus est filius Dei per naturam, debetur sibi hereditas aeterna, quam alii homines per bona opera merentur. Non ergo Christus aliquid sibi mereri potuit, qui a principio fuit filius Dei. Praeterea, quicumque habet id quod est principale, non proprie meretur id quod ex illo habito sequitur. Sed Christus habuit gloriam animae, ex qua secundum communem ordinem sequitur gloria corporis, ut Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Dioscorum, in Christo tamen dispensative factum est quod gloria animae non derivaretur ad corpus. Non ergo Christus meruit gloriam corporis. Praeterea, manifestatio excellentiae Christi non est bonum ipsius Christi, sed eorum qui eum cognoscunt, unde et pro praemio promittitur dilectoribus Christi ut eis manifestetur, secundum illud Ioan. XIV, si quis diligit me, diligetur a patre meo, et ego diligam eum, et manifestabo ei meipsum. Ergo Christus non meruit manifestationem suae altitudinis. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Philipp. II, factus est obediens usque ad mortem, propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum. Meruit ergo obediendo suam exaltationem, et ita aliquid sibi meruit. Respondeo dicendum quod habere aliquod bonum per se est nobilius quam habere illud per aliud, semper enim causa quae est per se, potior est ea quae est per aliud, ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Hoc autem dicitur aliquis habere per seipsum, cuius est sibi aliquo modo causa. Prima autem causa omnium bonorum nostrorum per auctoritatem est Deus, et per hunc modum nulla creatura habet aliquid boni per seipsam, secundum illud I Cor. IV, quid habes quod non accepisti? Potest tamen secundario aliquis esse causa sibi alicuius boni habendi, inquantum scilicet in hoc ipso Deo cooperatur. Et sic ille qui habet aliquid per meritum proprium, habet quodammodo illud per seipsum. Unde nobilius habetur id quod habetur per meritum quam id quod habetur sine merito. Quia autem omnis perfectio et nobilitas Christo est attribuenda, consequens est quod ipse per meritum habuit illud quod alii per meritum habent, nisi sit tale quid cuius carentia magis dignitati Christi et perfectioni praeiudicet quam per meritum accrescat. Unde nec gratiam, nec scientiam, nec beatitudinem animae, nec divinitatem meruit, quia, cum meritum non sit nisi eius quod nondum habetur, oportet quod Christus aliquando istis caruisset; quibus carere magis diminuit dignitatem Christi quam augeat meritum. Sed gloria corporis, vel si

Q. 19, A. 3

comprehensors do not merit: because the charity of the comprehensor belongs to the reward of beatitude, since fruition depends upon it. Hence it does not seem to be the principle of merit, since merit and reward are not the same. Therefore Christ before His passion did not merit, even as He does not merit now. Obj. 2: Further, no one merits what is due to him. But because Christ is the Son of God by nature, the eternal inheritance is due to Him, which other men merit by their works. And hence Christ Who, from the beginning, was the Word of God, could not merit anything for Himself. Obj. 3: Further, whoever has the principle does not properly merit what flows from its possession. But Christ has the glory of the soul, whence, in the natural course, flowed the glory of the body, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dios cxviii); though by a dispensation it was brought about that in Christ the glory of the soul should not overflow to the body. Hence Christ did not merit the glory of the body. Obj. 4: Further, the manifestation of Christ’s excellence is a good, not of Christ Himself, but of those who know Him. Hence it is promised as a reward to such as love Christ that He will be manifested to them, according to John 14:21: He that loveth Me, shall be loved of My Father, and I will love him and will manifest Myself to him. Therefore Christ did not merit the manifestation of His greatness. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil 2:8, 9): Becoming obedient unto death . . . For which cause God also hath exalted Him. Therefore by obeying He merited His exaltation and thus He merited something for Himself. I answer that, To have any good thing of oneself is more excellent than to have it from another, for what is of itself a cause is always more excellent than what is a cause through another, as is said Phys. viii, 5. Now a thing is said to have, of itself, that of which it is to some extent the cause. But of whatever good we possess the first cause by authority is God; and in this way no creature has any good of itself, according to 1 Cor. 4:7: What hast thou that thou hast not received? Nevertheless, in a secondary manner anyone may be a cause, to himself, of having certain good things, inasmuch as he cooperates with God in the matter, and thus whoever has anything by his own merit has it, in a manner, of himself. Hence it is better to have a thing by merit than without merit. Now since all perfection and greatness must be attributed to Christ, consequently He must have by merit what others have by merit; unless it be of such a nature that its want would detract from Christ’s dignity and perfection more than would accrue to Him by merit. Hence He merited neither grace nor knowledge nor the beatitude of His soul, nor the Godhead, because, since merit regards only what is not yet possessed, it would be necessary that Christ should have been without these at some time; and to be without them would have diminished Christ’s dignity more

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quid aliud huiusmodi est, minus est quam dignitas merendi, quae pertinet ad virtutem caritatis. Et ideo dicendum est quod Christus gloriam corporis, et ea quae pertinent ad exteriorem eius excellentiam, sicut est ascensio, veneratio, et alia huiusmodi, habuit per meritum. Et sic patet quod aliquid sibi mereri potuit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod fruitio, quae est actus caritatis, pertinet ad gloriam animae, quam Christus non meruit. Et ideo, si per caritatem aliquid meruit, non sequitur quod idem sit meritum et praemium. Nec tamen per caritatem meruit inquantum erat caritas comprehensoris, sed inquantum erat viatoris, nam ipse fuit simul viator et comprehensor, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo, quia nunc non est viator, non est in statu merendi. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christo, secundum quod est Deus et Dei filius per naturam, debetur gloria divina et dominium omnium sicut primo et supremo domino. Nihilominus tamen debetur ei gloria sicut homini beato, quam quantum ad aliquid debuit habere sine merito, et quantum ad aliquid cum merito, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ad tertium dicendum quod redundantia gloriae ex anima ad corpus est ex divina ordinatione secundum congruentiam humanorum meritorum, ut scilicet, sicut homo meretur per actum animae quem exercet in corpore, ita etiam remuneretur per gloriam animae redundantem ad corpus. Et propter hoc non solum gloria animae, sed etiam gloria corporis cadit sub merito, secundum illud Rom. VIII, vivificabit mortalia corpora nostra, propter inhabitantem spiritum eius in nobis. Et ita potuit cadere sub merito Christi. Ad quartum dicendum quod manifestatio excellentiae Christi pertinet ad bonum eius secundum esse quod habet in notitia aliorum, quamvis principalius pertineat ad bonum eorum qui eum cognoscunt secundum esse quod habent in seipsis. Sed hoc ipsum refertur ad Christum, inquantum sunt eius membra.

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than His merit would have increased it. But the glory of the body, and the like, are less than the dignity of meriting, which pertains to the virtue of charity. Hence we must say that Christ had, by merit, the glory of His body and whatever pertained to His outward excellence, as His Ascension, veneration, and the rest. And thus it is clear that He could merit for Himself. Reply Obj. 1: Fruition, which is an act of charity, pertains to the glory of the soul, which Christ did not merit. Hence if He merited by charity, it does not follow that the merit and the reward are the same. Nor did He merit by charity inasmuch as it was the charity of a comprehensor, but inasmuch as it was that of a wayfarer. For He was at once a wayfarer and a comprehensor, as was said above (Q. 15, A. 10). And therefore, since He is no longer a wayfarer, He is not in the state of meriting. Reply Obj. 2: Because by nature Christ is God and the Son of God, the Divine glory and the lordship of all things are due to Him, as to the first and supreme Lord. Nevertheless a glory is due to Him as a beatified man; and this He has partly without merit, and partly with merit, as is clear from what has been said. Reply Obj. 3: It is by Divine appointment that there is an overflow of glory from the soul to the body, in keeping with human merit; so that as man merits by the act of the soul which he performs in the body, so he may be rewarded by the glory of the soul overflowing to the body. And hence not only the glory of the soul, but also the glory of the body falls under merit, according to Rom. 8:11: He . . . shall quicken also our mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in us. And thus it could fall under Christ’s merit. Reply Obj. 4: The manifestation of Christ’s excellence is His good as regards the being which it has in the knowledge of others; although in regard to the being which they have in themselves it chiefly belongs to the good of those who know Him. Yet even this is referred to Christ inasmuch as they are His members.

Article 4 Whether Christ could merit for others? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus aliis mereri non potuit. Dicitur enim Ezech. XVIII, anima quae peccaverit ipsa morietur. Ergo, pari ratione, anima quae meretur ipsa remunerabitur. Non est ergo possibile quod Christus aliis meruerit. Praeterea, de plenitudine gratiae Christi omnes accipiunt, ut dicitur Ioan. I. Sed alii homines, habentes gratiam Christi, non possunt aliis mereri, dicitur enim

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ could not merit for others. For it is written (Ezek 18:4): The soul that sinneth, the same shall die. Hence, for a like reason, the soul that meriteth, the same shall be recompensed. Therefore it is not possible that Christ merited for others. Obj. 2: Further, of the fullness of Christ’s grace we all receive, as is written John 1:16. Now other men having Christ’s grace cannot merit for others. For it is written

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Ezech. XIV quod, si fuerint in civitate Noe, Daniel et Iob, filium et filiam non liberabunt, sed ipsi iustitia sua liberabunt animas suas. Ergo nec Christus potuit aliquid nobis mereri. Praeterea, merces quam quis meretur, debetur secundum iustitiam, et non secundum gratiam, ut patet Rom. IV. Si ergo Christus meruit salutem nostram, sequitur quod salus nostra non sit ex gratia Dei, sed ex iustitia, et quod iniuste agat cum eis quos non salvat, cum meritum Christi ad omnes se extendat. Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. V, sicut per unius delictum in omnes homines in condemnationem, sic et per unius iustitiam in omnes homines in iustificationem vitae. Sed demeritum Adae derivatur ad condemnationem aliorum. Ergo multo magis meritum Christi ad alios derivatur. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in Christo non solum fuit gratia sicut in quodam homine singulari, sed sicut in capite totius Ecclesiae, cui omnes uniuntur sicut capiti membra, ex quibus constituitur mystice una persona. Et exinde est quod meritum Christi se extendit ad alios, inquantum sunt membra eius, sicut etiam in uno homine actio capitis aliqualiter pertinet ad omnia membra eius, quia non solum sibi sentit, sed omnibus membris. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccatum singularis personae non nocet nisi sibi ipsi. Sed peccatum Adae, qui constitutus est a Deo principium totius naturae, ad alios per carnis propagationem derivatur. Et similiter meritum Christi, qui est a Deo constitutus caput omnium hominum quantum ad gratiam, se extendit ad omnia eius membra. Ad secundum dicendum quod alii de plenitudine Christi accipiunt, non quidem fontem gratiae, sed quandam particularem gratiam. Et ideo non oportet quod alii homines possint aliis mereri, sicut Christus. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut peccatum Adae non derivatur ad alios nisi per carnalem generationem, ita meritum Christi non derivatur ad alios nisi per regenerationem spiritualem, quae fit in Baptismo, per quam Christo incorporamur, secundum illud Galat. III, omnes quotquot in Christo baptizati estis, Christum induistis. Et hoc ipsum est gratiae, quod homini conceditur regenerari in Christo. Et sic salus hominis est ex gratia.

Q. 19, A. 4

(Ezek 14:20) that if Noah and Daniel and Job be in the city . . . they shall deliver neither son nor daughter; but they shall only deliver their own souls by their justice. Hence Christ could not merit anything for us. Obj. 3: Further, the reward that we merit is due according to justice and not according to grace, as is clear from Rom. 4:4. Therefore if Christ merited our salvation it follows that our salvation is not by God’s grace but by justice, and that He acts unjustly with those whom He does not save, since Christ’s merit extends to all. On the contrary, It is written (Rom 5:18): As by the offense of one, unto all men to condemnation; so also by the justice of one, unto all men to justification of life. But Adam’s demerits reached to the condemnation of others. Much more, therefore, does the merit of Christ reach others. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 8, AA. 1, 5), grace was in Christ not merely as in an individual, but also as in the Head of the whole Church, to Whom all are united, as members to a head, who constitute one mystical person. And hence it is that Christ’s merit extends to others inasmuch as they are His members; even as in a man the action of the head reaches in a manner to all his members, since it perceives not merely for itself alone, but for all the members. Reply Obj. 1: The sin of an individual harms himself alone; but the sin of Adam, who was appointed by God to be the principle of the whole nature, is transmitted to others by carnal propagation. So, too, the merit of Christ, Who has been appointed by God to be the head of all men in regard to grace, extends to all His members. Reply Obj. 2: Others receive of Christ’s fullness not indeed the fount of grace, but some particular grace. And hence it need not be that men merit for others, as Christ did. Reply Obj. 3: As the sin of Adam reaches others only by carnal generation, so, too, the merit of Christ reaches others only by spiritual regeneration, which takes place in baptism; wherein we are incorporated with Christ, according to Gal. 3:27, As many of you as have been baptized in Christ, have put on Christ; and it is by grace that it is granted to man to be incorporated with Christ. And thus man’s salvation is from grace.

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Question 20 Christ’s Subjection to the Father Deinde considerandum est de his quae conveniunt Christo per comparationem ad patrem. Quorum quaedam dicuntur de ipso secundum habitudinem ipsius ad patrem, puta quod est ei subiectus; quod ipsum oravit; quod ei in sacerdotio ministravit. Quaedam vero dicuntur, vel dici possunt, secundum habitudinem patris ad ipsum, puta, si pater eum adoptasset; et quod eum praedestinavit. Primo igitur considerandum est de subiectione Christi ad patrem; secundo, de eius oratione; tertio, de ipsius sacerdotio; quarto, de adoptione, an ei conveniat; quinto, de eius praedestinatione. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum Christus sit subiectus patri. Secundo, utrum sit subiectus sibi ipsi.

We must now consider such things as belong to Christ in relation to the Father. Some of these things are predicated of Him because of His relation to the Father, e.g., that He was subject to Him, that He prayed to Him, that He ministered to Him by priesthood. And some are predicated, or may be predicated, of Him because of the Father’s relation to Him, e.g., that the Father adopted Him and that He predestined Him. Hence we must consider (1) Christ’s subjection to the Father; (2) His prayer; (3) His priesthood; (4) Adoption— whether it is becoming to Him; (5) His predestination. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ is subject to the Father? (2) Whether He is subject to Himself?

Article 1 Whether we may say that Christ is subject to the Father? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit dicendum Christum esse subiectum patri. Omne enim quod subiicitur Deo patri, est creatura, quia, ut dicitur in libro de Ecclesiast. Dogmat., in Trinitate nihil est serviens neque subiectum. Sed non est simpliciter dicendum quod Christus sit creatura, ut supra dictum est. Ergo etiam non est simpliciter dicendum quod Christus sit Deo patri subiectus. Praeterea, ex hoc dicitur aliquid Deo subiectum, quod est eius dominio serviens. Sed humanae naturae in Christo non potest attribui servitus, dicit enim Damascenus, in III libro, sciendum quod neque servam ipsam, humanam scilicet naturam Christi, dicere possumus. Servitutis enim et dominationis nomen non naturae sunt cognitiones, sed eorum quae ad aliquid, quemadmodum paternitatis et filiationis. Ergo Christus secundum humanam naturam non est subiectus Deo patri. Praeterea, I Cor. XV dicitur, cum autem subiecta fuerint illi omnia, tunc ipse filius subiectus erit illi qui sibi subiecit omnia. Sed, sicut dicitur Heb. II, nunc necdum videmus ei subiecta omnia. Ergo nondum ipse est subiectus patri, qui ei subiecit omnia.

Objection 1: It would seem that we may not say that Christ was subject to the Father. For everything subject to the Father is a creature, since, as is said in De Eccles. Dogm. iv, in the Trinity there is no dependence or subjection. But we cannot say simply that Christ is a creature, as was stated above (Q. 16, A. 8). Therefore we cannot say simply that Christ is subject to God the Father.

Obj. 2: Further, a thing is said to be subject to God when it is subservient to His dominion. But we cannot attribute subservience to the human nature of Christ; for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 21): We must bear in mind that we may not call it (i.e., Christ’s human nature) a servant; for the words ‘subservience’ and ‘domination’ are not names of the nature, but of relations, as the words ‘paternity’ and ‘filiation.’ Hence Christ in His human nature is not subject to God the Father. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor 15:28): And when all things shall be subdued unto Him, then the Son also Himself shall be subject unto Him that put all things under Him. But, as is written (Heb 2:8): We see not as yet all things subject to Him. Hence He is not yet subject to the Father, Who has subjected all things to Him. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. XIV, pater maOn the contrary, Our Lord says (John 14:28), The ior me est. Et Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., non immeri- Father is greater than I; and Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): to Scriptura utrumque dicit, aequalem patri filium; et pa- It is not without reason that the Scripture mentions both, that

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Q. 20, A. 1

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trem maiorem filio. Illud enim propter formam Dei, hoc autem propter formam servi, sine ulla confusione intelligitur. Sed minor est subiectus maiori. Ergo Christus, secundum formam servi, est patri subiectus. Respondeo dicendum quod cuilibet habenti aliquam naturam conveniunt ea quae sunt propria illius naturae. Natura autem humana ex sui conditione habet triplicem subiectionem ad Deum. Unam quidem secundum gradum bonitatis, prout scilicet natura divina est ipsa essentia bonitatis, ut patet per Dionysium, I cap. de Div. Nom.; natura autem creata habet quandam participationem divinae bonitatis, quasi radiis illius bonitatis subiecta. Secundo, humana natura subiicitur Deo quantum ad Dei potestatem, prout scilicet humana natura, sicut et quaelibet creatura, subiacet operationi divinae dispositionis. Tertio modo, specialiter humana natura Deo subiicitur per proprium suum actum, inquantum scilicet propria voluntate obedit mandatis eius. Et hanc triplicem subiectionem ad patrem Christus de seipso confitetur. Primam quidem, Matth. XIX, quid me interrogas de bono? Unus est bonus Deus. Ubi Hieronymus dicit quod, quia eum magistrum vocaverat bonum, et non Deum vel Dei filium confessus erat, dixit quamvis sanctum hominem in comparatione Dei non esse bonum. Per quod dedit intelligere quod ipse, secundum humanam naturam, non pertingebat ad gradum bonitatis divinae. Et quia in his quae non mole magna sunt, idem est esse maius quod melius, ut Augustinus dicit, in VI de Trin.; ex hac ratione pater dicitur maior Christo secundum humanam naturam. Secunda autem subiectio Christo attribuitur, inquantum omnia quae circa humanitatem Christi acta sunt, divina dispositione gesta creduntur. Unde dicit Dionysius, IV cap. Cael. Hier., quod Christus subiicitur Dei patris ordinationibus. Et haec est subiectio servitutis, secundum quod omnis creatura Deo servit, eius ordinationi subiecta, secundum illud Sap. XVI, creatura tibi factori deserviens. Et secundum hoc etiam filius Dei, Philipp. II, dicitur formam servi accipiens. Tertiam etiam subiectionem attribuit sibi ipsi, Ioan. VIII, dicens, quae placita sunt ei, facio semper. Et haec est subiectio obedientiae. Unde dicitur Philipp. II quod factus est obediens patri usque ad mortem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut non est simpliciter intelligendum quod Christus sit creatura, sed solum secundum humanam naturam, sive apponatur ei determinatio sive non, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam non est simpliciter intelligendum quod Christus sit subiectus patri, sed solum secundum humanam naturam, etiam si haec determinatio non apponatur. Quam tamen convenientius est apponere, ad evitandum errorem Arii, qui posuit filium minorem patre. Ad secundum dicendum quod relatio servitutis et dominii fundatur super actione et passione, inquantum

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the Son is equal to the Father and the Father greater than the Son, for the first is said on account of the form of God, and the second on account of the form of a servant, without any confusion. Now the less is subject to the greater. Therefore in the form of a servant Christ is subject to the Father. I answer that, Whoever has a nature is competent to have what is proper to that nature. Now human nature from its beginning has a threefold subjection to God. The first regards the degree of goodness, inasmuch as the Divine Nature is the very essence of goodness as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) while a created nature has a participation of the Divine goodness, being subject, so to say, to the rays of this goodness. Second, human nature is subject to God, as regards God’s power, inasmuch as human nature, even as every creature, is subject to the operation of the Divine ordinance. Third, human nature is especially subject to God through its proper act, inasmuch as by its own will it obeys His command. This triple subjection to God Christ professes of Himself. The first (Matt 19:17): Why askest thou Me concerning good? One is good, God. And on this Jerome remarks: He who had called Him a good master, and had not confessed Him to be God or the Son of God, learns that no man, however holy, is good in comparison with God. And hereby He gave us to understand that He Himself, in His human nature, did not attain to the height of Divine goodness. And because in such things as are great, but not in bulk, to be great is the same as to be good, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8), for this reason the Father is said to be greater than Christ in His human nature. The second subjection is attributed to Christ, inasmuch as all that befell Christ is believed to have happened by Divine appointment; hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that Christ is subject to the ordinance of God the Father. And this is the subjection of subservience, whereby every creature serves God (Jdt 16:17), being subject to His ordinance, according to Wis. 16:24: The creature serving Thee the Creator. And in this way the Son of God (Phil 2:7) is said to have taken the form of a servant. The third subjection He attributes to Himself, saying (John 8:29): I do always the things that please Him. And this is the subjection to the Father, of obedience unto death. Hence it is written (Phil 2:8) that he became obedient to the Father unto death. Reply Obj. 1: As we are not to understand that Christ is a creature simply, but only in His human nature, whether this qualification be added or not, as stated above (Q. 16, A. 8), so also we are to understand that Christ is subject to the Father not simply but in His human nature, even if this qualification be not added; and yet it is better to add this qualification in order to avoid the error of Arius, who held the Son to be less than the Father. Reply Obj. 2: The relation of subservience and dominion is based upon action and passion, inasmuch as it be-

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scilicet servi est moveri a domino secundum imperium. Agere autem non attribuitur naturae sicut agenti, sed personae, actus enim suppositorum sunt et singularium, secundum philosophum. Attribuitur tamen actio naturae sicut ei secundum quam persona vel hypostasis agit. Et ideo, quamvis non proprie dicatur quod natura sit domina vel serva, potest tamen proprie dici quod aliqua hypostasis vel persona sit domina vel serva secundum hanc vel illam naturam. Et secundum hoc, nihil prohibet Christum dicere patri subiectum, vel servum, secundum humanam naturam. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., tunc Christus tradet regnum Deo et patri, quando iustos, in quibus nunc regnat per fidem, perducturus est ad speciem, ut scilicet videant ipsam essentiam communem patri et filio. Et tunc totaliter erit patri subiectus non solum in se, sed etiam in membris suis, per plenam participationem divinae bonitatis. Tunc etiam omnia erunt plene ei subiecta per finalem impletionem suae voluntatis de eis. Licet etiam modo sint omnia ei subiecta quantum ad potestatem, secundum illud Matth. ult., data est mihi omnis potestas in caelo et in terra, et cetera.

Q. 20, A. 2

longs to a servant to be moved by the will of his master. Now to act is not attributed to the nature as agent, but to the person, since acts belong to supposita and to singulars, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1). Nevertheless action is attributed to the nature as to that whereby the person or hypostasis acts. Hence, although the nature is not properly said to rule or serve, yet every hypostasis or person may be properly said to be ruling or serving in this or that nature. And in this way nothing prevents Christ being subject or servant to the Father in human nature. Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8): Christ will give the kingdom to God and the Father, when He has brought the faithful, over whom He now reigns by faith, to the vision, i.e., to see the essence common to the Father and the Son: and then He will be totally subject to the Father not only in Himself, but also in His members by the full participation of the Godhead. And then all things will be fully subject to Him by the final accomplishment of His will concerning them; although even now all things are subject to Him as regards His power, according to Matt. 28:18: All power is given to Me in heaven and in earth.

Article 2 Whether Christ is subject to himself? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non sit sibi ipsi subiectus. Dicit enim Cyrillus, in epistola synodica, quam scilicet synodus Ephesina recepit, neque, inquit, ipse Christus sibi servus est neque dominus. Fatuum enim est, magis autem et impium, ita dicere vel sapere. Et hoc etiam asseruit Damascenus, in III libro, dicens, unum enim ens Christus non potest servus esse sui ipsius et dominus. Sed intantum dicitur servus patris Christus, inquantum est ei subiectus. Ergo Christus non est subiectus sibi ipsi. Praeterea, servus refertur ad dominum. Sed relatio non est alicuius ad seipsum, unde et Hilarius dicit, in libro de Trin., quod nihil est sibi simile aut aequale. Ergo Christus non potest dici servus sui ipsius. Et per consequens, nec sibi esse subiectus. Preaterea, sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est homo, ita Deus et homo unus est Christus, ut Athanasius dicit. Sed homo non dicitur subiectus sibi ipsi, vel servus sui ipsius, aut maior seipso, propter hoc quod corpus eius subiectum est animae. Ergo neque Christus dicitur subiectus sibi ipsi propter hoc quod eius humanitas subiecta est divinitati ipsius. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., veritas ostendit, secundum istum modum, quo scilicet

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not subject to Himself. For Cyril says in a synodal letter which the Council of Ephesus (Part I, ch. xxvi) received: Christ is neither servant nor master of Himself. It is foolish, or rather impious, to think or say this. And Damascene says the same (De Fide Orth. iii, 21): The one Being, Christ, cannot be the servant or master of Himself. Now Christ is said to be the servant of the Father inasmuch as He is subject to Him. Hence Christ is not subject to Himself. Obj. 2: Further, servant has reference to master. Now nothing has a relation to itself, hence Hilary says (De Trin. vii) that nothing is like or equal to itself. Hence Christ cannot be said to be the servant of Himself, and consequently to be subject to Himself. Obj. 3: Further, as the rational soul and flesh are one man; so God and man are one Christ, as Athanasius says (Symb. Fid.). Now man is not said to be subject to himself or servant to himself or greater than himself because his body is subject to his soul. Therefore, Christ is not said to be subject to Himself because His Manhood is subject to His Godhead. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): Truth shows in this way (i.e., whereby the Father is greater

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pater maior est Christo secundum humanam naturam, etiam seipso minorem filium. Praeterea, sicut ipse argumentatur ibidem, sic accepta est a filio Dei forma servi ut non amitteretur forma Dei. Sed secundum formam Dei quae est communis patri et filio, pater est filio maior secundum humanam naturam. Ergo etiam filius maior est seipso secundum humanam naturam. Praeterea, Christus, secundum humanam naturam, est servus Dei patris secundum illud Ioan. XX, ascendo ad patrem meum et patrem vestrum, Deum meum et Deum vestrum. Sed quicumque est servus patris, est servus filii, alioquin non omnia quae sunt patris essent filii. Ergo Christus est servus sui ipsius, et sibi subditus. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, esse dominum et servum attribuitur personae vel hypostasi secundum aliquam naturam. Cum ergo Christus dicitur esse dominus vel servus sui ipsius, vel quod verbum Dei est dominus hominis Christi, hoc potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, ut intelligatur hoc esse dictum ratione alterius hypostasis vel personae, quasi alia sit persona verbi Dei dominantis, et alia hominis servientis, quod pertinet ad haeresim Nestorii. Unde in condemnatione Nestorii dicitur in synodo Ephesina, si quis dicit Deum vel dominum esse Christi ex Deo patre verbum, et non eundem magis confitetur simul Deum et hominem, utpote verbo carne facto, secundum Scripturas, anathema sit. Et hoc modo negatur a Cyrillo et Damasceno. Et sub eodem sensu negandum est Christum esse minorem seipso, vel esse sibi ipsi subiectum. Alio modo potest intelligi secundum diversitatem naturarum in una persona vel hypostasi. Et sic dicere possumus, secundum unam earum, in qua cum patre convenit, simul eum cum patre praeesse et dominari, secundum vero alteram naturam, in qua nobiscum convenit, ipsum subesse et servire. Et secundum hunc modum dicit Augustinus filium esse seipso minorem. Sciendum tamen quod, cum hoc nomen Christus sit nomen personae, sicut et hoc nomen filius, illa per se et absolute possunt dici de Christo quae conveniunt ei ratione suae personae, quae est aeterna, et maxime huiusmodi relationes, quae magis proprie videntur ad personam vel hypostasim pertinere. Sed ea quae conveniunt sibi secundum humanam naturam, sunt ei potius attribuenda cum determinatione. Ut videlicet dicamus Christum simpliciter esse maximum, et dominum, et praesidentem, quod autem sit subiectus, vel servus, vel minor, est ei attribuendum cum determinatione, scilicet, secundum humanam naturam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Cyrillus et Damascenus negant Christum esse dominum sui ipsius, se-

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than Christ in human nature) that the Son is less than Himself. Further, as he argues (De Trin. i, 7), the form of a servant was so taken by the Son of God that the form of God was not lost. But because of the form of God, which is common to the Father and the Son, the Father is greater than the Son in human nature. Therefore the Son is greater than Himself in human nature. Further, Christ in His human nature is the servant of God the Father, according to John 20:17: I ascend to My Father and to your Father, to My God and your God. Now whoever is the servant of the Father is the servant of the Son; otherwise not everything that belongs to the Father would belong to the Son. Therefore Christ is His own servant and is subject to Himself. I answer that, As was said above (A. 1, ad 2), to be master or servant is attributed to a person or hypostasis according to a nature. Hence when it is said that Christ is the master or servant of Himself, or that the Word of God is the Master of the Man Christ, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that this is understood to be said by reason of another hypostasis or person, as if there was the person of the Word of God ruling and the person of the man serving; and this is the heresy of Nestorius. Hence in the condemnation of Nestorius it is said in the Council of Ephesus (Part III, ch. i, anath. 6): If anyone say that the Word begotten of God the Father is the God or Lord of Christ, and does not rather confess the same to be at once God and man as the Word made flesh, according to the Scriptures, let him be anathema. And in this sense it is denied by Cyril and Damascene (Obj. 1); and in the same sense must it be denied that Christ is less than Himself or subject to Himself. Second, it may be understood of the diversity of natures in the one person or hypostasis. And thus we may say that in one of them, in which He agrees with the Father, He presides and rules together with the Father; and in the other nature, in which He agrees with us, He is subject and serves, and in this sense Augustine says that the Son is less than Himself. Yet it must be borne in mind that since this name Christ is the name of a Person, even as the name Son, those things can be predicated essentially and absolutely of Christ which belong to Him by reason of the Person, Which is eternal; and especially those relations which seem more properly to pertain to the Person or the hypostasis. But whatever pertains to Him in His human nature is rather to be attributed to Him with a qualification; so that we say that Christ is simply greatest, Lord, Ruler, whereas to be subject or servant or less is to be attributed to Him with the qualification, in His human nature. Reply Obj. 1: Cyril and Damascene deny that Christ is the head of Himself inasmuch as this implies a plurality

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cundum quod per hoc importatur pluralitas suppositorum, quae requiritur ad hoc quod aliquis simpliciter sit dominus alicuius. Ad secundum dicendum quod simpliciter quidem oportet esse alium dominum et alium servum, potest tamen aliqua ratio dominii et servitutis servari prout idem est dominus sui ipsius secundum aliud et aliud. Ad tertium dicendum quod, propter diversas partes hominis, quarum una est superior et alia inferior, dicit etiam philosophus, in V Ethic., quod iustitia hominis est ad seipsum, inquantum irascibilis et concupiscibilis obediunt rationi. Secundum etiam hunc modum unus homo potest dici sibi subiectus et serviens, secundum diversas sui partes. Ad alia autem argumenta patet responsio ex dictis. Nam Augustinus asserit filium seipso minorem, vel sibi subiectum, secundum humanam naturam, non secundum diversitatem suppositorum.

Q. 20, A. 2

of supposita, which is required in order that anyone may be the master of another. Reply Obj. 2: Simply speaking it is necessary that the master and the servant should be distinct; yet a certain notion of mastership and subservience may be preserved inasmuch as the same one is master of Himself in different respects. Reply Obj. 3: On account of the diverse parts of man, one of which is superior and the other inferior, the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 11) that there is justice between a man and himself inasmuch as the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason. Hence this way a man may be said to be subject and subservient to Himself as regards His different parts. To the other arguments, the reply is clear from what has been said. For Augustine asserts that the Son is less than, or subject to, Himself in His human nature, and not by a diversity of supposita.

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Question 21 Christ’s Prayer Deinde considerandum est de oratione Christi. Et We must now consider Christ’s prayer; and under this circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum Christo conveniat orare. (1) Whether it is becoming that Christ should pray? Secundo, utrum conveniat sibi secundum suam (2) Whether it pertains to Him in respect of His sensualitatem. sensuality? Tertio, utrum conveniat sibi orare pro seipso, an (3) Whether it is becoming to Him to pray for Himself tantum pro aliis. or only for others? Quarto, utrum omnis oratio eius sit exaudita. (4) Whether every prayer of His was heard?

Article 1 Whether it is becoming of Christ to pray? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christo non competat orare. Nam, sicut dicit Damascenus, oratio est petitio decentium a Deo. Sed, cum Christus omnia facere posset, non videtur ei convenire quod aliquid ab aliquo peteret. Ergo videtur quod Christo non conveniat orare. Praeterea, non oportet orando petere illud quod aliquis scit pro certo esse futurum, sicut non oramus quod sol oriatur cras. Neque etiam est conveniens quod aliquis orando petat quod scit nullo modo esse futurum. Sed Christus sciebat circa omnia quid esset futurum. Ergo non conveniebat ei aliquid orando petere. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod oratio est ascensus intellectus in Deum. Sed intellectus Christi non indigebat ascensione in Deum, quia semper intellectus eius erat Deo coniunctus, non solum secundum unionem hypostasis, sed etiam secundum fruitionem beatitudinis. Ergo Christo non conveniebat orare. Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. VI, factum est in illis diebus, exiit in montem orare, et erat pernoctans in oratione Dei. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est in secunda parte, oratio est quaedam explicatio propriae voluntatis apud Deum, ut eam impleat. Si igitur in Christo esset una tantum voluntas, scilicet divina, nullo modo sibi competeret orare, quia voluntas divina per seipsam est effectiva eorum quae vult, secundum illud Psalmi, omnia quaecumque voluit dominus fecit. Sed quia in Christo est alia voluntas divina et alia humana; et voluntas humana non est per seipsam efficax ad implendum ea quae vult, nisi per virtutem divinam, inde est quod Christo, secundum quod est homo et humanam voluntatem habens, competit orare.

Objection 1: It would seem unbecoming that Christ should pray. For, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24), prayer is the asking for becoming things from God. But since Christ could do all things, it does not seem becoming to Him to ask anything from anyone. Therefore it does not seem fitting that Christ should pray. Obj. 2: Further, we need not ask in prayer for what we know for certain will happen; thus, we do not pray that the sun may rise tomorrow. Nor is it fitting that anyone should ask in prayer for what he knows will not happen. But Christ in all things knew what would happen. Therefore it was not fitting that He should ask anything in prayer. Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that prayer is the raising up of the mind to God. Now Christ’s mind needed no uplifting to God, since His mind was always united to God, not only by the union of the hypostasis, but by the fruition of beatitude. Therefore it was not fitting that Christ should pray. On the contrary, It is written (Luke 6:12): And it came to pass in those days, that He went out into a mountain, and He passed the whole night in the prayer of God. I answer that, As was said in the Second Part (Q. 83, AA. 1, 2), prayer is the unfolding of our will to God, that He may fulfill it. If, therefore, there had been but one will in Christ, viz. the Divine, it would nowise belong to Him to pray, since the Divine will of itself is effective of whatever He wishes by it, according to Ps. 134:6: Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done. But because the Divine and the human wills are distinct in Christ, and the human will of itself is not efficacious enough to do what it wishes, except by Divine power, hence to pray belongs to Christ as man and as having a human will.

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Incarnation

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus poterat perficere omnia quae volebat secundum quod Deus, non autem secundum quod homo, quia, secundum quod homo, non habuit omnipotentiam, ut supra habitum est. Nihilominus tamen, idem ipse Deus existens et homo, voluit ad patrem orationem porrigere, non quasi ipse esset impotens, sed propter nostram instructionem. Primo quidem, ut ostenderet se esse a patre. Unde ipse dicit, Ioan. XI, propter populum qui circumstat dixi, scilicet verba orationis, ut credant quia tu me misisti. Unde Hilarius, in X de Trin., dicit, non prece eguit, nobis oravit, ne filius ignoraretur. Secundo, ut nobis exemplum daret. Unde Ambrosius dicit, super Luc., noli insidiatrices aperire aures, ut putes filium Dei quasi infirmum rogare, ut impetret quod implere non possit. Potestatis enim auctor, obedientiae magister, ad praecepta virtutis suo nos informat exemplo. Unde et Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., poterat dominus in forma servi, si hoc opus esset, orare silentio. Sed ita se patri voluit exhibere precatorem, ut meminisset nostrum se esse doctorem. Ad secundum dicendum quod, inter alia quae Christus scivit futura, scivit quaedam esse fienda propter suam orationem. Et huiusmodi non inconvenienter a Deo petiit. Ad tertium dicendum quod ascensio nihil est aliud quam motus in id quod est sursum. Motus autem, ut dicitur in III de anima, dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, proprie, secundum quod importat exitum de potentia in actum, prout est actus imperfecti. Et sic ascendere competit ei quod est potentia sursum et non actu. Et hoc modo, ut Damascenus dicit, in III libro, intellectus humanus Christi non eget ascensione in Deum, cum sit semper Deo unitus et secundum esse personale, et secundum beatam contemplationem. Alio modo dicitur motus actus perfecti, idest existentis in actu, sicut intelligere et sentire dicuntur quidam motus. Et hoc modo intellectus Christi semper ascendit in Deum, quia semper contemplatur ipsum ut supra se existentem.

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Reply Obj. 1: Christ as God and not as man was able to carry out all He wished, since as man He was not omnipotent, as stated above (Q. 13, A. 1). Nevertheless being both God and man, He wished to offer prayers to the Father, not as though He were incompetent, but for our instruction. First, that He might show Himself to be from the Father; hence He says (John 11:42): Because of the people who stand about I have said it (i.e., the words of the prayer) that they may believe that Thou hast sent Me. Hence Hilary says (De Trin. x): He did not need prayer. It was for us He prayed, lest the Son should be unknown. Second, to give us an example of prayer; hence Ambrose says (on Luke 6:12): Be not deceived, nor think that the Son of God prays as a weakling, in order to beseech what He cannot effect. For the Author of power, the Master of obedience persuades us to the precepts of virtue by His example. Hence Augustine says (Tract. civ in Joan.): Our Lord in the form of a servant could have prayed in silence, if need be, but He wished to show Himself a suppliant of the Father, in such sort as to bear in mind that He was our Teacher. Reply Obj. 2: Amongst the other things which He knew would happen, He knew that some would be brought about by His prayer; and for these He not unbecomingly besought God. Reply Obj. 3: To rise is nothing more than to move towards what is above. Now movement is taken in two ways, as is said De Anima iii, 7; first, strictly, according as it implies the passing from potentiality to act, inasmuch as it is the act of something imperfect, and thus to rise pertains to what is potentially and not actually above. Now in this sense, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24), the human mind of Christ did not need to rise to God, since it was ever united to God both by personal being and by the blessed vision. Second, movement signifies the act of something perfect, i.e., something existing in act, as to understand and to feel are called movements; and in this sense the mind of Christ was always raised up to God, since He was always contemplating Him as existing above Himself.

Article 2 Whether it pertains to Christ to pray according to his sensuality? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christo conveniat orare secundum suam sensualitatem. Dicitur enim in Psalmo, ex persona Christi, cor meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum. Sed sensualitas dicitur appetitus carnis. Ergo Christi sensualitas potuit ascendere in Deum vivum exultando, et pari ratione, orando. Praeterea, eius videtur esse orare cuius est desiderare illud quod petitur. Sed Christus petivit aliquid

Objection 1: It would seem that it pertains to Christ to pray according to His sensuality. For it is written (Ps 83:3) in the person of Christ: My heart and My flesh have rejoiced in the Living God. Now sensuality is called the appetite of the flesh. Hence Christ’s sensuality could ascend to the Living God by rejoicing; and with equal reason by praying. Obj. 2: Further, prayer would seem to pertain to that which desires what is besought. Now Christ be-

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quod desideravit sensualitas, cum dixit, transeat a me calix iste, ut habetur Matth. XXVI. Ergo sensualitas Christi oravit. Praeterea, magis est uniri Deo in persona quam ascendere in Deum per orationem. Sed sensualitas fuit assumpta a Deo in unitate personae, sicut et quaelibet pars humanae naturae. Ergo multo magis potuit ascendere in Deum orando. Sed contra est quod Philipp. II dicitur quod filius Dei, secundum naturam quam assumpsit, est in similitudinem hominum factus. Sed alii homines non orant secundum sensualitatem. Ergo nec Christus oravit secundum sensualitatem. Respondeo dicendum quod orare secundum sensualitatem potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, sic quod oratio sit actus sensualitatis. Et hoc modo Christus secundum sensualitatem non oravit. Quia eius sensualitas eiusdem naturae et speciei fuit in Christo et in nobis. In nobis autem non potest orare, duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia motus sensualitatis non potest sensualia transcendere, et ideo non potest in Deum ascendere, quod requiritur ad orationem. Secundo, quia oratio importat quandam ordinationem, prout aliquis desiderat aliquid quasi a Deo implendum, et hoc est solius rationis. Unde oratio est actus rationis, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Alio modo potest dici aliquis orare secundum sensualitatem, quia scilicet eius ratio orando Deo proposuit quod erat in appetitu sensualitatis ipsius. Et secundum hoc, Christus oravit secundum sensualitatem, inquantum scilicet eius oratio exprimebat sensualitatis affectum, tanquam sensualitatis advocata. Et hoc, ut nos de tribus instrueret. Primo, ut ostenderet se veram humanam naturam assumpsisse, cum omnibus naturalibus affectibus. Secundo, ut ostenderet quod homini licet, secundum naturalem affectum, aliquid velle quod Deus non vult. Tertio, ut ostendat quod proprium affectum debet homo divinae voluntati subiicere. Unde Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., sic Christus, hominem gerens, ostendit privatam quandam hominis voluntatem, cum dicit, transeat a me calix iste. Haec enim erat humana voluntas, proprium aliquid, et tanquam privatum, volens. Sed quia rectum vult esse hominem, et ad Deum dirigi, subdit, veruntamen non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu, ac si dicat, vide te in me, quia potes aliquid proprium velle, etsi Deus aliud velit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caro exultat in Deum vivum, non per actum carnis ascendentem in Deum, sed per redundantiam a corde in carnem, inquantum appetitus sensitivus sequitur motum appetitus rationalis. Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet sensualitas hoc voluerit quod ratio petebat, hoc tamen orando petere non erat sensualitatis, sed rationis, ut dictum est.

Q. 21, A. 2

sought something that His sensuality desired when He said (Matt 26:39): Let this chalice pass from Me. Therefore Christ’s sensuality prayed. Obj. 3: Further, it is a greater thing to be united to God in person than to mount to Him in prayer. But the sensuality was assumed by God to the unity of Person, even as every other part of human nature. Much more, therefore, could it mount to God by prayer. On the contrary, It is written (Phil 2:7) that the Son of God in the nature that He assumed was made in the likeness of men. But the rest of men do not pray with their sensuality. Therefore, neither did Christ pray according to His sensuality. I answer that, To pray according to sensuality may be understood in two ways. First as if prayer itself were an act of the sensuality; and in this sense Christ did not pray with His sensuality, since His sensuality was of the same nature and species in Christ as in us. Now in us the sensuality cannot pray for two reasons; first because the movement of the sensuality cannot transcend sensible things, and, consequently, it cannot mount to God, which is required for prayer; second, because prayer implies a certain ordering inasmuch as we desire something to be fulfilled by God; and this is the work of reason alone. Hence prayer is an act of the reason, as was said in the Second Part (II-II, Q. 83, A. 1). Second, we may be said to pray according to the sensuality when our prayer lays before God what is in our appetite of sensuality; and in this sense Christ prayed with His sensuality inasmuch as His prayer expressed the desire of His sensuality, as if it were the advocate of the sensuality— and this, that He might teach us three things. First, to show that He had taken a true human nature, with all its natural affections: second, to show that a man may wish with his natural desire what God does not wish: third, to show that man should subject his own will to the Divine will. Hence Augustine says in the Enchiridion (Serm. 1 in Ps. 32): Christ acting as a man, shows the proper will of a man when He says ‘Let this chalice pass from Me’; for this was the human will desiring something proper to itself and, so to say, private. But because He wishes man to be righteous and to be directed to God, He adds: ‘Nevertheless not as I will but as Thou wilt,’ as if to say, ‘See thyself in Me, for thou canst desire something proper to thee, even though God wishes something else.’

Reply Obj. 1: The flesh rejoices in the Living God, not by the act of the flesh mounting to God, but by the outpouring of the heart into the flesh, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite follows the movement of the rational appetite. Reply Obj. 2: Although the sensuality wished what the reason besought, it did not belong to the sensuality to seek this by praying, but to the reason, as stated above.

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Q. 21, A. 3

Incarnation

Ad tertium dicendum quod unio in persona est secundum esse personale, quod pertinet ad quamlibet partem humanae naturae. Sed ascensio orationis est per actum qui non convenit nisi rationi, ut dictum est. Unde non est similis ratio.

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Reply Obj. 3: The union in person is according to the personal being, which pertains to every part of the human nature; but the uplifting of prayer is by an act which pertains only to the reason, as stated above. Hence there is no parity.

Article 3 Whether it was fitting that Christ should pray for himself? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christo non fuerit conveniens pro se orare. Dicit enim Hilarius, in X de Trin., cum sibi non proficeret deprecationis sermo, ad profectum tamen fidei nostrae loquebatur. Sic ergo videtur quod Christus non sibi, sed nobis oraverit. Praeterea, nullus orat nisi pro eo quod vult, quia, sicut dictum est oratio est quaedam explicatio voluntatis per Deum implendae. Sed Christus volebat pati ea quae patiebatur, dicit enim Augustinus, XXVI contra Faustum, homo plerumque, etsi nolit, contristatur; etsi nolit, dormit; etsi nolit, esurit aut sitit. Ille autem, scilicet Christus, omnia ista habuit quia voluit. Ergo ei non competebat pro seipso orare. Praeterea, Cyprianus dicit, in libro de oratione dominica, pacis et unitatis magister noluit sigillatim et privatim precem fieri, ut quis, dum precatur, pro se tantum precetur. Sed Christus illud implevit quod docuit secundum illud Act. I, coepit Iesus facere et docere. Ergo Christus nunquam pro se solo oravit. Sed contra est quod ipse dominus orando dicit, Ioan. XVII, clarifica filium tuum. Respondeo dicendum quod Christus pro se oravit dupliciter. Uno modo, exprimendo affectum sensualitatis, ut supra dictum est; vel etiam voluntatis simplicis, quae consideratur ut natura; sicut cum oravit a se calicem passionis transferri. Alio modo, exprimendo affectum voluntatis deliberatae, quae consideratur ut ratio, sicut cum petiit gloriam resurrectionis. Et hoc rationabiliter. Sicut enim dictum est, Christus ad hoc uti voluit oratione ad patrem, ut nobis daret exemplum orandi; et ut ostenderet patrem suum esse auctorem a quo et aeternaliter processit secundum divinam naturam, et secundum humanam naturam ab eo habet quidquid boni habet. Sicut autem in humana natura quaedam bona habebat a patre iam percepta, ita etiam expectabat ab eo quaedam bona nondum habita, sed percipienda. Et ideo, sicut pro bonis iam perceptis in humana natura gratias agebat patri, recognoscendo eum auctorem, ut patet Matth. XXVI et Ioan. XI, ita etiam, ut patrem auctorem recognosceret, ab eo orando petebat quae sibi deerant secundum humanam naturam, puta gloriam corporis et

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that Christ should pray for Himself. For Hilary says (De Trin. x): Although His word of beseeching did not benefit Himself, yet He spoke for the profit of our faith. Hence it seems that Christ prayed not for Himself but for us. Obj. 2: Further, no one prays save for what He wishes, because, as was said (A. 1), prayer is an unfolding of our will to God that He may fulfill it. Now Christ wished to suffer what He suffered. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi): A man, though unwilling, is often angry; though unwilling, is sad; though unwilling, sleeps; though unwilling, hungers and thirsts. But He (i.e., Christ) did all these things, because He wished. Therefore it was not fitting that He should pray for Himself. Obj. 3: Further, Cyprian says (De Orat. Dom.): The Doctor of Peace and Master of Unity did not wish prayers to be offered individually and privately, lest when we prayed we should pray for ourselves alone. Now Christ did what He taught, according to Acts 1:1: Jesus began to do and to teach. Therefore Christ never prayed for Himself alone. On the contrary, our Lord Himself said while praying (John 17:1): Glorify Thy Son. I answer that, Christ prayed for Himself in two ways. First, by expressing the desire of His sensuality, as stated above (A. 2); or also of His simple will, considered as a nature; as when He prayed that the chalice of His Passion might pass from Him (Matt 26:39). Second, by expressing the desire of His deliberate will, which is considered as reason; as when He prayed for the glory of His Resurrection (John 17:1). And this is reasonable. For as we have said above (A. 1, ad 1) Christ wished to pray to His Father in order to give us an example of praying; and also to show that His Father is the author both of His eternal procession in the Divine Nature, and of all the good that He possesses in the human nature. Now just as in His human nature He had already received certain gifts from His Father, so there were other gifts which He had not yet received, but which He expected to receive. And therefore, as He gave thanks to the Father for gifts already received in His human nature, by acknowledging Him as the author thereof, as we read (Matt 26:27; John 11:41): so also, in recognition of His Father, He besought Him in prayer for those gifts still due to

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Q. 21, A. 4

alia huiusmodi. Et in hoc etiam nobis dedit exemplum ut Him in His human nature, such as the glory of His body, de perceptis muneribus gratias agamus, et nondum ha- and the like. And in this He gave us an example, that we bita orando postulemus. should give thanks for benefits received, and ask in prayer for those we have not as yet. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Hilarius loquitur Reply Obj. 1: Hilary is speaking of vocal prayer, which quantum ad orationem vocalem, quae non erat ei ne- was not necessary to Him for His own sake, but only for cessaria propter ipsum, sed solum propter nos. Unde si- ours. Whence he says pointedly that His word of beseeching gnanter dicit quod sibi non proficiebat deprecationis ser- did not benefit Himself. For if the Lord hears the desire of the mo. Si enim desiderium pauperum exaudit dominus, ut in poor, as is said in the Ps. 9:38, much more the mere will of Psalmo dicitur, multo magis sola voluntas Christi habet Christ has the force of a prayer with the Father: wherefore vim orationis apud patrem. Unde ipse dicebat, Ioan. XI, He said (John 11:42): I know that Thou hearest Me always, ego sciebam quia semper me audis, sed propter populum but because of the people who stand about have I said it, that qui circumstat dixi, ut credant quia tu me misisti. they may believe that Thou hast sent Me. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus volebat Reply Obj. 2: Christ wished indeed to suffer what He quidem pati illa quae patiebatur, pro tempore illo, sed ni- suffered, at that particular time: nevertheless He wished to hilominus volebat ut, post passionem, gloriam corporis obtain, after His passion, the glory of His body, which as yet consequeretur, quam nondum habebat. Quam quidem He had not. This glory He expected to receive from His Fagloriam expectabat a patre sicut ab auctore. Et ideo con- ther as the author thereof, and therefore it was fitting that venienter ab eo ipsam petebat. He should pray to Him for it. Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsa gloria quam ChriReply Obj. 3: This very glory which Christ, while praystus orando sibi petebat, pertinebat ad salutem aliorum, ing, besought for Himself, pertained to the salvation of othsecundum illud Rom. IV, resurrexit propter iustificatio- ers according to Rom. 4:25: He rose again for our justificanem nostram. Et ideo illa etiam oratio quam pro se fa- tion. Consequently the prayer which He offered for Himself ciebat, erat quodammodo pro aliis. Sicut et quicumque was also in a manner offered for others. So also anyone that homo aliquod bonum a Deo postulat ut utatur illo ad asks a boon of God that he may use it for the good of others, utilitatem aliorum, non sibi soli, sed etiam aliis orat. prays not only for himself, but also for others.

Article 4 Whether Christ’s prayer was always heard? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christi oratio non fuerit semper exaudita. Petiit enim a se removeri calicem passionis, ut patet Matth. XXVI, qui tamen ab eo non fuit translatus. Ergo videtur quod non omnis eius oratio fuerit exaudita. Praeterea, ipse oravit ut peccatum suis crucifixoribus ignosceretur, ut patet Luc. XXIII. Non tamen omnibus fuit illud peccatum dimissum, nam Iudaei fuerunt pro illo peccato puniti. Ergo videtur quod non omnis eius oratio fuerit exaudita. Praeterea, dominus oravit pro his qui erant credituri per verbum apostolorum in ipsum, ut omnes in eo unum essent, et ut pervenirent ad hoc quod essent cum ipso. Sed non omnes ad hoc perveniunt. Ergo non omnis eius oratio est exaudita. Praeterea, in Psalmo dicitur, in persona Christi, clamabo per diem, et non exaudies. Non igitur omnis eius oratio est exaudita. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Heb. V, cum clamore valido et lacrymis offerens, exauditus est pro sua reverentia.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s prayer was not always heard. For He besought that the chalice of His passion might be taken from Him, as we read (Matt 26:39): and yet it was not taken from Him. Therefore it seems that not every prayer of His was heard. Obj. 2: Further, He prayed that the sin of those who crucified Him might be forgiven, as is related (Luke 23:34). Yet not all were pardoned this sin, since the Jews were punished on account thereof. Therefore it seems that not every prayer of His was heard. Obj. 3: Further, our Lord prayed for them who would believe in Him through the word of the apostles, that they might all be one in Him, and that they might attain to being with Him (John 17:20, 21, 24). But not all attain to this. Therefore not every prayer of His was heard. Obj. 4: Further, it is said (Ps 21:3) in the person of Christ: I shall cry by day, and Thou wilt not hear. Not every prayer of His, therefore, was heard. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb 5:7): With a strong cry and tears offering up prayers . . . He was heard for His reverence.

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Q. 21, A. 4

Incarnation

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, oratio est quodammodo interpretativa voluntatis humanae. Tunc ergo alicuius orantis exauditur oratio, quando eius voluntas adimpletur. Voluntas autem simpliciter hominis est voluntas rationis, hoc enim absolute volumus quod secundum deliberatam rationem volumus. Illud autem quod volumus secundum motum sensualitatis, vel etiam secundum motum voluntatis simplicis, quae consideratur ut natura, non simpliciter volumus, sed secundum quid, scilicet, si aliud non obsistat quod per deliberationem rationis invenitur. Unde talis voluntas magis est dicenda velleitas quam absoluta voluntas, quia scilicet homo hoc vellet si aliud non obsisteret. Secundum autem voluntatem rationis, Christus nihil aliud voluit nisi quod scivit Deum velle. Et ideo omnis absoluta voluntas Christi, etiam humana, fuit impleta, quia fuit Deo conformis, et per consequens, omnis eius oratio fuit exaudita. Nam et secundum hoc aliorum orationes adimplentur, quod sunt eorum voluntates Deo conformes, secundum illud Rom. VIII, qui autem scrutatur corda, scit, idest, approbat, quid desideret spiritus, idest, quid faciat sanctos desiderare, quoniam secundum Deum, idest, secundum conformitatem divinae voluntatis, postulat pro sanctis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa petitio de translatione calicis diversimode a sanctis exponitur. Hilarius enim, super Matth., dicit, quod autem ut a se transeat rogat, non ut ipse praetereatur orat, sed ut in alterum id quod a se transit excedat. Atque ideo pro his orat qui passuri post se erant, ut sit sensus, quomodo a me bibitur calix passionis, ita ab aliis bibatur, sine spei diffidentia, sine sensu doloris, sine metu mortis. Vel, secundum Hieronymum, signanter dicit, calix iste, hoc est, populi Iudaeorum, qui excusationem ignorantiae habere non potest, si me occiderit, habens legem et prophetas, qui me vaticinantur. Vel, secundum Dionysium Alexandrinum, quod dicit, transfer calicem istum a me, non hoc est, non adveniat mihi, nisi enim advenerit, transferri non poterit. Sed, sicut quod praeterit nec intactum est nec permanens, sic salvator leviter invadentem tentationem flagitat pelli. Ambrosius autem et Origenes et Chrysostomus dicunt quod petiit quasi homo naturali voluntate mortem recusans. Sic igitur, si intelligatur quod petierit per hoc alios martyres suae passionis imitatores fieri, secundum Hilarium; vel si petiit quod timor bibendi calicis eum non perturbaret; vel quod mors eum non detineret, omnino impletum est quod petivit. Si vero intelligitur petiisse quod non biberet calicem passionis et mortis; vel quod non biberet ipsum a Iudaeis, non quidem est factum quod petiit, quia ratio, quae petitionem proposuit, non volebat ut hoc impleretur; sed, ad instructionem no-

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I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), prayer is a certain manifestation of the human will. Wherefore, then is the request of one who prays granted, when his will is fulfilled. Now absolutely speaking the will of man is the will of reason; for we will absolutely that which we will in accordance with reason’s deliberation. Whereas what we will in accordance with the movement of sensuality, or even of the simple will, which is considered as nature is willed not absolutely but conditionally (secundum quid)—that is, provided no obstacle be discovered by reason’s deliberation. Wherefore such a will should rather be called a velleity than an absolute will; because one would will (vellet) if there were no obstacle. But according to the will of reason, Christ willed nothing but what He knew God to will. Wherefore every absolute will of Christ, even human, was fulfilled, because it was in conformity with God; and consequently His every prayer was fulfilled. For in this respect also is it that other men’s prayers are fulfilled, in that their will is in conformity with God, according to Rom. 8:27: And He that searcheth the hearts knoweth, that is, approves of, what the Spirit desireth, that is, what the Spirit makes the saints to desire: because He asketh for the saints according to God, that is, in conformity with the Divine will. Reply Obj. 1: This prayer for the passing of the chalice is variously explained by the Saints. For Hilary (Super Matth. 31) says: When He asks that this may pass from Him, He does not pray that it may pass by Him, but that others may share in that which passes on from Him to them; so that the sense is: As I am partaking of the chalice of the passion, so may others drink of it, with unfailing hope, with unflinching anguish, without fear of death. Or according to Jerome (on Matt. 26:39): He says pointedly, ‘This chalice,’ that is of the Jewish people, who cannot allege ignorance as an excuse for putting Me to death, since they have the Law and the Prophets, who foretold concerning Me. Or, according to Dionysius of Alexandria (De Martyr. ad Origen 7): When He says ‘Remove this chalice from Me,’ He does not mean, ‘Let it not come to Me’; for if it come not, it cannot be removed. But, as that which passes is neither untouched nor yet permanent, so the Savior beseeches, that a slightly pressing trial may be repulsed. Lastly, Ambrose, Origen and Chrysostom say that He prayed thus as man, being reluctant to die according to His natural will. Thus, therefore, whether we understand, according to Hilary, that He thus prayed that other martyrs might be imitators of His Passion, or that He prayed that the fear of drinking His chalice might not trouble Him, or that death might not withhold Him, His prayer was entirely fulfilled. But if we understand that He prayed that He might not drink the chalice of His passion and death; or that He might not drink it at the hands of the Jews; what He besought was not indeed fulfilled, because His reason which formed the

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Christ’s Prayer

Q. 21, A. 4

stram, volebat declarare nobis suam voluntatem natura- petition did not desire its fulfilment, but for our instruction, lem, et sensualitatis motum, quam, sicut homo, habebat. it was His will to make known to us His natural will, and the movement of His sensuality, which was His as man. Ad secundum dicendum quod dominus non oravit Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord did not pray for all those who pro omnibus crucifixoribus, neque etiam pro omnibus crucified Him, as neither did He for all those who would qui erant credituri in eum, sed pro his solum qui erant believe in Him; but for those only who were predestined to praedestinati ut per ipsum vitam consequerentur aeter- obtain eternal life through Him. nam. Unde patet etiam responsio ad tertium. Wherefore the reply to the third objection is also manifest. Ad quartum dicendum quod, cum dicit, clamabo Reply Obj. 4: When He says: I shall cry and Thou wilt et non exaudies, intelligendum est quantum ad affectum not hear, we must take this as referring to the desire of sensensualitatis, quae mortem refugiebat. Exauditur tamen suality, which shunned death. But He is heard as to the dequantum ad affectum rationis, ut dictum est. sire of His reason, as stated above.

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Question 22 The Priesthood of Christ Deinde considerandum est de sacerdotio Christi. Et We have now to consider the Priesthood of Christ; and circa hoc quaeruntur sex. under this head there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum conveniat Christo esse sacerdotem. (1) Whether it is fitting that Christ should be a priest? Secundo, de hostia huius sacerdotis. (2) Of the victim offered by this priest; Tertio, de effectu huius sacerdotii. (3) Of the effect of this priesthood; Quarto, utrum effectus sacerdotii eius pertineat ad (4) Whether the effect of His priesthood pertains to ipsum, vel solum ad alios. Himself, or only to others? Quinto, de aeternitate sacerdotii eius. (5) Of the eternal duration of His priesthood; Sexto, utrum debeat dici sacerdos secundum (6) Whether He should be called a priest according to ordinem Melchisedech. the order of Melchisedech?

Article 1 Whether it is fitting that Christ should be a priest? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christo non conveniat esse sacerdotem. Sacerdos enim est minor Angelo, unde dicitur Zach. III, ostendit mihi Deus sacerdotem magnum stantem coram Angelo domini. Sed Christus est maior Angelis, secundum illud Heb. I, tanto melior Angelis effectus, quanto differentius prae illis nomen hereditavit. Ergo Christo non convenit esse sacerdotem. Praeterea, ea quae fuerunt in veteri testamento, fuerunt figurae Christi, secundum illud Coloss. II, quae sunt umbra futurorum, corpus autem Christi. Sed Christus non traxit carnis originem ex sacerdotibus veteris legis, dicit enim apostolus, Heb. VII, manifestum est quod ex Iuda ortus sit dominus noster, in qua tribu nihil de sacerdotibus Moyses locutus est. Ergo Christo non convenit esse sacerdotem. Praeterea, in veteri lege, quae est figura Christi, non est idem legislator et sacerdos, unde dicit dominus ad Moysen, legislatorem, Exod. XXVIII, applica Aaron, fratrem tuum, ut sacerdotio fungatur mihi. Christus autem est lator novae legis, secundum illud Ierem. XXXI, dabo leges meas in cordibus eorum. Ergo Christo non convenit esse sacerdotem. Sed contra est quod dicitur Heb. IV, habemus pontificem qui penetravit caelum, Iesum, filium Dei.

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that Christ should be a priest. For a priest is less than an angel; whence it is written (Zech 3:1): The Lord showed me the high-priest standing before the angel of the Lord. But Christ is greater than the angels, according to Heb. 1:4: Being made so much better than the angels, as He hath inherited a more excellent name than they. Therefore it is unfitting that Christ should be a priest. Obj. 2: Further, things which were in the Old Testament were figures of Christ, according to Col. 2:17: Which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ’s. But Christ was not descended from the priests of the Old Law, for the Apostle says (Heb 7:14): It is evident that our Lord sprang out of Judah, in which tribe Moses spoke nothing concerning priests. Therefore it is not fitting that Christ should be a priest. Obj. 3: Further, in the Old Law, which is a figure of Christ, the lawgivers and the priests were distinct: wherefore the Lord said to Moses the lawgiver (Exod 28:1): Take unto thee Aaron, thy brother . . . that he may minister to Me in the priest’s office. But Christ is the giver of the New Law, according to Jer. 31:33: I will give My law in their bowels. Therefore it is unfitting that Christ should be a priest. On the contrary, It is written (Heb 4:14): We have therefore a great high-priest that hath passed into the heavens, Jesus, the Son of God. Respondeo dicendum quod proprium officium saI answer that, The office proper to a priest is to be cerdotis est esse mediatorem inter Deum et populum, a mediator between God and the people: to wit, inasmuch inquantum scilicet divina populo tradit, unde sacerdos as He bestows Divine things on the people, wherefore sacdicitur quasi sacra dans, secundum illud Malach. II, le- erdos (priest) means a giver of sacred things (sacra dans), gem requirent ex ore eius, scilicet sacerdotis; et iterum in- according to Malachi 2:7: They shall seek the law at his, i.e.,

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Q. 22, A. 1

Incarnation

quantum preces populi Deo offert, et pro eorum peccatis Deo aliqualiter satisfacit; unde apostolus dicit, Heb. V, omnis pontifex ex hominibus assumptus, pro hominibus constituitur in his quae sunt ad Deum, ut offerat dona et sacrificia pro peccatis. Hoc autem maxime convenit Christo. Nam per ipsum dona hominibus sunt collata, secundum illud II Pet. I, per quem, scilicet Christum, maxima et pretiosa nobis promissa donavit, ut per haec efficiamini divinae consortes naturae. Ipse etiam humanum genus Deo reconciliavit, secundum illud Coloss. I, in ipso, scilicet Christo, complacuit omnem plenitudinem inhabitare, et per eum reconciliare omnia. Unde Christo maxime convenit esse sacerdotem.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod potestas hierarchica convenit quidem Angelis, inquantum et ipsi sunt medii inter Deum et hominem, ut patet per Dionysium, in libro Cael. Hier., ita quod ipse sacerdos, inquantum est medius inter Deum et populum, Angeli nomen habet, secundum illud Malach. II, Angelus domini exercituum est. Christus autem maior Angelis fuit, non solum secundum divinitatem, sed etiam secundum humanitatem, inquantum habuit plenitudinem gratiae et gloriae. Unde etiam excellentiori modo hierarchicam seu sacerdotalem potestatem prae Angelis habuit, ita etiam quod ipsi Angeli fuerunt ministri sacerdotii eius, secundum illud Matth. IV, accesserunt Angeli et ministrabant ei. Secundum tamen passibilitatem, modico ab Angelis minoratus est, ut apostolus dicit, Heb. II. Et secundum hoc conformis fuit hominibus viatoribus in sacerdotio constitutis. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Damascenus, in III libro, quod in omnibus est simile, idem utique erit, et non exemplum. Quia igitur sacerdotium veteris legis erat figura sacerdotii Christi, noluit Christus nasci de stirpe figuralium sacerdotum, ut ostenderetur non esse omnino idem sacerdotium, sed differre sicut verum a figurali. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, alii homines particulatim habent quasdam gratias, sed Christus, tanquam omnium caput, habet perfectionem omnium gratiarum. Et ideo, quantum ad alios pertinet, alius est legislator, et alius sacerdos, et alius rex, sed haec omnia concurrunt in Christo, tanquam in fonte omnium gratiarum. Unde dicitur Isaiae XXXIII, dominus iudex noster, dominus legifer noster, dominus rex noster, ipse veniet et salvabit nos.

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the priest’s, mouth; and again, forasmuch as he offers up the people’s prayers to God, and, in a manner, makes satisfaction to God for their sins; wherefore the Apostle says (Heb 5:1): Every high-priest taken from among men is ordained for men in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins. Now this is most befitting to Christ. For through Him are gifts bestowed on men, according to 2 Pet. 1:4: By Whom (i.e., Christ) He hath given us most great and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature. Moreover, He reconciled the human race to God, according to Col. 1:19, 20: In Him (i.e., Christ) it hath well pleased (the Father) that all fullness should dwell, and through Him to reconcile all things unto Himself. Therefore it is most fitting that Christ should be a priest. Reply Obj. 1: Hierarchical power appertains to the angels, inasmuch as they also are between God and man, as Dionysius explains (Coel. Hier. ix), so that the priest himself, as being between God and man, is called an angel, according to Malachi 2:7: He is the angel of the Lord of hosts. Now Christ was greater than the angels, not only in His Godhead, but also in His humanity, as having the fullness of grace and glory. Wherefore also He had the hierarchical or priestly power in a higher degree than the angels, so that even the angels were ministers of His priesthood, according to Matt. 4:11: Angels came and ministered unto Him. But, in regard to His passibility, He was made a little lower than the angels, as the Apostle says (Heb 2:9): and thus He was conformed to those wayfarers who are ordained to the priesthood.

Reply Obj. 2: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26): What is like in every particular must be, of course, identical, and not a copy. Since, therefore, the priesthood of the Old Law was a figure of the priesthood of Christ, He did not wish to be born of the stock of the figurative priests, that it might be made clear that His priesthood is not quite the same as theirs, but differs therefrom as truth from figure. Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 7, A. 7, ad 1), other men have certain graces distributed among them: but Christ, as being the Head of all, has the perfection of all graces. Wherefore, as to others, one is a lawgiver, another is a priest, another is a king; but all these concur in Christ, as the fount of all grace. Hence it is written (Isa 33:22): The Lord is our Judge, the Lord is our law-giver, the Lord is our King: He will come and save us.

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Priesthood of Christ

Q. 22, A. 2

Article 2 Whether Christ was himself both priest and victim? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ipse Christus non fuit simul sacerdos et hostia. Sacerdotis enim est hostiam occidere. Sed Christus non seipsum occidit. Ergo ipse non fuit simul sacerdos et hostia. Praeterea, sacerdotium Christi magis est simile sacerdotio Iudaeorum, quod erat a Deo institutum, quam sacerdotio gentilium, quo Daemones colebantur. In veteri autem lege nunquam homo in sacrificium offerebatur, quod maxime reprehenditur in sacrificiis gentilium, secundum illud Psalmi, effuderunt sanguinem innocentem filiorum suorum et filiarum suarum, quas sacrificaverunt sculptilibus Chanaan. Ergo in sacerdotio Christi non debuit esse ipse homo Christus hostia. Praeterea, omnis hostia, ex hoc quod Deo offertur, Deo sanctificatur. Sed ipsa Christi humanitas a principio fuit sanctificata et Deo coniuncta. Ergo non convenienter potest dici quod Christus, secundum quod homo, fuerit hostia. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Ephes. V, Christus dilexit nos, et tradidit semetipsum pro nobis oblationem et hostiam Deo in odorem suavitatis. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, in X de Civ. Dei, omne sacrificium visibile invisibilis sacrificii est sacramentum, idest sacrum signum. Est autem invisibile sacrificium quo homo spiritum suum offert Deo, secundum illud Psalmi; sacrificium Deo spiritus contribulatus. Et ideo omne illud quod Deo exhibetur ad hoc quod spiritus hominis feratur in Deum, potest dici sacrificium. Indiget igitur homo sacrificio propter tria. Uno quidem modo, ad remissionem peccati, per quod a Deo avertitur. Et ideo dicit apostolus, Heb. V, quod ad sacerdotem pertinet ut offerat dona et sacrificia pro peccatis. Secundo, ut homo in statu gratiae conservetur, semper Deo inhaerens, in quo eius pax et salus consistit. Unde et in veteri lege immolabatur hostia pacifica pro offerentium salute, ut habetur Levit. III. Tertio, ad hoc quod spiritus hominis perfecte Deo uniatur, quod maxime erit in gloria. Unde et in veteri lege offerebatur holocaustum, quasi totum incensum, ut dicitur Levit. I.

Haec autem per humanitatem Christi nobis provenerunt. Nam primo quidem, nostra peccata deleta sunt, secundum illud Rom. IV, traditus est propter delicta nostra. Secundo, gratiam nos salvantem per ipsum accepimus, secundum illud Heb. V, factus est omnibus obtemperantibus sibi causa salutis aeternae. Tertio, per ipsum

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ Himself was not both priest and victim. For it is the duty of the priest to slay the victim. But Christ did not kill Himself. Therefore He was not both priest and victim. Obj. 2: Further, the priesthood of Christ has a greater similarity to the Jewish priesthood, instituted by God, than to the priesthood of the Gentiles, by which the demons were worshiped. Now in the Old Law man was never offered up in sacrifice: whereas this was very much to be reprehended in the sacrifices of the Gentiles, according to Ps. 105:38: They shed innocent blood; the blood of their sons and of their daughters, which they sacrificed to the idols of Chanaan. Therefore in Christ’s priesthood the Man Christ should not have been the victim. Obj. 3: Further, every victim, through being offered to God, is consecrated to God. But the humanity of Christ was from the beginning consecrated and united to God. Therefore it cannot be said fittingly that Christ as man was a victim. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph 5:2): Christ hath loved us, and hath delivered Himself for us, an oblation and a victim to God for an odor of sweetness. I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5): Every visible sacrifice is a sacrament, that is a sacred sign, of the invisible sacrifice. Now the invisible sacrifice is that by which a man offers his spirit to God, according to Ps. 50:19: A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit. Wherefore, whatever is offered to God in order to raise man’s spirit to Him, may be called a sacrifice. Now man is required to offer sacrifice for three reasons. First, for the remission of sin, by which he is turned away from God. Hence the Apostle says (Heb 5:1) that it appertains to the priest to offer gifts and sacrifices for sins. Second, that man may be preserved in a state of grace, by ever adhering to God, wherein his peace and salvation consist. Wherefore under the old Law the sacrifice of peaceofferings was offered up for the salvation of the offerers, as is prescribed in the third chapter of Leviticus. Third, in order that the spirit of man be perfectly united to God: which will be most perfectly realized in glory. Hence, under the Old Law, the holocaust was offered, so called because the victim was wholly burnt, as we read in the first chapter of Leviticus. Now these effects were conferred on us by the humanity of Christ. For, in the first place, our sins were blotted out, according to Rom. 4:25: Who was delivered up for our sins. Second, through Him we received the grace of salvation, according to Heb. 5:9: He became to all that obey Him the cause of eternal salvation. Third, through Him we have

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Q. 22, A. 3

Incarnation

perfectionem gloriae adepti sumus, secundum illud Heb. X, habemus fiduciam per sanguinem eius in introitum sanctorum, scilicet in gloriam caelestem. Et ideo ipse Christus, inquantum homo, non solum fuit sacerdos, sed etiam hostia perfecta, simul existens hostia pro peccato, et hostia pacificorum, et holocaustum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus non se occidit, sed seipsum voluntarie morti exposuit, secundum illud Isaiae LIII, oblatus est quia ipse voluit. Et ideo dicitur seipsum obtulisse. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christi hominis occisio potest ad duplicem voluntatem comparari. Uno modo, ad voluntatem occidentium. Et sic non habuit rationem hostiae, non enim dicuntur occisores Christi hostiam Deo obtulisse, sed graviter deliquisse. Et huius peccati similitudinem gerebant impia gentilium sacrificia, quibus homines idolis immolabant. Alio modo potest considerari occisio Christi per comparationem ad voluntatem patientis, qui voluntarie se obtulit passioni. Et ex hac parte habet rationem hostiae. In quo non convenit cum sacrificiis gentilium.

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acquired the perfection of glory, according to Heb. 10:19: We have a confidence in the entering into the Holies (i.e., the heavenly glory) through His Blood. Therefore Christ Himself, as man, was not only priest, but also a perfect victim, being at the same time victim for sin, victim for a peaceoffering, and a holocaust. Reply Obj. 1: Christ did not slay Himself, but of His own free-will He exposed Himself to death, according to Isa. 53:7: He was offered because it was His own will. Thus He is said to have offered Himself. Reply Obj. 2: The slaying of the Man Christ may be referred to a twofold will. First, to the will of those who slew Him: and in this respect He was not a victim: for the slayers of Christ are not accounted as offering a sacrifice to God, but as guilty of a great crime: a similitude of which was borne by the wicked sacrifices of the Gentiles, in which they offered up men to idols. Second, the slaying of Christ may be considered in reference to the will of the Sufferer, Who freely offered Himself to suffering. In this respect He is a victim, and in this He differs from the sacrifices of the Gentiles.

Article 3 Whether the effect of Christ’s priesthood is the expiation of sins? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod effectus sacerdotii Christi non sit expiatio peccatorum. Solius enim Dei est peccata delere, secundum illud Isaiae XLIII, ego sum qui deleo iniquitates tuas propter me. Sed Christus non est sacerdos secundum quod Deus, sed secundum quod homo. Ergo sacerdotium Christi non est expiativum peccatorum. Praeterea, apostolus dicit, Heb. X, quod hostiae veteris testamenti non potuerunt perfectos facere, alioquin cessassent offerri, eo quod nullam haberent conscientiam peccati cultores sufficienter semel mundati; sed in ipsis commemoratio peccatorum per singulos annos fit. Sed similiter sub sacerdotio Christi fit commemoratio peccatorum, cum dicitur, dimitte nobis debita nostra, Matth. VI. Offertur etiam continue sacrificium in Ecclesia, unde ibidem dicitur, panem nostrum quotidianum da nobis hodie. Ergo per sacerdotium Christi non expiantur peccata. Praeterea, pro peccato in veteri lege maxime immolabatur hircus pro peccato principis, vel capra pro peccato alicuius de populo, vel vitulus pro peccato sacerdotis, ut patet Levit. IV. Sed Christus nulli horum comparatur, sed agno, secundum illud Ierem. XI ego quasi agnus mansuetus qui portatur ad victimam. Ergo videtur quod eius sacerdotium non sit expiativum peccatorum.

Objection 1: It would seem that the effect of Christ’s priesthood is not the expiation of sins. For it belongs to God alone to blot out sins, according to Isa. 43:25: I am He that blot out thy iniquities for My own sake. But Christ is priest, not as God, but as man. Therefore the priesthood of Christ does not expiate sins. Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Heb 10:1–3) that the victims of the Old Testament could not make (the comers thereunto) perfect: for then they would have ceased to be offered; because the worshipers once cleansed should have no conscience of sin any longer; but in them there is made a commemoration of sins every year. But in like manner under the priesthood of Christ a commemoration of sins is made in the words: Forgive us our trespasses (Matt 6:12). Moreover, the Sacrifice is offered continuously in the Church; wherefore again we say: Give us this day our daily bread. Therefore sins are not expiated by the priesthood of Christ. Obj. 3: Further, in the sin-offerings of the Old Law, a he-goat was mostly offered for the sin of a prince, a shegoat for the sin of some private individual, a calf for the sin of a priest, as we gather from Lev. 4:3, 23, 28. But Christ is compared to none of these, but to the lamb, according to Jer. 11:19: I was as a meek lamb, that is carried to be a victim. Therefore it seems that His priesthood does not expiate sins.

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Sed contra est quod dicit apostolus, Heb. IX, sanguis Christi, qui per spiritum sanctum seipsum obtulit immaculatum Deo, emundabit conscientias nostras ab operibus mortuis, ad serviendum Deo viventi. Opera autem mortua dicuntur peccata. Ergo sacerdotium Christi habet virtutem emundandi peccata. Respondeo dicendum quod ad perfectam peccatorum emundationem duo requiruntur, secundum quod duo sunt in peccato, scilicet macula culpae, et reatus poenae. Macula quidem culpae deletur per gratiam, qua cor peccatoris in Deum convertitur, reatus autem poenae totaliter tollitur per hoc quod homo Deo satisfacit. Utrumque autem horum efficit sacerdotium Christi. Nam virtute ipsius gratia nobis datur, qua corda nostra convertuntur ad Deum, secundum illud Rom. III, iustificati gratis per gratiam ipsius, per redemptionem quae est in Christo Iesu, quem proposuit Deus propitiatorem per fidem in sanguine ipsius. Ipse etiam pro nobis plenarie satisfecit, inquantum ipse languores nostros tulit, et dolores nostros ipse portavit. Unde patet quod Christi sacerdotium habet vim plenam expiandi peccata. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet Christus non fuerit sacerdos secundum quod Deus, sed secundum quod homo, unus tamen et idem fuit sacerdos et Deus. Unde in synodo Ephesina legitur, si quis pontificem nostrum et apostolum fieri dicit non ipsum ex Deo verbum, sed quasi alterum praeter ipsum specialiter hominem ex muliere, anathema sit. Et ideo, inquantum eius humanitas operabatur in virtute divinitatis, illud sacrificium erat efficacissimum ad delenda peccata. Propter quod Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin., ut, quoniam quatuor considerantur in omni sacrificio, cui offeratur, a quo offeratur, quid offeratur, pro quibus offeratur; idem ipse unus verusque mediator, per sacrificium pacis reconcilians nos Deo, unum cum illo maneret cui offerebat, unum in se faceret pro quibus offerebat, unus ipse esset qui offerebat, et quod offerebat. Ad secundum dicendum quod peccata non commemorantur in nova lege propter inefficaciam sacerdotii Christi, quasi per ipsum non sufficienter expientur peccata, sed commemorantur quantum ad illos scilicet qui vel eius sacrificii nolunt esse participes, sicut sunt infideles, pro quorum peccatis oramus, ut convertantur; vel etiam quantum ad illos qui, post participationem huius sacrificii, ab eo deviant qualitercumque peccando. Sacrificium autem quod quotidie in Ecclesia offertur, non est aliud a sacrificio quod ipse Christus obtulit, sed eius commemoratio. Unde Augustinus dicit, in X de Civ. Dei, sacerdos ipse Christus offerens, ipse et oblatio, cuius rei sacramentum quotidianum esse voluit Ecclesiae sacrificium. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Origenes dicit, super Ioan., licet diversa animalia in lege offerrentur, quotidianum tamen sacrificium, quod offerebatur mane et vespere, erat agnus, ut habetur Num. XXVIII. Unde si-

Q. 22, A. 3

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb 9:14): The blood of Christ, Who by the Holy Spirit offered Himself unspotted unto God, shall cleanse our conscience from dead works, to serve the living God. But dead works denote sins. Therefore the priesthood of Christ has the power to cleanse from sins. I answer that, Two things are required for the perfect cleansing from sins, corresponding to the two things comprised in sin—namely, the stain of sin and the debt of punishment. The stain of sin is, indeed, blotted out by grace, by which the sinner’s heart is turned to God: whereas the debt of punishment is entirely removed by the satisfaction that man offers to God. Now the priesthood of Christ produces both these effects. For by its virtue grace is given to us, by which our hearts are turned to God, according to Rom. 3:24, 25: Being justified freely by His grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood. Moreover, He satisfied for us fully, inasmuch as He hath borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows (Isa 53:4). Wherefore it is clear that the priesthood of Christ has full power to expiate sins. Reply Obj. 1: Although Christ was a priest, not as God, but as man, yet one and the same was both priest and God. Wherefore in the Council of Ephesus we read: If anyone say that the very Word of God did not become our High-Priest and Apostle, when He became flesh and a man like us, but altogether another one, the man born of a woman, let him be anathema. Hence in so far as His human nature operated by virtue of the Divine, that sacrifice was most efficacious for the blotting out of sins. For this reason Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 14): So that, since four things are to be observed in every sacrifice—to whom it is offered, by whom it is offered, what is offered, for whom it is offered; the same one true Mediator reconciling us to God by the sacrifice of peace, was one with Him to Whom it was offered, united in Himself those for whom He offered it, at the same time offered it Himself, and was Himself that which He offered. Reply Obj. 2: Sins are commemorated in the New Law, not on account of the inefficacy of the priesthood of Christ, as though sins were not sufficiently expiated by Him: but in regard to those who either are not willing to be participators in His sacrifice, such as unbelievers, for whose sins we pray that they be converted; or who, after taking part in this sacrifice, fall away from it by whatsoever kind of sin. The Sacrifice which is offered every day in the Church is not distinct from that which Christ Himself offered, but is a commemoration thereof. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. De. x, 20): Christ Himself both is the priest who offers it and the victim: the sacred token of which He wished to be the daily Sacrifice of the Church. Reply Obj. 3: As Origen says (Sup. Joan. i, 29), though various animals were offered up under the Old Law, yet the daily sacrifice, which was offered up morning and evening, was a lamb, as appears from Num. 38:3, 4. By which it was

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gnificabatur quod oblatio agni, idest Christi, esset sacri- signified that the offering up of the true lamb, i.e., Christ, ficium consummativum omnium aliorum. Et ideo Ioan. was the culminating sacrifice of all. Hence (John 1:29) it is I dicitur, ecce agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit peccata mundi. said: Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him Who taketh away the sins of the world.

Article 4 Whether the effect of the priesthood of Christ pertained not only to others, but also to himself? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod effectus sacerdotii Christi non solum pertinuerit ad alios, sed etiam ad ipsum. Ad officium enim sacerdotis pertinet pro populo orare, secundum illud II Machab. I, orationem faciebant sacerdotes dum consummaretur sacrificium. Sed Christus non solum pro aliis oravit, sed etiam pro seipso, secundum quod supra dictum est, et sicut expresse dicitur, Heb. V, quod in diebus carnis suae preces supplicationesque ad eum qui possit illum salvum facere a morte, cum clamore valido et lacrimis obtulit. Ergo sacerdotium Christi habuit non solum in aliis, sed etiam in seipso effectum. Praeterea, Christus obtulit seipsum sacrificium in sua passione. Sed per passionem suam non solum aliis meruit, sed etiam sibi, ut supra habitum est. Ergo sacerdotium Christi non solum habuit effectum in aliis, sed etiam in seipso. Praeterea, sacerdotium veteris legis fuit figura sacerdotii Christi. Sed sacerdos veteris legis non solum pro aliis, sed etiam pro seipso sacrificium offerebat, dicitur enim Levit. XVI, quod pontifex ingreditur sanctuarium ut roget pro se, et pro domo sua, et pro universo coetu filiorum Israel. Ergo etiam sacerdotium Christi non solum in aliis, sed in seipso effectum habuit. Sed contra est quod in Ephesina synodo legitur, si quis dicit Christum pro se obtulisse oblationem, et non magis pro nobis solum (nec enim indiguit sacrificio qui peccatum nescit), anathema sit. Sed in sacrificio offerendo potissime sacerdotis consistit officium. Ergo sacerdotium Christi non habuit effectum in ipso Christo. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, sacerdos constituitur medius inter Deum et populum. Ille autem indiget medio ad Deum qui per seipsum accedere ad Deum non potest, et talis sacerdotio subiicitur, effectum sacerdotii participans. Hoc autem Christo non competit, dicit enim apostolus, Heb. VII, accedens per seipsum ad Deum, semper vivens, ad interpellandum pro nobis. Et ideo Christo non competit effectum sacerdotii in se suscipere, sed potius ipsum aliis communicare. Primum enim agens in quolibet genere ita est influens quod non est recipiens in genere illo, sicut sol illuminat sed non illuminatur, et ignis calefacit sed non calefit. Chri-

Objection 1: It would seem that the effect of the priesthood of Christ pertained not only to others, but also to Himself. For it belongs to the priest’s office to pray for the people, according to 2 Macc. 1:23: The priests made prayer while the sacrifice was consuming. Now Christ prayed not only for others, but also for Himself, as we have said above (Q. 21, A. 3), and as expressly stated (Heb 5:7): In the days of His flesh, with a strong cry and tears He offered up prayers and supplications to Him that was able to save Him from death. Therefore the priesthood of Christ had an effect not only in others, but also in Himself. Obj. 2: Further, in His passion Christ offered Himself as a sacrifice. But by His passion He merited, not only for others, but also for Himself, as stated above (Q. 19, AA. 3, 4). Therefore the priesthood of Christ had an effect not only in others, but also in Himself. Obj. 3: Further, the priesthood of the Old Law was a figure of the priesthood of Christ. But the priest of the Old Law offered sacrifice not only for others, but also for himself: for it is written (Lev 16:17) that the high-priest goeth into the sanctuary to pray for himself and his house, and for the whole congregation of Israel. Therefore the priesthood of Christ also had an effect not merely in others, but also in Himself. On the contrary, We read in the acts of the Council of Ephesus: If anyone say that Christ offered sacrifice for Himself, and not rather for us alone (for He Who knew not sin needed no sacrifice), let him be anathema. But the priest’s office consists principally in offering sacrifice. Therefore the priesthood of Christ had no effect in Himself. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), a priest is set between God and man. Now he needs someone between himself and God, who of himself cannot approach to God; and such a one is subject to the priesthood by sharing in the effect thereof. But this cannot be said of Christ; for the Apostle says (Heb 7:25): Coming of Himself to God, always living to make intercession for us. And therefore it is not fitting for Christ to be the recipient of the effect of His priesthood, but rather to communicate it to others. For the influence of the first agent in every genus is such that it receives nothing in that genus: thus the sun gives but does not receive light; fire gives but does not receive heat. Now Christ

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stus autem est fons totius sacerdotii, nam sacerdos legalis erat figura ipsius; sacerdos autem novae legis in persona ipsius operatur, secundum illud II Cor. II, nam et ego, quod donavi, si quid donavi, propter vos, in persona Christi. Et ideo non competit Christo effectum sacerdotii suscipere. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod oratio, etsi conveniat sacerdotibus, non tamen est eorum officio propria, cuilibet enim convenit et pro se et pro aliis orare, secundum illud Iac. ult., orate pro invicem, ut salvemini. Et sic posset dici quod oratio qua Christus pro se oravit, non erat actus sacerdotii eius. Sed haec responsio videtur excludi per hoc quod apostolus, Heb. V, cum dixisset, tu es sacerdos in aeternum secundum ordinem Melchisedech, subdit, qui in diebus carnis suae preces etc., ut supra, et ita videtur quod oratio qua Christus oravit, ad eius sacerdotium pertineat. Et ideo oportet dicere quod alii sacerdotes effectum sacerdotii sui participant, non inquantum sacerdotes, sed inquantum peccatores, ut infra dicetur. Christus autem, simpliciter loquendo, peccatum non habuit, habuit tamen similitudinem peccati in carne, ut dicitur Rom. VIII. Et ideo non simpliciter dicendum est quod ipse effectum sacerdotii participaverit, sed secundum quid, scilicet secundum passibilitatem carnis. Unde signanter dicit, qui possit illum salvum facere a morte. Ad secundum dicendum quod in oblatione sacrificii cuiuscumque sacerdotis duo possunt considerari, scilicet ipsum sacrificium oblatum, et devotio offerentis. Proprius autem effectus sacerdotii est id quod sequitur ex ipso sacrificio. Christus autem consecutus est per suam passionem, non quasi ex vi sacrificii, quod offertur per modum satisfactionis, sed ex ipsa devotione qua, secundum caritatem, passionem humiliter sustinuit. Ad tertium dicendum quod figura non potest adaequare veritatem. Unde sacerdos figuralis veteris legis non poterat ad hanc perfectionem attingere ut sacrificio satisfactorio non indigeret. Sed Christus non indiguit. Unde non est similis ratio de utroque. Et hoc est quod apostolus dicit, lex homines constituit sacerdotes infirmitatem habentes, sermo autem iurisiurandi, qui post legem est, filium in aeternum perfectum.

Q. 22, A. 5

is the fountain-head of the entire priesthood: for the priest of the Old Law was a figure of Him; while the priest of the New Law works in His person, according to 2 Cor. 2:10: For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ. Therefore it is not fitting that Christ should receive the effect of His priesthood. Reply Obj. 1: Although prayer is befitting to priests, it is not their proper office, for it is befitting to everyone to pray both for himself and for others, according to James 5:16: Pray for one another that you may be saved. And so we may say that the prayer by which Christ prayed for Himself was not an action of His priesthood. But this answer seems to be precluded by the Apostle, who, after saying (Heb 5:6), Thou art a priest for ever according to the order of Melchisedech, adds, Who in the days of His flesh offering up payers, etc., as quoted above (Obj. 1): so that it seems that the prayer which Christ offered pertained to His priesthood. We must therefore say that other priests partake in the effect of their priesthood, not as priests, but as sinners, as we shall state farther on (ad 3). But Christ had, simply speaking, no sin; though He had the likeness of sin in the flesh, as is written Rom. 8:3. And, consequently, we must not say simply that He partook of the effect of His priesthood but with this qualification— in regard to the passibility of the flesh. Wherefore he adds pointedly, that was able to save Him from death. Reply Obj. 2: Two things may be considered in the offering of a sacrifice by any priest—namely, the sacrifice itself which is offered, and the devotion of the offerer. Now the proper effect of priesthood is that which results from the sacrifice itself. But Christ obtained a result from His passion, not as by virtue of the sacrifice, which is offered by way of satisfaction, but by the very devotion with which out of charity He humbly endured the passion. Reply Obj. 3: A figure cannot equal the reality, wherefore the figural priest of the Old Law could not attain to such perfection as not to need a sacrifice of satisfaction. But Christ did not stand in need of this. Consequently, there is no comparison between the two; and this is what the Apostle says (Heb 7:28): The Law maketh men priests, who have infirmity; but the word of the oath, which was since the Law, the Son Who is perfected for evermore.

Article 5 Whether the priesthood of Christ endures for ever? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod saObjection 1: It would seem that the priesthood of cerdotium Christi non permaneat in aeternum. Quia, Christ does not endure for ever. For as stated above ut dictum est, illi soli effectu sacerdotii indigent qui ha- (A. 4, ad 1, 3) those alone need the effect of the priesthood bent infirmitatem peccati quae per sacerdotis sacrifi- who have the weakness of sin, which can be expiated by

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cium expiari potest. Sed hoc non erit in aeternum. Quia in sanctis nulla erit infirmitas, secundum illud Isaiae LX, populus tuus omnes iusti, peccatorum autem infirmitas inexpiabilis erit, quia in Inferno nulla est redemptio. Ergo sacerdotium Christi non est in aeternum. Praeterea, sacerdotium Christi maxime manifestatum est in eius passione et morte, quando per proprium sanguinem introivit in sancta, ut dicitur Heb. IX. Sed passio et mors Christi non erit in aeternum, ut dicitur Rom. VI, Christus resurgens a mortuis iam non moritur. Ergo sacerdotium Christi non est in aeternum. Praeterea, Christus est sacerdos non secundum quod Deus, sed secundum quod homo. Sed Christus quandoque non fuit homo scilicet in triduo mortis. Ergo sacerdotium Christi non est in aeternum. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo, tu es sacerdos in aeternum. Respondeo dicendum quod in officio sacerdotis duo possunt considerari, primo quidem ipsa oblatio sacrificii; secundo, ipsa sacrificii consummatio, quae quidem consistit in hoc quod illi pro quibus sacrificium offertur finem sacrificii consequuntur. Finis autem sacrificii quod Christus obtulit, non fuerunt bona temporalia, sed aeterna, quae per eius mortem adipiscimur, unde dicitur, Heb. IX, quod Christus est assistens pontifex futurorum bonorum, ratione cuius Christi sacerdotium dicitur esse aeternum. Et haec quidem consummatio sacrificii Christi praefigurabatur in hoc ipso quod pontifex legalis semel in anno cum sanguine hirci et vituli intrabat in sancta sanctorum, ut dicitur Levit. XVI, cum tamen hircum et vitulum non immolaret in sancta sanctorum, sed extra. Similiter Christus in sancta sanctorum idest in ipsum caelum intravit et nobis viam paravit intrandi per virtutem sanguinis sui, quem pro nobis in terra effudit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sancti qui erunt in patria, non indigebunt ulterius expiari per sacerdotium Christi, sed, expiati iam, indigebunt consummari per ipsum Christum, a quo gloria eorum dependet, ut dicitur, Apoc. XXI, quod claritas Dei illuminat illam, scilicet civitatem sanctorum, et lucerna eius est agnus. Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet passio et mors Christi de cetero non sit iteranda, tamen virtus illius hostiae permanet in aeternum, quia ut dicitur Heb. X, una oblatione consummavit in aeternum sanctificatos. Per quod etiam patet responsio ad tertium. Unitas autem huius oblationis figurabatur in lege per hoc quod semel in anno legalis pontifex cum solemni oblatione sanguinis intrabat in sancta, ut dicitur Levit. XVI. Sed deficiebat figura a veritate in hoc, quod illa hostia non habebat sempiternam virtutem, et ideo annuatim illae hostiae reiterabantur.

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the priest’s sacrifice. But this will not be for ever. For in the Saints there will be no weakness, according to Isa. 60:21: Thy people shall be all just: while no expiation will be possible for the weakness of sin, since there is no redemption in hell (Office of the Dead, Resp. vii). Therefore the priesthood of Christ endures not for ever. Obj. 2: Further, the priesthood of Christ was made manifest most of all in His passion and death, when by His own blood He entered into the Holies (Heb 9:12). But the passion and death of Christ will not endure for ever, as stated Rom. 6:9: Christ rising again from the dead, dieth now no more. Therefore the priesthood of Christ will not endure for ever. Obj. 3: Further, Christ is a priest, not as God, but as man. But at one time Christ was not man, namely during the three days He lay dead. Therefore the priesthood of Christ endures not for ever. On the contrary, It is written (Ps 109:4): Thou art a priest for ever. I answer that, In the priestly office, we may consider two things: first, the offering of the sacrifice; second, the consummation of the sacrifice, consisting in this, that those for whom the sacrifice is offered, obtain the end of the sacrifice. Now the end of the sacrifice which Christ offered consisted not in temporal but in eternal good, which we obtain through His death, according to Heb. 9:11: Christ is a high-priest of the good things to come; for which reason the priesthood of Christ is said to be eternal. Now this consummation of Christ’s sacrifice was foreshadowed in this, that the high-priest of the Old Law, once a year, entered into the Holy of Holies with the blood of a he-goat and a calf, as laid down, Lev. 16:11, and yet he offered up the he-goat and calf not within the Holy of Holies, but without. In like manner Christ entered into the Holy of Holies—that is, into heaven—and prepared the way for us, that we might enter by the virtue of His blood, which He shed for us on earth. Reply Obj. 1: The Saints who will be in heaven will not need any further expiation by the priesthood of Christ, but having expiated, they will need consummation through Christ Himself, on Whom their glory depends, as is written (Rev 21:23): The glory of God hath enlightened it—that is, the city of the Saints—and the Lamb is the lamp thereof. Reply Obj. 2: Although Christ’s passion and death are not to be repeated, yet the virtue of that Victim endures for ever, for, as it is written (Heb 10:14), by one oblation He hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified. Wherefore the reply to the third objection is clear. As to the unity of this sacrifice, it was foreshadowed in the Law in that, once a year, the high-priest of the Law entered into the Holies, with a solemn oblation of blood, as set down, Lev. 16:11. But the figure fell short of the reality in this, that the victim had not an everlasting virtue, for which reason those sacrifices were renewed every year.

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Q. 22, A. 6

Article 6 Whether the priesthood of Christ was according to the order of Melchisedech? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacerdotium Christi non fuerit secundum ordinem Melchisedech. Christus enim est fons totius sacerdotii tanquam principalis sacerdos. Sed illud quod est principale, non sequitur ordinem aliorum, sed alia sequuntur ordinem ipsius. Ergo Christus non debet dici sacerdos secundum ordinem Melchisedech. Praeterea, sacerdotium veteris legis propinquius fuit sacerdotio Christi quam sacerdotium quod fuit ante legem. Sed sacramenta tanto expressius significabant Christum, quanto propinquiora fuerunt Christo, ut patet ex his quae in secunda parte dicta sunt. Ergo sacerdotium Christi magis debet denominari secundum sacerdotium legale quam secundum sacerdotium Melchisedech, quod fuit ante legem. Praeterea, Heb. VII dicitur, quod est rex pacis; sine patre sine matre sine genealogia; neque initium dierum neque finem vitae habens, quae quidem conveniunt soli filio Dei. Ergo non debet dici Christus sacerdos secundum ordinem Melchisedech tanquam cuiusdam alterius, sed secundum ordinem sui ipsius. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo, tu es sacerdos in aeternum secundum ordinem Melchisedech. Respondeo dicendum quod sicut, supra dictum est, legale sacerdotium fuit figura sacerdotii Christi, non quidem quasi adaequans veritatem, sed multum ab ea deficiens, tum quia sacerdotium legale non mundabat peccata; tum etiam quia non erat aeternum, sicut sacerdotium Christi. Ipsa autem excellentia sacerdotii Christi ad sacerdotium leviticum fuit figurata in sacerdotio Melchisedech, qui ab Abraham decimas sumpsit, in cuius lumbis decimatus est quodammodo ipse sacerdos legalis. Et ideo sacerdotium Christi dicitur esse secundum ordinem Melchisedech, propter excellentiam veri sacerdotii ad figurale sacerdotium legis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus non dicitur esse secundum ordinem Melchisedech quasi principalioris sacerdotis, sed quasi praefigurantis excellentiam sacerdotii Christi ad sacerdotium leviticum. Ad secundum dicendum quod in sacerdotio Christi duo possunt considerari, scilicet ipsa oblatio Christi, et participatio eius. Quantum autem ad ipsam oblationem, expressius figurabat sacerdotium Christi sacerdotium legale per sanguinis effusionem, quam sacerdotium Melchisedech in quo sanguis non effundebatur. Sed quantum ad participationem huius sacrificii et eius effectum, in quo praecipue attenditur excellentia sacerdotii Christi ad sacerdotium legale, expressius praefigurabatur per sacerdotium Melchisedech, qui offerebat panem et vinum,

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s priesthood was not according to the order of Melchisedech. For Christ is the fountain-head of the entire priesthood, as being the principal priest. Now that which is principal is not secondary in regard to others, but others are secondary in its regard. Therefore Christ should not be called a priest according to the order of Melchisedech. Obj. 2: Further, the priesthood of the Old Law was more akin to Christ’s priesthood than was the priesthood that existed before the Law. But the nearer the sacraments were to Christ, the more clearly they signified Him; as is clear from what we have said in the Second Part (II-II, Q. 2, A. 7). Therefore the priesthood of Christ should be denominated after the priesthood of the Law, rather than after the order of Melchisedech, which was before the Law. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Heb 7:2, 3): That is ‘king of peace,’ without father, without mother, without genealogy; having neither beginning of days nor ending of life: which can be referred only to the Son of God. Therefore Christ should not be called a priest according to the order of Melchisedech, as of some one else, but according to His own order. On the contrary, It is written (Ps 109:4): Thou art a priest for ever according to the order of Melchisedech. I answer that, As stated above (A. 4, ad 3) the priesthood of the Law was a figure of the priesthood of Christ, not as adequately representing the reality, but as falling far short thereof: both because the priesthood of the Law did not wash away sins, and because it was not eternal, as the priesthood of Christ. Now the excellence of Christ’s over the Levitical priesthood was foreshadowed in the priesthood of Melchisedech, who received tithes from Abraham, in whose loins the priesthood of the Law was tithed. Consequently the priesthood of Christ is said to be according to the order of Melchisedech, on account of the excellence of the true priesthood over the figural priesthood of the Law. Reply Obj. 1: Christ is said to be according to the order of Melchisedech not as though the latter were a more excellent priest, but because he foreshadowed the excellence of Christ’s over the Levitical priesthood. Reply Obj. 2: Two things may be considered in Christ’s priesthood: namely, the offering made by Christ, and (our) partaking thereof. As to the actual offering, the priesthood of Christ was more distinctly foreshadowed by the priesthood of the Law, by reason of the shedding of blood, than by the priesthood of Melchisedech in which there was no blood-shedding. But if we consider the participation of this sacrifice and the effect thereof, wherein the excellence of Christ’s priesthood over the priesthood of the Law principally consists, then the former was more distinctly fore-

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significantia, ut dicit Augustinus ecclesiasticam unitatem, quam constituit participatio sacrificii Christi. Unde etiam in nova lege verum Christi sacrificium communicatur fidelibus sub specie panis et vini.

IIIae

shadowed by the priesthood of Melchisedech, who offered bread and wine, signifying, as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) ecclesiastical unity, which is established by our taking part in the sacrifice of Christ. Wherefore also in the New Law the true sacrifice of Christ is presented to the faithful under the form of bread and wine. Ad tertium dicendum quod Melchisedech dictus Reply Obj. 3: Melchisedech is described as without faest sine patre et sine matre et sine genealogia, et quod ther, without mother, without genealogy, and as having neinon habet initium dierum neque finem non quia ista ther beginning of days nor ending of life, not as though he non habuit, sed quia in Scriptura sacra ista de eo non le- had not these things, but because these details in his regard guntur. Et per hoc ipsum, ut apostolus ibidem dicit, assi- are not supplied by Holy Scripture. And this it is that, as milatus est filio Dei, qui in terris est sine patre, et in cae- the Apostle says in the same passage, he is likened unto the lis sine matre et sine genealogia, secundum illud Isaiae Son of God, Who had no earthly father, no heavenly mother, LIII, generationem eius quis enarrabit? Et secundum di- and no genealogy, according to Isa. 53:8: Who shall declare vinitatem neque principium neque finem habet dierum. His generation? and Who in His Godhead has neither beginning nor end of days.

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Question 23 Adoption as Befitting to Christ Deinde considerandum est an adoptio Christo conWe must now come to consider whether adoption befits veniat. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Christ: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum Deo conveniat filios adoptare. (1) Whether it is fitting that God should adopt sons? Secundo, utrum hoc conveniat soli Deo patri. (2) Whether this is fitting to God the Father alone? Tertio, utrum sit proprium hominum adoptari in (3) Whether it is proper to man to be adopted to the filios Dei. sonship of God? Quarto, utrum Christus possit dici filius adoptivus. (4) Whether Christ can be called the adopted Son?

Article 1 Whether it is fitting that God should adopt sons? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deo non conveniat filios adoptare. Nullus enim adoptat nisi extraneam personam in filium, secundum quod iuristae dicunt. Sed nulla persona est extranea Deo, qui est omnium creator. Ergo videtur quod Deo non conveniat adoptare. Praeterea, adoptatio videtur esse introducta in defectu filiationis naturalis. Sed in Deo invenitur naturalis filiatio, ut in prima parte habitum est. Ergo non convenit Deo filios adoptare. Praeterea, ad hoc aliquis adoptatur ut in hereditate adoptantis succedat. Sed in hereditate Dei non videtur aliquis posse succedere, quia ipse nunquam decedit. Ergo Deo non competit adoptare. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ephes. I, praedestinavit nos in adoptionem filiorum Dei. Sed praedestinatio Dei non est irrita. Ergo Deus aliquos sibi adoptat in filios. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquis homo adoptat alium sibi in filium inquantum ex sua bonitate admittit eum ad participationem suae hereditatis. Deus autem est infinitae bonitatis, ex qua contingit quod ad participationem bonorum suas creaturas admittit et praecipue rationales creaturas, quae, inquantum sunt ad imaginem Dei factae, sunt capaces beatitudinis divinae. Quae quidem consistit in fruitione Dei, per quam etiam ipse Deus beatus est et per seipsum dives, inquantum scilicet seipso fruitur. Hoc autem dicitur hereditas alicuius ex quo ipse est dives. Et ideo, inquantum Deus ex sua bonitate admittit homines ad beatitudinis hereditatem, dicitur eos adoptare. Hoc autem plus habet adoptatio divina quam humana, quod Deus hominem quem adoptat idoneum facit, per gratiae munus, ad hereditatem cae-

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not fitting that God should adopt sons. For, as jurists say, no one adopts anyone but a stranger as his son. But no one is a stranger in relation to God, Who is the Creator of all. Therefore it seems unfitting that God should adopt. Obj. 2: Further, adoption seems to have been introduced in default of natural sonship. But in God there is natural sonship, as set down in the First Part (Q. 27, A. 2). Therefore it is unfitting that God should adopt. Obj. 3: Further, the purpose of adopting anyone is that he may succeed, as heir, the person who adopts him. But it does not seem possible for anyone to succeed God as heir, for He can never die. Therefore it is unfitting that God should adopt. On the contrary, It is written (Eph 1:5) that He hath predestined us unto the adoption of children of God. But the predestination of God is not ineffectual. Therefore God does adopt some as His sons. I answer that, A man adopts someone as his son forasmuch as out of goodness he admits him as heir to his estate. Now God is infinitely good: for which reason He admits His creatures to a participation of good things; especially rational creatures, who forasmuch as they are made to the image of God, are capable of Divine beatitude. And this consists in the enjoyment of God, by which also God Himself is happy and rich in Himself—that is, in the enjoyment of Himself. Now a man’s inheritance is that which makes him rich. Wherefore, inasmuch as God, of His goodness, admits men to the inheritance of beatitude, He is said to adopt them. Moreover Divine exceeds human adoption, forasmuch as God, by bestowing His grace, makes man whom He adopts worthy to receive the heavenly inheritance; whereas man does not make him worthy whom he

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lestem percipiendam, homo autem non facit idoneum eum quem adoptat, sed potius eum iam idoneum eligit adoptando. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo, in sua natura consideratus, non est extraneus a Deo quantum ad bona naturalia quae recipit, est tamen extraneus quantum ad bona gratiae et gloriae. Et secundum hoc adoptatur. Ad secundum dicendum quod hominis est operari ad supplendam suam indigentiam, non autem Dei, cui convenit operari ad communicandam suae perfectionis abundantiam. Et ideo, sicut per actum creationis communicatur bonitas divina omnibus creaturis secundum quandam similitudinem, ita per actum adoptionis communicatur similitudo naturalis filiationis hominibus, secundum illud Rom. VIII, quos praescivit conformes fieri imaginis filii sui. Ad tertium dicendum quod bona spiritualia possunt simul a pluribus possideri, non autem bona corporalia. Et ideo hereditatem corporalem nullus potest percipere nisi succedens decedenti, hereditatem autem spiritualem simul omnes ex integro percipiunt, sine detrimento patris semper viventis. Quamvis posset dici quod Deus decedit secundum quod est in nobis per fidem, ut incipiat in nobis esse per speciem, sicut Glossa dicit, Rom. VIII, super illud, si filii, et heredes.

IIIae

adopts; but rather in adopting him he chooses one who is already worthy. Reply Obj. 1: Considered in his nature man is not a stranger in respect to God, as to the natural gifts bestowed on him: but he is as to the gifts of grace and glory; in regard to which he is adopted. Reply Obj. 2: Man works in order to supply his wants: not so God, Who works in order to communicate to others the abundance of His perfection. Wherefore, as by the work of creation the Divine goodness is communicated to all creatures in a certain likeness, so by the work of adoption the likeness of natural sonship is communicated to men, according to Rom. 8:29: Whom He foreknew . . . to be made conformable to the image of His Son. Reply Obj. 3: Spiritual goods can be possessed by many at the same time; not so material goods. Wherefore none can receive a material inheritance except the successor of a deceased person: whereas all receive the spiritual inheritance at the same time in its entirety without detriment to the ever-living Father. Yet it might be said that God ceases to be according as He is in us by faith, so as to begin to be in us by vision, as a gloss says on Rom. 8:17: If sons, heirs also.

Article 2 Whether it is fitting that the whole Trinity should adopt? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod adoptare non conveniat toti Trinitati. Adoptatio enim dicitur in divinis ad similitudinem rerum humanarum. Sed in rebus humanis soli illi convenit adoptare qui potest filios generare, quod in divinis convenit soli patri. Ergo in divinis solus pater potest adoptare. Praeterea, homines per adoptionem efficiuntur fratres Christi, secundum illud Rom. VIII, ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus. Fratres autem dicuntur qui sunt filii unius patris, unde et dominus dicit, Ioan. XX, ascendo ad patrem meum et patrem vestrum. Ergo solus pater Christi habet filios adoptivos. Praeterea, Galat. IV dicitur, misit Deus filium suum, ut adoptionem filiorum Dei reciperemus. Quoniam autem estis filii Dei, misit Deus spiritum filii sui in corda vestra, clamantem, abba, pater. Ergo eius est adoptare cuius est filium et spiritum sanctum habere. Sed hoc est solius personae patris. Ergo adoptare convenit soli personae patris. Sed contra, eius est adoptare nos in filios quem nos patrem possumus nominare, unde dicitur Rom.

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that the whole Trinity should adopt. For adoption is said of God in likeness to human custom. But among men those only adopt who can beget: and in God this can be applied only to the Father. Therefore in God the Father alone can adopt. Obj. 2: Further, by adoption men become the brethren of Christ, according to Rom. 8:29: That He might be the firstborn among many brethren. Now brethren are the sons of the same father; wherefore our Lord says (John 20:17): I ascend to My Father and to your Father. Therefore Christ’s Father alone has adopted sons. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Gal 4:4, 5, 6): God sent His Son . . . that we might receive the adoption of sons. And because you are sons of God, God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying: ‘Abba’ (Father). Therefore it belongs to Him to adopt, Who has the Son and the Holy Spirit. But this belongs to the Father alone. Therefore it befits the Father alone to adopt. On the contrary, It belongs to Him to adopt us as sons, Whom we can call Father; whence it is written

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VIII, accepistis spiritum adoptionis filiorum, in quo clamamus, abba, pater. Sed cum Deo dicimus, pater noster, hoc pertinet ad totam Trinitatem, sicut et cetera nomina quae dicuntur de Deo relative ad creaturam, ut in prima parte habitum est. Ergo adoptare convenit toti Trinitati. Respondeo dicendum quod haec est differentia inter filium Dei adoptivum et filium Dei naturalem, quod filius Dei naturalis est genitus non factus, filius autem adoptivus est factus, secundum illud Ioan. I, dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri. Dicitur tamen quandoque filius adoptivus esse genitus, propter spiritualem regenerationem, quae est gratuita, non naturalis, unde dicitur Iac. I, voluntarie genuit nos verbo veritatis. Quamvis autem generare in divinis sit proprium personae patris, tamen facere quemcumque effectum in creaturis est commune toti Trinitati, propter unitatem naturae, quia, ubi est una natura, oportet quod ibi sit una virtus et una operatio; unde dominus dicit, Ioan. V, quaecumque facit pater, haec et filius similiter facit. Et ideo homines adoptare in filios Dei convenit toti Trinitati. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes personae humanae non sunt unius naturae secundum numerum, ut oporteat unam esse omnium operationem et unum effectum, sicut accidit in divinis. Et ideo quantum ad hoc non est possibile attendi similitudinem utrobique. Ad secundum dicendum quod nos per adoptionem efficimur fratres Christi quasi eundem patrem habentes cum ipso, qui tamen alio modo est pater Christi, et alio modo est pater noster. Unde signanter dominus, Ioan. XX, seorsum dixit, patrem meum, et seorsum dixit, patrem vestrum. Est enim pater Christi naturaliter generando, quod est proprium sibi, est autem noster voluntarie aliquid faciendo, quod est commune sibi et filio et spiritui sancto. Et ideo Christus non est filius totius Trinitatis, sicut nos. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, filiatio adoptiva est quaedam similitudo filiationis aeternae, sicut omnia quae in tempore facta sunt, similitudines quaedam sunt eorum quae ab aeterno fuerunt. Assimilatur autem homo splendori aeterni filii per gratiae claritatem, quae attribuitur spiritui sancto. Et ideo adoptatio, licet sit communis toti Trinitati, appropriatur tamen patri ut auctori, filio ut exemplari, spiritui sancto ut imprimenti in nobis huius similitudinem exemplaris.

Q. 23, A. 2

(Rom 8:15): You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: ‘Abba’ (Father). But when we say to God, Our Father, we address the whole Trinity: as is the case with the other names which are said of God in respect of creatures, as stated in the First Part (Q. 33, A. 3, Obj. 1; cf. Q. 45, A. 6). Therefore to adopt is befitting to the whole Trinity. I answer that, There is this difference between an adopted son of God and the natural Son of God, that the latter is begotten not made; whereas the former is made, according to John 1:12: He gave them power to be made the sons of God. Yet sometimes the adopted son is said to be begotten, by reason of the spiritual regeneration which is by grace, not by nature; wherefore it is written (Jas 1:18): Of His own will hath He begotten us by the word of truth. Now although, in God, to beget belongs to the Person of the Father, yet to produce any effect in creatures is common to the whole Trinity, by reason of the oneness of their Nature: since, where there is one nature, there must needs be one power and one operation: whence our Lord says (John 5:19): What things soever the Father doth, these the Son also doth in like manner. Therefore it belongs to the whole Trinity to adopt men as sons of God. Reply Obj. 1: All human individuals are not of one individual nature, so that there need be one operation and one effect of them all, as is the case in God. Consequently in this respect no comparison is possible. Reply Obj. 2: By adoption we are made the brethren of Christ, as having with Him the same Father: Who, nevertheless, is His Father in one way, and ours in another. Whence pointedly our Lord says, separately, My Father, and Your Father (John 20:17). For He is Christ’s Father by natural generation; and this is proper to Him: whereas He is our Father by a voluntary operation, which is common to Him and to the Son and Holy Spirit: so that Christ is not the Son of the whole Trinity, as we are. Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (A. 1, ad 2), adoptive sonship is a certain likeness of the eternal Sonship: just as all that takes place in time is a certain likeness of what has been from eternity. Now man is likened to the splendor of the Eternal Son by reason of the light of grace which is attributed to the Holy Spirit. Therefore adoption, though common to the whole Trinity, is appropriated to the Father as its author; to the Son, as its exemplar; to the Holy Spirit, as imprinting on us the likeness of this exemplar.

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Q. 23, A. 3

Incarnation

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Article 3 Whether it is proper to the rational nature to be adopted? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod adoptari non sit proprium rationalis creaturae. Non enim Deus pater creaturae rationalis dicitur nisi per adoptionem. Dicitur autem pater creaturae etiam irrationalis, secundum illud Iob XXXVIII, quis est pluviae pater? Aut quis genuit stillas roris? Ergo adoptari non est proprium rationalis naturae. Praeterea, per adoptionem dicuntur aliqui filii Dei. Sed esse filios Dei in Scriptura proprie videtur attribui Angelis, secundum illud Iob I, quadam autem die, cum assisterent filii Dei coram domino. Ergo non est proprium rationalis creaturae adoptari.

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to the rational nature to be adopted. For God is not said to be the Father of the rational creature, save by adoption. But God is called the Father even of the irrational creature, according to Job 38:28: Who is father of the rain? Or who begot the drops of dew? Therefore it is not proper to the rational creature to be adopted. Obj. 2: Further, by reason of adoption some are called sons of God. But to be sons of God seems to be properly attributed by the Scriptures to the angels; according to Job 1:6: On a certain day when the sons of God came to stand before the Lord. Therefore it is not proper to the rational creature to be adopted. Praeterea, quod est proprium alicui naturae, conObj. 3: Further, whatever is proper to a nature, belongs venit omnibus habentibus naturam illam, sicut risibile to all that have that nature: just as risibility belongs to all convenit omnibus hominibus. Sed adoptari non conve- men. But to be adopted does not belong to every rational nit omni rationali naturae. Ergo adoptari non est pro- nature. Therefore it is not proper to human nature.

prium rationalis naturae. Sed contra est quod filii adoptati sunt heredes Dei, ut patet Rom. VIII. Sed talis hereditas convenit soli creaturae rationali. Ergo proprium rationalis creaturae est adoptari. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, filiatio adoptionis est quaedam similitudo filiationis naturalis. Filius autem Dei naturaliter procedit a patre ut verbum intellectuale, unum cum ipso patre existens. Huic ergo verbo tripliciter potest aliquid assimilari. Uno quidem modo, secundum rationem formae, non autem secundum intellectualitatem ipsius, sicut forma domus exterius constitutae assimilatur verbo mentali artificis secundum speciem formae, non autem secundum intelligibilitatem, quia forma domus in materia non est intelligibilis, sicut erat in mente artificis. Et hoc modo verbo aeterno assimilatur quaelibet creatura, cum sit facta per verbum. Secundo assimilatur creatura verbo, non solum quantum ad rationem formae, sed etiam quantum ad intellectualitatem ipsius, sicut scientia quae fit in mente discipuli, assimilatur verbo quod est in mente magistri. Et hoc modo creatura rationalis, etiam secundum suam naturam, assimilatur verbo Dei. Tertio modo, assimilatur creatura verbo aeterno secundum unitatem quam habet ad patrem, quod quidem fit per gratiam et caritatem, unde dominus orat, Ioan. XVII, sint unum in nobis, sicut et nos unum sumus. Et talis assimilatio perficit rationem adoptionis, quia sic assimilatis debetur hereditas aeterna. Unde manifestum est quod adoptari convenit soli creaturae rationali, non tamen omni, sed solum habenti caritatem. Quae est diffusa in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, ut dicitur Rom. V. Et ideo, Rom. VIII, Spiritus Sanctus dicitur spiritus adoptionis filiorum.

On the contrary, Adopted sons are the heirs of God, as is stated Rom. 8:17. But such an inheritance belongs to none but the rational nature. Therefore it is proper to the rational nature to be adopted. I answer that, As stated above (A. 2, ad 3), the sonship of adoption is a certain likeness of natural sonship. Now the Son of God proceeds naturally from the Father as the Intellectual Word, in oneness of nature with the Father. To this Word, therefore, something may be likened in three ways. First, on the part of the form but not on the part of its intelligibility: thus the form of a house already built is like the mental word of the builder in its specific form, but not in intelligibility, because the material form of a house is not intelligible, as it was in the mind of the builder. In this way every creature is like the Eternal Word; since it was made through the Word. Second, the creature is likened to the Word, not only as to its form, but also as to its intelligibility: thus the knowledge which is begotten in the disciple’s mind is likened to the word in the mind of the master. In this way the rational creature, even in its nature, is likened to the Word of God. Third, a creature is likened to the Eternal Word, as to the oneness of the Word with the Father, which is by reason of grace and charity: wherefore our Lord prays (John 17:21, 22): That they may be one in Us . . . as We also are one. And this likeness perfects the adoption: for to those who are thus like Him the eternal inheritance is due. It is therefore clear that to be adopted belongs to the rational creature alone: not indeed to all, but only to those who have charity; which is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit (Rom 5:5); for which reason (Rom 8:15) the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of adoption of sons.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus dicitur pater creaturae irrationalis, non proprie per adoptionem, sed per creationem, secundum primam participationem similitudinis. Ad secundum dicendum quod Angeli dicuntur filii Dei filiatione adoptionis, non quia ipsis primo conveniat, sed quia ipsi primo adoptionem filiorum receperunt. Ad tertium dicendum quod adoptio non est proprium consequens naturam, sed consequens gratiam, cuius natura rationalis est capax. Et ideo non oportet quod omni rationali creaturae conveniat, sed quod omnis rationalis creatura sit capax adoptionis.

Q. 23, A. 4

Reply Obj. 1: God is called the Father of the irrational creature, not properly speaking, by reason of adoption, but by reason of creation; according to the first-mentioned participation of likeness. Reply Obj. 2: Angels are called sons of God by adoptive sonship, not that it belongs to them first; but because they were the first to receive the adoption of sons. Reply Obj. 3: Adoption is a property resulting not from nature, but from grace, of which the rational nature is capable. Therefore it need not belong to every rational nature: but every rational creature must needs be capable of adoption.

Article 4 Whether Christ as man is the adopted Son of God? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus, secundum quod homo sit filius Dei adoptivus. Dicit enim Hilarius, de Christo loquens, potestatis dignitas non amittitur dum carnis humanitas adoptatur. Ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, est filius adoptivus. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praedest. Sanct., quod eadem gratia ille homo est Christus, qua gratia ab initio fidei quicumque homo est Christianus. Sed alii homines sunt Christiani per gratiam adoptionis. Ergo et ille homo est Christus per adoptionem. Et ita videtur esse filius adoptivus. Praeterea, Christus, secundum quod homo, est servus. Sed dignius est esse filium adoptivum quam servum. Ergo multo magis Christus, secundum quod homo, est filius adoptivus. Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de Incarnat., adoptivum filium non dicimus filium esse natura, sed eum dicimus natura esse filium qui verus est filius. Christus autem verus et naturalis est filius Dei, secundum illud I Ioan. ult., ut simus in vero filio eius, Iesu Christo. Ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, non est filius adoptivus. Respondeo dicendum quod filiatio proprie convenit hypostasi vel personae, non autem naturae, unde in prima parte dictum est quod filiatio est proprietas personalis. In Christo autem non est alia persona vel hypostasis quam increata, cui convenit esse filium per naturam. Dictum est autem supra quod filiatio adoptionis est participata similitudo filiationis naturalis. Non autem dicitur aliquid participative quod per se dicitur. Et ideo Christus, qui est filius Dei naturalis, nullo modo potest dici filius adoptivus.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as man is the adopted Son of God. For Hilary says (De Trin. ii) speaking of Christ: The dignity of power is not forfeited when carnal humanity is adopted. Therefore Christ as man is the adopted Son of God. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv) that by the same grace that Man is Christ, as from the birth of faith every man is a Christian. But other men are Christians by the grace of adoption. Therefore this Man is Christ by adoption: and consequently He would seem to be an adopted son. Obj. 3: Further, Christ, as man, is a servant. But it is of greater dignity to be an adopted son than to be a servant. Therefore much more is Christ, as man, an adopted Son. On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Incarn. viii): We do not call an adopted son a natural son: the natural son is a true son. But Christ is the true and natural Son of God, according to 1 John 5:20: That we may . . . be in His true Son, Jesus Christ. Therefore Christ, as Man, is not an adopted Son. I answer that, Sonship belongs properly to the hypostasis or person, not to the nature; whence in the First Part (Q. 32, A. 3) we have stated that Filiation is a personal property. Now in Christ there is no other than the uncreated person or hypostasis, to Whom it belongs by nature to be the Son. But it has been said above (A. 1, ad 2), that the sonship of adoption is a participated likeness of natural sonship: nor can a thing be said to participate in what it has essentially. Therefore Christ, Who is the natural Son of God, can nowise be called an adopted Son.

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Q. 23, A. 4

Incarnation

Secundum autem illos qui ponunt in Christo duas personas, vel duas hypostases, seu duo supposita, nihil rationabiliter prohibet Christum hominem dici filium adoptivum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut filiatio non proprie convenit naturae, ita nec adoptio. Et ideo, cum dicitur quod carnis humanitas adoptatur, impropria est locutio, et accipitur ibi adoptio pro unione humanae naturae ad personam filii. Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo illa Augustini est intelligenda quantum ad principium, quia scilicet, sicut sine meritis habet quilibet homo ut sit Christianus, ita ille homo sine meritis habuit ut esset Christus. Est tamen differentia quantum ad terminum, quia scilicet Christus per gratiam unionis est filius naturalis; alius autem per gratiam habitualem est filius adoptivus. Gratia autem habitualis in Christo non facit de nonfilio filium adoptivum, sed est quidam effectus filiationis in anima Christi, secundum illud Ioan. I, vidimus gloriam eius quasi unigeniti a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis. Ad tertium dicendum quod esse creaturam, et etiam servitus vel subiectio ad Deum, non solum respicit personam, sed etiam naturam, quod non potest dici de filiatione. Et ideo non est similis ratio.

IIIae

But according to those who suppose two persons or two hypostases or two supposita in Christ, no reason prevents Christ being called the adopted Son of God. Reply Obj. 1: As sonship does not properly belong to the nature, so neither does adoption. Consequently, when it is said that carnal humanity is adopted, the expression is metaphorical: and adoption is used to signify the union of human nature to the Person of the Son. Reply Obj. 2: This comparison of Augustine is to be referred to the principle because, to wit, just as it is granted to any man without meriting it to be a Christian, so did it happen that this man without meriting it was Christ. But there is a difference on the part of the term: because by the grace of union Christ is the natural Son; whereas another man by habitual grace is an adopted son. Yet habitual grace in Christ does not make one who was not a son to be an adopted son, but is a certain effect of Filiation in the soul of Christ, according to John 1:14: We saw His glory . . . as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. Reply Obj. 3: To be a creature, as also to be subservient or subject to God, regards not only the person, but also the nature: but this cannot be said of sonship. Wherefore the comparison does not hold.

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Question 24 The Predestination of Christ Deinde considerandum est de praedestinatione We shall now consider the predestination of Christ. UnChristi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. der this head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum sit praedestinatus. (1) Whether Christ was predestined? Secundo, utrum sit praedestinatus secundum quod (2) Whether He was predestined as man? homo. Tertio, utrum eius praedestinatio sit exemplar (3) Whether His predestination is the exemplar of praedestinationis nostrae. ours? Quarto, utrum sit causa praedestinationis nostrae. (4) Whether it is the cause of our predestination?

Article 1 Whether it is befitting that Christ should be predestined? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christo non conveniat praedestinatum esse. Terminus enim cuiuslibet praedestinationis videtur esse adoptio filiorum, secundum illud Ephes. I, praedestinavit nos in adoptionem filiorum. Sed Christo non convenit esse filium adoptivum, ut dictum est. Ergo Christo non convenit praedestinatum esse. Praeterea, in Christo duo est considerare, scilicet naturam humanam, et personam. Sed non potest dici quod Christus est praedestinatus ratione naturae humanae, quia haec est falsa, humana natura est filius Dei. Similiter etiam neque ratione personae, quia illa persona non habet ex gratia quod sit filius Dei, sed ex natura; praedestinatio autem est eorum quae sunt ex gratia, ut in prima parte dictum est. Ergo Christus non est praedestinatus filius Dei. Praeterea, sicut illud quod est factum non semper fuit, ita et illud quod fuit praedestinatum, eo quod praedestinatio antecessionem quandam importat. Sed, quia Christus semper fuit Deus et filius Dei, non proprie dicitur quod homo ille sit factus filius Dei. Ergo, pari ratione, non debet dici quod Christus sit praedestinatus filius Dei. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. I, de Christo loquens, qui praedestinatus est filius Dei in virtute. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut patet ex his quae in prima parte dicta sunt, praedestinatio, proprie accepta, est quaedam divina praeordinatio ab aeterno de his quae per gratiam Dei sunt fienda in tempore. Est autem hoc in tempore factum per gratiam unionis a Deo, ut homo esset Deus et Deus esset homo. Nec potest dici quod Deus ab aeterno non praeordinaverit hoc se facturum

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that Christ should be predestined. For the term of anyone’s predestination seems to be the adoption of sons, according to Eph. 1:5: Who hath predestined us unto the adoption of children. But it is not befitting to Christ to be an adopted Son, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4). Therefore it is not fitting that Christ be predestined. Obj. 2: Further, we may consider two things in Christ: His human nature and His person. But it cannot be said that Christ is predestined by reason of His human nature; for this proposition is false—The human nature is Son of God. In like manner neither by reason of the person; for this person is the Son of God, not by grace, but by nature: whereas predestination regards what is of grace, as stated in the First Part, Q. 23, AA. 2, 5. Therefore Christ was not predestined to be the Son of God. Obj. 3: Further, just as that which has been made was not always, so also that which was predestined; since predestination implies a certain antecedence. But, because Christ was always God and the Son of God, it cannot be said that that Man was made the Son of God. Therefore, for a like reason, we ought not to say that Christ was predestined the Son of God. On the contrary, The Apostle says, speaking of Christ (Rom 1:4): Who was predestined the Son of God in power. I answer that, As is clear from what has been said in the First Part (Q. 23, AA. 1, 2), predestination, in its proper sense, is a certain Divine preordination from eternity of those things which are to be done in time by the grace of God. Now, that man is God, and that God is man, is something done in time by God through the grace of union. Nor can it be said that God has not from eternity

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in tempore, quia sequeretur quod divinae menti aliquid accideret de novo. Et oportet dicere quod ipsa unio naturarum in persona Christi cadat sub aeterna Dei praedestinatione. Et ratione huius Christus dicitur esse praedestinatus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus ibi loquitur de praedestinatione qua nos praedestinamur ut simus filii adoptivi. Sicut autem Christus singulari modo prae aliis est Dei filius naturalis, ita quodam singulari modo est praedestinatus. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Glossa Rom. I, quidam dixerunt praedestinationem illam intelligendam esse de natura, non de persona, quia scilicet humanae naturae facta est haec gratia ut uniretur filio Dei in unitate personae. Sed secundum hoc locutio apostoli est impropria, propter duo. Primo quidem, ratione communi. Non enim dicimus naturam alicuius praedestinari, sed personam, quia praedestinari est dirigi in salutem, quod quidem est suppositi agentis propter beatitudinis finem. Secundo, ratione speciali. Quia esse filium Dei non convenit humanae naturae, est enim haec falsa, natura humana est filius Dei. Nisi forte quis velit sic exponere, extorta expositione, qui praedestinatus est filius Dei in virtute, idest, praedestinatum est ut humana natura uniretur filio Dei in persona. Relinquitur ergo quod praedestinatio attribuatur personae Christi, non quidem secundum se, vel secundum quod subsistit in divina natura; sed secundum quod subsistit in humana natura. Unde, cum praedixisset apostolus, qui factus est ei ex semine David secundum carnem, subiunxit, qui praedestinatus est filius Dei in virtute, ut daret intelligere quod, secundum hoc quod est factus ex semine David secundum carnem, est praedestinatus filius Dei in virtute. Quamvis enim sit naturale illi personae secundum se consideratae quod sit filius Dei in virtute, non tamen est ei naturale secundum naturam humanam, secundum quam hoc sibi competit per gratiam unionis. Ad tertium dicendum quod Origenes, super epistolam ad Rom., dicit hanc esse litteram apostoli, qui destinatus est filius Dei in virtute, ita quod non designetur aliqua antecessio. Et sic nihil habet difficultatis. Alii vero antecessionem quae designatur in hoc participio praedestinatus, referunt, non ad id quod est esse filius Dei, sed ad eius manifestationem, secundum illum consuetum modum loquendi in Scripturis quo res dicuntur fieri quando innotescunt, ut sit sensus quod Christus praedestinatus est manifestari filius Dei. Sed sic non proprie praedestinatio accipitur. Nam aliquis dicitur proprie praedestinari secundum quod dirigitur in finem beatitudinis. Beatitudo autem Christi non dependet ex nostra cognitione.

IIIae

pre-ordained to do this in time: since it would follow that something would come anew into the Divine Mind. And we must needs admit that the union itself of natures in the Person of Christ falls under the eternal predestination of God. For this reason do we say that Christ was predestined. Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle there speaks of that predestination by which we are predestined to be adopted sons. And just as Christ in a singular manner above all others is the natural Son of God, so in a singular manner is He predestined. Reply Obj. 2: As a gloss says on Rom. 1:4, some understood that predestination to refer to the nature and not to the Person—that is to say, that on human nature was bestowed the grace of being united to the Son of God in unity of Person. But in that case the phrase of the Apostle would be improper, for two reasons. First, for a general reason: for we do not speak of a person’s nature, but of his person, as being predestined: because to be predestined is to be directed towards salvation, which belongs to a suppositum acting for the end of beatitude. Second, for a special reason. Because to be Son of God is not befitting to human nature; for this proposition is false: The human nature is the Son of God: unless one were to force from it such an exposition as: Who was predestined the Son of God in power—that is, It was predestined that the Human nature should be united to the Son of God in the Person. Hence we must attribute predestination to the Person of Christ: not, indeed, in Himself or as subsisting in the Divine Nature, but as subsisting in the human nature. Wherefore the Apostle, after saying, Who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh, added, Who was predestined the Son of God in power: so as to give us to understand that in respect of His being of the seed of David according to the flesh, He was predestined the Son of God in power. For although it is natural to that Person, considered in Himself, to be the Son of God in power, yet this is not natural to Him, considered in the human nature, in respect of which this befits Him according to the grace of union. Reply Obj. 3: Origen commenting on Rom. 1:4 says that the true reading of this passage of the Apostle is: Who was destined to be the Son of God in power; so that no antecedence is implied. And so there would be no difficulty. Others refer the antecedence implied in the participle predestined, not to the fact of being the Son of God, but to the manifestation thereof, according to the customary way of speaking in Holy Scripture, by which things are said to take place when they are made known; so that the sense would be—Christ was predestined to be made known as the Son of God. But this is an improper signification of predestination. For a person is properly said to be predestined by reason of his being directed to the end of beatitude: but the beatitude of Christ does not depend on our knowledge thereof.

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Predestination of Christ

Et ideo melius dicendum est quod illa antecessio quam importat hoc participium praedestinatus, non refertur ad personam secundum seipsam, sed ratione humanae naturae, quia scilicet persona illa etsi ab aeterno fuerit filius Dei, hoc tamen non fuit semper, quod subsistens in natura humana fuerit filius Dei. Unde dicit Augustinus, in libro de Praedest. Sanct., praedestinatus est Iesus ut qui futurus erat secundum carnem filius David, esset tamen in virtute filius Dei. Et est considerandum quod, licet hoc participium praedestinatus importet antecessionem, sicut et hoc participium factus, aliter tamen et aliter. Nam fieri pertinet ad ipsam rem secundum quod in se est, praedestinari autem pertinet ad aliquem secundum quod est in apprehensione alicuius praeordinantis. Id autem quod subest alicui formae vel naturae secundum rem, potest apprehendi vel prout est sub forma illa, vel etiam absolute. Et quia absolute non convenit personae Christi quod incoeperit esse filius Dei, convenit autem ei secundum quod intelligitur vel apprehenditur ut in natura humana existens, quia scilicet hoc aliquando incoepit esse quod in natura humana existens esset filius Dei, ideo magis est haec vera, Christus est praedestinatus filius Dei, quam ista, Christus est factus filius Dei.

Q. 24, A. 2

It is therefore better to say that the antecedence implied in the participle predestined is to be referred to the Person not in Himself, but by reason of the human nature: since, although that Person was the Son of God from eternity, it was not always true that one subsisting in human nature was the Son of God. Hence Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv): Jesus was predestined, so that He Who according to the flesh was to be the son of David, should be nevertheless Son of God in power. Moreover, it must be observed that, although the participle predestined, just as this participle made, implies antecedence, yet there is a difference. For to be made belongs to the thing in itself: whereas to be predestined belongs to someone as being in the apprehension of one who preordains. Now that which is the subject of a form or nature in reality, can be apprehended either as under that form or absolutely. And since it cannot be said absolutely of the Person of Christ that He began to be the Son of God, yet this is becoming to Him as understood or apprehended to exist in human nature, because at one time it began to be true that one existing in human nature was the Son of God; therefore this proposition—Christ was predestined the Son of God—is truer than this—Christ was made the Son of God.

Article 2 Whether this proposition is false: “Christ as man was predestined to be the Son of God”? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod haec sit falsa, Christus, secundum quod homo, est praedestinatus esse filius Dei. Hoc enim est unusquisque secundum aliquod tempus quod est praedestinatus esse, eo quod praedestinatio Dei non fallitur. Si ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, est praedestinatus filius Dei, videtur sequi quod sit filius Dei secundum quod homo. Hoc autem est falsum. Ergo et primum. Praeterea, illud quod convenit Christo secundum quod homo, convenit cuilibet homini, eo quod ipse est unius speciei cum aliis hominibus. Si ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, est praedestinatus esse filius Dei, sequetur quod cuilibet homini hoc conveniat. Hoc autem est falsum. Ergo et primum. Praeterea, hoc ab aeterno praedestinatur quod est aliquando fiendum in tempore. Sed magis est haec vera, filius Dei factus est homo, quam ista, homo factus est filius Dei. Ergo magis est haec vera, Christus, secundum quod filius Dei, est praedestinatus esse homo, quam e converso, Christus, secundum quod homo, praedestinatus est esse filius Dei. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de Praedest. Sanct., ipsum dominum gloriae, inquantum homo factus est Dei filius, praedestinatum esse dicimus.

Objection 1: It would seem that this proposition is false: Christ as man was predestined to be the Son of God. For at some time a man is that which he was predestined to be: since God’s predestination does not fail. If, therefore, Christ as man was predestined the Son of God, it seems to follow that as man He is the Son of God. But the latter is false. Therefore the former is false. Obj. 2: Further, what is befitting to Christ as man is befitting to any man; since He belongs to the same species as other men. If, therefore, Christ, as man, was predestined the Son of God, it will follow that this is befitting to any other man. But the latter is false. Therefore the former is false. Obj. 3: Further, that is predestined from eternity which is to take place at some time. But this proposition, The Son of God was made man, is truer than this, Man was made the Son of God. Therefore this proposition, Christ, as the Son of God, was predestined to be man, is truer than this, Christ as Man was predestined to be the Son of God. On the contrary, Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. xv) says: Forasmuch as God the Son was made Man, we say that the Lord of Glory was predestined.

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Q. 24, A. 2

Incarnation

Respondeo dicendum quod in praedestinatione duo possunt considerari. Unum quidem ex parte ipsius praedestinationis aeternae, et secundum hoc importat antecessionem quandam respectu eius quod sub praedestinatione cadit. Alio modo potest considerari secundum effectum temporalem, qui quidem est aliquod gratuitum Dei donum. Dicendum est ergo quod secundum utrumque istorum attribuitur praedestinatio Christo ratione solius humanae naturae, nam humana natura non semper fuit verbo unita; et ei etiam per gratiam hoc est collatum, ut filio Dei in persona uniretur. Et ideo solum ratione naturae humanae praedestinatio competit Christo. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praedest. Sanct., praedestinata est ista humanae naturae tanta et tam celsa et summa subvectio, ut quo attolleretur altius non haberet. Hoc autem dicimus convenire alicui secundum quod homo, quod convenit ei ratione humanae naturae. Et ideo dicendum est quod Christus, secundum quod homo, est praedestinatus esse filius Dei. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum dicitur, Christus, secundum quod homo, est praedestinatus esse filius Dei, haec determinatio secundum quod homo potest referri ad actum significatum per participium dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte eius quod materialiter cadit sub praedestinatione. Et hoc modo est falsa. Est enim sensus quod praedestinatum sit ut Christus, secundum quod homo, sit filius Dei. Et in hoc sensu procedit obiectio. Alio modo, potest referri ad ipsam propriam rationem actus, prout scilicet praedestinatio importat in sui ratione antecessionem et effectum gratuitum. Et hoc modo convenit Christo praedestinatio ratione humanae naturae, ut dictum est. Et secundum hoc dicitur praedestinatus secundum quod homo. Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquid potest convenire alicui homini ratione humanae naturae dupliciter. Uno modo, sic quod humana natura sit causa illius, sicut esse risibile convenit Socrati ratione humanae naturae, ex cuius principiis causatur. Et hoc modo praedestinatio non convenit nec Christo nec alteri homini ratione humanae naturae. Et in hoc sensu procedit obiectio. Alio modo dicitur aliquid convenire alicui ratione humanae naturae, cuius humana natura est susceptiva. Et sic dicimus Christum esse praedestinatum ratione humanae naturae, quia praedestinatio refertur ad exaltationem humanae naturae in ipso, sicut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praedest. Sanct., ipsa est illa ineffabiliter facta hominis a Deo verbo susceptio singularis, ut filius hominis simul propter susceptum hominem, et filius Dei propter suscipientem unigenitum Deum, veraciter et proprie diceretur. Et ideo, quia illa susceptio sub praedestinatione cadit tanquam gratuita, utrumque potest dici, quod et filius Dei praedestinatus sit esse homo, et filius

IIIae

I answer that, Two things may be considered in predestination. One on the part of eternal predestination itself: and in this respect it implies a certain antecedence in regard to that which comes under predestination. Second, predestination may be considered as regards its temporal effect, which is some gratuitous gift of God. Therefore from both points of view we must say that predestination is ascribed to Christ by reason of His human nature alone: for human nature was not always united to the Word; and by grace bestowed on it was it united in Person to the Son of God. Consequently, by reason of human nature alone can predestination be attributed to Christ. Wherefore Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv): This human nature of ours was predestined to be raised to so great, so lofty, so exalted a position, that it would be impossible to raise it higher. Now that is said to belong to anyone as man which belongs to him by reason of human nature. Consequently, we must say that Christ, as Man, was predestined the Son of God. Reply Obj. 1: When we say, Christ, as Man, was predestined the Son of God, this qualification, as Man, can be referred in two ways to the action signified by the participle. First, as regards what comes under predestination materially, and thus it is false. For the sense would be that it was predestined that Christ, as Man, should be the Son of God. And in this sense the objection takes it.

Second, it may be referred to the very nature of the action itself: that is, forasmuch as predestination implies antecedence and gratuitous effect. And thus predestination belongs to Christ by reason of His human nature, as stated above. And in this sense He is said to be predestined as Man. Reply Obj. 2: Something may be befitting to a man by reason of human nature, in two ways. First, so that human nature be the cause thereof: thus risibility is befitting to Socrates by reason of human nature, being caused by its principles. In this manner predestination is not befitting either to Christ or to any other man, by reason of human nature. This is the sense of the objection. Second, a thing may be befitting to someone by reason of human nature, because human nature is susceptible of it. And in this sense we say that Christ was predestined by reason of human nature; because predestination refers to the exaltation of human nature in Him, as stated above. Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Praedest. Sanct. xv): The Word of God assumed Man to Himself in such a singular and ineffable manner that at the same time He may be truly and correctly called the Son of Man, because He assumed Man to Himself; and the Son of God, because it was the Onlybegotten of God Who assumed human nature. Consequently, since this assumption comes under predestination by reason of its being gratuitous, we can say both that the Son of

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Predestination of Christ

hominis praedestinatus sit esse filius Dei. Quia tamen gratia non est facta filio Dei ut esset homo, sed potius humanae naturae ut filio Dei uniretur, magis proprie potest dici quod Christus, secundum quod homo, est praedestinatus esse filius Dei, quam quod Christus, secundum quod filius Dei, sit praedestinatus esse homo.

Q. 24, A. 3

God was predestined to be man, and that the Son of Man was predestined to be the Son of God. But because grace was not bestowed on the Son of God that He might be man, but rather on human nature, that it might be united to the Son of God; it is more proper to say that Christ, as Man, was predestined to be the Son of God, than that, Christ, as Son of God, was predestined to be Man.

Article 3 Whether Christ’s predestination is the exemplar of ours? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christi praedestinatio non sit exemplar nostrae praedestinationis. Exemplar enim praeexistit exemplato. Nihil autem praeexistit aeterno. Cum ergo praedestinatio nostra sit aeterna, videtur quod praedestinatio Christi non sit exemplar nostrae praedestinationis. Praeterea, exemplar ducit in cognitionem exemplati. Sed non oportuit quod Deus duceretur in cognitionem nostrae praedestinationis ex aliquo alio, cum dicatur Rom. VIII, quos praescivit, hos et praedestinavit. Ergo praedestinatio Christi non est exemplar nostrae praedestinationis. Praeterea, exemplar est conforme exemplato. Sed alterius rationis videtur esse praedestinatio Christi quam praedestinatio nostra, quia nos praedestinamur in filios adoptivos, Christus autem est praedestinatus filius Dei in virtute, ut dicitur Rom. I. Ergo eius praedestinatio non est exemplar nostrae praedestinationis. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de Praedest. Sanct., est praeclarissimum lumen praedestinationis et gratiae ipse salvator, ipse mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Iesus. Dicitur autem lumen praedestinationis et gratiae inquantum per eius praedestinationem et gratiam manifestatur nostra praedestinatio, quod videtur ad rationem exemplaris pertinere. Ergo praedestinatio Christi est exemplar nostrae praedestinationis. Respondeo dicendum quod praedestinatio dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, secundum ipsum actum praedestinantis. Et sic praedestinatio Christi non potest dici exemplar nostrae praedestinationis, uno enim modo, et eodem actu aeterno, praedestinavit Deus nos et Christum. Alio modo potest praedestinatio considerari secundum id ad quod aliquis praedestinatur, quod est praedestinationis terminus et effectus. Et secundum hoc praedestinatio Christi est exemplar nostrae praedestinationis. Et hoc dupliciter. Primo quidem, quantum ad bonum ad quod praedestinamur. Ipse enim praedestinatus est ad hoc quod esset Dei filius naturalis, nos

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s predestination is not the exemplar of ours. For the exemplar exists before the exemplate. But nothing exists before the eternal. Since, therefore, our predestination is eternal, it seems that Christ’s predestination is not the exemplar of ours. Obj. 2: Further, the exemplar leads us to knowledge of the exemplate. But there was no need for God to be led from something else to knowledge of our predestination; since it is written (Rom 8:29): Whom He foreknew, He also predestined. Therefore Christ’s predestination is not the exemplar of ours. Obj. 3: Further, the exemplar is conformed to the exemplate. But Christ’s predestination seems to be of a different nature from ours: because we are predestined to the sonship of adoption, whereas Christ was predestined Son of God in power, as is written (Rom 1:4). Therefore His predestination is not the exemplar of ours. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv): The Savior Himself, the Mediator of God and men, the Man Christ Jesus is the most splendid light of predestination and grace. Now He is called the light of predestination and grace, inasmuch as our predestination is made manifest by His predestination and grace; and this seems to pertain to the nature of an exemplar. Therefore Christ’s predestination is the exemplar of ours. I answer that, Predestination may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the act of predestination: and thus Christ’s predestination cannot be said to be the exemplar of ours: for in the same way and by the same eternal act God predestined us and Christ. Second, predestination may be considered on the part of that to which anyone is predestined, and this is the term and effect of predestination. In this sense Christ’s predestination is the exemplar of ours, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the good to which we are predestined: for He was predestined to be the natural Son of God, whereas we are predestined to the adoption of sons, which is a par-

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Q. 24, A. 4

Incarnation

autem praedestinamur ad filiationem adoptionis, quae est quaedam participata similitudo filiationis naturalis. Unde dicitur Rom. VIII, quos praescivit, hos et praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis filii eius. Alio modo, quantum ad modum consequendi istud bonum, quod est per gratiam. Quod quidem in Christo est manifestissimum, quia natura humana in ipso, nullis suis praecedentibus meritis, unita est filio Dei. Et de plenitudine gratiae eius nos omnes accepimus, ut dicitur Ioan. I. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa ratio procedit ex parte ipsius actus praedestinantis. Et similiter dicendum ad secundum. Ad tertium dicendum quod non est necessarium quod exemplatum exemplari quantum ad omnia conformetur, sed sufficit quod aliqualiter exemplatum imitetur suum exemplar.

IIIae

ticipated likeness of natural sonship. Whence it is written (Rom 8:29): Whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son. Second, in respect of the manner of obtaining this good—that is, by grace. This is most manifest in Christ; because human nature in Him, without any antecedent merits, was united to the Son of God: and of the fullness of His grace we all have received, as it is written (John 1:16). Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the aforesaid act of the predestinator. The same is to be said of the second objection. Reply Obj. 3: The exemplate need not be conformed to the exemplar in all respects: it is sufficient that it imitate it in some.

Article 4 Whether Christ’s predestination is the cause of ours? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praedestinatio Christi non sit causa nostrae praedestinationis. Aeternum enim non habet causam. Sed praedestinatio nostra est aeterna. Ergo praedestinatio Christi non est causa nostrae praedestinationis. Praeterea, illud quod dependet ex simplici Dei voluntate, non habet aliam causam nisi Dei voluntatem. Sed praedestinatio nostra ex simplici voluntate Dei dependet, dicitur enim Ephes. I, praedestinati secundum propositum eius, qui omnia operatur secundum consilium voluntatis suae. Ergo praedestinatio Christi non est causa nostrae praedestinationis. Praeterea, remota causa, removetur effectus. Sed, remota praedestinatione Christi, non removetur nostra praedestinatio, quia etiam si filius Dei non incarnaretur, erat alius modus possibilis nostrae salutis, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Trin. Praedestinatio ergo Christi non est causa nostrae praedestinationis. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ephes. I, praedestinavit nos in adoptionem filiorum per Iesum Christum. Respondeo dicendum quod, si consideretur praedestinatio secundum ipsum praedestinationis actum, praedestinatio Christi non est causa praedestinationis nostrae, cum uno et eodem actu Deus praedestinaverit Christum et nos. Si autem consideretur praedestinatio secundum terminum praedestinationis, sic praedestinatio Christi est causa nostrae praedestinationis, sic enim Deus praeordinavit nostram salutem, ab aeterno praedestinando, ut per Iesum Christum compleretur. Sub prae-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s predestination is not the cause of ours. For that which is eternal has no cause. But our predestination is eternal. Therefore Christ’s predestination is not the cause of ours. Obj. 2: Further, that which depends on the simple will of God has no other cause but God’s will. Now, our predestination depends on the simple will of God, for it is written (Eph 1:11): Being predestined according to the purpose of Him, Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will. Therefore Christ’s predestination is not the cause of ours. Obj. 3: Further, if the cause be taken away, the effect is also taken away. But if we take away Christ’s predestination, ours is not taken away; since even if the Son of God were not incarnate, our salvation might yet have been achieved in a different manner, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 10). Therefore Christ’s predestination is not the cause of ours. On the contrary, It is written (Eph 1:5): (Who) hath predestined us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ. I answer that, if we consider predestination on the part of the very act of predestinating, then Christ’s predestination is not the cause of ours; because by one and the same act God predestined both Christ and us. But if we consider predestination on the part of its term, thus Christ’s predestination is the cause of ours: for God, by predestinating from eternity, so decreed our salvation, that it should be achieved through Jesus Christ. For eternal predestination covers not only that which is to be accomplished in

264

IIIae

Predestination of Christ

destinatione enim aeterna non solum cadit id quod est fiendum in tempore, sed etiam modus et ordo secundum quod est complendum ex tempore. Ad primum ergo et secundum dicendum quod rationes illae procedunt de praedestinatione secundum praedestinationis actum. Ad tertium dicendum quod, si Christus non fuisset incarnandus, Deus praeordinasset homines salvari per aliam causam. Sed quia praeordinavit incarnationem Christi, simul cum hoc praeordinavit ut esset causa nostrae salutis.

Q. 24, A. 4

time, but also the mode and order in which it is to be accomplished in time. Replies Obj. 1 and 2: These arguments consider predestination on the part of the act of predestinating. Reply Obj. 3: If Christ were not to have been incarnate, God would have decreed men’s salvation by other means. But since He decreed the Incarnation of Christ, He decreed at the same time that He should be the cause of our salvation.

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Question 25 The Adoration of Christ Deinde considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad We have now to consider things pertaining to Christ in Christum in comparatione ad nos. Et primo, de adora- reference to us; and first, the adoration of Christ, by which tione Christi, qua scilicet nos eum adoramus; secundo, we adore Him; second, we must consider how He is our Mede hoc quod est mediator noster ad Deum. diator with God. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum una et eadem adoratione sit adoranda (1) Whether Christ’s Godhead and humanity are to be divinitas Christi et eius humanitas. adored with one and the same adoration? Secundo, utrum caro eius sit adoranda adoratione (2) Whether His flesh is to be adored with the latriae. adoration of latria? Tertio, utrum adoratio latriae sit exhibenda imagini (3) Whether the adoration of latria is to be given to the Christi. image of Christ? Quarto, utrum sit exhibenda cruci Christi. (4) Whether latria is to be given to the Cross of Christ? Quinto, utrum sit exhibenda matri eius. (5) Whether to His Mother? Sexto, de adoratione reliquiarum sanctorum. (6) Concerning the adoration of the relics of Saints.

Article 1 Whether Christ’s humanity and Godhead are to be adored with the same adoration? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non eadem adoratione adoranda sit humanitas Christi et eius divinitas. Divinitas enim Christi est adoranda, quae est communis patri et filio, unde dicitur Ioan. V, omnes honorificent filium sicut honorificant patrem. Sed humanitas Christi non est communis ei et patri. Ergo non eadem adoratione adoranda est humanitas Christi et eius divinitas. Praeterea, honor est proprie praemium virtutis, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Meretur autem virtus praemium suum per actum. Cum igitur in Christo sit alia operatio divinae et humanae naturae, ut supra habitum est, videtur quod alio honore sit adoranda humanitas Christi, et alio eius divinitas. Praeterea, anima Christi, si non esset verbo unita, esset veneranda propter excellentiam sapientiae et gratiae quam habet. Sed nihil dignitatis est ei subtractum per hoc quod est unita verbo. Ergo natura humana est quadam propria veneratione adoranda, praeter venerationem quae exhibetur divinitati ipsius. Sed contra est quod in capitulis quintae synodi sic legitur, si quis in duabus naturis adorari dicit Christum, ex quo duae adorationes introducuntur, sed non una adoratione Deum verbum incarnatum cum propria ipsius

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s humanity and Godhead are not to be adored with the same adoration. For Christ’s Godhead is to be adored, as being common to Father and Son; wherefore it is written (John 5:23): That all may honor the Son, as they honor the Father. But Christ’s humanity is not common to Him and the Father. Therefore Christ’s humanity and Godhead are not to be adored with the same adoration. Obj. 2: Further, honor is properly the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). But virtue merits its reward by action. Since, therefore, in Christ the action of the Divine Nature is distinct from that of the human nature, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 1), it seems that Christ’s humanity is to be adored with a different adoration from that which is given to His Godhead. Obj. 3: Further, if the soul of Christ were not united to the Word, it would have been worthy of veneration on account of the excellence of its wisdom and grace. But by being united to the Word it lost nothing of its worthiness. Therefore His human nature should receive a certain veneration proper thereto, besides the veneration which is given to His Godhead. On the contrary, We read in the chapters of the Fifth Council: If anyone say that Christ is adored in two natures, so as to introduce two distinct adorations, and does not adore God the Word made flesh with the one and the same

267

Q. 25, A. 1

Incarnation

carne adorat, sicut ab initio Dei Ecclesiae traditum est, talis anathema sit. Respondeo dicendum quod in eo qui honoratur, duo possumus considerare, scilicet eum cui honor exhibetur, et causam honoris. Proprie autem honor exhibetur toti rei subsistenti, non enim dicimus quod manus hominis honoretur, sed quod homo honoretur. Et si quandoque contingat quod dicatur honorari manus vel pes alicuius, hoc non dicitur ea ratione quod huiusmodi partes secundum se honorentur, sed quia in istis partibus honoratur totum. Per quem etiam modum aliquis homo potest honorari in aliquo exteriori, puta in veste, aut in imagine, aut in nuntio. Causa autem honoris est id ex quo ille qui honoratur habet aliquam excellentiam, nam honor est reverentia alicui exhibita propter sui excellentiam, ut in secunda parte dictum est. Et ideo, si in uno homine sunt plures causae honoris, puta praelatio, scientia et virtus, erit quidem illius hominis unus honor ex parte eius qui honoratur, plures tamen secundum causas honoris, homo enim est qui honoratur et propter scientiam, et propter virtutem. Cum igitur in Christo una sit tantum persona divinae et humanae naturae, et etiam una hypostasis et unum suppositum, est quidem una eius adoratio et unus honor ex parte eius qui adoratur, sed ex parte causae qua honoratur, possunt dici esse plures adorationes, ut scilicet alio honore honoretur propter sapientiam increatam, et propter sapientiam creatam. Si autem ponerentur in Christo plures personae seu hypostases, sequeretur quod simpliciter essent plures adorationes. Et hoc est quod in synodis reprobatur. Dicitur enim in capitulis Cyrilli, si quis audet dicere assumptum hominem coadorari oportere Deo verbo, quasi alterum alteri, et non magis una adoratione honorificat Emmanuelem, secundum quod factum est caro verbum, anathema sit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in Trinitate sunt tres qui honorantur, sed una est causa honoris. In mysterio autem incarnationis est e converso. Et ideo alio modo est unus honor Trinitatis, et alio modo est unus honor Christi. Ad secundum dicendum quod operatio non est quae honoratur, sed est ratio honoris. Et ideo per hoc quod in Christo sunt duae operationes, non ostenditur quod sint duae adorationes, sed quod sint duae adorationis causae. Ad tertium dicendum quod anima Christi, si non esset unita Dei verbo esset id quod est principalissimum in homine illo. Et ideo sibi praecipue deberetur honor, quia homo est quod est potissimum in eo. Sed quia anima Christi est unita personae digniori, illi personae

IIIae

adoration as His flesh, as the Church has handed down from the beginning; let such a one be anathema. I answer that, We may consider two things in a person to whom honor is given: the person himself, and the cause of his being honored. Now properly speaking honor is given to a subsistent thing in its entirety: for we do not speak of honoring a man’s hand, but the man himself. And if at any time it happen that we speak of honoring a man’s hand or foot, it is not by reason of these members being honored of themselves: but by reason of the whole being honored in them. In this way a man may be honored even in something external; for instance in his vesture, his image, or his messenger. The cause of honor is that by reason of which the person honored has a certain excellence, for honor is reverence given to something on account of its excellence, as stated in the Second Part (II-II, Q. 103, A. 1). If therefore in one man there are several causes of honor, for instance, rank, knowledge, and virtue, the honor given to him will be one in respect of the person honored, but several in respect of the causes of honor: for it is the man that is honored, both on account of knowledge and by reason of his virtue. Since, therefore, in Christ there is but one Person of the Divine and human natures, and one hypostasis, and one suppositum, He is given one adoration and one honor on the part of the Person adored: but on the part of the cause for which He is honored, we can say that there are several adorations, for instance that He receives one honor on account of His uncreated knowledge, and another on account of His created knowledge. But if it be said that there are several persons or hypostases in Christ, it would follow that there would be, absolutely speaking, several adorations. And this is what is condemned in the Councils. For it is written in the chapters of Cyril: If anyone dare to say that the man assumed should be adored besides the Divine Word, as though these were distinct persons; and does not rather honor the Emmanuel with one single adoration, inasmuch as the Word was made flesh; let him be anathema. Reply Obj. 1: In the Trinity there are three Who are honored, but only one cause of honor. In the mystery of the Incarnation it is the reverse: and therefore only one honor is given to the Trinity and only one to Christ, but in a different way. Reply Obj. 2: Operation is not the object but the motive of honor. And therefore there being two operations in Christ proves, not two adorations, but two causes of adoration. Reply Obj. 3: If the soul of Christ were not united to the Word of God, it would be the principal thing in that Man. Wherefore honor would be due to it principally, since man is that which is principal in him. But since Christ’s soul is united to a Person of greater dignity, to that Person is

268

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Adoration of Christ

Q. 25, A. 2

praecipue debetur honor cui anima Christi unitur. Nec honor principally due to Whom Christ’s soul is united. Nor per hoc tamen diminuitur dignitas animae Christi, sed is the dignity of Christ’s soul hereby diminished, but rather augetur ut supra dictum est. increased, as stated above (Q. 2, A. 2, ad 2).

Article 2 Whether Christ’s humanity should be adored with the adoration of latria? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod humanitas Christi non sit adoranda adoratione latriae. Quia super illud Psalmi, adorate scabellum pedum eius quoniam sanctum est, dicit Glossa, caro a verbo Dei assumpta sine impietate adoratur a nobis, quia nemo spiritualiter carnem eius manducat nisi prius adoret; non illa dico adoratione quae latria est, quae soli creatori debetur. Caro autem est pars humanitatis. Ergo humanitas Christi non est adoranda adoratione latriae. Praeterea, cultus latriae nulli creaturae debetur, ex hoc enim reprobantur gentiles quod coluerunt et servierunt creaturae, ut dicitur Rom. I. Sed humanitas Christi est creatura. Ergo non est adoranda adoratione latriae. Praeterea, adoratio latriae debetur Deo in recognitionem maximi dominii, secundum illud Deut. VI, dominum Deum tuum adorabis, et illi soli servies. Sed Christus, secundum quod homo, est minor patre. Ergo humanitas eius non est adoratione latriae adoranda. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in IV libro, adoratur autem caro Christi, incarnato Deo verbo, non propter seipsam, sed propter unitum ei secundum hypostasim verbum Dei. Et super illud Psalmi, adorate scabellum pedum eius, dicit Glossa, qui adorat corpus Christi, non terram intuetur, sed illum potius cuius scabellum est, in cuius honore scabellum adorat. Sed verbum incarnatum adoratur adoratione latriae. Ergo etiam corpus eius, sive eius humanitas. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, honor adorationis debetur hypostasi subsistenti, tamen ratio honoris potest esse aliquid non subsistens, propter quod honoratur persona cui illud inest. Adoratio igitur humanitatis Christi dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, ut sit eius sicut rei adoratae. Et sic adorare carnem Christi nihil est aliud quam adorare verbum Dei incarnatum, sicut adorare vestem regis nihil est aliud quam adorare regem vestitum. Et secundum hoc, adoratio humanitatis Christi est adoratio latriae. Alio modo potest intelligi adoratio humanitatis Christi quae fit ratione humanitatis Christi perfectae omni munere gratiarum. Et sic adoratio humanitatis Christi non est adoratio latriae, sed adoratio duliae. Ita scilicet quod una et eadem perso-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s soul should not be adored with the adoration of latria. For on the words of Ps. 98:5, Adore His foot-stool for it is holy, a gloss says: The flesh assumed by the Word of God is rightly adored by us: for no one partakes spiritually of His flesh unless he first adore it; but not indeed with the adoration called latria, which is due to the Creator alone. Now the flesh is part of the humanity. Therefore Christ’s humanity is not to be adored with the adoration of latria. Obj. 2: Further, the worship of latria is not to be given to any creature: since for this reason were the Gentiles reproved, that they worshiped and served the creature, as it is written (Rom 1:25). But Christ’s humanity is a creature. Therefore it should not be adored with the adoration of latria. Obj. 3: Further, the adoration of latria is due to God in recognition of His supreme dominion, according to Deut. 6:13: Thou shalt adore the Lord thy God, and shalt serve Him only. But Christ as man is less than the Father. Therefore His humanity is not to be adored with the adoration of latria. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 3): On account of the incarnation of the Divine Word, we adore the flesh of Christ not for its own sake, but because the Word of God is united thereto in person. And on Ps. 98:5, Adore His foot-stool, a gloss says: He who adores the body of Christ, regards not the earth, but rather Him whose foot-stool it is, in Whose honor he adores the foot-stool. But the incarnate Word is adored with the adoration of latria. Therefore also His body or His humanity. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1) adoration is due to the subsisting hypostasis: yet the reason for honoring may be something non-subsistent, on account of which the person, in whom it is, is honored. And so the adoration of Christ’s humanity may be understood in two ways. First, so that the humanity is the thing adored: and thus to adore the flesh of Christ is nothing else than to adore the incarnate Word of God: just as to adore a King’s robe is nothing else than to adore a robed King. And in this sense the adoration of Christ’s humanity is the adoration of latria. Second, the adoration of Christ’s humanity may be taken as given by reason of its being perfected with every gift of grace. And so in this sense the adoration of Christ’s humanity is the adoration not of latria but of dulia. So that one and the same

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Q. 25, A. 3

Incarnation

na Christi adoretur adoratione latriae propter suam divinitatem et adoratione duliae propter perfectionem humanitatis. Nec hoc est inconveniens. Quia ipsi Deo patri debetur honor latriae propter divinitatem, et honor duliae propter dominium quo creaturas gubernat. Unde super illud Psalmi, domine Deus meus in te speravi, dicit Glossa, domine omnium per potentiam, cui debetur dulia. Deus omnium per creationem, cui debetur latria. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Glossa illa non est sic intelligenda quasi seorsum adoretur caro Christi ab eius divinitate, hoc enim posset contingere solum hoc modo, si esset alia hypostasis Dei et hominis. Sed quia, ut dicit Damascenus, si dividas subtilibus intelligentiis quod videtur ab eo quod intelligitur, inadorabilis est ut creatura, scilicet adoratione latriae. Et tunc sic intellectae ut separatae a Dei verbo, debetur sibi adoratio duliae, non cuiuscumque, puta quae communiter exhibetur aliis creaturis; sed quadam excellentiori, quam hyperduliam vocant. Et per hoc etiam patet responsio ad secundum et tertium. Quia adoratio latriae non exhibetur humanitati Christi ratione sui ipsius, sed ratione divinitatis cui unitur, secundum quam Christus non est minor patre.

IIIae

Person of Christ is adored with latria on account of His Divinity, and with dulia on account of His perfect humanity. Nor is this unfitting. For the honor of latria is due to God the Father Himself on account of His Godhead; and the honor of dulia on account of the dominion by which He rules over creatures. Wherefore on Ps. 7:1, O Lord my God, in Thee have I hoped, a gloss says: Lord of all by power, to Whom dulia is due: God of all by creation, to Whom latria is due. Reply Obj. 1: That gloss is not to be understood as though the flesh of Christ were adored separately from its Godhead: for this could happen only, if there were one hypostasis of God, and another of man. But since, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 3): If by a subtle distinction you divide what is seen from what is understood, it cannot be adored because it is a creature—that is, with adoration of latria. And then thus understood as distinct from the Word of God, it should be adored with the adoration of dulia; not any kind of dulia, such as is given to other creatures, but with a certain higher adoration, which is called hyperdulia. Hence appear the answers to the second and third objections. Because the adoration of latria is not given to Christ’s humanity in respect of itself; but in respect of the Godhead to which it is united, by reason of which Christ is not less than the Father.

Article 3 Whether the image of Christ should be adored with the adoration of latria? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago Christi non sit adoranda adoratione latriae. Dicitur enim Exod. XX, non facies tibi sculptile, neque omnem similitudinem. Sed nulla adoratio est facienda contra Dei praeceptum. Ergo imago Christi non est adoranda adoratione latriae. Praeterea, operibus gentilium non debemus communicare, ut apostolus dicit, Ephes. V. Sed gentiles de hoc praecipue inculpantur, quia commutaverunt gloriam incorruptibilis Dei in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis, ut dicitur Rom. I. Ergo imago Christi non est adoranda adoratione latriae. Praeterea, Christo debetur adoratio latriae ratione divinitatis, non ratione humanitatis. Sed imagini divinitatis eius, quae animae rationali est impressa, non debetur adoratio latriae. Ergo multo minus imagini corporali, quae repraesentat humanitatem ipsius Christi. Praeterea, nihil videtur in cultu divino faciendum nisi quod est a Deo institutum, unde et apostolus, I Cor. XI, traditurus doctrinam de sacrificio Ecclesiae, dicit,

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s image should not be adored with the adoration of latria. For it is written (Exod 20:4): Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything. But no adoration should be given against the commandment of God. Therefore Christ’s image should not be adored with the adoration of latria. Obj. 2: Further, we should have nothing in common with the works of the Gentiles, as the Apostle says (Eph 5:11). But the Gentiles are reproached principally for that they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man, as is written (Rom 1:23). Therefore Christ’s image is not to be adored with the adoration of latria. Obj. 3: Further, to Christ the adoration of latria is due by reason of His Godhead, not of His humanity. But the adoration of latria is not due to the image of His Godhead, which is imprinted on the rational soul. Much less, therefore, is it due to the material image which represents the humanity of Christ Himself. Obj. 4: Further, it seems that nothing should be done in the Divine worship that is not instituted by God; wherefore the Apostle (1 Cor 11:23) when about to lay down the

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ego accepi a domino quod et tradidi vobis. Sed nulla tradi- doctrine of the sacrifice of the Church, says: I have received tio in Scriptura invenitur de adorandis imaginibus. Ergo of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you. But Scripimago Christi non est adoratione latriae adoranda. ture does not lay down anything concerning the adoration of images. Therefore Christ’s image is not to be adored with the adoration of latria. Sed contra est quod Damascenus inducit Basilium On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 16) dicentem, imaginis honor ad prototypum pervenit, idest quotes Basil as saying: The honor given to an image reaches exemplar. Sed ipsum exemplar, scilicet Christus, est ado- to the prototype, i.e., the exemplar. But the exemplar itself— randus adoratione latriae. Ergo et eius imago. namely, Christ—is to be adored with the adoration of latria; therefore also His image. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus diI answer that, As the Philosopher says (De Memor. et cit, in libro de Mem. et Remin., duplex est motus animae Remin. i), there is a twofold movement of the mind towards in imaginem, unus quidem in imaginem ipsam secun- an image: one indeed towards the image itself as a certain dum quod est res quaedam; alio modo, in imaginem thing; another, towards the image in so far as it is the iminquantum est imago alterius. Et inter hos motus est age of something else. And between these movements there haec differentia, quia primus motus, quo quis movetur is this difference; that the former, by which one is moved in imaginem prout est res quaedam, est alius a motu towards an image as a certain thing, is different from the qui est in rem, secundus autem motus, qui est in imagi- movement towards the thing: whereas the latter movement, nem inquantum est imago, est unus et idem cum illo qui which is towards the image as an image, is one and the est in rem. Sic igitur dicendum est quod imagini Christi same as that which is towards the thing. Thus therefore we inquantum est res quaedam, puta lignum sculptum vel must say that no reverence is shown to Christ’s image, as a pictum, nulla reverentia exhibetur, quia reverentia de- thing—for instance, carved or painted wood: because revbetur non nisi rationali naturae. Relinquitur ergo quod erence is not due save to a rational creature. It follows thereexhibeatur ei reverentia solum inquantum est imago. Et fore that reverence should be shown to it, in so far only as sic sequitur quod eadem reverentia exhibeatur imagi- it is an image. Consequently the same reverence should be ni Christi et ipsi Christo. Cum igitur Christus adoretur shown to Christ’s image as to Christ Himself. Since, thereadoratione latriae, consequens est quod eius imago sit fore, Christ is adored with the adoration of latria, it follows adoratione latriae adoranda. that His image should be adored with the adoration of latria. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non prohibetur ilReply Obj. 1: This commandment does not forbid the lo praecepto facere quamcumque sculpturam vel simi- making of any graven thing or likeness, but the making litudinem, sed facere ad adorandum, unde subdit non thereof for the purpose of adoration, wherefore it is added: adorabis ea neque coles. Et quia, sicut dictum est, idem Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them. And because, est motus in imaginem et in rem, eo modo prohibe- as stated above, the movement towards the image is the tur adoratio quo prohibetur adoratio rei cuius est ima- same as the movement towards the thing, adoration thereof go. Unde ibi intelligitur prohiberi adoratio imaginum is forbidden in the same way as adoration of the thing quas gentiles faciebant in venerationem deorum suo- whose image it is. Wherefore in the passage quoted we are rum, idest Daemonum, ideoque praemittitur, non habe- to understand the prohibition to adore those images which bis deos alienos coram me. Ipsi autem Deo vero, cum sit the Gentiles made for the purpose of venerating their own incorporeus, nulla imago corporalis poterat poni, quia, gods, i.e., the demons, and so it is premised: Thou shalt not ut Damascenus dicit, insipientiae summae est et impieta- have strange gods before Me. But no corporeal image could tis figurare quod est divinum. Sed quia in novo testamen- be raised to the true God Himself, since He is incorporeal; to Deus factus est homo, potest in sua imagine corporali because, as Damascene observes (De Fide Orth. iv, 16): It is adorari. the highest absurdity and impiety to fashion a figure of what is Divine. But because in the New Testament God was made man, He can be adored in His corporeal image. Ad secundum dicendum quod apostolus prohibet Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle forbids us to have anything communicare operibus infructuosis gentilium, commu- in common with the unfruitful works of the Gentiles, but nicare autem eorum utilibus operibus apostolus non not with their useful works. Now the adoration of images prohibet. Adoratio autem imaginum est inter infructuo- must be numbered among the unfruitful works in two resa opera computanda quantum ad duo. Primo quidem, spects. First, because some of the Gentiles used to adore quantum ad hoc quod quidam eorum adorabant ipsas the images themselves, as things, believing that there was imagines ut res quasdam, credentes in eis aliquid numi- something Divine therein, on account of the answers which nis esse, propter responsa quae Daemones in eis dabant, the demons used to give in them, and on account of other

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et alios mirabiles huiusmodi effectus. Secundo, propter res quarum erant imagines, statuebant enim imagines aliquibus creaturis, quas in eis veneratione latriae venerabantur. Nos autem adoramus adoratione latriae imaginem Christi, qui est verus Deus, non propter ipsam imaginem, sed propter rem cuius imago est, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod creaturae rationali debetur reverentia propter seipsam. Et ideo, si creaturae rationali, in qua est imago, exhiberetur adoratio latriae posset esse erroris occasio, ut scilicet motus adorantis in homine sisteret inquantum est res quaedam, et non ferretur in Deum, cuius est imago. Quod non potest contingere de imagine sculpta vel picta in materia insensibili. Ad quartum dicendum quod apostoli, familiari instinctu spiritus sancti, quaedam Ecclesiis tradiderunt servanda quae non reliquerunt in scriptis, sed in observatione Ecclesiae per successionem fidelium sunt ordinata. Unde ipse dicit, II Thess. II, state, et tenete traditiones quas didicistis, sive per sermonem, scilicet ab ore prolatum, sive per epistolam, scilicet scripto transmissam. Et inter huiusmodi traditiones est imaginum Christi adoratio. Unde et beatus Lucas dicitur depinxisse imaginem Christi, quae Romae habetur.

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such like wonderful effects. Second on account of the things of which they were images; for they set up images to certain creatures, to whom in these images they gave the veneration of latria. Whereas we give the adoration of latria to the image of Christ, Who is true God, not for the sake of the image, but for the sake of the thing whose image it is, as stated above. Reply Obj. 3: Reverence is due to the rational creature for its own sake. Consequently, if the adoration of latria were shown to the rational creature in which this image is, there might be an occasion of error—namely, lest the movement of adoration might stop short at the man, as a thing, and not be carried on to God, Whose image he is. This cannot happen in the case of a graven or painted image in insensible material. Reply Obj. 4: The Apostles, led by the inward instinct of the Holy Spirit, handed down to the churches certain instructions which they did not put in writing, but which have been ordained, in accordance with the observance of the Church as practiced by the faithful as time went on. Wherefore the Apostle says (2 Thess 2:14): Stand fast; and hold the traditions which you have learned, whether by word—that is by word of mouth—or by our epistle—that is by word put into writing. Among these traditions is the worship of Christ’s image. Wherefore it is said that Blessed Luke painted the image of Christ, which is in Rome.

Article 4 Whether Christ’s cross should be worshipped with the adoration of latria? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod crux Christi non sit adoranda adoratione latriae. Nullus enim pius filius veneratur contumeliam patris sui, puta flagellum quo flagellatus est, vel lignum in quo erat suspensus, sed magis illud abhorret. Christus autem in ligno crucis est opprobriosissimam mortem passus, secundum illud Sap. II, morte turpissima condemnemus eum. Ergo non debemus crucem venerari, sed magis abhorrere. Praeterea, humanitas Christi adoratione latriae adoratur inquantum est unita filio Dei in persona. Quod de cruce dici non potest. Ergo crux Christi non est adoranda adoratione latriae.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s cross should not be worshiped with the adoration of latria. For no dutiful son honors that which dishonors his father, as the scourge with which he was scourged, or the gibbet on which he was hanged; rather does he abhor it. Now Christ underwent the most shameful death on the cross; according to Wis. 2:20: Let us condemn Him to a most shameful death. Therefore we should not venerate the cross but rather we should abhor it. Obj. 2: Further, Christ’s humanity is worshiped with the adoration of latria, inasmuch as it is united to the Son of God in Person. But this cannot be said of the cross. Therefore Christ’s cross should not be worshiped with the adoration of latria. Praeterea, sicut crux Christi fuit instrumentum Obj. 3: Further, as Christ’s cross was the instrument of passionis eius et mortis, ita etiam et multa alia, puta cla- His passion and death, so were also many other things, for vi, corona et lancea, quibus tamen non exhibemus latriae instance, the nails, the crown, the lance; yet to these we cultum. Ergo videtur quod crux Christi non sit adoratio- do not show the worship of latria. It seems, therefore, that ne latriae adoranda. Christ’s cross should not be worshiped with the adoration of latria. Sed contra, illi exhibemus adorationem latriae in On the contrary, We show the worship of latria to quo ponimus spem salutis. Sed in cruce Christi ponimus that in which we place our hope of salvation. But we place

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spem, cantat enim Ecclesia, o crux, ave, spes unica, hoc our hope in Christ’s cross, for the Church sings: Dear Cross, passionis tempore, auge piis iustitiam, reisque dona ve- best hope o’er all beside, That cheers the solemn passion-tide: niam. Ergo crux Christi est adoranda adoratione latriae. Give to the just increase of grace, Give to each contrite sinner peace. Therefore Christ’s cross should be worshiped with the adoration of latria. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), honor or revhonor seu reverentia non debetur nisi rationali creatu- erence is due to a rational creature only; while to an insenrae, creaturae autem insensibili non debetur honor vel sible creature, no honor or reverence is due save by reason reverentia nisi ratione naturae rationalis. Et hoc dupli- of a rational nature. And this in two ways. First, inasmuch citer, uno modo, inquantum repraesentat naturam ra- as it represents a rational nature: second, inasmuch as it is tionalem; alio modo, inquantum ei quocumque modo united to it in any way whatsoever. In the first way men are coniungitur. Primo modo consueverunt homines vene- wont to venerate the king’s image; in the second way, his rari regis imaginem, secundo modo, eius vestimentum. robe. And both are venerated by men with the same venUtrumque autem venerantur homines eadem veneratio- eration as they show to the king. ne qua venerantur et regem. Si ergo loquamur de ipsa cruce in qua Christus cruciIf, therefore, we speak of the cross itself on which Christ fixus est, utroque modo est a nobis veneranda, uno mo- was crucified, it is to be venerated by us in both ways— do scilicet inquantum repraesentat nobis figuram Chri- namely, in one way in so far as it represents to us the figsti extensi in ea; alio modo, ex contactu ad membra ure of Christ extended thereon; in the other way, from its Christi, et ex hoc quod eius sanguine est perfusa. Unde contact with the limbs of Christ, and from its being satuutroque modo adoratur eadem adoratione cum Christo, rated with His blood. Wherefore in each way it is worshiped scilicet adoratione latriae. Et propter hoc etiam crucem with the same adoration as Christ, viz. the adoration of laalloquimur et deprecamur, quasi ipsum crucifixum. Si tria. And for this reason also we speak to the cross and pray vero loquamur de effigie crucis Christi in quacumque to it, as to the Crucified Himself. But if we speak of the efalia materia, puta lapidis vel ligni, argenti vel auri, sic figy of Christ’s cross in any other material whatever—for inveneramur crucem tantum ut imaginem Christi, quam stance, in stone or wood, silver or gold—thus we venerate veneramur adoratione latriae, ut supra dictum est. the cross merely as Christ’s image, which we worship with the adoration of latria, as stated above (A. 3). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in cruce Christi, Reply Obj. 1: If in Christ’s cross we consider the point quantum ad opinionem vel intentionem infidelium, con- of view and intention of those who did not believe in Him, sideratur opprobrium Christi, sed quantum ad effectum it will appear as His shame: but if we consider its effect, nostrae salutis, consideratur virtus divina ipsius, qua de which is our salvation, it will appear as endowed with Dihostibus triumphavit, secundum illud Coloss. II, ipsum vine power, by which it triumphed over the enemy, accordtulit de medio, affigens illud cruci, et spolians principatus ing to Col. 2:14, 15: He hath taken the same out of the way, et potestates, traduxit confidenter, palam triumphans il- fastening it to the cross, and despoiling the principalities and los in semetipso. Et ideo dicit apostolus, I Cor. I, verbum powers, He hath exposed them confidently, in open show, tricrucis pereuntibus quidem stultitia est, his autem qui salvi umphing over them in Himself. Wherefore the Apostle says fiunt, idest nobis, virtus Dei est. (1 Cor 1:18): The Word of the cross to them indeed that perish is foolishness; but to them that are saved—that is, to us— it is the power of God. Ad secundum dicendum quod crux Christi, licet Reply Obj. 2: Although Christ’s cross was not united non fuerit unita verbo Dei in persona, fuit tamen ei unita to the Word of God in Person, yet it was united to Him in aliquo alio modo, scilicet per repraesentationem et con- some other way, viz. by representation and contact. And for tactum. Et hac sola ratione exhibetur ei reverentia. this sole reason reverence is shown to it. Ad tertium dicendum quod, quantum ad ratioReply Obj. 3: By reason of the contact of Christ’s limbs nem contactus membrorum Christi, adoramus non so- we worship not only the cross, but all that belongs to Christ. lum crucem, sed etiam omnia quae sunt Christi. Un- Wherefore Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 11): The prede Damascenus dicit, in IV libro, pretiosum lignum, ut cious wood, as having been sanctified by the contact of His sanctificatum contactu sancti corporis et sanguinis, de- holy body and blood, should be meetly worshiped; as also His center adorandum; clavos, indumenta, lanceam; et sacra nails, His lance, and His sacred dwelling-places, such as the eius tabernacula. Ista tamen non repraesentant imagi- manger, the cave and so forth. Yet these very things do not nem Christi, sicut crux, quae dicitur signum filii ho- represent Christ’s image as the cross does, which is called minis, quod apparebit in caelo, ut dicitur Matth. XXIV. the Sign of the Son of Man that will appear in heaven, as Ideoque mulieribus dixit Angelus, Iesum quaeritis Naza- it is written (Matt 24:30). Wherefore the angel said to the

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renum crucifixum, non dixit, lanceatum, sed, crucifixum. Et inde est quod imaginem crucis Christi veneramur in quacumque materia, non autem imaginem clavorum, vel quorumcumque huiusmodi.

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women (Mark 16:6): You seek Jesus of Nazareth, Who was crucified: he said not pierced, but crucified. For this reason we worship the image of Christ’s cross in any material, but not the image of the nails or of any such thing.

Article 5 Whether the Mother of God should be worshipped with the adoration of latria? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mater Dei sit adoranda adoratione latriae. Videtur enim idem honor exhibendus esse matri regis et regi, unde dicitur III Reg. II quod positus est thronus matri regis, quae sedit ad dexteram eius. Et Augustinus dicit, in sermone de Assumpt., thronum Dei, thalamum domini caeli, atque tabernaculum Christi, dignum est ibi esse ubi est ipse. Sed Christus adoratur adoratione latriae. Ergo et mater eius.

Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in IV libro, quod honor matris refertur ad filium. Sed filius adoratur adoratione latriae. Ergo et mater. Praeterea, coniunctior est Christo mater eius quam crux. Sed crux adoratur adoratione latriae. Ergo et mater eadem adoratione est adoranda. Sed contra est quod mater Dei est pura creatura. Non ergo ei debetur adoratio latriae. Respondeo dicendum quod, quia latria soli Deo debetur, non debetur creaturae prout creaturam secundum se veneramur. Licet autem creaturae insensibiles non sint capaces venerationis secundum seipsas, creatura tamen rationalis est capax venerationis secundum seipsam. Et ideo nulli purae creaturae rationali debetur cultus latriae. Cum ergo beata virgo sit pure creatura rationalis, non debetur ei adoratio latriae, sed solum veneratio duliae, eminentius tamen quam ceteris creaturis, inquantum ipsa est mater Dei. Et ideo dicitur quod debetur ei, non qualiscumque dulia, sed hyperdulia. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod matri regis non debetur aequalis honor honori qui debetur regi. Debetur tamen ei quidam honor consimilis, ratione cuiusdam excellentiae. Et hoc significant auctoritates inductae. Ad secundum dicendum quod honor matris refertur ad filium, quia ipsa mater est propter filium honoranda. Non tamen eo modo quo honor imaginis refertur ad exemplar, quia ipsa imago, prout in se consideratur ut res quaedam, nullo modo est veneranda. Ad tertium dicendum quod crux, prout ipsa in se consideratur, ut dictum est, non est capax honoris. Sed

Objection 1: It would seem that the Mother of God is to be worshiped with the adoration of latria. For it seems that the same honor is due to the king’s mother as to the king: whence it is written (3 Kgs 2:19) that a throne was set for the king’s mother, and she sat on His right hand. Moreover, Augustine says: It is right that the throne of God, the resting-place of the Lord of Heaven, the abode of Christ, should be there where He is Himself. But Christ is worshiped with the adoration of latria. Therefore His Mother also should be. Obj. 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 16): The honor of the Mother reflects on the Son. But the Son is worshiped with the adoration of latria. Therefore the Mother also. Obj. 3: Further, Christ’s Mother is more akin to Him than the cross. But the cross is worshiped with the adoration of latria. Therefore also His Mother is to be worshiped with the same adoration. On the contrary, The Mother of God is a mere creature. Therefore the worship of latria is not due to her. I answer that, Since latria is due to God alone, it is not due to a creature so far as we venerate a creature for its own sake. For though insensible creatures are not capable of being venerated for their own sake, yet the rational creature is capable of being venerated for its own sake. Consequently the worship of latria is not due to any mere rational creature for its own sake. Since, therefore, the Blessed Virgin is a mere rational creature, the worship of latria is not due to her, but only that of dulia: but in a higher degree than to other creatures, inasmuch as she is the Mother of God. For this reason we say that not any kind of dulia is due to her, but hyperdulia. Reply Obj. 1: The honor due to the king’s mother is not equal to the honor which is due to the king: but is somewhat like it, by reason of a certain excellence on her part. This is what is meant by the authorities quoted. Reply Obj. 2: The honor given to the Mother reflects on her Son, because the Mother is to be honored for her Son’s sake. But not in the same way as honor given to an image reflects on its exemplar: because the image itself, considered as a thing, is not to be venerated in any way at all. Reply Obj. 3: The cross, considered in itself, is not an object of veneration, as stated above (AA. 4, 5). But the

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beata virgo est secundum seipsam capax venerationis. Et Blessed Virgin is in herself an object of veneration. Hence ideo non est similis ratio. there is no comparison.

Article 6 Whether any kind of worship is due to the relics of the saints? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sanctorum reliquiae nullo modo sint adorandae. Non enim est aliquid faciendum quod possit esse erroris occasio. Sed adorare mortuorum reliquias videtur ad errorem gentilium pertinere, qui mortuis hominibus honorificentiam impendebant. Ergo non sunt sanctorum reliquiae honorandae. Praeterea, stultum videtur rem insensibilem venerari. Sed sanctorum reliquiae sunt insensibiles. Ergo stultum est eas venerari. Praeterea, corpus mortuum non est eiusdem speciei cum corpore vivo, et per consequens non videtur esse numero idem. Ergo videtur quod post mortem alicuius sancti, corpus eius non sit adorandum. Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de Ecclesiast. Dogmat., sanctorum corpora, et praecipue beatorum martyrum reliquias, ac si Christi membra, sincerissime adoranda (scilicet, credimus). Et postea subdit, si quis contra hanc sententiam velit esse, non Christianus, sed Eunomianus et Vigilantius creditur. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Civ. Dei, si paterna vestis et anulus, ac si quid huiusmodi est, tanto carius est posteris quanto erga parentes est maior affectus, nullo modo ipsa spernenda sunt corpora, quae utique multo familiarius atque coniunctius quam quaelibet indumenta gestamus, haec enim ad ipsam naturam hominis pertinent. Ex quo patet quod qui habet affectum ad aliquem, etiam ipsa quae de ipso post mortem relinquuntur veneratur, non solum corpus aut partes corporis eius, sed etiam aliqua exteriora, puta vestes et similia. Manifestum est autem quod sanctos Dei in veneratione debemus habere, tanquam membra Christi, Dei filios et amicos, et intercessores, nostros. Et ideo eorum reliquias qualescumque honore congruo in eorum memoriam venerari debemus, et praecipue eorum corpora, quae fuerunt templum spiritus sancti, et organa spiritus sancti in eis habitantis et operantis, et sunt corpori Christi configuranda per gloriam resurrectionis. Unde et ipse Deus huiusmodi reliquias convenienter honorat, in eorum praesentia miracula faciendo. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod haec fuit ratio Vigilantii, cuius verba introducit Hieronymus in libro quem contra eum scripsit, dicentis, prope ritum gentilium videmus sub praetextu religionis introductum, pulvisculum nescio quem in modico vasculo, pretioso lin-

Objection 1: It would seem that the relics of the saints are not to be worshiped at all. For we should avoid doing what may be the occasion of error. But to worship the relics of the dead seems to savor of the error of the Gentiles, who gave honor to dead men. Therefore the relics of the saints are not to be honored. Obj. 2: Further, it seems absurd to venerate what is insensible. But the relics of the saints are insensible. Therefore it is absurd to venerate them. Obj. 3: Further, a dead body is not of the same species as a living body: consequently it does not seem to be identical with it. Therefore, after a saint’s death, it seems that his body should not be worshiped. On the contrary, It is written (De Eccles. Dogm. xl): We believe that the bodies of the saints, above all the relics of the blessed martyrs, as being the members of Christ, should be worshiped in all sincerity: and further on: If anyone holds a contrary opinion, he is not accounted a Christian, but a follower of Eunomius and Vigilantius. I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 13): If a father’s coat or ring, or anything else of that kind, is so much more cherished by his children, as love for one’s parents is greater, in no way are the bodies themselves to be despised, which are much more intimately and closely united to us than any garment; for they belong to man’s very nature. It is clear from this that he who has a certain affection for anyone, venerates whatever of his is left after his death, not only his body and the parts thereof, but even external things, such as his clothes, and such like. Now it is manifest that we should show honor to the saints of God, as being members of Christ, the children and friends of God, and our intercessors. Wherefore in memory of them we ought to honor any relics of theirs in a fitting manner: principally their bodies, which were temples, and organs of the Holy Spirit dwelling and operating in them, and are destined to be likened to the body of Christ by the glory of the Resurrection. Hence God Himself fittingly honors such relics by working miracles at their presence. Reply Obj. 1: This was the argument of Vigilantius, whose words are quoted by Jerome in the book he wrote against him (ch. ii) as follows: We see something like a pagan rite introduced under pretext of religion; they worship with kisses I know not what tiny heap of dust in a mean

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teamine circumdatum, osculantes adorant. Contra quem Hieronymus dicit, in epistola ad Riparium, nos, non dico martyrum reliquias, sed nec solem nec lunam nec Angelos adoramus, scilicet adoratione latriae. Honoramus autem reliquias martyrum, ut eum cuius sunt martyres adoremus, honoramus servos, ut honor servorum redundet ad dominum. Sic ergo honorando reliquias sanctorum non incidimus in errorem gentilium, qui cultum latriae mortuis hominibus exhibebant.

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vase surrounded with precious linen. To him Jerome replies (Ep. ad Ripar. cix): We do not adore, I will not say the relics of the martyrs, but either the sun or the moon or even the angels—that is to say, with the worship of latria. But we honor the martyrs’ relics, so that thereby we give honor to Him Whose martyrs they are: we honor the servants, that the honor shown to them may reflect on their Master. Consequently, by honoring the martyrs’ relics we do not fall into the error of the Gentiles, who gave the worship of latria to dead men. Ad secundum dicendum quod corpus insensibile Reply Obj. 2: We worship that insensible body, not for non adoramus propter seipsum, sed propter animam, its own sake, but for the sake of the soul, which was once quae ei fuit unita, quae nunc fruitur Deo; et propter united thereto, and now enjoys God; and for God’s sake, Deum, cuius fuerunt ministri. whose ministers the saints were. Ad tertium dicendum quod corpus mortuum aliReply Obj. 3: The dead body of a saint is not identical cuius sancti non est idem numero quod primo fuerit with that which the saint had during life, on account of the dum viveret, propter diversitatem formae, quae est ani- difference of form, viz. the soul: but it is the same by idenma, est tamen idem identitate materiae, quae est iterum tity of matter, which is destined to be reunited to its form.

suae formae unienda.

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Question 26 Christ as Called the Mediator of God and Man Deinde considerandum est de hoc quod Christus diWe have now to consider how Christ is called the Mecitur mediator Dei et hominum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur diator of God and man, and under this head there are two duo. points of inquiry: Primo, utrum esse mediatorem Dei et hominum sit (1) Whether it is proper to Christ to be the Mediator of proprium Christo. God and man? Secundo, utrum hoc conveniat ei secundum (2) Whether this belongs to Him by reason of His humanam naturam. human nature?

Article 1 Whether it is proper to Christ to be the mediator of God and man? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse mediatorem Dei et hominum non sit proprium Christo. Sacerdos enim et propheta videtur esse mediator inter Deum et homines, secundum illud Deut. V, ego illo tempore sequester et medius fui inter vos et Deum. Sed esse prophetam et sacerdotem non est proprium Christo. Ergo nec etiam esse mediatorem. Praeterea, illud quod convenit Angelis bonis et malis, non potest dici esse proprium Christo. Sed esse medium inter Deum et homines convenit Angelis bonis, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Convenit etiam Angelis malis, idest Daemonibus, habent enim quaedam communia cum Deo, scilicet immortalitatem; quaedam autem habent communia cum hominibus, scilicet quod sunt animo passivi, et per consequens miseri; ut patet per Augustinum, in Lib. IX de Civ. Dei. Ergo esse mediatorem Dei et hominum non est proprium Christo. Praeterea, ad officium mediatoris pertinet interpellare ad unum eorum inter quos est mediator, pro altero. Sed Spiritus Sanctus, sicut dicitur Rom. VIII, interpellat pro nobis ad Deum gemitibus inenarrabilibus. Ergo Spiritus Sanctus est mediator inter Deum et homines. Ergo non est proprium Christo. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Tim. II, unus est mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Iesus. Respondeo dicendum quod mediatoris officium proprie est coniungere eos inter quos est mediator, nam extrema uniuntur in medio. Unire autem homines Deo perfective quidem convenit Christo, per quem homines reconciliantur Deo, secundum illud II Cor. V, Deus erat in Christo mundum reconcilians sibi. Et ideo solus Christus est perfectus Dei et hominum mediator, inquantum per suam mortem humanum genus Deo reconciliavit. Unde, cum apostolus dixisset, mediator Dei et hominum

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to Christ to be the Mediator of God and man. For a priest and a prophet seem to be mediators between God and man, according to Deut. 5:5: I was the mediator and stood between God and you at that time. But it is not proper to Christ to be a priest and a prophet. Neither, therefore, is it proper to Him to be Mediator. Obj. 2: Further, that which is fitting to angels, both good and bad, cannot be said to be proper to Christ. But to be between God and man is fitting to the good angels, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). It is also fitting to the bad angels—that is, the demons: for they have something in common with God—namely, immortality; and something they have in common with men—namely, passibility of soul and consequently unhappiness; as appears from what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 13, 15). Therefore it is not proper to Christ to be a Mediator of God and man. Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the office of Mediator to beseech one of those, between whom he mediates, for the other. But the Holy Spirit, as it is written (Rom 8:26), asketh God for us with unspeakable groanings. Therefore the Holy Spirit is a Mediator between God and man. Therefore this is not proper to Christ. On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim 2:5): There is . . . one Mediator of God and man, the man Christ Jesus. I answer that, Properly speaking, the office of a mediator is to join together and unite those between whom he mediates: for extremes are united in the mean (medio). Now to unite men to God perfectively belongs to Christ, through Whom men are reconciled to God, according to 2 Cor. 5:19: God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself. And, consequently, Christ alone is the perfect Mediator of God and men, inasmuch as, by His death, He reconciled the human race to God. Hence the Apostle, after saying, Medi-

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Incarnation

homo Christus Iesus, subiunxit, qui dedit semetipsum redemptionem pro omnibus. Nihil tamen prohibet aliquos alios secundum quid dici mediatores inter Deum et hominem, prout scilicet cooperantur ad unionem hominum cum Deo dispositive vel ministerialiter. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prophetae et sacerdotes veteris legis dicti sunt mediatores inter Deum et homines dispositive et ministerialiter, inquantum scilicet praenuntiabant et praefigurabant verum et perfectum Dei et hominum mediatorem. Sacerdotes vero novae legis possunt dici mediatores Dei et hominum inquantum sunt ministri veri mediatoris, vice ipsius salutaria sacramenta hominibus exhibentes. Ad secundum dicendum quod Angeli boni, ut Augustinus dicit, in IX de Civ. Dei, non recte possunt dici mediatores inter Deum et homines. Cum enim utrumque habeant cum Deo, et beatitudinem et immortalitatem, nihil autem horum cum hominibus miseris et mortalibus, quomodo non potius remoti sunt ab hominibus, Deoque coniuncti, quam inter utrosque medii constituti? Dionysius tamen dicit eos esse medios, quia, secundum gradum naturae, sunt infra Deum et supra homines constituti. Et mediatoris officium exercent, non quidem principaliter et perfective, sed ministerialiter et dispositive, unde Matth. IV dicitur quod accesserunt Angeli et ministrabant ei, scilicet Christo. Daemones autem habent quidem cum Deo immortalitatem, cum hominibus vero miseriam. Ad hoc ergo se interponit medius Daemon immortalis et miser, ut ad immortalitatem beatam transire non sinat, sed perducat ad miseriam immortalem. Unde est sicut malus medius, qui separat amicos. Christus autem habuit cum Deo communem beatitudinem, cum hominibus autem mortalitatem. Et ideo ad hoc se interposuit medium ut, mortalitate transacta, ex mortuis faceret immortales, quod in se resurgendo monstravit; et ex miseris beatos efficeret, unde nunquam ipse discessit. Et ideo ipse est bonus mediator, qui reconciliat inimicos. Ad tertium dicendum quod Spiritus Sanctus, cum sit per omnia Deo aequalis, non potest dici medius vel mediator inter Deum et homines, sed solus Christus, qui, licet secundum divinitatem aequalis sit patri, tamen secundum humanitatem minor est patre, ut dictum est. Unde, super illud Galat. III, Christus est mediator, dicit Glossa, non pater vel Spiritus Sanctus. Dicitur autem Spiritus Sanctus interpellare pro nobis, quia ipse interpellare nos facit.

IIIae

ator of God and man, the man Christ Jesus, added: Who gave Himself a redemption for all. However, nothing hinders certain others from being called mediators, in some respect, between God and man, forasmuch as they cooperate in uniting men to God, dispositively or ministerially. Reply Obj. 1: The prophets and priests of the Old Law were called mediators between God and man, dispositively and ministerially: inasmuch as they foretold and foreshadowed the true and perfect Mediator of God and men. As to the priests of the New Law, they may be called mediators of God and men, inasmuch as they are the ministers of the true Mediator by administering, in His stead, the saving sacraments to men. Reply Obj. 2: The good angels, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 13), cannot rightly be called mediators between God and men. For since, in common with God, they have both beatitude and immortality, and none of these things in common with unhappy and mortal man, how much rather are they not aloof from men and akin to God, than established between them? Dionysius, however, says that they do occupy a middle place, because, in the order of nature, they are established below God and above man. Moreover, they fulfill the office of mediator, not indeed principally and perfectively, but ministerially and dispositively: whence (Matt 4:11) it is said that angels came and ministered unto Him—namely, Christ. As to the demons, it is true that they have immortality in common with God, and unhappiness in common with men. Hence for this purpose does the immortal and unhappy demon intervene, in order that he may hinder men from passing to a happy immortality, and may allure them to an unhappy immortality. Whence he is like an evil mediator, who separates friends. But Christ had beatitude in common with God, mortality in common with men. Hence for this purpose did He intervene, that having fulfilled the span of His mortality, He might from dead men make immortal—which He showed in Himself by rising again; and that He might confer beatitude on those who were deprived of it—for which reason He never forsook us. Wherefore He is the good Mediator, Who reconciles enemies (De Civ. Dei xv). Reply Obj. 3: Since the Holy Spirit is in everything equal to God, He cannot be said to be between, or a Mediator of, God and men: but Christ alone, Who, though equal to the Father in His Godhead, yet is less than the Father in His human nature, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 1). Hence on Gal. 3:20, Christ is a Mediator, the gloss says: Not the Father nor the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit, however, is said to ask for us, because He makes us ask.

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Christ as Called the Mediator of God and Man

Q. 26, A. 2

Article 2 Whether Christ, as man, is the mediator of God and men? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non sit mediator Dei et hominum secundum quod homo. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro contra Felicianum, una est Christi persona, ne sit non unus Christus, non una substantia; ne, mediatoris dispensatione submota, aut Dei tantum aut hominis dicatur filius. Sed non est Dei et hominis filius secundum quod homo, sed simul secundum quod Deus et homo. Ergo neque dicendum est quod sit mediator Dei et hominum solum secundum quod homo. Praeterea, sicut Christus, inquantum est Deus, convenit cum patre et spiritu sancto, ita, inquantum est homo, convenit cum hominibus. Sed propter hoc quod, inquantum est Deus, convenit cum patre et spiritu sancto, non potest dici mediator inquantum est Deus, quia super illud I Tim. II, mediator Dei et hominum, dicit Glossa, inquantum est verbum, non medius est, quia aequalis est Deo, et Deus apud Deum, et simul unus Deus. Ergo nec etiam inquantum homo, potest dici mediator, propter convenientiam quam cum hominibus habet. Praeterea, Christus dicitur mediator inquantum reconciliavit nos Deo, quod quidem fecit auferendo peccatum, quod nos separabat a Deo. Sed auferre peccatum convenit Christo non inquantum est homo, sed inquantum est Deus. Ergo Christus, inquantum est homo, non est mediator, sed inquantum est Deus. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in Lib. IX, de Civ. Dei, non ob hoc est mediator Christus, quia est verbum. Maxime quippe immortale et maxime beatum verbum longe a mortalibus miseris. Sed mediator est secundum quod homo. Respondeo dicendum quod in mediatore duo possumus considerare, primo quidem, rationem medii; secundo, officium coniungendi. Est autem de ratione medii quod distet ab utroque extremorum, coniungit autem mediator per hoc quod ea quae unius sunt, defert ad alterum. Neutrum autem horum potest convenire Christo secundum quod Deus, sed solum secundum quod homo. Nam secundum quod Deus, non differt a patre et spiritu sancto in natura et potestate dominii, nec etiam pater et Spiritus Sanctus aliquid habent quod non sit filii, ut sic possit id quod est patris vel spiritus sancti, quasi quod est aliorum, ad alios deferre. Sed utrumque convenit ei inquantum est homo. Quia, secundum quod est homo, distat et a Deo in natura, et ab hominibus in dignitate et gratiae et gloriae. Inquantum etiam est homo, competit ei coniungere homines Deo, praecepta et dona hominibus exhibendo, et pro hominibus ad Deum satisfaciendo et interpellando. Et ideo verissime dicitur mediator secundum quod homo.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not, as man, the Mediator of God and men. For Augustine says (Contra Felic. x): One is the Person of Christ: lest there be not one Christ, not one substance; lest, the office of Mediator being denied, He be called the Son either of God alone, or merely the Son of a man. But He is the Son of God and man, not as man, but as at the same time God and man. Therefore neither should we say that, as man alone, He is Mediator of God and man. Obj. 2: Further, just as Christ, as God, has a common nature with the Father and the Holy Spirit; so, as man, He has a common nature with men. But for the reason that, as God, He has the same nature as the Father and the Holy Spirit, He cannot be called Mediator, as God: for on 1 Tim. 2:5, Mediator of God and man, a gloss says: As the Word, He is not a Mediator, because He is equal to God, and God ‘with God,’ and at the same time one God. Therefore neither, as man, can He be called Mediator, on account of His having the same nature as men. Obj. 3: Further, Christ is called Mediator, inasmuch as He reconciled us to God: and this He did by taking away sin, which separated us from God. But to take away sin belongs to Christ, not as man, but as God. Therefore Christ is our Mediator, not as man, but as God. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 15): Not because He is the Word, is Christ Mediator, since He Who is supremely immortal and supremely happy is far from us unhappy mortals; but He is Mediator, as man. I answer that, We may consider two things in a mediator: first, that he is a mean; second, that he unites others. Now it is of the nature of a mean to be distant from each extreme: while it unites by communicating to one that which belongs to the other. Now neither of these can be applied to Christ as God, but only as man. For, as God, He does not differ from the Father and the Holy Spirit in nature and power of dominion: nor have the Father and the Holy Spirit anything that the Son has not, so that He be able to communicate to others something belonging to the Father or the Holy Spirit, as though it were belonging to others than Himself. But both can be applied to Him as man. Because, as man, He is distant both from God, by nature, and from man by dignity of both grace and glory. Again, it belongs to Him, as man, to unite men to God, by communicating to men both precepts and gifts, and by offering satisfaction and prayers to God for men. And therefore He is most truly called Mediator, as man.

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Mother of God

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si subtrahatur divina natura a Christo, subtrahitur per consequens ab eo singularis plenitudo gratiarum, quae convenit ei inquantum est unigenitus a patre, ut dicitur Ioan. I. Ex qua quidem plenitudine habet ut sit super omnes homines constitutus, et propinquius ad Deum accedens. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus, secundum quod Deus, est per omnia aequalis patri. Sed etiam in humana natura excedit alios homines. Et ideo, secundum quod homo, potest esse mediator, non autem secundum quod Deus. Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet auctoritative peccatum auferre conveniat Christo secundum quod est Deus, tamen satisfacere pro peccato humani generis convenit ei secundum quod homo. Et secundum hoc dicitur Dei et hominum mediator.

IIIae

Reply Obj. 1: If we take the Divine Nature from Christ, we consequently take from Him the singular fullness of grace, which belongs to Him as the Only-begotten of the Father, as it is written (John 1:14). From which fullness it resulted that He was established over all men, and approached nearer to God. Reply Obj. 2: Christ, as God, is in all things equal to the Father. But even in the human nature He is above all men. Therefore, as man, He can be Mediator, but not as God. Reply Obj. 3: Although it belongs to Christ as God to take away sin authoritatively, yet it belongs to Him, as man, to satisfy for the sin of the human race. And in this sense He is called the Mediator of God and men.

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Question 27 The Sanctification of the Blessed Virgin Post praedicta, in quibus de unione Dei et hominis et de his quae unionem sequuntur, tractatum est, restat considerandum de his quae filius Dei incarnatus in natura humana sibi unita fecit vel passus est. Quae quidem consideratio quadripartita erit. Nam primo, considerabimus de his quae pertinent ad ingressum eius in mundum; secundo, de his quae pertinent ad processum vitae ipsius in hoc mundo; tertio, de exitu ipsius ab hoc mundo; quarto, de his quae pertinent ad exaltationem ipsius post hanc vitam. Circa primum quatuor consideranda occurrunt, primo quidem, de conceptione Christi; secundo, de eius nativitate; tertio, de eius circumcisione; quarto, de eius Baptismo. Circa conceptionem autem eius, oportet aliqua considerare primo, quantum ad matrem concipientem; secundo, quantum ad modum conceptionis; tertio, quantum ad perfectionem prolis conceptae. Ex parte autem matris occurrunt quatuor consideranda, primo quidem, de sanctificatione eius; secundo, de virginitate eius; tertio, de desponsatione eius; quarto, de Annuntiatione ipsius, vel de praeparatione ipsius ad concipiendum. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum beata virgo mater Dei fuerit sanctificata ante nativitatem ex utero. Secundo, utrum fuerit sanctificata ante animationem. Tertio, utrum per huiusmodi sanctificationem fuerit sibi totaliter sublatus fomes peccati. Quarto, utrum per huiusmodi sanctificationem fuerit consecuta ut nunquam peccaret. Quinto, utrum per huiusmodi sanctificationem adepta fuerit plenitudinem gratiarum. Sexto, utrum sic fuisse sanctificata fuerit proprium sibi.

After the foregoing treatise of the union of God and man and the consequences thereof, it remains for us to consider what things the Incarnate Son of God did or suffered in the human nature united to Him. This consideration will be fourfold. For we shall consider: (1) Those things that relate to His coming into the world; (2) Those things that relate to the course of His life in this world; (3) His departure from this world; (4) Those things that concern His exaltation after this life. The first of these offers four points of consideration: (1) The Conception of Christ; (2) His Birth; (3) His Circumcision; (4) His Baptism. Concerning His Conception there are some points to be considered: (1) As to the Mother who conceived Him; (2) as to the mode of His Conception; (3) as to the perfection of the offspring conceived. On the part of the Mother four points offer themselves to our consideration: (1) Her sanctification. (2) her virginity; (3) her espousals; (4) her annunciation, or preparation for conception. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the Blessed Virgin, Mother of God, was sanctified before her birth from the womb? (2) Whether she was sanctified before animation? (3) Whether in virtue of this sanctification the fomes of sin was entirely taken away from her? (4) Whether the result of this sanctification was that she never sinned? (5) Whether in virtue of this sanctification she received the fullness of grace? (6) Whether it was proper to her to be thus sanctified?

Article 1 Whether the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before her birth from the womb? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beata virgo non fuerit sanctificata ante nativitatem ex utero. Dicit enim apostolus, I Cor. XV, non prius quod spirituale est, sed quod animale, deinde quod est spirituale. Sed per gratiam sanctificantem nascitur homo spiritualiter in filium Dei, secundum illud Ioan. I, ex Deo nati sunt. Nati-

Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin was not sanctified before her birth from the womb. For the Apostle says (1 Cor 15:46): That was not first which is spiritual but that which is natural; afterwards that which is spiritual. But by sanctifying grace man is born spiritually into a son of God according to John 1:13: (who) are born of God.

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Mother of God

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vitas autem ex utero est nativitas animalis. Non ergo bea- But birth from the womb is a natural birth. Therefore the ta virgo fuit prius sanctificata quam ex utero nasceretur. Blessed Virgin was not sanctified before her birth from the womb. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad DardaObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Ep. ad Dardan.): The num, sanctificatio, qua efficimur templum Dei, non nisi sanctification, by which we become temples of God, is only of renatorum est. Nemo autem renascitur nisi prius nasca- those who are born again. But no one is born again, who was tur. Ergo beata virgo non fuit prius sanctificata quam ex not born previously. Therefore the Blessed Virgin was not utero nasceretur. sanctified before her birth from the womb. Praeterea, quicumque est sanctificatus per graObj. 3: Further, whoever is sanctified by grace is tiam, est mundatus a peccato originali et actuali. Si er- cleansed from sin, both original and actual. If, therefore, go beata virgo fuit sanctificata ante nativitatem ex utero, the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before her birth from the consequens est quod fuerit tunc emundata ab origina- womb, it follows that she was then cleansed from origli peccato. Sed solum originale peccatum poterat eam inal sin. Now nothing but original sin could hinder her impedire ab introitu regni caelestis. Si ergo tunc mor- from entering the heavenly kingdom. If therefore she had tua fuisset, videtur quod ianuam regni caelestis introis- died then, it seems that she would have entered the gates set. Quod tamen fieri non potuit ante passionem Christi, of heaven. But this was not possible before the Passion iuxta illud apostoli, habemus enim fiduciam in introitum of Christ, according to the Apostle (Heb 10:19): We have sanctorum per sanguinem eius, ut dicitur Heb. X. Videtur therefore a confidence in the entering into the Holies by His ergo quod beata virgo non fuerit sanctificata antequam blood. It seems therefore that the Blessed Virgin was not ex utero nasceretur. sanctified before her birth from the womb. Praeterea, peccatum originale ex origine contraObj. 4: Further, original sin is contracted through the hitur, sicut peccatum actuale ex actu. Sed quandiu ali- origin, just as actual sin is contracted through an act. But as quis est in actu peccandi, non potest a peccato actuali long as one is in the act of sinning, one cannot be cleansed mundari. Ergo etiam nec beata virgo a peccato originali from actual sin. Therefore neither could the Blessed Virgin mundari potuit dum esset adhuc in ipso actu originis, in be cleansed from original sin as long as she was in the act materno utero existens. of origin, by existence in her mother’s womb. Sed contra est quod Ecclesia celebrat nativitatem On the contrary, The Church celebrates the feast beatae virginis. Non autem celebratur festum in Ecclesia of our Lady’s Nativity. Now the Church does not celebrate nisi pro aliquo sancto. Ergo beata virgo in ipsa sui nati- feasts except of those who are holy. Therefore even in her vitate fuit sancta. Fuit ergo in utero sanctificata. birth the Blessed Virgin was holy. Therefore she was sanctified in the womb. Respondeo dicendum quod de sanctificatione beaI answer that, Nothing is handed down in the tae Mariae, quod scilicet fuerit sanctificata in utero, ni- canonical Scriptures concerning the sanctification of the hil in Scriptura canonica traditur, quae etiam nec de Blessed Mary as to her being sanctified in the womb; ineius nativitate mentionem facit. Sed sicut Augustinus, de deed, they do not even mention her birth. But as Augusassumptione ipsius virginis, rationabiliter argumentatur tine, in his tractate on the Assumption of the Virgin, arquod cum corpore sit assumpta in caelum, quod tamen gues with reason, since her body was assumed into heaven, Scriptura non tradit; ita etiam rationabiliter argumentari and yet Scripture does not relate this; so it may be reapossumus quod fuerit sanctificata in utero. Rationabili- sonably argued that she was sanctified in the womb. For ter enim creditur quod illa quae genuit unigenitum a pa- it is reasonable to believe that she, who brought forth the tre, plenum gratiae et veritatis, prae omnibus aliis maiora Only-Begotten of the Father full of grace and truth, received gratiae privilegia accepit, unde legitur, Luc. I, quod An- greater privileges of grace than all others: hence we read gelus ei dixit, ave, gratia plena. (Luke 1:28) that the angel addressed her in the words: Hail full of grace! Invenimus autem quibusdam aliis hoc privilegialiter Moreover, it is to be observed that it was granted, by esse concessum ut in utero sanctificarentur, sicut Iere- way of privilege, to others, to be sanctified in the womb; mias, cui dictum est, Ierem. I, antequam exires de vulva, for instance, to Jeremias, to whom it was said (Jer 1:5): Besanctificavi te; et sicut Ioannes Baptista, de quo dictum fore thou camest forth out of the womb, I sanctified thee; and est, Luc. I, spiritu sancto replebitur adhuc ex utero matris again, to John the Baptist, of whom it is written (Luke 1:15): suae. Unde rationabiliter creditur quod beata virgo sanc- He shall be filled with the Holy Spirit even from his mother’s tificata fuerit antequam ex utero nasceretur. womb. It is therefore with reason that we believe the Blessed Virgin to have been sanctified before her birth from the womb.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod etiam in beata virgine prius fuit animale, et post id quod est spirituale, quia prius fuit secundum carnem concepta, et postea secundum spiritum sanctificata. Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur secundum legem communem, secundum quam per sacramenta non regenerantur aliqui nisi prius nati. Sed Deus huic legi sacramentorum potentiam suam non alligavit, quin aliquibus ex speciali privilegio gratiam suam conferre possit antequam nascantur ex utero. Ad tertium dicendum quod beata virgo sanctificata fuit in utero a peccato originali quantum ad maculam personalem, non tamen fuit liberata a reatu quo tota natura tenebatur obnoxia, ut scilicet non intraret in Paradisum nisi per Christi hostiam; sicut etiam de sanctis patribus dicitur qui fuerunt ante Christum. Ad quartum dicendum quod peccatum originale trahitur ex origine inquantum per eam communicatur humana natura, quam respicit proprie peccatum originale. Quod quidem fit quando proles concepta animatur. Unde post animationem nihil prohibet prolem conceptam sanctificari, postea enim non manet in materno utero ad accipiendam humanam naturam, sed ad aliqualem perfectionem eius quod iam accepit.

Q. 27, A. 2

Reply Obj. 1: Even in the Blessed Virgin, first was that which is natural, and afterwards that which is spiritual: for she was first conceived in the flesh, and afterwards sanctified in the spirit. Reply Obj. 2: Augustine speaks according to the common law, by reason of which no one is regenerated by the sacraments, save those who are previously born. But God did not so limit His power to the law of the sacraments, but that He can bestow His grace, by special privilege, on some before they are born from the womb. Reply Obj. 3: The Blessed Virgin was sanctified in the womb from original sin, as to the personal stain; but she was not freed from the guilt to which the whole nature is subject, so as to enter into Paradise otherwise than through the Sacrifice of Christ; the same also is to be said of the Holy Fathers who lived before Christ. Reply Obj. 4: Original sin is transmitted through the origin, inasmuch as through the origin the human nature is transmitted, and original sin, properly speaking, affects the nature. And this takes place when the offspring conceived is animated. Wherefore nothing hinders the offspring conceived from being sanctified after animation: for after this it remains in the mother’s womb not for the purpose of receiving human nature, but for a certain perfecting of that which it has already received.

Article 2 Whether the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before animation? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beata virgo sanctificata fuit ante animationem. Quia, ut dictum est, plus gratiae est collatum virgini matri Dei quam alicui sanctorum. Sed quibusdam videtur esse concessum quod sanctificarentur ante animationem. Quia dicitur Ierem. I, priusquam te formarem in utero, novi te, non autem infunditur anima ante corporis formationem. Similiter etiam de Ioanne Baptista dicit Ambrosius, super Luc., quod nondum inerat ei spiritus vitae, et iam inerat ei spiritus gratiae. Ergo multo magis beata virgo ante animationem sanctificari potuit. Praeterea, conveniens fuit, sicut Anselmus dicit, in libro de conceptu virginali, ut illa virgo ea puritate niteret qua maior sub Deo nequit intelligi, unde et in Cant. IV dicitur, tota pulchra es, amica mea, et macula non est in te. Sed maior puritas fuisset beatae virginis si nunquam fuisset inquinata contagio originalis peccati. Ergo hoc ei praestitum fuit quod, antequam animaretur caro eius, sanctificaretur. Praeterea, sicut dictum est, non celebratur festum nisi de aliquo sancto. Sed quidam celebrant festum con-

Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before animation. Because, as we have stated (A. 1), more grace was bestowed on the Virgin Mother of God than on any saint. Now it seems to have been granted to some, to be sanctified before animation. For it is written (Jer 1:5): Before I formed thee in the bowels of thy mother, I knew thee: and the soul is not infused before the formation of the body. Likewise Ambrose says of John the Baptist (Comment. in Luc. i, 15): As yet the spirit of life was not in him and already he possessed the Spirit of grace. Much more therefore could the Blessed Virgin be sanctified before animation. Obj. 2: Further, as Anselm says (De Concep. Virg. xviii), it was fitting that this Virgin should shine with such a purity that under God none greater can be imagined: wherefore it is written (Song 4:7): Thou art all fair, O my love, and there is not a spot in thee. But the purity of the Blessed Virgin would have been greater, if she had never been stained by the contagion of original sin. Therefore it was granted to her to be sanctified before her flesh was animated. Obj. 3: Further, as it has been stated above, no feast is celebrated except of some saint. But some keep the feast of

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ceptionis beatae virginis. Ergo videtur quod in ipsa sua conceptione fuerit sancta. Et ita videtur quod ante animationem fuerit sanctificata. Praeterea, apostolus dicit, Rom. XI, si radix sancta, et rami. Radix autem filiorum sunt parentes eorum. Potuit ergo beata virgo sanctificari etiam in suis parentibus, ante animationem. Sed contra est quod ea quae fuerunt in veteri testamento, sunt figura novi, secundum illud I Cor. X, omnia in figura contingebant illis. Per sanctificationem autem tabernaculi, de qua dicitur in Psalmo, sanctificavit tabernaculum suum altissimus, videtur significari sanctificatio matris Dei, quae tabernaculum Dei dicitur, secundum illud Psalmi, in sole posuit tabernaculum suum. De tabernaculo autem dicitur, Exod. ult., postquam cuncta perfecta sunt, operuit nubes tabernaculum testimonii, et gloria domini implevit illud. Ergo et beata virgo non fuit sanctificata nisi postquam cuncta eius perfecta sunt, scilicet corpus et anima. Respondeo dicendum quod sanctificatio beatae virginis non potest intelligi ante eius animationem, duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia sanctificatio de qua loquimur, non est nisi emundatio a peccato originali, sanctitas enim est perfecta munditia, ut Dionysius dicit, XII cap. de Div. Nom. Culpa autem non potest emundari nisi per gratiam, cuius subiectum est sola creatura rationalis. Et ideo ante infusionem animae rationalis beata virgo sanctificata non fuit. Secundo quia, cum sola creatura rationalis sit susceptiva culpae, ante infusionem animae rationalis proles concepta non est culpae obnoxia. Et sic, quocumque modo ante animationem beata virgo sanctificata fuisset, nunquam incurrisset maculam originalis culpae, et ita non indiguisset redemptione et salute quae est per Christum, de quo dicitur Matth. I, ipse salvum faciet populum suum a peccatis eorum. Hoc autem est inconveniens, quod Christus non sit salvator omnium hominum, ut dicitur I Tim. IV. Unde relinquitur quod sanctificatio beatae virginis fuerit post eius animationem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus dicit ante formationem in utero Ieremiam novisse, notitia scilicet praedestinationis, sed sanctificasse se dicit eum, non ante formationem, sed antequam exiret de ventre, et cetera. Quod autem dicit Ambrosius, quod Ioanni Baptistae nondum inerat spiritus vitae cum iam haberet spiritum gratiae, non est intelligendum secundum quod spiritus vitae dicitur anima vivificans, sed secundum quod spiritus dicitur aer exterius respiratus. Vel potest dici quod nondum inerat ei spiritus vitae, idest anima, quantum ad manifestas et completas operationes ipsius.

IIIae

the Conception of the Blessed Virgin. Therefore it seems that in her very Conception she was holy; and hence that she was sanctified before animation. Obj. 4: Further, the Apostle says (Rom 11:16): If the root be holy, so are the branches. Now the root of the children is their parents. Therefore the Blessed Virgin could be sanctified even in her parents, before animation. On the contrary, The things of the Old Testament were figures of the New, according to 1 Cor. 10:11: All things happened to them in figure. Now the sanctification of the tabernacle, of which it is written (Ps 45:5): The most High hath sanctified His own tabernacle, seems to signify the sanctification of the Mother of God, who is called God’s Tabernacle, according to Ps. 18:6: He hath set His tabernacle in the sun. But of the tabernacle it is written (Exod 40:31, 32): After all things were perfected, the cloud covered the tabernacle of the testimony, and the glory of the Lord filled it. Therefore also the Blessed Virgin was not sanctified until after all in her was perfected, viz. her body and soul. I answer that, The sanctification of the Blessed Virgin cannot be understood as having taken place before animation, for two reasons. First, because the sanctification of which we are speaking, is nothing but the cleansing from original sin: for sanctification is a perfect cleansing, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii). Now sin cannot be taken away except by grace, the subject of which is the rational creature alone. Therefore before the infusion of the rational soul, the Blessed Virgin was not sanctified. Second, because, since the rational creature alone can be the subject of sin; before the infusion of the rational soul, the offspring conceived is not liable to sin. And thus, in whatever manner the Blessed Virgin would have been sanctified before animation, she could never have incurred the stain of original sin: and thus she would not have needed redemption and salvation which is by Christ, of whom it is written (Matt 1:21): He shall save His people from their sins. But this is unfitting, through implying that Christ is not the Savior of all men, as He is called (1 Tim 4:10). It remains, therefore, that the Blessed Virgin was sanctified after animation. Reply Obj. 1: The Lord says that He knew Jeremias before he was formed in the womb, by knowledge, that is to say, of predestination: but He says that He sanctified him, not before formation, but before he came forth out of the womb, etc. As to what Ambrose says, viz. that in John the Baptist there was not the spirit of life when there was already the Spirit of grace, by spirit of life we are not to understand the life-giving soul, but the air which we breathe out (respiratus). Or it may be said that in him as yet there was not the spirit of life, that is the soul, as to its manifest and complete operations.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod, si nunquam anima beatae virginis fuisset contagio originalis peccati inquinata, hoc derogaret dignitati Christi, secundum quam est universalis omnium salvator. Et ideo sub Christo, qui salvari non indiguit, tanquam universalis salvator, maxima fuit beatae virginis puritas. Nam Christus nullo modo contraxit originale peccatum, sed in ipsa sui conceptione fuit sanctus, secundum illud Luc. I, quod ex te nascetur sanctum vocabitur filius Dei. Sed beata virgo contraxit quidem originale peccatum, sed ab eo fuit mundata antequam ex utero nasceretur. Et hoc significatur Iob III, ubi de nocte originalis peccati dicitur, exspectet lucem, idest Christum, et non videat (quia nihil inquinatum intravit in illam, ut dicitur Sap. VII), nec ortum surgentis aurorae, idest beatae virginis, quae in suo ortu a peccato originali fuit immunis. Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet Romana Ecclesia conceptionem beatae virginis non celebret, tolerat tamen consuetudinem aliquarum Ecclesiarum illud festum celebrantium. Unde talis celebritas non est totaliter reprobanda. Nec tamen per hoc festum conceptionis celebratum datur intelligi quod in sua conceptione fuerit sancta. Sed, quia quo tempore sanctificata fuerit ignoratur, celebratur festum sanctificationis eius, potius quam conceptionis, in die conceptionis ipsius. Ad quartum dicendum quod duplex est sanctificatio. Una quidem totius naturae, inquantum scilicet tota natura humana ab omni corruptione culpae et poenae liberatur. Et haec erit in resurrectione. Alia vero est sanctificatio personalis. Quae non transit in prolem carnaliter genitam, quia talis sanctificatio non respicit carnem, sed mentem. Et ideo, etsi parentes beatae virginis fuerunt mundati a peccato originali, nihilominus beata virgo contraxit peccatum originale, cum fuerit concepta secundum carnis concupiscentiam et ex commixtione maris et feminae, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de nuptiis et concupiscentia, omnem quae de concubitu nascitur, carnem esse peccati.

Q. 27, A. 3

Reply Obj. 2: If the soul of the Blessed Virgin had never incurred the stain of original sin, this would be derogatory to the dignity of Christ, by reason of His being the universal Savior of all. Consequently after Christ, who, as the universal Savior of all, needed not to be saved, the purity of the Blessed Virgin holds the highest place. For Christ did not contract original sin in any way whatever, but was holy in His very Conception, according to Luke 1:35: The Holy which shall be born of thee, shall be called the Son of God. But the Blessed Virgin did indeed contract original sin, but was cleansed therefrom before her birth from the womb. This is what is signified (Job 3:9) where it is written of the night of original sin: Let it expect light, i.e., Christ, and not see it—(because no defiled thing cometh into her, as is written Wis. 7:25), nor the rising of the dawning of the day, that is of the Blessed Virgin, who in her birth was immune from original sin. Reply Obj. 3: Although the Church of Rome does not celebrate the Conception of the Blessed Virgin, yet it tolerates the custom of certain churches that do keep that feast, wherefore this is not to be entirely reprobated. Nevertheless the celebration of this feast does not give us to understand that she was holy in her conception. But since it is not known when she was sanctified, the feast of her Sanctification, rather than the feast of her Conception, is kept on the day of her conception. Reply Obj. 4: Sanctification is twofold. One is that of the whole nature: inasmuch as the whole human nature is freed from all corruption of sin and punishment. This will take place at the resurrection. The other is personal sanctification. This is not transmitted to the children begotten of the flesh: because it does not regard the flesh but the mind. Consequently, though the parents of the Blessed Virgin were cleansed from original sin, nevertheless she contracted original sin, since she was conceived by way of fleshly concupiscence and the intercourse of man and woman: for Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i): All flesh born of carnal intercourse is sinful.

Article 3 Whether the Blessed Virgin was cleansed from the infection of the fomes? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod beata virgo non fuerit emundata ab infectione fomitis. Sicut enim poena originalis peccati est fomes, qui consistit in inferiorum virium rebellione ad rationem, ita etiam poena originalis peccati est mors, et ceterae poenalitates corporales. Sed beata virgo fuit subiecta huiusmodi poenalitatibus. Ergo etiam fomes ab ea totaliter remotus non fuit.

Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin was not cleansed from the infection of the fomes. For just as the fomes, consisting in the rebellion of the lower powers against the reason, is a punishment of original sin; so also are death and other corporeal penalties. Therefore the fomes was not entirely removed from her.

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Praeterea, II Cor. XII dicitur, virtus in infirmitate perficitur, et loquitur de infirmitate fomitis, secundum quam patiebatur stimulum carnis. Sed nihil quod pertinet ad perfectionem virtutis, fuit beatae virgini subtrahendum. Ergo non fuit beatae virgini totaliter subtrahendus fomes. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit quod in beata virgine supervenit Spiritus Sanctus purgans eam, ante conceptionem filii Dei. Quod non potest intelligi nisi de purgatione a fomite, nam peccatum non fecit, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura et gratia. Ergo per sanctificationem in utero non fuit libere mundata a fomite. Sed contra est quod dicitur Cant. IV, tota pulchra es, amica mea, et macula non est in te. Fomes autem ad maculam pertinet, saltem carnis. Ergo in beata virgine fomes non fuit. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc sunt diversae opiniones. Quidam enim dixerunt quod in ipsa sanctificatione beatae virginis, qua fuit sanctificata in utero, totaliter fuit ei fomes subtractus. Quidam vero dicunt quod remansit fomes quantum ad hoc quod facit difficultatem ad bonum, sublatus tamen fuit quantum ad hoc quod facit pronitatem ad malum. Alii vero dicunt quod sublatus fuit fomes inquantum pertinet ad corruptionem personae, prout impellit ad malum et difficultatem facit ad bonum, remansit tamen inquantum pertinet ad corruptionem naturae, prout scilicet est causa traducendi originale peccatum in prolem. Alii vero dicunt quod in prima sanctificatione remansit fomes secundum essentiam, sed ligatus fuit, in ipsa autem conceptione filii Dei fuit totaliter sublatus. Ad horum autem intellectum, oportet considerare quod fomes nihil aliud est quam inordinata concupiscentia sensibilis appetitus, habitualis tamen, quia actualis concupiscentia est motus peccati. Dicitur autem concupiscentia sensualitatis esse inordinata, inquantum repugnat rationi, quod quidem fit inquantum inclinat ad malum, vel difficultatem facit ad bonum. Et ideo ad ipsam rationem fomitis pertinet quod inclinet ad malum, vel difficultatem facit in bono. Unde ponere quod remanserit fomes in beata virgine non inclinans ad malum, est ponere duo opposita. Similiter etiam videtur oppositionem implicare quod remanserit fomes inquantum pertinet ad corruptionem naturae, non autem inquantum pertinet ad corruptionem personae. Nam secundum Augustinum, in libro de nuptiis et concupiscentia, libido est quae peccatum originale transmittit in prolem. Libido autem importat inordinatam concupiscentiam, quae non totaliter subditur rationi. Et ideo, si totaliter fomes subtraheretur inquantum pertinet ad corruptionem personae, non posset remanere inquantum pertinet ad corruptionem naturae.

IIIae

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (2 Cor 12:9): Power is made perfect in infirmity, which refers to the weakness of the fomes, by reason of which he (the Apostle) felt the sting of the flesh. But it was not fitting that anything should be taken away from the Blessed Virgin, pertaining to the perfection of virtue. Therefore it was unfitting that the fomes should be entirely taken away from her. Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that the Holy Spirit came upon the Blessed Virgin, purifying her, before she conceived the Son of God. But this can only be understood of purification from the fomes: for she committed no sin, as Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxvi). Therefore by the sanctification in the womb she was not absolutely cleansed from the fomes. On the contrary, It is written (Song 4:7): Thou art all fair, O my love, and there is not a spot in thee! But the fomes implies a blemish, at any rate in the flesh. Therefore the fomes was not in the Blessed Virgin. I answer that, on this point there are various opinions. For some have held that the fomes was entirely taken away in that sanctification whereby the Blessed Virgin was sanctified in the womb. Others say that it remained as far as it causes a difficulty in doing good, but was taken away as far as it causes a proneness to evil. Others again, that it was taken away as to the personal corruption, by which it makes us quick to do evil and slow to do good: but that it remained as to the corruption of nature, inasmuch as it is the cause of transmitting original sin to the offspring. Lastly, others say that, in her first sanctification, the fomes remained essentially, but was fettered; and that, when she conceived the Son of God, it was entirely taken away. In order to understand the question at issue, it must be observed that the fomes is nothing but a certain inordinate, but habitual, concupiscence of the sensitive appetite, for actual concupiscence is a sinful motion. Now sensual concupiscence is said to be inordinate, in so far as it rebels against reason; and this it does by inclining to evil, or hindering from good. Consequently it is essential to the fomes to incline to evil, or hinder from good. Wherefore to say that the fomes was in the Blessed Virgin without an inclination to evil, is to combine two contradictory statements.

In like manner it seems to imply a contradiction to say that the fomes remained as to the corruption of nature, but not as to the personal corruption. For, according to Augustine (De Nup. et Concup. i.), it is lust that transmits original sin to the offspring. Now lust implies inordinate concupiscence, not entirely subject to reason: and therefore, if the fomes were entirely taken away as to personal corruption, it could not remain as to the corruption of nature.

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Restat igitur ut dicamus quod vel totaliter fomes fuerit ab ea sublatus per primam sanctificationem, vel quod fuerit ligatus. Posset tamen intelligi quod totaliter fuit sublatus fomes hoc modo, quod praestitum fuerit beatae virgini, ex abundantia gratiae descendentis in ipsam, ut talis esset dispositio virium animae in ipsa quod inferiores vires nunquam moverentur sine arbitrio rationis, sicut dictum est, fuisse in Christo, quem constat peccati fomitem non habuisse; et sicut fuit in Adam ante peccatum per originalem iustitiam; ita quod, quantum ad hoc, gratia sanctificationis in virgine habuit vim originalis iustitiae. Et quamvis haec positio ad dignitatem virginis matris pertinere videatur, derogat tamen in aliquo dignitati Christi, absque cuius virtute nullus a prima damnatione liberatus est. Et quamvis per fidem Christi aliqui ante Christi incarnationem sint secundum spiritum ab illa damnatione liberati, tamen quod secundum carnem aliquis ab illa damnatione liberetur, non videtur fieri debuisse nisi post incarnationem eius in qua primo debuit immunitas damnationis apparere. Et ideo, sicut ante immortalitatem carnis Christi resurgentis nullus adeptus fuit carnis immortalitatem, ita inconveniens etiam videtur dicere quod ante carnem Christi, in qua nullum fuit peccatum, caro virginis matris eius, vel cuiuscumque alterius, fuerit absque fomite, qui dicitur lex carnis, sive membrorum.

Et ideo melius videtur dicendum quod per sanctificationem in utero non fuit sublatus virgini fomes secundum essentiam, sed remansit ligatus, non quidem per actum rationis suae, sicut in viris sanctis, quia non statim habuit usum liberi arbitrii adhuc in ventre matris existens, hoc enim speciale privilegium Christi fuit; sed per gratiam abundantem quam in sanctificatione recepit, et etiam perfectius per divinam providentiam sensualitatem eius ab omni inordinato motu prohibentem. Postmodum vero, in ipsa conceptione carnis Christi, in qua primo debuit refulgere peccati immunitas, credendum est quod ex prole redundaverit in matrem totaliter a fomite subtractio. Et hoc significatur Ezech. XLIII, ubi dicitur, ecce, gloria Dei Israel ingrediebatur per viam Orientalem, idest per beatam virginem, et terra, idest caro ipsius, splendebat a maiestate eius, scilicet Christi. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod mors et huiusmodi poenalitates de se non inclinant ad peccatum. Unde etiam Christus, licet assumpserit huiusmodi poenalitates, fomitem tamen non assumpsit. Unde etiam in beata virgine, ut filio conformaretur, de cuius plenitudine gratiam accipiebat, primo quidem fuit ligatus fomes, et postea sublatus, non autem fuit liberata a morte et aliis huiusmodi poenalitatibus.

Q. 27, A. 3

It remains, therefore, for us to say, either that the fomes was entirely taken away from her by her first sanctification or that it was fettered. Now that the fomes was entirely taken away, might be understood in this way, that, by the abundance of grace bestowed on the Blessed Virgin, such a disposition of the soul’s powers was granted to her, that the lower powers were never moved without the command of her reason: just as we have stated to have been the case with Christ (Q. 15, A. 2), who certainly did not have the fomes of sin; as also was the case with Adam, before he sinned, by reason of original justice: so that, in this respect, the grace of sanctification in the Virgin had the force of original justice. And although this appears to be part of the dignity of the Virgin Mother, yet it is somewhat derogatory to the dignity of Christ, without whose power no one had been freed from the first sentence of condemnation. And though, through faith in Christ, some were freed from that condemnation, according to the spirit, before Christ’s Incarnation, yet it does not seem fitting that any one should be freed from that condemnation, according to the flesh, except after His Incarnation, for it was then that immunity from condemnation was first to appear. Consequently, just as before the immortality of the flesh of Christ rising again, none obtained immortality of the flesh, so it seems unfitting to say that before Christ appeared in sinless flesh, His Virgin Mother’s or anyone else’s flesh should be without the fomes, which is called the law of the flesh or of the members (Rom 7:23, 25). Therefore it seems better to say that by the sanctification in the womb, the Virgin was not freed from the fomes in its essence, but that it remained fettered: not indeed by an act of her reason, as in holy men, since she had not the use of reason from the very first moment of her existence in her mother’s womb, for this was the singular privilege of Christ: but by reason of the abundant grace bestowed on her in her sanctification, and still more perfectly by Divine Providence preserving her sensitive soul, in a singular manner, from any inordinate movement. Afterwards, however, at the conception of Christ’s flesh, in which for the first time immunity from sin was to be conspicuous, it is to be believed that entire freedom from the fomes redounded from the Child to the Mother. This indeed is signified (Ezek 43:2): Behold the glory of the God of Israel came in by the way of the east, i.e., by the Blessed Virgin, and the earth, i.e., her flesh, shone with His, i.e., Christ’s, majesty. Reply Obj. 1: Death and such like penalties do not of themselves incline us to sin. Wherefore though Christ assumed them, He did not assume the fomes. Consequently in order that the Blessed Virgin might be conformed to her Son, from whose fullness her grace was derived, the fomes was at first fettered and afterwards taken away: while she was not freed from death and other such penalties.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod infirmitas carnis ad fomitem pertinens est quidem in sanctis viris perfectae virtutis occasio, non tamen causa sine qua perfectio haberi non possit. Sufficit autem in beata virgine ponere perfectam virtutem et abundantiam gratiae, nec in ea oportet ponere omnem occasionem perfectionis. Ad tertium dicendum quod Spiritus Sanctus in beata virgine duplicem purgationem fecit. Unam quidem quasi praeparatoriam ad Christi conceptionem, quae non fuit ab aliqua impuritate culpae vel fomitis, sed mentem eius magis in unum colligens et a multitudine sustollens. Nam et Angeli purgari dicuntur, in quibus nulla impuritas invenitur, ut Dionysius dicit, VI cap. Eccles. Hier. Aliam vero purgationem operatus est in ea Spiritus Sanctus mediante conceptione Christi, quae fuit opus spiritus sancti. Et secundum hoc potest dici quod purgavit eam totaliter a fomite.

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Reply Obj. 2: The infirmity of the flesh, that pertains to the fomes, is indeed to holy men an occasional cause of perfect virtue: but not the sine qua non of perfection: and it is quite enough to ascribe to the Blessed Virgin perfect virtue and abundant grace: nor is there any need to attribute to her every occasional cause of perfection. Reply Obj. 3: The Holy Spirit effected a twofold purification in the Blessed Virgin. The first was, as it were, preparatory to Christ’s conception: which did not cleanse her from the stain of sin or fomes, but rather gave her mind a unity of purpose and disengaged it from a multiplicity of things (Cf. Dionysius, Div. Nom. iv), since even the angels are said to be purified, in whom there is no stain, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi). The second purification effected in her by the Holy Spirit was by means of the conception of Christ which was the operation of the Holy Spirit. And in respect of this, it may be said that He purified her entirely from the fomes.

Article 4 Whether by being sanctified in the womb the Blessed Virgin was preserved from all actual sin? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod per sanctificationem in utero non fuerit beata virgo praeservata ab omni peccato actuali. Quia, ut dictum est, post primam sanctificationem fomes peccati remansit in virgine. Motus autem fomitis, etiam si rationem praeveniat, est peccatum veniale, licet levissimum, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Trin. Ergo in beata virgine fuit aliquod peccatum veniale. Praeterea, super illud Luc. II, tuam ipsius animam pertransibit gladius, dicit Augustinus, in libro de quaest. novi et veteris Test., quod beata virgo in morte domini stupore quodam dubitavit. Sed dubitare de fide est peccatum. Ergo beata virgo non fuit praeservata immunis ab omni peccato. Praeterea, Chrysostomus, super Matth., exponens illud, ecce mater tua et fratres tui foris stant quaerentes te, dicit, manifestum est quoniam solum ex vana gloria hoc faciebant. Et Ioan. II, super illud, vinum non habent, dicit idem Chrysostomus quod volebat illis ponere gratiam, et seipsam clariorem facere per filium; et fortassis quid humanum patiebatur, quemadmodum et fratres eius dicentes. Manifesta teipsum mundo. Et post pauca subdit, nondum enim quam oportebat de eo opinionem habebat. Quod totum constat esse peccatum. Ergo beata virgo non fuit praeservata immunis ab omni peccato.

Objection 1: It would seem that by being sanctified in the womb the Blessed Virgin was not preserved from all actual sin. For, as we have already stated (A. 3), after her first sanctification the fomes remained in the Virgin. Now the motion of the fomes, even if it precede the act of the reason, is a venial sin, albeit extremely slight, as Augustine says in his work De Trinitate. Therefore there was some venial sin in the Blessed Virgin. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test. lxxiii on Luke 2:35: Thy own soul a sword shall pierce) says that the Blessed Virgin was troubled with wondering doubt at the death of our Lord. But doubt in matters of faith is a sin. Therefore the Blessed Virgin was not preserved from all actual sin. Obj. 3: Further, Chrysostom (Hom. xlv in Matth.) expounding the text: Behold thy mother and thy brethren stand without, seeking thee, says: It is clear that they did this from mere vain glory. Again, on John 2:3: They have no wine, the same Chrysostom says that she wished to do them a favor, and raise herself in their esteem, by means of her Son: and perchance she succumbed to human frailty, just as did His brethren when they said: ‘Manifest Thyself to the world.’ And a little further on he says: For as yet she did not believe in Him as she ought. Now it is quite clear that all this was sinful. Therefore the Blessed Virgin was not preserved from all sin. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. natura et gratia, de sancta virgine Maria, propter hono- xxxvi): In the matter of sin, it is my wish to exclude absolutely rem Christi, nullam prorsus, cum de peccatis agitur, ha- all questions concerning the holy Virgin Mary, on account of bere volo quaestionem. Inde enim scimus quod ei plus the honor due to Christ. For since she conceived and brought

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gratiae collatum fuerit ad vincendum ex omni parte peccatum, quod concipere et parere meruit eum quem constat nullum habuisse peccatum. Respondeo dicendum quod illos quos Deus ad aliquid eligit, ita praeparat et disponit ut ad id ad quod eliguntur inveniantur idonei, secundum illud II Cor. III, idoneos nos fecit ministros novi testamenti. Beata autem virgo fuit electa divinitus ut esset mater Dei. Et ideo non est dubitandum quod Deus per suam gratiam eam ad hoc idoneam reddidit, secundum quod Angelus ad eam dicit, invenisti gratiam apud Deum, ecce, concipies, et cetera. Non autem fuisset idonea mater Dei, si peccasset aliquando. Tum quia honor parentum redundat in prolem, secundum illud Prov. XVII, gloria filiorum patres eorum. Unde et, per oppositum, ignominia matris ad filium redundasset. Tum etiam quia singularem affinitatem habuit ad Christum, qui ab ea carnem accepit. Dicitur autem II Cor. VI, quae conventio Christi ad Belial? Tum etiam quia singulari modo Dei filius, qui est Dei sapientia, in ipsa habitavit, non solum in anima, sed in utero. Dicitur autem Sap. I, in malevolam animam non intrabit sapientia, nec habitabit in corpore subdito peccatis.

Et ideo simpliciter fatendum est quod beata virgo nullum actuale peccatum commisit, nec mortale nec veniale, ut sic impleatur quod dicitur Cant. IV, tota pulchra es, amica mea, et macula non est in te, et cetera. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in beata virgine, post sanctificationem in utero, remansit quidem fomes, sed ligatus, ne scilicet prorumperet in aliquem motum inordinatum, qui rationem praeveniret. Et licet ad hoc operaretur gratia sanctificationis, non tamen ad hoc sufficiebat, alioquin, virtute illius gratiae hoc ei fuisset praestitum ut nullus motus posset esse in sensualitate eius non ratione praeventus, et sic fomitem non habuisset, quod est contra supra dicta. Unde oportet dicere quod complementum illius ligationis fuit ex divina providentia, quae non permittebat aliquem motum inordinatum ex fomite provenire. Ad secundum dicendum quod illud verbum Simeonis Origenes, et quidam alii doctores, exponunt de dolore quem passa est in Christi passione. Ambrosius autem per gladium dicit significari prudentiam Mariae, non ignaram mysterii caelestis. Vivum enim est verbum Dei et validum, acutius omni gladio ancipiti. Quidam vero gladium dubitationem intelligunt. Quae tamen non est intelligenda dubitatio infidelitatis, sed admirationis et discussionis. Dicit enim Basilius, in epistola ad optimum, quod beata virgo, assistens cruci et aspiciens singula, post testimonium Gabrielis, post ineffa-

Q. 27, A. 4

forth Him who most certainly was guilty of no sin, we know that an abundance of grace was given her that she might be in every way the conqueror of sin. I answer that, God so prepares and endows those, whom He chooses for some particular office, that they are rendered capable of fulfilling it, according to 2 Cor. 3:6: (Who) hath made us fit ministers of the New Testament. Now the Blessed Virgin was chosen by God to be His Mother. Therefore there can be no doubt that God, by His grace, made her worthy of that office, according to the words spoken to her by the angel (Luke 1:30, 31): Thou hast found grace with God: behold thou shalt conceive, etc. But she would not have been worthy to be the Mother of God, if she had ever sinned. First, because the honor of the parents reflects on the child, according to Prov. 17:6: The glory of children are their fathers: and consequently, on the other hand, the Mother’s shame would have reflected on her Son. Second, because of the singular affinity between her and Christ, who took flesh from her: and it is written (2 Cor 6:15): What concord hath Christ with Belial? Third, because of the singular manner in which the Son of God, who is the Divine Wisdom (1 Cor 1:24) dwelt in her, not only in her soul but in her womb. And it is written (Wis 1:4): Wisdom will not enter into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins. We must therefore confess simply that the Blessed Virgin committed no actual sin, neither mortal nor venial; so that what is written (Song 4:7) is fulfilled: Thou art all fair, O my love, and there is not a spot in thee, etc. Reply Obj. 1: After her sanctification the fomes remained in the Blessed Virgin, but fettered; lest she should be surprised by some sudden inordinate act, antecedent to the act of reason. And although the grace of her sanctification contributed to this effect, yet it did not suffice; for otherwise the result of her sanctification would have been to render impossible in her any sensual movement not preceded by an act of reason, and thus she would not have had the fomes, which is contrary to what we have said above (A. 3). We must therefore say that the above mentioned fettering (of the fomes) was perfected by divine providence not permitting any inordinate motion to result from the fomes. Reply Obj. 2: Origen (Hom. xvii in Luc.) and certain other doctors expound these words of Simeon as referring to the sorrow which she suffered at the time of our Lord’s Passion. Ambrose (in Luc. 2:35) says that the sword signifies Mary’s prudence which took note of the heavenly mystery. For the word of God is living and effectual, and more piercing than any two-edged sword (Heb 4:12). Others again take the sword to signify doubt. But this is to be understood of the doubt, not of unbelief, but of wonder and discussion. Thus Basil says (Ep. ad Optim.) that the Blessed Virgin while standing by the cross, and observing every detail, after the message of Gabriel, and the ineffa-

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bilem divinae conceptionis notitiam, post ingentem miraculorum ostensionem, animo fluctuabat, ex una scilicet parte videns eum pati abiecta, et ex alia parte considerans eius mirifica. Ad tertium dicendum quod in verbis illis Chrysostomus excessit. Possunt tamen exponi ut intelligatur in ea dominum cohibuisse, non inordinatum inanis gloriae motum quantum ad ipsam, sed id quod ab aliis posset existimari.

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ble knowledge of the Divine Conception, after that wondrous manifestation of miracles, was troubled in mind: that is to say, on the one side seeing Him suffer such humiliation, and on the other considering His marvelous works. Reply Obj. 3: In those words Chrysostom goes too far. They may, however, be explained as meaning that our Lord corrected in her, not the inordinate motion of vain glory in regard to herself, but that which might be in the thoughts of others.

Article 5 Whether, by her sanctification in the womb, the Blessed Virgin received the fullness of grace? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beata virgo per sanctificationem in utero non obtinuerit gratiae plenitudinem, sive perfectionem. Hoc enim videtur pertinere ad privilegium Christi, secundum illud Ioan. I, vidimus eum, quasi unigenitum a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis. Sed ea quae sunt propria Christi, non sunt alteri attribuenda. Ergo beata virgo plenitudinem gratiarum non accepit in sanctificatione. Praeterea, ei quod est plenum et perfectum, non restat aliquid addendum, quia perfectum est cui nihil deest, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed beata virgo postmodum additionem gratiae suscepit, quando Christum concepit, dictum est enim ei, Luc. I, Spiritus Sanctus superveniet in te. Et iterum, quando in gloriam est assumpta. Ergo videtur quod non habuerit in sua prima sanctificatione plenitudinem gratiarum. Praeterea, Deus non facit aliquid frustra, ut dicitur in I de coelo et mundo. Frustra autem habuisset quasdam gratias, cum earum usum nunquam exercuerit, non enim legitur eam docuisse, quod est actus sapientiae; aut miracula fecisse, quod est actus gratiae gratis datae. Non ergo habuit plenitudinem gratiarum. Sed contra est quod Angelus ad eam dixit, ave, gratia plena. Quod exponens Hieronymus, in sermone de assumptione, dicit, bene, gratia plena, quia ceteris per partes praestatur; Mariae vero se totam simul infudit gratiae plenitudo. Respondeo dicendum quod, quanto aliquid magis appropinquat principio in quolibet genere, tanto magis participat effectum illius principii, unde dicit Dionysius, IV cap. Cael. Hier., quod Angeli, qui sunt Deo propinquiores, magis participant de bonitatibus divinis quam homines. Christus autem est principium gratiae, secundum divinitatem quidem auctoritative, secundum humanitatem vero instrumentaliter, unde et Ioan. I dicitur, gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum facta est. Beata autem virgo Maria propinquissima Christo fuit secundum

Objection 1: It would seem that, by her sanctification in the womb, the Blessed Virgin did not receive the fullness or perfection of grace. For this seems to be Christ’s privilege, according to John 1:14: We saw His glory as the OnlyBegotten full of grace and truth. But what is proper to Christ ought not to be ascribed to some one else. Therefore the Blessed Virgin did not receive the fullness of grace at the time of her sanctification. Obj. 2: Further, nothing remains to be added to that which is full and perfect: for the perfect is that which lacks nothing, as is said Phys. iii. But the Blessed Virgin received additional grace afterwards when she conceived Christ; for to her was it said (Luke 1:35): The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee: and again, when she was assumed into glory. Therefore it seems that she did not receive the fullness of grace at the time of her first sanctification. Obj. 3: Further, God does nothing useless, as is said De Coelo et Mundo i. But it would have been useless for her to have certain graces, for she would never have put them to use: since we do not read that she taught, which is the act of wisdom; or that she worked miracles, which is the act of one of the gratuitous graces. Therefore she had not the fullness of grace. On the contrary, The angel said to her: Hail, full of grace (Luke 1:28); which words Jerome expounds as follows, in a sermon on the Assumption (cf. Ep. ad Paul. et Eustoch.): Full indeed of grace: for to others it is given in portions; whereas on Mary the fullness of grace was showered all at once. I answer that, In every genus, the nearer a thing is to the principle, the greater the part which it has in the effect of that principle, whence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that angels, being nearer to God, have a greater share than men, in the effects of the Divine goodness. Now Christ is the principle of grace, authoritatively as to His Godhead, instrumentally as to His humanity: whence (John 1:17) it is written: Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. But the Blessed Virgin Mary was nearest to Christ in His humanity: because He received His human nature from her. Therefore

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humanitatem, quia ex ea accepit humanam naturam. Et ideo prae ceteris maiorem debuit a Christo plenitudinem gratiae obtinere. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod unicuique a Deo datur gratia secundum hoc ad quod eligitur. Et quia Christus, inquantum est homo, ad hoc fuit praedestinatus et electus ut esset praedestinatus filius Dei in virtute sanctificationis, hoc fuit proprium sibi, ut haberet talem plenitudinem gratiae quod redundaret in omnes, secundum quod dicitur Ioan. I, de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus. Sed beata virgo Maria tantam gratiae obtinuit plenitudinem ut esset propinquissima auctori gratiae, ita quod eum qui est plenus omni gratia, in se reciperet; et, eum pariendo, quodammodo gratiam ad omnes derivaret. Ad secundum dicendum quod in rebus naturalibus primo quidem est perfectio dispositionis, puta cum materia est perfecte ad formam disposita. Secundo autem est perfectio formae, quae est potior, nam et ipse calor est perfectior qui provenit ex forma ignis, quam ille qui ad formam ignis disponebat. Tertio autem est perfectio finis, sicut cum ignis habet perfectissime suas qualitates, cum ad locum suum pervenerit. Et similiter in beata virgine fuit triplex perfectio gratiae. Prima quidem quasi dispositiva, per quam reddebatur idonea ad hoc quod esset mater Christi, et haec fuit perfectio sanctificationis. Secunda autem perfectio gratiae fuit in beata virgine ex praesentia filii Dei in eius utero incarnati. Tertia autem perfectio est finis, quam habet in gloria. Quod autem secunda perfectio sit potior quam prima, et tertia quam secunda, patet quidem, uno modo, per liberationem a malo. Nam primo, in sua sanctificatione fuit liberata a culpa originali; secundo, in conceptione filii Dei fuit totaliter mundata a fomite; tertio vero, in sui glorificatione fuit liberata etiam ab omni miseria. Alio modo, per ordinem ad bonum. Nam primo, in sua sanctificatione adepta est gratiam inclinantem eam ad bonum; in conceptione autem filii Dei consummata est ei gratia confirmans eam in bono; in sui vero glorificatione consummata est eius gratia perficiens eam in fruitione omnis boni. Ad tertium dicendum quod non est dubitandum quin beata virgo acceperit excellenter et donum sapientiae, et gratiam virtutum, et etiam gratiam prophetiae, sicut habuit Christus. Non tamen accepit ut haberet omnes usus harum et similium gratiarum, sicut habuit Christus, sed secundum quod conveniebat conditioni ipsius. Habuit enim usum sapientiae in contemplando, secundum illud Luc. II, Maria autem conservabat omnia verba haec, conferens in corde suo. Non autem habuit usum sapientiae quantum ad docendum, eo quod hoc non conveniebat sexui muliebri, secundum illud I Tim. II, docere autem mulieri non permitto. Miraculorum au-

Q. 27, A. 5

it was due to her to receive a greater fullness of grace than others. Reply Obj. 1: God gives to each one according to the purpose for which He has chosen him. And since Christ as man was predestined and chosen to be predestined the Son of God in power . . . of sanctification (Rom 1:4), it was proper to Him to have such a fullness of grace that it overflowed from Him into all, according to John 1:16: Of His fullness we have all received. Whereas the Blessed Virgin Mary received such a fullness of grace that she was nearest of all to the Author of grace; so that she received within her Him Who is full of all grace; and by bringing Him forth, she, in a manner, dispensed grace to all. Reply Obj. 2: In natural things at first there is perfection of disposition, for instance when matter is perfectly disposed for the form. Second, there is the perfection of the form; and this is the more excellent, for the heat that proceeds from the form of fire is more perfect than that which disposed to the form of fire. Third, there is the perfection of the end: for instance when fire has its qualities in the most perfect degree, having mounted to its own place. In like manner there was a threefold perfection of grace in the Blessed Virgin. The first was a kind of disposition, by which she was made worthy to be the mother of Christ: and this was the perfection of her sanctification. The second perfection of grace in the Blessed Virgin was through the presence of the Son of God Incarnate in her womb. The third perfection of the end is that which she has in glory. That the second perfection excels the first, and the third the second, appears (1) from the point of view of deliverance from evil. For at first in her sanctification she was delivered from original sin: afterwards, in the conception of the Son of God, she was entirely cleansed from the fomes: lastly, in her glorification she was also delivered from all affliction whatever. It appears (2) from the point of view of ordering to good. For at first in her sanctification she received grace inclining her to good: in the conception of the Son of God she received consummate grace confirming her in good; and in her glorification her grace was further consummated so as to perfect her in the enjoyment of all good. Reply Obj. 3: There is no doubt that the Blessed Virgin received in a high degree both the gift of wisdom and the grace of miracles and even of prophecy, just as Christ had them. But she did not so receive them, as to put them and such like graces to every use, as did Christ: but accordingly as it befitted her condition of life. For she had the use of wisdom in contemplation, according to Luke 2:19: But Mary kept all these words, pondering them in her heart. But she had not the use of wisdom as to teaching: since this befitted not the female sex, according to 1 Tim. 2:12: But I suffer not a woman to teach. The use of miracles did not become her while she lived: because at that time the Teaching

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tem usus sibi non competebat dum viveret, quia tunc temporis confirmanda erat doctrina Christi miraculis; et ideo soli Christo et eius discipulis, qui erant baiuli doctrinae Christi, conveniebat miracula facere. Propter quod etiam de Ioanne Baptista dicitur, Ioan. X, quod signum fecit nullum, ut scilicet omnes in Christo intenderent. Usum autem prophetiae habuit, ut patet in cantico quod fecit, magnificat anima mea dominum.

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of Christ was to be confirmed by miracles, and therefore it was befitting that Christ alone, and His disciples who were the bearers of His doctrine, should work miracles. Hence of John the Baptist it is written (John 10:41) that he did no sign; that is, in order that all might fix their attention on Christ. As to the use of prophecy, it is clear that she had it, from the canticle spoken by her: My soul doth magnify the Lord (Luke 1:46, etc.).

Article 6 Whether after Christ, it was proper to the Blessed Virgin to be sanctified in the womb? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sanctificari in utero, post Christum, proprium fuerit beatae virginis. Dictum est enim quod propter hoc beata virgo in utero fuit sanctificata, ut redderetur idonea ad hoc ut esset mater Dei. Sed hoc est proprium sibi. Ergo ipsa sola fuit sanctificata in utero. Praeterea, aliqui videntur propinquius accessisse ad Christum quam Ieremias et Ioannes Baptista, qui dicuntur sanctificati in utero. Nam Christus specialiter dicitur filius David et Abraham, propter promissionem eis specialiter factam de Christo. Isaias etiam expressissime de Christo prophetavit. Apostoli etiam cum ipso Christo conversati sunt. Nec tamen leguntur sanctificati in utero. Ergo etiam neque Ieremiae et Ioanni Baptistae convenit sanctificari in utero.

Praeterea, Iob de seipso dicit, Iob XXXI, ab infantia crevit mecum miseratio, et de utero egressa est mecum. Et tamen propter hoc non dicimus eum sanctificatum in utero. Ergo etiam neque Ioannem Baptistam et Ieremiam cogimur dicere sanctificatos in utero. Sed contra est quod de Ieremia dicitur, Ierem. I, antequam exires de ventre, sanctificavi te. Et de Ioanne Baptista dicitur, Luc. I, spiritu sancto replebitur adhuc ex utero matris suae. Respondeo dicendum quod Augustinus, in epistola ad Dardanum, dubie videtur loqui de horum sanctificatione in utero. Potuit enim exsultatio Ioannis in utero, ut ipse dicit, esse significatio rei tantae, scilicet quod mulier esset mater Dei, a maioribus cognoscendae, non a parvulo cognitae. Unde in Evangelio non dicitur, credidit infans in utero eius, sed, exsultavit, videmus autem exsultationem non solum parvulorum, sed etiam pecorum esse. Sed haec inusitata extitit, quia in utero. Et ideo, sicut solent miracula fieri, facta est divinitus in infante, non humanitus ab infante. Quamquam, etiam si usque adeo est in illo puero acceleratus usus rationis et voluntatis ut intra

Objection 1: It would seem that it was proper for the Blessed Virgin, after Christ, to be sanctified in the womb. For it has been said (A. 4) that the Blessed Virgin was sanctified in the womb, in order that she might be worthy to be the mother of God. But this is proper to her. Therefore she alone was sanctified in the womb. Obj. 2: Further, some men seem to have been more closely connected with Christ than Jeremias and John the Baptist, who are said to have been sanctified in the womb. For Christ is specially called the Son of David and of Abraham, by reason of the promise specially made to them concerning Christ. Isaias also prophesied of Christ in the most express terms. And the apostles were in converse with Christ Himself. And yet these are not mentioned as having been sanctified in the womb. Therefore it was not befitting that either Jeremias or John the Baptist should be sanctified in the womb. Obj. 3: Further, Job says of himself (Job 31:18): From my infancy mercy grew up with me; and it came out with me from womb. Nevertheless we do not for this reason say that he was sanctified in the womb. Neither therefore are we bound to say that Jeremias and John the Baptist were sanctified in the womb. On the contrary, It is written of Jeremias (Jer 1:5): Before thou camest forth out of the womb I sanctified thee. And of John the Baptist it is written (Luke 1:15): He shall be filled with the Holy Spirit, even from his mother’s womb. I answer that, Augustine (Ep. ad Dardan.) seems to speak dubiously of their (Jeremias’ and John the Baptist’s) sanctification in the womb. For the leaping of John in the womb might, as he says, signify the great truth, viz. that the woman was the mother of God, which was to be made known to his elders, though as yet unknown to the infant. Hence in the Gospel it is written, not that the infant in her womb believed, but that it ‘leaped’: and our eyes are witness that not only infants leap but also cattle. But this was unwonted because it was in the womb. And therefore, just as other miracles are wont to be done, this was done divinely, in the infant; not humanly by the infant. Perhaps also in this

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viscera materna iam posset agnoscere, credere et consenti- child the use of reason and will was so far accelerated that re, ad quod in aliis parvulis aetas expectatur ut possint, et while yet in his mother’s womb he was able to acknowledge, hoc in miraculis habendum puto divinae potentiae. believe, and consent, whereas in other children we have to wait for these things till they grow older: this again I count as a miraculous result of the divine power. Sed quia expresse in Evangelio dicitur quod spiritu But since it is expressly said (of John) in the Gospel that sancto replebitur adhuc ex utero matris suae; et de Iere- he shall be filled with the Holy Spirit, even from his mother’s mia expresse dicitur, antequam exires de vulva, sancti- womb; and of Jeremias, Before thou camest forth out of the ficavi te; asserendum videtur eos sanctificatos in utero, womb, I sanctified thee; it seems that we must needs assert quamvis in utero usum liberi arbitrii non habuerunt (de that they were sanctified in the womb, although, while in quo Augustinus quaestionem movet); sicut etiam pue- the womb, they had not the use of reason (which is the ri qui sanctificantur per Baptismum, non statim habent point discussed by Augustine); just as neither do children usum liberi arbitrii. enjoy the use of free will as soon as they are sanctified by baptism. Nec est credendum aliquos alios sanctificatos esNor are we to believe that any others, not mentioned by se in utero, de quibus Scriptura mentionem non facit. Scripture, were sanctified in the womb. For such privileges Quia huiusmodi privilegia gratiae, quae dantur aliqui- of grace, which are bestowed on some, outside the common bus praeter legem communem, ordinantur ad utilitatem law, are ordered for the salvation of others, according to 1 aliorum, secundum illud I Cor. XII, unicuique datur ma- Cor. 12:7: The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every nifestatio spiritus ad utilitatem, quae nulla proveniret ex man unto profit, which would not result from the sanctifisanctificatione aliquorum in utero, nisi Ecclesiae innote- cation of anyone unless it were made known to the Church. sceret. Et quamvis iudiciorum Dei non possit ratio assiAnd although it is not possible to assign a reason for gnari, quare scilicet huic et non alii hoc munus gra- God’s judgments, for instance, why He bestows such a grace tiae conferat, conveniens tamen videtur fuisse utrum- on one and not on another, yet there seems to be a certain que istorum sanctificari in utero, ad praefigurandam fittingness in both of these being sanctified in the womb, sanctificationem per Christum fiendam. Primo quidem, by their foreshadowing the sanctification which was to be per eius passionem, secundum illud Heb. ult., Iesus, ut effected through Christ. First, as to His Passion, according sanctificaret per suum sanguinem populum, extra por- to Heb. 13:12: Jesus, that He might sanctify the people by His tam passus est. Quam quidem passionem Ieremias verbis own blood, suffered without the gate: which Passion Jeremias et mysteriis apertissime praenuntiavit, et suis passio- foretold openly by words and by symbols, and most clearly nibus expressissime praefiguravit. Secundo, per Bapti- foreshadowed by his own sufferings. Second, as to His Bapsmum, I Cor. VI, sed abluti estis, sed sanctificati estis. Ad tism (1 Cor 6:11): But you are washed, but you are sanctified; quem quidem Baptismum Ioannes suo Baptismo homi- to which Baptism John prepared men by his baptism. nes praeparavit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod beata virgo, quae Reply Obj. 1: The blessed Virgin, who was chosen by fuit a Deo electa in matrem, ampliorem sanctificatio- God to be His Mother, received a fuller grace of sanctifinis gratiam obtinuit quam Ioannes Baptista et Ieremias, cation than John the Baptist and Jeremias, who were choqui sunt electi ut speciales praefiguratores sanctificatio- sen to foreshadow in a special way the sanctification efnis Christi. Cuius signum est quod beatae virgini prae- fected by Christ. A sign of this is that it was granted to the stitum est ut de cetero non peccaret mortaliter nec ve- Blessed Virgin thenceforward never to sin either mortally nialiter, aliis autem sanctificatis creditur praestitum esse or venially: whereas to the others who were thus sanctified ut de cetero non peccarent mortaliter, divina eos gratia it was granted thenceforward not to sin mortally, through protegente. the protection of God’s grace. Ad secundum dicendum quod quantum ad alia poReply Obj. 2: In other respects these saints might be tuerunt sancti esse Christo coniunctiores quam Ieremias more closely united to Christ than Jeremias and John the et Ioannes Baptista. Qui tamen fuerunt ei coniunctissi- Baptist. But the latter were most closely united to Him mi quantum ad expressam figuram sanctificationis ip- by clearly foreshadowing His sanctification, as explained sius, ut dictum est. above. Ad tertium dicendum quod miseratio de qua Iob Reply Obj. 3: The mercy of which Job speaks is not the loquitur, non significat virtutem infusam, sed quandam infused virtue; but a certain natural inclination to the act of inclinationem naturalem ad actum huius virtutis. that virtue.

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Question 28 The Virginity of the Mother of God Deinde considerandum est de virginitate matris Dei. We now have to consider the virginity of the Mother of Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. God; concerning which there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum fuerit virgo in concipiendo. (1) Whether she was a virgin in conceiving? Secundo, utrum fuerit virgo in partu. (2) Whether she was a virgin in His Birth? Tertio, utrum permanserit virgo post partum. (3) Whether she remained a virgin after His Birth? Quarto, utrum votum virginitatis emiserit. (4) Whether she took a vow of virginity?

Article 1 Whether the Mother of God was a virgin in conceiving Christ? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mater Dei non fuerit virgo in concipiendo Christum. Nulla enim proles quae habet patrem et matrem, ex virgine matre concipitur. Sed Christus non solum dicitur habere matrem, sed etiam patrem, dicitur enim Luc. II, erant pater et mater eius mirantes super his quae dicebantur de illo. Et infra eodem dicit, ecce, ego et pater tuus dolentes quaerebamus te. Ergo Christus non est conceptus ex virgine matre. Praeterea, Matth. I probatur quod Christus fuerit filius Abrahae et David, per hoc quod Ioseph ex David descendit. Quae quidem probatio nulla videtur esse si Ioseph pater Christi non fuisset. Ergo videtur quod mater Christi eum ex semine Ioseph conceperit. Et ita non videtur fuisse virgo in concipiendo. Praeterea, dicitur Galat. IV, misit Deus filium suum factum ex muliere. Mulier autem, consueto modo loquendi, dicitur quae est viro cognita. Ergo Christus non fuit conceptus ex virgine matre. Praeterea, eorum quae sunt eiusdem speciei, est idem modus generationis, quia generatio recipit speciem a termino, sicut et ceteri motus. Sed Christus fuit eiusdem speciei cum aliis hominibus, secundum illud Philipp. II, in similitudinem hominum factus, et habitu inventus ut homo. Cum ergo alii homines generentur ex commixtione maris et feminae, videtur quod etiam Christus simili modo fuerit generatus. Et ita non videtur fuisse conceptus ex virgine matre. Praeterea, quaelibet forma naturalis habet materiam sibi determinatam, extra quam esse non potest. Materia autem formae humanae videtur esse semen maris et feminae. Si ergo corpus Christi non fuerit conceptum ex semine maris et feminae, non vere fuisset corpus

Objection 1: It would seem that the Mother of God was not a virgin in conceiving Christ. For no child having father and mother is conceived by a virgin mother. But Christ is said to have had not only a mother, but also a father, according to Luke 2:33: His father and mother were wondering at those things which were spoken concerning Him: and further on (Luke 2:48) in the same chapter she says: Behold I and Thy father have sought Thee sorrowing. Therefore Christ was not conceived of a virgin mother. Obj. 2: Further (Matt 1) it is proved that Christ was the Son of Abraham and David, through Joseph being descended from David. But this proof would have availed nothing if Joseph were not the father of Christ. Therefore it seems that Christ’s Mother conceived Him of the seed of Joseph; and consequently that she was not a virgin in conceiving Him. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Gal 4:4): God sent His Son, made of a woman. But according to the customary mode of speaking, the term woman applies to one who is known of a man. Therefore Christ was not conceived by a virgin mother. Obj. 4: Further, things of the same species have the same mode of generation: since generation is specified by its terminus just as are other motions. But Christ belonged to the same species as other men, according to Phil. 2:7: Being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man. Since therefore other men are begotten of the mingling of male and female, it seems that Christ was begotten in the same manner; and that consequently He was not conceived of a virgin mother. Obj. 5: Further, every natural form has its determinate matter, outside which it cannot be. But the matter of human form appears to be the semen of male and female. If therefore Christ’s body was not conceived of the semen of male and female, it would not have been truly a human body;

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humanum, quod est inconveniens. Videtur igitur non fuisse conceptus ex virgine matre. Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae VII, ecce, virgo concipiet. Respondeo dicendum quod simpliciter confitendum est matrem Christi virginem concepisse, contrarium enim pertinet ad haeresim Ebionitarum et Cerinthi, qui Christum purum hominem arbitrantur, et de utroque sexu eum natum putaverunt. Quod Christus sit conceptus ex virgine, conveniens est propter quatuor. Primo, propter mittentis patris dignitatem conservandam. Cum enim Christus sit verus et naturalis Dei filius, non fuit conveniens quod alium patrem haberet quam Deum, ne Dei dignitas transferretur ad alium. Secundo, hoc fuit conveniens proprietati ipsius filii, qui mittitur. Qui quidem est verbum Dei. Verbum autem absque omni corruptione cordis concipitur, quinimmo cordis corruptio perfecti verbi conceptionem non patitur. Quia igitur caro sic fuit a verbo Dei assumpta ut esset caro verbi Dei, conveniens fuit quod etiam ipsa sine corruptione matris conciperetur. Tertio, hoc fuit conveniens dignitati humanitatis Christi, in qua locum peccatum habere non debuit, per quam peccatum mundi tollebatur, secundum illud Ioan. I, ecce, agnus Dei, scilicet innocens, qui tollit peccatum mundi. Non poterat autem esse quod in natura iam corrupta ex concubitu caro nasceretur sine infectione originalis peccati. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de nuptiis et concupiscentia, solus nuptialis concubitus ibi non fuit, scilicet in matrimonio Mariae et Ioseph, quia in carne peccati fieri non poterat sine ulla carnis concupiscentia, quae accidit ex peccato, sine qua concipi voluit qui futurus erat sine peccato. Quarto, propter ipsum finem incarnationis Christi, qui ad hoc fuit ut homines renascerentur in filios Dei, non ex voluntate carnis, neque ex voluntate viri, sed ex Deo, idest ex Dei virtute. Cuius rei exemplar apparere debuit in ipsa conceptione Christi. Unde Augustinus, in libro de sancta virginitate, oportebat caput nostrum, insigni miraculo, secundum corpus nasci de virgine, ut significaret membra sua de virgine Ecclesia secundum spiritum nascitura. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Beda dicit, super Luc., pater salvatoris appellatur Ioseph, non quod vere, iuxta Photinianos, pater fuerit ei, sed quod, ad famam Mariae conservandam, pater sit ab hominibus existimatus. Unde et Luc. III dicitur, ut putabatur, filius Ioseph. Vel, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono coniugali, eo modo pater Christi dicitur Ioseph quo et vir Mariae intelligitur, sine commixtione carnis, ipsa copulatione coniugii, multo videlicet coniunctius quam si esset aliun-

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which cannot be asserted. It seems therefore that He was not conceived of a virgin mother. On the contrary, It is written (Isa 7:14): Behold a virgin shall conceive. I answer that, We must confess simply that the Mother of Christ was a virgin in conceiving for to deny this belongs to the heresy of the Ebionites and Cerinthus, who held Christ to be a mere man, and maintained that He was born of both sexes. It is fitting for four reasons that Christ should be born of a virgin. First, in order to maintain the dignity or the Father Who sent Him. For since Christ is the true and natural Son of God, it was not fitting that He should have another father than God: lest the dignity belonging to God be transferred to another. Second, this was befitting to a property of the Son Himself, Who is sent. For He is the Word of God: and the word is conceived without any interior corruption: indeed, interior corruption is incompatible with perfect conception of the word. Since therefore flesh was so assumed by the Word of God, as to be the flesh of the Word of God, it was fitting that it also should be conceived without corruption of the mother. Third, this was befitting to the dignity of Christ’s humanity in which there could be no sin, since by it the sin of the world was taken away, according to John 1:29: Behold the Lamb of God (i.e., the Lamb without stain) who taketh away the sin of the world. Now it was not possible in a nature already corrupt, for flesh to be born from sexual intercourse without incurring the infection of original sin. Whence Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i): In that union, viz. the marriage of Mary and Joseph, the nuptial intercourse alone was lacking: because in sinful flesh this could not be without fleshly concupiscence which arises from sin, and without which He wished to be conceived, Who was to be without sin. Fourth, on account of the very end of the Incarnation of Christ, which was that men might be born again as sons of God, not of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God (John 1:13), i.e., of the power of God, of which fact the very conception of Christ was to appear as an exemplar. Whence Augustine says (De Sanct. Virg.): It behooved that our Head, by a notable miracle, should be born, after the flesh, of a virgin, that He might thereby signify that His members would be born, after the Spirit, of a virgin Church. Reply Obj. 1: As Bede says on Luke 1:33: Joseph is called the father of the Savior, not that he really was His father, as the Photinians pretended: but that he was considered by men to be so, for the safeguarding of Mary’s good name. Wherefore Luke adds (Luke 3:23): Being, as it was supposed, the son of Joseph. Or, according to Augustine (De Cons. Evang. ii), Joseph is called the father of Christ just as he is called the husband of Mary, without fleshly mingling, by the mere bond of marriage: being thereby united to Him much more closely than

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de adoptatus. Neque enim propterea non erat appellandus Ioseph pater Christi quia non eum concumbendo genuerat, quandoquidem pater esset etiam ei quem, non ex sua coniuge procreatum, aliunde adoptasset. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., cum Ioseph non sit pater domini salvatoris, ordo generationis eius usque ad Ioseph deducitur, primo quidem, quia non est consuetudinis Scripturarum ut mulierum in generationibus ordo texatur. Deinde, ex una tribu fuit Maria et Ioseph. Unde ex lege eam accipere cogebatur ut propinquam. Et, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de nuptiis et concupiscentia, fuit generationum series usque ad Ioseph perducenda, ne in illo coniugio virili sexui, utique potiori, fieret iniuria, cum veritati nihil deperiret, quia ex semine David et Ioseph erat et Maria. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Glossa dicit ibidem, mulierem pro femina posuit, more locutionis Hebraeorum. Usus enim Hebraeae locutionis mulieres dicit, non virginitate corruptas, sed feminas. Ad quartum dicendum quod ratio illa habet locum in his quae procedunt in esse per viam naturae, eo quod natura, sicut est determinata ad unum effectum, ita est etiam determinata ad unum modum producendi illum. Sed cum virtus supernaturalis divina possit in infinita, sicut non est determinata ad unum effectum, ita non est determinata ad modum producendi quemcumque effectum. Et ideo, sicut virtute divina fieri potuit ut primus homo de limo terrae formaretur, ita etiam fieri potuit ut divina virtute corpus Christi formaretur de virgine absque virili semine. Ad quintum dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in libro de Generat. Animal., semen maris non est sicut materia in conceptione animalis, sed solum sicut agens, sola autem femina materiam subministrat in conceptu. Unde per hoc quod semen maris defuit in conceptione corporis Christi, non sequitur quod defuerit ei debita materia. Si tamen semen maris esset materia fetus concepti in animalibus, manifestum tamen est quod non est materia permanens in eadem forma, sed materia transmutata. Et quamvis virtus naturalis non possit transmutare ad certam formam nisi determinatam materiam, virtus tamen divina, quae est infinita, potest transmutare omnem materiam in quamcumque formam. Unde, sicut transmutavit limum terrae in corpus Adae, ita in corpus Christi transmutare potuit materiam a matre ministratam, etiam si non esset sufficiens materia ad naturalem conceptum.

Q. 28, A. 1

if he were adopted from another family. Consequently that Christ was not begotten of Joseph by fleshly union is no reason why Joseph should not be called His father; since he would be the father even of an adopted son not born of his wife. Reply Obj. 2: As Jerome says on Matt. 1:18: Though Joseph was not the father of our Lord and Savior, the order of His genealogy is traced down to Joseph—first, because the Scriptures are not wont to trace the female line in genealogies: second, Mary and Joseph were of the same tribe; wherefore by law he was bound to take her as being of his kin. Likewise, as Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i), it was befitting to trace the genealogy down to Joseph, lest in that marriage any slight should be offered to the male sex, which is indeed the stronger: for truth suffered nothing thereby, since both Joseph and Mary were of the family of David. Reply Obj. 3: As the gloss says on this passage, the word ‘mulier’ is here used instead of ‘femina’, according to the custom of the Hebrew tongue: which applies the term signifying woman to those of the female sex who are virgins. Reply Obj. 4: This argument is true of those things which come into existence by the way of nature: since nature, just as it is fixed to one particular effect, so it is determinate to one mode of producing that effect. But as the supernatural power of God extends to the infinite: just as it is not determinate to one effect, so neither is it determinate to one mode of producing any effect whatever. Consequently, just as it was possible for the first man to be produced, by the Divine power, from the slime of the earth, so too was it possible for Christ’s body to be made, by Divine power, from a virgin without the seed of the male. Reply Obj. 5: According to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal. i, ii, iv), in conception the seed of the male is not by way of matter, but by way of agent: and the female alone supplies the matter. Wherefore though the seed of the male was lacking in Christ’s conception, it does not follow that due matter was lacking. But if the seed of the male were the matter of the fetus in animal conception, it is nevertheless manifest that it is not a matter remaining under one form, but subject to transformation. And though the natural power cannot transmute other than determinate matter to a determinate form; nevertheless the Divine power, which is infinite, can transmute all matter to any form whatsoever. Consequently, just as it transmuted the slime of the earth into Adam’s body, so could it transmute the matter supplied by His Mother into Christ’s body, even though it were not the sufficient matter for a natural conception.

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Article 2 Whether Christ’s Mother was a virgin in his birth? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mater Christi non fuerit virgo in partu. Dicit enim Ambrosius, super Luc., qui vulvam sanctificavit alienam ut nasceretur propheta, hic est qui aperuit matris suae vulvam ut immaculatus exiret. Sed apertio vulvae virginitatem excludit. Ergo mater Christi non fuit virgo in partu. Praeterea, nihil in mysterio Christi esse debuit per quod corpus eius phantasticum appareret. Sed hoc non videtur vero corpori, sed phantastico convenire, ut possit per clausa transire, eo quod duo corpora simul esse non possunt. Non igitur debuit ex matris utero clauso corpus Christi prodire. Et ita non decuit quod esset virgo in partu. Praeterea, sicut Gregorius dicit, in homilia octavarum Paschae, per hoc quod, ianuis clausis, ad discipulos post resurrectionem intravit dominus, ostendit corpus suum esse eiusdem naturae et alterius gloriae, et sic per clausa transire videtur ad gloriam corporis pertinere. Sed corpus Christi in sua conceptione non fuit gloriosum, sed passibile, habens similitudinem carnis peccati, ut apostolus dicit, Rom. VIII. Non ergo exivit per virginis uterum clausum. Sed contra est quod in quodam sermone Ephesini Concilii dicitur, natura post partum nescit ulterius virginem. Gratia vero et parientem ostendit, et matrem fecit, et virginitati non nocuit. Fuit ergo mater Christi virgo etiam in partu. Respondeo dicendum quod absque omni dubio asserendum est matrem Christi etiam in partu virginem fuisse, nam propheta non solum dicit, ecce, virgo concipiet; sed addit, et pariet filium. Et hoc quidem conveniens fuit propter tria. Primo quidem, quia hoc competebat proprietati eius qui nascebatur, quod est verbum Dei. Nam verbum non solum in corde absque corruptione concipitur, sed etiam absque corruptione ex corde procedit. Unde, ut ostenderetur quod illud corpus esset ipsius verbi Dei, conveniens fuit ut de incorrupto virginis utero nasceretur. Unde in sermone quodam Ephesini Concilii legitur, quae parit carnem puram, a virginitate cessat. Sed quia natum est carne verbum, Deus custodit virginitatem, seipsum ostendens per hoc verbum. Neque enim nostrum verbum, cum paritur, corrumpit mentem, neque Deus verbum substantiale, partum eligens, peremit virginitatem. Secundo, hoc est conveniens quantum ad effectum incarnationis Christi. Nam ad hoc venit ut nostram cor-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s Mother was not a virgin in His Birth. For Ambrose says on Luke 2:23: He who sanctified a strange womb, for the birth of a prophet, He it is who opened His Mother’s womb, that He might go forth unspotted. But opening of the womb excludes virginity. Therefore Christ’s Mother was not a virgin in His Birth. Obj. 2: Further, nothing should have taken place in the mystery of Christ, which would make His body to seem unreal. Now it seems to pertain not to a true but to an unreal body, to be able to go through a closed passage; since two bodies cannot be in one place at the same time. It was therefore unfitting that Christ’s body should come forth from His Mother’s closed womb: and consequently that she should remain a virgin in giving birth to Him. Obj. 3: Further, as Gregory says in the Homily for the octave of Easter, that by entering after His Resurrection where the disciples were gathered, the doors being shut, our Lord showed that His body was the same in nature but differed in glory: so that it seems that to go through a closed passage pertains to a glorified body. But Christ’s body was not glorified in its conception, but was passible, having the likeness of sinful flesh, as the Apostle says (Rom 8:3). Therefore He did not come forth through the closed womb of the Virgin. On the contrary, In a sermon of the Council of Ephesus (P. III, Cap. ix) it is said: After giving birth, nature knows not a virgin: but grace enhances her fruitfulness, and effects her motherhood, while in no way does it injure her virginity. Therefore Christ’s Mother was a virgin also in giving birth to Him. I answer that, Without any doubt whatever we must assert that the Mother of Christ was a virgin even in His Birth: for the prophet says not only: Behold a virgin shall conceive, but adds: and shall bear a son. This indeed was befitting for three reasons. First, because this was in keeping with a property of Him whose Birth is in question, for He is the Word of God. For the word is not only conceived in the mind without corruption, but also proceeds from the mind without corruption. Wherefore in order to show that body to be the body of the very Word of God, it was fitting that it should be born of a virgin incorrupt. Whence in the sermon of the Council of Ephesus (quoted above) we read: Whosoever brings forth mere flesh, ceases to be a virgin. But since she gave birth to the Word made flesh, God safeguarded her virginity so as to manifest His Word, by which Word He thus manifested Himself: for neither does our word, when brought forth, corrupt the mind; nor does God, the substantial Word, deigning to be born, destroy virginity. Second, this is fitting as regards the effect of Christ’s Incarnation: since He came for this purpose, that He might

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ruptionem tolleret. Unde non fuit conveniens ut virginitatem matris nascendo corrumperet. Unde Augustinus dicit, in quodam sermone de nativitate domini, fas non erat ut per eius adventum violaretur integritas, qui venerat sanare corrupta. Tertio fuit conveniens, ne matris honorem nascendo diminueret qui parentes praeceperat honorandos. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Ambrosius dicit hoc exponens illud quod Evangelista de lege induxit, omne masculinum adaperiens vulvam sanctum domino vocabitur. Quod quidem, ut Beda dicit, consuetae nativitatis more loquitur, non quod dominus sacri ventris hospitium, quod ingressus sanctificaverat, egressus devirginasse credendus sit. Unde illa aperitio non significat reserationem claustri pudoris virginei, sed solum exitum prolis de utero matris. Ad secundum dicendum quod ita Christus voluit veritatem sui corporis demonstrare quod etiam simul eius divinitas declararetur. Et ideo permiscuit mira humilibus. Unde, ut corpus eius verum ostenderetur, nascitur ex femina. Sed ut ostenderetur eius divinitas, nascitur ex virgine, talis enim partus decet Deum, ut Ambrosius dicit, in hymno nativitatis. Ad tertium dicendum quod quidam dixerunt Christum in sua nativitate dotem subtilitatis assumpsisse, quando exivit de clauso virginis utero; et quando ambulavit siccis pedibus super mare, dicunt eum assumpsisse dotem agilitatis. Sed hoc non convenit his quae supra determinata sunt. Huiusmodi enim dotes corporis gloriosi proveniunt ex redundantia gloriae animae ad corpus, ut infra dicetur, cum tractabitur de corporibus gloriosis. Dictum est autem supra quod Christus ante passionem permittebat carni suae agere et pati quae propria, nec fiebat talis redundantia gloriae ab anima ad corpus. Et ideo dicendum est quod omnia ista facta sunt miraculose per virtutem divinam. Unde Augustinus, super Ioan., moli corporis ubi divinitas erat, ostia clausa non obstiterunt. Ille quippe, non eis apertis, intrare potuit, quo nascente virginitas matris inviolata permansit. Et Dionysius dicit, in quadam epistola, quod Christus super hominem operabatur ea quae sunt hominis, et hoc monstrat virgo supernaturaliter concipiens, et aqua instabilis terrenorum pedum sustinens gravitatem.

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take away our corruption. Wherefore it is unfitting that in His Birth He should corrupt His Mother’s virginity. Thus Augustine says in a sermon on the Nativity of Our Lord: It was not right that He who came to heal corruption, should by His advent violate integrity. Third, it was fitting that He Who commanded us to honor our father and mother should not in His Birth lessen the honor due to His Mother. Reply Obj. 1: Ambrose says this in expounding the evangelist’s quotation from the Law: Every male opening the womb shall be called holy to the Lord. This, says Bede, is said in regard to the wonted manner of birth; not that we are to believe that our Lord in coming forth violated the abode of her sacred womb, which His entrance therein had hallowed. Wherefore the opening here spoken of does not imply the unlocking of the enclosure of virginal purity; but the mere coming forth of the infant from the maternal womb. Reply Obj. 2: Christ wished so to show the reality of His body, as to manifest His Godhead at the same time. For this reason He mingled wondrous with lowly things. Wherefore, to show that His body was real, He was born of a woman. But in order to manifest His Godhead, He was born of a virgin, for such a Birth befits a God, as Ambrose says in the Christmas hymn. Reply Obj. 3: Some have held that Christ, in His Birth, assumed the gift of subtlety, when He came forth from the closed womb of a virgin; and that He assumed the gift of agility when with dry feet He walked on the sea. But this is not consistent with what has been decided above (Q. 14). For these gifts of a glorified body result from an overflow of the soul’s glory on to the body, as we shall explain further on, in treating of glorified bodies (Suppl., Q. 82): and it has been said above (Q. 13, A. 3, ad 1; Q. 16, A. 1, ad 2) that before His Passion Christ allowed His flesh to do and to suffer what was proper to it (Damascene, De Fide Orth. iii): nor was there such an overflow of glory from His soul on to His body. We must therefore say that all these things took place miraculously by Divine power. Whence Augustine says (Sup. Joan. Tract. 121): To the substance of a body in which was the Godhead closed doors were no obstacle. For truly He had power to enter in by doors not open, in Whose Birth His Mother’s virginity remained inviolate. And Dionysius says in an epistle (Ad Caium iv) that Christ excelled man in doing that which is proper to man: this is shown in His supernatural conception, of a virgin, and in the unstable waters bearing the weight of earthly feet.

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Article 3 Whether Christ’s Mother remained a virgin after his birth? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod mater Christi non permanserit virgo post partum. Dicitur enim Matth. I, antequam convenirent Ioseph et Maria, inventa est in utero habens de spiritu sancto. Non autem Evangelista hoc diceret, antequam convenirent, nisi certus esset de conventuris, quia nemo dicit de non pransuro, antequam pranderet. Ergo videtur quod beata virgo quandoque convenit carnali copula cum Ioseph. Et ita non permansit virgo post partum.

Praeterea, ibidem subditur, ex verbis Angeli loquentis ad Ioseph, ne timeas accipere Mariam coniugem tuam. Coniugium autem consummatur per carnalem copulam. Ergo videtur quod quandoque carnalis copula intervenit inter Mariam et Ioseph. Et ita videtur quod non permansit virgo post partum. Praeterea, ibidem post pauca subditur, et accepit coniugem suam, et non cognoscebat eam donec peperit filium suum primogenitum. Hoc autem adverbium donec consuevit determinatum tempus signare, quo completo, fiat id quod usque ad illud tempus non fiebat. Verbum autem cognoscendi ibi ad coitum refertur, sicut et Gen. IV dicitur quod Adam cognovit uxorem suam. Ergo videtur quod post partum beata virgo fuit a Ioseph cognita. Ergo videtur quod non permanserit virgo post partum.

Praeterea, primogenitus non potest dici nisi qui habeat fratres subsequentes, unde Rom. VIII, quos praescivit, et praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis filii sui, ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus. Sed Evangelista nominat Christum primogenitum matris eius. Ergo alios filios habuit post Christum. Et ita videtur quod mater Christi non fuerit virgo post partum. Praeterea, Ioan. II dicitur, post haec descendit Capharnaum ipse, scilicet Christus, et mater et fratres eius. Sed fratres dicuntur qui ex eodem parente geniti sunt. Ergo videtur quod beata virgo habuerit alios filios post Christum. Praeterea, Matth. XXVII dicitur, erant ibi, scilicet iuxta crucem Christi, mulieres multae a longe, quae secutae erant Iesum a Galilaea, ministrantes ei, inter quas erat Maria Magdalene, et Maria Iacobi et Ioseph mater, et mater filiorum Zebedaei. Videtur autem haec Maria quae hic dicitur Iacobi et Ioseph mater, esse etiam mater Christi, dicitur enim Ioan. XIX quod stabat iuxta crucem Iesu

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s Mother did not remain a virgin after His Birth. For it is written (Matt 1:18): Before Joseph and Mary came together, she was found with child of the Holy Spirit. Now the Evangelist would not have said this—before they came together—unless he were certain of their subsequent coming together; for no one says of one who does not eventually dine before he dines (cf. Jerome, Contra Helvid.). It seems, therefore, that the Blessed Virgin subsequently had intercourse with Joseph; and consequently that she did not remain a virgin after (Christ’s) Birth. Obj. 2: Further, in the same passage (Matt 1:20) are related the words of the angel to Joseph: Fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife. But marriage is consummated by carnal intercourse. Therefore it seems that this must have at some time taken place between Mary and Joseph: and that, consequently she did not remain a virgin after (Christ’s) Birth. Obj. 3: Further, again in the same passage a little further on (Matt 1:24, 25) we read: And (Joseph) took unto him his wife; and he knew her not till she brought forth her first-born Son. Now this conjunction till is wont to designate a fixed time, on the completion of which that takes place which previously had not taken place. And the verb knew refers here to knowledge by intercourse (cf. Jerome, Contra Helvid.); just as (Gen 4:1) it is said that Adam knew his wife. Therefore it seems that after (Christ’s) Birth, the Blessed Virgin was known by Joseph; and, consequently, that she did not remain a virgin after the Birth (of Christ). Obj. 4: Further, first-born can only be said of one who has brothers afterwards: wherefore (Rom 8:29): Whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son; that He might be the first-born among many brethren. But the evangelist calls Christ the firstborn by His Mother. Therefore she had other children after Christ. And therefore it seems that Christ’s Mother did not remain a virgin after His Birth. Obj. 5: Further, it is written (John 2:12): After this He went down to Capharnaum, He—that is, Christ—and His Mother and His brethren. But brethren are those who are begotten of the same parent. Therefore it seems that the Blessed Virgin had other sons after Christ. Obj. 6: Further, it is written (Matt 27:55, 56): There were there—that is, by the cross of Christ—many women afar off, who had followed Jesus from Galilee, ministering unto Him; among whom was Mary Magdalen, and Mary the mother of James and Joseph, and the mother of the sons of Zebedee. Now this Mary who is called the mother of James and Joseph seems to have been also the Mother of Christ; for it is writ-

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Maria, mater eius. Ergo videtur quod mater Christi non ten (John 19:25) that there stood by the cross of Jesus, Mary permanserit virgo post partum. His Mother. Therefore it seems that Christ’s Mother did not remain a virgin after His Birth. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ezech. XLIV, porta On the contrary, It is written (Ezek 44:2): This gate haec clausa erit, et non aperietur, et vir non transibit per shall be shut, it shall not be opened, and no man shall pass eam, quoniam dominus Deus Israel ingressus est per eam. through it; because the Lord the God of Israel hath entered Quod exponens Augustinus, in quodam sermone, dicit, in by it. Expounding these words, Augustine says in a serquid est porta in domo domini clausa, nisi quod Maria mon (De Annunt. Dom. iii): What means this closed gate in semper erit intacta? Et quid est, homo non transibit per the House of the Lord, except that Mary is to be ever invieam, nisi quod Ioseph non cognoscet eam? Et quid est, do- olate? What does it mean that ‘no man shall pass through minus solus intrat et egreditur per eam, nisi quod Spiritus it,’ save that Joseph shall not know her? And what is this— Sanctus impraegnabit eam, et Angelorum dominus nasce- ‘The Lord alone enters in and goeth out by it’—except that the tur per eam? Et quid est, clausa erit in aeternum, nisi quod Holy Spirit shall impregnate her, and that the Lord of angels Maria virgo est ante partum, et virgo in partu, et virgo shall be born of her? And what means this—‘it shall be shut post partum? for evermore’—but that Mary is a virgin before His Birth, a virgin in His Birth, and a virgin after His Birth? Respondeo dicendum quod absque omni dubio deI answer that, Without any hesitation we must abtestandus est error Helvidii, qui dicere praesumpsit ma- hor the error of Helvidius, who dared to assert that Christ’s trem Christi a Ioseph post partum esse carnaliter cogni- Mother, after His Birth, was carnally known by Joseph, and tam, et alios filios genuisse. Hoc enim, primo, derogat bore other children. For, in the first place, this is derogaChristi perfectioni, qui, sicut secundum divinam natu- tory to Christ’s perfection: for as He is in His Godhead the ram unigenitus est patris, tanquam perfectus per om- Only-Begotten of the Father, being thus His Son in every nia filius eius, ita etiam decuit ut esset unigenitus matris, respect perfect, so it was becoming that He should be the tanquam perfectissimum germen eius. Only-begotten son of His Mother, as being her perfect offspring. Secundo, hic error iniuriam facit spiritui sancto, Second, this error is an insult to the Holy Spirit, whose cuius sacrarium fuit uterus virginalis, in quo carnem shrine was the virginal womb, wherein He had formed the Christi formavit, unde non decebat ut de cetero violare- flesh of Christ: wherefore it was unbecoming that it should tur per commixtionem virilem. be desecrated by intercourse with man. Tertio, hoc derogat dignitati et sanctitati matris Dei, Third, this is derogatory to the dignity and holiness of quae ingratissima videretur si tanto filio contenta non God’s Mother: for thus she would seem to be most ungrateesset; et si virginitatem, quae in ea miraculose conserva- ful, were she not content with such a Son; and were she, of ta fuerat, sponte perdere vellet per carnis concubitum. her own accord, by carnal intercourse to forfeit that virginity which had been miraculously preserved in her. Quarto, etiam ipsi Ioseph esset ad maximam praeFourth, it would be tantamount to an imputation of exsumptionem imputandum, si eam quam, revelante An- treme presumption in Joseph, to assume that he attempted gelo, de spiritu sancto Deum concepisse cognoverat, pol- to violate her whom by the angel’s revelation he knew to luere attentasset. have conceived by the Holy Spirit. Et ideo simpliciter est asserendum quod mater Dei, We must therefore simply assert that the Mother of God, sicut virgo concepit et virgo peperit, ita etiam virgo post as she was a virgin in conceiving Him and a virgin in giving partum in sempiternum permanserit. Him birth, so did she remain a virgin ever afterwards. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut HieronyReply Obj. 1: As Jerome says (Contra Helvid. i): Almus dicit, in libro contra Helvidium, intelligendum est though this particle ‘before’ often indicates a subsequent quod haec praepositio ante, licet saepe consequentia in- event, yet we must observe that it not infrequently points dicet, tamen nonnunquam ea tantum quae prius cogita- merely to some thing previously in the mind: nor is there need bantur, ostendit, nec est necesse ut cogitata fiant, cum ideo that what was in the mind take place eventually, since somealiud intervenerit, ne ea quae cogitata sunt, fierent. Sicut, thing may occur to prevent its happening. Thus if a man say: si aliquis dicat, antequam in portu pranderem, navigavi, ‘Before I dined in the port, I set sail,’ we do not understand non intelligitur quod in portu prandeat postquam naviga- him to have dined in port after he set sail: but that his mind verit, sed quia cogitabatur in portu pransurus. Et simili- was set on dining in port. In like manner the evangelist says: ter Evangelista dicit, antequam convenirent, inventa est Before they came together Mary was found with child, of Maria in utero habens de spiritu sancto, non quia postea the Holy Spirit, not that they came together afterwards: but convenerint, sed quia, dum viderentur conventuri, prae- that, when it seemed that they would come together, this

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venit conceptio per spiritum sanctum, ex quo factum est ut ulterius non convenirent. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de nuptiis et concupiscentia, coniux vocatur mater Dei ex prima desponsationis fide, quam concubitu non cognoverat, nec fuerat cogniturus. Ut enim Ambrosius dicit, super Luc., non virginitatis ereptio, sed coniugii testificatio nuptiarum celebratio declaratur. Ad tertium dicendum quod quidam dixerunt hoc non esse intelligendum de cognitione carnis, sed de cognitione notitiae. Dicit enim Chrysostomus quod non cognovit eam Ioseph, antequam pareret, cuius fuerit dignitatis, sed, postquam peperit, tunc cognovit eam. Quia per ipsius prolem speciosior et dignior facta fuerat quam totus mundus, quia quem totus mundus capere non poterat, in angusto uteri sui sola suscepit. Quidam vero hoc referunt ad notitiam visus. Sicut enim Moysi cum Deo colloquentis glorificata est facies, ut non possent intendere in eum filii Israel; sic Maria, claritate virtutis altissimi obumbrata, cognosci non poterat a Ioseph, donec pareret. Post partum autem a Ioseph agnita invenitur, specie faciei, non tactu libidinis. Hieronymus autem concedit hoc esse intelligendum de cognitione coitus. Sed dicit quod usque, vel donec, in Scripturis dupliciter potest intelligi. Quandoque enim designat certum tempus, secundum illud Galat. III, propter transgressionem lex posita est, donec veniret semen cui promiserat. Quandoque vero signat infinitum tempus, secundum illud Psalmi, oculi nostri ad dominum Deum nostrum, donec misereatur nostri; ex quo non est intelligendum quod post impetratam misericordiam oculi avertantur a Deo. Et secundum hunc modum loquendi, significantur ea de quibus posset dubitari si scripta non fuissent, cetera vero nostrae intelligentiae derelinquuntur. Et secundum hoc, Evangelista dicit matrem Dei non esse cognitam a viro usque ad partum, ut multo magis intelligamus cognitam non fuisse post partum. Ad quartum dicendum quod mos divinarum Scripturarum est ut primogenitum vocent non solum eum quem fratres sequuntur, sed eum qui primus natus sit. Alioquin, si non est primogenitus nisi quem sequuntur fratres, tandiu secundum legem primogenita non debentur, quandiu et alia fuerint procreata. Quod patet esse falsum, cum infra unum mensem primogenita redimi mandentur secundum legem. Ad quintum dicendum quod quidam, sicut dicit Hieronymus, super Matth., de alia uxore Ioseph fratres domini suspicantur. Nos autem fratres domini, non filios Ioseph, sed consobrinos salvatoris, Mariae materterae filios intelligimus. Quatuor enim modis in Scriptura fratres dicuntur, scilicet natura, gente, cognatione et af-

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was forestalled through her conceiving by the Holy Spirit, the result being that afterwards they did not come together. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i): The Mother of God is called (Joseph’s) wife from the first promise of her espousals, whom he had not known nor ever was to know by carnal intercourse. For, as Ambrose says on Luke 1:27: The fact of her marriage is declared, not to insinuate the loss of virginity, but to witness to the reality of the union. Reply Obj. 3: Some have said that this is not to be understood of carnal knowledge, but of acquaintance. Thus Chrysostom says that Joseph did not know her, until she gave birth, being unaware of her dignity: but after she had given birth, then did he know her. Because by reason of her child she surpassed the whole world in beauty and dignity: since she alone in the narrow abode of her womb received Him Whom the world cannot contain. Others again refer this to knowledge by sight. For as, while Moses was speaking with God, his face was so bright that the children of Israel could not steadfastly behold it; so Mary, while being overshadowed by the brightness of the power of the Most High, could not be gazed on by Joseph, until she gave birth. But afterwards she is acknowledged by Joseph, by looking on her face, not by lustful contact. Jerome, however, grants that this is to be understood of knowledge by intercourse; but he observes that before or until has a twofold sense in Scripture. For sometimes it indicates a fixed time, as Gal. 3:19: The law was set because of transgressions, until the seed should come, to whom He made the promise. On the other hand, it sometimes indicates an indefinite time, as in Ps. 122:2: Our eyes are unto the Lord our God, until He have mercy on us; from which it is not to be gathered that our eyes are turned from God as soon as His mercy has been obtained. In this sense those things are indicated of which we might doubt if they had not been written down: while others are left out to be supplied by our understanding. Thus the evangelist says that the Mother of God was not known by her husband until she gave birth, that we may be given to understand that still less did he know her afterwards (Adversus Helvid. v). Reply Obj. 4: The Scriptures are wont to designate as the first-born, not only a child who is followed by others, but also the one that is born first. Otherwise, if a child were not first-born unless followed by others, the first-fruits would not be due as long as there was no further produce: which is clearly false, since according to the law the first-fruits had to be redeemed within a month (Num 18:16). Reply Obj. 5: Some, as Jerome says on Matt. 12:49, 50, suppose that the brethren of the Lord were Joseph’s sons by another wife. But we understand the brethren of the Lord to be not sons of Joseph, but cousins of the Savior, the sons of Mary, His Mother’s sister. For Scripture speaks of brethren in four senses; namely, those who are united by being of the same par-

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fectu. Unde fratres domini dicti sunt, non secundum naturam, quasi ab eadem matre nati, sed secundum cognationem, quasi consanguinei eius existentes. Ioseph autem, sicut Hieronymus dicit, contra Helvidium, magis credendus est virgo permansisse, quia aliam uxorem habuisse non scribitur, et fornicatio in sanctum virum non cadit. Ad sextum dicendum quod Maria quae dicitur Iacobi et Ioseph mater, non intelligitur esse mater domini, quae in Evangelio non consuevit nominari nisi cum cognominatione huius dignitatis, quod sit mater Iesu. Haec autem Maria intelligitur esse uxor Alphaei, cuius filius est Iacobus minor, qui dictus est frater domini.

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ents, of the same nation, of the same family, by common affection. Wherefore the brethren of the Lord are so called, not by birth, as being born of the same mother; but by relationship, as being blood-relations of His. But Joseph, as Jerome says (Contra Helvid. ix), is rather to be believed to have remained a virgin, since he is not said to have had another wife, and a holy man does not live otherwise than chastely. Reply Obj. 6: Mary who is called the mother of James and Joseph is not to be taken for the Mother of our Lord, who is not wont to be named in the Gospels save under this designation of her dignity—the Mother of Jesus. This Mary is to be taken for the wife of Alphaeus, whose son was James the less, known as the brother of the Lord (Gal 1:19).

Article 4 Whether the Mother of God took a vow of virginity? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mater Dei virginitatem non voverit. Dicitur enim Deut. VII, non erit apud te sterilis utriusque sexus. Sterilitas autem sequitur virginitatem. Ergo servatio virginitatis erat contra praeceptum veteris legis. Sed adhuc lex vetus habebat statum antequam Christus nasceretur. Ergo non potuit licite beata virgo virginitatem vovere pro tempore illo. Praeterea, apostolus, I Cor. VII, dicit, de virginibus autem praeceptum domini non habeo, consilium autem do. Sed perfectio consiliorum a Christo debuit inchoari, qui est finis legis, ut apostolus dicit, Rom. X. Non ergo conveniens fuit quod virgo votum virginitatis emitteret. Praeterea, Glossa Hieronymi dicit, I Tim. V, quod voventibus virginitatem non solum nubere, sed etiam velle nubere damnabile est. Sed mater Christi nullum peccatum damnabile commisit, ut supra habitum est. Cum ergo desponsata fuerit, ut habetur Luc. I, videtur quod ipsa virginitatis votum non emiserit. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de sancta virginitate, annuntianti Angelo Maria respondit, quomodo fiet istud, quoniam virum non cognosco? Quod profecto non diceret, nisi se virginem Deo ante vovisset. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in secunda parte habitum est, perfectionis opera magis sunt laudabilia si ex voto celebrantur. Virginitas autem in matre Dei praecipue debuit pollere, ut ex supra dictis rationibus patet. Et ideo conveniens fuit ut virginitas eius ex voto esset Deo consecrata. Verum quia tempore legis oportebat generationi insistere tam mulieres quam viros, quia secundum carnis originem cultus Dei propagabatur antequam ex illo populo Christus nasceretur, mater Dei non credi-

Objection 1: It would seem that the Mother of God did not take a vow of virginity. For it is written (Deut 7:14): No one shall be barren among you of either sex. But sterility is a consequence of virginity. Therefore the keeping of virginity was contrary to the commandment of the Old Law. But before Christ was born the old law was still in force. Therefore at that time the Blessed Virgin could not lawfully take a vow of virginity. Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor 7:25): Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord; but I give counsel. But the perfection of the counsels was to take its beginning from Christ, who is the end of the Law, as the Apostle says (Rom 10:4). It was not therefore becoming that the Virgin should take a vow of virginity. Obj. 3: Further, the gloss of Jerome says on 1 Tim. 5:12, that for those who are vowed to virginity, it is reprehensible not only to marry, but also to desire to be married. But the Mother of Christ committed no sin for which she could be reprehended, as stated above (Q. 27, A. 4). Since therefore she was espoused, as related by Luke 1:27 it seems that she did not take a vow of virginity. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Sanct. Virg. iv): Mary answered the announcing angel: ‘How shall this be done, because I know not man?’ She would not have said this unless she had already vowed her virginity to God. I answer that, As we have stated in the Second Part (II-II, Q. 88, A. 6), works of perfection are more praiseworthy when performed in fulfilment of a vow. Now it is clear that for reasons already given (AA. 1, 2, 3) virginity had a special place in the Mother of God. It was therefore fitting that her virginity should be consecrated to God by vow. Nevertheless because, while the Law was in force both men and women were bound to attend to the duty of begetting, since the worship of God was spread according to carnal

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tur, antequam desponsaretur Ioseph, absolute virginitatem vovisse, licet eam in desiderio habuerit, super hoc tamen voluntatem suam divino commisit arbitrio. Postmodum vero, accepto sponso, secundum quod mores illius temporis exigebant, simul cum eo votum virginitatis emisit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia videbatur esse lege prohibitum non dare operam ad relinquendum semen super terram, ideo non simpliciter virginitatem vovit Dei genitrix, sed sub conditione, si Deo placeret. Postquam autem ei innotuit hoc esse Deo acceptum, absolute vovit, antequam ab Angelo annuntiaretur. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut gratiae plenitudo perfecte quidem fuit in Christo, et tamen aliqua eius inchoatio praecessit in matre; ita etiam observatio consiliorum, quae per gratiam Dei fit, perfecte quidem incoepit in Christo, sed aliquo modo fuit inchoata in virgine matre eius. Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum illud apostoli est intelligendum de illis qui absolute castitatem vovent. Quod quidem mater Dei non fecit antequam Ioseph desponsaretur. Sed post desponsationem, ex communi voluntate, simul cum sponso suo votum virginitatis emisit.

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origin, until Christ was born of that people; the Mother of God is not believed to have taken an absolute vow of virginity, before being espoused to Joseph, although she desired to do so, yet yielding her own will to God’s judgment. Afterwards, however, having taken a husband, according as the custom of the time required, together with him she took a vow of virginity. Reply Obj. 1: Because it seemed to be forbidden by the law not to take the necessary steps for leaving a posterity on earth, therefore the Mother of God did not vow virginity absolutely, but under the condition that it were pleasing to God. When, however, she knew that it was acceptable to God, she made the vow absolute, before the angel’s Annunciation. Reply Obj. 2: Just as the fullness of grace was in Christ perfectly, yet some beginning of the fullness preceded in His Mother; so also the observance of the counsels, which is an effect of God’s grace, began its perfection in Christ, but was begun after a fashion in His Virgin Mother. Reply Obj. 3: These words of the Apostle are to be understood of those who vow chastity absolutely. Christ’s Mother did not do this until she was espoused to Joseph. After her espousals, however, by their common consent she took a vow of virginity together with her spouse.

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Question 29 The Espousals of the Mother of God Deinde considerandum est de desponsatione matris We now consider the espousals of God’s Mother: conDei. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. cerning which two points arise for inquiry: Primo, utrum Christus debuerit de desponsata (1) Whether Christ should have been born of an nasci. espoused virgin? Secundo, utrum fuerit verum matrimonium inter (2) Whether there was true marriage between our matrem domini et Ioseph. Lord’s Mother and Joseph?

Article 1 Whether Christ should have been born of an espoused virgin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non debuerit de virgine desponsata nasci. Desponsatio enim ad carnalem copulam ordinatur. Sed mater domini nunquam voluit carnali viri copula uti, quia hoc derogaret virginitati mentis ipsius. Ergo non debuit esse desponsata. Praeterea, quod Christus ex virgine nasceretur, miraculum fuit, unde Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Volusianum, ipsa Dei virtus per inviolata matris virginea viscera membra infantis eduxit, quae per clausa ostia membra iuvenis introduxit. Huius si ratio quaeritur, non erit mirabile, si exemplum poscitur, non erit singulare. Sed miracula, quae fiunt ad confirmationem fidei, debent esse manifesta. Cum igitur per desponsationem hoc miraculum fuerit obumbratum, videtur non fuisse conveniens quod Christus de desponsata nasceretur. Praeterea, Ignatius martyr, ut dicit Hieronymus, super Matth., hanc causam assignat desponsationis matris Dei, ut partus eius celaretur Diabolo, dum eum putat non de virgine, sed de uxore generatum. Quae quidem causa nulla esse videtur. Tum quia Diabolus ea quae corporaliter fiunt perspicacitate sensus cognoscit. Tum quia per multa evidentia signa postmodum Daemones aliqualiter Christum cognoverunt, unde dicitur Marc. I, quod homo in spiritu immundo exclamavit, dicens, quid nobis et tibi, Iesu Nazarene? Venisti perdere nos? Scio quia sis sanctus Dei. Non ergo videtur conveniens fuisse quod mater Dei fuisset desponsata. Praeterea, aliam rationem assignat Hieronymus, ne lapidaretur mater Dei a Iudaeis sicut adultera. Haec autem ratio nulla esse videtur, si enim non esset desponsata, non posset de adulterio condemnari. Et ita non vi-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have been born of an espoused virgin. For espousals are ordered to carnal intercourse. But our Lord’s Mother never wished to have carnal intercourse with her husband; because this would be derogatory to the virginity of her mind. Therefore she should not have been espoused. Obj. 2: Further, that Christ was born of a virgin was miraculous, whence Augustine says (Ep. ad Volus. cxxxvii): This same power of God brought forth the infant’s limbs out of the virginal womb of His inviolate Mother, by which in the vigor of manhood He passed through the closed doors. If we are told why this happened, it will cease to be wonderful; if another instance be alleged, it will no longer be unique. But miracles that are wrought in confirmation of the Faith should be manifest. Since, therefore, by her Espousals this miracle would be less evident, it seems that it was unfitting that Christ should be born of an espoused virgin. Obj. 3: Further, the martyr Ignatius, as Jerome says on Matt. 1:18, gives as a reason of the espousals of the Mother of God, that the manner of His Birth might be hidden from the devil, who would think Him to be begotten not of a virgin but of a wife. But this seems to be no reason at all. First, because by his natural cunning he knows whatever takes place in bodies. Second, because later on the demons, through many evident signs, knew Christ after a fashion: whence it is written (Mark 1:23, 24): A man with an unclean spirit . . . cried out, saying: What have we to do with Thee, Jesus of Nazareth? Art Thou come to destroy us? I know . . . Thou art the Holy One of God. Therefore it does not seem fitting that the Mother of God should have been espoused. Obj. 4: Further, Jerome gives as another reason, lest the Mother of God should be stoned by the Jews as an adulteress. But this reason seems to have no weight, for if she were not espoused, she could not be condemned for adultery. There-

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detur rationabile fuisse quod Christus de desponsata nasceretur. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. I, cum esset desponsata mater eius Maria Ioseph; et Luc. I, missus est Gabriel Angelus ad Mariam, virginem desponsatam viro cui nomen erat Ioseph. Respondeo dicendum quod conveniens fuit Christum de desponsata virgine nasci, tum propter ipsum; tum propter matrem; tum etiam propter nos. Propter ipsum quidem Christum, quadruplici ratione. Primo quidem, ne ab infidelibus tamquam illegitime natus abiiceretur. Unde Ambrosius dicit, super Luc., quid Iudaeis, quid Herodi posset adscribi, si natum viderentur ex adulterio persecuti? Secundo, ut consueto modo eius genealogia per virum describeretur. Unde dicit Ambrosius, super Luc., qui in saeculum venit, saeculi debuit more describi. Viri autem persona quaeritur, qui in senatu et reliquis curiis civitatum generis asserit dignitatem. Consuetudo etiam nos instruit Scripturarum, quae semper viri originem quaerit.

Tertio, ad tutelam pueri nati, ne Diabolus contra eum vehementius nocumenta procurasset. Et ideo Ignatius dicit ipsam fuisse desponsatam ut partus eius Diabolo celaretur. Quarto, ut a Ioseph nutriretur. Unde et pater eius dictus est, quasi nutritius. Fuit etiam conveniens ex parte virginis. Primo quidem, quia per hoc redditur immunis a poena, ne scilicet lapidaretur a Iudaeis tanquam adultera, ut Hieronymus dicit. Secundo, ut per hoc ab infamia liberaretur. Unde dicit Ambrosius super Luc., quod desponsata est ne temeratae virginitatis adureretur infamia, cui gravis alvus corruptelae videretur insigne praeferre. Tertio, ut ei a Ioseph ministerium exhiberetur, ut Hieronymus dicit. Ex parte etiam nostra hoc fuit conveniens. Primo quidem, quia testimonio Ioseph comprobatum est Christum ex virgine natum. Unde Ambrosius dicit, super Luc., locupletior testis pudoris maritus adhibetur, qui posset et dolere iniuriam et vindicare opprobrium si non agnosceret sacramentum. Secundo, quia ipsa verba virginis magis credibilia redduntur, suam virginitatem asserentis. Unde Ambrosius dicit, super Luc., fides Mariae verbis magis asseritur, et mendacii causa removetur. Videtur enim culpam obumbrare voluisse mendacio innupta praegnans, causam autem mentiendi desponsata non habuit, cum coniugii praemium et gratia nuptiarum partus sit feminarum. Quae quidem duo pertinent ad firmitatem fidei nostrae.

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fore it does not seem reasonable that Christ should be born of an espoused virgin. On the contrary, It is written (Matt 1:18): When as His Mother Mary was espoused to Joseph: and (Luke 1:26, 27): The angel Gabriel was sent . . . to a virgin espoused to a man whose name was Joseph. I answer that, It was fitting that Christ should be born of an espoused virgin; first, for His own sake; second, for His Mother’s sake; third, for our sake. For the sake of Christ Himself, for four reasons. First, lest He should be rejected by unbelievers as illegitimate: wherefore Ambrose says on Luke 1:26, 27: How could we blame Herod or the Jews if they seem to persecute one who was born of adultery? Second, in order that in the customary way His genealogy might be traced through the male line. Thus Ambrose says on Luke 3:23: He Who came into the world, according to the custom of the world had to be enrolled. Now for this purpose, it is the men that are required, because they represent the family in the senate and other courts. The custom of the Scriptures, too, shows that the ancestry of the men is always traced out. Third, for the safety of the new-born Child: lest the devil should plot serious hurt against Him. Hence Ignatius says that she was espoused that the manner of His Birth might be hidden from the devil. Fourth, that He might be fostered by Joseph: who is therefore called His father, as bread-winner. It was also fitting for the sake of the Virgin. First, because thus she was rendered exempt from punishment; that is, lest she should be stoned by the Jews as an adulteress, as Jerome says. Second, that thus she might be safeguarded from ill fame. Whence Ambrose says on Luke 1:26, 27: She was espoused lest she be wounded by the ill-fame of violated virginity, in whom the pregnant womb would betoken corruption. Third, that, as Jerome says, Joseph might administer to her wants. This was fitting, again, for our sake. First, because Joseph is thus a witness to Christ’s being born of a virgin. Wherefore Ambrose says: Her husband is the more trustworthy witness of her purity, in that he would deplore the dishonor, and avenge the disgrace, were it not that he acknowledged the mystery. Second, because thereby the very words of the Virgin are rendered more credible by which she asserted her virginity. Thus Ambrose says: Belief in Mary’s words is strengthened, the motive for a lie is removed. If she had not been espoused when pregnant, she would seem to have wished to hide her sin by a lie: being espoused, she had no motive for lying, since a woman’s pregnancy is the reward of marriage and gives grace to the nuptial bond. These two reasons add strength to our faith.

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Tertio, ut tolleretur excusatio virginibus quae, propter incautelam suam, non vitant infamiam. Unde Ambrosius dicit, non decuit virginibus sinistra opinione viventibus velamen excusationis relinqui, quod infamia mater quoque domini ureretur. Quarto, quia per hoc significatur universa Ecclesia, quae, cum virgo sit, desponsata tamen est uni viro Christo, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de sancta virginitate. Potest etiam quinta ratio esse quia, quod mater domini fuit desponsata et virgo, in persona ipsius et virginitas et matrimonium honoratur, contra haereticos alteri horum detrahentes. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod beata virgo mater Dei ex familiari instinctu spiritus sancti credenda est desponsari voluisse, confidens de divino auxilio quod nunquam ad carnalem copulam perveniret, hoc tamen divino commisit arbitrio. Unde nullum passa est virginitatis detrimentum. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Ambrosius dicit, super Luc., maluit dominus aliquos de suo ortu quam de matris pudore dubitare. Sciebat enim teneram esse virginis verecundiam, et lubricam famam pudoris, nec putavit ortus sui fidem matris iniuriis adstruendam. Sciendum tamen quod miraculorum Dei quaedam sunt de quibus est fides, sicut miraculum virginei partus, et resurrectionis domini, et etiam sacramenti altaris. Et ideo dominus voluit ista occultiora esse, ut fides eorum magis meritoria esset. Quaedam vero miracula sunt ad fidei comprobationem. Et ista debent esse manifesta.

Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in III de Trin., Diabolus multa potest virtute suae naturae, a quibus tamen prohibetur virtute divina. Et hoc modo potest dici quod virtute suae naturae Diabolus cognoscere poterat matrem Dei non fuisse corruptam, sed virginem, prohibebatur tamen a Deo cognoscere modum partus divini. Quod autem postmodum eum aliqualiter cognovit Diabolus esse filium Dei, non obstat, quia iam tempus erat ut Christus suam virtutem contra Diabolum ostenderet, et persecutionem ab eo concitatam pateretur. Sed in infantia oportebat impediri malitiam Diaboli, ne eum acrius persequeretur, quando Christus nec pati disposuerat, nec virtutem suam ostendere, sed in omnibus aliis infantibus se similem exhibebat. Unde Leo Papa, in sermone de Epiphania, dicit quod magi invenerunt puerum Iesum quantitate parvum, alienae opis indigentem, fandi impotentem, et in nullo ab humanae infantiae generalitate discretum. Ambrosius tamen, super Luc., videtur magis referre ad membra Diaboli. Praemissa enim hac ratione, scilicet de fallendo principem mundi, subdit, sed tamen magis fefellit principes saeculi. Daemonum enim malitia facile etiam occul-

Q. 29, A. 1

Third, that all excuse be removed from those virgins who, through want of caution, fall into dishonor. Hence Ambrose says: It was not becoming that virgins should expose themselves to evil report, and cover themselves with the excuse that the Mother of the Lord had also been oppressed by ill-fame. Fourth, because by this the universal Church is typified, which is a virgin and yet is espoused to one Man, Christ, as Augustine says (De Sanct. Virg. xii). A fifth reason may be added: since the Mother of the Lord being both espoused and a virgin, both virginity and wedlock are honored in her person, in contradiction to those heretics who disparaged one or the other. Reply Obj. 1: We must believe that the Blessed Virgin, Mother of God, desired, from an intimate inspiration of the Holy Spirit, to be espoused, being confident that by the help of God she would never come to have carnal intercourse: yet she left this to God’s discretion. Wherefore she suffered nothing in detriment to her virginity. Reply Obj. 2: As Ambrose says on Luke 1:26: Our Lord preferred that men should doubt of His origin rather than of His Mother’s purity. For he knew the delicacy of virgin modesty, and how easily the fair name of chastity is disparaged: nor did He choose that our faith in His Birth should be strengthened in detriment to His Mother. We must observe, however, that some miracles wrought by God are the direct object of faith; such are the miracles of the virginal Birth, the Resurrection of our Lord, and the Sacrament of the Altar. Wherefore our Lord wished these to be more hidden, that belief in them might have greater merit. Whereas other miracles are for the strengthening of faith: and these it behooves to be manifest. Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Trin. iii), the devil can do many things by his natural power which he is hindered by the Divine power from doing. Thus it may be that by his natural power the devil could know that the Mother of God knew not man, but was a virgin; yet was prevented by God from knowing the manner of the Divine Birth. That afterwards the devil after a fashion knew that He was the Son of God, makes no difficulty: because then the time had already come for Christ to make known His power against the devil, and to suffer persecution aroused by him. But during His infancy it behooved the malice of the devil to be withheld, lest he should persecute Him too severely: for Christ did not wish to suffer such things then, nor to make His power known, but to show Himself to be in all things like other infants. Hence Pope Leo (Serm. in Epiph. iv) says that the Magi found the Child Jesus small in body, dependent on others, unable to speak, and in no way differing from the generality of human infants. Ambrose, however, expounding Luke 1:26, seems to understand this of the devil’s members. For, after giving the above reason—namely, that the prince of the world might be deceived—he continues thus: Yet still more did He deceive the princes of the world, since

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ta deprehendit, at vero qui saecularibus vanitatibus occu- the evil disposition of the demons easily discovers even hidpantur, scire divina non possunt. den things: but those who spend their lives in worldly vanities can have no acquaintance of Divine things. Ad quartum dicendum quod iudicio adulterorum Reply Obj. 4: The sentence of adulteresses according lapidabatur secundum legem non solum illa quae iam to the Law was that they should be stoned, not only if they erat desponsata vel nupta, sed etiam illa quae in domo were already espoused or married, but also if their maidpatris custodiebatur ut virgo quandoque nuptura. Unde enhood were still under the protection of the paternal roof, dicitur Deut. XXII, si non est in puella inventa virginitas, until the day when they enter the married state. Thus it is lapidibus obruent eam viri civitatis illius, et morietur, quia written (Deut 22:20, 21): If . . . virginity be not found in the fecit nefas in Israel, ut fornicaretur in domo patris sui. damsel . . . the men of the city shall stone her to death, and she shall die; because she hath done a wicked thing in Israel, to play the whore in her father’s house. Vel potest dici, secundum quosdam, quod beata virIt may also be said, according to some writers, that the go erat de stirpe sive parentela Aaron, unde erat cognata Blessed Virgin was of the family or kindred of Aaron, so Elisabeth, ut dicitur Luc. I. Virgo autem de genere sacer- that she was related to Elizabeth, as we are told (Luke 1:36). dotali propter stuprum occidebatur, legitur enim Levit. Now a virgin of the priestly tribe was condemned to death XXI, sacerdotis filia si deprehensa fuerit in stupro, et vio- for whoredom; for we read (Lev 21:9): If the daughter of a laverit nomen patris sui, flammis exuretur. priest be taken in whoredom, and dishonor the name of her father, she shall be burnt with fire. Quidam referunt verbum Hieronymi ad lapidatioLastly, some understand the passage of Jerome to refer nem infamiae. to the throwing of stones by ill-fame.

Article 2 Whether there was a true marriage between Mary and Joseph? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inter Mariam et Ioseph non fuerit verum matrimonium. Dicit enim Hieronymus, contra Helvidium, quod Ioseph Mariae custos fuit, potius quam maritus eius. Sed si fuisset verum matrimonium, vere Ioseph maritus eius fuisset. Ergo videtur quod non fuerit verum matrimonium inter Mariam et Ioseph. Praeterea, super illud Matth. I, Iacob genuit Ioseph virum Mariae, dicit Hieronymus, cum virum audieris, suspicio tibi non subeat nuptiarum, sed recordare consuetudinis Scripturarum, quod sponsi viri et sponsae vocantur uxores. Sed verum matrimonium non efficitur ex sponsalibus, sed ex nuptiis. Ergo non fuit verum matrimonium inter beatam virginem et Ioseph. Praeterea, Matth. I dicitur, Ioseph, vir eius, cum esset iustus, et nollet eam traducere, idest, in domum suam ad cohabitationem assiduam, voluit eam occulte dimittere, idest, tempus nuptiarum mutare, ut Remigius exponit. Ergo videtur quod, nondum nuptiis celebratis, nondum esset verum matrimonium, praesertim cum, post matrimonium contractum, non liceat alicui sponsam dimittere. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in II de consensu Evangelist., non est fas ut Ioseph ob hoc a coniugio Mariae separandum Evangelista putaret (cum dixit Ioseph virum Mariae), quod non ex eius concubitu, sed virgo

Objection 1: It would seem that there was no true marriage between Mary and Joseph. For Jerome says against Helvidius that Joseph was Mary’s guardian rather than her husband. But if this was a true marriage, Joseph was truly her husband. Therefore there was no true marriage between Mary and Joseph. Obj. 2: Further, on Matt. 1:16: Jacob begot Joseph the husband of Mary, Jerome says: When thou readest ‘husband’ suspect not a marriage; but remember that Scripture is wont to speak of those who are betrothed as husband and wife. But a true marriage is not effected by the betrothal, but by the wedding. Therefore, there was no true marriage between the Blessed Virgin and Joseph. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt 1:19): Joseph, her husband, being a just man, and not willing to take her away, i.e., to take her to his home in order to cohabit with her, was minded to put her away privately, i.e., to postpone the wedding, as Remigius expounds. Therefore, it seems that, as the wedding was not yet solemnized, there was no true marriage: especially since, after the marriage contract, no one can lawfully put his wife away. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. ii): It cannot be allowed that the evangelist thought that Joseph ought to sever his union with Mary (since he said that Joseph was Mary’s husband) on the ground that in

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peperit Christum. Hoc enim exemplo manifeste insinuatur fidelibus coniugatis, etiam servata pari consensu continentia, posse permanere vocarique coniugium, non permixto corporis sexu. Respondeo dicendum quod matrimonium sive coniugium dicitur verum ex hoc quod suam perfectionem attingit. Duplex est autem rei perfectio, prima et secunda. Prima quidem perfectio in ipsa forma rei consistit, ex qua speciem sortitur, secunda vero perfectio consistit in operatione rei, per quam res aliqualiter suum finem attingit. Forma autem matrimonii consistit in quadam indivisibili coniunctione animorum, per quam unus coniugum indivisibiliter alteri fidem servare tenetur. Finis autem matrimonii est proles generanda et educanda, ad quorum primum pervenitur per concubitum coniugalem; ad secundum, per alia opera viri et uxoris, quibus sibi invicem obsequuntur ad prolem nutriendam. Sic igitur dicendum est quod, quantum ad primam perfectionem, omnino verum fuit matrimonium virginis matris Dei et Ioseph, quia uterque consensit in copulam coniugalem; non autem expresse in copulam carnalem, nisi sub conditione, si Deo placeret. Unde et Angelus vocat Mariam coniugem Ioseph, dicens ad Ioseph, Matth. I, noli timere accipere Mariam coniugem tuam. Quod exponens Augustinus, in libro de nuptiis et concupiscentia, dicit, coniux vocatur ex prima desponsationis fide, quam concubitu nec cognoverat, nec fuerat cogniturus. Quantum vero ad secundam perfectionem, quae est per actum matrimonii, si hoc referatur ad carnalem concubitum, per quem proles generatur, non fuit illud matrimonium consummatum. Unde Ambrosius dicit, super Luc., non te moveat quod Mariam Scriptura coniugem vocat. Non enim virginitatis ereptio, sed coniugii testificatio nuptiarum celebratio declaratur. Habuit tamen illud matrimonium etiam secundam perfectionem quantum ad prolis educationem. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de nuptiis et concupiscentia, omne nuptiarum bonum impletum est in illis parentibus Christi, proles, fides et sacramentum. Prolem cognoscimus ipsum dominum Iesum; fidem, quia nullum adulterium; sacramentum, quia nullum divortium. Solus ibi nuptialis concubitus non fuit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Hieronymus accipit ibi maritum ab actu matrimonii consummati. Ad secundum dicendum quod nuptias Hieronymus vocat nuptialem concubitum. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., beata virgo sic fuit desponsata Ioseph quod etiam esset domi habita. Nam sicut in ea quae in domo viri concipit, intelligitur conceptio maritalis, sic in ea quae extra domum concipit, est suspecta coniunctio. Et ita non esset sufficienter provisum famae beatae

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giving birth to Christ, she had not conceived of him, but remained a virgin. For by this example the faithful are taught that if after marriage they remain continent by mutual consent, their union is still and is rightly called marriage, even without intercourse of the sexes. I answer that, Marriage or wedlock is said to be true by reason of its attaining its perfection. Now perfection of anything is twofold; first, and second. The first perfection of a thing consists in its very form, from which it receives its species; while the second perfection of a thing consists in its operation, by which in some way a thing attains its end. Now the form of matrimony consists in a certain inseparable union of souls, by which husband and wife are pledged by a bond of mutual affection that cannot be sundered. And the end of matrimony is the begetting and upbringing of children: the first of which is attained by conjugal intercourse; the second by the other duties of husband and wife, by which they help one another in rearing their offspring. Thus we may say, as to the first perfection, that the marriage of the Virgin Mother of God and Joseph was absolutely true: because both consented to the nuptial bond, but not expressly to the bond of the flesh, save on the condition that it was pleasing to God. For this reason the angel calls Mary the wife of Joseph, saying to him (Matt 1:20): Fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife: on which words Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i): She is called his wife from the first promise of her espousals, whom he had not known nor ever was to know by carnal intercourse. But as to the second perfection which is attained by the marriage act, if this be referred to carnal intercourse, by which children are begotten; thus this marriage was not consummated. Wherefore Ambrose says on Luke 1:26, 27: Be not surprised that Scripture calls Mary a wife. The fact of her marriage is declared, not to insinuate the loss of virginity, but to witness to the reality of the union. Nevertheless, this marriage had the second perfection, as to upbringing of the child. Thus Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i): All the nuptial blessings are fulfilled in the marriage of Christ’s parents, offspring, faith and sacrament. The offspring we know to have been the Lord Jesus; faith, for there was no adultery: sacrament, since there was no divorce. Carnal intercourse alone there was none. Reply Obj. 1: Jerome uses the term husband in reference to marriage consummated. Reply Obj. 2: By marriage Jerome means the nuptial intercourse. Reply Obj. 3: As Chrysostom says (Hom. i super Matth.) the Blessed Virgin was so espoused to Joseph that she dwelt in his home: for just as she who conceives in her husband’s house is understood to have conceived of him, so she who conceives elsewhere is suspect. Consequently sufficient precaution would not have been taken to safeguard

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virginis per hoc quod fuit desponsata, nisi etiam fuisset domi habita. Unde quod dicit, et nollet eam traducere, melius intelligitur, idest, nollet eam diffamare in publicum, quam quod intelligatur de traductione in domum. Unde et Evangelista subdit quod voluit occulte dimittere eam. Quamvis tamen esset domi habita propter primam desponsationis fidem, nondum tamen intervenerat solemnis celebratio nuptiarum, propter quod etiam nondum carnaliter convenerant. Unde, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, non dicit Evangelista, antequam duceretur in domum sponsi, etenim intus erat in domo. Consuetudo enim erat veteribus multoties in domo desponsatas habere. Et ideo etiam Angelus dicit Ioseph, ne timeas accipere Mariam coniugem tuam, idest, ne timeas nuptias eius solemniter celebrare. Licet alii dicant quod nondum erat in domum introducta, sed solum desponsata. Primum tamen magis consonat Evangelio.

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the fair fame of the Blessed Virgin, if she had not the entry of her husband’s house. Wherefore the words, not willing to take her away are better rendered as meaning, not willing publicly to expose her, than understood of taking her to his house. Hence the evangelist adds that he was minded to put her away privately. But although she had the entry of Joseph’s house by reason of her first promise of espousals, yet the time had not yet come for the solemnizing of the wedding; for which reason they had not yet consummated the marriage. Therefore, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.): The evangelist does not say, ‘before she was taken to the house of her husband,’ because she was already in the house. For it was the custom among the ancients for espoused maidens to enter frequently the houses of them to whom they were betrothed. Therefore the angel also said to Joseph: Fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife; that is: Fear not to solemnize your marriage with her. Others, however, say that she was not yet admitted to his house, but only betrothed to him. But the first is more in keeping with the Gospel narrative.

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Question 30 The Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin Deinde considerandum est de Annuntiatione beatae We now have to consider the Blessed Virgin’s Annuncivirginis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. ation, concerning which there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum conveniens fuerit ei annuntiari quod (1) Whether it was befitting that announcement should in ea generandum erat. be made to her of that which was to be begotten of her? Secundo, per quem erat ei annuntiandum. (2) By whom should this announcement be made? Tertio, per quem modum ei annuntiari debebat. (3) In what manner should this announcement be made? Quarto, de ordine Annuntiationis. (4) Of the order observed in the Annunciation.

Article 1 Whether it was necessary to announce to the Blessed Virgin that which was to be done in her? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit necessarium beatae virgini annuntiari quod in ea fiendum erat. Annuntiatio enim ad hoc solum necessarium videbatur ut virginis consensus haberetur. Sed consensus eius non videtur necessarius fuisse, quia conceptus virginis praenuntiatus fuit prophetia praedestinationis quae sine nostro completur arbitrio, ut dicit quaedam Glossa, Matth. I. Non ergo necessarium fuit quod talis Annuntiatio fieret. Praeterea, beata virgo incarnationis fidem habebat, sine qua nullus esse poterat in statu salutis, quia, ut dicitur Rom. III, iustitia Dei est per fidem Iesu Christi. Sed de eo quod aliquis per certitudinem credit, non indiget ulterius instrui. Ergo beatae virgini non fuit necessarium ut ei incarnatio filii annuntiaretur. Praeterea, sicut beata virgo corporaliter Christum concepit, ita quaelibet sancta anima concipit ipsum spiritualiter, unde apostolus dicit, Galat. IV, filioli mei, quos iterum parturio, donec formetur Christus in vobis. Sed illis qui spiritualiter debent ipsum concipere, talis conceptio eis non annuntiatur. Ergo nec beatae virgini fuit annuntiandum quod esset in utero conceptura filium Dei. Sed contra est quod habetur Luc. I, quod Angelus dixit ei, ecce, concipies in utero et paries filium. Respondeo dicendum quod congruum fuit beatae virgini annuntiari quod esset Christum conceptura. Primo quidem, ut servaretur congruus ordo coniunctionis filii Dei ad virginem, ut scilicet prius mens eius de ipso instrueretur quam carne eum conciperet. Unde Augusti-

Objection 1: It would seem that it was unnecessary to announce to the Blessed Virgin that which was to be done in her. For there seems to have been no need of the Annunciation except for the purpose of receiving the Virgin’s consent. But her consent seems to have been unnecessary: because the Virginal Conception was foretold by a prophecy of predestination, which is fulfilled without our consent, as a gloss says on Matt. 1:22. There was no need, therefore, for this Annunciation. Obj. 2: Further, the Blessed Virgin believed in the Incarnation, for to disbelieve therein excludes man from the way of salvation; because, as the Apostle says (Rom 3:22): The justice of God (is) by faith of Jesus Christ. But one needs no further instruction concerning what one believes without doubt. Therefore the Blessed Virgin had no need for the Incarnation of her Son to be announced to her. Obj. 3: Further, just as the Blessed Virgin conceived Christ in her body, so every pious soul conceives Him spiritually. Thus the Apostle says (Gal 4:19): My little children, of whom I am in labor again, until Christ be formed in you. But to those who conceive Him spiritually no announcement is made of this conception. Therefore neither should it have been announced to the Blessed Virgin that she was to conceive the Son of God in her womb. On the contrary, It is related (Luke 1:31) that the angel said to her: Behold, thou shalt conceive in thy womb, and shalt bring forth a son. I answer that, It was reasonable that it should be announced to the Blessed Virgin that she was to conceive Christ. First, in order to maintain a becoming order in the union of the Son of God with the Virgin—namely, that she should be informed in mind concerning Him, before con-

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nus dicit, in libro de virginitate, beatior Maria est percipiendo fidem Christi, quam concipiendo carnem Christi. Et postea subdit, materna propinquitas nihil Mariae profuisset, nisi felicius Christum corde quam carne gestasset.

Secundo, ut posset esse certior testis huius sacramenti, quando super hoc divinitus erat instructa. Tertio, ut voluntaria sui obsequii munera Deo offerret, ad quod se promptam obtulit, dicens, ecce ancilla domini. Quarto, ut ostenderetur esse quoddam spirituale matrimonium inter filium Dei et humanam naturam. Et ideo per Annuntiationem expetebatur consensus virginis loco totius humanae naturae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prophetia praedestinationis completur sine nostro arbitrio causante, non tamen sine nostro arbitrio consentiente. Ad secundum dicendum quod beata virgo expressam fidem habebat incarnationis futurae, sed, cum esset humilis, non tam alta de se sapiebat. Et ideo super hoc erat instruenda. Ad tertium dicendum quod spiritualem conceptionem Christi, quae est per fidem, praecedit Annuntiatio quae est per fidei praedicationem, secundum quod fides est ex auditu, ut dicitur Rom. X. Nec tamen propter hoc aliquis pro certo scit se gratiam habere, sed scit veram fidem esse quam accipit.

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ceiving Him in the flesh. Thus Augustine says (De Sancta Virgin. iii): Mary is more blessed in receiving the faith of Christ, than in conceiving the flesh of Christ; and further on he adds: Her nearness as a Mother would have been of no profit to Mary, had she not borne Christ in her heart after a more blessed manner than in her flesh. Second, that she might be a more certain witness of this mystery, being instructed therein by God. Third, that she might offer to God the free gift of her obedience: which she proved herself right ready to do, saying: Behold the handmaid of the Lord. Fourth, in order to show that there is a certain spiritual wedlock between the Son of God and human nature. Wherefore in the Annunciation the Virgin’s consent was besought in lieu of that of the entire human nature. Reply Obj. 1: The prophecy of predestination is fulfilled without the causality of our will; not without its consent. Reply Obj. 2: The Blessed Virgin did indeed believe explicitly in the future Incarnation; but, being humble, she did not think such high things of herself. Consequently she required instruction in this matter. Reply Obj. 3: The spiritual conception of Christ through faith is preceded by the preaching of the faith, for as much as faith is by hearing (Rom 10:17). Yet man does not know for certain thereby that he has grace; but he does know that the faith, which he has received, is true.

Article 2 Whether the Annunciation should have been made by an angel to the Blessed Virgin? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatae virgini non debuerit Annuntiatio fieri per Angelum. Supremis enim Angelis fit revelatio immediate a Deo, ut dicit Dionysius, VII cap. Cael. Hier. Sed mater Dei est super omnes Angelos exaltata. Ergo videtur quod immediate a Deo debuerit sibi annuntiari incarnationis mysterium, et non per Angelum. Praeterea, si in hoc oportebat servari communem ordinem, secundum quem divina hominibus per Angelos revelantur, similiter divina ad mulierem per virum deferuntur, unde et apostolus dicit, I Cor. XIV, mulieres in Ecclesiis taceant, et si quid velint discere, domi viros suos interrogent. Ergo videtur quod beatae virgini debuit annuntiari mysterium incarnationis per aliquem virum, praesertim quia Ioseph, vir eius, super hoc fuit ab Angelo instructus, ut legitur Matth. I.

Objection 1: It would seem that the Annunciation should not have been made by an angel to our Blessed Lady. For revelations to the highest angels are made immediately by God, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). But the Mother of God is exalted above all the angels. Therefore it seems that the mystery of the Incarnation should have been announced to her by God immediately, and not by an angel. Obj. 2: Further, if in this matter it behooved the common order to be observed, by which Divine things are announced to men by angels; in like manner Divine things are announced to a woman by a man: wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor 14:34, 35): Let women keep silence in the churches . . . but if they would learn anything, let them ask their husbands at home. Therefore it seems that the mystery of the Incarnation should have been announced to the Blessed Virgin by some man: especially seeing that Joseph, her husband, was instructed thereupon by an angel, as is related (Matt 1:20, 21).

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Praeterea, nullus potest congrue annuntiare quod ignorat. Sed supremi Angeli non plene cognoverunt incarnationis mysterium, unde Dionysius VII cap. Cael. Hier., ex eorum persona dicit esse intelligendam quaestionem quae ponitur Isaiae LXIII, quis est iste qui venit de Edom? Ergo videtur quod per nullum Angelum potuit convenienter Annuntiatio incarnationis fieri. Praeterea, maiora sunt per maiores nuntios annuntianda. Sed mysterium incarnationis est maximum inter omnia alia quae per Angelos sunt hominibus annuntiata. Ergo videtur quod, si per aliquem Angelum annuntiari debuit, quod annuntiandum fuit per aliquem de supremo ordine. Sed Gabriel non est de supremo ordine, sed de ordine Archangelorum, qui est penultimus, unde cantat Ecclesia, Gabrielem Archangelum scimus divinitus te esse affatum. Non ergo huiusmodi Annuntiatio per Gabrielem Archangelum convenienter facta est. Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. I, missus est Gabriel Angelus a Deo, et cetera. Respondeo dicendum quod conveniens fuit matri Dei annuntiari per Angelum divinae incarnationis mysterium, propter tria. Primo quidem, ut in hoc etiam servaretur divina ordinatio, secundum quam mediantibus Angelis divina ad homines perveniunt. Unde dicit Dionysius, IV cap. Cael. Hier., quod divinum Iesu benignitatis mysterium Angeli primum edocti sunt, postea per ipsos ad nos cognitionis gratia transivit. Sic igitur divinissimus Gabriel Zachariam quidem docebat prophetam esse futurum ex ipso, Mariam autem, quomodo in ipsa fieret thearchicum ineffabilis Dei formationis mysterium. Secundo, hoc fuit conveniens reparationi humanae, quae futura erat per Christum. Unde Beda dicit, in homilia, aptum humanae restaurationis principium ut Angelus a Deo mitteretur ad virginem partu consecrandam divino, quia prima perditionis humanae fuit causa cum serpens a Diabolo mittebatur ad mulierem spiritu superbiae decipiendam. Tertio, quia hoc congruebat virginitati matris Dei. Unde Hieronymus dicit in sermone assumptionis, bene Angelus ad virginem mittitur, quia semper est Angelis cognata virginitas. Profecto in carne praeter carnem vivere non terrena vita est, sed caelestis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod mater Dei superior erat Angelis quantum ad dignitatem ad quam divinitus eligebatur. Sed quantum ad statum praesentis vitae, inferior erat Angelis. Quia etiam ipse Christus, ratione passibilis vitae, modico ab Angelis minoratus est, ut dicitur Heb. II. Sed quia tamen Christus fuit viator et comprehensor, quantum ad cognitionem divinorum non indigebat ab Angelis instrui. Sed mater Dei nondum erat

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Obj. 3: Further, none can becomingly announce what he knows not. But the highest angels did not fully know the mystery of the Incarnation: wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the question, Who is this that cometh from Edom? (Isa 63:1) is to be understood as made by them. Therefore it seems that the announcement of the Incarnation could not be made becomingly by any angel. Obj. 4: Further, greater things should be announced by messengers of greater dignity. But the mystery of the Incarnation is the greatest of all things announced by angels to men. It seems, therefore, if it behooved to be announced by an angel at all, that this should have been done by an angel of the highest order. But Gabriel is not of the highest order, but of the order of archangels, which is the last but one: wherefore the Church sings: We know that the archangel Gabriel brought thee a message from God. Therefore this announcement was not becomingly made by the archangel Gabriel. On the contrary, It is written (Luke 1:26): The angel Gabriel was sent by God, etc. I answer that, It was fitting for the mystery of the Incarnation to be announced to the Mother of God by an angel, for three reasons. First, that in this also might be maintained the order established by God, by which Divine things are brought to men by means of the angels. Wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that the angels were the first to be taught the Divine mystery of the loving kindness of Jesus: afterwards the grace of knowledge was imparted to us through them. Thus, then, the most god-like Gabriel made known to Zachary that a prophet son would be born to him; and, to Mary, how the Divine mystery of the ineffable conception of God would be realized in her. Second, this was becoming to the restoration of human nature which was to be effected by Christ. Wherefore Bede says in a homily (in Annunt.): It was an apt beginning of man’s restoration that an angel should be sent by God to the Virgin who was to be hallowed by the Divine Birth: since the first cause of man’s ruin was through the serpent being sent by the devil to cajole the woman by the spirit of pride. Third, because this was becoming to the virginity of the Mother of God. Wherefore Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption: It is well that an angel be sent to the Virgin; because virginity is ever akin to the angelic nature. Surely to live in the flesh and not according to the flesh is not an earthly but a heavenly life. Reply Obj. 1: The Mother of God was above the angels as regards the dignity to which she was chosen by God. But as regards the present state of life, she was beneath the angels. For even Christ Himself, by reason of His passible life, was made a little lower than the angels, according to Heb. 2:9. But because Christ was both wayfarer and comprehensor, He did not need to be instructed by angels, as regards knowledge of Divine things. The Mother of God,

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in statu comprehensorum. Et ideo de divino conceptu however, was not yet in the state of comprehension: and per Angelos instruenda erat. therefore she had to be instructed by angels concerning the Divine Conception. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says in a sermon on the dicit, in sermone de assumptione, beata virgo Maria ve- Assumption (De Assump. B.V.M.) a true estimation of the ra existimatione ab aliquibus generalibus excipitur. Quia Blessed Virgin excludes her from certain general rules. For nec conceptus multiplicavit, nec sub viri, idest mariti, neither did she ‘multiply her conceptions’ nor was she ‘under potestate fuit, quae integerrimis visceribus de spiritu sanc- man’s, i.e., her husband’s,’ power (Gen 3:16), who in her spotto Christum suscepit. Et ideo non debuit mediante viro less womb conceived Christ of the Holy Spirit. Therefore it instrui de mysterio incarnationis, sed mediante Angelo. was fitting that she should be informed of the mystery of Propter quod etiam ipsa prius est instructa quam Iose- the Incarnation by means not of a man, but of an angel. For ph, nam ipsa instructa est ante conceptum, Ioseph autem this reason it was made known to her before Joseph: since post eius conceptum. the message was brought to her before she conceived, but to Joseph after she had conceived. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut patet ex aucReply Obj. 3: As may be gathered from the passage toritate Dionysii inducta, Angeli incarnationis myste- quoted from Dionysius, the angels were acquainted with rium cognoverunt, sed tamen interrogant, perfectius the mystery of the Incarnation: and yet they put this quesscire cupientes a Christo huius mysterii rationes, quae tion, being desirous that Christ should give them more persunt incomprehensibiles omni creato intellectui. Unde fect knowledge of the details of this mystery, which are inmaximus dicit quod utrum Angeli cognoverint futuram comprehensible to any created intellect. Thus Maximus says incarnationem, ambigere non oportet. Latuit autem eos that there can be no question that the angels knew that the investigabilis domini conceptio, atque modus qualiter to- Incarnation was to take place. But it was not given to them tus in genitore, totus manebat in omnibus, nec non et in to trace the manner of our Lord’s conception, nor how it was virginis cellula. that He remained whole in the Father, whole throughout the universe, and was whole in the narrow abode of the Virgin. Ad quartum dicendum quod quidam dicunt GaReply Obj. 4: Some say that Gabriel was of the highbrielem fuisse de supremo ordine, propter hoc quod est order; because Gregory says (Hom. de Centum Ovibus): Gregorius dicit, summum Angelum venire dignum fue- It was right that one of the highest angels should come, since rat, qui summum omnium nuntiabat. Sed ex hoc non his message was most sublime. But this does nat imply that habetur quod fuerit summus inter omnes ordines, sed he was of the highest order of all, but in regard to the anrespectu Angelorum, fuit enim de ordine Archangelo- gels: since he was an archangel. Thus the Church calls him rum. Unde et Ecclesia eum Archangelum nominat, et an archangel, and Gregory himself in a homily (De CenGregorius ipse dicit, in homilia de centum ovibus, quod tum Ovibus 34) says that those are called archangels who Archangeli dicuntur qui summa annuntiant. Satis est er- announce sublime things. It is therefore sufficiently credible go credibile quod sit summus in ordine Archangelorum. that he was the highest of the archangels. And, as Gregory Et, sicut Gregorius dicit, hoc nomen officio suo congruit, says (De Centum Ovibus 34), this name agrees with his ofGabriel enim Dei fortitudo nominatur. Per Dei ergo forti- fice: for Gabriel means ‘Power of God.’ This message theretudinem nuntiandum erat quia virtutum dominus et po- fore was fittingly brought by the ‘Power of God,’ because the tens in praelio ad debellandas potestates aereas veniebat. Lord of hosts and mighty in battle was coming to overcome the powers of the air.

Article 3 Whether the angel of the Annunciation should have appeared to the Virgin in a bodily vision? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus annuntians non debuerit virgini apparere visione corporali. Dignior enim est intellectualis visio quam corporalis, ut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., et praecipue ipsi Angelo magis conveniens, nam visione intellectuali videtur Angelus in sua substantia; visione autem corporali videtur in assumpta figura corporea. Sed

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel of the Annunciation should not have appeared to the Virgin in a bodily vision. For intellectual vision is more excellent than bodily vision, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii), and especially more becoming to an angel: since by intellectual vision an angel is seen in his substance; whereas in a bodily vision he is seen in the bodily shape which he assumes.

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sicut ad annuntiandum conceptum divinum decebat venire summum nuntium, ita etiam videtur quod decuerit esse summum genus visionis. Ergo videtur quod Angelus annuntians apparuit virgini visione intellectuali. Praeterea, visio imaginaria videtur etiam esse nobilior quam visio corporalis, sicut imaginatio est altior potentia quam sensus. Sed Angelus apparuit Ioseph in somnis, secundum imaginariam visionem, ut patet Matth. I et II. Ergo videtur quod etiam apparere debuerit beatae virgini imaginaria visione, et non corporali. Praeterea, corporalis visio spiritualis substantiae videntes stupefacit, unde etiam de ipsa virgine cantatur, et expavescit virgo de lumine. Sed melius fuisset quod a tali turbatione mens eius esset praeservata. Non ergo fuit conveniens quod huiusmodi Annuntiatio fieret per visionem corporalem. Sed contra est quod Augustinus, in quodam sermone, inducit beatam virginem sic dicentem, venit ad me Gabriel Archangelus facie rutilans, veste coruscans, incessu mirabilis. Sed haec non possunt pertinere nisi ad corpoream visionem. Ergo corporea visione Angelus annuntians beatae virgini apparuit. Respondeo dicendum quod Angelus annuntians apparuit matri Dei corporea visione. Et hoc conveniens fuit, primo quidem, quantum ad id quod annuntiabatur. Venerat enim Angelus annuntiare incarnationem invisibilis Dei. Unde etiam conveniens fuit ut ad huius rei declarationem invisibilis creatura formam assumeret in qua visibiliter appareret, cum etiam omnes apparitiones veteris testamenti ad hanc apparitionem ordinentur, qua filius Dei in carne apparuit. Secundo, congruum fuit dignitati matris Dei, quae non solum in mente, sed in corporeo ventre erat Dei filium receptura. Et ideo non solum mens eius, sed etiam sensus corporei erant visione angelica refovendi. Tertio, congruit certitudini eius quod annuntiabatur. Ea enim quae sunt oculis subiecta, certius apprehendimus quam ea quae imaginamur. Unde Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., quod Angelus non in somnis, immo visibiliter virgini astitit. Nam quia magnam valde relationem ab Angelo accipiebat, egebat ante tantae rei eventum visione solemni. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectualis visio est potior quam visio imaginaria vel corporalis si sit sola. Sed ipse Augustinus dicit quod est excellentior prophetia quae habet simul intellectualem et imaginariam visionem, quam illa quae habet alterum tantum. Beata autem virgo non solum percepit visionem corporalem, sed etiam intellectualem illuminationem. Unde talis apparitio nobilior fuit. Fuisset tamen nobilior si ipsum Angelum intellectuali visione in sua substantia vidisset. Sed

Q. 30, A. 3

Now since it behooved a sublime messenger to come to announce the Divine Conception, so, seemingly, he should have appeared in the most excellent kind of vision. Therefore it seems that the angel of the Annunciation appeared to the Virgin in an intellectual vision. Obj. 2: Further, imaginary vision also seems to excel bodily vision: just as the imagination is a higher power than the senses. But the angel . . . appeared to Joseph in his sleep (Matt 1:20), which was clearly an imaginary vision. Therefore it seems that he should have appeared to the Blessed Virgin also in an imaginary vision. Obj. 3: Further, the bodily vision of a spiritual substance stupefies the beholder; thus we sing of the Virgin herself: And the Virgin seeing the light was filled with fear. But it was better that her mind should be preserved from being thus troubled. Therefore it was not fitting that this announcement should be made in a bodily vision. On the contrary, Augustine in a sermon (De Annunt. iii) pictures the Blessed Virgin as speaking thus: To me came the archangel Gabriel with glowing countenance, gleaming robe, and wondrous step. But these cannot pertain to other than bodily vision. Therefore the angel of the Annunciation appeared in a bodily vision to the Blessed Virgin. I answer that, The angel of the Annunciation appeared in a bodily vision to the Blessed Virgin. And this indeed was fitting, first in regard to that which was announced. For the angel came to announce the Incarnation of the invisible God. Wherefore it was becoming that, in order to make this known, an invisible creature should assume a form in which to appear visibly: forasmuch as all the apparitions of the Old Testament are ordered to that apparition in which the Son of God appeared in the flesh. Second, it was fitting as regards the dignity of the Mother of God, who was to receive the Son of God not only in her mind, but in her bodily womb. Therefore it behooved not only her mind, but also her bodily senses to be refreshed by the angelic vision. Third, it is in keeping with the certainty of that which was announced. For we apprehend with greater certainty that which is before our eyes, than what is in our imagination. Thus Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.) that the angel came to the Virgin not in her sleep, but visibly. For since she was receiving from the angel a message exceeding great, before such an event she needed a vision of great solemnity. Reply Obj. 1: Intellectual vision excels merely imaginary and merely bodily vision. But Augustine himself says (De Annunt. iii) that prophecy is more excellent if accompanied by intellectual and imaginary vision, than if accompanied by only one of them. Now the Blessed Virgin perceived not only the bodily vision, but also the intellectual illumination. Wherefore this was a more excellent vision. Yet it would have been more excellent if she had perceived the angel himself in his substance by her intellectual vision.

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Mother of God

hoc non patiebatur status hominis viatoris, quod Angelum per essentiam videret. Ad secundum dicendum quod imaginatio quidem est altior potentia quam sensus exterior, quia tamen principium humanae cognitionis est sensus, in eo consistit maxima certitudo; quia semper oportet quod principia cognitionis sint certiora. Et ideo Ioseph, cui Angelus in somnis apparuit, non ita excellentem apparitionem habuit sicut beata virgo. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Ambrosius dicit, super Luc., perturbamur et a nostro alienamur affectu, quando restringimur alicuius superioris potestatis occursu. Et hoc non solum contingit in visione corporali, sed etiam in visione imaginaria. Unde Gen. XV dicitur quod, cum sol occubuisset, sopor irruit super Abraham, et horror magnus et tenebrosus invasit eum. Talis tamen perturbatio hominis non tantum homini nocet ut propter eam debeat angelica apparitio praetermitti. Primo quidem, quia ex hoc ipso quod homo supra seipsum elevatur, quod ad eius pertinet dignitatem, pars eius inferior debilitatur, ex quo provenit perturbatio praedicta, sicut etiam, calore naturali ad interiora reducto, exteriora tremunt. Secundo quia, sicut Origenes dicit, super Luc., Angelus apparens, sciens hanc esse humanam naturam, primum perturbationi humanae medetur. Unde tam Zachariae quam Mariae, post turbationem, dixit, ne timeas. Et propter hoc, ut legitur in vita Antonii, non difficilis est bonorum spirituum malorumque discretio. Si enim post timorem successerit gaudium, a domino venisse sciamus auxilium, quia securitas animae praesentis maiestatis indicium est. Si autem incussa formido permanserit hostis est qui videtur. Ipsa etiam turbatio virginis conveniens fuit verecundiae virginali. Quia, ut Ambrosius dicit, super Luc., trepidare virginum est, et ad omnes viri ingressus pavere, omnes viri affatus vereri. Quidam tamen dicunt quod, cum beata virgo assueta esset visionibus Angelorum, non fuit turbata in visione Angeli, sed in admiratione eorum quae ei ab Angelo dicebantur, quia de se tam magnifica non cogitabat. Unde et Evangelista non dicit quod turbata fuerit in visione Angeli, sed, in sermone eius.

IIIae

But it was incompatible with her state of wayfarer that she should see an angel in his essence. Reply Obj. 2: The imagination is indeed a higher power than the exterior sense: but because the senses are the principle of human knowledge, the greatest certainty is in them, for the principles of knowledge must needs always be most certain. Consequently Joseph, to whom the angel appeared in his sleep, did not have so excellent a vision as the Blessed Virgin. Reply Obj. 3: As Ambrose says on Luke 1:11: We are disturbed, and lose our presence of mind, when we are confronted by the presence of a superior power. And this happens not only in bodily, but also in imaginary vision. Wherefore it is written (Gen 15:12) that when the sun was setting, a deep sleep fell upon Abram, and a great and darksome horror seized upon him. But by being thus disturbed man is not harmed to such an extent that therefore he ought to forego the vision of an angel. First because from the very fact that man is raised above himself, in which matter his dignity is concerned, his inferior powers are weakened; and from this results the aforesaid disturbance: thus, also, when the natural heat is drawn within a body, the exterior parts tremble. Second, because, as Origen says (Hom. iv in Luc.): The angel who appeared, knowing hers was a human nature, first sought to remedy the disturbance of mind to which a man is subject. Wherefore both to Zachary and to Mary, as soon as they were disturbed, he said: Fear not. For this reason, as we read in the life of Anthony, it is difficult to discern good from evil spirits. For if joy succeed fear, we should know that the help is from the Lord: because security of soul is a sign of present majesty. But if the fear with which we are stricken persevere, it is an enemy that we see. Moreover it was becoming to virginal modesty that the Virgin should be troubled. Because, as Ambrose says on Luke 1:20: It is the part of a virgin to be timid, to fear the advances of men, and to shrink from men’s addresses. But others say that as the Blessed Virgin was accustomed to angelic visions, she was not troubled at seeing this angel, but with wonder at hearing what the angel said to her, for she did not think so highly of herself. Wherefore the evangelist does not say that she was troubled at seeing the angel, but at his saying.

Article 4 Whether the Annunciation took place in becoming order? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod AnObjection 1: It would seem that the Annunciation did nuntiatio non fuerit convenienti ordine perfecta. Digni- not take place in becoming order. For the dignity of the tas enim matris Dei dependet ex prole concepta. Sed Mother of God results from the child she conceived. But the causa prius debet manifestari quam effectus. Ergo pri- cause should be made known before the effect. Therefore

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Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin

Q. 30, A. 4

mo debuit Angelus virgini annuntiare conceptum prolis, the angel should have announced to the Virgin the concepquam eius dignitatem exprimere eam salutando. tion of her child before acknowledging her dignity in greeting her. Praeterea, probatio aut praetermitti debet, in his Obj. 2: Further, proof should be omitted in things quae dubia non sunt, aut praemitti, in his quae dubia es- which admit of no doubt; and premised where doubt is posse possunt. Sed Angelus primo videtur annuntiasse id de sible. But the angel seems first to have announced what quo virgo dubitaret, et dubitando quaereret, dicens, quo- the virgin might doubt, and which, because of her doubt, modo fiet istud? Et postea probationem adiunxit, tum ex would make her ask: How shall this be done? and afterwards exemplo Elisabeth, tum ex Dei omnipotentia. Ergo in- to have given the proof, alleging both the instance of Elizaconvenienti ordine Annuntiatio per Angelum est effec- beth and the omnipotence of God. Therefore the Annuncita. ation was made by the angel in unbecoming order. Praeterea, maius non potest sufficienter probari Obj. 3: Further, the greater cannot be adequately per minus. Sed maius fuit virginem parere quam vetu- proved by the less. But it was a greater wonder for a virgin lam. Ergo non fuit sufficiens probatio Angeli probantis than for an old woman to be with child. Therefore the anconceptum virginis ex conceptu senis. gel’s proof was insufficient to demonstrate the conception of a virgin from that of an old woman. Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. XIII, quae a Deo On the contrary, it is written (Rom 13:1): Those that sunt, ordinata sunt. Angelus autem missus est a Deo ad are of God, are well ordered. Now the angel was sent by God hoc quod virgini annuntiaret, ut dicitur Luc. I. Ergo or- to announce unto the Virgin, as is related Luke 1:26. Theredinatissime fuit Annuntiatio per Angelum completa. fore the Annunciation was made by the angel in the most perfect order. Respondeo dicendum quod Annuntiatio congruo I answer that, The Annunciation was made by the ordine per Angelum est perfecta. Tria enim Angelus in- angel in a becoming manner. For the angel had a threefold tendebat circa virginem. Primo quidem, reddere men- purpose in regard to the Virgin. First, to draw her attentem eius attentam ad tantae rei considerationem. Quod tion to the consideration of a matter of such moment. This quidem fecit eam salutando quadam nova et insolita he did by greeting her by a new and unwonted salutation. salutatione. Unde Origenes dicit, super Luc., quod, si Wherefore Origen says, commenting on Luke (Hom. vi), scivisset ad alium quempiam similem factum esse ser- that if she had known that similar words had been addressed monem (utpote quae habebat legis scientiam), nunquam to anyone else, she, who had knowledge of the Law, would eam, quasi peregrina, talis salutatio terruisset. In qua qui- never have been astonished at the seeming strangeness of the dem salutatione praemisit idoneitatem eius ad concep- salutation. In which salutation he began by asserting her tum, in eo quod dixit, gratia plena; expressit conceptum, worthiness of the conception, by saying, Full of grace; then in eo quod dixit, dominus tecum; et praenuntiavit hono- he announced the conception in the words, The Lord is with rem consequentem, cum dixit, benedicta tu in mulieri- thee; and then foretold the honor which would result to her bus. therefrom, by saying, Blessed art thou among women. Secundo autem, intendebat eam instruere de mysteSecond, he purposed to instruct her about the mystery rio incarnationis, quod in ea erat implendum. Quod qui- of the Incarnation, which was to be fulfilled in her. This he dem fecit praenuntiando conceptum et partum, dicens, did by foretelling the conception and birth, saying: Behold, ecce, concipies in utero, etc.; et ostendendo dignitatem thou shalt conceive in thy womb, etc.; and by declaring the prolis conceptae, cum dixit, hic erit magnus; et etiam dignity of the child conceived, saying: He shall be great; and demonstrando modum conceptionis, cum dixit, Spiritus further, by making known the mode of conception, when Sanctus superveniet in te. he said: The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee. Tertio, intendebat animum eius inducere ad consenThird, he purposed to lead her mind to consent. This he sum. Quod quidem fecit exemplo Elisabeth; et ratione ex did by the instance of Elizabeth, and by the argument from divina omnipotentia sumpta. Divine omnipotence. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod animo humili niReply Obj. 1: To a humble mind nothing is more ashil est mirabilius quam auditus suae excellentiae. Ad- tonishing than to hear its own excellence. Now, wonder is miratio autem maxime attentionem animi facit. Et ideo most effective in drawing the mind’s attention. Therefore Angelus, volens mentem virginis attentam reddere ad the angel, desirous of drawing the Virgin’s attention to the auditum tanti mysterii, ab eius laude incoepit. hearing of so great a mystery, began by praising her. Ad secundum dicendum quod Ambrosius expresReply Obj. 2: Ambrose says explicitly on Luke 1:34, se dicit, super Luc., quod beata virgo de verbis Angeli that the Blessed Virgin did not doubt the angel’s words. For non dubitavit. Dicit enim, temperatior est Mariae respon- he says: Mary’s answer is more temperate than the words of sio quam verba sacerdotis. Haec ait, quomodo fiet istud? the priest. She says: How shall this be? He replies: Whereby

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Ille respondit, unde hoc sciam? Negat ille se credere, qui negat se scire ista. Non dubitat esse faciendum quod, quomodo fieri possit, inquirit. Augustinus tamen videtur dicere quod dubitaverit. Dicit enim, in libro quaestionum veteris et novi Test., ambigenti Mariae de conceptu, possibilitatem Angelus praedicat. Sed talis dubitatio magis est admirationis quam incredulitatis. Et ideo Angelus probationem inducit, non ad auferendam infidelitatem, sed ad removendam eius admirationem. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Ambrosius dicit, in Hexaemeron, ob hoc multae steriles praevenerunt, ut partus credatur virginis. Et ideo conceptus Elisabeth sterilis inducitur, non quasi sufficiens argumentum, sed quasi quoddam figurale exemplum. Et ideo, ad confirmationem huius exempli, subditur argumentum efficax ex omnipotentia divina.

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shall I know this? He denies that he believes, since he denies that he knows this. She does not doubt fulfilment when she asks how it shall be done. Augustine, however, seems to assert that she doubted. For he says (De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. li): To Mary, in doubt about the conception, the angel declares the possibility thereof. But such a doubt is one of wonder rather than of unbelief. And so the angel adduces a proof, not as a cure for unbelief, but in order to remove her astonishment. Reply Obj. 3: As Ambrose says (Hexaemeron v): For this reason had many barren women borne children, that the virginal birth might be credible. The conception of the sterile Elizabeth is therefore adduced, not as a sufficient argument, but as a kind of figurative example: consequently in support of this instance, the convincing argument is added taken from the Divine omnipotence.

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Question 31 The Matter from Which the Savior’s Body was Conceived Deinde considerandum est de ipsa conceptione salWe have now to consider the Savior’s conception. First, vatoris. Et primo, quantum ad materiam de qua corpus as to the matter from which His body was conceived; seceius conceptum est; secundo, quantum ad conceptionis ond, as to the author of His conception; third, as to the auctorem; tertio, quantum ad modum et ordinem con- manner and order of His conception. ceptionis. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum caro Christi fuerit sumpta ab Adam. (1) Whether the flesh of Christ was derived from Adam? Secundo, utrum fuerit sumpta de David. (2) Whether it was derived from David? Tertio, de genealogia Christi quae in Evangeliis (3) Of the genealogy of Christ which is given in the ponitur. Gospels; Quarto, utrum decuerit Christum nasci de femina (4) Whether it was fitting for Christ to be born of a woman? quinto, utrum fuerit de purissimis sanguinibus (5) Whether His body was formed from the purest virginis corpus eius formatum. blood of the Virgin? Sexto, utrum caro Christi fuerit in antiquis patribus (6) Whether the flesh of Christ was in the patriarchs as secundum aliquid signatum. to something signate? Septimo, utrum caro Christi in patribus fuerit (7) Whether the flesh of Christ in the patriarchs was peccato obnoxia. subject to sin? Octavo, utrum fuerit decimata in lumbis Abrahae. (8) Whether Christ paid tithes in the loins of Abraham?

Article 1 Whether the flesh of Christ was derived from Adam? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caro Christi non fuerit sumpta ex Adam. Dicit enim apostolus, I Cor. XV, primus homo de terra, terrenus, secundus homo de caelo, caelestis. Primus autem homo est Adam, secundus homo est Christus. Ergo Christus non est ex Adam, sed habet ab eo distinctam originem. Praeterea, conceptio Christi debuit esse maxime miraculosa. Sed maius est miraculum formare corpus hominis ex limo terrae quam ex materia humana, quae de Adam trahitur. Ergo videtur quod non fuit conveniens Christum ab Adam carnem assumpsisse. Ergo videtur quod corpus Christi non debuit formari de massa humani generis derivata ab Adam, sed de aliqua alia materia. Preaterea, peccatum in hunc mundum intravit per hominem unum, scilicet Adam, quia omnes in eo gentes originaliter peccaverunt, ut patet Rom. V. Sed si corpus Christi fuisset ab Adam sumptum, ipse etiam in Adam originaliter fuisset quando peccavit. Ergo peccatum ori-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s flesh was not derived from Adam. For the Apostle says (1 Cor 15:47): The first man was of the earth, earthly: the second man, from heaven, heavenly. Now, the first man is Adam: and the second man is Christ. Therefore Christ is not derived from Adam, but has an origin distinct from him. Obj. 2: Further, the conception of Christ should have been most miraculous. But it is a greater miracle to form man’s body from the slime of the earth, than from human matter derived from Adam. It seems therefore unfitting that Christ should take flesh from Adam. Therefore the body of Christ should not have been formed from the mass of the human race derived from Adam, but of some other matter. Obj. 3: Further, by one man sin entered into this world, i.e., by Adam, because in him all nations sinned originally, as is clear from Rom. 5:12. But if Christ’s body was derived from Adam, He would have been in Adam originally when he sinned: therefore he would have contracted original sin;

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Incarnate Son of God

ginale contraxisset. Quod non decebat Christi puritatem. Non ergo corpus Christi est formatum de materia sumpta ab Adam. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Heb. II, nusquam Angelos apprehendit, scilicet filius Dei, sed semen Abrahae apprehendit. Semen autem Abrahae sumptum est ab Adam. Ergo corpus Christi fuit formatum de materia ex Adam sumpta. Respondeo dicendum quod Christus humanam naturam assumpsit ut eam a corruptione purgaret. Non autem purgatione indigebat humana natura nisi secundum quod infecta erat per originem vitiatam qua ex Adam descendebat. Et ideo conveniens fuit ut carnem sumeret ex materia ab Adam derivata, ut ipsa natura per assumptionem curaretur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod secundus homo, idest Christus, dicitur esse de caelo non quidem quantum ad materiam corporis, sed vel quantum ad virtutem formativam corporis; vel etiam quantum ad ipsam eius divinitatem. Secundum autem materiam corpus Christi fuit terrenum, sicut et corpus Adae. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, mysterium incarnationis Christi est quiddam miraculosum, non sicut ordinatum ad confirmationem fidei, sed sicut articulus fidei. Et ideo in mysterio incarnationis non requiritur quid sit maius miraculum, sicut in miraculis quae fiunt ad confirmationem fidei, sed quid sit divinae sapientiae convenientius, et magis expediens humanae saluti, quod requiritur in omnibus quae fidei sunt. Vel potest dici quod in mysterio incarnationis non solum attenditur miraculum ex materia conceptus, sed magis ex modo conceptionis et partus, quia scilicet virgo concepit et peperit Deum.

IIIae

which is unbecoming in His purity. Therefore the body of Christ was not formed of matter derived from Adam. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb 2:16): Nowhere doth He—that is, the Son of God—take hold of the angels: but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold. But the seed of Abraham was derived from Adam. Therefore Christ’s body was formed of matter derived from Adam. I answer that, Christ assumed human nature in order to cleanse it of corruption. But human nature did not need to be cleansed save in as far as it was soiled in its tainted origin whereby it was descended from Adam. Therefore it was becoming that He should assume flesh of matter derived from Adam, that the nature itself might be healed by the assumption. Reply Obj. 1: The second man, i.e., Christ, is said to be of heaven, not indeed as to the matter from which His body was formed, but either as to the virtue whereby it was formed; or even as to His very Godhead. But as to matter, Christ’s body was earthly, as Adam’s body was.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 29, A. 1, ad 2) the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation is miraculous, not as ordained to strengthen faith, but as an article of faith. And therefore in the mystery of the Incarnation we do not seek that which is most miraculous, as in those miracles that are wrought for the confirmation of faith, but what is most becoming to Divine wisdom, and most expedient to the salvation of man, since this is what we seek in all matters of faith. It may also be said that in the mystery of the Incarnation the miracle is not only in reference to the matter of the conception, but rather in respect of the manner of the conception and birth; inasmuch as a virgin conceived and gave birth to God. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 15, A. 1, ad 2), est, corpus Christi fuit in Adam secundum corpulentam Christ’s body was in Adam in respect of a bodily subsubstantiam, quia scilicet ipsa materia corporalis corpo- stance—that is to say, that the corporeal matter of Christ’s ris Christi derivata est ab Adam, non autem fuit ibi se- body was derived from Adam: but it was not there by reacundum seminalem rationem, quia non est concepta ex son of seminal virtue, because it was not conceived from the virili semine. Et ideo non contraxit originale peccatum seed of man. Thus it did not contract original sin, as others sicut et ceteri, qui ab Adam per viam virilis seminis de- who are descended from Adam by man’s seed.

rivantur.

Article 2 Whether Christ took flesh of the seed of David? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not take Christus non sumpserit carnem de semine David. Mat- flesh of the seed of David. For Matthew, in tracing the gethaeus enim, genealogiam Christi texens, eam ad Ioseph nealogy of Christ, brings it down to Joseph. But Joseph perduxit. Ioseph autem non fuit pater Christi, ut supra was not Christ’s father, as shown above (Q. 28, A. 1, ad 1,

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ostensum est. Non ergo videtur quod Christus de genere David descenderit. Praeterea, Aaron fuit de tribu levi, ut patet Exod. VI, Maria autem, mater Christi, cognata dicitur Elisabeth, quae est filia Aaron, ut patet Luc. I. Cum ergo David de tribu Iuda fuerit, ut patet Matth. I, videtur quod Christus de semine David non descenderit. Praeterea, Ierem. XXII dicitur de Iechonia, scribe virum istum sterilem, nec enim erit de semine eius vir qui sedeat super solium David. Sed de Christo dicitur Isaiae IX, super solium David sedebit. Ergo Christus non fuit de semine Iechoniae. Et per consequens nec de genere David, quia Matthaeus a David per Iechoniam seriem generationis perducit. Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. I, qui factus est ei ex semine David secundum carnem. Respondeo dicendum quod Christus specialiter duorum antiquorum patrum filius dicitur esse, Abrahae scilicet et David, ut patet Matth. I. Cuius est multiplex ratio. Prima quidem, quia ad hos specialiter de Christo repromissio facta est. Dictum est enim Abrahae, Gen. XXII, benedicentur in semine tuo omnes gentes terrae, quod apostolus de Christo exponit, dicens, Galat. III, Abrahae dictae sunt promissiones, et semini eius. Non dicit et seminibus, quasi in multis, sed, quasi in uno, et semini tuo, qui est Christus. Ad David autem dictum est, de fructu ventris tui ponam super sedem tuam. Unde et populi Iudaeorum, ut regem honorifice suscipientes, dicebant, Matth. XXI, hosanna filio David. Secunda ratio est quia Christus futurus erat rex, propheta et sacerdos. Abraham autem sacerdos fuit, ut patet ex hoc quod dominus dixit ad eum, Gen. XV, sume tibi vaccam triennem, et cetera. Fuit etiam propheta, secundum id quod dicitur Gen. XX, propheta est, et orabit pro te. David autem rex fuit et propheta. Tertia ratio est quia in Abraham primo incoepit circumcisio, in David autem maxime manifestata est Dei electio, secundum illud quod dicitur I Reg. XIII, quaesivit sibi dominus virum iuxta cor suum. Et ideo utriusque filius Christus specialissime dicitur, ut ostendatur esse in salutem circumcisioni et electioni gentilium.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio fuit Fausti Manichaei, volentis probare Christum non esse filium David, quia non est conceptus ex Ioseph, usque ad quem seriem generationis Matthaeus perducit. Contra quod Augustinus respondet, XXIII libro contra Faustum, quod, cum idem Evangelista dicat virum Mariae esse Ioseph, et Christi matrem virginem esse, et Christum ex semine David, quid restat nisi credere Mariam non fuisse extraneam a cognatione David; et eam Ioseph coniugem non frustra appellatam, propter animorum confoede-

Q. 31, A. 2

2). Therefore it seems that Christ was not descended from David. Obj. 2: Further, Aaron was of the tribe of Levi, as related Ex. 6. Now Mary the Mother of Christ is called the cousin of Elizabeth, who was a daughter of Aaron, as is clear from Luke 1:5, 36. Therefore, since David was of the tribe of Judah, as is shown Matt. 1, it seems that Christ was not descended from David. Obj. 3: Further, it is written of Jechonias (Jer 22:30): Write this man barren . . . for there shall not be a man of his seed that shall sit upon the throne of David. Whereas of Christ it is written (Isa 9:7): He shall sit upon the throne of David. Therefore Christ was not of the seed of Jechonias: nor, consequently, of the family of David, since Matthew traces the genealogy from David through Jechonias. On the contrary, It is written (Rom 1:3): Who was made to him of the seed of David according to the flesh. I answer that, Christ is said to have been the son especially of two of the patriarchs, Abraham and David, as is clear from Matt. 1:1. There are many reasons for this. First to these especially was the promise made concerning Christ. For it was said to Abraham (Gen 22:18): In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed: which words the Apostle expounds of Christ (Gal 3:16): To Abraham were the promises made and to his seed. He saith not, ‘And to his seeds’ as of many; but as of one, ‘And to thy seed,’ which is Christ. And to David it was said (Ps 131:11): Of the fruit of thy womb I will set upon thy throne. Wherefore the Jewish people, receiving Him with kingly honor, said (Matt 21:9): Hosanna to the Son of David. A second reason is because Christ was to be king, prophet, and priest. Now Abraham was a priest; which is clear from the Lord saying unto him (Gen 15:9): Take thee a cow of three years old, etc. He was also a prophet, according to Gen. 20:7: He is a prophet; and he shall pray for thee. Lastly David was both king and prophet. A third reason is because circumcision had its beginning in Abraham: while in David God’s election was most clearly made manifest, according to 1 Kings 13:14: The Lord hath sought Him a man according to His own heart. And consequently Christ is called in a most special way the Son of both, in order to show that He came for the salvation both of the circumcised and of the elect among the Gentiles. Reply Obj. 1: Faustus the Manichean argued thus, in the desire to prove that Christ is not the Son of David, because He was not conceived of Joseph, in whom Matthew’s genealogy terminates. Augustine answered this argument thus (Contra Faust. xxii): Since the same evangelist affirms that Joseph was Mary’s husband and that Christ’s mother was a virgin, and that Christ was of the seed of Abraham, what must we believe, but that Mary was not a stranger to the family of David: and that it is not without reason that she was called the wife of Joseph, by reason of the close alliance of their

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rationem, quamvis ei non fuerit carne commixtus; et quod potius propter dignitatem virilem ordo generationum ad Ioseph perducitur? Sic ergo nos credimus etiam Mariam fuisse in cognatione David, quia Scripturis credimus, quae utrumque dicunt, et Christum ex semine David secundum carnem, et eius matrem Mariam, non cum viro concumbendo, sed virginem. Ut enim dicit Hieronymus, super Matth., ex una tribu fuit Ioseph et Maria, unde et secundum legem eam accipere cogebatur ut propinquam. Propter quod et simul censentur in Bethlehem, quasi de una stirpe generati. Ad secundum dicendum quod huic obiectioni Gregorius Nazianzenus respondet dicens quod hoc nutu superno contigit, ut regium genus sacerdotali stirpi iungeretur, ut Christus, qui rex est et sacerdos, ab utrisque nasceretur secundum carnem. Unde et Aaron, qui fuit primus sacerdos secundum legem, duxit ex tribu Iudae coniugem Elisabeth, filiam Aminadab. Sic ergo potuit fieri ut pater Elisabeth aliquam uxorem habuerit de stirpe David, ratione cuius beata virgo Maria, quae fuit de stirpe David, esset Elisabeth cognata. Vel potius e converso quod pater beatae Mariae, de stirpe David existens, uxorem habuerit de stirpe Aaron. Vel, sicut Augustinus dicit, XXIII contra Faustum, si Ioachim, pater Mariae, de stirpe Aaron fuit (ut Faustus haereticus per quasdam Scripturas apocryphas asserebat), credendum est quod mater Ioachim fuerit de stirpe David, vel etiam uxor eius, ita quod per aliquem modum dicamus Mariam fuisse de progenie David. Ad tertium dicendum quod per illam auctoritatem propheticam, sicut Ambrosius dicit, super Luc., non negatur ex semine Iechoniae posteros nascituros. Et ideo de semine eius Christus est. Et quod regnavit Christus, non contra prophetiam est, non enim saeculari honore regnavit; ipse enim dixit, regnum meum non est de hoc mundo.

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hearts, although not mingled in the flesh; and that the genealogy is traced down to Joseph rather than to her by reason of the dignity of the husband? So therefore we believe that Mary was also of the family of David: because we believe the Scriptures, which assert both that Christ was of the seed of David according to the flesh, and that Mary was His Mother, not by sexual intercourse but retaining her virginity. For as Jerome says on Matt. 1:18: Joseph and Mary were of the same tribe: wherefore he was bound by law to marry her as she was his kinswoman. Hence it was that they were enrolled together at Bethlehem, as being descended from the same stock. Reply Obj. 2: Gregory of Nazianzum answers this objection by saying that it happened by God’s will, that the royal family was united to the priestly race, so that Christ, who is both king and priest, should be born of both according to the flesh. Wherefore Aaron, who was the first priest according to the Law, married a wife of the tribe of Judah, Elizabeth, daughter of Aminadab. It is therefore possible that Elizabeth’s father married a wife of the family of David, through whom the Blessed Virgin Mary, who was of the family of David, would be a cousin of Elizabeth. Or conversely, and with greater likelihood, that the Blessed Mary’s father, who was of the family of David, married a wife of the family of Aaron. Again, it may be said with Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii) that if Joachim, Mary’s father, was of the family of Aaron (as the heretic Faustus pretended to prove from certain apocryphal writings), then we must believe that Joachim’s mother, or else his wife, was of the family of David, so long as we say that Mary was in some way descended from David. Reply Obj. 3: As Ambrose says on Luke 3:25, this prophetical passage does not deny that a posterity will be born of the seed of Jechonias. And so Christ is of his seed. Neither is the fact that Christ reigned contrary to prophecy, for He did not reign with worldly honor; since He declared: ‘My kingdom is not of this world’.

Article 3 Whether Christ’s genealogy is suitably traced by the Evangelists? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod genealogia Christi inconvenienter ab Evangelistis texatur. Dicitur enim Isaiae LIII de Christo, generationem eius quis enarrabit? Ergo non fuit Christi generatio enarranda. Praeterea, impossibile est unum hominem duos patres habere. Sed Matthaeus dicit quod Iacob genuit Ioseph, virum Mariae, Lucas autem dicit Ioseph fuisse filium Heli. Ergo contraria sibi invicem scribunt.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s genealogy is not suitably traced by the Evangelists. For it is written (Isa 53:8): Who shall declare His generation? Therefore Christ’s genealogy should not have been set down. Obj. 2: Further, one man cannot possibly have two fathers. But Matthew says that Jacob begot Joseph, the husband of Mary: whereas Luke says that Joseph was the son of Heli. Therefore they contradict one another.

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Praeterea, videntur in quibusdam a se invicem diversificari. Matthaeus enim, in principio libri incipiens ab Abraham, descendendo usque ad Ioseph, quadraginta duas generationes enumerat. Lucas autem post Baptismum Christi generationem Christi ponit, incipiens a Christo et perducens generationum numerum usque ad Deum, ponens generationes septuaginta septem, utroque extremo computato. Videtur ergo quod inconvenienter generationem Christi describant. Praeterea, IV Reg. VIII legitur quod Ioram genuit Ochoziam; cui successit Ioas, filius eius; huic autem successit filius eius Amasias; postea regnavit filius eius Azarias, qui appellatur Ozias; cui successit Ioathan, filius eius. Matthaeus autem dicit quod Ioram genuit Oziam. Ergo videtur inconvenienter generationem Christi describere, tres reges in medio praetermittens. Praeterea, omnes qui in Christi generatione describuntur patres habuerunt et matres, et plurimi etiam ex eis fratres habuerunt. Matthaeus autem in generatione Christi tres tantum matres nominat scilicet Thamar, Ruth et uxorem Uriae. Fratres autem nominat Iudae et Iechoniae, et iterum Phares et Zaram. Quorum nihil posuit Lucas. Ergo videntur Evangelistae inconvenienter genealogiam Christi descripsisse. Sed contra est auctoritas Scripturae. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur II Tim. III, omnis Scriptura sacra est divinitus inspirata. Quae autem divinitus fiunt ordinatissime fiunt, secundum illud Rom. XIII, quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt. Unde convenienti ordine genealogia Christi est ab Evangelistis descripta. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., Isaias loquitur de generatione divinitatis Christi. Matthaeus autem enarrat generationem Christi secundum humanitatem, non quidem explicans modum incarnationis, quia hoc etiam est ineffabile; sed enumerat patres ex quibus Christus secundum carnem processit. Ad secundum dicendum quod ad hanc obiectionem, quam movit Iulianus apostata, diversimode ab aliquibus respondetur. Quidam enim, ut Gregorius Nazianzenus dicit, dicunt eosdem esse quos uterque Evangelista enumerat, sed sub diversis nominibus, quasi binomios. Sed hoc stare non potest, quia Matthaeus ponit unum filiorum David scilicet Salomonem, Lucas autem ponit alium, scilicet Nathan, quos secundum historiam libri regum constat fratres fuisse. Unde alii dixerunt quod Matthaeus veram genealogiam Christi tradidit, Lucas autem putativam, unde incoepit, ut putabatur, filius Ioseph. Erant enim aliqui ex Iudaeis qui, propter peccata regum Iuda, credebant

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Obj. 3: Further, there seem to be divergencies between them on several points. For Matthew, at the commencement of his book, beginning from Abraham and coming down to Joseph, enumerates forty-two generations. Whereas Luke sets down Christ’s genealogy after His Baptism, and beginning from Christ traces the series of generations back to God, counting in all seventy-seven generations, the first and last included. It seems therefore that their accounts of Christ’s genealogy do not agree. Obj. 4: Further, we read (4 Kgs 8:24) that Joram begot Ochozias, who was succeeded by his son Joas: who was succeeded by his son Amasius: after whom reigned his son Azarias, called Ozias; who was succeeded by his son Joathan. But Matthew says that Joram begot Ozias. Therefore it seems that his account of Christ’s genealogy is unsuitable, since he omits three kings in the middle thereof. Obj. 5: Further, all those who are mentioned in Christ’s genealogy had both a father and a mother, and many of them had brothers also. Now in Christ’s genealogy Matthew mentions only three mothers—namely, Thamar, Ruth, and the wife of Urias. He also mentions the brothers of Judas and Jechonias, and also Phares and Zara. But Luke mentions none of these. Therefore the evangelists seem to have described the genealogy of Christ in an unsuitable manner. On the contrary, The authority of Scripture suffices. I answer that, As is written (2 Tim 3:16), All Holy Scripture is inspired of God, etc. Now what is done by God is done in perfect order, according to Rom. 13:1: Those that are, are ordained of God. Therefore Christ’s genealogy is set down by the evangelists in a suitable order. Reply Obj. 1: As Jerome says on Matt. 1, Isaias speaks of the generation of Christ’s Godhead. Whereas Matthew relates the generation of Christ in His humanity; not indeed by explaining the manner of the Incarnation, which is also unspeakable; but by enumerating Christ’s forefathers from whom He was descended according to the flesh. Reply Obj. 2: Various answers have been made by certain writers to this objection which was raised by Julian the Apostate; for some, as Gregory of Nazianzum, say that the people mentioned by the two evangelists are the same, but under different names, as though they each had two. But this will not stand: because Matthew mentions one of David’s sons—namely, Solomon; whereas Luke mentions another—namely, Nathan, who according to the history of the kings (2 Kgs 5:14) were clearly brothers. Wherefore others said that Matthew gave the true genealogy of Christ: while Luke gave the supposititious genealogy; hence he began: Being (as it was supposed) the son of Joseph. For among the Jews there were some who be-

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Christum ex David non per reges, sed per aliam eius stir- lieved that, on account of the crimes of the kings of Judah, pem hominum privatorum, esse nasciturum. Christ would be born of the family of David, not through the kings, but through some other line of private individuals. Alii vero dixerunt quod Matthaeus posuit patres carOthers again have supposed that Matthew gave the forenales, Lucas autem posuit patres spirituales, scilicet iu- fathers according to the flesh: whereas Luke gave these acstos viros, qui dicuntur patres propter similitudinem ho- cording to the spirit, that is, righteous men, who are called nestatis. (Christ’s) forefathers by likeness of virtue. In libro vero de quaest. Nov. et Vet. Test., respondeBut an answer is given in the Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test. to the tur quod non est intelligendum quod Ioseph a Luca dica- effect that we are not to understand that Joseph is said by tur esse filius Heli, sed quia Heli et Ioseph fuerunt tem- Luke to be the son of Heli: but that at the time of Christ, pore Christi diversimode a David descendentes. Unde Heli and Joseph were differently descended from David. de Christo dicitur quod putabatur filius Ioseph, et quod Hence Christ is said to have been supposed to be the son ipse etiam Christus fuit Heli filius, quasi diceret quod of Joseph, and also to have been the son of Heli as though Christus ea ratione qua dicitur filius Ioseph, potest di- (the Evangelist) were to say that Christ, from the fact that ci filius Heli, et omnium eorum qui ex stirpe David de- He was the son of Joseph, could be called the son of Heli scendunt; sicut apostolus dicit, Rom. IX, ex quibus, sci- and of all those who were descended from David; as the licet Iudaeis, Christus est secundum carnem. Apostle says (Rom 9:5): Of whom (viz. the Jews) is Christ according to the flesh. Augustinus vero, in libro de quaest. Evang., tripliciAugustine again gives three solutions (De Qq. Evang. ter solvit, dicens, tres causae occurrunt, quarum aliquam ii), saying: There are three motives by one or other of which Evangelista secutus est. Aut enim unus Evangelista patrem the evangelist was guided. For either one evangelist mentions Ioseph a quo genitus est, nominavit, alter vero vel avum Joseph’s father of whom he was begotten; whilst the other gives maternum, vel aliquem de cognatis maioribus posuit. Aut either his maternal grandfather or some other of his later unus erat Ioseph naturalis pater, et alter eum adoptave- forefathers; or one was Joseph’s natural father: the other is rat. Aut, more Iudaeorum, cum sine filiis unus decessis- father by adoption. Or, according to the Jewish custom, one set, eius uxorem propinquus accipiens, filium quem genuit of those having died without children, a near relation of his propinquo mortuo deputavit, quod etiam quoddam ge- married his wife, the son born of the latter union being recknus adoptionis legalis est, ut ipse Augustinus dicit, in II oned as the son of the former: which is a kind of legal adopde consensu Evang. tion, as Augustine himself says (De Consensu Evang. ii, Cf. Retract. ii). Et haec ultima causa est verior, quam etiam HieroThis last motive is the truest: Jerome also gives it comnymus, super Matth., ponit; et Eusebius Caesariensis, in menting on Matt. 1:16; and Eusebius of Caesarea in his ecclesiastica historia, ab Africano historiographo tradi- Church history (I, vii), says that it is given by Africanus the tum asserit. Dicunt enim quod Mathan et Melchi diver- historian. For these writers say that Mathan and Melchi, at sis temporibus de una eademque uxore, Estha nomine, different times, each begot a son of one and the same wife, singulos filios procrearunt. Quia Mathan, qui per Salo- named Estha. For Mathan, who traced his descent through monem descendit, uxorem eam primum ceperat, et, re- Solomon, had married her first, and died, leaving one son, licto filio uno, Iacob nomine, defunctus est; post cuius whose name was Jacob: and after his death, as the law did obitum, quoniam lex viduam alii viro non vetat nube- not forbid his widow to remarry, Melchi, who traced his dere, Melchi, qui per Nathan genus ducit, cum esset ex ea- scent through Mathan, being of the same tribe though not dem tribu sed non ex eodem genere, relictam Mathan of the same family as Mathan, married his widow, who bore accepit uxorem, ex qua et ipse suscepit filium, nomine him a son, called Heli; so that Jacob and Heli were uterine Heli; et sic ex diverso patrum genere efficiuntur Iacob brothers born to different fathers. Now one of these, Jacob, et Heli uterini fratres. Quorum alter, idest Iacob, fratris on his brother Heli dying without issue, married the latter’s sui Heli, sine liberis defuncti, ex mandato legis accipiens widow, according to the prescription of the law, of whom uxorem, genuit Ioseph, natura quidem generis suum fi- he had a son, Joseph, who by nature was his own son, but lium, secundum vero legis praeceptum, Heli efficitur fi- by law was accounted the son of Heli. Wherefore Matthew lius. Et ideo Matthaeus dicit, Iacob genuit Ioseph, sed says Jacob begot Joseph: whereas Luke, who was giving the Lucas, quia legalem generationem describit, nullum no- legal genealogy, speaks of no one as begetting. minat aliquem genuisse. Et quamvis Damascenus dicat quod beata virgo MaAnd although Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv) says that ria Ioseph attinebat secundum illam originem qua pater the Blessed Virgin Mary was connected with Joseph in as eius dicitur Heli, quia dicit eam ex Melchi descendisse, far as Heli was accounted as his father, for he says that she

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tamen credendum est quod etiam ex Salomone originem duxerit, secundum aliquem modum, per illos patres quos enumerat Matthaeus, qui carnalem Christi generationem dicitur enarrare; praesertim cum Ambrosius dicat Christum de semine Iechoniae descendisse. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de consensu Evang., Matthaeus regiam in Christo instituerat insinuare personam, Lucas autem sacerdotalem. Unde in generationibus Matthaei significatur nostrorum susceptio peccatorum a domino Iesu Christo, inquantum scilicet per carnis originem similitudinem carnis peccati assumpsit. In generationibus autem Lucae significatur nostrorum ablutio peccatorum, quae est per sacrificium Christi. Et ideo generationes Matthaeus descendens enumerat, Lucas autem ascendens. Inde etiam est quod Matthaeus ab ipso David per Salomonem descendit, in cuius matre ille peccavit, Lucas vero ad ipsum David per Nathan ascendit per cuius nominis prophetam Deus peccatum illius expiavit. Et inde est etiam quod, quia Matthaeus ad mortalitatem nostram Christum descendentem voluit significare, ipsas generationes ab Abraham usque ad Ioseph, et usque ad ipsius Christi nativitatem, descendendo commemoravit ab initio Evangelii sui. Lucas autem non ab initio, sed a Baptismo Christi generationem narrat, nec descendendo, sed ascendendo, tanquam sacerdotem in expiandis peccatis magis assignans ubi testimonium Ioannes perhibuit, dicens, ecce qui tollit peccatum mundi. Ascendendo autem, transit Abraham et pervenit ad Deum, cui mundati et expiati reconciliamur. Merito etiam adoptionis originem ipse suscepit, quia per adoptionem efficimur filii Dei; per carnalem vero generationem filius Dei filius hominis factus est. Satis autem demonstravit non se ideo dixisse Ioseph filium Heli quod de illo sit genitus, sed quod ab illo fuerat adoptatus, cum et ipsum Adam filium Dei dixit, cum sit factus a Deo. Numerus etiam quadragenarius ad tempus praesentis vitae pertinet, propter quatuor partes mundi, in quo mortalem vitam ducimus sub Christo regnante. Quadraginta autem quater habent decem, et ipsa decem ab uno usque ad quatuor progrediente numero consummantur. Posset etiam denarius ad Decalogum referri, et quaternarius ad praesentem vitam; vel etiam ad quatuor Evangelia, secundum quod Christus regnat in nobis. Et ideo Matthaeus, regiam personam Christi commendans, quadraginta personas posuit excepto ipso. Sed hoc intelligendum est si sit idem Iechonias qui ponitur in fine secundi quaterdenarii et in principio tertii, ut Augustinus vult. Quod dicit factum esse ad significandum quod in Iechonia facta est quaedam deflexio ad extraneas gentes, quando in Babyloniam transmigratum est, quod etiam praefigurabat Christum a circumcisione ad praeputium migraturum.

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was descended from Melchi: yet must we also believe that she was in some way descended from Solomon through those patriarchs enumerated by Matthew, who is said to have set down Christ’s genealogy according to the flesh; and all the more since Ambrose states that Christ was of the seed of Jechonias. Reply Obj. 3: According to Augustine (De Consensu Evang. ii) Matthew purposed to delineate the royal personality of Christ; Luke the priestly personality: so that in Matthew’s genealogy is signified the assumption of our sins by our Lord Jesus Christ: inasmuch as by his carnal origin He assumed ‘the likeness of sinful flesh.’ But in Luke’s genealogy the washing away of our sins is signified, which is effected by Christ’s sacrifice. For which reason Matthew traces the generations downwards, Luke upwards. For the same reason too Matthew descends from David through Solomon, in whose mother David sinned; whereas Luke ascends to David through Nathan, through whose namesake, the prophet, God expiated his sin. And hence it is also that, because Matthew wished to signify that Christ had condescended to our mortal nature, he set down the genealogy of Christ at the very outset of his Gospel, beginning with Abraham and descending to Joseph and the birth of Christ Himself. Luke, on the contrary, sets forth Christ’s genealogy not at the outset, but after Christ’s Baptism, and not in the descending but in the ascending order: as though giving prominence to the office of the priest in expiating our sins, to which John bore witness, saying: ‘Behold Him who taketh away the sin of the world.’ And in the ascending order, he passes Abraham and continues up to God, to whom we are reconciled by cleansing and expiating. With reason too he follows the origin of adoption; because by adoption we become children of God: whereas by carnal generation the Son of God became the Son of Man. Moreover he shows sufficiently that he does not say that Joseph was the son of Heli as though begotten by him, but because he was adopted by him, since he says that Adam was the son of God, inasmuch as he was created by God. Again, the number forty pertains to the time of our present life: because of the four parts of the world in which we pass this mortal life under the rule of Christ. And forty is the product of four multiplied by ten: while ten is the sum of the numbers from one to four. The number ten may also refer to the decalogue; and the number four to the present life; or again to the four Gospels, according to which Christ reigns in us. And thus Matthew, putting forward the royal personality of Christ, enumerates forty persons not counting Him (cf. Augustine, De Consensu Evang. ii). But this is to be taken on the supposition that it be the same Jechonias at the end of the second, and at the commencement of the third series of fourteen, as Augustine understands it. According to him this was done in order to signify that under Jechonias there was a certain defection to strange nations during the Babylonian captivity; which also foreshadowed the fact that Christ would pass from the Jews to the Gentiles.

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Hieronymus autem dicit duos fuisse Ioachim, idest Iechonias, patrem scilicet et filium, quorum uterque in generatione Christi assumitur, ut constet distinctio generationum, quas Evangelista per tres quaterdenarios distinguit. Quod ascendit ad quadraginta duas personas. Qui etiam numerus convenit sanctae Ecclesiae. Hic enim numerus consurgit ex senario, qui significat laborem praesentis vitae, et septenario, qui significat quietem vitae futurae, sexies enim septem sunt quadraginta duo. Ipse etiam quaterdenarius, qui ex denario et quaternario constituitur per aggregationem, ad eandem significationem pertinere potest quae attributa est quadragenario qui consurgit ex eisdem numeris secundum multiplicationem. Numerus autem quo Lucas utitur in generationibus Christi, significat universitatem peccatorum. Denarius enim, tanquam iustitiae numerus, in decem praeceptis legis ostenditur. Peccatum autem est legis transgressio. Denarii vero numeri transgressio est undenarius. Septenarius autem significat universitatem, quia universum tempus septenario dierum numero volvitur. Septies autem undecim sunt septuaginta septem. Et ita per hoc significatur universitas peccatorum, quae per Christum tolluntur. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Hieronymus, super Matth., dicit, quia Ioram rex generi se miscuerat impiissimae Iezabel, idcirco usque ad tertiam generationem eius memoria tollitur, ne in sancto nativitatis ordine poneretur. Et ita, ut Chrysostomus dicit, quanta benedictio facta est super Iehu, qui vindictam fecerat super domum Achab et Iezabel, tanta est maledictio super domum Ioram, propter filiam iniqui Achab et Iezabel, ut usque ad quartam generationem praecidantur filii eius de numero regum, sicut scriptum est Exod. XX, reddam peccatum parentum in filios usque ad tertiam et quartam generationem. Est etiam attendendum quod et alii reges fuerunt peccatores, qui in genealogia Christi ponuntur, sed non fuit eorum continua impietas. Nam, ut dicitur in libro quaest. novi et Vet. Test., Salomon merito patris sui remissus in regno est, Roboam merito Asae, filii Abiae, filii sui. Horum autem trium continua fuit impietas. Ad quintum dicendum quod, sicut Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., in genealogia salvatoris nulla sanctarum mulierum assumitur, sed eas quas Scriptura reprehendit, ut qui propter peccatores venerat, de peccatoribus nascens, omnium peccata deleret. Unde ponitur Thamar, quae reprehenditur de socerino concubitu; et Rahab, quae fuit meretrix; et Ruth, quae fuit alienigena; et Bethsabee, uxor Uriae, quae fuit adultera. Quae tamen proprio nomine non ponitur, sed ex nomine viri designatur, tum propter peccatum ipsius, quia fuit adulterii et homicidii conscia; tum etiam ut, nominato viro,

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On the other hand, Jerome (on Matt. 1:12–15) says that there were two Joachims—that is, Jechonias, father and son: both of whom are mentioned in Christ’s genealogy, so as to make clear the distinction of the generations, which the evangelist divides into three series of fourteen; which amounts in all to forty-two persons. Which number may also be applied to the Holy Church: for it is the product of six, which signifies the labor of the present life, and seven, which signifies the rest of the life to come: for six times seven are forty-two. The number fourteen, which is the sum of ten and four, can also be given the same signification as that given to the number forty, which is the product of the same numbers by multiplication. But the number used by Luke in Christ’s genealogy signifies the generality of sins. For the number ten is shown in the ten precepts of the Law to be the number of righteousness. Now, to sin is to go beyond the restriction of the Law. And eleven is the number beyond ten. And seven signifies universality: because universal time is involved in seven days. Now seven times eleven are seventy-seven: so that this number signifies the generality of sins which are taken away by Christ. Reply Obj. 4: As Jerome says on Matt. 1:8, 11: Because Joram allied himself with the family of the most wicked Jezabel, therefore his memory is omitted down to the third generation, lest it should be inserted among the holy predecessors of the Nativity. Hence as Chrysostom says: Just as great was the blessing conferred on Jehu, who wrought vengeance on the house of Achab and Jezabel, so also great was the curse on the house of Joram, through the wicked daughter of Achab and Jezabel, so that until the fourth generation his posterity is cut off from the number of kings, according to Ex. 20:5: I shall visit the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generations. It must also be observed that there were other kings who sinned and are mentioned in Christ’s genealogy: but their impiety was not continuous. For, as it is stated in the book De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. lxxxv: Solomon through his father’s merits is included in the series of kings; and Roboam . . . through the merits of Asa, who was son of his (Roboam’s) son, Abiam. But the impiety of those three was continuous. Reply Obj. 5: As Jerome says on Matt. 1:3: None of the holy women are mentioned in the Savior’s genealogy, but only those whom Scripture censures, so that He who came for the sake of sinners, by being born of sinners, might blot out all sin. Thus Thamar is mentioned, who is censured for her sin with her father-in-law; Rahab who was a whore; Ruth who was a foreigner; and Bethsabee, the wife of Urias, who was an adulteress. The last, however, is not mentioned by name, but is designated through her husband; both on account of his sin, for he was cognizant of the adultery and murder; and further in order that, by mentioning the hus-

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peccatum David ad memoriam revocetur. Et quia Lucas Christum designare intendit ut peccatorum expiatorem, talium mulierum mentionem non facit. Fratres autem Iudae commemorat, ut ostendat eos ad Dei populum pertinere, cum tamen Ismael, frater Isaac, et Esau, frater Iacob, a populo Dei fuerint separati; propter quod in generatione Christi non commemorantur. Et etiam ut superbiam de nobilitate excludat, multi enim fratrum Iudae ex ancillis nati fuerunt, sed omnes simul erant patriarchae et tribuum principes. Phares autem et Zaram simul nominantur, ut Ambrosius dicit, super Luc., quia per eos gemina describitur vita populorum, una secundum legem, quae significatur per Zaram; altera per fidem, quae significatur per Phares. Fratres autem Iechoniae ponit, quia omnes regnaverunt diversis temporibus, quod in aliis regibus non acciderat. Vel quia eorum similis fuit et iniquitas et miseria.

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band by name, David’s sin might be recalled. And because Luke purposes to delineate Christ as the expiator of our sins, he makes no mention of these women. But he does mention Judah’s brethren, in order to show that they belong to God’s people: whereas Ismael, the brother of Isaac, and Esau, Jacob’s brother, were cut off from God’s people, and for this reason are not mentioned in Christ’s genealogy. Another motive was to show the emptiness of pride of birth: for many of Judah’s brethren were born of hand-maidens, and yet all were patriarchs and heads of tribes. Phares and Zara are mentioned together, because, as Ambrose says on Luke 3:23, they are the type of the twofold life of man: one, according to the Law, signified by Zara; the other by Faith, of which Phares is the type. The brethren of Jechonias are included, because they all reigned at various times: which was not the case with other kings: or, again, because they were alike in wickedness and misfortune.

Article 4 Whether the matter of Christ’s body should have been taken from a woman? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod materia corporis Christi non debuit esse assumpta de femina. Sexus enim masculinus est nobilior quam sexus femininus. Sed maxime decuit ut Christus assumeret id quod est perfectum in humana natura. Ergo non videtur quod debuerit de femina carnem assumere, sed magis de viro, sicut Heva de costa viri formata est. Praeterea, quicumque ex femina concipitur, utero feminae includitur. Sed Deo, qui caelum et terram implet, ut dicitur Ierem. XXIII, non competit ut parvo feminae utero includatur. Ergo videtur quod non debuit concipi de femina. Praeterea, illi qui concipiuntur ex femina, quandam immunditiam patiuntur, ut dicitur Iob XXV, nunquid iustificari potest homo comparatus Deo? Aut apparere mundus natus de muliere? Sed in Christo nulla immunditia esse debuit, ipse enim est Dei sapientia, de qua dicitur, Sap. VII, quod nihil inquinatum in illam incurrit. Ergo non videtur quod debuerit carnem assumpsisse de femina. Sed contra est quod dicitur Galat. IV, misit Deus filium suum factum ex muliere. Respondeo dicendum quod, licet filius Dei carnem humanam assumere potuerit de quacumque materia voluisset, convenientissimum tamen fuit ut de femina carnem acciperet. Primo quidem, quia per hoc tota humana natura nobilitata est. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro octogintatrium quaest., hominis liberatio in utroque sexu debuit apparere. Ergo, quia virum oportebat suscipere, qui sexus honorabilior est, conveniens erat ut feminei

Objection 1: It would seem that the matter of Christ’s body should not have been taken from a woman. For the male sex is more noble than the female. But it was most suitable that Christ should assume that which is perfect in human nature. Therefore it seems that He should not have taken flesh from a woman but rather from man: just as Eve was formed from the rib of a man. Obj. 2: Further, whoever is conceived of a woman is shut up in her womb. But it ill becomes God, Who fills heaven and earth, as is written Jer. 23:24, to be shut up within the narrow limits of the womb. Therefore it seems that He should not have been conceived of a woman. Obj. 3: Further, those who are conceived of a woman contract a certain uncleanness: as it is written (Job 25:4): Can man be justified compared with God? Or he that is born of a woman appear clean? But it was unbecoming that any uncleanness should be in Christ: for He is the Wisdom of God, of whom it is written (Wis 7:25) that no defiled thing cometh into her. Therefore it does not seem right that He should have taken flesh from a woman. On the contrary, It is written (Gal 4:4): God sent His Son, made of a woman. I answer that, Although the Son of God could have taken flesh from whatever matter He willed, it was nevertheless most becoming that He should take flesh from a woman. First because in this way the entire human nature was ennobled. Hence Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 11): It was suitable that man’s liberation should be made manifest in both sexes. Consequently, since it behooved a man, being of the nobler sex, to assume, it was becoming that the libera-

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sexus liberatio hinc appareret quia ille vir de femina natus est. Secundo, quia per hoc veritas incarnationis adstruitur. Unde Ambrosius dicit, in libro de incarnatione, multa secundum naturam invenies, et ultra naturam. Secundum conditionem etenim naturae in utero, feminei scilicet corporis, fuit; sed supra conditionem virgo concepit, virgo generavit, ut crederes quia Deus erat qui innovabat naturam; et homo erat, qui secundum naturam nascebatur ex homine. Et Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Volusianum, si omnipotens Deus hominem, ubicumque formatum, non ex materno utero crearet, sed repentinum inferret aspectibus, nonne opinionem confirmaret erroris; nec hominem verum suscepisse ullo modo crederetur; et, dum omnia mirabiliter facit, auferret quod misericorditer fecit? Nunc vero ita inter Deum et hominem mediator apparuit ut, in unitate personae copulans utramque naturam, et solita sublimaret insolitis, et insolita solitis temperaret.

Tertio, quia per hunc modum completur omnis diversitas generationis humanae. Nam primus homo productus est ex limo terrae sine viro et femina; Heva vero producta est ex viro sine femina; ceteri vero homines producuntur ex viro et femina. Unde hoc quartum quasi Christo proprium relinquebatur, ut produceretur ex femina sine viro. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sexus masculinus est nobilior quam femineus, ideo humanam naturam in masculino sexu assumpsit. Ne tamen sexus femininus contemneretur, congruum fuit ut carnem assumeret de femina. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de agone Christiano, nolite vos ipsos contemnere, viri, filius Dei virum suscepit. Nolite vos ipsas contemnere, feminae, filius Dei natus est ex femina. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XXIII libro contra Faustum, qui hac obiectione utebatur, non plane, inquit, Catholica fides, quae Christum, Dei filium, natum secundum carnem credit ex virgine ullo modo eundem Dei filium sic in utero mulieris includit quasi extra non sit, quasi caeli et terrae administrationem deseruerit, quasi a patre recesserit. Sed vos, Manichaei, corde illo quo nihil potestis nisi corporalia phantasmata cogitare, ista omnino non capitis. Ut enim dicit in epistola ad Volusianum, hominum iste sensus est nihil nisi corpora valentium cogitare, quorum nullum potest esse ubique totum, quoniam per innumerabiles partes aliud alibi habeat necesse est. Longe aliud est natura animae quam corporis. Quanto magis Dei, qui creator est animae et corporis. Novit ubique totus esse, et nullo conti-

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tion of the female sex should be manifested in that man being born of a woman. Second, because thus the truth of the Incarnation is made evident. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Incarn. vi): Thou shalt find in Christ many things both natural, and supernatural. In accordance with nature He was within the womb, viz. of a woman’s body: but it was above nature that a virgin should conceive and give birth: that thou mightest believe that He was God, who was renewing nature; and that He was man who, according to nature, was being born of a man. And Augustine says (Ep. ad Volus. cxxxvii): If Almighty God had created a man formed otherwise than in a mother’s womb, and had suddenly produced him to sight . . . would He not have strengthened an erroneous opinion, and made it impossible for us to believe that He had become a true man? And whilst He is doing all things wondrously, would He have taken away that which He accomplished in mercy? But now, He, the mediator between God and man, has so shown Himself, that, uniting both natures in the unity of one Person, He has given a dignity to ordinary by extraordinary things, and tempered the extraordinary by the ordinary. Third, because in this fashion the begetting of man is accomplished in every variety of manner. For the first man was made from the slime of the earth, without the concurrence of man or woman: Eve was made of man but not of woman: and other men are made from both man and woman. So that this fourth manner remained as it were proper to Christ, that He should be made of a woman without the concurrence of a man. Reply Obj. 1: The male sex is more noble than the female, and for this reason He took human nature in the male sex. But lest the female sex should be despised, it was fitting that He should take flesh of a woman. Hence Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xi): Men, despise not yourselves: the Son of God became a man: despise not yourselves, women; the Son of God was born of a woman. Reply Obj. 2: Augustine thus (Contra Faust. xxiii) replies to Faustus, who urged this objection; By no means, says he, does the Catholic Faith, which believes that Christ the Son of God was born of a virgin, according to the flesh, suppose that the same Son of God was so shut up in His Mother’s womb, as to cease to be elsewhere, as though He no longer continued to govern heaven and earth, and as though He had withdrawn Himself from the Father. But you, Manicheans, being of a mind that admits of naught but material images, are utterly unable to grasp these things. For, as he again says (Ep. ad Volus. cxxxvii), it belongs to the sense of man to form conceptions only through tangible bodies, none of which can be entire everywhere, because they must of necessity be diffused through their innumerable parts in various places . . . Far otherwise is the nature of the soul from that of the body:

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neri loco; novit venire, non recedendo ubi erat; novit abire, how much more the nature of God, the Creator of soul and non deserendo quo venerat. body! . . . He is able to be entire everywhere, and to be contained in no place. He is able to come without moving from the place where He was; and to go without leaving the spot whence He came. Ad tertium dicendum quod in conceptione viri ex Reply Obj. 3: There is no uncleanness in the confemina non est aliquid immundum inquantum est opus ception of man from a woman, as far as this is the work Dei, unde dicitur Act. X, quod Deus creavit, tu ne com- of God: wherefore it is written (Acts 10:15): That which mune dixeris, idest immundum. Est tamen aliqua ibi im- God hath cleansed do not thou call common, i.e., unclean. munditia ex peccato proveniens, prout cum libidine ali- There is, however, a certain uncleanness therein, resulting quis concipitur ex commixtione maris et feminae. Quod from sin, as far as lustful desire accompanies conception tamen in Christo non fuit, ut supra ostensum est. Si ta- by sexual union. But this was not the case with Christ, as men aliqua ibi esset immunditia, ex ea non inquinaretur shown above (Q. 28, A. 1). But if there were any uncleanDei verbum, quod nullo modo est mutabile. Unde Augu- ness therein, the Word of God would not have been sullied stinus dicit, in libro contra quinque haereses, dicit Deus, thereby, for He is utterly unchangeable. Wherefore Auguscreator hominis, quid est quod te permovet in mea nativi- tine says (Contra Quinque Haereses v): God saith, the Cretate? Non sum libidinis conceptus cupiditate. Ego matrem ator of man: What is it that troubles thee in My Birth? I was de qua nascerer, feci. Si solis radius cloacarum sordes sic- not conceived by lustful desire. I made Myself a mother of care novit, eis inquinari non novit multo magis splendor whom to be born. If the sun’s rays can dry up the filth in the lucis aeternae quocumque radiaverit mundare potest, ipse drain, and yet not be defiled: much more can the Splendor of pollui non potest. eternal light cleanse whatever It shines upon, but Itself cannot be sullied.

Article 5 Whether the flesh of Christ was conceived of the Virgin’s purest blood? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caro Christi non fuerit concepta ex purissimis sanguinibus virginis. Dicitur enim in collecta quod Deus verbum suum de virgine carnem sumere voluit. Sed caro differt a sanguine. Ergo corpus Christi non est sumptum de sanguine virginis. Praeterea, sicut mulier formata est miraculose de viro, ita corpus Christi miraculose formatum est de virgine. Sed mulier non dicitur esse formata de sanguine viri, sed magis de carne et ossibus eius, secundum illud quod dicitur Gen. II, hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis, et caro de carne mea. Ergo videtur quod nec etiam corpus Christi formari debuerit de sanguine virginis, sed de carnibus et ossibus eius. Praeterea, corpus Christi fuit eiusdem speciei cum corporibus aliorum hominum. Sed corpora aliorum hominum non formantur ex purissimo sanguine, sed ex semine et sanguine menstruo. Ergo videtur quod nec etiam corpus Christi fuerit conceptum ex purissimis sanguinibus virginis. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod filius Dei construxit sibi ipsi ex castis et purissimis sanguinibus virginis carnem animatam anima rationali. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in conceptione Christi fuit secundum conditionem naturae quod est natus ex femina, sed supra conditionem

Objection 1: It would seem that the flesh of Christ was not conceived of the Virgin’s purest blood: For it is said in the collect (Feast of the Annunciation) that God willed that His Word should take flesh from a Virgin. But flesh differs from blood. Therefore Christ’s body was not taken from the Virgin’s blood. Obj. 2: Further, as the woman was miraculously formed from the man, so Christ’s body was formed miraculously from the Virgin. But the woman is not said to have been formed from the man’s blood, but rather from his flesh and bones, according to Gen. 2:23: This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh. It seems therefore that neither should Christ’s body have been formed from the Virgin’s blood, but from her flesh and bones. Obj. 3: Further, Christ’s body was of the same species as other men’s bodies. But other men’s bodies are not formed from the purest blood but from the semen and the menstrual blood. Therefore it seems that neither was Christ’s body conceived of the purest blood of the Virgin. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that the Son of God, from the Virgin’s purest blood, formed Himself flesh, animated with a rational soul. I answer that, As stated above (A. 4), in Christ’s conception His being born of a woman was in accordance with the laws of nature, but that He was born of a virgin was

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naturae quod est natus ex virgine. Habet autem hoc naturalis conditio, quod in generatione animalis femina materiam ministret, ex parte autem maris sit activum principium in generatione, sicut probat philosophus, in libro de Generat. Animal. Femina autem quae ex mare concipit, non est virgo. Et ideo ad supernaturalem modum generationis Christi pertinet quod activum principium in generatione illa fuerit virtus supernaturalis divina, sed ad naturalem modum generationis eius pertinet quod materia de qua corpus eius conceptum est, sit conformis materiae quam aliae feminae subministrant ad conceptionem prolis. Haec autem materia, secundum philosophum, in libro de Generat. Animal., est sanguis mulieris, non quicumque, sed perductus ad quandam ampliorem digestionem per virtutem generativam matris, ut sit materia apta ad conceptum. Et ideo ex tali materia fuit corpus Christi conceptum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum beata virgo fuerit eiusdem naturae cum aliis feminis, consequens est quod habuerit carnem et ossa eiusdem naturae. Carnes autem et ossa in aliis feminis sunt actuales corporis partes, ex quibus constituitur integritas corporis, et ideo subtrahi non possunt sine corruptione corporis vel deminutione. Christus autem, qui venerat corrupta reparare, nullam corruptionem aut deminutionem integritati matris eius inferre debuit. Et ideo non debuit corpus Christi formari de carne vel ossibus virginis, sed de sanguine, qui nondum est actu pars, sed est potentia totum, ut dicitur in libro de Generat. Animal. Et ideo dicitur carnem de virgine sumpsisse, non quod materia corporis fuerit actu caro, sed sanguis, qui est potentia caro.

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut in prima parte dictum est, Adam, quia institutus erat ut principium quoddam humanae naturae, habebat in suo corpore aliquid carnis et ossis quod non pertinebat ad integritatem personalem ipsius, sed solum inquantum erat naturae humanae principium. Et de tali formata est mulier, absque viri detrimento. Sed nihil tale fuit in corpore virginis, ex quo corpus Christi posset formari sine corruptione materni corporis. Ad tertium dicendum quod semen feminae non est generationi aptum, sed est quiddam imperfectum in genere seminis, quod non potuit produci ad perfectum seminis complementum, propter imperfectionem virtutis femineae. Et ideo tale semen non est materia quae de necessitate requiratur ad conceptum, sicut philosophus dicit, in libro de Generat. Animal. Et ideo in conceptione Christi non fuit, praesertim quia, licet sit imperfectum in genere seminis, tamen cum quadam concupiscentia resolvitur, sicut et semen maris; in illo autem conceptu virginali concupiscentia locum habere non po-

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above the laws of nature. Now, such is the law of nature that in the generation of an animal the female supplies the matter, while the male is the active principle of generation; as the Philosopher proves (De Gener. Animal. i). But a woman who conceives of a man is not a virgin. And consequently it belongs to the supernatural mode of Christ’s generation, that the active principle of generation was the supernatural power of God: but it belongs to the natural mode of His generation, that the matter from which His body was conceived is similar to the matter which other women supply for the conception of their offspring. Now, this matter, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal.), is the woman’s blood, not any of her blood, but brought to a more perfect stage of secretion by the mother’s generative power, so as to be apt for conception. And therefore of such matter was Christ’s body conceived. Reply Obj. 1: Since the Blessed Virgin was of the same nature as other women, it follows that she had flesh and bones of the same nature as theirs. Now, flesh and bones in other women are actual parts of the body, the integrity of which results therefrom: and consequently they cannot be taken from the body without its being corrupted or diminished. But as Christ came to heal what was corrupt, it was not fitting that He should bring corruption or diminution to the integrity of His Mother. Therefore it was becoming that Christ’s body should be formed not from the flesh or bones of the Virgin, but from her blood, which as yet is not actually a part, but is potentially the whole, as stated in De Gener. Animal. i. Hence He is said to have taken flesh from the Virgin, not that the matter from which His body was formed was actual flesh, but blood, which is flesh potentially. Reply Obj. 2: As stated in the First Part (Q. 92, A. 3, ad 2), Adam, through being established as a kind of principle of human nature, had in his body a certain proportion of flesh and bone, which belonged to him, not as an integral part of his personality, but in regard to his state as a principle of human nature. And from this was the woman formed, without detriment to the man. But in the Virgin’s body there was nothing of this sort, from which Christ’s body could be formed without detriment to His Mother’s body. Reply Obj. 3: Woman’s semen is not apt for generation, but is something imperfect in the seminal order, which, on account of the imperfection of the female power, it has not been possible to bring to complete seminal perfection. Consequently this semen is not the necessary matter of conception; as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. i): wherefore there was none such in Christ’s conception: all the more since, though it is imperfect in the seminal order, a certain concupiscence accompanies its emission, as also that of the male semen: whereas in that virginal conception there could be no concupiscence. Wherefore Dam-

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tuit. Et ideo Damascenus dicit quod corpus Christi non seminaliter conceptum est. Sanguis autem menstruus, quem feminae per singulos menses emittunt, impuritatem quandam naturalem habet corruptionis, sicut et ceterae superfluitates, quibus natura non indiget, sed eas expellit. Ex tali autem menstruo corruptionem habente, quod natura repudiat, non formatur conceptus, sed hoc est purgamentum quoddam illius puri sanguinis qui digestione quadam est praeparatus ad conceptum, quasi purior et perfectior alio sanguine. Habet tamen impuritatem libidinis in conceptione aliorum hominum, inquantum ex ipsa commixtione maris et feminae talis sanguis ad locum generationi congruum attrahitur. Sed hoc in conceptione Christi non fuit, quia operatione spiritus sancti talis sanguis in utero virginis adunatus est et formatus in prolem. Et ideo dicitur corpus Christi ex castissimis et purissimis sanguinibus virginis formatum.

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ascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that Christ’s body was not conceived seminally. But the menstrual blood, the flow of which is subject to monthly periods, has a certain natural impurity of corruption: like other superfluities, which nature does not heed, and therefore expels. Of such menstrual blood infected with corruption and repudiated by nature, the conception is not formed; but from a certain secretion of the pure blood which by a process of elimination is prepared for conception, being, as it were, more pure and more perfect than the rest of the blood. Nevertheless, it is tainted with the impurity of lust in the conception of other men: inasmuch as by sexual intercourse this blood is drawn to a place apt for conception. This, however, did not take place in Christ’s conception: because this blood was brought together in the Virgin’s womb and fashioned into a child by the operation of the Holy Spirit. Therefore is Christ’s body said to be formed of the most chaste and purest blood of the Virgin.

Article 6 Whether Christ’s body was in Adam and the other patriarchs, as to something signate? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpus Christi fuerit secundum aliquid signatum in Adam et in aliis patribus. Dicit enim Augustinus, X super Gen. ad Litt., quod caro Christi fuit in Adam et Abraham secundum corpulentam substantiam. Sed corpulenta substantia est quiddam signatum. Ergo caro Christi fuit in Adam et Abraham et in aliis patribus secundum aliquid signatum. Praeterea, Rom. I dicitur quod Christus factus est ex semine David secundum carnem. Sed semen David fuit aliquid signatum in ipso. Ergo Christus fuit in David secundum aliquid signatum, et eadem ratione in aliis patribus. Praeterea, Christus ad humanum genus affinitatem habet inquantum ex humano genere carnem assumpsit. Sed si caro illa non fuit secundum aliquid signatum in Adam, nullam videtur habere affinitatem ad humanum genus, quod ex Adam derivatur, sed magis ad alias res, unde materia carnis eius assumpta est. Videtur ergo quod caro Christi fuerit in Adam et aliis patribus secundum aliquid signatum. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X super Gen. ad Litt., quocumque modo Christus fuit in Adam et Abraham, alii homines ibi fuerunt, sed non convertitur. Alii autem homines non fuerunt in Adam et Abraham secundum aliquam materiam signatam, sed solum secundum originem, ut in prima parte habitum est. Er-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s body was in Adam and the patriarchs as to something signate. For Augustine says (Gen ad lit. x) that the flesh of Christ was in Adam and Abraham by way of a bodily substance. But bodily substance is something signate. Therefore Christ’s flesh was in Adam, Abraham, and the other patriarchs, according to something signate. Obj. 2: Further, it is said (Rom 1:3) that Christ was made . . . of the seed of David according to the flesh. But the seed of David was something signate in him. Therefore Christ was in David, according to something signate, and for the same reason in the other patriarchs. Obj. 3: Further, the human race is Christ’s kindred, inasmuch as He took flesh therefrom. But if that flesh were not something signate in Adam, the human race, which is descended from Adam, would seem to have no kindred with Christ: but rather with those other things from which the matter of His flesh was taken. Therefore it seems that Christ’s flesh was in Adam and the other patriarchs according to something signate. On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. x) that in whatever way Christ was in Adam and Abraham, other men were there also; but not conversely. But other men were not in Adam and Abraham by way of some signate matter, but only according to origin, as stated in the First Part (Q. 119, A. 1, A. 2, ad 4). Therefore neither was Christ

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go neque Christus fuit in Adam et Abraham secundum in Adam and Abraham according to something signate; aliquid signatum, et, eadem ratione, nec in aliis patribus. and, for the same reason, neither was He in the other patriarchs. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, I answer that, As stated above (A. 5, ad 1), the matter materia corporis Christi non fuit caro et os beatae virgi- of Christ’s body was not the flesh and bones of the Blessed nis, nec aliquid quod fuerit actu pars corporis eius, sed Virgin, nor anything that was actually a part of her body, sanguis, qui est potentia caro. Quidquid autem fuit in but her blood which was her flesh potentially. Now, whatbeata virgine a parentibus acceptum, fuit actu pars cor- ever was in the Blessed Virgin, as received from her parents, poris beatae virginis. Unde illud quod fuit in beata vir- was actually a part of her body. Consequently that which gine a parentibus acceptum, non fuit materia corporis the Blessed Virgin received from her parents was not the Christi. Et ideo dicendum est quod corpus Christi non matter of Christ’s body. Therefore we must say that Christ’s fuit in Adam et aliis patribus secundum aliquid signa- body was not in Adam and the other patriarchs according tum, ita scilicet quod aliqua pars corporis Adae, vel ali- to something signate, in the sense that some part of Adam’s cuius alterius, posset designari determinate, ut dicere- or of anyone else’s body could be singled out and desigtur quod ex hac materia formabitur corpus Christi, sed nated as the very matter from which Christ’s body was to be fuit ibi secundum originem, sicut et caro aliorum homi- formed: but it was there according to origin, just as was the num. Corpus enim Christi habet relationem ad Adam flesh of other men. For Christ’s body is related to Adam and et alios patres mediante corpore matris eius. Unde nullo the other patriarchs through the medium of His Mother’s alio modo fuit in patribus corpus Christi quam corpus body. Consequently Christ’s body was in the patriarchs, in matris eius, quod non fuit in patribus secundum mate- no other way than was His Mother’s body, which was not in riam signatam, sicut nec corpora aliorum hominum, ut the patriarchs according to signate matter: as neither were in prima parte dictum est. the bodies of other men, as stated in the First Part (Q. 119, A. 1, A. 2, ad 4). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum dicitur ChriReply Obj. 1: The expression Christ was in Adam acstus fuisse in Adam secundum corpulentam substan- cording to bodily substance, does not mean that Christ’s tiam, non est intelligendum hoc modo, quod corpus body was a bodily substance in Adam: but that the bodChristi in Adam fuerit quaedam corpulenta substantia, ily substance of Christ’s body, i.e., the matter which He sed quia corpulenta substantia corporis Christi, idest took from the Virgin, was in Adam as in its active princimateria quam sumpsit ex virgine, fuit in Adam sicut in ple, but not as in its material principle: in other words, by principio activo, non autem sicut in principio materia- the generative power of Adam and his descendants down li; quia scilicet per virtutem generativam Adae, et alio- to the Blessed Virgin, this matter was prepared for Christ’s rum ab Adam descendentium usque ad beatam virgi- conception. But this matter was not fashioned into Christ’s nem, factum est ut illa materia taliter praepararetur ad body by the seminal power derived from Adam. Therefore conceptum corporis Christi. Non autem fuit materia illa Christ is said to have been in Adam by way of origin, acformata in corpus Christi per virtutem seminis ab Adam cording to bodily substance: but not according to seminal derivatam. Et ideo Christus dicitur fuisse in Adam origi- virtue. naliter secundum corpulentam substantiam, non autem secundum seminalem rationem. Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis corpus Reply Obj. 2: Although Christ’s body was not in Adam Christi non fuerit in Adam et in aliis patribus secun- and the other patriarchs, according to seminal virtue, yet dum seminalem rationem, corpus tamen beatae virginis, the Blessed Virgin’s body was thus in them, through her quod ex semine maris est conceptum, fuit in Adam et being conceived from the seed of a man. For this reason, in aliis patribus secundum rationem seminalem. Et ideo, through the medium of the Blessed Virgin, Christ is said to mediante beata virgine, Christus secundum carnem di- be of the seed of David, according to the flesh, by way of citur esse ex semine David per modum originis. origin. Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus habet affiReply Obj. 3: Christ and the human race are kinnitatem ad humanum genus secundum similitudinem dred, through the likeness of species. Now, specific likespeciei. Similitudo autem speciei attenditur, non secun- ness results not from remote but from proximate matter, dum materiam remotam, sed secundum materiam pro- and from the active principle which begets its like in speximam, et secundum principium activum, quod generat cies. Thus, then, the kinship of Christ and the human race sibi simile in specie. Sic igitur affinitas Christi ad huma- is sufficiently preserved by His body being formed from num genus sufficienter conservatur per hoc quod cor- the Virgin’s blood, derived in its origin from Adam and the pus Christi formatum est ex sanguinibus virginis, deri- other patriarchs. Nor is this kinship affected by the matter

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Q. 31, A. 7

vatis secundum originem ab Adam et aliis patribus. Nec whence this blood is taken, as neither is it in the generation refert ad hanc affinitatem undecumque materia illorum of other men, as stated in the First Part (Q. 119, A. 2, ad 3). sanguinum sumpta fuerit, sicut nec hoc refert in generatione aliorum hominum, sicut in prima parte dictum est.

Article 7 Whether Christ’s flesh in the patriarchs was infected by sin? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caro Christi in antiquis patribus peccato infecta non fuerit. Dicitur enim Sap. VII quod in divinam sapientiam nihil inquinatum incurrit. Christus autem est Dei sapientia, ut dicitur I ad Cor. I. Ergo caro Christi nunquam peccato inquinata fuit. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod Christus primitias nostrae naturae assumpsit. Sed in primo statu caro humana non erat peccato infecta. Ergo caro Christi non fuit infecta nec in Adam nec in aliis patribus. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, X super Gen. ad Litt., quod natura humana semper habuit, cum vulnere, vulneris medicinam. Sed id quod est infectum, non potest esse vulneris medicina, sed magis ipsum indiget medicina. Ergo semper in natura humana fuit aliquid non infectum, ex quo postmodum est corpus Christi formatum. Sed contra est quod corpus Christi non refertur ad Adam et ad alios patres nisi mediante corpore beatae virginis, de qua carnem assumpsit. Sed corpus beatae virginis totum fuit in originali conceptum, ut supra dictum est, et ita etiam, secundum quod fuit in patribus, fuit peccato obnoxium. Ergo caro Christi, secundum quod fuit in patribus, fuit peccato obnoxia. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum dicimus Christum, vel eius carnem, fuisse in Adam et in aliis patribus, comparamus ipsum, vel carnem eius, ad Adam et ad alios patres. Manifestum est autem quod alia fuit conditio patrum, et alia Christi, nam patres fuerunt subiecti peccato, Christus autem fuit omnino a peccato immunis. Dupliciter ergo in hac comparatione errare contingit. Uno modo, ut attribuamus Christo, vel carni eius, conditionem quae fuit in patribus, puta si dicamus quod Christus in Adam peccavit quia in eo aliquo modo fuit. Quod falsum est, quia non eo modo in eo fuit ut ad Christum peccatum Adae pertineret; quia non derivatur ab eo secundum concupiscentiae legem, sive secundum rationem seminalem, ut supra dictum est. Alio modo contingit errare, si attribuamus ei quod actu fuit in patribus, conditionem Christi, vel carnis eius, ut scilicet, quia caro Christi, secundum quod in Chri-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s flesh was not infected by sin in the patriarchs. For it is written (Wis 7:25) that no defiled thing cometh into Divine Wisdom. But Christ is the Wisdom of God according to 1 Cor. 1:24. Therefore Christ’s flesh was never defiled by sin. Obj. 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that Christ assumed the first-fruits of our nature. But in the primitive state human flesh was not infected by sin. Therefore Christ’s flesh was not infected either in Adam or in the other patriarchs. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. x) that human nature ever had, together with the wound, the balm with which to heal it. But that which is infected cannot heal a wound; rather does it need to be healed itself. Therefore in human nature there was ever something preserved from infection, from which afterwards Christ’s body was formed. On the contrary, Christ’s body is not related to Adam and the other patriarchs, save through the medium of the Blessed Virgin’s body, of whom He took flesh. But the body of the Blessed Virgin was wholly conceived in original sin, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 3, ad 1), and thus, as far as it was in the patriarchs, it was subject to sin. Therefore the flesh of Christ, as far as it was in the patriarchs, was subject to sin. I answer that, When we say that Christ or His flesh was in Adam and the other patriarchs, we compare Him, or His flesh, to Adam and the other patriarchs. Now, it is manifest that the condition of the patriarchs differed from that of Christ: for the patriarchs were subject to sin, whereas Christ was absolutely free from sin. Consequently a twofold error may occur on this point. First, by attributing to Christ, or to His flesh, that condition which was in the patriarchs; by saying, for instance, that Christ sinned in Adam, since after some fashion He was in him. But this is false; because Christ was not in Adam in such a way that Adam’s sin belonged to Christ: forasmuch as He is not descended from him according to the law of concupiscence, or according to seminal virtue; as stated above (A. 1, ad 3, A. 6, ad 1; Q. 15, A. 1, ad 2). Second, error may occur by attributing the condition of Christ or of His flesh to that which was actually in the patriarchs: by saying, for instance, that, because Christ’s flesh,

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sto fuit, non fuit peccato obnoxia, ita etiam in Adam et in aliis patribus fuit aliqua pars corporis eius quae non fuit peccato obnoxia, ex qua postmodum corpus Christi formaretur; sicut quidam posuerunt. Quod quidem esse non potest. Primo, quia caro Christi non fuit secundum aliquid signatum in Adam et in aliis patribus, quod posset distingui a reliqua eius carne sicut purum ab impuro, sicut iam supra dictum est. Secundo quia, cum caro humana peccato inficiatur ex hoc quod est per concupiscentiam concepta, sicut tota caro alicuius hominis per concupiscentiam concipitur, ita etiam tota peccato inquinatur. Et ideo dicendum est quod tota caro antiquorum patrum fuit peccato obnoxia, nec fuit in eis aliquid a peccato immune, de quo postmodum corpus Christi formaretur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus non assumpsit carnem humani generis subditam peccato, sed ab omni infectione peccati mundatam. Et ideo in Dei sapientiam nihil inquinatum incurrit. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus dicitur primitias nostrae naturae assumpsisse, quantum ad similitudinem conditionis, quia scilicet assumpsit carnem peccato non infectam, sicut fuerat caro hominis ante peccatum. Non autem hoc intelligitur secundum continuationem puritatis, ita scilicet quod illa caro puri hominis servaretur a peccato immunis usque ad formationem corporis Christi. Ad tertium dicendum quod in humana natura, ante Christum, erat vulnus, idest infectio originalis peccati, in actu. Medicina autem vulneris non erat ibi actu, sed solum secundum virtutem originis, prout ab illis patribus propaganda erat caro Christi.

IIIae

as existing in Christ, was not subject to sin, therefore in Adam also and in the patriarchs there was some part of his body that was not subject to sin, and from which afterwards Christ’s body was formed; as some indeed held. For this is quite impossible. First, because Christ’s flesh was not in Adam and in the other patriarchs, according to something signate, distinguishable from the rest of his flesh, as pure from impure; as already stated (A. 6). Second, because since human flesh is infected by sin, through being conceived in lust, just as the entire flesh of a man is conceived through lust, so also is it entirely defiled by sin. Consequently we must say that the entire flesh of the patriarchs was subjected to sin, nor was there anything in them that was free from sin, and from which afterwards Christ’s body could be formed. Reply Obj. 1: Christ did not assume the flesh of the human race subject to sin, but cleansed from all infection of sin. Thus it is that no defiled thing cometh into the Wisdom of God. Reply Obj. 2: Christ is said to have assumed the firstfruits of our nature, as to the likeness of condition; forasmuch as He assumed flesh not infected by sin, like unto the flesh of man before sin. But this is not to be understood to imply a continuation of that primitive purity, as though the flesh of innocent man was preserved in its freedom from sin until the formation of Christ’s body. Reply Obj. 3: Before Christ, there was actually in human nature a wound, i.e., the infection of original sin. But the balm to heal the wound was not there actually, but only by a certain virtue of origin, forasmuch as from those patriarchs the flesh of Christ was to be propagated.

Article 8 Whether Christ paid tithes in Abraham’s loins? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus fuerit in lumbis Abrahae decimatus. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Heb. VII, quod levi, pronepos Abrahae, decimatus fuit in Abraham, quia, eo decimas dante Melchisedech, adhuc levi erat in lumbis eius. Similiter Christus erat in lumbis Abrahae quando decimas dedit. Ergo ipse etiam Christus decimatus fuit in Abraham. Praeterea, Christus est ex semine Abrahae secundum carnem quam de matre accepit. Sed mater eius fuit decimata in Abraham. Ergo, pari ratione, Christus.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ paid tithes in Abraham’s loins. For the Apostle says (Heb 7:6–9) that Levi, the great-grandson of Abraham, paid tithes in Abraham, because, when the latter paid tithes to Melchisedech, he was yet in his loins. In like manner Christ was in Abraham’s loins when the latter paid tithes. Therefore Christ Himself also paid tithes in Abraham. Obj. 2: Further, Christ is of the seed of Abraham according to the flesh which He received from His Mother. But His Mother paid tithes in Abraham. Therefore for a like reason did Christ. Preaterea, illud in Abraham decimabatur quod inObj. 3: Further, in Abraham tithe was levied on that digebat curatione, ut Augustinus dicit, X super Gen. ad which needed healing, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. x). Litt. Curatione autem indigebat omnis caro peccato ob- But all flesh subject to sin needed healing. Since therefore

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noxia. Cum ergo caro Christi fuerit peccato obnoxia, sicut dictum est, videtur quod caro Christi in Abraham fuerit decimata. Praeterea, hoc non videtur aliquo modo derogare dignitati Christi. Nihil enim prohibet, patre alicuius pontificis decimas dante alicui sacerdoti, filium eius pontificem maiorem esse simplici sacerdote. Licet ergo dicatur Christus decimatus, Abraham decimas dante Melchisedech, non tamen propter hoc excluditur quin Christus sit maior quam Melchisedech. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X super Gen. ad Litt. quod Christus ibi, scilicet in Abraham, decimatus non est, cuius caro inde non fervorem vulneris, sed materiam medicaminis traxit. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum intentionem apostoli, oportet dicere quod Christus in lumbis Abrahae non fuerit decimatus. Probat enim apostolus maius esse sacerdotium quod est secundum ordinem Melchisedech, sacerdotio levitico, per hoc quod Abraham decimas dedit Melchisedech, adhuc levi existente in lumbis eius, ad quem pertinet legale sacerdotium. Si autem Christus etiam in Abraham decimatus esset, eius sacerdotium non esset secundum ordinem Melchisedech, sed minus sacerdotio Melchisedech. Et ideo dicendum est quod Christus non est decimatus in lumbis Abrahae, sicut levi. Quia enim ille qui decimas dat, novem sibi retinet et decimum alii attribuit, quod est perfectionis signum, inquantum est quodammodo terminus omnium numerorum, qui procedunt usque ad decem; inde est quod ille qui decimas dat, protestatur se imperfectum et perfectionem alii attribuere. Imperfectio autem humani generis est propter peccatum, quod indiget perfectione eius qui a peccato curat. Curare autem a peccato est solius Christi, ipse enim est agnus qui tollit peccatum mundi, ut dicitur Ioan. I. Figuram autem eius gerebat Melchisedech, ut apostolus probat, Heb. VII. Per hoc ergo quod Abraham Melchisedech decimas dedit, praefiguravit se, velut in peccato conceptum, et omnes qui ab eo descensuri erant ea ratione ut peccatum originale contraherent, indigere curatione quae est per Christum. Isaac autem et Iacob et levi, et omnes alii, sic fuerunt in Abraham ut ex eo derivarentur non solum secundum corpulentam substantiam, sed etiam secundum rationem seminalem, per quam originale contrahitur. Et ideo omnes in Abraham sunt decimati, idest praefigurati indigere curatione quae est per Christum. Solus autem Christus sic fuit in Abraham ut ab eo derivaretur non secundum rationem seminalem, sed secundum corpulentam substantiam. Et ideo non fuit in Abraham sicut curatione indigens, sed magis sicut vulneris medicina. Et ideo non fuit in lumbis Abrahae decimatus. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum.

Q. 31, A. 8

Christ’s flesh was the subject of sin, as stated above (A. 7), it seems that Christ’s flesh paid tithes in Abraham. Obj. 4: Further, this does not seem to be at all derogatory to Christ’s dignity. For the fact that the father of a bishop pays tithes to a priest does not hinder his son, the bishop, from being of higher rank than an ordinary priest. Consequently, although we may say that Christ paid tithes when Abraham paid them to Melchisedech, it does not follow that Christ was not greater than Melchisedech. On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. x) that Christ did not pay tithes there, i.e., in Abraham, for His flesh derived from him, not the heat of the wound, but the matter of the antidote. I answer that, It behooves us to say that the sense of the passage quoted from the Apostle is that Christ did not pay tithes in Abraham. For the Apostle proves that the priesthood according to the order of Melchisedech is greater than the Levitical priesthood, from the fact that Abraham paid tithes to Melchisedech, while Levi, from whom the legal priesthood was derived, was yet in his loins. Now, if Christ had also paid tithes in Abraham, His priesthood would not have been according to the order of Melchisedech, but of a lower order. Consequently we must say that Christ did not pay tithes in Abraham’s loins, as Levi did. For since he who pays a tithe keeps nine parts to himself, and surrenders the tenth to another, inasmuch as the number ten is the sign of perfection, as being, in a sort, the terminus of all numbers which mount from one to ten, it follows that he who pays a tithe bears witness to his own imperfection and to the perfection of another. Now, to sin is due the imperfection of the human race, which needs to be perfected by Him who cleanses from sin. But to heal from sin belongs to Christ alone, for He is the Lamb that taketh away the sin of the world (John 1:29), whose figure was Melchisedech, as the Apostle proves (Heb 7). Therefore by giving tithes to Melchisedech, Abraham foreshadowed that he, as being conceived in sin, and all who were to be his descendants in contracting original sin, needed that healing which is through Christ. And Isaac, Jacob, and Levi, and all the others were in Abraham in such a way so as to be descended from him, not only as to bodily substance, but also as to seminal virtue, by which original sin is transmitted. Consequently, they all paid tithes in Abraham, i.e., foreshadowed as needing to be healed by Christ. And Christ alone was in Abraham in such a manner as to descend from him, not by seminal virtue, but according to bodily substance. Therefore He was not in Abraham so as to need to be healed, but rather as the balm with which the wound was to be healed. Therefore He did not pay tithes in Abraham’s loins. Thus the answer to the first objection is made manifest.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod, quia beata virgo fuit in originali concepta, fuit in Abraham sicut curatione indigens. Et ideo fuit ibi decimata, velut inde descendens secundum seminalem rationem. De corpore autem Christi non est sic, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod caro Christi dicitur fuisse in antiquis patribus peccato obnoxia, secundum qualitatem quam habuit in ipsis parentibus, qui fuerunt decimati. Non autem secundum qualitatem quam habet prout est actu in Christo, qui non est decimatus. Ad quartum dicendum quod sacerdotium leviticum secundum carnis originem derivabatur. Unde non minus fuit in Abraham quam in levi. Unde per hoc quod Abraham decimas dedit Melchisedec tanquam maiori, ostenditur sacerdotium Melchisedec, inquantum gerit figuram Christi, esse maius sacerdotio levitico. Sacerdotium autem Christi non sequitur carnis originem, sed gratiam spiritualem. Et ideo potest esse quod pater dedit decimas alicui sacerdoti tanquam minor maiori, et tamen filius eius, si sit pontifex, est maior illo sacerdote, non propter carnis originem, sed propter gratiam spiritualem, quam habet a Christo.

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Reply Obj. 2: Because the Blessed Virgin was conceived in original sin, she was in Abraham as needing to be healed. Therefore she paid tithes in him, as descending from him according to seminal virtue. But this is not true of Christ’s body, as stated above. Reply Obj. 3: Christ’s flesh is said to have been subject to sin, according as it was in the patriarchs, by reason of the condition in which it was in His forefathers, who paid the tithes: but not by reason of its condition as actually in Christ, who did not pay the tithes. Reply Obj. 4: The levitical priesthood was handed down through carnal origin: wherefore it was not less in Abraham than in Levi. Consequently, since Abraham paid tithes to Melchisedech as to one greater than he, it follows that the priesthood of Melchisedech, inasmuch as he was a figure of Christ, was greater than that of Levi. But the priesthood of Christ does not result from carnal origin, but from spiritual grace. Therefore it is possible that a father pay tithes to a priest, as the less to the greater, and yet his son, if he be a bishop, is greater than that priest, not through carnal origin, but through the spiritual grace which he has received from Christ.

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Question 32 The Active Principle in Christ’s Conception Deinde considerandum est de principio activo in We shall now consider the active principle in Christ’s conceptione Christi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. conception: concerning which there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum Spiritus Sanctus fuerit principium (1) Whether the Holy Spirit was the active principle of activum conceptionis Christi. Christ’s conception? Secundo, utrum possit dici quod Christus sit (2) Whether it can be said that Christ was conceived of conceptus de spiritu sancto. the Holy Spirit? Tertio, utrum possit dici quod Spiritus Sanctus sit (3) Whether it can be said that the Holy Spirit is pater Christi secundum carnem. Christ’s father according to the flesh? Quarto, utrum beata virgo aliquid active egerit in (4) Whether the Blessed Virgin cooperated actively in conceptione Christi. Christ’s conception?

Article 1 Whether the accomplishment of Christ’s conception should be attributed to the Holy Spirit? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod efficere conceptionem Christi non debeat attribui spiritui sancto. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., indivisa sunt opera Trinitatis, sicut et indivisa est essentia Trinitatis. Sed efficere conceptionem Christi est quoddam opus divinum. Ergo videtur quod non magis sit attribuendum spiritui sancto quam patri vel filio. Praeterea, apostolus dicit, Galat. IV, cum venit plenitudo temporis, misit Deus filium suum factum ex muliere, quod exponens Augustinus, IV de Trin., dicit, eo utique missum, quo factum ex muliere. Sed missio filii attribuitur praecipue patri, ut in prima parte habitum est. Ergo et conceptio, secundum quam factus est ex muliere, debet praecipue patri attribui. Praeterea, Proverb. IX dicitur, sapientia aedificavit sibi domum. Est autem sapientia Dei ipse Christus, secundum illud I Cor. I, Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam. Domus autem huius sapientiae est corpus Christi, quod etiam dicitur templum eius, secundum illud Ioan. II, hoc autem dicebat de templo corporis sui. Ergo videtur quod efficere conceptionem corporis Christi debeat praecipue attribui filio. Non ergo spiritui sancto. Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. I, Spiritus Sanctus superveniet in te, et cetera. Respondeo dicendum quod conceptionem corporis Christi tota Trinitas est operata, attribuitur tamen hoc spiritui sancto, triplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia

Objection 1: It would seem that the accomplishment of Christ’s conception should not be attributed to the Holy Spirit, because, as Augustine says (De Trin. i), The works of the Trinity are indivisible, just as the Essence of the Trinity is indivisible. But the accomplishment of Christ’s conception was the work of God. Therefore it seems that it should not be attributed to the Holy Spirit any more than to the Father or the Son. Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Gal 4:4): When the fullness of time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman; which words Augustine expounds by saying (De Trin. iv): Sent, in so far as made of a woman. But the sending of the Son is especially attributed to the Father, as stated in the First Part (Q. 43, A. 8). Therefore His conception also, by reason of which He was made of a woman, should be attributed principally to the Father. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov 9:1): Wisdom hath built herself a house. Now, Christ is Himself the Wisdom of God; according to 1 Cor. 1:24: Christ the Power of God and the Wisdom of God. And the house of this Wisdom is Christ’s body, which is also called His temple, according to John 2:21: But He spoke of the temple of His body. Therefore it seems that the accomplishment of Christ’s conception should be attributed principally to the Son, and not, therefore, to the Holy Spirit. On the contrary, It is written (Luke 1:35): The Holy Spirit shall come upon Thee. I answer that, The whole Trinity effected the conception of Christ’s body: nevertheless, this is attributed to the Holy Spirit, for three reasons. First, because this is be-

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hoc congruit causae incarnationis quae consideratur ex parte Dei. Spiritus enim sanctus est amor patris et filii, ut in prima parte habitum est. Hoc autem ex maximo Dei amore provenit, ut filius Dei carnem sibi assumeret in utero virginali, unde dicitur Ioan. III, sic Deus dilexit mundum ut filium suum unigenitum daret. Secundo, quia hoc congruit causae incarnationis ex parte naturae assumptae. Quia per hoc datur intelligi quod humana natura assumpta est a filio Dei in unitatem personae non ex aliquibus meritis, sed ex sola gratia, quae spiritui sancto attribuitur, secundum illud I Cor. XII, divisiones gratiarum sunt, idem autem spiritus. Unde Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., iste modus quo est natus Christus de spiritu sancto, insinuat nobis gratiam Dei, qua homo, nullis praecedentibus meritis, ex ipso primo exordio naturae suae quo esse coepit, verbo Dei copularetur in tantam unitatem personae ut idem ipse esset filius Dei.

Tertio, quia hoc congruit termino incarnationis. Ad hoc enim terminata est incarnatio ut homo ille qui concipiebatur, esset sanctus et filius Dei. Utrumque autem horum attribuitur spiritui sancto. Nam per ipsum efficiuntur homines filii Dei, secundum illud Galat. IV, quoniam estis filii Dei, misit Deus spiritum filii sui in corda nostra, clamantem, abba, pater. Ipse est etiam spiritus sanctificationis, ut dicitur Rom. I. Sicut ergo alii per spiritum sanctum sanctificantur spiritualiter ut sint filii Dei adoptivi, ita Christus per spiritum sanctum est in sanctitate conceptus ut esset filius Dei naturalis. Unde Rom. I, secundum unam Glossam, quod praemittitur, qui praedestinatus est filius Dei in virtute, manifestatur per id quod immediate sequitur, secundum spiritum sanctificationis, idest, per hoc quod est conceptus de spiritu sancto. Et ipse Angelus annuntians, per hoc quod praemiserat, Spiritus Sanctus superveniet in te, concludit, ideoque et quod nascetur ex te sanctum, vocabitur filius Dei. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod opus conceptionis commune quidem est toti Trinitati, secundum tamen modum aliquem attribuitur singulis personis. Nam patri attribuitur auctoritas respectu personae filii, qui per huiusmodi conceptionem sibi assumpsit; filio autem attribuitur ipsa carnis assumptio; sed spiritui sancto attribuitur formatio corporis quod assumitur a filio. Nam Spiritus Sanctus est spiritus filii, secundum illud Galat. IV, misit Deus spiritum filii sui. Sicut autem virtus animae quae est in semine, per spiritum qui in semine concluditur, format corpus in generatione aliorum hominum; ita virtus Dei, quae est ipse filius, secundum illud I ad Cor. I, Christum Dei virtutem, per spiritum sanctum corpus formavit quod assumpsit. Et hoc etiam verba Angeli demonstrant dicentis, Spiritus Sanctus superveniet in te,

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fitting to the cause of the Incarnation, considered on the part of God. For the Holy Spirit is the love of Father and Son, as stated in the First Part (Q. 37, A. 1). Now, that the Son of God took to Himself flesh from the Virgin’s womb was due to the exceeding love of God: wherefore it is said (John 3:16): God so loved the world as to give His onlybegotten Son. Second, this is befitting to the cause of the Incarnation, on the part of the nature assumed. Because we are thus given to understand that human nature was assumed by the Son of God into the unity of Person, not by reason of its merits, but through grace alone; which is attributed to the Holy Spirit, according to 1 Cor. 12:4: There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit. Wherefore Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): The manner in which Christ was born of the Holy Spirit . . . suggests to us the grace of God, whereby man, without any merits going before, in the very beginning of his nature when he began to exist was joined to God the Word, into so great unity of Person, that He Himself should be the Son of God. Third, because this is befitting the term of the Incarnation. For the term of the Incarnation was that that man, who was being conceived, should be the Holy One and the Son of God. Now, both of these are attributed to the Holy Spirit. For by Him men are made to be sons of God, according to Gal. 4:6: Because you are sons, God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying: Abba, Father. Again, He is the Spirit of sanctification, according to Rom. 1:4. Therefore, just as other men are sanctified spiritually by the Holy Spirit; so as to be the adopted sons of God, so was Christ conceived in sanctity by the Holy Spirit, so as to be the natural Son of God. Hence, according to a gloss on Rom. 1:4, the words, Who was predestined the Son of God, in power, are explained by what immediately follows: According to the Spirit of sanctification, i.e., through being conceived of the Holy Spirit. And the Angel of the Annunciation himself, after saying, The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee, draws the conclusion: Therefore also the Holy which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God. Reply Obj. 1: The work of the conception is indeed common to the whole Trinity; yet in some way it is attributed to each of the Persons. For to the Father is attributed authority in regard to the Person of the Son, who by this conception took to Himself (human nature). The taking itself (of human nature) is attributed to the Son: but the formation of the body taken by the Son is attributed to the Holy Spirit. For the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, according to Gal. 4:6: God sent the Spirit of His Son. For just as the power of the soul which is in the semen, through the spirit enclosed therein, fashions the body in the generation of other men, so the Power of God, which is the Son Himself, according to 1 Cor. 1:24: Christ, the Power of God, through the Holy Spirit formed the body which He assumed. This is also shown by the words of the angel: The

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quasi ad praeparandam et formandam materiam corporis Christi; et virtus altissimi, idest Christus, obumbrabit tibi, idest, corpus humanitatis in te accipiet incorporeum lumen divinitatis, umbra enim a lumine formatur et corpore, ut Gregorius dicit, XVIII Moral. Altissimus autem intelligitur pater, cuius virtus est filius. Ad secundum dicendum quod missio refertur ad personam assumentem, quae a patre mittitur, sed conceptio refertur ad corpus assumptum, quod operatione spiritus sancti formatur. Et ideo, licet missio et conceptio sint idem subiecto, quia tamen differunt ratione, missio attribuitur patri, efficere autem conceptionem spiritui sancto, sed carnem assumere filio attribuitur. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de quaest. Vet. et Nov. Test., quaestio ista gemina ratione potest intelligi. Primo enim domus Christi Ecclesia est, quam aedificavit sibi sanguine suo. Deinde potest et corpus eius dici domus eius, sicut dicitur templum eius. Factum autem spiritus sancti filii Dei est, propter naturae et voluntatis unitatem.

Q. 32, A. 2

Holy Spirit shall come upon thee, as it were, in order to prepare and fashion the matter of Christ’s body; and the Power of the Most High, i.e., Christ, shall overshadow thee—that is to say, the incorporeal Light of the Godhead shall in thee take the corporeal substance of human nature: for a shadow is formed by light and body, as Gregory says (Moral. xviii). The Most High is the Father, whose Power is the Son. Reply Obj. 2: The mission refers to the Person assuming, who is sent by the Father; but the conception refers to the body assumed, which is formed by the operation of the Holy Spirit. And therefore, though mission and conception are in the same subject; since they differ in our consideration of them, mission is attributed to the Father, but the accomplishment of the conception to the Holy Spirit; whereas the assumption of flesh is attributed to the Son. Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 52): This may be understood in two ways. For, first, Christ’s house is the Church, which He built with His blood. Second, His body may be called His house, just as it is called His temple . . . and what is done by the Holy Spirit is done by the Son of God, because Theirs is one Nature and one Will.

Article 2 Whether it should be said that Christ was conceived of the Holy Spirit? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non debeat dici conceptus de spiritu sancto. Quia super illud Rom. XI, ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia, dicit Glossa Augustini, attendendum quod non ait de ipso, sed ex ipso. Ex ipso enim caelum sunt et terra, quia fecit ea. Non autem de ipso, quia non de substantia sua. Sed Spiritus Sanctus non formavit corpus Christi de substantia sua. Ergo Christus non debet dici conceptus de spiritu sancto. Praeterea, principium activum de quo aliquid concipitur, se habet sicut semen in generatione. Sed Spiritus Sanctus non se habuit sicut semen in conceptione Christi. Dicit enim Hieronymus, in Exposit. Catholicae fidei, non, sicut quidam sceleratissimi opinantur, spiritum sanctum dicimus fuisse pro semine, sed potentia et virtute creatoris dicimus esse operatum, idest formatum, corpus Christi. Non ergo debet dici quod Christus sit conceptus de spiritu sancto. Praeterea, nihil unum de duobus formatur nisi aliquo modo commixtis. Sed corpus Christi formatum est de virgine Maria. Si ergo Christus dicatur conceptus de spiritu sancto, videtur quod facta sit commixtio quaedam spiritus sancti et materiae quam virgo ministravit, quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo Christus debet dici conceptus de spiritu sancto.

Objection 1: It would seem that we should not say that Christ was conceived of (de) the Holy Spirit. Because on Rom. 11:36: For of Him (ex ipso) and by Him, and in Him, are all things, the gloss of Augustine says: Notice that he does not say, ‘of Him’ (de ipso), but ‘from Him’ (ex ipso). For from Him (ex ipso), are heaven and earth, since He made them: but not of Him, since they are not made of His substance. But the Holy Spirit did not form Christ’s body of (de) His own substance. Therefore we should not say that Christ was conceived of (de) the Holy Spirit. Obj. 2: Further, the active principle of (de) which something is conceived is as the seed in generation. But the Holy Spirit did not take the place of seed in Christ’s conception. For Jerome says (Expos. Cathol. Fidei): We do not say, as some wicked wretches hold, that the Holy Spirit took the place of seed: but we say that Christ’s body was wrought, i.e., formed, by the power and might of the Creator. Therefore we should not say that Christ’s body was conceived of (de) the Holy Spirit. Obj. 3: Further, no one thing is made of two, except they be in some way mingled. But Christ’s body was formed of (de) the Virgin Mary. If therefore we say that Christ was conceived of (de) the Holy Spirit, it seems that a mingling took place of the Holy Spirit with the matter supplied by the Virgin: and this is clearly false. Therefore we should not say that Christ was conceived of (de) the Holy Spirit.

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Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. I, antequam On the contrary, It is written (Matt 1:18): Before convenirent, inventa est in utero habens de spiritu sancto. they came together, she was found with child, of (de) the Holy Spirit. Respondeo dicendum quod conceptio non attriI answer that, Conception is not attributed to buitur soli corpori Christi, sed etiam ipsi Christo ratione Christ’s body alone, but also to Christ Himself by reason of ipsius corporis. In spiritu autem sancto duplex habitudo His body. Now, in the Holy Spirit we may observe a twofold consideratur respectu Christi. Nam ad ipsum filium Dei, habitude to Christ. For to the Son of God Himself, who is qui dicitur esse conceptus, habet habitudinem consub- said to have been conceived, He has a habitude of consubstantialitatis, ad corpus autem eius habet habitudinem stantiality: while to His body He has the habitude of efficausae efficientis. Haec autem praepositio de utramque cient cause. And this preposition of (de) signifies both habihabitudinem designat, sicut cum dicimus hominem ali- tudes: thus we say that a certain man is of (de) his father. quem de suo patre. Et ideo convenienter dicere possu- And therefore we can fittingly say that Christ was conceived mus Christum esse conceptum de spiritu sancto, hoc of the Holy Spirit in such a way that the efficiency of the modo quod efficacia spiritus sancti referatur ad corpus Holy Spirit be referred to the body assumed, and the conassumptum, consubstantialitas ad personam assumen- substantiality to the Person assuming. tem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod corpus Christi, Reply Obj. 1: Christ’s body, through not being consubquia non est consubstantiale spiritui sancto, non proprie stantial with the Holy Spirit, cannot properly be said to be potest dici de spiritu sancto conceptum, sed magis ex conceived of (de) the Holy Spirit, but rather from (ex) the spiritu sancto, sicut Ambrosius dicit, in libro de spiritu Holy Spirit, as Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. ii.): What is sancto, quod ex aliquo est, aut ex substantia aut ex pote- from someone is either from his substance or from his power: state eius est, ex substantia, sicut filius, qui a patre est; ex from his substance, as the Son who is from the Father; from potestate, sicut ex Deo omnia, quo modo et in utero habuit his power, as all things are from God, just as Mary conceived Maria ex spiritu sancto. from the Holy Spirit. Ad secundum dicendum quod super hoc videtur Reply Obj. 2: It seems that on this point there is a difesse quaedam diversitas Hieronymi ad quosdam alios ference of opinion between Jerome and certain other Docdoctores, qui asserunt spiritum sanctum in conceptione tors, who assert that the Holy Spirit took the place of seed fuisse pro semine. Dicit enim Chrysostomus, super Mat- in this conception. For Chrysostom says (Hom. i in Matth.): th., unigenito Dei in virginem ingressuro praecessit Spi- When God’s Only-Begotten was about to enter into the Virritus Sanctus, ut, praecedente spiritu sancto, in sanctifi- gin, the Holy Spirit preceded Him; that by the previous encationem nascatur Christus secundum corpus, divinitate trance of the Holy Spirit, Christ might be born unto sanctifiingrediente pro semine. Et Damascenus dicit, in III libro, cation according to His body, the Godhead entering instead of obumbravit super ipsam Dei sapientia et virtus, velut di- the seed. And Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): God’s wisvinum semen. dom and power overshadowed her, like unto a Divine seed. Sed hoc de facili solvitur. Quia secundum quod in But these expressions are easily explained. Because semine intelligitur virtus activa, sic Chrysostomus et Chrysostom and Damascene compare the Holy Spirit, or Damascenus comparant semini spiritum sanctum, vel also the Son, who is the Power of the Most High, to seed, etiam filium, qui est virtus altissimi. Secundum autem by reason of the active power therein; while Jerome denies quod in semine intelligitur substantia corporalis quae in that the Holy Spirit took the place of seed, considered as a conceptione transmutatur, negat Hieronymus spiritum corporeal substance which is transformed in conception. sanctum fuisse pro semine. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dicit AugustiReply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xl), nus, in Enchirid., non eodem modo dicitur Christus Christ is said to be conceived or born of the Holy Spirit conceptus aut natus de spiritu sancto, et de Maria virgi- in one sense; of the Virgin Mary in another—of the Virne, nam de Maria virgine materialiter, de spiritu sancto gin Mary materially; of the Holy Spirit efficiently. Therefore effective. Et ideo non habuit hic locum commixtio. there was no mingling here.

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Q. 32, A. 3

Article 3 Whether the Holy Spirit should be called Christ’s father in respect of his humanity? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Spiritus Sanctus debeat dici pater Christi secundum humanitatem. Quia secundum philosophum, in libro de Generat. Animal., pater dat principium activum in generatione, mater vero ministrat materiam. Sed beata virgo dicitur mater Christi propter materiam quam in conceptione eius ministravit. Ergo videtur quod etiam Spiritus Sanctus possit dici pater eius, propter hoc quod fuit principium activum in conceptione ipsius. Praeterea, sicut mentes aliorum sanctorum formantur per spiritum sanctum, ita etiam corpus Christi est per spiritum sanctum formatum. Sed alii sancti, propter praedictam formationem, dicuntur filii totius Trinitatis, et per consequens spiritus sancti. Videtur ergo quod Christus debeat dici filius spiritus sancti, inquantum corpus eius est spiritu sancto formatum. Praeterea, Deus dicitur pater noster secundum hoc quod nos fecit, secundum illud Deut. XXXII, nonne ipse est pater tuus, qui possedit et fecit et creavit te? Sed Spiritus Sanctus fecit corpus Christi, ut dictum est. Ergo Spiritus Sanctus debet dici pater Christi secundum corpus ab ipso formatum. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., natus est Christus de spiritu sancto non sicut filius, et de Maria virgine sicut filius. Respondeo dicendum quod nomina paternitatis et maternitatis et filiationis generationem consequuntur, non tamen quamlibet, sed proprie generationem viventium, et praecipue animalium. Non enim dicimus quod ignis generatus sit filius ignis generantis, nisi forte secundum metaphoram, sed hoc solum dicimus in animalibus quorum generatio est magis perfecta. Nec tamen omne quod in animalibus generatur, filiationis accepit nomen, sed solum illud quod generatur in similitudine generantis. Unde, sicut Augustinus dicit, non dicimus quod capillus qui nascitur ex homine, sit filius hominis; nec etiam dicimus quod homo qui nascitur sit filius seminis, quia nec capillus habet similitudinem hominis; nec homo qui nascitur habet similitudinem seminis, sed hominis generantis. Et si quidem perfecta sit similitudo, erit perfecta filiatio, tam in divinis quam in humanis. Si autem sit similitudo imperfecta, est etiam filiatio imperfecta. Sicut in homine est quaedam similitudo Dei imperfecta, et inquantum creatus est ad imaginem Dei, et inquantum creatus est secundum similitudinem gratiae. Et ideo utroque modo potest homo dici filius eius, et quia, scilicet, est creatus ad imaginem eius; et quia est ei assimilatus per gratiam. Est autem considerandum quod illud quod de aliquo dicitur secundum perfectam ratio-

Objection 1: It would seem that the Holy Spirit should be called Christ’s father in respect of His humanity. Because, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal. i): The Father is the active principle in generation, the Mother supplies the matter. But the Blessed Virgin is called Christ’s Mother, by reason of the matter which she supplied in His conception. Therefore it seems that the Holy Spirit can be called His father, through being the active principle in His conception. Obj. 2: Further, as the minds of other holy men are fashioned by the Holy Spirit, so also was Christ’s body fashioned by the Holy Spirit. But other holy men, on account of the aforesaid fashioning, are called the children of the whole Trinity, and consequently of the Holy Spirit. Therefore it seems that Christ should be called the Son of the Holy Spirit, forasmuch as His body was fashioned by the Holy Spirit. Obj. 3: Further, God is called our Father by reason of His having made us, according to Deut. 32:6: Is not He thy Father, that hath possessed thee, and made thee and created thee? But the Holy Spirit made Christ’s body, as stated above (AA. 1, 2). Therefore the Holy Spirit should be called Christ’s Father in respect of the body fashioned by Him. On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): Christ was born of the Holy Spirit not as a Son, and of the Virgin Mary as a Son. I answer that, The words fatherhood, motherhood, and sonship, result from generation; yet not from any generation, but from that of living things, especially animals. For we do not say that fire generated is the son of the fire generating it, except, perhaps, metaphorically; we speak thus only of animals in whom generation is more perfect. Nevertheless, the word son is not applied to everything generated in animals, but only to that which is generated into likeness of the generator. Wherefore, as Augustine says (Enchiridion xxxix), we do not say that a hair which is generated in a man is his son; nor do we say that a man who is born is the son of the seed; for neither is the hair like the man nor is the man born like the seed, but like the man who begot him. And if the likeness be perfect, the sonship is perfect, whether in God or in man. But if the likeness be imperfect, the sonship is imperfect. Thus in man there is a certain imperfect likeness to God, both as regards his being created to God’s image and as regards His being created unto the likeness of grace. Therefore in both ways man can be called His son, both because he is created to His image and because he is likened to Him by grace. Now, it must be observed that what is said in its perfect sense of a thing should not be said thereof in its imperfect sense: thus, because Socrates is said to be naturally a man, in the proper sense of man, never is

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nem, non est dicendum de eo secundum rationem imperfectam, sicut, quia Socrates dicitur naturaliter homo secundum propriam rationem hominis, nunquam dicitur homo secundum illam significationem qua pictura hominis dicitur homo, licet forte ipse assimiletur alteri homini. Christus autem est filius Dei secundum perfectam rationem filiationis. Unde, quamvis secundum humanam naturam sit creatus et iustificatus non tamen debet dici filius Dei neque ratione creationis, neque ratione iustificationis, sed solum ratione generationis aeternae, secundum quam est filius patris solius. Et ideo nullo modo debet dici Christus filius spiritus sancti, nec etiam totius Trinitatis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus conceptus est de Maria virgine materiam ministrante in similitudinem speciei. Et ideo dicitur filius eius. Christus autem, secundum quod homo, conceptus est de spiritu sancto sicut de activo principio, non tamen secundum similitudinem speciei, sicut homo nascitur de patre suo. Et ideo Christus non dicitur filius spiritus sancti. Ad secundum dicendum quod homines qui spiritualiter formantur a spiritu sancto, non possunt dici filii Dei secundum perfectam rationem filiationis. Et ideo dicuntur filii Dei secundum filiationem imperfectam, quae est secundum similitudinem gratiae, quae est a tota Trinitate. Sed de Christo est alia ratio, ut dictum est. Et similiter dicendum est ad tertium.

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he called man in the sense in which the portrait of a man is called a man, although, perhaps, he may resemble another man. Now, Christ is the Son of God in the perfect sense of sonship. Wherefore, although in His human nature He was created and justified, He ought not to be called the Son of God, either in respect of His being created or of His being justified, but only in respect of His eternal generation, by reason of which He is the Son of the Father alone. Therefore nowise should Christ be called the Son of the Holy Spirit, nor even of the whole Trinity.

Reply Obj. 1: Christ was conceived of the Virgin Mary, who supplied the matter of His conception unto likeness of species. For this reason He is called her Son. But as man He was conceived of the Holy Spirit as the active principle of His conception, but not unto likeness of species, as a man is born of his father. Therefore Christ is not called the Son of the Holy Spirit. Reply Obj. 2: Men who are fashioned spiritually by the Holy Spirit cannot be called sons of God in the perfect sense of sonship. And therefore they are called sons of God in respect of imperfect sonship, which is by reason of the likeness of grace, which flows from the whole Trinity. But with Christ it is different, as stated above. The same reply avails for the Third Objection.

Article 4 Whether the Blessed Virgin cooperated actively in the conception of Christ’s body? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beata virgo aliquid active egerit in conceptione corporis Christi. Dicit enim Damascenus, in III libro, quod Spiritus Sanctus supervenit virgini, purgans ipsam, et virtutem susceptivam verbi Dei tribuens, simul autem et generativam. Sed virtutem generativam passivam habebat a natura, sicut et quaelibet femina. Ergo dedit ei virtutem generativam activam. Et sic aliquid active egit in conceptione Christi. Praeterea, omnes virtutes animae vegetabilis sunt virtutes activae, sicut Commentator dicit, in II de anima. Sed potentia generativa, tam in mare quam in femina, pertinet ad animam vegetabilem. Ergo, tam in mare quam in femina, active operatur ad conceptum prolis. Praeterea, femina ad conceptionem prolis materiam ministrat ex qua naturaliter corpus prolis formatur. Sed natura est principium motus intrinsecum. Ergo videtur quod in ipsa materia quam beata virgo ministravit ad conceptum Christi, fuit aliquod principium activum.

Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin cooperated actively in the conception of Christ’s body. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that the Holy Spirit came upon the Virgin, purifying her, and bestowing on her the power to receive and to bring forth the Word of God. But she had from nature the passive power of generation, like any other woman. Therefore He bestowed on her an active power of generation. And thus she cooperated actively in Christ’s conception. Obj. 2: Further, all the powers of the vegetative soul are active, as the Commentator says (De Anima ii). But the generative power, in both man and woman, belongs to the vegetative soul. Therefore, both in man and woman, it cooperates actively in the conception of the child. Obj. 3: Further, in the conception of a child the woman supplies the matter from which the child’s body is naturally formed. But nature is an intrinsic principle of movement. Therefore it seems that in the very matter supplied by the Blessed Virgin there was an active principle.

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Sed contra est quod principium activum in generatione dicitur ratio seminalis. Sed, sicut Augustinus dicit, X super Gen. ad Litt., corpus Christi in sola materia corporali, per divinam conceptionis formationisque rationem, de virgine assumptum est, non autem secundum aliquam rationem seminalem humanam. Ergo beata virgo nihil active fecit in conceptione corporis Christi. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dicunt beatam virginem aliquid active esse operatam in conceptione Christi, et naturali virtute, et supernaturali. Naturali quidem virtute, quia ponunt quod in qualibet materia naturali est aliquod activum principium. Alioquin, credunt quod non esset transmutatio naturalis. In quo decipiuntur. Quia transmutatio dicitur naturalis propter principium intrinsecum non solum activum, sed etiam passivum, expresse enim dicit philosophus, in VIII Physic., quod in gravibus et levibus est principium passivum motus naturalis, et non activum. Nec est possibile quod materia agat ad sui formationem, quia non est actu. Nec est etiam possibile quod aliquid moveat seipsum, nisi dividatur in duas partes, quarum una sit movens et alia sit mota, quod in solis animatis contingit, ut probatur in VIII Physic. Supernaturali autem virtute, quia dicunt ad matrem requiri quod non solum materiam ministret, quae est sanguis menstruus; sed etiam semen, quod, commixtum virili semini, habet virtutem activam in generatione. Et quia in beata virgine nulla fuit facta resolutio seminis, propter integerrimam eius virginitatem, dicunt quod Spiritus Sanctus supernaturaliter ei tribuit virtutem activam in conceptione corporis Christi, quam aliae matres habent per semen resolutum. Sed hoc non potest stare. Quia, cum quaelibet res sit propter suam operationem, ut dicitur II de caelo; natura non distingueret ad opus generationis sexum maris et feminae, nisi esset distincta operatio maris ab operatione feminae. In generatione autem distinguitur operatio agentis et patientis. Unde relinquitur quod tota virtus activa sit ex parte maris, passio autem ex parte feminae. Propter quod in plantis, in quibus utraque vis commiscetur, non est distinctio maris et feminae. Quia igitur beata virgo non hoc accepit ut esset pater Christi, sed mater, consequens est quod non acceperit potentiam activam in conceptione Christi, sive aliquid egerit, ex quo sequitur ipsam patrem fuisse Christi; sive nihil egerit, ut quidam dicunt, ex quo sequitur huiusmodi potentiam activam sibi frustra fuisse collatam. Et ideo dicendum est quod in ipsa conceptione Christi beata virgo nihil active operata est, sed solam materiam ministravit. Operata tamen est ante conceptionem aliquid active, praeparando materiam ut esset apta conceptui.

Q. 32, A. 4

On the contrary, The active principle in generation is called the seminal virtue. But, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. x), Christ’s body was taken from the Virgin, only as to corporeal matter, by the Divine power of conception and formation, but not by any human seminal virtue. Therefore the Blessed Virgin did not cooperate actively in, the conception of Christ’s body. I answer that, Some say that the Blessed Virgin cooperated actively in Christ’s conception, both by natural and by a supernatural power. By natural power, because they hold that in all natural matter there is an active principle; otherwise they believe that there would be no such thing as natural transformation. But in this they are deceived. Because a transformation is said to be natural by reason not only of an active but also of a passive intrinsic principle: for the Philosopher says expressly (Phys. viii) that in heavy and light things there is a passive, and not an active, principle of natural movement. Nor is it possible for matter to be active in its own formation, since it is not in act. Nor, again, is it possible for anything to put itself in motion except it be divided into two parts, one being the mover, the other being moved: which happens in animate things only, as is proved Phys. viii. By a supernatural power, because they say that the mother requires not only to supply the matter, which is the menstrual blood, but also the semen, which, being mingled with that of the male, has an active power in generation. And since in the Blessed Virgin there was no resolution of semen, by reason of her inviolate virginity, they say that the Holy Spirit supernaturally bestowed on her an active power in the conception of Christ’s body, which power other mothers have by reason of the semen resolved. But this cannot stand, because, since each thing is on account of its operation (De Coel. ii), nature would not, for the purpose of the act of generation, distinguish the male and female sexes, unless the action of the male were distinct from that of the female. Now, in generation there are two distinct operations—that of the agent and that of the patient. Wherefore it follows that the entire active operation is on the part of the male, and the passive on the part of the female. For this reason in plants, where both forces are mingled, there is no distinction of male and female. Since, therefore, the Blessed Virgin was not Christ’s Father, but His Mother, it follows that it was not given to her to exercise an active power in His conception: whether to cooperate actively so as to be His Father, or not to cooperate at all, as some say. Whence it would follow that this active power was bestowed on her to no purpose. We must therefore say that in Christ’s conception itself she did not cooperate actively, but merely supplied the matter thereof. Nevertheless, before the conception she cooperated actively in the preparation of the matter so that it should be apt for the conception.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa conceptio tria privilegia habuit, scilicet, quod esset sine peccato originali; quod esset non puri hominis, sed Dei et hominis; item quod esset conceptio virginis. Et haec tria habuit a spiritu sancto. Et ideo dicit Damascenus, quantum ad primum, quod Spiritus Sanctus supervenit virgini purgans ipsam, idest, praeservans ne cum peccato originali conciperet. Quantum ad secundum, dicit, et virtutem susceptivam verbi Dei tribuens, idest, ut conciperet verbum Dei. Quantum autem ad tertium, dicit, simul et generativam, ut, scilicet, manens virgo posset generare, non quidem active sed passive, sicut aliae matres hoc consequuntur ex semine viri. Ad secundum dicendum quod potentia generativa in femina est imperfecta respectu potentiae generativae quae est in mare. Et ideo, sicut in artibus ars inferior disponit materiam, ars autem superior inducit formam, ut dicitur in II Physic.; ita etiam virtus generativa feminae praeparat materiam, virtus vero activa maris format materiam praeparatam. Ad tertium dicendum quod ad hoc quod transmutatio sit naturalis, non requiritur quod in materia sit principium activum, sed solum passivum, ut dictum est.

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Reply Obj. 1: This conception had three privileges— namely, that it was without original sin; that it was not that of a man only, but of God and man; and that it was a virginal conception. And all three were effected by the Holy Spirit. Therefore Damascene says, as to the first, that the Holy Spirit came upon the Virgin, purifying her—that is, preserving her from conceiving with original sin. As to the second, he says: And bestowing on her the power to receive, i.e., to conceive, the Word of God. As to the third, he says: And to give birth to Him, i.e., that she might, while remaining a virgin, bring Him forth, not actively, but passively, just as other mothers achieve this through the action of the male seed. Reply Obj. 2: The generative power of the female is imperfect compared to that of the male. And, therefore, just as in the arts the inferior art gives a disposition to the matter to which the higher art gives the form, as is stated Phys. ii, so also the generative power of the female prepares the matter, which is then fashioned by the active power of the male. Reply Obj. 3: In order for a transformation to be natural, there is no need for an active principle in matter, but only for a passive principle, as stated above.

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Question 33 The Mode and Order of Christ’s Conception Deinde considerandum est de modo et ordine conWe have now to consider the mode and order of Christ’s ceptionis Christi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. conception, concerning which there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum corpus Christi in primo instanti (1) Whether Christ’s body was formed in the first conceptionis fuerit formatum. instant of its conception? Secundo, utrum in primo instanti conceptionis (2) Whether it was animated in the first instant of its fuerit animatum. conception? Tertio, utrum in primo instanti conceptionis fuerit a (3) Whether it was assumed by the Word in the first verbo assumptum. instant of its conception? Quarto, utrum conceptio illa fuerit naturalis vel (4) Whether this conception was natural or miraculosa. miraculous?

Article 1 Whether Christ’s body was formed in the first instant of its conception? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpus Christi non fuerit formatum in primo instanti conceptionis. Dicitur enim Ioan. II, quadraginta et sex annis aedificatum est templum hoc, quod exponens Augustinus, in IV de Trin., dicit, hic numerus perfectioni dominici corporis aperte congruit. Et in libro octoginta trium quaest. dicit, non absurde quadraginta sex annis dicitur fabricatum esse templum, quod corpus eius figurabat, ut, quot anni fuerunt in fabricatione templi, tot dies fuerint in corporis dominici perfectione. Non ergo in primo instanti conceptionis corpus Christi fuit perfecte formatum. Praeterea, ad formationem corporis Christi requirebatur motus localis, quo purissimi sanguines de corpore virginis ad locum congruum generationi pervenirent. Nullum autem corpus potest moveri localiter in instanti, eo quod tempus motus dividitur secundum divisionem mobilis, ut probatur in VI Physic. Ergo corpus Christi non fuit in instanti formatum. Praeterea, corpus Christi formatum est ex purissimis sanguinibus virginis, ut supra habitum est. Non autem potuit esse materia illa in eodem instanti sanguis et caro, quia sic materia simul fuisset sub duabus formis. Ergo aliud fuit instans in quo ultimo fuit sanguis, et aliud in quo primo fuit caro formata. Sed inter quaelibet duo instantia est tempus medium. Ergo corpus Christi non fuit in instanti formatum, sed per aliquod tempus. Praeterea, sicut potentia augmentativa requirit determinatum tempus in suo actu, ita etiam virtus gene-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s body was not formed in the first instant of its conception. For it is written (John 2:20): Six-and-forty years was this Temple in building; on which words Augustine comments as follows (De Trin. iv): This number applies manifestly to the perfection of our Lord’s body. He says, further (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 56): It is not without reason that the Temple, which was a type of His body, is said to have been forty-six years in building: so that as many years as it took to build the Temple, in so many days was our Lord’s body perfected. Therefore Christ’s body was not perfectly formed in the first instant of its conception. Obj. 2: Further, there was need of local movement for the formation of Christ’s body in order that the purest blood of the Virgin’s body might be brought where generation might aptly take place. Now, no body can be moved locally in an instant: since the time taken in movement is divided according to the division of the thing moved, as is proved Phys. vi. Therefore Christ’s body was not formed in an instant. Obj. 3: Further, Christ’s body was formed of the purest blood of the Virgin, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 5). But that matter could not be in the same instant both blood and flesh, because thus matter would have been at the same time the subject of two forms. Therefore the last instant in which it was blood was distinct from the first instant in which it was flesh. But between any two instants there is an interval of time. Therefore Christ’s body was not formed in an instant, but during a space of time. Obj. 4: Further, as the augmentative power requires a fixed time for its act, so also does the generative power: for

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rativa, utraque enim est potentia naturalis ad vegetabilem animam pertinens. Sed corpus Christi fuit determinato tempore augmentatum, sicut et aliorum hominum corpora, dicitur enim Luc. II, quod proficiebat aetate et sapientia. Ergo videtur quod, pari ratione, formatio corporis eius, quae pertinet ad vim generativam, non fuerit in instanti, sed determinato tempore quo aliorum hominum corpora formantur. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, XVIII Moral., Angelo nuntiante, et spiritu adveniente, mox verbum in utero, mox intra uterum verbum caro. Respondeo dicendum quod in conceptione corporis Christi tria est considerare, primo quidem, motum localem sanguinis ad locum generationis; secundo, formationem corporis ex tali materia; tertio, augmentum quo perducitur ad quantitatem perfectam. In quorum medio ratio conceptionis consistit, nam primum est conceptioni praeambulum; tertium autem conceptionem consequitur. Primum autem non potuit esse in instanti, quia hoc est contra ipsam rationem motus localis corporis cuiuscumque, cuius partes successive subintrant locum. Similiter et tertium oportet esse successivum. Tum quia augmentum non est sine motu locali. Tum etiam quia procedit ex virtute animae iam in corpore formato operantis, quae non operatur nisi in tempore. Sed ipsa formatio corporis, in qua principaliter ratio conceptionis consistit, fuit in instanti, duplici ratione. Primo quidem, propter virtutem agentis infinitam, scilicet spiritus sancti, per quem corpus Christi est formatum, ut supra dictum est. Tanto enim aliquod agens citius potest materiam disponere, quanto fuerit maioris virtutis. Unde agens infinitae virtutis potest in instanti materiam disponere ad debitam formam. Secundo, ex parte personae filii, cuius corpus formabatur. Non enim erat congruum ut corpus humanum assumeret nisi formatum. Si autem ante formationem perfectam aliquod tempus conceptionis praecessisset, non posset tota conceptio attribui filio Dei, quae non attribuitur ei nisi ratione assumptionis. Et ideo in primo instanti quo materia adunata pervenit ad locum generationis, fuit perfecte formatum corpus Christi et assumptum. Et per hoc dicitur ipse filius Dei conceptus, quod aliter dici non posset.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum Augustini utrobique non refertur ad solam formationem corporis Christi, sed ad formationem simul cum determinato augmento usque ad tempus partus. Unde secundum rationem illius numeri dicitur perfici tempus novem mensium, quo Christus fuit in utero virginis.

IIIae

both are natural powers belonging to the vegetative soul. But Christ’s body took a fixed time to grow, like the bodies of other men: for it is written (Luke 2:52) that He advanced in wisdom and age. Therefore it seems for the same reason that the formation of His body, since that, too, belongs to the generative power, was not instantaneous, but took a fixed time, like the bodies of other men. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xviii): As soon as the angel announced it, as soon as the Spirit came down, the Word was in the womb, within the womb the Word was made flesh. I answer that, In the conception of Christ’s body three points may be considered: first, the local movement of the blood to the place of generation; second, the formation of the body from that matter; third, the development whereby it was brought to perfection of quantity. Of these, the second is the conception itself; the first is a preamble; the third, a result of the conception. Now, the first could not be instantaneous: since this would be contrary to the very nature of the local movement of any body whatever, the parts of which come into a place successively. The third also requires a succession of time: both because there is no increase without local movement, and because increase is effected by the power of the soul already informing the body, the operation of which power is subject to time. But the body’s very formation, in which conception principally consists, was instantaneous, for two reasons. First, because of the infinite power of the agent, viz. the Holy Spirit, by whom Christ’s body was formed, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 1). For the greater the power of an agent, the more quickly can it dispose matter; and, consequently, an agent of infinite power can dispose matter instantaneously to its due form. Second, on the part of the Person of the Son, whose body was being formed. For it was unbecoming that He should take to Himself a body as yet unformed. While, if the conception had been going on for any time before the perfect formation of the body, the whole conception could not be attributed to the Son of God, since it is not attributed to Him except by reason of the assumption of that body. Therefore in the first instant in which the various parts of the matter were united together in the place of generation, Christ’s body was both perfectly formed and assumed. And thus is the Son of God said to have been conceived; nor could it be said otherwise. Reply Obj. 1: Neither quotation from Augustine refers to formation alone of Christ’s body, but to its formation, together with a fixed development up to the time of His birth. Wherefore in the aforesaid number are foreshadowed the number of months during which Christ was in the Virgin’s womb.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod motus ille localis non comprehenditur infra ipsam conceptionem, sed est conceptioni praeambulus. Ad tertium dicendum quod non est assignare ultimum instans in quo materia illa fuit sanguis, sed est assignare ultimum tempus, quod continuatur, nullo interveniente medio, ad primum instans in quo fuit caro Christi formata. Et hoc instans fuit terminus temporis motus localis materiae ad locum generationis. Ad quartum dicendum quod augmentum fit per potentiam augmentativam ipsius quod augetur, sed formatio corporis fit per potentiam generativam, non eius qui generatur, sed patris generantis ex semine, in quo operatur vis formativa ab anima patris derivata. Corpus autem Christi non fuit formatum ex semine viri, sicut supra dictum est, sed ex operatione spiritus sancti. Et ideo talis debuit esse formatio ut spiritum sanctum deceret. Sed augmentum corporis Christi fuit factum secundum potentiam augmentativam animae Christi, quae cum sit specie conformis animae nostrae, eodem modo debuit corpus illud augmentari sicut et alia corpora hominum augmentantur, ut ex hoc ostenderetur veritas humanae naturae.

Q. 33, A. 2

Reply Obj. 2: This local movement is not comprised within the conception itself, but is a preamble thereto. Reply Obj. 3: It is not possible to fix the last instant in which that matter was blood: but it is possible to fix the last period of time which continued without any interval up to the first instant in which Christ’s body was formed. And this instant was the terminus of the time occupied by the local movement of the matter towards the place of generation. Reply Obj. 4: Increase is caused by the augmentative power of that which is the subject of increase: but the formation of the body is caused by the generative power, not of that which is generated, but of the father generating from seed, in which the formative power derived from the father’s soul has its operation. But Christ’s body was not formed by the seed of man, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 5, ad 3), but by the operation of the Holy Spirit. Therefore the formation thereof should be such as to be worthy of the Holy Spirit. But the development of Christ’s body was the effect of the augmentative power in Christ’s soul: and since this was of the same species as ours, it behooved His body to develop in the same way as the bodies of other men, so as to prove the reality of His human nature.

Article 2 Whether Christ’s body was animated in the first instant of its conception? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpus Christi non fuit animatum in primo instanti conceptionis. Dicit enim Leo Papa, in epistola ad Iulianum, non alterius naturae erat caro Christi quam nostrae, nec alio illi quam ceteris hominibus anima est inspirata principio. Sed aliis hominibus non infunditur anima in primo instanti suae conceptionis. Ergo neque corpori Christi anima debuit infundi in primo instanti suae conceptionis. Praeterea, anima, sicut quaelibet forma naturalis, requirit determinatam quantitatem in sua materia. Sed in primo instanti conceptionis corpus Christi non habuit tantam quantitatem quantam habent corpora aliorum hominum quando animantur, alioquin, si continue fuisset postmodum augmentatum, vel citius fuisset natum; vel in sua nativitate fuisset maioris quantitatis quam alii infantes. Quorum primum est contra Augustinum, IV de Trin., ubi probat eum spatio novem mensium in utero virginis fuisse, secundum autem est contra Leonem Papam, qui, in sermone Epiphaniae, dicit, invenerunt puerum Iesum in nullo ab humanae infantiae generalitate discretum. Non ergo corpus Christi fuit animatum in primo instanti suae conceptionis.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s body was not animated in the first instant of its conception. For Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Julian.): Christ’s flesh was not of another nature than ours: nor was the beginning of His animation different from that of other men. But the soul is not infused into other men at the first instant of their conception. Therefore neither should Christ’s soul have been infused into His body in the first instant of its conception. Obj. 2: Further, the soul, like any natural form, requires determinate quantity in its matter. But in the first instant of its conception Christ’s body was not of the same quantity as the bodies of other men when they are animated: otherwise, if afterwards its development had been continuous, either its birth would have occurred sooner, or at the time of birth He would have been a bigger child than others. The former alternative is contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. iv), where he proves that Christ was in the Virgin’s womb for the space of nine months: while the latter is contrary to what Pope Leo says (Serm. iv in Epiph.): They found the child Jesus nowise differing from the generality of infants. Therefore Christ’s body was not animated in the first instant of its conception.

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Incarnate Son of God

Praeterea, ubicumque est prius et posterius, oportet esse plura instantia. Sed secundum philosophum, in libro de Generat. Animal., in generatione hominis requiritur prius et posterius, prius enim est vivum, et postea animal, et postea homo. Ergo non potuit animatio Christi perfici in primo instanti conceptionis. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, simul caro, simul Dei verbi caro, simul caro animata anima rationali et intellectuali. Respondeo dicendum quod, ad hoc quod conceptio ipsi filio Dei attribuatur, ut in symbolo confitemur, dicentes, qui conceptus est de spiritu sancto; necesse est dicere quod ipsum corpus, dum conciperetur, esset a verbo Dei assumptum. Ostensum est autem supra quod verbum Dei assumpsit corpus mediante anima, et animam mediante spiritu, idest intellectu. Unde oportuit quod in primo instanti conceptionis corpus Christi esset animatum anima rationali. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod principium inspirationis animae potest considerari dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum dispositionem corporis. Et sic non ab alio principio inspirata est anima corpori Christi, et corporibus aliorum hominum. Sicut enim statim, formato corpore alterius hominis, infunditur anima, ita fuit in Christo. Alio modo potest considerari dictum principium solum secundum tempus. Et sic, quia prius tempore formatum fuit perfecte corpus Christi, prius tempore fuit etiam animatum. Ad secundum dicendum quod anima requirit debitam quantitatem in materia cui infunditur, sed ista quantitas quandam latitudinem habet, quia et in maiori et minori quantitate salvatur. Quantitas autem corporis quam habet cum primo sibi infunditur anima, proportionatur quantitati perfectae ad quam per augmentum perveniet, ita scilicet quod maiorum hominum maiorem quantitatem corpora habent in prima animatione. Christus autem in perfecta aetate habuit decentem et mediocrem quantitatem, cui proportionabatur quantitas quam corpus eius habuit in tempore quo aliorum hominum corpora animantur; minorem tamen habuit in principio suae conceptionis. Sed tamen illa parva quantitas non erat tam parva ut in ea non posset ratio animati corporis conservari, cum in tali quantitate quorundam parvorum hominum corpora animentur. Ad tertium dicendum quod in generatione aliorum hominum locum habet quod dicit philosophus, propter hoc quod successive corpus formatur et disponitur ad animam, unde primo, tanquam imperfecte dispositum, recipit animam imperfectam; et postmodum, quando perfecte est dispositum, recipit animam perfectam. Sed corpus Christi, propter infinitam virtutem

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Obj. 3: Further, whenever there is before and after there must be several instants. But according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal. ii) in the generation of a man there must needs be before and after: for he is first of all a living thing, and afterwards, an animal, and after that, a man. Therefore the animation of Christ could not be effected in the first instant of His conception. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): At the very instant that there was flesh, it was the flesh of the Word of God, it was flesh animated with a rational and intellectual soul. I answer that, For the conception to be attributed to the very Son of God, as we confess in the Creed, when we say, who was conceived by the Holy Spirit, we must needs say that the body itself, in being conceived, was assumed by the Word of God. Now it has been shown above (Q. 6, AA. 1, 2) that the Word of God assumed the body by means of the soul, and the soul by means of the spirit, i.e., the intellect. Wherefore in the first instant of its conception Christ’s body must needs have been animated by the rational soul. Reply Obj. 1: The beginning of the infusion of the soul may be considered in two ways. First, in regard to the disposition of the body. And thus, the beginning of the infusion of the soul into Christ’s body was the same as in other men’s bodies: for just as the soul is infused into another man’s body as soon as it is formed, so was it with Christ. Second, this beginning may be considered merely in regard to time. And thus, because Christ’s body was perfectly formed in a shorter space of time, so after a shorter space of time was it animated. Reply Obj. 2: The soul requires due quantity in the matter into which it is infused: but this quantity allows of a certain latitude because it is not fixed to a certain amount. Now the quantity that a body has when the soul is first infused into it is in proportion to the perfect quantity to which it will attain by development: that is to say, men of greater stature have greater bodies at the time of first animation. But Christ at the perfect age was of becoming and middle stature: in proportion to which was the quantity of His body at the time when other men’s bodies are animated; though it was less than theirs at the first instant of His conception. Nevertheless that quantity was not too small to safeguard the nature of an animated body; since it would have sufficed for the animation of a small man’s body.

Reply Obj. 3: What the Philosopher says is true in the generation of other men, because the body is successively formed and disposed for the soul: whence, first, as being imperfectly disposed, it receives an imperfect soul; and afterwards, when it is perfectly disposed, it receives a perfect soul. But Christ’s body, on account of the infinite power of the agent, was perfectly disposed instantaneously. Where-

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Q. 33, A. 3

agentis, fuit perfecte dispositum in instanti. Unde statim fore, at once and in the first instant it received a perfect in primo instanti recepit formam perfectam, idest ani- form, that is, the rational soul. mam rationalem.

Article 3 Whether Christ’s flesh was first of all conceived and afterwards assumed? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod caro Christi prius fuit concepta, et postmodum assumpta. Quod enim non est, non potest assumi. Sed caro Christi per conceptionem esse incoepit. Ergo videtur quod fuerit assumpta a verbo Dei postquam fuit concepta. Praeterea, caro Christi fuit assumpta a verbo Dei mediante anima rationali. Sed in termino conceptionis accepit animam rationalem. Ergo in termino conceptionis fuit assumpta. Sed in termino conceptionis dicitur iam concepta. Ergo prius fuit concepta, et postmodum assumpta. Praeterea, in omni generato prius tempore est id quod est imperfectum, eo quod est perfectum, ut patet per philosophum, in IX Metaphys. Sed corpus Christi est quiddam generatum. Ergo ad ultimam perfectionem, quae consistit in unione ad verbum Dei, non statim in primo instanti conceptionis pervenit, sed primo fuit caro concepta, et postmodum assumpta. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de fide ad Petrum, firmissime tene, et nullatenus dubites carnem Christi non fuisse conceptam in utero virginis priusquam susciperetur a verbo. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, proprie dicimus Deum factum esse hominem, non autem proprie dicimus quod homo factus sit Deus, quia scilicet Deus assumpsit sibi id quod est hominis; non autem praeexstitit id quod est hominis, quasi per se subsistens, antequam susciperetur a verbo. Si autem caro Christi fuisset concepta antequam susciperetur a verbo, habuisset aliquando aliquam hypostasim praeter hypostasim verbi Dei. Quod est contra rationem incarnationis, secundum quam ponimus verbum Dei esse unitum humanae naturae, et omnibus partibus eius, in unitate hypostasis, nec fuit conveniens quod hypostasim praeexistentem humanae naturae, vel alicuius partis eius, verbum Dei sua assumptione destrueret. Et ideo contra fidem est dicere quod caro Christi prius fuerit concepta, et postmodum assumpta a verbo Dei. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si caro Christi non fuisset in instanti formata seu concepta, sed per temporis successionem, oporteret alterum duorum sequi, vel quod assumptum nondum esset caro; vel quod prius esset conceptio carnis quam eius assumptio. Sed quia ponimus conceptionem in instanti esse perfectam, consequens est quod in illa carne simul fuit concipi et

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s flesh was first of all conceived, and afterwards assumed. Because what is not cannot be assumed. But Christ’s flesh began to exist when it was conceived. Therefore it seems that it was assumed by the Word of God after it was conceived. Obj. 2: Further, Christ’s flesh was assumed by the Word of God, by means of the rational soul. But it received the rational soul at the term of the conception. Therefore it was assumed at the term of the conception. But at the term of the conception it was already conceived. Therefore it was first of all conceived and afterwards assumed. Obj. 3: Further, in everything generated, that which is imperfect precedes in time that which is perfect: which is made clear by the Philosopher (Metaph. ix). But Christ’s body is something generated. Therefore it did not attain to its ultimate perfection, which consisted in the union with the Word of God, at the first instant of its conception; but, first of all, the flesh was conceived and afterwards assumed. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Fide ad Petrum xviii): Hold steadfastly, and doubt not for a moment that Christ’s flesh was not conceived in the Virgin’s womb, before being assumed by the Word. I answer that, As stated above, we may say properly that God was made man, but not that man was made God: because God took to Himself that which belongs to man— and that which belongs to man did not pre-exist, as subsisting in itself, before being assumed by the Word. But if Christ’s flesh had been conceived before being assumed by the Word, it would have had at some time an hypostasis other than that of the Word of God. And this is against the very nature of the Incarnation, which we hold to consist in this, that the Word of God was united to human nature and to all its parts in the unity of hypostasis: nor was it becoming that the Word of God should, by assuming human nature, destroy a pre-existing hypostasis of human nature or of any part thereof. It is consequently contrary to faith to assert that Christ’s flesh was first of all conceived and afterwards assumed by the Word of God. Reply Obj. 1: If Christ’s flesh had been formed or conceived, not instantaneously, but successively, one of two things would follow: either that what was assumed was not yet flesh, or that the flesh was conceived before it was assumed. But since we hold that the conception was effected instantaneously, it follows that in that flesh the beginning and the completion of its conception were in the same in-

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conceptum esse. Et sic, ut dicit Augustinus, in libro de fide ad Petrum, dicimus ipsum Dei verbum suae carnis acceptione conceptum, ipsamque carnem verbi incarnatione conceptam. Et per hoc patet responsio ad secundum. Nam simul dum caro illa concipitur, concepta est et animatur. Ad tertium dicendum quod in mysterio incarnationis non consideratur ascensus, quasi alicuius praeexistentis proficientis usque ad unionis dignitatem, sicut posuit Photinus haereticus. Sed potius ibi consideratur descensus, secundum quod perfectum Dei verbum imperfectionem naturae nostrae sibi assumpsit; secundum illud Ioan. VI, descendi de caelo.

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stant. So that, as Augustine says: We say that the very Word of God was conceived in taking flesh, and that His very flesh was conceived by the Word taking flesh. From the above the reply to the Second Objection is clear. For in the same moment that this flesh began to be conceived, its conception and animation were completed. Reply Obj. 3: The mystery of the Incarnation is not to be looked upon as an ascent, as it were, of a man already existing and mounting up to the dignity of the Union: as the heretic Photinus maintained. Rather is it to be considered as a descent, by reason of the perfect Word of God taking unto Himself the imperfection of our nature; according to John 6:38: I came down from heaven.

Article 4 Whether Christ’s conception was natural? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod conceptio Christi fuerit naturalis. Secundum enim conceptionem carnis Christus dicitur filius hominis. Est autem verus et naturalis hominis filius, sicut et verus et naturalis Dei filius. Ergo eius conceptio fuit naturalis. Praeterea, nulla creatura producit operationem miraculosam. Sed conceptio Christi attribuitur beatae virgini, quae est pura creatura, dicitur enim quod virgo Christum concepit. Ergo videtur quod non sit miraculosa, sed naturalis conceptio. Praeterea, ad hoc quod aliqua transmutatio sit naturalis, sufficit quod principium passivum sit naturale, ut supra habitum est. Sed principium passivum ex parte matris in conceptione Christi fuit naturale, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo conceptio Christi fuit naturalis. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, in epistola ad Caium monachum, super hominem operatur Christus ea quae sunt hominis, et hoc monstrat virgo supernaturaliter concipiens. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Ambrosius dicit, in libro de incarnatione, multa in hoc mysterio et secundum naturam invenies, et ultra naturam. Si enim consideremus id quod est ex parte materiae conceptus, quam mater ministravit, totum est naturale. Si vero consideremus id quod est ex parte virtutis activae, totum est miraculosum. Et quia unumquodque magis iudicatur secundum formam quam secundum materiam; et similiter secundum agens quam secundum patiens, inde est quod conceptio Christi debet dici simpliciter miraculosa et supernaturalis, sed secundum aliquid naturalis.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s conception was natural. For Christ is called the Son of Man by reason of His conception in the flesh. But He is a true and natural Son of Man: as also is He the true and natural Son of God. Therefore His conception was natural. Obj. 2: Further, no creature can be the cause of a miraculous effect. But Christ’s conception is attributed to the Blessed Virgin, who is a mere creature: for we say that the Virgin conceived Christ. Therefore it seems that His conception was not miraculous, but natural. Obj. 3: Further, for a transformation to be natural, it is enough that the passive principle be natural, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 4). But in Christ’s conception the passive principle on the part of His Mother was natural, as we have shown (Q. 32, A. 4). Therefore Christ’s conception was natural. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Ep. ad Caium Monach.): Christ does in a superhuman way those things that pertain to man: this is shown in the miraculous virginal conception. I answer that, As Ambrose says (De Incarn. vi): In this mystery thou shalt find many things that are natural, and many that are supernatural. For if we consider in this conception anything connected with the matter thereof, which was supplied by the mother, it was in all such things natural. But if we consider it on the part of the active power, thus it was entirely miraculous. And since judgment of a thing should be pronounced in respect of its form rather than of its matter: and likewise in respect of its activity rather than of its passiveness: therefore is it that Christ’s conception should be described simply as miraculous and supernatural, although in a certain respect it was natural. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus dicitur Reply Obj. 1: Christ is said to be a natural Son of naturalis filius hominis inquantum habet naturam hu- Man, by reason of His having a true human nature, through

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manam veram, per quam est filius hominis, licet eam miraculose habuerit, sicut caecus illuminatus videt naturaliter per potentiam visivam quam miraculose accepit. Ad secundum dicendum quod conceptio attribuitur beatae virgini, non tanquam principio activo, sed quia ministravit materiam conceptui, et in eius utero est conceptio celebrata. Ad tertium dicendum quod principium passivum naturale sufficit ad transmutationem naturalem quando naturali et consueto modo movetur a principio activo proprio. Sed hoc in proposito non habet locum. Et ideo conceptio illa non potest dici simpliciter naturalis.

Q. 33, A. 4

which He is a Son of Man, although He had it miraculously; thus, too, the blind man to whom sight has been restored sees naturally by sight miraculously received. Reply Obj. 2: The conception is attributed to the Blessed Virgin, not as the active principle thereof, but because she supplied the matter, and because the conception took place in her womb. Reply Obj. 3: A natural passive principle suffices for a transformation to be natural, when it is moved by its proper active principle in a natural and wonted way. But this is not so in the case in point. Therefore this conception cannot be called simply natural.

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Question 34 The Perfection of the Child Conceived Deinde considerandum est de perfectione prolis conWe must now consider the perfection of the child conceptae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. ceived: and concerning this there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum in primo instanti conceptionis (1) Whether Christ was sanctified by grace in the first Christus fuerit sanctificatus per gratiam. instant of His conception? Secundo, utrum in eodem instanti habuerit usum (2) Whether in that same instant He had the use of liberi arbitrii. free-will? Tertio, utrum in eodem instanti potuerit mereri. (3) Whether in that same instant He could merit? Quarto, utrum in eodem instanti fuerit plene (4) Whether in that same instant He was a perfect comprehensor. comprehensor?

Article 1 Whether Christ was sanctified in the first instant of his conception? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non fuerit sanctificatus in primo instanti suae conceptionis. Dicitur enim I Cor. XV, non prius quod spirituale est, sed quod animale, deinde quod spirituale. Sed sanctificatio gratiae pertinet ad spiritualitatem. Non ergo statim a principio suae conceptionis Christus percepit gratiam sanctificationis, sed post aliquod spatium temporis. Praeterea, sanctificatio videtur esse a peccato, secundum illud I Cor. VI, et hoc quidem fuistis aliquando, scilicet peccatores, sed abluti estis, sed sanctificati estis. Sed in Christo nunquam fuit peccatum. Ergo non convenit sibi sanctificari per gratiam. Praeterea, sicut per verbum Dei omnia facta sunt, ita per verbum incarnatum sunt omnes homines sanctificati qui sanctificantur, Heb. II, qui sanctificat et qui sanctificantur ex uno omnes. Sed verbum Dei, per quod facta sunt omnia, non est factum, ut Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin. Ergo Christus, per quem sanctificantur omnes, non est sanctificatus. Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. I, quod ex te nascetur sanctum, vocabitur filius Dei. Et Ioan. X, quem pater sanctificavit et misit in mundum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, abundantia gratiae sanctificantis animam Christi derivatur ex ipsa verbi unione, secundum illud Ioan. I, vidimus gloriam eius quasi unigeniti a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis. Ostensum est autem supra quod in primo instanti conceptionis corpus Christi animatum fuit et a verbo Dei assumptum. Unde consequens est quod in pri-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not sanctified in the first instant of His conception. For it is written (1 Cor 15:46): That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural: afterwards that which is spiritual. But sanctification by grace is something spiritual. Therefore Christ received the grace of sanctification, not at the very beginning of His conception, but after a space of time. Obj. 2: Further, sanctification seems to be a cleansing from sin: according to 1 Cor. 6:1: And such some of you were, namely, sinners, but you are washed, but you are sanctified. But sin was never in Christ. Therefore it was not becoming that He should be sanctified by grace. Obj. 3: Further, as by the Word of God all things were made, so from the Word incarnate all men who are made holy receive holiness, according to Heb. 2:11: Both he that sanctifieth and they who are sanctified are all of one. But the Word of God, by whom all things were made, was not Himself made; as Augustine says (De Trin. i). Therefore Christ, by whom all are made holy, was not Himself made holy. On the contrary, It is written (Luke 1:35): The Holy which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God; and (John 10:36): Whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 7, AA. 9, 10, 12), the abundance of grace sanctifying Christ’s soul flows from the very union of the Word, according to John 1:14: We saw His glory . . . as it were of the Only-Begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. For it has been shown above (Q. 33, AA. 2, 3) that in the first instant of conception, Christ’s body was both animated and assumed by the Word

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mo instanti conceptionis Christus habuit plenitudinem of God. Consequently, in the first instant of His conception, gratiae sanctificantis animam et corpus eius. Christ had the fullness of grace sanctifying His body and His soul. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille ordo quem poReply Obj. 1: The order set down by the Apostle in this nit ibi apostolus, pertinet ad eos qui per profectum ad passage refers to those who by advancing attain to the spirspiritualem statum perveniunt. In mysterio autem incar- itual state. But the mystery of the Incarnation is considered nationis magis consideratur descensus divinae plenitu- as a condescension of the fullness of the Godhead into hudinis in naturam humanam, quam profectus humanae man nature rather than as the promotion of human nature, naturae, quasi praeexistentis, in Deum. Et ideo in homi- already existing, as it were, to the Godhead. Therefore in the ne Christo a principio fuit perfecta spiritualitas. man Christ there was perfection of spiritual life from the very beginning. Ad secundum dicendum quod sanctificari est aliReply Obj. 2: To be sanctified is to be made holy. Now quid fieri sanctum. Fit autem aliquid non solum ex con- something is made not only from its contrary, but also from trario, sed etiam ex negative vel privative opposito, si- that which is opposite to it, either by negation or by pricut album fit ex nigro, et etiam ex non albo. Nos autem vation: thus white is made either from black or from notex peccatoribus sancti efficimur, et ita sanctificatio no- white. We indeed from being sinners are made holy: so that stra est ex peccato. Sed Christus quidem, secundum ho- our sanctification is a cleansing from sin. Whereas Christ, minem, factus est sanctus, quia hanc gratiae sanctitatem as man, was made holy, because He was not always thus non semper habuit, non tamen factus est sanctus ex pec- sanctified by grace: yet He was not made holy from being catore, quia peccatum nunquam habuit; sed factus est a sinner, because He never sinned; but He was made holy sanctus ex non sancto secundum hominem, non quidem from not-holy as man, not indeed by privation, as though privative, ut scilicet aliquando fuerit homo et non fue- He were at some time a man and not holy; but by negarit sanctus, sed negative, quia scilicet, quando non fuit tion—that is, when He was not man He had not human homo, non habuit sanctitatem humanam. Et ideo simul sanctity. Therefore at the same time He was made man and factus fuit homo et sanctus homo. Propter quod Ange- a holy man. For this reason the angel said (Luke 1:35): The lus dixit, Luc. I, quod nascetur ex te sanctum. Quod ex- Holy which shall be born of thee. Which words Gregory exponens Gregorius, XVIII Moral., dicit, ad distinctionem pounds as follows (Moral. xviii): In order to show the distincnostrae sanctitatis, Iesus sanctus nasciturus asseritur. Nos tion between His holiness and ours, it is declared that He shall quippe, si sancti efficimur, non tamen nascimur, quia ipsa be born holy. For we, though we are made holy, yet are not naturae corruptibilis conditione constringimur. Ille autem born holy, because by the mere condition of a corruptible nasolus veraciter sanctus natus est, qui ex coniunctione car- ture we are tied . . . But He alone is truly born holy who . . . nalis copulae conceptus non est. was not conceived by the combining of carnal union. Ad tertium dicendum quod aliter operatur pater Reply Obj. 3: The Father creates things through the creationem rerum per filium, aliter tota Trinitas sanc- Son, and the whole Trinity sanctifies men through the Man tificationem hominum per hominem Christum. Nam Christ, but not in the same way. For the Word of God has verbum Dei est eiusdem virtutis et operationis cum Deo the same power and operation as God the Father: hence the patre, unde pater non operatur per filium sicut per in- Father does not work through the Son as an instrument, strumentum, quod movet motum. Humanitas autem which is both mover and moved. Whereas the humanity of Christi est sicut instrumentum divinitatis, sicut supra Christ is as the instrument of the Godhead, as stated above dictum est. Et ideo humanitas Christi est sanctificans et (Q. 7, A. 1, ad 3; Q. 8, A. 1, ad 1). Therefore Christ’s humansanctificata. ity is both sanctified and sanctifier.

Article 2 Whether Christ as man had the use of free-will in the first instant of his conception? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus, secundum hominem, non habuerit usum liberi arbitrii in primo instanti suae conceptionis. Prius est enim esse rei quam agere vel operari. Usus autem liberi arbitrii est quaedam operatio. Cum ergo anima Chri-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as man had not the use of free-will in the first instant of His conception. For a thing is, before it acts or operates. Now the use of free-will is an operation. Since, therefore, Christ’s soul began to exist in the first instant of His conception, as was made clear

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sti esse incoeperit in primo instanti conceptionis, ut ex praedictis patet, videtur esse impossibile quod in primo instanti conceptionis habuit usum liberi arbitrii. Praeterea, usus liberi arbitrii est electio. Electio autem praesupponit deliberationem consilii, dicit enim philosophus, in III Ethic., quod electio est appetitus praeconsiliati. Ergo videtur impossibile quod in primo instanti suae conceptionis Christus habuerit usum liberi arbitrii. Praeterea, liberum arbitrium est facultas voluntatis et rationis, ut in prima parte habitum est, et ita usus liberi arbitrii est actus voluntatis et rationis, sive intellectus. Sed actus intellectus praesupponit actum sensus, qui esse non potest sine convenientia organorum, quae non videtur fuisse in primo instanti conceptionis Christi. Ergo videtur quod Christus non potuerit habere usum liberi arbitrii in primo instanti suae conceptionis. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Trin., mox ut verbum venit in uterum, servata veritate propriae naturae, factum est caro et perfectus homo. Sed perfectus homo habet usum liberi arbitrii. Ergo Christus habuit in primo instanti suae conceptionis usum liberi arbitrii. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, naturae humanae quam Christus assumpsit, convenit spiritualis perfectio, in quam non profecit, sed eam statim a principio habuit. Perfectio autem ultima non consistit in potentia vel in habitu, sed in operatione, unde in II de anima dicitur quod operatio est actus secundus. Et ideo dicendum est quod Christus in primo instanti suae conceptionis habuit illam operationem animae quae potest in instanti haberi. Talis autem est operatio voluntatis et intellectus, in qua consistit usus liberi arbitrii. Subito enim et in instanti perficitur operatio intellectus et voluntatis, multo magis quam visio corporalis, eo quod intelligere, velle et sentire non est motus qui sit actus imperfecti, quod successive perficitur; sed est actus iam perfecti, ut dicitur in III de anima. Et ideo dicendum est quod Christus in primo instanti suae conceptionis habuit usum liberi arbitrii. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod esse est prius natura quam agere, non tamen est prius tempore, sed, simul cum agens habet esse perfectum, incipit agere, nisi sit aliquid impediens. Sicut ignis, simul cum generatur, incipit calefacere et illuminare. Sed calefactio non terminatur in instanti, sed per temporis successionem, illuminatio autem perficitur in instanti. Et talis operatio est usus liberi arbitrii, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod, simul cum terminatur consilium vel deliberatio, potest esse electio. Illi autem qui deliberatione consilii indigent, in ipsa terminatione consilii primo habent certitudinem de eligen-

Q. 34, A. 2

above (Q. 33, A. 2), it seems impossible that He should have the use of free-will in the first instant of His conception. Obj. 2: Further, the use of free-will consists in choice. But choice presupposes the deliberation of counsel: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that choice is the desire of what has been previously the object of deliberation. Therefore it seems impossible that Christ should have had the use of free-will in the first instant of His conception. Obj. 3: Further, the free-will is a faculty of the will and reason, as stated in the First Part (Q. 83, A. 2, Obj. 2): consequently the use of free-will is an act of the will and the reason or intellect. But the act of the intellect presupposes an act of the senses; and this cannot exist without proper disposition of the organs—a condition which would seem impossible in the first instant of Christ’s conception. Therefore it seems that Christ could not have the use of free-will at the first instant of His conception. On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the Trinity (Gregory: Regist. ix, Ep. 61): As soon as the Word entered the womb, while retaining the reality of His Nature, He was made flesh, and a perfect man. But a perfect man has the use of free-will. Therefore Christ had the use of free-will in the first instant of His conception. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), spiritual perfection was becoming to the human nature which Christ took, which perfection He attained not by making progress, but by receiving it from the very first. Now ultimate perfection does not consist in power or habit, but in operation; wherefore it is said (De Anima ii, text. 5) that operation is a second act. We must, therefore, say that in the first instant of His conception Christ had that operation of the soul which can be had in an instant. And such is the operation of the will and intellect, in which the use of free-will consists. For the operation of the intellect and will is sudden and instantaneous, much more, indeed, than corporeal vision; inasmuch as to understand, to will, and to feel, are not movements that may be described as acts of an imperfect being, which attains perfection successively, but are the acts of an already perfect being, as is said, De Anima iii, text. 28. We must therefore say that Christ had the use of free-will in the first instant of His conception. Reply Obj. 1: Existence precedes action by nature, but not in time; but at the same time the agent has perfect existence, and begins to act unless it is hindered. Thus fire, as soon as it is generated, begins to give heat and light. The action of heating, however, is not terminated in an instant, but continues for a time; whereas the action of giving light is perfected in an instant. And such an operation is the use of free-will, as stated above. Reply Obj. 2: As soon as counsel or deliberation is ended, there may be choice. But those who need the deliberation of counsel, as soon as this comes to an end are certain of what ought to be chosen: and consequently they

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dis, et ideo statim eligunt. Ex quo patet quod deliberatio consilii non praeexigitur ad electionem nisi propter inquisitionem incerti. Christus autem in primo instanti suae conceptionis, sicut habuit plenitudinem gratiae iustificantis ita habuit plenitudinem veritatis cognitae, secundum illud, plenum gratiae et veritatis. Unde, quasi habens omnium certitudinem, potuit statim in instanti eligere. Ad tertium dicendum quod intellectus Christi, secundum scientiam infusam, poterat intelligere etiam non convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut supra habitum est. Unde poterat in eo esse operatio voluntatis et intellectus absque operatione sensus. Sed tamen potuit in eo esse etiam operatio sensus in primo instanti suae conceptionis, maxime quantum ad sensum tactus, quo sensu proles concepta sentit in matre etiam antequam animam rationalem obtineat, ut dicitur in libro de Generat. Animal. Unde, cum Christus in primo instanti suae conceptionis habuit animam rationalem, formato iam et organizato corpore eius, multo magis in eodem instanti poterat habere operationem sensus tactus.

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choose at once. From this it is clear that the deliberation of counsel does not of necessity precede choice save for the purpose of inquiring into what is uncertain. But Christ, in the first instant of His conception, had the fullness of sanctifying grace, and in like manner the fullness of known truth; according to John 1:14: Full of grace and truth. Wherefore, as being possessed of certainty about all things, He could choose at once in an instant. Reply Obj. 3: Christ’s intellect, in regard to His infused knowledge, could understand without turning to phantasms, as stated above (Q. 11, A. 2). Consequently His intellect and will could act without any action of the senses. Nevertheless it was possible for Him, in the first instant of His conception, to have an operation of the senses: especially as to the sense of touch, which the infant can exercise in the womb even before it has received the rational soul, as is said, De Gener. Animal. ii, 3, 4. Wherefore, since Christ had the rational soul in the first instant of His conception, through His body being already fashioned and endowed with sensible organs, much more was it possible for Him to exercise the sense of touch in that same instant.

Article 3 Whether Christ could merit in the first instant of his conception? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus in primo instanti suae conceptionis mereri non potuerit. Sicut enim se habet liberum arbitrium ad merendum, ita ad demerendum. Sed Diabolus in primo instanti suae creationis non potuit peccare, ut in prima parte habitum est. Ergo neque anima Christi in primo instanti suae creationis, quod fuit primum instans conceptionis Christi, potuit mereri. Praeterea, illud quod homo habet in primo instanti suae conceptionis, videtur ei esse naturale, quia hoc est ad quod terminatur sua generatio naturalis. Sed naturalibus non meremur, ut patet ex his quae dicta sunt in secunda parte. Ergo videtur quod usus liberi arbitrii quem Christus habuit secundum hominem in primo instanti suae conceptionis, non fuerit meritorius. Praeterea, illud quod semel aliquis meruit, iam facit quodammodo suum, et ita non videtur quod iterum possit illud idem mereri, quia nullus meretur quod suum est. Si ergo Christus in primo instanti suae conceptionis meruit, sequitur quod postea nihil meruerit. Quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo Christus in primo instanti suae conceptionis meruit. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, super Exod., non habuit omnino Christus, iuxta animae meritum, quo potuisset proficere. Potuisset autem proficere in merito si

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ could not merit in the first instant of His conception. For the freewill bears the same relation to merit as to demerit. But the devil could not sin in the first instant of his creation, as was shown in the First Part, Q. 63, A. 5. Therefore neither could Christ’s soul merit in the first instant of its creation—that is, in the first instant of Christ’s conception. Obj. 2: Further, that which man has in the first instant of his conception seems to be natural to him: for it is in this that his natural generation is terminated. But we do not merit by what is natural to us, as is clear from what has been said in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 109, A. 5; Q. 114, A. 2). Therefore it seems that the use of free-will, which Christ as man had in the first instant of His conception, was not meritorious. Obj. 3: Further, that which a man has once merited he makes, in a way, his own: consequently it seems that he cannot merit the same thing again: for no one merits what is already his. If, therefore, Christ merited in the first instant of His conception, it follows that afterwards He merited nothing. But this is evidently untrue. Therefore Christ did not merit in the first instant of His conception. On the contrary, Augustine says: Increase of merit was absolutely impossible to the soul of Christ. But increase of merit would have been possible had He not merited in

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in primo instanti suae conceptionis non meruisset. Ergo in primo instanti suae conceptionis meruit Christus. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Christus in primo instanti conceptionis suae sanctificatus fuit per gratiam. Est autem duplex sanctificatio, una quidem adultorum, qui secundum proprium actum sanctificantur; alia autem puerorum, qui non sanctificantur secundum proprium actum fidei, sed secundum fidem parentum vel Ecclesiae. Prima autem sanctificatio est perfectior quam secunda, sicut actus est perfectior quam habitus; et quod est per se, eo quod est per aliud. Cum ergo sanctificatio Christi fuerit perfectissima, quia sic sanctificatus est ut esset aliorum sanctificator; consequens est quod ipse secundum proprium motum liberi arbitrii in Deum fuerit sanctificatus. Qui quidem motus liberi arbitrii est meritorius. Unde consequens est quod in primo instanti suae conceptionis Christus meruerit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod liberum arbitrium non eodem modo se habet ad bonum et ad malum, nam ad bonum se habet per se et naturaliter; ad malum autem se habet per modum defectus, et praeter naturam. Sicut autem philosophus dicit, in II de caelo, posterius est quod est praeter naturam, eo quod est secundum naturam, quia id quod est praeter naturam, est quaedam excisio ab eo quod est secundum naturam. Et ideo liberum arbitrium creaturae in primo instanti creationis potest moveri ad bonum merendo, non autem ad malum peccando, si tamen natura sit integra. Ad secundum dicendum quod id quod homo habet in principio suae creationis secundum communem naturae cursum, est homini naturale, nihil tamen prohibet quin aliqua creatura in principio suae creationis aliquod beneficium gratiae a Deo consequatur. Et hoc modo anima Christi in principio suae creationis consecuta est gratiam, qua posset mereri. Et ea ratione gratia illa, secundum quandam similitudinem, dicitur fuisse illi homini naturalis, ut patet per Augustinum, in Enchirid. Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet idem esse alicuius ex diversis causis. Et secundum hoc, Christus gloriam immortalitatis, quam meruit in primo instanti suae conceptionis, potuit etiam posterioribus actibus et passionibus mereri, non quidem ut esset sibi magis debita; sed ut sibi ex pluribus causis deberetur.

Q. 34, A. 4

the first instant of His conception. Therefore Christ merited in the first instant of His conception. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), Christ was sanctified by grace in the first instant of His conception. Now, sanctification is twofold: that of adults who are sanctified in consideration of their own act; and that of infants who are sanctified in consideration of, not their own act of faith, but that of their parents or of the Church. The former sanctification is more perfect than the latter: just as act is more perfect than habit; and that which is by itself, than that which is by another. Since, therefore, the sanctification of Christ was most perfect, because He was so sanctified that He might sanctify others; consequently He was sanctified by reason of His own movement of the free-will towards God. Which movement, indeed, of the free-will is meritorious. Consequently, Christ did merit in the first instant of His conception. Reply Obj. 1: Free-will does not bear the same relation to good as to evil: for to good it is related of itself, and naturally; whereas to evil it is related as to a defect, and beside nature. Now, as the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 18): That which is beside nature is subsequent to that which is according to nature; because that which is beside nature is an exception to nature. Therefore the free-will of a creature can be moved to good meritoriously in the first instant of its creation, but not to evil sinfully; provided, however, its nature be unimpaired. Reply Obj. 2: That which man has at the first moment of his creation, in the ordinary course of nature, is natural to him; but nothing hinders a creature from receiving from God a gift of grace at the very beginning of its creation. In this way did Christ’s soul in the first instant of its creation receive grace by which it could merit. And for this reason is that grace, by way of a certain likeness, said to be natural to this Man, as explained by Augustine (Enchiridion xl). Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents the same thing belonging to someone from several causes. And thus it is that Christ was able by subsequent actions and sufferings to merit the glory of immortality, which He also merited in the first instant of His conception: not, indeed, so that it became thereby more due to Him than before, but so that it was due to Him from more causes than before.

Article 4 Whether Christ was a perfect comprehensor in the first instant of his conception? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not a perChristus non fuerit perfectus comprehensor in primo in- fect comprehensor in the first instant of His conception. stanti suae conceptionis. Meritum enim praecedit prae- For merit precedes reward, as fault precedes punishment. mium, sicut et culpa poenam. Sed Christus in primo in- But Christ merited in the first instant of His conception, as

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stanti suae conceptionis meruit, sicut dictum est. Cum ergo status comprehensoris sit principale praemium, videtur quod Christus in primo instanti suae conceptionis non fuerit comprehensor. Praeterea, dominus dicit, Luc. ult., haec oportuit Christum pati, et ita intrare in gloriam suam. Sed gloria pertinet ad statum comprehensionis. Ergo Christus non fuit in statu comprehensoris in primo instanti suae conceptionis, quando adhuc nullam sustinuit passionem. Praeterea, illud quod non convenit nec homini nec Angelo, videtur esse proprium Deo, et ita non convenit Christo secundum quod homo. Sed semper esse beatum non convenit nec homini nec Angelo, si enim fuissent conditi beati, postmodum non peccassent. Ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, non fuit beatus in primo instanti suae conceptionis. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo, beatus quem elegisti et assumpsisti, quod, secundum Glossam, refertur ad humanam naturam Christi, quae assumpta est a verbo Dei in unitatem personae. Sed in primo instanti conceptionis fuit assumpta humana natura a verbo Dei. Ergo in primo instanti suae conceptionis Christus, secundum quod homo, fuit beatus. Quod est esse comprehensorem. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, non fuit conveniens ut Christus in sua conceptione acciperet gratiam habitualem tantum absque actu. Accepit autem gratiam non ad mensuram, ut supra habitum est. Gratia autem viatoris, cum sit deficiens a gratia comprehensoris, habet mensuram minorem respectu comprehensoris. Unde manifestum est quod Christus in primo instanti suae conceptionis accepit non solum tantam gratiam quantam comprehensores habent, sed etiam omnibus comprehensoribus maiorem. Et quia gratia illa non fuit sine actu, consequens est quod actu fuit comprehensor, videndo Deum per essentiam clarius ceteris creaturis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Christus non meruit gloriam animae, secundum quam dicitur comprehensor, sed gloriam corporis, ad quam per suam passionem pervenit. Unde patet responsio ad secundum. Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus, ex hoc quod fuit Deus et homo, etiam in sua humanitate habuit aliquid prae ceteris creaturis, ut scilicet statim a principio esset beatus.

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stated above (A. 3). Since, therefore, the state of comprehension is the principal reward, it seems that Christ was not a comprehensor in the first instant of His conception. Obj. 2: Further, our Lord said (Luke 24:26): Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and so to enter into His glory? But glory belongs to the state of comprehension. Therefore Christ was not in the state of comprehension in the first instant of His conception, when as yet He had not suffered. Obj. 3: Further, what befits neither man nor angel seems proper to God; and therefore is not becoming to Christ as man. But to be always in the state of beatitude befits neither man nor angel: for if they had been created in beatitude, they would not have sinned afterwards. Therefore Christ, as man, was not in the state of beatitude in the first instant of His conception. On the contrary, It is written (Ps 64:5): Blessed is he whom Thou hast chosen, and taken to Thee; which words, according to the gloss, refer to Christ’s human nature, which was taken by the Word of God unto the unity of Person. But human nature was taken by the Word of God in the first instant of His conception. Therefore, in the first instant of His conception, Christ, as man, was in the state of beatitude; which is to be a comprehensor. I answer that, As appears from what was said above (A. 3), it was unbecoming that in His conception Christ should receive merely habitual grace without the act. Now, He received grace not by measure (John 3:34), as stated above (Q. 7, A. 11). But the grace of the wayfarer, being short of that of the comprehensor, is in less measure than that of the comprehensor. Wherefore it is manifest that in the first instant of His conception Christ received not only as much grace as comprehensors have, but also greater than that which they all have. And because that grace was not without its act, it follows that He was a comprehensor in act, seeing God in His Essence more clearly than other creatures. Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 19, A. 3), Christ did not merit the glory of the soul, in respect of which He is said to have been a comprehensor, but the glory of the body, to which He came through His Passion. Wherefore the reply to the Second Objection is clear. Reply Obj. 3: Since Christ was both God and man, He had, even in His humanity, something more than other creatures—namely, that He was in the state of beatitude from the very beginning.

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Question 35 Christ’s Nativity Consequenter, post Christi conceptionem, agendum After considering Christ’s conception, we must treat of est de eius nativitate. Et primo, quantum ad ipsam nati- His nativity. First, as to the nativity itself; second, as to His vitatem; secundo, quantum ad nati manifestationem. manifestation after birth. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum nativitas sit naturae, vel personae. (1) Whether nativity regards the nature or the person? Secundo, utrum Christo sit attribuenda alia nativitas (2) Whether another, besides His eternal, birth should praeter aeternam. be attributed to Christ? Tertio, utrum secundum nativitatem temporalem (3) Whether the Blessed Virgin is His Mother in beata virgo sit mater eius. respect of His temporal birth? Quarto, utrum debeat dici mater Dei. (4) Whether she ought to be called the Mother of God? Quinto, utrum Christus secundum duas filiationes (5) Whether Christ is the Son of God the Father and of sit filius Dei patris et virginis matris. the Virgin Mother in respect of two filiations? Sexto, de modo nativitatis. (6) Of the mode of the Nativity; Septimo, de loco. (7) Of its place; Octavo, de tempore nativitatis. (8) Of the time of the Nativity.

Article 1 Whether nativity regards the nature rather than the person? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nativitas naturae conveniat magis quam personae. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de fide ad Petrum, natura aeterna atque divina non posset concipi et nasci ex humana natura, nisi secundum veritatem humanae naturae. Sic igitur naturae divinae convenit concipi et nasci ratione humanae naturae. Multo magis igitur convenit humanae naturae. Praeterea, secundum philosophum in V Metaphys., nomen naturae a nascendo sumptum est. Sed denominationes fiunt secundum similitudinis convenientiam. Ergo videtur quod nativitas magis pertineat ad naturam quam ad personam. Praeterea, illud proprie nascitur quod per nativitatem incipit esse. Sed per nativitatem Christi non incoepit esse persona Christi, sed eius natura humana. Ergo videtur quod nativitas proprie pertineat ad naturam, non ad personam. Sed contra est quod dicit Damascenus, in III libro, nativitas hypostasis est, non naturae. Respondeo dicendum quod nativitas potest attribui alicui dupliciter, uno modo, sicut subiecto; alio modo, sicut termino. Sicut subiecto quidem attribuitur ei quod nascitur. Hoc autem proprie est hypostasis, non natura. Cum enim nasci sit quoddam generari, sicut generatur aliquid ad hoc quod sit, ita nascitur aliquid ad

Objection 1: It would seem that nativity regards the nature rather than the person. For Augustine says (De Fide ad Petrum): The eternal Divine Nature could not be conceived and born of human nature, except in a true human nature. Consequently it becomes the Divine Nature to be conceived and born by reason of the human nature. Much more, therefore, does it regard human nature itself. Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), nature is so denominated from nativity. But things are denominated from one another by reason of some likeness. Therefore it seems that nativity regards the nature rather than the person. Obj. 3: Further, properly speaking, that is born which begins to exist by nativity. But Christ’s Person did not begin to exist by His nativity, whereas His human nature did. Therefore it seems that the nativity properly regards the nature, and not the person. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): Nativity regards the hypostasis, not the nature. I answer that, Nativity can be attributed to someone in two ways: first, as to its subject; second, as to its terminus. To him that is born it is attributed as to its subject: and this, properly speaking, is the hypostasis, not the nature. For since to be born is to be generated; as a thing is generated in order for it to be, so is a thing born in order

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hoc quod sit. Esse autem proprie rei subsistentis est, nam forma quae non subsistit, dicitur esse solum quia ea aliquid est. Persona autem, vel hypostasis, significatur per modum subsistentis, natura autem significatur per modum formae in qua aliquid subsistit. Et ideo nativitas, tanquam subiecto proprie nascendi, attribuitur personae vel hypostasi, non naturae. Sed sicut termino, attribuitur nativitas naturae. Terminus enim generationis, et cuiuslibet nativitatis, est forma. Natura autem per modum formae significatur. Unde nativitas dicitur via in naturam, ut patet per philosophum, II Physic., terminatur enim naturae intentio ad formam, seu naturam speciei. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, propter identitatem quae in divinis est inter naturam et hypostasim, quandoque natura ponitur pro persona vel hypostasi. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus naturam divinam esse conceptam et natam, quia scilicet persona filii est concepta et nata secundum humanam naturam. Ad secundum dicendum quod nullus motus seu mutatio denominatur a subiecto quod movetur, sed a termino motus, a quo speciem habet. Et propter hoc nativitas non denominatur a persona quae nascitur, sed a natura ad quam nativitas terminatur. Ad tertium dicendum quod natura, proprie loquendo, non incipit esse sed magis persona incipit esse in aliqua natura. Quia, sicut dictum est, natura significatur ut quo aliquid est, persona vero significatur ut quae habet esse subsistens.

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for it to be. Now, to be, properly speaking, belongs to that which subsists; since a form that does not subsist is said to be only inasmuch as by it something is: and whereas person or hypostasis designates something as subsisting, nature designates form, whereby something subsists. Consequently, nativity is attributed to the person or hypostasis as to the proper subject of being born, but not to the nature. But to the nature nativity is attributed as to its terminus. For the terminus of generation and of every nativity is the form. Now, nature designates something as a form: wherefore nativity is said to be the road to nature, as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii): for the purpose of nature is terminated in the form or nature of the species. Reply Obj. 1: On account of the identity of nature and hypostasis in God, nature is sometimes put instead of person or hypostasis. And in this sense Augustine says that the Divine Nature was conceived and born, inasmuch as the Person of the Son was conceived and born in the human nature. Reply Obj. 2: No movement or change is denominated from the subject moved, but from the terminus of the movement, whence the subject has its species. For this reason nativity is not denominated from the person born, but from nature, which is the terminus of nativity. Reply Obj. 3: Nature, properly speaking, does not begin to exist: rather is it the person that begins to exist in some nature. Because, as stated above, nature designates that by which something is; whereas person designates something as having subsistent being.

Article 2 Whether a temporal nativity should be attributed to Christ? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christo non sit attribuenda aliqua nativitas temporalis. Nasci enim est sicut quidam motus rei non existentis antequam nascatur, id agens beneficio nativitatis, ut sit. Sed Christus ab aeterno fuit. Ergo non potuit temporaliter nasci. Praeterea, illud quod est in se perfectum, nativitate non indiget. Sed persona filii Dei ab aeterno fuit perfecta. Ergo non indiget temporali nativitate. Et ita videtur quod non sit temporaliter natus. Praeterea, nativitas proprie personae convenit. Sed in Christo tantum est una persona. Ergo in Christo tantum est una nativitas. Praeterea, quod duabus nativitatibus nascitur, bis nascitur. Sed haec videtur esse falsa, Christus est bis natus. Quia nativitas eius qua de patre est natus, interruptionem non patitur, cum sit aeterna. Quod tamen requiritur ad hoc adverbium bis, ille enim dicitur bis currere

Objection 1: It would seem that temporal nativity is not to be attributed to Christ. For to be born is a certain movement of a thing that did not exist before it was born, which movement procures for it the benefit of existence. But Christ was from all eternity. Therefore He could not be born in time. Obj. 2: Further, what is perfect in itself needs not to be born. But the Person of the Son of God was perfect from eternity. Therefore He needs not to be born in time. Therefore it seems that He had no temporal birth. Obj. 3: Further, properly speaking, nativity regards the person. But in Christ there is only one person. Therefore in Christ there is but one nativity. Obj. 4: Further, what is born by two nativities is born twice. But this proposition is false; Christ was born twice: because the nativity whereby He was born of the Father suffers no interruption; since it is eternal. Whereas interruption is required to warrant the use of the adverb twice: for

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qui cum interruptione currit. Ergo videtur quod in Chri- a man is said to run twice whose running is interrupted. sto non sit ponenda duplex nativitas. Therefore it seems that we should not admit a double nativity in Christ. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III liOn the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. bro, confitemur Christi duas nativitates, unam quae est ex iii): We confess two nativities in Christ: one of the Father— patre, aeternam; et unam quae est in ultimis temporibus eternal; and one which occurred in these latter times for our propter nos. sake. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, natuI answer that, As stated above (A. 1), nature is comra comparatur ad nativitatem sicut terminus ad motum pared to nativity, as the terminus to movement or change. vel mutationem. Motus autem diversificatur secundum Now, movement is diversified according to the diversity diversitatem terminorum, ut patet per philosophum, in of its termini, as the Philosopher shows (Phys. v). But, in V Physic. In Christo autem est duplex natura, quarum Christ there is a twofold nature: one which He received of unam accepit ab aeterno a patre, alteram autem accepit the Father from eternity, the other which He received from temporaliter a matre. Et ideo necesse est attribuere Chri- His Mother in time. Therefore we must needs attribute to sto duas nativitates, unam qua aeternaliter natus est a Christ a twofold nativity: one by which He was born of the patre, aliam qua temporaliter natus est a matre. Father from all eternity; one by which He was born of His Mother in time. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod haec fuit obiectio Reply Obj. 1: This was the argument of a certain cuiusdam Feliciani haeretici, quam Augustinus, in libro heretic, Felician, and is solved thus by Augustine (Contra contra Felicianum, sic solvit. Fingamus, inquit, sicut ple- Felic. xii). Let us suppose, says he, as many maintain, that rique volunt, esse in mundo animam generalem, quae sic in the world there is a universal soul, which, by its ineffable ineffabili motu semina cuncta vivificet ut non sit concre- movement, so gives life to all seed, that it is not compounded ta cum genitis, sed vitam praestet ipsa gignendis. Nempe with things begotten, but bestows life that they may be begotcum haec in uterum, passibilem materiam ad usus suos ten. Without doubt, when this soul reaches the womb, being formatura, pervenerit, unam facit secum esse personam intent on fashioning the passible matter to its own purpose, it eius rei, quam non eandem constat habere substantiam, unites itself to the personality thereof, though manifestly it is et fit, operante anima et patiente materia, ex duabus sub- not of the same substance; and thus of the active soul and passtantiis unus homo. Sicque animam nasci fatemur ex ute- sive matter, one man is made out of two substances. And so ro, non quia, antequam nasceretur, quantum ad se attinet, we confess that the soul is born from out the womb; but not as ipsa penitus non fuisset. Sic ergo, immo sublimius, natus though, before birth, it was nothing at all in itself. Thus, then, est filius Dei secundum hominem, eo pacto quo cum cor- but in a way much more sublime, the Son of God was born pore nasci docetur et animus, non quia utriusque sit una as man, just as the soul is held to be born together with the substantia, sed quia ex utraque fit una persona. Non ta- body: not as though they both made one substance, but that men ab hoc incoepisse initio dicimus Dei filium, ne tempo- from both, one person results. Yet we do not say that the Son ralem credat aliquis divinitatem. Non ab aeterno filii Dei of God began thus to exist: lest it be thought that His Divinnovimus carnem, ne non veritatem humani corporis, sed ity is temporal. Nor do we acknowledge the flesh of the Son quandam eum suscepisse putemus imaginem. of God to have been from eternity: lest it be thought that He took, not a true human body, but some resemblance thereof. Ad secundum dicendum quod haec fuit ratio NeReply Obj. 2: This was an argument of Nestorius, and storii, quam solvit Cyrillus, in quadam epistola, dicens, it is thus solved by Cyril in an epistle: We do not say that non dicimus quod filius Dei indiguerit necessario prop- the Son of God had need, for His own sake, of a second nativter se secunda nativitate, post eam quae ex patre est, est ity, after that which is from the Father: for it is foolish and a enim fatuum et indoctum existentem ante omnia saecu- mark of ignorance to say that He who is from all eternity, and la, et consempiternum patri, indigere dicere initio ut sit se- co-eternal with the Father, needs to begin again to exist. But cundo. Quoniam autem, propter nos, et propter nostram because for us and for our salvation, uniting the human nasalutem, uniens sibi secundum subsistentiam quod est hu- ture to His Person, He became the child of a woman, for this manum, processit ex muliere, ob hoc dicitur nasci carnali- reason do we say that He was born in the flesh. ter. Ad tertium dicendum quod nativitas est personae Reply Obj. 3: Nativity regards the person as its subut subiecti, naturae autem ut termini. Possibile est autem ject, the nature as its terminus. Now, it is possible for several uni subiecto plures transmutationes inesse, quas tamen transformations to be in the same subject: yet must they be necesse est secundum terminos variari. Quod tamen diversified in respect of their termini. But we do not say this non dicimus quasi aeterna nativitas sit transmutatio aut as though the eternal nativity were a transformation or a

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motus, sed quia significatur per modum mutationis aut motus. Ad quartum dicendum quod Christus potest dici bis natus, secundum duas nativitates. Sicut enim dicitur bis currere qui currit duobus temporibus, ita potest dici bis nasci qui semel nascitur in aeternitate, et semel in tempore, quia aeternitas et tempus multo magis differunt quam duo tempora, cum tamen utrumque designet mensuram durationis.

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movement, but because it is designated by way of a transformation or movement. Reply Obj. 4: Christ can be said to have been born twice in respect of His two nativities. For just as he is said to run twice who runs at two different times, so can He be said to be born twice who is born once from eternity and once in time: because eternity and time differ much more than two different times, although each signifies a measure of duration.

Article 3 Whether the Blessed Virgin can be called Christ’s Mother in respect of his temporal nativity? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod secundum temporalem nativitatem Christi beata virgo non possit dici mater eius. Ut enim supra dictum est, beata virgo Maria nihil active in generatione Christi operata est, sed solam materiam ministravit. Sed hoc non videtur sufficere ad rationem matris, alioquin, lignum diceretur mater lecti aut scamni. Ergo videtur quod beata virgo non possit dici mater Christi. Praeterea, Christus ex beata virgine miraculose natus est. Sed miraculosa generatio non sufficit ad rationem maternitatis vel filiationis, non enim dicimus Hevam fuisse filiam Adae. Ergo videtur quod nec Christus debeat dici filius beatae virginis. Praeterea, ad matrem pertinere videtur decisio seminis. Sed, sicut Damascenus dicit, in III libro, corpus Christi non seminaliter, sed conditive a spiritu sancto formatum est. Ergo videtur quod beata virgo non debeat dici mater Christi. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. I, Christi generatio sic erat. Cum esset desponsata mater Iesu Maria Ioseph, et cetera. Respondeo dicendum quod beata virgo Maria est vera et naturalis mater Christi. Sicut enim supra dictum est, corpus Christi non est de caelo allatum, sicut Valentinus haereticus posuit, sed de virgine matre sumptum, et ex purissimis sanguinibus eius formatum. Et hoc solum requiritur ad rationem matris, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde beata virgo vere est mater Christi. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, paternitas seu maternitas et filiatio non competunt in quacumque generatione sed in sola generatione viventium. Et ideo, si aliqua inanimata ex aliqua materia fiant, non propter hoc consequitur in eis relatio maternitatis et filiationis, sed solum in generatione viventium, quae proprie nativitas dicitur.

Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin cannot be called Christ’s Mother in respect of His temporal nativity. For, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 4), the Blessed Virgin Mary did not cooperate actively in begetting Christ, but merely supplied the matter. But this does not seem sufficient to make her His Mother: otherwise wood might be called the mother of the bed or bench. Therefore it seems that the Blessed Virgin cannot be called the Mother of Christ. Obj. 2: Further, Christ was born miraculously of the Blessed Virgin. But a miraculous begetting does not suffice for motherhood or sonship: for we do not speak of Eve as being the daughter of Adam. Therefore neither should Christ be called the Son of the Blessed Virgin. Obj. 3: Further, motherhood seems to imply partial separation of the semen. But, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii), Christ’s body was formed, not by a seminal process, but by the operation of the Holy Spirit. Therefore it seems that the Blessed Virgin should not be called the Mother of Christ. On the contrary, It is written (Matt 1:18): The generation of Christ was in this wise. When His Mother Mary was espoused to Joseph, etc. I answer that, The Blessed Virgin Mary is in truth and by nature the Mother of Christ. For, as we have said above (Q. 5, A. 2; Q. 31, A. 5), Christ’s body was not brought down from heaven, as the heretic Valentine maintained, but was taken from the Virgin Mother, and formed from her purest blood. And this is all that is required for motherhood, as has been made clear above (Q. 31, A. 5; Q. 32, A. 4). Therefore the Blessed Virgin is truly Christ’s Mother. Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 32, A. 3), not every generation implies fatherhood or motherhood and sonship, but only the generation of living things. Consequently when inanimate things are made from some matter, the relationship of motherhood and sonship does not follow from this, but only in the generation of living things, which is properly called nativity.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Damascenus dicit, in III libro, nativitas temporalis, qua Christus est natus propter nostram salutem, est quodammodo secundum nos, quoniam natus est homo ex muliere, et tempore conceptionis debito, super nos autem, quoniam non ex semine, sed ex sancto spiritu et sancta virgine, super legem conceptionis. Sic igitur ex parte matris nativitas illa fuit naturalis, sed ex parte operationis spiritus sancti fuit miraculosa. Unde beata virgo est vera et naturalis mater Christi. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, resolutio seminis feminae non pertinet ad necessitatem conceptus. Et ideo resolutio seminis non ex necessitate requiritur ad matrem.

Q. 35, A. 4

Reply Obj. 2: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): The temporal nativity by which Christ was born for our salvation is, in a way, natural, since a Man was born of a woman, and after the due lapse of time from His conception: but it is also supernatural, because He was begotten, not of seed, but of the Holy Spirit and the Blessed Virgin, above the law of conception. Thus, then, on the part of the mother, this nativity was natural, but on the part of the operation of the Holy Spirit it was supernatural. Therefore the Blessed Virgin is the true and natural Mother of Christ. Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 31, A. 5, ad 3; Q. 32, A. 4), the resolution of the woman’s semen is not necessary for conception; neither, therefore, is it required for motherhood.

Article 4 Whether the Blessed Virgin should be called the Mother of God? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beata virgo non debeat dici mater Dei. Non enim est dicendum circa divina mysteria nisi quod ex sacra Scriptura habetur. Sed nunquam in sacra Scriptura legitur quod sit mater aut genitrix Dei, sed quod sit mater Christi, aut mater pueri, ut patet Matth. I. Ergo non est dicendum quod beata virgo sit mater Dei. Praeterea, Christus dicitur Deus secundum divinam naturam. Sed divina natura non accepit initium essendi ex virgine. Ergo beata virgo non est dicenda mater Dei. Praeterea, hoc nomen Deus communiter praedicatur de patre et filio et spiritu sancto. Si ergo beata virgo est mater Dei, videtur sequi quod beata virgo sit mater patris et filii et spiritus sancti, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo beata virgo debet dici mater Dei. Sed contra est quod in capitulis Cyrilli, approbatis in Ephesina synodo, legitur, si quis non confitetur Deum esse secundum veritatem Emmanuel, et propter hoc Dei genitricem sanctam virginem, genuit enim carnaliter carnem factam ex Deo verbum, anathema sit. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, omne nomen significans in concreto naturam aliquam, potest supponere pro qualibet hypostasi illius naturae. Cum autem unio incarnationis sit facta in hypostasi, sicut supra dictum est, manifestum est quod hoc nomen Deus potest supponere pro hypostasi habente humanam naturam et divinam. Et ideo quidquid convenit divinae naturae et humanae, potest attribui illi personae, sive secundum quod pro ea supponit nomen significans divi-

Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin should not be called the Mother of God. For in the Divine mysteries we should not make any assertion that is not taken from Holy Scripture. But we read nowhere in Holy Scripture that she is the mother or parent of God, but that she is the mother of Christ or of the Child, as may be seen from Matt. 1:18. Therefore we should not say that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God. Obj. 2: Further, Christ is called God in respect of His Divine Nature. But the Divine Nature did not first originate from the Virgin. Therefore the Blessed Virgin should not be called the Mother of God. Obj. 3: Further, the word God is predicated in common of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. If, therefore, the Blessed Virgin is Mother of God it seems to follow that she was the Mother of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, which cannot be allowed. Therefore the Blessed Virgin should not be called Mother of God. On the contrary, In the chapters of Cyril, approved in the Council of Ephesus (P. 1, Cap. xxvi), we read: If anyone confess not that the Emmanuel is truly God, and that for this reason the Holy Virgin is the Mother of God, since she begot of her flesh the Word of God made flesh, let him be anathema. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 16, A. 1), every word that signifies a nature in the concrete can stand for any hypostasis of that nature. Now, since the union of the Incarnation took place in the hypostasis, as above stated (Q. 2, A. 3), it is manifest that this word God can stand for the hypostasis, having a human and a Divine nature. Therefore whatever belongs to the Divine and to the human nature can be attributed to that Person: both when a word is employed to stand for it, signifying the Divine Nature, and

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nam naturam; sive secundum quod pro ea supponit nomen significans humanam naturam. Concipi autem et nasci personae attribuitur et hypostasi secundum naturam illam in qua concipitur et nascitur. Cum igitur in ipso principio conceptionis fuerit humana natura assumpta a divina persona, sicut praedictum est, consequens est quod vere posset dici Deum esse conceptum et natum de virgine. Ex hoc autem dicitur aliqua mulier alicuius mater, quod eum concepit et genuit. Unde consequens est quod beata virgo vere dicatur mater Dei. Solum enim sic negari posset beatam virginem esse matrem Dei, si vel humanitas prius fuisset subiecta conceptioni et nativitati quam homo ille fuisset filius Dei, sicut Photinus posuit, vel humanitas non fuisset assumpta in unitatem personae vel hypostasis verbi Dei, sicut posuit Nestorius. Utrumque autem horum est erroneum. Unde haereticum est negare beatam virginem esse matrem Dei. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod haec fuit obiectio Nestorii. Quae quidem solvitur ex hoc quod, licet non inveniatur expresse in Scriptura dictum quod beata virgo sit mater Dei, invenitur tamen expresse in Scriptura quod Iesus Christus est verus Deus, ut patet I Ioan. ult.; et quod beata virgo est mater Iesu Christi, ut patet Matth. I. Unde sequitur ex necessitate ex verbis Scripturae quod sit mater Dei. Dicitur etiam Rom. IX, quod ex Iudaeis est secundum carnem Christus, qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula. Non autem est ex Iudaeis nisi mediante beata virgine. Unde ille qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula, est vere natus ex beata virgine sicut ex sua matre. Ad secundum dicendum quod illa est obiectio Nestorii. Sed Cyrillus, in quadam epistola contra Nestorium, eam solvit sic dicens, sicut hominis anima cum proprio corpore nascitur, et tanquam unum reputatur; et si voluerit dicere quispiam quia est genitrix carnis, non tamen et animae genitrix, nimis superflue loquitur, tale aliquid gestum percipimus in generatione Christi. Natum est enim ex Dei patris substantia Dei verbum, quia vero carnem assumpsit, necesse est confiteri quia natum est secundum carnem ex muliere. Dicendum est ergo quod beata virgo dicitur mater Dei, non quia sit mater divinitatis, sed quia personae habentis divinitatem et humanitatem est mater secundum humanitatem. Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc nomen Deus, quamvis sit commune tribus personis, tamen quandoque supponit pro sola persona patris, quandoque pro sola persona filii vel spiritus sancti, ut supra habitum est. Et ita, cum dicitur, beata virgo est mater Dei hoc nomen Deus supponit pro sola persona filii incarnata.

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when a word is used signifying the human nature. Now, conception and birth are attributed to the person and hypostasis in respect of that nature in which it is conceived and born. Since, therefore, the human nature was taken by the Divine Person in the very beginning of the conception, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 3), it follows that it can be truly said that God was conceived and born of the Virgin. Now from this is a woman called a man’s mother, that she conceived him and gave birth to him. Therefore the Blessed Virgin is truly called the Mother of God. For the only way in which it could be denied that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God would be either if the humanity were first subject to conception and birth, before this man were the Son of God, as Photinus said; or if the humanity were not assumed unto unity of the Person or hypostasis of the Word of God, as Nestorius maintained. But both of these are erroneous. Therefore it is heretical to deny that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God. Reply Obj. 1: This was an argument of Nestorius, and it is solved by saying that, although we do not find it said expressly in Scripture that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God, yet we do find it expressly said in Scripture that Jesus Christ is true God, as may be seen 1 John 5:20, and that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of Jesus Christ, which is clearly expressed Matt. 1:18. Therefore, from the words of Scripture it follows of necessity that she is the Mother of God. Again, it is written (Rom 9:5) that Christ is of the Jews according to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed for ever. But He is not of the Jews except through the Blessed Virgin. Therefore He who is above all things, God blessed for ever, is truly born of the Blessed Virgin as of His Mother. Reply Obj. 2: This was an argument of Nestorius. But Cyril, in a letter against Nestorius, answers it thus: Just as when a man’s soul is born with its body, they are considered as one being: and if anyone wish to say that the mother of the flesh is not the mother of the soul, he says too much. Something like this may be perceived in the generation of Christ. For the Word of God was born of the substance of God the Father: but because He took flesh, we must of necessity confess that in the flesh He was born of a woman. Consequently we must say that the Blessed Virgin is called the Mother of God, not as though she were the Mother of the Godhead, but because she is the mother, according to His human nature, of the Person who has both the divine and the human nature. Reply Obj. 3: Although the name God is common to the three Persons, yet sometimes it stands for the Person of the Father alone, sometimes only for the Person of the Son or of the Holy Spirit, as stated above (Q. 16, A. 1; First Part, Q. 39, A. 4). So that when we say, The Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God, this word God stands only for the incarnate Person of the Son.

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Q. 35, A. 5

Article 5 Whether there are two filiations in Christ? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo sint duae filiationes. Nativitas enim est causa filiationis. Sed in Christo sunt duae nativitates. Ergo etiam in Christo sunt duae filiationes. Praeterea, filiatio, qua quis dicitur filius alicuius ut matris vel patris, dependet aliqualiter ab ipso, quia esse relationis est ad aliud aliqualiter se habere; unde et, interempto uno relativorum, interimitur aliud. Sed filiatio aeterna, qua Christus est filius Dei patris, non dependet a matre, quia nullum aeternum dependet a temporali. Ergo Christus non est filius matris filiatione aeterna. Aut ergo nullo modo est filius eius, quod est contra praedicta, aut oportet quod sit filius eius quadam alia filiatione temporali. Sunt ergo in Christo duae filiationes.

Praeterea, unum relativorum ponitur in definitione alterius, ex quo patet quod unum relativorum specificatur ex alio. Sed unum et idem non potest esse in diversis speciebus. Ergo impossibile videtur quod una et eadem relatio terminetur ad extrema omnino diversa. Sed Christus dicitur filius patris aeterni, et matris temporalis, qui sunt termini omnino diversi. Ergo videtur quod non possit eadem relatione Christus dici filius patris et matris. Sunt ergo in Christo duae filiationes. Sed contra est quod, sicut Damascenus dicit, in III libro, ea quae sunt naturae, multiplicantur in Christo, non autem ea quae sunt personae. Sed filiatio maxime pertinet ad personam, est enim proprietas personalis, ut patet ex his quae in prima parte dicta sunt. Ergo in Christo est una tantum filiatio. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc sunt diversae opiniones. Quidam enim, attendentes ad causam filiationis, quae est nativitas, ponunt in Christo duas filiationes, sicut et duas nativitates. Alii vero, attendentes ad subiectum filiationis, quod est persona vel hypostasis, ponunt in Christo tantum unam filiationem, sicut et unam hypostasim vel personam. Unitas enim relationis vel eius pluralitas non attenditur secundum terminos, sed secundum causam vel subiectum. Si enim secundum terminos attenditur, oporteret quod quilibet homo in se duas filiationes haberet, unam qua refertur ad patrem, et aliam qua refertur ad matrem. Sed recte consideranti apparet eadem relatione referri unumquemque ad suum patrem et matrem, propter unitatem causae. Eadem enim nativitate homo nascitur ex patre et matre, unde eadem relatione ad utrumque refertur. Et eadem

Objection 1: It would seem that there are two filiations in Christ. For nativity is the cause of filiation. But in Christ there are two nativities. Therefore in Christ there are also two filiations. Obj. 2: Further, filiation, which is said of a man as being the son of someone, his father or his mother, depends, in a way, on him: because the very being of a relation consists in being referred to another; wherefore if one of two relatives be destroyed, the other is destroyed also. But the eternal filiation by which Christ is the Son of God the Father depends not on His Mother, because nothing eternal depends on what is temporal. Therefore Christ is not His Mother’s Son by temporal filiation. Either, therefore, He is not her Son at all, which is in contradiction to what has been said above (AA. 3, 4), or He must needs be her Son by some other temporal filiation. Therefore in Christ there are two filiations. Obj. 3: Further, one of two relatives enters the definition of the other; hence it is clear that of two relatives, one is specified from the other. But one and the same cannot be in diverse species. Therefore it seems impossible that one and the same relation be referred to extremes which are altogether diverse. But Christ is said to be the Son of the Eternal Father and a temporal mother, who are terms altogether diverse. Therefore it seems that Christ cannot, by the same relation, be called the Son of the Father and of His Mother. Therefore in Christ there are two filiations. On the contrary, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii), things pertaining to the nature are multiple in Christ; but not those things that pertain to the Person. But filiation belongs especially to the Person, since it is a personal property, as appears from what was said in the First Part (Q. 32, A. 3; Q. 40, A. 2). Therefore there is but one filiation in Christ. I answer that, opinions differ on this question. For some, considering only the cause of filiation, which is nativity, put two filiations in Christ, just as there are two nativities. On the contrary, others, considering only the subject of filiation, which is the person or hypostasis, put only one filiation in Christ, just as there is but one hypostasis or person. Because the unity or plurality of a relation is considered in respect, not of its terms, but of its cause or of its subject. For if it were considered in respect of its terms, every man would of necessity have in himself two filiations— one in reference to his father, and another in reference to his mother. But if we consider the question aright, we shall see that every man bears but one relation to both his father and his mother, on account of the unity of the cause thereof. For man is born by one birth of both father and mother: whence he bears but one relation to both. The same

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ratio est de magistro qui docet multos discipulos eadem doctrina; et de domino qui gubernat diversos subiectos eadem potestate. Si vero sint diversae causae specie differentes, ex consequenti videntur relationes specie differre. Unde nihil prohibet plures tales relationes eidem inesse. Sicut, si aliquis est aliquorum magister in grammatica et aliorum in logica, alia est ratio magisterii utriusque, et ideo diversis relationibus unus et idem homo potest esse magister vel diversorum vel eorundem secundum diversas doctrinas. Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquis habet relationem ad plures secundum diversas causas, eiusdem tamen speciei, sicut cum aliquis est pater diversorum filiorum secundum diversos generationis actus. Unde paternitas non potest specie differre, cum actus generationum sint iidem specie. Et quia plures formae eiusdem speciei non possunt simul inesse eidem subiecto, non est possibile quod sint plures paternitates in eo qui est pater plurium filiorum generatione naturali. Secus autem esset si esset pater unius generatione naturali, et alterius per adoptionem. Manifestum est autem quod non una et eadem nativitate Christus est natus ex patre ab aeterno, et ex matre ex tempore. Nec nativitas est unius speciei. Unde, quantum ad hoc, oporteret dicere in Christo esse diversas filiationes, unam temporalem et aliam aeternam. Sed quia subiectum filiationis non est natura aut pars naturae, sed solum persona vel hypostasis; in Christo autem non est hypostasis vel persona nisi aeterna, non potest in Christo esse aliqua filiatio nisi quae sit in hypostasi aeterna. Omnis autem relatio quae ex tempore de Deo dicitur, non ponit in ipso Deo aeterno aliquid secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum, sicut in prima parte habitum est. Et ideo filiatio qua Christus refertur ad matrem, non potest esse realis relatio, sed solum secundum rationem.

Et sic quantum ad aliquid utraque opinio verum dicit. Nam si attendamus ad perfectas rationes filiationis, oportet dicere duas filiationes, secundum dualitatem nativitatum. Si autem attendamus ad subiectum filiationis, quod non potest esse nisi suppositum aeternum, non potest in Christo esse realiter nisi filiatio aeterna. Dicitur tamen relative filius ad matrem relatione quae cointelligitur relationi maternitatis ad Christum. Sicut Deus dicitur dominus relatione quae cointelligitur reali relationi qua creatura subiicitur Deo. Et quamvis relatio dominii non sit realis in Deo, tamen realiter est dominus, ex reali subiectione creaturae ad ipsum. Et similiter Christus dicitur realiter filius virginis matris ex relatione reali maternitatis ad Christum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nativitas temporalis causaret in Christo temporalem filiationem realem,

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is said of one master who teaches many disciples the same doctrine, and of one lord who governs many subjects by the same power. But if there be various causes specifically diverse, it seems that in consequence the relations differ in species: wherefore nothing hinders several such relations being in the same subject. Thus if a man teach grammar to some and logic to others, his teaching is of a different kind in one case and in the other; and therefore one and the same man may have different relations as the master of different disciples, or of the same disciples in regard to diverse doctrines. Sometimes, however, it happens that a man bears a relation to several in respect of various causes, but of the same species: thus a father may have several sons by several acts of generation. Wherefore the paternity cannot differ specifically, since the acts of generation are specifically the same. And because several forms of the same species cannot at the same time be in the same subject, it is impossible for several paternities to be in a man who is the father of several sons by natural generation. But it would not be so were he the father of one son by natural generation and of another by adoption. Now, it is manifest that Christ was not born by one and the same nativity, of the Father from eternity, and of His Mother in time: indeed, these two nativities differ specifically. Wherefore, as to this, we must say that there are various filiations, one temporal and the other eternal. Since, however, the subject of filiation is neither the nature nor part of the nature, but the person or hypostasis alone; and since in Christ there is no other hypostasis or person than the eternal, there can be no other filiation in Christ but that which is in the eternal hypostasis. Now, every relation which is predicated of God from time does not put something real in the eternal God, but only something according to our way of thinking, as we have said in the First Part (Q. 13, A. 7). Therefore the filiation by which Christ is referred to His Mother cannot be a real relation, but only a relation of reason. Consequently each opinion is true to a certain extent. For if we consider the adequate causes of filiation, we must needs say that there are two filiations in respect of the twofold nativity. But if we consider the subject of filiation, which can only be the eternal suppositum, then no other than the eternal filiation in Christ is a real relation. Nevertheless, He has the relation of Son in regard to His Mother, because it is implied in the relation of motherhood to Christ. Thus God is called Lord by a relation which is implied in the real relation by which the creature is subject to God. And although lordship is not a real relation in God, yet is He really Lord through the real subjection of the creature to Him. In the same way Christ is really the Son of the Virgin Mother through the real relation of her motherhood to Christ. Reply Obj. 1: Temporal nativity would cause a real temporal filiation in Christ if there were in Him a subject

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si esset ibi subiectum huiusmodi filiationis capax. Quod quidem esse non potest, ipsum enim suppositum aeternum non potest esse susceptivum relationis temporalis, ut dictum est. Nec etiam potest dici quod sit susceptivum filiationis temporalis ratione humanae naturae, sicut etiam et temporalis nativitatis, quia oporteret naturam humanam aliqualiter esse subiectam filiationi, sicut est aliqualiter subiecta nativitati; cum enim Aethiops dicitur albus ratione dentis, oportet quod dens Aethiopis sit albedinis subiectum. Natura autem humana nullo modo potest esse subiectum filiationis, quia haec relatio directe respicit personam. Ad secundum dicendum quod filiatio aeterna non dependet a matre temporali, sed huic filiationi aeternae cointelligitur quidam respectus temporalis dependens a matre, secundum quem Christus dicitur filius matris. Ad tertium dicendum quod unum et ens se consequuntur, ut dicitur in IV Metaphys. Et ideo, sicut contingit quod in uno extremorum relatio sit quoddam ens, in alio autem non sit ens, sed ratio tantum, sicut de scibili et scientia philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., ita etiam contingit quod ex parte unius extremi est una relatio, ex parte autem alterius extremi sunt multae relationes. Sicut in hominibus ex parte parentum invenitur duplex relatio, una paternitatis et alia maternitatis, quae sunt specie differentes, propter hoc quod alia ratione pater, et alia mater est generationis principium (si vero essent plures eadem ratione principium unius actionis, puta cum multi simul trahunt navem, in omnibus esset una et eadem relatio), ex parte autem prolis est una sola filiatio secundum rem, sed duplex secundum rationem, inquantum correspondet utrique relationi parentum secundum duos respectus intellectus. Et sic etiam quantum ad aliquid in Christo est tantum una filiatio realis, quae respicit patrem aeternum, est tamen ibi alius respectus temporalis, qui respicit matrem temporalem.

Q. 35, A. 6

capable of such filiation. But this cannot be; since the eternal suppositum cannot be receptive of a temporal relation, as stated above. Nor can it be said that it is receptive of temporal filiation by reason of the human nature, just as it is receptive of the temporal nativity; because human nature would need in some way to be the subject of filiation, just as in a way it is the subject of nativity; for since an Ethiopian is said to be white by reason of his teeth, it must be that his teeth are the subject of whiteness. But human nature can nowise be the subject of filiation, because this relation regards directly the person. Reply Obj. 2: Eternal filiation does not depend on a temporal mother, but together with this eternal filiation we understand a certain temporal relation dependent on the mother, in respect of which relation Christ is called the Son of His Mother. Reply Obj. 3: One and being are mutually consequent, as is said Metaph. iv. Therefore, just as it happens that in one of the extremes of a relation there is something real, whereas in the other there is not something real, but merely a certain aspect, as the Philosopher observes of knowledge and the thing known; so also it happens that on the part of one extreme there is one relation, whereas on the part of the other there are many. Thus in man on the part of his parents there is a twofold relation, the one of paternity, the other of motherhood, which are specifically diverse, inasmuch as the father is the principle of generation in one way, and the mother in another (whereas if many be the principle of one action and in the same way—for instance, if many together draw a ship along—there would be one and the same relation in all of them); but on the part of the child there is but one filiation in reality, though there be two in aspect, corresponding to the two relations in the parents, as considered by the intellect. And thus in one way there is only one real filiation in Christ, which is in respect of the Eternal Father: yet there is another temporal relation in regard to His temporal mother.

Article 6 Whether Christ was born without his Mother suffering? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non fuerit natus sine dolore matris. Sicut enim mors hominum subsecuta est ex peccato primorum parentum, secundum illud Gen. II, quacumque die comederitis, morte moriemini; ita etiam dolor partus, secundum illud Gen. III, in dolore paries filios. Sed Christus mortem subire voluit. Ergo videtur quod pari ratione eius partus esse debuerit cum dolore.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not born without His Mother suffering. For just as man’s death was a result of the sin of our first parents, according to Gen. 2:17: In what day soever ye shall eat, ye shall die; so were the pains of childbirth, according to Gen. 3:16: In sorrow shalt thou bring forth children. But Christ was willing to undergo death. Therefore for the same reason it seems that His birth should have been with pain.

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Praeterea, finis proportionatur principio. Sed fiObj. 2: Further, the end is proportionate to the benis vitae Christi fuit cum dolore, secundum illud Isa- ginning. But Christ ended His life in pain, according to iae LIII, vere dolores nostros ipse tulit. Ergo videtur quod Isa. 53:4: Surely . . . He hath carried our sorrows. Therefore it etiam in sua nativitate fuerit dolor partus. seems that His nativity was not without the pains of childbirth. Praeterea, in libro de ortu salvatoris narratur Obj. 3: Further, in the book on the birth of our Savquod ad Christi nativitatem obstetrices occurrerunt, ior it is related that midwives were present at Christ’s birth; quae videntur necessariae parienti propter dolorem. Er- and they would be wanted by reason of the mother’s suffergo videtur quod beata virgo peperit cum dolore. ing pain. Therefore it seems that the Blessed Virgin suffered pain in giving birth to her Child. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in sermone On the contrary, Augustine says (Serm. de Nativ.), de nativitate, alloquens virginem matrem, nec in concep- addressing himself to the Virgin-Mother: In conceiving thou tione, inquit, inventa es sine pudore, nec in partu inventa wast all pure, in giving birth thou wast without pain. es cum dolore. Respondeo dicendum quod dolor parientis causaI answer that, The pains of childbirth are caused by tur ex apertione meatuum per quos proles egreditur. the infant opening the passage from the womb. Now it has Dictum est autem supra quod Christus est egressus ex been said above (Q. 28, A. 2, Replies to objections), that clauso utero matris, et sic nulla apertio meatuum ibi fuit. Christ came forth from the closed womb of His Mother, Et propter hoc in illo partu nullus fuit dolor, sicut nec and, consequently, without opening the passage. Consealiqua corruptio, sed fuit ibi maxima iucunditas, ex hoc quently there was no pain in that birth, as neither was there quod homo Deus natus est in mundum, secundum illud any corruption; on the contrary, there was much joy therein Isaiae XXXV, germinans germinabit sicut lilium, et exul- for that God-Man was born into the world, according to tabit laetabunda et laudans. Isa. 35:1, 2: Like the lily, it shall bud forth and blossom, and shall rejoice with joy and praise. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dolor partus conReply Obj. 1: The pains of childbirth in the woman folsequitur in muliere commixtionem virilem. Unde Gen. low from the mingling of the sexes. Wherefore (Gen 3:16) III, postquam dictum est, in dolore paries, subditur, et after the words, in sorrow shalt thou bring forth children, the sub viri potestate eris. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus, in ser- following are added: and thou shalt be under thy husband’s mone de assumptione beatae virginis, ab hac sententia power. But, as Augustine says (Serm. de Assumpt. B. Virg.,), excipitur virgo mater Dei, quae, quia sine peccati collu- from this sentence we must exclude the Virgin-Mother of vione et sine virilis admixtionis detrimento Christum su- God; who, because she conceived Christ without the defilescepit, sine dolore genuit, sine integritatis violatione, pudo- ment of sin, and without the stain of sexual mingling, therere virginitatis integra permansit. Christus autem mortem fore did she bring Him forth without pain, without violation suscepit spontanea voluntate, ut pro nobis satisfaceret, of her virginal integrity, without detriment to the purity of her non quasi ex necessitate illius sententiae, quia ipse mor- maidenhood. Christ, indeed, suffered death, but through tis debitor non erat. His own spontaneous desire, in order to atone for us, not as a necessary result of that sentence, for He was not a debtor unto death. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Christus moReply Obj. 2: As by His death Christ destroyed our riendo destruxit mortem nostram, ita suo dolore nos a death, so by His pains He freed us from our pains; and so doloribus liberavit, et ita mori voluit cum dolore. Sed do- He wished to die a painful death. But the mother’s pains in lor parientis matris non pertinebat ad Christum, qui pro childbirth did not concern Christ, who came to atone for peccatis nostris satisfacere veniebat. Et ideo non opor- our sins. And therefore there was no need for His Mother tuit quod mater eius pareret cum dolore. to suffer in giving birth. Ad tertium dicendum quod Luc. II dicitur quod Reply Obj. 3: We are told (Luke 2:7) that the Blessed beata virgo ipsamet puerum, quem pepererat, pannis in- Virgin herself wrapped up in swaddling clothes the Child volvit et posuit in praesepio. Et ex hoc ostenditur nar- whom she had brought forth, and laid Him in a manger. ratio huius libri, qui est apocryphus, esse falsa. Unde Consequently the narrative of this book, which is apocHieronymus dicit, contra Helvidium, nulla ibi obstetrix, ryphal, is untrue. Wherefore Jerome says (Adv. Helvid. iv): nulla muliercularum sedulitas intercessit. Et mater et ob- No midwife was there, no officious women interfered. She stetrix fuit. Pannis, inquit, involvit infantem, et posuit was both mother and midwife. ‘With swaddling clothes,’ says in praesepio. Quae sententia apocryphorum deliramenta he, ‘she wrapped up the child, and laid Him in a manger.’ convincit. These words prove the falseness of the apocryphal ravings.

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Q. 35, A. 7

Article 7 Whether Christ should have been born in Bethlehem? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non debuit in Bethlehem nasci. Dicitur enim Isaiae II, de Sion exibit lex, et verbum domini de Ierusalem. Sed Christus est vere verbum Dei. Ergo de Ierusalem debuit prodire in mundum. Praeterea, Matth. II dicitur scriptum esse de Christo quod Nazaraeus vocabitur, quod sumitur ex eo quod scribitur Isaiae XI, flos de radice eius ascendet; Nazareth enim flos interpretatur. Sed maxime aliquis denominatur a loco suae nativitatis. Ergo videtur quod in Nazareth nasci debuerit, ubi etiam fuit conceptus et nutritus. Praeterea, ad hoc dominus natus est in mundo ut veritatis fidem annuntiaret, secundum illud Ioan. XVIII, in hoc natus sum, et ad hoc veni in mundum, ut testimonium perhibeam veritati. Sed hoc facilius fieri potuisset si natus fuisset in civitate Romana, quae tunc dominatum orbis habebat, unde et Paulus, Romanis scribens, dicit, Rom. I, fides vestra annuntiatur universo mundo. Ergo videtur quod non debuit nasci in Bethlehem. Sed contra est quod dicitur Mich. V, et tu, Bethlehem Ephrata, ex te mihi egredietur qui sit dominator in Israel. Respondeo dicendum quod Christus in Bethlehem nasci voluit duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia factus est ex semine David secundum carnem, ut dicitur Rom. I, cui etiam fuerat facta repromissio specialis de Christo, secundum illud II Reg. XXIII, dixit vir cui constitutum de Christo Dei Iacob. Et ideo in Bethlehem, de qua natus fuit David, nasci voluit, ut ex ipso loco nativitatis promissio ei facta impleta ostenderetur. Et hoc designat Evangelista dicens, eo quod esset de domo et familia David. Secundo quia, ut Gregorius dicit, in homilia, Bethlehem domus panis interpretatur. Ipse Christus est qui ait, ego sum panis vivus, qui de caelo descendi.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut David in Bethlehem natus est, ita etiam Ierusalem elegit ut in ea sedem regni constitueret, et templum Dei ibi aedificaret, et sic Ierusalem esset civitas simul regalis et sacerdotalis. Sacerdotium autem Christi, et eius regnum, praecipue consummatum est in eius passione. Et ideo convenienter Bethlehem elegit nativitati, Ierusalem vero passioni. Simul etiam per hoc hominum gloriam confutavit, qui gloriantur de hoc quod ex civitatibus nobilibus originem ducunt, in quibus etiam praecipue volunt hono-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have been born in Bethlehem. For it is written (Isa 2:3): The law shall come forth from Zion, and the Word of the Lord from Jerusalem. But Christ is truly the Word of God. Therefore He should have come into the world at Jerusalem. Obj. 2: Further, it is said (Matt 2:23) that it is written of Christ that He shall be called a Nazarene; which is taken from Isa. 11:1: A flower shall rise up out of his root; for Nazareth is interpreted a flower. But a man is named especially from the place of his birth. Therefore it seems that He should have been born in Nazareth, where also He was conceived and brought up. Obj. 3: Further, for this was our Lord born into the world, that He might make known the true faith, according to John 18:37: For this was I born, and for this came I into the world; that I should give testimony to the truth. But this would have been easier if He had been born in the city of Rome, which at that time ruled the world; whence Paul, writing to the Romans (1:8) says: Your faith is spoken of in the whole world. Therefore it seems that He should not have been born in Bethlehem. On the contrary, It is written (Mic 5:2): And thou, Bethlehem, Ephrata . . . out of thee shall He come forth unto Me, that is to be the ruler in Israel. I answer that, Christ willed to be born in Bethlehem for two reasons. First, because He was made . . . of the seed of David according to the flesh, as it is written (Rom 1:3); to whom also was a special promise made concerning Christ; according to 2 Kings 23:1: The man to whom it was appointed concerning the Christ of the God of Jacob . . . said. Therefore He willed to be born at Bethlehem, where David was born, in order that by the very birthplace the promise made to David might be shown to be fulfilled. The Evangelist points this out by saying: Because He was of the house and of the family of David. Second, because, as Gregory says (Hom. viii in Evang.): Bethlehem is interpreted ‘the house of bread.’ It is Christ Himself who said, ‘I am the living Bread which came down from heaven.’ Reply Obj. 1: As David was born in Bethlehem, so also did he choose Jerusalem to set up his throne there, and to build there the Temple of God, so that Jerusalem was at the same time a royal and a priestly city. Now, Christ’s priesthood and kingdom were consummated principally in His Passion. Therefore it was becoming that He should choose Bethlehem for His Birthplace and Jerusalem for the scene of His Passion. At the same time, too, He put to silence the vain boasting of men who take pride in being born in great cities, where also they desire especially to receive honor. Christ,

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rari. Christus autem e converso in civitate ignobili nasci voluit, et in civitate nobili pati opprobrium. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus florere voluit secundum virtuosam conversationem, non secundum carnis originem. Et ideo in civitate Nazareth educari voluit et nutriri. In Bethlehem autem voluit quasi peregre nasci, quia, ut Gregorius dicit, per humanitatem quam assumpserat, quasi in alieno nascebatur, non secundum potestatem, sed secundum naturam. Et, ut etiam Beda dicit, per hoc quod in diversorio loco eget, nobis multas mansiones in domo patris sui praepararet. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in quodam sermone Ephesini Concilii, si maximam Romam elegisset civitatem, propter potentiam civium mutationem orbis terrarum putarent. Si filius fuisset imperatoris, potestati utilitatem adscriberent. Sed ut divinitas cognosceretur orbem transformasse terrarum, pauperculam elegit matrem, pauperiorem patriam. Elegit autem Deus infirma mundi ut confundat fortia, sicut dicitur I Cor. I. Et ideo, ut suam potestatem magis ostenderet, in ipsa Roma, quae caput orbis erat, statuit caput Ecclesiae suae, in signum perfectae victoriae, ut exinde fides derivaretur ad universum mundum, secundum illud Isaiae XXVI, civitatem sublimem humiliabit, et conculcabit eam pes pauperis, idest Christi, gressus egenorum, idest apostolorum Petri et Pauli.

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on the contrary, willed to be born in a mean city, and to suffer reproach in a great city. Reply Obj. 2: Christ wished to flower by His holy life, not in His carnal birth. Therefore He wished to be fostered and brought up at Nazareth. But He wished to be born at Bethlehem away from home; because, as Gregory says (Hom. viii in Evang.), through the human nature which He had taken, He was born, as it were, in a foreign place—foreign not to His power, but to His Nature. And, again, as Bede says on Luke 2:7: In order that He who found no room at the inn might prepare many mansions for us in His Father’s house. Reply Obj. 3: According to a sermon in the Council of Ephesus: If He had chosen the great city of Rome, the change in the world would be ascribed to the influence of her citizens. If He had been the son of the Emperor, His benefits would have been attributed to the latter’s power. But that we might acknowledge the work of God in the transformation of the whole earth, He chose a poor mother and a birthplace poorer still. But the weak things of the world hath God chosen, that He may confound the strong (1 Cor 1:27). And therefore, in order the more to show His power, He set up the head of His Church in Rome itself, which was the head of the world, in sign of His complete victory, in order that from that city the faith might spread throughout the world; according to Isa. 26:5, 6: The high city He shall lay low . . . the feet of the poor, i.e., of Christ, shall tread it down; the steps of the needy, i.e., of the apostles Peter and Paul.

Article 8 Whether Christ was born at a fitting time? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non fuerit congruo tempore natus. Ad hoc enim Christus venerat ut suos in libertatem revocaret. Natus est autem tempore servitutis, quo scilicet totus orbis praecepto Augusti describitur, quasi tributarius factus, ut habetur Luc. II. Ergo videtur quod non congruo tempore Christus fuerit natus. Praeterea, promissiones de Christo nascituro non gentilibus fuerant factae, secundum illud Rom. IX, quorum sunt promissa. Sed Christus natus est tempore quo rex alienigena dominabatur, sicut patet Matth. II, cum natus esset Iesus in diebus Herodis regis. Ergo videtur quod non fuerit congruo tempore natus. Praeterea, tempus praesentiae Christi in mundo diei comparatur, propter id quod ipse est lux mundi, unde ipse dicit, Ioan. IX, me oportet operari opera eius qui misit me, donec dies est. Sed in aestate sunt dies longiores quam in hieme. Ergo, cum natus fuerit in profundo

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not born at a fitting time. Because Christ came in order to restore liberty to His own. But He was born at a time of subjection— namely, when the whole world, as it were, tributary to Augustus, was being enrolled, at his command, as Luke relates (2:1). Therefore it seems that Christ was not born at a fitting time. Obj. 2: Further, the promises concerning the coming of Christ were not made to the Gentiles; according to Rom. 9:4: To whom belong . . . the promises. But Christ was born during the reign of a foreigner, as appears from Matt. 2:1: When Jesus was born in the days of King Herod. Therefore it seems that He was not born at a fitting time. Obj. 3: Further, the time of Christ’s presence on earth is compared to the day, because He is the Light of the world; wherefore He says Himself (John 9:4): I must work the works of Him that sent Me, whilst it is day. But in summer the days are longer than in winter. Therefore, since He was

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hiemis octo Kalendas Ianuarii, videtur quod non fuerit convenienti tempore natus. Sed contra est quod dicitur Galat. IV, cum venit plenitudo temporis, misit Deus filium suum, factum ex muliere, factum sub lege. Respondeo dicendum quod haec est differentia inter Christum et alios homines, quod alii homines nascuntur subiecti necessitati temporis, Christus autem, tanquam dominus et conditor omnium temporum, elegit sibi tempus in quo nasceretur, sicut et matrem et locum. Et quia quae a Deo sunt ordinata sunt, et convenienter disposita, consequens est quod convenientissimo tempore Christus nasceretur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus venerat nos in statum libertatis reducere de statu servitutis. Et ideo, sicut mortalitatem nostram suscepit ut nos ad vitam reduceret, ita, ut Beda dicit, eo tempore dignatus est incarnari quo, mox natus, censu Caesaris adscriberetur atque, ob nostri liberationem, ipse servitio subderetur. Tempore etiam illo, quo totus orbis sub uno principe vivebat, maxime pax fuit in mundo. Et ideo decebat ut illo tempore Christus nasceretur, qui est pax nostra, faciens utraque unum, ut dicitur Ephes. II. Unde Hieronymus dicit, super Isaiam, veteres revolvamus historias, et inveniemus usque ad vigesimum octavum annum Caesaris Augusti in toto orbe terrarum fuisse discordiam, orto autem domino, omnia bella cessaverunt, secundum illud Isaiae II, non levabit gens contra gentem gladium. Congruebat etiam ut illo tempore quo unus princeps dominabatur in mundo, Christus nasceretur, qui venerat suos congregare in unum, ut esset unum ovile et unus pastor, ut dicitur Ioan. X. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus regis alienigenae tempore nasci voluit, ut impleretur prophetia Iacob dicentis, Gen. penult., non auferetur sceptrum de Iuda, et dux de femore eius, donec veniat qui mittendus est. Quia, ut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., quandiu Iudaica gens sub Iudaicis regibus, quamvis peccatoribus, tenebatur, prophetae mittebantur ad remedium eius. Nunc autem, quando lex Dei sub potestate regis iniqui tenebatur, nascitur Christus, quia magna et desperabilis infirmitas medicum artificiosiorem quaerebat. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in libro de quaest. novi et Vet. Test., tunc Christus nasci voluit, quando lux diei crementum incipit accipere, ut ostenderetur quod ipse venerat ut homines crescerent in lucem divinam, secundum illud Luc. I, illuminare his qui in tenebris et umbra mortis sedent. Similiter etiam asperitatem hiemis elegit ad nativitatem, ut ex tunc carnis afflictionem pateretur pro nobis.

Q. 35, A. 8

born in the depth of winter, eight days before the Kalends of January, it seems that He was not born at a fitting time. On the contrary, It is written (Gal 4:4): When the fullness of the time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the law. I answer that, There is this difference between Christ and other men, that, whereas they are born subject to the restrictions of time, Christ, as Lord and Maker of all time, chose a time in which to be born, just as He chose a mother and a birthplace. And since what is of God is well ordered and becomingly arranged, it follows that Christ was born at a most fitting time. Reply Obj. 1: Christ came in order to bring us back from a state of bondage to a state of liberty. And therefore, as He took our mortal nature in order to restore us to life, so, as Bede says (Super Luc. ii, 4, 5), He deigned to take flesh at such a time that, shortly after His birth, He would be enrolled in Caesar’s census, and thus submit Himself to bondage for the sake of our liberty. Moreover, at that time, when the whole world lived under one ruler, peace abounded on the earth. Therefore it was a fitting time for the birth of Christ, for He is our peace, who hath made both one, as it is written (Eph 2:14). Wherefore Jerome says on Isa. 2:4: If we search the page of ancient history, we shall find that throughout the whole world there was discord until the twenty-eighth year of Augustus Caesar: but when our Lord was born, all war ceased; according to Isa. 2:4: Nation shall not lift up sword against nation. Again, it was fitting that Christ should be born while the world was governed by one ruler, because He came to gather His own together in one (John 11:52), that there might be one fold and one shepherd (John 10:16). Reply Obj. 2: Christ wished to be born during the reign of a foreigner, that the prophecy of Jacob might be fulfilled (Gen 49:10): The sceptre shall not be taken away from Judah, nor a ruler from his thigh, till He come that is to be sent. Because, as Chrysostom says (Hom. ii in Matth.), as long as the Jewish people was governed by Jewish kings, however wicked, prophets were sent for their healing. But now that the Law of God is under the power of a wicked king, Christ is born; because a grave and hopeless disease demanded a more skillful physician. Reply Obj. 3: As says the author of the book De Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test., Christ wished to be born, when the light of day begins to increase in length, so as to show that He came in order that man might come nearer to the Divine Light, according to Luke 1:79: To enlighten them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death. In like manner He chose to be born in the rough winter season, that He might begin from then to suffer in body for us.

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Question 36 The Manifestation of the Newly Born Christ Deinde considerandum est de manifestatione Christi We must now consider the manifestation of the newly nati. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. born Christ: concerning which there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum nativitas Christi debuerit omnibus (1) Whether Christ’s birth should have been made esse manifesta. known to all? Secundo, utrum debuerit aliquibus manifestari. (2) Whether it should have been made known to some? Tertio, quibus manifestari debuerit. (3) To whom should it have been made known? Quarto, utrum ipse se debuerit manifestare, vel (4) Whether He should have made Himself known, or potius manifestari per alios. should He rather have been manifested by others? Quinto, per quae alia manifestari debuerit. (5) By what other means should it have been made known? Sexto, de ordine manifestationum. (6) Of the order of these manifestations; Septimo, de stella per quam manifestata fuit eius (7) Of the star by means of which His birth was made nativitas. known; Octavo, de veneratione magorum, qui per stellam (8) Of the adoration of the Magi, who were informed nativitatem Christi cognoverunt. of Christ’s nativity by means of the star.

Article 1 Whether Christ’s birth should have been made known to all? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christi nativitas debuerit omnibus esse manifesta. Impletio enim debet promissioni respondere. Sed de promissione adventus Christi dicitur in Psalmo, Deus manifeste veniet. Venit autem per carnis nativitatem. Ergo videtur quod eius nativitas debuit esse toti mundo manifesta. Praeterea, I ad Tim. I dicitur, Christus in hunc mundum venit peccatores salvos facere. Sed hoc non fit nisi inquantum eis gratia Christi manifestatur, secundum illud Tit. II, apparuit gratia salvatoris nostri Dei omnibus hominibus, erudiens nos ut, abnegantes impietatem et saecularia desideria, sobrie et pie et iuste vivamus in hoc saeculo. Ergo videtur quod Christi nativitas debuerit esse omnibus manifesta. Praeterea, Deus super omnia pronior est ad miserendum, secundum illud Psalmi, miserationes eius super omnia opera eius. Sed in secundo adventu, quo iustitias iudicabit, veniet omnibus manifestus, secundum illud Matth. XXIV, sicut fulgur exit ab oriente et paret usque in occidentem, ita erit adventus filii hominis. Ergo multo magis primus, quo natus est in mundo secundum carnem, debuit omnibus esse manifestus.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s birth should have been made known to all. Because fulfilment should correspond to promise. Now, the promise of Christ’s coming is thus expressed (Ps 49:3): God shall come manifestly. But He came by His birth in the flesh. Therefore it seems that His birth should have been made known to the whole world. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (1 Tim 1:15): Christ came into this world to save sinners. But this is not effected save in as far as the grace of Christ is made known to them; according to Titus 2:11, 12: The grace of God our Savior hath appeared to all men, instructing us, that denying ungodliness and worldly desires, we should live soberly, and justly, and godly in this world. Therefore it seems that Christ’s birth should have been made known to all. Obj. 3: Further, God is most especially inclined to mercy; according to Ps. 144:9: His tender mercies are over all His works. But in His second coming, when He will judge justices (Ps 70:3), He will come before the eyes of all; according to Matt. 24:27: As lightning cometh out of the east, and appeareth even into the west, so shall also the coming of the Son of Man be. Much more, therefore, should His first coming, when He was born into the world according to the flesh, have been made known to all.

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Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae XLV, tu es Deus absconditus, sanctus Israel, salvator. Et Isaiae LIII, quasi absconditus est vultus eius et despectus. Respondeo dicendum quod nativitas Christi non debuit omnibus communiter esse manifesta. Primo quidem, quia per hoc impedita fuisset humana redemptio, quae per crucem eius peracta est, quia, ut dicitur I ad Cor. II, si cognovissent, nunquam dominum gloriae crucifixissent. Secundo, quia hoc diminuisset meritum fidei, per quam venerat homines iustificare, secundum illud Rom. III, iustitia Dei per fidem Iesu Christi. Si enim manifestis indiciis, Christo nascente, eius nativitas omnibus appareret, iam tolleretur ratio fidei, quae est argumentum non apparentium, ut dicitur Heb. XI. Tertio, quia per hoc venisset in dubium veritas humanitatis ipsius. Unde Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Volusianum, si nullas ex parvulo in iuventutem mutaret aetates, nullos cibos, nullos caperet somnos, nonne opinionem confirmaret erroris, nec hominem verum ullo modo suscepisse crederetur, et, dum omnia mirabiliter facit, auferret quod misericorditer fecit?

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa intelligitur de adventu Christi ad iudicium, secundum quod Glossa ibidem exponit. Ad secundum dicendum quod de gratia Dei salvatoris erudiendi erant omnes homines ad salutem, non in principio nativitatis eius, sed postea, tempore procedente, postquam operatus esset salutem in medio terrae. Unde, post passionem et resurrectionem suam, dixit discipulis, Matth. ult., euntes, docete omnes gentes. Ad tertium dicendum quod ad iudicium requiritur quod auctoritas iudicis cognoscatur, et propter hoc oportet quod adventus Christi ad iudicium sit manifestus. Sed primus adventus fuit ad omnium salutem, quae est per fidem, quae quidem est de non apparentibus. Et ideo adventus Christi primus debuit esse occultus.

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On the contrary, It is written (Isa 45:15): Thou art a hidden God, the Holy of Israel, the Savior. And, again (Isa 43:3): His look was, as it were, hidden and despised. I answer that, It was unfitting that Christ’s birth should be made known to all men without distinction. First, because this would have been a hindrance to the redemption of man, which was accomplished by means of the Cross; for, as it is written (1 Cor 2:8): If they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory. Second, because this would have lessened the merit of faith, which He came to offer men as the way to righteousness, according to Rom. 3:22: The justice of God by faith of Jesus Christ. For if, when Christ was born, His birth had been made known to all by evident signs, the very nature of faith would have been destroyed, since it is the evidence of things that appear not, as stated, Heb. 11:1. Third, because thus the reality of His human nature would have come into doubt. Whence Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii): If He had not passed through the different stages of age from babyhood to youth, had neither eaten nor slept, would He not have strengthened an erroneous opinion, and made it impossible for us to believe that He had become true man? And while He is doing all things wondrously, would He have taken away that which He accomplished in mercy? Reply Obj. 1: According to the gloss, the words quoted must be understood of Christ’s coming as judge. Reply Obj. 2: All men were to be instructed unto salvation, concerning the grace of God our Savior, not at the very time of His birth, but afterwards, in due time, after He had wrought salvation in the midst of the earth (Ps 73:12). Wherefore after His Passion and Resurrection, He said to His disciples (Matt 28:19): Going . . . teach ye all nations. Reply Obj. 3: For judgment to be passed, the authority of the judge needs to be known: and for this reason it behooves that the coming of Christ unto judgment should be manifest. But His first coming was unto the salvation of all, which is by faith that is of things not seen. And therefore it was fitting that His first coming should be hidden.

Article 2 Whether Christ’s birth should have been made known to some? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nativitas Christi nulli debuerit manifestari. Quia, ut dictum est, hoc erat congruum humanae saluti, ut primus Christi adventus esset occultus. Sed Christus venerat ut omnes salvaret, secundum illud I Tim. IV, qui est salvator omnium hominum, maxime fidelium. Ergo nativitas Christi nulli debuit manifestari.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s birth should not have been made known to anyone. For, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3), it befitted the salvation of mankind that Christ’s first coming should be hidden. But Christ came to save all; according to 1 Tim. 4:10: Who is the Savior of all men, especially of the faithful. Therefore Christ’s birth should not have been made known to anyone.

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Praeterea, ante nativitatem Christi, manifestata erat beatae virgini et Ioseph futura Christi nativitas. Non ergo erat necessarium, Christo nato, eandem aliis manifestari. Praeterea, nullus sapiens manifestat id ex quo turbatio nascitur et detrimentum aliorum. Sed, manifestata Christi nativitate, subsecuta est turbatio, dicitur enim Matth. II quod, audiens rex Herodes Christi nativitatem, turbatus est, et omnis Ierosolyma cum illo. Cessit etiam hoc in detrimentum aliorum, quia ex hac occasione Herodes occidit pueros in Bethlehem et in finibus eius a bimatu et infra. Ergo videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Christi nativitatem aliquibus manifestari. Sed contra est quod Christi nativitas nulli fuisset proficua si omnibus esset occulta. Sed oportebat Christi nativitatem esse proficuam, alioquin frustra natus fuisset. Ergo videtur quod aliquibus manifestari debuerit Christi nativitas. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, Rom. XIII, quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt. Pertinet autem ad divinae sapientiae ordinem ut Dei dona, et secreta sapientiae eius, non aequaliter ad omnes, sed immediate ad quosdam perveniant, et per eos ad alios deriventur. Unde et quantum ad resurrectionis mysterium dicitur, Act. X, quod Deus dedit Christum resurgentem manifestum fieri, non omni populo, sed testibus praeordinatis a Deo. Unde hoc etiam debuit circa ipsius nativitatem observari, ut non omnibus Christus manifestaretur, sed quibusdam, per quos posset ad alios devenire. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut fuisset in praeiudicium salutis humanae si omnibus hominibus Dei nativitas innotuisset, ita etiam et si nulli nota fuisset. Utroque enim modo tollitur fides, tam scilicet per hoc quod aliquid est totaliter manifestum; quam etiam per hoc quod a nullo cognoscitur a quo possit testimonium audiri; fides enim est ex auditu, ut dicitur Rom. X. Ad secundum dicendum quod Maria et Ioseph instruendi erant de Christi nativitate antequam nasceretur, quia ad eos pertinebat reverentiam habere prolis conceptae in utero, et obsequi nasciturae. Eorum autem testimonium, propter hoc quod erat domesticum, fuisset habitum suspectum circa magnificentiam Christi. Et ideo oportuit ut aliis manifestaretur extraneis, quorum testimonium suspectum esse non posset. Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsa turbatio subsecuta ex nativitate Christi manifestata congruebat Christi nativitati. Primo quidem, quia per hoc manifestatur caelestis Christi dignitas. Unde Gregorius dicit, in homilia, caeli rege nato, rex terrae turbatur, quia nimirum terrena altitudo confunditur cum celsitudo caelestis aperitur.

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Obj. 2: Further, before Christ was born, His future birth was made known to the Blessed Virgin and Joseph. Therefore it was not necessary that it should be made known to others after His birth. Obj. 3: Further, no wise man makes known that from which arise disturbance and harm to others. But, when Christ’s birth was made known, disturbance arose: for it is written (Matt 2:3) that King Herod, hearing of Christ’s birth, was troubled, and all Jerusalem with him. Moreover, this brought harm to others; because it was the occasion of Herod’s killing all the male children that were in Bethlehem . . . from two years old and under. Therefore it seems unfitting for Christ’s birth to have been made known to anyone. On the contrary, Christ’s birth would have been profitable to none if it had been hidden from all. But it behooved Christ’s birth to be profitable: else He were born in vain. Therefore it seems that Christ’s birth should have been made known to some. I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom 13:1) what is of God is well ordered. Now it belongs to the order of Divine wisdom that God’s gifts and the secrets of His wisdom are not bestowed on all equally, but to some immediately, through whom they are made known to others. Wherefore, with regard to the mystery of the Resurrection it is written (Acts 10:40, 41): God . . . gave Christ rising again to be made manifest, not to all the people, but to witnesses pre-ordained by God. Consequently, that His birth might be consistent with this, it should have been made known, not to all, but to some, through whom it could be made known to others.

Reply Obj. 1: As it would have been prejudicial to the salvation of mankind if God’s birth had been made known to all men, so also would it have been if none had been informed of it. Because in either case faith is destroyed, whether a thing be perfectly manifest, or whether it be entirely unknown, so that no one can hear it from another; for faith cometh by hearing (Rom 10:17). Reply Obj. 2: Mary and Joseph needed to be instructed concerning Christ’s birth before He was born, because it devolved on them to show reverence to the child conceived in the womb, and to serve Him even before He was born. But their testimony, being of a domestic character, would have aroused suspicion in regard to Christ’s greatness: and so it behooved it to be made known to others, whose testimony could not be suspect. Reply Obj. 3: The very disturbance that arose when it was known that Christ was born was becoming to His birth. First, because thus the heavenly dignity of Christ is made manifest. Wherefore Gregory says (Hom. x in Evang.): After the birth of the King of heaven, the earthly king is troubled: doubtless because earthly grandeur is covered with confusion when the heavenly majesty is revealed. Secundo, quia per hoc figurabatur iudiciaria ChriSecond, thereby the judicial power of Christ was foresti potestas. Unde Augustinus dicit, in quodam sermone shadowed. Thus Augustine says in a sermon (30 de Temp.)

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Epiphaniae, quid erit tribunal iudicantis, quando super- on the Epiphany: What will He be like in the judgment-seat; bos reges cuna terrebat infantis? since from His cradle He struck terror into the heart of a proud king? Tertio, quia per hoc figurabatur deiectio regni DiaThird, because thus the overthrow of the devil’s kingboli. Quia, ut Leo Papa dicit, in sermone Epiphaniae, dom was foreshadowed. For, as Pope Leo says in a sermon non tantum Herodes in semetipso turbatur, quantum Dia- on the Epiphany (Serm. v): Herod was not so much troubolus in Herode. Herodes enim hominem aestimabat, sed bled in himself as the devil in Herod. For Herod thought Him Diabolus Deum. Et uterque regni sui successorem timebat, to be a man, but the devil thought Him to be God. Each Diabolus caelestem, sed Herodes terrenum. Superflue ta- feared a successor to his kingdom: the devil, a heavenly sucmen, quia Christus non venerat regnum terrenum in ter- cessor; Herod, an earthly successor. But their fear was needra habere, ut Leo Papa dicit, Herodi loquens, non capit less: since Christ had not come to set up an earthly kingChristum regia tua, nec mundi dominus potestatis tuae dom, as Pope Leo says, addressing himself to Herod: Thy sceptri est contentus angustiis. Quod autem Iudaei tur- palace cannot hold Christ: nor is the Lord of the world conbantur, qui tamen magis gaudere debuerant, aut hoc est tent with the paltry power of thy scepter. That the Jews were quia, ut Chrysostomus dicit, de adventu iusti non pote- troubled, who, on the contrary, should have rejoiced, was rant gaudere iniqui, aut volentes favere Herodi, quem ti- either because, as Chrysostom says, wicked men could not mebant; populus enim plus iusto favet eis quos crudeles rejoice at the coming of the Holy one, or because they wished sustinet. to court favor with Herod, whom they feared; for the populace is inclined to favor too much those whose cruelty it endures. Quod autem pueri ab Herode sunt interfecti, non And that the children were slain by Herod was not cessit in eorum detrimentum, sed in eorum profectum. harmful to them, but profitable. For Augustine says in a serDicit enim Augustinus, in sermone quodam de Epipha- mon on the Epiphany (66 de Diversis): It cannot be quesnia, absit ut, ad liberandos homines Christus veniens, de tioned that Christ, who came to set man free, rewarded those illorum praemio qui pro eo interficerentur nihil egerit, qui, who were slain for Him; since, while hanging on the cross, He pendens in ligno, pro eis a quibus interficiebatur oravit. prayed for those who were putting Him to death.

Article 3 Whether those to whom Christ’s birth was made known were suitably chosen? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sunt convenienter electi illi quibus est Christi nativitas manifestata. Dominus enim, Matth. X, mandavit discipulis, in viam gentium ne abieritis, ut scilicet prius manifestaretur Iudaeis quam gentilibus. Ergo videtur quod multo minus a principio fuerit revelanda Christi nativitas gentibus, qui ab oriente venerunt, ut habetur Matth. II. Praeterea, manifestatio divinae veritatis praecipue debet fieri ad Dei amicos, secundum illud Iob XXXVII, annuntiat de ea amico suo. Sed magi videntur esse Dei inimici, dicitur enim Levit. XIX, non declinetis ad magos, nec ab ariolis aliquid sciscitemini. Non ergo debuit Christi nativitas magis manifestari.

Objection 1: It would seem that those to whom Christ’s birth was made known were not suitably chosen. For our Lord (Matt 10:5) commanded His disciples, Go ye not into the way of the Gentiles, so that He might be made known to the Jews before the Gentiles. Therefore it seems that much less should Christ’s birth have been at once revealed to the Gentiles who came from the east, as stated Matt. 2:1. Obj. 2: Further, the revelation of Divine truth should be made especially to the friends of God, according to Job 37: He showeth His friend concerning it. But the Magi seem to be God’s foes; for it is written (Lev 19:31): Go not aside after wizards (magi), neither ask anything of soothsayers. Therefore Christ’s birth should not have been made known to the Magi. Praeterea, Christus venerat mundum totum a poObj. 3: Further, Christ came in order to set free the testate Diaboli liberare, unde dicitur Malach. I, ab ortu whole world from the power of the devil; whence it is writsolis usque ad occasum magnum est nomen meum in gen- ten (Mal 1:11): From the rising of the sun even to the going tibus. Non ergo solum in oriente positis manifestari de- down, My name is great among the Gentiles. Therefore He buit, sed etiam ubique terrarum debuit aliquibus mani- should have been made known, not only to those who dwelt festari. in the east, but also to some from all parts of the world.

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Praeterea, omnia sacramenta veteris legis erant Christi figura. Sed sacramenta veteris legis dispensabantur per ministerium sacerdotum legalium. Ergo videtur quod magis debuerit Christi nativitas manifestari sacerdotibus in templo, quam pastoribus in agro. Praeterea, Christus ex virgine matre natus est, et aetate parvulus erat. Convenientius ergo videtur fuisse quod Christus manifestaretur iuvenibus et virginibus, quam senibus et coniugatis vel viduis, sicut Simeoni et Annae. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. XIII, ego scio quos elegerim. Quae autem fiunt secundum Dei sapientiam, convenienter fiunt. Ergo convenienter sunt electi illi quibus est manifestata Christi nativitas. Respondeo dicendum quod salus quae erat futura per Christum, ad omnem diversitatem hominum pertinebat, quia, sicut dicitur Coloss. III, in Christo non est masculus et femina, gentilis et Iudaeus, servus et liber, et sic de aliis huiusmodi. Et ut hoc in ipsa Christi nativitate praefiguraretur, omnibus conditionibus hominum est manifestatus. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in sermone de Epiphania, pastores erant Israelitae, magi gentiles. Illi prope, isti longe. Utrique tanquam ad angularem lapidem concurrerunt. Fuit etiam inter eos alia diversitas, nam magi fuerunt sapientes et potentes, pastores autem simplices et viles. Manifestatus est etiam iustis, Simeoni et Annae, et peccatoribus, scilicet magis; manifestatus est etiam et viris et mulieribus, scilicet Annae; ut per hoc ostenderetur nullam conditionem hominum excludi a Christi salute. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa manifestatio nativitatis Christi fuit quaedam praelibatio plenae manifestationis quae erat futura. Et sicut in secunda manifestatione primo annuntiata est gratia Christi per Christum et eius apostolos Iudaeis, et postea gentilibus; ita ad Christum primo pervenerunt pastores, qui erant primitiae Iudaeorum, tanquam prope existentes; et postea venerunt magi a remotis, qui fuerunt primitiae gentium, ut Augustinus dicit. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in sermone de Epiphania, sicut praevalet imperitia in rusticitate pastorum, ita praevalet impietas in sacrilegiis magorum. Utrosque tamen sibi ille lapis angularis attribuit, quippe qui venit stulta eligere ut confunderet sapientes, et non vocare iustos, sed peccatores; ut nullus magnus superbiret, nullus infirmus desperaret. Quidam tamen dicunt quod isti magi non fuerunt malefici, sed sapientes astrologi, qui apud Persas vel Chaldaeos magi vocantur. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, ab oriente venerunt magi, quia, unde dies nascitur, inde initium fidei processit, quia fides lumen est anima-

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Obj. 4: Further, all the sacraments of the Old Law were figures of Christ. But the sacraments of the Old Law were dispensed through the ministry of the legal priesthood. Therefore it seems that Christ’s birth should have been made known rather to the priests in the Temple than to the shepherds in the fields. Obj. 5: Further, Christ was born of a Virgin-Mother, and was as yet a little child. It was therefore more suitable that He should be made known to youths and virgins than to old and married people or to widows, such as Simeon and Anna. On the contrary, It is written (John 13:18): I know whom I have chosen. But what is done by God’s wisdom is done becomingly. Therefore those to whom Christ’s birth was made known were suitably chosen. I answer that, Salvation, which was to be accomplished by Christ, concerns all sorts and conditions of men: because, as it is written (Gal 3:28), in Christ there is neither male nor female, neither Gentile nor Jew . . . bond nor free, and so forth. And in order that this might be foreshadowed in Christ’s birth, He was made known to men of all conditions. Because, as Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (32 de Temp.), the shepherds were Israelites, the Magi were Gentiles. The former were nigh to Him, the latter far from Him. Both hastened to Him together as to the cornerstone. There was also another point of contrast: for the Magi were wise and powerful; the shepherds simple and lowly. He was also made known to the righteous as Simeon and Anna; and to sinners, as the Magi. He was made known both to men, and to women—namely, to Anna—so as to show no condition of men to be excluded from Christ’s redemption. Reply Obj. 1: That manifestation of Christ’s birth was a kind of foretaste of the full manifestation which was to come. And as in the later manifestation the first announcement of the grace of Christ was made by Him and His Apostles to the Jews and afterwards to the Gentiles, so the first to come to Christ were the shepherds, who were the first-fruits of the Jews, as being near to Him; and afterwards came the Magi from afar, who were the first-fruits of the Gentiles, as Augustine says (Serm. 30 de Temp. cc.). Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (Serm. 30 de Temp.): As unskilfulness predominates in the rustic manners of the shepherd, so ungodliness abounds in the profane rites of the Magi. Yet did this CornerStone draw both to Itself; inasmuch as He came ‘to choose the foolish things that He might confound the wise,’ and ‘not to call the just, but sinners,’ so that the proud might not boast, nor the weak despair. Nevertheless, there are those who say that these Magi were not wizards, but wise astronomers, who are called Magi among the Persians or Chaldees. Reply Obj. 3: As Chrysostom says: The Magi came from the east, because the first beginning of faith came from the land where the day is born; since faith is the light of the

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rum. Vel, quia omnes qui ad Christum veniunt, ab ipso et per ipsum veniunt, unde dicitur Zach. VI, ecce vir, oriens nomen eius. Dicuntur autem ab oriente, ad litteram, venisse, vel quia de ultimis orientis partibus venerunt, secundum quosdam, vel quia de aliquibus vicinis partibus Iudaeae venerunt, quae tamen sunt regioni Iudaeorum ad orientem. Credibile tamen est etiam in aliis partibus mundi aliqua indicia nativitatis Christi apparuisse, sicut Romae fluxit oleum; et in Hispania apparuerunt tres soles paulatim in unum coeuntes. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, Angelus manifestans Christi nativitatem non ivit Ierosolymam, non requisivit Scribas et Pharisaeos, erant enim corrupti, et prae invidia cruciabantur. Sed pastores erant sinceri, antiquam conversationem patriarcharum et Moysen colentes. Per hos etiam pastores significabantur doctores Ecclesiae, quibus Christi mysteria revelantur, quae latebant Iudaeos. Ad quintum dicendum quod, sicut Ambrosius dicit, generatio domini non solum a pastoribus, sed etiam a senioribus et iustis accipere debuit testimonium, quorum etiam testimonio, propter iustitiam, magis credebatur.

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soul. Or, because all who come to Christ come from Him and through Him: whence it is written (Zech 6:12): Behold a Man, the Orient is His name. Now, they are said to come from the east literally, either because, as some say, they came from the farthest parts of the east, or because they came from the neighboring parts of Judea that lie to the east of the region inhabited by the Jews. Yet it is to be believed that certain signs of Christ’s birth appeared also in other parts of the world: thus, at Rome the river flowed with oil; and in Spain three suns were seen, which gradually merged into one. Reply Obj. 4: As Chrysostom observes (Theophylact., Enarr. in Luc. ii, 8), the angel who announced Christ’s birth did not go to Jerusalem, nor did he seek the Scribes and Pharisees, for they were corrupted, and full of ill-will. But the shepherds were single-minded, and were like the patriarchs and Moses in their mode of life. Moreover, these shepherds were types of the Doctors of the Church, to whom are revealed the mysteries of Christ that were hidden from the Jews. Reply Obj. 5: As Ambrose says (on Luke 2:25): It was right that our Lord’s birth should be attested not only by the shepherds, but also by people advanced in age and virtue: whose testimony is rendered the more credible by reason of their righteousness.

Article 4 Whether Christ himself should have made his birth known? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus per seipsum suam nativitatem manifestare debuerit. Causa enim quae est per se, semper est potior ea quae est per aliud, ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Sed Christus suam nativitatem manifestavit per alios, puta pastoribus per Angelos et, magis per stellam. Ergo multo magis per seipsum debuit suam nativitatem manifestare. Praeterea, Eccli. XX dicitur, sapientia abscondita, et thesaurus invisus, quae utilitas in utrisque? Sed Christus a principio conceptionis suae plene habuit sapientiae et gratiae thesaurum. Nisi ergo hanc plenitudinem manifestasset per opera et verba, fuisset frustra ei data sapientia et gratia. Quod est inconveniens, quia Deus et natura nihil frustra facit, ut dicitur in I de caelo.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should have Himself made His birth known. For a direct cause is always of greater power than an indirect cause, as is stated Phys. viii. But Christ made His birth known through others—for instance, to the shepherds through the angels, and to the Magi through the star. Much more, therefore, should He Himself have made His birth known. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Sir 20:32): Wisdom that is hid and treasure that is not seen; what profit is there in them both? But Christ had, to perfection, the treasure of wisdom and grace from the beginning of His conception. Therefore, unless He had made the fullness of these gifts known by words and deeds, wisdom and grace would have been given Him to no purpose. But this is unreasonable: because God and nature do nothing without a purpose (De Coelo i). Praeterea, in libro de infantia salvatoris legitur Obj. 3: Further, we read in the book De Infantia Salvaquod Christus in sua pueritia multa miracula fecit. Et ita toris that in His infancy Christ worked many miracles. It videtur quod suam nativitatem per seipsum manifesta- seems therefore that He did Himself make His birth known.

verit. Sed contra est quod Leo Papa dicit, quod magi inOn the contrary, Pope Leo says (Serm. xxxiv) that venerunt puerum Iesum nulla ab infantiae humanae ge- the Magi found the infant Jesus in no way different from the neralitate discretum. Sed alii infantes non manifestant generality of human infants. But other infants do not make

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seipsos. Ergo neque decuit quod Christus per seipsum suam nativitatem manifestaret. Respondeo dicendum quod nativitas Christi ad humanam salutem ordinabatur, quae quidem est per fidem. Fides autem salutaris divinitatem et humanitatem Christi confitetur. Oportebat igitur ita manifestari nativitatem Christi ut demonstratio divinitatis eius fidei humanitatis ipsius non praeiudicaret. Hoc autem factum est dum Christus in seipso similitudinem infirmitatis humanae exhibuit, et tamen per Dei creaturas divinitatis virtutem in se monstravit. Et ideo Christus non per seipsum suam nativitatem manifestavit, sed per quasdam alias creaturas. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in via generationis et motus oportet per imperfecta ad perfectum perveniri. Et ideo Christus prius manifestatus est per alias creaturas, et postea manifestavit se per seipsum manifestatione perfecta. Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet sapientia abscondita inutilis sit, non tamen ad sapientem pertinet ut quolibet tempore manifestet seipsum, sed tempore congruo, dicitur enim Eccli. XX, est tacens non habens sensum loquelae, et est tacens sciens tempus apti temporis. Sic ergo sapientia Christo data non fuit inutilis, quia seipsam tempore congruo manifestavit. Et hoc ipsum quod tempore congruo abscondebatur, est sapientiae indicium. Ad tertium dicendum quod liber ille de infantia salvatoris est apocryphus. Et Chrysostomus, super Ioan., dicit quod Christus non fecit miracula antequam aquam converteret in vinum, secundum illud quod dicitur Ioan. II, hoc fecit initium signorum Iesus. Si enim secundum primam aetatem miracula fecisset, non indiguissent Israelitae alio manifestante eum, cum tamen Ioannes Baptista dicat, Ioan. I, ut manifestetur Israeli, propterea veni in aqua baptizans. Decenter autem non incoepit facere signa in prima aetate. Aestimassent enim phantasiam esse incarnationem, et ante opportunum tempus eum cruci tradidissent, livore liquefacti.

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themselves known. Therefore it was not fitting that Christ should Himself make His birth known. I answer that, Christ’s birth was ordered unto man’s salvation, which is by faith. But saving faith confesses Christ’s Godhead and humanity. It behooved, therefore, Christ’s birth to be made known in such a way that the proof of His Godhead should not be prejudicial to faith in His human nature. But this took place while Christ presented a likeness of human weakness, and yet, by means of God’s creatures, He showed the power of the Godhead in Himself. Therefore Christ made His birth known, not by Himself, but by means of certain other creatures. Reply Obj. 1: By the way of generation and movement we must of necessity come to the imperfect before the perfect. And therefore Christ was made known first through other creatures, and afterwards He Himself manifested Himself perfectly. Reply Obj. 2: Although hidden wisdom is useless, yet there is no need for a wise man to make himself known at all times, but at a suitable time; for it is written (Sir 20:6): There is one that holdeth his peace because he knoweth not what to say: and there is another that holdeth his peace, knowing the proper time. Hence the wisdom given to Christ was not useless, because at a suitable time He manifested Himself. And the very fact that He was hidden at a suitable time is a sign of wisdom. Reply Obj. 3: The book De Infantia Salvatoris is apocryphal. Moreover, Chrysostom (Hom. xxi super Joan.) says that Christ worked no miracles before changing the water into wine, according to John 2:11: ‘This beginning of miracles did Jesus.’ For if He had worked miracles at an early age, there would have been no need for anyone else to manifest Him to the Israelites; whereas John the Baptist says (John 1:31): ‘That He may be made manifest in Israel; therefore am I come baptizing with water.’ Moreover, it was fitting that He should not begin to work miracles at an early age. For people would have thought the Incarnation to be unreal, and, out of sheer spite, would have crucified Him before the proper time.

Article 5 Whether Christ’s birth should have been manifested by means of the angels and the star? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non debuerit manifestari per Angelos Christi nativitas. Angeli enim sunt spirituales substantiae, secundum illud Psalmi, qui facit Angelos suos spiritus. Sed Christi nativitas erat secundum carnem, non autem secundum spiritualem eius substantiam. Ergo non debuit per Angelos manifestari.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s birth should not have been manifested by means of the angels. For angels are spiritual substances, according to Ps. 103:4: Who maketh His angels, spirits. But Christ’s birth was in the flesh, and not in His spiritual substance. Therefore it should not have been manifested by means of angels.

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Praeterea, maior est affinitas iustorum ad Angelos quam ad quoscumque alios, secundum illud Psalmi, immittet Angelus domini in circuitu timentium eum, et eripiet eos. Sed iustis, scilicet Simeoni et Annae, non est manifestata Christi nativitas per Angelos. Ergo nec pastoribus per Angelos manifestari debuit.

Obj. 2: Further, the righteous are more akin to the angels than to any other, according to Ps. 33:8: The angel of the Lord shall encamp round about them that fear Him, and shall deliver them. But Christ’s birth was not announced to the righteous, viz. Simeon and Anna, through the angels. Therefore neither should it have been announced to the shepherds by means of the angels. Item, videtur quod nec magis debuit manifestari per Obj. 3: Further, it seems that neither ought it to have stellam. Hoc enim videtur esse erroris occasio quantum been announced to the Magi by means of the star. For this ad illos qui existimant sidera nativitatibus hominum do- seems to favor the error of those who think that man’s minari. Sed occasiones peccandi sunt hominibus aufe- birth is influenced by the stars. But occasions of sin should rendae. Non ergo fuit conveniens quod per stellam Chri- be taken away from man. Therefore it was not fitting that sti nativitas manifestaretur. Christ’s birth should be announced by a star. Praeterea, signum oportet esse certum, ad hoc Obj. 4: Further, a sign should be certain, in order that quod per ipsum aliquid manifestetur. Sed stella non vi- something be made known thereby. But a star does not detur esse signum certum nativitatis Christi. Ergo in- seem to be a certain sign of Christ’s birth. Therefore Christ’s convenienter fuit Christi nativitas per stellam manifesta- birth was not suitably announced by a star.

ta. Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. XXXII, Dei perOn the contrary, It is written (Deut 32:4): The works fecta sunt opera. Sed talis manifestatio fuit opus divinum. of God are perfect. But this manifestation is the work of Ergo per convenientia signa fuit effecta. God. Therefore it was accomplished by means of suitable signs. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut manifestatio sylI answer that, As knowledge is imparted through a logistica fit per ea quae sunt magis nota ei cui est ali- syllogism from something which we know better, so knowlquid manifestandum, ita manifestatio quae fit per signa, edge given by signs must be conveyed through things which debet fieri per ea quae sunt familiaria illis quibus ma- are familiar to those to whom the knowledge is imparted. nifestatur. Manifestum est autem quod viris iustis est Now, it is clear that the righteous have, through the spirit familiare et consuetum interiori spiritus sancti edoceri of prophecy, a certain familiarity with the interior instinct instinctu, absque signorum sensibilium demonstratione, of the Holy Spirit, and are wont to be taught thereby, withscilicet per spiritum prophetiae. Alii vero, corporalibus out the guidance of sensible signs. Whereas others, occurebus dediti, per sensibilia ad intelligibilia adducuntur. pied with material things, are led through the domain of Iudaei tamen consueti erant divina responsa per Angelos the senses to that of the intellect. The Jews, however, were accipere, per quos etiam legem acceperant, secundum il- accustomed to receive Divine answers through the angels; lud Act. VII, acceptis legem in dispositione Angelorum. through whom they also received the Law, according to Gentiles vero, et maxime astrologi, consueti sunt stella- Acts 7:53: You . . . have received the Law by the disposition of rum cursus aspicere. Et ideo iustis, scilicet Simeoni et angels. And the Gentiles, especially astrologers, were wont Annae, manifestata est Christi nativitas per interiorem to observe the course of the stars. And therefore Christ’s instinctum spiritus sancti, secundum illud Luc. II re- birth was made known to the righteous, viz. Simeon and sponsum accepit a spiritu sancto non visurum se mortem Anna, by the interior instinct of the Holy Spirit, according nisi prius videret Christum domini. Pastoribus autem et to Luke 2:26: He had received an answer from the Holy Spirit magis, tanquam rebus corporalibus deditis, manifestata that he should not see death before he had seen the Christ of est Christi nativitas per apparitiones visibiles. Et quia na- the Lord. But to the shepherds and Magi, as being occupied tivitas non erat pure terrena, sed quodammodo caelestis, with material things, Christ’s birth was made known by ideo per signa caelestia utrisque nativitas Christi revela- means of visible apparitions. And since this birth was not tur, ut enim Augustinus dicit, in sermone de Epiphania, only earthly, but also, in a way, heavenly, to both (shepherds caelos Angeli habitant, et sidera ornant, utrisque ergo cae- and Magi) it is revealed through heavenly signs: for, as Auli enarrant gloriam Dei. Rationabiliter autem pastoribus, gustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cciv): The angels tanquam Iudaeis, apud quos frequenter factae sunt ap- inhabit, and the stars adorn, the heavens: by both, therefore, paritiones Angelorum, revelata est nativitas Christi per do the ‘heavens show forth the glory of God.’ Moreover, it was Angelos, magis autem, assuetis in consideratione cae- not without reason that Christ’s birth was made known, by lestium corporum, manifestata est per signum stellae. means of angels, to the shepherds, who, being Jews, were Quia, ut Chrysostomus dicit, per consueta eos dominus accustomed to frequent apparitions of the angels: whereas vocare voluit, eis condescendens. Est autem et alia ratio. it was revealed by means of a star to the Magi, who were Quia, ut Gregorius dicit, Iudaeis, tanquam ratione uten- wont to consider the heavenly bodies. Because, as Chrysos-

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tibus, rationale animal, idest Angelus, praedicare debuit. Gentiles vero, qui uti ratione nesciebant ad cognoscendum Deum, non per vocem, sed per signa perducuntur. Et sicut dominum iam loquentem annuntiaverunt gentibus praedicatores loquentes, ita eum nondum loquentem elementa muta praedicaverunt. Est autem et alia ratio. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in sermone Epiphaniae, Abrahae innumerabilis erat promissa successio non carnis semine, sed fidei fecunditate generanda. Et ideo stellarum multitudini est comparata, ut caelestis progenies speraretur. Et ideo gentiles, in sideribus designati, ortu novi sideris excitantur ut perveniant ad Christum, per quem efficiuntur semen Abrahae.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud manifestatione indiget quod de se est occultum, non autem illud quod de se est manifestum. Caro autem eius qui nascebatur erat manifesta, sed divinitas erat occulta. Et ideo convenienter manifestata est illa nativitas per Angelos, qui sunt Dei ministri. Unde et cum claritate Angelus apparuit, ut ostenderetur quod ille qui nascebatur erat splendor paternae gloriae. Ad secundum dicendum quod iusti non indigebant visibili apparitione Angelorum, sed eis sufficiebat interior instinctus spiritus sancti, propter eorum perfectionem. Ad tertium dicendum quod stella quae nativitatem Christi manifestavit, omnem occasionem erroris subtraxit. Ut enim Augustinus dicit, contra Faustum, nulli astrologi constituerunt ita nascentium hominum fata sub stellis, ut aliquam stellarum, homine aliquo nato, circuitus sui ordinem reliquisse, et ad eum qui natus est perrexisse asseverent, sicut accidit circa stellam quae demonstravit nativitatem Christi. Et ideo per hoc non confirmatur error eorum qui sortem nascentium hominum astrorum ordini colligari arbitrantur, non autem credunt astrorum ordinem ad hominis nativitatem posse mutari. Similiter etiam, ut Chrysostomus dicit, non est hoc astronomiae opus, a stellis scire eos qui nascuntur, sed ab hora nativitatis futura praedicere. Magi autem tempus nativitatis non cognoverunt, ut, hinc sumentes initium, a stellarum motu futura cognoscerent, sed potius e converso.

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tom says (Hom. vi in Matth.): Our Lord deigned to call them through things to which they were accustomed. There is also another reason. For, as Gregory says (Hom. x in Evang.): To the Jews, as rational beings, it was fitting that a rational animal, viz. an angel, should preach. Whereas the Gentiles, who were unable to come to the knowledge of God through the reason, were led to God, not by words, but by signs. And as our Lord, when He was able to speak, was announced by heralds who spoke, so before He could speak He was manifested by speechless elements. Again, there is yet another reason. For, as Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany: To Abraham was promised an innumerable progeny, begotten, not of carnal propagation, but of the fruitfulness of faith. For this reason it is compared to the multitude of stars; that a heavenly progeny might be hoped for. Wherefore the Gentiles, who are thus designated by the stars, are by the rising of a new star stimulated to seek Christ, through whom they are made the seed of Abraham. Reply Obj. 1: That which of itself is hidden needs to be manifested, but not that which in itself is manifest. Now, the flesh of Him who was born was manifest, whereas the Godhead was hidden. And therefore it was fitting that this birth should be made known by angels, who are the ministers of God. Wherefore also a certain brightness (Luke 2:9) accompanied the angelic apparition, to indicate that He who was just born was the Brightness of the Father’s glory. Reply Obj. 2: The righteous did not need the visible apparition of the angel; on account of their perfection the interior instinct of the Holy Spirit was enough for them.

Reply Obj. 3: The star which manifested Christ’s birth removed all occasion of error. For, as Augustine says (Contra Faust. ii): No astrologer has ever so far connected the stars with man’s fate at the time of his birth as to assert that one of the stars, at the birth of any man, left its orbit and made its way to him who was just born: as happened in the case of the star which made known the birth of Christ. Consequently this does not corroborate the error of those who think there is a connection between man’s birth and the course of the stars, for they do not hold that the course of the stars can be changed at a man’s birth. In the same sense Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Matth.): It is not an astronomer’s business to know from the stars those who are born, but to tell the future from the hour of a man’s birth: whereas the Magi did not know the time of the birth, so as to conclude therefrom some knowledge of the future; rather was it the other way about. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut ChrysostoReply Obj. 4: Chrysostom relates (Hom. ii in Matth.) mus refert, in quibusdam scriptis apocryphis legitur that, according to some apocryphal books, a certain tribe quod quaedam gens in extremo orientis, iuxta Ocea- in the far east near the ocean was in the possession of a num, quandam Scripturam habebat, ex nomine Seth, document written by Seth, referring to this star and to the de hac stella et muneribus huiusmodi offerendis. Quae presents to be offered: which tribe watched attentively for gens diligenter observabat huius stellae exortum, posi- the rising of this star, twelve men being appointed to take tis exploratoribus duodecim, qui certis temporibus de- observations, who at stated times repaired to the summit

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vote ascendebant in montem. In quo postmodum viderunt eam habentem in se quasi parvuli formam, et super se similitudinem crucis. Vel dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in libro de quaest. Nov. et Vet. Test., magi illi traditionem Balaam sequebantur, qui dixit, orietur stella ex Iacob. Unde, videntes stellam extra ordinem mundi, hanc esse intellexerunt quam Balaam futuram indicem regis Iudaeorum prophetaverat.

of a mountain with faithful assiduity: whence they subsequently perceived the star containing the figure of a small child, and above it the form of a cross. Or we may say, as may be read in the book De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. lxiii, that these Magi followed the tradition of Balaam, who said, ‘A star shall rise out of Jacob.’ Wherefore observing this star to be a stranger to the system of this world, they gathered that it was the one foretold by Balaam to indicate the King of the Jews. Vel dicendum, sicut Augustinus dicit, in sermone de Or again, it may be said with Augustine, in a sermon on Epiphania, quod ab Angelis aliqua monitione revelatio- the Epiphany (ccclxxiv), that the Magi had received a revenis audierunt magi quod stella Christum natum signifi- lation through the angels that the star was a sign of the birth caret. Et probabile videtur quod a bonis, quando in Chri- of Christ: and he thinks it probable that these were good ansto adorando salus eorum iam quaerebatur. gels; since in adoring Christ they were seeking for salvation. Vel, sicut Leo Papa dicit, in sermone de Epiphania, Or with Pope Leo, in a sermon on the Epiphany (xxxiv), praeter illam speciem quae corporeum incitavit obtutum, that besides the outward form which aroused the attention fulgentior veritatis radius eorum corda perdocuit quod ad of their corporeal eyes, a more brilliant ray enlightened their illuminationem fidei pertinebat. minds with the light of faith.

Article 6 Whether Christ’s birth was made known in a becoming order? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienti ordine Christi nativitas fuit manifestata. Illis enim debuit primo manifestari Christi nativitas qui Christo propinquiores fuerunt, et qui magis Christum desiderabant, secundum illud Sap. VI, praeoccupat eos qui se concupiscunt, ut se priorem illis ostendat. Sed iusti propinquissimi erant Christo per fidem, et maxime eius adventum desiderabant, unde dicitur Luc. II de Simeone quod erat homo iustus et timoratus, expectans redemptionem Israel. Ergo prius debuisset manifestari Christi nativitas Simeoni quam pastoribus et magis. Praeterea, magi fuerunt primitiae gentium Christo crediturarum. Sed primo plenitudo gentium intrat ad fidem, et postmodum omnis Israel salvus fiet, ut dicitur Rom. XI. Ergo primo debuit manifestari Christi nativitas magis quam pastoribus. Praeterea, Matth. II dicitur quod Herodes occidit omnes pueros qui erant in Bethlehem et in omnibus finibus eius a bimatu et infra, secundum tempus quod exquisierat a magis, et sic videtur quod per duos annos post Christi nativitatem magi ad Christum pervenerunt. Inconvenienter igitur post tantum tempus fuit gentilibus Christi nativitas manifestata. Sed contra est quod dicitur Dan. II, ipse mutat tempora et aetates. Et ita tempus manifestationis nativitatis Christi videtur congruo ordine esse dispositum.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s birth was made known in an unbecoming order. For Christ’s birth should have been made known to them first who were nearest to Christ, and who longed for Him most; according to Wis. 6:14: She preventeth them that covet her, so that she first showeth herself unto them. But the righteous were nearest to Christ by faith, and longed most for His coming; whence it is written (Luke 2:25) of Simeon that he was just and devout, waiting for the consolation of Israel. Therefore Christ’s birth should have been made known to Simeon before the shepherds and Magi. Obj. 2: Further, the Magi were the first-fruits of the Gentiles, who were to believe in Christ. But first the fullness of the Gentiles . . . come in unto faith, and afterwards all Israel shall be saved, as is written (Rom 11:25). Therefore Christ’s birth should have been made known to the Magi before the shepherds. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt 2:16) that Herod killed all the male children that were in Bethlehem, and in all the borders thereof, from two years old and under, according to the time which he had diligently inquired from the wise men: so that it seems that the Magi were two years in coming to Christ after His birth. It was therefore unbecoming that Christ should be made known to the Gentiles so long after His birth. On the contrary, It is written (Dan 2:21): He changes time and ages. Consequently the time of the manifestation of Christ’s birth seems to have been arranged in a suitable order.

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Respondeo dicendum quod Christi nativitas primo quidem manifestata est pastoribus, ipso die nativitatis Christi. Ut enim dicitur Luc. II, erant pastores in eadem regione vigilantes et custodientes vigilias noctis super gregem suum. Et, ut discesserunt ab eis Angeli in caelum, loquebantur ad invicem, transeamus usque in Bethlehem. Et venerunt festinantes. Secundo autem magi pervenerunt ad Christum, tertiadecima die nativitatis eius, quo die festum Epiphaniae celebratur. Si enim revoluto anno, aut etiam duobus annis pervenissent, non invenissent eum in Bethlehem, cum scriptum sit Luc. II quod, postquam perfecerunt omnia secundum legem domini, offerentes scilicet puerum Iesum in templum, reversi sunt in Galilaeam, in civitatem suam, scilicet Nazareth. Tertio autem manifestata est iustis in templo, quadragesimo die a nativitate, ut habetur Luc. II. Et huius ordinis ratio est quia per pastores significantur apostoli et alii credentes ex Iudaeis, quibus primo manifestata est fides Christi, inter quos non fuerunt multi potentes nec multi nobiles, ut dicitur I Cor. I. Secundo autem fides Christi pervenit ad plenitudinem gentium, quae est praefigurata per magos. Tertio autem pervenit ad plenitudinem Iudaeorum, quae est praefigurata per iustos. Unde etiam in templo Iudaeorum est eis Christus manifestatus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, Rom. IX, Israel, sectando legem iustitiae, in legem iustitiae non pervenit, sed gentiles, qui non quaerebant iustitiam, Iudaeos communiter in iustitia fidei praevenerunt. Et in huius figuram, Simeon, qui expectabat consolationem Israel, ultimo Christum natum cognovit, et praecesserunt eum magi et pastores, qui Christi nativitatem non ita sollicite expectabant. Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet plenitudo gentium prius intraverit ad fidem quam plenitudo Iudaeorum, tamen primitiae Iudaeorum praevenerunt in fide primitias gentium. Et ideo pastoribus primo manifestata est Christi nativitas quam magis. Ad tertium dicendum quod de apparitione stellae quae apparuit magis, est duplex opinio. Chrysostomus enim dicit, super Matth., et Augustinus, in sermone Epiphaniae, stella magis apparuit per biennium ante Christi nativitatem, et tunc primo, meditantes et se ad iter praeparantes, a remotissimis partibus orientis pervenerunt ad Christum tertiadecima die a sua nativitate. Unde et Herodes statim post recessum magorum, videns se ab eis illusum, mandavit occidi pueros a bimatu et infra, dubitans ne tunc Christus natus esset quando stella apparuit, secundum quod a magis audierat.

Alii vero dicunt stellam apparuisse primo cum Christus est natus, et statim magi visa stella iter arripientes,

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I answer that, Christ’s birth was first made known to the shepherds on the very day that He was born. For, as it is written (Luke 2:8, 15, 16): There were in the same country shepherds watching, and keeping the night-watches over their flock . . . And it came to pass, after the angels departed from them into heaven, they said one to another: Let us go over to Bethlehem . . . and they came with haste. Second in order were the Magi, who came to Christ on the thirteenth day after His birth, on which day is kept the feast of the Epiphany. For if they had come after a year, or even two years, they would not have found Him in Bethlehem, since it is written (Luke 2:39) that after they had performed all things according to the law of the Lord—that is to say, after they had offered up the Child Jesus in the Temple—they returned into Galilee, to their city—namely, Nazareth. In the third place, it was made known in the Temple to the righteous on the fortieth day after His birth, as related by Luke (2:22). The reason of this order is that the shepherds represent the apostles and other believers of the Jews, to whom the faith of Christ was made known first; among whom there were not many mighty, not many noble, as we read 1 Cor. 1:26. Second, the faith of Christ came to the fullness of the Gentiles; and this is foreshadowed in the Magi. Third it came to the fullness of the Jews, which is foreshadowed in the righteous. Wherefore also Christ was manifested to them in the Jewish Temple. Reply Obj. 1: As the Apostle says (Rom 9:30, 31): Israel, by following after the law of justice, is not come unto the law of justice: but the Gentiles, who followed not after justice, forestalled the generality of the Jews in the justice which is of faith. As a figure of this, Simeon, who was waiting for the consolation of Israel, was the last to know Christ born: and he was preceded by the Magi and the shepherds, who did not await the coming of Christ with such longing. Reply Obj. 2: Although the fullness of the Gentiles came in unto faith before the fullness of the Jews, yet the firstfruits of the Jews preceded the first-fruits of the Gentiles in faith. For this reason the birth of Christ was made known to the shepherds before the Magi. Reply Obj. 3: There are two opinions about the apparition of the star seen by the Magi. For Chrysostom (Hom. ii in Matth.), and Augustine in a sermon on the Epiphany (cxxxi, cxxxii), say that the star was seen by the Magi during the two years that preceded the birth of Christ: and then, having first considered the matter and prepared themselves for the journey, they came from the farthest east to Christ, arriving on the thirteenth day after His birth. Wherefore Herod, immediately after the departure of the Magi, perceiving that He was deluded by them, commanded the male children to be killed from two years old and under, being doubtful lest Christ were already born when the star appeared, according as he had heard from the Magi. But others say that the star first appeared when Christ was born, and that the Magi set off as soon as they saw

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longissimum iter in tredecim diebus peregerunt, partim quidem adducti divina virtute, partim autem dromedariorum velocitate. Et hoc dico, si venerunt ex extremis partibus orientis. Quidam tamen dicunt eos venisse de regione propinqua, unde fuerat Balaam, cuius doctrinae successores fuerunt. Dicuntur autem ab oriente venisse, quia terra illa est ad Orientalem partem terrae Iudaeorum. Et secundum hoc, Herodes non statim recedentibus magis, sed post biennium interfecit pueros. Vel quia dicitur interim accusatus Romam ivisse, vel, aliquorum periculorum terroribus agitatus, a cura interficiendi puerum interim destitisse. Vel quia potuit credere magos, fallaci stellae visione deceptos, postquam non invenerunt quem natum putaverunt, erubuisse ad se redire, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de consensu Evangelist. Ideo autem non solum bimos interfecit sed etiam infra, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in quodam sermone innocentum, timebat ne puer cui sidera famulantur, speciem suam paulo super aetatem vel infra transformaret.

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the star, and accomplished a journey of very great length in thirteen days, owing partly to the Divine assistance, and partly to the fleetness of the dromedaries. And I say this on the supposition that they came from the far east. But others, again, say that they came from a neighboring country, whence also was Balaam, to whose teaching they were heirs; and they are said to have come from the east, because their country was to the east of the country of the Jews. In this case Herod killed the babes, not as soon as the Magi departed, but two years after: and that either because he is said to have gone to Rome in the meanwhile on account of an accusation brought against him, or because he was troubled at some imminent peril, and for the time being desisted from his anxiety to slay the child, or because he may have thought that the Magi, being deceived by the illusory appearance of the star, and not finding the child, as they had expected to, were ashamed to return to him: as Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. ii). And the reason why he killed not only those who were two years old, but also the younger children, would be, as Augustine says in a sermon on the Innocents, because he feared lest a child whom the stars obey, might make himself appear older or younger.

Article 7 Whether the star which appeared to the Magi belonged to the heavenly system? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod stella quae magis apparuit, fuerit una de caelestibus stellis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in quodam sermone Epiphaniae, dum pendet ad ubera et vilium patitur Deus involumenta pannorum, repente novum de caelo sidus effulsit. Fuit igitur stella caelestis quae magis apparuit. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in sermone quodam Epiphaniae, pastoribus Angeli, magis stella Christum demonstrat. Utrisque loquitur lingua caelorum, quia lingua cessaverat prophetarum. Sed Angeli pastoribus apparentes fuerunt vere de caelestibus Angelis. Ergo et stella magis apparens fuit vere de caelestibus stellis. Praeterea, stellae quae non sunt in caelo, sed in aere, dicuntur stellae comatae, quae non apparent in nativitatibus regum, sed magis sunt indicia mortis eorum. Sed illa stella designabat regis nativitatem, unde magi dicunt, Matth. II, ubi est qui natus est rex Iudaeorum? Vidimus enim stellam eius in oriente. Ergo videtur quod fuerit de caelestibus stellis. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro contra Faustum, non ex illis erat stellis quae ab initio crea-

Objection 1: It would seem that the star which appeared to the Magi belonged to the heavenly system. For Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cxxii): While God yet clings to the breast, and suffers Himself to be wrapped in humble swaddling clothes, suddenly a new star shines forth in the heavens. Therefore the star which appeared to the Magi belonged to the heavenly system. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cci): Christ was made known to the shepherds by angels, to the Magi by a star. A heavenly tongue speaks to both, because the tongue of the prophets spoke no longer. But the angels who appeared to the shepherds were really angels from heaven. Therefore also the star which appeared to the Magi was really a star from the heavens. Obj. 3: Further, stars which are not in the heavens but in the air are called comets, which do not appear at the birth of kings, but rather are signs of their approaching death. But this star was a sign of the King’s birth: wherefore the Magi said (Matt 2:2): Where is He that is born King of the Jews? For we have seen His star in the east. Therefore it seems that it was a star from the heavens. On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. ii): It was not one of those stars which since the beginning of the

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turae itinerum suorum ordinem sub creatoris lege custo- creation observe the course appointed to them by the Creator; diunt, sed, novo virginis partu, novum sidus apparuit. but this star was a stranger to the heavens, and made its appearance at the strange sight of a virgin in childbirth. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus I answer that, As Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in dicit, super Matth., quod illa stella quae magis apparuit Matth.), it is clear, for many reasons, that the star which non fuerit una caelestium stellarum, multipliciter ma- appeared to the Magi did not belong to the heavenly sysnifestum est. Primo quidem, quia nulla alia stellarum tem. First, because no other star approaches from the same hac via incedit. Haec enim stella ferebatur a Septen- quarter as this star, whose course was from north to south, trione in meridiem, ita enim iacet Iudaea ad Persidem, these being the relative positions of Persia, whence the unde magi venerunt. Secundo, apparet hoc ex tempore. Magi came, and Judea. Second, from the time at which it Non enim solum apparebat in nocte, sed etiam in media was seen. For it appeared not only at night, but also at middie. Quod non est virtutis stellae, sed nec etiam lunae. day: and no star can do this, not even the moon. Third, beTertio, quia quandoque apparebat et quandoque occul- cause it was visible at one time and hidden at another. For tabatur. Cum enim intraverunt Ierosolymam, occultavit when they entered Jerusalem it hid itself: then, when they seipsam, deinde, ubi Herodem reliquerunt, monstravit had left Herod, it showed itself again. Fourth, because its seipsam. Quarto, quia non habebat continuum motum, movement was not continuous, but when the Magi had to sed, cum oportebat ire magos, ibat; quando autem opor- continue their journey the star moved on; when they had to tebat stare, stabat; sicut et de columna nubis erat in stop the star stood still; as happened to the pillar of a cloud deserto. Quinto, quia non sursum manens partum vir- in the desert. Fifth, because it indicated the virginal Birth, ginis demonstrabat, sed deorsum descendens hoc facie- not by remaining aloft, but by coming down below. For it bat. Dicitur enim Matth. II quod stella quam viderant is written (Matt 2:9) that the star which they had seen in the in oriente, antecedebat eos, usque dum veniens staret su- east went before them, until it came and stood over where the pra ubi erat puer. Ex quo patet quod verbum magorum child was. Whence it is evident that the words of the Magi, dicentium, vidimus stellam eius in oriente, non est sic We have seen His star in the east, are to be taken as meaning, intelligendum quasi ipsis in oriente positis stella appar- not that when they were in the east the star appeared over uerit existens in terra Iuda, sed quia viderunt eam in the country of Judea, but that when they saw the star it was oriente existentem, et praecessit eos usque in Iudaeam in the east, and that it preceded them into Judea (although (quamvis hoc a quibusdam sub dubio relinquatur). Non this is considered doubtful by some). But it could not have autem potuisset distincte domum demonstrare nisi esset indicated the house distinctly, unless it were near the earth. terrae vicina. Et, sicut ipse dicit, hoc non videtur pro- And, as he observes, this does not seem fitting to a star, but prium esse stellae, sed virtutis cuiusdam rationalis. Unde of some power endowed with reason. Consequently it seems videtur quod haec stella virtus invisibilis fuisset in talem that this was some invisible force made visible under the form apparentiam transformata. of a star. Unde quidam dicunt quod, sicut Spiritus Sanctus deWherefore some say that, as the Holy Spirit, after our scendit super baptizatum dominum in specie columbae, Lord’s Baptism, came down on Him under the form of a ita apparuit magis in specie stellae. Alii vero dicunt quod dove, so did He appear to the Magi under the form of a Angelus qui apparuit pastoribus in specie humana, ap- star. While others say that the angel who, under a human paruit magis in specie stellae. Probabilius tamen videtur form, appeared to the shepherds, under the form of a star, quod fuerit stella de novo creata, non in caelo, sed in aere appeared to the Magi. But it seems more probable that it vicino terrae, quae secundum Dei voluntatem moveba- was a newly created star, not in the heavens, but in the air tur. Unde Leo Papa dicit, in sermone Epiphaniae, tribus near the earth, and that its movement varied according to magis in regione orientis stella novae claritatis apparuit, God’s will. Wherefore Pope Leo says in a sermon on the quae, illustrior ceteris pulchriorque sideribus, in se intuen- Epiphany (xxxi): A star of unusual brightness appeared to the tium oculos animosque converteret, ut confestim adverte- three Magi in the east, which, through being more brilliant retur non esse otiosum quod tam insolitum videbatur. and more beautiful than the other stars, drew men’s gaze and attention: so that they understood at once that such an unwonted event could not be devoid of purpose. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caelum in sacra Reply Obj. 1: In Holy Scripture the air is sometimes Scriptura quandoque dicitur aer, secundum illud, volu- called the heavens—for instance, The birds of the heavens cres caeli et pisces maris. and the fishes of the sea. Ad secundum dicendum quod ipsi caelestes AngeReply Obj. 2: The angels of heaven, by reason of their li ex suo officio habent ut ad nos descendant, in ministe- very office, come down to us, being sent to minister. But rium missi. Sed stellae caelestes suum situm non mutant. the stars of heaven do not change their position. Wherefore Unde non est similis ratio. there is no comparison.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut stella non est secuta motum stellarum caelestium, ita nec stellarum comatarum, quae nec de die apparent, nec cursum suum ordinatum mutant. Et tamen non omnino aberat significatio cometarum. Quia caeleste regnum Christi comminuit et consumpsit universa regna terrae, et ipsum stabit in aeternum, ut dicitur Dan. II.

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Reply Obj. 3: As the star did not follow the course of the heavenly stars, so neither did it follow the course of the comets, which neither appear during the daytime nor vary their customary course. Nevertheless in its signification it has something in common with the comets. Because the heavenly kingdom of Christ shall break in pieces, and shall consume all the kingdoms of the earth, and itself shall stand for ever (Dan 2:44).

Article 8 Whether it was becoming that the Magi should come to adore Christ and pay homage to him? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magi non convenienter venerunt ad Christum adorandum et venerandum. Unicuique enim regi reverentia debetur a suis subiectis. Magi autem non erant de regno Iudaeorum. Ergo, cum ex visione stellae cognoverunt natum esse regem Iudaeorum, videtur quod inconvenienter venerunt ad eum adorandum. Praeterea, stultum est, vivente rege aliquo, extraneum regem annuntiare. Sed in regno Iudaeae regnabat Herodes. Ergo stulte fecerunt magi regis nativitatem annuntiantes. Praeterea, certius est caeleste indicium quam humanum. Sed magi ducatu caelestis indicii ab oriente venerant in Iudaeam. Stulte ergo egerunt praeter ducatum stellae humanum indicium requirendo, dicentes, ubi est qui natus est rex Iudaeorum? Praeterea, munerum oblatio, et adorationis reverentia, non debetur nisi regibus iam regnantibus. Sed magi non invenerunt Christum regia dignitate fulgentem. Ergo inconvenienter ei munera et reverentiam regiam exhibuerunt. Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae LX, ambulabunt gentes in lumine tuo, et reges in splendore ortus tui. Sed qui divino lumine ducuntur, non errant. Ergo magi absque errore Christo reverentiam exhibuerunt. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, magi sunt primitiae gentium in Christo credentium, in quibus apparuit, sicut in quodam praesagio, fides et devotio gentium venientium a remotis ad Christum. Et ideo, sicut devotio et fides gentium est absque errore per inspirationem spiritus sancti, ita etiam credendum est magos, a spiritu sancto inspiratos, sapienter Christo reverentiam exhibuisse. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in sermone Epiphaniae, cum multi reges Iudaeorum nati fuissent atque defuncti, nullum eorum magi adorandum quaesierunt. Non itaque regi Iudaeorum quales illic esse solebant, hunc tam magnum honorem longinqui, alienigenae, et ab eodem regno prorsus extranei, a se debe-

Objection 1: It would seem that it was unbecoming that the Magi should come to adore Christ and pay homage to Him. For reverence is due to a king from his subjects. But the Magi did not belong to the kingdom of the Jews. Therefore, since they knew by seeing the star that He that was born was the King of the Jews, it seems unbecoming that they should come to adore Him. Obj. 2: Further, it seems absurd during the reign of one king to proclaim a stranger. But in Judea Herod was reigning. Therefore it was foolish of the Magi to proclaim the birth of a king. Obj. 3: Further, a heavenly sign is more certain than a human sign. But the Magi had come to Judea from the east, under the guidance of a heavenly sign. Therefore it was foolish of them to seek human guidance besides that of the star, saying: Where is He that is born King of the Jews? Obj. 4: Further, the offering of gifts and the homage of adoration are not due save to kings already reigning. But the Magi did not find Christ resplendent with kingly grandeur. Therefore it was unbecoming for them to offer Him gifts and homage. On the contrary, It is written (Isa 60:3): The Gentiles shall walk in the light, and kings in the brightness of thy rising. But those who walk in the Divine light do not err. Therefore the Magi were right in offering homage to Christ. I answer that, As stated above (A. 3, ad 1), the Magi are the first-fruits of the Gentiles that believed in Christ; because their faith was a presage of the faith and devotion of the nations who were to come to Christ from afar. And therefore, as the devotion and faith of the nations is without any error through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, so also we must believe that the Magi, inspired by the Holy Spirit, did wisely in paying homage to Christ. Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cc.): Though many kings of the Jews had been born and died, none of them did the Magi seek to adore. And so they who came from a distant foreign land to a kingdom that was entirely strange to them, had no idea of showing such great homage to such a king as the Jews were wont to have.

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ri arbitrabantur. Sed talem natum esse didicerunt in quo adorando se salutem quae secundum Deum est consecuturos minime dubitarent. Ad secundum dicendum quod per illam Annuntiationem magorum praefigurabatur constantia gentium Christum usque ad mortem confitentium. Unde Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., quod, dum considerabant regem futurum, non timebant regem praesentem. Adhuc non viderant Christum, et iam parati erant pro eo mori. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in sermone Epiphaniae, stella quae magos perduxit ad locum ubi erat cum matre virgine Deus infans, poterat eos ad ipsam perducere civitatem Bethlehem, in qua natus est Christus. Sed tamen subtraxit se, donec de civitate in qua Christus nasceretur, etiam Iudaei testimonium perhiberent, ut sic, geminato testimonio confirmati, sicut Leo Papa dicit, ardentiori fide expeterent quem et stellae claritas, et prophetiae manifestabat auctoritas. Ita ipsi annuntiant Christi nativitatem, et interrogant locum, credunt et quaerunt, tanquam significantes eos qui ambulant per fidem et desiderant speciem, ut Augustinus dicit, in sermone Epiphaniae. Iudaei autem, indicantes eis locum nativitatis Christi, similes facti sunt fabris arcae Noe, qui aliis ubi evaderent praestiterunt, et ipsi diluvio perierunt. Audierunt et abierunt inquisitores, dixerunt et remanserunt doctores, similes lapidibus miliariis, qui viam ostendunt, nec ambulant. Divino etiam nutu factum est ut, aspectu stellae subtracto, magi humano sensu irent in Ierusalem, quaerentes in civitate regia regem natum, ut in Ierusalem primo nativitas Christi publice annuntiaretur, secundum illud Isaiae II, de Sion exibit lex, et verbum domini de Ierusalem, et ut etiam studio magorum de longe venientium damnaretur pigritia Iudaeorum prope existentium.

Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., si magi regem terrenum quaerentes venissent, fuissent confusi, quia tanti itineris laborem sine causa suscepissent. Unde nec adorassent, nec munera obtulissent. Nunc autem, quia caelestem regem quaerebant, etsi nihil regalis excellentiae in eo viderunt, tamen, solius stellae testimonio contenti, adoraverunt, vident enim hominem, et agnoscunt Deum. Et offerunt munera dignitati Christi congruentia, aurum quidem, quasi regi magno; thus, quod in Dei sacrificio ponitur immolant ut Deo; myrrha, qua mortuorum corpora condiuntur, praebetur tanquam pro salute omnium morituro. Et, ut Gregorius dicit, instruimur ut nato regi aurum, per quod significatur sapientia, offeramus, in conspectu eius sapientiae lumine splendentes; thus autem, per quod exprimitur orationis devotio, offerimus Deo si per orationum studia Deo

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But they had learnt that such a King was born that by adoring Him they might be sure of obtaining from Him the salvation which is of God. Reply Obj. 2: By proclaiming the Magi foreshadowed the constancy of the Gentiles in confessing Christ even until death. Whence Chrysostom says (Hom. ii in Matth.) that, while they thought of the King who was to come, the Magi feared not the king who was actually present. They had not yet seen Christ, and they were already prepared to die for Him. Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cc.): The star which led the Magi to the place where the Divine Infant was with His Virgin-Mother could bring them to the town of Bethlehem, in which Christ was born. Yet it hid itself until the Jews also bore testimony of the city in which Christ was to be born: so that, being encouraged by a twofold witness, as Pope Leo says (Serm. xxxiv), they might seek with more ardent faith Him, whom both the brightness of the star and the authority of prophecy revealed. Thus they proclaim that Christ is born, and inquire where; they believe and ask, as it were, betokening those who walk by faith and desire to see, as Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cxcix). But the Jews, by indicating to them the place of Christ’s birth, are like the carpenters who built the Ark of Noah, who provided others with the means of escape, and themselves perished in the flood. Those who asked, heard and went their way: the teachers spoke and stayed where they were; like the milestones that point out the way but walk not (Augustine, Serm. cclxxiii). It was also by God’s will that, when they no longer saw the star, the Magi, by human instinct, went to Jerusalem, to seek in the royal city the newborn King, in order that Christ’s birth might be publicly proclaimed first in Jerusalem, according to Isa. 2:3: The Law shall come forth from Zion, and the Word of the Lord from Jerusalem; and also in order that by the zeal of the Magi who came from afar, the indolence of the Jews who lived near at hand, might be proved worthy of condemnation (Remig., Hom. in Matth. ii, 1). Reply Obj. 4: As Chrysostom says (Hom. ii in Matth.): If the Magi had come in search of an earthly King, they would have been disconcerted at finding that they had taken the trouble to come such a long way for nothing. Consequently they would have neither adored nor offered gifts. But since they sought a heavenly King, though they found in Him no signs of royal pre-eminence, yet, content with the testimony of the star alone, they adored: for they saw a man, and they acknowledged a God. Moreover, they offer gifts in keeping with Christ’s greatness: gold, as to the great King; they offer up incense as to God, because it is used in the Divine Sacrifice; and myrrh, which is used in embalming the bodies of the dead, is offered as to Him who is to die for the salvation of all (Gregory, Hom. x in Evang.). And hereby, as Gregory says (Hom. x in Evang.), we are taught to offer gold, which signifies wisdom, to the new-born King, by the luster of our

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redolere valeamus; myrrham, quae significat mortifica- wisdom in His sight. We offer God incense, which signifies tionem carnis, offerimus si carnis vitia per abstinentiam fervor in prayer, if our constant prayers mount up to God mortificamus. with an odor of sweetness; and we offer myrrh, which signifies mortification of the flesh, if we mortify the ill-deeds of the flesh by refraining from them.

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Question 37 Christ’s Circumcision Deinde considerandum est de circumcisione Christi. Et quia circumcisio est quaedam professio legis observandae, secundum illud Galat. V, testificor omni homini circumcidenti se, quoniam debitor est universae legis faciendae, simul cum hoc quaerendum est de aliis legalibus circa puerum Christum observatis. Unde quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, de eius circumcisione. Secundo, de nominis impositione. Tertio, de eius oblatione. Quarto, de matris purgatione.

We must now consider Christ’s circumcision. And since the circumcision is a kind of profession of observing the Law, according to Gal. 5:3: I testify . . . to every man circumcising himself that he is a debtor to do the whole Law, we shall have at the same time to inquire about the other legal observances accomplished in regard to the Child Christ. Wherefore there are four points of inquiry: (1) His circumcision; (2) The imposition of His name; (3) His presentation; (4) His Mother’s purification.

Article 1 Whether Christ should have been circumcised? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non debuerit circumcidi. Veniente enim veritate, cessat figura. Sed circumcisio fuit Abrahae praecepta in signum foederis quod erat de semine nascituro, ut patet Gen. XVII. Hoc autem foedus fuit in Christi nativitate completum. Ergo circumcisio statim cessare debuit. Preaterea, omnis Christi actio nostra est instructio, unde dicitur Ioan. XIII, exemplum dedi vobis, ut, quemadmodum ego feci vobis, ita et vos faciatis. Sed nos non debemus circumcidi, secundum illud Galat. V, si circumcidimini, Christus vobis nihil proderit. Ergo videtur quod nec Christus debuit circumcidi. Praeterea, circumcisio est ordinata in remedium originalis peccati. Sed Christus non contraxit originale peccatum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo Christus non debuit circumcidi. Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. II, postquam consummati sunt dies octo, ut circumcideretur puer. Respondeo dicendum quod pluribus de causis Christus debuit circumcidi. Primo quidem, ut ostendat veritatem carnis humanae, contra Manichaeum, qui dixit eum habuisse corpus phantasticum; et contra Apollinarium, qui dixit corpus Christi esse divinitati consubstantiale; et contra Valentinum, qui dixit Christum corpus de caelo attulisse. Secundo, ut approbaret circumcisionem, quam olim Deus instituerat. Tertio, ut comprobaret se esse de genere Abrahae, qui circumcisionis mandatum acceperat in signum fidei quam de ipso habuerat. Quarto, ut Iudaeis excusationem tolleret ne

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have been circumcised. For on the advent of the reality, the figure ceases. But circumcision was prescribed to Abraham as a sign of the covenant concerning his posterity, as may be seen from Gen. 17. Now this covenant was fulfilled in Christ’s birth. Therefore circumcision should have ceased at once. Obj. 2: Further, every action of Christ is a lesson to us; wherefore it is written (John 3:15): I have given you an example, that as I have done to you, so you do also. But we ought not to be circumcised; according to Gal. 5:2: If you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing. Therefore it seems that neither should Christ have been circumcised. Obj. 3: Further, circumcision was prescribed as a remedy of original sin. But Christ did not contract original sin, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 3; Q. 15, A. 1). Therefore Christ should not have been circumcised. On the contrary, It is written (Luke 2:21): After eight days were accomplished, that the child should be circumcised. I answer that, For several reasons Christ ought to have been circumcised. First, in order to prove the reality of His human nature, in contradiction to the Manicheans, who said that He had an imaginary body: and in contradiction to Apollinarius, who said that Christ’s body was consubstantial with His Godhead; and in contradiction to Valentine, who said that Christ brought His body from heaven. Second, in order to show His approval of circumcision, which God had instituted of old. Third, in order to prove that He was descended from Abraham, who had received the commandment of circumcision as a sign of his

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eum reciperent, si esset incircumcisus. Quinto, ut obedientiae virtutem nobis suo commendaret exemplo. Unde et octava die circumcisus est, sicut erat in lege praeceptum. Sexto, ut qui in similitudinem carnis peccati advenerat, remedium quo caro peccati consueverat mundari, non respueret. Septimo, ut, legis onus in se sustinens, alios a legis onere liberaret, secundum illud Galat. IV, misit Deus filium suum factum sub lege, ut eos qui sub lege erant redimeret.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod circumcisio, per remotionem carnalis pelliculae in membro generationis facta, significabat spoliationem vetustae generationis. A qua quidem vetustate liberamur per passionem Christi. Et ideo veritas huius figurae non fuit plene impleta in Christi nativitate, sed in eius passione, ante quam circumcisio suam virtutem et statum habebat. Et ideo decuit Christum, ante suam passionem, tanquam filium Abrahae, circumcidi. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus circumcisionem suscepit eo tempore quo erat sub praecepto. Et ideo sua actio in hoc est nobis imitanda, ut observemus ea quae sunt nostro tempore in praecepto. Quia unicuique negotio est tempus et opportunitas, ut dicitur Eccle. VIII. Et praeterea, ut Origenes dicit, sicut mortui sumus cum illo moriente, et consurreximus Christo resurgenti, ita circumcisi sumus spirituali circumcisione per Christum. Et ideo carnali circumcisione non indigemus. Et hoc est quod apostolus dicit, Coloss. II, in quo, scilicet Christo, circumcisi estis circumcisione non manu facta in exspoliatione corporis carnis, sed in circumcisione domini nostri Iesu Christi. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Christus propria voluntate mortem nostram suscepit, quae est effectus peccati, nullum in se habens peccatum, ut nos a morte liberaret, et spiritualiter nos faceret mori peccato; ita etiam circumcisionem, quae est remedium originalis peccati, suscepit absque hoc quod haberet originale peccatum, ut nos a legis iugo liberaret, et ut in nobis spiritualem circumcisionem efficeret; ut scilicet, suscipiendo figuram, impleret veritatem.

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faith in Him. Fourth, in order to take away from the Jews an excuse for not receiving Him, if He were uncircumcised. Fifth, in order by His example to exhort us to be obedient. Wherefore He was circumcised on the eighth day according to the prescription of the Law (Lev 12:3). Sixth, that He who had come in the likeness of sinful flesh might not reject the remedy whereby sinful flesh was wont to be healed. Seventh, that by taking on Himself the burden of the Law, He might set others free therefrom, according to Gal. 4:4, 5: God sent His Son . . . made under the Law, that He might redeem them who were under the Law. Reply Obj. 1: Circumcision by the removal of the piece of skin in the member of generation, signified the passing away of the old generation: from the decrepitude of which we are freed by Christ’s Passion. Consequently this figure was not completely fulfilled in Christ’s birth, but in His Passion, until which time the circumcision retained its virtue and status. Therefore it behooved Christ to be circumcised as a son of Abraham before His Passion. Reply Obj. 2: Christ submitted to circumcision while it was yet of obligation. And thus His action in this should be imitated by us, in fulfilling those things which are of obligation in our own time. Because there is a time and opportunity for every business (Eccl 8:6). Moreover, according to Origen (Hom. xiv in Luc.), as we died when He died, and rose again when Christ rose from the dead, so were we circumcised spiritually through Christ: wherefore we need no carnal circumcision. And this is what the Apostle says (Col 2:11): In whom you are circumcised with circumcision not made by hand in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the circumcision of our Lord Jesus Christ. Reply Obj. 3: As Christ voluntarily took upon Himself our death, which is the effect of sin, whereas He had no sin Himself, in order to deliver us from death, and to make us to die spiritually unto sin, so also He took upon Himself circumcision, which was a remedy against original sin, whereas He contracted no original sin, in order to deliver us from the yoke of the Law, and to accomplish a spiritual circumcision in us—in order, that is to say, that, by taking upon Himself the shadow, He might accomplish the reality.

Article 2 Whether a suitable name was given to Christ? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inObjection 1: It would seem that an unsuitable name convenienter fuerit Christo nomen impositum. Veritas was given to Christ. For the Gospel reality should correenim evangelica debet praenuntiationi propheticae re- spond to the prophetic foretelling. But the prophets foretold spondere. Sed prophetae aliud nomen de Christo prae- another name for Christ: for it is written (Isa 7:14): Behold

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nuntiaverunt, dicitur enim Isaiae VII, ecce, virgo concipiet et pariet filium, et vocabitur nomen eius Emmanuel; et VIII, voca nomen eius, accelera, spolia detrahe, festina praedari; et IX, vocabitur nomen eius, admirabilis, consiliarius, Deus, fortis, pater futuri saeculi, princeps pacis; et Zach. VI dicitur, ecce vir, oriens nomen eius. Ergo inconvenienter vocatum est nomen eius Iesus. Praeterea, Isaiae LXII dicitur, vocabitur tibi nomen novum, quod os domini nominavit. Sed hoc nomen Iesus non est nomen novum, sed pluribus fuit in veteri testamento impositum, ut patet etiam ex ipsa genealogia Christi, Luc. III. Ergo videtur quod inconvenienter vocatum est nomen eius Iesus. Praeterea, hoc nomen Iesus salutem significat, ut patet per id quod dicitur Matth. I, pariet filium, et vocabis nomen eius Iesum, ipse enim salvum faciet populum suum a peccatis eorum. Sed salus per Christum non est facta solum in circumcisione, sed etiam in praeputio, ut patet per apostolum, Rom. IV. Inconvenienter ergo hoc nomen fuit Christo impositum in sua circumcisione. Sed contra est auctoritas Scripturae, in qua dicitur, Luc. II, quod, postquam consummati sunt dies octo, ut circumcideretur puer, vocatum est nomen eius Iesus. Respondeo dicendum quod nomina debent proprietatibus rerum respondere. Et hoc patet in nominibus generum et specierum, prout dicitur IV Metaphys., ratio enim quam significat nomen, est definitio, quae designat propriam rei naturam. Nomina autem singularium hominum semper imponuntur ab aliqua proprietate eius cui nomen imponitur. Vel a tempore, sicut imponuntur nomina aliquorum sanctorum his qui in eorum festis nascuntur. Vel a cognatione, sicut cum filio imponitur nomen patris, vel alicuius de cognatione eius; sicut propinqui Ioannis Baptistae volebant eum vocare nomine patris sui Zachariam, non autem Ioannem, quia nullus erat in cognatione eius qui vocaretur hoc nomine, ut dicitur Luc. I. Vel etiam ab eventu, sicut Ioseph vocavit primogenitum suum Manassen, dicens, oblivisci me fecit Deus omnium laborum meorum, Gen. XLI. Vel etiam ex aliqua qualitate eius cui nomen imponitur, sicut Gen. XXV dicitur quod, quia qui primo egressus est de utero matris, rufus erat, et totus in morem pellis hispidus, vocatum est nomen eius Esau, quod interpretatur rubeus. Nomina autem quae imponuntur divinitus aliquibus, semper significant aliquod gratuitum donum eis divinitus datum, sicut Gen. XVII dictum est Abrahae, appellaberis Abraham, quia patrem multarum gentium constitui te; et Matth. XVI dictum est Petro, tu es Petrus, et super hanc petram aedificabo Ecclesiam meam. Quia igitur homini Christo hoc munus gratiae collatum erat ut per ipsum omnes salvarentur, ideo convenienter voca-

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a virgin shall conceive and bear a son, and His name shall be called Emmanuel; and (Isa 8:3): Call His name, Hasten to take away the spoils; Make haste to take away the prey; and (Isa 9:6): His name shall be called Wonderful, Counselor, God the Mighty, the Father of the world to come, the Prince of Peace; and (Zech 6:12): Behold a Man, the Orient is His name. Thus it was unsuitable that His name should be called Jesus. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Isa 62:2): Thou shalt be called by a new name, which the mouth of the Lord hath named. But the name Jesus is not a new name, but was given to several in the Old Testament: as may be seen in the genealogy of Christ (Luke 3:29), Therefore it seems that it was unfitting for His name to be called Jesus. Obj. 3: Further, the name Jesus signifies salvation; as is clear from Matt. 1:21: She shall bring forth a son, and thou shalt call His name Jesus. For He shall save His people from their sins. But salvation through Christ was accomplished not only in the circumcision, but also in uncircumcision, as is declared by the Apostle (Rom 4:11, 12). Therefore this name was not suitably given to Christ at His circumcision. On the contrary is the authority of Scripture, in which it is written (Luke 2:21): After eight days were accomplished, that the child should be circumcised, His name was called Jesus. I answer that, A name should answer to the nature of a thing. This is clear in the names of genera and species, as stated Metaph. iv: Since a name is but an expression of the definition which designates a thing’s proper nature. Now, the names of individual men are always taken from some property of the men to whom they are given. Either in regard to time; thus men are named after the Saints on whose feasts they are born: or in respect of some blood relation; thus a son is named after his father or some other relation; and thus the kinsfolk of John the Baptist wished to call him by his father’s name Zachary, not by the name John, because there was none of his kindred that was called by this name, as related Luke 1:59–61. Or, again, from some occurrence; thus Joseph called the name of the first-born Manasses, saying: God hath made me to forget all my labors (Gen 41:51). Or, again, from some quality of the person who receives the name; thus it is written (Gen 25:25) that he that came forth first was red and hairy like a skin; and his name was called Esau, which is interpreted red. But names given to men by God always signify some gratuitous gift bestowed on them by Him; thus it was said to Abraham (Gen 17:5): Thou shalt be called Abraham; because I have made thee a father of many nations: and it was said to Peter (Matt 16:18): Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build My Church. Since, therefore, this prerogative of grace was bestowed on the Man Christ that through Him all men might be saved, therefore He was becomingly named

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tum est nomen eius Iesus, idest salvator, Angelo hoc nomen praenuntiante non solum matri, sed etiam Ioseph, quia erat futurus eius nutritius. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in omnibus illis nominibus quodammodo significatur hoc nomen Iesus, quod est significativum salutis. Nam in hoc quod dicitur Emmanuel, quod interpretatur, nobiscum Deus, designatur causa salutis, quae est unio divinae et humanae naturae in persona filii Dei, per quam factum est ut Deus esset nobiscum. Per hoc autem quod dicitur, voca nomen eius, accelera, spolia detrahe, etc., designatur a quo nos salvaverit, quia a Diabolo, cuius spolia abstulit, secundum illud Coloss. II, exspolians principatus et potestates, traduxit confidenter. In hoc autem quod dicitur, vocabitur nomen eius admirabilis, etc., designatur via et terminus nostrae salutis, inquantum scilicet admirabili divinitatis consilio et virtute, ad haereditatem futuri saeculi perducimur, in quo erit pax perfecta filiorum Dei, sub ipso principe Deo. Quod vero dicitur, ecce vir, oriens nomen eius, ad idem refertur ad quod primum, scilicet ad incarnationis mysterium, secundum quod exortum est in tenebris lumen rectis corde. Ad secundum dicendum quod his qui fuerunt ante Christum potuit convenire hoc nomen Iesus secundum aliquam aliam rationem, puta quia aliquam particularem et temporalem salutem attulerunt. Sed secundum rationem spiritualis et universalis salutis, hoc nomen est proprium Christo. Et secundum hoc dicitur esse novum. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Gen. XVII legitur, simul Abraham suscepit impositionem nominis a Deo, et circumcisionis mandatum. Et ideo apud Iudaeos consuetum erat ut ipso die circumcisionis nomina pueris imponerentur, quasi ante circumcisionem perfectum esse non habuerint, sicut etiam nunc pueris in Baptismo nomina imponuntur. Unde super illud Proverb. IV, ego filius fui patris mei, tenellus et unigenitus coram matre mea, dicit Glossa, quare Salomon se unigenitum coram matre vocat, quem fratrem uterinum praecessisse Scriptura testatur, nisi quia ille mox natus sine nomine, quasi nunquam esset, de vita decessit? Et ideo Christus, simul cum fuit circumcisus, nominis impositionem accepit.

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Jesus, i.e., Savior: the angel having foretold this name not only to His Mother, but also to Joseph, who was to be his foster-father. Reply Obj. 1: All these names in some way mean the same as Jesus, which means salvation. For the name Emmanuel, which being interpreted is ‘God with us,’ designates the cause of salvation, which is the union of the Divine and human natures in the Person of the Son of God, the result of which union was that God is with us. When it was said, Call his name, Hasten to take away, etc., these words indicate from what He saved us, viz. from the devil, whose spoils He took away, according to Col. 2:15: Despoiling the principalities and powers, He hath exposed them confidently. When it was said, His name shall be called Wonderful, etc., the way and term of our salvation are pointed out: inasmuch as by the wonderful counsel and might of the Godhead we are brought to the inheritance of the life to come, in which the children of God will enjoy perfect peace under God their Prince. When it was said, Behold a Man, the Orient is His name, reference is made to the same, as in the first, viz. to the mystery of the Incarnation, by reason of which to the righteous a light is risen up in darkness (Ps 111:4). Reply Obj. 2: The name Jesus could be suitable for some other reason to those who lived before Christ—for instance, because they were saviours in a particular and temporal sense. But in the sense of spiritual and universal salvation, this name is proper to Christ, and thus it is called a new name. Reply Obj. 3: As is related Gen. 17, Abraham received from God and at the same time both his name and the commandment of circumcision. For this reason it was customary among the Jews to name children on the very day of circumcision, as though before being circumcised they had not as yet perfect existence: just as now also children receive their names in Baptism. Wherefore on Prov. 4:3, I was my father’s son, tender, and as an only son in the sight of my mother, the gloss says: Why does Solomon call himself an only son in the sight of his mother, when Scripture testifies that he had an elder brother of the same mother, unless it be that the latter died unnamed soon after birth? Therefore it was that Christ received His name at the time of His circumcision.

Article 3 Whether Christ was becomingly presented in the Temple? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod inObjection 1: It would seem that Christ was unbecomconvenienter fuerit Christus in templo oblatus. Dici- ingly presented in the Temple. For it is written (Exod 13:2): tur enim Exod. XIII, sanctifica mihi omne primogenitum Sanctify unto Me every first-born that openeth the womb

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quod aperit vulvam in filiis Israel. Sed Christus exivit de among the children of Israel. But Christ came forth from the clauso virginis utero, et ita matris vulvam non aperuit. closed womb of the Virgin; and thus He did not open His Ergo Christus ex hac lege non debuit in templo offerri. Mother’s womb. Therefore Christ was not bound by this law to be presented in the Temple. Praeterea, illud quod est semper praesens alicui, Obj. 2: Further, that which is always in one’s presence non potest ei praesentari. Sed Christi humanitas semper cannot be presented to one. But Christ’s humanity was alfuit Deo maxime praesens, utpote ei semper coniuncta ways in God’s presence in the highest degree, as being alin unitate personae. Ergo non oportuit quod coram do- ways united to Him in unity of person. Therefore there was mino sisteretur. no need for Him to be presented to the Lord. Praeterea, Christus est hostia principalis, ad Obj. 3: Further, Christ is the principal victim, to whom quam omnes hostiae veteris legis referuntur sicut figura all the victims of the Old Law are referred, as the figure to ad veritatem. Sed hostiae non debet esse alia hostia. Ergo the reality. But a victim should not be offered up for a vicnon fuit conveniens ut pro Christo alia hostia offerretur. tim. Therefore it was not fitting that another victim should be offered up for Christ. Praeterea, inter legales hostias praecipue fuit Obj. 4: Further, among the legal victims the princiagnus, qui erat iuge sacrificium, ut habetur Num. XX- pal was the lamb, which was a continual sacrifice, as is VIII. Unde etiam Christus dicitur agnus, Ioan. I, ecce stated Num. 28:6: for which reason Christ is also called the agnus Dei. Magis ergo fuit conveniens quod pro Chri- Lamb—Behold the Lamb of God (John 1: 29). It was theresto offerretur agnus quam par turturum vel duo pulli co- fore more fitting that a lamb should be offered for Christ lumbarum. than a pair of turtle doves or two young pigeons. Sed in contrarium est auctoritas Scripturae, quae On the contrary is the authority of Scripture which hoc factum esse testatur, Luc. II. relates this as having taken place (Luke 2:22). Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ChriI answer that, As stated above (A. 1), Christ wished stus voluit sub lege fieri, ut eos qui sub lege erant redi- to be made under the Law, that He might redeem them who meret, et ut iustificatio legis in suis membris spiritualiter were under the Law (Gal 4:4, 5), and that the justification impleretur. De prole autem nata duplex praeceptum in of the Law might be spiritually fulfilled in His members. lege traditur. Unum quidem generale quantum ad om- Now, the Law contained a twofold precept touching the nes, ut scilicet, completis diebus purificationis matris, children born. One was a general precept which affected offerretur sacrificium pro filio sive pro filia, ut habetur all—namely, that when the days of the mother’s purification Levit. XII. Et hoc quidem sacrificium erat et ad expia- were expired, a sacrifice was to be offered either for a son tionem peccati, in quo proles erat concepta et nata, et or for a daughter, as laid down Lev. 12:6. And this sacrifice etiam ad consecrationem quandam ipsius, quia tunc pri- was for the expiation of the sin in which the child was conmo praesentabatur in templo. Et ideo aliquid offerebatur ceived and born; and also for a certain consecration of the in holocaustum, et aliquid pro peccato. child, because it was then presented in the Temple for the first time. Wherefore one offering was made as a holocaust and another for sin. Aliud autem praeceptum erat speciale in lege de The other was a special precept in the law concerning primogenitis tam in hominibus quam in iumentis, si- the first-born of both man and beast: for the Lord claimed bi enim dominus deputaverat omne primogenitum in for Himself all the first-born in Israel, because, in order to Israel, pro eo quod, ad liberationem populi Israel, per- deliver the Israelites, He slew every first-born in the land of cusserat primogenita Aegypti ab homine usque ad pe- Egypt, both men and cattle (Exod 12:12, 13, 29), the firstcus, primogenitis filiorum Israel reservatis. Et hoc man- born of Israel being saved; which law is set down Ex. 13. datum ponitur Exod. XIII. In quo etiam praefigurabatur Here also was Christ foreshadowed, who is the First-born Christus, qui est primogenitus in multis fratribus, ut di- amongst many brethren (Rom 8:29). citur Rom. VIII. Quia igitur Christus, ex muliere natus, erat primogeTherefore, since Christ was born of a woman and was nitus; et voluit fieri sub lege, haec duo Evangelista Lucas her first-born, and since He wished to be made under the circa eum fuisse observata ostendit. Primo quidem, id Law, the Evangelist Luke shows that both these precepts quod pertinet ad primogenitos, cum dicit, tulerunt illum were fulfilled in His regard. First, as to that which concerns in Ierusalem, ut sisterent eum domino, sicut scriptum est the first-born, when he says (Luke 2:22, 23): They carried in lege domini, quia omne masculinum adaperiens vul- Him to Jerusalem to present Him to the Lord: as it is written vam sanctum domino vocabitur. Secundo, id quod per- in the law of the Lord, ‘Every male opening the womb shall tinet communiter ad omnes, cum dicit, et ut darent ho- be called holy to the Lord.’ Second, as to the general precept

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stiam, secundum quod dictum erat in lege domini, par which concerned all, when he says (Luke 2:24): And to offer turturum aut duos pullos columbarum. a sacrifice according as it is written in the law of the Lord, a pair of turtle doves or two young pigeons. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Gregorius Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory of Nyssa says (De Occursu Nyssenus dicit, illud legis praeceptum in solo incarna- Dom.): It seems that this precept of the Law was fulfilled in to Deo singulariter et ab aliis differenter impleri videtur. God incarnate alone in a special manner exclusively proper Ipse namque solus, ineffabiliter conceptus ac incompre- to Him. For He alone, whose conception was ineffable, and hensibiliter editus, virginalem uterum aperuit, non antea whose birth was incomprehensible, opened the virginal womb connubio reseratum, servans et post partum inviolabiliter which had been closed to sexual union, in such a way that signaculum castitatis. Unde quod dicit, aperiens vulvam, after birth the seal of chastity remained inviolate. Consedesignat quod nihil antea inde intraverat vel exiverat. Et quently the words opening the womb imply that nothing per hoc etiam specialiter dicitur masculinus, quia nihil hitherto had entered or gone forth therefrom. Again, for a de femineitate culpae portavit. Singulariter etiam sanc- special reason is it written ‘a male,’ because He contracted tus, qui terrenae contagia corruptelae, immaculati partus nothing of the woman’s sin: and in a singular way is He novitate, non sensit. called ‘holy,’ because He felt no contagion of earthly corruption, whose birth was wondrously immaculate (Ambrose, on Luke 2:23). Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut filius Dei non Reply Obj. 2: As the Son of God became man, and was propter seipsum factus est homo et circumcisus in carne, circumcised in the flesh, not for His own sake, but that He sed ut nos per gratiam faceret deos, et ut spiritualiter cir- might make us to be God’s through grace, and that we might cumcidamur; sic propter nos sistitur domino, ut discamus be circumcised in the spirit; so, again, for our sake He was Deo praesentare nosipsos. Et hoc post circumcisionem presented to the Lord, that we may learn to offer ourselves to eius factum est, ut ostendat neminem nisi circumcisum God. And this was done after His circumcision, in order to vitiis, dignum esse divinis conspectibus. show that no one who is not circumcised from vice is worthy of Divine regard. Ad tertium dicendum quod propter hoc ipsum Reply Obj. 3: For this very reason He wished the levoluit hostias legales pro se offerri, qui erat vera hostia, gal victims to be offered for Him who was the true Victim, ut figura veritati coniungeretur, et per veritatem figura in order that the figure might be united to and confirmed approbaretur, contra illos qui Deum legis negant a Chri- by the reality, against those who denied that in the Gospel sto fuisse in Evangelio praedicatum. Non enim putan- Christ preached the God of the Law. For we must not think, dum est, ut Origenes dicit, quod filium suum bonus Deus says Origen (Hom. xiv in Luc.) that the good God subjected sub lege inimici fecerit, quam ipse non dederat. His Son to the enemy’s law, which He Himself had not given. Ad quartum dicendum quod Levit. XII praecipitur Reply Obj. 4: The law of Lev. 12:6, 8 commanded those ut qui possent, agnum pro filio aut filia, simul et turtu- who could, to offer, for a son or a daughter, a lamb and also a rem sive columbam offerrent, qui vero non sufficerent ad turtle dove or a pigeon: but those who were unable to offer a offerendum agnum, duos turtures aut duos columbae pul- lamb were commanded to offer two turtle doves or two young los offerrent. Dominus ergo, qui, cum dives esset, propter pigeons. And so the Lord, who, ‘being rich, became poor for nos egenus factus est, ut illius inopia divites essemus, ut our sakes, that through His poverty we might be rich’, as is dicitur II Cor. VIII, pro se pauperum hostiam voluit of- written 2 Cor. 8:9, wished the poor man’s victim to be offered ferri, sicut et in ipsa nativitate pannis involvitur et recli- for Him just as in His birth He was wrapped in swaddling natur in praesepio. Nihilominus tamen huiusmodi aves clothes and laid in a manger. Nevertheless, these birds have figurae congruunt. Turtur enim, quia est avis loquax, a figurative sense. For the turtle dove, being a loquacious praedicationem et confessionem fidei significat; quia ve- bird, represents the preaching and confession of faith; and ro est animal castum, significat castitatem; quia vero est because it is a chaste animal, it signifies chastity; and being animal solitarium, significat contemplationem. Colum- a solitary animal, it signifies contemplation. The pigeon is ba vero est animal mansuetum et simplex, mansuetudi- a gentle and simple animal, and therefore signifies gentlenem et simplicitatem significans. Est autem animal gre- ness and simplicity. It is also a gregarious animal; wherefore gale, unde significat vitam activam. Et ideo huiusmodi it signifies the active life. Consequently this sacrifice signihostia significabat perfectionem Christi et membrorum fied the perfection of Christ and His members. Again, both eius. Utrumque autem animal, propter consuetudinem ge- these animals, by the plaintiveness of their song, represented mendi, praesentes sanctorum luctus designat, sed turtur, the mourning of the saints in this life: but the turtle dove, bequae est solitaria, significat orationum lacrimas; colum- ing solitary, signifies the tears of prayer; whereas the pigeon, ba vero, quae est gregalis, significat publicas orationes Ec- being gregarious, signifies the public prayers of the Church.

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clesiae. Utrumque tamen animal duplicatum offertur, ut Lastly, two of each of these animals are offered, to show that sanctitas sit non solum in anima, sed etiam in corpore. holiness should be not only in the soul, but also in the body.

Article 4 Whether it was fitting that the Mother of God should go to the Temple to be purified? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter mater Dei purganda ad templum accesserit. Purgatio enim non videtur esse nisi ab immunditia. Sed in beata virgine nulla fuit immunditia, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo non debuit ut purganda ad templum accedere. Praeterea, Levit. XII dicitur, mulier quae, suscepto semine, peperit masculum, immunda erit septem diebus, et ideo ei praecipitur quod non ingrediatur sanctuarium, donec impleantur dies purgationis eius. Sed beata virgo peperit masculum sine virili semine. Non ergo debuit venire ad templum purganda. Praeterea, purgatio ab immunditia non fit nisi per gratiam. Sed sacramenta veteris legis gratiam non conferebant, sed ipsa potius secum gratiae auctorem habebat. Non ergo conveniens fuit ut beata virgo ad templum purganda veniret. Sed contra est auctoritas Scripturae, qua dicitur, Luc. II, quod impleti sunt dies purgationis Mariae secundum legem Moysi. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut plenitudo gratiae a Christo derivatur in matrem, ita decuit ut mater humilitati filii conformaretur, humilibus enim Deus dat gratiam, ut dicitur Iac. IV. Et ideo, sicut Christus, licet legi non esset obnoxius, voluit tamen circumcisionem et alia legis onera subire, ad demonstrandum humilitatis et obedientiae exemplum, et ut approbaret legem, et ut calumniae occasionem Iudaeis tolleret; propter easdem rationes voluit et matrem suam implere legis observantias, quibus tamen non erat obnoxia.

Objection 1: It would seem that it was unfitting for the Mother of God to go to the Temple to be purified. For purification presupposes uncleanness. But there was no uncleanness in the Blessed Virgin, as stated above (QQ. 27, 28). Therefore she should not have gone to the Temple to be purified. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Lev 12:2–4): If a woman, having received seed, shall bear a man-child, she shall be unclean seven days; and consequently she is forbidden to enter into the sanctuary until the days of her purification be fulfilled. But the Blessed Virgin brought forth a male child without receiving the seed of man. Therefore she had no need to come to the Temple to be purified. Obj. 3: Further, purification from uncleanness is accomplished by grace alone. But the sacraments of the Old Law did not confer grace; rather, indeed, did she have the very Author of grace with her. Therefore it was not fitting that the Blessed Virgin should come to the Temple to be purified. On the contrary is the authority of Scripture, where it is stated (Luke 2:22) that the days of Mary’s purification were accomplished according to the law of Moses. I answer that, As the fullness of grace flowed from Christ on to His Mother, so it was becoming that the mother should be like her Son in humility: for God giveth grace to the humble, as is written James 4:6. And therefore, just as Christ, though not subject to the Law, wished, nevertheless, to submit to circumcision and the other burdens of the Law, in order to give an example of humility and obedience; and in order to show His approval of the Law; and, again, in order to take away from the Jews an excuse for calumniating Him: for the same reasons He wished His Mother also to fulfill the prescriptions of the Law, to which, nevertheless, she was not subject. Reply Obj. 1: Although the Blessed Virgin had no uncleanness, yet she wished to fulfill the observance of purification, not because she needed it, but on account of the precept of the Law. Thus the Evangelist says pointedly that the days of her purification according to the Law were accomplished; for she needed no purification in herself.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet beata virgo nullam haberet immunditiam, voluit tamen purgationis observantiam implere, non propter indigentiam, sed propter legis praeceptum. Et ideo signanter Evangelista dicit quod completi sunt dies purgationis eius secundum legem, ipsa enim secundum se purgatione non indigebat. Ad secundum dicendum quod signanter Moyses Reply Obj. 2: Moses seems to have chosen his words in videtur fuisse locutus, ad excipiendam ab immunditia order to exclude uncleanness from the Mother of God, who matrem Dei, quae non peperit suscepto semine. Et ideo was with child without receiving seed. It is therefore clear patet quod non obligatur ad impletionem illius praecep- that she was not bound to fulfill that precept, but fulfilled

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ti, sed voluntarie purgationis observantiam implevit, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod legalia sacramenta non purgabant ab immunditia culpae, quod fit per gratiam, sed hanc purgationem praefigurabant, purgabant enim purgatione quadam carnali ab immunditia irregularitatis cuiusdam; sicut in secunda parte dictum est. Neutram tamen immunditiam beata virgo contraxerat. Et ideo non indigebat purgari.

IIIae

the observance of purification of her own accord, as stated above. Reply Obj. 3: The sacraments of the Law did not cleanse from the uncleanness of sin which is accomplished by grace, but they foreshadowed this purification: for they cleansed by a kind of carnal purification, from the uncleanness of a certain irregularity, as stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 102, A. 5; Q. 103, A. 2). But the Blessed Virgin contracted neither uncleanness, and consequently did not need to be purified.

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Question 38 The Baptism of John Deinde considerandum est de Baptismo quo Christus baptizatus est. Et quia Christus baptizatus est Baptismo Ioannis, primo considerandum est de Baptismo Ioannis in communi; secundo, de baptizatione Christi. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum conveniens fuerit quod Ioannes baptizaret. Secundo, utrum ille Baptismus fuerit a Deo. Tertio, utrum contulerit gratiam quarto, utrum alii praeter Christum illo Baptismo debuerint baptizari. Quinto, utrum Baptismus ille cessare debuerit, Christo baptizato. Sexto, utrum baptizati Baptismo Ioannis essent postea baptizandi Baptismo Christi.

We now proceed to consider the baptism wherewith Christ was baptized. And since Christ was baptized with the baptism of John, we shall consider (1) the baptism of John in general; (2) the baptizing of Christ. In regard to the former there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether it was fitting that John should baptize? (2) Whether that baptism was from God? (3) Whether it conferred grace? (4) Whether others besides Christ should have received that baptism? (5) Whether that baptism should have ceased when Christ was baptized? (6) Whether those who received John’s baptism had afterwards to receive Christ’s baptism?

Article 1 Whether it was fitting that John should baptize? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Ioannem baptizare. Omnis enim ritus sacramentalis ad aliquam pertinet legem. Sed Ioannes non introduxit novam legem. Ergo inconveniens fuit quod novum ritum baptizandi introduceret. Praeterea, Ioannes fuit missus a Deo in testimonium tanquam propheta, secundum illud Luc. I, tu, puer, propheta altissimi vocaberis. Sed prophetae qui fuerunt ante Christum, non introduxerunt novum ritum, sed ad observantiam legalium rituum inducebant, ut patet Malach. ult., mementote legis Moysi, servi mei. Ergo nec Ioannes novum ritum baptizandi inducere debuit. Praeterea, ubi est alicuius rei superfluitas, non est ad illud aliquid addendum. Sed Iudaei excedebant in superfluitate Baptismatum, dicitur enim Marci VII, quod Pharisaei, et omnes Iudaei, nisi crebro lavent manus, non manducant; et a foro, nisi baptizentur, non comedunt; et alia multa quae tradita sunt illis servare, Baptismata calicum et urceorum et aeramentorum et lectorum. Ergo inconveniens fuit quod Ioannes baptizaret. Sed contra est auctoritas Scripturae, Matth. III, ubi, praemissa sanctitate Ioannis, subditur quod exibant ad eum multi, et baptizabantur in Iordane.

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that John should baptize. For every sacramental rite belongs to some law. But John did not introduce a new law. Therefore it was not fitting that he should introduce the new rite of baptism. Obj. 2: Further, John was sent by God . . . for a witness (John 1:6, 7) as a prophet; according to Luke 1:76: Thou, child, shalt be called the prophet of the Highest. But the prophets who lived before Christ did not introduce any new rite, but persuaded men to observe the rites of the Law, as is clearly stated Malachi 4:4: Remember the law of Moses My servant. Therefore neither should John have introduced a new rite of baptism. Obj. 3: Further, when there is too much of anything, nothing should be added to it. But the Jews observed a superfluity of baptisms; for it is written (Mark 7:3, 4) that the Pharisees and all the Jews eat not without often washing their hands . . . and when they come from the market, unless they be washed, they eat not; and many other things there are that have been delivered to them to observe, the washings of cups and of pots, and of brazen vessels, and of beds. Therefore it was unfitting that John should baptize. On the contrary is the authority of Scripture (Matt 3:5, 6), which, after stating the holiness of John, adds many went out to him, and were baptized in the Jordan.

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Respondeo dicendum quod conveniens fuit Ioannem baptizare, propter quatuor. Primo quidem, quia oportebat Christum a Ioanne baptizari, ut Baptismum consecraret, ut dicit Augustinus, super Ioan. Secundo, ut Christus manifestaretur. Unde ipse Ioannes Baptista dicit, Ioan. I, ut manifestetur, scilicet Christus, in Israel, propterea veni ego in aqua baptizans. Concurrentibus enim turbis annuntiabat Christum, quod quidem facilius sic factum est quam si per singulos discurrisset, ut Chrysostomus dicit, super Ioan. Tertio, ut suo Baptismo assuefaceret homines ad Baptismum Christi. Unde Gregorius dicit, in quadam homilia, quod ideo baptizavit Ioannes ut, praecursionis suae ordinem servans, qui nasciturum dominum nascendo praevenerat, baptizando quoque baptizaturum praeveniret. Quarto ut, ad poenitentiam homines inducens, homines praepararet ad digne suscipiendum Baptismum Christi. Unde Beda dicit quod, quantum catechumenis nondum baptizatis prodest doctrina fidei, tantum profuit Baptisma Ioannis ante Baptisma Christi. Quia sicut ille praedicabat poenitentiam, et Baptismum Christi praenuntiabat, et in cognitionem veritatis quae mundo apparuit attrahebat; sic ministri Ecclesiae, qui primo erudiunt, postea peccata eorum redarguunt, deinde in Baptismo Christi remissionem promittunt. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Baptismus Ioannis non erat per se sacramentum, sed quasi quoddam sacramentale, disponens ad Baptismum Christi. Et ideo aliqualiter pertinebat ad legem Christi, non autem ad legem Moysi. Ad secundum dicendum quod Ioannes non fuit solum propheta, sed plus quam propheta, ut dicitur Matth. XI, fuit enim terminus legis et initium Evangelii. Et ideo magis pertinebat ad eum verbo et opere inducere homines ad legem Christi quam ad observantiam veteris legis. Ad tertium dicendum quod Baptismata illa Pharisaeorum erant inania, utpote ad solam munditiam carnis ordinata. Sed Baptismus Ioannis ordinabatur ad munditiam spiritualem, inducebat enim homines ad poenitentiam, ut dictum est.

IIIae

I answer that, It was fitting for John to baptize, for four reasons: first, it was necessary for Christ to be baptized by John, in order that He might sanctify baptism; as Augustine observes, super Joan. (Tract. xiii in Joan.). Second, that Christ might be manifested. Whence John himself says (John 1:31): That He, i.e., Christ, may be made manifest in Israel, therefore am I come baptizing with water. For he announced Christ to the crowds that gathered around him; which was thus done much more easily than if he had gone in search of each individual, as Chrysostom observes, commenting on St. John (Hom. x in Matth.). Third, that by his baptism he might accustom men to the baptism of Christ; wherefore Gregory says in a homily (Hom. vii in Evang.) that therefore did John baptize, that, being consistent with his office of precursor, as he had preceded our Lord in birth, so he might also by baptizing precede Him who was about to baptize. Fourth, that by persuading men to do penance, he might prepare men to receive worthily the baptism of Christ. Wherefore Bede says that the baptism of John was as profitable before the baptism of Christ, as instruction in the faith profits the catechumens not yet baptized. For just as he preached penance, and foretold the baptism of Christ, and drew men to the knowledge of the Truth that hath appeared to the world, so do the ministers of the Church, after instructing men, chide them for their sins, and lastly promise them forgiveness in the baptism of Christ. Reply Obj. 1: The baptism of John was not a sacrament properly so called (per se), but a kind of sacramental, preparatory to the baptism of Christ. Consequently, in a way, it belonged to the law of Christ, but not to the law of Moses. Reply Obj. 2: John was not only a prophet, but more than a prophet, as stated Matt. 11:9: for he was the term of the Law and the beginning of the Gospel. Therefore it was in his province to lead men, both by word and deed, to the law of Christ rather than to the observance of the Old Law. Reply Obj. 3: Those baptisms of the Pharisees were vain, being ordered merely unto carnal cleanliness. But the baptism of John was ordered unto spiritual cleanliness, since it led men to do penance, as stated above.

Article 2 Whether the baptism of John was from God? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Baptismus Ioannis non fuit a Deo. Nihil enim sacramentale quod est a Deo, denominatur ab homine puro, sicut Baptismus novae legis non dicitur Petri vel Pauli, sed Christi. Sed ille Baptismus denominatur a Ioanne,

Objection 1: It would seem that the baptism of John was not from God. For nothing sacramental that is from God is named after a mere man: thus the baptism of the New Law is not named after Peter or Paul, but after Christ. But that baptism is named after John, according to

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secundum illud Matth. XXI, Baptismus Ioannis e caelo erat? An ex hominibus? Ergo Baptismus Ioannis non fuit a Deo. Praeterea, omnis doctrina de novo a Deo procedens aliquibus signis confirmatur, unde et dominus, Exod. IV, dedit Moysi potestatem signa faciendi, et Heb. II dicitur quod cum fides nostra principium accepisset enuntiari a domino, per eos qui audierunt in nos confirmata est, contestante Deo signis et prodigiis. Sed de Ioanne Baptista dicitur, Ioan. X, Ioannes signum fecit nullum. Ergo videtur quod Baptismus quo baptizavit, non esset a Deo. Praeterea, sacramenta quae sunt divinitus instituta, aliquibus sacrae Scripturae praeceptis continentur. Sed Baptismus Ioannis non praecipitur aliquo praecepto sacrae Scripturae. Ergo videtur quod non fuerit a Deo. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. I, qui me misit baptizare in aqua, ille mihi dixit, super quem videris spiritum, et cetera. Respondeo dicendum quod in Baptismo Ioannis duo possunt considerari, scilicet ipse ritus baptizandi, et effectus Baptismi. Ritus quidem baptizandi non fuit ab hominibus, sed a Deo, qui familiari spiritus sancti revelatione Ioannem ad baptizandum misit. Effectus autem illius Baptismi fuit ab homine, quia nihil in illo Baptismo efficiebatur quod homo facere non posset. Unde non fuit a solo Deo, nisi inquantum Deus in homine operatur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per Baptismum novae legis homines interius per spiritum sanctum baptizantur, quod facit solus Deus. Per Baptismum autem Ioannis solum corpus mundabatur aqua. Unde dicitur Matth. III, ego baptizo vos in aqua, ille vos baptizabit in spiritu sancto. Et ideo Baptismus Ioannis denominatur ab ipso, quia scilicet nihil in eo agebatur quod ipse non ageret. Baptismus autem novae legis non denominatur a ministro, qui principalem Baptismi effectum non agit, scilicet interiorem emundationem. Ad secundum dicendum quod tota doctrina et operatio Ioannis ordinabatur ad Christum, qui multitudine signorum et suam doctrinam et Ioannis confirmavit. Si autem Ioannes signa fecisset, homines ex aequo Ioanni et Christo attendissent. Et ideo, ut homines principaliter Christo attenderent, non est datum Ioanni ut faceret signum. Iudaeis tamen quaerentibus quare baptizaret, confirmavit suum officium auctoritate Scripturae, dicens, ego vox clamantis in deserto, etc., ut dicitur Ioan. I. Ipsa etiam austeritas vitae eius officium eius commendabat, quia, ut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth. mirabile erat in humano corpore tantam patientiam videre. Ad tertium dicendum quod Baptismus Ioannis non fuit ordinatus a Deo nisi ut modico tempore duraret, propter causas praedictas. Et ideo non fuit com-

Q. 38, A. 2

Matt. 21:25: The baptism of John . . . was it from heaven or from men? Therefore the baptism of John was not from God. Obj. 2: Further, every doctrine that proceeds from God anew is confirmed by some signs: thus the Lord (Exod 4) gave Moses the power of working signs; and it is written (Heb 2:3, 4) that our faith having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that heard Him, God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders. But it is written of John the Baptist (John 10:41) that John did no sign. Therefore it seems that the baptism wherewith he baptized was not from God. Obj. 3: Further, those sacraments which are instituted by God are contained in certain precepts of Holy Scripture. But there is no precept of Holy Writ commanding the baptism of John. Therefore it seems that it was not from God. On the contrary, It is written (John 1:33): He who sent me to baptize with water said to me: ‘He upon whom thou shalt see the Spirit,’ etc. I answer that, Two things may be considered in the baptism of John—namely, the rite of baptism and the effect of baptism. The rite of baptism was not from men, but from God, who by an interior revelation of the Holy Spirit sent John to baptize. But the effect of that baptism was from man, because it effected nothing that man could not accomplish. Wherefore it was not from God alone, except in as far as God works in man. Reply Obj. 1: By the baptism of the New Law men are baptized inwardly by the Holy Spirit, and this is accomplished by God alone. But by the baptism of John the body alone was cleansed by the water. Wherefore it is written (Matt 3:11): I baptize you in water; but . . . He shall baptize you in the Holy Spirit. For this reason the baptism of John was named after him, because it effected nothing that he did not accomplish. But the baptism of the New Law is not named after the minister thereof, because he does not accomplish its principal effect, which is the inward cleansing. Reply Obj. 2: The whole teaching and work of John was ordered unto Christ, who, by many miracles confirmed both His own teaching and that of John. But if John had worked signs, men would have paid equal attention to John and to Christ. Wherefore, in order that men might pay greater attention to Christ, it was not given to John to work a sign. Yet when the Jews asked him why he baptized, he confirmed his office by the authority of Scripture, saying: I am the voice of one crying in the wilderness, etc. as related, John 1:23 (cf. Isa. 40:3). Moreover, the very austerity of his life was a commendation of his office, because, as Chrysostom says, commenting on Matthew (Hom. x in Matth.), it was wonderful to witness such endurance in a human body. Reply Obj. 3: The baptism of John was intended by God to last only for a short time, for the reasons given above (A. 1). Therefore it was not the subject of a general com-

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Q. 38, A. 3

Incarnate Son of God

IIIae

mendatus aliquo praecepto communiter tradito in sa- mandment set down in Sacred Writ, but of a certain intecra Scriptura, sed familiari quadam revelatione spiritus rior revelation of the Holy Spirit, as stated above. sancti, ut dictum est.

Article 3 Whether grace was given in the baptism of John? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Baptismo Ioannis gratia daretur. Dicitur enim Marci I, fuit Ioannes in deserto baptizans, et praedicans Baptismum poenitentiae in remissionem peccatorum. Poenitentia autem et remissio peccatorum est per gratiam. Ergo Baptismus Ioannis gratiam conferebat. Praeterea, baptizandi a Ioanne confitebantur peccata sua, ut habetur Matth. III et Marci I. Sed confessio peccatorum ordinatur ad remissionem, quae fit per gratiam. Ergo in Baptismo Ioannis gratia conferebatur. Praeterea, Baptismus Ioannis propinquior erat Baptismo Christi quam circumcisio. Per circumcisionem autem remittebatur peccatum originale, quia, ut Beda dicit, idem salutiferae curationis auxilium circumcisio in lege contra originalis peccati vulnus agebat, quod nunc Baptismus agere revelatae gratiae tempore consuevit. Ergo multo magis Baptismus Ioannis remissionem peccatorum operabatur. Quod sine gratia fieri non potest. Sed contra est quod Matth. III dicitur, ego quidem baptizo vos in aqua in poenitentiam. Quod exponens Gregorius, in quadam homilia, dicit, Ioannes non in spiritu, sed in aqua baptizat, quia peccata solvere non valebat. Sed gratia est a spiritu sancto, et per eam peccata tolluntur. Ergo Baptismus Ioannis gratiam non conferebat. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, tota doctrina et operatio Ioannis praeparatoria erat ad Christum, sicut ministri et inferioris artificis est praeparare materiam ad formam, quam inducit principalis artifex. Gratia autem conferenda erat hominibus per Christum, secundum illud Ioan. I, gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum facta est. Et ideo Baptismus Ioannis gratiam non conferebat, sed solum ad gratiam praeparabat, tripliciter. Uno quidem modo, per doctrinam Ioannis, inducentem homines ad fidem Christi. Alio modo, assuefaciendo homines ad ritum Baptismi Christi. Tertio modo, per poenitentiam, praeparando homines ad suscipiendum effectum Baptismi Christi. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in illis verbis, ut Beda dicit, potest intelligi duplex Baptismus poenitentiae. Unus quidem, quem Ioannes baptizando conferebat, qui scilicet Baptismus dicitur poenitentiae, etc., quia scilicet ille Baptismus erat quoddam inductivum ad poenitentiam, et quasi quaedam protestatio qua profiteban-

Objection 1: It would seem that grace was given in the baptism of John. For it is written (Mark 1:4): John was in the desert baptizing and preaching the baptism of penance unto remission of sins. But penance and remission of sins are the effect of grace. Therefore the baptism of John conferred grace. Obj. 2: Further, those who were about to be baptized by John confessed their sins, as related Matt. 3:6 and Mk. 1:5. But the confession of sins is ordered to their remission, which is effected by grace. Therefore grace was conferred in the baptism of John. Obj. 3: Further, the baptism of John was more akin than circumcision to the baptism of Christ. But original sin was remitted through circumcision: because, as Bede says (Hom. x in Circumcis.), under the Law, circumcision brought the same saving aid to heal the wound of original sin as baptism is wont to bring now that grace is revealed. Much more, therefore, did the baptism of John effect the remission of sins, which cannot be accomplished without grace. On the contrary, It is written (Matt 3:11): I indeed baptize you in water unto penance. Which words Gregory thus expounds in a certain homily (Hom. vii in Evang.): John baptized, not in the Spirit, but in water: because he could not forgive sins. But grace is given by the Holy Spirit, and by means thereof sins are taken away. Therefore the baptism of John did not confer grace. I answer that, As stated above (A. 2, ad 2), the whole teaching and work of John was in preparation for Christ: just as it is the duty of the servant and of the undercraftsman to prepare the matter for the form which is accomplished by the head-craftsman. Now grace was to be conferred on men through Christ, according to John 1:17: Grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. Therefore the baptism of John did not confer grace, but only prepared the way for grace; and this in three ways: first, by John’s teaching, which led men to faith in Christ; second, by accustoming men to the rite of Christ’s baptism; third, by penance, preparing men to receive the effect of Christ’s baptism. Reply Obj. 1: In these words, as Bede says (on Mk. 1:4), a twofold baptism of penance may be understood. One is that which John conferred by baptizing, which is called a baptism of penance, etc., by reason of its inducing men to do penance, and of its being a kind of protestation by which men avowed their purpose of do-

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tur homines se poenitentiam acturos. Alius autem est Baptismus Christi, per quem peccata remittuntur, quem Ioannes dare non poterat, sed solum praedicabat, dicens, ille vos baptizabit in spiritu sancto. Vel potest dici quod praedicabat Baptismum poenitentiae, idest, inducentem ad poenitentiam, quae quidem poenitentia ducit homines in remissionem peccatorum. Vel potest dici quod per Baptismum Christi, ut Hieronymus dicit, gratia datur, qua peccata gratis dimittuntur, quod autem consummatur per sponsum, initiatur per paranymphum, scilicet per Ioannem. Unde dicitur quod baptizabat et praedicabat Baptismum poenitentiae in remissionem peccatorum, non ideo quia hoc ipse perficeret, sed quia hoc inchoabat praeparando. Ad secundum dicendum quod illa confessio peccatorum non fiebat ad remissionem peccatorum statim per Baptismum Ioannis exhibendam, sed consequendam per poenitentiam consequentem, et Baptismum Christi, ad quem poenitentia illa praeparabat. Ad tertium dicendum quod circumcisio instituta erat in remedium originalis peccati. Sed Baptismus Ioannis ad hoc non erat institutus, sed solum erat praeparatorius ad Baptismum Christi, ut dictum est. Sacramenta autem ex vi institutionis suum habent effectum.

Q. 38, A. 4

ing penance. The other is the baptism of Christ, by which sins are remitted, and which John could not give, but only preach, saying: He will baptize you in the Holy Spirit. Or it may be said that he preached the baptism of penance, i.e., which induced men to do penance, which penance leads men on to the remission of sins. Or again, it may be said with Jerome that by the baptism of Christ grace is given, by which sins are remitted gratis; and that what is accomplished by the bridegroom is begun by the bridesman, i.e., by John. Consequently it is said that he baptized and preached the baptism of penance unto remission of sins, not as though he accomplished this himself, but because he began it by preparing the way for it. Reply Obj. 2: That confession of sins was not made unto the remission of sins, to be realized immediately through the baptism of John, but to be obtained through subsequent penance and through the baptism of Christ, for which that penance was a preparation. Reply Obj. 3: Circumcision was instituted as a remedy for original sin. Whereas the baptism of John was not instituted for this purpose, but was merely in preparation for the baptism of Christ, as stated above; whereas the sacraments attain their effect through the force of their institution.

Article 4 Whether Christ alone should have been baptized with the baptism of John? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Baptismo Ioannis solus Christus debebat baptizari. Quia, sicut dictum est, ad hoc Ioannes baptizavit ut Christus baptizaretur, sicut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan. Sed quod est proprium Christo, non debet aliis convenire. Ergo nulli alii debuerunt illo Baptismo baptizari. Praeterea, quicumque baptizatur, aut accipit aliquid a Baptismo, aut Baptismo aliquid confert. Sed a Baptismo Ioannis nullus aliquid accipere poterat, quia in eo gratia non conferebatur, ut dictum est nec aliquis Baptismo aliquid conferre poterat nisi Christus, qui tactu mundissimae suae carnis aquas sanctificavit. Ergo videtur quod solus Christus Baptismo Ioannis debuerit baptizari. Praeterea, si alii illo Baptismo baptizabantur, hoc non erat nisi ut praepararentur ad Baptismum Christi, et sic conveniens videbatur quod, sicut Baptismus Christi omnibus confertur, et magnis et parvis, et gentilibus et Iudaeis, ita etiam et Baptismus Ioannis conferretur. Sed non legitur quod ab eo pueri baptizarentur, nec

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ alone should have been baptized with the baptism of John. For, as stated above (A. 1), the reason why John baptized was that Christ might receive baptism, as Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. xiii). But what is proper to Christ should not be applicable to others. Therefore no others should have received that baptism. Obj. 2: Further, whoever is baptized either receives something from the baptism or confers something on the baptism. But no one could receive anything from the baptism of John, because thereby grace was not conferred, as stated above (A. 3). On the other hand, no one could confer anything on baptism save Christ, who sanctified the waters by the touch of His most pure flesh. Therefore it seems that Christ alone should have been baptized with the baptism of John. Obj. 3: Further, if others were baptized with that baptism, this was only in order that they might be prepared for the baptism of Christ: and thus it would seem fitting that the baptism of John should be conferred on all, old and young, Gentile and Jew, just as the baptism of Christ. But we do not read that either children or Gentiles were bap-

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etiam gentiles, dicitur enim Marci I, quod egrediebantur ad eum Ierosolymitae universi, et baptizabantur ab illo. Ergo videtur quod solus Christus a Ioanne debuit baptizari. Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. III, factum est, cum baptizaretur omnis populus, et Iesu baptizato et orante, aperti sunt caeli. Respondeo dicendum quod duplici de causa oportuit alios a Christo baptizari Baptismo Ioannis. Primo quidem, ut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., quia, si solus Christus Baptismo Ioannis baptizatus esset, non defuissent qui dicerent Baptismum Ioannis, quo Christus est baptizatus, digniorem esse Baptismo Christi, quo alii baptizantur. Secundo, quia oportebat per Baptismum Ioannis alios ad Baptismum Christi praeparari, sicut dictum est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non propter hoc solum fuit Ioannis Baptismus institutus ut Christus baptizaretur, sed etiam propter alias causas, ut dictum est. Et tamen, si ad hoc solum esset institutus ut Christus eo baptizaretur, oportebat praedictum inconveniens vitari, aliis hoc Baptismo baptizatis. Ad secundum dicendum quod alii qui ad Baptismum Ioannis accedebant, non poterant quidem Baptismo aliquid conferre, nec tamen a Baptismo gratiam accipiebant, sed solum poenitentiae signum. Ad tertium dicendum quod ille Baptismus erat poenitentiae, quae pueris non convenit, ideo pueri illo Baptismo non baptizabantur. Conferre autem gentibus viam salutis soli Christo reservabatur, qui est expectatio gentium, ut dicitur Gen. penult. Sed et ipse Christus apostolis inhibuit gentibus Evangelium praedicare, ante passionem et resurrectionem. Unde multo minus conveniebat per Ioannem gentiles ad Baptismum admitti.

IIIae

tized by the latter; for it is written (Mark 1:5) that there went out to him . . . all they of Jerusalem, and were baptized by him. Therefore it seems that Christ alone should have been baptized by John. On the contrary, It is written (Luke 3:21): It came to pass, when all the people were baptized, that Jesus also being baptized and praying, heaven was opened. I answer that, For two reasons it behooved others besides Christ to be baptized with the baptism of John. First, as Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. iv, v), if Christ alone had been baptized with the baptism of John, some would have said that John’s baptism, with which Christ was baptized, was more excellent than that of Christ, with which others are baptized. Second, because, as above stated, it behooved others to be prepared by John’s baptism for the baptism of Christ. Reply Obj. 1: The baptism of John was instituted not only that Christ might be baptized, but also for other reasons, as stated above (A. 1). And yet, even if it were instituted merely in order that Christ might be baptized therewith, it was still necessary for others to receive this baptism, in order to avoid the objection mentioned above. Reply Obj. 2: Others who approached to be baptized by John could not, indeed, confer anything on his baptism: yet neither did they receive anything therefrom, save only the sign of penance. Reply Obj. 3: This was the baptism of penance, for which children were not suited; wherefore they were not baptized therewith. But to bring the nations into the way of salvation was reserved to Christ alone, who is the expectation of the nations, as we read Gen. 49:10. Indeed, Christ forbade the apostles to preach the Gospel to the Gentiles before His Passion and Resurrection. Much less fitting, therefore, was it for the Gentiles to be baptized by John.

Article 5 Whether John’s baptism should have ceased after Christ was baptized? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Baptismus Ioannis cessare debuerit postquam Christus est baptizatus. Dicitur enim Ioan. I, ut manifestetur Israeli, propterea veni in aqua baptizans. Sed, Christo baptizato, sufficienter fuit manifestatus, tum per testimonium Ioannis; tum per descensum columbae; tum etiam testimonio paternae vocis. Ergo non videtur quod postea debuerit Baptismus Ioannis durare.

Objection 1: It would seem that John’s baptism should have ceased after Christ was baptized. For it is written (John 1:31): That He may be made manifest in Israel, therefore am I come baptizing in water. But when Christ had been baptized, He was made sufficiently manifest, both by the testimony of John and by the dove coming down upon Him, and again by the voice of the Father bearing witness to Him. Therefore it seems that John’s baptism should not have endured thereafter. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., baptizaObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. iv): tus est Christus, et cessavit Ioannis Baptismus. Ergo vide- Christ was baptized, and John’s baptism ceased to avail.

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tur quod Ioannes, post Christum baptizatum, non debuerit baptizare. Praeterea, Baptismus Ioannis erat praeparatorius ad Baptismum Christi. Sed Baptismus Christi incoepit statim Christo baptizato, quia tactu suae mundissimae carnis vim regenerativam contulit aquis, ut Beda dicit. Ergo videtur quod Baptismus Ioannis cessaverit, Christo baptizato. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. III, venit Iesus in Iudaeam terram et baptizabat, erat autem et Ioannes baptizans. Sed Christus non baptizavit priusquam fuit baptizatus. Ergo videtur quod, postquam fuit Christus baptizatus, adhuc Ioannes baptizabat. Respondeo dicendum quod Baptismus Ioannis cessare non debuit, Christo baptizato. Primo quidem quia, ut Chrysostomus dicit, si cessasset Ioannes baptizare, Christo baptizato, existimaretur quod zelo vel ira faceret. Secundo quia, si cessasset a Baptismo, Christo baptizante, discipulos suos in maiorem zelum misisset. Tertio quia, persistens in baptizando, suos auditores mittebat ad Christum. Quarto quia, ut Beda dicit, adhuc permanebat umbra veteris legis, nec debet praecursor cessare donec veritas manifestetur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nondum Christus erat plene manifestatus, eo baptizato. Et ideo adhuc necessarium erat quod Ioannes baptizaret. Ad secundum dicendum quod, baptizato Christo, cessavit Baptismus Ioannis, non tamen statim, sed eo incarcerato. Unde Chrysostomus dicit, super Ioan., aestimo propter hoc permissam esse mortem Ioannis, et, eo sublato de medio, Christum maxime praedicare coepisse, ut omnis multitudinis affectio ad Christum transiret, et non ultra his quae de utroque erant sententiis scinderentur. Ad tertium dicendum quod Baptismus Ioannis praeparatorius erat, non solum ad hoc quod Christus baptizaretur, sed ad hoc quod alii ad Christi Baptismum accederent. Quod nondum fuit impletum, Christo baptizato.

Q. 38, A. 6

Therefore it seems that, after Christ’s baptism, John should not have continued to baptize. Obj. 3: Further, John’s baptism prepared the way for Christ’s. But Christ’s baptism began as soon as He had been baptized; because by the touch of His most pure flesh He endowed the waters with a regenerating virtue, as Bede asserts (Mag. Sent. iv, 3). Therefore it seems that John’s baptism ceased when Christ had been baptized. On the contrary, It is written (John 3:22, 23): Jesus . . . came into the land of Judea . . . and baptized: and John also was baptizing. But Christ did not baptize before being baptized. Therefore it seems that John continued to baptize after Christ had been baptized. I answer that, It was not fitting for the baptism of John to cease when Christ had been baptized. First, because, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xxix in Joan.), if John had ceased to baptize when Christ had been baptized, men would think that he was moved by jealousy or anger. Second, if he had ceased to baptize when Christ baptized, he would have given His disciples a motive for yet greater envy. Third, because, by continuing to baptize, he sent his hearers to Christ (Hom. xxix in Joan.). Fourth, because, as Bede says, there still remained a shadow of the Old Law: nor should the forerunner withdraw until the truth be made manifest. Reply Obj. 1: When Christ was baptized, He was not as yet fully manifested: consequently there was still need for John to continue baptizing. Reply Obj. 2: The baptism of John ceased after Christ had been baptized, not immediately, but when the former was cast into prison. Thus Chrysostom says (Hom. xxix in Joan.): I consider that John’s death was allowed to take place, and that Christ’s preaching began in a great measure after John had died, so that the undivided allegiance of the multitude was transferred to Christ, and there was no further motive for the divergence of opinions concerning both of them. Reply Obj. 3: John’s baptism prepared the way not only for Christ to be baptized, but also for others to approach to Christ’s baptism: and this did not take place as soon as Christ was baptized.

Article 6 Whether those who had been baptized with John’s baptism had to be baptized with the baptism of Christ? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod baptizati Baptismo Ioannis non fuerint baptizandi Baptismo Christi. Ioannes enim non fuit minor apostolis, cum de eo scriptum sit, Matth. XI, inter natos mulierum non surrexit maior Ioanne Baptista. Sed illi qui baptizabantur ab apostolis, non rebaptizabantur iterum, sed solummodo addebatur eis impositio manuum, dicitur enim

Objection 1: It would seem that those who had been baptized with John’s baptism had not to be baptized with the baptism of Christ. For John was not less than the apostles, since of him is it written (Matt 11:11): There hath not risen among them that are born of women a greater than John the Baptist. But those who were baptized by the apostles were not baptized again, but only received the impo-

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Act. VIII, quod aliqui tantum baptizati erant a Philippo in nomine domini Iesu, tunc apostoli, scilicet Petrus et Ioannes, imponebant manus super illos, et accipiebant spiritum sanctum. Ergo videtur quod baptizati a Ioanne non debuerint baptizari Baptismo Christi. Praeterea, apostoli fuerunt baptizati Baptismo Ioannis, fuerunt enim quidam eorum discipuli Ioannis, ut patet Ioan. I. Sed apostoli non videntur baptizati Baptismo Christi, dicitur enim Ioan. IV, quod Iesus non baptizabat, sed discipuli eius. Ergo videtur quod baptizati Baptismo Ioannis non erant baptizandi Baptismo Christi. Praeterea, minor est qui baptizatur quam qui baptizat. Sed ipse Ioannes non legitur baptizatus Baptismo Christi. Ergo multo minus illi qui a Ioanne baptizabantur, indigebant Baptismo Christi baptizari. Praeterea, Act. XIX dicitur quod Paulus invenit quosdam de discipulis, dixitque ad eos, si spiritum sanctum accepistis credentes? At illi dixerunt ad eum, sed neque si Spiritus Sanctus est, audivimus. Ille vero ait, in quo baptizati estis? Qui dixerunt, in Ioannis Baptismate. Unde baptizati sunt iterum in nomine domini nostri Iesu Christi. Sic ergo videtur quod, quia spiritum sanctum nesciebant, quod oportuerit eos iterum baptizari, sicut Hieronymus dicit, super Ioelem, et in epistola de viro unius uxoris; et Ambrosius, in libro de spiritu sancto. Sed quidam fuerunt baptizati Baptismo Ioannis qui habebant plenam notitiam Trinitatis. Ergo non erant baptizandi iterum Baptismo Christi. Praeterea, Rom. X, super illud, hoc est verbum fidei quod praedicamus, dicit Glossa Augustini, unde est ista virtus aquae ut corpus tangat et cor abluat, nisi faciente verbo, non quia dicitur, sed quia creditur? Ex quo patet quod virtus Baptismi dependet ex fide. Sed forma Baptismi Ioannis significavit fidem in qua nos baptizamur, dicit enim Paulus, Act. XIX, Ioannes baptizabat Baptismo poenitentiae populum, dicens in eum qui venturus est post ipsum ut crederent, hoc est, in Iesum. Ergo videtur quod non oportebat baptizatos Baptismo Ioannis iterum baptizari Baptismo Christi.

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., qui baptizati sunt Baptismate Ioannis, oportebat ut baptizarentur Baptismate domini. Respondeo dicendum quod secundum opinionem Magistri, in IV Sent., illi qui baptizati sunt a Ioanne nescientes spiritum sanctum esse, ac spem ponentes in illius Baptismo, postea baptizati sunt Baptismo Christi, illi vero qui spem non posuerunt in Baptismo Ioannis, et patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum credebant, non fuerunt postea

IIIae

sition of hands; for it is written (Acts 8:16, 17) that some were only baptized by Philip in the name of the Lord Jesus: then the apostles—namely, Peter and John—laid their hands upon them, and they received the Holy Spirit. Therefore it seems that those who had been baptized by John had not to be baptized with the baptism of Christ. Obj. 2: Further, the apostles were baptized with John’s baptism, since some of them were his disciples, as is clear from John 1:37. But the apostles do not seem to have been baptized with the baptism of Christ: for it is written (John 4:2) that Jesus did not baptize, but His disciples. Therefore it seems that those who had been baptized with John’s baptism had not to be baptized with the baptism of Christ. Obj. 3: Further, he who is baptized is less than he who baptizes. But we are not told that John himself was baptized with the baptism of Christ. Therefore much less did those who had been baptized by John need to receive the baptism of Christ. Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Acts 19:1–5) that Paul . . . found certain disciples; and he said to them: Have you received the Holy Spirit since ye believed? But they said to him: We have not so much as heard whether there be a Holy Spirit. And he said: In what then were you baptized? Who said: In John’s baptism. Wherefore they were again baptized in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ. Hence it seems that they needed to be baptized again, because they did not know of the Holy Spirit: as Jerome says on Joel 2:28 and in an epistle (lxix De Viro unius uxoris), and likewise Ambrose (De Spiritu Sancto). But some were baptized with John’s baptism who had full knowledge of the Trinity. Therefore these had no need to be baptized again with Christ’s baptism. Obj. 5: Further, on Rom. 10:8, This is the word of faith, which we preach, the gloss of Augustine says: Whence this virtue in the water, that it touches the body and cleanses the heart, save by the efficacy of the word, not because it is uttered, but because it is believed? Whence it is clear that the virtue of baptism depends on faith. But the form of John’s baptism signified the faith in which we are baptized; for Paul says (Acts 19:4): John baptized the people with the baptism of penance, saying: That they should believe in Him who was to come after him—that is to say, in Jesus. Therefore it seems that those who had been baptized with John’s baptism had no need to be baptized again with the baptism of Christ. On the contrary, Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. v): Those who were baptized with John’s baptism needed to be baptized with the baptism of our Lord. I answer that, According to the opinion of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 2), those who had been baptized by John without knowing of the existence of the Holy Spirit, and who based their hopes on his baptism, were afterwards baptized with the baptism of Christ: but those who did not base their hope on John’s baptism, and who believed in the Father, Son, and Holy

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Q. 38, A. 6

baptizati, sed, impositione manuum ab apostolis super eos Spirit, were not baptized afterwards, but received the Holy facta, spiritum sanctum receperunt. Spirit by the imposition of hands made over them by the apostles. Et hoc quidem verum est quantum ad primam parAnd this, indeed, is true as to the first part, and is contem, quod multis auctoritatibus confirmatur. Sed quan- firmed by many authorities. But as to the second part, the tum ad secundam partem, est penitus irrationabile quod assertion is altogether unreasonable. First, because John’s dicitur. Primo quidem, quia Baptismus Ioannis neque baptism neither conferred grace nor imprinted a characgratiam conferebat, neque characterem imprimebat, sed ter, but was merely in water, as he says himself (Matt 3:11). erat solum in aqua, ut ipse dicit, Matth. III. Unde bap- Wherefore the faith or hope which the person baptized had tizati fides vel spes quam habebat in Christum, non po- in Christ could not supply this defect. Second, because, terat hunc defectum supplere. Secundo quia, quando in when in a sacrament, that is omitted which belongs of nesacramento omittitur quod est de necessitate sacramen- cessity to the sacrament, not only must the omission be ti, non solum oportet suppleri quod fuerat omissum, sed supplied, but the whole must be entirely renewed. Now, oportet totaliter innovari. Est autem de necessitate Bap- it belongs of necessity to Christ’s baptism that it be given tismi Christi quod fiat non solum in aqua, sed etiam not only in water, but also in the Holy Spirit, according to in spiritu sancto, secundum illud Ioan. III, nisi quis re- John 3:5: Unless a man be born of water and the Holy Spirit, natus fuerit ex aqua et spiritu sancto, non potest introi- he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. Wherefore in the re in regnum Dei. Unde illis qui tantum in aqua baptiza- case of those who had been baptized with John’s baptism in ti erant Baptismo Ioannis, non solum erat supplendum water only, not merely had the omission to be supplied by quod deerat, ut scilicet daretur eis Spiritus Sanctus per giving them the Holy Spirit by the imposition of hands, but impositionem manuum, sed erant iterato totaliter bapti- they had to be baptized wholly anew in water and the Holy zandi in aqua et spiritu sancto. Spirit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. v): dicit, super Ioan., ideo post Ioannem baptizatum est, quia After John, baptism was administered, and the reason why non dabat Baptisma Christi, sed suum. Quod autem da- was because he gave not Christ’s baptism, but his own . . . batur a Petro, et si quod datum est a Iuda, Christi erat. That which Peter gave . . . and if any were given by Judas, Et ideo, si quos baptizavit Iudas, non sunt iterum bapti- that was Christ’s. And therefore if Judas baptized anyone, yet zandi, Baptisma enim tale est qualis est ille in cuius pote- were they not rebaptized . . . For the baptism corresponds state datur; non qualis ille cuius ministerio datur. Et inde with him by whose authority it is given, not with him by est etiam quod baptizati a Philippo diacono, qui Bapti- whose ministry it is given. For the same reason those who smum Christi dabat, non sunt iterum baptizati, sed ac- were baptized by the deacon Philip, who gave the baptism ceperunt manus impositionem per apostolos, sicut bap- of Christ, were not baptized again, but received the impositizati per sacerdotes confirmantur per episcopos. tion of hands by the apostles, just as those who are baptized by priests are confirmed by bishops. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says to Seleucianus (Ep. dicit, ad Seleucianum, intelligimus discipulos Christi fuis- cclxv), we deem that Christ’s disciples were baptized either se baptizatos, sive Baptismo Ioannis, sicut nonnulli arbi- with John’s baptism, as some maintain, or with Christ’s baptrantur, sive, quod magis credibile est, Baptismo Christi. tism, which is more probable. For He would not fail to adminNeque enim ministerio baptizandi defuit, ut haberet bap- ister baptism so as to have baptized servants through whom tizatos servos per quos ceteros baptizaret, qui non defuit He baptized others, since He did not fail in His humble service humilitatis ministerio quando eis pedes lavit. to wash their feet. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus Reply Obj. 3: As Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.): dicit, super Matth., per hoc quod Christus Ioanni dicen- Since, when John said, ‘I ought to be baptized by Thee,’ Christ ti, ego a te debeo baptizari, respondit, sine modo, ostendi- answered, ‘Suffer it to be so now’: it follows that afterwards tur quia postea Christus baptizavit Ioannem. Et hoc dicit Christ did baptize John. Moreover, he asserts that this is disin quibusdam libris apocryphis manifeste scriptum es- tinctly set down in some of the apocryphal books. At any rate, se. Certum tamen est, ut Hieronymus dicit, super Mat- it is certain, as Jerome says on Matt. 3:13, that, as Christ was th., quod, sicut Christus baptizatus fuit in aqua a Ioanne, baptized in water by John, so had John to be baptized in the ita Ioannes a Christo erat in spiritu baptizandus. Spirit by Christ. Ad quartum dicendum quod non est tota cauReply Obj. 4: The reason why these persons were bapsa quare illi fuerunt baptizati post Baptismum Ioannis, tized after being baptized by John was not only because quia spiritum sanctum non cognoverant, sed quia non they knew not of the Holy Spirit, but also because they had erant Baptismo Christi baptizati. not received the baptism of Christ.

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Ad quintum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, contra Faustum, sacramenta nostra sunt signa praesentis gratiae, sacramenta vero veteris legis fuerunt signa gratiae futurae. Unde ex hoc ipso quod Ioannes baptizavit in nomine venturi, datur intelligi quod non dabat Baptismum Christi, qui est sacramentum novae legis.

IIIae

Reply Obj. 5: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix), our sacraments are signs of present grace, whereas the sacraments of the Old Law were signs of future grace. Wherefore the very fact that John baptized in the name of one who was to come, shows that he did not give the baptism of Christ, which is a sacrament of the New Law.

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Question 39 The Baptizing of Christ Deinde considerandum est de baptizatione Christi. We have now to consider the baptizing of Christ, conEt circa hoc quaeruntur octo. cerning which there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum Christus debuerit baptizari. (1) Whether Christ should have been baptized? Secundo, utrum debuerit baptizari Baptismo (2) Whether He should have been baptized with the Ioannis. baptism of John? Tertio, de tempore Baptismi. (3) Of the time when He was baptized; Quarto, de loco. (4) Of the place; Quinto, de hoc quod sunt ei caeli aperti. (5) Of the heavens being opened unto Him; Sexto, de spiritu sancto apparente in specie (6) Of the apparition of the Holy Spirit under the form columbae. of a dove; Septimo, utrum illa columba fuerit verum animal. (7) Whether that dove was a real animal? Octavo, de voce paterni testimonii. (8) Of the voice of the Father witnessing unto Him.

Article 1 Whether it was fitting that Christ should be baptized? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Christum baptizari. Baptizari enim est ablui. Sed Christo non convenit ablui, in quo nulla fuit impuritas. Ergo videtur quod Christum non decuerit baptizari. Praeterea, Christus circumcisionem suscepit ut impleret legem. Sed Baptismus non pertinebat ad legem. Ergo non debebat baptizari. Praeterea, primum movens in quolibet genere est immobile secundum illum motum, sicut caelum, quod est primum alterans, non est alterabile. Sed Christus est primum baptizans, secundum illud, super quem videris spiritum descendentem et manentem, hic est qui baptizat. Ergo Christum non decuit baptizari. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. III, quod venit Iesus a Galilaea in Iordanem ad Ioannem, ut baptizaretur ab eo. Respondeo dicendum quod conveniens fuit Christum baptizari. Primo quidem quia, ut Ambrosius dicit, super Luc., baptizatus est dominus, non mundari volens, sed mundare aquas, ut, ablutae per carnem Christi, quae peccatum non cognovit, Baptismatis vim haberent, et ut sanctificatas relinqueret postmodum baptizandis, sicut Chrysostomus dicit. Secundo, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., quamvis Christus non esset peccator, tamen naturam suscepit peccatricem, et similitudinem carnis peccati. Propterea, etsi pro se Baptismate non indigebat, tamen in aliis carnalis natura opus habebat. Et,

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for Christ to be baptized. For to be baptized is to be washed. But it was not fitting for Christ to be washed, since there was no uncleanness in Him. Therefore it seems unfitting for Christ to be baptized. Obj. 2: Further, Christ was circumcised in order to fulfill the law. But baptism was not prescribed by the law. Therefore He should not have been baptized. Obj. 3: Further, the first mover in every genus is unmoved in regard to that movement; thus the heaven, which is the first cause of alteration, is unalterable. But Christ is the first principle of baptism, according to John 1:33: He upon whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that baptizeth. Therefore it was unfitting for Christ to be baptized. On the contrary, It is written (Matt 3:13) that Jesus cometh from Galilee to the Jordan, unto John, to be baptized by him. I answer that, It was fitting for Christ to be baptized. First, because, as Ambrose says on Luke 3:21: Our Lord was baptized because He wished, not to be cleansed, but to cleanse the waters, that, being purified by the flesh of Christ that knew no sin, they might have the virtue of baptism; and, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.), that He might bequeath the sanctified waters to those who were to be baptized afterwards. Second, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.), although Christ was not a sinner, yet did He take a sinful nature and ‘the likeness of sinful flesh.’ Wherefore, though He needed not baptism for His own sake, yet

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sicut Gregorius Nazianzenus dicit, baptizatus est Christus ut totum veteranum Adam immergat aquae. Tertio, baptizari voluit, sicut Augustinus dicit, in sermone de Epiphania, quia voluit facere quod faciendum omnibus imperavit. Et hoc est quod ipse dicit, sic decet nos adimplere omnem iustitiam. Ut enim Ambrosius dicit, super Luc., haec est iustitia, ut quod alterum facere velis, prius ipse incipias, et tuo alios horteris exemplo.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus non fuit baptizatus ut ablueretur, sed ut ablueret, sicut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus non solum debebat implere ea quae sunt legis veteris, sed etiam inchoare ea quae sunt novae. Et ideo non solum voluit circumcidi, sed etiam baptizari. Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus est primum baptizans spiritualiter. Et sic non est baptizatus, sed solum in aqua.

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carnal nature in others had need thereof. And, as Gregory Nazianzen says (Orat. xxxix) Christ was baptized that He might plunge the old Adam entirely in the water. Third, He wished to be baptized, as Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cxxxvi), because He wished to do what He had commanded all to do. And this is what He means by saying: So it becometh us to fulfill all justice (Matt 3:15). For, as Ambrose says (on Luke 3:21), this is justice, to do first thyself that which thou wishest another to do, and so encourage others by thy example. Reply Obj. 1: Christ was baptized, not that He might be cleansed, but that He might cleanse, as stated above. Reply Obj. 2: It was fitting that Christ should not only fulfill what was prescribed by the Old Law, but also begin what appertained to the New Law. Therefore He wished not only to be circumcised, but also to be baptized. Reply Obj. 3: Christ is the first principle of baptism’s spiritual effect. Unto this He was not baptized, but only in water.

Article 2 Whether it was fitting for Christ to be baptized with John’s baptism? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christum non decuerit baptizari Baptismo Ioannis. Baptismus enim Ioannis fuit Baptismus poenitentiae. Sed poenitentia Christo non convenit, quia nullum habuit peccatum. Ergo videtur quod non debuit baptizari Baptismo Ioannis. Praeterea, Baptismus Ioannis, sicut dicit Chrysostomus, medium fuit inter Baptismum Iudaeorum et Baptismum Christi. Sed medium sapit naturam extremorum. Cum ergo Christus non fuerit baptizatus Baptismate Iudaico, nec etiam Baptismate suo, videtur quod, pari ratione, Baptismate Ioannis baptizari non debuerit. Praeterea, omne quod in rebus humanis est optimum, debet attribui Christo. Sed Baptismus Ioannis non tenet supremum locum inter Baptismata. Ergo non convenit Christum baptizari Baptismo Ioannis. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. III, quod venit Iesus in Iordanem ut baptizaretur a Ioanne. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., baptizatus dominus baptizabat non Baptismate quo baptizatus est. Unde, cum ipse baptizaret Baptismo proprio, consequens est quod non fuerit baptizatus suo Baptismate, sed Baptismate Ioannis. Et hoc fuit conveniens, primo quidem, propter conditionem Baptismi Ioannis, qui non baptizavit in spiritu, sed solum in aqua. Christus autem spirituali Baptismate non indigebat, qui a principio suae conceptionis gratia spiri-

Objection 1: It would seem that it was unfitting for Christ to be baptized with John’s baptism. For John’s baptism was the baptism of penance. But penance is unbecoming to Christ, since He had no sin. Therefore it seems that He should not have been baptized with John’s baptism. Obj. 2: Further, John’s baptism, as Chrysostom says (Hom. de Bapt. Christi), was a mean between the baptism of the Jews and that of Christ. But the mean savors of the nature of the extremes (Aristotle, De Partib. Animal.). Since, therefore, Christ was not baptized with the Jewish baptism, nor yet with His own, on the same grounds He should not have been baptized with the baptism of John. Obj. 3: Further, whatever is best in human things should be ascribed to Christ. But John’s baptism does not hold the first place among baptisms. Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to be baptized with John’s baptism. On the contrary, It is written (Matt 3:13) that Jesus cometh to the Jordan, unto John, to be baptized by him. I answer that, As Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. xiii): After being baptized, the Lord baptized, not with that baptism wherewith He was baptized. Wherefore, since He Himself baptized with His own baptism, it follows that He was not baptized with His own, but with John’s baptism. And this was befitting: first, because John’s baptism was peculiar in this, that he baptized, not in the Spirit, but only in water; while Christ did not need spiritual baptism, since He was filled with the grace of the Holy Spirit from the be-

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tus sancti repletus fuit, ut patet ex dictis. Et haec est ratio Chrysostomi. Secundo, ut Beda dicit, baptizatus est Baptismo Ioannis, ut Baptismo suo Baptismum Ioannis comprobaret. Tertio, sicut Gregorius Nazianzenus dicit, accedit Iesus ad Baptismum Ioannis sanctificaturus Baptismum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Christus baptizari voluit ut nos suo exemplo induceret ad Baptismum. Et ideo, ad hoc quod esset efficacior eius inductio, voluit baptizari Baptismo quo manifeste non indigebat, ut homines ad Baptismum accederent quo indigebant. Unde Ambrosius dicit, super Luc., nemo refugiat lavacrum gratiae, quando Christus lavacrum poenitentiae non refugit. Ad secundum dicendum quod Baptismus Iudaeorum in lege praeceptus, erat solum figuralis; Baptismus autem Ioannis aliqualiter erat realis, inquantum inducebat homines ad abstinendum a peccatis; Baptismus autem Christi habet efficaciam mundandi a peccato et gratiam conferendi. Christus autem neque indigebat percipere remissionem peccatorum, quae in eo non erant; neque recipere gratiam, qua plenus erat. Similiter etiam, cum ipse sit veritas, non competebat ei id quod in sola figura gerebatur. Et ideo magis congruum fuit quod baptizaretur Baptismo medio quam aliquo extremorum. Ad tertium dicendum quod Baptismus est quoddam spirituale remedium. Quanto autem est aliquid magis perfectum, tanto minori remedio indiget. Unde ex hoc ipso quod Christus est maxime perfectus, conveniens fuit quod non baptizaretur perfectissimo Baptismo, sicut ille qui est sanus, non indiget efficaci medicina.

Q. 39, A. 3

ginning of His conception, as we have made clear above (Q. 34, A. 1). And this is the reason given by Chrysostom (Hom. de Bapt. Christi). Second, as Bede says on Mk. 1:9, He was baptized with the baptism of John, that, by being thus baptized, He might show His approval of John’s baptism. Third, as Gregory Nazianzen says (Orat. xxxix), by going to John to be baptized by him, He sanctified baptism. Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1), Christ wished to be baptized in order by His example to lead us to baptism. And so, in order that He might lead us thereto more efficaciously, He wished to be baptized with a baptism which He clearly needed not, that men who needed it might approach unto it. Wherefore Ambrose says on Luke 3:21: Let none decline the laver of grace, since Christ did not refuse the laver of penance. Reply Obj. 2: The Jewish baptism prescribed by the law was merely figurative, whereas John’s baptism, in a measure, was real, inasmuch as it induced men to refrain from sin; but Christ’s baptism is efficacious unto the remission of sin and the conferring of grace. Now Christ needed neither the remission of sin, which was not in Him, nor the bestowal of grace, with which He was filled. Moreover, since He is the Truth, it was not fitting that He should receive that which was no more than a figure. Consequently it was more fitting that He should receive the intermediate baptism than one of the extremes. Reply Obj. 3: Baptism is a spiritual remedy. Now, the more perfect a thing is, the less remedy does it need. Consequently, from the very fact that Christ is most perfect, it follows that it was fitting that He should not receive the most perfect baptism: just as one who is healthy does not need a strong medicine.

Article 3 Whether Christ was baptized at a fitting time? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non convenienti tempore Christus fuerit baptizatus. Ad hoc enim Christus baptizatus est ut suo exemplo alios ad Baptismum provocaret. Sed fideles Christi laudabiliter baptizantur, non solum ante trigesimum annum, sed etiam in infantili aetate. Ergo videtur quod Christus non debuit baptizari in aetate triginta annorum. Praeterea, Christus non legitur docuisse, vel miracula fecisse, ante Baptismum. Sed utilius fuisset mundo si pluri tempore docuisset, incipiens a vigesimo anno, vel etiam prius. Ergo videtur quod Christus, qui pro utilitate hominum venerat, ante trigesimum annum debuerat baptizari. Praeterea, indicium sapientiae divinitus infusae maxime debuit manifestari in Christo. Est autem mani-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was baptized at an unfitting time. For Christ was baptized in order that He might lead others to baptism by His example. But it is commendable that the faithful of Christ should be baptized, not merely before their thirtieth year, but even in infancy. Therefore it seems that Christ should not have been baptized at the age of thirty. Obj. 2: Further, we do not read that Christ taught or worked miracles before being baptized. But it would have been more profitable to the world if He had taught for a longer time, beginning at the age of twenty, or even before. Therefore it seems that Christ, who came for man’s profit, should have been baptized before His thirtieth year. Obj. 3: Further, the sign of wisdom infused by God should have been especially manifest in Christ. But in the

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festatum in Daniele tempore suae pueritiae, secundum illud Dan. XIII, suscitavit dominus spiritum sanctum pueri iunioris, cui nomen Daniel. Ergo multo magis Christus in sua pueritia debuit baptizari vel docere. Praeterea, Baptismus Ioannis ordinatur ad Baptismum Christi sicut ad finem. Sed finis est prior in intentione, et postremum in executione. Ergo vel debuit primus baptizari a Ioanne, vel ultimus. Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. III, factum est, cum baptizaretur omnis populus, et Iesu baptizato et orante, et infra, et ipse Iesus erat incipiens quasi annorum triginta. Respondeo dicendum quod Christus convenienter fuit in trigesimo anno baptizatus. Primo quidem, quia Christus baptizabatur quasi ex tunc incipiens docere et praedicare, ad quod requiritur perfecta aetas, qualis est triginta annorum. Unde et Gen. XLI legitur quod triginta annorum erat Ioseph quando suscepit regimen Aegypti. Similiter etiam II Reg. V legitur de David quod triginta annorum erat cum regnare coepisset. Ezechiel etiam in anno trigesimo coepit prophetare, ut habetur Ezech. I. Secundo quia, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., futurum erat ut post Baptismum Christi lex cessare inciperet. Et ideo hac aetate Christus ad Baptismum venit quae potest omnia peccata suscipere, ut, lege servata, nullus dicat quod ideo eam solvit quod implere non potuit. Tertio, quia per hoc quod Christus in aetate perfecta baptizatur, datur intelligi quod Baptismus parit viros perfectos, secundum illud Ephes. IV, donec occurramus omnes in unitatem fidei et agnitionis filii Dei, in virum perfectum, in mensuram aetatis plenitudinis Christi. Unde et ipsa proprietas numeri ad hoc pertinere videtur. Consurgit enim tricenarius numerus ex ductu ternarii in denarium; per ternarium autem intelligitur fides Trinitatis, per denarium autem impletio mandatorum legis; et in his duobus perfectio vitae Christianae consistit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Gregorius Nazianzenus dicit, Christus non est baptizatus quasi indigeret purgatione, nec aliquod illi immineret periculum differendo Baptismum. Sed cuivis alii non in parvum redundat periculum, si exeat ex hac vita non indutus veste incorruptionis, scilicet gratia. Et licet bonum sit post Baptismum munditiam custodire, potius tamen est, ut ipse dicit, interdum paulisper maculari, quam gratia omnino carere. Ad secundum dicendum quod utilitas quae a Christo provenit hominibus praecipue est per fidem et humilitatem, ad quorum utrumque valet quod Christus non in pueritia vel in adolescentia coepit docere, sed in perfecta aetate. Ad fidem quidem, quia per hoc ostenditur in eo vera humanitas, quod per temporum incrementa corporaliter profecit, et ne huiusmodi profectus

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case of Daniel this was manifested at the time of his boyhood; according to Dan. 13:45: The Lord raised up the Holy Spirit of a young boy, whose name was Daniel. Much more, therefore, should Christ have been baptized or have taught in His boyhood. Obj. 4: Further, John’s baptism was ordered to that of Christ as to its end. But the end is first in intention and last in execution. Therefore He should have been baptized by John either before all the others, or after them. On the contrary, It is written (Luke 3:21): It came to pass, when all the people were baptized, that Jesus also being baptized, and praying; and further on (Luke 3:23): And Jesus Himself was beginning about the age of thirty years. I answer that, Christ was fittingly baptized in His thirtieth year. First, because Christ was baptized as though for the reason that He was about forthwith to begin to teach and preach: for which purpose perfect age is required, such as is the age of thirty. Thus we read (Gen 41:46) that Joseph was thirty years old when he undertook the government of Egypt. In like manner we read (2 Kgs 5:4) that David was thirty years old when he began to reign. Again, Ezechiel began to prophesy in his thirtieth year, as we read Ezech. 1:1. Second, because, as Chrysostom says (Hom. x in Matth.), the law was about to pass away after Christ’s baptism: wherefore Christ came to be baptized at this age which admits of all sins; in order that by His observing the law, no one might say that because He Himself could not fulfill it, He did away with it. Third, because by Christ’s being baptized at the perfect age, we are given to understand that baptism brings forth perfect men, according to Eph. 4:13: Until we all meet into the unity of faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fullness of Christ. Hence the very property of the number seems to point to this. For thirty is product of three and ten: and by the number three is implied faith in the Trinity, while ten signifies the fulfilment of the commandments of the Law: in which two things the perfection of Christian life consists. Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory Nazianzen says (Orat. xl), Christ was baptized, not as though He needed to be cleansed, or as though some peril threatened Him if He delayed to be baptized. But no small danger besets any other man who departs from this life without being clothed with the garment of incorruptibility—namely, grace. And though it be a good thing to remain clean after baptism, yet is it still better, as he says, to be slightly sullied now and then than to be altogether deprived of grace. Reply Obj. 2: The profit which accrues to men from Christ is chiefly through faith and humility: to both of which He conduced by beginning to teach not in His boyhood or youth, but at the perfect age. To faith, because in this manner His human nature is shown to be real, by its making bodily progress with the advance of time; and lest this progress should be deemed imaginary, He did not

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putaretur esse phantasticus, noluit suam sapientiam et virtutem manifestare ante perfectam corporis aetatem. Ad humilitatem vero, ne ante perfectam aetatem aliquis praesumptuose praelationis gradum et docendi officium assumat. Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus proponebatur hominibus in exemplum omnium. Et ideo oportuit in eo ostendi id quod competit omnibus secundum legem communem, ut scilicet in aetate perfecta doceret. Sed, sicut Gregorius Nazianzenus dicit, non est lex Ecclesiae quod raro contingit, sicut nec una hirundo ver facit. Aliquibus enim, ex quadam speciali dispensatione, secundum divinae sapientiae rationem, concessum est, praeter legem communem, ut ante perfectam aetatem officium vel praesidendi vel docendi haberent, sicut Salomon, Daniel et Ieremias. Ad quartum dicendum quod Christus nec primus nec ultimus debuit a Ioanne baptizari. Quia, ut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., Christus ad hoc baptizatur ut confirmaret praedicationem et Baptismum Ioannis; et ut testimonium acciperet a Ioanne. Non autem creditum fuisset testimonio Ioannis nisi postquam multi fuerunt baptizati ab ipso. Et ideo non debuit primus a Ioanne baptizari. Similiter etiam nec ultimus. Quia, sicut ipse ibidem subdit, sicut lux solis non expectat occasum Luciferi, sed eo procedente egreditur, et suo lumine obscurat illius candorem; sic et Christus non expectavit ut cursum suum Ioannes impleret, sed, adhuc eo docente et baptizante, apparuit.

Q. 39, A. 4

wish to show His wisdom and power before His body had reached the perfect age: to humility, lest anyone should presume to govern or teach others before attaining to perfect age. Reply Obj. 3: Christ was set before men as an example to all. Wherefore it behooved that to be shown forth in Him, which is becoming to all according to the common law—namely, that He should teach after reaching the perfect age. But, as Gregory Nazianzen says (Orat. xxxix), that which seldom occurs is not the law of the Church; as neither does one swallow make the spring. For by special dispensation, in accordance with the ruling of Divine wisdom, it has been granted to some, contrary to the common law, to exercise the functions of governing or teaching, such as Solomon, Daniel, and Jeremias. Reply Obj. 4: It was not fitting that Christ should be baptized by John either before or after all others. Because, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.), for this was Christ baptized, that He might confirm the preaching and the baptism of John, and that John might bear witness to Him. Now, men would not have had faith in John’s testimony except after many had been baptized by him. Consequently it was not fitting that John should baptize Him before baptizing anyone else. In like manner, neither was it fitting that he should baptize Him last. For as he (Chrysostom) says in the same passage: As the light of the sun does not wait for the setting of the morning star, but comes forth while the latter is still above the horizon, and by its brilliance dims its shining: so Christ did not wait till John had run his course, but appeared while he was yet teaching and baptizing.

Article 4 Whether Christ should have been baptized in the Jordan? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non debuerit baptizari in Iordane. Veritas enim debet respondere figurae. Sed figura Baptismi praecessit in transitu maris rubri, ubi Aegyptii sunt submersi, sicut peccata delentur in Baptismo. Ergo videtur quod Christus magis debuerit baptizari in mari quam in flumine Iordanis. Praeterea, Iordanis interpretatur descensus. Sed per Baptismum aliquis plus ascendit quam descendit, unde et Matth. III dicitur quod baptizatus Iesus confestim ascendit de aqua. Ergo videtur inconveniens fuisse quod Christus in Iordane baptizaretur. Praeterea, transeuntibus filiis Israel, aquae Iordanis conversae sunt retrorsum, ut legitur Iosue IV, et sicut in Psalmo dicitur. Sed illi qui baptizantur, non retror-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have been baptized in the Jordan. For the reality should correspond to the figure. But baptism was prefigured in the crossing of the Red Sea, where the Egyptians were drowned, just as our sins are blotted out in baptism. Therefore it seems that Christ should rather have been baptized in the sea than in the river Jordan. Obj. 2: Further, Jordan is interpreted a going down. But by baptism a man goes up rather than down: wherefore it is written (Matt 3:16) that Jesus being baptized, forthwith came up from the water. Therefore it seems unfitting that Christ should be baptized in the Jordan. Obj. 3: Further, while the children of Israel were crossing, the waters of the Jordan were turned back, as it is related Jos. 4, and as it is written Ps. 113:3, 5. But those who

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Incarnate Son of God

sum, sed in antea progrediuntur. Non ergo fuit conveniens ut Christus in Iordane baptizaretur. Sed contra est quod dicitur Marci I, quod baptizatus est Iesus a Ioanne in Iordane. Respondeo dicendum quod fluvius Iordanis fuit per quem filii Israel in terram promissionis intraverunt. Hoc autem habet Baptismus Christi speciale prae omnibus Baptismatibus, quod introducit in regnum Dei, quod per terram promissionis significatur, unde dicitur Ioan. III, nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et spiritu sancto, non potest introire in regnum Dei. Ad quod etiam pertinet quod Elias divisit aquas Iordanis, qui erat in curru igneo rapiendus in caelum, ut dicitur IV Reg. II, quia scilicet transeuntibus per aquam Baptismi, per ignem spiritus sancti patet aditus in caelum. Et ideo conveniens fuit ut Christus in Iordane baptizaretur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod transitus maris rubri praefiguravit Baptismum quantum ad hoc quod Baptismus delet peccata. Sed transitus Iordanis quantum ad hoc quod aperit ianuam regni caelestis, qui est principalior effectus Baptismi, et per solum Christum impletus. Et ideo convenientius fuit quod Christus in Iordane quam in mari baptizaretur. Ad secundum dicendum quod in Baptismo est ascensus per profectum gratiae, qui requirit humilitatis descensum, secundum illud Iac. IV, humilibus autem dat gratiam. Et ad talem descensum referendum est nomen Iordanis. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in sermone de Epiphania, sicut antea aquae Iordanis retrorsum conversae fuerant, ita modo, Christo baptizato, peccata retrorsum conversa sunt. Vel etiam per hoc significatur quod, contra descensum aquarum, benedictionum fluvius sursum ferebatur.

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are baptized go forward, not back. Therefore it was not fitting that Christ should be baptized in the Jordan. On the contrary, It is written (Mark 1:9) that Jesus was baptized by John in the Jordan. I answer that, It was through the river Jordan that the children of Israel entered into the land of promise. Now, this is the prerogative of Christ’s baptism over all other baptisms: that it is the entrance to the kingdom of God, which is signified by the land of promise; wherefore it is said (John 3:5): Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. To this also is to be referred the dividing of the water of the Jordan by Elias, who was to be snatched up into heaven in a fiery chariot, as it is related 4 Kings 2: because, to wit, the approach to heaven is laid open by the fire of the Holy Spirit, to those who pass through the waters of baptism. Therefore it was fitting that Christ should be baptized in the Jordan. Reply Obj. 1: The crossing of the Red Sea foreshadowed baptism in this—that baptism washes away sin: whereas the crossing of the Jordan foreshadows it in this— that it opens the gate to the heavenly kingdom: and this is the principal effect of baptism, and accomplished through Christ alone. And therefore it was fitting that Christ should be baptized in the Jordan rather than in the sea. Reply Obj. 2: In baptism we go up by advancing in grace: for which we need to go down by humility, according to James 4:6: He giveth grace to the humble. And to this going down must the name of the Jordan be referred. Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says in a sermon for the Epiphany (x): As of yore the waters of the Jordan were held back, so now, when Christ was baptized, the torrent of sin was held back. Or else this may signify that against the downward flow of the waters the river of blessings flowed upwards.

Article 5 Whether the heavens should have been opened unto Christ at his baptism? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christo baptizato non debuerunt caeli aperiri. Illi enim aperiendi sunt caeli qui indiget intrare in caelum, quasi extra caelum existens. Sed Christus semper erat in caelo, secundum illud Ioan. III, filius hominis qui est in caelo. Ergo videtur quod non debuerint ei caeli aperiri. Praeterea, apertio caelorum aut intelligitur corporaliter, aut spiritualiter. Sed non potest intelligi corporaliter, quia corpora caelestia sunt impassibilia et infrangibilia, secundum illud Iob XXXVII, tu forsitan fabricatus es caelos, qui solidissimi quasi aere fusi sunt? Similiter etiam nec potest intelligi spiritualiter, quia ante

Objection 1: It would seem that the heavens should not have been opened unto Christ at His baptism. For the heavens should be opened unto one who needs to enter heaven, by reason of his being out of heaven. But Christ was always in heaven, according to John 3:13: The Son of Man who is in heaven. Therefore it seems that the heavens should not have been opened unto Him. Obj. 2: Further, the opening of the heavens is understood either in a corporal or in a spiritual sense. But it cannot be understood in a corporal sense: because the heavenly bodies are impassible and indissoluble, according to Job 37:18: Thou perhaps hast made the heavens with Him, which are most strong, as if they were of molten brass. In like

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oculos filii Dei caeli antea clausi non fuerant. Ergo in- manner neither can it be understood in a spiritual sense, convenienter videtur dici quod baptizato Christo aperti because the heavens were not previously closed to the eyes fuerunt caeli. of the Son of God. Therefore it seems unbecoming to say that when Christ was baptized the heavens were opened. Praeterea, fidelibus caelum apertum est per ChriObj. 3: Further, heaven was opened to the faithful sti passionem, secundum illud Heb. X, habemus fidu- through Christ’s Passion, according to Heb. 10:19: We have ciam in introitum sanctorum in sanguine Christi. Unde a confidence in the entering into the holies by the blood of etiam nec baptizati Baptismo Christi, si qui ante eius Christ. Wherefore not even those who were baptized with passionem decesserunt, caelos intrare potuerunt. Ergo Christ’s baptism, and died before His Passion, could enter magis debuerunt aperiri caeli Christo patiente, quam eo heaven. Therefore the heavens should have been opened baptizato. when Christ was suffering rather than when He was baptized. Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. III, Iesu baptizato On the contrary, It is written (Luke 3:21): Jesus beet orante, apertum est caelum. ing baptized and praying, heaven was opened. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ChriI answer that, As stated above (A. 1; Q. 38, A. 1), stus baptizari voluit ut suo Baptismo consecraret Bapti- Christ wished to be baptized in order to consecrate the bapsmum quo nos baptizaremur et ideo in Baptismo Christi tism wherewith we were to be baptized. And therefore it ea demonstrari debuerunt quae pertinent ad efficaciam behooved those things to be shown forth which belong to nostri Baptismi. Circa quam tria sunt consideranda. Pri- the efficacy of our baptism: concerning which efficacy three mo quidem, principalis virtus ex qua Baptismus effica- points are to be considered. First, the principal power from ciam habet, quae quidem est virtus caelestis. Et ideo bap- which it is derived; and this, indeed, is a heavenly power. tizato Christo apertum est caelum, ut ostenderetur quod For which reason, when Christ was baptized, heaven was de cetero caelestis virtus Baptismum sanctificaret. opened, to show that in future the heavenly power would sanctify baptism. Secundo, operatur ad efficaciam Baptismi fides EcSecond, the faith of the Church and of the person bapclesiae et eius qui baptizatur, unde et baptizati fidem tized conduces to the efficacy of baptism: wherefore those profitentur, et Baptismus dicitur fidei sacramentum. Per who are baptized make a profession of faith, and baptism is fidem autem inspicimus caelestia, quae sensum et ra- called the sacrament of faith. Now by faith we gaze on heavtionem humanam excedunt. Et ad hoc significandum, enly things, which surpass the senses and human reason. Christo baptizato aperti sunt caeli. And in order to signify this, the heavens were opened when Christ was baptized. Tertio, quia per Baptismum Christi specialiter apeThird, because the entrance to the heavenly kingdom ritur nobis introitus regni caelestis, qui primo homini was opened to us by the baptism of Christ in a special praeclusus fuerat per peccatum. Unde baptizato Christo manner, which entrance had been closed to the first man aperti sunt caeli, ut ostenderetur quod baptizatis patet through sin. Hence, when Christ was baptized, the heavens via in caelum. were opened, to show that the way to heaven is open to the baptized. Post Baptismum autem necessaria est homini iugis Now after baptism man needs to pray continually, in ororatio, ad hoc quod caelum introeat, licet enim per Bap- der to enter heaven: for though sins are remitted through tismum remittantur peccata, remanet tamen fomes pec- baptism, there still remain the fomes of sin assailing us cati nos impugnans interius, et mundus et Daemones from within, and the world and the devils assailing us from qui impugnant exterius. Et ideo signanter dicitur Luc. III without. And therefore it is said pointedly (Luke 3:21) that quod, Iesu baptizato et orante, apertum est caelum, quia Jesus being baptized and praying, heaven was opened: bescilicet fidelibus necessaria est oratio post Baptismum. cause, to wit, the faithful after baptism stand in need of Vel ut detur intelligi quod hoc ipsum quod per Bapti- prayer. Or else, that we may be led to understand that the smum caelum aperitur credentibus, est ex virtute ora- very fact that through baptism heaven is opened to believtionis Christi. Unde signanter dicitur, Matth. III, quod ers is in virtue of the prayer of Christ. Hence it is said pointapertum est ei caelum, idest, omnibus propter eum, sicut edly (Matt 3:16) that heaven was opened to Him—that is, to si imperator alicui pro alio petenti dicat, ecce, hoc bene- all for His sake. Thus, for example, the Emperor might say to ficium non illi do, sed tibi, idest, propter te illi; ut Chry- one asking a favor for another: Behold, I grant this favor, not sostomus dicit, super Matth. to him, but to thee—that is, to him for thy sake, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut ChrysostoReply Obj. 1: According to Chrysostom (Hom. iv in mus dicit, super Matth., sicut Christus secundum dispen- Matth.), as Christ was baptized for man’s sake, though He

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sationem humanam baptizatus est, quamvis propter se Baptismo non indigeret; sic secundum humanam dispensationem aperti sunt ei caeli, secundum autem naturam divinam semper erat in caelis. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., caeli aperti sunt Christo baptizato, non reseratione elementorum, sed spiritualibus oculis, sicut et Ezechiel in principio voluminis sui caelos apertos esse commemorat. Et hoc probat Chrysostomus, super Matth., dicens quod, si ipsa creatura, scilicet caelorum, rupta fuisset, non dixisset, aperti sunt ei, quia quod corporaliter aperitur, omnibus est apertum. Unde et Marci I expresse dicitur quod Iesus statim ascendens de aqua, vidit caelos apertos, quasi ipsa apertio caelorum ad visionem Christi referatur. Quod quidem aliqui referunt ad visionem corporalem, dicentes quod circa Christum baptizatum tantus splendor fulsit in Baptismo ut viderentur caeli aperti. Potest etiam referri ad imaginariam visionem, per quem modum Ezechiel vidit caelos apertos, formabatur enim ex virtute divina et voluntate rationis talis visio in imaginatione Christi, ad significandum quod per Baptismum caeli aditus hominibus aperitur. Potest etiam ad visionem intellectualem referri, prout Christus vidit, Baptismo iam sanctificato, apertum esse caelum hominibus; quod tamen etiam ante viderat fiendum.

Ad tertium dicendum quod per passionem Christi aperitur caelum hominibus sicut per causam communem apertionis caelorum. Oportet tamen hanc causam singulis applicari, ad hoc quod caelum introeant. Quod quidem fit per Baptismum, secundum illud Rom. VI, quicumque baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, in morte ipsius baptizati sumus. Et ideo potius fit mentio de apertione caelorum in Baptismo quam in passione. Vel, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., baptizato Christo caeli tantum sunt aperti, postquam vero tyrannum vicit per crucem, quia non erant portae necessariae caelo nunquam claudendo, non dicunt Angeli, aperite portas, sed, tollite portas. Per quod dat intelligere Chrysostomus quod obstacula quibus prius obsistentibus animae defunctorum introire non poterant caelos, sunt totaliter per passionem ablata, sed in Baptismo Christi sunt aperta, quasi manifestata iam via per quam homines in caelum erant intraturi.

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needed no baptism for His own sake, so the heavens were opened unto Him as man, whereas in respect of His Divine Nature He was ever in heaven. Reply Obj. 2: As Jerome says on Matt. 3:16, 17, the heavens were opened to Christ when He was baptized, not by an unfolding of the elements, but by a spiritual vision: thus does Ezechiel relate the opening of the heavens at the beginning of his book. And Chrysostom proves this (Hom. iv in Matth.) by saying that if the creature—namely, heaven—had been sundered he would not have said, ‘were opened to Him,’ since what is opened in a corporeal sense is open to all. Hence it is said expressly (Mark 1:10) that Jesus forthwith coming up out of the water, saw the heavens opened; as though the opening of the heavens were to be considered as seen by Christ. Some, indeed, refer this to the corporeal vision, and say that such a brilliant light shone round about Christ when He was baptized, that the heavens seemed to be opened. It can also be referred to the imaginary vision, in which manner Ezechiel saw the heavens opened: since such a vision was formed in Christ’s imagination by the Divine power and by His rational will, so as to signify that the entrance to heaven is opened to men through baptism. Lastly, it can be referred to intellectual vision: forasmuch as Christ, when He had sanctified baptism, saw that heaven was opened to men: nevertheless He had seen before that this would be accomplished. Reply Obj. 3: Christ’s Passion is the common cause of the opening of heaven to men. But it behooves this cause to be applied to each one, in order that he enter heaven. And this is effected by baptism, according to Rom. 6:3: All we who are baptized in Christ Jesus are baptized in His death. Wherefore mention is made of the opening of the heavens at His baptism rather than at His Passion. Or, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.): When Christ was baptized, the heavens were merely opened: but after He had vanquished the tyrant by the cross; since gates were no longer needed for a heaven which thenceforth would be never closed, the angels said, not ‘Open the gates,’ but ‘Take them away.’ Thus Chrysostom gives us to understand that the obstacles which had hitherto hindered the souls of the departed from entering into heaven were entirely removed by the Passion: but at Christ’s baptism they were opened, as though the way had been shown by which men were to enter into heaven.

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Article 6 Whether it is fitting to say that when Christ was baptized the Holy Spirit came down on him in the form of a dove? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter Spiritus Sanctus super Christum baptizatum dicatur in specie columbae descendisse. Spiritus enim sanctus habitat in homine per gratiam. Sed in homine Christo fuit plenitudo gratiae a principio suae conceptionis, quo fuit unigenitus a patre, ut ex supra dictis patet ergo non debuit Spiritus Sanctus ad eum mitti in Baptismo. Praeterea, Christus dicitur in mundum descendisse per mysterium incarnationis, quando exinanivit semetipsum, formam servi accipiens. Sed Spiritus Sanctus non est incarnatus. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur quod Spiritus Sanctus descenderit super eum. Praeterea, in Baptismo Christi ostendi debuit, sicut in quodam exemplari, id quod fit in nostro Baptismo. Sed in nostro Baptismo non fit aliqua missio visibilis spiritus sancti. Ergo nec in Baptismo Christi debuit fieri visibilis missio spiritus sancti. Praeterea, Spiritus Sanctus a Christo in omnes alios derivatur, secundum illud Ioan. I, de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus. Sed super apostolos Spiritus Sanctus descendit, non in specie columbae, sed in specie ignis. Ergo nec super Christum in specie columbae descendere debuit, sed in specie ignis. Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. III, descendit Spiritus Sanctus corporali specie sicut columba in ipsum. Respondeo dicendum quod hoc quod circa Christum factum est in eius Baptismo, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., pertinet ad mysterium omnium qui postmodum fuerant baptizandi. Omnes autem qui Baptismo Christi baptizantur, spiritum sanctum recipiunt, nisi ficti accedant, secundum illud Matth. III, ipse vos baptizabit in spiritu sancto. Et ideo conveniens fuit ut super baptizatum dominum Spiritus Sanctus descenderet. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XV de Trin., absurdissimum est dicere quod Christus, cum esset iam triginta annorum, accepisset spiritum sanctum, sed venit ad Baptismum, sicut sine peccato, ita non sine spiritu sancto. Si enim de Ioanne scriptum est quod replebitur spiritu sancto ab utero matris suae, quid de homine Christo dicendum est, cuius carnis ipsa conceptio non carnalis, sed spiritualis fuit? Nunc ergo, idest in Baptismo, corpus suum, idest Ecclesiam, praefigurare dignatus est, in qua baptizati praecipue accipiunt spiritum sanctum. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in II de Trin., Spiritus Sanctus descendisse dicitur

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not fitting to say that when Christ was baptized the Holy Spirit came down on Him in the form of a dove. For the Holy Spirit dwells in man by grace. But the fullness of grace was in the ManChrist from the beginning of His conception, because He was the Only-begotten of the Father, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. 7, A. 12; Q. 34, A. 1). Therefore the Holy Spirit should not have been sent to Him at His baptism. Obj. 2: Further, Christ is said to have descended into the world in the mystery of the Incarnation, when He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant (Phil 2:7). But the Holy Spirit did not become incarnate. Therefore it is unbecoming to say that the Holy Spirit descended upon Him. Obj. 3: Further, that which is accomplished in our baptism should have been shown in Christ’s baptism, as in an exemplar. But in our baptism no visible mission of the Holy Spirit takes place. Therefore neither should a visible mission of the Holy Spirit have taken place in Christ’s baptism. Obj. 4: Further, the Holy Spirit is poured forth on others through Christ, according to John 1:16: Of His fullness we all have received. But the Holy Spirit came down on the apostles in the form, not of a dove, but of fire. Therefore neither should He have come down on Christ in the form of a dove, but in the form of fire. On the contrary, It is written (Luke 3:22): The Holy Spirit descended in a bodily shape as a dove upon Him. I answer that, What took place with respect to Christ in His baptism, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.), is connected with the mystery accomplished in all who were to be baptized afterwards. Now, all those who are baptized with the baptism of Christ receive the Holy Spirit, unless they approach unworthily; according to Matt. 3:11: He shall baptize you in the Holy Spirit. Therefore it was fitting that when our Lord was baptized the Holy Spirit should descend upon Him. Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Trin. xv): It is most absurd to say that Christ received the Holy Spirit, when He was already thirty years old: for when He came to be baptized, since He was without sin, therefore was He not without the Holy Spirit. For if it is written of John that ‘he shall be filled with the Holy Spirit from his mother’s womb,’ what must we say of the Man-Christ, whose conception in the flesh was not carnal, but spiritual? Therefore now, i.e., at His baptism, He deigned to foreshadow His body, i.e., the Church, in which those who are baptized receive the Holy Spirit in a special manner. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Trin. ii), the Holy Spirit is said to have descended on Christ in a bodily shape,

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super Christum specie corporali sicut columba, non quia ipsa substantia spiritus sancti videretur, quae est invisibilis. Neque ita quod illa visibilis creatura in unitatem personae divinae assumeretur, neque enim dicitur quod Spiritus Sanctus sit columba, sicut dicitur quod filius Dei est homo, ratione unionis. Neque etiam hoc modo Spiritus Sanctus visus est in specie columbae sicut Ioannes vidit agnum occisum in Apocalypsi, ut habetur Apoc. V, illa enim visio facta fuit in spiritu per spirituales imagines corporum; de illa vero columba nullus unquam dubitavit quin oculis visa sit. Nec etiam hoc modo in specie columbae Spiritus Sanctus apparuit sicut dicitur, I Cor. X, petra autem erat Christus, illa enim iam erat in creatura, et per actionis modum nuncupata est nomine Christi, quem significabat illa autem columba ad hoc tantum significandum repente extitit et postea cessavit, sicut flamma quae in rubo apparuit Moysi. Dicitur ergo Spiritus Sanctus descendisse super Christum, non ratione unionis ad columbam, sed vel ratione ipsius columbae significantis spiritum sanctum, quae descendendo super Christum venit; vel etiam ratione spiritualis gratiae, quae a Deo per modum cuiusdam descensus in creaturam derivatur, secundum illud Iac. I, omne datum optimum, et omne donum perfectum, desursum est, descendens a patre luminum. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., in principiis spiritualium rerum semper sensibiles apparent visiones, propter eos qui nullam intelligentiam incorporalis naturae suscipere possunt, ut, si postea non fiant, ex his quae semel facta sunt, recipiant fidem. Et ideo circa Christum baptizatum corporali specie Spiritus Sanctus visibiliter descendit, ut super omnes baptizatos postea invisibiliter credatur descendere. Ad quartum dicendum quod Spiritus Sanctus in specie columbae apparuit super Christum baptizatum, propter quatuor. Primo quidem, propter dispositionem quae requiritur in baptizato, ut scilicet non fictus accedat, quia, sicut dicitur Sap. I, Spiritus Sanctus disciplinae effugiet fictum. Columba enim est animal simplex, astutia et dolo carens, unde dicitur Matth. X, estote simplices sicut columbae. Secundo, ad designandum septem dona spiritus sancti, quae columba suis proprietatibus significat. Columba enim secus fluenta habitat, ut, viso accipitre, mergat se et evadat. Quod pertinet ad donum sapientiae, per quam sancti secus Scripturae divinae fluenta resident, ut incursum Diaboli evadant. Item columba meliora grana eligit. Quod pertinet ad donum scientiae, qua sancti sententias sanas, quibus pascantur, eligunt. Item columba alienos pullos nutrit. Quod pertinet ad donum consilii, quo sancti homines, qui fuerunt pulli, idest imitatores, Diaboli, doctrina nutriunt et exemplo. Item columba

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as a dove, not because the very substance of the Holy Spirit was seen, for He is invisible: nor as though that visible creature were assumed into the unity of the Divine Person; since it is not said that the Holy Spirit was the dove, as it is said that the Son of God is man by reason of the union. Nor, again, was the Holy Spirit seen under the form of a dove, after the manner in which John saw the slain Lamb in the Apocalypse (5:6): For the latter vision took place in the spirit through spiritual images of bodies; whereas no one ever doubted that this dove was seen by the eyes of the body. Nor, again, did the Holy Spirit appear under the form of a dove in the sense in which it is said (1 Cor 10:4): ‘Now, the rock was Christ’: for the latter had already a created existence, and through the manner of its action was called by the name of Christ, whom it signified: whereas this dove came suddenly into existence, to fulfill the purpose of its signification, and afterwards ceased to exist, like the flame which appeared in the bush to Moses. Hence the Holy Spirit is said to have descended upon Christ, not by reason of His being united to the dove: but either because the dove itself signified the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as it descended when it came upon Him; or, again, by reason of the spiritual grace, which is poured out by God, so as to descend, as it were, on the creature, according to James 1:17: Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights. Reply Obj. 3: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xii in Matth.): At the beginning of all spiritual transactions sensible visions appear, for the sake of them who cannot conceive at all an incorporeal nature . . . so that, though afterwards no such thing occur, they may shape their faith according to that which has occurred once for all. And therefore the Holy Spirit descended visibly, under a bodily shape, on Christ at His baptism, in order that we may believe Him to descend invisibly on all those who are baptized. Reply Obj. 4: The Holy Spirit appeared over Christ at His baptism, under the form of a dove, for four reasons. First, on account of the disposition required in the one baptized—namely, that he approach in good faith: since, as it is written (Wis 1:5): The Holy Spirit of discipline will flee from the deceitful. For the dove is an animal of a simple character, void of cunning and deceit: whence it is said (Matt 10:16): Be ye simple as doves. Second, in order to designate the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, which are signified by the properties of the dove. For the dove dwells beside the running stream, in order that, on perceiving the hawk, it may plunge in and escape. This refers to the gift of wisdom, whereby the saints dwell beside the running waters of Holy Scripture, in order to escape the assaults of the devil. Again, the dove prefers the more choice seeds. This refers to the gift of knowledge, whereby the saints make choice of sound doctrines, with which they nourish themselves. Further, the dove feeds the brood of other birds. This refers to the gift of counsel, with which

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non lacerat rostro. Quod pertinet ad donum intellectus, quo sancti bonas sententias lacerando non pervertunt, haereticorum more. Item columba felle caret. Quod pertinet ad donum pietatis, per quam sancti ira irrationabili carent. Item columba in cavernis petrae nidificat. Quod pertinet ad donum fortitudinis, qua sancti in plagis mortis Christi, qui est petra firma, nidum ponunt, idest, suum refugium et spem. Item columba gemitum pro cantu habet. Quod pertinet ad donum timoris, quo sancti delectantur in gemitu pro peccatis.

Tertio, apparuit Spiritus Sanctus in specie columbae propter effectum proprium Baptismi, qui est remissio peccatorum et reconciliatio ad Deum, columba enim est animal mansuetum. Et ideo, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., in diluvio apparuit hoc animal, ramum ferens olivae et communem orbis terrarum tranquillitatem annuntians, et nunc etiam columba apparet in Baptismo, liberationem nobis demonstrans. Quarto, apparuit Spiritus Sanctus in specie columbae super dominum baptizatum, ad designandum communem effectum Baptismi, qui est constructio ecclesiasticae unitatis. Unde dicitur Ephes. V, quod Christus tradidit semetipsum ut exhiberet sibi gloriosam Ecclesiam, non habentem maculam aut rugam aut aliquid huiusmodi, lavans eam lavacro aquae in verbo vitae. Et ideo convenienter Spiritus Sanctus in Baptismo demonstratus est in specie columbae, quae est animal amicabile et gregale. Unde et Cantic. VI dicitur de Ecclesia, una est columba mea. Super apostolos autem in specie ignis Spiritus Sanctus descendit, propter duo. Primo quidem, ad ostendendum fervorem quo corda eorum erant commovenda, ad hoc quod Christum ubicumque inter pressuras praedicarent. Et ideo etiam in igneis linguis apparuit. Unde Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., duobus modis ostendit visibiliter dominus spiritum sanctum, scilicet per columbam, super dominum baptizatum; per ignem, super discipulos congregatos. Ibi simplicitas, hic fervor ostenditur. Ergo, ne per spiritum sanctificati dolum habeant, in columba demonstratus est, et ne simplicitas frigida remaneat, in igne demonstratus est. Nec moveat, quia linguae divisae sunt, unitatem in columba cognosce. Secundo quia, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, cum oportebat delictis ignoscere, quod fit in Baptismo, mansuetudo necessaria erat, quae demonstratur in columba. Sed ubi adepti sumus gratiam, restat iudicii tempus, quod significatur per ignem.

Q. 39, A. 6

the saints, by teaching and example, feed men who have been the brood, i.e., imitators, of the devil. Again, the dove tears not with its beak. This refers to the gift of understanding, wherewith the saints do not rend sound doctrines, as heretics do. Again, the dove has no gall. This refers to the gift of piety, by reason of which the saints are free from unreasonable anger. Again, the dove builds its nest in the cleft of a rock. This refers to the gift of fortitude, wherewith the saints build their nest, i.e., take refuge and hope, in the death wounds of Christ, who is the Rock of strength. Lastly, the dove has a plaintive song. This refers to the gift of fear, wherewith the saints delight in bewailing sins. Third, the Holy Spirit appeared under the form of a dove on account of the proper effect of baptism, which is the remission of sins and reconciliation with God: for the dove is a gentle creature. Wherefore, as Chrysostom says, (Hom. xii in Matth.), at the Deluge this creature appeared bearing an olive branch, and publishing the tidings of the universal peace of the whole world: and now again the dove appears at the baptism, pointing to our Deliverer. Fourth, the Holy Spirit appeared over our Lord at His baptism in the form of a dove, in order to designate the common effect of baptism—namely, the building up of the unity of the Church. Hence it is written (Eph 5:25–27): Christ delivered Himself up . . . that He might present . . . to Himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle, or any such thing . . . cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life. Therefore it was fitting that the Holy Spirit should appear at the baptism under the form of a dove, which is a creature both loving and gregarious. Wherefore also it is said of the Church (Song 6:8): One is my dove. But on the apostles the Holy Spirit descended under the form of fire, for two reasons. First, to show with what fervor their hearts were to be moved, so as to preach Christ everywhere, though surrounded by opposition. And therefore He appeared as a fiery tongue. Hence Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. vi): Our Lord manifests the Holy Spirit visibly in two ways—namely, by the dove coming upon the Lord when He was baptized; by fire, coming upon the disciples when they were met together . . . In the former case simplicity is shown, in the latter fervor . . . We learn, then, from the dove, that those who are sanctified by the Spirit should be without guile: and from the fire, that their simplicity should not be left to wax cold. Nor let it disturb anyone that the tongues were cloven . . . in the dove recognize unity. Second, because, as Chrysostom says (Gregory, Hom. xxx in Ev.): Since sins had to be forgiven, which is effected in baptism, meekness was required; this is shown by the dove: but when we have obtained grace we must look forward to be judged; and this is signified by the fire.

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Article 7 Whether the dove in which the Holy Spirit appeared was real? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod illa columba in qua Spiritus Sanctus apparuit, non fuerit verum animal. Illud enim videtur specie tenus apparere quod secundum similitudinem apparet sed Luc. III dicitur quod descendit Spiritus Sanctus corporali specie sicut columba in ipsum. Non ergo fuit vera columba, sed quaedam similitudo columbae. Praeterea, sicut natura nihil facit frustra, ita nec Deus, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Sed cum columba illa non advenerit nisi ut aliquid significaret atque praeteriret, ut Augustinus dicit, in II de Trin., frustra fuisset vera columba, quia hoc ipsum fieri poterat per columbae similitudinem. Non ergo illa columba fuit verum animal. Praeterea, proprietates cuiuslibet rei ducunt in cognitionem naturae illius rei. Si ergo fuisset illa columba verum animal, proprietates columbae significassent naturam veri animalis, non autem effectus spiritus sancti. Non ergo videtur quod illa columba fuerit verum animal. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de agone Christiano, neque hoc ita dicimus ut dominum Iesum Christum dicamus solum verum corpus habuisse, spiritum autem sanctum fallaciter apparuisse oculis hominum, sed ambo illa corpora vera esse credimus. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, non decebat ut filius Dei, qui est veritas patris, aliqua fictione uteretur, et ideo non phantasticum, sed verum corpus accepit. Et quia Spiritus Sanctus dicitur spiritus veritatis, ut patet Ioan. XVI, ideo etiam ipse veram columbam formavit in qua appareret, licet non assumeret ipsam in unitatem personae. Unde post praedicta verba Augustinus subdit, sicut non oportebat ut homines falleret filius Dei, sic etiam non oportebat ut falleret Spiritus Sanctus. Sed omnipotenti Deo, qui universam creaturam ex nihilo fabricavit, non erat difficile verum corpus columbae sine aliarum columbarum ministerio figurare, sicut non fuit ei difficile verum corpus in utero Mariae sine virili semine fabricare, cum creatura corporea et in visceribus feminae ad formandum hominem, et in ipso mundo ad formandum columbam, imperio domini voluntatique serviret. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Spiritus Sanctus dicitur descendisse in specie vel similitudine columbae, non ad excludendam veritatem columbae, sed ad ostendendum quod non apparuit in specie suae substantiae. Ad secundum dicendum quod non fuit superfluum formare veram columbam ut in ea Spiritus Sanctus appareret, quia per ipsam veritatem columbae significatur veritas spiritus sancti et effectuum eius.

Objection 1: It would seem that the dove in which the Holy Spirit appeared was not real. For that seems to be a mere apparition which appears in its semblance. But it is stated (Luke 3:22) that the Holy Spirit descended in a bodily shape as a dove upon Him. Therefore it was not a real dove, but a semblance of a dove. Obj. 2: Further, just as Nature does nothing useless, so neither does God (De Coelo i). Now since this dove came merely in order to signify something and pass away, as Augustine says (De Trin. ii), a real dove would have been useless: because the semblance of a dove was sufficient for that purpose. Therefore it was not a real dove. Obj. 3: Further, the properties of a thing lead us to a knowledge of that thing. If, therefore, this were a real dove, its properties would have signified the nature of the real animal, and not the effect of the Holy Spirit. Therefore it seems that it was not a real dove. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xxii): Nor do we say this as though we asserted that our Lord Jesus Christ alone had a real body, and that the Holy Spirit appeared to men’s eyes in a fallacious manner: but we say that both those bodies were real. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 5, A. 1), it was unbecoming that the Son of God, who is the Truth of the Father, should make use of anything unreal; wherefore He took, not an imaginary, but a real body. And since the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of Truth, as appears from John 16:13, therefore He too made a real dove in which to appear, though He did not assume it into unity of person. Wherefore, after the words quoted above, Augustine adds: Just as it behooved the Son of God not to deceive men, so it behooved the Holy Spirit not to deceive. But it was easy for Almighty God, who created all creatures out of nothing, to frame the body of a real dove without the help of other doves, just as it was easy for Him to form a true body in Mary’s womb without the seed of a man: since the corporeal creature obeys its Lord’s command and will, both in the mother’s womb in forming a man, and in the world itself in forming a dove. Reply Obj. 1: The Holy Spirit is said to have descended in the shape or semblance of a dove, not in the sense that the dove was not real, but in order to show that He did not appear in the form of His substance. Reply Obj. 2: It was not superfluous to form a real dove, in which the Holy Spirit might appear, because by the very reality of the dove the reality of the Holy Spirit and of His effects is signified.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod proprietates columbae Reply Obj. 3: The properties of the dove lead us to uneodem modo ducunt ad significandam naturam colum- derstand the dove’s nature and the effects of the Holy Spirit bae, et ad designandos effectus spiritus sancti. Per hoc in the same way. Because from the very fact that the dove enim quod columba habet tales proprietates, contingit has such properties, it results that it signifies the Holy Spirit. quod columba significat spiritum sanctum.

Article 8 Whether it was becoming, when Christ was baptized, that the Father’s voice should be heard, bearing witness to the Son? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter, Christo baptizato, fuit vox patris audita filium protestantis. Filius enim et Spiritus Sanctus, secundum hoc quod sensibiliter apparuerunt, dicuntur visibiliter esse missi. Sed patri non convenit mitti, ut patet per Augustinum, in II de Trin. Ergo etiam nec apparere. Praeterea, vox est significativa verbi in corde concepti. Sed pater non est verbum. Ergo inconvenienter manifestatur in voce. Praeterea, homo Christus non incoepit esse filius Dei in Baptismo, sicut quidam haeretici putaverunt, sed a principio suae conceptionis fuit filius Dei. Magis ergo in nativitate debuit vox patris protestari Christi divinitatem, quam in eius Baptismo. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. III, ecce, vox de caelis dicens, hic est filius meus dilectus, in quo mihi complacui. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in Baptismo Christi, qui fuit exemplar nostri Baptismi, demonstrari debuit quod in nostro Baptismo perficitur. Baptismus autem quo baptizantur fideles, consecratur in invocatione et virtute Trinitatis, secundum illud Matth. ult., euntes, docete omnes gentes, baptizantes eos in nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti. Et ideo in Baptismo Christi, ut Hieronymus dicit, mysterium Trinitatis demonstratur, dominus ipse in natura humana baptizatur; Spiritus Sanctus descendit in habitu columbae; patris vox testimonium filio perhibentis auditur. Et ideo conveniens fuit ut in illo Baptismo pater declararetur in voce. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod missio visibilis addit aliquid super apparitionem, scilicet auctoritatem mittentis. Et ideo filius et Spiritus Sanctus, qui sunt ab alio, dicuntur non solum apparere, sed etiam visibiliter mitti. Pater autem, qui non est ab alio, apparere quidem potest, visibiliter autem mitti non potest. Ad secundum dicendum quod pater non demonstratur in voce nisi sicut auctor vocis, vel loquens per vocem. Et quia proprium est patri producere verbum, quod est dicere vel loqui, ideo convenientissime pater per vo-

Objection 1: It would seem that it was unbecoming when Christ was baptized for the Father’s voice to be heard bearing witness to the Son. For the Son and the Holy Spirit, according as they have appeared visibly, are said to have been visibly sent. But it does not become the Father to be sent, as Augustine makes it clear (De Trin. ii). Neither, therefore, (does it become Him) to appear. Obj. 2: Further, the voice gives expression to the word conceived in the heart. But the Father is not the Word. Therefore He is unfittingly manifested by a voice. Obj. 3: Further, the Man-Christ did not begin to be Son of God at His baptism, as some heretics have stated: but He was the Son of God from the beginning of His conception. Therefore the Father’s voice should have proclaimed Christ’s Godhead at His nativity rather than at His baptism. On the contrary, It is written (Matt 3:17): Behold a voice from heaven, saying: This is My beloved Son in whom I am well pleased. I answer that, As stated above (A. 5), that which is accomplished in our baptism should be manifested in Christ’s baptism, which was the exemplar of ours. Now the baptism which the faithful receive is hallowed by the invocation and the power of the Trinity; according to Matt. 28:19: Go ye and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Wherefore, as Jerome says on Matt. 3:16, 17: The mystery of the Trinity is shown forth in Christ’s baptism. Our Lord Himself is baptized in His human nature; the Holy Spirit descended in the shape of a dove: the Father’s voice is heard bearing witness to the Son. Therefore it was becoming that in that baptism the Father should be manifested by a voice. Reply Obj. 1: The visible mission adds something to the apparition, to wit, the authority of the sender. Therefore the Son and the Holy Spirit who are from another, are said not only to appear, but also to be sent visibly. But the Father, who is not from another, can appear indeed, but cannot be sent visibly. Reply Obj. 2: The Father is manifested by the voice, only as producing the voice or speaking by it. And since it is proper to the Father to produce the Word—that is, to utter or to speak—therefore was it most becoming that the

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cem manifestatus est, quae significat verbum. Unde et ipsa vox a patre emissa filiationem verbi protestatur. Et sicut species columbae, in qua demonstratus est Spiritus Sanctus, non est natura spiritus sancti; nec species hominis, in qua demonstratus est ipse filius, est ipsa natura filii Dei, ita etiam ipsa vox non pertinet ad naturam verbi vel patris loquentis. Unde Ioan. V dominus dicit, neque vocem eius, idest patris, unquam audistis, neque speciem eius vidistis. Per quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super Ioan., paulatim eos in philosophicum dogma inducens, ostendit quoniam neque vox circa Deum est neque species, sed superior et figuris est et loquelis talibus. Et sicut columbam, et etiam humanam naturam a Christo assumptam, tota Trinitas operata est, ita etiam formationem vocis, sed tamen in voce declaratur solus pater ut loquens, sicut naturam humanam solus filius assumpsit, et sicut in columba solus Spiritus Sanctus demonstratus est; ut patet per Augustinum, in libro de fide ad Petrum.

Ad tertium dicendum quod divinitas Christi non debuit omnibus in eius nativitate manifestari, sed magis occultari in defectibus infantilis aetatis. Sed quando iam pervenit ad perfectam aetatem, in qua oportebat eum docere et miracula facere et homines ad se convertere, tunc testimonio patris erat eius divinitas indicanda, ut eius doctrina credibilior fieret. Unde et ipse dicit, Ioan. V, qui misit me pater, ipse testimonium perhibet de me. Et hoc praecipue in Baptismo, per quem homines renascuntur in filios Dei adoptivos, filii enim Dei adoptivi instituuntur ad similitudinem filii naturalis, secundum illud Rom. VIII, quos praescivit, hos et praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis filii sui. Unde Hilarius dicit, super Matth., quod super Iesum baptizatum descendit Spiritus Sanctus, et vox patris audita est dicentis, hic est filius meus dilectus, ut ex his quae consummabantur in Christo, cognosceremus, post aquae lavacrum, et de caelestibus partibus sanctum in nos spiritum avolare, et paternae vocis adoptione Dei filios fieri.

IIIae

Father should be manifested by a voice, because the voice designates the word. Wherefore the very voice to which the Father gave utterance bore witness to the Sonship of the Word. And just as the form of the dove, in which the Holy Spirit was made manifest, is not the Nature of the Holy Spirit, nor is the form of man in which the Son Himself was manifested, the very Nature of the Son of God, so neither does the voice belong to the Nature of the Word or of the Father who spoke. Hence (John 5:37) our Lord says: Neither have you heard His, i.e., the Father’s, voice at any time, nor seen His shape. By which words, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xl in Joan.), He gradually leads them to the knowledge of the philosophical truth, and shows them that God has neither voice nor shape, but is above all such forms and utterances. And just as the whole Trinity made both the dove and the human nature assumed by Christ, so also they formed the voice: yet the Father alone as speaking is manifested by the voice, just as the Son alone assumed human nature, and the Holy Spirit alone is manifested in the dove, as Augustine makes evident. Reply Obj. 3: It was becoming that Christ’s Godhead should not be proclaimed to all in His nativity, but rather that It should be hidden while He was subject to the defects of infancy. But when He attained to the perfect age, when the time came for Him to teach, to work miracles, and to draw men to Himself then did it behoove His Godhead to be attested from on high by the Father’s testimony, so that His teaching might become the more credible. Hence He says (John 5:37): The Father Himself who sent Me, hath given testimony of Me. And specially at the time of baptism, by which men are born again into adopted sons of God; since God’s sons by adoption are made to be like unto His natural Son, according to Rom. 8:29: Whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son. Hence Hilary says (Super Matth. ii) that when Jesus was baptized, the Holy Spirit descended on Him, and the Father’s voice was heard saying: ‘This is My beloved Son,’ that we might know, from what was accomplished in Christ, that after being washed in the waters of baptism the Holy Spirit comes down upon us from on high, and that the Father’s voice declares us to have become the adopted sons of God.

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Question 40 Christ’s Manner of Life Consequenter, post ea quae pertinent ad ingressum Christi in mundum vel ad eius principium, considerandum restat de his quae pertinent ad progressum ipsius. Et primo, considerandum est de modo conversationis ipsius; secundo, de tentatione eius; tertio, de doctrina; quarto, de miraculis. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Christus debuerit solitariam vitam ducere, an inter homines conversari. Secundo, utrum debuerit austeram vitam ducere in cibo et potu et vestitu, an aliis communem.

Having considered those things which relate to Christ’s entrance into the world, or to His beginning, it remains for us to consider those that relate to the process of His life. And we must consider (1) His manner of life; (2) His temptation; (3) His doctrine; (4) His miracles. Concerning the first there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ should have led a solitary life, or have associated with men? (2) Whether He should have led an austere life as regards food, drink, and clothing? Or should He have conformed Himself to others in these respects? (3) Whether He should have adopted a lowly state of life, or one of wealth and honor? (4) Whether He should have lived in conformity with the Law?

Tertio, utrum debuerit abiecte vivere in hoc mundo, an cum divitiis et honore. Quarto, utrum debuerit secundum legem vivere.

Article 1 Whether Christ should have associated with men, or led a solitary life? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non debuerit inter homines conversari, sed solitariam agere vitam. Oportebat enim quod Christus sua conversatione non solum se hominem ostenderet, sed etiam Deum. Sed Deum non convenit cum hominibus conversari, dicitur enim Dan. II, exceptis diis, quorum non est cum hominibus conversatio; et philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod ille qui solitarius vivit, aut est bestia, si scilicet propter saevitiam hoc faciat, aut est Deus, si hoc faciat propter contemplandam veritatem. Ergo videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Christum inter homines conversari. Praeterea, Christus, dum in carne mortali vixit, debuit perfectissimam vitam ducere. Perfectissima autem vita est contemplativa, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Ad vitam autem contemplativam maxime competit solitudo, secundum illud Osee II, ducam eam in solitudinem, et loquar ad cor eius. Ergo videtur quod Christus debuerit solitariam vitam ducere. Praeterea, conversatio Christi debuit esse uniformis, quia semper in eo debuit apparere quod optimum est. Sed quandoque Christus solitaria loca quaerebat, turbas declinans, unde Remigius dicit, super Matth., tria refugia legitur dominus habuisse, navim, montem et desertum, ad quorum alterum, quotiescumque a turbis com-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have associated with men, but should have led a solitary life. For it behooved Christ to show by His manner of life not only that He was man, but also that He was God. But it is not becoming that God should associate with men, for it is written (Dan 2:11): Except the gods, whose conversation is not with men; and the Philosopher says (Polit. i) that he who lives alone is either a beast—that is, if he do this from being wild—or a god, if his motive be the contemplation of truth. Therefore it seems that it was not becoming for Christ to associate with men. Obj. 2: Further, while He lived in mortal flesh, it behooved Christ to lead a most perfect life. But the most perfect is the contemplative life, as we have stated in the Second Part (II-II, Q. 182, AA. 1, 2). Now, solitude is most suitable to the contemplative life; according to Osee 2:14: I will lead her into the wilderness, and I will speak to her heart. Therefore it seems that Christ should have led a solitary life. Obj. 3: Further, Christ’s manner of life should have been uniform: because it should always have given evidence of that which is best. But at times Christ avoided the crowd and sought lonely places: hence Remigius, commenting on Matthew, says: We read that our Lord had three places of refuge: the ship, the mountain, the desert; to one or

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primebatur, conscendebat. Ergo et semper debuit solita- other of which He betook Himself whenever he was harassed riam vitam agere. by the crowd. Therefore He ought always to have led a solitary life. Sed contra est quod dicitur Baruch III, post haec On the contrary, It is written (Bar 3:38): Afterwards in terris visus est, et cum hominibus conversatus est. He was seen upon earth and conversed with men. Respondeo dicendum quod conversatio Christi taI answer that, Christ’s manner of life had to be in lis debuit esse ut conveniret fini incarnationis, secun- keeping with the end of His Incarnation, by reason of which dum quam venit in mundum. Venit autem in mundum, He came into the world. Now He came into the world, primo quidem, ad manifestandum veritatem, sicut ipse first, that He might publish the truth. Thus He says Himself dicit, Ioan. XVIII, in hoc natus sum, et ad hoc veni in (John 18:37): For this was I born, and for this came I into the mundum, ut testimonium perhibeam veritati. Et ideo non world, that I should give testimony to the truth. Hence it was debebat se occultare, vitam solitariam agens, sed in pu- fitting not that He should hide Himself by leading a solitary blicum procedere, publice praedicando. Unde, Luc. IV, life, but that He should appear openly and preach in public. dicit illis qui volebant eum detinere, quia et aliis civitati- Wherefore (Luke 4:42, 43) He says to those who wished to bus oportet me evangelizare regnum Dei, quia ideo missus stay Him: To other cities also I must preach the kingdom of sum. God: for therefore am I sent. Secundo, venit ad hoc ut homines a peccato liberaSecond, He came in order to free men from sin; accordret, secundum illud I Tim. I, Christus Iesus venit in hunc ing to 1 Tim. 1:15: Christ Jesus came into this world to save mundum peccatores salvos facere. Et ideo, ut Chrysosto- sinners. And hence, as Chrysostom says, although Christ mus dicit, licet in eodem loco manendo posset Christus might, while staying in the same place, have drawn all men omnes ad se attrahere, ut eius praedicationem audirent, to Himself, to hear His preaching, yet He did not do so; thus non tamen hoc fecit, praebens nobis exemplum ut peram- giving us the example to go about and seek those who perish, bulemus et requiramus pereuntes, sicut pastor ovem per- like the shepherd in his search of the lost sheep, and the physiditam, et medicus accedit ad infirmum. cian in his attendance on the sick. Tertio, venit ut per ipsum habeamus accessum ad Third, He came that by Him we might have access to Deum, ut dicitur Rom. V. Et ita, familiariter cum homi- God, as it is written (Rom 5:2). And thus it was fitting that nibus conversando, conveniens fuit ut hominibus fidu- He should give men confidence in approaching Him by ciam daret ad se accedendi. Unde dicitur Matth. IX, fac- associating familiarly with them. Wherefore it is written tum est, discumbente eo in domo, ecce, multi publicani et (Matt 9:10): It came to pass as He was sitting . . . in the house, peccatores venientes discumbebant cum Iesu et discipulis behold, many publicans and sinners came, and sat down with eius. Quod exponens Hieronymus dicit, viderant publi- Jesus and His disciples. On which Jerome comments as folcanum, a peccatis ad meliora conversum, locum invenisse lows: They had seen the publican who had been converted poenitentiae, et ob id etiam ipsi non desperant salutem. from a sinful to a better life: and consequently they did not despair of their own salvation. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus per huReply Obj. 1: Christ wished to make His Godhead manitatem suam voluit manifestare divinitatem. Et ideo, known through His human nature. And therefore, since it conversando cum hominibus, quod est proprium homi- is proper to man to do so, He associated with men, at the nis, manifestavit omnibus suam divinitatem, praedican- same time manifesting His Godhead to all, by preaching do et miracula faciendo, et innocenter et iuste inter ho- and working miracles, and by leading among men a blamemines conversando. less and righteous life. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut in secunda Reply Obj. 2: As stated in the Second Part (II-II, parte dictum est, vita contemplativa simpliciter est me- Q. 182, A. 1; Q. 188, A. 6), the contemplative life is, absolior quam activa quae occupatur circa corporales actus, lutely speaking, more perfect than the active life, because sed vita activa secundum quam aliquis praedicando et the latter is taken up with bodily actions: yet that form of docendo contemplata aliis tradit, est perfectior quam vi- active life in which a man, by preaching and teaching, deta quae solum contemplatur, quia talis vita praesuppo- livers to others the fruits of his contemplation, is more pernit abundantiam contemplationis. Et ideo Christus ta- fect than the life that stops at contemplation, because such lem vitam elegit. a life is built on an abundance of contemplation, and consequently such was the life chosen by Christ. Ad tertium dicendum quod actio Christi fuit noReply Obj. 3: Christ’s action is our instruction. And stra instructio. Et ideo, ut daret exemplum praedicatori- therefore, in order to teach preachers that they ought not bus quod non semper se darent in publicum, ideo quan- to be for ever before the public, our Lord withdrew Himdoque dominus se a turbis retraxit. Quod quidem legitur self sometimes from the crowd. We are told of three reafecisse propter tria. Quandoque quidem propter corpo- sons for His doing this. First, for the rest of the body: hence

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ralem quietem. Unde Marci VI dicitur quod dominus dixit discipulis, venite seorsum in desertum locum, et requiescite pusillum. Erant enim qui veniebant et redibant multi, et nec spatium manducandi habebant. Quandoque vero causa orationis. Unde dicitur Luc. VI, factum est in illis diebus, exiit in montem orare, et erat pernoctans in oratione Dei. Ubi dicit Ambrosius quod ad praecepta virtutis suo nos informat exemplo. Quandoque vero ut doceat favorem humanum vitare. Unde super illud Matth. V, videns Iesus turbas ascendit in montem, dicit Chrysostomus, per hoc quod non in civitate et foro, sed in monte et solitudine sedit, erudivit nos nihil ad ostentationem facere, et a tumultibus abscedere, et maxime cum de necessariis disputare oporteat.

Q. 40, A. 2

(Mark 6:31) it is stated that our Lord said to His disciples: Come apart into a desert place, and rest a little. For there were many coming and going: and they had not so much as time to eat. But sometimes it was for the sake of prayer; thus it is written (Luke 6:12): It came to pass in those days, that He went out into a mountain to pray; and He passed the whole night in the prayer of God. On this Ambrose remarks that by His example He instructs us in the precepts of virtue. And sometimes He did so in order to teach us to avoid the favor of men. Wherefore Chrysostom, commenting on Matt. 5:1, Jesus, seeing the multitude, went up into a mountain, says: By sitting not in the city and in the market-place, but on a mountain and in a place of solitude, He taught us to do nothing for show, and to withdraw from the crowd, especially when we have to discourse of needful things.

Article 2 Whether it was becoming that Christ should lead an austere life in this world? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christum decuerit austeram vitam ducere in hoc mundo. Christus enim multo magis praedicavit perfectionem vitae quam Ioannes. Sed Ioannes austeram vitam duxit, ut suo exemplo homines ad perfectionem vitae provocaret, dicitur enim, Matth. III, quod ipse Ioannes habebat vestimentum de pilis camelorum, et zonam pelliceam circa lumbos suos, esca autem eius erant locustae et mel sylvestre; quod exponens Chrysostomus dicit, erat mirabile in humano corpore tantam patientiam videre, quod et Iudaeos magis attrahebat. Ergo videtur quod multo magis Christum decuerit austeritas vitae. Praeterea, abstinentia ad continentiam ordinatur, dicitur enim Osee IV, comedentes non saturabuntur, fornicati sunt, et non cessaverunt. Sed Christus continentiam et in se servavit, et aliis servandam proposuit, cum dixit, Matth. XIX, sunt eunuchi qui se castraverunt propter regnum caelorum, qui potest capere, capiat. Ergo videtur quod Christus in se, et in suis discipulis, austeritatem vitae servare debuerit. Praeterea, ridiculum videtur ut aliquis districtiorem vitam incipiat, et ab ea in laxiorem revertatur, potest enim dici contra eum quod habetur Luc. XIV, hic homo coepit aedificare, et non potuit consummare. Christus autem districtissimam vitam incoepit post Baptismum, manens in deserto et ieiunans quadraginta diebus et quadraginta noctibus. Ergo videtur non fuisse congruum quod post tantam vitae districtionem ad communem vitam rediret. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. XI, venit filius hominis manducans et bibens.

Objection 1: It would seem that it was becoming that Christ should lead an austere life in this world. For Christ preached the perfection of life much more than John did. But John led an austere life in order that he might persuade men by his example to embrace a perfect life; for it is written (Matt 3:4) that the same John had his garment of camel’s hair and a leathern girdle about his loins: and his meat was locusts and wild honey; on which Chrysostom comments as follows (Hom. x): It was a marvelous and strange thing to behold such austerity in a human frame: which thing also particularly attracted the Jews. Therefore it seems that an austere life was much more becoming to Christ. Obj. 2: Further, abstinence is ordained to continency; for it is written (Hos 4:10): They shall eat and shall not be filled; they have committed fornication, and have not ceased. But Christ both observed continency in Himself and proposed it to be observed by others when He said (Matt 19:12): There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven: he that can take it let him take it. Therefore it seems that Christ should have observed an austere life both in Himself and in His disciples. Obj. 3: Further, it seems absurd for a man to begin a stricter form of life and to return to an easier life: for one might quote to his discredit that which is written, Luke 14:30: This man began to build, and was not able to finish. Now Christ began a very strict life after His baptism, remaining in the desert and fasting for forty days and forty nights. Therefore it seems unbecoming that, after leading such a strict life, He should return to the common manner of living. On the contrary, It is written (Matt 11:19): The Son of Man came eating and drinking.

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Respondeo dicendum quod sicut dictum est, congruum erat incarnationis fini ut Christus non ageret solitariam vitam, sed cum hominibus conversaretur. Qui autem cum aliquibus conversatur, convenientissimum est ut se eis in conversatione conformet, secundum illud apostoli, I Cor. IX, omnibus omnia factus sum. Et ideo convenientissimum fuit ut Christus in cibo et potu communiter se sicut alii haberet. Unde Augustinus dicit, contra Faustum, quod Ioannes dictus est non manducans neque bibens, quia illo victu quo Iudaei utebantur, non utebatur. Hoc ergo dominus nisi uteretur, non in eius comparatione manducans bibensque diceretur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus in sua conversatione exemplum perfectionis dedit in omnibus quae per se pertinent ad salutem. Ipsa autem abstinentia cibi et potus non per se pertinet ad salutem, secundum illud Rom. XIV, non est regnum Dei esca et potus. Et Augustinus dicit, in libro de quaestionibus Evang., exponens illud Matth. XI, iustificata est sapientia a filiis suis, quia scilicet sancti apostoli intellexerunt regnum Dei non esse in esca et potu, sed in aequanimitate tolerandi, quos nec copia sublevat nec deprimit egestas. Et in III de Doct. Christ., dicit quod in omnibus talibus non usus rerum, sed libido utentis in culpa est. Utraque autem vita est licita et laudabilis, ut scilicet aliquis a communi consortio hominum segregatus abstinentiam servet; et ut in societate aliorum positus communi vita utatur. Et ideo dominus voluit utriusque vitae exemplum dare hominibus. Ioannes autem, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., nihil plus ostendit praeter vitam et iustitiam. Christus autem et a miraculis testimonium habebat. Dimittens ergo Ioannem ieiunio fulgere, ipse contrariam incessit viam, ad mensam intrans publicanorum, et manducans et bibens. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut alii homines per abstinentiam consequuntur virtutem continendi, ita etiam Christus, in se et suis per virtutem suae divinitatis carnem comprimebat. Unde, sicut legitur Matth. IX, Pharisaei et discipuli Ioannis ieiunabant, non autem discipuli Christi. Quod exponens Beda dicit quod Ioannes vinum et siceram non bibit, quia illi abstinentia meritum auget cui potentia nulla inerat naturae. Dominus autem, cui naturaliter suppetebat delicta donare, cur eos declinaret quos abstinentibus poterat reddere puriores? Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., ut discas quam magnum bonum est ieiunium, et qualiter scutum est adversus Diabolum, et quoniam post Baptismum non lasciviae, sed ieiunio intendere oportet, ipse ieiunavit, non eo indigens, sed nos instruens. Non autem ultra processit ieiunando quam Moyses et Elias, ne incredibilis videretur carnis assumptio. Secundum mysterium autem, ut Gregorius dicit,

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I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), it was in keeping with the end of the Incarnation that Christ should not lead a solitary life, but should associate with men. Now it is most fitting that he who associates with others should conform to their manner of living; according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor 9:22): I became all things to all men. And therefore it was most fitting that Christ should conform to others in the matter of eating and drinking. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xvi) that John is described as ‘neither eating nor drinking,’ because he did not take the same food as the Jews. Therefore, unless our Lord had taken it, it would not be said of Him, in contrast, ‘eating and drinking.’ Reply Obj. 1: In His manner of living our Lord gave an example of perfection as to all those things which of themselves relate to salvation. Now abstinence in eating and drinking does not of itself relate to salvation, according to Rom. 14:17: The kingdom of God is not meat and drink. And Augustine (De Qq. Evang. ii, qu. 11) explains Matt. 11:19, Wisdom is justified by her children, saying that this is because the holy apostles understood that the kingdom of God does not consist in eating and drinking, but in suffering indigence with equanimity, for they are neither uplifted by affluence, nor distressed by want. Again (De Doctr. Christ. iii), he says that in all such things it is not making use of them, but the wantonness of the user, that is sinful. Now both these lives are lawful and praiseworthy—namely, that a man withdraw from the society of other men and observe abstinence; and that he associate with other men and live like them. And therefore our Lord wished to give men an example of either kind of life. As to John, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxxvii super Matth.), he exhibited no more than his life and righteous conduct . . . but Christ had the testimony also of miracles. Leaving, therefore, John to be illustrious by his fasting, He Himself came the opposite way, both coming unto publicans’ tables and eating and drinking. Reply Obj. 2: Just as by abstinence other men acquire the power of self-restraint, so also Christ, in Himself and in those that are His, subdued the flesh by the power of His Godhead. Wherefore, as we read Matt. 9:14, the Pharisees and the disciples of John fasted, but not the disciples of Christ. On which Bede comments, saying that John drank neither wine nor strong drink: because abstinence is meritorious where the nature is weak. But why should our Lord, whose right by nature it is to forgive sins, avoid those whom He could make holier than such as abstain? Reply Obj. 3: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xiii super Matth.), that thou mightest learn how great a good is fasting, and how it is a shield against the devil, and that after baptism thou shouldst give thyself up, not to luxury, but to fasting—for this cause did He fast, not as needing it Himself, but as teaching us . . . And for this did He proceed no further than Moses and Elias, lest His assumption of our flesh might seem incredible. The mystical meaning, as Gregory says (Hom. xvi

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quadragenarius numerus exemplo Christi in ieiunio custoditur, quia virtus Decalogi per libros quatuor sancti Evangelii impletur, denarius enim quater ductus in quadragenarium surgit. Vel, quia in hoc mortali corpore ex quatuor elementis subsistimus, per cuius voluntatem praeceptis dominicis contraimus, quae per Decalogum sunt accepta. Vel, secundum Augustinum, in libro octogintatrium quaest., omnis sapientiae disciplina est creatorem creaturamque cognoscere. Creator est Trinitas, pater et filius et Spiritus Sanctus. Creatura vero partim est invisibilis, sicut anima, cui ternarius numerus tribuitur, diligere enim Deum tripliciter iubemur, ex toto corde, ex tota anima, ex tota mente, partim visibilis, sicut corpus, cui quaternarius debetur propter calidum, humidum, frigidum et siccum. Denarius ergo numerus, qui totam insinuat disciplinam, quater ductus, idest numero qui corpori tribuitur multiplicatus, quia per corpus administratio geritur, quadragenarium conficit numerum. Et ideo tempus quo ingemiscimus et dolemus, quadragenario numero celebratur. Nec tamen incongruum fuit ut Christus post ieiunium et desertum ad communem vitam rediret. Hoc enim convenit vitae secundum quam aliquis contemplata aliis tradit, quam Christum dicimus assumpsisse, ut primo contemplationi vacet, et postea ad publicum actionis descendat aliis convivendo. Unde et Beda dicit, super Marc., ieiunavit Christus, ne praeceptum declinares, manducavit cum peccatoribus, ut, gratiam cernens, agnosceres potestatem.

Q. 40, A. 3

in Evang.), is that by Christ’s example the number forty is observed in His fast, because the power of the decalogue is fulfilled throughout the four books of the Holy Gospel: since ten multiplied by four amounts to forty. Or, because we live in this mortal body composed of the four elements, and by its lusts we transgress the commandments of the Lord, which are expressed in the decalogue. Or, according to Augustine (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 81): To know the Creator and the creature is the entire teaching of wisdom. The Creator is the Trinity, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Now the creature is partly invisible, as the soul, to which the number three may be ascribed, for we are commanded to love God in three ways, ‘with our whole heart, our whole soul, and our whole mind’; and partly visible, as the body, to which the number four is applicable on account of its being subject to heat, moisture, cold, and dryness. Hence if we multiply ten, which may be referred to the entire moral code, by four, which number may be applied to the body, because it is the body that executes the law, the product is the number forty: in which, consequently, the time during which we sigh and grieve is shown forth. And yet there was no inconsistency in Christ’s returning to the common manner of living, after fasting and (retiring into the) desert. For it is becoming to that kind of life, which we hold Christ to have embraced, wherein a man delivers to others the fruits of his contemplation, that he devote himself first of all to contemplation, and that he afterwards come down to the publicity of active life by associating with other men. Hence Bede says on Mk. 2:18: Christ fasted, that thou mightest not disobey the commandment; He ate with sinners, that thou mightest discern His sanctity and acknowledge His power.

Article 3 Whether Christ should have led a life of poverty in this world? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus in hoc mundo non debuerit pauperem vitam ducere. Christus enim debuit eligibilissimam vitam assumere. Sed eligibilissima vita est quae est mediocris inter divitias et paupertatem, dicitur enim Proverb. XXX, mendicitatem et divitias ne dederis mihi, tribue tantum victui meo necessaria. Ergo Christus non debuit pauperem vitam ducere, sed moderatam. Praeterea, exteriores divitiae ad usum corporis ordinantur quantum ad victum et vestitum. Sed Christus in victu et vestitu communem vitam duxit, secundum modum aliorum quibus convivebat. Ergo videtur quod etiam in divitiis et paupertate communem modum vivendi servare debuit, et non uti maxima paupertate. Praeterea, Christus maxime homines invitavit ad exemplum humilitatis, secundum illud Matth. XI, disci-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have led a life of poverty in this world. Because Christ should have embraced the most eligible form of life. But the most eligible form of life is that which is a mean between riches and poverty; for it is written (Prov 30:8): Give me neither beggary nor riches; give me only the necessaries of life. Therefore Christ should have led a life, not of poverty, but of moderation. Obj. 2: Further, external wealth is ordained to bodily use as to food and raiment. But Christ conformed His manner of life to those among whom He lived, in the matter of food and raiment. Therefore it seems that He should have observed the ordinary manner of life as to riches and poverty, and have avoided extreme poverty. Obj. 3: Further, Christ specially invited men to imitate His example of humility, according to Matt. 11:29: Learn

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te a me, quia mitis sum et humilis. Sed humilitas maxime commendatur in divitibus, ut dicitur I ad Tim. ult., divitibus huius saeculi praecipe non altum sapere. Ergo videtur quod Christus non debuit ducere pauperem vitam. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. VIII, filius hominis non habet ubi caput reclinet. Quasi dicat, secundum Hieronymum, quid me propter divitias et saeculi lucra cupis sequi, cum tantae sim paupertatis ut nec hospitiolum quidem habeam, et tecto utar non meo? Et super illud Matth. XVII, ut non scandalizemus eos vade ad mare, dicit Hieronymus, hoc, simpliciter intellectum, aedificat auditorem, dum audit tantae dominum fuisse paupertatis ut unde tributa pro se et apostolo redderet, non habuerit. Respondeo dicendum quod Christum decuit in hoc mundo pauperem vitam ducere. Primo quidem, quia hoc erat congruum praedicationis officio, propter quod venisse se dicit, Marc. I, eamus in proximos vicos et civitates, ut et ibi praedicem, ad hoc enim veni. Oportet autem praedicatores verbi Dei, ut omnino vacent praedicationi, omnino a saecularium rerum cura esse absolutos. Quod facere non possunt qui divitias possident. Unde et ipse dominus, apostolos ad praedicandum mittens, dicit eis, nolite possidere aurum neque argentum. Et ipsi apostoli dicunt, Act. VI, non est aequum nos relinquere verbum et ministrare mensis. Secundo quia, sicut mortem corporalem assumpsit ut nobis vitam largiretur spiritualem, ita corporalem paupertatem sustinuit ut nobis spirituales divitias largiretur, secundum illud II Cor. VIII, scitis gratiam domini nostri Iesu Christi, quoniam propter nos egenus factus est, ut illius inopia divites essemus. Tertio ne, si divitias haberet, cupiditati eius praedicatio adscriberetur. Unde Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., quod, si discipuli divitias habuissent, videbantur non causa salutis hominum, sed causa lucri praedicasse. Et eadem ratio est de Christo. Quarto, ut tanto maior virtus divinitatis eius ostenderetur, quanto per paupertatem videbatur abiectior. Unde dicitur in quodam sermone Ephesini Concilii, omnia paupera et vilia elegit, omnia mediocria et plurimis obscura, ut divinitas cognosceretur orbem terrarum transformasse. Propterea pauperculam elegit matrem, pauperiorem patriam, egens fit pecuniis. Et hoc tibi exponat praesepe. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod superabundantia divitiarum et mendicitas vitanda videntur ab his qui volunt vivere secundum virtutem, inquantum sunt occasiones peccandi, abundantia namque divitiarum est superbiendi occasio; mendicitas vero est occasio furandi et mentiendi, aut etiam periurandi. Quia vero Christus

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of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart. But humility is most commendable in the rich; thus it is written (1 Tim 6:11): Charge the rich of this world not to be highminded. Therefore it seems that Christ should not have chosen a life of poverty. On the contrary, It is written (Matt 8:20): The Son of Man hath not where to lay His head: as though He were to say as Jerome observes: Why desirest thou to follow Me for the sake of riches and worldly gain, since I am so poor that I have not even the smallest dwelling-place, and I am sheltered by a roof that is not Mine? And on Matt. 17:26: That we may not scandalize them, go to the sea, Jerome says: This incident, taken literally, affords edification to those who hear it when they are told that our Lord was so poor that He had not the wherewithal to pay the tax for Himself and His apostles. I answer that, It was fitting for Christ to lead a life of poverty in this world. First, because this was in keeping with the duty of preaching, for which purpose He says that He came (Mark 1:38): Let us go into the neighboring towns and cities, that I may preach there also: for to this purpose am I come. Now in order that the preachers of God’s word may be able to give all their time to preaching, they must be wholly free from care of worldly matters: which is impossible for those who are possessed of wealth. Wherefore the Lord Himself, when sending the apostles to preach, said to them (Matt 10:9): Do not possess gold nor silver. And the apostles (Acts 6:2) say: It is not reasonable that we should leave the word of God and serve tables. Second, because just as He took upon Himself the death of the body in order to bestow spiritual life on us, so did He bear bodily poverty, in order to enrich us spiritually, according to 2 Cor. 8:9: You know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ: that . . . He became poor for our sakes that through His poverty we might be rich. Third, lest if He were rich His preaching might be ascribed to cupidity. Wherefore Jerome says on Matt. 10:9, that if the disciples had been possessed of wealth, they had seemed to preach for gain, not for the salvation of mankind. And the same reason applies to Christ. Fourth, that the more lowly He seemed by reason of His poverty, the greater might the power of His Godhead be shown to be. Hence in a sermon of the Council of Ephesus (P. iii, c. ix) we read: He chose all that was poor and despicable, all that was of small account and hidden from the majority, that we might recognize His Godhead to have transformed the terrestrial sphere. For this reason did He choose a poor maid for His Mother, a poorer birthplace; for this reason did He live in want. Learn this from the manger. Reply Obj. 1: Those who wish to live virtuously need to avoid abundance of riches and beggary, in as far as these are occasions of sin: since abundance of riches is an occasion for being proud; and beggary is an occasion of thieving and lying, or even of perjury. But forasmuch as Christ was incapable of sin, He had not the same motive as Solomon

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peccati capax non erat, propter hanc causam, ex qua Salomon haec vitabat, Christo vitanda non erant. Neque tamen quaelibet mendicitas est furandi et periurandi occasio, ut ibidem Salomon subdere videtur, sed sola illa quae est contraria voluntati, ad quam vitandam homo furatur et periurat. Sed paupertas voluntaria hoc periculum non habet. Et talem paupertatem Christus elegit. Ad secundum dicendum quod communi vita uti quantum ad victum et vestitum potest aliquis non solum divitias possidendo, sed etiam a divitibus necessaria accipiendo. Quod etiam circa Christum factum est, dicitur enim Lucae VIII, quod mulieres quaedam sequebantur Christum, quae ministrabant ei de facultatibus suis. Ut enim Hieronymus dicit, contra Vigilantium, consuetudinis Iudaicae fuit, nec ducebatur in culpam, more gentis antiquo, ut mulieres de substantia sua victum et vestitum praeceptoribus suis ministrarent. Hoc autem, quia scandalum facere poterat in nationibus, Paulus se abiecisse commemorat. Sic ergo communis victus poterat esse sine sollicitudine impediente praedicationis officium, non autem divitiarum possessio. Ad tertium dicendum quod in eo qui ex necessitate pauper est, humilitas non multum commendatur. Sed in eo qui voluntarie pauper est, sicut fuit Christus, ipsa paupertas est maximae humilitatis indicium.

Q. 40, A. 4

for avoiding these things. Yet neither is every kind of beggary an occasion of theft and perjury, as Solomon seems to add (Prov 30:8); but only that which is involuntary, in order to avoid which, a man is guilty of theft and perjury. But voluntary poverty is not open to this danger: and such was the poverty chosen by Christ. Reply Obj. 2: A man may feed and clothe himself in conformity with others, not only by possessing riches, but also by receiving the necessaries of life from those who are rich. This is what happened in regard to Christ: for it is written (Luke 8:2, 3) that certain women followed Christ and ministered unto Him of their substance. For, as Jerome says on Matt. 27:55, It was a Jewish custom, nor was it thought wrong for women, following the ancient tradition of their nation, out of their private means to provide their instructors with food and clothing. But as this might give scandal to the heathens, Paul says that he gave it up: thus it was possible for them to be fed out of a common fund, but not to possess wealth, without their duty of preaching being hindered by anxiety. Reply Obj. 3: Humility is not much to be praised in one who is poor of necessity. But in one who, like Christ, is poor willingly, poverty itself is a sign of very great humility.

Article 4 Whether Christ conformed his conduct to the law? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non fuerit conversatus secundum legem. Lex enim praecipiebat ut nihil operis in sabbato fieret, sicut Deus die septimo requievit ab omni opere quod patrarat. Sed ipse in sabbato curavit hominem, et ei mandavit ut tolleret lectum suum. Ergo videtur quod non fuerit secundum legem conversatus. Praeterea, eadem Christus fecit et docuit, secundum illud Act. I, coepit Iesus facere et docere. Sed ipse docuit, Matth. XV, quod omne quod intrat in os, non coinquinat hominem, quod est contra praeceptum legis, quae per esum et contactum quorundam animalium dicebat hominem immundum fieri, ut patet Levit. XI. Ergo videtur quod ipse non fuerit secundum legem conversatus.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not conform His conduct to the Law. For the Law forbade any work whatsoever to be done on the Sabbath, since God rested on the seventh day from all His work which He had done. But He healed a man on the Sabbath, and commanded him to take up his bed. Therefore it seems that He did not conform His conduct to the Law. Obj. 2: Further, what Christ taught, that He also did, according to Acts 1:1: Jesus began to do and to teach. But He taught (Matt 15:11) that not all that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man: and this is contrary to the precept of the Law, which declared that a man was made unclean by eating and touching certain animals, as stated Lev. 11. Therefore it seems that He did not conform His conduct to the Law. Praeterea, idem iudicium videtur esse facientis et Obj. 3: Further, he who consents to anything is of the consentientis, secundum illud Rom. I, non solum illi qui same mind as he who does it, according to Rom. 1:32: Not faciunt, sed qui consentiunt facientibus. Sed Christus con- only they that do them, but they also that consent to them sensit discipulis solventibus legem in hoc quod sabbato that do them. But Christ, by excusing His disciples, conspicas vellebant, excusando eos, ut habetur Matth. XII. sented to their breaking the Law by plucking the ears of Ergo videtur quod Christus non conversatus fuerit se- corn on the Sabbath; as is related Matt. 12:1–8. Therefore it cundum legem. seems that Christ did not conform His conduct to the Law.

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Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. V, nolite putare quoniam veni solvere legem aut prophetas. Quod exponens Chrysostomus dicit, legem implevit, primo quidem, nihil transgrediendo legalium; secundo, iustificando per fidem, quod lex per litteram facere non valebat. Respondeo dicendum quod Christus in omnibus secundum legis praecepta conversatus est. In cuius signum, etiam voluit circumcidi, circumcisio enim est quaedam protestatio legis implendae, secundum illud Galat. V, testificor omni homini circumcidenti se, quoniam debitor est universae legis faciendae. Voluit autem Christus secundum legem conversari, primo quidem, ut legem veterem comprobaret. Secundo, ut eam observando in seipso consummaret et terminaret, ostendens quod ad ipsum erat ordinata. Tertio, ut Iudaeis occasionem calumniandi subtraheret. Quarto, ut homines a servitute legis liberaret, secundum illud Galat. IV, misit Deus filium suum factum sub lege, ut eos qui sub lege erant redimeret. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus super hoc se excusat a transgressione legis tripliciter. Uno quidem modo, quia per praeceptum de sanctificatione sabbati non interdicitur opus divinum, sed humanum opus, quamvis enim Deus die septima cessaverit a novis creaturis condendis, semper tamen operatur in rerum conservatione et gubernatione. Quod autem Christus miracula faciebat, erat operis divini. Unde ipse dicit, Ioan. V, pater meus usque modo operatur, et ego operor. Secundo, excusat se per hoc quod illo praecepto non prohibentur opera quae sunt de necessitate salutis corporalis. Unde ipse dicit, Luc. XIII, unusquisque vestrum non solvet sabbato bovem suum aut asinum a praesepio, et ducit adaquare? Et infra, XIV, cuius vestrum asinus aut bos in puteum cadit, et non continuo extrahet illum die sabbati? Manifestum est autem quod opera miraculorum quae Christus faciebat, ad salutem corporis et animae pertinebant. Tertio, quia illo praecepto non prohibentur opera quae pertinent ad Dei cultum unde dicit, Matth. XII, an non legistis in lege quia sabbatis sacerdotes in templo sabbatum violant, et sine crimine sunt? Et Ioan. VII dicitur quod circumcisionem accipit homo in sabbato. Quod autem Christus paralytico mandavit ut lectum suum sabbato portaret, ad cultum Dei pertinebat, idest ad laudem virtutis divinae. Et patet quod sabbatum non solvebat. Quamvis hoc ei Iudaei falso obiicerent, dicentes, Ioan. IX, non est hic homo a Deo, qui sabbatum non custodit.

Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus voluit ostendere per illa verba quod homo non redditur immundus secundum animam ex usu ciborum quorum-

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On the contrary, It is written (Matt 5:17): Do not think that I am come to destroy the Law or the Prophets. Commenting on these words, Chrysostom says: He fulfilled the Law . . . in one way, by transgressing none of the precepts of the Law; second, by justifying us through faith, which the Law, in the letter, was unable to do. I answer that, Christ conformed His conduct in all things to the precepts of the Law. In token of this He wished even to be circumcised; for the circumcision is a kind of protestation of a man’s purpose of keeping the Law, according to Gal. 5:3: I testify to every man circumcising himself, that he is a debtor to do the whole Law. And Christ, indeed, wished to conform His conduct to the Law, first, to show His approval of the Old Law. Second, that by obeying the Law He might perfect it and bring it to an end in His own self, so as to show that it was ordained to Him. Third, to deprive the Jews of an excuse for slandering Him. Fourth, in order to deliver men from subjection to the Law, according to Gal. 4:4, 5: God sent His Son . . . made under the Law that He might redeem them who were under the Law. Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord excuses Himself from any transgression of the Law in this matter, for three reasons. First, the precept of the hallowing of the Sabbath forbids not Divine work, but human work: for though God ceased on the seventh day from the creation of new creatures, yet He ever works by keeping and governing His creatures. Now that Christ wrought miracles was a Divine work: hence He says (John 5:17): My Father worketh until now; and I work. Second, He excuses Himself on the ground that this precept does not forbid works which are needful for bodily health. Wherefore He says (Luke 13:15): Doth not every one of you on the Sabbath-day loose his ox or his ass from the manger, and lead them to water? And farther on (Luke 14:5): Which of you shall have an ass or an ox fall into a pit, and will not immediately draw him out on the Sabbathday? Now it is manifest that the miraculous works done by Christ related to health of body and soul. Third, because this precept does not forbid works pertaining to the worship of God. Wherefore He says (Matt 12:5): Have ye not read in the Law that on the Sabbathdays the priests in the Temple break the Sabbath, and are without blame? And (John 7:23) it is written that a man receives circumcision on the Sabbath-day. Now when Christ commanded the paralytic to carry his bed on the Sabbathday, this pertained to the worship of God, i.e., to the praise of God’s power. And thus it is clear that He did not break the Sabbath: although the Jews threw this false accusation in His face, saying (John 9:16): This man is not of God, who keepeth not the Sabbath. Reply Obj. 2: By those words Christ wished to show that man is made unclean as to his soul, by the use of any sort of foods considered not in their nature, but only in

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cumque secundum suam naturam, sed solum secundum quandam significationem. Quod autem in lege quidam cibi dicuntur immundi, hoc est propter quandam significationem. Unde Augustinus dicit, contra Faustum, si de porco et agno requiratur, utrumque natura mundum est, quia omnis creatura Dei bona est, quadam vero significatione agnus mundus, porcus immundus est. Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam discipuli, quando esurientes spicas sabbato vellebant, a transgressione legis excusantur propter necessitatem famis, sicut et David non fuit transgressor legis quando, propter necessitatem famis, comedit panes quos ei edere non licebat.

Q. 40, A. 4

some signification. And that certain foods are in the Law called unclean is due to some signification; whence Augustine says (Contra Faust. vi): If a question be raised about swine and lambs, both are clean by nature, since ‘all God’s creatures are good’; but by a certain signification lambs are clean and swine unclean. Reply Obj. 3: The disciples also, when, being hungry, they plucked the ears of corn on the Sabbath, are to be excused from transgressing the Law, since they were pressed by hunger: just as David did not transgress the Law when, through being compelled by hunger, he ate the loaves which it was not lawful for him to eat.

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Question 41 Christ’s Temptation Deinde considerandum est de tentatione Christi. Et We have now to consider Christ’s temptation, concerncirca hoc quaeruntur quatuor. ing which there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum fuerit conveniens Christum tentari. (1) Whether it was becoming that Christ should be tempted? Secundo, de loco tentationis. (2) Of the place; Tertio, de tempore. (3) Of the time; Quarto, de modo et ordine tentationum. (4) Of the mode and order of the temptation.

Article 1 Whether it was becoming that Christ should be tempted? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christo tentari non conveniebat. Tentare enim est experimentum sumere. Quod quidem non fit nisi de re ignota. Sed virtus Christi erat nota etiam Daemonibus, dicitur enim Luc. IV, quod non sinebat Daemonia loqui, quia sciebant eum esse Christum. Ergo videtur quod non decuerit Christum tentari. Praeterea, Christus ad hoc venerat ut opera Diaboli dissolveret, secundum illud I Ioan. III, in hoc apparuit filius Dei, ut dissolvat opera Diaboli. Sed non est eiusdem dissolvere opera alicuius, et ea pati. Et ita videtur inconveniens fuisse quod Christus pateretur se tentari a Diabolo. Praeterea, triplex est tentatio, scilicet a carne, a mundo, a Diabolo. Sed Christus non fuit tentatus nec a carne nec a mundo. Ergo nec etiam debuit tentari a Diabolo. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. IV, ductus est Iesus a spiritu in desertum, ut tentaretur a Diabolo. Respondeo dicendum quod Christus tentari voluit, primo quidem, ut nobis contra tentationes auxilium ferret. Unde Gregorius dicit, in homilia, non erat indignum redemptori nostro quod tentari voluit, qui venerat et occidi, ut sic tentationes nostras suis tentationibus vinceret, sicut mortem nostram sua morte superavit. Secundo, propter nostram cautelam, ut nullus, quantumcumque sanctus, se existimet securum et immunem a tentatione. Unde etiam post Baptismum tentari voluit, quia, sicut Hilarius dicit, super Matth., in sanctificatis maxime Diaboli tentamenta grassantur, quia victoria magis est ei exoptanda de sanctis. Unde et Eccli. II dicitur, fi-

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not becoming for Christ to be tempted. For to tempt is to make an experiment, which is not done save in regard to something unknown. But the power of Christ was known even to the demons; for it is written (Luke 4:41) that He suffered them not to speak, for they knew that He was Christ. Therefore it seems that it was unbecoming for Christ to be tempted. Obj. 2: Further, Christ was come in order to destroy the works of the devil, according to 1 John 3:8: For this purpose the Son of God appeared, that He might destroy the works of the devil. But it is not for the same to destroy the works of a certain one and to suffer them. Therefore it seems unbecoming that Christ should suffer Himself to be tempted by the devil. Obj. 3: Further, temptation is from a threefold source— the flesh, the world, and the devil. But Christ was not tempted either by the flesh or by the world. Therefore neither should He have been tempted by the devil. On the contrary, It is written (Matt 4:1): Jesus was led by the Spirit into the desert to be tempted by the devil. I answer that, Christ wished to be tempted; first that He might strengthen us against temptations. Hence Gregory says in a homily (xvi in Evang.): It was not unworthy of our Redeemer to wish to be tempted, who came also to be slain; in order that by His temptations He might conquer our temptations, just as by His death He overcame our death. Second, that we might be warned, so that none, however holy, may think himself safe or free from temptation. Wherefore also He wished to be tempted after His baptism, because, as Hilary says (Super Matth., cap. iii.): The temptations of the devil assail those principally who are sanctified, for he desires, above all, to overcome the holy. Hence also it is

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li, accedens ad servitutem Dei, sta in iustitia et timore, et written (Sir 2): Son, when thou comest to the service of God, praepara animam tuam ad tentationem. stand in justice and in fear, and prepare thy soul for temptation. Tertio, propter exemplum, ut scilicet nos instrueret Third, in order to give us an example: to teach us, to wit, qualiter Diaboli tentationes vincamus. Unde Augustinus how to overcome the temptations of the devil. Hence Audicit, in IV de Trin. quod Christus Diabolo se tentandum gustine says (De Trin. iv) that Christ allowed Himself to be praebuit, ut ad superandas tentationes eius mediator esset, tempted by the devil, that He might be our Mediator in overnon solum per adiutorium, verum etiam per exemplum. coming temptations, not only by helping us, but also by giving us an example. Quarto, ut nobis fiduciam de sua misericordia largiFourth, in order to fill us with confidence in His mercy. retur. Unde dicitur Heb. IV, non habemus pontificem qui Hence it is written (Heb 4:15): We have not a high-priest, non possit compati infirmitatibus nostris, tentatum autem who cannot have compassion on our infirmities, but one per omnia, pro similitudine, absque peccato. tempted in all things like as we are, without sin. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix): Christ dicit, in IX de Civ. Dei, Christus tantum innotuit Daemo- was known to the demons only so far as He willed; not as nibus quantum voluit, non per id quod est vita aeterna, the Author of eternal life, but as the cause of certain temsed per quaedam temporalia suae virtutis effecta, ex qui- poral effects, from which they formed a certain conjecture bus quandam coniecturam habebant Christum esse fi- that Christ was the Son of God. But since they also oblium Dei. Sed quia rursus in eo quaedam signa humanae served in Him certain signs of human frailty, they did not infirmitatis videbant, non pro certo cognoscebant eum know for certain that He was the Son of God: wherefore esse filium Dei. Et ideo eum tentare voluit. Et hoc si- (the devil) wished to tempt Him. This is implied by the gnificatur Matth. IV, ubi dicitur quod postquam esuriit, words of Matt. 4:2, 3, saying that, after He was hungry, accessit tentator ad eum, quia, ut Hilarius dicit, tentare the tempter came to Him, because, as Hilary says (Super Christum Diabolus non fuisset ausus, nisi in eo, per esu- Matth., cap. iii), Had not Christ’s weakness in hungering beritionis infirmitatem, quae sunt hominis recognosceret. Et trayed His human nature, the devil would not have dared hoc etiam patet ex ipso modo tentandi, cum dixit, si fi- to tempt Him. Moreover, this appears from the very manlius Dei es. Quod exponens Gregorius dicit, quid sibi vult ner of the temptation, when he said: If Thou be the Son of talis sermonis exorsus, nisi quia cognoverat Dei filium esse God. Which words Ambrose explains as follows (In Luc. iv): venturum, sed venisse per infirmitatem corporis non puta- What means this way of addressing Him, save that, though he bat? knew that the Son of God was to come, yet he did not think that He had come in the weakness of the flesh? Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus venerat Reply Obj. 2: Christ came to destroy the works of the dissolvere opera Diaboli, non potestative agendo, sed devil, not by powerful deeds, but rather by suffering from magis ab eo et eius membris patiendo, ut sic Diabolum him and his members, so as to conquer the devil by righvinceret iustitia, non potestate, sicut Augustinus dicit, teousness, not by power; thus Augustine says (De Trin. xiii) XIII de Trin., quod Diabolus non potentia Dei, sed iu- that the devil was to be overcome, not by the power of God, stitia superandus fuit. Et ideo circa tentationem Christi but by righteousness. And therefore in regard to Christ’s considerandum est quod propria voluntate fecit, et quod temptation we must consider what He did of His own will a Diabolo passus fuit. Quod enim tentatori se offerret, and what He suffered from the devil. For that He allowed fuit propriae voluntatis. Unde dicitur Matth. IV, ductus Himself to be tempted was due to His own will. Wherefore est Iesus in desertum a spiritu, ut tentaretur a Diabolo, it is written (Matt 4:1): Jesus was led by the Spirit into the quod Gregorius intelligendum dicit de spiritu sancto, ut desert, to be tempted by the devil; and Gregory (Hom. xvi in scilicet illuc eum spiritus suus duceret, ubi eum ad ten- Evang.) says this is to be understood of the Holy Spirit, to tandum spiritus malignus inveniret. Sed a Diabolo pas- wit, that thither did His Spirit lead Him, where the wicked sus est quod assumeretur vel supra pinnaculum templi, spirit would find Him and tempt Him. But He suffered from vel etiam in montem excelsum valde. Nec est mirum, ut the devil in being taken up on to the pinnacle of the TemGregorius dicit, si se ab illo permisit in montem duci, qui ple and again into a very high mountain. Nor is it strange, se permisit a membris ipsius crucifigi. Intelligitur autem as Gregory observes, that He allowed Himself to be taken a Diabolo assumptus, non quasi ex necessitate, sed quia, by him on to a mountain, who allowed Himself to be cruciut Origenes dicit, super Luc., sequebatur eum ad tenta- fied by His members. And we understand Him to have been tionem quasi athleta sponte procedens. taken up by the devil, not, as it were, by force, but because, as Origen says (Hom. xxi super Luc.), He followed Him in the course of His temptation like a wrestler advancing of his own accord.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, Christus in omnibus tentari voluit, absque peccato. Tentatio autem quae est ab hoste, potest esse sine peccato, quia fit per solam exteriorem suggestionem. Tentatio autem quae est a carne, non potest esse sine peccato, quia haec tentatio fit per delectationem et concupiscentiam; et, sicut Augustinus dicit, nonnullum peccatum est cum caro concupiscit adversus spiritum. Et ideo Christus tentari voluit ab hoste, sed non a carne.

Q. 41, A. 2

Reply Obj. 3: As the Apostle says (Heb 4:15), Christ wished to be tempted in all things, without sin. Now temptation which comes from an enemy can be without sin: because it comes about by merely outward suggestion. But temptation which comes from the flesh cannot be without sin, because such a temptation is caused by pleasure and concupiscence; and, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix), it is not without sin that ‘the flesh desireth against the spirit.’ And hence Christ wished to be tempted by an enemy, but not by the flesh.

Article 2 Whether Christ should have been tempted in the desert? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non debuit tentari in deserto. Christus enim tentari voluit propter exemplum nostrum, ut dictum est. Sed exemplum debet manifeste proponi illis qui sunt per exemplum informandi. Non ergo debuit in deserto tentari. Praeterea, Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., quod tunc maxime instat Diabolus ad tentandum, cum viderit solitarios. Unde et in principio mulierem tentavit sine viro eam inveniens. Et sic videtur, per hoc quod in desertum ivit ut tentaretur, quod tentationi se exposuit. Cum ergo eius tentatio sit nostrum exemplum, videtur quod etiam alii debeant se ingerere ad tentationes suscipiendas. Quod tamen videtur esse periculosum, cum magis tentationum occasiones vitare debeamus. Praeterea, Matth. IV ponitur secunda Christi tentatio qua Diabolus Christum assumpsit in sanctam civitatem, et statuit eum super pinnaculum templi, quod quidem non erat in deserto. Non ergo tentatus est solum in deserto. Sed contra est quod dicitur Marc. I, quod erat Iesus in deserto quadraginta diebus et quadraginta noctibus, et tentabatur a Satana. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, Christus propria voluntate se Diabolo exhibuit ad tentandum, sicut etiam propria voluntate se membris eius exhibuit ad occidendum, alioquin Diabolus eum advenire non auderet. Diabolus autem magis attentat aliquem cum est solitarius, quia, ut dicitur Eccle. IV, si quispiam praevaluerit contra unum, duo resistunt ei. Et inde est quod Christus in desertum exivit, quasi ad campum certaminis, ut ibi a Diabolo tentaretur. Unde Ambrosius dicit, super Luc., quod Christus agebatur in desertum consilio, ut Diabolum provocaret. Nam nisi ille certasset, scilicet Diabolus, non iste vicisset, idest Christus. Addit autem et alias rationes, dicens hoc Christum fecisse mysterio, ut Adam de exilio liberaret, qui scilicet de Pa-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have been tempted in the desert. Because Christ wished to be tempted in order to give us an example, as stated above (A. 1). But an example should be set openly before those who are to follow it. Therefore He should not have been tempted in the desert. Obj. 2: Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xii in Matth.): Then most especially does the devil assail by tempting us, when he sees us alone. Thus did he tempt the woman in the beginning when he found her apart from her husband. Hence it seems that, by going into the desert to be tempted, He exposed Himself to temptation. Since, therefore, His temptation is an example to us, it seems that others too should take such steps as will lead them into temptation. And yet this seems a dangerous thing to do, since rather should we avoid the occasion of being tempted. Obj. 3: Further, Matt. 4:5, Christ’s second temptation is set down, in which the devil took Christ up into the Holy City, and set Him upon the pinnacle of the Temple: which is certainly not in the desert. Therefore He was not tempted in the desert only. On the contrary, It is written (Mark 1:13) that Jesus was in the desert forty days and forty nights, and was tempted by Satan. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1, ad 2), Christ of His own free-will exposed Himself to be tempted by the devil, just as by His own free-will He submitted to be killed by his members; else the devil would not have dared to approach Him. Now the devil prefers to assail a man who is alone, for, as it is written (Eccl 4:12), if a man prevail against one, two shall withstand him. And so it was that Christ went out into the desert, as to a field of battle, to be tempted there by the devil. Hence Ambrose says on Luke 4:1, that Christ was led into the desert for the purpose of provoking the devil. For had he, i.e., the devil, not fought, He, i.e., Christ, would not have conquered. He adds other reasons, saying that Christ in doing this set forth the mystery of Adam’s delivery from exile, who had been expelled from paradise into

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radiso in desertum eiectus est; exemplo, ut ostenderet nobis Diabolum ad meliora tendentibus invidere. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus proponitur omnibus in exemplum per fidem, secundum illud Heb. XII, aspicientes in auctorem fidei et consummatorem, Iesum. Fides autem, ut dicitur Rom. X, est ex auditu, non autem ex visu, quinimmo dicitur, Ioan. XX, beati qui non viderunt et crediderunt. Et ideo, ad hoc quod tentatio Christi esset nobis in exemplum, non oportet quod ab hominibus videretur, sed sufficiens fuit quod hominibus narraretur. Ad secundum dicendum quod duplex est tentationis occasio. Una quidem ex parte hominis, puta cum aliquis se peccato propinquum facit, occasiones peccandi non evitans. Et talis occasio tentationis est vitanda, sicut dictum est Lot, Gen. XIX, ne steteris in omni regione circa Sodomam. Alia vero tentationis occasio est ex parte Diaboli, qui semper invidet ad meliora tendentibus, ut Ambrosius dicit. Et talis tentationis occasio non est vitanda. Unde dicit Chrysostomus, super Matth., quod non solum Christus ductus est in desertum a spiritu, sed omnes filii Dei habentes spiritum sanctum. Non enim sunt contenti sedere otiosi, sed Spiritus Sanctus urget eos aliquod magnum apprehendere opus, quod est esse in deserto quantum ad Diabolum, quia non est ibi iniustitia, in qua Diabolus delectatur. Omne etiam bonum opus est desertum quantum ad carnem et mundum, quia non est secundum voluntatem carnis et mundi. Talem autem occasionem tentationis dare Diabolo non est periculosum, quia maius est auxilium spiritus sancti, qui est perfecti operis auctor, quam impugnatio Diaboli invidentis.

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the desert, and set an example to us, by showing that the devil envies those who strive for better things. Reply Obj. 1: Christ is set as an example to all through faith, according to Heb. 12:2: Looking on Jesus, the author and finisher of faith. Now faith, as it is written (Rom 10:17), cometh by hearing, but not by seeing: nay, it is even said (John 20:29): Blessed are they that have not seen and have believed. And therefore, in order that Christ’s temptation might be an example to us, it behooved that men should not see it, and it was enough that they should hear it related.

Reply Obj. 2: The occasions of temptation are twofold. One is on the part of man—for instance, when a man causes himself to be near to sin by not avoiding the occasion of sinning. And such occasions of temptation should be avoided, as it is written of Lot (Gen 19:17): Neither stay thou in all the country about Sodom. Another occasion of temptation is on the part of the devil, who always envies those who strive for better things, as Ambrose says (In Luc. iv, 1). And such occasions of temptation are not to be avoided. Hence Chrysostom says (Hom. v in Matth.): Not only Christ was led into the desert by the Spirit, but all God’s children that have the Holy Spirit. For it is not enough for them to sit idle; the Holy Spirit urges them to endeavor to do something great: which is for them to be in the desert from the devil’s standpoint, for no unrighteousness, in which the devil delights, is there. Again, every good work, compared to the flesh and the world, is the desert; because it is not according to the will of the flesh and of the world. Now, there is no danger in giving the devil such an occasion of temptation; since the help of the Holy Spirit, who is the Author of the perfect deed, is more powerful than the assault of the envious devil. Ad tertium dicendum quod quidam dicunt omnes Reply Obj. 3: Some say that all the temptations took tentationes factas fuisse in deserto. Quorum quidam di- place in the desert. Of these some say that Christ was led cunt quod Christus ductus est in sanctam civitatem, non into the Holy City, not really, but in an imaginary vision; realiter, sed secundum imaginariam visionem. Quidam while others say that the Holy City itself, i.e., Jerusalem, is autem dicunt quod etiam ipsa civitas sancta, idest Ieru- called a desert, because it was deserted by God. But there salem, desertum dicitur, quia erat derelicta a Deo. Sed is no need for this explanation. For Mark says that He was hoc non erat necessarium. Quia Marcus dicit quod in tempted in the desert by the devil, but not that He was deserto tentabatur a Diabolo, non autem dicit quod so- tempted in the desert only.

lum in deserto.

Article 3 Whether Christ’s temptation should have taken place after his fast? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod tentatio Christi non debuit esse post ieiunium. Dictum est enim supra quod Christum non decebat conversationis austeritas. Sed maximae austeritatis fuisse videtur quod quadraginta diebus et quadraginta noctibus nihil comederit, sic enim intelligitur quadraginta diebus et quadra-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s temptation should not have taken place after His fast. For it has been said above (Q. 40, A. 2) that an austere mode of life was not becoming to Christ. But it savors of extreme austerity that He should have eaten nothing for forty days and forty nights, for Gregory (Hom. xvi in Evang.) explains the fact

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ginta noctibus ieiunasse, quia scilicet in illis diebus nullum omnino cibum sumpsit, ut Gregorius dicit. Ergo non videtur quod debuerit huiusmodi ieiunium tentationi praemittere. Praeterea, Marci I dicitur quod erat in deserto quadraginta diebus et quadraginta noctibus, et tentabatur a Satana. Sed quadraginta diebus et quadraginta noctibus ieiunavit. Ergo videtur quod non post ieiunium, sed simul dum ieiunaret, sit tentatus a Diabolo. Praeterea, Christus non legitur nisi semel ieiunasse. Sed non solum semel fuit tentatus a Diabolo, dicitur enim Luc. IV, quod, consummata omni tentatione, Diabolus recessit ab illo usque ad tempus. Sicut igitur secundae tentationi non praemisit ieiunium, ita nec primae praemittere debuit. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. IV, cum ieiunasset quadraginta diebus et quadraginta noctibus, postea esuriit, et tunc accessit ad eum tentator. Respondeo dicendum quod convenienter Christus post ieiunium tentari voluit. Primo quidem, propter exemplum. Quia, cum omnibus, sicut dictum est, immineat se contra tentationes tueri; per hoc quod ipse ante tentationem futuram ieiunavit, docuit quod per ieiunium nos oportet contra tentationes armari. Unde inter arma iustitiae apostolus ieiunia connumerat, II Cor. VI. Secundo, ut ostenderet quod etiam ieiunantes Diabolus aggreditur ad tentandum, sicut alios qui bonis operibus vacant. Et ideo, sicut post Baptismum, ita post ieiunium Christus tentatur. Unde Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., ut discas quam magnum bonum est ieiunium, et qualiter scutum est adversus Diabolum; et quoniam post Baptismum non lasciviae, sed ieiunio intendere oportet; Christus ieiunavit, non ieiunio indigens, sed nos instruens. Tertio, quia post ieiunium secuta est esuries, quae dedit Diabolo audaciam eum aggrediendi, sicut dictum est. Cum autem esuriit dominus, ut Hilarius dicit, super Matth., non fuit ex subreptione inediae, sed naturae suae hominem dereliquit. Non enim erat a Deo Diabolus, sed a carne vincendus. Unde etiam, ut Chrysostomus dicit, non ultra processit in ieiunando quam Moyses et Elias, ne incredibilis videretur carnis assumptio. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christum non decuit conversatio austerioris vitae, ut se communem exhiberet illis quibus praedicavit. Nullus autem debet assumere praedicationis officium, nisi prius fuerit purgatus et in virtute perfectus, sicut et de Christo dicitur, Act. I, quod coepit Iesus facere et docere. Et ideo Christus statim post Baptismum austeritatem vitae assumpsit, ut doceret post carnem edomitam oportere alios ad praedicationis officium transire, secundum illud apostoli, castigo corpus

Q. 41, A. 3

that He fasted forty days and forty nights, saying that during that time He partook of no food whatever. It seems, therefore, that He should not thus have fasted before His temptation. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Mark 1:13) that He was in the desert forty days and forty nights; and was tempted by Satan. Now, He fasted forty days and forty nights. Therefore it seems that He was tempted by the devil, not after, but during, His fast. Obj. 3: Further, we read that Christ fasted but once. But He was tempted by the devil, not only once, for it is written (Luke 4:13) that all the temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him for a time. As, therefore, He did not fast before the second temptation, so neither should He have fasted before the first. On the contrary, It is written (Matt 4:2, 3): When He had fasted forty days and forty nights, afterwards He was hungry: and then the tempter came to Him. I answer that, It was becoming that Christ should wish to fast before His temptation. First, in order to give us an example. For since we are all in urgent need of strengthening ourselves against temptation, as stated above (A. 1), by fasting before being tempted, He teaches us the need of fasting in order to equip ourselves against temptation. Hence the Apostle (2 Cor 6:5, 7) reckons fastings together with the armor of justice. Second, in order to show that the devil assails with temptations even those who fast, as likewise those who are given to other good works. And so Christ’s temptation took place after His fast, as also after His baptism. Hence Chrysostom says (Hom. xiii super Matth.): To instruct thee how great a good is fasting, and how it is a most powerful shield against the devil; and that after baptism thou shouldst give thyself up, not to luxury, but to fasting; for this cause Christ fasted, not as needing it Himself, but as teaching us. Third, because after the fast, hunger followed, which made the devil dare to approach Him, as already stated (A. 1, ad 1). Now, when our Lord was hungry, says Hilary (Super Matth. iii), it was not because He was overcome by want of food, but because He abandoned His manhood to its nature. For the devil was to be conquered, not by God, but by the flesh. Wherefore Chrysostom too says: He proceeded no farther than Moses and Elias, lest His assumption of our flesh might seem incredible. Reply Obj. 1: It was becoming for Christ not to adopt an extreme form of austere life in order to show Himself outwardly in conformity with those to whom He preached. Now, no one should take up the office of preacher unless he be already cleansed and perfect in virtue, according to what is said of Christ, that Jesus began to do and to teach (Acts 1:1). Consequently, immediately after His baptism Christ adopted an austere form of life, in order to teach us the need of taming the flesh before passing on to the office

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meum et in servitutem redigo, ne forte, aliis praedicans, of preaching, according to the Apostle (1 Cor 9:27): I chasipse reprobus efficiar. tise my body, and bring it into subjection, lest perhaps when I have preached to others, I myself should become a castaway. Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum illud MarReply Obj. 2: These words of Mark may be understood ci potest sic intelligi quod erat in deserto quadraginta as meaning that He was in the desert forty days and forty diebus et quadraginta noctibus, quibus scilicet ieiuna- nights, and that He fasted during that time: and the words, vit, quod autem dicitur, et tentabatur a Satana, intelli- and He was tempted by Satan, may be taken as referring, gendum est, non in illis quadraginta diebus et quadra- not to the time during which He fasted, but to the time that ginta noctibus, sed post illos; eo quod Matthaeus dicit followed: since Matthew says that after He had fasted forty quod, cum ieiunasset quadraginta diebus et quadragin- days and forty nights, afterwards He was hungry, thus afta noctibus, postea esuriit, ex quo sumpsit tentator oc- fording the devil a pretext for approaching Him. And so the casionem accedendi ad ipsum. Unde et quod subditur, words that follow, and the angels ministered to Him, are to et Angeli ministrabant ei, consecutive intelligendum esse be taken in sequence, which is clear from the words of Matostenditur ex hoc quod Matth. IV dicitur, tunc reliquit thew (4:11): Then the devil left Him, i.e., after the temptaeum Diabolus, scilicet post tentationem, et ecce, Ange- tion, and behold angels came and ministered to Him. And as li accesserunt et ministrabant ei. Quod vero interponit to the words inserted by Mark, and He was with the beasts, Marcus, eratque cum bestiis, inducitur, secundum Chry- according to Chrysostom (Hom. xiii in Matth.), they are set sostomum, ad ostendendum quale erat desertum, quia down in order to describe the desert as being impassable to scilicet erat invium hominibus et bestiis plenum. man and full of beasts. Tamen secundum expositionem Bedae, dominus On the other hand, according to Bede’s exposition of tentatur quadraginta diebus et quadraginta noctibus. Mk. 1:12, 13, our Lord was tempted forty days and forty Sed hoc intelligendum est, non de illis tentationibus vi- nights. But this is not to be understood of the visible tempsibilibus quas narrant Matthaeus et Lucas, quae factae tations which are related by Matthew and Luke, and ocsunt post ieiunium, sed de quibusdam aliis impugnatio- curred after the fast, but of certain other assaults which pernibus quas forte illo ieiunii tempore Christus est a Dia- haps Christ suffered from the devil during that time of His bolo passus. fast. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Ambrosius dicit, Reply Obj. 3: As Ambrose says on Luke 4:13, the devil super Luc., recessit Diabolus a Christo usque ad tempus, departed from Christ for a time, because, later on, he requia postea, non tentaturus, sed aperte pugnaturus ad- turned, not to tempt Him, but to assail Him openly—namely, venit, tempore scilicet passionis. Et tamen per illam im- at the time of His Passion. Nevertheless, He seemed in this pugnationem videbatur Christum tentare de tristitia et later assault to tempt Christ to dejection and hatred of His odio proximorum, sicut in deserto de delectatione gulae neighbor; just as in the desert he had tempted Him to glutet contemptu Dei per idololatriam. tonous pleasure and idolatrous contempt of God.

Article 4 Whether the mode and order of the temptation were becoming? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit conveniens tentationis modus et ordo. Tentatio enim Diaboli ad peccandum inducit. Sed si Christus subvenisset corporali fami convertendo lapides in panes, non peccasset, sicut non peccavit cum panes multiplicavit, quod non fuit minus miraculum, ut turbae esurienti subveniret. Ergo videtur quod nulla fuerit illa tentatio.

Objection 1: It would seem that the mode and order of the temptation were unbecoming. For the devil tempts in order to induce us to sin. But if Christ had assuaged His bodily hunger by changing the stones into bread, He would not have sinned; just as neither did He sin when He multiplied the loaves, which was no less a miracle, in order to succor the hungry crowd. Therefore it seems that this was nowise a temptation. Praeterea, nullus persuasor convenienter persuaObj. 2: Further, a counselor is inconsistent if he perdet contrarium eius quod intendit. Sed Diabolus, sta- suades the contrary to what he intends. But when the devil tuens Christum supra pinnaculum templi, intendebat set Christ on a pinnacle of the Temple, he purposed to eum de superbia seu vana gloria tentare. Ergo inconve- tempt Him to pride or vainglory. Therefore it was inconsis-

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nienter persuadet ei ut se mittat deorsum, quod est contrarium superbiae vel vanae gloriae, quae semper quaerit ascendere. Praeterea, una tentatio conveniens est ut sit de uno peccato. Sed in tentatione quae fuit in monte, duo peccata persuasit, scilicet cupiditatem et idololatriam. Non ergo conveniens videtur fuisse tentationis modus. Praeterea, tentationes ad peccata ordinantur. Sed septem sunt vitia capitalia, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Non autem tentat nisi de tribus, scilicet gula et vana gloria et cupiditate. Non ergo videtur sufficiens tentatio. Praeterea, post victoriam omnium vitiorum, remanet homini tentatio superbiae vel vanae gloriae, quia superbia etiam bonis operibus insidiatur, ut pereant, sicut dicit Augustinus. Inconvenienter ergo Matthaeus ultimam ponit tentationem cupiditatis in monte, mediam autem inanis gloriae in templo, praesertim cum Lucas ordinet e converso. Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., quod propositum Christi fuit Diabolum humilitate vincere, non potestate. Ergo non imperiose obiurgando eum repellere debuit, vade retro, Satana. Praeterea, narratio Evangelii videtur falsum continere. Non enim videtur possibile quod Christus supra pinnaculum templi statui potuerit quin ab aliis videretur. Neque aliquis mons tam altus invenitur ut inde totus mundus inspici possit, ut sic ex eo potuerint Christo omnia regna mundi ostendi. Inconvenienter igitur videtur descripta Christi tentatio. Sed contra est Scripturae auctoritas. Respondeo dicendum quod tentatio quae est ab hoste, fit per modum suggestionis, ut Gregorius dicit. Non autem eodem modo potest aliquid omnibus suggeri, sed unicuique suggeritur aliquid ex his circa quae est affectus. Et ideo Diabolus hominem spiritualem non statim tentat de gravibus peccatis, sed paulatim a levioribus incipit, ut postmodum ad graviora perducat. Unde Gregorius, XXXI Moral., exponens illud Iob XXXIX, procul odoratur bellum, exhortationem ducum et ululatum exercitus, dicit, bene duces exhortari dicti sunt, exercitus ululare. Quia prima vitia deceptae menti quasi sub quadam ratione se ingerunt, sed innumera quae sequuntur, dum hanc ad omnem insaniam pertrahunt, quasi bestiali clamore confundunt. Et hoc idem Diabolus observavit in tentatione primi hominis. Nam primo sollicitavit mentem primi hominis de ligni vetiti esu, dicens, Gen. III, cur praecepit vobis Deus ut non comederetis de omni ligno Paradisi? Secundo, de inani gloria, cum dixit, aperientur oculi vestri. Tertio, perduxit tentationem ad extremam superbiam, cum dixit, eritis sicut dii, scientes bonum et malum. Et hunc etiam tentandi ordinem servavit in Christo. Nam primo

Q. 41, A. 4

tent to urge Him to cast Himself thence: for this would be contrary to pride or vainglory, which always seeks to rise. Obj. 3: Further, one temptation should lead to one sin. But in the temptation on the mountain he counseled two sins—namely, covetousness and idolatry. Therefore the mode of the temptation was unfitting. Obj. 4: Further, temptations are ordained to sin. But there are seven deadly sins, as we have stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 84, A. 4). But the tempter only deals with three, viz. gluttony, vainglory, and covetousness. Therefore the temptation seems to have been incomplete. Obj. 5: Further, after overcoming all the vices, man is still tempted to pride or vainglory: since pride worms itself in stealthily, and destroys even good works, as Augustine says (Ep. ccxi). Therefore Matthew unfittingly gives the last place to the temptation to covetousness on the mountain, and the second place to the temptation to vainglory in the Temple, especially since Luke puts them in the reverse order. Obj. 6: Further, Jerome says on Matt. 4:4 that Christ purposed to overcome the devil by humility, not by might. Therefore He should not have repulsed him with a haughty rebuke, saying: Begone, Satan. Obj. 7: Further, the gospel narrative seems to be false. For it seems impossible that Christ could have been set on a pinnacle of the Temple without being seen by others. Nor is there to be found a mountain so high that all the world can be seen from it, so that all the kingdoms of the earth could be shown to Christ from its summit. It seems, therefore, that Christ’s temptation is unfittingly described. On the contrary is the authority of Scripture. I answer that, The temptation which comes from the enemy takes the form of a suggestion, as Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Evang.). Now a suggestion cannot be made to everybody in the same way; it must arise from those things towards which each one has an inclination. Consequently the devil does not straight away tempt the spiritual man to grave sins, but he begins with lighter sins, so as gradually to lead him to those of greater magnitude. Wherefore Gregory (Moral. xxxi), expounding Job 39:25, He smelleth the battle afar off, the encouraging of the captains and the shouting of the army, says: The captains are fittingly described as encouraging, and the army as shouting. Because vices begin by insinuating themselves into the mind under some specious pretext: then they come on the mind in such numbers as to drag it into all sorts of folly, deafening it with their bestial clamor. Thus, too, did the devil set about the temptation of the first man. For at first he enticed his mind to consent to the eating of the forbidden fruit, saying (Gen 3:1): Why hath God commanded you that you should not eat of every tree of paradise? Second he tempted him to vainglory by saying: Your eyes shall be opened. Third, he led the temptation to the extreme height of pride, saying: You shall be as gods, knowing good and evil. This same order did he ob-

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tentavit ipsum de eo quod appetunt quantumcumque spirituales viri, scilicet de sustentatione corporalis naturae per cibum. Secundo, processit ad id in quo spirituales viri quandoque deficiunt, ut scilicet aliqua ad ostentationem operentur, quod pertinet ad inanem gloriam. Tertio, perduxit tentationem ad id quod iam non est spiritualium virorum, sed carnalium, scilicet ut divitias et gloriam mundi concupiscant usque ad contemptum Dei. Et ideo in primis duabus tentationibus dixit, si filius Dei es non autem in tertia, quae non potest spiritualibus convenire viris, qui sunt per adoptionem filii Dei, sicut et duae primae. His autem tentationibus Christus restitit testimoniis legis, non potestate virtutis, ut hoc ipso et hominem plus honoraret, et adversarium plus puniret, cum hostis generis humani non quasi a Deo, sed quasi ab homine vinceretur, sicut dicit Leo Papa. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod uti necessariis ad sustentationem non est peccatum gulae, sed quod ex desiderio huius sustentationis homo aliquid inordinatum faciat, ad vitium gulae pertinere potest. Est autem inordinatum quod aliquis, ubi potest haberi recursus ad humana subsidia, pro solo corpore sustentando miraculose sibi cibum quaerere velit. Unde et dominus filiis Israel miraculose manna praebuit in deserto, ubi aliunde cibus haberi non potuit. Et similiter Christus in deserto turbas pavit miraculose, ubi aliter cibi haberi non poterant. Sed Christus ad subveniendum fami poterat aliter sibi providere quam miracula faciendo, sicut et Ioannes Baptista fecit, ut legitur Matth. III; vel etiam ad loca proxima properando. Et ideo reputabat Diabolus quod Christus peccaret, si ad subveniendum fami miracula facere attentaret, si esset purus homo. Ad secundum dicendum quod per humiliationem exteriorem frequenter quaerit aliquis gloriam qua exaltetur circa spiritualia bona. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de sermone domini in monte, animadvertendum est non in solo rerum corporearum nitore atque pompa, sed etiam in ipsis sordibus lutosis esse posse iactantiam. Et ad hoc significandum, Diabolus Christo suasit ut, ad quaerendum gloriam spiritualem, corporaliter mitteret se deorsum. Ad tertium dicendum quod divitias et honores mundi appetere peccatum est, quando huiusmodi inordinate appetuntur. Hoc autem praecipue manifestatur ex hoc quod pro huiusmodi adipiscendis homo aliquid inhonestum facit. Et ideo non fuit contentus Diabolus persuadere cupiditatem divitiarum et honorum, sed induxit ad hoc quod propter huiusmodi adipiscenda Christus eum adoraret, quod est maximum scelus, et contra Deum. Nec solum dixit, si adoraveris me, sed addidit, si

IIIae

serve in tempting Christ. For at first he tempted Him to that which men desire, however spiritual they may be— namely, the support of the corporeal nature by food. Second, he advanced to that matter in which spiritual men are sometimes found wanting, inasmuch as they do certain things for show, which pertains to vainglory. Third, he led the temptation on to that in which no spiritual men, but only carnal men, have a part—namely, to desire worldly riches and fame, to the extent of holding God in contempt. And so in the first two temptations he said: If Thou be the Son of God; but not in the third, which is inapplicable to spiritual men, who are sons of God by adoption, whereas it does apply to the two preceding temptations. And Christ resisted these temptations by quoting the authority of the Law, not by enforcing His power, so as to give more honor to His human nature and a greater punishment to His adversary, since the foe of the human race was vanquished, not as by God, but as by man; as Pope Leo says (Serm. 1, De Quadrag. 3). Reply Obj. 1: To make use of what is needful for selfsupport is not the sin of gluttony; but if a man do anything inordinate out of the desire for such support, it can pertain to the sin of gluttony. Now it is inordinate for a man who has human assistance at his command to seek to obtain food miraculously for mere bodily support. Hence the Lord miraculously provided the children of Israel with manna in the desert, where there was no means of obtaining food otherwise. And in like fashion Christ miraculously provided the crowds with food in the desert, when there was no other means of getting food. But in order to assuage His hunger, He could have done otherwise than work a miracle, as did John the Baptist, according to Matthew (3:4); or He could have hastened to the neighboring country. Consequently the devil esteemed that if Christ was a mere man, He would fall into sin by attempting to assuage His hunger by a miracle. Reply Obj. 2: It often happens that a man seeks to derive glory from external humiliation, whereby he is exalted by reason of spiritual good. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12): It must be noted that it is possible to boast not only of the beauty and splendor of material things, but even of filthy squalor. And this is signified by the devil urging Christ to seek spiritual glory by casting His body down. Reply Obj. 3: It is a sin to desire worldly riches and honors in an inordinate fashion. And the principal sign of this is when a man does something wrong in order to acquire such things. And so the devil was not satisfied with instigating to a desire for riches and honors, but he went so far as to tempt Christ, for the sake of gaining possession of these things, to fall down and adore him, which is a very great crime, and against God. Nor does he say merely, if Thou wilt adore me, but he adds, if, falling down; because,

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cadens, quia, ut dicit Ambrosius, habet ambitio domesticum periculum, ut enim dominetur aliis, prius servit; et curvatur obsequio ut honore donetur; et, dum vult esse sublimior, fit remissior. Et similiter etiam in praecedentibus tentationibus ex appetitu unius peccati in aliud peccatum inducere est conatus, sicut ex desiderio cibi conatus est inducere in vanitatem sine causa miracula faciendi; et ex cupiditate gloriae conatus est ducere ad tentandum Deum per praecipitium. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Ambrosius, super Luc., non dixisset Scriptura quod, consummata omni tentatione, Diabolus recessit ab illo, nisi in tribus praemissis esset omnium materia delictorum. Quia causae tentationum causae sunt cupiditatum, scilicet carnis oblectatio, spes gloriae, et aviditas potentiae. Ad quintum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de consensu Evang., incertum est quid prius factum sit, utrum regna terrae prius demonstrata sint ei, et postea in pinnaculum templi locatus sit; aut hoc prius, et illud postea. Nihil tamen ad rem, dum omnia facta esse manifestum sit. Videntur autem Evangelistae diversum ordinem tenuisse, quia quandoque ex inani gloria venitur ad cupiditatem, quandoque e converso. Ad sextum dicendum quod Christus, cum passus fuisset tentationis iniuriam, dicente sibi Diabolo, si filius Dei es, mitte te deorsum, non est turbatus, nec Diabolum increpavit. Quando vero Diabolus Dei usurpavit sibi honorem, dicens, haec omnia tibi dabo si cadens adoraveris me, exasperatus est et repulit eum, dicens, vade, Satanas, ut nos illius discamus exemplo nostras quidem iniurias magnanimiter sustinere, Dei autem iniurias nec usque ad auditum sufferre. Ad septimum dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, Diabolus sic Christum assumebat (in pinnaculum templi) ut ab omnibus videretur, ipse autem, nesciente Diabolo, sic agebat ut a nemine videretur. Quod autem dicit, ostendit ei omnia regna mundi et gloriam eorum, non est intelligendum quod videret ipsa regna vel civitates vel populos, vel aurum vel argentum, sed partes in quibus unumquodque regnum vel civitas posita est, Diabolus Christo digito demonstrabat, et uniuscuiusque regni honores et statum verbis exponebat. Vel, secundum Origenem, ostendit ei quomodo ipse per diversa vitia regnabat in mundo.

Q. 41, A. 4

as Ambrose says on Luke 4:5: Ambition harbors yet another danger within itself: for, while seeking to rule, it will serve; it will bow in submission that it may be crowned with honor; and the higher it aims, the lower it abases itself. In like manner the devil in the preceding temptations tried to lead Christ from the desire of one sin to the commission of another; thus from the desire of food he tried to lead Him to the vanity of the needless working of a miracle; and from the desire of glory to tempt God by casting Himself headlong. Reply Obj. 4: As Ambrose says on Luke 4:13, Scripture would not have said that ‘all the temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him,’ unless the matter of all sins were included in the three temptations already related. For the causes of temptations are the causes of desires—namely, lust of the flesh, hope of glory, eagerness for power. Reply Obj. 5: As Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. ii): It is not certain which happened first; whether the kingdoms of the earth were first shown to Him, and afterwards He was set on the pinnacle of the Temple; or the latter first, and the former afterwards. However, it matters not, provided it be made clear that all these things did take place. It may be that the Evangelists set these things in different orders, because sometimes cupidity arises from vainglory, sometimes the reverse happens. Reply Obj. 6: When Christ had suffered the wrong of being tempted by the devil saying, If Thou be the Son of God cast Thyself down, He was not troubled, nor did He upbraid the devil. But when the devil usurped to himself the honor due to God, saying, All these things will I give Thee, if, falling down, Thou wilt adore me, He was exasperated, and repulsed him, saying, Begone, Satan: that we might learn from His example to bear bravely insults leveled at ourselves, but not to allow ourselves so much as to listen to those which are aimed at God. Reply Obj. 7: As Chrysostom says (Hom. v in Matth.): The devil set Him (on a pinnacle of the Temple) that He might be seen by all, whereas, unawares to the devil, He acted in such sort that He was seen by none. In regard to the words, ‘He showed Him all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them,’ we are not to understand that He saw the very kingdoms, with the cities and inhabitants, their gold and silver: but that the devil pointed out the quarters in which each kingdom or city lay, and set forth to Him in words their glory and estate. Or, again, as Origen says (Hom. xxx in Luc.), he showed Him how, by means of the various vices, he was the lord of the world.

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Question 42 Christ’s Doctrine Deinde considerandum est de doctrina Christi. Et We have now to consider Christ’s doctrine, about which circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum Christus debuerit praedicare solum (1) Whether Christ should have preached to the Jews Iudaeis, vel etiam gentibus. only, or to the Gentiles also? Secundo, utrum in sua praedicatione debuerit (2) Whether in preaching He should have avoided the turbationes Iudaeorum vitare. opposition of the Jews? Tertio, utrum debuerit praedicare publice, vel (3) Whether He should have preached in an open or in occulte. a hidden manner? Quarto, utrum solum debuerit docere verbo, vel (4) Whether He should have preached by word only, or etiam scripto. also by writing? De tempore autem quo docere incoepit, supra dicConcerning the time when He began to teach, we have tum est, cum de Baptismo eius ageretur. spoken above when treating of His baptism (Q. 29, A. 3).

Article 1 Whether Christ should have preached not only to the Jews, but also to the Gentiles? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non solum Iudaeis, sed etiam gentibus debuerit praedicare. Dicitur enim Isaiae XLIX, parum est ut sis mihi servus ad suscitandas tribus Israel et faeces Iacob convertendas, dedi te in lucem gentium, ut sis salus mea usque ad extrema terrae. Sed lumen et salutem Christus praebuit per suam doctrinam. Ergo videtur parum fuisse si solum Iudaeis, et non gentibus praedicavit.

Praeterea, sicut dicitur Matth. VII, erat docens eos sicut potestatem habens. Sed maior potestas doctrinae ostenditur in instructione illorum qui penitus nihil audierunt, quales erant gentiles, unde apostolus dicit, Rom. XV, sic praedicavi Evangelium, non ubi nominatus est Christus, ne super alienum fundamentum aedificarem. Ergo multo magis Christus praedicare debuit gentilibus quam Iudaeis. Praeterea, utilior est instructio multorum quam unius. Sed Christus aliquos gentilium instruxit, sicut mulierem Samaritanam, Ioan. IV, et Chananaeam, Matth. XV. Ergo videtur quod, multo fortius, Christus debuerit multitudini gentium praedicare. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Matth. XV, non sum missus nisi ad oves quae perierunt domus Israel. Sed Rom. X dicitur, quomodo praedicabunt nisi mittantur? Ergo Christus non debuit praedicare gentibus.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should have preached not only to the Jews, but also to the Gentiles. For it is written (Isa 49:6): It is a small thing that thou shouldst be My servant to raise up the tribes of Israel and to convert the dregs of Jacob: behold, I have given thee to be the light of the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation even to the farthest part of the earth. But Christ gave light and salvation through His doctrine. Therefore it seems that it was a small thing that He preached to Jews alone, and not to the Gentiles. Obj. 2: Further, as it is written (Matt 7:29): He was teaching them as one having power. Now the power of doctrine is made more manifest in the instruction of those who, like the Gentiles, have received no tidings whatever; hence the Apostle says (Rom 15:20): I have so preached the gospel, not where Christ was named, lest I should build upon another man’s foundation. Therefore much rather should Christ have preached to the Gentiles than to the Jews. Obj. 3: Further, it is more useful to instruct many than one. But Christ instructed some individual Gentiles, such as the Samaritan woman (John 4) and the Chananaean woman (Matt 15). Much more reason, therefore, was there for Christ to preach to the Gentiles in general. On the contrary, our Lord said (Matt 15:24): I was not sent but to the sheep that are lost of the house of Israel. And (Rom 10:15) it is written: How shall they preach unless they be sent? Therefore Christ should not have preached to the Gentiles.

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Respondeo dicendum quod conveniens fuit praedicationem Christi, tam per ipsum quam per apostolos, a principio solis Iudaeis exhiberi. Primo quidem, ut ostenderet per suum adventum impleri promissiones antiquitus factas Iudaeis, non autem gentilibus. Unde apostolus dicit, Rom. XV, dico Christum ministrum fuisse circumcisionis, idest apostolum et praedicatorem Iudaeorum, propter veritatem Dei, ad confirmandas promissiones patrum. Secundo, ut eius adventus ostenderetur esse a Deo. Quae enim a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt, ut dicitur Rom. XIII. Hoc autem debitus ordo exigebat, ut Iudaeis, qui Deo erant propinquiores per fidem et cultum unius Dei, prius quidem doctrina Christi proponeretur, et per eos transmitteretur ad gentes, sicut etiam et in caelesti hierarchia per superiores Angelos ad inferiores divinae illuminationes deveniunt. Unde super illud Matth. XV, non sum missus nisi ad oves quae perierunt domus Israel, dicit Hieronymus, non hoc dicit quin ad gentes missus sit, sed quod primum ad Israel missus est. Unde et Isaiae ult. dicitur, mittam ex eis qui salvati fuerint, scilicet ex Iudaeis, ad gentes, et annuntiabunt gloriam meam gentibus. Tertio, ut Iudaeis auferret calumniandi materiam. Unde super illud Matth. X, in viam gentium ne abieritis, dicit Hieronymus, oportebat primum adventum Christi nuntiari Iudaeis, ne iustam haberent excusationem, dicentes ideo se dominum reiecisse, quia ad gentes et Samaritanos apostolos miserit. Quarto, quia Christus per crucis victoriam meruit potestatem et dominium super gentes. Unde dicitur Apoc. II, qui vicerit, dabo ei potestatem super gentes, sicut et ego accepi a patre meo. Et Philipp. II, quod, quia factus est obediens usque ad mortem crucis, Deus exaltavit illum, ut in nomine Iesu omne genu flectatur, et omnis lingua ei confiteatur. Et ideo ante passionem suam noluit gentibus praedicari suam doctrinam, sed post passionem suam dixit discipulis, Matth. ult., euntes, docete omnes gentes. Propter quod, ut legitur Ioan. XII, cum, imminente passione, quidam gentiles vellent videre Iesum, respondit, nisi granum frumenti cadens in terram mortuum fuerit, ipsum solum manet, si autem mortuum fuerit, multum fructum affert. Et, sicut Augustinus dicit ibidem, se dicebat granum mortificandum in infidelitate Iudaeorum, multiplicandum in fide populorum.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus fuit in lumen et salutem gentium per discipulos suos, quos ad praedicandum gentibus misit. Ad secundum dicendum quod non est minoris potestatis, sed maioris, facere aliquid per alios, quam per seipsum. Et ideo in hoc maxime potestas divina in Christo monstrata est, quod discipulis suis tantam virtutem

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I answer that, It was fitting that Christ’s preaching, whether through Himself or through His apostles, should be directed at first to the Jews alone. First, in order to show that by His coming the promises were fulfilled which had been made to the Jews of old, and not to the Gentiles. Thus the Apostle says (Rom 15:8): I say that Christ . . . was minister of the circumcision, i.e., the apostle and preacher of the Jews, for the truth of God, to confirm the promises made unto the fathers. Second, in order to show that His coming was of God; because, as is written Rom. 13:1: Those things which are of God are well ordered. Now the right order demanded that the doctrine of Christ should be made known first to the Jews, who, by believing in and worshiping one God, were nearer to God, and that it should be transmitted through them to the Gentiles: just as in the heavenly hierarchy the Divine enlightenment comes to the lower angels through the higher. Hence on Matt. 15:24, I was not sent but to the sheep that are lost in the house of Israel, Jerome says: He does not mean by this that He was not sent to the Gentiles, but that He was sent to the Jews first. And so we read (Isa 66:19): I will send of them that shall be saved, i.e., of the Jews, to the Gentiles . . . and they shall declare My glory unto the Gentiles. Third, in order to deprive the Jews of ground for quibbling. Hence on Matt. 10:5, Go ye not into the way of the Gentiles. Jerome says: It behooved Christ’s coming to be announced to the Jews first, lest they should have a valid excuse, and say that they had rejected our Lord because He had sent His apostles to the Gentiles and Samaritans. Fourth, because it was through the triumph of the cross that Christ merited power and lordship over the Gentiles. Hence it is written (Rev 2:26, 28): He that shall overcome . . . I will give him power over the nations . . . as I also have received of My Father; and that because He became obedient unto the death of the cross, God hath exalted Him . . . that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow . . . and that every tongue should confess Him (Phil 2:8–11). Consequently He did not wish His doctrine to be preached to the Gentiles before His Passion: it was after His Passion that He said to His disciples (Matt 28:19): Going, teach ye all nations. For this reason it was that when, shortly before His Passion, certain Gentiles wished to see Jesus, He said: Unless the grain of wheat falling into the ground dieth, itself remaineth alone: but if it die it bringeth forth much fruit (John 12:20–25); and as Augustine says, commenting on this passage: He called Himself the grain of wheat that must be mortified by the unbelief of the Jews, multiplied by the faith of the nations. Reply Obj. 1: Christ was given to be the light and salvation of the Gentiles through His disciples, whom He sent to preach to them. Reply Obj. 2: It is a sign, not of lesser, but of greater power to do something by means of others rather than by oneself. And thus the Divine power of Christ was specially shown in this, that He bestowed on the teaching of His

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contulit in docendo, ut gentes, quae nihil de Christo audierant, converterent ad ipsum. Potestas autem Christi in docendo attenditur et quantum ad miracula, per quae doctrinam suam confirmabat; et quantum ad efficaciam persuadendi; et quantum ad auctoritatem loquentis, quia loquebatur quasi dominium habens super legem, cum diceret, ego autem dico vobis; et etiam quantum ad virtutem rectitudinis quam in sua conversatione monstrabat, sine peccato vivendo. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Christus non debuit a principio indifferenter gentilibus suam doctrinam communicare, ut Iudaeis tanquam primogenito populo deditus observaretur; ita etiam non debuit gentiles omnino repellere, ne spes salutis eis praecluderetur. Et propter hoc aliqui gentilium particulariter sunt admissi, propter excellentiam fidei et devotionis eorum.

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disciples such a power that they converted the Gentiles to Christ, although these had heard nothing of Him. Now the power of Christ’s teaching is to be considered in the miracles by which He confirmed His doctrine, in the efficacy of His persuasion, and in the authority of His words, for He spoke as being Himself above the Law when He said: But I say to you (Matt 5:22, 28, 32, 34, 39, 44); and, again, in the force of His righteousness shown in His sinless manner of life. Reply Obj. 3: Just as it was unfitting that Christ should at the outset make His doctrine known to the Gentiles equally with the Jews, in order that He might appear as being sent to the Jews, as to the first-born people; so neither was it fitting for Him to neglect the Gentiles altogether, lest they should be deprived of the hope of salvation. For this reason certain individual Gentiles were admitted, on account of the excellence of their faith and devotedness.

Article 2 Whether Christ should have preached to the Jews without offending them? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus debuerit Iudaeis sine eorum offensione praedicare. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de agone Christiano, in homine Iesu Christo se nobis ad exemplum vitae praebuit filius Dei. Sed nos debemus vitare offensionem, non solum fidelium, sed etiam infidelium, secundum illud I Cor. X, sine offensione estote Iudaeis et gentibus et Ecclesiae Dei. Ergo videtur quod etiam Christus in sua doctrina offensionem Iudaeorum vitare debuerit. Praeterea, nullus sapiens debet facere unde effectum sui operis impediat. Sed per hoc quod sua doctrina Christus Iudaeos turbavit, impediebatur effectus doctrinae eius, dicitur enim Luc. XI, quod, cum dominus Pharisaeos et Scribas reprehenderet, coeperunt graviter insistere, et os eius opprimere de multis, insidiantes ei et quaerentes aliquid capere ex ore eius ut accusarent eum. Non ergo videtur conveniens fuisse quod eos in sua doctrina offenderet. Praeterea, apostolus dicit, I Tim. V, seniorem ne increpaveris, sed obsecra ut patrem. Sed sacerdotes et principes Iudaeorum erant illius populi seniores. Ergo videtur quod non fuerint duris increpationibus arguendi. Sed contra est quod Isaiae VIII fuerat prophetatum quod Christus esset in lapidem offensionis et petram scandali duabus dominus Israel. Respondeo dicendum quod salus multitudinis est praeferenda paci quorumcumque singularium hominum. Et ideo, quando aliqui sua perversitate multitudi-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should have preached to the Jews without offending them. For, as Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xi): In the Man Jesus Christ, a model of life is given us by the Son of God. But we should avoid offending not only the faithful, but even unbelievers, according to 1 Cor. 10:32: Be without offense to the Jews, and to the Gentiles, and to the Church of God. Therefore it seems that, in His teaching, Christ should also have avoided giving offense to the Jews. Obj. 2: Further, no wise man should do anything that will hinder the result of his labor. Now through the disturbance which His teaching occasioned among the Jews, it was deprived of its results; for it is written (Luke 11:53, 54) that when our Lord reproved the Pharisees and Scribes, they began vehemently to urge Him, and to oppress His mouth about many things; lying in wait for Him, and seeking to catch something from His mouth, that they might accuse Him. It seems therefore unfitting that He should have given them offense by His teaching. Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim 5:1): An ancient man rebuke not; but entreat him as a father. But the priests and princes of the Jews were the elders of that people. Therefore it seems that they should not have been rebuked with severity. On the contrary, It was foretold (Isa 8:14) that Christ would be for a stone of stumbling and for a rock of offense to the two houses of Israel. I answer that, The salvation of the multitude is to be preferred to the peace of any individuals whatsoever. Consequently, when certain ones, by their perverseness, hinder

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nis salutem impediunt, non est timenda eorum offensio a praedicatore vel doctore, ad hoc quod multitudinis saluti provideat. Scribae autem et Pharisaei et principes Iudaeorum sui malitia plurimum impediebant populi salutem, tum quia repugnabant Christi doctrinae, per quam solam poterat esse salus; tum etiam quia pravis suis moribus vitam populi corrumpebant. Et ideo dominus, non obstante offensione eorum, publice veritatem docebat, quam illi odiebant, et eorum vitia arguebat. Et ideo dicitur, Matth. XV, quod, discipulis domino dicentibus, scis quia Iudaei, audito hoc verbo, scandalizati sunt? Respondit, sinite illos. Caeci sunt duces caecorum. Si caecus caeco ducatum praestet, ambo in foveam cadunt.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo sic debet esse sine offensione omnibus ut nulli det suo facto vel dicto minus recto occasionem ruinae. Si tamen de veritate scandalum oritur, magis est sustinendum scandalum quam veritas relinquatur, ut Gregorius dicit. Ad secundum dicendum quod per hoc quod Christus publice Scribas et Pharisaeos arguebat, non impedivit, sed magis promovit effectum suae doctrinae. Quia cum eorum vitia populo innotescebant, minus avertebatur a Christo propter verba Scribarum et Pharisaeorum, qui semper doctrinae Christi obsistebant. Ad tertium dicendum quod illud verbum apostoli est intelligendum de illis senioribus qui non solum aetate vel auctoritate, sed etiam honestate sunt senes, secundum illud Num. XI, congrega mihi septuaginta viros de senioribus Israel, quos tu nosti quod senes populi sint. Si autem auctoritatem senectutis in instrumentum malitiae vertant publice peccando, sunt manifeste et acriter arguendi, sicut et Daniel dixit, Dan. XIII, inveterate dierum malorum, et cetera.

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the salvation of the multitude, the preacher and the teacher should not fear to offend those men, in order that he may insure the salvation of the multitude. Now the Scribes and Pharisees and the princes of the Jews were by their malice a considerable hindrance to the salvation of the people, both because they opposed themselves to Christ’s doctrine, which was the only way to salvation, and because their evil ways corrupted the morals of the people. For which reason our Lord, undeterred by their taking offense, publicly taught the truth which they hated, and condemned their vices. Hence we read (Matt 15:12, 14) that when the disciples of our Lord said: Dost Thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard this word, were scandalized? He answered: Let them alone: they are blind and leaders of the blind; and if the blind lead the blind, both fall into the pit. Reply Obj. 1: A man ought so to avoid giving offense, as neither by wrong deed or word to be the occasion of anyone’s downfall. But if scandal arise from truth, the scandal should be borne rather than the truth be set aside, as Gregory says (Hom. vii in Ezech.). Reply Obj. 2: By publicly reproving the Scribes and Pharisees, Christ promoted rather than hindered the effect of His teaching. Because when the people came to know the vices of those men, they were less inclined to be prejudiced against Christ by hearing what was said of Him by the Scribes and Pharisees, who were ever withstanding His doctrine. Reply Obj. 3: This saying of the Apostle is to be understood of those elders whose years are reckoned not only in age and authority, but also in probity; according to Num. 11:16: Gather unto Me seventy men of the ancients of Israel, whom thou knowest to be ancients . . . of the people. But if by sinning openly they turn the authority of their years into an instrument of wickedness, they should be rebuked openly and severely, as also Daniel says (Dan 13:52): O thou that art grown old in evil days, etc.

Article 3 Whether Christ should have taught all things openly? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non omnia publice docere debuit. Legitur enim multa seorsum discipulis dixisse, sicut patet in sermone caenae. Unde et Matth. X dixit, quod in aure audistis in cubilibus, praedicabitur in tectis. Non ergo omnia publice docuit. Praeterea, profunda sapientiae non sunt nisi perfectis exponenda, secundum illud I Cor. II, sapientiam loquimur inter perfectos. Sed doctrina Christi continebat profundissimam sapientiam. Non ergo erat imperfectae multitudini communicanda.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have taught all things openly. For we read that He taught many things to His disciples apart: as is seen clearly in the sermon at the Supper. Wherefore He said: That which you heard in the ear in the chambers shall be preached on the housetops. Therefore He did not teach all things openly. Obj. 2: Further, the depths of wisdom should not be expounded save to the perfect, according to 1 Cor. 2:6: We speak wisdom among the perfect. Now Christ’s doctrine contained the most profound wisdom. Therefore it should not have been made known to the imperfect crowd.

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Praeterea, idem est veritatem aliquam occultare silentio, et obscuritate verborum. Sed Christus veritatem quam praedicabat, occultabat turbis obscuritate verborum, quia sine parabolis non loquebatur ad eos, ut dicitur Matth. XIII. Ergo pari ratione poterat occultari silentio.

Sed contra est quod ipse dicit, Ioan. XVIII, in occulto locutus sum nihil. Respondeo dicendum quod doctrina alicuius potest esse in occulto tripliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad intentionem docentis, qui intendit suam doctrinam non manifestare multis, sed magis occultare. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Quandoque ex invidia docentis, qui vult per suam scientiam excellere, et ideo scientiam suam non vult aliis communicare. Quod in Christo locum non habuit, ex cuius persona dicitur, Sap. VII, quam sine fictione didici, et sine invidia communico, et honestatem illius non abscondo. Quandoque vero hoc contingit propter inhonestatem eorum quae docentur, sicut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., quod quaedam sunt mala quae portare non potest qualiscumque pudor humanus. Unde de doctrina haereticorum dicitur, Prov. IX, aquae furtivae dulciores sunt. Doctrina autem Christi non est neque de errore neque de immunditia. Et ideo dominus dicit, Marci IV, nunquid venit lucerna, idest vera et honesta doctrina, ut sub modio ponatur? Alio modo aliqua doctrina est in occulto, quia paucis proponitur. Et sic etiam Christus nihil docuit in occulto, quia omnem doctrinam suam vel turbae toti proposuit, vel omnibus suis discipulis in communi. Unde Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., quis in occulto loquitur, cum coram tot hominibus loquitur? Praesertim si hoc loquitur paucis, quod per eos velit innotescere multis? Tertio modo aliqua doctrina est in occulto, quantum ad modum docendi. Et sic Christus quaedam turbis loquebatur in occulto, parabolis utens ad annuntianda spiritualia mysteria, ad quae capienda non erant idonei vel digni. Et tamen melius erat eis vel sic, sub tegumento parabolarum, spiritualium doctrinam audire, quam omnino ea privari. Harum tamen parabolarum apertam et nudam veritatem dominus discipulis exponebat, per quos deveniret ad alios, qui essent idonei, secundum illud II Tim. II, quae audisti a me per multos testes, haec commenda fidelibus hominibus, qui idonei erunt et alios docere. Et hoc significatum est Num. IV, ubi mandatur quod filii Aaron involverent vasa sanctuarii, quae Levitae involuta portarent. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Hilarius dicit, super Matth., exponens illud verbum inductum, non legimus dominum solitum fuisse noctibus sermocinari, et

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Obj. 3: Further, it comes to the same, to hide the truth, whether by saying nothing or by making use of a language that is difficult to understand. Now Christ, by speaking to the multitudes a language they would not understand, hid from them the truth that He preached; since without parables He did not speak to them (Matt 13:34). In the same way, therefore, He could have hidden it from them by saying nothing at all. On the contrary, He says Himself (John 18:20): In secret I have spoken nothing. I answer that, Anyone’s doctrine may be hidden in three ways. First, on the part of the intention of the teacher, who does not wish to make his doctrine known to many, but rather to hide it. And this may happen in two ways— sometimes through envy on the part of the teacher, who desires to excel in his knowledge, wherefore he is unwilling to communicate it to others. But this was not the case with Christ, in whose person the following words are spoken (Wis 7:13): Which I have learned without guile, and communicate without envy, and her riches I hide not. But sometimes this happens through the vileness of the things taught; thus Augustine says on John 16:12: There are some things so bad that no sort of human modesty can bear them. Wherefore of heretical doctrine it is written (Prov 9:17): Stolen waters are sweeter. Now, Christ’s doctrine is not of error nor of uncleanness (1 Thess 2:3). Wherefore our Lord says (Mark 4:21): Doth a candle, i.e., true and pure doctrine, come in to be put under a bushel? Second, doctrine is hidden because it is put before few. And thus, again, did Christ teach nothing in secret: for He propounded His entire doctrine either to the whole crowd or to His disciples gathered together. Hence Augustine says on John 18:20: How can it be said that He speaks in secret when He speaks before so many men? . . . especially if what He says to few He wishes through them to be made known to many? Third, doctrine is hidden, as to the manner in which it is propounded. And thus Christ spoke certain things in secret to the crowds, by employing parables in teaching them spiritual mysteries which they were either unable or unworthy to grasp: and yet it was better for them to be instructed in the knowledge of spiritual things, albeit hidden under the garb of parables, than to be deprived of it altogether. Nevertheless our Lord expounded the open and unveiled truth of these parables to His disciples, so that they might hand it down to others worthy of it; according to 2 Tim. 2:2: The things which thou hast heard of me by many witnesses, the same command to faithful men, who shall be fit to teach others. This is foreshadowed, Num. 4, where the sons of Aaron are commanded to wrap up the sacred vessels that were to be carried by the Levites. Reply Obj. 1: As Hilary says, commenting on the passage quoted, we do not read that our Lord was wont to preach at night, and expound His doctrine in the dark: but He says

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doctrinam in tenebris tradidisse, sed hoc dicit, quia omnis sermo eius carnalibus tenebrae sunt, et verbum eius infidelibus nox est. Itaque quod ab eo dictum est, inter infideles cum libertate fidei et confessionis est loquendum. Vel, secundum Hieronymum, comparative loquitur, quia videlicet erudiebat eos in parvo Iudaeae loco, respectu totius mundi, in quo erat per apostolorum praedicationem doctrina Christi publicanda. Ad secundum dicendum quod dominus non omnia profunda suae sapientiae sua doctrina manifestavit, non solum turbis, sed nec etiam discipulis, quibus dixit, Ioan. XVI, adhuc habeo vobis multa dicere, quae non potestis portare modo. Sed tamen quaecumque dignum duxit aliis tradere de sua sapientia, non in occulto, sed palam proposuit, licet non ab omnibus intelligeretur. Unde Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., intelligendum est ita dixisse dominum, palam locutus sum mundo, ac si dixisset, multi me audierunt. Et rursus non erat palam, quia non intelligebant. Ad tertium dicendum quod turbis dominus in parabolis loquebatur, sicut dictum est, quia non erant digni nec idonei nudam veritatem accipere, quam discipulis exponebat. Quod autem dicitur quod sine parabolis non loquebatur eis, secundum Chrysostomum intelligendum est quantum ad illum sermonem, quamvis alias et sine parabolis multa turbis locutus fuerit. Vel, secundum Augustinum, in libro de quaest. Evang., hoc dicitur, non quia nihil proprie locutus est, sed quia nullum fere sermonem explicavit ubi non per parabolam aliquid significaverit, quamvis in eo aliqua proprie dixerit.

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this because His speech is darkness to the carnal-minded, and His words are night to the unbeliever. His meaning, therefore, is that whatever He said we also should say in the midst of unbelievers, by openly believing and professing it. Or, according to Jerome, He speaks comparatively— that is to say, because He was instructing them in Judea, which was a small place compared with the whole world, where Christ’s doctrine was to be published by the preaching of the apostles. Reply Obj. 2: By His doctrine our Lord did not make known all the depths of His wisdom, neither to the multitudes, nor, indeed, to His disciples, to whom He said (John 16:12): I have yet many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now. Yet whatever things out of His wisdom He judged it right to make known to others, He expounded, not in secret, but openly; although He was not understood by all. Hence Augustine says on John 18:20: We must understand this, ‘I have spoken openly to the world,’ as though our Lord had said, ‘Many have heard Me’ . . . and, again, it was not ‘openly,’ because they did not understand. Reply Obj. 3: As stated above, our Lord spoke to the multitudes in parables, because they were neither able nor worthy to receive the naked truth, which He revealed to His disciples. And when it is said that without parables He did not speak to them, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xlvii in Matth.), we are to understand this of that particular sermon, since on other occasions He said many things to the multitude without parables. Or, as Augustine says (De Qq. Evang., qu. xvii), this means, not that He spoke nothing literally, but that He scarcely ever spoke without introducing a parable, although He also spoke some things in the literal sense.

Article 4 Whether Christ should have committed his doctrine to writing? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus doctrinam suam debuerit scripto tradere. Scriptura enim inventa est ad hoc quod doctrina commendetur memoriae in futurum. Sed doctrina Christi duratura erat in aeternum, secundum illud Luc. XXI, caelum et terra transibunt, verba autem mea non transibunt. Ergo videtur quod Christus doctrinam suam debuerit scripto mandare. Praeterea, lex vetus in figura Christi praecessit, secundum illud Heb. X, umbram habet lex futurorum bonorum. Sed lex vetus a Deo fuit descripta, secundum illud Exod. XXIV, dabo tibi duas tabulas lapideas, et legem ac mandata quae scripsi. Ergo videtur quod etiam Christus doctrinam suam scribere debuerit.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should have committed His doctrine to writing. For the purpose of writing is to hand down doctrine to posterity. Now Christ’s doctrine was destined to endure for ever, according to Luke 21:33: Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My words shall not pass away. Therefore it seems that Christ should have committed His doctrine to writing. Obj. 2: Further, the Old Law was a foreshadowing of Christ, according to Heb. 10:1: The Law has a shadow of the good things to come. Now the Old Law was put into writing by God, according to Ex. 24:12: I will give thee two tables of stone and the law, and the commandments which I have written. Therefore it seems that Christ also should have put His doctrine into writing.

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Christ’s Doctrine

Praeterea, ad Christum, qui venerat illuminare his qui in tenebris et in umbra mortis sedent, ut dicitur Luc. I, pertinebat erroris occasionem excludere, et viam fidei aperire. Sed hoc fecisset doctrinam suam scribendo, dicit enim Augustinus, in I de Consens. Evang., quod solet nonnullos movere cur ipse dominus nihil scripserit, ut aliis de illo scribentibus necesse sit credere. Hoc enim illi vel maxime Pagani quaerunt qui Christum culpare aut blasphemare non audent, eique tribuunt excellentissimam sapientiam, sed tamen tanquam homini. Discipulos vero eius dicunt magistro suo amplius tribuisse quam erat, ut eum filium Dei dicerent, et verbum Dei, per quod facta sunt omnia. Et postea subdit, videntur parati fuisse hoc de illo credere quod de se ipse scripsisset, non quod alii de illo pro suo arbitrio praedicassent. Ergo videtur quod Christus ipse doctrinam suam scripto tradere debuerit. Sed contra est quod nulli libri ab eo scripti habentur in canone Scripturae. Respondeo dicendum conveniens fuisse Christum doctrinam suam non scripsisse. Primo quidem, propter dignitatem ipsius. Excellentiori enim doctori excellentior modus doctrinae debetur. Et ideo Christo, tanquam excellentissimo doctori, hic modus competebat, ut doctrinam suam auditorum cordibus imprimeret. Propter quod dicitur Matth. VII, quod erat docens eos sicut potestatem habens. Unde etiam apud gentiles Pythagoras et Socrates, qui fuerunt excellentissimi doctores, nihil scribere voluerunt. Scripta enim ordinantur ad impressionem doctrinae in cordibus auditorum sicut ad finem.

Secundo, propter excellentiam doctrinae Christi, quae litteris comprehendi non potest, secundum illud Ioan. ult., sunt et alia multa quae fecit Iesus, quae si scribantur per singula, nec ipsum arbitror mundum capere eos qui scribendi sunt libros. Quos, sicut Augustinus dicit, non spatio locorum credendum est mundum capere non posse, sed capacitate legentium comprehendi non posse. Si autem Christus scripto suam doctrinam mandasset, nihil altius de eius doctrina homines existimarent quam quod Scriptura contineret.

Tertio, ut ordine quodam ab ipso doctrina ad omnes perveniret, dum ipse scilicet discipulos suos immediate docuit, qui postmodum alios verbo et scripto docuerunt. Si autem ipsemet scripsisset, eius doctrina immediate ad omnes pervenisset. Unde et de sapientia dicitur, Prov. IX, quod misit ancillas suas vocare ad arcem. Sciendum tamen est, sicut Augustinus dicit, in I de Consens. Evang., aliquos gentiles existimasse Christum quosdam libros scripsisse continentes quaedam magica, quibus miracula facie-

Q. 42, A. 4

Obj. 3: Further, to Christ, who came to enlighten them that sit in darkness (Luke 1:79), it belonged to remove occasions of error, and to open out the road to faith. Now He would have done this by putting His teaching into writing: for Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. i) that some there are who wonder why our Lord wrote nothing, so that we have to believe what others have written about Him. Especially do those pagans ask this question who dare not blame or blaspheme Christ, and who ascribe to Him most excellent, but merely human, wisdom. These say that the disciples made out the Master to be more than He really was when they said that He was the Son of God and the Word of God, by whom all things were made. And farther on he adds: It seems as though they were prepared to believe whatever He might have written of Himself, but not what others at their discretion published about Him. Therefore it seems that Christ should have Himself committed His doctrine to writing. On the contrary, No books written by Him were to be found in the canon of Scripture. I answer that, It was fitting that Christ should not commit His doctrine to writing. First, on account of His dignity: for the more excellent the teacher, the more excellent should be his manner of teaching. Consequently it was fitting that Christ, as the most excellent of teachers, should adopt that manner of teaching whereby His doctrine is imprinted on the hearts of His hearers; wherefore it is written (Matt 7:29) that He was teaching them as one having power. And so it was that among the Gentiles, Pythagoras and Socrates, who were teachers of great excellence, were unwilling to write anything. For writings are ordained, as to an end, unto the imprinting of doctrine in the hearts of the hearers. Second, on account of the excellence of Christ’s doctrine, which cannot be expressed in writing; according to John 21:25: There are also many other things which Jesus did: which, if they were written everyone, the world itself, I think, would not be able to contain the books that should be written. Which Augustine explains by saying: We are not to believe that in respect of space the world could not contain them . . . but that by the capacity of the readers they could not be comprehended. And if Christ had committed His doctrine to writing, men would have had no deeper thought of His doctrine than that which appears on the surface of the writing. Third, that His doctrine might reach all in an orderly manner: Himself teaching His disciples immediately, and they subsequently teaching others, by preaching and writing: whereas if He Himself had written, His doctrine would have reached all immediately. Hence it is said of Wisdom (Prov 9:3) that she hath sent her maids to invite to the tower. It is to be observed, however, that, as Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. i), some of the Gentiles thought that Christ wrote certain books treating of the magic art whereby He worked miracles:

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Q. 42, A. 4

Incarnate Son of God

bat, quae disciplina Christiana condemnat. Et tamen illi qui Christi libros tales se legisse affirmant, nulla talia faciunt qualia illum de libris talibus fecisse mirantur. Divino etiam iudicio sic errant ut eosdem libros ad Petrum et Paulum dicant tanquam epistolari titulo praenotatos, eo quod in pluribus locis simul eos cum Christo pictos viderunt. Nec mirum si a pingentibus fingentes decepti sunt. Toto enim tempore quo Christus in carne mortali cum suis discipulis vixit, nondum erat Paulus discipulus eius. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in eodem libro, omnibus discipulis suis tanquam membris sui corporis Christus caput est. Itaque, cum illi scripserunt quae ille ostendit et dixit, nequaquam dicendum est quod ipse non scripserit. Quandoquidem membra eius id operata sunt quod, dictante capite, cognoverunt. Quidquid enim ille de suis factis et dictis nos legere voluit, hoc scribendum illis tanquam suis manibus imperavit. Ad secundum dicendum quod, quia lex vetus in sensibilibus figuris dabatur, ideo etiam convenienter sensibilibus signis scripta fuit. Sed doctrina Christi, quae est lex spiritus vitae, scribi debuit, non atramento, sed spiritu Dei vivi, non in tabulis lapideis, sed in tabulis cordis carnalibus, ut apostolus dicit, II Cor. III. Ad tertium dicendum quod illi qui Scripturae apostolorum de Christo credere nolunt, nec ipsi Christo scribenti credidissent, de quo opinabantur quod magicis artibus fecisset miracula.

IIIae

which art is condemned by the Christian learning. And yet they who claim to have read those books of Christ do none of those things which they marvel at His doing according to those same books. Moreover, it is by a Divine judgment that they err so far as to assert that these books were, as it were, entitled as letters to Peter and Paul, for that they found them in several places depicted in company with Christ. No wonder that the inventors were deceived by the painters: for as long as Christ lived in the mortal flesh with His disciples, Paul was no disciple of His. Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says in the same book: Christ is the head of all His disciples who are members of His body. Consequently, when they put into writing what He showed forth and said to them, by no means must we say that He wrote nothing: since His members put forth that which they knew under His dictation. For at His command they, being His hands, as it were, wrote whatever He wished us to read concerning His deeds and words. Reply Obj. 2: Since the Old Law was given under the form of sensible signs, therefore also was it fittingly written with sensible signs. But Christ’s doctrine, which is the law of the spirit of life (Rom 8:2), had to be written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God; not in tables of stone, but in the fleshly tables of the heart, as the Apostle says (2 Cor 3:3). Reply Obj. 3: Those who were unwilling to believe what the apostles wrote of Christ would have refused to believe the writings of Christ, whom they deemed to work miracles by the magic art.

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Question 43 The Miracles Worked by Christ, in General Deinde considerandum est de miraculis a Christo We must now consider the miracles worked by Christ: factis. Et primo, in generali; secundo, in speciali de sin- (1) In general; (2) Specifically, of each kind of miracle; (3) gulis miraculorum generibus; tertio, in particulari de In particular, of His transfiguration. transfiguratione ipsius. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum Christus debuerit miracula facere. (1) Whether Christ should have worked miracles? Secundo, utrum fecerit ea virtute divina. (2) Whether He worked them by Divine power? Tertio, quo tempore incoeperit miracula facere. (3) When did He begin to work miracles? Quarto, utrum per miracula fuerit sufficienter (4) Whether His miracles are a sufficient proof of His ostensa eius divinitas. Godhead?

Article 1 Whether Christ should have worked miracles? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus miracula facere non debuit. Factum enim Christi verbo ipsius debuit concordare. Sed ipse dixit, Matth. XVI, generatio mala et adultera signum quaerit, et signum non dabitur ei, nisi signum Ionae prophetae. Ergo non debuit miracula facere. Praeterea, sicut Christus in secundo adventu venturus est in virtute magna et maiestate, ut dicitur Matth. XXIV; ita in primo adventu venit in infirmitate, secundum illud Isaiae LIII, virum dolorum et scientem infirmitatem. Sed operatio miraculorum magis pertinet ad virtutem quam ad infirmitatem. Ergo non fuit conveniens ut in primo adventu miracula faceret. Praeterea, Christus venit ad hoc ut per fidem homines salvaret, secundum illud Heb. XII, aspicientes in auctorem fidei et consummatorem, Iesum. Sed miracula diminuunt meritum fidei, unde dominus dicit, Ioan. IV, nisi signa et prodigia videritis, non creditis. Ergo videtur quod Christus non debuerit miracula facere. Sed contra est quod ex persona adversariorum dicitur, Ioan. XI, quid facimus, quia hic homo multa signa facit? Respondeo dicendum quod divinitus conceditur homini miracula facere, propter duo. Primo quidem, et principaliter, ad confirmandam veritatem quam aliquis docet. Quia enim ea quae sunt fidei humanam rationem excedunt, non possunt per rationes humanas probari, sed oportet quod probentur per argumentum divinae virtutis, ut, dum aliquis facit opera quae solus Deus facere potest, credantur ea quae dicuntur esse a Deo; si-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have worked miracles. For Christ’s deeds should have been consistent with His words. But He Himself said (Matt 16:4): A wicked and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign; and a sign shall not be given it, but the sign of Jonas the prophet. Therefore He should not have worked miracles. Obj. 2: Further, just as Christ, at His second coming, is to come with great power and majesty, as is written Matt. 24:30, so at His first coming He came in infirmity, according to Isa. 53:3: A man of sorrows and acquainted with infirmity. But the working of miracles belongs to power rather than to infirmity. Therefore it was not fitting that He should work miracles in His first coming. Obj. 3: Further, Christ came that He might save men by faith; according to Heb. 12:2: Looking on Jesus, the author and finisher of faith. But miracles lessen the merit of faith; hence our Lord says (John 4:48): Unless you see signs and wonders you believe not. Therefore it seems that Christ should not have worked miracles. On the contrary, It was said in the person of His adversaries (John 11:47): What do we; for this man doth many miracles? I answer that, God enables man to work miracles for two reasons. First and principally, in confirmation of the doctrine that a man teaches. For since those things which are of faith surpass human reason, they cannot be proved by human arguments, but need to be proved by the argument of Divine power: so that when a man does works that God alone can do, we may believe that what he says is from God: just as when a man is the bearer of letters sealed with

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Q. 43, A. 2

Incarnate Son of God

cut, cum aliquis defert litteras anulo regis signatas, creditur ex voluntate regis processisse quod in illis continetur. Secundo, ad ostendendum praesentiam Dei in homine per gratiam spiritus sancti, ut dum scilicet homo facit opera Dei, credatur Deus habitare in eo per gratiam. Unde dicitur, Galat. III, qui tribuit vobis spiritum, et operatur virtutes in vobis. Utrumque autem circa Christum erat hominibus manifestandum, scilicet quod Deus esset in eo per gratiam, non adoptionis, sed unionis; et quod eius supernaturalis doctrina esset a Deo. Et ideo convenientissimum fuit ut miracula faceret. Unde ipse dicit, Ioan. X, si mihi non vultis credere, operibus credite. Et Ioan. V, opera quae dedit mihi pater ut faciam, ipsa sunt quae testimonium perhibent de me. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc quod dicit, signum non dabitur ei nisi signum Ionae, sic intelligendum est, ut Chrysostomus dicit, quod tunc non acceperunt tale signum quale petebant, scilicet de caelo, non quod nullum signum eis dederit. Vel, quia signa faciebat, non propter eos, quos sciebat lapideos esse, sed ut alios emundaret. Et ideo non eis, sed aliis illa signa dabantur. Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet Christus venerit in infirmitate carnis, quod manifestatur per passiones, venit tamen in virtute Dei. Quod erat manifestandum per miracula. Ad tertium dicendum quod miracula intantum diminuunt meritum fidei, inquantum per hoc ostenditur duritia eorum qui nolunt credere ea quae Scripturis divinis probantur, nisi per miracula. Et tamen melius est eis ut vel per miracula convertantur ad fidem quam quod omnino in infidelitate permaneant. Dicitur enim I Cor. XIV, quod signa data sunt infidelibus, ut scilicet convertantur ad fidem.

IIIae

the king’s ring, it is to be believed that what they contain expresses the king’s will. Second, in order to make known God’s presence in a man by the grace of the Holy Spirit: so that when a man does the works of God we may believe that God dwells in him by His grace. Wherefore it is written (Gal 3:5): He who giveth to you the Spirit, and worketh miracles among you. Now both these things were to be made known to men concerning Christ—namely, that God dwelt in Him by grace, not of adoption, but of union: and that His supernatural doctrine was from God. And therefore it was most fitting that He should work miracles. Wherefore He Himself says (John 10:38): Though you will not believe Me, believe the works; and (John 5:36): The works which the Father hath given Me to perfect . . . themselves . . . give testimony to Me. Reply Obj. 1: These words, a sign shall not be given it, but the sign of Jonas, mean, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xliii in Matth.), that they did not receive a sign such as they sought, viz. from heaven: but not that He gave them no sign at all. Or that He worked signs not for the sake of those whom He knew to be hardened, but to amend others. Therefore those signs were given, not to them, but to others. Reply Obj. 2: Although Christ came in the infirmity of the flesh, which is manifested in the passions, yet He came in the power of God (2 Cor 13:4), and this had to be made manifest by miracles. Reply Obj. 3: Miracles lessen the merit of faith in so far as those are shown to be hard of heart who are unwilling to believe what is proved from the Scriptures unless (they are convinced) by miracles. Yet it is better for them to be converted to the faith even by miracles than that they should remain altogether in their unbelief. For it is written (1 Cor 14:22) that signs are given to unbelievers, viz. that they may be converted to the faith.

Article 2 Whether Christ worked miracles by Divine power? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non fecerit miracula virtute divina. Virtus enim divina est omnipotens. Sed videtur quod Christus non fuerit omnipotens in miraculis faciendis, dicitur enim Marci VI, quod non poterat ibi, scilicet in patria sua, ullam virtutem facere. Ergo videtur quod non fecerit miracula virtute divina. Praeterea, Dei non est orare. Sed Christus aliquando in miraculis faciendis orabat, ut patet in suscitatione Lazari, Ioan. XI; et in multiplicatione panum, ut

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not work miracles by Divine power. For the Divine power is omnipotent. But it seems that Christ was not omnipotent in working miracles; for it is written (Mark 6:5) that He could not do any miracles there, i.e., in His own country. Therefore it seems that He did not work miracles by Divine power. Obj. 2: Further, God does not pray. But Christ sometimes prayed when working miracles; as may be seen in the raising of Lazarus (John 11:41, 42), and in the multiplica-

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Miracles Worked by Christ, in General

patet Matth. XIV. Ergo videtur quod non fecerit miracula virtute divina. Praeterea, ea quae virtute divina fiunt, non possunt virtute alicuius creaturae fieri. Sed ea quae Christus faciebat, poterant etiam fieri virtute alicuius creaturae, unde et Pharisaei dicebant quod in Beelzebub, principe Daemoniorum, eiiciebat Daemonia. Ergo videtur quod Christus non fecerit miracula virtute divina. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. XIV, pater, in me manens, ipse facit opera. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in prima parte habitum est, vera miracula sola virtute divina fieri possunt, quia solus Deus potest mutare naturae ordinem, quod pertinet ad rationem miraculi. Unde Leo Papa dicit, in epistola ad Flavianum, quod, cum in Christo sint duae naturae, una earum est, scilicet divina, quae fulget miraculis; altera, scilicet humana, quae succumbit iniuriis; et tamen una earum agit cum communicatione alterius, inquantum scilicet humana natura est instrumentum divinae actionis, et actio humana virtutem accepit a natura divina, sicut supra habitum est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc quod dicitur, non poterat ibi ullam virtutem facere, non est referendum ad potentiam absolutam, sed ad id quod potest fieri congruenter, non enim congruum erat ut inter incredulos operaretur miracula. Unde subditur, et mirabatur propter incredulitatem eorum. Secundum quem modum dicitur Gen. XVIII, non celare potero Abraham quae gesturus sum; et XIX, non potero facere quidquam donec ingrediaris illuc. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super illud Matth. XIV, acceptis quinque panibus et duobus piscibus aspiciens in caelum benedixit et fregit, oportebat, inquit, credi de Christo quoniam a patre est, et quoniam ei aequalis est. Et ideo, ut utrumque ostendat, nunc quidem cum potestate, nunc autem orans miracula facit. Et in minoribus quidem respicit in caelum, puta in multiplicatione panum, in maioribus autem, quae sunt solius Dei, cum potestate agit, puta quando peccata dimisit, mortuos suscitavit. Quod autem dicitur Ioan. XI, quod in suscitatione Lazari oculos sursum levavit, non propter necessitatem suffragii, sed propter exemplum hoc fecit. Unde dicit, propter populum qui circumstat dixi, ut credant quia tu me misisti. Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus alio modo expellebat Daemones quam virtute Daemonum expellantur. Nam virtute superiorum Daemonum ita Daemones a corporibus expelluntur quod tamen remanet dominium eorum quantum ad animam, non enim contra regnum suum Diabolus agit. Sed Christus Daemones expellebat non solum a corpore, sed multo magis ab anima. Et ideo dominus blasphemiam Iudaeorum dicentium eum in virtute Daemonum Daemonia eiicere,

Q. 43, A. 2

tion of the loaves, as related Matt. 14:19. Therefore it seems that He did not work miracles by Divine power. Obj. 3: Further, what is done by Divine power cannot be done by the power of any creature. But the things which Christ did could be done also by the power of a creature: wherefore the Pharisees said (Luke 11:15) that He cast out devils by Beelzebub the prince of devils. Therefore it seems that Christ did not work miracles by Divine power. On the contrary, our Lord said (John 14:10): The Father who abideth in Me, He doth the works. I answer that, as stated in the First Part (Q. 110, A. 4), true miracles cannot be wrought save by Divine power: because God alone can change the order of nature; and this is what is meant by a miracle. Wherefore Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Flav. xxviii) that, while there are two natures in Christ, there is one, viz. the Divine, which shines forth in miracles; and another, viz. the human, which submits to insults; yet each communicates its actions to the other: in as far as the human nature is the instrument of the Divine action, and the human action receives power from the Divine Nature, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 1). Reply Obj. 1: When it is said that He could not do any miracles there, it is not to be understood that He could not do them absolutely, but that it was not fitting for Him to do them: for it was unfitting for Him to work miracles among unbelievers. Wherefore it is said farther on: And He wondered because of their unbelief. In like manner it is said (Gen 18:17): Can I hide from Abraham what I am about to do? and Gen. 19:22: I cannot do anything till thou go in thither. Reply Obj. 2: As Chrysostom says on Matt. 14:19, He took the five loaves and the two fishes, and, looking up to heaven, He blessed and brake: It was to be believed of Him, both that He is of the Father and that He is equal to Him . . . Therefore that He might prove both, He works miracles now with authority, now with prayer . . . in the lesser things, indeed, He looks up to heaven—for instance, in multiplying the loaves—but in the greater, which belong to God alone, He acts with authority; for example, when He forgave sins and raised the dead. When it is said that in raising Lazarus He lifted up His eyes (John 11:41), this was not because He needed to pray, but because He wished to teach us how to pray. Wherefore He said: Because of the people who stand about have I said it: that they may believe that Thou hast sent Me. Reply Obj. 3: Christ cast out demons otherwise than they are cast out by the power of demons. For demons are cast out from bodies by the power of higher demons in such a way that they retain their power over the soul: since the devil does not work against his own kingdom. On the other hand, Christ cast out demons, not only from the body, but still more from the soul. For this reason our Lord rebuked the blasphemy of the Jews, who said that He cast out demons by the power of the demons: first, by saying

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Q. 43, A. 3

Incarnate Son of God

reprobavit, primo quidem, per hoc quod Satanas contra seipsum non dividitur. Secundo, exemplo aliorum, qui Daemonia eiiciebant per spiritum Dei. Tertio, quia Daemonium expellere non posset nisi ipsum vicisset virtute divina. Quarto, quia nulla convenientia in operibus nec in effectu erat sibi et Satanae, cum Satanas dispergere cuperet quos Christus colligebat.

IIIae

that Satan is not divided against himself; second, by quoting the instance of others who cast out demons by the Spirit of God; third, because He could not have cast out a demon unless He had overcome Him by Divine power; fourth, because there was nothing in common between His works and their effects and those of Satan; since Satan’s purpose was to scatter those whom Christ gathered together.

Article 3 Whether Christ began to work miracles when he changed water into wine at the marriage feast? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non incoeperit miracula facere in nuptiis, mutando aquam in vinum. Legitur enim in libro de infantia salvatoris, quod Christus in sua pueritia multa miracula fecit. Sed miraculum de conversione aquae in vinum fecit in nuptiis trigesimo vel trigesimoprimo anno suae aetatis. Ergo videtur quod non incoeperit tunc miracula facere. Praeterea, Christus faciebat miracula secundum virtutem divinam. Sed virtus divina fuit in eo a principio suae conceptionis, ex tunc enim fuit Deus et homo. Ergo videtur quod a principio miracula fecerit. Praeterea, Christus post Baptismum et tentationem coepit discipulos congregare, ut legitur Matth. IV et Ioan. I. Sed discipuli praecipue congregati sunt ad ipsum propter miracula, sicut dicitur Luc. V, quod Petrum vocavit obstupescentem propter miraculum quod fecerat in captura piscium. Ergo videtur quod ante miraculum quod fecit in nuptiis, fecerit alia miracula. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. II, hoc fecit initium signorum Iesus in Cana Galilaeae. Respondeo dicendum quod miracula facta sunt a Christo propter confirmationem eius doctrinae, et ad ostendendum virtutem divinam in ipso. Et ideo, quantum ad primum, non debuit ante miracula facere quam docere inciperet. Non autem debuit incipere docere ante perfectam aetatem, ut supra habitum est, cum de Baptismo eius ageretur. Quantum autem ad secundum, sic debuit per miracula divinitatem ostendere ut crederetur veritas humanitatis ipsius. Et ideo, sicut dicit Chrysostomus, super Ioan., decenter non incoepit signa facere ex prima aetate, existimassent enim phantasiam esse incarnationem, et ante opportunum tempus cruci eum tradidissent. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super Ioan., ex verbo Ioannis Baptistae dicentis, ut manifestetur in Israel, propterea veni ego in aqua

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not begin to work miracles when He changed water into wine at the marriage feast. For we read in the book De Infantia Salvatoris that Christ worked many miracles in His childhood. But the miracle of changing water into wine at the marriage feast took place in the thirtieth or thirty-first year of His age. Therefore it seems that it was not then that He began to work miracles. Obj. 2: Further, Christ worked miracles by Divine power. Now He was possessed of Divine power from the first moment of His conception; for from that instant He was both God and man. Therefore it seems that He worked miracles from the very first. Obj. 3: Further, Christ began to gather His disciples after His baptism and temptation, as related Matt. 4:18 and John 1:35. But the disciples gathered around Him, principally on account of His miracles: thus it is written (Luke 5:4) that He called Peter when he was astonished at the miracle which He had worked in the draught of fishes. Therefore it seems that He worked other miracles before that of the marriage feast. On the contrary, It is written (John 2:11): This beginning of miracles did Jesus in Cana of Galilee. I answer that, Christ worked miracles in order to confirm His doctrine, and in order to show forth His Divine power. Therefore, as to the first, it was unbecoming for Him to work miracles before He began to teach. And it was unfitting that He should begin to teach until He reached the perfect age, as we stated above, in speaking of His baptism (Q. 39, A. 3). But as to the second, it was right that He should so manifest His Godhead by working miracles that men should believe in the reality of His manhood. And, consequently, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xxi in Joan.), it was fitting that He should not begin to work wonders from His early years: for men would have deemed the Incarnation to be imaginary and would have crucified Him before the proper time. Reply Obj. 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xvii in Joan.), in regard to the saying of John the Baptist, ‘That He may be made manifest in Israel, therefore am I come baptizing

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baptizans, manifestum est quod illa signa quae quidam dicunt in pueritia a Christo facta, mendacia et fictiones sunt. Si enim a prima aetate miracula fecisset Christus, nequaquam neque Ioannes eum ignorasset, neque reliqua multitudo indiguisset magistro ad manifestandum eum. Ad secundum dicendum quod divina virtus operabatur in Christo secundum quod erat necessarium ad salutem humanam, propter quam carnem assumpserat. Et ideo sic miracula fecit virtute divina ut fidei de veritate carnis eius praeiudicium non fieret. Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc ipsum ad laudem discipulorum pertinet, quod Christum secuti sunt cum nulla eum miracula facere vidissent, sicut Gregorius dicit, in quadam homilia. Et, ut Chrysostomus dicit, maxime tunc signa necessarium erat facere, quando discipuli iam congregati erant et devoti, et attendentes his quae fiebant. Unde subditur, et crediderunt in eum discipuli eius, non quia tunc primum crediderunt; sed quia tunc diligentius et perfectius crediderunt. Vel discipulos vocat eos qui futuri erant discipuli, sicut exponit Augustinus, in libro de consensu Evangelistarum.

Q. 43, A. 4

with water,’ it is clear that the wonders which some pretend to have been worked by Christ in His childhood are untrue and fictitious. For had Christ worked miracles from His early years, John would by no means have been unacquainted with Him, nor would the rest of the people have stood in need of a teacher to point Him out to them. Reply Obj. 2: What the Divine power achieved in Christ was in proportion to the needs of the salvation of mankind, the achievement of which was the purpose of His taking flesh. Consequently He so worked miracles by the Divine power as not to prejudice our belief in the reality of His flesh. Reply Obj. 3: The disciples were to be commended precisely because they followed Christ without having seen Him work any miracles, as Gregory says in a homily (Hom. v in Evang.). And, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xxiii in Joan.), the need for working miracles arose then, especially when the disciples were already gathered around and attached to Him, and attentive to what was going on around them. Hence it is added: ‘And His disciples believed in Him,’ not because they then believed in Him for the first time, but because then they believed with greater discernment and perfection. Or they are called disciples because they were to be disciples later on, as Augustine observes (De Consensu Evang. ii).

Article 4 Whether the miracles which Christ worked were a sufficient proof of his Godhead? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod miracula quae Christus fecit, non fuerunt sufficientia ad ostendendam divinitatem ipsius. Esse enim Deum et hominem proprium est Christo. Sed miracula quae Christus fecit, etiam ab aliis sunt facta. Ergo videtur quod non fuerint sufficientia ad ostendendam divinitatem ipsius. Praeterea, virtute divinitatis nihil est maius. Sed aliqui fecerunt maiora miracula quam Christus, dicitur enim Ioan. XIV, qui credit in me, opera quae ego facio, et ipse faciet, et maiora horum faciet. Ergo videtur quod miracula quae Christus fecit, non fuerint sufficientia ad ostendendum divinitatem ipsius. Praeterea, ex particulari non sufficienter ostenditur universale. Sed quodlibet miraculorum Christi fuit quoddam particulare opus. Ergo ex nullo eorum potuit manifestari sufficienter divinitas Christi, ad quam pertinet universalem virtutem habere de omnibus. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. V, opera quae dedit mihi pater ut faciam, ipsa testimonium perhibent de me. Respondeo dicendum quod miracula quae Christus fecit, sufficientia erant ad manifestandum divini-

Objection 1: It would seem that the miracles which Christ worked were not a sufficient proof of His Godhead. For it is proper to Christ to be both God and man. But the miracles which Christ worked have been done by others also. Therefore they were not a sufficient proof of His Godhead. Obj. 2: Further, no power surpasses that of the Godhead. But some have worked greater miracles than Christ, for it is written (John 14:12): He that believeth in Me, the works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than these shall he do. Therefore it seems that the miracles which Christ worked are not sufficient proof of His Godhead. Obj. 3: Further, the particular is not a sufficient proof of the universal. But any one of Christ’s miracles was one particular work. Therefore none of them was a sufficient proof of His Godhead, by reason of which He had universal power over all things. On the contrary, our Lord said (John 5:36): The works which the Father hath given Me to perfect . . . themselves . . . give testimony of Me. I answer that, The miracles which Christ worked were a sufficient proof of His Godhead in three respects.

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Q. 43, A. 4

Incarnate Son of God

tatem ipsius, secundum tria. Primo quidem, secundum ipsam speciem operum, quae transcendebant omnem potestatem creatae virtutis, et ideo non poterant fieri nisi virtute divina. Et propter hoc caecus illuminatus dicebat, Ioan. IX a saeculo non est auditum quia aperuit quis oculos caeci nati. Nisi esset hic a Deo, non posset facere quidquam. Secundo, propter modum miracula faciendi, quia scilicet quasi propria potestate miracula faciebat, non autem orando, sicut alii. Unde dicitur Luc. VI, quod virtus de illo exibat et sanabat omnes. Per quod ostenditur, sicut Cyrillus dicit, quod non accipiebat alienam virtutem, sed, cum esset naturaliter Deus, propriam virtutem super infirmos ostendebat. Et propter hoc etiam innumerabilia miracula faciebat. Unde super illud Matth. VIII, eiiciebat spiritus verbo, et omnes male habentes curavit, dicit Chrysostomus, intende quantam multitudinem curatam transcurrunt Evangelistae, non unumquemque curatum enarrantes, sed uno verbo pelagus ineffabile miraculorum inducentes. Et ex hoc ostendebatur quod haberet virtutem coaequalem Deo patri, secundum illud Ioan. V, quaecumque pater facit, haec et filius similiter facit; et ibidem, sicut pater suscitat mortuos et vivificat, sic et filius quos vult vivificat. Tertio, ex ipsa doctrina qua se Deum dicebat, quae nisi vera esset, non confirmaretur miraculis divina virtute factis. Et ideo dicitur Marci I, quaenam doctrina haec nova? Quia in potestate spiritibus immundis imperat, et obediunt ei? Ad primum ergo dicendum quod haec erat obiectio gentilium. Unde Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Volusianum, nulla, inquiunt, competentibus signis tantae maiestatis indicia claruerunt. Quia larvalis illa purgatio, qua scilicet Daemones effugabat, debilium cura, reddita vita defunctis, si et alia considerentur, Deo parva sunt. Et ad hoc respondet Augustinus, fatemur et nos talia quidem fecisse prophetas. Sed et ipse Moyses et ceteri prophetae dominum Iesum prophetaverunt, et ei gloriam magnam dederunt. Qui propterea talia et ipse facere voluit, ne esset absurdum, quod per illos fecerat, si ipse non faceret. Sed tamen et aliquid proprium facere debuit, nasci de virgine, resurgere a mortuis, in caelum ascendere. Hoc Deo qui parum putat, quid plus expectet ignoro. Num, homine assumpto, alium mundum facere debuit, ut eum esse crederemus per quem factus est mundus? Sed nec maior mundus, nec isti aequalis in hoc fieri posset, si autem minorem faceret infra istum, similiter hoc quoque parum putaretur.

Quae tamen alii fecerunt, Christus excellentius fecit. Unde super Ioan. XV, si opera non fecissem in eis quae nemo alius fecit, etc., dicit Augustinus, nulla in operibus

IIIae

First, as to the very nature of the works, which surpassed the entire capability of created power, and therefore could not be done save by Divine power. For this reason the blind man, after his sight had been restored, said (John 9:32, 33): From the beginning of the world it has not been heard, that any man hath opened the eyes of one born blind. Unless this man were of God, he could not do anything. Second, as to the way in which He worked miracles— namely, because He worked miracles as though of His own power, and not by praying, as others do. Wherefore it is written (Luke 6:19) that virtue went out from Him and healed all. Whereby it is proved, as Cyril says (Comment. in Lucam) that He did not receive power from another, but, being God by nature, He showed His own power over the sick. And this is how He worked countless miracles. Hence on Matt. 8:16: He cast out spirits with His word, and all that were sick He healed, Chrysostom says: Mark how great a multitude of persons healed, the Evangelists pass quickly over, not mentioning one by one . . . but in one word traversing an unspeakable sea of miracles. And thus it was shown that His power was co-equal with that of God the Father, according to John 5:19: What things soever the Father doth, these the Son doth also in like manner; and, again (John 5:21): As the Father raiseth up the dead and giveth life, so the Son also giveth life to whom He will. Third, from the very fact that He taught that He was God; for unless this were true it would not be confirmed by miracles worked by Divine power. Hence it was said (Mark 1:27): What is this new doctrine? For with power He commandeth the unclean spirits, and they obey Him. Reply Obj. 1: This was the argument of the Gentiles. Wherefore Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): No suitable wonders, say they, show forth the presence of so great a majesty, for the ghostly cleansing whereby He cast out demons, the cure of the sick, the raising of the dead to life, if other miracles be taken into account, are small things before God. To this Augustine answers thus: We own that the prophets did as much . . . But even Moses himself and the other prophets made Christ the Lord the object of their prophecy, and gave Him great glory . . . He, therefore, chose to do similar things to avoid the inconsistency of failing to do what He had done through others. Yet still He was bound to do something which no other had done: to be born of a virgin, to rise from the dead, and to ascend into heaven. If anyone deem this a slight thing for God to do, I know not what more he can expect. Having become man, ought He to have made another world, that we might believe Him to be Him by whom the world was made? But in this world neither a greater world could be made nor one equal to it: and if He had made a lesser world in comparison with this, that too would have been deemed a small thing. As to the miracles worked by others, Christ did greater still. Hence on John 15:24: If I had not done in them the works that no other men hath done, etc., Augustine says:

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Christi videntur esse maiora quam suscitatio mortuorum, quod scimus etiam antiquos fecisse prophetas. Fecit tamen aliqua Christus quae nemo alius fecit. Sed respondetur nobis et alios fecisse quae nec ipse, nec alius fecit. Sed quod tam multa vitia et malas valetudines vexationesque mortalium tanta potestate sanaret, nullus omnino legitur antiquorum fecisse. Ut enim taceatur quod iubendo, sicut occurrebant, salvos singulos fecit, Marcus dicit, quocumque introibat in vicos aut in villas aut in civitates, in plateis ponebant infirmos, et deprecabantur eum ut vel fimbriam vestimenti eius tangerent, et quotquot tangebant eum, salvi fiebant. Haec nemo alius fecit in eis. Sic enim intelligendum est quod ait, in eis, non inter eos, aut coram eis, sed prorsus in eis, quia sanavit eos. Nec tamen alius fecit, quicumque in eis talia opera fecit, quoniam quisquis alius homo aliquid eorum fecit, ipso faciente fecit; haec autem ipse, non illis facientibus, fecit.

Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus, exponens illud verbum Ioannis, inquirit, quae sunt ista opera maiora, quae credentes in eum erant facturi? An forte quod aegros, ipsis transeuntibus, etiam eorum umbra sanabat? Maius est enim quod sanet umbra, quam fimbria. Veruntamen, quando ista Christus dicebat, verborum suorum facta et opera commendabat. Cum enim dixit, pater in me manens ipse facit opera, quae opera tunc dicebat, nisi verba quae loquebatur? Et eorundem verborum fructus erat fides illorum. Veruntamen, evangelizantibus discipulis, non tam pauci quam illi erant, sed gentes etiam crediderunt. Nonne ab ore ipsius dives ille tristis abscessit, et tamen postea, quod ab illo auditum non fecit unus, fecerunt multi cum per discipulos loqueretur? Ecce, maiora fecit praedicatus a credentibus, quam locutus audientibus. Verum hoc adhuc movet, quod haec maiora per apostolos fecit, non autem ipsos tantum significans ait, qui credit in me. Audi ergo, qui credit in me, opera quae ego facio, et ipse faciet. Prius ego facio, deinde et ipse faciet, quia facio ut faciat. Quae opera, nisi ut ex impio iustus fiat? Quod utique in illo, sed non sine illo Christus operatur. Prorsus maius hoc esse dixerim quam creare caelum et terram, caelum enim et terra transibunt, praedestinatorum autem salus et iustificatio permanebit. Sed in caelis Angeli opera sunt Christi. Nunquid his operibus maiora facit qui cooperatur Christo ad suam iustificationem? Iudicet qui potest utrum maius sit iustos creare, quam impios iustificare. Certe, si aequalis est utrumque potentiae, hoc maioris est misericordiae.

Q. 43, A. 4

None of the works of Christ seem to be greater than the raising of the dead: which thing we know the ancient prophets also did . . . Yet Christ did some works ‘which no other man hath done.’ But we are told in answer that others did works which He did not, and which none other did . . . But to heal with so great a power so many defects and ailments and grievances of mortal men, this we read concerning none soever of the men of old. To say nothing of those, each of whom by His bidding, as they came in His way, He made whole . . . Mark saith (6:56): ‘Whithersoever He entered, into towns or into villages or into cities, they laid the sick in the streets, and besought Him that they might touch but the hem of His garment: and as many as touched Him were made whole.’ These things none other did in them; for when He saith ‘In them,’ it is not to be understood to mean ‘Among them,’ or ‘In their presence,’ but wholly ‘In them,’ because He healed them . . . Therefore whatever works He did in them are works that none ever did; since if ever any other man did any one of them, by His doing he did it; whereas these works He did, not by their doing, but by Himself. Reply Obj. 2: Augustine explains this passage of John as follows (Tract. lxxi): What are these ‘greater works’ which believers in Him would do? That, as they passed by, their very shadow healed the sick? For it is greater that a shadow should heal than the hem of a garment . . . When, however, He said these words, it was the deeds and works of His words that He spoke of: for when He said . . . ‘The Father who abideth in Me, He doth the works,’ what works did He mean, then, but the words He was speaking? . . . and the fruits of those same words was the faith of those (who believed): but when the disciples preached the Gospel, not some few like those, but the very nations believed . . . Did not that rich man go away from His presence sorrowful? . . . and yet afterwards, what one individual, having heard from Him, did not, that many did, when He spake by the mouth of His disciples . . . Behold, He did greater works when spoken of by men believing than when speaking to men hearing. But there is yet this difficulty: that He did these ‘greater works’ by the apostles: whereas He saith as meaning not only them: . . . ‘He that believeth in Me’ . . . Listen! . . . ‘He that believeth in Me, the works that I do, he also shall do’: first, ‘I do,’ then ‘he also shall do,’ because I do that he may do. What works—but that from ungodly he should be made righteous? . . . Which thing Christ worketh in him, truly, but not without him. Yes, I may affirm this to be altogether greater than to create heaven and earth . . . for ‘heaven and earth shall pass away’; but the salvation and justification of the predestinate shall remain . . . But also in the heavens . . . the angels are the works of Christ: and does that man do greater works than these, who co-operates with Christ in the work of his justification? . . . let him, who can, judge whether it be greater to create a righteous being than to justify an ungodly one. Certainly if both are works of equal power, the latter is a work of greater mercy.

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Q. 43, A. 4

Incarnate Son of God

Sed omnia opera Christi intelligere ubi ait, maiora horum faciet, nulla nos necessitas cogit. Horum enim forsitan dixit quae illa hora faciebat. Tunc autem verba fidei faciebat, et utique minus est verba praedicare iustitiae, quod fecit praeter nos, quam impium iustificare, quod ita facit in nobis ut faciamus et nos. Ad tertium dicendum quod, quando aliquod particulare opus proprium est alicuius agentis, tunc per illud particulare opus probatur tota virtus agentis, sicut, cum ratiocinari sit proprium hominis, ostenditur aliquis esse homo ex hoc ipso quod ratiocinatur circa quodcumque particulare propositum. Et similiter cum propria virtute miracula facere sit solius Dei, sufficienter ostensum est Christum esse Deum ex quocumque miraculo quod propria virtute fecit.

IIIae

But there is no need for us to understand all the works of Christ, where He saith ‘Greater than these shall he do.’ For by ‘these’ He meant, perhaps, those which He was doing at that hour: now at that time He was speaking words of faith: . . . and certainly it is less to preach words of righteousness, which thing He did without us, than to justify the ungodly, which thing He so doth in us that we also do it ourselves. Reply Obj. 3: When some particular work is proper to some agent, then that particular work is a sufficient proof of the whole power of that agent: thus, since the act of reasoning is proper to man, the mere fact that someone reasons about any particular proposition proves him to be a man. In like manner, since it is proper to God to work miracles by His own power, any single miracle worked by Christ by His own power is a sufficient proof that He is God.

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Question 44 Christ’s Miracles Considered Specifically Deinde considerandum est de singulis miraculorum speciebus. Et primo, de miraculis quae fecit circa spirituales substantias. Secundo, de miraculis quae fecit circa caelestia corpora. Tertio, de miraculis quae fecit circa homines. Quarto, de miraculis quae fecit circa creaturas irrationales.

We have now to consider each kind of miracle: (1) The miracles which He worked in spiritual substances; (2) The miracles which He worked in heavenly bodies; (3) The miracles which He worked in man; (4) The miracles which He worked in irrational creatures.

Article 1 Whether those miracles were fitting which Christ worked in spiritual substances? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod miracula quae Christus fecit circa spirituales substantias, non fuerint convenientia. Inter spirituales enim substantias, sancti Angeli praepollent Daemonibus, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in III de Trin., spiritus vitae rationalis desertor atque peccator regitur per spiritum vitae rationalem pium et iustum. Sed Christus non legitur aliqua miracula fecisse circa Angelos bonos. Ergo neque etiam circa Daemones aliqua miracula facere debuit. Praeterea, miracula Christi ordinabantur ad manifestandum divinitatem ipsius. Sed divinitas Christi non erat Daemonibus manifestanda, quia per hoc impeditum fuisset mysterium passionis eius, secundum illud I Cor. II, si cognovissent, nunquam dominum gloriae crucifixissent. Ergo non debuit circa Daemones aliqua miracula fecisse. Praeterea, miracula Christi ad gloriam Dei ordinabantur, unde dicitur Matth. IX, quod videntes turbae paralyticum sanatum a Christo, timuerunt et glorificaverunt Deum, qui dedit potestatem talem hominibus. Sed ad Daemones non pertinet glorificare Deum, quia non est speciosa laus in ore peccatoris, ut dicitur Eccli. XV. Unde et, sicut dicitur Marci I et Luc. IV, non sinebat Daemonia loqui ea quae ad gloriam ipsius pertinebant. Ergo videtur non fuisse conveniens quod circa Daemones aliqua miracula faceret. Praeterea, miracula a Christo facta ad salutem hominum ordinantur. Sed quaedam Daemonia ab hominibus eiecta fuerunt cum hominum detrimento. Quandoque quidem corporali, sicut dicitur Marci IX, quod Daemon, ad praeceptum Christi, exclamans et multum discerpens hominem exiit ab homine, et factus est sicut

Objection 1: It would seem that those miracles were unfitting which Christ worked in spiritual substances. For among spiritual substances the holy angels are above the demons; for, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii): The treacherous and sinful rational spirit of life is ruled by the rational, pious, and just spirit of life. But we read of no miracles worked by Christ in the good angels. Therefore neither should He have worked miracles in the demons. Obj. 2: Further, Christ’s miracles were ordained to make known His Godhead. But Christ’s Godhead was not to be made known to the demons: since this would have hindered the mystery of His Passion, according to 1 Cor. 2:8: If they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory. Therefore He should not have worked miracles in the demons. Obj. 3: Further, Christ’s miracles were ordained to the glory of God: hence it is written (Matt 9:8) that the multitudes seeing that the man sick of the palsy had been healed by Christ, feared, and glorified God that gave such power to men. But the demons have no part in glorifying God; since praise is not seemly in the mouth of a sinner (Sir 15:9). For which reason also He suffered them not to speak (Mark 1:34; Luke 4:41) those things which reflected glory on Him. Therefore it seems that it was unfitting for Him to work miracles in the demons. Obj. 4: Further, Christ’s miracles are ordained to the salvation of mankind. But sometimes the casting out of demons from men was detrimental to man, in some cases to the body: thus it is related (Mark 9:24, 25) that a demon at Christ’s command, crying out and greatly tearing the man, went out of him; and he became as dead, so that

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Q. 44, A. 1

Incarnate Son of God

mortuus, ita ut multi dicerent, quia mortuus est. Quandoque etiam cum damno rerum, sicut quando Daemones, ad eorum preces, misit in porcos, quos praecipitaverunt in mare; unde cives illius regionis rogaverunt eum ut transiret a finibus eorum, sicut legitur Matth. VIII. Ergo videtur inconvenienter fecisse huiusmodi miracula. Sed contra est quod Zach. XIII hoc praenuntiatum fuerat, ubi dicitur, spiritum immundum auferam de terra. Respondeo dicendum quod miracula quae Christus fecit, argumenta quaedam fuerunt fidei quam ipse docebat. Futurum autem erat ut per virtutem divinitatis eius excluderet Daemonum potestatem ab hominibus credituris in eum, secundum illud Ioan. XII, nunc princeps huius mundi eiicietur foras. Et ideo conveniens fuit ut, inter alia miracula, etiam obsessos a Daemonibus liberaret. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homines, sicut per Christum erant a potestate Daemonum liberandi, ita per eum erant Angelis consociandi, secundum illud Coloss. I, pacificans per sanguinem crucis eius quae in caelis et quae in terris sunt. Et ideo circa Angelos alia miracula hominibus demonstrare non conveniebat, nisi ut Angeli hominibus apparerent, quod quidem factum est in nativitate ipsius, et in resurrectione et in ascensione. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, IX de Civit. Dei, Christus tantum innotuit Daemonibus quantum voluit, tantum autem voluit quantum oportuit. Sed innotuit eis, non sicut Angelis sanctis, per id quod est vita aeterna, sed per quaedam temporalia suae virtutis effecta. Et primo quidem, videntes Christum esurire post ieiunium, aestimaverunt eum non esse filium Dei. Unde, super illud Luc. IV, si filius Dei es etc., dicit Ambrosius, quid sibi vult talis sermonis exorsus, nisi quia cognoverat Dei filium esse venturum, sed venisse per infirmitatem corporis non putavit? Sed postmodum, visis miraculis, ex quadam suspicatione coniecturavit eum esse filium Dei. Unde super illud Marci I, scio quia sis sanctus Dei, dicit Chrysostomus quod non certam aut firmam adventus Dei habebat notitiam. Sciebat tamen ipsum esse Christum in lege promissum, unde dicitur Luc. IV, quia sciebant ipsum esse Christum. Quod autem ipsum confitebantur esse filium Dei, magis erat ex suspicione quam ex certitudine. Unde Beda dicit, super Luc., Daemonia filium Dei confitentur, et, sicut postea dicitur, sciebant eum esse Christum. Quia, cum ieiunio fatigatum eum Diabolus videret, verum hominem intellexit, sed, quia tentando non praevaluit utrum filius Dei esset, dubitabat. Nunc autem, per signorum potentiam, vel intellexit, vel potius suspicatus est esse filium Dei. Non ideo igitur Iudaeis eum crucifigere persuasit, quia Christum sive Dei filium non esse putavit, sed quia se morte illius non praevidit esse damnandum. De hoc enim mysterio a saeculis abscondito dicit

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many said: He is dead; sometimes also to things: as when He sent the demons, at their own request, into the swine, which they cast headlong into the sea; wherefore the inhabitants of those parts besought Him that He would depart from their coasts (Matt 8:31–34). Therefore it seems unfitting that He should have worked such like miracles. On the contrary, this was foretold (Zech 13:2), where it is written: I will take away . . . the unclean spirit out of the earth. I answer that, The miracles worked by Christ were arguments for the faith which He taught. Now, by the power of His Godhead He was to rescue those who would believe in Him, from the power of the demons; according to John 12:31: Now shall the prince of this world be cast out. Consequently it was fitting that, among other miracles, He should also deliver those who were obsessed by demons. Reply Obj. 1: Just as men were to be delivered by Christ from the power of the demons, so by Him were they to be brought to the companionship of the angels, according to Col. 1:20: Making peace through the blood of His cross, both as to the things on earth and the things that are in heaven. Therefore it was not fitting to show forth to men other miracles as regards the angels, except by angels appearing to men: as happened in His Nativity, His Resurrection, and His Ascension. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix): Christ was known to the demons just as much as He willed; and He willed just as far as there was need. But He was known to them, not as to the holy angels, by that which is eternal life, but by certain temporal effects of His power. First, when they saw that Christ was hungry after fasting they deemed Him not to be the Son of God. Hence, on Luke 4:3, If Thou be the Son of God, etc., Ambrose says: What means this way of addressing Him? save that, though He knew that the Son of God was to come, yet he did not think that He had come in the weakness of the flesh? But afterwards, when he saw Him work miracles, he had a sort of conjectural suspicion that He was the Son of God. Hence on Mk. 1:24, I know who Thou art, the Holy One of God, Chrysostom says that he had no certain or firm knowledge of God’s coming. Yet he knew that He was the Christ promised in the Law, wherefore it is said (Luke 4:41) that they knew that He was Christ. But it was rather from suspicion than from certainty that they confessed Him to be the Son of God. Hence Bede says on Luke 4:41: The demons confess the Son of God, and, as stated farther on, ‘they knew that He was Christ.’ For when the devil saw Him weakened by His fast, He knew Him to be a real man: but when He failed to overcome Him by temptation, He doubted lest He should be the Son of God. And now from the power of His miracles He either knew, or rather suspected that He was the Son of God. His reason therefore for persuading the Jews to crucify Him was not that he deemed Him not to be Christ or the Son of God, but because he did not foresee

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Q. 44, A. 1

apostolus quod nemo principum huius saeculi cognovit, si that he would be the loser by His death. For the Apostle says enim cognovissent, nunquam dominum gloriae crucifixis- of this mystery (1 Cor 2:7, 8), which is hidden from the besent. ginning, that ‘none of the princes of this world knew it,’ for if they had known it they would never have crucified the Lord of glory. Ad tertium dicendum quod miracula in expulReply Obj. 3: The miracles which Christ worked in exsione Daemonum non fecit Christus propter utilitatem pelling demons were for the benefit, not of the demons, but Daemonum, sed propter utilitatem hominum, ut ipsi of men, that they might glorify Him. Wherefore He forbade eum glorificarent. Et ideo prohibuit eos loqui ea quae them to speak in His praise. First, to give us an example. ad laudem ipsius pertinebant, primo quidem, propter For, as Athanasius says, He restrained his speech, although exemplum. Quia, ut dicit Athanasius, compescebat eius he was confessing the truth; to teach us not to care about such sermonem, quamvis vera fateretur, ut nos assuefaciat ne things, although it may seem that what is said is true. For it curemus de talibus, etiam si vera loqui videantur. Nefas is wrong to seek to learn from the devil when we have the Diest enim ut, cum adsit nobis Scriptura divina, instrua- vine Scripture: Besides, it is dangerous, since the demons mur a Diabolo, est enim hoc periculosum, quia verita- frequently mix falsehood with truth. Or, as Chrysostom ti frequenter Daemones immiscent mendacia. Vel, sicut says: It was not meet for them to usurp the prerogative of the Chrysostomus dicit, non oportebat eos subripere officii apostolic office. Nor was it fitting that the mystery of Christ apostolici gloriam. Nec decebat Christi mysterium lingua should be proclaimed by a corrupt tongue because praise is fetida publicari, quia non est speciosa laus in ore peccato- not seemly in the mouth of a sinner. Third, because, as Bede ris. Tertio quia, ut Beda dicit, quia nolebat ex hoc invi- says, He did not wish the envy of the Jews to be aroused diam accendere Iudaeorum. Unde etiam ipsi apostoli iu- thereby. Hence even the apostles are commanded to be silent bentur reticere de ipso, ne, divina maiestate praedicata, about Him, lest, if His Divine majesty were proclaimed, the passionis dispensatio differatur. gift of His Passion should be deferred. Ad quartum dicendum quod Christus specialiter Reply Obj. 4: Christ came specially to teach and to venerat docere et miracula facere propter utilitatem ho- work miracles for the good of man, and principally as to the minum, principaliter quantum ad animae salutem. Et salvation of his soul. Consequently, He allowed the demons, ideo permisit Daemones quos eiiciebat hominibus ali- that He cast out, to do man some harm, either in his body quod nocumentum inferre, vel in corpore vel in rebus, or in his goods, for the salvation of man’s soul—namely, for propter animae humanae salutem, ad hominum scilicet man’s instruction. Hence Chrysostom says on Matt. 8:32 instructionem. Unde Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., that Christ let the demons depart into the swine, not as quod Christus permisit Daemonibus in porcos ire, non yielding to the demons, but first, to show . . . how harmful quasi a Daemonibus persuasus, sed primo quidem, ut in- are the demons who attack men; second, that all might learn struat magnitudinem nocumenti Daemonum qui homi- that the demons would not dare to hurt even the swine, exnibus insidiantur; secundo, ut omnes discerent quoniam cept He allow them; third, that they would have treated those neque adversus porcos audent aliquid facere, nisi ipse con- men more grievously than they treated the swine, unless they cesserit; tertio, ut ostenderet quod graviora in illos homi- had been protected by God’s providence. nes operati essent quam in illos porcos, nisi essent divina providentia adiuti. Et propter easdem etiam causas permisit eum qui a And for the same motives He allowed the man, who Daemonibus liberabatur, ad horam gravius affligi, a qua was being delivered from the demons, to suffer grievously tamen afflictione eum continuo liberavit. Per hoc etiam for the moment; yet did He release him at once from that ostenditur, ut Beda dicit, quod saepe, dum converti ad distress. By this, moreover, we are taught, as Bede says on Deum post peccata conamur, maioribus novisque antiqui Mk. 9:25, that often, when after falling into sin we strive to rehostis pulsamur insidiis. Quod facit vel ut odium virtutis turn to God, we experience further and more grievous attacks incutiat, vel expulsionis suae vindicet iniuriam. Factus est from the old enemy. This he does, either that he may inspire us etiam homo sanatus velut mortuus, ut Hieronymus dicit, with a distaste for virtue, or that he may avenge the shame of quia sanatis dicitur, mortui estis, et vita vestra abscondita having been cast out. For the man who was healed became est cum Christo in Deo. as dead, says Jerome, because to those who are healed it is said, ‘You are dead; and your life is hid with Christ in God’ (Col 3:3)

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Incarnate Son of God

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Article 2 Whether it was fitting that Christ should work miracles in the heavenly bodies? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter fuerint a Christo facta miracula circa caelestia corpora. Ut enim Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., divinae providentiae non est naturam corrumpere, sed salvare. Corpora autem caelestia secundum suam naturam sunt incorruptibilia et inalterabilia, ut probatur in I de caelo. Ergo non fuit conveniens ut per Christum fieret aliqua mutatio circa ordinem caelestium corporum. Praeterea, secundum motum caelestium corporum temporum cursus designatur, secundum illud Gen. I, fiant luminaria in firmamento caeli, et sint in signa et tempora et dies et annos. Sic ergo, mutato cursu caelestium corporum, mutatur temporum distinctio et ordo. Sed non legitur hoc esse perceptum ab astrologis, qui contemplantur sidera et computant menses, ut dicitur Isaiae XLVII. Ergo videtur quod per Christum non fuerit aliqua mutatio facta circa cursum caelestium corporum.

Praeterea, magis competebat Christo facere miracula vivens et docens quam moriens, tum quia, ut dicitur II ad Cor. ult., crucifixus est ex infirmitate, sed vivit ex virtute Dei, secundum quam miracula faciebat; tum etiam quia eius miracula confirmativa erant doctrinae ipsius. Sed in vita sua non legitur Christus aliquod miraculum circa caelestia corpora fecisse, quinimmo Pharisaeis petentibus ab eo signum de caelo, dare renuit, ut habetur Matth. XII et XVI. Ergo videtur quod nec in morte circa caelestia corpora aliquod miraculum facere debuit.

Objection 1: It would seem that it was unfitting that Christ should work miracles in the heavenly bodies. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), it beseems Divine providence not to destroy, but to preserve, nature. Now, the heavenly bodies are by nature incorruptible and unchangeable, as is proved De Coelo i. Therefore it was unfitting that Christ should cause any change in the order of the heavenly bodies. Obj. 2: Further, the course of time is marked out by the movement of the heavenly bodies, according to Gen. 1:14: Let there be lights made in the firmament of heaven . . . and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days and years. Consequently if the movement of the heavenly bodies be changed, the distinction and order of the seasons is changed. But there is no report of this having been perceived by astronomers, who gaze at the stars and observe the months, as it is written (Isa 47:13). Therefore it seems that Christ did not work any change in the movements of the heavenly bodies. Obj. 3: Further, it was more fitting that Christ should work miracles in life and when teaching, than in death: both because, as it is written (2 Cor 13:4), He was crucified through weakness, yet He liveth by the power of God, by which He worked miracles; and because His miracles were in confirmation of His doctrine. But there is no record of Christ having worked any miracles in the heavenly bodies during His lifetime: nay, more; when the Pharisees asked Him to give a sign from heaven, He refused, as Matthew relates (12, 16). Therefore it seems that neither in His death should He have worked any miracles in the heavenly bodies. On the contrary, It is written (Luke 23:44, 45): There was darkness over all the earth until the ninth hour; and the sun was darkened. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 43, A. 4) it behooved Christ’s miracles to be a sufficient proof of His Godhead. Now this is not so sufficiently proved by changes wrought in the lower bodies, which changes can be brought about by other causes, as it is by changes wrought in the course of the heavenly bodies, which have been established by God alone in an unchangeable order. This is what Dionysius says in his epistle to Polycarp: We must recognize that no alteration can take place in the order and movement of the heavens that is not caused by Him who made all and changes all by His word. Therefore it was fitting that Christ should work miracles even in the heavenly bodies.

Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. XXIII, tenebrae factae sunt in universa terra usque ad horam nonam, et obscuratus est sol. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, miracula Christi talia esse debebant ut sufficienter eum Deum esse ostenderent. Hoc autem non ita evidenter ostenditur per transmutationes corporum inferiorum, quae etiam ab aliis causis moveri possunt, sicut per transmutationem cursus caelestium corporum, quae a solo Deo sunt immobiliter ordinata. Et hoc est quod Dionysius dicit, in epistola ad Polycarpum, cognoscere oportet non aliter aliquando posse aliquid perverti caelestis ordinationis et motus, nisi causam haberet ad hoc moventem qui facit omnia et mutat secundum suum sermonem. Et ideo conveniens fuit ut Christus miracula faceret etiam circa caelestia corpora. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut corporibus Reply Obj. 1: Just as it is natural to the lower bodies inferioribus naturale est moveri a caelestibus corpori- to be moved by the heavenly bodies, which are higher in

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bus, quae sunt superiora secundum naturae ordinem; ita etiam naturale est cuilibet creaturae ut transmutetur a Deo secundum eius voluntatem. Unde Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, et habetur in Glossa Rom. XI, super illud, contra naturam insertus es etc., Deus, creator et conditor omnium naturarum, nihil contra naturam facit, quia id est cuique rei natura, quod facit. Et ita non corrumpitur natura caelestium corporum cum eorum cursus immutatur a Deo, corrumperetur autem si ab aliqua alia causa immutaretur. Ad secundum dicendum quod per miraculum a Christo factum non est perversus ordo temporum. Nam secundum quosdam, illae tenebrae, vel solis obscuratio, quae in passione Christi accidit, fuit propter hoc quod sol suos radios retraxit, nulla immutatione facta circa motum caelestium corporum, secundum quem tempora mensurantur. Unde Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., videtur luminare maius retraxisse radios suos, ne aut pendentem videret dominum, aut impii blasphemantes sua luce fruerentur. Talis autem retractio radiorum non est sic intelligenda quasi sol in sua potestate habeat radios emittere vel retrahere, non enim ex electione, sed ex natura radios emittit, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed sol dicitur retrahere radios, inquantum divina virtute factum est ut solis radii ad terram non pervenirent. Origenes autem dicit hoc accidisse per interpositionem nubium. Unde, super Matth., dicit, consequens est intelligere quasdam tenebrosissimas nubes multas et magnas concurrisse super Ierusalem et terram Iudaeae; et ideo factae sunt tenebrae profundae a sexta hora usque ad nonam. Arbitror ergo, sicut et cetera signa quae facta sunt in passione, scilicet quod velum est scissum, quod terra tremuit, etc., in Ierusalem tantummodo facta sunt, ita et hoc, aut si latius voluerit quis extendere ad terram Iudaeae, propter hoc quod dicitur quod tenebrae factae sunt in universa terra; quod intelligitur de terra Iudaea, sicut in III libro regum dixit Abdias ad Eliam, vivit Deus tuus, si est gens aut regnum ubi non miserit dominus meus quaerere te, ostendens quod eum quaesiverunt in gentibus quae sunt circa Iudaeam. Sed circa hoc magis est credendum Dionysio, qui oculata fide inspexit hoc accidisse per interpositionem lunae inter nos et solem. Dicit enim, in epistola ad Polycarpum, inopinabiliter soli lunam incidentem videbamus, in Aegypto scilicet existentes, ut ibidem dicitur. Et designat ibi quatuor miracula. Quorum primum est quod naturalis eclipsis solis per interpositionem lunae nunquam accidit nisi tempore coniunctionis solis et lunae. Tunc autem erat luna in oppositione ad solem, quintadecima existens, quia erat Pascha Iudaeorum. Unde dicit, non enim erat conventus tempus. Secundum miraculum est quod, cum circa horam sextam luna visa fuisset simul cum sole in medio caeli, in vesperis apparuit in

Q. 44, A. 2

the order of nature, so is it natural to any creature whatsoever to be changed by God, according to His will. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi; quoted by the gloss on Rom. 11:24: Contrary to nature thou wert grafted, etc.): God, the Creator and Author of all natures, does nothing contrary to nature: for whatsoever He does in each thing, that is its nature. Consequently the nature of a heavenly body is not destroyed when God changes its course: but it would be if the change were due to any other cause. Reply Obj. 2: The order of the seasons was not disturbed by the miracle worked by Christ. For, according to some, this gloom or darkening of the sun, which occurred at the time of Christ’s passion, was caused by the sun withdrawing its rays, without any change in the movement of the heavenly bodies, which measures the duration of the seasons. Hence Jerome says on Matt. 27:45: It seems as though the ‘greater light’ withdrew its rays, lest it should look on its Lord hanging on the Cross, or bestow its radiancy on the impious blasphemers. And this withdrawal of the rays is not to be understood as though it were in the sun’s power to send forth or withdraw its rays: for it sheds its light, not from choice, but by nature, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But the sun is said to withdraw its rays in so far as the Divine power caused the sun’s rays not to reach the earth. On the other hand, Origen says this was caused by clouds coming between (the earth and the sun). Hence on Matt. 27:45 he says: We must therefore suppose that many large and very dense clouds were massed together over Jerusalem and the land of Judea; so that it was exceedingly dark from the sixth to the ninth hour. Hence I am of opinion that, just as the other signs which occurred at the time of the Passion—namely, the rending of the veil, the quaking of the earth, etc.—took place in Jerusalem only, so this also: . . . or if anyone prefer, it may be extended to the whole of Judea, since it is said that ‘there was darkness over the whole earth,’ which expression refers to the land of Judea, as may be gathered from 3 Kings 18:10, where Abdias says to Elias: ‘As the Lord thy God liveth, there is no nation or kingdom whither my lord hath not sent to seek thee’: which shows that they sought him among the nations in the neighborhood of Judea. On this point, however, credence is to be given rather to Dionysius, who is an eyewitness as to this having occurred by the moon eclipsing the sun. For he says (Ep. ad Polycarp): Without any doubt we saw the moon encroach on the sun, he being in Egypt at the time, as he says in the same letter. And in this he points out four miracles. The first is that the natural eclipse of the sun by interposition of the moon never takes place except when the sun and moon are in conjunction. But then the sun and moon were in opposition, it being the fifteenth day, since it was the Jewish Passover. Wherefore he says: For it was not the time of conjunction.— The second miracle is that whereas at the sixth hour the moon was seen, together with the sun, in the middle of the

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Incarnate Son of God

suo loco, idest in oriente, opposita soli. Unde dicit, et rursus ipsam vidimus, scilicet lunam, a nona hora, scilicet in qua recessit a sole, cessantibus tenebris, usque ad vesperam, supernaturaliter restitutam ad diametrum solis, id est ut diametraliter esset soli opposita. Et sic patet quod non est turbatus consuetus temporum cursus, quia divina virtute factum est et quod ad solem supernaturaliter accederet praeter debitum tempus, et quod, a sole recedens, in locum proprium restitueretur tempore debito. Tertium miraculum est quod naturaliter eclipsis solis semper incipit ab Occidentali parte et pervenit usque ad Orientalem, et hoc ideo quia luna secundum proprium motum, quo movetur ab occidente in orientem, est velocior sole in suo proprio motu; et ideo luna, ab occidente veniens, attingit solem et pertransit ipsum ad orientem tendens. Sed tunc luna iam pertransiverat solem, et distabat ab eo per medietatem circuli, in oppositione existens. Unde oportuit quod reverteretur ad orientem versus solem, et attingeret ipsum primo ex parte Orientali, procedens versus occidentem. Et hoc est quod dicit, eclipsim etiam ipsam ex oriente vidimus inchoatam et usque ad solarem terminum venientem, quia totum solem eclipsavit, postea hinc regredientem. Quartum miraculum fuit quod in naturali eclipsi ex eadem parte incipit sol prius reapparere ex qua parte incipit prius obscurari, quia scilicet luna, se soli subiiciens, naturali suo motu solem pertransit versus orientem, et ita partem Occidentalem solis, quam primo occupat, primo etiam derelinquit. Sed tunc luna, miraculose ab oriente versus occidentem rediens, non pertransivit solem, ut esset eo Occidentalior, sed, postquam pervenit ad terminum solis, reversa est versus orientem, et ita partem solis quam ultimo occupavit, primo etiam dereliquit. Et sic ex parte Orientali inchoata fuit eclipsis, sed in parte Occidentali prius incoepit claritas apparere. Et hoc est quod dicit, et rursus vidimus non ex eodem, idest, non ex eadem parte solis, et defectum et repurgationem, sed e contra secundum diametrum factam. Quintum miraculum addit Chrysostomus, super Matth., dicens quod tribus horis tunc tenebrae permanserunt, cum eclipsis solis in momento pertranseat, non enim habet moram, ut sciunt illi qui consideraverunt. Unde datur intelligi quod luna quieverit sub sole. Nisi forte velimus dicere quod tempus tenebrarum computatur ab instanti quo incoepit sol obscurari, usque ad instans in quo sol totaliter fuit repurgatus. Sed, sicut Origenes dicit, super Matth., adversus hoc filii saeculi huius dicunt, quomodo hoc factum tam mirabile nemo Graecorum aut barbarorum scripsit? Et dicit quod quidam nomine Phlegon in chronicis suis scripsit hoc in principatu Tiberii Caesaris factum, sed non significavit quod fuerit in luna plena. Potuit ergo hoc contin-

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heavens, in the evening it was seen to be in its place, i.e., in the east, opposite the sun. Wherefore he says: Again we saw it, i.e., the moon, return supernaturally into opposition with the sun, so as to be diametrically opposite, having withdrawn from the sun at the ninth hour, when the darkness ceased, until evening. From this it is clear that the wonted course of the seasons was not disturbed, because the Divine power caused the moon both to approach the sun supernaturally at an unwonted season, and to withdraw from the sun and return to its proper place according to the season. The third miracle was that the eclipse of the sun naturally always begins in that part of the sun which is to the west and spreads towards the east: and this is because the moon’s proper movement from west to east is more rapid than that of the sun, and consequently the moon, coming up from the west, overtakes the sun and passes it on its eastward course. But in this case the moon had already passed the sun, and was distant from it by the length of half the heavenly circle, being opposite to it: consequently it had to return eastwards towards the sun, so as to come into apparent contact with it from the east, and continue in a westerly direction. This is what he refers to when he says: Moreover, we saw the eclipse begin to the east and spread towards the western edge of the sun, for it was a total eclipse, and afterwards pass away. The fourth miracle consisted in this, that in a natural eclipse that part of the sun which is first eclipsed is the first to reappear (because the moon, coming in front of the sun, by its natural movement passes on to the east, so as to come away first from the western portion of the sun, which was the first part to be eclipsed), whereas in this case the moon, while returning miraculously from the east to the west, did not pass the sun so as to be to the west of it: but having reached the western edge of the sun returned towards the east: so that the last portion of the sun to be eclipsed was the first to reappear. Consequently the eclipse began towards the east, whereas the sun began to reappear towards the west. And to this he refers by saying: Again we observed that the occultation and emersion did not begin from the same point, i.e., on the same side of the sun, but on opposite sides. Chrysostom adds a fifth miracle (Hom. lxxxviii in Matth.), saying that the darkness in this case lasted for three hours, whereas an eclipse of the sun lasts but a short time, for it is soon over, as those know who have seen one. Hence we are given to understand that the moon was stationary below the sun, except we prefer to say that the duration of the darkness was measured from the first moment of occultation of the sun to the moment when the sun had completely emerged from the eclipse. But, as Origen says (on Matt. 27:45), against this the children of this world object: How is it such a phenomenal occurrence is not related by any writer, whether Greek or barbarian? And he says that someone of the name of Phlegon relates in his chronicles that this took place during the reign of Tiberius Caesar, but he does not say that it occurred at the full

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gere quia astrologi ubique terrarum tunc temporis existentes, non sollicitabantur de observanda eclipsi, quia tempus non erat, sed illam obscuritatem ex aliqua passione aeris putaverunt accidere. Sed in Aegypto, ubi raro nubes apparent propter aeris serenitatem, permotus est Dionysius, et socii eius, ut praedicta circa illam obscuritatem observarent. Ad tertium dicendum quod tunc praecipue oportebat per miracula divinitatem Christi ostendere, quando in eo maxime apparebat infirmitas secundum humanam naturam. Et ideo in Christi nativitate stella nova in caelo apparuit. Unde maximus dicit, in sermone nativitatis, si praesepe despicis, erige paulisper oculos, et novam in caelo stellam, protestantem mundo nativitatem dominicam, contuere. In passione autem adhuc maior infirmitas circa humanitatem Christi apparuit. Et ideo oportuit ut maiora miracula ostenderentur circa principalia mundi luminaria. Et, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., hoc est signum quod petentibus promittebat dare, dicens, generatio prava et adultera signum quaerit, et signum non dabitur ei, nisi signum Ionae prophetae, crucem significans et resurrectionem. Etenim multo mirabilius est in eo qui crucifixus erat hoc fieri, quam ambulante eo super terram.

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moon. It may be, therefore, that because it was not the time for an eclipse, the various astronomers living then throughout the world were not on the look-out for one, and that they ascribed this darkness to some disturbance of the atmosphere. But in Egypt, where clouds are few on account of the tranquillity of the air, Dionysius and his companions were considerably astonished so as to make the aforesaid observations about this darkness. Reply Obj. 3: Then, above all, was there need for miraculous proof of Christ’s Godhead, when the weakness of human nature was most apparent in Him. Hence it was that at His birth a new star appeared in the heavens. Wherefore Maximus says (Serm. de Nativ. viii): If thou disdain the manger, raise thine eyes a little and gaze on the new star in the heavens, proclaiming to the world the birth of our Lord. But in His Passion yet greater weakness appeared in His manhood. Therefore there was need for yet greater miracles in the greater lights of the world. And, as Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxxviii in Matth.): This is the sign which He promised to them who sought for one saying: ‘An evil and adulterous generation seeketh a sign; and a sign shall not be given it, but the sign of Jonas the prophet,’ referring to His Cross . . . and Resurrection . . . For it was much more wonderful that this should happen when He was crucified than when He was walking on earth.

Article 3 Whether Christ worked miracles fittingly on men? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter circa homines Christus miracula fecit. In homine enim potior est anima quam corpus. Sed circa corpora multa miracula fecit Christus, circa animas vero nulla miracula legitur fecisse, nam neque aliquos incredulos ad fidem virtuose convertit, sed admonendo et exteriora miracula ostendendo; neque etiam aliquos fatuos legitur sapientes fecisse. Ergo videtur quod non convenienter sit circa homines miracula operatus. Praeterea, sicut supra dictum est, Christus faciebat miracula virtute divina, cuius proprium est subito operari, et perfecte, et absque adminiculo alicuius. Sed Christus non semper subito curavit homines quantum ad corpus, dicitur enim Marci VIII quod, apprehensa manu caeci, eduxit eum extra vicum, et exspuens in oculos eius, impositis manibus suis, interrogavit eum si aliquid videret. Et aspiciens ait, video homines velut arbores ambulantes. Deinde iterum imposuit manus super oculos eius, et coepit videre, et restitutus est ita ut videret clare omnia. Et sic patet quod non subito eum curavit, sed pri-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ worked miracles unfittingly on men. For in man the soul is of more import than the body. Now Christ worked many miracles on bodies, but we do not read of His working any miracles on souls: for neither did He convert any unbelievers to the faith mightily, but by persuading and convincing them with outward miracles, nor is it related of Him that He made wise men out of fools. Therefore it seems that He worked miracles on men in an unfitting manner. Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (Q. 43, A. 2), Christ worked miracles by Divine power: to which it is proper to work suddenly, perfectly, and without any assistance. Now Christ did not always heal men suddenly as to their bodies: for it is written (Mark 8:22–25) that, taking the blind man by the hand, He led him out of the town; and, spitting upon his eyes, laying His hands on him, He asked him if he saw anything. And, looking up, he said: I see men as it were trees walking. After that again He laid His hands upon his eyes, and he began to see, and was restored, so that he saw all things clearly. It is clear from this that He did not heal

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mo quidem imperfecte, et per sputum. Ergo videtur non him suddenly, but at first imperfectly, and by means of His convenienter circa homines miracula fecisse. spittle. Therefore it seems that He worked miracles on men unfittingly. Praeterea, quae se invicem non consequuntur, Obj. 3: Further, there is no need to remove at the same non oportet quod simul tollantur. Sed aegritudo corpo- time things which do not follow from one another. Now ralis non semper ex peccato causatur, ut patet per illud bodily ailments are not always the result of sin, as appears quod dominus dicit, Ioan. IX, neque hic peccavit, neque from our Lord’s words (John 9:3): Neither hath this man parentes eius, ut caecus nasceretur. Non ergo oportuit ut sinned, nor his parents, that he should be born blind. It was hominibus corporum curationem quaerentibus peccata unseemly, therefore, for Him to forgive the sins of those dimitteret, sicut legitur fecisse circa paralyticum, Mat- who sought the healing of the body, as He is related to have th. IX, praesertim quia sanatio corporalis, cum sit minus done in the case of the man sick of the palsy (Matt 9:2): the quam remissio peccatorum, non videtur esse sufficiens more that the healing of the body, being of less account than argumentum quod possit peccata dimittere. the forgiveness of sins, does not seem a sufficient argument for the power of forgiving sins. Praeterea, miracula Christi facta sunt ad confirObj. 4: Further, Christ’s miracles were worked in ormationem doctrinae ipsius, et testimonium divinitatis der to confirm His doctrine, and witness to His Godhead, eius, ut supra dictum est. Sed nullus debet impedire fi- as stated above (Q. 43, A. 4). Now no man should hinnem sui operis. Ergo videtur inconvenienter Christus der the purpose of his own work. Therefore it seems unquibusdam miraculose curatis praecepisse ut nemini di- fitting that Christ commanded those who had been healed cerent, ut patet Matth. IX et Marci VIII, praesertim quia miraculously to tell no one, as appears from Matt. 9:30 quibusdam aliis mandavit ut miracula circa se facta pu- and Mk. 8:26: the more so, since He commanded others blicarent, sicut Marci V legitur quod dixit ei quem a Dae- to proclaim the miracles worked on them; thus it is related monibus liberaverat, vade in domum tuam ad tuos, et (Mark 5:19) that, after delivering a man from the demons, nuntia eis quanta dominus tibi fecerit. He said to him: Go into thy house to thy friends, and tell them, how great things the Lord hath done for thee. Sed contra est quod dicitur Marci VII, bene omnia On the contrary, It is written (Mark 7:37): He hath fecit, et surdos fecit audire, et mutos loqui. done all things well: He hath made both the deaf to hear and the dumb to speak. Respondeo dicendum quod ea quae sunt ad finem, I answer that, The means should be proportionate to debent fini esse proportionata. Christus autem ad hoc the end. Now Christ came into the world and taught in orin mundum venerat et docebat, ut homines salvos face- der to save man, according to John 3:17: For God sent not ret, secundum illud Ioan. III, non enim misit Deus filium His Son into the world to judge the world, but that the world suum in mundum ut iudicet mundum, sed ut salvetur may be saved by Him. Therefore it was fitting that Christ, by mundus per ipsum. Et ideo conveniens fuit ut Christus, miraculously healing men in particular, should prove Himparticulariter homines miraculose curando, ostenderet self to be the universal and spiritual Savior of all. se esse universalem et spiritualem omnium salvatorem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea quae sunt ad Reply Obj. 1: The means are distinct from the end. finem, distinguuntur ab ipso fine. Miracula autem a Now the end for which Christ’s miracles were worked was Christo facta ordinabantur, sicut ad finem, ad rationalis the health of the rational part, which is healed by the light of partis salutem, quae consistit in sapientiae illustratione wisdom, and the gift of righteousness: the former of which et hominum iustificatione. Quorum primum praesup- presupposes the latter, since, as it is written (Wis 1:4): Wisponit secundum, quia, ut dicitur Sap. I, in malevolam dom will not enter into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body animam non intrabit sapientia, nec habitabit in corpore subject to sins. Now it was unfitting that man should be subdito peccatis. Iustificare autem homines non conve- made righteous unless he willed: for this would be both niebat nisi eis volentibus, hoc enim esset et contra ra- against the nature of righteousness, which implies rectitionem iustitiae, quae rectitudinem voluntatis importat; tude of the will, and contrary to the very nature of man, et etiam contra rationem humanae naturae, quae libero which requires to be led to good by the free-will, not by arbitrio ad bonum ducenda est, non autem per coac- force. Christ, therefore, justified man inwardly by the Ditionem. Christus ergo virtute divina interius hominem vine power, but not against man’s will. Nor did this pertain iustificavit, non tamen eis invitis. Nec hoc ad miracu- to His miracles, but to the end of His miracles. In like manla pertinet, sed ad miraculorum finem. Similiter etiam ner by the Divine power He infused wisdom into the simple virtute divina simplicibus discipulis sapientiam infudit, minds of His disciples: hence He said to them (Luke 21:15): unde dicit eis, Luc. XXI ego dabo vobis os et sapientiam I will give you a mouth and wisdom which all your advercui non poterunt resistere et contradicere omnes adversarii saries will not be able to resist and gainsay. And this, in so far

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vestri. Quod quidem, quantum ad interiorem illuminationem, inter visibilia miracula non numeratur, sed solum quantum ad exteriorem actum, inquantum scilicet videbant homines eos qui fuerant illiterati et simplices, tam sapienter et constanter loqui. Unde dicitur Act. IV, videntes Iudaei Petri constantiam et Ioannis, comperto quod homines essent sine litteris et idiotae, admirabantur. Et tamen huiusmodi spirituales effectus, etsi a miraculis visibilibus distinguantur, sunt tamen quaedam testimonia doctrinae et virtutis Christi, secundum illud Heb. II, contestante Deo signis et portentis et variis virtutibus, et spiritus sancti distributionibus. Sed tamen circa animas hominum, maxime quantum ad immutandas inferiores vires, Christus aliqua miracula fecit. Unde Hieronymus, super illud Matth. IX, surgens secutus est eum, dicit, fulgor ipse et maiestas divinitatis occultae, quae etiam in facie relucebat humana, videntes ad se trahere poterat ex primo aspectu. Et super illud Matth. XXI, eiiciebat omnes vendentes et ementes, dicit idem Hieronymus, mihi inter omnia signa quae fecit dominus hoc videtur esse mirabilius, quod unus homo, et illo tempore contemptibilis, potuerit ad unius flagelli verbera, tantam eiicere multitudinem. Igneum enim quiddam atque sidereum radiabat ex oculis eius, et divinitatis maiestas lucebat in facie. Et Origenes dicit, super Ioan., hoc esse maius miraculum eo quo aqua conversa est in vinum, eo quod illic subsistit inanimata materia, hic vero tot millium hominum domantur ingenia. Et super illud Ioan. XVIII, abierunt retrorsum et ceciderunt in terram, dicit Augustinus, una vox turbam odiis ferocem armisque terribilem, sine telo ullo, percussit, repulit, stravit, Deus enim latebat in carne. Et ad idem pertinet quod dicitur Luc. IV, quod Iesus transiens per medium illorum ibat, ubi dicit Chrysostomus quod stare in medio insidiantium et non apprehendi, divinitatis eminentiam ostendebat. Et quod dicitur Ioan. VIII, Iesus abscondit se et exivit de templo, ubi Augustinus dicit, non abscondit se in angulo templi quasi timens, vel post murum aut columnam divertens, sed, caelica potestate se invisibilem insidiantibus constituens, per medium illorum exivit.

Ex quibus omnibus patet quod Christus, quando voluit, virtute divina animas hominum immutavit, non solum iustificando et sapientiam infundendo, quod pertinet ad miraculorum finem, sed etiam exterius alliciendo vel terrendo vel stupefaciendo, quod pertinet ad ipsa miracula. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus venerat salvare mundum non solum virtute divina, sed per mysterium incarnationis ipsius. Et ideo frequenter in sanatione infirmorum non sola potestate divina utebatur,

Q. 44, A. 3

as the enlightenment was inward, is not to be reckoned as a miracle, but only as regards the outward action—namely, in so far as men saw that those who had been unlettered and simple spoke with such wisdom and constancy. Wherefore it is written (Acts 4:13) that the Jews, seeing the constancy of Peter and of John, understanding that they were illiterate and ignorant men . . . wondered.—And though such like spiritual effects are different from visible miracles, yet do they testify to Christ’s doctrine and power, according to Heb. 2:4: God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders and diverse miracles, and distributions of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless Christ did work some miracles on the soul of man, principally by changing its lower powers. Hence Jerome, commenting on Matt. 9:9, He rose up and followed Him, says: Such was the splendor and majesty of His hidden Godhead, which shone forth even in His human countenance, that those who gazed on it were drawn to Him at first sight. And on Matt. 21:12, (Jesus) cast out all them that sold and bought, the same Jerome says: Of all the signs worked by our Lord, this seems to me the most wondrous—that one man, at that time despised, could, with the blows of one scourge, cast out such a multitude. For a fiery and heavenly light flashed from His eyes, and the majesty of His Godhead shone in His countenance. And Origen says on John 2:15 that this was a greater miracle than when He changed water into wine, for there He shows His power over inanimate matter, whereas here He tames the minds of thousands of men. Again, on John 18:6, They went backward and fell to the ground, Augustine says: Though that crowd was fierce in hate and terrible with arms, yet did that one word . . . without any weapon, smite them through, drive them back, lay them prostrate: for God lay hidden in that flesh. Moreover, to this must be referred what Luke says (4:30) —namely, that Jesus, passing through the midst of them, went His way, on which Chrysostom observes (Hom. xlviii in Joan.): That He stood in the midst of those who were lying in wait for Him, and was not seized by them, shows the power of His Godhead; and, again, that which is written John 8:59, Jesus hid Himself and went out of the Temple, on which Theophylact says: He did not hide Himself in a corner of the Temple, as if afraid, or take shelter behind a wall or pillar; but by His heavenly power making Himself invisible to those who were threatening Him, He passed through the midst of them. From all these instances it is clear that Christ, when He willed, changed the minds of men by His Divine power, not only by the bestowal of righteousness and the infusion of wisdom, which pertains to the end of miracles, but also by outwardly drawing men to Himself, or by terrifying or stupefying them, which pertains to the miraculous itself. Reply Obj. 2: Christ came to save the world, not only by Divine power, but also through the mystery of His Incarnation. Consequently in healing the sick He frequently not only made use of His Divine power, healing by way of com-

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curando per modum imperii, sed etiam aliquid ad humanitatem ipsius pertinens apponendo. Unde super illud Luc. IV, singulis manus imponens curabat omnes, dicit Cyrillus, quamvis, ut Deus, potuisset omnes verbo pellere morbos, tangit tamen eos, ostendens propriam carnem efficacem ad praestanda remedia. Et super illud Marci VIII, exspuens in oculos eius impositis manibus etc., dicit Chrysostomus, spuit quidem et manus imponit caeco, volens ostendere quod verbum divinum, operationi adiunctum, mirabilia perficit, manus enim operationis est ostensiva, sputum sermonis ex ore prolati. Et super illud Ioan. IX, fecit lutum ex sputo et linivit lutum super oculos caeci, dicit Augustinus, de saliva sua lutum fecit, quia verbum caro factum est. Vel etiam ad significandum quod ipse erat qui ex limo terrae hominem formaverat, ut Chrysostomus dicit. Est etiam circa miracula Christi considerandum quod communiter perfectissima opera faciebat. Unde super illud Ioan. II, omnis homo primum bonum vinum ponit, dicit Chrysostomus, talia sunt Christi miracula ut multo his quae per naturam fiunt, speciosiora et utiliora fiant. Et similiter in instanti infirmis perfectam sanitatem conferebat. Unde super illud Matth. VIII, surrexit et ministrabat illis, dicit Hieronymus, sanitas quae confertur a domino, tota simul redit. Specialiter autem in illo caeco contrarium fuit propter infidelitatem ipsius, ut Chrysostomus dicit. Vel, sicut Beda dicit, quem uno verbo totum simul curare poterat, paulatim curat, ut magnitudinem humanae caecitatis ostendat, quae vix, et quasi per gradus ad lucem redeat, et gratiam suam nobis indicet, per quam singula perfectionis incrementa adiuvat.

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mand, but also by applying something pertaining to His human nature. Hence on Luke 4:40, He, laying His hands on every one of them, healed them, Cyril says: Although, as God, He might, by one word, have driven out all diseases, yet He touched them, showing that His own flesh was endowed with a healing virtue. And on Mk. 8:23, Spitting upon his eyes, laying His hands on him, etc., Chrysostom says: He spat and laid His hands upon the blind man, wishing to show that His Divine word, accompanied by His operation, works wonders: for the hand signifies operation; the spittle signifies the word which proceeds from the mouth. Again, on John 9:6, He made clay of the spittle, and spread the clay upon the eyes of the blind man, Augustine says: Of His spittle He made clay— because ‘the Word was made flesh.’ Or, again, as Chrysostom says, to signify that it was He who made man of the slime of the earth. It is furthermore to be observed concerning Christ’s miracles that generally what He did was most perfect. Hence on John 2:10, Every man at first setteth forth good wine, Chrysostom says: Christ’s miracles are such as to far surpass the works of nature in splendor and usefulness. Likewise in an instant He conferred perfect health on the sick. Hence on Matt. 8:15, She arose and ministered to them, Jerome says: Health restored by our Lord returns wholly and instantly. There was, however, special reason for the contrary happening in the case of the man born blind, and this was his want of faith, as Chrysostom says. Or as Bede observes on Mk. 8:23: Whom He might have healed wholly and instantly by a single word, He heals little by little, to show the extent of human blindness, which hardly, and that only by degrees, can come back to the light: and to point out that each step forward in the way of perfection is due to the help of His grace. Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 43, A. 2), Christ worked miracles by Divine power. Now the works of God are perfect (Deut 32:4). But nothing is perfect except it attain its end. Now the end of the outward healing worked by Christ is the healing of the soul. Consequently it was not fitting that Christ should heal a man’s body without healing his soul. Wherefore on John 7:23, I have healed the whole man on a Sabbath day, Augustine says: Because he was cured, so as to be whole in body; he believed, so as to be whole in soul. To the man sick of the palsy it is said specially, Thy sins are forgiven thee, because, as Jerome observes on Matt. 9:5, 6: We are hereby given to understand that ailments of the body are frequently due to sin: for which reason, perhaps, first are his sins forgiven, that the cause of the ailment being removed, health may return. Wherefore, also (John 4:14), it is said: Sin no more, lest some worse thing happen to thee. Whence, says Chrysostom, we learn that his sickness was the result of sin.

Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Christus miracula faciebat virtute divina. Dei autem perfecta sunt opera, ut dicitur Deut. XXXII. Non est autem aliquid perfectum, si finem non consequatur. Finis autem exterioris curationis per Christum factae est curatio animae. Et ideo non conveniebat Christo ut alicuius corpus curaret, nisi eius curaret animam. Unde super illud Ioan. VII, totum hominem sanum feci in sabbato, dicit Augustinus, quia curatus est, ut sanus esset in corpore; et credidit, ut sanus esset in anima. Specialiter autem paralytico dicitur, dimittuntur tibi peccata, quia, ut Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., datur ex hoc nobis intelligentia propter peccata plerasque evenire corporum debilitates, et ideo forsitan prius dimittuntur peccata, ut, causis debilitatis ablatis, sanitas restituatur. Unde et Ioan. V dicitur, iam noli peccare, ne deterius tibi aliquid contingat. Ubi, ut dicit Chrysostomus, discimus quod ex peccato nata erat ei aegritudo. Quamvis autem, ut Chrysostomus dicit, super MatNevertheless, as Chrysostom says on Matt. 9:5: By how th., quanto anima est potior corpore, tanto peccatum di- much a soul is of more account than a body, by so much is the mittere maius sit quam corpus sanare, quia tamen illud forgiving of sins a greater work than healing the body; but be-

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non est manifestum, facit minus quod est manifestius, ut demonstraret maius et non manifestum. Ad quartum dicendum quod, super illud Matth. IX, videte ne quis sciat, dicit Chrysostomus non esse hoc contrarium quod hic dicitur, ei quod alteri dicit, vade et annuntia gloriam Dei. Erudit enim nos prohibere eos qui volunt nos propter nos laudare. Si autem ad Deum gloria refertur, non debemus prohibere, sed magis iniungere ut hoc fiat.

Q. 44, A. 4

cause the one is unseen He does the lesser and more manifest thing in order to prove the greater and more unseen. Reply Obj. 4: On Matt. 9:30, See that no man know this, Chrysostom says: If in another place we find Him saying, ‘Go and declare the glory of God’ (cf. Mk. 5:19; Luke 8:39), that is not contrary to this. For He instructs us to forbid them that would praise us on our own account: but if the glory be referred to God, then we must not forbid, but command, that it be done.

Article 4 Whether Christ worked miracles fittingly on irrational creatures? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter fecerit Christus miracula circa creaturas irrationales. Bruta enim animalia sunt nobiliora plantis. Sed Christus fecit aliquod miraculum circa plantas, puta cum ad verbum eius est siccata ficulnea, ut dicitur Matth. XXI. Ergo videtur quod Christus etiam circa animalia bruta miracula facere debuisset. Praeterea, poena non iuste infertur nisi pro culpa. Sed non fuit culpa ficulneae quod in ea Christus fructum non invenit, quando non erat tempus fructuum. Ergo videtur quod inconvenienter eam siccaverit. Praeterea, aer et aqua sunt in medio caeli et terrae. Sed Christus aliqua miracula fecit in caelo, sicut supra dictum est. Similiter etiam in terra, quando in eius passione terra mota est. Ergo videtur quod etiam in aere et aqua aliqua miracula facere debuerit, ut mare dividere, sicut fecit Moyses; vel etiam flumen, sicut fecerunt Iosue et Elias; et ut fierent in aere tonitrua, sicut factum est in monte Sinai quando lex dabatur, et sicut Elias fecit, III Reg. XVIII.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ worked miracles unfittingly on irrational creatures. For brute animals are more noble than plants. But Christ worked a miracle on plants as when the fig-tree withered away at His command (Matt 21:19). Therefore Christ should have worked miracles also on brute animals. Obj. 2: Further, punishment is not justly inflicted save for fault. But it was not the fault of the fig-tree that Christ found no fruit on it, when fruit was not in season (Mark 11:13). Therefore it seems unfitting that He withered it up. Obj. 3: Further, air and water are between heaven and earth. But Christ worked some miracles in the heavens, as stated above (A. 2), and likewise in the earth, when it quaked at the time of His Passion (Matt 27:51). Therefore it seems that He should also have worked miracles in the air and water, such as to divide the sea, as did Moses (Exod 14:21); or a river, as did Josue (Josh 3:16) and Elias (4 Kgs 2:8); and to cause thunder to be heard in the air, as occurred on Mount Sinai when the Law was given (Exod 19:16), and like to what Elias did (3 Kgs 18:45). Obj. 4: Further, miraculous works pertain to the work of Divine providence in governing the world. But this work presupposes creation. It seems, therefore, unfitting that in His miracles Christ made use of creation: when, to wit, He multiplied the loaves. Therefore His miracles in regard to irrational creatures seem to have been unfitting.

Praeterea, opera miraculosa pertinent ad opus gubernationis mundi per divinam providentiam. Hoc autem opus praesupponit creationem. Inconveniens ergo videtur quod Christus in suis miraculis usus est creatione, quando scilicet multiplicavit panes. Non ergo convenientia videntur fuisse eius miracula circa irrationales creaturas. Sed contra est quod Christus est Dei sapientia, de On the contrary, Christ is the wisdom of God qua dicitur, Sap. VIII, quod disponit omnia suaviter. (1 Cor 1:24), of whom it is said (Wis 8:1) that she ordereth all things sweetly. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, I answer that, As stated above, Christ’s miracles were miracula Christi ad hoc ordinabantur quod virtus divi- ordained to the end that He should be recognized as havnitatis cognosceretur in ipso ad hominum salutem. Per- ing Divine power, unto the salvation of mankind. Now it tinet autem ad virtutem divinitatis ut omnis creatura sit belongs to the Divine power that every creature be subject ei subiecta. Et ideo in omnibus creaturarum generibus thereto. Consequently it behooved Him to work miracles

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miracula eum facere oportuit, et non solum in hominibus, sed etiam in irrationabilibus creaturis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod animalia bruta propinque se habent secundum genus ad hominem, unde et in eodem die cum homine facta sunt. Et quia circa corpora humana multa miracula fecerat, non oportebat quod circa corpora brutorum animalium aliqua miracula faceret, praesertim quia, quantum ad naturam sensibilem et corporalem, eadem ratio est de hominibus et animalibus, praecipue terrestribus. Pisces autem, cum vivant in aqua, magis a natura hominum differunt, unde et alio die sunt facti. In quibus miraculum Christus fecit in copiosa piscium captura, ut legitur Luc. V et Ioan. ult., et etiam in pisce quem Petrus coepit et in eo invenit staterem. Quod autem porci in mare praecipitati sunt, non fuit operatio divini miraculi, sed operatio Daemonum ex permissione divina. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., cum in plantis vel brutis aliquid tale dominus operatur, non quaeras qualiter iuste siccata est ficus, si tempus non erat, hoc enim quaerere est ultimae dementiae, quia scilicet in talibus non invenitur culpa et poena, sed miraculum inspice, et admirare miraculi factorem. Nec facit creator iniuriam possidenti, si creatura sua suo arbitrio utatur ad aliorum salutem, sed magis, ut Hilarius dicit, super Matth., in hoc bonitatis divinae argumentum reperimus. Nam ubi afferre voluit procuratae per se salutis exemplum, virtutis suae potestatem in humanis corporibus exercuit, ubi vero in contumaces formam severitatis constituebat, futuri speciem damno arboris indicavit. Et praecipue, ut Chrysostomus dicit, in ficulnea, quae est humidissima, ut miraculum maius appareat.

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on every kind of creature, not only on man, but also on irrational creatures. Reply Obj. 1: Brute animals are akin generically to man, wherefore they were created on the same day as man. And since He had worked many miracles on the bodies of men, there was no need for Him to work miracles on the bodies of brute animals; and so much the less that, as to their sensible and corporeal nature, the same reason applies to both men and animals, especially terrestrial. But fish, from living in water, are more alien from human nature; wherefore they were made on another day. On them Christ worked a miracle in the plentiful draught of fishes, related Luke 5 and John 21; and, again, in the fish caught by Peter, who found a stater in it (Matt 17:26). As to the swine who were cast headlong into the sea, this was not the effect of a Divine miracle, but of the action of the demons, God permitting. Reply Obj. 2: As Chrysostom says on Matt. 21:19: When our Lord does any such like thing on plants or brute animals, ask not how it was just to wither up the fig-tree, since it was not the fruit season; to ask such a question is foolish in the extreme, because such things cannot commit a fault or be punished: but look at the miracle, and wonder at the worker. Nor does the Creator inflict any hurt on the owner, if He choose to make use of His own creature for the salvation of others; rather, as Hilary says on Matt. 21:19, we should see in this a proof of God’s goodness, for when He wished to afford an example of salvation as being procured by Him, He exercised His mighty power on the human body: but when He wished to picture to them His severity towards those who wilfully disobey Him, He foreshadows their doom by His sentence on the tree. This is the more noteworthy in a figtree which, as Chrysostom observes (on Matt. 21:19), being full of moisture, makes the miracle all the more remarkable. Reply Obj. 3: Christ also worked miracles befitting to Himself in the air and water: when, to wit, as related Matt. 8:26, He commanded the winds, and the sea, and there came a great calm. But it was not befitting that He who came to restore all things to a state of peace and calm should cause either a disturbance in the atmosphere or a division of waters. Hence the Apostle says (Heb 12:18): You are not come to a fire that may be touched and approached, and a whirlwind, and darkness, and storm. At the time of His Passion, however, the veil was rent, to signify the unfolding of the mysteries of the Law; the graves were opened, to signify that His death gave life to the dead; the earth quaked and the rocks were rent, to signify that man’s stony heart would be softened, and the whole world changed for the better by the virtue of His Passion.

Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus etiam in aqua et in aere fecit miracula quae sibi conveniebant, quando scilicet, ut legitur Matth. VIII, imperavit ventis et mari, et facta est tranquillitas magna. Non autem conveniebat ei qui omnia in statum pacis et tranquillitatis revocare venerat, ut vel turbationem aeris, vel divisionem aquarum faceret. Unde apostolus dicit, Heb. XII, non accessistis ad tractabilem et accessibilem ignem, et turbinem et caliginem et procellam. Circa passionem tamen, divisum est velum, ad ostendendum reserationem mysteriorum legis; aperta sunt monumenta, ad ostendendum quod per eius mortem mortuis vita daretur; terra mota est et petrae scissae, ad ostendendum quod lapidea hominum corda per eius passionem emollirentur, et quod totus mundus virtute passionis eius erat in melius commutandus. Ad quartum dicendum quod multiplicatio panum Reply Obj. 4: The multiplication of the loaves was not non est facta per modum creationis, sed per additionem effected by way of creation, but by an addition of extraneextraneae materiae in panes conversae. Unde Augusti- ous matter transformed into loaves; hence Augustine says nus dicit, super Ioan., unde multiplicat de paucis granis on John 6:1–14: Whence He multiplieth a few grains into

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Q. 44, A. 4

segetes, inde in manibus suis multiplicavit quinque pa- harvests, thence in His hands He multiplied the five loaves: nes. Manifestum est autem quod per conversionem gra- and it is clearly by a process of transformation that grains na multiplicantur in segetes. are multiplied into harvests.

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Question 45 Christ’s Transfiguration Deinde considerandum est de transfiguratione ChriWe now consider Christ’s transfiguration; and here sti. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum conveniens fuerit Christum (1) Whether it was fitting that Christ should be transfigurari. transfigured? Secundo, utrum claritas transfigurationis fuerit (2) Whether the clarity of the transfiguration was the claritas gloriosa. clarity of glory? Tertio, de testibus transfigurationis. (3) Of the witnesses of the transfiguration; Quarto, de testimonio paternae vocis. (4) Of the testimony of the Father’s voice.

Article 1 Whether it was fitting that Christ should be transfigured? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Christum transfigurari. Non enim competit vero corpori ut in diversas figuras mutetur, sed corpori phantastico. Corpus autem Christi non fuit phantasticum, sed verum, ut supra habitum est. Ergo videtur quod transfigurari non debuit. Praeterea, figura est in quarta specie qualitatis, claritas autem est in tertia, cum sit sensibilis qualitas. Assumptio ergo claritatis a Christo transfiguratio dici non debet. Praeterea, corporis gloriosi sunt quatuor dotes, ut infra dicetur, scilicet impassibilitas, agilitas, subtilitas et claritas. Non ergo magis debuit transfigurari secundum assumptionem claritatis, quam secundum assumptionem aliarum dotium. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. XVII, quod Iesus transfiguratus est ante tres discipulorum suorum. Respondeo dicendum quod dominus discipulos suos, praenuntiata sua passione, induxerat eos ad suae passionis sequelam. Oportet autem ad hoc quod aliquis directe procedat in via, quod finem aliqualiter praecognoscat, sicut sagittator non recte iaciet sagittam nisi prius signum prospexerit in quod iaciendum est. Unde et Thomas dixit, Ioan. XIV, domine, nescimus quo vadis, et quomodo possumus viam scire? Et hoc praecipue necessarium est quando via est difficilis et aspera, et iter laboriosum, finis vero iucundus. Christus autem per passionem ad hoc pervenit ut gloriam obtineret, non solum animae, quam habuit a principio suae conceptionis, sed etiam corporis, secundum illud Luc. ult., haec oportuit Christum pati, et ita intrare in gloriam suam. Ad quam etiam perducit eos qui vestigia suae passionis sequuntur, secundum illud Act. XIV, per multas tribulationes opor-

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that Christ should be transfigured. For it is not fitting for a true body to be changed into various shapes (figuras), but only for an imaginary body. Now Christ’s body was not imaginary, but real, as stated above (Q. 5, A. 1). Therefore it seems that it should not have been transfigured. Obj. 2: Further, figure is in the fourth species of quality, whereas clarity is in the third, since it is a sensible quality. Therefore Christ’s assuming clarity should not be called a transfiguration. Obj. 3: Further, a glorified body has four gifts, as we shall state farther on (Suppl., Q. 82), viz. impassibility, agility, subtlety, and clarity. Therefore His transfiguration should not have consisted in an assumption of clarity rather than of the other gifts. On the contrary, It is written (Matt 17:2) that Jesus was transfigured in the presence of three of His disciples. I answer that, Our Lord, after foretelling His Passion to His disciples, had exhorted them to follow the path of His sufferings (Matt 16:21, 24). Now in order that anyone go straight along a road, he must have some knowledge of the end: thus an archer will not shoot the arrow straight unless he first see the target. Hence Thomas said (John 14:5): Lord, we know not whither Thou goest; and how can we know the way? Above all is this necessary when hard and rough is the road, heavy the going, but delightful the end. Now by His Passion Christ achieved glory, not only of His soul, which He had from the first moment of His conception, but also of His body; according to Luke (24:26): Christ ought to have suffered these things, and so to enter into His glory. To which glory He brings those who follow the footsteps of His Passion, according to Acts 14:21: Through many tribulations we must enter into the kingdom of God. Therefore it was fit-

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tet nos intrare in regnum caelorum. Et ideo conveniens fuit ut discipulis suis gloriam suae claritatis ostenderet (quod est ipsum transfigurari), cui suos configurabit, secundum illud Philipp. III, reformabit corpus humilitatis nostrae, configuratum corpori claritatis suae. Unde Beda dicit, super Marcum, pia provisione factum est ut, contemplatione semper manentis gaudii ad breve tempus delibata fortius adversa tolerarent. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., nemo putet Christum per hoc quod transfiguratus dicitur, pristinam formam et faciem perdidisse, vel amisisse corporis veritatem et assumpsisse corpus spirituale vel aereum. Sed quomodo transformatus sit, Evangelista demonstrat, dicens, resplenduit facies eius sicut sol, vestimenta autem eius facta sunt alba sicut nix. Ubi splendor faciei ostenditur, et candor describitur vestium, non substantia tollitur, sed gloria commutatur. Ad secundum dicendum quod figura circa extremitatem corporis consideratur, est enim figura quae termino vel terminis comprehenditur. Et ideo omnia illa quae circa extremitatem corporis considerantur ad figuram quodammodo pertinere videntur. Sicut autem color, ita et claritas corporis non transparentis in eius superficie attenditur. Et ideo assumptio claritatis transfiguratio dicitur. Ad tertium dicendum quod, inter praedictas quatuor dotes, sola claritas est qualitas ipsius personae in seipsa, aliae vero tres dotes non percipiuntur nisi in aliquo actu vel motu, seu passione. Ostendit igitur Christus in seipso aliqua illarum trium dotium indicia, puta agilitatis, cum supra undas maris ambulavit; subtilitatis, quando de clauso utero virginis exivit; impassibilitatis, quando de manibus Iudaeorum, vel praecipitare vel lapidare eum volentium, illaesus evasit. Nec tamen propter illas transfiguratus dicitur, sed propter solam claritatem, quae pertinet ad aspectum personae ipsius.

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ting that He should show His disciples the glory of His clarity (which is to be transfigured), to which He will configure those who are His; according to Phil. 3:21: (Who) will reform the body of our lowness configured to the body of His glory. Hence Bede says on Mk. 8:39: By His loving foresight He allowed them to taste for a short time the contemplation of eternal joy, so that they might bear persecution bravely. Reply Obj. 1: As Jerome says on Matt. 17:2: Let no one suppose that Christ, through being said to be transfigured, laid aside His natural shape and countenance, or substituted an imaginary or aerial body for His real body. The Evangelist describes the manner of His transfiguration when he says: ‘His face did shine as the sun, and His garments became white as snow.’ Brightness of face and whiteness of garments argue not a change of substance, but a putting on of glory. Reply Obj. 2: Figure is seen in the outline of a body, for it is that which is enclosed by one or more boundaries. Therefore whatever has to do with the outline of a body seems to pertain to the figure. Now the clarity, just as the color, of a non-transparent body is seen on its surface, and consequently the assumption of clarity is called transfiguration.

Reply Obj. 3: Of those four gifts, clarity alone is a quality of the very person in himself; whereas the other three are not perceptible, save in some action or movement, or in some passion. Christ, then, did show in Himself certain indications of those three gifts—of agility, for instance, when He walked on the waves of the sea; of subtlety, when He came forth from the closed womb of the Virgin; of impassibility, when He escaped unhurt from the hands of the Jews who wished to hurl Him down or to stone Him. And yet He is not said, on account of this, to be transfigured, but only on account of clarity, which pertains to the aspect of His Person.

Article 2 Whether this clarity was the clarity of glory? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod illa claritas non fuit claritas gloriosa. Dicit enim quaedam Glossa Bedae, super illud Matth. XVII, transfiguratus est coram eis, in corpore, inquit, mortali ostendit, non immortalitatem, sed claritatem similem futurae immortalitati. Sed claritas gloriae est claritas immortalitatis. Non ergo illa claritas quam Christus discipulis ostendit, fuit claritas gloriae. Praeterea, super illud Luc. IX, non gustabunt mortem nisi videant regnum Dei, dicit Glossa Bedae, idest, glorificationem corporis in imaginaria repraesentatione

Objection 1: It would seem that this clarity was not the clarity of glory. For a gloss of Bede on Matt. 17:2, He was transfigured before them, says: In His mortal body He shows forth, not the state of immortality, but clarity like to that of future immortality. But the clarity of glory is the clarity of immortality. Therefore the clarity which Christ showed to His disciples was not the clarity of glory. Obj. 2: Further, on Luke 9:27 They shall not taste death until they see the kingdom of God, Bede’s gloss says: That is, the glorification of the body in an imaginary vision of future

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futurae beatitudinis. Sed imago alicuius rei non est ipsa res. Ergo claritas illa non fuit claritas beatitudinis. Praeterea, claritas gloriae non est nisi in corpore humano. Sed claritas illa transfigurationis apparuit non solum in corpore Christi, sed etiam in vestimentis eius, et in nube lucida quae discipulos obumbravit. Ergo videtur quod illa claritas non fuit claritas gloriae. Sed contra est quod, super illud Matth. XVII, transfiguratus est ante eos, dicit Hieronymus, qualis futurus est tempore iudicii, talis apostolis apparuit. Et super illud Matth. XVI, donec videant filium hominis venientem in regno suo, dicit Chrysostomus, volens monstrare quid est illa gloria in qua postea venturus est, eis in praesenti vita revelavit, sicut possibile erat eos discere, ut neque in domini morte iam doleant. Respondeo dicendum quod claritas illa quam Christus in transfiguratione assumpsit, fuit claritas gloriae quantum ad essentiam, non tamen quantum ad modum essendi. Claritas enim corporis gloriosi derivatur ab animae claritate, sicut Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Dioscorum. Et similiter claritas corporis Christi in transfiguratione derivata est a divinitate ipsius, ut Damascenus dicit, et a gloria animae eius. Quod enim a principio conceptionis Christi gloria animae non redundaret ad corpus, ex quadam dispensatione divina factum est, ut in corpore passibili nostrae redemptionis expleret mysteria, sicut supra dictum est. Non tamen per hoc adempta est potestas Christo derivandi gloriam animae ad corpus. Et hoc quidem fecit, quantum ad claritatem, in transfiguratione, aliter tamen quam in corpore glorificato. Nam ad corpus glorificatum redundat claritas ab anima sicut quaedam qualitas permanens corpus afficiens. Unde fulgere corporaliter non est miraculosum in corpore glorioso. Sed ad corpus Christi in transfiguratione derivata est claritas a divinitate et anima eius, non per modum qualitatis immanentis et afficientis ipsum corpus, sed magis per modum passionis transeuntis, sicut cum aer illuminatur a sole. Unde ille fulgor tunc in corpore Christi apparens miraculosus fuit, sicut et hoc ipsum quod ambulavit super undas maris. Unde Dionysius dicit, in epistola IV, ad Caium, super hominem operatur Christus ea quae sunt hominis, et hoc monstrat virgo supernaturaliter concipiens, et aqua instabilis materialium et terrenorum pedum sustinens gravitatem. Unde non est dicendum, sicut Hugo de sancto Victore dixit, quod Christus assumpserit dotes claritatis in transfiguratione, agilitatis ambulando super mare, et subtilitatis egrediendo de clauso utero virginis, quia dos nominat quandam qualitatem immanentem corpori glorioso. Sed miraculose habuit ea quae pertinent ad dotes. Et est simile, quantum ad animam, de visione qua Paulus vidit Deum in raptu, ut in secunda parte dictum est.

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beatitude. But the image of a thing is not the thing itself. Therefore this was not the clarity of beatitude. Obj. 3: Further, the clarity of glory is only in a human body. But this clarity of the transfiguration was seen not only in Christ’s body, but also in His garments, and in the bright cloud which overshaded the disciples. Therefore it seems that this was not the clarity of glory. On the contrary, Jerome says on the words He was transfigured before them (Matt 17:2): He appeared to the Apostles such as He will appear on the day of judgment. And on Matt. 16:28, Till they see the Son of Man coming in His kingdom, Chrysostom says: Wishing to show with what kind of glory He is afterwards to come, so far as it was possible for them to learn it, He showed it to them in their present life, that they might not grieve even over the death of their Lord. I answer that, The clarity which Christ assumed in His transfiguration was the clarity of glory as to its essence, but not as to its mode of being. For the clarity of the glorified body is derived from that of the soul, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Diosc. cxviii). And in like manner the clarity of Christ’s body in His transfiguration was derived from His Godhead, as Damascene says (Orat. de Transfig.) and from the glory of His soul. That the glory of His soul did not overflow into His body from the first moment of Christ’s conception was due to a certain Divine dispensation, that, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 1, ad 2), He might fulfill the mysteries of our redemption in a passible body. This did not, however, deprive Christ of His power of outpouring the glory of His soul into His body. And this He did, as to clarity, in His transfiguration, but otherwise than in a glorified body. For the clarity of the soul overflows into a glorified body, by way of a permanent quality affecting the body. Hence bodily refulgence is not miraculous in a glorified body. But in Christ’s transfiguration clarity overflowed from His Godhead and from His soul into His body, not as an immanent quality affecting His very body, but rather after the manner of a transient passion, as when the air is lit up by the sun. Consequently the refulgence, which appeared in Christ’s body then, was miraculous: just as was the fact of His walking on the waves of the sea. Hence Dionysius says (Ep. ad Cai. iv): Christ excelled man in doing that which is proper to man: this is shown in His supernatural conception of a virgin and in the unstable waters bearing the weight of material and earthly feet. Wherefore we must not say, as Hugh of St. Victor said, that Christ assumed the gift of clarity in the transfiguration, of agility in walking on the sea, and of subtlety in coming forth from the Virgin’s closed womb: because the gifts are immanent qualities of a glorified body. On the contrary, whatever pertained to the gifts, that He had miraculously. The same is to be said, as to the soul, of the vision in which Paul saw God in a rapture, as we have stated in the Second Part (II-II, Q. 175, A. 3, ad 2).

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex illo verbo non ostenditur quod claritas Christi non fuerit claritas gloriae, sed quod non fuit claritas corporis gloriosi, quia corpus Christi nondum erat immortale. Sicut enim dispensative factum est ut in Christo gloria animae non redundaret ad corpus, ita fieri potuit dispensative ut redundaret quantum ad dotem claritatis, et non quantum ad dotem impassibilitatis. Ad secundum dicendum quod illa claritas dicitur imaginaria fuisse, non quin esset vera claritas gloriae, sed quia erat quaedam imago repraesentans illam gloriae perfectionem secundum quam corpus erit gloriosum. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut claritas quae erat in corpore Christi repraesentabat futuram claritatem corporis eius, ita claritas vestimentorum eius designat futuram claritatem sanctorum, quae superabitur a claritate Christi, sicut candor nivis superatur a candore solis. Unde Gregorius dicit, XXXII Moral., quod vestimenta Christi facta sunt splendentia, quia in supernae claritatis culmine sancti omnes ei luce iustitiae fulgentes adhaerebunt. Vestium enim nomine iustos, quos sibi adiunget, significat, secundum illud Isaiae XLIX, his omnibus velut ornamento vestieris. Nubes autem lucida significat spiritus sancti gloriam, vel virtutem paternam, ut Origenes dicit, per quam sancti in futura gloria protegentur. Quamvis etiam convenienter significare posset claritatem mundi innovati, quae erit sanctorum tabernaculum. Unde, Petro disponente tabernacula facere, nubes lucida discipulos obumbravit.

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Reply Obj. 1: The words quoted prove, not that the clarity of Christ was not that of glory, but that it was not the clarity of a glorified body, since Christ’s body was not as yet immortal. And just as it was by dispensation that in Christ the glory of the soul should not overflow into the body so was it possible that by dispensation it might overflow as to the gift of clarity and not as to that of impassibility. Reply Obj. 2: This clarity is said to have been imaginary, not as though it were not really the clarity of glory, but because it was a kind of image representing that perfection of glory, in virtue of which the body will be glorious. Reply Obj. 3: Just as the clarity which was in Christ’s body was a representation of His body’s future clarity, so the clarity which was in His garments signified the future clarity of the saints, which will be surpassed by that of Christ, just as the brightness of the snow is surpassed by that of the sun. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxii) that Christ’s garments became resplendent, because in the height of heavenly clarity all the saints will cling to Him in the refulgence of righteousness. For His garments signify the righteous, because He will unite them to Himself, according to Isa. 49:18: Thou shalt be clothed with all these as with an ornament. The bright cloud signifies the glory of the Holy Spirit or the power of the Father, as Origen says (Tract. iii in Matth.), by which in the glory to come the saints will be covered. Or, again, it may be said fittingly that it signifies the clarity of the world redeemed, which clarity will cover the saints as a tent. Hence when Peter proposed to make tents, a bright cloud overshaded the disciples.

Article 3 Whether the witnesses of the transfiguration were fittingly chosen? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non convenienter inducti fuerint testes transfigurationis. Unusquisque enim maxime perhibere potest testimonium de notis. Sed qualis esset futura gloria, tempore transfigurationis Christi nulli homini per experimentum erat adhuc notum, sed solis Angelis. Ergo testes transfigurationis magis debuerunt esse Angeli quam homines. Praeterea, testes veritatis non decet aliqua fictio, sed veritas. Moyses autem et Elias non ibi vere affuerunt, sed imaginarie, dicit enim quaedam Glossa super illud Luc. IX, erant autem Moyses et Elias etc., sciendum est, inquit, non corpus vel animas Moysi vel Eliae ibi apparuisse, sed in subiecta creatura illa corpora fuisse formata. Potest etiam credi ut angelico ministerio hoc factum esset, ut Angeli eorum personas assumerent. Non ergo videtur quod fuerint convenientes testes.

Objection 1: It would seem that the witnesses of the transfiguration were unfittingly chosen. For everyone is a better witness of things that he knows. But at the time of Christ’s transfiguration no one but the angels had as yet any knowledge from experience of the glory to come. Therefore the witnesses of the transfiguration should have been angels rather than men. Obj. 2: Further, truth, not fiction, is becoming in a witness of the truth. Now, Moses and Elias were there, not really, but only in appearance; for a gloss on Luke 9:30, They were Moses and Elias, says: It must be observed that Moses and Elias were there neither in body nor in soul; but that those bodies were formed of some available matter. It is also credible that this was the result of the angelic ministries, through the angels impersonating them. Therefore it seems that they were unsuitable witnesses.

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Praeterea, Act. X dicitur quod Christo omnes prophetae testimonium perhibent. Ergo non soli Moyses et Elias debuerunt adesse tanquam testes, sed etiam omnes prophetae. Praeterea, gloria Christi fidelibus omnibus repromittitur, quos per suam transfigurationem ad illius gloriae desiderium accendere voluit. Non ergo solos Petrum et Iacobum et Ioannem in testimonium suae transfigurationis assumere debuit, sed omnes discipulos. In contrarium est evangelicae Scripturae auctori-

Q. 45, A. 3

Obj. 3: Further, it is said (Acts 10:43) that all the prophets give testimony to Christ. Therefore not only Moses and Elias, but also all the prophets, should have been present as witnesses. Obj. 4: Further, Christ’s glory is promised as a reward to all the faithful (2 Cor 3:18; Phil. 3:21), in whom He wished by His transfiguration to enkindle a desire of that glory. Therefore He should have taken not only Peter, James, and John, but all His disciples, to be witnesses of His transfiguration. On the contrary is the authority of the Gospel.

tas. Respondeo dicendum quod Christus transfigurari voluit ut gloriam suam hominibus ostenderet, et ad eam desiderandam homines provocaret, sicut supra dictum est. Ad gloriam autem aeternae beatitudinis adducuntur homines per Christum, non solum qui post eum fuerunt, sed etiam qui eum praecesserunt, unde, eo ad passionem properante, tam turbae quae sequebantur, quam quae praecedebant ei, clamabant, hosanna, ut dicitur Matth. XXI, quasi salutem ab eo petentes. Et ideo conveniens fuit ut de praecedentibus ipsum testes adessent, scilicet Moyses et Elias; et de sequentibus, scilicet Petrus, Iacobus et Ioannes; ut in ore duorum vel trium testium staret hoc verbum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus per suam transfigurationem manifestavit discipulis corporis gloriam, quae ad solos homines pertinet. Et ideo convenienter non Angeli, sed homines pro testibus ad hoc inducuntur. Ad secundum dicendum quod illa Glossa dicitur esse sumpta ex libro qui intitulatur de mirabilibus sacrae Scripturae, qui non est liber authenticus, sed falso adscribitur Augustino. Et ideo illi Glossae non est standum. Dicit enim Hieronymus, super Matth., considerandum est quod Scribis et Pharisaeis de caelo signa poscentibus, dare noluit, hic vero, ut apostolorum augeat fidem, dat signum de caelo, Elia inde descendente quo conscenderat, et Moyse ab Inferis resurgente. Quod non est sic intelligendum quasi anima Moysi suum corpus resumpserit, sed quod anima eius apparuit per aliquod corpus assumptum, sicut Angeli apparent. Elias autem apparuit in proprio corpore, non quidem de caelo Empyreo allatus, sed de aliquo eminenti loco, in quem fuerat in curru igneo raptus. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., Moyses et Elias in medium adducuntur propter multas rationes. Prima est haec. Quia enim turbae dicebant eum esse Eliam vel Ieremiam aut unum ex prophetis, capita prophetarum secum ducit, ut saltem hinc appareat differentia servorum et domini. Secunda ratio est, quia Moyses legem dedit, Elias pro gloria domini aemulator fuit. Unde per hoc quod simul cum Christo apparent, excluditur calumnia Iudae-

I answer that, Christ wished to be transfigured in order to show men His glory, and to arouse men to a desire of it, as stated above (A. 1). Now men are brought to the glory of eternal beatitude by Christ—not only those who lived after Him, but also those who preceded Him; therefore, when He was approaching His Passion, both the multitude that followed and that which went before, cried saying: ‘Hosanna,’ as related Matt. 21:9, beseeching Him, as it were, to save them. Consequently it was fitting that witnesses should be present from among those who preceded Him—namely, Moses and Elias—and from those who followed after Him—namely, Peter, James, and John—that in the mouth of two or three witnesses this word might stand. Reply Obj. 1: By His transfiguration Christ manifested to His disciples the glory of His body, which belongs to men only. It was therefore fitting that He should choose men and not angels as witnesses. Reply Obj. 2: This gloss is said to be taken from a book entitled On the Marvels of Holy Scripture. It is not an authentic work, but is wrongly ascribed to St. Augustine; consequently we need not stand by it. For Jerome says on Matt. 17:3: Observe that when the Scribes and Pharisees asked for a sign from heaven, He refused to give one; whereas here in order to increase the apostles’ faith, He gives a sign from heaven, Elias coming down thence, whither he had ascended, and Moses arising from the nether world. This is not to be understood as though the soul of Moses was reunited to his body, but that his soul appeared through some assumed body, just as the angels do. But Elias appeared in his own body, not that he was brought down from the empyrean heaven, but from some place on high, whither he was taken up in the fiery chariot. Reply Obj. 3: As Chrysostom says on Matt. 17:3: Moses and Elias are brought forward for many reasons. And, first of all, because the multitude said He was Elias or Jeremias or one of the prophets, He brings the leaders of the prophets with Him; that hereby at least they might see the difference between the servants and their Lord. Another reason was . . . that Moses gave the Law . . . while Elias . . . was jealous for the glory of God. Therefore by appearing together with Christ, they show how falsely the Jews accused Him

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Q. 45, A. 4

Incarnate Son of God

orum accusantium Christum tanquam transgressorem legis, et blasphemum Dei sibi gloriam usurpantem. Tertia ratio est, ut ostendat se habere potestatem mortis et vitae, et esse iudicem mortuorum et vivorum, per hoc quod Moysen iam mortuum, et Eliam adhuc viventem, secum ducit. Quarta ratio est quia, sicut Lucas dicit, loquebantur cum eo de excessu, quem completurus erat in Ierusalem, idest de passione et morte sua. Et ideo, ut super hoc discipulorum animos confirmaret, inducit eos in medium qui se morti exposuerunt pro Deo, nam Moyses cum periculo mortis se obtulit Pharaoni, Elias vero regi Achab. Quinta ratio est, quia volebat ut discipuli eius aemularentur Moysi mansuetudinem, et zelum Eliae. Sextam rationem addit Hilarius, ut ostenderet scilicet se per legem, quam dedit Moyses, et per prophetas, inter quos fuit Elias praecipuus, esse praedicatum. Ad quartum dicendum quod alta mysteria non sunt omnibus exponenda immediate, sed per maiores suo tempore ad alios debent devenire. Et ideo, ut Chrysostomus dicit, assumpsit tres tanquam potiores. Nam Petrus excellens fuit in dilectione quam habuit ad Christum et iterum in potestate sibi commissa; Ioannes vero in privilegio amoris quo a Christo diligebatur propter suam virginitatem, et iterum propter praerogativam evangelicae doctrinae; Iacobus autem propter praerogativam martyrii. Et tamen hos ipsos noluit hoc quod viderant aliis annuntiare ante resurrectionem, ne, ut Hieronymus dicit, incredibile esset, pro rei magnitudine; et, post tantam gloriam, sequens crux scandalum faceret; vel etiam totaliter impediretur a populo; et ut, cum essent spiritu sancto repleti, tunc gestorum spiritualium testes essent.

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of transgressing the Law, and of blasphemously appropriating to Himself the glory of God. A third reason was to show that He has power of death and life, and that He is the judge of the dead and the living; by bringing with Him Moses who had died, and Elias who still lived. A fourth reason was because, as Luke says (9:31), they spoke with Him of His decease that He should accomplish in Jerusalem, i.e., of His Passion and death. Therefore, in order to strengthen the hearts of His disciples with a view to this, He sets before them those who had exposed themselves to death for God’s sake: since Moses braved death in opposing Pharaoh, and Elias in opposing Achab. A fifth reason was that He wished His disciples to imitate the meekness of Moses and the zeal of Elias. Hilary adds a sixth reason—namely, in order to signify that He had been foretold by the Law, which Moses gave them, and by the prophets, of whom Elias was the principal. Reply Obj. 4: Lofty mysteries should not be immediately explained to everyone, but should be handed down through superiors to others in their proper turn. Consequently, as Chrysostom says (on Matt. 17:3), He took these three as being superior to the rest. For Peter excelled in the love he bore to Christ and in the power bestowed on him; John in the privilege of Christ’s love for him on account of his virginity, and, again, on account of his being privileged to be an Evangelist; James on account of the privilege of martyrdom. Nevertheless He did not wish them to tell others what they had seen before His Resurrection; lest, as Jerome says on Matt. 17:19, such a wonderful thing should seem incredible to them; and lest, after hearing of so great glory, they should be scandalized at the Cross that followed; or, again, lest the Cross should be entirely hindered by the people; and in order that they might then be witnesses of spiritual things when they should be filled with the Holy Spirit.

Article 4 Whether the testimony of the Father’s voice, saying, “this is my beloved Son,” was fittingly added? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter additum fuerit testimonium paternae vocis dicentis, hic est filius meus dilectus. Quia, ut dicitur Iob XXXIII, semel loquitur Deus, et secundo idipsum non repetit. Sed in Baptismo hoc ipsum paterna vox fuerat protestata. Non ergo fuit conveniens quod hoc iterum protestaretur in transfiguratione. Praeterea, in Baptismo, simul cum voce paterna, affuit Spiritus Sanctus in specie columbae. Quod in transfiguratione factum non fuit. Non ergo conveniens videtur fuisse patris protestatio. Praeterea, Christus docere incoepit post Baptismum. Et tamen in Baptismo vox patris ad eum audien-

Objection 1: It would seem that the testimony of the Father’s voice, saying, This is My beloved Son, was not fittingly added; for, as it is written (Job 33:14), God speaketh once, and repeateth not the selfsame thing the second time. But the Father’s voice had testified to this at the time of (Christ’s) baptism. Therefore it was not fitting that He should bear witness to it a second time. Obj. 2: Further, at the baptism the Holy Spirit appeared under the form of a dove at the same time as the Father’s voice was heard. But this did not happen at the transfiguration. Therefore it seems that the testimony of the Father was made in an unfitting manner. Obj. 3: Further, Christ began to teach after His baptism. Nevertheless, the Father’s voice did not then com-

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dum homines non induxerat. Ergo nec in transfiguratione inducere debuit. Praeterea, non debent aliquibus dici ea quae ferre non possunt, secundum illud Ioan. XVI, adhuc habeo vobis multa dicere, quae non potestis portare modo. Sed discipuli vocem patris ferre non potuerunt, dicitur enim Matth. XVII quod audientes discipuli ceciderunt in faciem suam et timuerunt valde. Ergo non debuit vox paterna ad eos fieri. In contrarium est auctoritas evangelicae Scripturae. Respondeo dicendum quod adoptio filiorum Dei est per quandam conformitatem imaginis ad Dei filium naturalem. Quod quidem fit dupliciter, primo quidem, per gratiam viae, quae est conformitas imperfecta; secundo, per gloriam, quae est conformitas perfecta; secundum illud I Ioan. III, nunc filii Dei sumus, et nondum apparuit quid erimus, scimus quoniam, cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est. Quia igitur gratiam per Baptismum consequimur, in transfiguratione autem praemonstrata est claritas futurae gloriae, ideo tam in Baptismo quam in transfiguratione conveniens fuit manifestare naturalem Christi filiationem testimonio patris, quia solus est perfecte conscius illius perfectae generationis, simul cum filio et spiritu sancto. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud verbum referendum est ad aeternam Dei locutionem, qua Deus pater verbum unicum protulit sibi coaeternum. Et tamen potest dici quod idem corporali voce Deus bis protulerit, non tamen propter idem, sed ad ostendendum diversum modum quo homines participare possunt similitudinem filiationis aeternae. Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut in Baptismo, ubi declaratum fuit mysterium primae regenerationis, ostensa est operatio totius Trinitatis, per hoc quod fuit ibi filius incarnatus, apparuit Spiritus Sanctus in specie columbae, et pater fuit ibi declaratus in voce; ita etiam in transfiguratione, quae est sacramentum secundae regenerationis, tota Trinitas apparuit, pater in voce, filius in homine, Spiritus Sanctus in nube clara; quia sicut in Baptismo dat innocentiam, quae per simplicitatem columbae designatur, ita in resurrectione dabit electis suis claritatem gloriae et refrigerium ab omni malo, quae designantur in nube lucida. Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus venerat gratiam actualiter dare, gloriam vero verbo promittere. Et ideo convenienter in transfiguratione inducuntur homines ut ipsum audiant, non autem in Baptismo. Ad quartum dicendum quod conveniens fuit discipulos voce paterna terreri et prosterni, ut ostenderetur quod excellentia illius gloriae quae tunc demonstrabatur, excedit omnem sensum et facultatem mortalium, secun-

Q. 45, A. 4

mand men to hear him. Therefore neither should it have so commanded at the transfiguration. Obj. 4: Further, things should not be said to those who cannot bear them, according to John 16:12: I have yet many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now. But the disciples could not bear the Father’s voice; for it is written (Matt 17:6) that the disciples hearing, fell upon their face, and were very much afraid. Therefore the Father’s voice should not have been addressed to them. On the contrary is the authority of the Gospel. I answer that, The adoption of the sons of God is through a certain conformity of image to the natural Son of God. Now this takes place in two ways: first, by the grace of the wayfarer, which is imperfect conformity; second, by glory, which is perfect conformity, according to 1 John 3:2: We are now the sons of God, and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be: we know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is. Since, therefore, it is in baptism that we acquire grace, while the clarity of the glory to come was foreshadowed in the transfiguration, therefore both in His baptism and in His transfiguration the natural sonship of Christ was fittingly made known by the testimony of the Father: because He alone with the Son and Holy Spirit is perfectly conscious of that perfect generation. Reply Obj. 1: The words quoted are to be understood of God’s eternal speaking, by which God the Father uttered the only-begotten and co-eternal Word. Nevertheless, it can be said that God uttered the same thing twice in a bodily voice, yet not for the same purpose, but in order to show the diverse modes in which men can be partakers of the likeness of the eternal Sonship. Reply Obj. 2: Just as in the Baptism, where the mystery of the first regeneration was proclaimed, the operation of the whole Trinity was made manifest, because the Son Incarnate was there, the Holy Spirit appeared under the form of a dove, and the Father made Himself known in the voice; so also in the transfiguration, which is the mystery of the second regeneration, the whole Trinity appears—the Father in the voice, the Son in the man, the Holy Spirit in the bright cloud; for just as in baptism He confers innocence, signified by the simplicity of the dove, so in the resurrection will He give His elect the clarity of glory and refreshment from all sorts of evil, which are signified by the bright cloud. Reply Obj. 3: Christ came to give grace actually, and to promise glory by His words. Therefore it was fitting at the time of His transfiguration, and not at the time of His baptism, that men should be commanded to hear Him. Reply Obj. 4: It was fitting that the disciples should be afraid and fall down on hearing the voice of the Father, to show that the glory which was then being revealed surpasses in excellence the sense and faculty of all mortal be-

477

Q. 45, A. 4

Incarnate Son of God

dum illud Exod. XXXIII, non videbit me homo et vivet. Et hoc est quod Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., quod humana fragilitas conspectum maioris gloriae ferre non sustinet. Ab hac autem fragilitate sanantur homines per Christum, eos in gloriam adducendo. Quod significatur per hoc quod dixit eis, surgite, nolite timere.

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ings; according to Ex. 33:20: Man shall not see Me and live. This is what Jerome says on Matt. 17:6: Such is human frailty that it cannot bear to gaze on such great glory. But men are healed of this frailty by Christ when He brings them into glory. And this is signified by what He says to them: Arise, and fear not.

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Question 46 The Passion of Christ Consequenter considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad exitum Christi de mundo. Et primo, de passione eius; secundo, de morte; tertio, de sepultura; quarto, de descensu ad Inferos. Circa passionem occurrit triplex consideratio, prima, de ipsa passione; secunda, de causa efficiente passionis; tertia, de fructu passionis. Circa primum quaeruntur duodecim. Primo, utrum necesse fuerit Christum pati pro liberatione hominum. Secundo, utrum fuerit alius modus possibilis liberationis humanae. Tertio, utrum iste modus fuerit convenientior. Quarto, utrum fuerit conveniens quod in cruce pateretur. Quinto, de generalitate passionis eius. Sexto, utrum dolor quem in passione sustinuit, fuerit maximus. Septimo, utrum tota anima eius pateretur. Octavo, utrum passio eius impediverit gaudium fruitionis. Nono, de tempore passionis. Decimo, de loco. Undecimo, utrum conveniens fuerit ipsum cum latronibus crucifigi. Duodecimo, utrum passio ipsius Christi sit divinitati attribuenda.

In proper sequence we have now to consider all that relates to Christ’s leaving the world. In the first place, His Passion; second, His death; third, His burial; and, fourth, His descent into hell. With regard to the Passion, there arises a threefold consideration: (1) The Passion itself; (2) the efficient cause of the Passion; (3) the fruits of the Passion. Under the first heading there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether it was necessary for Christ to suffer for men’s deliverance? (2) Whether there was any other possible means of delivering men? (3) Whether this was the more suitable means? (4) Whether it was fitting for Christ to suffer on the cross? (5) The extent of His sufferings; (6) Whether the pain which He endured was the greatest? (7) Whether His entire soul suffered? (8) Whether His Passion hindered the joy of fruition? (9) The time of the Passion; (10) The place; (11) Whether it was fitting for Him to be crucified with robbers? (12) Whether Christ’s Passion is to be attributed to the Godhead?

Article 1 Whether it was necessary for Christ to suffer for the deliverance of the human race? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit necessarium Christum pati pro humani generis liberatione. Humanum enim genus liberari non poterat nisi a Deo, secundum illud Isaiae XLV, nunquid non ego dominus, et non est ultra Deus absque me? Deus iustus et salvans non est praeter me. In Deum autem non cadit aliqua necessitas, quia hoc repugnaret omnipotentiae ipsius. Ergo non fuit necessarium Christum pati. Praeterea, necessarium voluntario opponitur. Sed Christus propria voluntate est passus, dicitur enim Isaiae LIII, oblatus est quia ipse voluit. Ergo non necessarium fuit eum pati.

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for Christ to suffer for the deliverance of the human race. For the human race could not be delivered except by God, according to Isa. 45:21: Am not I the Lord, and there is no God else besides Me? A just God and a Savior, there is none besides Me. But no necessity can compel God, for this would be repugnant to His omnipotence. Therefore it was not necessary for Christ to suffer. Obj. 2: Further, what is necessary is opposed to what is voluntary. But Christ suffered of His own will; for it is written (Isa 53:7): He was offered because it was His own will. Therefore it was not necessary for Him to suffer.

479

Q. 46, A. 1

Incarnate Son of God

Praeterea, sicut in Psalmo dicitur, universae viae domini misericordia et veritas. Sed non videtur necessarium quod pateretur ex parte misericordiae divinae, quae, sicut gratis dona tribuit, ita videtur quod gratis debita relaxet, absque satisfactione. Neque etiam ex parte divinae iustitiae, secundum quam homo aeternam damnationem meruerat. Ergo videtur non fuisse necessarium quod Christus pro liberatione hominum pateretur. Praeterea, angelica natura est excellentior quam humana, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed pro reparatione angelicae naturae, quae peccaverat, Christus non est passus. Ergo videtur quod nec etiam fuerit necessarium eum pati pro salute humani generis. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. III, sicut Moyses exaltavit serpentem in deserto, sic oportet exaltari filium hominis, ut omnis qui credit in eum non pereat, sed habeat vitam aeternam. Quod quidem de exaltatione in cruce intelligitur. Ergo videtur quod Christum oportuerit pati. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus docet in V Metaphys., necessarium multipliciter dicitur. Uno quidem modo, quod secundum sui naturam impossibile est aliter se habere. Et sic manifestum est quod non fuit necessarium Christum pati, neque ex parte Dei, neque ex parte hominis. Alio modo dicitur aliquid necessarium ex aliquo exteriori. Quod quidem si sit causa efficiens vel movens, facit necessitatem coactionis, utpote cum aliquis non potest ire propter violentiam detinentis ipsum. Si vero illud exterius quod necessitatem inducit, sit finis, dicetur aliquid necessarium ex suppositione finis, quando scilicet finis aliquis aut nullo modo potest esse, aut non potest esse convenienter, nisi tali fine praesupposito. Non fuit ergo necessarium Christum pati necessitate coactionis, neque ex parte Dei, qui Christum definivit pati; neque etiam ex parte ipsius Christi, qui voluntarie passus est. Fuit autem necessarium necessitate finis. Qui quidem potest tripliciter intelligi. Primo quidem, ex parte nostra, qui per eius passionem liberati sumus, secundum illud Ioan. III, oportet exaltari filium hominis, ut omnis qui credit in eum non pereat, sed habeat vitam aeternam. Secundo, ex parte ipsius Christi, qui per humilitatem passionis meruit gloriam exaltationis. Et ad hoc pertinet quod dicitur Luc. ult., haec oportuit Christum pati, et sic intrare in gloriam suam. Tertio, ex parte Dei, cuius definitio est circa passionem Christi praenuntiatam in Scripturis et praefiguratam in observantia veteris testamenti. Et hoc est quod dicitur Luc. XXII, filius hominis secundum quod definitum est vadit; et Luc. ult., haec sunt verba quae locutus sum ad vos cum adhuc essem vobiscum, quoniam necesse est impleri omnia quae scripta sunt in lege Moysi et prophetis et Psalmis de me; et,

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Obj. 3: Further, as is written (Ps 24:10): All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth. But it does not seem necessary that He should suffer on the part of the Divine mercy, which, as it bestows gifts freely, so it appears to condone debts without satisfaction: nor, again, on the part of Divine justice, according to which man had deserved everlasting condemnation. Therefore it does not seem necessary that Christ should have suffered for man’s deliverance. Obj. 4: Further, the angelic nature is more excellent than the human, as appears from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But Christ did not suffer to repair the angelic nature which had sinned. Therefore, apparently, neither was it necessary for Him to suffer for the salvation of the human race. On the contrary, It is written (John 3:14): As Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, so must the Son of man be lifted up, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting. This is understood of his exaltation on the cross. Therefore it seems that Christ ought to suffer. I answer that, As the Philosopher teaches (Metaph. v), there are several acceptations of the word necessary. In one way it means anything which of its nature cannot be otherwise; and in this way it is evident that it was not necessary either on the part of God or on the part of man for Christ to suffer. In another sense a thing may be necessary from some cause quite apart from itself; and should this be either an efficient or a moving cause, then it brings about the necessity of compulsion; as, for instance, when a man cannot get away owing to the violence of someone else holding him. But if the external factor which induces necessity be an end, then it will be said to be necessary from presupposing such end—namely, when some particular end cannot exist at all, or not conveniently, except such end be presupposed. It was not necessary, then, for Christ to suffer from necessity of compulsion, either on God’s part, who ruled that Christ should suffer, or on Christ’s own part, who suffered voluntarily. Yet it was necessary from necessity of the end proposed; and this can be accepted in three ways. First of all, on our part, who have been delivered by His Passion, according to John (3:14): The Son of man must be lifted up, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting. Second, on Christ’s part, who merited the glory of being exalted, through the lowliness of His Passion: and to this must be referred Luke 24:26: Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and so to enter into His glory? Third, on God’s part, whose determination regarding the Passion of Christ, foretold in the Scriptures and prefigured in the observances of the Old Testament, had to be fulfilled. And this is what St. Luke says (22:22): The Son of man indeed goeth, according to that which is determined; and (Luke 24:44, 46): These are the words which I spoke to

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Passion of Christ

Q. 46, A. 2

quoniam scriptum est quoniam oportebat Christum pati you while I was yet with you, that all things must needs be et resurgere a mortuis. fulfilled which are written in the law of Moses, and in the prophets, and in the psalms concerning Me: for it is thus written, and thus it behooved Christ to suffer, and to rise again from the dead. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit Reply Obj. 1: This argument is based on the necessity de necessitate coactionis ex parte Dei. of compulsion on God’s part. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de Reply Obj. 2: This argument rests on the necessity of necessitate coactionis ex parte hominis Christi. compulsion on the part of the man Christ. Ad tertium dicendum quod hominem liberari per Reply Obj. 3: That man should be delivered by Christ’s passionem Christi, conveniens fuit et misericordiae et Passion was in keeping with both His mercy and His justice. iustitiae eius. Iustitiae quidem, quia per passionem suam With His justice, because by His Passion Christ made satChristus satisfecit pro peccato humani generis, et ita ho- isfaction for the sin of the human race; and so man was set mo per iustitiam Christi liberatus est. Misericordiae ve- free by Christ’s justice: and with His mercy, for since man of ro, quia, cum homo per se satisfacere non posset pro himself could not satisfy for the sin of all human nature, as peccato totius humanae naturae, ut supra habitum est, was said above (Q. 1, A. 2), God gave him His Son to satisfy Deus ei satisfactorem dedit filium suum, secundum illud for him, according to Rom. 3:24, 25: Being justified freely Rom. III, iustificati gratis per gratiam ipsius, per redemp- by His grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, tionem quae est in Christo Iesu, quem proposuit Deus whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith propitiatorem per fidem ipsius. Et hoc fuit abundantio- in His blood. And this came of more copious mercy than if ris misericordiae quam si peccata absque satisfactione He had forgiven sins without satisfaction. Hence it is said dimisisset. Unde dicitur Ephes. II, Deus, qui dives est in (Eph 2:4): God, who is rich in mercy, for His exceeding charmisericordia, propter nimiam caritatem qua dilexit nos, ity wherewith He loved us, even when we were dead in sins, cum essemus mortui peccatis, convivificavit nos in Chri- hath quickened us together in Christ. sto. Ad quartum dicendum quod peccatum Angeli non Reply Obj. 4: The sin of the angels was irreparable; not fuit remediabile, sicut peccatum hominis, ut ex supra so the sin of the first man (I, Q. 64, A. 2). dictis in prima parte patet.

Article 2 Whether there was any other possible way of human deliverance besides the Passion of Christ? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuit possibilis alius modus liberationis humanae naturae quam per passionem Christi. Dixit enim dominus, Ioan. XII, nisi granum frumenti cadens in terram mortuum fuerit, ipsum solum manet, si autem mortuum fuerit, multum fructum affert, ubi dicit Augustinus quod seipsum granum dicebat. Nisi ergo mortem passus esset, aliter fructum nostrae liberationis non fecisset. Praeterea, Matth. XXVI dominus dicit ad patrem, pater mi, si non potest iste calix transire nisi bibam illum, fiat voluntas tua. Loquitur autem ibi de calice passionis. Ergo passio Christi praeterire non poterat. Unde et Hilarius dicit, ideo calix transire non potest nisi illum bibat, quia reparari nisi ex eius passione non possumus. Praeterea, iustitia Dei exigebat ut homo a peccato liberaretur, Christo per passionem suam satisfaciente. Sed Christus suam iustitiam praeterire non potest. Dici-

Objection 1: It would seem that there was no other possible way of human deliverance besides Christ’s Passion. For our Lord says (John 12:24): Amen, amen I say to you, unless the grain of wheat falling into the ground dieth, itself remaineth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit. Upon this St. Augustine (Tract. li) observes that Christ called Himself the seed. Consequently, unless He suffered death, He would not otherwise have produced the fruit of our redemption. Obj. 2: Further, our Lord addresses the Father (Matt 26:42): My Father, if this chalice may not pass away but I must drink it, Thy will be done. But He spoke there of the chalice of the Passion. Therefore Christ’s Passion could not pass away; hence Hilary says (Comm. 31 in Matth.): Therefore the chalice cannot pass except He drink of it, because we cannot be restored except through His Passion. Obj. 3: Further, God’s justice required that Christ should satisfy by the Passion in order that man might be delivered from sin. But Christ cannot let His justice pass;

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tur enim II ad Tim. II, si non credimus, ille fidelis permanet, negare seipsum non potest. Seipsum autem negaret si iustitiam suam negaret, cum ipse sit iustitia. Ergo videtur quod non fuerit possibile alio modo hominem liberari quam per passionem Christi. Praeterea, fidei non potest subesse falsum. Sed antiqui patres crediderunt Christum passurum. Ergo videtur quod non potuerit esse quin Christus pateretur. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., istum modum quo nos per mediatorem Dei et hominum, hominem Christum Iesum, Deus liberare dignatur, asserimus bonum et divinae dignitati congruum, verum etiam ostendamus alium modum possibilem Deo fuisse, cuius potestati cuncta aequaliter subiacent. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid potest dici possibile vel impossibile dupliciter, uno modo, simpliciter et absolute; alio modo, ex suppositione. Simpliciter igitur et absolute loquendo, possibile fuit Deo alio modo hominem liberare quam per passionem Christi, quia non est impossibile apud Deum omne verbum, ut dicitur Luc. I. Sed ex aliqua suppositione facta, fuit impossibile. Quia enim impossibile est Dei praescientiam falli et eius voluntatem sive dispositionem cassari, supposita praescientia et praeordinatione Dei de passione Christi, non erat simul possibile Christum non pati, et hominem alio modo quam per eius passionem liberari. Et est eadem ratio de omnibus his quae sunt praescita et praeordinata a Deo, ut in prima parte habitum est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus ibi loquitur supposita praescientia et praeordinatione Dei, secundum quam erat ordinatum ut fructus humanae salutis non sequeretur nisi Christo patiente. Et similiter intelligendum est quod secundo obiicitur, si non potest hic calix transire nisi bibam illum, scilicet, propter hoc quod et tu ita disposuisti. Unde subdit, fiat voluntas tua. Ad tertium dicendum quod haec etiam iustitia dependet ex voluntate divina ab humano genere satisfactionem pro peccato exigente. Alioquin, si voluisset absque omni satisfactione hominem a peccato liberare, contra iustitiam non fecisset. Ille enim iudex non potest, salva iustitia, culpam sive poenam dimittere, qui habet punire culpam in alium commissam, puta vel in alium hominem, vel in totam rempublicam, sive in superiorem principem. Sed Deus non habet aliquem superiorem, sed ipse est supremum et commune bonum totius universi. Et ideo, si dimittat peccatum, quod habet rationem culpae ex eo quod contra ipsum committitur, nulli facit iniuriam, sicut quicumque homo remittit offensam in se commissam absque satisfactione, misericorditer, et

IIIae

for it is written (2 Tim 2:13): If we believe not, He continueth faithful, He cannot deny Himself. But He would deny Himself were He to deny His justice, since He is justice itself. It seems impossible, then, for man to be delivered otherwise than by Christ’s Passion. Obj. 4: Further, there can be no falsehood underlying faith. But the Fathers of old believed that Christ would suffer. Consequently, it seems that it had to be that Christ should suffer. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): We assert that the way whereby God deigned to deliver us by the man Jesus Christ, who is mediator between God and man, is both good and befitting the Divine dignity; but let us also show that other possible means were not lacking on God’s part, to whose power all things are equally subordinate. I answer that, A thing may be said to be possible or impossible in two ways: first of all, simply and absolutely; or second, from supposition. Therefore, speaking simply and absolutely, it was possible for God to deliver mankind otherwise than by the Passion of Christ, because no word shall be impossible with God (Luke 1:37). Yet it was impossible if some supposition be made. For since it is impossible for God’s foreknowledge to be deceived and His will or ordinance to be frustrated, then, supposing God’s foreknowledge and ordinance regarding Christ’s Passion, it was not possible at the same time for Christ not to suffer, and for mankind to be delivered otherwise than by Christ’s Passion. And the same holds good of all things foreknown and preordained by God, as was laid down in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 13). Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord is speaking there presupposing God’s foreknowledge and predetermination, according to which it was resolved that the fruit of man’s salvation should not follow unless Christ suffered. Reply Obj. 2: In the same way we must understand what is here objected to in the second instance: If this chalice may not pass away but I must drink of it—that is to say, because Thou hast so ordained it—hence He adds: Thy will be done. Reply Obj. 3: Even this justice depends on the Divine will, requiring satisfaction for sin from the human race. But if He had willed to free man from sin without any satisfaction, He would not have acted against justice. For a judge, while preserving justice, cannot pardon fault without penalty, if he must visit fault committed against another— for instance, against another man, or against the State, or any Prince in higher authority. But God has no one higher than Himself, for He is the sovereign and common good of the whole universe. Consequently, if He forgive sin, which has the formality of fault in that it is committed against Himself, He wrongs no one: just as anyone else, overlooking a personal trespass, without satisfaction, acts mercifully and not unjustly. And so David exclaimed when he sought

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non iniuste agit. Et ideo David, misericordiam petens, dicebat, tibi soli peccavi, quasi dicat, potes sine iniustitia mihi dimittere. Ad quartum dicendum quod fides humana, et etiam Scripturae divinae, quibus fides instruitur, innituntur praescientiae et ordinationi divinae. Et ideo eadem ratio est de necessitate quae provenit ex suppositione eorum, et de necessitate quae provenit ex praescientia et voluntate divina.

Q. 46, A. 3

mercy: To Thee only have I sinned (Ps 50:6), as if to say: Thou canst pardon me without injustice. Reply Obj. 4: Human faith, and even the Divine Scriptures upon which faith is based, are both based on the Divine foreknowledge and ordinance. And the same reason holds good of that necessity which comes of supposition, and of the necessity which arises of the Divine foreknowledge and will.

Article 3 Whether there was any more suitable way of delivering the human race than by Christ’s Passion? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod alius modus convenientior fuisset liberationis humanae quam per passionem Christi. Natura enim in sua operatione imitatur opus divinum, utpote a Deo mota et regulata. Sed natura non facit per duo quod per unum potest facere. Cum ergo Deus potuerit hominem liberare sola propria voluntate, non videtur conveniens fuisse quod ad liberationem humani generis Christi passio adderetur. Praeterea, ea quae fiunt per naturam, convenientius fiunt quam ea quae per violentiam fiunt, quia violentum est quaedam excisio, seu casus, ab eo quod est secundum naturam, ut dicitur in libro de caelo. Sed passio Christi mortem violentam induxit. Ergo convenientius fuisset quod Christus naturali morte moriendo hominem liberaret, quam quod pateretur. Praeterea, convenientissimum videtur quod ille qui violenter et iniuste detinet, per superioris potentiam spolietur, unde et Isaiae LII dicitur, gratis venundati estis, et sine argento redimemini. Sed Diabolus nullum ius in homine habebat, quem per fraudem deceperat, et per quandam violentiam servituti subiectum detinebat. Ergo videtur convenientissimum fuisse quod Christus Diabolum per solam potentiam spoliaret, absque sua passione. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., sanandae nostrae miseriae convenientior modus alius non fuit quam per Christi passionem. Respondeo dicendum quod tanto aliquis modus convenientior est ad assequendum finem, quanto per ipsum plura concurrunt quae sunt expedientia fini. Per hoc autem quod homo per Christi passionem est liberatus, multa occurrerunt ad salutem hominis pertinentia, praeter liberationem a peccato. Primo enim, per hoc homo cognoscit quantum Deus hominem diligat, et per hoc provocatur ad eum diligendum, in quo perfectio humanae salutis consistit. Unde apostolus dicit, Rom. V, commendat suam caritatem Deus in nobis, quoniam, cum

Objection 1: It would seem that there was some other more suitable way of delivering the human race besides Christ’s Passion. For nature in its operation imitates the Divine work, since it is moved and regulated by God. But nature never employs two agents where one will suffice. Therefore, since God could have liberated mankind solely by His Divine will, it does not seem fitting that Christ’s Passion should have been added for the deliverance of the human race. Obj. 2: Further, natural actions are more suitably performed than deeds of violence, because violence is a severance or lapse from what is according to nature, as is said in De Coelo ii. But Christ’s Passion brought about His death by violence. Therefore it would have been more appropriate had Christ died a natural death rather than suffer for man’s deliverance. Obj. 3: Further, it seems most fitting that whatsoever keeps something unjustly and by violence, should be deprived of it by some superior power; hence Isaias says (52:3): You were sold gratis, and you shall be redeemed without money. But the devil possessed no right over man, whom he had deceived by guile, and whom he held subject in servitude by a sort of violence. Therefore it seems most suitable that Christ should have despoiled the devil solely by His power and without the Passion. On the contrary, St. Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): There was no other more suitable way of healing our misery than by the Passion of Christ. I answer that, Among means to an end that one is the more suitable whereby the various concurring means employed are themselves helpful to such end. But in this that man was delivered by Christ’s Passion, many other things besides deliverance from sin concurred for man’s salvation. In the first place, man knows thereby how much God loves him, and is thereby stirred to love Him in return, and herein lies the perfection of human salvation; hence the Apostle says (Rom 5:8): God commendeth His charity towards us; for when as yet we were sinners . . . Christ died for

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inimici essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est. Secundo, quia per hoc dedit nobis exemplum obedientiae, humilitatis, constantiae, iustitiae, et ceterarum virtutum in passione Christi ostensarum, quae sunt necessariae ad humanam salutem. Unde dicitur I Pet. II, Christus passus est pro nobis, nobis relinquens exemplum, ut sequamur vestigia eius. Tertio, quia Christus per passionem suam non solum hominem a peccato liberavit, sed etiam gratiam iustificantem et gloriam beatitudinis ei promeruit, ut infra dicetur. Quarto, quia per hoc est homini indicta maior necessitas se immunem a peccato conservandi, secundum illud I Cor. VI, empti estis pretio magno, glorificate et portate Deum in corpore vestro. Quinto, quia hoc ad maiorem dignitatem cessit, ut, sicut homo victus fuerat et deceptus a Diabolo, ita etiam homo esset qui Diabolum vinceret; et sicut homo mortem meruit, ita homo moriendo mortem superaret; ut dicitur I Cor. XV, Deo gratias, qui dedit nobis victoriam per Iesum Christum. Et ideo convenientius fuit quod per passionem Christi liberaremur, quam per solam Dei voluntatem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod natura etiam, ut aliquid convenientius faciat, plura ad unum assumit, sicut duos oculos ad videndum. Et idem patet in aliis. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, Christus non sui mortem, quam non habebat, cum sit vita, sed hominum mortem venerat consumpturus. Unde non propria morte corpus deposuit, sed ab hominibus illatam sustinuit. Sed et, si aegrotavisset corpus eius et in conspectu omnium solveretur, inconveniens erat eum qui aliorum languores sanaret, habere proprium corpus affectum languoribus. Sed et, si absque aliquo morbo seorsum alicubi corpus deposuisset ac deinde se offerret, non crederetur ei de resurrectione disserenti. Quomodo enim pateret Christi in morte victoria, nisi, coram omnibus eam patiens, per incorruptionem corporis probasset extinctam?

Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet Diabolus iniuste invaserit hominem, tamen homo propter peccatum iuste erat sub servitute Diaboli derelictus a Deo. Et ideo conveniens fuit ut per iustitiam homo a servitute Diaboli liberaretur, Christo satisfaciente pro ipso per suam passionem. Fuit etiam hoc conveniens ad vincendam superbiam Diaboli, qui est desertor iustitiae et amator potentiae, ut Christus Diabolum vinceret et hominem liberaret, non per solam potentiam divinitatis, sed etiam per iustitiam et humilitatem passionis, ut Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trinitate.

IIIae

us. Second, because thereby He set us an example of obedience, humility, constancy, justice, and the other virtues displayed in the Passion, which are requisite for man’s salvation. Hence it is written (1 Pet 2:21): Christ also suffered for us, leaving you an example that you should follow in His steps. Third, because Christ by His Passion not only delivered man from sin, but also merited justifying grace for him and the glory of bliss, as shall be shown later (Q. 48, A. 1; Q. 49, AA. 1, 5). Fourth, because by this man is all the more bound to refrain from sin, according to 1 Cor. 6:20: You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God in your body. Fifth, because it redounded to man’s greater dignity, that as man was overcome and deceived by the devil, so also it should be a man that should overthrow the devil; and as man deserved death, so a man by dying should vanquish death. Hence it is written (1 Cor 15:57): Thanks be to God who hath given us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ. It was accordingly more fitting that we should be delivered by Christ’s Passion than simply by God’s good-will. Reply Obj. 1: Even nature uses several means to one intent, in order to do something more fittingly: as two eyes for seeing; and the same can be observed in other matters. Reply Obj. 2: As Chrysostom says: Christ had come in order to destroy death, not His own, (for since He is life itself, death could not be His), but men’s death. Hence it was not by reason of His being bound to die that He laid His body aside, but because the death He endured was inflicted on Him by men. But even if His body had sickened and dissolved in the sight of all men, it was not befitting Him who healed the infirmities of others to have his own body afflicted with the same. And even had He laid His body aside without any sickness, and had then appeared, men would not have believed Him when He spoke of His resurrection. For how could Christ’s victory over death appear, unless He endured it in the sight of all men, and so proved that death was vanquished by the incorruption of His body? Reply Obj. 3: Although the devil assailed man unjustly, nevertheless, on account of sin, man was justly left by God under the devil’s bondage. And therefore it was fitting that through justice man should be delivered from the devil’s bondage by Christ making satisfaction on his behalf in the Passion. This was also a fitting means of overthrowing the pride of the devil, who is a deserter from justice, and covetous of sway; in that Christ should vanquish him and deliver man, not merely by the power of His Godhead, but likewise by the justice and lowliness of the Passion, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii).

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Q. 46, A. 4

Article 4 Whether Christ ought to have suffered on the cross? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non debuerit pati in cruce. Veritas enim debet respondere figurae. Sed in figuram Christi praecesserunt omnia sacrificia veteris testamenti, in quibus animalia gladio necabantur, et postmodum igni cremabantur. Ergo videtur quod Christus non debuerit pati in cruce, sed magis gladio vel igne. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit quod Christus non debuit assumere detractibiles passiones. Sed mors crucis videtur maxime detractibilis et ignominiosa, unde dicitur Sap. II, morte turpissima condemnemus eum. Ergo videtur quod Christus non debuit pati mortem crucis. Praeterea, de Christo dicitur, benedictus qui venit in nomine domini, ut patet Matth. XXI. Sed mors crucis erat mors maledictionis, secundum illud Deut. XXI, maledictus a Deo est qui pendet in ligno. Ergo videtur quod non fuit conveniens Christum crucifigi. Sed contra est quod dicitur Philipp. II, factus est obediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis. Respondeo dicendum quod convenientissimum fuit Christum pati mortem crucis. Primo quidem, propter exemplum virtutis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octogintatrium quaest., sapientia Dei hominem, ad exemplum quo recte viveremus, suscepit. Pertinet autem ad vitam rectam ea quae non sunt metuenda, non metuere. Sunt autem homines qui, quamvis mortem ipsam non timeant, genus tamen mortis horrescunt. Ut ergo nullum genus mortis recte viventi homini metuendum esset, illius hominis cruce ostendendum fuit, nihil enim erat, inter omnia genera mortis, illo genere execrabilius et formidabilius. Secundo, quia hoc genus mortis maxime conveniens erat satisfactioni pro peccato primi parentis, quod fuit ex eo quod, contra mandatum Dei, pomum ligni vetiti sumpsit. Et ideo conveniens fuit quod Christus, ad satisfaciendum pro peccato illo, seipsum pateretur ligno affigi, quasi restituens quod Adam sustulerat, secundum illud Psalmi, quae non rapui, tunc exsolvebam. Unde Augustinus dicit, in quodam sermone de passione, contemsit Adam praeceptum, accipiens ex arbore, sed quidquid Adam perdidit, Christus in cruce invenit. Tertia ratio est quia, ut Chrysostomus dicit, in sermone de passione, in excelso ligno, et non sub tecto passus est, ut etiam ipsius aeris natura mundetur. Sed et ipsa terra simile beneficium sentiebat, decurrentis de latere sanguinis stillatione mundata. Et super illud Ioan. III, oportet exaltari filium hominis, exaltari audiens, suspensionem

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ ought not to have suffered on the cross. For the truth ought to conform to the figure. But in all the sacrifices of the Old Testament which prefigured Christ the beasts were slain with a sword and afterwards consumed by fire. Therefore it seems that Christ ought not to have suffered on a cross, but rather by the sword or by fire. Obj. 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that Christ ought not to assume dishonoring afflictions. But death on a cross was most dishonoring and ignominious; hence it is written (Wis 2:20): Let us condemn Him to a most shameful death. Therefore it seems that Christ ought not to have undergone the death of the cross. Obj. 3: Further, it was said of Christ (Matt 21:9): Blessed is He that cometh in the name of the Lord. But death upon the cross was a death of malediction, as we read Deut. 21:23: He is accursed of God that hangeth on a tree. Therefore it does not seem fitting for Christ to be crucified. On the contrary, It is written (Phil 2:8): He became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. I answer that, It was most fitting that Christ should suffer the death of the cross. First of all, as an example of virtue. For Augustine thus writes (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 25): God’s Wisdom became man to give us an example in righteousness of living. But it is part of righteous living not to stand in fear of things which ought not to be feared. Now there are some men who, although they do not fear death in itself, are yet troubled over the manner of their death. In order, then, that no kind of death should trouble an upright man, the cross of this Man had to be set before him, because, among all kinds of death, none was more execrable, more fear-inspiring, than this. Second, because this kind of death was especially suitable in order to atone for the sin of our first parent, which was the plucking of the apple from the forbidden tree against God’s command. And so, to atone for that sin, it was fitting that Christ should suffer by being fastened to a tree, as if restoring what Adam had purloined; according to Ps. 68:5: Then did I pay that which I took not away. Hence Augustine says in a sermon on the Passion: Adam despised the command, plucking the apple from the tree: but all that Adam lost, Christ found upon the cross. The third reason is because, as Chrysostom says in a sermon on the Passion (De Cruce et Latrone i, ii): He suffered upon a high rood and not under a roof, in order that the nature of the air might be purified: and the earth felt a like benefit, for it was cleansed by the flowing of the blood from His side. And on John 3:14: The Son of man must be lifted up,

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IIIae

intelligas in altum, ut sanctificaret aerem qui sanctificave- Theophylact says: When you hear that He was lifted up, unrat terram ambulando in ea. derstand His hanging on high, that He might sanctify the air who had sanctified the earth by walking upon it. Quarta ratio est quia, per hoc quod in ea moritur, The fourth reason is, because, by dying on it, He preascensum nobis parat in caelum, ut Chrysostomus dicit. pares for us an ascent into heaven, as Chrysostom says. Et inde est quod ipse dicit, Ioan. XII, ego, si exaltatus fue- Hence it is that He says (John 12:32): If I be lifted up from ro a terra, omnia traham ad meipsum. the earth, I will draw all things to Myself. Quinta ratio est quia hoc competit universali salvaThe fifth reason is because it is befitting the universal tioni totius mundi. Unde Gregorius Nyssenus dicit quod salvation of the entire world. Hence Gregory of Nyssa obfigura crucis, a medio contactu in quatuor extrema parti- serves (In Christ. Resurr., Orat. i) that the shape of the cross ta, significat virtutem et providentiam eius qui in ea pe- extending out into four extremes from their central point of pendit, ubique diffusam. Chrysostomus etiam dicit quod contact denotes the power and the providence diffused everyin cruce, expansis manibus, moritur, ut altera manu vete- where of Him who hung upon it. Chrysostom also says that rem populum, altera eos qui ex gentibus sunt, trahat. upon the cross He dies with outstretched hands in order to draw with one hand the people of old, and with the other those who spring from the Gentiles. Sexta ratio est quia per hoc genus mortis diversae virThe sixth reason is because of the various virtues detutes designantur. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de gra- noted by this class of death. Hence Augustine in his book tia Vet. et novi Test., non frustra tale genus mortis elegit, on the grace of the Old and New Testament (Ep. cxl) says: ut latitudinis et altitudinis et longitudinis et profundita- Not without purpose did He choose this class of death, that He tis, de quibus apostolus loquitur, magister existeret. Nam might be a teacher of that breadth, and height, and length, latitudo est in eo ligno quod transversum desuper figitur; and depth, of which the Apostle speaks (Eph 3:18): For hoc ad bona opera pertinet, quia ibi extenduntur manus. breadth is in the beam, which is fixed transversely above; Longitudo in eo quod ab ipso ligno usque ad terram con- this appertains to good works, since the hands are stretched spicuum est, ibi enim quodammodo statur, idest, persisti- out upon it. Length is the tree’s extent from the beam to tur et perseveratur; quod longanimitati tribuitur. Altitudo the ground; and there it is planted—that is, it stands and est in ea ligni parte quae ab illa quae transversa figitur, abides—which is the note of longanimity. Height is in that sursum versus relinquitur, hoc est, ad caput crucifixi, quia portion of the tree which remains over from the transverse bene sperantium superna expectatio est. Iam vero illud ex beam upwards to the top, and this is at the head of the Cruligno quod fixum occultatur, unde totum illud exurgit, si- cified, because He is the supreme desire of souls of good hope. gnificat profunditatem gratuitae gratiae. Et, sicut Augu- But that part of the tree which is hidden from view to hold stinus dicit, super Ioan., lignum in quo fixa erant membra it fixed, and from which the entire rood springs, denotes the patientis, etiam cathedra fuit magistri docentis. depth of gratuitous grace. And, as Augustine says (Tract. cxix in Joan.): The tree upon which were fixed the members of Him dying was even the chair of the Master teaching. Septima ratio est quia hoc genus mortis plurimis fiThe seventh reason is because this kind of death reguris respondet. Ut enim Augustinus dicit, in sermone sponds to very many figures. For, as Augustine says in a serde passione, de diluvio aquarum humanum genus arca mon on the Passion (Serm. ci De Tempore), an ark of wood lignea liberavit; de Aegypto Dei populo recedente, Moy- preserved the human race from the waters of the Deluge; at ses mare virga divisit, et Pharaonem prostravit, et popu- the exodus of God’s people from Egypt, Moses with a rod lum Dei redemit; idem Moyses lignum in aquam misit divided the sea, overthrew Pharaoh and saved the people of et amaram aquam in dulcedinem commutavit; ex lignea God; the same Moses dipped his rod into the water, changvirga de spirituali petra salutaris unda profertur; et, ut ing it from bitter to sweet; at the touch of a wooden rod Amalec vinceretur, contra virgam Moyses expansis ma- a salutary spring gushed forth from a spiritual rock; likenibus extenditur; et lex Dei arcae testamenti creditur li- wise, in order to overcome Amalec, Moses stretched forth gneae; ut his omnibus ad lignum crucis, quasi per quo- his arms with rod in hand; lastly, God’s law is entrusted to sdam gradus, veniatur. the wooden Ark of the Covenant; all of which are like steps by which we mount to the wood of the cross. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod altare holocaustoReply Obj. 1: The altar of holocausts, upon which the rum, in quo sacrificia animalium offerebantur, erat fac- sacrifices of animals were immolated, was constructed of tum de lignis, ut habetur Exod. XXVII, et quantum ad timbers, as is set forth Ex. 27; and in this respect the truth hoc veritas respondet figurae. Non autem oportet quod answers to the figure; but it is not necessary for it to be quantum, ad omnia, quia iam non esset similitudo, sed ve- likened in every respect, otherwise it would not be a likeness, ritas, ut Damascenus dicit, in III libro. Specialiter tamen, but the reality, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii). But,

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ut Chrysostomus dicit, non caput ei amputatur, ut Ioanni; neque sectus est, ut Isaias, ut corpus integrum et indivisibile morti servet, et non fiat occasio volentibus Ecclesiam dividere. Loco autem materialis ignis, fuit in holocausto Christi ignis caritatis. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus detractibiles passiones assumere renuit quae pertinebant ad defectum scientiae vel gratiae, aut etiam virtutis. Non autem illas quae pertinent ad iniuriam ab exteriori illatam, quinimmo, ut dicitur Heb. XII, sustinuit crucem confusione contempta. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIV contra Faustum, peccatum maledictum est et per consequens mors et mortalitas ex peccato proveniens, caro autem Christi mortalis fuit, similitudinem habens carnis peccati. Et propter hoc Moyses eam nominat maledictum, sicut et apostolus nominat eam peccatum, dicens, II Cor. V, eum qui non noverat peccatum, pro nobis peccatum fecit, scilicet per poenam peccati. Nec ideo maior invidia est, quia dixit, maledictus est a Deo. Nisi enim Deus peccatum odisset, non ad eam suscipiendam atque tollendam filium suum mitteret. Confitere ergo maledictum suscepisse pro nobis, quem confiteris mortuum esse pro nobis. Unde et Galat. III dicitur, Christus nos redemit de maledicto legis, factus pro nobis maledictum.

Q. 46, A. 5

in particular, as Chrysostom says: His head is not cut off, as was done to John; nor was He sawn in twain, like Isaias, in order that His entire and indivisible body might obey death, and that there might be no excuse for them who want to divide the Church. While, instead of material fire, there was the spiritual fire of charity in Christ’s holocaust. Reply Obj. 2: Christ refused to undergo dishonorable sufferings which are allied with defects of knowledge, or of grace, or even of virtue, but not those injuries inflicted from without—nay, more, as is written Heb. 12:2: He endured the cross, despising the shame. Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xiv), sin is accursed, and, consequently, so is death, and mortality, which comes of sin. But Christ’s flesh was mortal, ‘having the resemblance of the flesh of sin’; and hence Moses calls it accursed, just as the Apostle calls it sin, saying (2 Cor 5:21): Him that knew no sin, for us He hath made sin—namely, because of the penalty of sin. Nor is there greater ignominy on that account, because he said: ‘He is accursed of God.’ For, unless God had hated sin, He would never have sent His Son to take upon Himself our death, and to destroy it. Acknowledge, then, that it was for us He took the curse upon Himself, whom you confess to have died for us. Hence it is written (Gal 3:13): Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us.

Article 5 Whether Christ endured all sufferings? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus omnes passiones sustinuerit. Dicit enim Hilarius, in X de Trin., unigenitus Dei, ad peragendum mortis suae sacramentum, consummasse in se omne humanarum genus passionum testatur, cum, inclinato capite, emisit spiritum. Videtur ergo quod omnes passiones humanas sustinuerit. Praeterea, Isaiae LII dicitur, ecce, intelliget servus meus, et exaltabitur, et elevabitur, et sublimis erit valde. Sicut obstupuerunt super eum multi, sic inglorius erit inter viros aspectus eius, et forma eius inter filios hominum. Sed Christus est exaltatus secundum hoc quod habuit omnem gratiam et omnem scientiam, pro quo super eo multi admirantes obstupuerunt. Ergo videtur quod inglorius fuerit sustinendo omnem passionem humanam. Praeterea, passio Christi ordinata est ad liberationem hominis a peccato, ut supra dictum est. Sed Christus venit liberare homines ab omni peccatorum genere. Ergo debuit pati omne genus passionum. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. XIX, quod milites primi quidem fregerunt crura et alterius qui crucifixus

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did endure all sufferings, because Hilary (De Trin. x) says: God’s onlybegotten Son testifies that He endured every kind of human sufferings in order to accomplish the sacrament of His death, when with bowed head He gave up the ghost. It seems, therefore, that He did endure all human sufferings. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Isa 52:13): Behold My servant shall understand, He shall be exalted and extolled, and shall be exceeding high; as many as have been astonished at Him, so shall His visage be inglorious among men, and His form among the sons of men. But Christ was exalted in that He had all grace and all knowledge, at which many were astonished in admiration thereof. Therefore it seems that He was inglorious, by enduring every human suffering. Obj. 3: Further, Christ’s Passion was ordained for man’s deliverance from sin, as stated above (A. 3). But Christ came to deliver men from every kind of sin. Therefore He ought to have endured every kind of suffering. On the contrary, It is written (John 19:32): The soldiers therefore came: and they broke the legs of the first, and

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est cum eo, ad Iesum autem cum venissent, non fregerunt of the other who was crucified with Him; but after they were eius crura. Non ergo passus est omnem humanam pas- come to Jesus, when they saw that He was already dead, they sionem. did not break His legs. Consequently, He did not endure every human suffering. Respondeo dicendum quod passiones humanae I answer that, Human sufferings may be considered possunt considerari dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad under two aspects. First of all, specifically, and in this way speciem. Et sic non oportuit Christum omnem huma- it was not necessary for Christ to endure them all, since nam passionem pati, quia multae passionum species si- many are mutually exclusive, as burning and drowning; for bi invicem contrariantur, sicut combustio in igne et sub- we are dealing now with sufferings inflicted from without, mersio in aqua. Loquimur enim nunc de passionibus ab since it was not beseeming for Him to endure those arisextrinseco illatis, quia passiones ab intrinseco causatas, ing from within, such as bodily ailments, as already stated sicut sunt aegritudines corporales, non decuit eum pati, (Q. 14, A. 4). But, speaking generically, He did endure evut supra dictum est. Sed secundum genus, passus est om- ery human suffering. This admits of a threefold acceptance. nem passionem humanam. Quod quidem potest consi- First of all, on the part of men: for He endured something derari tripliciter. Uno modo, ex parte hominum. Passus from Gentiles and from Jews; from men and from women, est enim aliquid et a gentilibus, et a Iudaeis; a masculis et as is clear from the women servants who accused Peter. He feminis, ut patet de ancillis accusantibus Petrum. Passus suffered from the rulers, from their servants and from the est etiam a principibus, et a ministris eorum, et popula- mob, according to Ps. 2:1, 2: Why have the Gentiles raged, ribus, secundum illud Psalmi, quare fremuerunt gentes, and the people devised vain things? The kings of the earth et populi meditati sunt inania? Astiterunt reges terrae, et stood up, and the princes met together, against the Lord and principes convenerunt in unum, adversus dominum et ad- against His Christ. He suffered from friends and acquainversus Christum eius. Passus est etiam a familiaribus et tances, as is manifest from Judas betraying and Peter denynotis, sicut patet de Iuda eum prodente, et Petro ipsum ing Him. negante. Alio modo patet idem ex parte eorum in quibus hoSecond, the same is evident on the part of the sufferings mo potest pati. Passus est enim Christus in suis amicis which a man can endure. For Christ suffered from friends eum deserentibus; in fama per blasphemias contra eum abandoning Him; in His reputation, from the blasphemies dictas; in honore et gloria per irrisiones et contumelias hurled at Him; in His honor and glory, from the mockeries ei illatas; in rebus per hoc quod etiam vestibus spoliatus and the insults heaped upon Him; in things, for He was deest; in anima per tristitiam, taedium et timorem; in cor- spoiled of His garments; in His soul, from sadness, wearipore per vulnera et flagella. ness, and fear; in His body, from wounds and scourgings. Tertio potest considerari quantum ad corporis memThird, it may be considered with regard to His bodily bra. Passus est enim Christus in capite pungentium members. In His head He suffered from the crown of piercspinarum coronam; in manibus et pedibus fixionem ing thorns; in His hands and feet, from the fastening of the clavorum; in facie alapas et sputa; et in toto corpo- nails; on His face from the blows and spittle; and from the re flagella. Fuit etiam passus secundum omnem sen- lashes over His entire body. Moreover, He suffered in all sum corporeum, secundum tactum quidem, flagellatus His bodily senses: in touch, by being scourged and nailed; et clavis confixus; secundum gustum, felle et aceto po- in taste, by being given vinegar and gall to drink; in smell, tatus; secundum olfactum, in loco fetido cadaverum by being fastened to the gibbet in a place reeking with the mortuorum, qui dicitur Calvariae, appensus patibulo; stench of corpses, which is called Calvary; in hearing, by besecundum auditum, lacessitus vocibus blasphemantium ing tormented with the cries of blasphemers and scorners; et irridentium; secundum visum, videns matrem et di- in sight, by beholding the tears of His Mother and of the scipulum quem diligebat flentes. disciple whom He loved. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum illud HiReply Obj. 1: Hilary’s words are to be understood as to larii est intelligendum quantum ad omnia genera passio- all classes of sufferings, but not as to their kinds. num, non autem quantum ad omnes species. Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo ibi attenReply Obj. 2: The likeness is sustained, not as to the ditur, non quantum ad numerum passionum et gratia- number of the sufferings and graces, but as to their greatrum, sed quantum ad magnitudinem utriusque, quia si- ness; for, as He was uplifted above others in gifts of graces, cut sublimatus est in donis gratiarum super alios, ita so was He lowered beneath others by the ignominy of His deiectus est infra alios per ignominiam passionis. sufferings. Ad tertium dicendum quod, secundum sufficienReply Obj. 3: The very least one of Christ’s sufferings tiam, una minima passio Christi suffecit ad redimendum was sufficient of itself to redeem the human race from all

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genus humanum ab omnibus peccatis. Sed secundum sins; but as to fittingness, it sufficed that He should endure convenientiam, sufficiens fuit quod pateretur omnia ge- all classes of sufferings, as stated above. nera passionum, sicut iam dictum est.

Article 6 Whether the pain of Christ’s Passion was greater than all other pains? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor passionis Christi non fuerit maior omnibus aliis doloribus. Dolor enim patientis augetur secundum gravitatem et diuturnitatem passionis. Sed quidam martyres graviores passiones et diuturniores sustinuerunt quam Christus, sicut patet de Laurentio, qui est assatus in craticula; et de Vincentio, cuius carnes sunt ungulis ferreis laceratae. Ergo videtur quod dolor Christi patientis non fuerit maximus. Praeterea, virtus mentis est mitigativa doloris, in tantum quod Stoici posuerunt tristitiam in animo sapientis non cadere. Et Aristoteles posuit quod virtus moralis medium tenet in passionibus. Sed in Christo fuit perfectissima virtus mentis. Ergo videtur quod in Christo fuerit minimus dolor. Praeterea, quanto aliquod patiens est magis sensibile, tanto maior sequitur dolor passionis. Sed anima est sensibilior quam corpus, cum corpus sentiat ex anima. Adam etiam in statu innocentiae videtur corpus sensibilius habuisse quam Christus, qui assumpsit corpus humanum cum naturalibus defectibus. Ergo videtur quod dolor animae patientis in Purgatorio vel in Inferno, vel etiam dolor Adae si passus fuisset, maior fuisset quam dolor passionis Christi. Praeterea, maioris boni amissio causat maiorem dolorem. Sed peccator peccando amittit maius bonum quam Christus patiendo, quia vita gratiae est melior quam vita naturae. Christus etiam, qui amisit vitam post triduum resurrecturus, minus aliquid videtur amisisse quam illi qui amittunt vitam permansuri in morte. Ergo videtur quod dolor Christi non fuerit maximus dolor. Praeterea, innocentia patientis diminuit dolorem passionis. Sed Christus innocenter est passus, secundum illud Ierem. XI, ego autem quasi agnus mansuetus qui portatur ad victimam. Ergo videtur quod dolor passionis Christi non fuerit maximus. Praeterea, in his quae Christi sunt, nihil fuit superfluum. Sed minimus dolor Christi suffecisset ad finem salutis humanae, habuisset enim infinitam virtutem ex persona divina. Ergo superfluum fuisset assumere maximum dolorem. Sed contra est quod habetur Thren. I ex persona Christi, attendite, et videte si est dolor sicut dolor meus.

Objection 1: It would seem that the pain of Christ’s Passion was not greater than all other pains. For the sufferer’s pain is increased by the sharpness and the duration of the suffering. But some of the martyrs endured sharper and more prolonged pains than Christ, as is seen in St. Lawrence, who was roasted upon a gridiron; and in St. Vincent, whose flesh was torn with iron pincers. Therefore it seems that the pain of the suffering Christ was not the greatest. Obj. 2: Further, strength of soul mitigates pain, so much so that the Stoics held there was no sadness in the soul of a wise man; and Aristotle (Ethic. ii) holds that moral virtue fixes the mean in the passions. But Christ had most perfect strength of soul. Therefore it seems that the greatest pain did not exist in Christ. Obj. 3: Further, the more sensitive the sufferer is, the more acute will the pain be. But the soul is more sensitive than the body, since the body feels in virtue of the soul; also, Adam in the state of innocence seems to have had a body more sensitive than Christ had, who assumed a human body with its natural defects. Consequently, it seems that the pain of a sufferer in purgatory, or in hell, or even Adam’s pain, if he suffered at all, was greater than Christ’s in the Passion. Obj. 4: Further, the greater the good lost, the greater the pain. But by sinning the sinner loses a greater good than Christ did when suffering; since the life of grace is greater than the life of nature: also, Christ, who lost His life, but was to rise again after three days, seems to have lost less than those who lose their lives and abide in death. Therefore it seems that Christ’s pain was not the greatest of all. Obj. 5: Further, the victim’s innocence lessens the sting of his sufferings. But Christ died innocent, according to Jer. 9:19: I was as a meek lamb, that is carried to be a victim. Therefore it seems that the pain of Christ’s Passion was not the greatest. Obj. 6: Further, there was nothing superfluous in Christ’s conduct. But the slightest pain would have sufficed to secure man’s salvation, because from His Divine Person it would have had infinite virtue. Therefore it would have been superfluous to choose the greatest of all pains. On the contrary, It is written (Lam 1:12) on behalf of Christ’s Person: O all ye that pass by the way attend, and see if there be any sorrow like unto My sorrow.

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Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est cum de defectibus assumptis a Christo ageretur, in Christo patiente fuit verus dolor et sensibilis, qui causatur ex corporali nocivo; et dolor interior, qui causatur ex apprehensione alicuius nocivi, qui tristitia dicitur. Uterque autem dolor in Christo fuit maximus inter dolores praesentis vitae. Quod quidem contingit propter quatuor. Primo quidem, propter causas doloris. Nam doloris sensibilis causa fuit laesio corporalis. Quae acerbitatem habuit, tum propter generalitatem passionis, de qua dictum est, tum etiam ex genere passionis. Quia mors confixorum in cruce est acerbissima, quia configuntur in locis nervosis et maxime sensibilibus, scilicet in manibus et pedibus; et ipsum pondus corporis pendentis continue auget dolorem; et cum hoc etiam est doloris diuturnitas, quia non statim moriuntur, sicut hi qui sunt gladio interfecti. Doloris autem interioris causa fuit, primo quidem, omnia peccata humani generis, pro quibus satisfaciebat patiendo, unde ea quasi sibi adscribit, dicens in Psalmo, verba delictorum meorum. Secundo, specialiter casus Iudaeorum et aliorum in eius mortem delinquentium, et praecipue discipulorum, qui scandalum passi fuerant in Christi passione. Tertio etiam amissio vitae corporalis, quae naturaliter est horribilis humanae naturae. Secundo potest magnitudo considerari ex perceptibilitate patientis. Nam et secundum corpus erat optime complexionatus, cum corpus eius fuerit formatum miraculose operatione spiritus sancti, sicut et alia quae per miracula facta sunt, sunt aliis potiora, ut Chrysostomus dicit de vino in quod Christus aquam convertit in nuptiis. Et ideo in eo maxime viguit sensus tactus, ex cuius perceptione sequitur dolor. Anima etiam, secundum vires interiores, efficacissime apprehendit omnes causas tristitiae.

Tertio magnitudo doloris Christi patientis potest considerari ex doloris puritate. Nam in aliis patientibus mitigatur tristitia interior, et etiam dolor exterior, ex aliqua consideratione rationis, per quandam derivationem seu redundantiam a superioribus viribus ad inferiores. Quod in Christo patiente non fuit, unicuique enim virium permisit agere quod est sibi proprium, sicut Damascenus dicit. Quarto potest considerari magnitudo doloris Christi patientis ex hoc quod passio illa et dolor a Christo fuerunt assumpta voluntarie, propter finem liberationis hominum a peccato. Et ideo tantam quantitatem doloris assumpsit quae esset proportionata magnitudini fructus qui inde sequebatur. Ex his igitur omnibus causis simul consideratis manifeste apparet quod dolor Christi fuit maximus.

IIIae

I answer that, As we have stated, when treating of the defects assumed by Christ (Q. 15, AA. 5, 6), there was true and sensible pain in the suffering Christ, which is caused by something hurtful to the body: also, there was internal pain, which is caused from the apprehension of something hurtful, and this is termed sadness. And in Christ each of these was the greatest in this present life. This arose from four causes. First of all, from the sources of His pain. For the cause of the sensitive pain was the wounding of His body; and this wounding had its bitterness, both from the extent of the suffering already mentioned (A. 5) and from the kind of suffering, since the death of the crucified is most bitter, because they are pierced in nervous and highly sensitive parts—to wit, the hands and feet; moreover, the weight of the suspended body intensifies the agony, and besides this there is the duration of the suffering because they do not die at once like those slain by the sword. The cause of the interior pain was, first of all, all the sins of the human race, for which He made satisfaction by suffering; hence He ascribes them, so to speak, to Himself, saying (Ps 21:2): The words of my sins. Second, especially the fall of the Jews and of the others who sinned in His death, chiefly of the apostles, who were scandalized at His Passion. Third, the loss of His bodily life, which is naturally horrible to human nature. The magnitude of His suffering may be considered, second, from the susceptibility of the sufferer as to both soul and body. For His body was endowed with a most perfect constitution, since it was fashioned miraculously by the operation of the Holy Spirit; just as some other things made by miracles are better than others, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xxii in Joan.) respecting the wine into which Christ changed the water at the wedding-feast. And, consequently, Christ’s sense of touch, the sensitiveness of which is the reason for our feeling pain, was most acute. His soul likewise, from its interior powers, apprehended most vehemently all the causes of sadness. Third, the magnitude of Christ’s suffering can be estimated from the singleness of His pain and sadness. In other sufferers the interior sadness is mitigated, and even the exterior suffering, from some consideration of reason, by some derivation or redundance from the higher powers into the lower; but it was not so with the suffering Christ, because He permitted each one of His powers to exercise its proper function, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii). Fourth, the magnitude of the pain of Christ’s suffering can be reckoned by this, that the pain and sorrow were accepted voluntarily, to the end of men’s deliverance from sin; and consequently He embraced the amount of pain proportionate to the magnitude of the fruit which resulted therefrom. From all these causes weighed together, it follows that Christ’s pain was the very greatest.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit ex uno tantum praedictorum, scilicet ex laesione corporali, quae est causa sensibilis doloris. Sed ex aliis causis multo magis dolor Christi patientis augetur, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus moralis aliter mitigat tristitiam interiorem, et aliter exteriorem dolorem sensibilem. Tristitiam enim interiorem diminuit directe, in ea medium constituendo sicut in propria materia. Medium autem in passionibus virtus moralis constituit, ut in secunda parte habitum est, non secundum quantitatem rei, sed secundum quantitatem proportionis, ut scilicet passio non excedat regulam rationis. Et quia Stoici reputabant quod nulla tristitia esset ad aliquid utilis, ideo credebant quod totaliter a ratione discordaret, et per consequens quod totaliter esset sapienti vitanda. Sed secundum rei veritatem, tristitia aliqua laudabilis est, ut Augustinus probat, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quando scilicet procedit ex sancto amore, ut puta cum aliquis tristatur de peccatis propriis vel alienis. Assumitur etiam ut utilis ad finem satisfactionis pro peccato, secundum illud II Cor. VII, quae secundum Deum est tristitia, poenitentiam in salutem stabilem operatur. Et ideo Christus, ut satisfaceret pro peccatis omnium hominum, assumpsit tristitiam maximam quantitate absoluta, non tamen excedentem regulam rationis. Dolorem autem exteriorem sensus virtus moralis directe non minuit, quia talis dolor non obedit rationi, sed sequitur corporis naturam. Diminuit tamen ipsum indirecte per redundantiam a superioribus viribus in inferiores. Quod in Christo non fuit, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod dolor animae separatae patientis pertinet ad statum futurae damnationis, qui excedit omne malum huius vitae, sicut sanctorum gloria excedit omne bonum praesentis vitae. Unde, cum diximus Christi dolorem esse maximum, non comparamus ipsum dolori animae separatae. Corpus autem Adae pati non poterat, nisi peccaret et sic fieret mortale et passibile. Et minus doleret patiens quam corpus Christi, propter rationes praedictas. Ex quibus etiam apparet quod etiam si, per impossibile, ponatur quod Adam in statu innocentiae passus fuisset, minor fuisset eius dolor quam Christi. Ad quartum dicendum quod Christus non solum doluit pro amissione vitae corporalis propriae, sed etiam pro peccatis omnium aliorum. Qui dolor in Christo excessit omnem dolorem cuiuslibet contriti. Tum quia ex maiori sapientia et caritate processit, ex quibus dolor contritionis augetur. Tum etiam quia pro omnium peccatis simul doluit, secundum illud Isaiae LIII, vere dolores nostros ipse tulit. Vita autem corporalis Christi fuit tantae dignitatis, et praecipue propter divinitatem unitam, quod de eius amissione etiam ad horam, magis esset dolendum quam de amissione alterius hominis per

Q. 46, A. 6

Reply Obj. 1: This argument follows from only one of the considerations adduced—namely, from the bodily injury, which is the cause of sensitive pain; but the torment of the suffering Christ is much more intensified from other causes, as above stated. Reply Obj. 2: Moral virtue lessens interior sadness in one way, and outward sensitive pain in quite another; for it lessens interior sadness directly by fixing the mean, as being its proper matter, within limits. But, as was laid down in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 64, A. 2), moral virtue fixes the mean in the passions, not according to mathematical quantity, but according to quantity of proportion, so that the passion shall not go beyond the rule of reason. And since the Stoics held all sadness to be unprofitable, they accordingly believed it to be altogether discordant with reason, and consequently to be shunned altogether by a wise man. But in very truth some sadness is praiseworthy, as Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei xiv)—namely, when it flows from holy love, as, for instance, when a man is saddened over his own or others’ sins. Furthermore, it is employed as a useful means of satisfying for sins, according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor 7:10): The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance, steadfast unto salvation. And so to atone for the sins of all men, Christ accepted sadness, the greatest in absolute quantity, yet not exceeding the rule of reason. But moral virtue does not lessen outward sensitive pain, because such pain is not subject to reason, but follows the nature of the body; yet it lessens it indirectly by redundance of the higher powers into the lower. But this did not happen in Christ’s case, as stated above (cf. Q. 14, A. 1, ad 2; Q. 45, A. 2). Reply Obj. 3: The pain of a suffering, separated soul belongs to the state of future condemnation, which exceeds every evil of this life, just as the glory of the saints surpasses every good of the present life. Accordingly, when we say that Christ’s pain was the greatest, we make no comparison between His and the pain of a separated soul. But Adam’s body could not suffer, except he sinned; so that he would become mortal, and passible. And, though actually suffering, it would have felt less pain than Christ’s body, for the reasons already stated. From all this it is clear that even if Adam had suffered in the state of innocence, his pain would have been less than Christ’s. Reply Obj. 4: Christ grieved not only over the loss of His own bodily life, but also over the sins of all others. And this grief in Christ surpassed all grief of every contrite heart, both because it flowed from a greater wisdom and charity, by which the pang of contrition is intensified, and because He grieved at the one time for all sins, according to Isa. 53:4: Surely He hath carried our sorrows. But such was the dignity of Christ’s life in the body, especially on account of the Godhead united with it, that its loss, even for one hour, would be a matter of greater grief than the loss of another man’s life for howsoever long a time. Hence the

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quantumcumque tempus. Unde et philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod virtuosus plus diligit vitam suam quanto scit eam esse meliorem, et tamen eam exponit propter bonum virtutis. Et similiter Christus vitam suam maxime dilectam exposuit propter bonum caritatis, secundum illud Ierem. XII, dedi dilectam animam meam in manibus inimicorum eius. Ad quintum dicendum quod innocentia patientis minuit dolorem passionis quantum ad numerum, quia, dum nocens patitur, dolet non solum de poena, sed etiam de culpa; innocens autem solum de poena. Qui tamen dolor in eo augetur ex innocentia, inquantum apprehendit nocumentum illatum ut magis indebitum. Unde etiam et alii magis sunt reprehensibiles si eis non compatiuntur, secundum illud Isaiae LVII, iustus autem perit, et non est qui recogitet in corde suo.

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Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that the man of virtue loves his life all the more in proportion as he knows it to be better; and yet he exposes it for virtue’s sake. And in like fashion Christ laid down His most beloved life for the good of charity, according to Jer. 12:7: I have given My dear soul into the hands of her enemies.

Reply Obj. 5: The sufferer’s innocence does lessen numerically the pain of the suffering, since, when a guilty man suffers, he grieves not merely on account of the penalty, but also because of the crime, whereas the innocent man grieves only for the penalty: yet this pain is more intensified by reason of his innocence, in so far as he deems the hurt inflicted to be the more undeserved. Hence it is that even others are more deserving of blame if they do not compassionate him, according to Isa. 57:1: The just perisheth, and no man layeth it to heart. Ad sextum dicendum quod Christus voluit genus Reply Obj. 6: Christ willed to deliver the human race humanum a peccatis liberare, non sola potestate, sed from sins not merely by His power, but also according to etiam iustitia. Et ideo non solum attendit quantam vir- justice. And therefore He did not simply weigh what great tutem dolor eius haberet ex divinitate unita, sed etiam virtue His suffering would have from union with the Godquantum dolor eius sufficeret secundum naturam hu- head, but also how much, according to His human nature, manam, ad tantam satisfactionem. His pain would avail for so great a satisfaction.

Article 7 Whether Christ suffered in his whole soul? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non fuerit passus secundum totam animam. Anima enim patitur, patiente corpore, per accidens, inquantum est corporis actus. Sed anima non est actus corporis secundum quamlibet partem eius, nam intellectus nullius corporis actus est, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo videtur quod Christus non fuerit passus secundum totam animam. Praeterea, quaelibet potentia animae patitur a suo obiecto. Sed superioris partis rationis obiectum sunt rationes aeternae, quibus inspiciendis et consulendis intendit, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin. Ex rationibus autem aeternis nullum potuit Christus pati nocumentum, cum in nullo ei contrariarentur. Ergo videtur quod non fuerit passus secundum totam animam. Praeterea, quando passio sensibilis usque ad rationem pertingit, tunc dicitur completa passio. Quae in Christo non fuit, ut Hieronymus dicit, sed solum propassio. Unde et Dionysius dicit, in epistola ad Ioannem Evangelistam, quod passiones sibi illatas patiebatur secundum iudicare solum. Non ergo videtur quod Christus secundum totam animam pateretur. Praeterea, passio dolorem causat. Sed in intellectu speculativo non est dolor, quia delectationi quae est ab

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not suffer in His whole soul. For the soul suffers indirectly when the body suffers, inasmuch as it is the act of the body. But the soul is not, as to its every part, the act of the body; because the intellect is the act of no body, as is said De Anima iii. Therefore it seems that Christ did not suffer in His whole soul. Obj. 2: Further, every power of the soul is passive in regard to its proper object. But the higher part of reason has for its object the eternal types, to the consideration and consultation of which it directs itself, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii). But Christ could suffer no hurt from the eternal types, since they are nowise opposed to Him. Therefore it seems that He did not suffer in His whole soul. Obj. 3: Further, a sensitive passion is said to be complete when it comes into contact with the reason. But there was none such in Christ, but only pro-passions; as Jerome remarks on Matt. 26:37. Hence Dionysius says in a letter to John the Evangelist that He endured only mentally the sufferings inflicted upon Him. Consequently it does not seem that Christ suffered in His whole soul. Obj. 4: Further, suffering causes pain: but there is no pain in the speculative intellect, because, as the Philosopher

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eo quod est considerare, nulla tristitia opponitur, ut philosophus dicit, I Topic. Ergo videtur quod Christus non pateretur secundum totam animam. Sed contra est quod in Psalmo dicitur, ex persona Christi, repleta est malis anima mea, Glossa, non vitiis, sed doloribus, quibus anima carni compatitur, vel malis, scilicet pereuntis populi, compatiendo. Non autem fuisset anima eius his malis repleta, si non secundum totam animam passus esset. Ergo Christus secundum totam animam passus est. Respondeo dicendum quod totum dicitur respectu partium. Partes autem animae dicuntur potentiae eius. Sic ergo dicitur anima tota pati, inquantum patitur secundum suam essentiam, vel inquantum secundum omnes suas potentias patitur. Sed considerandum est quod aliqua potentia animae potest pati dupliciter. Uno modo, passione propria, quae quidem est secundum quod patitur a suo obiecto, sicut si visus patiatur ex superabundantia visibilis. Alio modo patitur aliqua potentia passione subiecti super quod fundatur, sicut visus patitur patiente sensu tactus in oculo, super quem fundatur visus; puta cum oculus pungitur, aut etiam distemperatur per calorem. Sic igitur dicendum quod, si intelligamus totam animam ratione suae essentiae, sic manifestum est totam animam Christi passam esse. Nam tota essentia animae coniungitur corpori ita quod tota est in toto, et tota in qualibet parte eius. Et ideo, corpore patiente et disposito ad separationem ab anima, tota anima patiebatur. Si vero intelligamus totam animam secundum omnes potentias eius, sic, loquendo de passionibus propriis potentiarum, patiebatur quidem secundum omnes vires inferiores, quia in singulis viribus inferioribus animae, quae circa temporalia operantur, inveniebatur aliquid quod erat causa doloris Christi, sicut ex supra dictis patet. Sed secundum hoc superior ratio non patiebatur in Christo ex parte sui obiecti, scilicet Dei, qui non erat animae Christi causa doloris, sed delectationis et gaudii. Secundum autem illum modum passionis quo potentia aliqua dicitur pati ex parte sui subiecti, sic omnes potentiae animae Christi patiebantur. Omnes enim potentiae animae Christi radicantur in essentia eius, ad quam perveniebat passio, passo corpore, cuius est actus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet intellectus, secundum quod est potentia quaedam, non sit corporis actus; essentia tamen animae est corporis actus, in qua radicatur potentia intellectiva, ut in prima parte habitum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de passione quae est ex parte proprii obiecti, secundum quam superior ratio in Christo passa non fuit. Ad tertium dicendum quod dolor tunc dicitur esse passio perfecta, per quam anima perturbatur, quando passio sensitivae partis pertingit usque ad immutan-

Q. 46, A. 7

says (Topic. i), there is no sadness in opposition to the pleasure which comes of consideration. Therefore it seems that Christ did not suffer in His whole soul. On the contrary, It is written (Ps 87:4) on behalf of Christ: My soul is filled with evils: upon which the gloss adds: Not with vices, but with woes, whereby the soul suffers with the flesh; or with evils, viz. of a perishing people, by compassionating them. But His soul would not have been filled with these evils except He had suffered in His whole soul. Therefore Christ suffered in His entire soul. I answer that, A whole is so termed with respect to its parts. But the parts of a soul are its faculties. So, then, the whole soul is said to suffer in so far as it is afflicted as to its essence, or as to all its faculties. But it must be borne in mind that a faculty of the soul can suffer in two ways: first of all, by its own passion; and this comes of its being afflicted by its proper object; thus, sight may suffer from superabundance of the visible object. In another way a faculty suffers by a passion in the subject on which it is based; as sight suffers when the sense of touch in the eye is affected, upon which the sense of sight rests, as, for instance, when the eye is pricked, or is disaffected by heat. So, then, we say that if the soul be considered with respect to its essence, it is evident that Christ’s whole soul suffered. For the soul’s whole essence is allied with the body, so that it is entire in the whole body and in its every part. Consequently, when the body suffered and was disposed to separate from the soul, the entire soul suffered. But if we consider the whole soul according to its faculties, speaking thus of the proper passions of the faculties, He suffered indeed as to all His lower powers; because in all the soul’s lower powers, whose operations are but temporal, there was something to be found which was a source of woe to Christ, as is evident from what was said above (A. 6). But Christ’s higher reason did not suffer thereby on the part of its object, which is God, who was the cause, not of grief, but rather of delight and joy, to the soul of Christ. Nevertheless, all the powers of Christ’s soul did suffer according as any faculty is said to be affected as regards its subject, because all the faculties of Christ’s soul were rooted in its essence, to which suffering extended when the body, whose act it is, suffered. Reply Obj. 1: Although the intellect as a faculty is not the act of the body, still the soul’s essence is the act of the body, and in it the intellective faculty is rooted, as was shown in the First Part, Q. 77, AA. 6, 8. Reply Obj. 2: This argument proceeds from passion on the part of the proper object, according to which Christ’s higher reason did not suffer. Reply Obj. 3: Grief is then said to be a true passion, by which the soul is troubled, when the passion in the sensitive part causes reason to deflect from the rectitude of its act, so

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dam rationem a rectitudine sui actus, ut scilicet sequatur passionem, et non habeat liberum arbitrium super eam. Sic autem passio sensitivae partis non pervenit in Christo usque ad rationem, sed ex parte subiecti, ut dictum est. Ad quartum dicendum quod intellectus speculativus non potest habere dolorem vel tristitiam ex parte sui obiecti, quod est verum absolute consideratum, quod est perfectio eius. Potest tamen ad ipsum pertinere dolor, vel causa doloris, per modum iam dictum.

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that it then follows the passion, and has no longer free-will with regard to it. In this way passion of the sensitive part did not extend to reason in Christ, but merely subjectively, as was stated above. Reply Obj. 4: The speculative intellect can have no pain or sadness on the part of its object, which is truth considered absolutely, and which is its perfection: nevertheless, both grief and its cause can reach it in the way mentioned above.

Article 8 Whether Christ’s entire soul enjoyed blessed fruition during the Passion? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi, in articulo illius passionis, non tota frueretur fruitione beata. Impossibile est enim simul dolere et gaudere, cum dolor et gaudium sint contraria. Sed anima Christi tota patiebatur dolorem in tempore passionis, ut supra habitum est. Non ergo poterat esse ut tota frueretur. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod tristitia, si sit vehemens, non solum impedit delectationem contrariam, sed quamcumque, et e converso. Dolor autem passionis Christi fuit maximus, ut ostensum est, et similiter delectatio fruitionis est maxima, ut in primo secundae partis habitum est. Non ergo potuit esse quod anima Christi tota simul pateretur et frueretur. Praeterea, fruitio beata est secundum cognitionem et amorem divinorum, ut patet per Augustinum, in I de Doct. Christ. Sed non omnes vires animae attingunt ad cognoscendum et amandum Deum. Non ergo tota anima Christi fruebatur. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod divinitas Christi permisit carni agere et pati quae propria. Ergo, pari ratione, cum proprium esset animae Christi, inquantum erat beata, quod frueretur, passio eius fruitionem non impediebat. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est prius, tota anima potest intelligi et secundum essentiam, et secundum omnes eius potentias. Si autem intelligatur secundum essentiam, sic tota anima fruebatur, inquantum est subiectum superioris partis animae, cuius est frui divinitate, ut, sicut passio ratione essentiae attribuitur superiori parti animae, ita e converso fruitio ratione superioris partis animae attribuatur essentiae. Si vero accipiamus totam animam ratione omnium potentiarum eius, sic non tota anima fruebatur, nec directe quidem, quia fruitio non potest esse actus cuiuslibet partis animae; nec per redundantiam, quia, dum Christus erat via-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s entire soul did not enjoy blessed fruition during the Passion. For it is not possible to be sad and glad at the one time, since sadness and gladness are contraries. But Christ’s whole soul suffered grief during the Passion, as was stated above (A. 7). Therefore His whole soul could not enjoy fruition. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii) that, if sadness be vehement, it not only checks the contrary delight, but every delight; and conversely. But the grief of Christ’s Passion was the greatest, as shown above (A. 6); and likewise the enjoyment of fruition is also the greatest, as was laid down in the first volume of the Second Part (I-II, Q. 34, A. 3). Consequently, it was not possible for Christ’s whole soul to be suffering and rejoicing at the one time. Obj. 3: Further, beatific fruition comes of the knowledge and love of Divine things, as Augustine says (Doctr. Christ. i). But all the soul’s powers do not extend to the knowledge and love of God. Therefore Christ’s whole soul did not enjoy fruition. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): Christ’s Godhead permitted His flesh to do and to suffer what was proper to it. In like fashion, since it belonged to Christ’s soul, inasmuch as it was blessed, to enjoy fruition, His Passion did not impede fruition. I answer that, As stated above (A. 7), the whole soul can be understood both according to its essence and according to all its faculties. If it be understood according to its essence, then His whole soul did enjoy fruition, inasmuch as it is the subject of the higher part of the soul, to which it belongs, to enjoy the Godhead: so that as passion, by reason of the essence, is attributed to the higher part of the soul, so, on the other hand, by reason of the superior part of the soul, fruition is attributed to the essence. But if we take the whole soul as comprising all its faculties, thus His entire soul did not enjoy fruition: not directly, indeed, because fruition is not the act of any one part of

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tor, non fiebat redundantia gloriae a superiori parte in inferiorem, nec ab anima in corpus. Sed quia nec e converso superior pars animae non impediebatur circa id quod est sibi proprium, per inferiorem, consequens est quod superior pars animae perfecte fruebatur, Christo patiente. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod gaudium fruitionis non contrariatur directe dolori passionis, quia non sunt de eodem. Nihil enim prohibet contraria eidem inesse non secundum idem. Et sic gaudium fruitionis potest pertinere ad superiorem partem rationis per proprium actum, dolor autem passionis secundum suum subiectum. Ad essentiam vero animae pertinet dolor passionis ex parte corporis, cuius est forma, gaudium vero fruitionis ex parte potentiae, cui subiicitur. Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi habet veritatem ratione redundantiae quae naturaliter fit ab una potentia animae in aliam. Sed hoc in Christo non fuit, ut supra dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de totalitate animae quantum ad eius potentias.

Q. 46, A. 9

the soul; nor by any overflow of glory, because, since Christ was still upon earth, there was no overflowing of glory from the higher part into the lower, nor from the soul into the body. But since, on the contrary, the soul’s higher part was not hindered in its proper acts by the lower, it follows that the higher part of His soul enjoyed fruition perfectly while Christ was suffering. Reply Obj. 1: The joy of fruition is not opposed directly to the grief of the Passion, because they have not the same object. Now nothing prevents contraries from being in the same subject, but not according to the same. And so the joy of fruition can appertain to the higher part of reason by its proper act; but grief of the Passion according to the subject. Grief of the Passion belongs to the essence of the soul by reason of the body, whose form the soul is; whereas the joy of fruition (belongs to the soul) by reason of the faculty in which it is subjected. Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher’s contention is true because of the overflow which takes place naturally of one faculty of the soul into another; but it was not so with Christ, as was said above. Reply Obj. 3: Such argument holds good of the totality of the soul with regard to its faculties.

Article 9 Whether Christ suffered at a suitable time? Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non fuerit convenienti tempore passus. Passio enim Christi figurabatur per immolationem agni paschalis, unde et apostolus dicit, I Cor. V, Pascha nostrum immolatus est Christus. Sed agnus paschalis immolabatur quartadecima die ad vesperam, ut dicitur Exod. XII. Ergo videtur quod Christus tunc debuerit pati. Quod patet esse falsum, nam tunc Pascha cum suis discipulis celebravit, secundum illud Marc. XIV, prima die azymorum, quando Pascha immolabant; sequenti autem die passus fuit.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not suffer at a suitable time. For Christ’s Passion was prefigured by the sacrifice of the Paschal lamb: hence the Apostle says (1 Cor 5:7): Christ our Pasch is sacrificed. But the paschal lamb was slain on the fourteenth day at eventide, as is stated in Ex. 12:6. Therefore it seems that Christ ought to have suffered then; which is manifestly false: for He was then celebrating the Pasch with His disciples, according to Mark’s account (14:12): On the first day of the unleavened bread, when they sacrificed the Pasch; whereas it was on the following day that He suffered. Praeterea, passio Christi dicitur eius exaltatio, seObj. 2: Further, Christ’s Passion is called His uplifting, cundum illud Ioan. III, oportet exaltari filium hominis. according to John 3:14: So must the Son of man be lifted up. Ipse autem Christus dicitur sol iustitiae, ut patet Malach. And Christ is Himself called the Sun of Justice, as we read ultimo. Ergo videtur quod debuit pati hora sexta, quan- Mal. 4:2. Therefore it seems that He ought to have suffered do sol est in maxima sua exaltatione. Cuius contrarium at the sixth hour, when the sun is at its highest point, and videtur per id quod dicitur Marc. XV, erat autem hora yet the contrary appears from Mk. 15:25: It was the third tertia, et crucifixerunt eum. hour, and they crucified Him. Praeterea, sicut sol in hora sexta maxime exaltaObj. 3: Further, as the sun is at its highest point in each tur quolibet die, ita in solstitio aestivali maxime exalta- day at the sixth hour, so also it reaches its highest point in tur quolibet anno. Debuit ergo Christus magis pati circa every year at the summer solstice. Therefore Christ ought to tempus solstitii aestivalis, quam circa tempus aequinoc- have suffered about the time of the summer solstice rather tii vernalis. than about the vernal equinox.

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Praeterea, per praesentiam Christi in mundo mundus illuminabatur, secundum illud Ioan. IX, quandiu sum in mundo, lux mundi sum. Conveniens igitur fuisset humanae saluti ut diutius in hoc mundo vixisset, ita quod non pateretur in iuvenili aetate, sed magis in senili. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. XIII, sciens Iesus quod venit hora eius ut transeat de hoc mundo ad patrem. Et Ioan. II dicit, nondum venit hora mea. Ubi dicit Augustinus, ubi tantum fecit quantum sufficere iudicavit, venit hora eius, non necessitatis, sed voluntatis; non conditionis, sed potestatis. Convenienti igitur tempore passus est. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, passio Christi subiecta erat eius voluntati. Voluntas autem eius regebatur divina sapientia, quae omnia convenienter et suaviter disponit, ut dicitur Sap. VIII. Et ideo dicendum est quod convenienti tempore passio Christi celebrata est. Unde et in libro quaest. Nov. et Vet. Test., dicitur, omnia propriis locis et temporibus gessit salvator. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quidam dicunt Christum fuisse passum quartadecima luna, quando Iudaei Pascha immolabant. Unde et Ioan. XVIII dicitur quod Iudaei non introierunt in praetorium Pilati ipso die passionis, ut non contaminarentur, sed ut manducarent Pascha. Ubi Chrysostomus dicit quod tunc Iudaei faciebant Pascha, ipse vero ante unam diem celebravit Pascha, reservans suam occisionem sextae feriae, quando vetus Pascha fiebat. Cui videtur consonare quod dicitur Ioan. XIII, quod ante diem festum Paschae, Christus, facta cena, pedes discipulorum lavit. Sed contra hoc videtur esse quod dicitur Matth. XXVI, quod prima die azymorum accesserunt discipuli ad Iesum dicentes, ubi vis paremus tibi comedere Pascha? Ex quo patet, cum primus dies azymorum dicatur quartusdecimus dies mensis primi, quando agnus immolabatur et luna plenissima est, ut Hieronymus dicit, quartadecima luna Christum cenam fecisse, et quintadecima eum passum fuisse. Et hoc expressius manifestatur per id quod dicitur Marc. XIV, primo die azymorum, quando Pascha immolabant, etc.; et Luc. XXII, venit dies azymorum, in quo necesse erat occidi Pascha. Et ideo quidam dicunt quod Christus die convenienti, idest quartadecima luna, Pascha cum discipulis suis manducavit, demonstrans quod usque ad ultimum diem non erat contrarius legi, ut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., sed Iudaei, occupati circa procurationem mortis Christi, contra legem celebrationem Paschae in crastinum distulerunt. Et propter hoc de his dicitur quod in die passionis Christi noluerunt intrare praetorium, ut non contaminarentur, sed manducarent Pascha.

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Obj. 4: Further, the world was enlightened by Christ’s presence in it, according to John 9:5: As long as I am in the world I am the light of the world. Consequently it was fitting for man’s salvation that Christ should have lived longer in the world, so that He should have suffered, not in young, but in old, age. On the contrary, It is written (John 13:1): Jesus, knowing that His hour was come for Him to pass out of this world to the Father; and (John 2:4): My hour is not yet come. Upon which texts Augustine observes: When He had done as much as He deemed sufficient, then came His hour, not of necessity, but of will, not of condition, but of power. Therefore Christ died at an opportune time. I answer that, As was observed above (A. 1), Christ’s Passion was subject to His will. But His will was ruled by the Divine wisdom which ordereth all things conveniently and sweetly (Wis 8:1). Consequently it must be said that Christ’s Passion was enacted at an opportune time. Hence it is written in De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. lv: The Savior did everything in its proper place and season. Reply Obj. 1: Some hold that Christ did die on the fourteenth day of the moon, when the Jews sacrificed the Pasch: hence it is stated (John 18:28) that the Jews went not into Pilate’s hall on the day of the Passion, that they might not be defiled, but that they might eat the Pasch. Upon this Chrysostom observes (Hom. lxxxii in Joan.): The Jews celebrated the Pasch then; but He celebrated the Pasch on the previous day, reserving His own slaying until the Friday, when the old Pasch was kept. And this appears to tally with the statement (John 13:1–5) that before the festival day of the Pasch . . . when supper was done . . . Christ washed the feet of the disciples. But Matthew’s account (26:17) seems opposed to this; that on the first day of the Azymes the disciples came to Jesus, saying: Where wilt Thou that we prepare for Thee to eat the Pasch? From which, as Jerome says, since the fourteenth day of the first month is called the day of the Azymes, when the lamb was slain, and when it was full moon, it is quite clear that Christ kept the supper on the fourteenth and died on the fifteenth. And this comes out more clearly from Mk. 14:12: On the first day of the unleavened bread, when they sacrificed the Pasch, etc.; and from Luke 22:7: The day of the unleavened bread came, on which it was necessary that the Pasch should be killed. Consequently, then, others say that Christ ate the Pasch with His disciples on the proper day—that is, on the fourteenth day of the moon—showing thereby that up to the last day He was not opposed to the law, as Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxxi in Matth.): but that the Jews, being busied in compassing Christ’s death against the law, put off celebrating the Pasch until the following day. And on this account it is said of them that on the day of Christ’s Passion they were unwilling to enter Pilate’s hall, that they might not be defiled, but that they might eat the Pasch.

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Sed nec illud videtur esse consonum verbis Marci dicentis, primo die azymorum, quando Pascha immolabant. Simul ergo Christus et Iudaei vetus Pascha celebraverunt. Et, sicut Beda dicit, super Marc., licet Christus, qui est Pascha nostrum, sit crucifixus sequenti die, hoc est quintadecima luna; attamen nocte qua agnus immolabatur, corporis sanguinisque sui discipulis tradens mysteria celebranda, et a Iudaeis tentus et alligatus, ipsius immolationis, hoc est passionis suae, sacravit exordium.

Cum autem dicitur, Ioan. XIII, ante diem festum Paschae, intelligitur hoc fuisse quartadecima luna, quod tunc evenit feria quinta, nam, luna existente quintadecima, erat dies solemnissimus Paschae apud Iudaeos. Et sic eundem diem quem Ioannes nominat ante diem festum Paschae, propter distinctionem naturalem dierum, Matthaeus nominat primam diem azymorum, quia, secundum ritum Iudaicae festivitatis, solemnitas incipiebat a vespera praecedentis diei. Quod autem dicitur eos comesturos esse Pascha in quintadecima luna, intelligendum est quod ibi Pascha non dicitur agnus paschalis, qui immolatus fuerat decimaquarta luna, sed dicitur cibus paschalis, idest azymi panes, quos oportebat comedi a mundis. Unde Chrysostomus ibi aliam expositionem ponit, quod Pascha potest accipi pro toto festo Iudaeorum, quod septem diebus agebatur.

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de consensu Evang., hora erat quasi sexta, cum traditus esset dominus crucifigendus a Pilato, ut Ioannes dicit, non enim erat plena sexta, sed quasi sexta, idest, peracta quinta, et aliquid de sexta esse coeperat, donec, completa sexta, Christo pendente in cruce, tenebrae fierent. Intelligitur autem fuisse hora tertia cum clamaverunt Iudaei ut dominus crucifigeretur, et veracissime demonstratur tunc eos crucifixisse quando clamaverunt. Ergo, ne quisquam cogitationem tanti criminis a Iudaeis aversus in milites converteret, erat, inquit, hora tertia, et crucifixerunt eum, ut illi potius eum crucifixisse inveniantur qui hora tertia ut crucifigeretur clamaverunt. Quanquam non desint qui parasceve, quam Ioannes commemorat, dicens, erat autem parasceve hora quasi sexta, horam diei tertiam velint intelligi. Parasceve quippe interpretatur praeparatio. Verum autem Pascha, quod in passione domini celebratur, incoepit praeparari ab hora noctis nona, quando scilicet omnes principes sacerdotum dixerunt, reus est mortis. Ab illa ergo hora noctis usque ad Christi crucifixionem occurrit hora parasceve sexta, secundum Ioannem; et hora diei tertia, secundum Marcum.

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But even this solution does not tally with Mark, who says: On the first day of the unleavened bread, when they sacrificed the Pasch. Consequently Christ and the Jews celebrated the ancient Pasch at the one time. And as Bede says on Luke 22:7, 8: Although Christ who is our Pasch was slain on the following day—that is, on the fifteenth day of the moon—nevertheless, on the night when the Lamb was sacrificed, delivering to the disciples to be celebrated, the mysteries of His body and blood, and being held and bound by the Jews, He hallowed the opening of His own immolation—that is, of His Passion. But the words (John 13:1) Before the festival day of the Pasch are to be understood to refer to the fourteenth day of the moon, which then fell upon the Thursday: for the fifteenth day of the moon was the most solemn day of the Pasch with the Jews: and so the same day which John calls before the festival day of the Pasch, on account of the natural distinction of days, Matthew calls the first day of the unleavened bread, because, according to the rite of the Jewish festivity, the solemnity began from the evening of the preceding day. When it is said, then, that they were going to eat the Pasch on the fifteenth day of the month, it is to be understood that the Pasch there is not called the Paschal lamb, which was sacrificed on the fourteenth day, but the Paschal food—that is, the unleavened bread—which had to be eaten by the clean. Hence Chrysostom in the same passage gives another explanation, that the Pasch can be taken as meaning the whole feast of the Jews, which lasted seven days. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. iii): ‘It was about the sixth hour’ when the Lord was delivered up by Pilate to be crucified, as John relates. For it was not quite the sixth hour, but about the sixth—that is, it was after the fifth, and when part of the sixth had been entered upon until the sixth hour was ended—that the darkness began, when Christ hung upon the cross. It is understood to have been the third hour when the Jews clamored for the Lord to be crucified: and it is most clearly shown that they crucified Him when they clamored out. Therefore, lest anyone might divert the thought of so great a crime from the Jews to the soldiers, he says: ‘It was the third hour, and they crucified Him,’ that they before all may be found to have crucified Him, who at the third hour clamored for His crucifixion. Although there are not wanting some persons who wish the Parasceve to be understood as the third hour, which John recalls, saying: ‘It was the Parasceve, about the sixth hour.’ For ‘Parasceve’ is interpreted ‘preparation.’ But the true Pasch, which was celebrated in the Lord’s Passion, began to be prepared from the ninth hour of the night—namely, when the chief priests said: ‘He is deserving of death.’ According to John, then, the sixth hour of the Parasceve lasts from that hour of the night down to Christ’s crucifixion; while, according to Mark, it is the third hour of the day.

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Quidam tamen dicunt quod haec diversitas ex peccato scriptoris contingit apud Graecos, nam figurae quibus tria et sex repraesentantur, satis sunt propinquae apud eos. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in libro de quaest. Nov. et Vet. Test., tunc voluit dominus passione sua mundum redimere et reformare, quando eum creaverat, idest in aequinoctio. Et tunc dies super noctem increscit, quia per passionem salvatoris a tenebris ad lucem perducimur. Et quia perfecta illuminatio erit in secundo adventu Christi, ideo tempus secundi adventus aestati comparatur, Matth. XXIV, ubi dicitur, cum ramus eius iam tener fuerit et folia nata, scitis quia prope est aestas. Ita et vos, cum videritis haec omnia, scitote quia prope est et in ianuis. Et tunc etiam erit maxima Christi exaltatio.

Ad quartum dicendum quod Christus in iuvenili aetate pati voluit propter tria. Primo quidem, ut ex hoc magis suam dilectionem commendaret, quod vitam suam pro nobis dedit quando erat in perfectissimo statu. Secundo, quia non conveniebat ut in eo appareret naturae diminutio, sicut nec morbus, ut supra dictum est. Tertio ut, in iuvenili aetate moriens et resurgens, futuram resurgentium qualitatem in seipso Christus praemonstraret. Unde dicitur Ephes. IV, donec occurramus omnes in unitatem fidei et agnitionis filii Dei, in virum perfectum, in mensuram aetatis plenitudinis Christi.

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Still, there are some who contend that this discrepancy is due to the error of a Greek transcriber: since the characters employed by them to represent 3 and 6 are somewhat alike. Reply Obj. 3: According to the author of De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. lv, our Lord willed to redeem and reform the world by His Passion, at the time of year at which He had created it—that is, at the equinox. It is then that day grows upon night; because by our Savior’s Passion we are brought from darkness to light. And since the perfect enlightening will come about at Christ’s second coming, therefore the season of His second coming is compared (Matt 24:32, 33) to the summer in these words: When the branch thereof is now tender, and the leaves come forth, you know that summer is nigh: so you also, when you shall see all these things, know ye that it is nigh even at the doors. And then also shall be Christ’s greatest exaltation. Reply Obj. 4: Christ willed to suffer while yet young, for three reasons. First of all, to commend the more His love by giving up His life for us when He was in His most perfect state of life. Second, because it was not becoming for Him to show any decay of nature nor to be subject to disease, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 4). Third, that by dying and rising at an early age Christ might exhibit beforehand in His own person the future condition of those who rise again. Hence it is written (Eph 4:13): Until we all meet into the unity of faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fullness of Christ.

Article 10 Whether Christ suffered in a suitable place? Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non convenienti loco Christus passus fuerit. Christus enim passus est secundum carnem humanam, quae quidem concepta fuit ex virgine in Nazareth, et nata in Bethlehem. Ergo videtur quod non in Ierusalem, sed in Nazareth vel in Bethlehem pati debuerit. Praeterea, veritas debet respondere figurae. Sed passio Christi figurabatur per sacrificia veteris legis. Sed huiusmodi sacrificia offerebantur in templo. Ergo et Christus in templo pati debuit, et non extra portam civitatis. Praeterea, medicina debet morbo respondere. Sed passio Christi fuit medicina contra peccatum Adae. Adam autem non fuit sepultus in Ierusalem, sed in Hebron, dicitur enim Iosue XIV, nomen Hebron antea vocabatur Cariath Arbe, Adam maximus ibi in terra Enacim situs erat.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not suffer in a suitable place. For Christ suffered according to His human nature, which was conceived in Nazareth and born in Bethlehem. Consequently it seems that He ought not to have suffered in Jerusalem, but in Nazareth or Bethlehem. Obj. 2: Further, the reality ought to correspond with the figure. But Christ’s Passion was prefigured by the sacrifices of the Old Law, and these were offered up in the Temple. Therefore it seems that Christ ought to have suffered in the Temple, and not outside the city gate. Obj. 3: Further, the medicine should correspond with the disease. But Christ’s Passion was the medicine against Adam’s sin: and Adam was not buried in Jerusalem, but in Hebron; for it is written (Josh 14:15): The name of Hebron before was called Cariath-Arbe: Adam the greatest in the land of the Enacims was laid there.

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Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. XIII, non capit prophetam perire extra Ierusalem. Convenienter igitur in Ierusalem passus est. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in libro octoginta trium quaest., omnia propriis locis et temporibus gessit salvator, quia, sicut omnia sunt in manu eius, ita etiam omnia loca. Et ideo, sicut convenienti tempore Christus passus est, ita etiam convenienti loco. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus convenientissime in Ierusalem passus est. Primo quidem, quia Ierusalem erat locus a Deo electus ad sacrificia sibi offerenda. Quae quidem figuralia sacrificia figurabant Christi passionem, quod est verum sacrificium, secundum illud Ephes. V, tradidit semetipsum hostiam et oblationem in odorem suavitatis. Unde Beda dicit, in quadam homilia, quod appropinquante hora passionis, dominus appropinquare voluit loco passionis, scilicet in Ierusalem, quo pervenit ante quinque dies Paschae, sicut agnus paschalis ante quinque dies Paschae, idest decima luna, secundum praeceptum legis, ad locum immolationis ducebatur. Secundo, quia virtus passionis eius ad totum mundum diffundenda erat, in medio terrae habitabilis pati voluit, idest in Ierusalem. Unde dicitur in Psalmo, Deus autem, rex noster ante saecula, operatus est salutem in medio terrae, idest in Ierusalem, quae dicitur esse terrae umbilicus. Tertio, quia hoc maxime conveniebat humilitati eius, ut scilicet, sicut turpissimum genus mortis elegit, ita etiam ad eius humilitatem pertinuit quod in loco tam celebri confusionem pati non recusavit. Unde Leo Papa dicit, in sermone quodam Epiphaniae, qui servi susceperat formam, Bethlehem praeelegit nativitati, Ierusalem passioni. Quarto, ut ostenderet a principibus populi exortam esse iniquitatem occidentium ipsum. Et ideo in Ierusalem, ubi principes morabantur, voluit pati. Unde dicitur Act. IV, convenerunt in ista civitate adversus puerum sanctum tuum Iesum, quem unxisti, Herodes et Pontius Pilatus, cum gentibus et populis Israel. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus non in templo aut in civitate, sed extra portam passus est, propter tria. Primo quidem, ut veritas responderet figurae. Nam vitulus et hircus, qui solemnissimo sacrificio ad expiationem totius multitudinis offerebantur, extra castra comburebantur, ut praecipitur Levit. XVI. Unde dicitur Heb. XIII, quorum animalium infertur sanguis pro peccato in sancta per pontificem, horum corpora cremantur extra castra. Propter quod et Iesus, ut sanctificaret suum populum, extra portam passus est.

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On the contrary, It is written (Luke 13:33): It cannot be that a prophet perish out of Jerusalem. Therefore it was fitting that He should die in Jerusalem. I answer that, According to the author of De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. lv, the Savior did everything in its proper place and season, because, as all things are in His hands, so are all places: and consequently, since Christ suffered at a suitable time, so did He in a suitable place. Reply Obj. 1: Christ died most appropriately in Jerusalem. First of all, because Jerusalem was God’s chosen place for the offering of sacrifices to Himself: and these figurative sacrifices foreshadowed Christ’s Passion, which is a true sacrifice, according to Eph. 5:2: He hath delivered Himself for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odor of sweetness. Hence Bede says in a Homily (xxiii): When the Passion drew nigh, our Lord willed to draw nigh to the place of the Passion—that is to say, to Jerusalem—whither He came five days before the Pasch; just as, according to the legal precept, the Paschal lamb was led to the place of immolation five days before the Pasch, which is the tenth day of the moon.

Second, because the virtue of His Passion was to be spread over the whole world, He wished to suffer in the center of the habitable world—that is, in Jerusalem. Accordingly it is written (Ps 73:12): But God is our King before ages: He hath wrought salvation in the midst of the earth—that is, in Jerusalem, which is called the navel of the earth. Third, because it was specially in keeping with His humility: that, as He chose the most shameful manner of death, so likewise it was part of His humility that He did not refuse to suffer in so celebrated a place. Hence Pope Leo says (Serm. I in Epiph.): He who had taken upon Himself the form of a servant chose Bethlehem for His nativity and Jerusalem for His Passion. Fourth, He willed to suffer in Jerusalem, where the chief priests dwelt, to show that the wickedness of His slayers arose from the chiefs of the Jewish people. Hence it is written (Acts 4:27): There assembled together in this city against Thy holy child Jesus whom Thou hast anointed, Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Israel. Reply Obj. 2: For three reasons Christ suffered outside the gate, and not in the Temple nor in the city. First of all, that the truth might correspond with the figure. For the calf and the goat which were offered in most solemn sacrifice for expiation on behalf of the entire multitude were burnt outside the camp, as commanded in Lev. 16:27. Hence it is written (Heb 13:27): For the bodies of those beasts, whose blood is brought into the holies by the high-priest for sin, are burned without the camp. Wherefore Jesus also, that He might sanctify the people by His own blood, suffered without the gate. Secundo, ut per hoc daret exemplum nobis exeundi Second, to set us the example of shunning worldly cona mundana conversatione. Unde ibidem subditur, exea- versation. Accordingly the passage continues: Let us go

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mus igitur ad eum extra castra, improperium eius portantes. Tertio, ut Chrysostomus dicit, in sermone de passione, noluit dominus pati sub tecto, non in templo Iudaico, ne Iudaei subtraherent sacrificium salutare, ne putares pro illa tantum plebe oblatum. Et ideo foras civitatem, foras muros, ut scias sacrificium esse commune quod totius terrae est oblatio, quod communis est purificatio.

Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., quidam exposuit Calvariae locum, in quo sepultus est Adam, et ideo sic appellatum quia ibi antiqui hominis sit conditum caput. Favorabilis interpretatio, et mulcens aures populi, nec tamen vera. Extra urbem enim et foris portam, loca sunt in quibus truncantur capita damnatorum; et Calvariae, idest decollatorum, sumpsere nomen. Propterea autem ibi crucifixus est Iesus, ut ubi prius erat area damnatorum, ibi erigerentur vexilla martyrii. Adam vero sepultum iuxta Hebron, in libro Iesu filii Nave legimus. Magis autem Christus crucifigendus erat in loco communi damnatorum quam iuxta sepulcrum Adae, ut ostenderetur quod crux Christi non solum erat in remedium contra peccatum personale Adae, sed etiam contra peccatum totius mundi.

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forth therefore to Him without the camp, bearing His reproach. Third, as Chrysostom says in a sermon on the Passion (Hom. i De Cruce et Latrone): The Lord was not willing to suffer under a roof, nor in the Jewish Temple, lest the Jews might take away the saving sacrifice, and lest you might think He was offered for that people only. Consequently, it was beyond the city and outside the walls, that you may learn it was a universal sacrifice, an oblation for the whole world, a cleansing for all. Reply Obj. 3: According to Jerome, in his commentary on Matt. 27:33, someone explained ‘the place of Calvary’ as being the place where Adam was buried; and that it was so called because the skull of the first man was buried there. A pleasing interpretation indeed, and one suited to catch the ear of the people, but, still, not the true one. For the spots where the condemned are beheaded are outside the city and beyond the gates, deriving thence the name of Calvary—that is, of the beheaded. Jesus, accordingly, was crucified there, that the standards of martyrdom might be uplifted over what was formerly the place of the condemned. But Adam was buried close by Hebron and Arbe, as we read in the book of Jesus Ben Nave. But Jesus was to be crucified in the common spot of the condemned rather than beside Adam’s sepulchre, to make it manifest that Christ’s cross was the remedy, not only for Adam’s personal sin, but also for the sin of the entire world.

Article 11 Whether it was fitting for Christ to be crucified with thieves? Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Christum cum latronibus crucifigi. Dicitur enim II Cor. VI, quae participatio iustitiae cum iniquitate? Sed Christus factus est nobis iustitia a Deo; iniquitas autem pertinet ad latrones. Non ergo fuit conveniens ut Christus simul cum latronibus crucifigeretur. Praeterea, super illud Matth. XXVI, si oportuerit me mori tecum, non te negabo, dicit Origenes, mori cum Iesu pro omnibus moriente, hominum non erat. Et Ambrosius dicit, super illud Luc. XXII, paratus sum tecum et in carcerem et in mortem ire, passio, inquit, domini aemulos habet, pares non habet. Multo igitur minus conveniens videtur quod Christus simul cum latronibus pateretur. Praeterea, Matth. XXVII dicitur quod latrones qui crucifixi erant, improperabant ei. Sed Luc. XXIII dicitur quod unus eorum qui crucifixi erant cum Christo, ei dicebat, memento mei, domine, cum veneris in regnum tuum. Ergo videtur quod, praeter latrones blasphemantes, fuerit cum eo crucifixus alius non blasphemans.

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting for Christ to have been crucified with thieves, because it is written (2 Cor 6:14): What participation hath justice with injustice? But for our sakes Christ of God is made unto us justice (1 Cor 1:30); whereas iniquity applies to thieves. Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to be crucified with thieves. Obj. 2: Further, on Matt. 26:35, Though I should die with Thee, I will not deny Thee, Origen (Tract. xxxv in Matth.) observes: It was not men’s lot to die with Jesus, since He died for all. Again, on Luke 22:33, I am ready to go with Thee, both into prison and death, Ambrose says: Our Lord’s Passion has followers, but not equals. It seems, then, much less fitting for Christ to suffer with thieves. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt 27:44) that the thieves who were crucified with Him reproached Him. But in Luke 22:42 it is stated that one of them who were crucified with Christ cried out to Him: Lord, remember me when Thou shalt come into Thy kingdom. It seems, then, that besides the blasphemous thieves there was another man who

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Et sic videtur inconvenienter ab Evangelistis narratum did not blaspheme Him: and so the Evangelist’s account quod Christus fuerit cum latronibus crucifixus. does not seem to be accurate when it says that Christ was crucified with thieves. Sed contra est quod Isaiae LIII fuerat prophetaOn the contrary, It was foretold by Isaias (53:12): tum, et cum sceleratis reputatus est. And He was reputed with the wicked. Respondeo dicendum quod Christus inter latrones I answer that, Christ was crucified between thieves crucifixus est, alia quidem ratione quantum ad intentio- from one intention on the part of the Jews, and from quite nem Iudaeorum, alia vero quantum ad Dei ordinatio- another on the part of God’s ordaining. As to the intention nem. Quantum enim ad intentionem Iudaeorum, duos of the Jews, Chrysostom remarks (Hom. lxxxvii in Matth.) latrones utrinque crucifixerunt, sicut dicit Chrysosto- that they crucified the two thieves, one on either side, that mus, ut eorum suspicionis fieret particeps. Sed non ita eve- He might be made to share their guilt. But it did not hapnit. Nam de illis nil dicitur, huius autem ubique crux ho- pen so; because mention is never made of them; whereas His noratur. Reges, diademata deponentes, assumunt crucem, cross is honored everywhere. Kings lay aside their crowns to in purpuris, in diadematibus, in armis, in mensa sacrata, take up the cross: on their purple robes, on their diadems, on ubique terrarum crux emicat. their weapons, on the consecrated table, everywhere the cross shines forth. Quantum vero ad Dei ordinationem, Christus cum As to God’s ordinance, Christ was crucified with latronibus crucifixus est, quia, ut Hieronymus dicit, su- thieves, because, as Jerome says on Matt. 27:33: As Christ per Matth., sicut pro nobis maledictum crucis factus est became accursed of the cross for us, so for our salvation He Christus, sic, pro omnium salute, inter noxios quasi no- was crucified as a guilty one among the guilty. Second, as xius crucifigitur. Secundo, ut dicit Leo Papa, in sermo- Pope Leo observes (Serm. iv de Passione): Two thieves were ne de passione, duo latrones unus ad dexteram alius ad crucified, one on His right hand and one on His left, to set sinistram crucifiguntur, ut in ipsa patibuli specie demon- forth by the very appearance of the gibbet that separation of straretur illa quae in iudicio ipsius omnium hominum fa- all men which shall be made in His hour of judgment. And cienda est discretio. Et Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., ipsa Augustine on John 7:36 says: The very cross, if thou mark it crux, si attendas, tribunal fuit. In medio enim iudice con- well, was a judgment-seat: for the judge being set in the midst, stituto, unus, qui credidit, liberatus; alius, qui insultavit, the one who believed was delivered, the other who mocked damnatus est. Iam significabat quid facturus est de vivis et Him was condemned. Already He has signified what He shall mortuis, alios positurus ad dextram et alios ad sinistram. do to the quick and the dead; some He will set on His right, Tertio, secundum Hilarium, duo latrones laevae ac dex- others on His left hand. Third, according to Hilary (Comm. trae affiguntur, omnem humani generis diversitatem voca- xxxiii in Matth.): Two thieves are set, one upon His right and ri ad sacramentum passionis domini ostendentes. Sed quia one upon His left, to show that all mankind is called to the per diversitatem fidelium atque infidelium fit omnium se- sacrament of His Passion. But because of the cleavage becundum dextram et sinistram divisio, unus ex duobus, ad tween believers and unbelievers, the multitude is divided into dextram situs, fidei iustificatione salvatur. Quarto quia, ut right and left, those on the right being saved by the justificaBeda dicit, super Marc., latrones qui cum domino cruci- tion of faith. Fourth, because, as Bede says on Mk. 15:27: fixi sunt, significant eos qui, sub fide et confessione Chri- The thieves crucified with our Lord denote those who, believsti, vel agonem martyrii vel quaelibet arctioris disciplinae ing in and confessing Christ, either endure the conflict of marinstituta subeunt. Sed qui hoc pro aeterna gloria gerunt, tyrdom or keep the institutes of stricter observance. But those dextri latronis fide designantur, qui vero humanae laudis who do the like for the sake of everlasting glory are denoted intuitu, sinistri latronis mentem imitantur et actus. by the faith of the thief on the right; while others who do so for the sake of human applause copy the mind and behavior of the one on the left. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Christus deReply Obj. 1: Just as Christ was not obliged to die, but bitum mortis non habuit, sed mortem voluntarie subiit willingly submitted to death so as to vanquish death by His ut sua virtute vinceret mortem, ita etiam non habuit me- power: so neither deserved He to be classed with thieves; ritum ut cum latronibus poneretur, sed voluit cum ini- but willed to be reputed with the ungodly that He might dequis deputari ut sua virtute iniquitatem destrueret. Unde stroy ungodliness by His power. Accordingly, Chrysostom Chrysostomus dicit, super Ioan., quod latronem in cruce says (Hom. lxxxiv in Joan.) that to convert the thief upon the convertere et in Paradisum inducere, non minus fuit quam cross, and lead him into paradise, was no less a wonder than concutere petras. to shake the rocks. Ad secundum dicendum quod non conveniebat Reply Obj. 2: It was not fitting that anyone else should quod cum Christo aliquis alius pateretur ex eadem cau- die with Christ from the same cause as Christ: hence Orisa. Unde Origenes ibidem subdit, omnes fuerant in pec- gen continues thus in the same passage: All had been un-

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catis, et omnes opus habebant ut pro eis alius moreretur, non ipsi pro aliis. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de consensu Evang., possumus intelligere Matthaeum posuisse pluralem numerum pro singulari, cum dixit, latrones improperabant ei. Vel potest dici, secundum Hieronymum, quod primum uterque blasphemaverit; deinde, visis signis, unus eorum crediderit.

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der sin, and all required that another should die for them, not they for others. Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. iii): We can understand Matthew as putting the plural for the singular when he said the thieves reproached Him. Or it may be said, with Jerome, that at first both blasphemed Him, but afterwards one believed in Him on witnessing the wonders.

Article 12 Whether Christ’s Passion is to be attributed to his Godhead? Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio Christi sit eius divinitati attribuenda. Dicitur enim I Cor. II, si cognovissent, nunquam dominum gloriae crucifixissent. Sed dominus gloriae est Christus secundum divinitatem. Ergo passio Christi competit ei secundum divinitatem. Praeterea, principium salutis humanae est ipsa divinitas, secundum illud Psalmi, salus autem iustorum a domino. Si ergo passio Christi ad eius divinitatem non pertineret, videtur quod non posset esse nobis fructifera. Praeterea, Iudaei puniti sunt pro peccato occisionis Christi tanquam homicidae ipsius Dei, quod magnitudo poenae demonstrat. Hoc autem non esset, si passio ad divinitatem non pertineret. Ergo passio Christi ad divinitatem pertinuit. Sed contra est quod Athanasius dicit, in epistola ad Epictetum, natura Deus manens verbum est impassibile. Sed impassibile non potest pati. Passio ergo Christi non pertinebat ad eius divinitatem. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, unio humanae naturae et divinae facta est in persona et hypostasi et supposito, manente tamen distinctione naturarum, ut scilicet sit eadem persona et hypostasis divinae et humanae naturae, salva tamen utriusque naturae proprietate. Et ideo, sicut supra dictum est, supposito divinae naturae attribuenda est passio, non ratione divinae naturae, quae est impassibilis, sed ratione humanae naturae. Unde in epistola synodali Cyrilli dicitur, si quis non confitetur Dei verbum passum carne et crucifixum carne, anathema sit. Pertinet ergo passio Christi ad suppositum divinae naturae ratione naturae passibilis assumptae, non autem ratione divinae naturae impassibilis.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s Passion is to be attributed to His Godhead; for it is written (1 Cor 2:8): If they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory. But Christ is the Lord of glory in respect of His Godhead. Therefore Christ’s Passion is attributed to Him in respect of His Godhead. Obj. 2: Further, the principle of men’s salvation is the Godhead Itself, according to Ps. 36:39: But the salvation of the just is from the Lord. Consequently, if Christ’s Passion did not appertain to His Godhead, it would seem that it could not produce fruit in us. Obj. 3: Further, the Jews were punished for slaying Christ as for murdering God Himself; as is proved by the gravity of the punishment. Now this would not be so if the Passion were not attributed to the Godhead. Therefore Christ’s Passion should be so attributed. On the contrary, Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epict.): The Word is impassible whose Nature is Divine. But what is impassible cannot suffer. Consequently, Christ’s Passion did not concern His Godhead. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 2, AA. 1, 2, 3, 6), the union of the human nature with the Divine was effected in the Person, in the hypostasis, in the suppositum, yet observing the distinction of natures; so that it is the same Person and hypostasis of the Divine and human natures, while each nature retains that which is proper to it. And therefore, as stated above (Q. 16, A. 4), the Passion is to be attributed to the suppositum of the Divine Nature, not because of the Divine Nature, which is impassible, but by reason of the human nature. Hence, in a Synodal Epistle of Cyril we read: If any man does not confess that the Word of God suffered in the flesh and was crucified in the flesh, let him be anathema. Therefore Christ’s Passion belongs to the suppositum of the Divine Nature by reason of the passible nature assumed, but not on account of the impassible Divine Nature. Reply Obj. 1: The Lord of glory is said to be crucified, not as the Lord of glory, but as a man capable of suffering.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus gloriae dicitur crucifixus, non secundum quod dominus est gloriae, sed secundum quod erat homo passibilis. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in quoReply Obj. 2: As is said in a sermon of the Council dam sermone Ephesini Concilii, quod mors Christi, tan- of Ephesus, Christ’s death being, as it were, God’s death—

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quam facta mors Dei, scilicet per unionem in persona, destruxit mortem, quoniam Deus et homo erat qui patiebatur. Non enim natura Dei laesa est, nec mutatione sua suscepit passiones. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut subditur ibidem, non purum hominem crucifixerunt Iudaei, sed Deo intulerunt praesumptiones. Pone enim principem loqui per verbum, et hoc formari per litteras in charta aliqua, et dirigi civitatibus, et aliquis inobediens chartam disrumpat. Ad mortis sententiam deducetur, non tanquam chartam discerpens, sed tanquam verbum imperiale disrumpens. Non ergo securus sit Iudaeus, tanquam purum hominem crucifigens. Quod enim videbat, quasi charta erat, quod autem in ea celabatur, imperiale verbum erat, natum ex natura, non prolatum per linguam.

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namely, by union in Person—destroyed death; since He who suffered was both God and man. For God’s Nature was not wounded, nor did It undergo any change by those sufferings. Reply Obj. 3: As the passage quoted goes on to say: The Jews did not crucify one who was simply a man; they inflicted their presumptions upon God. For suppose a prince to speak by word of mouth, and that his words are committed to writing on a parchment and sent out to the cities, and that some rebel tears up the document, he will be led forth to endure the death sentence, not for merely tearing up a document, but as destroying the imperial message. Let not the Jew, then, stand in security, as crucifying a mere man; since what he saw was as the parchment, but what was hidden under it was the imperial Word, the Son by nature, not the mere utterance of a tongue.

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Question 47 The Efficient Cause of Christ’s Passion Deinde considerandum est de causa efficiente passioWe have now to consider the efficient cause of Christ’s nis Christi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Passion, concerning which there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum Christus fuerit ab aliis occisus, vel a (1) Whether Christ was slain by others, or by Himself? seipso. Secundo, ex quo motivo seipsum passioni tradiderit. (2) From what motive did He deliver Himself up to the Passion? Tertio, utrum pater tradiderit eum ad patiendum. (3) Whether the Father delivered Him up to suffer? Quarto, utrum fuerit conveniens ut per manus (4) Whether it was fitting that He should suffer at the gentium pateretur, vel potius a Iudaeis. hands of the Gentiles, or rather of the Jews? Quinto, utrum occisores eius eum cognoverint. (5) Whether His slayers knew who He was? Sexto, de peccato eorum qui Christum occiderunt. (6) Of the sin of them who slew Christ.

Article 1 Whether Christ was slain by another or by himself? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non fuerit ab alio occisus, sed a seipso. Dicit enim ipse, Ioan. X, nemo a me tollit animam meam, sed ego pono eam. Ille autem dicitur aliquem occidere qui animam eius tollit. Non est ergo Christus ab aliis occisus, sed a seipso. Praeterea, illi qui ab aliis occiduntur, paulatim, debilitata natura, deficiunt. Et maxime hoc apparet in crucifixis, ut enim dicit Augustinus, in IV de Trin., longa morte cruciabantur ligno suspensi. In Christo autem non hoc accidit, nam clamans voce magna emisit spiritum, ut dicitur Matth. XXVII. Non ergo Christus est ab aliis occisus, sed a seipso. Praeterea, illi qui ab aliis occiduntur, per violentiam moriuntur, et ita non voluntarie, quia violentum opponitur voluntario. Sed Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin., quod spiritus Christi non deseruit carnem invitus, sed quia voluit, quando voluit, et quomodo voluit. Non ergo Christus est ab aliis occisus, sed a seipso. Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. XVIII, postquam flagellaverint, occident eum. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid potest esse causa alicuius effectus dupliciter. Uno modo, directe ad illud agendo. Et hoc modo persecutores Christi eum occiderunt, quia sufficientem causam mortis ei intulerunt, cum intentione occidendi ipsum et effectu subsequente; quia scilicet ex illa causa est mors subsecuta. Alio modo dicitur aliquis causa alicuius indirecte, scilicet quia non impedit, cum impedire possit, sicut si dicatur aliquis alium perfundere quia non claudit fenestram, per quam im-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not slain by another, but by Himself. For He says Himself (John 10:18): No man taketh My life from Me, but I lay it down of Myself. But he is said to kill another who takes away his life. Consequently, Christ was not slain by others, but by Himself. Obj. 2: Further, those slain by others sink gradually from exhausted nature, and this is strikingly apparent in the crucified: for, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv): Those who were crucified were tormented with a lingering death. But this did not happen in Christ’s case, since crying out, with a loud voice, He yielded up the ghost (Matt 27:50). Therefore Christ was not slain by others, but by Himself. Obj. 3: Further, those slain by others suffer a violent death, and hence die unwillingly, because violent is opposed to voluntary. But Augustine says (De Trin. iv): Christ’s spirit did not quit the flesh unwillingly, but because He willed it, when He willed it, and as He willed it. Consequently Christ was not slain by others, but by Himself. On the contrary, It is written (Luke 18:33): After they have scourged Him, they will put him to death. I answer that, A thing may cause an effect in two ways: in the first instance by acting directly so as to produce the effect; and in this manner Christ’s persecutors slew Him because they inflicted on Him what was a sufficient cause of death, and with the intention of slaying Him, and the effect followed, since death resulted from that cause. In another way someone causes an effect indirectly—that is, by not preventing it when he can do so; just as one person is said to drench another by not closing the window through

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ber ingreditur. Et hoc modo ipse Christus fuit causa passionis et mortis. Poterat enim suam passionem et mortem impedire. Primo quidem, adversarios reprimendo, ut eum aut non vellent, aut non possent interficere. Secundo, quia spiritus eius habebat potestatem conservandi naturam carnis suae, ne a quocumque laesivo inflicto opprimeretur. Quod quidem habuit anima Christi quia erat verbo Dei coniuncta in unitate personae, ut Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin. Quia ergo anima Christi non repulit a proprio corpore nocumentum illatum, sed voluit quod natura corporalis illi nocumento succumberet, dicitur suam animam posuisse, vel voluntarie mortuus esse. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum dicitur, nemo tollit animam meam a me, intelligitur, me invito. Quod enim aliquis ab invito aufert, qui resistere non potest, id proprie dicitur tolli. Ad secundum dicendum quod, ut Christus ostenderet quod passio illata per violentiam eius animam non eripiebat, naturam corporalem in eius fortitudine conservavit, ut etiam in extremis positus voce magna clamaret. Quod inter alia miracula mortis eius computatur. Unde dicitur Marci XV, videns autem centurio qui ex adverso stabat, quia sic clamans exspirasset, ait, vere homo hic filius Dei erat. Fuit etiam et mirabile in Christi morte quod velocius mortuus fuit aliis qui simili poena afficiebantur. Unde dicitur Ioan. XIX, quod eorum qui cum Christo erant fregerunt crura, ut cito morerentur, ad Iesum autem cum venissent, invenerunt eum mortuum, unde non fregerunt eius crura. Et Marci XV dicitur quod Pilatus mirabatur si iam obiisset. Sicut enim eius voluntate natura corporalis conservata est in suo vigore usque ad extremum, sic etiam, quando voluit, subito cessit nocumento illato.

which the shower is entering: and in this way Christ was the cause of His own Passion and death. For He could have prevented His Passion and death. First, by holding His enemies in check, so that they would not have been eager to slay Him, or would have been powerless to do so. Second, because His spirit had the power of preserving His fleshly nature from the infliction of any injury; and Christ’s soul had this power, because it was united in unity of person with the Divine Word, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv). Therefore, since Christ’s soul did not repel the injury inflicted on His body, but willed His corporeal nature to succumb to such injury, He is said to have laid down His life, or to have died voluntarily. Reply Obj. 1: When we hear the words, No man taketh away My life from Me, we must understand against My will: for that is properly said to be taken away which one takes from someone who is unwilling and unable to resist. Reply Obj. 2: In order for Christ to show that the Passion inflicted by violence did not take away His life, He preserved the strength of His bodily nature, so that at the last moment He was able to cry out with a loud voice: and hence His death should be computed among His other miracles. Accordingly it is written (Mark 15:39): And the centurion who stood over against Him, seeing that crying out in this manner, He had given up the ghost, said: Indeed, this man was the Son of God. It was also a subject of wonder in Christ’s death that He died sooner than the others who were tormented with the same suffering. Hence John says (19:32) that they broke the legs of the first, and of the other that was crucified with Him, that they might die more speedily; but after they were come to Jesus, when they saw that He was already dead, they did not break His legs. Mark also states (15:44) that Pilate wondered that He should be already dead. For as of His own will His bodily nature kept its vigor to the end, so likewise, when He willed, He suddenly succumbed to the injury inflicted. Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus simul et vioReply Obj. 3: Christ at the same time suffered violence lentiam passus est, ut moreretur, et tamen voluntarie in order to die, and died, nevertheless, voluntarily; because mortuus fuit, quia violentia corpori eius illata est, quae violence was inflicted on His body, which, however, pretamen tantum corpori eius praevaluit quantum ipse vol- vailed over His body only so far as He willed it.

uit.

Article 2 Whether Christ died out of obedience? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non fuerit ex obedientia mortuus. Obedientia enim respicit praeceptum. Sed non legitur Christo fuisse praeceptum quod ipse pateretur. Non ergo ex obedientia passus fuit. Praeterea, illud dicitur ex obedientia aliquis facere quod facit ex necessitate praecepti. Christus autem

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not die out of obedience. For obedience is referred to a command. But we do not read that Christ was commanded to suffer. Therefore He did not suffer out of obedience. Obj. 2: Further, a man is said to do from obedience what he does from necessity of precept. But Christ did not

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non ex necessitate, sed voluntarie passus fuit. Non ergo passus est ex obedientia. Praeterea, caritas est excellentior virtus quam obedientia. Sed Christus legitur ex caritate passus, secundum illud Ephes. V, ambulate in dilectione, sicut et Christus dilexit nos, et tradidit semetipsum pro nobis. Ergo passio Christi magis debet attribui caritati quam obedientiae. Sed contra est quod dicitur Philipp. II, factus est obediens patri usque ad mortem. Respondeo dicendum quod convenientissimum fuit quod Christus ex obedientia pateretur. Primo quidem, quia hoc conveniebat iustificationi humanae, ut, sicut per unius hominis inobedientiam peccatores constituti sunt multi, ita per unius hominis obedientiam iusti constituantur multi, ut dicitur Rom. V. Secundo, hoc fuit conveniens reconciliationi Dei ad homines, secundum illud Rom. V, reconciliati sumus Deo per mortem filii eius, inquantum scilicet ipsa mors Christi fuit quoddam sacrificium acceptissimum Deo, secundum illud Ephes., tradidit semetipsum pro nobis oblationem et hostiam Deo in odorem suavitatis. Obedientia vero omnibus sacrificiis antefertur, secundum illud I Reg. XV, melior est obedientia quam victimae. Et ideo conveniens fuit ut sacrificium passionis et mortis Christi ex obedientia procederet. Tertio, hoc conveniens fuit eius victoriae, qua de morte et auctore mortis triumphavit. Non enim miles vincere potest nisi duci obediat. Et ita homo Christus victoriam obtinuit per hoc quod Deo fuit obediens, secundum illud Proverb. XXI, vir obediens loquitur victorias. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus mandatum accepit a patre ut pateretur, dicitur enim Ioan. X, potestatem habeo ponendi animam meam, et potestatem habeo iterum sumendi eam, et hoc mandatum accepi a patre meo, scilicet ponendi animam et sumendi. Ex quo, ut Chrysostomus dicit, non est intelligendum quod prius expectaverit audire, et opus fuerit ei discere, sed voluntarium monstravit processum, et contrarietatis ad patrem suspicionem destruxit. Quia tamen in morte Christi lex vetus consummata est, secundum illud quod ipse moriens dixit, Ioan. XIX, consummatum est; potest intelligi quod patiendo omnia veteris legis praecepta implevit. Moralia quidem, quae in praeceptis caritatis fundantur, implevit inquantum passus est et ex dilectione patris, secundum illud Ioan. XIV, ut cognoscat mundus quia diligo patrem, et sicut mandatum dedit mihi pater sic facio, surgite, eamus hinc, scilicet ad locum passionis, et etiam ex dilectione proximi, secundum illud Galat. II dilexit me, et tradidit semetipsum pro me. Caeremonialia vero praecepta legis, quae ad sacrificia et oblationes praecipue ordinantur, implevit Christus sua passione inquantum omnia antiqua sacrificia figurae fuerunt illius veri sacrificii quod Christus obtulit moriendo pro nobis. Unde dicitur Coloss. II, nemo vos iudicet in cibo aut in potu, aut

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suffer necessarily, but voluntarily. Therefore He did not suffer out of obedience. Obj. 3: Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than obedience. But we read that Christ suffered out of charity, according to Eph. 5:2: Walk in love, as Christ also has loved us, and delivered Himself up for us. Therefore Christ’s Passion ought to be ascribed rather to charity than to obedience. On the contrary, It is written (Phil 2:8): He became obedient to the Father unto death. I answer that, It was befitting that Christ should suffer out of obedience. First of all, because it was in keeping with human justification, that as by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners: so also by the obedience of one, many shall be made just, as is written Rom. 5:19. Second, it was suitable for reconciling man with God: hence it is written (Rom 5:10): We are reconciled to God by the death of His Son, in so far as Christ’s death was a most acceptable sacrifice to God, according to Eph. 5:2: He delivered Himself for us an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odor of sweetness. Now obedience is preferred to all sacrifices. according to 1 Kings 15:22: Obedience is better than sacrifices. Therefore it was fitting that the sacrifice of Christ’s Passion and death should proceed from obedience. Third, it was in keeping with His victory whereby He triumphed over death and its author; because a soldier cannot conquer unless he obey his captain. And so the Man-Christ secured the victory through being obedient to God, according to Prov. 21:28: An obedient man shall speak of victory. Reply Obj. 1: Christ received a command from the Father to suffer. For it is written (John 10:18): I have power to lay down My life, and I have power to take it up again: (and) this commandment have I received of My Father—namely, of laying down His life and of resuming it again. From which, as Chrysostom says (Hom. lix in Joan.), it is not to be understood that at first He awaited the command, and that He had need to be told, but He showed the proceeding to be a voluntary one, and destroyed suspicion of opposition to the Father. Yet because the Old Law was ended by Christ’s death, according to His dying words, It is consummated (John 19:30), it may be understood that by His suffering He fulfilled all the precepts of the Old Law. He fulfilled those of the moral order which are founded on the precepts of charity, inasmuch as He suffered both out of love of the Father, according to John 14:31: That the world may know that I love the Father, and as the Father hath given Me commandment, so do I: arise, let us go hence—namely, to the place of His Passion: and out of love of His neighbor, according to Gal. 2:20: He loved me, and delivered Himself up for me. Christ likewise by His Passion fulfilled the ceremonial precepts of the Law, which are chiefly ordained for sacrifices and oblations, in so far as all the ancient sacrifices were figures of that true sacrifice which the dying Christ offered for us. Hence

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in parte diei festi aut Neomeniae, quae sunt umbra futurorum, corpus autem Christi, eo scilicet quod Christus comparatur ad illa sicut corpus ad umbram. Praecepta vero iudicialia legis, quae praecipue ordinantur ad satisfaciendum iniuriam passis, implevit Christus sua passione, quoniam, ut in Psalmo dicitur, quae non rapuit, tunc exsolvit, permittens se ligno affigi pro pomo quod de ligno homo rapuerat contra Dei mandatum.

Ad secundum dicendum quod obedientia, etsi importet necessitatem respectu eius quod praecipitur, tamen importat voluntatem respectu impletionis praecepti. Et talis fuit obedientia Christi. Nam ipsa passio et mors, secundum se considerata, naturali voluntati repugnabat, volebat tamen Christus Dei voluntatem circa hoc implere, secundum illud Psalmi, ut facerem voluntatem tuam, Deus meus, volui. Unde dicebat, Matth. XXVI, si non potest transire a me calix iste nisi bibam illum, fiat voluntas tua. Ad tertium dicendum quod eadem ratione Christus passus est ex caritate, et obedientia, quia etiam praecepta caritatis nonnisi ex obedientia implevit; et obediens fuit ex dilectione ad patrem praecipientem.

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it is written (Col 2:16, 17): Let no man judge you in meat or drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ’s, for the reason that Christ is compared to them as a body is to a shadow. Christ also by His Passion fulfilled the judicial precepts of the Law, which are chiefly ordained for making compensation to them who have suffered wrong, since, as is written Ps. 68:5: He paid that which He took not away, suffering Himself to be fastened to a tree on account of the apple which man had plucked from the tree against God’s command. Reply Obj. 2: Although obedience implies necessity with regard to the thing commanded, nevertheless it implies free-will with regard to the fulfilling of the precept. And, indeed, such was Christ’s obedience, for, although His Passion and death, considered in themselves, were repugnant to the natural will, yet Christ resolved to fulfill God’s will with respect to the same, according to Ps. 39:9: That I should do Thy will: O my God, I have desired it. Hence He said (Matt 26:42): If this chalice may not pass away, but I must drink it, Thy will be done. Reply Obj. 3: For the same reason Christ suffered out of charity and out of obedience; because He fulfilled even the precepts of charity out of obedience only; and was obedient, out of love, to the Father’s command.

Article 3 Whether God the Father delivered up Christ to the Passion? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus pater non tradiderit Christum passioni. Iniquum enim et crudele esse videtur quod innocens passioni et morti tradatur. Sed, sicut dicitur Deut. XXXII Deus fidelis et absque ulla iniquitate. Ergo Christum innocentem non tradidit passioni et morti. Praeterea, non videtur quod aliquis a seipso, et ab alio morti tradatur. Sed Christus tradidit semetipsum pro nobis, secundum quod dicitur Isaiae LIII, tradidit in mortem animam suam. Non ergo videtur quod Deus pater eum tradiderit. Praeterea, Iudas vituperatur ex eo quod tradidit Christum Iudaeis, secundum illud Ioan. VI, unus ex vobis Diabolus est, quod dicebat propter Iudam, qui eum erat traditurus. Similiter etiam vituperantur Iudaei, qui eum tradiderunt Pilato, secundum quod ipse dicit, Ioan. XVIII, gens tua et pontifices tui tradiderunt te mihi. Pilatus autem tradidit ipsum ut crucifigeretur, ut habetur Ioan. XIX, non est autem conventio iustitiae cum iniquitate, ut dicitur II Cor. VI. Ergo videtur quod Deus pater Christum non tradiderit passioni.

Objection 1: It would seem that God the Father did not deliver up Christ to the Passion. For it is a wicked and cruel act to hand over an innocent man to torment and death. But, as it is written (Deut 32:4): God is faithful, and without any iniquity. Therefore He did not hand over the innocent Christ to His Passion and death. Obj. 2: Further, it is not likely that a man be given over to death by himself and by another also. But Christ gave Himself up for us, as it is written (Isa 53:12): He hath delivered His soul unto death. Consequently it does not appear that God the Father delivered Him up. Obj. 3: Further, Judas is held to be guilty because he betrayed Christ to the Jews, according to John 6:71: One of you is a devil, alluding to Judas, who was to betray Him. The Jews are likewise reviled for delivering Him up to Pilate; as we read in John 18:35: Thy own nation, and the chief priests have delivered Thee up to me. Moreover, as is related in John 19:16: Pilate delivered Him to them to be crucified; and according to 2 Cor. 6:14: there is no participation of justice with injustice. It seems, therefore, that God the Father did not deliver up Christ to His Passion.

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Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. VIII, proprio filio suo non pepercit Deus, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, Christus passus est voluntarie ex obedientia patris. Unde secundum tria Deus pater tradidit Christum passioni. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod sua aeterna voluntate praeordinavit passionem Christi ad humani generis liberationem, secundum illud quod dicitur Isaiae LIII, dominus posuit in eo iniquitatem omnium nostrum; et iterum, dominus voluit conterere eum in infirmitate. Secundo, inquantum inspiravit ei voluntatem patiendi pro nobis, infundendo ei caritatem. Unde ibidem sequitur, oblatus est quia voluit. Tertio, non protegendo eum a passione, sed exponendo persequentibus. Unde, ut legitur Matth. XXVII, pendens in cruce Christus dicebat, Deus meus, ut quid dereliquisti me? Quia scilicet potestati persequentium eum exposuit, ut Augustinus dicit.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod innocentem hominem passioni et morti tradere contra eius voluntatem, est impium et crudele. Sic autem Deus pater Christum non tradidit, sed inspirando ei voluntatem patiendi pro nobis. In quo ostenditur et Dei severitas, qui peccatum sine poena dimittere noluit, quod significat apostolus dicens, proprio filio suo non pepercit, et bonitas eius, in eo quod, cum homo sufficienter satisfacere non posset per aliquam poenam quam pateretur, ei satisfactorem dedit, quod significavit apostolus dicens, pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum. Et Rom. III dicit, quem, scilicet Christum, per fidem propitiatorem proposuit Deus in sanguine ipsius. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus, secundum quod Deus, tradidit semetipsum in mortem eadem voluntate et actione qua et pater tradidit eum. Sed inquantum homo, tradidit semetipsum voluntate a patre inspirata. Unde non est contrarietas in hoc quod pater tradidit Christum, et ipse tradidit semetipsum. Ad tertium dicendum quod eadem actio diversimode iudicatur in bono vel in malo, secundum quod ex diversa radice procedit. Pater enim tradidit Christum, et ipse seipsum, ex caritate, et ideo laudantur. Iudas autem tradidit ipsum ex cupiditate, Iudaei ex invidia, Pilatus ex timore mundano, quo timuit Caesarem, et ideo ipsi vituperantur.

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On the contrary, It is written (Rom 8:32): God hath not spared His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all. I answer that, As observed above (A. 2), Christ suffered voluntarily out of obedience to the Father. Hence in three respects God the Father did deliver up Christ to the Passion. In the first way, because by His eternal will He preordained Christ’s Passion for the deliverance of the human race, according to the words of Isaias (53:6): The Lord hath laid on Him the iniquities of us all; and again (Isa 53:10): The Lord was pleased to bruise Him in infirmity. Second, inasmuch as, by the infusion of charity, He inspired Him with the will to suffer for us; hence we read in the same passage: He was offered because it was His own will (Isa 53:7). Third, by not shielding Him from the Passion, but abandoning Him to His persecutors: thus we read (Matt 27:46) that Christ, while hanging upon the cross, cried out: My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me? because, to wit, He left Him to the power of His persecutors, as Augustine says (Ep. cxl). Reply Obj. 1: It is indeed a wicked and cruel act to hand over an innocent man to torment and to death against his will. Yet God the Father did not so deliver up Christ, but inspired Him with the will to suffer for us. God’s severity (cf. Rom. 11:22) is thereby shown, for He would not remit sin without penalty: and the Apostle indicates this when (Rom 8:32) he says: God spared not even His own Son. Likewise His goodness (Rom 11:22) shines forth, since by no penalty endured could man pay Him enough satisfaction: and the Apostle denotes this when he says: He delivered Him up for us all: and, again (Rom 3:25): Whom—that is to say, Christ—God hath proposed to be a propitiation through faith in His blood. Reply Obj. 2: Christ as God delivered Himself up to death by the same will and action as that by which the Father delivered Him up; but as man He gave Himself up by a will inspired of the Father. Consequently there is no contrariety in the Father delivering Him up and in Christ delivering Himself up. Reply Obj. 3: The same act, for good or evil, is judged differently, accordingly as it proceeds from a different source. The Father delivered up Christ, and Christ surrendered Himself, from charity, and consequently we give praise to both: but Judas betrayed Christ from greed, the Jews from envy, and Pilate from worldly fear, for he stood in fear of Caesar; and these accordingly are held guilty.

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Article 4 Whether it was fitting for Christ to suffer at the hands of the Gentiles? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Christum pati a gentilibus. Quia enim per mortem Christi homines erant a peccato liberandi, conveniens videretur ut paucissimi in morte eius peccarent. Peccaverunt autem in morte eius Iudaei, ex quorum persona dicitur, Matth. XXI, hic est heres; venite, occidamus eum. Ergo videtur conveniens fuisse quod in peccato occisionis Christi gentiles non implicarentur. Praeterea, veritas debet respondere figurae. Sed figuralia sacrificia veteris legis non gentiles, sed Iudaei offerebant. Ergo neque passio Christi, quae fuit verum sacrificium, impleri debuit per manus gentilium. Praeterea, sicut dicitur Ioan. V, Iudaei quaerebant Christum interficere, non solum quia solvebat sabbatum, sed etiam quia patrem suum dicebat Deum, aequalem se Deo faciens. Sed haec videbantur esse solum contra legem Iudaeorum, unde et ipsi dicunt, Ioan. XIX, secundum legem debet mori, quia filium Dei se fecit. Videtur ergo conveniens fuisse quod Christus non a gentilibus, sed a Iudaeis pateretur, et falsum esse quod dixerunt, nobis non licet interficere quemquam, cum multa peccata secundum legem morte puniantur, ut patet Levit. XX. Sed contra est quod ipse dominus dicit, Matth. XX, tradent eum gentibus ad illudendum et flagellandum et crucifigendum. Respondeo dicendum quod in ipso modo passionis Christi praefiguratus est effectus ipsius. Primo enim passio Christi effectum salutis habuit in Iudaeis, quorum plurimi in morte Christi baptizati sunt, ut patet Act. II et IV. Secundo vero, Iudaeis praedicantibus, effectus passionis Christi transivit ad gentes. Et ideo conveniens fuit ut Christus a Iudaeis pati inciperet, et postea, Iudaeis tradentibus, per manus gentilium eius passio finiretur.

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that Christ should suffer at the hands of the Gentiles. For since men were to be freed from sin by Christ’s death, it would seem fitting that very few should sin in His death. But the Jews sinned in His death, on whose behalf it is said (Matt 21:38): This is the heir; come, let us kill him. It seems fitting, therefore, that the Gentiles should not be implicated in the sin of Christ’s slaying. Obj. 2: Further, the truth should respond to the figure. Now it was not the Gentiles but the Jews who offered the figurative sacrifices of the Old Law. Therefore neither ought Christ’s Passion, which was a true sacrifice, to be fulfilled at the hands of the Gentiles. Obj. 3: Further, as related John 5:18, the Jews sought to kill Christ because He did not only break the sabbath, but also said God was His Father, making Himself equal to God. But these things seemed to be only against the Law of the Jews: hence they themselves said (John 19:7): According to the Law He ought to die because He made Himself the Son of God. It seems fitting, therefore, that Christ should suffer, at the hands not of the Gentiles, but of the Jews, and that what they said was untrue: It is not lawful for us to put any man to death, since many sins are punishable with death according to the Law, as is evident from Lev. 20. On the contrary, our Lord Himself says (Matt 20:19): They shall deliver Him to the Gentiles to be mocked, and scourged, and crucified. I answer that, The effect of Christ’s Passion was foreshown by the very manner of His death. For Christ’s Passion wrought its effect of salvation first of all among the Jews, very many of whom were baptized in His death, as is evident from Acts 2:41 and Acts 4:4. Afterwards, by the preaching of Jews, Christ’s Passion passed on to the Gentiles. Consequently it was fitting that Christ should begin His sufferings at the hands of the Jews, and, after they had delivered Him up, finish His Passion at the hands of the Gentiles. Reply Obj. 1: In order to demonstrate the fullness of His love, on account of which He suffered, Christ upon the cross prayed for His persecutors. Therefore, that the fruits of His petition might accrue to Jews and Gentiles, Christ willed to suffer from both. Reply Obj. 2: Christ’s Passion was the offering of a sacrifice, inasmuch as He endured death of His own free-will out of charity: but in so far as He suffered from His persecutors it was not a sacrifice, but a most grievous sin.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia Christus, ad ostendendam abundantiam caritatis suae, ex qua patiebatur, in cruce positus veniam persecutoribus postulavit; ut huius petitionis fructus ad Iudaeos et gentiles perveniret, voluit Christus ab utrisque pati. Ad secundum dicendum quod passio Christi fuit sacrificii oblatio inquantum Christus propria voluntate mortem sustinuit ex caritate. Inquantum autem a persecutoribus est passus, non fuit sacrificium, sed peccatum gravissimum. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus diReply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Tract. cxiv in Joan.): cit, Iudaei dicentes, nobis non licet interficere quemquam, The Jews said that ‘it is not lawful for us to put any man intellexerunt non sibi licere interficere quemquam prop- to death,’ because they understood that it was not lawful for

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ter festi diei sanctitatem, quam celebrare iam coeperant. Vel hoc dicebant, ut Chrysostomus dicit, quia volebant eum occidi, non tanquam transgressorem legis, sed tanquam publicum hostem, quia regem se fecerat, de quo non erat eorum iudicare. Vel quia non licebat eis crucifigere, quod cupiebant, sed lapidare, quod in Stephano fecerunt. Vel melius dicendum est quod per Romanos, quibus erant subiecti, erat eis potestas occidendi interdicta.

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them to put any man to death owing to the sacredness of the feast-day, which they had already begun to celebrate. Or, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. lxxxiii in Joan.), because they wanted Him to be slain, not as a transgressor of the Law, but as a public enemy, since He had made Himself out to be a king, of which it was not their place to judge. Or, again, because it was not lawful for them to crucify Him (as they wanted to), but to stone Him, as they did to Stephen. Better still is it to say that the power of putting to death was taken from them by the Romans, whose subjects they were.

Article 5 Whether Christ’s persecutors knew who he was? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod persecutores Christi eum cognoverunt. Dicitur enim Matth. XXI, quod agricolae, videntes filium, dixerunt intra se, hic est heres, venite, occidamus eum. Ubi dicit Hieronymus, manifestissime dominus probat his verbis Iudaeorum principes non per ignorantiam, sed per invidiam Dei filium crucifixisse. Intellexerunt enim esse illum cui pater per prophetam dicit, postula a me, et dabo tibi gentes hereditatem tuam. Ergo videtur quod cognoverunt eum esse Christum, vel filium Dei. Praeterea, Ioan. XV dominus dixit, nunc autem et viderunt et oderunt et me et patrem meum. Quod autem videtur, manifeste cognoscitur. Ergo Iudaei, cognoscentes Christum, ex causa odii ei passionem intulerunt. Praeterea, in quodam sermone Ephesini Concilii dicitur, sicut qui chartam imperialem disrumpit, tanquam imperatoris disrumpens verbum, ad mortem adducitur, sic crucifigens Iudaeus quem viderat, poenas dabit tanquam in ipsum Deum verbum praesumptiones iniiciens. Hoc autem non esset si eum Dei filium esse non cognoverunt, quia ignorantia eos excusasset. Ergo videtur quod Iudaei crucifigentes Christum cognoverunt eum esse filium Dei. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Cor. II, si cognovissent, nunquam dominum gloriae crucifixissent. Et Act. III dicit Petrus, Iudaeis loquens, scio quod per ignorantiam fecistis sicut et principes vestri. Et dominus, in cruce pendens, dixit, pater, dimitte illis, non enim sciunt quid faciunt. Respondeo dicendum quod apud Iudaeos quidam erant maiores, et quidam minores. Maiores quidem, qui eorum principes dicebantur, cognoverunt, ut dicitur in libro quaest. Nov. et Vet. Test., sicut et Daemones cognoverunt, eum esse Christum promissum in lege, omnia enim signa videbant in eo quae dixerant futura prophetae. Mysterium autem divinitatis eius ignorabant, et ideo apostolus dixit quod, si cognovissent, nunquam domi-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s persecutors did know who He was. For it is written (Matt 21:38) that the husbandmen seeing the son said within themselves: This is the heir; come, let us kill him. On this Jerome remarks: Our Lord proves most manifestly by these words that the rulers of the Jews crucified the Son of God, not from ignorance, but out of envy: for they understood that it was He to whom the Father says by the Prophet: ‘Ask of Me, and I will give Thee the Gentiles for Thy inheritance.’ It seems, therefore, that they knew Him to be Christ or the Son of God. Obj. 2: Further, our Lord says (John 15:24): But now they have both seen and hated both Me and My Father. Now what is seen is known manifestly. Therefore the Jews, knowing Christ, inflicted the Passion on Him out of hatred. Obj. 3: Further, it is said in a sermon delivered in the Council of Ephesus (P. iii, cap. x): Just as he who tears up the imperial message is doomed to die, as despising the prince’s word; so the Jew, who crucified Him whom he had seen, will pay the penalty for daring to lay his hands on God the Word Himself. Now this would not be so had they not known Him to be the Son of God, because their ignorance would have excused them. Therefore it seems that the Jews in crucifying Christ knew Him to be the Son of God. On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor 2:8): If they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory. And (Acts 3:17), Peter, addressing the Jews, says: I know that you did it through ignorance, as did also your rulers. Likewise the Lord hanging upon the cross said: Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do (Luke 23:34). I answer that, Among the Jews some were elders, and others of lesser degree. Now according to the author of De Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test., qu. lxvi, the elders, who were called rulers, knew, as did also the devils, that He was the Christ promised in the Law: for they saw all the signs in Him which the prophets said would come to pass: but they did not know the mystery of His Godhead. Consequently the Apostle says: If they had known it, they would never have cruci-

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num gloriae crucifixissent. Sciendum tamen quod eorum ignorantia non eos excusabat a crimine, quia erat quodammodo ignorantia affectata. Videbant enim evidentia signa ipsius divinitatis, sed ex odio et invidia Christi ea pervertebant, et verbis eius, quibus se Dei filium fatebatur, credere noluerunt. Unde ipse de eis dicit, Ioan. XV, si non venissem, et locutus eis non fuissem, peccatum non haberent, nunc autem excusationem non habent de peccato suo. Et postea subdit, si opera non fecissem in eis quae nemo alius fecit, peccatum non haberent. Et sic ex persona eorum accipi potest quod dicitur Iob XXI, dixerunt Deo, recede a nobis, scientiam viarum tuarum nolumus.

Minores vero, idest populares, qui mysteria Scripturae non noverant, non plene cognoverunt ipsum esse nec Christum nec filium Dei, licet aliqui eorum etiam in eum crediderint. Multitudo tamen non credidit. Et si aliquando dubitarent an ipse esset Christus, propter signorum multitudinem, et efficaciam doctrinae, ut habetur Ioan. VII, tamen postea decepti fuerunt a suis principibus ut eum non crederent neque filium Dei neque Christum. Unde et Petrus eis dixit, scio quod per ignorantiam hoc fecistis, sicut et principes vestri, quia scilicet per principes seducti erant. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa verba dicuntur ex persona colonorum vineae, per quos significantur rectores illius populi, qui eum cognoverunt esse heredem, inquantum cognoverunt eum esse Christum promissum in lege. Sed contra hanc responsionem videtur esse quod illa verba Psalmi, postula a me et dabo tibi gentes hereditatem tuam, eidem dicuntur cui dicitur, filius meus es tu, ego hodie genui te. Si ergo cognoverunt eum esse illum cui dictum est, postula a me et dabo tibi gentes hereditatem tuam, sequitur quod cognoverunt eum esse filium Dei. Chrysostomus etiam, ibidem, dicit quod cognoverunt eum esse filium Dei. Beda etiam dicit, super illud Luc. XXIII, quia nesciunt quid faciunt, notandum, inquit, quod non pro eis orat qui, quem filium Dei intellexerunt, crucifigere quam confiteri maluerunt. Sed ad hoc potest responderi quod cognoverunt eum esse filium Dei non per naturam, sed per excellentiam gratiae singularis. Possumus tamen dicere quod etiam verum Dei filium cognovisse dicuntur, quia evidentia signa huius rei habebant, quibus tamen assentire propter odium et invidiam noluerunt, ut eum cognoscerent esse filium Dei. Ad secundum dicendum quod ante illa verba praemittitur, si opera non fecissem in eis quae nemo alius fecit, peccatum non haberent, et postea subditur, nunc autem viderunt, et oderunt et me et patrem meum. Per quod

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fied the Lord of glory. It must, however, be understood that their ignorance did not excuse them from crime, because it was, as it were, affected ignorance. For they saw manifest signs of His Godhead; yet they perverted them out of hatred and envy of Christ; neither would they believe His words, whereby He avowed that He was the Son of God. Hence He Himself says of them (John 15:22): If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin. And afterwards He adds (John 15:24): If I had not done among them the works that no other man hath done, they would not have sin. And so the expression employed by Job (21:14) can be accepted on their behalf: (Who) said to God: depart from us, we desire not the knowledge of Thy ways. But those of lesser degree—namely, the common folk— who had not grasped the mysteries of the Scriptures, did not fully comprehend that He was the Christ or the Son of God. For although some of them believed in Him, yet the multitude did not; and if they doubted sometimes whether He was the Christ, on account of the manifold signs and force of His teaching, as is stated John 7:31, 41, nevertheless they were deceived afterwards by their rulers, so that they did not believe Him to be the Son of God or the Christ. Hence Peter said to them: I know that you did it through ignorance, as did also your rulers—namely, because they were seduced by the rulers. Reply Obj. 1: Those words are spoken by the husbandmen of the vineyard; and these signify the rulers of the people, who knew Him to be the heir, inasmuch as they knew Him to be the Christ promised in the Law. But the words of Ps. 2:8 seem to militate against this answer: Ask of Me, and I will give Thee the Gentiles for Thy inheritance; which are addressed to Him of whom it is said: Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee. If, then, they knew Him to be the one to whom the words were addressed: Ask of Me, and I will give Thee the Gentiles for Thy inheritance, it follows that they knew Him to be the Son of God. Chrysostom, too, says upon the same passage that they knew Him to be the Son of God. Bede likewise, commenting on the words, For they know not what they do (Luke 23:34), says: It is to be observed that He does not pray for them who, understanding Him to be the Son of God, preferred to crucify Him rather than acknowledge Him. But to this it may be replied that they knew Him to be the Son of God, not from His Nature, but from the excellence of His singular grace. Yet we may hold that they are said to have known also that He was verily the Son of God, in that they had evident signs thereof: yet out of hatred and envy, they refused credence to these signs, by which they might have known that He was the Son of God. Reply Obj. 2: The words quoted are preceded by the following: If I had not done among them the works that no other man hath done, they would not have sin; and then follow the words: But now they have both seen and hated both

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ostenditur quod, videntes opera Christi mirifica, ex odio Me and My Father. Now all this shows that while they beprocessit quod eum filium Dei non cognoverunt. held Christ’s marvelous works, it was owing to their hatred that they did not know Him to be the Son of God. Ad tertium dicendum quod ignorantia affectata Reply Obj. 3: Affected ignorance does not excuse from non excusat a culpa sed magis videtur culpam aggrava- guilt, but seems, rather, to aggravate it: for it shows that a re, ostendit enim hominem sic vehementer esse affectum man is so strongly attached to sin that he wishes to incur ad peccandum quod vult ignorantiam incurrere ne pec- ignorance lest he avoid sinning. The Jews therefore sinned, catum vitet. Et ideo Iudaei peccaverunt, non solum ho- as crucifiers not only of the Man-Christ, but also as of God. minis Christi, sed tanquam Dei crucifixores.

Article 6 Whether the sin of those who crucified Christ was most grievous? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum crucifigentium Christum non fuerit gravissimum. Non enim est gravissimum peccatum quod excusationem habet. Sed ipse dominus excusavit peccatum crucifigentium eum, dicens, pater, ignosce illis, quia nesciunt quid faciunt. Non ergo peccatum eorum fuit gravissimum. Praeterea, dominus dixit Pilato, Ioan. XIX, qui tradidit me tibi, maius peccatum habet. Ipse autem Pilatus fecit Christum crucifigi per suos ministros. Ergo videtur fuisse maius peccatum Iudae proditoris peccato crucifigentium Christum. Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in V Ethic., nullus patitur iniustum volens, et, sicut ipse ibidem dicit, nullo patiente iniustum, nullus facit iniustum. Ergo volenti nullus facit iniustum. Sed Christus voluntarie est passus, ut supra habitum est. Non ergo iniustum fecerunt crucifixores Christi. Et ita eorum peccatum non est gravissimum. Sed contra est quod super illud Matth. XXIII, et vos implete mensuram patrum vestrorum, dicit Chrysostomus, quantum ad veritatem, excesserunt mensuram patrum suorum. Illi enim homines occiderunt, isti Deum crucifixerunt. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, principes Iudaeorum cognoverunt Christum, et si aliqua ignorantia fuit in eis, fuit ignorantia affectata, quae eos non poterat excusare. Et ideo peccatum eorum fuit gravissimum, tum ex genere peccati; tum ex malitia voluntatis. Minores autem Iudaei gravissime peccaverunt quantum ad genus peccati, in aliquo tamen diminuebatur eorum peccatum propter eorum ignorantiam. Unde super illud Luc. XXIII, nesciunt quid faciunt, dicit Beda, pro illis rogat qui nescierunt quod fecerunt, zelum Dei habentes, sed non secundum scientiam. Multo autem magis fuit excusabile peccatum gentilium per quorum manus Christus crucifixus est, qui legis scientiam non habebant.

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of Christ’s crucifiers was not the most grievous. Because the sin which has some excuse cannot be most grievous. But our Lord Himself excused the sin of His crucifiers when He said: Father, forgive them: for they know not what they do (Luke 23:34). Therefore theirs was not the most grievous sin. Obj. 2: Further, our Lord said to Pilate (John 19:11): He that hath delivered Me to thee hath the greater sin. But it was Pilate who caused Christ to be crucified by his minions. Therefore the sin of Judas the traitor seems to be greater than that of those who crucified Him. Obj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v): No one suffers injustice willingly; and in the same place he adds: Where no one suffers injustice, nobody works injustice. Consequently nobody wreaks injustice upon a willing subject. But Christ suffered willingly, as was shown above (AA. 1, 2). Therefore those who crucified Christ did Him no injustice; and hence their sin was not the most grievous. On the contrary, Chrysostom, commenting on the words, Fill ye up, then, the measure of your fathers (Matt 23:32), says: In very truth they exceeded the measure of their fathers; for these latter slew men, but they crucified God. I answer that, As stated above (A. 5), the rulers of the Jews knew that He was the Christ: and if there was any ignorance in them, it was affected ignorance, which could not excuse them. Therefore their sin was the most grievous, both on account of the kind of sin, as well as from the malice of their will. The Jews also of the common order sinned most grievously as to the kind of their sin: yet in one respect their crime was lessened by reason of their ignorance. Hence Bede, commenting on Luke 23:34, Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do, says: He prays for them who know not what they are doing, as having the zeal of God, but not according to knowledge. But the sin of the Gentiles, by whose hands He was crucified, was much more excusable, since they had no knowledge of the Law.

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Q. 47, A. 6

Incarnate Son of God

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod excusatio illa domini non refertur ad principes Iudaeorum, sed ad minores de populo, sicut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod Iudas tradidit Christum, non Pilato, sed principibus sacerdotum, qui tradiderunt eum Pilato, secundum illud Ioan. XVIII, gens tua et pontifices tui tradiderunt te mihi. Horum tamen omnium peccatum fuit maius quam Pilati, qui timore Caesaris Christum occidit; et etiam quam peccatum militum, qui mandato praesidis Christum crucifixerunt; non ex cupiditate, sicut Iudas, nec ex invidia et odio, sicut principes sacerdotum. Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus voluit quidem suam passionem, sicut et Deus eam voluit, iniquam tamen actionem Iudaeorum noluit. Et ideo occisores Christi ab iniustitia non excusantur. Et tamen ille qui occidit hominem, iniuriam facit non solum homini, sed etiam Deo et reipublicae, sicut etiam et ille qui occidit seipsum, ut philosophus dicit, in V Ethic. Unde David damnavit illum ad mortem qui non timuerat mittere manum ut occideret Christum domini, quamvis eo petente, ut legitur II Reg. I.

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Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, the excuse made by our Lord is not to be referred to the rulers among the Jews, but to the common people. Reply Obj. 2: Judas did not deliver up Christ to Pilate, but to the chief priests who gave Him up to Pilate, according to John 18:35: Thy own nation and the chief priests have delivered Thee up to me. But the sin of all these was greater than that of Pilate, who slew Christ from fear of Caesar; and even greater than the sin of the soldiers who crucified Him at the governor’s bidding, not out of cupidity like Judas, nor from envy and hate like the chief priests. Reply Obj. 3: Christ, indeed willed His Passion just as the Father willed it; yet He did not will the unjust action of the Jews. Consequently Christ’s slayers are not excused of their injustice. Nevertheless, whoever slays a man not only does a wrong to the one slain, but likewise to God and to the State; just as he who kills himself, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v). Hence it was that David condemned to death the man who did not fear to lay hands upon the Lord’s anointed, even though he (Saul) had requested it, as related 2 Kings 1:5–14.

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Question 48 The Efficiency of Christ’s Passion Deinde considerandum est de effectu passionis ChriWe now have to consider Christ’s Passion as to its effect; sti. Et primo, de modo efficiendi; secundo, de ipso effec- first of all, as to the manner in which it was brought about; tu. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. and, second, as to the effect in itself. Under the first heading there are six points for inquiry: Primo, utrum passio Christi causaverit nostram (1) Whether Christ’s Passion brought about our salutem per modum meriti. salvation by way of merit? Secundo, utrum per modum satisfactionis. (2) Whether it was by way of atonement? Tertio, utrum per modum sacrificii. (3) Whether it was by way of sacrifice? Quarto, utrum per modum redemptionis. (4) Whether it was by way of redemption? Quinto, utrum esse redemptorem sit proprium (5) Whether it is proper to Christ to be the Redeemer? Christi. Sexto, utrum causaverit effectum nostrae salutis per (6) Whether (the Passion) secured man’s salvation modum efficientiae. efficiently?

Article 1 Whether Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation by way of merit? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio Christi non causaverit nostram salutem per modum meriti. Passionum enim principia non sunt in nobis. Nullus autem meretur vel laudatur nisi per id cuius principium est in ipso. Ergo passio Christi nihil est operata per modum meriti. Praeterea, Christus ab initio suae conceptionis meruit et sibi et nobis, ut supra dictum est. Sed superfluum est iterum mereri id quod alias meruerat. Ergo Christus per suam passionem non meruit nostram salutem. Praeterea, radix merendi est caritas. Sed caritas Christi non fuit magis augmentata in passione quam ante. Ergo non magis meruit salutem nostram patiendo quam ante fecerat. Sed contra est quod, super illud Philipp. II, propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum etc., dicit Augustinus, humilitas passionis claritatis est meritum, claritas humilitatis est praemium. Sed ipse clarificatus est non solum in seipso, sed etiam in suis fidelibus, ut ipse dicit, Ioan. XVII. Ergo videtur quod ipse meruit salutem suorum fidelium.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s Passion did not bring about our salvation by way of merit. For the sources of our sufferings are not within us. But no one merits or is praised except for that whose principle lies within him. Therefore Christ’s Passion wrought nothing by way of merit. Obj. 2: Further, from the beginning of His conception Christ merited for Himself and for us, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 4; Q. 34, A. 3). But it is superfluous to merit over again what has been merited before. Therefore by His Passion Christ did not merit our salvation. Obj. 3: Further, the source of merit is charity. But Christ’s charity was not made greater by the Passion than it was before. Therefore He did not merit our salvation by suffering more than He had already. On the contrary, on the words of Phil. 2:9, Therefore God exalted Him, etc., Augustine says (Tract. civ in Joan.): The lowliness of the Passion merited glory; glory was the reward of lowliness. But He was glorified, not merely in Himself, but likewise in His faithful ones, as He says Himself (John 17:10). Therefore it appears that He merited the salvation of the faithful. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, I answer that, As stated above (Q. 7, AA. 1, 9; Q. 8, Christo data est gratia non solum sicut singulari perso- AA. 1, 5), grace was bestowed upon Christ, not only as an nae, sed inquantum est caput Ecclesiae, ut scilicet ab ipso individual, but inasmuch as He is the Head of the Church, redundaret ad membra. Et ideo opera Christi hoc modo so that it might overflow into His members; and therefore se habent tam ad se quam ad sua membra, sicut se ha- Christ’s works are referred to Himself and to His members bent opera alterius hominis in gratia constituti ad ipsum. in the same way as the works of any other man in a state of

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Incarnate Son of God

Manifestum est autem quod quicumque in gratia constitutus propter iustitiam patitur, ex hoc ipso meretur sibi salutem, secundum illud Matth. V, beati qui persecutionem patiuntur propter iustitiam. Unde Christus non solum per suam passionem sibi, sed etiam omnibus suis membris meruit salutem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod passio inquantum huiusmodi, habet principium ab exteriori. Sed secundum quod eam aliquis voluntarie sustinet, habet principium ab interiori. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus a principio suae conceptionis meruit nobis salutem aeternam, sed ex parte nostra erant impedimenta quaedam, quibus impediebamur consequi effectum praecedentium meritorum. Unde, ad removendum illa impedimenta, oportuit Christum pati, ut supra dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod passio Christi habuit aliquem effectum quem non habuerunt praecedentia merita, non propter maiorem caritatem, sed propter genus operis, quod erat conveniens tali effectui, ut patet ex rationibus supra inductis de convenientia passionis Christi.

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grace are referred to himself. But it is evident that whosoever suffers for justice’s sake, provided that he be in a state of grace, merits his salvation thereby, according to Matt. 5:10: Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice’s sake. Consequently Christ by His Passion merited salvation, not only for Himself, but likewise for all His members. Reply Obj. 1: Suffering, as such, is caused by an outward principle: but inasmuch as one bears it willingly, it has an inward principle. Reply Obj. 2: From the beginning of His conception Christ merited our eternal salvation; but on our side there were some obstacles, whereby we were hindered from securing the effect of His preceding merits: consequently, in order to remove such hindrances, it was necessary for Christ to suffer, as stated above (Q. 46, A. 3). Reply Obj. 3: Christ’s Passion has a special effect, which His preceding merits did not possess, not on account of greater charity, but because of the nature of the work, which was suitable for such an effect, as is clear from the arguments brought forward above on the fittingness of Christ’s Passion (Q. 46, AA, 3, 4).

Article 2 Whether Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation by way of atonement? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio Christi non causaverit nostram salutem per modum satisfactionis. Eiusdem enim videtur esse satisfacere cuius est peccare, sicut patet in aliis poenitentiae partibus; eiusdem enim est conteri et confiteri cuius est peccare. Sed Christus non peccavit, secundum illud I Pet. II, qui peccatum non fecit. Ergo ipse non satisfecit propria passione. Praeterea, nulli satisfit per maiorem offensam. Sed maxima offensa fuit perpetrata in Christi passione, quia gravissime peccaverunt qui eum occiderunt, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod per passionem Christi non potuit Deo satisfieri. Praeterea, satisfactio importat aequalitatem quandam ad culpam, cum sit actus iustitiae. Sed passio Christi non videtur esse aequalis omnibus peccatis humani generis, quia Christus non est passus secundum divinitatem, sed secundum carnem, secundum illud I Pet. IV, Christo igitur passo in carne; anima autem, in qua est peccatum, potior est quam caro. Non ergo Christus sua passione satisfecit pro peccatis nostris. Sed contra est quod ex persona eius dicitur in Psalmo, quae non rapui, tunc exsolvebam. Non autem

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s Passion did not bring about our salvation by way of atonement. For it seems that to make the atonement devolves on him who commits the sin; as is clear in the other parts of penance, because he who has done the wrong must grieve over it and confess it. But Christ never sinned, according to 1 Pet. 2:22: Who did no sin. Therefore He made no atonement by His personal suffering. Obj. 2: Further, no atonement is made to another by committing a graver offense. But in Christ’s Passion the gravest of all offenses was perpetrated, because those who slew Him sinned most grievously, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 6). Consequently it seems that atonement could not be made to God by Christ’s Passion. Obj. 3: Further, atonement implies equality with the trespass, since it is an act of justice. But Christ’s Passion does not appear equal to all the sins of the human race, because Christ did not suffer in His Godhead, but in His flesh, according to 1 Pet. 4:1: Christ therefore having suffered in the flesh. Now the soul, which is the subject of sin, is of greater account than the flesh. Therefore Christ did not atone for our sins by His Passion. On the contrary, It is written (Ps 68:5) in Christ’s person: Then did I pay that which I took not away. But he

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exsolvit qui perfecte non satisfecit. Ergo videtur quod Christus patiendo satisfecerit perfecte pro peccatis nostris. Respondeo dicendum quod ille proprie satisfacit pro offensa qui exhibet offenso id quod aeque vel magis diligit quam oderit offensam. Christus autem, ex caritate et obedientia patiendo, maius aliquid Deo exhibuit quam exigeret recompensatio totius offensae humani generis. Primo quidem, propter magnitudinem caritatis ex qua patiebatur. Secundo, propter dignitatem vitae suae, quam pro satisfactione ponebat, quae erat vita Dei et hominis. Tertio, propter generalitatem passionis et magnitudinem doloris assumpti, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo passio Christi non solum sufficiens, sed etiam superabundans satisfactio fuit pro peccatis humani generis, secundum illud I Ioan. II, ipse est propitiatio pro peccatis nostris, non pro nostris autem tantum, sed etiam pro totius mundi. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caput et membra sunt quasi una persona mystica. Et ideo satisfactio Christi ad omnes fideles pertinet sicut ad sua membra. Inquantum etiam duo homines sunt unum in caritate, unus pro alio satisfacere potest, ut infra patebit. Non autem est similis ratio de confessione et contritione, quia satisfactio consistit in actu exteriori, ad quem assumi possunt instrumenta; inter quae computantur etiam amici. Ad secundum dicendum quod maior fuit caritas Christi patientis quam malitia crucifigentium. Et ideo plus potuit Christus satisfacere sua passione quam crucifixores offendere occidendo, in tantum quod passio Christi sufficiens fuit, et superabundans, ad satisfaciendum pro peccatis crucifigentium ipsum. Ad tertium dicendum quod dignitas carnis Christi non est aestimanda solum secundum carnis naturam, sed secundum personam assumentem, inquantum scilicet erat caro Dei, ex quo habebat dignitatem infinitam.

Q. 48, A. 3

has not paid who has not fully atoned. Therefore it appears that Christ by His suffering has fully atoned for our sins. I answer that, He properly atones for an offense who offers something which the offended one loves equally, or even more than he detested the offense. But by suffering out of love and obedience, Christ gave more to God than was required to compensate for the offense of the whole human race. First of all, because of the exceeding charity from which He suffered; second, on account of the dignity of His life which He laid down in atonement, for it was the life of one who was God and man; third, on account of the extent of the Passion, and the greatness of the grief endured, as stated above (Q. 46, A. 6). And therefore Christ’s Passion was not only a sufficient but a superabundant atonement for the sins of the human race; according to 1 John 2:2: He is the propitiation for our sins: and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world. Reply Obj. 1: The head and members are as one mystic person; and therefore Christ’s satisfaction belongs to all the faithful as being His members. Also, in so far as any two men are one in charity, the one can atone for the other as shall be shown later (Suppl., Q. 13, A. 2). But the same reason does not hold good of confession and contrition, because atonement consists in an outward action, for which helps may be used, among which friends are to be computed. Reply Obj. 2: Christ’s love was greater than His slayers’ malice: and therefore the value of His Passion in atoning surpassed the murderous guilt of those who crucified Him: so much so that Christ’s suffering was sufficient and superabundant atonement for His murderer’s crime. Reply Obj. 3: The dignity of Christ’s flesh is not to be estimated solely from the nature of flesh, but also from the Person assuming it—namely, inasmuch as it was God’s flesh, the result of which was that it was of infinite worth.

Article 3 Whether Christ’s Passion operated by way of sacrifice? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio Christi non fuerit operata per modum sacrificii. Veritas enim debet respondere figurae. Sed in sacrificiis veteris legis, quae erant figurae Christi, nunquam offerebatur caro humana, quinimmo haec sacrificia nefanda habebantur, secundum illud Psalmi, effuderunt sanguinem innocentem, sanguinem filiorum suorum et filiarum, quas sacrificaverunt sculptilibus Chanaan. Ergo videtur quod passio Christi sacrificium dici non possit.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s Passion did not operate by way of sacrifice. For the truth should correspond with the figure. But human flesh was never offered up in the sacrifices of the Old Law, which were figures of Christ: nay, such sacrifices were reputed as impious, according to Ps. 105:38: And they shed innocent blood: the blood of their sons and of their daughters, which they sacrificed to the idols of Chanaan. It seems therefore that Christ’s Passion cannot be called a sacrifice.

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Q. 48, A. 3

Incarnate Son of God

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in X de Civ. Dei, quod sacrificium visibile invisibilis sacrificii sacramentum, idest sacrum signum, est. Sed passio Christi non est signum, sed magis significatum per alia signa. Ergo videtur quod passio Christi non sit sacrificium. Praeterea, quicumque offert sacrificium, aliquid sacrum facit, ut ipsum nomen sacrificii demonstrat. Illi autem qui Christum occiderunt, non fecerunt aliquod sacrum, sed magnam malitiam perpetraverunt. Ergo passio Christi magis fuit maleficium quam sacrificium. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Ephes. V, tradidit semetipsum pro nobis oblationem et hostiam Deo in odorem suavitatis. Respondeo dicendum quod sacrificium proprie dicitur aliquid factum in honorem proprie Deo debitum, ad eum placandum. Et inde est quod Augustinus dicit, in X de Civ. Dei, verum sacrificium est omne opus quod agitur ut sancta societate Deo inhaereamus, relatum scilicet ad illum finem boni quo veraciter beati esse possumus. Christus autem, ut ibidem subditur, seipsum obtulit in passione pro nobis, et hoc ipsum opus, quod voluntarie passionem sustinuit, fuit Deo maxime acceptum, utpote ex caritate proveniens. Unde manifestum est quod passio Christi fuit verum sacrificium. Et, sicut ipse postea subdit in eodem libro, huius veri sacrificii multiplicia variaque signa erant sacrificia prisca sanctorum, cum hoc unum per multa figuraretur, tanquam verbis multis res una diceretur, ut sine fastidio multum commendaretur; et, cum quatuor considerentur in omni sacrificio, ut Augustinus dicit in IV de Trin., scilicet cui offeratur, a quo offeratur, quid offeratur, pro quibus offeratur, idem ipse qui unus verusque mediator per sacrificium pacis reconciliat nos Deo, unum cum illo maneret cui offerebat, unum in se faceret pro quibus offerebat, unus ipse esset qui offerebat, et quod offerebat. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet veritas respondeat figurae quantum ad aliquid, non tamen quantum ad omnia, quia oportet quod veritas figuram excedat. Et ideo convenienter figura huius sacrificii, quo caro Christi offertur pro nobis, fuit caro, non hominum, sed aliorum animalium significantium carnem Christi. Quae est perfectissimum sacrificium. Primo quidem quia, ex eo quod est humanae naturae caro, congrue pro hominibus offertur, et ab eis sumitur sub sacramento. Secundo quia, ex eo quod erat passibilis et mortalis, apta erat immolationi. Tertio quia, ex hoc quod erat sine peccato, efficax erat ad emundanda peccata. Quarto quia, ex eo quod erat caro ipsius offerentis, erat Deo accepta propter caritatem suam carnem offerentis. Unde Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin., quid tam congruenter ab hominibus sumeretur quod pro eis offerretur, quam humana caro? Et quid tam aptum huic immolationi quam caro mortalis? Et quid tam mundum pro mundandis vitiis

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Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x) that a visible sacrifice is a sacrament—that is, a sacred sign—of an invisible sacrifice. Now Christ’s Passion is not a sign, but rather the thing signified by other signs. Therefore it seems that Christ’s Passion is not a sacrifice. Obj. 3: Further, whoever offers sacrifice performs some sacred rite, as the very word sacrifice shows. But those men who slew Christ did not perform any sacred act, but rather wrought a great wrong. Therefore Christ’s Passion was rather a malefice than a sacrifice. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph 5:2): He delivered Himself up for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odor of sweetness. I answer that, A sacrifice properly so called is something done for that honor which is properly due to God, in order to appease Him: and hence it is that Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x): A true sacrifice is every good work done in order that we may cling to God in holy fellowship, yet referred to that consummation of happiness wherein we can be truly blessed. But, as is added in the same place, Christ offered Himself up for us in the Passion: and this voluntary enduring of the Passion was most acceptable to God, as coming from charity. Therefore it is manifest that Christ’s Passion was a true sacrifice. Moreover, as Augustine says farther on in the same book, the primitive sacrifices of the holy Fathers were many and various signs of this true sacrifice, one being prefigured by many, in the same way as a single concept of thought is expressed in many words, in order to commend it without tediousness: and, as Augustine observes, (De Trin. iv), since there are four things to be noted in every sacrifice—to wit, to whom it is offered, by whom it is offered, what is offered, and for whom it is offered—that the same one true Mediator reconciling us with God through the peace-sacrifice might continue to be one with Him to whom He offered it, might be one with them for whom He offered it, and might Himself be the offerer and what He offered. Reply Obj. 1: Although the truth answers to the figure in some respects, yet it does not in all, since the truth must go beyond the figure. Therefore the figure of this sacrifice, in which Christ’s flesh is offered, was flesh right fittingly, not the flesh of men, but of animals, as denoting Christ’s. And this is a most perfect sacrifice. First of all, since being flesh of human nature, it is fittingly offered for men, and is partaken of by them under the Sacrament. Second, because being passible and mortal, it was fit for immolation. Third, because, being sinless, it had virtue to cleanse from sins. Fourth, because, being the offerer’s own flesh, it was acceptable to God on account of His charity in offering up His own flesh. Hence it is that Augustine says (De Trin. iv): What else could be so fittingly partaken of by men, or offered up for men, as human flesh? What else could be so appropriate for this immolation as mortal flesh? What else is there so clean for cleansing mortals as the flesh born in the womb without fleshly concupiscence, and coming from a vir-

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mortalium quam sine contagione carnalis concupiscentiae caro nata in utero et ex utero virginali? Et quid tam grate offerri et suscipi posset quam caro sacrificii nostri, corpus effectum sacerdotis nostri? Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de sacrificiis visibilibus figuralibus. Et tamen ipsa passio Christi, licet sit aliquid significatum per alia sacrificia figuralia, est tamen signum alicuius rei observandae a nobis, secundum illud I Pet. IV, Christo igitur passo in carne, et vos eadem cogitatione armamini, quia qui passus est in carne, desiit a peccatis; ut iam non hominum desideriis, sed voluntati Dei, quod reliquum est in carne vivat temporis. Ad tertium dicendum quod passio Christi ex parte occidentium ipsum fuit maleficium, sed ex parte ipsius ex caritate patientis fuit sacrificium. Unde hoc sacrificium ipse Christus obtulisse dicitur, non autem illi qui eum occiderunt.

Q. 48, A. 4

ginal womb? What could be so favorably offered and accepted as the flesh of our sacrifice, which was made the body of our Priest? Reply Obj. 2: Augustine is speaking there of visible figurative sacrifices: and even Christ’s Passion, although denoted by other figurative sacrifices, is yet a sign of something to be observed by us, according to 1 Pet. 4:1: Christ therefore, having suffered in the flesh, be you also armed with the same thought: for he that hath suffered in the flesh hath ceased from sins: that now he may live the rest of his time in the flesh, not after the desires of men, but according to the will of God. Reply Obj. 3: Christ’s Passion was indeed a malefice on His slayers’ part; but on His own it was the sacrifice of one suffering out of charity. Hence it is Christ who is said to have offered this sacrifice, and not the executioners.

Article 4 Whether Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation by way of redemption? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio Christi non fuerit operata nostram salutem per modum redemptionis. Nullus enim emit vel redimit quod suum esse non desiit. Sed homines nunquam desierunt esse Dei, secundum illud Psalmi, domini est terra et plenitudo eius, orbis terrarum et universi qui habitant in eo. Ergo videtur quod Christus non redemerit nos sua passione. Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., Diabolus a Christo iustitia superandus fuit. Sed hoc exigit iustitia, ut ille qui invasit dolose rem alienam, debeat privari, quia fraus et dolus nemini debet patrocinari, ut etiam iura humana dicunt. Cum ergo Diabolus creaturam Dei, scilicet hominem, dolose deceperit et sibi subiugaverit, videtur quod non debuit homo per modum redemptionis ab eius eripi potestate. Praeterea, quicumque emit aut redimit aliquid, pretium solvit ei qui possidebat. Sed Christus non solvit sanguinem suum, qui dicitur esse pretium redemptionis nostrae, Diabolo, qui nos captivos tenebat. Non ergo Christus sua passione nos redemit. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Pet. I, non corruptibilibus auro vel argento redempti estis de vana vestra conversatione paternae traditionis, sed pretioso sanguine, quasi agni immaculati et incontaminati, Christi. Et Galat. III dicitur, Christus nos redemit de maledicto legis, factus pro nobis maledictum. Dicitur autem pro nobis factus male-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s Passion did not effect our salvation by way of redemption. For no one purchases or redeems what never ceased to belong to him. But men never ceased to belong to God according to Ps. 23:1: The earth is the Lord’s and the fullness thereof: the world and all they that dwell therein. Therefore it seems that Christ did not redeem us by His Passion. Obj. 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): The devil had to be overthrown by Christ’s justice. But justice requires that the man who has treacherously seized another’s property shall be deprived of it, because deceit and cunning should not benefit anyone, as even human laws declare. Consequently, since the devil by treachery deceived and subjugated to himself man, who is God’s creature, it seems that man ought not to be rescued from his power by way of redemption. Obj. 3: Further, whoever buys or redeems an object pays the price to the holder. But it was not to the devil, who held us in bondage, that Christ paid His blood as the price of our redemption. Therefore Christ did not redeem us by His Passion. On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet 1:18): You were not redeemed with corruptible things as gold or silver from your vain conversation of the tradition of your fathers: but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb unspotted and undefiled. And (Gal 3:13): Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us. Now He is said to

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dictum, inquantum pro nobis passus est in ligno, ut su- be a curse for us inasmuch as He suffered upon the tree, as pra dictum est. Ergo per passionem suam nos redemit. stated above (Q. 46, A. 4). Therefore He did redeem us by His Passion. Respondeo dicendum quod per peccatum dupliciI answer that, Man was held captive on account of ter homo obligatus erat. Primo quidem, servitute pecca- sin in two ways: first of all, by the bondage of sin, because ti, quia qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati, ut dicitur (John 8:34): Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin; Ioan. VIII; et II Pet. II, a quo quis superatus est, huic et and (2 Pet 2:19): By whom a man is overcome, of the same servus addictus est. Quia igitur Diabolus hominem su- also he is the slave. Since, then, the devil had overcome peraverat inducendo eum ad peccatum, homo servitu- man by inducing him to sin, man was subject to the devil’s ti Diaboli addictus erat. Secundo, quantum ad reatum bondage. Second, as to the debt of punishment, to the paypoenae, quo homo erat obligatus secundum Dei iusti- ment of which man was held fast by God’s justice: and this, tiam. Et haec est servitus quaedam, ad servitutem enim too, is a kind of bondage, since it savors of bondage for a pertinet quod aliquis patiatur quod non vult, cum liberi man to suffer what he does not wish, just as it is the free hominis sit uti seipso ut vult. man’s condition to apply himself to what he wills. Igitur, quia passio Christi fuit sufficiens et superaSince, then, Christ’s Passion was a sufficient and a subundans satisfactio pro peccato et reatu generis humani, perabundant atonement for the sin and the debt of the hueius passio fuit quasi quoddam pretium, per quod libe- man race, it was as a price at the cost of which we were freed rati sumus ab utraque obligatione. Nam ipsa satisfactio from both obligations. For the atonement by which one satqua quis satisfacit sive pro se sive pro alio, pretium quod- isfies for self or another is called the price, by which he randam dicitur quo se redimit a peccato et poena, secun- soms himself or someone else from sin and its penalty, acdum illud Dan. IV, peccata tua eleemosynis redime. Chri- cording to Dan. 4:24: Redeem thou thy sins with alms. Now stus autem satisfecit, non quidem pecuniam dando aut Christ made satisfaction, not by giving money or anything aliquid huiusmodi, sed dando id quod fuit maximum, of the sort, but by bestowing what was of greatest price— seipsum, pro nobis. Et ideo passio Christi dicitur esse Himself—for us. And therefore Christ’s Passion is called nostra redemptio. our redemption. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo dicitur esse Reply Obj. 1: Man is said to belong to God in two Dei dupliciter. Uno modo, inquantum subiicitur potesta- ways. First of all, in so far as he comes under God’s power: ti eius. Et hoc modo nunquam homo desiit Dei esse, se- in which way he never ceased to belong to God; according cundum illud Dan. IV, dominatur excelsus in regno homi- to Dan. 4:22: The Most High ruleth over the kingdom of men, num, et cuicumque voluerit, dabit illud. Alio modo, per and giveth it to whomsoever he will. Second, by being united unionem caritatis ad eum, secundum quod dicitur Rom. to Him in charity, according to Rom. 8:9: If any man have VIII, si quis spiritum Christi non habet, hic non est eius. not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His. In the first way, Primo igitur modo, nunquam homo desiit esse Dei. Se- then, man never ceased to belong to God, but in the second cundo modo, desiit esse Dei per peccatum. Et ideo, in- way he did cease because of sin. And therefore in so far as quantum fuit a peccato liberatus, Christo passo satisfa- he was delivered from sin by the satisfaction of Christ’s Pasciente, dicitur per passionem Christi esse redemptus. sion, he is said to be redeemed by the Passion of Christ. Ad secundum dicendum quod homo peccando obReply Obj. 2: Man by sinning became the bondsman ligatus erat et Deo et Diabolo. Quantum enim ad cul- both of God and of the devil. Through guilt he had offended pam, Deum offenderat, et Diabolo se subdiderat, ei con- God, and put himself under the devil by consenting to him; sentiens. Unde ratione culpae non erat factus servus Dei, consequently he did not become God’s servant on account sed potius, a Dei servitute recedens, Diaboli servitutem of his guilt, but rather, by withdrawing from God’s service, incurrerat, Deo iuste hoc permittente propter offensam he, by God’s just permission, fell under the devil’s servitude in se commissam. Sed quantum ad poenam, principali- on account of the offense perpetrated. But as to the penalty, ter homo erat Deo obligatus, sicut summo iudici, Diabo- man was chiefly bound to God as his sovereign judge, and lo autem tanquam tortori, secundum illud Matth. V, ne to the devil as his torturer, according to Matt. 5:25: Lest perforte tradat te adversarius tuus iudici, et iudex tradat te haps the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deministro, idest Angelo poenarum crudeli, ut Chrysosto- liver thee to the officer—that is, to the relentless avenging anmus dicit. Quamvis igitur Diabolus iniuste, quantum in gel, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xi). Consequently, although, ipso erat, hominem, sua fraude deceptum, sub servitute after deceiving man, the devil, so far as in him lay, held him teneret, et quantum ad culpam et quantum ad poenam, unjustly in bondage as to both sin and penalty, still it was iustum tamen erat hoc hominem pati, Deo hoc permit- just that man should suffer it, God so permitting it as to tente quantum ad culpam, et ordinante quantum ad poe- the sin and ordaining it as to the penalty. And therefore jus-

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nam. Et ideo per respectum ad Deum iustitia exigebat quod homo redimeretur, non autem per respectum ad Diabolum. Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia redemptio requirebatur ad hominis liberationem per respectum ad Deum, non autem per respectum ad Diabolum; non erat pretium solvendum Diabolo, sed Deo. Et ideo Christus sanguinem suum, qui est pretium nostrae redemptionis, non dicitur obtulisse Diabolo, sed Deo.

Q. 48, A. 5

tice required man’s redemption with regard to God, but not with regard to the devil. Reply Obj. 3: Because, with regard to God, redemption was necessary for man’s deliverance, but not with regard to the devil, the price had to be paid not to the devil, but to God. And therefore Christ is said to have paid the price of our redemption—His own precious blood—not to the devil, but to God.

Article 5 Whether it is proper to Christ to be the Redeemer? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse redemptorem non sit proprium Christi. Dicitur enim in Psalmo, redemisti me, domine Deus veritatis. Sed esse dominum Deum veritatis convenit toti Trinitati. Non ergo est proprium Christo. Praeterea, ille dicitur redimere qui dat pretium redemptionis. Sed Deus pater dedit filium suum redemptionem pro peccatis nostris, secundum illud Psalmi, redemptionem misit dominus populo suo; Glossa, idest Christum, qui dat redemptionem captivis. Ergo non solum Christus, sed etiam Deus pater nos redemit. Praeterea, non solum passio Christi, sed etiam aliorum sanctorum, proficua fuit ad nostram salutem, secundum illud Coloss. I, gaudeo in passionibus pro vobis, et adimpleo ea quae desunt passionum Christi in carne mea pro corpore eius, quod est Ecclesia. Ergo non solum Christus debet dici redemptor, sed etiam alii sancti.

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to Christ to be the Redeemer, because it is written (Ps 30:6): Thou hast redeemed me, O Lord, the God of Truth. But to be the Lord God of Truth belongs to the entire Trinity. Therefore it is not proper to Christ. Obj. 2: Further, he is said to redeem who pays the price of redemption. But God the Father gave His Son in redemption for our sins, as is written (Ps 110:9): The Lord hath sent redemption to His people, upon which the gloss adds, that is, Christ, who gives redemption to captives. Therefore not only Christ, but the Father also, redeemed us. Obj. 3: Further, not only Christ’s Passion, but also that of other saints conduced to our salvation, according to Col. 1:24: I now rejoice in my sufferings for you, and fill up those things that are wanting of the sufferings of Christ, in my flesh for His body, which is the Church. Therefore the title of Redeemer belongs not only to Christ, but also to the other saints. On the contrary, It is written (Gal 3:13): Christ redeemed us from the curse of the Law, being made a curse for us. But only Christ was made a curse for us. Therefore only Christ ought to be called our Redeemer. I answer that, For someone to redeem, two things are required—namely, the act of paying and the price paid. For if in redeeming something a man pays a price which is not his own, but another’s, he is not said to be the chief redeemer, but rather the other is, whose price it is. Now Christ’s blood or His bodily life, which is in the blood, is the price of our redemption (Lev 17:11, 14), and that life He paid. Hence both of these belong immediately to Christ as man; but to the Trinity as to the first and remote cause, to whom Christ’s life belonged as to its first author, and from whom Christ received the inspiration of suffering for us. Consequently it is proper to Christ as man to be the Redeemer immediately; although the redemption may be ascribed to the whole Trinity as its first cause.

Sed contra est quod dicitur Galat. III, Christus nos redemit de maledicto legis, factus pro nobis maledictum. Sed solus Christus factus est pro nobis maledictum. Ergo solus Christus debet dici noster redemptor. Respondeo dicendum quod ad hoc quod aliquis redimat, duo requiruntur, scilicet actus solutionis, et pretium solutum. Si enim aliquis solvat pro redemptione alicuius rei pretium, si non est suum, sed alterius, non dicitur ipse redimere principaliter, sed magis ille cuius est pretium. Pretium autem redemptionis nostrae est sanguis Christi, vel vita eius corporalis quae est in sanguine, quam ipse Christus exsolvit. Unde utrumque istorum ad Christum pertinet immediate inquantum est homo, sed ad totam Trinitatem sicut ad causam primam et remotam, cuius erat et ipsa vita Christi sicut primi auctoris, et a qua inspiratum fuit ipsi homini Christo ut pateretur pro nobis. Et ideo esse immediate redemptorem est proprium Christi inquantum est homo, quamvis ipsa redemptio possit attribui toti Trinitati sicut primae causae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Glossa sic expoReply Obj. 1: A gloss explains the text thus: Thou, O nit, tu, Deus veritatis, redemisti me in Christo clamante, Lord God of Truth, hast redeemed me in Christ, crying out,

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in manus tuas, domine, commendo spiritum meum. Et sic redemptio immediate pertinet ad hominem Christum, principaliter autem ad Deum. Ad secundum dicendum quod pretium redemptionis nostrae homo Christus solvit immediate, sed de mandato patris sicut primordialis auctoris. Ad tertium dicendum quod passiones sanctorum proficiunt Ecclesiae, non quidem per modum redemptionis, sed per modum exhortationis et exempli, secundum illud II Cor. I, sive tribulamur pro vestra exhortatione et salute.

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‘Lord, into Thy hands I commend my spirit.’ And so redemption belongs immediately to the Man-Christ, but principally to God. Reply Obj. 2: The Man-Christ paid the price of our redemption immediately, but at the command of the Father as the original author. Reply Obj. 3: The sufferings of the saints are beneficial to the Church, as by way, not of redemption, but of example and exhortation, according to 2 Cor. 1:6: Whether we be in tribulation, it is for your exhortation and salvation.

Article 6 Whether Christ’s passion brought about our salvation efficiently? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio Christi non fuerit operata nostram salutem per modum efficientiae. Causa enim efficiens nostrae salutis est magnitudo divinae virtutis, secundum illud Isaiae LIX, ecce, non est abbreviata manus eius, ut salvare non possit. Christus autem crucifixus est ex infirmitate, ut dicitur II Cor. XIII. Non ergo passio Christi efficienter operata est salutem nostram. Praeterea, nullum agens corporale efficienter agit nisi per contactum, unde etiam et Christus tangendo mundavit leprosum, ut ostenderet carnem suam salutiferam virtutem habere, sicut Chrysostomus dicit. Sed passio Christi non potuit contingere omnes homines. Ergo non potuit efficienter operari omnium hominum salutem. Praeterea, non videtur eiusdem esse operari per modum meriti, et per modum efficientiae, quia ille qui meretur, expectat effectum ab alio. Sed passio Christi operata est nostram salutem per modum meriti. Non ergo per modum efficientiae. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Cor. I, quod verbum crucis his qui salvi fiunt est virtus Dei. Sed virtus Dei efficienter operatur nostram salutem. Ergo passio Christi in cruce efficienter operata est nostram salutem. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est efficiens, principale, et instrumentale. Efficiens quidem principale humanae salutis Deus est. Quia vero humanitas Christi est divinitatis instrumentum, ut supra dictum est, ex consequenti omnes actiones et passiones Christi instrumentaliter operantur, in virtute divinitatis, ad salutem humanam. Et secundum hoc, passio Christi efficienter causat salutem humanam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod passio Christi, relata ad Christi carnem, congruit infirmitati assumptae, relata vero ad divinitatem, consequitur ex ea infinitam

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s Passion did not bring about our salvation efficiently. For the efficient cause of our salvation is the greatness of the Divine power, according to Isa. 59:1: Behold the hand of the Lord is not shortened that it cannot save. But Christ was crucified through weakness, as it is written (2 Cor 13:4). Therefore, Christ’s Passion did not bring about our salvation efficiently. Obj. 2: Further, no corporeal agency acts efficiently except by contact: hence even Christ cleansed the leper by touching him in order to show that His flesh had saving power, as Chrysostom says. But Christ’s Passion could not touch all mankind. Therefore it could not efficiently bring about the salvation of all men. Obj. 3: Further, it does not seem to be consistent for the same agent to operate by way of merit and by way of efficiency, since he who merits awaits the result from someone else. But it was by way of merit that Christ’s Passion accomplished our salvation. Therefore it was not by way of efficiency. On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor 1:18) that the word of the cross to them that are saved . . . is the power of God. But God’s power brings about our salvation efficiently. Therefore Christ’s Passion on the cross accomplished our salvation efficiently. I answer that, There is a twofold efficient agency— namely, the principal and the instrumental. Now the principal efficient cause of man’s salvation is God. But since Christ’s humanity is the instrument of the Godhead, as stated above (Q. 43, A. 2), therefore all Christ’s actions and sufferings operate instrumentally in virtue of His Godhead for the salvation of men. Consequently, then, Christ’s Passion accomplishes man’s salvation efficiently. Reply Obj. 1: Christ’s Passion in relation to His flesh is consistent with the infirmity which He took upon Himself, but in relation to the Godhead it draws infinite might

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virtutem, secundum illud I Cor. I, quod infirmum est Dei, fortius est hominibus; quia scilicet ipsa infirmitas Christi, inquantum est Dei, habet virtutem excedentem omnem virtutem humanam. Ad secundum dicendum quod passio Christi, licet sit corporalis, habet tamen spiritualem virtutem ex divinitate unita. Et ideo per spiritualem contactum efficaciam sortitur, scilicet per fidem et fidei sacramenta, secundum illud apostoli, quem proposuit propitiatorem per fidem in sanguine eius. Ad tertium dicendum quod passio Christi, secundum quod comparatur ad divinitatem eius, agit per modum efficientiae; inquantum vero comparatur ad voluntatem animae Christi, agit per modum meriti; secundum vero quod consideratur in ipsa carne Christi, agit per modum satisfactionis, inquantum per eam liberamur a reatu poenae; per modum vero redemptionis, inquantum per eam liberamur a servitute culpae; per modum autem sacrificii, inquantum per eam reconciliamur Deo, ut infra dicetur.

Q. 48, A. 6

from It, according to 1 Cor. 1:25: The weakness of God is stronger than men; because Christ’s weakness, inasmuch as He is God, has a might exceeding all human power. Reply Obj. 2: Christ’s Passion, although corporeal, has yet a spiritual effect from the Godhead united: and therefore it secures its efficacy by spiritual contact—namely, by faith and the sacraments of faith, as the Apostle says (Rom 3:25): Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood. Reply Obj. 3: Christ’s Passion, according as it is compared with His Godhead, operates in an efficient manner: but in so far as it is compared with the will of Christ’s soul it acts in a meritorious manner: considered as being within Christ’s very flesh, it acts by way of satisfaction, inasmuch as we are liberated by it from the debt of punishment; while inasmuch as we are freed from the servitude of guilt, it acts by way of redemption: but in so far as we are reconciled with God it acts by way of sacrifice, as shall be shown farther on (Q. 49).

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Question 49 The Effects of Christ’s Passion Deinde considerandum est de ipsis effectibus passioWe have now to consider what are the effects of Christ’s nis Christi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Passion, concerning which there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum per passionem Christi simus liberati a (1) Whether we were freed from sin by Christ’s peccato. Passion? Secundo, utrum per eam simus liberati a potestate (2) Whether we were thereby delivered from the power Diaboli. of the devil? Tertio, utrum per eam simus liberati a reatu poenae. (3) Whether we were freed thereby from our debt of punishment? Quarto, utrum per eam simus Deo reconciliati. (4) Whether we were thereby reconciled with God? Quinto, utrum per eam sit nobis aperta ianua caeli. (5) Whether heaven’s gate was opened to us thereby? Sexto, utrum per eam Christus adeptus fuerit (6) Whether Christ derived exaltation from it? exaltationem.

Article 1 Whether we were delivered from sin through Christ’s Passion? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod per passionem Christi non simus liberati a peccato. Liberare enim a peccato est proprium Dei secundum illud Isaiae XLIII, ego sum qui deleo iniquitates tuas propter me. Christus autem non est passus secundum quod Deus, sed secundum quod homo. Ergo passio Christi non liberavit nos a peccato. Praeterea, corporale non agit in spirituale. Sed passio Christi corporalis est, peccatum autem non est nisi in anima, quae est spiritualis creatura. Ergo passio Christi non potuit nos mundare a peccato. Praeterea, nullus potest liberari a peccato quod nondum commisit, sed quod in posterum est commissurus. Cum igitur multa peccata post Christi passionem sint commissa, et tota die committantur, videtur quod per passionem Christi non simus liberati a peccato. Praeterea, posita causa sufficienti, nihil aliud requiritur ad effectum inducendum. Requiruntur autem adhuc alia ad remissionem peccatorum, scilicet Baptismus et poenitentia. Ergo videtur quod passio Christi non sit sufficiens causa remissionis peccatorum. Praeterea, Proverb. X dicitur, universa delicta operit caritas; et XV dicitur, per misericordiam et fidem purgantur peccata. Sed multa sunt alia de quibus habemus fidem, et quae sunt provocativa caritatis. Ergo passio Christi non est propria causa remissionis peccatorum. Sed contra est quod dicitur Apoc. I, dilexit nos, et lavit nos a peccatis nostris in sanguine suo.

Objection 1: It would seem that we were not delivered from sin through Christ’s Passion. For to deliver from sin belongs to God alone, according to Isa. 43:25: I am He who blot out your iniquities for My own sake. But Christ did not suffer as God, but as man. Therefore Christ’s Passion did not free us from sin. Obj. 2: Further, what is corporeal does not act upon what is spiritual. But Christ’s Passion is corporeal, whereas sin exists in the soul, which is a spiritual creature. Therefore Christ’s Passion could not cleanse us from sin. Obj. 3: Further, one cannot be purged from a sin not yet committed, but which shall be committed hereafter. Since, then, many sins have been committed since Christ’s death, and are being committed daily, it seems that we were not delivered from sin by Christ’s death. Obj. 4: Further, given an efficient cause, nothing else is required for producing the effect. But other things besides are required for the forgiveness of sins, such as baptism and penance. Consequently it seems that Christ’s Passion is not the sufficient cause of the forgiveness of sins. Obj. 5: Further, it is written (Prov 10:12): Charity covereth all sins; and (Prov 15:27): By mercy and faith, sins are purged away. But there are many other things of which we have faith, and which excite charity. Therefore Christ’s Passion is not the proper cause of the forgiveness of sins. On the contrary, It is written (Rev 1:5): He loved us, and washed us from our sins in His own blood.

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Respondeo dicendum quod passio Christi est propria causa remissionis peccatorum, tripliciter. Primo quidem, per modum provocantis ad caritatem. Quia, ut apostolus dicit, Rom. V, commendat Deus suam caritatem in nobis, quoniam, cum inimici essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est. Per caritatem autem consequimur veniam peccatorum, secundum illud Luc. VII, dimissa sunt ei peccata multa, quoniam dilexit multum. Secundo, passio Christi causat remissionem peccatorum per modum redemptionis. Quia enim ipse est caput nostrum, per passionem suam, quam ex caritate et obedientia sustinuit, liberavit nos, tanquam membra sua, a peccatis, quasi per pretium suae passionis, sicut si homo per aliquod opus meritorium quod manu exerceret, redimeret se a peccato quod pedibus commisisset. Sicut enim naturale corpus est unum, ex membrorum diversitate consistens, ita tota Ecclesia, quae est mysticum corpus Christi, computatur quasi una persona cum suo capite, quod est Christus. Tertio, per modum efficientiae, inquantum caro, secundum quam Christus passionem sustinuit, est instrumentum divinitatis, ex quo eius passiones et actiones operantur in virtute divina ad expellendum peccatum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet Christus non sit passus secundum quod Deus, tamen caro eius est divinitatis instrumentum. Et ex hoc passio eius habet quandam divinam virtutem ad expellendum peccatum, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod passio Christi, licet sit corporalis, sortitur tamen quandam spiritualem virtutem ex divinitate, cuius caro ei unita est instrumentum. Secundum quam quidem virtutem passio Christi est causa remissionis peccatorum. Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus sua passione a peccatis nos liberavit causaliter, idest, instituens causam nostrae liberationis, ex qua possent quaecumque peccata quandocumque remitti, vel praeterita vel praesentia vel futura, sicut si medicus faciat medicinam ex qua possint etiam quicumque morbi sanari, etiam in futurum. Ad quartum dicendum quod, quia passio Christi praecessit ut causa quaedam universalis remissionis peccatorum, sicut dictum est, necesse est quod singulis adhibeatur ad deletionem propriorum peccatorum. Hoc autem fit per Baptismum et poenitentiam et alia sacramenta, quae habent virtutem ex passione Christi, ut infra patebit. Ad quintum dicendum quod etiam per fidem applicatur nobis passio Christi ad percipiendum fructum ipsius, secundum illud Rom. III, quem proposuit Deus propitiatorem per fidem in sanguine eius. Fides autem per quam a peccato mundamur, non est fides informis, quae potest esse etiam cum peccato, sed est fides formata per caritatem, ut sic passio Christi nobis applicetur non so-

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I answer that, Christ’s Passion is the proper cause of the forgiveness of sins in three ways. First of all, by way of exciting our charity, because, as the Apostle says (Rom 5:8): God commendeth His charity towards us: because when as yet we were sinners, according to the time, Christ died for us. But it is by charity that we procure pardon of our sins, according to Luke 7:47: Many sins are forgiven her because she hath loved much. Second, Christ’s Passion causes forgiveness of sins by way of redemption. For since He is our head, then, by the Passion which He endured from love and obedience, He delivered us as His members from our sins, as by the price of His Passion: in the same way as if a man by the good industry of his hands were to redeem himself from a sin committed with his feet. For, just as the natural body is one though made up of diverse members, so the whole Church, Christ’s mystic body, is reckoned as one person with its head, which is Christ. Third, by way of efficiency, inasmuch as Christ’s flesh, wherein He endured the Passion, is the instrument of the Godhead, so that His sufferings and actions operate with Divine power for expelling sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Although Christ did not suffer as God, nevertheless His flesh is the instrument of the Godhead; and hence it is that His Passion has a kind of Divine Power of casting out sin, as was said above. Reply Obj. 2: Although Christ’s Passion is corporeal, still it derives a kind of spiritual energy from the Godhead, to which the flesh is united as an instrument: and according to this power Christ’s Passion is the cause of the forgiveness of sins. Reply Obj. 3: Christ by His Passion delivered us from our sins causally—that is, by setting up the cause of our deliverance, from which cause all sins whatsoever, past, present, or to come, could be forgiven: just as if a doctor were to prepare a medicine by which all sicknesses can be cured even in future. Reply Obj. 4: As stated above, since Christ’s Passion preceded, as a kind of universal cause of the forgiveness of sins, it needs to be applied to each individual for the cleansing of personal sins. Now this is done by baptism and penance and the other sacraments, which derive their power from Christ’s Passion, as shall be shown later (Q. 62, A. 5). Reply Obj. 5: Christ’s Passion is applied to us even through faith, that we may share in its fruits, according to Rom. 3:25: Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood. But the faith through which we are cleansed from sin is not lifeless faith, which can exist even with sin, but faith living through charity; that thus Christ’s Passion may be applied to us, not only as to our

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lum quantum ad intellectum, sed etiam quantum ad af- minds, but also as to our hearts. And even in this way sins fectum. Et per hunc etiam modum peccata dimittuntur are forgiven through the power of the Passion of Christ. ex virtute passionis Christi.

Article 2 Whether we were delivered from the devil’s power through Christ’s Passion? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod per passionem Christi non simus liberati a potestate Diaboli. Ille enim non habet potestatem super aliquos, in quibus nihil sine permissione alterius facere potest. Sed Diabolus nunquam potuit aliquid in nocumentum hominum facere nisi ex permissione divina, sicut patet Iob I et II quod, potestate divinitus accepta, eum primo in rebus, et postea in corpore laesit. Et similiter Matth. VIII dicitur quod Daemones, nisi Christo concedente, non potuerunt porcos intrare. Ergo Diabolus nunquam habuit in hominibus potestatem. Et ita per passionem Christi non sumus a potestate Diaboli liberati. Praeterea, Diabolus potestatem suam in hominibus exercet tentando et corporaliter vexando. Sed hoc adhuc in hominibus operatur, post Christi passionem. Ergo non sumus per passionem Christi ab eius potestate liberati. Praeterea, virtus passionis Christi in perpetuum durat, secundum illud Heb. X, una oblatione consummavit sanctificatos in sempiternum. Sed liberatio a potestate Diaboli nec est ubique, quia in multis partibus mundi adhuc sunt idololatrae, nec etiam erit semper, quia tempore Antichristi maxime suam potestatem exercebit in hominum nocumentum, de quo dicitur, II ad Thess. II, quod eius adventus erit secundum operationem Satanae in omni virtute et signis et prodigiis mendacibus, et in omni seductione iniquitatis. Ergo videtur quod passio Christi non sit causa liberationis humani generis a potestate Diaboli. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. XII, passione imminente, nunc princeps huius mundi eiicietur foras, et ego, si exaltatus fuero a terra, omnia traham ad meipsum. Est autem exaltatus a terra per crucis passionem. Ergo per eius passionem Diabolus est a potestate hominum eiectus. Respondeo dicendum quod circa potestatem quam Diabolus in homines exercebat ante Christi passionem, tria sunt consideranda. Primum quidem est ex parte hominis, qui suo peccato meruit ut in potestatem traderetur Diaboli, per cuius tentationem fuerat superatus. Aliud autem est ex parte Dei, quem homo peccando offenderat, qui, per suam iustitiam, hominem reliquerat

Objection 1: It would seem that we were not delivered from the power of the devil through Christ’s Passion. For he has no power over others, who can do nothing to them without the sanction of another. But without the Divine permission the devil could never do hurt to any man, as is evident in the instance of Job (1, 2), where, by power received from God, the devil first injured him in his possessions, and afterwards in his body. In like manner it is stated (Matt 8:31, 32) that the devils could not enter into the swine except with Christ’s leave. Therefore the devil never had power over men: and hence we are not delivered from his power through Christ’s Passion. Obj. 2: Further, the devil exercises his power over men by tempting them and molesting their bodies. But even after the Passion he continues to do the same to men. Therefore we are not delivered from his power through Christ’s Passion. Obj. 3: Further, the might of Christ’s Passion endures for ever, as, according to Heb. 10:14: By one oblation He hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified. But deliverance from the devil’s power is not found everywhere, since there are still idolaters in many regions of the world; nor will it endure for ever, because in the time of Antichrist he will be especially active in using his power to the hurt of men; because it is said of him (2 Thess 2:9): Whose coming is according to the working of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders, and in all seduction of iniquity. Consequently it seems that Christ’s Passion is not the cause of the human race being delivered from the power of the devil. On the contrary, our Lord said (John 12:31), when His Passion was drawing nigh: Now shall the prince of this world be cast out; and I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all things to Myself. Now He was lifted up from the earth by His Passion on the cross. Therefore by His Passion the devil was deprived of his power over man. I answer that, There are three things to be considered regarding the power which the devil exercised over men previous to Christ’s Passion. The first is on man’s own part, who by his sin deserved to be delivered over to the devil’s power, and was overcome by his tempting. Another point is on God’s part, whom man had offended by sinning, and who with justice left man under the devil’s power. The

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Incarnate Son of God

potestati Diaboli. Tertium autem est ex parte ipsius Diaboli, qui sua nequissima voluntate hominem a consecutione salutis impediebat. Quantum igitur ad primum, homo est a potestate Diaboli liberatus per passionem Christi, inquantum passio Christi est causa remissionis peccatorum, ut dictum est. Quantum autem ad secundum, dicendum quod passio Christi nos a potestate Diaboli liberavit, inquantum nos Deo reconciliavit, ut infra dicetur. Quantum vero ad tertium, passio Christi nos a Diabolo liberavit, inquantum in passione Christi excessit modum potestatis sibi traditae a Deo, machinando in mortem Christi, qui non habebat meritum mortis, cum esset absque peccato. Unde Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin., iustitia Christi Diabolus victus est, quia, cum in eo nihil morte dignum inveniret, occidit eum tamen; et utique iustum est ut debitores quos tenebat, liberi dimittantur, in eum credentes quem sine ullo debito occidit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non dicitur sic Diabolus in homines potestatem habuisse quasi posset eis nocere Deo non permittente. Sed quia iuste permittebatur nocere hominibus, quos tentando ad suum consensum perduxerat. Ad secundum dicendum quod Diabolus etiam nunc quidem potest, Deo permittente, homines tentare quantum ad animam, et vexare quantum ad corpus, sed tamen praeparatum est homini remedium ex passione Christi, quo se potest tueri contra hostis impugnationes, ne deducatur in interitum mortis aeternae. Et quicumque ante passionem Christi Diabolo resistebant, per fidem passionis Christi hoc facere poterant, licet, passione Christi nondum peracta, quantum ad aliquid nullus potuerit Diaboli manus evadere, ut scilicet non descenderet in Infernum. A quo, post passionem Christi, se possunt homines eius virtute tueri. Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus permittit Diabolo posse decipere homines certis personis, temporibus et locis, secundum occultam rationem iudiciorum suorum. Semper tamen per passionem Christi est paratum hominibus remedium se tuendi contra nequitias Daemonum, etiam tempore Antichristi. Sed si aliqui hoc remedio uti negligant, nil deperit efficaciae passionis Christi.

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third is on the devil’s part, who out of his most wicked will hindered man from securing his salvation. As to the first point, by Christ’s Passion man was delivered from the devil’s power, in so far as the Passion is the cause of the forgiveness of sins, as stated above (A. 1). As to the second, it must be said that Christ’s Passion freed us from the devil’s power, inasmuch as it reconciled us with God, as shall be shown later (A. 4). But as to the third, Christ’s Passion delivered us from the devil, inasmuch as in Christ’s Passion he exceeded the limit of power assigned him by God, by conspiring to bring about Christ’s death, Who, being sinless, did not deserve to die. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, cap. xiv): The devil was vanquished by Christ’s justice: because, while discovering in Him nothing deserving of death, nevertheless he slew Him. And it is certainly just that the debtors whom he held captive should be set at liberty, since they believed in Him whom the devil slew, though He was no debtor. Reply Obj. 1: The devil is said to have had such power over men not as though he were able to injure them without God’s sanction, but because he was justly permitted to injure men whom by tempting he had induced to give consent. Reply Obj. 2: God so permitting it, the devil can still tempt men’s souls and harass their bodies: yet there is a remedy provided for man through Christ’s Passion, whereby he can safeguard himself against the enemy’s assaults, so as not to be dragged down into the destruction of everlasting death. And all who resisted the devil previous to the Passion were enabled to do so through faith in the Passion, although it was not yet accomplished. Yet in one respect no one was able to escape the devil’s hands, i.e., so as not to descend into hell. But after Christ’s Passion, men can defend themselves from this by its power. Reply Obj. 3: God permits the devil to deceive men by certain persons, and in times and places, according to the hidden motive of His judgments; still, there is always a remedy provided through Christ’s Passion, for defending themselves against the wicked snares of the demons, even in Antichrist’s time. But if any man neglect to make use of this remedy, it detracts nothing from the efficacy of Christ’s Passion.

Article 3 Whether men were freed from the punishment of sin through Christ’s Passion? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod per Objection 1: It would seem that men were not freed passionem Christi non fuerunt homines liberati a poe- from the punishment of sin by Christ’s Passion. For the na peccati. Praecipua enim poena peccati est aeterna chief punishment of sin is eternal damnation. But those damnatio. Sed illi qui damnati erant in Inferno pro suis damned in hell for their sins were not set free by Christ’s

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peccatis, non sunt per Christi passionem liberati, quia in Inferno nulla est redemptio. Ergo videtur quod passio Christi non liberavit homines a poena. Praeterea, illis qui sunt liberati a reatu poenae, non est aliqua poena iniungenda. Sed poenitentibus iniungitur poena satisfactoria. Non ergo per passionem Christi sunt homines liberati a reatu poenae.

Passion, because in hell there is no redemption. It seems, therefore, that Christ’s Passion did not deliver men from the punishment of sin. Obj. 2: Further, no punishment should be imposed upon them who are delivered from the debt of punishment. But a satisfactory punishment is imposed upon penitents. Consequently, men were not freed from the debt of punishment by Christ’s Passion. Praeterea, mors est poena peccati, secundum ilObj. 3: Further, death is a punishment of sin, accordlud Rom. VI, stipendia peccati mors. Sed adhuc post ing to Rom. 6:23: The wages of sin is death. But men still die passionem Christi homines moriuntur. Ergo videtur after Christ’s Passion. Therefore it seems that we have not quod per passionem Christi non sumus a reatu poenae been delivered from the debt of punishment.

liberati. Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae LIII, vere languores nostros ipse tulit, et dolores nostros ipse portavit. Respondeo dicendum quod per passionem Christi liberati sumus a reatu poenae dupliciter. Uno modo, directe, inquantum scilicet passio Christi fuit sufficiens et superabundans satisfactio pro peccatis totius humani generis. Exhibita autem satisfactione sufficienti, tollitur reatus poenae. Alio modo, indirecte, inquantum scilicet passio Christi est causa remissionis peccati, in quo fundatur reatus poenae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod passio Christi sortitur effectum suum in illis quibus applicatur per fidem et caritatem, et per fidei sacramenta. Et ideo damnati in Inferno, qui praedicto modo passioni Christi non coniunguntur, effectum eius percipere non possunt. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad hoc quod consequamur effectum passionis Christi, oportet nos ei configurari. Configuramur autem ei in Baptismo sacramentaliter, secundum illud Rom. VI, consepulti sumus ei per Baptismum in mortem. Unde baptizatis nulla poena satisfactoria imponitur, quia sunt totaliter liberati per satisfactionem Christi. Quia vero Christus semel tantum pro peccatis nostris mortuus est, ut dicitur I Pet. III, ideo non potest homo secundario configurari morti Christi per sacramentum Baptismi. Unde oportet quod illi qui post Baptismum peccant, configurentur Christo patienti per aliquid poenalitatis vel passionis quam in seipsis sustineant. Quae tamen multo minor sufficit quam esset condigna peccato, cooperante satisfactione Christi. Ad tertium dicendum quod satisfactio Christi habet effectum in nobis inquantum incorporamur ei ut membra capiti, sicut supra dictum est. Membra autem oportet capiti esse conformia. Et ideo, sicut Christus primo quidem habuit gratiam in anima cum passibilitate corporis, et per passionem ad gloriam immortalitatis pervenit; ita et nos, qui sumus membra eius, per passionem ipsius liberamur quidem a reatu cuiuslibet poenae, ita tamen quod primo recipimus in anima spiritum adoptionis filiorum, quo adscribimur ad heredi-

On the contrary, It is written (Isa 53:4): Surely He hath borne our iniquities and carried our sorrows. I answer that, Through Christ’s Passion we have been delivered from the debt of punishment in two ways. First of all, directly—namely, inasmuch as Christ’s Passion was sufficient and superabundant satisfaction for the sins of the whole human race: but when sufficient satisfaction has been paid, then the debt of punishment is abolished. In another way—indirectly, that is to say—in so far as Christ’s Passion is the cause of the forgiveness of sin, upon which the debt of punishment rests. Reply Obj. 1: Christ’s Passion works its effect in them to whom it is applied, through faith and charity and the sacraments of faith. And, consequently, the lost in hell cannot avail themselves of its effects, since they are not united to Christ in the aforesaid manner. Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (A. 1, ad 4, 5), in order to secure the effects of Christ’s Passion, we must be likened unto Him. Now we are likened unto Him sacramentally in Baptism, according to Rom. 6:4: For we are buried together with Him by baptism into death. Hence no punishment of satisfaction is imposed upon men at their baptism, since they are fully delivered by Christ’s satisfaction. But because, as it is written (1 Pet 3:18), Christ died but once for our sins, therefore a man cannot a second time be likened unto Christ’s death by the sacrament of Baptism. Hence it is necessary that those who sin after Baptism be likened unto Christ suffering by some form of punishment or suffering which they endure in their own person; yet, by the co-operation of Christ’s satisfaction, much lighter penalty suffices than one that is proportionate to the sin. Reply Obj. 3: Christ’s satisfaction works its effect in us inasmuch as we are incorporated with Him, as the members with their head, as stated above (A. 1). Now the members must be conformed to their head. Consequently, as Christ first had grace in His soul with bodily passibility, and through the Passion attained to the glory of immortality, so we likewise, who are His members, are freed by His Passion from all debt of punishment, yet so that we first receive in our souls the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby our names are written down for the inheritance of immor-

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tatem gloriae immortalitatis, adhuc corpus passibile et mortale habentes; postmodum vero, configurati passionibus et morti Christi, in gloriam immortalem perducimur; secundum illud apostoli, Rom. VIII, si filii Dei, et heredes, heredes quidem Dei, coheredes autem Christi, si tamen compatimur, ut simul glorificemur.

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tal glory, while we yet have a passible and mortal body: but afterwards, being made conformable to the sufferings and death of Christ, we are brought into immortal glory, according to the saying of the Apostle (Rom 8:17): And if sons, heirs also: heirs indeed of God, and joint heirs with Christ; yet so if we suffer with Him, that we may be also glorified with Him.

Article 4 Whether we were reconciled to God through Christ’s Passion? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod per passionem Christi non simus Deo reconciliati. Reconciliatio enim non habet locum inter amicos. Sed Deus semper dilexit nos, secundum illud Sap. XI, diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti. Ergo passio Christi non reconciliavit nos Deo. Praeterea, non potest idem esse principium et effectus, unde gratia, quae est principium merendi, non cadit sub merito. Sed dilectio Dei est principium passionis Christi, secundum illud Ioan. III, sic Deus dilexit mundum ut filium suum unigenitum daret. Non ergo videtur quod per passionem Christi simus reconciliati Deo, ita quod de novo nos amare inciperet. Praeterea, passio Christi impleta est per homines Christum occidentes, qui ex hoc graviter Deum offenderunt. Ergo passio Christi magis est causa indignationis quam reconciliationis Dei. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, reconciliati sumus Deo per mortem filii eius. Respondeo dicendum quod passio Christi est causa reconciliationis nostrae ad Deum dupliciter. Uno modo, inquantum removet peccatum, per quod homines constituuntur inimici Dei, secundum illud Sap. XIV, similiter odio sunt Deo impius et impietas eius; et in Psalmo, odisti omnes qui operantur iniquitatem. Alio modo, inquantum est Deo sacrificium acceptissimum. Est enim hoc proprie sacrificii effectus, ut per ipsum placetur Deus, sicut cum homo offensam in se commissam remittit propter aliquod obsequium acceptum quod ei exhibetur. Unde dicitur I Reg. XXVI, si dominus incitat te adversum me, odoretur sacrificium. Et similiter tantum bonum fuit quod Christus voluntarie passus est, quod propter hoc bonum in natura humana inventum, Deus placatus est super omni offensa generis humani, quantum ad eos qui Christo passo coniunguntur secundum modum praemissum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus diligit omnes homines quantum ad naturam, quam ipse fecit. Odit tamen eos quantum ad culpam, quam contra eum homines committunt, secundum illud Eccli. XII, altissimus odio habet peccatores.

Objection 1: It would seem that we were not reconciled to God through Christ’s Passion. For there is no need of reconciliation between friends. But God always loved us, according to Wis. 11:25: Thou lovest all the things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made. Therefore Christ’s Passion did not reconcile us to God. Obj. 2: Further, the same thing cannot be cause and effect: hence grace, which is the cause of meriting, does not come under merit. But God’s love is the cause of Christ’s Passion, according to John 3:16: God so loved the world, as to give His only-begotten Son. It does not appear, then, that we were reconciled to God through Christ’s Passion, so that He began to love us anew. Obj. 3: Further, Christ’s Passion was completed by men slaying Him; and thereby they offended God grievously. Therefore Christ’s Passion is rather the cause of wrath than of reconciliation to God. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom 5:10): We are reconciled to God by the death of His Son. I answer that, Christ’s Passion is in two ways the cause of our reconciliation to God. In the first way, inasmuch as it takes away sin by which men became God’s enemies, according to Wis. 14:9: To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike; and Ps. 5:7: Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity. In another way, inasmuch as it is a most acceptable sacrifice to God. Now it is the proper effect of sacrifice to appease God: just as man likewise overlooks an offense committed against him on account of some pleasing act of homage shown him. Hence it is written (1 Kgs 26:19): If the Lord stir thee up against me, let Him accept of sacrifice. And in like fashion Christ’s voluntary suffering was such a good act that, because of its being found in human nature, God was appeased for every offense of the human race with regard to those who are made one with the crucified Christ in the aforesaid manner (A. 1, ad 4). Reply Obj. 1: God loves all men as to their nature, which He Himself made; yet He hates them with respect to the crimes they commit against Him, according to Ecclus. 12:3: The Highest hateth sinners.

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Q. 49, A. 5

Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus non dicitur quantum ad hoc nos Deo reconciliasse, quod de novo nos amare inciperet, cum scriptum sit, Ierem. XXXI, in caritate perpetua dilexi te. Sed quia per passionem Christi est sublata odii causa, tum propter ablutionem peccati; tum propter recompensationem acceptabilioris boni.

Reply Obj. 2: Christ is not said to have reconciled us with God, as if God had begun anew to love us, since it is written (Jer 31:3): I have loved thee with an everlasting love; but because the source of hatred was taken away by Christ’s Passion, both through sin being washed away and through compensation being made in the shape of a more pleasing offering. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut occisores ChriReply Obj. 3: As Christ’s slayers were men, so also was sti homines fuerunt, ita et Christus occisus. Maior autem the Christ slain. Now the charity of the suffering Christ surfuit caritas Christi patientis quam iniquitas occisorum. passed the wickedness of His slayers. Accordingly Christ’s Et ideo passio Christi magis valuit ad reconciliandum Passion prevailed more in reconciling God to the whole huDeum toti humano generi, quam ad provocandum iram. man race than in provoking Him to wrath.

Article 5 Whether Christ opened the gate of heaven to us by his Passion? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus sua passione non aperuerit nobis ianuam caeli. Dicitur enim Proverb. XI, seminanti iustitiam merces fidelis. Sed merces iustitiae est introitus regni caelestis. Ergo videtur quod sancti patres, qui operati sunt opera iustitiae, fideliter consecuti essent introitum regni caelestis, etiam absque Christi passione. Non ergo passio Christi est causa apertionis ianuae regni caelestis. Praeterea, ante passionem Christi, Elias raptus est in caelum, ut dicitur IV Reg. II. Sed effectus non praecedit causam. Ergo videtur quod apertio ianuae caelestis non sit effectus passionis Christi. Praeterea, sicut legitur Matth. III, Christo baptizato aperti sunt caeli. Sed Baptismus praecessit passionem. Ergo apertio caeli non est effectus passionis Christi. Praeterea, Mich. II dicitur, ascendit pandens iter ante eos. Sed nihil aliud videtur pandere iter caeli quam eius ianuam aperire. Ergo videtur quod ianua caeli sit nobis aperta, non per passionem, sed per ascensionem Christi. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Heb. X, habemus fiduciam in introitu sanctorum, scilicet caelestium, in sanguine Christi. Respondeo dicendum quod clausio ianuae est obstaculum quoddam prohibens homines ab ingressu. Prohibebantur autem homines ab ingressu regni caelestis propter peccatum, quia, sicut dicitur Isaiae XXXV, via illa sancta vocabitur, et non transibit per eam pollutus. Est autem duplex peccatum impediens ab ingressu regni caelestis. Unum quidem commune totius humanae naturae, quod est peccatum primi parentis. Et per hoc peccatum praecludebatur homini aditus regni caelestis,

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not open the gate of heaven to us by his Passion. For it is written (Prov 11:18): To him that soweth justice, there is a faithful reward. But the reward of justice is the entering into the kingdom of heaven. It seems, therefore, that the holy Fathers who wrought works of justice, obtained by faith the entering into the heavenly kingdom even without Christ’s Passion. Consequently Christ’s Passion is not the cause of the opening of the gate of the kingdom of heaven. Obj. 2: Further, Elias was caught up to heaven previous to Christ’s Passion (4 Kgs 2). But the effect never precedes the cause. Therefore it seems that the opening of heaven’s gate is not the result of Christ’s Passion. Obj. 3: Further, as it is written (Matt 3:16), when Christ was baptized the heavens were opened to Him. But His baptism preceded the Passion. Consequently the opening of heaven is not the result of Christ’s Passion. Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Mic 2:13): For He shall go up that shall open the way before them. But to open the way to heaven seems to be nothing else than to throw open its gate. Therefore it seems that the gate of heaven was opened to us, not by Christ’s Passion, but by His Ascension. On the contrary, is the saying of the Apostle (Heb 10:19): We have confidence in the entering into the Holies—that is, of the heavenly places—through the blood of Christ. I answer that, The shutting of the gate is the obstacle which hinders men from entering in. But it is on account of sin that men were prevented from entering into the heavenly kingdom, since, according to Isa. 35:8: It shall be called the holy way, and the unclean shall not pass over it. Now there is a twofold sin which prevents men from entering into the kingdom of heaven. The first is common to the whole race, for it is our first parents’ sin, and by that sin heaven’s entrance is closed to man. Hence we read in

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Incarnate Son of God

unde legitur Gen. III quod, post peccatum primi hominis, collocavit Deus Cherubim, et flammeum gladium atque versatilem, ad custodiendam viam ligni vitae. Aliud autem est peccatum speciale uniuscuiusque personae, quod per proprium actum committitur uniuscuiusque hominis. Per passionem autem Christi liberati sumus non solum a peccato communi totius humanae naturae, et quantum ad culpam et quantum ad reatum poenae, ipso solvente pretium pro nobis, sed etiam a peccatis propriis singulorum qui communicant eius passioni per fidem et caritatem et fidei sacramenta. Et ideo per passionem Christi aperta est nobis ianua regni caelestis. Et hoc est quod apostolus dicit, Heb. IX, quod Christus, assistens pontifex futurorum bonorum, per proprium sanguinem introivit semel in sancta, aeterna redemptione inventa. Et hoc significatur Num. XXXV, ubi dicitur quod homicida manebit ibi, scilicet in civitate refugii, donec sacerdos magnus, qui oleo sancto unctus est, moriatur, quo mortuo, poterit in domum suam redire. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sancti patres, operando opera iustitiae, meruerunt introitum regni caelestis per fidem passionis Christi, secundum illud Heb. XI, sancti per fidem vicerunt regna, operati sunt iustitiam, per quam etiam unusquisque a peccato purgabatur quantum pertinet ad emundationem propriae personae. Non tamen alicuius fides vel iustitia sufficiebat ad removendum impedimentum quod erat per reatum totius humanae creaturae. Quod quidem remotum est pretio sanguinis Christi. Et ideo ante passionem Christi nullus intrare poterat regnum caeleste, adipiscendo scilicet beatitudinem aeternam, quae consistit in plena Dei fruitione. Ad secundum dicendum quod Elias sublevatus est in caelum aereum, non autem in caelum Empyreum, qui est locus beatorum. Et similiter nec Henoch, sed raptus est ad Paradisum terrestrem, ubi cum Elia simul creditur vivere usque ad adventum Antichristi. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Christo baptizato aperti sunt caeli, non propter ipsum Christum, cui semper caelum patuit, sed ad significandum quod caelum aperitur baptizatis Baptismo Christi, qui habet efficaciam ex passione ipsius. Ad quartum dicendum quod Christus sua passione meruit nobis introitum regni caelestis, et impedimentum removit, sed per suam ascensionem nos quasi in possessionem regni caelestis introduxit. Et ideo dicitur quod ascendens pandit iter ante eos.

IIIae

Gen. 3:24 that after our first parents’ sin God placed . . . cherubim and a flaming sword, turning every way, to keep the way of the tree of life. The other is the personal sin of each one of us, committed by our personal act.

Now by Christ’s Passion we have been delivered not only from the common sin of the whole human race, both as to its guilt and as to the debt of punishment, for which He paid the penalty on our behalf; but, furthermore, from the personal sins of individuals, who share in His Passion by faith and charity and the sacraments of faith. Consequently, then the gate of heaven’s kingdom is thrown open to us through Christ’s Passion. This is precisely what the Apostle says (Heb 9:11, 12): Christ being come a high-priest of the good things to come . . . by His own blood entered once into the Holies, having obtained eternal redemption. And this is foreshadowed (Num 35:25, 28), where it is said that the slayer shall abide there—that is to say, in the city of refuge— until the death of the high-priest, that is anointed with the holy oil: but after he is dead, then shall he return home. Reply Obj. 1: The holy Fathers, by doing works of justice, merited to enter into the heavenly kingdom, through faith in Christ’s Passion, according to Heb. 11:33: The saints by faith conquered kingdoms, wrought justice, and each of them was thereby cleansed from sin, so far as the cleansing of the individual is concerned. Nevertheless the faith and righteousness of no one of them sufficed for removing the barrier arising from the guilt of the whole human race: but this was removed at the cost of Christ’s blood. Consequently, before Christ’s Passion no one could enter the kingdom of heaven by obtaining everlasting beatitude, which consists in the full enjoyment of God. Reply Obj. 2: Elias was taken up into the atmospheric heaven, but not in to the empyrean heaven, which is the abode of the saints: and likewise Enoch was translated into the earthly paradise, where he is believed to live with Elias until the coming of Antichrist. Reply Obj. 3: As was stated above (Q. 39, A. 5), the heavens were opened at Christ’s baptism, not for Christ’s sake, to whom heaven was ever open, but in order to signify that heaven is opened to the baptized, through Christ’s baptism, which has its efficacy from His Passion. Reply Obj. 4: Christ by His Passion merited for us the opening of the kingdom of heaven, and removed the obstacle; but by His ascension He, as it were, brought us to the possession of the heavenly kingdom. And consequently it is said that by ascending He opened the way before them.

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Effects of Christ’s Passion

Q. 49, A. 6

Article 6 Whether by his Passion Christ merited to be exalted? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus per suam passionem non meruit exaltari. Sicut enim cognitio veritatis est proprium Deo, ita et sublimitas, secundum illud Psalmi, excelsus super omnes gentes dominus, et super caelos gloria eius. Sed Christus, secundum quod homo, habuit cognitionem omnis veritatis non ex aliquo merito praecedenti, sed ex ipsa unione Dei et hominis, secundum illud Ioan. I, vidimus gloriam eius quasi unigeniti a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis. Ergo neque exaltationem habuit ex merito passionis, sed ex sola unione. Praeterea, Christus meruit sibi a primo instanti suae conceptionis, ut supra habitum est. Non autem maior caritas fuit in eo tempore passionis quam ante. Cum ergo caritas sit merendi principium, videtur quod non magis meruit per passionem suam exaltationem quam ante. Praeterea, gloria corporis resultat ex gloria animae, ut Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Dioscorum. Sed Christus per passionem suam non meruit exaltationem quantum ad gloriam animae, quia anima eius fuit beata a primo instanti suae conceptionis. Ergo neque etiam per passionem meruit exaltationem quantum ad gloriam corporis. Sed contra est quod dicitur Philipp. II, factus est obediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis, propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum. Respondeo dicendum quod meritum importat quandam aequalitatem iustitiae, unde apostolus dicit, ei qui operatur, merces imputatur secundum debitum. Cum autem aliquis ex sua iniusta voluntate sibi attribuit plus quam debeatur, iustum est ut diminuatur etiam quantum ad id quod sibi debebatur, sicut, cum furatur quis unam ovem, reddet quatuor, ut dicitur Exod. XXII. Et hoc dicitur mereri, inquantum per hoc punitur cuius est iniqua voluntas. Ita etiam, cum aliquis sibi ex iusta voluntate subtrahit quod debebat habere, meretur ut sibi amplius aliquid superaddatur, quasi merces iustae voluntatis. Et inde est quod, sicut dicitur Luc. XIV, qui se humiliat, exaltabitur. Christus autem in sua passione seipsum humiliavit infra suam dignitatem, quantum ad quatuor. Primo quidem, quantum ad passionem et mortem, cuius debitor non erat. Secundo, quantum ad locum, quia corpus eius positum est in sepulcro, anima in Inferno. Tertio, quantum ad confusionem et opprobria quae sustinuit. Quarto, quantum ad hoc quod est traditus humanae potestati, secundum quod ipse dicit Pilato, Ioan. XIX, non haberes in me potestatem, nisi datum tibi fuisset desuper. Et ideo per suam passionem meruit exaltationem quantum

Objection 1: It seems that Christ did not merit to be exalted on account of His Passion. For eminence of rank belongs to God alone, just as knowledge of truth, according to Ps. 112:4: The Lord is high above all nations, and His glory above the heavens. But Christ as man had the knowledge of all truth, not on account of any preceding merit, but from the very union of God and man, according to John 1:14: We saw His glory . . . as it were of the Only-Begotten of the Father, full of grace and of truth. Therefore neither had He exaltation from the merit of the Passion but from the union alone. Obj. 2: Further, Christ merited for Himself from the first instant of His conception, as stated above (Q. 34, A. 3). But His love was no greater during the Passion than before. Therefore, since charity is the principle of merit, it seems that He did not merit exaltation from the Passion more than before. Obj. 3: Further, the glory of the body comes from the glory of the soul, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.). But by His Passion Christ did not merit exaltation as to the glory of His soul, because His soul was beatified from the first instant of His conception. Therefore neither did He merit exaltation, as to the glory of His body, from the Passion. On the contrary, It is written (Phil 2:8): He became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross; for which cause God also exalted Him. I answer that, Merit implies a certain equality of justice: hence the Apostle says (Rom 4:4): Now to him that worketh, the reward is reckoned according to debt. But when anyone by reason of his unjust will ascribes to himself something beyond his due, it is only just that he be deprived of something else which is his due; thus, when a man steals a sheep he shall pay back four (Exod 22:1). And he is said to deserve it, inasmuch as his unjust will is chastised thereby. So likewise when any man through his just will has stripped himself of what he ought to have, he deserves that something further be granted to him as the reward of his just will. And hence it is written (Luke 14:11): He that humbleth himself shall be exalted. Now in His Passion Christ humbled Himself beneath His dignity in four respects. In the first place as to His Passion and death, to which He was not bound; second, as to the place, since His body was laid in a sepulchre and His soul in hell; third, as to the shame and mockeries He endured; fourth, as to His being delivered up to man’s power, as He Himself said to Pilate (John 19:11): Thou shouldst not have any power against Me, unless it were given thee from above. And, consequently, He merited a four-fold exaltation from His Passion. First of all, as to His glorious Resurrec-

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ad quatuor. Primo quidem, quantum ad resurrectionem gloriosam. Unde dicitur in Psalmo, tu cognovisti sessionem meam, idest humilitatem meae passionis, et resurrectionem meam. Secundo, quantum ad ascensionem in caelum. Unde dicitur Ephes. IV, descendit primo in inferiores partes terrae, qui autem descendit, ipse est et qui ascendit super omnes caelos. Tertio, quantum ad consessum paternae dexterae, et manifestationem divinitatis ipsius, secundum illud Isaiae LII, exaltabitur et elevabitur, et sublimis erit valde, sicut obstupuerunt super eum multi, sic inglorius erit inter viros aspectus eius. Et Philipp. II dicitur, factus est obediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis, propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum, et dedit illi nomen quod est super omne nomen, ut scilicet ab omnibus nominetur Deus, et omnes sibi reverentiam exhibeant sicut Deo. Et hoc est quod subditur, ut in nomine Iesu omne genu flectatur, caelestium, terrestrium et Infernorum. Quarto, quantum ad iudiciariam potestatem. Dicitur enim Iob XXXVI, causa tua quasi impii iudicata est, iudicium causamque recipies.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod principium merendi est ex parte animae, corpus autem est instrumentum meritorii actus. Et ideo perfectio animae Christi, quae fuit merendi principium, non debuit in eo acquiri per meritum, sicut perfectio corporis, quod fuit passioni subiectum, et per hoc fuit ipsius meriti instrumentum. Ad secundum dicendum quod per priora merita Christus meruit exaltationem ex parte ipsius animae, cuius voluntas caritate et aliis virtutibus informabatur. Sed in passione meruit suam exaltationem, per modum cuiusdam recompensationis, etiam ex parte corporis, iustum enim est ut corpus, quod fuerat ex caritate passioni subiectum, acciperet recompensationem in gloria. Ad tertium dicendum quod dispensatione quadam factum est in Christo ut gloria animae, ante passionem, non redundaret ad corpus, ad hoc quod gloriam corporis honorabilius obtineret, quando eam per passionem meruisset. Gloriam autem animae differri non conveniebat, quia anima immediate uniebatur verbo, unde decens erat ut gloria repleretur ab ipso verbo. Sed corpus uniebatur verbo mediante anima.

IIIae

tion: hence it is written (Ps 138:1): Thou hast known my sitting down—that is, the lowliness of My Passion—and My rising up. Second, as to His ascension into heaven: hence it is written (Eph 4:9): Now that He ascended, what is it, but because He also descended first into the lower parts of the earth? He that descended is the same also that ascended above all the heavens. Third, as to the sitting on the right hand of the Father and the showing forth of His Godhead, according to Isa. 52:13: He shall be exalted and extolled, and shall be exceeding high: as many have been astonished at him, so shall His visage be inglorious among men. Moreover (Phil 2:8) it is written: He humbled Himself, becoming obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross: for which cause also God hath exalted Him, and hath given Him a name which is above all names—that is to say, so that He shall be hailed as God by all; and all shall pay Him homage as God. And this is expressed in what follows: That in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth. Fourth, as to His judiciary power: for it is written (Job 36:17): Thy cause hath been judged as that of the wicked, cause and judgment Thou shalt recover. Reply Obj. 1: The source of meriting comes of the soul, while the body is the instrument of the meritorious work. And consequently the perfection of Christ’s soul, which was the source of meriting, ought not to be acquired in Him by merit, like the perfection of the body, which was the subject of suffering, and was thereby the instrument of His merit. Reply Obj. 2: Christ by His previous merits did merit exaltation on behalf of His soul, whose will was animated with charity and the other virtues; but in the Passion He merited His exaltation by way of recompense even on behalf of His body: since it is only just that the body, which from charity was subjected to the Passion, should receive recompense in glory. Reply Obj. 3: It was owing to a special dispensation in Christ that before the Passion the glory of His soul did not shine out in His body, in order that He might procure His bodily glory with greater honor, when He had merited it by His Passion. But it was not beseeming for the glory of His soul to be postponed, since the soul was united immediately with the Word; hence it was beseeming that its glory should be filled by the Word Himself. But the body was united with the Word through the soul.

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Question 50 The Death of Christ Deinde considerandum est de morte Christi. Et circa We have now to consider the death of Christ; concernhoc quaeruntur sex. ing which there are six subjects of inquiry: Primo, utrum conveniens fuerit Christum mori. (1) Whether it was fitting that Christ should die? Secundo, utrum per mortem fuerit separata unio (2) Whether His death severed the union of Godhead divinitatis et carnis. and flesh? Tertio, utrum fuerit separata unio divinitatis et (3) Whether His Godhead was separated from His animae. soul? Quarto, utrum Christus in triduo mortis fuerit (4) Whether Christ was a man during the three days of homo. His death? Quinto, utrum corpus eius fuerit idem numero (5) Whether His was the same body, living and dead? vivum et mortuum. Sexto, utrum mors eius aliquid sit operata ad (6) Whether His death conduced in any way to our nostram salutem. salvation?

Article 1 Whether it was fitting that Christ should die? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Christum mori. Illud enim quod est primum principium in aliquo genere, non disponitur per id quod est contrarium illi generi, sicut ignis, qui est principium caloris, nunquam potest esse frigidus. Sed filius Dei est principium et fons omnis vitae, secundum illud Psalmi, apud te est fons vitae. Ergo videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Christum mori. Praeterea, maior est defectus mortis quam morbi, quia per morbum pervenitur ad mortem. Sed non fuit conveniens Christum aliquo morbo languescere, ut Chrysostomus dicit. Ergo etiam non fuit conveniens Christum mori. Praeterea, dominus dicit, Ioan. X, ego veni ut vitam habeant, et abundantius habeant. Sed oppositum non perducit ad oppositum. Ergo videtur quod non fuit conveniens Christum mori. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. XI, expedit ut moriatur unus homo pro populo, ut non tota gens pereat, quod quidem Caiphas prophetice dixit, ut Evangelista testatur. Respondeo dicendum quod conveniens fuit Christum mori. Primo quidem, ad satisfaciendum pro humano genere, quod erat morti adiudicatum propter peccatum, secundum illud Gen. II, quacumque die comederitis, morte moriemini. Est autem conveniens satisfaciendi pro alio modus cum aliquis se subiicit poenae quam alius meruit. Et ideo Christus mori voluit, ut, mo-

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that Christ should die. For a first principle in any order is not affected by anything contrary to such order: thus fire, which is the principle of heat, can never become cold. But the Son of God is the fountain-head and principle of all life, according to Ps. 35:10: With Thee is the fountain of life. Therefore it does not seem fitting for Christ to die. Obj. 2: Further, death is a greater defect than sickness, because it is through sickness that one comes to die. But it was not beseeming for Christ to languish from sickness, as Chrysostom says. Consequently, neither was it becoming for Christ to die. Obj. 3: Further, our Lord said (John 10:10): I am come that they may have life, and may have it more abundantly. But one opposite does not lead to another. Therefore it seems that neither was it fitting for Christ to die. On the contrary, It is written, (John 11:50): It is expedient that one man should die for the people . . . that the whole nation perish not: which words were spoken prophetically by Caiphas, as the Evangelist testifies. I answer that, It was fitting for Christ to die. First of all to satisfy for the whole human race, which was sentenced to die on account of sin, according to Gen. 2:17: In what day soever ye shall eat of it ye shall die the death. Now it is a fitting way of satisfying for another to submit oneself to the penalty deserved by that other. And so Christ resolved to die, that by dying He might atone for us, accord-

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Q. 50, A. 2

Incarnate Son of God

riendo, pro nobis satisfaceret, secundum illud I Pet. III, Christus semel pro peccatis nostris mortuus est. Secundo, ad ostendendum veritatem naturae assumptae. Sicut enim Eusebius dicit, si aliter, post conversationem cum hominibus, evanescens subito evolaret fugiens mortem, ab omnibus compararetur phantasmati. Tertio ut, moriendo, nos a timore mortis liberaret. Unde dicitur Heb. II, quod communicavit carni et sanguini, ut per mortem destrueret eum qui habebat mortis imperium, et liberaret eos qui timore mortis per totam vitam obnoxii erant servituti. Quarto ut, corporaliter moriendo similitudini peccati, idest poenalitati, daret nobis exemplum moriendi spiritualiter peccato. Unde dicitur Rom. VI, quod enim mortuus est peccato, mortuus est semel, quod autem vivit, vivit Deo. Ita et vos existimate mortuos esse peccato, viventes autem Deo. Quinto ut, a mortuis resurgendo, virtutem suam ostenderet, qua mortem superavit, et nobis spem resurgendi a mortuis daret. Unde apostolus dicit, I Cor. XV, si Christus praedicatur quod resurrexit a mortuis, quomodo quidam in vobis dicunt quod resurrectio mortuorum non erit? Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus est fons vitae secundum quod Deus, non autem secundum quod homo. Mortuus autem est non secundum quod Deus, sed secundum quod homo. Unde Augustinus dicit, contra Felicianum, absit ut Christus sic senserit mortem ut, quantum est in se vita, vitam perdiderit. Si enim hoc ita esset, vitae fons aruisset. Sensit igitur mortem participatione humani affectus, quem sponte susceperat, non naturae suae perdidit potentiam, per quam cuncta vivificat. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus non sustinuit mortem ex morbo provenientem, ne videretur ex necessitate mori propter infirmitatem naturae. Sed sustinuit mortem ab exteriori illatam, cui se spontaneum obtulit, ut mors eius voluntaria ostenderetur. Ad tertium dicendum quod unum oppositorum per se non ducit ad aliud, sed quandoque per accidens, sicut frigidum quandoque per accidens calefacit. Et hoc modo Christus per suam mortem nos perduxit ad vitam, quia de sua morte mortem nostram destruxit, sicut ille qui poenam pro alio sustinet, removet poenam eius.

IIIae

ing to 1 Pet. 3:18: Christ also died once for our sins. Second, in order to show the reality of the flesh assumed. For, as Eusebius says (Orat. de Laud. Constant. xv), if, after dwelling among men Christ were suddenly to disappear from men’s sight, as though shunning death, then by all men He would be likened to a phantom. Third, that by dying He might deliver us from fearing death: hence it is written (Heb 2:14, 15) that He communicated to flesh and blood, that through death He might destroy him who had the empire of death and might deliver them who, through the fear of death, were all their lifetime subject to servitude. Fourth, that by dying in the body to the likeness of sin—that is, to its penalty—He might set us the example of dying to sin spiritually. Hence it is written (Rom 6:10): For in that He died to sin, He died once, but in that He liveth, He liveth unto God: so do you also reckon that you are dead to sin, but alive unto God. Fifth, that by rising from the dead, and manifesting His power whereby He overthrew death, He might instill into us the hope of rising from the dead. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor 15:12): If Christ be preached that He rose again from the dead, how do some among you say, that there is no resurrection from the dead? Reply Obj. 1: Christ is the fountain of life, as God, and not as man: but He died as man, and not as God. Hence Augustine says against Felician: Far be it from us to suppose that Christ so felt death that He lost His life inasmuch as He is life in Himself; for, were it so, the fountain of life would have run dry. Accordingly, He experienced death by sharing in our human feeling, which of His own accord He had taken upon Himself, but He did not lose the power of His Nature, through which He gives life to all things. Reply Obj. 2: Christ did not suffer death which comes of sickness, lest He should seem to die of necessity from exhausted nature: but He endured death inflicted from without, to which He willingly surrendered Himself, that His death might be shown to be a voluntary one. Reply Obj. 3: One opposite does not of itself lead to the other, yet it does so indirectly at times: thus cold sometimes is the indirect cause of heat: and in this way Christ by His death brought us back to life, when by His death He destroyed our death; just as he who bears another’s punishment takes such punishment away.

Article 2 Whether the Godhead was separated from the flesh when Christ died? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in morte Christi fuerit separata divinitas a carne. Ut enim dicitur Matth. XXVII, dominus, in cruce pendens, clamavit, Deus, Deus meus, ut quid me dereliquisti? Quod exponens Ambrosius, dicit, clamat homo separatione di-

Objection 1: It would seem that the Godhead was separated from the flesh when Christ died. For as Matthew relates (27:46), when our Lord was hanging upon the cross He cried out: My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me? which words Ambrose, commenting on Luke 23:46,

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IIIae

Death of Christ

vinitatis moriturus. Nam, cum divinitas morte libera sit, utique mors ibi esse non poterat nisi vita discederet, quia vita divinitas est. Et sic videtur quod in morte Christi sit divinitas separata a carne.

Praeterea, remoto medio, separantur extrema. Sed divinitas unita est carni mediante anima, ut supra habitum est. Ergo videtur quod cum in morte Christi anima sit separata a carne, quod per consequens divinitas sit a carne separata. Praeterea, maior est virtus vivificativa Dei quam animae. Sed corpus mori non poterat nisi anima separata. Ergo videtur quod multo minus mori poterat nisi separata divinitate. Sed contra, ea quae sunt humanae naturae, non dicuntur de filio Dei nisi ratione unionis, ut supra habitum est. Sed de filio Dei dicitur id quod convenit corpori Christi post mortem, scilicet esse sepultum, ut patet in symbolo fidei, ubi dicitur quod filius Dei conceptus est et natus ex virgine, passus, mortuus et sepultus. Ergo corpus Christi non fuit separatum in morte a divinitate.

Respondeo dicendum quod id quod per gratiam Dei conceditur, nunquam absque culpa revocatur, unde dicitur Rom. XI, quod sine poenitentia sunt dona Dei et vocatio. Multo autem maior est gratia unionis, per quam divinitas unita est carni Christi in persona, quam gratia adoptionis, qua alii sanctificantur, et etiam magis permanens ex sui ratione, quia haec gratia ordinatur ad unionem personalem, gratia autem adoptionis ad quandam unionem affectualem. Et tamen videmus quod gratia adoptionis nunquam perditur sine culpa. Cum igitur in Christo nullum fuerit peccatum, impossibile fuit quod solveretur unio divinitatis a carne ipsius. Et ideo, sicut ante mortem caro Christi unita fuit secundum personam et hypostasim verbo Dei, ita et remansit unita post mortem, ut scilicet non esset alia hypostasis verbi Dei et carnis Christi post mortem, ut Damascenus dicit, in III libro. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod derelictio illa non est referenda ad solutionem unionis personalis, sed ad hoc quod Deus pater eum exposuit passioni. Unde derelinquere ibi non est aliud quam non protegere a persequentibus. Vel dicit se derelictum quantum ad illam orationem qua dixerat, pater, si fieri potest, transeat a me calix iste, ut Augustinus exponit, in libro de gratia novi testamenti. Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum Dei dicitur esse unitum carni mediante anima, inquantum caro per animam pertinet ad humanam naturam, quam filius Dei assumere intendebat, non autem ita quod anima

Q. 50, A. 2

explains as follows: The man cried out when about to expire by being severed from the Godhead; for since the Godhead is immune from death, assuredly death could not be there, except life departed, for the Godhead is life. And so it seems that when Christ died, the Godhead was separated from His flesh. Obj. 2: Further, extremes are severed when the mean is removed. But the soul was the mean through which the Godhead was united with the flesh, as stated above (Q. 6, A. 1). Therefore since the soul was severed from the flesh by death, it seems that, in consequence, His Godhead was also separated from it. Obj. 3: Further, God’s life-giving power is greater than that of the soul. But the body could not die unless the soul quitted it. Therefore, much less could it die unless the Godhead departed. On the contrary, As stated above (Q. 16, AA. 4, 5), the attributes of human nature are predicated of the Son of God only by reason of the union. But what belongs to the body of Christ after death is predicated of the Son of God—namely, being buried: as is evident from the Creed, in which it is said that the Son of God was conceived and born of a Virgin, suffered, died, and was buried. Therefore Christ’s Godhead was not separated from the flesh when He died. I answer that, What is bestowed through God’s grace is never withdrawn except through fault. Hence it is written (Rom 11:29): The gifts and the calling of God are without repentance. But the grace of union whereby the Godhead was united to the flesh in Christ’s Person, is greater than the grace of adoption whereby others are sanctified: also it is more enduring of itself, because this grace is ordained for personal union, whereas the grace of adoption is referred to a certain affective union. And yet we see that the grace of adoption is never lost without fault. Since, then, there was no sin in Christ, it was impossible for the union of the Godhead with the flesh to be dissolved. Consequently, as before death Christ’s flesh was united personally and hypostatically with the Word of God, it remained so after His death, so that the hypostasis of the Word of God was not different from that of Christ’s flesh after death, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii). Reply Obj. 1: Such forsaking is not to be referred to the dissolving of the personal union, but to this, that God the Father gave Him up to the Passion: hence there to forsake means simply not to protect from persecutors. Or else He says there that He is forsaken, with reference to the prayer He had made: Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass away from Me, as Augustine explains it (De Gratia Novi Test.). Reply Obj. 2: The Word of God is said to be united with the flesh through the medium of the soul, inasmuch as it is through the soul that the flesh belongs to human nature, which the Son of God intended to assume; but not as

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sit quasi medium ligans unita. Habet autem caro ab anima quod pertineat ad humanam naturam, etiam postquam anima separatur ab ea, inquantum scilicet in carne mortua remanet, ex divina ordinatione, quidam ordo ad resurrectionem. Et ideo non tollitur unio divinitatis ad carnem. Ad tertium dicendum quod anima habet vim vivificandi formaliter. Et ideo, ea praesente et unita formaliter, necesse est corpus esse vivum. Divinitas autem non habet vim vivificandi formaliter, sed effective, non enim potest esse corporis forma. Et ideo non est necesse quod, manente unione divinitatis ad carnem, caro sit viva, quia Deus non ex necessitate agit, sed ex voluntate.

IIIae

though the soul were the medium linking them together. But it is due to the soul that the flesh is human even after the soul has been separated from it—namely, inasmuch as by God’s ordinance there remains in the dead flesh a certain relation to the resurrection. And therefore the union of the Godhead with the flesh is not taken away. Reply Obj. 3: The soul formally possesses the lifegiving energy, and therefore, while it is present, and united formally, the body must necessarily be a living one, whereas the Godhead has not the life-giving energy formally, but effectively; because It cannot be the form of the body: and therefore it is not necessary for the flesh to be living while the union of the Godhead with the flesh remains, since God does not act of necessity, but of His own will.

Article 3 Whether in Christ’s death there was a severance between his Godhead and his soul? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in morte Christi fuerit separatio divinitatis ab anima. Dicit enim dominus, Ioan. X, nemo tollit animam meam a me, sed ego pono eam, et iterum sumo eam. Non autem videtur quod corpus animam ponere possit, eam a se separando, quia anima non subiicitur potestati corporis, sed potius e converso. Et sic videtur quod Christo secundum quod est verbum Dei, conveniat animam suam ponere. Hoc autem est eam a se separare. Ergo per mortem anima eius fuit a divinitate separata. Praeterea, Athanasius dicit maledictum qui totum hominem quem assumpsit Dei filius, denuo assumptum vel liberatum, tertia die a mortuis resurrexisse non confitetur. Sed non potuit totus homo denuo assumi, nisi aliquando fuerit totus homo a Dei verbo separatus. Totus autem homo componitur ex anima et corpore. Ergo aliquando fuit facta separatio divinitatis et a corpore et ab anima. Praeterea, propter unionem ad totum hominem filius Dei vere dicitur homo. Si igitur, soluta unione animae et corporis per mortem, verbum Dei remansit unitum animae, sequeretur quod vere dici potuisset filium Dei esse animam. Hoc autem est falsum, quia, cum anima sit forma corporis, sequeretur quod verbum Dei fuerit corporis forma, quod est impossibile. Ergo in morte Christi anima fuit a verbo Dei separata. Praeterea, anima et corpus, ab invicem separata, non sunt una hypostasis, sed duae. Si igitur verbum Dei remansit unitum tam animae quam corpori Christi, separatis eis ab invicem per mortem Christi, videtur sequi quod verbum Dei, durante morte Christi, fuerit duae hy-

Objection 1: It would seem that there was a severance in death between Christ’s Godhead and His soul, because our Lord said (John 10:18): No man taketh away My soul from Me: but I lay it down of Myself, and I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it up again. But it does not appear that the body can set the soul aside, by separating the soul from itself, because the soul is not subject to the power of the body, but rather conversely: and so it appears that it belongs to Christ, as the Word of God, to lay down His soul: but this is to separate it from Himself. Consequently, by death His soul was severed from the Godhead. Obj. 2: Further, Athanasius says that he is accursed who does not confess that the entire man, whom the Son of God took to Himself, after being assumed once more or delivered by Him, rose again from the dead on the third day. But the entire man could not be assumed again, unless the entire man was at one time separated from the Word of God: and the entire man is made of soul and body. Therefore there was a separation made at one time of the Godhead from both the body and the soul. Obj. 3: Further, the Son of God is truly styled a man because of the union with the entire man. If then, when the union of the soul with the body was dissolved by death, the Word of God continued united with the soul, it would follow that the Son of God could be truly called a soul. But this is false, because since the soul is the form of the body, it would result in the Word of God being the form of the body; which is impossible. Therefore, in death the soul of Christ was separated from the Word of God. Obj. 4: Further, the separated soul and body are not one hypostasis, but two. Therefore, if the Word of God remained united with Christ’s soul and body, then, when they were severed by Christ’s death, it seems to follow that the Word of God was two hypostases during such time as

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Q. 50, A. 3

postases. Quod est inconveniens. Non ergo post mortem Christ was dead; which cannot be admitted. Therefore after Christi remansit anima verbo unita. Christ’s death His soul did not continue to be united with the Word. Sed contra est quod dicit Damascenus, in III libro, On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. etsi Christus mortuus est ut homo, et sancta eius anima ab iii): Although Christ died as man, and His holy soul was sepincontaminato divisa est corpore; sed divinitas inseparabi- arated from His spotless body, nevertheless His Godhead relis ab utrisque permansit, ab anima dico et corpore. mained unseparated from both—from the soul, I mean, and from the body. Respondeo dicendum quod anima unita est verbo I answer that, The soul is united with the Word of Dei immediatius et per prius quam corpus, cum corpus God more immediately and more primarily than the body unitum sit verbo Dei mediante anima, ut supra dictum is, because it is through the soul that the body is united est. Cum igitur verbum Dei non sit separatum in morte a with the Word of God, as stated above (Q. 6, A. 1). Since, corpore, multo minus separatum est ab anima. Unde, si- then, the Word of God was not separated from the body at cut de filio Dei praedicatur id quod convenit corpori ab Christ’s death, much less was He separated from the soul. anima separato, scilicet esse sepultum; ita de eo in sym- Accordingly, since what regards the body severed from the bolo dicitur quod descendit ad Inferos, quia anima eius, soul is affirmed of the Son of God—namely, that it was a corpore separata, descendit ad Inferos. buried—so is it said of Him in the Creed that He descended into hell, because His soul when separated from the body did go down into hell. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus, expoReply Obj. 1: Augustine (Tract. xlvii in Joan.), in comnens illud verbum Ioannis, inquirit, cum Christus sit ver- menting on the text of John, asks, since Christ is Word and bum et anima et caro, utrum ex eo quod est verbum, ponat soul and body, whether He putteth down His soul, for that animam; an ex eo quod est anima; an iterum ex eo quod He is the Word? Or, for that He is a soul? Or, again, for that est caro. Et dicit quod, si dixerimus quod verbum Dei ani- He is flesh? And he says that, should we say that the Word mam posuit, sequeretur quod aliquando anima illa sepa- of God laid down His soul . . . it would follow that there was rata est a verbo. Quod est falsum. Mors enim corpus ab a time when that soul was severed from the Word—which is anima separavit, a verbo autem animam separatam non untrue. For death severed the body and soul . . . but that the dico. Si vero dixerimus quod anima ipsa se ponat, sequitur soul was severed from the Word I do not affirm . . . But should quod ipsa a se separatur. Quod est absurdissimum. Relin- we say that the soul laid itself down, it follows that it is sevquitur ergo quod ipsa caro animam suam ponit et iterum ered from itself: which is most absurd. It remains, therefore, eam sumit, non potestate sua, sed potestate verbi inhabi- that the flesh itself layeth down its soul and taketh it again, tantis carnem, quia, sicut supra dictum est, per mortem not by its own power, but by the power of the Word dwelling non est separata divinitas verbi a carne. in the flesh: because, as stated above (A. 2), the Godhead of the Word was not severed from the flesh in death. Ad secundum dicendum quod in verbis illis AthaReply Obj. 2: In those words Athanasius never meant nasius non intellexit quod totus homo denuo sit assump- to say that the whole man was reassumed—that is, as to all tus, idest, omnes partes eius, quasi verbum Dei partes his parts—as if the Word of God had laid aside the parts of humanae naturae deposuerit per mortem. Sed quod ite- human nature by His death; but that the totality of the asrato totalitas naturae assumptae sit in resurrectione re- sumed nature was restored once more in the resurrection dintegrata per iteratam unionem animae et corporis. by the resumed union of soul and body. Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum Dei, propter Reply Obj. 3: Through being united to human nature, unionem humanae naturae, non dicitur humana natura, the Word of God is not on that account called human nased dicitur homo, quod est habens humanam naturam. ture: but He is called a man—that is, one having human naAnima autem et corpus sunt partes essentiales humanae ture. Now the soul and the body are essential parts of hunaturae. Unde propter unionem verbi ad utrumque eo- man nature. Hence it does not follow that the Word is a soul rum non sequitur quod verbum Dei sit anima vel corpus, or a body through being united with both, but that He is sed quod est habens animam vel corpus. one possessing a soul or a body. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Damascenus Reply Obj. 4: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): dicit, in III libro, quod in morte Christi est separata ani- In Christ’s death the soul was separated from the flesh: not ma a carne, non est una hypostasis in duas hypostases di- one hypostasis divided into two: because both soul and body visa. Et corpus enim et anima secundum idem ex principio in the same respect had their existence from the beginning in verbi hypostasi habuerunt existentiam, et in morte, in- in the hypostasis of the Word; and in death, though severed vicem divisa, singula eorum manserunt unam hypostasim from one another, each one continued to have the one same verbi habens. Quare una verbi hypostasis verbi et animae hypostasis of the Word. Wherefore the one hypostasis of the

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Q. 50, A. 4

Incarnate Son of God

et corporis exstitit hypostasis. Nunquam enim neque anima neque corpus propriam habuerunt hypostasim, praeter verbi hypostasim. Una enim semper verbi hypostasis, et nunquam duae.

IIIae

Word was the hypostasis of the Word, of the soul, and of the body. For neither soul nor body ever had an hypostasis of its own, besides the hypostasis of the Word: for there was always one hypostasis of the Word, and never two.

Article 4 Whether Christ was a man during the three days of his death? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus in triduo mortis fuerit homo. Dicit enim Augustinus, in I de Trin., talis erat illa susceptio, quae Deum hominem faceret et hominem Deum. Sed illa susceptio non cessavit per mortem. Ergo videtur quod per mortem non desiit esse homo. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic., quod unusquisque homo est suus intellectus. Unde et, post mortem animam Petri alloquentes, dicimus, sancte Petre, ora pro nobis. Sed post mortem filius Dei non fuit separatus ab anima intellectuali. Ergo in illo triduo filius Dei fuit homo. Praeterea, omnis sacerdos est homo. Sed in illo triduo mortis Christus fuit sacerdos, aliter enim non verum esset quod dicitur in Psalmo, tu es sacerdos in aeternum. Ergo Christus in illo triduo fuit homo. Sed contra, remoto superiori, removetur inferius. Sed vivum, sive animatum, est superius ad animal et ad hominem, nam animal est substantia animata sensibilis. Sed in illo triduo mortis corpus Christi non fuit vivum neque animatum. Ergo non fuit homo. Respondeo dicendum quod Christum vere fuisse mortuum est articulus fidei. Unde asserere omne id per quod tollitur veritas mortis Christi, est error contra fidem. Propter quod in epistola synodali Cyrilli dicitur, si quis non confitetur Dei verbum passum carne, et crucifixum carne, et quod mortem gustavit carne, anathema sit. Pertinet autem ad veritatem mortis hominis vel animalis quod per mortem desinat esse homo vel animal, mors enim hominis vel animalis provenit ex separatione animae, quae complet rationem animalis vel hominis. Et ideo dicere Christum in triduo mortis hominem fuisse, simpliciter et absolute loquendo, erroneum est. Potest tamen dici quod Christus in triduo fuit homo mortuus. Quidam tamen confessi sunt Christum in triduo hominem fuisse, dicentes quidem verba erronea, sed sensum erroris non habentes in fide, sicut Hugo de sancto Victore, qui ea ratione dixit Christum in triduo mortis fuisse hominem, quia dicebat animam esse hominem. Quod tamen est falsum, ut in prima parte ostensum est. Magister etiam sententiarum, in XXII distinctione III li-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was a man during the three days of His death, because Augustine says (De Trin. iii): Such was the assuming as to make God to be man, and man to be God. But this assuming did not cease at Christ’s death. Therefore it seems that He did not cease to be a man in consequence of death. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix) that each man is his intellect; consequently, when we address the soul of Peter after his death we say: Saint Peter, pray for us. But the Son of God after death was not separated from His intellectual soul. Therefore, during those three days the Son of God was a man. Obj. 3: Further, every priest is a man. But during those three days of death Christ was a priest: otherwise what is said in Ps. 109:4 would not be true: Thou art a priest for ever. Therefore Christ was a man during those three days. On the contrary, When the higher is removed, so is the lower. But the living or animated being is a higher species than animal and man, because an animal is a sensible animated substance. Now during those three days of death Christ’s body was not living or animated. Therefore He was not a man. I answer that, It is an article of faith that Christ was truly dead: hence it is an error against faith to assert anything whereby the truth of Christ’s death is destroyed. Accordingly it is said in the Synodal epistle of Cyril: If any man does not acknowledge that the Word of God suffered in the flesh, and was crucified in the flesh and tasted death in the flesh, let him be anathema. Now it belongs to the truth of the death of man or animal that by death the subject ceases to be man or animal; because the death of the man or animal results from the separation of the soul, which is the formal complement of the man or animal. Consequently, to say that Christ was a man during the three days of His death simply and without qualification, is erroneous. Yet it can be said that He was a dead man during those three days. However, some writers have contended that Christ was a man during those three days, uttering words which are indeed erroneous, yet without intent of error in faith: as Hugh of Saint Victor, who (De Sacram. ii) contended that Christ, during the three days that followed His death, was a man, because he held that the soul is a man: but this is false, as was shown in the First Part (I, Q. 75, A. 4). Likewise the

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Death of Christ

bri, posuit quod Christus in triduo mortis fuit homo, alia ratione, quia credidit quod unio animae et carnis non esset de ratione hominis, sed sufficit ad hoc quod aliquid sit homo, quod habeat animam humanam et corpus, sive coniuncta sive non coniuncta. Quod etiam patet esse falsum ex his quae dicta sunt in prima parte, et ex his quae dicta sunt circa modum unionis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum Dei suscepit animam et carnem unitam, et ideo illa susceptio fecit Deum hominem et hominem Deum. Non autem cessavit illa susceptio per separationem verbi ab anima vel a carne, cessavit tamen unio carnis et animae. Ad secundum dicendum quod homo dicitur esse suus intellectus, non quia intellectus sit totus homo, sed quia intellectus est principalior pars hominis, in quo virtualiter existit tota dispositio hominis, sicut si rector civitatis dicatur tota civitas, quia in eo consistit tota dispositio civitatis. Ad tertium dicendum quod esse sacerdotem convenit homini ratione animae, in qua est ordinis character. Unde per mortem homo non perdit ordinem sacerdotalem. Et multo minus Christus, qui est totius sacerdotii origo.

Q. 50, A. 5

Master of the Sentences (iii, D, 22) held Christ to be a man during the three days of His death for quite another reason. For he believed the union of soul and flesh not to be essential to a man, and that for anything to be a man it suffices if it have a soul and body, whether united or separated: and that this is likewise false is clear both from what has been said in the First Part (I, Q. 75, A. 4), and from what has been said above regarding the mode of union (Q. 2, A. 5). Reply Obj. 1: The Word of God assumed a united soul and body: and the result of this assumption was that God is man, and man is God. But this assumption did not cease by the separation of the Word from the soul or from the flesh; yet the union of soul and flesh ceased. Reply Obj. 2: Man is said to be his own intellect, not because the intellect is the entire man, but because the intellect is the chief part of man, in which man’s whole disposition lies virtually; just as the ruler of the city may be called the whole city, since its entire disposal is vested in him. Reply Obj. 3: That a man is competent to be a priest is by reason of the soul, which is the subject of the character of order: hence a man does not lose his priestly order by death, and much less does Christ, who is the fount of the entire priesthood.

Article 5 Whether Christ’s was identically the same body living and dead? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuit idem numero corpus Christi viventis et mortui. Christus enim vere mortuus fuit, sicut et alii homines moriuntur. Sed corpus cuiuscumque alterius hominis non est simpliciter idem numero mortuum et vivum quia differunt essentiali differentia. Ergo neque corpus Christi est idem numero mortuum et vivum simpliciter. Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in V Metaphys., quaecumque sunt diversa specie, sunt diversa etiam numero. Sed corpus Christi vivum et mortuum fuit diversum specie, quia non dicitur oculus aut caro mortui nisi aequivoce, ut patet per philosophum, et in II de anima et VII Metaphys. Ergo corpus Christi non fuit simpliciter idem numero vivum et mortuum. Praeterea, mors est corruptio quaedam. Sed illud quod corrumpitur corruptione substantiali, postquam corruptum est, iam non est, quia corruptio est mutatio de esse in non esse. Corpus igitur Christi, postquam mortuum fuit, non remansit idem numero, cum mors sit substantialis corruptio. Sed contra est quod Athanasius dicit, in epistola ad Epictetum, circumciso corpore, et potato et manducante et laborante, et in ligno affixo, erat impassibile et in-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s was not identically the same body living and dead. For Christ truly died just as other men do. But the body of everyone else is not simply identically the same, dead and living, because there is an essential difference between them. Therefore neither is the body of Christ identically the same, dead and living. Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 12), things specifically diverse are also numerically diverse. But Christ’s body, living and dead, was specifically diverse: because the eye or flesh of the dead is only called so equivocally, as is evident from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text. 9; Metaph. vii). Therefore Christ’s body was not simply identically the same, living and dead. Obj. 3: Further, death is a kind of corruption. But what is corrupted by substantial corruption after being corrupted, exists no longer, since corruption is change from being to non-being. Therefore, Christ’s body, after it was dead, did not remain identically the same, because death is a substantial corruption. On the contrary, Athanasius says (Epist. ad Epict.): In that body which was circumcised and carried, which ate, and toiled, and was nailed on the tree, there was the impas-

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corporeum Dei verbum, hoc erat in sepulcro positum. Sed corpus Christi vivum fuit circumcisum et in ligno affixum, corpus autem Christi mortuum fuit positum in sepulcro. Ergo hoc idem corpus quod fuit vivum, fuit et mortuum. Respondeo dicendum quod hoc quod dico simpliciter, potest dupliciter accipi. Uno modo, quod simpliciter idem est quod absolute, sicut simpliciter dicitur quod nullo addito dicitur, ut philosophus dicit. Et hoc modo corpus Christi mortuum et vivum simpliciter fuit idem numero. Dicitur enim aliquid esse idem numero simpliciter, quia est supposito idem. Corpus autem Christi vivum et mortuum fuit supposito idem, quia non habuit aliam hypostasim vivum et mortuum, praeter hypostasim Dei verbi, ut supra dictum est. Et hoc modo loquitur Athanasius in auctoritate inducta. Alio modo, simpliciter idem est quod omnino vel totaliter. Et sic corpus Christi mortuum et vivum non fuit simpliciter idem numero. Quia non fuit totaliter idem, cum vita sit aliquid de essentia corporis viventis, est enim praedicatum essentiale, non accidentale; unde consequens est quod corpus quod desinit esse vivum, non totaliter idem remaneat. Si autem diceretur quod corpus Christi mortuum totaliter idem remaneret, sequeretur quod non esset corruptum, corruptione dico mortis. Quod est haeresis Gaianitarum, ut Isidorus dicit, et habetur in decretis, XXIV, qu. III. Et Damascenus dicit, in III libro quod corruptionis nomen duo significat, uno modo, separationem animae a corpore, et alia huiusmodi; alio modo, perfectam dissolutionem in elementa. Ergo incorruptibile dicere corpus domini, secundum Iulianum et Gaianum, secundum primum corruptionis modum, ante resurrectionem, est impium, quia corpus Christi non esset consubstantiale nobis; nec in veritate mortuum esset; nec secundum veritatem salvati essemus. Secundo autem modo, corpus Christi fuit incorruptum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod corpus mortuum cuiuscumque alterius hominis non remanet unitum alicui hypostasi permanenti, sicut corpus mortuum Christi. Et ideo corpus mortuum cuiuscumque alterius hominis non est idem simpliciter, sed secundum quid, quia est idem secundum materiam, non autem idem secundum formam. Corpus autem Christi remanet idem simpliciter, propter identitatem suppositi, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod, quia idem numero dicitur aliquid secundum suppositum, idem autem specie est idem secundum formam, ubicumque suppositum subsistit in una sola natura, oportet quod, sublata unitate speciei, auferatur unitas numeralis. Sed hypostasis verbi Dei subsistit in duabus naturis. Et ideo, quamvis in aliis non remaneat corpus idem secundum speciem humanae

IIIae

sible and incorporeal Word of God: the same was laid in the tomb. But Christ’s living body was circumcised and nailed on the tree; and Christ’s dead body was laid in the tomb. Therefore it was the same body living and dead. I answer that, The expression simply can be taken in two senses. In the first instance by taking simply to be the same as absolutely; thus that is said simply which is said without addition, as the Philosopher put it (Topic. ii): and in this way the dead and living body of Christ was simply identically the same: since a thing is said to be simply identically the same from the identity of the subject. But Christ’s body living and dead was identical in its suppositum because alive and dead it had none other besides the Word of God, as was stated above (A. 2). And it is in this sense that Athanasius is speaking in the passage quoted. In another way simply is the same as altogether or totally: in which sense the body of Christ, dead and alive, was not simply the same identically, because it was not totally the same, since life is of the essence of a living body; for it is an essential and not an accidental predicate: hence it follows that a body which ceases to be living does not remain totally the same. Moreover, if it were to be said that Christ’s dead body did continue totally the same, it would follow that it was not corrupted—I mean, by the corruption of death: which is the heresy of the Gaianites, as Isidore says (Etym. viii), and is to be found in the Decretals (xxiv, qu. iii). And Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that the term ‘corruption’ denotes two things: in one way it is the separation of the soul from the body and other things of the sort; in another way, the complete dissolving into elements. Consequently it is impious to say with Julian and Gaian that the Lord’s body was incorruptible after the first manner of corruption before the resurrection: because Christ’s body would not be consubstantial with us, nor truly dead, nor would we have been saved in very truth. But in the second way Christ’s body was incorrupt. Reply Obj. 1: The dead body of everyone else does not continue united to an abiding hypostasis, as Christ’s dead body did; consequently the dead body of everyone else is not the same simply, but only in some respect: because it is the same as to its matter, but not the same as to its form. But Christ’s body remains the same simply, on account of the identity of the suppositum, as stated above. Reply Obj. 2: Since a thing is said to be the same identically according to suppositum, but the same specifically according to form: wherever the suppositum subsists in only one nature, it follows of necessity that when the unity of species is taken away the unity of identity is also taken away. But the hypostasis of the Word of God subsists in two natures; and consequently, although in others the body

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naturae, remanet tamen in Christo idem numero secun- does not remain the same according to the species of hudum suppositum verbi Dei. man nature, still it continues identically the same in Christ according to the suppositum of the Word of God. Ad tertium dicendum quod corruptio et mors Reply Obj. 3: Corruption and death do not belong to non competit Christo ratione suppositi, secundum quod Christ by reason of the suppositum, from which supposisuppositum attenditur unitas numeralis, sed ratione na- tum follows the unity of identity; but by reason of the huturae humanae, secundum quam invenitur in corpore man nature, according to which is found the difference of Christi differentia mortis et vitae. death and of life in Christ’s body.

Article 6 Whether Christ’s death conduced in any way to our salvation? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mors Christi nihil operata fuerit ad nostram salutem. Mors enim est privatio quaedam, est enim privatio vitae. Sed privatio, cum non sit res aliqua, non habet aliquam virtutem agendi. Ergo non potuit aliquid operari ad nostram salutem. Praeterea, passio Christi operata est ad nostram salutem per modum meriti. Sic autem non potuit operari mors Christi, nam in morte separatur anima a corpore, quae est merendi principium. Ergo mors Christi non est operata aliquid ad nostram salutem. Praeterea, corporale non est causa spiritualis. Sed mors Christi fuit corporalis. Non ergo potuit esse causa spiritualis nostrae salutis. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin., una mors nostri salvatoris, scilicet corporalis, duabus mortibus nostris, idest animae et corporis, saluti fuit. Respondeo dicendum quod de morte Christi dupliciter loqui possumus, uno modo, secundum quod est in fieri; alio modo, secundum quod est in facto esse. Dicitur autem mors esse in fieri, quando aliquis per aliquam passionem, vel naturalem vel violentam, tendit in mortem. Et hoc modo, idem est loqui de morte Christi et de passione ipsius. Et ita, secundum hunc modum, mors Christi est causa salutis nostrae, secundum illud quod de passione supra dictum est. Sed in facto esse mors consideratur secundum quod iam facta est separatio corporis et animae. Et sic nunc loquimur de morte Christi. Hoc autem modo mors Christi non potest esse causa salutis nostrae per modum meriti, sed solum per modum efficientiae, inquantum scilicet nec per mortem divinitas separata est a carne Christi, et ideo quidquid contigit circa carnem Christi, etiam anima separata, fuit nobis salutiferum virtute divinitatis unitae. Consideratur autem proprie alicuius causae effectus secundum similitudinem causae. Unde, quia mors est quaedam privatio vitae propriae, effectus mortis Christi attenditur circa remotionem eorum quae contrariantur nostrae saluti,

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s death did not conduce in any way to our salvation. For death is a sort of privation, since it is the privation of life. But privation has not any power of activity, because it is nothing positive. Therefore it could not work anything for our salvation. Obj. 2: Further, Christ’s Passion wrought our salvation by way of merit. But Christ’s death could not operate in this way, because in death the body is separated from the soul, which is the principle of meriting. Consequently, Christ’s death did not accomplish anything towards our salvation. Obj. 3: Further, what is corporeal is not the cause of what is spiritual. But Christ’s death was corporeal. Therefore it could not be the cause of our salvation, which is something spiritual. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv): The one death of our Savior, namely, that of the body, saved us from our two deaths, that is, of the soul and the body. I answer that, We may speak of Christ’s death in two ways, in becoming and in fact. Death is said to be in becoming when anyone from natural or enforced suffering is tending towards death: and in this way it is the same thing to speak of Christ’s death as of His Passion: so that in this sense Christ’s death is the cause of our salvation, according to what has been already said of the Passion (Q. 48). But death is considered in fact, inasmuch as the separation of soul and body has already taken place: and it is in this sense that we are now speaking of Christ’s death. In this way Christ’s death cannot be the cause of our salvation by way of merit, but only by way of causality, that is to say, inasmuch as the Godhead was not separated from Christ’s flesh by death; and therefore, whatever befell Christ’s flesh, even when the soul was departed, was conducive to salvation in virtue of the Godhead united. But the effect of any cause is properly estimated according to its resemblance to the cause. Consequently, since death is a kind of privation of one’s own life, the effect of Christ’s death is considered in relation to the removal of the obstacles to our salvation: and these are the death of the soul and of the body. Hence

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Incarnate Son of God

quae quidem sunt mors animae et mors corporis. Et ideo per mortem Christi dicitur esse destructa in nobis et mors animae, quae est per peccatum, secundum illud Rom. IV, traditus est, scilicet in mortem, propter delicta nostra; et mors corporis, quae consistit in separatione animae, secundum illud I Cor. XV, absorpta est mors in victoria. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod mors Christi est operata salutem nostram ex virtute divinitatis unitae, et non ex sola ratione mortis. Ad secundum dicendum quod mors Christi, secundum quod consideratur in facto esse, etsi non fuerit ad nostram salutem operata per modum meriti, fuit tamen operata per modum efficientiae, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod mors Christi fuit quidem corporalis, sed corpus illud fuit instrumentum divinitatis sibi unitae, operans in virtute eius etiam mortuum.

IIIae

Christ’s death is said to have destroyed in us both the death of the soul, caused by sin, according to Rom. 4:25: He was delivered up for our sins: and the death of the body, consisting in the separation of the soul, according to 1 Cor. 15:54: Death is swallowed up in victory.

Reply Obj. 1: Christ’s death wrought our salvation from the power of the Godhead united, and not considered merely as His death. Reply Obj. 2: Though Christ’s death, considered in fact did not effect our salvation by way of merit, yet it did so by way of causality, as stated above. Reply Obj. 3: Christ’s death was indeed corporeal; but the body was the instrument of the Godhead united to Him, working by Its power, although dead.

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Question 51 Christ’s Burial Deinde considerandum est de sepultura Christi. Et We have now to consider Christ’s burial, concerning circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. which there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum conveniens fuerit Christum sepeliri. (1) Whether it was fitting for Christ to be buried? Secundo, de modo sepulturae eius. (2) Concerning the manner of His burial; Tertio, utrum corpus eius fuerit in sepulcro (3) Whether His body was decomposed in the tomb? resolutum. Quarto, de tempore quo iacuit in sepulcro. (4) Concerning the length of time He lay in the tomb.

Article 1 Whether it was fitting for Christ to be buried? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Christum sepeliri. De Christo enim dicitur in Psalmo, factus est sicut homo sine adiutorio, inter mortuos liber. Sed in sepulcro includuntur corpora mortuorum, quod videtur libertati esse contrarium. Ergo non videtur fuisse conveniens quod corpus Christi sepeliretur. Praeterea, nihil circa Christum fieri debuit quod non esset salutiferum nobis. Sed in nullo videtur ad salutem hominum pertinere quod Christus fuit sepultus. Ergo non fuit conveniens Christum sepeliri. Praeterea, inconveniens esse videtur quod Deus, qui est super caelos excelsos, in terra sepeliretur. Sed illud quod convenit corpori Christi mortuo, attribuitur Deo, ratione unionis. Ergo inconveniens videtur Christum fuisse sepultum. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Matth. XXVI, de muliere quae eum inunxit, opus bonum operata est in me, et postea subdit, mittens unguentum hoc in corpus meum, ad sepeliendum me fecit. Respondeo dicendum quod conveniens fuit Christum sepeliri. Primo quidem, ad comprobandum veritatem mortis, non enim aliquis in sepulcro ponitur, nisi quando iam de veritate mortis constat. Unde et Marci XV legitur quod Pilatus, antequam concederet Christum sepeliri, diligenti inquisitione cognovit eum mortuum esse. Secundo, quia per hoc quod Christus de sepulcro resurrexit, datur spes resurgendi per ipsum his qui sunt in sepulcro, secundum illud Ioan. V, omnes qui in monumentis sunt, audient vocem filii Dei, et qui audierint, vivent. Tertio, ad exemplum eorum qui per mortem Christi spiritualiter moriuntur peccatis, qui scilicet absconduntur a conturbatione hominum. Unde dicitur Coloss. III, mortui estis, et vita vestra abscondita est cum

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting for Christ to have been buried, because it is said of Him (Ps 87:6): He is become as a man without help, free among the dead. But the bodies of the dead are enclosed in a tomb; which seems contrary to liberty. Therefore it does not seem fitting for Christ to have been buried. Obj. 2: Further, nothing should be done to Christ except it was helpful to our salvation. But Christ’s burial seems in no way to be conducive to our salvation. Therefore, it was not fitting for Him to be buried. Obj. 3: Further, it seems out of place for God who is above the high heavens to be laid in the earth. But what befalls the dead body of Christ is attributed to God by reason of the union. Therefore it appears to be unbecoming for Christ to be buried. On the contrary, our Lord said (Matt 26:10) of the woman who anointed Him: She has wrought a good work upon Me, and then He added (Matt 26:12)—for she, in pouring this ointment upon My body, hath done it for My burial. I answer that, It was fitting for Christ to be buried. First of all, to establish the truth of His death; for no one is laid in the grave unless there be certainty of death. Hence we read (Mark 15:44, 45), that Pilate by diligent inquiry assured himself of Christ’s death before granting leave for His burial. Second, because by Christ’s rising from the grave, to them who are in the grave, hope is given of rising again through Him, according to John 5:25, 28: All that are in their graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God . . . and they that hear shall live. Third, as an example to them who dying spiritually to their sins are hidden away from the disturbance of men (Ps 30:21). Hence it is said (Col 3:3): You are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God. Wherefore the baptized likewise who through Christ’s death die to sins, are

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Incarnate Son of God

Christo in Deo. Unde et baptizati, qui per mortem Christi moriuntur peccatis, quasi consepeliuntur Christo per immersionem, secundum illud Rom. VI, consepulti sumus cum Christo per Baptismum in mortem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus etiam sepultus ostendit se inter mortuos liberum fuisse, in hoc quod per inclusionem sepulcri non potuit impediri quin ab eo resurgendo exiverit. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Christi mors efficienter operata est nostram salutem, ita etiam et eius sepultura. Unde Hieronymus dicit, super Marc., sepultura Christi resurgimus. Et Isaiae LIII, super illud, dabit impios pro sepultura, dicit Glossa, idest, gentes, quae sine pietate erant, Deo patrique dabit, quia mortuus et sepultus eos acquisivit. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in quodam sermone Concilii Ephesini, nihil horum quae salvant homines, iniuriam Deo facit, quae ostendunt eum, non passibilem, sed clementem. Et in alio sermone eiusdem Concilii legitur, nihil putat iniuriam Deus quod est occasio salutis hominibus. Tu quidem non ita vilem Dei naturam arbitreris, tanquam quae aliquando subiecta possit esse iniuriis.

IIIae

as it were buried with Christ by immersion, according to Rom. 6:4: We are buried together with Christ by baptism into death. Reply Obj. 1: Though buried, Christ proved Himself free among the dead: since, although imprisoned in the tomb, He could not be hindered from going forth by rising again. Reply Obj. 2: As Christ’s death wrought our salvation, so likewise did His burial. Hence Jerome says (Super Marc. xiv): By Christ’s burial we rise again; and on Isa. 53:9: He shall give the ungodly for His burial, a gloss says: He shall give to God and the Father the Gentiles who were without godliness, because He purchased them by His death and burial. Reply Obj. 3: As is said in a discourse made at the Council of Ephesus, Nothing that saves man is derogatory to God; showing Him to be not passible, but merciful: and in another discourse of the same Council: God does not repute anything as an injury which is an occasion of men’s salvation. Thus thou shalt not deem God’s Nature to be so vile, as though It may sometimes be subjected to injuries.

Article 2 Whether Christ was buried in a becoming manner? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur non convenienti modo Christum fuisse sepultum. Sepultura enim eius respondet morti ipsius. Sed Christus fuit passus mortem abiectissimam, secundum illud Sap. II, morte turpissima condemnemus eum. Ergo inconveniens videtur fuisse quod Christo exhibita fuit honorabilis sepultura, inquantum a magnatibus fuit tumulatus, scilicet a Ioseph ab Arimathaea, qui erat nobilis decurio, ut habetur Marci XV, et a Nicodemo, qui erat princeps Iudaeorum, ut habetur Ioan. III. Praeterea, circa Christum non debuit aliquid fieri quod esset superfluitatis exemplum. Videtur autem superfluitatis fuisse quod ad sepeliendum Christum Nicodemus venit ferens mixturam myrrhae et aloes quasi libras centum, ut dicitur Ioan. XIX, praesertim cum mulier praevenerit corpus eius ungere in sepulturam, ut dicitur Marci XIV. Non ergo fuit hoc convenienter circa Christum factum. Praeterea, non est conveniens ut aliquod factum sibi ipsi dissonum sit. Sed sepultura Christi fuit simplex ex una parte, quia scilicet Ioseph involvit corpus eius in sindone munda, ut dicitur Matth. XXVII, non autem auro aut gemmis aut serico, ut Hieronymus ibidem dicit, ex alia vero parte videtur fuisse ambitiosa, inquantum

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was buried in an unbecoming manner. For His burial should be in keeping with His death. But Christ underwent a most shameful death, according to Wis. 2:20: Let us condemn Him to a most shameful death. It seems therefore unbecoming for honorable burial to be accorded to Christ, inasmuch as He was buried by men of position—namely, by Joseph of Arimathea, who was a noble counselor, to use Mark’s expression (Mark 15:43), and by Nicodemus, who was a ruler of the Jews, as John states (John 3:1). Obj. 2: Further, nothing should be done to Christ which might set an example of wastefulness. But it seems to savor of waste that in order to bury Christ Nicodemus came bringing a mixture of myrrh and aloes about a hundred pounds weight, as recorded by John (19:39), especially since a woman came beforehand to anoint His body for the burial, as Mark relates (Mark 14:28). Consequently, this was not done becomingly with regard to Christ. Obj. 3: Further, it is not becoming for anything done to be inconsistent with itself. But Christ’s burial on the one hand was simple, because Joseph wrapped His body in a clean linen cloth, as is related by Matthew (27:59), but not with gold or gems, or silk, as Jerome observes: yet on the other hand there appears to have been some display, inas-

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eum cum aromatibus sepelierunt. Ergo videtur non fuis- much as they buried Him with fragrant spices (John 19:40). se conveniens modus sepulturae Christi. Consequently, the manner of Christ’s burial does not seem to have been seemly. Praeterea, quaecumque scripta sunt, et praecipue Obj. 4: Further, What things soever were written, espede Christo, ad nostram doctrinam scripta sunt, ut dicitur cially of Christ, were written for our learning, according to Rom. XV. Sed quaedam scribuntur in Evangeliis circa se- Rom. 15:4. But some of the things written in the Gospels pulcrum quae in nullo videntur ad nostram doctrinam touching Christ’s burial in no wise seem to pertain to our pertinere, sicut quod fuit sepultus in horto, quod in mo- instruction—as that He was buried in a garden . . . in a tomb numento alieno, et novo, et exciso in petra. Inconveniens which was not His own, which was new, and hewed out in igitur fuit modus sepulturae Christi. a rock. Therefore the manner of Christ’s burial was not becoming. Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae XI, et erit sepulOn the contrary, It is written (Isa 11:10): And His crum eius gloriosum. sepulchre shall be glorious. Respondeo dicendum quod modus sepulturae I answer that, The manner of Christ’s burial is shown Christi ostenditur esse conveniens quantum ad tria. Pri- to be seemly in three respects. First, to confirm faith in His mo quidem, quantum ad confirmandam fidem mortis death and resurrection. Second, to commend the devotion et resurrectionis ipsius. Secundo, ad commendandam of those who gave Him burial. Hence Augustine says (De pietatem eorum qui eum sepelierunt. Unde Augustinus Civ. Dei i): The Gospel mentions as praiseworthy the deed of dicit, in I de Civ. Dei, laudabiliter commemorantur in those who received His body from the cross, and with due care Evangelio qui corpus eius, de cruce acceptum, diligenter and reverence wrapped it up and buried it. Third, as to the atque honorifice tegendum sepeliendumque curarunt. Ter- mystery whereby those are molded who are buried together tio, quantum ad mysterium, per quod informantur illi with Christ into death (Rom 6:4). qui Christo consepeliuntur in mortem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, circa mortem Reply Obj. 1: With regard to Christ’s death, His paChristi, commendantur patientia et constantia ipsius qui tience and constancy in enduring death are commended, mortem est passus, et tanto magis, quanto mors fuit and all the more that His death was the more despicable: abiectior. Sed in sepultura honorifica consideratur virtus but in His honorable burial we can see the power of the dymorientis, qui, contra intentionem occidentium, etiam ing Man, who, even in death, frustrated the intent of His mortuus honorifice sepelitur, et praefiguratur devotio fi- murderers, and was buried with honor: and thereby is foredelium, qui erant Christo mortuo servituri. shadowed the devotion of the faithful who in the time to come were to serve the dead Christ. Ad secundum dicendum quod in hoc quod EvanReply Obj. 2: On that expression of the Evangelist gelista dicit quod sepelierunt eum sicut mos est Iudaeis (John 19:40) that they buried Him as the manner of the Jews sepelire, sicut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., admonuit in is to bury, Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cxx): He admonhuiusmodi officiis quae mortuis exhibentur, morem cuius- ishes us that in offices of this kind which are rendered to the que gentis esse servandum. Erat autem illius gentis con- dead, the custom of each nation should be observed. Now it suetudo ut mortuorum corpora variis aromatibus condi- was the custom of this people to anoint bodies with varirentur, ut diutius servarentur illaesa. Unde et in III de ous spices in order the longer to preserve them from corDoct. Christ. dicitur quod in omnibus talibus non usus ruption. Accordingly it is said in De Doctr. Christ. iii that rerum, sed libido utentis in culpa est. Et postea subdit, in all such things, it is not the use thereof, but the luxury of quod in aliis personis plerumque flagitium est, in divina the user that is at fault; and, farther on: what in other pervel prophetica persona magnae cuiusdam rei signum est. sons is frequently criminal, in a divine or prophetic person is Myrrha enim et aloes, propter sui amaritudinem, signifi- a sign of something great. For myrrh and aloes by their bitcant poenitentiam, per quam aliquis in seipso Christum terness denote penance, by which man keeps Christ within conservat absque corruptione peccati. Odor autem aro- himself without the corruption of sin; while the odor of the matum significat bonam famam. ointments expresses good report. Ad tertium dicendum quod myrrha et aloes adReply Obj. 3: Myrrh and aloes were used on Christ’s hibebantur corpori Christi ut immune a corruptione body in order that it might be preserved from corruption, servaretur, quod videbatur ad quandam necessitatem and this seemed to imply a certain need (in the body): pertinere. Unde datur nobis exemplum ut licite possi- hence the example is set us that we may lawfully use premus aliquibus pretiosis uti medicinaliter pro necessitate cious things medicinally, from the need of preserving our nostri corporis conservandi. Sed involutio corporis per- body. But the wrapping up of the body was merely a questinebat ad solam quandam decentiam honestatis. Et in tion of becoming propriety. And we ought to content ourtalibus, simplicibus debemus esse contenti. Per hoc ta- selves with simplicity in such things. Yet, as Jerome ob-

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men significabatur, ut Hieronymus dicit, quod ille in sindone munda involvit Iesum, qui mente pura eum susceperit. Et hinc, ut Beda dicit, super Marc., Ecclesiae mos obtinuit ut sacrificium altaris non in serico neque in panno tincto, sed in lino terreno celebretur, sicut corpus domini est in sindone munda sepultum. Ad quartum dicendum quod Christus sepelitur in horto, ad significandum quod per mortem et sepulturam ipsius liberamur a morte, quam incurrimus per peccatum Adae in horto Paradisi commissum. Ideo autem salvator in aliena ponitur sepultura, ut Augustinus dicit, in quodam sermone, quia pro aliorum moriebatur salute, sepulcrum autem mortis est habitaculum. Per hoc etiam considerari potest paupertatis abundantia pro nobis susceptae. Nam qui domum in vita non habuit, post mortem quoque in alieno sepulcro reconditur, et nudus existens a Ioseph operitur. In novo autem ponitur monumento, ut Hieronymus dicit, ne, post resurrectionem, ceteris corporibus remanentibus, surrexisse alius fingeretur. Potest autem et novum sepulcrum Mariae virginalem uterum demonstrare. Per hoc etiam datur intelligi quod per Christi sepulturam omnes innovamur, morte et corruptione destructa. In monumento autem deciso in petra conditus est, ut Hieronymus dicit, ne, si ex multis lapidibus aedificatum fuisset, tumuli fundamentis suffossis, sublatus furto diceretur. Unde et saxum magnum quod appositum fuit, ostendit non absque auxilio plurimorum sepulcrum potuisse reserari. Si etiam sepultus fuisset in terra, dicere poterant, suffoderunt terram, et furati sunt eum, sicut Augustinus dicit. Significatur autem mystice per hoc, ut Hilarius dicit, quod per apostolorum doctrinam in pectus duritiae gentilis, quodam doctrinae opere excisum, Christus infertur, rude scilicet ac novum, nullo antea ingressu timori Dei pervium. Et quia nihil oporteat praeter eum in pectora nostra penetrare, lapis ostio advolvitur. Et, sicut Origenes dicit, non fortuito scriptum est, Ioseph involvit corpus Christi sindone munda, et posuit in monumento novo, et quod advolvit lapidem magnum, quia omnia quae sunt circa corpus Iesu, munda sunt, et nova, et valde magna.

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serves, by this act was denoted that he swathes Jesus in clean linen, who receives Him with a pure soul. Hence, as Bede says on Mark 15:46: The Church’s custom has prevailed for the sacrifice of the altar to be offered not upon silk, nor upon dyed cloth, but on linen of the earth; as the Lord’s body was buried in a clean winding-sheet. Reply Obj. 4: Christ was buried in a garden to express that by His death and burial we are delivered from the death which we incur through Adam’s sin committed in the garden of paradise. But for this was our Lord buried in the grave of a stranger, as Augustine says in a sermon (ccxlviii), because He died for the salvation of others; and a sepulchre is the abode of death. Also the extent of the poverty endured for us can be thereby estimated: since He who while living had no home, after death was laid to rest in another’s tomb, and being naked was clothed by Joseph. But He is laid in a new sepulchre, as Jerome observes on Matt. 27:60, lest after the resurrection it might be pretended that someone else had risen, while the other corpses remained. The new sepulchre can also denote Mary’s virginal womb. And furthermore it may be understood that all of us are renewed by Christ’s burial; death and corruption being destroyed. Moreover, He was buried in a monument hewn out of a rock, as Jerome says on Matt. 27:64, lest, if it had been constructed of many stones, they might say that He was stolen away by digging away the foundations of the tomb. Hence the great stone which was set shows that the tomb could not be opened except by the help of many hands. Again, if He had been buried in the earth, they might have said: They dug up the soil and stole Him away, as Augustine observes. Hilary (Comment. in Matth. cap. xxxiii) gives the mystical interpretation, saying that by the teaching of the apostles, Christ is borne into the stony heart of the gentile; for it is hewn out by the process of teaching, unpolished and new, untenanted and open to the entrance of the fear of God. And since naught besides Him must enter into our hearts, a great stone is rolled against the door. Furthermore, as Origen says (Tract. xxxv in Matth.): It was not written by hazard: ‘Joseph wrapped Christ’s body in a clean winding-sheet, and placed it in a new monument,’ and that ‘he rolled a great stone,’ because all things around the body of Jesus are clean, and new, and exceeding great.

Article 3 Whether Christ’s body was reduced to dust in the tomb? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpus Christi in sepulcro fuerit incineratum. Sicut enim mors est poena peccati primi parentis, ita etiam incineratio, dictum est enim primo homini post peccatum, pulvis es, et in pulverem reverteris, ut dicitur Gen. III. Sed Christus mortem sustinuit ut nos a morte liberaret. Ergo

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s body was reduced to dust in the tomb. For just as man dies in punishment of his first parent’s sin, so also does he return to dust, since it was said to the first man after his sin: Dust thou art, and into dust thou shalt return (Gen 3:19). But Christ endured death in order to deliver us from death. Therefore His

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etiam incinerari debuit corpus eius, ut nos ab incineratione liberaret. Praeterea, corpus Christi fuit eiusdem naturae cum corporibus nostris. Sed corpora nostra statim post mortem resolvi incipiunt et ad putrefactionem disponuntur, quia, exhalante calido naturali, supervenit calor extraneus, qui putrefactionem causat. Ergo videtur quod similiter in corpore Christi acciderit. Praeterea, sicut dictum est, Christus sepeliri voluit ut daret hominibus spem resurgendi etiam de sepulcris. Ergo etiam incinerationem pati debuit, ut spem resurgendi incineratis post incinerationem daret. Sed contra est quod in Psalmo dicitur, non dabis sanctum tuum videre corruptionem, quod Damascenus exponit, in III libro, de corruptione quae est per resolutionem in elementa. Respondeo dicendum quod non fuit conveniens corpus Christi putrefieri, vel quocumque modo incinerari. Quia putrefactio cuiuscumque corporis provenit ex infirmitate naturae illius corporis, quae non potest amplius corpus continere in unum. Mors autem Christi, sicut supra dictum est, non debuit esse cum infirmitate naturae, ne crederetur non esse voluntaria. Et ideo non ex morbo, sed ex passione illata voluit mori, cui se obtulit sponte. Et ideo Christus, ne mors eius naturae infirmitati adscriberetur, noluit corpus suum qualitercumque putrefieri, aut qualitercumque resolvi, sed, ad ostensionem virtutis divinae, voluit corpus illud incorruptum permanere. Unde Chrysostomus dicit quod, viventibus aliis hominibus, his scilicet qui egerunt strenue, arrident propria gesta, his autem pereuntibus, pereunt. Sed in Christo est totum contrarium, nam ante crucem, omnia sunt maesta et infirma; ut autem crucifixus est, omnia clariora sunt facta, ut noscas non purum hominem crucifixum.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus, cum non esset subiectus peccato, neque morti erat obnoxius neque incinerationi. Voluntarie tamen mortem sustinuit propter nostram salutem, propter rationes supra dictas. Si autem corpus eius fuisset putrefactum vel resolutum, magis hoc fuisset in detrimentum humanae salutis, dum non crederetur in eo esse virtus divina. Unde ex persona eius in Psalmo dicitur, quae utilitas in sanguine meo dum descendo in corruptionem? Quasi dicat, si corpus meum putrescat, perdetur effusi sanguinis utilitas. Ad secundum dicendum quod corpus Christi, quantum ad conditionem naturae passibilis, putrefactibile fuit, licet non quantum ad meritum putrefactionis, quod est peccatum. Sed virtus divina corpus Christi a putrefactione reservavit, sicut et resuscitavit a morte. Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus de sepulcro resurrexit virtute divina, quae nullis terminis coarcta-

Q. 51, A. 3

body ought to be made to return to dust, so as to free us from the same penalty. Obj. 2: Further, Christ’s body was of the same nature as ours. But directly after death our bodies begin to dissolve into dust, and are disposed towards putrefaction, because when the natural heat departs, there supervenes heat from without which causes corruption. Therefore it seems that the same thing happened to Christ’s body. Obj. 3: Further, as stated above (A. 1), Christ willed to be buried in order to furnish men with the hope of rising likewise from the grave. Consequently, He sought likewise to return to dust so as to give to them who have returned to dust the hope of rising from the dust. On the contrary, It is written (Ps 15:10): Nor wilt Thou suffer Thy holy one to see corruption: and Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii) expounds this of the corruption which comes of dissolving into elements. I answer that, It was not fitting for Christ’s body to putrefy, or in any way be reduced to dust, since the putrefaction of any body comes of that body’s infirmity of nature, which can no longer hold the body together. But as was said above (Q. 50, A. 1, ad 2), Christ’s death ought not to come from weakness of nature, lest it might not be believed to be voluntary: and therefore He willed to die, not from sickness, but from suffering inflicted on Him, to which He gave Himself up willingly. And therefore, lest His death might be ascribed to infirmity of nature, Christ did not wish His body to putrefy in any way or dissolve no matter how; but for the manifestation of His Divine power He willed that His body should continue incorrupt. Hence Chrysostom says that with other men, especially with such as have wrought strenuously, their deeds shine forth in their lifetime; but as soon as they die, their deeds go with them. But it is quite the contrary with Christ: because previous to the cross all is sadness and weakness, but as soon as He is crucified, everything comes to light, in order that you may learn it was not an ordinary man that was crucified. Reply Obj. 1: Since Christ was not subject to sin, neither was He prone to die or to return to dust. Yet of His own will He endured death for our salvation, for the reasons alleged above (Q. 51, A. 1). But had His body putrefied or dissolved, this fact would have been detrimental to man’s salvation, for it would not have seemed credible that the Divine power was in Him. Hence it is on His behalf that it is written (Ps 19:10): What profit is there in my blood, whilst I go down to corruption? as if He were to say: If My body corrupt, the profit of the blood shed will be lost. Reply Obj. 2: Christ’s body was a subject of corruption according to the condition of its passible nature, but not as to the deserving cause of putrefaction, which is sin: but the Divine power preserved Christ’s body from putrefying, just as it raised it up from death. Reply Obj. 3: Christ rose from the tomb by Divine power, which is not narrowed within bounds. Conse-

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tur. Et ideo hoc quod a sepulcro surrexit, sufficiens ar- quently, His rising from the grave was a sufficient argument gumentum fuit quod homines erant resuscitandi virtute to prove that men are to be raised up by Divine power, not divina non solum de sepulcris, sed etiam de quibuscum- only from their graves, but also from any dust whatever. que cineribus.

Article 4 Whether Christ was in the tomb only one day and two nights? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non fuerit in sepulcro solum una die et duabus noctibus. Dicit enim ipse, Matth. XII, sicut fuit Ionas in ventre ceti tribus diebus et tribus noctibus, ita filius hominis erit in corde terrae tribus diebus et tribus noctibus. Sed in corde terrae fuit in sepulcro existens. Non ergo fuit in sepulcro solum una die et duabus noctibus. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in homilia paschali, quod sicut Samson abstulit media nocte portas Gazae, ita Christus media nocte, auferens portas Inferni, resurrexit. Sed postquam resurrexit, non fuit in sepulcro. Ergo non fuit in sepulcro duabus noctibus integris. Praeterea, per mortem Christi lux praevaluit tenebris. Sed nox ad tenebras pertinet, dies autem ad lucem. Ergo convenientius fuit quod corpus Christi fuerit in sepulcro duabus diebus et una nocte, quam e converso. Sed contra est quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin., a vespere sepulturae usque ad diluculum resurrectionis triginta sex horae sunt, idest, nox tota cum die tota et nocte tota. Respondeo dicendum quod ipsum tempus quo Christus in sepulcro mansit, effectum mortis eius repraesentat. Dictum est enim supra quod per mortem Christi liberati sumus a duplici morte, scilicet a morte animae et a morte corporis. Et hoc significatur per duas noctes quibus Christus in sepulcro permansit. Mors autem eius, quia non fuit ex peccato proveniens sed ex caritate suscepta, non habuit rationem noctis, sed diei. Et ideo significatur per diem integram qua Christus fuit in sepulcro. Et sic conveniens fuit quod Christus una die et duabus noctibus esset in sepulcro. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de consensu Evang., quidam, modum Scripturae nescientes, noctem voluerunt animadvertere tres illas horas, a sexta usque ad nonam, quibus sol obscuratus est; et diem, tres horas alias quibus iterum terris est redditus, idest a nona usque ad eius occasum. Sequitur enim nox futura sabbati, qua cum suo die computata, erunt iam duae noctes et duo dies. Post sabbatum autem, sequitur nox primae sabbati, idest illucescentis diei dominici, in qua tunc dominus resurrexit. Et ita adhuc non constabit ratio trium dierum et trium noctium. Restat ergo ut hoc

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not in the tomb during only one day and two nights; because He said (Matt 12:40): As Jonas was in the whale’s belly three days and three nights: so shall the Son of man be in the heart of the earth three days and three nights. But He was in the heart of the earth while He was in the grave. Therefore He was not in the tomb for only one day and two nights. Obj. 2: Gregory says in a Paschal Homily (Hom. xxi): As Samson carried off the gates of Gaza during the night, even so Christ rose in the night, taking away the gates of hell. But after rising He was not in the tomb. Therefore He was not two whole nights in the grave. Obj. 3: Further, light prevailed over darkness by Christ’s death. But night belongs to darkness, and day to light. Therefore it was more fitting for Christ’s body to be in the tomb for two days and a night, rather than conversely. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv): There were thirty-six hours from the evening of His burial to the dawn of the resurrection, that is, a whole night with a whole day, and a whole night. I answer that, The very time during which Christ remained in the tomb shows forth the effect of His death. For it was said above (Q. 50, A. 6) that by Christ’s death we were delivered from a twofold death, namely, from the death of the soul and of the body: and this is signified by the two nights during which He remained in the tomb. But since His death did not come of sin, but was endured from charity, it has not the semblance of night, but of day: consequently it is denoted by the whole day during which Christ was in the sepulchre. And so it was fitting for Christ to be in the sepulchre during one day and two nights. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. iii): Some men, ignorant of Scriptural language, wished to compute as night those three hours, from the sixth to the ninth hour, during which the sun was darkened, and as day those other three hours during which it was restored to the earth, that is, from the ninth hour until its setting: for the coming night of the Sabbath follows, and if this be reckoned with its day, there will be already two nights and two days. Now after the Sabbath there follows the night of the first day of the Sabbath, that is, of the dawning Sunday, on which the Lord rose. Even so, the reckoning of the three days and three nights will

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inveniatur illo Scripturarum usitato loquendi modo quo a parte totum intelligitur, ita scilicet quod unam noctem et unam diem accipiamus pro uno die naturali. Et sic primus dies computatur ab extrema parte sui, qua Christus in sexta feria est mortuus et sepultus; secunda autem dies est integra cum viginti quatuor horis nocturnis et diurnis; nox autem sequens pertinet ad tertium diem. Sicut enim primi dies, propter futurum hominis lapsum, a luce in noctem; ita isti, propter hominis reparationem, a tenebris computantur in lucem. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin., Christus in diluculo resurrexit, in quo aliquid lucis apparet, et adhuc tamen aliquid remanet tenebrarum noctis, unde de mulieribus dicitur, Ioan. XX, quod cum tenebrae adhuc essent, venerunt ad monumentum. Ratione ergo harum tenebrarum, Gregorius dicit Christum media nocte surrexisse, non quidem divisa nocte in duas partes aequales, sed infra illam noctem. Illud enim diluculum et pars noctis et pars diei dici potest, propter communicantiam quam habet cum utroque. Ad tertium dicendum quod in tantum lux in morte Christi praevaluit, quod significatur per unam diem, quod tenebras duarum noctium, idest duplicis mortis nostrae, removit, ut dictum est.

Q. 51, A. 4

not stand. It remains then to find the solution in the customary usage of speech of the Scriptures, whereby the whole is understood from the part: so that we are able to take a day and a night as one natural day. And so the first day is computed from its ending, during which Christ died and was buried on the Friday; while the second day is an entire day with twenty-four hours of night and day; while the night following belongs to the third day. For as the primitive days were computed from light to night on account of man’s future fall, so these days are computed from the darkness to the daylight on account of man’s restoration (De Trin. iv). Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Trin. iv; cf. De Consens. Evang. iii), Christ rose with the dawn, when light appears in part, and still some part of the darkness of the night remains. Hence it is said of the women that when it was yet dark they came to the sepulchre (John 20:1). Therefore, in consequence of this darkness, Gregory says (Hom. xxi) that Christ rose in the middle of the night, not that night is divided into two equal parts, but during the night itself: for the expression early can be taken as partly night and partly day, from its fittingness with both. Reply Obj. 3: The light prevailed so far in Christ’s death (which is denoted by the one day) that it dispelled the darkness of the two nights, that is, of our twofold death, as stated above.

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Question 52 Christ’s Descent into Hell Deinde considerandum est de descensu Christi ad We have now to consider Christ’s descent into hell; conInferos. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. cerning which there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum conveniens fuerit Christum ad Inferos (1) Whether it was fitting for Christ to descend into descendere. hell? Secundo, in quem Infernum descenderit. (2) Into which hell did He descend? Tertio, utrum totus fuerit in Inferno. (3) Whether He was entirely in hell? Quarto, utrum aliquam moram ibi contraxerit. (4) Whether He made any stay there? Quinto, utrum sanctos patres ab Inferno liberaverit. (5) Whether He delivered the Holy Fathers from hell? Sexto, utrum ab Inferno liberaverit damnatos. (6) Whether He delivered the lost from hell? Septimo, utrum liberaverit pueros in peccato (7) Whether He delivered the children who died in originali defunctos. original sin? Octavo, utrum liberaverit homines de Purgatorio. (8) Whether He delivered men from Purgatory?

Article 1 Whether it was fitting for Christ to descend into hell? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Christum ad Infernum descendere. Dicit enim Augustinus, in epistola ad Evodium, nec ipsos quidem Inferos uspiam Scripturarum in bono appellatos potui reperire. Sed anima Christi non descendit ad aliquod malum, quia nec animae iustorum ad aliquod malum descendunt. Ergo videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Christum ad Inferos descendere. Praeterea, descendere ad Inferos non potest Christo convenire secundum divinam naturam, quae est omnino immobilis, sed solum convenire potest ei secundum naturam assumptam. Ea vero quae Christus fecit vel passus est in natura assumpta, ordinantur ad humanam salutem. Ad quam non videtur necessarium fuisse quod Christus descenderit ad Inferos, quia per passionem suam, quam in hoc mundo sustinuit, nos liberavit a culpa et poena, ut supra dictum est. Non igitur fuit conveniens quod Christus ad Infernum descenderet. Praeterea, per mortem Christi separata est anima a corpore eius, quod quidem positum fuerat in sepulcro, ut supra habitum est. Non videtur autem quod secundum animam solam ad Infernum descenderit, quia anima, cum sit incorporea, non videtur quod localiter possit moveri; hoc enim est corporum, ut probatur in VI Physic.; descensus autem motum corporalem importat. Non ergo fuit conveniens quod Christus ad Infernum descenderet. Sed contra est quod dicitur in symbolo, descendit ad Inferos. Et apostolus dicit, Ephes. IV, quod autem

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for Christ to descend into hell, because Augustine says (Ep. ad Evod. cliv.): Nor could I find anywhere in the Scriptures hell mentioned as something good. But Christ’s soul did not descend into any evil place, for neither do the souls of the just. Therefore it does not seem fitting for Christ’s soul to descend into hell. Obj. 2: Further, it cannot belong to Christ to descend into hell according to His Divine Nature, which is altogether immovable; but only according to His assumed nature. But that which Christ did or suffered in His assumed nature is ordained for man’s salvation: and to secure this it does not seem necessary for Christ to descend into hell, since He delivered us from both guilt and penalty by His Passion which He endured in this world, as stated above (Q. 49, AA. 1, 3). Consequently, it was not fitting that Christ should descend into hell. Obj. 3: Further, by Christ’s death His soul was separated from His body, and this was laid in the sepulchre, as stated above (Q. 51). But it seems that He descended into hell, not according to His soul only, because seemingly the soul, being incorporeal, cannot be a subject of local motion; for this belongs to bodies, as is proved in Phys. vi, text. 32; while descent implies corporeal motion. Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to descend into hell. On the contrary, It is said in the Creed: He descended into hell: and the Apostle says (Eph 4:9): Now that

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ascendit, quid est nisi quia descendit primum ad inferio- He ascended, what is it, but because He also descended first res partes terrae? Glossa, idest ad Inferos. into the lower parts of the earth? And a gloss adds: that is— into hell. Respondeo dicendum quod conveniens fuit ChriI answer that, It was fitting for Christ to descend into stum ad Infernum descendere. Primo quidem, quia ipse hell. First of all, because He came to bear our penalty in orvenerat poenam nostram portare, ut nos a poena eripe- der to free us from penalty, according to Isa. 53:4: Surely ret, secundum illud Isaiae LIII, vere languores nostros ip- He hath borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows. But se tulit, et dolores nostros ipse portavit. Ex peccato autem through sin man had incurred not only the death of the homo incurrerat non solum mortem corporis, sed etiam body, but also descent into hell. Consequently since it was descensum ad Inferos. Et ideo, sicut fuit conveniens eum fitting for Christ to die in order to deliver us from death, so mori ut nos liberaret a morte, ita conveniens fuit eum it was fitting for Him to descend into hell in order to dedescendere ad Inferos ut nos a descensu ad Inferos li- liver us also from going down into hell. Hence it is writberaret. Unde dicitur Osee XIII, ero mors tua, o mors. ten (Hos 13:14): O death, I will be thy death; O hell, I will Ero morsus tuus, Inferne. Secundo, quia conveniens erat be thy bite. Second, because it was fitting when the devil ut, victo Diabolo per passionem, vinctos eius eriperet, was overthrown by the Passion that Christ should deliver qui detinebantur in Inferno, secundum illud Zach. IX, the captives detained in hell, according to Zech. 9:11: Thou tu quoque in sanguine testamenti tui vinctos tuos emisisti also by the blood of Thy Testament hast sent forth Thy prisonde lacu. Et Coloss. II dicitur, exspolians principatus et po- ers out of the pit. And it is written (Col 2:15): Despoiling the testates, traduxit confidenter. Tertio ut, sicut potestatem principalities and powers, He hath exposed them confidently. suam ostendit in terra vivendo et moriendo, ita etiam Third, that as He showed forth His power on earth by living potestatem suam ostenderet in Inferno, ipsum visitando and dying, so also He might manifest it in hell, by visiting it et illuminando; unde dicitur in Psalmo, attollite portas, and enlightening it. Accordingly it is written (Ps 23:7): Lift principes, vestras, Glossa, idest, principes Inferni, auferte up your gates, O ye princes, which the gloss thus interprets: potestatem vestram, qua usque nunc homines in Inferno that is—Ye princes of hell, take away your power, whereby detinebatis; et sic in nomine Iesu omne genu flectatur, hitherto you held men fast in hell; and so at the name of Jesus non solum caelestium, sed etiam Infernorum, ut dicitur every knee should bow, not only of them that are in heaven, Philipp. II. but likewise of them that are in hell, as is said in Phil. 2:10. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nomen InfernoReply Obj. 1: The name of hell stands for an evil of rum sonat in malum poenae, non autem in malum cul- penalty, and not for an evil of guilt. Hence it was becoming pae. Unde decuit Christum in Infernum descendere, non that Christ should descend into hell, not as liable to punishtanquam ipse esset debitor poena, sed ut eos qui erant ment Himself, but to deliver them who were. poenae obnoxii, liberaret. Ad secundum dicendum quod passio Christi fuit Reply Obj. 2: Christ’s Passion was a kind of universal quaedam causa universalis humanae salutis, tam vivo- cause of men’s salvation, both of the living and of the dead. rum quam mortuorum. Causa autem universalis appli- But a general cause is applied to particular effects by means catur ad singulares effectus per aliquid speciale. Unde, of something special. Hence, as the power of the Passion is sicut virtus passionis Christi applicatur viventibus per applied to the living through the sacraments which make sacramenta configurantia nos passioni Christi, ita etiam us like unto Christ’s Passion, so likewise it is applied to the applicata est mortuis per descensum Christi ad Inferos. dead through His descent into hell. On which account it is Propter quod signanter dicitur Zach. IX, quod eduxit written (Zech 9:11) that He sent forth prisoners out of the vinctos de lacu in sanguine testamenti sui, idest per vir- pit, in the blood of His testament, that is, by the power of His tutem passionis suae. Passion. Ad tertium dicendum quod anima Christi non deReply Obj. 3: Christ’s soul descended into hell not by scenderit ad Inferos eo genere motus quo corpora mo- the same kind of motion as that whereby bodies are moved, ventur, sed eo genere motus quo Angeli moventur, sicut but by that kind whereby the angels are moved, as was said in prima parte habitum est. in the First Part (Q. 53, A. 1).

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Christ’s Descent into Hell

Q. 52, A. 2

Article 2 Whether Christ went down into the hell of the lost? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus descenderit etiam ad Infernum damnatorum. Dicitur enim ex ore divinae sapientiae, Eccli. XXIV, penetrabo omnes inferiores partes terrae. Sed inter partes inferiores terrae computatur etiam Infernus damnatorum, secundum illud Psalmi, introibunt in inferiora terrae. Ergo Christus, qui est Dei sapientia, etiam usque ad Infernum damnatorum descendit. Praeterea, Act. II dicit Petrus quod Deus Christum suscitavit, solutis doloribus Inferni, iuxta quod impossibile erat teneri illum ab eo. Sed dolores non sunt in Inferno patrum, neque etiam in Inferno puerorum, qui non puniuntur poena sensus propter peccatum actuale, sed solum poena damni propter peccatum originale. Ergo Christus descendit in Infernum damnatorum, vel etiam in Purgatorium, ubi homines puniuntur poena sensus pro peccatis actualibus. Praeterea, I Pet. III dicitur quod Christus his qui in carcere conclusi erant, spiritu veniens praedicavit, qui increduli fuerant aliquando, quod, sicut Athanasius dicit, in epistola ad Epictetum, intelligitur de descensu Christi ad Inferos. Dicit enim quod corpus Christi fuit in sepulcro positum, quando ipse perrexit praedicare his qui in custodia erant spiritibus, sicut dixit Petrus. Constat autem quod increduli erant in Inferno damnatorum. Ergo Christus ad Infernum damnatorum descendit. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Evodium, si in illum Abrahae sinum Christum mortuum venisse sacra Scriptura dixisset non nominato Inferno eiusque doloribus, miror si quisquam eum ad Inferos descendisse asserere auderet. Sed quia evidentia testimonia et Infernum commemorant et dolores, nulla causa occurrit cur illo credatur venisse salvator, nisi ut ab eisdem doloribus salvos faceret. Sed locus dolorum est Infernus damnatorum. Ergo Christus in Infernum damnatorum descendit. Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, in quodam sermone de passione, Christus ad Infernum descendens omnes iustos qui originali peccato adstricti tenebantur, absolvit. Sed inter illos erat etiam Iob, qui de seipso dicit, Iob XVII, in profundissima Inferni descendent omnia mea. Ergo Christus etiam usque ad profundissimum Inferni descendit. Sed contra est quod de Inferno damnatorum dicitur, Iob X, antequam vadam, et non revertar, ad terram tenebrosam et opertam mortis caligine, et cetera. Nulla autem est conventio lucis ad tenebras, ut dicitur II Cor. VI. Ergo Christus, qui est lux, ad illum Infernum damnatorum non descendit.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ went down into the hell of the lost, because it is said by the mouth of Divine Wisdom (Sir 24:45): I will penetrate to all the lower parts of the earth. But the hell of the lost is computed among the lower parts of the earth according to Ps. 62:10: They shall go into the lower parts of the earth. Therefore Christ who is the Wisdom of God, went down even into the hell of the lost. Obj. 2: Further, Peter says (Acts 2:24) that God hath raised up Christ, having loosed the sorrows of hell, as it was impossible that He should be holden by it. But there are no sorrows in the hell of the Fathers, nor in the hell of the children, since they are not punished with sensible pain on account of any actual sin, but only with the pain of loss on account of original sin. Therefore Christ went down into the hell of the lost, or else into Purgatory, where men are tormented with sensible pain on account of actual sins. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (1 Pet 3:19) that Christ coming in spirit preached to those spirits that were in prison, which had some time been incredulous: and this is understood of Christ’s descent into hell, as Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epict.). For he says that Christ’s body was laid in the sepulchre when He went to preach to those spirits who were in bondage, as Peter said. But it is clear the unbelievers were in the hell of the lost. Therefore Christ went down into the hell of the lost. Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (Ep. ad Evod. clxiv): If the sacred Scriptures had said that Christ came into Abraham’s bosom, without naming hell or its woes, I wonder whether any person would dare to assert that He descended into hell. But since evident testimonies mention hell and its sorrows, there is no reason for believing that Christ went there except to deliver men from the same woes. But the place of woes is the hell of the lost. Therefore Christ descended into the hell of the lost. Obj. 5: Further, as Augustine says in a sermon upon the Resurrection: Christ descending into hell set free all the just who were held in the bonds of original sin. But among them was Job, who says of himself (Job 17:16): All that I have shall go down into the deepest pit. Therefore Christ descended into the deepest pit. On the contrary, Regarding the hell of the lost it is written (Job 10:21): Before I go, and return no more, to a land that is dark and covered with the mist of death. Now there is no fellowship of light with darkness, according to 2 Cor. 6:14. Therefore Christ, who is the light, did not descend into the hell of the lost.

555

Q. 52, A. 2

Incarnate Son of God

Respondeo dicendum quod dupliciter dicitur aliquid alicubi esse. Uno modo, per suum effectum. Et hoc modo Christus in quemlibet Infernum descendit, aliter tamen et aliter. Nam in Infernum damnatorum habuit hunc effectum quod, descendens ad Inferos, eos de sua incredulitate et malitia confutavit. Illis vero qui detinebantur in Purgatorio, spem gloriae consequendae dedit. Sanctis autem patribus, qui pro solo peccato originali detinebantur in Inferno, lumen aeternae gloriae infudit. Alio modo dicitur aliquid esse alicubi per suam essentiam. Et hoc modo anima Christi descendit solum ad locum Inferni in quo iusti detinebantur, ut quos ipse per gratiam interius visitabat secundum divinitatem, eos etiam secundum animam visitaret et loco. Sic autem in una parte Inferni existens, effectum suum aliqualiter ad omnes Inferni partes derivavit, sicut, in uno loco terrae passus, totum mundum sua passione liberavit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus, qui est Dei sapientia, penetravit omnes inferiores partes terrae, non localiter, secundum animam omnes circumeundo; sed effectum suae potentiae aliqualiter ad omnes extendendo. Ita tamen quod solos iustos illuminavit, sequitur enim, et illuminabo omnes sperantes in domino. Ad secundum dicendum quod duplex est dolor. Unus de passione poenae, quam patiuntur homines pro peccato actuali, secundum illud Psalmi, dolores Inferni circumdederunt me. Alius autem dolor est de dilatione speratae gloriae, secundum illud Proverb. XIII, spes quae differtur, affligit animam. Quem quidem dolorem etiam patiebantur sancti patres in Inferno. Ad quod significandum Augustinus, in sermone de passione, dicit quod lacrymabili obsecratione Christum orabant. Utrosque autem dolores Christus solvit ad Infernum descendens, aliter tamen et aliter. Nam dolores poenarum solvit praeservando ab eis, sicut medicus dicitur solvere morbum a quo praeservat per medicinam. Dolores autem causatos ex dilatione gloriae actualiter solvit, gloriam praebendo. Ad tertium dicendum quod illud quod ibi dicit Petrus, a quibusdam refertur ad descensum Christi ad Inferos, sic exponentes verbum illud, his qui in carcere conclusi erant, idest in Inferno, spiritu, idest secundum animam, Christus veniens praedicavit, qui increduli fuerant aliquando. Unde et Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod, sicut his qui in terra sunt evangelizavit, ita et his qui in Inferno, non quidem ut incredulos ad fidem converteret, sed ut eorum infidelitatem confutaret. Quia et ipsa praedicatio nihil aliud intelligi potest quam manifestatio divinitatis eius, quae manifestata est infernalibus per virtuosum descensum Christi ad Inferos. Augustinus tamen melius exponit, in epistola ad Evodium, ut referatur, non ad descensum Christi ad Inferos, sed ad operationem divinitatis eius, quam exercuit a principio mundi. Ut sit sensus quod his qui in carcere

IIIae

I answer that, A thing is said to be in a place in two ways. First of all, through its effect, and in this way Christ descended into each of the hells, but in different manner. For going down into the hell of the lost He wrought this effect, that by descending thither He put them to shame for their unbelief and wickedness: but to them who were detained in Purgatory He gave hope of attaining to glory: while upon the holy Fathers detained in hell solely on account of original sin, He shed the light of glory everlasting. In another way a thing is said to be in a place through its essence: and in this way Christ’s soul descended only into that part of hell wherein the just were detained; so that He visited them in place, according to His soul, whom He visited interiorly by grace, according to His Godhead. Accordingly, while remaining in one part of hell, He wrought this effect in a measure in every part of hell, just as while suffering in one part of the earth He delivered the whole world by His Passion. Reply Obj. 1: Christ, who is the Wisdom of God, penetrated to all the lower parts of the earth, not passing through them locally with His soul, but by spreading the effects of His power in a measure to them all: yet so that He enlightened only the just: because the text quoted continues: And I will enlighten all that hope in the Lord. Reply Obj. 2: Sorrow is twofold: one is the suffering of pain which men endure for actual sin, according to Ps. 17:6: The sorrows of hell encompassed me. Another sorrow comes of hoped-for glory being deferred, according to Prov. 13:12: Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul: and such was the sorrow which the holy Fathers suffered in hell, and Augustine refers to it in a sermon on the Passion, saying that they besought Christ with tearful entreaty. Now by descending into hell Christ took away both sorrows, yet in different ways: for He did away with the sorrows of pains by preserving souls from them, just as a physician is said to free a man from sickness by warding it off by means of physic. Likewise He removed the sorrows caused by glory deferred, by bestowing glory. Reply Obj. 3: These words of Peter are referred by some to Christ’s descent into hell: and they explain it in this sense: Christ preached to them who formerly were unbelievers, and who were shut up in prison—that is, in hell—in spirit—that is, by His soul. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): As He evangelized them who are upon the earth, so did He those who were in hell; not in order to convert unbelievers unto belief, but to put them to shame for their unbelief, since preaching cannot be understood otherwise than as the open manifesting of His Godhead, which was laid bare before them in the lower regions by His descending in power into hell. Augustine, however, furnishes a better exposition of the text in his Epistle to Evodius quoted above, namely, that the preaching is not to be referred to Christ’s descent into hell, but to the operation of His Godhead, to which He gave

556

IIIae

Christ’s Descent into Hell

conclusi erant, viventes scilicet in corpore mortali, quod est quasi quidam carcer animae, spiritu suae divinitatis veniens praedicavit, per internas inspirationes, et etiam exteriores admonitiones per ora iustorum, his, inquam, praedicavit qui increduli fuerant aliquando, Noe scilicet praedicanti, quando expectabant Dei patientiam, per quam differebatur poena diluvii. Unde subdit, in diebus Noe, cum fabricaretur arca.

Ad quartum dicendum quod sinus Abrahae potest secundum duo considerari. Uno modo, secundum quietem quae ibi erat a poena sensibili. Et quantum ad hoc non competit ei nec nomen Inferni, nec sunt ibi aliqui dolores. Alio modo potest considerari quantum ad privationem gloriae speratae. Et secundum hoc habet rationem Inferni et doloris. Et ideo nunc dicitur sinus Abrahae illa requies beatorum, non tamen dicitur Infernus, nec dicuntur nunc in sinu Abrahae esse dolores. Ad quintum dicendum quod, sicut Gregorius ibidem dicit, ipsa superiora loca Inferni profundissimum Infernum vocat. Si enim, quantum ad celsitudinem caeli, aer iste caliginosus Infernus est; quantum ad eiusdem aeris altitudinem, terra, quae inferius iacet, et Infernus intelligi, et profundum potest. Quantum vero ad eiusdem terrae altitudinem, illa loca Inferni quae superiora sunt aliis receptaculis Inferni, hoc modo Inferni profundissimi appellatione significantur.

Q. 52, A. 3

effect from the beginning of the world. Consequently, the sense is, that to those (spirits) that were in prison—that is, living in the mortal body, which is, as it were, the soul’s prison-house—by the spirit of His Godhead He came and preached by internal inspirations, and from without by the admonitions spoken by the righteous: to those, I say, He preached which had been some time incredulous, i.e., not believing in the preaching of Noah, when they waited for the patience of God, whereby the chastisement of the Deluge was put off: accordingly (Peter) adds: In the days of Noah, when the Ark was being built. Reply Obj. 4: The expression Abraham’s bosom may be taken in two senses. First of all, as implying that restfulness, existing there, from sensible pain; so that in this sense it cannot be called hell, nor are there any sorrows there. In another way it can be taken as implying the privation of longed-for glory: in this sense it has the character of hell and sorrow. Consequently, that rest of the blessed is now called Abraham’s bosom, yet it is not styled hell, nor are sorrows said to be now in Abraham’s bosom. Reply Obj. 5: As Gregory says (Moral. xiii): Even the higher regions of hell he calls the deepest hell . . . For if relatively to the height of heaven this darksome air is infernal, then relatively to the height of this same air the earth lying beneath can be considered as infernal and deep. And again in comparison with the height of the same earth, those parts of hell which are higher than the other infernal mansions, may in this way be designated as the deepest hell.

Article 3 Whether the whole Christ was in hell? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non fuit totus in Inferno. Corpus enim Christi est aliqua pars eius. Sed corpus Christi non fuit in Inferno. Ergo totus Christus non fuit in Inferno. Praeterea, nihil cuius partes ab invicem separatae sunt, potest dici totum. Sed corpus et anima, quae sunt partes humanae naturae, fuerunt ab invicem separata post mortem, ut supra dictum est. Descendit autem ad Infernum mortuus existens. Non ergo potuit esse totus in Inferno. Praeterea, illud totum dicitur esse in loco cuius nihil est extra locum illum. Sed aliquid Christi erat extra Infernum, quia et corpus erat in sepulcro, et divinitas ubique. Ergo Christus non fuit totus in Inferno.

Objection 1: It would seem that the whole Christ was not in hell. For Christ’s body is one of His parts. But His body was not in hell. Therefore, the whole Christ was not in hell. Obj. 2: Further, nothing can be termed whole when its parts are severed. But the soul and body, which are the parts of human nature, were separated at His death, as stated above (Q. 50, AA. 3, 4), and it was after death that He descended into hell. Therefore the whole (Christ) could not be in hell. Obj. 3: Further, the whole of a thing is said to be in a place when no part of it is outside such place. But there were parts of Christ outside hell; for instance, His body was in the grave, and His Godhead everywhere. Therefore the whole Christ was not in hell. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de On the contrary, Augustine says (De Symbolo iii): symbolo, totus filius apud patrem, totus in caelo, totus in The whole Son is with the Father, the whole Son in heaven, terra, totus in utero virginis, totus in cruce, totus in Infer- on earth, in the Virgin’s womb, on the Cross, in hell, in parno, totus in Paradiso quo latronem introduxit. adise, into which He brought the robber.

557

Q. 52, A. 4

Incarnate Son of God

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut patet ex his quae in prima parte dicta sunt, masculinum genus refertur ad hypostasim vel personam, neutrum autem genus pertinet ad naturam. In morte autem Christi, licet anima fuerit separata a corpore, neutrum tamen fuit separatum a persona filii Dei, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo, in illo triduo mortis Christi, dicendum est quod totus Christus fuit in sepulcro, quia tota persona fuit ibi per corpus sibi unitum; et similiter totus fuit in Inferno, quia tota persona Christi fuit ibi ratione animae sibi unitae; totus etiam Christus tunc erat ubique, ratione divinae naturae.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod corpus quod tunc erat in sepulcro, non est pars personae increatae, sed naturae assumptae. Et ideo per hoc quod corpus Christi non fuit in Inferno, non excluditur quin totus Christus fuerit, sed ostenditur quod non fuit ibi totum quod pertinet ad humanam naturam. Ad secundum dicendum quod ex anima et corpore unitis constituitur totalitas humanae naturae, non autem totalitas divinae personae. Et ideo, soluta unione animae et corporis per mortem, remansit totus Christus, sed non remansit humana natura in sua totalitate. Ad tertium dicendum quod persona Christi est tota in quolibet loco, sed non totaliter, quia nullo loco circumscribitur. Sed nec omnia loca simul accepta eius immensitatem comprehendere possunt. Quinimmo ipse sua immensitate omnia comprehendit. Hoc autem locum habet in his quae corporaliter et circumscriptive sunt in loco, quod, si totum sit alicubi, nihil eius sit extra. Sed hoc in Deo locum non habet. Unde Augustinus dicit, in sermone de symbolo, non per diversa tempora vel loca dicimus ubique Christum esse totum, ut modo ibi totus sit, et alio tempore alibi totus, sed ut semper ubique sit totus.

IIIae

I answer that, It is evident from what was said in the First Part (Q. 31, A. 2, ad 4), the masculine gender is referred to the hypostasis or person, while the neuter belongs to the nature. Now in the death of Christ, although the soul was separated from the body, yet neither was separated from the Person of the Son of God, as stated above (Q. 50, A. 2). Consequently, it must be affirmed that during the three days of Christ’s death the whole Christ was in the tomb, because the whole Person was there through the body united with Him, and likewise He was entirely in hell, because the whole Person of Christ was there by reason of the soul united with Him, and the whole Christ was then everywhere by reason of the Divine Nature. Reply Obj. 1: The body which was then in the grave is not a part of the uncreated Person, but of the assumed nature. Consequently, the fact of Christ’s body not being in hell does not prevent the whole Christ from being there: but proves that not everything appertaining to human nature was there. Reply Obj. 2: The whole human nature is made up of the united soul and body; not so the Divine Person. Consequently when death severed the union of the soul with the body, the whole Christ remained, but His whole human nature did not remain. Reply Obj. 3: Christ’s Person is whole in each single place, but not wholly, because it is not circumscribed by any place: indeed, all places put together could not comprise His immensity; rather is it His immensity that embraces all things. But it happens in those things which are in a place corporeally and circumscriptively, that if a whole be in some place, then no part of it is outside that place. But this is not the case with God. Hence Augustine says (De Symbolo iii): It is not according to times or places that we say that the whole Christ is everywhere, as if He were at one time whole in one place, at another time whole in another: but as being whole always and everywhere.

Article 4 Whether Christ made any stay in hell? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus nullam moram contraxit in Inferno. Christus enim ad hoc in Infernum descendit ut ex eo homines liberaret. Sed hoc statim ab eo factum est in ipso suo descensu, facile enim est in conspectu Dei subito honestare pauperem, ut dicitur Eccli. XI. Ergo videtur quod nullam moram in Inferno contraxit. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in sermone de passione, quod sine aliqua mora, ad imperium domini ac salvatoris, omnes ferrei confracti sunt vectes. Unde ex persona Angelorum concomitantium Christum dicitur, tollite

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not make any stay in hell. For Christ went down into hell to deliver men from thence. But He accomplished this deliverance at once by His descent, for, according to Ecclus. 11:23: It is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to make the poor man rich. Consequently He does not seem to have tarried in hell. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on the Passion (clx) that of a sudden at our Lord and Savior’s bidding all ‘the bars of iron were burst’ (Cf. Isa. 45:2). Hence on behalf of the angels accompanying Christ it is written

558

IIIae

Christ’s Descent into Hell

portas, principes, vestras. Ad hoc autem Christus illuc descendit ut vectes Inferni confringeret. Ergo Christus in Inferno nullam moram contraxit. Praeterea, Luc. XXIII dicitur quod dominus, in cruce pendens, dixit latroni, hodie mecum eris in Paradiso, ex quo patet quod eadem die Christus fuit in Paradiso. Non autem secundum corpus, quod positum fuit in sepulcro. Ergo secundum animam, quae ad Infernum descenderat. Et ita videtur quod non contraxit moram in Inferno. Sed contra est quod Petrus dicit, Act. II, quem Deus suscitavit, solutis doloribus Inferni, iuxta quod impossibile erat teneri illum ab eo. Ergo videtur quod usque ad horam resurrectionis mansit in Inferno. Respondeo dicendum quod sicut Christus, ut nostras poenas in se susciperet, voluit corpus suum in sepulcro poni, ita etiam voluit animam suam ad Infernum descendere. Corpus autem eius mansit in sepulcro per diem integrum et duas noctes ad comprobandum veritatem mortis suae. Unde etiam tantundem credendum est animam eius fuisse in Inferno, ut simul anima eius educeretur de Inferno, et corpus de sepulcro. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus, ad Infernum descendens, sanctos ibi existentes liberavit, non quidem statim educendo eos de loco Inferni, sed in ipso Inferno eos luce gloriae illustrando. Et tamen conveniens fuit ut tandiu anima eius remaneret in Inferno quandiu corpus manebat in sepulcro. Ad secundum dicendum quod vectes Inferni dicuntur impedimenta quibus sancti patres de Inferno exire prohibebantur, reatu culpae primi parentis. Quos Christus statim descendens ad Inferos, virtute suae passionis et mortis confregit. Et tamen voluit in Inferno aliquandiu remanere, propter rationem praedictam. Ad tertium dicendum quod illud verbum domini est intelligendum, non de Paradiso terrestri corporeo, sed de Paradiso spirituali, in quo esse dicuntur quicumque divina gloria perfruuntur. Unde latro loco quidem cum Christo ad Infernum descendit, ut cum Christo esset, quia dictum est ei, mecum eris in Paradiso, sed praemio in Paradiso fuit, quia ibi divinitate Christi fruebatur, sicut et alii sancti.

Q. 52, A. 5

(Ps 23:7, 9): Lift up your gates, O ye princes. Now Christ descended thither in order to break the bolts of hell. Therefore He did not make any stay in hell. Obj. 3: Further, it is related (Luke 23:43) that our Lord while hanging on the cross said to the thief: This day thou shalt be with Me in paradise: from which it is evident that Christ was in paradise on that very day. But He was not there with His body, for that was in the grave. Therefore He was there with the soul which had gone down into hell: and consequently it appears that He made no stay in hell. On the contrary, Peter says (Acts 2:24): Whom God hath raised up, having loosed the sorrows of hell, as it was impossible that He should be held by it. Therefore it seems that He remained in hell until the hour of the Resurrection. I answer that, As Christ, in order to take our penalties upon Himself, willed His body to be laid in the tomb, so likewise He willed His soul to descend into hell. But the body lay in the tomb for a day and two nights, so as to demonstrate the truth of His death. Consequently, it is to be believed that His soul was in hell, in order that it might be brought back out of hell simultaneously with His body from the tomb. Reply Obj. 1: When Christ descended into hell He delivered the saints who were there, not by leading them out at once from the confines of hell, but by enlightening them with the light of glory in hell itself. Nevertheless it was fitting that His soul should abide in hell as long as His body remained in the tomb. Reply Obj. 2: By the expression bars of hell are understood the obstacles which kept the holy Fathers from quitting hell, through the guilt of our first parent’s sin; and these bars Christ burst asunder by the power of His Passion on descending into hell: nevertheless He chose to remain in hell for some time, for the reason stated above. Reply Obj. 3: Our Lord’s expression is not to be understood of the earthly corporeal paradise, but of a spiritual one, in which all are said to be who enjoy the Divine glory. Accordingly, the thief descended locally into hell with Christ, because it was said to him: This day thou shalt be with Me in paradise; still as to reward he was in paradise, because he enjoyed Christ’s Godhead just as the other saints did.

Article 5 Whether Christ descending into hell delivered the holy Fathers from thence? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus, descendens ad Inferos, sanctos patres inde non liberaverit. Dicit enim Augustinus, in epistola ad Evodium, illis iustis qui in sinu erant Abrahae cum Christus in Inferna descenderet, nondum quid contulisset inveni, a quibus eum, secundum beatificam praesentiam suae divi-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ descending into hell did not deliver the holy Fathers from thence. For Augustine (Epist. ad Evod. clxiv) says: I have not yet discovered what Christ descending into hell bestowed upon those righteous ones who were in Abraham’s bosom, from whom I fail to see that He ever departed according to the beatific pres-

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Q. 52, A. 5

Incarnate Son of God

nitatis, nunquam video recessisse. Multum autem eis contulisset si eos ab Inferis liberasset. Non ergo videtur quod Christus sanctos patres ab Inferis liberaverit. Praeterea, nullus in Inferno detinetur nisi propter peccatum. Sed sancti patres, dum adhuc viverent, per fidem Christi iustificati fuerant a peccato. Ergo non indigebant liberari ab Inferno, ad Inferos Christo descendente. Praeterea, remota causa, removetur effectus. Sed causa descendendi ad Inferos est peccatum, quod fuit remotum per passionem Christi, ut supra dictum est. Non ergo per descensum Christi ad Inferos sancti patres sunt de Inferno educti. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in sermone de passione, quod Christus, quando ad Inferna descendit, portam Inferni et vectes ferreos confregit, et omnes iustos, qui originali peccato adstricti tenebantur, absolvit. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Christus, descendens ad Inferos, operatus est in virtute suae passionis. Per passionem autem Christi liberatum est genus humanum, non solum a peccato, sed etiam a reatu poenae, ut supra dictum est. Dupliciter autem homines reatu poenae erant adstricti. Uno modo, pro peccato actuali, quod quilibet in sua persona commiserat. Alio modo, pro peccato totius humanae naturae, quod a primo parente in omnes originaliter devenit, ut dicitur Rom. V. Cuius quidem peccati poena est mors corporalis et exclusio a vita gloriae, ut patet ex his quae dicuntur Gen. II et III, nam Deus hominem de Paradiso post peccatum eiecit, cui ante peccatum mortem fuerat comminatus si peccaret. Et ideo Christus, descendens ad Inferos, virtute suae passionis ab hoc reatu sanctos absolvit, quo erant a vita gloriae exclusi, ut non possent Deum per essentiam videre, in quo consistit perfecta hominis beatitudo, ut in secunda parte dictum est. Per hoc autem sancti patres detinebantur in Inferno, quod eis ad vitam gloriae, propter peccatum primi parentis, aditus non patebat. Et sic Christus, descendens ad Inferos, sanctos patres ab Inferis liberavit. Et hoc est quod dicitur Zach. IX, tu vero in sanguine testamenti tui eduxisti vinctos de lacu in quo non erat aqua. Et Coloss. II dicitur quod, exspolians principatus et potestates, scilicet infernales, auferendo Isaac et Iacob et ceteros iustos, traduxit eos, idest, longe ab hoc regno tenebrarum ad caelum duxit, ut Glossa ibidem dicit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur contra quosdam qui aestimabant antiquos iustos, ante adventum Christi, in Inferno doloribus poenarum fuisse subiectos. Unde, parum ante verba inducta, praemittit dicens, addunt quidam hoc beneficium antiquis etiam sanctis fuisse concessum, ut, dominus cum in Infernum venisset, ab illis doloribus solverentur. Sed quonam

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ence of His Godhead. But had He delivered them, He would have bestowed much upon them. Therefore it does not appear that Christ delivered the holy Fathers from hell. Obj. 2: Further, no one is detained in hell except on account of sin. But during life the holy Fathers were justified from sin through faith in Christ. Consequently they did not need to be delivered from hell on Christ’s descent thither. Obj. 3: Further, if you remove the cause, you remove the effect. But that Christ went down into hell was due to sin which was taken away by the Passion, as stated above (Q. 49, A. 1). Consequently, the holy Fathers were not delivered on Christ’s descent into hell. On the contrary, Augustine says in the sermon on the Passion already quoted that when Christ descended into hell He broke down the gate and ‘iron bars’ of hell, setting at liberty all the righteous who were held fast through original sin. I answer that, As stated above (A. 4, ad 2), when Christ descended into hell He worked through the power of His Passion. But through Christ’s Passion the human race was delivered not only from sin, but also from the debt of its penalty, as stated above (Q. 49, AA. 1, 3). Now men were held fast by the debt of punishment in two ways: first of all for actual sin which each had committed personally: second, for the sin of the whole human race, which each one in his origin contracts from our first parent, as stated in Rom. 5 of which sin the penalty is the death of the body as well as exclusion from glory, as is evident from Gen. 2 and 3: because God cast out man from paradise after sin, having beforehand threatened him with death should he sin. Consequently, when Christ descended into hell, by the power of His Passion He delivered the saints from the penalty whereby they were excluded from the life of glory, so as to be unable to see God in His Essence, wherein man’s beatitude lies, as stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 3, A. 8). But the holy Fathers were detained in hell for the reason, that, owing to our first parent’s sin, the approach to the life of glory was not opened. And so, when Christ descended into hell He delivered the holy Fathers from thence. And this is what is written Zech. 9:11: Thou also by the blood of Thy testament hast sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit, wherein is no water. And (Col 2:15) it is written that despoiling the principalities and powers, i.e., of hell, by taking out Isaac and Jacob, and the other just souls, He led them, i.e., He brought them far from this kingdom of darkness into heaven, as the gloss explains. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking there against such as maintained that the righteous of old were subject to penal sufferings before Christ’s descent into hell. Hence shortly before the passage quoted he says: Some add that this benefit was also bestowed upon the saints of old, that on the Lord’s coming into hell they were freed from their sufferings. But I fail to see how Abraham, into whose bosom the

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modo intelligatur Abraham, in cuius sinum pius etiam pauper ille susceptus est, in illis fuisse doloribus, ego quidem non video. Et ideo, cum postea subdit se nondum invenisse quid descensus Christi ad Inferos antiquis iustis contulerit, intelligendum est quantum ad absolutionem a doloribus poenarum. Contulit tamen eis quantum ad adeptionem gloriae, et per consequens solvit eorum dolorem quem patiebantur ex dilatione gloriae. Ex cuius tamen spe magnum gaudium habebant, secundum illud Ioan. VIII, Abraham, pater vester, exultavit ut videret diem meum. Et ideo subdit, a quibus eum, secundum beatificam praesentiam suae divinitatis, nunquam video recessisse, inquantum scilicet, etiam ante adventum Christi, erant beati in spe, licet nondum essent perfecte beati in re. Ad secundum dicendum quod sancti patres, dum adhuc viverent, liberati fuerunt per fidem Christi ab omni peccato tam originali quam actuali, et reatu poenae actualium peccatorum, non tamen a reatu poenae originalis peccati, per quem excludebantur a gloria, nondum soluto pretio redemptionis humanae. Sicut etiam nunc fideles Christi liberantur per Baptismum a reatu actualium peccatorum, et a reatu originalis quantum ad exclusionem a gloria, remanent tamen adhuc obligati reatu originalis peccati quantum ad necessitatem corporaliter moriendi; quia renovantur secundum spiritum, sed nondum secundum carnem, secundum illud Rom. VIII, corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum, spiritus vero vivit propter iustificationem. Ad tertium dicendum quod statim, Christo mortem patiente, anima eius ad Infernum descendit, et suae passionis fructum exhibuit sanctis in Inferno detentis, quamvis ex loco illo non exierint, Christo apud Inferos commorante, quia ipsa Christi praesentia pertinebat ad cumulum gloriae.

Q. 52, A. 6

poor man was received, was ever in such sufferings. Consequently, when he afterwards adds that he had not yet discovered what Christ’s descent into hell had brought to the righteous of old, this must be understood as to their being freed from penal sufferings. Yet Christ bestowed something upon them as to their attaining glory: and in consequence He dispelled the suffering which they endured through their glory being delayed: still they had great joy from the very hope thereof, according to John 8:56: Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see my day. And therefore he adds: I fail to see that He ever departed, according to the beatific presence of His Godhead, that is, inasmuch as even before Christ’s coming they were happy in hope, although not yet fully happy in fact. Reply Obj. 2: The holy Fathers while yet living were delivered from original as well as actual sin through faith in Christ; also from the penalty of actual sins, but not from the penalty of original sin, whereby they were excluded from glory, since the price of man’s redemption was not yet paid: just as the faithful are now delivered by baptism from the penalty of actual sins, and from the penalty of original sin as to exclusion from glory, yet still remain bound by the penalty of original sin as to the necessity of dying in the body because they are renewed in the spirit, but not yet in the flesh, according to Rom. 8:10: The body indeed is dead, because of sin; but the spirit liveth, because of justification.

Reply Obj. 3: Directly Christ died His soul went down into hell, and bestowed the fruits of His Passion on the saints detained there; although they did not go out as long as Christ remained in hell, because His presence was part of the fullness of their glory.

Article 6 Whether Christ delivered any of the lost from hell? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus aliquos damnatos ab Inferno liberavit. Dicitur enim Isaiae XXIV, congregabuntur congregatione unius fascis in lacum, et claudentur in carcerem, et post multos dies visitabuntur. Loquitur autem ibi de damnatis, qui militiam caeli adoraverant. Ergo videtur quod etiam damnati, Christo descendente ad Inferos, sunt visitati. Quod ad eorum liberationem videtur pertinere.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did deliver some of the lost from hell, because it is written (Isa 24:22): And they shall be gathered together as in the gathering of one bundle into the pit, end they shall be shut up there in prison: and after many days they shall be visited. But there he is speaking of the lost, who had adored the host of heaven, according to Jerome’s commentary. Consequently it seems that even the lost were visited at Christ’s descent into hell; and this seems to imply their deliverance. Praeterea, super illud Zach. IX, tu autem in sanObj. 2: Further, on Zech. 9:11: Thou also by the blood guine testamenti tui eduxisti vinctos de lacu in quo non of Thy testament hast sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit erat aqua, dicit Glossa, tu eos liberasti qui tenebantur wherein is no water, the gloss observes: Thou hast delivered

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Incarnate Son of God

vincti carceribus, ubi nulla misericordia eos refrigerabat, quam dives ille petebat. Sed soli damnati includuntur carceribus absque misericordia. Ergo Christus liberavit aliquos de Inferno damnatorum. Praeterea, potentia Christi non fuit minor in Inferno quam in hoc mundo, utrobique enim operatus est per potentiam suae divinitatis. Sed in hoc mundo de quolibet statu aliquos liberavit. Ergo etiam in Inferno liberavit aliquos etiam de statu damnatorum. Sed contra est quod dicitur Osee XIII, ero mors tua, o mors. Morsus tuus, Inferne. Glossa, electos educendo, reprobos vero ibidem relinquendo. Sed soli reprobi sunt in Inferno damnatorum. Ergo per descensum Christi ad Inferos non sunt aliqui de Inferno damnatorum liberati. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Christus, descendens ad Inferos, operatus est in virtute suae passionis. Et ideo eius descensus ad Inferos illis solis liberationis contulit fructum qui fuerunt passioni Christi coniuncti per fidem caritate formatam, per quam peccata tolluntur. Illi autem qui erant in Inferno damnatorum, aut penitus fidem passionis Christi non habuerant, sicut infideles, aut, si fidem habuerant, nullam conformitatem habebant ad caritatem Christi patientis. Unde nec a peccatis suis erant mundati. Et propter hoc descensus Christi ad Inferos non contulit eis liberationem a reatu poenae infernalis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, Christo descendente ad Inferos, omnes qui erant in quacumque parte Inferni, sunt aliqualiter visitati, sed quidam ad suam consolationem et liberationem; quidam autem ad suam confutationem et confusionem, scilicet damnati. Unde ibidem subditur, et erubescet luna, et confundetur sol, et cetera. Potest etiam hoc referri ad visitationem qua visitabuntur in die iudicii, non ut liberentur, sed ut condemnentur amplius, secundum illud Sophon. I, visitabo super viros defixos in faecibus suis.

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them who were held bound in prisons, where no mercy refreshed them, which that rich man prayed for. But only the lost are shut up in merciless prisons. Therefore Christ did deliver some from the hell of the lost. Obj. 3: Further, Christ’s power was not less in hell than in this world, because He worked in every place by the power of His Godhead. But in this world He delivered some persons of every state. Therefore, in hell also, He delivered some from the state of the lost. On the contrary, It is written (Hos 13:14): O death, I will be thy death; O hell, I will be thy bite: upon which the gloss says: By leading forth the elect, and leaving there the reprobate. But only the reprobate are in the hell of the lost. Therefore, by Christ’s descent into hell none were delivered from the hell of the lost. I answer that, As stated above (A. 5), when Christ descended into hell He worked by the power of His Passion. Consequently, His descent into hell brought the fruits of deliverance to them only who were united to His Passion through faith quickened by charity, whereby sins are taken away. Now those detained in the hell of the lost either had no faith in Christ’s Passion, as infidels; or if they had faith, they had no conformity with the charity of the suffering Christ: hence they could not be cleansed from their sins. And on this account Christ’s descent into hell brought them no deliverance from the debt of punishment in hell. Reply Obj. 1: When Christ descended into hell, all who were in any part of hell were visited in some respect: some to their consolation and deliverance, others, namely, the lost, to their shame and confusion. Accordingly the passage continues: And the moon shall blush, and the sun be put to shame, etc.

This can also be referred to the visitation which will come upon them in the Day of Judgment, not for their deliverance, but for their yet greater confusion, according to Sophon. i, 12: I will visit upon the men that are settled on their lees. Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur in Reply Obj. 2: When the gloss says where no mercy reGlossa, ubi nulla misericordia eos refrigerabat, intelligen- freshed them, this is to be understood of the refreshing of dum est quantum ad refrigerium perfectae liberationis. full deliverance, because the holy Fathers could not be deQuia sancti patres ab illis Inferni carceribus ante Christi livered from this prison of hell before Christ’s coming.

adventum non poterant liberari. Ad tertium dicendum quod non fuit propter Christi impotentiam quod non sunt aliqui liberati de quolibet statu infernalium, sicut de quolibet statu mundanorum, sed propter diversam utrorumque conditionem. Nam homines quandiu hic vivunt, possunt ad fidem et caritatem converti, quia in hac vita non sunt homines confirmati in bono vel in malo, sicut post exitum ab hac vita.

Reply Obj. 3: It was not due to any lack of power on Christ’s part that some were not delivered from every state in hell, as out of every state among men in this world; but it was owing to the very different condition of each state. For, so long as men live here below, they can be converted to faith and charity, because in this life men are not confirmed either in good or in evil, as they are after quitting this life.

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Q. 52, A. 7

Article 7 Whether the children who died in original sin were delivered by Christ’s descent? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pueri qui cum originali peccato decesserant, fuerint per descensum Christi liberati. Non enim tenebantur in Inferno nisi pro peccato originali, sicut et sancti patres. Sed sancti patres sunt ab Inferno liberati per Christum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo et pueri similiter per Christum sunt ab Inferno liberati. Praeterea, apostolus dicit, Rom. V, si unius delicto multi mortui sunt, multo magis gratia Dei et donum, in gratia unius hominis Iesu Christi, in plures abundavit. Sed propter peccatum primi parentis pueri cum solo peccato originali decedentes in Inferno detinentur. Ergo multo magis per gratiam Christi sunt ab Inferno liberati. Praeterea, sicut Baptismus operatur in virtute passionis Christi, ita et descensus Christi ad Inferos, ut ex dictis patet. Sed pueri per Baptismum liberantur a peccato originali et ab Inferno. Ergo similiter liberati sunt per descensum Christi ad Inferos. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. III, quod Deus proposuit Christum propitiatorem per fidem in sanguine eius. Sed pueri qui cum solo peccato originali decesserant, nullo modo fuerant participes fidei. Ergo non perceperunt fructum propitiationis Christi, ut per ipsum ab Inferno liberarentur. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, descensus Christi ad Inferos in illis solis effectum habuit qui per fidem et caritatem passioni Christi coniungebantur, in cuius virtute descensus Christi ad Inferos liberatorius erat. Pueri autem qui cum originali decesserant, nullo modo fuerant coniuncti passioni Christi per fidem et dilectionem, neque enim fidem propriam habere potuerant, quia non habuerant usum liberi arbitrii; neque per fidem parentum aut per aliquod fidei sacramentum fuerant a peccato originali mundati. Et ideo descensus Christi ad Inferos huiusmodi pueros non liberavit ab Inferno. Et praeterea per hoc sancti patres ab Inferno sunt liberati quia sunt ad gloriam divinae visionis admissi, ad quam nullus potest pervenire nisi per gratiam, secundum illud Rom. VI, gratia Dei vita aeterna. Cum igitur pueri cum originali decedentes gratiam non habuerint, non fuerunt ab Inferno liberati. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sancti patres, etsi adhuc tenerentur adstricti reatu originalis peccati inquantum respicit humanam naturam, tamen liberati erant per fidem Christi ab omni macula peccati, et ideo capaces erant illius liberationis quam Christus attulit descendens ad Inferos. Sed hoc de pueris dici non potest, ut ex supra dictis patet.

Objection 1: It would seem that the children who died in original sin were delivered from hell by Christ’s descending thither. For, like the holy Fathers, the children were kept in hell simply because of original sin. But the holy Fathers were delivered from hell, as stated above (A. 5). Therefore the children were similarly delivered from hell by Christ. Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom 5:15): If by the offense of one, many died; much more the grace of God and the gift, by the grace of one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many. But the children who die with none but original sin are detained in hell owing to their first parent’s sin. Therefore, much more were they delivered from hell through the grace of Christ. Obj. 3: Further, as Baptism works in virtue of Christ’s Passion, so also does Christ’s descent into hell, as is clear from what has been said (A. 4, ad 2, AA. 5, 6). But through Baptism children are delivered from original sin and hell. Therefore, they were similarly delivered by Christ’s descent into hell. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom 3:25): God hath proposed Christ to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood. But the children who had died with only original sin were in no wise sharers of faith in Christ. Therefore, they did not receive the fruits of Christ’s propitiation, so as to be delivered by Him from hell. I answer that, As stated above (A. 6), Christ’s descent into hell had its effect of deliverance on them only who through faith and charity were united to Christ’s Passion, in virtue whereof Christ’s descent into hell was one of deliverance. But the children who had died in original sin were in no way united to Christ’s Passion by faith and love: for, not having the use of free will, they could have no faith of their own; nor were they cleansed from original sin either by their parents’ faith or by any sacrament of faith. Consequently, Christ’s descent into hell did not deliver the children from thence. And furthermore, the holy Fathers were delivered from hell by being admitted to the glory of the vision of God, to which no one can come except through grace; according to Rom. 6:23: The grace of God is life everlasting. Therefore, since children dying in original sin had no grace, they were not delivered from hell. Reply Obj. 1: The holy Fathers, although still held bound by the debt of original sin, in so far as it touches human nature, were nevertheless delivered from all stain of sin by faith in Christ: consequently, they were capable of that deliverance which Christ brought by descending into hell. But the same cannot be said of the children, as is evident from what was said above.

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Incarnate Son of God

Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum apostolus dicit, gratia Dei in plures abundavit, ly plures non est accipiendum comparative, quasi plures numero sint salvati per gratiam Christi quam damnati per peccatum Adae, sed absolute, ac si diceret quod gratia unius Christi abundavit in multos, sicut et peccatum unius Adae pervenit ad multos. Sed sicut peccatum Adae ad eos tantum pervenit qui per seminalem rationem carnaliter ab eo descenderunt, ita gratia Christi ad illos tantum pervenit qui spirituali regeneratione eius membra sunt facti. Quod non competit pueris decedentibus cum originali peccato. Ad tertium dicendum quod Baptismus adhibetur hominibus in hac vita, in qua homo potest transmutari de culpa in gratiam. Sed descensus Christi ad Inferos exhibitus fuit animabus post hanc vitam, ubi non sunt capaces transmutationis praedictae. Et ideo per Baptismum pueri liberantur a peccato originali et ab Inferno, non autem per descensum Christi ad Inferos.

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Reply Obj. 2: When the Apostle says that the grace of God hath abounded unto many, the word many is to be taken, not comparatively, as if more were saved by Christ’s grace than lost by Adam’s sin: but absolutely, as if he said that the grace of the one Christ abounded unto many, just as Adam’s sin was contracted by many. But as Adam’s sin was contracted by those only who descended seminally from him according to the flesh, so Christ’s grace reached those only who became His members by spiritual regeneration: which does not apply to children dying in original sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Baptism is applied to men in this life, in which man’s state can be changed from sin into grace: but Christ’s descent into hell was vouchsafed to the souls after this life when they are no longer capable of the said change. And consequently by baptism children are delivered from original sin and from hell, but not by Christ’s descent into hell.

Article 8 Whether Christ by his descent into hell delivered souls from Purgatory? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus suo descensu ad Inferos liberaverit animas a Purgatorio. Dicit enim Augustinus, in epistola ad Evodium, quia evidentia testimonia et Infernum commemorant et dolores, nulla causa occurrit cur illo credatur venisse salvator, nisi ut ab eisdem doloribus salvos faceret. Sed utrum omnes quos in eis invenit, an quosdam, quos illo beneficio dignos iudicavit, adhuc requiro. Tamen venisse Christum apud Inferos, et in eorum doloribus constitutis hoc beneficium praestitisse, non dubito. Non autem praestitit beneficium liberationis damnatis, sicut supra dictum est. Praeter eos autem nulli sunt in doloribus poenalibus constituti nisi illi qui sunt in Purgatorio. Ergo Christus animas de Purgatorio liberavit. Praeterea, ipsa animae Christi praesentia non minorem effectum habuit quam sacramenta ipsius. Sed per sacramenta Christi liberantur animae a Purgatorio, et praecipue per Eucharistiae sacramentum, ut infra dicetur. Ergo multo magis per praesentiam Christi ad Inferos descendentis sunt animae a Purgatorio liberatae.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ by His descent into hell delivered souls from Purgatory—for Augustine says (Ep. ad Evod. clxiv): Because evident testimonies speak of hell and its pains, there is no reason for believing that the Savior came thither except to rescue men from those same pains: but I still wish to know whether it was all whom He found there, or some whom He deemed worthy of such a benefit. Yet I do not doubt that Christ went into hell, and granted this favor to them who were suffering from its pains. But, as stated above (A. 6), He did not confer the benefit of deliverance upon the lost: and there are no others in a state of penal suffering except those in Purgatory. Consequently Christ delivered souls from Purgatory.

Obj. 2: Further, the very presence of Christ’s soul had no less effect than His sacraments have. But souls are delivered from Purgatory by the sacraments, especially by the sacrament of the Eucharist, as shall be shown later (Suppl., Q. 71, A. 9). Therefore much more were souls delivered from Purgatory by the presence of Christ descending into hell. Praeterea, Christus quoscumque curavit in hac Obj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Poenit. ix), those vita, totaliter curavit, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de poe- whom Christ healed in this life He healed completely. Also, nitentia. Et Ioan. VII dominus dicit, totum hominem sal- our Lord says (John 7:23): I have healed the whole man on vum feci in sabbato. Sed Christus eos qui in Purgatorio the sabbath-day. But Christ delivered them who were in erant, liberavit a reatu poenae damni, quo excludeban- Purgatory from the punishment of the pain of loss, whereby tur a gloria. Ergo etiam liberavit eos a reatu poenae Pur- they were excluded from glory. Therefore, He also delivered gatorii. them from the punishment of Purgatory.

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Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, XIII Moral., dum conditor ac redemptor noster, claustra Inferni penetrans, electorum exinde animas eduxit, nos illo ire non patitur, unde iam alios descendendo liberavit. Patitur autem nos ire ad Purgatorium. Ergo, descendens ad Inferos, animas a Purgatorio non liberavit. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut saepe dictum est, descensus Christi ad Inferos liberatorius fuit in virtute passionis ipsius. Passio autem eius non habuit temporalem virtutem et transitoriam sed sempiternam, secundum illud Heb. X, una oblatione consummavit sanctificatos in sempiternum. Et sic patet quod non habuit tunc maiorem efficaciam passio Christi quam habeat nunc. Et ideo illi qui fuerunt tales quales nunc sunt qui in Purgatorio detinentur, non fuerunt a Purgatorio liberati per descensum Christi ad Inferos. Si qui autem inventi sunt ibi tales quales etiam nunc virtute passionis Christi a Purgatorio liberantur, tales nihil prohibet per descensum Christi ad Inferos a Purgatorio esse liberatos. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex illa auctoritate Augustini non potest concludi quod omnes illi qui in Purgatorio erant, fuerint a Purgatorio liberati, sed quod aliquibus eorum fuerit hoc beneficium collatum, illis scilicet qui iam sufficienter purgati erant; vel etiam qui, dum adhuc viverent, meruerunt per fidem et dilectionem, et devotionem ad mortem Christi, ut, eo descendente, liberarentur a temporali Purgatorii poena. Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus Christi operatur in sacramentis per modum sanationis et expiationis cuiusdam. Unde sacramentum Eucharistiae liberat homines a Purgatorio inquantum est quoddam sacrificium satisfactorium pro peccato. Descensus autem Christi ad Inferos non fuit satisfactorius. Operabatur tamen in virtute passionis, quae fuit satisfactoria, ut supra habitum est, sed erat satisfactoria in generali, cuius virtutem oportebat applicari ad unumquemque per aliquid specialiter ad ipsum pertinens. Et ideo non oportet quod per descensum Christi ad Inferos omnes fuerint a Purgatorio liberati. Ad tertium dicendum quod illi defectus a quibus Christus simul in hoc mundo homines liberabat, erant personales, proprie ad unumquemque pertinentes. Sed exclusio a gloria Dei erat quidam defectus generalis pertinens ad totam humanam naturam. Et ideo nihil prohibet eos qui erant in Purgatorio, per Christum esse liberatos ab exclusione a gloria, non autem a reatu poenae Purgatorii, qui pertinet ad proprium defectum. Sicut e converso sancti patres, ante Christi adventum, liberati sunt a propriis defectibus, non autem a defectu communi, sicut supra dictum est.

Q. 52, A. 8

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xiii): Since our Creator and Redeemer, penetrating the bars of hell, brought out from thence the souls of the elect, He does not permit us to go thither, from whence He has already by descending set others free. But He permits us to go to Purgatory. Therefore, by descending into hell, He did not deliver souls from Purgatory. I answer that, As we have stated more than once (A. 4, ad 2, AA. 5, 6, 7), Christ’s descent into hell was one of deliverance in virtue of His Passion. Now Christ’s Passion had a virtue which was neither temporal nor transitory, but everlasting, according to Heb. 10:14: For by one oblation He hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified. And so it is evident that Christ’s Passion had no greater efficacy then than it has now. Consequently, they who were such as those who are now in Purgatory, were not set free from Purgatory by Christ’s descent into hell. But if any were found such as are now set free from Purgatory by virtue of Christ’s Passion, then there was nothing to hinder them from being delivered from Purgatory by Christ’s descent into hell. Reply Obj. 1: From this passage of Augustine it cannot be concluded that all who were in Purgatory were delivered from it, but that such a benefit was bestowed upon some persons, that is to say, upon such as were already cleansed sufficiently, or who in life, by their faith and devotion towards Christ’s death, so merited, that when He descended, they were delivered from the temporal punishment of Purgatory. Reply Obj. 2: Christ’s power operates in the sacraments by way of healing and expiation. Consequently, the sacrament of the Eucharist delivers men from Purgatory inasmuch as it is a satisfactory sacrifice for sin. But Christ’s descent into hell was not satisfactory; yet it operated in virtue of the Passion, which was satisfactory, as stated above (Q. 48, A. 2), but satisfactory in general, since its virtue had to be applied to each individual by something specially personal (Q. 49, A. 1, ad 4, 5). Consequently, it does not follow of necessity that all were delivered from Purgatory by Christ’s descent into hell. Reply Obj. 3: Those defects from which Christ altogether delivered men in this world were purely personal, and concerned the individual; whereas exclusion from God’s glory was a general defect and common to all human nature. Consequently, there was nothing to prevent those detained in Purgatory being delivered by Christ from their privation of glory, but not from the debt of punishment in Purgatory which pertains to personal defect. Just as on the other hand, the holy Fathers before Christ’s coming were delivered from their personal defects, but not from the common defect, as was stated above (A. 7, ad 1; Q. 49, A. 5, ad 1).

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Question 53 Christ’s Resurrection Consequenter considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad exaltationem Christi. Et primo, de eius resurrectione; secundo, de eius ascensione; tertio, de sessione ad dexteram patris; quarto, de iudiciaria potestate. Circa primum occurrit quadruplex consideratio, quarum prima est de ipsa Christi resurrectione; secunda, de qualitate resurgentis; tertia, de manifestatione resurrectionis; quarta, de eius causalitate. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, de necessitate resurrectionis eius. Secundo, de tempore. Tertio, de ordine. Quarto, de causa.

We have now to consider those things that concern Christ’s Exaltation; and we shall deal with (1) His Resurrection; (2) His Ascension; (3) His sitting at the right hand of God the Father; (4) His Judiciary Power. Under the first heading there is a fourfold consideration: (1) Christ’s Resurrection in itself; (2) the quality of the Person rising; (3) the manifestation of the Resurrection; (4) its causality. Concerning the first there are four points of inquiry: (1) The necessity of His Resurrection; (2) The time of the Resurrection; (3) Its order; (4) Its cause.

Article 1 Whether it was necessary for Christ to rise again? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit necessarium Christum resurgere. Dicit enim Damascenus, in IV libro, resurrectio est secunda eius quod dissolutum est et cecidit animalis surrectio. Sed Christus non cecidit per peccatum, nec corpus eius est dissolutum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Non ergo proprie convenit sibi resurgere. Praeterea, quicumque resurgit, ad aliquid altius promovetur, quia surgere est sursum moveri. Sed corpus Christi remansit post mortem divinitati unitum, et ita non potuit in aliquid altius promoveri. Ergo non competebat sibi resurgere. Praeterea, ea quae circa humanitatem Christi sunt acta, ad nostram salutem ordinantur. Sed sufficiebat ad salutem nostram passio Christi, per quam sumus liberati a culpa et poena, ut ex supra dictis patet. Non ergo fuit necessarium quod Christus a mortuis resurgeret.

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for Christ to rise again. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): Resurrection is the rising again of an animate being, which was disintegrated and fallen. But Christ did not fall by sinning, nor was His body dissolved, as is manifest from what was stated above (Q. 51, A. 3). Therefore, it does not properly belong to Him to rise again. Obj. 2: Further, whoever rises again is promoted to a higher state, since to rise is to be uplifted. But after death Christ’s body continued to be united with the Godhead, hence it could not be uplifted to any higher condition. Therefore, it was not due to it to rise again. Obj. 3: Further, all that befell Christ’s humanity was ordained for our salvation. But Christ’s Passion sufficed for our salvation, since by it we were loosed from guilt and punishment, as is clear from what was said above (Q. 49, A. 1, 3). Consequently, it was not necessary for Christ to rise again from the dead. Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. ult., oportebat On the contrary, It is written (Luke 24:46): It beChristum pati et resurgere a mortuis. hooved Christ to suffer and to rise again from the dead. Respondeo dicendum quod necessarium fuit ChriI answer that, It behooved Christ to rise again, for stum resurgere, propter quinque. Primo quidem, ad five reasons. First of all; for the commendation of Divine commendationem divinae iustitiae, ad quam pertinet Justice, to which it belongs to exalt them who humble themexaltare illos qui se propter Deum humiliant, secundum selves for God’s sake, according to Luke 1:52: He hath put illud Luc. I, deposuit potentes de sede, et exaltavit humiles. down the mighty from their seat, and hath exalted the humQuia igitur Christus, propter caritatem et obedientiam ble. Consequently, because Christ humbled Himself even to Dei, se humiliavit usque ad mortem crucis, oportebat the death of the Cross, from love and obedience to God, it quod exaltaretur a Deo usque ad gloriosam resurrectio- behooved Him to be uplifted by God to a glorious resur-

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nem. Unde ex eius persona dicitur in Psalmo, tu cognovisti, idest approbasti, sessionem meam, idest humilitatem et passionem, et resurrectionem meam, idest glorificationem in resurrectione, sicut Glossa exponit. Secundo, ad fidei nostrae instructionem. Quia per eius resurrectionem confirmata est fides nostra circa divinitatem Christi, quia, ut dicitur II Cor. ult., etsi crucifixus est ex infirmitate nostra, sed vivit ex virtute Dei. Et ideo I Cor. XV dicitur, si Christus non resurrexit, inanis est praedicatio nostra, inanis est et fides nostra. Et in Psalmo, quae utilitas erit in sanguine meo, idest in effusione sanguinis mei, dum descendo, quasi per quosdam gradus malorum, in corruptionem? Quasi dicat, nulla. Si enim statim non resurgo, corruptumque fuerit corpus meum, nemini annuntiabo, nullum lucrabor ut Glossa exponit. Tertio, ad sublevationem nostrae spei. Quia, dum videmus Christum resurgere, qui est caput nostrum, speramus et nos resurrecturos. Unde dicitur I Cor. XV, si Christus praedicatur quod resurrexit a mortuis, quomodo quidam dicunt in vobis quoniam resurrectio mortuorum non est? Et Iob XIX dicitur, scio, scilicet per certitudinem fidei, quod redemptor meus, idest Christus, vivit, a mortuis resurgens, et ideo in novissimo die de terra surrecturus sum, reposita est haec spes mea in sinu meo. Quarto, ad informationem vitae fidelium, secundum illud Rom. VI, quomodo Christus resurrexit a mortuis per gloriam patris, ita et nos in novitate vitae ambulemus. Et infra, Christus resurgens ex mortuis iam non moritur, ita et vos existimate mortuos esse peccato, viventes autem Deo. Quinto, ad complementum nostrae salutis. Quia sicut propter hoc mala sustinuit moriendo ut nos liberaret a malis, ita glorificatus est resurgendo ut nos promoveret ad bona, secundum illud Rom. IV, traditus est propter delicta nostra, et resurrexit propter iustificationem nostram. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet Christus non ceciderit per peccatum, cecidit tamen per mortem, quia sicut peccatum est casus a iustitia, ita mors est casus a vita. Unde ex persona Christi potest intelligi quod dicitur Mich. VII, ne laeteris, inimica mea, super me, quia cecidi, consurgam. Similiter etiam, licet corpus Christi non fuerit dissolutum per incinerationem, ipsa tamen separatio animae a corpore dissolutio quaedam fuit. Ad secundum dicendum quod divinitas erat carni Christi post mortem unita unione personali, non autem unione naturae, sicut anima unitur corpori ut forma ad constituendam humanam naturam. Et ideo per hoc quod corpus eius unitum est animae, promotum est in altiorem statum naturae, non autem in altiorem statum personae.

IIIae

rection; hence it is said in His Person (Ps 138:2): Thou hast known, i.e., approved, my sitting down, i.e., My humiliation and Passion, and my rising up, i.e., My glorification in the resurrection; as the gloss expounds. Second, for our instruction in the faith, since our belief in Christ’s Godhead is confirmed by His rising again, because, according to 2 Cor. 13:4, although He was crucified through weakness, yet He liveth by the power of God. And therefore it is written (1 Cor 15:14): If Christ be not risen again, then is our preaching vain, and our faith is also vain: and (Ps 29:10): What profit is there in my blood? that is, in the shedding of My blood, while I go down, as by various degrees of evils, into corruption? As though He were to answer: None. ‘For if I do not at once rise again but My body be corrupted, I shall preach to no one, I shall gain no one,’ as the gloss expounds. Third, for the raising of our hope, since through seeing Christ, who is our head, rise again, we hope that we likewise shall rise again. Hence it is written (1 Cor 15:12): Now if Christ be preached that He rose from the dead, how do some among you say, that there is no resurrection of the dead? And (Job 19:25, 27): I know, that is with certainty of faith, that my Redeemer, i.e., Christ, liveth, having risen from the dead; and therefore in the last day I shall rise out of the earth . . . this my hope is laid up in my bosom. Fourth, to set in order the lives of the faithful: according to Rom. 6:4: As Christ is risen from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in newness of life: and further on; Christ rising from the dead dieth now no more; so do you also reckon that you are dead to sin, but alive to God. Fifth, in order to complete the work of our salvation: because, just as for this reason did He endure evil things in dying that He might deliver us from evil, so was He glorified in rising again in order to advance us towards good things; according to Rom. 4:25: He was delivered up for our sins, and rose again for our justification. Reply Obj. 1: Although Christ did not fall by sin, yet He fell by death, because as sin is a fall from righteousness, so death is a fall from life: hence the words of Mic. 7:8 can be taken as though spoken by Christ: Rejoice not thou, my enemy, over me, because I am fallen: I shall rise again. Likewise, although Christ’s body was not disintegrated by returning to dust, yet the separation of His soul and body was a kind of disintegration. Reply Obj. 2: The Godhead was united with Christ’s flesh after death by personal union, but not by natural union; thus the soul is united with the body as its form, so as to constitute human nature. Consequently, by the union of the body and soul, the body was uplifted to a higher condition of nature, but not to a higher personal state.

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Q. 53, A. 2

Ad tertium dicendum quod passio Christi operata Reply Obj. 3: Christ’s Passion wrought our salvation, est nostram salutem, proprie loquendo, quantum ad re- properly speaking, by removing evils; but the Resurrection motionem malorum, resurrectio autem quantum ad in- did so as the beginning and exemplar of all good things. choationem et exemplar bonorum.

Article 2 Whether it was fitting for Christ to rise again on the third day? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Christum tertia die resurgere. Membra enim debent capiti conformari. Sed nos, qui sumus membra Christi, non resurgimus a morte tertia die, sed nostra resurrectio differtur usque ad finem mundi. Ergo videtur quod Christus, qui est caput nostrum, non debuit tertia die resurgere, sed debuit eius resurrectio differri usque ad finem mundi. Praeterea, Act. II dicit Petrus quod impossibile erat Christum detineri ab Inferno et morte. Sed quandiu aliquis est mortuus, detinetur a morte. Ergo videtur quod Christi resurrectio non debuerit differri usque ad tertiam diem, sed statim eodem die resurgere, praecipue cum Glossa super inducta dicat nullam esse utilitatem in effusione sanguinis Christi si non statim resurgeret. Praeterea, dies incipere videtur ab ortu solis, qui sua praesentia diem causat. Sed ante ortum solis Christus resurrexit, dicitur enim Ioan. XX, quod una sabbati Maria Magdalene venit mane, cum adhuc tenebrae essent, ad monumentum, et tunc Christus iam resurrexerat, quia sequitur, et vidit revolutum lapidem a monumento. Ergo non resurrexit Christus tertia die. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. XX, tradent eum gentibus ad illudendum et flagellandum et crucifigendum, et tertia die resurget. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, resurrectio Christi necessaria fuit ad instructionem fidei nostrae. Est autem fides nostra et de divinitate et de humanitate Christi, non enim sufficit alterum sine altero credere, ut ex praedictis patet. Et ideo, ad hoc quod confirmaretur fides divinitatis ipsius, oportuit quod cito resurgeret, et eius resurrectio non differretur usque ad finem mundi, ad hoc autem quod confirmaretur fides de veritate humanitatis et mortis eius, oportuit moram esse inter mortem et resurrectionem; si enim statim post mortem resurrexisset videri posset quod eius mors vera non fuerit, et per consequens nec resurrectio vera. Ad veritatem autem mortis Christi manifestandam, sufficiebat quod usque ad tertiam diem eius resurrectio differretur, quia non contingit quin infra hoc tempus, in homine qui mortuus videtur cum vivat, appareant aliqua indicia vitae.

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that Christ should have risen again on the third day. For the members ought to be in conformity with their head. But we who are His members do not rise from death on the third day, since our rising is put off until the end of the world. Therefore, it seems that Christ, who is our head, should not have risen on the third day, but that His Resurrection ought to have been deferred until the end of the world. Obj. 2: Further, Peter said (Acts 2:24) that it was impossible for Christ to be held fast by hell and death. Therefore it seems that Christ’s rising ought not to have been deferred until the third day, but that He ought to have risen at once on the same day; especially since the gloss quoted above (A. 1) says that there is no profit in the shedding of Christ’s blood, if He did not rise at once. Obj. 3: The day seems to start with the rising of the sun, the presence of which causes the day. But Christ rose before sunrise: for it is related (John 20:1) that Mary Magdalen cometh early, when it was yet dark, unto the sepulchre: but Christ was already risen, for it goes on to say: And she saw the stone taken away from the sepulchre. Therefore Christ did not rise on the third day. On the contrary, It is written (Matt 20:19): They shall deliver Him to the Gentiles to be mocked, and scourged, and crucified, and the third day He shall rise again. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1) Christ’s Resurrection was necessary for the instruction of our faith. But our faith regards Christ’s Godhead and humanity, for it is not enough to believe the one without the other, as is evident from what has been said (Q. 36, A. 4; cf. II-II, Q. 2, AA. 7, 8). Consequently, in order that our faith in the truth of His Godhead might be confirmed it was necessary that He should rise speedily, and that His Resurrection should not be deferred until the end of the world. But to confirm our faith regarding the truth of His humanity and death, it was needful that there should be some interval between His death and rising. For if He had risen directly after death, it might seem that His death was not genuine and consequently neither would His Resurrection be true. But to establish the truth of Christ’s death, it was enough for His rising to be deferred until the third day, for within that time some signs of life always appear in one who appears to be dead whereas he is alive.

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Q. 53, A. 2

Incarnate Son of God

Per hoc etiam quod tertia die resurrexit, commendatur perfectio ternarii, qui est numerus omnis rei, utpote habens principium, medium et finem, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Ostenditur etiam, secundum mysterium, quod Christus una sua morte, quae fuit lux propter iustitiam, corporali scilicet, duas nostras mortes destruxit, scilicet corporis et animae, quae sunt tenebrosae propter peccatum, et ideo una die integra et duabus noctibus permansit in morte, ut Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin. Per hoc etiam significatur quod per resurrectionem Christi tertium tempus incipiebat. Nam primum fuit ante legem; secundum sub lege; tertium sub gratia. Incipit etiam in Christi resurrectione tertius status sanctorum. Nam primus fuit sub figuris legis; secundus, sub veritate fidei; tertius erit in aeternitate gloriae, quam Christus resurgendo inchoavit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caput et membra conformantur in natura, sed non in virtute, excellentior est enim virtus capitis quam membrorum. Et ideo, ad demonstrandam excellentiam virtutis Christi, conveniens fuit ipsum tertia die resurgere, aliorum resurrectione dilata usque ad finem mundi. Ad secundum dicendum quod detentio coactionem quandam importat. Christus autem nulla necessitate mortis tenebatur adstrictus, sed erat inter mortuos liber. Et ideo aliquandiu in morte mansit, non quasi detentus, sed propria voluntate, quandiu iudicavit hoc esse necessarium ad instructionem fidei nostrae. Dicitur autem statim fieri quod fit brevi interposito tempore. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Christus resurrexit circa diluculum, illucescente iam die, ad significandum quod per suam resurrectionem nos ad lucem gloriae inducebat, sicut mortuus est advesperascente iam die et tendente in tenebras, ad ostendendum quod per suam mortem destrueret tenebras culpae et poenae. Et tamen dicitur tertia die resurrexisse, accipiendo diem pro die naturali, quae continet spatium viginti quatuor horarum. Et, sicut dicit Augustinus, in IV de Trin., nox usque ad diluculum quo domini resurrectio declarata est, ad tertium pertinet diem. Quia Deus, qui dixit de tenebris lumen clarescere, ut per gratiam novi testamenti et participationem resurrectionis Christi audiremus, fuistis aliquando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in domino, insinuat nobis quodammodo quod a nocte dies sumat initium. Sicut enim primi dies, propter futurum hominis lapsum, a luce in noctem, ita isti, propter hominis reparationem, a tenebris ad lucem computantur. Et ita patet quod, etiam si media nocte surrexisset, posset dici die tertia eum surrexisse, intelligendo de die naturali. Nunc autem, cum in diluculo surrexerit, potest dici quod die tertia surrexit, etiam accipiendo diem artificialem, quae causatur ex praesentia solis, quia iam sol incipiebat aerem illustrare. Unde et Marci ult. dicitur quod mulieres venerunt ad monumentum, orto iam so-

IIIae

Furthermore, by His rising on the third day, the perfection of the number three is commended, which is the number of everything, as having beginning, middle, and end, as is said in De Coelo i. Again in the mystical sense we are taught that Christ by His one death (i.e., of the body) which was light, by reason of His righteousness, destroyed our two deaths (i.e., of soul and body), which are as darkness on account of sin; consequently, He remained in death for one day and two nights, as Augustine observes (De Trin. iv). And thereby is also signified that a third epoch began with the Resurrection: for the first was before the Law; the second under the Law; and the third under grace. Moreover the third state of the saints began with the Resurrection of Christ: for, the first was under figures of the Law; the second under the truth of faith; while the third will be in the eternity of glory, which Christ inaugurated by rising again. Reply Obj. 1: The head and members are likened in nature, but not in power; because the power of the head is more excellent than that of the members. Accordingly, to show forth the excellence of Christ’s power, it was fitting that He should rise on the third day, while the resurrection of the rest is put off until the end of the world. Reply Obj. 2: Detention implies a certain compulsion. But Christ was not held fast by any necessity of death, but was free among the dead: and therefore He abode a while in death, not as one held fast, but of His own will, just so long as He deemed necessary for the instruction of our faith. And a task is said to be done at once which is performed within a short space of time. Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 51, A. 4, ad 1, 2), Christ rose early when the day was beginning to dawn, to denote that by His Resurrection He brought us to the light of glory; just as He died when the day was drawing to its close, and nearing to darkness, in order to signify that by His death He would destroy the darkness of sin and its punishment. Nevertheless He is said to have risen on the third day, taking day as a natural day which contains twenty-four hours. And as Augustine says (De Trin. iv): The night until the dawn, when the Lord’s Resurrection was proclaimed, belongs to the third day. Because God, who made the light to shine forth from darkness, in order that by the grace of the New Testament and partaking of Christ’s rising we might hear this—‘Once ye were darkness, but now light in the Lord’— insinuates in a measure to us that day draws its origin from night: for, as the first days are computed from light to darkness on account of man’s coming fall, so these days are reckoned from darkness to light owing to man’s restoration. And so it is evident that even if He had risen at midnight, He could be said to have risen on the third day, taking it as a natural day. But now that He rose early, it can be affirmed that He rose on the third day, even taking the artificial day which is caused by the sun’s presence, because the sun had already begun to brighten the sky. Hence it is written (Mark 16:2) that the women come to the sepulchre, the sun being now

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le. Quod non est contrarium ei quod Ioannes dicit, cum adhuc tenebrae essent, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de consensu Evang., quia, die surgente, reliquiae tenebrarum tanto magis extenuantur, quanto magis oritur lux; quod autem dicit Marcus, orto iam sole, non sic accipiendum est tanquam iam sol ipse videretur super terram, sed tanquam eo proximo veniente in has partes.

Q. 53, A. 3

risen; which is not contrary to John’s statement when it was yet dark, as Augustine says (De Cons. Evang. iii), because, as the day advances the more the light rises, the more are the remaining shadows dispelled. But when Mark says ‘the sun being now risen,’ it is not to be taken as if the sun were already apparent over the horizon, but as coming presently into those parts.

Article 3 Whether Christ was the first to rise from the Dead? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non primo resurrexit. Nam in veteri testamento per Eliam et Elisaeum aliqui resuscitati leguntur, secundum illud Heb. XI, acceperunt mulieres de resurrectione mortuos suos. Similiter etiam Christus, ante passionem suam, tres mortuos suscitavit. Non ergo Christus fuit primus resurgentium. Praeterea, Matth. XXVII, inter alia miracula quae in passione Christi acciderunt, narratur quod monumenta aperta sunt, et multa corpora sanctorum qui dormierant, surrexerunt. Non ergo Christus fuit primus resurgentium. Praeterea, sicut Christus per suam resurrectionem est causa nostrae resurrectionis, ita per suam gratiam est causa nostrae gratiae, secundum illud Ioan. I, de plenitudine eius omnes accepimus. Sed alii prius tempore gratiam habuerunt quam Christus, sicut omnes patres veteris testamenti. Ergo etiam aliqui prius ad resurrectionem corporalem pervenerunt quam Christus. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Cor. XV, Christus resurrexit a mortuis primitiae dormientium, Glossa, quia prius tempore et dignitate surrexit.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not the first to rise from the dead, because we read in the Old Testament of some persons raised to life by Elias and Eliseus, according to Heb. 11:35: Women received their dead raised to life again: also Christ before His Passion raised three dead persons to life. Therefore Christ was not the first to rise from the dead. Obj. 2: Further, among the other miracles which happened during the Passion, it is narrated (Matt 27:52) that the monuments were opened, and many bodies of the saints who had slept rose again. Therefore Christ was not the first to rise from the dead. Obj. 3: Further, as Christ by His own rising is the cause of our resurrection, so by His grace He is the cause of our grace, according to John 1:16: Of His fullness we all have received. But in point of time some others had grace previous to Christ—for instance all the fathers of the Old Testament. Therefore some others came to the resurrection of the body before Christ. On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor 15:20): Christ is risen from the dead, the first fruits of them that sleep—because, says the gloss, He rose first in point of time and dignity. I answer that, Resurrection is a restoring from death to life. Now a man is snatched from death in two ways: first of all, from actual death, so that he begins in any way to live anew after being actually dead: in another way, so that he is not only rescued from death, but from the necessity, nay more, from the possibility of dying again. Such is a true and perfect resurrection, because so long as a man lives, subject to the necessity of dying, death has dominion over him in a measure, according to Rom. 8:10: The body indeed is dead because of sin. Furthermore, what has the possibility of existence, is said to exist in some respect, that is, in potentiality. Thus it is evident that the resurrection, whereby one is rescued from actual death only, is but an imperfect one.

Respondeo dicendum quod resurrectio est reparatio a morte in vitam. Dupliciter autem aliquis eripitur a morte. Uno modo, solum a morte in actu, ut scilicet aliquis vivere incipiat qualitercumque postquam mortuus fuerat. Alio modo, ut aliquis liberetur non solum a morte, sed etiam a necessitate et, quod plus est, a possibilitate moriendi. Et haec est vera et perfecta resurrectio. Quia quandiu aliquis vivit subiectus necessitati moriendi, quodammodo mors ei dominatur, secundum illud Rom. VIII, corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum. Illud etiam quod possibile est esse, secundum quid dicitur esse, idest potentialiter. Et sic patet quod illa resurrectio qua quis eripitur solum ab actuali morte, est resurrectio imperfecta. Loquendo ergo de resurrectione perfecta, Christus Consequently, speaking of perfect resurrection, Christ est primus resurgentium, quia ipse resurgendo primo is the first of them who rise, because by rising He was the pervenit ad vitam penitus immortalem; secundum illud first to attain life utterly immortal, according to Rom. 6:9:

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Rom. VI, Christus, resurgens ex mortuis, iam non moritur. Sed resurrectione imperfecta quidam alii surrexerunt ante Christum, ad praemonstrandum quasi in quodam signo resurrectionem ipsius. Et sic patet responsio ad primum. Quia et illi qui suscitati sunt in veteri testamento, et illi qui suscitati sunt a Christo, sic redierunt ad vitam ut iterum morerentur. Ad secundum dicendum quod de illis qui resurrexerunt cum Christo, duplex est opinio. Quidam enim asserunt quod redierunt ad vitam tanquam non iterum morituri, quoniam maius illis esset tormentum si iterum morerentur, quam si non resurgerent. Et secundum hoc, intelligendum erit, sicut Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., quod non ante resurrexerunt quam resurgeret dominus. Unde et Evangelista dicit quod, exeuntes de monumentis post resurrectionem eius, venerunt in sanctam civitatem et apparuerunt multis. Sed Augustinus, in epistola ad Evodium, hanc opinionem commemorans, dicit, scio quibusdam videri morte domini Christi iam talem resurrectionem praestitam iustis, qualis nobis in fine promittitur quod si non iterum, repositis corporibus, dormierunt, videndum est quomodo intelligatur Christus primogenitus a mortuis, si eum in illam resurrectionem tot praecesserunt. Quod si respondetur hoc dictum esse per anticipationem, ut monumenta illo terrae motu aperta intelligantur cum Christus in cruce penderet, resurrexisse autem iustorum corpora non tunc, sed cum ille prior resurrexisset, sed adhuc restat quod moveat quomodo Petrus non de David sed de Christo asseruit fuisse praedictum carnem eius non vidisse corruptionem, scilicet per hoc quod apud eos erat monumentum David; et sic illos non convincebat, si corpus David ibi iam non erat; quia, etsi ante in recenti sua morte resurrexisset, nec caro eius vidisset corruptionem, posset monumentum illud manere. Durum autem videtur ut David non fuerit in illa resurrectione iustorum, si eis iam aeterna donata est, cuius Christus ex semine commendatur. Periclitabitur etiam illud quod ad Hebraeos de iustis antiquis dicitur, ne sine nobis perficerentur, si iam in illa resurrectionis incorruptione constituti sunt quae nobis perficiendis in fine promittitur. Sic ergo Augustinus sentire videtur quod resurrexerint iterum morituri. Ad quod etiam videtur pertinere quod Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., quod, sicut Lazarus resurrexit, sic et multa corpora sanctorum resurrexerunt, ut dominum ostenderent resurgentem. Quamvis hoc in sermone de assumptione sub dubio relinquat. Rationes tamen Augustini multo efficaciores videntur. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut ea quae praecesserunt Christi adventum, fuerunt praeparatoria ad Christum, ita gratia est dispositio ad gloriam. Et ideo ea quae sunt gloriae, sive quantum ad animam, sicut perfecta Dei fruitio, sive quantum ad corpus, sicut resurrectio gloriosa, prius tempore debuit esse in Christo, sicut in auctore

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Christ rising from the dead dieth now no more. But by an imperfect resurrection, some others have risen before Christ, so as to be a kind of figure of His Resurrection. And thus the answer to the first objection is clear: because both those raised from the dead in the Old Testament, and those raised by Christ, so returned to life that they had to die again. Reply Obj. 2: There are two opinions regarding them who rose with Christ. Some hold that they rose to life so as to die no more, because it would be a greater torment for them to die a second time than not to rise at all. According to this view, as Jerome observes on Matt. 27:52, 53, we must understand that they had not risen before our Lord rose. Hence the Evangelist says that coming out of the tombs after His Resurrection, they came into the holy city, and appeared to many. But Augustine (Ep. ad Evod. clxiv) while giving this opinion, says: I know that it appears to some, that by the death of Christ the Lord the same resurrection was bestowed upon the righteous as is promised to us in the end; and if they slept not again by laying aside their bodies, it remains to be seen how Christ can be understood to be ‘the first-born of the dead,’ if so many preceded Him unto that resurrection. Now if reply be made that this is said by anticipation, so that the monuments be understood to have been opened by the earthquake while Christ was still hanging on the cross, but that the bodies of the just did not rise then but after He had risen, the difficulty still arises—how is it that Peter asserts that it was predicted not of David but of Christ, that His body would not see corruption, since David’s tomb was in their midst; and thus he did not convince them, if David’s body was no longer there; for even if he had risen soon after his death, and his flesh had not seen corruption, his tomb might nevertheless remain. Now it seems hard that David from whose seed Christ is descended, was not in that rising of the just, if an eternal rising was conferred upon them. Also that saying in the Epistle to the Hebrews (11:40) regarding the ancient just would be hard to explain, ‘that they should not be perfected without us,’ if they were already established in that incorruption of the resurrection which is promised at the end when we shall be made perfect: so that Augustine would seem to think that they rose to die again. In this sense Jerome also in commenting on Matthew (27:52, 53) says: As Lazarus rose, so also many of the bodies of the saints rose, that they might bear witness to the risen Christ. Nevertheless in a sermon for the Assumption he seems to leave the matter doubtful. But Augustine’s reasons seem to be much more cogent. Reply Obj. 3: As everything preceding Christ’s coming was preparatory for Christ, so is grace a disposition for glory. Consequently, it behooved all things appertaining to glory, whether they regard the soul, as the perfect fruition of God, or whether they regard the body, as the glorious resurrection, to be first in Christ as the author of glory: but

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gloriae. Gratiam vero conveniebat prius esse in his quae that grace should be first in those that were ordained unto ordinabantur ad Christum. Christ.

Article 4 Whether Christ was the cause of his own Resurrection? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non fuerit causa suae resurrectionis. Quicumque enim suscitatur ab alio, non est suae resurrectionis causa. Sed Christus est suscitatus ab alio, secundum illud Act. II, quem Deus suscitavit, solutis doloribus Inferni; et Rom. VIII, qui suscitavit Iesum Christum a mortuis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora nostra, et cetera. Ergo Christus non est causa suae resurrectionis. Praeterea, nullus dicitur mereri, vel ab alio petit, aliquid cuius ipse est causa. Sed Christus sua passione meruit resurrectionem, sicut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., quod humilitas passionis meritum est gloriae resurrectionis. Ipse etiam petit a patre se resuscitari, secundum illud Psalmi, tu autem, domine, miserere mei et resuscita me. Ergo Christus non fuit causa suae resurrectionis.

Praeterea, sicut Damascenus probat, in IV libro, resurrectio non est animae, sed corporis, quod per mortem cadit. Corpus autem non potuit sibi animam unire, quae est eo nobilior. Ergo id quod resurrexit in Christo, non potuit esse causa suae resurrectionis. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. X, nemo tollit animam meam a me, sed ego pono eam et iterum sumo eam. Sed nihil est aliud resurgere quam iterato animam sumere. Ergo videtur quod Christus propria virtute resurrexit. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, per mortem non fuit separata divinitas nec ab anima Christi, nec ab eius carne. Potest igitur tam anima Christi mortui, quam eius caro, considerari dupliciter, uno modo, ratione divinitatis; alio modo, ratione ipsius naturae creatae. Secundum igitur unitae divinitatis virtutem, et corpus resumpsit animam, quam deposuerat; et anima resumpsit corpus, quod dimiserat. Et hoc est quod de Christo dicitur II Cor. ult., quod, etsi crucifixus est ex infirmitate nostra, sed vivit ex virtute Dei. Si autem consideremus corpus et animam Christi mortui secundum virtutem naturae creatae, sic non potuerunt sibi invicem reuniri, sed oportuit Christum resuscitari a Deo.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod eadem est divina virtus et operatio patris et filii. Unde haec duo sese con-

Objection 1: It seems that Christ was not the cause of His own Resurrection. For whoever is raised up by another is not the cause of his own rising. But Christ was raised up by another, according to Acts 2:24: Whom God hath raised up, having loosed the sorrows of hell: and Rom. 8:11: He that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead, shall quicken also your mortal bodies. Therefore Christ is not the cause of His own Resurrection. Obj. 2: Further, no one is said to merit, or ask from another, that of which he is himself the cause. But Christ by His Passion merited the Resurrection, as Augustine says (Tract. civ in Joan.): The lowliness of the Passion is the meritorious cause of the glory of the Resurrection. Moreover He asked the Father that He might be raised up again, according to Ps. 40:11: But thou, O Lord, have mercy on me, and raise me up again. Therefore He was not the cause of His rising again. Obj. 3: Further, as Damascene proves (De Fide Orth. iv), it is not the soul that rises again, but the body, which is stricken by death. But the body could not unite the soul with itself, since the soul is nobler. Therefore what rose in Christ could not be the cause of His Resurrection. On the contrary, Our Lord says (John 10:18): No one taketh My soul from Me, but I lay it down, and I take it up again. But to rise is nothing else than to take the soul up again. Consequently, it appears that Christ rose again of His own power. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 50, AA. 2, 3) in consequence of death Christ’s Godhead was not separated from His soul, nor from His flesh. Consequently, both the soul and the flesh of the dead Christ can be considered in two respects: first, in respect of His Godhead; second, in respect of His created nature. Therefore, according to the virtue of the Godhead united to it, the body took back again the soul which it had laid aside, and the soul took back again the body which it had abandoned: and thus Christ rose by His own power. And this is precisely what is written (2 Cor 13:4): For although He was crucified through our weakness, yet He liveth by the power of God. But if we consider the body and soul of the dead Christ according to the power of created nature, they could not thus be reunited, but it was necessary for Christ to be raised up by God. Reply Obj. 1: The Divine power is the same thing as the operation of the Father and the Son; accordingly these

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sequuntur, quod Christus sit suscitatus divina virtute pa- two things are mutually consequent, that Christ was raised tris, et sui ipsius. up by the Divine power of the Father, and by His own power. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus orando peReply Obj. 2: Christ by praying besought and merited tiit et meruit suam resurrectionem, inquantum homo, His Resurrection, as man and not as God. non autem inquantum Deus. Ad tertium dicendum quod corpus secundum naReply Obj. 3: According to its created nature Christ’s turam creatam non est potentius anima Christi, est ta- body is not more powerful than His soul; yet according to men ea potentius secundum virtutem divinam. Quae its Divine power it is more powerful. Again the soul by reaetiam rursus, secundum divinitatem unitam, est poten- son of the Godhead united to it is more powerful than the tior corpore secundum naturam creatam. Et ideo se- body in respect of its created nature. Consequently, it was cundum virtutem divinam corpus et anima mutuo se by the Divine power that the body and soul mutually reresumpserunt, non autem secundum virtutem naturae sumed each other, but not by the power of their created nacreatae. ture.

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Question 54 The Quality of Christ Rising Again Deinde considerandum est de qualitate Christi resurWe have now to consider the quality of the rising Christ, gentis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. which presents four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum post resurrectionem Christus (1) Whether Christ had a true body after His habuerit verum corpus. Resurrection? Secundo, utrum resurrexit cum corporis integritate. (2) Whether He rose with His complete body? Tertio, utrum corpus eius fuerit gloriosum. (3) Whether His was a glorified body? Quarto, de eius cicatricibus in corpore apparentibus. (4) Of the scars which showed in His body.

Article 1 Whether Christ had a true body after his Resurrection? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus post resurrectionem non habuerit verum corpus. Verum enim corpus non potest simul esse cum alio corpore in eodem loco. Sed corpus Christi post resurrectionem fuit simul cum alio corpore in eodem loco, intravit enim ad discipulos ianuis clausis, ut dicitur Ioan. XX. Ergo videtur quod Christus post resurrectionem non habuerit verum corpus. Praeterea, verum corpus non evanescit ab aspectu intuentium, nisi forte corrumpatur. Sed corpus Christi evanuit ab oculis discipulorum eum intuentium, ut dicitur Luc. ult. Ergo videtur quod Christus post resurrectionem non habuerit verum corpus. Praeterea, cuiuslibet veri corporis est determinata figura. Sed corpus Christi apparuit discipulis in alia effigie, ut patet Marci ult. Ergo videtur quod Christus post resurrectionem non habuerit verum corpus humanum. Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. ult., quod Christo discipulis apparente, conturbati et conterriti, existimabant se spiritum videre, scilicet ac si non haberet verum corpus, sed phantasticum. Ad quod removendum, ipse postea subdit, palpate et videte, quia spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere. Non ergo habuit corpus phantasticum, sed verum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Damascenus dicit, in IV libro, illud resurgere dicitur quod cecidit. Corpus autem Christi per mortem cecidit, inquantum scilicet fuit ab eo anima separata, quae erat eius formalis perfectio. Unde oportuit, ad hoc quod esset vera Christi resurrectio, ut idem corpus Christi iterato eidem animae uniretur. Et quia veritas naturae corporis est ex forma, consequens est quod corpus Christi post resurrectionem

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not have a true body after His Resurrection. For a true body cannot be in the same place at the same time with another body. But after the Resurrection Christ’s body was with another at the same time in the same place: since He entered among the disciples the doors being shut, as is related in John 20:26. Therefore it seems that Christ did not have a true body after His Resurrection. Obj. 2: Further, a true body does not vanish from the beholder’s sight unless perchance it be corrupted. But Christ’s body vanished out of the sight of the disciples as they gazed upon Him, as is related in Luke 24:31. Therefore, it seems that Christ did not have a true body after His Resurrection. Obj. 3: Further, every true body has its determinate shape. But Christ’s body appeared before the disciples in another shape, as is evident from Mk. 15:12. Therefore it seems that Christ did not possess a true body after His Resurrection. On the contrary, It is written (Luke 24:37) that when Christ appeared to His disciples they being troubled and frightened, supposed that they saw a spirit, as if He had not a true but an imaginary body: but to remove their fears He presently added: Handle and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have. Consequently, He had not an imaginary but a true body. I answer that, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): that is said to rise, which fell. But Christ’s body fell by death; namely, inasmuch as the soul which was its formal perfection was separated from it. Hence, in order for it to be a true resurrection, it was necessary for the same body of Christ to be once more united with the same soul. And since the truth of the body’s nature is from its form it follows that Christ’s body after His Resurrection was a true body, and of

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et verum corpus fuerit, et eiusdem naturae cuius fuerat prius. Si autem eius corpus fuisset phantasticum, non fuisset vera resurrectio, sed apparens. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod corpus Christi post resurrectionem, non ex miraculo, sed ex conditione gloriae, sicut quidam dicunt, clausis ianuis ad discipulos introivit, simul cum alio corpore in eodem loco existens. Sed utrum hoc facere possit corpus gloriosum ex aliqua proprietate sibi indita, ut simul cum alio corpore in eodem loco existat, inferius discutietur, ubi agetur de resurrectione communi. Nunc autem, quantum ad propositum sufficit, dicendum est quod non ex natura corporis, sed potius ex virtute divinitatis unitae, illud corpus ad discipulos, licet verum esset, ianuis clausis introivit. Unde Augustinus dicit, in quodam sermone paschali, quod quidam sic disputant, si corpus erat, si hoc surrexit de sepulcro quod pependit in ligno, quomodo per ostia clausa intrare potuit? Et respondet, si comprehendis modum, non est miraculum. Ubi deficit ratio, ibi est fidei aedificatio. Et super Ioan., dicit, moli corporis ubi divinitas erat, ostia clausa non obstiterunt, ille quippe non eis apertis intrare potuit, quo nascente virginitas matris inviolata permansit. Et idem dicit Gregorius, in quadam homilia de octava Paschae. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, Christus resurrexit ad immortalem gloriae vitam. Haec est autem dispositio corporis gloriosi, ut sit spirituale, idest subiectum spiritui, ut apostolus dicit, I Cor. XV. Ad hoc autem quod sit omnino corpus subiectum spiritui, requiritur quod omnis actio corporis subdatur spiritus voluntati. Quod autem aliquid videatur, fit per actionem visibilis in visum, ut patet per philosophum, in II de anima. Et ideo quicumque habet corpus glorificatum, in potestate sua habet videri quando vult, et, quando non vult, non videri. Hoc tamen Christus habuit non solum ex conditione corporis gloriosi, sed etiam ex virtute divinitatis, per quam fieri potest ut etiam corpora non gloriosa miraculose non videantur; sicut praestitum fuit miraculose beato Bartholomaeo, ut, si vellet, videretur, non autem videretur si non vellet. Dicitur ergo quod Christus ab oculis discipulorum evanuit, non quia corrumperetur aut resolveretur in aliqua invisibilia, sed quia sua voluntate desiit ab eis videri, vel eo praesente, vel etiam eo abscedente per dotem agilitatis. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Severianus dicit in sermone paschali, nemo putet Christum sua resurrectione sui vultus effigiem commutasse. Quod est intelligendum quantum ad lineamenta membrorum, quia nihil inordinatum et deforme fuerat in corpore Christi, per spiritum sanctum concepto, quod in resurrectione corrigendum esset. Accepit tamen in resurrectione gloriam claritatis. Unde idem subdit, sed mutatur effigies

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the same nature as it was before. But had His been an imaginary body, then His Resurrection would not have been true, but apparent. Reply Obj. 1: Christ’s body after His Resurrection, not by miracle but from its glorified condition, as some say, entered in among the disciples while the doors were shut, thus existing with another body in the same place. But whether a glorified body can have this from some hidden property, so as to be with another body at the same time in the same place, will be discussed later (Suppl., Q. 83, A. 4) when the common resurrection will be dealt with. For the present let it suffice to say that it was not from any property within the body, but by virtue of the Godhead united to it, that this body, although a true one, entered in among the disciples while the doors were shut. Accordingly Augustine says in a sermon for Easter (ccxlvii) that some men argue in this fashion: If it were a body; if what rose from the sepulchre were what hung upon the tree, how could it enter through closed doors? And he answers: If you understand how, it is no miracle: where reason fails, faith abounds. And (Tract. cxxi super Joan.) he says: Closed doors were no obstacle to the substance of a Body wherein was the Godhead; for truly He could enter in by doors not open, in whose Birth His Mother’s virginity remained inviolate. And Gregory says the same in a homily for the octave of Easter (xxvi in Evang.). Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 53, A. 3), Christ rose to the immortal life of glory. But such is the disposition of a glorified body that it is spiritual, i.e., subject to the spirit, as the Apostle says (1 Cor 15:44). Now in order for the body to be entirely subject to the spirit, it is necessary for the body’s every action to be subject to the will of the spirit. Again, that an object be seen is due to the action of the visible object upon the sight, as the Philosopher shows (De Anima ii). Consequently, whoever has a glorified body has it in his power to be seen when he so wishes, and not to be seen when he does not wish it. Moreover Christ had this not only from the condition of His glorified body, but also from the power of His Godhead, by which power it may happen that even bodies not glorified are miraculously unseen: as was by a miracle bestowed on the blessed Bartholomew, that if he wished he could be seen, and not be seen if he did not wish it. Christ, then, is said to have vanished from the eyes of the disciples, not as though He were corrupted or dissolved into invisible elements; but because He ceased, of His own will, to be seen by them, either while He was present or while He was departing by the gift of agility. Reply Obj. 3: As Severianus says in a sermon for Easter: Let no one suppose that Christ changed His features at the Resurrection. This is to be understood of the outline of His members; since there was nothing out of keeping or deformed in the body of Christ which was conceived of the Holy Spirit, that had to be righted at the Resurrection. Nevertheless He received the glory of clarity in the Resurrection: accordingly the same writer adds: but the semblance is

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dum efficitur ex mortali immortalis, ut hoc sit acquisivisse vultus gloriam, non vultus substantiam perdidisse. Nec tamen illis discipulis in specie gloriosa apparuit, sed, sicut in potestate eius erat ut corpus suum videretur vel non videretur, ita in potestate eius erat ut ex eius aspectu formaretur in oculis intuentium vel forma gloriosa, vel non gloriosa, aut etiam commixta, vel qualitercumque se habens. Modica tamen differentia sufficit ad hoc quod aliquis videatur in aliena effigie apparere.

Q. 54, A. 2

changed, when, ceasing to be mortal, it becomes immortal; so that it acquired the glory of countenance, without losing the substance of the countenance. Yet He did not come to those disciples in glorified appearance; but, as it lay in His power for His body to be seen or not, so it was within His power to present to the eyes of the beholders His form either glorified or not glorified, or partly glorified and partly not, or in any fashion whatsoever. Still it requires but a slight difference for anyone to seem to appear another shape.

Article 2 Whether Christ’s body rose glorified? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpus Christi non resurrexerit gloriosum. Corpora enim gloriosa sunt fulgentia, secundum illud Matth. XIII, fulgebunt iusti sicut sol in regno patris eorum. Sed corpora fulgida videntur secundum rationem lucis, non autem secundum rationem coloris. Cum ergo corpus Christi visum fuerit sub coloris specie, sicut et prius videbatur, videtur quod non fuerit gloriosum. Praeterea, corpus gloriosum est incorruptibile. Sed corpus Christi non videtur fuisse incorruptibile. Fuit enim palpabile, sicut ipse dicit, Luc. ult., palpate et videte. Dicit autem Gregorius, in quadam homilia, quod corrumpi necesse est quod palpatur, et palpari non potest quod non corrumpitur. Non ergo corpus Christi fuit gloriosum. Praeterea, corpus gloriosum non est animale, sed spirituale, ut patet I Cor. XV. Sed corpus Christi videtur animale fuisse post resurrectionem, quia cum discipulis manducavit et bibit, ut legitur Luc. ult., et Ioan. ult. Ergo videtur quod corpus Christi non fuerit gloriosum. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Philipp. III, reformabit corpus humilitatis nostrae, configuratum corpori claritatis suae. Respondeo dicendum quod corpus Christi in resurrectione fuit gloriosum. Et hoc apparet triplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia resurrectio Christi fuit exemplar et causa nostrae resurrectionis, ut habetur I Cor. XV. Sancti autem in resurrectione habebunt corpora gloriosa, sicut dicitur ibidem, seminatur in ignobilitate, surget in gloria. Unde, cum causa sit potior causato et exemplar exemplato, multo magis corpus Christi resurgentis fuit gloriosum. Secundo, quia per humilitatem passionis meruit gloriam resurrectionis. Unde et ipse dicebat, nunc anima mea turbata est, quod pertinet ad passionem, et postea subdit, pater, clarifica nomen tuum, in quo petit gloriam resurrectionis. Tertio quia, sicut supra habitum est, anima Christi a principio suae conceptio-

Objection 1: It seems that Christ’s body did not rise glorified. For glorified bodies shine, according to Matt. 13:43: Then shall the just shine as the sun in the kingdom of their Father. But shining bodies are seen under the aspect of light, but not of color. Therefore, since Christ’s body was beheld under the aspect of color, as it had been hitherto, it seems that it was not a glorified one. Obj. 2: Further, a glorified body is incorruptible. But Christ’s body seems not to have been incorruptible; because it was palpable, as He Himself says in Luke 24:39: Handle, and see. Now Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxvi) that what is handled must be corruptible, and that which is incorruptible cannot be handled. Consequently, Christ’s body was not glorified. Obj. 3: Further, a glorified body is not animal, but spiritual, as is clear from 1 Cor. 15. But after the Resurrection Christ’s body seems to have been animal, since He ate and drank with His disciples, as we read in the closing chapters of Luke and John. Therefore, it seems that Christ’s body was not glorified. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil 3:21): He will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of His glory. I answer that, Christ’s was a glorified body in His Resurrection, and this is evident from three reasons. First of all, because His Resurrection was the exemplar and the cause of ours, as is stated in 1 Cor. 15:43. But in the resurrection the saints will have glorified bodies, as is written in the same place: It is sown in dishonor, it shall rise in glory. Hence, since the cause is mightier than the effect, and the exemplar than the exemplate; much more glorious, then, was the body of Christ in His Resurrection. Second, because He merited the glory of His Resurrection by the lowliness of His Passion. Hence He said (John 12:27): Now is My soul troubled, which refers to the Passion; and later He adds: Father, glorify Thy name, whereby He asks for the glory of the Resurrection. Third, because as stated above

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nis fuit gloriosa per fruitionem divinitatis perfectam. Est autem dispensative factum, sicut supra dictum est, ut ab anima gloria non redundaret in corpus, ad hoc quod mysterium nostrae redemptionis sua passione impleret. Et ideo, peracto hoc mysterio passionis et mortis Christi, anima Christi statim in corpus, in resurrectione resumptum, suam gloriam derivavit. Et ita factum est corpus illud gloriosum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo secundum modum recipientis. Quia igitur gloria corporis derivatur ab anima, ut Augustinus dicit in epistola ad Dioscorum, fulgor seu claritas corporis gloriosi est secundum colorem humano corpori naturalem, sicut vitrum diversimode coloratum recipit splendorem ex illustratione solis secundum modum sui coloris. Sicut autem in potestate hominis glorificati est ut corpus eius videatur vel non videatur, sicut dictum est; ita in potestate eius est quod claritas eius videatur vel non videatur. Unde potest in suo colore sine aliqua claritate videri. Et hoc modo Christus discipulis post resurrectionem suam apparuit. Ad secundum dicendum quod corpus aliquod dicitur esse palpabile, non solum ratione resistentiae, sed ratione spissitudinis suae. Ad rarum autem et spissum sequuntur grave et leve, calidum et frigidum, et alia huiusmodi contraria, quae sunt principia corruptionis corporum elementarium. Unde corpus quod est palpabile humano tactu, est naturaliter corruptibile. Si autem sit aliquod corpus resistens tactui quod non sit dispositum secundum praedictas qualitates, quae sunt propria obiecta tactus humani, sicut est corpus caeleste, tale corpus non potest dici palpabile. Corpus autem Christi vere post resurrectionem fuit ex elementis compositum, habens in se tangibiles qualitates, secundum quod requirit natura corporis humani, et ideo naturaliter erat palpabile. Et si nihil aliud habuisset supra corporis humani naturam, fuisset etiam corruptibile. Habuit autem aliquid aliud quod ipsum incorruptibile reddidit, non quidem naturam caelestis corporis, ut quidam dicunt, de quo infra magis inquiretur; sed gloriam redundantem ab anima beata; quia, ut Augustinus dicit, ad Dioscorum, tam potenti natura Deus fecit animam ut ex eius plenissima beatitudine redundet in corpus plenitudo sanitatis, idest incorruptionis vigor. Et ideo, sicut dicit Gregorius, ibidem, ostenditur corpus Christi post resurrectionem fuisse eiusdem naturae, sed alterius gloriae. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIII de Civ. Dei, salvator noster, post resurrectionem, iam quidem in spirituali carne, sed tamen vera, cibum ac potum cum discipulis sumpsit, non alimentorum indigentia, sed ea qua hoc poterat potestate. Ut enim Beda dicit, super Luc., aliter absorbet aquam terra sitiens, aliter solis radius calens, illa indigentia, iste potentia. Mandu-

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(Q. 34, A. 4), Christ’s soul was glorified from the instant of His conception by perfect fruition of the Godhead. But, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 1, ad 2), it was owing to the Divine economy that the glory did not pass from His soul to His body, in order that by the Passion He might accomplish the mystery of our redemption. Consequently, when this mystery of Christ’s Passion and death was finished, straightway the soul communicated its glory to the risen body in the Resurrection; and so that body was made glorious. Reply Obj. 1: Whatever is received within a subject is received according to the subject’s capacity. Therefore, since glory flows from the soul into the body, it follows that, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor. cxviii), the brightness or splendor of a glorified body is after the manner of natural color in the human body; just as variously colored glass derives its splendor from the sun’s radiance, according to the mode of the color. But as it lies within the power of a glorified man whether his body be seen or not, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2), so is it in his power whether its splendor be seen or not. Accordingly it can be seen in its color without its brightness. And it was in this way that Christ’s body appeared to the disciples after the Resurrection. Reply Obj. 2: We say that a body can be handled not only because of its resistance, but also on account of its density. But from rarity and density follow weight and lightness, heat and cold, and similar contraries, which are the principles of corruption in elementary bodies. Consequently, a body that can be handled by human touch is naturally corruptible. But if there be a body that resists touch, and yet is not disposed according to the qualities mentioned, which are the proper objects of human touch, such as a heavenly body, then such body cannot be said to be handled. But Christ’s body after the Resurrection was truly made up of elements, and had tangible qualities such as the nature of a human body requires, and therefore it could naturally be handled; and if it had nothing beyond the nature of a human body, it would likewise be corruptible. But it had something else which made it incorruptible, and this was not the nature of a heavenly body, as some maintain, and into which we shall make fuller inquiry later (Suppl., Q. 82, A. 1), but it was glory flowing from a beatified soul: because, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor. cxviii): God made the soul of such powerful nature, that from its fullest beatitude the fullness of health overflows into the body, that is, the vigor of incorruption. And therefore Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxvi): Christ’s body is shown to be of the same nature, but of different glory, after the Resurrection. Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii): After the Resurrection, our Savior in spiritual but true flesh partook of meat with the disciples, not from need of food, but because it lay in His power. For as Bede says on Luke 24:41: The thirsty earth sucks in the water, and the sun’s burning ray absorbs it; the former from need, the latter by its power. Hence after the Resurrection He ate, not as needing food, but in or-

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cavit ergo post resurrectionem, non quasi cibo indigens, der thus to show the nature of His risen body. Nor does it sed ut eo modo naturam corporis resurgentis adstrueret. follow that His was an animal body that stands in need of Et propter hoc, non sequitur quod fuerit eius corpus ani- food. male, quod est indigens cibo.

Article 3 Whether Christ’s body rose again entire? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpus Christi non resurrexerit integrum. Sunt enim de integritate humani corporis caro et sanguis. Quae Christus non videtur habuisse, dicitur enim I Cor. XV, caro et sanguis regnum Dei non possidebunt. Christus autem resurrexit in gloria regni Dei. Ergo videtur quod non habuerit carnem et sanguinem. Praeterea, sanguis est unus de quatuor humoribus. Si ergo Christus habuit sanguinem, pari ratione habuit alios humores, ex quibus causatur corruptio in corporibus animalium. Sic ergo sequeretur quod corpus Christi fuerit corruptibile. Quod est inconveniens. Non igitur habuit carnem et sanguinem. Praeterea, corpus Christi quod resurrexit, in caelum ascendit. Sed aliquid de sanguine eius in quibusdam Ecclesiis reservatur pro reliquiis. Non ergo resurrexit Christi corpus cum integritate omnium suarum partium. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Luc. ult., post resurrectionem discipulis loquens, spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, corpus Christi in resurrectione fuit eiusdem naturae, sed alterius gloriae. Unde quidquid ad naturam corporis humani pertinet, totum fuit in corpore Christi resurgentis. Manifestum est autem quod ad naturam corporis humani pertinent carnes et ossa et sanguis, et alia huiusmodi. Et ideo omnia ista in corpore Christi resurgentis fuerunt. Et etiam integraliter, absque omni diminutione, alioquin non fuisset perfecta resurrectio, si non fuisset redintegratum quidquid per mortem ceciderat. Unde et dominus fidelibus suis promittit dicens, Matth. X, vestri autem et capilli capitis omnes numerati sunt. Et Luc. XXI dicitur, capillus de capite vestro non peribit. Dicere autem quod corpus Christi carnem et ossa non habuerit, et alias huiusmodi partes humano corpori naturales, pertinet ad errorem Eutychii, Constantinopolitanae urbis episcopi, qui dicebat quod corpus nostrum in illa resurrectionis gloria erit impalpabile, et ventis aereque subtilius; et quod dominus, post confirmata corda discipulorum palpantium, omne illud quod in eo palpari potuit, in subtilitatem aliquam redegit. Quod ibidem improbat Gregorius, quia corpus Christi post resurrec-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s body did not rise entire. For flesh and blood belong to the integrity of the body: whereas Christ seems not to have had both, for it is written (1 Cor 15:50): Flesh and blood can not possess the kingdom of God. But Christ rose in the glory of the kingdom of God. Therefore it seems that He did not have flesh and blood. Obj. 2: Further, blood is one of the four humors. Consequently, if Christ had blood, with equal reason He also had the other humors, from which corruption is caused in animal bodies. It would follow, then, that Christ’s body was corruptible, which is unseemly. Therefore Christ did not have flesh and blood. Obj. 3: Further, the body of Christ which rose, ascended to heaven. But some of His blood is kept as relics in various churches. Therefore Christ’s body did not rise with the integrity of all its parts. On the contrary, our Lord said (Luke 24:39) while addressing His disciples after the Resurrection: A spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see Me to have. I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), Christ’s body in the Resurrection was of the same nature, but differed in glory. Accordingly, whatever goes with the nature of a human body, was entirely in the body of Christ when He rose again. Now it is clear that flesh, bones, blood, and other such things, are of the very nature of the human body. Consequently, all these things were in Christ’s body when He rose again; and this also integrally, without any diminution; otherwise it would not have been a complete resurrection, if whatever was lost by death had not been restored. Hence our Lord assured His faithful ones by saying (Matt 10:30): The very hairs of your head are all numbered: and (Luke 21:18): A hair of your head shall not perish. But to say that Christ’s body had neither flesh, nor bones, nor the other natural parts of a human body, belongs to the error of Eutyches, Bishop of Constantinople, who maintained that our body in that glory of the resurrection will be impalpable, and more subtle than wind and air: and that our Lord, after the hearts of the disciples who handled Him were confirmed, brought back to subtlety whatever could be handled in Him. Now Gregory condemns this in the same book, because Christ’s body was not changed af-

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tionem immutatum non fuit, secundum illud Rom. VI, Christus resurgens ex mortuis iam non moritur. Unde et ille quae dixerat, in morte retractavit. Si enim inconveniens est ut Christus alterius naturae corpus in sua conceptione acciperet, puta caeleste, sicut Valentinus asseruit; multo magis inconveniens est quod in resurrectione alterius naturae corpus reassumpserit, quia corpus in resurrectione resumpsit ad vitam immortalem, quod in conceptione acceperat ad vitam mortalem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caro et sanguis ibi non accipitur pro natura carnis et sanguinis, sed vel pro culpa carnis et sanguinis, sicut Gregorius dicit, in XIV Moral.; vel pro corruptione carnis et sanguinis, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, ad Consentium, de resurrectione carnis, non ibi erit corruptio et mortalitas carnis et sanguinis. Caro ergo secundum substantiam possidet regnum Dei, secundum quod dictum est, spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere. Caro autem cum secundum corruptionem intelligitur, non possidebit. Unde continuo additum est in verbis apostoli, neque corruptio incorruptelam. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in eodem libro, fortassis, accepta occasione sanguinis, urgebit nos molestior persecutor, et dicet, si sanguis in corpore Christi resurgentis fuit, cur non et pituita, idest phlegma; cur non et fel flavum, idest cholera, et fel nigrum, idest melancholia; quibus quatuor humoribus naturam carnis temperari etiam medicinae disciplina testatur? Sed, quodlibet quisque addat, corruptionem addere caveat, ne suae fidei sanitatem castitatemque corrumpat. Valet enim divina potentia de ista visibili atque tractabili natura corporum, quibusdam manentibus, auferre quas voluerit qualitates, ut absit labes, scilicet corruptionis, adsit effigies; adsit motio, absit fatigatio; adsit vescendi potestas, absit esuriendi necessitas. Ad tertium dicendum quod totus sanguis qui de corpore Christi fluxit, cum ad veritatem humanae naturae pertineat, in Christi corpore resurrexit. Et eadem ratio est de omnibus particulis ad veritatem et integritatem humanae naturae pertinentibus. Sanguis autem ille qui in quibusdam Ecclesiis pro reliquiis observatur, non fluxit de latere Christi, sed miraculose dicitur effluxisse de quadam imagine Christi percussa.

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ter the Resurrection, according to Rom. 6:9: Christ rising from the dead, dieth now no more. Accordingly, the very man who had said these things, himself retracted them at his death. For, if it be unbecoming for Christ to take a body of another nature in His conception, a heavenly one for instance, as Valentine asserted, it is much more unbecoming for Him at His Resurrection to resume a body of another nature, because in His Resurrection He resumed unto an everlasting life, the body which in His conception He had assumed to a mortal life. Reply Obj. 1: Flesh and blood are not to be taken there for the nature of flesh and blood, but, either for the guilt of flesh and blood, as Gregory says, or else for the corruption of flesh and blood: because, as Augustine says (Ad Consent., De Resur. Carn.), there will be neither corruption there, nor mortality of flesh and blood. Therefore flesh according to its substance possesses the kingdom of God, according to Luke 24:39: A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have. But flesh, if understood as to its corruption, will not possess it; hence it is straightway added in the words of the Apostle: Neither shall corruption possess incorruption. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says in the same book: Perchance by reason of the blood some keener critic will press us and say; If the blood was in the body of Christ when He rose, why not the rheum? that is, the phlegm; why not also the yellow gall? that is, the gall proper; and why not the black gall? that is, the bile, with which four humors the body is tempered, as medical science bears witness. But whatever anyone may add, let him take heed not to add corruption, lest he corrupt the health and purity of his own faith; because Divine power is equal to taking away such qualities as it wills from the visible and tractable body, while allowing others to remain, so that there be no defilement, i.e., of corruption, though the features be there; motion without weariness, the power to eat, without need of food. Reply Obj. 3: All the blood which flowed from Christ’s body, belonging as it does to the integrity of human nature, rose again with His body: and the same reason holds good for all the particles which belong to the truth and integrity of human nature. But the blood preserved as relics in some churches did not flow from Christ’s side, but is said to have flowed from some maltreated image of Christ.

Article 4 Whether Christ’s body ought to have risen with its scars? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corObjection 1: It would seem that Christ’s body pus Christi cum cicatricibus resurgere non debuerit. Di- ought not to have risen with its scars. For it is written citur enim I Cor. XV, quod mortui resurgent incorrupti. (1 Cor 15:52): The dead shall rise incorrupt. But scars and

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Sed cicatrices et vulnera ad quandam corruptionem pertinent et defectum. Non ergo fuit conveniens ut Christus, qui resurrectionis auctor est, cum cicatricibus resurgeret. Praeterea, corpus Christi integrum resurrexit, sicut dictum est. Sed aperturae vulnerum contrariantur integritati corporis, quia per eas discontinuatur corpus. Non ergo videtur fuisse conveniens quod in Christi corpore aperturae vulnerum remanerent, etsi remanerent ibi quaedam vulnerum insignia, quae sufficiebant ad aspectum, ad quem Thomas credidit, cui dictum est, quia vidisti me, Thoma, credidisti. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in IV libro, quod post resurrectionem de Christo dicuntur quaedam vere quidem, non autem secundum naturam, sed secundum dispensationem, ad certificandum quod ipsum quod passum est corpus resurrexit, ut cicatrices. Cessante autem causa, cessat effectus. Ergo videtur quod, certificatis discipulis de sua resurrectione, cicatrices ulterius non habuit. Sed non conveniebat immutabilitati gloriae quod aliquid assumeret quod in eo perpetuo non remaneret. Videtur ergo quod non debuerit corpus cum cicatricibus in resurrectione resumere. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit Thomae, Ioan. XX, infer digitum tuum huc, et vide manus meas, et affer manum tuam et mitte in latus meum. Respondeo dicendum quod conveniens fuit animam Christi in resurrectione corpus cum cicatricibus resumere. Primo quidem, propter gloriam ipsius Christi. Dicit enim Beda, super Luc., quod non ex impotentia curandi cicatrices servavit, sed ut in perpetuum victoriae suae circumferat triumphum. Unde et Augustinus dicit, in XXII de Civ. Dei, quod fortassis in illo regno in corporibus martyrum videbimus vulnerum cicatrices quae pro Christi nomine pertulerunt, non enim deformitas in eis, sed dignitas erit; et quaedam, quamvis in corpore, non corporis, sed virtutis pulchritudo fulgebit. Secundo, ad confirmandum corda discipulorum circa fidem suae resurrectionis. Tertio, ut patri, pro nobis supplicans, quale genus mortis pro homine pertulerit, semper ostendat. Quarto, ut sua morte redemptis quam misericorditer sint adiuti, propositis eiusdem mortis indiciis, insinuet. Postremo, ut in iudicio quam iuste damnentur, ibidem annuntiet. Unde, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de symbolo, sciebat Christus quare cicatrices in suo corpore servaret. Sicut enim demonstravit Thomae non credenti nisi tangeret et videret, ita etiam inimicis vulnera demonstraturus est sua, ut convincens eos veritas dicat, ecce hominem quem crucifixistis. Videtis vulnera quae infixistis. Agno-

Q. 54, A. 4

wounds imply corruption and defect. Therefore it was not fitting for Christ, the author of the resurrection, to rise again with scars. Obj. 2: Further, Christ’s body rose entire, as stated above (A. 3). But open scars are opposed to bodily integrity, since they interfere with the continuity of the tissue. It does not therefore seem fitting for the open wounds to remain in Christ’s body; although the traces of the wounds might remain, which would satisfy the beholder; thus it was that Thomas believed, to whom it was said: Because thou hast seen Me, Thomas, thou hast believed (John 20:29). Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv) that some things are truly said of Christ after the Resurrection, which He did not have from nature but from special dispensation, such as the scars, in order to make it sure that it was the body which had suffered that rose again. Now when the cause ceases, the effect ceases. Therefore it seems that when the disciples were assured of the Resurrection, He bore the scars no longer. But it ill became the unchangeableness of His glory that He should assume anything which was not to remain in Him for ever. Consequently, it seems that He ought not at His Resurrection to have resumed a body with scars. On the contrary, Our Lord said to Thomas (John 20:27): Put in thy finger hither, and see My hands; and bring hither thy hand, and put it into My side, and be not faithless but believing. I answer that, It was fitting for Christ’s soul at His Resurrection to resume the body with its scars. In the first place, for Christ’s own glory. For Bede says on Luke 24:40 that He kept His scars not from inability to heal them, but to wear them as an everlasting trophy of His victory. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii): Perhaps in that kingdom we shall see on the bodies of the Martyrs the traces of the wounds which they bore for Christ’s name: because it will not be a deformity, but a dignity in them; and a certain kind of beauty will shine in them, in the body, though not of the body. Second, to confirm the hearts of the disciples as to the faith in His Resurrection (Bede, on Luke 24:40). Third, that when He pleads for us with the Father, He may always show the manner of death He endured for us (Bede, on Luke 24:40). Fourth, that He may convince those redeemed in His blood, how mercifully they have been helped, as He exposes before them the traces of the same death (Bede, on Luke 24:40). Lastly, that in the Judgment-day He may upbraid them with their just condemnation (Bede, on Luke 24:40). Hence, as Augustine says (De Symb. ii): Christ knew why He kept the scars in His body. For, as He showed them to Thomas who would not believe except he handled and saw them, so will He show His wounds to His enemies, so that He who is the

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scitis latus quod pupugistis. Quoniam per vos, et propter Truth may convict them, saying: ‘Behold the man whom you vos apertum est, nec tamen intrare voluistis. crucified; see the wounds you inflicted; recognize the side you pierced, since it was opened by you and for you, yet you would not enter.’ Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cicatrices illae Reply Obj. 1: The scars that remained in Christ’s body quae in corpore Christi permanserunt, non pertinent ad belong neither to corruption nor defect, but to the greater corruptionem vel defectum, sed ad maiorem cumulum increase of glory, inasmuch as they are the trophies of His gloriae, inquantum sunt quaedam virtutis insignia. Et in power; and a special comeliness will appear in the places illis locis vulnerum quidam specialis decor apparebit. scarred by the wounds. Ad secundum dicendum quod illa apertura vulneReply Obj. 2: Although those openings of the wounds rum, quamvis sit cum quadam solutione continuitatis, break the continuity of the tissue, still the greater beauty of totum tamen hoc recompensatur per maiorem decorem glory compensates for all this, so that the body is not less gloriae, ut corpus non sit minus integrum, sed magis entire, but more perfected. Thomas, however, not only saw, perfectum. Thomas autem non solum vidit, sed etiam but handled the wounds, because as Pope Leo says: It sufvulnera tetigit, quia, ut dicit Leo Papa, suffecit sibi ad fi- ficed for his personal faith for him to have seen what he saw; dem propriam vidisse quod viderat; sed nobis operatus est but it was on our behalf that he touched what he beheld. ut tangeret quem videbat. Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus in suo corReply Obj. 3: Christ willed the scars of His wounds to pore voluit cicatrices vulnerum remanere, non solum remain on His body, not only to confirm the faith of His disad certificandum discipulorum fidem, sed etiam prop- ciples, but for other reasons also. From these it seems that ter alias rationes. Ex quibus apparet quod semper in eius those scars will always remain on His body; because, as Aucorpore cicatrices illae remanebunt. Quia, ut Augusti- gustine says (Ad Consent., De Resurr. Carn.): I believe our nus dicit, ad Consentium de resurrectione carnis, domini Lord’s body to be in heaven, such as it was when He ascended corpus in caelo esse credo ut erat quando ascendit in cae- into heaven. And Gregory (Moral. xiv) says that if aught lum. Et Gregorius, XIV Moral., dicit quod, si quid in cor- could be changed in Christ’s body after His Resurrection, conpore Christi post resurrectionem potuit immutari, contra trary to Paul’s truthful teaching, then the Lord after His Resveridicam Pauli sententiam, post resurrectionem dominus urrection returned to death; and what fool would dare to say rediit in mortem. Quod quis dicere vel stultus praesumat, this, save he that denies the true resurrection of the flesh? Acnisi qui veram carnis resurrectionem denegat? Unde pa- cordingly, it is evident that the scars which Christ showed tet quod cicatrices quas Christus post resurrectionem in on His body after His Resurrection, have never since been suo corpore ostendit, nunquam postmodum ab illo cor- removed from His body. pore sunt remotae.

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Question 55 The Manifestation of the Resurrection Deinde considerandum est de manifestatione resurWe have now to consider the manifestation of the Resrectionis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. urrection: concerning which there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum resurrectio Christi omnibus (1) Whether Christ’s Resurrection ought to have been hominibus manifestari debuerit, an solum manifested to all men or only to some special quibusdam specialibus hominibus. individuals? Secundo, utrum fuisset conveniens quod, eis (2) Whether it was fitting that they should see Him videntibus, resurgeret. rise? Tertio, utrum post resurrectionem debuerit cum (3) Whether He ought to have lived with the disciples suis discipulis conversari. after the Resurrection? Quarto, utrum fuerit conveniens quod suis (4) Whether it was fitting for Him to appear to the discipulis in aliena effigie appareret. disciples in another shape? Quinto, utrum resurrectionem suam argumentis (5) Whether He ought to have demonstrated the manifestare debuerit. Resurrection by proofs? Sexto, de sufficientia illorum argumentorum. (6) Of the cogency of those proofs.

Article 1 Whether Christ’s Resurrection ought to have been manifested to all? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod resurrectio Christi debuerit omnibus manifestari. Sicut enim publico peccato debetur poena publica, secundum illud I Tim. V, peccantem coram omnibus argue; ita merito publico debetur praemium publicum. Sed claritas resurrectionis est praemium humilitatis passionis, ut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan. Cum ergo passio Christi fuerit omnibus manifestata, eo publice patiente, videtur quod gloria resurrectionis ipsius omnibus manifestari debuerit. Praeterea, sicut passio Christi ordinatur ad nostram salutem, ita et eius resurrectio, secundum illud Rom. IV, resurrexit propter iustificationem nostram. Sed illud quod ad communem utilitatem pertinet, omnibus debet manifestari. Ergo resurrectio Christi omnibus debuit manifestari, et non specialiter quibusdam. Praeterea, illi quibus manifestata est resurrectio, fuerunt resurrectionis testes, unde dicitur Act. III, quem Deus suscitavit a mortuis, cuius nos testes sumus. Hoc autem testimonium ferebant publice praedicando. Quod quidem non convenit mulieribus, secundum illud I Cor. XIV, mulieres in Ecclesiis taceant; et I Tim. II, docere mulieri non permitto. Ergo videtur quod inconvenienter resurrectio Christi manifestata fuerit primo mulieribus quam hominibus communiter. Sed contra est quod dicitur Act. X, quem Deus suscitavit tertia die, et dedit eum manifestum fieri, non omni populo, sed testibus praeordinatis a Deo.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s Resurrection ought to have been manifested to all. For just as a public penalty is due for public sin, according to 1 Tim. 5:20: Them that sin reprove before all, so is a public reward due for public merit. But, as Augustine says (Tract. civ in Joan.), the glory of the Resurrection is the reward of the humility of the Passion. Therefore, since Christ’s Passion was manifested to all while He suffered in public, it seems that the glory of the Resurrection ought to have been manifested to all. Obj. 2: Further, as Christ’s Passion is ordained for our salvation, so also is His Resurrection, according to Rom. 4:25: He rose again for our justification. But what belongs to the public weal ought to be manifested to all. Therefore Christ’s Resurrection ought to have been manifested to all, and not to some specially. Obj. 3: Further, they to whom it was manifested were witnesses of the Resurrection: hence it is said (Acts 3:15): Whom God hath raised from the dead, of which we are witnesses. Now they bore witness by preaching in public: and this is unbecoming in women, according to 1 Cor. 14:34: Let women keep silence in the churches: and 1 Tim. 2:12: I suffer not a woman to teach. Therefore, it does not seem becoming for Christ’s Resurrection to be manifested first of all to the women and afterwards to mankind in general. On the contrary, It is written (Acts 10:40): Him God raised up the third day, and gave Him to be made manifest, not to all the people, but to witnesses preordained by God.

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Incarnate Son of God

Respondeo dicendum quod eorum quae cognoscuntur, quaedam cognoscuntur communi lege naturae; quaedam autem cognoscuntur ex speciali munere gratiae, sicut ea quae divinitus revelantur. Quorum quidem, ut Dionysius dicit, in libro Caelest. Hier., haec est lex divinitus instituta, ut a Deo immediate superioribus revelentur, quibus mediantibus deferantur ad inferiores, sicut patet in ordinatione caelestium spirituum. Ea vero quae pertinent ad futuram gloriam, communem hominum cognitionem excedunt, secundum illud Isaiae LXIV, oculus non vidit, Deus, absque te, quae preparasti diligentibus te. Et ideo huiusmodi ab homine non cognoscuntur nisi divinitus revelata, sicut apostolus dicit, I Cor. II, nobis revelavit Deus per spiritum suum. Quia igitur Christus resurrexit gloriosa resurrectione, ideo eius resurrectio non omni populo manifestata est, sed quibusdam, quorum testimonio deferretur in aliorum notitiam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod passio Christi peracta est in corpore adhuc habente naturam passibilem, quae communi lege nota est omnibus. Et ideo passio Christi omni populo immediate manifestari potuit. Resurrectio autem Christi facta est per gloriam patris, ut apostolus dicit, Rom. VI. Et ideo immediate manifestata est, non omnibus, sed quibusdam. Quod autem publice peccantibus publica poena imponitur, intelligendum est de poena praesentis vitae. Et similiter publica merita publice praemiari oportet, ut alii provocentur. Sed poenae et praemia futurae vitae non publice omnibus manifestantur, sed specialiter illis qui ad hoc praeordinati sunt a Deo. Ad secundum dicendum quod resurrectio Christi, sicut est ad communem omnium salutem, ita in notitiam omnium pervenit, non quidem sic quod immediate omnibus manifestaretur; sed quibusdam, per quorum testimonium deferretur ad omnes. Ad tertium dicendum quod mulieri non permittitur publice docere in Ecclesia, permittitur autem ei privatim domestica aliquos admonitione instruere. Et ideo, sicut Ambrosius dicit, super Luc., ad eos femina mittitur qui domestici sunt, non autem mittitur ad hoc quod resurrectionis testimonium ferat ad populum. Ideo autem primo mulieribus apparuit, ut mulier, quae primo initium mortis ad hominem detulit, primo etiam initia resurgentis Christi in gloria nuntiaret. Unde Cyrillus dicit, femina, quae quondam fuit mortis ministra, venerandum resurrectionis mysterium prima percepit et nuntiat. Adeptum est igitur femineum genus et ignominiae absolutionem, et maledictionis repudium. Simul etiam per hoc ostenditur quod, quantum ad statum gloriae pertinet, nullum detrimentum patietur sexus femineus, sed, si maiori caritate fervebunt, maiori etiam gloria ex visione divina potientur, eo quod mulieres, quae dominum

IIIae

I answer that, Some things come to our knowledge by nature’s common law, others by special favor of grace, as things divinely revealed. Now, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv), the divinely established law of such things is that they be revealed immediately by God to higher persons, through whom they are imparted to others, as is evident in the ordering of the heavenly spirits. But such things as concern future glory are beyond the common ken of mankind, according to Isa. 64:4: The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee. Consequently, such things are not known by man except through Divine revelation, as the Apostle says (1 Cor 2:10): God hath revealed them to us by His spirit. Since, then, Christ rose by a glorious Resurrection, consequently His Resurrection was not manifested to everyone, but to some, by whose testimony it could be brought to the knowledge of others. Reply Obj. 1: Christ’s Passion was consummated in a body that still had a passible nature, which is known to all by general laws: consequently His Passion could be directly manifested to all. But the Resurrection was accomplished through the glory of the Father, as the Apostle says (Rom 6:4). Therefore it was manifested directly to some, but not to all. But that a public penance is imposed upon public sinners, is to be understood of the punishment of this present life. And in like manner public merits should be rewarded in public, in order that others may be stirred to emulation. But the punishments and rewards of the future life are not publicly manifested to all, but to those specially who are preordained thereto by God. Reply Obj. 2: Just as Christ’s Resurrection is for the common salvation of all, so it came to the knowledge of all; yet not so that it was directly manifested to all, but only to some, through whose testimony it could be brought to the knowledge of all. Reply Obj. 3: A woman is not to be allowed to teach publicly in church; but she may be permitted to give familiar instruction to some privately. And therefore as Ambrose says on Luke 24:22, a woman is sent to them who are of her household, but not to the people to bear witness to the Resurrection. But Christ appeared to the woman first, for this reason, that as a woman was the first to bring the source of death to man, so she might be the first to announce the dawn of Christ’s glorious Resurrection. Hence Cyril says on John 20:17: Woman who formerly was the minister of death, is the first to see and proclaim the adorable mystery of the Resurrection: thus womankind has procured absolution from ignominy, and removal of the curse. Hereby, moreover, it is shown, so far as the state of glory is concerned, that the female sex shall suffer no hurt; but if women burn with greater charity, they shall also attain greater glory from the Divine vision: because the women whose love for our Lord

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Q. 55, A. 2

arctius amaverunt, in tantum ut ab eius sepulcro, disci- was more persistent—so much so that when even the discipulis etiam recedentibus, non recederent, primo viderunt ples withdrew from the sepulchre they did not depart—were dominum in gloriam resurgentem. the first to see Him rising in glory.

Article 2 Whether it was fitting that the disciples should see him rise again? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur conveniens fuisse quod discipuli viderent Christum resurgere. Ad discipulos enim pertinebat resurrectionem Christi testificari, secundum illud Act. IV, virtute magna reddebant apostoli testimonium resurrectionis Iesu Christi, domini nostri. Sed certissimum est testimonium de visu. Ergo conveniens fuisset ut ipsam resurrectionem Christi viderent. Praeterea, ad certitudinem fidei habendam, discipuli ascensionem Christi viderunt, secundum illud Act. I, videntibus illis, elevatus est. Sed similiter oporteret de resurrectione Christi certam fidem habere. Ergo videtur quod, discipulis videntibus, debuerit Christus resurgere. Praeterea, resurrectio Lazari quoddam indicium fuit futurae resurrectionis Christi. Sed, discipulis videntibus, dominus Lazarum suscitavit. Ergo videtur quod etiam Christus resurgere debuerit, discipulis videntibus. Sed contra est quod dicitur Marci ult., resurgens dominus mane prima sabbati, apparuit primo Mariae Magdalenae. Sed Maria Magdalena non vidit eum resurgere, sed, cum eum quaereret in sepulcro, audivit ab Angelo, surrexit dominus, non est hic. Ergo nullus vidit eum resurgere. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, Rom. XIII, quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt. Est autem hic ordo divinitus institutus, ut ea quae supra homines sunt, hominibus per Angelos revelentur, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. Cael. Hier. Christus autem resurgens non rediit ad vitam communiter omnibus notam, sed ad vitam quandam immortalem et Deo conformem, secundum illud Rom. VI, quod enim vivit, vivit Deo. Et ideo ipsa Christi resurrectio non debuit immediate ab hominibus videri, sed eis ab Angelis nuntiari. Unde Hilarius dicit, super Matth., quod ideo Angelus prior resurrectionis est index, ut quodam famulatu paternae voluntatis resurrectio nuntiaretur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostoli potuerunt testificari Christi resurrectionem etiam de visu, quia Christum post resurrectionem viventem oculata fide viderunt, quem mortuum sciverant. Sed sicut ad visionem beatam pervenitur per auditum fidei, ita ad visionem Christi resurgentis pervenerunt homines per ea quae prius ab Angelis audierunt.

Objection 1: It would seem fitting that the disciples should have seen Him rise again, because it was their office to bear witness to the Resurrection, according to Acts 4:33: With great power did the apostles give testimony to the Resurrection of Jesus Christ our Lord. But the surest witness of all is an eye-witness. Therefore it would have been fitting for them to see the very Resurrection of Christ. Obj. 2: Further, in order to have the certainty of faith the disciples saw Christ ascend into heaven, according to Acts 1:9: While they looked on, He was raised up. But it was also necessary for them to have faith in the Resurrection. Therefore it seems that Christ ought to have risen in sight of the disciples. Obj. 3: Further, the raising of Lazarus was a sign of Christ’s coming Resurrection. But the Lord raised up Lazarus in sight of the disciples. Consequently, it seems that Christ ought to have risen in sight of the disciples. On the contrary, It is written (Mark 16:9): The Lord rising early the first day of the week, appeared first to Mary Magdalen. Now Mary Magdalen did not see Him rise; but, while searching for Him in the sepulchre, she heard from the angel: He is risen, He is not here. Therefore no one saw Him rise again. I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom 13:1): Those things that are of God, are well ordered. Now the divinely established order is this, that things above men’s ken are revealed to them by angels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). But Christ on rising did not return to the familiar manner of life, but to a kind of immortal and God-like condition, according to Rom. 6:10: For in that He liveth, He liveth unto God. And therefore it was fitting for Christ’s Resurrection not to be witnessed by men directly, but to be proclaimed to them by angels. Accordingly, Hilary (Comment. Matth. cap. ult.) says: An angel is therefore the first herald of the Resurrection, that it might be declared out of obedience to the Father’s will. Reply Obj. 1: The apostles were able to testify to the Resurrection even by sight, because from the testimony of their own eyes they saw Christ alive, whom they had known to be dead. But just as man comes from the hearing of faith to the beatific vision, so did men come to the sight of the risen Christ through the message already received from angels.

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Incarnate Son of God

Ad secundum dicendum quod ascensio Christi, quantum ad terminum a quo, non transcendebat hominum communem notitiam, sed solum quantum ad terminum ad quem. Et ideo discipuli potuerunt videre ascensionem Christi quantum ad terminum a quo, idest secundum quod elevabatur a terra. Non autem viderunt ipsam quantum ad terminum ad quem, quia non viderunt quomodo reciperetur in caelo. Sed resurrectio Christi transcendebat communem notitiam et quantum ad terminum a quo, secundum quod anima rediit ab Inferis et corpus de sepulcro clauso exivit; et quantum ad terminum ad quem, secundum quod est adeptus vitam gloriosam. Et ideo non debuit resurrectio fieri sic quod ab homine videretur. Ad tertium dicendum quod Lazarus resuscitatus est ut rediret ad vitam qualem prius habuerat, quae communem notitiam hominum non transcendit. Et ideo non est similis ratio.

IIIae

Reply Obj. 2: Christ’s Ascension as to its term wherefrom, was not above men’s common knowledge, but only as to its term whereunto. Consequently, the disciples were able to behold Christ’s Ascension as to the term wherefrom, that is, according as He was uplifted from the earth; but they did not behold Him as to the term whereunto, because they did not see how He was received into heaven. But Christ’s Resurrection transcended common knowledge as to the term wherefrom, according as His soul returned from hell and His body from the closed sepulchre; and likewise as to the term whereunto, according as He attained to the life of glory. Consequently, the Resurrection ought not to be accomplished so as to be seen by man. Reply Obj. 3: Lazarus was raised so that he returned to the same life as before, which life is not beyond man’s common ken. Consequently, there is no parity.

Article 3 Whether Christ ought to have lived constantly with his disciples after the Resurrection? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus post resurrectionem debuerit continue cum discipulis conversari. Ad hoc enim Christus discipulis post resurrectionem apparuit, ut eos de fide resurrectionis certificaret, et consolationem perturbatis afferret, secundum illud Ioan. XX, gavisi sunt discipuli, viso domino. Sed magis fuissent certificati et consolati si eis continue suam praesentiam exhibuisset. Ergo videtur quod continue cum eis debuerit conversari. Praeterea, Christus resurgens a mortuis non statim ascendit in caelum, sed post dies quadraginta, ut habetur Act. I. Illo autem tempore intermedio in nullo alio loco potuit convenientius esse quam ubi discipuli eius erant pariter congregati. Ergo videtur quod continue cum eis conversari debuerit. Praeterea, ipso die resurrectionis dominicae quinquies Christus apparuisse legitur, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de consensu Evang., primo quidem, mulieribus ad monumentum; secundo, eisdem regredientibus a monumento in itinere; tertio, Petro; quarto, duobus euntibus in castellum; quinto, pluribus in Ierusalem, ubi non erat Thomas. Ergo etiam videtur quod et aliis diebus ante suam ascensionem ad minus pluries debuit apparere. Praeterea, dominus ante passionem eis dixerat, Matth. XXVI, postquam resurrexero, praecedam vos in Galilaeam. Quod etiam Angelus, et ipsemet dominus, post resurrectionem mulieribus dixit. Et tamen antea in Ierusalem ab eis visus est, et ipsa die resurrectionis, ut dictum est, et etiam die octava, ut legitur Ioan. XX. Non

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ ought to have lived constantly with His Disciples, because He appeared to them after His Resurrection in order to confirm their faith in the Resurrection, and to bring them comfort in their disturbed state, according to John 20:20: The disciples were glad when they saw the Lord. But they would have been more assured and consoled had He constantly shown them His presence. Therefore it seems that He ought to have lived constantly with them. Obj. 2: Further, Christ rising from the dead did not at once ascend to heaven, but after forty days, as is narrated in Acts 1:3. But meanwhile He could have been in no more suitable place than where the disciples were met together. Therefore it seems that He ought to have lived with them continually. Obj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. iii), we read how Christ appeared five times on the very day of His Resurrection: first to the women at the sepulchre; second to the same on the way from the sepulchre; third to Peter; fourth to the two disciples going to the town; fifth to several of them in Jerusalem when Thomas was not present. Therefore it also seems that He ought to have appeared several times on the other days before the Ascension. Obj. 4: Further, our Lord had said to them before the Passion (Matt 26:32): But after I shall be risen again, I will go before you into Galilee; moreover an angel and our Lord Himself repeated the same to the women after the Resurrection: nevertheless He was seen by them in Jerusalem on the very day of the Resurrection, as stated above (Obj. 3);

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ergo videtur quod convenienti modo post resurrectio- also on the eighth day, as we read in John 20:26. It seems, nem cum discipulis fuerit conversatus. therefore, that He did not live with the disciples in a fitting way after the Resurrection. Sed contra est quod Ioan. XX dicitur, quod post On the contrary, It is written (John 20:26) that afdies octo Christus discipulis apparuit. Non ergo contin- ter eight days Christ appeared to the disciples. Therefore He ue conversabatur cum eis. did not live constantly with them. Respondeo dicendum quod circa resurrectionem I answer that, Concerning the Resurrection two Christi duo erant discipulis declaranda, scilicet ipsa veri- things had to be manifested to the disciples, namely, the tas resurrectionis; et gloria resurgentis. Ad veritatem au- truth of the Resurrection, and the glory of Him who rose. tem resurrectionis manifestandam, sufficit quod pluries Now in order to manifest the truth of the Resurrection, it apparuit, et cum eis familiariter est locutus, et comedit sufficed for Him to appear several times before them, to et bibit, et se eis palpandum praebuit. Ad gloriam au- speak familiarly to them, to eat and drink, and let them tem resurrectionis manifestandam, noluit continue con- touch Him. But in order to manifest the glory of the risen versari cum eis, sicut prius fecerat, ne videretur ad talem Christ, He was not desirous of living with them constantly vitam resurrexisse qualem prius habuerat. Unde Luc. ult. as He had done before, lest it might seem that He rose unto dicit eis, haec sunt verba quae locutus sum ad vos cum ad- the same life as before. Hence (Luke 24:44) He said to them: huc essem vobiscum. Tunc quidem erat cum eis praesen- These are the words which I spoke to you, while I was yet with tia corporali, sed ante cum eis fuerat, non solum corpo- you. For He was there with them by His bodily presence, rali praesentia, sed etiam per similitudinem mortalitatis. but hitherto He had been with them not merely by His bodUnde Beda, supradicta verba exponens, dicit, cum adhuc ily presence, but also in mortal semblance. Hence Bede in essem vobiscum, idest, cum adhuc essem in carne mortali, explaining those words of Luke, while I was with you, says: in qua estis et vos. Tunc quidem in eadem carne resuscita- that is, while I was still in mortal flesh, in which you are yet: tus erat, sed cum illis in eadem mortalitate non erat. for He had then risen in the same flesh, but was not in the same state of mortality as they. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod frequens ChriReply Obj. 1: Christ’s frequent appearing served to assti apparitio sufficiebat ad certificandum discipulos de sure the disciples of the truth of the Resurrection; but converitate resurrectionis, conversatio autem continua eos tinual intercourse might have led them into the error of bepotuisset ducere in errorem, si ad similem vitam eum lieving that He had risen to the same life as was His before. resurrexisse crederent quam prius habuerat. Consolatio- Yet by His constant presence He promised them comfort in nem autem de continua sui praesentia eis in alia vita another life, according to John 16:22: I will see you again, repromisit, secundum illud Ioan. XVI, iterum videbo vos, and your heart shall rejoice; and your joy no man shall take et gaudebit cor vestrum, et gaudium vestrum nemo tollet a from you. vobis. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus non ideo Reply Obj. 2: That Christ did not stay continually with non continue conversabatur cum discipulis quia reputa- the disciples was not because He deemed it more experet se alibi convenientius esse, sed quia hoc discipulis in- dient for Him to be elsewhere: but because He judged it struendis convenientius iudicabat, si non continue con- to be more suitable for the apostles’ instruction that He versaretur cum eis, ratione praedicta. Incognitum autem should not abide continually with them, for the reason est quibus in locis intermedio tempore corporaliter esset, given above. But it is quite unknown in what places He was cum hoc Scriptura non tradat, et in omni loco sit domina- bodily present in the meantime, since Scripture is silent, tio eius. and His dominion is in every place (Cf. Ps. 102:22). Ad tertium dicendum quod ideo prima die freReply Obj. 3: He appeared oftener on the first day, bequentius apparuit, quia per plura indicia erant admo- cause the disciples were to be admonished by many proofs nendi, ut a principio fidem resurrectionis reciperent. to accept the faith in His Resurrection from the very outPostquam autem iam eam receperant, non oportebat set: but after they had once accepted it, they had no fureos, iam certificatos, tam frequentibus apparitionibus ther need of being instructed by so many apparitions. Acinstrui. Unde in Evangelio non legitur quod post pri- cordingly one reads in the Gospel that after the first day mum diem eis apparuit nisi quinquies. Ut enim Augu- He appeared again only five times. For, as Augustine says stinus dicit, in libro de consensu Evang., post primas (De Consens. Evang. iii), after the first five apparitions He quinque apparitiones, sexto eis apparuit ubi vidit eum came again a sixth time when Thomas saw Him; a seventh Thomas; septimo, ad mare Tiberiadis, in captione piscium; time was by the sea of Tiberias at the capture of the fishes; the octavo, in monte Galilaeae, secundum Matthaeum; no- eighth was on the mountain of Galilee, according to Matthew; no, quod dicit Marcus, novissime recumbentibus, quia iam the ninth occasion is expressed by Mark, ‘at length when they non erant in terra cum eo convivaturi; decimo, in ipso die, were at table,’ because no more were they going to eat with

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Q. 55, A. 3

Incarnate Son of God

non iam in terra, sed elevatum in nube, cum in caelum ascenderet. Sed non omnia scripta sunt, sicut Ioannes fatetur. Crebra enim erat eius cum illis conversatio, priusquam ascendisset in caelum, et hoc ad consolationem ipsorum. Unde et I Cor. XV dicitur quod visus est plus quam quingentis fratribus simul, deinde visus est Iacobo, de quibus apparitionibus in Evangelio non habetur mentio. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, exponens illud quod dicitur Matth. XXVI, postquam resurrexero, praecedam vos in Galilaeam, non, inquit, in longinquam quandam regionem, ut eis appareat, vadit, sed in ipsa gente, et in ipsis fere regionibus in quibus cum eo plurimum fuerant conversati, ut et hinc crederent quoniam qui crucifixus est, ipse est et qui resurrexit. Propter hoc etiam in Galilaeam se ire dicit, ut a timore Iudaeorum liberarentur. Sic ergo, ut Ambrosius dicit, super Luc., dominus mandaverat discipulis ut in Galilaea eum viderent, sed illis ob metum intra conclave residentibus primum ipse se obtulit. Nec hoc est promissi transgressio, sed potius festinata ex benignitate impletio. Postea vero, confirmatis animis, illos Galilaeam petisse. Vel nihil obstat si dicamus pauciores intra conclave, quamplures in monte fuisse. Ut enim Eusebius dicit, duo Evangelistae, scilicet Lucas et Ioannes, solis undecim hunc scribunt apparuisse in Ierusalem, ceteri vero duo in Galilaeam properare non solum undecim, sed universis discipulis et fratribus dixerunt Angelum et salvatorem iussisse. De quibus Paulus meminit, dicens, deinde apparuit plus quam quingentis fratribus simul. Est autem verior solutio quod prius in Ierusalem latitantibus semel aut bis visus est, ad eorum consolationem. In Galilaea vero non clam, aut semel aut bis, sed cum multa potestate ostensionem sui fecit, praebens se eis viventem, post passionem in signis multis, ut Lucas testatur in actibus. Vel, sicut dicit Augustinus, in libro de consensu Evang., quod ab Angelo et domino dictum est, quod praecederet eos in Galilaeam, prophetice accipiendum est. In Galilaea enim, secundum transmigrationis significationem, intelligendum occurrit quia de populo Israel transmigraturi erant ad gentes, quibus apostoli praedicantes non crederentur, nisi ipse viam in cordibus hominum praepararet. Et hoc intelligitur, praecedet vos in Galilaeam. Secundum autem illud quod Galilaea interpretatur revelatio, non iam in forma servi intelligendum est, sed in illa in qua aequalis est patri, quam promisit dilectoribus suis, quo nos praecedens non deseruit.

IIIae

Him upon earth; the tenth was on the very day, when no longer upon the earth, but uplifted into the cloud, He was ascending into heaven. But, as John admits, not all things were written down. And He visited them frequently before He went up to heaven, in order to comfort them. Hence it is written (1 Cor 15:6, 7) that He was seen by more than five hundred brethren at once . . . after that He was seen by James; of which apparitions no mention is made in the Gospels. Reply Obj. 4: Chrysostom in explaining Matt. 26:32— after I shall be risen again, I will go before you into Galilee, says (Hom. lxxxiii in Matth.), He goes not to some far off region in order to appear to them, but among His own people, and in those very places in which for the most part they had lived with Him; in order that they might thereby believe that He who was crucified was the same as He who rose again. And on this account He said that He would go into Galilee, that they might be delivered from fear of the Jews. Consequently, as Ambrose says (Expos. in Luc.), The Lord had sent word to the disciples that they were to see Him in Galilee; yet He showed Himself first to them when they were assembled together in the room out of fear. (Nor is there any breaking of a promise here, but rather a hastened fulfilling out of kindness): afterwards, however, when their minds were comforted, they went into Galilee. Nor is there any reason to prevent us from supposing that there were few in the room, and many more on the mountain. For, as Eusebius says, Two Evangelists, Luke and John, write that He appeared in Jerusalem to the eleven only; but the other two said that an angel and our Savior commanded not merely the eleven, but all the disciples and brethren, to go into Galilee. Paul makes mention of them when he says (1 Cor 15:6): ‘Then He appeared to more then five hundred brethren at once.’ The truer solution, however, is this, that while they were in hiding in Jerusalem He appeared to them at first in order to comfort them; but in Galilee it was not secretly, nor once or twice, that He made Himself known to them with great power, showing Himself to them alive after His Passion, by many proofs, as Luke says (Acts 1:3). Or as Augustine writes (De Consens. Evang. iii): What was said by the angel and by our Lord—that He would ‘go before them into Galilee,’ must be taken prophetically. For if we take Galilee as meaning ‘a passing,’ we must understand that they were going to pass from the people of Israel to the Gentiles, who would not believe in the preaching of the apostles unless He prepared the way for them in men’s hearts: and this is signified by the words ‘He shall go before you into Galilee.’ But if by Galilee we understand ‘revelation,’ we are to understand this as applying to Him not in the form of a servant, but in that form wherein He is equal to the Father, and which He has promised to them that love Him. Although He has gone before us in this sense, He has not abandoned us.

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Manifestation of the Resurrection

Q. 55, A. 4

Article 4 Whether Christ should have appeared to the disciples in another shape? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non debuerit discipulis in alia effigie apparere. Non enim potest apparere secundum veritatem nisi quod est. Sed in Christo non fuit nisi una effigies. Si ergo Christus in alia apparuit, non fuit apparitio vera, sed ficta. Hoc autem est inconveniens, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., si fallit, veritas non est; est autem veritas Christus. Ergo videtur quod Christus non debuit discipulis in alia effigie apparere. Praeterea, nihil potest in alia effigie apparere quam habeat, nisi oculi intuentium aliquibus praestigiis detineantur. Huiusmodi autem praestigia, cum fiant magicis artibus, non conveniunt Christo, secundum illud II Cor. VI, quae conventio Christi ad Belial? Ergo videtur quod non debuit in alia effigie apparere. Praeterea, sicut per sacram Scripturam nostra fides certificatur, ita discipuli certificati sunt de fide resurrectionis per Christi apparitiones. Sed, sicut Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Hieronymum si vel unum mendacium in sacra Scriptura recipiatur, infirmabitur tota sacrae Scripturae auctoritas. Ergo, si vel in una apparitione Christus discipulis apparuit aliter quam esset, infirmabitur quidquid post resurrectionem viderunt in Christo. Quod est inconveniens. Non ergo debuit in alia effigie apparere. Sed contra est quod dicitur Marci ult., post haec, duobus ex eis ambulantibus ostensus est in alia effigie, euntibus in villam. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, resurrectio Christi manifestanda fuit hominibus per modum quo eis divina revelantur. Innotescunt autem divina hominibus secundum quod diversimode sunt affecti. Nam illi qui habent mentem bene dispositam, secundum veritatem divina percipiunt. Illi autem qui habent mentem non bene dispositam, divina percipiunt cum quadam confusione dubietatis vel erroris, animalis enim homo non percipit ea quae sunt spiritus Dei, ut dicitur I Cor. II. Et ideo Christus quibusdam, ad credendum dispositis, post resurrectionem apparuit in sua effigie. Illis autem in alia effigie apparuit qui iam videbantur circa fidem tepescere, unde dicebant, nos sperabamus quia ipse esset redempturus Israel. Unde Gregorius dicit, in homilia, quod talem se eis exhibuit in corpore qualis apud illos erat in mente. Quia enim adhuc in eorum cordibus peregrinus erat a fide, ire se longius finxit, scilicet ac si esset peregrinus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de quaestionibus Evang., non omne quod fingimus, mendacium est. Sed quando id fingimus quod

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ ought not to have appeared to the disciples in another shape. For a thing cannot appear in very truth other than it is. But there was only one shape in Christ. Therefore if He appeared under another, it was not a true but a false apparition. Now this is not at all fitting, because as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 14): If He deceives He is not the Truth; yet Christ is the Truth. Consequently, it seems that Christ ought not to have appeared to the disciples in another shape. Obj. 2: Further, nothing can appear in another shape than the one it has, except the beholder’s eyes be captivated by some illusions. But since such illusions are brought about by magical arts, they are unbecoming in Christ, according to what is written (2 Cor 6:15): What concord hath Christ with Belial? Therefore it seems that Christ ought not to have appeared in another shape. Obj. 3: Further, just as our faith receives its surety from Scripture, so were the disciples assured of their faith in the Resurrection by Christ appearing to them. But, as Augustine says in an Epistle to Jerome (xxviii), if but one untruth be admitted into the Sacred Scripture, the whole authority of the Scriptures is weakened. Consequently, if Christ appeared to the disciples, in but one apparition, otherwise than He was, then whatever they saw in Christ after the Resurrection will be of less import, which is not fitting. Therefore He ought not to have appeared in another shape. On the contrary, It is written (Mark 16:12): After that He appeared in another shape to two of them walking, as they were going into the country. I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 2), Christ’s Resurrection was to be manifested to men in the same way as Divine things are revealed. But Divine things are revealed to men in various ways, according as they are variously disposed. For, those who have minds well disposed, perceive Divine things rightly, whereas those not so disposed perceive them with a certain confusion of doubt or error: for, the sensual men perceiveth not those things that are of the Spirit of God, as is said in 1 Cor. 2:14. Consequently, after His Resurrection Christ appeared in His own shape to some who were well disposed to belief, while He appeared in another shape to them who seemed to be already growing tepid in their faith: hence these said (Luke 24:21): We hoped that it was He that should have redeemed Israel. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xxiii in Evang.), that He showed Himself to them in body such as He was in their minds: for, because He was as yet a stranger to faith in their hearts, He made pretense of going on farther, that is, as if He were a stranger. Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Qq. Evang. ii), not everything of which we make pretense is a falsehood; but when what we pretend has no meaning then is it a falsehood.

589

Q. 55, A. 5

Incarnate Son of God

nihil significat, tunc est mendacium. Cum autem fictio nostra refertur ad aliquam significationem, non est mendacium, sed aliqua figura veritatis. Alioquin omnia quae a sapientibus et sanctis viris, vel etiam ab ipso domino, figurate dicta sunt, mendacia reputabuntur, quia, secundum usitatum intellectum, non consistit veritas in talibus dictis. Sicut autem dicta, ita etiam finguntur facta sine mendacio, ad aliquam rem significandam. Et ita factum est hic, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de consensu Evang., dominus poterat transformare carnem suam, ut alia re vera esset effigies ab illa quam solebant intueri, quandoquidem et ante passionem suam transformatus est in monte, ut facies eius claresceret sicut sol. Sed non ita nunc factum est. Non enim incongruenter accipimus hoc impedimentum in oculis eorum a Satana fuisse, ne agnosceretur Iesus. Unde Luc. ult. dicitur quod oculi eorum tenebantur, ne eum agnoscerent. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa sequeretur si ab alienae effigiei aspectu non fuissent reducti ad vere videndum Christi effigiem. Sicut enim Augustinus ibidem dicit, tantum a Christo facta est permissio, ut scilicet praedicto modo oculi eorum tenerentur, usque ad sacramentum panis, ut, unitate corporis eius participata, removeri intelligatur impedimentum inimici, ut Christus possit agnosci. Unde ibidem subditur quod aperti sunt oculi eorum et cognoverunt eum, non quod ante clausis oculis ambularent; sed inerat aliquid quo non sinerentur agnoscere quod videbant, quod scilicet caligo et aliquis humor solet efficere.

IIIae

But when our pretense has some signification, it is not a lie, but a figure of the truth; otherwise everything said figuratively by wise and holy men, or even by our Lord Himself, would be set down as a falsehood, because it is not customary to take such expressions in the literal sense. And deeds, like words, are feigned without falsehood, in order to denote something else. And so it happened here, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. iii): Our Lord could change His flesh so that His shape really was other than they were accustomed to behold; for, before His Passion He was transfigured on the mountain, so that His face shone like the sun. But it did not happen thus now. For not without reason do we understand this hindrance in their eyes to have been of Satan’s doing, lest Jesus might be recognized. Hence Luke says (24:16) that their eyes were held, that they should not know Him. Reply Obj. 3: Such an argument would prove, if they had not been brought back from the sight of a strange shape to that of Christ’s true countenance. For, as Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. iii): The permission was granted by Christ, namely, that their eyes should be held fast in the aforesaid way, until the Sacrament of the bread; that when they had shared in the unity of His body, the enemy’s hindrance may be understood to have been taken away, so that Christ might be recognized. Hence he goes on to say that ‘their eyes were opened, and they knew Him’; not that they were hitherto walking with their eyes shut; but there was something in them whereby they were not permitted to recognize what they saw. This could be caused by the darkness or by some kind of humor.

Article 5 Whether Christ should have demonstrated the truth of his resurrection by proofs? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus veritatem resurrectionis non debuerit argumentis declarare. Dicit enim Ambrosius, tolle argumenta ubi fides quaeritur. Sed circa resurrectionem Christi quaeritur fides. Non ergo habent locum argumenta. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, fides non habet meritum cui humana ratio praebet experimentum. Sed ad Christum non pertinebat meritum fidei evacuare. Ergo ad eum non pertinebat resurrectionem per argumenta confirmare. Praeterea, Christus in mundum venit ut per eum homines beatitudinem adipiscantur, secundum illud Ioan. X, ego veni ut vitam habeant, et abundantius habeant. Sed per huiusmodi ostensiones argumentorum videtur humanae beatitudini impedimentum praestari,

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have demonstrated the truth of His Resurrection by proofs. For Ambrose says (De Fide, ad Gratian. i): Let there be no proofs where faith is required. But faith is required regarding the Resurrection. Therefore proofs are out of place there. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xxvi): Faith has no merit where human reason supplies the test. But it was no part of Christ’s office to void the merit of faith. Consequently, it was not for Him to confirm the Resurrection by proofs. Obj. 3: Further, Christ came into the world in order that men might attain beatitude through Him, according to John 10:10: I am come that they may have life, and may have it more abundantly. But supplying proofs seems to be a hindrance in the way of man’s beatitude; because our Lord

590

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Manifestation of the Resurrection

dicitur enim Ioan. XX, ex ore ipsius domini, beati qui non viderunt, et crediderunt. Ergo videtur quod Christus non debuerit per aliqua argumenta resurrectionem suam manifestare. Sed contra est quod dicitur Act. I, quod apparuit discipulis Christus per dies quadraginta in multis argumentis, loquens de regno Dei. Respondeo dicendum quod argumentum dupliciter dicitur. Quandoque dicitur argumentum quaecumque ratio rei dubiae faciens fidem. Quandoque autem dicitur argumentum aliquod sensibile signum quod inducitur ad alicuius veritatis manifestationem, sicut etiam Aristoteles aliquando in libris suis utitur nomine argumenti. Primo igitur modo accipiendo argumentum, Christus non probavit discipulis suam resurrectionem per argumenta. Quia talis probatio argumentativa procedit ex aliquibus principiis, quae si non essent nota discipulis, nihil per ea eis manifestaretur, quia ex ignotis non potest aliquod fieri notum; si autem essent eis nota, non transcenderent rationem humanam, et ideo non essent efficacia ad fidem resurrectionis adstruendam, quae rationem humanam excedit; oportet enim principia ex eodem genere assumi, ut dicitur in I posteriorum. Probavit autem eis resurrectionem suam per auctoritatem sacrae Scripturae, quae est fidei fundamentum, cum dixit, oportet impleri omnia quae scripta sunt in lege et Psalmis et prophetis de me, ut habetur Luc. ult.

Si autem accipiatur secundo modo argumentum, sic Christus dicitur suam resurrectionem argumentis declarasse, inquantum per quaedam evidentissima signa se vere resurrexisse ostendit. Unde et in Graeco, ubi nos habemus in multis argumentis, loco argumenti ponitur tekmerium, quod est signum evidens ad probandum. Quae quidem signa resurrectionis Christus ostendit discipulis propter duo. Primo quidem, quia non erant corda eorum disposita ad hoc quod de facili fidem resurrectionis acciperent. Unde ipse dicit eis, Luc. ult., o stulti, et tardi corde ad credendum. Et Marci ult., exprobravit incredulitatem eorum et duritiam cordis. Secundo, ut per huiusmodi signa eis ostensa efficacius eorum testimonium redderetur, secundum illud I Ioan. I, quod vidimus et audivimus, et manus nostrae contractaverunt, hoc testamur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Ambrosius ibi loquitur de argumentis secundum rationem humanam procedentibus, quae invalida sunt ad ea quae sunt fidei ostendenda, sicut ostensum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod meritum fidei est ex hoc quod homo ex mandato Dei credit quod non videt. Unde illa sola ratio meritum excludit quae facit videri per scientiam id quod credendum proponitur. Et talis est ratio demonstrativa. Huiusmodi autem rationes

Q. 55, A. 5

Himself said (John 20:29): Blessed are they that have not seen, and have believed. Consequently, it seems that Christ ought not to manifest His Resurrection by any proofs. On the contrary, It is related in Acts 1:3, that Christ appeared to His disciples for forty days by many proofs, speaking of the Kingdom of God. I answer that, The word proof is susceptible of a twofold meaning: sometimes it is employed to designate any sort of reason in confirmation of what is a matter of doubt: and sometimes it means a sensible sign employed to manifest the truth; thus also Aristotle occasionally uses the term in his works. Taking proof in the first sense, Christ did not demonstrate His Resurrection to the disciples by proofs, because such argumentative proof would have to be grounded on some principles: and if these were not known to the disciples, nothing would thereby be demonstrated to them, because nothing can be known from the unknown. And if such principles were known to them, they would not go beyond human reason, and consequently would not be efficacious for establishing faith in the Resurrection, which is beyond human reason, since principles must be assumed which are of the same order, according to 1 Poster. But it was from the authority of the Sacred Scriptures that He proved to them the truth of His Resurrection, which authority is the basis of faith, when He said: All things must needs be fulfilled which are written in the Law, and in the prophets, and in the Psalms, concerning Me: as is set forth Luke 24:44. But if the term proof be taken in the second sense, then Christ is said to have demonstrated His Resurrection by proofs, inasmuch as by most evident signs He showed that He was truly risen. Hence where our version has by many proofs, the Greek text, instead of proof has tekmerion, i.e., an evident sign affording positive proof. Now Christ showed these signs of the Resurrection to His disciples, for two reasons. First, because their hearts were not disposed so as to accept readily the faith in the Resurrection. Hence He says Himself (Luke 24:25): O foolish and slow of heart to believe: and (Mark 16:14): He upbraided them with their incredulity and hardness of heart. Second, that their testimony might be rendered more efficacious through the signs shown them, according to 1 John 1:1, 3: That which we have seen, and have heard, and our hands have handled . . . we declare. Reply Obj. 1: Ambrose is speaking there of proofs drawn from human reason, which are useless for demonstrating things of faith, as was shown above. Reply Obj. 2: The merit of faith arises from this, that at God’s bidding man believes what he does not see. Accordingly, only that reason debars merit of faith which enables one to see by knowledge what is proposed for belief: and this is demonstrative argument. But Christ did not make

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Q. 55, A. 6

Incarnate Son of God

Christus non induxit ad resurrectionem suam declarandam. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, meritum beatitudinis quod causat fides, non totaliter excluditur nisi homo nollet credere nisi ea quae videt, sed quod aliquis ea quae non videt, credat per aliqua signa visa, non totaliter fidem evacuat nec meritum eius. Sicut et Thomas, cui dictum est, quia vidisti me, credidisti, aliud vidit, et aliud credidit, vidit vulnera, et credidit Deum. Est autem perfectioris fidei qui non requirit huiusmodi auxilia ad credendum. Unde, ad arguendum defectum fidei in quibusdam, dominus dicit, Ioan. IV, nisi signa et prodigia videritis, non creditis. Et secundum hoc, potest intelligi quod illi qui sunt tam prompti animi ut credant Deo etiam signis non visis, sunt beati per comparationem ad illos qui non crederent nisi talia viderent.

IIIae

use of any such argument for demonstrating His Resurrection. Reply Obj. 3: As stated already (ad 2), the merit of beatitude, which comes of faith, is not entirely excluded except a man refuse to believe. But for a man to believe from visible signs the things he does not see, does not entirely deprive him of faith nor of the merit of faith: just as Thomas, to whom it was said (John 20:29): ‘Because thou hast seen Me, Thomas, thou hast believed,’ saw one thing and believed another: the wounds were what he saw, God was the object of His belief. But his is the more perfect faith who does not require such helps for belief. Hence, to put to shame the faith of some men, our Lord said (John 4:48): Unless you see signs and wonders, you believe not. From this one can learn how they who are so ready to believe God, even without beholding signs, are blessed in comparison with them who do not believe except they see the like.

Article 6 Whether the proofs which Christ made use of manifested sufficiently the truth of his Resurrection? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod argumenta quae Christus induxit, non sufficienter manifestaverunt veritatem resurrectionis eius. Nihil enim ostendit Christus discipulis post resurrectionem quod etiam Angeli, hominibus apparentes, vel non ostenderint, vel non ostendere potuerint. Nam Angeli frequenter in humana effigie se hominibus ostenderunt, et cum eis loquebantur et conversabantur et comedebant, ac si essent homines veri, sicut patet Gen. XVIII, de Angelis quos Abraham suscepit hospitio; et in libro Tobiae, de Angelo qui eum duxit et reduxit. Et tamen Angeli non habent vera corpora naturaliter sibi unita, quod requiritur ad resurrectionem. Non ergo signa quae Christus discipulis exhibuit, fuerunt sufficientia ad resurrectionem eius manifestandam. Praeterea, Christus resurrexit resurrectione gloriosa, idest, habens simul humanam naturam cum gloria. Sed quaedam Christus ostendit discipulis quae videntur esse contraria naturae humanae, sicut quod ab oculis eorum evanuit, et quod ad eos ianuis clausis intravit, quaedam autem videntur fuisse contraria gloriae, puta quod manducavit et bibit, quod etiam habuit vulnerum cicatrices. Ergo videtur quod illa argumenta non fuerunt sufficientia, neque convenientia, ad fidem resurrectionis ostendendam. Praeterea, corpus Christi non erat tale post resurrectionem ut tangi deberet ab homine mortali, unde ipse dixit Magdalenae, Ioan. XX, noli me tangere, nondum enim ascendi ad patrem meum. Non ergo fuit conveniens

Objection 1: It would seem that the proofs which Christ made use of did not sufficiently manifest the truth of His Resurrection. For after the Resurrection Christ showed nothing to His disciples which angels appearing to men did not or could not show; because angels have frequently shown themselves to men under human aspect, have spoken and lived with them, and eaten with them, just as if they were truly men, as is evident from Genesis 18, of the angels whom Abraham entertained, and in the Book of Tobias, of the angel who conducted him and brought him back. Nevertheless, angels have not true bodies naturally united to them; which is required for a resurrection. Consequently, the signs which Christ showed His disciples were not sufficient for manifesting His Resurrection. Obj. 2: Further, Christ rose again gloriously, that is, having a human nature with glory. But some of the things which Christ showed to His disciples seem contrary to human nature, as for instance, that He vanished out of their sight, and entered in among them when the doors were shut: and some other things seem contrary to glory, as for instance, that He ate and drank, and bore the scars of His wounds. Consequently, it seems that those proofs were neither sufficient nor fitting for establishing faith in the Resurrection. Obj. 3: Further, after the Resurrection Christ’s body was such that it ought not to be touched by mortal man; hence He said to Magdalen (John 20:17): Do not touch Me; for I am not yet ascended to My Father. Consequently, it was not fit-

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quod, ad manifestandam veritatem suae resurrectionis, seipsum discipulis palpabile exhibuerit. Praeterea, inter dotes glorificati corporis praecipua videtur esse claritas. Quam tamen in resurrectione nullo argumento ostendit. Ergo videtur quod insufficientia fuerint illa argumenta ad manifestandam qualitatem resurrectionis Christi. Sed contra est quod Christus, qui est Dei sapientia, suaviter et convenienter disponit omnia, ut dicitur Sap. VIII. Respondeo dicendum quod Christus resurrectionem suam dupliciter manifestavit, scilicet testimonio; et argumento seu signo. Et utraque manifestatio in suo genere fuit sufficiens. Est enim usus duplici testimonio ad manifestandam suam resurrectionem discipulis, quorum neutrum potest refelli. Quorum primum est testimonium Angelorum, qui mulieribus resurrectionem annuntiaverunt, ut patet per omnes Evangelistas. Aliud autem est testimonium Scripturarum, quas ipse proposuit ad ostensionem suae resurrectionis, ut dicitur Luc. ult. Argumenta etiam fuerunt sufficientia ad ostendendam veram resurrectionem, et etiam gloriosam. Quod autem fuerit vera resurrectio, ostendit uno modo ex parte corporis. Circa quod tria ostendit. Primo quidem, quod esset corpus verum et solidum, non corpus phantasticum, vel rarum, sicut est aer. Et hoc ostendit per hoc quod corpus suum palpabile praebuit. Unde ipse dicit, Luc. ult., palpate et videte, quia spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere. Secundo, ostendit quod esset corpus humanum, ostendendo eis veram effigiem, quam oculis intuerentur. Tertio, ostendit eis quod esset idem numero corpus quod prius habuerat, ostendendo eis vulnerum cicatrices. Unde legitur Luc. ult., dixit eis, videte manus meas et pedes meos, quia ego ipse sum. Alio modo ostendit eis veritatem suae resurrectionis ex parte animae iterato corpori unitae. Et hoc ostendit per opera triplicis vitae. Primo quidem, per opus vitae nutritivae, in hoc quod cum discipulis manducavit et bibit, ut legitur Luc. ult. Secundo, per opera vitae sensitivae, in hoc quod discipulis ad interrogata respondebat, et praesentes salutabat, in quo ostendebat se et videre et audire. Tertio, per opera vitae intellectivae, in hoc quod cum eo loquebantur, et de Scripturis disserebant. Et ne quid deesset ad perfectionem manifestationis, ostendit etiam se habere divinam naturam, per miraculum quod fecit in piscibus capiendis; et ulterius per hoc quod, eis videntibus, ascendit in caelum; quia, ut dicitur Ioan. III, nemo ascendit in caelum nisi qui descendit de caelo, filius hominis, qui est in caelo.

Q. 55, A. 6

ting for manifesting the truth of His Resurrection, that He should permit Himself to be handled by His disciples. Obj. 4: Further, clarity seems to be the principal of the qualities of a glorified body: yet He gave no sign thereof in His Resurrection. Therefore it seems that those proofs were insufficient for showing the quality of Christ’s Resurrection. On the contrary, Christ, who is the Wisdom of God, ordereth all things sweetly and in a fitting manner, according to Wis. 8:1. I answer that, Christ manifested His Resurrection in two ways: namely, by testimony; and by proof or sign: and each manifestation was sufficient in its own class. For in order to manifest His Resurrection He made use of a double testimony, neither of which can be rebutted. The first of these was the angels’ testimony, who announced the Resurrection to the women, as is seen in all the Evangelists: the other was the testimony of the Scriptures, which He set before them to show the truth of the Resurrection, as is narrated in the last chapter of Luke. Again, the proofs were sufficient for showing that the Resurrection was both true and glorious. That it was a true Resurrection He shows first on the part of the body; and this He shows in three respects; first of all, that it was a true and solid body, and not phantastic or rarefied, like the air. And He establishes this by offering His body to be handled; hence He says in the last chapter of Luke (39): Handle and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have. Second, He shows that it was a human body, by presenting His true features for them to behold. Third, He shows that it was identically the same body which He had before, by showing them the scars of the wounds; hence, as we read in the last chapter of Luke (39) he said to them: See My hands and feet, that it is I Myself. Second, He showed them the truth of His Resurrection on the part of His soul reunited with His body: and He showed this by the works of the threefold life. First of all, in the operations of the nutritive life, by eating and drinking with His disciples, as we read in the last chapter of Luke. Second, in the works of the sensitive life, by replying to His disciples’ questions, and by greeting them when they were in His presence, showing thereby that He both saw and heard; third, in the works of the intellective life by their conversing with Him, and discoursing on the Scriptures. And, in order that nothing might be wanting to make the manifestation complete, He also showed that He had the Divine Nature, by working the miracle of the draught of fishes, and further by ascending into heaven while they were beholding Him: because, according to John 3:13: No man hath ascended into heaven, but He that descended from heaven, the Son of Man who is in heaven.

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Incarnate Son of God

Gloriam etiam suae resurrectionis ostendit discipulis, per hoc quod ad eos ianuis clausis intravit, secundum quod Gregorius dicit, in homilia, palpandam carnem dominus praebuit, quam clausis ianuis introduxit, ut esse post resurrectionem ostenderet corpus suum et eiusdem naturae, et alterius gloriae. Similiter etiam ad proprietatem gloriae pertinebat quod subito ab oculis discipulorum evanuit, ut dicitur Lucae ultimo, quia per hoc ostendebatur quod in potestate eius erat videri et non videri quod pertinet ad conditionem corporis gloriosi, ut supra dictum est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod singula argumentorum non sufficerent ad manifestandam Christi resurrectionem, omnia tamen simul accepta perfecte Christi resurrectionem manifestant; maxime propter Scripturae testimonium, et Angelorum dicta, et ipsius Christi assertionem miraculis confirmatam. Angeli autem apparentes non asserebant se homines esse, sicut asseruit Christus vere se hominem esse. Et tamen aliter Christus manducavit, et aliter Angeli. Nam quia corpora ab Angelis assumpta non erant corpora viva vel animata, non erat vera comestio, licet esset vera cibi contritio et traiectio in interiorem partem corporis assumpti, unde et Angelus dixit, Tobiae XII, cum essem vobiscum, videbar quidem manducare et bibere vobiscum, sed ego cibo invisibili utor. Sed quia corpus Christi vere fuit animatum, vera fuit eius comestio. Ut enim Augustinus dicit, XIII de Civ. Dei, non potestas, sed egestas edendi corporibus resurgentium aufertur. Unde, sicut Beda dicit, Christus manducavit potestate, non egestate. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, argumenta quaedam inducebantur a Christo ad probandum veritatem humanae naturae; quaedam vero ad probandum gloriam resurgentis. Conditio autem naturae humanae, secundum quod in se consideratur, quantum scilicet ad statum praesentem, contrariatur conditioni gloriae, secundum illud I Cor. XV, seminatur in infirmitate, et surget in virtute. Et ideo ea quae inducuntur ad ostendendam conditionem gloriae, videntur habere contrarietatem ad naturam, non simpliciter, sed secundum statum praesentem; et e converso. Unde Gregorius dicit, in homilia, quod duo mira, et iuxta humanam rationem sibi valde contraria, dominus ostendit, dum post resurrectionem corpus suum et incorruptibile, et tamen palpabile demonstravit. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., quod hoc dominus dixit, noli me tangere, nondum enim ascendi ad patrem meum, ut in illa femina figuraretur Ecclesia de gentibus, quae in Christum non credidit nisi cum ascendisset ad patrem. Aut sic in se credi voluit Iesus, hoc est, sic se spiritualiter tangi, quod ipse et pater unum sunt. Eius quippe intimis sensibus quodammodo ascendit ad patrem, qui sic in eo profecerit ut patri

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He also showed His disciples the glory of His Resurrection by entering in among them when the doors were closed: as Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.): Our Lord allowed them to handle His flesh which He had brought through closed doors, to show that His body was of the same nature but of different glory. It likewise was part of the property of glory that He vanished suddenly from their eyes, as related in the last chapter of Luke; because thereby it was shown that it lay in His power to be seen or not seen; and this belongs to a glorified body, as stated above (Q. 54, A. 1, ad 2, A. 2, ad 1). Reply Obj. 1: Each separate argument would not suffice of itself for showing perfectly Christ’s Resurrection, yet all taken collectively establish it completely, especially owing to the testimonies of the Scriptures, the sayings of the angels, and even Christ’s own assertion supported by miracles. As to the angels who appeared, they did not say they were men, as Christ asserted that He was truly a man. Moreover, the manner of eating was different in Christ and the angels: for since the bodies assumed by the angels were neither living nor animated, there was no true eating, although the food was really masticated and passed into the interior of the assumed body: hence the angels said to Tobias (12:18, 19): When I was with you . . . I seemed indeed to eat and drink with you; but I use an invisible meat. But since Christ’s body was truly animated, His eating was genuine. For, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei xiii), it is not the power but the need of eating that shall be taken away from the bodies of them who rise again. Hence Bede says on Luke 24:41: Christ ate because He could, not because He needed. Reply Obj. 2: As was observed above, some proofs were employed by Christ to prove the truth of His human nature, and others to show forth His glory in rising again. But the condition of human nature, as considered in itself, namely, as to its present state, is opposite to the condition of glory, as is said in 1 Cor. 15:43: It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power. Consequently, the proofs brought forward for showing the condition of glory, seem to be in opposition to nature, not absolutely, but according to the present state, and conversely. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.): The Lord manifested two wonders, which are mutually contrary according to human reason, when after the Resurrection He showed His body as incorruptible and at the same time palpable. Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Tract. cxxi super Joan.), these words of our Lord, ‘Do not touch Me, for I am not yet ascended to My Father,’ show that in that woman there is a figure of the Church of the Gentiles, which did not believe in Christ until He was ascended to the Father. Or Jesus would have men to believe in Him, i.e., to touch Him spiritually, as being Himself one with the Father. For to that man’s innermost perceptions He is, in some sort, ascended unto the

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agnoscat aequalem. Haec autem carnaliter adhuc in eum credebat, quem sicut hominem flebat. Quod autem Maria alibi legitur Christum tetigisse, quando simul cum aliis mulieribus accessit et tenuit pedes, quaestionem non facit, ut Severianus dicit. Siquidem illud de figura est, hoc de sexu, illud de divina gratia, hoc de humana natura. Vel, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, volebat haec mulier adhuc cum Christo conversari sicut et ante passionem. Prae gaudio nihil magnum cogitabat, quamvis caro Christi multo melior fuerit facta resurgendo. Et ideo dixit, nondum ascendi ad patrem meum, quasi dicat, non aestimes me iam terrenam vitam agere. Quod enim in terris me vides, hoc est quia nondum ascendi ad patrem meum, sed in promptu est quod ascendam. Unde subdit, ascendo ad patrem meum et patrem vestrum.

Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, ad Orosium, clarificata carne dominus resurrexit, sed noluit in ea clarificatione discipulis suis apparere, quia non possent oculis talem claritatem perspicere. Si enim, antequam moreretur pro nobis et resurgeret, quando transfiguratus est in monte, discipuli sui eum videre non potuerunt; quanto magis, clarificata carne domini, eum videre non potuerunt. Est etiam considerandum quod post resurrectionem dominus hoc praecipue volebat ostendere, quod idem ipse esset qui mortuus fuerat. Quod multum poterat impedire si eis sui corporis claritatem ostenderet. Nam immutatio quae fit secundum aspectum, maxime ostendit diversitatem eius quod videtur, quia sensibilia communia, inter quae est unum et multa, vel idem et diversum, maxime diiudicat visus. Sed ante passionem, ne infirmitatem passionis eius discipuli despicerent, maxime intendebat Christus eis gloriam maiestatis suae ostendere, quam maxime demonstrat claritas corporis. Et ideo, ante passionem, gloriam suam praemonstravit discipulis per claritatem, post resurrectionem autem, per alia indicia. Ad quintum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de consensu Evang., possumus intelligere unum Angelum visum a mulieribus, et secundum Matthaeum et secundum Marcum, ut eas ingressas in monumentum accipiamus, in aliquod scilicet spatium quod erat aliqua maceria communitum, atque ibi vidisse Angelum sedentem supra lapidem revolutum a monumento, sicut dicit Matthaeus; ut hoc sit sedentem a dextris, quod dicit Marcus. Deinde, dum introspicerent locum in quo iacebat corpus domini, visos ab eis duos Angelos, primo quidem sedentes, ut dicit Ioannes; et post eis assurrexisse, ut stantes viderentur, ut dicit Lucas.

Q. 55, A. 6

Father, who has become so far proficient in Him, as to recognize in Him the equal with the Father . . . whereas she as yet believed in Him but carnally, since she wept for Him as for a man. But when one reads elsewhere of Mary having touched Him, when with the other women, she ‘came up and took hold of His feet,’ that matters little, as Severianus says, for, the first act relates to figure, the other to sex; the former is of Divine grace, the latter of human nature. Or as Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxxvi in Joan.): This woman wanted to converse with Christ just as before the Passion, and out of joy was thinking of nothing great, although Christ’s flesh had become much nobler by rising again. And therefore He said: I have not yet ascended to My Father; as if to say: Do not suppose I am leading an earthly life; for if you see Me upon earth, it is because I have not yet ascended to My Father, but I am going to ascend shortly. Hence He goes on to say: I ascend to My Father, and to your Father. Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine says ad Orosium (Dial. lxv, Qq.): Our Lord rose in clarified flesh; yet He did not wish to appear before the disciples in that condition of clarity, because their eyes could not gaze upon that brilliancy. For if before He died for us and rose again the disciples could not look upon Him when He was transfigured upon the mountain, how much less were they able to gaze upon Him when our Lord’s flesh was glorified. It must also be borne in mind that after His Resurrection our Lord wished especially to show that He was the same as had died; which the manifestation of His brightness would have hindered considerably: because change of features shows more than anything else the difference in the person seen: and this is because sight specially judges of the common sensibles, among which is one and many, or the same and different. But before the Passion, lest His disciples might despise its weakness, Christ meant to show them the glory of His majesty; and this the brightness of the body specially indicates. Consequently, before the Passion He showed the disciples His glory by brightness, but after the Resurrection by other tokens. Reply Obj. 5: As Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. iii): We can understand one angel to have been seen by the women, according to both Matthew and Mark, if we take them as having entered the sepulchre, that is, into some sort of walled enclosure, and that there they saw an angel sitting upon the stone which was rolled back from the monument, as Matthew says; and that this is Mark’s expression—‘sitting on the right side’; afterwards when they scanned the spot where the Lord’s body had lain, they beheld two angels, who were at first seated, as John says, and who afterwards rose so as to be seen standing, as Luke relates.

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Question 56 The Causality of Christ’s Resurrection Deinde considerandum est de causalitate resurrecWe have now to consider the causality of Christ’s Resurtionis Christi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. rection, concerning which there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum resurrectio Christi sit causa nostrae (1) Whether Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of our resurrectionis. resurrection? Secundo, utrum sit causa nostrae iustificationis. (2) Whether it is the cause of our justification?

Article 1 Whether Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of the Resurrection of our bodies? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod resurrectio Christi non sit causa resurrectionis corporum. Posita enim causa sufficienti, necesse est effectum poni. Si ergo resurrectio Christi est causa sufficiens resurrectionis corporum, statim, eo resurgente, omnes mortui resurgere debuerunt. Praeterea, causa resurrectionis mortuorum est divina iustitia; ut scilicet corpora simul praemientur vel puniantur cum animabus, sicut communicaverunt in merito vel peccato; ut dicit Dionysius, ult. cap. Eccles. Hier., et etiam Damascenus, in IV libro. Sed iustitiam Dei necesse esset impleri, etiam si Christus non resurrexisset. Ergo, etiam Christo non resurgente, mortui resurgerent. Non ergo resurrectio Christi est causa resurrectionis corporum. Praeterea, si resurrectio Christi sit causa resurrectionis corporum, aut esset causa exemplaris; aut causa effectiva; aut causa meritoria. Sed non est causa exemplaris. Quia resurrectionem corporum Deus operabitur, secundum illud Ioan. V, pater suscitat mortuos. Deus autem non indiget inspicere ad aliquod exemplar extra se. Similiter etiam non est causa effectiva. Quia causa efficiens non agit nisi per contactum, vel spiritualem vel corporalem. Manifestum est autem quod resurrectio Christi non agit per contactum corporalem ad mortuos qui resurgent, propter distantiam temporis et loci. Similiter etiam nec per contactum spiritualem, qui est per fidem et caritatem, quia etiam infideles et peccatores resurgent. Neque etiam est causa meritoria. Quia Christus resurgens iam non erat viator, et ita non erat in statu merendi. Et ita nullo modo resurrectio Christi videtur esse causa nostrae resurrectionis.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s Resurrection is not the cause of the resurrection of our bodies, because, given a sufficient cause, the effect must follow of necessity. If, then, Christ’s Resurrection be the sufficient cause of the resurrection of our bodies, then all the dead should have risen again as soon as He rose. Obj. 2: Further, Divine justice is the cause of the resurrection of the dead, so that the body may be rewarded or punished together with the soul, since they shared in merit or sin, as Dionysius says (Eccl Hier. vii) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv). But God’s justice must necessarily be accomplished, even if Christ had not risen. Therefore the dead would rise again even though Christ did not. Consequently Christ’s Resurrection is not the cause of the resurrection of our bodies. Obj. 3: Further, if Christ’s Resurrection be the cause of the resurrection of our bodies, it would be either the exemplar, or the efficient, or the meritorious cause. Now it is not the exemplar cause; because it is God who will bring about the resurrection of our bodies, according to John 5:21: The Father raiseth up the dead: and God has no need to look at any exemplar cause outside Himself. In like manner it is not the efficient cause; because an efficient cause acts only through contact, whether spiritual or corporeal. Now it is evident that Christ’s Resurrection has no corporeal contact with the dead who shall rise again, owing to distance of time and place; and similarly it has no spiritual contact, which is through faith and charity, because even unbelievers and sinners shall rise again. Nor again is it the meritorious cause, because when Christ rose He was no longer a wayfarer, and consequently not in a state of merit. Therefore, Christ’s Resurrection does not appear to be in any way the cause of ours. Praeterea, cum mors sit privatio vitae, nihil viObj. 4: Further, since death is the privation of life, then detur esse aliud destruere mortem quam reducere vi- to destroy death seems to be nothing else than to bring life tam, quod pertinet ad resurrectionem. Sed Christus mo- back again; and this is resurrection. But by dying, Christ

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Incarnate Son of God

riendo mortem nostram destruxit. Ergo mors Christi est causa nostrae resurrectionis. Non ergo eius resurrectio. Sed contra est quod, super illud I Cor. XV, si Christus praedicatur quod resurrexit a mortuis etc., dicit Glossa, qui est efficiens causa nostrae resurrectionis. Respondeo dicendum quod illud quod est primum in quolibet genere, est causa omnium eorum quae sunt post, ut dicitur in II Metaphys. Primum autem in genere nostrae resurrectionis fuit resurrectio Christi, sicut ex supra dictis patet. Unde oportet quod resurrectio Christi sit causa nostrae resurrectionis. Et hoc est quod apostolus dicit, I Cor. XV, Christus resurrexit a mortuis primitiae dormientium, quoniam quidem per hominem mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum. Et hoc rationabiliter. Nam principium humanae vivificationis est verbum Dei, de quo dicitur in Psalmo, apud te est fons vitae, unde et ipse dicit, Ioan. V, sicut pater suscitat mortuos et vivificat, sic et filius quos vult vivificat. Habet autem hoc naturalis ordo rerum divinitus institutus, ut quaelibet causa primo operetur in id quod est sibi propinquius, et per id operetur in alia magis remota, sicut ignis primo calefacit aerem propinquum, per quem calefacit corpora distantia; et ipse Deus primo illuminat substantias sibi propinquas, per quas illuminat magis remotas, ut Dionysius dicit, XIII cap. Cael. Hier. Et ideo verbum Dei primo attribuit vitam immortalem corpori sibi naturaliter unito, et per ipsum operatur resurrectionem in omnibus aliis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, resurrectio Christi causa est nostrae resurrectionis per virtutem verbi uniti. Quod quidem operatur secundum voluntatem. Et ideo non oportet quod statim sequatur effectus, sed secundum dispositionem verbi Dei, ut scilicet primo conformemur Christo patienti et morienti in hac vita passibili et mortali, deinde perveniamus ad participandum similitudinem resurrectionis. Ad secundum dicendum quod iustitia Dei est causa prima resurrectionis nostrae, resurrectio autem Christi est causa secundaria, et quasi instrumentalis. Licet autem virtus principalis agentis non determinetur ad hoc instrumentum determinate, tamen, ex quo per hoc instrumentum operatur, instrumentum illud est causa effectus. Sic igitur divina iustitia, quantum est de se, non est obligata ad resurrectionem nostram causandam per resurrectionem Christi, potuit enim alio modo nos Deus liberare quam per Christi passionem et resurrectionem, ut supra dictum est. Ex quo tamen decrevit hoc modo nos liberare, manifestum est quod resurrectio Christi est causa nostrae resurrectionis. Ad tertium dicendum quod resurrectio Christi non est, proprie loquendo, causa meritoria nostrae resurrectionis, sed est causa efficiens et exemplaris. Efficiens quidem, inquantum humanitas Christi, secundum

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destroyed our death. Consequently, Christ’s death, not His Resurrection, is the cause of our resurrection. On the contrary, on 1 Cor. 15:12: Now if Christ be preached, that He rose again from the dead, the gloss says: Who is the efficient cause of our resurrection. I answer that, As stated in 2 Metaphysics, text 4: Whatever is first in any order, is the cause of all that come after it. But Christ’s Resurrection was the first in the order of our resurrection, as is evident from what was said above (Q. 53, A. 3). Hence Christ’s Resurrection must be the cause of ours: and this is what the Apostle says (1 Cor 15:20, 21): Christ is risen from the dead, the first-fruits of them that sleep; for by a man came death, and by a man the resurrection of the dead. And this is reasonable. Because the principle of human life-giving is the Word of God, of whom it is said (Ps 35:10): With Thee is the fountain of life: hence He Himself says (John 5:21): As the Father raiseth up the dead, and giveth life; so the Son also giveth life to whom He will. Now the divinely established natural order is that every cause operates first upon what is nearest to it, and through it upon others which are more remote; just as fire first heats the nearest air, and through it it heats bodies that are further off: and God Himself first enlightens those substances which are closer to Him, and through them others that are more remote, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiii). Consequently, the Word of God first bestows immortal life upon that body which is naturally united with Himself, and through it works the resurrection in all other bodies. Reply Obj. 1: As was stated above, Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of ours through the power of the united Word, who operates according to His will. And consequently, it is not necessary for the effect to follow at once, but according as the Word of God disposes, namely, that first of all we be conformed to the suffering and dying Christ in this suffering and mortal life; and afterwards may come to share in the likeness of His Resurrection. Reply Obj. 2: God’s justice is the first cause of our resurrection, whereas Christ’s Resurrection is the secondary, and as it were the instrumental cause. But although the power of the principal cause is not restricted to one instrument determinately, nevertheless since it works through this instrument, such instrument causes the effect. So, then, the Divine justice in itself is not tied down to Christ’s Resurrection as a means of bringing about our resurrection: because God could deliver us in some other way than through Christ’s Passion and Resurrection, as already stated (Q. 46, A. 2). But having once decreed to deliver us in this way, it is evident that Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of ours. Reply Obj. 3: Properly speaking, Christ’s Resurrection is not the meritorious cause, but the efficient and exemplar cause of our resurrection. It is the efficient cause, inasmuch as Christ’s humanity, according to which He rose again, is

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quam resurrexit, est quodammodo instrumentum divinitatis ipsius, et operatur in virtute eius, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo, sicut alia quae Christus in sua humanitate fecit vel passus est, ex virtute divinitatis eius sunt nobis salutaria, ut supra dictum est; ita et resurrectio Christi est causa efficiens nostrae resurrectionis virtute divina, cuius proprium est mortuos vivificare. Quae quidem virtus praesentialiter attingit omnia loca et tempora. Et talis contactus virtualis sufficit ad rationem huius efficientiae. Et quia, ut dictum est, primordialis causa resurrectionis humanae est divina iustitia, ex qua Christus habet potestatem iudicium facere inquantum filius hominis est, virtus effectiva resurrectionis eius se extendit non solum ad bonos, sed etiam ad malos, qui sunt eius iudicio subiecti. Sicut autem resurrectio corporis Christi, ex eo quod corpus illud est personaliter verbo unitum, est prima tempore, ita etiam est prima dignitate et perfectione, ut Glossa dicit, I Cor. XV. Semper autem id quod est perfectissimum, est exemplar quod imitantur minus perfecta secundum suum modum. Et ideo resurrectio Christi est exemplar nostrae resurrectionis. Quod quidem necessarium est, non ex parte resuscitantis, qui non indiget exemplari, sed ex parte resuscitatorum, quos oportet illi resurrectioni conformari, secundum illud Philipp. III, reformabit corpus humilitatis nostrae, configuratum corpori claritatis suae. Licet autem efficientia resurrectionis Christi se extendat ad resurrectionem tam bonorum quam malorum, exemplaritas tamen eius se extendit proprie solum ad bonos, qui sunt facti conformes filiationis ipsius, ut dicitur Rom. VIII. Ad quartum dicendum quod, secundum rationem efficientiae, quae dependet ex virtute divina, communiter tam mors Christi quam etiam resurrectio est causa tam destructionis mortis quam reparationis vitae. Sed secundum rationem exemplaritatis, mors Christi, per quam recessit a vita mortali, est causa destructionis mortis nostrae, resurrectio vero eius, per quam inchoavit vitam immortalem, est causa reparationis vitae nostrae. Passio tamen Christi est insuper causa meritoria, ut supra dictum est.

Q. 56, A. 2

as it were the instrument of His Godhead, and works by Its power, as stated above (Q. 13, AA. 2, 3). And therefore, just as all other things which Christ did and endured in His humanity are profitable to our salvation through the power of the Godhead, as already stated (Q. 48, A. 6), so also is Christ’s Resurrection the efficient cause of ours, through the Divine power whose office it is to quicken the dead; and this power by its presence is in touch with all places and times; and such virtual contact suffices for its efficiency. And since, as was stated above (ad 2), the primary cause of human resurrection is the Divine justice, from which Christ has the power of passing judgment, because He is the Son of Man (John 5:27); the efficient power of His Resurrection extends to the good and wicked alike, who are subject to His judgment. But just as the Resurrection of Christ’s body, through its personal union with the Word, is first in point of time, so also is it first in dignity and perfection; as the gloss says on 1 Cor. 15:20, 23. But whatever is most perfect is always the exemplar, which the less perfect copies according to its mode; consequently Christ’s Resurrection is the exemplar of ours. And this is necessary, not on the part of Him who rose again, who needs no exemplar, but on the part of them who are raised up, who must be likened to that Resurrection, according to Phil. 3:21: He will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of His glory. Now although the efficiency of Christ’s Resurrection extends to the resurrection of the good and wicked alike, still its exemplarity extends properly only to the just, who are made conformable with His Sonship, according to Rom. 8:29. Reply Obj. 4: Considered on the part of their efficiency, which is dependent on the Divine power, both Christ’s death and His Resurrection are the cause both of the destruction of death and of the renewal of life: but considered as exemplar causes, Christ’s death—by which He withdrew from mortal life—is the cause of the destruction of our death; while His Resurrection, whereby He inaugurated immortal life, is the cause of the repairing of our life. But Christ’s Passion is furthermore a meritorious cause, as stated above (Q. 48, A. 1).

Article 2 Whether Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of souls? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod resurrectio Christi non sit causa resurrectionis animarum. Dicit enim Augustinus, super Ioan., quod corpora resurgunt per dispensationem humanam, sed animae resurgunt per substantiam Dei. Sed resurrectio Christi non pertinet ad substantiam Dei, sed ad dispensationem humanam.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s Resurrection is not the cause of the resurrection of souls, because Augustine says (Tract. xxiii super Joan.) that bodies rise by His human dispensation, but souls rise by the Substance of God. But Christ’s Resurrection does not belong to God’s Substance, but to the dispensation of His humanity. Therefore,

599

Q. 56, A. 2

Incarnate Son of God

Ergo resurrectio Christi, etsi sit causa resurrectionis corporum, non tamen videtur esse causa resurrectionis animarum. Praeterea, corpus non agit in spiritum. Sed resurrectio Christi pertinet ad corpus eius, quod cecidit per mortem. Ergo resurrectio Christi non est causa resurrectionis animarum. Praeterea, quia resurrectio Christi est causa resurrectionis corporum, omnium corpora resurgent, secundum illud I Cor. XV, omnes quidem resurgemus. Sed non omnium animae resurgent, quia quidam ibunt in supplicium aeternum, ut dicitur Matth. XXV. Ergo resurrectio Christi non est causa resurrectionis animarum. Praeterea, resurrectio animarum fit per remissionem peccatorum. Sed hoc factum est per Christi passionem, secundum illud Apoc. I, lavit nos a peccatis nostris in sanguine suo. Ergo resurrectionis animarum magis est causa Christi passio quam eius resurrectio. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. IV, resurrexit propter iustificationem nostram, quae nihil aliud est quam resurrectio animarum. Et super illud Psalmi, ad vesperum demorabitur fletus, dicit Glossa quod resurrectio Christi causa est resurrectionis nostrae et animae in praesenti, et corporis in futuro. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, resurrectio Christi agit in virtute divinitatis. Quae quidem se extendit non solum ad resurrectionem corporum, sed etiam ad resurrectionem animarum, a Deo enim est et quod anima vivit per gratiam, et quod corpus vivit per animam. Et ideo resurrectio Christi habet instrumentaliter virtutem effectivam non solum respectu resurrectionis corporum, sed etiam respectu resurrectionis animarum. Similiter autem habet rationem exemplaritatis respectu resurrectionis animarum. Quia Christo resurgenti debemus etiam secundum animam conformari, ut sicut, secundum apostolum, Rom. VI, Christus resurrexit a mortuis per gloriam patris, ita et nos in novitate vitae ambulemus; et sicut ipse resurgens ex mortuis iam non moritur, ita et nos existimemus nos mortuos esse peccato, ut iterum nos vivamus cum illo. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus dicit resurrectionem animarum fieri per Dei substantiam, quantum ad participationem, quia scilicet participando divinam bonitatem animae fiunt iustae et bonae, non autem participando quamcumque creaturam. Unde, cum dixisset, animae resurgunt per substantiam Dei, subdit, participatione enim Dei fit anima beata, non participatione animae sanctae. Sed participando gloriam corporis Christi, efficientur corpora nostra gloriosa. Ad secundum dicendum quod efficacia resurrectionis Christi pertingit ad animas, non per propriam virtutem ipsius corporis resurgentis, sed per virtutem divinitatis, cui personaliter unitur.

IIIae

although Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of bodies rising, nevertheless it does not seem to be the cause of the resurrection of souls. Obj. 2: Further, a body does not act upon a spirit. But the Resurrection belongs to His body, which death laid low. Therefore His Resurrection is not the cause of the resurrection of souls. Obj. 3: Further, since Christ’s Resurrection is the cause why bodies rise again, the bodies of all men shall rise again, according to 1 Cor. 15:51: We shall all indeed rise again. But the souls of all will not rise again, because according to Matt. 25:46: some shall go into everlasting punishment. Therefore Christ’s Resurrection is not the cause of the resurrection of souls. Obj. 4: Further, the resurrection of souls comes of the forgiveness of sins. But this was effected by Christ’s Passion, according to Apoc. 1:5: He washed us from our sins in His own blood. Consequently, Christ’s Passion even more than His Resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of souls. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom 4:25): He rose again for our justification, which is nothing else than the resurrection of souls: and on Ps. 29:6: In the evening weeping shall have place, the gloss says, Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of ours, both of the soul at present, and of the body in the future. I answer that, As stated above, Christ’s Resurrection works in virtue of the Godhead; now this virtue extends not only to the resurrection of bodies, but also to that of souls: for it comes of God that the soul lives by grace, and that the body lives by the soul. Consequently, Christ’s Resurrection has instrumentally an effective power not only with regard to the resurrection of bodies, but also with respect to the resurrection of souls. In like fashion it is an exemplar cause with regard to the resurrection of souls, because even in our souls we must be conformed with the rising Christ: as the Apostle says (Rom 6:4–11) Christ is risen from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in newness of life: and as He, rising again from the dead, dieth now no more, so let us reckon that we are dead to sin, that we may live together with Him. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine says that the resurrection of souls is wrought by God’s Substance, as to participation, because souls become good and just by sharing in the Divine goodness, but not by sharing in anything created. Accordingly, after saying that souls rise by the Divine Substance, he adds: the soul is beatified by a participation with God, and not by a participation with a holy soul. But our bodies are made glorious by sharing in the glory of Christ’s body. Reply Obj. 2: The efficacy of Christ’s Resurrection reaches souls not from any special virtue of His risen body, but from the virtue of the Godhead personally united with it.

600

IIIae

Causality of Christ’s Resurrection

Ad tertium dicendum quod resurrectio animarum pertinet ad meritum quod est effectus iustificationis, sed resurrectio corporum ordinatur ad poenam vel praemium, quae sunt effectus iudicantis. Ad Christum autem non pertinet iustificare omnes, sed iudicare. Et ideo omnes resuscitat secundum corpus, sed non secundum animam. Ad quartum dicendum quod in iustificatione animarum duo concurrunt, scilicet remissio culpae, et novitas vitae per gratiam. Quantum ergo ad efficaciam, quae est per virtutem divinam, tam passio Christi quam resurrectio est causa iustificationis quoad utrumque. Sed quantum ad exemplaritatem, proprie passio et mors Christi est causa remissionis culpae, per quam morimur peccato, resurrectio autem est causa novitatis vitae, quae est per gratiam sive iustitiam. Et ideo apostolus dicit, Rom. IV, quod traditus est, scilicet in mortem, propter delicta nostra, scilicet tollenda, et resurrexit propter iustificationem nostram. Sed passio Christi est etiam causa meritoria, ut dictum est.

Q. 56, A. 2

Reply Obj. 3: The resurrection of souls pertains to merit, which is the effect of justification; but the resurrection of bodies is ordained for punishment or reward, which are the effects of Him who judges. Now it belongs to Christ, not to justify all men, but to judge them: and therefore He raises up all as to their bodies, but not as to their souls. Reply Obj. 4: Two things concur in the justification of souls, namely, forgiveness of sin and newness of life through grace. Consequently, as to efficacy, which comes of the Divine power, the Passion as well as the Resurrection of Christ is the cause of justification as to both the above. But as to exemplarity, properly speaking Christ’s Passion and death are the cause of the forgiveness of guilt, by which forgiveness we die unto sin: whereas Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of newness of life, which comes through grace or justice: consequently, the Apostle says (Rom 4:25) that He was delivered up, i.e., to death, for our sins, i.e., to take them away, and rose again for our justification. But Christ’s Passion was also a meritorious cause, as stated above (A. 1, ad 4; Q. 48, A. 1).

601

Question 57 The Ascension of Christ Deinde considerandum est de ascensione Christi. Et We have now to consider Christ’s Ascension: concerncirca hoc quaeruntur sex. ing which there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum fuerit conveniens Christum (1) Whether it belonged for Christ to ascend into ascendere. heaven? Secundo, secundum quam naturam conveniat sibi (2) According to which nature did it become Him to ascensio. ascend? Tertio, utrum propria virtute ascenderit. (3) Whether He ascended by His own power? Quarto, utrum ascenderit super omnes caelos (4) Whether He ascended above all the corporeal corporeos. heavens? Quinto, utrum ascenderit super omnes spirituales (5) Whether He ascended above all spiritual creatures? creaturas. Sexto, de effectu ascensionis. (6) Of the effect of the Ascension.

Article 1 Whether it was fitting for Christ to ascend into heaven? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Christum ascendere. Dicit enim philosophus, in II de caelo, quod illa quae optimo modo se habent, possident suum bonum sine motu. Sed Christus optime se habuit, quia et secundum naturam divinam est summum bonum; et secundum humanam naturam est summe glorificatus. Ergo suum bonum habet sine motu. Sed ascensio est quidam motus. Ergo non fuit conveniens quod Christus ascenderet. Praeterea, omne quod movetur, movetur propter aliquid melius. Sed Christo non fuit melius esse in caelo quam in terra, nihil enim accrevit sibi per hoc quod fuit in caelo, neque quantum ad animam neque quantum ad corpus. Ergo videtur quod Christus non debuit in caelum ascendere. Praeterea, filius Dei humanam naturam assumpsit ad nostram salutem. Sed magis fuisset salutare hominibus quod semper conversaretur nobiscum in terris, ut ipse dixit discipulis suis, Luc. XVII, venient dies quando desideretis videre unum diem filii hominis, et non videbitis. Videtur ergo quod non fuerit conveniens Christum ascendere in caelum. Praeterea, sicut Gregorius dicit, in XIV Moral., corpus Christi in nullo mutatum fuit post resurrectionem. Sed non immediate post resurrectionem ascendit in caelum, quia ipse dicit post resurrectionem, Ioan. XX, nondum ascendi ad patrem meum. Ergo videtur quod nec post quadraginta dies ascendere debuerit.

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for Christ to ascend into heaven. For the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii) that things which are in a state of perfection possess their good without movement. But Christ was in a state of perfection, since He is the Sovereign Good in respect of His Divine Nature, and sovereignly glorified in respect of His human nature. Consequently, He has His good without movement. But ascension is movement. Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to ascend. Obj. 2: Further, whatever is moved, is moved on account of something better. But it was no better thing for Christ to be in heaven than upon earth, because He gained nothing either in soul or in body by being in heaven. Therefore it seems that Christ should not have ascended into heaven. Obj. 3: Further, the Son of God took human flesh for our salvation. But it would have been more beneficial for men if He had tarried always with us upon earth; thus He said to His disciples (Luke 17:22): The days will come when you shall desire to see one day of the Son of man; and you shall not see it. Therefore it seems unfitting for Christ to have ascended into heaven. Obj. 4: Further, as Gregory says (Moral. xiv), Christ’s body was in no way changed after the Resurrection. But He did not ascend into heaven immediately after rising again, for He said after the Resurrection (John 20:17): I am not yet ascended to My Father. Therefore it seems that neither should He have ascended after forty days.

603

Q. 57, A. 1

Incarnate Son of God

Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. XX, ascendo ad patrem meum et patrem vestrum. Respondeo dicendum quod locus debet esse proportionatus locato. Christus autem per resurrectionem vitam immortalem et incorruptibilem inchoavit. Locus autem in quo nos habitamus, est locus generationis et corruptionis, sed locus caelestis est locus incorruptionis. Et ideo non fuit conveniens quod Christus post resurrectionem remaneret in terris, sed conveniens fuit quod ascenderet in caelum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud optime se habens quod sine motu possidet suum bonum, est Deus, qui est omnino immutabilis, secundum illud Malach. III, ego dominus, et non mutor. Quaelibet autem creatura est aliquo modo mutabilis, ut patet per Augustinum, VIII super Gen. ad Litt. Et quia natura assumpta a filio Dei remansit creata, ut patet ex his quae supra dicta sunt, non est inconveniens si ei aliquis motus attribuatur. Ad secundum dicendum quod per hoc quod Christus ascendit in caelum, nihil ei accrevit quantum ad ea quae sunt de essentia gloriae, sive secundum corpus sive secundum animam, tamen accrevit ei aliquid quantum ad loci decentiam, quod est ad bene esse gloriae. Non quod corpori eius aliquid aut perfectionis aut conservationis acquireretur ex corpore caelesti, sed solummodo propter quandam decentiam. Hoc autem aliquo modo pertinebat ad eius gloriam. Et de hac decentia gaudium quoddam habuit, non quidem quod tunc de novo de hoc gaudere inciperet quando in caelum ascendit; sed quia novo modo de hoc gavisus est, sicut de re impleta. Unde super illud Psalmi, delectationes in dextera tua usque in finem, dicit Glossa, delectatio et laetitia erit mihi in consessu tuo humanis obtutibus subtracto. Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet praesentia corporalis Christi fuerit subtracta fidelibus per ascensionem, praesentia tamen divinitatis ipsius semper adest fidelibus, secundum quod ipse dicit, Matth. ult., ecce, ego vobiscum sunt omnibus diebus usque ad consummationem saeculi. Qui enim ascendit in caelos, non deserit adoptatos, ut Leo Papa dicit. Sed ipsa ascensio Christi in caelum, qua corporalem suam praesentiam nobis subtraxit, magis fuit utilis nobis quam praesentia corporalis fuisset. Primo quidem, propter fidei augmentum, quae est de non visis. Unde ipse dominus dicit Ioan. XVI, quod Spiritus Sanctus adveniens arguet mundum de iustitia, scilicet eorum qui credunt, ut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., ipsa quippe fidelium comparatio infidelium est vituperatio. Unde subdit, quia ad patrem vado, et iam non videbitis me, beati enim qui non vident, et credunt. Erit itaque nostra iustitia de qua mundus arguitur, quoniam in me, quem non videbitis, credetis.

IIIae

On the contrary, Are the words of our Lord (John 20:17): I ascend to My Father and to your Father. I answer that, The place ought to be in keeping with what is contained therein. Now by His Resurrection Christ entered upon an immortal and incorruptible life. But whereas our dwelling-place is one of generation and corruption, the heavenly place is one of incorruption. And consequently it was not fitting that Christ should remain upon earth after the Resurrection; but it was fitting that He should ascend to heaven. Reply Obj. 1: That which is best and possesses its good without movement is God Himself, because He is utterly unchangeable, according to Malachi 3:6: I am the Lord, and I change not. But every creature is changeable in some respect, as is evident from Augustine (Gen ad lit. viii). And since the nature assumed by the Son of God remained a creature, as is clear from what was said above (Q. 2, A. 7; Q. 16, AA. 8, 10; Q. 20, A. 1), it is not unbecoming if some movement be attributed to it. Reply Obj. 2: By ascending into heaven Christ acquired no addition to His essential glory either in body or in soul: nevertheless He did acquire something as to the fittingness of place, which pertains to the well-being of glory: not that His body acquired anything from a heavenly body by way of perfection or preservation; but merely out of a certain fittingness. Now this in a measure belonged to His glory; and He had a certain kind of joy from such fittingness, not indeed that He then began to derive joy from it when He ascended into heaven, but that He rejoiced thereat in a new way, as at a thing completed. Hence, on Ps. 15:11: At Thy right hand are delights even unto the end, the gloss says: I shall delight in sitting nigh to Thee, when I shall be taken away from the sight of men. Reply Obj. 3: Although Christ’s bodily presence was withdrawn from the faithful by the Ascension, still the presence of His Godhead is ever with the faithful, as He Himself says (Matt 28:20): Behold, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world. For, by ascending into heaven He did not abandon those whom He adopted, as Pope Leo says (De Resurrec., Serm. ii). But Christ’s Ascension into heaven, whereby He withdrew His bodily presence from us, was more profitable for us than His bodily presence would have been. First of all, in order to increase our faith, which is of things unseen. Hence our Lord said (John 26) that the Holy Spirit shall come and convince the world . . . of justice, that is, of the justice of those that believe, as Augustine says (Tract. xcv super Joan.): For even to put the faithful beside the unbeliever is to put the unbeliever to shame; wherefore he goes on to say (10): ‘Because I go to the Father; and you shall see Me no longer’—For ‘blessed are they that see not, yet believe.’ Hence it is of our justice that the world is reproved: because ‘you will believe in Me whom you shall not see.’

604

IIIae

Ascension of Christ

Secundo, ad spei sublevationem. Unde ipse dicit, Ioan. XIV, si abiero et praeparavero vobis locum, iterum veniam, et accipiam vos ad meipsum, ut ubi ego sum, et vos sitis. Per hoc enim quod Christus humanam naturam assumptam in caelo collocavit, dedit nobis spem illuc perveniendi, quia ubi fuerit corpus, illuc congregabuntur et aquilae, ut dicitur Matth. XXIV. Unde et Mich. II dicitur, ascendit pandens iter ante eos. Tertio, ad erigendum caritatis affectum in caelestia. Unde dicit apostolus, Coloss. III, quae sursum sunt quaerite, ubi Christus est in dextera Dei sedens, quae sursum sunt sapite, non quae super terram. Ut enim dicitur Matth. VI, ubi est thesaurus tuus, ibi est et cor tuum. Et quia Spiritus Sanctus est amor nos in caelestia rapiens, ideo dominus dicit discipulis, Ioan. XVI, expedit vobis ut ego vadam. Si enim non abiero, Paraclitus non veniet ad vos, si autem abiero, mittam eum ad vos. Quod exponens Augustinus, super Ioan., dicit, non potestis capere spiritum quandiu secundum carnem nosse persistitis Christum. Christo autem discedente corporaliter, non solum Spiritus Sanctus, sed et pater et filius illis affuit spiritualiter. Ad quartum dicendum quod, licet Christo resurgenti in vitam immortalem congrueret locus caelestis, tamen ascensionem distulit, ut veritas resurrectionis comprobaretur. Unde dicitur Act. I, quod post passionem suam praebuit seipsum vivum discipulis in multis argumentis per dies quadraginta. Ubi dicit Glossa quaedam quod, quia quadraginta horas mortuus fuerat, quadraginta diebus se vivere confirmat. Vel per quadraginta dies tempus praesentis saeculi, quo Christus in Ecclesia conversatur, potest intelligi, secundum quod homo constat ex quatuor elementis, et eruditur contra transgressionem Decalogi.

Q. 57, A. 2

Second, to uplift our hope: hence He says (John 14:3): If I shall go, and prepare a place for you, I will come again, and will take you to Myself; that where I am, you also may be. For by placing in heaven the human nature which He assumed, Christ gave us the hope of going thither; since wheresoever the body shall be, there shall the eagles also be gathered together, as is written in Matt. 24:28. Hence it is written likewise (Mic 2:13): He shall go up that shall open the way before them. Third, in order to direct the fervor of our charity to heavenly things. Hence the Apostle says (Col 3:1, 2): Seek the things that are above, where Christ is sitting at the right hand of God. Mind the things that are above, not the things that are upon the earth: for as is said (Matt 6:21): Where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also. And since the Holy Spirit is love drawing us up to heavenly things, therefore our Lord said to His disciples (John 16:7): It is expedient to you that I go; for if I go not, the Paraclete will not come to you; but if I go, I will send Him to you. On which words Augustine says (Tract. xciv super Joan.): Ye cannot receive the Spirit, so long as ye persist in knowing Christ according to the flesh. But when Christ withdrew in body, not only the Holy Spirit, but both Father and Son were present with them spiritually. Reply Obj. 4: Although a heavenly place befitted Christ when He rose to immortal life, nevertheless He delayed the Ascension in order to confirm the truth of His Resurrection. Hence it is written (Acts 1:3), that He showed Himself alive after His Passion, by many proofs, for forty days appearing to them: upon which the gloss says that because He was dead for forty hours, during forty days He established the fact of His being alive again. Or the forty days may be understood as a figure of this world, wherein Christ dwells in His Church: inasmuch as man is made out of the four elements, and is cautioned not to transgress the Decalogue.

Article 2 Whether Christ’s Ascension into heaven belonged to him according to his divine nature? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ascendere in caelum conveniat Christo secundum naturam divinam. Dicitur enim in Psalmo, ascendit Deus in iubilatione; et Deut. XXXIII, ascensor caeli auxiliator tuus. Sed ista dicuntur de Deo etiam ante Christi incarnationem. Ergo Christo convenit ascendere in caelum secundum quod Deus. Praeterea, eiusdem est ascendere in caelum cuius est descendere de caelo, secundum illud Ioan. III, nemo ascendit in caelum nisi qui de caelo descendit; et Ephes. IV, qui descendit, ipse est et qui ascendit. Sed Christus descendit de caelo, non secundum quod homo, sed se-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s Ascension into heaven belonged to Him according to His Divine Nature. For, it is written (Ps 46:6): God is ascended with jubilee: and (Deut 33:26): He that is mounted upon the heaven is thy helper. But these words were spoken of God even before Christ’s Incarnation. Therefore it belongs to Christ to ascend into heaven as God. Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to the same person to ascend into heaven as to descend from heaven, according to John 3:13: No man hath ascended into heaven, but He that descended from heaven: and Eph. 4:10: He that descended is the same also that ascended. But Christ came down from

605

Q. 57, A. 2

Incarnate Son of God

cundum quod Deus, non enim humana eius natura ante in caelo fuerat, sed divina. Ergo videtur quod Christus ascendit in caelum secundum quod Deus. Praeterea, Christus sua ascensione ascendit ad patrem. Sed ad patris aequalitatem non pervenit secundum quod homo, sic enim dicit, maior me est, ut habetur Ioan. XIV. Ergo videtur quod Christus ascendit secundum quod Deus. Sed contra est quod, Ephes. IV, super illud, quod autem ascendit, quid est nisi quia descendit, dicit Glossa, constat quod secundum humanitatem Christus descendit et ascendit. Respondeo dicendum quod ly secundum quod duo potest notare, scilicet conditionem ascendentis, et causam ascensionis. Et si quidem designet conditionem ascendentis, tunc ascendere non potest convenire Christo secundum conditionem divinae naturae. Tum quia nihil est deitate altius, quo possit ascendere. Tum etiam quia ascensio est motus localis, qui divinae naturae non competit, quae est immobilis et inlocalis. Sed per hunc modum ascensio competit Christo secundum humanam naturam, quae continetur loco, et motui subiici potest. Unde sub hoc sensu poterimus dicere quod Christus ascendit in caelum secundum quod homo, non secundum quod Deus. Si vero ly secundum quod designet causam ascensionis, cum etiam Christus ex virtute divinitatis in caelum ascenderit, non autem ex virtute humanae naturae, dicendum erit quod Christus ascendit in caelum, non secundum quod homo, sed secundum quod Deus. Unde Augustinus dicit, in sermone de ascensione, de nostro fuit quod filius Dei pependit in cruce, de suo quod ascendit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritates illae prophetice dicuntur de Deo secundum quod erat incarnandus. Potest tamen dici quod ascendere, etsi non proprie conveniat divinae naturae, potest tamen ei metaphorice convenire, prout scilicet dicitur in corde hominis ascendere, quando cor hominis se subiicit et humiliat Deo. Et eodem modo metaphorice dicitur ascendere respectu cuiuslibet creaturae, ex eo quod eam subiicit sibi. Ad secundum dicendum quod ipse idem est qui ascendit et qui descendit. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de symbolo, quis est qui descendit? Deus homo. Quis est qui ascendit? Idem ipse Deus homo. Descensus tamen duplex attribuitur Christo. Unus quidem, quo dicitur descendisse de caelo. Qui quidem attribuitur Deo homini secundum quod Deus. Non enim est iste descensus intelligendus secundum motum localem, sed secundum exinanitionem, qua, cum in forma Dei esset, servi formam suscepit. Sicut enim dicitur exinanitus, non ex eo quod suam plenitudinem amitteret, sed ex eo quod nostram parvitatem suscepit; ita dicitur descendisse de caelo, non

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heaven not as man, but as God: because previously His Nature in heaven was not human, but Divine. Therefore it seems that Christ ascended into heaven as God. Obj. 3: Further, by His Ascension Christ ascended to the Father. But it was not as man that He rose to equality with the Father; for in this respect He says: He is greater than I, as is said in John 14:28. Therefore it seems that Christ ascended as God. On the contrary, on Eph. 4:10: That He ascended, what is it, but because He also descended, a gloss says: It is clear that He descended and ascended according to His humanity. I answer that, The expression according to can denote two things; the condition of the one who ascends, and the cause of his ascension. When taken to express the condition of the one ascending, the Ascension in no wise belongs to Christ according to the condition of His Divine Nature; both because there is nothing higher than the Divine Nature to which He can ascend; and because ascension is local motion, a thing not in keeping with the Divine Nature, which is immovable and outside all place. Yet the Ascension is in keeping with Christ according to His human nature, which is limited by place, and can be the subject of motion. In this sense, then, we can say that Christ ascended into heaven as man, but not as God. But if the phrase according to denote the cause of the Ascension, since Christ ascended into heaven in virtue of His Godhead, and not in virtue of His human nature, then it must be said that Christ ascended into heaven not as man, but as God. Hence Augustine says in a sermon on the Ascension: It was our doing that the Son of man hung upon the cross; but it was His own doing that He ascended. Reply Obj. 1: These utterances were spoken prophetically of God who was one day to become incarnate. Still it can be said that although to ascend does not belong to the Divine Nature properly, yet it can metaphorically; as, for instance, it is said to ascend in the heart of man (cf. Ps. 83:6), when his heart submits and humbles itself before God: and in the same way God is said to ascend metaphorically with regard to every creature, since He subjects it to Himself. Reply Obj. 2: He who ascended is the same as He who descended. For Augustine says (De Symb. iv): Who is it that descends? The God-Man. Who is it that ascends? The self-same God-Man. Nevertheless a twofold descent is attributed to Christ; one, whereby He is said to have descended from heaven, which is attributed to the God-Man according as He is God: for He is not to be understood as having descended by any local movement, but as having emptied Himself, since when He was in the form of God He took the form of a servant. For just as He is said to be emptied, not by losing His fullness, but because He took our littleness upon Himself, so likewise He is said to have de-

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quia caelum deseruerit, sed quia naturam terrenam assumpsit in unitatem personae. Alius autem est descensus quo descendit in inferiores partes terrae, ut dicitur Ephes. IV. Qui quidem est descensus localis. Unde competit Christo secundum conditionem humanae naturae. Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus dicitur ad patrem ascendere, inquantum ascendit ad consessum paternae dexterae. Quod quidem convenit Christo aliqualiter secundum divinam naturam, aliqualiter autem secundum humanam, ut infra dicetur.

Q. 57, A. 3

scended from heaven, not that He deserted heaven, but because He assumed human nature in unity of person. And there is another descent whereby He descended into the lower regions of the earth, as is written Eph. 4:9; and this is local descent: hence this belongs to Christ according to the condition of human nature. Reply Obj. 3: Christ is said to ascend to the Father, inasmuch as He ascends to sit on the right hand of the Father; and this is befitting Christ in a measure according to His Divine Nature, and in a measure according to His human nature, as will be said later (Q. 58, A. 3).

Article 3 Whether Christ ascended by his own power? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non ascenderit propria virtute. Dicitur enim Marci ult. quod dominus Iesus, postquam locutus est discipulis, assumptus est in caelum. Et Act. I dicitur quod, videntibus illis, elevatus est, et nubes suscepit eum ab oculis eorum. Sed illud quod assumitur et elevatur, ab alio videtur moveri. Ergo Christus non propria virtute, sed aliena, ferebatur in caelum. Praeterea, corpus Christi fuit terrenum, sicut et corpora nostra. Corpori autem terreno contra naturam est ferri sursum. Nullus autem motus est propria virtute eius quod contra naturam movetur. Ergo Christus non ascendit in caelum propria virtute. Praeterea, propria virtus Christi est virtus divina. Sed motus ille non videtur fuisse ex virtute divina, quia, cum virtus divina sit infinita, motus ille fuisset in instanti; et sic non potuisset videntibus discipulis elevari in caelum, ut dicitur Act. I. Ergo videtur quod Christus non ascenderit propria virtute. Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae LXIII, iste formosus in stola sua, gradiens in multitudine fortitudinis suae. Et Gregorius dicit, in homilia ascensionis, notandum est quod Elias in curru legitur ascendisse, ut videlicet aperte demonstraretur quia homo purus adiutorio indigebat alieno. Redemptor autem noster non curru, non Angelis sublevatus legitur, quia qui fecerat omnia, super omnia sua virtute ferebatur. Respondeo dicendum quod in Christo est duplex natura, divina scilicet et humana. Unde secundum utramque naturam potest accipi propria virtus eius. Sed secundum humanam naturam potest accipi duplex virtus Christi. Una quidem naturalis, quae procedit ex principiis naturae. Et tali virtute manifestum est quod Christus non ascendit. Alia autem virtus in humana natura

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not ascend by His own power, because it is written (Mark 16:19) that the Lord Jesus, after He had spoken to them, was taken up to heaven; and (Acts 1:9) that, while they looked on, He was raised up, and a cloud received Him out of their sight. But what is taken up, and lifted up, appears to be moved by another. Consequently, it was not by His own power, but by another’s that Christ was taken up into heaven. Obj. 2: Further, Christ’s was an earthly body, like to ours. But it is contrary to the nature of an earthly body to be borne upwards. Moreover, what is moved contrary to its nature is nowise moved by its own power. Therefore Christ did not ascend to heaven by His own power. Obj. 3: Further, Christ’s own power is Divine. But this motion does not seem to have been Divine, because, whereas the Divine power is infinite, such motion would be instantaneous; consequently, He would not have been uplifted to heaven while the disciples looked on, as is stated in Acts 1:9. Therefore, it seems that Christ did not ascend to heaven by His own power. On the contrary, It is written (Isa 63:1): This beautiful one in his robe, walking in the greatness of his strength. Also Gregory says in a Homily on the Ascension (xxix): It is to be noted that we read of Elias having ascended in a chariot, that it might be shown that one who was mere man needed another’s help. But we do not read of our Savior being lifted up either in a chariot or by angels, because He who had made all things was taken up above all things by His own power. I answer that, There is a twofold nature in Christ, to wit, the Divine and the human. Hence His own power can be accepted according to both. Likewise a twofold power can be accepted regarding His human nature: one is natural, flowing from the principles of nature; and it is quite evident that Christ did not ascend into heaven by such power as this. The other is the power of glory, which is in Christ’s

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Q. 57, A. 3

Incarnate Son of God

est virtus gloriae. Secundum quam Christus in caelum ascendit. Cuius quidem virtutis rationem quidam accipiunt ex natura quintae essentiae, quae est lux, ut dicunt, quam ponunt esse de compositione humani corporis, et per eam elementa contraria conciliari in unum. Ita quod in statu huius mortalitatis natura elementaris in corporibus humanis dominatur, et ideo, secundum naturam elementi praedominantis, corpus humanum naturali virtute deorsum fertur. In statu autem gloriae praedominabitur natura caelestis, secundum cuius inclinationem et virtutem corpus Christi, et alia sanctorum corpora, feruntur in caelum. Sed de hac opinione et in prima parte habitum est; et infra magis agetur, in tractatu de resurrectione communi. Hac autem opinione praetermissa, alii assignant rationem praedictae virtutis ex parte animae glorificatae, ex cuius redundantia glorificabitur corpus, ut Augustinus dicit, ad Dioscorum. Erit enim tanta obedientia corporis gloriosi ad animam beatam ut, sicut Augustinus dicit, XXII de Civ. Dei, ubi volet spiritus, ibi erit protinus corpus, nec volet aliquid quod nec spiritum possit decere nec corpus. Decet autem corpus gloriosum et immortale esse in loco caelesti, sicut dictum est. Et ideo ex virtute animae volentis corpus Christi ascendit in caelum. Sicut autem corpus efficitur gloriosum, ita, ut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., participatione Dei fit anima beata. Unde prima origo ascensionis in caelum est virtus divina. Sic igitur Christus ascendit in caelum propria virtute, primo quidem, virtute divina; secundo, virtute animae glorificatae moventis corpus prout vult.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Christus dicitur propria virtute surrexisse, et tamen est suscitatus a patre, eo quod est eadem virtus patris et filii; ita etiam Christus propria virtute ascendit in caelum, et tamen a patre est elevatus et assumptus. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa probat quod Christus non ascenderit in caelum propria virtute quae est humanae naturae naturalis. Ascendit tamen in caelum propria virtute quae est virtus divina; et propria virtute quae est animae beatae. Et licet ascendere sursum sit contra naturam humani corporis secundum statum praesentem, in quo corpus non est omnino subiectum spiritui non tamen erit contra naturam neque violentum corpori glorioso, cuius tota natura est omnino subiecta spiritui. Ad tertium dicendum quod, etsi virtus divina sit infinita, et infinite operetur quantum est ex parte operantis, tamen effectus virtutis eius recipitur in rebus secundum earum capacitatem, et secundum Dei dispositionem. Corpus autem non est capax ut in instanti

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human nature; and it was according to this that He ascended to heaven. Now there are some who endeavor to assign the cause of this power to the nature of the fifth essence. This, as they say, is light, which they make out to be of the composition of the human body, and by which they contend that contrary elements are reconciled; so that in the state of this mortality, elemental nature is predominant in human bodies: so that, according to the nature of this predominating element the human body is borne downwards by its own power: but in the condition of glory the heavenly nature will predominate, by whose tendency and power Christ’s body and the bodies of the saints are lifted up to heaven. But we have already treated of this opinion in the First Part (Q. 76, A. 7), and shall deal with it more fully in treating of the general resurrection (Suppl., Q. 84, A. 1). Setting this opinion aside, others assign as the cause of this power the glorified soul itself, from whose overflow the body will be glorified, as Augustine writes to Dioscorus (Ep. cxviii). For the glorified body will be so submissive to the glorified soul, that, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), wheresoever the spirit listeth, thither the body will be on the instant; nor will the spirit desire anything unbecoming to the soul or the body. Now it is befitting the glorified and immortal body for it to be in a heavenly place, as stated above (A. 1). Consequently, Christ’s body ascended into heaven by the power of His soul willing it. But as the body is made glorious by participation with the soul, even so, as Augustine says (Tract. xxiii in Joan.), the soul is beatified by participating in God. Consequently, the Divine power is the first source of the ascent into heaven. Therefore Christ ascended into heaven by His own power, first of all by His Divine power, and second by the power of His glorified soul moving His body at will. Reply Obj. 1: As Christ is said to have risen by His own power, though He was raised to life by the power of the Father, since the Father’s power is the same as the Son’s; so also Christ ascended into heaven by His own power, and yet was raised up and taken up to heaven by the Father. Reply Obj. 2: This argument proves that Christ did not ascend into heaven by His own power, i.e., that which is natural to human nature: yet He did ascend by His own power, i.e., His Divine power, as well as by His own power, i.e., the power of His beatified soul. And although to mount upwards is contrary to the nature of a human body in its present condition, in which the body is not entirely dominated by the soul, still it will not be unnatural or forced in a glorified body, whose entire nature is utterly under the control of the spirit. Reply Obj. 3: Although the Divine power be infinite, and operate infinitely, so far as the worker is concerned, still the effect thereof is received in things according to their capacity, and as God disposes. Now a body is incapable of being moved locally in an instant, because it must be com-

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localiter moveatur, quia oportet quod commetiatur se spatio, secundum cuius divisionem dividitur tempus, ut probatur VI Physic. Et ideo non oportet quod corpus motum a Deo moveatur in instanti, sed movetur ea velocitate qua Deus disponit.

Q. 57, A. 4

mensurate with space, according to the division of which time is reckoned, as is proved in Physics vi. Consequently, it is not necessary for a body moved by God to be moved instantaneously, but with such speed as God disposes.

Article 4 Whether Christ ascended above all the heavens? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non ascenderit super omnes caelos. Dicitur enim in Psalmo, dominus in templo sancto suo, dominus, in caelo sedes eius. Quod autem est in caelo, non est supra caelum. Ergo Christus non ascendit super omnes caelos. Praeterea, duo corpora non possunt esse in eodem loco. Cum igitur non sit transitus de extremo in extremum nisi per medium, videtur quod Christus non potuisset ascendere super omnes caelos nisi caelum divideretur. Quod est impossibile. Praeterea, Act. I dicitur quod nubes suscepit eum ab oculis eorum. Sed nubes non possunt elevari supra caelum. Ergo Christus non ascendit super omnes caelos. Praeterea, ibi credimus Christum in perpetuum permansurum quo ascendit. Sed quod contra naturam est, non potest esse sempiternum, quia id quod est secundum naturam, est ut in pluribus et frequentius. Cum ergo contra naturam sit corpori terreno esse supra caelum, videtur quod corpus Christi supra caelum non ascenderit. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ephes. IV, ascendit super omnes caelos, ut adimpleret omnia. Respondeo dicendum quod, quanto aliqua corpora perfectius participant bonitatem divinam, tanto sunt superiora corporali ordine, qui est ordo localis. Unde videmus quod corpora quae sunt magis formalia, sunt naturaliter superiora, ut patet per philosophum, in IV Physic., et in II de caelo, per formam enim unumquodque corpus participat divinum esse, ut patet in I Physic. Plus autem participat de divina bonitate corpus per gloriam quam quodcumque corpus naturale per formam suae naturae. Et inter cetera corpora gloriosa, manifestum est quod corpus Christi maiori refulget gloria. Unde convenientissimum est sibi quod sit supra omnia corpora constitutum in alto. Et ideo, super illud Ephes. IV, ascendens in altum, dicit Glossa, loco et dignitate. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sedes Dei dicitur esse in caelo, non sicut in continente, sed magis sicut in contento. Unde non oportet aliquam partem caeli eo superiorem esse, sed ipsum esse super omnes caelos, sicut et in Psalmo dicitur, elevata est magnificentia tua super caelos, Deus.

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not ascend above all the heavens, for it is written (Ps 10:5): The Lord is in His holy temple, the Lord’s throne is in heaven. But what is in heaven is not above heaven. Therefore Christ did not ascend above all the heavens. Obj. 3: Further, two bodies cannot occupy the same place. Since, then, there is no passing from place to place except through the middle space, it seems that Christ could not have ascended above all the heavens unless heaven were divided; which is impossible. Obj. 4: Further, it is narrated (Acts 1:9) that a cloud received Him out of their sight. But clouds cannot be uplifted beyond heaven. Consequently, Christ did not ascend above all the heavens. Obj. 5: Further, we believe that Christ will dwell for ever in the place whither He has ascended. But what is against nature cannot last for ever, because what is according to nature is more prevalent and of more frequent occurrence. Therefore, since it is contrary to nature for an earthly body to be above heaven, it seems that Christ’s body did not ascend above heaven. On the contrary, It is written (Eph 4:10): He ascended above all the heavens that He might fill all things. I answer that, The more fully anything corporeal shares in the Divine goodness, the higher its place in the corporeal order, which is order of place. Hence we see that the more formal bodies are naturally the higher, as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. iv; De Coelo ii), since it is by its form that every body partakes of the Divine Essence, as is shown in Physics i. But through glory the body derives a greater share in the Divine goodness than any other natural body does through its natural form; while among other glorious bodies it is manifest that Christ’s body shines with greater glory. Hence it was most fitting for it to be set above all bodies. Thus it is that on Eph. 4:8: Ascending on high, the gloss says: in place and dignity. Reply Obj. 1: God’s seat is said to be in heaven, not as though heaven contained Him, but rather because it is contained by Him. Hence it is not necessary for any part of heaven to be higher, but for Him to be above all the heavens; according to Ps. 8:2: For Thy magnificence is elevated above the heavens, O God!

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Q. 57, A. 5

Incarnate Son of God

Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis de natura corporis non sit quod possit esse in eodem loco cum alio corpore, tamen potest hoc Deus facere per miraculum quod in eodem loco possint esse, sicut et fecit corpus Christi ut de clauso utero beatae virginis exiret, et quod intravit ianuis clausis, sicut dicit beatus Gregorius. Corpori ergo Christi convenire potest esse cum alio corpore in eodem loco, non ex proprietate corporis, sed per virtutem divinam assistentem et hoc operantem. Ad tertium dicendum quod nubes illa non praebuit adminiculum Christo ascendenti per modum vehiculi, sed apparuit in signum divinitatis, secundum quod gloria Dei Israel apparebat super tabernaculum in nube. Ad quartum dicendum quod corpus gloriosum non habet ex principiis suae naturae quod possit in caelo aut supra caelum esse, sed habet hoc ex anima beata, ex qua recipit gloriam. Et sicut motus gloriosi corporis sursum non est violentus, ita nec quies violenta. Unde nihil prohibet eam esse sempiternam.

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Reply Obj. 3: Although it is not of the nature of a body for it to be in the same place with another body, yet God can bring it about miraculously that a body be with another in the same place, as Christ did when He went forth from the Virgin’s sealed womb, also when He entered among the disciples through closed doors, as Gregory says (Hom. xxvi). Therefore Christ’s body can be in the same place with another body, not through some inherent property in the body, but through the assistance and operation of the Divine power. Reply Obj. 4: That cloud afforded no support as a vehicle to the ascending Christ: but it appeared as a sign of the Godhead, just as God’s glory appeared to Israel in a cloud over the Tabernacle (Exod 40:32; Num 9:15). Reply Obj. 5: A glorified body has the power to be in heaven or above heaven, not from its natural principles, but from the beatified soul, from which it derives its glory: and just as the upward motion of a glorified body is not violent, so neither is its rest violent: consequently, there is nothing to prevent it from being everlasting.

Article 5 Whether Christ’s body ascended above every spiritual creature? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpus Christi non ascenderit super omnem creaturam spiritualem. Eorum enim quae non dicuntur secundum rationem unam, non potest convenienter fieri comparatio. Sed locus non eadem ratione attribuitur corporibus et spiritualibus creaturis, ut patet ex his quae dicta sunt in prima parte. Ergo videtur quod non possit dici corpus Christi ascendisse super omnem creaturam spiritualem. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., quod omni corpori spiritus praefertur. Sed nobiliori rei sublimior debetur locus. Ergo videtur quod Christus non ascenderit super omnem spiritualem creaturam. Praeterea, in omni loco est aliquod corpus, cum nihil sit vacuum in natura. Si ergo nullum corpus obtinet altiorem locum quam spiritus in ordine naturalium corporum, nullus locus erit supra omnem spiritualem creaturam. Non ergo corpus Christi potuit ascendere super omnem spiritualem creaturam. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ephes. I, constituit illum super omnem principatum et potestatem, et supra omne nomen quod nominatur sive in hoc saeculo sive in futuro. Respondeo dicendum quod tanto alicui rei debetur altior locus, quanto est nobilior, sive debeatur ei locus per modum contactus corporalis, sicut corporibus; sive per modum contactus spiritualis, sicut spiritualibus substantiis. Exinde enim spiritualibus substantiis debe-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s body did not ascend above every spiritual creature. For no fitting comparison can be made between things which have no common ratio. But place is not predicated in the same ratio of bodies and of spiritual creatures, as is evident from what was said in the First Part (Q. 8, A. 2, ad 1, 2; Q. 52, A. 1). Therefore it seems that Christ’s body cannot be said to have ascended above every spiritual creature. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. lv) that a spirit always takes precedence over a body. But the higher place is due to the higher things. Therefore it does not seem that Christ ascended above every spiritual creature. Obj. 3: Further, in every place a body exists, since there is no such thing as a vacuum in nature. Therefore if no body obtains a higher place than a spirit in the order of natural bodies, then there will be no place above every spiritual creature. Consequently, Christ’s body could not ascend above every spiritual creature. On the contrary, It is written (Eph 1:21): God set Him above all principality, and Power, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come. I answer that, The more exalted place is due to the nobler subject, whether it be a place according to bodily contact, as regards bodies, or whether it be by way of spiritual contact, as regards spiritual substances; thus a heavenly place which is the highest of places is becomingly due

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tur secundum quandam congruentiam locus caelestis, qui est supremus locorum, quia illae substantiae sunt supremae in ordine substantiarum. Corpus autem Christi, licet, considerando conditionem naturae corporeae, sit infra spirituales substantias; considerando tamen dignitatem unionis qua est personaliter Deo coniunctum, excellit dignitatem omnium spiritualium substantiarum. Et ideo, secundum praedictae congruentiae rationem, debetur sibi locus altior ultra omnem creaturam etiam spiritualem. Unde et Gregorius dicit, in homilia ascensionis, quod qui fecerat omnia, super omnia sua virtute ferebatur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet alia ratione attribuatur locus corporali et spirituali substantiae, tamen hoc est in utraque ratione commune, quod digniori rei attribuitur superior locus. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de corpore Christi secundum conditionem naturae corporeae, non autem secundum rationem unionis. Ad tertium dicendum quod comparatio ista potest attendi vel secundum rationem locorum, et sic nullus locus est tam altus quod excedat dignitatem spiritualis substantiae; secundum quod procedit obiectio. Vel secundum dignitatem eorum quibus attribuitur locus. Et sic corpori Christi debetur ut sit supra spirituales creaturas.

Q. 57, A. 6

to spiritual substances, since they are highest in the order of substances. But although Christ’s body is beneath spiritual substances, if we weigh the conditions of its corporeal nature, nevertheless it surpasses all spiritual substances in dignity, when we call to mind its dignity of union whereby it is united personally with God. Consequently, owing to this very fittingness, a higher place is due to it above every spiritual creature. Hence Gregory says in a Homily on the Ascension (xxix in Evang.) that He who had made all things, was by His own power raised up above all things.

Reply Obj. 1: Although a place is differently attributed to corporeal and spiritual substances, still in either case this remains in common, that the higher place is assigned to the worthier. Reply Obj. 2: This argument holds good of Christ’s body according to the conditions of its corporeal nature, but not according to its formality of union. Reply Obj. 3: This comparison may be considered either on the part of the places; and thus there is no place so high as to exceed the dignity of a spiritual substance: in this sense the objection runs. Or it may be considered on the part of the dignity of the things to which a place is attributed: and in this way it is due to the body of Christ to be above spiritual creatures.

Article 6 Whether Christ’s ascension is the cause of our salvation? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ascensio Christi non sit causa nostrae salutis. Christus enim fuit causa nostrae salutis inquantum salutem nostram meruit. Sed per ascensionem nihil nobis meruit, quia ascensio pertinet ad praemium exaltationis eius; non est autem idem meritum et praemium, sicut nec via et terminus. Ergo videtur quod ascensio Christi non fuit causa nostrae salutis. Praeterea, si ascensio Christi est causa nostrae salutis, maxime hoc videtur quantum ad hoc quod ascensio eius sit causa nostrae ascensionis. Sed hoc collatum est nobis per eius passionem, quia, ut dicitur Heb. X, habemus fiduciam in introitu sanctorum per sanguinem ipsius. Ergo videtur quod ascensio Christi non fuit causa nostrae salutis. Praeterea, salus per Christum nobis collata est sempiterna, secundum illud Isaiae li, salus autem mea in sempiternum erit. Sed Christus non ascendit in caelum ut ibi in sempiternum esset, dicitur enim Act. I, quemadmodum vidistis eum ascendentem in caelum, ita veniet. Legitur etiam multis sanctis se demonstrasse in terris

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s Ascension is not the cause of our salvation. For, Christ was the cause of our salvation in so far as He merited it. But He merited nothing for us by His Ascension, because His Ascension belongs to the reward of His exaltation: and the same thing is not both merit and reward, just as neither are a road and its terminus the same. Therefore it seems that Christ’s Ascension is not the cause of our salvation. Obj. 2: Further, if Christ’s Ascension be the cause of our salvation, it seems that this is principally due to the fact that His Ascension is the cause of ours. But this was bestowed upon us by His Passion, for it is written (Heb 10:19): We have confidence in the entering into the holies by His blood. Therefore it seems that Christ’s Ascension was not the cause of our salvation. Obj. 3: Further, the salvation which Christ bestows is an everlasting one, according to Isa. 51:6: My salvation shall be for ever. But Christ did not ascend into heaven to remain there eternally; for it is written (Acts 1:11): He shall so come as you have seen Him going, into heaven. Besides, we read of Him showing Himself to many holy people on earth after

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post suam ascensionem, sicut de Paulo legitur Act. IX. Ergo videtur quod eius ascensio non sit causa nostrae salutis. Sed contra est quod ipse dicit, Ioan. XVI, expedit vobis ut ego vadam, idest, ut recedam a vobis per ascensionem. Respondeo dicendum quod ascensio Christi est causa nostrae salutis dupliciter, uno modo, ex parte nostra; alio modo, ex parte ipsius. Ex parte quidem nostra, inquantum per Christi ascensionem mens nostra movetur in ipsum. Quia per eius ascensionem, sicut supra dictum est, primo quidem datur locus fidei; secundo, spei; tertio, caritati. Quarto etiam, per hoc reverentia nostra augetur ad ipsum, dum iam non existimamus eum sicut hominem terrenum, sed sicut Deum caelestem, sicut et apostolus dicit, II Cor. V, etsi cognovimus secundum carnem Christum, idest, mortalem, per quod putavimus eum tantum hominem, ut Glossa exponit, sed nunc iam non novimus. Ex parte autem sua, quantum ad ea quae ipse fecit ascendens propter nostram salutem. Et primo quidem, viam nobis praeparavit ascendendi in caelum, secundum quod ipse dicit, Ioan. XIV, vado parare vobis locum; et Mich. II, ascendit pandens iter ante eos. Quia enim ipse est caput nostrum, oportet illuc sequi membra quo caput praecessit, unde dicitur Ioan. XIV, ut ubi sum ego, et vos sitis. Et in huius signum, animas sanctorum quas de Inferno eduxerat, in caelum traduxit, secundum illud Psalmi, ascendens in altum captivam duxit captivitatem, quia scilicet eos qui fuerant a Diabolo captivati, secum duxit in caelum, quasi in locum peregrinum humanae naturae, bona captione captivos, utpote per victoriam acquisitos. Secundo quia, sicut pontifex in veteri testamento intrabat sanctuarium ut assisteret Deo pro populo, ita et Christus intravit in caelum ad interpellandum pro nobis, ut dicitur Heb. VII. Ipsa enim repraesentatio sui ex natura humana, quam in caelum intulit, est quaedam interpellatio pro nobis, ut, ex quo Deus humanam naturam sic exaltavit in Christo, etiam eorum misereatur pro quibus filius Dei humanam naturam assumpsit. Tertio ut, in caelorum sede quasi Deus et dominus constitutus, exinde divina dona hominibus mitteret, secundum illud Ephes. IV, ascendit super omnes caelos ut adimpleret omnia, scilicet donis suis, secundum Glossam.

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He went up to heaven, to Paul, for instance (Acts 9). Consequently, it seems that Christ’s Ascension is not the cause of our salvation. On the contrary, He Himself said (John 16:7): It is expedient to you that I go; i.e., that I should leave you and ascend into heaven. I answer that, Christ’s Ascension is the cause of our salvation in two ways: first of all, on our part; second, on His. On our part, in so far as by the Ascension our souls are uplifted to Him; because, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3), His Ascension fosters, first, faith; second, hope; third, charity. Fourth, our reverence for Him is thereby increased, since we no longer deem Him an earthly man, but the God of heaven; thus the Apostle says (2 Cor 5:16): If we have known Christ according to the flesh—‘that is, as mortal, whereby we reputed Him as a mere man,’ as the gloss interprets the words—but now we know Him so no longer.

On His part, in regard to those things which, in ascending, He did for our salvation. First, He prepared the way for our ascent into heaven, according to His own saying (John 14:2): I go to prepare a place for you, and the words of Micheas (2:13), He shall go up that shall open the way before them. For since He is our Head the members must follow whither the Head has gone: hence He said (John 14:3): That where I am, you also may be. In sign whereof He took to heaven the souls of the saints delivered from hell, according to Ps. 67:19 (Cf. Eph. 4:8): Ascending on high, He led captivity captive, because He took with Him to heaven those who had been held captives by the devil—to heaven, as to a place strange to human nature; captives in deed of a happy taking, since they were acquired by His victory. Second, because as the high-priest under the Old Testament entered the holy place to stand before God for the people, so also Christ entered heaven to make intercession for us, as is said in Heb. 7:25. Because the very showing of Himself in the human nature which He took with Him to heaven is a pleading for us, so that for the very reason that God so exalted human nature in Christ, He may take pity on them for whom the Son of God took human nature. Third, that being established in His heavenly seat as God and Lord, He might send down gifts upon men, according to Eph. 4:10: He ascended above all the heavens, that He might fill all things, that is, with His gifts, according to the gloss. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ascensio Christi Reply Obj. 1: Christ’s Ascension is the cause of our salest causa nostrae salutis, non per modum meriti, sed per vation by way not of merit, but of efficiency, as was stated modum efficientiae, sicut supra de resurrectione dictum above regarding His Resurrection (Q. 56, A. 1, ad 3, 4).

est. Ad secundum dicendum quod passio Christi est Reply Obj. 2: Christ’s Passion is the cause of our ascausa nostrae ascensionis in caelum, proprie loquendo, cending to heaven, properly speaking, by removing the hinper remotionem peccati prohibentis, et per modum me- drance which is sin, and also by way of merit: whereas riti. Ascensio autem Christi est directe causa ascensio- Christ’s Ascension is the direct cause of our ascension, as

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Ascension of Christ

nis nostrae, quasi inchoando ipsam in capite nostro, cui oportet membra coniungi. Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus, semel ascendens in caelum, adeptus est sibi et nobis in perpetuum ius et dignitatem mansionis caelestis. Cui tamen dignitati non derogat si ex aliqua dispensatione Christus quandoque corporaliter ad terram descendat, vel ut ostendat se omnibus, sicut in iudicio; vel ut ostendat se alicui specialiter, sicut Paulo, ut habetur Act. IX. Et ne aliquis credat hoc factum fuisse, non Christo ibi corporaliter praesente, sed aliqualiter apparente, contrarium apparet per hoc quod ipse apostolus dicit, I Cor. XV, ad confirmandam resurrectionis fidem, novissime omnium, tanquam abortivo, visus est et mihi, quae quidem visio veritatem resurrectionis non probaret nisi ipsum verum corpus visum fuisset ab eo.

Q. 57, A. 6

by beginning it in Him who is our Head, with whom the members must be united. Reply Obj. 3: Christ by once ascending into heaven acquired for Himself and for us in perpetuity the right and worthiness of a heavenly dwelling-place; which worthiness suffers in no way, if, from some special dispensation, He sometimes comes down in body to earth; either in order to show Himself to the whole world, as at the judgment; or else to show Himself particularly to some individual, e.g., in Paul’s case, as we read in Acts 9. And lest any man may think that Christ was not bodily present when this occurred, the contrary is shown from what the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 14:8, to confirm faith in the Resurrection: Last of all He was seen also by me, as by one born out of due time: which vision would not confirm the truth of the Resurrection except he had beheld Christ’s very body.

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Question 58 Christ’s Sitting at the Right Hand of the Father Deinde considerandum est de sessione Christi ad We have now to consider Christ’s sitting at the right dexteram patris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. hand of the Father, concerning which there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum Christus sedeat ad dexteram patris. (1) Whether Christ is seated at the right hand of the Father? Secundo, utrum hoc conveniat sibi secundum (2) Whether this belongs to Him according to the divinam naturam. Divine Nature? Tertio, utrum conveniat sibi secundum humanam. (3) Whether it belongs to Him according to His human nature? Quarto, utrum hoc sit proprium Christi. (4) Whether it is something proper to Christ?

Article 1 Whether it is fitting that Christ should sit at the right hand of God the Father? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christo non conveniat sedere ad dexteram Dei patris. Dextera enim et sinistra sunt differentiae positionum corporalium. Sed nihil corporale convenit Deo, quia Deus spiritus est, ut habetur Ioan. IV. Ergo videtur quod Christus non sedeat ad dexteram patris. Praeterea, si aliquis sedet ad dexteram alicuius, ille sedet ad sinistram eius. Si ergo Christus sedet ad dexteram patris, sequitur quod pater sedeat ad sinistram filii. Quod est inconveniens. Praeterea, sedere et stare videntur oppositionem habere. Sed Stephanus dicit, Act. VII, ecce, video caelos apertos, et filium hominis stantem a dextris virtutis Dei. Ergo videtur quod Christus non sedeat ad dexteram patris. Sed contra est quod dicitur Marci ult., dominus quidem Iesus, postquam locutus est eis, ascendit in caelum, et sedet a dextris Dei. Respondeo dicendum quod in nomine sessionis duo possumus intelligere, videlicet quietem, secundum illud Luc. ult., sedete hic in civitate; et etiam regiam vel iudiciariam potestatem, secundum illud Proverb. XX, rex qui sedet in solio iudicii, dissipat omne malum intuitu suo. Utroque igitur modo Christo convenit sedere ad dexteram patris. Uno quidem modo, inquantum aeternaliter manet incorruptibilis in beatitudine patris, quae eius dextera dicitur, secundum illud Psalmi, delectationes in dextera tua usque in finem. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de symbolo, sedet ad dexteram patris, sedere habitare intelligite, quomodo dicimus de quocumque homine, in illa patria sedit per tres annos. Sic ergo credite Christum

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that Christ should sit at the right hand of God the Father. For right and left are differences of bodily position. But nothing corporeal can be applied to God, since God is a spirit, as we read in John 4:24. Therefore it seems that Christ does not sit at the right hand of the Father. Obj. 2: Further, if anyone sits at another’s right hand, then the latter is seated on his left. Consequently, if Christ sits at the right hand of the Father, it follows that the Father is seated on the left of the Son; which is unseemly. Obj. 3: Further, sitting and standing savor of opposition. But Stephen (Acts 7:55) said: Behold, I see the heavens opened, and the Son of man standing on the right hand of God. Therefore it seems that Christ does not sit at the right hand of the Father. On the contrary, It is written in the last chapter of Mark (16:19): The Lord Jesus, after He had spoken to them, was taken up to heaven, and sitteth on the right hand of God. I answer that, The word sitting may have a twofold meaning; namely, abiding as in Luke 24:49: Sit you in the city: and royal or judiciary power, as in Prov. 20:8: The king, that sitteth on the throne of judgment, scattereth away all evil with his look. Now in either sense it belongs to Christ to sit at the Father’s right hand. First of all inasmuch as He abides eternally unchangeable in the Father’s bliss, which is termed His right hand, according to Ps. 15:11: At Thy right hand are delights even to the end. Hence Augustine says (De Symb. i): ‘Sitteth at the right hand of the Father’: To sit means to dwell, just as we say of any man: ‘He sat in that country for three years’: Believe, then, that Christ dwells so at the right hand of the Father: for He is happy, and the Father’s right

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habitare in dextera Dei patris, beatus enim est, et ipsius beatitudinis nomen est dextera patris. Alio modo dicitur Christus sedere in dextera patris, inquantum patri conregnat, et ab eo habet iudiciariam potestatem, sicut ille qui considet regi ad dexteram, assidet ei in regnando et iudicando. Unde Augustinus dicit, in alio sermone de symbolo, ipsam dexteram intelligite potestatem quam accepit ille homo susceptus a Deo, ut veniat iudicaturus qui prius venerat iudicandus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Damascenus dicit, in IV libro, non localem dexteram patris dicimus. Qualiter enim qui incircumscriptibilis est, localem adipiscetur dexteram? Dextera enim et sinistra eorum quae circumscribuntur sunt. Dexteram autem patris dicimus gloriam et honorem divinitatis. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit secundum quod sedere ad dexteram intelligitur corporaliter. Unde Augustinus dicit, in quodam sermone de symbolo, si carnaliter acceperimus quod Christus sedet ad dexteram patris, ille erit ad sinistram. Ibi autem, idest in aeterna beatitudine, omnis dextera est, quia nulla ibi est miseria. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Gregorius dicit, in homilia ascensionis, sedere iudicantis est, stare vero pugnantis vel adiuvantis. Stephanus ergo, in labore certaminis positus, stantem vidit quem adiutorem habuit. Sed hunc post ascensionem Marcus sedere describit, quia post assumptionis suae gloriam, iudex in fine videbitur.

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hand is the name for His bliss. Second, Christ is said to sit at the right hand of the Father inasmuch as He reigns together with the Father, and has judiciary power from Him; just as he who sits at the king’s right hand helps him in ruling and judging. Hence Augustine says (De Symb. ii): By the expression ‘right hand,’ understand the power which this Man, chosen of God, received, that He might come to judge, who before had come to be judged. Reply Obj. 1: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): We do not speak of the Father’s right hand as of a place, for how can a place be designated by His right hand, who Himself is beyond all place? Right and left belong to things definable by limit. But we style, as the Father’s right hand, the glory and honor of the Godhead. Reply Obj. 2: The argument holds good if sitting at the right hand be taken corporeally. Hence Augustine says (De Symb. i): If we accept it in a carnal sense that Christ sits at the Father’s right hand, then the Father will be on the left. But there—that is, in eternal bliss, it is all right hand, since no misery is there. Reply Obj. 3: As Gregory says in a Homily on the Ascension (Hom. xxix in Evang.), it is the judge’s place to sit, while to stand is the place of the combatant or helper. Consequently, Stephen in his toil of combat saw Him standing whom He had as his helper. But Mark describes Him as seated after the Ascension, because after the glory of His Ascension He will at the end be seen as judge.

Article 2 Whether it belongs to Christ as God to sit at the right hand of the Father? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sedere ad dexteram Dei patris non conveniat Christo secundum quod Deus. Christus enim, secundum quod est Deus, est dextera patris. Sed non videtur idem esse dextera alicuius, et ille qui sedet ad dexteram eius. Ergo Christus, secundum quod est Deus, non sedet ad dexteram patris. Praeterea, Marci ult. dicitur quod dominus Iesus assumptus est in caelum, et sedet a dextris Dei. Christus autem non est assumptus in caelum secundum quod Deus. Ergo etiam neque secundum quod Deus, sedet a dextris Dei. Praeterea, Christus, secundum quod Deus, est aequalis patri et spiritui sancto. Si ergo Christus, secundum quod Deus, sedet ad dexteram patris, pari ratione et Spiritus Sanctus sedebit ad dexteram patris et filii, et ipse pater ad dexteram filii. Quod nusquam invenitur.

Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to Christ as God to sit at the right hand of the Father. For, as God, Christ is the Father’s right hand. But it does not appear to be the same thing to be the right hand of anyone and to sit on his right hand. Therefore, as God, Christ does not sit at the right hand of the Father. Obj. 2: Further, in the last chapter of Mark (16:19) it is said that the Lord Jesus was taken up into heaven, and sitteth on the right hand of God. But it was not as God that Christ was taken up to heaven. Therefore neither does He, as God, sit at the right hand of God. Obj. 3: Further, Christ as God is the equal of the Father and of the Holy Spirit. Consequently, if Christ sits as God at the right hand of the Father, with equal reason the Holy Spirit sits at the right hand of the Father and of the Son, and the Father Himself on the right hand of the Son; which no one is found to say.

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Q. 58, A. 3

Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, quod dexteram patris dicimus gloriam et honorem divinitatis, in qua Dei filius exstitit ante saecula ut Deus et patri consubstantialis. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, nomine dexterae tria intelligi possunt, uno modo, secundum Damascenum, gloria divinitatis; alio modo, secundum Augustinum, beatitudo patris; tertio modo, secundum eundem, iudiciaria potestas. Sessio autem, ut dictum est, vel habitationem, vel regiam vel iudiciariam dignitatem designat. Unde sedere ad dexteram patris nihil aliud est quam simul cum patre habere gloriam divinitatis, et beatitudinem, et iudiciariam potestatem, et hoc immutabiliter et regaliter. Hoc autem convenit filio secundum quod Deus. Unde manifestum est quod Christus, secundum quod Deus, sedet ad dexteram patris, ita tamen quod haec praepositio ad, quae transitiva est, solam distinctionem personalem importat et originis ordinem, non autem gradum naturae vel dignitatis, qui nullus est in divinis personis, ut in prima parte habitum est.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): that what we style as the Father’s right hand, is the glory and honor of the Godhead, wherein the Son of God existed before ages as God and as consubstantial with the Father. I answer that, As may be gathered from what has been said (A. 1) three things can be understood under the expression right hand. First of all, as Damascene takes it, the glory of the Godhead: second, according to Augustine, the beatitude of the Father: third, according to the same authority, judiciary power. Now as we observed (A. 1) sitting denotes either abiding, or royal or judiciary dignity. Hence, to sit on the right hand of the Father is nothing else than to share in the glory of the Godhead with the Father, and to possess beatitude and judiciary power, and that unchangeably and royally. But this belongs to the Son as God. Hence it is manifest that Christ as God sits at the right hand of the Father; yet so that this preposition at, which is a transitive one, implies merely personal distinction and order of origin, but not degree of nature or dignity, for there is no such thing in the Divine Persons, as was shown in the First Part (Q. 42, AA. 3, 4). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod filius dicitur dexReply Obj. 1: The Son of God is called the Father’s right tera patris appropriate, per modum quo etiam dicitur hand by appropriation, just as He is called the Power of the virtus patris. Sed dextera patris secundum tres significa- Father (1 Cor 1:24). But right hand of the Father, in its three tiones praedictas est aliquid commune tribus personis. meanings given above, is something common to the three Persons. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus, secundum Reply Obj. 2: Christ as man is exalted to Divine honor; quod homo, assumptus est ad divinum honorem, qui in and this is signified in the aforesaid sitting; nevertheless praedicta sessione designatur. Sed tamen ille honor divi- such honor belongs to Him as God, not through any asnus convenit Christo, inquantum est Deus, non per ali- sumption, but through His origin from eternity.

quam assumptionem, sed per aeternam originem. Ad tertium dicendum quod nullo modo potest dici quod pater sedeat ad dexteram filii vel spiritus sancti, quia filius et Spiritus Sanctus trahunt originem a patre, et non e converso. Sed Spiritus Sanctus proprie potest dici sedere ad dexteram patris vel filii secundum sensum praedictum, licet secundum quandam appropriationem attribuatur filio, cui appropriatur aequalitas, sicut Augustinus dicit quod in patre est unitas, in filio aequalitas, in spiritu sancto unitatis aequalitatisque connexio.

Reply Obj. 3: In no way can it be said that the Father is seated at the right hand of the Son or of the Holy Spirit; because the Son and the Holy Spirit derive their origin from the Father, and not conversely. The Holy Spirit, however, can be said properly to sit at the right hand of the Father or of the Son, in the aforesaid sense, although by a kind of appropriation it is attributed to the Son, to whom equality is appropriated; thus Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i) that in the Father there is unity, in the Son equality, in the Holy Spirit the connection of unity with equality.

Article 3 Whether it belongs to Christ as man to sit at the right hand of the Father? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod sedere ad dexteram patris non conveniat Christo secundum quod homo. Ut enim Damascenus dicit dexteram patris dicimus gloriam et honorem divinitatis. Sed honor et gloria divinitatis non convenit Christo secundum quod ho-

Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to Christ as man to sit at the right hand of the Father, because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): What we call the Father’s right hand is the glory and honor of the Godhead. But the glory and honor of the Godhead do not belong to Christ

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mo. Ergo videtur quod Christus, secundum quod homo, non sedeat ad dexteram patris. Praeterea, sedere ad dexteram regnantis subiectionem excludere videtur, quia qui sedet ad dexteram regnantis, quodammodo illi conregnat. Christus autem, secundum quod homo, est subiectus patri, ut dicitur I Cor. XV. Ergo videtur quod Christus, secundum quod homo, non sit ad dexteram patris. Praeterea, Rom. VIII, super illud, qui est ad dexteram Dei, exponit Glossa, idest, aequalis patri in honore quo Deus pater est; vel, ad dexteram patris, idest in potioribus bonis Dei. Et super illud Heb. I, sedet ad dexteram Dei in excelsis, Glossa, idest, ad aequalitatem patris, super omnia et loco et dignitate. Sed esse aequalem Deo non convenit Christo secundum quod homo, nam secundum hoc ipse dicit, Ioan. XIV, pater maior me est. Ergo videtur quod sedere ad dexteram patris non conveniat Christo secundum quod homo. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in sermone de symbolo, ipsam dexteram intelligite potestatem quam accepit ille homo susceptus a Deo, ut veniat iudicaturus qui prius venerat iudicandus. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, nomine dexterae patris intelligitur vel ipsa gloria divinitatis ipsius, vel beatitudo aeterna eius, vel potestas iudiciaria et regalis. Haec autem praepositio ad quendam ad dexteram accessum designat, in quo designatur convenientia cum quadam distinctione, ut supra dictum est. Quod quidem potest esse tripliciter. Uno modo, ut sit convenientia in natura et distinctio in persona. Et sic Christus, secundum quod filius Dei, sedet ad dexteram patris, quia habet eandem naturam cum patre. Unde praedicta conveniunt essentialiter filio sicut et patri. Et hoc est esse in aequalitate patris. Alio modo, secundum gratiam unionis, quae importat e converso distinctionem naturae et unitatem personae. Et secundum hoc Christus, secundum quod homo, est filius Dei, et per consequens sedens ad dexteram patris, ita tamen quod ly secundum quod non designet conditionem naturae, sed unitatem suppositi, ut supra expositum est. Tertio modo potest praedictus accessus intelligi secundum gratiam habitualem, quae abundantior est in Christo prae omnibus aliis creaturis, in tantum quod ipsa natura humana in Christo est beatior ceteris creaturis, et super omnes alias creaturas habens regiam et iudiciariam potestatem. Sic igitur, si ly secundum quod designet conditionem naturae, Christus, secundum quod Deus, sedet ad dexteram patris, idest in aequalitate patris. Secundum autem quod homo, sedet ad dexteram patris, idest in bonis paternis potioribus prae ceteris creaturis, idest in maiori beatitudine, et habens iudiciariam potestatem. Si vero ly secundum quod designet unitatem suppositi, sic etiam, secundum quod homo, sedet ad dexteram patris

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as man. Consequently, it seems that Christ as man does not sit at the right hand of the Father. Obj. 2: Further, to sit on the ruler’s right hand seems to exclude subjection, because one so sitting seems in a measure to be reigning with him. But Christ as man is subject unto the Father, as is said in 1 Cor. 15:28. Therefore it seems that Christ as man does not sit at the Father’s right hand. Obj. 3: Further, on Rom. 8:34: Who is at the right hand of God, the gloss adds: that is, equal to the Father in that honor, whereby God is the Father: or, on the right hand of the Father, that is, in the mightier gifts of God. And on Heb. 1:3: sitteth on the right hand of the majesty on high, the gloss adds, that is, in equality with the Father over all things, both in place and dignity. But equality with God does not belong to Christ as man; for in this respect Christ Himself says (John 14:28): The Father is greater than I. Consequently, it appears unseemly for Christ as man to sit on the Father’s right hand. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Symb. ii): By the expression ‘right hand’ understand the power which this Man, chosen of God, received, that He might come as judge, who before had come to be judged. I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), by the expression right hand is understood either the glory of His Godhead, or His eternal beatitude, or His judicial and royal power. Now this preposition at signifies a kind of approach to the right hand; thus denoting something in common, and yet with a distinction, as already observed (De Symb. ii). And this can be in three ways: first of all, by something common in nature, and a distinction in person; and thus Christ as the Son of God, sits at the right hand of the Father, because He has the same Nature as the Father: hence these things belong to the Son essentially, just as to the Father; and this is to be in equality with the Father. Second, according to the grace of union, which, on the contrary, implies distinction of nature, and unity of person. According to this, Christ as man is the Son of God, and consequently sits at the Father’s right hand; yet so that the expression as does not denote condition of nature, but unity of suppositum, as explained above (Q. 16, AA. 10, 11). Third, the said approach can be understood according to habitual grace, which is more fully in Christ than in all other creatures, so much so that human nature in Christ is more blessed than all other creatures, and possesses over all other creatures royal and judiciary power. So, then, if as denote condition of nature, then Christ, as God, sits at the Father’s right hand, that is, in equality with the Father; but as man, He sits at the right hand of the Father, that is, in the Father’s mightier gifts beyond all other creatures, that is to say, in greater beatitude, and exercising judiciary power. But if as denote unity of person, thus again as man, He sits at the Father’s right hand as to equality of honor, inasmuch as with the same honor we venerate the

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secundum aequalitatem honoris, inquantum scilicet eodem honore veneramur ipsum filium Dei cum eadem natura assumpta, ut supra dictum est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod humanitas Christi, secundum conditiones suae naturae, non habet gloriam vel honorem deitatis, quem tamen habet ratione personae cui unitur. Unde ibidem Damascenus subdit, in qua, scilicet gloria deitatis, Dei filius existens ante saecula ut Deus et patri consubstantialis sedet, conglorificata ei carne eius. Adoratur enim una hypostasis una adoratione cum carne eius, ab omni creatura.

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Son of God with His assumed nature, as was said above (Q. 25, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1: Christ’s humanity according to the conditions of His nature has not the glory or honor of the Godhead, which it has nevertheless by reason of the Person with whom it is united. Hence Damascene adds in the passage quoted: In which, that is, in the glory of the Godhead, the Son of God existing before ages, as God and consubstantial with the Father, sits in His conglorified flesh; for, under one adoration the one hypostasis, together with His flesh, is adored by every creature. Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus, secundum Reply Obj. 2: Christ as man is subject to the Father, if quod homo, subiectus est patri prout ly secundum quod as denote the condition of nature: in which respect it does designat conditionem naturae. Et secundum hoc, non not belong to Him as man to sit at the Father’s right hand, competit ei sedere ad dexteram patris secundum ratio- by reason of their mutual equality. But it does thus belong nem aequalitatis, secundum quod est homo. Sic autem to Him to sit at the right hand of the Father, according as competit ei sedere ad dexteram patris secundum quod is thereby denoted the excellence of beatitude and His judiper hoc designatur excellentia beatitudinis, et iudiciaria ciary power over every creature.

potestas super omnem creaturam. Ad tertium dicendum quod esse in aequalitate patris non pertinet ad ipsam naturam humanam Christi, sed solum ad personam assumentem. Sed esse in potioribus bonis Dei, secundum quod importat excessum aliarum creaturarum, convenit etiam ipsi naturae assumptae.

Reply Obj. 3: It does not belong to Christ’s human nature to be in equality with the Father, but only to the Person who assumed it; but it does belong even to the assumed human nature to share in God’s mightier gifts, in so far as it implies exaltation above other creatures.

Article 4 Whether it is proper to Christ to sit at the right hand of the Father? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sedere ad dexteram patris non sit proprium Christi. Dicit enim apostolus, Ephes. II, quod resuscitavit nos, et consedere fecit in caelestibus in Christo Iesu. Sed resuscitari non est proprium Christi. Ergo pari ratione etiam nec sedere ad dexteram Dei in excelsis. Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de symbolo, Christum sedere ad dexteram patris, hoc est habitare in eius beatitudine. Sed hoc multis aliis convenit. Ergo videtur quod sedere ad dexteram patris non sit proprium Christi. Praeterea, ipse dicit, Apoc. III, qui vicerit, dabo ei sedere mecum in throno meo, sicut et ego vici, et sedi cum patre meo in throno eius. Sed per hoc sedet Christus ad dexteram patris, quod sedet in throno eius. Ergo etiam et alii qui vincunt, sedent ad dexteram patris. Praeterea, Matth. XX dominus dicit, sedere ad dexteram vel sinistram meam, non est meum dare vobis, sed quibus paratum est a patre meo. Hoc autem frustra

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to Christ to sit at the right hand of the Father, because the Apostle says (Eph 2:4, 6): God . . . hath raised us up together, and hath made us sit together in the heavenly places through Christ Jesus. But to be raised up is not proper to Christ. Therefore for like reason neither is it proper to Him to sit on the right hand of God on high (Heb 1:3). Obj. 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Symb. i): For Christ to sit at the right hand of the Father, is to dwell in His beatitude. But many more share in this. Therefore it does not appear to be proper to Christ to sit at the right hand of the Father. Obj. 3: Further, Christ Himself says (Rev 3:21): To him that shall overcome, I will give to sit with Me in My throne: as I also have overcome, and am set down with My Father in His throne. But it is by sitting on His Father’s throne that Christ is seated at His right hand. Therefore others who overcome likewise, sit at the Father’s right hand. Obj. 4: Further, the Lord says (Matt 20:23): To sit on My right or left hand, is not Mine to give to you, but to them for whom it is prepared by My Father. But no purpose would be

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diceretur nisi esset aliquibus paratum. Non ergo sedere ad dexteram soli Christo convenit. Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Heb. I, ad quem aliquando dixit Angelorum, sede a dextris meis, idest, in potioribus meis, vel mihi secundum divinitatem aequalis? Quasi dicat, ad nullum. Sed Angeli sunt superiores aliis creaturis. Ergo multo minus ulli alii convenit sedere ad dexteram patris quam Christo. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, Christus dicitur sedere ad dexteram patris, inquantum secundum divinam naturam est in aequalitate patris, secundum autem humanam naturam in excellenti possessione divinorum bonorum prae ceteris aliis creaturis. Utrumque autem soli Christo convenit. Unde nulli alii, nec Angelo nec homini, convenit sedere ad dexteram patris, nisi soli Christo. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia Christus est caput nostrum, illud quod collatum est Christo, est etiam nobis in ipso collatum. Et propter hoc, quia ipse iam resuscitatus est, dicit apostolus quod Deus nos quodammodo ei conresuscitavit, qui tamen in nobis ipsis nondum sumus resuscitati, sed resuscitandi, secundum illud Rom. VIII, qui suscitavit Iesum Christum a mortuis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora nostra. Et secundum eundem modum loquendi subdit apostolus quod consedere nos fecit in caelestibus, scilicet in hoc ipso quod caput nostrum, quod est Christus, ibi sedet. Ad secundum dicendum quod, quia dextera est divina beatitudo, sedere in dextera non significat simpliciter esse in beatitudine, sed habere beatitudinem cum quadam dominativa potestate, et quasi propriam et naturalem. Quod soli Christo convenit, nulli autem alii creaturae. Potest tamen dici quod omnis sanctus qui est in beatitudine, est ad dexteram Dei constitutus. Unde et dicitur Matth. XXV, quod statuet oves a dextris. Ad tertium dicendum quod per thronum significatur iudiciaria potestas, quam Christus habet a patre. Et secundum hoc, dicitur sedere in throno patris. Alii autem sancti habent eam a Christo. Et secundum hoc, dicuntur in throno Christi sedere, secundum illud Matth. XIX, sedebitis et vos super sedes duodecim iudicantes duodecim tribus Israel. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., locus ille, idest consessus dexterae, invius est omnibus non solum hominibus, sed etiam Angelis. Sicut enim praecipuum unigeniti ponit Paulus, dicens, ad quem autem Angelorum dixit unquam, sede a dextris meis? Dominus ergo, non quasi existentibus quibusdam qui sessuri sint, sed condescendens interrogantium supplicationi, respondit. Hoc enim unum solum quaerebant, prae aliis stare apud ipsum. Potest tamen dici quod petebant filii Zebedaei excellentiam habere prae aliis in par-

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served by saying this, unless it was prepared for some. Consequently, to sit at the right hand is not proper to Christ. On the contrary, It is written (Heb 1:13): To which of the angels said He at any time: Sit thou on My right hand?, i.e., in My mightier gifts, or as my equal in the Godhead, as if to answer: To none. But angels are higher than other creatures. Therefore, much less does it belong to anyone save Christ to sit at the Father’s right hand. I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), Christ is said to sit at the Father’s right hand inasmuch as He is on equality with the Father in respect of His Divine Nature, while in respect of His humanity, He excels all creatures in the possession of Divine gifts. But each of these belongs exclusively to Christ. Consequently, it belongs to no one else, angel or man, but to Christ alone, to sit at the right hand of the Father. Reply Obj. 1: Since Christ is our Head, then what was bestowed on Christ is bestowed on us through Him. And on this account, since He is already raised up, the Apostle says that God has, so to speak, raised us up together with Him, still we ourselves are not raised up yet, but are to be raised up, according to Rom. 8:11: He who raised up Jesus from the dead, shall quicken also your mortal bodies: and after the same manner of speech the Apostle adds that He has made us to sit together with Him, in the heavenly places; namely, for the very reason that Christ our Head sits there. Reply Obj. 2: Since the right hand is the Divine beatitude, then to sit on the right hand does not mean simply to be in beatitude, but to possess beatitude with a kind of dominative power, as a property and part of one’s nature. This belongs to Christ alone, and to no other creature. Yet it can be said that every saint in bliss is placed on God’s right hand; hence it is written (Matt 25:33): He shall set the sheep on His right hand. Reply Obj. 3: By the throne is meant the judiciary power which Christ has from the Father: and in this sense He is said to sit in the Father’s throne. But other saints have it from Christ; and in this respect they are said to sit on Christ’s throne; according to Matt. 19:28: You also shall sit upon twelve seats, judging the twelve tribes of Israel. Reply Obj. 4: As Chrysostom says (Hom. lxv in Matth.), that place, to wit, sitting at the right hand, is closed not only to all men, but likewise to angels: for, Paul declares it to be the prerogative of Christ, saying: ‘To which of the angels said He at any time: Sit on My right hand?’ Our Lord therefore replied not as though some were going to sit there one day, but condescending to the supplication of the questioners; since more than others they sought this one thing alone, to stand nigh to Him. Still it can be said that the sons of Zebedee sought for higher excellence in sharing His judi-

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ticipando iudiciariam potestatem eius. Unde non pete- ciary power; hence they did not ask to sit on the Father’s bant quod sederent ad dexteram vel sinistram patris, sed right hand or left, but on Christ’s. ad dexteram vel sinistram Christi.

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Question 59 Christ’s Judiciary Power Deinde considerandum est de iudiciaria potestate Christi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum iudiciaria potestas sit attribuenda Christo. Secundo, utrum conveniat sibi secundum quod est homo. Tertio, utrum fuerit eam ex merito adeptus. Quarto, utrum eius potestas iudiciaria sit universalis respectu omnium hominum. Quinto, utrum, praeter iudicium quod agit in hoc tempore, sit expectandus ad universale iudicium futurum. Sexto, utrum eius iudiciaria potestas etiam ad Angelos se extendat. De executione autem finalis iudicii convenientius agetur cum considerabimus de his quae pertinent ad finem mundi. Nunc autem sufficit ea sola tangere quae pertinent ad Christi dignitatem.

We have now to consider Christ’s judiciary power. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether judiciary power is to be attributed to Christ? (2) Whether it belongs to Him as man? (3) Whether He acquired it by merits? (4) Whether His judiciary power is universal with regard to all men? (5) Whether besides the judgment that takes place now in time, we are to expect Him in the future general judgment? (6) Whether His judiciary power extends likewise to the angels? It will be more suitable to consider the execution of the Last Judgment when we treat of things pertaining to the end of the world. For the present it will be enough to touch on those points that concern Christ’s dignity.

Article 1 Whether judiciary power is to be specially attributed to Christ? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iudiciaria potestas non sit specialiter attribuenda Christo. Iudicium enim aliquorum videtur pertinere ad dominum, unde dicitur Rom. XIV, tu quis es, qui iudicas alienum servum? Sed esse dominum creaturarum est commune toti Trinitati. Non ergo debet Christo specialiter attribui iudiciaria potestas. Praeterea, Daniel VII dicitur, antiquus dierum sedit; et postea subditur, iudicium sedit et libri aperti sunt. Sed antiquus dierum intelligitur pater, quia, ut Hilarius dicit, in patre est aeternitas. Ergo iudiciaria potestas magis est attribuenda patri quam Christo.

Objection 1: It would seem that judiciary power is not to be specially attributed to Christ. For judgment of others seems to belong to their lord; hence it is written (Rom 14:4): Who art thou that judgest another man’s servant? But, it belongs to the entire Trinity to be Lord over creatures. Therefore judiciary power ought not to be attributed specially to Christ. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Dan 7:9): The Ancient of days sat; and further on (Dan 7:10), the judgment sat, and the books were opened. But the Ancient of days is understood to be the Father, because as Hilary says (De Trin. ii): Eternity is in the Father. Consequently, judiciary power ought rather to be attributed to the Father than to Christ. Praeterea, eiusdem videtur iudicare cuius est arObj. 3: Further, it seems to belong to the same person guere. Sed arguere pertinet ad spiritum sanctum, dicit to judge as it does to convince. But it belongs to the Holy enim dominus, Ioan. XVI, cum autem venerit ille, scili- Spirit to convince: for our Lord says (John 16:8): And when cet Spiritus Sanctus, arguet mundum de peccato et de iu- He is come, i.e., the Holy Spirit, He will convince the world stitia et de iudicio. Ergo iudiciaria potestas magis debet of sin, and of justice, and of judgment. Therefore judiciary attribui spiritui sancto quam Christo. power ought to be attributed to the Holy Spirit rather than to Christ. Sed contra est quod dicitur Act. X de Christo, hic On the contrary, It is said of Christ (Acts 10:42): It est qui constitutus est a Deo iudex vivorum et mortuorum. is He who was appointed by God, to be judge of the living end of the dead.

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Respondeo dicendum quod ad iudicium faciendum tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, potestas subditos coercendi, unde dicitur Eccli. VII, noli quaerere fieri iudex, nisi valeas virtute rumpere iniquitates. Secundo, requiritur rectitudinis zelus, ut scilicet aliquis non ex odio vel livore, sed ex amore iustitiae iudicium proferat, secundum illud Proverb. III, quem enim diligit dominus, corripit, et quasi pater in filio complacet sibi. Tertio, requiritur sapientia, secundum quam formatur iudicium, unde dicitur Eccli. X, iudex sapiens iudicabit populum suum. Prima autem duo praeexiguntur ad iudicium, sed proprie tertium est secundum quod accipitur forma iudicii, quia ipsa ratio iudicii est lex sapientiae vel veritatis, secundum quam iudicatur. Et quia filius est sapientia genita, et veritas a patre procedens et ipsum perfecte repraesentans, ideo proprie iudiciaria potestas attribuitur filio Dei. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., haec est incommutabilis illa veritas quae lex omnium artium recte dicitur, et ars omnipotentis artificis. Ut autem nos, et omnes animae rationales, secundum veritatem de inferioribus recte iudicamus, sic de nobis, quando eidem cohaeremus, sola ipsa veritas iudicat. De ipsa vero nec pater, non enim minus est quam ipse. Et ideo quae pater iudicat, per ipsam iudicat. Et postea concludit, pater ergo non iudicat quemquam, sed omne iudicium dedit filio.

I answer that, Three things are required for passing judgment: first, the power of coercing subjects; hence it is written (Sir 7:6): Seek not to be made a judge unless thou have strength enough to extirpate iniquities. The second thing required is upright zeal, so as to pass judgment not out of hatred or malice, but from love of justice, according to Prov. 3:12: For whom the Lord loveth, He chasteneth: and as a father in the son He pleaseth Himself. Third, wisdom is needed, upon which judgment is based, according to Ecclus. 10:1: A wise judge shall judge his people. The first two are conditions for judging; but on the third the very rule of judgment is based, because the standard of judgment is the law of wisdom or truth, according to which the judgment is passed. Now because the Son is Wisdom begotten, and Truth proceeding from the Father, and His perfect Image, consequently, judiciary power is properly attributed to the Son of God. Accordingly Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): This is that unchangeable Truth, which is rightly styled the law of all arts, and the art of the Almighty Craftsman. But even as we and all rational souls judge aright of the things beneath us, so does He who alone is Truth itself pass judgment on us, when we cling to Him. But the Father judges Him not, for He is the Truth no less than Himself. Consequently, whatever the Father judges, He judges through It. Further on he concludes by saying: Therefore the Father judges no man, but has given all judgment to the Son. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex illa ratione proReply Obj. 1: This argument proves that judiciary batur quod iudiciaria potestas sit communis toti Trini- power is common to the entire Trinity, which is quite true: tati, quod et verum est. Sed tamen per quandam appro- still by special appropriation such power is attributed to the priationem iudiciaria potestas attribuitur filio, ut dictum Son, as stated above.

est. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in VI de Trin., patri attribuitur aeternitas propter commendationem principii, quod etiam importatur in ratione aeternitatis. Ibidem etiam Augustinus dicit quod filius est ars patris. Sic igitur auctoritas iudicandi attribuitur patri inquantum est principium filii; sed ipsa ratio iudicii attribuitur filio, qui est ars et sapientia patris, ut scilicet, sicut pater fecit omnia per filium suum inquantum est ars eius, ita etiam iudicat omnia per filium suum inquantum est sapientia et veritas eius. Et hoc significatur in Daniele, ubi primo dicitur quod antiquus dierum sedit, et postea subditur quod filius hominis pervenit usque ad antiquum dierum, et dedit ei potestatem et honorem et regnum, per quod datur intelligi quod auctoritas iudicandi est apud patrem, a quo filius accepit potestatem iudicandi. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., ita dixit Christus quod Spiritus Sanctus arguet mundum de peccato, tanquam diceret, ille diffundet in cordibus vestris caritatem. Sic enim, timore depulso, arguendi habebitis libertatem. Sic ergo spiritui sancto

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Trin. vi), eternity is attributed to the Father, because He is the Principle, which is implied in the idea of eternity. And in the same place Augustine says that the Son is the art of the Father. So, then, judiciary authority is attributed to the Father, inasmuch as He is the Principle of the Son, but the very rule of judgment is attributed to the Son who is the art and wisdom of the Father, so that as the Father does all things through the Son, inasmuch as the Son is His art, so He judges all things through the Son, inasmuch as the Son is His wisdom and truth. And this is implied by Daniel, when he says in the first passage that the Ancient of days sat, and when he subsequently adds that the Son of Man came even to the Ancient of days, who gave Him power, and glory, and a kingdom: and thereby we are given to understand that the authority for judging lies with the Father, from whom the Son received the power to judge. Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Tract. xcv in Joan.): Christ said that the Holy Spirit shall convince the world of sin, as if to say ‘He shall pour out charity upon your hearts.’ For thus, when fear is driven away, you shall have freedom for convincing. Consequently, then, judgment is attributed

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attribuitur iudicium, non quantum ad rationem iudicii, to the Holy Spirit, not as regards the rule of judgment, but sed quantum ad affectum iudicandi quem homines ha- as regards man’s desire to judge others aright. bent.

Article 2 Whether judiciary power belongs to Christ as man? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iudiciaria potestas non conveniat Christo secundum quod est homo. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., quod iudicium attribuitur filio inquantum est ipsa lex primae veritatis. Sed hoc pertinet ad Christum secundum quod est Deus. Ergo iudiciaria potestas non convenit Christo secundum quod est homo, sed secundum quod est Deus. Praeterea, ad iudiciariam potestatem pertinet praemiare bene agentes, sicut et punire malos. Sed praemium bonorum operum est beatitudo aeterna, quae non datur nisi a Deo, dicit enim Augustinus, super Ioan., quod participatione Dei fit anima beata, non autem participatione animae sanctae. Ergo videtur quod iudiciaria potestas non conveniat Christo secundum quod est homo, sed secundum quod est Deus. Praeterea, ad iudiciariam Christi potestatem pertinet iudicare occulta cordium, secundum illud I ad Cor. IV, nolite ante tempus iudicare, quousque veniat dominus, qui et illuminabit abscondita tenebrarum et manifestabit consilia cordium. Sed hoc pertinet ad solam virtutem divinam, secundum illud Ierem. XVII, pravum est cor hominis et inscrutabile, quis cognoscet illud? Ego dominus, scrutans corda et probans renes, qui do unicuique iuxta viam suam. Ergo iudiciaria potestas non convenit Christo secundum quod est homo, sed secundum quod est Deus. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. V, potestatem dedit ei iudicium facere, quia filius hominis est. Respondeo dicendum quod Chrysostomus, super Ioan., sentire videtur quod iudiciaria potestas non conveniat Christo secundum quod est homo, sed solum secundum quod est Deus. Unde auctoritatem Ioannis inductam sic exponit, potestatem dedit ei iudicium facere. Quia filius hominis est, nolite mirari hoc. Non enim propterea suscepit iudicium quoniam homo est, sed quia ineffabilis Dei filius est, propterea iudex est. Quia vero ea quae dicebantur erant maiora quam secundum hominem, ideo, hanc opinionem solvens, dixit, ne miremini quia filius hominis est, etenim ipse est etiam filius Dei. Quod quidem probat per resurrectionis effectum, unde subdit, quia venit hora in qua omnes qui in monumentis sunt, audient vocem filii Dei. Sciendum tamen quod, quamvis apud Deum remaneat primaeva auctoritas iudicandi, hominibus tamen

Objection 1: It would seem that judiciary power does not belong to Christ as man. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi) that judgment is attributed to the Son inasmuch as He is the law of the first truth. But this is Christ’s attribute as God. Consequently, judiciary power does not belong to Christ as man but as God.

Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to judiciary power to reward the good, just as to punish the wicked. But eternal beatitude, which is the reward of good works, is bestowed by God alone: thus Augustine says (Tract. xxiii super Joan.) that the soul is made blessed by participation of God, and not by participation of a holy soul. Therefore it seems that judiciary power does not belong to Christ as man, but as God. Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to Christ’s judiciary power to judge secrets of hearts, according to 1 Cor. 4:5: Judge not before the time; until the Lord come, who both will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the hearts. But this belongs exclusively to the Divine power, according to Jer. 17:9, 10: The heart of man is perverse and unsearchable, who can know it? I am the Lord who search the heart, and prove the reins: who give to every one according to his way. Therefore judiciary power does not belong to Christ as man but as God. On the contrary, It is said (John 5:27): He hath given Him power to do judgment, because He is the Son of man. I answer that, Chrysostom (Hom. xxxix in Joan.) seems to think that judiciary power belongs to Christ not as man, but only as God. Accordingly he thus explains the passage just quoted from John: ‘He gave Him power to do judgment, because He is the Son of man: wonder not at this.’ For He received judiciary power, not because He is man; but because He is the Son of the ineffable God, therefore is He judge. But since the expressions used were greater than those appertaining to man, He said in explanation: ‘Wonder not at this, because He is the Son of man, for He is likewise the Son of God.’ And he proves this by the effect of the Resurrection: wherefore He adds: Because the hour cometh when the dead in their graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God. But it must be observed that although the primary authority of judging rests with God, nevertheless the power

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committitur a Deo iudiciaria potestas respectu eorum qui eorum iurisdictioni subiiciuntur. Unde dicitur Deut. I, quod iustum est iudicate, et postea subditur, quia Dei est iudicium, cuius scilicet auctoritate vos iudicatis. Dictum est autem supra quod Christus, etiam in natura humana, est caput totius Ecclesiae, et quod sub pedibus eius Deus omnia subiecit. Unde et ad eum pertinet, etiam secundum naturam humanam, habere iudiciariam potestatem. Propter quod videtur auctoritatem praedictam Evangelii sic esse intelligendam, potestatem dedit ei iudicium facere quia filius hominis est, non quidem propter conditionem naturae, quia sic omnes homines huiusmodi potestatem haberent, ut Chrysostomus obiicit, sed hoc pertinet ad gratiam capitis, quam Christus in humana natura accepit. Competit autem Christo hoc modo secundum humanam naturam iudiciaria potestas, propter tria. Primo quidem, propter convenientiam et affinitatem ipsius ad homines. Sicut enim Deus per causas medias, tanquam propinquiores effectibus, operatur; ita iudicat per hominem Christum homines, ut sit suavius iudicium hominibus. Unde apostolus dicit, Heb. IV, non habemus pontificem qui non possit compati infirmitatibus nostris, tentatum per omnia per similitudinem, absque peccato. Adeamus ergo cum fiducia ad thronum gratiae eius. Secundo, quia in finali iudicio, ut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., erit resurrectio corporum mortuorum, quae suscitat Deus per filium hominis, sicut per eundem Christum suscitat animas inquantum est filius Dei. Tertio quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis domini, rectum erat ut iudicandi viderent iudicem. Iudicandi autem erant boni et mali. Restabat ut in iudicio forma servi et bonis et malis ostenderetur, forma Dei solis bonis servaretur.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iudicium pertinet ad veritatem sicut ad regulam iudicii, sed ad hominem qui est veritate imbutus pertinet secundum quod est unum quodammodo cum ipsa veritate, quasi quaedam lex et quaedam iustitia animata. Unde et ibidem Augustinus introduxit quod dicitur I Cor. II, spiritualis iudicat omnia. Anima autem Christi prae ceteris creaturis magis fuit unita veritati et magis ea repleta, secundum illud Ioan. I, vidimus eum plenum gratiae et veritatis. Et secundum hoc, ad animam Christi maxime pertinet omnia iudicare. Ad secundum dicendum quod solius Dei est sui participatione animas beatas facere. Sed adducere homines ad beatitudinem, inquantum est caput et auctor salutis eorum, Christi est, secundum illud Heb. II, qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat, auctorem salutis eorum per passionem consummari.

IIIae

to judge is committed to men with regard to those subject to their jurisdiction. Hence it is written (Deut 1:16): Judge that which is just; and further on (Deut 1:17): Because it is the judgment of God, that is to say, it is by His authority that you judge. Now it was said before (Q. 8, AA. 1, 4) that Christ even in His human nature is Head of the entire Church, and that God has put all things under His feet. Consequently, it belongs to Him, even according to His human nature, to exercise judiciary power. On this account, it seems that the authority of Scripture quoted above must be interpreted thus: He gave Him power to do judgment, because He is the Son of Man; not on account of the condition of His nature, for thus all men would have this kind of power, as Chrysostom objects (Hom. xxxix in Joan.); but because this belongs to the grace of the Head, which Christ received in His human nature. Now judiciary power belongs to Christ in this way according to His human nature on three accounts. First, because of His likeness and kinship with men; for, as God works through intermediary causes, as being closer to the effects, so He judges men through the Man Christ, that His judgment may be sweeter to men. Hence (Heb 4:15) the Apostle says: For we have not a high-priest, who cannot have compassion on our infirmities; but one tempted in all things like as we are, without sin. Let us go therefore with confidence to the throne of His grace. Second, because at the last judgment, as Augustine says (Tract. xix in Joan.), there will be a resurrection of dead bodies, which God will raise up through the Son of Man; just as by the same Christ He raises souls, inasmuch as He is the Son of God. Third, because, as Augustine observes (De Verb. Dom., Serm. cxxvii): It was but right that those who were to be judged should see their judge. But those to be judged were the good and the bad. It follows that the form of a servant should be shown in the judgment to both good and wicked, while the form of God should be kept for the good alone. Reply Obj. 1: Judgment belongs to truth as its standard, while it belongs to the man imbued with truth, according as he is as it were one with truth, as a kind of law and living justice. Hence Augustine quotes (De Verb. Dom., Serm. cxxvii) the saying of 1 Cor. 2:15: The spiritual man judgeth all things. But beyond all creatures Christ’s soul was more closely united with truth, and more full of truth; according to John 1:14: We saw Him . . . full of grace and truth. And according to this it belongs principally to the soul of Christ to judge all things. Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to God alone to bestow beatitude upon souls by a participation with Himself; but it is Christ’s prerogative to bring them to such beatitude, inasmuch as He is their Head and the author of their salvation, according to Heb. 2:10: Who had brought many children into glory, to perfect the author of their salvation by His Passion.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod cognoscere occulta cordium et diiudicare per se quidem pertinet ad solum Deum, sed ex refluentia divinitatis ad animam Christi, convenit ei etiam cognoscere et diiudicare occulta cordium, ut supra dictum est, cum de scientia Christi ageretur. Et ideo dicitur Rom. II, in die cum iudicabit Deus occulta hominum per Iesum Christum.

Q. 59, A. 3

Reply Obj. 3: To know and judge the secrets of hearts, of itself belongs to God alone; but from the overflow of the Godhead into Christ’s soul it belongs to Him also to know and to judge the secrets of hearts, as we stated above (Q. 10, A. 2), when dealing with the knowledge of Christ. Hence it is written (Rom 2:16): In the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ.

Article 3 Whether Christ acquired his judiciary power by his merits? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non ex meritis fuerit adeptus iudiciariam potestatem. Iudiciaria enim potestas assequitur regiam dignitatem, secundum illud Proverb. XX, rex qui sedet in solio iudicii, dissipat omne malum intuitu suo. Sed regiam dignitatem Christus obtinuit absque meritis, competit enim ei ex hoc ipso quod est unigenitus Dei; dicitur enim Luc. I, dabit ei dominus Deus sedem David, patris eius, et regnabit in domo Iacob in aeternum. Ergo Christus iudiciariam potestatem non obtinuit ex meritis. Praeterea, sicut dictum est, iudiciaria potestas competit Christo inquantum est caput nostrum. Sed gratia capitis non competit Christo ex meritis, sed consequitur personalem unionem divinae et humanae naturae, secundum illud, vidimus gloriam eius, quasi unigeniti a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis, et de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus, quod pertinet ad rationem capitis. Ergo videtur quod Christus non habuerit ex meritis iudiciariam potestatem. Praeterea, apostolus dicit, I Cor. II, spiritualis iudicat omnia. Sed homo efficitur spiritualis per gratiam, quae non est ex meritis, alioquin iam non esset gratia, ut dicitur Rom. XI. Ergo videtur quod iudiciaria potestas non conveniat nec Christo nec aliis ex meritis, sed ex sola gratia. Sed contra est quod dicitur Iob XXXVI, causa tua quasi impii iudicata est, iudicium causamque recipies. Et Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis domini, sedebit iudex qui stetit sub iudice, damnabit veros reos qui falso factus est reus. Respondeo dicendum quod nihil prohibet unum et idem deberi alicui ex causis diversis, sicut gloria corporis resurgentis debita fuit Christo non solum propter congruentiam divinitatis et propter gloriam animae, sed etiam ex merito humilitatis passionis. Et similiter dicendum est quod iudiciaria potestas homini Christo competit et propter divinam personam, et propter capitis dignitatem, et propter plenitudinem gratiae habitualis, et tamen etiam ex merito eam obtinuit, ut scilicet, secundum Dei iustitiam, iudex esset qui pro Dei iustitia pu-

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not acquire His judiciary power by His merits. For judiciary power flows from the royal dignity: according to Prov. 20:8: The king that sitteth on the throne of judgment, scattereth away all evil with his look. But it was without merits that Christ acquired royal power, for it is His due as God’s Onlybegotten Son: thus it is written (Luke 1:32): The Lord God shall give unto Him the throne of David His father, and He shall reign in the house of Jacob for ever. Therefore Christ did not obtain judiciary power by His merits. Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 2), judiciary power is Christ’s due inasmuch as He is our Head. But the grace of headship does not belong to Christ by reason of merit, but follows the personal union of the Divine and human natures: according to John 1:14, 16: We saw His glory . . . as of the Only-Begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth . . . and of His fullness we all have received: and this pertains to the notion of headship. Consequently, it seems that Christ did not have judiciary power from merits. Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor 2:15): The spiritual man judgeth all things. But a man becomes spiritual through grace, which is not from merits; otherwise it is no more grace, as is said in Rom. 11:6. Therefore it seems that judiciary power belongs neither to Christ nor to others from any merits, but from grace alone. On the contrary, It is written (Job 36:17): Thy cause hath been judged as that of the wicked, cause and judgment thou shalt recover. And Augustine says (Serm. cxxvii): The Judge shall sit, who stood before a judge; He shall condemn the truly wicked, who Himself was falsely reputed wicked. I answer that, There is nothing to hinder one and the same thing from being due to some one from various causes: as the glory of the body in rising was due to Christ not only as befitting His Godhead and His soul’s glory, but likewise from the merit of the lowliness of His Passion. And in the same way it must be said that judiciary power belongs to the Man Christ on account of both His Divine personality, and the dignity of His headship, and the fullness of His habitual grace: and yet He obtained it from merit, so that, in accordance with the Divine justice, He should be

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gnavit et vicit, et iniuste iudicatus est. Unde ipse dicit, Apoc. III, ego vici, et sedi in throno patris mei. In throno autem intelligitur iudiciaria potestas, secundum illud Psalmi, sedet super thronum, et iudicat iustitiam.

judge who fought for God’s justice, and conquered, and was unjustly condemned. Hence He Himself says (Rev 3:21): I have overcome and am set down in My Father’s throne. Now judiciary power is understood by throne, according to Ps. 9:5: Thou hast sat on the throne, who judgest justice. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit Reply Obj. 1: This argument holds good of judiciary de iudiciaria potestate secundum quod debetur Christo power according as it is due to Christ by reason of the union ex ipsa unione ad verbum Dei. with the Word of God. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit ex Reply Obj. 2: This argument is based on the ground of parte gratiae capitis. His grace as Head. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit ex Reply Obj. 3: This argument holds good in regard to parte gratiae habitualis, quae est perfectiva animae Chri- habitual grace, which perfects Christ’s soul. But although sti. Per hoc tamen quod his modis debetur Christo iudi- judiciary power be Christ’s due in these ways, it is not hinciaria potestas, non excluditur quin debeatur ei ex meri- dered from being His due from merit.

to.

Article 4 Whether judiciary power belongs to Christ with respect to all human affairs? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad Christum non pertineat iudiciaria potestas quantum ad omnes res humanas. Ut enim legitur Luc. XII, cum quidam de turba diceret, dic fratri meo ut dividat mecum hereditatem, ille respondit, homo, quis me constituit iudicem aut divisorem super vos? Non ergo habet iudicium super omnes res humanas. Praeterea, nullus habet iudicium nisi super ea quae sunt sibi subiecta. Sed Christo nondum videmus omnia esse subiecta, ut dicitur Heb. II. Ergo videtur quod Christus non habeat super omnes res humanas iudicium. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XX de Civ. Dei, quod ad iudicium divinum pertinet hoc quod interdum boni affliguntur in hoc mundo et interdum prosperantur, et similiter mali. Sed hoc fuit etiam ante Christi incarnationem. Ergo non omnia iudicia Dei circa res humanas pertinent ad potestatem iudiciariam Christi. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. V, pater omne iudicium dedit filio. Respondeo dicendum quod, si de Christo loquamur secundum divinam naturam, manifestum est quod omne iudicium patris pertinet ad filium, sicut enim pater facit omnia verbo suo, ita et omnia iudicat verbo suo. Si vero loquamur de Christo secundum humanam naturam, sic etiam manifestum est quod omnes res humanae subduntur eius iudicio. Et hoc manifestum est, primo quidem, si consideremus habitudinem animae Christi ad verbum Dei. Si enim spiritualis iudicat omnia, ut dicitur I Cor. II, inquantum mens eius verbo Dei in-

Objection 1: It would seem that judiciary power concerning all human affairs does not belong to Christ. For as we read in Luke 12:13, 14, when one of the crowd said to Christ: Speak to my brother that he divide the inheritance with me; He said to him: Man, who hath appointed Me judge, or divider over you? Consequently, He does not exercise judgment over all human affairs. Obj. 2: Further, no one exercises judgment except over his own subjects. But, according to Heb. 2:8, we see not as yet all things subject to Christ. Therefore it seems that Christ has not judgment over all human affairs. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) that it is part of Divine judgment for the good to be afflicted sometimes in this world, and sometimes to prosper, and in like manner the wicked. But the same was the case also before the Incarnation. Consequently, not all God’s judgments regarding human affairs are included in Christ’s judiciary power. On the contrary, It is said (John 5:22): The Father hath given all judgment to the Son. I answer that, If we speak of Christ according to His Divine Nature, it is evident that every judgment of the Father belongs to the Son; for, as the Father does all things through His Word, so He judges all things through His Word. But if we speak of Christ in His human nature, thus again is it evident that all things are subject to His judgment. This is made clear if we consider first of all the relationship subsisting between Christ’s soul and the Word of God; for, if the spiritual man judgeth all things, as is said in 1 Cor. 2:15, inasmuch as his soul clings to the Word of God,

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haeret; multo magis anima Christi, quae plena est veritate verbi Dei, super omnia iudicium habet. Secundo, apparet idem ex merito mortis eius. Quia, ut dicitur Rom. XIV, in hoc Christus mortuus est et resurrexit, ut vivorum et mortuorum dominetur. Et ideo super omnes habet iudicium. Propter quod et apostolus ibi subdit quod omnes stabimus ante tribunal Christi, et Daniel VII, quod dedit ei potestatem et honorem et regnum, et omnes populi, tribus et linguae servient ei. Tertio, apparet idem ex comparatione rerum humanarum ad finem humanae salutis. Cuicumque enim committitur principale, committitur et accessorium. Omnes autem res humanae ordinantur in finem beatitudinis, quae est salus aeterna, ad quam homines admittuntur, vel etiam repelluntur, iudicio Christi, ut patet Matth. XXV. Et ideo manifestum est quod ad iudiciariam potestatem Christi pertinent omnes res humanae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, iudiciaria potestas consequitur regiam dignitatem. Christus autem, quamvis rex esset constitutus a Deo, non tamen in terris vivens terrenum regnum temporaliter administrare voluit, unde ipse dicit, Ioan. XVIII, regnum meum non est de hoc mundo. Et similiter etiam iudiciariam potestatem exercere noluit super res temporales, qui venerat homines ad divina transferre, ut Ambrosius, ibidem, dicit, bene terrena declinat qui propter divina descenderat, nec iudex dignatur esse litium et arbiter facultatum, vivorum habens mortuorumque iudicium, arbitriumque meritorum.

Q. 59, A. 4

how much more Christ’s soul, which is filled with the truth of the Word of God, passes judgment upon all things. Second, the same appears from the merit of His death; because, according to Rom. 14:9: To this end Christ died and rose again; that He might be Lord both of the dead and of the living. And therefore He has judgment over all men; and on this account the Apostle adds (Rom 14:10): We shall all stand before the judgment seat of Christ: and (Dan 7:14) it is written that He gave Him power, and glory, and a kingdom; and all peoples, tribes, and tongues shall serve Him. Third, the same thing is evident from comparison of human affairs with the end of human salvation. For, to whomsoever the substance is entrusted, the accessory is likewise committed. Now all human affairs are ordered for the end of beatitude, which is everlasting salvation, to which men are admitted, or from which they are excluded by Christ’s judgment, as is evident from Matt. 25:31, 40. Consequently, it is manifest that all human affairs are included in Christ’s judiciary power. Reply Obj. 1: As was said above (A. 3, Obj. 1), judiciary power goes with royal dignity. Now Christ, although established king by God, did not wish while living on earth to govern temporarily an earthly kingdom; consequently He said (John 18:36): My kingdom is not of this world. In like fashion He did not wish to exercise judiciary power over temporal concerns, since He came to raise men to Divine things. Hence Ambrose observes on this passage in Luke: It is well that He who came down with a Divine purpose should hold Himself aloof from temporal concerns; nor does He deign to be a judge of quarrels and an arbiter of property, since He is judge of the quick and the dead, and the arbitrator of merits. Reply Obj. 2: All things are subject to Christ in respect of that power, which He received from the Father, over all things, according to Matt. 28:18: All power is given to Me in heaven and in earth. But as to the exercise of this power, all things are not yet subject to Him: this will come to pass in the future, when He shall fulfill His will regarding all things, by saving some and punishing others.

Ad secundum dicendum quod Christo omnia sunt subiecta quantum ad potestatem, quam a patre super omnia accepit, secundum illud Matth. ult., data est mihi omnis potestas in caelo et in terra. Nondum tamen sunt ei omnia subiecta quantum ad executionem suae potestatis. Quod quidem erit in futuro, quando de omnibus voluntatem suam adimplebit, quosdam quidem salvando, quosdam puniendo. Ad tertium dicendum quod ante incarnationem Reply Obj. 3: Judgments of this kind were exercised by huiusmodi iudicia exercebantur per Christum inquan- Christ before His Incarnation, inasmuch as He is the Word tum est verbum Dei, cuius potestatis facta est particeps of God: and the soul united with Him personally became a per incarnationem anima ei personaliter unita. partaker of this power by the Incarnation.

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Article 5 Whether after the Judgment that takes place in the present time, there remains yet another General Judgment? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod post iudicium quod in praesenti tempore agitur, non restat aliud iudicium generale. Post ultimam enim retributionem praemiorum et poenarum, frustra adhiberetur iudicium. Sed in hoc praesenti tempore fit retributio praemiorum et poenarum, dixit enim dominus latroni in cruce, Luc. XXIII, hodie mecum eris in Paradiso; et Luc. XVI dicitur quod mortuus est dives et sepultus in Inferno. Ergo frustra expectatur finale iudicium. Praeterea, Nahum I dicitur, secundum aliam litteram, non iudicabit Deus bis in idipsum. Sed in hoc tempore Dei iudicium exercetur et quantum ad temporalia et quantum ad spiritualia. Ergo videtur quod non sit expectandum aliud finale iudicium. Praeterea, praemium et poena respondent merito et demerito. Sed meritum et demeritum non pertinent ad corpus nisi inquantum est animae instrumentum. Ergo nec praemium seu poena debetur corpori nisi per animam. Non ergo requiritur aliud iudicium in fine, ad hoc quod homo praemietur aut puniatur in corpore, praeter illud quo nunc puniuntur aut praemiantur animae. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. XII, sermo quem locutus sum vobis, ille vos iudicabit in novissimo die. Erit ergo quoddam iudicium in novissimo die, praeter iudicium quod nunc agitur. Respondeo dicendum quod iudicium de aliqua re mutabili perfecte dari non potest ante eius consummationem. Sicut iudicium de aliqua actione qualis sit, perfecte dari non potest antequam sit consummata et in se et in suis effectibus, quia multae actiones videntur esse utiles, quae ex effectibus demonstrantur nocivae. Et similiter de homine aliquo iudicium perfecte dari non potest quandiu eius vita terminetur, eo quod multipliciter potest mutari de bono in malum aut e converso, vel de bono in melius, aut de malo in peius. Unde apostolus dicit, Heb. IX, quod hominibus statutum est semel mori, post hoc autem, iudicium. Sciendum tamen quod, licet per mortem vita hominis temporalis terminetur secundum se, remanet tamen ex futuris secundum quid dependens. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod adhuc vivit in memoriis hominum, in quibus quandoque contra veritatem remanet bonae famae vel malae. Alio modo in filiis, qui sunt quasi aliquid patris, secundum illud Eccli. XXX, mortuus est pater illius, et quasi non est mortuus, similem enim reliquit sibi post se. Et tamen multorum bonorum sunt mali filii, et e converso. Tertio modo, quantum ad effectum

Objection 1: It would seem that after the Judgment that takes place in the present time, there does not remain another General Judgment. For a judgment serves no purpose after the final allotment of rewards and punishments. But rewards and punishments are allotted in this present time: for our Lord said to the thief on the cross (Luke 23:43): This day thou shalt be with Me in paradise: and (Luke 16:22) it is said that the rich man died and was buried in hell. Therefore it is useless to look forward to a final Judgment. Obj. 2: Further, according to another (the Septuagint) version of Nahum 1:9, God shall not judge the same thing a second time. But in the present time God judges both temporal and spiritual matters. Therefore, it does not seem that another final judgment is to be expected. Obj. 3: Further, reward and punishment correspond with merit and demerit. But merit and demerit bear relation to the body only in so far as it is the instrument of the soul. Therefore reward or punishment is not due to the body save as the soul’s instrument. Therefore no other Judgment is called for at the end (of the world) to requite man with reward or punishment in the body, besides that Judgment in which souls are now punished or rewarded. On the contrary, It is said in John 12:48: The word that I have spoken, the same shall judge you in the last day. Therefore there will be a Judgment at the last day besides that which takes place in the present time. I answer that, Judgment cannot be passed perfectly upon any changeable subject before its consummation: just as judgment cannot be given perfectly regarding the quality of any action before its completion in itself and in its results: because many actions appear to be profitable, which in their effects prove to be hurtful. And in the same way perfect judgment cannot be passed upon any man before the close of his life, since he can be changed in many respects from good to evil, or conversely, or from good to better, or from evil to worse. Hence the Apostle says (Heb 9:27): It is appointed unto men once to die, and after this the Judgment. But it must be observed that although man’s temporal life in itself ends with death, still it continues dependent in a measure on what comes after it in the future. In one way, as it still lives on in men’s memories, in which sometimes, contrary to the truth, good or evil reputations linger on. In another way in a man’s children, who are so to speak something of their parent, according to Ecclus. 30:4: His father is dead, and he is as if he were not dead, for he hath left one behind him that is like himself. And yet many good men have wicked sons, and conversely. Third, as to the result of his ac-

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suorum operum, sicut ex deceptione Arii et aliorum seductorum pullulat infidelitas usque ad finem mundi; et usque tunc proficit fides ex praedicatione apostolorum. Quarto modo, quantum ad corpus, quod quandoque honorifice traditur sepulturae, quandoque vero relinquitur insepultum, et tandem incineratum resolvitur omnino. Quinto modo, quantum ad ea in quibus homo suum affectum defixit, puta in quibuscumque temporalibus rebus, quorum quaedam citius finiuntur, quaedam diutius durant. Omnia autem haec subduntur existimationi divini iudicii. Et ideo de his omnibus perfectum et manifestum iudicium haberi non potest quandiu huius temporis cursus durat. Et propter hoc oportet esse finale iudicium in novissimo die, in quo perfecte id quod ad unumquemque hominem pertinet quocumque modo, perfecte et manifeste diiudicetur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod opinio quorundam fuit quod animae sanctorum non praemiantur in caelo, nec animae damnatorum puniuntur in Inferno, usque ad diem iudicii. Quod apparet falsum ex hoc quod apostolus, II Cor. V, dicit, audemus, et bonam voluntatem habemus, peregrinari a corpore et praesentes esse ad dominum, quod est iam non ambulare per fidem, sed per speciem, ut patet ex his quae subsequuntur. Hoc autem est videre Deum per essentiam, in quo consistit vita aeterna, ut patet Ioan. XVII. Unde manifestum est animas a corporibus separatas esse in vita aeterna. Et ideo dicendum est quod post mortem, quantum ad ea quae sunt animae, homo sortitur quendam immutabilem statum. Et ideo, quantum ad praemium animae, non oportet ulterius differri iudicium. Sed quia quaedam alia sunt ad hominem pertinentia quae toto temporis cursu aguntur, quae non sunt aliena a divino iudicio, oportet iterum in fine temporis omnia haec in iudicium adduci. Licet enim homo secundum haec non mereatur neque demereatur, tamen pertinent ad aliquod eius praemium vel poenam. Unde oportet haec omnia existimari in finali iudicio. Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus non iudicabit bis in idipsum, idest secundum idem. Sed secundum diversa non est inconveniens Deum bis iudicare. Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet praemium vel poena corporis dependeat ex praemio vel poena animae, tamen, quia anima non est mutabilis nisi per accidens propter corpus, separata statim a corpore habet statum immutabilem, et accipit suum iudicium. Sed corpus remanet mutabilitati subiectum usque ad finem temporis. Et ideo oportet quod tunc recipiat suum praemium vel poenam in finali iudicio.

Q. 59, A. 5

tions: just as from the deceit of Arius and other false leaders unbelief continues to flourish down to the close of the world; and even until then faith will continue to derive its progress from the preaching of the apostles. In a fourth way, as to the body, which is sometimes buried with honor and sometimes left unburied, and finally falls to dust utterly. In a fifth way, as to the things upon which a man’s heart is set, such as temporal concerns, for example, some of which quickly lapse, while others endure longer. Now all these things are submitted to the verdict of the Divine Judgment; and consequently, a perfect and public Judgment cannot be made of all these things during the course of this present time. Wherefore, there must be a final Judgment at the last day, in which everything concerning every man in every respect shall be perfectly and publicly judged. Reply Obj. 1: Some men have held the opinion that the souls of the saints shall not be rewarded in heaven, nor the souls of the lost punished in hell, until the Judgmentday. That this is false appears from the testimony of the Apostle (2 Cor 5:8), where he says: We are confident and have a good will to be absent rather from the body, and to be present with the Lord: that is, not to walk by faith but by sight, as appears from the context. But this is to see God in His Essence, wherein consists eternal life, as is clear from John 17:3. Hence it is manifest that the souls separated from bodies are in eternal life. Consequently, it must be maintained that after death man enters into an unchangeable state as to all that concerns the soul: and therefore there is no need for postponing judgment as to the reward of the soul. But since there are some other things pertaining to a man which go on through the whole course of time, and which are not foreign to the Divine judgment, all these things must be brought to judgment at the end of time. For although in regard to such things a man neither merits nor demerits, still in a measure they accompany his reward or punishment. Consequently all these things must be weighed in the final judgment. Reply Obj. 2: God shall not judge twice the same thing, i.e., in the same respect; but it is not unseemly for God to judge twice according to different respects. Reply Obj. 3: Although the reward or punishment of the body depends upon the reward or punishment of the soul, nevertheless, since the soul is changeable only accidentally, on account of the body, once it is separated from the body it enters into an unchangeable condition, and receives its judgment. But the body remains subject to change down to the close of time: and therefore it must receive its reward or punishment then, in the last Judgment.

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Incarnate Son of God

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Article 6 Whether Christ’s judiciary power extends to the angels? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod potestas Christi iudiciaria non se extendat ad Angelos. Angeli enim, tam boni quam mali, iudicati sunt a principio mundi, quando, quibusdam cadentibus per peccatum, alii sunt in beatitudine confirmati. Sed illi qui iudicati sunt, non iterum indigent iudicari. Ergo potestas iudiciaria Christi non se extendit ad Angelos. Praeterea, non est eiusdem iudicare et iudicari. Sed Angeli venient cum Christo iudicaturi, secundum illud Matth. XXV, cum venerit filius hominis in maiestate sua, et omnes Angeli eius cum eo. Ergo videtur quod Angeli non sint iudicandi a Christo. Praeterea, Angeli sunt superiores aliis creaturis. Si ergo Christus est iudex non solum hominum, sed etiam Angelorum, pari ratione erit iudex omnium creaturarum. Quod videtur esse falsum, cum hoc sit proprium providentiae Dei, unde dicitur Iob XXXIV, quem constituit alium super terram? Aut quem posuit super orbem quem fabricatus est? Non ergo Christus est iudex Angelorum. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I Cor. VI, an nescitis quoniam Angelos iudicabimus? Sed sancti non iudicabunt nisi auctoritate Christi. Ergo multo magis Christus habet iudiciariam potestatem super Angelos. Respondeo dicendum quod Angeli subsunt iudiciariae potestati Christi, non solum quantum ad divinam naturam, prout est verbum Dei, sed etiam ratione humanae naturae. Quod patet ex tribus. Primo quidem, ex propinquitate naturae assumptae ad Deum, quia, ut dicitur Heb. II, nusquam Angelos apprehendit, sed semen Abrahae apprehendit. Et ideo anima Christi magis est repleta veritate verbi Dei quam aliquis Angelorum. Unde et Angelos illuminat, sicut Dionysius dicit, VII cap. Cael. Hier. Unde de eis habet iudicare. Secundo, quia per humilitatem passionis humana natura in Christo meruit exaltari super Angelos, ita quod, sicut dicitur Philipp. II, in nomine Iesu omne genu flectatur, caelestium, terrestrium et Infernorum. Et ideo Christus habet iudiciariam potestatem etiam super Angelos bonos et malos. In cuius signum dicitur, Apoc. VII, quod omnes Angeli stabant in circuitu throni. Tertio, ratione eorum quae circa homines operantur, quorum Christus speciali quodam modo est caput. Unde dicitur Heb. I, omnes sunt administratorii spiritus, in ministerium missi propter eos qui hereditatem capiunt salutis. Subsunt autem iudicio Christi, uno quidem modo, quantum ad dispensationem eorum quae per ipsos aguntur. Quae quidem dispensatio fit etiam per hominem Christum, cui Angeli ministrabant, ut dicitur Matth. IV; et a quo Daemones petebant ut in porcos mitterentur, ut dicitur Matth. VIII. Secundo,

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s judiciary power does not extend to the angels, because the good and wicked angels alike were judged in the beginning of the world, when some fell through sin while others were confirmed in bliss. But those already judged have no need of being judged again. Therefore Christ’s judiciary power does not extend to the angels. Obj. 2: Further, the same person cannot be both judge and judged. But the angels will come to judge with Christ, according to Matt. 25:31: When the Son of Man shall come in His majesty, and all the angels with Him. Therefore it seems that the angels will not be judged by Christ. Obj. 3: Further, the angels are higher than other creatures. If Christ, then, be judge not only of men but likewise of angels, then for the same reason He will be judge of all creatures; which seems to be false, since this belongs to God’s providence: hence it is written (Job 34:13): What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He made? Therefore Christ is not the judge of the angels. On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor 6:3): Know you not that we shall judge angels? But the saints judge only by Christ’s authority. Therefore, much more does Christ possess judiciary power over the angels. I answer that, The angels are subjects of Christ’s judiciary power, not only with regard to His Divine Nature, as He is the Word of God, but also with regard to His human nature. And this is evident from three considerations. First of all, from the closeness of His assumed nature to God; because, according to Heb. 2:16: For nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold. Consequently, Christ’s soul is more filled with the truth of the Word of God than any angel: for which reason He also enlightens the angels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), and so He has power to judge them. Second, because by the lowliness of His Passion, human nature in Christ merited to be exalted above the angels; so that, as is said in Phil. 2:10: In the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth. And therefore Christ has judiciary power even over the good and wicked angels: in token whereof it is said in the Apocalypse (7:11) that all the angels stood round about the throne. Third, on account of what they do for men, of whom Christ is the Head in a special manner. Hence it is written (Heb 1:14): They are all ministering spirits, sent to minister for them, who shall receive the inheritance of salvation. But they are submitted to Christ’s judgment, first, as regards the dispensing of those things which are done through them; which dispensing is likewise done by the Man Christ, to whom the angels ministered, as related (Matt 4:11), and from whom the devils

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quantum ad alia accidentalia praemia bonorum Angelorum, quae sunt gaudia quae habent de salute hominum, secundum illud Luc. XV, gaudium est Angelis Dei super uno peccatore poenitentiam agente. Et etiam quantum ad poenas accidentales Daemonum, quibus torquentur vel hic, vel recluduntur in Inferno. Et hoc etiam pertinet ad hominem Christum. Unde Marci I dicitur quod Daemon clamavit, quid nobis et tibi, Iesu Nazarene? Venisti perdere nos? Tertio, quantum ad praemium essentiale beatorum Angelorum, quod est beatitudo aeterna, et quantum ad poenam essentialem malorum, quae est damnatio aeterna. Sed hoc factum est per Christum inquantum est verbum Dei, a principio mundi.

besought that they might be sent into the swine, according to Matt. 8:31. Second, as to other accidental rewards of the good angels, such as the joy which they have at the salvation of men, according to Luke 15:10: There shall be joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing penance: and furthermore as to the accidental punishments of the devils wherewith they are either tormented here, or are shut up in hell; and this also belongs to the Man Christ: hence it is written (Mark 1:24) that the devil cried out: What have we to do with thee, Jesus of Nazareth? art Thou come to destroy us? Third, as to the essential reward of the good angels, which is everlasting bliss; and as to the essential punishment of the wicked angels, which is everlasting damnation. But this was done by Christ from the beginning of the world, inasmuch as He is the Word of God. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers judgment as to de iudicio quantum ad praemium essentiale et poenam the essential reward and chief punishment.

principalem. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., licet spiritualis iudicet omnia, tamen iudicatur ab ipsa veritate. Et ideo, licet Angeli, ex eo quod sunt spirituales, iudicent, iudicantur tamen a Christo, inquantum est veritas. Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus habet iudicium non solum super Angelos, sed etiam super administrationem totius creaturae. Si enim, ut Augustinus dicit, in III de Trin., inferiora quodam ordine reguntur a Deo per superiora, oportet dicere quod omnia regantur per animam Christi, quae est super omnem creaturam. Unde et apostolus dicit, Heb. II, non enim Angelis subiecit Deus orbem terrae futurum, scilicet subiectum ei de quo loquimur, idest Christo. Nec tamen propter hoc alium constituit Deus super terram. Quia unus et idem est Deus et homo dominus Iesus Christus. De cuius incarnationis mysterio ad praesens dicta sufficiant.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): Although the spiritual man judgeth all things, still he is judged by Truth Itself. Consequently, although the angels judge, as being spiritual creatures, still they are judged by Christ, inasmuch as He is the Truth. Reply Obj. 3: Christ judges not only the angels, but also the administration of all creatures. For if, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii) the lower things are ruled by God through the higher, in a certain order, it must be said that all things are ruled by Christ’s soul, which is above every creature. Hence the Apostle says (Heb 2:5): For God hath not subjected unto angels the world to come—subject namely to Christ—of whom we speak. Nor does it follow that God set another over the earth; since one and the same Person is God and Man, our Lord Jesus Christ. Let what has been said of the Mystery of His Incarnation suffice for the present.

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