Summa Theologiae Secunda Secundae, 92-189 (Latin-English Opera Omnia) [1 ed.] 1623400112, 9781623400118

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Saint Thomas Aquinas

Summa Theologiae Secunda Secundae, 92–189

Translated by Fr. Laurence Shapcote, op

Summa Theologiae Volume 18 Latin/English Edition of the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas

Aquinas Institute, Inc. Green Bay, Wisconsin 2017

This printing was funded in part by donations made in memory of: Marcus Berquist, Rose Johanna Trumbull, John and Mary Deignan, Thomas and Eleanor Sullivan, Ann C. Arcidi, and Fr. John T. Feeney and his sister Mary This printing was also made possible by donations from Kevin Bergdorf, Patricia Lynch, Josh and Holly Harnisch, and by donations made in honor of the Studentate Community of the Dominican Province of St. Albert the Great, USA, Fr. Brian McMaster, Dr. Brian Cutter, and in gratitude to the Very Rev. Romanus Cessario, op, stm

Published with the ecclesiastical approval of The Most Reverend Paul D. Etienne, dd, stl Bishop of Cheyenne Given on July 16, 2015

Copyright © 2017 Aquinas Institute, Inc. 240 E Falcon Hill Way Green Bay, WI 54302 www.TheAquinasInstitute.org Printed in the United States of America

Thomas Aquinas, St., 1225?–1274 Summa Theologiae Secunda Secundae, 92–189 / Saint Thomas Aquinas; edited by The Aquinas Institute; translated by Fr. Laurence Shapcote, O.P. p. cm. ISBN 978-1-62340-211-2 1. Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, 1225?–1274 — Summa theologiae — Secunda Secundae — 92–189. 2. Catholic Church — Doctrines — Early works to 1800. 3. Theology, Doctrinal — Early works to 1800. I. Title. II. Series BX1749.T512 2015 230΄.2--dc23

2012953835

Notes on the Text

Latin Text of St. Thomas The Latin text used in this volume is based on the Leonine Edition, transcribed and revised by The Aquinas Institute.

English Translation of St. Thomas The English translation of the Summa Theologiae was prepared by Fr. Laurence Shapcote, op (1864–1947), of the English Dominican Province. It has been edited and revised by The Aquinas Institute.

The Aquinas Institute requests your assistance in the continued perfection of these texts. If you discover any errors, please send us a note by email: [email protected]

Dedicated with love to Our Lady of Mt. Carmel

Contents Question 92 – Superstition 1. Whether superstition is a vice contrary to religion?............................................................................................1 2. Whether there are various species of superstition? .............................................................................................2

Question 93 – Superstition Consisting in Undue Worship of the True God 1. Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God? ......................................................5 2. Whether there can be any excess in the worship of God? ...................................................................................6

Question 94 – Idolatry 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether idolatry is rightly reckoned a species of superstition? ..........................................................................9 Whether idolatry is a sin?..................................................................................................................................12 Whether idolatry is the gravest of sins?.............................................................................................................13 Whether the cause of idolatry was on the part of man? ....................................................................................15

Question 95 – Superstition in Divinations 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Whether divination is a sin? ..............................................................................................................................19 Whether divination is a species of superstition? ...............................................................................................21 Whether we ought to distinguish several species of divination? .......................................................................22 Whether divination practiced by invoking the demons is unlawful? ................................................................24 Whether divination by the stars is unlawful? ....................................................................................................26 Whether divination by dreams is unlawful?......................................................................................................28 Whether divination by auguries, omens, and by like observations of external things is unlawful? ..................30 Whether divination by drawing lots is unlawful?..............................................................................................32

Question 96 – Superstition in Observances 1. Whether it be unlawful to practice the observances of the magic art? ..............................................................35 2. Whether observances directed to the alteration of bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring health or the like, are unlawful? ..................................................................................................................... 37 3. Whether observances directed to the purpose of fortune-telling are unlawful? ...............................................39 4. Whether it is unlawful to wear divine words at the neck? .................................................................................40

Question 97 – The Temptation of God 1. Whether the temptation of God consists in certain deeds, wherein the expected result is ascribed to the power of God alone? .............................................................................................................. 43 2. Whether it is a sin to tempt God?......................................................................................................................45 3. Whether temptation of God is opposed to the virtue of religion?.....................................................................47 4. Whether the temptation of God is a graver sin than superstition?....................................................................48

Question 98 – Perjury 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether it is necessary for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath be false?.........................................51 Whether all perjury is sinful? ............................................................................................................................52 Whether all perjury is a mortal sin? ..................................................................................................................54 Whether he sins who demands an oath of a perjurer? ......................................................................................55

Question 99 – Sacrilege 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether sacrilege is the violation of a sacred thing?.........................................................................................59 Whether sacrilege is a special sin? .....................................................................................................................60 Whether the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred things? .........................................61 Whether the punishment of sacrilege should be pecuniary?.............................................................................63

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Question 100 – Simony 1. Whether simony is an intentional will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing? ............................................................................................................................................... 65 2. Whether it is always unlawful to give money for the sacraments? ....................................................................68 3. Whether it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual actions? ...............................................................70 4. Whether it is lawful to receive money for things annexed to spiritual things?..................................................73 5. Whether it is lawful to grant spiritual things in return for an equivalent of service, or for an oral remuneration?......................................................................................................................................... 75 6. Whether those who are guilty of simony are fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired by simony? .............................................................................................................................. 76

Question 101 – Piety 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether piety extends to particular human individuals? .................................................................................81 Whether piety provides support for our parents?..............................................................................................82 Whether piety is a special virtue distinct from other virtues? ...........................................................................83 Whether the duties of piety towards one’s parents should be omitted for the sake of religion? ........................84

Question 102 – Observance 1. Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues? ................................................................89 2. Whether it belongs to observance to pay worship and honor to those who are in positions of dignity? ..........91 3. Whether observance is a greater virtue than piety?...........................................................................................92

Question 103 – Dulia 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether honor denotes something corporal? ...................................................................................................95 Whether honor is properly due to those who are above us?..............................................................................97 Whether dulia is a special virtue distinct from latria? .......................................................................................98 Whether dulia has various species? .................................................................................................................100

Question 104 – Obedience 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether one man is bound to obey another? .................................................................................................103 Whether obedience is a special virtue?............................................................................................................104 Whether obedience is the greatest of the virtues? ...........................................................................................107 Whether God ought to be obeyed in all things? ..............................................................................................109 Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?..................................................................110 Whether Christians are bound to obey the secular powers? ...........................................................................112

Question 105 – Disobedience 1. Whether disobedience is a mortal sin? ............................................................................................................115 2. Whether disobedience is the most grievous of sins? .......................................................................................116

Question 106 – Thankfulness or Gratitude 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether thankfulness is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?............................................................119 Whether the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent? ............................................120 Whether a man is bound to give thanks to every benefactor?.........................................................................122 Whether a man is bound to repay a favor at once? .........................................................................................124 Whether in giving thanks we should look at the benefactor’s disposition or at the deed? ..............................125 Whether the repayment of gratitude should surpass the favor received?........................................................126

Question 107 – Ingratitude 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether ingratitude is always a sin? ...............................................................................................................129 Whether ingratitude is a special sin? ...............................................................................................................130 Whether ingratitude is always a mortal sin?....................................................................................................131 Whether favors should be withheld from the ungrateful?...............................................................................133

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Question 108 – Vengeance 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether vengeance is lawful? .........................................................................................................................135 Whether vengeance is a special virtue? ...........................................................................................................137 Whether vengeance should be wrought by means of punishments customary among men? .........................139 Whether vengeance should be taken on those who have sinned involuntarily?..............................................140

Question 109 – Truth 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether truth is a virtue?................................................................................................................................145 Whether truth is a special virtue?....................................................................................................................146 Whether truth is a part of justice? ...................................................................................................................148 Whether the virtue of truth inclines rather to that which is less?....................................................................150

Question 110 – Lying 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether lying is always opposed to truth?......................................................................................................153 Whether lies are sufficiently divided into officious, jocose, and mischievous lies?..........................................155 Whether every lie is a sin? ...............................................................................................................................157 Whether every lie is a mortal sin? ...................................................................................................................160

Question 111 – Dissimulation and Hypocrisy 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether all dissimulation is a sin? ..................................................................................................................163 Whether hypocrisy is the same as dissimulation? ...........................................................................................165 Whether hypocrisy is contrary to the virtue of truth?.....................................................................................166 Whether hypocrisy is always a mortal sin?......................................................................................................168

Question 112 – Boasting 1. Whether boasting is opposed to the virtue of truth? .......................................................................................171 2. Whether boasting is a mortal sin? ...................................................................................................................172

Question 113 – Irony 1. Whether irony is a sin? ....................................................................................................................................175 2. Whether irony is a less grievous sin than boasting? ........................................................................................176

Question 114 – The Friendliness Which is Called Affability 1. Whether friendliness is a special virtue? .........................................................................................................179 2. Whether this kind of friendship is a part of justice?........................................................................................181

Question 115 – Flattery 1. Whether flattery is a sin? .................................................................................................................................183 2. Whether flattery is a mortal sin? .....................................................................................................................184

Question 116 – Quarreling 1. Whether quarreling is opposed to the virtue of friendship or affability?.........................................................187 2. Whether quarreling is a more grievous sin than the contrary vice, flattery?...................................................188

Question 117 – Liberality 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether liberality is a virtue?..........................................................................................................................191 Whether liberality is about money?.................................................................................................................193 Whether using money is the act of liberality? .................................................................................................194 Whether it belongs to a liberal man chiefly to give? ........................................................................................195 Whether liberality is a part of justice? .............................................................................................................197 Whether liberality is the greatest of the virtues? .............................................................................................198

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Question 118 – Covetousness 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Whether covetousness is a sin?........................................................................................................................201 Whether covetousness is a special sin? ............................................................................................................202 Whether covetousness is opposed to liberality? ..............................................................................................204 Whether covetousness is always a mortal sin?.................................................................................................205 Whether covetousness is the greatest of sins?..................................................................................................206 Whether covetousness is a spiritual sin?..........................................................................................................208 Whether covetousness is a capital vice?...........................................................................................................209 Whether treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy are daughters of covetousness?...........................................................................................................211

Question 119 – Prodigality 1. Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness? ...........................................................................................213 2. Whether prodigality is a sin? ...........................................................................................................................214 3. Whether prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness? .....................................................................216

Question 120 – Equity 1. Whether epikeia is a virtue? ............................................................................................................................219 2. Whether epikeia is a part of justice? ................................................................................................................220

Question 121 – Piety 1. Whether piety is a gift? ....................................................................................................................................223 2. Whether the second beatitude, “blessed are the meek,” corresponds to the gift of piety? ...............................224

Question 122 – The Precepts of Justice 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?.......................................................................227 Whether the first precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed? ...................................................................228 Whether the second precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed? ..............................................................230 Whether the third precept of the decalogue, concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is fittingly expressed? ........................................................................................................................................232 5. Whether the fourth precept, about honoring one’s parents, is fittingly expressed? .........................................236 6. Whether the other six precepts of the decalogue are fittingly expressed?........................................................237

Question 123 – Fortitude 1. Whether fortitude is a virtue?..........................................................................................................................241 2. Whether fortitude is a special virtue? ..............................................................................................................243 3. Whether fortitude is about fear and daring? ...................................................................................................244 4. Whether fortitude is only about dangers of death? .........................................................................................245 5. Whether fortitude is properly about dangers of death in battle?.....................................................................247 6. Whether endurance is the chief act of fortitude?.............................................................................................248 7. Whether the brave man acts for the sake of the good of his habit? .................................................................249 8. Whether the brave man delights in his act?.....................................................................................................250 9. Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences? .............................................................................252 10. Whether the brave man uses anger in his action? .........................................................................................253 11. Whether fortitude is a cardinal virtue? ..........................................................................................................255 12. Whether fortitude excels among all other virtues? ........................................................................................256

Question 124 – Martyrdom 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue? .........................................................................................................259 Whether martyrdom is an act of fortitude? .....................................................................................................260 Whether martyrdom is an act of the greatest perfection? ...............................................................................262 Whether death is essential to martyrdom? ......................................................................................................263 Whether faith alone is the cause of martyrdom?.............................................................................................265

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Question 125 – Fear 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether fear is a sin? ......................................................................................................................................269 Whether the sin of fear is contrary to fortitude? .............................................................................................270 Whether fear is a mortal sin?...........................................................................................................................271 Whether fear excuses from sin?.......................................................................................................................273

Question 126 – Fearlessness 1. Whether fearlessness is a sin? ..........................................................................................................................275 2. Whether fearlessness is opposed to fortitude?.................................................................................................276

Question 127 – Daring 1. Whether daring is a sin? ..................................................................................................................................279 2. Whether daring is opposed to fortitude?.........................................................................................................280

Question 128 – The Parts of Fortitude 1. Whether the parts of fortitude are suitably assigned? .....................................................................................283

Question 129 – Magnanimity 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Whether magnanimity is about honors? .........................................................................................................287 Whether magnanimity is essentially about great honors? ...............................................................................289 Whether magnanimity is a virtue? ..................................................................................................................290 Whether magnanimity is a special virtue?.......................................................................................................293 Whether magnanimity is a part of fortitude? ..................................................................................................295 Whether confidence belongs to magnanimity? ...............................................................................................296 Whether security belongs to magnanimity? ....................................................................................................298 Whether goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity? .....................................................................................299

Question 130 – Presumption 1. Whether presumption is a sin? ........................................................................................................................301 2. Whether presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess?........................................................................302

Question 131 – Ambition 1. Whether ambition is a sin? ..............................................................................................................................305 2. Whether ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess?..............................................................................306

Question 132 – Vainglory 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Whether the desire of glory is a sin?................................................................................................................309 Whether vainglory is opposed to magnanimity?.............................................................................................311 Whether vainglory is a mortal sin?..................................................................................................................312 Whether vainglory is a capital vice? ................................................................................................................314 Whether the daughters of vainglory are suitably reckoned to be disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord, and love of novelties?..................................................................315

Question 133 – Pusillanimity 1. Whether pusillanimity is a sin? .......................................................................................................................317 2. Whether pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity?.......................................................................................319

Question 134 – Magnificence 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether magnificence is a virtue? ..................................................................................................................321 Whether magnificence is a special virtue?.......................................................................................................322 Whether the matter of magnificence is great expenditure? .............................................................................324 Whether magnificence is a part of fortitude? ..................................................................................................326

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Question 135 – Meanness 1. Whether meanness is a vice? ...........................................................................................................................329 2. Whether there is a vice opposed to meanness? ...............................................................................................330

Question 136 – Patience 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Whether patience is a virtue? ..........................................................................................................................333 Whether patience is the greatest of the virtues? ..............................................................................................334 Whether it is possible to have patience without grace? ...................................................................................335 Whether patience is a part of fortitude? ..........................................................................................................337 Whether patience is the same as longanimity?................................................................................................338

Question 137 – Perseverance 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether perseverance is a virtue? ...................................................................................................................341 Whether perseverance is a part of fortitude?...................................................................................................343 Whether constancy pertains to perseverance? ................................................................................................344 Whether perseverance needs the help of grace? ..............................................................................................345

Question 138 – The Vices Opposed to Perseverance 1. Whether effeminacy is opposed to perseverance? ...........................................................................................347 2. Whether pertinacity is opposed to perseverance? ...........................................................................................348

Question 139 – The Gift of Fortitude 1. Whether fortitude is a gift? ..............................................................................................................................351 2. Whether the fourth beatitude, “blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,” corresponds to the gift of fortitude? ..............................................................................................................352

Question 140 – The Precepts of Fortitude 1. Whether the precepts of fortitude are suitably given in the divine law?..........................................................355 2. Whether the precepts of the parts of fortitude are suitably given in the divine law?.......................................356

Question 141 – Temperance 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Whether temperance is a virtue? .....................................................................................................................359 Whether temperance is a special virtue? .........................................................................................................360 Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures?..............................................................................362 Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures of touch?................................................................363 Whether temperance is about the pleasures proper to the taste? ....................................................................366 Whether the rule of temperance depends on the need of the present life?......................................................367 Whether temperance is a cardinal virtue? .......................................................................................................368 Whether temperance is the greatest of the virtues? .........................................................................................370

Question 142 – The Vices Opposed to Temperance 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether insensibility is a vice?........................................................................................................................373 Whether intemperance is a childish sin? .........................................................................................................375 Whether cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance?................................................................................376 Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of sins? ..................................................................................378

Question 143 – The Parts of Temperance, in General 1. Whether the parts of temperance are rightly assigned?...................................................................................381

Question 144 – Shamefacedness 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether shamefacedness is a virtue? ..............................................................................................................385 Whether shamefacedness is about a disgraceful action? .................................................................................387 Whether man is more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him?................................389 Whether even virtuous men can be ashamed? ................................................................................................391

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Question 145 – Honesty 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether honesty is the same as virtue?...........................................................................................................393 Whether the honest is the same as the beautiful?............................................................................................394 Whether the honest differs from the useful and the pleasant? ........................................................................396 Whether honesty should be reckoned a part of temperance?..........................................................................397

Question 146 – Abstinence 1. Whether abstinence is a virtue?.......................................................................................................................399 2. Whether abstinence is a special virtue? ...........................................................................................................401

Question 147 – Fasting 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Whether fasting is an act of virtue? .................................................................................................................403 Whether fasting is an act of abstinence?..........................................................................................................405 Whether fasting is a matter of precept? ...........................................................................................................406 Whether all are bound to keep the fasts of the Church?..................................................................................407 Whether the times for the Church fast are fittingly ascribed? .........................................................................410 Whether it is requisite for fasting that one eat but once? ................................................................................412 Whether the ninth hour is suitably fixed for the faster’s meal?........................................................................413 Whether it is fitting that those who fast should be bidden to abstain from meat, eggs, and milk foods? .......415

Question 148 – Gluttony 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether gluttony is a sin? ...............................................................................................................................417 Whether gluttony is a mortal sin?....................................................................................................................418 Whether gluttony is the greatest of sins? .........................................................................................................419 Whether the species of gluttony are fittingly distinguished? ...........................................................................420 Whether gluttony is a capital vice? ..................................................................................................................422 Whether daughters are fittingly assigned to gluttony? ....................................................................................423

Question 149 – Sobriety 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether drink is the matter of sobriety?.........................................................................................................425 Whether sobriety is by itself a special virtue? ..................................................................................................426 Whether the use of wine is altogether unlawful?.............................................................................................427 Whether sobriety is more requisite in persons of greater standing?................................................................428

Question 150 – Drunkenness 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether drunkenness is a sin? ........................................................................................................................431 Whether drunkenness is a mortal sin? ............................................................................................................432 Whether drunkenness is the gravest of sins?...................................................................................................434 Whether drunkenness excuses from sin? ........................................................................................................435

Question 151 – Chastity 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether chastity is a virtue? ...........................................................................................................................437 Whether chastity is a general virtue?...............................................................................................................438 Whether chastity is a distinct virtue from abstinence?....................................................................................439 Whether purity belongs especially to chastity?................................................................................................441

Question 152 – Virginity 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Whether virginity consists in integrity of the flesh? ........................................................................................443 Whether virginity is unlawful? ........................................................................................................................445 Whether virginity is a virtue? ..........................................................................................................................447 Whether virginity is more excellent than marriage? .......................................................................................449 Whether virginity is the greatest of virtues? ....................................................................................................451

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Question 153 – Lust 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Whether the matter of lust is only venereal desires and pleasures? .................................................................453 Whether no venereal act can be without sin? ..................................................................................................454 Whether the lust that is about venereal acts can be a sin? ...............................................................................456 Whether lust is a capital vice?..........................................................................................................................457 Whether the daughters of lust are fittingly described? ....................................................................................458

Question 154 – The Parts of Lust 1. Whether six species are fittingly assigned to lust? ...........................................................................................461 2. Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?....................................................................................................463 3. Whether fornication is the most grievous of sins? ..........................................................................................467 4. Whether there can be mortal sin in touches and kisses? .................................................................................468 5. Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin? .................................................................................................469 6. Whether seduction should be reckoned a species of lust? ...............................................................................472 7. Whether rape is a species of lust, distinct from seduction? .............................................................................474 8. Whether adultery is a determinate species of lust, distinct from the other species? .......................................475 9. Whether incest is a determinate species of lust?..............................................................................................477 10. Whether sacrilege can be a species of lust?....................................................................................................479 11. Whether the unnatural vice is a species of lust? ............................................................................................480 12. Whether the unnatural vice is the greatest sin among the species of lust? ....................................................481

Question 155 – Continence 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether continence is a virtue? ......................................................................................................................485 Whether desires for pleasures of touch are the matter of continence? ............................................................486 Whether the subject of continence is the concupiscible power?......................................................................488 Whether continence is better than temperance? .............................................................................................490

Question 156 – Incontinence 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body? ............................................................................493 Whether incontinence is a sin?........................................................................................................................495 Whether the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate?.........................................................496 Whether the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire?....................................................498

Question 157 – Clemency and Meekness 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether clemency and meekness are absolutely the same? ............................................................................501 Whether both clemency and meekness are virtues?........................................................................................502 Whether the aforesaid virtues are parts of temperance? .................................................................................504 Whether clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues? .............................................................................505

Question 158 – Anger 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Whether it is lawful to be angry?.....................................................................................................................509 Whether anger is a sin?....................................................................................................................................511 Whether all anger is a mortal sin? ...................................................................................................................513 Whether anger is the most grievous sin? .........................................................................................................514 Whether the Philosopher suitably assigns the species of anger? .....................................................................515 Whether anger should be reckoned among the capital vices? .........................................................................517 Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to anger? ...................................................................................518 Whether there is a vice opposed to anger, resulting from lack of anger?.........................................................519

Question 159 – Cruelty 1. Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency? .......................................................................................................521 2. Whether cruelty differs from savagery or brutality?........................................................................................522

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Question 160 – Modesty 1. Whether modesty is a part of temperance? .....................................................................................................525 2. Whether modesty is only about outward actions?...........................................................................................526

Question 161 – Humility 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether humility is a virtue? ..........................................................................................................................529 Whether humility has to do with the appetite? ...............................................................................................531 Whether one ought, by humility, to subject oneself to all men? ......................................................................533 Whether humility is a part of modesty or temperance? ..................................................................................535 Whether humility is the greatest of the virtues? ..............................................................................................536 Whether twelve degrees of humility are fittingly distinguished in the Rule of the blessed Benedict? .............538

Question 162 – Pride 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Whether pride is a sin? ....................................................................................................................................543 Whether pride is a special sin? ........................................................................................................................545 Whether the subject of pride is the irascible faculty? ......................................................................................547 Whether the four species of pride are fittingly assigned by Gregory? .............................................................549 Whether pride is a mortal sin? ........................................................................................................................552 Whether pride is the most grievous of sins?....................................................................................................553 Whether pride is the first sin of all?.................................................................................................................555 Whether pride should be reckoned a capital vice? ..........................................................................................557

Question 163 – The First Man’s Sin 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether pride was the first man’s first sin? .....................................................................................................559 Whether the first man’s pride consisted in his coveting God’s likeness?..........................................................561 Whether the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins?........................................................563 Whether Adam’s sin was more grievous than Eve’s? ........................................................................................564

Question 164 – The Punishments of the First Man’s Sin 1. Whether death is the punishment of our first parents’ sin?.............................................................................567 2. Whether the particular punishments of our first parents are suitably appointed in Scripture? ......................570

Question 165 – Our First Parents’ Temptation 1. Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil?.............................................................................575 2. Whether the manner and order of the first temptation was fitting? ................................................................576

Question 166 – Studiousness 1. Whether the proper matter of studiousness is knowledge? .............................................................................579 2. Whether studiousness is a part of temperance?...............................................................................................580

Question 167 – Curiosity 1. Whether curiosity can be about intellective knowledge? ................................................................................583 2. Whether the vice of curiosity is about sensitive knowledge?...........................................................................585

Question 168 – Modesty in the Outward Movements of the Body 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether any virtue regards the outward movements of the body?.................................................................589 Whether there can be a virtue about games?...................................................................................................591 Whether there can be sin in the excess of play?...............................................................................................593 Whether there is a sin in lack of mirth?...........................................................................................................595

Question 169 – Modesty in the Outward Apparel 1. Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward apparel? ..................................................597 2. Whether the adornment of women is devoid of mortal sin? ...........................................................................600

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Question 170 – The Precepts of Temperance 1. Whether the precepts of temperance are suitably given in the divine law? .....................................................603 2. Whether the precepts of the virtues annexed to temperance are suitably given in the divine law?.................604

Question 171 – Prophecy 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge? .....................................................................................................608 Whether prophecy is a habit? ..........................................................................................................................610 Whether prophecy is only about future contingencies? ..................................................................................612 Whether by the divine revelation a prophet knows all that can be known prophetically? ..............................614 Whether the prophet always distinguishes what he says by his own spirit from what he says by the prophetic spirit?..................................................................................................................................615 6. Whether things known or declared prophetically can be false? ......................................................................617

Question 172 – The Cause of Prophecy 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether prophecy can be natural?..................................................................................................................621 Whether prophetic revelation comes through the angels? ..............................................................................623 Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy? ................................................................................624 Whether a good life is requisite for prophecy? ................................................................................................626 Whether any prophecy comes from the demons? ...........................................................................................628 Whether the prophets of the demons ever foretell the truth?..........................................................................629

Question 173 – The Manner of Prophetic Knowledge 1. Whether the prophets see the very essence of God?........................................................................................633 2. Whether, in prophetic revelation, new species of things are impressed on the prophet’s mind, or merely a new light? ...................................................................................................................................635 3. Whether the prophetic vision is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses? ..................................637 4. Whether prophets always know the things which they prophesy? ..................................................................639

Question 174 – The Division of Prophecy 1. Whether prophecy is fittingly divided into the prophecy of divine predestination, of foreknowledge, and of denunciation? ...........................................................................................................641 2. Whether the prophecy which is accompanied by intellective and imaginative vision is more excellent than that which is accompanied by intellective vision alone? ........................................................643 3. Whether the degrees of prophecy can be distinguished according to the imaginary vision? ..........................646 4. Whether Moses was the greatest of the prophets? ...........................................................................................648 5. Whether there is a degree of prophecy in the blessed? ....................................................................................649 6. Whether the degrees of prophecy change as time goes on?.............................................................................651

Question 175 – Rapture 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether the soul of man is carried away to things divine?.............................................................................655 Whether rapture pertains to the cognitive rather than to the appetitive power? ............................................657 Whether Paul, when in rapture, saw the essence of God? ...............................................................................659 Whether Paul, when in rapture, was withdrawn from his senses? ..................................................................661 Whether, while in this State, Paul’s soul was wholly separated from his body?...............................................662 Did Paul know whether his soul were separated from his body? ....................................................................664

Question 176 – The Grace of Tongues 1. Whether those who received the gift of tongues spoke in every language? .....................................................667 2. Whether the gift of tongues is more excellent than the grace of prophecy? ....................................................669

Question 177 – The Gratuitous Grace Consisting in Words 1. Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words? ...........................................................................................673 2. Whether the grace of the word of wisdom and knowledge is becoming to women?.......................................675

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Question 178 – The Grace of Miracles 1. Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles?...............................................................................677 2. Whether the wicked can work miracles? .........................................................................................................679

Question 179 – The Division of Life into Active and Contemplative 1. Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?......................................................................683 2. Whether life is adequately divided into active and contemplative? .................................................................684

Question 180 – The Contemplative Life 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Whether the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections, and pertains wholly to the intellect? .687 Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life? .........................................................................688 Whether there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life? ........................................................690 Whether the contemplative life consists only in the contemplation of God, or also in the consideration of any truth whatever?............................................................................................................692 Whether in the present state of life the contemplative life can reach to the vision of the divine essence? ......694 Whether the operation of contemplation is fittingly divided into a threefold movement: circular, straight and oblique? .......................................................................................................................696 Whether there is delight in contemplation? ....................................................................................................699 Whether the contemplative life is continuous?................................................................................................701

Question 181 – The Active Life 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether all the actions of the moral virtues pertain to the active life? ...........................................................703 Whether prudence pertains to the active life? .................................................................................................704 Whether teaching is a work of the active or of the contemplative life?............................................................706 Whether the active life remains after this life?.................................................................................................707

Question 182 – The Active Life in Comparison with the Contemplative Life 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether the active life is more excellent than the contemplative?..................................................................709 Whether the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative? ................................................................711 Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life? ........................................................................713 Whether the active life precedes the contemplative? .......................................................................................714

Question 183 – Man’s Various Duties and States in General 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether the notion of a state denotes a condition of freedom or servitude?..................................................717 Whether there should be different duties or states in the Church? .................................................................718 Whether duties differ according to their actions? ...........................................................................................720 Whether the difference of states applies to those who are beginning, progressing, or perfect? ......................721

Question 184 – The State of Perfection in General 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Whether the perfection of the Christian life consists chiefly in charity? .........................................................725 Whether any one can be perfect in this life?....................................................................................................727 Whether, in this life, perfection consists in the observance of the commandments or of the counsels? .........729 Whether whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection?................................................................................731 Whether religious and prelates are in the state of perfection?.........................................................................733 Whether all ecclesiastical prelates are in the state of perfection? ....................................................................735 Whether the religious state is more perfect than that of prelates?...................................................................737 Whether parish priests and archdeacons are more perfect than religious? .....................................................739

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Question 185 – Things Pertaining to the Episcopal State 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Whether it is lawful to desire the office of a bishop? .......................................................................................743 Whether it is lawful for a man to refuse absolutely an appointment to the episcopate?..................................746 Whether he that is appointed to the episcopate ought to be better than others? ............................................748 Whether a bishop may lawfully forsake the episcopal cure, in order to enter religion? ..................................750 Whether it is lawful for a bishop on account of bodily persecution to abandon the flock committed to his care? ..................................................................................................................................753 6. Whether it is lawful for a bishop to have property of his own? .......................................................................754 7. Whether bishops sin mortally if they distribute not to the poor the ecclesiastical goods which accrue to them? .............................................................................................................................................756 8. Whether religious who are raised to the episcopate are bound to religious observances? ..............................759

Question 186 – Those Things in Which the Religious State Properly Consists 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether religion implies a state of perfection? ...............................................................................................763 Whether every religious is bound to keep all the counsels? ............................................................................765 Whether poverty is required for religious perfection?.....................................................................................767 Whether perpetual continence is required for religious perfection? ...............................................................771 Whether obedience belongs to religious perfection?.......................................................................................773 Whether it is requisite for religious perfection that poverty, continence, and obedience should come under a vow?........................................................................................................................................775 7. Whether it is right to say that religious perfection consists in these three vows?............................................776 8. Whether the vow of obedience is the chief of the three religious vows?..........................................................779 9. Whether a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses the things contained in his rule? ......................781 10. Whether a religious sins more grievously than a secular by the same kind of sin? .......................................783

Question 187 – Those Things That are Competent to Religious 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether it is lawful for religious to teach, preach, and the like? .....................................................................785 Whether it is lawful for religious to occupy themselves with secular business? ..............................................787 Whether religious are bound to manual labor? ...............................................................................................789 Whether it is lawful for religious to live on alms? ...........................................................................................794 Whether it is lawful for religious to beg? .........................................................................................................797 Whether it is lawful for religious to wear coarser clothes than others? ...........................................................800

Question 188 – The Different Kinds of Religious Life 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether there is only one religious order?......................................................................................................803 Whether a religious order should be established for the works of the active life? ...........................................805 Whether a religious order can be directed to soldiering? ................................................................................807 Whether a religious order can be established for preaching or hearing confessions? .....................................809 Whether a religious order should be established for the purpose of study? ....................................................811 Whether a religious order devoted to the contemplative life is more excellent than one given to the active life?............................................................................................................................................814 7. Whether religious perfection is diminished by possessing something in common?.......................................816 8. Whether the religious life of those who live in community is more perfect than that of those who lead a solitary life? .................................................................................................................................821

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Question 189 – The Entrance into Religious Life 1. Whether those who are not practiced in keeping the commandments should enter religion? .......................825 2. Whether one ought to be bound by vow to enter religion? .............................................................................829 3. Whether one who is bound by a vow to enter religion is under an obligation of entering religion? ...............831 4. Whether he who has vowed to enter religion is bound to remain in religion in perpetuity? ..........................833 5. Whether children should be received in religion? ...........................................................................................834 6. Whether one ought to be withdrawn from entering religion through deference to one’s parents? .................837 7. Whether parish priests may lawfully enter religion? .......................................................................................839 8. Whether it is lawful to pass from one religious order to another? ..................................................................840 9. Whether one ought to induce others to enter religion? ...................................................................................842 10. Whether it is praiseworthy to enter religion without taking counsel of many, and previously deliberating for a long time? .........................................................................................................................844

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Summa Theologiae Secunda Secundae, 92–189

Question 92 Superstition Deinde considerandum est de vitiis religioni oppositis. Et primo, de illis quae cum religione conveniunt in hoc quod exhibent cultum divinum; secundo, de vitiis manifestam contrarietatem ad religionem habentibus, per contemptum eorum quae ad cultum divinum pertinent. Primum autem horum pertinet ad superstitionem; secundum ad irreligiositatem. Unde primo considerandum est de ipsa superstitione, et de partibus eius; deinde de irreligiositate et partibus eius. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum superstitio sit vitium religioni contrarium. Secundo, utrum habeat plures partes seu species.

In due sequence we must consider the vices that are opposed to religion. First we shall consider those which agree with religion in giving worship to God; second, we shall treat of those vices which are manifestly contrary to religion, through showing contempt of those things that pertain to the worship of God. The former come under the head of superstition, the latter under that of irreligion. Accordingly we must consider in the first place, superstition and its parts, and afterwards irreligion and its parts. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether superstition is a vice opposed to religion? (2) Whether it has several parts or species?

Article 1 Whether superstition is a vice contrary to religion? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod superstitio non sit vitium religioni contrarium. Unum enim contrariorum non ponitur in definitione alterius. Sed religio ponitur in definitione superstitionis, dicitur enim superstitio esse religio supra modum servata, ut patet in Glossa ad Coloss. II, super illud, quae sunt rationem habentia sapientiae in superstitione. Ergo superstitio non est vitium religioni oppositum. Praeterea, Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., superstitiosos ait Cicero appellatos qui totos dies precabantur et immolabant ut sui sibi liberi superstites fierent. Sed hoc etiam fieri potest secundum verae religionis cultum. Ergo superstitio non est vitium religioni oppositum.

Objection 1: It would seem that superstition is not a vice contrary to religion. One contrary is not included in the definition of the other. But religion is included in the definition of superstition: for the latter is defined as being immoderate observance of religion, according to a gloss on Col. 2:23, Which things have indeed a show of wisdom in superstition. Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary to religion. Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x): Cicero states that the superstitious were so called because they spent the day in praying and offering sacrifices that their children might survive (superstites) them. But this may be done even in accordance with true religious worship. Therefore superstition is not a vice opposed to religion. Obj. 3: Further, superstition seems to denote an excess. But religion admits of no excess, since, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 5, ad 3), there is no possibility of rendering to God, by religion, the equal of what we owe Him. Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary to religion. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Decem Chord. Serm. ix): Thou strikest the first chord in the worship of one God, and the beast of superstition hath fallen. Now the worship of one God belongs to religion. Therefore superstition is contrary to religion. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 81, A. 5), religion is a moral virtue. Now every moral virtue observes a mean, as stated above (I-II, Q. 64, A. 1). Therefore a twofold vice is opposed to a moral virtue; one by way of excess, the other

Praeterea, superstitio quendam excessum importare videtur. Sed religio non potest habere excessum, quia sicut supra dictum est, secundum eam non contingit aequale Deo reddere eius quod debemus. Ergo superstitio non est vitium religioni oppositum. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de decem chordis, tangis primam chordam, qua colitur unus Deus, et cecidit bestia superstitionis. Sed cultus unius Dei pertinet ad religionem. Ergo superstitio religioni opponitur. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, religio est virtus moralis. Omnis autem virtus moralis in medio consistit, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo duplex vitium virtuti morali opponitur, unum quidem secundum

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excessum; aliud autem secundum defectum. Contingit autem excedere medium virtutis non solum secundum circumstantiam quae dicitur quantum, sed etiam secundum alias circumstantias. Unde in aliquibus virtutibus, sicut in magnanimitate et magnificentia, vitium excedit virtutis medium non quia ad maius aliquid tendat quam virtus, sed forte ad minus, transcendit tamen virtutis medium, inquantum facit aliquid cui non debet, vel quando non debet, et similiter secundum alia huiusmodi; ut patet per philosophum, in IV Ethic. Sic igitur superstitio est vitium religioni oppositum secundum excessum, non quia plus exhibeat in cultum divinum quam vera religio, sed quia exhibet cultum divinum vel cui non debet, vel eo modo quo non debet. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut bonum metaphorice dicitur in malis, prout dicimus bonum latronem, ita etiam nomina virtutum quandoque transumptive accipiuntur in malis, sicut prudentia quandoque ponitur pro astutia, secundum illud Luc. XVI, filii huius saeculi prudentiores filiis lucis sunt. Et per hunc modum superstitio dicitur esse religio.

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by way of deficiency. Again, the mean of virtue may be exceeded, not only with regard to the circumstance called how much, but also with regard to other circumstances: so that, in certain virtues such as magnanimity and magnificence; vice exceeds the mean of virtue, not through tending to something greater than the virtue, but possibly to something less, and yet it goes beyond the mean of virtue, through doing something to whom it ought not, or when it ought not, and in like manner as regards other circumstances, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. iv, 1, 2, 3). Accordingly superstition is a vice contrary to religion by excess, not that it offers more to the divine worship than true religion, but because it offers divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in a manner it ought not. Reply Obj. 1: Just as we speak metaphorically of good among evil things—thus we speak of a good thief—so too sometimes the names of the virtues are employed by transposition in an evil sense. Thus prudence is sometimes used instead of cunning, according to Luke 16:8, The children of this world are more prudent in their generation than the children of light. It is in this way that superstition is described as religion. Reply Obj. 2: The etymology of a word differs from its meaning. For its etymology depends on what it is taken from for the purpose of signification: whereas its meaning depends on the thing to which it is applied for the purpose of signifying it. Now these things differ sometimes: for lapis (a stone) takes its name from hurting the foot (laedere pedem), but this is not its meaning, else iron, since it hurts the foot, would be a stone. In like manner it does not follow that superstition means that from which the word is derived.

Ad secundum dicendum quod aliud est etymologia nominis, et aliud est significatio nominis. Etymologia attenditur secundum id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum, nominis vero significatio attenditur secundum id ad quod significandum nomen imponitur. Quae quandoque diversa sunt, nomen enim lapidis imponitur a laesione pedis, non tamen hoc significat; alioquin ferrum, cum pedem laedat, lapis esset. Similiter etiam nomen superstitionis non oportet quod significet illud a quo nomen est impositum. Ad tertium dicendum quod religio non potest habere excessum secundum quantitatem absolutam. Potest tamen habere excessum secundum quantitatem proportionis, prout scilicet in cultu divino fit aliquid quod fieri non debet.

Reply Obj. 3: Religion does not admit of excess, in respect of absolute quantity, but it does admit of excess in respect of proportionate quantity, in so far, to wit, as something may be done in divine worship that ought not to be done.

Article 2 Whether there are various species of superstition? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint diversae superstitionis species. Quia secundum philosophum, in I Topic., si unum oppositorum dicitur multipliciter, et reliquum. Sed religio, cui superstitio opponitur, non habet diversas species, sed omnes eius actus ad unam speciem referuntur. Ergo nec superstitio habet diversas species. Praeterea, opposita sunt circa idem. Sed religio, cui opponitur superstitio, est circa ea quibus ordinamur in Deum, ut supra habitum est. Non ergo species superstitionis, quae opponitur religioni, potest attendi secun-

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not various species of superstition. According to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 13), if one contrary includes many kinds, so does the other. Now religion, to which superstition is contrary, does not include various species; but all its acts belong to the one species. Therefore neither has superstition various species. Obj. 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But religion, to which superstition is opposed, relates to those things whereby we are directed to God, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 1). Therefore superstition, which is opposed to

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Superstition

Q. 92, A. 2

dum aliquas divinationes humanorum eventuum, vel se- religion, is not specified according to divinations of human cundum aliquas observationes humanorum actuum. occurrences, or by the observances of certain human actions. Praeterea, Coloss. II, super illud, quae sunt raObj. 3: Further, a gloss on Col. 2:23, Which things have tionem habentia sapientiae in superstitione, dicit Glossa, . . . a show of wisdom in superstition, adds: that is to say in idest, in simulata religione. Ergo etiam simulatio debet a hypocritical religion. Therefore hypocrisy should be reckponi species superstitionis. oned a species of superstition. Sed contra est quod Augustinus, in II de Doct. On the contrary, Augustine assigns the various speChrist., diversas species superstitionis assignat. cies of superstition (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20). Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, I answer that, As stated above, sins against religion vitium religionis consistit in hoc quod transcenditur vir- consist in going beyond the mean of virtue in respect of certutis medium secundum aliquas circumstantias. Ut au- tain circumstances (A. 1). For as we have stated (I-II, Q. 72, tem supra dictum est, non quaelibet circumstantiarum A. 9), not every diversity of corrupt circumstances differencorruptarum diversitas variat peccati speciem, sed so- tiates the species of a sin, but only that which is referred to lum quando referuntur ad diversa obiecta vel diversos fi- diverse objects, for diverse ends: since it is in this respect nes, secundum hoc enim morales actus speciem sortiun- that moral acts are diversified specifically, as stated above tur, ut supra habitum est. (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 2, 6). Diversificatur ergo superstitionis species, primo quiAccordingly the species of superstition are differentidem, ex parte obiecti. Potest enim divinus cultus exhibe- ated, first on the part of the mode, second on the part of ri vel cui exhibendus est, scilicet Deo vero, modo tamen the object. For the divine worship may be given either to indebito, et haec est prima superstitionis species. Vel ei whom it ought to be given, namely, to the true God, but cui non debet exhiberi, scilicet cuicumque creaturae. Et in an undue mode, and this is the first species of superstihoc est aliud superstitionis genus, quod in multas spe- tion; or to whom it ought not to be given, namely, to any cies dividitur, secundum diversos fines divini cultus or- creature whatsoever, and this is another genus of superstidinatur enim, primo, divinus cultus ad reverentiam Deo tion, divided into many species in respect of the various exhibendam. Et secundum hoc, prima species huius ge- ends of divine worship. For the end of divine worship is neris est idololatria, quae divinam reverentiam indebite in the first place to give reverence to God, and in this reexhibet creaturae. Secundo, ordinatur ad hoc quod ho- spect the first species of this genus is idolatry, which unduly mo instruatur a Deo, quem colit. Et ad hoc pertinet su- gives divine honor to a creature. The second end of reliperstitio divinativa, quae Daemones consulit per aliqua gion is that man may be taught by God Whom he worships; pacta cum eis inita, tacita vel expressa. Tertio, ordina- and to this must be referred divinatory superstition, which tur divinus cultus ad quandam directionem humanorum consults the demons through compacts made with them, actuum secundum instituta Dei, qui colitur. Et ad hoc whether tacit or explicit. Third, the end of divine worship pertinet superstitio quarundam observationum. is a certain direction of human acts according to the precepts of God the object of that worship: and to this must be referred the superstition of certain observances. Et haec tria tangit Augustinus, in II de Doct. Christ., Augustine alludes to these three (De Doctr. Christ. ii, dicens superstitiosum esse quidquid institutum ab homi- 20), where he says that anything invented by man for maknibus est ad facienda et colenda idola pertinens, et hoc ing and worshipping idols is superstitious, and this refers to pertinet ad primum. Et postea subdit, vel ad consultatio- the first species. Then he goes on to say, or any agreement nes et pacta quaedam significationum cum Daemonibus or covenant made with the demons for the purpose of consulplacita atque foederata, quod pertinet ad secundum. Et tation and of compact by tokens, which refers to the second post pauca subdit, ad hoc genus pertinent omnes ligatu- species; and a little further on he adds: To this kind belong rae, etc., quod pertinet ad tertium. all sorts of amulets and such like, and this refers to the third species. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Dionysius Reply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), good dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., bonum contingit ex una et in- results from a cause that is one and entire, whereas evil arises tegra causa, malum autem ex singularibus defectibus. Et from each single defect. Wherefore several vices are opposed ideo uni virtuti plura vitia opponuntur, ut supra habitum to one virtue, as stated above (A. 1; Q. 10, A. 5). The saying est. Verbum autem philosophi veritatem habet in oppo- of the Philosopher is true of opposites wherein there is the sitis in quibus est eadem ratio multiplicationis. same reason of multiplicity. Ad secundum dicendum quod divinationes et obReply Obj. 2: Divinations and certain observances servationes aliquae pertinent ad superstitionem inquan- come under the head of superstition, insofar as they depend

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tum dependent ex aliquibus operationibus Daemonum. Et sic pertinent ad quaedam pacta cum ipsis inita. Ad tertium dicendum quod simulata religio ibi dicitur quando traditioni humanae nomen religionis applicatur, prout in Glossa sequitur. Unde ista simulata religio nihil est aliud quam cultus Deo vero exhibitus modo indebito, sicut si aliquis tempore gratiae vellet colere Deum secundum veteris legis ritum. Et de hoc ad litteram loquitur Glossa.

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on certain actions of the demons: and thus they pertain to compacts made with them. Reply Obj. 3: Hypocritical religion is taken here for religion as applied to human observances, as the gloss goes on to explain. Wherefore this hypocritical religion is nothing else than worship given to God in an undue mode: as, for instance, if a man were, in the time of grace, to wish to worship God according to the rite of the Old Law. It is of religion taken in this sense that the gloss speaks literally.

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Question 93 Superstition Consisting in Undue Worship of the True God Deinde considerandum est de speciebus superstitionis. Et primo, de superstitione indebiti cultus veri Dei; secundo, de superstitione idololatriae; tertio, de superstitione divinationum; quarto, de superstitione observationum. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum in cultu Dei veri possit esse aliquid perniciosum. Secundo, utrum possit ibi esse aliquid superfluum.

We must now consider the species of superstition. We shall treat (1) Of the superstition which consists in giving undue worship to the true God; (2) Of the superstition of idolatry; (3) of divinatory superstition; (4) of the superstition of observances. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God? (2) Whether there can be anything superfluous therein?

Article 1 Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in cultu veri Dei non possit esse aliquid perniciosum. Dicitur enim Ioel II, omnis quicumque invocaverit nomen domini, salvus erit. Sed quicumque colit Deum quocumque modo, invocat nomen eius. Ergo omnis cultus Dei confert salutem. Nullus ergo est perniciosus. Praeterea, idem Deus est qui colitur a iustis quacumque mundi aetate. Sed ante legem datam, iusti, absque peccato mortali, colebant Deum qualitercumque eis placebat, unde et Iacob proprio voto se obligavit ad specialem cultum, ut habetur Gen. XXVIII. Ergo etiam modo nullus Dei cultus est perniciosus.

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God. It is written (Joel 2:32): Everyone that shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved. Now whoever worships God calls upon His name. Therefore all worship of God is conducive to salvation, and consequently none is pernicious. Obj. 2: Further, it is the same God that is worshiped by the just in any age of the world. Now before the giving of the Law the just worshiped God in whatever manner they pleased, without committing mortal sin: wherefore Jacob bound himself by his own vow to a special kind of worship, as related in Genesis 28. Therefore now also no worship of God is pernicious. Obj. 3: Further, nothing pernicious is tolerated in the Church. Yet the Church tolerates various rites of divine worship: wherefore Gregory, replying to Augustine, bishop of the English (Regist. xi, ep. 64), who stated that there existed in the churches various customs in the celebration of Mass, wrote: I wish you to choose carefully whatever you find likely to be most pleasing to God, whether in the Roman territory, or in the land of the Gauls, or in any part of the Church. Therefore no way of worshiping God is pernicious. On the contrary, Augustine in a letter to Jerome (and the words are quoted in a gloss on Gal. 2:14) says that after the Gospel truth had been preached the legal observances became deadly, and yet these observances belonged to the worship of God. Therefore there can be something deadly in the divine worship. I answer that, As Augustine states (Cont. Mendac. xiv), a most pernicious lie is that which is uttered in matters pertaining to Christian religion. Now it is a lie if one signify outwardly that which is contrary to the truth. But just as a

Praeterea, nihil perniciosum in Ecclesia sustinetur. Sustinet autem Ecclesia diversos ritus colendi Deum, unde Gregorius scribit Augustino episcopo Anglorum, proponenti quod sunt diversae Ecclesiarum consuetudines in Missarum celebratione, mihi, inquit, placet ut, sive in Romanis sive in Galliarum sive in qualibet Ecclesia aliquid invenisti quod plus omnipotenti Deo possit placere, sollicite eligas. Ergo nullus modus colendi Deum est perniciosus. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Hieron., et habetur in Glossa, Galat. II, quod legalia observata post veritatem Evangelii divulgatam, sunt mortifera. Et tamen legalia ad cultum Dei pertinent. Ergo in cultu Dei potest esse aliquid mortiferum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro contra mendacium, mendacium maxime perniciosum est quod fit in his quae ad Christianam religionem pertinent. Est autem mendacium cum aliquis exterius si-

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gnificat contrarium veritati. Sicut autem significatur aliquid verbo, ita etiam significatur aliquid facto, et in tali significatione facti consistit exterior religionis cultus, ut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo si per cultum exteriorem aliquid falsum significetur, erit cultus perniciosus. Hoc autem contingit dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, ex parte rei significatae, a qua discordat significatio cultus. Et hoc modo, tempore novae legis, peractis iam Christi mysteriis, perniciosum est uti caeremoniis veteris legis, quibus Christi mysteria significabantur futura, sicut etiam perniciosum esset si quis verbo confiteretur Christum esse passurum. Alio modo potest contingere falsitas in exteriori cultu ex parte colentis, et hoc praecipue in cultu communi, qui per ministros exhibetur in persona totius Ecclesiae. Sicut enim falsarius esset qui aliqua proponeret ex parte alicuius quae non essent ei commissa, ita vitium falsitatis incurrit qui ex parte Ecclesiae cultum exhibet Deo contra modum divina auctoritate ab Ecclesia constitutum et in Ecclesia consuetum. Unde Ambrosius dicit, indignus est qui aliter celebrat mysterium quam Christus tradidit. Et propter hoc etiam Glossa dicit, Coloss. II, quod superstitio est quando traditioni humanae nomen religionis applicatur.

thing is signified by word, so it is by deed: and it is in this signification by deed that the outward worship of religion consists, as shown above (Q. 81, A. 7). Consequently, if anything false is signified by outward worship, this worship will be pernicious. Now this happens in two ways. In the first place, it happens on the part of the thing signified, through the worship signifying something discordant therefrom: and in this way, at the time of the New Law, the mysteries of Christ being already accomplished, it is pernicious to make use of the ceremonies of the Old Law whereby the mysteries of Christ were foreshadowed as things to come: just as it would be pernicious for anyone to declare that Christ has yet to suffer. In the second place, falsehood in outward worship occurs on the part of the worshiper, and especially in common worship which is offered by ministers impersonating the whole Church. For even as he would be guilty of falsehood who would, in the name of another person, proffer things that are not committed to him, so too does a man incur the guilt of falsehood who, on the part of the Church, gives worship to God contrary to the manner established by the Church or divine authority, and according to ecclesiastical custom. Hence Ambrose says: He is unworthy who celebrates the mystery otherwise than Christ delivered it. For this reason, too, a gloss on Col. 2:23 says that superstition is the use of human observances under the name of religion. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum Deus sit veReply Obj. 1: Since God is truth, to invoke God is to ritas, illi invocant Deum qui in spiritu et veritate eum worship Him in spirit and truth, according to John 4:23. colunt, ut dicitur Ioan. IV. Et ideo cultus continens fal- Hence a worship that contains falsehood, is inconsistent sitatem non pertinet proprie ad Dei invocationem quae with a salutary calling upon God.

salvat. Ad secundum dicendum quod ante tempus legis, iusti per interiorem instinctum instruebantur de modo colendi Deum, quos alii sequebantur. Postmodum vero exterioribus praeceptis circa hoc homines sunt instructi, quae praeterire pestiferum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod diversae consuetudines Ecclesiae in cultu divino in nullo veritati repugnant. Et ideo sunt servandae; et eas praeterire illicitum est.

Reply Obj. 2: Before the time of the Law the just were instructed by an inward instinct as to the way of worshiping God, and others followed them. But afterwards men were instructed by outward precepts about this matter, and it is wicked to disobey them. Reply Obj. 3: The various customs of the Church in the divine worship are in no way contrary to the truth: wherefore we must observe them, and to disregard them is unlawful.

Article 2 Whether there can be any excess in the worship of God? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in cultu Dei non possit esse aliquid superfluum. Dicitur enim Eccli. XLIII, glorificantes Deum quantumcumque potueritis, supervalebit adhuc. Sed cultus divinus ordinatur ad Deum glorificandum. Ergo nihil superfluum in eo esse potest. Praeterea, exterior cultus est professio quaedam cultus interioris quo Deus colitur fide, spe et caritate; ut

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be excess in the worship of God. It is written (Sir 43:32): Glorify the Lord as much as ever you can, for He will yet far exceed. Now the divine worship is directed to the glorification of God. Therefore there can be no excess in it. Obj. 2: Further, outward worship is a profession of inward worship, whereby God is worshiped with faith, hope,

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Superstition Consisting in Undue Worship of the True God

Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid. Sed in fide, spe et caritate non potest esse aliquid superfluum. Ergo etiam neque in divino cultu. Praeterea, ad divinum cultum pertinet ut ea Deo exhibeamus quae a Deo accepimus. Sed omnia bona nostra a Deo accepimus. Ergo si totum quidquid possumus facimus ad Dei reverentiam, nihil erit superfluum in divino cultu. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in II de Doct. Christ., quod bonus verusque Christianus etiam in litteris sacris superstitiosa figmenta repudiat. Sed per sacras litteras Deus colendus ostenditur. Ergo etiam in cultu divino potest esse superstitio ex aliqua superfluitate. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid dicitur superfluum dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quantitatem absolutam. Et secundum hoc non potest esse superfluum in divino cultu, quia nihil potest homo facere quod non sit minus eo quod Deo debet. Alio modo potest esse aliquid superfluum secundum quantitatem proportionis, quia scilicet non est fini proportionatum. Finis autem divini cultus est ut homo Deo det gloriam, et ei se subiiciat mente et corpore. Et ideo quidquid homo faciat quod pertinet ad Dei gloriam, et ad hoc quod mens hominis Deo subiiciatur, et etiam corpus per moderatam refrenationem concupiscentiarum, secundum Dei et Ecclesiae ordinationem, et consuetudinem eorum quibus homo convivit, non est superfluum in divino cultu. Si autem aliquid sit quod quantum est de se non pertinet ad Dei gloriam, neque ad hoc quod mens hominis feratur in Deum, aut quod carnis concupiscentiae moderate refrenantur; aut etiam si sit praeter Dei et Ecclesiae institutionem, vel contra consuetudinem communem (quae secundum Augustinum, pro lege habenda est). Totum hoc reputandum est superfluum et superstitiosum, quia, in exterioribus solum consistens, ad interiorem Dei cultum non pertinet. Unde Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., inducit quod dicitur Luc. XVII, regnum Dei intra vos est, contra superstitiosos, qui scilicet exterioribus principalem curam impendunt. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in ipsa Dei glorificatione implicatur quod id quod fit pertineat ad Dei gloriam. Per quod excluditur superstitionis superfluitas. Ad secundum dicendum quod per fidem, spem et caritatem anima subiicitur Deo. Unde in eis non potest esse aliquid superfluum. Aliud autem est de exterioribus actibus, qui quandoque ad haec non pertinent. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de superfluo quantum ad quantitatem absolutam.

Q. 93, A. 2

and charity, as Augustine says (Enchiridion iii). Now there can be no excess in faith, hope, and charity. Neither, therefore, can there be in the worship of God. Obj. 3: Further, to worship God consists in offering to Him what we have received from Him. But we have received all our goods from God. Therefore if we do all that we possibly can for God’s honor, there will be no excess in the divine worship. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 18) that the good and true Christian rejects also superstitious fancies from Holy Writ. But Holy Writ teaches us to worship God. Therefore there can be superstition by reason of excess even in the worship of God. I answer that, A thing is said to be in excess in two ways. First, with regard to absolute quantity, and in this way there cannot be excess in the worship of God, because whatever man does is less than he owes God. Second, a thing is in excess with regard to quantity of proportion, through not being proportionate to its end. Now the end of divine worship is that man may give glory to God, and submit to Him in mind and body. Consequently, whatever a man may do conducing to God’s glory, and subjecting his mind to God, and his body, too, by a moderate curbing of the concupiscences, is not excessive in the divine worship, provided it be in accordance with the commandments of God and of the Church, and in keeping with the customs of those among whom he lives. On the other hand if that which is done be, in itself, not conducive to God’s glory, nor raise man’s mind to God, nor curb inordinate concupiscence, or again if it be not in accordance with the commandments of God and of the Church, or if it be contrary to the general custom—which, according to Augustine, has the force of law—all this must be reckoned excessive and superstitious, because consisting, as it does, of mere externals, it has no connection with the internal worship of God. Hence Augustine (De Vera Relig. iii) quotes the words of Luke 17:21, The kingdom of God is within you, against the superstitious, those, to wit, who pay more attention to externals. Reply Obj. 1: The glorification of God implies that what is done is done for God’s glory: and this excludes the excess denoted by superstition. Reply Obj. 2: Faith, hope and charity subject the mind to God, so that there can be nothing excessive in them. It is different with external acts, which sometimes have no connection with these virtues. Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers excess by way of absolute quantity.

7

Question 94 Idolatry Deinde considerandum est de idololatria. Et circa We must now consider idolatry: under which head hoc quaeruntur quatuor. there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum idololatria sit species superstitionis. (1) Whether idolatry is a species of superstition? Secundo, utrum sit peccatum. (2) Whether it is a sin? Tertio, utrum sit gravissimum peccatorum. (3) Whether it is the gravest sin? Quarto, de causa huius peccati. Utrum autem cum (4) Of the cause of this sin. idololatris sit communicandum, dictum est supra, cum de infidelitate ageretur.

Article 1 Whether idolatry is rightly reckoned a species of superstition? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod idololatria non recte ponatur species superstitionis. Sicut enim haeretici sunt infideles, ita et idololatrae. Sed haeresis est species infidelitatis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo et idololatria, non autem superstitionis. Praeterea, latria pertinet ad virtutem religionis, cui opponitur superstitio. Sed idololatria videtur univoce dici latria cum ea quae ad veram religionem pertinet, sicut enim appetitus falsae beatitudinis univoce dicitur cum appetitu verae beatitudinis, ita cultus falsorum deorum, qui dicitur idololatria, univoce videtur dici cum cultu veri Dei, qui est latria verae religionis. Ergo idololatria non est species superstitionis.

Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not rightly reckoned a species of superstition. Just as heretics are unbelievers, so are idolaters. But heresy is a species of unbelief, as stated above (Q. 11, A. 1). Therefore idolatry is also a species of unbelief and not of superstition. Obj. 2: Further, latria pertains to the virtue of religion to which superstition is opposed. But latria, apparently, is univocally applied to idolatry and to that which belongs to the true religion. For just as we speak univocally of the desire of false happiness, and of the desire of true happiness, so too, seemingly, we speak univocally of the worship of false gods, which is called idolatry, and of the worship of the true God, which is the latria of true religion. Therefore idolatry is not a species of superstition. Obj. 3: Further, that which is nothing cannot be the species of any genus. But idolatry, apparently, is nothing: for the Apostle says (1 Cor 8:4): We know that an idol is nothing in the world, and further on (1 Cor 10:19): What then? Do I say that what is offered in sacrifice to idols is anything? Or that the idol is anything? implying an answer in the negative. Now offering things to idols belongs properly to idolatry. Therefore since idolatry is like to nothing, it cannot be a species of superstition. Obj. 4: Further, it belongs to superstition to give divine honor to whom that honor is not due. Now divine honor is undue to idols, just as it is undue to other creatures, wherefore certain people are reproached (Rom 1:25) for that they worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator. Therefore this species of superstition is unfittingly called idolatry, and should rather be named worship of creatures. On the contrary, It is related (Acts 17:16) that when Paul awaited Silas and Timothy at Athens, his spirit was stirred within him seeing the whole city given to idolatry, and

Praeterea, id quod nihil est non potest esse alicuius generis species. Sed idololatria nihil esse videtur. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. VIII, scimus quia nihil est idolum in mundo, et infra, X, quid ergo? Dico quod idolis immolatum sit aliquid? Aut quod idolum sit aliquid? Quasi dicat, non. Immolare autem idolis proprie ad idololatriam pertinet. Ergo idololatria, quasi nihil existens, non potest esse superstitionis species. Praeterea, ad superstitionem pertinet exhibere cultum divinum cui non debetur. Sed cultus divinus, sicut non debetur idolis, ita nec aliis creaturis, unde Rom. I quidam vituperantur de hoc quod coluerunt et servierunt potius creaturis quam creatori. Ergo inconvenienter huiusmodi superstitionis species idololatria nominatur, sed deberet potius nominari latria creaturae. Sed contra est quod Act. XVII dicitur quod Paulus cum Athenis expectaret, incitabatur spiritus eius in ipso, videns idololatriae deditam civitatem, et postea dixit, viri

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Q. 94, A. 1

Justice

IIa-IIae

Athenienses, per omnia quasi superstitiosos vos iudico. further on (Acts 17:22) he says: Ye men of Athens, I perceive Ergo idololatria ad superstitionem pertinet. that in all things you are too superstitious. Therefore idolatry belongs to superstition. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, I answer that, As stated above (Q. 92, A. 2), it bead superstitionem pertinet excedere debitum modum longs to superstition to exceed the due mode of divine wordivini cultus. Quod quidem praecipue fit quando divi- ship, and this is done chiefly when divine worship is given nus cultus exhibetur cui non debet exhiberi. Debet au- to whom it should not be given. Now it should be given tem exhiberi soli summo Deo increato, ut supra habitum to the most high uncreated God alone, as stated above est, cum de religione ageretur. Et ideo, cuicumque crea- (Q. 81, A. 1) when we were treating of religion. Therefore it turae divinus cultus exhibeatur, superstitiosum est. is superstition to give worship to any creature whatsoever. Huiusmodi autem cultus divinus, sicut creaturis senNow just as this divine worship was given to sensisibilibus exhibebatur per aliqua sensibilia signa, puta ble creatures by means of sensible signs, such as sacrifices, sacrificia, ludos et alia huiusmodi; ita etiam exhibeba- games, and the like, so too was it given to a creature repretur creaturae repraesentatae per aliquam sensibilem for- sented by some sensible form or shape, which is called an mam seu figuram, quae idolum dicitur. Diversimode ta- idol. Yet divine worship was given to idols in various ways. men cultus divinus idolis exhibebatur. Quidam enim per For some, by means of a nefarious art, constructed images quandam nefariam artem imagines quasdam construe- which produced certain effects by the power of the demons: bant quae virtute Daemonum aliquos certos effectus ha- wherefore they deemed that the images themselves conbebant, unde putabant in ipsis imaginibus esse aliquid tained something God-like, and consequently that divine divinitatis; et quod per consequens divinus cultus eis worship was due to them. This was the opinion of Herdeberetur. Et haec fuit opinio Hermetis Trimegisti; ut mes Trismegistus, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei viii, 23): Augustinus dicit, in VIII de Civ. Dei. Alii vero non ex- while others gave divine worship not to the images, but to hibebant cultum divinitatis ipsis imaginibus, sed creatu- the creatures represented thereby. The Apostle alludes to ris quarum erant imagines. Et utrumque horum tangit both of these (Rom 1:23, 25). For, as regards the former, he apostolus, ad Rom. I. Nam quantum ad primum, dicit, says: They changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the mutaverunt gloriam incorruptibilis Dei in similitudinem likeness of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds, and imaginis corruptibilis hominis, et volucrum et quadrupe- of four-footed beasts, and of creeping things, and of the latter dum et serpentum. Quantum autem ad secundum, sub- he says: Who worshipped and served the creature rather than dit, coluerunt et servierunt potius creaturae quam creato- the Creator. ri. Horum tamen fuit triplex opinio. Quidam enim aeThese latter were of three ways of thinking. For some stimabant quosdam homines deos fuisse, quos per eo- deemed certain men to have been gods, whom they worrum imagines colebant, sicut Iovem, Mercurium, et alios shipped in the images of those men: for instance, Jupiter, huiusmodi. Quidam vero aestimabant totum mundum Mercury, and so forth. Others again deemed the whole esse unum Deum, non propter corporalem substantiam, world to be one god, not by reason of its material substance, sed propter animam, quam Deum esse credebant, dicen- but by reason of its soul, which they believed to be God, tes Deum nihil aliud esse quam animam motu et ratio- for they held God to be nothing else than a soul governing ne mundum gubernantem; sicut et homo dicitur sapiens the world by movement and reason: even as a man is said propter animam, non propter corpus. Unde putabant to- to be wise in respect not of his body but of his soul. Hence ti mundo, et omnibus partibus eius, esse cultum divini- they thought that divine worship ought to be given to the tatis exhibendum, caelo, aeri, aquae, et omnibus huius- whole world and to all its parts, heaven, air, water, and to modi. Et ad haec referebant nomina et imagines suorum all such things: and to these they referred the names of their deorum, sicut Varro dicebat, et narrat Augustinus, VII gods, as Varro asserted, and Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei de Civ. Dei. Alii vero, scilicet Platonici, posuerunt unum vii, 5). Lastly, others, namely, the Platonists, said that there esse summum Deum, causam omnium; post quem po- is one supreme god, the cause of all things. After him they nebant esse substantias quasdam spirituales a summo placed certain spiritual substances created by the supreme Deo creatas, quas deos nominabant, participatione sci- god. These they called gods, on account of their having a licet divinitatis, nos autem eos Angelos dicimus; post share of the godhead; but we call them angels. After these quos ponebant animas caelestium corporum; et sub his they placed the souls of the heavenly bodies, and beneath Daemones, quos dicebant esse aerea quaedam animalia; these the demons which they stated to be certain animal et sub his ponebant animas hominum, quas per virtutis denizens of the air, and beneath these again they placed humeritum ad deorum vel Daemonum societatem assumi man souls, which they believed to be taken up into the fel-

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Idolatry

Q. 94, A. 1

credebant. Et omnibus his cultum divinitatis exhibebant, lowship of the gods or of the demons by reason of the merit ut Augustinus narrat, in XVIII de Civ. Dei. of their virtue. To all these they gave divine worship, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xviii, 14). Has autem duas ultimas opiniones dicebant pertineThe last two opinions were held to belong to natural there ad physicam theologiam, quam philosophi conside- ology which the philosophers gathered from their study of rabant in mundo, et docebant in scholis. Aliam vero, de the world and taught in the schools: while the other, relatcultu hominum, dicebant pertinere ad theologiam fabu- ing to the worship of men, was said to belong to mythical larem, quae secundum figmenta poetarum repraesenta- theology which was wont to be represented on the stage acbatur in theatris. Aliam vero opinionem, de imaginibus, cording to the fancies of poets. The remaining opinion redicebant pertinere ad civilem theologiam, quae per pon- lating to images was held to belong to civil theology, which tifices celebrabatur in templis. was celebrated by the pontiffs in the temples. Omnia autem haec ad superstitionem idololatriae Now all these come under the head of the superstition pertinebant. Unde Augustinus dicit, in II de Doct. of idolatry. Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, Christ., superstitiosum est quidquid institutum ab homi- 20): Anything invented by man for making and worshipping nibus est ad facienda et colenda idola pertinens, vel ad co- idols, or for giving Divine worship to a creature or any part of lendam sicut Deum creaturam partemve ullam creaturae. a creature, is superstitious. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut religio non Reply Obj. 1: Just as religion is not faith, but a confesest fides, sed fidei protestatio per aliqua exteriora signa, sion of faith by outward signs, so superstition is a confesita superstitio est quaedam infidelitatis protestatio per sion of unbelief by external worship. Such a confession is exteriorem cultum. Quam quidem protestationem no- signified by the term idolatry, but not by the term heresy, men idololatriae significat, non autem nomen haeresis, which only means a false opinion. Therefore heresy is a spesed solum falsam opinionem. Et ideo haeresis est species cies of unbelief, but idolatry is a species of superstition. infidelitatis, sed idololatria est species superstitionis. Ad secundum dicendum quod nomen latriae duReply Obj. 2: The term latria may be taken in two pliciter accipi potest. Uno modo potest significare huma- senses. In one sense it may denote a human act pertainnum actum ad cultum Dei pertinentem. Et secundum ing to the worship of God: and then its signification rehoc, non variatur significatio huius nominis latria, cui- mains the same, to whomsoever it be shown, because, in cumque exhibeatur, quia illud cui exhibetur non cadet, this sense, the thing to which it is shown is not included secundum hoc, in eius definitione. Et secundum hoc la- in its definition. Taken thus latria is applied univocally, tria univoce dicetur secundum quod pertinet ad veram whether to true religion or to idolatry, just as the payment religionem, et secundum quod pertinet ad idololatriam, of a tax is univocally the same, whether it is paid to the sicut solutio tributi univoce dicitur sive exhibeatur vero true or to a false king. In another sense latria denotes the regi, sive falso. Alio modo accipitur latria prout est idem same as religion, and then, since it is a virtue, it is essenreligioni. Et sic, cum sit virtus, de ratione eius est quod tial thereto that divine worship be given to whom it ought cultus divinus exhibeatur ei cui debet exhiberi. Et secun- to be given; and in this way latria is applied equivocally to dum hoc latria aequivoce dicetur de latria verae religio- the latria of true religion, and to idolatry: just as prudence nis, et de idololatria, sicut prudentia aequivoce dicitur de is applied equivocally to the prudence that is a virtue, and prudentia quae est virtus, et de prudentia quae est carnis. to that which is carnal. Ad tertium dicendum quod apostolus intelligit niReply Obj. 3: The saying of the Apostle that an idol is hil esse in mundo quia imagines illae quae idola dice- nothing in the world means that those images which were bantur, non erant animatae aut aliquam virtutem divini- called idols, were not animated, or possessed of a divine tatis habentes, sicut Hermes ponebat, quasi esset aliquid power, as Hermes maintained, as though they were comcompositum ex spiritu et corpore. Et similiter intelligen- posed of spirit and body. In the same sense we must undum est quod idolis immolatum non est aliquid, quia derstand the saying that what is offered in sacrifice to idols per huiusmodi immolationem carnes immolatitiae ne- is not anything, because by being thus sacrificed the sacrique aliquam sanctificationem consequebantur, ut genti- ficial flesh acquired neither sanctification, as the Gentiles les putabant; neque aliquam immunditiam, ut putabant thought, nor uncleanness, as the Jews held. Iudaei. Ad quartum dicendum quod ex communi consueReply Obj. 4: It was owing to the general custom tudine qua creaturas quascumque colebant gentiles sub among the Gentiles of worshipping any kind of creature unquibusdam imaginibus, impositum est hoc nomen ido- der the form of images that the term idolatry was used to lolatria ad significandum quemcumque cultum creatu- signify any worship of a creature, even without the use of rae, et etiam si sine imaginibus fieret. images.

11

Q. 94, A. 2

Justice

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Article 2 Whether idolatry is a sin? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod idololatria non sit peccatum. Nihil enim est peccatum quod vera fides in cultum Dei assumit. Sed vera fides imagines quasdam assumit ad divinum cultum, nam et in tabernaculo erant imagines Cherubin, ut legitur Exod. XXV; et in Ecclesia quaedam imagines ponuntur quas fideles adorant. Ergo idololatria, secundum quam idola adorantur, non est peccatum. Praeterea, cuilibet superiori est reverentia exhibenda. Sed Angeli et animae sanctorum sunt nobis superiores. Ergo, si eis exhibeatur reverentia per aliquem cultum vel sacrificiorum vel aliquorum huiusmodi, non erit peccatum. Praeterea, summus Deus interiori cultu mentis est colendus, secundum illud Ioan. IV, Deum oportet adorare in spiritu et veritate. Et Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod Deus colitur fide, spe et caritate. Potest autem contingere quod aliquis exterius idola colat, interius tamen a vera fide non discedat. Ergo videtur quod sine praeiudicio divini cultus possit aliquis exterius idola colere. Sed contra est quod Exod. XX dicitur, non adorabis ea, scilicet exterius, neque coles, scilicet interius, ut Glossa exponit et loquitur de sculptilibus et imaginibus. Ergo peccatum est idolis exteriorem vel interiorem cultum exhibere. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc aliqui dupliciter erraverunt. Quidam enim putaverunt quod offerre sacrificium et alia ad latriam pertinentia non solum summo Deo, sed etiam aliis supra dictis, est debitum et per se bonum, eo quod superiori cuilibet naturae divinam reverentiam exhibendam putant, quasi Deo propinquiori. Sed hoc irrationabiliter dicitur. Nam etsi omnes superiores revereri debeamus, non tamen eadem reverentia omnibus debetur, sed aliquid speciale debetur summo Deo, qui singulari ratione omnes excellit, et hic est latriae cultus. Nec potest dici, sicut quidam putaverunt, haec visibilia sacrificia diis aliis congruere, illi vero summo Deo, tanquam meliori, meliora, scilicet purae mentis officia, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in X de Civ. Dei, exteriora sacrificia ita sunt signa interiorum sicut verba sonantia signa sunt rerum. Quocirca, sicut orantes atque laudantes ad eum dirigimus significantes voces cui res ipsas in corde quas significamus offerimus, ita, sacrificantes, non alteri visibile sacrificium offerendum esse noverimus quam ei cuius in cordibus nostris invisibile sacrificium nos ipsi esse debemus.

Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not a sin. Nothing is a sin that the true faith employs in worshipping God. Now the true faith employs images for the divine worship: since both in the Tabernacle were there images of the cherubim, as related in Ex. 25, and in the Church are images set up which the faithful worship. Therefore idolatry, whereby idols are worshipped, is not a sin. Obj. 2: Further, reverence should be paid to every superior. But the angels and the souls of the blessed are our superiors. Therefore it will be no sin to pay them reverence by worship, of sacrifices or the like. Obj. 3: Further, the most high God should be honored with an inward worship, according to John 4:24, God . . . they must adore . . . in spirit and in truth: and Augustine says (Enchiridion iii), that God is worshipped by faith, hope and charity. Now a man may happen to worship idols outwardly, and yet not wander from the true faith inwardly. Therefore it seems that we may worship idols outwardly without prejudice to the divine worship. On the contrary, It is written (Exod 20:5): Thou shalt not adore them, i.e., outwardly, nor serve them, i.e., inwardly, as a gloss explains it: and it is a question of graven things and images. Therefore it is a sin to worship idols whether outwardly or inwardly. I answer that, There has been a twofold error in this matter. For some have thought that to offer sacrifices and other things pertaining to latria, not only to God but also to the others aforesaid, is due and good in itself, since they held that divine honor should be paid to every superior nature, as being nearer to God. But this is unreasonable. For though we ought to revere all superiors, yet the same reverence is not due to them all: and something special is due to the most high God Who excels all in a singular manner: and this is the worship of latria. Nor can it be said, as some have maintained, that these visible sacrifices are fitting with regard to other gods, and that to the most high God, as being better than those others, better sacrifices, namely, the service of a pure mind, should be offered. The reason is that, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 19), external sacrifices are signs of internal, just as audible words are signs of things. Wherefore, just as by prayer and praise we utter significant words to Him, and offer to Him in our hearts the things they signify, so too in our sacrifices we ought to realize that we should offer a visible sacrifice to no other than to Him Whose invisible sacrifice we ourselves should be in our hearts.

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Alii vero aestimaverunt latriae cultum exteriorem non esse idolis exhibendum tanquam per se bonum aut opportunum, sed tanquam vulgari consuetudini consonum, ut Augustinus, in VI de Civ. Dei, introducit Senecam dicentem, sic, inquit, adorabimus ut meminerimus huiusmodi cultum magis ad morem quam ad rem pertinere. Et in libro de vera Relig. Augustinus dicit non esse religionem a philosophis quaerendam, qui eadem sacra recipiebant cum populis, et de suorum deorum natura ac summo bono diversas contrariasque sententias in scholis personabant. Et hunc etiam errorem secuti sunt quidam haeretici asserentes non esse perniciosum si quis, persecutionis tempore deprehensus, exterius idola colat, dum tamen fidem servat in mente. Sed hoc apparet manifeste falsum. Nam cum exterior cultus sit signum interioris cultus, sicut est perniciosum mendacium si quis verbis asserat contrarium eius quod per veram fidem tenet in corde, ita etiam est perniciosa falsitas si quis exteriorem cultum exhibeat alicui contra id quod sentit in mente. Unde Augustinus dicit contra Senecam, in VI de Civ. Dei, quod eo damnabilius colebat idola, quo illa quae mendaciter agebat sic ageret ut cum populo veraciter agere existimaretur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod neque in veteris legis tabernaculo seu templo, neque etiam nunc in Ecclesia imagines instituuntur ut eis cultus latriae exhibeatur, sed ad quandam significationem, ut per huiusmodi imagines mentibus hominum imprimatur et confirmetur fides de excellentia Angelorum et sanctorum. Secus autem est de imagine Christi, cui, ratione deitatis, latria debetur, ut dicetur in tertio. Ad secundum et tertium patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt.

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Others held that the outward worship of latria should be given to idols, not as though it were something good or fitting in itself, but as being in harmony with the general custom. Thus Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) quotes Seneca as saying: We shall adore, says he, in such a way as to remember that our worship is in accordance with custom rather than with the reality: and (De Vera Relig. v) Augustine says that we must not seek religion from the philosophers, who accepted the same things for sacred, as did the people; and gave utterance in the schools to various and contrary opinions about the nature of their gods, and the sovereign good. This error was embraced also by certain heretics, who affirmed that it is not wrong for one who is seized in time of persecution to worship idols outwardly so long as he keeps the faith in his heart. But this is evidently false. For since outward worship is a sign of the inward worship, just as it is a wicked lie to affirm the contrary of what one holds inwardly of the true faith so too is it a wicked falsehood to pay outward worship to anything counter to the sentiments of one’s heart. Wherefore Augustine condemns Seneca (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) in that his worship of idols was so much the more infamous forasmuch as the things he did dishonestly were so done by him that the people believed him to act honestly. Reply Obj. 1: Neither in the Tabernacle or Temple of the Old Law, nor again now in the Church are images set up that the worship of latria may be paid to them, but for the purpose of signification, in order that belief in the excellence of angels and saints may be impressed and confirmed in the mind of man. It is different with the image of Christ, to which latria is due on account of His Divinity, as we shall state in the Third Part (Q. 25, A. 3). The Replies to the Second and Third Objections are evident from what has been said above.

Article 3 Whether idolatry is the gravest of sins? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod idololatria non sit gravissimum peccatorum. Pessimum enim optimo opponitur, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Sed cultus interior, qui consistit in fide, spe et caritate, est melior quam cultus exterior. Ergo infidelitas, desperatio et odium Dei, quae opponuntur cultui interiori, sunt graviora peccata quam idololatria, quae opponitur cultui exteriori. Praeterea, tanto aliquod peccatum est gravius quanto magis est contra Deum. Sed directius videtur aliquis contra Deum agere blasphemando, vel fidem impugnando, quam cultum Dei alii exhibendo, quod pertinet

Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not the gravest of sins. The worst is opposed to the best (Ethic. viii, 10). But interior worship, which consists of faith, hope and charity, is better than external worship. Therefore unbelief, despair and hatred of God, which are opposed to internal worship, are graver sins than idolatry, which is opposed to external worship. Obj. 2: Further, the more a sin is against God the more grievous it is. Now, seemingly, a man acts more directly against God by blaspheming, or denying the faith, than by giving God’s worship to another, which pertains to idola-

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ad idololatriam. Ergo blasphemia vel impugnatio fidei est gravius peccatum quam idololatria. Praeterea, minora mala maioribus malis puniri videntur. Sed peccatum idololatriae punitum est peccato contra naturam, ut dicitur Rom. I. Ergo peccatum contra naturam est gravius peccato idololatriae. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XX contra Faust., neque vos, scilicet Manichaeos, Paganos dicimus, aut schisma Paganorum, sed habere cum eis quandam similitudinem, eo quod multos colatis deos. Verum vos esse eis longe deteriores, quod illi ea colunt quae sunt, sed pro diis colenda non sunt; vos autem ea colitis quae omnino non sunt. Ergo vitium haereticae pravitatis est gravius quam idololatria. Praeterea, super illud Gal. IV, quomodo convertimini iterum ad infirma et egena elementa? Dicit Glossa Hieronymi, legis observantia, cui dediti tunc erant, erat peccatum paene par servituti idolorum, cui ante conversionem vacaverant. Non ergo peccatum idololatriae est gravissimum. Sed contra est quod Levit. XV, super illud quod dicitur de immunditia mulieris patientis fluxum sanguinis, dicit Glossa, omne peccatum est immunditia animae, sed idololatria maxime. Respondeo dicendum quod gravitas alicuius peccati potest attendi dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius peccati. Et sic peccatum idololatriae est gravissimum. Sicut enim in terrena republica gravissimum esse videtur quod aliquis honorem regium alteri impendat quam vero regi, quia quantum in se est, totum reipublicae perturbat ordinem; ita in peccatis quae contra Deum committuntur, quae tamen sunt maxima, gravissimum esse videtur quod aliquis honorem divinum creaturae impendat, quia quantum est in se, facit alium Deum in mundo, minuens principatum divinum. Alio modo potest attendi gravitas peccati ex parte peccantis, sicut dicitur esse gravius peccatum eius qui peccat scienter quam eius qui peccat ignoranter. Et secundum hoc nihil prohibet gravius peccare haereticos, qui scienter corrumpunt fidem quam acceperunt, quam idololatras ignoranter peccantes. Et similiter etiam aliqua alia peccata possunt esse maiora propter maiorem contemptum peccantis.

try. Therefore blasphemy and denial of the faith are more grievous sins than idolatry. Obj. 3: Further, it seems that lesser evils are punished with greater evils. But the sin of idolatry was punished with the sin against nature, as stated in Rom. 1:26. Therefore the sin against nature is a graver sin than idolatry. Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xx, 5): Neither do we say that you, viz. the Manichees, are pagans, or a sect of pagans, but that you bear a certain likeness to them since you worship many gods: and yet you are much worse than they are, for they worship things that exist, but should not be worshiped as gods, whereas you worship things that exist not at all. Therefore the vice of heretical depravity is more grievous than idolatry. Obj. 5: Further, a gloss of Jerome on Gal. 4:9, How turn you again to the weak and needy elements? says: The observance of the Law, to which they were then addicted, was a sin almost equal to the worship of idols, to which they had been given before their conversion. Therefore idolatry is not the most grievous sin. On the contrary, A gloss on the saying of Lev. 15:25, about the uncleanness of a woman suffering from an issue of blood, says: Every sin is an uncleanness of the soul, but especially idolatry. I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the sin itself, and thus idolatry is the most grievous sin. For just as the most heinous crime in an earthly commonwealth would seem to be for a man to give royal honor to another than the true king, since, so far as he is concerned, he disturbs the whole order of the commonwealth, so, in sins that are committed against God, which indeed are the greater sins, the greatest of all seems to be for a man to give God’s honor to a creature, since, so far as he is concerned, he sets up another God in the world, and lessens the divine sovereignty. Second, the gravity of a sin may be considered on the part of the sinner. Thus the sin of one that sins knowingly is said to be graver than the sin of one that sins through ignorance: and in this way nothing hinders heretics, if they knowingly corrupt the faith which they have received, from sinning more grievously than idolaters who sin through ignorance. Furthermore other sins may be more grievous on account of greater contempt on the part of the sinner. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod idololatria praeReply Obj. 1: Idolatry presupposes internal unbelief, supponit interiorem infidelitatem, et adiicit exterius in- and to this it adds undue worship. But in a case of external debitum cultum. Si vero sit exterior tantum idololatria idolatry without internal unbelief, there is an additional sin absque interiori infidelitate, additur culpa falsitatis, ut of falsehood, as stated above (A. 2).

prius dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod idololatria includit magnam blasphemiam, inquantum Deo subtrahitur dominii singularitas. Et fidem opere impugnat idololatria. Ad tertium dicendum quod quia de ratione poenae est quod sit contra voluntatem, peccatum per quod aliud punitur oportet esse magis manifestum, ut ex hoc

Reply Obj. 2: Idolatry includes a grievous blasphemy, inasmuch as it deprives God of the singleness of His dominion and denies the faith by deeds. Reply Obj. 3: Since it is essential to punishment that it be against the will, a sin whereby another sin is punished needs to be more manifest, in order that it may make the

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homo sibi ipsi et aliis detestabilis reddatur, non autem oportet quod sit gravius. Et secundum hoc, peccatum contra naturam minus est quam peccatum idololatriae, sed quia est manifestius, ponitur quasi conveniens poena peccati idololatriae, ut scilicet, sicut homo per idololatriam pervertit ordinem divini honoris, ita per peccatum contra naturam propriae naturae confusibilem perversitatem patiatur. Ad quartum dicendum quod haeresis Manichaeorum, etiam quantum ad genus peccati, gravior est quam peccatum aliorum idololatrarum, quia magis derogant divino honori, ponentes duos deos contrarios, et multa vana fabulosa de Deo fingentes. Secus autem est de aliis haereticis, qui unum Deum confitentur et eum solum colunt. Ad quintum dicendum quod observatio legis tempore gratiae non est omnino aequalis idololatriae secundum genus peccati, sed paene aequalis, quia utrumque est species pestiferae superstitionis.

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man more hateful to himself and to others; but it need not be a more grievous sin: and in this way the sin against nature is less grievous than the sin of idolatry. But since it is more manifest, it is assigned as a fitting punishment of the sin of idolatry, in order that, as by idolatry man abuses the order of the divine honor, so by the sin against nature he may suffer confusion from the abuse of his own nature. Reply Obj. 4: Even as to the genus of the sin, the Manichean heresy is more grievous than the sin of other idolaters, because it is more derogatory to the divine honor, since they set up two gods in opposition to one another, and hold many vain and fabulous fancies about God. It is different with other heretics, who confess their belief in one God and worship Him alone. Reply Obj. 5: The observance of the Law during the time of grace is not quite equal to idolatry as to the genus of the sin, but almost equal, because both are species of pestiferous superstition.

Article 4 Whether the cause of idolatry was on the part of man? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod causa idololatriae non fuerit ex parte hominis. In homine enim nihil est nisi vel natura, vel virtus, vel culpa. Sed causa idololatriae non potuit esse ex parte naturae hominis, quin potius naturalis ratio hominis dictat quod sit unus Deus, et quod non sit mortuis cultus divinus exhibendus, neque rebus inanimatis. Similiter etiam nec idololatria habet causam in homine ex parte virtutis, quia non potest arbor bona fructus malos facere, ut dicitur Matth. VII. Neque etiam ex parte culpae, quia, ut dicitur Sap. XIV, infandorum idolorum cultura omnis mali causa est, et initium et finis. Ergo idololatria non habet causam ex parte hominis. Praeterea, ea quae ex parte hominis causantur, omni tempore in hominibus inveniuntur. Non autem semper fuit idololatria, sed in secunda aetate legitur esse adinventa, vel a Nemrod, qui, ut dicitur, cogebat homines ignem adorare; vel a Nino, qui imaginem patris sui Beli adorari fecit. Apud Graecos autem, ut Isidorus refert, Prometheus primus simulacra hominum de luto finxit. Iudaei vero dicunt quod Ismael primus simulacra de luto fecit. Cessavit etiam in sexta aetate idololatria ex magna parte. Ergo idololatria non habuit causam ex parte hominis. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XXI de Civ. Dei, neque potuit primum, nisi illis, scilicet Daemonibus, docentibus, disci quid quisque illorum appetat, quid exhorreat, quo invitetur nomine, quo cogatur, unde magicae

Objection 1: It would seem that the cause of idolatry was not on the part of man. In man there is nothing but either nature, virtue, or guilt. But the cause of idolatry could not be on the part of man’s nature, since rather does man’s natural reason dictate that there is one God, and that divine worship should not be paid to the dead or to inanimate beings. Likewise, neither could idolatry have its cause in man on the part of virtue, since a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, according to Matt. 7:18: nor again could it be on the part of guilt, because, according to Wis. 14:27, the worship of abominable idols is the cause and the beginning and end of all evil. Therefore idolatry has no cause on the part of man. Obj. 2: Further, those things which have a cause in man are found among men at all times. Now idolatry was not always, but is stated to have been originated either by Nimrod, who is related to have forced men to worship fire, or by Ninus, who caused the statue of his father Bel to be worshiped. Among the Greeks, as related by Isidore (Etym. viii, 11), Prometheus was the first to set up statues of men: and the Jews say that Ismael was the first to make idols of clay. Moreover, idolatry ceased to a great extent in the sixth age. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of man. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): It was not possible to learn, for the first time, except from their (i.e., the demons’) teaching, what each of them desired or disliked, and by what name to invite or compel him: so as to give

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artes, earumque artifices extiterunt. Eadem autem ratio videtur esse de idololatria. Ergo idololatriae causa non est ex parte hominum. Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. XIV, supervacuitas hominum haec, scilicet idola, adinvenit in orbe terrarum. Respondeo dicendum quod idololatriae est duplex causa. Una quidem dispositiva. Et haec fuit ex parte hominum. Et hoc tripliciter. Primo quidem, ex inordinatione affectus, prout scilicet homines aliquem hominem vel nimis amantes vel nimis venerantes, honorem divinum ei impenderunt. Et haec causa assignatur Sap. XIV, acerbo luctu dolens pater cito sibi rapti filii fecit imaginem; et illum qui tunc, quasi homo, mortuus fuerat, tanquam Deum colere coepit. Et ibidem etiam subditur quod homines, aut affectui aut regibus deservientes, incommunicabile nomen, scilicet divinitatis, lignis et lapidibus imposuerunt. Secundo, propter hoc quod homo naturaliter de repraesentatione delectatur, ut philosophus dicit, in poetria sua. Et ideo homines rudes a principio videntes per diligentiam artificum imagines hominum expressive factas, divinitatis cultum eis impenderunt. Unde dicitur Sap. XIII, si quis artifex faber de silva lignum rectum secuerit; et per scientiam suae artis figuret illud et assimilet imagini hominis, de substantia sua, et filiis et nuptiis, votum faciens, inquirit. Tertio, propter ignorantiam veri Dei, cuius excellentiam homines non considerantes, quibusdam creaturis, propter pulchritudinem seu virtutem, divinitatis cultum exhibuerunt. Unde dicitur Sap. XIII, neque, operibus attendentes, agnoverunt quis esset artifex. Sed aut ignem, aut spiritum, aut citatum aerem, aut gyrum stellarum, aut nimiam aquam, aut solem, aut lunam, rectores orbis terrarum, deos putaverunt.

Alia autem causa idololatriae fuit consummativa, ex parte Daemonum, qui se colendos hominibus errantibus exhibuerunt in idolis, dando responsa et aliqua quae videbantur hominibus mirabilia faciendo. Unde et in Psalm. dicitur, omnes dii gentium Daemonia. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod causa dispositiva idololatriae fuit, ex parte hominis, naturae defectus vel per ignorantiam intellectus vel per deordinationem affectus, ut dictum est. Et hoc etiam ad culpam pertinet. Dicitur autem idololatria esse causa, initium et finis omnis peccati, quia non est aliquod genus peccati quod interdum idololatria non producat, vel expresse inducendo, per modum causae; vel occasionem praebendo, per modum initii; vel per modum finis, inquantum peccata aliqua assumebantur in cultum idolorum, sicut occisiones hominum et mutilationes membrorum, et alia huiusmodi. Et tamen aliqua peccata possunt idololatriam praecedere, quae ad ipsam hominem disponunt.

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birth to the magic arts and their professors: and the same observation seems to apply to idolatry. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of man. On the contrary, It is written (Wis 14:14): By the vanity of men they, i.e., idols, came into the world. I answer that, Idolatry had a twofold cause. One was a dispositive cause; this was on the part of man, and in three ways. First, on account of his inordinate affections, forasmuch as he gave other men divine honor, through either loving or revering them too much. This cause is assigned (Wis 14:15): A father being afflicted with bitter grief, made to himself the image of his son, who was quickly taken away: and him who then had died as a man he began to worship as a god. The same passage goes on to say (Wis 14:21) that men serving either their affection, or their kings, gave the incommunicable name, i.e., of the Godhead, to stones and wood. Second, because man takes a natural pleasure in representations, as the Philosopher observes (Poet. iv), wherefore as soon as the uncultured man saw human images skillfully fashioned by the diligence of the craftsman, he gave them divine worship; hence it is written (Wis 13:11–17): If an artist, a carpenter, hath cut down a tree, proper for his use, in the wood . . . and by the skill of his art fashioneth it, and maketh it like the image of a man . . . and then maketh prayer to it, inquiring concerning his substance, and his children, or his marriage. Third, on account of their ignorance of the true God, inasmuch as through failing to consider His excellence men gave divine worship to certain creatures, on account of their beauty or power, wherefore it is written (Wis 13:1, 2): All men . . . neither by attending to the works have acknowledged who was the workman, but have imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and the moon, to be the gods that rule the world. The other cause of idolatry was completive, and this was on the part of the demons, who offered themselves to be worshipped by men, by giving answers in the idols, and doing things which to men seemed marvelous. Hence it is written (Ps 95:5): All the gods of the Gentiles are devils. Reply Obj. 1: The dispositive cause of idolatry was, on the part of man, a defect of nature, either through ignorance in his intellect, or disorder in his affections, as stated above; and this pertains to guilt. Again, idolatry is stated to be the cause, beginning and end of all sin, because there is no kind of sin that idolatry does not produce at some time, either through leading expressly to that sin by causing it, or through being an occasion thereof, either as a beginning or as an end, insofar as certain sins were employed in the worship of idols; such as homicides, mutilations, and so forth. Nevertheless certain sins may precede idolatry and dispose man thereto.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod in prima aetate non fuit idololatria propter recentem memoriam creationis mundi, ex qua adhuc vigebat cognitio unius Dei in mente hominum. In sexta autem aetate idololatria est exclusa per doctrinam et virtutem Christi, qui de Diabolo triumphavit. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de causa consummativa idololatriae.

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Reply Obj. 2: There was no idolatry in the first age, owing to the recent remembrance of the creation of the world, so that man still retained in his mind the knowledge of one God. In the sixth age idolatry was banished by the doctrine and power of Christ, who triumphed over the devil. Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the consummative cause of idolatry.

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Question 95 Superstition in Divinations Deinde considerandum est de superstitione divinatiWe must now consider superstition in divinations, unva. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. der which head there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum divinatio sit peccatum. (1) Whether divination is a sin? Secundo, utrum sit species superstitionis. (2) Whether it is a species of superstition? Tertio, de speciebus divinationis. (3) Of the species of divination; Quarto, de divinatione quae fit per Daemones. (4) Of divination by means of demons; Quinto, de divinatione quae fit per astra. (5) Of divination by the stars; Sexto, de divinatione quae fit per somnia. (6) Of divination by dreams; Septimo, de divinatione quae fit per auguria et alias (7) Of divination by auguries and like observances; huiusmodi observationes. Octavo, de divinatione quae fit per sortes. (8) Of divination by lots.

Article 1 Whether divination is a sin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod divinatio non sit peccatum. Divinatio enim ab aliquo divino nominatur. Sed ea quae sunt divina magis ad sanctitatem pertinent quam ad peccatum. Ergo videtur quod divinatio non est peccatum. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arbit., quis audeat dicere disciplinam esse malum? Et iterum, nullo modo dixerim aliquam intelligentiam malam esse posse. Sed aliquae artes sunt divinativae, ut patet per philosophum, in libro de memoria. Videtur etiam ipsa divinatio ad aliquam intelligentiam veritatis pertinere. Ergo videtur quod divinatio non sit peccatum. Praeterea, naturalis inclinatio non est ad aliquod malum, quia natura non inclinat nisi ad simile sibi. Sed ex naturali inclinatione homines sollicitantur praenoscere futuros eventus, quod pertinet ad divinationem. Ergo divinatio non est peccatum. Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. XVIII, non sit qui Pythones consulat, neque divinos. Et in decretis, XXVI, qu. V, dicitur, qui divinationes expetunt, sub regulis quinquennii iaceant, secundum gradus poenitentiae definitos. Respondeo dicendum quod in nomine divinationis intelligitur quaedam praenuntiatio futurorum. Futura autem dupliciter praenosci possunt, uno quidem modo, in suis causis; alio modo, in seipsis. Causae autem futurorum tripliciter se habent. Quaedam enim producunt ex necessitate et semper suos effectus. Et huiusmodi effectus futuri per certitudinem praenosci possunt

Objection 1: It would seem that divination is not a sin. Divination is derived from something divine: and things that are divine pertain to holiness rather than to sin. Therefore it seems that divination is not a sin. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 1): Who dares to say that learning is an evil? and again: I could nowise admit that intelligence can be an evil. But some arts are divinatory, as the Philosopher states (De Memor. i): and divination itself would seem to pertain to a certain intelligence of the truth. Therefore it seems that divination is not a sin. Obj. 3: Further, there is no natural inclination to evil; because nature inclines only to its like. But men by natural inclination seek to foreknow future events; and this belongs to divination. Therefore divination is not a sin. On the contrary, It is written (Deut 18:10, 11): Neither let there be found among you . . . any one that consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune tellers: and it is stated in the Decretals (26, qu. v, can. Qui divinationes): Those who seek for divinations shall be liable to a penance of five years’ duration, according to the fixed grades of penance. I answer that, Divination denotes a foretelling of the future. The future may be foreknown in two ways: first in its causes, second in itself. Now the causes of the future are threefold: for some produce their effects, of necessity and always; and such like future effects can be foreknown and foretold with certainty, from considering their causes, even as astrologers foretell a coming eclipse. Other

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et praenuntiari ex consideratione suarum causarum, sicut astrologi praenuntiant eclipses futuras. Quaedam vero causae producunt suos effectus non ex necessitate et semper, sed ut in pluribus, raro tamen deficiunt. Et per huiusmodi causas possunt praenosci futuri effectus, non quidem per certitudinem, sed per quandam coniecturam, sicut astrologi per considerationem stellarum quaedam praenoscere et praenuntiare possunt de pluviis et siccitatibus, et medici de sanitate vel morte. Quaedam vero causae sunt quae, si secundum se considerentur, se habent ad utrumlibet, quod praecipue videtur de potentiis rationalibus, quae se habent ad opposita, secundum philosophum. Et tales effectus, vel etiam si qui effectus ut in paucioribus casu accidunt ex naturalibus causis, per considerationem causarum praenosci non possunt, quia eorum causae non habent inclinationem determinatam ad huiusmodi effectus. Et ideo effectus huiusmodi praenosci non possunt nisi in seipsis considerentur. Homines autem in seipsis huiusmodi effectus considerare possunt solum dum sunt praesentes, sicut cum homo videt Socratem currere vel ambulare. Sed considerare huiusmodi in seipsis antequam fiant, est Dei proprium, qui solus in sua aeternitate videt ea quae futura sunt quasi praesentia, ut in primo habitum est, unde dicitur Isaiae XLI, annuntiate quae futura sunt in futurum, et sciemus quoniam dii estis vos. Si quis ergo huiusmodi futura praenoscere aut praenuntiare quocumque modo praesumpserit, nisi Deo revelante, manifeste usurpat sibi quod Dei est. Et ex hoc aliqui divini dicuntur, unde dicit Isidorus, in libro Etymol., divini dicti quasi Deo pleni, divinitate enim se plenos simulant, et astutia quadam fraudulentiae hominibus futura coniectant. Divinatio ergo non dicitur si quis praenuntiet ea quae ex necessario eveniunt vel ut in pluribus, quae humana ratione praenosci possunt. Neque etiam si quis futura alia contingentia, Deo revelante, cognoscat, tunc enim non ipse divinat, idest, quod divinum est facit, sed magis quod divinum est suscipit. Tunc autem solum dicitur divinare quando sibi indebito modo usurpat praenuntiationem futurorum eventuum. Hoc autem constat esse peccatum. Unde divinatio semper est peccatum. Et propter hoc Hieronymus dicit, super Michaeam, quod divinatio semper in malam partem accipitur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod divinatio non dicitur ab ordinata participatione alicuius divini, sed ab indebita usurpatione, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod artes quaedam sunt ad praecognoscendum futuros eventus qui ex necessitate vel frequenter proveniunt, quod ad divinationem non pertinet. Sed ad alios futuros eventus cognoscendos non sunt aliquae verae artes seu disciplinae, sed fallaces et vanae, ex deceptione Daemonum introductae; ut dicit Augustinus, in XXI de Civ. Dei.

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causes produce their effects, not of necessity and always, but for the most part, yet they rarely fail: and from such like causes their future effects can be foreknown, not indeed with certainty, but by a kind of conjecture, even as astrologers by considering the stars can foreknow and foretell things concerning rains and droughts, and physicians, concerning health and death. Again, other causes, considered in themselves, are indifferent; and this is chiefly the case in the rational powers, which stand in relation to opposites, according to the Philosopher. Such like effects, as also those which ensue from natural causes by chance and in the minority of instances, cannot be foreknown from a consideration of their causes, because these causes have no determinate inclination to produce these effects. Consequently such like effects cannot be foreknown unless they be considered in themselves. Now man cannot consider these effects in themselves except when they are present, as when he sees Socrates running or walking: the consideration of such things in themselves before they occur is proper to God, Who alone in His eternity sees the future as though it were present, as stated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 13; Q. 57, A. 3; Q. 86, A. 4). Hence it is written (Isa 41:23): Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods. Therefore if anyone presume to foreknow or foretell such like future things by any means whatever, except by divine revelation, he manifestly usurps what belongs to God. It is for this reason that certain men are called divines: wherefore Isidore says (Etym. viii, 9): They are called divines, as though they were full of God. For they pretend to be filled with the Godhead, and by a deceitful fraud they forecast the future to men. Accordingly it is not called divination, if a man foretells things that happen of necessity, or in the majority of instances, for the like can be foreknown by human reason: nor again if anyone knows other contingent future things, through divine revelation: for then he does not divine, i.e., cause something divine, but rather receives something divine. Then only is a man said to divine, when he usurps to himself, in an undue manner, the foretelling of future events: and this is manifestly a sin. Consequently divination is always a sin; and for this reason Jerome says in his commentary on Mic. 3:9, seqq. that divination is always taken in an evil sense. Reply Obj. 1: Divination takes its name not from a rightly ordered share of something divine, but from an undue usurpation thereof, as stated above. Reply Obj. 2: There are certain arts for the foreknowledge of future events that occur of necessity or frequently, and these do not pertain to divination. But there are no true arts or sciences for the knowledge of other future events, but only vain inventions of the devil’s deceit, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 8).

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Q. 95, A. 2

Ad tertium dicendum quod homo habet naturaReply Obj. 3: Man has a natural inclination to know lem inclinationem ad cognoscendum futura secundum the future by human means, but not by the undue means of modum humanum, non autem secundum indebitum di- divination. vinationis modum.

Article 2 Whether divination is a species of superstition? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod divinatio non sit species superstitionis. Idem enim non potest esse species diversorum generum. Sed divinatio videtur esse species curiositatis; ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig. Ergo videtur quod non sit species superstitionis. Praeterea, sicut religio est cultus debitus, ita superstitio est cultus indebitus. Sed divinatio non videtur ad aliquem cultum indebitum pertinere. Ergo divinatio non pertinet ad superstitionem. Praeterea, superstitio religioni opponitur. Sed in vera religione non invenitur aliquid divinationi per contrarium respondens. Ergo divinatio non est species superstitionis. Sed contra est quod Origenes dicit, in periarchon, est quaedam operatio Daemonum in ministerio praescientiae, quae artibus quibusdam ab his qui se Daemonibus mancipaverunt, nunc per sortes, nunc per auguria, nunc ex contemplatione umbrarum comprehendi videtur. Haec autem omnia operatione Daemonum fieri non dubito. Sed sicut Augustinus dicit, in II de Doct. Christ., quidquid procedit ex societate Daemonum et hominum superstitiosum est. Ergo divinatio est species superstitionis. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, superstitio importat indebitum cultum divinitatis. Ad cultum autem Dei pertinet aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, cum aliquid Deo offertur, vel sacrificium, vel oblatio, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Alio modo, cum aliquid divinum assumitur, sicut dictum est supra de iuramento. Et ideo ad superstitionem pertinet non solum cum sacrificium Daemonibus offertur per idololatriam, sed etiam cum aliquis assumit auxilium Daemonum ad aliquid faciendum vel cognoscendum. Omnis autem divinatio ex operatione Daemonum provenit, vel quia expresse Daemones invocantur ad futura manifestanda; vel quia Daemones se ingerunt vanis inquisitionibus futurorum, ut mentes hominum implicent vanitate; de qua vanitate in Psalm. dicitur, non respexit in vanitates et insanias falsas. Vana autem inquisitio futurorum est quando aliquis futurum praenoscere tentat unde praenosci non potest. Unde manifestum est quod divinatio species superstitionis est.

Objection 1: It would seem that divination is not a species of superstition. The same thing cannot be a species of diverse genera. Now divination is apparently a species of curiosity, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxviii). Therefore it is not, seemingly, a species of superstition. Obj. 2: Further, just as religion is due worship, so is superstition undue worship. But divination does not seem to pertain to undue worship. Therefore it does not pertain to superstition. Obj. 3: Further, superstition is opposed to religion. But in true religion nothing is to be found corresponding as a contrary to divination. Therefore divination is not a species of superstition. On the contrary, Origen says in his Peri Archon: There is an operation of the demons in the administering of foreknowledge, comprised, seemingly, under the head of certain arts exercised by those who have enslaved themselves to the demons, by means of lots, omens, or the observance of shadows. I doubt not that all these things are done by the operation of the demons. Now, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20, 23), whatever results from fellowship between demons and men is superstitious. Therefore divination is a species of superstition. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1; QQ. 92, 94), superstition denotes undue divine worship. Now a thing pertains to the worship of God in two ways: in one way, it is something offered to God; as a sacrifice, an oblation, or something of the kind: in another way, it is something divine that is assumed, as stated above with regard to an oath (Q. 89, A. 4, ad 2). Wherefore superstition includes not only idolatrous sacrifices offered to demons, but also recourse to the help of the demons for the purpose of doing or knowing something. But all divination results from the demons’ operation, either because the demons are expressly invoked that the future may be made known, or because the demons thrust themselves into futile searchings of the future, in order to entangle men’s minds with vain conceits. Of this kind of vanity it is written (Ps 39:5): Who hath not regard to vanities and lying follies. Now it is vain to seek knowledge of the future, when one tries to get it from a source whence it cannot be foreknown. Therefore it is manifest that divination is a species of superstition.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod divinatio pertinet ad curiositatem quantum ad finem intentum, qui est praecognitio futurorum. Sed pertinet ad superstitionem quantum ad modum operationis. Ad secundum dicendum quod huiusmodi divinatio pertinet ad cultum Daemonum, inquantum aliquis utitur quodam pacto tacito vel expresso cum Daemonibus. Ad tertium dicendum quod in nova lege mens hominis arcetur a temporalium sollicitudine, et ideo non est in nova lege aliquid institutum ad praecognitionem eventuum futurorum de temporalibus rebus. In veteri autem lege, quae promittebat terrena, erant consultationes de futuris ad religionem pertinentes, unde dicitur Isaiae VIII, et cum dixerint ad vos, quaerite a Pythonibus et a divinis, qui strident incantationibus suis, subdit, quasi responsionem, numquid non populus a Deo suo requiret visionem pro vivis et mortuis?

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Reply Obj. 1: Divination is a kind of curiosity with regard to the end in view, which is foreknowledge of the future; but it is a kind of superstition as regards the mode of operation. Reply Obj. 2: This kind of divination pertains to the worship of the demons, inasmuch as one enters into a compact, tacit or express with the demons.

Reply Obj. 3: In the New Law man’s mind is restrained from solicitude about temporal things: wherefore the New Law contains no institution for the foreknowledge of future events in temporal matters. On the other hand in the Old Law, which contained earthly promises, there were consultations about the future in connection with religious matters. Hence where it is written (Isa 8:19): And when they shall say to you: Seek of pythons and of diviners, who mutter in their enchantments, it is added by way of answer: Should not the people seek of their God, a vision for the living and the dead? Fuerunt tamen in novo testamento etiam aliqui proIn the New Testament, however, there were some posphetiae spiritum habentes, qui multa de futuris eventi- sessed of the spirit of prophecy, who foretold many things bus praedixerunt. about future events.

Article 3 Whether we ought to distinguish several species of divination? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit determinare plures divinationis species. Ubi enim est una ratio peccandi, non videntur esse plures peccati species. Sed in omni divinatione est una ratio peccandi, quia scilicet utitur aliquis pacto Daemonum ad cognoscendum futura. Ergo divinationis non sunt diversae species. Praeterea, actus humanus speciem sortitur ex fine, ut supra habitum est. Sed omnis divinatio ordinatur ad unum finem, scilicet ad praenuntiationem futurorum. Ergo omnis divinatio est unius speciei. Praeterea, signa non diversificant speciem peccati, sive enim aliquis detrahat verbis, vel scripto vel nutu, est eadem peccati species. Sed divinationes non videntur differre nisi secundum diversa signa ex quibus accipitur praecognitio futurorum. Ergo non sunt diversae divinationis species. Sed contra est quod Isidorus, in libro Etymol., enumerat diversas species divinationis. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, omnis divinatio utitur ad praecognitionem futuri eventus aliquo Daemonum consilio et auxilio. Quod quidem vel expresse imploratur, vel praeter petitionem hominis, se occulte Daemon ingerit ad praenuntiandum quaedam futura quae hominibus sunt ignota, eis autem cognita

Objection 1: It would seem that we should not distinguish several species of divination. Where the formality of sin is the same, there are not seemingly several species of sin. Now there is one formality of sin in all divinations, since they consist in entering into compact with the demons in order to know the future. Therefore there are not several species of divination. Obj. 2: Further, a human act takes its species from its end, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6). But all divination is directed to one end, namely, the foretelling of the future. Therefore all divinations are of one species. Obj. 3: Further, signs do not vary the species of a sin, for whether one detracts by word, writing or gestures, it is the same species of sin. Now divinations seem to differ merely according to the various signs whence the foreknowledge of the future is derived. Therefore there are not several species of divination. On the contrary, Isidore enumerates various species of divination (Etym. viii, 9). I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), all divinations seek to acquire foreknowledge of future events, by means of some counsel and help of a demon, who is either expressly called upon to give his help, or else thrusts himself in secretly, in order to foretell certain future things unknown to men, but known to him in such manners as have

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per modos de quibus in primo dictum est. Daemones autem expresse invocati solent futura praenuntiare multipliciter. Quandoque quidem praestigiosis quibusdam apparitionibus se aspectui et auditui hominum ingerentes ad praenuntiandum futura. Et haec species vocatur praestigium, ex eo quod oculi hominum praestringuntur. Quandoque autem per somnia. Et haec vocatur divinatio somniorum. Quandoque vero per mortuorum aliquorum apparitionem vel locutionem. Et haec species vocatur nigromantia, quia, ut Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., nigrum Graece mortuus, mantia divinatio nuncupatur, quia quibusdam praecantationibus, adhibito sanguine, videntur resuscitati mortui divinare et ad interrogata respondere. Quandoque vero futura praenuntiant per homines vivos, sicut in arreptitiis patet. Et haec est divinatio per Pythones, et ut Isidorus dicit, Pythones a Python Apolline sunt dicti, qui dicebatur esse auctor divinandi. Quandoque vero futura praenuntiant per aliquas figuras vel signa quae in rebus inanimatis apparent. Quae quidem si appareant in aliquo corpore terrestri, puta in ligno vel ferro aut lapide polito, vocatur geomantia; si autem in aqua, hydromantia; si autem in aere, aeromantia; si autem in igne, pyromantia; si autem in visceribus animalium immolatorum in aris Daemonum, vocatur aruspicium. Divinatio autem quae fit absque expressa Daemonum invocatione, in duo genera dividitur. Quorum primum est cum ad praenoscendum futura aliquid consideramus in dispositionibus aliquarum rerum. Et si quidem aliquis conetur futura praenoscere ex consideratione situs et motus siderum, hoc pertinet ad astrologos; qui et geneatici dicuntur, propter natalium considerationes dierum. Si vero per motus vel voces avium, seu quorumcumque animalium; sive per sternutationes hominum, vel membrorum saltus; hoc pertinet generaliter ad augurium, quod dicitur a garritu avium, sicut auspicium ab inspectione avium, quorum primum pertinet ad aures, secundum ad oculos; in avibus enim huiusmodi praecipue considerari solent. Si vero huiusmodi consideratio fiat circa verba hominum alia intentione dicta, quae quis retorquet ad futurum quod vult praenoscere, hoc vocatur omen. Et sic ut maximus Valerius dicit, ominum observatio aliquo contractu religioni innexa est. Quoniam non fortuito motu, sed divina providentia constare creditur quae fecit, ut, Romanis deliberantibus utrum ad alium locum migrarent, forte eo tempore centurio quidam exclamavit, signifer, statue signum, hic optime manebimus; quam vocem auditam pro omine acceperunt, transeundi consilium omittentes. Si autem considerentur aliquae dispositiones figurarum in aliquibus corporibus visui occurrentes, erit alia divinationis species. Nam ex lineamentis manus consideratis divinatio sumpta chiromantia vocatur, quasi divinatio manus, chiros enim Graece dicitur manus. Divinatio vero ex quibusdam fi-

Q. 95, A. 3

been explained in the First Part (Q. 57, A. 3). When demons are expressly invoked, they are wont to foretell the future in many ways. Sometimes they offer themselves to human sight and hearing by mock apparitions in order to foretell the future: and this species is called prestigiation because man’s eyes are blindfolded (praestringuntur). Sometimes they make use of dreams, and this is called divination by dreams: sometimes they employ apparitions or utterances of the dead, and this species is called necromancy, for as Isidore observes (Etym. viii) in Greek, nekron means dead, and manteia divination, because after certain incantations and the sprinkling of blood, the dead seem to come to life, to divine and to answer questions. Sometimes they foretell the future through living men, as in the case of those who are possessed: this is divination by pythons, of whom Isidore says that pythons are so called from Pythius Apollo, who was said to be the inventor of divination. Sometimes they foretell the future by means of shapes or signs which appear in inanimate beings. If these signs appear in some earthly body such as wood, iron or polished stone, it is called geomancy, if in water hydromancy, if in the air aeromancy, if in fire pyromancy, if in the entrails of animals sacrificed on the altars of demons, aruspicy.

The divination which is practiced without express invocation of the demons is of two kinds. The first is when, with a view to obtain knowledge of the future, we take observations in the disposition of certain things. If one endeavor to know the future by observing the position and movements of the stars, this belongs to astrologers, who are also called genethliacs, because they take note of the days on which people are born. If one observe the movements and cries of birds or of any animals, or the sneezing of men, or the sudden movements of limbs, this belongs in general to augury, which is so called from the chattering of birds (avium garritu), just as auspice is derived from watching birds (avium inspectione). These are chiefly wont to be observed in birds, the former by the ear, the latter by the eye. If, however, these observations have for their object men’s words uttered unintentionally, which someone twist so as to apply to the future that he wishes to foreknow, then it is called an omen: and as Valerius Maximus remarks, the observing of omens has a touch of religion mingled with it, for it is believed to be founded not on a chance movement, but on divine providence. It was thus that when the Romans were deliberating whether they would change their position, a centurion happened to exclaim at the time: ‘Standard-bearer, fix the banner, we had best stand here’: and on hearing these words they took them as an omen, and abandoned their intention of advancing further. If, however, the observation regards the dispositions, that occur to the eye, of figures in certain bodies, there will be another species of divination: for the divination that is taken from observing the lines of

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guris in spatula alicuius animalis apparentibus, spatuli- the hand is called chiromancy, i.e., divination of the hand mantia vocatur. (because cheir is the Greek for hand): while the divination which is taken from signs appearing in the shoulder-blades of an animal is called spatulamancy. Ad secundum autem divinationis genus quae est siTo this second species of divination, which is without ne expressa Daemonum invocatione, pertinet divinatio express invocation of the demons, belongs that which is quae fit ex consideratione eorum quae eveniunt ex qui- practiced by observing certain things done seriously by busdam quae ab hominibus serio fiunt ad aliquid occul- men in the research of the occult, whether by drawing lots, tum inquirendum, sive per protractionem punctorum which is called geomancy; or by observing the shapes result(quod pertinet ad artem geomantiae); sive per consi- ing from molten lead poured into water; or by observing derationem figurarum quae proveniunt ex plumbo li- which of several sheets of paper, with or without writing quefacto in aquam proiecto; sive ex quibusdam cedulis, upon them, a person may happen to draw; or by holdscriptis vel non scriptis, in occulto repositis, dum con- ing out several unequal sticks and noting who takes the sideratur quis quam accipiat; vel etiam ex festucis inae- greater or the lesser, or by throwing dice, and observing qualibus propositis, quis maiorem vel minorem accipiat; who throws the highest score; or by observing what catches vel etiam ex taxillorum proiectione, quis plura puncta the eye when one opens a book, all of which are named sorproiiciat; vel etiam dum consideratur quid aperienti li- tilege. brum occurrat. Quae omnia sortium nomen habent. Sic igitur patet triplex esse divinationis genus. QuoAccordingly it is clear that there are three kinds of divrum primum est per manifestam Daemonum invocatio- ination. The first is when the demons are invoked openly, nem, quod pertinet ad nigromanticos. Secundum autem this comes under the head of necromancy; the second is est per solam considerationem dispositionis vel motus merely an observation of the disposition or movement of alterius rei, quod pertinet ad augures. Tertium est dum some other being, and this belongs to augury; while the facimus aliquid ut nobis manifestetur aliquid occultum, third consists in doing something in order to discover the quod pertinet ad sortes. Sub quolibet autem horum mul- occult; and this belongs to sortilege. Under each of these ta continentur, ut patet ex dictis. many others are contained, as explained above. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in omnibus praeReply Obj. 1: In all the aforesaid there is the same gendictis est eadem ratio generalis peccandi, sed non ea- eral, but not the same special, character of sin: for it is much dem specialis. Multo enim gravius est Daemones invoca- more grievous to invoke the demons than to do things that re quam aliqua facere quibus dignum sit ut se Daemones deserve the demons’ interference. ingerant. Ad secundum dicendum quod cognitio futurorum Reply Obj. 2: Knowledge of the future or of the ocvel occultorum est ultimus finis, ex quo sumitur genera- cult is the ultimate end whence divination takes its general lis ratio divinationis. Distinguuntur autem diversae spe- formality. But the various species are distinguished by their cies secundum propria obiecta sive materias, prout scili- proper objects or matters, according as the knowledge of cet in diversis rebus occultorum cognitio consideratur. the occult is sought in various things. Ad tertium dicendum quod res quas divinantes atReply Obj. 3: The things observed by diviners are contendunt considerantur ab eis non sicut signa quibus ex- sidered by them, not as signs expressing what they already primant quod iam sciunt, sicut accidit in detractione, know, as happens in detraction, but as principles of knowlsed sicut principia cognoscendi. Manifestum est autem edge. Now it is evident that diversity of principles diversifies quod diversitas principiorum diversificat speciem, etiam the species, even in demonstrative sciences. in scientiis demonstrativis.

Article 4 Whether divination practiced by invoking the demons is unlawful? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod divinatio quae fit per invocationes Daemonum non sit illicita. Christus enim nihil illicitum commisit, secundum illud I Pet. II, qui peccatum non fecit. Sed dominus a Daemone interrogavit, quod tibi nomen est? Qui respondit,

Objection 1: It would seem that divination practiced by invoking the demons is not unlawful. Christ did nothing unlawful, according to 1 Pet. 2:22, Who did no sin. Yet our Lord asked the demon: What is thy name? and the latter replied: My name is Legion, for we are many (Mark 5:9).

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legio, multi enim sumus, ut habetur Marc. V. Ergo videtur quod liceat a Daemonibus aliquid occultum interrogare. Praeterea, sanctorum animae non favent illicite interrogantibus. Sed Sauli interroganti de eventu futuri belli a muliere habente spiritum Pythonis, apparuit Samuel, et ei futurum eventum praedixit, ut legitur I Reg. XXVIII. Ergo divinatio quae fit per interrogationem a Daemonibus non est illicita. Praeterea, licitum esse videtur veritatem ab aliquo sciente inquirere, quam utile est scire. Sed quandoque utile est scire aliqua occulta quae per Daemones sciri possunt, sicut apparet in inventione furtorum. Ergo divinatio quae fit per invocationem Daemonum non est illicita. Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. XVIII, non inveniatur in te qui ariolos sciscitetur, neque Pythones consulat. Respondeo dicendum quod omnis divinatio quae fit per invocationes Daemonum est illicita, duplici ratione. Quarum prima sumitur ex parte principii divinationis, quod scilicet est pactum expresse cum Daemone initum per ipsam Daemonis invocationem. Et hoc est omnino illicitum. Unde contra quosdam dicitur Isaiae XXVIII, dixistis, percussimus foedus cum morte, et cum Inferno fecimus pactum. Et adhuc gravius esset si sacrificium vel reverentia Daemoni invocato exhiberetur. Secunda ratio sumitur ex parte futuri eventus. Daemon enim, qui intendit perditionem hominum, ex huiusmodi suis responsis, etiam si aliquando vera dicat, intendit homines assuefacere ad hoc quod ei credatur, et sic intendit perducere in aliquid quod sit saluti humanae nocivum. Unde Athanasius, exponens id quod habetur Luc. IV, increpavit illum, dicens, obmutesce, dicit, quamvis vera fateretur Daemon, compescebat tamen Christus eius sermonem, ne simul cum veritate etiam suam iniquitatem promulget. Ut nos etiam assuefaciat ne curemus de talibus, etsi vera loqui videantur, nefas enim est ut, cum adsit nobis Scriptura divina, a Diabolo instruamur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Beda dicit, Luc. VIII, non velut inscius dominus inquirit, sed ut, confessa peste quam tolerabat, virtus curantis gratior emicaret. Aliud autem est quaerere aliquid a Daemone sponte occurrente, quod quandoque licet propter utilitatem aliorum, maxime quando virtute divina potest compelli ad vera dicendum, et aliud est Daemonem invocare ad cognitionem occultorum acquirendum ab ipso.

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, ad Simplicianum, non est absurdum credere aliqua dispensatione permissum fuisse ut, non dominante arte magica vel potentia, sed dispensatione occulta, quae pythonissam et Saulem latebat, se ostenderet spiritus iusti aspectibus regis, divina eum sententia percussurus. Vel,

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Therefore it seems lawful to question the demons about the occult. Obj. 2: Further, the souls of the saints do not encourage those who ask unlawfully. Yet Samuel appeared to Saul when the latter inquired of the woman that had a divining spirit, concerning the issue of the coming war (1 Kgs 28:8, sqq.). Therefore the divination that consists in questioning demons is not unlawful. Obj. 3: Further, it seems lawful to seek the truth from one who knows, if it be useful to know it. But it is sometimes useful to know what is hidden from us, and can be known through the demons, as in the discovery of thefts. Therefore divination by questioning demons is not unlawful. On the contrary, It is written (Deut 18:10, 11): Neither let there there be found among you . . . anyone that consulteth soothsayers . . . nor . . . that consulteth pythonic spirits. I answer that, All divination by invoking demons is unlawful for two reasons. The first is gathered from the principle of divination, which is a compact made expressly with a demon by the very fact of invoking him. This is altogether unlawful; wherefore it is written against certain persons (Isa 28:15): You have said: We have entered into a league with death, and we have made a covenant with hell. And still more grievous would it be if sacrifice were offered or reverence paid to the demon invoked. The second reason is gathered from the result. For the demon who intends man’s perdition endeavors, by his answers, even though he sometimes tells the truth, to accustom men to believe him, and so to lead him on to something prejudicial to the salvation of mankind. Hence Athanasius, commenting on the words of Luke 4:35, He rebuked him, saying: Hold thy peace, says: Although the demon confessed the truth, Christ put a stop to his speech, lest together with the truth he should publish his wickedness and accustom us to care little for such things, however much he may seem to speak the truth. For it is wicked, while we have the divine Scriptures, to seek knowledge from the demons. Reply Obj. 1: According to Bede’s commentary on Luke 8:30, Our Lord inquired, not through ignorance, but in order that the disease, which he tolerated, being made public, the power of the Healer might shine forth more graciously. Now it is one thing to question a demon who comes to us of his own accord (and it is lawful to do so at times for the good of others, especially when he can be compelled, by the power of God, to tell the truth) and another to invoke a demon in order to gain from him knowledge of things hidden from us. Reply Obj. 2: According to Augustine (Ad Simplic. ii, 3), there is nothing absurd in believing that the spirit of the just man, being about to smite the king with the divine sentence, was permitted to appear to him, not by the sway of magic art or power, but by some occult dispensation of which neither the witch nor Saul was aware. Or else the spirit of

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non vere spiritus Samuelis a requie sua excitatus est, sed aliquod phantasma et illusio imaginaria, Diaboli machinationibus facta, quam Scriptura Samuelem appellat, sicut solent imagines rerum suarum nominibus appellari.

Samuel was not in reality aroused from his rest, but some phantom or mock apparition formed by the machinations of the devil, and styled by Scripture under the name of Samuel, just as the images of things are wont to be called by the names of those things. Ad tertium dicendum quod nulla utilitas temporaReply Obj. 3: No temporal utility can compare with lis potest comparari detrimento spiritualis salutis, quod the harm to spiritual health that results from the research imminet ex inquisitione occultorum per Daemonum in- of the unknown by invoking the demon.

vocationem.

Article 5 Whether divination by the stars is unlawful? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod divinatio quae fit per astra non sit illicita. Licitum enim est ex consideratione causarum praenuntiare effectus, sicut medici ex dispositione aegritudinis praenuntiant mortem. Sed corpora caelestia sunt causa eorum quae fiunt in hoc mundo, ut etiam Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo divinatio quae fit per astra non est illicita. Praeterea, scientia humana ex experimentis originem sumit, ut patet per philosophum, in principio Metaphys. Sed per multa experimenta aliqui compererunt ex consideratione siderum aliqua futura posse praenosci. Ergo non videtur esse illicitum tali divinatione uti. Praeterea, divinatio dicitur esse illicita inquantum innititur pacto cum Daemonibus inito. Sed hoc non fit in divinatione quae fit per astra, sed solum consideratur dispositio creaturarum Dei. Ergo videtur quod huiusmodi divinatio non sit illicita. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., illos planetarios quos mathematicos vocant, consulere non desistebam, quod quasi nullum esset eis sacrificium, et nullae preces ad aliquem spiritum ob divinationem dirigerentur. Quod tamen Christiana et vera pietas expellit et damnat. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, divinationi quae ex opinione falsa vel vana procedit, ingerit se operatio Daemonis, ut hominum animos implicet vanitati aut falsitati. Vana autem aut falsa opinione utitur si quis ex consideratione stellarum futura velit praecognoscere quae per ea praecognosci non possunt. Est igitur considerandum quid per caelestium corporum inspectionem de futuris possit praenosci. Et de his quidem quae ex necessitate eveniunt, manifestum est quod per considerationem stellarum possunt praenosci, sicut astrologi praenuntiant eclipses futuras. Circa praecognitionem vero futurorum eventuum ex consideratione stellarum, diversi diversa dixerunt. Fuerunt enim qui dicerent quod stellae significant potius quam faciant ea quae ex earum consideratione praenun-

Objection 1: It would seem that divination by the stars is not unlawful. It is lawful to foretell effects by observing their causes: thus a physician foretells death from the disposition of the disease. Now the heavenly bodies are the cause of what takes place in the world, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore divination by the stars is not unlawful. Obj. 2: Further, human science originates from experiments, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1). Now it has been discovered through many experiments that the observation of the stars is a means whereby some future events may be known beforehand. Therefore it would seem not unlawful to make use of this kind of divination. Obj. 3: Further, divination is declared to be unlawful insofar as it is based on a compact made with the demons. But divination by the stars contains nothing of the kind, but merely an observation of God’s creatures. Therefore it would seem that this species of divination is not unlawful. On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 3): Those astrologers whom they call mathematicians, I consulted without scruple; because they seemed to use no sacrifice, nor to pray to any spirit for their divinations which art, however, Christian and true piety rejects and condemns. I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 2), the operation of the demon thrusts itself into those divinations which are based on false and vain opinions, in order that man’s mind may become entangled in vanity and falsehood. Now one makes use of a vain and false opinion if, by observing the stars, one desires to foreknow the future that cannot be forecast by their means. Wherefore we must consider what things can be foreknown by observing the stars: and it is evident that those things which happen of necessity can be foreknown by this means: even so astrologers forecast a future eclipse. However, with regard to the foreknowledge of future events acquired by observing the stars there have been various opinions. For some have stated that the stars signify rather than cause the things foretold by means of their ob-

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tiantur. Sed hoc irrationabiliter dicitur. Omne enim corporale signum vel est effectus eius cuius est signum, sicut fumus significat ignem, a quo causatur, vel procedit ab eadem causa, et sic, dum significat causam, per consequens significat effectum, sicut iris quandoque significat serenitatem, inquantum causa eius est causa serenitatis. Non autem potest dici quod dispositiones caelestium corporum et motus sint effectus futurorum eventuum. Nec iterum possunt reduci in aliquam superiorem causam communem quae sit corporalis. Possunt autem reduci in unam causam communem quae est providentia divina, sed alia ratione disponuntur a divina providentia motus et situs caelestium corporum, et alia ratione eventus contingentium futurorum; quia illa disponuntur secundum rationem necessitatis, ut semper eodem modo proveniant; haec autem secundum rationem contingentiae, ut variabiliter contingant. Unde non potest esse quod ex inspectione siderum accipiatur praecognitio futurorum nisi sicut ex causis praecognoscuntur effectus.

Duplices autem effectus subtrahuntur causalitati caelestium corporum. Primo quidem, omnes effectus per accidens contingentes, sive in rebus humanis sive in rebus naturalibus. Quia, ut probatur in VI Metaphys., ens per accidens non habet causam, et praecipue naturalem, cuiusmodi est virtus caelestium corporum. Quia quod per accidens fit neque est ens proprie neque unum, sicut quod, lapide cadente, fiat terraemotus, vel quod, homine fodiente sepulcrum, inveniatur thesaurus; haec enim, et huiusmodi, non sunt unum, sed simpliciter multa. Operatio autem naturae semper terminatur ad aliquid unum, sicut et procedit ab uno principio, quod est forma rei naturalis. Secundo autem, subtrahuntur causalitati caelestium corporum actus liberi arbitrii, quod est facultas voluntatis et rationis. Intellectus enim, sive ratio, non est corpus nec actus organi corporei; et per consequens nec voluntas, quae est in ratione, ut patet per philosophum, in III de anima. Nullum autem corpus potest imprimere in rem incorpoream. Unde impossibile est quod corpora caelestia directe imprimant in intellectum et voluntatem, hoc enim esset ponere intellectum non differre a sensu; quod Aristoteles, in libro de anima, imponit his qui dicebant quod talis voluntas est in hominibus qualem in die inducit pater virorum deorumque, scilicet sol vel caelum. Unde corpora caelestia non possunt esse per se causa operum liberi arbitrii. Possunt tamen ad hoc dispositive inclinare, inquantum imprimunt in corpus humanum, et per consequens in vires sensitivas, quae sunt actus corporalium organorum, quae inclinant ad humanos actus. Quia tamen vires sensitivae obediunt rationi, ut patet

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servation. But this is an unreasonable statement: since every corporeal sign is either the effect of that for which it stands (thus smoke signifies fire whereby it is caused), or it proceeds from the same cause, so that by signifying the cause, in consequence it signifies the effect (thus a rainbow is sometimes a sign of fair weather, insofar as its cause is the cause of fair weather). Now it cannot be said that the dispositions and movements of the heavenly bodies are the effect of future events; nor again can they be ascribed to some common higher cause of a corporeal nature, although they are referable to a common higher cause, which is divine providence. On the contrary the appointment of the movements and positions of the heavenly bodies by divine providence is on a different principle from the appointment of the occurrence of future contingencies, because the former are appointed on a principle of necessity, so that they always occur in the same way, whereas the latter are appointed on a principle of contingency, so that the manner of their occurrence is variable. Consequently it is impossible to acquire foreknowledge of the future from an observation of the stars, except insofar as effects can be foreknown from their causes. Now two kinds of effects escape the causality of heavenly bodies. In the first place all effects that occur accidentally, whether in human affairs or in the natural order, since, as it is proved in Metaph. vi, an accidental being has no cause, least of all a natural cause, such as is the power of a heavenly body, because what occurs accidentally, neither is a being properly speaking, nor is one—for instance, that an earthquake occur when a stone falls, or that a treasure be discovered when a man digs a grave—for these and like occurrences are not one thing, but are simply several things. Whereas the operation of nature has always some one thing for its term, just as it proceeds from some one principle, which is the form of a natural thing. In the second place, acts of the free-will, which is the faculty of will and reason, escape the causality of heavenly bodies. For the intellect or reason is not a body, nor the act of a bodily organ, and consequently neither is the will, since it is in the reason, as the Philosopher shows (De Anima iii, 4, 9). Now no body can make an impression on an incorporeal body. Wherefore it is impossible for heavenly bodies to make a direct impression on the intellect and will: for this would be to deny the difference between intellect and sense, with which position Aristotle reproaches (De Anima iii, 3) those who held that such is the will of man, as is the day which the father of men and of gods, i.e., the sun or the heavens, brings on. Hence the heavenly bodies cannot be the direct cause of the free-will’s operations. Nevertheless they can be a dispositive cause of an inclination to those operations, insofar as they make an impression on the human body, and consequently on the sensitive powers which are acts of bodily organs having an inclination for human acts. Since, however,

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per philosophum, in III de anima et in I Ethic., nulla necessitas ex hoc libero arbitrio imponitur, sed contra inclinationem caelestium corporum homo potest per rationem operari. Si quis ergo consideratione astrorum utatur ad praecognoscendos futuros casuales vel fortuitos eventus, aut etiam ad cognoscendum per certitudinem futura opera hominum, procedet hoc ex falsa et vana opinione. Et sic operatio Daemonis se immiscet. Unde erit divinatio superstitiosa et illicita. Si vero aliquis utatur consideratione astrorum ad praecognoscendum futura quae ex caelestibus causantur corporibus, puta siccitates et pluvias et alia huiusmodi, non erit illicita divinatio nec superstitiosa. Et secundum hoc patet responsio ad primum. Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc quod astrologi ex consideratione astrorum frequenter vera praenuntiant, contingit dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, quia plures hominum passiones corporales sequuntur, et ideo actus eorum disponuntur, ut in pluribus, secundum inclinationem caelestium corporum, pauci autem sunt, idest soli sapientes, qui ratione huiusmodi inclinationes moderentur. Et ideo astrologi in multis vera praenuntiant, et praecipue in communibus eventibus, qui dependent ex multitudine. Alio modo, propter Daemones se immiscentes. Unde Augustinus dicit, in II super Gen. ad Litt., fatendum est, quando a mathematicis vera dicuntur, instinctu quodam occultissimo dici, quem nescientes humanae mentes patiuntur. Quod cum ad decipiendos homines fit, spirituum immundorum et seductorum operatio est, quibus quaedam vera de temporalibus rebus nosse permittitur. Unde concludit, quapropter bono Christiano sive mathematici, sive quilibet impie divinantium, et maxime dicentes vera, cavendi sunt, ne consortio Daemoniorum animam deceptam pacto quodam societatis irretiant. Et per hoc patet responsio ad tertium.

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the sensitive powers obey reason, as the Philosopher shows (De Anima iii, 11; Ethic. i, 13), this does not impose any necessity on the free-will, and man is able, by his reason, to act counter to the inclination of the heavenly bodies. Accordingly if anyone take observation of the stars in order to foreknow casual or fortuitous future events, or to know with certitude future human actions, his conduct is based on a false and vain opinion; and so the operation of the demon introduces itself therein, wherefore it will be a superstitious and unlawful divination. On the other hand if one were to apply the observation of the stars in order to foreknow those future things that are caused by heavenly bodies, for instance, drought or rain and so forth, it will be neither an unlawful nor a superstitious divination. Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident. Reply Obj. 2: That astrologers not unfrequently forecast the truth by observing the stars may be explained in two ways. First, because a great number of men follow their bodily passions, so that their actions are for the most part disposed in accordance with the inclination of the heavenly bodies: while there are few, namely, the wise alone, who moderate these inclinations by their reason. The result is that astrologers in many cases foretell the truth, especially in public occurrences which depend on the multitude. Second, because of the interference of the demons. Hence Augustine says (Gen ad lit. ii, 17): When astrologers tell the truth, it must be allowed that this is due to an instinct that, unknown to man, lies hidden in his mind. And since this happens through the action of unclean and lying spirits who desire to deceive man for they are permitted to know certain things about temporal affairs. Wherefore he concludes: Thus a good Christian should beware of astrologers, and of all impious diviners, especially of those who tell the truth, lest his soul become the dupe of the demons and by making a compact of of partnership with them enmesh itself in their fellowship. This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.

Article 6 Whether divination by dreams is unlawful? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod divinatio quae fit per somnia non sit illicita. Uti enim instructione divina non est illicitum. Sed in somniis homines instruuntur a Deo, dicitur enim Iob XXXIII, per somnium in visione nocturna, quando irruit sopor super homines et dormiunt in lectulo, tunc aperit, scilicet Deus, aures virorum, et erudiens eos instruit disciplina. Ergo uti divinatione quae est per somnia non est illicitum. Praeterea, illi qui interpretantur somnia, proprie utuntur divinatione somniorum. Sed sancti viri legun-

Objection 1: It would seem that divination by dreams is not unlawful. It is not unlawful to make use of divine instruction. Now men are instructed by God in dreams, for it is written (Job 33:15, 16): By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, and they are sleeping in their beds, then He, God to wit, openeth the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn. Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of divination by dreams. Obj. 2: Further, those who interpret dreams, properly speaking, make use of divination by dreams. Now we

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tur somnia interpretari, sicut Ioseph interpretatur somnia pincernae Pharaonis et magistri pistorum, ut legitur Gen. XL, et somnium Pharaonis, ut legitur Gen. XLI; et Daniel interpretatus est somnium regis Babylonis, ut habetur Dan. II et IV. Ergo divinatio somniorum non est illicita. Praeterea, illud quod communiter homines experiuntur, irrationabile est negare. Sed omnes experiuntur somnia habere aliquam significationem futurorum. Ergo vanum est negare somnia habere vim divinationis. Ergo licitum est eis intendere. Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. XVIII, non inveniatur in te qui observet somnia. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, divinatio quae innititur falsae opinioni est superstitiosa et illicita. Ideo considerare oportet quid sit verum circa praecognitionem futurorum de somniis sunt autem somnia futurorum eventuum quandoque quidem causa, puta cum mens alicuius, sollicita ex his quae videt in somniis, inducitur ad aliquid faciendum vel vitandum. Quandoque vero somnia sunt signa aliquorum futurorum eventuum, inquantum reducuntur in aliquam causam communem somniis et futuris eventibus. Secundum hoc plurimum praecognitiones futurorum ex somniis fiunt. Est ergo considerandum quae sit causa somniorum; et an possit esse causa futurorum eventuum; vel ea possit cognoscere. Sciendum est ergo quod somniorum causa quandoque quidem est interius, quandoque autem exterius. Interior autem somniorum causa est duplex. Una quidem animalis, inquantum scilicet ea occurrunt hominis phantasiae in dormiendo circa quae eius cogitatio et affectio fuit immorata in vigilando. Et talis causa somniorum non est causa futurorum eventuum. Unde huiusmodi somnia per accidens se habent ad futuros eventus, et si quandoque simul concurrant, erit casuale. Quandoque vero causa intrinseca somniorum est corporalis. Nam ex interiori dispositione corporis formatur aliquis motus in phantasia conveniens tali dispositioni, sicut homini in quo abundant frigidi humores, occurrit in somniis quod sit in aqua vel nive. Et propter haec medici dicunt esse intendendum somniis ad cognoscendum interiores dispositiones. Causa autem somniorum exterior similiter est duplex, scilicet corporalis, et spiritualis. Corporalis quidem, inquantum imaginatio dormientis immutatur vel ab aere continenti vel ex impressione caelestis corporis, ut sic dormienti aliquae phantasiae appareant conformes caelestium dispositioni. Spiritualis autem causa est quandoque quidem a Deo, qui ministerio Angelorum aliqua hominibus revelat in somniis, secundum illud Num. XII, si quis fuerit inter vos propheta domini, in visione apparebo ei, vel per somnium loquar ad illum.

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read of holy men interpreting dreams: thus Joseph interpreted the dreams of Pharaoh’s butler and of his chief baker (Gen 40), and Daniel interpreted the dream of the king of Babylon (Dan 2, 4). Therefore divination by dreams is not unlawful. Obj. 3: Further, it is unreasonable to deny the common experiences of men. Now it is the experience of all that dreams are significative of the future. Therefore it is useless to deny the efficacy of dreams for the purpose of divination, and it is lawful to listen to them. On the contrary, It is written (Deut 18:10): Neither let there be found among you any one that . . . observeth dreams. I answer that, As stated above (AA. 2, 6), divination is superstitious and unlawful when it is based on a false opinion. Wherefore we must consider what is true in the matter of foreknowing the future from dreams. Now dreams are sometimes the cause of future occurrences; for instance, when a person’s mind becomes anxious through what it has seen in a dream and is thereby led to do something or avoid something: while sometimes dreams are signs of future happenings, insofar as they are referable to some common cause of both dreams and future occurrences, and in this way the future is frequently known from dreams. We must, then, consider what is the cause of dreams, and whether it can be the cause of future occurrences, or be cognizant of them. Accordingly it is to be observed that the cause of dreams is sometimes in us and sometimes outside us. The inward cause of dreams is twofold: one regards the soul, insofar as those things which have occupied a man’s thoughts and affections while awake recur to his imagination while asleep. A such like cause of dreams is not a cause of future occurrences, so that dreams of this kind are related accidentally to future occurrences, and if at any time they concur it will be by chance. But sometimes the inward cause of dreams regards the body: because the inward disposition of the body leads to the formation of a movement in the imagination consistent with that disposition; thus a man in whom there is abundance of cold humors dreams that he is in the water or snow: and for this reason physicians say that we should take note of dreams in order to discover internal dispositions. In like manner the outward cause of dreams is twofold, corporal and spiritual. It is corporal insofar as the sleeper’s imagination is affected either by the surrounding air, or through an impression of a heavenly body, so that certain images appear to the sleeper, in keeping with the disposition of the heavenly bodies. The spiritual cause is sometimes referable to God, Who reveals certain things to men in their dreams by the ministry of the angels, according Num. 12:6, If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream.

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Quandoque vero operatione Daemonum aliquae phan- Sometimes, however, it is due to the action of the demons tasiae dormientibus apparent, ex quibus quandoque ali- that certain images appear to persons in their sleep, and qua futura revelant his qui cum eis habent pacta illicita. by this means they, at times, reveal certain future things to those who have entered into an unlawful compact with them. Sic ergo dicendum quod si quis utatur somniis ad Accordingly we must say that there is no unlawful divpraecognoscenda futura secundum quod somnia proce- ination in making use of dreams for the foreknowledge of dunt ex revelatione divina; vel ex causa naturali, intrin- the future, so long as those dreams are due to divine revelaseca sive extrinseca, quantum se potest virtus talis causae tion, or to some natural cause inward or outward, and so far extendere, non erit illicita divinatio. Si autem huiusmodi as the efficacy of that cause extends. But it will be an unlawdivinatio causetur ex revelatione Daemonum cum qui- ful and superstitious divination if it be caused by a revelabus pacta habentur expressa, quia ad hoc invocantur; vel tion of the demons, with whom a compact has been made, tacita, quia huiusmodi divinatio extenditur ad quod se whether explicit, through their being invoked for the purnon potest extendere, erit divinatio illicita et superstitio- pose, or implicit, through the divination extending beyond sa. its possible limits. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Article 7 Whether divination by auguries, omens, and by like observations of external things is unlawful? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod divinatio quae est per auguria et omina et alias huiusmodi observationes exteriorum rerum, non sit illicita. Si enim esset illicita, sancti viri ea non uterentur. Sed de Ioseph legitur quod auguriis intendebat, legitur enim Gen. XLIV quod dispensator Ioseph dixit, scyphus quem furati estis ipse est in quo bibit dominus meus, et in quo augurari solet; et ipse postea dixit fratribus suis, an ignoratis quod non sit similis mei in augurandi scientia? Ergo uti tali divinatione non est illicitum. Praeterea, aves aliqua circa futuros temporum eventus naturaliter cognoscunt, secundum illud Ierem. VIII, milvus in caelo cognovit tempus suum, turtur et hirundo et ciconia custodierunt tempus adventus sui. Sed naturalis cognitio est infallibilis, et a Deo. Ergo uti cognitione avium ad praenoscendum futura, quod est augurari, non videtur esse illicitum. Praeterea, Gedeon in numero sanctorum ponitur, ut patet Heb. XI. Sed Gedeon usus fuit omine ex hoc quod audivit recitationem et interpretationem cuiusdam somnii, ut legitur Iudic. VII. Et similiter Eliezer, servus Abrahae, ut legitur Gen. XXIV. Ergo videtur quod talis divinatio non sit illicita. Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. XVIII, non inveniatur in te qui observet auguria. Respondeo dicendum quod motus vel garritus avium, vel quaecumque dispositiones huiusmodi in rebus consideratae, manifestum est quod non sunt causa

Objection 1: It would seem that divination by auguries, omens, and by like observations of external things is not unlawful. If it were unlawful holy men would not make use thereof. Now we read of Joseph that he paid attention to auguries, for it is related (Gen 44:5) that Joseph’s steward said: The cup which you have stolen is that in which my lord drinketh and in which he is wont to divine (augurari): and he himself afterwards said to his brethren (Gen 44:15): Know you not that there is no one like me in the science of divining? Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of this kind of divination. Obj. 2: Further, birds naturally know certain things regarding future occurrences of the seasons, according to Jer. 8:7, The kite in the air hath known her time; the turtle, the swallow, and the stork have observed the time of their coming. Now natural knowledge is infallible and comes from God. Therefore it seems not unlawful to make use of the birds’ knowledge in order to know the future, and this is divination by augury. Obj. 3: Further, Gedeon is numbered among the saints (Heb 11:32). Yet Gedeon made use of an omen, when he listened to the relation and interpreting of a dream (Judg 7:15): and Eliezer, Abraham’s servant, acted in like manner (Gen 24). Therefore it seems that this kind of divination is not unlawful. On the contrary, It is written (Deut 18:10): Neither let there be found among you anyone . . . that observeth omens. I answer that, The movements or cries of birds, and whatever dispositions one may consider in such things, are manifestly not the cause of future events: wherefore the fu-

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futurorum eventuum, unde ex eis futura cognosci non possunt sicut ex causis. Relinquitur ergo quod si ex eis aliqua futura cognoscantur, hoc erit inquantum sunt effectus aliquarum causarum quae etiam sunt causantes vel praecognoscentes futuros eventus. Causa autem operationum brutorum animalium est instinctus quidam quo moventur in modum naturae, non enim habent dominium sui actus. Hic autem instinctus ex duplici causa potest procedere. Uno quidem modo, ex causa corporali. Cum enim bruta animalia non habeant nisi animam sensitivam, cuius omnes potentiae sunt actus corporalium organorum, subiacet eorum anima dispositioni continentium corporum, et primordialiter caelestium. Et ideo nihil prohibet aliquas eorum operationes esse futurorum signa, inquantum conformantur dispositionibus corporum caelestium et aeris continentis, ex qua proveniunt aliqui futuri eventus. In hoc tamen duo considerari oportet. Primum quidem, ut huiusmodi operationes non extendantur nisi ad praecognoscenda futura quae causantur per motus caelestium corporum, ut supra dictum est. Secundo, ut non extendantur nisi ad ea quae aliqualiter possunt ad huiusmodi animalia pertinere. Consequuntur enim per caelestia corpora cognitionem quandam naturalem et instinctum ad ea quae eorum vitae sunt necessaria, sicut sunt immutationes quae fiunt per pluvias et ventos, et alia huiusmodi. Alio modo instinctus huiusmodi causantur ex causa spirituali. Scilicet vel ex Deo, ut patet in columba super Christum descendente, et in corvo qui pavit Eliam, et in cete qui absorbuit et eiecit Ionam. Vel etiam ex Daemonibus, qui utuntur huiusmodi operationibus brutorum animalium ad implicandas animas vanis opinionibus. Et eadem ratio videtur esse de omnibus aliis accipiuntur pro omine, non subduntur dispositioni stellarum. Huiusmodi, praeterquam de ominibus. Quia verba humana, quae disponuntur tamen secundum divinam providentiam; et quandoque secundum Daemonum operationem. Sic igitur dicendum quod omnis huiusmodi divinatio, si extendatur ultra id ad quod potest pertingere secundum ordinem naturae vel divinae providentiae, est superstitiosa et illicita. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc quod Ioseph dixit, non esse aliquem sibi similem in scientia augurandi, secundum Augustinum, ioco dixit, non serio, referens forte hoc ad id quod vulgus de eo opinabatur. Et sic etiam dispensator eius locutus est. Ad secundum dicendum quod illa auctoritas loquitur de cognitione avium respectu eorum quae ad eas pertinent. Et ad haec praecognoscenda considerare earum voces et motus non est illicitum, puta si quis ex hoc quod cornicula frequenter crocitat, praedicat pluviam cito esse futuram.

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ture cannot be known therefrom as from its cause. It follows therefore that if anything future can be known from them, it will be because the causes from which they proceed are also the causes of future occurrences or are cognizant of them. Now the cause of dumb animals’ actions is a certain instinct whereby they are inclined by a natural movement, for they are not masters of their actions. This instinct may proceed from a twofold cause. In the first place it may be due to a bodily cause. For since dumb animals have naught but a sensitive soul, every power of which is the act of a bodily organ, their soul is subject to the disposition of surrounding bodies, and primarily to that of the heavenly bodies. Hence nothing prevents some of their actions from being signs of the future, insofar as they are conformed to the dispositions of the heavenly bodies and of the surrounding air, to which certain future events are due. Yet in this matter we must observe two things: first, that such observations must not be applied to the foreknowledge of future things other than those which can be foreknown from the movements of heavenly bodies, as stated above (AA. 5, 6): second, that they be not applied to other matters than those which in some way may have reference to these animals (since they acquire through the heavenly bodies a certain natural knowledge and instinct about things necessary for their life—such as changes resulting from rain and wind and so forth). In the second place, this instinct is produced by a spiritual cause, namely, either by God, as may be seen in the dove that descended upon Christ, the raven that fed Elias, and the whale that swallowed and vomited Jonas, or by demons, who make use of these actions of dumb animals in order to entangle our minds with vain opinions. This seems to be true of all such like things; except omens, because human words which are taken for an omen are not subject to the disposition of the stars, yet are they ordered according to divine providence and sometimes according to the action of the demons. Accordingly we must say that all such like divinations are superstitious and unlawful, if they be extended beyond the limits set according to the order of nature or of divine providence. Reply Obj. 1: According to Augustine, when Joseph said that there was no one like him in the science of divining, he spoke in joke and not seriously, referring perhaps to the common opinion about him: in this sense also spoke his steward. Reply Obj. 2: The passage quoted refers to the knowledge that birds have about things concerning them; and in order to know these things it is not unlawful to observe their cries and movements: thus from the frequent cawing of crows one might say that it will rain soon.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod Gedeon observavit recitationem et expositionem somnii accipiens ea pro omine, quasi ordinata ad sui instructionem a divina providentia. Et similiter Eliezer attendit verba puellae, oratione praemissa ad Deum.

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Reply Obj. 3: Gedeon listened to the recital and interpretation of a dream, seeing therein an omen, ordered by divine providence for his instruction. In like manner Eliezer listened to the damsel’s words, having previously prayed to God.

Article 8 Whether divination by drawing lots is unlawful? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod divinatio sortium non sit illicita. Quia super illud Psalm., in manibus tuis sortes meae, dicit Glossa Augustini, sors non est aliquid mali, sed res, in humana dubitatione, divinam indicans voluntatem. Praeterea, ea quae a sanctis in Scripturis observata leguntur non videntur esse illicita. Sed sancti viri, tam in veteri quam in novo testamento, inveniuntur sortibus usi esse. Legitur enim Iosue VII, quod Iosue, ex praecepto domini, iudicio sortium punivit Achar, qui de anathemate surripuerat. Saul etiam sorte deprehendit filium suum Ionatham mel comedisse, ut habetur I Reg. XIV. Ionas etiam, a facie domini fugiens, sorte deprehensus, est in mare deiectus, ut legitur Ionae I. Zacharias etiam sorte exiit ut incensum poneret, ut legitur Luc. I. Matthias etiam est sorte ab apostolis in apostolatum electus, ut legitur Act. I. Ergo videtur quod divinatio sortium non sit illicita. Praeterea, pugna pugilum quae monomachia dicitur, idest singularis concertatio, et iudicia ignis et aquae, quae dicuntur vulgaria, videntur ad sortes pertinere, cum per huiusmodi aliqua exquirantur occulta. Sed huiusmodi non videntur esse illicita, quia et David legitur cum Philisthaeo singulare iniisse certamen, ut legitur I Reg. XVII. Ergo videtur quod divinatio sortium non sit illicita. Sed contra est quod in decretis, XXVI, qu. V, dicitur, sortes quibus cuncta vos vestris discriminatis provinciis, quas patres damnaverunt, nihil aliud quam divinationes et maleficia decernimus. Quamobrem volumus omnino illas damnari, et ultra inter Christianos nolumus nominari, et ne exerceantur, anathematis interdicto prohibemus. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sortes proprie dicuntur cum aliquid fit ut, eius eventu considerato, aliquid occultum innotescat. Et si quidem quaeratur iudicio sortium quid cui sit exhibendum, sive illud sit res possessa, sive sit honor seu dignitas, seu poena, aut actio aliqua, vocatur sors divisoria. Si autem inquiratur quid agere oporteat, vocatur sors consultoria.

Objection 1: It would seem that divination by drawing lots is not unlawful, because a gloss of Augustine on Ps. 30:16, My lots are in Thy hands, says: It is not wrong to cast lots, for it is a means of ascertaining the divine will when a man is in doubt. Obj. 2: There is, seemingly, nothing unlawful in the observances which the Scriptures relate as being practiced by holy men. Now both in the Old and in the New Testament we find holy men practicing the casting of lots. For it is related (Josh 7:14, sqq.) that Josue, at the Lord’s command, pronounced sentence by lot on Achan who had stolen of the anathema. Again Saul, by drawing lots, found that his son Jonathan had eaten honey (1 Kgs 14:58, sqq.): Jonas, when fleeing from the face of the Lord, was discovered and thrown into the sea (Jonah 1:7, sqq.): Zacharias was chosen by lot to offer incense (Luke 1:9): and the apostles by drawing lots elected Matthias to the apostleship (Acts 1:26). Therefore it would seem that divination by lots is not unlawful. Obj. 3: Further, fighting with the fists, or monomachy, i.e., single combat as it is called, and trial by fire and water, which are called popular trials, seem to come under the head of sortilege, because something unknown is sought by their means. Yet these practices seem to be lawful, because David is related to have engaged in single combat with the Philistine (1 Kgs 17:32, sqq.). Therefore it would seem that divination by lot is not unlawful. On the contrary, It is written in the Decretals (XXVI, qu. v, can. Sortes): We decree that the casting of lots, by which means you make up your mind in all your undertakings, and which the Fathers have condemned, is nothing but divination and witchcraft. For which reason we wish them to be condemned altogether, and henceforth not to be mentioned among Christians, and we forbid the practice thereof under pain of anathema. I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), sortilege consists, properly speaking, in doing something, that by observing the result one may come to the knowledge of something unknown. If by casting lots one seeks to know what is to be given to whom, whether it be a possession, an honor, a dignity, a punishment, or some action or other, it is called sortilege of allotment; if one seeks to know what ought to

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Si vero quaeratur quid sit futurum, vocatur sors divinatoria. Actus autem hominum, qui requiruntur ad sortes, non subduntur dispositioni stellarum, nec etiam eventus ipsorum. Unde si quis ea intentione sortibus utatur quasi huiusmodi actus humani, qui requiruntur ad sortes, secundum dispositionem stellarum sortiantur effectum, vana et falsa est opinio, et per consequens non carens Daemonum ingestione. Ex quo talis divinatio erit superstitiosa et illicita. Hac autem causa remota, necesse est quod sortialium actuum expectetur eventus vel ex fortuna, vel ex aliqua spirituali causa dirigente. Et si quidem ex fortuna, quod locum habere potest solum in divisoria sorte, non videtur habere nisi forte vitium vanitatis sicut si aliqui non valentes aliquid concorditer dividere, velint sortibus ad divisionem uti, quasi fortunae exponentes quis quam partem accipiat. Si vero ex spirituali causa expectetur sortium iudicium, quandoque quidem expectatur ex Daemonibus, sicut legitur Ezech. XXI, quod rex Babylonis stetit in bivio, in capite duarum viarum, commiscens sagittas, interrogavit idola, exta consuluit. Et tales sortes sunt illicitae, et secundum canones prohibentur. Quandoque vero expectatur a Deo, secundum illud Prov. XVI. Sortes mittuntur in sinum, sed a domino temperantur. Et talis sors secundum se non est malum, ut Augustinus dicit. Potest tamen in hoc quadrupliciter peccatum incidere. Primo quidem, si absque ulla necessitate ad sortes recurratur, hoc enim videtur ad Dei tentationem pertinere. Unde Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, qui sorte eligitur, humano iudicio non comprehenditur. Secundo, si quis, etiam in necessitate, absque reverentia sortibus utatur. Unde, super actus Apost., dicit Beda, si qui, necessitate aliqua compulsi, Deum putant sortibus, exemplo apostolorum, esse consulendum, videant hoc ipsos apostolos non nisi collecto fratrum coetu, et precibus ad Deum fusis, egisse. Tertio, si divina oracula ad terrena negotia convertantur. Unde Augustinus dicit, ad inquisitiones Ianuarii, his qui de paginis evangelicis sortes legunt, etsi optandum sit ut id potius faciant quam ad Daemonia consulenda concurrant, tamen ista mihi displicet consuetudo, ad negotia saecularia et ad vitae huius vanitatem divina oracula velle convertere. Quarto, si in electionibus ecclesiasticis, quae ex spiritus sancti inspiratione fieri debent, aliqui sortibus utantur. Unde, sicut Beda dicit, super actus Apost., Matthias, ante Pentecosten ordinatus, sorte quaeritur, quia scilicet nondum erat plenitudo spiritus sancti in Ecclesia effusa, septem autem diaconi postea non sorte, sed electione discipulorum sunt ordinati. Secus autem est in temporalibus dignitatibus, quae ad terrena disponenda ordinantur; in quarum electione plerumque

Q. 95, A. 8

be done, it is called sortilege of consultation; if one seeks to know what is going to happen, it is called sortilege of divination. Now the actions of man that are required for sortilege and their results are not subject to the dispositions of the stars. Wherefore if anyone practicing sortilege is so minded as though the human acts requisite for sortilege depended for their result on the dispositions of the stars, his opinion is vain and false, and consequently is not free from the interference of the demons, so that a divination of this kind is superstitious and unlawful. Apart from this cause, however, the result of sortilegious acts must needs be ascribed to chance, or to some directing spiritual cause. If we ascribe it to chance, and this can only take place in sortilege of allotment, it does not seem to imply any vice other than vanity, as in the case of persons who, being unable to agree upon the division of something or other, are willing to draw lots for its division, thus leaving to chance what portion each is to receive. If, on the other hand, the decision by lot be left to a spiritual cause, it is sometimes ascribed to demons. Thus we read (Ezek 21:21) that the king of Babylon stood in the highway, at the head of two ways, seeking divination, shuffling arrows; he inquired of the idols, and consulted entrails: sortilege of this kind is unlawful, and forbidden by the canons. Sometimes, however, the decision is left to God, according to Prov. 16:33, Lots are cast into the lap, but they are disposed of by the Lord: sortilege of this kind is not wrong in itself, as Augustine declares. Yet this may happen to be sinful in four ways. First, if one have recourse to lots without any necessity: for this would seem to amount to tempting God. Hence Ambrose, commenting on the words of Luke 1:8, says: He that is chosen by lot is not bound by the judgment of men. Second, if even in a case of necessity one were to have recourse to lots without reverence. Hence, on the Acts of the Apostles, Bede says (Super Act. Apost. i): But if anyone, compelled by necessity, thinks that he ought, after the apostles’ example, to consult God by casting lots, let him take note that the apostles themselves did not do so, except after calling together the assembly of the brethren and pouring forth prayer to God. Third, if the Divine oracles be misapplied to earthly business. Hence Augustine says (ad inquisit. Januar. ii; Ep. lv): Those who tell fortunes from the Gospel pages, though it is to be hoped that they do so rather than have recourse to consulting the demons, yet does this custom also displease me, that anyone should wish to apply the Divine oracles to worldly matters and to the vain things of this life. Fourth, if anyone resort to the drawing of lots in ecclesiastical elections, which should be carried out by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Wherefore, as Bede says (Super Act. Apost. i): Before Pentecost the ordination of Matthias was decided by lot, because as yet the fullness of the Holy Spirit was not yet poured forth into the Church: whereas the same deacons

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homines sortibus utuntur, sicut et in temporalium rerum were ordained not by lot but by the choice of the disciples. It divisione. is different with earthly honors, which are directed to the disposal of earthly things: in elections of this kind men frequently have recourse to lots, even as in the distribution of earthly possessions. Si vero necessitas immineat, licitum est, cum debita If, however, there be urgent necessity it is lawful to seek reverentia, sortibus divinum iudicium implorare. Unde the divine judgment by casting lots, provided due reverence Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Honoratum, si inter Dei be observed. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Honor. ccxxviii), ministros sit disceptatio qui eorum persecutionis tempore If, at a time of persecution, the ministers of God do not agree maneant, ne fuga omnium, et qui eorum fugiant, ne morte as to which of them is to remain at his post lest all should omnium deseratur Ecclesia, si haec disceptatio aliter non flee, and which of them is to flee, lest all die and the Church potuerit terminari, quantum mihi videtur, qui maneant be forsaken, should there be no other means of coming to an et qui fugiant sorte legendi sunt. Et in I de Doct. Christ. agreement, so far as I can see, they must be chosen by lot. dicit, si tibi abundaret aliquid, quod oporteret dari ei qui Again he says (De Doctr. Christ. xxviii): If thou aboundest non haberet, nec duobus dari potuisset; si tibi occurrerent in that which it behooves thee to give to him who hath not, duo, quorum neuter alium vel indigentia vel erga te aliqua and which cannot be given to two; should two come to you, necessitate superaret; nihil iustius faceres quam ut sorte le- neither of whom surpasses the other either in need or in some geres cui dandum esset quod dari utrique non posset. claim on thee, thou couldst not act more justly than in choosing by lot to whom thou shalt give that which thou canst not give to both. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum et secunThis suffices for the Reply to the First and Second dum. Objections. Ad tertium dicendum quod iudicium ferri canReply Obj. 3: The trial by hot iron or boiling water is dentis vel aquae ferventis ordinatur quidem ad alicuius directed to the investigation of someone’s hidden sin, by peccati occulti inquisitionem per aliquid quod ab homi- means of something done by a man, and in this it agrees ne fit, et in hoc convenit cum sortibus, inquantum tamen with the drawing of lots. But insofar as a miraculous reexpectatur aliquis miraculosus effectus a Deo, excedit sult is expected from God, it surpasses the common gencommunem sortium rationem. Unde huiusmodi iudi- erality of sortilege. Hence this kind of trial is rendered uncium illicitum redditur, tum quia ordinatur ad iudican- lawful, both because it is directed to the judgment of the dum occulta, quae divino iudicio reservantur; tum etiam occult, which is reserved to the divine judgment, and bequia huiusmodi iudicium non est auctoritate divina san- cause such like trials are not sanctioned by divine authorcitum. Unde II, qu. V, in decreto Stephani Papae, dicitur, ity. Hence we read in a decree of Pope Stephen V: The sacred ferri candentis vel aquae ferventis examinatione confes- canons do not approve of extorting a confession from anyone sionem extorqueri a quolibet, sacri non censent canones, by means of the trial by hot iron or boiling water, and no one et quod sanctorum patrum documento sancitum non est, must presume, by a superstitious innovation, to practice what superstitiosa adinventione non est praesumendum. Spon- is not sanctioned by the teaching of the holy fathers. For it tanea enim confessione vel testium approbatione publicata is allowable that public crimes should be judged by our audelicta, habito prae oculis Dei timore, concessa sunt no- thority, after the culprit has made spontaneous confession, or stro regimini iudicare. Occulta vero et incognita illi sunt when witnesses have been approved, with due regard to the relinquenda qui solus novit corda filiorum hominum. Et fear of God; but hidden and unknown crimes must be left eadem ratio videtur esse de lege duellorum, nisi quod to Him Who alone knows the hearts of the children of men. plus accedit ad communem rationem sortium, inquan- The same would seem to apply to the law concerning dutum non expectatur ibi miraculosus effectus; nisi forte els, save that it approaches nearer to the common kind of quando pugiles sunt valde impares virtute vel arte. sortilege, since no miraculous effect is expected thereupon, unless the combatants be very unequal in strength or skill.

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Question 96 Superstition in Observances Deinde considerandum est de superstitionibus obWe must now consider superstition in observances, unservantiarum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. der which head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, de observantiis ad scientiam acquirendam, (1) Of observances for acquiring knowledge, which are quae traduntur in arte notoria. prescribed by the magic art; Secundo, de observantiis quae ordinantur ad aliqua (2) Of observances for causing alterations in certain corpora immutanda. bodies; Tertio, de observantiis quae ordinantur ad (3) Of observances practiced in fortune-telling; coniecturas sumendas fortuniorum vel infortuniorum. Quarto, de suspensionibus sacrorum verborum ad (4) Of wearing sacred words at the neck. collum.

Article 1 Whether it be unlawful to practice the observances of the magic art? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod uti observantiis artis notoriae non sit illicitum. Dupliciter enim est aliquid illicitum, uno modo, secundum genus operis, sicut homicidium vel furtum; alio modo, ex eo quod ordinatur ad malum finem, sicut cum quis dat eleemosynam propter inanem gloriam. Sed ea quae observantur in arte notoria secundum genus operis non sunt illicita, sunt enim quaedam ieiunia et orationes ad Deum. Ordinantur etiam ad bonum finem, scilicet ad scientiam acquirendam. Ergo uti huiusmodi observationibus non est illicitum. Praeterea, Dan. I legitur quod pueris abstinentibus dedit Deus scientiam et disciplinam in omni libro et sapientia. Sed observantiae artis notoriae sunt secundum aliqua ieiunia et abstinentias quasdam. Ergo videtur quod divinitus sortiatur ars illa effectum. Non ergo illicitum est ea uti. Praeterea, ideo videtur esse inordinatum a Daemonibus inquirere de futuris quia ea non cognoscunt, sed hoc est proprium Dei, ut dictum est. Sed veritates scientiarum Daemones sciunt, quia scientiae sunt de his quae sunt ex necessitate et semper, quae subiacent humanae cognitioni, et multo magis Daemonum, qui sunt perspicaciores, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo non videtur esse peccatum uti arte notoria, etiam si per Daemones sortiatur effectum.

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to practice the observances of the magic art. A thing is said to be unlawful in two ways. First, by reason of the genus of the deed, as murder and theft: second, through being directed to an evil end, as when a person gives an alms for the sake of vainglory. Now the observances of the magic art are not evil as to the genus of the deed, for they consist in certain fasts and prayers to God; moreover, they are directed to a good end, namely, the acquisition of science. Therefore it is not unlawful to practice these observances.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Dan 1:17) that to the children who abstained, God gave knowledge, and understanding in every book, and wisdom. Now the observances of the magic art consist in certain fasts and abstinences. Therefore it seems that this art achieves its results through God: and consequently it is not unlawful to practice it. Obj. 3: Further, seemingly, as stated above (A. 1), the reason why it is wrong to inquire of the demons concerning the future is because they have no knowledge of it, this knowledge being proper to God. Yet the demons know scientific truths: because sciences are about things necessary and invariable, and such things are subject to human knowledge, and much more to the knowledge of demons, who are of keener intellect, as Augustine says. Therefore it seems to be no sin to practice the magic art, even though it achieve its result through the demons. Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. XVIII, non inOn the contrary, It is written (Deut 18:10, 11): Neiveniatur in te qui quaerat a mortuis veritatem, quae qui- ther let there be found among you . . . anyone . . . that seeketh dem inquisitio innititur auxilio Daemonum. Sed per ob- the truth from the dead: which search relies on the demons’

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servantias artis notoriae inquiritur cognitio veritatis per help. Now through the observances of the magic art, knowlquaedam pacta significationum cum Daemonibus inita. edge of the truth is sought by means of certain signs agreed Ergo uti arte notoria non est licitum. upon by compact with the demons. Therefore it is unlawful to practice the notary art. Respondeo dicendum quod ars notoria et illicita I answer that, The magic art is both unlawful and fuest, et inefficax. Illicita quidem est, quia utitur quibus- tile. It is unlawful, because the means it employs for acquirdam ad scientiam acquirendam quae non habent secun- ing knowledge have not in themselves the power to cause dum se virtutem causandi scientiam, sicut inspectione science, consisting as they do in gazing certain shapes, and quarundam figurarum, et prolatione quorundam igno- muttering certain strange words, and so forth. Wherefore torum verborum, et aliis huiusmodi. Et ideo huiusmodi this art does not make use of these things as causes, but ars non utitur his ut causis, sed ut signis. Non autem ut as signs; not however as signs instituted by God, as are the signis divinitus institutis, sicut sunt sacramentalia signa. sacramental signs. It follows, therefore, that they are empty Unde relinquitur quod sint supervacua signa, et per con- signs, and consequently a kind of agreement or covenant sequens pertinentia ad pacta quaedam significationum made with the demons for the purpose of consultation and of cum Daemonibus placita atque foederata. Et ideo ars no- compact by tokens. Wherefore the magic art is to be absotoria penitus est repudianda et fugienda Christiano, si- lutely repudiated and avoided by Christians, even as other cut et aliae artes nugatoriae vel noxiae superstitionis, ut arts of vain and noxious superstition, as Augustine declares Augustinus dicit, in II de Doct. Christ. Est etiam huius- (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23). This art is also useless for the acmodi ars inefficax ad scientiam acquirendam. Cum enim quisition of science. For since it is not intended by means of per huiusmodi artem non intendatur acquisitio scientiae this art to acquire science in a manner connatural to man, per modum homini connaturalem, scilicet adinvenien- namely, by discovery and instruction, the consequence is do vel addiscendo, consequens est quod iste effectus vel that this effect is expected either from God or from the expectetur a Deo, vel a Daemonibus. Certum est autem demons. Now it is certain that some have received wisaliquos a Deo sapientiam et scientiam per infusionem dom and science infused into them by God, as related of habuisse, sicut de Salomone legitur, III Reg. III, et II Pa- Solomon (3 Kgs 3 and 2 Paralip. 1). Moreover, our Lord said ral. I. Dominus etiam discipulis suis dicit, Luc. XXI, ego to His disciples (Luke 21:15): I will give you a mouth and dabo vobis os et sapientiam, cui non poterunt resistere et wisdom, which all your adversaries shall not be able to recontradicere omnes adversarii vestri. Sed hoc donum non sist and gainsay. However, this gift is not granted to all, or datur quibuscumque, aut cum certa observatione, sed in connection with any particular observance, but accordsecundum arbitrium spiritus sancti, secundum illud I ad ing to the will of the Holy Spirit, as stated in 1 Cor. 12:8, Cor. XII, alii quidem datur per spiritum sermo sapientiae, To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to alii sermo scientiae secundum eundem spiritum; et postea another the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit, subditur, haec omnia operatur unus atque idem spiritus, and afterwards it is said (1 Cor 12:11): All these things one dividens singulis prout vult. Ad Daemones autem non and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to everyone accordpertinet illuminare intellectum, ut habitum est in pri- ing as He will. On the other hand it does not belong to the ma huius operis parte. Acquisitio autem scientiae et sa- demons to enlighten the intellect, as stated in the First Part pientiae fit per illuminationem intellectus. Et ideo nullus (Q. 109, A. 3). Now the acquisition of knowledge and wisunquam per Daemones scientiam acquisivit. Unde Au- dom is effected by the enlightening of the intellect, wheregustinus dicit, in X de Civ. Dei, Porphyrium fateri quod fore never did anyone acquire knowledge by means of the theurgicis teletis, in operationibus Daemonum, intellec- demons. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 9): Porphyry tuali animae nihil purgationis accidit quod eam facit ido- confesses that the intellectual soul is in no way cleansed by neam ad videndum Deum suum, et perspicienda ea quae theurgic inventions, i.e., the operations of the demons, so as vera sunt, qualia sunt omnia scientiarum theoremata. to be fitted to see its God, and discern what is true, such as Possent tamen Daemones, verbis hominibus colloquen- are all scientific conclusions. The demons may, however, be tes, exprimere aliqua scientiarum documenta, sed hoc able by speaking to men to express in words certain teachnon quaeritur per artem notoriam. ings of the sciences, but this is not what is sought by means of magic. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod acquirere scienReply Obj. 1: It is a good thing to acquire knowledge, tiam bonum est, sed acquirere eam modo indebito non but it is not good to acquire it by undue means, and it is to est bonum. Et hunc finem intendit ars notoria. this end that the magic art tends. Ad secundum dicendum quod pueri illi non abstiReply Obj. 2: The abstinence of these children was not nebant secundum vanam observantiam artis notoriae, in accordance with a vain observance of the notary art, but sed secundum auctoritatem legis divinae, nolentes in- according to the authority of the divine law, for they refused quinari cibis gentilium. Et ideo merito obedientiae con- to be defiled by the meat of Gentiles. Hence as a reward

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secuti sunt a Deo scientiam, secundum illud Psalm., su- for their obedience they received knowledge from God, acper senes intellexi, quia mandata tua quaesivi. cording to Ps. 118:100, I have had understanding above the ancients, because I have sought Thy commandments. Ad tertium dicendum quod exquirere cognitioReply Obj. 3: To seek knowledge of the future from the nem futurorum a Daemonibus non solum est peccatum demons is a sin not only because they are ignorant of the fupropter hoc quod ipsi futura non cognoscunt, sed prop- ture, but also on account of the fellowship entered into with ter societatem cum eis initam, quae etiam in proposito them, which also applies to the case in point. locum habet.

Article 2 Whether observances directed to the alteration of bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring health or the like, are unlawful? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod observationes ordinatae ad corporum immutationem, puta ad sanitatem vel ad aliquid huiusmodi, sint licitae. Licitum enim est uti naturalibus virtutibus corporum ad proprios effectus inducendos. Res autem naturales habent quasdam virtutes occultas, quarum ratio ab homine assignari non potest, sicut quod adamas trahit ferrum, et multa alia quae Augustinus enumerat, XXI de Civ. Dei. Ergo videtur quod uti huiusmodi rebus ad corpora immutanda non sit illicitum. Praeterea, sicut corpora naturalia subduntur corporibus caelestibus, ita etiam corpora artificialia. Sed corpora naturalia sortiuntur quasdam virtutes occultas, speciem consequentes, ex impressione caelestium corporum. Ergo etiam corpora artificialia, puta imagines, sortiuntur aliquam virtutem occultam a corporibus caelestibus ad aliquos effectus causandos. Ergo uti eis, et aliis huiusmodi, non est illicitum. Praeterea, Daemones etiam multipliciter possunt corpora transmutare, ut dicit Augustinus, III de Trin. Sed eorum virtus a Deo est. Ergo licet uti eorum virtute ad aliquas huiusmodi immutationes faciendas. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in II de Doct. Christ., quod ad superstitionem pertinent molimina magicarum artium, et ligaturae, et remedia quae medicorum quoque medicina condemnat, sive in praecantationibus, sive in quibusdam notis, quas characteres vocant, sive in quibuscumque rebus suspendendis atque insignandis. Respondeo dicendum quod in his quae fiunt ad aliquos effectus corporales inducendos, considerandum est utrum naturaliter videantur posse tales effectus causare. Sic enim non erit illicitum, licet enim causas naturales adhibere ad proprios effectus. Si autem naturaliter non videantur posse tales effectus causare, consequens est quod non adhibeantur ad hos effectus causandos tanquam causae, sed solum quasi signa. Et sic pertinent ad pacta significationum cum Daemonibus inita. Unde Au-

Objection 1: It would seem that observances directed to the alteration of bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring health, or the like, are lawful. It is lawful to make use of the natural forces of bodies in order to produce their proper effects. Now in the physical order things have certain occult forces, the reason of which man is unable to assign; for instance that the magnet attracts iron, and many like instances, all of which Augustine enumerates (De Civ. Dei xxi, 5, 7). Therefore it would seem lawful to employ such like forces for the alteration of bodies. Obj. 2: Further, artificial bodies are subject to the heavenly bodies, just as natural bodies are. Now natural bodies acquire certain occult forces resulting from their species through the influence of the heavenly bodies. Therefore artificial bodies, e.g., images, also acquire from the heavenly bodies a certain occult force for the production of certain effects. Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of them and of such like things. Obj. 3: Further, the demons too are able to alter bodies in many ways, as Augustine states (De Trin. iii, 8, 9). But their power is from God. Therefore it is lawful to make use of their power for the purpose of producing these alterations. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that to superstition belong the experiments of magic arts, amulets and nostrums condemned by the medical faculty, consisting either of incantations or of certain cyphers which they call characters, or of any kind of thing worn or fastened on. I answer that, In things done for the purpose of producing some bodily effect we must consider whether they seem able to produce that effect naturally: for if so it will not be unlawful to do so, since it is lawful to employ natural causes in order to produce their proper effects. But, if they seem unable to produce those effects naturally, it follows that they are employed for the purpose of producing those effects, not as causes but only as signs, so that they come under the head of compact by tokens entered into with

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gustinus dicit, XXI de Civ. Dei, illiciuntur Daemones per creaturas, quas non ipsi, sed Deus condidit, delectabilibus pro sua diversitate diversis, non ut animalia cibis, sed ut spiritus signis, quae cuiusque delectationi congruunt, per varia genera lapidum, herbarum, lignorum, animalium, carminum, rituum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod si simpliciter adhibeantur res naturales ad aliquos effectus producendos ad quos putantur naturalem habere virtutem, non est superstitiosum neque illicitum. Si vero adiungantur vel characteres aliqui, vel aliqua nomina, vel aliae quaecumque variae observationes, quae manifestum est naturaliter efficaciam non habere, erit superstitiosum et illicitum. Ad secundum dicendum quod virtutes naturales corporum naturalium consequuntur eorum formas substantiales, quas sortiuntur ex impressione caelestium corporum, et ideo ex eorundem impressione sortiuntur quasdam virtutes activas. Sed corporum artificialium formae procedunt ex conceptione artificis, et cum nihil aliud sint quam compositio, ordo et figura, ut dicitur in I Physic., non possunt habere naturalem virtutem ad agendum. Et inde est quod ex impressione caelestium corporum nullam virtutem sortiuntur inquantum sunt artificialia, sed solum secundum materiam naturalem. Falsum est ergo quod Porphyrio videbatur, ut Augustinus dicit, X de Civ. Dei, herbis et lapidibus et animantibus, et sonis certis quibusdam ac vocibus, et figurationibus atque figmentis quibusdam etiam observatis in caeli conversione motibus siderum, fabricari in terra ab hominibus potestates idoneas siderum variis effectibus exequendis, quasi effectus magicarum artium ex virtute caelestium corporum provenirent. Sed sic ut Augustinus ibidem subdit, totum hoc ad Daemones pertinet, ludificatores animarum sibi subditarum. Unde etiam imagines quas astronomicas vocant, ex operatione Daemonum habent effectum. Cuius signum est quod necesse est eis inscribi quosdam characteres, qui naturaliter ad nihil operantur, non enim est figura actionis naturalis principium. Sed in hoc distant astronomicae imagines a nigromanticis, quod in nigromanticis fiunt expressae invocationes et praestigia quaedam, unde pertinent ad expressa pacta cum Daemonibus inita, sed in aliis imaginibus sunt quaedam tacita pacta per quaedam figurarum seu characterum signa. Ad tertium dicendum quod ad dominium pertinet divinae maiestatis, cui Daemones subsunt, ut eis utatur Deus ad quodcumque voluerit. Sed homini non est potestas super Daemones commissa, ut eis licite uti possit ad quodcumque voluerit, sed est ei contra Daemones bel-

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the demons. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): The demons are allured by means of creatures, which were made, not by them, but by God. They are enticed by various objects differing according to the various things in which they delight, not as animals by meat, but as spirits by signs, such as are to each one’s liking, by means of various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs and rites. Reply Obj. 1: There is nothing superstitious or unlawful in employing natural things simply for the purpose of causing certain effects such as they are thought to have the natural power of producing. But if in addition there be employed certain characters, words, or any other vain observances which clearly have no efficacy by nature, it will be superstitious and unlawful. Reply Obj. 2: The natural forces of natural bodies result from their substantial forms which they acquire through the influence of heavenly bodies; wherefore through this same influence they acquire certain active forces. On the other hand the forms of artificial bodies result from the conception of the craftsman; and since they are nothing else but composition, order and shape, as stated in Phys. i, 5, they cannot have a natural active force. Consequently, no force accrues to them from the influence of heavenly bodies, insofar as they are artificial, but only in respect of their natural matter. Hence it is false, what Porphyry held, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11), that by herbs, stones, animals, certain particular sounds, words, shapes and devices, or again by certain movements of the stars observed in the course of the heavens it is possible for men to fashion on earth forces capable of carrying into effect the various dispositions of the stars, as though the results of the magic arts were to be ascribed to the power of the heavenly bodies. In fact as Augustine adds (De Civ. Dei x, 11), all these things are to be ascribed to the demons, who delude the souls that are subject to them. Wherefore those images called astronomical also derive their efficacy from the actions of the demons: a sign of this is that it is requisite to inscribe certain characters on them which do not conduce to any effect naturally, since shape is not a principle of natural action. Yet astronomical images differ from necromantic images in this, that the latter include certain explicit invocations and trickery, wherefore they come under the head of explicit agreements made with the demons: whereas in the other images there are tacit agreements by means of tokens in certain shapes or characters. Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to the domain of the divine majesty, to Whom the demons are subject, that God should employ them to whatever purpose He will. But man has not been entrusted with power over the demons, to employ them to whatsoever purpose he will; on the contrary,

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lum indictum. Unde nullo modo licet homini Daemo- it is appointed that he should wage war against the demons. num auxilio uti per pacta tacita vel expressa. Hence in no way is it lawful for man to make use of the demons’ help by compacts either tacit or express.

Article 3 Whether observances directed to the purpose of fortune-telling are unlawful? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod observationes quae ordinantur ad praecognoscenda aliqua fortunia vel infortunia, non sunt illicita. Inter alia enim infortunia hominum sunt etiam infirmitates. Sed infirmitates in hominibus quaedam signa praecedunt, quae etiam a medicis observantur. Ergo observare huiusmodi significationes non videtur esse illicitum. Praeterea, irrationabile est negare illud quod quasi communiter omnes experiuntur. Sed quasi omnes experiuntur quod aliqua tempora vel loca, vel verba audita, vel occursus hominum seu animalium, aut distorti aut inordinati actus, aliquod praesagium habent boni vel mali futuri. Ergo observare ista non videtur esse illicitum. Praeterea, actus hominum et eventus ex divina providentia disponuntur secundum ordinem quendam, ad quem pertinere videtur quod praecedentia sint subsequentium signa. Unde ea quae antiquis patribus contigerunt signa sunt eorum quae in nobis complentur, ut patet per apostolum, I ad Cor. X. Observare autem ordinem ex divina providentia procedentem non est illicitum. Ergo observare huiusmodi praesagia non videtur esse illicitum. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in II de Doct. Christ., quod ad pacta cum Daemonibus inita pertinent millia inanium observationum, puta si membrum aliquod salierit; si iunctim ambulantibus amicis lapis aut canis aut puer medius intervenerit; limen calcare cum ante domum suam aliquis transit; redire ad lectum si quis, dum se calceat, sternutaverit; redire domum si procedens offenderit; cum vestis a soricibus roditur, plus timere superstitionem mali futuri quam praesens damnum dolere. Respondeo dicendum quod homines omnes huiusmodi observationes attendunt non ut quasdam causas, sed ut quaedam signa futurorum eventuum bonorum vel malorum. Non autem observantur sicut signa a Deo tradita, cum non sint introducta ex auctoritate divina, sed magis ex vanitate humana, cooperante Daemonum malitia, qui nituntur animos hominum huiusmodi vanitatibus implicare. Et ideo manifestum est omnes huiusmodi observantias esse superstitiosas et illicitas. Et videntur esse quaedam reliquiae idololatriae, secundum quam observabantur auguria, et quidam dies Fausti vel

Objection 1: It would seem that observances directed to the purpose of fortune-telling are not unlawful. Sickness is one of the misfortunes that occur to man. Now sickness in man is preceded by certain symptoms, which the physician observes. Therefore it seems not unlawful to observe such like signs. Obj. 2: Further, it is unreasonable to deny that which nearly everybody experiences. Now nearly everyone experiences that certain times, or places, hearing of certain words meetings of men or animals, uncanny or ungainly actions, are presages of good or evil to come. Therefore it seems not unlawful to observe these things. Obj. 3: Further, human actions and occurrences are disposed by divine providence in a certain order: and this order seems to require that precedent events should be signs of subsequent occurrences: wherefore, according to the Apostle (1 Cor 10:6), the things that happened to the fathers of old are signs of those that take place in our time. Now it is not unlawful to observe the order that proceeds from divine providence. Therefore it is seemingly not unlawful to observe these presages. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that a thousand vain observances are comprised under the head of compacts entered into with the demons: for instance, the twitching of a limb; a stone, a dog, or a boy coming between friends walking together; kicking the door-post when anyone passes in front of one’s house; to go back to bed if you happen to sneeze while putting on your shoes; to return home if you trip when going forth; when the rats have gnawed a hole in your clothes, to fear superstitiously a future evil rather than to regret the actual damage. I answer that, Men attend to all these observances, not as causes but as signs of future events, good or evil. Nor do they observe them as signs given by God, since these signs are brought forward, not on divine authority, but rather by human vanity with the cooperation of the malice of the demons, who strive to entangle men’s minds with such like trifles. Accordingly it is evident that all these observances are superstitious and unlawful: they are apparently remains of idolatry, which authorized the observance of auguries, of lucky and unlucky days which is allied to divination by the stars, in respect of which one day is dif-

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infausti (quod quodammodo pertinet ad divinationem quae fit per astra, secundum quae diversificantur dies), nisi quod huiusmodi observationes sunt sine ratione et arte; unde sunt magis vanae et superstitiosae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod infirmitatum causae praecedunt in nobis, ex quibus aliqua signa procedunt futurorum morborum, quae licite a medicis observantur. Unde et si quis praesagium futurorum eventuum consideret ex sua causa, non erit illicitum, sicut si servus timeat flagella videns domini iram. Et simile etiam esse posset si quis timeret nocumentum alicui puero ex oculo fascinante, de quo dictum est in primo libro. Sic autem non est in huiusmodi observationibus. Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc quod a principio in istis observationibus aliquid veri homines experti sunt, casu accidit. Sed postmodum, cum homines incipiunt huiusmodi observantiis suum animum implicare, multa secundum huiusmodi observationes eveniunt per deceptionem Daemonum, ut his observationibus homines implicati curiosiores fiant, et sese magis inserant multiplicibus laqueis perniciosi erroris, ut Augustinus dicit, II de Doct. Christ. Ad tertium dicendum quod in populo Iudaeorum, ex quo Christus erat nasciturus, non solum dicta, sed etiam facta fuerunt prophetica, ut Augustinus dicit, contra Faustum. Et ideo licitum est illa facta assumere ad nostram instructionem, sicut signis divinitus datis. Non autem omnia quae aguntur per divinam providentiam sic ordinantur ut sint futurorum signa. Unde ratio non sequitur.

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ferentiated from another: except that these observances are devoid of reason and art, wherefore they are yet more vain and superstitious. Reply Obj. 1: The causes of sickness are seated in us, and they produce certain signs of sickness to come, which physicians lawfully observe. Wherefore it is not unlawful to consider a presage of future events as proceeding from its cause; as when a slave fears a flogging when he sees his master’s anger. Possibly the same might be said if one were to fear for child lest it take harm from the evil eye, of which we have spoken in the First Part (Q. 117, A. 3, ad 2). But this does not apply to this kind of observances. Reply Obj. 2: That men have at first experienced a certain degree of truth in these observances is due to chance. But afterwards when a man begins to entangle his mind with observances of this kind, many things occur in connection with them through the trickery of the demons, so that men, through being entangled in these observances, become yet more curious, and more and more embroiled in the manifold snares of a pernicious error, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23). Reply Obj. 3: Among the Jewish people of whom Christ was to be born, not only words but also deeds were prophetic, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. iv, 2; xxii, 24). Wherefore it is lawful to apply those deeds to our instruction, as signs given by God. Not all things, however, that occur through divine providence are ordered so as to be signs of the future. Hence the argument does not prove.

Article 4 Whether it is unlawful to wear divine words at the neck? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod suspendere divina verba ad collum non sit illicitum. Non enim divina verba minoris sunt efficaciae cum scribuntur quam cum proferuntur. Sed licet aliqua sacra verba dicere ad aliquos effectus, puta ad sanandum infirmos, sicut, pater noster, ave Maria, vel qualitercumque nomen domini invocetur, secundum illud Marci ult., in nomine meo Daemonia eiicient, linguis loquentur novis, serpentes tollent. Ergo videtur quod licitum sit aliqua sacra scripta collo suspendere in remedium infirmitatis vel cuiuscumque nocumenti. Praeterea, verba sacra non minus operantur in corporibus hominum quam in corporibus serpentum et aliorum animalium. Sed incantationes quaedam efficaciam habent ad reprimendum serpentes, vel ad sanandum quaedam alia animalia, unde dicitur in Psalm., sicut aspidis surdae et obturantis aures suas, quae non exaudiet

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to wear divine words at the neck. Divine words are no less efficacious when written than when uttered. But it is lawful to utter sacred words for the purpose of producing certain effects; (for instance, in order to heal the sick), such as the Our Father or the Hail Mary, or in any way whatever to call on the Lord’s name, according to Mk. 16:17, 18, In My name they shall cast out devils, they shall speak with new tongues, they shall take up serpents. Therefore it seems to be lawful to wear sacred words at one’s neck, as a remedy for sickness or for any kind of distress. Obj. 2: Further, sacred words are no less efficacious on the human body than on the bodies of serpents and other animals. Now certain incantations are efficacious in checking serpents, or in healing certain other animals: wherefore it is written (Ps 57:5): Their madness is according to the likeness of a serpent, like the deaf asp that stoppeth her ears,

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vocem incantantium, et venefici incantantis sapienter. Er- which will not hear the voice of the charmers, nor of the wizgo licet suspendere sacra verba ad remedium hominum. ard that charmeth wisely. Therefore it is lawful to wear sacred words as a remedy for men. Praeterea, verbum Dei non est minoris sanctitatis Obj. 3: Further, God’s word is no less holy than the quam sanctorum reliquiae, unde Augustinus dicit quod relics of the saints; wherefore Augustine says (Lib. L. Hom. non minus est verbum Dei quam corpus Christi. Sed reli- xxvi) that God’s word is of no less account than the Body quias sanctorum licet homini collo suspendere, vel qua- of Christ. Now it is lawful for one to wear the relics of the litercumque portare, ad suam protectionem. Ergo, pa- saints at one’s neck, or to carry them about one in any way ri ratione, licet homini verbo vel scripto verba sacrae for the purpose of self-protection. Therefore it is equally Scripturae ad suam tutelam assumere. lawful to have recourse to the words of Holy Writ, whether uttered or written, for one’s protection. Sed contra est quod Chrysostomus dicit, super Obj. 4: On the other hand, Chrysostom says (Hom. xliii Matth., quidam aliquam partem Evangelii scriptam circa in Matth.): Some wear round their necks a passage in writcollum portant. Sed nonne quotidie Evangelium in Eccle- ing from the Gospel. Yet is not the Gospel read in church and sia legitur, et auditur ab omnibus? Cui ergo in auribus po- heard by all every day? How then, if it does a man no good sita Evangelia nihil prosunt, quomodo eum possunt circa to have the Gospels in his ears, will he find salvation by wearcollum suspensa salvare? Deinde, ubi est virtus Evangelii? ing them round his neck? Moreover, where is the power of the In figuris litterarum, an in intellectu sensuum? Si in figu- Gospel? In the shapes of the letters or in the understanding of ris, bene circa collum suspendis. Si in intellectu, ergo me- the sense? If in the shapes, you do well to wear them round lius in corde posita prosunt quam circa collum suspensa. your neck; if in the understanding, you will then do better to bear them in your heart than to wear them round your neck. Respondeo dicendum quod in omnibus incantatioI answer that, In every incantation or wearing of nibus vel Scripturis suspensis duo cavenda videntur. Pri- written words, two points seem to demand caution. The mo quidem, quid sit quod profertur vel scribitur. Quia si first is the thing said or written, because if it is connected est aliquid ad invocationes Daemonum pertinens, mani- with invocation of the demons it is clearly superstitious feste est superstitiosum et illicitum. Similiter etiam vide- and unlawful. In like manner it seems that one should betur esse cavendum, si contineat ignota nomina, ne sub ware lest it contain strange words, for fear that they conceal illis aliquid illicitum lateat. Unde Chrysostomus dicit, something unlawful. Hence Chrysostom says that many super Matth., quod, Pharisaeorum magnificantium fim- now after the example of the Pharisees who enlarged their brias suas exemplo, nunc multi aliqua nomina Hebraica fringes, invent and write Hebrew names of angels, and fasAngelorum confingunt et scribunt et alligant, quae non ten them to their persons. Such things seem fearsome to those intelligentibus metuenda videntur. Est etiam cavendum who do not understand them. Again, one should take care ne aliquid falsitatis contineat. Quia sic eius effectus non lest it contain anything false, because in that case also the posset expectari a Deo, qui non est testis falsitatis. effect could not be ascribed to God, Who does not bear witness to a falsehood. Deinde, secundo, cavendum est ne cum verbis sacris In the second place, one should beware lest besides the contineantur ibi aliqua vana, puta aliqui characteres in- sacred words it contain something vain, for instance cerscripti, praeter signum crucis. Aut si spes habeatur in tain written characters, except the sign of the Cross; or if modo scribendi aut ligandi, aut in quacumque huiusmo- hope be placed in the manner of writing or fastening, or di vanitate quae ad divinam reverentiam non pertineat. in any like vanity, having no connection with reverence for Quia hoc iudicaretur superstitiosum. Alias autem est li- God, because this would be pronounced superstitious: othcitum. Unde in decretis dicitur, XXVI, qu. V, cap. non li- erwise, however, it is lawful. Hence it is written in the Decceat Christianis etc., nec in collectionibus herbarum quae retals (XXVI, qu. v, cap. Non liceat Christianis): In blending medicinales sunt aliquas observationes aut incantationes together medicinal herbs, it is not lawful to make use of obserliceat attendere, nisi tantum cum symbolo divino aut ora- vances or incantations, other than the divine symbol, or the tione dominica, ut tantum creator omnium et Deus hono- Lord’s Prayer, so as to give honor to none but God the Creator retur. of all. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod etiam proferre diReply Obj. 1: It is indeed lawful to pronounce divine vina verba, aut invocare divinum nomen, si respectus words, or to invoke the divine name, if one do so with a habeatur ad solam Dei reverentiam, a qua expectatur ef- mind to honor God alone, from Whom the result is exfectus, licitum erit, si vero habeatur respectus ad aliquid pected: but it is unlawful if it be done in connection with aliud vane observatum, erit illicitum. any vain observance. Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam in incantaReply Obj. 2: Even in the case of incantations of sertionibus serpentum vel quorumcumque animalium, si pents or any animals whatever, if the mind attend exclu-

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respectus habeatur solum ad verba sacra et ad virtutem divinam, non erit illicitum. Sed plerumque tales praecantationes habent illicitas observantias, et per Daemones sortiuntur effectum, et praecipue in serpentibus, quia serpens fuit primum Daemonis instrumentum ad hominem decipiendum. Unde dicit Glossa, ibidem, notandum quia non laudatur a Scriptura undecumque datur in Scriptura similitudo, ut patet de iniquo iudice qui rogantem viduam vix audivit. Ad tertium dicendum quod eadem etiam ratio est de portatione reliquiarum. Quia si portentur ex fiducia Dei et sanctorum quorum sunt reliquiae, non erit illicitum, si autem circa hoc attenderetur aliquid aliud vanum, puta quod vas esset triangulare, aut aliquid aliud huiusmodi quod non pertineret ad reverentiam Dei et sanctorum, esset superstitiosum et illicitum. Ad quartum dicendum quod Chrysostomus loquitur quando respectus habetur magis ad figuras scriptas quam ad intellectum verborum.

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sively to the sacred words and to the divine power, it will not be unlawful. Such like incantations, however, often include unlawful observances, and rely on the demons for their result, especially in the case of serpents, because the serpent was the first instrument employed by the devil in order to deceive man. Hence a gloss on the passage quoted says: Note that Scripture does not commend everything whence it draws its comparisons, as in the case of the unjust judge who scarcely heard the widow’s request. Reply Obj. 3: The same applies to the wearing of relics, for if they be worn out of confidence in God, and in the saints whose relics they are, it will not be unlawful. But if account were taken in this matter of some vain circumstance (for instance that the casket be three-cornered, or the like, having no bearing on the reverence due to God and the saints), it would be superstitious and unlawful. Reply Obj. 4: Chrysostom is speaking of the case in which more attention is paid the written characters than to the understanding of the words.

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Question 97 The Temptation of God Deinde considerandum est de vitiis religioni oppositis per religionis defectum, quae manifestam contrarietatem ad religionem habent, unde sub irreligiositate continentur. Huiusmodi autem sunt ea quae pertinent ad contemptum sive irreverentiam Dei et rerum sacrarum. Primo ergo considerandum est de vitiis quae pertinent directe ad irreverentiam Dei; secundo, de his quae pertinent ad irreverentiam rerum sacrarum. Circa primum, considerandum occurrit et de tentatione qua Deus tentatur; et de periurio, quo nomen Dei irreverenter assumitur. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, in quo consistit Dei tentatio. Secundo, utrum sit peccatum. Tertio, cui virtuti opponatur. Quarto, de comparatione eius ad alia peccata.

We must now consider the vices that are opposed to religion, through lack of religion, and which are manifestly contrary thereto, so that they come under the head of irreligion. Such are the vices which pertain to contempt or irreverence for God and holy things. Accordingly we shall consider: (1) Vices pertaining directly to irreverence for God; (2) Vices pertaining to irreverence for holy things. With regard to the first we shall consider the temptation whereby God is tempted, and perjury, whereby God’s name is taken with irreverence. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) In what the temptation of God consists; (2) Whether it is a sin? (3) To what virtue it is opposed; (4) Of its comparison with other vices.

Article 1 Whether the temptation of God consists in certain deeds, wherein the expected result is ascribed to the power of God alone? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod tentatio Dei non consistat in aliquibus factis in quibus solius divinae potestatis expectatur effectus. Sicut enim tentatur Deus ab homine, ita etiam homo tentatur et a Deo, et ab homine, et a Daemone. Sed non quandocumque homo tentatur, expectatur aliquis effectus potestatis ipsius. Ergo neque etiam per hoc Deus tentatur quod expectatur solus effectus potestatis ipsius. Praeterea, omnes illi qui per invocationem divini nominis miracula operantur, expectant aliquem effectum solius potestatis divinae. Si igitur in factis huiusmodi consisteret divina tentatio quicumque miracula faciunt Deum tentarent. Praeterea, ad perfectionem hominis pertinere videtur ut, praetermissis humanis subsidiis, in solo Deo spem ponat. Unde Ambrosius, super illud Luc. IX, nihil tuleritis in via etc., qualis debeat esse qui evangelizat regnum Dei, praeceptis evangelicis designatur, hoc est, ut subsidii saecularis adminicula non requirat, fideique totus inhaerens putet, quo minus ista requiret, magis posse suppetere. Et beata Agatha dixit, medicinam carnalem corpori meo nunquam exhibui, sed habeo dominum Iesum Christum, qui solo sermone restaurat universa. Sed Dei tentatio non consistit in eo quod ad perfectionem per-

Objection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God does not consist in certain deeds wherein the result is expected from the power of God alone. Just as God is tempted by man so is man tempted by God, man, and demons. But when man is tempted the result is not always expected from his power. Therefore neither is God tempted when the result is expected from His power alone. Obj. 2: Further, all those who work miracles by invoking the divine name look for an effect due to God’s power alone. Therefore, if the temptation of God consisted in such like deeds, all who work miracles would tempt God. Obj. 3: Further, it seems to belong to man’s perfection that he should put aside human aids and put his hope in God alone. Hence Ambrose, commenting on Luke 9:3, Take nothing for your journey, etc. says: The Gospel precept points out what is required of him that announces the kingdom of God, namely, that he should not depend on worldly assistance, and that, taking assurance from his faith, he should hold himself to be the more able to provide for himself, the less he seeks these things. And the Blessed Agatha said: I have never treated my body with bodily medicine, I have my Lord Jesus Christ, Who restores all things by His mere word. But

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tinet. Ergo tentatio non consistit in huiusmodi factis in the temptation of God does not consist in anything pertainquibus expectatur solum Dei auxilium. ing to perfection. Therefore the temptation of God does not consist in such like deeds, wherein the help of God alone is expected. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XXII contra On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, Faustum, quod Christus, qui palam docendo et arguendo 36): Christ who gave proof of God’s power by teaching and reet tamen inimicorum rabiem valere in se aliquid non si- proving openly, yet not allowing the rage of His enemies to nendo, Dei demonstrabat potestatem; idem tamen, fugien- prevail against Him, nevertheless by fleeing and hiding, indo et latendo, hominis instruebat infirmitatem, ne Deum structed human weakness, lest it should dare to tempt God tentare audeat quando habet quod faciat ut quod cavere when it has to strive to escape from that which it needs to oportet evadat. Ex quo videtur in hoc tentationem Dei avoid. From this it would seem that the temptation of God consistere, quando praetermittit homo facere quod po- consists in omitting to do what one can in order to escape test ad pericula evadenda, respiciens solum ad auxilium from danger, and relying on the assistance of God alone. divinum. Respondeo dicendum quod tentare proprie est exI answer that, Properly speaking, to tempt is to test perimentum sumere de eo qui tentatur. Sumimus autem the person tempted. Now we put a person to the test by experimentum de aliquo et verbis et factis. Verbis qui- words or by deeds. By words, that we may find out whether dem, ut experiamur an sciat quod quaerimus, vel possit he knows what we ask, or whether he can and will grant aut velit illud implere. Factis autem, cum per ea quae fa- it: by deeds, when, by what we do, we probe another’s cimus exploramus alterius prudentiam, vel voluntatem, prudence, will or power. Either of these may happen in vel potestatem. Utrumque autem horum contingit du- two ways. First, openly, as when one declares oneself a pliciter. Uno quidem modo, aperte, sicut cum quis ten- tempter: thus Samson (Judg 14:12) proposed a riddle to the tatorem se profitetur; sicut Samson, Iudic. XIV, propo- Philistines in order to tempt them. In the second place it suit Philisthaeis problema ad eos tentandum. Alio vero may be done with cunning and by stealth, as the Pharisees modo, insidiose et occulte, sicut Pharisaei tentaverunt tempted Christ, as we read in Matt. 22:15, sqq. Again this Christum, ut legitur Matth. XXII. Rursus, quandoque is sometimes done explicitly, as when anyone intends, by quidem expresse, puta cum quis dicto vel facto intendit word or deed, to put some person to the test; and someexperimentum sumere de aliquo. Quandoque vero inter- times implicitly, when, to wit, though he does not intend to pretative, quando scilicet, etsi hoc non intendat ut expe- test a person, yet that which he does or says can seemingly rimentum sumat, id tamen agit vel dicit quod ad nihil have no other purpose than putting him to a test. aliud videtur ordinabile nisi ad experimentum sumendum. Sic igitur homo Deum tentat quandoque verbis, Accordingly, man tempts God sometimes by words, quandoque factis. Verbis quidem Deo colloquimur sometimes by deeds. Now we speak with God in words orando. Unde in sua petitione aliquis expresse Deum when we pray. Hence a man tempts God explicitly in his tentat quando ea intentione aliquid a Deo postulat ut prayers when he asks something of God with the intention exploret Dei scientiam, potestatem vel voluntatem. Fac- of probing God’s knowledge, power or will. He tempts God tis autem expresse aliquis Deum tentat quando per ea explicitly by deeds when he intends, by whatever he does, to quae facit intendit experimentum sumere divinae pote- experiment on God’s power, good will or wisdom. But He statis, seu pietatis aut sapientiae. Sed quasi interpreta- will tempt God implicitly, if, though he does not intend to tive Deum tentat qui, etsi non intendat experimentum make an experiment on God, yet he asks for or does somede Deo sumere, aliquid tamen vel petit vel facit ad nihil thing which has no other use than to prove God’s power, aliud utile nisi ad probandum Dei potestatem vel boni- goodness or knowledge. Thus when a man wishes his horse tatem, seu cognitionem. Sicut, cum aliquis equum cur- to gallop in order to escape from the enemy, this is not givrere facit ut evadat hostes, hoc non est experimentum de ing the horse a trial: but if he make the horse gallop with equo sumere, sed si equum currere faciat absque aliqua out any useful purpose, it seems to be nothing else than a utilitate, hoc nihil aliud esse videtur quam experimen- trial of the horse’s speed; and the same applies to all other tum sumere de equi velocitate, et idem est in omnibus things. Accordingly when a man in his prayers or deeds aliis rebus. Quando ergo propter aliquam necessitatem entrusts himself to the divine assistance for some urgent seu utilitatem committit se aliquis divino auxilio in suis or useful motive, this is not to tempt God: for it is written petitionibus vel factis, hoc non est Deum tentare, dici- (2 Chr 20:12): As we know not what to do, we can only turn tur enim II Paralip. XX, cum ignoramus quid agere debea- our eyes to Thee. But if this be done without any useful or mus, hoc solum habemus residui, ut oculos nostros diriga- urgent motive, this is to tempt God implicitly. Wherefore a mus ad te. Quando vero hoc agitur absque necessitate et gloss on Deut. 6:16, Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God,

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utilitate, hoc est interpretative tentare Deum. Unde super illud Deut. VI, non tentabis dominum Deum tuum, dicit Glossa, Deum tentat qui, habens quid faciat, sine ratione se committit periculo, experiens utrum possit liberari a Deo. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo etiam quandoque factis tentatur utrum possit vel sciat vel velit huiusmodi factis auxilium vel impedimentum praestare. Ad secundum dicendum quod sancti suis precibus miracula facientes, ex aliqua necessitate vel utilitate moventur ad petendum divinae potestatis effectum. Ad tertium dicendum quod praedicatores regni Dei ex magna utilitate et necessitate subsidia temporalia praetermittunt, ut verbo Dei expeditius vacent. Et ideo si soli Deo innitantur, non ex hoc tentant Deum. Sed si absque utilitate vel necessitate humana subsidia desererent, tentarent Deum. Unde et Augustinus dicit, XXII contra Faustum, quod Paulus non fugit quasi non credendo in Deum, sed ne Deum tentaret si fugere noluisset, cum sic fugere potuisset. Beata vero Agatha experta erat erga se divinam benevolentiam, ut vel infirmitates non pateretur, pro quibus corporali medicina indigeret, vel statim sentiret divinae sanationis effectum.

Q. 97, A. 2

says: A man tempts God, if having the means at hand, without reason he chooses a dangerous course, trying whether he can be delivered by God.

Reply Obj. 1: Man also is sometimes tempted by means of deeds, to test his ability or knowledge or will to uphold or oppose those same deeds. Reply Obj. 2: When saints work miracles by their prayers, they are moved by a motive of necessity or usefulness to ask for that which is an effect of the divine power. Reply Obj. 3: The preachers of God’s kingdom dispense with temporal aids, so as to be freer to give their time to the word of God: wherefore if they depend on God alone, it does not follow that they tempt God. But if they were to neglect human assistance without any useful or urgent motive, they would be tempting God. Hence Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 36) says that Paul fled, not through ceasing to believe in God, but lest he should tempt God, were he not to flee when he had the means of flight. The Blessed Agatha had experience of God’s kindness towards her, so that either she did not suffer such sickness as required bodily medicine, or else she felt herself suddenly cured by God.

Article 2 Whether it is a sin to tempt God? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod tentare Deum non sit peccatum. Deus enim non praecipit aliquod peccatum. Praecipit autem ut homines eum probent, quod est eum tentare, dicitur enim Malach. III, inferte omnem decimam in horreum meum, ut sit cibus in domo mea, et probate me super hoc, dicit dominus, si non aperuero vobis cataractas caeli. Ergo videtur quod tentare Deum non sit peccatum. Praeterea, sicut aliquis tentatur ad hoc quod experientia sumatur de scientia vel potentia eius, ita etiam et de bonitate vel voluntate ipsius. Sed licitum est quod aliquis experimentum sumat divinae bonitatis, seu etiam voluntatis, dicitur enim in Psalm., gustate, et videte quoniam suavis est dominus; et Rom. XII, ut probetis quae sit voluntas Dei bona et beneplacens et perfecta. Ergo tentare Deum non est peccatum. Praeterea, nullus vituperatur in Scriptura ex eo quod a peccato cessat, sed magis si peccatum committat. Vituperatur autem Achaz quia domino dicenti, pete tibi signum a domino Deo tuo, respondit, non petam, et non tentabo dominum, dictum est enim ei, numquid parum vobis est molestos esse hominibus, quia molesti estis et Deo meo? Ut dicitur Isaiae VII. De Abraham autem legitur Gen. XV, quod dixit ad dominum, unde scire possum

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not a sin to tempt God. For God has not commanded sin. Yet He has commanded men to try, which is the same as to tempt, Him: for it is written (Mal 3:10): Bring all the tithes into the storehouse, that there may be meat in My house; and try Me in this, saith the Lord, if I open not unto you the flood-gates of heaven. Therefore it seems not to be a sin to tempt God. Obj. 2: Further, a man is tempted not only in order to test his knowledge and his power, but also to try his goodness or his will. Now it is lawful to test the divine goodness or will, for it is written (Ps 33:9): O taste and see that the Lord is sweet, and (Rom 12:2): That you may prove what is the good, and the acceptable, and the perfect will of God. Therefore it is not a sin to tempt God. Obj. 3: Further, Scripture never blames a man for ceasing from sin, but rather for committing a sin. Now Achaz is blamed because when the Lord said: Ask thee a sign of the Lord thy God, he replied: I will not ask, and I will not tempt the Lord, and then it was said to him: Is it a small thing for you to be grievous to men, that you are grievous to my God also? (Isa 7:11–13). And we read of Abraham (Gen 15:8) that he said to the Lord: Whereby may I know that I shall

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quod possessurus sim eam, scilicet terram repromissam a Deo? Similiter etiam Gedeon signum a domino petiit de victoria repromissa, ut legitur Iudic. VI. Qui tamen ex hoc non reprehenduntur. Ergo tentare Deum non est peccatum. Sed contra est quod prohibetur lege Dei. Dicitur enim Deut. VI, non tentabis dominum Deum tuum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, tentare est experimentum sumere. Nullus autem experimentum sumit de eo de quo est certus. Et ideo omnis tentatio ex aliqua ignorantia vel dubitatione procedit, vel eius qui tentat, sicut cum quis experimentum de re aliqua sumit ut eius qualitatem cognoscat; sive aliorum, sicut cum quis experimentum de aliquo sumit ut aliis ostendat, per quem modum Deus dicitur nos tentare. Ignorare autem vel dubitare de his quae pertinent ad Dei perfectionem est peccatum. Unde manifestum est quod tentare Deum ad hoc quod ipse tentans cognoscat Dei virtutem, est peccatum. Si quis autem ad hoc experimentum sumat eorum quae ad divinam perfectionem pertinent, non ut ipse cognoscat, sed ut aliis demonstret, hoc non est tentare Deum, cum subsit iusta necessitas seu pia utilitas, et alia quae ad hoc concurrere debent. Sic enim apostoli petiverunt a domino ut in nomine Iesu Christi fierent signa, ut dicitur Act. IV, ad hoc scilicet quod virtus Christi infidelibus manifestaretur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod solutio decimarum praecepta erat in lege, ut supra habitum est. Unde habebat necessitatem ex obligatione praecepti; et utilitatem quae ibi dicitur, ut sit cibus in domo Dei. Unde solvendo decimas non tentabant Deum. Quod autem ibi subditur, et probate me, non est intelligendum causaliter, quasi ad hoc solvere deberent decimas ut probarent si Deus non aperiret eis cataractas caeli, sed consecutive, quia scilicet, si decimas solverent, experimento probaturi erant beneficia quae eis Deus conferret.

IIa-IIae

possess it? namely, the land which God had promised him. Again Gedeon asked God for a sign of the victory promised to him (Judg 6:36, sqq.). Yet they were not blamed for so doing. Therefore it is not a sin to tempt God. On the contrary, It is forbidden in God’s Law, for it is written (Deut 6:10): Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), to tempt a person is to put him to a test. Now one never tests that of which one is certain. Wherefore all temptation proceeds from some ignorance or doubt, either in the tempter (as when one tests a thing in order to know its qualities), or in others (as when one tests a thing in order to prove it to others), and in this latter way God is said to tempt us. Now it is a sin to be ignorant of or to doubt that which pertains to God’s perfection. Wherefore it is evident that it is a sin to tempt God in order that the tempter himself may know God’s power. On the other hand, if one were to test that which pertains to the divine perfection, not in order to know it oneself, but to prove it to others: this is not tempting God, provided there be just motive of urgency, or a pious motive of usefulness, and other requisite conditions. For thus did the apostles ask the Lord that signs might be wrought in the name of Jesus Christ, as related in Acts 4:30, in order, to wit, that Christ’s power might be made manifest to unbelievers. Reply Obj. 1: The paying of tithes was prescribed in the Law, as stated above (Q. 87, A. 1). Hence there was a motive of urgency to pay it, through the obligation of the Law, and also a motive of usefulness, as stated in the text quoted—that there may be meat in God’s house: wherefore they did not tempt God by paying tithes. The words that follow, and try Me, are not to be understood causally, as though they had to pay tithes in order to try if God would open the flood-gates of heaven, but consecutively, because, to wit, if they paid tithes, they would prove by experience the favors which God would shower upon them. Reply Obj. 2: There is a twofold knowledge of God’s goodness or will. One is speculative and as to this it is not lawful to doubt or to prove whether God’s will be good, or whether God is sweet. The other knowledge of God’s will or goodness is effective or experimental and thereby a man experiences in himself the taste of God’s sweetness, and complacency in God’s will, as Dionysius says of Hierotheos (Div. Nom. ii) that he learnt divine things through experience of them. It is in this way that we are told to prove God’s will, and to taste His sweetness.

Ad secundum dicendum quod duplex est cognitio divinae bonitatis vel voluntatis. Una quidem speculativa. Et quantum ad hanc, non licet dubitare nec probare utrum Dei voluntas sit bona, vel utrum Deus sit suavis. Alia autem est cognitio divinae bonitatis seu voluntatis affectiva seu experimentalis, dum quis experitur in seipso gustum divinae dulcedinis et complacentiam divinae voluntatis, sicut de Hierotheo dicit Dionysius, II cap. de Div. Nom., quod didicit divina ex compassione ad ipsa. Et hoc modo monemur ut probemus Dei voluntatem et gustemus eius suavitatem. Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus volebat signum Reply Obj. 3: God wished to give a sign to Achaz, not dare regi Achaz non pro ipso solum, sed pro totius po- for him alone, but for the instruction of the whole people. puli instructione. Et ideo reprehenditur, quasi impeditor Hence he was reproved because, by refusing to ask a sign, he communis salutis, quod signum petere nolebat. Nec pe- was an obstacle to the common welfare. Nor would he have

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Q. 97, A. 3

tendo tentasset Deum. Tum quia ex mandato Dei petiisset. Tum quia hoc pertinebat ad utilitatem communem. Abraham vero signum petiit ex instinctu divino. Et ideo non peccavit. Gedeon vero signum ex debilitate fidei petiisse videtur, et ideo a peccato non excusatur, sicut Glossa ibidem dicit. Sicut et Zacharias peccavit dicens, Luc. I, ad Angelum, unde hoc sciam? Unde et propter incredulitatem punitus fuit.

tempted God by asking, both because he would have asked through God commanding him to do so, and because it was a matter relating to the common good. Abraham asked for a sign through the divine instinct, and so he did not sin. Gedeon seems to have asked a sign through weakness of faith, wherefore he is not to be excused from sin, as a gloss observes: just as Zachary sinned in saying to the angel (Luke 1:18): Whereby shall I know this? so that he was punished for his unbelief. Sciendum tamen quod dupliciter aliquis signum peIt must be observed, however, that there are two ways of tit a Deo. Uno modo, ad explorandum divinam potesta- asking God for a sign: first in order to test God’s power or tem, aut veritatem dicti eius. Et hoc de se pertinet ad Dei the truth of His word, and this of its very nature pertains tentationem. Alio modo, ad hoc quod instruatur quid sit to the temptation of God. Second, in order to be instructed circa aliquod factum placitum Deo. Et hoc nullo modo as to what is God’s pleasure in some particular matter; and pertinet ad Dei tentationem. this nowise comes under the head of temptation of God.

Article 3 Whether temptation of God is opposed to the virtue of religion? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod tentatio Dei non opponatur virtuti religionis. Tentatio enim Dei habet rationem peccati ex hoc quod homo de Deo dubitat, sicut dictum est sed dubitare de Deo pertinet ad peccatum infidelitatis, quod opponitur fidei. Ergo tentatio Dei magis opponitur fidei quam religioni. Praeterea, Eccli. XVIII dicitur, ante orationem praepara animam tuam, et noli esse quasi homo qui tentat Deum, ubi dicit interlinearis qui, scilicet tentans Deum, orat quod docuit, sed non facit quod iussit. Sed hoc pertinet ad praesumptionem, quae opponitur spei. Ergo videtur quod tentatio Dei sit peccatum oppositum spei. Praeterea, super illud Psalm., et tentaverunt Deum in cordibus suis, dicit Glossa quod tentare Deum est dolose postulare, ut in verbis sit simplicitas, cum sit in corde malitia. Sed dolus opponitur virtuti veritatis. Ergo tentatio Dei non opponitur religioni, sed veritati. Sed contra est quod, sicut ex praedicta Glossa habetur, tentare Deum est inordinate postulare. Sed debito modo postulare est actus religionis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo tentare Deum est peccatum religioni oppositum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, finis religionis est Deo reverentiam exhibere. Unde omnia illa quae directe pertinent ad irreverentiam Dei, religioni opponuntur. Manifestum est autem quod tentare aliquem ad irreverentiam eius pertinet, nullus enim praesumit tentare eum de cuius excellentia certus est. Unde manifestum est quod tentare Deum est peccatum religioni oppositum.

Objection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God is not opposed to the virtue of religion. The temptation of God is sinful, because a man doubts God, as stated above (A. 2). Now doubt about God comes under the head of unbelief, which is opposed to faith. Therefore temptation of God is opposed to faith rather than to religion. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Sir 18:23): Before prayer prepare thy soul, and be not as a man that tempteth God. Such a man, that is, who tempts God, says the interlinear gloss, prays for what God taught him to pray for, yet does not what God has commanded him to do. Now this pertains to imprudence which is opposed to hope. Therefore it seems that temptation of God is a sin opposed to hope. Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Ps. 77:18, And they tempted God in their hearts, says that to tempt God is to pray to Him deceitfully, with simplicity in our words and wickedness in our hearts. Now deceit is opposed to the virtue of truth. Therefore temptation of God is opposed, not to religion, but to truth. On the contrary, According to the gloss quoted above to tempt God is to pray to Him inordinately. Now to pray to God becomingly is an act of religion as stated above (Q. 83, A. 15). Therefore to tempt God is a sin opposed to religion. I answer that, As clearly shown above (Q. 81, A. 5), the end of religion is to pay reverence to God. Wherefore whatever pertains directly to irreverence for God is opposed to religion. Now it is evident that to tempt a person pertains to irreverence for him: since no one presumes to tempt one of whose excellence he is sure. Hence it is manifest that to tempt God is a sin opposed to religion.

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Q. 97, A. 4

Justice

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad religionem pertinet protestari fidem per aliqua signa ad divinam reverentiam pertinentia. Et ideo ad irreligiositatem pertinet quod ex incertitudine fidei homo aliqua faciat quae ad divinam irreverentiam pertinent, cuiusmodi est tentare Deum. Et ideo est irreligiositatis species. Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui ante orationem suam animam non praeparat, dimittendo si quid adversum aliquem habet, vel alias se ad devotionem non disponendo, non facit quod in se est ut exaudiatur a Deo. Et ideo quasi interpretative tentat Deum. Et quamvis huiusmodi interpretativa tentatio videatur ex praesumptione seu indiscretione provenire, tamen hoc ipsum ad irreverentiam Dei pertinet ut homo praesumptuose et sine debita diligentia se habeat in his quae ad Deum pertinent, dicitur enim I Pet. V, humiliamini sub potenti manu Dei; et II ad Tim. II, sollicite cura teipsum probabilem exhibere Deo. Unde etiam huiusmodi tentatio irreligiositatis species est. Ad tertium dicendum quod in comparatione ad Deum, qui novit cordis abscondita, non dicitur aliquis dolose postulare, sed per respectum ad homines. Unde dolus per accidens se habet ad tentationem Dei. Et propter hoc non oportet quod tentatio Dei directe opponatur veritati.

IIa-IIae

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 81, A. 7), it belongs to religion to declare one’s faith by certain signs indicative of reverence towards God. Consequently it belongs to irreligion that, through doubtful faith, a man does things indicative of irreverence towards God. To tempt God is one of these; wherefore it is a species of irreligion. Reply Obj. 2: He that prepares not his soul before prayer by forgiving those against whom he has anything, or in some other way disposing himself to devotion, does not do what he can to be heard by God, wherefore he tempts God implicitly as it were. And though this implicit temptation would seem to arise from presumption or indiscretion, yet the very fact that a man behaves presumptuously and without due care in matters relating to God implies irreverence towards Him. For it is written (1 Pet 5:6): Be you humbled . . . under the mighty hand of God, and (2 Tim 2:15): Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God. Therefore also this kind of temptation is a species of irreligion. Reply Obj. 3: A man is said to pray deceitfully, not in relation to God, Who knows the secrets of the heart, but in relation to man. Wherefore deceit is accidental to the temptation of God, and consequently it does not follow that to tempt God is directly opposed to the truth.

Article 4 Whether the temptation of God is a graver sin than superstition? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod tentatio Dei sit gravius peccatum quam superstitio. Maior enim poena pro maiori peccato infertur. Sed gravius est punitum in Iudaeis peccatum tentationis Dei quam peccatum idololatriae, quod tamen est praecipuum inter superstitiones, quia pro peccato idololatriae interfecti sunt ex eis tria millia hominum, ut legitur Exodi XXXII; pro peccato autem tentationis universaliter omnes in deserto perierunt, terram promissionis non intrantes, secundum illud Psalm., tentaverunt me patres vestri; et postea sequitur, quibus iuravi in ira mea si introibunt in requiem meam. Ergo tentare Deum est gravius peccatum quam superstitio. Praeterea, tanto aliquod peccatum videtur esse gravius quanto magis virtuti opponitur. Sed irreligiositas, cuius species est tentatio Dei, magis opponitur virtuti religionis quam superstitio, quae habet aliquam similitudinem cum ipsa. Ergo tentatio Dei est gravius peccatum quam superstitio. Praeterea, maius peccatum esse videtur irreverenter se habere ad parentes quam reverentiam parentibus debitam aliis exhibere. Sed Deus est honorandus a

Objection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God is a graver sin than superstition. The greater sin receives the greater punishment. Now the sin of tempting God was more severely punished in the Jews than was the sin of idolatry; and yet the latter is the chief form of superstition: since for the sin of idolatry three thousand men of their number were slain, as related in Ex. 32:28, whereas for the sin of temptation they all without exception perished in the desert, and entered not into the land of promise, according to Ps. 94:9, Your fathers tempted Me, and further on, so I swore in My wrath that they should not enter into My rest. Therefore to tempt God is a graver sin than superstition. Obj. 2: Further, the more a sin is opposed to virtue the graver it would seem to be. Now irreligion, of which the temptation of God is a species, is more opposed to the virtue of religion, than superstition which bears some likeness to religion. Therefore to tempt God is a graver sin than superstition. Obj. 3: Further, it seems to be a greater sin to behave disrespectfully to one’s parents, than to pay others the respect we owe to our parents. Now God should be honored

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IIa-IIae

Temptation of God

nobis sicut omnium pater, sicut dicitur Malach. I. Ergo maius peccatum esse videtur tentatio Dei, per quam irreverenter nos habemus ad Deum, quam idololatria, per quam reverentia Deo debita exhibetur creaturae. Sed contra est quod super illud Deut. XVII, cum reperti fuerint apud te etc., dicit Glossa, lex errorem et idololatriam maxime detestatur, maximum enim scelus est honorem creatoris impendere creaturae. Respondeo dicendum quod in peccatis quae religioni adversantur tanto aliquid gravius est quanto magis divinae reverentiae adversatur. Cui quidem minus adversatur quod aliquis de divina excellentia dubitet quam quod contrarium per certitudinem sentiat. Sicut enim magis est infidelis qui in errore confirmatus est quam qui de veritate fidei dubitat, ita etiam magis contra Dei reverentiam agit qui suo facto protestatur errorem contra divinam excellentiam quam qui protestatur dubitationem. Superstitiosus autem protestatur errorem, ut ex dictis patet. Ille autem qui tentat Deum verbis vel factis, protestatur dubitationem de divina excellentia, ut dictum est. Et ideo gravius est peccatum superstitionis quam peccatum tentationis Dei. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccatum idololatriae non fuit punitum illa poena quasi sufficienti, sed in posterum pro illo peccato gravior poena reservabatur, dicitur enim Exod. XXXII, ego autem in die ultionis visitabo hoc peccatum eorum. Ad secundum dicendum quod superstitio habet similitudinem cum religione quantum ad materialem actum, quem exhibet sicut religio. Sed quantum ad finem, plus contrariatur ei quam tentatio Dei, quia plus pertinet ad divinam irreverentiam, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod de ratione divinae excellentiae est quod sit singularis et incommunicabilis, et ideo idem est contra divinam reverentiam aliquid agere, et divinam reverentiam alteri communicare. Non est autem similis ratio de honore parentum qui potest sine culpa aliis communicari.

Q. 97, A. 4

by us as the Father of all (Mal 1:6). Therefore, temptation of God whereby we behave irreverently to God, seems to be a greater sin than idolatry, whereby we give to a creature the honor we owe to God. On the contrary, A gloss on Deut. 17:2, When there shall be found among you, etc. says: The Law detests error and idolatry above all: for it is a very great sin to give to a creature the honor that belongs to the Creator. I answer that, Among sins opposed to religion, the more grievous is that which is the more opposed to the reverence due to God. Now it is less opposed to this reverence that one should doubt the divine excellence than that one should hold the contrary for certain. For just as a man is more of an unbeliever if he be confirmed in his error, than if he doubt the truth of faith, so, too, a man acts more against the reverence due to God, if by his deeds he professes an error contrary to the divine excellence, than if he expresses a doubt. Now the superstitious man professes an error, as shown above (Q. 94, A. 1, ad 1), whereas he who tempts God by words or deeds expresses a doubt of the divine excellence, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore the sin of superstition is graver than the sin of tempting God. Reply Obj. 1: The sin of idolatry was not punished in the above manner, as though it were a sufficient punishment; because a more severe punishment was reserved in the future for that sin, for it is written (Exod 32:34): And I, in the day of revenge, will visit this sin also of theirs. Reply Obj. 2: Superstition bears a likeness to religion, as regards the material act which it pays just as religion does. But, as regards the end, it is more contrary to religion than the temptation of God, since it implies greater irreverence for God, as stated. Reply Obj. 3: It belongs essentially to the divine excellence that it is singular and incommunicable. Consequently to give divine reverence to another is the same as to do a thing opposed to the divine excellence. There is no comparison with the honor due to our parents, which can without sin be given to others.

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Question 98 Perjury Deinde considerandum est de periurio. Et circa hoc We must now consider perjury: under which head there quaeruntur quatuor. are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum falsitas requiratur ad periurium. (1) Whether falsehood is necessary for perjury? Secundo, utrum periurium semper sit peccatum. (2) Whether perjury is always a sin? Tertio, utrum semper sit peccatum mortale. (3) Whether it is always a mortal sin? Quarto, utrum peccet ille qui iniungit iuramentum (4) Whether it is a sin to enjoin an oath on a perjurer? periuro.

Article 1 Whether it is necessary for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath be false? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod falsitas eius quod iuramento confirmatur non requiratur ad periurium. Ut enim supra dictum est, sicut veritas debet concomitari iuramentum, ita etiam iudicium et iustitia. Sicut ergo incurritur periurium per defectum veritatis, ita etiam per defectum iudicii, puta cum aliquis indiscrete iurat; et per defectum iustitiae, puta cum aliquis iurat aliquid illicitum. Praeterea, illud per quod aliquid confirmatur potius esse videtur eo quod confirmatur per illud, sicut in syllogismo principia sunt potiora conclusione. Sed in iuramento confirmatur dictum hominis per assumptionem divini nominis. Ergo magis videtur esse periurium si aliquis iuret per falsos deos, quam si veritas desit dicto hominis quod iuramento confirmatur. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in sermone de verbis Apost. Iacobi, homines falsum iurant vel cum fallunt, vel cum falluntur. Et ponit tria exempla. Quorum primum est, fac illum iurare qui verum putat esse pro quo iurat. Secundum est, da alium, scit falsum esse, et iurat. Tertium est, fac alium, putat esse falsum, et iurat tanquam sit verum, quod forte verum est, de quo postea subdit quod periurus est. Ergo aliquis veritatem iurans potest esse periurus. Non ergo falsitas ad periurium requiritur.

Sed contra est quod periurium definitur esse mendacium iuramento firmatum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, morales actus ex fine speciem sortiuntur. Finis autem iuramenti est confirmatio dicti humani. Cui quidem confirmationi falsitas opponitur, per hoc enim confirmatur aliquod dictum, quod ostenditur firmiter esse verum;

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath be false. As stated above (Q. 89, A. 3), an oath should be accompanied by judgment and justice no less than by truth. Since therefore perjury is incurred through lack of truth, it is incurred likewise through lack of judgment, as when one swears indiscreetly, and through lack of justice, as when one swears to something unjust. Obj. 2: Further, that which confirms is more weighty than the thing confirmed thereby: thus in a syllogism the premises are more weighty than the conclusion. Now in an oath a man’s statement is confirmed by calling on the name of God. Therefore perjury seems to consist in swearing by false gods rather than in a lack of truth in the human statement which is confirmed on oath. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): Men swear falsely both in deceiving others and when they are deceived themselves; and he gives three examples. The first is: Supposing a man to swear, thinking that what he swears to is true, whereas it is false; the second is: Take the instance of another who knows the statement to be false, and swears to it as though it were true; and the third is: Take another, who thinks his statement false, and swears to its being true, while perhaps it is true, of whom he says afterwards that he is a perjurer. Therefore one may be a perjurer while swearing to the truth. Therefore falsehood is not necessary for perjury. On the contrary, Perjury is defined a falsehood confirmed by oath. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 92, A. 2), moral acts take their species from their end. Now the end of an oath is the confirmation of a human assertion. To this confirmation falsehood is opposed: since an assertion is confirmed by being firmly shown to be true; and this cannot

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Q. 98, A. 2

Justice

quod quidem non potest contingere de eo quod est falsum. Unde falsitas directe evacuat finem iuramenti. Et propter hoc a falsitate praecipue specificatur perversitas iuramenti, quae periurium dicitur. Et ideo falsitas est de ratione periurii. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Hieronymus dicit, Ierem. IV, quodcumque illorum trium defuerit, periurium est. Non tamen eodem ordine. Sed primo quidem et principaliter periurium est quando deest veritas, ratione iam dicta. Secundario autem, quando deest iustitia, quicumque enim iurat illicitum, ex hoc ipso falsitatem incurrit, quia obligatus est ad hoc quod contrarium faciat. Tertio vero, quando deest iudicium, quia cum indiscrete iurat, ex hoc ipso periculo se committit falsitatem incurrendi. Ad secundum dicendum quod principia in syllogismis sunt potiora tanquam habentia rationem activi principii, ut dicitur in II Physic. Sed in moralibus actibus principalior est finis quam principium activum. Et ideo, licet sit perversum iuramentum quando aliquis verum iurat per falsos deos, tamen ab illa perversitate iuramenti periurium nominatur quae tollit iuramenti finem, falsum iurando. Ad tertium dicendum quod actus morales procedunt a voluntate, cuius obiectum est bonum apprehensum. Et ideo si falsum apprehendatur ut verum, erit quidem, relatum ad voluntatem, materialiter falsum, formaliter autem verum. Si autem id quod est falsum accipiatur ut falsum, erit falsum et materialiter et formaliter. Si autem id quod est verum apprehendatur ut falsum, erit verum materialiter, falsum formaliter. Et ideo in quolibet istorum casuum salvatur aliquo modo ratio periurii, propter aliquem falsitatis modum. Sed quia in unoquoque potius est id quod est formale quam id quod est materiale, non ita est periurus ille qui falsum iurat quod putat esse verum, sicut ille qui verum iurat quod putat esse falsum. Dicit enim ibi Augustinus, interest quemadmodum verbum procedat ex animo, quia ream linguam non facit nisi rea mens.

IIa-IIae

happen to that which is false. Hence falsehood directly annuls the end of an oath: and for this reason, that perversity in swearing, which is called perjury, takes its species chiefly from falsehood. Consequently falsehood is essential to perjury. Reply Obj. 1: As Jerome says on Jer. 4:2, whichever of these three be lacking, there is perjury, but in different order. For first and chiefly perjury consists in a lack of truth, for the reason stated in the Article. Second, there is perjury when justice is lacking, for in whatever way a man swears to that which is unlawful, for this very reason he is guilty of falsehood, since he is under an obligation to do the contrary. Third, there is perjury when judgment is lacking, since by the very fact that a man swears indiscreetly, he incurs the danger of lapsing into falsehood. Reply Obj. 2: In syllogisms the premises are of greater weight, since they are in the position of active principle, as stated in Phys. ii, 3: whereas in moral matters the end is of greater importance than the active principle. Hence though it is a perverse oath when a man swears to the truth by false gods, yet perjury takes its name from that kind of perversity in an oath, that deprives the oath of its end, by swearing what is false. Reply Obj. 3: Moral acts proceed from the will, whose object is the apprehended good. Wherefore if the false be apprehended as true, it will be materially false, but formally true, as related to the will. If something false be apprehended as false, it will be false both materially and formally. If that which is true be apprehended as false, it will be materially true, and formally false. Hence in each of these cases the conditions required for perjury are to be found in some way, on account of some measure of falsehood. Since, however, that which is formal in anything is of greater importance than that which is material, he that swears to a falsehood thinking it true is not so much of a perjurer as he that swears to the truth thinking it false. For Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): It depends how the assertion proceeds from the mind, for the tongue is not guilty except the mind be guilty.

Article 2 Whether all perjury is sinful? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omne periurium sit peccatum. Quicumque enim non implet quod iuramento firmavit, periurus esse videtur. Sed quandoque aliquis iurat se facturum aliquid illicitum, puta adulterium vel homicidium, quod si faciat, peccat. Si ergo etiam non faciendo peccaret peccato periurii, sequeretur quod esset perplexus.

Objection 1: It would seem that not all perjury is sinful. Whoever does not fulfill what he has confirmed on oath is seemingly a perjurer. Yet sometimes a man swears he will do something unlawful (adultery, for instance, or murder): and if he does it, he commits a sin. If therefore he would commit a sin even if he did it not, it would follow that he is perplexed.

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IIa-IIae

Perjury

Praeterea, nullus peccat faciendo quod melius est. Sed quandoque aliquis periurando facit quod melius est, sicut cum aliquis iuravit se non intraturum religionem, vel quaecumque opera virtuosa non facturum. Ergo non omne periurium est peccatum. Praeterea, ille qui iurat facere alterius voluntatem, nisi eam faciat, videtur incurrere periurium. Sed quandoque potest contingere quod non peccat si eius non impleat voluntatem, puta cum praecipit ei aliquid nimis durum et importabile. Ergo videtur quod non omne periurium sit peccatum. Praeterea, iuramentum promissorium se extendit ad futura, sicut assertorium ad praeterita et praesentia. Sed potest contingere quod tollatur obligatio iuramenti per aliquid quod in futurum emergat, sicut cum aliqua civitas iurat se aliquid servaturam, et postea superveniunt novi cives qui illud non iuraverunt; vel cum aliquis canonicus iurat statuta alicuius Ecclesiae se servaturum, et postmodum aliqua fiunt de novo. Ergo videtur quod ille qui transgreditur iuramentum non peccet. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in sermone de verbis Apost. Iacobi, de periurio loquens, videtis quam ista detestanda sit belua, et de rebus humanis exterminanda. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, iurare est Deum testem invocare. Pertinet autem ad Dei irreverentiam quod aliquis eum testem invocet falsitatis, quia per hoc dat intelligere vel quod Deus veritatem non cognoscat, vel quod falsitatem testificari velit. Et ideo periurium manifeste est peccatum religioni contrarium, cuius est Deo reverentiam exhibere. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille qui iurat se facturum aliquod illicitum, iurando incurrit periurium propter defectum iustitiae. Sed si non impleat quod iuravit, in hoc periurium non incurrit, quia hoc non erat tale quid quod sub iuramento cadere posset. Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui iurat se non intraturum religionem, vel non daturum eleemosynam, vel aliquid huiusmodi, iurando periurium incurrit propter defectum iudicii. Et ideo quando facit id quod melius est, non est periurium, sed periurio contrarium, contrarium enim eius quod facit sub iuramento cadere non poterat. Ad tertium dicendum quod cum aliquis iurat vel promittit se facturum voluntatem alterius, intelligenda est debita conditio, si scilicet id quod ei mandatur sit licitum et honestum, et portabile sive moderatum. Ad quartum dicendum quod quia iuramentum est actio personalis, ille qui de novo fit civis alicuius civitatis, non obligatur quasi iuramento ad servanda illa quae civitas se servaturam iuravit. Tenetur tamen ex quadam fidelitate, ex qua obligatur ut sicut fit socius bonorum civitatis, ita etiam fiat particeps onerum.

Q. 98, A. 2

Obj. 2: Further, no man sins by doing what is best. Yet sometimes by committing a perjury one does what is best: as when a man swears not to enter religion, or not to do some kind of virtuous deed. Therefore not all perjury is sinful. Obj. 3: Further, he that swears to do another’s will would seem to be guilty of perjury unless he do it. Yet it may happen sometimes that he sins not, if he do not the man’s will: for instance, if the latter order him to do something too hard and unbearable. Therefore seemingly not all perjury is sinful. Obj. 4: Further, a promissory oath extends to future, just as a declaratory oath extends to past and present things. Now the obligation of an oath may be removed by some future occurrence: thus a state may swear to fulfill some obligation, and afterwards other citizens come on the scene who did not take the oath; or a canon may swear to keep the statutes of a certain church, and afterwards new statutes are made. Therefore seemingly he that breaks an oath does not sin. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. cxxx), in speaking of perjury: See how you should detest this horrible beast and exterminate it from all human business. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 89, A. 1), to swear is to call God as witness. Now it is an irreverence to God to call Him to witness to a falsehood, because by so doing one implies either that God ignores the truth or that He is willing to bear witness to a falsehood. Therefore perjury is manifestly a sin opposed to religion, to which it belongs to show reverence to God. Reply Obj. 1: He that swears to do what is unlawful is thereby guilty of perjury through lack of justice: though, if he fails to keep his oath, he is not guilty of perjury in this respect, since that which he swore to do was not a fit matter of an oath. Reply Obj. 2: A person who swears not to enter religion, or not to give an alms, or the like, is guilty of perjury through lack of judgment. Hence when he does that which is best it is not an act of perjury, but contrary thereto: for the contrary of that which he is doing could not be a matter of an oath. Reply Obj. 3: When one man swears or promises to do another’s will, there is to be understood this requisite condition—that the thing commanded be lawful and virtuous, and not unbearable or immoderate. Reply Obj. 4: An oath is a personal act, and so when a man becomes a citizen of a state, he is not bound, as by oath, to fulfill whatever the state has sworn to do. Yet he is bound by a kind of fidelity, the nature of which obligation is that he should take his share of the state’s burdens if he takes a share of its goods.

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Q. 98, A. 3

Justice

Canonicus vero qui iurat se servaturum statuta edita in aliquo collegio, non tenetur ex iuramento ad servandum futura, nisi intenderit se obligare ad omnia statuta praeterita et futura tenetur tamen ea servare ex ipsa vi statutorum, quae habent coactivam virtutem, ut ex supradictis patet.

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The canon who swears to keep the statutes that have force in some particular college is not bound by his oath to keep any that may be made in the future, unless he intends to bind himself to keep all, past and future. Nevertheless he is bound to keep them by virtue of the statutes themselves, since they are possessed of coercive force, as stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 4).

Article 3 Whether all perjury is a mortal sin? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omne periurium sit peccatum mortale. Dicitur enim extra, de iureiurando, in ea quaestione quae ponitur, an a sacramenti vinculo absolvantur qui illud inviti pro vita et rebus servandis fecerunt, nihil aliud arbitramur quam quod antecessores nostri Romani pontifices arbitrati fuisse noscuntur, qui tales a iuramenti nexibus absolverunt. Ceterum ut agatur consultius, et auferatur materia deierandi, non eis ita expresse dicatur ut iuramenta non servent, sed si non ea attenderint, non ob hoc sunt tanquam pro mortali crimine puniendi. Non ergo omne periurium est peccatum mortale. Praeterea, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, maius est iurare per Deum quam per Evangelium. Sed non semper mortaliter peccat ille qui per Deum iurat aliquod falsum, puta si ex ioco, vel ex lapsu linguae, aliquis tali iuramento in communi sermone utatur. Ergo nec etiam si aliquis frangat iuramentum quod solemniter per Evangelium iurat, semper erit peccatum mortale. Praeterea, secundum iura propter periurium aliquis incurrit infamiam, ut habetur VI, qu. I, cap. infames. Non autem videtur quod propter quodlibet periurium aliquis infamiam incurrat, sicut dicitur de assertorio iuramento violato per periurium. Ergo videtur quod non omne periurium sit peccatum mortale. Sed contra, omne peccatum quod contrariatur praecepto divino est peccatum mortale. Sed periurium contrariatur praecepto divino, dicitur enim Levit. XIX, non periurabis in nomine meo. Ergo est peccatum mortale. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum doctrinam philosophi, propter quod unumquodque, illud magis. Videmus autem quod ea quae, si de se sint peccata venialia, vel etiam bona ex genere, si in contemptum Dei fiant, sunt peccata mortalia. Unde multo magis quidquid est quod de sui ratione pertinet ad contemptum Dei, est peccatum mortale. Periurium autem de sui ratione importat contemptum Dei, ex hoc enim habet rationem culpae, ut dictum est, quia ad irreverentiam Dei pertinet.

Objection 1: It would seem that not all perjury is a mortal sin. It is laid down (Extra, De Jurejur., cap. Verum): Referring to the question whether an oath is binding on those who have taken one in order to safeguard their life and possessions, we have no other mind than that which our predecessors the Roman Pontiffs are known to have had, and who absolved such persons from the obligations of their oath. Henceforth, that discretion may be observed, and in order to avoid occasions of perjury, let them not be told expressly not to keep their oath: but if they should not keep it, they are not for this reason to be punished as for a mortal sin. Therefore not all perjury is a mortal sin. Obj. 2. Further, as Chrysostom says, it is a greater thing to swear by God than by the Gospels. Now it is not always a mortal sin to swear by God to something false; for instance, if we were to employ such an oath in fun or by a slip of the tongue in the course of an ordinary conversation. Therefore neither is it always a mortal sin to break an oath that has been taken solemnly on the Gospels. Obj. 3: Further, according to the Law a man incurs infamy through committing perjury (VI, qu. i, cap. Infames). Now it would seem that infamy is not incurred through any kind of perjury, as it is prescribed in the case of a declaratory oath violated by perjury. Therefore, seemingly, not all perjury is a mortal sin. On the contrary, Every sin that is contrary to a divine precept is a mortal sin. Now perjury is contrary to a divine precept, for it is written (Lev 19:12): Thou shalt not swear falsely by My name. Therefore it is a mortal sin. I answer that, According to the teaching of the Philosopher (Poster. i, 2), that which causes a thing to be such is yet more so. Now we know that an action which is, by reason of its very nature, a venial sin, or even a good action, is a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt of God. Wherefore any action that of its nature, implies contempt of God is a mortal sin. Now perjury, of its very nature implies contempt of God, since, as stated above (A. 2), the reason why it is sinful is because it is an act of irreverence towards God.

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Unde manifestum est quod periurium ex suo genere est peccatum mortale. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, coactio non aufert iuramento promissorio vim obligandi respectu eius quod licite fieri potest. Et ideo si aliquis non impleat quod coactus iuravit, nihilominus periurium incurrit et mortaliter peccat. Potest tamen per auctoritatem summi pontificis ab obligatione iuramenti absolvi, praesertim si coactus fuerit tali metu qui cadere posset in constantem virum. Quod autem dicitur quod non sunt tales puniendi tanquam pro mortali crimine, non hoc ideo dicitur quia non peccent mortaliter, sed quia poena eis minor infligitur. Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui iocose periurat, non evitat divinam irreverentiam, sed quantum ad aliquid magis auget. Et ideo non excusatur a peccato mortali. Ille autem qui ex lapsu linguae falsum iurat, si quidem advertat se iurare et falsum esse quod iurat, non excusatur a peccato mortali, sicut nec a Dei contemptu. Si autem hoc non advertat, non videtur habere intentionem iurandi, et ideo a crimine periurii excusatur. Est autem gravius peccatum si quis solemniter iuret per Evangelium quam si per Deum in communi sermone iuret, tum propter scandalum; tum propter maiorem deliberationem. Quibus aequaliter hinc inde positis, gravius est si quis per Deum iurans periuret quam si periuret iurans per Evangelium. Ad tertium dicendum quod non propter quodlibet peccatum mortale aliquis infamis efficitur ipso iure. Unde non sequitur, si ille qui iurat falsum iuramento assertorio non est infamis ipso iure, sed solum per sententiam definitivam latam contra eum in causa accusationis, quod propter hoc non peccet mortaliter. Ideo autem magis reputatur infamis ipso iure qui frangit iuramentum promissorium solemniter factum, quia in eius potestate remanet, postquam iuravit, ut det suo iuramento veritatem, quod non contingit in iuramento assertorio.

Q. 98, A. 4

Therefore it is manifest that perjury, of its very nature, is a mortal sin. Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 89, A. 7, ad 3), coercion does not deprive a promissory oath of its binding force, as regards that which can be done lawfully. Wherefore he who fails to fulfill an oath which he took under coercion is guilty of perjury and sins mortally. Nevertheless the Sovereign Pontiff can, by his authority, absolve a man from an obligation even of an oath, especially if the latter should have been coerced into taking the oath through such fear as may overcome a high-principled man. When, however, it is said that these persons are not to be punished as for a mortal sin, this does not mean that they are not guilty of mortal sin, but that a lesser punishment is to be inflicted on them. Reply Obj. 2: He that swears falsely in fun is nonetheless irreverent to God, indeed, in a way, he is more so, and consequently is not excused from mortal sin. He that swears falsely by a slip of tongue, if he adverts to the fact that he is swearing, and that he is swearing to something false, is not excused from mortal sin, as neither is he excused from contempt of God. If, however, he does not advert to this, he would seem to have no intention of swearing, and consequently is excused from the sin of perjury. It is, however, a more grievous sin to swear solemnly by the Gospels, than to swear by God in ordinary conversation, both on account of scandal and on account of the greater deliberation. But if we consider them equally in comparison with one another, it is more grievous to commit perjury in swearing by God than in swearing by the Gospels. Reply Obj. 3: Not every sin makes a man infamous in the eye of the law. Wherefore, if a man who has sworn falsely in a declaratory oath be not infamous in the eye of the law, but only when he has been so declared by sentence in a court of law, it does not follow that he has not sinned mortally. The reason why the law attaches infamy rather to one who breaks a promissory oath taken solemnly is that he still has it in his power after he has sworn to substantiate his oath, which is not the case in a declaratory oath.

Article 4 Whether he sins who demands an oath of a perjurer? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccet ille qui iniungit iuramentum ei qui periurat. Aut enim scit eum verum iurare, aut falsum. Si scit eum verum iurare, pro nihilo ei iuramentum iniungit si autem credit eum falsum iurare, quantum est de se, inducit eum

Objection 1: It would seem that he who demands an oath of a perjurer commits a sin. Either he knows that he swears truly, or he knows that he swears falsely. If he knows him to swear truly, it is useless for him to demand an oath: and if he believes him to swear falsely, for his own part he

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ad peccandum. Ergo videtur quod nullo modo debeat aliquis alicui iniungere iuramentum. Praeterea, iuramentum minus est accipere ab aliquo quam iuramentum iniungere alicui. Sed recipere iuramentum ab aliquo non videtur esse licitum, et praecipue si periuret, quia in hoc videtur consentire peccato. Ergo videtur quod multo minus liceat exigere iuramentum ab eo qui periurat. Praeterea, dicitur Levit. V, si peccaverit anima, et audierit vocem iurantis falsum, testisque fuerit quod aut ipse vidit aut conscius est, nisi indicaverit, portabit iniquitatem suam, ex quo videtur quod aliquis sciens aliquem iurare falsum, teneatur eum accusare. Non igitur licet ab eo exigere iuramentum. Sed contra, sicut peccat ille qui falsum iurat, ita ille qui per falsos deos iurat. Sed licet uti iuramento eius qui per falsos deos iurat, ut Augustinus dicit, ad Publicolam. Ergo licet iuramentum exigere ab eo qui falsum iurat. Respondeo dicendum quod circa eum qui exigit ab alio iuramentum, distinguendum videtur. Aut enim exigit iuramentum pro seipso propria sponte, aut exigit iuramentum pro alio ex necessitate officii sibi commissi. Et si quidem aliquis pro seipso exigit iuramentum tanquam persona privata, distinguendum videtur, ut Augustinus dicit, in sermone de periuriis. Si enim nescit eum iuraturum falsum, et ideo dicit, iura mihi, ut fides ei sit, non est peccatum, tamen est humana tentatio, quia scilicet procedit ex quadam infirmitate, qua homo dubitat alium esse verum dicturum. Et hoc est illud malum de quo dominus dicit, Matth. V, quod amplius est, a malo est. Si autem scit eum fecisse, scilicet contrarium eius quod iurat, et cogit eum iurare, homicida est. Ille enim de suo periurio se interimit, sed iste manum interficientis impressit.

Si autem aliquis exigat iuramentum tanquam persona publica, secundum quod exigit ordo iuris, ad petitionem alterius, non videtur esse in culpa si ipse iuramentum exigat, sive sciat eum falsum iurare sive verum, quia non videtur ille exigere, sed ille ad cuius instantiam exigit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit quando pro aliquis exigit iuramentum. Et tamen non semper scit eum iurare verum, vel falsum, sed quandoque dubitat de facto, et credit eum verum iuraturum, et tunc ad maiorem certitudinem exigit iuramentum. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, ad Publicolam, quamvis dictum sit ne iuremus, nunquam me in Scripturis sanctis legisse memini ne ab aliquo iurationem accipiamus. Unde ille qui iurationem

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leads him into sin. Therefore nowise seemingly should one enjoin an oath on another person. Obj. 2: Further, to receive an oath from a person is less than to impose an oath on him. Now it would seem unlawful to receive an oath from a person, especially if he swear falsely, because he would then seem to consent in his sin. Much less therefore would it seem lawful to impose an oath on one who swears falsely. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Lev 5:1): If anyone sin, and hear the voice of one swearing falsely, and is a witness either because he himself hath seen, or is privy to it: if he do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity. Hence it would seem that when a man knows another to be swearing falsely, he is bound to denounce him. Therefore it is not lawful to demand an oath of such a man. Obj. 4: On the other hand, Just as it is a sin to swear falsely so is it to swear by false gods. Yet it is lawful to take advantage of an oath of one who has sworn by false gods, as Augustine says (ad Public. Ep. xlvii). Therefore it is lawful to demand an oath from one who swears falsely. I answer that, As regards a person who demands an oath from another, a distinction would seem to be necessary. For either he demands the oath on his own account and of his own accord, or he demands it on account of the exigencies of a duty imposed on him. If a man demands an oath on his own account as a private individual, we must make a distinction, as does Augustine (de Perjuriis. serm. clxxx): For if he knows not that the man will swear falsely, and says to him accordingly: ‘Swear to me’ in order that he may be credited, there is no sin: yet it is a human temptation (because, to wit, it proceeds from his weakness in doubting whether the man will speak the truth). This is the evil whereof Our Lord says (Matt 5:37): That which is over and above these, is of evil. But if he knows the man to have done so, i.e., the contrary of what he swears to, and yet forces him to swear, he is a murderer: for the other destroys himself by his perjury, but it is he who urged the hand of the slayer. If, on the other hand, a man demands an oath as a public person, in accordance with the requirements of the law, on the requisition of a third person: he does not seem to be at fault, if he demands an oath of a person, whether he knows that he will swear falsely or truly, because seemingly it is not he that exacts the oath but the person at whose instance he demands it. Reply Obj. 1: This argument avails in the case of one who demands an oath on his own account. Yet he does not always know that the other will swear truly or falsely, for at times he has doubts about the fact, and believes he will swear truly. In such a case he exacts an oath in order that he may be more certain. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (ad Public. serm. xlvii), though we are forbidden to swear, I do not remember ever to have read in the Holy Scriptures that we must not accept oaths from others. Hence he that accepts an oath does

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recipit non peccat, nisi forte quando propria sponte ad iurandum cogit eum quem scit falsum iuraturum. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, Moyses non expressit in praedicta auctoritate cui sit indicandum periurium alterius. Et ideo intelligitur quod debeat indicari talibus qui magis possunt prodesse quam obesse periuro. Similiter etiam non expressit quo ordine debeat manifestare. Et ideo videtur servandus ordo evangelicus, si sit peccatum periurii occultum, et praecipue quando non vergit in detrimentum alterius, quia in tali casu non haberet locum ordo evangelicus, ut supra dictum est. Ad quartum dicendum quod licet uti malo propter bonum, sicut et Deus utitur, non tamen licet aliquem ad malum inducere. Unde licet eius qui paratus est per falsos deos iurare, iuramentum recipere, non tamen licet eum inducere ad hoc quod per falsos deos iuret. Alia tamen ratio esse videtur in eo qui per verum Deum falsum iurat. Quia in tali iuramento deest bonum fidei, qua utitur aliquis in iuramento illius qui verum per falsos deos iurat, ut Augustinus dicit, ad Publicolam. Unde in iuramento eius qui falsum per verum Deum iurat, non videtur esse aliquod bonum quo uti liceat.

Q. 98, A. 4

not sin, except perchance when of his own accord he forces another to swear, knowing that he will swear falsely. Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (QQ. Super Lev, qu. i), Moses in the passage quoted did not state to whom one man had to denounce another’s perjury: wherefore it must be understood that the matter had to be denounced to those who would do the perjurer good rather than harm. Again, neither did he state in what order the denunciation was to be made: wherefore seemingly the Gospel order should be followed, if the sin of perjury should be hidden, especially when it does not tend to another person’s injury: because if it did, the Gospel order would not apply to the case, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 7; Q. 68, A. 1). Reply Obj. 4: It is lawful to make use of an evil for the sake of good, as God does, but it is not lawful to lead anyone to do evil. Consequently it is lawful to accept the oath of one who is ready to swear by false gods, but it is not lawful to induce him to swear by false gods. Yet it seems to be different in the case of one who swears falsely by the true God, because an oath of this kind lacks the good of faith, which a man makes use of in the oath of one who swears truly by false gods, as Augustine says (ad Public. Ep. xlvii). Hence when a man swears falsely by the true God his oath seems to lack any good that one may use lawfully.

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Question 99 Sacrilege Deinde considerandum est de vitiis ad irreligiositaWe must now consider the vices which pertain to irretem pertinentibus quibus rebus sacris irreverentia exhi- ligion, whereby sacred things are treated with irreverence. betur. Et primo, de sacrilegio; secundo, de simonia. We shall consider (1) Sacrilege; (2) Simony. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, quid sit sacrilegium. (1) What is sacrilege? Secundo, utrum sit speciale peccatum. (2) Whether it is a special sin? Tertio, de speciebus sacrilegii. (3) Of the species of sacrilege; Quarto, de poena sacrilegii. (4) Of the punishment of sacrilege.

Article 1 Whether sacrilege is the violation of a sacred thing? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacrilegium non sit sacrae rei violatio. Dicitur enim XVII, qu. IV, committunt sacrilegium qui de principis iudicio disputant, dubitantes an is dignus sit honore quem princeps elegerit. Sed hoc ad nullam rem sacram pertinere videtur. Ergo sacrilegium non importat sacrae rei violationem. Praeterea, ibidem subditur quod si quis permiserit Iudaeos officia publica exercere, velut in sacrilegum excommunicatio proferatur. Sed officia publica non videntur ad aliquod sacrum pertinere. Ergo videtur quod sacrilegium non importet violationem alicuius sacri. Praeterea, maior est virtus Dei quam virtus hominis. Sed res sacrae a Deo sanctitatem obtinent. Non ergo possunt per hominem violari. Et ita sacrilegium non videtur esse sacrae rei violatio. Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., quod sacrilegus dicitur ab eo quod sacra legit, idest furatur. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, sacrum dicitur aliquid ex eo quod ad divinum cultum ordinatur. Sicut autem ex eo quod aliquid ordinatur in finem bonum, sortitur rationem boni; ita etiam ex hoc quod aliquid deputatur ad cultum Dei, efficitur quoddam divinum, et sic ei quaedam reverentia debetur quae refertur in Deum. Et ideo omne illud quod ad irreverentiam rerum sacrarum pertinet, ad iniuriam Dei pertinet, et habet sacrilegii rationem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in I Ethic., bonum commune gentis est quoddam divinum. Et ideo antiquitus rectores reipublicae divini vocabantur, quasi divinae providentiae ministri, secundum illud Sap. VI, cum essetis ministri regni il-

Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege is not the violation of a sacred thing. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv ): They are guilty of sacrilege who disagree about the sovereign’s decision, and doubt whether the person chosen by the sovereign be worthy of honor. Now this seems to have no connection with anything sacred. Therefore sacrilege does not denote the violation of something sacred. Obj. 2: Further, it is stated further on that if any man shall allow the Jews to hold public offices, he must be excommunicated as being guilty of sacrilege. Yet public offices have nothing to do with anything sacred. Therefore it seems that sacrilege does not denote the violation of a sacred thing. Obj. 3: Further, God’s power is greater than man’s. Now sacred things receive their sacred character from God. Therefore they cannot be violated by man: and so a sacrilege would not seem to be the violation of a sacred thing. On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man is said to be sacrilegious because he selects, i.e., steals, sacred things. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 81, A. 5; I-II, Q. 101, A. 4), a thing is called sacred through being deputed to the divine worship. Now just as a thing acquires an aspect of good through being deputed to a good end, so does a thing assume a divine character through being deputed to the divine worship, and thus a certain reverence is due to it, which reverence is referred to God. Therefore whatever pertains to irreverence for sacred things is an injury to God, and comes under the head of sacrilege. Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2) the common good of the nation is a divine thing, wherefore in olden times the rulers of a commonwealth were called divines, as being the ministers of divine providence, according to Wis. 6:5, Being ministers of His kingdom, you have not

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lius, non recte iudicastis. Et sic, per quandam nominis extensionem, illud quod pertinet ad reverentiam principis, scilicet disputare de eius iudicio, an oporteat ipsum sequi, secundum quandam similitudinem sacrilegium dicitur. Ad secundum dicendum quod populus Christianus per fidem et sacramenta Christi sanctificatus est, secundum illud I ad Cor. VI, sed abluti estis, sed sanctificati estis. Et ideo I Pet. II dicitur, vos estis genus electum, regale sacerdotium, gens sancta, populus acquisitionis. Et ita id quod fit in iniuriam populi Christiani, scilicet quod infideles ei praeficiantur, pertinet ad irreverentiam sacrae rei. Unde rationabiliter sacrilegium dicitur. Ad tertium dicendum quod violatio hic large dicitur quaecumque irreverentia vel exhonoratio. Sicut autem honor est in honorante, non autem in eo qui honoratur, ut dicitur in I Ethic.; ita etiam irreverentia est in eo qui irreverenter se habet, quamvis etiam nihil noceat ei cui irreverentiam exhibet. Quantum ergo est in ipso, rem sacram violat, licet illa non violetur.

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judged rightly. Hence by an extension of the term, whatever savors of irreverence for the sovereign, such as disputing his judgment, and questioning whether one ought to follow it, is called sacrilege by a kind of likeness. Reply Obj. 2: Christians are sanctified by faith and the sacraments of Christ, according to 1 Cor. 6:11, But you are washed, but you are sanctified. Wherefore it is written (1 Pet 2:9): You are a chosen generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people. Therefore any injury inflicted on the Christian people, for instance that unbelievers should be put in authority over it, is an irreverence for a sacred thing, and is reasonably called a sacrilege. Reply Obj. 3: Violation here means any kind of irreverence or dishonor. Now as honor is in the person who honors and not in the one who is honored (Ethic. i, 5), so again irreverence is in the person who behaves irreverently even though he do no harm to the object of his irreverence. Hence, so far he is concerned, he violates the sacred thing, though the latter be not violated in itself.

Article 2 Whether sacrilege is a special sin? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacrilegium non sit speciale peccatum. Dicitur enim XVII, qu. IV, committunt sacrilegium qui in divinae legis sanctitatem aut nesciendo committunt, aut negligendo violant et offendunt. Sed hoc fit per omne peccatum, nam peccatum est dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem Dei, ut Augustinus dicit, XXII contra Faustum. Ergo sacrilegium est generale peccatum. Praeterea, nullum speciale peccatum continetur sub diversis generibus peccatorum. Sed sacrilegium sub diversis generibus peccatorum continetur, puta sub homicidio, si quis sacerdotem occidat; sub luxuria, si quis virginem sacratam violet, vel quamcumque mulierem in loco sacro; sub furto, si quis rem sacram furatus fuerit. Ergo sacrilegium non est speciale peccatum. Praeterea, omne speciale peccatum invenitur distinctum ab aliis peccatis, ut de iniustitia speciali philosophus dicit, in V Ethic. Sed sacrilegium non videtur inveniri absque aliis peccatis, sed quandoque coniungitur furto, quandoque homicidio, ut dictum est. Non ergo est speciale peccatum. Sed contra est quod opponitur speciali virtuti, scilicet religioni, ad quam pertinet revereri Deum et divina. Ergo sacrilegium est speciale peccatum.

Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege is not a special sin. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv) They are guilty of sacrilege who through ignorance sin against the sanctity of the law, violate and defile it by their negligence. But this is done in every sin, because sin is a word, deed or desire contrary to the law of God, according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxi, 27). Therefore sacrilege is a general sin. Obj. 2: Further, no special sin is comprised under different kinds of sin. Now sacrilege is comprised under different kinds of sin, for instance under murder, if one kill a priest under lust, as the violation of a consecrate virgin, or of any woman in a sacred place under theft, if one steal a sacred thing. Therefore sacrilege is not a special sin.

Obj. 3: Further, every special sin is to found apart from other sins as the Philosopher states, in speaking of special justice (Ethic. v, 11). But, seemingly, sacrilege is not to be found apart from other sins; for it is sometimes united to theft, sometimes to murder, as stated in the preceding objection. Therefore it is not a special sin. On the contrary, That which is opposed to a special virtue is a special sin. But sacrilege is opposed to a special virtue, namely religion, to which it belongs to reverence God and divine things. Therefore sacrilege is a special sin. Respondeo dicendum quod ubicumque invenitur I answer that, Wherever we find a special aspect of specialis ratio deformitatis, ibi necesse est quod sit spe- deformity, there must needs be a special sin; because the

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ciale peccatum, quia species cuiuslibet rei praecipue attenditur secundum formalem rationem ipsius, non autem secundum materiam vel subiectum. In sacrilegio autem invenitur specialis ratio deformitatis, quia scilicet violatur res sacra per aliquam irreverentiam. Et ideo est speciale peccatum. Et opponitur religioni. Sicut enim Damascenus dicit, in IV Lib., purpura, regale indumentum facta, honoratur et glorificatur, et si quis hanc perforaverit, morte damnatur, quasi contra regem agens. Ita etiam si quis rem sacram violat, ex hoc ipso contra Dei reverentiam agit, et sic per irreligiositatem peccat.

Q. 99, A. 3

species of a thing is derived chiefly from its formal aspect, and not from its matter or subject. Now in sacrilege we find a special aspect of deformity, namely, the violation of a sacred thing by treating it irreverently. Hence it is a special sin.

Moreover, it is opposed to religion. For according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 3), When the purple has been made into a royal robe, we pay it honor and homage, and if anyone dishonor it he is condemned to death, as acting against the king: and in the same way if a man violate a sacred thing, by so doing his behavior is contrary to the reverence due to God and consequently he is guilty of irreligion. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illi dicuntur in diReply Obj. 1: Those are said to sin against the sancvinae legis sanctitatem committere qui legem Dei impu- tity of the divine law who assail God’s law, as heretics and gnant, sicut haeretici et blasphemi. Qui ex hoc quod Deo blasphemers do. These are guilty of unbelief, through not non credunt, incurrunt infidelitatis peccatum, ex hoc ve- believing in God; and of sacrilege, through perverting the ro quod divinae legis verba pervertunt, sacrilegium in- words of the divine law.

currunt. Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet unam specialem rationem peccati in pluribus peccatorum generibus inveniri, secundum quod diversa peccata ad finem unius peccati ordinantur, prout etiam in virtutibus apparet quibus imperatur ab una virtute. Et hoc modo quocumque genere peccati aliquis faciat contra reverentiam debitam sacris rebus, sacrilegium formaliter committit, licet materialiter sint ibi diversa genera peccatorum. Ad tertium dicendum quod sacrilegium interdum invenitur separatum ab aliis peccatis, eo quod actus non habet aliam deformitatem nisi quia res sacra violatur, puta si aliquis iudex rapiat aliquem de loco sacro, quem in aliis locis licite capere posset.

Reply Obj. 2: Nothing prevents one specific kind of sin being found in various generic kinds of sin, inasmuch as various sins are directed to the end of one sin, just as happens in the case of virtues commanded by one virtue. In this way, by whatever kind of sin a man acts counter to reverence due to sacred things, he commits a sacrilege formally; although his act contains various kinds of sin materially.

Reply Obj. 3: Sacrilege is sometimes found apart from other sins, through its act having no other deformity than the violation of a sacred thing: for instance, if a judge were to take a person from a sacred place, for he might lawfully have taken him from elsewhere.

Article 3 Whether the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred things? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod species sacrilegii non distinguantur secundum res sacras. Materialis enim diversitas non diversificat speciem, si sit eadem ratio formalis. Sed in violatione quarumcumque rerum sacrarum videtur esse eadem ratio formalis peccati, et quod non sit diversitas nisi materialis. Ergo per hoc non diversificantur sacrilegii species. Praeterea, non videtur esse possibile quod aliqua sint eiusdem speciei, et tamen specie differant. Sed homicidium et furtum et illicitus concubitus sunt diversae species peccatorum. Ergo non possunt convenire in una specie sacrilegii. Et ita videtur quod sacrilegii species di-

Objection 1: It would seem that the species of sacrilege are not distinguished according to the sacred things. Material diversity does not differentiate species, if the formal aspect remains the same. Now there would seem to be the same formal aspect of sin in all violations of sacred things, and that the only difference is one of matter. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not distinguished thereby. Obj. 2: Further, it does not seem possible that things belonging to the same species should at the same time differ specifically. Now murder, theft, and unlawful intercourse, are different species of sin. Therefore they cannot belong to the one same species of sacrilege: and consequently it seems

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stinguantur secundum diversas species aliorum pecca- that the species of sacrilege are distinguished in accordance torum, et non secundum diversitatem rerum sacrarum. with the species of other sins, and not according to the various sacred things. Praeterea, inter res sacras connumerantur etiam Obj. 3: Further, among sacred things sacred persons are personae sacrae. Si ergo una species sacrilegii esset qua reckoned. If, therefore, one species of sacrilege arises from violatur persona sacra, sequeretur quod omne peccatum the violation of a sacred person, it would follow that every quod persona sacra committit esset sacrilegium, quia sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege, since every per quodlibet peccatum violatur persona peccantis. Non sin violates the person of the sinner. Therefore the species of ergo species sacrilegii accipiuntur secundum res sacras. sacrilege are not reckoned according to the sacred things. Sed contra est quod actus et habitus distinguuntur On the contrary, Acts and habits are distinguished secundum obiecta. Sed res sacra est obiectum sacrilegii. by their objects. Now the sacred thing is the object of sacUt dictum est. Ergo species sacrilegii distinguuntur se- rilege, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the species of sacricundum differentiam rerum sacrarum. lege are distinguished according to the sacred things. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, pecI answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the sin of saccatum sacrilegii in hoc consistit quod aliquis irreveren- rilege consists in the irreverent treatment of a sacred thing. ter se habet ad rem sacram. Debetur autem reverentia Now reverence is due to a sacred thing by reason of its holirei sacrae ratione sanctitatis. Et ideo secundum diversam ness: and consequently the species of sacrilege must needs rationem sanctitatis rerum sacrarum quibus irreverentia be distinguished according to the different aspects of sancexhibetur, necesse est quod sacrilegii species distinguan- tity in the sacred things which are treated irreverently: for tur, et tanto sacrilegium est gravius quanto res sacra in the greater the holiness ascribed to the sacred thing that is quam peccatur maiorem obtinet sanctitatem. sinned against, the more grievous the sacrilege. Attribuitur autem sanctitas et personis sacris, idest Now holiness is ascribed, not only to sacred persons, divino cultui dedicatis, et locis sacris, et rebus quibus- namely, those who are consecrated to the divine worship, dam aliis sacris. Sanctitas autem loci ordinatur ad sanc- but also to sacred places and to certain other sacred things. titatem hominis, qui in loco sacro cultum exhibet Deo, And the holiness of a place is directed to the holiness of dicitur enim II Machab. V, non propter locum gentem, man, who worships God in a holy place. For it is written sed propter gentem dominus locum elegit. Et ideo gravius (2 Macc 5:19): God did not choose the people for the place’s peccatum est sacrilegium quo peccatur contra personam sake, but the place for the people’s sake. Hence sacrilege comsacram quam quo peccatur contra locum sacrum. Sunt mitted against a sacred person is a graver sin than that tamen in utraque sacrilegii specie diversi gradus, secun- which is committed against a sacred place. Yet in either spedum differentiam personarum et locorum sacrorum. cies there are various degrees of sacrilege, according to differences of sacred persons and places. Similiter etiam et tertia species sacrilegii, quae circa In like manner the third species of sacrilege, which is alias res sacras committitur, diversos habet gradus, se- committed against other sacred things, has various degrees, cundum differentiam sacrarum rerum. Inter quas sum- according to the differences of sacred things. Among these mum locum obtinent ipsa sacramenta, quibus homo the highest place belongs to the sacraments whereby man is sanctificatur, quorum praecipuum est Eucharistiae sa- sanctified: chief of which is the sacrament of the Eucharist, cramentum, quod continet ipsum Christum. Et ideo sa- for it contains Christ Himself. Wherefore the sacrilege that crilegium quod contra hoc sacramentum committitur is committed against this sacrament is the gravest of all. gravissimum est inter omnia. Post sacramenta autem, The second place, after the sacraments, belongs to the vessecundum locum tenent vasa consecrata ad sacramen- sels consecrated for the administration of the sacraments; torum susceptionem; et ipsae imagines sacrae, et sanc- also sacred images, and the relics of the saints, wherein the torum reliquiae, in quibus quodammodo ipsae personae very persons of the saints, so to speak, are reverenced and sanctorum venerantur vel dehonorantur. Deinde ea quae honored. After these come things connected with the appertinent ad ornatum Ecclesiae et ministrorum. Deinde parel of the Church and its ministers; and those things, ea quae sunt deputata ad sustentationem ministrorum, whether movable or immovable, that are deputed to the upsive sint mobilia sive immobilia. Quicumque autem con- keep of the ministers. And whoever sins against any one of tra quodcumque praedictorum peccat, crimen sacrilegii the aforesaid incurs the crime of sacrilege. incurrit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non est in omniReply Obj. 1: There is not the same aspect of holiness bus praedictis eadem ratio sanctitatis. Et ideo differentia in all the aforesaid: wherefore the diversity of sacred things sacrarum rerum non solum est differentia materialis, sed is not only a material, but also a formal difference. formalis.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliqua duo secundum aliquid esse unius speciei, et secundum aliud diversarum, sicut Socrates et Plato conveniunt in specie animalis, differunt autem in specie colorati, si unus sit albus et alius niger. Et similiter etiam possibile est aliqua duo peccata differre specie secundum materiales actus, convenire autem in specie secundum unam rationem formalem sacrilegii, puta si quis sanctimonialem violaverit verberando, vel concumbendo. Ad tertium dicendum quod omne peccatum quod sacra persona committit, materialiter quidem et quasi per accidens est sacrilegium, unde Hieronymus dicit quod nugae in ore sacerdotis sacrilegium sunt vel blasphemia. Formaliter autem et proprie illud solum peccatum sacrae personae sacrilegium est quod agitur directe contra eius sanctitatem, puta si virgo Deo dicata fornicetur; et eadem ratio est in aliis.

Q. 99, A. 4

Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders two things from belonging to one species in one respect, and to different species in another respect. Thus Socrates and Plato belong to the one species, animal, but differ in the species colored thing, if one be white and the other black. In like manner it is possible for two sins to differ specifically as to their material acts, and to belong to the same species as regards the one formal aspect of sacrilege: for instance, the violation of a nun by blows or by copulation. Reply Obj. 3: Every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege materially and accidentally as it were. Hence Jerome says that a trifle on a priest’s lips is a sacrilege or a blasphemy. But formally and properly speaking a sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege only when it is committed against his holiness, for instance if a virgin consecrated to God be guilty of fornication: and the same is to be said of other instances.

Article 4 Whether the punishment of sacrilege should be pecuniary? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod poena sacrilegii non debeat esse pecuniaria. Poena enim pecuniaria non solet imponi pro culpa criminali. Sed sacrilegium est culpa criminalis, unde capitali sententia punitur secundum leges civiles. Ergo sacrilegium non debet puniri poena pecuniaria. Praeterea, idem peccatum non debet duplici poena puniri, secundum illud Nahum I, non consurget duplex tribulatio. Sed poena sacrilegii est excommunicatio, maior quidem si violentia inferatur in personam sacram, vel si aliquis incendat vel frangat Ecclesiam; minor autem in aliis sacrilegiis. Ergo non debet sacrilegium puniri poena pecuniaria. Praeterea, apostolus dicit, I ad Thess. II, non fuimus aliquando in occasione avaritiae. Sed hoc videtur ad occasionem avaritiae pertinere quod poena pecuniaria exigatur pro violatione rei sacrae. Ergo non videtur talis poena esse conveniens sacrilegii. Sed contra est quod dicitur XVII, qu. IV, si quis contumax vel superbus fugitivum servum de atrio Ecclesiae per vim abstraxerit, nongentos solidos componat. Et ibidem postea dicitur, quisquis inventus fuerit reus sacrilegii, triginta libras argenti examinati purissimi componat. Respondeo dicendum quod in poenis infligendis duo sunt consideranda. Primo quidem, aequalitas, ad hoc quod poena sit iusta, ut scilicet in quo quis peccat, per hoc torqueatur, ut dicitur Sap. XI. Et hoc modo conveniens poena sacrilegi, qui sacris iniuriam infert est ex-

Objection 1: It would seem that the punishment of sacrilege should not be pecuniary. A pecuniary punishment is not wont to be inflicted for a criminal fault. But sacrilege is a criminal fault, wherefore it is punished by capital sentence according to civil law. Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment. Obj. 2: Further, the same sin should not receive a double punishment, according to Nahum 1:9, There shall not rise a double affliction. But sacrilege is punished with excommunication; major excommunication, for violating a sacred person, and for burning or destroying a church, and minor excommunication for other sacrileges. Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment. Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Thess 2:5): Neither have we taken an occasion of covetousness. But it seems to involve an occasion of covetousness that a pecuniary punishment should be exacted for the violation of a sacred thing. Therefore this does not seem to be a fitting punishment of sacrilege. On the contrary, It is written: If anyone contumaciously or arrogantly take away by force an escaped slave from the confines of a church he shall pay nine hundred soldi: and again further on (XVII, qu. iv, can. Quisquis inventus, can. 21): Whoever is found guilty of sacrilege shall pay thirty pounds of tried purest silver. I answer that, In the award of punishments two points must be considered. First equality, in order that the punishment may be just, and that by what things a man sinneth by the same . . . he may be tormented (Wis 11:17). In this respect the fitting punishment of one guilty of sacrilege,

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communicatio, per quam a sacris arcetur. Secundo autem consideratur utilitas, nam poenae quasi medicinae quaedam infliguntur, ut his territi homines a peccando desistant. Sacrilegus autem, qui sacra non reveretur, non sufficienter videtur a peccando arceri per hoc quod ei sacra interdicuntur, de quibus non curat. Et ideo secundum leges humanas adhibetur capitis poena; secundum vero Ecclesiae sententiam, quae mortem corporalem non infligit, adhibetur pecuniaria poena, ut saltem poenis temporalibus homines a sacrilegiis revocentur.

since he has done an injury to a sacred thing, is excommunication whereby sacred things are withheld from him. The second point to be considered is utility. For punishments are inflicted as medicines, that men being deterred thereby may desist from sin. Now it would seem that the sacrilegious man, who reverences not sacred things, is not sufficiently deterred from sinning by sacred things being withheld from him, since he has no care for them. Wherefore according to human laws he is sentenced to capital punishment, and according to the statutes of the Church, which does not inflict the death of the body, a pecuniary punishment is inflicted, in order that men may be deterred from sacrilege, at least by temporal punishments. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Ecclesia corporaReply Obj. 1: The Church inflicts not the death of the lem mortem non infligit, sed loco eius infligit excommu- body, but excommunication in its stead.

nicationem. Ad secundum dicendum quod necesse est duas poenas adhiberi quando per unam non sufficienter revocatur aliquis a peccando. Et ideo oportuit, supra poenam excommunicationis, adhibere aliquam temporalem poenam, ad coercendum homines qui spiritualia contemnunt. Ad tertium dicendum quod si pecunia exigeretur sine rationabili causa, hoc videretur ad occasionem avaritiae pertinere. Sed quando exigitur ad hominum correctionem, habet manifestam utilitatem. Et ideo non pertinet ad occasionem avaritiae.

Reply Obj. 2: When one punishment is not sufficient to deter a man from sin, a double punishment must be inflicted. Wherefore it was necessary to inflict some kind of temporal punishment in addition to the punishment of excommunication, in order to coerce those who despise spiritual things. Reply Obj. 3: If money were exacted without a reasonable cause, this would seem to involve an occasion of covetousness. But when it is exacted for the purpose of man’s correction, it has a manifest utility, and consequently involves no occasion of avarice.

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Question 100 Simony Deinde considerandum est de simonia. Et circa hoc We must now consider simony, under which head there quaeruntur sex. are six points of inquiry: Primo, quid sit simonia. (1) What is simony? Secundo, utrum liceat pro sacramentis pecuniam (2) Whether it is lawful to accept money for the accipere. sacraments? Tertio, utrum liceat accipere pecuniam pro (3) Whether it is lawful to accept money for spiritual spiritualibus actibus. actions? Quarto, utrum liceat vendere ea quae sunt (4) Whether it is lawful to sell things connected with spiritualibus annexa. spirituals? Quinto, utrum solum munus a manu faciat (5) Whether real remuneration alone makes a man simoniacum, an etiam munus a lingua et ab guilty of simony, or also oral remuneration or obsequio. remuneration by service? Sexto, de poena simoniaci. (6) Of the punishment of simony.

Article 1 Whether simony is an intentional will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod simonia non sit studiosa voluntas emendi et vendendi aliquid spirituale vel spirituali annexum. Simonia enim est haeresis quaedam, dicitur enim I, qu. I, tolerabilior est Macedonii, et eorum qui circa ipsum sunt sancti spiritus impugnatorum, impia haeresis quam simoniacorum. Illi enim creaturam, et servum Dei patris et filii, spiritum sanctum delirando fatentur, isti vero eundem spiritum sanctum efficiunt servum suum. Omnis enim dominus quod habet, si vult, vendit, sive servum, sive quid aliud eorum quae possidet. Sed infidelitas non consistit in voluntate, sed magis in intellectu, sicut et fides, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo simonia non debet per voluntatem definiri. Praeterea, studiose peccare est ex malitia peccare, quod est peccare in spiritum sanctum. Si ergo simonia est studiosa voluntas peccandi, sequitur quod semper sit peccatum in spiritum sanctum. Praeterea, nihil magis est spirituale quam regnum caelorum. Sed licet emere regnum caelorum, dicit enim Gregorius, in quadam homilia, regnum caelorum tantum valet quantum habes. Ergo non est simonia velle emere aliquid spirituale. Praeterea, nomen simoniae a Simone mago acceptum est, de quo legitur Act. VIII, quod obtulit apostolis pecuniam ad spiritualem potestatem emendam, ut, scilicet, quibuscumque manus imponeret, reciperent spi-

Objection 1: It would seem that simony is not an express will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing. Simony is heresy, since it is written (I, qu. i ): The impious heresy of Macedonius and of those who with him impugned the Holy Spirit, is more endurable than that of those who are guilty of simony: since the former in their ravings maintained that the Holy Spirit of Father and Son is a creature and the slave of God, whereas the latter make the same Holy Spirit to be their own slave. For every master sells what he has just as he wills, whether it be his slave or any other of his possessions. But unbelief, like faith, is an act not of the will but of the intellect, as shown above (Q. 10, A. 2). Therefore simony should not be defined as an act of the will. Obj. 2: Further, to sin intentionally is to sin through malice, and this is to sin against the Holy Spirit. Therefore, if simony is an intentional will to sin, it would seem that it is always a sin against the Holy Spirit. Obj. 3: Further, nothing is more spiritual than the kingdom of heaven. But it is lawful to buy the kingdom of heaven: for Gregory says in a homily (v, in Ev.): The kingdom of heaven is worth as much as you possess. Therefore simony does not consist in a will to buy something spiritual. Obj. 4: Further, simony takes its name from Simon the magician, of whom we read (Acts 8:18, 19) that he offered the apostles money that he might buy a spiritual power, in order, to wit, that on whomsoever he imposed his hand they

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ritum sanctum. Non autem legitur quod aliquid voluit vendere. Ergo simonia non est voluntas vendendi aliquid spirituale. Praeterea, multae aliae sunt voluntariae commutationes praeter emptionem et venditionem, sicut permutatio, transactio. Ergo videtur quod insufficienter definiatur simonia. Praeterea, omne quod est spirituali annexum est spirituale. Superflue igitur additur, vel spirituali annexum. Praeterea, Papa, secundum quosdam, non potest committere simoniam. Potest autem emere vel vendere aliquid spirituale. Ergo simonia non est voluntas emendi vel vendendi aliquid spirituale vel spirituali annexum. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in registro, altare et decimas et spiritum sanctum emere vel vendere simoniacam haeresim esse nullus fidelium ignorat. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, actus aliquis est malus ex genere ex eo quod cadit super materiam indebitam. Emptionis autem et venditionis est materia indebita res spiritualis, triplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia res spiritualis non potest aliquo terreno pretio compensari, sicut de sapientia dicitur Prov. III, pretiosior est cunctis opibus, et omnia quae desiderantur huic non valent comparari. Et ideo Petrus, in ipsa sui radice Simonis pravitatem condemnans, dixit, pecunia tua tecum sit in perditionem, quoniam donum Dei existimasti pecunia possidere. Secundo, quia illud potest esse debita venditionis materia cuius venditor est dominus, ut patet in auctoritate supra inducta. Praelatus autem Ecclesiae non est dominus spiritualium rerum, sed dispensator, secundum illud I ad Cor. IV. Sic nos existimet homo ut ministros Christi, et dispensatores ministeriorum Dei. Tertio, quia venditio repugnat spiritualium origini, quae ex gratuita Dei voluntate proveniunt. Unde et dominus dicit, Matth. X, gratis accepistis, gratis date. Et ideo aliquis, vendendo vel emendo rem spiritualem, irreverentiam exhibet Deo et rebus divinis. Propter quod, peccat peccato irreligiositatis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut religio consistit in quadam fidei protestatione, quam tamen interdum aliquis non habet in corde; ita etiam vitia opposita religioni habent quandam protestationem infidelitatis, licet quandoque non sit infidelitas in mente. Secundum hoc ergo, simonia haeresis dicitur secundum exteriorem protestationem, quia in hoc quod aliquis vendit donum spiritus sancti, quodammodo se protestatur esse dominum spiritualis doni; quod est haereticum. Sciendum tamen quod Simon magus, praeter hoc quod ab apostolis spiritus sancti gratiam pecunia emere voluit, dixit quod mundus non erat a Deo creatus, sed a quadam superna

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might receive the Holy Spirit. But we do not read that he wished to sell anything. Therefore simony is not the will to sell a spiritual thing. Obj. 5: Further, there are many other voluntary commutations besides buying and selling, such as exchange and transaction. Therefore it would seem that simony is defined insufficiently. Obj. 6: Further, anything connected with spiritual things is itself spiritual. Therefore it is superfluous to add or connected with spiritual things. Obj. 7: Further, according to some, the Pope cannot commit simony: yet he can buy or sell something spiritual. Therefore simony is not the will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing. On the contrary, Gregory VII says (Regist. ): None of the faithful is ignorant that buying or selling altars, tithes, or the Holy Spirit is the heresy of simony. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2) an act is evil generically when it bears on undue matter. Now a spiritual thing is undue matter for buying and selling for three reasons. First, because a spiritual thing cannot be appraised at any earthly price, even as it is said concerning wisdom (Prov 3:15), she is more precious than all riches, and all things that are desired, are not to be compared with her: and for this reason Peter, in condemning the wickedness of Simon in its very source, said (Acts 8:20): Keep thy money to thyself to perish with thee, because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be purchased with money. Second, because a thing cannot be due matter for sale if the vendor is not the owner thereof, as appears from the authority quoted (Obj. 1). Now ecclesiastical superiors are not owners, but dispensers of spiritual things, according to 1 Cor. 4:1, Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the ministers of God. Third, because sale is opposed to the source of spiritual things, since they flow from the gratuitous will of God. Wherefore Our Lord said (Matt 10:8): Freely have you received, freely give. Therefore by buying or selling a spiritual thing, a man treats God and divine things with irreverence, and consequently commits a sin of irreligion. Reply Obj. 1: Just as religion consists in a kind of protestation of faith, without, sometimes, faith being in one’s heart, so too the vices opposed to religion include a certain protestation of unbelief without, sometimes, unbelief being in the mind. Accordingly simony is said to be a heresy, as regards the outward protestation, since by selling a gift of the Holy Spirit a man declares, in a way, that he is the owner of a spiritual gift; and this is heretical. It must, however, be observed that Simon Magus, besides wishing the apostles to sell him a grace of the Holy Spirit for money, said that the world was not created by God, but by some heavenly power, as Isidore states (Etym. viii, 5): and so for

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virtute, ut dicit Isidorus, in libro Etymol. Et secundum hoc, inter alios haereticos simoniaci computantur, ut patet in libro Augustini de haeresibus. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, iustitia et omnes partes eius, et per consequens omnia vitia opposita, sunt in voluntate sicut in subiecto. Et ideo convenienter simonia per voluntatem definitur. Additur autem studiosa, ad designandum electionem, quae principaliter pertinet ad virtutem et vitium. Non autem omnis qui peccat electione peccat peccato in spiritum sanctum, sed solum qui peccatum eligit per contemptum eorum quae homines solent retrahere a peccando, ut supra dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod regnum caelorum dicitur emi, dum quis dat quod habet propter Deum, large sumpto nomine emptionis, secundum quod accipitur pro merito. Quod tamen non pertingit ad perfectam rationem emptionis. Tum quia non sunt condignae passiones huius temporis, nec aliqua nostra dona vel opera, ad futuram gloriam quae revelabitur in nobis, ut dicitur Rom. VIII. Tum quia meritum non consistit principaliter in exteriori dono vel actu vel passione, sed in interiori affectu. Ad quartum dicendum quod Simon magus ad hoc emere voluit spiritualem potestatem ut eam postea venderet, dicitur enim I, qu. III, quod Simon magus donum spiritus sancti emere voluit ut ex venditione signorum quae per eum fierent, multiplicatam pecuniam lucraretur. Et sic illi qui spiritualia vendunt, conformantur Simoni mago in intentione, in actu vero, illi qui emere volunt. Illi autem qui vendunt, in actu imitantur Giezi, discipulum Elisaei, de quo legitur IV Reg. V, quod accepit pecuniam a leproso mundato. Unde venditores spiritualium possunt dici non solum simoniaci, sed etiam Giezitae. Ad quintum dicendum quod nomine emptionis et venditionis intelligitur omnis contractus non gratuitus. Unde nec permutatio praebendarum vel ecclesiasticorum beneficiorum fieri potest, auctoritate partium absque periculo simoniae, sicut nec transactio, ut iura determinant. Potest tamen praelatus, ex officio suo. Permutationes huiusmodi facere pro causa utili vel necessaria. Ad sextum dicendum quod sicut anima vivit secundum seipsam, corpus vero vivit ex unione animae; ita etiam quaedam sunt spiritualia secundum seipsa, sicut sacramenta et alia huiusmodi; quaedam autem dicuntur spiritualia ex hoc quod talibus adhaerent. Unde I, qu. III, dicitur, cap. si quis obiecerit, quod spiritualia sine corporalibus rebus non proficiunt, sicut nec anima sine corpore corporaliter vivit. Ad septimum dicendum quod Papa potest incurrere vitium simoniae, sicut et quilibet alius homo, peccatum enim tanto in aliqua persona est gravius quanto ma-

Q. 100, A. 1

this reason simoniacs are reckoned with other heretics, as appears from Augustine’s book on heretics. Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 58, A. 4), justice, with all its parts, and consequently all the opposite vices, is in the will as its subject. Hence simony is fittingly defined from its relation to the will. This act is furthermore described as express, in order to signify that it proceeds from choice, which takes the principal part in virtue and vice. Nor does everyone sin against the Holy Spirit that sins from choice, but only he who chooses sin through contempt of those things whereby man is wont to be withdrawn from sin, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 1). Reply Obj. 3: The kingdom of heaven is said to be bought when a man gives what he has for God’s sake. But this is to employ the term buying in a wide sense, and as synonymous with merit: nor does it reach to the perfect signification of buying, both because neither the sufferings of this time, nor any gift or deed of ours, are worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us (Rom 8:18), and because merit consists chiefly, not in an outward gift, action or passion, but in an inward affection. Reply Obj. 4: Simon the magician wished to buy a spiritual power in order that afterwards he might sell it. For it is written (I, qu. iii ), that Simon the magician wished to buy the gift of the Holy Spirit, in order that he might make money by selling the signs to be wrought by him. Hence those who sell spiritual things are likened in intention to Simon the magician: while those who wish to buy them are likened to him in act. Those who sell them imitate, in act, Giezi the disciple of Eliseus, of whom we read (4 Kgs 5:20–24) that he received money from the leper who was healed: wherefore the sellers of spiritual things may be called not only simoniacs but also giezites. Reply Obj. 5: The terms buying and selling cover all kinds of non-gratuitous contracts. Wherefore it is impossible for the exchange or agency of prebends or ecclesiastical benefices to be made by authority of the parties concerned without danger of committing simony, as laid down by law. Nevertheless the superior, in virtue of his office, can cause these exchanges to be made for useful or necessary reasons. Reply Obj. 6: Even as the soul lives by itself, while the body lives through being united to the soul; so, too, certain things are spiritual by themselves, such as the sacraments and the like, while others are called spiritual, through adhering to those others. Hence (I, qu. iii, cap. Siquis objecerit) it is stated that spiritual things do not progress without corporal things, even as the soul has no bodily life without the body. Reply Obj. 7: The Pope can be guilty of the vice of simony, like any other man, since the higher a man’s position the more grievous is his sin. For although the possessions

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iorem obtinet locum. Quamvis enim res Ecclesiae sint eius ut principalis dispensatoris, non tamen sunt eius ut domini et possessoris. Et ideo si reciperet pro aliqua re spirituali pecuniam de redditibus alicuius Ecclesiae, non careret vitio simoniae. Et similiter etiam posset simoniam committere recipiendo pecuniam ab aliquo laico non de bonis Ecclesiae.

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of the Church belong to him as dispenser in chief, they are not his as master and owner. Therefore, were he to accept money from the income of any church in exchange for a spiritual thing, he would not escape being guilty of the vice of simony. In like manner he might commit simony by accepting from a layman moneys not belonging to the goods of the Church.

Article 2 Whether it is always unlawful to give money for the sacraments? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non semper sit illicitum pro sacramentis pecuniam dare. Baptismus enim est ianua sacramentorum, ut in III parte dicetur. Sed licet, ut videtur, in aliquo casu dare pecuniam pro Baptismo, puta quando sacerdos puerum morientem sine pretio baptizare non vellet. Ergo non semper est illicitum emere vel vendere sacramenta.

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not always unlawful to give money for the sacraments. Baptism is the door of the sacraments, as we shall state in the Third Part (Q. 68, A. 6; Q. 73, A. 3). But seemingly it is lawful in certain cases to give money for Baptism, for instance if a priest were unwilling to baptize a dying child without being paid. Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or sell the sacraments. Praeterea, maximum sacramentorum est EuchaObj. 2: Further, the greatest of the sacraments is the Euristia, quae in Missa consecratur. Sed pro Missis can- charist, which is consecrated in the Mass. But some priests tandis aliqui sacerdotes praebendam vel pecuniam acci- receive a prebend or money for singing masses. Much more piunt. Ergo licet multo magis alia sacramenta emere vel therefore is it lawful to buy or sell the other sacraments.

vendere. Praeterea, sacramentum poenitentiae est sacramentum necessitatis, quod praecipue in absolutione consistit. Sed quidam absolventes ab excommunicatione pecuniam exigunt. Ergo non semper est illicitum sacramenta emere vel vendere. Praeterea, consuetudo facit ut non sit peccatum illud quod alias peccatum esset, sicut Augustinus dicit quod habere plures uxores, quando mos erat, crimen non erat. Sed apud quosdam est consuetudo quod in consecrationibus episcoporum, benedictionibus abbatum, et ordinibus clericorum, pro chrismate vel oleo sancto et aliis huiusmodi aliquid detur. Ergo videtur quod hoc non sit illicitum. Praeterea, contingit quandoque quod aliquis malitiose impedit aliquem vel ab episcopatu obtinendo, vel ab aliqua alia dignitate. Sed licet unicuique redimere suam vexationem. Ergo licitum videtur in tali casu pecuniam dare pro episcopatu, vel aliqua alia ecclesiastica dignitate. Praeterea, matrimonium est quoddam sacramentum. Sed quandoque datur pecunia pro matrimonio. Ergo licitum est sacramenta pecunia vendere. Sed contra est quod dicitur I, qu. I, qui per pecuniam quemquam consecraverit, alienus sit a sacerdotio.

Obj. 3: Further, the sacrament of Penance is a necessary sacrament consisting chiefly in the absolution. But some persons demand money when absolving from excommunication. Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or sell a sacrament. Obj. 4: Further, custom makes that which otherwise were sinful to be not sinful; thus Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 47) that it was no crime to have several wives, so long as it was the custom. Now it is the custom in some places to give something in the consecration of bishops, blessings of abbots, ordinations of the clergy, in exchange for the chrism, holy oil, and so forth. Therefore it would seem that it is not unlawful. Obj. 5: Further, it happens sometimes that someone maliciously hinders a person from obtaining a bishopric or some like dignity. But it is lawful for a man to make good his grievance. Therefore it is lawful, seemingly, in such a case to give money for a bishopric or a like ecclesiastical dignity.

Obj. 6: Further, marriage is a sacrament. But sometimes money is given for marriage. Therefore it is lawful to sell a sacrament. On the contrary, It is written (I, qu. i ): Whosoever shall consecrate anyone for money, let him be cut off from the priesthood. Respondeo dicendum quod sacramenta novae legis I answer that, The sacraments of the New Law are of sunt maxime spiritualia, inquantum sunt spiritualis gra- all things most spiritual, inasmuch as they are the cause of tiae causa, quae pretio aestimari non potest, et eius ratio- spiritual grace, on which no price can be set, and which is

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ni repugnat quod non gratuito detur. Dispensantur autem sacramenta per Ecclesiae ministros, quos oportet a populo sustentari, secundum illud apostoli, I ad Cor. IX, nescitis quoniam qui in sacrario operantur, quae de sacrario sunt edunt, et qui altari deserviunt, cum altario participantur? Sic igitur dicendum est quod accipere pecuniam pro spirituali sacramentorum gratia est crimen simoniae, quod nulla consuetudine potest excusari, quia consuetudo non praeiudicat iuri naturali vel divino. Per pecuniam autem intelligitur omne illud cuius pretium potest pecunia aestimari, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Accipere autem aliqua ad sustentationem eorum qui sacramenta ministrant, secundum ordinationem Ecclesiae et consuetudines approbatas, non est simonia, neque peccatum, non enim accipitur tanquam pretium mercedis, sed tanquam stipendium necessitatis. Unde super illud I ad Tim. V, qui bene praesunt presbyteri etc., dicit Glossa Augustini, accipiant sustentationem necessitatis a populo, mercedem dispensationis a domino. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in casu necessitatis potest quilibet baptizare. Et quia nullo modo est peccandum, pro eodem est habendum si sacerdos absque pretio baptizare non velit, ac si non esset qui baptizaret. Unde ille qui gerit curam pueri in tali casu licite posset eum baptizare, vel a quocumque alio facere baptizari. Posset tamen licite aquam a sacerdote emere, quae est pure elementum corporale. Si autem esset adultus qui Baptismum desideraret, et immineret mortis periculum, nec sacerdos eum vellet sine pretio baptizare, deberet, si posset, per alium baptizari. Quod si non posset ad alium habere recursum, nullo modo deberet pretium pro Baptismo dare, sed potius absque Baptismo decedere, suppletur enim ei ex Baptismo flaminis quod ex sacramento deest. Ad secundum dicendum quod sacerdos non accipit pecuniam quasi pretium consecrationis Eucharistiae aut Missae cantandae, hoc enim esset simoniacum, sed quasi stipendium suae sustentationis, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod pecunia non exigitur ab eo qui absolvitur quasi pretium absolutionis, hoc enim esset simoniacum, sed quasi poena culpae praecedentis, pro qua fuit excommunicatus. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, consuetudo non praeiudicat iuri naturali vel divino, quo simonia prohibetur. Et ideo si aliqua ex consuetudine exigantur quasi pretium rei spiritualis, cum intentione emendi vel vendendi, est manifeste simonia, et praecipue si ab invito exigantur. Si vero accipiantur quasi quaedam stipendia per consuetudinem approbatam, non est simonia, si tamen desit intentio emendi vel vendendi, sed intentio referatur ad solam consuetudinis observantiam; et praecipue quando aliquis voluntarie solvit. In his

Q. 100, A. 2

essentially incompatible with a non-gratuitous giving. Now the sacraments are dispensed through the ministers of the Church, whom the people are bound to support, according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor 9:13), Know you not, that they who work in the holy place, eat the things that are of the holy place; and they that serve the altar, partake with the altar? Accordingly we must answer that to receive money for the spiritual grace of the sacraments, is the sin of simony, which cannot be excused by any custom whatever, since custom does not prevail over natural or divine law. Now by money we are to understand anything that has a pecuniary value, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 1). On the other hand, to receive anything for the support of those who administer the sacraments, in accordance with the statutes of the Church and approved customs, is not simony, nor is it a sin. For it is received not as a price of goods, but as a payment for their need. Hence a gloss of Augustine on 1 Tim. 5:17, Let the priests that rule well, says: They should look to the people for a supply to their need, but to the Lord for the reward of their ministry. Reply Obj. 1: In a case of necessity anyone may baptize. And since nowise ought one to sin, if the priest be unwilling to baptize without being paid, one must act as though there were no priest available for the baptism. Hence the person who is in charge of the child can, in such a case, lawfully baptize it, or cause it to be baptized by anyone else. He could, however, lawfully buy the water from the priest, because it is merely a bodily element. But if it were an adult in danger of death that wished to be baptized, and the priest were unwilling to baptize him without being paid, he ought, if possible, to be baptized by someone else. And if he is unable to have recourse to another, he must by no means pay a price for Baptism, and should rather die without being baptized, because for him the baptism of desire would supply the lack of the sacrament. Reply Obj. 2: The priest receives money, not as the price for consecrating the Eucharist, or for singing the Mass (for this would be simoniacal), but as payment for his livelihood, as stated above. Reply Obj. 3: The money exacted of the person absolved is not the price of his absolution (for this would be simoniacal), but a punishment of a past crime for which he was excommunicated. Reply Obj. 4: As stated above, custom does not prevail over natural or divine law whereby simony is forbidden. Wherefore the custom, if such there be, of demanding anything as the price of a spiritual thing, with the intention of buying or selling it, is manifestly simoniacal, especially when the demand is made of a person unwilling to pay. But if the demand be made in payment of a stipend recognized by custom it is not simoniacal, provided there be no intention of buying or selling, but only of doing what is customary, and especially if the demand be acceded to voluntar-

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tamen omnibus sollicite cavendum est quod habet spe- ily. In all these cases, however, one must beware of anything ciem simoniae vel cupiditatis, secundum illud apostoli, I having an appearance of simony or avarice, according to ad Thess. ult., ab omni specie mala abstinete vos. the saying of the Apostle (1 Thess 5:22), From all appearance of evil restrain yourselves. Ad quintum dicendum quod antequam alicui acReply Obj. 5: It would be simoniacal to buy off the quiratur ius in episcopatu, vel quacumque dignitate seu opposition of one’s rivals, before acquiring the right to a praebenda, per electionem vel provisionem seu collatio- bishopric or any dignity or prebend, by election, appointnem, simoniacum esset adversantium obstacula pecunia ment or presentation, since this would be to use money as redimere, sic enim per pecuniam pararet sibi viam ad a means of obtaining a spiritual thing. But it is lawful to use rem spiritualem obtinendam. Sed postquam iam ius ali- money as a means of removing unjust opposition, after one cui acquisitum est, licet per pecuniam iniusta impedi- has already acquired that right. menta removere. Ad sextum dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod Reply Obj. 6: Some say that it is lawful to give money pro matrimonio licet pecuniam dare, quia in eo non for Matrimony because no grace is conferred thereby. But confertur gratia. Sed hoc non est usquequaque verum, ut this is not altogether true, as we shall state in the Third Part in III parte huius operis dicetur. Et ideo aliter dicendum of the work. Wherefore we must reply that Matrimony is est, quod matrimonium non solum est Ecclesiae sacra- not only a sacrament of the Church, but also an office of mentum, sed etiam naturae officium. Et ideo dare pecu- nature. Consequently it is lawful to give money for Matriniam pro matrimonio inquantum est naturae officium, mony considered as an office of nature, but unlawful if it be licitum est, inquantum vero est Ecclesiae sacramentum, considered as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, according est illicitum. Et ideo secundum iura prohibetur ne pro to the law, it is forbidden to demand anything for the Nupbenedictione nuptiarum aliquid exigatur. tial Blessing.

Article 3 Whether it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual actions? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod licitum sit dare et accipere pecuniam pro spiritualibus actibus. Usus enim prophetiae est spiritualis actus. Sed pro usu prophetiae olim aliquid dabatur, ut patet I Reg. IX, et III Reg. XIV. Ergo videtur quod liceat dare et accipere pecuniam pro actu spirituali. Praeterea, oratio, praedicatio, laus divina sunt actus maxime spirituales. Sed ad impetrandum orationum suffragia pecunia datur sanctis viris, secundum illud Luc. XVI, facite vobis amicos de mammona iniquitatis. Praedicatoribus etiam spiritualia seminantibus temporalia debentur, secundum apostolum, I ad Cor. IX. Celebrantibus etiam divinas laudes in ecclesiastico officio, et processiones facientibus, aliquid datur, et quandoque annui redditus ad hoc assignantur. Ergo licitum est pro spiritualibus actibus accipere aliquid. Praeterea, scientia non est minus spiritualis quam potestas. Sed pro usu scientiae licet pecuniam accipere, sicut advocato licet vendere iustum patrocinium, et medico consilium sanitatis, et magistro officium doctrinae. Ergo, pari ratione, videtur quod liceat praelato accipere aliquid pro usu spiritualis suae potestatis, puta pro correctione, vel dispensatione, vel aliquo huiusmodi.

Objection 1: It seems that it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual actions. The use of prophecy is a spiritual action. But something used to be given of old for the use of prophecy, as appears from 1 Kings 9:7, 8, and 3 Kings 14:3. Therefore it would seem that it is lawful to give and receive money for a spiritual action. Obj. 2: Further, prayer, preaching, divine praise, are most spiritual actions. Now money is given to holy persons in order to obtain the assistance of their prayers, according to Luke 16:9, Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity. To preachers also, who sow spiritual things, temporal things are due according to the Apostle (1 Cor 9:14). Moreover, something is given to those who celebrate the divine praises in the ecclesiastical office, and make processions: and sometimes an annual income is assigned to them. Therefore it is lawful to receive something for spiritual actions. Obj. 3: Further, science is no less spiritual than power. Now it is lawful to receive money for the use of science: thus a lawyer may sell his just advocacy, a physician his advice for health, and a master the exercise of his teaching. Therefore in like manner it would seem lawful for a prelate to receive something for the use of his spiritual power, for instance, for correction, dispensation, and so forth.

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Praeterea, religio est status spiritualis perfectionis. Sed in aliquibus monasteriis aliquid ab his qui recipiuntur exigitur. Ergo licet pro spiritualibus aliquid exigere. Sed contra est quod dicitur I, qu. I, quidquid invisibilis gratiae consolatione tribuitur, nunquam quaestibus, vel quibuslibet praemiis, venundari penitus debet. Sed omnia huiusmodi spiritualia per invisibilem gratiam tribuuntur. Ergo non licet ea quaestibus vel praemiis venundari. Respondeo dicendum quod sicut sacramenta dicuntur spiritualia quia spiritualem conferunt gratiam, ita etiam quaedam alia dicuntur spiritualia quia ex spirituali procedunt gratia et ad eam disponunt. Quae tamen per hominum ministerium exhibentur, quos oportet a populo sustentari, cui spiritualia administrant, secundum illud I ad Cor. IX, quis militat suis stipendiis unquam? Quis pascit gregem, et de lacte gregis non manducat? Et ideo vendere quod spirituale est in huiusmodi actibus, aut emere, simoniacum est, sed accipere aut dare aliquid pro sustentatione ministrantium spiritualia, secundum ordinationem Ecclesiae et consuetudinem approbatam, licitum est; ita tamen quod desit intentio emptionis et venditionis; et quod ab invitis non exigatur per subtractionem spiritualium quae sunt exhibenda, haec enim haberent quandam venditionis speciem. Gratis tamen spiritualibus prius exhibitis, licite possunt statutae et consuetae oblationes, et quicumque alii proventus, exigi a nolentibus et valentibus solvere, auctoritate superioris interveniente. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Hieronymus dicit, super Michaeam, munera quaedam sponte exhibebantur bonis prophetis ad sustentationem ipsorum, non quasi ad emendum prophetiae usum, quem tamen pseudoprophetae retorquebant ad quaestum. Ad secundum dicendum quod illi qui dant eleemosynas pauperibus ut orationum ab ipsis suffragia impetrent, non eo tenore dant quasi intendentes orationes emere, sed per gratuitam beneficentiam pauperum animas provocant ad hoc quod pro eis gratis et ex caritate orent. Praedicantibus etiam temporalia debentur ad sustentationem praedicantium, non autem ad emendum praedicationis verbum. Unde super illud I ad Tim. V, qui bene praesunt presbyteri etc., dicit Glossa, necessitatis est accipere unde vivitur, caritatis est praebere, non tamen venale est Evangelium, ut pro his praedicetur. Si enim sic vendunt, magnam rem vili vendunt pretio. Similiter etiam aliqua temporalia dantur Deum laudantibus in celebratione ecclesiastici officii, sive pro vivis sive pro mortuis, non quasi pretium, sed quasi sustentationis stipendium. Et eo etiam tenore pro processionibus faciendis in aliquo funere aliquae eleemosynae recipiuntur. Si autem huiusmodi pacto interveniente fiant, aut etiam cum intentione emptionis vel venditionis, simoniacum esset.

Q. 100, A. 3

Obj. 4: Further, religion is the state of spiritual perfection. Now in certain monasteries something is demanded from those who are received there. Therefore it is lawful to demand something for spiritual things. On the contrary, It is stated (I, qu. i ): It is absolutely forbidden to make a charge for what is acquired by the consolation of invisible grace, whether by demanding a price or by seeking any kind of return whatever. Now all these spiritual things are acquired through an invisible grace. Therefore it is not lawful to charge a price or return for them. I answer that, Just as the sacraments are called spiritual, because they confer a spiritual grace, so, too, certain other things are called spiritual, because they flow from spiritual grace and dispose thereto. And yet these things are obtainable through the ministry of men, according to 1 Cor. 9:7, Who serveth as a soldier at any time at his own charges? Who feedeth the flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock? Hence it is simoniacal to sell or buy that which is spiritual in such like actions; but to receive or give something for the support of those who minister spiritual things in accordance with the statutes of the Church and approved customs is lawful, yet in such wise that there be no intention of buying or selling, and that no pressure be brought to bear on those who are unwilling to give, by withholding spiritual things that ought to be administered, for then there would be an appearance of simony. But after the spiritual things have been freely bestowed, then the statutory and customary offerings and other dues may be exacted from those who are unwilling but able to pay, if the superior authorize this to be done. Reply Obj. 1: As Jerome says in his commentary on Mic. 3:9, certain gifts were freely offered to the good prophets, for their livelihood, but not as a price for the exercise of their gift of prophecy. Wicked prophets, however, abused this exercise by demanding payment for it. Reply Obj. 2: Those who give alms to the poor in order to obtain from them the assistance of their prayers do not give with the intent of buying their prayers; but by their gratuitous beneficence inspire the poor with the mind to pray for them freely and out of charity. Temporal things are due to the preacher as means for his support, not as a price of the words he preaches. Hence a gloss on 1 Tim. 5:11, Let the priests that rule well, says: Their need allows them to receive the wherewithal to live, charity demands that this should be given to them: yet the Gospel is not for sale, nor is a livelihood the object of preaching: for if they sell it for this purpose, they sell a great thing for a contemptible price. In like manner temporal things are given to those who praise God by celebrating the divine office whether for the living or for the dead, not as a price but as a means of livelihood; and the same purpose is fulfilled when alms are received for making processions in funerals. Yet it is simoniacal to do such things by contract, or with the intention of buying or selling. Hence it would be an unlawful ordinance if it were de-

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Unde illicita esset ordinatio si in aliqua Ecclesia statueretur quod non fieret processio in funere alicuius nisi solveret certam pecuniae quantitatem, quia per tale statutum praecluderetur via gratis officium pietatis aliquibus impendendi. Magis autem licita esset ordinatio si statueretur quod omnibus certam eleemosynam dantibus talis honor exhiberetur, quia per hoc non praecluderetur via aliis exhibendi. Et praeterea prima ordinatio habet speciem exactionis, secunda vero habet speciem gratuitae recompensationis. Ad tertium dicendum quod ille cui committitur spiritualis potestas, ex officio obligatur ad usum potestatis sibi commissae in spiritualium dispensatione, et etiam pro sua sustentatione statuta stipendia habet ex redditibus ecclesiasticis. Et ideo si aliquid acciperet pro usu spiritualis potestatis, non intelligeretur locare operas suas, quas ex debito suscepti officii debet impendere, sed intelligeretur vendere ipsum spiritualis gratiae usum. Et propter hoc, non licet pro quacumque dispensatione aliquid accipere; neque etiam pro hoc quod suas vices committant; neque etiam pro hoc quod suos subditos corrigant, vel a corrigendo desistant. Licet tamen eis accipere procurationes quando subditos visitant, non quasi pretium correctionis, sed quasi debitum stipendium. Ille autem qui habet scientiam, non suscipit tamen hoc officium ex quo obligetur aliis usum scientiae impendere. Et ideo licite potest pretium suae doctrinae vel consilii accipere, non quasi veritatem aut scientiam vendens sed quasi operas suas locans. Si autem ex officio ad hoc teneretur, intelligeretur ipsam veritatem vendere, unde graviter peccaret. Sicut patet in illis qui instituuntur in aliquibus Ecclesiis ad docendum clericos Ecclesiae et alios pauperes, pro quo ab Ecclesia beneficium recipiunt, a quibus non licet eis aliquid recipere, nec ad hoc quod doceant, nec ad hoc quod aliqua festa faciant vel praetermittant. Ad quartum dicendum quod pro ingressu monasterii non licet aliquid exigere vel accipere quasi pretium. Licet tamen, si monasterium sit tenue, quod non sufficiat ad tot personas nutriendas, gratis quidem ingressum monasterii exhibere, sed accipere aliquid pro victu personae quae in monasterio fuerit recipienda, si ad hoc monasterii non sufficiant opes. Similiter etiam licitum est si propter devotionem quam aliquis ad monasterium ostendit largas eleemosynas faciendo, facilius in monasterio recipiatur; sicut etiam licitum est e converso aliquem provocare ad devotionem monasterii per temporalia beneficia, ut ex hoc inclinetur ad monasterii ingressum; licet non sit licitum ex pacto aliquid dare vel recipere pro ingressu monasterii, ut habetur I, qu. II, cap. quam pio.

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creed in any church that no procession would take place at a funeral unless a certain sum of money were paid, because such an ordinance would preclude the free granting of pious offices to any person. The ordinance would be more in keeping with the law, if it were decreed that this honor would be accorded to all who gave a certain alms, because this would not preclude its being granted to others. Moreover, the former ordinance has the appearance of an exaction, whereas the latter bears a likeness to a gratuitous remuneration. Reply Obj. 3: A person to whom a spiritual power is entrusted is bound by virtue of his office to exercise the power entrusted to him in dispensing spiritual things. Moreover, he receives a statutory payment from the funds of the Church as a means of livelihood. Therefore, if he were to accept anything for the exercise of his spiritual power, this would imply, not a hiring of his labor (which he is bound to give, as a duty arising out of the office he has accepted), but a sale of the very use of a spiritual grace. For this reason it is unlawful for him to receive anything for any dispensing whatever, or for allowing someone else to take his duty, or for correcting his subjects, or for omitting to correct them. On the other hand it is lawful for him to receive procurations, when he visits his subjects, not as a price for correcting them, but as a means of livelihood. He that is possessed of science, without having taken upon himself the obligation of using it for the benefit of others can lawfully receive a price for his learning or advice, since this is not a sale of truth or science, but a hiring of labor. If, on the other hand, he be so bound by virtue of his office, this would amount to a sale of the truth, and consequently he would sin grievously. For instance, those who in certain churches are appointed to instruct the clerics of that church and other poor persons, and are in receipt of an ecclesiastical benefice for so doing, are not allowed to receive anything in return, either for teaching, or for celebrating or omitting any feasts. Reply Obj. 4: It is unlawful to exact or receive anything as price for entering a monastery: but, in the case of small monasteries, that are unable to support so many persons, it is lawful, while entrance to the monastery is free, to accept something for the support of those who are about to be received into the monastery, if its revenues are insufficient. In like manner it is lawful to be easier in admitting to a monastery a person who has proved his regard for that monastery by the generosity of his alms: just as, on the other hand, it is lawful to incite a person’s regard for a monastery by means of temporal benefits, in order that he may thereby be induced to enter the monastery; although it is unlawful to agree to give or receive something for entrance into a monastery (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam pio).

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Q. 100, A. 4

Article 4 Whether it is lawful to receive money for things annexed to spiritual things? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod licitum sit pecuniam accipere pro his quae sunt spiritualibus annexa. Omnia enim temporalia videntur esse spiritualibus annexa, quia temporalia sunt propter spiritualia quaerenda. Si ergo non licet vendere ea quae sunt spiritualibus annexa, nihil temporale vendere licebit. Quod patet esse falsum. Praeterea, nihil videtur magis spiritualibus annexum quam vasa consecrata. Sed ea licet vendere pro redemptione captivorum, ut Ambrosius dicit. Ergo licitum est vendere ea quae sunt spiritualibus annexa. Praeterea, spiritualibus annexa videntur ius sepulturae, ius patronatus, et ius primogeniturae secundum antiquos (quia primogeniti, ante legem, sacerdotis officio fungebantur), et etiam ius accipiendi decimas. Sed Abraham emit ab Ephron speluncam duplicem in sepulturam. Ut habetur Gen. XXIII. Iacob autem emit ab Esau ius primogeniturae, ut habetur Gen. XXV. Ius etiam patronatus cum re vendita transit, in feudum conceditur. Decimae etiam concessae sunt quibusdam militibus, et redimi possunt. Praelati interdum retinent sibi ad tempus fructus praebendarum quas conferunt, cum tamen praebendae sint spiritualibus annexae. Ergo licet emere et vendere ea quae sunt spiritualibus annexa. Sed contra est quod dicit paschalis Papa, et habetur I, qu. III, cap. si quis obiecerit, quisquis eorum vendidit alterum sine quo nec alterum provenit, neutrum invenditum derelinquit. Nullus ergo emat Ecclesiam vel praebendam, vel aliquid ecclesiasticum. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid potest esse spiritualibus annexum dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut ex spiritualibus dependens, sicut habere beneficia ecclesiastica dicitur spiritualibus annexum quia non competit nisi habenti officium clericale. Unde huiusmodi nullo modo possunt esse sine spiritualibus. Et propter hoc, ea nullo modo vendere licet, quia, eis venditis, intelliguntur etiam spiritualia venditioni subiici. Quaedam autem sunt annexa spiritualibus inquantum ad spiritualia ordinantur, sicut ius patronatus, quod ordinatur ad praesentandum clericos ad ecclesiastica beneficia; et vasa sacra, quae ordinantur ad sacramentorum usum. Unde huiusmodi non praesupponunt spiritualia, sed magis ea ordine temporis praecedunt. Et ideo aliquo modo vendi possunt, non autem inquantum sunt spiritualibus annexa. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnia temporalia annectuntur spiritualibus sicut fini. Et ideo ipsa quidem temporalia vendere licet, sed ordo eorum ad spiritualia sub venditione cadere non debet.

Objection 1: It would seem lawful to receive money for things annexed to spiritual things. Seemingly all temporal things are annexed to spiritual things, since temporal things ought to be sought for the sake of spiritual things. If, therefore, it is unlawful to sell what is annexed to spiritual things, it will be unlawful to sell anything temporal, and this is clearly false. Obj. 2: Further, nothing would seem to be more annexed to spiritual things than consecrated vessels. Yet it is lawful to sell a chalice for the ransom of prisoners, according to Ambrose (De Offic. ii, 28). Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things. Obj. 3: Further, things annexed to spiritual things include right of burial, right of patronage, and, according to ancient writers, right of the first-born (because before the Lord the first-born exercised the priestly office), and the right to receive tithes. Now Abraham bought from Ephron a double cave for a burying-place (Gen 23:8, sqq.), and Jacob bought from Esau the right of the first-born (Gen 25:31, sqq.). Again the right of patronage is transferred with the property sold, and is granted in fee. Tithes are granted to certain soldiers, and can be redeemed. Prelates also at times retain for themselves the revenues of prebends of which they have the presentation, although a prebend is something annexed to a spiritual thing. Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things. On the contrary, Pope Paschal says (cf. I, qu. iii, cap. Si quis objecerit): Whoever sells one of two such things, that the one is unproductive without the other, leaves neither unsold. Wherefore let no person sell a church, or a prebend, or anything ecclesiastical. I answer that, A thing may be annexed to spiritual things in two ways. First, as being dependent on spiritual things. Thus to have ecclesiastical benefices is said to be annexed to spiritual things, because it is not competent save to those who hold a clerical office. Hence such things can by no means exist apart from spiritual things. Consequently it is altogether unlawful to sell such things, because the sale thereof implies the sale of things spiritual. Other things are annexed to spiritual things through being directed thereto, for instance the right of patronage, which is directed to the presentation of clerics to ecclesiastical benefices; and sacred vessels, which are directed to the use of the sacraments. Wherefore such things as these do not presuppose spiritual things, but precede them in the order of time. Hence in a way they can be sold, but not as annexed to spiritual things. Reply Obj. 1: All things temporal are annexed to spiritual things, as to their end, wherefore it is lawful to sell temporal things, but their relation to spiritual things cannot be the matter of a lawful sale.

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Justice

Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam vasa sacra sunt spiritualibus annexa sicut fini. Et ideo eorum consecratio vendi non potest, tamen, pro necessitate Ecclesiae et pauperum, materia eorum vendi potest; dummodo, praemissa oratione, prius confringantur; quia post confractionem non intelliguntur esse vasa sacra, sed purum metallum. Unde si ex eadem materia similia vasa iterum reintegrarentur, indigerent iterum consecrari. Ad tertium dicendum quod spelunca duplex quam Abraham emit in sepulturam, non habetur quod erat terra consecrata ad sepeliendum. Et ideo licebat Abrahae terram illam emere ad usum sepulturae, ut ibi institueret sepulcrum, sicut etiam nunc liceret emere aliquem agrum communem ad instituendum ibi coemeterium, vel etiam Ecclesiam. Quia tamen etiam apud gentiles loca sepulturae deputata religiosa reputabantur, si Ephron pro iure sepulturae pretium intendit accipere, peccavit vendens, licet Abraham non peccaverit emens, quia non intendebat emere nisi terram communem. Licet etiam nunc terram ubi quondam fuit Ecclesia, vendere aut emere in casu necessitatis, sicut et de materia vasorum sacrorum dictum est. Vel excusatur Abraham quia in hoc redemit suam vexationem. Quamvis enim Ephron gratis ei sepulturam offerret, perpendit tamen Abraham quod gratis recipere sine eius offensa non posset.

Ius autem primogeniturae debebatur Iacob ex divina electione, secundum illud Malach. I, Iacob dilexi, Esau odio habui. Et ideo Esau peccavit primogenita vendens, Iacob autem non peccavit emendo, quia intelligitur suam vexationem redemisse. Ius autem patronatus per se vendi non potest, nec in feudum dari, sed transit cum villa quae venditur vel conceditur. Ius autem spirituale accipiendi decimas non conceditur laicis, sed tantummodo res temporales quae nomine decimae dantur, ut supra dictum est. Circa collationem vero beneficiorum, sciendum est quod si episcopus, antequam alicui beneficium offerat, ob aliquam causam ordinaverit aliquid subtrahendum de fructibus beneficii conferendi et in pios usus expendendum, non est illicitum. Si vero ab eo cui beneficium offert requirat aliquid sibi exhiberi de fructibus illius beneficii, idem est ac si aliud munus ab eo exigeret, et non caret vitio simoniae.

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Reply Obj. 2: Sacred vessels also are annexed to spiritual things as to their end, wherefore their consecration cannot be sold. Yet their material can be sold for the needs of the Church or of the poor provided they first be broken, after prayer has been said over them, since when once broken, they are considered to be no longer sacred vessels but mere metal: so that if like vessels were to be made out of the same material they would have to be consecrated again. Reply Obj. 3: We have no authority for supposing that the double cave which Abraham bought for a burial place was consecrated for that purpose: wherefore Abraham could lawfully buy that site to be used for burial, in order to turn it into a supulchre: even so it would be lawful now to buy an ordinary field as a site for a cemetery or even a church. Nevertheless because even among the Gentiles burial places are looked upon as religious, if Ephron intended to accept the price as payment for a burial place, he sinned in selling, though Abraham did not sin in buying, because he intended merely to buy an ordinary plot of ground. Even now, it is lawful in a case of necessity to sell or buy land on which there has previously been a church, as we have also said with regard to sacred vessels (Reply Obj. 2). Or again, Abraham is to be excused because he thus freed himself of a grievance. For although Ephron offered him the burial place for nothing, Abraham deemed that he could not accept it gratis without prejudice to himself. The right of the first-born was due to Jacob by reason of God’s choice, according to Malach. 1:2, 3, I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau. Wherefore Esau sinned by selling his birthright, yet Jacob sinned not in buying, because he is understood to have freed himself of his grievance. The right of patronage cannot be the matter of a direct sale, nor can it be granted in fee, but is transferred with the property sold or granted. The spiritual right of receiving tithes is not granted to layfolk, but merely the temporal commodities which are granted in the name of tithe, as stated above (Q. 87, A. 3). With regard to the granting of benefices it must, however, be observed, that it is not unlawful for a bishop, before presenting a person to a benefice, to decide, for some reason, to retain part of the revenues of the benefice in question, and to spend it on some pious object. But, on the other hand, if he were to require part of the revenues of that benefice to be given to him by the beneficiary, it would be the same as though he demanded payment from him, and he would not escape the guilt of simony.

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Q. 100, A. 5

Article 5 Whether it is lawful to grant spiritual things in return for an equivalent of service, or for an oral remuneration? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod liceat spiritualia dare pro munere quod est ab obsequio vel a lingua. Dicit enim Gregorius, in registro, ecclesiasticis utilitatibus deservientes ecclesiastica dignum est remuneratione gaudere. Sed deservire ecclesiasticis utilitatibus pertinet ad munus ab obsequio. Ergo videtur quod licitum sit pro obsequio accepto ecclesiastica beneficia largiri. Praeterea, sicut carnalis videtur esse intentio si quis alicui det beneficium ecclesiasticum pro suscepto servitio, ita etiam si quis det intuitu consanguinitatis. Sed hoc non videtur esse simoniacum, quia non est ibi emptio et venditio. Ergo nec primum. Praeterea, illud quod solum ad preces alicuius fit, gratis fieri videtur, et ita non videtur habere locum simonia, quae in emptione et venditione consistit. Sed munus a lingua intelligitur si quis ad preces alicuius ecclesiasticum beneficium conferat. Ergo hoc non est simoniacum. Praeterea, hypocritae spiritualia opera faciunt ut laudem humanam consequantur, quae videtur ad munus linguae pertinere. Nec tamen hypocritae dicuntur simoniaci. Non ergo per munus a lingua simonia contrahitur. Sed contra est quod Urbanus Papa dicit, quisquis res ecclesiasticas, non ad quod institutae sunt, sed ad propria lucra, munere linguae vel obsequii vel pecuniae largitur vel adipiscitur, simoniacus est.

Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to grant spiritual things in return for an equivalent of service, or an oral remuneration. Gregory says (Regist. iii, ep. 18): It is right that those who serve the interests of the Church should be rewarded. Now an equivalent of service denotes serving the interests of the Church. Therefore it seems lawful to confer ecclesiastical benefices for services received. Obj. 2: Further, to confer an ecclesiastical benefice for service received seems to indicate a carnal intention, no less than to do so on account of kinship. Yet the latter seemingly is not simoniacal since it implies no buying or selling. Therefore neither is the former simoniacal. Obj. 3: Further, that which is done only at another’s request would seem to be done gratis: so that apparently it does not involve simony, which consists in buying or selling. Now oral remuneration denotes the conferring of an ecclesiastical benefice at some person’s request. Therefore this is not simoniacal. Obj. 4: Further, hypocrites perform spiritual deeds in order that they may receive human praise, which seems to imply oral remuneration: and yet hypocrites are not said to be guilty of simony. Therefore oral remuneration does not entail simony. On the contrary, Pope Urban says: Whoever grants or acquires ecclesiastical things, not for the purpose for which they were instituted but for his own profit, in consideration of an oral remuneration or of an equivalent in service rendered or money received, is guilty of simony. I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), the term money denotes anything that can have a pecuniary value. Now it is evident that a man’s service is directed to some kind of usefulness, which has a pecuniary value, wherefore servants are hired for a money wage. Therefore to grant a spiritual thing for a service rendered or to be rendered is the same as to grant it for the money, received or promised, at which that service could be valued. Likewise, to grant a person’s request for the bestowal of a temporary favor is directed to some kind of usefulness which has a pecuniary value. Wherefore just as a man contracts the guilt of simony by accepting money or any external thing which comes under the head of real remuneration, so too does he contract it, by receiving oral remuneration or an equivalent in service rendered.

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, nomine pecuniae intelligitur cuiuscumque pretium pecunia mensurari potest. Manifestum est autem quod obsequium hominis ad aliquam utilitatem ordinatur quae potest pretio pecuniae aestimari, unde et pecuniaria mercede ministri conducuntur. Et ideo idem est quod aliquis det rem spiritualem pro aliquo obsequio temporali exhibito vel exhibendo, ac si daret pro pecunia, data vel promissa, qua illud obsequium aestimari posset. Similiter etiam quod aliquis satisfaciat precibus alicuius ad temporalem gratiam quaerendam, ordinatur ad aliquam utilitatem quae potest pecuniae pretio aestimari. Et ideo sicut contrahitur simonia accipiendo pecuniam vel quamlibet rem exteriorem, quod pertinet ad munus a manu, ita etiam contrahitur per munus a lingua, vel ab obsequio. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod si aliquis clericus Reply Obj. 1: If a cleric renders a prelate a lawful seralicui praelato impendat obsequium honestum et ad spi- vice, directed to spiritual things (e.g., to the good of the ritualia ordinatum, puta ad Ecclesiae utilitatem vel mini- Church, or benefit of her ministers), he becomes worthy strorum eius auxilium, ex ipsa devotione obsequii red- of an ecclesiastical benefice by reason of the devotion that

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ditur dignus ecclesiastico beneficio, sicut et propter alia bona opera. Unde non intelligitur esse munus ab obsequi. Et in hoc casu loquitur Gregorius. Si vero sit inhonestum obsequium, vel ad carnalia ordinatum, puta quia servivit praelato ad utilitatem consanguineorum suorum vel patrimonii sui, vel ad aliquid huiusmodi, esset munus ab obsequio, et simoniacum. Ad secundum dicendum quod si aliquis aliquid spirituale alicui conferat gratis propter consanguinitatem, vel quamcumque carnalem affectionem, est quidem illicita et carnalis collatio, non tamen simoniaca, quia nihil ibi accipitur, unde hoc non pertinet ad contractum emptionis et venditionis, in quo fundatur simonia. Si tamen aliquis det beneficium ecclesiasticum alicui hoc pacto, vel intentione, ut exinde suis consanguineis provideat, est manifesta simonia. Ad tertium dicendum quod munus a lingua dicitur vel ipsa laus pertinens ad favorem humanum, qui sub pretio cadit, vel etiam preces ex quibus acquiritur favor humanus, vel contrarium evitatur. Et ideo si aliquis principaliter ad hoc intendat, simoniam committit. Videtur autem ad hoc principaliter intendere qui preces pro indigno porrectas exaudit. Unde ipsum factum est simoniacum. Si autem preces pro digno porrigantur, ipsum factum non est simoniacum, quia subest debita causa ex qua illi pro quo preces porriguntur, spirituale aliquid conferatur. Potest tamen esse simonia in intentione, si non attendatur ad dignitatem personae, sed ad favorem humanum. Si vero aliquis pro se rogat ut obtineat curam animarum, ex ipsa praesumptione redditur indignus, et sic preces sunt pro indigno. Licite tamen potest aliquis, si sit indigens, pro se beneficium ecclesiasticum petere sine cura animarum.

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led him to render the service, as he would by reason of any other good deed. Hence this is not a case of remuneration for service rendered, such as Gregory has in mind. But if the service be unlawful, or directed to carnal things (e.g., a service rendered to the prelate for the profit of his kindred, or the increase of his patrimony, or the like), it will be a case of remuneration for service rendered, and this will be simony. Reply Obj. 2: The bestowal of a spiritual thing gratis on a person by reason of kinship or of any carnal affection is unlawful and carnal, but not simoniacal: since nothing is received in return, wherefore it does not imply a contract of buying and selling, on which simony is based. But to present a person to an ecclesiastical benefice with the understanding or intention that he provide for one’s kindred from the revenue is manifest simony.

Reply Obj. 3: Oral remuneration denotes either praise that pertains to human favor, which has its price, or a request whereby man’s favor is obtained or the contrary avoided. Hence if one intend this chiefly one commits simony. Now to grant a request made for an unworthy person implies, seemingly, that this is one’s chief intention wherefore the deed itself is simoniacal. But if the request be made for a worthy person, the deed itself is not simoniacal, because it is based on a worthy cause, on account of which a spiritual thing is granted to the person for whom the request is made. Nevertheless there may be simony in the intention, if one look, not to the worthiness of the person, but to human favor. If, however, a person asks for himself, that he may obtain the cure of souls, his very presumption renders him unworthy, and so his request is made for an unworthy person. But, if one be in need, one may lawfully seek for oneself an ecclesiastical benefice without the cure of souls. Ad quartum dicendum quod hypocrita non dat aliReply Obj. 4: A hypocrite does not give a spiritual quid spirituale propter laudem, sed solum demonstrat, thing for the sake of praise, he only makes a show of it, and et simulando magis furtive surripit laudem humanam under false pretenses stealthily purloins rather than buys quam emat. Unde non videtur pertinere ad vitium simo- human praise: so that seemingly the hypocrite is not guilty niae. of simony.

Article 6 Whether those who are guilty of simony are fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired by simony? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit conveniens simoniaci poena ut privetur eo quod per simoniam acquisivit. Simonia enim committitur ex eo quod alicuius muneris interventu spiritualia acquiruntur. Sed quaedam sunt spiritualia quae semel adepta, non possunt amitti, sicut omnes characteres, qui per aliquam

Objection 1: It would seem that those who are guilty of simony are not fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired by simony. Simony is committed by acquiring spiritual things in return for a remuneration. Now certain spiritual things cannot be lost when once acquired, such as all characters that are imprinted by a conse-

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consecrationem imprimuntur. Ergo non est conveniens poena ut quis privetur eo quod simoniace acquisivit. Praeterea, contingit quandoque quod ille qui est episcopatum per simoniam adeptus, praecipiat subdito ut ab eo recipiat ordines, et videtur quod debeat ei obedire quandiu ab Ecclesia toleratur. Sed nullus debet aliquid recipere ab eo qui non habet potestatem conferendi. Ergo episcopus non amittit episcopalem potestatem si eam simoniace acquisivit. Praeterea, nullus debet puniri pro eo quod non est factum eo sciente et volente, quia poena debetur peccato, quod est voluntarium, ut ex supra dictis patet. Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquis simoniace consequitur aliquid spirituale procurantibus aliis, eo nesciente et nolente. Ergo non debet puniri per privationem eius quod ei collatum est. Praeterea, nullus debet portare commodum de suo peccato. Sed si ille qui consecutus est beneficium ecclesiasticum per simoniam, restitueret quod percepit, quandoque hoc redundaret in utilitatem eorum qui fuerunt simoniae participes, puta quando praelatus et totum collegium in simoniam consensit. Ergo non semper est restituendum quod per simoniam acquiritur. Praeterea, quandoque aliquis per simoniam in aliquo monasterio recipitur, et votum solemne ibi facit profitendo. Sed nullus debet absolvi ab obligatione voti propter culpam commissam. Ergo non debet monachatum amittere quem simoniace acquisivit. Praeterea, exterior poena in hoc mundo non infligitur pro interiori motu cordis, de quo solius Dei est iudicare. Sed simonia committitur ex sola intentione vel voluntate, unde et per voluntatem definitur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non semper debet aliquis privari eo quod simoniace acquisivit. Praeterea, multo maius est promoveri ad maiora quam in susceptis permanere. Sed quandoque simoniaci, ex dispensatione, promoventur ad maiora. Ergo non semper debent susceptis privari.

Sed contra est quod dicitur I, qu. I, cap. si quis episcopus, qui ordinatus est, nihil ex ordinatione vel promotione quae est per negotiationem facta, proficiat, sed sit alienus a dignitate vel sollicitudine quam pecuniis acquisivit. Respondeo dicendum quod nullus potest licite retinere illud quod contra voluntatem domini acquisivit, puta si aliquis dispensator de rebus domini sui daret alicui contra voluntatem et ordinationem domini sui, ille qui acciperet licite retinere non posset. Dominus autem, cuius Ecclesiarum praelati sunt dispensatores et mini-

Q. 100, A. 6

cration. Therefore it is not a fitting punishment for a person to be deprived of what he has acquired simoniacally. Obj. 2: Further, it sometimes happens that one who has obtained the episcopate by simony commands a subject of his to receive orders from him: and apparently the subject should obey, so long as the Church tolerates him. Yet no one ought to receive from him that has not the power to give. Therefore a bishop does not lose his episcopal power, if he has acquired it by simony. Obj. 3: Further, no one should be punished for what was done without his knowledge and consent, since punishment is due for sin which is voluntary, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 74, AA. 1, 2; Q. 77, A. 7). Now it happens sometimes that a person acquires something spiritual, which others have procured for him without his knowledge and consent. Therefore he should not be punished by being deprived of what has been bestowed on him. Obj. 4: Further, no one should profit by his own sin. Yet, if a person who has acquired an ecclesiastical benefice by simony, were to restore what he has received, this would sometimes turn to the profit of those who had a share in his simony; for instance, when a prelate and his entire chapter have consented to the simony. Therefore that which has been acquired by simony ought not always to be restored. Obj. 5: Further, sometimes a person obtains admission to a monastery by simony, and there takes the solemn vow of profession. But no one should be freed from the obligation of a vow on account of a fault he has committed. Therefore he should not be expelled from the monastic state which he has acquired by simony. Obj. 6: Further, in this world external punishment is not inflicted for the internal movements of the heart, whereof God alone is the judge. Now simony is committed in the mere intention or will, wherefore it is defined in reference to the will, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). Therefore a person should not always be deprived of what he has acquired by simony. Obj. 7: Further, to be promoted to greater dignity is much less than to retain that which one has already received. Now sometimes those who are guilty of simony are, by dispensation, promoted to greater dignity. Therefore they should not always be deprived of what they have received. On the contrary, It is written (I, qu. i, cap. Si quis Episcopus): He that has been ordained shall profit nothing from his ordination or promotion that he has acquired by the bargain, but shall forfeit the dignity or cure that he has acquired with his money. I answer that, No one can lawfully retain that which he has acquired against the owner’s will. For instance, if a steward were to give some of his lord’s property to a person, against his lord’s will and orders, the recipient could not lawfully retain what he received. Now Our Lord, Whose stewards and ministers are the prelates of churches, ordered

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stri, ordinavit ut spiritualia gratis darentur, secundum illud Matth. X, gratis accepistis, gratis date. Et ideo qui muneris interventu spiritualia quaecumque assequuntur, ea licite retinere non possunt. Insuper autem simoniaci, tam vendentes quam ementes spiritualia, aut etiam mediatores, aliis poenis puniuntur, scilicet infamia et depositione, si sint clerici; et excommunicatione, si sint laici; ut habetur I, qu. I, cap. si quis episcopus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille qui simoniace accipit sacrum ordinem, recipit quidem characterem ordinis, propter efficaciam sacramenti, non tamen recipit gratiam, neque ordinis executionem, eo quod quasi furtive suscepit characterem, contra principalis domini voluntatem. Et ideo est ipso iure suspensus, et quoad se, ut scilicet de executione sui ordinis se non intromittat; et quoad alios, ut scilicet nullus ei communicet in ordinis executione; sive sit peccatum eius publicum, sive occultum. Nec potest repetere pecuniam quam turpiter dedit, licet alius iniuste detineat. Si vero sit simoniacus quia contulit ordinem simoniace, vel quia dedit vel recepit beneficium simoniace, vel fuit mediator simoniae, si est publicum, est ipso iure suspensus et quoad se et quoad alios; si autem est occultum, est suspensus ipso iure quoad se tantum, non autem quoad alios.

Ad secundum dicendum quod nec propter praeceptum eius, nec etiam propter excommunicationem, debet aliquis recipere ordinem ab episcopo quem scit simoniace promotum. Et si ordinetur, non recipit ordinis executionem, etiam si ignoret eum esse simoniacum, sed indiget dispensatione. Quamvis quidam dicunt quod, si non potest probare eum esse simoniacum, debet obedire recipiendo ordinem, sed non debet exequi sine dispensatione. Sed hoc absque ratione dicitur. Quia nullus debet obedire alicui ad communicandum sibi in facto illicito. Ille autem qui est ipso iure suspensus et quoad se et quoad alios, illicite confert ordinem. Unde nullus debet sibi communicare recipiendo ab eo, quacumque ex causa. Si autem ei non constat, non debet credere peccatum alterius, et ita cum bona conscientia debet ab eo ordinem recipere. Si autem episcopus sit simoniacus aliquo alio modo quam per promotionem suam simoniace factam, potest recipere ab eo ordinem, si sit occultum, quia non est suspensus quoad alios, sed solum quoad seipsum, ut dictum est.

Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc quod aliquis privetur eo quod accepit, non solum est poena peccati, sed

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spiritual things to be given gratis, according to Matt. 10:8, Freely have you received, freely give. Wherefore whosoever acquires spiritual things in return for a remuneration cannot lawfully retain them. Moreover, those who are guilty of simony, by either selling or buying spiritual things, as well as those who act as go-between, are sentenced to other punishments, namely, infamy and deposition, if they be clerics, and excommunication if they be laymen, as stated qu. i, cap. Si quis Episcopus. Reply Obj. 1: He that has received a sacred Order simoniacally, receives the character of the Order on account of the efficacy of the sacrament: but he does not receive the grace nor the exercise of the Order, because he has received the character by stealth as it were, and against the will of the Supreme Lord. Wherefore he is suspended, by virtue of the law, both as regards himself, namely, that he should not busy himself about exercising his Order, and as regards others, namely, that no one may communicate with him in the exercise of his Order, whether his sin be public or secret. Nor may he reclaim the money which he basely gave, although the other party unjustly retains it. Again, a man who is guilty of simony, through having conferred Orders simoniacally, or through having simoniacally granted or received a benefice, or through having been a go-between in a simoniacal transaction, if he has done so publicly, is suspended by virtue of the law, as regards both himself and others; but if he has acted in secret he is suspended by virtue of the law, as regards himself alone, and not as regards others. Reply Obj. 2: One ought not to receive Orders from a bishop one knows to have been promoted simoniacally, either on account of his command or for fear of his excommunication: and such as receive Orders from him do not receive the exercise of their Orders, even though they are ignorant of his being guilty of simony; and they need to receive a dispensation. Some, however, maintain that one ought to receive Orders in obedience to his command unless one can prove him to be guilty of simony, but that one ought not to exercise the Order without a dispensation. But this is an unreasonable statement, because no one should obey a man to the extent of communicating with him in an unlawful action. Now he that is, by virtue of the law, suspended as regards both himself and others, confers Orders unlawfully: wherefore no one should communicate with him, by receiving Orders from him for any cause whatever. If, however, one be not certain on the point, one ought not to give credence to another’s sin, and so one ought with a good conscience to receive Orders from him. And if the bishop has been guilty of simony otherwise than by a simoniacal promotion, and the fact be a secret, one can receive Orders from him because he is not suspended as regards others, but only as regards himself, as stated above (ad 1). Reply Obj. 3: To be deprived of what one has received is not only the punishment of a sin, but is also sometimes

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etiam quandoque est effectus acquisitionis iniustae, puta cum aliquis emit rem aliquam ab eo qui vendere non potest. Et ideo si aliquis scienter et propria sponte simoniace accipiat ordinem vel ecclesiasticum beneficium, non solum privatur eo quod accepit, ut scilicet careat executione ordinis et beneficium resignet cum fructibus inde perceptis; sed etiam ulterius punitur, quia notatur infamia; et tenetur ad restituendos fructus non solum perceptos, sed etiam eos qui percipi potuerunt a possessore diligenti (quod tamen intelligendum est de fructibus qui supersunt deductis expensis factis causa fructuum, exceptis fructibus illis qui alias expensi sunt in utilitatem Ecclesiae). Si vero, eo nec volente nec sciente, per alios alicuius promotio simoniace procuratur, caret quidem ordinis executione, et tenetur resignare beneficium quod est consecutus, cum fructibus extantibus (non autem tenetur restituere fructus consumptos, quia bona fide possedit), nisi forte inimicus eius fraudulenter pecuniam daret pro alicuius promotione, vel nisi ipse expresse contradixerit. Tunc enim non tenetur ad abrenuntiandum, nisi forte postmodum pacto consenserit, solvendo quod fuit promissum. Ad quartum dicendum quod pecunia, vel possessio, vel fructus simoniace accepti, debent restitui Ecclesiae in cuius iniuriam data sunt, non obstante quod praelatus, vel aliquis de collegio illius Ecclesiae, fuit in culpa, quia eorum peccatum non debet aliis nocere. Ita tamen quod, quantum fieri potest, ipsi qui peccaverunt inde commodum non consequantur. Si vero praelatus et totum collegium sunt in culpa, debet cum auctoritate superioris vel pauperibus vel alteri Ecclesiae erogari. Ad quintum dicendum quod si aliqui sunt in monasterio simoniace recepti, debent abrenuntiare. Et si eis scientibus commissa est simonia post Concilium generale, sine spe restitutionis de suo monasterio repelluntur, et ad agendam perpetuam poenitentiam sunt in arctiori regula ponendi, vel in aliquo loco eiusdem ordinis, si arctior ordo non inveniretur. Si vero hoc fuit ante Concilium, debent in aliis locis eiusdem ordinis collocari. Et si hoc fieri non potest, dispensative debent in eisdem monasteriis recipi, ne in saeculo evagentur, mutatis tamen prioribus locis et inferioribus assignatis.

Si vero ipsis ignorantibus, sive ante Concilium sive post, sint simoniace recepti, postquam renuntiaverint, possunt de novo recipi, locis mutatis, ut dictum est. Ad sextum dicendum quod quoad Deum sola voluntas facit simoniacum, sed quoad poenam ecclesiasti-

Q. 100, A. 6

the effect of acquiring unjustly, as when one buys a thing of a person who cannot sell it. Wherefore if a man, knowingly and spontaneously, receives Orders or an ecclesiastical benefice simoniacally, not only is he deprived of what he has received, by forfeiting the exercise of his order, and resigning the benefice and the fruits acquired therefrom, but also in addition to this he is punished by being marked with infamy. Moreover, he is bound to restore not only the fruit actually acquired, but also such as could have been acquired by a careful possessor (which, however, is to be understood of the net fruits, allowance being made for expenses incurred on account of the fruits), excepting those fruits that have been expended for the good of the Church. On the other hand, if a man’s promotion be procured simoniacally by others, without his knowledge and consent, he forfeits the exercise of his Order, and is bound to resign the benefice obtained together with fruits still extant; but he is not bound to restore the fruits which he has consumed, since he possessed them in good faith. Exception must be made in the case when his promotion has been deceitfully procured by an enemy of his; or when he expressly opposes the transaction, for then he is not bound to resign, unless subsequently he agree to the transaction, by paying what was promised. Reply Obj. 4: Money, property, or fruits simoniacally received, must be restored to the Church that has incurred loss by their transfer, notwithstanding the fact that the prelate or a member of the chapter of that church was at fault, since others ought not to be the losers by his sin: in suchwise, however, that, as far as possible, the guilty parties be not the gainers. But if the prelate and the entire chapter be at fault, restitution must be made, with the consent of superior authority, either to the poor or to some other church. Reply Obj. 5: If there are any persons who have been simoniacally admitted into a monastery, they must quit: and if the simony was committed with their knowledge since the holding of the General Council, they must be expelled from their monastery without hope of return, and do perpetual penance under a stricter rule, or in some house of the same order, if a stricter one be not found. If, however, this took place before the Council, they must be placed in other houses of the same order. If this cannot be done, they must be received into monasteries of the same order, by way of compensation, lest they wander about the world, but they must not be admitted to their former rank, and must be assigned a lower place. On the other hand, if they were received simoniacally, without their knowledge, whether before or after the Council, then after quitting they may be received again, their rank being changed as stated. Reply Obj. 6: In God’s sight the mere will makes a man guilty of simony; but as regards the external ecclesi-

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cam exteriorem, non punitur ut simoniacus, ut abrenun- astical punishment he is not punished as a simoniac, by betiare teneatur, sed debet de mala intentione poenitere. ing obliged to resign, but is bound to repent of his evil intention. Ad septimum dicendum quod dispensare cum eo Reply Obj. 7: The Pope alone can grant a dispensation qui est scienter beneficiatus, solus Papa potest. In aliis to one who has knowingly received a benefice (simoniaautem casibus potest etiam episcopus dispensare, ita ta- cally). In other cases the bishop also can dispense, provided men quod prius abrenuntiet quod simoniace acquisivit. the beneficiary first of all renounce what he has received Et tunc dispensationem consequatur vel parvam, ut ha- simoniacally, so that he will receive either the lesser disbeat laicam communionem; vel magnam, ut, post poe- pensation allowing him to communicate with the laity, or a nitentiam, in alia Ecclesia in suo ordine remaneat; vel greater dispensation, allowing him after doing penance to maiorem, ut remaneat in eadem, sed in minoribus ordi- retain his order in some other Church; or again a greater nibus; vel maximam, ut in eadem Ecclesia etiam maiores dispensation, allowing him to remain in the same Church, ordines exequatur, non tamen praelationem accipiat. but in minor orders; or a full dispensation allowing him to exercise even the major orders in the same Church, but not to accept a prelacy.

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Question 101 Piety Deinde, post religionem, considerandum est de pieAfter religion we must consider piety, the consideration tate. Cuius opposita vitia ex ipsius consideratione inno- of which will render the opposite vices manifest. Accordtescunt. Circa pietatem ergo quaeruntur quatuor. ingly four points of inquiry arise with regard to piety: Primo, ad quos pietas se extendat. (1) To whom does piety extend? Secundo, quid per pietatem aliquibus exhibeatur. (2) What does piety make one offer a person? Tertio, utrum pietas sit specialis virtus. (3) Whether piety is a special virtue? Quarto, utrum religionis obtentu sit pietatis (4) Whether the duties of piety should be omitted for officium praetermittendum. the sake of religion?

Article 1 Whether piety extends to particular human individuals? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pietas non se extendat ad determinatas personas aliquorum hominum, dicit enim Augustinus, in X de Civ. Dei, quod pietas proprie Dei cultus intelligi solet, quam Graeci eusebiam vocant. Sed Dei cultus non dicitur per comparationem ad homines, sed solum ad Deum. Ergo pietas non se extendit determinate ad aliquas hominum personas. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in I Moral., pietas in die suo convivium exhibet, quia cordis viscera misericordiae operibus replet. Sed opera misericordiae sunt omnibus exhibenda, ut patet per Augustinum, in I de Doct. Christ. Ergo pietas non se extendit determinate ad aliquas speciales personas. Praeterea, multae sunt aliae in humanis rebus communicationes praeter consanguinitatem et concivium communicationem, ut patet per philosophum, in VIII Ethic., et super quamlibet earum aliqua amicitia fundatur, quae videtur esse pietatis virtus, ut dicit Glossa, II ad Tim. III, super illud. Habentes quidem speciem pietatis. Ergo non solum ad consanguineos et concives pietas se extendit. Sed contra est quod Tullius dicit, in sua rhetorica, pietas est per quam sanguine iunctis, patriaeque benevolis, officium et diligens tribuitur cultus. Respondeo dicendum quod homo efficitur diversimode aliis debitor secundum diversam eorum excellentiam, et diversa beneficia ab eis suscepta. In utroque autem Deus summum obtinet locum, qui et excellentissimus est, et est nobis essendi et gubernationis primum principium. Secundario vero nostri esse et gubernationis principium sunt parentes et patria, a quibus et in qua et nati et nutriti sumus. Et ideo post Deum, maxime est homo debitor parentibus et patriae. Unde sicut ad reli-

Objection 1: It seems that piety does not extend to particular human individuals. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x) that piety denotes, properly speaking, the worship of God, which the Greeks designate by the term eusebeia. But the worship of God does not denote relation to man, but only to God. Therefore piety does not extend definitely to certain human individuals. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i): Piety, on her day, provides a banquet, because she fills the inmost recesses of the heart with works of mercy. Now the works of mercy are to be done to all, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i). Therefore piety does not extend definitely to certain special persons. Obj. 3: Further, in human affairs there are many other mutual relations besides those of kindred and citizenship, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 11, 12), and on each of them is founded a kind of friendship, which would seem to be the virtue of piety, according to a gloss on 2 Tim. 3:5, Having an appearance indeed of piety. Therefore piety extends not only to one’s kindred and fellow-citizens. On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that it is by piety that we do our duty towards our kindred and well-wishers of our country and render them faithful service. I answer that, Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways, according to their various excellence and the various benefits received from them. On both counts God holds first place, for He is supremely excellent, and is for us the first principle of being and government. In the second place, the principles of our being and government are our parents and our country, that have given us birth and nourishment. Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents and his country, after God. Wherefore just as it

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gionem pertinet cultum Deo exhibere, ita secundo gradu ad pietatem pertinet exhibere cultum parentibus et patriae. In cultu autem parentum includitur cultus omnium consanguineorum, quia etiam consanguinei ex hoc dicuntur quod ex eisdem parentibus processerunt, ut patet per philosophum, in VIII Ethic. In cultu autem patriae intelligitur cultus concivium, et omnium patriae amicorum. Et ideo ad hos principaliter pietas se extendit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in maiori includitur minus. Et ideo cultus qui Deo debetur includit in se, sicut aliquid particulare, cultum qui debetur parentibus. Unde dicitur Malach. I, si ego pater, ubi honor meus? Et ideo nomen pietatis etiam ad divinum cultum refertur. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in X de Civ. Dei, more vulgi nomen pietatis etiam in operibus misericordiae frequentatur. Quod ideo arbitror evenisse quia haec fieri praecipue mandat Deus, eaque sibi vel pro sacrificiis placere testatur. Ex qua consuetudine factum est ut et Deus ipse pius dicatur. Ad tertium dicendum quod communicatio consanguineorum et concivium magis referuntur ad principia nostri esse quam aliae communicationes. Et ideo ad hoc nomen pietatis magis extenditur.

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belongs to religion to give worship to God, so does it belong to piety, in the second place, to give worship to one’s parents and one’s country. The worship due to our parents includes the worship given to all our kindred, since our kinsfolk are those who descend from the same parents, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12). The worship given to our country includes homage to all our fellow-citizens and to all the friends of our country. Therefore piety extends chiefly to these. Reply Obj. 1: The greater includes the lesser: wherefore the worship due to God includes the worship due to our parents as a particular. Hence it is written (Mal 1:6): If I be a father, where is My honor? Consequently the term piety extends also to the divine worship. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), the term piety is often used in connection with works of mercy, in the language of the common people; the reason for which I consider to be the fact that God Himself has declared that these works are more pleasing to Him than sacrifices. This custom has led to the application of the word ‘pious’ to God Himself. Reply Obj. 3: The relations of a man with his kindred and fellow-citizens are more referable to the principles of his being than other relations: wherefore the term piety is more applicable to them.

Article 2 Whether piety provides support for our parents? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pietas non exhibeat parentibus sustentationem. Ad pietatem enim videtur pertinere illud praeceptum Decalogi, honora patrem tuum et matrem tuam. Sed ibi non praecipitur nisi honoris exhibitio. Ergo ad pietatem non pertinet sustentationem parentibus exhibere. Praeterea, illis debet homo thesaurizare quos tenetur sustentare. Sed secundum apostolum, II ad Cor. XII, filii non debent thesaurizare parentibus. Ergo non tenentur eos per pietatem sustentare.

Objection 1: It seems that piety does not provide support for our parents. For, seemingly, the precept of the decalogue, Honor thy father and mother, belongs to piety. But this prescribes only the giving of honor. Therefore it does not belong to piety to provide support for one’s parents.

Obj. 2: Further, a man is bound to lay up for those whom he is bound to support. Now according to the Apostle (2 Cor 12:14), neither ought the children to lay up for the parents. Therefore piety does not oblige them to support their parents. Praeterea, pietas non solum se extendit ad parenObj. 3: Further, piety extends not only to one’s parents, tes, sed etiam ad alios consanguineos et concives, ut dic- but also to other kinsmen and to one’s fellow-citizens, as tum est. Sed non tenetur aliquis omnes consanguineos et stated above (A. 1). But one is not bound to support all one’s concives sustentare. Ergo nec etiam tenetur ad sustenta- kindred and fellow-citizens. Therefore neither is one bound tionem parentum. to support one’s parents. Sed contra est quod dominus, Matth. XV, redarOn the contrary, our Lord (Matt 15:3–6) reproved guit Pharisaeos quod impediebant filios ne parentibus the Pharisees for hindering children from supporting their sustentationem exhiberent. parents. Respondeo dicendum quod parentibus aliquid deI answer that, We owe something to our parents in betur dupliciter, uno modo, per se; alio modo, per acci- two ways: that is to say, both essentially, and accidentally.

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dens. Per se quidem debetur eis id quod decet patrem inquantum est pater. Qui cum sit superior, quasi principium filii existens, debetur ei a filio reverentia et obsequium. Per accidens autem aliquid debetur patri quod decet eum accipere secundum aliquid quod ei accidit, puta, si sit infirmus, quod visitetur, et eius curationi intendatur; et si sit pauper, quod sustentetur; et sic de aliis huiusmodi, quae omnia sub debito obsequio continentur. Et ideo Tullius dicit quod pietas exhibet et officium et cultum. Ut officium referatur ad obsequium, cultus vero ad reverentiam sive honorem; quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in X de Civ. Dei, dicimur colere homines quos honorificatione, vel recordatione, vel praesentia frequentamus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in honoratione parentum intelligitur omnis subventio quae debet parentibus exhiberi, ut dominus interpretatur, Matth. XV. Et hoc ideo, quia subventio fit patri ex debito, tanquam maiori. Ad secundum dicendum quod quia pater habet rationem principii, filius autem habet rationem a principio existentis, ideo per se patri convenit ut subveniat filio; et propter hoc, non solum ad horam debet ei subvenire, sed ad totam suam vitam, quod est thesaurizare. Sed quod filius aliquid conferat patri, hoc est per accidens, ratione alicuius necessitatis instantis, in qua tenetur ei subvenire, non autem thesaurizare, quasi in longinquum, quia naturaliter non parentes filiorum, sed filii parentum sunt successores. Ad tertium dicendum quod cultus et officium, ut Tullius dicit, debetur omnibus sanguine iunctis et patriae benevolis, non tamen aequaliter omnibus, sed praecipue parentibus, aliis autem secundum propriam facultatem et decentiam personarum.

Q. 101, A. 3

We owe them essentially that which is due to a father as such: and since he is his son’s superior through being the principle of his being, the latter owes him reverence and service. Accidentally, that is due to a father, which it befits him to receive in respect of something accidental to him, for instance, if he be ill, it is fitting that his children should visit him and see to his cure; if he be poor, it is fitting that they should support him; and so on in like instance, all of which come under the head of service due. Hence Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that piety gives both duty and homage: duty referring to service, and homage to reverence or honor, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), we are said to give homage to those whose memory or presence we honor. Reply Obj. 1: According to our Lord’s interpretation (Matt 15:3–6) the honor due to our parents includes whatever support we owe them; and the reason for this is that support is given to one’s father because it is due to him as to one greater. Reply Obj. 2: Since a father stands in the relation of principle, and his son in the relation of that which is from a principle, it is essentially fitting for a father to support his son: and consequently he is bound to support him not only for a time, but for all his life, and this is to lay by. On the other hand, for the son to bestow something on his father is accidental, arising from some momentary necessity, wherein he is bound to support him, but not to lay by as for a long time beforehand, because naturally parents are not the successors of their children, but children of their parents. Reply Obj. 3: As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), we offer homage and duty to all our kindred and to the wellwishers of our country; not, however, equally to all, but chiefly to our parents, and to others according to our means and their personal claims.

Article 3 Whether piety is a special virtue distinct from other virtues? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod pietas non sit specialis virtus ab aliis distincta. Exhibere enim obsequium et cultum aliquibus ex amore procedit. Sed hoc pertinet ad pietatem. Ergo pietas non est virtus a caritate distincta. Praeterea, cultum Deo exhibere est proprium religionis. Sed etiam pietas exhibet Deo cultum, ut Augustinus dicit, X de Civ. Dei. Ergo pietas non distinguitur a religione. Praeterea, pietas quae exhibet cultum et officium patriae videtur idem esse cum iustitia legali, quae respicit bonum commune. Sed iustitia legalis est virtus gene-

Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues. For the giving of service and homage to anyone proceeds from love. But it belongs to piety. Therefore piety is not a distinct virtue from charity. Obj. 2: Further, it is proper to religion to give worship to God. But piety also gives worship to God, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x). Therefore piety is not distinct from religion. Obj. 3: Further, piety, whereby we give our country worship and duty, seems to be the same as legal justice, which looks to the common good. But legal justice is a gen-

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ralis, ut patet per philosophum, in V Ethic. Ergo pietas eral virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1, 2). non est virtus specialis. Therefore piety is not a special virtue. Sed contra est quod ponitur a Tullio pars iustitiae. On the contrary, It is accounted by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) as a part of justice. Respondeo dicendum quod virtus aliqua est speI answer that, A special virtue is one that regards an cialis ex hoc quod respicit aliquod obiectum secundum object under a special aspect. Since, then, the nature of jusaliquam rationem specialem. Cum autem ad rationem tice consists in rendering another person his due, wherever iustitiae pertineat quod debitum alii reddat, ubi inveni- there is a special aspect of something due to a person, there tur specialis ratio debiti alicui personae, ibi est specialis is a special virtue. Now a thing is indebted in a special way virtus. Debetur autem aliquid specialiter alicui quia est to that which is its connatural principle of being and govconnaturale principium producens in esse et gubernans. ernment. And piety regards this principle, inasmuch as it Hoc autem principium respicit pietas, inquantum paren- pays duty and homage to our parents and country, and to tibus et patriae, et his qui ad haec ordinantur, officium et those who are related thereto. Therefore piety is a special cultum impendit. Et ideo pietas est specialis virtus. virtue. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut religio est Reply Obj. 1: Just as religion is a protestation of faith, quaedam protestatio fidei, spei et caritatis, quibus ho- hope and charity, whereby man is primarily directed to mo primordialiter ordinatur in Deum; ita etiam pietas God, so again piety is a protestation of the charity we bear est quaedam protestatio caritatis quam quis habet ad pa- towards our parents and country. rentes et ad patriam. Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus longe excelReply Obj. 2: God is the principle of our being and lentiori modo est principium essendi et gubernationis government in a far more excellent manner than one’s faquam pater vel patria. Et ideo alia virtus est religio, quae ther or country. Hence religion, which gives worship to cultum Deo exhibet, a pietate, quae exhibet cultum pa- God, is a distinct virtue from piety, which pays homage to rentibus et patriae. Sed ea quae sunt creaturarum per our parents and country. But things relating to creatures are quandam superexcellentiam et causalitatem transferun- transferred to God as the summit of excellence and causaltur in Deum, ut Dionysius dicit, in libro de Div. Nom. ity, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): wherefore, by way of exUnde per excellentiam pietas cultus Dei nominatur, si- cellence, piety designates the worship of God, even as God, cut et Deus excellenter dicitur pater noster. by way of excellence, is called Our Father. Ad tertium dicendum quod pietas se extendit ad Reply Obj. 3: Piety extends to our country insofar as patriam secundum quod est nobis quoddam essendi the latter is for us a principle of being: but legal justice reprincipium, sed iustitia legalis respicit bonum patriae se- gards the good of our country, considered as the common cundum quod est bonum commune. Et ideo iustitia le- good: wherefore legal justice has more of the character of a galis magis habet quod sit virtus generalis quam pietas. general virtue than piety has.

Article 4 Whether the duties of piety towards one’s parents should be omitted for the sake of religion? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod occasione religionis sint praetermittenda pietatis officia in parentes. Dicit enim dominus, Luc. XIV, si quis venit ad me, et non odit patrem suum et matrem et uxorem, fratres, filios et sorores, adhuc autem et animam suam, non potest meus esse discipulus. Unde et in laudem Iacobi et Ioannis, Matth. IV, dicitur quod, relictis retibus et patre, secuti sunt Christum. Et in laudem Levitarum dicitur, Deut. XXXIII, qui dixit patri suo et matri suae, nescio vos; et fratribus suis, ignoro illos; et nescierunt filios suos, hi custodierunt eloquium tuum. Sed ignorando parentes et alios consanguineos, vel etiam eos odiendo, necesse est

Objection 1: It seems that the duties of piety towards one’s parents should be omitted for the sake of religion. For Our Lord said (Luke 14:26): If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea and his own life also, he cannot be My disciple. Hence it is said in praise of James and John (Matt 4:22) that they left their nets and father, and followed Christ. Again it is said in praise of the Levites (Deut 33:9): Who hath said to his father, and to his mother: I do not know you; and to his brethren: I know you not; and their own children they have not known. These have kept Thy word. Now a man who knows not his parents and other kinsmen, or

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quod praetermittantur pietatis officia. Ergo propter reli- who even hates them, must needs omit the duties of piety. gionem officia pietatis sunt praetermittenda. Therefore the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of religion. Praeterea, Matth. VIII et Luc. IX dicitur quod doObj. 2: Further, it is written (Luke 9:59, 60) that in anminus dicenti sibi, permitte mihi primum ire et sepelire swer to him who said: Suffer me first to go and bury my fapatrem meum, respondit, sine ut mortui sepeliant mor- ther, Our Lord replied: Let the dead bury their dead: but go tuos suos. Tu autem vade et annuntia regnum Dei, quod thou, and preach the kingdom of God. Now the latter perpertinet ad religionem. Sepultura autem patris pertinet tains to religion, while it is a duty of piety to bury one’s faad pietatis officium. Ergo pietatis officium est praeter- ther. Therefore a duty of piety should be omitted for the mittendum propter religionem. sake of religion. Praeterea, Deus per excellentiam dicitur pater noObj. 3: Further, God is called Our Father by excellence. ster. Sed sicut per pietatis obsequia colimus parentes, Now just as we worship our parents by paying them the duita per religionem colimus Deum. Ergo praetermittenda ties of piety so do we worship God by religion. Therefore the sunt pietatis obsequia propter religionis cultum. duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of the worship of religion. Praeterea, religiosi tenentur ex voto, quod tranObj. 4: Further, religious are bound by a vow which sgredi non licet, suae religionis observantias implere. they may not break to fulfill the observances of religion. Secundum quas suis parentibus subvenire impediun- Now in accordance with those observances they are hintur, tum propter paupertatem, quia proprio carent; tum dered from supporting their parents, both on the score of etiam propter inobedientiam, quia sine licentia suorum poverty, since they have nothing of their own, and on the praelatorum eis claustrum exire non licet. Ergo prop- score of obedience, since they may not leave the cloister ter religionem praetermittenda sunt pietatis officia in pa- without the permission of their superior. Therefore the durentes. ties of piety towards one’s parents should be omitted for the sake of religion. Sed contra est quod dominus, Matth. XV, redarOn the contrary, Our Lord reproved the Pharisees guit Pharisaeos, qui intuitu religionis honorem parenti- (Matt 15:3–6) who taught that for the sake of religion one bus debitum subtrahere docebant. ought to refrain from paying one’s parents the honor we owe them. Respondeo dicendum quod religio et pietas sunt I answer that, Religion and piety are two virtues. duae virtutes. Nulla autem virtus alii virtuti contraria- Now no virtue is opposed to another virtue, since according tur aut repugnat, quia secundum philosophum, in prae- to the Philosopher, in his book on the Categories (Cap. De dicamentis, bonum non est bono contrarium. Unde non Oppos.), good is not opposed to good. Therefore it is impossipotest esse quod pietas et religio se mutuo impediant, ut ble that religion and piety mutually hinder one another, so propter unam alterius actus excludatur. Cuiuslibet enim that the act of one be excluded by the act of the other. Now, virtutis actus, ut ex supra dictis patet, debitis circum- as stated above (I-II, Q. 7, A. 2; Q. 18, A. 3), the act of evstantiis limitatur, quas si praetereat, iam non erit virtu- ery virtue is limited by the circumstances due thereto, and tis actus, sed vitii. Unde ad pietatem pertinet officium if it overstep them it will be an act no longer of virtue but et cultum parentibus exhibere secundum debitum mo- of vice. Hence it belongs to piety to pay duty and homage dum. Non est autem debitus modus ut plus homo in- to one’s parents according to the due mode. But it is not the tendat ad colendum patrem quam ad colendum Deum, due mode that man should tend to worship his father rather sed sicut Ambrosius dicit, super Luc., necessitudini gene- than God, but, as Ambrose says on Luke 12:52, the piety of ris divinae religionis pietas antefertur. divine religion takes precedence of the claims of kindred. Si ergo cultus parentum abstrahat nos a cultu Dei, Accordingly, if the worship of one’s parents take one iam non esset pietatis parentum insistere cultui contra away from the worship of God it would no longer be an Deum. Unde Hieronymus dicit, in epistola ad Heliodo- act of piety to pay worship to one’s parents to the prejurum, per calcatum perge patrem, per calcatam perge ma- dice of God. Hence Jerome says (Ep. ad Heliod.): Though trem, ad vexillum crucis evola. Summum genus pietatis est thou trample upon thy father, though thou spurn thy mother, in hac re fuisse crudelem. Et ideo in tali casu dimittenda turn not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of the sunt officia in parentes propter divinum religionis cul- cross; it is the highest degree of piety to be cruel in this mattum. Si vero exhibendo debita obsequia parentibus non ter. Therefore in such a case the duties of piety towards one’s abstrahamur a divino cultu, hoc iam pertinebit ad pie- parents should be omitted for the sake of the worship reli-

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tatem. Et sic non oportebit propter religionem pietatem gion gives to God. If, however, by paying the services due to deserere. our parents, we are not withdrawn from the service of God, then will it be an act of piety, and there will be no need to set piety aside for the sake of religion. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Gregorius, expoReply Obj. 1: Gregory expounding this saying of our nens illud verbum domini, dicit quod parentes quos ad- Lord says (Hom. xxxvii in Ev.) that when we find our parents versarios in via Dei patimur, odiendo et fugiendo nesci- to be a hindrance in our way to God, we must ignore them re debemus. Si enim parentes nostri nos provocent ad by hating and fleeing from them. For if our parents incite us peccandum, et abstrahant nos a cultu divino, debemus to sin, and withdraw us from the service of God, we must, quantum ad hoc eos deserere et odire. Et hoc modo di- as regards this point, abandon and hate them. It is in this cuntur Levitae suos consanguineos ignorasse, quia ido- sense that the Levites are said to have not known their kinlolatris, secundum mandatum domini, non pepercerunt, dred, because they obeyed the Lord’s command, and spared ut habetur Exod. XXXII. Iacobus autem et Ioannes lau- not the idolaters (Exod 32). James and John are praised for dantur ex hoc quod secuti sunt dominum dimisso pa- leaving their parents and following our Lord, not that their rente, non quia eorum pater eos provocaret ad malum, father incited them to evil, but because they deemed it possed quia aliter aestimabant ipsum posse vitam transige- sible for him to find another means of livelihood, if they folre, eis sequentibus Christum. lowed Christ. Ad secundum dicendum quod dominus ideo proReply Obj. 2: Our Lord forbade the disciple to bury hibuit discipulum a sepultura patris, quia, sicut Chryso- his father because, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii stomus dicit, per hoc eum dominus a multis malis eripuit, in Matth.), Our Lord by so doing saved him from many evils, puta luctibus et maeroribus, et aliis quae hinc expectan- such as the sorrows and worries and other things that one antur. Post sepulturam enim necesse erat et testamenta scru- ticipates under these circumstances. For after the burial the tari, et haereditatis divisionem, et alia huiusmodi. Et prae- will had to be read, the estate had to be divided, and so forth: cipue quia alii erant qui complere poterant huius funeris but chiefly, because there were others who could see to the fusepulturam. Vel, sicut Cyrillus exponit, super Lucam, di- neral. Or, according to Cyril’s commentary on Luke 9, this scipulus ille non petiit quod patrem iam defunctum sepeli- disciple’s request was, not that he might bury a dead father, ret, sed adhuc viventem in senectute sustentaret usquequo but that he might support a yet living father in the latter’s old sepeliret. Quod dominus non concessit, quia erant alii qui age, until at length he should bury him. This is what Our Lord eius curam habere poterant, linea parentelae adstricti. did not grant, because there were others, bound by the duties of kindred, to take care of him. Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod paReply Obj. 3: Whatever we give our parents out of rentibus carnalibus ex pietate exhibemus, in Deum re- piety is referred by us to God; just as other works of mercy ferimus, sicut et alia misericordiae opera quae quibu- which we perform with regard to any of our neighbors are scumque proximis impendimus, Deo exhibita videntur offered to God, according to Matt. 25:40: As long as you did secundum illud Matth. XXV, quod uni ex minimis meis it to one of . . . My least . . . you did it to Me. Accordingly, if fecistis, mihi fecistis. Et ideo si carnalibus parentibus no- our carnal parents stand in need of our assistance, so that stra obsequia sunt necessaria, ut sine his sustentari non they have no other means of support, provided they incite possint; nec nos ad aliquid contra Deum inducant, non us to nothing against God, we must not abandon them for debemus intuitu religionis eos deserere. Si autem si- the sake of religion. But if we cannot devote ourselves to ne peccato eorum obsequiis vacare non possumus; vel their service without sin, or if they can be supported withetiam si absque nostro obsequio possunt sustentari, li- out our assistance, it is lawful to forego their service, so as citum est eorum obsequia praetermittere ad hoc quod to give more time to religion. amplius religioni vacemus. Ad quartum dicendum quod aliud est dicendum Reply Obj. 4: We must speak differently of one who is de eo qui est adhuc in saeculo constitutus, et aliud de eo yet in the world, and of one who has made his profession qui est iam in religione professus. Ille enim qui est in sae- in religion. For he that is in the world, if he has parents unculo constitutus, si habet parentes qui sine ipso sustenta- able to find support without him, he must not leave them ri non possunt, non debet, eis relictis, religionem intrare, and enter religion, because he would be breaking the comquia transgrederetur praeceptum de honoratione paren- mandment prescribing the honoring of parents. Some say, tum. Quamvis dicant quidam quod etiam in hoc casu li- however, that even then he might abandon them, and leave cite posset eos deserere, eorum curam Deo committens. them in God’s care. But this, considered aright, would be Sed si quis recte consideret, hoc esset tentare Deum, cum to tempt God: since, while having human means at hand, habens ex humano consilio quid ageret, periculo paren- he would be exposing his parents to danger, in the hope tes exponeret sub spe divini auxilii. Si vero sine eo pa- of God’s assistance. On the other hand, if the parents can

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rentes vitam transigere possent, licitum esset ei, desertis parentibus, religionem intrare. Quia filii non tenentur ad sustentationem parentum nisi causa necessitatis, ut dictum est. Ille vero qui iam est in religione professus, reputatur iam quasi mortuus mundo. Unde non debet occasione sustentationis parentum exire claustrum, in quo Christo consepelitur, et se iterum saecularibus negotiis implicare. Tenetur tamen, salva sui praelati obedientia et suae religionis statu, pium studium adhibere qualiter eius parentibus subveniatur.

Q. 101, A. 4

find means of livelihood without him, it is lawful for him to abandon them and enter religion, because children are not bound to support their parents except in cases of necessity, as stated above. He that has already made his profession in religion is deemed to be already dead to the world: wherefore he ought not, under pretext of supporting his parents, to leave the cloister where he is buried with Christ, and busy himself once more with worldly affairs. Nevertheless he is bound, saving his obedience to his superiors, and his religious state withal, to make points efforts for his parents’ support.

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Question 102 Observance Deinde considerandum est de observantia, et partiWe must now consider observance and its parts, the bus eius. Per quae de oppositis vitiis erit manifestum. considerations of which will manifest the contrary vices. Circa observantiam autem quaeruntur tria. Under the head of observance there are three points of inquiry: Primo, utrum observantia sit specialis virtus ab aliis (1) Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct distincta. from other virtues? Secundo, quid observantia exhibeat. (2) What does observance offer? Tertio, de comparatione eius ad pietatem. (3) Of its comparison with piety.

Article 1 Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod observantia non sit specialis virtus ab aliis distincta. Virtutes enim distinguuntur secundum obiecta. Sed obiectum observantiae non distinguitur ab obiecto pietatis. Dicit enim Tullius, in sua rhetorica, quod observantia est per quam homines aliqua dignitate antecedentes quodam cultu et honore dignantur. Sed cultum et honorem etiam pietas exhibet parentibus, qui dignitate antecedunt. Ergo observantia non est virtus distincta a pietate. Praeterea, sicut hominibus in dignitate constitutis debetur honor et cultus, ita etiam eis qui excellunt in scientia et virtute. Sed non est aliqua specialis virtus per quam honorem et cultum exibeamus hominibus qui scientiae vel virtutis excellentiam habent. Ergo etiam observantia, per quam cultum et honorem exhibemus his qui nos in dignitate antecedunt, non est specialis virtus ab aliis distincta. Praeterea, hominibus in dignitate constitutis multa debentur ad quae solvenda lex cogit, secundum illud Rom. XIII, reddite omnibus debita, cui tributum, tributum, et cetera. Ea vero ad quae per legem compellimur, pertinent ad iustitiam legalem, seu etiam ad iustitiam specialem. Ergo observantia non est per se specialis virtus ab aliis distincta. Sed contra est quod Tullius condividit observantiam aliis iustitiae partibus, quae sunt speciales virtutes.

Objection 1: It seems that observance is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues. For virtues are distinguished by their objects. But the object of observance is not distinct from the object of piety: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that it is by observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some kind of dignity. But worship and honor are paid also by piety to our parents, who excel in dignity. Therefore observance is not a distinct virtue from piety. Obj. 2: Further, just as honor and worship are due to those that are in a position of dignity, so also are they due to those who excel in science and virtue. But there is no special virtue whereby we pay honor and worship to those who excel in science and virtue. Therefore observance, whereby we pay worship and honor to those who excel in dignity, is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, we have many duties towards those who are in a position of dignity, the fulfilment of which is required by law, according to Rom. 13:7, Render . . . to all men their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due, etc. Now the fulfilment of the requirements of the law belongs to legal justice, or even to special justice. Therefore observance is not by itself a special virtue distinct from other virtues. On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons observance along with the other parts of justice, which are special virtues. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, I answer that, As explained above (Q. 101, AA. 1, 3; necesse est ut eo modo per quendam ordinatum descen- Q. 80), according to the various excellences of those persum distinguantur virtutes, sicut et excellentia persona- sons to whom something is due, there must needs be a rum quibus est aliquid reddendum. Sicut autem carnalis corresponding distinction of virtues in a descending order. pater particulariter participat rationem principii, quae Now just as a carnal father partakes of the character of prinuniversaliter invenitur in Deo; ita etiam persona quae ciple in a particular way, which character is found in God

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quantum ad aliquid providentiam circa nos gerit, particulariter participat proprietatem patris, quia pater est principium et generationis et educationis et disciplinae, et omnium quae ad perfectionem humanae vitae pertinent. Persona autem in dignitate constituta est sicut principium gubernationis respectu aliquarum rerum, sicut princeps civitatis in rebus civilibus, dux autem exercitus in rebus bellicis, magister autem in disciplinis, et simile est in aliis. Et inde est quod omnes tales personae patres appellantur, propter similitudinem curae, sicut IV Reg. V, servi Naaman dixerunt ad eum, pater, etsi rem grandem dixisset tibi propheta, et cetera. Et ideo sicut sub religione, per quam cultus tribuitur Deo, quodam ordine invenitur pietas, per quam coluntur parentes; ita sub pietate invenitur observantia, per quam cultus et honor exhibetur personis in dignitate constitutis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut supra dictum est quod religio per quandam supereminentiam pietas dicitur, et tamen pietas proprie dicta a religione distinguitur; ita etiam pietas per quandam excellentiam potest dici observantia, et tamen observantia proprie dicta a pietate distinguitur. Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquis ex hoc quod est in dignitate constitutus, non solum quandam status excellentiam habet, sed etiam quandam potestatem gubernandi subditos. Unde competit sibi ratio principii, prout est aliorum gubernator. Ex hoc autem quod aliquis habet perfectionem scientiae vel virtutis, non sortitur rationem principii quantum ad alios, sed solum quandam excellentiam in seipso. Et ideo specialiter quaedam virtus determinatur ad exhibendum honorem et cultum his qui sunt in dignitate constituti. Verum quia per scientiam et virtutem, et omnia alia huiusmodi, aliquis idoneus redditur ad dignitatis statum, reverentia quae propter quamcumque excellentiam aliquibus exhibetur, ad eandem virtutem pertinet. Ad tertium dicendum quod ad iustitiam specialem proprie sumptam pertinet reddere aequale ei cui aliquid debetur. Quod quidem non potest fieri ad virtuosos, et ad eos qui bene statu dignitatis utuntur, sicut nec ad Deum, nec ad parentes. Et ideo ad quandam virtutem adiunctam hoc pertinet, non autem ad iustitiam specialem, quae est principalis virtus. Iustitia vero legalis se extendit ad actus omnium virtutum, ut supra dictum est.

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in a universal way, so too a person who, in some way, exercises providence in one respect, partakes of the character of father in a particular way, since a father is the principle of generation, of education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the perfection of human life: while a person who is in a position of dignity is as a principle of government with regard to certain things: for instance, the governor of a state in civil matters, the commander of an army in matters of warfare, a professor in matters of learning, and so forth. Hence it is that all such persons are designated as fathers, on account of their being charged with like cares: thus the servants of Naaman said to him (4 Kgs 5:13): Father, if the prophet had bid thee do some great thing, etc. Therefore, just as, in a manner, beneath religion, whereby worship is given to God, we find piety, whereby we worship our parents; so under piety we find observance, whereby worship and honor are paid to persons in positions of dignity. Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 101, A. 3, ad 2), religion goes by the name of piety by way of supereminence, although piety properly so called is distinct from religion; and in the same way piety can be called observance by way of excellence, although observance properly speaking is distinct from piety. Reply Obj. 2: By the very fact of being in a position of dignity a man not only excels as regards his position, but also has a certain power of governing subjects, wherefore it is fitting that he should be considered as a principle inasmuch as he is the governor of others. On the other hand, the fact that a man has perfection of science and virtue does not give him the character of a principle in relation to others, but merely a certain excellence in himself. Wherefore a special virtue is appointed for the payment of worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity. Yet, forasmuch as science, virtue and all like things render a man fit for positions of dignity, the respect which is paid to anyone on account of any excellence whatever belongs to the same virtue. Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to special justice, properly speaking, to pay the equivalent to those to whom we owe anything. Now this cannot be done to the virtuous, and to those who make good use of their position of dignity, as neither can it be done to God, nor to our parents. Consequently these matters belong to an annexed virtue, and not to special justice, which is a principal virtue. Legal justice extends to the acts of all the virtues, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 6).

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Q. 102, A. 2

Article 2 Whether it belongs to observance to pay worship and honor to those who are in positions of dignity? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad observantiam non pertinet exhibere cultum et honorem his qui sunt in dignitate constituti. Quia ut Augustinus dicit, in X de Civ. Dei, colere dicimur illas personas quas in quodam honore habemus, et sic idem videtur esse cultus quod honor. Inconvenienter igitur determinatur quod observantia exhibet in dignitate constitutis cultum et honorem. Praeterea, ad iustitiam pertinet reddere debitum. Unde et ad observantiam, quae ponitur iustitiae pars. Sed cultum et honorem non debemus omnibus in dignitate constitutis, sed solum his qui super nos praelationem habent. Ergo inconvenienter determinatur quod eis observantia exhibet cultum et honorem. Praeterea, superioribus nostris in dignitate constitutis non solum debemus honorem, sed etiam timorem, et aliquam munerum largitionem, secundum illud ad Rom. XIII, reddite omnibus debita, et cui tributum, tributum; cui vectigal, vectigal; cui timorem, timorem; cui honorem, honorem. Debemus etiam eis reverentiam et subiectionem, secundum illud Heb. XIII, obedite praepositis vestris, et subiacete eis. Non ergo convenienter determinatur quod observantia exhibet cultum et honorem. Sed contra est quod Tullius dicit, quod observantia est per quam homines aliqua dignitate antecedentes quodam cultu et honore dignantur. Respondeo dicendum quod ad eos qui sunt in dignitate constituti pertinet gubernare subditos. Gubernare autem est movere aliquos in debitum finem, sicut nauta gubernat navem ducendo eam ad portum. Omne autem movens habet excellentiam quandam et virtutem supra id quod movetur. Unde oportet quod in eo qui est in dignitate constitutus, primo consideretur excellentia status, cum quadam potestate in subditos; secundo, ipsum gubernationis officium. Ratione igitur excellentiae, debetur eis honor, qui est quaedam recognitio excellentiae alicuius. Ratione autem officii gubernationis, debetur eis cultus, qui in quodam obsequio consistit dum scilicet aliquis eorum obedit imperio, et vicem beneficiis eorum pro suo modo rependit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in cultu non solum intelligitur honor, sed etiam quaecumque alia pertinent ad decentes actus quibus homo ad alium ordinatur. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex est debitum. Unum quidem legale, ad quod reddendum homo lege compellitur. Et sic debet homo honorem et cultum his qui sunt in dignitate constituti praelationem super ipsum habentes. Aliud autem est

Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to observance to pay worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity. For according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x), we are said to worship those persons whom we hold in honor, so that worship and honor would seem to be the same. Therefore it is unfitting to define observance as paying worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity. Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to justice that we pay what we owe: wherefore this belongs to observance also, since it is a part of justice. Now we do not owe worship and honor to all persons in positions of dignity, but only to those who are placed over us. Therefore observance is unfittingly defined as giving worship and honor to all. Obj. 3: Further, not only do we owe honor to persons of dignity who are placed over us; we owe them also fear and a certain payment of remuneration, according to Rom. 13:7, Render . . . to all men their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor. Moreover, we owe them reverence and subjection, according to Heb. 13:17, Obey your prelates, and be subject to them. Therefore observance is not fittingly defined as paying worship and honor. On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that it is by observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some kind of dignity. I answer that, It belongs to persons in positions of dignity to govern subjects. Now to govern is to move certain ones to their due end: thus a sailor governs his ship by steering it to port. But every mover has a certain excellence and power over that which is moved. Wherefore, a person in a position of dignity is an object of twofold consideration: first, insofar as he obtains excellence of position, together with a certain power over subjects: second, as regards the exercise of his government. In respect of his excellence there is due to him honor, which is the recognition of some kind of excellence; and in respect of the exercise of his government, there is due to him worship, consisting in rendering him service, by obeying his commands, and by repaying him, according to one’s faculty, for the benefits we received from him. Reply Obj. 1: Worship includes not only honor, but also whatever other suitable actions are connected with the relations between man and man. Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 80), debt is twofold. One is legal debt, to pay which man is compelled by law; and thus man owes honor and worship to those persons in positions of dignity who are placed over him. The other is moral debt, which is due by reason of a certain honesty: it

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debitum morale, quod ex quadam honestate debetur. Et hoc modo debemus cultum et honorem his qui sunt in dignitate constituti, etiam si non simus eis subiecti. Ad tertium dicendum quod excellentiae eorum qui sunt in dignitate constituti debetur honor ratione sublimioris gradus; timor autem ratione potestatis quam habent ad coercendum. Officio vero gubernationis ipsorum debetur obedientia, per quam subditi moventur ad imperium praesidentium; et tributa, quae sunt quaedam stipendia laboris ipsorum.

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is in this way that we owe worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity even though we be not their subjects. Reply Obj. 3: Honor is due to the excellence of persons in positions of dignity, on account of their higher rank: while fear is due to them on account of their power to use compulsion: and to the exercise of their government there is due both obedience, whereby subjects are moved at the command of their superiors, and tributes, which are a repayment of their labor.

Article 3 Whether observance is a greater virtue than piety? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod observantia sit potior virtus quam pietas. Princeps enim, cui cultus per observantiam exhibetur, comparatur ad patrem, qui pietate colitur, sicut universalis gubernator ad particularem, nam familia, quam pater gubernat, est pars civitatis, quae gubernatur a principe. Sed universalis virtus potior est, et magis ei inferiora subduntur. Ergo observantia est potior virtus quam pietas. Praeterea, illi qui sunt in dignitate constituti curam gerunt boni communis. Consanguinei autem pertinent ad bonum privatum, quod est propter bonum commune contemnendum, unde laudabiliter aliqui seipsos pro bono communi periculis mortis exponunt. Ergo observantia, per quam exhibetur cultus his qui sunt in dignitate constituti, est potior virtus quam pietas, quae exhibet cultum personis sanguine coniunctis. Praeterea, honor et reverentia maxime debetur virtuosis, post Deum. Sed virtuosis exhibetur honor et reverentia per observantiae virtutem, ut dictum est. Ergo observantia est praecipua post religionem. Sed contra est quod praecepta legis dantur de actibus virtutum. Immediate autem post praecepta religionis, quae pertinent ad primam tabulam, subditur praeceptum de honoratione parentum, quod pertinet ad pietatem. Ergo pietas immediate sequitur religionem ordine dignitatis. Respondeo dicendum quod personis in dignitate constitutis potest aliquid exhiberi dupliciter. Uno modo, in ordine ad bonum commune, puta cum aliquis ei servit in administratione reipublicae. Et hoc iam non pertinet ad observantiam, sed ad pietatem, quae cultum exhibet non solum patri, sed etiam patriae. Alio modo exhibetur aliquid personis in dignitate constitutis pertinens specialiter ad personalem eorum utilitatem vel gloriam. Et hoc proprie pertinet ad observantiam secundum quod a pietate distinguitur. Et ideo comparatio observantiae ad

Objection 1: It seems that observance is a greater virtue than piety. For the prince to whom worship is paid by observance is compared to a father who is worshiped by piety, as a universal to a particular governor; because the household which a father governs is part of the state which is governed by the prince. Now a universal power is greater, and inferiors are more subject thereto. Therefore observance is a greater virtue than piety. Obj. 2: Further, persons in positions of dignity take care of the common good. Now our kindred pertain to the private good, which we ought to set aside for the common good: wherefore it is praiseworthy to expose oneself to the danger of death for the sake of the common good. Therefore observance, whereby worship is paid to persons in positions of dignity, is a greater virtue than piety, which pays worship to one’s kindred. Obj. 3: Further honor and reverence are due to the virtuous in the first place after God. Now honor and reverence are paid to the virtuous by the virtue of observance, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). Therefore observance takes the first place after religion. On the contrary, The precepts of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Now, immediately after the precepts of religion, which belong to the first table, follows the precept of honoring our parents which refers to piety. Therefore piety follows immediately after religion in the order of excellence. I answer that, Something may be paid to persons in positions of dignity in two ways. First, in relation to the common good, as when one serves them in the administration of the affairs of the state. This no longer belongs to observance, but to piety, which pays worship not only to one’s father but also to one’s fatherland. Second, that which is paid to persons in positions of dignity refers specially to their personal usefulness or renown, and this belongs properly to observance, as distinct from piety. Therefore in comparing observance with piety we must needs take into

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pietatem necesse est quod attendatur secundum diversas habitudines diversarum personarum ad nos, quas respicit utraque virtus. Manifestum est autem quod personae parentum, et eorum qui sunt nobis sanguine iuncti, substantialius nobis coniunguntur quam personae quae sunt in dignitate constitutae, magis enim ad substantiam pertinet generatio et educatio, cuius principium est pater, quam exterior gubernatio, cuius principium sunt illi qui in dignitate constituuntur. Et secundum hoc, pietas observantiae praeeminet, inquantum cultum reddit personis magis coniunctis, quibus magis obligamur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod princeps comparatur ad patrem sicut universalis virtus ad particularem, quantum ad exteriorem gubernationem, non autem quantum ad hoc quod pater est principium generationis. Sic enim comparatur ad ipsum virtus divina, quae est omnium productiva in esse. Ad secundum dicendum quod ex ea parte qua personae in dignitate constitutae ordinantur ad bonum commune, non pertinet earum cultus ad observantiam, sed ad pietatem, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod exhibitio honoris vel cultus non solum est proportionanda personae cui exhibetur secundum se consideratae, sed etiam secundum quod ad exhibentes comparatur. Quamvis ergo virtuosi, secundum se considerati, sint magis digni honore quam personae parentum, tamen filii magis obligantur, propter beneficia suscepta et coniunctionem naturalem, ad exhibendum cultum et honorem parentibus quam extraneis virtuosis.

Q. 102, A. 3

consideration the different relations in which other persons stand to ourselves, which relations both virtues regard. Now it is evident that the persons of our parents and of our kindred are more substantially akin to us than persons in positions of dignity, since birth and education, which originate in the father, belong more to one’s substance than external government, the principle of which is seated in those who are in positions of dignity. For this reason piety takes precedence of observance, inasmuch as it pays worship to persons more akin to us, and to whom we are more strictly bound. Reply Obj. 1: The prince is compared to the father as a universal to a particular power, as regards external government, but not as regards the father being a principle of generation: for in this way the father should be compared with the divine power from which all things derive their being. Reply Obj. 2: insofar as persons in positions of dignity are related to the common good, their worship does not pertain to observance, but to piety, as stated above. Reply Obj. 3: The rendering of honor or worship should be proportionate to the person to whom it is paid not only as considered in himself, but also as compared to those who pay them. Wherefore, though virtuous persons, considered in themselves, are more worthy of honor than the persons of one’s parents, yet children are under a greater obligation, on account of the benefits they have received from their parents and their natural kinship with them, to pay worship and honor to their parents than to virtuous persons who are not of their kindred.

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Question 103 Dulia Deinde considerandum est de partibus observantiae. We must now consider the parts of observance. We shall Et primo, de dulia, quae exhibet honorem, et cetera ad consider (1) dulia, whereby we pay honor and other things hoc pertinentia, personis superioribus; secundo, de obe- pertaining thereto to those who are in a higher position; (2) dientia, per quam earum obeditur imperio. obedience, whereby we obey their commands. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum honor sit aliquid spirituale, vel (1) Whether honor is a spiritual or a corporal thing? corporale. Secundo, utrum honor debeatur solis superioribus. (2) Whether honor is due to those only who are in a higher position? Tertio, utrum dulia, cuius est exhibere honorem et (3) Whether dulia, which pays honor and worship to cultum superioribus, sit specialis virtus a latria those who are above us, is a special virtue, distinct distincta. from latria? Quarto, utrum per species distinguatur. (4) Whether it contains several species?

Article 1 Whether honor denotes something corporal? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod honor non importet aliquid corporale. Honor enim est exhibitio reverentiae in testimonium virtutis, ut potest accipi a philosopho, in I Ethic. Sed exhibitio reverentiae est aliquid spirituale, revereri enim est actus timoris, ut supra habitum est. Ergo honor est aliquid spirituale. Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in IV Ethic., honor est praemium virtutis. Virtutis autem, quae principaliter in spiritualibus consistit, praemium non est aliquid corporale, cum praemium sit potius merito. Ergo honor non consistit in corporalibus. Praeterea, honor a laude distinguitur, et etiam a gloria. Sed laus et gloria in exterioribus consistunt. Ergo honor consistit in interioribus et spiritualibus. Sed contra est quod Hieronymus, exponens illud I ad Tim. V, qui bene praesunt presbyteri duplici honore etc., dicit, honor in praesentiarum vel pro eleemosyna, vel pro munere accipitur. Utrumque autem horum ad corporalia pertinet. Ergo honor in corporalibus consistit.

Respondeo dicendum quod honor testificationem quandam importat de excellentia alicuius, unde homines qui volunt honorari, testimonium suae excellentiae quaerunt, ut per philosophum patet, in I et VIII Ethic. Testimonium autem redditur vel coram Deo, vel coram hominibus. Coram Deo quidem, qui inspector

Objection 1: It seems that honor does not denote something corporal. For honor is showing reverence in acknowledgment of virtue, as may be gathered from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5). Now showing reverence is something spiritual, since to revere is an act of fear, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 2, ad 1). Therefore honor is something spiritual. Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), honor is the reward of virtue. Now, since virtue consists chiefly of spiritual things, its reward is not something corporal, for the reward is more excellent than the merit. Therefore honor does not consist of corporal things. Obj. 3: Further, honor is distinct from praise, as also from glory. Now praise and glory consist of external things. Therefore honor consists of things internal and spiritual. On the contrary, Jerome in his exposition of 1 Tim. 5:3, Honor widows that are widows indeed, and (1 Tim 5:17), let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor etc. says (Ep. ad Ageruch.): Honor here stands either for almsgiving or for remuneration. Now both of these pertain to things. Therefore honor consists of corporal things. I answer that, Honor denotes a witnessing to a person’s excellence. Therefore men who wish to be honored seek a witnessing to their excellence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5; viii, 8). Now witness is borne either before God or before man. Before God, Who is the searcher of hearts, the witness of one’s conscience suffices. wherefore

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est cordium, testimonium conscientiae sufficit. Et ideo honor quoad Deum potest consistere in solo interiori motu cordis, dum scilicet aliquis recogitat vel Dei excellentiam, vel etiam alterius hominis coram Deo. Sed quoad homines aliquis non potest testimonium ferre nisi per aliqua signa exteriora, vel verborum, puta cum aliquis ore pronuntiat excellentiam alicuius; vel factis, sicut inclinationibus, obviationibus, et aliis huiusmodi; vel etiam exterioribus rebus, puta in exenniorum vel munerum oblatione, aut imaginum institutione, vel aliis huiusmodi. Et secundum hoc, honor in signis exterioribus et corporalibus consistit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod reverentia non est idem quod honor, sed ex una parte est principium motivum ad honorandum, inquantum scilicet aliquis ex reverentia quam habet ad aliquem, eum honorat; ex alia vero parte est honoris finis, inquantum scilicet aliquis ad hoc honoratur ut in reverentia habeatur ab aliis. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut philosophus ibidem dicit, honor non est sufficiens virtutis praemium, sed nihil potest esse in humanis rebus et corporalibus maius honore, inquantum scilicet ipsae corporales res sunt signa demonstrativa excellentis virtutis. Est autem debitum bono et pulchro ut manifestetur, secundum illud Matth. V, neque accendunt lucernam et ponunt eam sub modio, sed super candelabrum, ut luceat omnibus qui in domo sunt, et pro tanto praemium virtutis dicitur honor. Ad tertium dicendum quod laus distinguitur ab honore dupliciter. Uno modo, quia laus consistit in solis signis verborum, honor autem in quibuscumque exterioribus signis. Et secundum hoc, laus in honore includitur. Alio modo, quia per exhibitionem honoris testimonium reddimus de excellentia bonitatis alicuius absolute, sed per laudem testificamur de bonitate alicuius in ordine ad finem, sicut laudamus bene operantem propter finem; honor autem est etiam optimorum, quae non ordinantur ad finem, sed iam sunt in fine; ut patet per philosophum, in I Ethic. Gloria autem est effectus honoris et laudis. Quia ex hoc quod testificamur de bonitate alicuius, clarescit eius bonitas in notitia plurimorum. Et hoc importat nomen gloriae, nam gloria dicitur quasi claria. Unde Rom. I, dicit quaedam Glossa Ambrosii quod gloria est clara cum laude notitia.

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honor, so far as God is concerned, may consist of the mere internal movement of the heart, for instance when a man acknowledges either God’s excellence or another man’s excellence before God. But, as regards men, one cannot bear witness, save by means of signs, either by words, as when one proclaims another’s excellence by word of mouth, or by deeds, for instance by bowing, saluting, and so forth, or by external things, as by offering gifts, erecting statues, and the like. Accordingly honor consists of signs, external and corporal.

Reply Obj. 1: Reverence is not the same as honor: but on the one hand it is the primary motive for showing honor, insofar as one man honors another out of the reverence he has for him; and on the other hand, it is the end of honor, insofar as a person is honored in order that he may be held in reverence by others. Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), honor is not a sufficient reward of virtue: yet nothing in human and corporal things can be greater than honor, since these corporal things themselves are employed as signs in acknowledgment of excelling virtue. It is, however, due to the good and the beautiful, that they may be made known, according to Matt. 5:15, Neither do men light a candle, and put it under a bushel, but upon a candlestick, that it may shine to all that are in the house. In this sense honor is said to be the reward of virtue. Reply Obj. 3: Praise is distinguished from honor in two ways. First, because praise consists only of verbal signs, whereas honor consists of any external signs, so that praise is included in honor. Second, because by paying honor to a person we bear witness to a person’s excelling goodness absolutely, whereas by praising him we bear witness to his goodness in reference to an end: thus we praise one that works well for an end. On the other hand, honor is given even to the best, which is not referred to an end, but has already arrived at the end, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5). Glory is the effect of honor and praise, since the result of our bearing witness to a person’s goodness is that his goodness becomes clear to the knowledge of many. The word glory signifies this, for glory is the same as kleria, wherefore a gloss of Augustine on Rom. 16:27 observes that glory is clear knowledge together with praise.

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Q. 103, A. 2

Article 2 Whether honor is properly due to those who are above us? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod honor non proprie debeatur superioribus. Angelus enim est superior quolibet homine viatore, secundum illud Matth. XI, qui minor est in regno caelorum, est maior Ioanne Baptista. Sed Angelus prohibuit Ioannem volentem se honorare, ut patet Apoc. ult. Ergo honor non debetur superioribus. Praeterea, honor debetur alicui in testimonium virtutis, ut dictum est. Sed quandoque contingit quod superiores non sunt virtuosi. Ergo eis non debetur honor. Sicut nec Daemonibus, qui tamen superiores sunt nobis ordine naturae. Praeterea, apostolus dicit, Rom. XII, honore invicem praevenientes. Et I Pet. II, omnes honorate. Sed hoc non esset servandum si solis superioribus honor deberetur. Ergo honor non debetur proprie superioribus. Praeterea, Tobiae I dicitur quod Tobias habebat decem talenta ex his quibus erat honoratus a rege. Legitur etiam Esther VI, quod Assuerus honoravit Mardochaeum, et coram eo fecit clamari, hoc honore dignus est quem rex honorare voluerit. Ergo honor exhibetur etiam inferioribus. Et ita non videtur quod honor proprie superioribus debeatur.

Objection 1: It seems that honor is not properly due to those who are above us. For an angel is above any human wayfarer, according to Matt. 11:11, He that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than John the Baptist. Yet an angel forbade John when the latter wished to honor him (Rev 22:10). Therefore honor is not due to those who are above us. Obj. 2: Further, honor is due to a person in acknowledgment of his virtue, as stated above (A. 1; Q. 63, A. 3). But sometimes those who are above us are not virtuous. Therefore honor is not due to them, as neither is it due to the demons, who nevertheless are above us in the order of nature. Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom 12:10): With honor preventing one another, and we read (1 Pet 2:17): Honor all men. But this would not be so if honor were due to those alone who are above us. Therefore honor is not due properly to those who are above us. Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Tob 1:16) that Tobias had ten talents of silver of that which he had been honored by the king: and we read (Esther 6:11) that Assuerus honored Mardochaeus, and ordered it to be proclaimed in his presence: This honor is he worthy of whom the king hath a mind to honor. Therefore honor is paid to those also who are beneath us, and it seems, in consequence, that honor is not due properly to those who are above us. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 12) that honor is due to the best. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), honor is nothing but an acknowledgment of a person’s excelling goodness. Now a person’s excellence may be considered, not only in relation to those who honor him, in the point of his being more excellent than they, but also in itself, or in relation to other persons, and in this way honor is always due to a person, on account of some excellence or superiority.

Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod honor debetur optimis. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, honor nihil est aliud quam quaedam protestatio de excellentia bonitatis alicuius. Potest autem alicuius excellentia considerari non solum per comparationem ad honorantem, ut scilicet sit excellentior eo qui honoratur, sed etiam secundum se, vel per comparationem ad aliquos alios. Et secundum hoc, honor semper debetur alicui propter aliquam excellentiam vel superioritatem. Non enim oportet quod ille qui honoratur sit excelFor the person honored has no need to be more excellentior honorante, sed forte quibusdam aliis; vel etiam lent than those who honor him; it may suffice for him to be ipso honorante quantum ad aliquid, et non simpliciter. more excellent than some others, or again he may be more excellent than those who honor him in some respect and not simply. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Angelus prohibuit Reply Obj. 1: The angel forbade John to pay him, not Ioannem non a quacumque honoratione, sed ab hono- any kind of honor, but the honor of adoration and latria, ratione adorationis latriae, quae debetur Deo. Vel etiam which is due to God. Or again, he forbade him to pay the ab honoratione duliae, ut ostenderet ipsius Ioannis di- honor of dulia, in order to indicate the dignity of John himgnitatem, qua per Christum erat Angelis adaequatus, se- self, for which Christ equaled him to the angels according to cundum spem gloriae filiorum Dei. Et ideo nolebat ab eo the hope of glory of the children of God: wherefore he refused adorari tanquam superior. to be honored by him as though he were superior to him. Ad secundum dicendum quod si praelati sunt maReply Obj. 2: A wicked superior is honored for the li, non honorantur propter excellentiam propriae virtu- excellence, not of his virtue but of his dignity, as being

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tis, sed propter excellentiam dignitatis, secundum quam sunt Dei ministri. Et in eis etiam honoratur tota communitas, cui praesunt. Daemones autem sunt irrevocabiliter mali, et pro inimicis habendi magis quam honorandi. Ad tertium dicendum quod in quolibet invenitur aliquid ex quo potest aliquis eum superiorem reputare, secundum illud Philipp. II in humilitate superiores invicem arbitrantes. Et secundum hoc etiam omnes se invicem debent honore praevenire. Ad quartum dicendum quod privatae personae interdum honorantur a regibus, non quia sint eis superiores secundum ordinem dignitatis, sed propter aliquam excellentiam virtutis ipsarum. Et secundum hoc honorati sunt Tobias et Mardochaeus a regibus.

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God’s minister, and because the honor paid to him is paid to the whole community over which he presides. As for the demons, they are wicked beyond recall, and should be looked upon as enemies, rather than treated with honor. Reply Obj. 3: In every man is to be found something that makes it possible to deem him better than ourselves, according to Phil. 2:3, In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves, and thus, too, we should all be on the alert to do honor to one another. Reply Obj. 4: Private individuals are sometimes honored by kings, not that they are above them in the order of dignity but on account of some excellence of their virtue: and in this way Tobias and Mardochaeus were honored by kings.

Article 3 Whether dulia is a special virtue distinct from latria? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod dulia non sit specialis virtus a latria distincta. Quia super illud Psalm., domine Deus meus, in te speravi, dicit Glossa, domine omnium per potentiam, cui debetur dulia, Deus per creationem, cui debetur latria. Sed non est distincta virtus quae ordinatur in Deum secundum quod est dominus, et secundum quod est Deus. Ergo dulia non est virtus distincta a latria. Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in VIII Ethic., amari simile est ei quod est honorari. Sed eadem est virtus caritatis qua amatur Deus, et qua amatur proximus. Ergo dulia, qua honoratur proximus, non est alia virtus a latria, qua honoratur Deus. Praeterea, idem est motus quo aliquis movetur in imaginem, et in rem cuius est imago. Sed per duliam honoratur homo inquantum est ad Dei imaginem, dicitur enim Sap. II, de impiis quod non iudicaverunt honorem animarum sanctarum, quoniam Deus creavit hominem inexterminabilem, et ad imaginem suae similitudinis fecit illum. Ergo dulia non est alia virtus a latria, qua honoratur Deus. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X de Civ. Dei, quod alia est servitus quae debetur hominibus, secundum quam praecepit apostolus servos dominis suis subditos esse, quae scilicet Graece dulia dicitur, alia vero latria, quae dicitur servitus pertinens ad colendum Deum. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum ea quae supra dicta sunt, ubi est alia ratio debiti, ibi necesse est quod sit alia virtus quae debitum reddat. Alia autem ratione debetur servitus Deo, et homini, sicut alia ratione dominum esse competit Deo, et homini. Nam Deus

Objection 1: It seems that dulia is not a special virtue distinct from latria. For a gloss on Ps. 7:1, O Lord my God, in Thee have I put my trust, says: Lord of all by His power, to Whom dulia is due; God by creation, to Whom we owe latria. Now the virtue directed to God as Lord is not distinct from that which is directed to Him as God. Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria. Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 8), to be loved is like being honored. Now the charity with which we love God is the same as that whereby we love our neighbor. Therefore dulia whereby we honor our neighbor is not a distinct virtue from latria with which we honor God. Obj. 3: Further, the movement whereby one is moved towards an image is the same as the movement whereby one is moved towards the thing represented by the image. Now by dulia we honor a man as being made to the image of God. For it is written of the wicked (Wis 2:22, 23) that they esteemed not the honor of holy souls, for God created man incorruptible, and to the image of His own likeness He made him. Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria whereby God is honored. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), that the homage due to man, of which the Apostle spoke when he commanded servants to obey their masters and which in Greek is called dulia, is distinct from latria which denotes the homage that consists in the worship of God. I answer that, According to what has been stated above (Q. 101, A. 3), where there are different aspects of that which is due, there must needs be different virtues to render those dues. Now servitude is due to God and to man under different aspects: even as lordship is competent to

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plenarium et principale dominium habet respectu totius et cuiuslibet creaturae, quae totaliter eius subiicitur potestati, homo autem participat quandam similitudinem divini dominii, secundum quod habet particularem potestatem super aliquem hominem vel super aliquam creaturam. Et ideo dulia, quae debitam servitutem exhibet homini dominanti, alia virtus est a latria, quae exhibet debitam servitutem divino dominio. Et est quaedam observantiae species. Quia per observantiam honoramus quascumque personas dignitate praecellentes, per duliam autem proprie sumptam servi suos dominos venerantur; dulia enim Graece servitus dicitur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut religio per excellentiam dicitur pietas, inquantum Deus est per excellentiam pater; ita etiam latria per excellentiam dicitur dulia, inquantum Deus excellenter est dominus. Non autem creatura participat potentiam creandi, ratione cuius Deo debetur latria. Et ideo Glossa illa distinxit, attribuens latriam Deo secundum creationem, quae creaturae non communicatur; duliam vero secundum dominium, quod creaturae communicatur. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio diligendi proximum Deus est, non enim diligimus per caritatem in proximo nisi Deum, et ideo eadem caritas est qua diligitur Deus, et proximus. Sunt tamen aliae amicitiae, differentes a caritate, secundum alias rationes quibus homines amantur. Et similiter, cum sit alia ratio serviendi Deo et homini, aut honorandi utrumque, non est eadem virtus latria et dulia. Ad tertium dicendum quod motus qui est in imaginem inquantum est imago, refertur in rem cuius est imago, non tamen omnis motus qui est in imaginem est in eam inquantum est imago. Et ideo quandoque est alius specie motus in imaginem, et motus in rem. Sic ergo dicendum est quod honor vel subiectio duliae respicit absolute quandam hominis dignitatem. Licet enim secundum illam dignitatem sit homo ad imaginem vel similitudinem Dei, non tamen semper homo, quando reverentiam alteri exhibet, refert hoc actu in Deum. Vel dicendum quod motus qui est in imaginem quodammodo est in rem, non tamen motus qui est in rem oportet quod sit in imaginem. Et ideo reverentia quae exhibetur alicui inquantum est ad imaginem, redundat quodammodo in Deum, alia tamen est reverentia quae ipsi Deo exhibetur, quae nullo modo pertinet ad eius imaginem.

Q. 103, A. 3

God and to man under different aspects. For God has absolute and paramount lordship over the creature wholly and singly, which is entirely subject to His power: whereas man partakes of a certain likeness to the divine lordship, forasmuch as he exercises a particular power over some man or creature. Wherefore dulia, which pays due service to a human lord, is a distinct virtue from latria, which pays due service to the lordship of God. It is, moreover, a species of observance, because by observance we honor all those who excel in dignity, while dulia properly speaking is the reverence of servants for their master, dulia being the Greek for servitude. Reply Obj. 1: Just as religion is called piety by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is our Father by way of excellence, so again latria is called dulia by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is our Lord by way of excellence. Now the creature does not partake of the power to create by reason of which latria is due to God: and so this gloss drew a distinction, by ascribing latria to God in respect of creation, which is not communicated to a creature, but dulia in respect of lordship, which is communicated to a creature. Reply Obj. 2: The reason why we love our neighbor is God, since that which we love in our neighbor through charity is God alone. Wherefore the charity with which we love God is the same as that with which we love our neighbor. Yet there are other friendships distinct from charity, in respect of the other reasons for which a man is loved. In like manner, since there is one reason for serving God and another for serving man, and for honoring the one or the other, latria and dulia are not the same virtue. Reply Obj. 3: Movement towards an image as such is referred to the thing represented by the image: yet not every movement towards an image is referred to the image as such, and consequently sometimes the movement to the image differs specifically from the movement to the thing. Accordingly we must reply that the honor or subjection of dulia regards some dignity of a man absolutely. For though, in respect of that dignity, man is made to the image or likeness of God, yet in showing reverence to a person, one does not always refer this to God actually. Or we may reply that the movement towards an image is, after a fashion, towards the thing, yet the movement towards the thing need not be towards its image. Wherefore reverence paid to a person as the image of God redounds somewhat to God: and yet this differs from the reverence that is paid to God Himself, for this in no way refers to His image.

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Article 4 Whether dulia has various species? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod dulia habeat diversas species. Per duliam enim exhibetur honor proximo. Diversa autem ratione honorantur diversi proximi, sicut rex, pater et magister, ut patet per philosophum, in IX Ethic. Cum ergo diversa ratio obiecti diversificet speciem virtutis, videtur quod dulia dividatur in virtutes specie differentes. Praeterea, medium differt specie ab extremo, sicut pallidum ab albo et nigro. Sed hyperdulia videtur esse medium inter latriam et duliam, exhibetur enim creaturis quae habent specialem affinitatem ad Deum, sicut beatae virgini inquantum est mater Dei. Ergo videtur quod duliae sint species differentes, una quidem dulia simpliciter, alia vero hyperdulia. Praeterea, sicut in creatura rationali invenitur imago Dei, ratione cuius honoratur, ita etiam in creatura irrationali invenitur vestigium Dei. Sed alia ratio similitudinis importatur in nomine imaginis, et in nomine vestigii. Ergo etiam oportet secundum hoc diversas species duliae attendi, praesertim cum quibusdam irrationabilibus creaturis honor exhibeatur, sicut ligno sanctae crucis, et aliis huiusmodi. Sed contra est quod dulia contra latriam dividitur. Latria autem non dividitur per diversas species. Ergo nec dulia. Respondeo dicendum quod dulia potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo, communiter, secundum quod exhibet reverentiam cuicumque homini, ratione cuiuscumque excellentiae. Et sic continet sub se pietatem et observantiam, et quamcumque huiusmodi virtutem quae homini reverentiam exhibet. Et secundum hoc habebit partes specie diversas. Alio modo potest accipi stricte, prout secundum eam servus reverentiam exhibet domino, nam dulia servitus dicitur, ut dictum est. Et secundum hoc non dividitur in diversas species, sed est una specierum observantiae, quam Tullius ponit, eo quod alia ratione servus reveretur dominum, miles ducem, discipulus magistrum, et sic de aliis huiusmodi.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de dulia communiter sumpta. Ad secundum dicendum quod hyperdulia est potissima species duliae communiter sumptae. Maxima enim reverentia debetur homini ex affinitate quam habet ad Deum. Ad tertium dicendum quod creaturae irrationali in se consideratae non debetur ab homine aliqua subiectio vel honor, quin potius omnis talis creatura est naturaliter homini subiecta. Quod autem crux Christi honore-

Objection 1: It seems that dulia has various species. For by dulia we show honor to our neighbor. Now different neighbors are honored under different aspects, for instance king, father and master, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2). Since this difference of aspect in the object differentiates the species of virtue, it seems that dulia is divided into specifically different virtues. Obj. 2: Further, the mean differs specifically from the extremes, as pale differs from white and black. Now hyperdulia is apparently a mean between latria and dulia: for it is shown towards creatures having a special affinity to God, for instance to the Blessed Virgin as being the mother of God. Therefore it seems that there are different species of dulia, one being simply dulia, the other hyperdulia. Obj. 3: Further, just as in the rational creature we find the image of God, for which reason it is honored, so too in the irrational creature we find the trace of God. Now the aspect of likeness denoted by an image differs from the aspect conveyed by a trace. Therefore we must distinguish a corresponding difference of dulia: and all the more since honor is shown to certain irrational creatures, as, for instance, to the wood of the Holy Cross. On the contrary, Dulia is condivided with latria. But latria is not divided into different species. Neither therefore is dulia. I answer that, Dulia may be taken in two ways. In one way it may be taken in a wide sense as denoting reverence paid to anyone on account of any kind of excellence, and thus it comprises piety and observance, and any similar virtue whereby reverence is shown towards a man. Taken in this sense it will have parts differing specifically from one another. In another way it may be taken in a strict sense as denoting the reverence of a servant for his lord, for dulia signifies servitude, as stated above (A. 3). Taken in this sense it is not divided into different species, but is one of the species of observance, mentioned by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), for the reason that a servant reveres his lord under one aspect, a soldier his commanding officer under another, the disciple his master under another, and so on in similar cases. Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes dulia in a wide sense. Reply Obj. 2: Hyperdulia is the highest species of dulia taken in a wide sense, since the greatest reverence is that which is due to a man by reason of his having an affinity to God. Reply Obj. 3: Man owes neither subjection nor honor to an irrational creature considered in itself, indeed all such creatures are naturally subject to man. As to the Cross of Christ, the honor we pay to it is the same as that which we

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tur, hoc fit eodem honore quo Christus honoratur, sicut pay to Christ, just as the king’s robe receives the same honor purpura regis honoratur eodem honore quo rex, ut Da- as the king himself, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. mascenus dicit, in IV libro. iv).

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Question 104 Obedience Deinde considerandum est de obedientia. Et circa We must now consider obedience, under which head hoc quaeruntur sex. there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum homo debeat homini obedire. (1) Whether one man is bound to obey another? Secundo, utrum obedientia sit specialis virtus. (2) Whether obedience is a special virtue? Tertio, de comparatione eius ad alias virtutes. (3) Of its comparison with other virtues; Quarto, utrum Deo sit in omnibus obediendum. (4) Whether God must be obeyed in all things? Quinto, utrum subditi suis praelatis teneantur in (5) Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors omnibus obedire. in all things? Sexto, utrum fideles teneantur saecularibus (6) Whether the faithful are bound to obey the secular potestatibus obedire. power?

Article 1 Whether one man is bound to obey another? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus homo non teneatur alii obedire. Non enim est aliquid faciendum contra institutionem divinam. Sed hoc habet divina institutio, ut homo suo consilio regatur, secundum illud Eccli. XV, Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit illum in manu consilii sui. Ergo non tenetur unus homo alteri obedire. Praeterea, si aliquis alicui teneretur obedire, oporteret quod haberet voluntatem praecipientis tanquam regulam suae actionis. Sed sola divina voluntas, quae semper est recta, est regula humanae actionis. Ergo non tenetur homo obedire nisi Deo. Praeterea, servitia, quanto sunt magis gratuita, tanto sunt magis accepta. Sed illud quod homo ex debito facit non est gratuitum. Si ergo homo ex debito teneretur aliis obedire in bonis operibus faciendis, ex hoc ipso redderetur minus acceptabile opus bonum quod ex obedientia fieret. Non ergo tenetur homo alteri obedire. Sed contra est quod praecipitur ad Heb. ult., obedite praepositis vestris, et subiacete eis. Respondeo dicendum quod sicut actiones rerum naturalium procedunt ex potentiis naturalibus, ita etiam operationes humanae procedunt ex humana voluntate. Oportuit autem in rebus naturalibus ut superiora moverent inferiora ad suas actiones, per excellentiam naturalis virtutis collatae divinitus. Unde etiam oportet in rebus humanis quod superiores moveant inferiores per suam voluntatem, ex vi auctoritatis divinitus ordinatae. Movere autem per rationem et voluntatem est praecipere. Et ideo, sicut ex ipso ordine naturali divinitus insti-

Objection 1: It seems that one man is not bound to obey another. For nothing should be done contrary to the divine ordinance. Now God has so ordered that man is ruled by his own counsel, according to Ecclus. 15:14, God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel. Therefore one man is not bound to obey another. Obj. 2: Further, if one man were bound to obey another, he would have to look upon the will of the person commanding him, as being his rule of conduct. Now God’s will alone, which is always right, is a rule of human conduct. Therefore man is bound to obey none but God. Obj. 3: Further, the more gratuitous the service the more is it acceptable. Now what a man does out of duty is not gratuitous. Therefore if a man were bound in duty to obey others in doing good deeds, for this very reason his good deeds would be rendered less acceptable through being done out of obedience. Therefore one man is not bound to obey another. On the contrary, It is prescribed (Heb 13:17): Obey your prelates and be subject to them. I answer that, Just as the actions of natural things proceed from natural powers, so do human actions proceed from the human will. In natural things it behooved the higher to move the lower to their actions by the excellence of the natural power bestowed on them by God: and so in human affairs also the higher must move the lower by their will in virtue of a divinely established authority. Now to move by reason and will is to command. Wherefore just as in virtue of the divinely established natural order the lower natural things need to be subject to the movement of

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tuto inferiora in rebus naturalibus necesse habent subdi motioni superiorum, ita etiam in rebus humanis, ex ordine iuris naturalis et divini, tenentur inferiores suis superioribus obedire. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus reliquit hominem in manu consilii sui, non quia liceat ei facere omne quod velit, sed quia ad id quod faciendum est non cogitur necessitate naturae, sicut creaturae irrationales, sed libera electione ex proprio consilio procedente. Et sicut ad alia facienda debet procedere proprio consilio, ita etiam ad hoc quod obediat suis superioribus, dicit enim Gregorius, ult. Moral., quod dum alienae voci humiliter subdimur, nosmetipsos in corde superamus. Ad secundum dicendum quod divina voluntas est prima regula, qua regulantur omnes rationales voluntates, cui una magis appropinquat quam alia, secundum ordinem divinitus institutum. Et ideo voluntas unius hominis praecipientis potest esse quasi secunda regula voluntatis alterius obedientis. Ad tertium dicendum quod aliquid potest iudicari gratuitum dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius operis, quia scilicet ad id homo non obligatur. Alio modo, ex parte operantis, quia scilicet libera voluntate hoc facit. Opus autem redditur virtuosum et laudabile et meritorium praecipue secundum quod ex voluntate procedit. Et ideo, quamvis obedire sit debitum, si prompta voluntate aliquis obediat, non propter hoc minuitur eius meritum, maxime apud Deum, qui non solum exteriora opera, verum etiam interiorem voluntatem videt.

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the higher, so too in human affairs, in virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to obey their superiors. Reply Obj. 1: God left man in the hand of his own counsel, not as though it were lawful to him to do whatever he will, but because, unlike irrational creatures, he is not compelled by natural necessity to do what he ought to do, but is left the free choice proceeding from his own counsel. And just as he has to proceed on his own counsel in doing other things, so too has he in the point of obeying his superiors. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxv), When we humbly give way to another’s voice, we overcome ourselves in our own hearts. Reply Obj. 2: The will of God is the first rule whereby all rational wills are regulated: and to this rule one will approaches more than another, according to a divinely appointed order. Hence the will of the one man who issues a command may be as a second rule to the will of this other man who obeys him. Reply Obj. 3: A thing may be deemed gratuitous in two ways. In one way on the part of the deed itself, because, to wit, one is not bound to do it; in another way, on the part of the doer, because he does it of his own free will. Now a deed is rendered virtuous, praiseworthy and meritorious, chiefly according as it proceeds from the will. Wherefore although obedience be a duty, if one obey with a prompt will, one’s merit is not for that reason diminished, especially before God, Who sees not only the outward deed, but also the inward will.

Article 2 Whether obedience is a special virtue? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod obedientia non sit specialis virtus. Obedientiae enim inobedientia opponitur. Sed inobedientia est generale peccatum, dicit enim Ambrosius quod peccatum est inobedientia legis divinae. Ergo obedientia non est specialis virtus, sed generalis. Praeterea, omnis virtus specialis aut est theologica, aut moralis. Sed obedientia non est virtus theologica, quia neque continetur sub fide, neque sub spe, neque sub caritate. Similiter etiam non est virtus moralis, quia non est in medio superflui et diminuti; quanto enim aliquis est magis obediens, tanto magis laudatur. Ergo obedientia non est specialis virtus. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, ult. Moral., quod obedientia tanto magis est meritoria et laudabilis quanto minus habet de suo. Sed quaelibet specialis virtus tanto magis laudatur quanto magis habet de suo, eo quod ad

Objection 1: It seems that obedience is not a special virtue. For disobedience is contrary to obedience. But disobedience is a general sin, because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that sin is to disobey the divine law. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue. Obj. 2: Further, every special virtue is either theological or moral. But obedience is not a theological virtue, since it is not comprised under faith, hope or charity. Nor is it a moral virtue, since it does not hold the mean between excess and deficiency, for the more obedient one is the more is one praised. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue. Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that obedience is the more meritorious and praiseworthy, the less it holds its own. But every special virtue is the more to be praised the more it holds its own, since virtue requires a

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virtutem requiritur ut sit volens et eligens, sicut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo obedientia non est specialis virtus. Praeterea, virtutes differunt specie secundum obiecta. Obiectum autem obedientiae esse videtur superioris praeceptum, quod multipliciter diversificari videtur, secundum diversos superioritatis gradus. Ergo obedientia est virtus generalis sub se multas virtutes speciales comprehendens. Sed contra est quod obedientia a quibusdam ponitur pars iustitiae, ut supra dictum est. Respondeo dicendum quod ad omnia opera bona quae specialem laudis rationem habent, specialis virtus determinatur, hoc enim proprie competit virtuti, ut opus bonum reddat. Obedire autem superiori debitum est secundum divinum ordinem rebus inditum, ut ostensum est, et per consequens est bonum, cum bonum consistat in modo, specie et ordine, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Nat. boni. Habet autem hic actus specialem rationem laudis ex speciali obiecto. Cum enim inferiores suis superioribus multa debeant exhibere, inter cetera hoc est unum speciale, quod tenentur eius praeceptis obedire. Unde obedientia est specialis virtus, et eius speciale obiectum est praeceptum tacitum vel expressum. Voluntas enim superioris, quocumque modo innotescat, est quoddam tacitum praeceptum, et tanto videtur obedientia promptior quanto praeceptum expressum obediendo praevenit, voluntate superioris intellecta. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet duas speciales rationes, ad quas duae speciales virtutes respiciunt, in uno et eodem materiali obiecto concurrere, sicut miles, defendendo castrum regis, implet opus fortitudinis non refugiens mortis pericula propter bonum, et opus iustitiae debitum servitium domino suo reddens. Sic igitur ratio praecepti, quam attendit obedientia, concurrit cum actibus omnium virtutum, non tamen cum omnibus virtutum actibus, quia non omnes actus virtutum sunt in praecepto, ut supra habitum est. Similiter etiam quaedam quandoque sub praecepto cadunt quae ad nullam aliam virtutem pertinent, ut patet in his quae non sunt mala nisi quia prohibita. Sic ergo, si obedientia proprie accipiatur, secundum quod respicit per intentionem formalem rationem praecepti, erit specialis virtus et inobedientia speciale peccatum. Secundum hoc ad obedientiam requiretur quod impleat aliquis actum iustitiae, vel alterius virtutis, intendens implere praeceptum, et ad inobedientiam requiretur quod actualiter contemnat praeceptum. Si vero obedientia large accipiatur pro executione cuiuscumque quod potest cadere sub praecepto, et inobedientia pro omissione eiusdem ex quacumque intentione, sic obedientia erit generalis virtus, et inobedientia generale peccatum. Ad secundum dicendum quod obedientia non est virtus theologica. Non enim per se obiectum eius est

Q. 104, A. 2

man to exercise his will and choice, as stated in Ethic. ii, 4. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue. Obj. 4: Further, virtues differ in species according to their objects. Now the object of obedience would seem to be the command of a superior, of which, apparently, there are as many kinds as there are degrees of superiority. Therefore obedience is a general virtue, comprising many special virtues. On the contrary, obedience is reckoned by some to be a part of justice, as stated above (Q. 80). I answer that, A special virtue is assigned to all good deeds that have a special reason of praise: for it belongs properly to virtue to render a deed good. Now obedience to a superior is due in accordance with the divinely established order of things, as shown above (A. 1), and therefore it is a good, since good consists in mode, species and order, as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iii). Again, this act has a special aspect of praiseworthiness by reason of its object. For while subjects have many obligations towards their superiors, this one, that they are bound to obey their commands, stands out as special among the rest. Wherefore obedience is a special virtue, and its specific object is a command tacit or express, because the superior’s will, however it become known, is a tacit precept, and a man’s obedience seems to be all the more prompt, forasmuch as by obeying he forestalls the express command as soon as he understands his superior’s will. Reply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents the one same material object from admitting two special aspects to which two special virtues correspond: thus a soldier, by defending his king’s fortress, fulfils both an act of fortitude, by facing the danger of death for a good end, and an act of justice, by rendering due service to his lord. Accordingly the aspect of precept, which obedience considers, occurs in acts of all virtues, but not in all acts of virtue, since not all acts of virtue are a matter of precept, as stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 3). Moreover, certain things are sometimes a matter of precept, and pertain to no other virtue, such things for instance as are not evil except because they are forbidden. Wherefore, if obedience be taken in its proper sense, as considering formally and intentionally the aspect of precept, it will be a special virtue, and disobedience a special sin: because in this way it is requisite for obedience that one perform an act of justice or of some other virtue with the intention of fulfilling a precept; and for disobedience that one treat the precept with actual contempt. On the other hand, if obedience be taken in a wide sense for the performance of any action that may be a matter of precept, and disobedience for the omission of that action through any intention whatever, then obedience will be a general virtue, and disobedience a general sin. Reply Obj. 2: Obedience is not a theological virtue, for its direct object is not God, but the precept of any superior,

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Deus, sed praeceptum superioris cuiuscumque, vel expressum vel interpretativum, scilicet simplex verbum praelati eius indicans voluntatem, cui obedit promptus obediens, secundum illud Tit. III, dicto obedire. Est autem virtus moralis, cum sit pars iustitiae, et est medium inter superfluum et diminutum. Attenditur autem eius superfluum non quidem secundum quantum, sed secundum alias circumstantias, inquantum scilicet aliquis obedit vel cui non debet vel in quibus sicut etiam supra de religione dictum est. Potest etiam dici quod sicut in iustitia superfluum est in eo qui retinet alienum, diminutum autem in eo cui non redditur quod debetur, ut philosophus dicit, in V Ethic.; ita etiam obedientia medium est inter superfluum quod attenditur ex parte eius qui subtrahit superiori obedientiae debitum, quia superabundat in implendo propriam voluntatem, diminutum autem ex parte superioris cui non obeditur. Unde secundum hoc, obedientia non erit medium duarum malitiarum, sicut supra de iustitia dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod obedientia, sicut et quaelibet virtus, debet habere promptam voluntatem in suum proprium obiectum, non autem in id quod repugnans est ei. Proprium autem obiectum obedientiae est praeceptum, quod quidem ex alterius voluntate procedit. Unde obedientia reddit promptam hominis voluntatem ad implendam voluntatem alterius, scilicet praecipientis. Si autem id quod ei praecipitur sit propter se ei volitum, etiam absque ratione praecepti, sicut accidit in prosperis; iam ex propria voluntate tendit in illud, et non videtur illud implere propter praeceptum, sed propter propriam voluntatem. Sed quando illud quod praecipitur nullo modo est secundum se volitum, sed est, secundum se consideratum, propriae voluntati repugnans, sicut accidit in asperis; tunc omnino manifestum est quod non impletur nisi propter praeceptum. Et ideo Gregorius dicit, in libro Moral., quod obedientia quae habet aliquid de suo in prosperis, est nulla vel minor, quia scilicet voluntas propria non videtur principaliter tendere ad implendum praeceptum, sed ad assequendum proprium volitum, in adversis autem vel difficilibus est maior, quia propria voluntas in nihil aliud tendit quam in praeceptum. Sed hoc intelligendum est secundum illud quod exterius apparet. Secundum tamen Dei iudicium, qui corda rimatur, potest contingere quod etiam in prosperis obedientia, aliquid de suo habens, non propter hoc sit minus laudabilis, si scilicet propria voluntas obedientis non minus devote tendat ad impletionem praecepti. Ad quartum dicendum quod reverentia directe respicit personam excellentem, et ideo secundum diversam rationem excellentiae, diversas species habet. Obedientia vero respicit praeceptum personae excellentis, et ideo est unius rationis. Sed quia propter reverentiam personae obedientia debetur eius praecepto, consequens

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whether expressed or inferred, namely, a simple word of the superior, indicating his will, and which the obedient subject obeys promptly, according to Titus 3:1, Admonish them to be subject to princes, and to obey at a word, etc. It is, however, a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and it observes the mean between excess and deficiency. Excess thereof is measured in respect, not of quantity, but of other circumstances, insofar as a man obeys either whom he ought not, or in matters wherein he ought not to obey, as we have stated above regarding religion (Q. 92, A. 2). We may also reply that as in justice, excess is in the person who retains another’s property, and deficiency in the person who does not receive his due, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4), so too obedience observes the mean between excess on the part of him who fails to pay due obedience to his superior, since he exceeds in fulfilling his own will, and deficiency on the part of the superior, who does not receive obedience. Wherefore in this way obedience will be a mean between two forms of wickedness, as was stated above concerning justice (Q. 58, A. 10). Reply Obj. 3: Obedience, like every virtue, requires the will to be prompt towards its proper object, but not towards that which is repugnant to it. Now the proper object of obedience is a precept, and this proceeds from another’s will. Wherefore obedience makes a man’s will prompt in fulfilling the will of another, the maker, namely, of the precept. If that which is prescribed to him is willed by him for its own sake apart from its being prescribed, as happens in agreeable matters, he tends towards it at once by his own will and seems to comply, not on account of the precept, but on account of his own will. But if that which is prescribed is nowise willed for its own sake, but, considered in itself, repugnant to his own will, as happens in disagreeable matters, then it is quite evident that it is not fulfilled except on account of the precept. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that obedience perishes or diminishes when it holds its own in agreeable matters, because, to wit, one’s own will seems to tend principally, not to the accomplishment of the precept, but to the fulfilment of one’s own desire; but that it increases in disagreeable or difficult matters, because there one’s own will tends to nothing beside the precept. Yet this must be understood as regards outward appearances: for, on the other hand, according to the judgment of God, Who searches the heart, it may happen that even in agreeable matters obedience, while holding its own, is nonetheless praiseworthy, provided the will of him that obeys tend no less devotedly to the fulfilment of the precept. Reply Obj. 4: Reverence regards directly the person that excels: wherefore it admits a various species according to the various aspects of excellence. Obedience, on the other hand, regards the precept of the person that excels, and therefore admits of only one aspect. And since obedience is due to a person’s precept on account of reverence to

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est quod obedientia omnis sit eadem specie, ex diversis him, it follows that obedience to a man is of one species, tamen specie causis procedens. though the causes from which it proceeds differ specifically.

Article 3 Whether obedience is the greatest of the virtues? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod obedientia sit maxima virtutum. Dicitur enim I Reg. XV, melior est obedientia quam victimae. Sed oblatio victimarum pertinet ad religionem, quae est potissima inter omnes virtutes morales, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo obedientia est potissima inter virtutes. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, ult. Moral., quod obedientia sola virtus est quae virtutes ceteras menti inserit, insertasque custodit. Sed causa est potior effectu. Ergo obedientia est potior omnibus virtutibus. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, ult. Moral., quod nunquam per obedientiam malum fieri, aliquando autem debet per obedientiam bonum quod agitur intermitti. Sed non praetermittitur aliquid nisi pro meliori. Ergo obedientia, pro qua praetermittuntur bona aliarum virtutum, est virtutibus aliis melior. Sed contra est quod obedientia habet laudem ex eo quod ex caritate procedit, dicit enim Gregorius, ult. Moral., quod obedientia non servili metu, sed caritatis affectu servanda est, non timore poenae, sed amore iustitiae. Ergo caritas est potior virtus quam obedientia. Respondeo dicendum quod sicut peccatum consistit in hoc quod homo, contempto Deo, commutabilibus bonis inhaeret; ita meritum virtuosi actus consistit e contrario in hoc quod homo, contemptis bonis creatis, Deo inhaeret. Finis autem potior est his quae sunt ad finem. Si ergo bona creata propter hoc contemnantur ut Deo inhaereatur, maior est laus virtutis ex hoc quod Deo inhaeret quam ex hoc quod bona terrena contemnit. Et ideo illae virtutes quibus Deo secundum se inhaeretur, scilicet theologicae, sunt potiores virtutibus moralibus, quibus aliquid terrenum contemnitur ut Deo inhaereatur. Inter virtutes autem morales, tanto aliqua potior est quanto maius aliquid contemnit ut Deo inhaereat. Sunt autem tria genera bonorum humanorum quae homo potest contemnere propter Deum, quorum infimum sunt exteriora bona; medium autem sunt bona corporis; supremum autem sunt bona animae, inter quae quodammodo praecipuum est voluntas, inquantum scilicet per voluntatem homo omnibus aliis bonis utitur. Et ideo, per se loquendo, laudabilior est obedientiae virtus, quae

Objection 1: It seems that obedience is the greatest of the virtues. For it is written (1 Kgs 15:22): Obedience is better than sacrifices. Now the offering of sacrifices belongs to religion, which is the greatest of all moral virtues, as shown above (Q. 81, A. 6). Therefore obedience is the greatest of all virtues. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that obedience is the only virtue that ingrafts virtues in the soul and protects them when ingrafted. Now the cause is greater than the effect. Therefore obedience is greater than all the virtues. Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that evil should never be done out of obedience: yet sometimes for the sake of obedience we should lay aside the good we are doing. Now one does not lay aside a thing except for something better. Therefore obedience, for whose sake the good of other virtues is set aside, is better than other virtues. On the contrary, obedience deserves praise because it proceeds from charity: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that obedience should be practiced, not out of servile fear, but from a sense of charity, not through fear of punishment, but through love of justice. Therefore charity is a greater virtue than obedience. I answer that, Just as sin consists in man contemning God and adhering to mutable things, so the merit of a virtuous act consists in man contemning created goods and adhering to God as his end. Now the end is greater than that which is directed to the end. Therefore if a man contemns created goods in order that he may adhere to God, his virtue derives greater praise from his adhering to God than from his contemning earthly things. And so those, namely the theological, virtues whereby he adheres to God in Himself, are greater than the moral virtues, whereby he holds in contempt some earthly thing in order to adhere to God. Among the moral virtues, the greater the thing which a man contemns that he may adhere to God, the greater the virtue. Now there are three kinds of human goods that man may contemn for God’s sake. The lowest of these are external goods, the goods of the body take the middle place, and the highest are the goods of the soul; and among these the chief, in a way, is the will, insofar as, by his will, man makes use of all other goods. Therefore, properly speaking, the virtue of obedience, whereby we contemn our own will

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propter Deum contemnit propriam voluntatem, quam aliae virtutes morales, quae propter Deum aliqua alia bona contemnunt. Unde Gregorius dicit, in ult. Moral., quod obedientia victimis iure praeponitur, quia per victimas aliena caro, per obedientiam vero voluntas propria mactatur. Unde etiam quaecumque alia virtutum opera ex hoc meritoria sunt apud Deum quod sint ut obediatur voluntati divinae. Nam si quis etiam martyrium sustineret, vel omnia sua pauperibus erogaret, nisi haec ordinaret ad impletionem divinae voluntatis, quod recte ad obedientiam pertinet, meritoria esse non possent, sicut nec si fierent sine caritate, quae sine obedientia esse non potest. Dicitur enim I Ioan. II, quod qui dicit se nosse Deum, et mandata eius non custodit, mendax est, qui autem servat verba eius, vere in hoc caritas Dei perfecta est. Et hoc ideo est quia amicitia facit idem velle et nolle. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obedientia procedit ex reverentia, quae exhibet cultum et honorem superiori. Et quantum ad hoc, sub diversis virtutibus continetur, licet secundum se considerata, prout respicit rationem praecepti, sit una specialis virtus. Inquantum ergo procedit ex reverentia praelatorum, continetur quodammodo sub observantia. Inquantum vero procedit ex reverentia parentum, sub pietate. Inquantum vero procedit ex reverentia Dei, sub religione, et pertinet ad devotionem, quae est principalis actus religionis. Unde secundum hoc, laudabilius est obedire Deo quam sacrificium offerre. Et etiam quia in sacrificio immolatur aliena caro, per obedientiam autem propria voluntas, ut Gregorius dicit. Specialiter tamen in casu in quo loquebatur Samuel, melius fuisset Sauli obedire Deo quam animalia pinguia Amalecitarum in sacrificium offerre, contra Dei mandatum. Ad secundum dicendum quod ad obedientiam pertinent omnes actus virtutum prout sunt in praecepto. Inquantum ergo actus virtutum operantur causaliter vel dispositive ad earum generationem et conservationem, intantum dicitur quod obedientia omnes virtutes menti inserit et custodit. Nec tamen sequitur quod obedientia sit simpliciter omnibus virtutibus prior, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia licet actus virtutis cadat sub praecepto, tamen potest aliquis implere actum virtutis non attendens ad rationem praecepti. Unde si aliqua virtus sit cuius obiectum sit naturaliter prius quam praeceptum, illa virtus dicitur naturaliter prior quam obedientia, ut patet de fide, per quam nobis divinae auctoritatis sublimitas innotescit, ex qua competit ei potestas praecipiendi. Secundo, quia infusio gratiae et virtutum potest praecedere, etiam tempore, omnem actum virtuosum. Et secundum hoc, neque tempore neque natura est obedientia omnibus aliis virtutibus prior.

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for God’s sake, is more praiseworthy than the other moral virtues, which contemn other goods for the sake of God. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that obedience is rightly preferred to sacrifices, because by sacrifices another’s body is slain whereas by obedience we slay our own will. Wherefore even any other acts of virtue are meritorious before God through being performed out of obedience to God’s will. For were one to suffer even martyrdom, or to give all one’s goods to the poor, unless one directed these things to the fulfilment of the divine will, which pertains directly to obedience, they could not be meritorious: as neither would they be if they were done without charity, which cannot exist apart from obedience. For it is written (1 John 2:4, 5): He who saith that he knoweth God, and keepeth not His commandments, is a liar . . . but he that keepeth His word, in him in very deed the charity of God is perfected: and this because friends have the same likes and dislikes. Reply Obj. 1: Obedience proceeds from reverence, which pays worship and honor to a superior, and in this respect it is contained under different virtues, although considered in itself, as regarding the aspect of precept, it is one special virtue. Accordingly, insofar as it proceeds from reverence for a superior, it is contained, in a way, under observance; while insofar as it proceeds from reverence for one’s parents, it is contained under piety; and insofar as it proceeds from reverence for God, it comes under religion, and pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion. Wherefore from this point of view it is more praiseworthy to obey God than to offer sacrifice, as well as because, in a sacrifice we slay another’s body, whereas by obedience we slay our own will, as Gregory says (Moral. xxxv). As to the special case in which Samuel spoke, it would have been better for Saul to obey God than to offer in sacrifice the fat animals of the Amalekites against the commandment of God. Reply Obj. 2: All acts of virtue, insofar as they come under a precept, belong to obedience. Wherefore according as acts of virtue act causally or dispositively towards their generation and preservation, obedience is said to ingraft and protect all virtues. And yet it does not follow that obedience takes precedence of all virtues absolutely, for two reasons. First, because though an act of virtue come under a precept, one may nevertheless perform that act of virtue without considering the aspect of precept. Consequently, if there be any virtue, whose object is naturally prior to the precept, that virtue is said to be naturally prior to obedience. Such a virtue is faith, whereby we come to know the sublime nature of divine authority, by reason of which the power to command is competent to God. Second, because infusion of grace and virtues may precede, even in point of time, all virtuous acts: and in this way obedience is not prior to all virtues, neither in point of time nor by nature.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod duplex est bonum. Quoddam ad quod faciendum homo ex necessitate tenetur, sicut amare Deum, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Et tale bonum nullo modo debet propter obedientiam praetermitti. Est autem aliud bonum ad quod homo non tenetur ex necessitate. Et tale bonum debet homo quandoque propter obedientiam praetermittere, ad quam ex necessitate homo tenetur, quia non debet homo aliquid bonum facere culpam incurrendo. Et tamen, sicut ibidem Gregorius dicit, qui ab uno quolibet bono subiectos vetat, necesse est ut multa concedat, ne obedientis mens funditus intereat, si a bonis omnibus penitus repulsa ieiunet. Et sic per obedientiam et alia bona potest damnum unius boni recompensari.

Q. 104, A. 4

Reply Obj. 3: There are two kinds of good. There is that to which we are bound of necessity, for instance to love God, and so forth: and by no means may such a good be set aside on account of obedience. But there is another good to which man is not bound of necessity, and this good we ought sometimes to set aside for the sake of obedience to which we are bound of necessity, since we ought not to do good by falling into sin. Yet as Gregory remarks (Moral. xxxv), he who forbids his subjects any single good, must needs allow them many others, lest the souls of those who obey perish utterly from starvation, through being deprived of every good. Thus the loss of one good may be compensated by obedience and other goods.

Article 4 Whether God ought to be obeyed in all things? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non in omnibus sit Deo obediendum. Dicitur enim Matth. IX, quod dominus duobus caecis curatis praecepit dicens, videte ne quis sciat. Illi autem, exeuntes, diffamaverunt eum per totam terram illam. Nec tamen ex hoc inculpantur. Ergo videtur quod non teneamur in omnibus obedire Deo. Praeterea, nullus tenetur aliquid facere contra virtutem. Sed inveniuntur quaedam praecepta Dei contra virtutem, sicut quod praecepit Abrahae quod occideret filium innocentem, ut habetur Gen. XXII, et Iudaeis ut furarentur res Aegyptiorum, ut habetur Exod. XI, quae sunt contra iustitiam; et Osee quod acciperet mulierem adulteram, quod est contra castitatem. Ergo non in omnibus est obediendum Deo. Praeterea, quicumque obedit Deo, conformat voluntatem suam voluntati divinae etiam in volito. Sed non quantum ad omnia tenemur conformare voluntatem nostram voluntati divinae in volito, ut supra habitum est. Ergo non in omnibus tenetur homo Deo obedire. Sed contra est quod dicitur Exod. XXIV, omnia quae locutus est dominus faciemus, et erimus obedientes. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ille qui obedit movetur per imperium eius cui obedit, sicut res naturales moventur per suos motores. Sicut autem Deus est primus motor omnium quae naturaliter moventur, ita etiam est primus motor omnium voluntatum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo sicut naturali necessitate omnia naturalia subduntur divinae motioni, ita etiam quadam necessitate iustitiae omnes voluntates tenentur obedire divino imperio. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus caecis dixit ut miraculum occultarent, non quasi intendens

Objection 1: It seems that God need not be obeyed in all things. For it is written (Matt 9:30, 31) that our Lord after healing the two blind men commanded them, saying: See that no man know this. But they going out spread His fame abroad in all that country. Yet they are not blamed for so doing. Therefore it seems that we are not bound to obey God in all things. Obj. 2: Further, no one is bound to do anything contrary to virtue. Now we find that God commanded certain things contrary to virtue: thus He commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gen 22); and the Jews to steal the property of the Egyptians (Exod 11), which things are contrary to justice; and Osee to take to himself a woman who was an adulteress (Hos 3), and this is contrary to chastity. Therefore God is not to be obeyed in all things. Obj. 3: Further, whoever obeys God conforms his will to the divine will even as to the thing willed. But we are not bound in all things to conform our will to the divine will as to the thing willed, as stated above (I-II, Q. 19, A. 10). Therefore man is not bound to obey God in all things. On the contrary, It is written (Exod 24:7): All things that the Lord hath spoken we will do, and we will be obedient. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), he who obeys is moved by the command of the person he obeys, just as natural things are moved by their motive causes. Now just as God is the first mover of all things that are moved naturally, so too is He the first mover of all wills, as shown above (I-II, Q. 9, A. 6). Therefore just as all natural things are subject to the divine motion by a natural necessity so too all wills, by a kind of necessity of justice, are bound to obey the divine command. Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord in telling the blind men to conceal the miracle had no intention of binding them with the

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eos per virtutem divini praecepti obligare, sed, sicut Gregorius dicit, XIX Moral., servis suis se sequentibus exemplum dedit, ut ipsi quidem virtutes suas occultare desiderent; et tamen, ut alii eorum exemplo proficiant, prodantur inviti. Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut Deus nihil operatur contra naturam, quia haec est natura uniuscuiusque rei quod in ea Deus operatur, ut habetur in Glossa Rom. XI, operatur tamen aliquid contra solitum cursum naturae; ita etiam Deus nihil potest praecipere contra virtutem, quia in hoc principaliter consistit virtus et rectitudo voluntatis humanae quod Dei voluntati conformetur et eius sequatur imperium, quamvis sit contra consuetum virtutis modum. Secundum hoc ergo, praeceptum Abrahae factum quod filium innocentem occideret, non fuit contra iustitiam, quia Deus est auctor mortis et vitae. Similiter nec fuit contra iustitiam quod mandavit Iudaeis ut res Aegyptiorum acciperent, quia eius sunt omnia, et cui voluerit dat illa. Similiter etiam non fuit contra castitatem praeceptum ad Osee factum ut mulierem adulteram acciperet, quia ipse Deus est humanae generationis ordinator, et ille est debitus modus mulieribus utendi quem Deus instituit. Unde patet quod praedicti nec obediendo Deo, nec obedire volendo, peccaverunt. Ad tertium dicendum quod etsi non semper teneatur homo velle quod Deus vult, semper tamen tenetur velle quod Deus vult eum velle. Et hoc homini praecipue innotescit per praeceptum divinum. Et ideo tenetur homo in omnibus divinis praeceptis obedire.

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force of a divine precept, but, as Gregory says (Moral. xix), gave an example to His servants who follow Him that they might wish to hide their virtue and yet that it should be proclaimed against their will, in order that others might profit by their example. Reply Obj. 2: Even as God does nothing contrary to nature (since the nature of a thing is what God does therein, according to a gloss on Rom. 11), and yet does certain things contrary to the wonted course of nature; so too God can command nothing contrary to virtue since virtue and rectitude of human will consist chiefly in conformity with God’s will and obedience to His command, although it be contrary to the wonted mode of virtue. Accordingly, then, the command given to Abraham to slay his innocent son was not contrary to justice, since God is the author of life and death. Nor again was it contrary to justice that He commanded the Jews to take things belonging to the Egyptians, because all things are His, and He gives them to whom He will. Nor was it contrary to chastity that Osee was commanded to take an adulteress, because God Himself is the ordainer of human generation, and the right manner of intercourse with woman is that which He appoints. Hence it is evident that the persons aforesaid did not sin, either by obeying God or by willing to obey Him. Reply Obj. 3: Though man is not always bound to will what God wills, yet he is always bound to will what God wills him to will. This comes to man’s knowledge chiefly through God’s command, wherefore man is bound to obey God’s commands in all things.

Article 5 Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod subditi teneantur suis superioribus in omnibus obedire. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Coloss. III, filii, obedite parentibus per omnia. Et postea subdit, servi, obedite per omnia dominis carnalibus. Ergo, eadem ratione, alii subditi debent suis praelatis in omnibus obedire. Praeterea, praelati sunt medii inter Deum et subditos, secundum illud Deut. V, ego sequester et medius fui inter Deum et vos in tempore illo, ut annuntiarem vobis verba eius. Sed ab extremo in extremum non pervenitur nisi per medium. Ergo praecepta praelati sunt reputanda tanquam praecepta Dei. Unde et apostolus dicit, Gal. IV, sicut Angelum Dei accepistis me, sicut Christum Iesum; et I ad Thess. II, cum accepissetis a nobis verbum auditus Dei, accepistis illud non ut verbum hominum, sed,

Objection 1: It seems that subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things. For the Apostle says (Col 3:20): Children, obey your parents in all things, and farther on (Col 3:22): Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh. Therefore in like manner other subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things. Obj. 2: Further, superiors stand between God and their subjects, according to Deut. 5:5, I was the mediator and stood between the Lord and you at that time, to show you His words. Now there is no going from extreme to extreme, except through that which stands between. Therefore the commands of a superior must be esteemed the commands of God, wherefore the Apostle says (Gal 4:14): You . . . received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus and (1 Thess 2:13): When you had received of us the word of the

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sicut vere est, verbum Dei. Ergo sicut Deo debet homo in hearing of God, you received it, not as the word of men, but, omnibus obedire, ita etiam et praelatis. as it is indeed, the word of God. Therefore as man is bound to obey God in all things, so is he bound to obey his superiors. Praeterea, sicut religiosi profitendo vovent castiObj. 3: Further, just as religious in making their profestatem et paupertatem, ita et obedientiam. Sed religiosus sion take vows of chastity and poverty, so do they also vow tenetur quantum ad omnia servare castitatem et pauper- obedience. Now a religious is bound to observe chastity and tatem. Ergo similiter quantum ad omnia tenetur obedi- poverty in all things. Therefore he is also bound to obey in re. all things. Sed contra est quod dicitur Act. V, obedire oporOn the contrary, It is written (Acts 5:29): We ought tet Deo magis quam hominibus. Sed quandoque praecep- to obey God rather than men. Now sometimes the things ta praelatorum sunt contra Deum. Ergo non in omnibus commanded by a superior are against God. Therefore supraelatis est obediendum. periors are not to be obeyed in all things. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, obI answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 4), he who ediens movetur ad imperium praecipientis quadam ne- obeys is moved at the bidding of the person who comcessitate iustitiae, sicut res naturalis movetur ex virtute mands him, by a certain necessity of justice, even as a natsui motoris necessitate naturae. Quod autem aliqua res ural thing is moved through the power of its mover by a naturalis non moveatur a suo motore, potest continge- natural necessity. That a natural thing be not moved by re dupliciter. Uno modo, propter impedimentum quod its mover, may happen in two ways. First, on account of a provenit ex fortiori virtute alterius moventis, sicut li- hindrance arising from the stronger power of some other gnum non comburitur ab igne si fortior vis aquae impe- mover; thus wood is not burnt by fire if a stronger force of diat. Alio modo, ex defectu ordinis mobilis ad motorem, water intervene. Second, through lack of order in the movquia etsi subiiciatur eius actioni quantum ad aliquid, non able with regard to its mover, since, though it is subject to tamen quantum ad omnia, sicut humor quandoque su- the latter’s action in one respect, yet it is not subject thereto biicitur actioni caloris quantum ad calefieri, non autem in every respect. Thus, a humor is sometimes subject to the quantum ad exsiccari sive consumi. Et similiter ex duo- action of heat, as regards being heated, but not as regards bus potest contingere quod subditus suo superiori non being dried up or consumed. In like manner there are two teneatur in omnibus obedire. Uno modo, propter prae- reasons, for which a subject may not be bound to obey his ceptum maioris potestatis. Ut enim dicitur Rom. XIII, superior in all things. First on account of the command of a super illud, qui resistunt, ipsi sibi damnationem acqui- higher power. For as a gloss says on Rom. 13:2, They that rerunt, dicit Glossa, si quid iusserit curator, numquid ti- sist the power, resist the ordinance of God (cf. St. Augustine, bi faciendum est si contra proconsulem iubeat? Rursum, De Verb. Dom. viii). If a commissioner issue an order, are si quid ipse proconsul iubeat, et aliud imperator, num- you to comply, if it is contrary to the bidding of the proconquid dubitatur, illo contempto, illi esse serviendum? Ergo, sul? Again if the proconsul command one thing, and the emsi aliud imperator, aliud Deus iubeat, contempto illo, ob- peror another, will you hesitate to disregard the former and temperandum est Deo. Alio modo, non tenetur inferior serve the latter? Therefore if the emperor commands one thing suo superiori obedire, si ei aliquid praecipiat in quo ei and God another, you must disregard the former and obey non subdatur. Dicit enim Seneca, in III de Benefic., errat God. Second, a subject is not bound to obey his superior si quis existimat servitutem in totum hominem descende- if the latter command him to do something wherein he is re. Pars eius melior excepta est. Corpora obnoxia sunt et not subject to him. For Seneca says (De Beneficiis iii): It is adscripta dominis, mens quidem est sui iuris. Et ideo in wrong to suppose that slavery falls upon the whole man: for his quae pertinent ad interiorem motum voluntatis, ho- the better part of him is excepted. His body is subjected and mo non tenetur homini obedire, sed solum Deo. assigned to his master but his soul is his own. Consequently in matters touching the internal movement of the will man is not bound to obey his fellow-man, but God alone. Tenetur autem homo homini obedire in his quae exNevertheless man is bound to obey his fellow-man in terius per corpus sunt agenda. In quibus tamen etiam, things that have to be done externally by means of the body: secundum ea quae ad naturam corporis pertinent, homo and yet, since by nature all men are equal, he is not bound homini obedire non tenetur, sed solum Deo, quia om- to obey another man in matters touching the nature of the nes homines natura sunt pares, puta in his quae perti- body, for instance in those relating to the support of his nent ad corporis sustentationem et prolis generationem. body or the begetting of his children. Wherefore servants Unde non tenentur nec servi dominis, nec filii parenti- are not bound to obey their masters, nor children their parbus obedire de matrimonio contrahendo vel virginitate ents, in the question of contracting marriage or of remainservanda, aut aliquo alio huiusmodi. Sed in his quae per- ing in the state of virginity or the like. But in matters con-

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tinent ad dispositionem actuum et rerum humanarum, tenetur subditus suo superiori obedire secundum rationem superioritatis, sicut miles duci exercitus in his quae pertinent ad bellum; servus domino in his quae pertinent ad servilia opera exequenda; filius patri in his quae pertinent ad disciplinam vitae et curam domesticam; et sic de aliis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc quod apostolus dixit, per omnia, intelligendum est quantum ad illa quae pertinent ad ius patriae vel dominativae potestatis. Ad secundum dicendum quod Deo subiicitur homo simpliciter quantum ad omnia, et interiora et exteriora, et ideo in omnibus ei obedire tenetur. Subditi autem non subiiciuntur suis superioribus quantum ad omnia, sed quantum ad aliqua determinate. Et quantum ad illa, medii sunt inter Deum et subditos. Quantum ad alia vero, immediate subduntur Deo, a quo instruuntur per legem naturalem vel scriptam. Ad tertium dicendum quod religiosi obedientiam profitentur quantum ad regularem conversationem, secundum quam suis praelatis subduntur. Et ideo quantum ad illa sola obedire tenentur quae possunt ad regularem conversationem pertinere. Et haec est obedientia sufficiens ad salutem. Si autem etiam in aliis obedire voluerint, hoc pertinebit ad cumulum perfectionis, dum tamen illa non sint contra Deum, aut contra professionem regulae; quia talis obedientia esset illicita. Sic ergo potest triplex obedientia distingui, una sufficiens ad salutem, quae scilicet obedit in his ad quae obligatur; alia perfecta, quae obedit in omnibus licitis; alia indiscreta, quae etiam in illicitis obedit.

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cerning the disposal of actions and human affairs, a subject is bound to obey his superior within the sphere of his authority; for instance a soldier must obey his general in matters relating to war, a servant his master in matters touching the execution of the duties of his service, a son his father in matters relating to the conduct of his life and the care of the household; and so forth. Reply Obj. 1: When the Apostle says in all things, he refers to matters within the sphere of a father’s or master’s authority. Reply Obj. 2: Man is subject to God simply as regards all things, both internal and external, wherefore he is bound to obey Him in all things. On the other hand, inferiors are not subject to their superiors in all things, but only in certain things and in a particular way, in respect of which the superior stands between God and his subjects, whereas in respect of other matters the subject is immediately under God, by Whom he is taught either by the natural or by the written law. Reply Obj. 3: Religious profess obedience as to the regular mode of life, in respect of which they are subject to their superiors: wherefore they are bound to obey in those matters only which may belong to the regular mode of life, and this obedience suffices for salvation. If they be willing to obey even in other matters, this will belong to the superabundance of perfection; provided, however, such things be not contrary to God or to the rule they profess, for obedience in this case would be unlawful. Accordingly we may distinguish a threefold obedience; one, sufficient for salvation, and consisting in obeying when one is bound to obey: second, perfect obedience, which obeys in all things lawful: third, indiscreet obedience, which obeys even in matters unlawful.

Article 6 Whether Christians are bound to obey the secular powers? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christiani non teneantur saecularibus potestatibus obedire. Quia super illud Matth. XVII, ergo liberi sunt filii, dicit Glossa, si in quolibet regno filii illius regis qui regno illi praefertur sunt liberi, tunc filii regis cui omnia regna subduntur, in quolibet regno liberi esse debent. Sed Christiani per fidem Christi facti sunt filii Dei, secundum illud Ioan. I, dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri, his qui credunt in nomine eius. Ergo non tenentur potestatibus saecularibus obedire. Praeterea, Rom. VII dicitur, mortificati estis legi per corpus Christi, et loquitur de lege divina veteris testamenti. Sed minor est lex humana, per quam homines potestatibus saecularibus subduntur, quam lex divina vete-

Objection 1: It seems that Christians are not bound to obey the secular power. For a gloss on Matt. 17:25, Then the children are free, says: If in every kingdom the children of the king who holds sway over that kingdom are free, then the children of that King, under Whose sway are all kingdoms, should be free in every kingdom. Now Christians, by their faith in Christ, are made children of God, according to John 1:12: He gave them power to be made the sons of God, to them that believe in His name. Therefore they are not bound to obey the secular power. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Rom 7:4): You . . . are become dead to the law by the body of Christ, and the law mentioned here is the divine law of the Old Testament. Now human law whereby men are subject to the secular power is

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ris testamenti. Ergo multo magis homines, per hoc quod of less account than the divine law of the Old Testament. sunt facti membra corporis Christi, liberantur a lege su- Much more, therefore, since they have become members biectionis qua saecularibus principibus adstringebantur. of Christ’s body, are men freed from the law of subjection, whereby they were under the power of secular princes. Praeterea, latronibus, qui per violentiam oppriObj. 3: Further, men are not bound to obey robbers, munt, homines obedire non tenentur. Sed Augustinus who oppress them with violence. Now, Augustine says (De dicit, IV de Civ. Dei, remota iustitia, quid sunt regna nisi Civ. Dei iv): Without justice, what else is a kingdom but magna latrocinia? Cum igitur dominia saecularia prin- a huge robbery? Since therefore the authority of secular cipum plerumque cum iniustitia exerceantur, vel ab ali- princes is frequently exercised with injustice, or owes its qua iniusta usurpatione principium sumpserint, vide- origin to some unjust usurpation, it seems that Christians tur quod non sit principibus saecularibus obediendum a ought not to obey secular princes. Christianis. Sed contra est quod dicitur Tit. III, admone illos On the contrary, It is written (Titus 3:1): Admonish principibus et potestatibus subditos esse; et I Pet. II, subiec- them to be subject to princes and powers, and (1 Pet 2:13, 14): ti estote omni humanae creaturae propter Deum, sive regi, Be ye subject . . . to every human creature for God’s sake: quasi praecellenti; sive ducibus, tanquam ab eo Missis. whether it be to the king as excelling, or to governors as sent by him. Respondeo dicendum quod fides Christi est iustiI answer that, Faith in Christ is the origin and cause tiae principium et causa, secundum illud Rom. III, iusti- of justice, according to Rom. 3:22, The justice of God by faith tia Dei per fidem Iesu Christi. Et ideo per fidem Christi of Jesus Christ: wherefore faith in Christ does not void the non tollitur ordo iustitiae, sed magis firmatur. Ordo au- order of justice, but strengthens it. Now the order of justice tem iustitiae requirit ut inferiores suis superioribus obe- requires that subjects obey their superiors, else the stabildiant, aliter enim non posset humanarum rerum status ity of human affairs would cease. Hence faith in Christ does conservari. Et ideo per fidem Christi non excusantur fi- not excuse the faithful from the obligation of obeying secdeles quin principibus saecularibus obedire teneantur. ular princes. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dicReply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 5), subjection tum est, servitus qua homo homini subiicitur ad corpus whereby one man is bound to another regards the body; not pertinet, non ad animam, quae libera manet. Nunc au- the soul, which retains its liberty. Now, in this state of life tem, in statu huius vitae, per gratiam Christi liberamur we are freed by the grace of Christ from defects of the soul, a defectibus animae, non autem a defectibus corporis, ut but not from defects of the body, as the Apostle declares by patet per apostolum, Rom. VII, qui dicit de seipso quod saying of himself (Rom 7:23) that in his mind he served the mente servit legi Dei, carne autem legi peccati. Et ideo illi law of God, but in his flesh the law of sin. Wherefore those qui fiunt filii Dei per gratiam, liberi sunt a spirituali ser- that are made children of God by grace are free from the vitute peccati, non autem a servitute corporali, qua tem- spiritual bondage of sin, but not from the bodily bondage, poralibus dominis tenentur adstricti, ut dicit Glossa, su- whereby they are held bound to earthly masters, as a gloss per illud I ad Tim. VI, quicumque sunt sub iugo servi, et observes on 1 Tim. 6:1, Whosoever are servants under the cetera. yoke, etc. Ad secundum dicendum quod lex vetus fuit figura Reply Obj. 2: The Old Law was a figure of the New novi testamenti, et ideo debuit cessare, veritate veniente. Testament, and therefore it had to cease on the advent of Non autem est simile de lege humana, per quam homo truth. And the comparison with human law does not stand subiicitur homini. Et tamen etiam ex lege divina homo because thereby one man is subject to another. Yet man is tenetur homini obedire. bound by divine law to obey his fellow-man. Ad tertium dicendum quod principibus saeculaReply Obj. 3: Man is bound to obey secular princes ribus intantum homo obedire tenetur, inquantum ordo insofar as this is required by order of justice. Wherefore if iustitiae requirit. Et ideo si non habeant iustum princi- the prince’s authority is not just but usurped, or if he compatum sed usurpatum, vel si iniusta praecipiant, non te- mands what is unjust, his subjects are not bound to obey nentur eis subditi obedire, nisi forte per accidens, prop- him, except perhaps accidentally, in order to avoid scandal ter vitandum scandalum vel periculum. or danger.

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Question 105 Disobedience Deinde considerandum est de inobedientia. Et circa We must now consider disobedience, under which head hoc quaeruntur duo. there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum sit peccatum mortale. (1) Whether it is a mortal sin? Secundo, utrum sit gravissimum peccatorum. (2) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?

Article 1 Whether disobedience is a mortal sin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inobedientia non sit peccatum mortale. Omne enim peccatum est inobedientia, ut patet per definitionem Ambrosii superius positam. Si ergo inobedientia esset peccatum mortale, omne peccatum esset mortale. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, XXXI Moral., quod inobedientia oritur ex inani gloria. Sed inanis gloria non est peccatum mortale. Ergo nec inobedientia. Praeterea, tunc dicitur aliquis esse inobediens quando superioris praeceptum non implet. Sed superiores multoties praecepta multiplicant, quae vix aut nunquam omnia possunt observari. Si ergo inobedientia esset peccatum mortale, sequeretur quod homo non posset vitare mortale peccatum, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo inobedientia est peccatum mortale. Sed contra est quod Rom. I, et II ad Tim. III, inter alia peccata mortalia computatur, parentibus non obedientes. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum mortale est quod contrariatur caritati, per quam est spiritualis vita. Caritate autem diligitur Deus et proximus. Exigit autem caritas Dei ut eius mandatis obediatur, sicut supra dictum est. Et ideo inobedientem esse divinis praeceptis peccatum mortale est, quasi divinae dilectioni contrarium. In praeceptis autem divinis continetur quod etiam superioribus obediatur. Et ideo etiam inobedientia qua quis inobediens est praeceptis superiorum, est peccatum mortale, quasi divinae dilectioni contrarium, secundum illud Rom. XIII, qui potestati resistit, Dei ordinationi resistit. Contrariatur insuper dilectioni proximi, inquantum superiori proximo subtrahit obedientiam quam ei debet. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa definitio Ambrosii datur de peccato mortali, quod habet perfectam peccati rationem. Peccatum enim veniale non est ino-

Objection 1: It seems that disobedience is not a mortal sin. For every sin is a disobedience, as appears from Ambrose’s definition given above (Q. 104, A. 2, Obj. 1). Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, every sin would be mortal. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that disobedience is born of vainglory. But vainglory is not a mortal sin. Neither therefore is disobedience. Obj. 3: Further, a person is said to be disobedient when he does not fulfill a superior’s command. But superiors often issue so many commands that it is seldom, if ever, possible to fulfill them. Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, it would follow that man cannot avoid mortal sin, which is absurd. Wherefore disobedience is not a mortal sin. On the contrary, The sin of disobedience to parents is reckoned (Rom 1:30; 2 Tim. 3:2) among other mortal sins. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 24, A. 12; I-II, Q. 72, A. 5; I-II, Q. 88, A. 1), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity which is the cause of spiritual life. Now by charity we love God and our neighbor. The charity of God requires that we obey His commandments, as stated above (Q. 24, A. 12). Therefore to be disobedient to the commandments of God is a mortal sin, because it is contrary to the love of God. Again, the commandments of God contain the precept of obedience to superiors. Wherefore also disobedience to the commands of a superior is a mortal sin, as being contrary to the love of God, according to Rom. 13:2, He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. It is also contrary to the love of our neighbor, as it withdraws from the superior who is our neighbor the obedience that is his due. Reply Obj. 1: The definition given by Ambrose refers to mortal sin, which has the character of perfect sin. Venial sin is not disobedience, because it is not contrary to

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bedientia, quia non est contra praeceptum, sed praeter praeceptum. Nec etiam omne peccatum mortale est inobedientia, proprie et per se loquendo, sed solum sicut quando aliquis praeceptum contemnit. Quia ex fine morales actus speciem habent. Cum autem facit aliquid contra praeceptum non propter praecepti contemptum, sed propter aliquid aliud, est inobedientia materialiter tantum, sed pertinet formaliter ad aliam speciem peccati. Ad secundum dicendum quod inanis gloria appetit manifestationem alicuius excellentiae, et quia videtur ad quandam excellentiam pertinere quod homo praeceptis alterius non subdatur, inde est quod inobedientia ex inani gloria oritur. Nihil autem prohibet ex peccato veniali oriri mortale, cum veniale sit dispositio ad mortale. Ad tertium dicendum quod nullus obligatur ad impossibile. Et ideo si tot praecepta aliquis praelatus ingerat quod subditus ea implere non possit, excusatur a peccato. Et ideo praelati abstinere debent a multitudine praeceptorum.

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a precept, but beside it. Nor again is every mortal sin disobedience, properly and essentially, but only when one contemns a precept, since moral acts take their species from the end. And when a thing is done contrary to a precept, not in contempt of the precept, but with some other purpose, it is not a sin of disobedience except materially, and belongs formally to another species of sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Vainglory desires display of excellence. And since it seems to point to a certain excellence that one be not subject to another’s command, it follows that disobedience arises from vainglory. But there is nothing to hinder mortal sin from arising out of venial sin, since venial sin is a disposition to mortal. Reply Obj. 3: No one is bound to do the impossible: wherefore if a superior makes a heap of precepts and lays them upon his subjects, so that they are unable to fulfill them, they are excused from sin. Wherefore superiors should refrain from making a multitude of precepts.

Article 2 Whether disobedience is the most grievous of sins? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inobedientia sit gravissimum peccatum. Dicitur enim I Reg. XV, et quasi scelus idololatriae nolle acquiescere. Sed idolatria est gravissimum peccatum, ut supra habitum est. Ergo inobedientia est gravissimum peccatum. Praeterea, illud peccatum dicitur esse in spiritum sanctum per quod tolluntur impedimenta peccati, ut supra dictum est. Sed per inobedientiam contemnit homo praeceptum, quod maxime retrahit hominem a peccando. Ergo inobedientia est peccatum in spiritum sanctum. Et ita est gravissimum peccatum. Praeterea, apostolus dicit, Rom. V, quod per unius inobedientiam peccatores constituti sunt multi. Sed causa videtur esse potior effectu. Ergo inobedientia videtur esse gravius peccatum quam alia quae ex ea causantur. Sed contra est quod gravius est contemnere praecipientem quam praeceptum. Sed quaedam peccata sunt contra ipsam personam praecipientis, sicut patet de blasphemia et homicidio. Ergo inobedientia non est gravissimum peccatum. Respondeo dicendum quod non omnis inobedientia est aequale peccatum. Potest enim una inobedientia esse gravior altera dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte praecipientis. Quamvis enim omnem curam homo apponere debeat ad hoc quod cuilibet superiori obediat,

Objection 1: It seems that disobedience is the most grievous of sins. For it is written (1 Kgs 15:23): It is like the sin of witchcraft to rebel, and like the crime of idolatry to refuse to obey. But idolatry is the most grievous of sins, as stated above (Q. 94, A. 3). Therefore disobedience is the most grievous of sins. Obj. 2: Further, the sin against the Holy Spirit is one that removes the obstacles of sin, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 2). Now disobedience makes a man contemn a precept which, more than anything, prevents a man from sinning. Therefore disobedience is a sin against the Holy Spirit, and consequently is the most grievous of sins. Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom 5:19) that by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners. Now the cause is seemingly greater than its effect. Therefore disobedience seems to be a more grievous sin than the others that are caused thereby. On the contrary, Contempt of the commander is a more grievous sin than contempt of his command. Now some sins are against the very person of the commander, such as blasphemy and murder. Therefore disobedience is not the most grievous of sins. I answer that, Not every disobedience is equally a sin: for one disobedience may be greater than another, in two ways. First, on the part of the superior commanding, since, although a man should take every care to obey each superior, yet it is a greater duty to obey a higher than a

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tamen magis est debitum quod homo obediat superiori quam inferiori potestati. Cuius signum est quod praeceptum inferioris praetermittitur si sit praecepto superioris contrarium unde consequens est quod quanto superior est ille qui praecipit, tanto ei inobedientem esse sit gravius. Et sic inobedientem esse Deo est gravius quam inobedientem esse homini. Secundo, ex parte praeceptorum. Non enim praecipiens aequaliter vult impleri omnia quae mandat, magis enim unusquisque vult finem, et id quod est fini propinquius. Et ideo tanto est inobedientia gravior, quanto praeceptum quod quis praeterit magis est de intentione illius qui praecipit. Et in praeceptis quidem Dei, manifestum est quod quanto praeceptum datur de meliori, tanto est eius inobedientia gravior. Quia cum voluntas Dei per se feratur ad bonum, quanto aliquid est melius, tanto Deus vult illud magis impleri. Unde qui inobediens est praecepto de dilectione Dei, gravius peccat quam qui inobediens est praecepto de dilectione proximi. Voluntas autem hominis non semper magis fertur in melius. Et ideo, ubi obligamur ex solo hominis praecepto, non est gravius peccatum ex eo quod maius bonum praeteritur, sed ex eo quod praeteritur quod est magis de intentione praecipientis. Sic ergo oportet diversos inobedientiae gradus diversis peccatorum gradibus comparare. Nam inobedientia qua contemnitur Dei praeceptum, ex ipsa ratione inobedientiae gravius est peccatum quam peccatum quo peccatur in hominem, si secerneretur inobedientia Dei (et hoc dico, quia qui contra proximum peccat, etiam contra Dei praeceptum agit). Si tamen in aliquo potiori praeceptum Dei contemneret, adhuc gravius peccatum esset. Inobedientia autem qua contemnitur praeceptum hominis, levior est peccato quo contemnitur ipse praecipiens, quia ex reverentia praecipientis procedere debet reverentia praecepti. Et similiter peccatum quod directe pertinet ad contemptum Dei, sicut blasphemia vel aliquid huiusmodi, gravius est, etiam semota per intellectum inobedientia a peccato, quam peccatum in quo contemnitur solum Dei praeceptum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa comparatio Samuelis non est aequalitatis, sed similitudinis, quia inobedientia redundat in contemptum Dei sicut et idololatria, licet idololatria magis. Ad secundum dicendum quod non omnis inobedientia est peccatum in spiritum sanctum, sed solum illa cui obstinatio adhibetur. Non enim contemptus cuiuscumque quod peccatum impedit, constituit peccatum in spiritum sanctum, alioquin cuiuslibet boni contemptus esset peccatum in spiritum sanctum, quia per quodli-

Q. 105, A. 2

lower authority, in sign of which the command of a lower authority is set aside if it be contrary to the command of a higher authority. Consequently the higher the person who commands, the more grievous is it to disobey him: so that it is more grievous to disobey God than man. Second, on the part of the things commanded. For the person commanding does not equally desire the fulfilment of all his commands: since every such person desires above all the end, and that which is nearest to the end. Wherefore disobedience is the more grievous, according as the unfulfilled commandment is more in the intention of the person commanding. As to the commandments of God, it is evident that the greater the good commanded, the more grievous the disobedience of that commandment, because since God’s will is essentially directed to the good, the greater the good the more does God wish it to be fulfilled. Consequently he that disobeys the commandment of the love of God sins more grievously than one who disobeys the commandment of the love of our neighbor. On the other hand, man’s will is not always directed to the greater good: hence, when we are bound by a mere precept of man, a sin is more grievous, not through setting aside a greater good, but through setting aside that which is more in the intention of the person commanding. Accordingly the various degrees of disobedience must correspond with the various degrees of precepts: because the disobedience in which there is contempt of God’s precept, from the very nature of disobedience is more grievous than a sin committed against a man, apart from the latter being a disobedience to God. And I say this because whoever sins against his neighbor acts also against God’s commandment. And if the divine precept be contemned in a yet graver matter, the sin is still more grievous. The disobedience that contains contempt of a man’s precept is less grievous than the sin which contemns the man who made the precept, because reverence for the person commanding should give rise to reverence for his command. In like manner a sin that directly involves contempt of God, such as blasphemy, or the like, is more grievous (even if we mentally separate the disobedience from the sin) than would be a sin involving contempt of God’s commandment alone. Reply Obj. 1: This comparison of Samuel is one, not of equality but of likeness, because disobedience redounds to the contempt of God just as idolatry does, though the latter does so more. Reply Obj. 2: Not every disobedience is sin against the Holy Spirit, but only that which obstinacy is added: for it is not the contempt of any obstacle to sin that constitutes sin against the Holy Spirit, else the contempt of any good would be a sin against the Holy Spirit, since any good may hinder a man from committing sin. The sin against the

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bet bonum potest homo a peccato impediri. Sed illorum bonorum contemptus facit peccatum in spiritum sanctum quae directe ducunt ad poenitentiam et remissionem peccatorum. Ad tertium dicendum quod primum peccatum primi parentis, ex quo in omnes peccatum emanavit, non fuit inobedientia, secundum quod est speciale peccatum, sed superbia, ex qua homo ad inobedientiam processit. Unde apostolus in verbis illis videtur accipere inobedientiam secundum quod generaliter se habet ad omne peccatum.

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Holy Spirit consists in the contempt of those goods which lead directly to repentance and the remission of sins.

Reply Obj. 3: The first sin of our first parent, from which sin was transmitted to all men, was not disobedience considered as a special sin, but pride, from which then man proceeded to disobey. Hence the Apostle in these words seems to take disobedience in its relation to every sin.

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Question 106 Thankfulness or Gratitude Deinde considerandum est de gratia sive gratitudine, We must now consider thankfulness or gratitude, and et ingratitudine. Circa gratiam autem quaeruntur sex. ingratitude. Concerning thankfulness there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum gratia sit virtus specialis ab aliis (1) Whether thankfulness is a special virtue distinct distincta. from other virtues? Secundo, quis tenetur ad maiores gratiarum (2) Who owes more thanks to God, the innocent or the actiones Deo, utrum innocens vel poenitens. penitent? Tertio, utrum semper teneatur homo ad gratias (3) Whether man is always bound to give thanks for humanis beneficiis reddendas. human favors? Quarto, utrum retributio gratiarum sit differenda. (4) Whether thanksgiving should be deferred? Quinto, utrum sit mensuranda secundum acceptum (5) Whether thanksgiving should be measured beneficium, vel secundum dantis affectum. according to the favor received or the disposition of the giver? Sexto, utrum oporteat aliquid maius rependere. (6) Whether one ought to pay back more than one has received?

Article 1 Whether thankfulness is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia non sit virtus specialis ab aliis distincta. Maxima enim beneficia a Deo et a parentibus accepimus. Sed honor quem Deo retribuimus, pertinet ad virtutem religionis, honor autem quem retribuimus parentibus, pertinet ad virtutem pietatis. Ergo gratia sive gratitudo non est virtus ab aliis distincta. Praeterea, retributio proportionalis pertinet ad iustitiam commutativam, ut patet per philosophum, in V Ethic. Sed gratiae redduntur ut retributio sit, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo redditio gratiarum, quod pertinet ad gratitudinem, est actus iustitiae. Non ergo gratitudo est specialis virtus ab aliis distincta. Praeterea, recompensatio requiritur ad amicitiam conservandam, ut patet per philosophum, in VIII et IX Ethic. Sed amicitia se habet ad omnes virtutes, propter quas homo amatur. Ergo gratia sive gratitudo, ad quam pertinet recompensare beneficia, non est specialis virtus. Sed contra est quod Tullius ponit gratiam specialem iustitiae partem. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, secundum diversas causas ex quibus aliquid debetur, necesse est diversificari debiti reddendi rationem, ita tamen quod semper in maiori illud quod minus est continetur. In Deo autem primo et principaliter invenitur

Objection 1: It seems that thankfulness is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues. For we have received the greatest benefits from God, and from our parents. Now the honor which we pay to God in return belongs to the virtue of religion, and the honor with which we repay our parents belongs to the virtue of piety. Therefore thankfulness or gratitude is not distinct from the other virtues. Obj. 2: Further, proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4). Now the purpose of giving thanks is repayment (Ethic. 5, 4). Therefore thanksgiving, which belongs to gratitude, is an act of justice. Therefore gratitude is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues. Obj. 3: Further, acknowledgment of favor received is requisite for the preservation of friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13; ix, 1). Now friendship is associated with all the virtues, since they are the reason for which man is loved. Therefore thankfulness or gratitude, to which it belongs to repay favors received, is not a special virtue. On the contrary, Tully reckons thankfulness a special part of justice (De Invent. Rhet. ii). I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 3), the nature of the debt to be paid must needs vary according to various causes giving rise to the debt, yet so that the greater always includes the lesser. Now the cause of debt is found primarily and chiefly in God, in that He is the first

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Q. 106, A. 2

Justice

causa debiti, eo quod ipse est primum principium omnium bonorum nostrorum. Secundario autem, in patre, quod est proximum nostrae generationis et disciplinae principium. Tertio autem, in persona quae dignitate praecellit, ex qua communia beneficia procedunt. Quarto autem, in aliquo benefactore a quo aliqua particularia et privata beneficia percepimus, pro quibus particulariter ei obligamur. Quia ergo non quidquid debemus Deo vel patri vel personae dignitate praecellenti, debemus alicui benefactorum a quo aliquod particulare beneficium recepimus; inde est quod post religionem, qua debitum cultum Deo impendimus; et pietatem, qua colimus parentes; et observantiam, qua colimus personas dignitate praecellentes; est gratia sive gratitudo, quae benefactoribus gratiam recompensat. Et distinguitur a praemissis virtutibus, sicut quaelibet posteriorum distinguitur a priori, quasi ab eo deficiens. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut religio est quaedam superexcellens pietas, ita est etiam quaedam excellens gratia seu gratitudo. Unde et gratiarum actio ad Deum supra posita est inter ea quae ad religionem pertinent. Ad secundum dicendum quod retributio proportionalis pertinet ad iustitiam commutativam quando attenditur secundum debitum legale, puta si pacto firmetur ut tantum pro tanto retribuatur. Sed ad virtutem gratiae sive gratitudinis pertinet retributio quae fit ex solo debito honestatis, quam scilicet aliquis sponte facit. Unde gratitudo est minus grata si sit coacta, ut Seneca dicit, in libro de beneficiis. Ad tertium dicendum quod cum vera amicitia supra virtutem fundetur, quidquid est virtuti contrarium in amico est amicitiae impeditivum, et quidquid est virtuosum est amicitiae provocativum. Et secundum hoc, per recompensationem beneficiorum amicitia conservatur; quamvis recompensatio beneficiorum specialiter ad virtutem gratitudinis pertineat.

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principle of all our goods: secondarily it is found in our father, because he is the proximate principle of our begetting and upbringing: third it is found in the person that excels in dignity, from whom general favors proceed; fourth it is found in a benefactor, from whom we have received particular and private favors, on account of which we are under particular obligation to him. Accordingly, since what we owe God, or our father, or a person excelling in dignity, is not the same as what we owe a benefactor from whom we have received some particular favor, it follows that after religion, whereby we pay God due worship, and piety, whereby we worship our parents, and observance, whereby we worship persons excelling in dignity, there is thankfulness or gratitude, whereby we give thanks to our benefactors. And it is distinct from the foregoing virtues, just as each of these is distinct from the one that precedes, as falling short thereof. Reply Obj. 1: Just as religion is superexcelling piety, so is it excelling thankfulness or gratitude: wherefore giving thanks to God was reckoned above (Q. 83, A. 17) among things pertaining to religion. Reply Obj. 2: Proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice, when it answers to the legal due; for instance when it is contracted that so much be paid for so much. But the repayment that belongs to the virtue of thankfulness or gratitude answers to the moral debt, and is paid spontaneously. Hence thanksgiving is less thankful when compelled, as Seneca observes (De Beneficiis iii). Reply Obj. 3: Since true friendship is based on virtue, whatever there is contrary to virtue in a friend is an obstacle to friendship, and whatever in him is virtuous is an incentive to friendship. In this way friendship is preserved by repayment of favors, although repayment of favors belongs specially to the virtue of gratitude.

Article 2 Whether the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magis teneatur ad gratias reddendas Deo innocens quam poenitens. Quanto enim aliquis maius donum percepit a Deo, tanto magis ad gratiarum actiones tenetur. Sed maius est donum innocentiae quam iustitiae restitutae. Ergo videtur quod magis teneatur ad gratiarum actionem innocens quam poenitens. Praeterea, sicut benefactori debetur gratiarum actio, ita et dilectio. Sed Augustinus dicit, in II Confess.,

Objection 1: It seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent. For the greater the gift one has received from God, the more one is bound to give Him thanks. Now the gift of innocence is greater than that of justice restored. Therefore it seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent. Obj. 2: Further, a man owes love to his benefactor just as he owes him gratitude. Now Augustine says (Confess. ii):

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quis hominum, suam cogitans infirmitatem, audet viribus suis tribuere castitatem atque innocentiam suam, ut minus amet te, quasi minus fuerit ei necessaria misericordia tua donans peccata conversis ad te? Et postea subdit, et ideo tantundem, immo amplius te diligat, quia per quem me videt tantis peccatorum meorum languoribus exui, per eum se videt tantis peccatorum languoribus non implicari. Ergo etiam magis tenetur ad gratiam reddendam innocens quam poenitens. Praeterea, quanto gratuitum beneficium est magis continuatum, tanto maior pro eo debetur gratiarum actio. Sed in innocente magis continuatur divinae gratiae beneficium quam in poenitente. Dicit enim Augustinus, ibidem, gratiae tuae deputo, et misericordiae tuae, quod peccata mea tanquam glaciem solvisti. Gratiae tuae deputo et quaecumque non feci mala, quid enim non facere potui? Et omnia mihi dimissa esse fateor, et quae mea sponte feci mala, et quae te duce non feci. Ergo magis tenetur ad gratiarum actionem innocens quam poenitens. Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. VII, cui plus dimittitur, plus diligit. Ergo, eadem ratione, plus tenetur ad gratiarum actiones. Respondeo dicendum quod actio gratiarum in accipiente respicit gratiam dantis. Unde ubi est maior gratia ex parte dantis, ibi requiritur maior gratiarum actio ex parte recipientis. Gratia autem est quod gratis datur. Unde dupliciter potest esse ex parte dantis maior gratia. Uno modo, ex quantitate dati. Et hoc modo, innocens tenetur ad maiores gratiarum actiones, quia maius donum ei datur a Deo et magis continuatum, ceteris paribus, absolute loquendo. Alio modo potest dici maior gratia quia magis datur gratis. Et secundum hoc, magis tenetur ad gratiarum actiones poenitens quam innocens, quia magis gratis datur illud quod ei datur a Deo; cum enim esset dignus poena, datur ei gratia. Et sic, licet illud donum quod datur innocenti sit, absolute consideratum, maius; tamen donum quod datur poenitenti est maius in comparatione ad ipsum, sicut etiam parvum donum pauperi datum ei est maius quam diviti magnum. Et quia actus circa singularia sunt, in his quae agenda sunt magis consideratur quod est hic vel nunc tale, quam quod est simpliciter tale, sicut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., de voluntario et involuntario.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.

Q. 106, A. 2

What man, weighing his own infirmity, would dare to ascribe his purity and innocence to his own strength; that so he should love Thee the less, as if he had less needed Thy mercy, whereby Thou remittest sins to those that turn to Thee? And farther on he says: And for this let him love Thee as much, yea and more, since by Whom he sees me to have been recovered from such deep torpor of sin, by Him he sees himself to have been from the like torpor of sin preserved. Therefore the innocent is also more bound to give thanks than the penitent. Obj. 3: Further, the more a gratuitous favor is continuous, the greater the thanksgiving due for it. Now the favor of divine grace is more continuous in the innocent than in the penitent. For Augustine says (Confess. iii): To Thy grace I ascribe it, and to Thy mercy, that Thou hast melted away my sins as it were ice. To Thy grace I ascribe also whatsoever I have not done of evil; for what might I not have done? . . . Yea, all I confess to have been forgiven me, both what evils I committed by my own wilfulness, and what by Thy guidance committed not. Therefore the innocent is more bound to give thanks than the penitent. On the contrary, It is written (Luke 7:43): To whom more is forgiven, he loveth more. Therefore for the same reason he is bound to greater thanksgiving. I answer that, Thanksgiving (gratiarum actio) in the recipient corresponds to the favor (gratia) of the giver: so that when there is greater favor on the part of the giver, greater thanks are due on the part of the recipient. Now a favor is something bestowed gratis: wherefore on the part of the giver the favor may be greater on two counts. First, owing to the quantity of the thing given: and in this way the innocent owes greater thanksgiving, because he receives a greater gift from God, also, absolutely speaking, a more continuous gift, other things being equal. Second, a favor may be said to be greater, because it is given more gratuitously; and in this sense the penitent is more bound to give thanks than the innocent, because what he receives from God is more gratuitously given: since, whereas he was deserving of punishment, he has received grace. Wherefore, although the gift bestowed on the innocent is, considered absolutely, greater, yet the gift bestowed on the penitent is greater in relation to him: even as a small gift bestowed on a poor man is greater to him than a great gift is to a rich man. And since actions are about singulars, in matters of action, we have to take note of what is such here and now, rather than of what is such absolutely, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii) in treating of the voluntary and the involuntary. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

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Q. 106, A. 3

Justice

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Article 3 Whether a man is bound to give thanks to every benefactor? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non teneatur ad gratiarum actiones omni homini benefacienti. Potest enim aliquis sibi ipsi benefacere, sicut et sibi ipsi nocere, secundum illud Eccli. XIV, qui sibi nequam est, cui alii bonus erit? Sed homo sibi ipsi non potest gratias agere, quia gratiarum actio videtur transire ab uno in alterum. Ergo non omni benefactori debetur gratiarum actio. Praeterea, gratiarum actio est quaedam gratiae recompensatio. Sed aliqua beneficia non cum gratia dantur, sed magis cum contumelia, et tarditate vel tristitia. Ergo non semper benefactori sunt gratiae reddendae. Praeterea, nulli debetur gratiarum actio ex eo quod suam utilitatem procurat. Sed quandoque aliqui aliqua beneficia dant propter suam utilitatem. Ergo eis non debetur gratiarum actio. Praeterea, servo non debetur gratiarum actio, quia hoc ipsum quod est, domini est. Sed quandoque contingit servum in dominum beneficum esse. Ergo non omni benefactori debetur gratiarum actio. Praeterea, nullus tenetur ad id quod facere non potest honeste et utiliter. Sed quandoque contingit quod ille qui beneficium tribuit est in statu magnae felicitatis, cui inutiliter aliquid recompensaretur pro suscepto beneficio. Quandoque etiam contingit quod benefactor mutatur de virtute in vitium, et sic videtur quod ei honeste recompensari non potest. Quandoque etiam ille qui accipit beneficium pauper est, et omnino recompensare non potest. Ergo videtur quod non semper teneatur homo ad gratiarum recompensationem. Praeterea, nullus debet pro alio facere quod ei non expedit, sed est ei nocivum. Sed quandoque contingit quod recompensatio beneficii est nociva vel inutilis ei cui recompensatur. Ergo non semper est beneficium recompensandum per gratiarum actionem. Sed contra est quod dicitur I ad Thess. ult., in omnibus gratias agite. Respondeo dicendum quod omnis effectus naturaliter ad suam causam convertitur. Unde Dionysius dicit, I cap. de Div. Nom., quod Deus omnia in se convertit, tanquam omnium causa, semper enim oportet quod effectus ordinetur ad finem agentis. Manifestum est autem quod benefactor, inquantum huiusmodi, est causa beneficiati. Et ideo naturalis ordo requirit ut ille qui suscipit beneficium, per gratiarum recompensationem convertatur ad benefactorem, secundum modum utriusque. Et sicut de patre supra dictum est, benefactori quidem, inquantum huiusmodi, debetur honor et reverentia, eo quod habet rationem principii, sed per accidens debetur ei subventio vel sustentatio, si indigeat.

Objection 1: It seems that a man is not bound to give thanks to every benefactor. For a man may benefit himself just as he may harm himself, according to Ecclus. 14:5, He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good? But a man cannot thank himself, since thanksgiving seems to pass from one person to another. Therefore thanksgiving is not due to every benefactor. Obj. 2: Further, gratitude is a repayment of an act of grace. But some favors are granted without grace, and are rudely, slowly and grudgingly given. Therefore gratitude is not always due to a benefactor. Obj. 3: Further, no thanks are due to one who works for his own profit. But sometimes people bestow favors for their own profit. Therefore thanks are not due to them. Obj. 4: Further, no thanks are due to a slave, for all that he is belongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave does a good turn to his master. Therefore gratitude is not due to every benefactor. Obj. 5: Further, no one is bound to do what he cannot do equitably and advantageously. Now it happens at times that the benefactor is very well off, and it would be of no advantage to him to be repaid for a favor he has bestowed. Again it happens sometimes that the benefactor from being virtuous has become wicked, so that it would not seem equitable to repay him. Also the recipient of a favor may be a poor man, and is quite unable to repay. Therefore seemingly a man is not always bound to repayment for favors received. Obj. 6: Further, no one is bound to do for another what is inexpedient and hurtful to him. Now sometimes it happens that repayment of a favor would be hurtful or useless to the person repaid. Therefore favors are not always to be repaid by gratitude. On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess 5:18): In all things give thanks. I answer that, Every effect turns naturally to its cause; wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that God turns all things to Himself because He is the cause of all: for the effect must needs always be directed to the end of the agent. Now it is evident that a benefactor, as such, is cause of the beneficiary. Hence the natural order requires that he who has received a favor should, by repaying the favor, turn to his benefactor according to the mode of each. And, as stated above with regard to a father (Q. 31, A. 3; Q. 101, A. 2), a man owes his benefactor, as such, honor and reverence, since the latter stands to him in the relation of principle; but accidentally he owes him assistance or support, if he need it.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Seneca dicit, in V de Benefic., sicut non est liberalis qui sibi donat, nec clemens qui sibi ignoscit, nec misericors qui malis suis tangitur, sed qui aliis, ita etiam nemo sibi ipsi beneficium dat, sed naturae suae paret, quae movet ad refutanda nociva et ad appetenda proficua. Unde in his quae sunt ad seipsum non habet locum gratitudo et ingratitudo, non enim potest homo sibi aliquid denegare nisi sibi retinendo. Metaphorice tamen illa quae ad alterum proprie dicuntur, accipiuntur in his quae sunt ad seipsum, sicut de iustitia philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., inquantum scilicet accipiuntur diversae partes hominis sicut diversae personae. Ad secundum dicendum quod boni animi est ut magis attendat ad bonum quam ad malum. Et ideo si aliquis beneficium dedit non eo modo quo debuit, non omnino debet recipiens a gratiarum actione cessare. Minus tamen quam si modo debito praestitisset, quia etiam beneficium minus est, quia, ut Seneca dicit, in II de Benefic., multum celeritas fecit, multum abstulit mora. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Seneca dicit, in VI de Benefic., multum interest utrum aliquis beneficium nobis det sua causa, an sua et nostra. Ille qui totus ad se spectat, et nobis prodest quia aliter sibi prodesse non potest, eo mihi loco habendus videtur quo qui pecori suo pabulum prospicit. Si me in consortium admisit, si duos cogitavit, ingratus sum et iniustus nisi gaudeo hoc illi profuisse quod proderat mihi. Summae malignitatis est non vocare beneficium nisi quod dantem aliquo incommodo afficit.

Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Seneca dicit, in III de Benefic., quandiu servus praestat quod a servo exigi solet, ministerium est, ubi plus quam a servo necesse, beneficium est. Ubi enim in affectum amici transit, incipit vocari beneficium. Et ideo etiam servis ultra debitum facientibus gratiae sunt habendae. Ad quintum dicendum quod etiam pauper ingratus non est si faciat quod possit, sicut enim beneficium magis in affectu consistit quam in effectu, ita etiam et recompensatio magis in affectu consistit. Unde Seneca dicit, in II de Benefic., qui grate beneficium accipit, primam eius pensionem solvit. Quam grate autem ad nos beneficia pervenerint, indicemus effusis affectibus, quod non ipso tantum audiente, sed ubique testemur. Et ex hoc patet quod quantumcumque in felicitate existenti potest recompensatio beneficii fieri per exhibitionem reverentiae et honoris. Unde philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod superexcellenti quidem debet fieri honoris retributio, indigenti autem retributio lucri. Et Seneca dicit, in VI de Benefic., multa sunt per quae quidquid debemus reddere et felicibus possumus, fidele consilium, assidua conversa-

Q. 106, A. 3

Reply Obj. 1: In the words of Seneca (1 Benef. v), just as a man is liberal who gives not to himself but to others, and gracious who forgives not himself but others, and merciful who is moved, not by his own misfortunes but by another’s, so too, no man confers a favor on himself, he is but following the bent of his nature, which moves him to resist what hurts him, and to seek what is profitable. Wherefore in things that one does for oneself, there is no place for gratitude or ingratitude, since a man cannot deny himself a thing except by keeping it. Nevertheless things which are properly spoken of in relation to others are spoken of metaphorically in relation to oneself, as the Philosopher states regarding justice (Ethic. v, 11), in so far, to wit, as the various parts of man are considered as though they were various persons. Reply Obj. 2: It is the mark of a happy disposition to see good rather than evil. Wherefore if someone has conferred a favor, not as he ought to have conferred it, the recipient should not for that reason withhold his thanks. Yet he owes less thanks, than if the favor had been conferred duly, since in fact the favor is less, for, as Seneca remarks (De Benef. ii.) promptness enhances, delay discounts a favor. Reply Obj. 3: As Seneca observes (De Benef. vi), it matters much whether a person does a kindness to us for his own sake, or for ours, or for both his and ours. He that considers himself only, and benefits because cannot otherwise benefit himself, seems to me like a man who seeks fodder for his cattle. And farther on: If he has done it for me in common with himself, having both of us in his mind, I am ungrateful and not merely unjust, unless I rejoice that what was profitable to him is profitable to me also. It is the height of malevolence to refuse to recognize a kindness, unless the giver has been the loser thereby. Reply Obj. 4: As Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), when a slave does what is wont to be demanded of a slave, it is part of his service: when he does more than a slave is bound to do, it is a favor: for as soon as he does anything from a motive of friendship, if indeed that be his motive, it is no longer called service. Wherefore gratitude is due even to a slave, when he does more than his duty. Reply Obj. 5: A poor man is certainly not ungrateful if he does what he can. For since kindness depends on the heart rather than on the deed, so too gratitude depends chiefly the heart. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. ii): Who receives a favor gratefully, has already begun to pay it back: and that we are grateful for favors received should be shown by the outpourings of the heart, not only in his hearing but everywhere. From this it is evident that however well off a man may be, it is possible to thank him for his kindness by showing him reverence and honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14): He that abounds should be repaid with honor, he that is in want should be repaid with money: and Seneca writes (De Benef. vi): There are many ways of repaying those who are well off, whatever we happen to owe them; such as good advice, frequent fellowship, affable and pleas-

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Q. 106, A. 4

Justice

tio, sermo communis et sine adulatione iucundus. Et ideo non oportet ut homo optet indigentiam eius seu miseriam qui beneficium dedit, ad hoc quod beneficium recompensetur. Quia, ut Seneca dicit, in VI de Benefic., si hoc ei optares cuius nullum beneficium haberes, inhumanum erat votum. Quanto inhumanius ei optas cui beneficium debes. Si autem ille qui beneficium dedit in peius mutatus est, debet tamen sibi fieri recompensatio secundum statum ipsius, ut scilicet ad virtutem reducatur, si sit possibile. Si autem sit insanabilis propter malitiam, tunc alter est effectus quam prius erat, et ideo non debetur ei recompensatio beneficii sicut prius. Et tamen, quantum fieri potest salva honestate, memoria debet haberi praestiti beneficii. Ut patet per philosophum, in IX Ethic. Ad sextum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, recompensatio beneficii praecipue pendet ex affectu. Et ideo eo modo debet recompensatio fieri quo magis sit utilis, si tamen postea, per eius incuriam, in damnum ipsius vertatur, non imputatur recompensanti. Unde Seneca dicit, in VII de Benefic., reddendum mihi est, non servandum, cum reddidero, ac tuendum.

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ant conversation without flattery. Therefore there is no need for a man to desire neediness or distress in his benefactor before repaying his kindness, because, as Seneca says (De Benef. vi), it were inhuman to desire this in one from whom you have received no favor; how much more so to desire it in one whose kindness has made you his debtor! If, however, the benefactor has lapsed from virtue, nevertheless he should be repaid according to his state, that he may return to virtue if possible. But if he be so wicked as to be incurable, then his heart has changed, and consequently no repayment is due for his kindness, as heretofore. And yet, as far as it possible without sin, the kindness he has shown should be held in memory, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3). Reply Obj. 6: As stated in the preceding reply, repayment of a favor depends chiefly on the affection of the heart: wherefore repayment should be made in such a way as to prove most beneficial. If, however, through the benefactor’s carelessness it prove detrimental to him, this is not imputed to the person who repays him, as Seneca observes (De Benef. vii): It is my duty to repay, and not to keep back and safeguard my repayment.

Article 4 Whether a man is bound to repay a favor at once? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo debeat statim beneficium recompensare. Illa enim quae debemus sine certo termino, tenemur restituere ad statim. Sed non est aliquis terminus praescriptus recompensationi beneficiorum, quae tamen cadit sub debito, ut dictum est. Ergo tenetur homo statim beneficium recompensare. Praeterea, quanto aliquod bonum fit ex maiori animi fervore, tanto videtur esse laudabilius. Sed ex fervore animi videtur procedere quod homo nullas moras adhibeat in faciendo quod debet. Ergo videtur esse laudabilius quod homo statim beneficium reddat. Praeterea, Seneca dicit, in II de Benefic., quod proprium benefactoris est libenter et cito facere. Sed recompensatio debet beneficium adaequare. Ergo debet statim recompensare. Sed contra est quod Seneca dicit, in IV de Benefic., qui festinat reddere, non animum habet grati hominis, sed debitoris. Respondeo dicendum quod sicut in beneficio dando duo considerantur, scilicet affectus et donum; ita etiam haec duo considerantur in recompensatione beneficii. Et quantum quidem ad affectum, statim recompensatio fieri debet. Unde Seneca dicit, in II de Benefic., vis

Objection 1: It seems that a man is bound to repay a favor at once. For we are bound to restore at once what we owe, unless the term be fixed. Now there is no term prescribed for the repayment of favors, and yet this repayment is a duty, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore a man is bound to repay a favor at once. Obj. 2: Further, a good action would seem to be all the more praiseworthy according as it is done with greater earnestness. Now earnestness seems to make a man do his duty without any delay. Therefore it is apparently more praiseworthy to repay a favor at once. Obj. 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii) that it is proper to a benefactor to act freely and quickly. Now repayment ought to equal the favor received. Therefore it should be done at once. On the contrary, Seneca says (De Benef. iv): He that hastens to repay, is animated with a sense, not of gratitude but of indebtedness. I answer that, Just as in conferring a favor two things are to be considered, namely, the affection of the heart and the gift, so also must these things be considered in repaying the favor. As regards the affection of the heart, repayment should be made at once, wherefore Seneca says (De Benef.

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reddere beneficium? Benigne accipe. Quantum autem ad donum, debet expectari tempus quo recompensatio sit benefactori opportuna. Si autem, non convenienti tempore, statim velit aliquis munus pro munere reddere, non videtur esse virtuosa recompensatio. Ut enim Seneca dicit, IV de Benefic., qui nimis cito cupit solvere, invitus debet, et qui invitus debet, ingratus est.

Q. 106, A. 5

ii): Do you wish to repay a favor? Receive it graciously. As regards the gift, one ought to wait until such a time as will be convenient to the benefactor. In fact, if instead of choosing a convenient time, one wished to repay at once, favor for favor, it would not seem to be a virtuous, but a constrained repayment. For, as Seneca observes (De Benef. iv), he that wishes to repay too soon, is an unwilling debtor, and an unwilling debtor is ungrateful. Reply Obj. 1: A legal debt must be paid at once, else the equality of justice would not be preserved, if one kept another’s property without his consent. But a moral debt depends on the equity of the debtor: and therefore it should be repaid in due time according as the rectitude of virtue demands. Reply Obj. 2: Earnestness of the will is not virtuous unless it be regulated by reason; wherefore it is not praiseworthy to forestall the proper time through earnestness.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod debitum legale est statim solvendum, alioquin non esset conservata iustitiae aequalitas, si unus retineret rem alterius absque eius voluntate. Sed debitum morale dependet ex honestate debentis. Et ideo debet reddi debito tempore, secundum quod exigit rectitudo virtutis. Ad secundum dicendum quod fervor voluntatis non est virtuosus nisi sit ratione ordinatus. Et ideo si aliquis ex fervore animi praeoccupet debitum tempus, non erit laudandum. Ad tertium dicendum quod beneficia etiam sunt Reply Obj. 3: Favors also should be conferred at a conopportuno tempore danda. Et tunc non est amplius tar- venient time and one should no longer delay when the condandum cum opportunum tempus advenerit. Et idem venient time comes; and the same is to be observed in reetiam observari oportet in beneficiorum recompensatio- paying favors. ne.

Article 5 Whether in giving thanks we should look at the benefactor’s disposition or at the deed? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beneficiorum recompensatio non sit attendenda secundum affectum beneficiantis, sed secundum effectum. Recompensatio enim beneficiis debetur. Sed beneficium in effectu consistit, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Ergo recompensatio debet attendi secundum effectum. Praeterea, gratia, quae beneficia recompensat, est pars iustitiae. Sed iustitia respicit aequalitatem dati et accepti. Ergo et in gratiarum recompensatione attendendus est magis effectus quam affectus beneficiantis. Praeterea, nullus potest attendere ad id quod ignorat. Sed solus Deus recognoscit interiorem affectum. Ergo non potest fieri gratiae recompensatio secundum affectum. Sed contra est quod Seneca dicit, in I de beneficiis, nonnunquam magis nos obligat qui dedit parva magnifice; qui exiguum tribuit, sed libenter. Respondeo dicendum quod recompensatio beneficii potest ad tres virtutes pertinere, scilicet ad iustitiam, ad gratiam, et ad amicitiam. Ad iustitiam quidem pertinet quando recompensatio habet rationem debiti legalis, sicut in mutuo et in aliis huiusmodi. Et in tali recompensatio debet attendi secundum quantitatem dati.

Objection 1: It seems that in repaying favors we should not look at the benefactor’s disposition but at the deed. For repayment is due to beneficence, and beneficence consists in deeds, as the word itself denotes. Therefore in repaying favors we should look at the deed. Obj. 2: Further, thanksgiving, whereby we repay favors, is a part of justice. But justice considers equality between giving and taking. Therefore also in repaying favors we should consider the deed rather than the disposition of the benefactor. Obj. 3: Further, no one can consider what he does not know. Now God alone knows the interior disposition. Therefore it is impossible to repay a favor according to the benefactor’s disposition. On the contrary, Seneca says (De Benef. i): We are sometimes under a greater obligation to one who has given little with a large heart, and has bestowed a small favor, yet willingly. I answer that, The repayment of a favor may belong to three virtues, namely, justice, gratitude and friendship. It belongs to justice when the repayment has the character of a legal debt, as in a loan and the like: and in such cases repayment must be made according to the quantity received.

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Justice

Ad amicitiam autem pertinet recompensatio beneficii, et similiter ad virtutem gratiae, secundum quod habet rationem debiti moralis, aliter tamen et aliter. Nam in recompensatione amicitiae oportet respectum haberi ad amicitiae causam. Unde in amicitia utilis debet recompensatio fieri secundum utilitatem quam quis est ex beneficio consecutus. In amicitia autem honesti debet in recompensatione haberi respectus ad electionem, sive ad affectum dantis, quia hoc praecipue requiritur ad virtutem, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Et similiter, quia gratia respicit beneficium secundum quod est gratis impensum, quod quidem pertinet ad affectum; ideo etiam gratiae recompensatio attendit magis affectum dantis quam effectum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnis actus moralis ex voluntate dependet. Unde beneficium, secundum quod est laudabile, prout ei gratiae recompensatio debetur, materialiter quidem consistit in effectu, sed formaliter et principaliter in voluntate. Unde Seneca dicit, in I de Benefic., beneficium non in eo quod fit aut datur consistit, sed in ipso dantis aut facientis animo. Ad secundum dicendum quod gratia est pars iustitiae, non quidem sicut species generis, sed per quandam reductionem ad genus iustitiae, ut supra dictum est. Unde non oportet quod eadem ratio debiti attendatur in utraque virtute. Ad tertium dicendum quod affectum hominis per se quidem solus Deus videt, sed secundum quod per aliqua signa manifestatur, potest etiam ipsum homo cognoscere. Et hoc modo affectus beneficiantis cognoscitur ex ipso modo quo beneficium tribuitur, puta quia gaudenter et prompte aliquis beneficium impendit.

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On the other hand, repayment of a favor belongs, though in different ways, to friendship and likewise to the virtue of gratitude when it has the character of a moral debt. For in the repayment of friendship we have to consider the cause of friendship; so that in the friendship that is based on the useful, repayment should be made according to the usefulness accruing from the favor conferred, and in the friendship based on virtue repayment should be made with regard for the choice or disposition of the giver, since this is the chief requisite of virtue, as stated in Ethic. viii, 13. And likewise, since gratitude regards the favor inasmuch as it is bestowed gratis, and this regards the disposition of the giver, it follows again that repayment of a favor depends more on the disposition of the giver than on the effect. Reply Obj. 1: Every moral act depends on the will. Hence a kindly action, insofar as it is praiseworthy and is deserving of gratitude, consists materially in the thing done, but formally and chiefly in the will. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. i): A kindly action consists not in deed or gift, but in the disposition of the giver or doer. Reply Obj. 2: Gratitude is a part of justice, not indeed as a species is part of a genus, but by a kind of reduction to the genus of justice, as stated above (Q. 80). Hence it does not follow that we shall find the same kind of debt in both virtues. Reply Obj. 3: God alone sees man’s disposition in itself: but insofar as it is shown by certain signs, man also can know it. It is thus that a benefactor’s disposition is known by the way in which he does the kindly action, for instance through his doing it joyfully and readily.

Article 6 Whether the repayment of gratitude should surpass the favor received? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non oporteat aliquem plus exhibere in recompensatione quam susceperit in beneficio. Quibusdam enim, sicut parentibus, nec etiam aequalis recompensatio fieri potest, sicut philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic. Sed virtus non conatur ad impossibile. Non ergo gratiae recompensatio tendit ad aliquid maius. Praeterea, si aliquis plus recompensat quam in beneficio acceperit, ex hoc ipso quasi aliquid de novo dat. Sed ad beneficium de novo datum tenetur homo gratiam recompensare. Ergo ille qui primo beneficium dederat tenebitur aliquid maius recompensare, et sic procederet in infinitum. Sed virtus non conatur ad infinitum, quia infinitum aufert naturam boni, ut dicitur

Objection 1: It seems that there is no need for the repayment of gratitude to surpass the favor received. For it is not possible to make even equal repayment to some, for instance, one’s parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Now virtue does not attempt the impossible. Therefore gratitude for a favor does not tend to something yet greater. Obj. 2: Further, if one person repays another more than he has received by his favor, by that very fact he gives him something his turn, as it were. But the latter owes him repayment for the favor which in his turn the former has conferred on him. Therefore he that first conferred a favor will be bound to a yet greater repayment, and so on indefinitely. Now virtue does not strive at the indefinite, since the indef-

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Q. 106, A. 6

in II Metaphys. Ergo gratiae recompensatio non debet inite removes the nature of good (Metaph. ii, text. 8). Thereexcedere acceptum beneficium. fore repayment of gratitude should not surpass the favor received. Praeterea, iustitia in aequalitate consistit. Sed maObj. 3: Further, justice consists in equality. But more is ius est quidam aequalitatis excessus. Cum ergo in qua- excess of equality. Since therefore excess is sinful in every libet virtute excessus sit vitiosus, videtur quod recom- virtue, it seems that to repay more than the favor received pensare aliquid maius accepto beneficio sit vitiosum, et is sinful and opposed to justice. iustitiae oppositum. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5): refamulari oportet ei qui gratiam fecit, et rursum ipsum We should repay those who are gracious to us, by being graincipere. Quod quidem fit dum aliquid maius retribuitur. cious to them return, and this is done by repaying more than Ergo recompensatio debet tendere ad hoc quod aliquid we have received. Therefore gratitude should incline to do maius faciat. something greater. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, reI answer that, As stated above (A. 5), gratitude recompensatio gratiae respicit beneficium secundum vo- gards the favor received according the intention of the luntatem beneficiantis. In quo quidem praecipue hoc benefactor; who seems be deserving of praise, chiefly for commendabile videtur quod gratis beneficium contulit having conferred the favor gratis without being bound to ad quod non tenebatur. Et ideo qui beneficium accepit do so. Wherefore the beneficiary is under a moral obligaad hoc obligatur, ex debito honestatis, ut similiter gratis tion to bestow something gratis in return. Now he does aliquid impendat. Non autem videtur gratis aliquid im- not seem to bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the pendere nisi excedat quantitatem accepti beneficii, quia quantity of the favor received: because so long as he repays quandiu recompensat minus vel aequale, non videtur fa- less or an equivalent, he would seem to do nothing gratis, cere gratis, sed reddere quod accepit. Et ideo gratiae re- but only to return what he has received. Therefore gratitude compensatio semper tendit ut, pro suo posse, aliquid always inclines, as far as possible, to pay back something maius retribuat. more. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 3, ad 5; A. 5), in rein recompensatione beneficii magis est considerandus paying favors we must consider the disposition rather than affectus benefici quam effectus. Si ergo consideremus ef- the deed. Accordingly, if we consider the effect of benefifectum beneficii quod filius a parentibus accepit, scilicet cence, which a son receives from his parents namely, to be esse et vivere, nihil aequale filius recompensare potest, ut and to live, the son cannot make an equal repayment, as the philosophus dicit. Si autem attendamus ad ipsam volun- Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). But if we consider the tatem dantis et retribuentis, sic potest filius aliquid ma- will of the giver and of the repayer, then it is possible for the ius patri retribuere, ut Seneca dicit, in III de Benefic. Si son to pay back something greater to his father, as Seneca tamen non posset, sufficeret ad gratitudinem recompen- declares (De Benef. iii). If, however, he were unable to do sandi voluntas. so, the will to pay back would be sufficient for gratitude. Ad secundum dicendum quod debitum gratitudiReply Obj. 2: The debt of gratitude flows from charity, nis ex caritate derivatur, quae, quanto plus solvitur, tanto which the more it is paid the more it is due, according to magis debetur, secundum illud Rom. XIII, nemini quid- Rom. 13:8, Owe no man anything, but to love one another. quam debeatis, nisi ut invicem diligatis. Et ideo non est Wherefore it is not unreasonable if the obligation of gratiinconveniens si obligatio gratitudinis interminabilis sit. tude has no limit. Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut in iustitia quae Reply Obj. 3: As in justice, which is a cardinal virtue, est virtus cardinalis, attenditur aequalitas rerum, ita in we consider equality of things, so in gratitude we consider gratitudine attenditur aequalitas voluntatum, ut scilicet equality of wills. For while on the one hand the benefactor sicut ex promptitudine voluntatis beneficus aliquid ex- of his own free-will gave something he was not bound to hibuit ad quod non tenebatur, ita etiam ille qui suscepit give, so on the other hand the beneficiary repays something beneficium aliquid supra debitum recompenset. over and above what he has received.

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Question 107 Ingratitude Deinde considerandum est de ingratitudine. Et circa We must now consider ingratitude, under which head hoc quaeruntur quatuor. there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum ingratitudo semper sit peccatum. (1) Whether ingratitude is always a sin? Secundo, utrum ingratitudo sit peccatum speciale. (2) Whether ingratitude is a special sin? Tertio, utrum omnis ingratitudo sit peccatum (3) Whether every act of ingratitude is a mortal sin? mortale. Quarto, utrum ingrato sint beneficia subtrahenda. (4) Whether favors should be withdrawn from the ungrateful?

Article 1 Whether ingratitude is always a sin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ingratitudo non semper sit peccatum. Dicit enim Seneca, in III de Benefic., quod ingratus est qui non reddit beneficium. Sed quandoque non posset aliquis recompensare beneficium nisi peccando, puta si aliquis auxiliatus est homini ad peccandum. Cum ergo abstinere a peccato non sit peccatum, videtur quod ingratitudo non semper sit peccatum. Praeterea, omne peccatum est in potestate peccantis, quia secundum Augustinum, nullus peccat in eo quod vitare non potest. Sed quandoque non est in potestate peccantis ingratitudinem vitare, puta cum non habet unde reddat. Oblivio etiam non est in potestate nostra, cum tamen Seneca dicat, in III de Benefic., quod ingratissimus omnium est qui oblitus est. Ergo ingratitudo non semper est peccatum.

Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is not always a sin. For Seneca says (De Benef. iii) that he who does not repay a favor is ungrateful. But sometimes it is impossible to repay a favor without sinning, for instance if one man has helped another to commit a sin. Therefore, since it is not a sin to refrain from sinning, it seems that ingratitude is not always a sin. Obj. 2: Further, every sin is in the power of the person who commits it: because, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i), no man sins in what he cannot avoid. Now sometimes it is not in the power of the sinner to avoid ingratitude, for instance when he has not the means of repaying. Again forgetfulness is not in our power, and yet Seneca declares (De Benef. iii) that to forget a kindness is the height of ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin. Obj. 3: Further, there would seem to be no repayment in being unwilling to owe anything, according to the Apostle (Rom 13:8), Owe no man anything. Yet an unwilling debtor is ungrateful, as Seneca declares (De Benef. iv). Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin. On the contrary, Ingratitude is reckoned among other sins (2 Tim 3:2), where it is written: Disobedient to parents, ungrateful, wicked. etc. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 106, A. 4, ad 1, A. 6) a debt of gratitude is a moral debt required by virtue. Now a thing is a sin from the fact of its being contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is evident that every ingratitude is a sin.

Praeterea, non videtur peccare qui non vult aliquid debere, secundum illud apostoli, Rom. XIII, nemini quidquam debeatis. Sed qui invitus debet ingratus est, ut Seneca dicit, in IV de Benefic. Ergo non semper ingratitudo est peccatum. Sed contra est quod II ad Tim. III, ingratitudo connumeratur aliis peccatis, cum dicitur, parentibus non obedientes, ingrati, scelesti. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, debitum gratitudinis est quoddam debitum honestatis quam virtus requirit. Ex hoc autem aliquid est peccatum quod repugnat virtuti. Unde manifestum est quod omnis ingratitudo est peccatum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod gratitudo respicit Reply Obj. 1: Gratitude regards a favor received: and beneficium. Ille autem qui alicui auxiliatur ad peccan- he that helps another to commit a sin does him not a fadum non confert beneficium, sed magis nocumentum. vor but an injury: and so no thanks are due to him, except

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Justice

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Et ideo non debetur ei gratiarum actio, nisi forte propter voluntatem, si sit deceptus, dum credidit adiuvare ad bonum, adiuvit ad peccandum. Sed tunc non debetur recompensatio talis ut adiuvetur ad peccandum, quia hoc non esset recompensare bonum, sed malum, quod contrariatur gratitudini. Ad secundum dicendum quod nullus propter impotentiam reddendi ab ingratitudine excusatur, ex quo ad debitum gratitudinis reddendum sufficit sola voluntas, ut dictum est. Oblivio autem beneficii ad ingratitudinem pertinet, non quidem illa quae provenit ex naturali defectu, quae non subiacet voluntati; sed illa quae ex negligentia provenit. Ut enim dicit Seneca, in III de Benefic., apparet illum non saepe de reddendo cogitasse cui obrepsit oblivio.

perhaps on account of his good will, supposing him to have been deceived, and to have thought to help him in doing good, whereas he helped him to sin. In such a case the repayment due to him is not that he should be helped to commit a sin, because this would be repaying not good but evil, and this is contrary to gratitude. Reply Obj. 2: No man is excused from ingratitude through inability to repay, for the very reason that the mere will suffices for the repayment of the debt of gratitude, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 6, ad 1). Forgetfulness of a favor received amounts to ingratitude, not indeed the forgetfulness that arises from a natural defect, that is not subject to the will, but that which arises from negligence. For, as Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), when forgetfulness of favors lays hold of a man, he has apparently given little thought to their repayment. Ad tertium dicendum quod debitum gratitudinis Reply Obj. 3: The debt of gratitude flows from the debt ex debito amoris derivatur, a quo nullus debet velle ab- of love, and from the latter no man should wish to be free. solvi. Unde quod aliquis invitus hoc debitum debeat, vi- Hence that anyone should owe this debt unwillingly seems detur provenire ex defectu amoris ad eum qui benefi- to arise from lack of love for his benefactor.

cium dedit.

Article 2 Whether ingratitude is a special sin? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ingratitudo non sit speciale peccatum. Quicumque enim peccat, contra Deum agit, qui est summus benefactor. Sed hoc pertinet ad ingratitudinem. Ergo ingratitudo non est speciale peccatum. Praeterea, nullum speciale peccatum sub diversis generibus peccatorum continetur. Sed diversis peccatorum generibus potest aliquis esse ingratus, puta si quis benefactori detrahat, si quis furetur, vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi contra eum committat. Ergo ingratitudo non est speciale peccatum. Praeterea, Seneca dicit, in III de Benefic., ingratus est qui dissimulat; ingratus qui non reddit; ingratissimus omnium qui oblitus est. Sed ista non videntur ad unam peccati speciem pertinere. Ergo ingratitudo non est speciale peccatum. Sed contra est quod ingratitudo opponitur gratitudini sive gratiae, quae est specialis virtus. Ergo est speciale peccatum. Respondeo dicendum quod omne vitium ex defectu virtutis nominatur quod magis virtuti opponitur, sicut illiberalitas magis opponitur liberalitati quam prodigalitas. Potest autem virtuti gratitudinis aliquod vitium opponi per excessum, puta si recompensatio beneficii fiat vel pro quibus non debet, vel citius quam debet, ut ex dictis patet. Sed magis opponitur gratitudini vitium quod est per defectum, quia virtus gratitudinis, ut supra

Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is not a special sin. For whoever sins acts against God his sovereign benefactor. But this pertains to ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin. Obj. 2: Further, no special sin is contained under different kinds of sin. But one can be ungrateful by committing different kinds of sin, for instance by calumny, theft, or something similar committed against a benefactor. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin. Obj. 3: Further, Seneca writes (De Benef. iii): It is ungrateful to take no notice of a kindness, it is ungrateful not to repay one, but it is the height of ingratitude to forget it. Now these do not seem to belong to the same species of sin. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin. On the contrary, Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude or thankfulness, which is a special virtue. Therefore it is a special sin. I answer that, Every vice is denominated from a deficiency of virtue, because deficiency is more opposed to virtue: thus illiberality is more opposed to liberality than prodigality is. Now a vice may be opposed to the virtue of gratitude by way of excess, for instance if one were to show gratitude for things for which gratitude is not due, or sooner than it is due, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 4). But still more opposed to gratitude is the vice denoting deficiency

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habitum est, in aliquid amplius tendit. Et ideo proprie ingratitudo nominatur ex gratitudinis defectu. Omnis autem defectus seu privatio speciem sortitur secundum habitum oppositum, differunt enim caecitas et surditas secundum differentiam visus et auditus. Unde sicut gratitudo vel gratia est una specialis virtus, ita etiam ingratitudo est unum speciale peccatum. Habet tamen diversos gradus, secundum ordinem eorum quae ad gratitudinem requiruntur. In qua primum est quod homo beneficium acceptum recognoscat; secundum est quod laudet et gratias agat; tertium est quod retribuat, pro loco et tempore, secundum suam facultatem. Sed quia quod est ultimum in generatione est primum in resolutione, ideo primus ingratitudinis gradus est ut homo beneficium non retribuat; secundus est ut dissimulet, quasi non demonstrans se beneficium accepisse; tertium, et gravissimum est quod non recognoscat, sive per oblivionem, sive quocumque alio modo. Et quia in affirmatione opposita intelligitur negatio, ideo ad primum ingratitudinis gradum pertinet quod aliquis retribuat mala pro bonis; ad secundum, quod beneficium vituperet; ad tertium, quod beneficium quasi maleficium reputet. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in quolibet peccato est materialis ingratitudo ad Deum, inquantum scilicet facit homo aliquid quod potest ad ingratitudinem pertinere. Formalis autem ingratitudo est quando actualiter beneficium contemnitur. Et hoc est speciale peccatum. Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet formalem rationem alicuius specialis peccati in pluribus peccatorum generibus materialiter inveniri. Et secundum hoc, in multis generibus peccatorum invenitur ingratitudinis ratio. Ad tertium dicendum quod illa tria non sunt diversae species, sed diversi gradus unius specialis peccati.

Q. 107, A. 3

of gratitude, because the virtue of gratitude, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 6), inclines to return something more. Wherefore ingratitude is properly denominated from being a deficiency of gratitude. Now every deficiency or privation takes its species from the opposite habit: for blindness and deafness differ according to the difference of sight and hearing. Therefore just as gratitude or thankfulness is one special virtue, so also is ingratitude one special sin. It has, however, various degrees corresponding in their order to the things required for gratitude. The first of these is to recognize the favor received, the second to express one’s appreciation and thanks, and the third to repay the favor at a suitable place and time according to one’s means. And since what is last in the order of generation is first in the order of destruction, it follows that the first degree of ingratitude is when a man fails to repay a favor, the second when he declines to notice or indicate that he has received a favor, while the third and supreme degree is when a man fails to recognize the reception of a favor, whether by forgetting it or in any other way. Moreover, since opposite affirmation includes negation, it follows that it belongs to the first degree of ingratitude to return evil for good, to the second to find fault with a favor received, and to the third to esteem kindness as though it were unkindness. Reply Obj. 1: In every sin there is material ingratitude to God, inasmuch as a man does something that may pertain to ingratitude. But formal ingratitude is when a favor is actually contemned, and this is a special sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders the formal aspect of some special sin from being found materially in several kinds of sin, and in this way the aspect of ingratitude is to be found in many kinds of sin. Reply Obj. 3: These three are not different species but different degrees of one special sin.

Article 3 Whether ingratitude is always a mortal sin? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ingratitudo semper sit peccatum mortale. Deo enim maxime debet aliquis esse gratus. Sed peccando venialiter homo non est ingratus Deo, alioquin omnes essent ingrati. Ergo nulla ingratitudo est veniale peccatum. Praeterea, ex hoc aliquod peccatum est mortale quod contrariatur caritati, ut supra dictum est. Sed ingratitudo contrariatur caritati, ex qua procedit debitum gratitudinis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo ingratitudo semper est peccatum mortale.

Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is always a mortal sin. For one ought to be grateful to God above all. But one is not ungrateful to God by committing a venial sin: else every man would be guilty of ingratitude. Therefore no ingratitude is a venial sin. Obj. 2: Further, a sin is mortal through being contrary to charity, as stated above (Q. 24, A. 12). But ingratitude is contrary to charity, since the debt of gratitude proceeds from that virtue, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 1, ad 3; A. 6, ad 2). Therefore ingratitude is always a mortal sin.

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Praeterea, Seneca dicit, in II de Benefic., haec beneficii lex est, alter statim oblivisci debet dati, alter memor esse accepti. Sed propter hoc, ut videtur, debet oblivisci, ut lateat eum peccatum recipientis, si contingat eum esse ingratum. Quod non oporteret si ingratitudo esset leve peccatum. Ergo ingratitudo semper est mortale peccatum.

Sed contra est quod nulli est danda via peccandi mortaliter. Sed sicut Seneca dicit, ibidem, interdum qui iuvatur fallendus est, ut habeat, nec a quo acceperit sciat, quod videtur viam ingratitudinis recipienti praebere. Ergo ingratitudo non semper est peccatum mortale.

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, ingratus dicitur aliquis dupliciter. Uno modo, per solam omissionem, puta quia non recognoscit, vel non laudat, vel non retribuit vices pro beneficio accepto. Et hoc non semper est peccatum mortale. Quia, ut supra dictum est, debitum gratitudinis est ut homo aliquid etiam liberaliter tribuat ad quod non tenetur, et ideo, si illud praetermittit, non peccat mortaliter. Est tamen peccatum veniale, quia hoc provenit ex negligentia quadam, aut ex aliqua indispositione hominis ad virtutem. Potest tamen contingere quod etiam talis ingratitudo sit mortale peccatum, vel propter interiorem contemptum; vel etiam propter conditionem eius quod subtrahitur, quod ex necessitate debetur benefico, sive simpliciter sive in aliquo necessitatis casu. Alio modo dicitur aliquis ingratus, quia non solum praetermittit implere gratitudinis debitum, sed etiam contrarium agit. Et hoc etiam, secundum conditionem eius quod agitur, quandoque est peccatum mortale, quandoque veniale. Sciendum tamen quod ingratitudo quae provenit ex peccato mortali habet perfectam ingratitudinis rationem, illa vero quae provenit ex peccato veniali, imperfectam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per peccatum veniale non est aliquis ingratus Deo secundum perfectam ingratitudinis rationem. Habet tamen aliquid ingratitudinis, inquantum peccatum veniale tollit aliquem actum virtutis, per quem homo Deo obsequitur. Ad secundum dicendum quod ingratitudo quae est cum peccato veniali non est contraria caritati, sed est praeter ipsam, quia non tollit habitum caritatis, sed aliquem actum ipsius excludit. Ad tertium dicendum quod idem Seneca dicit, in VII de Benefic., errat si quis aestimat, cum dicimus eum qui beneficium dedit oblivisci oportere, excutere nos illi memoriam rei, praesertim honestissimae. Cum ergo dici-

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Obj. 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii): Between the giver and the receiver of a favor there is this law, that the former should forthwith forget having given, and the latter should never forget having received. Now, seemingly, the reason why the giver should forget is that he may be unaware of the sin of the recipient, should the latter prove ungrateful; and there would be no necessity for that if ingratitude were a slight sin. Therefore ingratitude is always a mortal sin. On the contrary, No one should be put in the way of committing a mortal sin. Yet, according to Seneca (De Benef. ii), sometimes it is necessary to deceive the person who receives assistance, in order that he may receive without knowing from whom he has received. But this would seem to put the recipient in the way of ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not always a mortal sin. I answer that, As appears from what we have said above (A. 2), a man may be ungrateful in two ways: first, by mere omission, for instance by failing to recognize the favor received, or to express his appreciation of it or to pay something in return, and this is not always a mortal sin, because, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 6), the debt of gratitude requires a man to make a liberal return, which, however, he is not bound to do; wherefore if he fail to do so, he does not sin mortally. It is nevertheless a venial sin, because it arises either from some kind of negligence or from some disinclination to virtue in him. And yet ingratitude of this kind may happen to be a mortal sin, by reason either of inward contempt, or of the kind of thing withheld, this being needful to the benefactor, either simply, or in some case of necessity. Second, a man may be ungrateful, because he not only omits to pay the debt of gratitude, but does the contrary. This again is sometimes a mortal and sometimes a venial sin, according to the kind of thing that is done. It must be observed, however, that when ingratitude arises from a mortal sin, it has the perfect character of ingratitude, and when it arises from venial sin, it has the imperfect character. Reply Obj. 1: By committing a venial sin one is not ungrateful to God to the extent of incurring the guilt of perfect ingratitude: but there is something of ingratitude in a venial sin, insofar as it removes a virtuous act of obedience to God. Reply Obj. 2: When ingratitude is a venial sin it is not contrary to, but beside charity: since it does not destroy the habit of charity, but excludes some act thereof. Reply Obj. 3: Seneca also says (De Benef. vii): When we say that a man after conferring a favor should forget about it, it is a mistake to suppose that we mean him to shake off the recollection of a thing so very praiseworthy. When we say: He

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mus, meminisse non debet, hoc volumus intelligi, praedicare non debet, nec iactare. Ad quartum dicendum quod ille qui ignorat beneficium non est ingratus si beneficium non recompenset, dummodo sit paratus recompensare si noscet. Est autem laudabile quandoque ut ille cui providetur beneficium ignoret, tum propter inanis gloriae vitationem, sicut beatus Nicolaus, aurum furtim in domum proiiciens, vitare voluit humanum favorem; tum etiam quia in hoc ipso amplius beneficium facit quod consulit verecundiae eius qui beneficium accipit.

Q. 107, A. 4

must not remember it, we mean that he must not publish it abroad and boast about it. Reply Obj. 4: He that is unaware of a favor conferred on him is not ungrateful, if he fails to repay it, provided he be prepared to do so if he knew. It is nevertheless commendable at times that the object of a favor should remain in ignorance of it, both in order to avoid vainglory, as when Blessed Nicolas threw gold into a house secretly, wishing to avoid popularity: and because the kindness is all the greater through the benefactor wishing not to shame the person on whom he is conferring the favor.

Article 4 Whether favors should be withheld from the ungrateful? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ingratis sint beneficia subtrahenda. Dicitur enim Sap. XVI, ingratis spes tanquam hibernalis glacies tabescet. Non autem eius spes tabesceret si non esset ei beneficium subtrahendum. Ergo sunt subtrahenda beneficia ingratis. Praeterea, nullus debet alteri praebere occasionem peccandi. Sed ingratus beneficium recipiens sumit ingratitudinis occasionem ergo non est ingrato beneficium dandum. Praeterea, in quo quis peccat, per hoc et torquetur, ut dicitur Sap. XI. Sed ille qui ingratus est beneficio accepto, peccat contra beneficium. Ergo est beneficio privandus. Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. VI, quod altissimus benignus est super ingratos et malos. Sed eius per imitationem nos filios esse oportet, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo non debemus beneficia ingratis subtrahere. Respondeo dicendum quod circa ingratum duo consideranda sunt. Primo quidem, quid ipse dignus sit pati. Et sic certum est quod meretur beneficii subtractionem. Alio modo, considerandum est quid oporteat beneficum facere. Primo namque, debet non esse facilis ad ingratitudinem iudicandam, quia frequenter aliquis, ut Seneca dicit, qui non reddidit, gratus est; quia forte non occurrit ei facultas aut debita opportunitas reddendi. Secundo, debet tendere ad hoc quod de ingrato gratum faciat, quod si non potest primo beneficio facere, forte faciet secundo. Si vero ex beneficiis multiplicatis ingratitudinem augeat et peior fiat, debet a beneficiorum exhibitione cessare. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur quantum ad id quod ingratus dignus est pati.

Objection 1: It seems that favors should withheld from the ungrateful. For it is written (Wis 16:29): The hope of the unthankful shall melt away as the winter’s ice. But this hope would not melt away unless favors were withheld from him. Therefore favors should be withheld from the ungrateful. Obj. 2: Further, no one should afford another an occasion of committing sin. But the ungrateful in receiving a favor is given an occasion of ingratitude. Therefore favors should not be bestowed on the ungrateful. Obj. 3: Further, By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented (Wis 11:17). Now he that is ungrateful when he receives a favor sins against the favor. Therefore he should be deprived of the favor. On the contrary, It is written (Luke 6:35) that the Highest . . . is kind to the unthankful, and to the evil. Now we should prove ourselves His children by imitating Him (Luke 6:36). Therefore we should not withhold favors from the ungrateful. I answer that, There are two points to be considered with regard to an ungrateful person. The first is what he deserves to suffer and thus it is certain that he deserves to be deprived of our favor. The second is, what ought his benefactor to do? For in the first place he should not easily judge him to be ungrateful, since, as Seneca remarks (De Benef. iii), a man is often grateful although he repays not, because perhaps he has not the means or the opportunity of repaying. Second, he should be inclined to turn his ungratefulness into gratitude, and if he does not achieve this by being kind to him once, he may by being so a second time. If, however, the more he repeats his favors, the more ungrateful and evil the other becomes, he should cease from bestowing his favors upon him. Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted speaks of what the ungrateful man deserves to suffer.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui ingrato beneficium exhibet non dat ei occasionem peccandi, sed magis gratitudinis et amoris. Si vero ille qui accipit ingratitudinis exinde occasionem sumat, non est danti imputandum. Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui beneficium dat non statim debet se exhibere punitorem ingratitudinis, sed prius pium medicum, ut scilicet iteratis beneficiis ingratitudinem sanet.

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Reply Obj. 2: He that bestows a favor on an ungrateful person affords him an occasion not of sin but of gratitude and love. And if the recipient takes therefrom an occasion of ingratitude, this is not to be imputed to the bestower. Reply Obj. 3: He that bestows a favor must not at once act the part of a punisher of ingratitude, but rather that of a kindly physician, by healing the ingratitude with repeated favors.

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Question 108 Vengeance Deinde considerandum est de vindicatione. Et circa We must now consider vengeance, under which head hoc quaeruntur quatuor. there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum vindicatio sit licita. (1) Whether vengeance is lawful? Secundo, utrum sit specialis virtus. (2) Whether it is a special virtue? Tertio, de modo vindicandi. (3) Of the manner of taking vengeance; Quarto, in quos sit vindicta exercenda. (4) On whom should vengeance be taken?

Article 1 Whether vengeance is lawful? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vindicatio non sit licita. Quicumque enim usurpat sibi quod Dei est, peccat. Sed vindicta pertinet ad Deum, dicitur enim Deut. XXXII, secundum aliam litteram, mihi vindictam, et ego retribuam. Ergo omnis vindicatio est illicita. Praeterea, ille de quo vindicta sumitur, non toleratur. Sed mali sunt tolerandi, quia super illud Cant. II, sicut lilium inter spinas, dicit Glossa, non fuit bonus qui malos tolerare non potuit. Ergo vindicta non est sumenda de malis. Praeterea, vindicta per poenas fit, ex quibus causatur timor servilis. Sed lex nova non est lex timoris, sed amoris, ut Augustinus dicit, contra Adamantum. Ergo, ad minus in novo testamento, vindicta fieri non debet. Praeterea, ille dicitur se vindicare qui iniurias suas ulciscitur. Sed, ut videtur, non licet etiam iudici in se delinquentes punire, dicit enim Chrysostomus, super Matth., discamus exemplo Christi nostras iniurias magnanimiter sustinere, Dei autem iniurias nec usque ad auditum sufferre. Ergo vindicatio videtur esse illicita. Praeterea, peccatum multitudinis magis est nocivum quam peccatum unius tantum, dicitur enim Eccli. XXVI, a tribus timuit cor meum, zelaturam civitatis, et collectionem populi. Sed de peccato multitudinis non est vindicta sumenda, quia super illud Matth. XIII, sinite utraque crescere, ne forte eradicetis triticum, dicit Glossa quod multitudo non est excommunicanda, nec princeps. Ergo nec alia vindicatio est licita.

Sed contra, nihil est expectandum a Deo nisi quod est bonum et licitum. Sed vindicta de hostibus est ex-

Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not lawful. For whoever usurps what is God’s sins. But vengeance belongs to God, for it is written (Deut 32:35, Rom 12:19): Revenge to Me, and I will repay. Therefore all vengeance is unlawful.

Obj. 2: Further, he that takes vengeance on a man does not bear with him. But we ought to bear with the wicked, for a gloss on Cant. 2:2, As the lily among the thorns, says: He is not a good man that cannot bear with a wicked one. Therefore we should not take vengeance on the wicked. Obj. 3: Further, vengeance is taken by inflicting punishment, which is the cause of servile fear. But the New Law is not a law of fear, but of love, as Augustine states (Contra Adamant. xvii). Therefore at least in the New Testament all vengeance is unlawful. Obj. 4: Further, a man is said to avenge himself when he takes revenge for wrongs inflicted on himself. But, seemingly, it is unlawful even for a judge to punish those who have wronged him: for Chrysostom says: Let us learn after Christ’s example to bear our own wrongs with magnanimity, yet not to suffer God’s wrongs, not even by listening to them. Therefore vengeance seems to be unlawful. Obj. 5: Further, the sin of a multitude is more harmful than the sin of only one: for it is written (Sir 26:5–7): Of three things my heart hath been afraid . . . the accusation of a city, and the gathering together of the people, and a false calumny. But vengeance should not be taken on the sin of a multitude, for a gloss on Matt. 13:29, 30, Lest perhaps . . . you root up the wheat . . . suffer both to grow, says that a multitude should not be excommunicated, nor should the sovereign. Neither therefore is any other vengeance lawful. On the contrary, We should look to God for nothing save what is good and lawful. But we are to look to God

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pectanda a Deo, dicitur enim Luc. XVIII, Deus non faciet vindictam electorum suorum clamantium ad se die ac nocte? Quasi diceret, immo faciet. Ergo vindicatio non est per se mala et illicita. Respondeo dicendum quod vindicatio fit per aliquod poenale malum inflictum peccanti. Est ergo in vindicatione considerandus vindicantis animus. Si enim eius intentio feratur principaliter in malum illius de quo vindictam sumit, et ibi quiescat, est omnino illicitum, quia delectari in malo alterius pertinet ad odium, quod caritati repugnat, qua omnes homines debemus diligere. Nec aliquis excusatur si malum intendat illius qui sibi iniuste intulit malum, sicut non excusatur aliquis per hoc quod odit se odientem. Non enim debet homo in alium peccare, propter hoc quod ille peccavit prius in ipsum, hoc enim est vinci a malo, quod apostolus prohibet, Rom. XII, dicens, noli vinci a malo, sed vince in bono malum. Si vero intentio vindicantis feratur principaliter ad aliquod bonum, ad quod pervenitur per poenam peccantis, puta ad emendationem peccantis, vel saltem ad cohibitionem eius et quietem aliorum, et ad iustitiae conservationem et Dei honorem, potest esse vindicatio licita, aliis debitis circumstantiis servatis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille qui secundum gradum sui ordinis vindictam exercet in malos, non usurpat sibi quod Dei est, sed utitur potestate sibi divinitus concessa, dicitur enim Rom. XIII, de principe terreno, quod Dei minister est, vindex in iram ei qui male agit. Si autem praeter ordinem divinae institutionis aliquis vindictam exerceat, usurpat sibi quod Dei est, et ideo peccat. Ad secundum dicendum quod mali tolerantur a bonis in hoc quod ab eis proprias iniurias patienter sustinent, secundum quod oportet, non autem tolerant eos ut sustineant iniurias Dei et proximorum. Dicit enim Chrysostomus, super Matth., in propriis iniuriis esse quempiam patientem, laudabile est, iniurias autem Dei dissimulare nimis est impium. Ad tertium dicendum quod lex Evangelii est lex amoris. Ideo illis qui ex amore bonum operantur, qui soli proprie ad Evangelium pertinent, non est timor incutiendus per poenas, sed solum illis qui ex amore non moventur ad bonum, qui, etsi numero sint de Ecclesia, non tamen merito. Ad quartum dicendum quod iniuria quae infertur personae alicui quandoque redundat in Deum et in Ecclesiam, et tunc debet aliquis propriam iniuriam ulcisci. Sicut patet de Elia, qui fecit ignem descendere super eos qui venerant ad ipsum capiendum, ut legitur IV Reg. I. Et similiter Elisaeus maledixit pueris eum irridentibus, ut habetur IV Reg. II. Et Silvester Papa excommunica-

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for vengeance on His enemies: for it is written (Luke 18:7): Will not God revenge His elect who cry to Him day and night? as if to say: He will indeed. Therefore vengeance is not essentially evil and unlawful. I answer that, Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil on one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we must consider the mind of the avenger. For if his intention is directed chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance and rests there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because to take pleasure in another’s evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary to the charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is it an excuse that he intends the evil of one who has unjustly inflicted evil on him, as neither is a man excused for hating one that hates him: for a man may not sin against another just because the latter has already sinned against him, since this is to be overcome by evil, which was forbidden by the Apostle, who says (Rom 12:21): Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good. If, however, the avenger’s intention be directed chiefly to some good, to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has sinned (for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and God honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided other due circumstances be observed. Reply Obj. 1: He who takes vengeance on the wicked in keeping with his rank and position does not usurp what belongs to God but makes use of the power granted him by God. For it is written (Rom 13:4) of the earthly prince that he is God’s minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. If, however, a man takes vengeance outside the order of divine appointment, he usurps what is God’s and therefore sins. Reply Obj. 2: The good bear with the wicked by enduring patiently, and in due manner, the wrongs they themselves receive from them: but they do not bear with them as to endure the wrongs they inflict on God and their neighbor. For Chrysostom says: It is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to overlook God’s wrongs is most wicked. Reply Obj. 3: The law of the Gospel is the law of love, and therefore those who do good out of love, and who alone properly belong to the Gospel, ought not to be terrorized by means of punishment, but only those who are not moved by love to do good, and who, though they belong to the Church outwardly, do not belong to it in merit. Reply Obj. 4: Sometimes a wrong done to a person reflects on God and the Church: and then it is the duty of that person to avenge the wrong. For example, Elias made fire descend on those who were come to seize him (4 Kgs 1); likewise Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked him (4 Kgs 2); and Pope Sylverius excommunicated those who sent him into exile (XXIII, Q. iv, Cap. Guilisarius). But insofar as the

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vit eos qui eum in exilium miserunt, ut habetur XXIII, qu. IV. Inquantum vero iniuria in aliquem illata ad eius personam pertinet, debet eam tolerare patienter, si expediat. Huiusmodi enim praecepta patientiae intelligenda sunt secundum praeparationem animi, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte. Ad quintum dicendum quod quando tota multitudo peccat, est de ea vindicta sumenda vel quantum ad totam multitudinem, sicut Aegyptii submersi sunt in mari rubro persequentes filios Israel, ut habetur Exod. XIV, et sicut Sodomitae universaliter perierunt, vel quantum ad magnam multitudinis partem, sicut patet Exod. XXXII, in poena eorum qui vitulum adoraverunt. Quandoque vero, si speretur multorum correctio, debet severitas vindictae exerceri in aliquos paucos principaliores, quibus punitis ceteri terreantur, sicut dominus, Num. XXV, mandavit suspendi principes populi pro peccato multitudinis. Si autem non tota multitudo peccavit, sed pro parte, tunc, si possunt mali secerni a bonis, debet in eos vindicta exerceri, si tamen hoc fieri possit sine scandalo aliorum. Alioquin, parcendum est multitudini, et detrahendum severitati. Et eadem ratio est de principe, quem sequitur multitudo. Tolerandum enim est peccatum eius, si sine scandalo multitudinis puniri non posset, nisi forte esset tale peccatum principis quod magis noceret multitudini, vel spiritualiter vel temporaliter, quam scandalum quod exinde timeretur.

Q. 108, A. 2

wrong inflicted on a man affects his person, he should bear it patiently if this be expedient. For these precepts of patience are to be understood as referring to preparedness of the mind, as Augustine states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i).

Reply Obj. 5: When the whole multitude sins, vengeance must be taken on them, either in respect of the whole multitude—thus the Egyptians were drowned in the Red Sea while they were pursuing the children of Israel (Exod 14), and the people of Sodom were entirely destroyed (Gen 19)—or as regards part of the multitude, as may be seen in the punishment of those who worshipped the calf. Sometimes, however, if there is hope of many making amends, the severity of vengeance should be brought to bear on a few of the principals, whose punishment fills the rest with fear; thus the Lord (Num 25) commanded the princes of the people to be hanged for the sin of the multitude. On the other hand, if it is not the whole but only a part of the multitude that has sinned, then if the guilty can be separated from the innocent, vengeance should be wrought on them: provided, however, that this can be done without scandal to others; else the multitude should be spared and severity foregone. The same applies to the sovereign, whom the multitude follow. For his sin should be borne with, if it cannot be punished without scandal to the multitude: unless indeed his sin were such, that it would do more harm to the multitude, either spiritually or temporally, than would the scandal that was feared to arise from his punishment.

Article 2 Whether vengeance is a special virtue? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vindicatio non sit specialis virtus ab aliis distincta. Sicut enim remunerantur boni pro his quae bene agunt, ita puniuntur mali pro his quae male agunt. Sed remuneratio bonorum non pertinet ad aliquam specialem virtutem, sed est actus commutativae iustitiae. Ergo, pari ratione, et vindicatio non debet poni specialis virtus. Praeterea, ad actum illum non debet ordinari specialis virtus ad quem homo sufficienter disponitur per alias virtutes. Sed ad vindicandum mala sufficienter disponitur homo per virtutem fortitudinis et per zelum. Non ergo vindicatio debet poni specialis virtus. Praeterea, cuilibet speciali virtuti aliquod speciale vitium opponitur. Sed vindicationi non videtur opponi aliquod speciale vitium. Ergo non est specialis virtus. Sed contra est quod Tullius ponit eam partem iustitiae.

Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not a special and distinct virtue. For just as the good are rewarded for their good deeds, so are the wicked punished for their evil deeds. Now the rewarding of the good does not belong to a special virtue, but is an act of commutative justice. Therefore in the same way vengeance should not be accounted a special virtue. Obj. 2: Further, there is no need to appoint a special virtue for an act to which a man is sufficiently disposed by the other virtues. Now man is sufficiently disposed by the virtues of fortitude or zeal to avenge evil. Therefore vengeance should not be reckoned a special virtue. Obj. 3: Further, there is a special vice opposed to every special virtue. But seemingly no special vice is opposed to vengeance. Therefore it is not a special virtue. On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of justice.

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Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., aptitudo ad virtutem inest nobis a natura, licet complementum virtutis sit per assuetudinem vel per aliquam aliam causam. Unde patet quod virtutes perficiunt nos ad prosequendum debito modo inclinationes naturales, quae pertinent ad ius naturale. Et ideo ad quamlibet inclinationem naturalem determinatam ordinatur aliqua specialis virtus. Est autem quaedam specialis inclinatio naturae ad removendum nocumenta, unde et animalibus datur vis irascibilis separatim a vi concupiscibili. Repellit autem homo nocumenta per hoc quod se defendit contra iniurias, ne ei inferantur, vel iam illatas iniurias ulciscitur, non intentione nocendi, sed intentione removendi nocumenta. Hoc autem pertinet ad vindicationem, dicit enim Tullius, in sua rhetorica, quod vindicatio est per quam vis aut iniuria, et omnino quidquid obscurum est, idest ignominiosum, defendendo aut ulciscendo propulsatur. Unde vindicatio est specialis virtus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut recompensatio debiti legalis pertinet ad iustitiam commutativam, recompensatio autem debiti moralis quod nascitur ex particulari beneficio exhibito, pertinet ad virtutem gratiae; ita etiam punitio peccatorum, secundum quod pertinet ad publicam iustitiam, est actus commutativae iustitiae; secundum autem quod pertinet ad immunitatem alicuius personae singularis, a qua iniuria propulsatur, pertinet ad virtutem vindicationis. Ad secundum dicendum quod fortitudo disponit ad vindictam removendo prohibens, scilicet timorem periculi imminentis. Zelus autem, secundum quod importat fervorem amoris, importat primam radicem vindicationis, prout aliquis vindicat iniurias Dei vel proximorum, quas ex caritate reputat quasi suas. Cuiuslibet autem virtutis actus ex radice caritatis procedit, quia, ut Gregorius dicit, in quadam homilia, nihil habet viriditatis ramus boni operis, si non procedat ex radice caritatis. Ad tertium dicendum quod vindicationi opponuntur duo vitia. Unum quidem per excessum, scilicet peccatum crudelitatis vel saevitiae, quae excedit mensuram in puniendo. Aliud autem est vitium quod consistit in defectu, sicut cum aliquis est nimis remissus in puniendo, unde dicitur Prov. XIII, qui parcit virgae, odit filium suum. Virtus autem vindicationis consistit ut homo secundum omnes circumstantias debitam mensuram in vindicando conservet.

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I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1), aptitude to virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of virtue is in us through habituation or some other cause. Hence it is evident that virtues perfect us so that we follow in due manner our natural inclinations, which belong to the natural right. Wherefore to every definite natural inclination there corresponds a special virtue. Now there is a special inclination of nature to remove harm, for which reason animals have the irascible power distinct from the concupiscible. Man resists harm by defending himself against wrongs, lest they be inflicted on him, or he avenges those which have already been inflicted on him, with the intention, not of harming, but of removing the harm done. And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by vengeance we resist force, or wrong, and in general whatever is obscure (i.e., derogatory), either by self-defense or by avenging it. Therefore vengeance is a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as repayment of a legal debt belongs to commutative justice, and as repayment of a moral debt, arising from the bestowal of a particular favor, belongs to the virtue of gratitude, so too the punishment of sins, so far as it is the concern of public justice, is an act of commutative justice; while so far as it is concerned in defending the rights of the individual by whom a wrong is resisted, it belongs to the virtue of revenge. Reply Obj. 2: Fortitude disposes to vengeance by removing an obstacle thereto, namely, fear of an imminent danger. Zeal, as denoting the fervor of love, signifies the primary root of vengeance, insofar as a man avenges the wrong done to God and his neighbor, because charity makes him regard them as his own. Now every act of virtue proceeds from charity as its root, since, according to Gregory (Hom. xxvii in Ev.), there are no green leaves on the bough of good works, unless charity be the root. Reply Obj. 3: Two vices are opposed to vengeance: one by way of excess, namely, the sin of cruelty or brutality, which exceeds the measure in punishing: while the other is a vice by way of deficiency and consists in being remiss in punishing, wherefore it is written (Prov 13:24): He that spareth the rod hateth his son. But the virtue of vengeance consists in observing the due measure of vengeance with regard to all the circumstances.

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Article 3 Whether vengeance should be wrought by means of punishments customary among men? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod vindicatio non debeat fieri per poenas apud homines consuetas. Occisio enim hominis est quaedam eradicatio eius. Sed dominus mandavit, Matth. XIII, quod zizania, per quae significantur filii nequam, non eradicarentur. Ergo peccatores non sunt occidendi. Praeterea, quicumque mortaliter peccant, eadem poena videntur digni. Si ergo aliqui mortaliter peccantes morte puniuntur, videtur quod omnes tales deberent morte puniri. Quod patet esse falsum. Praeterea, cum aliquis pro peccato punitur manifeste, ex hoc peccatum eius manifestatur. Quod videtur esse nocivum multitudini, quae ex exemplo peccati sumit occasionem peccandi. Ergo videtur quod non sit poena mortis pro aliquo peccato infligenda. Sed contra est quod in lege divina his huiusmodi poenae determinantur, ut ex supra dictis patet. Respondeo dicendum quod vindicatio intantum licita est et virtuosa inquantum tendit ad cohibitionem malorum. Cohibentur autem aliqui a peccando, qui affectum virtutis non habent, per hoc quod timent amittere aliqua quae plus amant quam illa quae peccando adipiscuntur, alias timor non compesceret peccatum. Et ideo per subtractionem omnium quae homo maxime diligit, est vindicta de peccatis sumenda. Haec sunt autem quae homo maxime diligit, vitam, incolumitatem corporis, libertatem sui, et bona exteriora, puta divitias, patriam et gloriam. Et ideo, ut Augustinus refert, XXI de Civ. Dei, octo genera poenarum in legibus esse scribit Tullius, scilicet mortem, per quam tollitur vita; verbera et talionem (ut scilicet oculum pro oculo perdat), per quae amittit corporis incolumitatem; servitutem et vincula, per quae perdit libertatem; exilium, per quod perdit patriam; damnum, per quod perdit divitias; ignominiam, per quam perdit gloriam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus prohibet eradicari zizania quando timetur ne simul cum eis eradicetur et triticum. Sed quandoque possunt eradicari mali per mortem non solum sine periculo, sed etiam cum magna utilitate bonorum. Et ideo in tali casu potest poena mortis peccatoribus infligi. Ad secundum dicendum quod omnes peccantes mortaliter digni sunt morte aeterna quantum ad futuram retributionem, quae est secundum veritatem divini iudicii. Sed poenae praesentis vitae sunt magis medicinales. Et ideo illis solis peccatis poena mortis infligitur quae in gravem perniciem aliorum cedunt.

Objection 1: It seems that vengeance should not be wrought by means of punishments customary among men. For to put a man to death is to uproot him. But our Lord forbade (Matt 13:29) the uprooting of the cockle, whereby the children of the wicked one are signified. Therefore sinners should not be put to death. Obj. 2: Further, all who sin mortally seem to be deserving of the same punishment. Therefore if some who sin mortally are punished with death, it seems that all such persons should be punished with death: and this is evidently false. Obj. 3: Further, to punish a man publicly for his sin seems to publish his sin: and this would seem to have a harmful effect on the multitude, since the example of sin is taken by them as an occasion for sin. Therefore it seems that the punishment of death should not be inflicted for a sin. On the contrary, These punishments are fixed by the divine law as appears from what we have said above (I-II, Q. 105, A. 2). I answer that, Vengeance is lawful and virtuous so far as it tends to the prevention of evil. Now some who are not influenced by motive of virtue are prevented from committing sin, through fear of losing those things which they love more than those they obtain by sinning, else fear would be no restraint to sin. Consequently vengeance for sin should be taken by depriving a man of what he loves most. Now the things which man loves most are life, bodily safety, his own freedom, and external goods such as riches, his country and his good name. Wherefore, according to Augustine’s reckoning (De Civ. Dei xxi), Tully writes that the laws recognize eight kinds of punishment: namely, death, whereby man is deprived of life; stripes, retaliation, or the loss of eye for eye, whereby man forfeits his bodily safety; slavery, and imprisonment, whereby he is deprived of freedom; exile whereby he is banished from his country; fines, whereby he is mulcted in his riches; ignominy, whereby he loses his good name. Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord forbids the uprooting of the cockle, when there is fear lest the wheat be uprooted together with it. But sometimes the wicked can be uprooted by death, not only without danger, but even with great profit, to the good. Wherefore in such a case the punishment of death may be inflicted on sinners. Reply Obj. 2: All who sin mortally are deserving of eternal death, as regards future retribution, which is in accordance with the truth of the divine judgment. But the punishments of this life are more of a medicinal character; wherefore the punishment of death is inflicted on those sins alone which conduce to the grave undoing of others.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod quando simul cum culpa innotescit et poena, vel mortis vel quaecumque alia quam homo horret, ex hoc ipso voluntas eius a peccando abstrahitur, quia plus terret poena quam alliciat exemplum culpae.

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Reply Obj. 3: The very fact that the punishment, whether of death or of any kind that is fearsome to man, is made known at the same time as the sin, makes man’s will avers to sin: because the fear of punishment is greater than the enticement of the example of sin.

Article 4 Whether vengeance should be taken on those who have sinned involuntarily? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vindicta sit exercenda in eos qui involuntarie peccaverunt. Voluntas enim unius non consequitur voluntatem alterius. Sed unus punitur pro alio, secundum illud Exod. XX, ego sum Deus Zelotes, visitans iniquitatem patrum in filios, in tertiam et quartam generationem. Unde et pro peccato Cham Chanaan, filius eius, maledictus est, ut habetur Gen. IX. Giezi etiam peccante, lepra transmittitur ad posteros, ut habetur IV Reg. V. Sanguis etiam Christi reddit poenae obnoxios successores Iudaeorum, qui dixerunt, sanguis eius super nos, et super filios nostros. Matth. XXVII, legitur etiam quod pro peccato Achar populus Israel traditus est in manus hostium, ut habetur Iosue VII. Et pro peccato filiorum Heli idem populus corruit in conspectu Philistinorum, ut habetur I Reg. IV. Ergo aliquis involuntarius est puniendus. Praeterea, illud solum est voluntarium quod est in potestate hominis. Sed quandoque poena infertur pro eo quod non est in eius potestate, sicut propter vitium leprae aliquis removetur ab administratione Ecclesiae; et propter paupertatem aut malitiam civium Ecclesia perdit cathedram episcopalem. Ergo non solum pro peccato voluntario vindicta infertur. Praeterea, ignorantia causat involuntarium. Sed vindicta quandoque exercetur in aliquos ignorantes. Parvuli enim Sodomitarum, licet haberent ignorantiam invincibilem, cum parentibus perierunt, ut legitur Gen. XIX. Similiter etiam parvuli pro peccato Dathan et Abiron pariter cum eis absorpti sunt, ut habetur Num. XVI. Bruta etiam animalia, quae carent ratione, iussa sunt interfici pro peccato Amalecitarum, ut habetur I Reg. XV. Ergo vindicta quandoque exercetur in involuntarios. Praeterea, coactio maxime repugnat voluntario. Sed aliquis qui timore coactus aliquod peccatum committit, non propter hoc reatum poenae evadit. Ergo vindicta exercetur etiam in involuntarios. Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, quod navicula in qua erat Iudas, turbatur, unde et Petrus, qui erat firmus meritis suis, turbatur alienis. Sed Petrus non

Objection 1: It seems that vengeance should be taken on those who have sinned involuntarily. For the will of one man does not follow from the will of another. Yet one man is punished for another, according to Ex. 20:5, I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation. Thus for the sin of Cham, his son Chanaan was cursed (Gen 9:25) and for the sin of Giezi, his descendants were struck with leprosy (4 Kgs 5). Again the blood of Christ lays the descendants of the Jews under the ban of punishment, for they said (Matt 27:25): His blood be upon us and upon our children. Moreover we read (Josue 7) that the people of Israel were delivered into the hands of their enemies for the sin of Achan, and that the same people were overthrown by the Philistines on account of the sin of the sons of Heli (1 Kgs 4). Therefore a person is to be punished without having deserved it voluntarily. Obj. 2: Further, nothing is voluntary except what is in a man’s power. But sometimes a man is punished for what is not in his power; thus a man is removed from the administration of the Church on account of being infected with leprosy; and a Church ceases to be an episcopal see on account of the depravity or evil of the people. Therefore vengeance is taken not only for voluntary sins. Obj. 3: Further, ignorance makes an act involuntary. Now vengeance is sometimes taken on the ignorant. Thus the children of the people of Sodom, though they were in invincible ignorance, perished with their parents (Gen 19). Again, for the sin of Dathan and Abiron their children were swallowed up together with them (Num 16). Moreover, dumb animals, which are devoid of reason, were commanded to be slain on account of the sin of the Amalekites (1 Kgs 15). Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those who have deserved it involuntarily. Obj. 4: Further, compulsion is most opposed to voluntariness. But a man does not escape the debt of punishment through being compelled by fear to commit a sin. Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those who have deserved it involuntarily. Obj. 5: Further Ambrose says on Luke 5 that the ship in which Judas was, was in distress; wherefore Peter, who was calm in the security of his own merits, was in distress about

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volebat peccatum Iudae. Ergo quandoque involuntarius those of others. But Peter did not will the sin of Judas. Therepunitur. fore a person is sometimes punished without having voluntarily deserved it. Sed contra est quod poena debetur peccato. Sed On the contrary, Punishment is due to sin. But evomne peccatum est voluntarium, ut dicit Augustinus. ery sin is voluntary according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. Ergo in solos voluntarios est exercenda vindicta. iii; Retract. i). Therefore vengeance should be taken only on those who have deserved it voluntarily. Respondeo dicendum quod poena potest dupliciI answer that, Punishment may be considered in two ter considerari. Uno modo, secundum rationem poenae. ways. First, under the aspect of punishment, and in this Et secundum hoc, poena non debetur nisi peccato, quia way punishment is not due save for sin, because by means per poenam reparatur aequalitas iustitiae, inquantum il- of punishment the equality of justice is restored, insofar as le qui peccando nimis secutus est suam voluntatem, ali- he who by sinning has exceeded in following his own will quid contra suam voluntatem patitur. Unde cum omne suffers something that is contrary to this will. Wherefore, peccatum sit voluntarium, etiam originale, ut supra ha- since every sin is voluntary, not excluding original sin, as bitum est; consequens est quod nullus punitur hoc modo stated above (I-II, Q. 81, A. 1), it follows that no one is punnisi pro eo quod voluntarie factum est. Alio modo po- ished in this way, except for something done voluntarily. test considerari poena inquantum est medicina, non so- Second, punishment may be considered as a medicine, not lum sanativa peccati praeteriti, sed etiam praeservativa only healing the past sin, but also preserving from future a peccato futuro et promotiva in aliquod bonum. Et se- sin, or conducing to some good, and in this way a person is cundum hoc, aliquis interdum punitur sine culpa, non sometimes punished without any fault of his own, yet not tamen sine causa. without cause. Sciendum tamen quod nunquam medicina subtrahit It must, however, be observed that a medicine never remaius bonum ut promoveat minus bonum, sicut medici- moves a greater good in order to promote a lesser; thus the na carnalis nunquam caecat oculum ut sanet calcaneum, medicine of the body never blinds the eye, in order to repair quandoque tamen infert nocumentum in minoribus ut the heel: yet sometimes it is harmful in lesser things that it melioribus auxilium praestet. Et quia bona spiritualia may be helpful in things of greater consequence. And since sunt maxima bona, bona autem temporalia sunt mi- spiritual goods are of the greatest consequence, while temnima; ideo quandoque punitur aliquis in temporalibus poral goods are least important, sometimes a person is punbonis absque culpa, cuiusmodi sunt plures poenae prae- ished in his temporal goods without any fault of his own. sentis vitae divinitus inflictae ad humiliationem vel pro- Such are many of the punishments inflicted by God in this bationem, non autem punitur aliquis in spiritualibus present life for our humiliation or probation. But no one is bonis sine propria culpa, neque in praesenti neque in punished in spiritual goods without any fault on his part, futuro; quia ibi poenae non sunt medicinae, sed conse- neither in this nor in the future life, because in the latter quuntur spiritualem damnationem. punishment is not medicinal, but a result of spiritual condemnation. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod unus homo poeReply Obj. 1: A man is never condemned to a spiritual na spirituali nunquam punitur pro peccato alterius, quia punishment for another man’s sin, because spiritual punpoena spiritualis pertinet ad animam, secundum quam ishment affects the soul, in respect of which each man is quilibet est liber sui. Poena autem temporali quandoque master of himself. But sometimes a man is condemned to unus punitur pro peccato alterius, triplici ratione. Pri- punishment in temporal matters for the sin of another, and mo quidem, quia unus homo temporaliter est res alte- this for three reasons. First, because one man may be the rius, et ita in poenam eius etiam ipse punitur, sicut filii temporal goods of another, and so he may be punished in sunt secundum corpus quaedam res patris, et servi sunt punishment of the latter: thus children, as to the body, are a quaedam res dominorum. Alio modo, inquantum pec- belonging of their father, and slaves are a possession of their catum unius derivatur in alterum. Vel per imitationem, master. Second, when one person’s sin is transmitted to ansicut filii imitantur peccata parentum, et servi peccata other, either by imitation, as children copy the sins of their dominorum, ut audacius peccent. Vel per modum meri- parents, and slaves the sins of their masters, so as to sin with ti, sicut peccata subditorum merentur peccatorem prae- greater daring; or by way of merit, as the sinful subjects latum, secundum illud Iob XXXIV, qui regnare facit ho- merit a sinful superior, according to Job 34:30, Who maketh minem hypocritam, propter peccata populi; unde et pro a man that is a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people? peccato David populum numerantis, populus Israel pu- Hence the people of Israel were punished for David’s sin nitus est, ut habetur II Reg. ult. Sive etiam per aliqualem in numbering the people (2 Kgs 24). This may also happen consensum seu dissimulationem, sicut etiam interdum through some kind of consent or connivance: thus someboni simul puniuntur temporaliter cum malis, quia eo- times even the good are punished in temporal matters to-

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rum peccata non redarguerunt, ut Augustinus dicit, in I de Civ. Dei, tertio, ad commendandum unitatem humanae societatis, ex qua unus debet pro alio sollicitus esse ne peccet, et ad detestationem peccati, dum poena unius redundat in omnes, quasi omnes essent unum corpus, ut Augustinus dicit de peccato Achar. Quod autem dominus dicit, visitans peccata parentum in filios, in tertiam et quartam generationem, magis videtur ad misericordiam quam ad severitatem pertinere, dum non statim vindictam adhibet, sed expectat in posterum, ut vel saltem posteri corrigantur; sed, crescente malitia posteriorum, quasi necesse est ultionem inferri.

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, iudicium humanum debet imitari divinum iudicium in manifestis Dei iudiciis, quibus homines spiritualiter damnat pro proprio peccato. Occulta vero Dei iudicia, quibus temporaliter aliquos punit absque culpa, non potest humanum iudicium imitari, quia homo non potest comprehendere horum iudiciorum rationes, ut sciat quid expediat unicuique. Et ideo nunquam secundum humanum iudicium aliquis debet puniri sine culpa poena flagelli, ut occidatur, vel mutiletur, vel verberetur. Poena autem damni punitur aliquis, etiam secundum humanum iudicium, etiam sine culpa, sed non sine causa. Et hoc tripliciter.

Uno modo, ex hoc quod aliquis ineptus redditur, sine sua culpa, ad aliquod bonum habendum vel consequendum, sicut propter vitium leprae aliquis removetur ab administratione Ecclesiae, et propter bigamiam vel iudicium sanguinis aliquis impeditur a sacris ordinibus. Secundo, quia bonum in quo damnificatur non est proprium bonum, sed commune, sicut quod aliqua Ecclesia habeat episcopatum, pertinet ad bonum totius civitatis, non autem ad bonum clericorum tantum. Tertio, quia bonum unius dependet ex bono alterius, sicut in crimine laesae maiestatis filius amittit haereditatem pro peccato parentis. Ad tertium dicendum quod parvuli divino iudicio simul puniuntur temporaliter cum parentibus, tum quia sunt res parentum, et in eis etiam parentes puniuntur. Tum etiam quia hoc in eorum bonum cedit, ne, si reservarentur, essent imitatores paternae malitiae, et sic graviores poenas mererentur. In bruta vero animalia, et quascumque alias irrationales creaturas, vindicta exercetur, quia per hoc puniuntur illi quorum sunt. Et iterum propter detestationem peccati.

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gether with the wicked, for not having condemned their sins, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9). Third, in order to mark the unity of human fellowship, whereby one man is bound to be solicitous for another, lest he sin; and in order to inculcate horror of sin, seeing that the punishment of one affects all, as though all were one body, as Augustine says in speaking of the sin of Achan (QQ. sup. Josue viii). The saying of the Lord, Visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation, seems to belong to mercy rather than to severity, since He does not take vengeance forthwith, but waits for some future time, in order that the descendants at least may mend their ways; yet should the wickedness of the descendants increase, it becomes almost necessary to take vengeance on them. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine states (QQ. sup. Josue viii), human judgment should conform to the divine judgment, when this is manifest, and God condemns men spiritually for their own sins. But human judgment cannot be conformed to God’s hidden judgments, whereby He punishes certain persons in temporal matters without any fault of theirs, since man is unable to grasp the reasons of these judgments so as to know what is expedient for each individual. Wherefore according to human judgment a man should never be condemned without fault of his own to an inflictive punishment, such as death, mutilation or flogging. But a man may be condemned, even according to human judgment, to a punishment of forfeiture, even without any fault on his part, but not without cause: and this in three ways. First, through a person becoming, without any fault of his, disqualified for having or acquiring a certain good: thus for being infected with leprosy a man is removed from the administration of the Church: and for bigamy, or through pronouncing a death sentence a man is hindered from receiving sacred orders. Second, because the particular good that he forfeits is not his own but common property: thus that an episcopal see be attached to a certain church belongs to the good of the whole city, and not only to the good of the clerics. Third, because the good of one person may depend on the good of another: thus in the crime of high treason a son loses his inheritance through the sin of his parent. Reply Obj. 3: By the judgment of God children are punished in temporal matters together with their parents, both because they are a possession of their parents, so that their parents are punished also in their person, and because this is for their good lest, should they be spared, they might imitate the sins of their parents, and thus deserve to be punished still more severely. Vengeance is wrought on dumb animals and any other irrational creatures, because in this way their owners are punished; and also in horror of sin.

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Ad quartum dicendum quod coactio timoris non facit simpliciter involuntarium, sed habet voluntarium mixtum, ut supra habitum est. Ad quintum dicendum quod hoc modo pro peccato Iudae ceteri apostoli turbabantur, sicut pro peccato unius punitur multitudo, ad unitatem commendandam, ut dictum est.

Q. 108, A. 4

Reply Obj. 4: An act done through compulsion of fear is not involuntary simply, but has an admixture of voluntariness, as stated above (I-II, Q. 6, AA. 5, 6). Reply Obj. 5: The other apostles were distressed about the sin of Judas, in the same way as the multitude is punished for the sin of one, in commendation of unity, as state above (Reply Obj. 1, 2).

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Question 109 Truth Deinde considerandum est de veritate, et vitiis oppoWe must now consider truth and the vices opposed sitis. Circa veritatem autem quaeruntur quatuor. thereto. Concerning truth there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum veritas sit virtus. (1) Whether truth is a virtue? Secundo, utrum sit virtus specialis. (2) Whether it is a special virtue? Tertio, utrum sit pars iustitiae. (3) Whether it is a part of justice? Quarto, utrum magis declinet ad minus. (4) Whether it inclines to that which is less?

Article 1 Whether truth is a virtue? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit virtus. Prima enim virtutum est fides, cuius obiectum est veritas. Cum igitur obiectum sit prius habitu et actu, videtur quod veritas non sit virtus, sed aliquid prius virtute. Praeterea, sicut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., ad veritatem pertinet quod aliquis confiteatur existentia circa seipsum, et neque maiora neque minora. Sed hoc non semper est laudabile, neque in bonis, quia dicitur Prov. XXVII, laudet te alienus, et non os tuum; nec etiam in malis, quia contra quosdam dicitur Isaiae III, peccatum suum quasi Sodoma praedicaverunt, nec absconderunt. Ergo veritas non est virtus.

Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a virtue. For the first of virtues is faith, whose object is truth. Since then the object precedes the habit and the act, it seems that truth is not a virtue, but something prior to virtue. Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), it belongs to truth that a man should state things concerning himself to be neither more nor less than they are. But this is not always praiseworthy—neither in good things, since according to Prov. 27:2, Let another praise thee, and not thy own mouth—nor even in evil things, because it is written in condemnation of certain people (Isa 3:9): They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid it. Therefore truth is not a virtue. Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or intellectual, or moral. Now truth is not a theological virtue, because its object is not God but temporal things. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by truth we faithfully represent things as they are, were, or will be. Likewise it is not one of the intellectual virtues, but their end. Nor again is it a moral virtue, since it is not a mean between excess and deficiency, for the more one tells the truth, the better it is. Therefore truth is not a virtue.

Praeterea, omnis virtus aut est theologica, aut intellectualis, aut moralis. Sed veritas non est virtus theologica, quia non habet Deum pro obiecto, sed res temporales; dicit enim Tullius quod veritas est per quam immutata ea quae sunt aut fuerunt aut futura sunt, dicuntur. Similiter etiam non est virtus intellectualis, sed finis earum. Neque etiam est virtus moralis, quia non consistit in medio inter superfluum et diminutum; quanto enim aliquis plus dicit verum, tanto melius est. Ergo veritas non est virtus. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II et IV Ethic., On the contrary, The Philosopher both in the Secponit veritatem inter ceteras virtutes. ond and in the Fourth Book of Ethics places truth among the other virtues. Respondeo dicendum quod veritas dupliciter acciI answer that, Truth can be taken in two ways. First, pi potest. Uno modo secundum quod veritate aliquid di- for that by reason of which a thing is said to be true, and citur verum. Et sic veritas non est virtus, sed obiectum thus truth is not a virtue, but the object or end of a virtue: vel finis virtutis. Sic enim accepta veritas non est habi- because, taken in this way, truth is not a habit, which is the tus, quod est genus virtutis, sed aequalitas quaedam in- genus containing virtue, but a certain equality between the tellectus vel signi ad rem intellectam et significatam, vel understanding or sign and the thing understood or signietiam rei ad suam regulam, ut in primo habitum est. Alio fied, or again between a thing and its rule, as stated in the modo potest dici veritas qua aliquis verum dicit, secun- First Part (Q. 16, A. 1; Q. 21, A. 2). Second, truth may stand

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dum quod per eam aliquis dicitur verax. Et talis veritas, sive veracitas, necesse est quod sit virtus, quia hoc ipsum quod est dicere verum est bonus actus; virtus autem est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de veritate primo modo dicta. Ad secundum dicendum quod confiteri id quod est circa seipsum, inquantum est confessio veri, est bonum ex genere. Sed hoc non sufficit ad hoc quod sit actus virtutis, sed ad hoc requiritur quod ulterius debitis circumstantiis vestiatur, quae si non observentur, erit actus vitiosus. Et secundum hoc, vitiosum est quod aliquis, sine debita causa, laudet seipsum etiam de vero. Vitiosum etiam est quod aliquis peccatum suum publicet, quasi se de hoc laudando, vel qualitercumque inutiliter manifestando. Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui dicit verum profert aliqua signa conformia rebus, scilicet vel verba, vel aliqua facta exteriora, aut quascumque res exteriores. Circa huiusmodi autem res sunt solae virtutes morales, ad quas etiam usus pertinet exteriorum membrorum, secundum quod fit per imperium voluntatis. Unde veritas non est virtus theologica neque intellectualis, sed moralis. Est autem in medio inter superfluum et diminutum dupliciter, uno quidem modo, ex parte obiecti; alio modo, ex parte actus. Ex parte quidem obiecti, quia verum secundum suam rationem importat quandam aequalitatem. Aequale autem est medium inter maius et minus. Unde ex hoc ipso quod aliquis verum dicit de seipso, medium tenet inter eum qui maiora dicit de seipso, et inter eum qui minora. Ex parte autem actus medium tenet, inquantum verum dicit quando oportet, et secundum quod oportet. Superfluum autem convenit illi qui importune ea quae sua sunt manifestat, defectus autem competit illi qui occultat, quando manifestare oportet.

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for that by which a person says what is true, in which sense one is said to be truthful. This truth or truthfulness must needs be a virtue, because to say what is true is a good act: and virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and renders his action good. Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes truth in the first sense. Reply Obj. 2: To state that which concerns oneself, insofar as it is a statement of what is true, is good generically. Yet this does not suffice for it to be an act of virtue, since it is requisite for that purpose that it should also be clothed with the due circumstances, and if these be not observed, the act will be sinful. Accordingly it is sinful to praise oneself without due cause even for that which is true: and it is also sinful to publish one’s sin, by praising oneself on that account, or in any way proclaiming it uselessly. Reply Obj. 3: A person who says what is true, utters certain signs which are in conformity with things; and such signs are either words, or external actions, or any external thing. Now such kinds of things are the subject-matter of the moral virtues alone, for the latter are concerned with the use of the external members, insofar as this use is put into effect at the command of the will. Wherefore truth is neither a theological, nor an intellectual, but a moral virtue. And it is a mean between excess and deficiency in two ways. First, on the part of the object, second, on the part of the act. On the part of the object, because the true essentially denotes a kind of equality, and equal is a mean between more and less. Hence for the very reason that a man says what is true about himself, he observes the mean between one that says more than the truth about himself, and one that says less than the truth. On the part of the act, to observe the mean is to tell the truth, when one ought, and as one ought. Excess consists in making known one’s own affairs out of season, and deficiency in hiding them when one ought to make them known.

Article 2 Whether truth is a special virtue? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit specialis virtus. Verum enim et bonum convertuntur. Sed bonitas non est specialis virtus, quinimmo omnis virtus est bonitas, quia bonum facit habentem. Ergo veritas non est specialis virtus. Praeterea, manifestatio eius quod ad ipsum hominem pertinet, est actus veritatis de qua nunc loquimur. Sed hoc pertinet ad quamlibet virtutem, quilibet enim virtutis habitus manifestatur per proprium actum. Ergo veritas non est specialis virtus.

Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a special virtue. For the true and the good are convertible. Now goodness is not a special virtue, in fact every virtue is goodness, because it makes its possessor good. Therefore truth is not a special virtue. Obj. 2: Further, to make known what belongs to oneself is an act of truth as we understand it here. But this belongs to every virtue, since every virtuous habit is made known by its own act. Therefore truth is not a special virtue.

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Praeterea, veritas vitae dicitur qua aliquis recte vivit, de qua dicitur Isaiae XXXVIII, memento, quaeso, quomodo ambulaverim coram te in veritate et in corde perfecto. Sed qualibet virtute recte vivitur, ut patet per definitionem virtutis supra positam. Ergo veritas non est specialis virtus. Praeterea, veritas videtur idem esse simplicitati, quia utrique opponitur simulatio. Sed simplicitas non est specialis virtus, quia facit intentionem rectam, quod requiritur in omni virtute. Ergo etiam veritas non est specialis virtus. Sed contra est quia in II Ethic. connumeratur aliis virtutibus. Respondeo dicendum quod ad rationem virtutis humanae pertinet quod opus hominis bonum reddat. Unde ubi in actu hominis invenitur specialis ratio bonitatis, necesse est quod ad hoc disponatur homo per specialem virtutem. Cum autem bonum, secundum Augustinum, in libro de natura boni, consistat in ordine, necesse est specialem rationem boni considerari ex determinato ordine. Est autem specialis quidam ordo secundum quod exteriora nostra vel verba vel facta debite ordinantur ad aliquid sicut signum ad signatum. Et ad hoc perficitur homo per virtutem veritatis. Unde manifestum est quod veritas est specialis virtus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verum et bonum subiecto quidem convertuntur, quia omne verum est bonum, et omne bonum est verum. Sed secundum rationem, invicem se excedunt, sicut intellectus et voluntas invicem se includunt; nam intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et multa alia, et voluntas appetit ea quae pertinent ad intellectum, et multa alia. Unde verum, secundum rationem propriam, qua est perfectio intellectus, est quoddam particulare bonum, inquantum est appetibile quoddam. Et similiter bonum, secundum propriam rationem, prout est finis appetitus, est quoddam verum, inquantum est quoddam intelligibile. Quia ergo virtus includit rationem bonitatis, potest esse quod veritas sit specialis virtus, sicut verum est speciale bonum. Non autem potest esse quod bonitas sit specialis virtus, cum magis secundum rationem sit genus virtutis. Ad secundum dicendum quod habitus virtutum et vitiorum sortiuntur speciem ex eo quod est per se intentum, non autem ab eo quod est per accidens et praeter intentionem. Quod autem aliquis manifestat quod circa ipsum est, pertinet quidem ad virtutem veritatis sicut per se intentum, ad alias autem virtutes potest pertinere ex consequenti, praeter principalem intentionem. Fortis enim intendit fortiter agere, quod autem fortiter agendo aliquis manifestet fortitudinem quam habet, hoc consequitur praeter eius principalem intentionem. Ad tertium dicendum quod veritas vitae est veritas secundum quam aliquid est verum, non veritas secundum quam aliquis dicit verum. Dicitur autem vita vera,

Q. 109, A. 2

Obj. 3: Further, the truth of life is the truth whereby one lives aright, and of which it is written (Isa 38:3): I beseech Thee . . . remember how I have walked before Thee in truth, and with a perfect heart. Now one lives aright by any virtue, as follows from the definition of virtue given above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore truth is not a special virtue. Obj. 4: Further, truth seems to be the same as simplicity, since hypocrisy is opposed to both. But simplicity is not a special virtue, since it rectifies the intention, and that is required in every virtue. Therefore neither is truth a special virtue. On the contrary, It is numbered together with other virtues (Ethic. ii, 7). I answer that, The nature of human virtue consists in making a man’s deed good. Consequently whenever we find a special aspect of goodness in human acts, it is necessary that man be disposed thereto by a special virtue. And since according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii) good consists in order, it follows that a special aspect of good will be found where there is a special order. Now there is a special order whereby our externals, whether words or deeds, are duly ordered in relation to some thing, as sign to thing signified: and thereto man is perfected by the virtue of truth. Wherefore it is evident that truth is a special virtue. Reply Obj. 1: The true and the good are convertible as to subject, since every true thing is good, and every good thing is true. But considered logically, they exceed one another, even as the intellect and will exceed one another. For the intellect understands the will and many things besides, and the will desires things pertaining to the intellect, and many others. Wherefore the true considered in its proper aspect as a perfection of the intellect is a particular good, since it is something appetible: and in like manner the good considered in its proper aspect as the end of the appetite is something true, since it is something intelligible. Therefore since virtue includes the aspect of goodness, it is possible for truth to be a special virtue, just as the true is a special good; yet it is not possible for goodness to be a special virtue, since rather, considered logically, it is the genus of virtue. Reply Obj. 2: The habits of virtue and vice take their species from what is directly intended, and not from that which is accidental and beside the intention. Now that a man states that which concerns himself, belongs to the virtue of truth, as something directly intended: although it may belong to other virtues consequently and beside his principal intention. For the brave man intends to act bravely: and that he shows his fortitude by acting bravely is a consequence beside his principal intention. Reply Obj. 3: The truth of life is the truth whereby a thing is true, not whereby a person says what is true. Life like anything else is said to be true, from the fact that it at-

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sicut etiam quaelibet alia res, ex hoc quod attingit suam regulam et mensuram, scilicet divinam legem, per cuius conformitatem rectitudinem habet. Et talis veritas, sive rectitudo, communis est ad quamlibet virtutem. Ad quartum dicendum quod simplicitas dicitur per oppositum duplicitati, qua scilicet aliquis aliud habet in corde, aliud ostendit exterius. Et sic simplicitas ad hanc virtutem pertinet. Facit autem intentionem rectam, non quidem directe, quia hoc pertinet ad omnem virtutem, sed excludendo duplicitatem, qua homo unum praetendit et aliud intendit.

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tains its rule and measure, namely, the divine law; since rectitude of life depends on conformity to that law. This truth or rectitude is common to every virtue. Reply Obj. 4: Simplicity is so called from its opposition to duplicity, whereby, to wit, a man shows one thing outwardly while having another in his heart: so that simplicity pertains to this virtue. And it rectifies the intention, not indeed directly (since this belongs to every virtue), but by excluding duplicity, whereby a man pretends one thing and intends another.

Article 3 Whether truth is a part of justice? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit pars iustitiae. Iustitiae enim proprium esse videtur quod reddat alteri debitum. Sed ex hoc quod aliquis verum dicit, non videtur alteri debitum reddere, sicut fit in omnibus praemissis iustitiae partibus. Ergo veritas non est iustitiae pars. Praeterea, veritas pertinet ad intellectum. Iustitia autem est in voluntate, ut supra habitum est. Ergo veritas non est pars iustitiae. Praeterea, triplex distinguitur veritas, secundum Hieronymum, scilicet veritas vitae, et veritas iustitiae, et veritas doctrinae. Sed nulla istarum est pars iustitiae. Nam veritas vitae continet in se omnem virtutem, ut dictum est. Veritas autem iustitiae est idem iustitiae, unde non est pars eius. Veritas autem doctrinae pertinet magis ad virtutes intellectuales. Ergo veritas nullo modo est pars iustitiae. Sed contra est quod Tullius ponit veritatem inter partes iustitiae. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ex hoc aliqua virtus iustitiae annectitur sicut secundaria principali, quod partim quidem cum iustitia convenit, partim autem deficit ab eius perfecta ratione. Virtus autem veritatis convenit quidem cum iustitia in duobus. Uno quidem modo, in hoc quod est ad alterum. Manifestatio enim, quam diximus esse actum veritatis, est ad alterum, inquantum scilicet ea quae circa ipsum sunt, unus homo alteri manifestat. Alio modo, inquantum iustitia aequalitatem quandam in rebus constituit. Et hoc etiam facit virtus veritatis, adaequat enim signa rebus existentibus circa ipsum. Deficit autem a propria ratione iustitiae quantum ad rationem debiti. Non enim haec virtus attendit debitum legale, quod attendit iustitia, sed potius debitum morale, inquantum scilicet ex honestate unus homo alteri debet veritatis manifestationem. Unde

Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a part of justice. For it seems proper to justice to give another man his due. But, by telling the truth, one does not seem to give another man his due, as is the case in all the foregoing parts of justice. Therefore truth is not a part of justice. Obj. 2: Further, truth pertains to the intellect: whereas justice is in the will, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 4). Therefore truth is not a part of justice. Obj. 3: Further, according to Jerome truth is threefold, namely, truth of life, truth of justice, and truth of doctrine. But none of these is a part of justice. For truth of life comprises all virtues, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3): truth of justice is the same as justice, so that it is not one of its parts; and truth of doctrine belongs rather to the intellectual virtues. Therefore truth is nowise a part of justice. On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons truth among the parts of justice. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 80), a virtue is annexed to justice, as secondary to a principal virtue, through having something in common with justice, while falling short from the perfect virtue thereof. Now the virtue of truth has two things in common with justice. In the first place it is directed to another, since the manifestation, which we have stated to be an act of truth, is directed to another, inasmuch as one person manifests to another the things that concern himself. In the second place, justice sets up a certain equality between things, and this the virtue of truth does also, for it equals signs to the things which concern man himself. Nevertheless it falls short of the proper aspect of justice, as to the notion of debt: for this virtue does not regard legal debt, which justice considers, but rather the moral debt, insofar as, out of equity, one man owes another a manifestation of the truth. Therefore truth is a part of jus-

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veritas est pars iustitiae, inquantum annectitur ei sicut virtus secundaria principali. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quia homo est animal sociale, naturaliter unus homo debet alteri id sine quo societas humana conservari non posset. Non autem possent homines ad invicem convivere nisi sibi invicem crederent, tanquam sibi invicem veritatem manifestantibus. Et ideo virtus veritatis aliquo modo attendit rationem debiti. Ad secundum dicendum quod veritas secundum quod est cognita, pertinet ad intellectum. Sed homo per propriam voluntatem, per quam utitur et habitibus et membris, profert exteriora signa ad veritatem manifestandam. Et secundum hoc, manifestatio veritatis est actus voluntatis. Ad tertium dicendum quod veritas de qua nunc loquimur, differt a veritate vitae ut dictum est. Veritas autem iustitiae dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod ipsa iustitia est rectitudo quaedam regulata secundum regulam divinae legis. Et secundum hoc, differt veritas iustitiae a veritate vitae, quia veritas vitae est secundum quam aliquis recte vivit in seipso; veritas autem iustitiae est secundum quam aliquis rectitudinem legis in iudiciis, quae sunt ad alterum, servat. Et secundum hoc, veritas iustitiae non pertinet ad veritatem de qua nunc loquimur, sicut nec veritas vitae. Alio modo potest intelligi veritas iustitiae secundum quod aliquis ex iustitia veritatem manifestat, puta cum aliquis in iudicio verum confitetur aut verum testimonium dicit. Et haec veritas est quidam particularis actus iustitiae. Et non pertinet directe ad hanc veritatem de qua nunc loquimur, quia scilicet in hac manifestatione veritatis principaliter homo intendit ius suum alteri reddere. Unde philosophus, in IV Ethic., de hac veritate determinans, dicit, non de veridico in confessionibus dicimus, neque quaecumque ad iustitiam vel iniustitiam contendunt. Veritas autem doctrinae consistit in quadam manifestatione verorum de quibus est scientia. Unde nec ista veritas directe pertinet ad hanc virtutem, sed solum veritas qua aliquis et vita et sermone talem se demonstrat qualis est, et non alia quam circa ipsum sint, nec maiora nec minora. Veruntamen quia vera scibilia, inquantum sunt a nobis cognita, circa nos sunt et ad nos pertinent; secundum hoc veritas doctrinae potest ad hanc virtutem pertinere, et quaecumque alia veritas qua quis manifestat verbo vel facto quod cognoscit.

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tice, being annexed thereto as a secondary virtue to its principal. Reply Obj. 1: Since man is a social animal, one man naturally owes another whatever is necessary for the preservation of human society. Now it would be impossible for men to live together, unless they believed one another, as declaring the truth one to another. Hence the virtue of truth does, in a manner, regard something as being due. Reply Obj. 2: Truth, as known, belongs to the intellect. But man, by his own will, whereby he uses both habits and members, utters external signs in order to manifest the truth, and in this way the manifestation of the truth is an act of the will. Reply Obj. 3: The truth of which we are speaking now differs from the truth of life, as stated in the preceding A. 2, ad 3. We speak of the truth of justice in two ways. In one way we refer to the fact that justice itself is a certain rectitude regulated according to the rule of the divine law; and in this way the truth of justice differs from the truth of life, because by the truth of life a man lives aright in himself, whereas by the truth of justice a man observes the rectitude of the law in those judgments which refer to another man: and in this sense the truth of justice has nothing to do with the truth of which we speak now, as neither has the truth of life. In another way the truth of justice may be understood as referring to the fact that, out of justice, a man manifests the truth, as for instance when a man confesses the truth, or gives true evidence in a court of justice. This truth is a particular act of justice, and does not pertain directly to this truth of which we are now speaking, because, to wit, in this manifestation of the truth a man’s chief intention is to give another man his due. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) in describing this virtue: We are not speaking of one who is truthful in his agreements, nor does this apply to matters in which justice or injustice is questioned. The truth of doctrine consists in a certain manifestation of truths relating to science wherefore neither does this truth directly pertain to this virtue, but only that truth whereby a man, both in life and in speech, shows himself to be such as he is, and the things that concern him, not other, and neither greater nor less, than they are. Nevertheless since truths of science, as known by us, are something concerning us, and pertain to this virtue, in this sense the truth of doctrine may pertain to this virtue, as well as any other kind of truth whereby a man manifests, by word or deed, what he knows.

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Article 4 Whether the virtue of truth inclines rather to that which is less? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus veritatis non declinet in minus. Sicut enim aliquis dicendo maius incurrit falsitatem, ita et dicendo minus, non enim magis est falsum quatuor esse quinque quam quatuor esse tria. Sed omne falsum est secundum se malum et fugiendum, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Ergo veritatis virtus non plus declinat in minus quam in maius. Praeterea, quod una virtus magis declinet ad unum extremum quam ad aliud, contingit ex hoc quod virtutis medium est propinquius uni extremo quam alteri, sicut fortitudo est propinquior audaciae quam timiditati. Sed veritatis medium non est propinquius uni extremo quam alteri, quia veritas, cum sit aequalitas quaedam, in medio punctali consistit. Ergo veritas non magis declinat in minus. Praeterea, in minus videtur a veritate recedere qui veritatem negat, in maius autem qui veritati aliquid superaddit. Sed magis repugnat veritati qui veritatem negat quam qui superaddit, quia veritas non compatitur secum negationem veritatis, compatitur autem secum superadditionem. Ergo videtur quod veritas magis debeat declinare in maius quam in minus.

Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod homo secundum hanc virtutem magis a vero declinat in minus. Respondeo dicendum quod declinare in minus a veritate contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, affirmando, puta cum aliquis non manifestat totum bonum quod in ipso est, puta scientiam vel sanctitatem vel aliquid huiusmodi. Quod fit sine praeiudicio veritatis, quia in maiori est etiam minus. Et secundum hoc, haec virtus declinat in minus. Hoc enim, ut philosophus dicit ibidem, videtur esse prudentius, propter onerosas superabundantias esse. Homines enim qui maiora de seipsis dicunt quam sint, sunt aliis onerosi, quasi excellere alios volentes, homines autem qui minora de seipsis dicunt, gratiosi sunt, quasi aliis condescendentes per quandam moderationem. Unde apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. XII, si voluero gloriari, non ero insipiens, veritatem enim dicam. Parco autem, ne quis me existimet supra id quod videt in me, aut audit aliquid ex me. Alio modo potest aliquis declinare in minus negando, scilicet ut neget sibi inesse quod inest. Et sic non pertinet ad hanc virtutem declinare in minus, quia per hoc incurret falsum. Et tamen hoc ipsum esset minus repugnans virtuti, non quidem secundum propriam ra-

Objection 1: It seems that the virtue of truth does not incline to that which is less. For as one incurs falsehood by saying more, so does one by saying less: thus it is no more false that four are five, than that four are three. But every falsehood is in itself evil, and to be avoided, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore the virtue of truth does not incline to that which is less rather than to that which is greater. Obj. 2: Further, that a virtue inclines to the one extreme rather than to the other, is owing to the fact that the virtue’s mean is nearer to the one extreme than to the other: thus fortitude is nearer to daring than to timidity. But the mean of truth is not nearer to one extreme than to the other; because truth, since it is a kind of equality, holds to the exact mean. Therefore truth does not more incline to that which is less. Obj. 3: Further, to forsake the truth for that which is less seems to amount to a denial of the truth, since this is to subtract therefrom; and to forsake the truth for that which is greater seems to amount to an addition thereto. Now to deny the truth is more repugnant to truth than to add something to it, because truth is incompatible with the denial of truth, whereas it is compatible with addition. Therefore it seems that truth should incline to that which is greater rather than to that which is less. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that by this virtue a man declines rather from the truth towards that which is less. I answer that, There are two ways of declining from the truth to that which is less. First, by affirming, as when a man does not show the whole good that is in him, for instance science, holiness and so forth. This is done without prejudice to truth, since the lesser is contained in the greater: and in this way this virtue inclines to what is less. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), this seems to be more prudent because exaggerations give annoyance. For those who represent themselves as being greater than they are, are a source of annoyance to others, since they seem to wish to surpass others: whereas those who make less account of themselves are a source of pleasure, since they seem to defer to others by their moderation. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor 12:6): Though I should have a mind to glory, I shall not be foolish: for I will say the truth. But I forbear, lest any man should think of me above that which he seeth in me or anything he heareth from me. Second, one may incline to what is less by denying, so as to say that what is in us is not. In this way it does not belong to this virtue to incline to what is less, because this would imply falsehood. And yet this would be less repugnant to the truth, not indeed as regards the proper aspect of

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tionem veritatis, sed secundum rationem prudentiae, quam oportet salvari in omnibus virtutibus. Magis enim repugnat prudentiae, quia periculosius est et onerosius aliis, quod aliquis existimet vel iactet se habere quod non habet, quam quod non existimet, vel dicat se non habere quod habet. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.

Q. 109, A. 4

truth, but as regards the aspect of prudence, which should be safeguarded in all the virtues. For since it is fraught with greater danger and is more annoying to others, it is more repugnant to prudence to think or boast that one has what one has not, than to think or say that one has not what one has. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

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Question 110 Lying Deinde considerandum est de vitiis oppositis veritati. We must now consider the vices opposed to truth, and Et primo, de mendacio; secundo, de simulatione sive hy- (1) lying: (2) dissimulation or hypocrisy: (3) boasting and pocrisi; tertio, de iactantia et opposito vitio. Circa men- the opposite vice. Concerning lying there are four points of dacium quaeruntur quatuor. inquiry: Primo, utrum mendacium semper opponatur (1) Whether lying, as containing falsehood, is always veritati, quasi continens falsitatem. opposed to truth? Secundo, de speciebus mendacii. (2) Of the species of lying; Tertio, utrum mendacium semper sit peccatum. (3) Whether lying is always a sin? Quarto, utrum semper sit peccatum mortale. (4) Whether it is always a mortal sin?

Article 1 Whether lying is always opposed to truth? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mendacium non semper opponatur veritati. Opposita enim non possunt esse simul. Sed mendacium simul potest esse cum veritate, qui enim verum loquitur quod falsum esse credit, mentitur, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro contra mendacium. Ergo mendacium non opponitur veritati. Praeterea, virtus veritatis non solum consistit in verbis, sed etiam in factis, quia secundum philosophum, in IV Ethic., secundum hanc virtutem aliquis verum dicit et in sermone et in vita. Sed mendacium consistit solum in verbis, dicitur enim quod mendacium est falsa vocis significatio. Ergo videtur quod mendacium non directe opponatur virtuti veritatis. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro contra mendacium, quod culpa mentientis est fallendi cupiditas. Sed hoc non opponitur veritati, sed magis benevolentiae vel iustitiae. Ergo mendacium non opponitur veritati. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro contra mendacium, nemo dubitet mentiri eum qui falsum enuntiat causa fallendi. Quapropter enuntiationem falsi cum voluntate ad fallendum prolatam, manifestum est esse mendacium. Sed hoc opponitur veritati. Ergo mendacium veritati opponitur. Respondeo dicendum quod actus moralis ex duobus speciem sortitur, scilicet ex obiecto, et ex fine. Nam finis est obiectum voluntatis, quae est primum movens in moralibus actibus. Potentia autem a voluntate mota habet suum obiectum, quod est proximum obiectum voluntarii actus, et se habet in actu voluntatis ad finem sicut materiale ad formale, ut ex supra dictis patet. Dictum est autem quod virtus veritatis, et per consequens opposita vitia, in manifestatione consistit, quae fit

Objection 1: It seems that lying is not always opposed to truth. For opposites are incompatible with one another. But lying is compatible with truth, since he that speaks the truth, thinking it to be false, lies, according to Augustine (Lib. De Mendac. iii). Therefore lying is not opposed to truth. Obj. 2: Further, the virtue of truth applies not only to words but also to deeds, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) by this virtue one tells the truth both in one’s speech and in one’s life. But lying applies only to words, for Augustine says (Contra Mend. xii) that a lie is a false signification by words. Accordingly, it seems that lying is not directly opposed to the virtue of truth. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mendac. iii) that the liar’s sin is the desire to deceive. But this is not opposed to truth, but rather to benevolence or justice. Therefore lying is not opposed to truth. On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mend. x): Let no one doubt that it is a lie to tell a falsehood in order to deceive. Wherefore a false statement uttered with intent to deceive is a manifest lie. But this is opposed to truth. Therefore lying is opposed to truth. I answer that, A moral act takes its species from two things, its object, and its end: for the end is the object of the will, which is the first mover in moral acts. And the power moved by the will has its own object, which is the proximate object of the voluntary act, and stands in relation to the will’s act towards the end, as material to formal, as stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 6, 7). Now it has been said above (Q. 109, A. 1, ad 3) that the virtue of truth—and consequently the opposite vices—re-

153

Q. 110, A. 1

Justice

per aliqua signa. Quae quidem manifestatio, sive enuntiatio, est rationis actus conferentis signum ad signatum, omnis enim repraesentatio consistit in quadam collatione, quae proprie pertinet ad rationem; unde etsi bruta animalia aliquid manifestent, non tamen manifestationem intendunt, sed naturali instinctu aliquid agunt ad quod manifestatio sequitur. Inquantum tamen huiusmodi manifestatio sive enuntiatio est actus moralis, oportet quod sit voluntarius et ex intentione voluntatis dependens. Obiectum autem proprium manifestationis sive enuntiationis est verum vel falsum. Intentio vero voluntatis inordinatae potest ad duo ferri, quorum unum est ut falsum enuntietur; aliud quidem est effectus proprius falsae enuntiationis, ut scilicet aliquis fallatur. Si ergo ista tria concurrant, scilicet quod falsum sit id quod enuntiatur, et quod adsit voluntas falsum enuntiandi, et iterum intentio fallendi, tunc est falsitas materialiter, quia falsum dicitur; et formaliter, propter voluntatem falsum dicendi; et effective, propter voluntatem falsitatem imprimendi. Sed tamen ratio mendacii sumitur a formali falsitate, ex hoc scilicet quod aliquis habet voluntatem falsum enuntiandi. Unde et mendacium nominatur ex eo quod contra mentem dicitur. Et ideo si quis falsum enuntiet credens illud verum esse, est quidem falsum materialiter, sed non formaliter, quia falsitas est praeter intentionem dicentis. Unde non habet perfectam rationem mendacii, id enim quod praeter intentionem est, per accidens est; unde non potest esse specifica differentia. Si vero formaliter aliquis falsum dicat, habens voluntatem falsum dicendi, licet sit verum id quod dicitur, inquantum tamen huiusmodi actus est voluntarius et moralis, habet per se falsitatem, et per accidens veritatem. Unde ad speciem mendacii pertingit. Quod autem aliquis intendat falsitatem in opinione alterius constituere fallendo ipsum, non pertinet ad speciem mendacii, sed ad quandam perfectionem ipsius, sicut et in rebus naturalibus aliquid speciem sortitur si formam habeat, etiam si desit formae effectus; sicut patet in gravi quod violenter sursum detinetur, ne descendat secundum exigentiam suae formae. Sic ergo patet quod mendacium directe et formaliter opponitur virtuti veritatis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod unumquodque magis iudicatur secundum id quod est in eo formaliter et per se, quam secundum id quod est in eo materialiter et per accidens. Et ideo magis opponitur veritati, inquantum est virtus moralis, quod aliquis dicat verum intendens dicere falsum, quam quod dicat falsum intendens dicere verum. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in II de Doctr. Christ., voces praecipuum locum tenent inter alia signa. Et ideo cum dicitur quod mendacium est falsa vocis significatio, nomine vocis intelligi-

IIa-IIae

gards a manifestation made by certain signs: and this manifestation or statement is an act of reason comparing sign with the thing signified; because every representation consists in comparison, which is the proper act of the reason. Wherefore though dumb animals manifest something, yet they do not intend to manifest anything: but they do something by natural instinct, and a manifestation is the result. But when this manifestation or statement is a moral act, it must needs be voluntary, and dependent on the intention of the will. Now the proper object of a manifestation or statement is the true or the false. And the intention of a bad will may bear on two things: one of which is that a falsehood may be told; while the other is the proper effect of a false statement, namely, that someone may be deceived. Accordingly if these three things concur, namely, falsehood of what is said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the intention to deceive, then there is falsehood—materially, since what is said is false, formally, on account of the will to tell an untruth, and effectively, on account of the will to impart a falsehood. However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal falsehood, from the fact namely, that a person intends to say what is false; wherefore also the word mendacium (lie) is derived from its being in opposition to the mind. Consequently if one says what is false, thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not formally, because the falseness is beside the intention of the speaker so that it is not a perfect lie, since what is beside the speaker’s intention is accidental for which reason it cannot be a specific difference. If, on the other hand, one utters falsehood formally, through having the will to deceive, even if what one says be true, yet inasmuch as this is a voluntary and moral act, it contains falseness essentially and truth accidentally, and attains the specific nature of a lie. That a person intends to cause another to have a false opinion, by deceiving him, does not belong to the species of lying, but to perfection thereof, even as in the physical order, a thing acquires its species if it has its form, even though the form’s effect be lacking; for instance a heavy body which is held up aloft by force, lest it come down in accordance with the exigency of its form. Therefore it is evident that lying is directly an formally opposed to the virtue of truth. Reply Obj. 1: We judge of a thing according to what is in it formally and essentially rather than according to what is in it materially and accidentally. Hence it is more in opposition to truth, considered as a moral virtue, to tell the truth with the intention of telling a falsehood than to tell a falsehood with the intention of telling the truth. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii), words hold the chief place among other signs. And so when it is said that a lie is a false signification by words, the term words denotes every kind of sign. Wherefore if a person

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tur omne signum. Unde ille qui aliquod falsum nutibus significare intenderet, non esset a mendacio immunis. Ad tertium dicendum quod cupiditas fallendi pertinet ad perfectionem mendacii, non autem ad speciem ipsius, sicut nec aliquis effectus pertinet ad speciem suae causae.

Q. 110, A. 2

intended to signify something false by means of signs, he would not be excused from lying. Reply Obj. 3: The desire to deceive belongs to the perfection of lying, but not to its species, as neither does any effect belong to the species of its cause.

Article 2 Whether lies are sufficiently divided into officious, jocose, and mischievous lies? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod insufficienter mendacium dividatur per mendacium officiosum, iocosum et perniciosum. Divisio enim est danda secundum ea quae per se conveniunt rei, ut patet per philosophum, in VII Metaphys. Sed intentio effectus est praeter speciem actus moralis, et per accidens se habet ad illum, ut videtur, unde et infiniti effectus possunt consequi ex uno actu. Haec autem divisio datur secundum intentionem effectus, nam mendacium iocosum est quod fit causa ludi; mendacium autem officiosum, quod fit causa utilitatis; mendacium autem perniciosum, quod fit causa nocumenti. Ergo inconvenienter hoc modo dividitur mendacium. Praeterea, Augustinus, in libro contra mendacium, dividit mendacium in octo partes. Quorum primum est in doctrina religionis; secundum est ut nulli prosit et obsit alicui; tertium est quod prodest uni ita ut alteri obsit; quartum est quod fit sola mentiendi fallendique libidine; quintum est quod fit placendi cupiditate; sextum est quod nulli obest, et prodest alicui ad conservandam pecuniam; septimum est quod nulli obest, et prodest alicui ad vitandum mortem; octavum quod nulli obest, et prodest alicui ad vitandum immunditiam corporalem. Ergo videtur quod prima divisio mendacii sit insufficiens. Praeterea, philosophus, in IV Ethic., dividit mendacium in iactantiam, quae verum excedit in dicendo, et ironiam, quae deficit a vero in minus. Quae duo sub nullo praedictorum membrorum continentur. Ergo videtur quod praedicta divisio mendacii sit incompetens. Sed contra est quod super illud Psalm., perdes omnes qui loquuntur mendacium, dicit Glossa quod sunt tria genera mendaciorum. Quaedam enim sunt pro salute et commodo alicuius; est etiam aliud genus mendacii, quod fit ioco; tertium vero mendacii genus est quod fit ex malignitate. Primum autem horum dicitur officiosum; secundum, iocosum; tertium, perniciosum. Ergo mendacium in tria praedicta dividitur. Respondeo dicendum quod mendacium tripliciter dividi potest. Uno modo, secundum ipsam mendacii rationem, quae est propria et per se mendacii divisio. Et

Objection 1: It seems that lies are not sufficiently divided into officious, jocose and mischievous lies. For a division should be made according to that which pertains to a thing by reason of its nature, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vii, text. 43; De Part. Animal i, 3). But seemingly the intention of the effect resulting from a moral act is something beside and accidental to the species of that act, so that an indefinite number of effects can result from one act. Now this division is made according to the intention of the effect: for a jocose lie is told in order to make fun, an officious lie for some useful purpose, and a mischievous lie in order to injure someone. Therefore lies are unfittingly divided in this way. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (Contra Mendac. xiv) gives eight kinds of lies. The first is in religious doctrine; the second is a lie that profits no one and injures someone; the third profits one party so as to injure another; the fourth is told out of mere lust of lying and deceiving; the fifth is told out of the desire to please; the sixth injures no one, and profits someone in saving his money; the seventh injures no one and profits someone in saving him from death; the eighth injures no one, and profits someone in saving him from defilement of the body. Therefore it seems that the first division of lies is insufficient. Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) divides lying into boasting, which exceeds the truth in speech, and irony, which falls short of the truth by saying something less: and these two are not contained under any one of the kinds mentioned above. Therefore it seems that the aforesaid division of lies is inadequate. On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 5:7, Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie, says that there are three kinds of lies; for some are told for the wellbeing and convenience of someone; and there is another kind of lie that is told in fun; but the third kind of lie is told out of malice. The first of these is called an officious lie, the second a jocose lie, the third a mischievous lie. Therefore lies are divided into these three kinds. I answer that, Lies may be divided in three ways. First, with respect to their nature as lies: and this is the proper and essential division of lying. In this way, accord-

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Q. 110, A. 2

Justice

secundum hoc, mendacium in duo dividitur, scilicet in mendacium quod transcendit veritatem in maius, quod pertinet ad iactantiam; et in mendacium quod deficit a veritate in minus, quod pertinet ad ironiam; ut patet per philosophum, in IV Ethic. Haec autem divisio ideo per se est ipsius mendacii, quia mendacium, inquantum huiusmodi, opponitur veritati, ut dictum est, veritas autem aequalitas quaedam est, cui per se opponitur maius et minus. Alio modo potest dividi mendacium inquantum habet rationem culpae, secundum ea quae aggravant vel diminuunt culpam mendacii ex parte finis intenti. Aggravat autem culpam mendacii si aliquis per mendacium intendat alterius nocumentum, quod vocatur mendacium perniciosum. Diminuitur autem culpa mendacii si ordinetur ad aliquod bonum, vel delectabile et sic est mendacium iocosum; vel, utile, et sic est mendacium officiosum, sive quo intenditur iuvamentum alterius vel remotio nocumenti. Et secundum hoc, dividitur mendacium in tria praedicta. Tertio modo dividitur mendacium universalius secundum ordinem ad finem, sive ex hoc addatur vel diminuatur ad culpam mendacii, sive non. Et secundum hoc, est divisio octo membrorum quae dicta est. In qua quidem tria prima membra continentur sub mendacio pernicioso. Quod quidem fit vel contra Deum, et ad hoc pertinet primum mendacium, quod est in doctrina religionis. Vel est contra hominem, sive sola intentione nocendi alicui, et sic est secundum mendacium, quod scilicet nulli prodest et obest alicui; sive etiam intendatur in nocumento unius utilitas alterius, et hoc est tertium mendacium, quod uni prodest et alteri obest. Inter quae tria primum est gravissimum, quia semper peccata contra Deum sunt graviora, ut supra dictum est. Secundum autem est gravius tertio, quod diminuitur ex intentione utilitatis alterius. Post haec autem tria quae superaddunt ad gravitatem culpae mendacii, ponitur quartum, quod habet propriam quantitatem sine additione vel diminutione. Et hoc est mendacium quod fit ex sola mentiendi libidine, quod procedit ex habitu, unde et philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod mendax, eo quod talis est secundum habitum, ipso mendacio gaudet. Quatuor vero subsequentes modi diminuunt de culpa mendacii. Nam quintum est mendacium iocosum, quod fit placendi cupiditate. Alia vero tria continentur sub mendacio officioso. In quo intenditur quod est alteri utile vel quantum ad res exteriores, et sic est sextum mendacium, quod prodest alicui ad pecuniam conservandam; vel est utile corpori, et hoc est septimum mendacium, quo impeditur mors hominis; vel est utile etiam ad honestatem virtutis, et hoc est octavum mendacium, in quo impeditur illicita pollutio corporalis.

IIa-IIae

ing to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), lies are of two kinds, namely, the lie which goes beyond the truth, and this belongs to boasting, and the lie which stops short of the truth, and this belongs to irony. This division is an essential division of lying itself, because lying as such is opposed to truth, as stated in the preceding Article: and truth is a kind of equality, to which more and less are in essential opposition. Second, lies may be divided with respect to their nature as sins, and with regard to those things that aggravate or diminish the sin of lying, on the part of the end intended. Now the sin of lying is aggravated, if by lying a person intends to injure another, and this is called a mischievous lie, while the sin of lying is diminished if it be directed to some good—either of pleasure and then it is a jocose lie, or of usefulness, and then we have the officious lie, whereby it is intended to help another person, or to save him from being injured. In this way lies are divided into the three kinds aforesaid. Third, lies are divided in a more general way, with respect to their relation to some end, whether or not this increase or diminish their gravity: and in this way the division comprises eight kinds, as stated in the Second Objection. Here the first three kinds are contained under mischievous lies, which are either against God, and then we have the lie in religious doctrine, or against man, and this either with the sole intention of injuring him, and then it is the second kind of lie, which profits no one, and injures someone; or with the intention of injuring one and at the same time profiting another, and this is the third kind of lie, which profits one, and injures another. Of these the first is the most grievous, because sins against God are always more grievous, as stated above (I-II, Q. 73, A. 3): and the second is more grievous than the third, since the latter’s gravity is diminished by the intention of profiting another. After these three, which aggravate the sin of lying, we have a fourth, which has its own measure of gravity without addition or diminution; and this is the lie which is told out of mere lust of lying and deceiving. This proceeds from a habit, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that the liar, when he lies from habit, delights in lying. The four kinds that follow lessen the gravity of the sin of lying. For the fifth kind is the jocose lie, which is told with a desire to please: and the remaining three are comprised under the officious lie, wherein something useful to another person is intended. This usefulness regards either external things, and then we have the sixth kind of lie, which profits someone in saving his money; or his body, and this is the seventh kind, which saves a man from death; or the morality of his virtue, and this is the eighth kind, which saves him from unlawful defilement of his body.

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Patet autem quod quanto bonum intentum est melius, tanto magis minuitur culpa mendacii. Et ideo, si quis diligenter consideret, secundum ordinem praedictae enumerationis est ordo gravitatis culpae in istis mendaciis, nam bonum utile praefertur delectabili; et vita corporalis praefertur pecuniae; honestas autem etiam ipsi corporali vitae. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.

Q. 110, A. 3

Now it is evident that the greater the good intended, the more is the sin of lying diminished in gravity. Wherefore a careful consideration of the matter will show that these various kinds of lies are enumerated in their order of gravity: since the useful good is better than the pleasurable good, and life of the body than money, and virtue than the life of the body. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Article 3 Whether every lie is a sin? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omne mendacium sit peccatum. Manifestum est enim quod Evangelistae scribendo Evangelium non peccaverunt. Videntur tamen aliquid falsum dixisse, quia verba Christi, et etiam aliorum, frequenter aliter unus et aliter retulit alius; unde videtur quod alter eorum dixerit falsum. Non ergo omne mendacium est peccatum. Praeterea, nullus remuneratur a Deo pro peccato. Sed obstetrices Aegypti remuneratae sunt a Deo propter mendacium, dicitur enim Exod. I, quod aedificavit illis Deus domos. Ergo mendacium non est peccatum. Praeterea, gesta sanctorum narrantur in sacra Scriptura ad informationem vitae humanae. Sed de quibusdam sanctissimis viris legitur quod sunt mentiti, sicut legitur Gen. XII et XX quod Abraham dixit de uxore sua quod soror sua esset. Iacob etiam mentitus est dicens se Esau, tamen benedictionem adeptus est, ut habetur Gen. XXVII. Iudith etiam commendatur, quae tamen Holoferni mentita est. Non ergo omne mendacium est peccatum. Praeterea, minus malum est eligendum ut vitetur maius malum, sicut medicus praecidit membrum ne corrumpatur totum corpus. Sed minus nocumentum est quod aliquis generet falsam opinionem in animo alicuius quam quod aliquis occidat vel occidatur. Ergo licite potest homo mentiri ut unum praeservet ab homicidio, et alium praeservet a morte. Praeterea, mendacium est si quis non impleat quod promisit. Sed non omnia promissa sunt implenda, dicit enim Isidorus, in malis promissis rescinde fidem. Ergo non omne mendacium est vitandum. Praeterea, mendacium ob hoc videtur esse peccatum quia per ipsum homo decipit proximum, unde Augustinus dicit, in libro contra mendacium, quisquis esse aliquod genus mendacii quod peccatum non sit, putaverit, decipiet seipsum turpiter, cum honestum se deceptorem arbitretur aliorum. Sed non omne mendacium est deceptionis causa, quia per mendacium iocosum nullus decipitur. Non enim ad hoc dicuntur huiusmodi menda-

Objection 1: It seems that not every lie is a sin. For it is evident that the evangelists did not sin in the writing of the Gospel. Yet they seem to have told something false: since their accounts of the words of Christ and of others often differ from one another: wherefore seemingly one of them must have given an untrue account. Therefore not every lie is a sin. Obj. 2: Further, no one is rewarded by God for sin. But the midwives of Egypt were rewarded by God for a lie, for it is stated that God built them houses (Exod 1:21). Therefore a lie is not a sin. Obj. 3: Further, the deeds of holy men are related in Sacred Writ that they may be a model of human life. But we read of certain very holy men that they lied. Thus (Gen 12 and 20) we are told that Abraham said of his wife that she was his sister. Jacob also lied when he said that he was Esau, and yet he received a blessing (Gen 27:27–29). Again, Judith is commended (Jdt 15:10, 11) although she lied to Holofernes. Therefore not every lie is a sin. Obj. 4: Further, one ought to choose the lesser evil in order to avoid the greater: even so a physician cuts off a limb, lest the whole body perish. Yet less harm is done by raising a false opinion in a person’s mind, than by someone slaying or being slain. Therefore a man may lawfully lie, to save another from committing murder, or another from being killed. Obj. 5: Further, it is a lie not to fulfill what one has promised. Yet one is not bound to keep all one’s promises: for Isidore says (Synonym. ii): Break your faith when you have promised ill. Therefore not every lie is a sin. Obj. 6: Further, apparently a lie is a sin because thereby we deceive our neighbor: wherefore Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xxi): Whoever thinks that there is any kind of lie that is not a sin deceives himself shamefully, since he deems himself an honest man when he deceives others. Yet not every lie is a cause of deception, since no one is deceived by a jocose lie; seeing that lies of this kind are told, not with the intention of being believed, but merely for the sake of giving pleasure.

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cia ut credantur, sed propter delectationem solam, unde et hyperbolicae locutiones quandoque etiam in sacra Scriptura inveniuntur. Non ergo omne mendacium est peccatum. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. VII, noli velle mentiri omne mendacium. Respondeo dicendum quod illud quod est secundum se malum ex genere, nullo modo potest esse bonum et licitum, quia ad hoc quod aliquid sit bonum, requiritur quod omnia recte concurrant; bonum enim est ex integra causa, malum autem est ex singularibus defectibus, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Mendacium autem est malum ex genere. Est enim actus cadens super indebitam materiam, cum enim voces sint signa naturaliter intellectuum, innaturale est et indebitum quod aliquis voce significet id quod non habet in mente. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod mendacium est per se pravum et fugiendum, verum autem et bonum et laudabile. Unde omne mendacium est peccatum, sicut etiam Augustinus asserit, in libro contra mendacium. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nec in Evangelio, nec in aliqua Scriptura canonica fas est opinari aliquod falsum asseri, nec quod scriptores earum mendacium dixerunt, quia periret fidei certitudo, quae auctoritati sacrae Scripturae innititur. In hoc vero quod in Evangelio, et in aliis Scripturis sacris, verba aliquorum diversimode recitantur, non est mendacium. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de consensu Evangelist., nullo modo laborandum esse iudicat qui prudenter intelligit ipsas sententias esse necessarias cognoscendae veritati, quibuslibet verbis fuerint explicatae. Et in hoc apparet, ut ibidem subdit, non debere nos arbitrari mentiri quemquam si, pluribus reminiscentibus rem quam audierunt vel viderunt, non eodem modo atque eisdem verbis eadem res fuerit indicata. Ad secundum dicendum quod obstetrices non sunt remuneratae pro mendacio, sed pro timore Dei et benevolentia, ex qua processit mendacium. Unde signanter dicitur Exod. I, et quia timuerunt obstetrices Deum, aedificavit illis domos. Mendacium vero postea sequens non fuit meritorium. Ad tertium dicendum quod in sacra Scriptura, sicut Augustinus dicit, inducuntur aliquorum gesta quasi exempla perfectae virtutis, de quibus non est aestimandum eos fuisse mentitos. Si qua tamen in eorum dictis appareant quae mendacia videantur, intelligendum est ea figuraliter et prophetice dicta esse. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro contra mendacium, credendum est illos homines qui propheticis temporibus digni auctoritate fuisse commemorantur, omnia quae scripta sunt de illis prophetice gessisse atque dixisse. Abraham tamen, ut Augustinus dicit, in quaest. Genes. Dicens Saram esse suam sororem, veritatem voluit celari, non mendacium dici, soror enim dicitur quia filia fratris erat. Unde et ipse Abraham

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Hence again we find hyperbolical expressions in Holy Writ. Therefore not every lie is a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Sir 7:14): Be not willing to make any manner of lie. I answer that, An action that is naturally evil in respect of its genus can by no means be good and lawful, since in order for an action to be good it must be right in every respect: because good results from a complete cause, while evil results from any single defect, as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now a lie is evil in respect of its genus, since it is an action bearing on undue matter. For as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words something that is not in his mind. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that lying is in itself evil and to be shunned, while truthfulness is good and worthy of praise. Therefore every lie is a sin, as also Augustine declares (Contra Mend. i). Reply Obj. 1: It is unlawful to hold that any false assertion is contained either in the Gospel or in any canonical Scripture, or that the writers thereof have told untruths, because faith would be deprived of its certitude which is based on the authority of Holy Writ. That the words of certain people are variously reported in the Gospel and other sacred writings does not constitute a lie. Hence Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. ii): He that has the wit to understand that in order to know the truth it is necessary to get at the sense, will conclude that he must not be the least troubled, no matter by what words that sense is expressed. Hence it is evident, as he adds (De Consens. Evang. ii), that we must not judge that someone is lying, if several persons fail to describe in the same way and in the same words a thing which they remember to have seen or heard. Reply Obj. 2: The midwives were rewarded, not for their lie, but for their fear of God, and for their good-will, which latter led them to tell a lie. Hence it is expressly stated (Exod 2:21): And because the midwives feared God, He built them houses. But the subsequent lie was not meritorious. Reply Obj. 3: In Holy Writ, as Augustine observes (Lib. De Mend. v), the deeds of certain persons are related as examples of perfect virtue: and we must not believe that such persons were liars. If, however, any of their statements appear to be untruthful, we must understand such statements to have been figurative and prophetic. Hence Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v): We must believe that whatever is related of those who, in prophetical times, are mentioned as being worthy of credit, was done and said by them prophetically. As to Abraham when he said that Sarah was his sister, he wished to hide the truth, not to tell a lie, for she is called his sister since she was the daughter of his father, Augustine says (QQ. Super. Gen. xxvi; Contra Mend. x; Contra Faust. xxii).

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dicit, Gen. XX, vere soror mea est, filia patris mei, et non matris meae filia, quia scilicet ex parte patris ei attinebat. Iacob vero mystice dixit se esse Esau, primogenitum Isaac, quia videlicet primogenita illius de iure ei debebantur. Usus autem est hoc modo loquendi per spiritum prophetiae, ad designandum mysterium, quia videlicet minor populus, scilicet gentilium, substituendus erat in locum primogeniti, scilicet in locum Iudaeorum. Quidam vero commendantur in Scriptura non propter perfectam virtutem, sed propter quandam virtutis indolem, quia scilicet apparebat in eis aliquis laudabilis affectus, ex quo movebantur ad quaedam indebita facienda. Et hoc modo Iudith laudatur, non quia mentita est Holoferni, sed propter affectum quem habuit ad salutem populi, pro qua periculis se exposuit. Quamvis etiam dici possit quod verba eius veritatem habent secundum aliquem mysticum intellectum. Ad quartum dicendum quod mendacium non solum habet rationem peccati ex damno quod infert proximo, sed ex sua inordinatione, ut dictum est. Non licet autem aliqua illicita inordinatione uti ad impediendum nocumenta et defectus aliorum, sicut non licet furari ad hoc quod homo eleemosynam faciat (nisi forte in casu necessitatis, in quo omnia sunt communia). Et ideo non est licitum mendacium dicere ad hoc quod aliquis alium a quocumque periculo liberet. Licet tamen veritatem occultare prudenter sub aliqua dissimulatione, ut Augustinus dicit, contra mendacium. Ad quintum dicendum quod ille qui aliquid promittit, si habeat animum faciendi quod promittit, non mentitur, quia non loquitur contra id quod gerit in mente. Si vero non faciat quod promisit, tunc videtur infideliter agere per hoc quod animum mutat. Potest tamen excusari ex duobus. Uno modo, si promisit id quod est manifeste illicitum, quia promittendo peccavit, mutando autem propositum bene facit. Alio modo, si sint mutatae conditiones personarum et negotiorum. Ut enim Seneca dicit, in libro de Benefic., ad hoc quod homo teneatur facere quod promisit, requiritur quod omnia immutata permaneant, alioquin nec fuit mendax in promittendo, quia promisit quod habebat in mente, subintellectis debitis conditionibus; nec etiam est infidelis non implendo quod promisit, quia eaedem conditiones non extant. Unde et apostolus non est mentitus, qui non ivit Corinthum, quo se iturum esse promiserat, ut dicitur II Cor. I, et hoc propter impedimenta quae supervenerant. Ad sextum dicendum quod operatio aliqua potest considerari dupliciter, uno modo, secundum seipsam; alio modo, ex parte operantis. Mendacium igitur iocosum ex ipso genere operis habet rationem fallendi, quamvis ex intentione dicentis non dicatur ad fallendum, nec fallat ex modo dicendi. Nec est simile de hyperbolicis aut quibuscumque figurativis locutionibus,

Q. 110, A. 3

Wherefore Abraham himself said (Gen 20:12): She is truly my sister, the daughter of my father, and not the daughter of my mother, being related to him on his father’s side. Jacob’s assertion that he was Esau, Isaac’s first-born, was spoken in a mystical sense, because, to wit, the latter’s birthright was due to him by right: and he made use of this mode of speech being moved by the spirit of prophecy, in order to signify a mystery, namely, that the younger people, i.e., the Gentiles, should supplant the first-born, i.e., the Jews. Some, however, are commended in the Scriptures, not on account of perfect virtue, but for a certain virtuous disposition, seeing that it was owing to some praiseworthy sentiment that they were moved to do certain undue things. It is thus that Judith is praised, not for lying to Holofernes, but for her desire to save the people, to which end she exposed herself to danger. And yet one might also say that her words contain truth in some mystical sense. Reply Obj. 4: A lie is sinful not only because it injures one’s neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above in this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x). Reply Obj. 5: A man does not lie, so long as he has a mind to do what he promises, because he does not speak contrary to what he has in mind: but if he does not keep his promise, he seems to act without faith in changing his mind. He may, however, be excused for two reasons. First, if he has promised something evidently unlawful, because he sinned in promise, and did well to change his mind. Second, if circumstances have changed with regard to persons and the business in hand. For, as Seneca states (De Benef. iv), for a man to be bound to keep a promise, it is necessary for everything to remain unchanged: otherwise neither did he lie in promising—since he promised what he had in his mind, due circumstances being taken for granted—nor was he faithless in not keeping his promise, because circumstances are no longer the same. Hence the Apostle, though he did not go to Corinth, whither he had promised to go (2 Cor 1), did not lie, because obstacles had arisen which prevented him. Reply Obj. 6: An action may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, second, with regard to the agent. Accordingly a jocose lie, from the very genus of the action, is of a nature to deceive; although in the intention of the speaker it is not told to deceive, nor does it deceive by the way it is told. Nor is there any similarity in the hyperbolical or any kind of figurative expressions, with which we meet in

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quae in sacra Scriptura inveniuntur, quia, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro contra mendacium, quidquid figurate fit aut dicitur, non est mendacium. Omnis enim enuntiatio ad id quod enuntiat referenda est, omne autem figurate aut factum aut dictum hoc enuntiat quod significat eis quibus intelligendum prolatum est.

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Holy Writ: because, as Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v), it is not a lie to do or say a thing figuratively: because every statement must be referred to the thing stated: and when a thing is done or said figuratively, it states what those to whom it is tendered understand it to signify.

Article 4 Whether every lie is a mortal sin? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omne mendacium sit peccatum mortale. Dicitur enim in Psalm., perdes omnes qui loquuntur mendacium, et Sap. I, os quod mentitur occidit animam. Sed perditio et mors animae non est nisi per peccatum mortale. Ergo omne mendacium est peccatum mortale. Praeterea, omne quod est contra praeceptum Decalogi est peccatum mortale. Sed mendacium est contra hoc praeceptum Decalogi, non falsum testimonium dices. Ergo omne mendacium est peccatum mortale. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., nemo mentiens, in eo quod mentitur, servat fidem, nam hoc utique vult, ut cui mentitur fidem sibi habeat, quam tamen ei mentiendo non servat. Omnis autem fidei violator iniquus est. Nullus autem dicitur fidei violator vel iniquus propter peccatum veniale. Ergo nullum mendacium est peccatum veniale. Praeterea, merces aeterna non perditur nisi pro peccato mortali. Sed pro mendacio perditur merces aeterna, commutata in temporale, dicit enim Gregorius quod in remuneratione obstetricum cognoscitur quid mendacii culpa mereatur. Nam benignitatis earum merces, quae eis potuit in aeterna vita tribui, praemissa culpa mendacii, in terrenam est remunerationem declinata. Ergo etiam mendacium officiosum, quale fuit obstetricum, quod videtur esse levissimum, est peccatum mortale. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro contra mendacium, quod perfectorum praeceptum est omnino non solum non mentiri, sed nec velle mentiri. Sed facere contra praeceptum est peccatum mortale. Ergo omne mendacium perfectorum est peccatum mortale. Pari ergo ratione et quorumlibet aliorum, alioquin essent peioris conditionis. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in V Psalm., duo sunt genera mendaciorum in quibus non est magna culpa, sed tamen non sunt sine culpa, cum aut iocamur, aut proximo consulendo mentimur. Sed omne peccatum mortale habet gravem culpam. Ergo mendacium iocosum et officiosum non sunt peccata mortalia.

Objection 1: It seems that every lie is a mortal sin. For it is written (Ps 6:7): Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie, and (Wis 1:11): The mouth that belieth killeth the soul. Now mortal sin alone causes destruction and death of the soul. Therefore every lie is a mortal sin. Obj. 2: Further, whatever is against a precept of the decalogue is a mortal sin. Now lying is against this precept of the decalogue: Thou shalt not bear false witness. Therefore every lie is a mortal sin. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 36): Every liar breaks his faith in lying, since forsooth he wishes the person to whom he lies to have faith in him, and yet he does not keep faith with him, when he lies to him: and whoever breaks his faith is guilty of iniquity. Now no one is said to break his faith or to be guilty of iniquity, for a venial sin. Therefore no lie is a venial sin. Obj. 4: Further, the eternal reward is not lost save for a mortal sin. Now, for a lie the eternal reward was lost, being exchanged for a temporal meed. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that we learn from the reward of the midwives what the sin of lying deserves: since the reward which they deserved for their kindness, and which they might have received in eternal life, dwindled into a temporal meed on account of the lie of which they were guilty. Therefore even an officious lie, such as was that of the midwives, which seemingly is the least of lies, is a mortal sin. Obj. 5: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xvii) that it is a precept of perfection, not only not to lie at all, but not even to wish to lie. Now it is a mortal sin to act against a precept. Therefore every lie of the perfect is a mortal sin: and consequently so also is a lie told by anyone else, otherwise the perfect would be worse off than others. On the contrary, Augustine says on Ps. 5:7, Thou wilt destroy, etc.: There are two kinds of lie, that are not grievously sinful yet are not devoid of sin, when we lie either in joking, or for the sake of our neighbor’s good. But every mortal sin is grievous. Therefore jocose and officious lies are not mortal sins.

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Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum mortale proprie est quod repugnat caritati, per quam anima vivit Deo coniuncta, ut dictum est. Potest autem mendacium contrariari caritati tripliciter, uno modo, secundum se; alio modo, secundum finem intentum; tertio modo, per accidens. Secundum se quidem contrariatur caritati ex ipsa falsa significatione. Quae quidem si sit circa res divinas, contrariatur caritati Dei, cuius veritatem aliquis tali mendacio occultat vel corrumpit. Unde huiusmodi mendacium non solum opponitur virtuti veritatis, sed etiam virtuti fidei et religionis. Et ideo hoc mendacium est gravissimum, et mortale. Si vero falsa significatio sit circa aliquid cuius cognitio pertineat ad hominis bonum, puta quae pertinent ad perfectionem scientiae et informationem morum, tale mendacium, inquantum infert damnum falsae opinionis proximo, contrariatur caritati quantum ad dilectionem proximi. Unde est peccatum mortale. Si vero sit falsa opinio ex mendacio generata circa aliquid de quo non referat utrum sic vel aliter cognoscatur, tunc ex tali mendacio non damnificatur proximus, sicut si aliquis fallatur in aliquibus particularibus contingentibus ad se non pertinentibus. Unde tale mendacium secundum se non est peccatum mortale. Ratione vero finis intenti, aliquod mendacium contrariatur caritati, puta quod dicitur aut in iniuriam Dei, quod semper est peccatum mortale, utpote religioni contrarium; aut in nocumentum proximi, quantum ad personam, divitias vel famam. Et hoc etiam est peccatum mortale, cum nocere proximo sit peccatum mortale; ex sola autem intentione peccati mortalis, aliquis mortaliter peccat. Si vero finis intentus non sit contrarium caritati, nec mendacium secundum hanc rationem erit peccatum mortale, sicut apparet in mendacio iocoso, in quo intenditur aliqua levis delectatio; et in mendacio officioso, in quo intenditur etiam utilitas proximi. Per accidens autem potest contrariari caritati ratione scandali, vel cuiuscumque damni consequentis. Et sic erit etiam peccatum mortale, dum scilicet aliquis non veretur propter scandalum publice mentiri. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritates illae intelliguntur de mendacio pernicioso, ut Glossa exponit, super illud Psalm., perdes omnes qui loquuntur mendacium. Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum omnia praecepta Decalogi ordinentur ad dilectionem Dei et proximi, sicut supra dictum est, intantum mendacium est contra praeceptum Decalogi inquantum est contra dilectionem Dei et proximi. Unde signanter prohibetur contra proximum falsum testimonium. Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam peccatum veniale largo modo potest dici iniquitas, inquantum est

Q. 110, A. 4

I answer that, A mortal sin is, properly speaking, one that is contrary to charity whereby the soul lives in union with God, as stated above (Q. 24, A. 12; Q. 35, A. 3). Now a lie may be contrary to charity in three ways: first, in itself; second, in respect of the evil intended; third, accidentally. A lie may be in itself contrary to charity by reason of its false signification. For if this be about divine things, it is contrary to the charity of God, whose truth one hides or corrupts by such a lie; so that a lie of this kind is opposed not only to the virtue of charity, but also to the virtues of faith and religion: wherefore it is a most grievous and a mortal sin. If, however, the false signification be about something the knowledge of which affects a man’s good, for instance if it pertain to the perfection of science or to moral conduct, a lie of this description inflicts an injury on one’s neighbor, since it causes him to have a false opinion, wherefore it is contrary to charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, and consequently is a mortal sin. On the other hand, if the false opinion engendered by the lie be about some matter the knowledge of which is of no consequence, then the lie in question does no harm to one’s neighbor; for instance, if a person be deceived as to some contingent particulars that do not concern him. Wherefore a lie of this kind, considered in itself, is not a mortal sin. As regards the end in view, a lie may be contrary to charity, through being told with the purpose of injuring God, and this is always a mortal sin, for it is opposed to religion; or in order to injure one’s neighbor, in his person, his possessions or his good name, and this also is a mortal sin, since it is a mortal sin to injure one’s neighbor, and one sins mortally if one has merely the intention of committing a mortal sin. But if the end intended be not contrary to charity, neither will the lie, considered under this aspect, be a mortal sin, as in the case of a jocose lie, where some little pleasure is intended, or in an officious lie, where the good also of one’s neighbor is intended. Accidentally a lie may be contrary to charity by reason of scandal or any other injury resulting therefrom: and thus again it will be a mortal sin, for instance if a man were not deterred through scandal from lying publicly. Reply Obj. 1: The passages quoted refer to the mischievous lie, as a gloss explains the words of Ps. 5:7, Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie. Reply Obj. 2: Since all the precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love of God and our neighbor, as stated above (Q. 44, A. 1, ad 3; I-II, Q. 100, A. 5, ad 1), a lie is contrary to a precept of the decalogue, insofar as it is contrary to the love of God and our neighbor. Hence it is expressly forbidden to bear false witness against our neighbor. Reply Obj. 3: Even a venial sin can be called iniquity in a broad sense, insofar as it is beside the equity of justice;

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praeter aequitatem iustitiae. Unde dicitur I Ioan. III, omne peccatum est iniquitas. Et hoc modo loquitur Augustinus. Ad quartum dicendum quod mendacium obstetricum potest dupliciter considerari. Uno modo, quantum ad effectum benevolentiae in Iudaeos, et quantum ad reverentiam divini timoris, ex quibus commendatur in eis indoles virtutis. Et sic debetur eis remuneratio aeterna. Unde Hieronymus exponit quod Deus aedificavit illis domos spirituales. Alio modo potest considerari quantum ad ipsum exteriorem actum mendacii. Quo quidem non potuerunt aeternam remunerationem mereri, sed forte aliquam remunerationem temporalem, cuius merito non repugnabat deformitas illius mendacii, sicut repugnabat merito remunerationis aeternae. Et sic intelligenda sunt verba Gregorii, non quod per illud mendacium mererentur amittere remunerationem aeternam quam iam ex praecedenti affectu meruerant, sicut ratio procedebat. Ad quintum dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod perfectis viris omne mendacium est peccatum mortale. Sed hoc irrationabiliter dicitur. Nulla enim circumstantia aggravat in infinitum nisi quae transfert in aliam speciem. Circumstantia autem personae non trahit in aliam speciem, nisi forte ratione alicuius annexi, puta si sit contra votum ipsius; quod non potest dici de mendacio officioso vel iocoso. Et ideo mendacium officiosum vel iocosum non est peccatum mortale in viris perfectis, nisi forte per accidens, ratione scandali. Et ad hoc potest referri quod Augustinus dicit, perfectis esse praeceptum non solum non mentiri, sed nec velle mentiri. Quamvis hoc Augustinus non assertive, sed sub dubitatione dicat, praemittit enim, nisi forte ita ut perfectorum et cetera. Nec obstat quod ipsi ponuntur in statu conservandae veritatis qui ad veritatem tenentur ex suo officio in iudicio vel doctrina. Contra quae si mentiantur, erit mendacium quod est peccatum mortale. In aliis autem non oportet quod mortaliter peccent mentiendo.

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wherefore it is written (1 John 3:4): Every sin is iniquity. It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking. Reply Obj. 4: The lie of the midwives may be considered in two ways. First as regards their feeling of kindliness towards the Jews, and their reverence and fear of God, for which their virtuous disposition is commended. For this an eternal reward is due. Wherefore Jerome explains that God built them spiritual houses. Second, it may be considered with regard to the external act of lying. For thereby they could merit, not indeed eternal reward, but perhaps some temporal meed, the deserving of which was not inconsistent with the deformity of their lie, though this was inconsistent with their meriting an eternal reward. It is in this sense that we must understand the words of Gregory, and not that they merited by that lie to lose the eternal reward as though they had already merited it by their preceding kindliness, as the objection understands the words to mean. Reply Obj. 5: Some say that for the perfect every lie is a mortal sin. But this assertion is unreasonable. For no circumstance causes a sin to be infinitely more grievous unless it transfers it to another species. Now a circumstance of person does not transfer a sin to another species, except perhaps by reason of something annexed to that person, for instance if it be against his vow: and this cannot apply to an officious or jocose lie. Wherefore an officious or a jocose lie is not a mortal sin in perfect men, except perhaps accidentally on account of scandal. We may take in this sense the saying of Augustine that it is a precept of perfection not only not to lie at all, but not even to wish to lie: although Augustine says this not positively but dubiously, for he begins by saying: Unless perhaps it is a precept, etc. Nor does it matter that they are placed in a position to safeguard the truth: because they are bound to safeguard the truth by virtue of their office in judging or teaching, and if they lie in these matters their lie will be a mortal sin: but it does not follow that they sin mortally when they lie in other matters.

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Question 111 Dissimulation and Hypocrisy Deinde considerandum est de simulatione et hypoIn due sequence we must consider dissimulation and crisi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. hypocrisy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum omnis simulatio sit peccatum. (1) Whether all dissimulation is a sin? Secundo, utrum hypocrisis sit simulatio. (2) Whether hypocrisy is dissimulation? Tertio, utrum opponatur veritati. (3) Whether it is opposed to truth? Quarto, utrum sit peccatum mortale. (4) Whether it is a mortal sin?

Article 1 Whether all dissimulation is a sin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnis simulatio sit peccatum. Dicitur enim Luc. ult., quod dominus se finxit longius ire. Et Ambrosius dicit de Abraham, in libro de patriarchis, quod captiose loquebatur cum servulis cum dixit, Gen. XXII, ego et puer, illuc usque properantes, postquam adoraverimus, revertemur ad vos. Fingere autem et captiose loqui ad simulationem pertinet. Non est autem dicendum quod in Christo et in Abraham fuerit peccatum. Ergo non omnis simulatio est peccatum. Praeterea, nullum peccatum est utile. Sed sicut Hieronymus dicit, utilem simulationem, et in tempore assumendam, Iehu, regis Israel, nos doceat exemplum, qui interfecit sacerdotes Baal fingens se idola colere velle, ut habetur IV Reg. X. Et David immutavit faciem suam coram Achis, rege Geth, ut habetur I Reg. XXI. Ergo non omnis simulatio est peccatum.

Objection 1: It seems that not all dissimulation is a sin. For it is written (Luke 24:28) that our Lord pretended he would go farther; and Ambrose in his book on the Patriarchs (De Abraham i) says of Abraham that he spoke craftily to his servants, when he said (Gen 22:5): I and the boy will go with speed as far as yonder, and after we have worshipped, will return to you. Now to pretend and to speak craftily savor of dissimulation: and yet it is not to be said that there was sin in Christ or Abraham. Therefore not all dissimulation is a sin. Obj. 2: Further, no sin is profitable. But according to Jerome, in his commentary on Gal. 2:11, When Peter was come to Antioch:—The example of Jehu, king of Israel, who slew the priest of Baal, pretending that he desired to worship idols, should teach us that dissimulation is useful and sometimes to be employed; and David changed his countenance before Achis, king of Geth (1 Kgs 21:13). Therefore not all dissimulation is a sin. Obj. 3: Further, good is contrary to evil. Therefore if it is evil to simulate good, it is good to simulate evil. Obj. 4: Further, it is written in condemnation of certain people (Isa 3:9): They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid it. Now it pertains to dissimulation to hide one’s sin. Therefore it is reprehensible sometimes not to simulate. But it is never reprehensible to avoid sin. Therefore dissimulation is not a sin. On the contrary, A gloss on Isa. 16:14, In three years, etc., says: Of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate holiness. But to sin openly is always a sin. Therefore dissimulation is always a sin.

Praeterea, bonum malo est contrarium. Si ergo simulare bonum est malum, simulare malum erit bonum. Praeterea, Isaiae III, contra quosdam dicitur, peccatum suum quasi Sodoma praedicaverunt, nec absconderunt. Sed abscondere peccatum ad simulationem pertinet. Ergo non uti simulatione interdum est reprehensibile. Vitare autem peccatum nunquam est reprehensibile. Ergo simulatio non semper est peccatum. Sed contra est quod Isaiae XVI, super illud, in tribus annis etc., dicit Glossa, in comparatione duorum malorum, levius est aperte peccare quam sanctitatem simulare. Sed aperte peccare semper est peccatum. Ergo simulatio semper est peccatum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad I answer that, As stated above (Q. 109, A. 3; Q. 110, virtutem veritatis pertinet ut aliquis talem se exhibeat A. 1), it belongs to the virtue of truth to show oneself outexterius per signa exteriora qualis est. Signa autem ex- wardly by outward signs to be such as one is. Now outward teriora non solum sunt verba, sed etiam facta. Sicut ergo signs are not only words, but also deeds. Accordingly just

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veritati opponitur quod aliquis per verba exteriora aliud significet quam quod habet apud se, quod ad mendacium pertinet; ita etiam veritati opponitur quod aliquis per aliqua signa factorum vel rerum aliquid de se significet contrarium eius quod in eo est, quod proprie simulatio dicitur. Unde simulatio proprie est mendacium quoddam in exteriorum signis factorum consistens. Non refert autem utrum aliquis mentiatur verbo, vel quocumque alio facto, ut supra dictum est. Unde, cum omne mendacium sit peccatum, ut supra habitum est, consequens est etiam quod omnis simulatio est peccatum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de quaest. Evang., non omne quod fingimus mendacium est. Sed quando id fingimus quod nihil significat, tunc est mendacium, cum autem fictio nostra refertur ad aliquam significationem, non est mendacium, sed aliqua figura veritatis. Et subiungit exemplum de figurativis locutionibus, in quibus fingitur quaedam res non ut asseratur ita esse, sed eam proponimus ut figuram alterius quod asserere volumus. Sic igitur dominus se finxit longius ire, quia composuit motum suum quasi volentis longius ire, ad aliquid figurate significandum, scilicet quod ipse ab eorum fide longe erat, ut Gregorius dicit; vel, ut Augustinus dicit, quia, cum longius recessurus esset ascendendo in caelum, per hospitalitatem quodammodo retinebatur in terra. Abraham etiam figurate locutus est. Unde Ambrosius dicit de Abraham quod prophetavit quod ignorabat. Ipse enim solus disponebat redire, immolato filio, sed dominus per os eius locutus est quod parabat. Unde patet quod neuter simulavit. Ad secundum dicendum quod Hieronymus large utitur nomine simulationis pro quacumque fictione. Commutatio autem faciei David fuit fictio figuralis, sicut Glossa exponit in titulo illius Psalmi, benedicam dominum in omni tempore. Simulationem vero Iehu non est necesse excusari a peccato vel mendacio, quia malus fuit, utpote ab idololatria Ieroboam non recedens. Commendatur tamen et temporaliter remuneratur a Deo, non pro simulatione, sed pro zelo quo destruxit cultum Baal. Ad tertium dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod nullus potest se simulare esse malum, quia per opera bona nullus se simulat malum; si autem opera mala faciat, malus est. Sed haec ratio non cogit. Potest enim aliquis se simulare malum per opera quae in se non sunt mala, sed habent quandam speciem mali. Et tamen ipsa simulatio est mala, tum ratione mendacii; tum ratione scandali. Et quamvis per hoc fiat malus, non tamen fit malus illa malitia quam simulat. Et quia ipsa simulatio secundum se mala est, non ratione eius de quo est; sive sit de bono sive de malo, peccatum est. Ad quartum dicendum quod sicut aliquis verbo mentitur quando significat quod non est, non autem

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as it is contrary to truth to signify by words something different from that which is in one’s mind, so also is it contrary to truth to employ signs of deeds or things to signify the contrary of what is in oneself, and this is what is properly denoted by dissimulation. Consequently dissimulation is properly a lie told by the signs of outward deeds. Now it matters not whether one lie in word or in any other way, as stated above (Q. 110, A. 1, Obj. 2). Wherefore, since every lie is a sin, as stated above (Q. 110, A. 3), it follows that also all dissimulation is a sin. Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii), To pretend is not always a lie: but only when the pretense has no signification, then it is a lie. When, however, our pretense refers to some signification, there is no lie, but a representation of the truth. And he cites figures of speech as an example, where a thing is pretended, for we do not mean it to be taken literally but as a figure of something else that we wish to say. In this way our Lord pretended He would go farther, because He acted as if wishing to go farther; in order to signify something figuratively either because He was far from their faith, according to Gregory (Hom. xxiii in Ev.); or, as Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii), because, as He was about to go farther away from them by ascending into heaven, He was, so to speak, held back on earth by their hospitality. Abraham also spoke figuratively. Wherefore Ambrose (De Abraham i) says that Abraham foretold what he knew not: for he intended to return alone after sacrificing his son: but by his mouth the Lord expressed what He was about to do. It is evident therefore that neither dissembled. Reply Obj. 2: Jerome employs the term simulation in a broad sense for any kind of pretense. David’s change of countenance was a figurative pretense, as a gloss observes in commenting on the title of Ps. 33, I will bless the Lord at all times. There is no need to excuse Jehu’s dissimulation from sin or lie, because he was a wicked man, since he departed not from the idolatry of Jeroboam (4 Kgs 10:29, 31). And yet he is praised withal and received an earthly reward from God, not for his dissimulation, but for his zeal in destroying the worship of Baal. Reply Obj. 3: Some say that no one may pretend to be wicked, because no one pretends to be wicked by doing good deeds, and if he do evil deeds, he is evil. But this argument proves nothing. Because a man might pretend to be evil, by doing what is not evil in itself but has some appearance of evil: and nevertheless this dissimulation is evil, both because it is a lie, and because it gives scandal; and although he is wicked on this account, yet his wickedness is not the wickedness he simulates. And because dissimulation is evil in itself, its sinfulness is not derived from the thing simulated, whether this be good or evil. Reply Obj. 4: Just as a man lies when he signifies by word that which he is not, yet lies not when he refrains

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quando tacet quod est, quod aliquando licet; ita etiam simulatio est quando aliquis per exteriora signa factorum vel rerum significat aliquid quod non est, non autem si aliquis praetermittat significare quod est. Unde aliquis potest peccatum suum occultare absque simulatione. Et secundum hoc intelligendum est quod Hieronymus dicit ibidem, quod secundum remedium post naufragium est peccatum abscondere, ne scilicet exinde aliis scandalum generetur.

Q. 111, A. 2

from saying what he is, for this is sometimes lawful; so also does a man dissemble, when by outward signs of deeds or things he signifies that which he is not, yet he dissembles not if he omits to signify what he is. Hence one may hide one’s sin without being guilty of dissimulation. It is thus that we must understand the saying of Jerome on the words of Isa. 3:9, that the second remedy after shipwreck is to hide one’s sin, lest, to wit, others be scandalized thereby.

Article 2 Whether hypocrisy is the same as dissimulation? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod hypocrisis non sit idem quod simulatio. Simulatio enim consistit in quodam factorum mendacio. Sed hypocrisis potest esse etiam si aliquis ostendat exterius quae interius agit, secundum illud Matth. VI, cum facis eleemosynam, noli tuba canere ante te, sicut hypocritae faciunt. Ergo hypocrisis non est idem simulationi. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, XXXI Moral., sunt nonnulli qui et sanctitatis habitum tenent, et perfectionis meritum exequi non valent. Hos nequaquam credendum est in hypocritarum numerum currere, quia aliud est infirmitate, aliud malitia peccare. Sed illi qui tenent habitum sanctitatis et meritum perfectionis non exequuntur, sunt simulatores, quia exterior habitus sanctitatis opera perfectionis significat. Non ergo simulatio est idem quod hypocrisis. Praeterea, hypocrisis in sola intentione consistit, dicit enim dominus de hypocritis, Matth. XXIII, quod omnia opera sua faciunt ut ab hominibus videantur; et Gregorius dicit, XXXI Moral., quod nunquam quid agant, sed quomodo de actione qualibet hominibus possint placere, considerant. Sed simulatio non consistit in sola intentione, sed in exteriori operatione, unde super illud Iob XXXVI, simulatores et callidi provocant iram Dei, dicit Glossa quod simulator aliud simulat, aliud agit, castitatem praefert, et lasciviam sequitur; ostentat paupertatem, et marsupium replet. Ergo hypocrisis non est idem quod simulatio. Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., hypocrita Graeco sermone in Latino simulator interpretatur, qui, dum intus malus sit, bonum se palam ostendit, hypo enim falsum, crisis iudicium interpretatur. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Isidorus dicit, ibidem, nomen hypocritae tractum est a specie eorum qui in spectaculis contecta facie incedunt, distinguentes vultum vario colore ut ad personae quam simulant colorem perveniant, modo in specie viri, modo in specie feminae, ut in ludis populum fallant. Unde Augustinus dicit, in li-

Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation. For dissimulation consists in lying by deeds. But there may be hypocrisy in showing outwardly what one does inwardly, according to Matt. 6:2, When thou dost an alms-deed sound not a trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do. Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7): Some there are who wear the habit of holiness, yet are unable to attain the merit of perfection. We must by no means deem these to have joined the ranks of the hypocrites, since it is one thing to sin from weakness, and another to sin from malice. Now those who wear the habit of holiness, without attaining the merit of perfection, are dissemblers, since the outward habit signifies works of perfection. Therefore dissimulation is not the same as hypocrisy. Obj. 3: Further, hypocrisy consists in the mere intention. For our Lord says of hypocrites (Matt 23:5) that all their works they do for to be seen of men: and Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that they never consider what it is that they do, but how by their every action they may please men. But dissimulation consists, not in the mere intention, but in the outward action: wherefore a gloss on Job 36:13, Dissemblers and crafty men prove the wrath of God, says that the dissembler simulates one thing and does another: he pretends chastity, and delights in lewdness, he makes a show of poverty and fills his purse. Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation. On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): ‘Hypocrite’ is a Greek word corresponding to the Latin ‘simulator,’ for whereas he is evil within, he shows himself outwardly as being good; hypo denoting falsehood, and krisis, judgment. I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x), the word hypocrite is derived from the appearance of those who come on to the stage with a disguised face, by changing the color of their complexion, so as to imitate the complexion of the person they simulate, at one time under the guise of a man, at another under the guise of a woman, so as to deceive the peo-

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bro de Serm. Dom. in monte, quod sicut hypocritae simulatores personarum aliarum, agunt partes illius quod non sunt (non enim qui agit partes Agamemnonis, vere ipse est, sed simulat eum); sic in Ecclesiis et in omni vita humana quisquis se vult videri quod non est, hypocrita est, simulat enim se iustum, non exhibet. Sic dicendum est quod hypocrisis simulatio est, non autem omnis simulatio, sed solum illa qua quis simulat personam alterius; sicut cum peccator simulat personam iusti. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod opus exterius naturaliter significat intentionem. Quando ergo aliquis per bona opera quae facit, ex suo genere ad Dei servitium pertinentia, non quaerit Deo placere, sed hominibus, simulat rectam intentionem, quam non habet. Unde Gregorius dicit, XXXI Moral., quod hypocritae per causas Dei intentioni deserviunt saeculi, quia per ipsa quoque quae se agere sancta ostendunt, non conversionem quaerunt hominum, sed auras favorum. Et ita simulant mendaciter intentionem rectam, quam non habent, quamvis non simulent aliquod rectum opus quod non agant. Ad secundum dicendum quod habitus sanctitatis, puta religionis vel clericatus, significat statum quo quis obligatur ad opera perfectionis. Et ideo cum quis habitum sanctitatis assumit intendens se ad statum perfectionis transferre, si per infirmitatem deficiat, non est simulator vel hypocrita, quia non tenetur manifestare suum peccatum sanctitatis habitum deponendo. Si autem ad hoc sanctitatis habitum assumeret ut se iustum ostentaret, esset hypocrita et simulator. Ad tertium dicendum quod in simulatione, sicut in mendacio, duo sunt, unum quidem sicut signum, et aliud sicut signatum. Mala ergo intentio in hypocrisi consideratur sicut signatum, quod non respondet signo. Exteriora autem vel verba vel opera, vel quaecumque sensibilia, considerantur in omni simulatione et mendacio sicut signa.

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ple in their acting. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. ii) that just as hypocrites by simulating other persons act the parts of those they are not (since he that acts the part of Agamemnon is not that man himself but pretends to be), so too in the Church and in every department of human life, whoever wishes to seem what he is not is a hypocrite: for he pretends to be just without being so in reality. We must conclude, therefore, that hypocrisy is dissimulation, not, however, any form of dissimulation, but only when one person simulates another, as when a sinner simulates the person of a just man. Reply Obj. 1: The outward deed is a natural sign of the intention. Accordingly when a man does good works pertaining by their genus to the service of God, and seeks by their means to please, not God but man, he simulates a right intention which he has not. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral.) that hypocrites make God’s interests subservient to worldly purposes, since by making a show of saintly conduct they seek, not to turn men to God, but to draw to themselves the applause of their approval: and so they make a lying pretense of having a good intention, which they have not, although they do not pretend to do a good deed without doing it. Reply Obj. 2: The habit of holiness, for instance the religious or the clerical habit, signifies a state whereby one is bound to perform works of perfection. And so when a man puts on the habit of holiness, with the intention of entering the state of perfection, if he fail through weakness, he is not a dissembler or a hypocrite, because he is not bound to disclose his sin by laying aside the habit of holiness. If, however, he were to put on the habit of holiness in order to make a show of righteousness, he would be a hypocrite and a dissembler. Reply Obj. 3: In dissimulation, as in a lie, there are two things: one by way of sign, the other by way of thing signified. Accordingly the evil intention in hypocrisy is considered as a thing signified, which does not tally with the sign: and the outward words, or deeds, or any sensible objects are considered in every dissimulation and lie as a sign.

Article 3 Whether hypocrisy is contrary to the virtue of truth? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod hypocrisis non opponatur virtuti veritatis. In simulatione enim sive hypocrisi est signum et signatum. Sed quantum ad utrumque, non videtur opponi alicui speciali virtuti, hypocrita enim simulat quamcumque virtutem; et etiam per quaecumque virtutis opera, puta per ieiunium,

Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is not contrary to the virtue of truth. For in dissimulation or hypocrisy there is a sign and a thing signified. Now with regard to neither of these does it seem to be opposed to any special virtue: for a hypocrite simulates any virtue, and by means of any virtuous deeds, such as fasting, prayer and alms deeds, as

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orationem et eleemosynam, ut habetur Matth. VI. Ergo hypocrisis non opponitur specialiter virtuti veritatis. Praeterea, omnis simulatio ex aliquo dolo procedere videtur, unde et simplicitati opponitur. Dolus autem opponitur prudentiae, ut supra habitum est. Ergo hypocrisis, quae est simulatio. Non opponitur veritati, sed magis prudentiae vel simplicitati. Praeterea, species moralium considerantur ex fine. Sed finis hypocrisis est acquisitio lucri vel inanis gloriae, unde super illud Iob XXVII, quae est spes hypocritae, si avare rapiat etc., dicit Glossa, hypocrita, qui Latine dicitur simulator, avarus raptor est, qui dum inique agens desiderat de sanctitate venerari, laudem vitae rapit alienae. Cum ergo avaritia, vel inanis gloria, non directe opponatur veritati, videtur quod nec simulatio sive hypocrisis. Sed contra est quia omnis simulatio est mendacium quoddam, ut dictum est. Mendacium autem directe opponitur veritati. Ergo et simulatio sive hypocrisis. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in X Metaphys., contrarietas est oppositio secundum formam, a qua scilicet res speciem habet. Et ideo dicendum est quod simulatio sive hypocrisis potest opponi alicui virtuti dupliciter, uno modo, directe; et alio modo, indirecte. Directa quidem oppositio eius sive contrarietas est attendenda secundum ipsam speciem actus, quae accipitur secundum proprium obiectum. Unde cum hypocrisis sit quaedam simulatio qua quis simulat se habere personam quam non habet, ut dictum est, consequens est quod directe opponatur veritati, per quam aliquis exhibet se talem vita et sermone qualis est, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Indirecta autem oppositio vel contrarietas hypocrisis potest attendi secundum quodcumque accidens, puta secundum aliquem finem remotum, vel secundum aliquod instrumentum actus, vel quodcumque aliud huiusmodi. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hypocrita simulans aliquam virtutem, assumit eam ut finem non quidem secundum existentiam, quasi volens eam habere; sed secundum apparentiam, quasi volens videri eam habere. Ex quo non habet quod opponatur illi virtuti, sed quod opponatur veritati, inquantum vult decipere homines circa illam virtutem. Opera autem illius virtutis non assumit quasi per se intenta, sed instrumentaliter, quasi signa illius virtutis. Unde ex hoc non habet directam oppositionem ad illam virtutem. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, prudentiae directe opponitur astutia, ad quam pertinet adinvenire quasdam vias apparentes et non existentes ad propositum consequendum. Executio autem astutiae est proprie per dolum in verbis, per fraudem autem in factis. Et sicut astutia se habet ad prudentiam, ita do-

Q. 111, A. 3

stated in Matt. 6:1–18. Therefore hypocrisy is not specially opposed to the virtue of truth. Obj. 2: Further, all dissimulation seems to proceed from guile, wherefore it is opposed to simplicity. Now guile is opposed to prudence as above stated (Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore, hypocrisy which is dissimulation is not opposed to truth, but rather to prudence or simplicity. Obj. 3: Further, the species of moral acts is taken from their end. Now the end of hypocrisy is the acquisition of gain or vainglory: wherefore a gloss on Job 27:8, What is the hope of the hypocrite, if through covetousness he take by violence, says: A hypocrite or, as the Latin has it, a dissimulator, is a covetous thief: for through desire of being honored for holiness, though guilty of wickedness, he steals praise for a life which is not his. Therefore since covetousness or vainglory is not directly opposed to truth, it seems that neither is hypocrisy or dissimulation. On the contrary, All dissimulation is a lie, as stated above (A. 1). Now a lie is directly opposed to truth. Therefore dissimulation or hypocrisy is also. I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. text. 13, 24, x), contrariety is opposition as regards form, i.e., the specific form. Accordingly we must reply that dissimulation or hypocrisy may be opposed to a virtue in two ways, in one way directly, in another way indirectly. Its direct opposition or contrariety is to be considered with regard to the very species of the act, and this species depends on that act’s proper object. Wherefore since hypocrisy is a kind of dissimulation, whereby a man simulates a character which is not his, as stated in the preceding article, it follows that it is directly opposed to truth whereby a man shows himself in life and speech to be what he is, as stated in Ethic. iv, 7. The indirect opposition or contrariety of hypocrisy may be considered in relation to any accident, for instance a remote end, or an instrument of action, or anything else of that kind. Reply Obj. 1: The hypocrite in simulating a virtue regards it as his end, not in respect of its existence, as though he wished to have it, but in respect of appearance, since he wishes to seem to have it. Hence his hypocrisy is not opposed to that virtue, but to truth, inasmuch as he wishes to deceive men with regard to that virtue. And he performs acts of that virtue, not as intending them for their own sake, but instrumentally, as signs of that virtue, wherefore his hypocrisy has not, on that account, a direct opposition to that virtue. Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 55, AA. 3, 4, 5), the vice directly opposed to prudence is cunning, to which it belongs to discover ways of achieving a purpose, that are apparent and not real: while it accomplishes that purpose, by guile in words, and by fraud in deeds: and it stands in relation to prudence, as guile and fraud to simplicity. Now

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lus et fraus ad simplicitatem. Dolus autem vel fraus ordinatur ad decipiendum principaliter, et quandoque secundario ad nocendum. Unde ad simplicitatem pertinet directe se praeservare a deceptione. Et secundum hoc, ut supra dictum est, virtus simplicitatis est eadem virtuti veritatis, sed differt sola ratione, quia veritas dicitur secundum quod signa concordant signatis; simplicitas autem dicitur secundum quod non tendit in diversa, ut scilicet aliud intendat interius, aliud praetendat exterius.

guile and fraud are directed chiefly to deception, and sometimes secondarily to injury. Wherefore it belongs directly to simplicity to guard oneself from deception, and in this way the virtue of simplicity is the same as the virtue of truth as stated above (Q. 109, A. 2, ad 4). There is, however, a mere logical difference between them, because by truth we mean the concordance between sign and thing signified, while simplicity indicates that one does not tend to different things, by intending one thing inwardly, and pretending another outwardly. Ad tertium dicendum quod lucrum vel gloria est Reply Obj. 3: Gain or glory is the remote end of the finis remotus simulatoris, sicut et mendacis. Unde ex hoc dissembler as also of the liar. Hence it does not take its fine speciem non sortitur, sed ex fine proximo, qui est species from this end, but from the proximate end, which ostendere se alium quam sit. Unde quandoque contin- is to show oneself other than one is. Wherefore it somegit quod aliquis fingit de se magna, nullius alterius gratia, times happens to a man to pretend great things of himself, sed sola libidine simulandi, sicut philosophus dicit, in IV for no further purpose than the mere lust of hypocrisy, as Ethic., et sicut etiam supra de mendacio dictum est. the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), and as also we have said above with regard to lying (Q. 110, A. 2).

Article 4 Whether hypocrisy is always a mortal sin? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod hypocrisis semper sit peccatum mortale. Dicit enim Hieronymus, Isaiae XVI, in Glossa, quod in comparatione duorum malorum, levius est aperte peccare quam sanctitatem simulare. Et super illud Iob I, sicut autem domino placuit etc., dicit Glossa quod simulata aequitas non est aequitas, sed duplicatum peccatum. Et super illud Thren. IV, maior effecta est iniquitas populi mei peccato Sodomorum, dicit Glossa, scelera animae planguntur quae in hypocrisim labitur, cuius maior est iniquitas peccato Sodomorum. Peccata autem Sodomorum sunt peccata mortalia. Ergo et hypocrisis semper est peccatum mortale. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, XXXI Moral., quod hypocritae ex malitia peccant. Sed hoc est gravissimum, quod pertinet ad peccatum in spiritum sanctum. Ergo hypocrita semper mortaliter peccat. Praeterea, nullus meretur iram Dei et exclusionem a Dei visione nisi propter peccatum mortale. Sed per hypocrisim aliquis meretur iram Dei, secundum illud Iob XXXVI, simulatores et callidi provocant iram Dei. Excluditur etiam hypocrita a visione Dei, secundum illud Iob XIII, non veniet in conspectu eius omnis hypocrita. Ergo hypocrisis semper est peccatum mortale. Sed contra est quia hypocrisis est mendacium operis, cum sit simulatio quaedam. Non autem omne mendacium oris est peccatum mortale. Ergo nec omnis hypocrisis.

Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is always a mortal sin. For Jerome says on Isa. 16:14: Of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate holiness: and a gloss on Job 1:21, As it hath pleased the Lord, etc., says that pretended justice is no justice, but a twofold sin: and again a gloss on Lam. 4:6, The iniquity . . . of my people is made greater than the sin of Sodom, says: He deplores the sins of the soul that falls into hypocrisy, which is a greater iniquity than the sin of Sodom. Now the sins of Sodom are mortal sin. Therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 8) that hypocrites sin out of malice. But this is most grievous, for it pertains to the sin against the Holy Spirit. Therefore a hypocrite always sins mortally. Obj. 3: Further, no one deserves the anger of God and exclusion from seeing God, save on account of mortal sin. Now the anger of God is deserved through hypocrisy according to Job 36:13, Dissemblers and crafty men prove the wrath of God: and the hypocrite is excluded from seeing God, according to Job 13:16, No hypocrite shall come before His presence. Therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin. On the contrary, Hypocrisy is lying by deed since it is a kind of dissimulation. But it is not always a mortal sin to lie by deed. Neither therefore is all hypocrisy a mortal sin.

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Praeterea, intentio hypocritae est ad hoc quod videatur bonus. Sed hoc non opponitur caritati. Ergo hypocrisis non est secundum se peccatum mortale. Praeterea, hypocrisis nascitur ex inani gloria, ut Gregorius dicit, XXXI Moral. Sed inanis gloria non semper est peccatum mortale. Ergo neque hypocrisis. Respondeo dicendum quod in hypocrisi duo sunt, scilicet defectus sanctitatis, et simulatio ipsius. Si ergo hypocrita dicatur ille cuius intentio fertur ad utrumque, ut scilicet aliquis non curet sanctitatem habere, sed solum sanctus apparere, sicut consuevit accipi in sacra Scriptura, sic manifestum est quod est peccatum mortale. Nullus enim privatur totaliter sanctitate nisi per peccatum mortale. Si autem dicatur hypocrita ille qui intendit simulare sanctitatem, a qua deficit per peccatum mortale, tunc, quamvis sit in peccato mortali, ex quo privatur sanctitate; non tamen semper ipsa simulatio est ei in peccatum mortale, sed quandoque veniale. Quod discernendum est ex fine. Qui si repugnat caritati Dei vel proximi, erit peccatum mortale, puta cum simulat sanctitatem ut falsam doctrinam disseminet, vel ut adipiscatur ecclesiasticam dignitatem indignus, vel quaecumque alia temporalia bona in quibus finem constituit. Si vero finis intentus non repugnet caritati, erit peccatum veniale, puta cum aliquis in ipsa fictione delectatur, de quo philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod magis videtur vanus quam malus. Eadem enim ratio est de mendacio et simulatione. Contingit tamen quandoque quod aliquis simulat perfectionem sanctitatis, quae non est de necessitate salutis. Et talis simulatio nec semper est peccatum mortale, nec semper est cum peccato mortali. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.

Q. 111, A. 4

Further, the intention of a hypocrite is to appear to be good. But this is not contrary to charity. Therefore hypocrisy is not of itself a mortal sin. Further, hypocrisy is born of vainglory, as Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17). But vainglory is not always a mortal sin. Neither therefore is hypocrisy. I answer that, There are two things in hypocrisy, lack of holiness, and simulation thereof. Accordingly if by a hypocrite we mean a person whose intention is directed to both the above, one, namely, who cares not to be holy but only to appear so, in which sense Sacred Scripture is wont to use the term, it is evident that hypocrisy is a mortal sin: for no one is entirely deprived of holiness save through mortal sin. But if by a hypocrite we mean one who intends to simulate holiness, which he lacks through mortal sin, then, although he is in mortal sin, whereby he is deprived of holiness, yet, in his case, the dissimulation itself is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes a venial sin. This will depend on the end in view; for if this be contrary to the love of God or of his neighbor, it will be a mortal sin: for instance if he were to simulate holiness in order to disseminate false doctrine, or that he may obtain ecclesiastical preferment, though unworthy, or that he may obtain any temporal good in which he fixes his end. If, however, the end intended be not contrary to charity, it will be a venial sin, as for instance when a man takes pleasure in the pretense itself: of such a man it is said in Ethic. iv, 7 that he would seem to be vain rather than evil; for the same applies to simulation as to a lie. It happens also sometimes that a man simulates the perfection of holiness which is not necessary for spiritual welfare. Simulation of this kind is neither a mortal sin always, nor is it always associated with mortal sin. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

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Question 112 Boasting Deinde considerandum est de iactantia et ironia, We must now consider boasting and irony, which are quae sunt partes mendacii, secundum philosophum, in parts of lying according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). IV Ethic. Primo autem circa iactantiam quaeruntur duo. Under the first head, namely, boasting, there are two points of inquiry: Primo, cui virtuti opponatur. (1) To which virtue is it opposed? Secundo, utrum sit peccatum mortale. (2) Whether it is a mortal sin?

Article 1 Whether boasting is opposed to the virtue of truth? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iactantia non opponatur virtuti veritatis. Veritati enim opponitur mendacium. Sed quandoque potest esse iactantia etiam sine mendacio, sicut cum aliquis excellentiam suam ostentat, dicitur enim Esther I, quod Assuerus fecit grande convivium, ut ostenderet divitias gloriae suae ac regni sui, ac magnitudinem atque iactantiam potentiae suae. Ergo iactantia non opponitur virtuti veritatis. Praeterea, iactantia ponitur a Gregorio, XXIII Moral., una de quatuor speciebus superbiae, cum scilicet quis iactat se habere quod non habet. Unde dicitur Ierem. XLVIII, audivimus superbiam Moab, superbus est valde. Sublimitatem eius et arrogantiam et superbiam et altitudinem cordis illius ego scio, ait dominus, iactantiam eius, et quod non sit iuxta eam virtus eius. Et XXXI Moral., dicit Gregorius quod iactantia oritur ex inani gloria. Superbia autem et inanis gloria opponuntur virtuti humilitatis. Ergo iactantia non opponitur veritati, sed humilitati. Praeterea, iactantia ex divitiis causari videtur, unde dicitur Sap. V, quid nobis profuit superbia? Aut quid divitiarum iactantia contulit nobis? Sed superfluitas divitiarum videtur pertinere ad peccatum avaritiae, quod opponitur iustitiae vel liberalitati. Non ergo iactantia opponitur veritati. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II et IV Ethic., iactantiam opponit veritati. Respondeo dicendum quod iactantia proprie importare videtur quod homo verbis se extollat, illa enim quae homo vult longe iactare, in altum elevat. Tunc autem proprie aliquis se extollit, quando de se supra se aliquid dicit. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Quandoque enim aliquis loquitur de se, non quidem supra id quod in se est, sed supra id quod de eo homines opinantur quod apostolus refugiens dicit, II ad Cor. XII, parco,

Objection 1: It seems that boasting is not opposed to the virtue of truth. For lying is opposed to truth. But it is possible to boast even without lying, as when a man makes a show of his own excellence. Thus it is written (Esther 1:3, 4) that Assuerus made a great feast . . . that he might show the riches of the glory and of his kingdom, and the greatness and boasting of his power. Therefore boasting is not opposed to the virtue of truth. Obj. 2: Further, boasting is reckoned by Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 4) to be one of the four species of pride, when, to wit, a man boasts of having what he has not. Hence it is written (Jer 48:29, 30): We have heard the pride of Moab, he is exceeding proud: his haughtiness, and his arrogancy, and his pride, and the loftiness of his heart. I know, saith the Lord, his boasting, and that the strength thereof is not according to it. Moreover, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that boasting arises from vainglory. Now pride and vainglory are opposed to the virtue of humility. Therefore boasting is opposed, not to truth, but to humility. Obj. 3: Further, boasting seems to be occasioned by riches; wherefore it is written (Wis 5:8): What hath pride profited us? or what advantage hath the boasting of riches brought us? Now excess of riches seems to belong to the sin of covetousness, which is opposed to justice or liberality. Therefore boasting is not opposed to truth. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 7), that boasting is opposed to truth. I answer that, Jactantia (boasting) seems properly to denote the uplifting of self by words: since if a man wishes to throw (jactare) a thing far away, he lifts it up high. And to uplift oneself, properly speaking, is to talk of oneself above oneself. This happens in two ways. For sometimes a man speaks of himself, not above what he is in himself, but above that which he is esteemed by men to be: and this the Apostle declines to do when he says (2 Cor 12:6): I forbear lest

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Q. 112, A. 2

Justice

ne quis me existimet supra id quod videt in me, aut audit aliquid ex me. Alio modo aliquis per verba se extollit loquens de se supra id quod in se est secundum rei veritatem. Et quia magis est aliquid iudicandum secundum quod in se est quam secundum quod est in opinione aliorum, inde est quod magis proprie dicitur iactantia quando aliquis effert se supra id quod in ipso est, quam quando effert se supra id quod est in opinione aliorum, quamvis utroque modo iactantia dici possit. Et ideo iactantia proprie dicta opponitur veritati per modum excessus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de iactantia secundum quod excedit opinionem. Ad secundum dicendum quod peccatum iactantiae potest considerari dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum speciem actus. Et sic opponitur veritati, ut dictum est. Alio modo, secundum causam suam, ex qua, etsi non semper, tamen frequentius accidit. Et sic procedit quidem ex superbia sicut ex causa interius motiva et impellente, ex hoc enim quod aliquis interius per arrogantiam supra seipsum elevatur, sequitur plerumque quod exterius maiora quaedam de se iactet; licet quandoque non ex arrogantia, sed ex quadam vanitate aliquis ad iactantiam procedat, et in hoc delectetur quia talis est secundum habitum. Et ideo arrogantia, per quam aliquis supra seipsum extollitur, est superbiae species, non tamen est idem iactantiae, sed, ut frequentius, eius causa, et propter hoc Gregorius iactantiam ponit inter superbiae species. Tendit autem iactator plerumque ad hoc quod gloriam consequatur per suam iactantiam. Et ideo, secundum Gregorium, ex inani gloria oritur secundum rationem finis. Ad tertium dicendum quod opulentia etiam iactantiam causat dupliciter. Uno modo, occasionaliter, inquantum de divitiis aliquis superbit. Unde et signanter, Prov. VIII, opes dicuntur superbae. Alio modo, per modum finis, quia, ut dicitur in IV Ethic., aliqui seipsos iactant non solum propter gloriam, sed etiam propter lucrum, qui de seipsis fingunt ea ex quibus lucrari possint, puta quod sint medici, vel sapientes et divini.

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any man should think of me above that which he seeth in me, or anything he heareth of me. In another way a man uplifts himself in words, by speaking of himself above that which he is in reality. And since we should judge of things as they are in themselves, rather than as others deem them to be, it follows that boasting denotes more properly the uplifting of self above what one is in oneself, than the uplifting of self above what others think of one: although in either case it may be called boasting. Hence boasting properly so called is opposed to truth by way of excess. Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes boasting as exceeding men’s opinion. Reply Obj. 2: The sin of boasting may be considered in two ways. First, with regard to the species of the act, and thus it is opposed to truth; as stated (in the body of the article and Q. 110, A. 2). Second, with regard to its cause, from which more frequently though not always it arises: and thus it proceeds from pride as its inwardly moving and impelling cause. For when a man is uplifted inwardly by arrogance, it often results that outwardly he boasts of great things about himself; though sometimes a man takes to boasting, not from arrogance, but from some kind of vanity, and delights therein, because he is a boaster by habit. Hence arrogance, which is an uplifting of self above oneself, is a kind of pride; yet it is not the same as boasting, but is very often its cause. For this reason Gregory reckons boasting among the species of pride. Moreover, the boaster frequently aims at obtaining glory through his boasting, and so, according to Gregory, it arises from vainglory considered as its end. Reply Obj. 3: Wealth also causes boasting, in two ways. First, as an occasional cause, inasmuch as a man prides himself on his riches. Hence (Prov 8:18) riches are significantly described as proud. Second, as being the end of boasting, since according to Ethic. iv, 7, some boast, not only for the sake of glory, but also for the sake of gain. Such people invent stories about themselves, so as to make profit thereby; for instance, they pretend to be skilled in medicine, wisdom, or divination.

Article 2 Whether boasting is a mortal sin? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iactantia sit peccatum mortale. Dicitur enim Prov. XXVIII, qui se iactat et dilatat, iurgia concitat. Sed concitare iurgia est peccatum mortale, detestatur enim Deus eos qui seminant discordias, ut habetur Prov. VI. Ergo iactantia est peccatum mortale. Praeterea, omne quod prohibetur in lege Dei est peccatum mortale. Sed super illud Eccli. VI, non te ex-

Objection 1: It seems that boasting is a mortal sin. For it is written (Prov 28:25): He that boasteth, and puffeth himself, stirreth up quarrels. Now it is a mortal sin to stir up quarrels, since God hates those that sow discord, according to Prov. 6:19. Therefore boasting is a mortal sin. Obj. 2: Further, whatever is forbidden in God’s law is a mortal sin. Now a gloss on Ecclus. 6:2, Extol not thyself in

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tollas in cogitatione tua, dicit Glossa, iactantiam et superbiam prohibet. Ergo iactantia est peccatum mortale. Praeterea, iactantia est mendacium quoddam. Non est autem mendacium officiosum vel iocosum. Quod patet ex fine mendacii. Quia, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., iactator fingit de se maiora existentibus, quandoque nullius gratia, quandoque autem gratia gloriae vel honoris, quandoque autem gratia argenti, et sic patet quod neque est mendacium iocosum, neque officiosum. Unde relinquitur quod semper sit perniciosum. Videtur ergo semper esse peccatum mortale. Sed contra est quod iactantia oritur ex inani gloria, secundum Gregorium, XXXI Moral. Sed inanis gloria non semper est peccatum mortale, sed quandoque veniale, quod vitare est valde perfectorum, dicit enim Gregorius quod valde perfectorum est sic ostenso opere auctoris gloriam quaerere ut de illata laude privata nesciant exultatione gaudere. Ergo iactantia non semper est peccatum mortale. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum mortale est quod caritati contrariatur. Dupliciter ergo iactantia considerari potest. Uno modo, secundum se, prout est mendacium quoddam. Et sic quandoque est peccatum mortale, quandoque veniale. Mortale quidem, quando aliquis iactanter de se profert quod est contra gloriam Dei, sicut ex persona regis Tyri dicitur Ezech. XXVIII, elevatum est cor tuum, et dixisti, Deus ego sum. Vel etiam contra caritatem proximi, sicut cum aliquis, iactando seipsum, prorumpit in contumelias aliorum; sicut habetur Luc. XVIII de Pharisaeo, qui dicebat, non sum sicut ceteri hominum, raptores, iniusti, adulteri, velut etiam hic publicanus. Quandoque vero est peccatum veniale, quando scilicet aliquis de se talia iactat quae neque sunt contra Deum, neque contra proximum. Alio modo potest considerari secundum suam causam, scilicet superbiam, vel appetitum lucri aut inanis gloriae. Et sic, si procedat ex superbia vel inani gloria quae sit peccatum mortale, etiam ipsa iactantia erit peccatum mortale. Alioquin erit peccatum veniale. Sed quando aliquis prorumpit in iactantiam propter appetitum lucri, hoc videtur iam pertinere ad proximi deceptionem et damnum. Et ideo talis iactantia magis est peccatum mortale. Unde et philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod turpior est qui se iactat causa lucri quam qui se iactat causa gloriae vel honoris. Non tamen semper est peccatum mortale, quia potest esse tale lucrum ex quo alius non damnificatur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille qui se iactat ad hoc quod iurgia concitet, peccat mortaliter. Sed quandoque contingit quod iactantia est causa iurgiorum non per se, sed per accidens. Unde ex hoc iactantia non est peccatum mortale.

Q. 112, A. 2

the thoughts of thy soul, says: This is a prohibition of boasting and pride. Therefore boasting is a mortal sin. Obj. 3: Further, boasting is a kind of lie. But it is neither an officious nor a jocose lie. This is evident from the end of lying; for according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), the boaster pretends to something greater than he is, sometimes for no further purpose, sometimes for the sake of glory or honor, sometimes for the sake of money. Thus it is evident that it is neither an officious nor a jocose lie, and consequently it must be a mischievous lie. Therefore seemingly it is always a mortal sin. On the contrary, Boasting arises from vainglory, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17). Now vainglory is not always a mortal sin, but is sometimes a venial sin which only the very perfect avoid. For Gregory says (Moral. viii, 30) that it belongs to the very perfect, by outward deeds so to seek the glory of their author, that they are not inwardly uplifted by the praise awarded them. Therefore boasting is not always a mortal sin. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 110, A. 4), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity. Accordingly boasting may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, as a lie, and thus it is sometimes a mortal, and sometimes a venial sin. It will be a mortal sin when a man boasts of that which is contrary to God’s glory—thus it is said in the person of the king of Tyre (Ezek 28:2): Thy heart is lifted up, and thou hast said: I am God—or contrary to the love of our neighbor, as when a man while boasting of himself breaks out into invectives against others, as told of the Pharisee who said (Luke 18:11): I am not as the rest of men, extortioners, unjust, adulterers, as also is this publican. Sometimes it is a venial sin, when, to wit, a man boasts of things that are against neither God nor his neighbor. Second, it may be considered with regard to its cause, namely, pride, or the desire of gain or of vainglory: and then if it proceeds from pride or from such vainglory as is a mortal sin, then the boasting will also be a mortal sin: otherwise it will be a venial sin. Sometimes, however, a man breaks out into boasting through desire of gain, and for this very reason he would seem to be aiming at the deception and injury of his neighbor: wherefore boasting of this kind is more likely to be a mortal sin. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that a man who boasts for the sake of gain, is viler than one who boasts for the sake of glory or honor. Yet it is not always a mortal sin because the gain may be such as not to injure another man. Reply Obj. 1: To boast in order to stir quarrels is a mortal sin. But it happens sometimes that boasts are the cause of quarrels, not intentionally but accidentally: and consequently boasting will not be a mortal sin on that account.

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Justice

Ad secundum dicendum quod Glossa illa loquitur de iactantia secundum quod procedit ex superbia prohibita, quae est peccatum mortale. Ad tertium dicendum quod non semper iactantia importat mendacium perniciosum, sed solum quando est contra caritatem Dei aut proximi, aut secundum se aut secundum causam suam. Quod autem aliquis se iactet quasi hoc ipso delectatus, est quiddam vanum, ut philosophus dicit. Unde reducitur ad mendacium iocosum, nisi forte hoc divinae dilectioni praeferret, ut propter hoc Dei praecepta contemneret; sic enim esset contra caritatem Dei, in quo solo mens nostra debet quiescere sicut in ultimo fine. Videtur autem ad mendacium officiosum pertinere cum aliquis ad hoc se iactat ut gloriam vel lucrum acquirat, dummodo hoc sit sine damno aliorum; quia hoc iam pertineret ad mendacium perniciosum.

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Reply Obj. 2: This gloss speaks of boasting as arising from pride that is a mortal sin. Reply Obj. 3: Boasting does not always involve a mischievous lie, but only where it is contrary to the love of God or our neighbor, either in itself or in its cause. That a man boast, through mere pleasure in boasting, is an inane thing to do, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. iv, 7): wherefore it amounts to a jocose lie. Unless perchance he were to prefer this to the love of God, so as to contemn God’s commandments for the sake of boasting: for then it would be against the charity of God, in Whom alone ought our mind to rest as in its last end. To boast for the sake of glory or gain seems to involve an officious lie: provided it be done without injury to others, for then it would at once become a mischievous lie.

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Question 113 Irony Deinde considerandum est de ironia. Circa quam We must now consider irony, under which head there quaeruntur duo. are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum ironia sit peccatum. (1) Whether irony is a sin? Secundo, de comparatione eius ad iactantiam. (2) Of its comparison with boasting.

Article 1 Whether irony is a sin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ironia, per quam aliquis minora de se fingit, non sit peccatum. Nullum enim peccatum procedit ex divina confortatione. Ex qua procedit quod aliquis de se minora dicat, secundum illud Prov. XXX, visio quam locutus est vir cum quo est Deus, et qui, Deo secum morante confortatus, ait, stultissimus sum virorum. Et Amos VII dicitur, respondit Amos, non sum propheta. Ergo ironia, per quam aliquis minora de se dicit, non est peccatum. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in epistola ad Augustinum Anglorum episcopum, bonarum mentium est ibi suas culpas agnoscere ubi culpa non est. Sed omne peccatum repugnat bonitati mentis. Ergo ironia non est peccatum. Praeterea, fugere superbiam non est peccatum. Sed aliqui minora de seipsis dicunt fugientes tumidum, ut philosophus dicit, IV Ethic. Ergo ironia non est peccatum. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis Apost., cum humilitatis causa mentiris, si non eras peccator antequam mentireris, mentiendo efficeris. Respondeo dicendum quod hoc quod aliqui minora de se dicant, potest contingere dupliciter. Uno modo, salva veritate, dum scilicet maiora quae sunt in seipsis, reticent; quaedam vero minora detegunt et de se proferunt, quae tamen in se esse recognoscunt. Et sic minora de se dicere non pertinet ad ironiam, nec est peccatum secundum genus suum, nisi per alicuius circumstantiae corruptionem. Alio modo aliquis dicit minora a veritate declinans, puta cum asserit de se aliquid vile quod in se non recognoscit; aut cum negat de se aliquid magnum quod tamen percipit in seipso esse. Et sic pertinet ad ironiam, et est semper peccatum.

Objection 1: It seems that irony, which consists in belittling oneself, is not a sin. For no sin arises from one’s being strengthened by God: and yet this leads one to belittle oneself, according to Prov. 30:1, 2: The vision which the man spoke, with whom is God, and who being strengthened by God, abiding with him, said, I am the most foolish of men. Also it is written (Amos 7:14): Amos answered . . . I am not a prophet. Therefore irony, whereby a man belittles himself in words, is not a sin. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says in a letter to Augustine, bishop of the English (Regist. xii): It is the mark of a welldisposed mind to acknowledge one’s fault when one is not guilty. But all sin is inconsistent with a well-disposed mind. Therefore irony is not a sin. Obj. 3: Further, it is not a sin to shun pride. But some belittle themselves in words, so as to avoid pride, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore irony is not a sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost., Serm. xxix): If thou liest on account of humility, if thou wert not a sinner before lying, thou hast become one by lying. I answer that, To speak so as to belittle oneself may occur in two ways. First so as to safeguard truth, as when a man conceals the greater things in himself, but discovers and asserts lesser things of himself the presence of which in himself he perceives. To belittle oneself in this way does not belong to irony, nor is it a sin in respect of its genus, except through corruption of one of its circumstances. Second, a person belittles himself by forsaking the truth, for instance by ascribing to himself something mean the existence of which in himself he does not perceive, or by denying something great of himself, which nevertheless he perceives himself to possess: this pertains to irony, and is always a sin. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod duplex est sapienReply Obj. 1: There is a twofold wisdom and a twofold tia, et duplex stultitia. Est enim quaedam sapientia se- folly. For there is a wisdom according to God, which has hucundum Deum, quae humanam vel mundanam stulti- man or worldly folly annexed to it, according to 1 Cor. 3:18,

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tiam habet adiunctam, secundum illud I ad Cor. III, si quis inter vos sapiens videtur esse in hoc saeculo, stultus fiat, ut sit sapiens. Alia vero est sapientia mundana, quae, ut ibidem subditur. Stultitia est apud Deum. Ille ergo qui a Deo confortatur. Confitetur se esse stultissimum secundum reputationem humanam, quia scilicet mundana contemnit, quae hominum sapientia quaerit. Unde et ibidem subditur, et sapientia hominum non est mecum, et postea subdit, et novi sanctorum scientiam. Vel potest dici sapientia hominum esse quae humana ratione acquiritur, sapientia vero sanctorum quae ex divina inspiratione habetur. Amos autem negavit se esse prophetam origine, quia scilicet non erat de genere prophetarum. Unde et ibidem subdit, nec filius prophetae. Ad secundum dicendum quod ad bonitatem mentis pertinet ut homo ad iustitiae perfectionem tendat. Et ideo in culpam reputat non solum si deficiat a communi iustitia, quod vere culpa est, sed etiam si deficiat a iustitiae perfectione, quod quandoque culpa non est. Non autem culpam dicit quod pro culpa non recognoscit, quod ad ironiae mendacium pertineret. Ad tertium dicendum quod homo non debet unum peccatum facere ut aliud vitet. Et ideo non debet mentiri qualitercumque ut vitet superbiam. Unde Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., non ita caveatur arrogantia ut veritas relinquatur. Et Gregorius dicit quod incaute sunt humiles qui se mentiendo illaqueant.

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If any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let him become a fool that he may be wise. But there is another wisdom that is worldly, which as the same text goes on to say, is foolishness with God. Accordingly, he that is strengthened by God acknowledges himself to be most foolish in the estimation of men, because, to wit, he despises human things, which human wisdom seeks. Hence the text quoted continues, and the wisdom of men is not with me, and farther on, and I have known the science of the saints. It may also be replied that the wisdom of men is that which is acquired by human reason, while the wisdom of the saints is that which is received by divine inspiration. Amos denied that he was a prophet by birth, since, to wit, he was not of the race of prophets: hence the text goes on, nor am I the son of a prophet. Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to a well-disposed mind that a man tend to perfect righteousness, and consequently deem himself guilty, not only if he fall short of common righteousness, which is truly a sin, but also if he fall short of perfect righteousness, which sometimes is not a sin. But he does not call sinful that which he does not acknowledge to be sinful: which would be a lie of irony. Reply Obj. 3: A man should not commit one sin in order to avoid another: and so he ought not to lie in any way at all in order to avoid pride. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xliii in Joan.): Shun not arrogance so as to forsake truth: and Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 3) that it is a reckless humility that entangles itself with lies.

Article 2 Whether irony is a less grievous sin than boasting? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ironia non sit minus peccatum quam iactantia. Utrumque enim est peccatum inquantum declinat a veritate, quae est aequalitas quaedam. Sed ab aequalitate non magis declinat qui excedit quam qui diminuit. Ergo ironia non est minus peccatum quam iactantia. Praeterea, secundum philosophum, ironia quandoque iactantia est. Iactantia autem non est ironia. Ergo ironia est gravius peccatum quam iactantia. Praeterea, Prov. XXVI dicitur, quando submiserit vocem suam, ne credideris ei, quoniam septem nequitiae sunt in corde illius. Sed submittere vocem pertinet ad ironiam. Ergo in ea est multiplex nequitia. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod irones et minus dicentes gratiores secundum mores videntur. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, unum mendacium est gravius altero, quandoque quidem ex materia de qua est, sicut mendacium quod fit in doc-

Objection 1: It seems that irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting. For each of them is a sin through forsaking truth, which is a kind of equality. But one does not forsake truth by exceeding it any more than by diminishing it. Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting. Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), irony sometimes is boasting. But boasting is not irony. Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov 26:25): When he shall speak low, trust him not: because there are seven mischiefs in his heart. Now it belongs to irony to speak low. Therefore it contains a manifold wickedness. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7): Those who speak with irony and belittle themselves are more gracious, seemingly, in their manners. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 110, AA. 2, 4), one lie is more grievous than another, sometimes on account of the matter which it is about—thus a lie about a matter

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trina religionis est gravissimum, quandoque autem ex motivo ad peccandum, sicut mendacium perniciosum est gravius quam officiosum vel iocosum. Ironia autem et iactantia circa idem mentiuntur, vel verbis vel quibuscumque exterioribus signis, scilicet circa conditionem personae. Unde quantum ad hoc aequalia sunt. Sed ut plurimum iactantia ex turpiori motivo procedit, scilicet ex appetitu lucri vel honoris, ironia vero ex hoc quod fugit, licet inordinate, per elationem aliis gravis esse. Et secundum hoc philosophus dicit quod iactantia est gravius peccatum quam ironia. Contingit tamen quandoque quod aliquis minora de se fingit ex aliquo alio motivo, puta ad dolose decipiendum. Et tunc ironia est gravior. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de ironia et iactantia secundum quod mendacii gravitas consideratur ex seipso, vel ex materia eius. Sic enim dictum est quod aequalitatem habent. Ad secundum dicendum quod duplex est excellentia, una quidem in temporalibus rebus; alia vero in spiritualibus. Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquis per exteriora signa vel per verba praetendit quidem defectum in exterioribus rebus, puta per aliquam vestem abiectam aut per aliquid huiusmodi, et per hoc ipsum intendit ostentare aliquam excellentiam spiritualem, sicut dominus de quibusdam dicit, Matth. VI, quod exterminant facies suas ut appareant hominibus ieiunantes. Unde isti simul incurrunt vitium ironiae et iactantiae (tamen secundum diversa), et propter hoc gravius peccant. Unde et philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod et superabundantia et valde defectus iactantium est. Propter quod et de Augustino legitur quod neque vestes nimis pretiosas, neque nimis abiectas habere volebat, quia in utroque homines suam gloriam quaerunt. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dicitur Eccli. XIX, est qui nequiter se humiliat, et interiora eius plena sunt dolo. Et secundum hoc, Salomon loquitur de eo qui ex dolosa humilitate vocem suam submittit.

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of religious doctrine is most grievous—and sometimes on account of the motive for sinning; thus a mischievous lie is more grievous than an officious or jocose lie. Now irony and boasting lie about the same matter, either by words, or by any other outward signs, namely, about matters affecting the person: so that in this respect they are equal. But for the most part boasting proceeds from a viler motive, namely, the desire of gain or honor: whereas irony arises from a man’s averseness, albeit inordinate, to be disagreeable to others by uplifting himself: and in this respect the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that boasting is a more grievous sin than irony. Sometimes, however, it happens that a man belittles himself for some other motive, for instance that he may deceive cunningly: and then irony is more grievous. Reply Obj. 1: This argument applies to irony and boasting, according as a lie is considered to be grievous in itself or on account of its matter: for it has been said that in this way they are equal. Reply Obj. 2: Excellence is twofold: one is in temporal, the other in spiritual things. Now it happens at times that a person, by outward words or signs, pretends to be lacking in external things, for instance by wearing shabby clothes, or by doing something of the kind, and that he intends by so doing to make a show of some spiritual excellence. Thus our Lord said of certain men (Matt 6:16) that they disfigure their faces that they may appear unto men to fast. Wherefore such persons are guilty of both vices, irony and boasting, although in different respects, and for this reason they sin more grievously. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that it is the practice of boasters both to make overmuch of themselves, and to make very little of themselves: and for the same reason it is related of Augustine that he was unwilling to possess clothes that were either too costly or too shabby, because by both do men seek glory. Reply Obj. 3: According to the words of Ecclus. 19:23, There is one that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior is full of deceit, and it is in this sense that Solomon speaks of the man who, through deceitful humility, speaks low wickedly.

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Question 114 The Friendliness Which is Called Affability Deinde considerandum est de amicitia quae affabiliWe must now consider the friendliness which is called tas dicitur; et de vitiis oppositis, quae sunt adulatio et liti- affability, and the opposite vices which are flattery and gium. Circa amicitiam autem seu affabilitatem quaerun- quarreling. Concerning friendliness or affability, there are tur duo. two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum sit specialis virtus. (1) Whether it is a special virtue? Secundo, utrum sit pars iustitiae. (2) Whether it is a part of justice?

Article 1 Whether friendliness is a special virtue? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amicitia non sit specialis virtus. Dicit enim philosophus, in VIII Ethic., quod amicitia perfecta est quae est propter virtutem. Quaelibet autem virtus est amicitiae causa, quia bonum omnibus est amabile, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo amicitia non est specialis virtus, sed consequens omnem virtutem. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., de tali amico, quod non in amando vel inimicando recipit singula ut oportet. Sed quod aliquis signa amicitiae ostendat ad eos quos non amat, videtur pertinere ad simulationem, quae repugnat virtuti. Ergo huiusmodi amicitia non est virtus. Praeterea, virtus in medietate constituitur prout sapiens determinabit, sicut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed Eccle. VII dicitur, cor sapientum ubi tristitia, et cor stultorum ubi laetitia, unde ad virtuosum pertinet maxime a delectatione sibi cavere, ut dicitur II Ethic. Haec autem amicitia per se quidem desiderat condelectare, contristare autem reveretur, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Ergo huiusmodi amicitia non est virtus. Sed contra, praecepta legis dantur de actibus virtutum. Sed Eccli. IV dicitur, congregationi pauperum affabilem te facito. Ergo affabilitas, quae hic amicitia dicitur, est quaedam specialis virtus. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, cum virtus ordinetur ad bonum, ubi occurrit specialis ratio boni, ibi oportet esse specialem rationem virtutis. Bonum autem in ordine consistit, sicut supra dictum est. Oportet autem hominem convenienter ad alios homines ordinari in communi conversatione, tam in factis quam in dictis, ut scilicet ad unumquemque se habeat secundum quod decet. Et ideo oportet esse quandam specia-

Objection 1: It seems that friendliness is not a special virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 3) that the perfect friendship is that which is on account of virtue. Now any virtue is the cause of friendship: since the good is lovable to all, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore friendliness is not a special virtue, but a consequence of every virtue. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) of this kind of friend that he takes everything in a right manner both from those he loves and from those who are not his friends. Now it seems to pertain to simulation that a person should show signs of friendship to those whom he loves not, and this is incompatible with virtue. Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue. Obj. 3: Further, virtue observes the mean according as a wise man decides (Ethic. ii, 6). Now it is written (Eccl 7:5): The heart of the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there is mirth: wherefore it belongs to a virtuous man to be most wary of pleasure (Ethic. ii, 9). Now this kind of friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), is essentially desirous of sharing pleasures, but fears to give pain. Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue. On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. Now it is written (Sir 4:7): Make thyself affable to the congregation of the poor. Therefore affability, which is what we mean by friendship, is a special virtue. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 109, A. 2; I-II, Q. 55, A. 3), since virtue is directed to good, wherever there is a special kind of good, there must needs be a special kind of virtue. Now good consists in order, as stated above (Q. 109, A. 2). And it behooves man to be maintained in a becoming order towards other men as regards their mutual relations with one another, in point of both deeds and words, so that they behave towards one another in a be-

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lem virtutem quae hanc convenientiam ordinis observet. coming manner. Hence the need of a special virtue that Et haec vocatur amicitia sive affabilitas. maintains the becomingness of this order: and this virtue is called friendliness. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus in liReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher speaks of a twofold bro Ethicorum de duplici amicitia loquitur. Quarum una friendship in his Ethics. One consists chiefly in the affection consistit principaliter in affectu quo unus alium diligit. whereby one man loves another and may result from any Et haec potest consequi quamcumque virtutem. Quae virtue. We have stated above, in treating of charity (Q. 23, autem ad hanc amicitiam pertinent, supra de caritate A. 1, A. 3, ad 1; QQ. 25, 26), what things belong to this dicta sunt. Aliam vero amicitiam ponit quae consistit in kind of friendship. But he mentions another friendliness, solis exterioribus verbis vel factis. Quae quidem non ha- which consists merely in outward words or deeds; this has bet perfectam rationem amicitiae, sed quandam eius si- not the perfect nature of friendship, but bears a certain likemilitudinem, inquantum scilicet quis decenter se habet ness thereto, insofar as a man behaves in a becoming manad illos cum quibus conversatur. ner towards those with whom he is in contact. Ad secundum dicendum quod omnis homo natuReply Obj. 2: Every man is naturally every man’s raliter omni homini est amicus quodam generali amo- friend by a certain general love; even so it is written re, sicut etiam dicitur Eccli. XIII, quod omne animal (Sir 13:19) that every beast loveth its like. This love is sigdiligit simile sibi. Et hunc amorem repraesentant signa nified by signs of friendship, which we show outwardly by amicitiae quae quis exterius ostendit in verbis vel fac- words or deeds, even to those who are strangers or untis etiam extraneis et ignotis. Unde non est ibi simula- known to us. Hence there is no dissimulation in this: betio. Non enim ostendit eis signa perfectae amicitiae, quia cause we do not show them signs of perfect friendship, for non eodem modo se habet familiariter ad extraneos si- we do not treat strangers with the same intimacy as those cut ad eos qui sunt sibi speciali amicitia iuncti. who are united to us by special friendship. Ad tertium dicendum quod cor sapientum dicitur Reply Obj. 3: When it is said that the heart of the wise esse ubi tristitia non quidem ut ipse proximo tristitiam is where there is mourning it is not that he may bring sorrow inferat, dicit enim apostolus, si propter cibum frater tuus to his neighbor, for the Apostle says (Rom 14:15): If, because contristatur, iam non secundum caritatem ambulas, sed of thy meat, thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now ut contristantibus consolationem ferat, secundum illud according to charity: but that he may bring consolation to Eccli. VII, non desis plorantibus in consolationem, et cum the sorrowful, according to Ecclus. 7:38, Be not wanting in lugentibus ambula. Cor autem stultorum est ubi laetitia, comforting them that weep, and walk with them that mourn. non quidem ut ipsi alios laetificent, sed ut ipsi aliorum Again, the heart of fools is where there is mirth, not that they laetitia perfruantur. Pertinet ergo ad sapientem ut con- may gladden others, but that they may enjoy others’ gladdelectationem afferat his cum quibus conversatur, non ness. Accordingly, it belongs to the wise man to share his quidem lascivam, quam virtus cavet, sed honestam; se- pleasures with those among whom he dwells, not lustful cundum illud Psalm., ecce quam bonum et quam iucun- pleasures, which virtue shuns, but honest pleasures, accorddum habitare fratres in unum. ing to Ps. 132:1, Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity. Quandoque tamen, propter aliquod bonum conseNevertheless, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6), for quens vel propter aliquod malum excludendum, non re- the sake of some good that will result, or in order to avoid fugiet virtuosus eos quibus convivit contristare, ut phi- some evil, the virtuous man will sometimes not shrink from losophus dicit, IV Ethic. Unde et apostolus dicit, II ad bringing sorrow to those among whom he lives. Hence the Cor. VII, si contristavi vos in epistola, non me poenitet, et Apostle says (2 Cor 7:8): Although I made you sorrowful by postea, gaudeo, non quia contristati estis, sed quia contri- my epistle, I do not repent, and further on (2 Cor 7:9), I am stati estis ad poenitentiam. Et ideo his qui sunt proni ad glad; not because you were made sorrowful, but because you peccandum non debemus hilarem vultum ostendere ad were made sorrowful unto repentance. For this reason we eos delectandum, ne videamur eorum peccato consenti- should not show a cheerful face to those who are given to re et quodammodo peccandi audaciam ministrare. Un- sin, in order that we may please them, lest we seem to conde dicitur Eccli. VII, filiae tibi sunt, serva corpus illarum, sent to their sin, and in a way encourage them to sin further. et non ostendas hilarem faciem tuam ad illas. Hence it is written (Sir 7:26): Hast thou daughters? Have a care of their body, and show not thy countenance gay towards them.

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Q. 114, A. 2

Article 2 Whether this kind of friendship is a part of justice? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod huiusmodi amicitia non sit pars iustitiae. Ad iustitiam enim pertinet reddere debitum alteri. Sed hoc non pertinet ad hanc virtutem, sed solum delectabiliter aliis convivere. Ergo huiusmodi virtus non est pars iustitiae. Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in IV Ethic., huiusmodi virtus consistit circa delectationem vel tristitiam quae est in convictu. Sed moderari maximas delectationes pertinet ad temperantiam, ut supra habitum est. Ergo haec virtus magis est pars temperantiae quam iustitiae. Praeterea, aequalia inaequalibus exhibere contra iustitiam est, ut supra habitum est. Sed sicut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., haec virtus similiter ad ignotos et notos, et consuetos et inconsuetos operatur. Ergo haec virtus non est pars iustitiae, sed magis ei contrariatur. Sed contra est quod Macrobius ponit amicitiam partem iustitiae. Respondeo dicendum quod haec virtus est pars iustitiae, inquantum adiungitur ei sicut principali virtuti. Convenit enim cum iustitia in hoc quod ad alterum est, sicut et iustitia. Deficit autem a ratione iustitiae, quia non habet plenam debiti rationem, prout aliquis alteri obligatur vel debito legali, ad cuius solutionem lex cogit, vel etiam aliquo debito proveniente ex aliquo beneficio suscepto, sed solum attendit quoddam debitum honestatis, quod magis est ex parte ipsius virtuosi quam ex parte alterius, ut scilicet faciat alteri quod decet eum facere. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, quia homo naturaliter est animal sociale, debet ex quadam honestate veritatis manifestationem aliis hominibus, sine qua societas hominum durare non posset. Sicut autem non posset vivere homo in societate sine veritate, ita nec sine delectatione, quia sicut philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., nullus potest per diem morari cum tristi, neque cum non delectabili. Et ideo homo tenetur ex quodam debito naturali honestatis ut homo aliis delectabiliter convivat, nisi propter aliquam causam necesse sit aliquando alios utiliter contristare. Ad secundum dicendum quod ad temperantiam pertinet refrenare delectationes sensibiles. Sed haec virtus consistit circa delectationes in convictu, quae ex ratione proveniunt, inquantum unus ad alterum decenter se habet. Et has delectationes non oportet refrenare tanquam noxias. Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi non est intelligendum quod aliquis eodem modo debeat colloqui et convivere notis et ignotis, quia, ut ipse

Objection 1: It seems that this kind of friendship is not a part of justice. For justice consists in giving another man his due. But this virtue does not consist in doing that, but in behaving agreeably towards those among whom we live. Therefore this virtue is not a part of justice. Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue is concerned about the joys and sorrows of those who dwell in fellowship. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate the greatest pleasures, as stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 5; Q. 61, A. 3). Therefore this virtue is a part of temperance rather than of justice. Obj. 3: Further, to give equal things to those who are unequal is contrary to justice, as stated above (Q. 59, AA. 1, 2). Now, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue treats in like manner known and unknown, companions and strangers. Therefore this virtue rather than being a part of justice is opposed thereto. On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somno Scip. i) accounts friendship a part of justice. I answer that, This virtue is a part of justice, being annexed to it as to a principal virtue. Because in common with justice it is directed to another person, even as justice is: yet it falls short of the notion of justice, because it lacks the full aspect of debt, whereby one man is bound to another, either by legal debt, which the law binds him to pay, or by some debt arising out of a favor received. For it regards merely a certain debt of equity, namely, that we behave pleasantly to those among whom we dwell, unless at times, for some reason, it be necessary to displease them for some good purpose. Reply Obj. 1: As we have said above (Q. 109, A. 3, ad 1), because man is a social animal he owes his fellowman, in equity, the manifestation of truth without which human society could not last. Now as man could not live in society without truth, so likewise, not without joy, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii), no one could abide a day with the sad nor with the joyless. Therefore, a certain natural equity obliges a man to live agreeably with his fellow-men; unless some reason should oblige him to sadden them for their good. Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to temperance to curb pleasures of the senses. But this virtue regards the pleasures of fellowship, which have their origin in the reason, insofar as one man behaves becomingly towards another. Such pleasures need not to be curbed as though they were noisome. Reply Obj. 3: This saying of the Philosopher does not mean that one ought to converse and behave in the same way with acquaintances and strangers, since, as he says

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ibidem subdit, non similiter convenit consuetos et extra- (Ethic. iv, 6), it is not fitting to please and displease intimate neos curare aut contristare. Sed in hoc attenditur simili- friends and strangers in the same way. This likeness consists tudo, quod ad omnes oportet facere quod decet. in this, that we ought to behave towards all in a fitting manner.

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Question 115 Flattery Deinde considerandum est de vitiis oppositis praeWe must now consider the vices opposed to the aforedictae virtuti. Et primo, de adulatione; secundo, de liti- said virtue: (1) Flattery, and (2) Quarreling. Concerning gio. Circa adulationem quaeruntur duo. flattery there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum adulatio sit peccatum. (1) Whether flattery is a sin? Secundo, utrum sit peccatum mortale. (2) Whether it is a mortal sin?

Article 1 Whether flattery is a sin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod adulatio non sit peccatum. Adulatio enim consistit in quodam sermone laudis alteri exhibito intentione placendi. Sed laudare aliquem non est malum, secundum illud Prov. ult., surrexerunt filii eius et beatissimam praedicaverunt, vir eius, et laudavit eam. Similiter etiam velle placere aliis non est malum, secundum illud I ad Cor. X, per omnia omnibus placeo. Ergo adulatio non est peccatum. Praeterea, bono malum est contrarium, et similiter vituperium laudi. Sed vituperare malum non est peccatum. Ergo neque laudare bonum, quod videtur ad adulationem pertinere. Ergo adulatio non est peccatum. Praeterea, adulationi detractio contrariatur. Unde Gregorius dicit quod remedium contra adulationem est detractio. Sciendum est, inquit, quod ne immoderatis laudibus elevemur, plerumque nostri rectoris moderamine detractionibus lacerari permittimur, ut quos vox laudantis elevat, lingua detrahentis humiliet. Sed detractio est malum, ut supra habitum est. Ergo adulatio est bonum.

Objection 1: It seems that flattery is not a sin. For flattery consists in words of praise offered to another in order to please him. But it is not a sin to praise a person, according to Prov. 31:28, Her children rose up and called her blessed: her husband, and he praised her. Moreover, there is no evil in wishing to please others, according to 1 Cor. 10:33, I . . . in all things please all men. Therefore flattery is not a sin. Obj. 2: Further, evil is contrary to good, and blame to praise. But it is not a sin to blame evil. Neither, then, is it a sin to praise good, which seems to belong to flattery. Therefore flattery is not a sin. Obj. 3: Further, detraction is contrary to flattery. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 5) that detraction is a remedy against flattery. It must be observed, says he, that by the wonderful moderation of our Ruler, we are often allowed to be rent by detractions but are uplifted by immoderate praise, so that whom the voice of the flatterer upraises, the tongue of the detractor may humble. But detraction is an evil, as stated above (Q. 73, AA. 2, 3). Therefore flattery is a good. Sed contra est quod super illud Ezech. XIII, vae, On the contrary, A gloss on Ezech. 13:18, Woe to qui consuunt pulvillos sub omni cubito manus, dicit Glos- them that sew cushions under every elbow, says, that is to say, sa, idest, suavem adulationem. Ergo adulatio est pecca- sweet flattery. Therefore flattery is a sin.

tum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, amicitia praedicta, vel affabilitas, etsi principaliter delectare intendat eos quibus convivit, tamen, ubi necesse est propter aliquod bonum exequendum vel malum vitandum, non veretur contristare. Si ergo aliquis in omnibus velit ad delectationem alteri loqui, excedit modum in delectando, et ideo peccat per excessum. Et si quidem hoc faciat sola intentione delectandi, vocatur placidus, secundum philosophum, si autem hoc faciat intentione alicuius lucri consequendi, vocatur blanditor sive adulator. Communiter tamen nomen adulationis solet attribui

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 114, A. 1, ad 3), although the friendship of which we have been speaking, or affability, intends chiefly the pleasure of those among whom one lives, yet it does not fear to displease when it is a question of obtaining a certain good, or of avoiding a certain evil. Accordingly, if a man were to wish always to speak pleasantly to others, he would exceed the mode of pleasing, and would therefore sin by excess. If he do this with the mere intention of pleasing he is said to be complaisant, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6): whereas if he do it with the intention of making some gain out of it, he is called

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omnibus qui supra debitum modum virtutis volunt alios a flatterer or adulator. As a rule, however, the term flattery verbis vel factis delectare in communi conversatione. is wont to be applied to all who wish to exceed the mode of virtue in pleasing others by words or deeds in their ordinary behavior towards their fellows. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod laudare aliquem Reply Obj. 1: One may praise a person both well and contingit et bene et male, prout scilicet debitae circum- ill, according as one observes or omits the due circumstantiae vel servantur vel praetermittuntur. Si enim ali- stances. For if while observing other due circumstances one quis aliquem velit delectare laudando ut ex hoc eum were to wish to please a person by praising him, in orconsoletur ne in tribulationibus deficiat, vel etiam ut in der thereby to console him, or that he may strive to make bono proficere studeat, aliis debitis circumstantiis ob- progress in good, this will belong to the aforesaid virtue servatis, pertinebit hoc ad praedictam virtutem amici- of friendship. But it would belong to flattery, if one wished tiae. Pertinet autem ad adulationem si aliquis velit ali- to praise a person for things in which he ought not to be quem laudare in quibus non est laudandus, quia forte praised; since perhaps they are evil, according to Ps. 9:24, mala sunt, secundum illud, laudatur peccator in deside- The sinner is praised in the desires of his soul; or they may riis animae suae; vel quia non sunt certa, secundum il- be uncertain, according to Ecclus. 27:8, Praise not a man lud Eccli. XXVII, ante sermonem ne laudes virum, et ite- before he speaketh, and again (Sir 11:2), Praise not a man rum Eccli. XI, non laudes virum in specie sua; vel etiam si for his beauty; or because there may be fear lest human timeri possit ne humana laude ad inanem gloriam pro- praise should incite him to vainglory, wherefore it is writvocetur, unde dicitur Eccli. XI, ante mortem ne laudes ten, (Sir 11:30), Praise not any man before death. Again, hominem. Similiter etiam velle placere hominibus prop- in like manner it is right to wish to please a man in orter caritatem nutriendam, et ut in eis homo spiritualiter der to foster charity, so that he may make spiritual progress proficere possit, laudabile est. Quod autem aliquis velit therein. But it would be sinful to wish to please men for the placere hominibus propter inanem gloriam vel propter sake of vainglory or gain, or to please them in something lucrum, vel etiam in malis, hoc esset peccatum, secun- evil, according to Ps. 52:6, God hath scattered the bones of dum illud Psalm., Deus dissipavit ossa eorum qui homi- them that please men, and according to the words of the nibus placent. Et apostolus dicit, ad Galat. I, si adhuc ho- Apostle (Gal 1:10), If I yet pleased men, I should not be the minibus placerem, Christi servus non essem. servant of Christ. Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam vituperare Reply Obj. 2: Even to blame evil is sinful, if due cirmalum, si non adhibeantur debitae circumstantiae, est cumstances be not observed; and so too is it to praise good. vitiosum. Et similiter laudare bonum. Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet duo viReply Obj. 3: Nothing hinders two vices being contia esse contraria. Et ideo sicut detractio est malum, ita trary to one another. Wherefore even as detraction is evil, et adulatio. Quae ei contrariatur quantum ad ea quae di- so is flattery, which is contrary thereto as regards what cuntur, non autem directe quantum ad finem, quia adu- is said, but not directly as regards the end. Because flatlator quaerit delectationem eius cui adulatur; detractor tery seeks to please the person flattered, whereas the deautem non quaerit eius contristationem, cum aliquando tractor seeks not the displeasure of the person defamed, occulte detrahat, sed magis quaerit eius infamiam. since at times he defames him in secret, but seeks rather his defamation.

Article 2 Whether flattery is a mortal sin? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod adulatio sit peccatum mortale. Quia secundum Augustinum, in Enchirid., malum dicitur quia nocet. Sed adulatio maxime nocet, secundum illud Psalm., quoniam laudatur peccator in desideriis animae suae, et iniquus benedicitur, exacerbavit dominum peccator. Et Hieronymus dicit quod nihil est quod tam facile corrumpat mentes hominum quam adulatio. Et super illud Psalm., convertantur statim erubescentes, dicit Glossa, plus nocet lingua

Objection 1: It seems that flattery is a mortal sin. For, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), a thing is evil because it is harmful. But flattery is most harmful, according to Ps. 9:24, For the sinner is praised in the desires of his soul, and the unjust man is blessed. The sinner hath provoked the Lord. Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. ad Celant): Nothing so easily corrupts the human mind as flattery: and a gloss on Ps. 69:4, Let them be presently turned away blushing for shame that say to me: ‘Tis well, ‘Tis well, says: The tongue

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adulatoris quam gladius persecutoris. Ergo adulatio est gravissimum peccatum. Praeterea, quicumque verbis alii nocet, non minus nocet sibi quam aliis, unde dicitur in Psalm., gladius eorum intret in corda ipsorum. Sed ille qui alteri adulatur, inducit eum ad peccandum mortaliter, unde super illud Psalm., oleum peccatoris non impinguet caput meum, dicit Glossa, falsa laus adulatoris mentes a rigore veritatis emollit ad noxia. Ergo multo magis adulator in se mortaliter peccat. Praeterea, in decretis scribitur, dist. XLVI, clericus qui adulationibus et proditionibus vacare deprehenditur, degradetur ab officio. Sed talis poena non infligitur nisi pro peccato mortali. Ergo adulatio est peccatum mortale. Sed contra est quod Augustinus, in Serm. de Purgat., inter peccata minuta numerat, si quis cuiquam maiori personae, aut ex voluntate aut ex necessitate, adulari voluerit. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum mortale est quod contrariatur caritati. Adulatio autem quandoque quidem caritati contrariatur, quandoque autem non. Contrariatur siquidem caritati tripliciter. Uno modo, ratione ipsius materiae, puta cum aliquis laudat alicuius peccatum. Hoc enim contrariatur dilectioni Dei, contra cuius iustitiam homo loquitur, et contra dilectionem proximi, quem in peccato fovet. Unde est peccatum mortale, secundum illud Isaiae V, vae, qui dicunt malum bonum. Alio modo, ratione intentionis, puta cum aliquis adulatur alicui ad hoc quod fraudulenter ei noceat, vel corporaliter vel spiritualiter. Et hoc etiam est peccatum mortale. Et de hoc habetur Prov. XXVII, meliora sunt vulnera diligentis quam fraudulenta odientis oscula. Tertio modo, per occasionem, sicut cum laus adulatoris fit alteri occasio peccandi, et praeter adulatoris intentionem. Et in hoc considerare oportet utrum sit occasio data vel accepta, et qualis ruina subsequatur, sicut potest patere ex his quae supra de scandalo dicta sunt. Si autem aliquis ex sola aviditate delectandi alios, vel etiam ad evitandum aliquod malum vel consequendum aliquid in necessitate, alicui adulatus fuerit, non est contra caritatem. Unde non est peccatum mortale, sed veniale. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritates illae loquuntur de adulatore qui laudat peccatum alicuius. Talis enim adulatio dicitur plus nocere quam gladius persecutoris, quia in potioribus bonis nocet, scilicet in spiritualibus. Non enim nocet ita efficaciter, quia gladius persecutoris effective occidit, quasi sufficiens causa mortis; nullus autem potest esse alteri sufficiens causa peccandi, ut ex supra dictis patet.

Q. 115, A. 2

of the flatterer harms more than the sword of the persecutor. Therefore flattery is a most grievous sin. Obj. 2: Further, whoever does harm by words, harms himself no less than others: wherefore it is written (Ps 36:15): Let their sword enter into their own hearts. Now he that flatters another induces him to sin mortally: hence a gloss on Ps. 140:5, Let not the oil of the sinner fatten my head, says: The false praise of the flatterer softens the mind by depriving it of the rigidity of truth and renders it susceptive of vice. Much more, therefore, does the flatterer sin in himself. Obj. 3: Further, it is written in the Decretals (D. XLVI, Cap. 3): The cleric who shall be found to spend his time in flattery and treachery shall be degraded from his office. Now such a punishment as this is not inflicted save for mortal sin. Therefore flattery is a mortal sin. On the contrary, Augustine in a sermon on Purgatory (xli, de Sanctis) reckons among slight sins, If one desire to flatter any person of higher standing, whether of one’s own choice, or out of necessity. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 112, A. 2), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity. Now flattery is sometimes contrary to charity and sometimes not. It is contrary to charity in three ways. First, by reason of the very matter, as when one man praises another’s sin: for this is contrary to the love of God, against Whose justice he speaks, and contrary to the love of his neighbor, whom he encourages to sin. Wherefore this is a mortal sin, according to Isa. 5:20: Woe to you that call evil good. Second, by reason of the intention, as when one man flatters another, so that by deceiving him he may injure him in body or in soul; this is also a mortal sin, and of this it is written (Prov 27:6): Better are the wounds of a friend than the deceitful kisses of an enemy. Third, by way of occasion, as when the praise of a flatterer, even without his intending it, becomes to another an occasion of sin. In this case it is necessary to consider, whether the occasion were given or taken, and how grievous the consequent downfall, as may be understood from what has been said above concerning scandal (Q. 43, AA. 3, 4). If, however, one man flatters another from the mere craving to please others, or again in order to avoid some evil, or to acquire something in a case of necessity, this is not contrary to charity. Consequently it is not a mortal but a venial sin. Reply Obj. 1: The passages quoted speak of the flatterer who praises another’s sin. Flattery of this kind is said to harm more than the sword of the persecutor, since it does harm to goods that are of greater consequence, namely, spiritual goods. Yet it does not harm so efficaciously, since the sword of the persecutor slays effectively, being a sufficient cause of death; whereas no one by flattering can be a sufficient cause of another’s sinning, as was shown above (Q. 43, A. 1, ad 3; I-II, Q. 73, A. 8, ad 3; I-II, Q. 80, A. 1).

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Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de Reply Obj. 2: This argument applies to one that flateo qui adulatur intentione nocendi. Ille enim plus nocet ters with the intention of doing harm: for such a man harms sibi quam aliis, quia sibi nocet tanquam sufficiens causa himself more than others, since he harms himself, as the peccandi, aliis autem occasionaliter tantum. sufficient cause of sinning, whereas he is only the occasional cause of the harm he does to others. Ad tertium dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur Reply Obj. 3: The passage quoted refers to the man de eo qui proditorie alteri adulatur ut eum decipiat. who flatters another treacherously, in order to deceive him.

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Question 116 Quarreling Deinde considerandum est de litigio. Et circa hoc We must now consider quarreling; concerning which quaeruntur duo. there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum opponatur virtuti amicitiae. (1) Whether it is opposed to the virtue of friendship? Secundo, de comparatione eius ad adulationem. (2) Of its comparison with flattery?

Article 1 Whether quarreling is opposed to the virtue of friendship or affability? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod litigium non opponatur virtuti amicitiae vel affabilitatis. Litigium enim ad discordiam pertinere videtur, sicut et contentio. Sed discordia opponitur caritati, sicut dictum est. Ergo et litigium. Praeterea, Prov. XXVI dicitur, homo iracundus incendit litem. Sed iracundia opponitur mansuetudini. Ergo et lis, sive litigium. Praeterea, Iac. IV dicitur, unde bella et lites in vobis? Nonne ex concupiscentiis vestris, quae militant in membris vestris? Sed sequi concupiscentias videtur opponi temperantiae. Ergo videtur quod litigium non opponatur amicitiae, sed temperantiae. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in IV Ethic., litigium opponit amicitiae. Respondeo dicendum quod proprie litigium in verbis consistit, cum scilicet unus verbis alterius contradicit. In qua quidem contradictione duo possunt attendi. Quandoque enim contingit contradictio propter personam dicentis cui contradicens consentire recusat propter defectum amoris animos unientis. Et hoc videtur ad discordiam pertinere, caritati contrariam. Quandoque vero contradictio oritur ratione personae quam aliquis contristare non veretur. Et sic fit litigium, quod praedictae amicitiae vel affabilitati opponitur, ad quam pertinet delectabiliter aliis convivere. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod illi qui ad omnia contrariantur causa eius quod est contristare, neque quodcumque curantes, discoli et litigiosi vocantur.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod contentio magis proprie pertinet ad contradictionem discordiae, litigium autem ad contradictionem quae fit intentione contristandi.

Objection 1: It seems that quarreling is not opposed to the virtue of friendship or affability. For quarreling seems to pertain to discord, just as contention does. But discord is opposed to charity, as stated above (Q. 37, A. 1). Therefore quarreling is also. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov 26:21): An angry man stirreth up strife. Now anger is opposed to meekness. Therefore strife or quarreling is also. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Jas 4:1): From whence are wars and quarrels among you? Are they not hence, from your concupiscences which war in your members? Now it would seem contrary to temperance to follow one’s concupiscences. Therefore it seems that quarreling is opposed not to friendship but to temperance. On the contrary, The Philosopher opposes quarreling to friendship (Ethic. iv, 6). I answer that, Quarreling consists properly in words, when, namely, one person contradicts another’s words. Now two things may be observed in this contradiction. For sometimes contradiction arises on account of the person who speaks, the contradictor refusing to consent with him from lack of that love which unites minds together, and this seems to pertain to discord, which is contrary to charity. Whereas at times contradiction arises by reason of the speaker being a person to whom someone does not fear to be disagreeable: whence arises quarreling, which is opposed to the aforesaid friendship or affability, to which it belongs to behave agreeably towards those among whom we dwell. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that those who are opposed to everything with the intent of being disagreeable, and care for nobody, are said to be peevish and quarrelsome. Reply Obj. 1: Contention pertains rather to the contradiction of discord, while quarreling belongs to the contradiction which has the intention of displeasing.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod directa oppositio vitiorum ad virtutes non attenditur secundum causas, cum contingat unum vitium ex diversis causis oriri, sed attenditur secundum speciem actus. Licet autem quandoque litigium ex ira oriatur, potest tamen ex multis aliis causis oriri. Unde non oportet quod directe opponatur mansuetudini. Ad tertium dicendum quod Iacobus loquitur ibi de concupiscentia secundum quod est generale malum, ex quo omnia vitia oriuntur, prout dicit Glossa Rom. VII, bona est lex, quae, dum concupiscentiam prohibet, omne malum prohibet.

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Reply Obj. 2: The direct opposition of virtues to vices depends, not on their causes, since one vice may arise from many causes, but on the species of their acts. And although quarreling arises at times from anger, it may arise from many other causes, hence it does not follow that it is directly opposed to meekness. Reply Obj. 3: James speaks there of concupiscence considered as a general evil whence all vices arise. Thus, a gloss on Rom. 7:7 says: The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evil.

Article 2 Whether quarreling is a more grievous sin than the contrary vice, flattery? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod litigium sit minus peccatum quam contrarium vitium, scilicet placiditatis vel adulationis. Quanto enim aliquod peccatum plus nocet, tanto peius esse videtur. Sed adulatio plus nocet quam litigium, dicitur enim Isaiae III, popule meus, qui beatum te dicunt, ipsi te decipiunt, et viam gressuum tuorum dissipant. Ergo adulatio est gravius peccatum quam litigium. Praeterea, in adulatione videtur esse quaedam dolositas, quia aliud adulator dicit ore, aliud habet in corde. Litigiosus autem caret dolo, quia manifeste contradicit. Ille autem qui cum dolo peccat, turpior est, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic. Ergo gravius peccatum est adulatio quam litigium. Praeterea, verecundia est timor de turpi, ut patet per philosophum, in IV Ethic. Sed magis verecundatur homo esse adulator quam litigiosus. Ergo litigium est minus peccatum quam adulatio. Sed contra est quod tanto aliquod peccatum videtur esse gravius quanto spirituali statui magis repugnat. Sed litigium magis repugnare videtur spirituali, dicitur enim I ad Tim. III, quod oportet episcopum non litigiosum esse; et II ad Tim. II, servum domini non oportet litigare. Ergo litigium videtur esse gravius peccatum. Respondeo dicendum quod de utroque istorum peccatorum loqui possumus dupliciter. Uno modo, considerando speciem utriusque peccati. Et secundum hoc, tanto aliquod vitium est gravius quanto magis repugnat oppositae virtuti. Virtus autem amicitiae principalius tendit ad delectandum quam ad contristandum. Et ideo litigiosus, qui superabundat in contristando, gravius peccat quam placidus vel adulator, qui superabundat in delectando. Alio modo possunt considerari secundum aliqua exteriora motiva. Et secundum hoc,

Objection 1: It seems that quarreling is a less grievous sin than the contrary vice, viz. adulation or flattery. For the more harm a sin does the more grievous it seems to be. Now flattery does more harm than quarreling, for it is written (Isa 3:12): O My people, they that call thee blessed, the same deceive thee, and destroy the way of thy steps. Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarreling. Obj. 2: Further, there appears to be a certain amount of deceit in flattery, since the flatterer says one thing, and thinks another: whereas the quarrelsome man is without deceit, for he contradicts openly. Now he that sins deceitfully is a viler man, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarreling. Obj. 3: Further, shame is fear of what is vile, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9). But a man is more ashamed to be a flatterer than a quarreler. Therefore quarreling is a less grievous sin than flattery. On the contrary, The more a sin is inconsistent with the spiritual state, the more it appears to be grievous. Now quarreling seems to be more inconsistent with the spiritual state: for it is written (1 Tim 3:2, 3) that it behooveth a bishop to be . . . not quarrelsome; and (2 Tim 3:24): The servant of the Lord must not wrangle. Therefore quarreling seems to be a more grievous sin than flattery. I answer that, We can speak of each of these sins in two ways. In one way we may consider the species of either sin, and thus the more a vice is at variance with the opposite virtue the more grievous it is. Now the virtue of friendship has a greater tendency to please than to displease: and so the quarrelsome man, who exceeds in giving displeasure sins more grievously than the adulator or flatterer, who exceeds in giving pleasure. In another way we may consider them as regards certain external motives, and thus flattery is sometimes more grievous, for instance when one intends

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quandoque adulatio est gravior, puta quando intendit per deceptionem indebite honorem vel lucrum acquirere. Quandoque vero litigium est gravius, puta quando homo intendit vel veritatem impugnare, vel dicentem in contemptum adducere. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut adulator potest nocere occulte decipiendo, ita litigiosus potest interdum nocere manifeste impugnando. Gravius autem est, ceteris paribus, manifeste alicui nocere, quasi per violentiam, quam occulte, unde rapina est gravius peccatum quam furtum, ut supra dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod non semper in actibus humanis illud est gravius quod est turpius. Decor enim hominis est ex ratione, et ideo turpiora sunt peccata carnalia, quibus caro dominatur rationi, quamvis peccata spiritualia sint graviora, quia procedunt ex maiori contemptu. Et similiter peccata quae fiunt ex dolo sunt turpiora, inquantum videntur ex quadam infirmitate procedere, et ex quadam falsitate rationis, cum tamen peccata manifesta quandoque sint ex maiori contemptu. Et ideo adulatio, quasi cum dolo existens videtur esse turpior, sed litigium, quasi ex maiori contemptu procedens, videtur esse gravius.

Q. 116, A. 2

by deception to acquire undue honor or gain: while sometimes quarreling is more grievous; for instance, when one intends either to deny the truth, or to hold up the speaker to contempt.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as the flatterer may do harm by deceiving secretly, so the quarreler may do harm sometimes by assailing openly. Now, other things being equal, it is more grievous to harm a person openly, by violence as it were, than secretly. Wherefore robbery is a more grievous sin than theft, as stated above (Q. 66, A. 9). Reply Obj. 2: In human acts, the more grievous is not always the more vile. For the comeliness of a man has its source in his reason: wherefore the sins of the flesh, whereby the flesh enslaves the reason, are viler, although spiritual sins are more grievous, since they proceed from greater contempt. In like manner, sins that are committed through deceit are viler, insofar as they seem to arise from a certain weakness, and from a certain falseness of the reason, although sins that are committed openly proceed sometimes from a greater contempt. Hence flattery, through being accompanied by deceit, seems to be a viler sin; while quarreling, through proceeding from greater contempt, is apparently more grievous. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, veReply Obj. 3: As stated in the objection, shame regards recundia respicit turpitudinem peccati. Unde non sem- the vileness of a sin; wherefore a man is not always more per magis verecundatur homo de graviori peccato, sed ashamed of a more grievous sin, but of a viler sin. Hence it de magis turpi peccato. Et inde est quod magis verecun- is that a man is more ashamed of flattery than of quarreling, datur homo de adulatione quam de litigio, quamvis liti- although quarreling is more grievous.

gium sit gravius.

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Question 117 Liberality Deinde considerandum est de liberalitate, et vitiis We must now consider liberality and the opposite vices, oppositis, scilicet avaritia et prodigalitate. namely, covetousness and prodigality. Circa liberalitatem quaeruntur sex. Concerning liberality there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum liberalitas sit virtus. (1) Whether liberality is a virtue? Secundo, quae sit materia eius. (2) What is its matter? Tertio, de actu ipsius. (3) Of its act; Quarto, utrum magis ad eum pertineat dare quam (4) Whether it pertains thereto to give rather than to recipere. take? Quinto, utrum liberalitas sit pars iustitiae. (5) Whether liberality is a part of justice? Sexto, de comparatione eius ad alias virtutes. (6) Of its comparison with other virtues.

Article 1 Whether liberality is a virtue? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod liberalitas non sit virtus. Nulla enim virtus contrariatur inclinationi naturali. Inclinatio autem naturalis est ad hoc ut aliquis plus sibi quam aliis provideat. Cuius contrarium pertinet ad liberalem, quia, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., liberalis est non respicere ad seipsum, ita quod sibi minora derelinquit. Ergo liberalitas non est virtus. Item, per divitias homo suam vitam sustentat, et ad felicitatem divitiae organice deserviunt, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Cum igitur omnis virtus ordinetur ad felicitatem, videtur quod liberalis non est virtuosus, de quo philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod non est acceptivus pecuniae neque custoditivus, sed emissivus. Praeterea, virtutes habent connexionem ad invicem. Sed liberalitas non videtur connexa aliis virtutibus, multi enim sunt virtuosi qui non possunt esse liberales, quia non habent quod dent; multique liberaliter dant vel expendunt qui tamen alias sunt vitiosi. Ergo liberalitas non est virtus. Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic., quod in Evangelio multas disciplinas accipimus iustae liberalitatis. Sed in Evangelio non docentur nisi ea quae ad virtutem pertinent. Ergo liberalitas est virtus. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arbit., bene uti his quibus male uti possumus, pertinet ad virtutem. Possumus autem bene et male uti non solum his quae intra nos sunt, puta potentiis et passionibus animae, sed etiam his quae extra nos sunt, scilicet rebus huius mundi concessis nobis ad sustenta-

Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not a virtue. For no virtue is contrary to a natural inclination. Now it is a natural inclination for one to provide for oneself more than for others: and yet it pertains to the liberal man to do the contrary, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1), it is the mark of a liberal man not to look to himself, so that he leaves for himself the lesser things. Therefore liberality is not a virtue. Obj. 2: Further, man sustains life by means of riches, and wealth contributes to happiness instrumentally, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. Since, then, every virtue is directed to happiness, it seems that the liberal man is not virtuous, for the Philosopher says of him (Ethic. iv, 1) that he is inclined neither to receive nor to keep money, but to give it away. Obj. 3: Further, the virtues are connected with one another. But liberality does not seem to be connected with the other virtues: since many are virtuous who cannot be liberal, for they have nothing to give; and many give or spend liberally who are not virtuous otherwise. Therefore liberality is not a virtue. On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that the Gospel contains many instances in which a just liberality is inculcated. Now in the Gospel nothing is taught that does not pertain to virtue. Therefore liberality is a virtue. I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19), it belongs to virtue to use well the things that we can use ill. Now we may use both well and ill, not only the things that are within us, such as the powers and the passions of the soul, but also those that are without, such as the things of this world that are granted us for our livelihood. Wherefore

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tionem vitae. Et ideo, cum bene uti his rebus pertineat ad liberalitatem, consequens est quod liberalitas virtus sit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Ambrosius et Basilius dicunt, superabundantia divitiarum datur aliquibus a Deo ut meritum bonae dispensationis acquirant. Pauca autem uni sufficiunt. Et ideo liberalis plura laudabiliter in alios expendit quam in seipsum. Debet autem homo semper magis sibi providere in spiritualibus bonis, in quibus unusquisque sibi praecipue subvenire potest. Et tamen etiam in temporalibus rebus non pertinet ad liberalem ut sic aliis intendat quod omnino se et suos despiciat. Unde Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic., est illa probanda liberalitas ut proximos seminis tui non despicias, si egere cognoscas. Ad secundum dicendum quod ad liberalem non pertinet sic divitias emittere ut non sibi remaneat unde sustentetur, et unde virtutis opera exequatur, quibus ad felicitatem pervenitur. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod liberalis curat propria, volens per hoc quibusdam sufficere. Et Ambrosius dicit, in libro de Offic., quod dominus non vult simul effundi opes, sed dispensari. Nisi forte ut Elisaeus boves suos occidit et pavit pauperes ex eo quod habuit, ut nulla cura teneretur domestica, quod pertinet ad statum perfectionis spiritualis vitae, de quo infra dicetur. Et tamen sciendum quod hoc ipsum quod est sua liberaliter largiri, inquantum est actus virtutis, ad beatitudinem ordinatur. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., illi qui consumunt multa in intemperantias, non sunt liberales, sed prodigi. Et similiter quicumque effundit quae habet propter quaecumque alia peccata. Unde et Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic., si adiuves eum qui possessiones aliorum eripere conatur, non probatur largitas. Nec illa perfecta est liberalitas, si iactantiae causa, magis quam misericordiae, largiaris. Et ideo illi qui carent aliis virtutibus, licet in aliqua mala opera multa expendant, non sunt liberales. Nihil etiam prohibet aliquos multa in bonos usus expendentes habitum liberalitatis non habere, sicut et aliarum virtutum opera faciunt homines antequam habitum virtutis habeant, licet non eo modo quo virtuosi, ut supra dictum est. Similiter etiam nihil prohibet aliquos virtuosos, licet sint pauperes, esse liberales. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., secundum substantiam, idest facultatem divitiarum, liberalitas dicitur, non enim consistit in multitudine datorum, sed in dantis habitu. Et Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic., quod effectus divitem collationem aut pauperem facit, et pretium rebus imponit.

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since it belongs to liberality to use these things well, it follows that liberality is a virtue. Reply Obj. 1: According to Ambrose (Serm. lxiv de Temp.) and Basil (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18) excess of riches is granted by God to some, in order that they may obtain the merit of a good stewardship. But it suffices for one man to have few things. Wherefore the liberal man commendably spends more on others than on himself. Nevertheless we are bound to be more provident for ourselves in spiritual goods, in which each one is able to look after himself in the first place. And yet it does not belong to the liberal man even in temporal things to attend so much to others as to lose sight of himself and those belonging to him. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i): It is a commendable liberality not to neglect your relatives if you know them to be in want. Reply Obj. 2: It does not belong to a liberal man so to give away his riches that nothing is left for his own support, nor the wherewithal to perform those acts of virtue whereby happiness is acquired. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that the liberal man does not neglect his own, wishing thus to be of help to certain people; and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that Our Lord does not wish a man to pour out his riches all at once, but to dispense them: unless he do as Eliseus did, who slew his oxen and fed the poor, that he might not be bound by any household cares. For this belongs to the state of perfection, of which we shall speak farther on (Q. 184; Q. 186, A. 3). It must be observed, however, that the very act of giving away one’s possessions liberally, insofar as it is an act of virtue, is directed to happiness. Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), those who spend much on intemperance are not liberal but prodigal; and likewise whoever spends what he has for the sake of other sins. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i): If you assist to rob others of their possessions, your honesty is not to be commended, nor is your liberality genuine if you give for the sake of boasting rather than of pity. Wherefore those who lack other virtues, though they spend much on certain evil works, are not liberal. Again, nothing hinders certain people from spending much on good uses, without having the habit of liberality: even as men perform works of other virtues, before having the habit of virtue, though not in the same way as virtuous people, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). In like manner nothing prevents a virtuous man from being liberal, although he be poor. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): Liberality is proportionate to a man’s substance, i.e., his means, for it consists, not in the quantity given, but in the habit of the giver: and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that it is the heart that makes a gift rich or poor, and gives things their value.

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Q. 117, A. 2

Article 2 Whether liberality is about money? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod liberalitas non sit circa pecunias. Omnis enim virtus moralis est circa operationes vel passiones. Esse autem circa operationes est proprium iustitiae, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Ergo, cum liberalitas sit virtus moralis, videtur quod sit circa passiones, et non circa pecunias. Praeterea, ad liberalem pertinet quarumcumque divitiarum usus. Sed divitiae naturales sunt veriores quam divitiae artificiales, quae in pecuniis consistunt, ut patet per philosophum, in I Polit. Ergo liberalitas non est principaliter circa pecunias. Praeterea, diversarum virtutum diversae sunt materiae, quia habitus distinguuntur secundum obiecta. Sed res exteriores sunt materiae iustitiae distributivae et commutativae. Ergo non sunt materia liberalitatis. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod liberalitas videtur esse medietas quaedam circa pecunias. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in IV Ethic., ad liberalem pertinet emissivum esse. Unde et alio nomine liberalitas largitas nominatur, quia quod largum est, non est retentivum, sed est emissivum. Et ad hoc idem videtur pertinere etiam liberalitatis nomen, cum enim aliquis a se emittit, quodammodo illud a sua custodia et dominio liberat, et animum suum ab eius affectu liberum esse ostendit. Ea vero quae emittenda sunt ab uno homine in alium, sunt bona possessa, quae nomine pecuniae significantur. Et ideo propria materia liberalitatis est pecunia. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, liberalitas non attenditur in quantitate dati, sed in affectu dantis. Affectus autem dantis disponitur secundum passiones amoris et concupiscentiae, et per consequens delectationis et tristitiae, ad ea quae dantur. Et ideo immediata materia liberalitatis sunt interiores passiones, sed pecunia exterior est obiectum ipsarum passionum. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de doctrina Christ., totum quidquid homines in terra habent, et omnia quorum sunt domini, pecunia vocatur, quia antiqui, quae habebant, in pecoribus habebant. Et philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod pecunias dicimus omnia quorum dignitas numismate mensuratur. Ad tertium dicendum quod iustitia constituit aequalitatem in istis exterioribus rebus, non autem ad eam proprie pertinet moderari interiores passiones. Unde aliter pecunia est materia liberalitatis, et aliter iustitiae.

Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not about money. For every moral virtue is about operations and passions. Now it is proper to justice to be about operations, as stated in Ethic. v, 1. Therefore, since liberality is a moral virtue, it seems that it is about passions and not about money. Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man to make use of any kind of wealth. Now natural riches are more real than artificial riches, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 5, 6). Therefore liberality is not chiefly about money. Obj. 3: Further, different virtues have different matter, since habits are distinguished by their objects. But external things are the matter of distributive and commutative justice. Therefore they are not the matter of liberality. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that liberality seems to be a mean in the matter of money. I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) it belongs to the liberal man to part with things. Hence liberality is also called open-handedness (largitas), because that which is open does not withhold things but parts with them. The term liberality seems also to allude to this, since when a man quits hold of a thing he frees it (liberat), so to speak, from his keeping and ownership, and shows his mind to be free of attachment thereto. Now those things which are the subject of a man’s free-handedness towards others are the goods he possesses, which are denoted by the term money. Therefore the proper matter of liberality is money. Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), liberality depends not on the quantity given, but on the heart of the giver. Now the heart of the giver is disposed according to the passions of love and desire, and consequently those of pleasure and sorrow, towards the things given. Hence the interior passions are the immediate matter of liberality, while exterior money is the object of those same passions. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says in his book De Disciplina Christi (Tract. de diverse, i), everything whatsoever man has on earth, and whatsoever he owns, goes by the name of pecunia (money), because in olden times men’s possessions consisted entirely of pecora (flocks). And the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): We give the name of money to anything that can be valued in currency. Reply Obj. 3: Justice establishes equality in external things, but has nothing to do, properly speaking, with the regulation of internal passions: wherefore money is in one way the matter of liberality, and in another way of justice.

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Article 3 Whether using money is the act of liberality? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod uti pecunia non sit actus liberalitatis. Diversarum enim virtutum diversi sunt actus. Sed uti pecunia convenit aliis virtutibus, sicut iustitiae et magnificentiae. Non ergo est proprius actus liberalitatis. Praeterea, ad liberalem non solum pertinet dare, sed etiam accipere et custodire. Sed acceptio et custodia non videtur ad usum pecuniae pertinere. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur proprius liberalitatis actus usus pecuniae.

Objection 1: It seems that using money is not the act of liberality. For different virtues have different acts. But using money is becoming to other virtues, such as justice and magnificence. Therefore it is not the proper act of liberality.

Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man, not only to give but also to receive and keep. But receiving and keeping do not seem to be connected with the use of money. Therefore using money seems to be unsuitably assigned as the proper act of liberality. Praeterea, usus pecuniae non solum consistit in Obj. 3: Further, the use of money consists not only in hoc quod pecunia detur, sed in hoc quod expendatur. giving it but also in spending it. But the spending of money Sed expendere pecuniam refertur ad ipsum expenden- refers to the spender, and consequently is not an act of libtem, et sic non videtur esse liberalitatis actus, dicit enim erality: for Seneca says (De Benef. v): A man is not liberal by Seneca, in V de Benefic., non est liberalis aliquis ex hoc giving to himself. Therefore not every use of money belongs quod sibi donat. Ergo non quilibet usus pecuniae perti- to liberality.

net ad liberalitatem. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., unoquoque optime utitur qui habet circa singula virtutem. Divitiis ergo utetur optime qui habet circa pecunias virtutem. Iste autem est liberalis. Ergo bonus usus pecuniarum est actus liberalitatis. Respondeo dicendum quod species actus sumitur ex obiecto, ut supra habitum est. Obiectum autem sive materia liberalitatis est pecunia, et quidquid pecunia mensurari potest, ut dictum est. Et quia quaelibet virtus convenienter se habet ad suum obiectum, consequens est ut, cum liberalitas sit virtus, actus eius sit proportionatus pecuniae. Pecunia autem cadit sub ratione bonorum utilium, quia omnia exteriora bona ad usum hominis sunt ordinata. Et ideo proprius actus liberalitatis est pecunia vel divitiis uti. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad liberalitatem pertinet bene uti divitiis inquantum huiusmodi, eo quod divitiae sunt propria materia liberalitatis. Ad iustitiam autem pertinet uti divitiis secundum aliam rationem, scilicet secundum rationem debiti, prout scilicet res exterior debetur alteri. Ad magnificentiam etiam pertinet uti divitiis secundum quandam specialem rationem, idest secundum quod assumuntur in alicuius magni operis expletionem. Unde et magnificentia quodammodo se habet ex additione ad liberalitatem, ut infra dicetur. Ad secundum dicendum quod ad virtuosum pertinet non solum convenienter uti sua materia vel instrumento, sed etiam praeparare opportunitates ad bene utendum, sicut ad fortitudinem militis pertinet non solum exserere gladium in hostes, sed etiam exacuere gladium et in vagina conservare. Sic etiam ad liberalitatem

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): In whatever matter a man is virtuous, he will make the best use of that matter: Therefore he that has the virtue with regard to money will make the best use of riches. Now such is the liberal man. Therefore the good use of money is the act of liberality. I answer that, The species of an act is taken from its object, as stated above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2). Now the object or matter of liberality is money and whatever has a money value, as stated in the foregoing Article (ad 2). And since every virtue is consistent with its object, it follows that, since liberality is a virtue, its act is consistent with money. Now money comes under the head of useful goods, since all external goods are directed to man’s use. Hence the proper act of liberality is making use of money or riches. Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to liberality to make good use of riches as such, because riches are the proper matter of liberality. On the other hand it belongs to justice to make use of riches under another aspect, namely, that of debt, insofar as an external thing is due to another. And it belongs to magnificence to make use of riches under a special aspect, in so far, to wit, as they are employed for the fulfilment of some great deed. Hence magnificence stands in relation to liberality as something in addition thereto, as we shall explain farther on (Q. 134). Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to a virtuous man not only to make good use of his matter or instrument, but also to provide opportunities for that good use. Thus it belongs to a soldier’s fortitude not only to wield his sword against the foe, but also to sharpen his sword and keep it in its sheath. Thus, too, it belongs to liberality not only to use money, but

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pertinet non solum uti pecunia, sed etiam eam praeparare et conservare ad idoneum usum. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, propinqua materia liberalitatis sunt interiores passiones secundum quas homo afficitur circa pecuniam. Et ideo ad liberalitatem praecipue pertinet ut homo propter inordinatam affectionem ad pecuniam non prohibeatur a quocumque debito usu eius. Est autem duplex usus pecuniae, unus ad seipsum, qui videtur ad sumptus vel expensas pertinere; alius autem quo quis utitur ad alios, quod pertinet ad dationes. Et ideo ad liberalem pertinet ut neque propter immoderatum amorem pecuniae aliquis impediatur a convenientibus expensis, neque a convenientibus dationibus. Unde circa dationes et sumptus liberalitas consistit, secundum philosophum, in IV Ethic. Verbum autem Senecae intelligendum est de liberalitate secundum quod se habet ad dationes. Non enim dicitur aliquis liberalis ex hoc quod sibi aliquid donat.

Q. 117, A. 4

also to keep it in preparation and safety in order to make fitting use of it. Reply Obj. 3: As stated (A. 2, ad 1), the internal passions whereby man is affected towards money are the proximate matter of liberality. Hence it belongs to liberality before all that a man should not be prevented from making any due use of money through an inordinate affection for it. Now there is a twofold use of money: one consists in applying it to one’s own use, and would seem to come under the designation of costs or expenditure; while the other consists in devoting it to the use of others, and comes under the head of gifts. Hence it belongs to liberality that one be not hindered by an immoderate love of money, either from spending it becomingly, or from making suitable gifts. Therefore liberality is concerned with giving and spending, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). The saying of Seneca refers to liberality as regards giving: for a man is not said to be liberal for the reason that he gives something to himself.

Article 4 Whether it belongs to a liberal man chiefly to give? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad liberalem non maxime pertineat dare. Liberalitas enim a prudentia dirigitur, sicut et quaelibet alia moralis virtus. Sed maxime videtur ad prudentiam pertinere divitias conservare, unde et philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod illi qui non acquisierunt pecuniam, sed susceperunt ab aliis acquisitam, liberalius eam expendunt, quia sunt inexperti indigentiae. Ergo videtur quod dare non maxime pertineat ad liberalitatem. Praeterea, de hoc quod aliquis maxime intendit, nullus tristatur, neque ab eo cessat. Sed liberalis quandoque tristatur de his quae dedit, neque etiam dat omnibus, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Ergo ad liberalem non maxime pertinet dare. Praeterea, ad illud implendum quod quis maxime intendit, homo utitur viis quibus potest. Sed liberalis non est petitivus, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., cum per hoc posset sibi praeparare facultatem aliis donandi. Ergo videtur quod maxime non intendat ad dandum.

Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to a liberal man chiefly to give. For liberality, like all other moral virtues, is regulated by prudence. Now it seems to belong very much to prudence that a man should keep his riches. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that those who have not earned money, but have received the money earned by others, spend it more liberally, because they have not experienced the want of it. Therefore it seems that giving does not chiefly belong to the liberal man. Obj. 2: Further, no man is sorry for what he intends chiefly to do, nor does he cease from doing it. But a liberal man is sometimes sorry for what he has given, nor does he give to all, as stated in Ethic. iv, 1. Therefore it does not belong chiefly to a liberal man to give. Obj. 3: Further, in order to accomplish what he intends chiefly, a man employs all the ways he can. Now a liberal man is not a beggar, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1); and yet by begging he might provide himself with the means of giving to others. Therefore it seems that he does not chiefly aim at giving. Praeterea, magis homo obligatur ad hoc quod Obj. 4: Further, man is bound to look after himself provideat sibi quam aliis. Sed expendendo aliquid pro- rather than others. But by spending he looks after himself, videt sibi, dando autem providet aliis. Ergo ad liberalem whereas by giving he looks after others. Therefore it belongs magis pertinet expendere quam dare. to a liberal man to spend rather than to give. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in IV On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) Ethic., quod liberalis est superabundare in datione. that it belongs to a liberal man to surpass in giving. Respondeo dicendum quod proprium est liberaI answer that, It is proper to a liberal man to use lis uti pecunia. Usus autem pecuniae est in emissione money. Now the use of money consists in parting with it. ipsius, nam acquisitio pecuniae magis assimilatur ge- For the acquisition of money is like generation rather than

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nerationi quam usui; custodia vero pecuniae, inquantum ordinatur ad facultatem utendi, assimilatur habitui. Emissio autem alicuius rei, quanto fit ad aliquid distantius, tanto a maiori virtute procedit, sicut patet in his quae proiiciuntur. Et ideo ex maiori virtute procedit quod aliquis emittat pecuniam dando eam aliis, quam expendendo eam circa seipsum. Proprium autem est virtutis ut praecipue tendat in id quod perfectius est, nam virtus est perfectio quaedam, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Et ideo liberalis maxime laudatur ex datione. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad prudentiam pertinet custodire pecuniam ne subripiatur aut inutiliter expendatur. Sed utiliter eam expendere non est minoris prudentiae quam utiliter eam conservare, sed maioris, quia plura sunt attendenda circa usum rei, qui assimilatur motui, quam circa conservationem, quae assimilatur quieti. Quod autem illi qui susceperunt pecunias ab aliis acquisitas, liberalius expendunt, quasi existentes inopiae inexperti, si solum propter hanc inexperientiam liberaliter expenderent, non haberent liberalitatis virtutem. Sed quandoque huiusmodi inexperientia se habet solum sicut tollens impedimentum liberalitatis, ita quod promptius liberaliter agant. Timor enim inopiae, ex eius experientia procedens, impedit quandoque eos qui acquisiverunt pecuniam ne eam consumant liberaliter agendo. Et similiter amor quo eam amant tanquam proprium effectum, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad liberalitatem pertinet convenienter uti pecunia, et per consequens convenienter dare, quod est quidam pecuniae usus. Quaelibet autem virtus tristatur de contrario sui actus, et vitat eius impedimenta. Ei autem quod est convenienter dare duo opponuntur, scilicet non dare quod convenienter est dandum, et dare aliquid non convenienter. Unde de utroque tristatur liberalis, sed de primo magis, quia plus opponitur proprio actui. Et ideo etiam non dat omnibus, impediretur enim actus eius si quibuslibet daret; non enim haberet unde aliis daret, quibus dare convenit. Ad tertium dicendum quod dare et accipere se habent sicut agere et pati. Non est autem idem principium agendi et patiendi. Unde quia liberalitas est principium dationis, non pertinet ad liberalem ut sit promptus ad recipiendum, et multo minus ad petendum. Ordinat autem ad dandum aliqua secundum liberalitatis convenientiam, scilicet fructus propriarum possessionum; quos sollicite procurat, ut eis liberaliter utatur. Ad quartum dicendum quod ad expendendum in seipsum natura inclinat. Unde hoc quod pecuniam quis perfundat in alios, pertinet proprie ad virtutem.

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use: while the keeping of money, insofar as it is directed to facilitate the use of money, is like a habit. Now in parting with a thing—for instance, when we throw something—the farther we put it away the greater the force (virtus) employed. Hence parting with money by giving it to others proceeds from a greater virtue than when we spend it on ourselves. But it is proper to a virtue as such to tend to what is more perfect, since virtue is a kind of perfection (Phys. vii, text. 17, 18). Therefore a liberal man is praised chiefly for giving. Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to prudence to keep money, lest it be stolen or spent uselessly. But to spend it usefully is not less but more prudent than to keep it usefully: since more things have to be considered in money’s use, which is likened to movement, than in its keeping, which is likened to rest. As to those who, having received money that others have earned, spend it more liberally, through not having experienced the want of it, if their inexperience is the sole cause of their liberal expenditure they have not the virtue of liberality. Sometimes, however, this inexperience merely removes the impediment to liberality, so that it makes them all the more ready to act liberally, because, not unfrequently, the fear of want that results from the experience of want hinders those who have acquired money from using it up by acting with liberality; as does likewise the love they have for it as being their own effect, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). Reply Obj. 2: As stated in this and the preceding Article, it belongs to liberality to make fitting use of money, and consequently to give it in a fitting manner, since this is a use of money. Again, every virtue is grieved by whatever is contrary to its act, and avoids whatever hinders that act. Now two things are opposed to suitable giving; namely, not giving what ought suitably to be given, and giving something unsuitably. Wherefore the liberal man is grieved at both: but especially at the former, since it is more opposed to his proper act. For this reason, too, he does not give to all: since his act would be hindered were he to give to everyone: for he would not have the means of giving to those to whom it were fitting for him to give. Reply Obj. 3: Giving and receiving are related to one another as action and passion. Now the same thing is not the principle of both action and passion. Hence, since liberality is a principle of giving, it does not belong to the liberal man to be ready to receive, and still less to beg. But he makes provision in order to give certain things according as liberality requires; such are the fruits of his own possessions, for he is careful about realizing them that he may make a liberal use thereof. Reply Obj. 4: To spend on oneself is an inclination of nature; hence to spend money on others belongs properly to a virtue.

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Article 5 Whether liberality is a part of justice? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod liberalitas non sit pars iustitiae. Iustitia enim respicit debitum. Sed quanto aliquid est magis debitum, tanto minus liberaliter datur. Ergo liberalitas non est pars iustitiae, sed ei repugnat. Praeterea, iustitia est circa operationes, ut supra habitum est. Liberalitas autem praecipue est circa amorem et concupiscentiam pecuniarum, quae sunt passiones. Ergo magis videtur liberalitas ad temperantiam pertinere quam ad iustitiam. Praeterea, ad liberalitatem pertinet praecipue convenienter dare, ut dictum est. Sed convenienter dare pertinet ad beneficentiam et misericordiam, quae pertinent ad caritatem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo liberalitas magis est pars caritatis quam iustitiae. Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic., iustitia ad societatem generis humani refertur. Societatis enim ratio dividitur in duas partes, iustitiam et beneficentiam, quam eandem liberalitatem aut benignitatem vocant. Ergo liberalitas ad iustitiam pertinet. Respondeo dicendum quod liberalitas non est species iustitiae, quia iustitia exhibet alteri quod est eius, liberalitas autem exhibet id quod est suum. Habet tamen quandam convenientiam cum iustitia in duobus. Primo quidem, quia principaliter est ad alterum, sicut et iustitia. Secundo, quia est circa res exteriores, sicut et iustitia, licet secundum aliam rationem, ut dictum est. Et ideo liberalitas a quibusdam ponitur pars iustitiae, sicut virtus ei annexa ut principali. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod liberalitas, etsi non attendat debitum legale, quod attendit iustitia, attendit tamen debitum quoddam morale, quod attenditur ex quadam ipsius decentia, non ex hoc quod sit alteri obligatus. Unde minimum habet de ratione debiti. Ad secundum dicendum quod temperantia est circa concupiscentias corporalium delectationum. Concupiscentia autem pecuniae, et delectatio, non est corporalis, sed magis animalis. Unde liberalitas non pertinet proprie ad temperantiam. Ad tertium dicendum quod datio benefici et misericordis procedit ex eo quod homo est aliqualiter affectus circa eum cui dat. Et ideo talis datio pertinet ad caritatem sive ad amicitiam. Sed datio liberalitatis provenit ex eo quod dans est aliqualiter affectus circa pecuniam, dum eam non concupiscit neque amat. Unde etiam non solum amicis, sed etiam ignotis dat, quando oportet. Unde non pertinet ad caritatem, sed magis ad iustitiam, quae est circa res exteriores.

Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not a part of justice. For justice regards that which is due. Now the more a thing is due the less liberally is it given. Therefore liberality is not a part of justice, but is incompatible with it. Obj. 2: Further, justice is about operation as stated above (Q. 58, A. 9; I-II, Q. 60, AA. 2, 3): whereas liberality is chiefly about the love and desire of money, which are passions. Therefore liberality seems to belong to temperance rather than to justice. Obj. 3: Further, it belongs chiefly to liberality to give becomingly, as stated (A. 4). But giving becomingly belongs to beneficence and mercy, which pertain to charity, as state above (QQ. 30, 31). Therefore liberality is a part of charity rather than of justice. On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): Justice has to do with the fellowship of mankind. For the notion of fellowship is divided into two parts, justice and beneficence, also called liberality or kind-heartedness. Therefore liberality pertains to justice. I answer that, Liberality is not a species of justice, since justice pays another what is his whereas liberality gives another what is one’s own. There are, however, two points in which it agrees with justice: first, that it is directed chiefly to another, as justice is; second, that it is concerned with external things, and so is justice, albeit under a different aspect, a stated in this Article and above (A. 2, ad 3). Hence it is that liberality is reckoned by some to be a part of justice, being annexed thereto as to a principal virtue. Reply Obj. 1: Although liberality does not consider the legal due that justice considers, it considers a certain moral due. This due is based on a certain fittingness and not on an obligation: so that it answers to the idea of due in the lowest degree. Reply Obj. 2: Temperance is about concupiscence in pleasures of the body. But the concupiscence and delight in money is not referable to the body but rather to the soul. Hence liberality does not properly pertain to temperance. Reply Obj. 3: The giving of beneficence and mercy proceeds from the fact that a man has a certain affection towards the person to whom he gives: wherefore this giving belongs to charity or friendship. But the giving of liberality arises from a person being affected in a certain way towards money, in that he desires it not nor loves it: so that when it is fitting he gives it not only to his friends but also to those whom he knows not. Hence it belong not to charity, but to justice, which is about external things.

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Article 6 Whether liberality is the greatest of the virtues? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod liberalitas sit maxima virtutum. Omnis enim virtus hominis est quaedam similitudo divinae bonitatis. Sed per liberalitatem homo maxime assimilatur Deo, qui dat omnibus affluenter et non improperat, ut dicitur Iac. Ergo liberalitas est maxima virtutum. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, in VI de Trin., in his quae non mole magna sunt, idem est esse maius quod melius. Sed ratio bonitatis maxime videtur ad liberalitatem pertinere, quia bonum est diffusivum, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Unde et Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic., quod iustitia censuram tenet, liberalitas bonitatem. Ergo liberalitas est maxima virtutum. Praeterea, homines honorantur et amantur propter virtutem. Sed Boetius dicit, in libro de Consolat., largitas maxime claros facit. Et philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod inter virtuosos maxime liberales amantur. Ergo liberalitas est maxima virtutum. Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic., quod iustitia excelsior videtur liberalitate, sed liberalitas gratior. Philosophus etiam dicit, in I Rhetoric., quod fortes et iusti maxime honorantur, et post eos liberales. Respondeo dicendum quod quaelibet virtus tendit in aliquod bonum. Unde quanto aliqua virtus in melius bonum tendit, tanto melior est. Liberalitas autem tendit in aliquod bonum dupliciter, uno modo, primo et per se; alio modo, ex consequenti. Primo quidem et per se tendit ad ordinandum propriam affectionem circa pecuniarum possessionem et usum. Et sic, secundum hoc, praefertur liberalitati et temperantia, quae moderatur concupiscentias et delectationes pertinentes ad proprium corpus; et fortitudo et iustitia, quae ordinantur quodammodo in bonum commune, una tempore pacis, alia tempore belli; et omnibus praeferuntur virtutes quae ordinant in bonum divinum. Nam bonum divinum praeeminet cuilibet bono humano; et in bonis humanis bonum publicum praeeminet bono privato; in quibus bonum corporis praeeminet bono exteriorum rerum. Alio modo ordinatur liberalitas ad aliquod bonum ex consequenti. Et secundum hoc, liberalitas ordinatur in omnia bona praedicta, ex hoc enim quod homo non est amativus pecuniae, sequitur quod de facili utatur ea et ad seipsum, et ad utilitatem aliorum, et ad honorem Dei. Et secundum hoc, habet quandam excellentiam ex hoc quod utilis est ad multa. Quia tamen unumquodque magis iudicatur secundum illud quod primo et per se competit ei quam secundum id quod consequenter se habet, ideo dicendum est liberalitatem non esse maximam virtutem.

Objection 1: It seems that liberality is the greatest of the virtues. For every virtue of man is a likeness to the divine goodness. Now man is likened chiefly by liberality to God, Who giveth to all men abundantly, and upbraideth not (Jas 1:5). Therefore liberality is the greatest of the virtues. Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 8), in things that are great, but not in bulk, to be greatest is to be best. Now the nature of goodness seems to pertain mostly to liberality, since the good is self-communicative, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that justice reclines to severity, liberality to goodness. Therefore liberality is the greatest of virtues. Obj. 3: Further, men are honored and loved on account of virtue. Now Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that bounty above all makes a man famous: and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that among the virtuous the liberal are the most beloved. Therefore liberality is the greatest of virtues. On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that justice seems to be more excellent than liberality, although liberality is more pleasing. The Philosopher also says (Rhet. i, 9) that brave and just men are honored chiefly and, after them, those who are liberal. I answer that, Every virtue tends towards a good; wherefore the greater virtue is that which tends towards the greater good. Now liberality tends towards a good in two ways: in one way, primarily and of its own nature; in another way, consequently. Primarily and of its very nature it tends to set in order one’s own affection towards the possession and use of money. In this way temperance, which moderates desires and pleasures relating to one’s own body, takes precedence of liberality: and so do fortitude and justice, which, in a manner, are directed to the common good, one in time of peace, the other in time of war: while all these are preceded by those virtues which are directed to the Divine good. For the Divine good surpasses all manner of human good; and among human goods the public good surpasses the good of the individual; and of the last named the good of the body surpasses those goods that consist of external things. Again, liberality is ordained to a good consequently, and in this way it is directed to all the aforesaid goods. For by reason of his not being a lover of money, it follows that a man readily makes use of it, whether for himself, or for the good of others, or for God’s glory. Thus it derives a certain excellence from being useful in many ways. Since, however, we should judge of things according to that which is competent to them primarily and in respect of their nature, rather than according to that which pertains to them. Consequently, it remains to be said that liberality is not the greatest of virtues.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod datio divina provenit ex eo quod amat homines quibus dat, non autem ex eo quod afficiatur ad ea quae dat. Et ideo magis videtur pertinere ad caritatem, quae est maxima virtutum, quam ad liberalitatem. Ad secundum dicendum quod quaelibet virtus participat rationem boni quantum ad emissionem proprii actus. Actus autem quarundam aliarum virtutum meliores sunt pecunia, quam emittit liberalis. Ad tertium dicendum quod liberales maxime amantur, non quidem amicitia honesti, quasi sint meliores; sed amicitia utilis, quia sunt utiliores in exterioribus bonis, quae communiter homines maxime cupiunt. Et etiam propter eandem causam clari redduntur.

Q. 117, A. 6

Reply Obj. 1: God’s giving proceeds from His love for those to whom He gives, not from His affection towards the things He gives, wherefore it seems to pertain to charity, the greatest of virtues, rather than to liberality. Reply Obj. 2: Every virtue shares the nature of goodness by giving forth its own act: and the acts of certain other virtues are better than money which liberality gives forth. Reply Obj. 3: The friendship whereby a liberal man is beloved is not that which is based on virtue, as though he were better than others, but that which is based on utility, because he is more useful in external goods, which as a rule men desire above all others. For the same reason he becomes famous.

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Question 118 Covetousness Deinde considerandum est de vitiis oppositis liberaWe must now consider the vices opposed to liberality: litati. Et primo, de avaritia; secundo, de prodigalitate. and (1) covetousness; (2) prodigality. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum avaritia sit peccatum. (1) Whether covetousness is a sin? Secundo, utrum sit speciale peccatum. (2) Whether it is a special sin? Tertio, cui virtuti opponatur. (3) To which virtue it is opposed; Quarto, utrum sit peccatum mortale. (4) Whether it is a mortal sin? Quinto, utrum sit gravissimum peccatorum. (5) Whether it is the most grievous of sins? Sexto, utrum sit peccatum carnale, vel spirituale. (6) Whether it is a sin of the flesh or a spiritual sin? Septimo, utrum sit vitium capitale. (7) Whether it is a capital vice? Octavo, de filiabus eius. (8) Of its daughters.

Article 1 Whether covetousness is a sin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod avaritia non sit peccatum. Dicitur enim avaritia quasi aeris aviditas, quia scilicet in appetitu pecuniae consistit, per quam omnia exteriora bona intelligi possunt. Sed appetere exteriora bona non est peccatum. Naturaliter enim homo ea appetit, tum quia naturaliter subiecta sunt homini; tum quia per ea vita hominis conservatur, unde et substantia hominis dicuntur. Ergo avaritia non est peccatum. Praeterea, omne peccatum aut est in Deum, aut in proximum, aut est in seipsum, sicut supra habitum est. Sed avaritia non est proprie peccatum contra Deum, non enim opponitur neque religioni neque virtutibus theologicis, quibus homo ordinatur in Deum. Neque etiam est peccatum in seipsum, hoc enim proprie pertinet ad gulam et luxuriam, de qua apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. VI, quod qui fornicatur in corpus suum peccat. Similiter etiam non videtur peccatum esse in proximum, quia per hoc quod homo retinet sua, nulli facit iniuriam. Ergo avaritia non est peccatum. Praeterea, ea quae naturaliter adveniunt non sunt peccata. Sed avaritia naturaliter consequitur senectutem et quemlibet defectum, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Ergo avaritia non est peccatum. Sed contra est quod dicitur Heb. ult., sint mores sine avaritia, contenti praesentibus.

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a sin. For covetousness (avaritia) denotes a certain greed for gold (aeris aviditas), because, to wit, it consists in a desire for money, under which all external goods may be comprised . . . Now it is not a sin to desire external goods: since man desires them naturally, both because they are naturally subject to man, and because by their means man’s life is sustained (for which reason they are spoken of as his substance). Therefore covetousness is not a sin. Obj. 2: Further, every sin is against either God, or one’s neighbor, or oneself, as stated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 4). But covetousness is not, properly speaking, a sin against God: since it is opposed neither to religion nor to the theological virtues, by which man is directed to God. Nor again is it a sin against oneself, for this pertains properly to gluttony and lust, of which the Apostle says (1 Cor 6:18): He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body. In like manner neither is it apparently a sin against one’s neighbor, since a man harms no one by keeping what is his own. Therefore covetousness is not a sin. Obj. 3: Further, things that occur naturally are not sins. Now covetousness comes naturally to old age and every kind of defect, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore covetousness is not a sin. On the contrary, It is written (Heb 13:5): Let your manners be without covetousness, contented with such things as you have. Respondeo dicendum quod in quibuscumque boI answer that, In whatever things good consists in a num consistit in debita mensura, necesse est quod per due measure, evil must of necessity ensue through excess excessum vel diminutionem illius mensurae malum pro- or deficiency of that measure. Now in all things that are

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veniat. In omnibus autem quae sunt propter finem, bonum consistit in quadam mensura, nam ea quae sunt ad finem necesse est commensurari fini, sicut medicina sanitati; ut patet per philosophum, in I Polit. Bona autem exteriora habent rationem utilium ad finem, sicut dictum est. Unde necesse est quod bonum hominis circa ea consistat in quadam mensura, dum scilicet homo secundum aliquam mensuram quaerit habere exteriores divitias prout sunt necessaria ad vitam eius secundum suam conditionem. Et ideo in excessu huius mensurae consistit peccatum, dum scilicet aliquis supra debitum modum vult eas vel acquirere vel retinere. Quod pertinet ad rationem avaritiae, quae definitur esse immoderatus amor habendi. Unde patet quod avaritia est peccatum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod appetitus rerum exteriorum est homini naturalis ut eorum quae sunt propter finem. Et ideo intantum vitio caret inquantum continetur sub regula sumpta ex ratione finis. Avaritia autem hanc regulam excedit. Et ideo est peccatum. Ad secundum dicendum quod avaritia potest importare immoderantiam circa res exteriores dupliciter. Uno modo, immediate, quantum ad acceptionem vel conservationem ipsarum, ut scilicet homo plus debito eas acquirat vel conservet. Et secundum hoc, est directe peccatum in proximum, quia in exterioribus divitiis non potest unus homo superabundare nisi alter deficiat, quia bona temporalia non possunt simul possideri a multis. Alio modo, potest importare immoderantiam circa interiores affectiones quas quis ad divitias habet, puta quod immoderate aliquis divitias amet aut desideret, aut delectetur in eis. Et sic avaritia est peccatum hominis in seipsum, quia per hoc deordinatur eius affectus; licet non deordinetur corpus, sicut per vitia carnalia. Ex consequenti autem est peccatum in Deum, sicut et omnia peccata mortalia, inquantum homo propter bonum temporale contemnit aeternum. Ad tertium dicendum quod inclinationes naturales sunt regulandae secundum rationem, quae principatum tenet in natura humana. Et ideo quamvis senes, propter naturae defectum, avidius exteriorum rerum inquirant subsidia, sicut et omnis indigens quaerit suae indigentiae supplementum; non tamen a peccato excusantur, si debitam rationis mensuram circa divitias excedant.

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for an end, the good consists in a certain measure: since whatever is directed to an end must needs be commensurate with the end, as, for instance, medicine is commensurate with health, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 6). External goods come under the head of things useful for an end, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 3; I-II, Q. 2, A. 1). Hence it must needs be that man’s good in their respect consists in a certain measure, in other words, that man seeks, according to a certain measure, to have external riches, insofar as they are necessary for him to live in keeping with his condition of life. Wherefore it will be a sin for him to exceed this measure, by wishing to acquire or keep them immoderately. This is what is meant by covetousness, which is defined as immoderate love of possessing. It is therefore evident that covetousness is a sin. Reply Obj. 1: It is natural to man to desire external things as means to an end: wherefore this desire is devoid of sin, insofar as it is held in check by the rule taken from the nature of the end. But covetousness exceeds this rule, and therefore is a sin. Reply Obj. 2: Covetousness may signify immoderation about external things in two ways. First, so as to regard immediately the acquisition and keeping of such things, when, to wit, a man acquires or keeps them more than is due. In this way it is a sin directly against one’s neighbor, since one man cannot over-abound in external riches, without another man lacking them, for temporal goods cannot be possessed by many at the same time. Second, it may signify immoderation in the internal affection which a man has for riches when, for instance, a man loves them, desires them, or delights in them, immoderately. In this way by covetousness a man sins against himself, because it causes disorder in his affections, though not in his body as do the sins of the flesh. As a consequence, however, it is a sin against God, just as all mortal sins, inasmuch as man condemns things eternal for the sake of temporal things. Reply Obj. 3: Natural inclinations should be regulated according to reason, which is the governing power in human nature. Hence though old people seek more greedily the aid of external things, just as everyone that is in need seeks to have his need supplied, they are not excused from sin if they exceed this due measure of reason with regard to riches.

Article 2 Whether covetousness is a special sin? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a speavaritia non sit speciale peccatum. Dicit enim Augusti- cial sin. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): Covetousness, nus, in III de Lib. Arbit., avaritia, quae Graece philargy- which in Greek is called philargyria, applies not only to silver

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ria dicitur, non in solo argento vel nummis, sed in omnibus rebus quae immoderate cupiuntur, intelligenda est. Sed in omni peccato est cupiditas immoderata alicuius rei, quia peccatum est, spreto bono incommutabili, bonis commutabilibus inhaerere, ut supra habitum est. Ergo avaritia est generale peccatum. Praeterea, secundum Isidorum, in libro Etymol., avarus dicitur quasi avidus aeris, idest pecuniae, unde et in Graeco avaritia philargyria nominatur, idest amor argenti. Sed sub argento, per quod pecunia significatur, significantur omnia exteriora bona quorum pretium potest numismate mensurari, ut supra habitum est. Ergo avaritia consistit in appetitu cuiuslibet exterioris rei. Ergo videtur esse generale peccatum. Praeterea, super illud Rom. VII, nam concupiscentiam nesciebam etc., dicit Glossa, bona est lex, quae, dum concupiscentiam prohibet, omne malum prohibet. Videtur autem lex specialiter prohibere concupiscentiam avaritiae, ubi dicitur, Exod. XX, non concupisces rem proximi tui. Ergo concupiscentia avaritiae est omne malum. Et ita avaritia est generale peccatum. Sed contra est quod Rom. I, avaritia connumeratur inter alia specialia peccata, ubi dicitur, repletos omni iniquitate, malitia, fornicatione, avaritia, et cetera. Respondeo dicendum quod peccata sortiuntur speciem secundum obiecta, ut supra habitum est. Obiectum autem peccati est illud bonum in quod tendit inordinatus appetitus. Et ideo ubi est specialis ratio boni quod inordinate appetitur, ibi est specialis ratio peccati. Alia autem est ratio boni utilis, et boni delectabilis. Divitiae autem secundum se habent rationem utilis, ea enim ratione appetuntur, inquantum in usum hominis cedunt. Et ideo speciale quoddam peccatum est avaritia, secundum quod est immoderatus amor habendi possessiones, quae nomine pecuniae designantur, ex qua sumitur avaritiae nomen. Verum quia verbum habendi secundum primam impositionem ad possessiones pertinere videtur, quarum sumus totaliter domini; ad multa alia derivatur, sicut dicitur homo habere sanitatem, uxorem, vestimentum, et alia huiusmodi, ut patet in praedicamentis, per consequens etiam et nomen avaritiae ampliatum est ad omnem immoderatum appetitum habendi quamcumque rem; sicut Gregorius dicit, in quadam homilia, quod avaritia est non solum pecuniae, sed etiam scientiae et altitudinis, cum supra modum sublimitas ambitur. Et secundum hoc, avaritia non esset peccatum speciale. Et hoc etiam modo loquitur Augustinus de avaritia in auctoritate inducta. Unde patet responsio ad primum. Ad secundum dicendum quod omnes res exteriores quae veniunt in usum humanae vitae, nomine pe-

Q. 118, A. 2

or money, but also to anything that is desired immoderately. Now in every sin there is immoderate desire of something, because sin consists in turning away from the immutable good, and adhering to mutable goods, as stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 6, Obj. 3). Therefore covetousness is a general sin. Obj. 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x), the covetous (avarus) man is so called because he is greedy for brass (avidus aeris), i.e., money: wherefore in Greek covetousness is called philargyria, i.e., love of silver. Now silver, which stands for money, signifies all external goods the value of which can be measured by money, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 2, ad 2). Therefore covetousness is a desire for any external thing: and consequently seems to be a general sin. Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Rom. 7:7, For I had not known concupiscence, says: The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evil. Now the law seems to forbid especially the concupiscence of covetousness: hence it is written (Exod 20:17): Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s goods. Therefore the concupiscence of covetousness is all evil, and so covetousness is a general sin. On the contrary, Covetousness is numbered together with other special sins (Rom 1:29), where it is written: Being filled with all iniquity, malice, fornication, covetousness, etc. I answer that, Sins take their species from their objects, as stated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 1). Now the object of a sin is the good towards which an inordinate appetite tends. Hence where there is a special aspect of good inordinately desired, there is a special kind of sin. Now the useful good differs in aspect from the delightful good. And riches, as such, come under the head of useful good, since they are desired under the aspect of being useful to man. Consequently covetousness is a special sin, forasmuch as it is an immoderate love of having possessions, which are comprised under the name of money, whence covetousness (avaritia) is denominated. Since, however, the verb to have, which seems to have been originally employed in connection with possessions whereof we are absolute masters, is applied to many other things (thus a man is said to have health, a wife, clothes, and so forth, as stated in De Praedicamentis), consequently the term covetousness has been amplified to denote all immoderate desire for having anything whatever. Thus Gregory says in a homily (xvi in Ev.) that covetousness is a desire not only for money, but also for knowledge and high places, when prominence is immoderately sought after. In this way covetousness is not a special sin: and in this sense Augustine speaks of covetousness in the passage quoted in the First Objection. Wherefore this suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. Reply Obj. 2: All those external things that are subject to the uses of human life are comprised under the term

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cuniae intelliguntur inquantum habent rationem boni utilis. Sunt autem quaedam exteriora bona quae potest aliquis pecunia consequi, sicut voluptates et honores et alia huiusmodi, quae habent aliam rationem appetibilitatis. Et ideo illorum appetitus non proprie dicitur avaritia, secundum quod est vitium speciale. Ad tertium dicendum quod Glossa illa loquitur de concupiscentia inordinata cuiuscumque rei. Potest enim intelligi quod per prohibitionem concupiscentiae rerum possessarum prohibeatur quarumcumque rerum concupiscentia quae per res possessas acquiri possunt.

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money, inasmuch as they have the aspect of useful good. But there are certain external goods that can be obtained by money, such as pleasures, honors, and so forth, which are desirable under another aspect. Wherefore the desire for such things is not properly called covetousness, insofar as it is a special vice. Reply Obj. 3: This gloss speaks of the inordinate concupiscence for anything whatever. For it is easy to understand that if it is forbidden to covet another’s possessions it is also forbidden to covet those things that can be obtained by means of those possessions.

Article 3 Whether covetousness is opposed to liberality? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod avaritia non opponatur liberalitati. Quia super illud Matth. V, beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt iustitiam, dicit Chrysostomus quod est duplex iustitia, una generalis, et alia specialis, cui opponitur avaritia. Et hoc idem philosophus dicit, in V Ethic. Ergo avaritia non opponitur liberalitati. Praeterea, peccatum avaritiae in hoc consistit quod homo transcendit mensuram in rebus possessis. Sed huiusmodi mensura statuitur per iustitiam. Ergo avaritia directe opponitur iustitiae, et non liberalitati. Praeterea, liberalitas est virtus media inter duo vitia contraria, ut patet per philosophum, in II et IV Ethic. Sed avaritia non habet peccatum contrarium oppositum, ut patet per philosophum, in V Ethic. Ergo avaritia non opponitur liberalitati. Sed contra est quod, sicut dicitur Eccle. V, avarus non impletur pecunia, et qui amat divitias fructum non capiet ex eis. Sed non impleri pecunia, et inordinate eas amare, est contrarium liberalitati, quae in appetitu divitiarum medium tenet. Ergo avaritia opponitur liberalitati. Respondeo dicendum quod avaritia importat immoderantiam quandam circa divitias dupliciter. Uno modo, immediate circa ipsam acceptionem et conservationem divitiarum, inquantum scilicet aliquis acquirit pecuniam ultra debitum aliena subripiendo vel retinendo. Et sic opponitur iustitiae. Et hoc modo accipitur avaritia Ezech. XXII, ubi dicitur, principes eius in medio eius quasi lupi rapientes praedam ad effundendum sanguinem, et avare lucra sectanda. Alio modo, importat immoderantiam circa interiores affectiones divitiarum, puta cum quis nimis amat vel desiderat divitias, aut nimis delectatur in eis, etiam si nolit rapere aliena. Et hoc modo avaritia opponitur liberalitati, quae moderatur huiusmodi affectiones, ut dictum est. Et sic accipitur avaritia II ad Cor.

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not opposed to liberality. For Chrysostom, commenting on Matt. 5:6, Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice, says, (Hom. xv in Matth.) that there are two kinds of justice, one general, and the other special, to which covetousness is opposed: and the Philosopher says the same (Ethic. v, 2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality. Obj. 2: Further, the sin of covetousness consists in a man’s exceeding the measure in the things he possesses. But this measure is appointed by justice. Therefore covetousness is directly opposed to justice and not to liberality. Obj. 3: Further, liberality is a virtue that observes the mean between two contrary vices, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 7; iv, 1). But covetousness has no contrary and opposite sin, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1, 2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality. On the contrary, It is written (Eccl 5:9): A covetous man shall not be satisfied with money, and he that loveth riches shall have no fruits from them. Now not to be satisfied with money and to love it inordinately are opposed to liberality, which observes the mean in the desire of riches. Therefore covetousness is opposed to liberality. I answer that, Covetousness denotes immoderation with regard to riches in two ways. First, immediately in respect of the acquisition and keeping of riches. In this way a man obtains money beyond his due, by stealing or retaining another’s property. This is opposed to justice, and in this sense covetousness is mentioned (Ezek 22:27): Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood . . . and to run after gains through covetousness. Second, it denotes immoderation in the interior affections for riches; for instance, when a man loves or desires riches too much, or takes too much pleasure in them, even if he be unwilling to steal. In this way covetousness is opposed to liberality, which moderates these affections, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 2, ad 3; A. 3, ad 3; A. 6). In this sense covetous-

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Q. 118, A. 4

IX, praeparent repromissam benedictionem hanc paratam ness is spoken of (2 Cor 9:5): That they would . . . prepare esse sic quasi benedictionem, non quasi avaritiam, Glossa, this blessing before promised, to be ready, so as a blessing, not ut scilicet doleant pro dato, et parum sit quod dent. as covetousness, where a gloss observes: Lest they should regret what they had given, and give but little. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Chrysostomus et Reply Obj. 1: Chrysostom and the Philosopher are philosophus loquuntur de avaritia primo modo dicta. speaking of covetousness in the first sense: covetousness in Avaritiam autem secundo modo dictam nominat philo- the second sense is called illiberality by the Philosopher. sophus illiberalitatem. Ad secundum dicendum quod iustitia proprie staReply Obj. 2: It belongs properly to justice to appoint tuit mensuram in acceptionibus et conservationibus di- the measure in the acquisition and keeping of riches from vitiarum secundum rationem debiti legalis, ut scilicet the point of view of legal due, so that a man should neither homo nec accipiat nec retineat alienum. Sed liberali- take nor retain another’s property. But liberality appoints tas constituit mensuram rationis principaliter quidem in the measure of reason, principally in the interior affections, interioribus affectionibus, et per consequens in exterio- and consequently in the exterior taking and keeping of ri acceptione et conservatione pecuniarum et emissio- money, and in the spending of the same, insofar as these ne earum secundum quod ex interiori affectione proce- proceed from the interior affection, looking at the matter dunt, non observando rationem debiti legalis, sed debiti from the point of view not of the legal but of the moral debt, moralis, quod attenditur secundum regulam rationis. which latter depends on the rule of reason. Ad tertium dicendum quod avaritia secundum Reply Obj. 3: Covetousness as opposed to justice has quod opponitur iustitiae, non habet vitium oppositum, no opposite vice: since it consists in having more than one quia avaritia consistit in plus habendo quam debeat ought according to justice, the contrary of which is to have secundum iustitiam, et huic opponitur minus habere, less than one ought, and this is not a sin but a punishment. quod non habet rationem culpae, sed poenae. Sed ava- But covetousness as opposed to liberality has the vice of ritia secundum quod opponitur liberalitati, habet vitium prodigality opposed to it. prodigalitatis oppositum.

Article 4 Whether covetousness is always a mortal sin? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod avaritia semper sit peccatum mortale. Nullus enim est dignus morte nisi pro peccato mortali. Sed propter avaritiam homines digni sunt morte, cum enim apostolus, ad Rom. I, praemisisset, repletos omni iniquitate, fornicatione, avaritia, subdit, qui talia agunt digni sunt morte. Ergo avaritia est peccatum mortale. Praeterea, minimum in avaritia est quod aliquis inordinate retineat sua. Sed hoc videtur esse peccatum mortale, dicit enim Basilius, est panis famelici quem tu tenes, nudi tunica quam conservas, indigentis argentum quod possides. Quocirca tot iniuriaris quot exhibere valeres. Sed iniuriari alteri est peccatum mortale, quia contrariatur dilectioni proximi. Ergo multo magis omnis alia avaritia est peccatum mortale. Praeterea, nullus excaecatur spirituali caecitate nisi per peccatum mortale, quod animam privat lumine gratiae. Sed secundum Chrysostomum, tenebra animae est pecuniarum cupido. Ergo avaritia, quae est pecuniarum cupido, est peccatum mortale.

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is always a mortal sin. For no one is worthy of death save for a mortal sin. But men are worthy of death on account of covetousness. For the Apostle after saying (Rom 1:29): Being filled with all iniquity . . . fornication, covetousness, etc. adds (Rom 1:32): They who do such things are worthy of death. Therefore covetousness is a mortal sin. Obj. 2: Further, the least degree of covetousness is to hold to one’s own inordinately. But this seemingly is a mortal sin: for Basil says (Serm. super. Luc. xii, 18): It is the hungry man’s bread that thou keepest back, the naked man’s cloak that thou hoardest, the needy man’s money that thou possessest, hence thou despoilest as many as thou mightest succor. Now it is a mortal sin to do an injustice to another, since it is contrary to the love of our neighbor. Much more therefore is all covetousness a mortal sin. Obj. 3: Further, no one is struck with spiritual blindness save through a mortal sin, for this deprives a man of the light of grace. But, according to Chrysostom, Lust for money brings darkness on the soul. Therefore covetousness, which is lust for money, is a mortal sin.

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Sed contra est quod I ad Cor. III, super illud, si quis aedificaverit super hoc fundamentum etc., dicit Glossa quod lignum, faenum et stipulam superaedificat ille qui cogitat quae mundi sunt, quomodo placeat mundo, quod pertinet ad peccatum avaritiae. Ille autem qui aedificat lignum, faenum et stipulam, non peccat mortaliter, sed venialiter, de eo enim dicitur quod salvus erit sic quasi per ignem. Ergo avaritia quandoque est peccatum veniale. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, avaritia dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, secundum quod opponitur iustitiae. Et hoc modo ex genere suo est peccatum mortale, sic enim ad avaritiam pertinet quod aliquis iniuste accipiat vel retineat res alienas, quod pertinet ad rapinam vel furtum, quae sunt peccata mortalia, ut supra habitum est. Contingit tamen in hoc genere avaritiae aliquid esse peccatum veniale propter imperfectionem actus, sicut supra dictum est, cum de furto ageretur. Alio modo potest accipi avaritia secundum quod opponitur liberalitati. Et secundum hoc, importat inordinatum amorem divitiarum. Si ergo intantum amor divitiarum crescat quod praeferatur caritati, ut scilicet propter amorem divitiarum aliquis non vereatur facere contra amorem Dei et proximi, sic avaritia erit peccatum mortale. Si autem inordinatio amoris infra hoc sistat, ut scilicet homo, quamvis superflue divitias amet, non tamen praefert earum amorem amori divino, ut scilicet propter divitias non velit aliquid facere contra Deum et proximum, sic avaritia est peccatum veniale. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod avaritia connumeratur peccatis mortalibus secundum illam rationem qua est peccatum mortale. Ad secundum dicendum quod Basilius loquitur in illo casu in quo aliquis tenetur ex debito legali bona sua pauperibus erogare, vel propter periculum necessitatis, vel etiam propter superfluitatem habitorum. Ad tertium dicendum quod cupido divitiarum obtenebrat animam proprie quando excludit lumen caritatis, praeferendo amorem divitiarum amori divino.

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On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 3:12, If any man build upon this foundation, says (cf. St. Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi) that he builds wood, hay, stubble, who thinks in the things of the world, how he may please the world, which pertains to the sin of covetousness. Now he that builds wood, hay, stubble, sins not mortally but venially, for it is said of him that he shall be saved, yet so as by fire. Therefore covetousness is sometimes a venial sin. I answer that, As stated above (A. 3) covetousness is twofold. In one way it is opposed to justice, and thus it is a mortal sin in respect of its genus. For in this sense covetousness consists in the unjust taking or retaining of another’s property, and this belongs to theft or robbery, which are mortal sins, as stated above (Q. 66, AA. 6, 8). Yet venial sin may occur in this kind of covetousness by reason of imperfection of the act, as stated above (Q. 66, A. 6, ad 3), when we were treating of theft. In another way covetousness may be taken as opposed to liberality: in which sense it denotes inordinate love of riches. Accordingly if the love of riches becomes so great as to be preferred to charity, in such wise that a man, through love of riches, fear not to act counter to the love of God and his neighbor, covetousness will then be a mortal sin. If, on the other hand, the inordinate nature of his love stops short of this, so that although he love riches too much, yet he does not prefer the love of them to the love of God, and is unwilling for the sake of riches to do anything in opposition to God or his neighbor, then covetousness is a venial sin. Reply Obj. 1: Covetousness is numbered together with mortal sins, by reason of the aspect under which it is a mortal sin. Reply Obj. 2: Basil is speaking of a case wherein a man is bound by a legal debt to give of his goods to the poor, either through fear of their want or on account of his having too much. Reply Obj. 3: Lust for riches, properly speaking, brings darkness on the soul, when it puts out the light of charity, by preferring the love of riches to the love of God.

Article 5 Whether covetousness is the greatest of sins? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod avaritia sit maximum peccatorum. Dicitur enim Eccli. X, avaro nihil est scelestius; et postea subditur, nihil est iniquius quam amare pecuniam, hic enim et animam suam venalem habet. Et Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., nihil est tam angusti animi, tamque parvi, quam amare pecuniam. Sed hoc pertinet ad avaritiam. Ergo avaritia est gravissimum peccatorum.

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is the greatest of sins. For it is written (Sir 10:9): Nothing is more wicked than a covetous man, and the text continues: There is not a more wicked thing than to love money: for such a one setteth even his own soul to sale. Tully also says (De Offic. i): Nothing is so narrow or little minded as to love money. But this pertains to covetousness. Therefore covetousness is the most grievous of sins.

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Praeterea, tanto aliquod peccatum est gravius quanto magis caritati contrariatur. Sed avaritia maxime contrariatur caritati, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod venenum caritatis est cupiditas. Ergo avaritia est maximum peccatorum. Praeterea, ad gravitatem peccati pertinet quod sit incurabile, unde et peccatum in spiritum sanctum, quod est gravissimum, dicitur esse irremissibile. Sed avaritia est peccatum insanabile, ut dicit philosophus, in IV Ethic., quod senectus et omnis impotentia illiberales facit. Ergo avaritia est gravissimum peccatorum. Praeterea, apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. V, quod avaritia est idolorum servitus. Sed idololatria computatur inter gravissima peccata. Ergo et avaritia. Sed contra est quod adulterium est gravius peccatum quam furtum, ut habetur Prov. VI. Furtum autem pertinet ad avaritiam. Ergo avaritia non est gravissimum peccatorum. Respondeo dicendum quod omne peccatum, ex hoc ipso quod est malum, consistit in quadam corruptione seu privatione alicuius boni, inquantum autem est voluntarium, consistit in appetitu alicuius boni. Dupliciter ergo ordo peccatorum potest attendi. Uno modo, ex parte boni quod per peccatum contemnitur vel corrumpitur, quod quanto maius est, tanto peccatum gravius est. Et secundum hoc, peccatum quod est contra Deum est gravissimum; et sub hoc est peccatum quod est contra personam hominis; sub quo est peccatum quod est contra res exteriores quae sunt ad usum hominis deputatae, quod videtur ad avaritiam pertinere. Alio modo potest attendi gradus peccatorum ex parte boni cui inordinate subditur appetitus humanus, quod quanto minus est, tanto peccatum est deformius; turpius enim est subesse inferiori bono quam superiori. Bonum autem exteriorum rerum est infimum inter humana bona, est enim minus quam bonum corporis; quod etiam est minus quam bonum animae; quod etiam exceditur a bono divino. Et secundum hoc, peccatum avaritiae, quo appetitus humanus subiicitur etiam exterioribus rebus, habet quodammodo deformitatem maiorem. Quia tamen corruptio vel privatio boni formaliter se habet in peccato, conversio autem ad bonum commutabile materialiter; magis est iudicanda gravitas peccati ex parte boni quod corrumpitur quam ex parte boni cui subiicitur appetitus. Et ideo dicendum est quod avaritia non est simpliciter maximum peccatorum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritates illae loquuntur de avaritia ex parte boni cui subditur appetitus. Unde et in ecclesiastico pro ratione subditur, quia avarus animam suam habet venalem, quia videlicet animam suam, idest vitam, exponit periculis pro pecunia, et ideo subdit, quoniam in vita sua proiecit, idest con-

Q. 118, A. 5

Obj. 2: Further, the more a sin is opposed to charity, the more grievous it is. Now covetousness is most opposed to charity: for Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36) that greed is the bane of charity. Therefore covetousness is the greatest of sins. Obj. 3: Further, the gravity of a sin is indicated by its being incurable: wherefore the sin against the Holy Spirit is said to be most grievous, because it is irremissible. But covetousness is an incurable sin: hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that old age and helplessness of any kind make men illiberal. Therefore covetousness is the most grievous of sins. Obj. 4: Further, the Apostle says (Eph 5:5) that covetousness is a serving of idols. Now idolatry is reckoned among the most grievous sins. Therefore covetousness is also. On the contrary, Adultery is a more grievous sin than theft, according to Prov. 6:30. But theft pertains to covetousness. Therefore covetousness is not the most grievous of sins. I answer that, Every sin, from the very fact that it is an evil, consists in the corruption or privation of some good: while, insofar as it is voluntary, it consists in the desire of some good. Consequently the order of sins may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the good that is despised or corrupted by sin, and then the greater the good the graver the sin. From this point of view a sin that is against God is most grievous; after this comes a sin that is committed against a man’s person, and after this comes a sin against external things, which are deputed to man’s use, and this seems to belong to covetousness. Second, the degrees of sin may be considered on the part of the good to which the human appetite is inordinately subjected; and then the lesser the good, the more deformed is the sin: for it is more shameful to be subject to a lower than to a higher good. Now the good of external things is the lowest of human goods: since it is less than the good of the body, and this is less than the good of the soul, which is less than the Divine good. From this point of view the sin of covetousness, whereby the human appetite is subjected even to external things, has in a way a greater deformity. Since, however, corruption or privation of good is the formal element in sin, while conversion to a mutable good is the material element, the gravity of the sin is to be judged from the point of view of the good corrupted, rather than from that of the good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence we must assert that covetousness is not simply the most grievous of sins. Reply Obj. 1: These authorities speak of covetousness on the part of the good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence (Sir 10:10) it is given as a reason that the covetous man setteth his own soul to sale; because, to wit, he exposes his soul—that is, his life—to danger for the sake of money. Hence the text continues: Because while he liveth he hath

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tempsit, intima sua, ut scilicet pecuniam lucraretur. Tullius etiam addit hoc esse angusti animi, ut scilicet velit pecuniae subiici. Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus ibi accipit cupiditatem generaliter cuiuscumque temporalis boni, non secundum quod specialiter pro avaritia accipitur. Cupiditas enim cuiuscumque temporalis boni est venenum caritatis, inquantum scilicet homo spernit bonum divinum propter hoc quod inhaeret bono temporali. Ad tertium dicendum quod aliter est insanabile peccatum in spiritum sanctum, et aliter avaritia. Nam peccatum in spiritum sanctum est insanabile ex parte contemptus, puta quia homo contemnit vel misericordiam vel iustitiam divinam, aut aliquid horum per quae hominis peccata sanantur. Et ideo talis insanabilitas pertinet ad maiorem gravitatem peccati. Avaritia vero habet insanabilitatem ex parte defectus humani, in quem scilicet semper procedit humana natura, quia quo aliquis est magis deficiens, eo magis indiget adminiculo exteriorum rerum, et ideo magis in avaritiam labitur. Unde per talem insanabilitatem non ostenditur peccatum esse gravius, sed quodammodo per hoc est periculosius.

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cast away—that is, despised—his bowels, in order to make money. Tully also adds that it is the mark of a narrow mind, namely, that one be willing to be subject to money. Reply Obj. 2: Augustine is taking greed generally, in reference to any temporal good, not in its special acceptation for covetousness: because greed for any temporal good is the bane of charity, inasmuch as a man turns away from the Divine good through cleaving to a temporal good.

Reply Obj. 3: The sin against the Holy Spirit is incurable in one way, covetousness in another. For the sin against the Holy Spirit is incurable by reason of contempt: for instance, because a man contemns God’s mercy, or His justice, or some one of those things whereby man’s sins are healed: wherefore incurability of this kind points to the greater gravity of the sin. On the other hand, covetousness is incurable on the part of a human defect; a thing which human nature ever seeks to remedy, since the more deficient one is the more one seeks relief from external things, and consequently the more one gives way to covetousness. Hence incurability of this kind is an indication not of the sin being more grievous, but of its being somewhat more dangerous. Ad quartum dicendum quod avaritia comparatur Reply Obj. 4: Covetousness is compared to idolatry on idololatriae per quandam similitudinem quam habet ad account of a certain likeness that it bears to it: because the ipsam, quia sicut idololatra subiicit se creaturae exterio- covetous man, like the idolater, subjects himself to an exterri, ita etiam et avarus. Non tamen eodem modo, sed ido- nal creature, though not in the same way. For the idolater lolatra quidem subiicit se creaturae exteriori ut exhibeat subjects himself to an external creature by paying it Divine ei cultum divinum; avarus autem subiicit se creaturae honor, whereas the covetous man subjects himself to an exexteriori immoderate ipsam concupiscendo ad usum, ternal creature by desiring it immoderately for use, not for non ad cultum. Et ideo non oportet quod avaritia habeat worship. Hence it does not follow that covetousness is as tantam gravitatem quantam habet idololatria. grievous a sin as idolatry.

Article 6 Whether covetousness is a spiritual sin? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod avaritia non sit peccatum spirituale. Vitia enim spiritualia videntur esse circa spiritualia bona. Sed materia avaritiae sunt bona corporalia, scilicet exteriores divitiae. Ergo avaritia non est peccatum spirituale. Praeterea, peccatum spirituale contra carnale dividitur. Sed avaritia videtur esse peccatum carnale, sequitur enim corruptionem carnis; ut patet in senibus, qui propter naturae carnalis defectum in avaritiam incidunt. Ergo avaritia non est peccatum spirituale.

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a spiritual sin. For spiritual sins seem to regard spiritual goods. But the matter of covetousness is bodily goods, namely, external riches. Therefore covetousness is not a spiritual sin.

Obj. 2: Further, spiritual sin is condivided with sin of the flesh. Now covetousness is seemingly a sin of the flesh, for it results from the corruption of the flesh, as instanced in old people who, through corruption of carnal nature, fall into covetousness. Therefore covetousness is not a spiritual sin. Praeterea, peccatum carnale est per quod etiam Obj. 3: Further, a sin of the flesh is one by which man’s corpus hominis deordinatur, secundum illud apostoli, body is disordered, according to the saying of the Apostle I ad Cor. VI, qui fornicatur in corpus suum peccat. (1 Cor 6:18), He that committeth fornication sinneth against Sed avaritia etiam hominem corporaliter vexat, unde et his own body. Now covetousness disturbs man even in his

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Chrysostomus, Marc. V, comparat avarum daemoniaco, body; wherefore Chrysostom (Hom. xxix in Matth.) comqui in corpore vexatur. Ergo avaritia non videtur esse pares the covetous man to the man who was possessed by peccatum spirituale. the devil (Mark 5) and was troubled in body. Therefore covetousness seems not to be a spiritual sin. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers computat avaritiam vitiis spiritualibus. covetousness among spiritual vices. Respondeo dicendum quod peccata praecipue in I answer that, Sins are seated chiefly in the affecaffectu consistunt. Omnes autem affectiones animae, si- tions: and all the affections or passions of the soul have their ve passiones, terminantur ad delectationes et tristitias, term in pleasure and sorrow, according to the Philosopher ut patet per philosophum, in II Ethic. Delectationum (Ethic. ii, 5). Now some pleasures are carnal and some spirautem quaedam sunt carnales, et quaedam spirituales. itual. Carnal pleasures are those which are consummated Carnales quidem delectationes dicuntur quae in sensu in the carnal senses—for instance, the pleasures of the tacarnis complentur, sicut delectationes ciborum et ve- ble and sexual pleasures: while spiritual pleasures are those nereorum, delectationes vero spirituales dicuntur quae which are consummated in the mere apprehension of the complentur in sola animae apprehensione. Illa ergo pec- soul. Accordingly, sins of the flesh are those which are concata dicuntur carnalia quae perficiuntur in carnalibus summated in carnal pleasures, while spiritual sins are condelectationibus, illa vero dicuntur spiritualia quae per- summated in pleasures of the spirit without pleasure of the ficiuntur in spiritualibus delectationibus, absque carnali flesh. Such is covetousness: for the covetous man takes pleadelectatione. Et huiusmodi est avaritia, delectatur enim sure in the consideration of himself as a possessor of riches. avarus in hoc quod considerat se possessorem divitia- Therefore covetousness is a spiritual sin. rum. Et ideo avaritia est peccatum spirituale. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod avaritia circa corReply Obj. 1: Covetousness with regard to a bodily obporale obiectum non quaerit delectationem corporalem, ject seeks the pleasure, not of the body but only of the soul, sed solum animalem, prout scilicet homo delectatur in forasmuch as a man takes pleasure in the fact that he poshoc quod divitias possideat. Et ideo non est peccatum sesses riches: wherefore it is not a sin of the flesh. Nevercarnale. Ratione tamen obiecti, medium est inter peccata theless by reason of its object it is a mean between purely pure spiritualia, quae quaerunt delectationem spiritua- spiritual sins, which seek spiritual pleasure in respect of lem circa obiecta spiritualia, sicut superbia est circa ex- spiritual objects (thus pride is about excellence), and purely cellentiam; et vitia pure carnalia, quae quaerunt delecta- carnal sins, which seek a purely bodily pleasure in respect tionem pure corporalem circa obiectum corporale. of a bodily object. Ad secundum dicendum quod motus recipit speReply Obj. 2: Movement takes its species from the ciem secundum terminum ad quem, non autem secun- term whereto and not from the term wherefrom. Hence a dum terminum a quo. Et ideo vitium dicitur carnale ex vice of the flesh is so called from its tending to a pleasure of hoc quod tendit in delectationem carnalem, non autem the flesh, and not from its originating in some defect of the ex eo quod procedit ex aliquo defectu carnis. flesh. Ad tertium dicendum quod Chrysostomus comReply Obj. 3: Chrysostom compares a covetous man parat avarum daemoniaco, non quia vexetur in carne to the man who was possessed by the devil, not that the forsicut daemoniacus, sed per oppositum, quia sicut dae- mer is troubled in the flesh in the same way as the latter, but moniacus ille de quo legitur Marc. V, se denudabat, ita by way of contrast, since while the possessed man, of whom avarus se superfluis divitiis onerat. we read in Mk. 5, stripped himself, the covetous man loads himself with an excess of riches.

Article 7 Whether covetousness is a capital vice? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod avaritia non sit vitium capitale. Avaritia enim opponitur liberalitati sicut medio, et prodigalitati sicut extremo. Sed neque liberalitas est principalis virtus, neque prodigalitas vitium capitale. Ergo etiam avaritia non debet poni vitium capitale.

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a capital vice. For covetousness is opposed to liberality as the mean, and to prodigality as extreme. But neither is liberality a principal virtue, nor prodigality a capital vice. Therefore covetousness also should not be reckoned a capital vice.

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Praeterea, sicut supra dictum est, illa dicuntur esse vitia capitalia quae habent principales fines, ad quos ordinantur fines aliorum vitiorum. Sed hoc non competit avaritiae, quia divitiae non habent rationem finis, sed magis rationem eius quod est ad finem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo avaritia non est vitium capitale. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in Moral., quod avaritia quandoque oritur ex elatione, quandoque per timorem. Dum enim quidam deficere sibi ad sumptum necessaria aestimant, mentem ad avaritiam relaxant. Sunt alii qui, dum potentiores videri appetunt, ad alienarum rerum ambitum succenduntur. Ergo avaritia magis oritur ab aliis vitiis quam ipsa sit vitium capitale respectu aliorum. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., ponit avaritiam inter vitia capitalia. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, vitium capitale dicitur ex quo alia oriuntur secundum rationem finis; qui cum sit multum appetibilis, propter eius appetitum homo procedit ad multa facienda vel bona vel mala. Finis autem maxime appetibilis est beatitudo sive felicitas, quae est ultimus finis humanae vitae, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo quanto aliquid magis participat conditiones felicitatis, tanto magis est appetibile. Est autem una de conditionibus felicitatis ut sit per se sufficiens, alioquin non quietaret appetitum tanquam ultimus finis. Sed per se sufficientiam maxime repromittunt divitiae, ut Boetius dicit, in III de Consol. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., denario utimur quasi fideiussore ad omnia habenda, et Eccle. X dicitur quod pecuniae obediunt omnia. Et ideo avaritia, quae consistit in appetitu pecuniae, est vitium capitale. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus perficitur secundum rationem, vitium autem perficitur secundum inclinationem appetitus sensitivi. Non autem ad idem genus principaliter respicit ratio, et appetitus sensitivus. Et ideo non oportet quod principale vitium opponatur principali virtuti. Unde licet liberalitas non sit principalis virtus, quia non respicit ad principale bonum rationis; avaritia tamen est principale vitium, quia respicit ad pecuniam, quae habet quandam principalitatem inter bona sensibilia, ratione iam dicta. Prodigalitas autem non ordinatur ad aliquem finem principaliter appetibilem, sed magis videtur procedere ex defectu rationis. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod prodigus magis dicitur vanus quam malus. Ad secundum dicendum quod pecunia ordinatur quidem ad aliud sicut ad finem, inquantum tamen utilis est ad omnia sensibilia conquirenda, continet quodammodo virtute omnia. Et ideo habet quandam similitudinem felicitatis, ut dictum est.

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Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3, 4), those vices are called capital which have principal ends, to which the ends of other vices are directed. But this does not apply to covetousness: since riches have the aspect, not of an end, but rather of something directed to an end, as stated in Ethic. i, 5. Therefore covetousness is not a capital vice. Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xv), that covetousness arises sometimes from pride, sometimes from fear. For there are those who, when they think that they lack the needful for their expenses, allow the mind to give way to covetousness. And there are others who, wishing to be thought more of, are incited to greed for other people’s property. Therefore covetousness arises from other vices instead of being a capital vice in respect of other vices. On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) reckons covetousness among the capital vices. I answer that, As stated in the Second Objection, a capital vice is one which under the aspect of end gives rise to other vices: because when an end is very desirable, the result is that through desire thereof man sets about doing many things either good or evil. Now the most desirable end is happiness or felicity, which is the last end of human life, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, AA. 4, 7, 8): wherefore the more a thing is furnished with the conditions of happiness, the more desirable it is. Also one of the conditions of happiness is that it be self-sufficing, else it would not set man’s appetite at rest, as the last end does. Now riches give great promise of self-sufficiency, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii): the reason of which, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), is that we use money in token of taking possession of something, and again it is written (Eccl 10:19): All things obey money. Therefore covetousness, which is desire for money, is a capital vice. Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is perfected in accordance with reason, but vice is perfected in accordance with the inclination of the sensitive appetite. Now reason and sensitive appetite do not belong chiefly to the same genus, and consequently it does not follow that principal vice is opposed to principal virtue. Wherefore, although liberality is not a principal virtue, since it does not regard the principal good of the reason, yet covetousness is a principal vice, because it regards money, which occupies a principal place among sensible goods, for the reason given in the Article. On the other hand, prodigality is not directed to an end that is desirable principally, indeed it seems rather to result from a lack of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that a prodigal man is a fool rather than a knave. Reply Obj. 2: It is true that money is directed to something else as its end: yet insofar as it is useful for obtaining all sensible things, it contains, in a way, all things virtually. Hence it has a certain likeness to happiness, as stated in the Article.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet vitium Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents a capital vice from capitale interdum a quibusdam aliis oriri, ut dictum est, arising sometimes out of other vices, as stated above (Q. 36, dum tamen ex eo alia vitia soleant plerumque oriri. A. 4, ad 1; I-II, Q. 84, A. 4), provided that itself be frequently the source of others.

Article 8 Whether treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy are daughters of covetousness? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint avaritiae filiae quae dicuntur, scilicet proditio, fraus, fallacia, periuria, inquietudo, violentiae, et contra misericordiam obduratio. Avaritia enim opponitur liberalitati, ut dictum est. Proditio autem, fraus et fallacia opponuntur prudentiae; periuria religioni; inquietudo spei vel caritati, quae quiescit in amato; violentiae opponuntur iustitiae; obduratio misericordiae. Ergo huiusmodi vitia non pertinent ad avaritiam. Praeterea, proditio, dolus et fallacia ad idem pertinere videntur, scilicet ad proximi deceptionem. Ergo non debent enumerari tanquam diversae filiae avaritiae. Praeterea, Isidorus ponit novem filias, quae sunt mendacium, fraus, furtum, periurium, et turpis lucri appetitus, falsa testimonia, violentia inhumanitas, rapacitas. Ergo prima assignatio filiarum fuit insufficiens. Praeterea, philosophus, in IV Ethic., ponit multa genera vitiorum pertinentium ad avaritiam, quam illiberalitatem nominat, videlicet parcos, tenaces, kimibiles, illiberales operationes operantes, et de meretricio pastos, et usurarios, aleatores, et mortuorum spoliatores, et latrones. Ergo videtur quod praedicta enumeratio sit insufficiens. Praeterea, tyranni maxime violentias subditis inferunt. Dicit autem philosophus, ibidem, quod tyrannos civitates desolantes et sacra praedantes non dicimus illiberales, idest avaros. Ergo violentia non debet poni filia avaritiae. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., assignat avaritiae filias prius enumeratas. Respondeo dicendum quod filiae avaritiae dicuntur vitia quae ex ipsa oriuntur, et praecipue secundum appetitum finis. Quia vero avaritia est superfluus amor habendi divitias, in duobus excedit. Primo enim, superabundat in retinendo. Et ex hac parte oritur ex avaritia obduratio contra misericordiam, quia scilicet cor eius misericordia non emollitur, ut de divitiis suis subveniat miseris. Secundo, ad avaritiam pertinet superabundare in accipiendo. Et secundum hoc, avaritia potest considerari dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod est in affectu. Et sic ex avaritia oritur inquietudo, inquantum ingerit

Objection 1: It seems that the daughters of covetousness are not as commonly stated, namely, treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy. For covetousness is opposed to liberality, as stated above (A. 3). Now treachery, fraud, and falsehood are opposed to prudence, perjury to religion, restlessness to hope, or to charity which rests in the beloved object, violence to justice, insensibility to mercy. Therefore these vices have no connection with covetousness. Obj. 2: Further, treachery, fraud and falsehood seem to pertain to the same thing, namely, the deceiving of one’s neighbor. Therefore they should not be reckoned as different daughters of covetousness. Obj. 3: Further, Isidore (Comment. in Deut.) enumerates nine daughters of covetousness; which are lying, fraud, theft, perjury, greed of filthy lucre, false witnessing, violence, inhumanity, rapacity. Therefore the former reckoning of daughters is insufficient. Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) mentions many kinds of vices as belonging to covetousness which he calls illiberality, for he speaks of those who are sparing, tight-fisted, skinflints, misers, who do illiberal deeds, and of those who batten on whoredom, usurers, gamblers, despoilers of the dead, and robbers. Therefore it seems that the aforesaid enumeration is insufficient. Obj. 5: Further, tyrants use much violence against their subjects. But the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that tyrants who destroy cities and despoil sacred places are not to be called illiberal, i.e., covetous. Therefore violence should not be reckoned a daughter of covetousness. On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) assigns to covetousness the daughters mentioned above. I answer that, The daughters of covetousness are the vices which arise therefrom, especially in respect of the desire of an end. Now since covetousness is excessive love of possessing riches, it exceeds in two things. For in the first place it exceeds in retaining, and in this respect covetousness gives rise to insensibility to mercy, because, to wit, a man’s heart is not softened by mercy to assist the needy with his riches. In the second place it belongs to covetousness to exceed in receiving, and in this respect covetousness may be considered in two ways. First as in the thought (affectu). In this way it gives rise to restlessness, by hindering man

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homini sollicitudinem et curas superfluas, avarus enim non impletur pecunia, ut dicitur Eccle. V. Alio modo, potest considerari in effectu. Et sic in acquirendo aliena utitur quandoque quidem vi, quod pertinet ad violentias; quandoque autem dolo. Qui quidem si fiat in verbo, erit fallacia, quantum ad simplex verbum; periurium autem si addatur confirmatio iuramenti. Si autem dolus committatur in opere, sic, quantum ad res, erit fraus; quantum autem ad personas, proditio, ut patet de Iuda, qui ex avaritia prodidit Christum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non oportet filias alicuius peccati capitalis ad idem genus vitii pertinere, quia ad finem unius vitii possunt ordinari etiam peccata alterius generis. Aliud est enim peccatum habere filias, et peccatum habere species. Ad secundum dicendum quod illa tria distinguuntur sicut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod illa novem reducuntur ad praedicta septem. Nam mendacium et falsum testimonium continetur sub fallacia, falsum enim testimonium est quaedam specificatio mendacii; sicut et furtum est quaedam specificatio fraudis, unde sub fraude continetur. Appetitus autem turpis lucri pertinet ad inquietudinem. Rapacitas autem continetur sub violentia, cum sit species eius. Inhumanitas autem est idem quod obduratio contra misericordiam. Ad quartum dicendum quod illa quae ponit Aristoteles sunt illiberalitatis vel avaritiae species magis quam filiae. Potest enim aliquis dici illiberalis vel avarus ex eo quod deficit in dando, et si quidem parum det, vocatur parcus; si autem nihil, tenax; si autem cum magna difficultate det, vocatur kimibilis, quasi kimini venditor, quia de parvis magnam vim facit. Quandoque autem aliquis dicitur illiberalis vel avarus quia excedit in accipiendo. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, quia turpiter lucratur, vel vilia et servilia opera exercendo per illiberales operationes; vel quia de aliquibus vitiosis actibus lucratur, sicut de meretricio, vel de aliquo huiusmodi; vel quia lucratur de eo quod gratis oportet concedere, sicut usurarii; vel quia lucratur parva cum magno labore. Alio modo, quia iniuste lucratur, vel vivis vim inferendo, sicut latrones; vel mortuos spoliando; vel ab amicis auferendo, sicut aleatores.

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with excessive anxiety and care, for a covetous man shall not be satisfied with money (Eccl 5:9). Second, it may be considered in the execution (effectu). In this way the covetous man, in acquiring other people’s goods, sometimes employs force, which pertains to violence, sometimes deceit, and then if he has recourse to words, it is falsehood, if it be mere words, perjury if he confirm his statement by oath; if he has recourse to deeds, and the deceit affects things, we have fraud; if persons, then we have treachery, as in the case of Judas, who betrayed Christ through covetousness. Reply Obj. 1: There is no need for the daughters of a capital sin to belong to that same kind of vice: because a sin of one kind allows of sins even of a different kind being directed to its end; seeing that it is one thing for a sin to have daughters, and another for it to have species. Reply Obj. 2: These three are distinguished as stated in the Article. Reply Obj. 3: These nine are reducible to the seven aforesaid. For lying and false witnessing are comprised under falsehood, since false witnessing is a special kind of lie, just as theft is a special kind of fraud, wherefore it is comprised under fraud; and greed of filthy lucre belongs to restlessness; rapacity is comprised under violence, since it is a species thereof; and inhumanity is the same as insensibility to mercy.

Reply Obj. 4: The vices mentioned by Aristotle are species rather than daughters of illiberality or covetousness. For a man may be said to be illiberal or covetous through a defect in giving. If he gives but little he is said to be sparing; if nothing, he is tightfisted: if he gives with great reluctance, he is said to be kyminopristes (skinflint), a cumin-seller, as it were, because he makes a great fuss about things of little value. Sometimes a man is said to be illiberal or covetous, through an excess in receiving, and this in two ways. In one way, through making money by disgraceful means, whether in performing shameful and servile works by means of illiberal practices, or by acquiring more through sinful deeds, such as whoredom or the like, or by making a profit where one ought to have given gratis, as in the case of usury, or by laboring much to make little profit. In another way, in making money by unjust means, whether by using violence on the living, as robbers do, or by despoiling the dead, or by preying on one’s friends, as gamblers do. Ad quintum dicendum quod sicut liberalitas est Reply Obj. 5: Just as liberality is about moderate sums circa mediocres pecunias, ita et illiberalitas. Unde tyran- of money, so is illiberality. Wherefore tyrants who take ni, qui magna per violentiam auferunt, non dicuntur il- great things by violence, are said to be, not illiberal, but unliberales, sed iniusti. just.

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Question 119 Prodigality Deinde considerandum est de prodigalitate. Et circa We must now consider prodigality, under which head hoc quaeruntur tria. there are three points of inquiry: Primo, utrum prodigalitas avaritiae opponatur. (1) Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness? Secundo, utrum prodigalitas sit peccatum. (2) Whether prodigality is a sin? Tertio, utrum sit gravius peccatum quam avaritia. (3) Whether it is a graver sin than covetousness?

Article 1 Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prodiObjection 1: It seems that prodigality is not opposite galitas non opponatur avaritiae. Opposita enim non pos- to covetousness. For opposites cannot be together in the sunt esse simul in eodem. Sed aliqui sunt simul prodigi same subject. But some are at the same time prodigal and et illiberales. Ergo prodigalitas non opponitur avaritiae. covetous. Therefore prodigality is not opposite to covetousness. Praeterea, opposita sunt circa idem. Sed avaritia, Obj. 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But secundum quod opponitur liberalitati, est circa passio- covetousness, as opposed to liberality, relates to certain pasnes quasdam quibus homo afficitur ad pecuniam. Pro- sions whereby man is affected towards money: whereas digalitas autem non videtur esse circa aliquas animae prodigality does not seem to relate to any passions of the passiones, non enim afficitur circa pecunias, nec circa soul, since it is not affected towards money, or to anything aliquid aliud huiusmodi. Non ergo prodigalitas opponi- else of the kind. Therefore prodigality is not opposite to tur avaritiae. covetousness. Praeterea, peccatum principaliter recipit speciem Obj. 3: Further, sin takes its species chiefly from its end, a fine, ut supra habitum est. Sed prodigalitas semper vi- as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 3). Now prodigality seems detur ordinari ad aliquem finem illicitum, propter quem always to be directed to some unlawful end, for the sake bona sua expendit, et praecipue propter voluptates, un- of which the prodigal squanders his goods. Especially is it de et Luc. XV dicitur de filio prodigo quod dissipavit sub- directed to pleasures, wherefore it is stated (Luke 15:13) of stantiam suam luxuriose vivendo. Ergo videtur quod pro- the prodigal son that he wasted his substance living riotously. digalitas opponatur magis temperantiae et insensibilitati Therefore it seems that prodigality is opposed to temperquam avaritiae et liberalitati. ance and insensibility rather than to covetousness and liberality. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II et IV Ethic., On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; ponit prodigalitatem oppositam liberalitati et illiberali- iv, 1) that prodigality is opposed to liberality, and illiberaltati, quam nunc avaritiam dicimus. ity, to which we give here the name of covetousness. Respondeo dicendum quod in moralibus attendiI answer that, In morals vices are opposed to one antur oppositio vitiorum ad invicem et ad virtutem secun- other and to virtue in respect of excess and deficiency. Now dum superabundantiam et defectum. Differunt autem covetousness and prodigality differ variously in respect of avaritia et prodigalitas secundum superabundantiam et excess and deficiency. Thus, as regards affection for riches, defectum, diversimode. Nam in affectione divitiarum, the covetous man exceeds by loving them more than he avarus superabundat, plus debito eas diligens, prodigus ought, while the prodigal is deficient, by being less careautem deficit, minus debito earum sollicitudinem ge- ful of them than he ought: and as regards external action, rens. Circa exteriora vero, ad prodigalitatem pertinet ex- prodigality implies excess in giving, but deficiency in recedere quidem in dando, deficere autem in retinendo et taining and acquiring, while covetousness, on the contrary, acquirendo, ad avaritiam autem pertinet e contrario de- denotes deficiency in giving, but excess in acquiring and re-

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ficere quidem in dando, superabundare autem in accipiendo et retinendo. Unde patet quod prodigalitas avaritiae opponitur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet eidem inesse opposita secundum diversa, ab illo tamen aliquid magis denominatur quod est principalius. Sicut autem in liberalitate, quae medium tenet, praecipua est datio, ad quam acceptio et retentio ordinantur; ita etiam avaritia et prodigalitas praecipue attenduntur secundum dationem. Unde ille qui superabundat in dando vocatur prodigus; qui autem deficit in dando vocatur avarus. Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquis deficit in dando qui tamen non excedit in accipiendo, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Similiter etiam contingit quod aliquis excedat in dando, et ex hoc est prodigus; et simul cum hoc, excedat in accipiendo. Vel ex quadam necessitate, quia, dum superabundant in dando, deficiunt eis propria bona, unde coguntur indebite acquirere, quod pertinet ad avaritiam. Vel etiam propter animi inordinationem, dum enim non dant propter bonum, quasi contempta virtute, non curant undecumque et qualitercumque accipiant. Et sic non secundum idem sunt prodigi et avari.

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taining. Hence it is evident that prodigality is opposed to covetousness.

Reply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents opposites from being in the same subject in different respects. For a thing is denominated more from what is in it principally. Now just as in liberality, which observes the mean, the principal thing is giving, to which receiving and retaining are subordinate, so, too, covetousness and prodigality regard principally giving. Wherefore he who exceeds in giving is said to be prodigal, while he who is deficient in giving is said to be covetous. Now it happens sometimes that a man is deficient in giving, without exceeding in receiving, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1). And in like manner it happens sometimes that a man exceeds in giving, and therefore is prodigal, and yet at the same time exceeds in receiving. This may be due either to some kind of necessity, since while exceeding in giving he is lacking in goods of his own, so that he is driven to acquire unduly, and this pertains to covetousness; or it may be due to inordinateness of the mind, for he gives not for a good purpose, but, as though despising virtue, cares not whence or how he receives. Wherefore he is prodigal and covetous in different respects. Ad secundum dicendum quod prodigalitas attendiReply Obj. 2: Prodigality regards passions in respect of tur circa passiones pecuniae non sicut superabundans in money, not as exceeding, but as deficient in them.

eis, sed sicut deficiens. Ad tertium dicendum quod prodigus non semper abundat in dando propter voluptates, circa quas est intemperantia, sed quandoque quidem ex eo quod taliter est dispositus ut divitias non curet; quandoque autem propter aliquid aliud. Ut frequentius tamen ad intemperantias declinant, tum quia, ex quo superflue expendunt in aliis, etiam in rebus voluptuosis expendere non verentur, ad quas magis inclinat concupiscentia carnis; tum etiam, quia non delectantur in bono virtutis, quaerunt sibi delectationes corporales. Et inde est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod multi prodigorum fiunt intemperati.

Reply Obj. 3: The prodigal does not always exceed in giving for the sake of pleasures which are the matter of temperance, but sometimes through being so disposed as not to care about riches, and sometimes on account of something else. More frequently, however, he inclines to intemperance, both because through spending too much on other things he becomes fearless of spending on objects of pleasure, to which the concupiscence of the flesh is more prone; and because through taking no pleasure in virtuous goods, he seeks for himself pleasures of the body. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that many a prodigal ends in becoming intemperate.

Article 2 Whether prodigality is a sin? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prodigalitas non sit peccatum. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Tim. ult., radix omnium malorum est cupiditas. Non autem est radix prodigalitatis, quae ei opponitur. Ergo prodigalitas non est peccatum. Praeterea, apostolus, I ad Tim. ult., dicit, divitibus huius saeculi praecipe facile tribuere, communicare. Sed hoc maxime faciunt prodigi. Ergo prodigalitas non est peccatum.

Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not a sin. For the Apostle says (1 Tim 6:10): Covetousness is the root of all evils. But it is not the root of prodigality, since this is opposed to it. Therefore prodigality is not a sin. Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim 6:17, 18): Charge the rich of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate to others. Now this is especially what prodigal persons do. Therefore prodigality is not a sin.

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Praeterea, ad prodigalitatem pertinet superabundare in datione et deficere in sollicitudine divitiarum. Sed hoc maxime convenit viris perfectis implentibus quod dominus dicit, Matth. VI, nolite solliciti esse in crastinum; et XIX, vende omnia quae habes, et da pauperibus. Ergo prodigalitas non est peccatum. Sed contra est quod filius prodigus vituperatur de sua prodigalitate, Luc. XV. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, prodigalitas opponitur avaritiae secundum oppositionem superabundantiae et defectus. Medium autem virtutis per utrumque horum corrumpitur. Ex hoc autem est aliquid vitiosum et peccatum quod corrumpit bonum virtutis. Unde relinquitur quod prodigalitas sit peccatum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud verbum apostoli quidam exponunt non de cupiditate actuali, sed de quadam habituali cupiditate, quae est concupiscentia fomitis, ex qua omnia peccata oriuntur. Alii vero dicunt quod loquitur de cupiditate generali respectu cuiuscumque boni. Et sic manifestum est quod etiam prodigalitas ex cupiditate oritur, prodigus enim aliquod bonum temporale cupit consequi inordinate; vel placere aliis, vel saltem satisfacere suae voluntati in dando. Sed si quis recte consideret, apostolus ibi loquitur, ad litteram, de cupiditate divitiarum, nam supra praemiserat, qui volunt divites fieri, et cetera. Et sic dicitur esse avaritia radix omnium malorum, non quia omnia mala semper ex avaritia oriantur, sed quia nullum malum est quod non interdum ex avaritia oriatur. Unde et prodigalitas quandoque ex avaritia nascitur, sicut cum aliquis prodige multa consumit intentione captandi favorem aliquorum, a quibus divitias accipiat. Ad secundum dicendum quod apostolus monet divites ut facile tribuant et communicent sua secundum quod oportet. Quod non faciunt prodigi, quia, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., dationes eorum non sunt bonae, neque boni gratia, neque secundum quod oportet, sed quandoque dant multa illis quos oporteret pauperes esse, scilicet histrionibus et adulatoribus, bonis autem nihil darent. Ad tertium dicendum quod superexcessus prodigalitatis non attenditur principaliter secundum quantitatem dati, sed magis inquantum excedit id quod fieri oportet. Unde quandoque liberalis maiora dat quam prodigus, si necessarium sit. Sic ergo dicendum est quod illi qui, intentione sequendi Christum, omnia sua dant, et ab animo suo omnem temporalium sollicitudinem removent, non sunt prodigi, sed perfecte liberales.

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Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to prodigality to exceed in giving and to be deficient in solicitude about riches. But this is most becoming to the perfect, who fulfill the words of Our Lord (Matt 6:34), Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow, and (Matt 19:21), Sell all thou hast, and give to the poor. Therefore prodigality is not a sin. On the contrary, The prodigal son is held to blame for his prodigality. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the opposition between prodigality and covetousness is one of excess and deficiency; either of which destroys the mean of virtue. Now a thing is vicious and sinful through corrupting the good of virtue. Hence it follows that prodigality is a sin. Reply Obj. 1: Some expound this saying of the Apostle as referring, not to actual covetousness, but to a kind of habitual covetousness, which is the concupiscence of the fomes, whence all sins arise. Others say that he is speaking of a general covetousness with regard to any kind of good: and in this sense also it is evident that prodigality arises from covetousness; since the prodigal seeks to acquire some temporal good inordinately, namely, to give pleasure to others, or at least to satisfy his own will in giving. But to one that reviews the passage correctly, it is evident that the Apostle is speaking literally of the desire of riches, for he had said previously (1 Tim 6:9): They that will become rich, etc. In this sense covetousness is said to be the root of all evils, not that all evils always arise from covetousness, but because there is no evil that does not at some time arise from covetousness. Wherefore prodigality sometimes is born of covetousness, as when a man is prodigal in going to great expense in order to curry favor with certain persons from whom he may receive riches. Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle bids the rich to be ready to give and communicate their riches, according as they ought. The prodigal does not do this: since, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. iv, 1), his giving is neither good, nor for a good end, nor according as it ought to be. For sometimes they give much to those who ought to be poor, namely, to buffoons and flatterers, whereas to the good they give nothing. Reply Obj. 3: The excess in prodigality consists chiefly, not in the total amount given, but in the amount over and above what ought to be given. Hence sometimes the liberal man gives more than the prodigal man, if it be necessary. Accordingly we must reply that those who give all their possessions with the intention of following Christ, and banish from their minds all solicitude for temporal things, are not prodigal but perfectly liberal.

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Article 3 Whether prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod prodigalitas sit gravius peccatum quam avaritia. Per avaritiam enim aliquis nocet proximo, cui bona sua non communicat. Per prodigalitatem autem aliquis sibi ipsi nocet, dicit enim philosophus, in IV Ethic., quod corruptio divitiarum, per quas homo vivit, est quaedam ipsius esse perditio. Gravius autem peccat qui sibi ipsi nocet, secundum illud Eccli. XIV, qui sibi nequam est, cui bonus erit? Ergo prodigalitas erit gravius peccatum quam avaritia. Praeterea, inordinatio quae provenit cum aliqua conditione laudabili, minus est vitiosa. Sed inordinatio avaritiae quandoque est cum aliqua laudabili conditione, ut patet in illis qui nolunt sua expendere nec aliena accipere. Prodigalitatis autem inordinatio provenit cum conditione vituperabili, unde et prodigalitatem attribuimus intemperatis hominibus, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Ergo prodigalitas est gravius vitium quam avaritia.

Praeterea, prudentia est praecipua inter morales virtutes, ut supra habitum est. Sed prodigalitas magis opponitur prudentiae quam avaritia, dicitur enim Prov. XXI, thesaurus desiderabilis et oleum in tabernaculo iusti, et imprudens homo dissipabit illud; et philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod insipientis est superabundanter dare et non accipere. Ergo prodigalitas est gravius peccatum quam avaritia. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod prodigus multum videtur melior illiberali. Respondeo dicendum quod prodigalitas, secundum se considerata, minus peccatum est quam avaritia. Et hoc triplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia avaritia magis differt a virtute opposita. Magis enim ad liberalem pertinet dare, in quo superabundat prodigus, quam accipere vel retinere, in quo superabundat avarus. Secundo, quia prodigus est multis utilis, quibus dat, avarus autem nulli, sed nec sibi ipsi, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Tertio, quia prodigalitas est facile sanabilis. Et per hoc quod declinat ad aetatem senectutis, quae est contraria prodigalitati. Et per hoc quod pervenit ad egestatem de facili, dum multa inutiliter consumit, et sic, pauper factus, non potest in dando superabundare. Et etiam quia de facili perducitur ad virtutem, propter similitudinem quam habet ad ipsam. Sed avarus non de facili sanatur, ratione supradicta. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod differentia prodigi et avari non attenditur secundum hoc quod est peccare

Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness. For by covetousness a man injures his neighbor by not communicating his goods to him, whereas by prodigality a man injures himself, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that the wasting of riches, which are the means whereby a man lives, is an undoing of his very being. Now he that injures himself sins more grievously, according to Ecclus. 14:5, He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good? Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness. Obj. 2: Further, a disorder that is accompanied by a laudable circumstance is less sinful. Now the disorder of covetousness is sometimes accompanied by a laudable circumstance, as in the case of those who are unwilling to spend their own, lest they be driven to accept from others: whereas the disorder of prodigality is accompanied by a circumstance that calls for blame, inasmuch as we ascribe prodigality to those who are intemperate, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness. Obj. 3: Further, prudence is chief among the moral virtues, as stated above (Q. 56, A. 1, ad 1; I-II, Q. 61, A. 2, ad 1). Now prodigality is more opposed to prudence than covetousness is: for it is written (Prov 21:20): There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of the just; and the foolish man shall spend it: and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that it is the mark of a fool to give too much and receive nothing. Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that the prodigal seems to be much better than the illiberal man. I answer that, Prodigality considered in itself is a less grievous sin than covetousness, and this for three reasons. First, because covetousness differs more from the opposite virtue: since giving, wherein the prodigal exceeds, belongs to liberality more than receiving or retaining, wherein the covetous man exceeds. Second, because the prodigal man is of use to the many to whom he gives, while the covetous man is of use to no one, not even to himself, as stated in Ethic. iv, 6. Third, because prodigality is easily cured. For not only is the prodigal on the way to old age, which is opposed to prodigality, but he is easily reduced to a state of want, since much useless spending impoverishes him and makes him unable to exceed in giving. Moreover, prodigality is easily turned into virtue on account of its likeness thereto. On the other hand, the covetous man is not easily cured, for the reason given above (Q. 118, A. 5, ad 3). Reply Obj. 1: The difference between the prodigal and the covetous man is not that the former sins against himself

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in seipsum, et in alium. Nam prodigus peccat in seipsum, dum bona sua consumit, unde vivere debet, peccat etiam in alterum, consumendo bona ex quibus aliis deberet providere. Et praecipue hoc apparet in clericis, qui sunt dispensatores bonorum Ecclesiae, quae sunt pauperum, quos defraudant prodige expendendo. Similiter etiam avarus peccat in alios, inquantum deficit in dationibus, peccat etiam in seipsum, inquantum deficit in sumptibus; unde dicitur Eccle. VI, vir cui Deus dedit divitias, nec tribuit ei potestatem ut comedat ex eis. Sed tamen in hoc superabundat prodigus, quia sic sibi et quibusdam aliis nocet quod tamen aliquibus prodest. Avarus autem nec sibi nec aliis prodest, quia non audet uti etiam ad suam utilitatem bonis suis. Ad secundum dicendum quod cum de vitiis communiter loquimur, iudicamus de eis secundum proprias rationes ipsorum, sicut circa prodigalitatem attendimus quod superflue consumit divitias, circa avaritiam vero quod superflue eas retinet. Quod autem aliquis propter intemperantiam superflue consumat, hoc iam nominat simul multa peccata, unde et tales prodigi sunt peiores, ut dicitur IV Ethic. Quod autem illiberalis sive avarus abstineat ab accipiendis alienis, etsi in se laudabile videatur, tamen ex causa propter quam facit, vituperabile est, dum ideo non vult ab aliis accipere ne cogatur aliis dare. Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia vitia prudentiae opponuntur, sicut et omnes virtutes a prudentia diriguntur. Et ideo vitium ex hoc ipso quod opponitur soli prudentiae, levius reputatur.

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and the latter against another. For the prodigal sins against himself by spending that which is his, and his means of support, and against others by spending the wherewithal to help others. This applies chiefly to the clergy, who are the dispensers of the Church’s goods, that belong to the poor whom they defraud by their prodigal expenditure. In like manner the covetous man sins against others, by being deficient in giving; and he sins against himself, through deficiency in spending: wherefore it is written (Eccl 6:2): A man to whom God hath given riches . . . yet doth not give him the power to eat thereof. Nevertheless the prodigal man exceeds in this, that he injures both himself and others yet so as to profit some; whereas the covetous man profits neither others nor himself, since he does not even use his own goods for his own profit. Reply Obj. 2: In speaking of vices in general, we judge of them according to their respective natures: thus, with regard to prodigality we note that it consumes riches to excess, and with regard to covetousness that it retains them to excess. That one spend too much for the sake of intemperance points already to several additional sins, wherefore the prodigal of this kind is worse, as stated in Ethic. iv, 1. That an illiberal or covetous man refrain from taking what belongs to others, although this appears in itself to call for praise, yet on account of the motive for which he does so it calls for blame, since he is unwilling to accept from others lest he be forced to give to others. Reply Obj. 3: All vices are opposed to prudence, even as all virtues are directed by prudence: wherefore if a vice be opposed to prudence alone, for this very reason it is deemed less grievous.

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Question 120 Equity Deinde considerandum est de epieikeia. Circa quam We must now consider epikeia, under which head there quaeruntur duo. are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum epieikeia sit virtus. (1) Whether epikeia is a virtue? Secundo, utrum sit pars iustitiae. (2) Whether it is a part of justice?

Article 1 Whether epikeia is a virtue? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod epieikeia non sit virtus. Nulla enim virtus aufert aliam virtutem. Sed epieikeia aufert aliam virtutem, quia et tollit id quod iustum est secundum legem; et opponi videtur severitati. Ergo epieikeia non est virtus. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., in istis temporalibus legibus, quanquam de his homines iudicent cum eas instituunt, tamen cum fuerint institutae et firmatae, non licebit iudici de ipsis iudicare, sed secundum ipsas. Sed epieikes videtur iudicare de lege, quando eam aestimat non esse servandam in aliquo casu. Ergo epieikeia magis est vitium quam virtus. Praeterea, ad epieikeiam videtur pertinere ut attendat ad intentionem legislatoris, ut philosophus dicit, in V Ethic. Sed interpretari intentionem legislatoris ad solum principem pertinet, unde imperator dicit, in codice, de legibus et Constitut. Princip., inter aequitatem iusque interpositam interpretationem nobis solis et oportet et licet inspicere. Ergo actus epieikeiae est illicitus. Non ergo epieikeia est virtus. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in V Ethic., ponit eam virtutem. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de legibus ageretur, quia humani actus, de quibus leges dantur, in singularibus contingentibus consistunt, quae infinitis modis variari possunt, non fuit possibile aliquam regulam legis institui quae in nullo casu deficeret, sed legislatores attendunt ad id quod in pluribus accidit, secundum hoc legem ferentes; quam tamen in aliquibus casibus servare est contra aequalitatem iustitiae, et contra bonum commune, quod lex intendit. Sicut lex instituit quod deposita reddantur, quia hoc ut in pluribus iustum est, contingit tamen aliquando esse nocivum, puta si furiosus deposuit gladium et eum reposcat dum est in furia, vel si aliquis reposcat depositum ad patriae impugnationem. In his ergo et similibus casibus malum es-

Objection 1: It seems that epikeia is not a virtue. For no virtue does away with another virtue. Yet epikeia does away with another virtue, since it sets aside that which is just according to law, and seemingly is opposed to severity. Therefore epikeia is not a virtue. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): With regard to these earthly laws, although men pass judgment on them when they make them, yet, when once they are made and established, the judge must pronounce judgment not on them but according to them. But seemingly epikeia pronounces judgment on the law, when it deems that the law should not be observed in some particular case. Therefore epikeia is a vice rather than a virtue. Obj. 3: Further, apparently it belongs to epikeia to consider the intention of the lawgiver, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). But it belongs to the sovereign alone to interpret the intention of the lawgiver, wherefore the Emperor says in the Codex of Laws and Constitutions, under Law i: It is fitting and lawful that We alone should interpret between equity and law. Therefore the act of epikeia is unlawful: and consequently epikeia is not a virtue. On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) states it to be a virtue. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 6), when we were treating of laws, since human actions, with which laws are concerned, are composed of contingent singulars and are innumerable in their diversity, it was not possible to lay down rules of law that would apply to every single case. Legislators in framing laws attend to what commonly happens: although if the law be applied to certain cases it will frustrate the equality of justice and be injurious to the common good, which the law has in view. Thus the law requires deposits to be restored, because in the majority of cases this is just. Yet it happens sometimes to be injurious—for instance, if a madman were to put his sword in deposit, and demand its delivery while in a state of madness, or if a man were to seek the return of his deposit in

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set sequi legem positam, bonum autem est, praetermissis verbis legis, sequi id quod poscit iustitiae ratio et communis utilitas. Et ad hoc ordinatur epieikeia, quae apud nos dicitur aequitas. Unde patet quod epieikeia est virtus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod epieikes non deserit iustum simpliciter, sed iustum quod est lege determinatum. Nec etiam opponitur severitati, quae sequitur veritatem legis in quibus oportet, sequi autem verba legis in quibus non oportet, vitiosum est. Unde dicitur in codice, de legibus et Constit. Princip., non dubium est in legem committere eum qui, verba legis amplexus, contra legis nititur voluntatem. Ad secundum dicendum quod ille de lege iudicat qui dicit eam non esse bene positam. Qui vero dicit verba legis non esse in hoc casu servanda, non iudicat de lege, sed de aliquo particulari negotio quod occurrit.

order to fight against his country. In these and like cases it is bad to follow the law, and it is good to set aside the letter of the law and to follow the dictates of justice and the common good. This is the object of epikeia which we call equity. Therefore it is evident that epikeia is a virtue. Reply Obj. 1: Epikeia does not set aside that which is just in itself but that which is just as by law established. Nor is it opposed to severity, which follows the letter of the law when it ought to be followed. To follow the letter of the law when it ought not to be followed is sinful. Hence it is written in the Codex of Laws and Constitutions under Law v: Without doubt he transgresses the law who by adhering to the letter of the law strives to defeat the intention of the lawgiver. Reply Obj. 2: It would be passing judgment on a law to say that it was not well made; but to say that the letter of the law is not to be observed in some particular case is passing judgment not on the law, but on some particular contingency. Ad tertium dicendum quod interpretatio locum Reply Obj. 3: Interpretation is admissible in doubtful habet in dubiis, in quibus non licet, absque determina- cases where it is not allowed to set aside the letter of the law tione principis, a verbis legis recedere. Sed in manifestis without the interpretation of the sovereign. But when the non est opus interpretatione, sed executione. case is manifest there is need, not of interpretation, but of execution.

Article 2 Whether epikeia is a part of justice? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod epieikeia non sit pars iustitiae. Ut enim ex praedictis patet, duplex est iustitia, una particularis, et alia legalis. Sed epieikeia non est pars iustitiae particularis, quia se extendit ad omnes virtutes, sicut et iustitia legalis. Similiter etiam non est pars iustitiae legalis, quia operatur praeter id quod lege positum est. Ergo videtur quod epieikeia non sit pars iustitiae. Praeterea, virtus principalior non assignatur virtuti minus principali ut pars, cardinalibus enim virtutibus, quasi principalibus, assignantur secundariae virtutes ut partes. Sed epieikeia videtur esse principalior virtus quam iustitia, ut ipsum nomen sonat, dicitur enim ab epi, quod est supra, et dikaion, quod est iustum. Ergo epieikeia non est pars iustitiae. Praeterea, videtur quod epieikeia sit idem quod modestia. Nam Philipp. IV, ubi dicitur, modestia vestra nota sit omnibus hominibus, in Graeco habetur epieikeia. Sed secundum Tullium, modestia est pars temperantiae. Ergo epieikeia non est pars iustitiae. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod epieikes est quoddam iustum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtus aliqua habet triplicem partem, scilicet partem subiectivam, integralem et quasi potentialem. Pars autem

Objection 1: It seems that epikeia is not a part of justice. For, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 7), justice is twofold, particular and legal. Now epikeia is not a part of particular justice, since it extends to all virtues, even as legal justice does. In like manner, neither is it a part of legal justice, since its operation is beside that which is established by law. Therefore it seems that epikeia is not a part of justice. Obj. 2: Further, a more principal virtue is not assigned as the part of a less principal virtue: for it is to the cardinal virtue, as being principal, that secondary virtues are assigned as parts. Now epikeia seems to be a more principal virtue than justice, as implied by its name: for it is derived from epi, i.e., above, and dikaion, i.e., just. Therefore epikeia is not a part of justice. Obj. 3: Further, it seems that epikeia is the same as modesty. For where the Apostle says (Phil 4:5), Let your modesty be known to all men, the Greek has epieikeia. Now, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), modesty is a part of temperance. Therefore epikeia is not a part of justice. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 10) that epikeia is a kind of justice. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 48), a virtue has three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. A subjective part is one of which the whole is predicated es-

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subiectiva est de qua essentialiter praedicatur totum, et est in minus. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter, quandoque enim aliquid praedicatur de pluribus secundum unam rationem, sicut animal de equo et bove; quandoque autem praedicatur secundum prius et posterius, sicut ens praedicatur de substantia et accidente. Epieikeia ergo est pars iustitiae communiter dictae, tanquam iustitia quaedam existens, ut philosophus dicit, in V Ethic. Unde patet quod epieikeia est pars subiectiva iustitiae. Et de ea iustitia per prius dicitur quam de legali, nam legalis iustitia dirigitur secundum epieikeiam. Unde epieikeia est quasi superior regula humanorum actuum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod epieikeia correspondet proprie iustitiae legali, et quodammodo continetur sub ea, et quodammodo excedit eam. Si enim iustitia legalis dicatur quae obtemperat legi sive quantum ad verba legis sive quantum ad intentionem legislatoris, quae potior est, sic epieikeia est pars potior legalis iustitiae. Si vero iustitia legalis dicatur solum quae obtemperat legi secundum verba legis, sic epieikeia non est pars legalis iustitiae, sed est pars iustitiae communiter dictae, contra iustitiam legalem divisa sicut excedens ipsam. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., epieikeia est melior quadam iustitia, scilicet legali quae observat verba legis. Quia tamen et ipsa est iustitia quaedam, non est melior omni iustitia. Ad tertium dicendum quod ad epieikeiam pertinet aliquid moderari, scilicet observantiam verborum legis. Sed modestia quae ponitur pars temperantiae, moderatur exteriorem hominis vitam, puta in incessu vel habitu, vel aliis huiusmodi. Potest tamen esse quod nomen epieikeiae, apud Graecos, per quandam similitudinem transfertur ad omnes moderationes.

Q. 120, A. 2

sentially, and it is less than the whole. This may happen in two ways. For sometimes one thing is predicated of many in one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox: and sometimes one thing is predicated of many according to priority and posteriority, as being of substance and accident. Accordingly, epikeia is a part of justice taken in a general sense, for it is a kind of justice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). Wherefore it is evident that epikeia is a subjective part of justice; and justice is predicated of it with priority to being predicated of legal justice, since legal justice is subject to the direction of epikeia. Hence epikeia is by way of being a higher rule of human actions. Reply Obj. 1: Epikeia corresponds properly to legal justice, and in one way is contained under it, and in another way exceeds it. For if legal justice denotes that which complies with the law, whether as regards the letter of the law, or as regards the intention of the lawgiver, which is of more account, then epikeia is the more important part of legal justice. But if legal justice denote merely that which complies with the law with regard to the letter, then epikeia is a part not of legal justice but of justice in its general acceptation, and is condivided with legal justice, as exceeding it. Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10), epikeia is better than a certain, namely, legal, justice, which observes the letter of the law: yet since it is itself a kind of justice, it is not better than all justice. Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to epikeia to moderate something, namely, the observance of the letter of the law. But modesty, which is reckoned a part of temperance, moderates man’s outward life—for instance, in his deportment, dress or the like. Possibly also the term epieikeia is applied in Greek by a similitude to all kinds of moderation.

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Question 121 Piety Deinde considerandum est de dono correspondente We must now consider the gift that corresponds to jusiustitiae, scilicet de pietate. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. tice; namely, piety. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum sit donum spiritus sancti. (1) Whether it is a gift of the Holy Spirit? Secundo, quid in beatitudinibus et fructibus ei (2) Which of the beatitudes and fruits corresponds to respondeat. it?

Article 1 Whether piety is a gift? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pietas non sit donum. Dona enim a virtutibus differunt, ut supra habitum est. Sed pietas est quaedam virtus, ut supra habitum est. Ergo pietas non est donum. Praeterea, dona sunt excellentiora virtutibus, maxime moralibus, ut supra habitum est. Sed inter partes iustitiae religio est potior pietate. Si ergo aliqua pars iustitiae debeat poni donum, videtur quod magis religio deberet esse donum quam pietas. Praeterea, dona manent in patria, et actus donorum, ut supra habitum est. Sed actus pietatis non potest manere in patria, dicit enim Gregorius, in I Moral., quod pietas cordis viscera misericordiae operibus replet; et sic non erit in patria, ubi nulla erit miseria. Ergo pietas non est donum. Sed contra est quod Isaiae XI ponitur inter dona. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, dona spiritus sancti sunt quaedam habituales animae dispositiones quibus est prompte mobilis a spiritu sancto. Inter cetera autem, movet nos Spiritus Sanctus ad hoc quod affectum quendam filialem habeamus ad Deum, secundum illud Rom. VIII, accepistis spiritum adoptionis filiorum, in quo clamamus, abba, pater. Et quia ad pietatem proprie pertinet officium et cultum patri exhibere, consequens est quod pietas secundum quam cultum et officium exhibemus Deo ut patri per instinctum spiritus sancti sit spiritus sancti donum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod pietas quae exhibet patri carnali officium et cultum, est virtus, sed pietas quae est donum, hoc exhibet Deo ut patri. Ad secundum dicendum quod exhibere cultum Deo ut creatori, quod facit religio, est excellentius quam exhibere cultum patri carnali, quod facit pietas quae est

Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a gift. For the gifts differ from the virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 1). But piety is a virtue, as stated above (Q. 101, A. 3). Therefore piety is not a gift. Obj. 2: Further, the gifts are more excellent than the virtues, above all the moral virtues, as above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 8). Now among the parts of justice religion is greater than piety. Therefore if any part of justice is to be accounted a gift, it seems that religion should be a gift rather than piety. Obj. 3: Further, the gifts and their acts remain in heaven, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 6). But the act of piety cannot remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that piety fills the inmost recesses of the heart with works of mercy: and so there will be no piety in heaven since there will be no unhappiness. Therefore piety is not a gift. On the contrary, It is reckoned among the gifts in the eleventh chapter of Isaias (verse 2). I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 1; Q. 69, AA. 1, 3), the gifts of the Holy Spirit are habitual dispositions of the soul, rendering it amenable to the motion of the Holy Spirit. Now the Holy Spirit moves us to this effect among others, of having a filial affection towards God, according to Rom. 8:15, You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father). And since it belongs properly to piety to pay duty and worship to one’s father, it follows that piety, whereby, at the Holy Spirit’s instigation, we pay worship and duty to God as our Father, is a gift of the Holy Spirit. Reply Obj. 1: The piety that pays duty and worship to a father in the flesh is a virtue: but the piety that is a gift pays this to God as Father. Reply Obj. 2: To pay worship to God as Creator, as religion does, is more excellent than to pay worship to one’s father in the flesh, as the piety that is a virtue does. But to

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virtus. Sed exhibere cultum Deo ut patri est adhuc excellentius quam exhibere cultum Deo ut creatori et domino. Unde religio est potior pietate virtute, sed pietas secundum quod est donum, est potior religione. Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut per pietatem quae est virtus exhibet homo officium et cultum non solum patri carnali, sed etiam omnibus sanguine iunctis, secundum quod pertinent ad patrem; ita etiam pietas secundum quod est donum, non solum exhibet cultum et officium Deo, sed omnibus hominibus inquantum pertinent ad Deum. Et propter hoc ad ipsam pertinet honorare sanctos, non contradicere Scripturae, sive intellectae sive non intellectae, sicut Augustinus dicit, in II de Doct. Christ. Ipsa etiam ex consequenti subvenit in miseria constitutis. Et quamvis iste actus non habeat locum in patria, praecipue post diem iudicii, habebit tamen locum praecipuus actus eius, qui est revereri Deum affectu filiali, quod praecipue tunc erit, secundum illud Sap. V, ecce quomodo computati sunt inter filios Dei. Erit etiam mutua honoratio sanctorum ad invicem. Nunc autem, ante diem iudicii, miserentur sancti etiam eorum qui in statu huius miseriae vivunt.

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pay worship to God as Father is yet more excellent than to pay worship to God as Creator and Lord. Wherefore religion is greater than the virtue of piety: while the gift of piety is greater than religion. Reply Obj. 3: As by the virtue of piety man pays duty and worship not only to his father in the flesh, but also to all his kindred on account of their being related to his father, so by the gift of piety he pays worship and duty not only to God, but also to all men on account of their relationship to God. Hence it belongs to piety to honor the saints, and not to contradict the Scriptures whether one understands them or not, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii). Consequently it also assists those who are in a state of unhappiness. And although this act has no place in heaven, especially after the Day of Judgment, yet piety will exercise its principal act, which is to revere God with filial affection: for it is then above all that this act will be fulfilled, according to Wis. 5:5, Behold how they are numbered among the children of God. The saints will also mutually honor one another. Now, however, before the Judgment Day, the saints have pity on those also who are living in this unhappy state.

Article 2 Whether the second beatitude, “blessed are the meek,” corresponds to the gift of piety? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod dono pietatis non respondeat secunda beatitudo, scilicet, beati mites. Pietas enim est donum respondens iustitiae. Ad quam magis pertinet quarta beatitudo, scilicet, beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt iustitiam, vel etiam quinta, beati misericordes, quia, ut dictum est, opera misericordiae pertinent ad pietatem. Non ergo secunda beatitudo pertinet ad donum pietatis. Praeterea, donum pietatis dirigitur dono scientiae, quod adiungitur in connumeratione donorum Isaiae XI. Ad idem autem se extendunt dirigens et exequens. Cum igitur ad scientiam pertineat tertia beatitudo, scilicet, beati qui lugent, videtur quod non pertineat ad pietatem secunda beatitudo. Praeterea, fructus respondent beatitudinibus et donis, ut supra habitum est. Sed inter fructus, bonitas et benignitas magis videntur convenire cum pietate quam mansuetudo, quae pertinet ad mititatem. Ergo secunda beatitudo non respondet dono pietatis.

Objection 1: It seems that the second beatitude, Blessed are the meek, does not correspond to the gift of piety. For piety is the gift corresponding to justice, to which rather belongs the fourth beatitude, Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice, or the fifth beatitude, Blessed are the merciful, since as stated above (A. 1, Obj. 3), the works of mercy belong to piety. Therefore the second beatitude does not pertain to the gift of piety. Obj. 2: Further, the gift of piety is directed by the gift of knowledge, which is united to it in the enumeration of the gifts (Isa 11). Now direction and execution extend to the same matter. Since, then, the third beatitude, Blessed are they that mourn, corresponds to the gift of knowledge, it seems that the second beatitude corresponds to piety. Obj. 3: Further, the fruits correspond to the beatitudes and gifts, as stated above (I-II, Q. 70, A. 2). Now among the fruits, goodness and benignity seem to agree with piety rather than mildness, which pertains to meekness. Therefore the second beatitude does not correspond to the gift of piety. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Serm. Dom. in monte, pietas congruit mitibus. Monte i): Piety is becoming to the meek. Respondeo dicendum quod in adaptatione beatituI answer that, In adapting the beatitudes to the gifts dinum ad dona duplex convenientia potest attendi. Una a twofold congruity may be observed. One is according to quidem secundum rationem ordinis, quam videtur Au- the order in which they are given, and Augustine seems to gustinus fuisse secutus. Unde primam beatitudinem at- have followed this: wherefore he assigns the first beatitude

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tribuit infimo dono, scilicet timori; secundam autem scilicet, beati mites, attribuit pietati; et sic de aliis. Alia convenientia potest attendi secundum propriam rationem doni et beatitudinis. Et secundum hoc, oporteret adaptare beatitudines donis secundum obiecta et actus. Et ita pietati magis responderet quarta et quinta beatitudo quam secunda. Secunda tamen beatitudo habet aliquam convenientiam cum pietate, inquantum scilicet per mansuetudinem tolluntur impedimenta actuum pietatis. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. Ad secundum dicendum quod secundum proprietatem beatitudinum et donorum, oportet quod eadem beatitudo respondeat scientiae et pietati. Sed secundum rationem ordinis, diversae beatitudines eis adaptantur, observata tamen aliquali convenientia, ut supra dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod bonitas et benignitas in fructibus directe attribui possunt pietati, mansuetudo autem indirecte, inquantum tollit impedimenta actuum pietatis, ut dictum est.

Q. 121, A. 2

to the lowest gift, namely, fear, and the second beatitude, Blessed are the meek, to piety, and so on. Another congruity may be observed in keeping with the special nature of each gift and beatitude. In this way one must adapt the beatitudes to the gifts according to their objects and acts: and thus the fourth and fifth beatitudes would correspond to piety, rather than the second. Yet the second beatitude has a certain congruity with piety, inasmuch as meekness removes the obstacles to acts of piety. This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. Reply Obj. 2: Taking the beatitudes and gifts according to their proper natures, the same beatitude must needs correspond to knowledge and piety: but taking them according to their order, different beatitudes correspond to them, although a certain congruity may be observed, as stated above. Reply Obj. 3: In the fruits goodness and benignity may be directly ascribed to piety; and mildness indirectly insofar as it removes obstacles to acts of piety, as stated above.

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Question 122 The Precepts of Justice Deinde considerandum est de praeceptis iustitiae. Et We must now consider the precepts of justice, under circa hoc quaeruntur sex. which head there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum praecepta Decalogi sint praecepta (1) Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts iustitiae. of justice? Secundo, de primo praecepto Decalogi. (2) Of the first precept of the decalogue; Tertio, de secundo. (3) Of the second; Quarto, de tertio. (4) Of the third; Quinto, de quarto. (5) Of the fourth; Sexto, de aliis sex. (6) Of the other six.

Article 1 Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta Decalogi non sint praecepta iustitiae. Intentio enim legislatoris est cives facere virtuosos secundum omnem virtutem, ut dicitur in II Ethic., unde et in V Ethic. dicitur quod lex praecipit de omnibus actibus virtutum omnium. Sed praecepta Decalogi sunt prima principia totius divinae legis. Ergo praecepta Decalogi non pertinent ad solam iustitiam. Praeterea, ad iustitiam videntur pertinere praecipue praecepta iudicialia, quae contra moralia dividuntur, ut supra habitum est. Sed praecepta Decalogi sunt praecepta moralia, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo praecepta Decalogi non sunt praecepta iustitiae. Praeterea, lex praecipue tradit praecepta de actibus iustitiae pertinentibus ad bonum commune, puta de officiis publicis, et aliis huiusmodi. Sed de his non fit mentio in praeceptis Decalogi. Ergo videtur quod praecepta Decalogi non pertineant proprie ad iustitiam. Praeterea, praecepta Decalogi distinguuntur in duas tabulas secundum dilectionem Dei et proximi, quae pertinent ad virtutem caritatis. Ergo praecepta Decalogi magis pertinent ad caritatem quam ad iustitiam. Sed contra est quod iustitia sola videtur esse virtus per quam ordinamur ad alterum. Sed per omnia praecepta Decalogi ordinamur ad alterum, ut patet discurrenti per singula. Ergo omnia praecepta Decalogi pertinent ad iustitiam. Respondeo dicendum quod praecepta Decalogi sunt prima praecepta legis, et quibus statim ratio natura-

Objection 1: It seems that the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice. For the intention of a lawgiver is to make the citizens virtuous in respect of every virtue, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. Wherefore, according to Ethic. v, 1, the law prescribes about all acts of all virtues. Now the precepts of the decalogue are the first principles of the whole Divine Law. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue do not pertain to justice alone. Obj. 2: Further, it would seem that to justice belong especially the judicial precepts, which are condivided with the moral precepts, as stated above (I-II, Q. 99, A. 4). But the precepts of the decalogue are moral precepts, as stated above (I-II, Q. 100, A. 3). Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice. Obj. 3: Further, the Law contains chiefly precepts about acts of justice regarding the common good, for instance about public officers and the like. But there is no mention of these in the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore it seems that the precepts of the decalogue do not properly belong to justice. Obj. 4: Further, the precepts of the decalogue are divided into two tables, corresponding to the love of God and the love of our neighbor, both of which regard the virtue of charity. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue belong to charity rather than to justice. On the contrary, Seemingly justice is the sole virtue whereby we are directed to another. Now we are directed to another by all the precepts of the decalogue, as is evident if one consider each of them. Therefore all the precepts of the decalogue pertain to justice. I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are the first principles of the Law: and the natural reason assents to

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lis assentit sicut manifestissimis. Manifestissime autem ratio debiti, quae requiritur ad praeceptum, apparet in iustitia, quae est ad alterum, quia in his quae spectant ad seipsum, videtur primo aspectui quod homo sit sui dominus, et quod liceat ei facere quodlibet; sed in his quae sunt ad alterum, manifeste apparet quod homo est alteri obligatus ad reddendum ei quod debet. Et ideo praecepta Decalogi oportuit ad iustitiam pertinere. Unde tria prima praecepta sunt de actibus religionis, quae est potissima pars iustitiae; quartum autem praeceptum est de actu pietatis, quae est pars iustitiae secunda; alia vero sex dantur de actibus iustitiae communiter dictae, quae inter aequales attenditur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod lex intendit omnes homines facere virtuosos, sed ordine quodam, ut scilicet prius tradat eis praecepta de his in quibus est manifestior ratio debiti, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod iudicialia praecepta sunt quaedam determinationes moralium praeceptorum prout ordinantur ad proximum, sicut et caeremonialia sunt quaedam determinationes moralium praeceptorum prout ordinantur ad Deum. Unde neutra praecepta continentur in Decalogo. Sunt tamen determinationes praeceptorum Decalogi. Et sic ad iustitiam pertinent. Ad tertium dicendum quod ea quae pertinent ad bonum commune oportet diversimode dispensari secundum hominum diversitatem. Et ideo non fuerunt ponenda inter praecepta Decalogi, sed inter praecepta iudicialia. Ad quartum dicendum quod praecepta Decalogi pertinent ad caritatem sicut ad finem, secundum illud I ad Tim. I, finis praecepti caritas est. Sed ad iustitiam pertinent inquantum immediate sunt de actibus iustitiae.

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them at once, as to principles that are most evident. Now it is altogether evident that the notion of duty, which is essential to a precept, appears in justice, which is of one towards another. Because in those matters that relate to himself it would seem at a glance that man is master of himself, and that he may do as he likes: whereas in matters that refer to another it appears manifestly that a man is under obligation to render to another that which is his due. Hence the precepts of the decalogue must needs pertain to justice. Wherefore the first three precepts are about acts of religion, which is the chief part of justice; the fourth precept is about acts of piety, which is the second part of justice; and the six remaining are about justice commonly so called, which is observed among equals. Reply Obj. 1: The intention of the law is to make all men virtuous, but in a certain order, namely, by first of all giving them precepts about those things where the notion of duty is most manifest, as stated above. Reply Obj. 2: The judicial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts, insofar as these are directed to one’s neighbor, just as the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts insofar as these are directed to God. Hence neither precepts are contained in the decalogue: and yet they are determinations of the precepts of the decalogue, and therefore pertain to justice. Reply Obj. 3: Things that concern the common good must needs be administered in different ways according to the difference of men. Hence they were to be given a place not among the precepts of the decalogue, but among the judicial precepts. Reply Obj. 4: The precepts of the decalogue pertain to charity as their end, according to 1 Tim. 1:5, The end of the commandment is charity: but they belong to justice, inasmuch as they refer immediately to acts of justice.

Article 2 Whether the first precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod primum praeceptum Decalogi inconvenienter tradatur. Magis enim homo est obligatus Deo quam patri carnali, secundum illud Heb. XII, quanto magis obtemperabimus patri spirituum, et vivemus? Sed praeceptum pietatis, qua honoratur pater, ponitur affirmative, cum dicitur, honora patrem tuum et matrem tuam. Ergo multo magis primum praeceptum religionis, qua honoratur Deus, debuit proponi affirmative, praesertim cum affirmatio sit naturaliter prior negatione. Praeterea, primum praeceptum Decalogi ad religionem pertinet, ut dictum est. Sed religio, cum sit una virtus, habet unum actum. In primo autem praecepto

Objection 1: It seems that the first precept of the decalogue is unfittingly expressed. For man is more bound to God than to his father in the flesh, according to Heb. 12:9, How much more shall we obey the Father of spirits and live? Now the precept of piety, whereby man honors his father, is expressed affirmatively in these words: Honor thy father and thy mother. Much more, therefore, should the first precept of religion, whereby all honor God, be expressed affirmatively, especially as affirmation is naturally prior to negation. Obj. 2: Further, the first precept of the decalogue pertains to religion, as stated above (A. 1). Now religion, since it is one virtue, has one act. Yet in the first precept three

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prohibentur tres actus, nam primo dicitur, non habebis deos alienos coram me; secundo dicitur, non facies tibi sculptile; tertio, non adorabis ea, neque coles. Ergo inconvenienter traditur primum praeceptum. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de decem chordis, quod per primum praeceptum excluditur vitium superstitionis. Sed multae sunt aliae noxiae superstitiones praeter idololatriam, ut supra dictum est. Insufficienter ergo prohibetur sola idololatria. In contrarium est auctoritas Scripturae. Respondeo dicendum quod ad legem pertinet facere homines bonos. Et ideo oportet praecepta legis ordinari secundum ordinem generationis, qua scilicet homo fit bonus. In ordine autem generationis duo sunt attendenda. Quorum primum est quod prima pars primo constituitur, sicut in generatione animalis primo generatur cor, et in domo primo fit fundamentum. In bonitate autem animae prima pars est bonitas voluntatis, ex qua aliquis homo bene utitur qualibet alia bonitate. Bonitas autem voluntatis attenditur ad obiectum suum, quod est finis. Et ideo in eo qui erat per legem instituendus ad virtutem, primo oportuit quasi iacere quoddam fundamentum religionis, per quam homo debite ordinatur in Deum, qui est ultimus finis humanae voluntatis.

Secundo attendendum est in ordine generationis quod primo contraria et impedimenta tolluntur, sicut agricola primo purgat agrum, et postea proiicit semina, secundum illud Ierem. IV, novate vobis novale, et nolite serere super spinas. Et ideo circa religionem primo homo erat instituendus ut impedimenta verae religionis excluderet. Praecipuum autem impedimentum religionis est quod homo falso Deo inhaereat, secundum illud Matth. VI, non potestis servire Deo et mammonae. Et ideo in primo praecepto legis excluditur cultus falsorum deorum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod etiam circa religionem ponitur unum praeceptum affirmativum, scilicet, memento ut diem sabbati sanctifices. Sed erant praemittenda praecepta negativa, quibus impedimenta religionis tollerentur. Quamvis enim affirmatio naturaliter sit prior negatione, tamen in via generationis negatio, qua removentur impedimenta, est prior, ut dictum est. Et praecipue in rebus divinis in quibus negationes praeferuntur affirmationibus, propter insufficientiam nostram, ut Dionysius dicit, II cap. Cael. Hier. Ad secundum dicendum quod cultus alienorum deorum dupliciter apud aliquos observabatur. Quidam enim quasdam creaturas pro diis colebant absque institutione imaginum, unde Varro dixit quod antiqui Romani diu sine simulacris deos coluerunt. Et hic cultus prohibetur primo, cum dicitur, non habebis deos alienos.

Q. 122, A. 2

acts are forbidden: since we read first: Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me; second, Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing; and third, Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them. Therefore the first precept is unfittingly expressed. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De decem chord. ix) that the first precept forbids the sin of superstition. But there are many wicked superstitions besides idolatry, as stated above (Q. 92, A. 2). Therefore it was insufficient to forbid idolatry alone. On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture. I answer that, It pertains to law to make men good, wherefore it behooved the precepts of the Law to be set in order according to the order of generation, the order, to wit, of man’s becoming good. Now two things must be observed in the order of generation. The first is that the first part is the first thing to be established; thus in the generation of an animal the first thing to be formed is the heart, and in building a home the first thing to be set up is the foundation: and in the goodness of the soul the first part is goodness of the will, the result of which is that a man makes good use of every other goodness. Now the goodness of the will depends on its object, which is its end. Wherefore since man was to be directed to virtue by means of the Law, the first thing necessary was, as it were, to lay the foundation of religion, whereby man is duly directed to God, Who is the last end of man’s will. The second thing to be observed in the order of generation is that in the first place contraries and obstacles have to be removed. Thus the farmer first purifies the soil, and afterwards sows his seed, according to Jer. 4:3, Break up anew your fallow ground, and sow not upon thorns. Hence it behooved man, first of all to be instructed in religion, so as to remove the obstacles to true religion. Now the chief obstacle to religion is for man to adhere to a false god, according to Matt. 6:24, You cannot serve God and mammon. Therefore in the first precept of the Law the worship of false gods is excluded. Reply Obj. 1: In point of fact there is one affirmative precept about religion, namely: Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath Day. Still the negative precepts had to be given first, so that by their means the obstacles to religion might be removed. For though affirmation naturally precedes negation, yet in the process of generation, negation, whereby obstacles are removed, comes first, as stated in the Article. Especially is this true in matters concerning God, where negation is preferable to affirmation, on account of our insufficiency, as Dionysius observes (Coel. Hier. ii). Reply Obj. 2: People worshiped strange gods in two ways. For some served certain creatures as gods without having recourse to images. Hence Varro says that for a long time the ancient Romans worshiped gods without using images: and this worship is first forbidden by the words, Thou shalt not have strange gods. Among others the worship

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Apud alios autem erat cultus falsorum deorum sub quibusdam imaginibus. Et ideo opportune prohibetur et ipsarum imaginum institutio, cum dicitur, non facies tibi sculptile; et imaginum ipsarum cultus, cum dicitur, non coles ea, et cetera. Ad tertium dicendum quod omnes aliae superstitiones procedunt ex aliquo pacto cum Daemonibus inito tacito vel expresso. Et ideo omnes intelliguntur prohiberi in hoc quod dicitur, non habebis deos alienos.

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of false gods was observed by using certain images: and so the very making of images was fittingly forbidden by the words, Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing, as also the worship of those same images, by the words, Thou shalt not adore them, etc. Reply Obj. 3: All other kinds of superstition proceed from some compact, tacit or explicit, with the demons; hence all are understood to be forbidden by the words, Thou shalt not have strange gods.

Article 3 Whether the second precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod secundum praeceptum Decalogi non convenienter tradatur. Hoc enim praeceptum, non assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum, sic exponitur in Glossa Exod. XX, idest, non existimes creaturam esse filium Dei, per quod prohibetur error contra fidem. Et Deut. V exponitur, non assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum, scilicet, nomen Dei ligno et lapidi attribuendo, per quod prohibetur falsa confessio, quae est actus infidelitatis, sicut et error. Infidelitas autem est prior superstitione, sicut et fides religione. Ergo hoc praeceptum debuit praemitti primo, in quo prohibetur superstitio. Praeterea, nomen Dei ad multa assumitur, sicut ad laudandum, ad miracula faciendum, et universaliter ad omnia quae dicuntur vel fiunt a nobis, secundum illud Coloss. III, omne quodcumque facitis in verbo vel opere, in nomine domini facite. Ergo praeceptum quo prohibetur nomen Dei assumi in vanum, videtur universalius esse quam praeceptum quo prohibetur superstitio. Et ita debuit ei praemitti. Praeterea, Exod. XX exponitur illud praeceptum, non assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum, iurando scilicet pro nihilo. Unde videtur per hoc prohiberi vana iuratio, quae scilicet est sine iudicio. Sed multo gravior est falsa iuratio, quae est sine veritate; et iniusta iuratio, quae est sine iustitia. Ergo magis debuerunt illa prohiberi per hoc praeceptum.

Objection 1: It seems that the second precept of the decalogue is unfittingly expressed. For this precept, Thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain is thus explained by a gloss on Ex. 20:7: Thou shalt not deem the Son of God to be a creature, so that it forbids an error against faith. Again, a gloss on the words of Deut. 5:11, Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain, adds, i.e., by giving the name of God to wood or stone, as though they forbade a false confession of faith, which, like error, is an act of unbelief. Now unbelief precedes superstition, as faith precedes religion. Therefore this precept should have preceded the first, whereby superstition is forbidden. Obj. 2: Further, the name of God is taken for many purposes—for instance, those of praise, of working miracles, and generally speaking in conjunction with all we say or do, according to Col. 3:17, All whatsoever you do in word or in work . . . do ye in the name of the Lord. Therefore the precept forbidding the taking of God’s name in vain seems to be more universal than the precept forbidding superstition, and thus should have preceded it. Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Ex. 20:7 expounds the precept, Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain, namely, by swearing to nothing. Hence this precept would seem to forbid useless swearing, that is to say, swearing without judgment. But false swearing, which is without truth, and unjust swearing, which is without justice, are much more grievous. Therefore this precept should rather have forbidden them. Praeterea, multo gravius peccatum est blaspheObj. 4: Further, blasphemy or any word or deed that mia, vel quidquid fiat verbo vel facto in contumeliam is an insult to God is much more grievous than perjury. Dei, quam periurium. Ergo blasphemia et alia huiusmo- Therefore blasphemy and other like sins should rather have di magis debuerunt per hoc praeceptum prohiberi. been forbidden by this precept. Praeterea, multa sunt Dei nomina. Ergo non deObj. 5: Further, God’s names are many. Therefore it buit indeterminate dici, non assumes nomen Dei tui in should not have been said indefinitely: Thou shalt not take vanum. the name of . . . thy God in vain. Sed in contrarium est Scripturae auctoritas. On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture. Respondeo dicendum quod oportet prius impediI answer that, In one who is being instructed in menta verae religionis excludere in eo qui instituitur ad virtue it is necessary to remove obstacles to true religion be-

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virtutem, quam eum in vera religione fundare. Opponitur autem verae religioni aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, per excessum, quando scilicet id quod est religionis alteri indebite exhibetur, quod pertinet ad superstitionem. Alio modo, quasi per defectum reverentiae, cum scilicet Deus contemnitur, quod pertinet ad vitium irreligiositatis, ut supra habitum est. Superstitio autem impedit religionem quantum ad hoc, ne suscipiatur Deus ad colendum. Ille autem cuius animus implicatus est indebito cultui, non potest simul debitum Dei cultum suscipere, secundum illud Isaiae XXVIII, angustatum est stratum, ut alter decidat, scilicet Deus verus vel falsus a corde hominis, et pallium breve utrumque operire non potest. Per irreligiositatem autem impeditur religio quantum ad hoc, ne Deus, postquam susceptus est, honoretur. Prius autem est Deum suscipere ad colendum quam eum susceptum honorare. Et ideo praemittitur praeceptum quo prohibetur superstitio secundo praecepto, quo prohibetur periurium, ad irreligiositatem pertinens. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illae expositiones sunt mysticae. Litteralis autem expositio est quae habetur Deut. V, non assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum, scilicet iurando pro re quae non est. Ad secundum dicendum quod non prohibetur quaelibet assumptio divini nominis per hoc praeceptum, sed proprie illa qua sumitur divinum nomen ad confirmationem humani verbi per modum iuramenti, quia ista assumptio divini nominis est frequentior apud homines. Potest tamen ex consequenti intelligi ut per hoc prohibeatur omnis inordinata divini nominis assumptio. Et secundum hoc procedunt illae expositiones de quibus supra dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod pro nihilo iurare dicitur ille qui iurat pro eo quod non est, quod pertinet ad falsam iurationem, quae principaliter periurium nominatur, ut supra dictum est. Quando enim aliquis falsum iurat, tunc iuratio est vana secundum seipsam, quia non habet firmamentum veritatis. Quando autem aliquis iurat sine iudicio ex aliqua levitate, si verum iurat, non est ibi vanitas ex parte ipsius iuramenti, sed solum ex parte iurantis. Ad quartum dicendum quod sicut ei qui instruitur in aliqua scientia primo proponuntur quaedam communia documenta, ita etiam lex, quae instituit hominem ad virtutem, in praeceptis Decalogi, quae sunt prima, ea proposuit, vel prohibendo vel mandando, quae communius in cursu humanae vitae solent accidere. Et ideo inter praecepta Decalogi prohibetur periurium, quod frequentius accidit quam blasphemia, in quam homo rarius prolabitur.

Q. 122, A. 3

fore establishing him in true religion. Now a thing is opposed to true religion in two ways. First, by excess, when, to wit, that which belongs to religion is given to others than to whom it is due, and this pertains to superstition. Second, by lack, as it were, of reverence, when, to wit, God is contemned, and this pertains to the vice of irreligion, as stated above (Q. 97, in the preamble, and in the Article that follows). Now superstition hinders religion by preventing man from acknowledging God so as to worship Him: and when a man’s mind is engrossed in some undue worship, he cannot at the same time give due worship to God, according to Isa. 28:20, The bed is straitened, so that one must fall out, i.e., either the true God or a false god must fall out from man’s heart, and a short covering cannot cover both. On the other hand, irreligion hinders religion by preventing man from honoring God after he has acknowledged Him. Now one must first of all acknowledge God with a view to worship, before honoring Him we have acknowledged. For this reason the precept forbidding superstition is placed before the second precept, which forbids perjury that pertains to irreligion. Reply Obj. 1: These expositions are mystical. The literal explanation is that which is given Deut. 5:11: Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain, namely, by swearing on that which is not. Reply Obj. 2: This precept does not forbid all taking of the name of God, but properly the taking of God’s name in confirmation of a man’s word by way of an oath, because men are wont to take God’s name more frequently in this way. Nevertheless we may understand that in consequence all inordinate taking of the Divine name is forbidden by this precept: and it is in this sense that we are to take the explanation quoted in the First Objection. Reply Obj. 3: To swear to nothing means to swear to that which is not. This pertains to false swearing, which is chiefly called perjury, as stated above (Q. 98, A. 1, ad 3). For when a man swears to that which is false, his swearing is vain in itself, since it is not supported by the truth. On the other hand, when a man swears without judgment, through levity, if he swear to the truth, there is no vanity on the part of the oath itself, but only on the part of the swearer. Reply Obj. 4: Just as when we instruct a man in some science, we begin by putting before him certain general maxims, even so the Law, which forms man to virtue by instructing him in the precepts of the decalogue, which are the first of all precepts, gave expression, by prohibition or by command, to those things which are of most common occurrence in the course of human life. Hence the precepts of the decalogue include the prohibition of perjury, which is of more frequent occurrence than blasphemy, since man does not fall so often into the latter sin.

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Ad quintum dicendum quod nominibus Dei debetur reverentia ex parte rei significatae, quae est una, non autem ratione vocum significantium, quae sunt multae. Et ideo singulariter dixit, non assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum, quia non differt per quodcumque nomen Dei periurium committatur.

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Reply Obj. 5: Reverence is due to the Divine names on the part of the thing signified, which is one, and not on the part of the signifying words, which are many. Hence it is expressed in the singular: Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain: since it matters not in which of God’s names perjury is committed.

Article 4 Whether the third precept of the decalogue, concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is fittingly expressed? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter tertium praeceptum Decalogi tradatur, scilicet de sanctificatione sabbati. Hoc enim praeceptum, spiritualiter intellectum, est generale, dicit enim Ambrosius, super illud Luc. XIII, archisynagogus indignans quia sabbato curasset, lex, inquit, in sabbato non hominem curare, sed servilia opera facere, idest peccatis gravari, prohibet. Secundum autem litteralem sensum, est praeceptum caeremoniale, dicitur enim Exod. XXXI, videte ut sabbatum meum custodiatis, quia signum est inter me et vos in generationibus vestris. Praecepta autem Decalogi et sunt praecepta spiritualia, et sunt moralia. Inconvenienter ergo ponitur inter praecepta Decalogi. Praeterea, caeremonialia legis praecepta continent sacra, sacrificia, sacramenta et observantias, ut supra habitum est. Ad sacra autem pertinebant non solum sacri dies, sed etiam sacra loca et sacra vasa et alia huiusmodi. Similiter etiam erant multi sacri dies praeter sabbatum. Inconveniens igitur est quod, praetermissis omnibus aliis caeremonialibus, de sola observantia sabbati fit mentio. Praeterea, quicumque transgreditur praeceptum Decalogi, peccat. Sed in veteri lege aliqui transgredientes observantiam sabbati non peccabant, sicut circumcidentes pueros octava die, et sacerdotes in templo sabbatis operantes. Et Elias, cum quadraginta diebus pervenisset ad montem Dei Horeb, consequens est quod in sabbato itineraverit. Similiter etiam sacerdotes, dum circumferrent septem diebus arcam domini, ut legitur Iosue VI, intelliguntur eam die sabbati circumtulisse. Dicitur etiam Luc. XIII, nonne unusquisque vestrum solvit bovem suum aut asinum et ducit adaquare? Ergo inconvenienter ponitur inter praecepta Decalogi.

Objection 1: It seems that the third precept of the decalogue, concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is unfittingly expressed. For this, understood spiritually, is a general precept: since Bede in commenting on Luke 13:14, The ruler of the synagogue being angry that He had healed on the Sabbath, says (Comment. iv): The Law forbids, not to heal man on the Sabbath, but to do servile works, i.e., to burden oneself with sin. Taken literally it is a ceremonial precept, for it is written (Exod 31:13): See that you keep My Sabbath: because it is a sign between Me and you in your generations. Now the precepts of the decalogue are both spiritual and moral. Therefore it is unfittingly placed among the precepts of the decalogue. Obj. 2: Further, the ceremonial precepts of the Law contain sacred things, sacrifices, sacraments and observances, as stated above (I-II, Q. 101, A. 4). Now sacred things comprised not only sacred days, but also sacred places and sacred vessels, and so on. Moreover, there were many sacred days other than the Sabbath. Therefore it was unfitting to omit all other ceremonial observances and to mention only that of the Sabbath. Obj. 3: Further, whoever breaks a precept of the decalogue, sins. But in the Old Law some who broke the observances of the Sabbath did not sin—for instance, those who circumcised their sons on the eighth day, and the priests who worked in the temple on the Sabbath. Also Elias (3 Kgs 19), who journeyed for forty days unto the mount of God, Horeb, must have traveled on a Sabbath: the priests also who carried the ark of the Lord for seven days, as related in Josue 7, must be understood to have carried it on a Sabbath. Again it is written (Luke 13:15): Doth not every one of you on the Sabbath day loose his ox or his ass . . . and lead them to water? Therefore it is unfittingly placed among the precepts of the decalogue. Praeterea, praecepta Decalogi sunt etiam in nova Obj. 4: Further, the precepts of the decalogue have to be lege observanda. Sed in nova lege non servatur hoc prae- observed also under the New Law. Yet in the New Law this ceptum, nec quantum ad diem sabbati, nec quantum ad precept is not observed, neither in the point of the Sabbath diem dominicam, in qua et cibi coquuntur, et itinerantur day, nor as to the Lord’s day, on which men cook their food,

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et piscantur homines, et alia multa huiusmodi faciunt. Ergo inconvenienter traditur praeceptum de observantia sabbati. Sed in contrarium est Scripturae auctoritas. Respondeo dicendum quod, remotis impedimentis verae religionis per primum et secundum praeceptum Decalogi, ut supra dictum est, consequens fuit ut tertium praeceptum poneretur, per quod homines in vera religione fundarentur. Ad religionem autem pertinet cultum Deo exhibere. Sicut autem in Scriptura divina traduntur nobis sub aliquibus corporalium rerum similitudinibus, ita cultus exterior Deo exhibetur per aliquod sensibile signum. Et quia ad interiorem cultum, qui consistit in oratione et devotione, magis inducitur homo ex interiori spiritus sancti instinctu, praeceptum legis dandum fuit de exteriori cultu secundum aliquod sensibile signum. Et quia praecepta Decalogi sunt quasi quaedam prima et communia legis principia, ideo in tertio praecepto Decalogi praecipitur exterior Dei cultus sub signo communis beneficii quod pertinet ad omnes, scilicet ad repraesentandum opus creationis mundi, a quo requievisse dicitur Deus septimo die, in cuius signum, dies septima mandatur sanctificanda, idest deputanda ad vacandum Deo. Et ideo Exod. XX, praemisso praecepto de sanctificatione sabbati, assignatur ratio, quia sex diebus fecit Deus caelum et terram, et in die septimo requievit.

Q. 122, A. 4

travel, fish, and do many like things. Therefore the precept of the observance of the Sabbath is unfittingly expressed. On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture. I answer that, The obstacles to true religion being removed by the first and second precepts of the decalogue, as stated above (AA. 2, 3), it remained for the third precept to be given whereby man is established in true religion. Now it belongs to religion to give worship to God: and just as the Divine scriptures teach the interior worship under the guise of certain corporal similitudes, so is external worship given to God under the guise of sensible signs. And since for the most part man is induced to pay interior worship, consisting in prayer and devotion, by the interior prompting of the Holy Spirit, a precept of the Law as necessary respecting the exterior worship that consists in sensible signs. Now the precepts of the decalogue are, so to speak, first and common principles of the Law, and consequently the third precept of the decalogue describes the exterior worship of God as the sign of a universal boon that concerns all. This universal boon was the work of the Creation of the world, from which work God is stated to have rested on the seventh day: and sign of this we are commanded to keep holy seventh day—that is, to set it aside as a day to be given to God. Hence after the precept about the hallowing of the Sabbath the reason for it is given: For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth . . . and rested on the seventh day. Reply Obj. 1: The precept about hallowing the Sabbath, understood literally, is partly moral and partly ceremonial. It is a moral precept in the point of commanding man to aside a certain time to be given to Divine things. For there is in man a natural inclination to set aside a certain time for each necessary thing, such as refreshment of the body, sleep, and so forth. Hence according to the dictate of reason, man sets aside a certain time for spiritual refreshment, by which man’s mind is refreshed in God. And thus to have a certain time set aside for occupying oneself with Divine things is the matter of a moral precept. But, insofar as this precept specializes the time as a sign representing the Creation of the world, it is a ceremonial precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its allegorical signification, as representative of Christ’s rest in the tomb on the seventh day: also in its moral signification, as representing cessation from all sinful acts, and the mind’s rest in God, in which sense, too, it is a general precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its analogical signification, as foreshadowing the enjoyment of God in heaven. Hence the precept about hallowing the Sabbath is placed among the precepts of the decalogue, as a moral, but not as a ceremonial precept.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praeceptum de sanctificatione sabbati, litteraliter intellectum, est partim morale, partim caeremoniale. Morale quidem, quantum ad hoc quod homo deputet aliquod tempus vitae suae ad vacandum divinis. Inest enim homini naturalis inclinatio ad hoc quod cuilibet rei necessariae deputetur aliquod tempus, sicut corporali refectioni, somno et aliis huiusmodi. Unde etiam spirituali refectioni, qua mens hominis in Deo reficitur, secundum dictamen rationis naturalis aliquod tempus deputat homo. Et sic habere aliquod tempus deputatum ad vacandum divinis, cadit sub praecepto morali. Sed inquantum in hoc praecepto determinatur speciale tempus in signum creationis mundi, sic est praeceptum caeremoniale. Similiter etiam caeremoniale est secundum allegoricam significationem, prout fuit figura quietis Christi in sepulcro, quae fuit septima die. Et similiter secundum moralem significationem, prout significat cessationem ab omni actu peccati et quietem mentis in Deo, et secundum hoc quodammodo est praeceptum generale. Similiter etiam caeremoniale est secundum significationem anagogicam, prout scilicet praefigurat quietem fruitionis Dei quae erit in patria. Unde praeceptum de sanctificatione sabbati ponitur inter praecepta Decalogi inquantum est praeceptum morale, non inquantum est caeremoniale. Ad secundum dicendum quod aliae caeremoniae Reply Obj. 2: The other ceremonies of the Law are legis sunt signa aliquorum particularium effectuum Dei. signs of certain particular Divine works: but the observance

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Sed observatio sabbati est signum generalis beneficii, scilicet productionis universae creaturae. Et ideo convenientius poni debuit inter generalia praecepta Decalogi quam aliquod aliud caeremoniale legis. Ad tertium dicendum quod in observantia sabbati duo sunt consideranda. Quorum unum est sicut finis, et hoc est ut homo vacet rebus divinis. Quod significatur in hoc quod dicit, memento ut diem sabbati sanctifices, illa enim sanctificari dicuntur in lege quae divino cultui applicantur. Aliud autem est cessatio operum, quae significatur cum subditur, septimo die domini Dei tui, non facies omne opus. Sed de quo opere intelligatur, apparet per id quod exponitur Levit. XXIII, omne opus servile non facietis in eo. Opus autem servile dicitur a servitute. Est autem triplex servitus. Una quidem qua homo servit peccato, secundum illud, qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Et secundum hoc, omne opus peccati dicitur servile. Alia vero servitus est qua homo servit homini. Est autem homo alterius servus non secundum mentem, sed secundum corpus, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo opera servilia, secundum hoc, dicuntur opera corporalia in quibus unus homo alteri servit. Tertia autem est servitus Dei. Et secundum hoc, opus servile posset dici opus latriae, quod pertinet ad Dei servitium. Si autem sic intelligatur opus servile, non prohibetur in die sabbati. Quia hoc esset contrarium fini observationis sabbati, homo enim ad hoc ab aliis operibus abstinet in die sabbati, ut vacet operibus ad Dei servitutem pertinentibus. Et inde est quod, sicut dicitur Ioan. VII, circumcisionem accipit homo in sabbato, ut non solvatur lex Moysi. Inde etiam est quod, sicut dicitur Matth. XII, sabbatis sacerdotes in templo sabbatum violant, idest, corporaliter in sabbato operantur, et sine crimine sunt. Et sic etiam sacerdotes in sabbato circumferentes arcam non transgrediebantur praeceptum de observantia sabbati. Et similiter etiam nullius spiritualis actus exercitium est contra observantiam sabbati, puta si quis doceat verbo vel scripto, unde Num. XXVIII, dicit Glossa quod fabri et huiusmodi artifices otiantur in die sabbati. Lector autem divinae legis vel doctor ab opere suo non desinit, nec tamen contaminatur sabbatum, sicut sacerdotes in templo sabbatum violant, et sine crimine sunt. Sed alia opera servilia, quae dicuntur servilia primo vel secundo modo, contrariantur observantiae sabbati, inquantum impediunt applicationem hominis ad divina. Et quia impeditur magis homo a rebus divinis per opus peccati quam per opus licitum, quamvis sit corporale; ideo magis contra hoc praeceptum agit qui peccat in die festo quam qui aliquod corporale opus licitum facit. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de decem chordis, melius faceret Iudaeus in agro suo aliquid utile quam in theatro seditiosus existeret. Et melius feminae eorum die sabbati lanam facerent quam tota die in Neomeniis suis impudice saltarent. Non autem qui peccat

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of the Sabbath is representative of a general boon, namely, the production of all creatures. Hence it was fitting that it should be placed among the general precepts of the decalogue, rather than any other ceremonial precept of the Law. Reply Obj. 3: Two things are to be observed in the hallowing of the Sabbath. One of these is the end: and this is that man occupy himself with Divine things, and is signified in the words: Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath day. For in the Law those things are said to be holy which are applied to the Divine worship. The other thing is cessation from work, and is signified in the words (Exod 20:11), On the seventh day . . . thou shalt do no work. The kind of work meant appears from Lev. 23:3, You shall do no servile work on that day. Now servile work is so called from servitude: and servitude is threefold. One, whereby man is the servant of sin, according to John 8:34, Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin, and in this sense all sinful acts are servile. Another servitude is whereby one man serves another. Now one man serves another not with his mind but with his body, as stated above (Q. 104, AA. 5, 6, ad 1). Wherefore in this respect those works are called servile whereby one man serves another. The third is the servitude of God; and in this way the work of worship, which pertains to the service of God, may be called a servile work. In this sense servile work is not forbidden on the Sabbath day, because that would be contrary to the end of the Sabbath observance: since man abstains from other works on the Sabbath day in order that he may occupy himself with works connected with God’s service. For this reason, according to John 7:23, a man receives circumcision on the Sabbath day, that the law of Moses may not be broken: and for this reason too we read (Matt 12:5), that on the Sabbath days the priests in the temple break the Sabbath, i.e., do corporal works on the Sabbath, and are without blame. Accordingly, the priests in carrying the ark on the Sabbath did not break the precept of the Sabbath observance. In like manner it is not contrary to the observance of the Sabbath to exercise any spiritual act, such as teaching by word or writing. Wherefore a gloss on Num. 28 says that smiths and like craftsmen rest on the Sabbath day, but the reader or teacher of the Divine law does not cease from his work. Yet he profanes not the Sabbath, even as the priests in the temple break the Sabbath, and are without blame. On the other hand, those works that are called servile in the first or second way are contrary to the observance of the Sabbath, insofar as they hinder man from applying himself to Divine things. And since man is hindered from applying himself to Divine things rather by sinful than by lawful albeit corporal works, it follows that to sin on a feast day is more against this precept than to do some other but lawful bodily work. Hence Augustine says (De decem chord. iii): It would be better if the Jew did some useful work on his farm than spent his time seditiously in the theatre: and their womenfolk would do better to be making

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venialiter in sabbato contra hoc praeceptum facit, quia linen on the Sabbath than to be dancing lewdly all day in peccatum veniale non excludit sanctitatem. their feasts of the new moon. It is not, however, against this precept to sin venially on the Sabbath, because venial sin does not destroy holiness. Opera etiam corporalia ad spiritualem Dei cultum Again, corporal works, not pertaining to the spiritual non pertinentia intantum servilia dicuntur inquantum worship of God, are said to be servile insofar as they belong proprie pertinent ad servientes, inquantum vero sunt properly to servants; while they are not said to be servile, communia et servis et liberis, servilia non dicuntur. Qui- insofar as they are common to those who serve and those libet autem, tam servus quam liber, tenetur in necessa- who are free. Moreover, everyone, be he servant or free, is riis providere non tantum sibi, sed etiam proximo, prae- bound to provide necessaries both for himself and for his cipue quidem in his quae ad salutem corporis pertinent, neighbor, chiefly in respect of things pertaining to the wellsecundum illud Prov. XXIV, erue eos qui ducuntur ad being of the body, according to Prov. 24:11, Deliver them mortem; secundario autem etiam in damno rerum vi- that are led to death: secondarily as regards avoiding damtando, secundum illud Deut. XXII, non videbis bovem age to one’s property, according to Deut. 22:1, Thou shalt not aut ovem fratris tui errantem et praeteribis, sed reduces pass by if thou seest thy brother’s ox or his sheep go astray, but fratri tuo. Et ideo opus corporale pertinens ad conser- thou shalt bring them back to thy brother. Hence a corpovandam salutem proprii corporis non violat sabbatum, ral work pertaining to the preservation of one’s own bodnon enim est contra observantiam sabbati quod aliquis ily well-being does not profane the Sabbath: for it is not comedat, et alia huiusmodi faciat quibus salus corporis against the observance of the Sabbath to eat and do such conservatur. Et propter hoc Machabaei non polluerunt things as preserve the health of the body. For this reason the sabbatum pugnantes ad sui defensionem die sabbati, ut Machabees did not profane the Sabbath when they fought legitur I Machab. II. Similiter etiam nec Elias fugiens a in self-defense on the Sabbath day (1 Macc 2), nor Elias facie Iezabel in die sabbati. Et propter hoc etiam domi- when he fled from the face of Jezabel on the Sabbath. For nus, Matth. XII, excusat discipulos suos, qui colligebant this same reason our Lord (Matt 12:3) excused His discispicas in die sabbati propter necessitatem quam patie- ples for plucking the ears of corn on account of the need bantur. Similiter etiam opus corporale quod ordinatur which they suffered. In like manner a bodily work that is ad salutem corporalem alterius, non est contra obser- directed to the bodily well-being of another is not contrary vantiam sabbati. Unde dominus, Ioan. VII, mihi indigna- to the observance of the Sabbath: wherefore it is written mini quia totum hominem salvum feci in sabbato? Simi- (John 7:23): Are you angry at Me because I have healed the liter etiam opus corporale quod ordinatur ad imminens whole man on the Sabbath day? And again, a bodily work damnum rei exterioris vitandum, non violat sabbatum. that is done to avoid an imminent damage to some exterUnde dominus dicit, Matth. XII, quis erit ex vobis homo nal thing does not profane the Sabbath, wherefore our Lord qui habet unam ovem, et ceciderit sabbato in foveam, non- says (Matt 12:11): What man shall there be among you, that ne tenebit et levabit eam? hath one sheep, and if the same fall into a pit on the Sabbath day, will he not take hold on it and lift it up? Ad quartum dicendum quod observatio diei doReply Obj. 4: In the New Law the observance of the minicae in nova lege succedit observantiae sabbati non Lord’s day took the place of the observance of the Sabbath, ex vi praecepti legis, sed ex constitutione Ecclesiae et not by virtue of the precept but by the institution of the consuetudine populi Christiani. Nec etiam huiusmodi Church and the custom of Christian people. For this obserobservatio est figuralis, sicut fuit observatio sabbati in vance is not figurative, as was the observance of the Sabbath veteri lege. Et ideo non est ita arcta prohibitio operandi in the Old Law. Hence the prohibition to work on the Lord’s in die dominica sicut in die sabbati, sed quaedam opera day is not so strict as on the Sabbath: and certain works conceduntur in die dominica quae in die sabbati prohi- are permitted on the Lord’s day which were forbidden on bebantur, sicut decoctio ciborum et alia huiusmodi. Et the Sabbath, such as the cooking of food and so forth. And etiam in quibusdam operibus prohibitis facilius propter again in the New Law, dispensation is more easily granted necessitatem dispensatur in nova quam in veteri lege, than in the Old, in the matter of certain forbidden works, quia figura pertinet ad protestationem veritatis, quam on account of their necessity, because the figure pertains to nec in modico praeterire oportet; opera autem secun- the protestation of truth, which it is unlawful to omit even dum se considerata immutari possunt pro loco et tem- in small things; while works, considered in themselves, are pore. changeable in point of place and time.

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Article 5 Whether the fourth precept, about honoring one’s parents, is fittingly expressed? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter tradatur quartum praeceptum, de honoratione parentum. Hoc enim praeceptum pertinet ad pietatem. Sed sicut pietas est pars iustitiae, ita etiam observantia et gratia, et alia de quibus dictum est. Ergo videtur quod non debuit dari speciale praeceptum de pietate, cum de aliis non detur. Praeterea, pietas non solum exhibet cultum parentibus, sed etiam patriae et aliis sanguine coniunctis et patriae benevolis, ut supra dictum est. Inconvenienter ergo in hoc quarto praecepto fit mentio solum de honoratione patris et matris.

Objection 1: It seems that the fourth precept, about honoring one’s parents, is unfittingly expressed. For this is the precept pertaining to piety. Now, just as piety is a part of justice, so are observance, gratitude, and others of which we have spoken (QQ. 101, 102, seq.). Therefore it seems that there should not have been given a special precept of piety, as none is given regarding the others. Obj. 2: Further, piety pays worship not only to one’s parents, but also to one’s country, and also to other blood kindred, and to the well-wishers of our country, as stated above (Q. 101, AA. 1, 2). Therefore it was unfitting for this precept to mention only the honoring of one’s father and mother. Obj. 3: Further, we owe our parents not merely honor but also support. Therefore the mere honoring of one’s parents is unfittingly prescribed. Obj. 4: Further, sometimes those who honor their parents die young, and on the contrary those who honor them not live a long time. Therefore it was unfitting to supplement this precept with the promise, That thou mayest be long-lived upon earth. On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture. I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love of God and of our neighbor. Now to our parents, of all our neighbors, we are under the greatest obligation. Hence, immediately after the precepts directing us to God, a place is given to the precept directing us to our parents, who are the particular principle of our being, just as God is the universal principle: so that this precept has a certain affinity to the precepts of the First Table. Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 101, A. 2), piety directs us to pay the debt due to our parents, a debt which is common to all. Hence, since the precepts of the decalogue are general precepts, they ought to contain some reference to piety rather than to the other parts of justice, which regard some special debt. Reply Obj. 2: The debt to one’s parents precedes the debt to one’s kindred and country since it is because we are born of our parents that our kindred and country belong to us. Hence, since the precepts of the decalogue are the first precepts of the Law, they direct man to his parents rather than to his country and other kindred. Nevertheless this precept of honoring our parents is understood to command whatever concerns the payment of debt to any person, as secondary matter included in the principal matter.

Praeterea, parentibus non solum debetur honoris reverentia, sed etiam sustentatio. Ergo insufficienter sola parentum honoratio praecipitur. Praeterea, contingit quandoque quod aliqui qui honorant parentes cito moriuntur, et e contrario qui parentes non honorant diu vivunt. Inconvenienter ergo additur huic praecepto haec promissio, ut sis longaevus super terram. In contrarium est auctoritas sacrae Scripturae. Respondeo dicendum quod praecepta Decalogi ordinantur ad dilectionem Dei et proximi. Inter proximos autem, maxime obligamur parentibus. Et ideo immediate post praecepta ordinantia nos in Deum, ponitur praeceptum ordinans nos ad parentes, qui sunt particulare principium nostri esse, sicut Deus est universale principium. Et sic est quaedam affinitas huius praecepti ad praecepta primae tabulae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, pietas ordinatur ad reddendum debitum parentibus, quod communiter ad omnes pertinet. Et ideo inter praecepta Decalogi, quae sunt communia, magis debet poni aliquid pertinens ad pietatem quam ad alias partes iustitiae, quae respiciunt aliquod debitum speciale. Ad secundum dicendum quod per prius debetur aliquid parentibus quam patriae et consanguineis, quia per hoc quod sumus a parentibus nati, pertinent ad nos et consanguinei et patria. Et ideo, cum praecepta Decalogi sint prima praecepta legis, magis per ea ordinatur homo ad parentes quam ad patriam vel ad alios consanguineos. Nihilominus tamen in hoc praecepto, quod est de honoratione parentum, intelligitur mandari quidquid pertinet ad reddendum debitum cuicumque personae, sicut secundarium includitur in principali. Ad tertium dicendum quod parentibus inquantum Reply Obj. 3: Reverential honor is due to one’s parents huiusmodi, debetur reverentiae honor. Sed sustentatio as such, whereas support and so forth are due to them acet alia debentur eis ratione alicuius accidentis, puta in- cidentally, for instance, because they are in want, in slavquantum sunt indigentes, vel secundum aliquid huius- ery, or the like, as stated above (Q. 101, A. 2). And since

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modi, ut supra dictum est. Et quia quod est per se prius est eo quod est per accidens, ideo inter prima praecepta legis, quae sunt praecepta Decalogi, specialiter praecipitur honoratio parentum. In qua tamen, sicut in quodam principali, intelligitur mandari et sustentatio et quidquid aliud debetur parentibus. Ad quartum dicendum quod longaevitas promittitur honorantibus parentes non solum quantum ad futuram vitam, sed etiam quantum ad praesentem, secundum illud apostoli, I ad Tim. IV, pietas ad omnia utilis est, promissionem habens vitae quae nunc est et futurae. Et hoc rationabiliter. Qui enim gratus est beneficio meretur secundum quandam congruentiam ut sibi beneficium conservetur, propter ingratitudinem autem meretur aliquis beneficium perdere. Beneficium autem vitae corporalis, post Deum, a parentibus habemus. Et ideo ille qui honorat parentes, quasi beneficio gratus, meretur vitae conservationem, qui autem non honorat parentes, tanquam ingratus, meretur vita privari. Quia tamen praesentia bona vel mala non cadunt sub merito vel demerito nisi inquantum ordinantur ad futuram remunerationem, ut dictum est; ideo quandoque secundum occultam rationem divinorum iudiciorum, quae maxime futuram remunerationem respiciunt, ideo aliqui qui sunt pii in parentes citius vita privantur, alii vero qui sunt impii in parentes diutius vivunt.

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that which belongs to a thing by nature precedes that which is accidental, it follows that among the first precepts of the Law, which are the precepts of the decalogue, there is a special precept of honoring our parents: and this honor, as a kind of principle, is understood to comprise support and whatever else is due to our parents. Reply Obj. 4: A long life is promised to those who honor their parents not only as to the life to come, but also as to the present life, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Tim 4:8): Piety is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is and of that which is to come. And with reason. Because the man who is grateful for a favor deserves, with a certain congruity, that the favor should be continued to him, and he who is ungrateful for a favor deserves to lose it. Now we owe the favor of bodily life to our parents after God: wherefore he that honors his parents deserves the prolongation of his life, because he is grateful for that favor: while he that honors not his parents deserves to be deprived of life because he is ungrateful for the favor. However, present goods or evils are not the subject of merit or demerit except insofar as they are directed to a future reward, as stated above (I-II, Q. 114, A. 12). Wherefore sometimes in accordance with the hidden design of the Divine judgments, which regard chiefly the future reward, some, who are dutiful to their parents, are sooner deprived of life, while others, who are undutiful to their parents, live longer.

Article 6 Whether the other six precepts of the decalogue are fittingly expressed? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod alia sex praecepta Decalogi inconvenienter tradantur. Non enim sufficit ad salutem quod aliquis proximo suo non noceat, sed requiritur quod ei debitum reddat, secundum illud Rom. XIII, reddite omnibus debita. Sed in sex ultimis praeceptis solum prohibetur nocumentum proximo inferendum. Ergo inconvenienter praedicta praecepta traduntur. Praeterea, in praedictis praeceptis prohibentur homicidium, adulterium, furtum et falsum testimonium. Sed multa alia nocumenta possunt proximo inferri, ut patet ex his quae supra determinata sunt. Ergo videtur quod inconvenienter sint tradita huiusmodi praecepta. Praeterea, concupiscentia dupliciter accipi potest, uno modo, secundum quod est actus voluntatis, ut dicitur Sap. VI, concupiscentia sapientiae perducit ad regnum perpetuum; alio modo, secundum quod est actus sensualitatis, sicut dicitur Iac. IV, unde bella et lites in vobis? Nonne ex concupiscentiis quae militant in membris vestris? Sed per praeceptum Decalogi non prohibetur con-

Objection 1: It seems that the other six precepts of the decalogue are unfittingly expressed. For it is not sufficient for salvation that one refrain from injuring one’s neighbor; but it is required that one pay one’s debts, according to Rom. 13:7, Render . . . to all men their dues. Now the last six precepts merely forbid one to injure one’s neighbor. Therefore these precepts are unfittingly expressed. Obj. 2: Further, these precepts forbid murder, adultery, stealing and bearing false witness. But many other injuries can be inflicted on one’s neighbor, as appears from those which have been specified above (QQ. 72, seq.). Therefore it seems that the aforesaid precepts are unfittingly expressed. Obj. 3: Further, concupiscence may be taken in two ways. First as denoting an act of the will, as in Wis. 6:21, The desire (concupiscentia) of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom: second, as denoting an act of the sensuality, as in James 4:1, From whence are wars and contentions among you? Are they not . . . from your concupiscences which war in your members? Now the concupiscence of the sensu-

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cupiscentia sensualitatis, quia secundum hoc, primi motus essent peccata mortalia, utpote contra praeceptum Decalogi existentes. Similiter etiam non prohibetur concupiscentia voluntatis, quia haec includitur in quolibet peccato. Inconvenienter ergo inter praecepta Decalogi ponuntur quaedam concupiscentiae prohibitiva. Praeterea, homicidium est gravius peccatum quam adulterium vel furtum. Sed non ponitur aliquod praeceptum prohibitivum concupiscentiae homicidii. Ergo etiam inconvenienter ponuntur quaedam praecepta prohibitiva concupiscentiae furti et adulterii. Sed in contrarium est auctoritas Scripturae. Respondeo dicendum quod sicut per partes iustitiae debitum redditur aliquibus determinatis personis quibus homo ex aliqua speciali ratione obligatur, ita etiam per iustitiam proprie dictam aliquis debitum reddit communiter omnibus. Et ideo post tria praecepta pertinentia ad religionem, qua redditur debitum Deo et post quartum praeceptum, quod est pietatis, qua redditur parentibus debitum, in quo includitur omne debitum quod ex aliqua speciali ratione debetur; necesse fuit quod ponerentur consequenter alia praecepta pertinentia ad iustitiam proprie dictam, quae indifferenter omnibus debitum reddit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod communiter ad hoc obligatur homo ut nulli inferat nocumentum. Et ideo praecepta negativa, quibus prohibentur nocumenta quae possunt proximis inferri, tanquam communia, fuerunt ponenda inter praecepta Decalogi. Ea vero quae sunt proximis exhibenda, diversimode exhibentur diversis. Et ideo non fuerunt inter praecepta Decalogi ponenda de his affirmativa praecepta. Ad secundum dicendum quod omnia alia nocumenta quae proximis inferuntur, possunt ad ista reduci quae his praeceptis prohibentur tanquam ad quaedam communiora et principaliora. Nam omnia nocumenta quae in personam proximi inferuntur, intelliguntur prohiberi in homicidio, sicut in principaliori. Quae vero inferuntur in personam coniunctam, et maxime per modum libidinis, intelliguntur prohiberi simul cum adulterio. Quae vero pertinent ad damna in rebus illata, intelliguntur prohiberi simul cum furto. Quae autem pertinet ad locutionem, sicut detractiones, blasphemiae, et si qua huiusmodi, intelliguntur prohiberi falso testimonio, quod directius iustitiae contrariatur. Ad tertium dicendum quod per praecepta prohibitiva concupiscentiae non intelligitur prohiberi primus motus concupiscentiae, qui sistit infra limites sensualitatis. Sed prohibetur directe consensus voluntatis qui est in opus vel in delectationem. Ad quartum dicendum quod homicidium secundum se non est concupiscibile, sed magis horribile, quia

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ality is not forbidden by a precept of the decalogue, otherwise first movements would be mortal sins, as they would be against a precept of the decalogue. Nor is the concupiscence of the will forbidden, since it is included in every sin. Therefore it is unfitting for the precepts of the decalogue to include some that forbid concupiscence. Obj. 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than adultery or theft. But there is no precept forbidding the desire of murder. Therefore neither was it fitting to have precepts forbidding the desire of theft and of adultery. On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture. I answer that, Just as by the parts of justice a man pays that which is due to certain definite persons, to whom he is bound for some special reason, so too by justice properly so called he pays that which is due to all in general. Hence, after the three precepts pertaining to religion, whereby man pays what is due God, and after the fourth precept pertaining to piety, whereby he pays what is due to his parents—which duty includes the paying of all that is due for any special reason—it was necessary in due sequence to give certain precepts pertaining to justice properly so called, which pays to all indifferently what is due to them. Reply Obj. 1: Man is bound towards all persons in general to inflict injury on no one: hence the negative precepts, which forbid the doing of those injuries that can be inflicted on one’s neighbor, had to be given a place, as general precepts, among the precepts of the decalogue. On the other hand, the duties we owe to our neighbor are paid in different ways to different people: hence it did not behoove to include affirmative precepts about those duties among the precepts of the decalogue. Reply Obj. 2: All other injuries that are inflicted on our neighbor are reducible to those that are forbidden by these precepts, as taking precedence of others in point of generality and importance. For all injuries that are inflicted on the person of our neighbor are understood to be forbidden under the head of murder as being the principal of all. Those that are inflicted on a person connected with one’s neighbor, especially by way of lust, are understood to be forbidden together with adultery: those that come under the head of damage done to property are understood to be forbidden together with theft: and those that are comprised under speech, such as detractions, insults, and so forth, are understood to be forbidden together with the bearing of false witness, which is more directly opposed to justice. Reply Obj. 3: The precepts forbidding concupiscence do not include the prohibition of first movements of concupiscence, that do not go farther than the bounds of sensuality. The direct object of their prohibition is the consent of the will, which is directed to deed or pleasure. Reply Obj. 4: Murder in itself is an object not of concupiscence but of horror, since it has not in itself the aspect

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non habet de se rationem alicuius boni. Sed adulterium habet aliquam rationem boni, scilicet delectabilis. Furtum etiam habet rationem alicuius boni, scilicet utilis. Bonum autem de se habet rationem concupiscibilis. Et ideo fuit specialibus praeceptis prohibenda concupiscentia furti et adulterii, non autem concupiscentia homicidii.

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of good. On the other hand, adultery has the aspect of a certain kind of good, i.e., of something pleasurable, and theft has an aspect of good, i.e., of something useful: and good of its very nature has the aspect of something concupiscible. Hence the concupiscence of theft and adultery had to be forbidden by special precepts, but not the concupiscence of murder.

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Question 123 Fortitude Consequenter, post iustitiam, considerandum est de fortitudine. Et primo, de ipsa virtute fortitudinis; secundo, de partibus eius; tertio, de dono ei correspondente; quarto, de praeceptis ad ipsam pertinentibus. Circa fortitudinem autem consideranda sunt tria, primo quidem, de ipsa fortitudine; secundo, de actu praecipuo eius, scilicet de martyrio; tertio, de vitiis oppositis. Circa primum quaeruntur duodecim. Primo, utrum fortitudo sit virtus. Secundo, utrum sit virtus specialis. Tertio, utrum sit circa timores et audacias. Quarto, utrum sit solum circa timorem mortis. Quinto, utrum sit solum in rebus bellicis. Sexto, utrum sustinere sit praecipuus actus eius. Septimo, utrum operetur propter proprium bonum. Octavo, utrum habeat delectationem in suo actu. Nono, utrum fortitudo maxime consistat in repentinis. Decimo, utrum utatur ira in sua operatione. Undecimo, utrum sit virtus cardinalis. Duodecimo, de comparatione eius ad alias virtutes cardinales.

After considering justice we must in due sequence consider fortitude. We must (1) consider the virtue itself of fortitude; (2) its parts; (3) the gift corresponding thereto; (4) the precepts that pertain to it. Concerning fortitude three things have to be considered: (1) Fortitude itself; (2) its principal act, viz. martyrdom; (3) the vices opposed to fortitude. Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether fortitude is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a special virtue? (3) Whether fortitude is only about fear and daring? (4) Whether it is only about fear of death? (5) Whether it is only in warlike matters? (6) Whether endurance is its chief act? (7) Whether its action is directed to its own good? (8) Whether it takes pleasure in its own action? (9) Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences? (10) Whether it makes use of anger in its action? (11) Whether it is a cardinal virtue? (12) Of its comparison with the other cardinal virtues.

Article 1 Whether fortitude is a virtue? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fortitudo non sit virtus. Dicit enim apostolus, II ad Cor. XII, virtus in infirmitate perficitur. Sed fortitudo infirmitati opponitur. Ergo fortitudo non est virtus. Praeterea, si est virtus, aut est theologica, aut intellectualis, aut moralis. Sed fortitudo neque continetur inter virtutes theologicas, neque inter intellectuales, ut ex supra dictis patet. Neque etiam videtur esse virtus moralis. Quia, ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., videntur aliqui esse fortes propter ignorantiam, aut etiam propter experientiam, sicut milites, quae magis pertinent ad artem quam ad virtutem moralem, quidam etiam dicuntur esse fortes propter aliquas passiones, puta propter timorem comminationum vel dehonorationis, aut etiam propter tristitiam vel iram, seu spem; virtus autem moralis non operatur ex passione, sed ex electione, ut supra habitum est. Ergo fortitudo non est virtus.

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a virtue. For the Apostle says (2 Cor 12:9): Virtue is perfected in infirmity. But fortitude is contrary to infirmity. Therefore fortitude is not a virtue. Obj. 2: Further, if it is a virtue, it is either theological, intellectual, or moral. Now fortitude is not contained among the theological virtues, nor among the intellectual virtues, as may be gathered from what we have said above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 2; Q. 62, A. 3). Neither, apparently, is it contained among the moral virtues, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7, 8): Some seem to be brave through ignorance; or through experience, as soldiers, both of which cases seem to pertain to act rather than to moral virtue, and some are called brave on account of certain passions; for instance, on account of fear of threats, or of dishonor, or again on account of sorrow, anger, or hope. But moral virtue does not act from passion but from choice, as stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.

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Praeterea, virtus humana maxime consistit in anima, est enim bona qualitas mentis, ut supra iam dictum est. Sed fortitudo videtur consistere in corpore, vel saltem corporis complexionem sequi. Ergo videtur quod fortitudo non sit virtus. Sed contra est quod Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccle., fortitudinem inter virtutes numerat. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in II Ethic., virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit, unde virtus hominis, de qua loquimur, est quae bonum facit hominem, et opus eius bonum reddit. Bonum autem hominis est secundum rationem esse, secundum Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Et ideo ad virtutem humanam pertinet ut faciat hominem et opus eius secundum rationem esse. Quod quidem tripliciter contingit. Uno modo, secundum quod ipsa ratio rectificatur, quod fit per virtutes intellectuales. Alio modo, secundum quod ipsa rectitudo rationis in rebus humanis instituitur, quod pertinet ad iustitiam. Tertio, secundum quod tolluntur impedimenta huius rectitudinis in rebus humanis ponendae. Dupliciter autem impeditur voluntas humana ne rectitudinem rationis sequatur. Uno modo, per hoc quod attrahitur ab aliquo delectabili ad aliud quam rectitudo rationis requirat, et hoc impedimentum tollit virtus temperantiae. Alio modo, per hoc quod voluntatem repellit ab eo quod est secundum rationem, propter aliquid difficile quod incumbit. Et ad hoc impedimentum tollendum requiritur fortitudo mentis, qua scilicet huiusmodi difficultatibus resistat, sicut et homo per fortitudinem corporalem impedimenta corporalia superat et repellit. Unde manifestum est quod fortitudo est virtus, inquantum facit hominem secundum rationem esse. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus animae non perficitur in infirmitate animae, sed in infirmitate carnis, de qua apostolus loquebatur. Hoc autem ad fortitudinem mentis pertinet, quod infirmitatem carnis fortiter ferat, quod pertinet ad virtutem patientiae vel fortitudinis. Et quod homo propriam infirmitatem recognoscat, pertinet ad perfectionem quae dicitur humilitas. Ad secundum dicendum quod exteriorem virtutis actum quandoque aliqui efficiunt non habentes virtutem, ex aliqua alia causa quam ex virtute. Et ideo philosophus, in III Ethic., ponit quinque modos eorum qui similitudinarie dicuntur fortes, quasi exercentes actum fortitudinis praeter virtutem. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter. Primo quidem, quia feruntur in id quod est difficile ac si non esset difficile. Quod in tres modos dividitur. Quandoque enim hoc accidit propter ignorantiam, quia scilicet homo non percipit magnitudinem periculi. Quandoque autem hoc accidit propter hoc quod homo est bonae spei ad pericula vincenda, puta cum expertus est se saepe pericula evasisse. Quandoque autem hoc accidit propter scientiam et artem quandam, sicut con-

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Obj. 3: Further, human virtue resides chiefly in the soul, since it is a good quality of the mind, as stated above (Ethic. iii, 7, 8). But fortitude, seemingly, resides in the body, or at least results from the temperament of the body. Therefore it seems that fortitude is not a virtue. On the contrary, Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv, xxi, xxii) numbers fortitude among the virtues. I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and renders his work good. Hence human virtue, of which we are speaking now, is that which makes a man good, and renders his work good. Now man’s good is to be in accordance with reason, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). Wherefore it belongs to human virtue to make man good, to make his work accord with reason. This happens in three ways: first, by rectifying reason itself, and this is done by the intellectual virtues; second, by establishing the rectitude of reason in human affairs, and this belongs to justice; third, by removing the obstacles to the establishment of this rectitude in human affairs. Now the human will is hindered in two ways from following the rectitude of reason. First, through being drawn by some object of pleasure to something other than what the rectitude of reason requires; and this obstacle is removed by the virtue of temperance. Second, through the will being disinclined to follow that which is in accordance with reason, on account of some difficulty that presents itself. In order to remove this obstacle fortitude of the mind is requisite, whereby to resist the aforesaid difficulty even as a man, by fortitude of body, overcomes and removes bodily obstacles. Hence it is evident that fortitude is a virtue, insofar as it conforms man to reason. Reply Obj. 1: The virtue of the soul is perfected, not in the infirmity of the soul, but in the infirmity of the body, of which the Apostle was speaking. Now it belongs to fortitude of the mind to bear bravely with infirmities of the flesh, and this belongs to the virtue of patience or fortitude, as also to acknowledge one’s own infirmity, and this belongs to the perfection that is called humility. Reply Obj. 2: Sometimes a person performs the exterior act of a virtue without having the virtue, and from some other cause than virtue. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) mentions five ways in which people are said to be brave by way of resemblance, through performing acts of fortitude without having the virtue. This may be done in three ways. First, because they tend to that which is difficult as though it were not difficult: and this again happens in three ways, for sometimes this is owing to ignorance, through not perceiving the greatness of the danger; sometimes it is owing to the fact that one is hopeful of overcoming dangers—when, for instance, one has often experienced escape from danger; and sometimes this is owing to a certain science and art, as in the case of soldiers who,

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tingit in militibus, qui propter peritiam armorum et exercitium non reputant gravia pericula belli, aestimantes se per suam artem posse contra ea defendi; sicut Vegetius dicit, in libro de re militari, nemo facere metuit quod se bene didicisse confidit. Alio modo agit aliquis actum fortitudinis sine virtute, propter impulsum passionis, vel tristitiae, quam vult repellere; vel etiam irae. Tertio modo, propter electionem, non quidem finis debiti, sed alicuius temporalis commodi acquirendi, puta honoris, voluptatis vel lucri; vel alicuius incommodi vitandi, puta vituperii, afflictionis vel damni. Ad tertium dicendum quod ad similitudinem corporalis fortitudinis dicitur fortitudo animae, quae ponitur virtus, ut dictum est. Nec tamen est contra rationem virtutis quod ex naturali complexione aliquis habeat naturalem inclinationem ad virtutem, ut supra dictum est.

Q. 123, A. 2

through skill and practice in the use of arms, think little of the dangers of battle, as they reckon themselves capable of defending themselves against them; thus Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i), No man fears to do what he is confident of having learned to do well. Second, a man performs an act of fortitude without having the virtue, through the impulse of a passion, whether of sorrow that he wishes to cast off, or again of anger. Third, through choice, not indeed of a due end, but of some temporal advantage to be obtained, such as honor, pleasure, or gain, or of some disadvantage to be avoided, such as blame, pain, or loss. Reply Obj. 3: The fortitude of the soul which is reckoned a virtue, as explained in the Reply to the First Objection, is so called from its likeness to fortitude of the body. Nor is it inconsistent with the notion of virtue, that a man should have a natural inclination to virtue by reason of his natural temperament, as stated above (I-II, Q. 63, A. 1).

Article 2 Whether fortitude is a special virtue? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fortitudo non sit specialis virtus. Dicitur enim Sap. VIII, quod sapientia sobrietatem et prudentiam docet, iustitiam et virtutem, et ponitur ibi virtus pro fortitudine. Cum ergo nomen virtutis sit commune omnibus virtutibus, videtur quod fortitudo sit generalis virtus. Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic., non mediocris animi est fortitudo, quae sola defendit ornamenta virtutum omnium, et iudicia custodit; et quae inexpiabili praelio adversus omnia vitia decertat. Invicta ad labores, fortis ad pericula, rigidior adversus voluptates, avaritiam fugat tanquam labem quandam quae virtutem effeminet. Et idem postea subdit de aliis vitiis. Hoc autem non potest convenire alicui speciali virtuti. Ergo fortitudo non est specialis virtus. Praeterea, nomen fortitudinis a firmitate sumptum esse videtur. Sed firmiter se habere pertinet ad omnem virtutem, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo fortitudo est generalis virtus. Sed contra est quod in XXII Moral., Gregorius connumerat eam aliis virtutibus. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, nomen fortitudinis dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, secundum quod absolute importat quandam animi firmitatem. Et secundum hoc est generalis virtus, vel potius conditio cuiuslibet virtutis, quia sicut philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., ad virtutem requiritur firmiter et immobiliter operari. Alio modo potest accipi fortitudo secundum quod importat firmitatem animi in sustinendis et repellendis his in quibus maxime difficile est firmitatem habe-

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a special virtue. For it is written (Wis 7:7): She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, where the text has virtue for fortitude. Since then the term virtue is common to all virtues, it seems that fortitude is a general virtue. Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): Fortitude is not lacking in courage, for alone she defends the honor of the virtues and guards their behests. She it is that wages an inexorable war on all vice, undeterred by toil, brave in face of dangers, steeled against pleasures, unyielding to lusts, avoiding covetousness as a deformity that weakens virtue; and he says the same further on in connection with other vices. Now this cannot apply to any special virtue. Therefore fortitude is not a special virtue. Obj. 3: Further, fortitude would seem to derive its name from firmness. But it belongs to every virtue to stand firm, as stated in Ethic. ii. Therefore fortitude is a general virtue. On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxii) numbers it among the other virtues. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), the term fortitude can be taken in two ways. First, as simply denoting a certain firmness of mind, and in this sense it is a general virtue, or rather a condition of every virtue, since as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii), it is requisite for every virtue to act firmly and immovably. Second, fortitude may be taken to denote firmness only in bearing and withstanding those things wherein it is most difficult to be firm, namely in certain grave dangers. Therefore Tully says

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re, scilicet in aliquibus periculis gravibus. Unde Tullius dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod fortitudo est considerata periculorum susceptio et laborum perpessio. Et sic fortitudo ponitur specialis virtus, utpote materiam determinatam habens. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod secundum philosophum, in I de caelo, nomen virtutis refertur ad ultimum potentiae. Dicitur autem uno modo potentia naturalis secundum quam aliquis potest resistere corrumpentibus, alio modo secundum quod est principium agendi, ut patet in V Metaphys. Et ideo, quia haec acceptio est communior, nomen virtutis secundum quod importat ultimum talis potentiae, est commune, nam virtus communiter sumpta nihil est aliud quam habitus quo quis potest bene operari. Secundum autem quod importat ultimum potentiae primo modo dictae, qui quidem est modus magis specialis, attribuitur speciali virtuti scilicet fortitudini, ad quam pertinet firmiter stare contra quaecumque impugnantia. Ad secundum dicendum quod Ambrosius accipit fortitudinem large, secundum quod importat animi firmitatem respectu quorumcumque impugnantium. Et tamen etiam secundum quod est specialis virtus habens determinatam materiam, coadiuvat ad resistendum impugnationibus omnium vitiorum. Qui enim potest firmiter stare in his quae sunt difficillima ad sustinendum, consequens est quod sit idoneus ad resistendum aliis quae sunt minus difficilia. Ad tertium dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de fortitudine primo modo dicta.

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(Rhet. ii), that fortitude is deliberate facing of dangers and bearing of toils. In this sense fortitude is reckoned a special virtue, because it has a special matter.

Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (De Caelo i, 116) the word virtue refers to the extreme limit of a power. Now a natural power is, in one sense, the power of resisting corruptions, and in another sense is a principle of action, as stated in Metaph. v, 17. And since this latter meaning is the more common, the term virtue, as denoting the extreme limit of such a power, is a common term, for virtue taken in a general sense is nothing else than a habit whereby one acts well. But as denoting the extreme limit of power in the first sense, which sense is more specific, it is applied to a special virtue, namely fortitude, to which it belongs to stand firm against all kinds of assaults.

Reply Obj. 2: Ambrose takes fortitude in a broad sense, as denoting firmness of mind in face of assaults of all kinds. Nevertheless even as a special virtue with a determinate matter, it helps to resist the assaults of all vices. For he that can stand firm in things that are most difficult to bear, is prepared, in consequence, to resist those which are less difficult.

Reply Obj. 3: This objection takes fortitude in the first sense.

Article 3 Whether fortitude is about fear and daring? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod fortitudo non sit circa timores et audacias. Dicit enim Gregorius, VII Moral., iustorum fortitudo est carnem vincere, propriis voluptatibus contraire, delectationem vitae praesentis extinguere. Ergo fortitudo magis videtur esse circa delectationes quam circa timores et audacias. Praeterea, Tullius dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod ad fortitudinem pertinet susceptio periculorum et perpessio laborum. Sed hoc non videtur pertinere ad passionem timoris vel audaciae, sed magis ad actiones hominis laboriosas, vel ad exteriores res periculosas. Ergo fortitudo non est circa timores et audacias. Praeterea, timori non solum opponitur audacia, sed etiam spes, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Ergo fortitudo non magis debet esse circa audaciam quam circa spem.

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not about fear and daring. For Gregory says (Moral. vii): The fortitude of the just man is to overcome the flesh, to withstand selfindulgence, to quench the lusts of the present life. Therefore fortitude seems to be about pleasures rather than about fear and daring. Obj. 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), that it belongs to fortitude to face dangers and to bear toil. But this seemingly has nothing to do with the passions of fear and daring, but rather with a man’s toilsome deeds and external dangers. Therefore fortitude is not about fear and daring. Obj. 3: Further, not only daring, but also hope, is opposed to fear, as stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 1, ad 2) in the treatise on passions. Therefore fortitude should not be about daring any more than about hope.

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Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II et in III Ethic., quod fortitudo est circa timorem et audaciam. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad virtutem fortitudinis pertinet removere impedimentum quo retrahitur voluntas a sequela rationis. Quod autem aliquis retrahatur ab aliquo difficili, pertinet ad rationem timoris, qui importat recessum quendam a malo difficultatem habente, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Et ideo fortitudo principaliter est circa timores rerum difficilium, quae retrahere possunt voluntatem a sequela rationis. Oportet autem huiusmodi rerum difficilium impulsum non solum firmiter tolerare cohibendo timorem, sed etiam moderate aggredi, quando scilicet oportet ea exterminare, ad securitatem in posterum habendam. Quod videtur pertinere ad rationem audaciae. Et ideo fortitudo est circa timores et audacias, quasi cohibitiva timorum, et moderativa audaciarum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Gregorius ibi loquitur de fortitudine iustorum secundum quod communiter se habet ad omnem virtutem. Unde praemittit quaedam pertinentia ad temperantiam, ut dictum est, et subdit de his quae pertinent proprie ad fortitudinem secundum quod est specialis virtus, dicens, huius mundi aspera pro aeternis praemiis amare. Ad secundum dicendum quod res periculosae et actus laboriosi non retrahunt voluntatem a via rationis nisi inquantum timentur. Et ideo oportet quod fortitudo sit immediate circa timores et audacias, mediate autem circa pericula et labores, sicut circa obiecta praedictarum passionum. Ad tertium dicendum quod spes opponitur timori ex parte obiecti, quia spes est de bono, timor de malo. Audacia autem est circa idem obiectum, et opponitur timori secundum accessum et recessum, ut supra dictum est. Et quia fortitudo proprie respicit temporalia mala retrahentia a virtute, ut patet per definitionem Tullii; inde est quod fortitudo proprie est circa timorem et audaciam, non autem circa spem, nisi inquantum connectitur audaciae, ut supra habitum est.

Q. 123, A. 4

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 9) that fortitude is about fear and daring. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), it belongs to the virtue of fortitude to remove any obstacle that withdraws the will from following the reason. Now to be withdrawn from something difficult belongs to the notion of fear, which denotes withdrawal from an evil that entails difficulty, as stated above (I-II, Q. 42, AA. 3, 5) in the treatise on passions. Hence fortitude is chiefly about fear of difficult things, which can withdraw the will from following the reason. And it behooves one not only firmly to bear the assault of these difficulties by restraining fear, but also moderately to withstand them, when, to wit, it is necessary to dispel them altogether in order to free oneself therefrom for the future, which seems to come under the notion of daring. Therefore fortitude is about fear and daring, as curbing fear and moderating daring. Reply Obj. 1: Gregory is speaking then of the fortitude of the just man, as to its common relation to all virtues. Hence he first of all mentions matters pertaining to temperance, as in the words quoted, and then adds that which pertains properly to fortitude as a special virtue, by saying: To love the trials of this life for the sake of an eternal reward. Reply Obj. 2: Dangers and toils do not withdraw the will from the course of reason, except insofar as they are an object of fear. Hence fortitude needs to be immediately about fear and daring, but mediately about dangers and toils, these being the objects of those passions. Reply Obj. 3: Hope is opposed to fear on the part of the object, for hope is of good, fear of evil: whereas daring is about the same object, and is opposed to fear by way of approach and withdrawal, as stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 1). And since fortitude properly regards those temporal evils that withdraw one from virtue, as appears from Tully’s definition quoted in the Second Objection, it follows that fortitude properly is about fear and daring and not about hope, except insofar as it is connected with daring, as stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2).

Article 4 Whether fortitude is only about dangers of death? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fortitudo non solum sit circa pericula mortis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccle., quod fortitudo est amor facile tolerans omnia propter id quod amatur. Et in VI musicae dicit quod fortitudo est affectio quae nullas

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not only about dangers of death. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that fortitude is love bearing all things readily for the sake of the object beloved: and (Music. vi) he says that fortitude is the love which dreads no hardship, not even death. Therefore

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adversitates mortemve formidat. Ergo fortitudo non est solum circa pericula mortis, sed circa omnia alia adversa. Praeterea, oportet omnes passiones animae per aliquam virtutem ad medium reduci. Sed non est dare aliquam aliam virtutem reducentem ad medium alios timores. Ergo fortitudo non solum est circa timores mortis, sed etiam circa alios timores. Praeterea, nulla virtus est in extremis. Sed timor mortis est in extremo, quia est maximus timorum, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Ergo virtus fortitudinis non est circa timores mortis. Sed contra est quod Andronicus dicit, quod fortitudo est virtus irascibilis non facile obstupescibilis a timoribus qui sunt circa mortem. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad virtutem fortitudinis pertinet ut voluntatem hominis tueatur ne retrahatur a bono rationis propter timorem mali corporalis. Oportet autem bonum rationis firmiter tenere contra quodcumque malum, quia nullum bonum corporale aequivalet bono rationis. Et ideo oportet quod fortitudo animi dicatur quae firmiter retinet voluntatem hominis in bono rationis contra maxima mala, quia qui stat firmus contra maiora, consequens est quod stet firmus contra minora, sed non convertitur; et hoc etiam ad rationem virtutis pertinet, ut respiciat ultimum. Maxime autem terribile inter omnia corporalia mala est mors, quae tollit omnia corporalia bona, unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccle., quod vinculum corporis, ne concutiatur atque vexetur, laboris et doloris; ne auferatur autem atque perimatur, mortis terrore animam quatit. Et ideo virtus fortitudinis est circa timores periculorum mortis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod fortitudo bene se habet in omnibus adversis tolerandis. Non tamen ex toleratione quorumlibet adversorum reputatur homo simpliciter fortis, sed solum ex hoc quod bene tolerat etiam maxima mala. Ex aliis autem dicitur aliquis fortis secundum quid. Ad secundum dicendum quod quia timor ex amore nascitur, quaecumque virtus moderatur amorem aliquorum bonorum, consequens est ut moderetur timorem contrariorum malorum. Sicut liberalitas, quae moderatur amorem pecuniarum, per consequens etiam moderatur timorem amissionis earum. Et idem apparet in temperantia et in aliis virtutibus. Sed amare propriam vitam est naturale. Et ideo oportuit esse specialem virtutem quae moderaretur timores mortis. Ad tertium dicendum quod extremum in virtutibus attenditur secundum excessum rationis rectae. Et ideo si aliquis maxima pericula subeat secundum rationem, non est virtuti contrarium.

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fortitude is not only about danger of death, but also about other afflictions. Obj. 2: Further, all the passions of the soul need to be reduced to a mean by some virtue. Now there is no other virtue reducing fears to a mean. Therefore fortitude is not only about fear of death, but also about other fears. Obj. 3: Further, no virtue is about extremes. But fear of death is about an extreme, since it is the greatest of fears, as stated in Ethic. iii. Therefore the virtue of fortitude is not about fear of death. On the contrary, Andronicus says that fortitude is a virtue of the irascible faculty that is not easily deterred by the fear of death. I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), it belongs to the virtue of fortitude to guard the will against being withdrawn from the good of reason through fear of bodily evil. Now it behooves one to hold firmly the good of reason against every evil whatsoever, since no bodily good is equivalent to the good of the reason. Hence fortitude of soul must be that which binds the will firmly to the good of reason in face of the greatest evils: because he that stands firm against great things, will in consequence stand firm against less things, but not conversely. Moreover it belongs to the notion of virtue that it should regard something extreme: and the most fearful of all bodily evils is death, since it does away all bodily goods. Wherefore Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxii) that the soul is shaken by its fellow body, with fear of toil and pain, lest the body be stricken and harassed with fear of death lest it be done away and destroyed. Therefore the virtue of fortitude is about the fear of dangers of death. Reply Obj. 1: Fortitude behaves well in bearing all manner of adversity: yet a man is not reckoned brave simply through bearing any kind of adversity, but only through bearing well even the greatest evils; while through bearing others he is said to be brave in a restricted sense. Reply Obj. 2: Since fear is born of love, any virtue that moderates the love of certain goods must in consequence moderate the fear of contrary evils: thus liberality, which moderates the love of money, as a consequence, moderates the fear of losing it, and the same is the case with temperance and other virtues. But to love one’s own life is natural: and hence the necessity of a special virtue modifying the fear of death. Reply Obj. 3: In virtues the extreme consists in exceeding right reason: wherefore to undergo the greatest dangers in accordance with reason is not contrary to virtue.

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Q. 123, A. 5

Article 5 Whether fortitude is properly about dangers of death in battle? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fortitudo non consistat proprie circa pericula mortis quae sunt in bello. Martyres enim praecipue de fortitudine commendantur. Sed martyres non commendantur de rebus bellicis. Ergo fortitudo non proprie consistit circa pericula mortis quae sunt in bellicis. Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic., quod fortitudo dividitur in res bellicas et domesticas. Tullius etiam dicit, in I de Offic., quod cum plerique arbitrentur res bellicas maiores esse quam urbanas, minuenda est haec opinio, sed si vere volumus iudicare, multae res extiterunt urbanae maiores clarioresque quam bellicae. Sed circa maiora maior fortitudo consistit. Ergo non proprie consistit fortitudo circa mortem quae est in bello.

Praeterea, bella ordinantur ad pacem temporalem reipublicae conservandam, dicit enim Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod intentione pacis bella aguntur. Sed pro pace temporali reipublicae non videtur quod aliquis debeat se periculo mortis exponere, cum talis pax sit multarum lasciviarum occasio. Ergo videtur quod virtus fortitudinis non consistat circa mortis bellicae pericula. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod maxime est fortitudo circa mortem quae est in bello. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, fortitudo confirmat animum hominis contra maxima pericula, quae sunt pericula mortis. Sed quia fortitudo virtus est, ad cuius rationem pertinet quod semper tendat in bonum, consequens est ut homo pericula mortis non refugiat propter aliquod bonum prosequendum. Pericula autem mortis quae est ex aegritudine, vel ex tempestate maris, vel ex incursu latronum, vel si qua alia sunt huiusmodi, non videntur directe alicui imminere ex hoc quod prosequatur aliquod bonum. Sed pericula mortis quae est in bellicis directe imminent homini propter aliquod bonum, inquantum scilicet defendit bonum commune per iustum bellum. Potest autem aliquod esse iustum bellum dupliciter. Uno modo, generale, sicut cum aliqui decertant in acie. Alio modo, particulare, puta cum aliquis iudex, vel etiam privata persona, non recedit a iusto iudicio timore gladii imminentis vel cuiuscumque periculi, etiam si sit mortiferum. Pertinet ergo ad fortitudinem firmitatem animi praebere contra pericula mortis non solum quae imminent in bello communi, sed etiam

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not properly about dangers of death in battle. For martyrs above all are commended for their fortitude. But martyrs are not commended in connection with battle. Therefore fortitude is not properly about dangers of death in battle. Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that fortitude is applicable both to warlike and to civil matters: and Tully (De Offic. i), under the heading, That it pertains to fortitude to excel in battle rather than in civil life, says: Although not a few think that the business of war is of greater importance than the affairs of civil life, this opinion must be qualified: and if we wish to judge the matter truly, there are many things in civil life that are more important and more glorious than those connected with war. Now greater fortitude is about greater things. Therefore fortitude is not properly concerned with death in battle. Obj. 3: Further, war is directed to the preservation of a country’s temporal peace: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix) that wars are waged in order to insure peace. Now it does not seem that one ought to expose oneself to the danger of death for the temporal peace of one’s country, since this same peace is the occasion of much license in morals. Therefore it seems that the virtue of fortitude is not about the danger of death in battle. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that fortitude is chiefly about death in battle. I answer that, As stated above (A. 4), fortitude strengthens a man’s mind against the greatest danger, which is that of death. Now fortitude is a virtue; and it is essential to virtue ever to tend to good; wherefore it is in order to pursue some good that man does not fly from the danger of death. But the dangers of death arising out of sickness, storms at sea, attacks from robbers, and the like, do not seem to come on a man through his pursuing some good. On the other hand, the dangers of death which occur in battle come to man directly on account of some good, because, to wit, he is defending the common good by a just fight. Now a just fight is of two kinds. First, there is the general combat, for instance, of those who fight in battle; second, there is the private combat, as when a judge or even private individual does not refrain from giving a just judgment through fear of the impending sword, or any other danger though it threaten death. Hence it belongs to fortitude to strengthen the mind against dangers of death, not only such as arise in a general battle, but also such as occur in singular combat, which may be called by the general

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Q. 123, A. 6

Fortitude

quae imminent in particulari impugnatione, quae communi nomine bellum dici potest. Et secundum hoc, concedendum est quod fortitudo proprie est circa pericula mortis quae est in bello. Sed et circa pericula cuiuscumque alterius mortis fortis bene se habet, praesertim quia et cuiuslibet mortis homo potest periculum subire propter virtutem; puta cum aliquis non refugit amico infirmanti obsequi propter timorem mortiferae infectionis; vel cum non refugit itinerari ad aliquod pium negotium prosequendum propter timorem naufragii vel latronum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod martyres sustinent personales impugnationes propter summum bonum, quod est Deus. Ideo eorum fortitudo praecipue commendatur. Nec est extra genus fortitudinis quae est circa bellica. Unde dicuntur fortes facti in bello.

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name of battle. Accordingly it must be granted that fortitude is properly about dangers of death occurring in battle.

Moreover, a brave man behaves well in face of danger of any other kind of death; especially since man may be in danger of any kind of death on account of virtue: thus may a man not fail to attend on a sick friend through fear of deadly infection, or not refuse to undertake a journey with some godly object in view through fear of shipwreck or robbers. Reply Obj. 1: Martyrs face the fight that is waged against their own person, and this for the sake of the sovereign good which is God; wherefore their fortitude is praised above all. Nor is it outside the genus of fortitude that regards warlike actions, for which reason they are said to have been valiant in battle. Ad secundum dicendum quod res domesticae vel Reply Obj. 2: Personal and civil business is differenurbanae distinguuntur contra res bellicas, quae scilicet tiated from the business of war that regards general wars. pertinent ad bella communia. In ipsis tamen rebus do- However, personal and civil affairs admit of dangers of mesticis vel urbanis possunt imminere pericula mor- death arising out of certain conflicts which are private wars, tis ex impugnationibus quibusdam, quae sunt quaedam and so with regard to these also there may be fortitude particularia bella. Et ita etiam circa huiusmodi potest es- properly so called.

se proprie dicta fortitudo. Ad tertium dicendum quod pax reipublicae est secundum se bona, nec redditur mala ex hoc quod aliqui male ea utuntur. Nam et multi alii sunt qui bene ea utuntur, et multo peiora mala per eam prohibentur, scilicet homicidia, sacrilegia, quam ex ea occasionentur, quae praecipue pertinent ad vitia carnis.

Reply Obj. 3: The peace of the state is good in itself, nor does it become evil because certain persons make evil use of it. For there are many others who make good use of it; and many evils prevented by it, such as murders and sacrileges, are much greater than those which are occasioned by it, and which belong chiefly to the sins of the flesh.

Article 6 Whether endurance is the chief act of fortitude? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sustinere non sit principalis actus fortitudinis. Virtus enim est circa difficile et bonum, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed difficilius est aggredi quam sustinere. Ergo sustinere non est praecipuus fortitudinis actus. Praeterea, maioris potentiae esse videtur quod aliquid possit in aliud agere quam quod ipsum ab alio non immutetur. Sed aggredi est in aliud agere, sustinere autem est immobile perseverare. Cum ergo fortitudo perfectionem potentiae nominet, videtur quod magis ad fortitudinem pertineat aggredi quam sustinere. Praeterea, magis distat ab uno contrariorum aliud contrarium quam simplex eius negatio. Sed ille qui sustinet hoc solum habet quod non timet, ille autem qui aggreditur contrarie movetur timenti, quia insequitur.

Objection 1: It seems that endurance is not the chief act of fortitude. For virtue is about the difficult and the good (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is more difficult to attack than to endure. Therefore endurance is not the chief act of fortitude. Obj. 2: Further, to be able to act on another seems to argue greater power than not to be changed by another. Now to attack is to act on another, and to endure is to persevere unchangeably. Since then fortitude denotes perfection of power, it seems that it belongs to fortitude to attack rather than to endure. Obj. 3: Further, one contrary is more distant from the other than its mere negation. Now to endure is merely not to fear, whereas to attack denotes a movement contrary to that of fear, since it implies pursuit. Since then fortitude

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Ergo videtur quod, cum fortitudo maxime retrahat animum a timore, quod magis pertineat ad eam aggredi quam sustinere. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod in sustinendo tristia maxime aliqui fortes dicuntur. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, et philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., fortitudo magis est circa timores reprimendos quam circa audacias moderandas. Difficilius enim est timorem reprimere quam audaciam moderari, eo quod ipsum periculum, quod est obiectum audaciae et timoris, de se confert aliquid ad repressionem audaciae, sed operatur ad augmentum timoris. Aggredi autem pertinet ad fortitudinem secundum quod moderatur audaciam, sed sustinere sequitur repressionem timoris. Et ideo principalior actus est fortitudinis sustinere, idest immobiliter sistere in periculis, quam aggredi. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sustinere est difficilius quam aggredi, triplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia sustinere videtur aliquis ab aliquo fortiori invadente, qui autem aggreditur invadit per modum fortioris. Difficilius autem est pugnare cum fortiori quam cum debiliori. Secundo, quia ille qui sustinet iam sentit pericula imminentia, ille autem qui aggreditur habet ea ut futura. Difficilius autem est non moveri a praesentibus quam a futuris. Tertio, quia sustinere importat diuturnitatem temporis, sed aggredi potest aliquis ex subito motu. Difficilius autem est diu manere immobilem quam subito motu moveri ad aliquid arduum. Unde philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod quidam sunt praevolantes ante pericula, in ipsis autem discedunt, fortes autem e contrario se habent.

Q. 123, A. 7

above all withdraws the mind from fear, it seems that it regards attack rather than endurance. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that certain persons are said to be brave chiefly because they endure affliction. I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), and according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 9), fortitude is more concerned to allay fear, than to moderate daring. For it is more difficult to allay fear than to moderate daring, since the danger which is the object of daring and fear, tends by its very nature to check daring, but to increase fear. Now to attack belongs to fortitude insofar as the latter moderates daring, whereas to endure follows the repression of fear. Therefore the principal act of fortitude is endurance, that is to stand immovable in the midst of dangers rather than to attack them.

Reply Obj. 1: Endurance is more difficult than aggression, for three reasons. First, because endurance seemingly implies that one is being attacked by a stronger person, whereas aggression denotes that one is attacking as though one were the stronger party; and it is more difficult to contend with a stronger than with a weaker. Second, because he that endures already feels the presence of danger, whereas the aggressor looks upon danger as something to come; and it is more difficult to be unmoved by the present than by the future. Third, because endurance implies length of time, whereas aggression is consistent with sudden movements; and it is more difficult to remain unmoved for a long time, than to be moved suddenly to something arduous. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that some hurry to meet danger, yet fly when the danger is present; this is not the behavior of a brave man. Ad secundum dicendum quod sustinere importat Reply Obj. 2: Endurance denotes indeed a passion of quidem passionem corporis, sed actum animae fortissi- the body, but an action of the soul cleaving most resolutely me inhaerentis bono, ex quo sequitur quod non cedat (fortissime) to good, the result being that it does not yield passioni corporali iam imminenti. Virtus autem magis to the threatening passion of the body. Now virtue concerns attenditur circa animam quam circa corpus. the soul rather than the body. Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui sustinet non tiReply Obj. 3: He that endures fears not, though he is met, praesente iam causa timoris, quam non habet prae- confronted with the cause of fear, whereas this cause is not sentem ille qui aggreditur. present to the aggressor.

Article 7 Whether the brave man acts for the sake of the good of his habit? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod forObjection 1: It seems that the brave man does not act tis non operetur propter bonum proprii habitus. Finis for the sake of the good of his habit. For in matters of action enim in rebus agendis, etsi sit prior in intentione, est ta- the end, though first in intention, is last in execution. Now men posterior in executione. Sed actus fortitudinis in the act of fortitude, in the order of execution, follows the

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Q. 123, A. 8

Fortitude

executione est posterior quam ipse fortitudinis habitus. Non ergo potest esse quod fortis agat propter bonum proprii habitus. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., virtutes, quas propter solam beatitudinem amamus, sic persuadere quidam nobis audent, scilicet dicendo eas propter se appetendas, ut ipsam beatitudinem non amemus. Quod si faciunt, etiam ipsas utique amare desistemus, quando illam propter quam solam istas amavimus, non amamus. Sed fortitudo est virtus quaedam. Ergo actus fortitudinis non est ad ipsam fortitudinem, sed ad beatitudinem referendus. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccle., quod fortitudo est amor omnia propter Deum facile perferens. Deus autem non est ipse habitus fortitudinis, sed aliquid melius, sicut oportet finem esse meliorem his quae sunt ad finem. Non ergo fortis agit propter bonum proprii habitus. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod forti fortitudo est bonum, talis autem et finis. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est finis, scilicet proximus, et ultimus. Finis autem proximus uniuscuiusque agentis est ut similitudinem suae formae in alterum inducat, sicut finis ignis calefacientis est ut inducat similitudinem sui caloris in patiente, et finis aedificatoris est ut inducat similitudinem suae artis in materia. Quodcumque autem bonum ex hoc sequitur, si sit intentum, potest dici finis remotus agentis. Sicut autem in factibilibus materia exterior disponitur per artem, ita etiam in agibilibus per prudentiam disponuntur actus humani. Sic ergo dicendum est quod fortis sicut finem proximum intendit ut similitudinem sui habitus exprimat in actu, intendit enim agere secundum convenientiam sui habitus. Finis autem remotus est beatitudo, vel Deus. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam prima ratio procedebat ac si ipsa essentia habitus esset finis, non autem similitudo eius in actu, ut dictum est. Alia vero duo procedunt de fine ultimo.

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habit of fortitude. Therefore it is impossible for the brave man to act for the sake of the good of his habit. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): We love virtues for the sake of happiness, and yet some make bold to counsel us to be virtuous, namely by saying that we should desire virtue for its own sake, without loving happiness. If they succeed in their endeavor, we shall surely cease to love virtue itself, since we shall no longer love that for the sake of which alone we love virtue. But fortitude is a virtue. Therefore the act of fortitude is directed not to fortitude but to happiness. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that fortitude is love ready to bear all things for God’s sake. Now God is not the habit of fortitude, but something better, since the end must needs be better than what is directed to the end. Therefore the brave man does not act for the sake of the good of his habit. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that to the brave man fortitude itself is a good: and such is his end. I answer that, An end is twofold: proximate and ultimate. Now the proximate end of every agent is to introduce a likeness of that agent’s form into something else: thus the end of fire in heating is to introduce the likeness of its heat into some passive matter, and the end of the builder is to introduce into matter the likeness of his art. Whatever good ensues from this, if it be intended, may be called the remote end of the agent. Now just as in things made, external matter is fashioned by art, so in things done, human deeds are fashioned by prudence. Accordingly we must conclude that the brave man intends as his proximate end to reproduce in action a likeness of his habit, for he intends to act in accordance with his habit: but his remote end is happiness or God. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the First Objection proceeds as though the very essence of a habit were its end, instead of the likeness of the habit in act, as stated. The other two objections consider the ultimate end.

Article 8 Whether the brave man delights in his act? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fortis delectetur in suo actu. Delectatio enim est operatio connaturalis habitus non impedita, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Sed operatio fortis procedit ex habitu, qui agit in modum naturae. Ergo fortis habet delectationem in suo actu. Praeterea, Galat. V, super illud, fructus autem spiritus caritas, gaudium, pax, dicit Ambrosius quod opera

Objection 1: It seems that the brave man delights in his act. For delight is the unhindered action of a connatural habit (Ethic. x, 4, 6, 8). Now the brave deed proceeds from a habit which acts after the manner of nature. Therefore the brave man takes pleasure in his act. Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose, commenting on Gal. 5:22, But the fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace, says that deeds

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Q. 123, A. 8

virtutum dicuntur fructus quia mentem hominis sancta et sincera delectatione reficiunt. Sed fortis agit opera virtutis. Ergo habet delectationem in suo actu. Praeterea, debilius vincitur a fortiori. Sed fortis plus amat bonum virtutis quam proprium corpus, quod periculis mortis exponit. Ergo delectatio de bono virtutis evacuat dolorem corporalem. Et ita delectabiliter omnino operatur.

of virtue are called fruits because they refresh man’s mind with a holy and pure delight. Now the brave man performs acts of virtue. Therefore he takes pleasure in his act. Obj. 3: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. Now the brave man has a stronger love for the good of virtue than for his own body, which he exposes to the danger of death. Therefore the delight in the good of virtue banishes the pain of the body; and consequently the brave man does all things with pleasure. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) Ethic., quod fortis in suo actu nihil delectabile videtur that the brave man seems to have no delight in his act.

habere. Respondeo dicendum quod sicut supra dictum est, cum de passionibus ageretur, duplex est delectatio, una quidem corporalis, quae consequitur tactum corporalem; alia autem animalis, quae consequitur apprehensionem animae. Et haec proprie consequitur opera virtutum, quia in eis consideratur bonum rationis. Principalis vero actus fortitudinis est sustinere aliqua tristia secundum apprehensionem animae, puta quod homo amittit corporalem vitam (quam virtuosus amat, non solum inquantum est quoddam bonum naturale, sed etiam inquantum est necessaria ad opera virtutum) et quae ad eam pertinent, et iterum sustinere aliqua dolorosa secundum tactum corporis, puta vulnera et flagella. Et ideo fortis ex una parte habet unde delectetur, scilicet secundum delectationem animalem, scilicet de ipso actu virtutis et de fine eius, ex alia vero parte habet unde doleat, et animaliter, dum considerat amissionem propriae vitae, et corporaliter. Unde, ut legitur II Machab. VI, Eleazarus dixit, diros corporis sustineo dolores, secundum animam vero, propter timorem tuum, libenter haec patior. Sensibilis autem dolor corporis facit non sentiri animalem delectationem virtutis, nisi forte propter superabundantem Dei gratiam, quae fortius elevat animam ad divina, in quibus delectatur, quam a corporalibus poenis afficiatur; sicut beatus Tiburtius, cum super carbones incensos nudis plantis incederet, dixit quod videbatur sibi super roseos flores ambulare. Facit tamen virtus fortitudinis ut ratio non absorbeatur a corporalibus doloribus. Tristitiam autem animalem superat delectatio virtutis, inquantum homo praefert bonum virtutis corporali vitae et quibuscumque ad eam pertinentibus. Et ideo philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod a forti non requiritur ut delectetur, quasi delectationem sentiens, sed sufficit quod non tristetur.

I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 31, AA. 3, 4, 5) where we were treating of the passions, pleasure is twofold; one is bodily, resulting from bodily contact, the other is spiritual, resulting from an apprehension of the soul. It is the latter which properly results from deeds of virtue, since in them we consider the good of reason. Now the principal act of fortitude is to endure, not only certain things that are unpleasant as apprehended by the soul— for instance, the loss of bodily life, which the virtuous man loves not only as a natural good, but also as being necessary for acts of virtue, and things connected with them— but also to endure things unpleasant in respect of bodily contact, such as wounds and blows. Hence the brave man, on one side, has something that affords him delight, namely as regards spiritual pleasure, in the act itself of virtue and the end thereof: while, on the other hand, he has cause for both spiritual sorrow, in the thought of losing his life, and for bodily pain. Hence we read (2 Macc 6:30) that Eleazar said: I suffer grievous pains in body: but in soul am well content to suffer these things because I fear Thee.

Now the sensible pain of the body makes one insensible to the spiritual delight of virtue, without the copious assistance of God’s grace, which has more strength to raise the soul to the Divine things in which it delights, than bodily pains have to afflict it. Thus the Blessed Tiburtius, while walking barefoot on the burning coal, said that he felt as though he were walking on roses. Yet the virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from being entirely overcome by bodily pain. And the delight of virtue overcomes spiritual sorrow, inasmuch as a man prefers the good of virtue to the life of the body and to whatever appertains thereto. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3; iii, 9) that it is not necessary for a brave man to delight so as to perceive his delight, but it suffices for him not to be sad. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vehementia actus Reply Obj. 1: The vehemence of the action or passion vel passionis unius potentiae impedit aliam potentiam of one power hinders the action of another power: wherein suo actu. Et ideo per dolorem sensus impeditur mens fore the pain in his senses hinders the mind of the brave fortis ne in propria operatione delectationem sentiat. man from feeling delight in its proper operation. Ad secundum dicendum quod opera virtutum sunt Reply Obj. 2: Deeds of virtue are delightful chiefly on delectabilia praecipue propter finem, possunt autem ex account of their end; yet they can be painful by their na-

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Q. 123, A. 9

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sui natura esse tristia. Et praecipue hoc contingit in fortitudine. Unde philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod non in omnibus virtutibus operari delectabiliter existit, praeter inquantum finem attingit. Ad tertium dicendum quod tristitia animalis vincitur in forti a delectatione virtutis. Sed quia dolor corporalis est sensibilior, et apprehensio sensitiva magis est homini in manifesto, inde est quod a magnitudine corporalis doloris quasi evanescit delectatio spiritualis, quae est de fine virtutis.

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ture, and this is principally the case with fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that to perform deeds with pleasure does not happen in all virtues, except insofar as one attains the end. Reply Obj. 3: In the brave man spiritual sorrow is overcome by the delight of virtue. Yet since bodily pain is more sensible, and the sensitive apprehension is more in evidence to man, it follows that spiritual pleasure in the end of virtue fades away, so to speak, in the presence of great bodily pain.

Article 9 Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences? Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fortitudo non maxime consistat in repentinis. Illud enim videtur esse in repentinis quod ex inopinato provenit. Sed Tullius dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod fortitudo est considerata periculorum susceptio et laborum perpessio. Ergo fortitudo non consistit maxime in repentinis. Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic., fortis viri est non dissimulare cum aliquid immineat, sed praetendere, et tanquam de specula quadam mentis obviare cogitatione provida rebus futuris, ne forte dicat postea, ideo ista incidi, quia non arbitrabar posse evenire. Sed ubi est aliquid repentinum, ibi non potest provideri in futuro. Ergo operatio fortitudinis non est circa repentina.

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden occurrences. For it would seem that things occur suddenly when they are unforeseen. But Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that fortitude is the deliberate facing of danger, and bearing of toil. Therefore fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden happenings. Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): The brave man is not unmindful of what may be likely to happen; he takes measures beforehand, and looks out as from the conning-tower of his mind, so as to encounter the future by his forethought, lest he should say afterwards: This befell me because I did not think it could possibly happen. But it is not possible to be prepared for the future in the case of sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of fortitude is not concerned with sudden happenings. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that fortis est bonae spei. Sed spes expectat aliquid in futu- the brave man is of good hope. But hope looks forward to rum, quod repugnat repentino. Ergo operatio fortitudi- the future, which is inconsistent with sudden occurrences. nis non consistit circa repentina. Therefore the operation of fortitude is not concerned with sudden happenings. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) Ethic., quod fortitudo maxime est circa quaecumque mor- that fortitude is chiefly about sudden dangers of death.

tem inferunt, repentina existentia. Respondeo dicendum quod in operatione fortitudinis duo sunt consideranda. Unum quidem, quantum ad electionem ipsius. Et sic fortitudo non est circa repentina. Eligit enim fortis praemeditari pericula quae possunt imminere, ut eis resistere possit, aut facilius ea ferre, quia, ut Gregorius dicit, in quadam homilia, iacula quae praevidentur minus feriunt, et nos mala mundi facilius ferimus, si contra ea clipeo praescientiae praemunimur. Aliud vero est considerandum in operatione fortitudinis quantum ad manifestationem virtuosi habitus. Et sic fortitudo maxime est circa repentina, quia secundum philosophum, in III Ethic., in repentinis periculis maxime manifestatur fortitudinis habitus. Habitus enim agit in modum naturae. Unde quod aliquis absque praeme-

I answer that, Two things must be considered in the operation of fortitude. One is in regard to its choice: and thus fortitude is not about sudden occurrences: because the brave man chooses to think beforehand of the dangers that may arise, in order to be able to withstand them, or to bear them more easily: since according to Gregory (Hom. xxv in Evang.), the blow that is foreseen strikes with less force, and we are able more easily to bear earthly wrongs, if we are forearmed with the shield of foreknowledge. The other thing to be considered in the operation of fortitude regards the display of the virtuous habit: and in this way fortitude is chiefly about sudden occurrences, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) the habit of fortitude is displayed chiefly in sudden dangers: since a habit works by way of na-

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Q. 123, A. 10

ditatione faciat ea quae sunt virtutis, cum necessitas im- ture. Wherefore if a person without forethought does that minet propter repentina pericula, hoc maxime manife- which pertains to virtue, when necessity urges on account stat quod sit fortitudo habitualiter in anima confirmata. of some sudden danger, this is a very strong proof that habitual fortitude is firmly seated in his mind. Potest autem aliquis etiam qui habitu fortitudinis caYet is it possible for a person even without the habit of ret, ex diuturna praemeditatione animum suum contra fortitude, to prepare his mind against danger by long forepericula praeparare. Qua praeparatione etiam fortis uti- thought: in the same way as a brave man prepares himself tur, cum tempus adest. when necessary. Et per hoc patet responsio ab obiecta. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Article 10 Whether the brave man uses anger in his action? Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fortis non utatur ira in suo actu. Nullus enim debet assumere quasi instrumentum suae actionis illud quo non potest uti pro suo arbitrio. Sed homo non potest uti ira pro suo arbitrio, ut scilicet possit eam assumere cum velit et deponere cum velit, ut enim philosophus dicit, in libro de memoria, quando passio corporalis mota est, non statim quiescit ut homo vult. Ergo fortis non debet assumere iram ad suam operationem. Praeterea, ille qui per seipsum sufficit ad aliquid agendum, non debet in auxilium sui assumere illud quod est infirmius et imperfectius. Sed ratio per seipsam sufficit ad opus fortitudinis exequendum, in quo iracundia deficit. Unde Seneca dicit, in libro de ira, non ad providendum tantum, sed ad res gerendas satis est per se ipsa ratio. Et quid stultius est quam hanc ab iracundia petere praesidium, rem stabilem ab incerta, fidelem ab infida, sanam ab aegra? Ergo fortitudo non debet iram assumere. Praeterea, sicut propter iram aliqui vehementius opera fortitudinis exequuntur, ita etiam et propter tristitiam vel concupiscentiam, unde philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod ferae propter tristitiam seu dolorem incitantur ad pericula, et adulteri propter concupiscentiam multa audacia operantur. Sed fortitudo non assumit ad suum actum neque tristitiam neque concupiscentiam. Ergo, pari ratione, non debet assumere iram. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod furor cooperatur fortibus. Respondeo dicendum quod de ira et ceteris animae passionibus, sicut supra dictum est, aliter sunt locuti Peripatetici, et aliter Stoici. Stoici enim et iram et omnes alias animae passiones ab animo sapientis, sive virtuosi, excludebant. Peripatetici vero, quorum princeps fuit Aristoteles, iram et alias animae passiones attribuebant virtuosis, sed moderatas ratione. Et forte quantum ad rem non differebant, sed solum quantum ad modum loquendi. Nam Peripatetici omnes motus appetitus sensiti-

Objection 1: It seems that the brave man does not use anger in his action. For no one should employ as an instrument of his action that which he cannot use at will. Now man cannot use anger at will, so as to take it up and lay it aside when he will. For, as the Philosopher says (De Memoria ii), when a bodily passion is in movement, it does not rest at once just as one wishes. Therefore a brave man should not employ anger for his action. Obj. 2: Further, if a man is competent to do a thing by himself, he should not seek the assistance of something weaker and more imperfect. Now the reason is competent to achieve by itself deeds of fortitude, wherein anger is impotent: wherefore Seneca says (De Ira i): Reason by itself suffices not only to make us prepared for action but also to accomplish it. In fact is there greater folly than for reason to seek help from anger? the steadfast from the unstaid, the trusty from the untrustworthy, the healthy from the sick? Therefore a brave man should not make use of anger. Obj. 3: Further, just as people are more earnest in doing deeds of fortitude on account of anger, so are they on account of sorrow or desire; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that wild beasts are incited to face danger through sorrow or pain, and adulterous persons dare many things for the sake of desire. Now fortitude employs neither sorrow nor desire for its action. Therefore in like manner it should not employ anger. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that anger helps the brave. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 24, A. 2), concerning anger and the other passions there was a difference of opinion between the Peripatetics and the Stoics. For the Stoics excluded anger and all other passions of the soul from the mind of a wise or good man: whereas the Peripatetics, of whom Aristotle was the chief, ascribed to virtuous men both anger and the other passions of the soul albeit modified by reason. And possibly they differed not in reality but in their way of speaking. For the Peripatetics,

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vi, qualitercumque se habentes, passiones animae nominabant, ut supra habitum est, et quia appetitus sensitivus movetur per imperium rationis ad hoc quod cooperetur ad promptius agendum, idcirco ponebant et iram et alias passiones animae assumendas esse a virtuosis, moderatas secundum imperium rationis. Stoici vero vocabant passiones animae immoderatos quosdam affectus appetitus sensitivi (unde nominabant eos aegritudines vel morbos), et ideo penitus eos a virtute separabant.

Sic ergo iram moderatam assumit fortis ad suum actum, non autem iram immoderatam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ira moderata secundum rationem subiicitur imperio rationis. Unde consequens est ut homo ea utatur pro suo arbitrio, non autem si esset immoderata. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio non assumit iram ad sui actum quasi auxilium ab ea accipiens, sed quia utitur appetitu sensitivo ut instrumento, sicut et membris corporis. Nec est inconveniens si instrumentum sit imperfectius principali agente, ut martellus fabro. Seneca autem sectator fuit Stoicorum, et directe contra Aristotelem verba praemissa proponit. Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum fortitudo, sicut dictum est, habeat duos actus, scilicet sustinere et aggredi, non assumit iram ad actum sustinendi, quia hunc actum sola ratio per se facit, sed ad actum aggrediendi. Ad quem magis assumit iram quam alias passiones, quia ad iram pertinet insilire in rem contristantem, et sic directe cooperatur fortitudini in aggrediendo. Tristitia autem, secundum propriam rationem, succumbit nocivo, sed per accidens coadiuvat ad aggrediendum; vel inquantum tristitia est causa irae, ut supra dictum est; vel inquantum aliquis periculo se exponit ut tristitiam fugiat. Similiter etiam concupiscentia, secundum propriam rationem, tendit in bonum delectabile, cui per se repugnat aggressio periculorum, sed per accidens quandoque coadiuvat ad aggrediendum, inquantum scilicet aliquis potius vult pericula incidere quam delectabili carere. Et ideo philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod inter fortitudines quae sunt ex passione, naturalissima esse videtur quae est per iram, et accipiens electionem et cuius gratia (scilicet debitum finem), fortitudo (scilicet, fuit vera).

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as stated above (I-II, Q. 24, A. 2), gave the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive appetite, however they may comport themselves. And since the sensitive appetite is moved by the command of reason, so that it may cooperate by rendering action more prompt, they held that virtuous persons should employ both anger and the other passions of the soul, modified according to the dictate of reason. On the other hand, the Stoics gave the name of passions to certain immoderate emotions of the sensitive appetite, wherefore they called them sicknesses or diseases, and for this reason severed them altogether from virtue. Accordingly the brave man employs moderate anger for his action, but not immoderate anger. Reply Obj. 1: Anger that is moderated in accordance with reason is subject to the command of reason: so that man uses it at his will, which would not be the case were it immoderate. Reply Obj. 2: Reason employs anger for its action, not as seeking its assistance, but because it uses the sensitive appetite as an instrument, just as it uses the members of the body. Nor is it unbecoming for the instrument to be more imperfect than the principal agent, even as the hammer is more imperfect than the smith. Moreover, Seneca was a follower of the Stoics, and the above words were aimed by him directly at Aristotle. Reply Obj. 3: Whereas fortitude, as stated above (A. 6), has two acts, namely endurance and aggression, it employs anger, not for the act of endurance, because the reason by itself performs this act, but for the act of aggression, for which it employs anger rather than the other passions, since it belongs to anger to strike at the cause of sorrow, so that it directly cooperates with fortitude in attacking. On the other hand, sorrow by its very nature gives way to the thing that hurts; though accidentally it helps in aggression, either as being the cause of anger, as stated above (I-II, Q. 47, A. 3), or as making a person expose himself to danger in order to escape from sorrow. In like manner desire, by its very nature, tends to a pleasurable good, to which it is directly contrary to withstand danger: yet accidentally sometimes it helps one to attack, insofar as one prefers to risk dangers rather than lack pleasure. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): Of all the cases in which fortitude arises from a passion, the most natural is when a man is brave through anger, making his choice and acting for a purpose, i.e., for a due end; this is true fortitude.

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Q. 123, A. 11

Article 11 Whether fortitude is a cardinal virtue? Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fortitudo non sit virtus cardinalis. Ira enim, ut dictum est, maximam affinitatem habet ad fortitudinem. Sed ira non ponitur passio principalis, nec etiam audacia, quae ad fortitudinem pertinet. Ergo nec fortitudo debet poni virtus cardinalis. Praeterea, virtus ordinatur ad bonum. Sed fortitudo non directe ordinatur ad bonum, sed magis ad malum, scilicet ad sustinendum pericula et labores, ut Tullius dicit. Ergo fortitudo non est virtus cardinalis. Praeterea, virtus cardinalis est circa ea in quibus praecipue versatur vita humana, sicut ostium in cardine vertitur. Sed fortitudo est circa pericula mortis, quae raro occurrunt in vita humana. Ergo fortitudo non debet poni virtus cardinalis sive principalis. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXII Moral., et Ambrosius, super Luc., et Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccle., numerant fortitudinem inter quatuor virtutes cardinales seu principales. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes cardinales seu principales dicuntur quae praecipue sibi vindicant id quod pertinet communiter ad virtutes. Inter alias autem communes virtutis conditiones, una ponitur firmiter operari, ut patet in II Ethic. Laudem autem firmitatis potissime sibi vindicat fortitudo. Tanto enim magis laudatur qui firmiter stat, quanto habet gravius impellens ad cadendum vel retrocedendum. Impellit autem hominem ad discedendum ab eo quod est secundum rationem et bonum delectans et malum affligens, sed gravius impellit dolor corporis quam voluptas, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., nemo est qui non magis dolorem fugiat quam affectat voluptatem, quandoquidem videmus et immanissimas bestias a maximis voluptatibus exterreri dolorum metu. Et inter dolores animi et pericula maxime timentur ea quae ducunt ad mortem, contra quae firmiter stat fortis. Unde fortitudo est virtus cardinalis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod audacia et ira non cooperantur fortitudini ad actum eius qui est sustinere, in quo praecipue commendatur firmitas eius. Per hunc enim actum fortis cohibet timorem, qui est passio principalis, ut supra habitum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus ordinatur ad bonum rationis, quod conservari oportet contra impulsus malorum. Fortitudo autem ordinatur ad mala corporalia sicut ad contraria, quibus resistit, ad bonum autem rationis sicut ad finem, quem intendit conservare.

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a cardinal virtue. For, as stated above (A. 10), anger is closely allied with fortitude. Now anger is not accounted a principal passion; nor is daring which belongs to fortitude. Therefore neither should fortitude be reckoned a cardinal virtue. Obj. 2: Further, the object of virtue is good. But the direct object of fortitude is not good, but evil, for it is endurance of evil and toil, as Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii). Therefore fortitude is not a cardinal virtue. Obj. 3: Further, the cardinal virtues are about those things upon which human life is chiefly occupied, just as a door turns upon a hinge (cardine). But fortitude is about dangers of death which are of rare occurrence in human life. Therefore fortitude should not be reckoned a cardinal or principal virtue. On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxii), Ambrose in his commentary on Luke 6:20, and Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), number fortitude among the four cardinal or principal virtues. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), those virtues are said to be cardinal or principal which have a foremost claim to that which belongs to the virtues in common. And among other conditions of virtue in general one is that it is stated to act steadfastly, according to Ethic. ii, 4. Now fortitude above all lays claim to praise for steadfastness. Because he that stands firm is so much the more praised, as he is more strongly impelled to fall or recede. Now man is impelled to recede from that which is in accordance with reason, both by the pleasing good and the displeasing evil. But bodily pain impels him more strongly than pleasure. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36): There is none that does not shun pain more than he desires pleasure. For we perceive that even the most untamed beasts are deterred from the greatest pleasures by the fear of pain. And among the pains of the mind and dangers those are mostly feared which lead to death, and it is against them that the brave man stands firm. Therefore fortitude is a cardinal virtue. Reply Obj. 1: Daring and anger do not cooperate with fortitude in its act of endurance, wherein its steadfastness is chiefly commended: for it is by that act that the brave man curbs fear, which is a principal passion, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 4). Reply Obj. 2: Virtue is directed to the good of reason which it behooves to safeguard against the onslaught of evils. And fortitude is directed to evils of the body, as contraries which it withstands, and to the good of reason, as the end, which it intends to safeguard.

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Q. 123, A. 12

Fortitude

Ad tertium dicendum quod quamvis pericula mortis raro immineant, tamen occasiones horum periculorum frequenter occurrunt, dum scilicet homini adversarii mortales suscitantur propter iustitiam quam sequitur, et propter alia bona quae facit.

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Reply Obj. 3: Though dangers of death are of rare occurrence, yet the occasions of those dangers occur frequently, since on account of justice which he pursues, and also on account of other good deeds, man encounters mortal adversaries.

Article 12 Whether fortitude excels among all other virtues? Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fortitudo praecellat inter omnes virtutes. Dicit enim Ambrosius, in I de Offic., est fortitudo velut ceteris excelsior. Praeterea, virtus est circa difficile et bonum. Sed fortitudo est circa difficillima. Ergo est maxima virtutum. Praeterea, dignior est persona hominis quam res eius. Sed fortitudo est circa personam hominis, quam aliquis periculo mortis exponit propter bonum virtutis, iustitia autem et aliae virtutes morales sunt circa alias res exteriores. Ergo fortitudo est praecipua inter virtutes morales. Sed contra est quod Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., in iustitia virtutis splendor est maximus, ex qua viri boni nominantur. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in I Rhet., necesse est maximas esse virtutes quae maxime aliis utiles sunt. Sed liberalitas videtur magis utilis quam fortitudo. Ergo est maior virtus. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in VI de Trin., in his quae non mole magna sunt, idem est esse maius quod melius. Unde tanto aliqua virtus maior est quanto melior est. Bonum autem rationis est hominis bonum, secundum Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Hoc autem bonum essentialiter quidem habet prudentia, quae est perfectio rationis. Iustitia autem est huius boni factiva, inquantum scilicet ad ipsam pertinet ordinem rationis ponere in omnibus rebus humanis. Aliae autem virtutes sunt conservativae huius boni, inquantum scilicet moderantur passiones, ne abducant hominem a bono rationis. Et in ordine harum fortitudo tenet locum praecipuum, quia timor periculorum mortis maxime est efficax ad hoc quod hominem faciat recedere a bono rationis. Post quam ordinatur temperantia, quia etiam delectationes tactus maxime inter cetera impediunt bonum rationis. Id autem quod essentialiter dicitur, potius est eo quod dicitur effective, et hoc etiam potius est eo quod dicitur conservative, secundum remotionem impedimenti. Unde inter virtutes cardinales prudentia est potior; secunda, iustitia; tertia, fortitudo; quarta, temperantia. Et post has, ceterae virtutes.

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude excels among all other virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i): Fortitude is higher, so to speak, than the rest. Obj. 2: Further, virtue is about that which is difficult and good. But fortitude is about most difficult things. Therefore it is the greatest of the virtues. Obj. 3: Further, the person of a man is more excellent than his possessions. But fortitude is about a man’s person, for it is this that a man exposes to the danger of death for the good of virtue: whereas justice and the other moral virtues are about other and external things. Therefore fortitude is the chief of the moral virtues. Obj. 4: On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i): Justice is the most resplendent of the virtues and gives its name to a good man. Obj. 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 19): Those virtues must needs be greatest which are most profitable to others. Now liberality seems to be more useful than fortitude. Therefore it is a greater virtue. I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. vi), In things that are great, but not in bulk, to be great is to be good: wherefore the better a virtue the greater it is. Now reason’s good is man’s good, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) prudence, since it is a perfection of reason, has the good essentially: while justice effects this good, since it belongs to justice to establish the order of reason in all human affairs: whereas the other virtues safeguard this good, inasmuch as they moderate the passions, lest they lead man away from reason’s good. As to the order of the latter, fortitude holds the first place, because fear of dangers of death has the greatest power to make man recede from the good of reason: and after fortitude comes temperance, since also pleasures of touch excel all others in hindering the good of reason. Now to be a thing essentially ranks before effecting it, and the latter ranks before safeguarding it by removing obstacles thereto. Wherefore among the cardinal virtues, prudence ranks first, justice second, fortitude third, temperance fourth, and after these the other virtues.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Ambrosius fortitudinem aliis virtutibus praefert secundum quandam generalem utilitatem, prout scilicet et in rebus bellicis et in rebus civilibus seu domesticis utilis est. Unde ipse ibidem praemittit, nunc de fortitudine tractemus, quae, velut excelsior ceteris, dividitur in res bellicas et domesticas. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio virtutis magis consistit in bono quam in difficili. Unde magis est mensuranda magnitudo virtutis secundum rationem boni quam secundum rationem difficilis. Ad tertium dicendum quod homo non exponit personam suam mortis periculis nisi propter iustitiam conservandam. Et ideo laus fortitudinis dependet quodammodo ex iustitia. Unde dicit Ambrosius, in I de Offic., quod fortitudo sine iustitia iniquitatis est materia, quo enim validior est, eo promptior ut inferiorem opprimat. Quartum concedimus. Ad quintum dicendum quod liberalitas utilis est in quibusdam particularibus beneficiis. Sed fortitudo habet utilitatem generalem ad conservandum totum iustitiae ordinem. Et ideo philosophus dicit, in I Rhet., quod iusti et fortes maxime amantur, quia sunt maxime utiles et in bello et in pace.

Q. 123, A. 12

Reply Obj. 1: Ambrose places fortitude before the other virtues, in respect of a certain general utility, inasmuch as it is useful both in warfare, and in matters relating to civil or home life. Hence he begins by saying (De Offic. i): Now we come to treat of fortitude, which being higher so to speak than the others, is applicable both to warlike and to civil matters. Reply Obj. 2: Virtue essentially regards the good rather than the difficult. Hence the greatness of a virtue is measured according to its goodness rather than its difficulty. Reply Obj. 3: A man does not expose his person to dangers of death except in order to safeguard justice: wherefore the praise awarded to fortitude depends somewhat on justice. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that fortitude without justice is an occasion of injustice; since the stronger a man is the more ready is he to oppress the weaker. The Fourth argument is granted. Reply Obj. 5: Liberality is useful in conferring certain particular favors: whereas a certain general utility attaches to fortitude, since it safeguards the whole order of justice. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that just and brave men are most beloved, because they are most useful in war and peace.

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Question 124 Martyrdom Deinde considerandum est de martyrio. Et circa hoc We must now consider martyrdom, under which head quaeruntur quinque. there are five points of inquiry: Primo, utrum martyrium sit actus virtutis. (1) Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue? Secundo, cuius virtutis sit actus. (2) Of what virtue is it the act? Tertio, de perfectione huius actus. (3) Concerning the perfection of this act; Quarto, de poena martyrii. (4) The pain of martyrdom; Quinto, de causa. (5) Its cause.

Article 1 Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod martyrium non sit actus virtutis. Omnis enim actus virtutis est voluntarius. Sed martyrium quandoque non est voluntarium, ut patet de innocentibus pro Christo occisis, de quibus dicit Hilarius, super Matth., quod in aeternitatis profectum per martyrii gloriam efferebantur. Ergo martyrium non est actus virtutis. Praeterea, nullum illicitum est actus virtutis. Sed occidere seipsum est illicitum, ut supra habitum est. Per quod tamen martyrium consummatur, dicit enim Augustinus, in I de Civ. Dei, quod quaedam sanctae feminae, tempore persecutionis, ut insectatores suae pudicitiae devitarent, se in fluvium deiecerunt, eoque modo defunctae sunt; earumque martyria in Catholica Ecclesia veneratione celeberrima frequentantur. Non ergo martyrium est actus virtutis. Praeterea, laudabile est quod aliquis sponte se offerat ad exequendum actum virtutis. Sed non est laudabile quod aliquis martyrio se ingerat, sed magis videtur esse praesumptuosum et periculosum. Non ergo martyrium est actus virtutis. Sed contra est quod praemium beatitudinis non debetur nisi actui virtutis. Debetur autem martyrio, secundum illud Matth. V, beati qui persecutionem patiuntur propter iustitiam, quoniam ipsorum est regnum caelorum. Ergo martyrium est actus virtutis. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad virtutem pertinet quod aliquis in bono rationis conservetur. Consistit autem bonum rationis in veritate, sicut in proprio obiecto; et in iustitia, sicut in proprio effectu, sicut ex supra dictis patet. Pertinet autem ad rationem martyrii ut aliquis firmiter stet in veritate et iustitia contra persequentium impetus. Unde manifestum est quod martyrium est actus virtutis.

Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of virtue. For all acts of virtue are voluntary. But martyrdom is sometimes not voluntary, as in the case of the Innocents who were slain for Christ’s sake, and of whom Hilary says (Super Matth. i) that they attained the ripe age of eternity through the glory of martyrdom. Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue. Obj. 2: Further, nothing unlawful is an act of virtue. Now it is unlawful to kill oneself, as stated above (Q. 64, A. 5), and yet martyrdom is achieved by so doing: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) that during persecution certain holy women, in order to escape from those who threatened their chastity, threw themselves into a river, and so ended their lives, and their martyrdom is honored in the Catholic Church with most solemn veneration. Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue. Obj. 3: Further, it is praiseworthy to offer oneself to do an act of virtue. But it is not praiseworthy to court martyrdom, rather would it seem to be presumptuous and rash. Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue. On the contrary, The reward of beatitude is not due save to acts of virtue. Now it is due to martyrdom, since it is written (Matt 5:10): Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice’ sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Therefore martyrdom is an act of virtue. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 123, AA. 1, 3), it belongs to virtue to safeguard man in the good of reason. Now the good of reason consists in the truth as its proper object, and in justice as its proper effect, as shown above (Q. 109, AA. 1, 2; Q. 123, A. 12). And martyrdom consists essentially in standing firmly to truth and justice against the assaults of persecution. Hence it is evident that martyrdom is an act of virtue.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod in innocentibus acceleratus est miraculose usus liberi arbitrii, ita quod etiam voluntarie martyrium passi sunt. Sed quia hoc per auctoritatem Scripturae non comprobatur, ideo melius dicendum est quod martyrii gloriam, quam in aliis propria voluntas meretur, illi parvuli occisi per Dei gratiam sunt assecuti. Nam effusio sanguinis propter Christum vicem gerit Baptismi. Unde sicut pueris baptizatis per gratiam baptismalem meritum Christi operatur ad gloriam obtinendam, ita in occisis propter Christum meritum martyrii Christi operatur ad palmam martyrii consequendam. Unde Augustinus dicit, in quodam sermone de Epiphania, quasi eos alloquens, ille de vestra corona dubitabit in passione pro Christo, qui etiam parvulis Baptismum prodesse non aestimat Christi. Non habebatis aetatem qua in passurum Christum crederetis, sed habebatis carnem in qua pro Christo passuro passionem sustineretis. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, esset possibile quod aliquibus fide dignis testificationibus divina persuasit auctoritas Ecclesiae ut dictarum sanctarum memoriam honoraret. Ad tertium dicendum quod praecepta legis dantur de actibus virtutis. Dictum autem est supra quaedam praecepta legis divinae tradita esse secundum praeparationem animi, ut scilicet homo sit paratus hoc vel illud faciendi cum fuerit opportunum. Ita etiam et aliqua pertinent ad actum virtutis secundum animi praeparationem, ut scilicet, superveniente tali casu, homo secundum rationem agat. Et hoc praecipue videtur observandum in martyrio, quod consistit in debita sustinentia passionum iniuste inflictarum, non autem debet homo occasionem dare alteri iniuste agendi, sed si alius iniuste egerit, ipse debet moderate tolerare.

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Reply Obj. 1: Some have said that in the case of the Innocents the use of their free will was miraculously accelerated, so that they suffered martyrdom even voluntarily. Since, however, Scripture contains no proof of this, it is better to say that these babes in being slain obtained by God’s grace the glory of martyrdom which others acquire by their own will. For the shedding of one’s blood for Christ’s sake takes the place of Baptism. Wherefore just as in the case of baptized children the merit of Christ is conducive to the acquisition of glory through the baptismal grace, so in those who were slain for Christ’s sake the merit of Christ’s martyrdom is conducive to the acquisition of the martyr’s palm. Hence Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (De Diversis lxvi), as though he were addressing them: A man that does not believe that children are benefited by the baptism of Christ will doubt of your being crowned in suffering for Christ. You were not old enough to believe in Christ’s future sufferings, but you had a body wherein you could endure suffering of Christ Who was to suffer. Reply Obj. 2: Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) that possibly the Church was induced by certain credible witnesses of Divine authority thus to honor the memory of those holy women. Reply Obj. 3: The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now it has been stated (I-II, Q. 108, A. 1, ad 4) that some of the precepts of the Divine Law are to be understood in reference to the preparation of the mind, in the sense that man ought to be prepared to do such and such a thing, whenever expedient. In the same way certain things belong to an act of virtue as regards the preparation of the mind, so that in such and such a case a man should act according to reason. And this observation would seem very much to the point in the case of martyrdom, which consists in the right endurance of sufferings unjustly inflicted. Nor ought a man to give another an occasion of acting unjustly: yet if anyone act unjustly, one ought to endure it in moderation.

Article 2 Whether martyrdom is an act of fortitude? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod martyrium non sit actus fortitudinis. Dicitur enim martyr in Graeco quasi testis. Testimonium autem redditur fidei Christi, secundum illud Act. I, eritis mihi testes in Ierusalem, et cetera. Et maximus dicit, in quodam sermone, mater martyrii fides Catholica est, in qua illustres athletae suo sanguine subscripserunt. Ergo martyrium est potius actus fidei quam fortitudinis. Praeterea, actus laudabilis ad illam virtutem praecipue pertinet quae ad ipsum inclinat, et quae ab ipso manifestatur, et sine qua ipse non valet. Sed ad marty-

Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of fortitude. For the Greek martyr signifies a witness. Now witness is borne to the faith of Christ. according to Acts 1:8, You shall be witnesses unto Me, etc. and Maximus says in a sermon: The mother of martyrs is the Catholic faith which those glorious warriors have sealed with their blood. Therefore martyrdom is an act of faith rather than of fortitude. Obj. 2: Further, a praiseworthy act belongs chiefly to the virtue which inclines thereto, is manifested thereby, and without which the act avails nothing. Now charity is

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rium praecipue inclinat caritas, unde in quodam sermone maximi dicitur, caritas Christi in martyribus suis vicit. Maxime etiam caritas per actum martyrii manifestatur, secundum illud Ioan. XV, maiorem dilectionem nemo habet quam ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis. Sine caritate etiam martyrium nihil valet, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIII, si tradidero corpus meum ita ut ardeam, caritatem autem non habuero, nihil mihi prodest. Ergo martyrium magis est actus caritatis quam fortitudinis. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in quodam sermone de sancto Cypriano, facile est martyrem celebrando venerari, magnum vero fidem eius et patientiam imitari. Sed in unoquoque actu virtutis praecipue laudabilis redditur virtus cuius est actus. Ergo martyrium magis est actus patientiae quam fortitudinis. Sed contra est quod Cyprianus dicit, in epistola ad martyres et confessores, o beati martyres, quibus vos laudibus praedicem? O milites fortissimi, robur corporis vestri quo praeconio vocis explicem? Quilibet autem laudatur de virtute cuius actum exercet. Ergo martyrium est actus fortitudinis. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, ad fortitudinem pertinet ut confirmet hominem in bono virtutis contra pericula, et praecipue contra pericula mortis, et maxime eius quae est in bello. Manifestum est autem quod in martyrio homo firmiter confirmatur in bono virtutis, dum fidem et iustitiam non deserit propter imminentia pericula mortis, quae etiam in quodam certamine particulari a persecutoribus imminent. Unde Cyprianus dicit, in quodam sermone, vidit admirans praesentium multitudo caeleste certamen, et in praelio stetisse servos Christi voce libera, mente incorrupta, virtute divina. Unde manifestum est quod martyrium est fortitudinis actus. Et propter hoc de martyribus legit Ecclesia, fortes facti sunt in bello. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in actu fortitudinis duo sunt consideranda. Quorum unum est bonum in quo fortis firmatur, et hoc est fortitudinis finis. Aliud est ipsa firmitas, qua quis non cedit contrariis prohibentibus ab illo bono, et in hoc consistit essentia fortitudinis. Sicut autem fortitudo civilis firmat animum hominis in iustitia humana, propter cuius conservationem mortis pericula sustinet; ita etiam fortitudo gratuita firmat animum hominis in bono iustitiae Dei, quae est per fidem Iesu Christi, ut dicitur Rom. III. Et sic martyrium comparatur ad fidem sicut ad finem in quo aliquis firmatur, ad fortitudinem autem sicut ad habitum elicientem. Ad secundum dicendum quod ad actum martyrii inclinat quidem caritas sicut primum et principale motivum, per modum virtutis imperantis, fortitudo autem sicut motivum proprium, per modum virtutis elicientis. Et inde etiam est quod martyrium est actus caritatis ut im-

Q. 124, A. 2

the chief incentive to martyrdom: Thus Maximus says in a sermon: The charity of Christ is victorious in His martyrs. Again the greatest proof of charity lies in the act of martyrdom, according to John 15:13, Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends. Moreover without charity martyrdom avails nothing, according to 1 Cor. 13:3, If I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. Therefore martyrdom is an act of charity rather than of fortitude. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on St. Cyprian: It is easy to honor a martyr by singing his praises, but it is a great thing to imitate his faith and patience. Now that which calls chiefly for praise in a virtuous act, is the virtue of which it is the act. Therefore martyrdom is an act of patience rather than of fortitude. On the contrary, Cyprian says (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): Blessed martyrs, with what praise shall I extol you? Most valiant warriors, how shall I find words to proclaim the strength of your courage? Now a person is praised on account of the virtue whose act he performs. Therefore martyrdom is an act of fortitude. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 123, A. 1, seqq.), it belongs to fortitude to strengthen man in the good of virtue, especially against dangers, and chiefly against dangers of death, and most of all against those that occur in battle. Now it is evident that in martyrdom man is firmly strengthened in the good of virtue, since he cleaves to faith and justice notwithstanding the threatening danger of death, the imminence of which is moreover due to a kind of particular contest with his persecutors. Hence Cyprian says in a sermon (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): The crowd of onlookers wondered to see an unearthly battle, and Christ’s servants fighting erect, undaunted in speech, with souls unmoved, and strength divine. Wherefore it is evident that martyrdom is an act of fortitude; for which reason the Church reads in the office of Martyrs: They became valiant in battle. Reply Obj. 1: Two things must be considered in the act of fortitude. One is the good wherein the brave man is strengthened, and this is the end of fortitude; the other is the firmness itself, whereby a man does not yield to the contraries that hinder him from achieving that good, and in this consists the essence of fortitude. Now just as civic fortitude strengthens a man’s mind in human justice, for the safeguarding of which he braves the danger of death, so gratuitous fortitude strengthens man’s soul in the good of Divine justice, which is through faith in Christ Jesus, according to Rom. 3:22. Thus martyrdom is related to faith as the end in which one is strengthened, but to fortitude as the eliciting habit. Reply Obj. 2: Charity inclines one to the act of martyrdom, as its first and chief motive cause, being the virtue commanding it, whereas fortitude inclines thereto as being its proper motive cause, being the virtue that elicits it. Hence martyrdom is an act of charity as commanding, and

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perantis, fortitudinis autem ut elicientis. Et inde est quod utramque virtutem manifestat. Quod autem sit meritorium, habet ex caritate, sicut et quilibet virtutis actus. Et ideo sine caritate non valet. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, principalior actus fortitudinis est sustinere, ad quem pertinet martyrium; non autem ad secundarium actum eius, qui est aggredi. Et quia patientia deservit fortitudini ex parte actus principalis qui est sustinere, inde est etiam quod concomitanter in martyribus patientia commendatur.

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of fortitude as eliciting. For this reason also it manifests both virtues. It is due to charity that it is meritorious, like any other act of virtue: and for this reason it avails not without charity. Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 123, A. 6), the chief act of fortitude is endurance: to this and not to its secondary act, which is aggression, martyrdom belongs. And since patience serves fortitude on the part of its chief act, viz. endurance, hence it is that martyrs are also praised for their patience.

Article 3 Whether martyrdom is an act of the greatest perfection? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod martyrium non sit actus maximae perfectionis. Illud enim ad perfectionem vitae videtur pertinere quod cadit sub consilio, non sub praecepto, quia scilicet non est de necessitate salutis. Sed martyrium videtur esse de necessitate salutis, dicit enim apostolus, Rom. X, corde creditur ad iustitiam, ore autem fit confessio ad salutem; et I Ioann. III dicitur quod nos debemus pro fratribus animam ponere. Ergo martyrium non pertinet ad perfectionem. Praeterea, ad maiorem perfectionem pertinere videtur quod aliquis det Deo animam, quod fit per obedientiam, quam quod det Deo proprium corpus, quod fit per martyrium, unde Gregorius dicit, ult. Moral., quod obedientia cunctis victimis praefertur. Ergo martyrium non est actus maximae perfectionis. Praeterea, melius esse videtur aliis prodesse quam seipsum in bono conservare, quia bonum gentis melius est quam bonum unius hominis, secundum philosophum, in I Ethic. Sed ille qui martyrium sustinet, sibi soli prodest, ille autem qui docet, proficit multis. Ergo actus docendi et gubernandi subditos est perfectior quam actus martyrii. Sed contra est quod Augustinus, in libro de sancta Virginit., praefert martyrium virginitati, quae ad perfectionem pertinet. Ergo videtur martyrium maxime ad perfectionem pertinere. Respondeo dicendum quod de aliquo actu virtutis dupliciter loqui possumus. Uno modo, secundum speciem ipsius actus, prout comparatur ad virtutem proxime elicientem ipsum. Et sic non potest esse quod martyrium, quod consistit in debita tolerantia mortis, sit perfectissimus inter virtutis actus. Quia tolerare mortem non est laudabile secundum se, sed solum secundum quod ordinatur ad aliquod bonum quod consistit in actu virtutis, puta ad fidem et dilectionem Dei. Unde ille actus virtutis, cum sit finis, melior est.

Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection. For seemingly that which is a matter of counsel and not of precept pertains to perfection, because, to wit, it is not necessary for salvation. But it would seem that martyrdom is necessary for salvation, since the Apostle says (Rom 10:10), With the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation, and it is written (1 John 3:16), that we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren. Therefore martyrdom does not pertain to perfection. Obj. 2: Further, it seems to point to greater perfection that a man give his soul to God, which is done by obedience, than that he give God his body, which is done by martyrdom: wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that obedience is preferable to all sacrifices. Therefore martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection. Obj. 3: Further, it would seem better to do good to others than to maintain oneself in good, since the good of the nation is better than the good of the individual, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). Now he that suffers martyrdom profits himself alone, whereas he that teaches does good to many. Therefore the act of teaching and guiding subjects is more perfect than the act of martyrdom. On the contrary, Augustine (De Sanct. Virgin. xlvi) prefers martyrdom to virginity which pertains to perfection. Therefore martyrdom seems to belong to perfection in the highest degree. I answer that, We may speak of an act of virtue in two ways. First, with regard to the species of that act, as compared to the virtue proximately eliciting it. In this way martyrdom, which consists in the due endurance of death, cannot be the most perfect of virtuous acts, because endurance of death is not praiseworthy in itself, but only insofar as it is directed to some good consisting in an act of virtue, such as faith or the love of God, so that this act of virtue being the end is better.

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Alio modo potest considerari actus virtutis secundum quod comparatur ad primum motivum, quod est amor caritatis. Et ex hac parte praecipue aliquis actus habet quod ad perfectionem vitae pertineat, quia, ut apostolus dicit, Coloss. III, caritas est vinculum perfectionis. Martyrium autem, inter omnes actus virtuosos, maxime demonstrat perfectionem caritatis. Quia tanto magis ostenditur aliquis aliquam rem amare, quanto pro ea rem magis amatam contemnit, et rem magis odiosam eligit pati. Manifestum est autem quod inter omnia alia bona praesentis vitae, maxime amat homo ipsam vitam, et e contrario maxime odit ipsam mortem, et praecipue cum doloribus corporalium tormentorum, quorum metu etiam bruta animalia a maximis voluptatibus absterrentur, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest. Et secundum hoc patet quod martyrium inter ceteros actus humanos est perfectior secundum suum genus, quasi maximae caritatis signum, secundum illud Ioan. XV, maiorem caritatem nemo habet quam ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nullus est actus perfectionis sub consilio cadens qui in aliquo eventu non cadat sub praecepto, quasi de necessitate salutis existens, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de adulterinis coniugiis, quod aliquis incidit in necessitatem continentiae servandae propter absentiam vel infirmitatem uxoris. Et ideo non est contra perfectionem martyrii si in aliquo casu sit de necessitate salutis. Est enim aliquis casus in quo martyrium perferre non est de necessitate salutis, puta cum ex zelo fidei et caritate fraterna multoties leguntur sancti martyres sponte se obtulisse martyrio. Illa autem praecepta sunt intelligenda secundum praeparationem animi. Ad secundum dicendum quod martyrium complectitur id quod summum in obedientia esse potest, ut scilicet aliquis sit obediens usque ad mortem, sicut de Christo legitur, Philipp. II, quod factus est obediens usque ad mortem. Unde patet quod martyrium secundum se est perfectius quam obedientia absolute dicta. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de martyrio secundum propriam speciem actus, ex qua non habet excellentiam inter omnes actus virtutum, sicut nec fortitudo est excellentior inter omnes virtutes.

Q. 124, A. 4

A virtuous act may be considered in another way, in comparison with its first motive cause, which is the love of charity, and it is in this respect that an act comes to belong to the perfection of life, since, as the Apostle says (Col 3:14), that charity . . . is the bond of perfection. Now, of all virtuous acts martyrdom is the greatest proof of the perfection of charity: since a man’s love for a thing is proved to be so much the greater, according as that which he despises for its sake is more dear to him, or that which he chooses to suffer for its sake is more odious. But it is evident that of all the goods of the present life man loves life itself most, and on the other hand he hates death more than anything, especially when it is accompanied by the pains of bodily torment, from fear of which even dumb animals refrain from the greatest pleasures, as Augustine observes (QQ. 83, qu. 36). And from this point of view it is clear that martyrdom is the most perfect of human acts in respect of its genus, as being the sign of the greatest charity, according to John 15:13: Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends. Reply Obj. 1: There is no act of perfection, which is a matter of counsel, but what in certain cases is a matter of precept, as being necessary for salvation. Thus Augustine declares (De Adult. Conjug. xiii) that a man is under the obligation of observing continency, through the absence or sickness of his wife. Hence it is not contrary to the perfection of martyrdom if in certain cases it be necessary for salvation, since there are cases when it is not necessary for salvation to suffer martyrdom; thus we read of many holy martyrs who through zeal for the faith or brotherly love gave themselves up to martyrdom of their own accord. As to these precepts, they are to be understood as referring to the preparation of the mind. Reply Obj. 2: Martyrdom embraces the highest possible degree of obedience, namely obedience unto death; thus we read of Christ (Phil 2:8) that He became obedient unto death. Hence it is evident that martyrdom is of itself more perfect than obedience considered absolutely. Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers martyrdom according to the proper species of its act, whence it derives no excellence over all other virtuous acts; thus neither is fortitude more excellent than all virtues.

Article 4 Whether death is essential to martyrdom? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mors non sit de ratione martyrii. Dicit enim Hieronymus, in sermone de assumptione, recte dixerim quod Dei genitrix virgo et martyr fuit, quamvis in pace vitam finierit. Et Gregorius dicit, quamvis occasio persecutionis desit, ha-

Objection 1: It seems that death is not essential to martyrdom. For Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption (Epist. ad Paul. et Eustoch.): I should say rightly that the Mother of God was both virgin and martyr, although she ended her days in peace: and Gregory says (Hom. iii in

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bet tamen pax suum martyrium, quia etsi carnis colla ferro non subiicimus, spirituali tamen gladio carnalia desideria in mente trucidamus. Ergo absque passione mortis potest esse martyrium.

Praeterea, pro integritate carnis servanda aliquae mulieres leguntur laudabiliter vitam suam contempsisse, et ita videtur quod corporalis integritas castitatis praeferatur vitae corporali. Sed quandoque ipsa integritas carnis aufertur, vel auferri intentatur, pro confessione fidei Christianae, ut patet de Agnete et Lucia. Ergo videtur quod martyrium magis debeat dici si aliqua mulier pro fide Christi integritatem carnis perdat, quam si etiam vitam perderet corporalem. Unde et Lucia dixit, si me invitam feceris violari, castitas mihi duplicabitur ad coronam.

Praeterea, martyrium est fortitudinis actus. Ad fortitudinem autem pertinet non solum mortem non formidare, sed nec alias adversitates, ut Augustinus dicit, in VI musicae. Sed multae sunt aliae adversitates praeter mortem, quas aliqui possunt sustinere pro fide Christi, sicut carcerem, exilium, rapinam bonorum, ut patet ad Heb. X. Unde et sancti Marcelli Papae martyrium celebratur, qui tamen fuit in carcere mortuus. Ergo non est de necessitate martyrii quod aliquis sustineat poenam mortis. Praeterea, martyrium est actus meritorius, ut dictum est. Sed actus meritorius non potest esse post mortem. Ergo ante mortem. Et ita mors non est de ratione martyrii. Sed contra est quod maximus dicit, in quodam sermone, de martyre, quod vincit pro fide moriendo qui vinceretur sine fide vivendo. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, martyr dicitur quasi testis fidei Christianae, per quam nobis visibilia pro invisibilibus contemnenda proponuntur, ut dicitur Heb. XI. Ad martyrium ergo pertinet ut homo testificetur fidem, se opere ostendens cuncta praesentia contemnere, ut ad futura et ad invisibilia bona perveniat. Quandiu autem homini remanet vita corporalis, nondum opere se ostendit temporalia cuncta despicere, consueverunt enim homines et consanguineos et omnia bona possessa contemnere, et etiam dolores corporis pati, ut vitam conservent. Unde et Satan contra Iob induxit, pellem pro pelle, et cuncta quae habet homo, dabit pro anima sua, idest pro vita corporali. Et ideo ad perfectam rationem martyrii requiritur quod aliquis mortem sustineat propter Christum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illae auctoritates, et si quae similes inveniuntur, loquuntur de martyrio per quandam similitudinem.

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Evang.): Although persecution has ceased to offer the opportunity, yet the peace we enjoy is not without its martyrdom, since even if we no longer yield the life of the body to the sword, yet do we slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword of the spirit. Therefore there can be martyrdom without suffering death. Obj. 2: Further, we read of certain women as commended for despising life for the sake of safeguarding the integrity of the flesh: wherefore seemingly the integrity of chastity is preferable to the life of the body. Now sometimes the integrity of the flesh has been forfeited or has been threatened in confession of the Christian faith, as in the case of Agnes and Lucy. Therefore it seems that the name of martyr should be accorded to a woman who forfeits the integrity of the flesh for the sake of Christ’s faith, rather than if she were to forfeit even the life of the body: wherefore also Lucy said: If thou causest me to be violated against my will, my chastity will gain me a twofold crown. Obj. 3: Further, martyrdom is an act of fortitude. But it belongs to fortitude to brave not only death but also other hardships, as Augustine declares (Music. vi). Now there are many other hardships besides death, which one may suffer for Christ’s faith, namely imprisonment, exile, being stripped of one’s goods, as mentioned in Heb. 10:34, for which reason we celebrate the martyrdom of Pope Saint Marcellus, notwithstanding that he died in prison. Therefore it is not essential to martyrdom that one suffer the pain of death. Obj. 4: Further, martyrdom is a meritorious act, as stated above (A. 2, ad 1; A. 3). Now it cannot be a meritorious act after death. Therefore it is before death; and consequently death is not essential to martyrdom. On the contrary, Maximus says in a sermon on the martyrs that in dying for the faith he conquers who would have been vanquished in living without faith. I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), a martyr is so called as being a witness to the Christian faith, which teaches us to despise things visible for the sake of things invisible, as stated in Heb. 11. Accordingly it belongs to martyrdom that a man bear witness to the faith in showing by deed that he despises all things present, in order to obtain invisible goods to come. Now so long as a man retains the life of the body he does not show by deed that he despises all things relating to the body. For men are wont to despise both their kindred and all they possess, and even to suffer bodily pain, rather than lose life. Hence Satan testified against Job (Job 2:4): Skin for skin, and all that a man hath he will give for his soul i.e., for the life of his body. Therefore the perfect notion of martyrdom requires that a man suffer death for Christ’s sake. Reply Obj. 1: The authorities quoted, and the like that one may meet with, speak of martyrdom by way of similitude.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod in muliere quae integritatem carnis perdit, vel ad perdendum eam damnatur, occasione fidei Christianae, non est apud homines manifestum utrum hoc mulier patiatur propter amorem fidei Christianae, vel magis pro contemptu castitatis. Et ideo apud homines non redditur per hoc testimonium sufficiens. Unde hoc non proprie habet rationem martyrii. Sed apud Deum, qui corda scrutatur, potest hoc ad praemium deputari, sicut Lucia dixit. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, fortitudo principaliter consistit circa pericula mortis, circa alia autem consequenter. Et ideo nec martyrium proprie dicitur pro sola tolerantia carceris vel exilii vel rapinae divitiarum, nisi forte secundum quod ex his sequitur mors. Ad quartum dicendum quod meritum martyrii non est post mortem, sed in ipsa voluntaria sustinentia mortis, prout scilicet aliquis voluntarie patitur inflictionem mortis. Contingit tamen quandoque quod aliquis post mortalia vulnera suscepta pro Christo, vel quascumque alias tribulationes continuatas usque ad mortem, quas a persecutoribus patitur pro fide Christi, diu aliquis vivat. In quo statu actus martyrii meritorius est, et etiam ipso eodem tempore quo huiusmodi afflictiones patitur.

Q. 124, A. 5

Reply Obj. 2: When a woman forfeits the integrity of the flesh, or is condemned to forfeit it under pretext of the Christian faith, it is not evident to men whether she suffers this for love of the Christian faith, or rather through contempt of chastity. Wherefore in the sight of men her testimony is not held to be sufficient, and consequently this is not martyrdom properly speaking. In the sight of God, however, Who searcheth the heart, this may be deemed worthy of a reward, as Lucy said. Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 123, AA. 4, 5), fortitude regards danger of death chiefly, and other dangers consequently; wherefore a person is not called a martyr merely for suffering imprisonment, or exile, or forfeiture of his wealth, except insofar as these result in death. Reply Obj. 4: The merit of martyrdom is not after death, but in the voluntary endurance of death, namely in the fact that a person willingly suffers being put to death. It happens sometimes, however, that a man lives for some time after being mortally wounded for Christ’s sake, or after suffering for the faith of Christ any other kind of hardship inflicted by persecution and continued until death ensues. The act of martyrdom is meritorious while a man is in this state, and at the very time that he is suffering these hardships.

Article 5 Whether faith alone is the cause of martyrdom? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sola fides sit causa martyrii. Dicitur enim I Pet. IV, nemo vestrum patiatur quasi homicida aut fur, aut aliquid huiusmodi, si autem ut Christianus, non erubescat, glorificet autem Deum in isto nomine. Sed ex hoc dicitur aliquis Christianus quod tenet fidem Christi. Ergo sola fides Christi dat patientibus martyrii gloriam. Praeterea, martyr dicitur quasi testis. Testimonium autem non redditur nisi veritati. Non autem aliquis dicitur martyr ex testimonio cuiuslibet veritatis, sed solum ex testimonio veritatis divinae. Alioquin, si quis moreretur pro confessione veritatis geometriae, vel alterius scientiae speculativae, esset martyr, quod videtur ridiculum. Ergo sola fides est martyrii causa. Praeterea, inter alia virtutum opera illa videntur esse potiora quae ordinantur ad bonum commune, quia bonum gentis melius est quam bonum unius hominis, secundum philosophum, in I Ethic. Si ergo aliquod aliud bonum esset causa martyrii, maxime videretur quod illi martyres essent qui pro defensione reipublicae moriuntur. Quod Ecclesiae observatio non habet, non enim mi-

Objection 1: It seems that faith alone is the cause of martyrdom. For it is written (1 Pet 4:15, 16): Let none of you suffer as a murderer, or a thief, or a railer, or a coveter of other men’s things. But if as a Christian, let him not be ashamed, but let him glorify God in this name. Now a man is said to be a Christian because he holds the faith of Christ. Therefore only faith in Christ gives the glory of martyrdom to those who suffer. Obj. 2: Further, a martyr is a kind of witness. But witness is borne to the truth alone. Now one is not called a martyr for bearing witness to any truth, but only for witnessing to the Divine truth, otherwise a man would be a martyr if he were to die for confessing a truth of geometry or some other speculative science, which seems ridiculous. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom. Obj. 3: Further, those virtuous deeds would seem to be of most account which are directed to the common good, since the good of the nation is better than the good of the individual, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). If, then, some other good were the cause of martyrdom, it would seem that before all those would be martyrs who die for the defense of their country. Yet this is not consistent with

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litum qui in bello iusto moriuntur martyria celebrantur. Church observance, for we do not celebrate the martyrdom Ergo sola fides videtur esse martyrii causa. of those who die in a just war. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. V, beati qui perOn the contrary, It is written (Matt 5:10): Blessed secutionem patiuntur propter iustitiam, quod pertinet ad are they that suffer persecution for justice’ sake, which permartyrium, ut Glossa ibidem dicit. Ad iustitiam autem tains to martyrdom, according to a gloss, as well as Jerome’s pertinet non solum fides, sed etiam aliae virtutes. Ergo commentary on this passage. Now not only faith but also etiam aliae virtutes possunt esse martyrii causa. the other virtues pertain to justice. Therefore other virtues can be the cause of martyrdom. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, marI answer that, As stated above (A. 4), martyrs are tyres dicuntur quasi testes, quia scilicet corporalibus suis so called as being witnesses, because by suffering in body passionibus usque ad mortem testimonium perhibent unto death they bear witness to the truth; not indeed to any veritati, non cuicumque, sed veritati quae secundum truth, but to the truth which is in accordance with godpietatem est, quae per Christum nobis innotuit; unde et liness, and was made known to us by Christ: wherefore martyres Christi dicuntur, quasi testes ipsius. Huiusmo- Christ’s martyrs are His witnesses. Now this truth is the di autem est veritas fidei. Et ideo cuiuslibet martyrii cau- truth of faith. Wherefore the cause of all martyrdom is the sa est fidei veritas. truth of faith. Sed ad fidei veritatem non solum pertinet ipsa creBut the truth of faith includes not only inward belief, dulitas cordis, sed etiam exterior protestatio. Quae qui- but also outward profession, which is expressed not only by dem fit non solum per verba quibus aliquis confitetur fi- words, whereby one confesses the faith, but also by deeds, dem, sed etiam per facta quibus aliquis fidem se habere whereby a person shows that he has faith, according to ostendit, secundum illud Iac. II, ego ostendam tibi ex ope- James 2:18, I will show thee, by works, my faith. Hence it is ribus fidem meam. Unde et de quibusdam dicitur Tit. I, written of certain people (Titus 1:16): They profess that they confitentur se nosse Deum, factis autem negant. Et ideo know God but in their works they deny Him. Thus all virtuomnium virtutum opera, secundum quod referuntur in ous deeds, inasmuch as they are referred to God, are proDeum, sunt quaedam protestationes fidei, per quam no- fessions of the faith whereby we come to know that God rebis innotescit quod Deus huiusmodi opera a nobis requi- quires these works of us, and rewards us for them: and in rit, et nos pro eis remunerat. Et secundum hoc possunt this way they can be the cause of martyrdom. For this reaesse martyrii causa. Unde et beati Ioannis Baptistae mar- son the Church celebrates the martyrdom of Blessed John tyrium in Ecclesia celebratur, qui non pro neganda fide, the Baptist, who suffered death, not for refusing to deny the sed pro reprehensione adulterii mortem sustinuit. faith, but for reproving adultery. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christianus diciReply Obj. 1: A Christian is one who is Christ’s. Now a tur qui Christi est. Dicitur autem aliquis esse Christi non person is said to be Christ’s, not only through having faith solum ex eo quod habet fidem Christi, sed etiam ex eo in Christ, but also because he is actuated to virtuous deeds quod spiritu Christi ad opera virtuosa procedit, secun- by the Spirit of Christ, according to Rom. 8:9, If any man dum illud Rom. VIII, si quis spiritum Christi non habet, have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His; and again behic non est eius; et etiam ex hoc quod, ad imitationem cause in imitation of Christ he is dead to sins, according to Christi, peccatis moritur, secundum illud Galat. V, qui Gal. 5:24, They that are Christ’s have crucified their flesh with Christi sunt, carnem suam crucifixerunt, cum vitiis et con- the vices and concupiscences. Hence to suffer as a Christian cupiscentiis. Et ideo ut Christianus patitur non solum qui is not only to suffer in confession of the faith, which is done patitur pro fidei confessione quae fit per verba, sed etiam by words, but also to suffer for doing any good work, or for quicumque patitur pro quocumque bono opere facien- avoiding any sin, for Christ’s sake, because this all comes do, vel pro quocumque peccato vitando, propter Chri- under the head of witnessing to the faith. stum, quia totum hoc pertinet ad fidei protestationem. Ad secundum dicendum quod veritas aliarum Reply Obj. 2: The truth of other sciences has no conscientiarum non pertinet ad cultum divinitatis. Et ideo nection with the worship of the Godhead: hence it is not non dicitur esse secundum pietatem. Unde nec eius con- called truth according to godliness, and consequently the fessio potest esse directe martyrii causa. Sed quia omne confession thereof cannot be said to be the direct cause mendacium peccatum est, ut supra habitum est, vita- of martyrdom. Yet, since every lie is a sin, as stated above tio mendacii, contra quamcumque veritatem sit, inquan- (Q. 110, AA. 3, 4), avoidance of a lie, to whatever truth it tum mendacium est peccatum divinae legi contrarium, may be contrary, may be the cause of martyrdom inasmuch potest esse martyrii causa. as a lie is a sin against the Divine Law. Ad tertium dicendum quod bonum reipublicae est Reply Obj. 3: The good of one’s country is paramount praecipuum inter bona humana. Sed bonum divinum, among human goods: yet the Divine good, which is the

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quod est propria causa martyrii, est potius quam humanum. Quia tamen bonum humanum potest effici divinum, ut si referatur in Deum; potest esse quodcumque bonum humanum martyrii causa secundum quod in Deum refertur.

Q. 124, A. 5

proper cause of martyrdom, is of more account than human good. Nevertheless, since human good may become Divine, for instance when it is referred to God, it follows that any human good insofar as it is referred to God, may be the cause of martyrdom.

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Question 125 Fear Deinde considerandum est de vitiis oppositis fortituWe must now consider the vices opposed to fortitude: dini. Et primo, de timore; secundo, de intimiditate; ter- (1) Fear; (2) Fearlessness; (3) Daring. tio, de audacia. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum timor sit peccatum. (1) Whether fear is a sin? Secundo, utrum opponatur fortitudini. (2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude? Tertio, utrum sit peccatum mortale. (3) Whether it is a mortal sin? Quarto, utrum excuset vel diminuat peccatum. (4) Whether it excuses from sin, or diminishes it?

Article 1 Whether fear is a sin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non sit peccatum. Timor enim est passio quaedam, ut supra habitum est. Sed passionibus nec laudamur nec vituperamur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Cum igitur omne peccatum sit vituperabile, videtur quod timor non sit peccatum. Praeterea, nihil quod in lege divina mandatur est peccatum, quia lex domini est immaculata, ut dicitur in Psalmo. Sed timor mandatur in lege Dei, dicitur enim ad Ephes. VI, servi, obedite dominis carnalibus, cum timore et tremore. Timor ergo non est peccatum.

Objection 1: It seems that fear is not a sin. For fear is a passion, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 42). Now we are neither praised nor blamed for passions, as stated in Ethic. ii. Since then every sin is blameworthy, it seems that fear is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing that is commanded in the Divine Law is a sin: since the law of the Lord is unspotted (Ps 18:8). Yet fear is commanded in God’s law, for it is written (Eph 6:5): Servants, be obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with fear and trembling. Therefore fear is not a sin. Praeterea, nihil quod naturaliter inest homini est Obj. 3: Further, nothing that is naturally in man is a sin, peccatum, quia peccatum est contra naturam, ut Da- for sin is contrary to nature according to Damascene (De mascenus dicit, II libro. Sed timere est homini naturale, Fide Orth. iii). Now fear is natural to man: wherefore the unde philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod erit aliquis Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that a man would be insane insanus, vel sine sensu doloris, si nihil timeat, neque ter- or insensible to pain, if nothing, not even earthquakes nor delraemotum neque inundationes. Ergo timor non est pec- uges, inspired him with fear. Therefore fear is not a sin.

catum. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Matth. X, nolite timere eos qui occidunt corpus. Et Ezech. II dicitur, ne timeas eos, neque sermones eorum metuas. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid dicitur esse peccatum in actibus humanis propter inordinationem, nam bonum humani actus in ordine quodam existit, ut ex supra dictis patet. Est autem hic debitus ordo, ut appetitus regimini rationis subdatur. Ratio autem dictat aliqua esse fugienda, et aliqua esse prosequenda; et inter fugienda, quaedam dictat magis esse fugienda quam alia; et similiter inter prosequenda, quaedam dictat esse magis prosequenda quam alia; et quantum est bonum prosequendum, tantum est aliquod oppositum malum fugiendum. Inde est quod ratio dictat quaedam bona

On the contrary, our Lord said (Matt 10:28): Fear ye not them that kill the body, and it is written (Ezek 2:6): Fear not, neither be thou afraid of their words. I answer that, A human act is said to be a sin on account of its being inordinate, because the good of a human act consists in order, as stated above (Q. 109, A. 2; Q. 114, A. 1). Now this due order requires that the appetite be subject to the ruling of reason. And reason dictates that certain things should be shunned and some sought after. Among things to be shunned, it dictates that some are to be shunned more than others; and among things to be sought after, that some are to be sought after more than others. Moreover, the more a good is to be sought after, the more is the opposite evil to be shunned. The result is that rea-

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magis esse prosequenda quam quaedam mala fugienda. Quando ergo appetitus fugit ea quae ratio dictat esse sustinenda ne desistat ab aliis quae magis prosequi debet, timor inordinatus est, et habet rationem peccati. Quando vero appetitus timendo refugit id quod est secundum rationem fugiendum, tunc appetitus non est inordinatus, nec peccatum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod timor communiter dictus secundum suam rationem importat universaliter fugam, unde quantum ad hoc non importat rationem boni vel mali. Et similiter est de qualibet alia passione. Et ideo philosophus dicit quod passiones non sunt laudabiles neque vituperabiles, quia scilicet non laudantur neque vituperantur qui irascuntur vel timent, sed qui circa hoc aut ordinate aut inordinate se habent. Ad secundum dicendum quod timor ille ad quem inducit apostolus, est conveniens rationi, ut scilicet servus timeat ne deficiat ab obsequiis quae domino debet impendere. Ad tertium dicendum quod mala quibus homo resistere non potest, et ex quorum sustinentia nihil boni provenit homini, ratio dictat esse fugienda. Et ideo timor talium non est peccatum.

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son dictates that certain goods are to be sought after more than certain evils are to be avoided. Accordingly when the appetite shuns what the reason dictates that we should endure rather than forfeit others that we should rather seek for, fear is inordinate and sinful. On the other hand, when the appetite fears so as to shun what reason requires to be shunned, the appetite is neither inordinate nor sinful. Reply Obj. 1: Fear in its generic acceptation denotes avoidance in general. Hence in this way it does not include the notion of good or evil: and the same applies to every other passion. Wherefore the Philosopher says that passions call for neither praise nor blame, because, to wit, we neither praise nor blame those who are angry or afraid, but only those who behave thus in an ordinate or inordinate manner. Reply Obj. 2: The fear which the Apostle inculcates is in accordance with reason, namely that servants should fear lest they be lacking in the service they owe their masters. Reply Obj. 3: Reason dictates that we should shun the evils that we cannot withstand, and the endurance of which profits us nothing. Hence there is no sin in fearing them.

Article 2 Whether the sin of fear is contrary to fortitude? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum timoris non opponatur fortitudini. Fortitudo enim est circa pericula mortis, ut supra habitum est. Sed peccatum timoris non semper pertinet ad pericula mortis. Quia super illud Psalmi, beati omnes qui timent dominum, dicit Glossa quod humanus timor est quo timemus pati pericula carnis, vel perdere mundi bona. Et super illud Matth. XXVI, oravit tertio eundem sermonem etc., dicit Glossa quod triplex est malus timor, scilicet timor mortis, timor vilitatis, et timor doloris. Non ergo peccatum timoris opponitur fortitudini. Praeterea, praecipuum quod commendatur in fortitudine est quod exponit se periculis mortis. Sed quandoque aliquis ex timore servitutis vel ignominiae exponit se morti, sicut Augustinus, in I de Civ. Dei, narrat de Catone, qui, ut non incurreret Caesaris servitutem, morti se tradidit. Ergo peccatum timoris non opponitur fortitudini, sed magis habet similitudinem cum ipsa. Praeterea, omnis desperatio ex aliquo timore procedit. Sed desperatio non opponitur fortitudini, sed magis spei, ut supra habitum est. Ergo neque timoris peccatum opponitur fortitudini.

Objection 1: It seems that the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude: because fortitude is about dangers of death, as stated above (Q. 123, AA. 4, 5). But the sin of fear is not always connected with dangers of death, for a gloss on Ps. 127:1, Blessed are all they that fear the Lord, says that it is human fear whereby we dread to suffer carnal dangers, or to lose worldly goods. Again a gloss on Matt. 27:44, He prayed the third time, saying the selfsame word, says that evil fear is threefold, fear of death, fear of pain, and fear of contempt. Therefore the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude. Obj. 2: Further, the chief reason why a man is commended for fortitude is that he exposes himself to the danger of death. Now sometimes a man exposes himself to death through fear of slavery or shame. Thus Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei i) that Cato, in order not to be Caesar’s slave, gave himself up to death. Therefore the sin of fear bears a certain likeness to fortitude instead of being opposed thereto. Obj. 3: Further, all despair arises from fear. But despair is opposed not to fortitude but to hope, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 1; I-II, Q. 40, A. 4). Neither therefore is the sin of fear opposed to fortitude.

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Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II et III Ethic., timiditatem ponit fortitudini oppositam. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra habitum est, omnis timor ex amore procedit, nullus enim timet nisi contrarium eius quod amat. Amor autem non determinatur ad aliquod genus virtutis vel vitii, sed amor ordinatus includitur in qualibet virtute, quilibet enim virtuosus amat proprium bonum virtutis; amor autem inordinatus includitur in quolibet peccato, ex amore enim inordinato procedit inordinata cupiditas. Unde similiter inordinatus timor includitur in quolibet peccato, sicut avarus timet amissionem pecuniae, intemperatus amissionem voluptatis, et sic de aliis. Sed timor praecipuus est periculorum mortis, ut probatur in III Ethic. et ideo talis timoris inordinatio opponitur fortitudini, quae est circa pericula mortis. Et propter hoc antonomastice dicitur timiditas fortitudini opponi. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritates illae loquuntur de timore inordinato communiter sumpto, qui diversis virtutibus opponi potest. Ad secundum dicendum quod actus humani praecipue diiudicantur ex fine, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ad fortem autem pertinet ut se exponat periculis mortis propter bonum, sed ille qui se periculis mortis exponit ut fugiat servitutem vel aliquid laboriosum, a timore vincitur, quod est fortitudini contrarium. Unde philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod mori fugientem inopiam vel cupidinem vel aliquid triste, non est fortis, sed magis timidi, mollities enim est fugere laboriosa. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sicut spes est principium audaciae, ita timor est principium desperationis. Unde sicut ad fortem, qui utitur audacia moderate, praeexigitur spes, ita e converso desperatio ex aliquo timore procedit. Non autem oportet quod quaelibet desperatio procedat ex quolibet timore, sed ex eo qui est sui generis. Desperatio autem quae opponitur spei, ad aliud genus refertur, scilicet ad res divinas, quam timor qui opponitur fortitudini, qui pertinet ad pericula mortis. Unde ratio non sequitur.

Q. 125, A. 3

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 7) states that timidity is opposed to fortitude. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 19, A. 3; I-II, Q. 43, A. 1), all fear arises from love; since no one fears save what is contrary to something he loves. Now love is not confined to any particular kind of virtue or vice: but ordinate love is included in every virtue, since every virtuous man loves the good proper to his virtue; while inordinate love is included in every sin, because inordinate love gives use to inordinate desire. Hence in like manner inordinate fear is included in every sin; thus the covetous man fears the loss of money, the intemperate man the loss of pleasure, and so on. But the greatest fear of all is that which has the danger of death for its object, as we find proved in Ethic. iii, 6. Wherefore the inordinateness of this fear is opposed to fortitude which regards dangers of death. For this reason timidity is said to be antonomastically opposed to fortitude. Reply Obj. 1: The passages quoted refer to inordinate fear in its generic acceptation, which can be opposed to various virtues. Reply Obj. 2: Human acts are estimated chiefly with reference to the end, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6): and it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger of death for the sake of a good. But a man who exposes himself to danger of death in order to escape from slavery or hardships is overcome by fear, which is contrary to fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), that to die in order to escape poverty, lust, or something disagreeable is an act not of fortitude but of cowardice: for to shun hardships is a mark of effeminacy. Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2), fear is the beginning of despair even as hope is the beginning of daring. Wherefore, just as fortitude which employs daring in moderation presupposes hope, so on the other hand despair proceeds from some kind of fear. It does not follow, however, that any kind of despair results from any kind of fear, but that only from fear of the same kind. Now the despair that is opposed to hope is referred to another kind, namely to Divine things; whereas the fear that is opposed to fortitude regards dangers of death. Hence the argument does not prove.

Article 3 Whether fear is a mortal sin? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non sit peccatum mortale. Timor enim, ut supra dictum est, est in irascibili, quae est pars sensualitatis. Sed in sensualitate est tantum peccatum veniale, ut supra habitum est. Ergo timor non est peccatum mortale.

Objection 1: It seems that fear is not a mortal sin. For, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 1), fear is in the irascible faculty which is a part of the sensuality. Now there is none but venial sin in the sensuality, as stated above (I-II, Q. 74, A. 4). Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.

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Praeterea, omne peccatum mortale totaliter cor avertit a Deo. Hoc autem non facit timor, quia super illud Iudic. VII, qui formidolosus est etc., dicit Glossa quod timidus est qui primo aspectu congressum trepidat, non tamen corde terretur, sed reparari et animari potest. Ergo timor non est peccatum mortale. Praeterea, peccatum mortale non solum retrahit a perfectione, sed etiam a praecepto. Sed timor non retrahit a praecepto, sed solum a perfectione, quia super illud Deut. XX, quis est homo formidolosus et corde pavido, etc., dicit Glossa, docet non posse quemquam perfectionem contemplationis vel militiae spiritualis accipere qui adhuc nudari terrenis opibus pertimescit. Ergo timor non est peccatum mortale. Sed contra, pro solo peccato mortali debetur poena Inferni. Quae tamen debetur timidis, secundum illud Apoc. XXI, timidis et incredulis et execratis, etc., pars erit in stagno ignis et sulphuris, quod est mors secunda. Ergo timiditas est peccatum mortale. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, timor peccatum est secundum quod est inordinatus, prout scilicet refugit quod non est secundum rationem refugiendum. Haec autem inordinatio timoris quandoque quidem consistit in solo appetitu sensitivo, non superveniente consensu rationalis appetitus, et sic non potest esse peccatum mortale, sed solum veniale. Quandoque vero huiusmodi inordinatio timoris pertingit usque ad appetitum rationalem, qui dicitur voluntas, quae ex libero arbitrio refugit aliquid non secundum rationem. Et talis inordinatio timoris quandoque est peccatum mortale, quandoque veniale. Si enim quis propter timorem quo refugit periculum mortis, vel quodcumque aliud temporale malum, sic dispositus est ut faciat aliquid prohibitum, vel praetermittat aliquid quod est praeceptum in lege divina, talis timor est peccatum mortale. Alioquin erit peccatum veniale. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de timore secundum quod sistit infra sensualitatem. Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam Glossa illa potest intelligi de timore in sensualitate existente. Vel potest melius dici quod ille toto corde terretur cuius animum timor vincit irreparabiliter. Potest autem contingere quod, etiam si timor sit peccatum mortale, non tamen aliquis ita obstinate terretur quin persuasionibus revocari possit, sicut quandoque aliquis mortaliter peccans concupiscentiae consentiendo, revocatur, ne opere impleat quod proposuit facere. Ad tertium dicendum quod Glossa illa loquitur de timore revocante hominem a bono quod non est de necessitate praecepti, sed de perfectione consilii. Talis autem timor non est peccatum mortale, sed quandoque veniale; quandoque etiam non est peccatum, puta cum aliquis habet rationabilem causam timoris.

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Obj. 2: Further, every mortal sin turns the heart wholly from God. But fear does not this, for a gloss on Judges 7:3, Whosoever is fearful, etc., says that a man is fearful when he trembles at the very thought of conflict; yet he is not so wholly terrified at heart, but that he can rally and take courage. Therefore fear is not a mortal sin. Obj. 3: Further, mortal sin is a lapse not only from perfection but also from a precept. But fear does not make one lapse from a precept, but only from perfection; for a gloss on Deut. 20:8, What man is there that is fearful and fainthearted? says: We learn from this that no man can take up the profession of contemplation or spiritual warfare, if he still fears to be despoiled of earthly riches. Therefore fear is not a mortal sin. On the contrary, For mortal sin alone is the pain of hell due: and yet this is due to the fearful, according to Apoc. 21:8, But the fearful and unbelieving and the abominable, etc., shall have their portion in the pool burning with fire and brimstone which is the second death. Therefore fear is a mortal sin. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), fear is a sin through being inordinate, that is to say, through shunning what ought not to be shunned according to reason. Now sometimes this inordinateness of fear is confined to the sensitive appetites, without the accession of the rational appetite’s consent: and then it cannot be a mortal, but only a venial sin. But sometimes this inordinateness of fear reaches to the rational appetite which is called the will, which deliberately shuns something against the dictate of reason: and this inordinateness of fear is sometimes a mortal, sometimes a venial sin. For if a man through fear of the danger of death or of any other temporal evil is so disposed as to do what is forbidden, or to omit what is commanded by the Divine law, such fear is a mortal sin: otherwise it is a venial sin.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers fear as confined to the sensuality. Reply Obj. 2: This gloss also can be understood as referring to the fear that is confined within the sensuality. Or better still we may reply that a man is terrified with his whole heart when fear banishes his courage beyond remedy. Now even when fear is a mortal sin, it may happen nevertheless that one is not so wilfully terrified that one cannot be persuaded to put fear aside: thus sometimes a man sins mortally by consenting to concupiscence, and is turned aside from accomplishing what he purposed doing. Reply Obj. 3: This gloss speaks of the fear that turns man aside from a good that is necessary, not for the fulfilment of a precept, but for the perfection of a counsel. Such like fear is not a mortal sin, but is sometimes venial: and sometimes it is not a sin, for instance when one has a reasonable cause for fear.

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Q. 125, A. 4

Article 4 Whether fear excuses from sin? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non excuset a peccato. Timor enim est peccatum, ut dictum est. Sed peccatum non excusat a peccato, sed magis aggravat ipsum. Ergo timor non excusat a peccato. Praeterea, si aliquis timor excusat a peccato, maxime excusaret timor mortis, qui dicitur cadere in constantem virum. Sed hic timor non videtur excusare, quia cum mors ex necessitate immineat omnibus, non videtur esse timenda. Ergo timor non excusat a peccato. Praeterea, timor omnis aut est mali temporalis, aut spiritualis. Sed timor mali spiritualis non potest excusare peccatum, quia non inducit ad peccandum, sed magis retrahit a peccato. Timor etiam mali temporalis non excusat a peccato, quia sicut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., inopiam non oportet timere, neque aegritudinem, neque quaecumque non a propria malitia procedunt. Ergo videtur quod timor nullo modo excusat a peccato. Sed contra est quod in decretis, qu. I, dicitur, vim passus et invitus ab haereticis ordinatus colorem habet excusationis. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, timor intantum habet rationem peccati inquantum est contra ordinem rationis. Ratio autem iudicat quaedam mala esse magis aliis fugienda. Et ideo quicumque, ut fugiat mala quae sunt secundum rationem magis fugienda, non refugit mala quae sunt minus fugienda, non est peccatum. Sicut magis est fugienda mors corporalis quam amissio rerum, unde si quis, propter timorem mortis, latronibus aliquid promitteret aut daret, excusaretur a peccato quod incurreret si sine causa legitima, praetermissis bonis, quibus esset magis dandum, peccatoribus largiretur. Si autem aliquis per timorem fugiens mala quae secundum rationem sunt minus fugienda, incurrat mala quae secundum rationem sunt magis fugienda, non posset totaliter a peccato excusari, quia timor talis inordinatus esset. Sunt autem magis timenda mala animae quam mala corporis; et mala corporis quam mala exteriorum rerum. Et ideo si quis incurrat mala animae, idest peccata, fugiens mala corporis, puta flagella vel mortem, aut mala exteriorum rerum, puta damnum pecuniae; aut si sustineat mala corporis ut vitet damnum pecuniae; non excusatur totaliter a peccato. Diminuitur tamen aliquid eius peccatum, quia minus voluntarium est quod ex timore agitur; imponitur enim homini quaedam necessitas aliquid faciendi propter imminentem timorem. Unde philosophus huiusmodi quae ex timore fiunt, dicit esse non simpliciter voluntaria, sed mixta ex voluntario et involuntario.

Objection 1: It seems that fear does not excuse from sin. For fear is a sin, as stated above (A. 1). But sin does not excuse from sin, rather does it aggravate it. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin. Obj. 2: Further, if any fear excuses from sin, most of all would this be true of the fear of death, to which, as the saying is, a courageous man is subject. Yet this fear, seemingly, is no excuse, because, since death comes, of necessity, to all, it does not seem to be an object of fear. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin. Obj. 3: Further, all fear is of evil, either temporal or spiritual. Now fear of spiritual evil cannot excuse sin, because instead of inducing one to sin, it withdraws one from sin: and fear of temporal evil does not excuse from sin, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6), one should not fear poverty, nor sickness, nor anything that is not a result of one’s own wickedness. Therefore it seems that in no sense does fear excuse from sin. On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (I, Q. 1, Cap. Constat.): A man who has been forcibly and unwillingly ordained by heretics, has an ostensible excuse. I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), fear is sinful insofar as it runs counter to the order of reason. Now reason judges certain evils to be shunned rather than others. Wherefore it is no sin not to shun what is less to be shunned in order to avoid what reason judges to be more avoided: thus death of the body is more to be avoided than the loss of temporal goods. Hence a man would be excused from sin if through fear of death he were to promise or give something to a robber, and yet he would be guilty of sin were he to give to sinners, rather than to the good to whom he should give in preference. On the other hand, if through fear a man were to avoid evils which according to reason are less to be avoided, and so incur evils which according to reason are more to be avoided, he could not be wholly excused from sin, because such like fear would be inordinate. Now the evils of the soul are more to be feared than the evils of the body, and evils of the body more than evils of external things. Wherefore if one were to incur evils of the soul, namely sins, in order to avoid evils of the body, such as blows or death, or evils of external things, such as loss of money; or if one were to endure evils of the body in order to avoid loss of money, one would not be wholly excused from sin. Yet one’s sin would be extenuated somewhat, for what is done through fear is less voluntary, because when fear lays hold of a man he is under a certain necessity of doing a certain thing. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) says that these things that are done through fear are not simply voluntary, but a mixture of voluntary and involuntary.

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Q. 125, A. 4

Fortitude

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod timor non excusat ex ea parte qua est peccatum, sed ex ea parte qua est involuntarium. Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet mors omnibus immineat ex necessitate, tamen ipsa diminutio temporis vitae est quoddam malum, et per consequens timendum. Ad tertium dicendum quod secundum Stoicos, qui ponebant bona temporalia non esse hominis bona, sequitur ex consequenti quod mala temporalia non sint hominis mala, et per consequens nullo modo timenda. Sed secundum Augustinum, in libro de Lib. Arbit., huiusmodi temporalia sunt minima bona. Quod etiam Peripatetici senserunt. Et ideo contraria eorum sunt quidem timenda, non tamen multum, ut pro eis recedatur ab eo quod est bonum secundum virtutem.

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Reply Obj. 1: Fear excuses, not in the point of its sinfulness, but in the point of its involuntariness. Reply Obj. 2: Although death comes, of necessity, to all, yet the shortening of temporal life is an evil and consequently an object of fear. Reply Obj. 3: According to the opinion of Stoics, who held temporal goods not to be man’s goods, it follows in consequence that temporal evils are not man’s evils, and that therefore they are nowise to be feared. But according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii) these temporal things are goods of the least account, and this was also the opinion of the Peripatetics. Hence their contraries are indeed to be feared; but not so much that one ought for their sake to renounce that which is good according to virtue.

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Question 126 Fearlessness Deinde considerandum est de vitio intimiditatis. Et We must now consider the vice of fearlessness: under circa hoc quaeruntur duo. which head there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum intimidum esse sit peccatum. (1) Whether it is a sin to be fearless? Secundo, utrum opponatur fortitudini. (2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?

Article 1 Whether fearlessness is a sin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intimiditas non sit peccatum. Quod enim ponitur pro commendatione viri iusti, non est peccatum. Sed in commendationem viri iusti dicitur, Prov. XXVIII, iustus, quasi leo confidens, absque terrore erit. Ergo esse impavidum non est peccatum. Praeterea, maxime terribilis est mors, secundum philosophum, in III Ethic. Sed nec mortem oportet timere, secundum illud Matth. X, nolite timere eos qui occidunt corpus, nec etiam aliquid quod ab homine possit inferri, secundum illud Isaiae li, quis tu, ut timeas ab homine mortali? Ergo impavidum esse non est peccatum. Praeterea, timor ex amore nascitur, ut supra dictum est. Sed nihil mundanum amare pertinet ad perfectionem virtutis, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui, facit cives civitatis caelestis. Ergo nihil humanum formidare videtur non esse peccatum. Sed contra est quod de iudice iniquo dicitur, Luc. XVIII, quod nec Deum timebat, nec hominem reverebatur. Respondeo dicendum quod, quia timor ex amore nascitur, idem iudicium videtur esse de amore et de timore. Agitur autem nunc de timore quo mala temporalia timentur, qui provenit ex temporalium bonorum amore. Inditum autem est unicuique naturaliter ut propriam vitam amet, et ea quae ad ipsam ordinantur, tamen debito modo, ut scilicet amentur huiusmodi non quasi finis constituatur in eis, sed secundum quod eis utendum est propter ultimum finem. Unde quod aliquis deficiat a debito modo amoris ipsorum, est contra naturalem inclinationem, et per consequens est peccatum. Nunquam tamen a tali amore totaliter aliquis decidit, quia id quod est naturae totaliter perdi non potest. Propter quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. V, quod nemo unquam carnem suam odio habuit. Unde etiam illi qui seipsos interimunt,

Objection 1: It seems that fearlessness is not a sin. For that which is reckoned to the praise of a just man is not a sin. Now it is written in praise of the just man (Prov 28:1): The just, bold as a lion, shall be without dread. Therefore it is not a sin to be without fear. Obj. 2: Further, nothing is so fearful as death, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6). Yet one ought not to fear even death, according to Matt. 10:28, Fear ye not them that kill the body, etc., nor anything that can be inflicted by man, according to Isa. 51:12, Who art thou, that thou shouldst be afraid of a mortal man? Therefore it is not a sin to be fearless. Obj. 3: Further, fear is born of love, as stated above (Q. 125, A. 2). Now it belongs to the perfection of virtue to love nothing earthly, since according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), the love of God to the abasement of self makes us citizens of the heavenly city. Therefore it is seemingly not a sin to fear nothing earthly. On the contrary, It is said of the unjust judge (Luke 18:2) that he feared not God nor regarded man. I answer that, Since fear is born of love, we must seemingly judge alike of love and fear. Now it is here a question of that fear whereby one dreads temporal evils, and which results from the love of temporal goods. And every man has it instilled in him by nature to love his own life and whatever is directed thereto; and to do so in due measure, that is, to love these things not as placing his end therein, but as things to be used for the sake of his last end. Hence it is contrary to the natural inclination, and therefore a sin, to fall short of loving them in due measure. Nevertheless, one never lapses entirely from this love: since what is natural cannot be wholly lost: for which reason the Apostle says (Eph 5:29): No man ever hated his own flesh. Wherefore even those that slay themselves do so from love of their own flesh, which they desire to free from present stress. Hence

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Q. 126, A. 2

Fortitude

ex amore carnis suae hoc faciunt, quam volunt a praesentibus angustiis liberari. Unde contingere potest quod aliquis minus quam debeat timeat, mortem et alia temporalia mala, propter hoc quod minus debito amet ea. Sed quod nihil horum timeat, non potest ex totali defectu amoris contingere, sed ex eo quod aestimat mala opposita bonis quae amat, sibi supervenire non posse. Quod quandoque contingit ex superbia animi de se praesumentis et alios contemnentis, secundum quod dicitur Iob XLI, factus est ut nullum timeret, omne sublime videt. Quandoque autem contingit ex defectu rationis, sicut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod Celtae propter stultitiam nihil timent. Unde patet quod esse impavidum est vitiosum, sive causetur ex defectu amoris, sive causetur ex elatione animi, sive causetur ex stoliditate; quae tamen excusat a peccato si sit invincibilis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iustus commendatur a timore retrahente eum a bono, non quod sit absque omni timore. Dicitur enim Eccli. I, qui sine timore est, non poterit iustificari. Ad secundum dicendum quod mors, vel quidquid aliud ab homine mortali potest inferri, non est ea ratione timendum ut a iustitia recedatur. Est tamen timendum inquantum per hoc homo potest impediri ab operibus virtuosis, vel quantum ad se, vel quantum ad profectum quem in aliis facit. Unde dicitur Prov. XIV, sapiens timet, et declinat a malo. Ad tertium dicendum quod bona temporalia debent contemni quantum nos impediunt ab amore et timore Dei. Et secundum hoc etiam non debent timeri, unde dicitur Eccli. XXXIV, qui timet Deum nihil trepidabit. Non autem debent contemni bona temporalia inquantum instrumentaliter nos iuvant ad ea quae sunt divini amoris et timoris.

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it may happen that a man fears death and other temporal evils less than he ought, for the reason that he loves them less than he ought. But that he fear none of these things cannot result from an entire lack of love, but only from the fact that he thinks it impossible for him to be afflicted by the evils contrary to the goods he loves. This is sometimes the result of pride of soul presuming on self and despising others, according to the saying of Job 41:24, 25: He was made to fear no one, he beholdeth every high thing: and sometimes it happens through a defect in the reason; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that the Celts, through lack of intelligence, fear nothing. It is therefore evident that fearlessness is a vice, whether it result from lack of love, pride of soul, or dullness of understanding: yet the latter is excused from sin if it be invincible. Reply Obj. 1: The just man is praised for being without fear that withdraws him from good; not that he is altogether fearless, for it is written (Sir 1:28): He that is without fear cannot be justified. Reply Obj. 2: Death and whatever else can be inflicted by mortal man are not to be feared so that they make us forsake justice: but they are to be feared as hindering man in acts of virtue, either as regards himself, or as regards the progress he may cause in others. Hence it is written (Prov 14:16): A wise man feareth and declineth from evil. Reply Obj. 3: Temporal goods are to be despised as hindering us from loving and serving God, and on the same score they are not to be feared; wherefore it is written (Sir 34:16): He that feareth the Lord shall tremble at nothing. But temporal goods are not to be despised, insofar as they are helping us instrumentally to attain those things that pertain to Divine fear and love.

Article 2 Whether fearlessness is opposed to fortitude? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse impavidum non opponatur fortitudini. De habitibus enim iudicamus per actus. Sed nullus actus fortitudinis impeditur per hoc quod aliquis est impavidus, remoto enim timore, aliquis et fortiter sustinet et audacter aggreditur. Ergo esse impavidum non opponitur fortitudini. Praeterea, esse impavidum est vitiosum vel propter defectum debiti amoris, vel propter superbiam, vel propter stultitiam. Sed defectus debiti amoris opponitur caritati; superbia autem humilitati; stultitia autem prudentiae, sive sapientiae. Ergo vitium impaviditatis non opponitur fortitudini.

Objection 1: It seems that fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude. For we judge of habits by their acts. Now no act of fortitude is hindered by a man being fearless: since if fear be removed, one is both brave to endure, and daring to attack. Therefore fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude.

Obj. 2: Further, fearlessness is a vice, either through lack of due love, or on account of pride, or by reason of folly. Now lack of due love is opposed to charity, pride is contrary to humility, and folly to prudence or wisdom. Therefore the vice of fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude.

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Fearlessness

Praeterea, virtuti opponuntur vitia sicut extrema medio. Sed unum medium ex una parte non habet nisi unum extremum. Cum ergo fortitudini ex una parte opponatur timor, ex alia vero parte opponatur ei audacia, videtur quod impaviditas ei non opponatur. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in III Ethic., ponit impaviditatem fortitudini oppositam. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, fortitudo est circa timores et audacias. Omnis autem virtus moralis ponit modum rationis in materia circa quam est. Unde ad fortitudinem pertinet timor moderatus secundum rationem, ut scilicet homo timeat quod oportet, et quando oportet, et similiter de aliis. Hic autem modus rationis corrumpi potest, sicut per excessum, ita et per defectum. Unde sicut timiditas opponitur fortitudini per excessum timoris, inquantum scilicet homo timet quod non oportet, vel secundum quod non oportet; ita etiam impaviditas opponitur ei per defectum timoris, inquantum scilicet non timet aliquis quod oportet timere. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod actus fortitudinis est timorem sustinere et aggredi non qualitercumque, sed secundum rationem. Quod non facit impavidus. Ad secundum dicendum quod impaviditas ex sua specie corrumpit medium fortitudinis, et ideo directe fortitudini opponitur. Sed secundum suas causas, nihil prohibet quin opponatur aliis virtutibus. Ad tertium dicendum quod vitium audaciae opponitur fortitudini secundum excessum audaciae, impaviditas autem secundum defectum timoris. Fortitudo autem in utraque passione medium ponit. Unde non est inconveniens quod secundum diversa habeat diversa extrema.

Q. 126, A. 2

Obj. 3: Further, vices are opposed to virtue and extremes to the mean. But one mean has only one extreme on the one side. Since then fortitude has fear opposed to it on the one side and daring on the other, it seems that fearlessness is not opposed thereto. On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii) reckons fearlessness to be opposed to fortitude. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 123, A. 3), fortitude is concerned about fear and daring. Now every moral virtue observes the rational mean in the matter about which it is concerned. Hence it belongs to fortitude that man should moderate his fear according to reason, namely that he should fear what he ought, and when he ought, and so forth. Now this mode of reason may be corrupted either by excess or by deficiency. Wherefore just as timidity is opposed to fortitude by excess of fear, insofar as a man fears what he ought not, and as he ought not, so too fearlessness is opposed thereto by deficiency of fear, insofar as a man fears not what he ought to fear. Reply Obj. 1: The act of fortitude is to endure death without fear, and to be aggressive, not anyhow, but according to reason: this the fearless man does not do. Reply Obj. 2: Fearlessness by its specific nature corrupts the mean of fortitude, wherefore it is opposed to fortitude directly. But in respect of its causes nothing hinders it from being opposed to other virtues. Reply Obj. 3: The vice of daring is opposed to fortitude by excess of daring, and fearlessness by deficiency of fear. Fortitude imposes the mean on each passion. Hence there is nothing unreasonable in its having different extremes in different respects.

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Question 127 Daring Deinde considerandum est de audacia. Et circa hoc We must now consider daring; and under this head quaeruntur duo. there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum audacia sit peccatum. (1) Whether daring is a sin? Secundo, utrum opponatur fortitudini. (2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?

Article 1 Whether daring is a sin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod audacia non sit peccatum. Dicitur enim Iob XXXIX, de equo, per quem significatur bonus praedicator, secundum Gregorium, in Moral., quod audacter in occursum pergit armatis. Sed nullum vitium cedit in commendationem alicuius. Ergo esse audacem non est peccatum. Praeterea, sicut philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., oportet consiliari quidem tarde, operari autem velociter consiliata. Sed ad hanc velocitatem operandi iuvat audacia. Ergo audacia non est peccatum, sed magis aliquid laudabile. Praeterea, audacia est quaedam passio quae causatur a spe, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Sed spes non ponitur peccatum, sed magis virtus. Ergo nec audacia debet poni peccatum. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. VIII, cum audace non eas in via, ne forte gravet mala sua in te. Nullius autem societas est declinanda nisi propter peccatum. Ergo audacia est peccatum. Respondeo dicendum quod audacia, sicut supra dictum est, est passio quaedam. Passio autem quandoque quidem est moderata secundum rationem, quandoque autem caret modo rationis, vel per excessum vel per defectum; et secundum hoc est passio vitiosa. Sumuntur autem quandoque nomina passionum a superabundanti, sicut ira dicitur non quaecumque, sed superabundans, prout scilicet est vitiosa. Et hoc etiam modo audacia, per superabundantiam dicta, ponitur esse peccatum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod audacia ibi sumitur secundum quod est moderata ratione. Sic enim pertinet ad virtutem fortitudinis. Ad secundum dicendum quod operatio festina commendabilis est post consilium, quod est actus rationis. Sed si quis ante consilium vellet festine agere, non esset hoc laudabile, sed vitiosum, esset enim quaedam praecipitatio actionis, quod est vitium prudentiae oppo-

Objection 1: It seems that daring is not a sin. For it is written (Job 39:21) concerning the horse, by which according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi) the godly preacher is denoted, that he goeth forth boldly to meet armed men. But no vice redounds to a man’s praise. Therefore it is not a sin to be daring. Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9), one should take counsel in thought, and do quickly what has been counseled. But daring helps this quickness in doing. Therefore daring is not sinful but praiseworthy. Obj. 3: Further, daring is a passion caused by hope, as stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2) when we were treating of the passions. But hope is accounted not a sin but a virtue. Neither therefore should daring be accounted a sin. On the contrary, It is written (Sir 8:18): Go not on the way with a bold man, lest he burden thee with his evils. Now no man’s fellowship is to be avoided save on account of sin. Therefore daring is a sin. I answer that, Daring, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 55), is a passion. Now a passion is sometimes moderated according to reason, and sometimes it lacks moderation, either by excess or by deficiency, and on this account the passion is sinful. Again, the names of the passions are sometimes employed in the sense of excess, thus we speak of anger meaning not any but excessive anger, in which case it is sinful, and in the same way daring as implying excess is accounted a sin. Reply Obj. 1: The daring spoken of there is that which is moderated by reason, for in that sense it belongs to the virtue of fortitude. Reply Obj. 2: It is praiseworthy to act quickly after taking counsel, which is an act of reason. But to wish to act quickly before taking counsel is not praiseworthy but sinful; for this would be to act rashly, which is a vice contrary to prudence, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 3). Wherefore dar-

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Q. 127, A. 2

Fortitude

situm, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo audacia, quae operatur ad velocitatem operandi, intantum laudabilis est inquantum a ratione ordinatur. Ad tertium dicendum quod quaedam vitia innominata sunt, et similiter quaedam virtutes, ut patet per philosophum, in IV Ethic. Et ideo oportuit quibusdam passionibus uti nomine virtutum et vitiorum. Praecipue autem illis passionibus utimur ad vitia designanda quarum obiectum est malum, sicut patet de odio, timore et ira, et etiam audacia. Spes autem et amor habent bonum pro obiecto. Et ideo magis eis utimur ad designanda nomina virtutum.

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ing which leads one to act quickly is so far praiseworthy as it is directed by reason. Reply Obj. 3: Some vices are unnamed, and so also are some virtues, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 4, 5, 6). Hence the names of certain passions have to be applied to certain vices and virtues: and in order to designate vices we employ especially the names of those passions the object of which is an evil, as in the case of hatred, fear, anger and daring. But hope and love have a good for this object, and so we use them rather to designate virtues.

Article 2 Whether daring is opposed to fortitude? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod audacia non opponatur fortitudini. Superfluitas enim audaciae videtur ex animi praesumptione procedere. Sed praesumptio pertinet ad superbiam, quae opponitur humilitati. Ergo audacia magis opponitur humilitati quam fortitudini. Praeterea, audacia non videtur esse vituperabilis nisi inquantum ex ea provenit vel nocumentum aliquod ipsi audaci, qui se periculis inordinate ingerit; vel etiam aliis, quos per audaciam aggreditur vel in pericula praecipitat. Sed hoc videtur ad iniustitiam pertinere. Ergo audacia, secundum quod est peccatum, non opponitur fortitudini, sed iustitiae. Praeterea, fortitudo est et circa timores et circa audacias, ut supra habitum est. Sed quia timiditas opponitur fortitudini secundum excessum timoris, habet aliud vitium oppositum timiditati secundum defectum timoris. Si ergo audacia opponatur fortitudini propter excessum audaciae, pari ratione opponetur ei aliquod vitium propter audaciae defectum. Sed hoc non invenitur. Ergo nec audacia debet poni vitium oppositum fortitudini. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II et III Ethic., ponit audaciam fortitudini oppositam. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad virtutem moralem pertinet modum rationis observare in materia circa quam est. Et ideo omne vitium quod importat immoderantiam circa materiam alicuius virtutis moralis, opponitur illi virtuti morali sicut immoderatum moderato. Audacia autem, secundum quod sonat in vitium, importat excessum passionis quae audacia dicitur. Unde manifestum est quod opponitur virtuti fortitudinis, quae est circa timores et audacias, ut supra dictum est.

Objection 1: It seems that daring is not opposed to fortitude. For excess of daring seems to result from presumption of mind. But presumption pertains to pride which is opposed to humility. Therefore daring is opposed to humility rather than to fortitude. Obj. 2: Further, daring does not seem to call for blame, except insofar as it results in harm either to the daring person who puts himself in danger inordinately, or to others whom he attacks with daring, or exposes to danger. But this seemingly pertains to injustice. Therefore daring, as designating a sin, is opposed, not to fortitude but to justice. Obj. 3: Further, fortitude is concerned about fear and daring, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 3). Now since timidity is opposed to fortitude in respect of an excess of fear, there is another vice opposed to timidity in respect of a lack of fear. If then, daring is opposed to fortitude, in the point of excessive daring, there will likewise be a vice opposed to it in the point of deficient daring. But there is no such vice. Therefore neither should daring be accounted a vice in opposition to fortitude. On the contrary, The Philosopher in both the Second and Third Books of Ethics accounts daring to be opposed to fortitude. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 126, A. 2), it belongs to a moral virtue to observe the rational mean in the matter about which it is concerned. Wherefore every vice that denotes lack of moderation in the matter of a moral virtue is opposed to that virtue, as immoderate to moderate. Now daring, insofar as it denotes a vice, implies excess of passion, and this excess goes by the name of daring. Wherefore it is evident that it is opposed to the virtue of fortitude which is concerned about fear and daring, as stated above (Q. 122, A. 3).

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod oppositio vitii ad virtutem non attenditur principaliter secundum causam vitii, sed secundum ipsam vitii speciem. Et ideo non oportet quod audacia opponatur eidem virtuti cui opponitur praesumptio, quae est causa ipsius. Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut directa oppositio vitii non attenditur circa eius causam, ita etiam non attenditur secundum eius effectum. Nocumentum autem quod provenit ex audacia est effectus ipsius. Unde nec etiam secundum hoc attenditur oppositio audaciae. Ad tertium dicendum quod motus audaciae consistit in invadendo id quod est homini contrarium, ad quod natura inclinat, nisi inquantum talis inclinatio impeditur per timorem patiendi nocumentum ab eo. Et ideo vitium quod excedit in audacia non habet contrarium defectum nisi timiditatem tantum. Sed audacia non semper concomitatur tantum defectum timiditatis. Quia sicut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., audaces sunt praevolantes et volentes ante pericula, sed in ipsis discedunt, scilicet prae timore.

Q. 127, A. 2

Reply Obj. 1: Opposition between vice and virtue does not depend chiefly on the cause of the vice but on the vice’s very species. Wherefore it is not necessary that daring be opposed to the same virtue as presumption which is its cause. Reply Obj. 2: Just as the direct opposition of a vice does not depend on its cause, so neither does it depend on its effect. Now the harm done by daring is its effect. Wherefore neither does the opposition of daring depend on this. Reply Obj. 3: The movement of daring consists in a man taking the offensive against that which is in opposition to him: and nature inclines him to do this except insofar as such inclination is hindered by the fear of receiving harm from that source. Hence the vice which exceeds in daring has no contrary deficiency, save only timidity. Yet daring does not always accompany so great a lack of timidity, for as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), the daring are precipitate and eager to meet danger, yet fail when the danger is present, namely through fear.

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Question 128 The Parts of Fortitude Deinde considerandum est de partibus fortitudinis. We must now consider the parts of fortitude; first we Et primo considerandum est quae sint fortitudinis par- shall consider what are the parts of fortitude; and second tes; secundo, de singulis partibus est agendum. we shall treat of each part.

Article 1 Whether the parts of fortitude are suitably assigned? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter partes fortitudinis enumerentur. Tullius enim, in sua rhetorica, ponit fortitudinis quatuor partes, scilicet magnificentiam, fiduciam, patientiam et perseverantiam. Et videtur quod inconvenienter. Magnificentia enim videtur ad liberalitatem pertinere, quia utraque est circa pecunias, et necesse est magnificum liberalem esse, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Sed liberalitas est pars iustitiae, ut supra habitum est. Ergo magnificentia non debet poni pars fortitudinis. Praeterea, fiducia nihil aliud esse videtur quam spes. Sed spes non videtur ad fortitudinem pertinere, sed ponitur per se virtus. Ergo fiducia non debet poni pars fortitudinis. Praeterea, fortitudo facit hominem bene se habere circa pericula. Sed magnificentia et fiducia non important in sui ratione aliquam habitudinem ad pericula. Ergo non ponuntur convenienter partes fortitudinis. Praeterea, patientia, secundum Tullium, importat difficilium perpessionem, quod etiam ipse attribuit fortitudini. Ergo patientia est idem fortitudini, et non est pars eius. Praeterea, illud quod requiritur in qualibet virtute, non debet poni pars alicuius specialis virtutis. Sed perseverantia requiritur in qualibet virtute, dicitur enim Matth. XXIV, qui perseveraverit usque in finem, hic salvus erit. Ergo perseverantia non debet poni pars fortitudinis.

Objection 1: It seems that the parts of fortitude are unsuitably assigned. For Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) assigns four parts to fortitude, namely magnificence, confidence, patience, and perseverance. Now magnificence seems to pertain to liberality; since both are concerned about money, and a magnificent man must needs be liberal, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 2). But liberality is a part of justice, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 5). Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude. Obj. 2: Further, confidence is apparently the same as hope. But hope does not seem to pertain to fortitude, but is rather a virtue by itself. Therefore confidence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude. Obj. 3: Further, fortitude makes a man behave aright in face of danger. But magnificence and confidence do not essentially imply any relation to danger. Therefore they are not suitably reckoned as parts of fortitude. Obj. 4: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) patience denotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same to fortitude. Therefore patience is the same as fortitude and not a part thereof. Obj. 5: Further, that which is a requisite to every virtue should not be reckoned a part of a special virtue. But perseverance is required in every virtue: for it is written (Matt 24:13): He that shall persevere to the end he shall be saved. Therefore perseverance should not be accounted a part of fortitude. Obj. 6: Further, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) reckons seven parts of fortitude, namely magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence, constancy, forbearance, stability. Andronicus also reckons seven virtues annexed to fortitude, and these are, courage, strength of will, magnanimity, manliness, perseverance, magnificence. Therefore it seems that Tully’s reckoning of the parts of fortitude is incomplete.

Praeterea, Macrobius ponit septem partes fortitudinis, scilicet magnanimitatem, fiduciam, securitatem, magnificentiam, constantiam, tolerantiam, firmitatem. Andronicus etiam ponit septem virtutes annexas fortitudini, quae sunt eupsychia, lema, magnanimitas, virilitas, perseverantia, magnificentia, andragathia. Ergo videtur quod insufficienter Tullius partes fortitudinis enumeraverat. Praeterea, Aristoteles, in III Ethic., ponit quinObj. 7: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. iii) reckons five parts of que modos fortitudinis. Quorum prima est politica, quae fortitude. The first is civic fortitude, which produces brave

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fortiter operatur propter timorem exhonorationis vel poenae; secunda militaris, quae fortiter operatur propter artem et experientiam rei bellicae; tertia est fortitudo quae fortiter operatur ex passione, praecipue irae; quarta est fortitudo quae fortiter operatur propter consuetudinem victoriae; quinta autem est quae fortiter operatur propter ignorantiam periculorum. Has autem fortitudines nulla praedictarum divisionum continet. Ergo praedictae enumerationes partium fortitudinis videntur esse inconvenientes.

deeds through fear of dishonor or punishment; the second is military fortitude, which produces brave deeds as a result of warlike art or experience; the third is the fortitude which produces brave deeds resulting from passion, especially anger; the fourth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through being accustomed to overcome; the fifth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through being unaccustomed to danger. Now these kinds of fortitude are not comprised under any of the above enumerations. Therefore these enumerations of the parts of fortitude are unfitting. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, I answer that, As stated above (Q. 48), a virtue can alicuius virtutis possunt esse triplices partes, scilicet su- have three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. biectivae, integrales et potentiales. Fortitudini autem, se- But fortitude, taken as a special virtue, cannot have subjeccundum quod est specialis virtus, non possunt assigna- tive parts, since it is not divided into several specifically disri partes subiectivae, eo quod non dividitur in multas tinct virtues, for it is about a very special matter.

virtutes specie differentes, quia est circa materiam valde specialem. Assignantur autem ei partes quasi integrales, et potentiales, integrales quidem secundum ea quae oportet concurrere ad actum fortitudinis; potentiales autem secundum quod ea quae fortitudo observat circa difficillima, scilicet circa pericula mortis, aliquae aliae virtutes observant circa quasdam alias materias minus difficiles; quae quidem virtutes adiunguntur fortitudini sicut secundariae principali. Est autem, sicut supra dictum est, duplex fortitudinis actus, scilicet aggredi, et sustinere. Ad actum autem aggrediendi duo requiruntur. Quorum primum pertinet ad animi praeparationem, ut scilicet aliquis promptum animum habeat ad aggrediendum. Et quantum ad hoc ponit Tullius fiduciam. Unde dicit quod fiducia est per quam magnis et honestis rebus multum ipse animus in se fiduciae cum spe collocavit. Secundum autem pertinet ad operis executionem, ne scilicet aliquis deficiat in executione illorum quae fiducialiter inchoavit. Et quantum ad hoc ponit Tullius magnificentiam. Unde dicit quod magnificentia est rerum magnarum et excelsarum cum animi ampla quadam et splendida propositione cogitatio atque administratio, idest executio, ut scilicet amplo proposito administratio non desit. Haec ergo duo, si coarctentur ad propriam materiam fortitudinis, scilicet ad pericula mortis, erunt quasi partes integrales ipsius, sine quibus fortitudo esse non potest. Si autem referantur ad aliquas alias materias in quibus est minus difficultatis, erunt virtutes distinctae a fortitudine secundum speciem, tamen adiungentur ei sicut secundarium principali, sicut magnificentia a philosopho, in IV Ethic., ponitur circa magnos sumptus; magnanimitas autem, quae videtur idem esse fiduciae, circa magnos honores. Ad alium autem actum fortitudinis, qui est sustinere, duo requiruntur. Quorum primum est ne difficultate imminentium malorum animus frangatur per tristitiam, et decidat a sua magnitudine. Et quantum ad hoc ponit patientiam. Unde dicit quod patientia est ho-

However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts assigned to it: integral parts, with regard to those things the concurrence of which is requisite for an act of fortitude; and potential parts, because what fortitude practices in face of the greatest hardships, namely dangers of death, certain other virtues practice in the matter of certain minor hardships and these virtues are annexed to fortitude as secondary virtues to the principal virtue. As stated above (Q. 123, AA. 3, 6), the act of fortitude is twofold, aggression and endurance. Now two things are required for the act of aggression. The first regards preparation of the mind, and consists in one’s having a mind ready for aggression. In this respect Tully mentions confidence, of which he says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that with this the mind is much assured and firmly hopeful in great and honorable undertakings. The second regards the accomplishment of the deed, and consists in not failing to accomplish what one has confidently begun. In this respect Tully mentions magnificence, which he describes as being the discussion and administration, i.e., accomplishment of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind, so as to combine execution with greatness of purpose. Accordingly if these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to dangers of death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, because without them there can be no fortitude; whereas if they be referred to other matters involving less hardship, they will be virtues specifically distinct from fortitude, but annexed thereto as secondary virtues to principal: thus magnificence is referred by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv) to great expenses, and magnanimity, which seems to be the same as confidence, to great honors. Again, two things are requisite for the other act of fortitude, viz. endurance. The first is that the mind be not broken by sorrow, and fall away from its greatness, by reason of the stress of threatening evil. In this respect he mentions patience, which he describes as the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous

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nestatis aut utilitatis causa rerum arduarum ac difficilium voluntaria ac diuturna perpessio. Aliud autem est ut ex diuturna difficilium passione homo non fatigetur usque ad hoc quod desistat, secundum illud Heb. XII, non fatigemini, animis vestris deficientes. Et quantum ad hoc ponit perseverantiam. Unde dicit quod perseverantia est in ratione bene considerata stabilis et perpetua permansio. Haec etiam duo, si coarctentur ad propriam materiam fortitudinis, erunt partes quasi integrales ipsius. Si autem ad quascumque materias difficiles referantur, erunt virtutes a fortitudine distinctae, et tamen ei adiungentur sicut secundariae principali. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod magnificentia circa materiam liberalitatis addit quandam magnitudinem, quae pertinet ad rationem ardui, quod est obiectum irascibilis, quam principaliter perficit fortitudo. Et ex hac parte pertinet ad fortitudinem. Ad secundum dicendum quod spes qua quis de Deo confidit, ponitur virtus theologica, ut supra habitum est. Sed per fiduciam quae nunc ponitur fortitudinis pars, homo habet spem in seipso, tamen sub Deo.

Q. 128, A. 1

and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit. The other is that by the prolonged suffering of hardships man be not wearied so as to lose courage, according to Heb. 12:3, That you be not wearied, fainting in your minds. In this respect he mentions perseverance, which accordingly he describes as the fixed and continued persistence in a well considered purpose. If these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be referred to any kind of hardship they will be virtues distinct from fortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to principal.

Reply Obj. 1: Magnificence in the matter of liberality adds a certain greatness: this is connected with the notion of difficulty which is the object of the irascible faculty, that is perfected chiefly by fortitude: and to this virtue, in this respect, it belongs. Reply Obj. 2: Hope whereby one confides in God is accounted a theological virtue, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 5; I-II, Q. 62, A. 3). But by confidence which here is accounted a part of fortitude, man hopes in himself, yet under God withal. Ad tertium dicendum quod quascumque magnas Reply Obj. 3: To venture on anything great seems to res aggredi videtur esse periculosum, quia in his defi- involve danger, since to fail in such things is very disastrous. cere est valde nocivum. Unde etiam si magnificentia et Wherefore although magnificence and confidence are refiducia circa quaecumque alia magna operanda vel ag- ferred to the accomplishment of or venturing on any other gredienda ponantur, habent quandam affinitatem cum great things, they have a certain connection with fortitude fortitudine, ratione periculi imminentis. by reason of the imminent danger. Ad quartum dicendum quod patientia non solum Reply Obj. 4: Patience endures not only dangers of perpetitur pericula mortis, circa quae est fortitudo, abs- death, with which fortitude is concerned, without excessive que superabundanti tristitia, sed etiam quaecumque alia sorrow, but also any other hardships or dangers. In this redifficilia seu periculosa. Et secundum hoc ponitur virtus spect it is accounted a virtue annexed to fortitude: but as readiuncta fortitudini. Inquantum autem est circa pericula ferred to dangers of death, it is an integral part thereof.

mortis, est pars integralis ipsius. Ad quintum dicendum quod perseverantia secundum quod dicit continuitatem boni operis usque in finem, circumstantia omnis virtutis esse potest. Ponitur autem pars fortitudinis secundum quod dictum est. Ad sextum dicendum quod Macrobius ponit quatuor praedicta a Tullio posita, scilicet fiduciam, magnificentiam, tolerantiam, quam ponit loco patientiae, et firmitatem, quam ponit loco perseverantiae. Superaddit autem tria. Quorum duo, scilicet magnanimitas et securitas, a Tullio sub fiducia comprehenduntur, sed Macrobius magis per specialia distinguit. Nam fiducia importat spem hominis ad magna. Spes autem cuiuslibet rei praesupponit appetitum in magna protensum per desiderium, quod pertinet ad magnanimitatem; dictum est enim supra quod spes praesupponit amorem et desiderium rei speratae. Vel melius potest dici quod fiducia pertinet ad spei certitudinem; magnanimitas autem ad magnitudinem rei speratae. Spes autem firma esse non potest nisi amoveatur contrarium, quandoque enim aliquis, quantum

Reply Obj. 5: Perseverance as denoting persistence in a good deed unto the end, may be a circumstance of every virtue, but it is reckoned a part of fortitude in the sense stated in the body of the Article. Reply Obj. 6: Macrobius reckons the four aforesaid mentioned by Tully, namely confidence, magnificence, forbearance, which he puts in the place of patience, and firmness, which he substitutes for perseverance. And he adds three, two of which, namely magnanimity and security, are comprised by Tully under the head of confidence. But Macrobius is more specific in his enumeration. Because confidence denotes a man’s hope for great things: and hope for anything presupposes an appetite stretching forth to great things by desire, and this belongs to magnanimity. For it has been stated above (I-II, Q. 40, A. 2) that hope presupposes love and desire of the thing hoped for. A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the certitude of hope; while magnanimity refers to the magnitude of the thing hoped for. Now hope has no firmness unless its contrary be removed, for sometimes one, for one’s own

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Fortitude

ex seipso est, speraret aliquid, sed spes tollitur propter impedimentum timoris; timor enim quodammodo spei contrariatur, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo Macrobius addit securitatem, quae excludit timorem. Tertium autem addit, scilicet constantiam, quae sub magnificentia comprehendi potest, oportet enim in his quae magnifice aliquis facit, constantem animum habere. Et ideo Tullius ad magnificentiam pertinere dicit non solum administrationem rerum magnarum, sed etiam animi amplam excogitationem ipsarum. Potest etiam constantia ad perseverantiam pertinere, ut perseverans dicatur aliquis ex eo quod non desistit propter diuturnitatem; constans autem ex eo quod non desistit propter quaecumque alia repugnantia. Illa etiam quae Andronicus ponit ad eadem pertinere videntur. Ponit enim perseverantiam et magnificentiam cum Tullio et Macrobio; magnanimitatem autem cum Macrobio. Lema autem est idem quod patientia vel tolerantia, dicit enim quod lema est habitus promptus tribuens ad conari qualia oportet, et sustinere quae ratio dicit. Eupsychia autem, idest bona animositas, idem videtur esse quod securitas, dicit enim quod est robur animae ad perficiendum opera ipsius. Virilitas autem idem esse videtur quod fiducia, dicit enim quod virilitas est habitus per se sufficiens tributus in his quae secundum virtutem. Magnificentiae autem addit andragathiam, quasi virilem bonitatem, quae apud nos strenuitas potest dici. Ad magnificentiam enim pertinet non solum quod homo consistat in executione magnorum operum, quod pertinet ad constantiam, sed etiam cum quadam virili prudentia et sollicitudine ea exequatur, quod pertinet ad andragathiam sive strenuitatem. Unde dicit quod andragathia est viri virtus adinventiva communicabilium operum. Et sic patet quod omnes huiusmodi partes ad quatuor principales reducuntur quas Tullius ponit. Ad septimum dicendum quod illa quinque quae ponit Aristoteles, deficiunt a vera ratione virtutis, quia etsi conveniant in actu fortitudinis, differunt tamen in motivo, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo non ponuntur partes fortitudinis, sed quidam fortitudinis modi.

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part, would hope for something, but hope is avoided on account of the obstacle of fear, since fear is somewhat contrary to hope, as stated above (I-II, Q. 40, A. 4, ad 1). Hence Macrobius adds security, which banishes fear. He adds a third, namely constancy, which may be comprised under magnificence. For in performing deeds of magnificence one needs to have a constant mind. For this reason Tully says that magnificence consists not only in accomplishing great things, but also in discussing them generously in the mind. Constancy may also pertain to perseverance, so that one may be called persevering through not desisting on account of delays, and constant through not desisting on account of any other obstacles. Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to amount to the same as the above. For with Tully and Macrobius he mentions perseverance and magnificence, and with Macrobius, magnanimity. Strength of will is the same as patience or forbearance, for he says that strength of will is a habit that makes one ready to attempt what ought to be attempted, and to endure what reason says should be endured—i.e., good courage seems to be the same as assurance, for he defines it as strength of soul in the accomplishment of its purpose. Manliness is apparently the same as confidence, for he says that manliness is a habit of selfsufficiency in matters of virtue. Besides magnificence he mentions andragathia, i.e., manly goodness which we may render strenuousness. For magnificence consists not only in being constant in the accomplishment of great deeds, which belongs to constancy, but also in bringing a certain manly prudence and solicitude to that accomplishment, and this belongs to andragathia, strenuousness: wherefore he says that andragathia is the virtue of a man, whereby he thinks out profitable works. Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be reduced to the four principal parts mentioned by Tully. Reply Obj. 7: The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short of the true notion of virtue, for though they concur in the act of fortitude, they differ as to motive, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 1, ad 2); wherefore they are not reckoned parts but modes of fortitude.

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Question 129 Magnanimity Deinde considerandum est de singulis fortitudinis partibus, ita tamen ut sub quatuor principalibus quas Tullius ponit, alias comprehendamus; nisi quod magnanimitatem, de qua etiam Aristoteles tractat, loco fiduciae ponemus. Primo ergo considerandum erit de magnanimitate; secundo, de magnificentia; tertio, de patientia; quarto, de perseverantia. Circa primum, primo considerandum est de magnanimitate; secundo, de vitiis oppositis. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum magnanimitas sit circa honores. Secundo, utrum magnanimitas sit solum circa magnos honores. Tertio, utrum sit virtus. Quarto, utrum sit virtus specialis. Quinto, utrum sit pars fortitudinis. Sexto, quomodo se habeat ad fiduciam. Septimo, quomodo se habeat ad securitatem. Octavo, quomodo se habeat ad bona fortunae.

We must now consider each of the parts of fortitude, including, however, the other parts under those mentioned by Tully, with the exception of confidence, for which we shall substitute magnanimity, of which Aristotle treats. Accordingly we shall consider (1) Magnanimity; (2) Magnificence; (3) Patience; (4) Perseverance. As regards the first we shall treat (1) of magnanimity; (2) of its contrary vices. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether magnanimity is about honors? (2) Whether magnanimity is only about great honors? (3) Whether it is a virtue? (4) Whether it is a special virtue? (5) Whether it is a part of fortitude? (6) Of its relation to confidence; (7) Of its relation to assurance; (8) Of its relation to goods of fortune.

Article 1 Whether magnanimity is about honors? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnanimitas non sit circa honores. Magnanimitas enim est in irascibili. Quod ex ipso nomine patet, nam magnanimitas dicitur quasi magnitudo animi; animus autem pro vi irascibili ponitur, ut patet in III de anima, ubi philosophus dicit quod in sensitivo appetitu est desiderium et animus, idest concupiscibilis et irascibilis. Sed honor est quoddam bonum concupiscibile, cum sit praemium virtutis. Ergo videtur quod magnanimitas non sit circa honores. Praeterea, magnanimitas, cum sit virtus moralis, oportet quod sit circa passiones vel operationes. Non est autem circa operationes, quia sic esset pars iustitiae. Et sic relinquitur quod sit circa passiones. Honor autem non est passio. Ergo magnanimitas non est circa honores. Praeterea, magnanimitas videtur pertinere magis ad prosecutionem quam ad fugam, dicitur enim magnanimus quia ad magna tendit. Sed virtuosi non laudantur ex hoc quod cupiunt honores, sed magis ex hoc quod eos fugiunt. Ergo magnanimitas non est circa honores.

Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not about honors. For magnanimity is in the irascible faculty, as its very name shows, since magnanimity signifies greatness of mind, and mind denotes the irascible part, as appears from De Anima iii, 42, where the Philosopher says that in the sensitive appetite are desire and mind, i.e., the concupiscible and irascible parts. But honor is a concupiscible good since it is the reward of virtue. Therefore it seems that magnanimity is not about honors. Obj. 2: Further, since magnanimity is a moral virtue, it must needs be about either passions or operations. Now it is not about operations, for then it would be a part of justice: whence it follows that it is about passions. But honor is not a passion. Therefore magnanimity is not about honors. Obj. 3: Further, the nature of magnanimity seems to regard pursuit rather than avoidance, for a man is said to be magnanimous because he tends to great things. But the virtuous are praised not for desiring honors, but for shunning them. Therefore magnanimity is not about honors.

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Q. 129, A. 1

Fortitude

Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod magnanimus est circa honores et inhonorationes. Respondeo dicendum quod magnanimitas ex suo nomine importat quandam extensionem animi ad magna. Consideratur autem habitudo virtutis ad duo, uno quidem modo, ad materiam circa quam operatur; alio modo, ad actum proprium, qui consistit in debito usu talis materiae. Et quia habitus virtutis principaliter ex actu determinatur, ex hoc principaliter dicitur aliquis magnanimus quod animum habet ad aliquem magnum actum. Aliquis autem actus potest dici dupliciter magnus, uno modo, secundum proportionem; alio modo, absolute. Magnus quidem potest dici actus secundum proportionem etiam qui consistit in usu alicuius rei parvae vel mediocris, puta si aliquis illa re optime utatur. Sed simpliciter et absolute magnus actus est qui consistit in optimo usu rei maximae. Res autem quae in usum hominis veniunt sunt res exteriores. Inter quae simpliciter maximum est honor, tum quia propinquissimum est virtuti, utpote testificatio quaedam existens de virtute alicuius, ut supra habitum est; tum etiam quia Deo et optimis exhibetur; tum etiam quia homines propter honorem consequendum et vituperium vitandum omnia alia postponunt. Sic autem dicitur aliquis magnanimus ex his quae sunt magna simpliciter et absolute, sicut dicitur aliquis fortis ex his quae sunt simpliciter difficilia. Et ideo consequens est quod magnanimitas consistat circa honores. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bonum vel malum, absolute quidem considerata, pertinent ad concupiscibilem, sed inquantum additur ratio ardui, sic pertinet ad irascibilem. Et hoc modo honorem respicit magnanimitas, inquantum scilicet habet rationem magni vel ardui. Ad secundum dicendum quod honor, etsi non sit passio vel operatio, est tamen alicuius passionis obiectum, scilicet spei, quae tendit in bonum arduum. Et ideo magnanimitas est quidem immediate circa passionem spei, mediate autem circa honorem, sicut circa obiectum spei, sicut et de fortitudine supra dictum est quod est circa pericula mortis inquantum sunt obiectum timoris et audaciae. Ad tertium dicendum quod illi qui contemnunt honores hoc modo quod pro eis adipiscendis nihil inconveniens faciunt, nec eos nimis appretiantur, laudabiles sunt. Si quis autem hoc modo contemneret honores quod non curaret facere ea quae sunt digna honore, hoc vituperabile esset. Et hoc modo magnanimitas est circa honorem, ut videlicet studeat facere ea quae sunt honore digna, non tamen sic ut pro magno aestimet humanum honorem.

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On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that magnanimity is about honor and dishonor. I answer that, Magnanimity by its very name denotes stretching forth of the mind to great things. Now virtue bears a relationship to two things, first to the matter about which is the field of its activity, second to its proper act, which consists in the right use of such matter. And since a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly from its act, a man is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is minded to do some great act. Now an act may be called great in two ways: in one way proportionately, in another absolutely. An act may be called great proportionately, even if it consist in the use of some small or ordinary thing, if, for instance, one make a very good use of it: but an act is simply and absolutely great when it consists in the best use of the greatest thing. The things which come into man’s use are external things, and among these honor is the greatest simply, both because it is the most akin to virtue, since it is an attestation to a person’s virtue, as stated above (Q. 103, AA. 1, 2); and because it is offered to God and to the best; and again because, in order to obtain honor even as to avoid shame, men set aside all other things. Now a man is said to be magnanimous in respect of things that are great absolutely and simply, just as a man is said to be brave in respect of things that are difficult simply. It follows therefore that magnanimity is about honors. Reply Obj. 1: Good and evil absolutely considered regard the concupiscible faculty, but insofar as the aspect of difficult is added, they belong to the irascible. Thus it is that magnanimity regards honor, inasmuch, to wit, as honor has the aspect of something great or difficult. Reply Obj. 2: Although honor is neither a passion nor an operation, yet it is the object of a passion, namely hope, which tends to a difficult good. Wherefore magnanimity is immediately about the passions of hope, and mediately about honor as the object of hope: even so, we have stated (Q. 123, AA. 4, 5) with regard to fortitude that it is about dangers of death insofar as they are the object of fear and daring. Reply Obj. 3: Those are worthy of praise who despise riches in such a way as to do nothing unbecoming in order to obtain them, nor have too great a desire for them. If, however, one were to despise honors so as not to care to do what is worthy of honor, this would be deserving of blame. Accordingly magnanimity is about honors in the sense that a man strives to do what is deserving of honor, yet not so as to think much of the honor accorded by man.

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Q. 129, A. 2

Article 2 Whether magnanimity is essentially about great honors? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnanimitas de sui ratione non habeat quod sit circa magnum honorem. Propria enim materia magnanimitatis est honor, ut dictum est. Sed magnum et parvum accidunt honori. Ergo de ratione magnanimitatis non est quod sit circa magnum honorem. Praeterea, sicut magnanimitas est circa honores, ita mansuetudo est circa iras. Sed non est de ratione mansuetudinis quod sit circa magnas iras, vel circa parvas. Ergo etiam non est de ratione magnanimitatis quod sit circa magnos honores. Praeterea, parvus honor minus distat a magno honore quam exhonoratio. Sed magnanimus bene se habet circa exhonorationes. Ergo etiam et circa parvos honores. Non ergo est solum circa honores magnos. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod magnanimitas est circa magnos honores. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in VII Physic., virtus est perfectio quaedam. Et intelligitur esse perfectio potentiae, ad cuius ultimum pertinet, ut patet in I de caelo. Perfectio autem potentiae non attenditur in qualicumque operatione, sed in operatione quae habet aliquam magnitudinem aut difficultatem, quaelibet enim potentia, quantumcumque imperfecta, potest in aliquam operationem modicam et debilem. Et ideo ad rationem virtutis pertinet ut sic circa difficile et bonum, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Difficile autem et magnum, quae ad idem pertinent, in actu virtutis potest attendi dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte rationis, inquantum scilicet difficile est medium rationis adinvenire et in aliqua materia statuere. Et ista difficultas sola invenitur in actu virtutum intellectualium, et etiam in actu iustitiae. Alia autem est difficultas ex parte materiae, quae de se repugnantiam habere potest ad modum rationis qui est circa eam ponendus. Et ista difficultas praecipue attenditur in aliis virtutibus moralibus, quae sunt circa passiones, quia passiones pugnant contra rationem, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Circa quas considerandum est quod quaedam passiones sunt quae habent magnam vim resistendi rationi principaliter ex parte passionis, quaedam vero principaliter ex parte rerum quae sunt obiecta passionum. Passiones autem non habent magnam vim repugnandi rationi nisi fuerint vehementes, eo quod appetitus sensitivus, in quo sunt passiones, naturaliter subditur rationi. Et ideo virtutes quae sunt circa huiusmodi passiones non ponuntur nisi circa id quod est magnum in ipsis passionibus, sicut fortitudo est circa maximos timores et audacias, temperantia est circa maximarum delectationum

Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not essentially about great honors. For the proper matter of magnanimity is honor, as stated above (A. 1). But great and little are accidental to honor. Therefore it is not essential to magnanimity to be about great honors. Obj. 2: Further, just as magnanimity is about honor, so is meekness about anger. But it is not essential to meekness to be about either great or little anger. Therefore neither is it essential to magnanimity to be about great honor. Obj. 3: Further, small honor is less aloof from great honor than is dishonor. But magnanimity is well ordered in relation to dishonor, and consequently in relation to small honors also. Therefore it is not only about great honors. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that magnanimity is about great honors. I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Phys. vii, 17, 18), virtue is a perfection, and by this we are to understand the perfection of a power, and that it regards the extreme limit of that power, as stated in De Caelo i, 116. Now the perfection of a power is not perceived in every operation of that power, but in such operations as are great or difficult: for every power, however imperfect, can extend to ordinary and trifling operations. Hence it is essential to a virtue to be about the difficult and the good, as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. Now the difficult and the good (which amount to the same) in an act of virtue may be considered from two points of view. First, from the point of view of reason, insofar as it is difficult to find and establish the rational means in some particular matter: and this difficulty is found only in the act of intellectual virtues, and also of justice. The other difficulty is on the part of the matter, which may involve a certain opposition to the moderation of reason, which moderation has to be applied thereto: and this difficulty regards chiefly the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, because the passions resist reason as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, 4). Now as regards the passions it is to be observed that the greatness of this power of resistance to reason arises chiefly in some cases from the passions themselves, and in others from the things that are the objects of the passions. The passions themselves have no great power of resistance, unless they be violent, because the sensitive appetite, which is the seat of the passions, is naturally subject to reason. Hence the resisting virtues that are about these passions regard only that which is great in such passions: thus fortitude is about very great fear and daring; temperance about the concupiscence of the greatest pleasures, and likewise meek-

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concupiscentias, et similiter mansuetudo est circa maximas iras. Passiones autem quaedam habent magnam vim repugnandi rationi ex ipsis rebus exterioribus quae sunt passionum obiecta, sicut amor vel cupiditas pecuniae seu honoris. Et in istis oportet esse virtutem non solum circa id quod est maximum in eis, sed etiam circa mediocria vel minora, quia res exterius existentes, etiam si sint parvae, sunt multum appetibiles, utpote necessariae ad hominis vitam. Et ideo circa appetitum pecuniarum sunt duae virtutes, una quidem circa mediocres et moderatas, scilicet liberalitas; alia autem circa magnas pecunias, scilicet magnificentia. Similiter etiam et circa honores sunt duae virtutes. Una quidem circa mediocres honores, quae innominata est, nominatur tamen ex suis extremis, quae sunt philotimia, idest amor honoris, et aphilotimia, idest sine amore honoris; laudatur enim quandoque qui amat honorem, quandoque autem qui non curat de honore, prout scilicet utrumque moderate fieri potest. Circa magnos autem honores est magnanimitas. Et ideo dicendum est quod propria materia magnanimitatis est magnus honor, et ad ea tendit magnanimus quae sunt magno honore digna.

ness about the greatest anger. On the other hand, some passions have great power of resistance to reason arising from the external things themselves that are the objects of those passions: such are the love or desire of money or of honor. And for these it is necessary to have a virtue not only regarding that which is greatest in those passions, but also about that which is ordinary or little: because things external, though they be little, are very desirable, as being necessary for human life. Hence with regard to the desire of money there are two virtues, one about ordinary or little sums of money, namely liberality, and another about large sums of money, namely magnificence. In like manner there are two virtues about honors, one about ordinary honors. This virtue has no name, but is denominated by its extremes, which are philotimia, i.e., love of honor, and aphilotimia, i.e., without love of honor: for sometimes a man is commended for loving honor, and sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as both these things may be done in moderation. But with regard to great honors there is magnanimity. Wherefore we must conclude that the proper matter of magnanimity is great honor, and that a magnanimous man tends to such things as are deserving of honor. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod magnum et parReply Obj. 1: Great and little are accidental to honor vum per accidens se habent ad honorem secundum se considered in itself: but they make a great difference in their consideratum, sed magnam differentiam faciunt secun- relation to reason, the mode of which has to be observed in dum quod comparantur ad rationem, cuius modum in the use of honor, for it is much more difficult to observe it usu honoris observari oportet, qui multo difficilius ob- in great than in little honors.

servatur in magnis honoribus quam in parvis. Ad secundum dicendum quod in ira et in aliis materiis non habet difficultatem notabilem nisi illud quod est maximum, circa quod solum oportet esse virtutem. Alia autem ratio est de divitiis et honoribus, quae sunt res extra animam existentes. Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui bene utitur magnis, multo magis potest bene uti parvis. Magnanimitas ergo attendit magnos honores sicut quibus est dignus, vel etiam sicut minores his quibus est dignus, quia scilicet virtus non potest sufficienter honorari ab homine, cui debetur honor a Deo. Et ideo non extollitur ex magnis honoribus, quia non reputat eos supra se, sed magis eos contemnit. Et multo magis moderatos aut parvos. Et similiter etiam dehonorationibus non frangitur, sed eas contemnit, utpote quas reputat sibi indigne afferri.

Reply Obj. 2: In anger and other matters only that which is greatest presents any notable difficulty, and about this alone is there any need of a virtue. It is different with riches and honors which are things existing outside the soul. Reply Obj. 3: He that makes good use of great things is much more able to make good use of little things. Accordingly the magnanimous man looks upon great honors as a thing of which he is worthy, or even little honors as something he deserves, because, to wit, man cannot sufficiently honor virtue which deserves to be honored by God. Hence he is not uplifted by great honors, because he does not deem them above him; rather does he despise them, and much more such as are ordinary or little. In like manner he is not cast down by dishonor, but despises it, since he recognizes that he does not deserve it.

Article 3 Whether magnanimity is a virtue? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod maObjection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a gnanimitas non sit virtus. Omnis enim virtus moralis in virtue. For every moral virtue observes the mean. But magmedio consistit. Sed magnanimitas non consistit in me- nanimity observes not the mean but the greater extreme:

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Q. 129, A. 3

dio, sed in maximo, quia maximis dignificat seipsum, ut because the magnanimous man deems himself worthy of the dicitur in IV Ethic. Ergo magnanimitas non est virtus. greatest things (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue. Praeterea, qui habet unam virtutem, habet omObj. 2: Further, he that has one virtue has them all, as nes, ut supra habitum est. Sed aliquis potest habere ali- stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). But one may have a virtue quam virtutem non habens magnanimitatem, dicit enim without having magnanimity: since the Philosopher says philosophus, in IV Ethic., quod qui est parvis dignus, et (Ethic. iv, 3) that whosoever is worthy of little things and his dignificat seipsum, temperatus est, magnanimus au- deems himself worthy of them, is temperate, but he is not tem non. Ergo magnanimitas non est virtus. magnanimous. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue. Praeterea, virtus est bona qualitas mentis, ut suObj. 3: Further, Virtue is a good quality of the mind, as pra habitum est. Sed magnanimitas habet quasdam cor- stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). But magnanimity implies porales dispositiones, dicit enim philosophus, in IV certain dispositions of the body: for the Philosopher says Ethic., quod motus lentus magnanimi videtur, et vox gra- (Ethic. iv, 3) of a magnanimous man that his gait is slow, his vis, et locutio stabilis. Ergo magnanimitas non est virtus. voice deep, and his utterance calm. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue. Praeterea, nulla virtus opponitur alteri virtuti. Obj. 4: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. Sed magnanimitas opponitur humilitati, nam magnani- But magnanimity is opposed to humility, since the magnanmus dignum se reputat magnis, et alios contemnit, ut di- imous deems himself worthy of great things, and despises othcitur in IV Ethic. Ergo magnanimitas non est virtus. ers, according to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue. Praeterea, cuiuslibet virtutis proprietates sunt Obj. 5: Further, the properties of every virtue are laudabiles. Sed magnanimitas habet quasdam proprie- praiseworthy. But magnanimity has certain properties that tates vituperabiles, primo quidem, quod non est me- call for blame. For, in the first place, the magnanimous mor benefactorum; secundo, quod est otiosus et tardus; is unmindful of favors; second, he is remiss and slow of tertio, quod utitur ironia ad multos; quarto, quod non action; third, he employs irony towards many; fourth, he potest alii convivere; quinto, quod magis possidet in- is unable to associate with others; fifth, because he holds fructuosa quam fructuosa. Ergo magnanimitas non est to the barren things rather than to those that are fruitful. virtus. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue. Sed contra est quod in laudem quorundam diciOn the contrary, It is written in praise of certain tur, II Machab. XIV, Nicanor audiens virtutem comitum men (2 Macc 15:18): Nicanor hearing of the valor of Judas’ Iudae, et animi magnitudinem quam pro patriae certami- companions, and the greatness of soul with which they fought nibus habebant, et cetera. Laudabilia autem sunt solum for their country, was afraid to try the matter by the sword. virtutum opera. Ergo magnanimitas, ad quam pertinet Now, only deeds of virtue are worthy of praise. Therefore magnum animum habere, est virtus. magnanimity which consists in greatness of courage is a virtue. Respondeo dicendum quod ad rationem virtutis I answer that, The essence of human virtue consists humanae pertinet ut in rebus humanis bonum rationis in safeguarding the good of reason in human affairs, for this servetur, quod est proprium hominis bonum. Inter cete- is man’s proper good. Now among external human things ras autem res humanas exteriores, honores praecipuum honors take precedence of all others, as stated above (A. 1; locum tenent, sicut dictum est. Et inde magnanimitas, I-II, Q. 11, A. 2, Obj. 3). Therefore magnanimity, which obquae modum rationis ponit circa magnos honores, est serves the mode of reason in great honors, is a virtue. virtus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, dicit, in IV Ethic., magnanimus est quidem magnitudine 3), the magnanimous in point of quantity goes to extremes, extremus, inquantum scilicet ad maxima tendit, eo au- insofar as he tends to what is greatest, but in the matter of tem quod ut oportet, medius, quia videlicet ad ea quae becomingness, he follows the mean, because he tends to the sunt maxima, secundum rationem tendit; eo enim quod greatest things according to reason, for he deems himself secundum dignitatem seipsum dignificat, ut ibidem di- worthy in accordance with his worth (Ethic. iv, 3), since his citur, quia scilicet se non extendit ad maiora quam di- aims do not surpass his deserts. gnus est. Ad secundum dicendum quod connexio virtutum Reply Obj. 2: The mutual connection of the virtues non est intelligenda secundum actus, ut scilicet cuili- does not apply to their acts, as though every one were combet competat habere actus omnium virtutum. Unde ac- petent to practice the acts of all the virtues. Wherefore the tus magnanimitatis non competit cuilibet virtuoso, sed act of magnanimity is not becoming to every virtuous man,

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Fortitude

solum magnis. Sed secundum principia virtutum, quae sunt prudentia et gratia, omnes virtutes sunt connexae secundum habitus simul in anima existentes, vel in actu vel in propinqua dispositione. Et sic potest aliquis cui non competit actus magnanimitatis, habere magnanimitatis habitum, per quem scilicet disponitur ad talem actum exequendum si sibi secundum statum suum competeret. Ad tertium dicendum quod corporales motus diversificantur secundum diversas animae apprehensiones et affectiones. Et secundum hoc contingit quod ad magnanimitatem consequuntur quaedam determinata accidentia circa motus corporales. Velocitas enim motus provenit ex eo quod homo ad multa intendit, quae explere festinat, sed magnanimus intendit solum ad magna, quae pauca sunt, quae etiam indigent magna attentione; et ideo habet motum tardum. Similiter etiam acuitas vocis, et velocitas, praecipue competit his qui de quibuslibet contendere volunt, quod non pertinet ad magnanimos, qui non intromittunt se nisi de magnis. Et sicut praedictae dispositiones corporalium motuum conveniunt magnanimis secundum modum affectionis eorum, ita etiam in his qui sunt naturaliter dispositi ad magnanimitatem tales conditiones naturaliter inveniuntur. Ad quartum dicendum quod in homine invenitur aliquid magnum, quod ex dono Dei possidet; et aliquis defectus, qui competit ei ex infirmitate naturae. Magnanimitas igitur facit quod homo se magnis dignificet secundum considerationem donorum quae possidet ex Deo, sicut, si habet magnam virtutem animi, magnanimitas facit quod ad perfecta opera virtutis tendat. Et similiter est dicendum de usu cuiuslibet alterius boni, puta scientiae vel exterioris fortunae. Humilitas autem facit quod homo seipsum parvipendat secundum considerationem proprii defectus. Similiter etiam magnanimitas contemnit alios secundum quod deficiunt a donis Dei, non enim tantum alios appretiatur quod pro eis aliquid indecens faciat. Sed humilitas alios honorat, et superiores aestimat, inquantum in eis aliquid inspicit de donis Dei. Unde in Psalmo dicitur de viro iusto, ad nihilum deductus est in conspectu eius malignus, quod pertinet ad contemptum magnanimi; timentes autem dominum glorificat, quod pertinet ad honorationem humilis. Et sic patet quod magnanimitas et humilitas non sunt contraria, quamvis in contraria tendere videantur, quia procedunt secundum diversas considerationes.

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but only to great men. On the other hand, as regards the principles of virtue, namely prudence and grace, all virtues are connected together, since their habits reside together in the soul, either in act or by way of a proximate disposition thereto. Thus it is possible for one to whom the act of magnanimity is not competent, to have the habit of magnanimity, whereby he is disposed to practice that act if it were competent to him according to his state. Reply Obj. 3: The movements of the body are differentiated according to the different apprehensions and emotions of the soul. And so it happens that to magnanimity there accrue certain fixed accidents by way of bodily movements. For quickness of movement results from a man being intent on many things which he is in a hurry to accomplish, whereas the magnanimous is intent only on great things; these are few and require great attention, wherefore they call for slow movement. Likewise shrill and rapid speaking is chiefly competent to those who are quick to quarrel about anything, and this becomes not the magnanimous who are busy only about great things. And just as these dispositions of bodily movements are competent to the magnanimous man according to the mode of his emotions, so too in those who are naturally disposed to magnanimity these conditions are found naturally.

Reply Obj. 4: There is in man something great which he possesses through the gift of God; and something defective which accrues to him through the weakness of nature. Accordingly magnanimity makes a man deem himself worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he holds from God: thus if his soul is endowed with great virtue, magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of virtue; and the same is to be said of the use of any other good, such as science or external fortune. On the other hand, humility makes a man think little of himself in consideration of his own deficiency, and magnanimity makes him despise others insofar as they fall away from God’s gifts: since he does not think so much of others as to do anything wrong for their sake. Yet humility makes us honor others and esteem them better than ourselves, insofar as we see some of God’s gifts in them. Hence it is written of the just man (Ps 14:4): In his sight a vile person is contemned, which indicates the contempt of magnanimity, but he honoreth them that fear the Lord, which points to the reverential bearing of humility. It is therefore evident that magnanimity and humility are not contrary to one another, although they seem to tend in contrary directions, because they proceed according to different considerations. Ad quintum dicendum quod proprietates illae, seReply Obj. 5: These properties insofar as they belong cundum quod ad magnanimum pertinent, non sunt vi- to a magnanimous man call not for blame, but for very tuperabiles, sed superexcedenter laudabiles. Quod enim great praise. For in the first place, when it is said that the primo dicitur, quod magnanimus non habet in memo- magnanimous is not mindful of those from whom he has ria a quibus beneficia recipit, intelligendum est quantum received favors, this points to the fact that he takes no pleaad hoc quod non est sibi delectabile quod ab aliquibus sure in accepting favors from others unless he repay them

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beneficia recipiat, quin sibi maiora recompenset. Quod pertinet ad perfectionem gratitudinis, in cuius actu vult superexcellere, sicut et in actibus aliarum virtutum. Similiter etiam secundo dicitur quod est otiosus et tardus, non quia deficiat ab operando ea quae sibi conveniunt, sed quia non ingerit se quibuscumque operibus sibi convenientibus, sed solum magnis, qualia decent eum. Dicitur etiam tertio quod utitur ironia, non secundum quod opponitur veritati, ut scilicet dicat de se aliqua vilia quae non sunt vel neget aliqua magna quae sunt, sed quia non totam magnitudinem suam monstrat, maxime quantum ad inferiorum multitudinem; quia sicut philosophus ibidem dicit, ad magnanimum pertinet magnum esse ad eos qui in dignitate et bonis fortunis sunt, ad medios autem moderatum. Quarto etiam dicitur quod ad alios non potest convivere, scilicet familiariter, nisi ad amicos, quia omnino vitat adulationem et simulationem, quae pertinent ad animi parvitatem. Convivit tamen omnibus, et magnis et parvis, secundum quod oportet, ut dictum est. Quinto etiam dicitur quod vult habere magis infructuosa, non quaecumque, sed bona, idest honesta. Nam in omnibus praeponit honesta utilibus, tanquam maiora, utilia enim quaeruntur ad subveniendum alicui defectui, qui magnanimitati repugnat.

Q. 129, A. 4

with yet greater favor; this belongs to the perfection of gratitude, in the act of which he wishes to excel, even as in the acts of other virtues. Again, in the second place, it is said that he is remiss and slow of action, not that he is lacking in doing what becomes him, but because he does not busy himself with all kinds of works, but only with great works, such as are becoming to him. He is also said, in the third place, to employ irony, not as opposed to truth, and so as either to say of himself vile things that are not true, or deny of himself great things that are true, but because he does not disclose all his greatness, especially to the large number of those who are beneath him, since, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great towards persons of dignity and affluence, and unassuming towards the middle class. In the fourth place, it is said that he cannot associate with others: this means that he is not at home with others than his friends: because he altogether shuns flattery and hypocrisy, which belong to littleness of mind. But he associates with all, both great and little, according as he ought, as stated above (ad 1). It is also said, fifth, that he prefers to have barren things, not indeed any, but good, i.e., virtuous; for in all things he prefers the virtuous to the useful, as being greater: since the useful is sought in order to supply a defect which is inconsistent with magnanimity.

Article 4 Whether magnanimity is a special virtue? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnanimitas non sit specialis virtus. Nulla enim specialis virtus operatur in omnibus virtutibus. Sed philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod ad magnanimum pertinet quod est in unaquaque virtute magnum. Ergo magnanimitas non est specialis virtus. Praeterea, nulli speciali virtuti attribuuntur actus virtutum diversarum. Sed magnanimo attribuuntur diversarum virtutum actus, dicitur enim in IV Ethic., quod ad magnanimum pertinet non fugere commonentem, quod est actus prudentiae; neque facere iniusta, quod est actus iustitiae; et quod est promptus ad benefaciendum, quod est actus caritatis; et quod ministrat prompte, quod est actus liberalitatis; et quod est veridicus, quod est actus veritatis; et quod non est planctivus, quod est actus patientiae. Ergo magnanimitas non est virtus specialis. Praeterea, quaelibet virtus est quidam spiritualis ornatus animae, secundum illud Isaiae LXI, induit me dominus vestimentis salutis; et postea subdit, quasi sponsam ornatam monilibus suis. Sed magnanimitas est orna-

Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a special virtue. For no special virtue is operative in every virtue. But the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 3) that whatever is great in each virtue belongs to the magnanimous. Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue. Obj. 2: Further, the acts of different virtues are not ascribed to any special virtue. But the acts of different virtues are ascribed to the magnanimous man. For it is stated in Ethic. iv, 3 that it belongs to the magnanimous not to avoid reproof (which is an act of prudence), nor to act unjustly (which is an act of justice), that he is ready to do favors (which is an act of charity), that he gives his services readily (which is an act of liberality), that he is truthful (which is an act of truthfulness), and that he is not given to complaining (which is an act of patience). Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue. Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is a special ornament of the soul, according to the saying of Isa. 61:10, He hath clothed me with the garments of salvation, and afterwards he adds, and as a bride adorned with her jewels. But magnanimity is

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tus omnium virtutum, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Ergo magnanimitas est generalis virtus. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II Ethic., distinguit eam contra alias virtutes. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad specialem virtutem pertinet quod modum rationis in aliqua determinata materia ponat. Magnanimitas autem ponit modum rationis circa determinatam materiam, scilicet circa honores, ut supra dictum est. Honor autem, secundum se consideratus, est quoddam bonum speciale. Et secundum hoc magnanimitas, secundum se considerata, est quaedam specialis virtus. Sed quia honor est cuiuslibet virtutis praemium, ut ex supra dictis patet; ideo ex consequenti, ratione suae materiae, respicit omnes virtutes. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod magnanimitas non est circa honorem quemcumque, sed circa magnum honorem. Sicut autem honor debetur virtuti, ita etiam magnus honor debetur magno operi virtutis. Et inde est quod magnanimus intendit magna operari in qualibet virtute, inquantum scilicet tendit ad ea quae sunt digna magno honore. Ad secundum dicendum quod quia magnanimus tendit ad magna, consequens est quod ad illa praecipue tendat quae important aliquam excellentiam, et illa fugiat quae pertinent ad defectum. Pertinet autem ad quandam excellentiam quod aliquis bene faciat, et quod sit communicativus, et plurium retributivus. Et ideo ad ista promptum se exhibet, inquantum habent rationem cuiusdam excellentiae, non autem secundum eam rationem qua sunt actus aliarum virtutum. Ad defectum autem pertinet quod aliquis intantum magnipendat aliqua exteriora bona vel mala quod pro eis a iustitia vel quacumque virtute declinet. Similiter etiam ad defectum pertinet omnis occultatio veritatis, quia videtur ex timore procedere. Quod etiam aliquis sit planctivus, ad defectum pertinet, quia per hoc videtur animus exterioribus malis succumbere. Et ideo haec et similia vitat magnanimus secundum quandam specialem rationem, scilicet tanquam contraria excellentiae vel magnitudini. Ad tertium dicendum quod quaelibet virtus habet quendam decorem sive ornatum ex sua specie, qui est proprius unicuique virtuti. Sed superadditur alius ornatus ex ipsa magnitudine operis virtuosi per magnanimitatem, quae omnes virtutes maiores facit, ut dicitur in IV Ethic.

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the ornament of all the virtues, as stated in Ethic. iv. Therefore magnanimity is a general virtue. On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) distinguishes it from the other virtues. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 123, A. 2), it belongs to a special virtue to establish the mode of reason in a determinate matter. Now magnanimity establishes the mode of reason in a determinate matter, namely honors, as stated above (AA. 1, 2): and honor, considered in itself, is a special good, and accordingly magnanimity considered in itself is a special virtue. Since, however, honor is the reward of every virtue, as stated above (Q. 103, A. 1, ad 2), it follows that by reason of its matter it regards all the virtues. Reply Obj. 1: Magnanimity is not about any kind of honor, but great honor. Now, as honor is due to virtue, so great honor is due to a great deed of virtue. Hence it is that the magnanimous is intent on doing great deeds in every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he tends to what is worthy of great honors. Reply Obj. 2: Since the magnanimous tends to great things, it follows that he tends chiefly to things that involve a certain excellence, and shuns those that imply defect. Now it savors of excellence that a man is beneficent, generous and grateful. Wherefore he shows himself ready to perform actions of this kind, but not as acts of the other virtues. On the other hand, it is a proof of defect, that a man thinks so much of certain external goods or evils, that for their sake he abandons and gives up justice or any virtue whatever. Again, all concealment of the truth indicates a defect, since it seems to be the outcome of fear. Also that a man be given to complaining denotes a defect, because by so doing the mind seems to give way to external evils. Wherefore these and like things the magnanimous man avoids under a special aspect, inasmuch as they are contrary to his excellence or greatness.

Reply Obj. 3: Every virtue derives from its species a certain luster or adornment which is proper to each virtue: but further adornment results from the very greatness of a virtuous deed, through magnanimity which makes all virtues greater as stated in Ethic. iv, 3.

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Q. 129, A. 5

Article 5 Whether magnanimity is a part of fortitude? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnanimitas non sit pars fortitudinis. Idem enim non est pars sui ipsius. Sed magnanimitas videtur idem esse fortitudini. Dicit enim Seneca, in libro de quatuor Virtut., magnanimitas, quae et fortitudo dicitur, si insit animo tuo, cum magna fiducia vives. Et Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., viros fortes magnanimos esse eosdem volumus, veritatis amicos, minimeque fallaces. Ergo magnanimitas non est pars fortitudinis. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod magnanimus non est philokindynus, idest amator periculi. Ad fortem autem pertinet exponere se periculis. Ergo magnanimitas non convenit cum fortitudine, ut possit dici pars eius. Praeterea, magnanimitas respicit magnum in bonis sperandis, fortitudo autem respicit magnum in malis timendis vel audendis. Sed bonum est principalius quam malum. Ergo magnanimitas est principalior virtus quam fortitudo. Non ergo est pars eius. Sed contra est quod Macrobius et Andronicus ponunt magnanimitatem fortitudinis partem. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, principalis virtus est ad quam pertinet aliquem generalem modum virtutis constituere in aliqua materia principali. Inter alios autem generales modos virtutis unus est firmitas animi, quia firmiter se habere requiritur in omni virtute, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Praecipue tamen hoc laudatur in virtutibus quae in aliquod arduum tendunt, in quibus difficillimum est firmitatem servare. Et ideo quanto difficilius est in aliquo arduo firmiter se habere, tanto principalior est virtus quae circa illud firmitatem praestat animo. Difficilius autem est firmiter se habere in periculis mortis, in quibus confirmat animum fortitudo, quam in maximis bonis sperandis vel adipiscendis, ad quae confirmat animum magnanimitas, quia sicut homo maxime diligit vitam suam, ita maxime refugit mortis pericula. Sic ergo patet quod magnanimitas convenit cum fortitudine inquantum confirmat animum circa aliquid arduum, deficit autem ab ea in hoc quod firmat animum in eo circa quod facilius est firmitatem servare. Unde magnanimitas ponitur pars fortitudinis, quia adiungitur ei sicut secundaria principali. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., carere malo accipitur in ratione boni. Unde et non superari ab aliquo gravi malo, puta a periculis mortis, accipitur quodammodo pro eo quod est attingere ad magnum bonum, quorum primum pertinet ad fortitudinem, secundum ad magnanimitatem. Et secundum hoc fortitudo et magnanimitas pro eodem ac-

Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a part of fortitude. For a thing is not a part of itself. But magnanimity appears to be the same as fortitude. For Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): If magnanimity, which is also called fortitude, be in thy soul, thou shalt live in great assurance: and Tully says (De Offic. i): If a man is brave we expect him to be magnanimous, truth-loving, and far removed from deception. Therefore magnanimity is not a part of fortitude. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a magnanimous man is not philokindynos, that is, a lover of danger. But it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger. Therefore magnanimity has nothing in common with fortitude so as to be called a part thereof. Obj. 3: Further, magnanimity regards the great in things to be hoped for, whereas fortitude regards the great in things to be feared or dared. But good is of more import than evil. Therefore magnanimity is a more important virtue than fortitude. Therefore it is not a part thereof. On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnanimity as a part of fortitude. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, A. 3), a principal virtue is one to which it belongs to establish a general mode of virtue in a principal matter. Now one of the general modes of virtue is firmness of mind, because a firm standing is necessary in every virtue, according to Ethic. ii. And this is chiefly commended in those virtues that tend to something difficult, in which it is most difficult to preserve firmness. Wherefore the more difficult it is to stand firm in some matter of difficulty, the more principal is the virtue which makes the mind firm in that matter. Now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of death, wherein fortitude confirms the mind, than in hoping for or obtaining the greatest goods, wherein the mind is confirmed by magnanimity, for, as man loves his life above all things, so does he fly from dangers of death more than any others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity agrees with fortitude in confirming the mind about some difficult matter; but it falls short thereof, in that it confirms the mind about a matter wherein it is easier to stand firm. Hence magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal. Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1, 3), to lack evil is looked upon as a good, wherefore not to be overcome by a grievous evil, such as the danger of death, is looked upon as though it were the obtaining of a great good, the former belonging to fortitude, and the latter to magnanimity: in this sense fortitude and magnanimity may be considered as identical. Since, however, there is a differ-

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cipi possunt. Quia tamen alia ratio difficultatis est in ence as regards the difficulty on the part of either of the utroque praedictorum, ideo, proprie loquendo, magna- aforesaid, it follows that properly speaking magnanimity, nimitas ab Aristotele ponitur alia virtus a fortitudine. according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), is a distinct virtue from fortitude. Ad secundum dicendum quod amator periculi diReply Obj. 2: A man is said to love danger when he citur qui indifferenter se periculis exponit. Quod videtur exposes himself to all kinds of dangers, which seems to be pertinere ad eum qui indifferenter multa quasi magna the mark of one who thinks many the same as great. This is existimat, quod est contra rationem magnanimi, nul- contrary to the nature of a magnanimous man, for no one lus enim videtur pro aliquo se periculis exponere ni- seemingly exposes himself to danger for the sake of a thing si illud magnum existimet. Sed pro his quae vere sunt that he does not deem great. But for things that are truly magna, magnanimus promptissime periculis se exponit, great, a magnanimous man is most ready to expose himquia operatur magnum in actu fortitudinis, sicut et in ac- self to danger, since he does something great in the act of tibus aliarum virtutum. Unde et philosophus ibidem di- fortitude, even as in the acts of the other virtues. Hence the cit quod magnanimus non est microkindynus, idest pro Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that the magnanimous man parvis periclitans, sed megalokindynus, idest pro magnis is not mikrokindynos, i.e., endangering himself for small periclitans. Et Seneca dicit, in libro de quatuor Virtut., things, but megalokindynos, i.e., endangering himself for eris magnanimus, si pericula nec appetas ut temerarius, great things. And Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): Thou wilt nec formides ut timidus, nam nihil timidum facit animum be magnanimous if thou neither seekest dangers like a rash nisi reprehensibilis vitae conscientia. man, nor fearest them like a coward. For nothing makes the soul a coward save the consciousness of a wicked life. Ad tertium dicendum quod malum, inquantum Reply Obj. 3: Evil as such is to be avoided: and that one huiusmodi, fugiendum est, quod autem sit contra ipsum has to withstand it is accidental; in so far, to wit, as one has persistendum, est per accidens, inquantum scilicet opor- to suffer an evil in order to safeguard a good. But good as tet sustinere mala ad conservationem bonorum. Sed bo- such is to be desired, and that one avoids it is only accidennum de se est appetendum, et quod ab eo refugiatur, non tal, in so far, to wit, as it is deemed to surpass the ability of est nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet existimatur ex- the one who desires it. Now that which is so essentially is cedere facultatem desiderantis. Semper autem quod est always of more account than that which is so accidentally. per se potius est quam id quod est per accidens. Et ideo Wherefore the difficult in evil things is always more opmagis repugnat firmitati animi arduum in malis quam posed to firmness of mind than the difficult in good things. arduum in bonis. Et ideo principalior est virtus fortitudi- Hence the virtue of fortitude takes precedence of the virtue nis quam magnanimitatis, licet enim bonum sit simplici- of magnanimity. For though good is simply of more import ter principalius quam malum, malum tamen est princi- than evil, evil is of more import in this particular respect. palius quantum ad hoc.

Article 6 Whether confidence belongs to magnanimity? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fiducia non pertineat ad magnanimitatem. Potest enim aliquis habere fiduciam non solum de seipso, sed etiam de alio, secundum illud II ad Cor. III, fiduciam autem habemus per Iesum Christum ad Deum, non quod sumus sufficientes cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis. Sed hoc videtur esse contra rationem magnanimitatis. Ergo fiducia ad magnanimitatem non pertinet. Praeterea, fiducia videtur timori esse opposita, secundum illud Isaiae XII, fiducialiter agam, et non timebo. Sed carere timore magis pertinet ad fortitudinem. Ergo et fiducia magis ad fortitudinem pertinet quam ad magnanimitatem.

Objection 1: It seems that confidence does not belong to magnanimity. For a man may have assurance not only in himself, but also in another, according to 2 Cor. 3:4, 5, Such confidence we have, through Christ towards God, not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves. But this seems inconsistent with the idea of magnanimity. Therefore confidence does not belong to magnanimity. Obj. 2: Further, confidence seems to be opposed to fear, according to Isa. 12:2, I will deal confidently and will not fear. But to be without fear seems more akin to fortitude. Therefore confidence also belongs to fortitude rather than to magnanimity.

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Praeterea, praemium non debetur nisi virtuti. Sed fiduciae debetur praemium, dicitur enim Heb. III, quod nos sumus domus Christi, si fiduciam et gloriam spei usque in finem firmam retineamus. Ergo fiducia est quaedam virtus distincta a magnanimitate. Quod etiam videtur per hoc quod Macrobius eam magnanimitati condividit. Sed contra est quod Tullius, in sua rhetorica, videtur ponere fiduciam loco magnanimitatis, ut supra dictum est. Respondeo dicendum quod nomen fiduciae ex fide assumptum esse videtur. Ad fidem autem pertinet aliquid et alicui credere. Pertinet autem fiducia ad spem, secundum illud Iob XI, habebis fiduciam, proposita tibi spe. Et ideo nomen fiduciae hoc principaliter significare videtur, quod aliquis spem concipiat ex hoc quod credit verbis alicuius auxilium promittentis. Sed quia fides dicitur etiam opinio vehemens; contingit autem aliquid vehementer opinari non solum ex eo quod est ab alio dictum, sed etiam ex eo quod in alio consideratur, inde est quod fiducia etiam potest dici qua aliquis spem alicuius rei concipit ex aliquo considerato; quandoque quidem in seipso, puta cum aliquis, videns se sanum, confidit se diu victurum; quandoque autem in alio, puta cum aliquis, considerans alium amicum suum esse et potentem, fiduciam habet adiuvari ab eo. Dictum est autem supra quod magnanimitas proprie est circa spem alicuius ardui. Et ideo, quia fiducia importat quoddam robur spei proveniens ex aliqua consideratione quae facit vehementem opinionem de bono assequendo, inde est quod fiducia ad magnanimitatem pertinet. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., ad magnanimum pertinet nullo indigere, quia hoc deficientis est, hoc tamen debet intelligi secundum modum humanum; unde addit, vel vix. Hoc enim est supra hominem, ut omnino nullo indigeat. Indiget enim omnis homo, primo quidem, divino auxilio, secundario autem etiam auxilio humano, quia homo est naturaliter animal sociale, eo quod sibi non sufficit ad vitam. Inquantum ergo indiget aliis, sic ad magnanimum pertinet ut habeat fiduciam de aliis, quia hoc etiam ad excellentiam hominis pertinet, quod habeat alios in promptu qui eum possint iuvare. Inquantum autem ipse aliquid potest, intantum ad magnanimitatem pertinet fiducia quam habet de seipso. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de passionibus ageretur, spes quidem directe opponitur desperationi, quae est circa idem obiectum, scilicet circa bonum, sed secundum contrarietatem obiectorum opponitur timori, cuius obiectum est malum. Fiducia autem quoddam robur spei importat. Et ideo opponitur timori, sicut et spes. Sed quia fortitudo proprie

Q. 129, A. 6

Obj. 3: Further, reward is not due except to virtue. But a reward is due to confidence, according to Heb. 3:6, where it is said that we are the house of Christ, if we hold fast the confidence and glory of hope unto the end. Therefore confidence is a virtue distinct from magnanimity: and this is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius enumerates it with magnanimity (In Somn. Scip. i). On the contrary, Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii) seems to substitute confidence for magnanimity, as stated above in the preceding Question (ad 6) and in the prologue to this. I answer that, Confidence takes its name from fides (faith): and it belongs to faith to believe something and in somebody. But confidence belongs to hope, according to Job 11:18, Thou shalt have confidence, hope being set before thee. Wherefore confidence apparently denotes chiefly that a man derives hope through believing the word of one who promises to help him. Since, however, faith signifies also a strong opinion, and since one may come to have a strong opinion about something, not only on account of another’s statement, but also on account of something we observe in another, it follows that confidence may denote the hope of having something, which hope we conceive through observing something either in oneself—for instance, through observing that he is healthy, a man is confident that he will live long. Or in another, for instance, through observing that another is friendly to him and powerful, a man is confident that he will receive help from him. Now it has been stated above (A. 1, ad 2) that magnanimity is chiefly about the hope of something difficult. Wherefore, since confidence denotes a certain strength of hope arising from some observation which gives one a strong opinion that one will obtain a certain good, it follows that confidence belongs to magnanimity. Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), it belongs to the magnanimous to need nothing, for need is a mark of the deficient. But this is to be understood according to the mode of a man, hence he adds or scarcely anything. For it surpasses man to need nothing at all. For every man needs, first, the Divine assistance, second, even human assistance, since man is naturally a social animal, for he is sufficient by himself to provide for his own life. Accordingly, insofar as he needs others, it belongs to a magnanimous man to have confidence in others, for it is also a point of excellence in a man that he should have at hand those who are able to be of service to him. And insofar as his own ability goes, it belongs to a magnanimous man to be confident in himself. Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2; Q. 40, A. 4), when we were treating of the passions, hope is directly opposed to despair, because the latter is about the same object, namely good. But as regards contrariety of objects it is opposed to fear, because the latter’s object is evil. Now confidence denotes a certain strength of hope, wherefore it is opposed to fear even as hope is. Since, however,

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firmat hominem contra mala, magnanimitas autem circa prosecutionem bonorum; inde est quod fiducia magis proprie pertinet ad magnanimitatem quam ad fortitudinem. Sed quia spes causat audaciam, quae pertinet ad fortitudinem, inde est quod fiducia ad fortitudinem ex consequenti pertinet. Ad tertium dicendum quod fiducia, sicut dictum est, importat quendam modum spei, est enim fiducia spes roborata ex aliqua firma opinione. Modus autem adhibitus alicui affectioni potest pertinere ad commendationem ipsius actus, ut ex hoc sit meritorius, non tamen ex hoc determinatur ad speciem virtutis, sed ex materia. Et ideo fiducia non potest, proprie loquendo, nominare aliquam virtutem, sed potest nominare conditionem virtutis. Et propter hoc numeratur inter partes fortitudinis, non quasi virtus adiuncta (nisi secundum quod accipitur pro magnanimitate a Tullio), sed sicut pars integralis, ut dictum est.

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fortitude properly strengthens a man in respect of evil, and magnanimity in respect of the obtaining of good, it follows that confidence belongs more properly to magnanimity than to fortitude. Yet because hope causes daring, which belongs to fortitude, it follows in consequence that confidence pertains to fortitude. Reply Obj. 3: Confidence, as stated above, denotes a certain mode of hope: for confidence is hope strengthened by a strong opinion. Now the mode applied to an affection may call for commendation of the act, so that it become meritorious, yet it is not this that draws it to a species of virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly speaking, confidence cannot denote a virtue, though it may denote the conditions of a virtue. For this reason it is reckoned among the parts of fortitude, not as an annexed virtue, except as identified with magnanimity by Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii), but as an integral part, as stated in the preceding Question.

Article 7 Whether security belongs to magnanimity? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod securitas ad magnanimitatem non pertineat. Securitas enim, ut supra habitum est, importat quietem quandam a perturbatione timoris. Sed hoc maxime facit fortitudo. Ergo securitas videtur idem esse quod fortitudo. Sed fortitudo non pertinet ad magnanimitatem, sed potius e converso. Ergo neque securitas ad magnanimitatem pertinet. Praeterea, Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., quod securus dicitur quasi sine cura. Sed hoc videtur esse contra virtutem, quae curam habet de rebus honestis, secundum illud apostoli, II ad Tim. II, sollicite cura teipsum probabilem exhibere Deo. Ergo securitas non pertinet ad magnanimitatem, quae operatur magnum in omnibus virtutibus. Praeterea, non est idem virtus et virtutis praemium. Sed securitas ponitur praemium virtutis, ut patet Iob XI, si iniquitatem quae est in manu tua abstuleris, defossus securus dormies. Ergo securitas non pertinet ad magnanimitatem, neque ad aliam virtutem, sicut pars eius. Sed contra est quod Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., quod ad magnanimum pertinet neque perturbationi animi, neque homini, neque fortunae succumbere. Sed in hoc consistit hominis securitas. Ergo securitas ad magnanimitatem pertinet. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in II suae rhetoricae, timor facit homines consiliativos, inquantum scilicet curam habent qualiter possint ea

Objection 1: It seems that security does not belong to magnanimity. For security, as stated above (Q. 128, ad 6), denotes freedom from the disturbance of fear. But fortitude does this most effectively. Wherefore security is seemingly the same as fortitude. But fortitude does not belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case. Neither therefore does security belong to magnanimity. Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man is said to be secure because he is without care. But this seems to be contrary to virtue, which has a care for honorable things, according to 2 Tim. 2:15, Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God. Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity, which does great things in all the virtues. Obj. 3: Further, virtue is not its own reward. But security is accounted the reward of virtue, according to Job 11:14, 18, If thou wilt put away from thee the iniquity that is in thy hand . . . being buried thou shalt sleep secure. Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity or to any other virtue, as a part thereof. On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: Magnanimity consists of two things, that it belongs to magnanimity to give way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man, nor to fortune. But a man’s security consists in this. Therefore security belongs to magnanimity. I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), fear makes a man take counsel, because, to wit he takes care to avoid what he fears. Now security takes its name from the

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evadere quae timent. Securitas autem dicitur per remotionem huius curae quam timor ingerit. Et ideo securitas importat quandam perfectam quietem animi a timore, sicut fiducia importat quoddam robur spei. Sicut autem spes directe pertinet ad magnanimitatem, ita timor directe pertinet ad fortitudinem. Et ideo, sicut fiducia immediate pertinet ad magnanimitatem, ita securitas immediate pertinet ad fortitudinem. Considerandum tamen est quod, sicut spes est causa audaciae, ita timor est causa desperationis, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Et ideo, sicut fiducia ex consequenti pertinet ad fortitudinem, inquantum utitur audacia; ita et securitas ex consequenti pertinet ad magnanimitatem, inquantum repellit desperationem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod fortitudo non praecipue laudatur ex hoc quod non timeat, quod pertinet ad securitatem, sed inquantum importat firmitatem quandam in passionibus. Unde securitas non est idem quod fortitudo, sed est quaedam conditio eius. Ad secundum dicendum quod non quaelibet securitas est laudabilis, sed quando deponit aliquis curam prout debet, et in quibus timere non oportet. Et hoc modo est conditio fortitudinis et magnanimitatis. Ad tertium dicendum quod in virtutibus est quaedam similitudo et participatio futurae beatitudinis, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo nihil prohibet securitatem quandam esse conditionem alicuius virtutis, quamvis perfecta securitas ad praemium virtutis pertineat.

Q. 129, A. 8

removal of this care, of which fear is the cause: wherefore security denotes perfect freedom of the mind from fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope. Now, as hope directly belongs to magnanimity, so fear directly regards fortitude. Wherefore as confidence belongs immediately to magnanimity, so security belongs immediately to fortitude.

It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause of daring, so is fear the cause of despair, as stated above when we were treating of the passion (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2). Wherefore as confidence belongs indirectly to fortitude, insofar as it makes use of daring, so security belongs indirectly to magnanimity, insofar as it banishes despair. Reply Obj. 1: Fortitude is chiefly commended, not because it banishes fear, which belongs to security, but because it denotes a firmness of mind in the matter of the passion. Wherefore security is not the same as fortitude, but is a condition thereof. Reply Obj. 2: Not all security is worthy of praise but only when one puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when one should not fear: in this way it is a condition of fortitude and of magnanimity. Reply Obj. 3: There is in the virtues a certain likeness to, and participation of, future happiness, as stated above (I-II, Q. 5, AA. 3, 7). Hence nothing hinders a certain security from being a condition of a virtue, although perfect security belongs to virtue’s reward.

Article 8 Whether goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod bona fortunae non conferant ad magnanimitatem. Quia ut Seneca dicit, in libro de ira, virtus sibi sufficiens est. Sed magnanimitas facit omnes virtutes magnas, ut dictum est. Ergo bona fortunae non conferunt ad magnanimitatem. Praeterea, nullus virtuosus contemnit ea quibus iuvatur. Sed magnanimus contemnit ea quae pertinent ad exteriorem fortunam, dicit enim Tullius, in I de Offic., quod magnus animus in externarum rerum despicientia commendatur. Ergo magnanimitas non adiuvatur a bonis fortunae. Praeterea, ibidem Tullius subdit quod ad magnum animum pertinet ea quae videntur acerba ita ferre ut nihil a statu naturae discedat, nihil a dignitate sapientis. Et Aristoteles dicit, in IV Ethic., quod magnanimus in infortuniis non est tristis. Sed acerba et infortunia opponuntur bonis fortunae, quilibet autem tristatur de sub-

Objection 1: It seems that goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity. For according to Seneca (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi): virtue suffices for itself. Now magnanimity takes every virtue great, as stated above (A. 4, ad 3). Therefore goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity. Obj. 2: Further, no virtuous man despises what is helpful to him. But the magnanimous man despises whatever pertains to goods of fortune: for Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: Magnanimity consists of two things, that a great soul is commended for despising external things. Therefore a magnanimous man is not helped by goods of fortune. Obj. 3: Further, Tully adds (De Offic. i) that it belongs to a great soul so to bear what seems troublesome, as nowise to depart from his natural estate, or from the dignity of a wise man. And Aristotle says (Ethic. iv, 3) that a magnanimous man does not grieve at misfortune. Now troubles and misfortunes are opposed to goods of fortune, for every one

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Fortitude

tractione eorum quibus iuvatur. Ergo exteriora bona fortunae non conferunt ad magnanimitatem. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod bonae fortunae videntur conferre ad magnanimitatem. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, magnanimitas ad duo respicit, ad honorem quidem sicut ad materiam; sed ad aliquid magnum operandum sicut ad finem. Ad utrumque autem istorum bona fortunae cooperantur. Quia enim honor virtuosis non solum a sapientibus, sed etiam a multitudine exhibetur, quae maxima reputat huiusmodi exteriora bona fortunae; fit ex consequenti ut ab eis maior honor exhibeatur his quibus adsunt exteriora bona fortunae. Similiter etiam ad actus virtutum organice bona fortunae deserviunt, quia per divitias et potentiam et amicos datur nobis facultas operandi. Et ideo manifestum est quod bona fortunae conferunt ad magnanimitatem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus sibi sufficiens esse dicitur, quia sine his etiam exterioribus bonis esse potest. Indiget tamen his exterioribus bonis ad hoc quod expeditius operetur. Ad secundum dicendum quod magnanimus exteriora bona contemnit, inquantum non reputat ea magna bona, pro quibus debeat aliquid indecens facere. Non tamen quantum ad hoc contemnit ea, quin reputet ea utilia ad opus virtutis exequendum. Ad tertium dicendum quod quicumque non reputat aliquid magnum, neque multum gaudet si illud obtineat, neque multum tristatur si illud amittat. Et ideo, quia magnanimus non aestimat exteriora bona fortunae quasi aliqua magna, inde est quod nec de eis multum extollitur si adsint, neque in eorum amissione multum deiicitur.

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grieves at the loss of what is helpful to him. Therefore external goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that good fortune seems to conduce to magnanimity. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), magnanimity regards two things: honor as its matter, and the accomplishment of something great as its end. Now goods of fortune conduce to both these things. For since honor is conferred on the virtuous, not only by the wise, but also by the multitude who hold these goods of fortune in the highest esteem, the result is that they show greater honor to those who possess goods of fortune. Likewise goods of fortune are useful organs or instruments of virtuous deeds: since we can easily accomplish things by means of riches, power and friends. Hence it is evident that goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity. Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself, because it can be without even these external goods; yet it needs them in order to act more expeditiously. Reply Obj. 2: The magnanimous man despises external goods, inasmuch as he does not think them so great as to be bound to do anything unbecoming for their sake. Yet he does not despise them, but that he esteems them useful for the accomplishment of virtuous deeds. Reply Obj. 3: If a man does not think much of a thing, he is neither very joyful at obtaining it, nor very grieved at losing it. Wherefore, since the magnanimous man does not think much of external goods, that is goods of fortune, he is neither much uplifted by them if he has them, nor much cast down by their loss.

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Question 130 Presumption Deinde considerandum est de vitiis oppositis magnanimitati. Et primo, de illis quae opponuntur sibi per excessum, quae sunt tria, scilicet praesumptio, ambitio, inanis gloria. Secundo, de pusillanimitate, quae opponitur ei per modum defectus. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum praesumptio sit peccatum. Secundo, utrum opponatur magnanimitati per excessum.

We must now consider the vices opposed to magnanimity; and in the first place, those that are opposed thereto by excess. These are three, namely, presumption, ambition, and vainglory. Second, we shall consider pusillanimity which is opposed to it by way of deficiency. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether presumption is a sin? (2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?

Article 1 Whether presumption is a sin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praesumptio non sit peccatum. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Philipp. III, quae retro sunt obliviscens, ad anteriora me extendo. Sed hoc videtur ad praesumptionem pertinere quod aliquis tendat in ea quae sunt supra seipsum. Ergo praesumptio non est peccatum. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod oportet non secundum suadentes humana sapere hominem entem, neque mortalia mortalem, sed inquantum contingit immortale facere. Et in I Metaphys. dicit quod homo debet se trahere ad divina inquantum potest. Sed divina et immortalia maxime videntur esse supra hominem. Cum ergo de ratione praesumptionis sit quod aliquis tendat in ea quae sunt supra seipsum, videtur quod praesumptio non sit peccatum sed magis sit aliquid laudabile. Praeterea, apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. III, non sumus sufficientes cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis. Si ergo praesumptio, secundum quam aliquis nititur in ea ad quae non sufficit, sit peccatum, videtur quod homo nec cogitare aliquod bonum licite possit. Quod est inconveniens. Non ergo praesumptio est peccatum. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XXXVII, o praesumptio nequissima, unde creata es? Ubi respondet Glossa, de mala scilicet voluntate creaturae. Sed omne quod procedit ex radice malae voluntatis est peccatum. Ergo praesumptio est peccatum. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum ea quae sunt secundum naturam sint ordinata ratione divina, quam humana ratio debet imitari, quidquid secundum rationem humanam fit quod est contra ordinem communiter in naturalibus rebus inventum, est vitiosum et peccatum.

Objection 1: It seems that presumption is not a sin. For the Apostle says: Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch forth myself to those that are before. But it seems to savor of presumption that one should tend to what is above oneself. Therefore presumption is not a sin. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 7) we should not listen to those who would persuade us to relish human things because we are men, or mortal things because we are mortal, but we should relish those that make us immortal: and (Metaph. i) that man should pursue divine things as far as possible. Now divine and immortal things are seemingly far above man. Since then presumption consists essentially in tending to what is above oneself, it seems that presumption is something praiseworthy, rather than a sin. Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor 3:5): Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves. If then presumption, by which one strives at that for which one is not sufficient, be a sin, it seems that man cannot lawfully even think of anything good: which is absurd. Therefore presumption is not a sin. On the contrary, It is written (Sir 37:3): O wicked presumption, whence camest thou? and a gloss answers: From a creature’s evil will. Now all that comes of the root of an evil will is a sin. Therefore presumption is a sin. I answer that, Since whatever is according to nature, is ordered by the Divine Reason, which human reason ought to imitate, whatever is done in accordance with human reason in opposition to the order established in general throughout natural things is vicious and sinful. Now it

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Q. 130, A. 2

Fortitude

Hoc autem communiter in omnibus rebus naturalibus invenitur, quod quaelibet actio commensuratur virtuti agentis, nec aliquod agens naturale nititur ad agendum id quod excedit suam facultatem. Et ideo vitiosum est et peccatum, quasi contra ordinem naturalem existens, quod aliquis assumat ad agendum ea quae praeferuntur suae virtuti. Quod pertinet ad rationem praesumptionis, sicut et ipsum nomen manifestat. Unde manifestum est quod praesumptio est peccatum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse supra potentiam activam alicuius rei naturalis quod non est supra potentiam passivam eiusdem, inest enim aeri potentia passiva per quam potest transmutari in hoc quod habeat actionem et motum ignis, quae excedunt potentiam activam aeris. Sic etiam vitiosum esset et praesumptuosum quod aliquis in statu imperfectae virtutis existens attentaret statim assequi ea quae sunt perfectae virtutis, sed si quis ad hoc tendat ut proficiat in virtutem perfectam, hoc non est praesumptuosum nec vitiosum. Et hoc modo apostolus in anteriora se extendebat, scilicet per continuum profectum. Ad secundum dicendum quod divina et immortalia secundum ordinem naturae sunt supra hominem, homini tamen inest quaedam naturalis potentia, scilicet intellectus, per quam potest coniungi immortalibus et divinis. Et secundum hoc philosophus dicit quod oportet hominem se attrahere ad immortalia et divina, non quidem ut ea operetur quae decet Deum facere, sed ut ei uniatur per intellectum et voluntatem. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quae per alios possumus, aliqualiter per nos possumus. Et ideo, quia cogitare et facere bonum possumus cum auxilio divino, non totaliter hoc excedit facultatem nostram. Et ideo non est praesumptuosum si aliquis ad aliquod opus virtuosum faciendum intendat. Esset autem praesumptuosum si ad hoc aliquis tenderet absque fiducia divini auxilii.

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is established throughout all natural things, that every action is commensurate with the power of the agent, nor does any natural agent strive to do what exceeds its ability. Hence it is vicious and sinful, as being contrary to the natural order, that any one should assume to do what is above his power: and this is what is meant by presumption, as its very name shows. Wherefore it is evident that presumption is a sin. Reply Obj. 1: Above the active power of a natural thing, and yet not above the passive power of that same thing: thus the air is possessed of a passive power by reason of which it can be so changed as to obtain the action and movement of fire, which surpass the active power of air. Thus too it would be sinful and presumptuous for a man while in a state of imperfect virtue to attempt the immediate accomplishment of what belongs to perfect virtue. But it is not presumptuous or sinful for a man to endeavor to advance towards perfect virtue. In this way the Apostle stretched himself forth to the things that were before him, namely continually advancing forward. Reply Obj. 2: Divine and immortal things surpass man according to the order of nature. Yet man is possessed of a natural power, namely the intellect, whereby he can be united to immortal and Divine things. In this respect the Philosopher says that man ought to pursue immortal and divine things, not that he should do what it becomes God to do, but that he should be united to Him in intellect and will. Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), what we can do by the help of others we can do by ourselves in a sense. Hence since we can think and do good by the help of God, this is not altogether above our ability. Hence it is not presumptuous for a man to attempt the accomplishment of a virtuous deed: but it would be presumptuous if one were to make the attempt without confidence in God’s assistance.

Article 2 Whether presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praesumptio non opponatur magnanimitati per excessum. Praesumptio enim ponitur species peccati in spiritum sanctum, ut supra habitum est. Sed peccatum in spiritum sanctum non opponitur magnanimitati, sed magis caritati. Ergo etiam neque praesumptio opponitur magnanimitati. Praeterea, ad magnanimitatem pertinet quod aliquis se magnis dignificet. Sed aliquis dicitur praesumptuosus etiam si se parvis dignificet, dummodo hoc exce-

Objection 1: It seems that presumption is not opposed to magnanimity by excess. For presumption is accounted a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 2; Q. 21, A. 1). But the sin against the Holy Spirit is not opposed to magnanimity, but to charity. Neither therefore is presumption opposed to magnanimity. Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to magnanimity that one should deem oneself worthy of great things. But a man is said to be presumptuous even if he deem himself worthy of

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dat propriam facultatem. Non ergo directe praesumptio magnanimitati opponitur. Praeterea, magnanimus exteriora bona reputat quasi parva. Sed secundum philosophum, in IV Ethic., praesumptuosi propter exteriorem fortunam fiunt despectores et iniuriatores aliorum, quasi magnum aliquid aestimantes exteriora bona. Ergo praesumptio non opponitur magnanimitati per excessum, sed solum per defectum. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II et IV Ethic., dicit quod magnanimo per excessum opponitur chaunus, idest furiosus vel ventosus, quem nos dicimus praesumptuosum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, magnanimitas consistit in medio, non quidem secundum quantitatem eius in quod tendit, quia tendit in maximum, sed constituitur in medio secundum proportionem ad propriam facultatem; non enim in maiora tendit quam sibi conveniant. Praesumptuosus autem, quantum ad id in quod tendit, non excedit magnanimum, sed multum quandoque ab eo deficit. Excedit autem secundum proportionem suae facultatis, quam magnanimus non transcendit. Et hoc modo praesumptio opponitur magnanimitati per excessum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non quaelibet praesumptio ponitur peccatum in spiritum sanctum, sed illa qua quis divinam iustitiam contemnit ex inordinata confidentia divinae misericordiae. Et talis praesumptio, ratione materiae, inquantum scilicet per eam contemnitur aliquid divinum, opponitur caritati, vel potius dono timoris, cuius est Deum revereri. Inquantum tamen talis contemptus excedit proportionem propriae facultatis, potest opponi magnanimitati. Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut magnanimitas, ita et praesumptio in aliquid magnum tendere videtur, non enim multum consuevit dici aliquis praesumptuosus si in aliquo modico vires proprias transcendat. Si tamen praesumptuosus talis dicatur, haec praesumptio non opponitur magnanimitati, sed illi virtuti quae est circa mediocres honores, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod nullus attentat aliquid supra suam facultatem nisi inquantum facultatem suam aestimat maiorem quam sit. Circa quod potest esse error dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum solam quantitatem, puta cum aliquis aestimat se habere maiorem virtutem vel scientiam, vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi, quam habeat. Alio modo, secundum genus rei, puta cum aliquis ex hoc aestimat se magnum et magnis dignum ex quo non est, puta propter divitias vel propter aliqua bona fortunae; ut enim philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., qui sine virtute talia bona habent, neque iuste magnis seipsos dignificant, neque recte magnanimi dicuntur.

Q. 130, A. 2

small things, if they surpass his ability. Therefore presumption is not directly opposed to magnanimity. Obj. 3: Further, the magnanimous man looks upon external goods as little things. Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), on account of external fortune the presumptuous disdain and wrong others, because they deem external goods as something great. Therefore presumption is opposed to magnanimity, not by excess, but only by deficiency. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 3) that the vain man, i.e., a vaporer or a wind-bag, which with us denotes a presumptuous man, is opposed to the magnanimous man by excess. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 1), magnanimity observes the means, not as regards the quantity of that to which it tends, but in proportion to our own ability: for it does not tend to anything greater than is becoming to us. Now the presumptuous man, as regards that to which he tends, does not exceed the magnanimous, but sometimes falls far short of him: but he does exceed in proportion to his own ability, whereas the magnanimous man does not exceed his. It is in this way that presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess. Reply Obj. 1: It is not every presumption that is accounted a sin against the Holy Spirit, but that by which one contemns the Divine justice through inordinate confidence in the Divine mercy. The latter kind of presumption, by reason of its matter, inasmuch, to wit, as it implies contempt of something Divine, is opposed to charity, or rather to the gift of fear, whereby we revere God. Nevertheless, insofar as this contempt exceeds the proportion to one’s own ability, it can be opposed to magnanimity. Reply Obj. 2: Presumption, like magnanimity, seems to tend to something great. For we are not, as a rule, wont to call a man presumptuous for going beyond his powers in something small. If, however, such a man be called presumptuous, this kind of presumption is not opposed to magnanimity, but to that virtue which is about ordinary honor, as stated above (Q. 129, A. 2). Reply Obj. 3: No one attempts what is above his ability, except insofar as he deems his ability greater than it is. In this one may err in two ways. First only as regards quantity, as when a man thinks he has greater virtue, or knowledge, or the like, than he has. Second, as regards the kind of thing, as when he thinks himself great, and worthy of great things, by reason of something that does not make him so, for instance by reason of riches or goods of fortune. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), those who have these things without virtue, neither justly deem themselves worthy of great things, nor are rightly called magnanimous.

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Fortitude

Similiter etiam illud ad quod aliquis tendit supra vires suas, quandoque quidem secundum rei veritatem est magnum simpliciter, sicut patet de Petro, qui tendebat ad hoc quod pro Christo pateretur, quod erat supra virtutem suam. Quandoque vero non est aliquid magnum simpliciter, sed solum secundum stultorum opinionem, sicut pretiosis vestibus indui, despicere et iniuriari aliis. Quod quidem pertinet ad excessum magnanimitatis non secundum rei veritatem, sed secundum opinionem. Unde Seneca dicit, in libro de quatuor Virtut., quod magnanimitas, si se extra modum suum extollat, faciet virum minacem, inflatum, turbidum, inquietum, et in quascumque excellentias dictorum factorumque, neglecta honestate, festinum. Et sic patet quod praesumptuosus secundum rei veritatem quandoque deficit a magnanimo, sed secundum apparentiam in excessu se habet.

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Again, the thing to which a man sometimes tends in excess of his ability, is sometimes in very truth something great, simply as in the case of Peter, whose intent was to suffer for Christ, which has exceeded his power; while sometimes it is something great, not simply, but only in the opinion of fools, such as wearing costly clothes, despising and wronging others. This savors of an excess of magnanimity, not in any truth, but in people’s opinion. Hence Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.) that when magnanimity exceeds its measure, it makes a man high-handed, proud, haughty, restless, and bent on excelling in all things, whether in words or in deeds, without any considerations of virtue. Thus it is evident that the presumptuous man sometimes falls short of the magnanimous in reality, although in appearance he surpasses him.

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Question 131 Ambition Deinde considerandum est de ambitione. Et circa We must now consider ambition: and under this head hoc quaeruntur duo: there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum ambitio sit peccatum. (1) Whether it is a sin? Secundo, utrum opponatur magnanimitati per (2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess? excessum.

Article 1 Whether ambition is a sin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ambitio non sit peccatum. Importat enim ambitio cupiditatem honoris. Honor autem de se quoddam bonum est, et maximum inter exteriora bona, unde et illi qui de honore non curant, vituperantur. Ergo ambitio non est peccatum, sed magis aliquid laudabile, secundum quod bonum laudabiliter appetitur. Praeterea, quilibet absque vitio potest appetere id quod sibi debetur pro praemio. Sed honor est praemium virtutis, ut philosophus dicit, in I et VIII Ethic. Ergo ambitio honoris non est peccatum. Praeterea, illud per quod homo provocatur ad bonum et revocatur a malo, non est peccatum. Sed per honorem homines provocantur ad bona facienda et mala vitanda, sicut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod fortissimi videntur esse apud quos timidi sunt inhonorati, fortes autem honorati; et Tullius dicit, in libro de Tusculan. quaest., quod honor alit artes. Ergo ambitio non est peccatum. Sed contra est quod dicitur I ad Cor. XIII, quod caritas non est ambitiosa, non quaerit quae sua sunt. Nihil aut repugnat caritati nisi peccatum. Ergo ambitio est peccatum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, honor importat quandam reverentiam alicui exhibitam in testimonium excellentiae eius. Circa excellentiam autem hominis duo sunt attendenda. Primo quidem, quod id secundum quod homo excellit, non habet homo a seipso, sed est quasi quiddam divinum in eo. Et ideo ex hoc non debetur principaliter sibi honor, sed Deo. Secundo considerandum est quod id in quo homo excellit, datur homini a Deo ut ex eo aliis prosit. Unde intantum debet homini placere testimonium suae excellentiae quod ab aliis exhibetur, inquantum ex hoc paratur sibi via ad hoc quod aliis prosit.

Objection 1: It seems that ambition is not a sin. For ambition denotes the desire of honor. Now honor is in itself a good thing, and the greatest of external goods: wherefore those who care not for honor are reproved. Therefore ambition is not a sin; rather is it something deserving of praise, insofar as a good is laudably desired. Obj. 2: Further, anyone may, without sin, desire what is due to him as a reward. Now honor is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 12; iv, 3; viii, 14). Therefore ambition of honor is not a sin. Obj. 3: Further, that which heartens a man to do good and disheartens him from doing evil, is not a sin. Now honor heartens men to do good and to avoid evil; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that with the bravest men, cowards are held in dishonor, and the brave in honor: and Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that honor fosters the arts. Therefore ambition is not a sin. On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor 13:5) that charity is not ambitious, seeketh not her own. Now nothing is contrary to charity, except sin. Therefore ambition is a sin. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 103, AA. 1, 2), honor denotes reverence shown to a person in witness of his excellence. Now two things have to be considered with regard to man’s honor. The first is that a man has not from himself the thing in which he excels, for this is, as it were, something Divine in him, wherefore on this count honor is due principally, not to him but to God. The second point that calls for observation is that the thing in which man excels is given to him by God, that he may profit others thereby: wherefore a man ought so far to be pleased that others bear witness to his excellence, as this enables him to profit others.

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Tripliciter ergo appetitum honoris contingit esse inordinatum. Uno modo, per hoc quod aliquis appetit testimonium de excellentia quam non habet, quod est appetere honorem supra suam proportionem. Alio modo, per hoc quod honorem sibi cupit non referendo in Deum. Tertio modo, per hoc quod appetitus eius in ipso honore quiescit, non referens honorem ad utilitatem aliorum. Ambitio autem importat inordinatum appetitum honoris. Unde manifestum est quod ambitio semper est peccatum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod appetitus boni debet regulari secundum rationem, cuius regulam si transcendat, erit vitiosus. Et hoc modo vitiosum est quod aliquis honorem appetat non secundum ordinem rationis. Vituperantur autem qui non curant de honore secundum quod ratio dictat, ut scilicet vitent ea quae sunt contraria honori. Ad secundum dicendum quod honor non est praemium virtutis quoad ipsum virtuosum, ut scilicet hoc pro praemio expetere debeat, sed pro praemio expetit beatitudinem, quae est finis virtutis. Dicitur autem esse praemium virtutis ex parte aliorum, qui non habent aliquid maius quod virtuoso retribuant quam honorem, qui ex hoc ipso magnitudinem habet quod perhibet testimonium virtuti. Unde patet quod non est sufficiens praemium, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut per appetitum honoris, quando debito modo appetitur, aliqui provocantur ad bonum et revocantur a malo; ita etiam, si inordinate appetatur, potest esse homini occasio multa mala faciendi, dum scilicet non curat qualitercumque honorem consequi possit. Unde Sallustius dicit, in Catilinario, quod gloriam, honorem et imperium bonus et ignavus aeque sibi exoptat, sed ille, scilicet bonus, vera via nititur; huic, scilicet ignavo, quia bonae artes desunt, dolis atque fallaciis contendit. Et tamen illi qui solum propter honorem vel bona faciunt vel mala vitant, non sunt virtuosi, ut patet per philosophum, in III Ethic., ubi dicit quod non sunt vere fortes qui propter honorem fortia faciunt.

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Now the desire of honor may be inordinate in three ways. First, when a man desires recognition of an excellence which he has not: this is to desire more than his share of honor. Second, when a man desires honor for himself without referring it to God. Third, when a man’s appetite rests in honor itself, without referring it to the profit of others. Since then ambition denotes inordinate desire of honor, it is evident that it is always a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: The desire for good should be regulated according to reason, and if it exceed this rule it will be sinful. In this way it is sinful to desire honor in disaccord with the order of reason. Now those are reproved who care not for honor in accordance with reason’s dictate that they should avoid what is contrary to honor. Reply Obj. 2: Honor is not the reward of virtue, as regards the virtuous man, in this sense that he should seek for it as his reward: since the reward he seeks is happiness, which is the end of virtue. But it is said to be the reward of virtue as regards others, who have nothing greater than honor whereby to reward the virtuous; which honor derives greatness from the very fact that it bears witness to virtue. Hence it is evident that it is not an adequate reward, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Reply Obj. 3: Just as some are heartened to do good and disheartened from doing evil, by the desire of honor, if this be desired in due measure; so, if it be desired inordinately, it may become to man an occasion of doing many evil things, as when a man cares not by what means he obtains honor. Wherefore Sallust says (Catilin.) that the good as well as the wicked covet honors for themselves, but the one, i.e., the good, go about it in the right way, whereas the other, i.e., the wicked, through lack of the good arts, make use of deceit and falsehood. Yet they who, merely for the sake of honor, either do good or avoid evil, are not virtuous, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8), where he says that they who do brave things for the sake of honor are not truly brave.

Article 2 Whether ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ambitio non opponatur magnanimitati per excessum. Uni enim medio non opponitur ex una parte nisi unum extremum. Sed magnanimitati per excessum opponitur praesumptio ut dictum est. Ergo non opponitur ei ambitio per excessum. Praeterea, magnanimitas est circa honores. Sed ambitio videtur pertinere ad dignitates, dicitur enim II

Objection 1: It seems that ambition is not opposed to magnanimity by excess. For one mean has only one extreme opposed to it on the one side. Now presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess as stated above (Q. 130, A. 2). Therefore ambition is not opposed to it by excess. Obj. 2: Further, magnanimity is about honors; whereas ambition seems to regard positions of dignity: for it is writ-

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Machab. IV, quod Iason ambiebat summum sacerdotium. ten (2 Macc 4:7) that Jason ambitiously sought the high Ergo ambitio non opponitur magnanimitati. priesthood. Therefore ambition is not opposed to magnanimity. Praeterea, ambitio videtur ad exteriorem apparaObj. 3: Further, ambition seems to regard outward tum pertinere, dicitur enim Act. XXV, quod Agrippa et show: for it is written (Acts 25:27) that Agrippa and Berenice cum multa ambitione introierunt praetorium; Berenice . . . with great pomp (ambitione) . . . had entered into et II Paralip. XVI, quod super corpus Asa mortui com- the hall of audience, and (2 Chr 16:14) that when Asa died busserunt aromata et unguenta ambitione nimia. Sed they burned spices and . . . ointments over his body with very magnanimitas non est circa exteriorem apparatum. Er- great pomp (ambitione). But magnanimity is not about outgo ambitio non opponitur magnanimitati. ward show. Therefore ambition is not opposed to magnanimity. Sed contra est quod Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) that the quod sicut quisque magnitudine animi excellit, ita maxi- more a man exceeds in magnanimity, the more he desires me vult princeps omnium solus esse. Sed hoc pertinet ad himself alone to dominate others. But this pertains to ambiambitionem. Ergo ambitio pertinet ad excessum magna- tion. Therefore ambition denotes an excess of magnanimity. nimitatis. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, amI answer that, As stated above (A. 1), ambition sigbitio importat inordinatum appetitum honoris. Magna- nifies inordinate love of honor. Now magnanimity is about nimitas autem est circa honores, et utitur eis secundum honors and makes use of them in a becoming manner. quod oportet. Unde manifestum est quod ambitio oppo- Wherefore it is evident that ambition is opposed to magnanitur magnanimitati sicut inordinatum ordinato. nimity as the inordinate to that which is well ordered. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod magnanimitas ad Reply Obj. 1: Magnanimity regards two things. It reduo respicit. Ad unum quidem sicut ad finem inten- gards one as its end, insofar as it is some great deed that the tum, quod est aliquod magnum opus, quod magnani- magnanimous man attempts in proportion to his ability. In mus attentat secundum suam facultatem. Et quantum ad this way presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess: hoc opponitur magnanimitati per excessum praesump- because the presumptuous man attempts great deeds betio, quae attentat aliquod magnum opus supra suam fa- yond his ability. The other thing that magnanimity regards cultatem. Ad aliud autem respicit magnanimitas sicut is its matter, viz. honor, of which it makes right use: and ad materiam qua debite utitur, scilicet ad honorem. Et in this way ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess. quantum ad hoc opponitur magnanimitati per excessum Nor is it impossible for one mean to be exceeded in various ambitio. Non est autem inconveniens secundum diversa respects. esse plures excessus unius medii. Ad secundum dicendum quod illis qui sunt in diReply Obj. 2: Honor is due to those who are in a posignitate constituti, propter quandam excellentiam status, tion of dignity, on account of a certain excellence of their debetur honor. Et secundum hoc inordinatus appetitus estate: and accordingly inordinate desire for positions of dignitatum pertinet ad ambitionem. Si quis enim inor- dignity pertains to ambition. For if a man were to have an dinate appeteret dignitatem non ratione honoris, sed inordinate desire for a position of dignity, not for the sake of propter debitum dignitatis usum suam facultatem exce- honor, but for the sake of a right use of a dignity exceeding dentem, non esset ambitiosus, sed magis praesumptuo- his ability, he would not be ambitious but presumptuous. sus. Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsa solemnitas exteReply Obj. 3: The very solemnity of outward worship rioris cultus ad quendam honorem pertinet, unde et ta- is a kind of honor, wherefore in such cases honor is wont to libus consuevit honor exhiberi. Quod significatur Iac. II, be shown. This is signified by the words of James 2:2, 3: If si introierit in conventum vestrum vir anulum habens au- there shall come into your assembly a man having a golden reum, in veste candida, et dixeritis ei, tu sede hic bene, et ring, in fine apparel . . . and you . . . shall say to him: Sit thou cetera. Unde ambitio non est circa exteriorem cultum ni- here well, etc. Wherefore ambition does not regard outward si secundum quod pertinet ad honorem. worship, except insofar as this is a kind of honor.

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Question 132 Vainglory Deinde considerandum est de inani gloria. Et circa We must now consider vainglory: under which head hoc quaeruntur quinque. there are five points of inquiry: Primo, utrum appetitus gloriae sit peccatum. (1) Whether desire of glory is a sin? Secundo, utrum inanis gloria magnanimitati (2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity? opponatur. Tertio, utrum sit peccatum mortale. (3) Whether it is a mortal sin? Quarto, utrum sit vitium capitale. (4) Whether it is a capital vice? Quinto, de filiabus eius. (5) Of its daughters.

Article 1 Whether the desire of glory is a sin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod appetitus gloriae non sit peccatum. Nullus enim peccat in hoc quod Deo assimilatur, quinimmo mandatur, Ephes. V, estote imitatores Dei, sicut filii carissimi. Sed in hoc quod homo quaerit gloriam, videtur Deum imitari, qui ab hominibus gloriam quaerit, unde dicitur Isaiae XLIII, omnem qui invocat nomen meum, in gloriam meam creavi eum. Ergo appetitus gloriae non est peccatum. Praeterea, illud per quod aliquis provocatur ad bonum, non videtur esse peccatum. Sed per appetitum gloriae homines provocantur ad bonum, dicit enim Tullius, in libro de Tusculan. quaest., quod omnes ad studia impelluntur gloria. In sacra etiam Scriptura promittitur gloria pro bonis operibus, secundum illud Rom. II, his qui sunt secundum patientiam boni operis, gloriam et honorem. Ergo appetitus gloriae non est peccatum. Praeterea, Tullius dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod gloria est frequens de aliquo fama cum laude, et ad idem pertinet quod Ambrosius dicit, quod gloria est clara cum laude notitia. Sed appetere laudabilem famam non est peccatum, quinimmo videtur esse laudabile, secundum illud Eccli. XLI, curam habe de bono nomine; et ad Rom. XII, providentes bona non solum coram Deo, sed etiam coram omnibus hominibus. Ergo appetitus inanis gloriae non est peccatum.

Objection 1: It seems that the desire of glory is not a sin. For no one sins in being likened to God: in fact we are commanded (Eph 5:1): Be ye . . . followers of God, as most dear children. Now by seeking glory man seems to imitate God, Who seeks glory from men: wherefore it is written (Isa 43:6, 7): Bring My sons from afar, and My daughters from the ends of the earth. And every one that calleth on My name, I have created him for My glory. Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin. Obj. 2: Further, that which incites a man to do good is apparently not a sin. Now the desire of glory incites men to do good. For Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that glory inflames every man to strive his utmost: and in Holy Writ glory is promised for good works, according to Rom. 2:7: To them, indeed, who according to patience in good work . . . glory and honor. Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that glory is consistent good report about a person, together with praise: and this comes to the same as what Augustine says (Contra Maximin. iii), viz. that glory is, as it were, clear knowledge with praise. Now it is no sin to desire praiseworthy renown: indeed, it seems itself to call for praise, according to Ecclus. 41:15, Take care of a good name, and Rom. 12:17, Providing good things not only in the sight of God, but also in the sight of all men. Therefore the desire of vainglory is not a sin. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, V de Civ. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v): Dei, sanius videt qui et amorem laudis vitium esse cogno- He is better advised who acknowledges that even the love of scit. praise is sinful. Respondeo dicendum quod gloria claritatem quanI answer that, Glory signifies a certain clarity, dam significat, unde glorificari idem est quod clarificari, wherefore Augustine says (Tract. lxxxii, c, cxiv in Joan.) that ut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan. Claritas autem et de- to be glorified is the same as to be clarified. Now clarity

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corem quendam habet, et manifestationem. Et ideo nomen gloriae proprie importat manifestationem alicuius de hoc quod apud homines decorum videtur, sive illud sit bonum aliquod corporale, sive spirituale. Quia vero illud quod simpliciter clarum est, a multis conspici potest et a remotis, ideo proprie per nomen gloriae designatur quod bonum alicuius deveniat in multorum notitiam et approbationem, secundum quem modum dicitur in Tito Livio, gloriari ad unum non est. Largius tamen accepto nomine gloriae, non solum consistit in multitudinis cognitione, sed etiam paucorum vel unius, aut sui solius, dum scilicet aliquis proprium bonum considerat ut dignum laude. Quod autem aliquis bonum suum cognoscat et approbet, non est peccatum, dicitur enim I ad Cor. II, nos autem non spiritum huius mundi accepimus, sed spiritum qui ex Deo est, ut sciamus quae a Deo donata sunt nobis. Similiter etiam non est peccatum quod aliquis velit bona sua ab aliis approbari, dicitur enim Matth. V, luceat lux vestra coram hominibus. Et ideo appetitus gloriae de se non nominat aliquid vitiosum. Sed appetitus inanis vel vanae gloriae vitium importat, nam quidlibet vanum appetere vitiosum est, secundum illud Psalmi, ut quid diligitis vanitatem, et quaeritis mendacium? Potest autem gloria dici vana, uno modo, ex parte rei de qua quis gloriam quaerit, puta cum quis quaerit gloriam de eo quod non est, vel de eo quod non est gloria dignum, sicut de aliqua re fragili et caduca. Alio modo, ex parte eius a quo quis gloriam quaerit, puta hominis, cuius iudicium non est certum. Tertio modo, ex parte ipsius qui gloriam appetit, qui videlicet appetitum gloriae suae non refert in debitum finem, puta ad honorem Dei vel proximi salutem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, super illud Ioan. XIII, vos vocatis me, magister et domine, et bene dicitis, periculosum est sibi placere cui cavendum est superbire. Ille autem qui super omnia est, quantumcumque se laudet, non se extollit. Nobis namque expedit Deum nosse, non illi, nec eum quisque cognoscit, si non se indicet ipse qui novit. Unde patet quod Deus suam gloriam non quaerit propter se, sed propter nos. Et similiter etiam homo laudabiliter potest ad aliorum utilitatem gloriam suam appetere, secundum illud Matth. V, videant opera vestra bona, et glorificent patrem vestrum qui in caelis est. Ad secundum dicendum quod gloria quae habetur a Deo, non est gloria vana, sed vera. Et talis gloria bonis operibus in praemium repromittitur. De qua dicitur, II ad Cor. X, qui gloriatur, in domino glorietur, non enim qui seipsum commendat, ille probatus est; sed quem Deus commendat. Provocantur etiam aliqui ad virtutum opera ex appetitu gloriae humanae, sicut etiam ex appetitu aliorum terrenorum bonorum, non tamen est vere vir-

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and comeliness imply a certain display: wherefore the word glory properly denotes the display of something as regards its seeming comely in the sight of men, whether it be a bodily or a spiritual good. Since, however, that which is clear simply can be seen by many, and by those who are far away, it follows that the word glory properly denotes that somebody’s good is known and approved by many, according to the saying of Sallust (Catilin.): I must not boast while I am addressing one man. But if we take the word glory in a broader sense, it not only consists in the knowledge of many, but also in the knowledge of few, or of one, or of oneself alone, as when one considers one’s own good as being worthy of praise. Now it is not a sin to know and approve one’s own good: for it is written (1 Cor 2:12): Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God that we may know the things that are given us from God. Likewise it is not a sin to be willing to approve one’s own good works: for it is written (Matt 5:16): Let your light shine before men. Hence the desire for glory does not, of itself, denote a sin: but the desire for empty or vain glory denotes a sin: for it is sinful to desire anything vain, according to Ps. 4:3, Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying? Now glory may be called vain in three ways. First, on the part of the thing for which one seeks glory: as when a man seeks glory for that which is unworthy of glory, for instance when he seeks it for something frail and perishable: second, on the part of him from whom he seeks glory, for instance a man whose judgment is uncertain: third, on the part of the man himself who seeks glory, for that he does not refer the desire of his own glory to a due end, such as God’s honor, or the spiritual welfare of his neighbor. Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says on John 13:13, You call Me Master and Lord; and you say well (Tract. lviii in Joan.): Self-complacency is fraught with danger of one who has to beware of pride. But He Who is above all, however much He may praise Himself, does not uplift Himself. For knowledge of God is our need, not His: nor does any man know Him unless he be taught of Him Who knows. It is therefore evident that God seeks glory, not for His own sake, but for ours. In like manner a man may rightly seek his own glory for the good of others, according to Matt. 5:16, That they may see your good works, and glorify your Father Who is in heaven. Reply Obj. 2: That which we receive from God is not vain but true glory: it is this glory that is promised as a reward for good works, and of which it is written (2 Cor 10:17, 18): He that glorieth let him glory in the Lord, for not he who commendeth himself is approved, but he whom God commendeth. It is true that some are heartened to do works of virtue, through desire for human glory, as also through the desire for other earthly goods. Yet he is not

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tuosus qui propter humanam gloriam opera virtutis operatur, ut Augustinus probat, in V de Civ. Dei. Ad tertium dicendum quod ad perfectionem hominis pertinet quod ipse cognoscat, sed quod ipse ab aliis cognoscatur non pertinet ad eius perfectionem, et ideo non est per se appetendum. Potest tamen appeti inquantum est utile ad aliquid, vel ad hoc quod Deus ab hominibus glorificetur; vel ad hoc quod homines proficiant ex bono quod in alio cognoscunt; vel ex hoc quod ipse homo ex bonis quae in se cognoscit per testimonium laudis alienae studeat in eis perseverare et ad meliora proficere. Et secundum hoc laudabile est quod curam habeat aliquis de bono nomine, et quod provideat bona coram hominibus, non tamen quod in hominum laude inaniter delectetur.

Q. 132, A. 2

truly virtuous who does virtuous deeds for the sake of human glory, as Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei v). Reply Obj. 3: It is requisite for man’s perfection that he should know himself; but not that he should be known by others, wherefore it is not to be desired in itself. It may, however, be desired as being useful for something, either in order that God may be glorified by men, or that men may become better by reason of the good they know to be in another man, or in order that man, knowing by the testimony of others’ praise the good which is in him, may himself strive to persevere therein and to become better. In this sense it is praiseworthy that a man should take care of his good name, and that he should provide good things in the sight of God and men: but not that he should take an empty pleasure in human praise.

Article 2 Whether vainglory is opposed to magnanimity? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inanis gloria magnanimitati non opponatur. Pertinet enim ad inanem gloriam, ut dictum est, quod aliquis glorietur in his quae non sunt, quod pertinet ad falsitatem; vel in rebus terrenis vel caducis, quod pertinet ad cupiditatem; vel in testimonio hominum, quorum iudicium non est certum, quod pertinet ad imprudentiam. Huiusmodi autem vitia non opponuntur magnanimitati. Ergo inanis gloria non opponitur magnanimitati. Praeterea, inanis gloria non opponitur magnanimitati per defectum, sicut pusillanimitas, quae inani gloriae repugnans videtur. Similiter etiam nec per excessum, sic enim opponitur magnanimitati praesumptio et ambitio, ut dictum est, a quibus inanis gloria differt. Ergo inanis gloria non opponitur magnanimitati. Praeterea, Philipp. II, super illud, nihil per contentionem aut inanem gloriam, dicit Glossa, erant aliqui inter eos dissentientes, inquieti, inanis gloriae causa contendentes. Contentio autem non opponitur magnanimitati. Ergo neque inanis gloria. Sed contra est quod Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., cavenda est gloriae cupiditas, eripit enim animi libertatem, pro qua magnanimis viris omnis debet esse contentio. Ergo opponitur magnanimitati. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, gloria est quidam effectus honoris et laudis, ex hoc enim quod aliquis laudatur, vel quaecumque reverentia ei exhibetur, redditur clarus in notitia aliorum. Et quia magnanimitas est circa honorem, ut supra dictum est, con-

Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity. For, as stated above (A. 1), vainglory consists in glorying in things that are not, which pertains to falsehood; or in earthly and perishable things, which pertains to covetousness; or in the testimony of men, whose judgment is uncertain, which pertains to imprudence. Now these vices are not contrary to magnanimity. Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity. Obj. 2: Further, vainglory is not, like pusillanimity, opposed to magnanimity by way of deficiency, for this seems inconsistent with vainglory. Nor is it opposed to it by way of excess, for in this way presumption and ambition are opposed to magnanimity, as stated above (Q. 130, A. 2; Q. 131, A. 2): and these differ from vainglory. Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity. Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Phil. 2:3, Let nothing be done through contention, neither by vainglory, says: Some among them were given to dissension and restlessness, contending with one another for the sake of vainglory. But contention is not opposed to magnanimity. Neither therefore is vainglory. On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading, Magnanimity consists in two things: We should beware of the desire for glory, since it enslaves the mind, which a magnanimous man should ever strive to keep untrammeled. Therefore it is opposed to magnanimity. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 103, A. 1, ad 3), glory is an effect of honor and praise: because from the fact that a man is praised, or shown any kind of reverence, he acquires charity in the knowledge of others. And since magnanimity is about honor, as stated above (Q. 129, AA. 1,

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sequens est etiam ut sit circa gloriam, ut scilicet sicut moderate utitur honore, ita moderate utatur gloria. Et ideo inordinatus appetitus gloriae directe magnanimitati opponitur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc ipsum magnitudini animi repugnat, quod aliquis res modicas tantum appretietur quod de eis glorietur, unde in IV Ethic. dicitur de magnanimo quod sibi sit honor parvum. Similiter etiam et alia quae propter honorem quaeruntur, puta potentatus et divitiae, parva reputantur ab eo. Similiter etiam magnitudini animi repugnat quod aliquis de his quae non sunt glorietur. Unde de magnanimo dicitur in IV Ethic., quod magis curat veritatem quam opinionem. Similiter etiam et magnitudini animi repugnat quod aliquis glorietur in testimonio laudis humanae, quasi hoc magnum aliquid aestimetur. Unde de magnanimo dicitur in IV Ethic., quod non est ei cura ut laudetur. Et sic ea quae aliis virtutibus opponuntur nihil prohibet opponi magnanimitati, secundum quod habent pro magnis quae parva sunt. Ad secundum dicendum quod inanis gloriae cupidus, secundum rei veritatem, deficit a magnanimo, quia videlicet gloriatur in his quae magnanimus parva aestimat, ut dictum est. Sed considerando aestimationem eius, opponitur magnanimo per excessum, quia videlicet gloriam quam appetit, reputat aliquid magnum, et ad eam tendit supra suam dignitatem. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, oppositio vitiorum non attenditur secundum effectum. Et tamen hoc ipsum magnitudini animi opponitur, quod aliquis contentionem intendat, nullus enim contendit nisi pro re quam aestimat magnam. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod magnanimus non est contentiosus, qui nihil aestimat magnum.

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2), it follows that it also is about glory: seeing that as a man uses honor moderately, so too does he use glory in moderation. Wherefore inordinate desire of glory is directly opposed to magnanimity. Reply Obj. 1: To think so much of little things as to glory in them is itself opposed to magnanimity. Wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that honor is of little account to him. In like manner he thinks little of other things that are sought for honor’s sake, such as power and wealth. Likewise it is inconsistent with magnanimity to glory in things that are not; wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that he cares more for truth than for opinion. Again it is incompatible with magnanimity for a man to glory in the testimony of human praise, as though he deemed this something great; wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv), that he cares not to be praised. And so, when a man looks upon little things as though they were great, nothing hinders this from being contrary to magnanimity, as well as to other virtues. Reply Obj. 2: He that is desirous of vainglory does in truth fall short of being magnanimous, because he glories in what the magnanimous man thinks little of, as stated in the preceding Reply. But if we consider his estimate, he is opposed to the magnanimous man by way of excess, because the glory which he seeks is something great in his estimation, and he tends thereto in excess of his deserts. Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 127, A. 2, ad 2), the opposition of vices does not depend on their effects. Nevertheless contention, if done intentionally, is opposed to magnanimity: since no one contends save for what he deems great. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the magnanimous man is not contentious, because nothing is great in his estimation.

Article 3 Whether vainglory is a mortal sin? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod inanis gloria sit peccatum mortale. Nihil enim excludit mercedem aeternam nisi peccatum mortale. Sed inanis gloria excludit mercedem aeternam, dicitur enim Matth. VI, attendite ne iustitiam vestram faciatis coram hominibus, ut videamini ab eis. Ergo inanis gloria est peccatum mortale. Praeterea, quicumque subripit sibi quod est Dei proprium, mortaliter peccat. Sed per appetitum inanis gloriae aliquis sibi attribuit quod est proprium Dei, dicitur enim Isaiae XLII, gloriam meam alteri non dabo; et I ad Tim. I, soli Deo honor et gloria. Ergo inanis gloria est peccatum mortale.

Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is a mortal sin. For nothing precludes the eternal reward except a mortal sin. Now vainglory precludes the eternal reward: for it is written (Matt 6:1): Take heed, that you do not give justice before men, to be seen by them: otherwise you shall not have a reward of your Father Who is in heaven. Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin. Obj. 2: Further, whoever appropriates to himself that which is proper to God, sins mortally. Now by desiring vainglory, a man appropriates to himself that which is proper to God. For it is written (Isa 42:8): I will not give My glory to another, and (1 Tim 1:17): To . . . the only God be honor and glory. Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.

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Praeterea, illud peccatum quod est maxime periculosum et nocivum, videtur esse mortale. Sed peccatum inanis gloriae est huiusmodi, quia super illud I ad Thess. II, Deo qui probat corda nostra, dicit Glossa Augustini, quas vires nocendi habeat humanae gloriae amor, non sentit nisi qui ei bellum indixerit, quia etsi cuiquam facile est laudem non cupere dum negatur, difficile tamen est ea non delectari cum offertur. Chrysostomus etiam dicit, Matth. VI, quod inanis gloria occulte ingreditur, et omnia quae intus sunt insensibiliter aufert. Ergo inanis gloria est peccatum mortale. Sed contra est quod Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., quod cum cetera vitia locum habeant in servis Diaboli, inanis gloria locum habet etiam in servis Christi. In quibus tamen nullum est peccatum mortale. Ergo inanis gloria non est peccatum mortale. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ex hoc aliquod peccatum est mortale quod caritati contrariatur. Peccatum autem inanis gloriae, secundum se consideratum, non videtur contrariari caritati quantum ad dilectionem proximi. Quantum autem ad dilectionem Dei, potest contrariari caritati dupliciter. Uno modo, ratione materiae de qua quis gloriatur. Puta cum quis gloriatur de aliquo falso quod contrariatur divinae reverentiae, secundum illud Ezech. XXVIII, elevatum est cor tuum, et dixisti, Deus ego sum; et I ad Cor. IV, quid habes quod non accepisti? Si autem accepisti, quare gloriaris quasi non acceperis? Vel etiam cum quis bonum temporale de quo gloriatur, praefert Deo, quod prohibetur Ierem. IX, non glorietur sapiens in sapientia sua, nec fortis in fortitudine sua, nec dives in divitiis suis, sed in hoc glorietur qui gloriatur, scire et nosse me. Aut etiam cum quis praefert testimonium hominum testimonio Dei, sicut contra quosdam dicitur Ioan. XII, qui dilexerunt magis gloriam hominum quam Dei.

Alio modo, ex parte ipsius gloriantis, qui intentionem suam refert ad gloriam tanquam ad ultimum finem, ad quem scilicet ordinet etiam virtutis opera, et pro quo consequendo non praetermittat facere etiam ea quae sunt contra Deum. Et sic est peccatum mortale. Unde Augustinus dicit, in V de Civ. Dei, quod hoc vitium, scilicet amor humanae laudis, tam inimicum est piae fidei, si maior in corde sit cupiditas gloriae quam Dei timor vel amor, ut dominus diceret (Ioan. V), quomodo potestis credere, gloriam ab invicem expectantes, et gloriam quae a solo Deo est non quaerentes? Si autem amor humanae gloriae, quamvis sit inanis, non tamen repugnet caritati, neque quantum ad id de quo est gloria, neque quantum ad intentionem gloriam quaerentis, non est peccatum mortale, sed veniale. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nullus peccando meretur vitam aeternam. Unde opus virtuosum amittit

Q. 132, A. 3

Obj. 3: Further, apparently a sin is mortal if it be most dangerous and harmful. Now vainglory is a sin of this kind, because a gloss of Augustine on 1 Thess. 2:4, God, Who proveth our hearts, says: Unless a man war against the love of human glory he does not perceive its baneful power, for though it be easy for anyone not to desire praise as long as one does not get it, it is difficult not to take pleasure in it, when it is given. Chrysostom also says (Hom. xix in Matth.) that vainglory enters secretly, and robs us insensibly of all our inward possessions. Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin. On the contrary, Chrysostom says that while other vices find their abode in the servants of the devil, vainglory finds a place even in the servants of Christ. Yet in the latter there is no mortal sin. Therefore vainglory is not a mortal sin. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 24, A. 12; Q. 110, A. 4; Q. 112, A. 2), a sin is mortal through being contrary to charity. Now the sin of vainglory, considered in itself, does not seem to be contrary to charity as regards the love of one’s neighbor: yet as regards the love of God it may be contrary to charity in two ways. In one way, by reason of the matter about which one glories: for instance when one glories in something false that is opposed to the reverence we owe God, according to Ezech. 28:2, Thy heart is lifted up, and Thou hast said: I am God, and 1 Cor. 4:7, What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it? Or again when a man prefers to God the temporal good in which he glories: for this is forbidden (Jer 9:23, 24): Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, and let not the strong man glory in his strength, and let not the rich man glory in his riches. But let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me. Or again when a man prefers the testimony of man to God’s; thus it is written in reproval of certain people (John 12:43): For they loved the glory of men more than the glory of God. In another way vainglory may be contrary to charity, on the part of the one who glories, in that he refers his intention to glory as his last end: so that he directs even virtuous deeds thereto, and, in order to obtain it, forbears not from doing even that which is against God. In this way it is a mortal sin. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 14) that this vice, namely the love of human praise, is so hostile to a godly faith, if the heart desires glory more than it fears or loves God, that our Lord said (John 5:44): How can you believe, who receive glory one from another, and the glory which is from God alone, you do not seek? If, however, the love of human glory, though it be vain, be not inconsistent with charity, neither as regards the matter gloried in, nor as to the intention of him that seeks glory, it is not a mortal but a venial sin. Reply Obj. 1: No man, by sinning, merits eternal life: wherefore a virtuous deed loses its power to merit eternal

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Fortitude

vim merendi vitam aeternam si propter inanem gloriam fiat, etiam si illa inanis gloria non sit peccatum mortale. Sed quando aliquis simpliciter amittit aeternam mercedem propter inanem gloriam, et non solum quantum ad unum actum, tunc inanis gloria est peccatum mortale. Ad secundum dicendum quod non omnis qui est inanis gloriae cupidus, appetit sibi illam excellentiam quae competit soli Deo. Alia enim est gloria quae debetur soli Deo, et alia quae debetur homini virtuoso vel diviti. Ad tertium dicendum quod inanis gloria dicitur esse periculosum peccatum non tam propter gravitatem sui, quam etiam propter hoc quod est dispositio ad gravia peccata, inquantum scilicet per inanem gloriam redditur homo praesumptuosus et nimis de se ipso confidens. Et sic etiam paulatim disponit ad hoc quod homo privetur interioribus bonis.

IIa-IIae

life, if it be done for the sake of vainglory, even though that vainglory be not a mortal sin. On the other hand when a man loses the eternal reward simply through vainglory, and not merely in respect of one act, vainglory is a mortal sin. Reply Obj. 2: Not every man that is desirous of vainglory, desires the excellence which belongs to God alone. For the glory due to God alone differs from the glory due to a virtuous or rich man. Reply Obj. 3: Vainglory is stated to be a dangerous sin, not only on account of its gravity, but also because it is a disposition to grave sins, insofar as it renders man presumptuous and too self-confident: and so it gradually disposes a man to lose his inward goods.

Article 4 Whether vainglory is a capital vice? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inanis gloria non sit vitium capitale. Vitium enim quod semper ex altero oritur, non videtur esse capitale. Sed inanis gloria semper ex superbia nascitur. Ergo inanis gloria non est vitium capitale. Praeterea, honor videtur esse aliquid principalius quam gloria, quae est eius effectus. Sed ambitio, quae est inordinatus appetitus honoris, non est vitium capitale. Ergo etiam neque appetitus inanis gloriae. Praeterea, vitium capitale habet aliquam principalitatem. Sed inanis gloria non videtur habere aliquam principalitatem, neque quantum ad rationem peccati, quia non semper est peccatum mortale; neque etiam quantum ad rationem boni appetibilis, quia gloria humana videtur esse quiddam fragile et extra hominem existens. Ergo inanis gloria non est vitium capitale. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., numerat inanem gloriam inter septem vitia capitalia. Respondeo dicendum quod de vitiis capitalibus dupliciter aliqui loquuntur. Quidam enim ponunt superbiam unum de vitiis capitalibus. Et hi non ponunt inanem gloriam inter vitia capitalia. Gregorius autem, in XXXI Moral., superbiam ponit reginam omnium vitiorum, et inanem gloriam, quae immediate ab ipsa oritur, ponit vitium capitale. Et hoc rationabiliter. Superbia enim, ut infra dicetur, importat inordinatum appetitum excellentiae. Ex omni autem bono quod quis appetit, quandam perfectionem et excellentiam consequitur. Et ideo fines omnium vitiorum ordinantur in finem superbiae. Et propter hoc videtur quod habeat quandam gene-

Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is not a capital vice. For a vice that always arises from another vice is seemingly not capital. But vainglory always arises from pride. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice. Obj. 2: Further, honor would seem to take precedence of glory, for this is its effect. Now ambition which is inordinate desire of honor is not a capital vice. Neither therefore is the desire of vainglory. Obj. 3: Further, a capital vice has a certain prominence. But vainglory seems to have no prominence, neither as a sin, because it is not always a mortal sin, nor considered as an appetible good, since human glory is apparently a frail thing, and is something outside man himself. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice. On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers vainglory among the seven capital vices. I answer that, The capital vices are enumerated in two ways. For some reckon pride as one of their number: and these do not place vainglory among the capital vices. Gregory, however (Moral. xxxi), reckons pride to be the queen of all the vices, and vainglory, which is the immediate offspring of pride, he reckons to be a capital vice: and not without reason. For pride, as we shall state farther on (Q. 152, AA. 1, 2), denotes inordinate desire of excellence. But whatever good one may desire, one desires a certain perfection and excellence therefrom: wherefore the end of every vice is directed to the end of pride, so that this vice seems to exercise a kind of causality over the other vices,

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ralem causalitatem super alia vitia, et non debeat computari inter specialia vitiorum principia, quae sunt vitia capitalia. Inter bona autem per quae excellentiam homo consequitur, praecipue ad hoc operari videtur gloria, inquantum importat manifestationem bonitatis alicuius, nam bonum naturaliter amatur et honoratur ab omnibus. Et ideo sicut per gloriam quae est apud Deum, consequitur homo excellentiam in rebus divinis; ita etiam per gloriam hominum consequitur homo excellentiam in rebus humanis. Et ideo, propter propinquitatem ad excellentiam, quam homines maxime desiderant, consequens est quod sit multum appetibilis, et quod ex eius inordinato appetitu multa vitia oriantur. Et ita inanis gloria est vitium capitale. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquod vitium oriri ex superbia non repugnat ei quod est esse vitium capitale, eo quod, sicut supra dictum est, superbia est regina et mater omnium vitiorum. Ad secundum dicendum quod laus et honor comparantur ad gloriam, ut supra dictum est, sicut causae ex quibus gloria sequitur. Unde gloria comparatur ad ea sicut finis, propter hoc enim aliquis amat honorari et laudari, inquantum per hoc aliquis aestimat se in aliorum notitia fore praeclarum. Ad tertium dicendum quod inanis gloria habet principalem rationem appetibilis, ratione iam dicta, et hoc sufficit ad rationem vitii capitalis. Non autem requiritur quod vitium capitale semper sit peccatum mortale, quia etiam ex veniali peccato potest mortale oriri, inquantum scilicet veniale disponit ad mortale.

Q. 132, A. 5

and ought not to be reckoned among the special sources of vice, known as the capital vices. Now among the goods that are the means whereby man acquires honor, glory seems to be the most conducive to that effect, inasmuch as it denotes the manifestation of a man’s goodness: since good is naturally loved and honored by all. Wherefore, just as by the glory which is in God’s sight man acquires honor in Divine things, so too by the glory which is in the sight of man he acquires excellence in human things. Hence on account of its close connection with excellence, which men desire above all, it follows that it is most desirable. And since many vices arise from the inordinate desire thereof, it follows that vainglory is a capital vice. Reply Obj. 1: It is not impossible for a capital vice to arise from pride, since as stated above (in the body of the Article and I-II, Q. 84, A. 2) pride is the queen and mother of all the vices. Reply Obj. 2: Praise and honor, as stated above (A. 2), stand in relation to glory as the causes from which it proceeds, so that glory is compared to them as their end. For the reason why a man loves to be honored and praised is that he thinks thereby to acquire a certain renown in the knowledge of others. Reply Obj. 3: Vainglory stands prominent under the aspect of desirability, for the reason given above, and this suffices for it to be reckoned a capital vice. Nor is it always necessary for a capital vice to be a mortal sin; for mortal sin can arise from venial sin, inasmuch as venial sin can dispose man thereto.

Article 5 Whether the daughters of vainglory are suitably reckoned to be disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord, and love of novelties? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter dicantur filiae inanis gloriae esse inobedientia, iactantia, hypocrisis, contentio, pertinacia, discordia, novitatum praesumptio. Iactantia enim, secundum Gregorium, XXIII Moral., ponitur inter species superbiae. Superbia autem non oritur ex inani gloria, sed potius e converso, ut Gregorius dicit, XXXI Moral. Ergo iactantia non debet poni filia inanis gloriae. Praeterea, contentiones et discordiae videntur ex ira maxime provenire. Sed ira est capitale vitium inani gloriae condivisum. Ergo videtur quod non sint filiae inanis gloriae. Praeterea, Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., quod ubique vana gloria malum est, sed maxime in philanthropia, idest in misericordia. Quae tamen non est

Objection 1: It seems that the daughters of vainglory are unsuitably reckoned to be disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord, and eccentricity. For according to Gregory (Moral. xxiii) boastfulness is numbered among the species of pride. Now pride does not arise from vainglory, rather is it the other way about, as Gregory says (Moral. xxxi). Therefore boastfulness should not be reckoned among the daughters of vainglory. Obj. 2: Further, contention and discord seem to be the outcome chiefly of anger. But anger is a capital vice condivided with vainglory. Therefore it seems that they are not the daughters of vainglory. Obj. 3: Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xix in Matth.) that vainglory is always evil, but especially in philanthropy, i.e., mercy. And yet this is nothing new, for it is an estab-

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Fortitude

IIa-IIae

aliquid novum, sed in consuetudine hominum existit. lished custom among men. Therefore eccentricity should Ergo praesumptio novitatum non debet specialiter poni not be specially reckoned as a daughter of vainglory. filia inanis gloriae. Sed contra est auctoritas Gregorii, in XXXI MoOn the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory ral., ubi praedictas filias inani gloriae assignat. (Moral. xxxi), who there assigns the above daughters to vainglory. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, I answer that, As stated above (Q. 34, A. 5; Q. 35, illa vitia quae de se nata sunt ordinari ad finem alicuius A. 4; I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3, 4), the vices which by their very navitii capitalis, dicuntur filiae eius. Finis autem inanis glo- ture are such as to be directed to the end of a certain capital riae est manifestatio propriae excellentiae, ut ex supra vice, are called its daughters. Now the end of vainglory is dictis patet. Ad quod potest homo tendere dupliciter. the manifestation of one’s own excellence, as stated above Uno modo, directe, sive per verba, et sic est iactantia; (AA. 1, 4): and to this end a man may tend in two ways. sive per facta, et sic, si sint vera, habentia aliquam ad- In one way directly, either by words, and this is boasting, mirationem, est praesumptio novitatum, quas homines or by deeds, and then if they be true and call for astonishsolent magis admirari; si autem per ficta sit, sic est hypo- ment, it is love of novelties which men are wont to wonder crisis. Alio autem modo nititur aliquis manifestare suam at most; but if they be false, it is hypocrisy. In another way a excellentiam indirecte, ostendendo se non esse alio mi- man strives to make known his excellence by showing that norem. Et hoc quadrupliciter. Primo quidem, quantum he is not inferior to another, and this in four ways. First, as ad intellectum, et sic est pertinacia, per quam homo ni- regards the intellect, and thus we have obstinacy, by which mis innititur suae sententiae, nolens credere sententiae a man is too much attached to his own opinion, being unmeliori. Secundo, quantum ad voluntatem, et sic est di- willing to believe one that is better. Second, as regards the scordia, dum non vult a propria voluntate discedere ut will, and then we have discord, whereby a man is unwilling aliis concordet. Tertio, quantum ad locutionem, et sic est to give up his own will, and agree with others. Third, as recontentio, dum aliquis verbis clamose contra alium liti- gards speech, and then we have contention, whereby a man gat. Quarto, quantum ad factum, et sic est inobedientia, quarrels noisily with another. Fourth as regards deeds, and dum scilicet aliquis non vult exequi superioris praecep- this is disobedience, whereby a man refuses to carry out the tum. command of his superiors. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dicReply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 112, A. 1, ad 2), tum est, iactantia ponitur species superbiae quantum ad boasting is reckoned a kind of pride, as regards its interior interiorem causam eius, quae est arrogantia. Ipsa au- cause, which is arrogance: but outward boasting, according tem iactantia exterior. Ut dicitur in IV Ethic., ordinatur to Ethic. iv, is directed sometimes to gain, but more often to quandoque quidem ad lucrum, sed frequentius ad glo- glory and honor, and thus it is the result of vainglory. riam vel honorem. Et sic oritur ex inani gloria. Ad secundum dicendum quod ira non causat diReply Obj. 2: Anger is not the cause of discord and scordiam et contentionem nisi cum adiunctione inanis contention, except in conjunction with vainglory, in that a gloriae, per hoc scilicet quod aliquis sibi gloriosum re- man thinks it a glorious thing for him not to yield to the will putat quod non cedat voluntati vel verbis aliorum. and words of others. Ad tertium dicendum quod inanis gloria vitupeReply Obj. 3: Vainglory is reproved in connection with ratur circa eleemosynam propter defectum caritatis, qui almsdeeds on account of the lack of charity apparent in one videtur esse in eo qui praefert inanem gloriam utilitati who prefers vainglory to the good of his neighbor, seeing proximi, dum hoc propter illud facit. Non autem vitupe- that he does the latter for the sake of the former. But a man ratur aliquis ex hoc quod praesumat eleemosynam face- is not reproved for presuming to give alms as though this re quasi aliquid novum. were something novel.

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Question 133 Pusillanimity Deinde considerandum est de pusillanimitate. Et cirWe must now consider pusillanimity. Under this head ca hoc quaeruntur duo. there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum pusillanimitas sit peccatum. (1) Whether pusillanimity is a sin? Secundo, cui virtuti opponatur. (2) To what virtue is it opposed?

Article 1 Whether pusillanimity is a sin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pusillanimitas non sit peccatum. Ex omni enim peccato aliquis efficitur malus, sicut ex omni virtute aliquis efficitur bonus. Sed pusillanimus non est malus, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Ergo pusillanimitas non est peccatum. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, ibidem, quod maxime videtur pusillanimus esse qui magnis bonis dignus existit, et tamen his non dignificat seipsum. Sed nullus est dignus magnis bonis nisi virtuosus, quia, ut ibidem philosophus dicit, secundum veritatem solus bonus est honorandus. Ergo pusillanimus est virtuosus. Non ergo pusillanimitas est peccatum. Praeterea, initium omnis peccati est superbia, ut dicitur Eccli. X. Sed pusillanimitas non procedit ex superbia, quia superbus extollit se supra id quod est; pusillanimus autem subtrahit se ab his quibus est dignus. Ergo pusillanimitas non est peccatum. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod qui dignificat se minoribus quam sit dignus, dicitur pusillanimus. Sed quandoque sancti viri dignificant seipsos minoribus quam sint digni, sicut patet de Moyse et Ieremia, qui digni erant officio ad quod assumebantur a Deo, quod tamen uterque eorum humiliter recusabat, ut habetur Exod. III et Ierem. I. Non ergo pusillanimitas est peccatum. Sed contra, nihil in moribus hominum est vitandum nisi peccatum. Sed pusillanimitas est vitanda, dicitur enim ad Coloss. III, patres, nolite ad indignationem provocare filios vestros, ut non pusillo animo fiant. Ergo pusillanimitas est peccatum. Respondeo dicendum quod omne illud quod contrariatur naturali inclinationi est peccatum, quia contrariatur legi naturae. Inest autem unicuique rei naturalis inclinatio ad exequendam actionem commensuratam suae potentiae, ut patet in omnibus rebus naturalibus, tam animatis quam inanimatis. Sicut autem per praesumptionem aliquis excedit proportionem suae po-

Objection 1: It seems that pusillanimity is not a sin. For every sin makes a man evil, just as every virtue makes a man good. But a fainthearted man is not evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that a fainthearted man is especially one who is worthy of great goods, yet does not deem himself worthy of them. Now no one is worthy of great goods except the virtuous, since as the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3), none but the virtuous are truly worthy of honor. Therefore the fainthearted are virtuous: and consequently pusillanimity is not a sin. Obj. 3: Further, Pride is the beginning of all sin (Sir 10:15). But pusillanimity does not proceed from pride, since the proud man sets himself above what he is, while the fainthearted man withdraws from the things he is worthy of. Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin. Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that he who deems himself less worthy than he is, is said to be fainthearted. Now sometimes holy men deem themselves less worthy than they are; for instance, Moses and Jeremias, who were worthy of the office God chose them for, which they both humbly declined (Exod 3:11; Jer. 1:6). Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin. On the contrary, Nothing in human conduct is to be avoided save sin. Now pusillanimity is to be avoided: for it is written (Col 3:21): Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be discouraged. Therefore pusillanimity is a sin. I answer that, Whatever is contrary to a natural inclination is a sin, because it is contrary to a law of nature. Now everything has a natural inclination to accomplish an action that is commensurate with its power: as is evident in all natural things, whether animate or inanimate. Now just as presumption makes a man exceed what is proportionate to his power, by striving to do more than he can, so

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Q. 133, A. 1

Fortitude

tentiae, dum nititur ad maiora quam possit; ita etiam pusillanimus deficit a proportione suae potentiae, dum recusat in id tendere quod est suae potentiae commensuratum. Et ideo, sicut praesumptio est peccatum, ita et pusillanimitas. Et inde est quod servus qui acceptam pecuniam domini sui fodit in terram, nec est operatus ex ea, propter quendam pusillanimitatis timorem, punitur a domino, ut habetur Matth. XXV et Luc. XIX. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus illos nominat malos qui proximis inferunt nocumenta. Et secundum hoc, pusillanimus dicitur non esse malus, quia nulli infert nocumentum, nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet deficit ab operationibus quibus posset alios iuvare. Dicit enim Gregorius, in pastorali, quod illi qui prodesse utilitati proximorum in praedicatione refugiunt, si districte iudicentur, ex tantis rei sunt ex quantis venientes ad publicum prodesse potuerunt. Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquem habentem habitum virtutis peccare, venialiter quidem, etiam ipso habitu remanente; mortaliter autem, cum corruptione ipsius habitus virtutis gratuitae. Et ideo potest contingere quod aliquis ex virtute quam habet sit dignus ad aliqua magna facienda, quae sunt digna magno honore; et tamen, per hoc quod ipse non attentat sua virtute uti, peccat, quandoque quidem venialiter, quandoque autem mortaliter. Vel potest dici quod pusillanimus est dignus magnis secundum habilitatem ad virtutem quae inest ei, vel ex bona dispositione naturae, vel ex scientia, vel ex exteriori fortuna, quibus dum recusat uti ad virtutem, pusillanimus redditur. Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam pusillanimitas aliquo modo ex superbia potest oriri, dum scilicet aliquis nimis proprio sensui innititur, quo reputat se insufficientem ad ea respectu quorum sufficientiam habet. Unde dicitur Prov. XXVI, sapientior sibi piger videtur septem viris loquentibus sententias. Nihil enim prohibet quod se quantum ad aliqua deiiciat, et quantum ad alia se in sublime extollat. Unde Gregorius, in pastorali, de Moyse dicit quod superbus fortasse esset si ducatum plebis suae sine trepidatione susciperet, et rursum superbus existeret si auctoris imperio obedire recusaret.

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pusillanimity makes a man fall short of what is proportionate to his power, by refusing to tend to that which is commensurate thereto. Wherefore as presumption is a sin, so is pusillanimity. Hence it is that the servant who buried in the earth the money he had received from his master, and did not trade with it through fainthearted fear, was punished by his master (Matt 25; Luke 19). Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher calls those evil who injure their neighbor: and accordingly the fainthearted is said not to be evil, because he injures no one, save accidentally, by omitting to do what might be profitable to others. For Gregory says (Pastoral. i) that if they who demur to do good to their neighbor in preaching be judged strictly, without doubt their guilt is proportionate to the good they might have done had they been less retiring. Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders a person who has a virtuous habit from sinning venially and without losing the habit, or mortally and with loss of the habit of gratuitous virtue. Hence it is possible for a man, by reason of the virtue which he has, to be worthy of doing certain great things that are worthy of great honor, and yet through not trying to make use of his virtue, he sins sometimes venially, sometimes mortally.

Again it may be replied that the fainthearted is worthy of great things in proportion to his ability for virtue, ability which he derives either from a good natural disposition, or from science, or from external fortune, and if he fails to use those things for virtue, he becomes guilty of pusillanimity. Reply Obj. 3: Even pusillanimity may in some way be the result of pride: when, to wit, a man clings too much to his own opinion, whereby he thinks himself incompetent for those things for which he is competent. Hence it is written (Prov 26:16): The sluggard is wiser in his own conceit than seven men that speak sentences. For nothing hinders him from depreciating himself in some things, and having a high opinion of himself in others. Wherefore Gregory says (Pastoral. i) of Moses that perchance he would have been proud, had he undertaken the leadership of a numerous people without misgiving: and again he would have been proud, had he refused to obey the command of his Creator. Ad quartum dicendum quod Moyses et Ieremias Reply Obj. 4: Moses and Jeremias were worthy of the digni erant officio ad quod divinitus eligebantur, ex di- office to which they were appointed by God, but their worvina gratia. Sed ipsi considerantes propriae infirmitatis thiness was of Divine grace: yet they, considering the insufinsufficientiam, recusabant, non tamen pertinaciter, ne ficiency of their own weakness, demurred; though not obin superbiam laberentur. stinately lest they should fall into pride.

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Q. 133, A. 2

Article 2 Whether pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pusillanimitas non opponatur magnanimitati. Dicit enim philosophus, in IV Ethic., quod pusillanimus ignorat seipsum, appeteret enim bona quibus dignus est, si se cognosceret. Sed ignorantia sui videtur opponi prudentiae. Ergo pusillanimitas opponitur prudentiae. Praeterea, Matth. XXV, servum qui propter pusillanimitatem pecunia uti recusavit, vocat dominus malum et pigrum. Philosophus etiam dicit, in IV Ethic., quod pusillanimi videntur pigri. Sed pigritia opponitur sollicitudini, quae est actus prudentiae, ut supra habitum est. Ergo pusillanimitas non opponitur magnanimitati. Praeterea, pusillanimitas videtur ex inordinato timore procedere, unde dicitur Isaiae XXXV, dicite, pusillanimes, confortamini et nolite timere. Videtur etiam procedere ex inordinata ira, secundum illud Coloss. III, patres, nolite ad indignationem provocare filios vestros, ut non pusillo animo fiant. Sed inordinatio timoris opponitur fortitudini, inordinatio autem irae mansuetudini. Ergo pusillanimitas non opponitur magnanimitati. Praeterea, vitium quod opponitur alicui virtuti, tanto gravius est quanto magis est virtuti dissimile. Sed pusillanimitas magis est dissimilis magnanimitati quam praesumptio. Ergo, si pusillanimitas opponeretur magnanimitati, sequeretur quod esset gravius peccatum quam praesumptio. Quod est contra id quod dicitur Eccli. XXXVII, o praesumptio nequissima, unde creata es? Non ergo pusillanimitas magnanimitati opponitur. Sed contra est quod pusillanimitas et magnanimitas differunt secundum magnitudinem et parvitatem animi, ut ex ipsis nominibus apparet. Sed magnum et parvum sunt opposita. Ergo pusillanimitas opponitur magnanimitati. Respondeo dicendum quod pusillanimitas potest tripliciter considerari. Uno modo, secundum seipsam. Et sic manifestum est quod secundum propriam rationem opponitur magnanimitati, a qua differt secundum differentiam magnitudinis et parvitatis circa idem, nam sicut magnanimus ex animi magnitudine tendit ad magna, ita pusillanimus ex animi parvitate se retrahit a magnis. Alio modo potest considerari ex parte suae causae, quae ex parte intellectus, est ignorantia propriae conditionis; ex parte autem appetitus, est timor deficiendi in his quae falso aestimat excedere suam facultatem. Tertio modo potest considerari quantum ad effectum, qui est retrahere se a magnis quibus est dignus. Sed sicut supra dictum est, oppositio vitii ad virtutem attenditur magis secundum propriam speciem quam secundum causam

Objection 1: It seems that pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity. For the Philosopher says (Ethic., 3) that the fainthearted man knows not himself: for he would desire the good things, of which he is worthy, if he knew himself. Now ignorance of self seems opposed to prudence. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to prudence. Obj. 2: Further our Lord calls the servant wicked and slothful who through pusillanimity refused to make use of the money. Moreover the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the fainthearted seem to be slothful. Now sloth is opposed to solicitude, which is an act of prudence, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9). Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity. Obj. 3: Further, pusillanimity seems to proceed from inordinate fear: hence it is written (Isa 35:4): Say to the fainthearted: Take courage and fear not. It also seems to proceed from inordinate anger, according to Col. 3:21, Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be discouraged. Now inordinate fear is opposed to fortitude, and inordinate anger to meekness. Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity. Obj. 4: Further, the vice that is in opposition to a particular virtue is the more grievous according as it is more unlike that virtue. Now pusillanimity is more unlike magnanimity than presumption is. Therefore if pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity, it follows that it is a more grievous sin than presumption: yet this is contrary to the saying of Ecclus. 37:3, O wicked presumption, whence camest thou? Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity. On the contrary, Pusillanimity and magnanimity differ as greatness and littleness of soul, as their very names denote. Now great and little are opposites. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity. I answer that, Pusillanimity may be considered in three ways. First, in itself; and thus it is evident that by its very nature it is opposed to magnanimity, from which it differs as great and little differ in connection with the same subject. For just as the magnanimous man tends to great things out of greatness of soul, so the pusillanimous man shrinks from great things out of littleness of soul. Second, it may be considered in reference to its cause, which on the part of the intellect is ignorance of one’s own qualification, and on the part of the appetite is the fear of failure in what one falsely deems to exceed one’s ability. Third, it may be considered in reference to its effect, which is to shrink from the great things of which one is worthy. But, as stated above (Q. 132, A. 2, ad 3), opposition between vice and virtue depends rather on their respective species than on their cause

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Q. 133, A. 2

Fortitude

vel effectum. Et ideo pusillanimitas directe magnanimitati opponitur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de pusillanimitate ex parte causae quam habet in intellectu. Et tamen non proprie potest dici quod opponatur prudentiae etiam secundum causam suam, quia talis ignorantia non procedit ex insipientia, sed magis ex pigritia considerandi suam facultatem, ut dicitur in IV Ethic., vel exequendi quod suae subiacet potestati. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de pusillanimitate ex parte effectus. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit ex parte causae. Nec tamen timor causans pusillanimitatem semper est timor periculorum mortis. Unde etiam ex hac parte non oportet quod opponatur fortitudini. Ira autem, secundum rationem proprii motus, quo quis extollitur in vindictam, non causat pusillanimitatem, quae deiicit animum, sed magis tollit eam. Inducit autem ad pusillanimitatem ratione causarum irae, quae sunt iniuriae illatae, ex quibus deiicitur animus patientis.

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or effect. Hence pusillanimity is directly opposed to magnanimity. Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers pusillanimity as proceeding from a cause in the intellect. Yet it cannot be said properly that it is opposed to prudence, even in respect of its cause: because ignorance of this kind does not proceed from indiscretion but from laziness in considering one’s own ability, according to Ethic. iv, 3, or in accomplishing what is within one’s power. Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers pusillanimity from the point of view of its effect. Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the point of view of cause. Nor is the fear that causes pusillanimity always a fear of the dangers of death: wherefore it does not follow from this standpoint that pusillanimity is opposed to fortitude. As regards anger, if we consider it under the aspect of its proper movement, whereby a man is roused to take vengeance, it does not cause pusillanimity, which disheartens the soul; on the contrary, it takes it away. If, however, we consider the causes of anger, which are injuries inflicted whereby the soul of the man who suffers them is disheartened, it conduces to pusillanimity. Ad quartum dicendum quod pusillanimitas est Reply Obj. 4: According to its proper species pusilgravius peccatum, secundum propriam speciem, quam lanimity is a graver sin than presumption, since thereby a praesumptio, quia per ipsam recedit homo a bonis, quod man withdraws from good things, which is a very great evil est pessimum, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Sed praesumptio di- according to Ethic. iv. Presumption, however, is stated to be citur esse nequissima ratione superbiae, ex qua procedit. wicked on account of pride whence it proceeds.

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Question 134 Magnificence Deinde considerandum est de magnificentia et vitiis We must now consider magnificence and the vices opoppositis. Circa magnificentiam autem quaeruntur qua- posed to it. With regard to magnificence there are four tuor. points of inquiry: Primo, utrum magnificentia sit virtus. (1) Whether magnificence is a virtue? Secundo, utrum sit virtus specialis. (2) Whether it is a special virtue? Tertio, quae sit materia eius. (3) What is its matter? Quarto, utrum sit pars fortitudinis. (4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?

Article 1 Whether magnificence is a virtue? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnificentia non sit virtus. Qui enim habet unam virtutem, habet omnes, ut supra habitum est. Sed aliquis potest habere alias virtutes sine magnificentia, dicit enim philosophus, in IV Ethic., quod non omnis liberalis est magnificus. Ergo magnificentia non est virtus. Praeterea, virtus moralis consistit in medio, ut in II Ethic. dicitur. Sed magnificentia non videtur consistere in medio. Superexcellit enim liberalitatem magnitudine. Magnum autem opponitur parvo sicut extremum, quorum medium est aequale, ut dicitur X Metaphys. Et sic magnificentia non est in medio, sed in extremo. Ergo non est virtus. Praeterea, nulla virtus contrariatur inclinationi naturali, sed magis perficit ipsam, ut supra habitum est. Sed sicut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., magnificus non est sumptuosus in seipsum, quod est contra inclinationem naturalem, per quam aliquis maxime providet sibi. Ergo magnificentia non est virtus. Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in VI Ethic., ars est recta ratio factibilium. Sed magnificentia est circa factibilia, ut ex ipso nomine apparet. Ergo magis est ars quam virtus. Sed contra, virtus humana est participatio quaedam virtutis divinae. Sed magnificentia pertinet ad virtutem divinam, secundum illud Psalmi, magnificentia eius et virtus eius in nubibus. Ergo magnificentia est virtus. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in I de caelo, virtus dicitur per comparationem ad ultimum in quod potentia potest, non quidem ad ultimum ex parte defectus; sed ex parte excessus, cuius ratio consistit in magnitudine. Et ideo operari aliquid magnum, ex quo

Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a virtue. For whoever has one virtue has all the virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). But one may have the other virtues without having magnificence: because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that not every liberal man is magnificent. Therefore magnificence is not a virtue. Obj. 2: Further, moral virtue observes the mean, according to Ethic. ii, 6. But magnificence does not seemingly observe the mean, for it exceeds liberality in greatness. Now great and little are opposed to one another as extremes, the mean of which is equal, as stated in Metaph. x. Hence magnificence observes not the mean, but the extreme. Therefore it is not a virtue. Obj. 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to a natural inclination, but on the contrary perfects it, as stated above (Q. 108, A. 2; Q. 117, A. 1, Obj. 1). Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2) the magnificent man is not lavish towards himself : and this is opposed to the natural inclination one has to look after oneself. Therefore magnificence is not a virtue. Obj. 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 4) art is right reason about things to be made. Now magnificence is about things to be made, as its very name denotes. Therefore it is an act rather than a virtue. On the contrary, Human virtue is a participation of Divine power. But magnificence (virtutis) belongs to Divine power, according to Ps. 47:35: His magnificence and His power is in the clouds. Therefore magnificence is a virtue. I answer that, According to De Caelo i, 16, we speak of virtue in relation to the extreme limit of a thing’s power, not as regards the limit of deficiency, but as regards the limit of excess, the very nature of which denotes something great. Wherefore to do something great, whence magnifi-

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Q. 134, A. 2

Fortitude

sumitur nomen magnificentiae, proprie pertinet ad rationem virtutis. Unde magnificentia nominat virtutem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non omnis liberalis est magnificus quantum ad actum, quia desunt sibi ea quibus uti necesse est ad actum magnificum. Tamen omnis liberalis habet habitum magnificentiae, vel actu vel in propinqua dispositione, ut supra dictum est, cum de connexione virtutum ageretur. Ad secundum dicendum quod magnificentia consistit quidem in extremo, considerata quantitate eius quod facit. Sed tamen in medio consistit, considerata regula rationis, a qua non deficit nec eam excedit, sicut et de magnanimitate dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod ad magnificentiam pertinet facere aliquid magnum. Quod autem pertinet ad personam uniuscuiusque, est aliquid parvum in comparatione ad id quod convenit rebus divinis vel rebus communibus. Et ideo magnificus non principaliter intendit sumptus facere in his quae pertinent ad personam propriam, non quia bonum suum non quaerat, sed quia non est magnum. Si quid tamen in his quae ad ipsum pertinent magnitudinem habeat, hoc etiam magnifice magnificus prosequitur, sicut ea quae semel fiunt, ut nuptiae vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi; vel etiam ea quae permanentia sunt, sicut ad magnificum pertinet praeparare convenientem habitationem, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., oportet artis esse quandam virtutem, scilicet moralem, per quam scilicet appetitus inclinetur ad recte utendum ratione artis. Et hoc pertinet ad magnificentiam. Unde non est ars, sed virtus.

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cence takes its name, belongs properly to the very notion of virtue. Hence magnificence denotes a virtue. Reply Obj. 1: Not every liberal man is magnificent as regards his actions, because he lacks the wherewithal to perform magnificent deeds. Nevertheless every liberal man has the habit of magnificence, either actually or in respect of a proximate disposition thereto, as explained above (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 2), as also (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1) when we were treating of the connection of virtues. Reply Obj. 2: It is true that magnificence observes the extreme, if we consider the quantity of the thing done: yet it observes the mean, if we consider the rule of reason, which it neither falls short of nor exceeds, as we have also said of magnanimity (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 1). Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to magnificence to do something great. But that which regards a man’s person is little in comparison with that which regards Divine things, or even the affairs of the community at large. Wherefore the magnificent man does not intend principally to be lavish towards himself, not that he does not seek his own good, but because to do so is not something great. Yet if anything regarding himself admits of greatness, the magnificent man accomplishes it magnificently: for instance, things that are done once, such as a wedding, or the like; or things that are of a lasting nature; thus it belongs to a magnificent man to provide himself with a suitable dwelling, as stated in Ethic. iv. Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) there must needs be a virtue of act, i.e., a moral virtue, whereby the appetite is inclined to make good use of the rule of act: and this is what magnificence does. Hence it is not an act but a virtue.

Article 2 Whether magnificence is a special virtue? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnificentia non sit specialis virtus. Ad magnificentiam enim videtur pertinere facere aliquid magnum. Sed facere aliquid magnum potest convenire cuilibet virtuti, si sit magna, sicut qui habet magnam virtutem temperantiae, facit magnum temperantiae opus. Ergo magnificentia non est aliqua specialis virtus, sed significat statum perfectum cuiuslibet virtutis. Praeterea, eiusdem videtur facere aliquid et tendere in illud. Sed tendere in aliquid magnum pertinet ad magnanimitatem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo et facere aliquid magnum pertinet ad magnanimitatem. Non ergo magnificentia est virtus distincta a magnanimitate.

Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a special virtue. For magnificence would seem to consist in doing something great. But it may belong to any virtue to do something great, if the virtue be great: as in the case of one who has a great virtue of temperance, for he does a great work of temperance. Therefore, magnificence is not a special virtue, but denotes a perfect degree of any virtue. Obj. 2: Further, seemingly that which tends to a thing is the same as that which does it. But it belongs to magnanimity to tend to something great, as stated above (Q. 129, AA. 1, 2). Therefore it belongs to magnanimity likewise to do something great. Therefore magnificence is not a special virtue distinct from magnanimity.

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Praeterea, magnificentia videtur ad sanctitatem pertinere, dicitur enim Exod. XV, magnificus in sanctitate; et in Psalmo, sanctitas et magnificentia in sanctificatione eius. Sed sanctitas idem est religioni, ut supra habitum est. Ergo magnificentia videtur esse idem religioni. Non ergo est virtus specialis ab aliis distincta. Sed contra est quod philosophus connumerat eam aliis virtutibus specialibus. Respondeo dicendum quod ad magnificentiam pertinet facere aliquid magnum, sicut ex ipso nomine apparet. Facere autem dupliciter potest accipi, uno modo, proprie; alio modo, communiter. Proprie autem facere dicitur operari aliquid in exteriori materia, sicut facere domum vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi. Communiter autem dicitur facere pro quacumque actione, sive transeat in exteriorem materiam, sicut urere et secare; sive maneat in ipso agente, sicut intelligere et velle. Si igitur magnificentia accipiatur secundum quod importat factionem alicuius magni prout factio proprie dicitur, sic magnificentia est specialis virtus. Opus enim factibile producitur ab arte. In cuius quidem usu potest attendi una specialis ratio bonitatis quod ipsum opus factum per artem sit magnum, scilicet in quantitate, pretiositate vel dignitate, quod facit magnificentia. Et secundum hoc magnificentia est specialis virtus. Si vero nomen magnificentiae accipiatur ab eo quod est facere magnum secundum quod facere communiter sumitur, sic magnificentia non est specialis virtus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad quamlibet virtutem perfectam pertinet magnum facere in suo genere, secundum quod facere communiter sumitur, non autem secundum quod sumitur proprie, sed hoc est proprium magnificentiae. Ad secundum dicendum quod ad magnanimitatem pertinet non solum tendere in magnum, sed etiam in omnibus virtutibus magnum operari, vel faciendo vel qualitercumque agendo, ut dicitur in IV Ethic., ita tamen quod magnanimitas circa hoc respicit solam rationem magni. Aliae autem virtutes, quae, si sint perfectae, magnum operantur, non principaliter dirigunt intentionem suam ad magnum, sed ad id quod est proprium unicuique virtuti, magnitudo autem consequitur ex quantitate virtutis. Ad magnificentiam vero pertinet non solum facere magnum secundum quod facere proprie sumitur, sed etiam ad magnum faciendum tendere animo, unde Tullius dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod magnificentia est rerum magnarum et excelsarum, cum animi quadam ampla et splendida propositione, cogitatio atque administratio; ut cogitatio referatur ad interiorem intentionem, administratio ad exteriorem executionem. Unde oportet quod

Q. 134, A. 2

Obj. 3: Further, magnificence seems to belong to holiness, for it is written (Exod 15:11): Magnificent in holiness, and (Ps 95:6): Holiness and magnificence in His sanctuary. Now holiness is the same as religion, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 8). Therefore magnificence is apparently the same as religion. Therefore it is not a special virtue, distinct from the others. On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons it with other special virtues (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 2). I answer that, It belongs to magnificence to do (facere) something great, as its name implies. Now facere may be taken in two ways, in a strict sense, and in a broad sense. Strictly facere means to work something in external matter, for instance to make a house, or something of the kind; in a broad sense facere is employed to denote any action, whether it passes into external matter, as to burn or cut, or remain in the agent, as to understand or will. Accordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the doing of something great, the doing (factio) being understood in the strict sense, it is then a special virtue. For the work done is produced by act: in the use of which it is possible to consider a special aspect of goodness, namely that the work produced (factum) by the act is something great, namely in quantity, value, or dignity, and this is what magnificence does. In this way magnificence is a special virtue. If, on the other hand, magnificence take its name from doing something great, the doing (facere) being understood in a broad sense, it is not a special virtue. Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to every perfect virtue to do something great in the genus of that virtue, if doing (facere) be taken in the broad sense, but not if it be taken strictly, for this is proper to magnificence. Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to magnanimity not only to tend to something great, but also to do great works in all the virtues, either by making (faciendo), or by any kind of action, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3: yet so that magnanimity, in this respect, regards the sole aspect of great, while the other virtues which, if they be perfect, do something great, direct their principal intention, not to something great, but to that which is proper to each virtue: and the greatness of the thing done is sometimes consequent upon the greatness of the virtue. On the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only to do something great, doing (facere) being taken in the strict sense, but also to tend with the mind to the doing of great things. Hence Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that magnificence is the discussing and administering of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind, discussion referring to the inward intention, and administration to the outward accomplishment. Wherefore

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Q. 134, A. 3

Fortitude

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sicut magnanimitas intendit aliquod magnum in omni just as magnanimity intends something great in every matmateria, ita magnificentia in aliquo opere factibili. ter, it follows that magnificence does the same in every work that can be produced in external matter (factibili). Ad tertium dicendum quod magnificentia intendit Reply Obj. 3: The intention of magnificence is the proopus magnum facere. Opera autem ab hominibus facta duction of a great work. Now works done by men are diad aliquem finem ordinantur. Nullus autem finis huma- rected to an end: and no end of human works is so great norum operum est adeo magnus sicut honor Dei. Et ideo as the honor of God: wherefore magnificence does a great magnificentia praecipue magnum opus facit in ordine ad work especially in reference to the Divine honor. Wherefore honorem Dei. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that the most commendhonorabiles sumptus sunt maxime qui pertinent ad divina able expenditure is that which is directed to Divine sacrifices: sacrificia, et circa hoc maxime studet magnificus. Et ideo and this is the chief object of magnificence. For this reason magnificentia coniungitur sanctitati, quia praecipue eius magnificence is connected with holiness, since its chief efeffectus ad religionem, sive ad sanctitatem, ordinatur. fect is directed to religion or holiness.

Article 3 Whether the matter of magnificence is great expenditure? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod materia magnificentiae non sint sumptus magni. Circa eandem enim materiam non sunt duae virtutes. Sed circa sumptus est liberalitas, ut supra habitum est. Ergo magnificentia non est circa sumptus. Praeterea, omnis magnificus est liberalis, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Sed liberalitas magis est circa dona quam circa sumptus. Ergo etiam magnificentia non praecipue est circa sumptus, sed magis circa dona. Praeterea, ad magnificentiam pertinet aliquod opus exterius facere. Non autem quibuslibet sumptibus fit aliquod exterius opus, etiam si sint sumptus magni, puta cum aliquis multa expendit in exenniis mittendis. Ergo sumptus non sunt propria materia magnificentiae. Praeterea, magnos sumptus non possunt facere nisi divites. Sed omnes virtutes possunt habere etiam pauperes, quia virtutes non ex necessitate indigent exteriori fortuna, sed sibi ipsis sufficiunt, ut Seneca dicit, in libro de ira. Ergo magnificentia non est circa magnos sumptus. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod magnificentia non extenditur circa omnes operationes quae sunt in pecuniis, sicut liberalitas, sed circa sumptuosas solum, in quibus excellit liberalitatem magnitudine. Ergo est solum circa magnos sumptus. Respondeo dicendum quod ad magnificentiam, sicut dictum est, pertinet intendere ad aliquod magnum opus faciendum. Ad hoc autem quod aliquod magnum opus convenienter fiat, requiruntur proportionati sumptus, non enim possunt magna opera fieri nisi cum magnis expensis. Unde ad magnificentiam pertinet magnos sumptus facere ad hoc quod opus magnum convenienter fiat, unde et philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod magnificus ab aequali, idest proportionato, sumptu, opus faciet

Objection 1: It seems that the matter of magnificence is not great expenditure. For there are not two virtues about the same matter. But liberality is about expenditure, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 2). Therefore magnificence is not about expenditure. Obj. 2: Further, every magnificent man is liberal (Ethic. iv, 2). But liberality is about gifts rather than about expenditure. Therefore magnificence also is not chiefly about expenditure, but about gifts. Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to magnificence to produce an external work. But not even great expenditure is always the means of producing an external work, for instance when one spends much in sending presents. Therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of magnificence. Obj. 4: Further, only the rich are capable of great expenditure. But the poor are able to possess all the virtues, since the virtues do not necessarily require external fortune, but are sufficient for themselves, as Seneca says (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi). Therefore magnificence is not about great expenditure. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that magnificence does not extend, like liberality, to all transactions in money, but only to expensive ones, wherein it exceeds liberality in scale. Therefore it is only about great expenditure. I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), it belongs to magnificence to intend doing some great work. Now for the doing of a great work, proportionate expenditure is necessary, for great works cannot be produced without great expenditure. Hence it belongs to magnificence to spend much in order that some great work may be accomplished in becoming manner. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that a magnificent man will produce a more magnificent work with equal, i.e., proportionate, expenditure. Now ex-

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magis magnificum. Sumptus autem est quaedam pecuniae emissio, a qua potest aliquis prohiberi per superfluum amorem pecuniae. Et ideo materia magnificentiae possunt dici et ipsi sumptus, quibus utitur magnificus ad opus magnum faciendum; et ipsa pecunia, qua utitur ad sumptus magnos faciendos; et amor pecuniae, quem moderatur magnificus, ne sumptus magni impediantur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes illae quae sunt circa res exteriores habent aliquam difficultatem ex ipso genere rei circa quam est virtus, et aliam difficultatem ex magnitudine ipsius rei. Et ideo oportet circa pecuniam et usum eius esse duas virtutes, scilicet liberalitatem, quae respicit communiter usum pecuniae; et magnificentiam, quae respicit magnum in pecuniae usu. Ad secundum dicendum quod usus pecuniae aliter pertinet ad liberalem, et aliter ad magnificum. Ad liberalem enim pertinet secundum quod procedit ex ordinato affectu circa pecunias. Et ideo omnis usus debitus pecuniae, cuius impedimentum tollit moderatio amoris pecuniae, pertinet ad liberalitatem, scilicet et dona et sumptus. Sed usus pecuniae pertinet ad magnificum in ordine ad aliquod opus magnum quod faciendum est. Et talis usus non potest esse nisi sumptus sive expensa. Ad tertium dicendum quod magnificus etiam dat dona vel exennia, ut dicitur in IV Ethic., non tamen sub ratione doni, sed potius sub ratione sumptus ordinati ad aliquod opus faciendum, puta ad honorandum aliquem, vel ad faciendum aliquid unde proveniat honor toti civitati, sicut cum facit aliquid ad quod tota civitas studet. Ad quartum dicendum quod principalis actus virtutis est interior electio, quam virtus potest habere absque exteriori fortuna. Et sic etiam pauper potest esse magnificus. Sed ad exteriores actus virtutum requiruntur bona fortunae sicut quaedam instrumenta. Et secundum hoc, pauper non potest actum magnificentiae exteriorem exercere in his quae sunt magna simpliciter, sed forte in his quae sunt magna per comparationem ad aliquod opus quod, etsi in se sit parvum, tamen potest magnifice fieri secundum proportionem illius generis; nam parvum et magnum dicuntur relative, ut philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis.

Q. 134, A. 3

penditure is the outlay of a sum of money; and a man may be hindered from making that outlay if he love money too much. Hence the matter of magnificence may be said to be both this expenditure itself, which the magnificent man uses to produce a great work, and also the very money which he employs in going to great expense, and as well as the love of money, which love the magnificent man moderates, lest he be hindered from spending much. Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 129, A. 2), those virtues that are about external things experience a certain difficulty arising from the genus itself of the thing about which the virtue is concerned, and another difficulty besides arising from the greatness of that same thing. Hence the need for two virtues, concerned about money and its use; namely, liberality, which regards the use of money in general, and magnificence, which regards that which is great in the use of money. Reply Obj. 2: The use of money regards the liberal man in one way and the magnificent man in another. For it regards the liberal man, inasmuch as it proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of money; wherefore all due use of money (such as gifts and expenditure), the obstacles to which are removed by a moderate love of money, belongs to liberality. But the use of money regards the magnificent man in relation to some great work which has to be produced, and this use is impossible without expenditure or outlay. Reply Obj. 3: The magnificent man also makes gifts of presents, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2, but not under the aspect of gift, but rather under the aspect of expenditure directed to the production of some work, for instance in order to honor someone, or in order to do something which will reflect honor on the whole state: as when he brings to effect what the whole state is striving for. Reply Obj. 4: The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, and a virtue may have this without outward fortune: so that even a poor man may be magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite as instruments to the external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are great simply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to do so in things that are great by comparison to some particular work; which, though little in itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion to its genus: for little and great are relative terms, as the Philosopher says (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.).

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Article 4 Whether magnificence is a part of fortitude? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnificentia non sit pars fortitudinis. Magnificentia enim convenit in materia cum liberalitate, ut dictum est. Sed liberalitas non est pars fortitudinis, sed iustitiae. Ergo magnificentia non est pars fortitudinis. Praeterea, fortitudo est circa timores et audacias. Magnificentia autem in nullo videtur respicere timorem, sed solum sumptus, qui sunt operationes quaedam. Ergo magnificentia magis videtur pertinere ad iustitiam, quae est circa operationes, quam ad fortitudinem. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod magnificus scienti assimilatur. Sed scientia magis convenit cum prudentia quam cum fortitudine. Ergo magnificentia non debet poni pars fortitudinis. Sed contra est quod Tullius et Macrobius et Andronicus magnificentiam partem fortitudinis ponunt. Respondeo dicendum quod magnificentia, secundum quod est specialis virtus, non potest poni pars subiectiva fortitudinis, quia non convenit cum ea in materia, sed ponitur pars eius inquantum adiungitur ei sicut virtus secundaria principali. Ad hoc autem quod aliqua virtus adiungatur alicui principali, duo requiruntur, ut supra dictum est, quorum unum est ut secundaria conveniat cum principali; aliud autem est ut in aliquo excedatur ab ea. Magnificentia autem convenit cum fortitudine in hoc quod, sicut fortitudo tendit in aliquod arduum et difficile, ita etiam et magnificentia, unde etiam videtur esse in irascibili, sicut et fortitudo. Sed magnificentia deficit a fortitudine in hoc quod illud arduum in quod tendit fortitudo, habet difficultatem propter periculum quod imminet personae, arduum autem in quod tendit magnificentia, habet difficultatem propter dispendium rerum; quod est multo minus quam periculum personae. Et ideo magnificentia ponitur pars fortitudinis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iustitia respicit operationes secundum se, prout in eis consideratur ratio debiti. Sed liberalitas et magnificentia considerant operationes sumptuum secundum quod comparantur ad passiones animae, diversimode tamen. Nam liberalitas respicit sumptus per comparationem ad amorem et concupiscentiam pecuniarum, quae sunt passiones concupiscibilis, quibus non impeditur liberalis a dationibus et sumptibus faciendis, unde est in concupiscibili. Sed magnificentia respicit sumptus per comparationem ad spem, attingendo ad aliquid arduum, non simpliciter, si-

Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a part of fortitude. For magnificence agrees in matter with liberality, as stated above (A. 3). But liberality is a part, not of fortitude, but of justice. Therefore magnificence is not a part of fortitude. Obj. 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and darings. But magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear, but only with expenditure, which is a kind of action. Therefore magnificence seems to pertain to justice, which is about actions, rather than to fortitude. Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that the magnificent man is like the man of science. Now science has more in common with prudence than with fortitude. Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude. On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of fortitude. I answer that, Magnificence, insofar as it is a special virtue, cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude, since it does not agree with this virtue in the point of matter: but it is reckoned a part thereof, as being annexed to it as secondary to principal virtue. In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue, two things are necessary, as stated above (Q. 80). The one is that the secondary virtue agree with the principal, and the other is that in some respect it be exceeded thereby. Now magnificence agrees with fortitude in the point that as fortitude tends to something arduous and difficult, so also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is seated, like fortitude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence falls short of fortitude, in that the arduous thing to which fortitude tends derives its difficulty from a danger that threatens the person, whereas the arduous thing to which magnificence tends, derives its difficulty from the dispossession of one’s property, which is of much less account than danger to one’s person. Wherefore magnificence is accounted a part of fortitude. Reply Obj. 1: Justice regards operations in themselves, as viewed under the aspect of something due: but liberality and magnificence regard sumptuary operations as related to the passions of the soul, albeit in different ways. For liberality regards expenditure in reference to the love and desire of money, which are passions of the concupiscible faculty, and do not hinder the liberal man from giving and spending: so that this virtue is in the concupiscible. On the other hand, magnificence regards expenditure in reference to hope, by attaining to the difficulty, not simply, as magnanimity does, but in a determinate matter, namely expendi-

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cut magnanimitas, sed in determinata materia, scilicet in sumptibus. Unde magnificentia videtur esse in irascibili, sicut et magnanimitas. Ad secundum dicendum quod magnificentia, etsi non conveniat cum fortitudine in materia, convenit tamen cum ea in conditione materiae, inquantum scilicet tendit in aliquid arduum circa sumptus, sicut fortitudo in aliquid arduum circa timores. Ad tertium dicendum quod magnificentia ordinat usum artis ad aliquid magnum, ut dictum est. Ars autem est in ratione. Et ideo ad magnificum pertinet bene uti ratione in attendendo proportionem sumptus ad opus quod faciendum est. Et hoc praecipue necessarium est propter magnitudinem utriusque, quia nisi diligens consideratio adhiberetur, immineret periculum magni damni.

Q. 134, A. 4

ture: wherefore magnificence, like magnanimity, is apparently in the irascible part. Reply Obj. 2: Although magnificence does not agree with fortitude in matter, it agrees with it as the condition of its matter: since it tends to something difficult in the matter of expenditure, even as fortitude tends to something difficult in the matter of fear. Reply Obj. 3: Magnificence directs the use of art to something great, as stated above and in the preceding Article. Now art is in the reason. Wherefore it belongs to the magnificent man to use his reason by observing proportion of expenditure to the work he has in hand. This is especially necessary on account of the greatness of both those things, since if he did not take careful thought, he would incur the risk of a great loss.

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Question 135 Meanness Deinde considerandum est de vitiis oppositis magniWe must now consider the vices opposed to magnifificentiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. cence: under which head there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum parvificentia sit vitium. (1) Whether meanness is a vice? Secundo, de vitio ei opposito. (2) Of the vice opposed to it.

Article 1 Whether meanness is a vice? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod parvificentia non sit vitium. Virtus enim, sicut est moderativa magnorum, ita etiam est moderativa parvorum, unde et liberales et magnifici aliqua parva faciunt. Sed magnificentia est virtus. Ergo similiter parvificentia magis est virtus quam vitium. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod diligentia ratiocinii est parvifica. Sed diligentia ratiocinii videtur esse laudabilis, quia bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo parvificentia non est vitium. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod parvificus consumit pecuniam tristatus. Sed hoc pertinet ad avaritiam, sive ad illiberalitatem. Ergo parvificentia non est vitium ab aliis distinctum. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II et IV Ethic., ponit parvificentiam speciale vitium magnificentiae oppositum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, moralia speciem a fine sortiuntur. Unde et a fine ut pluries nominantur. Ex hoc ergo dicitur aliquis parvificus quod intendit ad aliquid parvum faciendum. Parvum autem et magnum, secundum philosophum, in praedicamentis, relative dicuntur. Unde cum dicitur quod parvificus intendit aliquid parvum faciendum, facere parvum intelligendum est in comparatione ad genus operis quod facit. In quo quidem parvum et magnum potest attendi dupliciter, uno modo, ex parte operis fiendi; alio modo, ex parte sumptus. Magnificus igitur principaliter intendit magnitudinem operis, secundario intendit magnitudinem sumptus, quam non vitat, ut faciat magnum opus, unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod magnificus ab aequali sumptu opus facit magis magnificum. Parvificus autem e converso principaliter quidem intendit parvitatem sumptus, unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod intendit qualiter minimum consumat, ex consequenti autem intendit parvitatem operis, quam

Objection 1: It seems that meanness is not a vice. For just as vice moderates great things, so does it moderate little things: wherefore both the liberal and the magnificent do little things. But magnificence is a virtue. Therefore likewise meanness is a virtue rather than a vice. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that careful reckoning is mean. But careful reckoning is apparently praiseworthy, since man’s good is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, 4). Therefore meanness is not a vice. Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that a mean man is loth to spend money. But this belongs to covetousness or illiberality. Therefore meanness is not a distinct vice from the others. On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii) accounts meanness a special vice opposed to magnificence. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6), moral acts take their species from their end, wherefore in many cases they are denominated from that end. Accordingly a man is said to be mean (parvificus) because he intends to do something little (parvum). Now according to the Philosopher (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.) great and little are relative terms: and when we say that a mean man intends to do something little, this must be understood in relation to the kind of work he does. This may be little or great in two ways: in one way as regards the work itself to be done, in another as regards the expense. Accordingly the magnificent man intends principally the greatness of his work, and secondarily he intends the greatness of the expense, which he does not shirk, so that he may produce a great work. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 4) that the magnificent man with equal expenditure will produce a more magnificent result. On the other hand, the mean man intends principally to spend little, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that he seeks how he may

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Fortitude

scilicet non recusat, dummodo parvum sumptum faciat. Unde philosophus dicit, ibidem, quod parvificus, maxima consumens in parvo, quod scilicet non vult expendere, bonum perdit, scilicet magnifici operis. Sic ergo patet quod parvificus deficit a proportione quae debet esse secundum rationem inter sumptum et opus. Defectus autem ab eo quod est secundum rationem, causat rationem vitii. Unde manifestum est quod parvificentia vitium est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus moderatur parva secundum regulam rationis, a qua deficit parvificus, ut dictum est. Non enim dicitur parvificus qui parva moderatur, sed qui in moderando magna vel parva deficit a regula rationis. Et ideo habet vitii rationem. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicit philosophus, in II Rhet., timor facit consiliativos. Et ideo parvificus diligenter ratiociniis intendit, quia inordinate timet bonorum suorum consumptionem, etiam in minimis. Unde hoc non est laudabile, sed vitiosum et vituperabile, quia non dirigit affectum suum secundum rationem, sed potius rationis usum applicat ad inordinationem sui affectus. Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut magnificus convenit cum liberali in hoc quod prompte et delectabiliter pecunias emittit, ita etiam parvificus convenit cum illiberali sive avaro in hoc quod cum tristitia et tarditate expensas facit. Differt autem in hoc quod illiberalitas attenditur circa communes sumptus, parvificentia autem circa magnos sumptus, quos difficilius est facere. Et ideo minus vitium est parvificentia quam illiberalitas. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod quamvis parvificentia et oppositum vitium sint malitiae, non tamen opprobria inferunt, quia neque sunt nociva proximo, neque sunt valde turpes.

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spend least. As a result of this he intends to produce a little work, that is, he does not shrink from producing a little work, so long as he spends little. Wherefore the Philosopher says that the mean man after going to great expense forfeits the good of the magnificent work, for the trifle that he is unwilling to spend. Therefore it is evident that the mean man fails to observe the proportion that reason demands between expenditure and work. Now the essence of vice is that it consists in failing to do what is in accordance with reason. Hence it is manifest that meanness is a vice. Reply Obj. 1: Virtue moderates little things, according to the rule of reason: from which rule the mean man declines, as stated in the Article. For he is called mean, not for moderating little things, but for declining from the rule of reason in moderating great or little things: hence meanness is a vice. Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), fear makes us take counsel: wherefore a mean man is careful in his reckonings, because he has an inordinate fear of spending his goods, even in things of the least account. Hence this is not praiseworthy, but sinful and reprehensible, because then a man does not regulate his affections according to reason, but, on the contrary, makes use of his reason in pursuance of his inordinate affections. Reply Obj. 3: Just as the magnificent man has this in common with the liberal man, that he spends his money readily and with pleasure, so too the mean man in common with the illiberal or covetous man is loth and slow to spend. Yet they differ in this, that illiberality regards ordinary expenditure, while meanness regards great expenditure, which is a more difficult accomplishment: wherefore meanness is less sinful than illiberality. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that although meanness and its contrary vice are sinful, they do not bring shame on a man, since neither do they harm one’s neighbor, nor are they very disgraceful.

Article 2 Whether there is a vice opposed to meanness? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod parvificentiae nullum vitium opponatur. Parvo enim opponitur magnum. Sed magnificentia non est vitium, sed virtus. Ergo parvificentiae non opponitur vitium. Praeterea, cum parvificentia sit vitium ex defectu, ut dictum est, videtur quod, si aliquod vitium esset parvificentiae oppositum, quod consisteret solum in superabundanti consumptione. Sed illi qui consumunt multa ubi pauca oporteret consumere, consumunt pauca ubi

Objection 1: It seems that there is no vice opposed to meanness. For great is opposed to little. Now, magnificence is not a vice, but a virtue. Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness. Obj. 2: Further, since meanness is a vice by deficiency, as stated above (A. 1), it seems that if any vice is opposed to meanness, it would merely consist in excessive spending. But those who spend much, where they ought to spend little, spend little where they ought to spend much, according

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multa oporteret consumere, ut dicitur in IV Ethic., et sic habent aliquid de parvificentia. Non ergo est aliquod vitium parvificentiae oppositum. Praeterea, moralia sortiuntur speciem ex fine, ut dictum est. Sed illi qui superflue consumunt, hoc faciunt causa ostentationis divitiarum, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Hoc autem pertinet ad inanem gloriam, quae opponitur magnanimitati, ut dictum est. Ergo nullum vitium parvificentiae opponitur. Sed contra est auctoritas philosophi, qui, in II et IV Ethic., ponit magnificentiam medium duorum oppositorum vitiorum. Respondeo dicendum quod parvo opponitur magnum. Parvum autem et magnum, ut dictum est, relative dicuntur. Sicut autem contingit sumptum esse parvum per comparationem ad opus, ita etiam contingit sumptum esse magnum in comparatione ad opus, ut scilicet excedat proportionem quae esse debet sumptus ad opus secundum regulam rationis. Unde manifestum est quod vitio parvificentiae, qua aliquis deficit a proportione debita expensarum ad opus, intendens minus expendere quam dignitas operis requirat, opponitur vitium quo aliquis dictam proportionem excedit, ut scilicet plus expendat quam sit operi proportionatum. Et hoc vitium Graece quidem dicitur banausia, a furno dicta, quia videlicet ad modum ignis qui est in furno, omnia consumit, vel dicitur apirocalia, idest sine bono igne, quia ad modum ignis consumit non propter bonum. Unde Latine hoc vitium nominari potest consumptio. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod magnificentia dicitur esse eo quod facit magnum opus, non autem ex eo quod in sumptu excedat proportionem operis. Hoc enim pertinet ad vitium quod opponitur parvificentiae. Ad secundum dicendum quod idem vitium contrariatur virtuti quae est in medio, et contrario vitio. Sic igitur vitium consumptionis opponitur parvificentiae in eo quod excedit in sumptu operis dignitatem, expendens multa ubi pauca oporteret expendere. Opponitur autem magnificentiae ex parte operis magni, quod praecipue intendit magnificus, inquantum scilicet, ubi oportet multa expendere, nihil aut parum expendit.

Q. 135, A. 2

to Ethic. iv, 2, and thus they have something of meanness. Therefore there is not a vice opposed to meanness. Obj. 3: Further, moral acts take their species from their end, as stated above (A. 1). Now those who spend excessively, do so in order to make a show of their wealth, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2. But this belongs to vainglory, which is opposed to magnanimity, as stated above (Q. 131, A. 2). Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness. On the contrary, stands the authority of the Philosopher who (Ethic. ii, 8; iv, 2) places magnificence as a mean between two opposite vices. I answer that, Great is opposed to little. Also little and great are relative terms, as stated above (A. 1). Now just as expenditure may be little in comparison with the work, so may it be great in comparison with the work in that it exceeds the proportion which reason requires to exist between expenditure and work. Hence it is manifest that the vice of meanness, whereby a man intends to spend less than his work is worth, and thus fails to observe due proportion between his expenditure and his work, has a vice opposed to it, whereby a man exceeds this same proportion, by spending more than is proportionate to his work. This vice is called in Greek banausia, so called from the Greek baunos, because, like the fire in the furnace, it consumes everything. It is also called apyrokalia, i.e., lacking good fire, since like fire it consumes all, but not for a good purpose. Hence in Latin it may be called consumptio (waste).

Reply Obj. 1: Magnificence is so called from the great work done, but not from the expenditure being in excess of the work: for this belongs to the vice which is opposed to meanness. Reply Obj. 2: To the one same vice there is opposed the virtue which observes the mean, and a contrary vice. Accordingly, then, the vice of waste is opposed to meanness in that it exceeds in expenditure the value of the work, by spending much where it behooved to spend little. But it is opposed to magnificence on the part of the great work, which the magnificent man intends principally, insofar as when it behooves to spend much, it spends little or nothing. Ad tertium dicendum quod consumptor ex ipsa Reply Obj. 3: Wastefulness is opposed to meanness by specie actus opponitur parvifico, inquantum transcen- the very species of its act, since it exceeds the rule of readit regulam rationis, a qua parvificus deficit. Nihil tamen son, whereas meanness falls short of it. Yet nothing hinders prohibet quin hoc ad finem alterius vitii ordinetur, puta this from being directed to the end of another vice, such as inanis gloria, vel cuiuscumque alterius. vainglory or any other.

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Question 136 Patience Deinde considerandum est de patientia. Et circa hoc We must now consider patience. Under this head there quaeruntur quinque. are five points of inquiry: Primo, utrum patientia sit virtus. (1) Whether patience is a virtue? Secundo, utrum sit maxima virtutum. (2) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues? Tertio, utrum possit haberi sine gratia. (3) Whether it can be had without grace? Quarto, utrum sit pars fortitudinis. (4) Whether it is a part of fortitude? Quinto, utrum sit idem cum longanimitate. (5) Whether it is the same as longanimity?

Article 1 Whether patience is a virtue? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod patientia non sit virtus. Virtutes enim perfectissime sunt in patria, ut dicit Augustinus, XIV de Trin. Sed ibi non est patientia, quia nulla sunt ibi mala toleranda, secundum illud Isaiae XLIX et Apocalyps. XXI, non esurient neque sitient, et non percutiet eos aestus neque sol. Ergo patientia non est virtus. Praeterea, nulla virtus in malis potest inveniri, quia virtus est quae bonum facit habentem. Sed patientia quandoque in malis hominibus invenitur, sicut patet in avaris, qui multa mala patienter tolerant ut pecunias congregent, secundum illud Eccle. V cunctis diebus vitae suae comedit in tenebris, et in curis multis, et in aerumna atque tristitia. Ergo patientia non est virtus. Praeterea, fructus a virtutibus differunt, ut supra habitum est. Sed patientia ponitur inter fructus, ut patet Galat. V. Ergo patientia non est virtus. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de patientia, virtus animi quae patientia dicitur, tam magnum Dei donum est ut etiam ipsius qui nobis eam largitur patientia praedicetur. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est supra, virtutes morales ordinantur ad bonum inquantum conservant bonum rationis contra impetus passionum. Inter alias autem passiones, tristitia efficax est ad impediendum bonum rationis, secundum illud II ad Cor. VII, saeculi tristitia mortem operatur; et Eccli. XXX, multos occidit tristitia, et non est utilitas in illa. Unde necesse est habere aliquam virtutem per quam bonum rationis conservetur contra tristitiam, ne scilicet ratio tristitiae succumbat. Hoc autem facit patientia. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de patientia, quod patientia hominis est qua mala aequo animo toleramus, idest sine perturbatione

Objection 1: It seems that patience is not a virtue. For the virtues are most perfect in heaven, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv). Yet patience is not there, since no evils have to be borne there, according to Isa. 49:10 and Apoc. 7:16, They shall not hunger nor thirst, neither shall the heat nor the sun strike them. Therefore patience is not a virtue. Obj. 2: Further, no virtue can be found in the wicked, since virtue it is that makes its possessor good. Yet patience is sometimes found in wicked men; for instance, in the covetous, who bear many evils patiently that they may amass money, according to Eccles. 5:16, All the days of his life he eateth in darkness, and in many cares, and in misery and in sorrow. Therefore patience is not a virtue. Obj. 3: Further, the fruits differ from the virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 70, A. 1, ad 3). But patience is reckoned among the fruits (Gal 5:22). Therefore patience is not a virtue. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Patientia i): The virtue of the soul that is called patience, is so great a gift of God, that we even preach the patience of Him who bestows it upon us. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 123, A. 1), the moral virtues are directed to the good, inasmuch as they safeguard the good of reason against the impulse of the passions. Now among the passions sorrow is strong to hinder the good of reason, according to 2 Cor. 7:10, The sorrow of the world worketh death, and Ecclus. 30:25, Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it. Hence the necessity for a virtue to safeguard the good of reason against sorrow, lest reason give way to sorrow: and this patience does. Wherefore Augustine says (De Patientia ii): A man’s patience it is whereby he bears evil with an equal mind, i.e., without being disturbed by sorrow, lest he abandon with an

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tristitiae, ne animo iniquo bona deseramus per quae ad meliora perveniamus. Unde manifestum est patientiam esse virtutem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutes morales non remanent secundum eundem actum in patria quem habent in via, scilicet per comparationem ad bona praesentis vitae, quae non remanebunt in patria, sed per comparationem ad finem, qui erit in patria. Sicut iustitia non erit in patria circa emptiones et venditiones, et alia quae pertinent ad vitam praesentem, sed in hoc quod est subditum esse Deo. Similiter actus patientiae in patria non erit in sustinendo aliqua, sed in fruitione bonorum in quae pervenire volebamus patiendo. Unde Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod in patria non erit ipsa patientia, quae necessaria non est nisi ubi toleranda sunt mala, sed aeternum erit id quo per patientiam pervenitur. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de patientia, patientes proprie dicuntur qui mala malunt non committendo ferre, quam non ferendo committere. In illis autem qui mala sustinent ut mala faciant, nec miranda nec laudanda est patientia, quae nulla est, sed miranda duritia, neganda patientia. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, fructus in sui ratione importat quandam delectationem. Sunt autem operationes virtutum delectabiles secundum seipsas, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Consuetum est autem ut nomine virtutum etiam virtutum actus significentur. Et ideo patientia, quantum ad habitum, ponitur virtus quantum autem ad delectationem quam habet in actu, ponitur fructus et praecipue quantum ad hoc quod per patientiam animus praeservatur ne obruatur tristitia.

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unequal mind the goods whereby he may advance to better things. It is therefore evident that patience is a virtue. Reply Obj. 1: The moral virtues do not remain in heaven as regards the same act that they have on the way, in relation, namely, to the goods of the present life, which will not remain in heaven: but they will remain in their relation to the end, which will be in heaven. Thus justice will not be in heaven in relation to buying and selling and other matters pertaining to the present life, but it will remain in the point of being subject to God. In like manner the act of patience, in heaven, will not consist in bearing things, but in enjoying the goods to which we had aspired by suffering. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv) that patience itself will not be in heaven, since there is no need for it except where evils have to be borne: yet that which we shall obtain by patience will be eternal. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Patientia ii; v) properly speaking those are patient who would rather bear evils without inflicting them, than inflict them without bearing them. As for those who bear evils that they may inflict evil, their patience is neither marvelous nor praiseworthy, for it is no patience at all: we may marvel at their hardness of heart, but we must refuse to call them patient. Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (I-II, Q. 11, A. 1), the very notion of fruit denotes pleasure. And works of virtue afford pleasure in themselves, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. Now the names of the virtues are wont to be applied to their acts. Wherefore patience as a habit is a virtue, but as to the pleasure which its act affords, it is reckoned a fruit, especially in this, that patience safeguards the mind from being overcome by sorrow.

Article 2 Whether patience is the greatest of the virtues? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod patientia sit potissima virtutum. Id enim quod est perfectum est potissimum in unoquoque genere. Sed patentia habet opus perfectum, ut dicitur Iac. I. Ergo patientia est potissima virtutum. Praeterea, omnes virtutes ad bonum animae ordinantur. Sed hoc praecipue videtur pertinere ad patientiam, dicitur enim Luc. XXI, in patientia vestra possidebitis animas vestras. Ergo patientia est maxima virtutum. Praeterea, illud quod est conservativum et causa aliorum, videtur potius esse. Sed sicut Gregorius dicit, in quadam homilia, patientia est radix et custos omnium virtutum. Ergo patientia est maxima virtutum.

Objection 1: It seems that patience is the greatest of the virtues. For in every genus that which is perfect is the greatest. Now patience hath a perfect work (Jas 1:4). Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues. Obj. 2: Further, all the virtues are directed to the good of the soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience; for it is written (Luke 21:19): In your patience you shall possess your souls. Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues. Obj. 3: Further, seemingly that which is the safeguard and cause of other things is greater than they are. But according to Gregory (Hom. xxxv in Evang.) patience is the root and safeguard of all the virtues. Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.

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Sed contra est quod non enumeratur inter quatuor virtutes quas Gregorius, XXII Moral., et Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccle., vocat principales. Respondeo dicendum quod virtutes secundum suam rationem ordinantur ad bonum, est enim virtus quae bonum facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Unde oportet quod tanto principalior sit virtus et potior, quanto magis et directius ordinat in bonum. Directius autem ad bonum ordinant hominem virtutes quae sunt constitutivae boni, quam illae quae sunt impeditivae eorum quae abducunt a bono. Et sicut inter illas quae sunt constitutivae boni tanto aliqua potior est quanto in maiori bono statuit hominem, sicut fides, spes et caritas quam prudentia et iustitia; ita etiam inter illas quae sunt impeditivae retrahentium a bono, tanto aliqua est potior quanto id quod ab ea impeditur magis a bono retrahit. Plus autem a bono retrahunt pericula mortis, circa quae est fortitudo, vel delectationes tactus, circa quae est temperantia, quam quaevis adversa, circa quae est patientia. Et ideo patientia non est potissima virtutum, sed deficit non solum a virtutibus theologicis et prudentia et iustitia, quae directe statuunt hominem in bono; sed etiam a fortitudine et temperantia, quae retrahunt a maioribus impedimentis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod patientia dicitur habere opus perfectum in adversis tolerandis, ex quibus primo procedit tristitia, quam moderatur patientia; secundo ira, quam moderatur mansuetudo; tertio odium, quod tollit caritas; quarto iniustum nocumentum, quod prohibet iustitia. Tollere enim principium uniuscuiusque est perfectius. Nec tamen sequitur, si in hoc patientia est perfectior, quod sit perfectior simpliciter. Ad secundum dicendum quod possessio importat quietum dominium. Et ideo per patientiam dicitur homo suam animam possidere, inquantum radicitus evellit passiones adversitatum, quibus anima inquietatur. Ad tertium dicendum quod patientia dicitur esse radix et custos omnium virtutum, non quasi directe eas causando et conservando, sed solum removendo prohibens.

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On the contrary, It is not reckoned among the four virtues which Gregory (Moral. xxii) and Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv) call principal. I answer that, Virtues by their very nature are directed to good. For it is virtue that makes its possessor good, and renders the latter’s work good (Ethic. ii, 6). Hence it follows that a virtue’s superiority and preponderance over other virtues is the greater according as it inclines man to good more effectively and directly. Now those virtues which are effective of good, incline a man more directly to good than those which are a check on the things which lead man away from good: and just as among those that are effective of good, the greater is that which establishes man in a greater good (thus faith, hope, and charity are greater than prudence and justice); so too among those that are a check on things that withdraw man from good, the greater virtue is the one which is a check on a greater obstacle to good. But dangers of death, about which is fortitude, and pleasures of touch, with which temperance is concerned, withdraw man from good more than any kind of hardship, which is the object of patience. Therefore patience is not the greatest of the virtues, but falls short, not only of the theological virtues, and of prudence and justice which directly establish man in good, but also of fortitude and temperance which withdraw him from greater obstacles to good. Reply Obj. 1: Patience is said to have a perfect work in bearing hardships: for these give rise first to sorrow, which is moderated by patience; second, to anger, which is moderated by meekness; third, to hatred, which charity removes; fourth, to unjust injury, which justice forbids. Now that which removes the principle is the most perfect. Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this respect, that it is more perfect simply. Reply Obj. 2: Possession denotes undisturbed ownership; wherefore man is said to possess his soul by patience, insofar as it removes by the root the passions that are evoked by hardships and disturb the soul. Reply Obj. 3: Patience is said to be the root and safeguard of all the virtues, not as though it caused and preserved them directly, but merely because it removes their obstacles.

Article 3 Whether it is possible to have patience without grace? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod patientia possit haberi sine gratia. Illud enim ad quod ratio magis inclinat, magis potest implere rationalis creatura. Sed magis est rationabile quod aliquis patiatur mala propter bonum quam propter malum. Aliqui autem patiuntur mala propter malum ex propria virtute, sine au-

Objection 1: It seems that it is possible to have patience without grace. For the more his reason inclines to a thing, the more is it possible for the rational creature to accomplish it. Now it is more reasonable to suffer evil for the sake of good than for the sake of evil. Yet some suffer evil for evil’s sake, by their own virtue and without the help of

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xilio gratiae, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de patientia, quod multa in laboribus et doloribus sustinent homines propter ea quae vitiose diligunt. Ergo multo magis homo potest mala sustinere propter bonum, quod est vere patientem esse, praeter auxilium gratiae. Praeterea, aliqui non existentes in statu gratiae magis abhorrent mala vitiorum quam corporalia mala, unde quidam gentilium leguntur multa mala tolerasse ne patriam proderent, aut aliquid aliud inhonestum committerent. Sed hoc est vere patientem esse. Ergo videtur quod patientia possit haberi absque auxilio gratiae. Praeterea, manifeste apparet quod aliqui propter sanitatem corporis recuperandam gravia quaedam et amara patiuntur. Salus autem animae non est minus appetibilis quam sanitas corporis. Ergo, pari ratione, pro salute animae potest aliquis multa mala sustinere, quod est vere patientem esse, absque auxilio gratiae. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo, ab ipso, scilicet Deo, patientia mea. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de patientia, vis desideriorum facit tolerantiam laborum et dolorum, et nemo nisi pro eo quod delectat, sponte suscipit ferre quod cruciat. Et huius ratio est quia tristitiam et dolorem secundum se abhorret animus, unde nunquam eligeret eam pati propter se, sed solum propter finem. Ergo oportet quod illud bonum propter quod aliquis vult pati mala, sit magis volitum et amatum quam illud bonum cuius privatio ingerit dolorem quem patienter toleramus. Quod autem aliquis praeferat bonum gratiae omnibus naturalibus bonis ex quorum amissione potest dolor causari, pertinet ad caritatem, quae diligit Deum super omnia. Unde manifestum est quod patientia, secundum quod est virtus, a caritate causatur, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIII, caritas patiens est. Manifestum est autem quod caritas non potest haberi nisi per gratiam, secundum illud Rom. V, caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis. Unde patet quod patientia non potest haberi sine auxilio gratiae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in natura humana, si esset integra, praevaleret inclinatio rationis, sed in natura corrupta praevalet inclinatio concupiscentiae, quae in homine dominatur. Et ideo pronior est homo ad sustinendum mala in quibus concupiscentia delectatur praesentialiter, quam tolerare mala propter bona futura quae secundum rationem appetuntur, quod tamen pertinet ad veram patientiam. Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum politicae virtutis est commensuratum naturae humanae. Et ideo absque auxilio gratiae gratum facientis potest voluntas humana in illud tendere, licet non absque auxilio Dei. Sed

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grace; for Augustine says (De Patientia iii) that men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they love sinfully. Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without the help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good, and this is to be truly patient. Obj. 2: Further, some who are not in a state of grace have more abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils: hence some heathens are related to have endured many hardships rather than betray their country or commit some other misdeed. Now this is to be truly patient. Therefore it seems that it is possible to have patience without the help of grace. Obj. 3: Further, it is quite evident that some go through much trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body. Now the health of the soul is not less desirable than bodily health. Therefore in like manner one may, without the help of grace, endure many evils for the health of the soul, and this is to be truly patient. On the contrary, It is written (Ps 61:6): From Him, i.e., from God, is my patience. I answer that, As Augustine says (De Patientia iv), the strength of desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one willingly undertakes to bear what is painful, save for the sake of that which gives pleasure. The reason of this is because sorrow and pain are of themselves displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose to suffer them for their own sake, but only for the sake of an end. Hence it follows that the good for the sake of which one is willing to endure evils, is more desired and loved than the good the privation of which causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now the fact that a man prefers the good of grace to all natural goods, the loss of which may cause sorrow, is to be referred to charity, which loves God above all things. Hence it is evident that patience, as a virtue, is caused by charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, Charity is patient. But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity save through grace, according to Rom. 5:5, The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit Who is given to us. Therefore it is clearly impossible to have patience without the help of grace. Reply Obj. 1: The inclination of reason would prevail in human nature in the state of integrity. But in corrupt nature the inclination of concupiscence prevails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is more prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the concupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for the sake of goods to come, which are desired in accordance with reason: and yet it is this that pertains to true patience. Reply Obj. 2: The good of a social virtue is commensurate with human nature; and consequently the human will can tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet not without the help of God’s grace. On the other hand, the

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bonum gratiae est supernaturale. Unde in illud non potest tendere homo per virtutem suae naturae. Et ideo non est similis ratio. Ad tertium dicendum quod tolerantia etiam malorum quae quis sustinet propter corporis sanitatem, procedit ex amore quo homo naturaliter diligit suam carnem. Et ideo non est similis ratio de patientia, quae procedit ex amore supernaturali.

Q. 136, A. 4

good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot tend thereto by a natural virtue. Hence the comparison fails. Reply Obj. 3: Even the endurance of those evils which a man bears for the sake of his body’s health, proceeds from the love a man naturally has for his own flesh. Hence there is no comparison between this endurance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural love.

Article 4 Whether patience is a part of fortitude? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod patientia non sit pars fortitudinis. Idem enim non est pars sui ipsius. Sed patientia videtur idem esse fortitudini, quia sicut supra dictum est, proprius actus fortitudinis est sustinere; et hoc etiam pertinet ad patientiam, dicitur enim in libro sententiarum prosperi quod patientia consistit in alienis malis tolerandis. Ergo patientia non est pars fortitudinis. Praeterea, fortitudo est circa timores et audacias, ut supra habitum est, et ita est in irascibili. Sed patientia videtur esse circa tristitias, et ita videtur esse in concupiscibili. Ergo patientia non est pars fortitudinis, sed magis temperantiae. Praeterea, totum non potest esse sine parte. Si ergo patientia sit pars fortitudinis, fortitudo nunquam posset esse sine patientia, cum tamen fortis quandoque non toleret patienter mala, sed etiam aggrediatur eum qui mala facit. Ergo patientia non est pars fortitudinis. Sed contra est quod Tullius, in sua rhetorica, ponit eam fortitudinis partem. Respondeo dicendum quod patientia est pars fortitudinis quasi potentialis, quia adiungitur fortitudini sicut virtus secundaria principali. Ad patientiam enim pertinet aliena mala aequanimiter perpeti, ut Gregorius dicit, in quadam homilia. In malis autem quae ab aliis inferuntur, praecipua sunt, et difficillima ad sustinendum, illa quae pertinent ad pericula mortis, circa quae est fortitudo. Unde patet quod in ista materia principalitatem tenet fortitudo, quasi vindicans sibi id quod principalius est in hac materia. Et ideo patientia adiungitur ei sicut secundaria virtus principali.

Objection 1: It seems that patience is not a part of fortitude. For a thing is not part of itself. Now patience is apparently the same as fortitude: because, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 6), the proper act of fortitude is to endure; and this belongs also to patience. For it is stated in the Liber Sententiarum Prosperi that patience consists in enduring evils inflicted by others. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude. Obj. 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and daring, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 3), and thus it is in the irascible. But patience seems to be about sorrow, and consequently would seem to be in the concupiscible. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude but of temperance. Obj. 3: Further, the whole cannot be without its part. Therefore if patience is a part of fortitude, there can be no fortitude without patience. Yet sometimes a brave man does not endure evils patiently, but even attacks the person who inflicts the evil. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude. On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of fortitude. I answer that, Patience is a quasi-potential part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal virtue. For it belongs to patience to suffer with an equal mind the evils inflicted by others, as Gregory says in a homily (xxxv in Evang.). Now of those evils that are inflicted by others, foremost and most difficult to endure are those that are connected with the danger of death, and about these evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is clear that in this matter fortitude has the principal place, and that it lays claim to that which is principal in this matter. Wherefore patience is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue, for which reason Prosper calls patience brave (Sent. 811). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad fortitudinem Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to fortitude to endure, not pertinet non qualiacumque sustinere, sed illud quod est anything indeed, but that which is most difficult to endure, summe difficile in sustinendo, scilicet sustinere pericula namely dangers of death: whereas it may pertain to pamortis. Ad patientiam autem pertinere potest sustinen- tience to endure any kind of evil.

tia quorumcumque malorum.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod actus fortitudinis non solum consistit in hoc quod aliquis in bono persistat contra timores futurorum periculorum, sed etiam ut non deficiat propter praesentium tristitiam sive dolorem, et ex hac parte habet affinitatem cum fortitudine patientia. Et tamen fortitudo est principaliter circa timores, ad quorum rationem pertinet fugere, quod vitat fortitudo. Patientia vero principalius est circa tristitias, nam patiens aliquis dicitur non ex hoc quod non fugit, sed ex hoc quod laudabiliter se habet in patiendo quae praesentialiter nocent, ut scilicet non inordinate ex eis tristetur. Et ideo fortitudo proprie est in irascibili, patientia autem in concupiscibili. Nec hoc impedit quin patientia sit pars fortitudinis, quia adiunctio virtutis ad virtutem non attenditur secundum subiectum, sed secundum materiam vel formam. Nec tamen patientia ponitur pars temperantiae, quamvis utraque sit in concupiscibili. Quia temperantia est solum circa tristitias quae opponuntur delectationibus tactus, puta quae sunt ex abstinentia ciborum vel venereorum, sed patientia praecipue est circa tristitias quae ab aliis inferuntur. Et iterum ad temperantiam pertinet refrenare huiusmodi tristitias, sicut et delectationes contrarias, ad patientiam autem pertinet ut propter huiusmodi tristitias, quantaecumque sint, homo non recedat a bono virtutis. Ad tertium dicendum quod patientia potest, quantum ad aliquid sui, poni pars integralis fortitudinis, de qua parte obiectio procedit, prout scilicet aliquis patienter sustinet mala quae pertinent ad pericula mortis. Nec est contra rationem patientiae quod aliquis, quando opus fuerit, insiliat in eum qui mala facit, quia, ut Chrysostomus dicit, super illud Matth., vade Satanas, in iniuriis propriis patientem esse laudabile est, iniurias autem Dei patienter sustinere nimis est impium. Et Augustinus dicit, in quadam epistola contra Marcellinum, quod praecepta patientiae non contrariantur bono reipublicae, pro quo conservando contra inimicos compugnatur. Secundum vero quod patientia se habet circa quaecumque alia mala, adiungitur fortitudini ut virtus secundaria principali.

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Reply Obj. 2: The act of fortitude consists not only in holding fast to good against the fear of future dangers, but also in not failing through sorrow or pain occasioned by things present; and it is in the latter respect that patience is akin to fortitude. Yet fortitude is chiefly about fear, which of itself evokes flight which fortitude avoids; while patience is chiefly about sorrow, for a man is said to be patient, not because he does not fly, but because he behaves in a praiseworthy manner by suffering (patiendo) things which hurt him here and now, in such a way as not to be inordinately saddened by them. Hence fortitude is properly in the irascible, while patience is in the concupiscible faculty. Nor does this hinder patience from being a part of fortitude, because the annexing of virtue to virtue does not regard the subject, but the matter or the form. Nevertheless patience is not to be reckoned a part of temperance, although both are in the concupiscible, because temperance is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures of touch, such as arise through abstinence from pleasures of food and sex: whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows inflicted by other persons. Moreover it belongs to temperance to control these sorrows besides their contrary pleasures: whereas it belongs to patience that a man forsake not the good of virtue on account of such like sorrows, however great they be. Reply Obj. 3: It may be granted that patience in a certain respect is an integral part of justice, if we consider the fact that a man may patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers of death; and it is from this point of view that the objection argues. Nor is it inconsistent with patience that a man should, when necessary, rise up against the man who inflicts evils on him; for Chrysostom says on Matt. 4:10, Begone Satan, that it is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to endure God’s wrongs patiently is most wicked: and Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii) that the precepts of patience are not opposed to the good of the commonwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight against our enemies. But insofar as patience regards all kinds of evils, it is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue.

Article 5 Whether patience is the same as longanimity? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod patientia sit idem quod longanimitas. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de patientia, quod patientia Dei praedicatur non in hoc quod aliquod malum patiatur, sed in hoc quod expectat malos ut convertantur, unde Eccli. V dicitur, al-

Objection 1: It seems that patience is the same as longanimity. For Augustine says (De Patientia i) that we speak of patience in God, not as though any evil made Him suffer, but because He awaits the wicked, that they may be converted. Wherefore it is written (Sir 5:4): The Most High is

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tissimus patiens redditor est. Ergo videtur quod patientia sit idem quod longanimitas. Praeterea, idem non est oppositum duobus. Sed impatientia opponitur longanimitati, per quam aliquis moram expectat, dicitur enim aliquis impatiens morae, sicut et aliorum malorum. Ergo videtur quod patientia sit idem longanimitati. Praeterea, sicut tempus est quaedam circumstantia malorum quae sustinentur, ita etiam locus. Sed ex parte loci non sumitur aliqua virtus quae distinguatur a patientia. Ergo similiter nec longanimitas, quae sumitur ex parte temporis, inquantum scilicet aliquis diu expectat, distinguitur a patientia. Sed contra est quod Rom. II, super illud, an divitias bonitatis eius et patientiae et longanimitatis contemnis, dicit Glossa, videtur longanimitas a patientia differre, quia qui infirmitate magis quam proposito delinquunt, sustentari per longanimitatem dicuntur, qui vero pertinaci mente exultant in delictis suis, ferri patienter dicendi sunt. Respondeo dicendum quod sicut magnanimitas dicitur per quam aliquis habet animum tendendi in magna, ita etiam longanimitas dicitur per quam aliquis habet animum tendendi in aliquid quod in longinquum distat. Et ideo sicut magnanimitas magis respicit spem tendentem in bonum, quam audaciam vel timorem sive tristitiam quae respiciunt malum, ita etiam et longanimitas. Unde longanimitas maiorem convenientiam videtur habere cum magnanimitate quam cum patientia. Potest tamen convenire cum patientia duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia patientia, sicut et fortitudo, sustinet aliqua mala propter aliquod bonum. Quod si ex propinquo expectetur, facilius est sustinere, si autem in longinquum differatur, mala autem oporteat in praesenti sustinere, difficilius est. Secundo, quia hoc ipsum quod est differri bonum speratum, natum est causare tristitiam, secundum illud Prov. XIII, spes quae differtur affligit animam. Unde et in sustinendo huiusmodi afflictionem potest esse patientia, sicut et in sustinendo quascumque alias tristitias. Sic igitur secundum quod sub ratione mali contristantis potest comprehendi et dilatio boni sperati, quae pertinet ad longanimitatem; et labor quem homo sustinet in continuata executione boni operis, quod pertinet ad constantiam; tam longanimitas quam etiam constantia sub patientia comprehenduntur. Unde et Tullius, definiens patientiam, dicit quod patientia est, honestatis ac utilitatis causa, voluntaria ac diuturna perpessio rerum arduarum ac difficilium. Quod dicit arduarum, pertinet ad constantiam in bono; quod dicit difficilium, pertinet ad gravitatem mali, quam proprie respicit patientia; quod vero addit ac diuturna, pertinet ad longanimitatem secundum quod convenit cum patientia.

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a patient rewarder. Therefore it seems that patience is the same as longanimity. Obj. 2: Further, the same thing is not contrary to two things. But impatience is contrary to longanimity, whereby one awaits a delay: for one is said to be impatient of delay, as of other evils. Therefore it seems that patience is the same as longanimity. Obj. 3: Further, just as time is a circumstance of wrongs endured, so is place. But no virtue is distinct from patience on the score of place. Therefore in like manner longanimity which takes count of time, insofar as a person waits for a long time, is not distinct from patience. On the contrary, a gloss on Rom. 2:4, Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and patience, and longsuffering? says: It seems that longanimity differs from patience, because those who offend from weakness rather than of set purpose are said to be borne with longanimity: while those who take a deliberate delight in their crimes are said to be borne patiently. I answer that, Just as by magnanimity a man has a mind to tend to great things, so by longanimity a man has a mind to tend to something a long way off. Wherefore as magnanimity regards hope, which tends to good, rather than daring, fear, or sorrow, which have evil as their object, so also does longanimity. Hence longanimity has more in common with magnanimity than with patience.

Nevertheless it may have something in common with patience, for two reasons. First, because patience, like fortitude, endures certain evils for the sake of good, and if this good is awaited shortly, endurance is easier: whereas if it be delayed a long time, it is more difficult. Second, because the very delay of the good we hope for, is of a nature to cause sorrow, according to Prov. 13:12, Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul. Hence there may be patience in bearing this trial, as in enduring any other sorrows. Accordingly longanimity and constancy are both comprised under patience, insofar as both the delay of the hoped for good (which regards longanimity) and the toil which man endures in persistently accomplishing a good work (which regards constancy) may be considered under the one aspect of grievous evil. For this reason Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) in defining patience, says that patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit. By saying arduous he refers to constancy in good; when he says difficult he refers to the grievousness of evil, which is the proper object of patience; and by adding continued or long lasting, he refers to longanimity, insofar as it has something in common with patience.

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Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum et secundum. Ad tertium dicendum quod illud quod est longinquum loco, quamvis sit remotum a nobis, tamen non est similiter remotum a natura rerum sicut illud quod est longinquum tempore. Et ideo non est similis ratio. Et praeterea quod est longinquum loco non affert difficultatem nisi ratione temporis, quia quod est longinquum loco a nobis tardius tempore ad nos potest pervenire. Quartum concedimus. Tamen consideranda est ratio illius differentiae quam Glossa assignat. Quia in his qui ex infirmitate peccant hoc solum videtur importabile, quod diu perseverant in malo, et ideo dicitur quod ex longanimitate supportantur. Sed hoc ipsum quod aliquis ex superbia peccat, importabile videtur, et ideo per patientiam dicuntur sustineri illi qui ex superbia peccant.

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This suffices for the Replies to the First and Second Objections. Reply Obj. 3: That which is a long way off as to place, though distant from us, is not simply distant from things in nature, as that which is a long way off in point of time: hence the comparison fails. Moreover, what is remote as to place offers no difficulty save in the point of time, since what is placed a long way from us is a long time coming to us. We grant the fourth argument. We must observe, however, that the reason for the difference assigned by this gloss is that it is hard to bear with those who sin through weakness, merely because they persist a long time in evil, wherefore it is said that they are borne with longanimity: whereas the very fact of sinning through pride seems to be unendurable; for which reason those who sin through pride are stated to be borne with patience.

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Question 137 Perseverance Deinde considerandum est de perseverantia, et de viWe must now consider perseverance and the vices optiis oppositis. Circa perseverantiam autem quaeruntur posed to it. Under the head of perseverance there are four quatuor. points of inquiry: Primo, utrum perseverantia sit virtus. (1) Whether perseverance is a virtue? Secundo, utrum sit pars fortitudinis. (2) Whether it is a part of fortitude? Tertio, quomodo se habet ad constantiam. (3) Of its relation to constancy; Quarto, utrum indigeat auxilio gratiae. (4) Whether it needs the help of grace?

Article 1 Whether perseverance is a virtue? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod perseverantia non sit virtus. Quia, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., continentia est potior quam perseverantia. Sed continentia non est virtus, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Ergo perseverantia non est virtus. Praeterea, virtus est qua recte vivitur, secundum Augustinum, in libro de Lib. Arbit. Sed sicut ipse dicit in libro de perseverantia, nullus potest dici perseverantiam habere quandiu vivit, nisi perseveret usque ad mortem. Ergo perseverantia non est virtus. Praeterea, immobiliter persistere in opere virtutis requiritur ad omnem virtutem, ut patet in II Ethic. Sed hoc pertinet ad rationem perseverantiae, dicit enim Tullius, in sua rhetorica, quod perseverantia est in ratione bene considerata stabilis et perpetua permansio. Ergo perseverantia non est specialis virtus, sed conditio omnis virtutis. Sed contra est quod Andronicus dicit, quod perseverantia est habitus eorum quibus immanendum est et non immanendum, et neutrorum. Sed habitus ordinans nos ad bene faciendum aliquid vel omittendum est virtus. Ergo perseverantia est virtus. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in II Ethic., virtus est circa difficile et bonum. Et ideo ubi occurrit specialis ratio difficultatis vel boni, ibi est specialis virtus. Opus autem virtutis potest habere bonitatem et difficultatem ex duobus. Uno quidem modo, ex specie ipsa actus, quae accipitur secundum rationem proprii obiecti. Alio modo, ex ipsa diuturnitate temporis, nam hoc ipsum quod est diu insistere alicui difficili, specialem difficultatem habet. Et ideo diu persistere in aliquo bono usque ad consummationem pertinet ad specialem virtutem.

Objection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a virtue. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), continency is greater than perseverance. But continency is not a virtue, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue. Obj. 2: Further, by virtue man lives aright, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Now according to the same authority (De Persever. i), no one can be said to have perseverance while living, unless he persevere until death. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue. Obj. 3: Further, it is requisite of every virtue that one should persist unchangeably in the work of that virtue, as stated in Ethic. ii, 4. But this is what we understand by perseverance: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that perseverance is the fixed and continued persistence in a wellconsidered purpose. Therefore perseverance is not a special virtue, but a condition of every virtue. On the contrary, Andronicus says that perseverance is a habit regarding things to which we ought to stand, and those to which we ought not to stand, as well as those that are indifferent. Now a habit that directs us to do something well, or to omit something, is a virtue. Therefore perseverance is a virtue. I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3), virtue is about the difficult and the good; and so where there is a special kind of difficulty or goodness, there is a special virtue. Now a virtuous deed may involve goodness or difficulty on two counts. First, from the act’s very species, which is considered in respect of the proper object of that act: second, from the length of time, since to persist long in something difficult involves a special difficulty. Hence to persist long in something good until it is accomplished belongs to a special virtue.

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Sicut ergo temperantia et fortitudo sunt speciales virtutes eo quod altera earum moderatur delectationes tactus, quod de se difficultatem habet, altera autem moderatur timores et audacias circa pericula mortis, quod etiam secundum se difficile est; ita etiam perseverantia est quaedam specialis virtus ad quam pertinet in his vel in aliis virtuosis operibus diuturnitatem sustinere prout necesse est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus accipit ibi perseverantiam secundum quod aliquis perseverat in his in quibus difficillimum est diu sustinere. Non est autem difficile sustinere bona, sed mala. Mala autem quae sunt pericula mortis, ut plurimum non diu sustinentur, quia ut frequentius cito transeunt. Unde respectu illorum non est praecipua laus perseverantiae. Inter alia autem mala, praecipua sunt illa quae opponuntur delectationibus tactus, quia huiusmodi mala attenduntur circa necessaria vitae, puta circa defectum ciborum et aliorum huiusmodi, quae quandoque imminent diu sustinenda. Non est autem difficile hoc diu sustinere illi qui circa hoc non multum tristatur, nec in oppositis bonis multum delectatur, sicut patet in temperato, in quo huiusmodi passiones non sunt vehementes. Sed maxime hoc difficile est in eo qui circa hoc vehementer afficitur, utpote non habens perfectam virtutem modificantem has passiones. Et ideo, si accipiatur hoc modo perseverantia, non est virtus perfecta, sed est quoddam imperfectum in genere virtutis. Si autem accipiamus perseverantiam secundum quod aliquis in quocumque bono difficili diu persistit, hoc potest convenire etiam habenti perfectam virtutem. Cui etiam si persistere sit minus difficile, persistit tamen in bono magis perfecto. Unde talis perseverantia potest esse virtus, quia perfectio virtutis magis attenditur secundum rationem boni quam secundum rationem difficilis. Ad secundum dicendum quod eodem nomine quandoque nominatur et virtus, et actus virtutis, sicut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., fides est credere quod non vides. Potest tamen contingere quod aliquis habet habitum virtutis qui tamen non exercet actum, sicut aliquis pauper habet habitum magnificentiae, cum tamen actum non exerceat. Quandoque vero aliquis habens habitum incipit quidem exercere actum, sed non perficit, puta si aedificator incipiat aedificare et non compleat domum. Sic ergo dicendum est quod nomen perseverantiae quandoque sumitur pro habitu quo quis eligit perseverare, quandoque autem pro actu quo quis perseverat. Et quandoque quidem habens habitum perseverantiae eligit quidem perseverare, et incipit exequi aliquandiu persistendo; non tamen complet actum, quia non persistit usque in finem. Est autem duplex finis, unus quidem qui est finis operis; alius autem qui est finis humanae vitae. Per se autem ad perseverantiam pertinet ut aliquis perseveret usque ad terminum virtuosi operis, sicut

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Accordingly just as temperance and fortitude are special virtues, for the reason that the one moderates pleasures of touch (which is of itself a difficult thing), while the other moderates fear and daring in connection with dangers of death (which also is something difficult in itself), so perseverance is a special virtue, since it consists in enduring delays in the above or other virtuous deeds, so far as necessity requires. Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is taking perseverance there, as it is found in one who bears those things which are most difficult to endure long. Now it is difficult to endure, not good, but evil. And evils that involve danger of death, for the most part are not endured for a long time, because often they soon pass away: wherefore it is not on this account that perseverance has its chief title to praise. Among other evils foremost are those which are opposed to pleasures of touch, because evils of this kind affect the necessaries of life: such are the lack of food and the like, which at times call for long endurance. Now it is not difficult to endure these things for a long time for one who grieves not much at them, nor delights much in the contrary goods; as in the case of the temperate man, in whom these passions are not violent. But they are most difficult to bear for one who is strongly affected by such things, through lacking the perfect virtue that moderates these passions. Wherefore if perseverance be taken in this sense it is not a perfect virtue, but something imperfect in the genus of virtue. On the other hand, if we take perseverance as denoting long persistence in any kind of difficult good, it is consistent in one who has even perfect virtue: for even if it is less difficult for him to persist, yet he persists in the more perfect good. Wherefore such like perseverance may be a virtue, because virtue derives perfection from the aspect of good rather than from the aspect of difficulty. Reply Obj. 2: Sometimes a virtue and its act go by the same name: thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. lxxix): Faith is to believe without seeing. Yet it is possible to have a habit of virtue without performing the act: thus a poor man has the habit of magnificence without exercising the act. Sometimes, however, a person who has the habit, begins to perform the act, yet does not accomplish it, for instance a builder begins to build a house, but does not complete it. Accordingly we must reply that the term perseverance is sometimes used to denote the habit whereby one chooses to persevere, sometimes for the act of persevering: and sometimes one who has the habit of perseverance chooses to persevere and begins to carry out his choice by persisting for a time, yet completes not the act, through not persisting to the end. Now the end is twofold: one is the end of the work, the other is the end of human life. Properly speaking it belongs to perseverance to persevere to the end of the virtuous work, for instance that a soldier persevere to the end of the fight, and the magnificent man until his work be accom-

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quod miles perseveret usque ad finem certaminis, et magnificus usque ad consummationem operis. Sunt autem quaedam virtutes quarum actus per totam vitam debet durare, sicut fidei, spei et caritatis, quia respiciunt ultimum finem totius vitae humanae. Et ideo respectu harum virtutum, quae sunt principales, non consummatur actus perseverantiae usque ad finem vitae. Et secundum hoc, Augustinus accipit perseverantiam pro actu perseverantiae consummato. Ad tertium dicendum quod virtuti potest aliquid convenire dupliciter. Uno modo, ex propria intentione finis. Et sic diu persistere usque ad finem in bono pertinet ad specialem virtutem quae dicitur perseverantia, quae hoc intendit sicut specialem finem. Alio modo, ex comparatione habitus ad subiectum. Et sic immobiliter persistere consequitur quamlibet virtutem, inquantum est qualitas difficile mobilis.

Q. 137, A. 2

plished. There are, however, some virtues whose acts must endure throughout the whole of life, such as faith, hope, and charity, since they regard the last end of the entire life of man. Wherefore as regards these which are the principal virtues, the act of perseverance is not accomplished until the end of life. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of perseverance as denoting the consummate act of perseverance. Reply Obj. 3: Unchangeable persistence may belong to a virtue in two ways. First, on account of the intended end that is proper to that virtue; and thus to persist in good for a long time until the end, belongs to a special virtue called perseverance, which intends this as its special end. Second, by reason of the relation of the habit to its subject: and thus unchangeable persistence is consequent upon every virtue, inasmuch as virtue is a quality difficult to change.

Article 2 Whether perseverance is a part of fortitude? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod perseverantia non sit pars fortitudinis. Quia, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., perseverantia est circa tristitias tactus. Sed huiusmodi pertinent ad temperantiam. Ergo perseverantia magis est pars temperantiae quam fortitudinis. Praeterea, omnis pars virtutis moralis est circa aliquas passiones, quas virtus moralis moderatur. Sed perseverantia non importat moderantiam passionum, quia quanto vehementiores fuerint passiones, tanto aliquis secundum rationem perseverans laudabilior videtur. Ergo videtur quod perseverantia non sit pars alicuius virtutis moralis, sed magis prudentiae, quae perficit rationem. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de perseverantia, quod perseverantiam nullus potest amittere. Alias autem virtutes potest homo amittere. Ergo perseverantia est potior omnibus aliis virtutibus. Sed virtus principalis est potior quam pars eius. Ergo perseverantia non est pars alicuius virtutis, sed magis ipsa est virtus principalis. Sed contra est quod Tullius ponit perseverantiam partem fortitudinis. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtus principalis est cui principaliter adscribitur aliquid quod pertinet ad laudem virtutis, inquantum scilicet exercet illud circa propriam materiam in qua difficillimum et optimum est illud observare. Et secundum hoc dictum est quod fortitudo est principalis virtus, quia firmitatem servat in his in quibus difficillimum est firmiter persiste-

Objection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a part of fortitude. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 7), perseverance is about pains of touch. But these belong to temperance. Therefore perseverance is a part of temperance rather than of fortitude. Obj. 2: Further, every part of a moral virtue is about certain passions which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply moderation of the passions: since the more violent the passions, the more praiseworthy is it to persevere in accordance with reason. Therefore it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue, but rather of prudence which perfects the reason. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i) that no one can lose perseverance; whereas one can lose the other virtues. Therefore perseverance is greater than all the other virtues. Now a principal virtue is greater than its part. Therefore perseverance is not a part of a virtue, but is itself a principal virtue. On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons perseverance as a part of fortitude. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 123, A. 2; I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), a principal virtue is one to which is principally ascribed something that lays claim to the praise of virtue, inasmuch as it practices it in connection with its own matter, wherein it is most difficult of accomplishment. In accordance with this it has been stated (Q. 123, A. 2) that fortitude is a principal virtue, because it observes firm-

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re, scilicet in periculis mortis. Et ideo necesse est quod fortitudini adiungatur sicut secundaria virtus principali, omnis virtus cuius laus consistit in sustinendo firmiter aliquod difficile. Sustinere autem difficultatem quae provenit ex diuturnitate boni operis, dat laudem perseverantiae, nec hoc est ita difficile sicut sustinere pericula mortis. Et ideo perseverantia adiungitur fortitudini sicut virtus secundaria principali. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod annexio secundariae virtutis ad principalem non solum attenditur secundum materiam, sed magis secundum modum, quia forma in unoquoque potior est quam materia. Unde licet perseverantia magis videatur convenire in materia cum temperantia quam cum fortitudine, tamen in modo magis convenit cum fortitudine, inquantum firmitatem servat contra difficultatem diuturnitatis. Ad secundum dicendum quod illa perseverantia de qua philosophus loquitur, non moderatur aliquas passiones, sed consistit solum in quadam firmitate rationis et voluntatis. Sed perseverantia secundum quod ponitur virtus, moderatur aliquas passiones, scilicet timorem fatigationis aut defectus propter diuturnitatem. Unde haec virtus est in irascibili, sicut et fortitudo. Ad tertium dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de perseverantia non secundum quod nominat habitum virtutis, sed secundum quod nominat actum virtutis continuatum usque in finem, secundum illud Matth. XXIV qui perseveraverit usque in finem, hic salvus erit. Et ideo contra rationem perseverantiae sic acceptae esset quod amitteretur, quia iam non duraret usque in finem.

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ness in matters wherein it is most difficult to stand firm, namely in dangers of death. Wherefore it follows of necessity that every virtue which has a title to praise for the firm endurance of something difficult must be annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue. Now the endurance of difficulty arising from delay in accomplishing a good work gives perseverance its claim to praise: nor is this so difficult as to endure dangers of death. Therefore perseverance is annexed to fortitude, as secondary to principal virtue. Reply Obj. 1: The annexing of secondary to principal virtues depends not only on the matter, but also on the mode, because in everything form is of more account than matter. Wherefore although, as to matter, perseverance seems to have more in common with temperance than with fortitude, yet, in mode, it has more in common with fortitude, in the point of standing firm against the difficulty arising from length of time. Reply Obj. 2: The perseverance of which the Philosopher speaks (Ethic. vii, 4, 7) does not moderate any passions, but consists merely in a certain firmness of reason and will. But perseverance, considered as a virtue, moderates certain passions, namely fear of weariness or failure on account of the delay. Hence this virtue, like fortitude, is in the irascible. Reply Obj. 3: Augustine speaks there of perseverance, as denoting, not a virtuous habit, but a virtuous act sustained to the end, according to Matt. 24:13, He that shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved. Hence it is incompatible with such like perseverance for it to be lost, since it would no longer endure to the end.

Article 3 Whether constancy pertains to perseverance? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod constantia non pertineat ad perseverantiam. Constantia enim pertinet ad patientiam, ut supra dictum est. Sed patientia differt a perseverantia. Ergo constantia non pertinet ad perseverantiam. Praeterea, virtus est circa difficile et bonum. Sed in parvis operibus constantem esse non videtur esse difficile, sed solum in operibus magnis, quae pertinent ad magnificentiam. Ergo constantia magis pertinet ad magnificentiam quam ad perseverantiam. Praeterea, si ad perseverantiam pertineret constantia, in nullo videretur a perseverantia differre, quia utrumque immobilitatem quandam importat. Differunt autem, nam Macrobius condividit constantiam firmitati, per quam intelligitur perseverantia, ut supra dictum est. Ergo constantia non pertinet ad perseverantiam.

Objection 1: It seems that constancy does not pertain to perseverance. For constancy pertains to patience, as stated above (Q. 137, A. 5): and patience differs from perseverance. Therefore constancy does not pertain to perseverance. Obj. 2: Further, virtue is about the difficult and the good. Now it does not seem difficult to be constant in little works, but only in great deeds, which pertain to magnificence. Therefore constancy pertains to magnificence rather than to perseverance. Obj. 3: Further, if constancy pertained to perseverance, it would seem nowise to differ from it, since both denote a kind of unchangeableness. Yet they differ: for Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) condivides constancy with firmness by which he indicates perseverance, as stated above (Q. 128, A. 6). Therefore constancy does not pertain to perseverance.

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Sed contra est quod aliquis dicitur esse constans ex eo quod in aliquo stat. Sed immanere aliquibus pertinet ad perseverantiam, ut patet ex definitione quam Andronicus ponit. Ergo constantia pertinet ad perseverantiam. Respondeo dicendum quod perseverantia et constantia conveniunt quidem in fine, quia ad utramque pertinet firmiter persistere in aliquo bono, differunt autem secundum ea quae difficultatem afferunt ad persistendum in bono. Nam virtus perseverantiae proprie facit firmiter persistere hominem in bono contra difficultatem quae provenit ex ipsa diuturnitate actus, constantia autem facit firmiter persistere in bono contra difficultatem quae provenit ex quibuscumque aliis exterioribus impedimentis. Et ideo principalior pars fortitudinis est perseverantia quam constantia, quia difficultas quae est ex diuturnitate actus, est essentialior actui virtutis quam illa quae est ex exterioribus impedimentis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod exteriora impedimenta persistendi in bono praecipue sunt illa quae tristitiam inferunt. Circa tristitiam autem est patientia, ut dictum est. Et ideo constantia secundum finem convenit cum perseverantia, secundum autem ea quae difficultatem inferunt, convenit cum patientia. Finis autem potior est. Et ideo constantia magis pertinet ad perseverantiam quam ad patientiam. Ad secundum dicendum quod in magnis operibus persistere difficilius est, sed in parvis vel mediocribus diu persistere habet difficultatem, etsi non ex magnitudine actus, quam respicit magnificentia, saltem ex ipsa diuturnitate, quam respicit perseverantia. Et ideo constantia potest ad utrumque pertinere. Ad tertium dicendum quod constantia pertinet quidem ad perseverantiam, inquantum convenit cum ea, non tamen est idem ei inquantum differt ab ea ut dictum est.

Q. 137, A. 4

On the contrary, One is said to be constant because one stands to a thing. Now it belongs to perseverance to stand to certain things, as appears from the definition given by Andronicus. Therefore constancy belongs to perseverance. I answer that, Perseverance and constancy agree as to end, since it belongs to both to persist firmly in some good: but they differ as to those things which make it difficult to persist in good. Because the virtue of perseverance properly makes man persist firmly in good, against the difficulty that arises from the very continuance of the act: whereas constancy makes him persist firmly in good against difficulties arising from any other external hindrances. Hence perseverance takes precedence of constancy as a part of fortitude, because the difficulty arising from continuance of action is more intrinsic to the act of virtue than that which arises from external obstacles. Reply Obj. 1: External obstacles to persistence in good are especially those which cause sorrow. Now patience is about sorrow, as stated above (Q. 136, A. 1). Hence constancy agrees with perseverance as to end: while it agrees with patience as to those things which occasion difficulty. Now the end is of most account: wherefore constancy pertains to perseverance rather than to patience. Reply Obj. 2: It is more difficult to persist in great deeds: yet in little or ordinary deeds, it is difficult to persist for any length of time, if not on account of the greatness of the deed which magnificence considers, yet from its very continuance which perseverance regards. Hence constancy may pertain to both. Reply Obj. 3: Constancy pertains to perseverance insofar as it has something in common with it: but it is not the same thing in the point of their difference, as stated in the Article.

Article 4 Whether perseverance needs the help of grace? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod perseverantia non indigeat auxilio gratiae. Perseverantia enim est quaedam virtus, ut dictum est. Sed virtus, ut Tullius dicit, in sua rhetorica, agit in modum naturae. Ergo sola inclinatio virtutis sufficit ad perseverandum. Non ergo ad hoc requiritur aliud auxilium gratiae. Praeterea, donum gratiae Christi est maius quam nocumentum quod Adam intulit, ut patet Rom. V. Sed ante peccatum homo sic conditus fuit ut posset perseverare per id quod acceperat, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Corrept. et gratia. Ergo multo magis homo per

Objection 1: It seems that perseverance does not need the help of grace. For perseverance is a virtue, as stated above (A. 1). Now according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) virtue acts after the manner of nature. Therefore the sole inclination of virtue suffices for perseverance. Therefore this does not need the help of grace. Obj. 2: Further, the gift of Christ’s grace is greater than the harm brought upon us by Adam, as appears from Rom. 5:15, seqq. Now before sin man was so framed that he could persevere by means of what he had received, as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi). Much more therefore can

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gratiam Christi reparatus, potest perseverare absque auxilio novae gratiae. Praeterea, opera peccati quandoque sunt difficiliora quam opera virtutis, unde ex persona impiorum dicitur Sap. V, ambulavimus vias difficiles. Sed aliqui perseverant in operibus peccati absque alterius auxilio. Ergo etiam in operibus virtutum potest homo perseverare absque auxilio gratiae. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de perseverantia, asserimus donum Dei esse perseverantiam, qua usque in finem perseveratur in Christo. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, perseverantia dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, pro ipso habitu perseverantiae, secundum quod est virtus. Et hoc modo indiget dono habitualis gratiae, sicut et ceterae virtutes infusae. Alio modo potest accipi pro actu perseverantiae durante usque ad mortem. Et secundum hoc indiget non solum gratia habituali, sed etiam gratuito Dei auxilio conservantis hominem in bono usque ad finem vitae, sicut supra dictum est, cum de gratia ageretur. Quia cum liberum arbitrium de se sit vertibile, et hoc ei non tollatur per habitualem gratiam praesentis vitae; non subest potestati liberi arbitrii, etiam per gratiam reparati, ut se immobiliter in bono statuat, licet sit in potestate eius quod hoc eligat, plerumque enim cadit in potestate nostra electio, non autem executio. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus perseverantiae, quantum est de se, inclinat ad perseverandum. Quia tamen habitus est quo quis utitur cum voluerit, non est necessarium quod habens habitum virtutis immobiliter utatur eo usque ad mortem. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Corrept. et gratia, primo homini datum est, non ut perseveraret, sed ut perseverare posset, per liberum arbitrium, quia nulla corruptio tunc erat in natura humana quae perseverandi difficultatem praeberet. Sed nunc praedestinatis per gratiam Christi non solum datur ut perseverare possint, sed ut perseverent. Unde primus homo, nullo terrente, contra Dei terrentis imperium libero usus arbitrio, non stetit in tanta felicitate, cum tanta non peccandi facilitate. Isti autem, saeviente mundo ne starent, steterunt in fide. Ad tertium dicendum quod homo per se potest cadere in peccatum, sed non potest per se resurgere a peccato sine auxilio gratiae. Et ideo ex hoc ipso quod homo cadit in peccatum, inquantum est de se, facit se in peccato perseverantem, nisi gratia Dei liberetur. Non autem ex hoc quod facit bonum facit se perseverantem in bono, quia de se potens est peccare. Et ideo ad hoc indiget auxilio gratiae.

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man, after being repaired by the grace of Christ, persevere without the help of a further grace. Obj. 3: Further, sinful deeds are sometimes more difficult than deeds of virtue: hence it is said in the person of the wicked (Wis 5:7): We . . . have walked through hard ways. Now some persevere in sinful deeds without the help of another. Therefore man can also persevere in deeds of virtue without the help of grace. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Persev. i): We hold that perseverance is a gift of God, whereby we persevere unto the end, in Christ. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1, ad 2; A. 2, ad 3), perseverance has a twofold signification. First, it denotes the habit of perseverance, considered as a virtue. In this way it needs the gift of habitual grace, even as the other infused virtues. Second, it may be taken to denote the act of perseverance enduring until death: and in this sense it needs not only habitual grace, but also the gratuitous help of God sustaining man in good until the end of life, as stated above (I-II, Q. 109, A. 10), when we were treating of grace. Because, since the free-will is changeable by its very nature, which changeableness is not taken away from it by the habitual grace bestowed in the present life, it is not in the power of the free-will, albeit repaired by grace, to abide unchangeably in good, though it is in its power to choose this: for it is often in our power to choose yet not to accomplish. Reply Obj. 1: The virtue of perseverance, so far as it is concerned, inclines one to persevere: yet since it is a habit, and a habit is a thing one uses at will, it does not follow that a person who has the habit of virtue uses it unchangeably until death. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi), it was given to the first man, not to persevere, but to be able to persevere of his free-will: because then no corruption was in human nature to make perseverance difficult. Now, however, by the grace of Christ, the predestined receive not only the possibility of persevering, but perseverance itself. Wherefore the first man whom no man threatened, of his own free-will rebelling against a threatening God, forfeited so great a happiness and so great a facility of avoiding sin: whereas these, although the world rage against their constancy, have persevered in faith. Reply Obj. 3: Man is able by himself to fall into sin, but he cannot by himself arise from sin without the help of grace. Hence by falling into sin, so far as he is concerned man makes himself to be persevering in sin, unless he be delivered by God’s grace. On the other hand, by doing good he does not make himself to be persevering in good, because he is able, by himself, to sin: wherefore he needs the help of grace for that end.

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Question 138 The Vices Opposed to Perseverance Deinde considerandum est de vitiis oppositis perseWe must now consider the vices opposed to perseververantiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. ance; under which head there are two points of inquiry: Primo, de mollitie. (1) Of effeminacy; Secundo, de pertinacia. (2) Of pertinacity.

Article 1 Whether effeminacy is opposed to perseverance? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mollities non opponatur perseverantiae. Quia super illud I ad Cor. VI, neque adulteri neque molles neque masculorum concubitores, Glossa exponit molles, idest pathici, hoc est muliebria patientes. Sed hoc opponitur castitati. Ergo mollities non est vitium oppositum perseverantiae. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod delicia mollities quaedam est. Sed esse deliciosum videtur pertinere ad intemperantiam. Ergo mollities non opponitur perseverantiae, sed magis temperantiae. Praeterea, philosophus, ibidem, dicit quod lusivus est mollis. Sed esse immoderate lusivum opponitur eutrapeliae, quae est virtus circa delectationes ludorum, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Ergo mollities non opponitur perseverantiae. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod molli opponitur perseverativus. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, laus perseverantiae in hoc consistit quod aliquis non recedit a bono propter diuturnam tolerantiam difficilium et laboriosorum. Cui directe opponi videtur quod aliquis de facili recedat a bono propter aliqua difficilia, quae sustinere non potest. Et hoc pertinet ad rationem mollitiei, nam molle dicitur quod facile cedit tangenti. Non autem iudicatur aliquid molle ex hoc quod cedit fortiter impellenti, nam et parietes cedunt machinae percutienti. Et ideo non reputatur aliquis mollis si cedat aliquibus valde graviter impellentibus, unde philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod si quis a fortibus et superexcellentibus delectationibus vincitur vel tristitiis, non est admirabile, sed condonabile, si contra tendat. Manifestum est autem quod gravius impellit metus periculorum quam cupiditas delectationum, unde Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., non est consentaneum qui metu non frangatur, eum frangi cupiditate; nec qui invictum se a labore praestiterit, vinci a voluptate. Ipsa etiam voluptas fortius movet attrahendo quam tristitia de carentia voluptatis retrahendo, quia ca-

Objection 1: It seems that effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance. For a gloss on 1 Cor. 6:9, 10, Nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor liers with mankind, expounds the text thus: Effeminate—i.e., obscene, given to unnatural vice. But this is opposed to chastity. Therefore effeminacy is not a vice opposed to perseverance. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that delicacy is a kind of effeminacy. But to be delicate seems akin to intemperance. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance but to temperance. Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that the man who is fond of amusement is effeminate. Now immoderate fondness of amusement is opposed to eutrapelia, which is the virtue about pleasures of play, as stated in Ethic. iv, 8. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that the persevering man is opposed to the effeminate. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 137, AA. 1, 2), perseverance is deserving of praise because thereby a man does not forsake a good on account of long endurance of difficulties and toils: and it is directly opposed to this, seemingly, for a man to be ready to forsake a good on account of difficulties which he cannot endure. This is what we understand by effeminacy, because a thing is said to be soft if it readily yields to the touch. Now a thing is not declared to be soft through yielding to a heavy blow, for walls yield to the battering-ram. Wherefore a man is not said to be effeminate if he yields to heavy blows. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that it is no wonder, if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or sorrows; but he is to be pardoned if he struggles against them. Now it is evident that fear of danger is more impelling than the desire of pleasure: wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading True magnanimity consists of two things: It is inconsistent for one who is not cast down by fear, to be defeated by lust, or who has proved himself unbeaten by toil, to yield to pleasure. Moreover, pleasure itself is a stronger mo-

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Q. 138, A. 2

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rentia voluptatis est purus defectus. Et ideo secundum philosophum, proprie mollis dicitur qui recedit a bono propter tristitias causatas ex defectu delectationum, quasi cedens debili moventi.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praedicta mollities causatur dupliciter. Uno modo, ex consuetudine, cum enim aliquis consuetus est voluptatibus frui, difficilius potest earum absentiam sustinere. Alio modo, ex naturali dispositione, quia videlicet habent animum minus constantem, propter fragilitatem complexionis. Et hoc modo comparantur feminae ad masculos, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic. Et ideo illi qui muliebria patiuntur molles dicuntur, quasi muliebres effecti. Ad secundum dicendum quod voluptati corporali opponitur labor, et ideo res laboriosae tantum impediunt voluptates. Deliciosi autem dicuntur qui non possunt sustinere aliquos labores, nec aliquid quod voluptatem diminuat, unde dicitur Deut. XXVIII, tenera mulier et delicata, quae super terram ingredi non valebat, nec pedis vestigium figere, propter mollitiem. Et ideo delicia quaedam mollities est. Sed mollities proprie respicit defectum delectationum, deliciae autem causam impeditivam delectationis, puta laborem vel aliquid huiusmodi. Ad tertium dicendum quod in ludo duo est considerare. Uno quidem modo, delectationem, et sic inordinate lusivus opponitur eutrapeliae. Alio modo in ludo consideratur quaedam remissio sive quies, quae opponitur labori. Et ideo sicut non posse sustinere laboriosa pertinet ad mollitiem, ita etiam nimis appetere remissionem ludi, vel quamcumque aliam quietem.

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tive of attraction than sorrow, for the lack of pleasure is a motive of withdrawal, since lack of pleasure is a pure privation. Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), properly speaking an effeminate man is one who withdraws from good on account of sorrow caused by lack of pleasure, yielding as it were to a weak motion. Reply Obj. 1: This effeminacy is caused in two ways. In one way, by custom: for where a man is accustomed to enjoy pleasures, it is more difficult for him to endure the lack of them. In another way, by natural disposition, because, to wit, his mind is less persevering through the frailty of his temperament. This is how women are compared to men, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): wherefore those who are passively sodomitical are said to be effeminate, being womanish themselves, as it were. Reply Obj. 2: Toil is opposed to bodily pleasure: wherefore it is only toilsome things that are a hindrance to pleasures. Now the delicate are those who cannot endure toils, nor anything that diminishes pleasure. Hence it is written (Deut 28:56): The tender and delicate woman, that could not go upon the ground, nor set down her foot for . . . softness. Thus delicacy is a kind of effeminacy. But properly speaking effeminacy regards lack of pleasures, while delicacy regards the cause that hinders pleasure, for instance toil or the like. Reply Obj. 3: In play two things may be considered. In the first place there is the pleasure, and thus inordinate fondness of play is opposed to eutrapelia. Second, we may consider the relaxation or rest which is opposed to toil. Accordingly just as it belongs to effeminacy to be unable to endure toilsome things, so too it belongs thereto to desire play or any other relaxation inordinately.

Article 2 Whether pertinacity is opposed to perseverance? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pertinacia non opponatur perseverantiae. Dicit enim Gregorius, XXXI Moral., quod pertinacia oritur ex inani gloria. Sed inanis gloria non opponitur perseverantiae, sed magis magnanimitati, ut supra dictum est. Ergo pertinacia non opponitur perseverantiae. Praeterea, si opponitur perseverantiae, aut opponitur ei per excessum, aut per defectum. Sed non opponitur ei per excessum, quia etiam pertinax cedit alicui delectationi et tristitiae; quia, ut dicit philosophus, in VII Ethic., gaudent vincentes, et tristantur si sententiae eorum infirmae appareant. Si autem per defectum, erit

Objection 1: It seems that pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that pertinacity arises from vainglory. But vainglory is not opposed to perseverance but to magnanimity, as stated above (Q. 132, A. 2). Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance. Obj. 2: Further, if it is opposed to perseverance, this is so either by excess or by deficiency. Now it is not opposed by excess: because the pertinacious also yield to certain pleasure and sorrow, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) they rejoice when they prevail, and grieve when their opinions are rejected. And if it be opposed by de-

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Q. 138, A. 2

idem quod mollities, quod patet esse falsum. Nullo ergo ficiency, it will be the same as effeminacy, which is clearly modo pertinacia opponitur perseverantiae. false. Therefore pertinacity is nowise opposed to perseverance. Praeterea, sicut perseverans persistit in bono conObj. 3: Further, just as the persevering man persists tra tristitias, ita continens et temperatus contra delecta- in good against sorrow, so too do the continent and the tiones, et fortis contra timores, et mansuetus contra iras. temperate against pleasures, the brave against fear, and the Sed pertinax dicitur aliquis ex eo quod nimis in aliquo meek against anger. But pertinacity is over-persistence in persistit. Ergo pertinacia non magis opponitur perseve- something. Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to perserantiae quam aliis virtutibus. verance more than to other virtues. Sed contra est quod Tullius dicit, in sua rhetoriOn the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) ca, quod ita se habet pertinacia ad perseverantiam sicut that pertinacity is to perseverance as superstition is to relisuperstitio ad religionem. Sed superstitio opponitur re- gion. But superstition is opposed to religion, as stated above ligioni, ut supra dictum est. Ergo et pertinacia perseve- (Q. 92, A. 1). Therefore pertinacity is opposed to perseverrantiae. ance. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Isidorus dicit, in I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) a person libro Etymol., pertinax dicitur aliquis qui est impudenter is said to be pertinacious who holds on impudently, as betenens, quasi omnia tenax. Et hic idem dicitur pervicax, ing utterly tenacious. Pervicacious has the same meaning, eo quod in proposito suo ad victoriam perseverat, antiqui for it signifies that a man perseveres in his purpose until enim dicebant viciam quam nos victoriam. Et hos philo- he is victorious: for the ancients called ‘vicia’ what we call sophus vocat, in VII Ethic., ischyrognomones, idest for- victory. These the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) calls ischytis sententiae, vel idiognomones, idest propriae senten- rognomones, that is head-strong, or idiognomones, that is tiae, quia scilicet perseverant in propria sententia plus self-opinionated, because they abide by their opinions more quam oportet; mollis autem minus quam oportet; perse- than they should; whereas the effeminate man does so less verans autem secundum quod oportet. Unde patet quod than he ought, and the persevering man, as he ought. Hence perseverantia laudatur sicut in medio existens; pertinax it is clear that perseverance is commended for observing autem vituperatur sicut secundum excessum medii mol- the mean, while pertinacity is reproved for exceeding the lis autem secundum defectum. mean, and effeminacy for falling short of it. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ideo aliquis nimis Reply Obj. 1: The reason why a man is too persistent persistit in propria sententia, quia per hoc vult suam ex- in his own opinion, is that he wishes by this means to make cellentiam manifestare. Et ideo oritur ex inani gloria si- a show of his own excellence: wherefore this is the result of cut ex causa. Dictum est autem supra quod oppositio vainglory as its cause. Now it has been stated above (Q. 127, vitiorum ad virtutes non attenditur secundum causam, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 133, A. 2), that opposition of vices to virtues sed secundum propriam speciem. depends, not on their cause, but on their species. Ad secundum dicendum quod pertinax excedit Reply Obj. 2: The pertinacious man exceeds by perquidem in hoc quod inordinate persistit in aliquo contra sisting inordinately in something against many difficulties: multas difficultates, habet tamen aliquam delectationem yet he takes a certain pleasure in the end, just as the brave in fine, sicut et fortis et etiam perseverans. Quia tamen and the persevering man. Since, however, this pleasure is illa delectatio est vitiosa, ex hoc quod nimis eam appe- sinful, seeing that he desires it too much, and shuns the tit et contrariam tristitiam fugit, assimilatur incontinen- contrary pain, he is like the incontinent or effeminate man. ti vel molli. Ad tertium dicendum quod aliae virtutes, etsi perReply Obj. 3: Although the other virtues persist sistant contra impetus passionum, non tamen proprie against the onslaught of the passions, they are not comlaus earum est ex persistendo, sicut laus perseverantiae. mended for persisting in the same way as perseverance is. Laus vero continentiae magis videtur ex vincendo delec- As to continence, its claim to praise seems to lie rather tationes. Et ideo pertinacia directe opponitur perseve- in overcoming pleasures. Hence pertinacity is directly oprantiae. posed to perseverance.

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Question 139 The Gift of Fortitude Deinde considerandum est de dono quod respondet We must next consider the gift corresponding to fortifortitudini, quod est fortitudinis donum. Et circa hoc tude, and this is the gift of fortitude. Under this head there quaeruntur duo. are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum fortitudo sit donum. (1) Whether fortitude is a gift? Secundo, quid respondeat ei in beatitudinibus et (2) Which among the beatitudes and fruits correspond fructibus. to it?

Article 1 Whether fortitude is a gift? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fortitudo non sit donum. Virtutes enim a donis differunt. Sed fortitudo est virtus. Ergo non debet poni donum. Praeterea, actus donorum manent in patria, ut supra habitum est. Sed actus fortitudinis non manent in patria, dicit enim Gregorius, in I Moral., quod fortitudo dat fiduciam trepidanti contra adversa; quae nulla erunt in patria. Ergo fortitudo non est donum. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in II de Doctr. Christ., quod fortitudinis est ab omni transeuntium mortifera iucunditate seipsum sequestrare. Sed circa noxias iucunditates seu delectationes magis consistit temperantia quam fortitudo. Ergo videtur quod fortitudo non sit donum respondens virtuti fortitudinis. Sed contra est quod Isaiae XI fortitudo inter alia dona spiritus sancti computatur. Respondeo dicendum quod fortitudo importat quandam animi firmitatem, ut supra dictum est, et haec quidem firmitas animi requiritur et in bonis faciendis et in malis perferendis, et praecipue in arduis bonis vel malis. Homo autem secundum proprium et connaturalem sibi modum hanc firmitatem in utroque potest habere, ut non deficiat a bono propter difficultatem vel alicuius ardui operis implendi, vel alicuius gravis mali perferendi, et secundum hoc fortitudo ponitur virtus specialis vel generalis, ut supra dictum est. Sed ulterius a spiritu sancto movetur animus hominis ad hoc quod perveniat ad finem cuiuslibet operis inchoati, et evadat quaecumque pericula imminentia. Quod quidem excedit naturam humanam, quandoque enim non subest potestati hominis ut consequatur finem sui operis, vel evadat mala seu pericula, cum quandoque opprimatur ab eis in mortem. Sed hoc operatur Spiritus Sanctus in homine, dum perducit eum ad vitam

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For the virtues differ from the gifts: and fortitude is a virtue. Therefore it should not be reckoned a gift. Obj. 2: Further, the acts of the gifts remain in heaven, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 6). But the act of fortitude does not remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that fortitude encourages the fainthearted against hardships, which will be altogether absent from heaven. Therefore fortitude is not a gift. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that it is a sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the deadly pleasures of the passing show. Now noisome pleasures and delights are the concern of temperance rather than of fortitude. Therefore it seems that fortitude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of fortitude. On the contrary, Fortitude is reckoned among the other gifts of the Holy Spirit (Isa 11:2). I answer that, Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of mind, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 2; I-II, Q. 61, A. 3): and this firmness of mind is required both in doing good and in enduring evil, especially with regard to goods or evils that are difficult. Now man, according to his proper and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in both these respects, so as not to forsake the good on account of difficulties, whether in accomplishing an arduous work, or in enduring grievous evil. In this sense fortitude denotes a special or general virtue, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 2). Yet furthermore man’s mind is moved by the Holy Spirit, in order that he may attain the end of each work begun, and avoid whatever perils may threaten. This surpasses human nature: for sometimes it is not in a man’s power to attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or dangers, since these may happen to overwhelm him in death. But the Holy Spirit works this in man, by bringing him to everlasting life, which is the end of all good deeds, and the release from all

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Q. 139, A. 2

Fortitude

aeternam, quae est finis omnium bonorum operum et evasio omnium periculorum. Et huius rei infundit quandam fiduciam menti Spiritus Sanctus, contrarium timorem excludens. Et secundum hoc fortitudo donum spiritus sancti ponitur, dictum est enim supra quod dona respiciunt motionem animae a spiritu sancto. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod fortitudo quae est virtus perficit animam ad sustinendum quaecumque pericula, sed non sufficit dare fiduciam evadendi quaecumque pericula, sed hoc pertinet ad fortitudinem quae est donum spiritus sancti. Ad secundum dicendum quod dona non habent eosdem actus in patria quos habent in via, sed ibi habent actus circa perfruitionem finis. Unde actus fortitudinis ibi est perfrui plena securitate a laboribus et malis. Ad tertium dicendum quod donum fortitudinis respicit virtutem fortitudinis non solum secundum quod consistit in sustinendo pericula, sed etiam secundum quod consistit in quocumque arduo opere faciendo. Et ideo donum fortitudinis dirigitur a dono consilii, quod videtur praecipue esse de melioribus bonis.

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perils. A certain confidence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy Spirit Who expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense that fortitude is reckoned a gift of the Holy Spirit. For it has been stated above (I-II, Q. 68, AA. 1, 2) that the gifts regard the motion of the mind by the Holy Spirit. Reply Obj. 1: Fortitude, as a virtue, perfects the mind in the endurance of all perils whatever; but it does not go so far as to give confidence of overcoming all dangers: this belongs to the fortitude that is a gift of the Holy Spirit. Reply Obj. 2: The gifts have not the same acts in heaven as on the way: for they exercise acts in connection with the enjoyment of the end. Hence the act of fortitude there is to enjoy full security from toil and evil. Reply Obj. 3: The gift of fortitude regards the virtue of fortitude not only because it consists in enduring dangers, but also inasmuch as it consists in accomplishing any difficult work. Wherefore the gift of fortitude is directed by the gift of counsel, which seems to be concerned chiefly with the greater goods.

Article 2 Whether the fourth beatitude, “blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,” corresponds to the gift of fortitude? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod quarta beatitudo, scilicet beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt iustitiam, non respondeat dono fortitudinis. Donum enim fortitudinis non respondet virtuti iustitiae, sed potius donum pietatis. Sed esurire, et sitire iustitiam pertinet ad actum iustitiae. Ergo ista beatitudo magis pertinet ad donum pietatis quam ad donum fortitudinis. Praeterea, esuries et sitis iustitiae importat desiderium boni. Sed hoc proprie pertinet ad caritatem, cui non respondet donum fortitudinis, sed magis donum sapientiae, ut supra habitum est. Ergo ista beatitudo non respondet dono fortitudinis, sed dono sapientiae. Praeterea, fructus consequuntur ad beatitudines, quia de ratione beatitudinis est delectatio, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sed in fructibus non videtur aliquid poni quod pertineat ad fortitudinem. Ergo neque aliqua beatitudo ei respondet. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, fortitudo congruit esurientibus, laborant enim, desiderantes gaudium de veris bonis, amorem a terrenis avertere cupientes. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Augustinus attribuit beatitudines donis secundum ordinem enumerationis, considerata tamen aliqua conve-

Objection 1: It seems that the fourth beatitude, Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice, does not correspond to the gift of fortitude. For the gift of piety and not the gift of fortitude corresponds to the virtue of justice. Now hungering and thirsting after justice pertain to the act of justice. Therefore this beatitude corresponds to the gift of piety rather than to the gift of fortitude. Obj. 2: Further, hunger and thirst after justice imply a desire for good. Now this belongs properly to charity, to which the gift of wisdom, and not the gift of fortitude, corresponds, as stated above (Q. 45). Therefore this beatitude corresponds, not to the gift of fortitude, but to the gift of wisdom. Obj. 3: Further, the fruits are consequent upon the beatitudes, since delight is essential to beatitude, according to Ethic. i, 8. Now the fruits, apparently, include none pertaining to fortitude. Therefore neither does any beatitude correspond to it. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): Fortitude becomes the hungry and thirsty: since those who desire to enjoy true goods, and wish to avoid loving earthly and material things, must toil. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 121, A. 2), Augustine makes the beatitudes correspond to the gifts according to the order in which they are set forth, observing at the

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nientia. Et ideo quartam beatitudinem, scilicet de esurie et siti iustitiae, attribuit quarto dono, scilicet dono fortitudinis. Est tamen ibi aliqua convenientia. Quia sicut dictum est, fortitudo in arduis consistit. Est autem valde arduum quod aliquis non solum opera virtuosa faciat, quae communiter dicuntur opera iustitiae; sed quod faciat ea cum insatiabili quodam desiderio, quod potest significari per famem et sitim iustitiae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., iustitia hic potest accipi non solum particularis, sed etiam universalis; quae se habet ad omnium virtutum opera, ut dicitur in V Ethic. In quibus arduum intendit fortitudo quae est donum. Ad secundum dicendum quod caritas est radix omnium donorum et virtutum, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo quidquid pertinet ad fortitudinem potest etiam ad caritatem pertinere. Ad tertium dicendum quod inter fructus ponuntur duo quae sufficienter correspondent dono fortitudinis, scilicet patientia, quae respicit sustinentiam malorum; et longanimitas, quae respicere potest diuturnam expectationem et operationem bonorum.

Q. 139, A. 2

same time a certain fittingness between them. Wherefore he ascribes the fourth beatitude, concerning the hunger and thirst for justice, to the fourth gift, namely fortitude. Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because, as stated (A. 1), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it is very difficult, not merely to do virtuous deeds, which receive the common designation of works of justice, but furthermore to do them with an unsatiable desire, which may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice. Reply Obj. 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), we may understand here not only particular, but also universal justice, which is related to all virtuous deeds according to Ethic. v, 1, wherein whatever is hard is the object of that fortitude which is a gift. Reply Obj. 2: Charity is the root of all the virtues and gifts, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 8, ad 3; I-II, Q. 68, A. 4, ad 3). Hence whatever pertains to fortitude may also be referred to charity. Reply Obj. 3: There are two of the fruits which correspond sufficiently to the gift of fortitude: namely, patience, which regards the enduring of evils: and longanimity, which may regard the long delay and accomplishment of goods.

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Question 140 The Precepts of Fortitude Deinde considerandum est de praeceptis fortitudinis. Et primo, de praeceptis ipsius fortitudinis. Secundo, de praeceptis partium eius.

We must next consider the precepts of fortitude: (1) The precepts of fortitude itself; (2) The precepts of its parts.

Article 1 Whether the precepts of fortitude are suitably given in the divine law? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non convenienter in lege divina praecepta fortitudinis tradantur. Lex enim nova perfectior est veteri lege. Sed in veteri lege ponuntur aliqua praecepta fortitudinis, ut patet Deut. XX. Ergo et in nova lege aliqua praecepta fortitudinis danda fuerunt. Praeterea, praecepta affirmativa videntur esse potiora praeceptis negativis, quia affirmativa includunt negativa, sed non e converso. Inconvenienter igitur in lege divina ponuntur praecepta fortitudinis solum negativa, timorem prohibentia. Praeterea, fortitudo est una de virtutibus principalibus, ut supra habitum est. Sed praecepta ordinantur ad virtutes sicut ad fines, unde debent eis proportionari. Ergo et praecepta fortitudinis debuerunt poni inter praecepta Decalogi, quae sunt principalia legis praecepta.

Sed contrarium apparet ex traditione sacrae Scripturae. Respondeo dicendum quod praecepta legis ordinantur ad intentionem legislatoris. Unde secundum diversos fines quos intendit legislator, oportet diversimode praecepta legis institui. Unde et in rebus humanis alia sunt praecepta democratica, alia regia, alia tyrannica. Finis autem legis divinae est ut homo inhaereat Deo. Et ideo praecepta legis divinae, tam de fortitudine quam de aliis virtutibus, dantur secundum quod convenit ordinationi mentis in Deum. Et propter hoc Deut. XX dicitur, non formidetis eos, quia dominus Deus vester in medio vestri est, et pro vobis contra adversarios dimicabit. Leges autem humanae ordinantur ad aliqua mundana bona. Secundum quorum conditionem praecepta fortitudinis in humanis legibus inveniuntur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vetus testamentum habebat temporalia promissa, novum autem spiritualia et aeterna, ut Augustinus dicit, contra Faust. Et

Objection 1: It seems that the precepts of fortitude are not suitably given in the Divine Law. For the New Law is more perfect than the Old Law. Yet the Old Law contains precepts of fortitude (Deut 20). Therefore precepts of fortitude should have been given in the New Law also. Obj. 2: Further, affirmative precepts are of greater import than negative precepts, since the affirmative include the negative, but not vice versa. Therefore it is unsuitable for the Divine Law to contain none but negative precepts in prohibition of fear. Obj. 3: Further, fortitude is one of the principal virtues, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 2; I-II, Q. 61, A. 2). Now the precepts are directed to the virtues as to their end: wherefore they should be proportionate to them. Therefore the precepts of fortitude should have been placed among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the chief precepts of the Law. On the contrary, stands Holy Writ which contains these precepts. I answer that, Precepts of law are directed to the end intended by the lawgiver. Wherefore precepts of law must needs be framed in various ways according to the various ends intended by lawgivers, so that even in human affairs there are laws of democracies, others of kingdoms, and others again of tyrannical governments. Now the end of the Divine Law is that man may adhere to God: wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts both of fortitude and of the other virtues, with a view to directing the mind to God. For this reason it is written (Deut 20:3, 4): Fear ye them not: because the Lord your God is in the midst of you, and will fight for you against your enemies. As to human laws, they are directed to certain earthly goods, and among them we find precepts of fortitude according to the requirements of those goods. Reply Obj. 1: The Old Testament contained temporal promises, while the promises of the New Testament are spiritual and eternal, according to Augustine (Contra

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Fortitude

ideo necessarium fuit ut in veteri lege populus instrueretur qualiter pugnare deberet etiam corporaliter, pro terrena possessione acquirenda. In novo autem instruendi fuerunt homines qualiter, spiritualiter certando, ad possessionem vitae aeternae pervenirent, secundum illud Matth. XI, regnum caelorum vim patitur, et violenti diripiunt illud. Unde et Petrus praecipit, I Pet. ult., adversarius vester Diabolus tanquam leo rugiens circuit, quaerens quem devoret, cui resistite fortes in fide; et Iac. IV, resistite Diabolo, et fugiet a vobis. Quia tamen homines ad spiritualia bona tendentes ab eis retrahi possent per corporalia pericula, fuerunt etiam in lege divina danda fortitudinis praecepta ad sustinenda fortiter temporalia mala, secundum illud Matth. X, nolite timere eos qui occidunt corpus. Ad secundum dicendum quod lex suis praeceptis habet communem instructionem. Ea vero quae sunt agenda in periculis non possunt ad aliquid commune reduci, sicut ea quae sunt vitanda. Et ideo praecepta fortitudinis magis dantur negative quam affirmative. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, praecepta Decalogi ponuntur in lege sicut prima principia, quae statim debent esse omnibus nota. Et ideo praecepta Decalogi debuerunt esse principaliter de actibus iustitiae, in quibus manifeste invenitur ratio debiti, non autem de actibus fortitudinis, quia non ita manifeste videtur esse debitum quod aliquis mortis pericula non reformidet.

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Faust. iv). Hence in the Old Law there was need for the people to be taught how to fight, even in a bodily contest, in order to obtain an earthly possession. But in the New Testament men were to be taught how to come to the possession of eternal life by fighting spiritually, according to Matt. 11:12, The kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent bear it away. Hence Peter commands (1 Pet 5:8, 9): Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour: whom resist ye, strong in faith, as also James 4:7: Resist the devil, and he will fly from you. Since, however, men while tending to spiritual goods may be withdrawn from them by corporal dangers, precepts of fortitude had to be given even in the New Law, that they might bravely endure temporal evils, according to Matt. 10:28, Fear ye not them that kill the body. Reply Obj. 2: The law gives general directions in its precepts. But the things that have to be done in cases of danger are not, like the things to be avoided, reducible to some common thing. Hence the precepts of fortitude are negative rather than affirmative. Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 122, A. 1), the precepts of the decalogue are placed in the Law, as first principles, which need to be known to all from the outset. Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue had to be chiefly about those acts of justice in which the notion of duty is manifest, and not about acts of fortitude, because it is not so evident that it is a duty for a person not to fear dangers of death.

Article 2 Whether the precepts of the parts of fortitude are suitably given in the divine law? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter tradantur praecepta in lege divina de partibus fortitudinis. Sicut enim patientia et perseverantia sunt partes fortitudinis, ita etiam magnificentia et magnanimitas sive fiducia, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed de patientia inveniuntur aliqua praecepta tradita in lege divina, similiter autem et de perseverantia. Ergo, pari ratione, de magnificentia et magnanimitate aliqua praecepta tradi debuerunt. Praeterea, patientia est virtus maxime necessaria, cum sit custos aliarum virtutum, ut Gregorius dicit. Sed de aliis virtutibus dantur praecepta absolute. Non ergo de patientia fuerunt danda praecepta quae intelligantur solum secundum praeparationem animi, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro Serm. Dom. in monte. Praeterea, patientia et perseverantia sunt partes fortitudinis, ut dictum est. Sed de fortitudine non dantur praecepta affirmativa, sed solum negativa, ut supra habitum est. Ergo etiam neque de patientia et perseverantia

Objection 1: It seems that the precept of the parts of fortitude are unsuitably given in the Divine Law. For just as patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude, so also are magnificence, magnanimity, and confidence, as stated above (Q. 128). Now we find precepts of patience in the Divine Law, as also of perseverance. Therefore there should also have been precepts of magnificence and magnanimity.

Obj. 2: Further, patience is a very necessary virtue, since it is the guardian of the other virtues, as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxv). Now the other virtues are commanded absolutely. Therefore patience should not have been commanded merely, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i), as to the preparedness of the mind. Obj. 3: Further, patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude, as stated above (Q. 128; Q. 136, A. 4; Q. 137, A. 2). Now the precepts of fortitude are not affirmative but only negative, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). Therefore the pre-

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fuerunt danda praecepta affirmativa, sed solum negativa. Sed contrarium habetur ex traditione sacrae Scripturae. Respondeo dicendum quod lex divina perfecte informat hominem de his quae sunt necessaria ad recte vivendum. Indiget autem homo ad recte vivendum non solum virtutibus principalibus, sed etiam virtutibus secundariis et adiunctis. Et ideo in lege divina, sicut dantur convenientia praecepta de actibus virtutum principalium, ita etiam dantur convenientia praecepta de actibus secundariarum virtutum et adiunctarum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod magnificentia et magnanimitas non pertinent ad genus fortitudinis nisi secundum quandam magnitudinis excellentiam quam circa propriam materiam considerant. Ea autem quae pertinent ad excellentiam magis cadunt sub consiliis perfectionis quam sub praeceptis necessitatis. Et ideo de magnificentia et magnanimitate non fuerunt danda praecepta, sed magis consilia. Afflictiones autem et labores praesentis vitae pertinent ad patientiam et perseverantiam non ratione alicuius magnitudinis in eis consideratae, sed ratione ipsius generis. Et ideo de patientia et perseverantia fuerunt danda praecepta. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, praecepta affirmativa, etsi semper obligent, non tamen obligant ad semper, sed pro loco et tempore. Et ideo sicut praecepta affirmativa quae de patientia dantur, sunt accipienda secundum praeparationem animi, ut scilicet homo sit paratus ea adimplere cum opus fuerit, ita etiam et praecepta patientiae. Ad tertium dicendum quod fortitudo, secundum quod distinguitur a patientia et perseverantia, est circa maxima pericula, in quibus cautius est agendum, nec oportet aliquid determinari in particulari quid sit faciendum. Sed patientia et perseverantia sunt circa minores afflictiones et labores. Et ideo magis sine periculo potest in eis determinari quid sit agendum, maxime in universali.

Q. 140, A. 2

cepts of patience and perseverance should have been negative and not affirmative. The contrary, however, follows from the way in which they are given by Holy Writ. I answer that, The Divine Law instructs man perfectly about such things as are necessary for right living. Now in order to live aright man needs not only the principal virtues, but also the secondary and annexed virtues. Wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts not only about the acts of the principal virtues, but also about the acts of the secondary and annexed virtues. Reply Obj. 1: Magnificence and magnanimity do not belong to the genus of fortitude, except by reason of a certain excellence of greatness which they regard in their respective matters. Now things pertaining to excellence come under the counsels of perfection rather than under precepts of obligation. Wherefore, there was need of counsels, rather than of precepts about magnificence and magnanimity. On the other hand, the hardships and toils of the present life pertain to patience and perseverance, not by reason of any greatness observable in them, but on account of the very nature of those virtues. Hence the need of precepts of patience and perseverance. Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 3, A. 2), although affirmative precepts are always binding, they are not binding for always, but according to place and time. Wherefore just as the affirmative precepts about the other virtues are to be understood as to the preparedness of the mind, in the sense that man be prepared to fulfill them when necessary, so too are the precepts of patience to be understood in the same way. Reply Obj. 3: Fortitude, as distinct from patience and perseverance, is about the greatest dangers wherein one must proceed with caution; nor is it necessary to determine what is to be done in particular. On the other hand, patience and perseverance are about minor hardships and toils, wherefore there is less danger in determining, especially in general, what is to be done in such cases.

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Question 141 Temperance Consequenter considerandum est de temperantia. Et In the next place we must consider temperance: (1) primo quidem, de ipsa temperantia; secundo, de parti- Temperance itself; (2) its parts; (3) its precepts. With regard bus eius; tertio, de praeceptis ipsius. Circa temperantiam to temperance we must consider (1) temperance itself; (2) autem, primo considerare oportet de ipsa temperantia; the contrary vices. secundo, de vitiis oppositis. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum temperantia sit virtus. (1) Whether temperance is a virtue? Secundo, utrum sit virtus specialis. (2) Whether it is a special virtue? Tertio, utrum sit solum circa concupiscentias et (3) Whether it is only about desires and pleasures? delectationes. Quarto, utrum sit solum circa delectationes tactus. (4) Whether it is only about pleasures of touch? Quinto, utrum sit circa delectationes gustus (5) Whether it is about pleasures of taste, as such, or inquantum est gustus, vel solum inquantum est only as a kind of touch? tactus quidam. Sexto, quae sit regula temperantiae. (6) What is the rule of temperance? Septimo, utrum sit virtus cardinalis seu principalis. (7) Whether it is a cardinal, or principal, virtue? Octavo, utrum sit potissima virtutum. (8) Whether it is the greatest of virtues?

Article 1 Whether temperance is a virtue? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod temperantia non sit virtus. Nulla enim virtus repugnat inclinationi naturae, eo quod in nobis est naturalis aptitudo ad virtutem, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed temperantia retrahit a delectationibus, ad quas natura inclinat, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo temperantia non est virtus. Praeterea, virtutes sunt connexae ad invicem, ut supra habitum est. Sed aliqui habent temperantiam qui non habent alias virtutes, multi enim inveniuntur temperati qui tamen sunt avari vel timidi. Ergo temperantia non est virtus. Praeterea, cuilibet virtuti respondet aliquod donum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed temperantiae non videtur aliquod donum respondere, quia iam in superioribus dona omnia sunt aliis virtutibus attributa. Ergo temperantia non est virtus. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in VI musicae, ea est virtus quae temperantia nominatur. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, de ratione virtutis est ut inclinet hominem ad bonum. Bonum autem hominis est secundum rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Et ideo virtus humana est quae inclinat ad id quod est secundum ratio-

Objection 1: It seems that temperance is not a virtue. For no virtue goes against the inclination of nature, since there is in us a natural aptitude for virtue, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. Now temperance withdraws us from pleasures to which nature inclines, according to Ethic. ii, 3, 8. Therefore temperance is not a virtue. Obj. 2: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). But some people have temperance without having the other virtues: for we find many who are temperate, and yet covetous or timid. Therefore temperance is not a virtue. Obj. 3: Further, to every virtue there is a corresponding gift, as appears from what we have said above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 4). But seemingly no gift corresponds to temperance, since all the gifts have been already ascribed to the other virtues (QQ. 8, 9, 19, 45, 52, 71, 139). Therefore temperance is not a virtue. On the contrary, Augustine says (Music. vi, 15): Temperance is the name of a virtue. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 3), it is essential to virtue to incline man to good. Now the good of man is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence human virtue is that which inclines man to something in accordance with reason. Now tem-

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nem. Manifeste autem ad hoc inclinat temperantia, nam in ipso eius nomine importatur quaedam moderatio seu temperies, quam ratio facit. Et ideo temperantia est virtus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod natura inclinat in id quod est conveniens unicuique. Unde homo naturaliter appetit delectationem sibi convenientem. Quia vero homo, inquantum huiusmodi, est rationalis, consequens est quod delectationes sunt homini convenientes quae sunt secundum rationem. Et ab his non retrahit temperantia, sed potius ab his quae sunt contra rationem. Unde patet quod temperantia non contrariatur inclinationi naturae humanae, sed convenit cum ea. Contrariatur tamen inclinationi naturae bestialis non subiectae rationi. Ad secundum dicendum quod temperantia, secundum quod perfecte habet rationem virtutis, non est sine prudentia, qua carent quicumque vitiosi. Et ideo illi qui carent aliis virtutibus, oppositis vitiis subditi, non habent temperantiam quae est virtus, sed operantur actus temperantiae ex quadam naturali dispositione, prout virtutes quaedam imperfectae sunt hominibus naturales, ut supra dictum est; vel per consuetudinem acquisita, quae sine prudentia non habet perfectionem rationis, ut supra dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod temperantiae etiam respondet aliquod donum, scilicet timoris, quo aliquis refrenatur a delectationibus carnis, secundum illud Psalmi, confige timore tuo carnes meas. Donum autem timoris principaliter quidem respicit Deum, cuius offensam vitat, et secundum hoc correspondet virtuti spei, ut supra dictum est. Secundario autem potest respicere quaecumque aliquis refugit ad vitandam Dei offensam. Maxime autem homo indiget timore divino ad fugiendum ea quae maxime alliciunt, circa quae est temperantia. Et ideo temperantiae etiam respondet donum timoris.

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perance evidently inclines man to this, since its very name implies moderation or temperateness, which reason causes. Therefore temperance is a virtue. Reply Obj. 1: Nature inclines everything to whatever is becoming to it. Wherefore man naturally desires pleasures that are becoming to him. Since, however, man as such is a rational being, it follows that those pleasures are becoming to man which are in accordance with reason. From such pleasures temperance does not withdraw him, but from those which are contrary to reason. Wherefore it is clear that temperance is not contrary to the inclination of human nature, but is in accord with it. It is, however, contrary to the inclination of the animal nature that is not subject to reason. Reply Obj. 2: The temperance which fulfils the conditions of perfect virtue is not without prudence, while this is lacking to all who are in sin. Hence those who lack other virtues, through being subject to the opposite vices, have not the temperance which is a virtue, though they do acts of temperance from a certain natural disposition, insofar as certain imperfect virtues are either natural to man, as stated above (I-II, Q. 63, A. 1), or acquired by habituation, which virtues, through lack of prudence, are not perfected by reason, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). Reply Obj. 3: Temperance also has a corresponding gift, namely, fear, whereby man is withheld from the pleasures of the flesh, according to Ps. 118:120: Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear. The gift of fear has for its principal object God, Whom it avoids offending, and in this respect it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 9, ad 1). But it may have for its secondary object whatever a man shuns in order to avoid offending God. Now man stands in the greatest need of the fear of God in order to shun those things which are most seductive, and these are the matter of temperance: wherefore the gift of fear corresponds to temperance also.

Article 2 Whether temperance is a special virtue? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod temperantia non sit specialis virtus. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccle., quod ad temperantiam pertinet Deo sese integrum incorruptumque servare. Sed hoc convenit omni virtuti. Ergo temperantia est virtus generalis. Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic., quod in temperantia maxime tranquillitas animi spectatur et quaeritur. Sed hoc pertinet ad omnem virtutem. Ergo temperantia est generalis virtus.

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a special virtue. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that it belongs to temperance to preserve one’s integrity and freedom from corruption for God’s sake. But this is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special virtue. Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 42) that what we observe and seek most in temperance is tranquillity of soul. But this is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.

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Praeterea, Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., quod decorum ab honesto nequit separari, et quod iusta omnia decora sunt. Sed decorum proprie consideratur in temperantia, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo temperantia non est specialis virtus. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II et III Ethic., ponit eam specialem virtutem. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum consuetudinem humanae locutionis, aliqua nomina communia restringuntur ad ea quae sunt praecipua inter illa quae sub tali communitate continentur, sicut nomen urbis accipitur antonomastice pro Roma. Sic igitur nomen temperantiae dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, secundum communitatem suae significationis. Et sic temperantia non est virtus specialis, sed generalis, quia nomen temperantiae significat quandam temperiem, idest moderationem, quam ratio ponit in humanis operationibus et passionibus; quod est commune in omni virtute morali. Differt tamen ratione temperantia a fortitudine etiam secundum quod utraque sumitur ut virtus communis. Nam temperantia retrahit ab his quae contra rationem appetitum alliciunt, fortitudo autem impellit ad ea sustinenda vel aggredienda propter quae homo refugit bonum rationis. Si vero consideretur antonomastice temperantia, secundum quod refrenat appetitum ab his quae maxime alliciunt hominem, sic est specialis virtus, utpote habens specialem materiam, sicut et fortitudo. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod appetitus hominis maxime corrumpitur per ea quibus allicitur homo ad recedendum a regula rationis et legis divinae. Et ideo, sicut ipsum temperantiae nomen dupliciter potest sumi, uno modo communiter, alio modo excellenter; ita et integritas, quam temperantiae Augustinus attribuit. Ad secundum dicendum quod ea circa quae est temperantia maxime possunt animum inquietare, propter hoc quod sunt homini essentialia, ut infra dicetur. Et ideo tranquillitas animi per quandam excellentiam attribuitur temperantiae, quamvis communiter conveniat omnibus virtutibus. Ad tertium dicendum quod quamvis pulchritudo conveniat cuilibet virtuti, excellenter tamen attribuitur temperantiae, duplici ratione. Primo quidem, secundum communem rationem temperantiae, ad quam pertinet quaedam moderata et conveniens proportio, in qua consistit ratio pulchritudinis, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Alio modo, quia ea a quibus refrenat temperantia sunt infima in homine, convenientia sibi secundum naturam bestialem, ut infra dicetur, et ideo ex eis maxime natus est homo deturpari. Et per consequens pulchritudo maxime attribuitur temperantiae, quae praecipue turpitudinem hominis tollit. Et ex eadem etiam ratione honestum maxime attribuitur temperan-

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Obj. 3: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) that we cannot separate the beautiful from the virtuous, and that whatever is just is beautiful. Now the beautiful is considered as proper to temperance, according to the same authority (Tully, De Offic. i, 27). Therefore temperance is not a special virtue. On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 10) reckons it a special virtue. I answer that, It is customary in human speech to employ a common term in a restricted sense in order to designate the principal things to which that common term is applicable: thus the word city is used antonomastically to designate Rome . . . Accordingly the word temperance has a twofold acceptation. First, in accordance with its common signification: and thus temperance is not a special but a general virtue, because the word temperance signifies a certain temperateness or moderation, which reason appoints to human operations and passions: and this is common to every moral virtue. Yet there is a logical difference between temperance and fortitude, even if we take them both as general virtues: since temperance withdraws man from things which seduce the appetite from obeying reason, while fortitude incites him to endure or withstand those things on account of which he forsakes the good of reason. On the other hand, if we take temperance antonomastically, as withholding the appetite from those things which are most seductive to man, it is a special virtue, for thus it has, like fortitude, a special matter. Reply Obj. 1: Man’s appetite is corrupted chiefly by those things which seduce him into forsaking the rule of reason and Divine law. Wherefore integrity, which Augustine ascribes to temperance, can, like the latter, be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense, and second in a sense of excellence. Reply Obj. 2: The things about which temperance is concerned have a most disturbing effect on the soul, for the reason that they are natural to man, as we shall state further on (AA. 4, 5). Hence tranquillity of soul is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence, although it is a common property of all the virtues. Reply Obj. 3: Although beauty is becoming to every virtue, it is ascribed to temperance, by way of excellence, for two reasons. First, in respect of the generic notion of temperance, which consists in a certain moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what we understand by beauty, as attested by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Second, because the things from which temperance withholds us, hold the lowest place in man, and are becoming to him by reason of his animal nature, as we shall state further on (AA. 4, 5; Q. 142, A. 4), wherefore it is natural that such things should defile him. In consequence beauty is a foremost attribute of temperance which above all hinders man from being defiled. In like manner honesty is a special attribute of temperance: for

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tiae. Dicit enim Isidorus, in libro Etymol., honestus dicitur quod nihil habeat turpitudinis, nam honestas dicitur quasi honoris status, qui maxime consideratur in temperantia, quae repellit vitia maxime opprobriosa, ut infra dicetur.

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Isidore says (Etym. x): An honest man is one who has no defilement, for honesty means an honorable state. This is most applicable to temperance, which withstands the vices that bring most dishonor on man, as we shall state further on (Q. 142, A. 4).

Article 3 Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod temperantia non sit solum circa concupiscentias et delectationes. Dicit enim Tullius, in sua rhetorica, quod temperantia est rationis in libidinem atque in alios non rectos impetus animi firma et moderata dominatio. Sed impetus animi dicuntur omnes animae passiones. Ergo videtur quod temperantia non sit solum circa concupiscentias et delectationes. Praeterea, virtus est circa difficile et bonum. Sed difficilius videtur esse temperare timorem, maxime circa pericula mortis, quam moderari concupiscentias et delectationes, quae propter dolores et pericula mortis contemnuntur, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro octogintatrium quaest. Ergo videtur quod virtus temperantiae non sit praecipue circa concupiscentias et delectationes. Praeterea, ad temperantiam pertinet moderationis gratia, ut Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic. Et Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., quod ad temperantiam pertinet omnis sedatio perturbationum animi, et rerum modus. Oportet autem modum ponere non solum in concupiscentiis et delectationibus, sed etiam in exterioribus actibus et quibuslibet exterioribus. Ergo temperantia non est solum circa concupiscentias et delectationes. Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., quod temperantia est qua libido concupiscentiaque refrenatur. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad virtutem moralem pertinet conservatio boni rationis contra passiones rationi repugnantes. Motus autem passionum animae est duplex, ut supra dictum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Unus quidem secundum quod appetitus sensitivus prosequitur sensibilia et corporalia bona; alius autem secundum quod refugit sensibilia et corporalia mala. Primus autem motus appetitus sensitivi praecipue repugnat rationi per immoderantiam. Nam bona sensibilia et corporalia, secundum suam speciem considerata, non repugnant rationi, sed magis serviunt ei, sicut instrumenta quibus ratio utitur ad consecutionem proprii finis. Repugnant autem ei praecipue secundum quod appetitus sensitivus in ea tendit non secundum modum rationis. Et ideo ad virtutem moralem proprie pertinet

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that temperance is reason’s firm and moderate mastery of lust and other wanton emotions of the mind. Now all the passions of the soul are called emotions of the mind. Therefore it seems that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures. Obj. 2: Further, Virtue is about the difficult and the good. Now it seems more difficult to temper fear, especially with regard to dangers of death, than to moderate desires and pleasures, which are despised on account of deadly pains and dangers, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 36). Therefore it seems that the virtue of temperance is not chiefly about desires and pleasures. Obj. 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) the grace of moderation belongs to temperance: and Tully says (De Offic. ii, 27) that it is the concern of temperance to calm all disturbances of the mind and to enforce moderation. Now moderation is needed, not only in desires and pleasures, but also in external acts and whatever pertains to the exterior. Therefore temperance is not only about desires and pleasures. On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym.): that it is temperance whereby lust and desire are kept under control. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 123, A. 12; Q. 136, A. 1), it belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against the passions that rebel against reason. Now the movement of the soul’s passions is twofold, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2), when we were treating of the passions: the one, whereby the sensitive appetite pursues sensible and bodily goods, the other whereby it flies from sensible and bodily evils. The first of these movements of the sensitive appetite rebels against reason chiefly by lack of moderation. Because sensible and bodily goods, considered in their species, are not in opposition to reason, but are subject to it as instruments which reason employs in order to attain its proper end: and that they are opposed to reason is owing to the fact that the sensitive appetite fails to tend towards them in accord with the mode of reason. Hence it belongs properly

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moderari huiusmodi passiones quae important prosecutionem boni. Motus autem appetitus sensitivi refugientis mala sensibilia, praecipue contrariatur rationi non quidem secundum suam immoderantiam, sed maxime secundum suum effectum, prout scilicet aliquis, refugiendo mala sensibilia et corporalia, quae interdum concomitantur bonum rationis, per consequens discedit ab ipso bono rationis. Et ideo ad virtutem moralem pertinet in huiusmodi firmitatem praestare in bono rationis. Sicut ergo virtus fortitudinis, de cuius ratione est firmitatem praestare, praecipue consistit circa passionem pertinentem ad fugam corporalium malorum, scilicet circa timorem; ex consequenti autem circa audaciam, quae aggreditur terribilia sub spe alicuius boni, ita etiam temperantia, quae importat moderationem quandam, praecipue consistit circa passiones tendentes in bona sensibilia, scilicet circa concupiscentiam et delectationem; consequenter autem circa tristitias quae contingunt ex absentia talium delectationum. Nam sicut audacia praesupponit terribilia, ita etiam tristitia talis provenit ex absentia praedictarum delectationum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de passionibus ageretur, passiones quae pertinent ad fugam mali praesupponunt passiones quae pertinent ad prosecutionem boni, et passiones irascibilis praesupponunt passiones concupiscibilis. Et sic, dum temperantia directe modificat passiones concupiscibilis tendentes in bonum, per quandam consequentiam modificat omnes alias passiones, inquantum ad moderantiam priorum sequitur moderantia posteriorum. Qui enim non immoderate concupiscit, consequens est ut moderate speret, et moderate de absentia concupiscibilium tristetur. Ad secundum dicendum quod concupiscentia importat impetum quendam appetitus in delectabile, qui indiget refrenatione, quod pertinet ad temperantiam. Sed timor importat retractionem quandam animi ab aliquibus malis, contra quod indiget homo animi firmitate, quam praestat fortitudo. Et ideo temperantia proprie est circa concupiscentias, fortitudo circa timores. Ad tertium dicendum quod exteriores actus procedunt ab interioribus animae passionibus. Et ideo moderatio eorum dependet a moderatione interiorum passionum.

Q. 141, A. 4

to moral virtue to moderate those passions which denote a pursuit of the good. On the other hand, the movement of the sensitive appetite in flying from sensible evil is mostly in opposition to reason, not through being immoderate, but chiefly in respect of its flight: because, when a man flies from sensible and bodily evils, which sometimes accompany the good of reason, the result is that he flies from the good of reason. Hence it belongs to moral virtue to make man while flying from evil to remain firm in the good of reason. Accordingly, just as the virtue of fortitude, which by its very nature bestows firmness, is chiefly concerned with the passion, viz. fear, which regards flight from bodily evils, and consequently with daring, which attacks the objects of fear in the hope of attaining some good, so, too, temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation, is chiefly concerned with those passions that tend towards sensible goods, viz. desire and pleasure, and consequently with the sorrows that arise from the absence of those pleasures. For just as daring presupposes objects of fear, so too such like sorrow arises from the absence of the aforesaid pleasures. Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 23, AA. 1, 2; I-II, Q. 25, A. 1), when we were treating of the passions, those passions which pertain to avoidance of evil, presuppose the passions pertaining to the pursuit of good; and the passions of the irascible presuppose the passions of the concupiscible. Hence, while temperance directly moderates the passions of the concupiscible which tend towards good, as a consequence, it moderates all the other passions, inasmuch as moderation of the passions that precede results in moderation of the passions that follow: since he that is not immoderate in desire is moderate in hope, and grieves moderately for the absence of the things he desires. Reply Obj. 2: Desire denotes an impulse of the appetite towards the object of pleasure and this impulse needs control, which belongs to temperance. On the other hand fear denotes a withdrawal of the mind from certain evils, against which man needs firmness of mind, which fortitude bestows. Hence temperance is properly about desires, and fortitude about fears. Reply Obj. 3: External acts proceed from the internal passions of the soul: wherefore their moderation depends on the moderation of the internal passions.

Article 4 Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures of touch? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod temObjection 1: It would seem that temperance is not perantia non solum sit circa concupiscentias et delec- only about desires and pleasures of touch. For Augustine tationes tactus. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de mo- says (De Morib. Eccl. xix) that the function of temperance is

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ribus Eccle., quod munus temperantiae est in coercendis sedandisque cupiditatibus, quibus inhiamus in ea quae nos avertunt a legibus Dei et a fructu bonitatis eius. Et post pauca subdit quod officium temperantiae est contemnere omnes corporeas illecebras, laudemque popularem. Sed non solum cupiditates delectationum tactus avertunt nos a legibus Dei, sed etiam concupiscentiae delectationum aliorum sensuum, quae etiam pertinent ad illecebras corporales, et similiter cupiditates divitiarum, vel etiam mundanae gloriae, unde dicitur, I ad Tim. ult., quod radix omnium malorum est cupiditas. Ergo temperantia non est solum circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod ille qui est parvis dignus et his dignificat seipsum, est temperatus, non autem magnanimus. Sed honores parvi vel magni, de quibus ibi loquitur, non sunt delectabiles secundum tactum, sed secundum apprehensionem animalem. Ergo temperantia non est solum circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus. Praeterea, ea quae sunt unius generis, videntur eadem ratione pertinere ad materiam alicuius virtutis. Sed omnes delectationes sensuum videntur esse unius generis. Ergo pari ratione pertinent ad materiam temperantiae. Praeterea, delectationes spirituales sunt maiores quam corporales, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Sed quandoque propter concupiscentias delectationum spiritualium aliqui discedunt a legibus Dei et a statu virtutis, sicut propter curiositatem scientiae. Unde et primo homini Diabolus scientiam promisit, Gen. III, dicens, eritis sicut dii, scientes bonum et malum. Ergo non solum est temperantia circa delectationes tactus. Praeterea, si delectationes tactus essent propria materia temperantiae, oporteret quod circa omnes delectationes tactus temperantia esset. Non autem est circa omnes, puta circa eas quae sunt in ludis. Ergo delectationes tactus non sunt propria materia temperantiae. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod temperantia proprie est circa concupiscentias et delectationes tactus. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ita est temperantia circa concupiscentias et delectationes sicut fortitudo circa timores et audacias. Fortitudo autem est circa timores et audacias respectu maximorum malorum, quibus ipsa natura extinguitur, quae sunt pericula mortis. Unde similiter temperantia oportet quod sit circa concupiscentias maximarum delectationum. Et quia delectatio consequitur operationem connaturalem, tanto aliquae delectationes sunt vehementiores quanto consequuntur operationes magis naturales. Maxime autem naturales animalibus sunt operationes quibus conservatur natura individui per cibum et potum, et natura spe-

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to control and quell the desires which draw us to the things which withdraw us from the laws of God and from the fruit of His goodness; and a little further on he adds that it is the duty of temperance to spurn all bodily allurements and popular praise. Now we are withdrawn from God’s laws not only by the desire for pleasures of touch, but also by the desire for pleasures of the other senses, for these, too, belong to the bodily allurements, and again by the desire for riches or for worldly glory: wherefore it is written (1 Tim 6:10). Desire is the root of all evils. Therefore temperance is not only about desires of pleasures of touch.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that one who is worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them is temperate, but he is not magnificent. Now honors, whether small or great, of which he is speaking there, are an object of pleasure, not of touch, but in the soul’s apprehension. Therefore temperance is not only about desires for pleasures of touch. Obj. 3: Further, things that are of the same genus would seem to pertain to the matter of a particular virtue under one same aspect. Now all pleasures of sense are apparently of the same genus. Therefore they all equally belong to the matter of temperance. Obj. 4: Further, spiritual pleasures are greater than the pleasures of the body, as stated above (I-II, Q. 31, A. 5) in the treatise on the passions. Now sometimes men forsake God’s laws and the state of virtue through desire for spiritual pleasures, for instance, through curiosity in matters of knowledge: wherefore the devil promised man knowledge, saying (Gen 3:5): Ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil. Therefore temperance is not only about pleasures of touch. Obj. 5: Further, if pleasures of touch were the proper matter of temperance, it would follow that temperance is about all pleasures of touch. But it is not about all, for instance, about those which occur in games. Therefore pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of temperance. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that temperance is properly about desires of pleasures of touch. I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), temperance is about desires and pleasures in the same way as fortitude is about fear and daring. Now fortitude is about fear and daring with respect to the greatest evils whereby nature itself is dissolved; and such are dangers of death. Wherefore in like manner temperance must needs be about desires for the greatest pleasures. And since pleasure results from a natural operation, it is so much the greater according as it results from a more natural operation. Now to animals the most natural operations are those which preserve the nature of the individual by means of meat and drink, and the nature of the species by the union of the sexes. Hence temper-

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ciei per coniunctionem maris et feminae. Et ideo circa delectationes ciborum et potuum, et circa delectationes venereorum, est proprie temperantia. Huiusmodi autem delectationes consequuntur sensum tactus. Unde relinquitur quod temperantia sit circa delectationes tactus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ibi videtur accipere temperantiam non secundum quod est specialis virtus habens determinatam materiam, sed secundum quod ad eam pertinet moderatio rationis in quacumque materia, quod pertinet ad generalem conditionem virtutis. Quamvis etiam dici possit quod ille qui potest refrenare maximas delectationes, multo etiam magis potest refrenare minores delectationes. Et ideo ad temperantiam principaliter quidem et proprie pertinet moderari concupiscentias delectationum tactus, secundario autem, alias concupiscentias. Ad secundum dicendum quod philosophus ibi refert nomen temperantiae ad moderationem exteriorum rerum, dum scilicet aliquis tendit in aliqua sibi commensurata, non autem prout refertur ad moderationem affectionum animae, quae pertinet ad virtutem temperantiae. Ad tertium dicendum quod delectationes aliorum sensuum aliter se habent in hominibus, et aliter in aliis animalibus. In aliis enim animalibus ex aliis sensibus non causantur delectationes nisi in ordine ad sensibilia tactus, sicut leo delectatur videns cervum vel audiens vocem eius, propter cibum. Homo autem delectatur secundum alios sensus non solum propter hoc, sed etiam propter convenientiam sensibilium. Et sic circa delectationes aliorum sensuum, inquantum referuntur ad delectationes tactus, est temperantia, non principaliter, sed ex consequenti. Inquantum autem sensibilia aliorum sensuum sunt delectabilia propter sui convenientiam, sicut cum delectatur homo in sono bene harmonizato, ista delectatio non pertinet ad conservationem naturae. Unde non habent huiusmodi passiones illam principalitatem ut circa eas antonomastice temperantia dicatur. Ad quartum dicendum quod delectationes spirituales, etsi secundum suam naturam sint maiores delectationibus corporalibus, tamen non ita percipiuntur sensu. Et per consequens non ita vehementer afficiunt appetitum sensitivum, contra cuius impetum bonum rationis conservatur per moralem virtutem. Vel dicendum quod delectationes spirituales, per se loquendo, sunt secundum rationem. Unde non sunt refrenandae, nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet una delectatio spiritualis retrahit ab alia potiori et magis debita. Ad quintum dicendum quod non omnes delectationes tactus pertinent ad naturae conservationem. Et ideo non oportet quod circa omnes delectationes tactus sit temperantia.

Q. 141, A. 4

ance is properly about pleasures of meat and drink and sexual pleasures. Now these pleasures result from the sense of touch. Wherefore it follows that temperance is about pleasures of touch. Reply Obj. 1: In the passage quoted Augustine apparently takes temperance, not as a special virtue having a determinate matter, but as concerned with the moderation of reason, in any matter whatever: and this is a general condition of every virtue. However, we may also reply that if a man can control the greatest pleasures, much more can he control lesser ones. Wherefore it belongs chiefly and properly to temperance to moderate desires and pleasures of touch, and secondarily other pleasures.

Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher takes temperance as denoting moderation in external things, when, to wit, a man tends to that which is proportionate to him, but not as denoting moderation in the soul’s emotions, which pertains to the virtue of temperance. Reply Obj. 3: The pleasures of the other senses play a different part in man and in other animals. For in other animals pleasures do not result from the other senses save in relation to sensibles of touch: thus the lion is pleased to see the stag, or to hear its voice, in relation to his food. On the other hand man derives pleasure from the other senses, not only for this reason, but also on account of the becomingness of the sensible object. Wherefore temperance is about the pleasures of the other senses, in relation to pleasures of touch, not principally but consequently: while insofar as the sensible objects of the other senses are pleasant on account of their becomingness, as when a man is pleased at a well-harmonized sound, this pleasure has nothing to do with the preservation of nature. Hence these passions are not of such importance that temperance can be referred to them antonomastically. Reply Obj. 4: Although spiritual pleasures are by their nature greater than bodily pleasures, they are not so perceptible to the senses, and consequently they do not so strongly affect the sensitive appetite, against whose impulse the good of reason is safeguarded by moral virtue. We may also reply that spiritual pleasures, strictly speaking, are in accordance with reason, wherefore they need no control, save accidentally, insofar as one spiritual pleasure is a hindrance to another greater and more binding. Reply Obj. 5: Not all pleasures of touch regard the preservation of nature, and consequently it does not follow that temperance is about all pleasures of touch.

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Article 5 Whether temperance is about the pleasures proper to the taste? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod circa proprias delectationes gustus sit temperantia. Delectationes enim gustus sunt in cibis et potibus, qui sunt magis necessarii ad vitam hominis quam delectationes venereorum, quae pertinent ad tactum. Sed secundum praedicta, temperantia est circa delectationes eorum quae sunt necessaria ad vitam hominis. Ergo temperantia est magis circa proprias delectationes gustus quam circa proprias delectationes tactus. Praeterea, temperantia est circa passiones magis quam circa res ipsas. Sed sicut dicitur in II de anima, tactus videtur esse sensus alimenti, quantum ad ipsam substantiam alimenti, sapor autem, qui est proprie obiectum gustus, est sicut delectamentum alimentorum. Ergo temperantia magis est circa gustum quam circa tactum. Praeterea, sicut dicitur in VII Ethic., circa eadem sunt temperantia et intemperantia, continentia et incontinentia, perseverantia et mollities, ad quam pertinent deliciae. Sed ad delicias videtur pertinere delectatio quae est in saporibus, qui pertinent ad gustum. Ergo temperantia est circa delectationes proprias gustus. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit quod temperantia et intemperantia videntur gustu parum vel nihil uti. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, temperantia consistit circa praecipuas delectationes, quae maxime pertinent ad conservationem humanae vitae, vel in specie vel in individuo. In quibus aliquid consideratur principaliter, aliquid autem secundario. Principaliter quidem ipse usus rei necessariae, puta vel feminae, quae est necessaria ad conservationem speciei; vel cibi vel potus, quae sunt necessaria ad conservationem individui. Et ipse usus horum necessariorum habet quandam essentialem delectationem adiunctam. Secundario autem consideratur circa utrumque usum aliquid quod facit ad hoc quod usus sit magis delectabilis, sicut pulchritudo et ornatus feminae, et sapor delectabilis in cibo, et etiam odor. Et ideo principaliter temperantia est circa delectationem tactus, quae per se consequitur ipsum usum rerum necessariarum, quarum omnis usus est in tangendo. Circa delectationes autem vel gustus vel olfactus vel visus, est temperantia et intemperantia secundario, inquantum sensibilia horum sensuum conferunt ad delectabilem usum rerum necessariarum, qui pertinet ad tactum. Quia tamen gustus propinquior est tactui quam alii sensus, ideo temperantia magis est circa gustum quam circa alios sensus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod etiam ipse usus ciborum, et delectatio essentialiter ipsum consequens, ad tactum pertinet, unde philosophus dicit, in II de anima,

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste. For pleasures of the taste result from food and drink, which are more necessary to man’s life than sexual pleasures, which regard the touch. But according to what has been said (A. 4), temperance is about pleasures in things that are necessary to human life. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste rather than about those proper to the touch. Obj. 2: Further, temperance is about the passions rather than about things themselves. Now, according to De Anima ii, 3, the touch is the sense of food, as regards the very substance of the food, whereas savor which is the proper object of the taste, is the pleasing quality of the food. Therefore temperance is about the taste rather than about the touch. Obj. 3: Further, according to Ethic. vii, 4, 7: temperance and intemperance are about the same things, and so are continence and incontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy, to which delicacy pertains. Now delicacy seems to regard the delight taken in savors which are the object of the taste. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that seemingly temperance and intemperance have little if anything to do with the taste. I answer that, As stated above (A. 4), temperance is about the greatest pleasures, which chiefly regard the preservation of human life either in the species or in the individual. In these matters certain things are to be considered as principal and others as secondary. The principal thing is the use itself of the necessary means, of the woman who is necessary for the preservation of the species, or of food and drink which are necessary for the preservation of the individual: while the very use of these necessary things has a certain essential pleasure annexed thereto. In regard to either use we consider as secondary whatever makes the use more pleasurable, such as beauty and adornment in woman, and a pleasing savor and likewise odor in food. Hence temperance is chiefly about the pleasure of touch, that results essentially from the use of these necessary things, which use is in all cases attained by the touch. Secondarily, however, temperance and intemperance are about pleasures of the taste, smell, or sight, inasmuch as the sensible objects of these senses conduce to the pleasurable use of the necessary things that have relation to the touch. But since the taste is more akin to the touch than the other senses are, it follows that temperance is more about the taste than about the other senses. Reply Obj. 1: The use of food and the pleasure that essentially results therefrom pertain to the touch. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3) that touch is the sense of

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quod tactus est sensus alimenti, nutrimur enim calido et frigido, humido et sicco. Sed ad gustum pertinet discretio saporum, qui conferunt ad delectationem alimenti, inquantum sunt signa convenientis nutrimenti. Ad secundum dicendum quod delectatio saporis est quasi superveniens, sed delectatio tactus per se consequitur usum cibi et potus. Ad tertium dicendum quod deliciae principaliter quidem consistunt in ipsa substantia alimenti, sed secundario in exquisito sapore et praeparatione ciborum.

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food, for food is hot or cold, wet or dry. To the taste belongs the discernment of savors, which make the food pleasant to eat, insofar as they are signs of its being suitable for nourishment. Reply Obj. 2: The pleasure resulting from savor is additional, so to speak, whereas the pleasure of touch results essentially from the use of food and drink. Reply Obj. 3: Delicacy regards principally the substance of the food, but secondarily it regards its delicious savor and the way in which it is served.

Article 6 Whether the rule of temperance depends on the need of the present life? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod regula temperantiae non sit sumenda secundum necessitatem praesentis vitae. Superius enim non regulatur ab inferiori. Sed temperantia, cum sit virtus animae, est superior quam necessitas corporalis. Ergo regula temperantiae non debet sumi secundum necessitatem corporalem. Praeterea, quicumque excedit regulam, peccat. Si ergo necessitas corporalis esset regula temperantiae, quicumque aliqua delectatione uteretur supra necessitatem naturae, quae valde modicis contenta est, peccaret contra temperantiam. Quod videtur esse inconveniens. Praeterea, nullus attingens regulam peccat. Si ergo necessitas corporalis esset regula temperantiae, quicumque uteretur aliqua delectatione propter necessitatem corporalem, puta propter sanitatem, esset immunis a peccato. Hoc autem videtur esse falsum. Ergo necessitas corporalis non est regula temperantiae. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccle., habet vir temperans in rebus huius vitae regulam utroque testamento firmatam, ut eorum nihil diligat, nihil per se appetendum putet; sed ad vitae huius atque officiorum necessitatem quantum sat est usurpet, utentis modestia, non amantis affectu. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, bonum virtutis moralis praecipue consistit in ordine rationis, nam bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Praecipuus autem ordo rationis consistit ex hoc quod aliqua in finem ordinat, et in hoc ordine maxime consistit bonum rationis nam bonum habet rationem finis, et ipse finis est regula eorum quae sunt ad finem. Omnia autem delectabilia quae in usum hominis veniunt, ordinantur ad aliquam vitae huius necessitatem sicut ad finem. Et ideo temperantia accipit necessitatem huius vitae sicut regulam delectabilium quibus utitur, ut scilicet tantum eis utatur quantum necessitas huius vitae requirit.

Objection 1: It would seem that the rule of temperance does not depend on the needs of the present life. For higher things are not regulated according to lower. Now, as temperance is a virtue of the soul, it is above the needs of the body. Therefore the rule of temperance does not depend on the needs of the body. Obj. 2: Further, whoever exceeds a rule sins. Therefore if the needs of the body were the rule of temperance, it would be a sin against temperance to indulge in any other pleasure than those required by nature, which is content with very little. But this would seem unreasonable. Obj. 3: Further, no one sins in observing a rule. Therefore if the need of the body were the rule of temperance, there would be no sin in using any pleasure for the needs of the body, for instance, for the sake of health. But this is apparently false. Therefore the need of the body is not the rule of temperance. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi): In both Testaments the temperate man finds confirmation of the rule forbidding him to love the things of this life, or to deem any of them desirable for its own sake, and commanding him to avail himself of those things with the moderation of a user not the attachment of a lover, insofar as they are requisite for the needs of this life and of his station. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1; Q. 109, A. 2; Q. 123, A. 12), the good of moral virtue consists chiefly in the order of reason: because man’s good is to be in accord with reason, as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now the principal order of reason is that by which it directs certain things towards their end, and the good of reason consists chiefly in this order; since good has the aspect of end, and the end is the rule of whatever is directed to the end. Now all the pleasurable objects that are at man’s disposal, are directed to some necessity of this life as to their end. Wherefore temperance takes the need of this life, as the rule of the pleasurable objects of which it makes use, and uses them only for as much as the need of this life requires.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, necessitas huius vitae habet rationem regulae inquantum est finis. Considerandum est autem quod quandoque aliud est finis operantis, et aliud finis operis, sicut patet quod aedificationis finis est domus, sed aedificatoris finis quandoque est lucrum. Sic igitur temperantiae ipsius finis et regula est beatitudo, sed eius rei qua utitur, finis et regula est necessitas humanae vitae, infra quam est id quod in usum vitae venit. Ad secundum dicendum quod necessitas humanae vitae potest attendi dupliciter, uno modo, secundum quod dicitur necessarium id sine quo res nullo modo potest esse, sicut cibus est necessarius animali; alio modo, secundum quod necessarium dicitur id sine quo res non potest convenienter esse. Temperantia autem non solum attendit primam necessitatem, sed etiam secundam, unde philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod temperatus appetit delectabilia propter sanitatem, vel propter bonam habitudinem. Alia vero quae ad hoc non sunt necessaria, possunt dupliciter se habere. Quaedam enim sunt impedimenta sanitatis vel bonae habitudinis. Et his nullo modo temperatus utitur, hoc enim esset peccatum contra temperantiam. Quaedam vero sunt quae non sunt his impedimenta. Et his moderate utitur, pro loco et tempore et congruentia eorum quibus convivit. Et ideo ibidem philosophus dicit quod et temperatus appetit alia delectabilia, quae scilicet non sunt necessaria ad sanitatem vel ad bonam habitudinem, non impedimenta his existentia. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, temperantia respicit necessitatem quantum ad convenientiam vitae. Quae quidem attenditur non solum secundum convenientiam corporis, sed etiam secundum convenientiam exteriorum rerum, puta divitiarum et officiorum; et multo magis secundum convenientiam honestatis. Et ideo philosophus ibidem subdit quod in delectabilibus quibus temperatus utitur, non solum considerat ut non sint impeditiva sanitatis et bonae habitudinis corporalis, sed etiam ut non sint praeter bonum, idest contra honestatem; et quod non sint supra substantiam, idest supra facultatem divitiarum. Et Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccle., quod temperatus respicit non solum necessitatem huius vitae, sed etiam officiorum.

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Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, the need of this life is regarded as a rule insofar as it is an end. Now it must be observed that sometimes the end of the worker differs from the end of the work, thus it is clear that the end of building is a house, whereas sometimes the end of the builder is profit. Accordingly the end and rule of temperance itself is happiness; while the end and rule of the thing it makes use of is the need of human life, to which whatever is useful for life is subordinate. Reply Obj. 2: The need of human life may be taken in two ways. First, it may be taken in the sense in which we apply the term necessary to that without which a thing cannot be at all; thus food is necessary to an animal. Second, it may be taken for something without which a thing cannot be becomingly. Now temperance regards not only the former of these needs, but also the latter. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11) that the temperate man desires pleasant things for the sake of health, or for the sake of a sound condition of body. Other things that are not necessary for this purpose may be divided into two classes. For some are a hindrance to health and a sound condition of body; and these temperance makes not use of whatever, for this would be a sin against temperance. But others are not a hindrance to those things, and these temperance uses moderately, according to the demands of place and time, and in keeping with those among whom one dwells. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11) says that the temperate man also desires other pleasant things, those namely that are not necessary for health or a sound condition of body, so long as they are not prejudicial to these things. Reply Obj. 3: As stated (ad 2), temperance regards need according to the requirements of life, and this depends not only on the requirements of the body, but also on the requirements of external things, such as riches and station, and more still on the requirements of good conduct. Hence the Philosopher adds (Ethic. iii, 11) that the temperate man makes use of pleasant things provided that not only they be not prejudicial to health and a sound bodily condition, but also that they be not inconsistent with good, i.e., good conduct, nor beyond his substance, i.e., his means. And Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi) that the temperate man considers the need not only of this life but also of his station.

Article 7 Whether temperance is a cardinal virtue? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a temperantia non sit virtus cardinalis. Bonum enim vir- cardinal virtue. For the good of moral virtue depends on tutis moralis a ratione dependet. Sed temperantia est cir- reason. But temperance is about those things that are fur-

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ca ea quae magis distant a ratione, scilicet circa delectationes quae sunt nobis et brutis communes, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Ergo temperantia non videtur esse principalis virtus. Praeterea, quanto aliquid est magis impetuosum, tanto difficilius videtur esse ad refrenandum. Sed ira, quam refrenat mansuetudo, videtur esse impetuosior quam concupiscentia, quam refrenat temperantia, dicitur enim Prov. XXVII, ira non habet misericordiam, nec erumpens furor, et impetum concitati spiritus ferre quis poterit? Ergo mansuetudo est principalior virtus quam temperantia. Praeterea, spes est principalior motus animae quam desiderium seu concupiscentia, ut supra habitum est. Sed humilitas refrenat praesumptionem immoderatae spei. Ergo humilitas videtur esse principalior virtus quam temperantia, quae refrenat concupiscentiam. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, in II Moral., ponit temperantiam inter virtutes principales. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtus principalis seu cardinalis dicitur quae principalius laudatur ex aliquo eorum quae communiter requiruntur ad rationem virtutis. Moderatio autem, quae in omni virtute requiritur, praecipue laudabilis est in delectationibus tactus, circa quae est temperantia, tum quia tales delectationes sunt magis nobis naturales, et ideo difficilius est ab eis abstinere et concupiscentias earum refrenare; tum etiam quia earum obiecta magis sunt necessaria praesenti vitae, ut ex dictis patet. Et ideo temperantia ponitur virtus principalis seu cardinalis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod tanto maior ostenditur agentis virtus, quanto in ea quae sunt magis distantia potest suam operationem extendere. Et ideo ex hoc ipso ostenditur maior virtus rationis quod potest etiam concupiscentias et delectationes maxime distantes moderari. Unde hoc pertinet ad principalitatem temperantiae. Ad secundum dicendum quod impetus irae causatur ex quodam accidente, puta ex aliqua laesione contristante, et ideo cito transit, quamvis magnum impetum habeat. Sed impetus concupiscentiae delectabilium tactus procedit ex causa naturali, unde est diuturnior et communior. Et ideo ad principaliorem virtutem pertinet ipsum refrenare. Ad tertium dicendum quod ea quorum est spes, sunt altiora his quorum est concupiscentia, et propter hoc spes ponitur passio principalis in irascibili. Sed ea quorum est concupiscentia et delectatio tactus, vehementius movent appetitum, quia sunt magis naturalia. Et ideo temperantia, quae in his modum statuit, est virtus principalis.

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thest removed from reason, namely about pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated in Ethic. iii, 10. Therefore temperance, seemingly, is not a principal virtue. Obj. 2: Further, the greater the impetus the more difficult is it to control. Now anger, which is controlled by meekness, seems to be more impetuous than desire, which is controlled by temperance. For it is written (Prov 27:4): Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth; and who can bear the violence (impetum) of one provoked? Therefore meekness is a principal virtue rather than temperance. Obj. 3: Further, hope as a movement of the soul takes precedence of desire and concupiscence, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 4). But humility controls the presumption of immoderate hope. Therefore, seemingly, humility is a principal virtue rather than temperance which controls concupiscence. On the contrary, Gregory reckons temperance among the principal virtues (Moral. ii, 49). I answer that, As stated above (Q. 123, A. 11; Q. 61, A. 3), a principal or cardinal virtue is so called because it has a foremost claim to praise on account of one of those things that are requisite for the notion of virtue in general. Now moderation, which is requisite in every virtue, deserves praise principally in pleasures of touch, with which temperance is concerned, both because these pleasures are most natural to us, so that it is more difficult to abstain from them, and to control the desire for them, and because their objects are more necessary to the present life, as stated above (A. 4). For this reason temperance is reckoned a principal or cardinal virtue. Reply Obj. 1: The longer the range of its operation, the greater is the agent’s power (virtus) shown to be: wherefore the very fact that the reason is able to moderate desires and pleasures that are furthest removed from it, proves the greatness of reason’s power. This is how temperance comes to be a principal virtue. Reply Obj. 2: The impetuousness of anger is caused by an accident, for instance, a painful hurt; wherefore it soon passes, although its impetus be great. On the other hand, the impetuousness of the desire for pleasures of touch proceeds from a natural cause, wherefore it is more lasting and more general, and consequently its control regards a more principal virtue. Reply Obj. 3: The object of hope is higher than the object of desire, wherefore hope is accounted the principal passion in the irascible. But the objects of desires and pleasures of touch move the appetite with greater force, since they are more natural. Therefore temperance, which appoints the mean in such things, is a principal virtue.

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Article 8 Whether temperance is the greatest of the virtues? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod temperantia sit maxima virtutum. Dicit enim Ambrosius, in I de Offic., quod in temperantia maxime honesti cura, decoris consideratio spectatur et quaeritur. Sed virtus laudabilis est inquantum est honesta et decora. Ergo temperantia est maxima virtutum. Praeterea, maioris virtutis est operari id quod est difficilius. Sed difficilius est refrenare concupiscentias et delectationes tactus quam rectificare actiones exteriores, quorum primum pertinet ad temperantiam, secundum ad iustitiam. Ergo temperantia est maior virtus quam iustitia. Praeterea, quanto aliquid est communius, tanto magis necessarium videtur esse et melius. Sed fortitudo est circa pericula mortis, quae rarius occurrunt quam delectabilia tactus, quae quotidie occurrunt, et sic usus temperantiae est communior quam fortitudinis. Ergo temperantia est nobilior virtus quam fortitudo. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in I Rhet., quod maximae virtutes sunt quae aliis maxime sunt utiles, et propter hoc, fortes et iustos maxime honoramus. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., bonum multitudinis divinius est quam bonum unius. Et ideo quanto aliqua virtus magis pertinet ad bonum multitudinis tanto melior est. Iustitia autem et fortitudo magis pertinent ad bonum multitudinis quam temperantia, quia iustitia consistit in communicationibus, quae sunt ad alterum; fortitudo autem in periculis bellorum, quae sustinentur pro salute communi; temperantia autem moderatur solum concupiscentias et delectationes eorum quae pertinent ad ipsum hominem. Unde manifestum est quod iustitia et fortitudo sunt excellentiores virtutes quam temperantia, quibus prudentia et virtutes theologicae sunt potiores. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod honestas et decor maxime attribuuntur temperantiae, non propter principalitatem proprii boni, sed propter turpitudinem contrarii mali, a quo retrahit, inquantum scilicet moderatur delectationes quae sunt nobis et brutis communes. Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum virtus sit circa difficile et bonum, dignitas virtutis magis attenditur circa rationem boni, in quo excedit iustitia, quam secundum rationem difficilis, in quo excedit temperantia. Ad tertium dicendum quod illa communitas qua aliquid pertinet ad multitudinem hominum, magis facit ad excellentiam bonitatis quam illa quae consideratur secundum quod aliquid frequenter occurrit, in quarum prima excedit fortitudo, in secunda temperantia. Unde

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is the greatest of the virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that what we observe and seek most in temperance is the safeguarding of what is honorable, and the regard for what is beautiful. Now virtue deserves praise for being honorable and beautiful. Therefore temperance is the greatest of the virtues. Obj. 2: Further, the more difficult the deed the greater the virtue. Now it is more difficult to control desires and pleasures of touch than to regulate external actions, the former pertaining to temperance and the latter to justice. Therefore temperance is a greater virtue than justice. Obj. 3: Further, seemingly the more general a thing is, the more necessary and the better it is. Now fortitude is about dangers of death which occur less frequently than pleasures of touch, for these occur every day; so that temperance is in more general use than fortitude. Therefore temperance is a more excellent virtue than fortitude. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that the greatest virtues are those which are most profitable to others, for which reason we give the greatest honor to the brave and the just. I answer that, As the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 2) the good of the many is more of the godlike than the good of the individual, wherefore the more a virtue regards the good of the many, the better it is. Now justice and fortitude regard the good of the many more than temperance does, since justice regards the relations between one man and another, while fortitude regards dangers of battle which are endured for the common weal: whereas temperance moderates only the desires and pleasures which affect man himself. Hence it is evident that justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues than temperance: while prudence and the theological virtues are more excellent still. Reply Obj. 1: Honor and beauty are especially ascribed to temperance, not on account of the excellence of the good proper to temperance, but on account of the disgrace of the contrary evil from which it withdraws us, by moderating the pleasures common to us and the lower animals. Reply Obj. 2: Since virtue is about the difficult and the good, the excellence of a virtue is considered more under the aspect of good, wherein justice excels, than under the aspect of difficult, wherein temperance excels. Reply Obj. 3: That which is general because it regards the many conduces more to the excellence of goodness than that which is general because it occurs frequently: fortitude excels in the former way, temperance in the latter. Hence fortitude is greater simply, although in some respects tem-

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simpliciter fortitudo est potior, licet quoad aliquid possit perance may be described as greater not only than fortitude dici temperantia potior non solum fortitudine, sed etiam but also than justice. iustitia.

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Question 142 The Vices Opposed to Temperance Deinde considerandum est de vitiis oppositis tempeWe must now consider the vices opposed to temperrantiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. ance. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum insensibilitas sit peccatum. (1) Whether insensibility is a sin? Secundo, utrum intemperantia sit vitium puerile. (2) Whether intemperance is a childish sin? Tertio, de comparatione intemperantiae ad (3) Of the comparison between intemperance and timiditatem. timidity; Quarto, utrum vitium intemperantiae sit maxime (4) Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of opprobriosum. vices?

Article 1 Whether insensibility is a vice? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod insensibilitas non sit vitium. Dicuntur enim insensibiles qui deficiunt circa delectationes tactus. Sed in his penitus deficere videtur esse laudabile et virtuosum, dicitur enim Dan. X, in diebus illis ego, Daniel, lugebam trium hebdomadarum tempus, panem desiderabilem non comedi, et caro et vinum non introierunt in os meum, sed neque unguento unctus sum. Ergo insensibilitas non est peccatum. Praeterea, bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse, secundum Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed abstinere ab omnibus delectabilibus tactus maxime promovet hominem in bono rationis, dicitur enim Dan. I, quod pueris qui utebantur leguminibus dedit Deus scientiam et disciplinam in omni libro et sapientia. Ergo insensibilitas, quae universaliter repellit huiusmodi delectationes, non est vitiosa. Praeterea, illud per quod maxime receditur a peccato, non videtur esse vitiosum. Sed hoc est potissimum remedium abstinendi a peccato, quod aliquis fugiat delectationes, quod pertinet ad insensibilitatem, dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod abiicientes delectationem minus peccabimus. Ergo insensibilitas non est aliquid vitiosum. Sed contra, nihil opponitur virtuti nisi vitium. Sed insensibilitas virtuti temperantiae opponitur, ut patet per philosophum, in II et III Ethic. Ergo insensibilitas est vitium. Respondeo dicendum quod omne illud quod contrariatur ordini naturali, est vitiosum. Natura autem delectationem apposuit operationibus necessariis ad vitam hominis. Et ideo naturalis ordo requirit ut homo intantum huiusmodi delectationibus utatur, quantum necessarium est saluti humanae, vel quantum ad conser-

Objection 1: It would seem that insensibility is not a vice. For those are called insensible who are deficient with regard to pleasures of touch. Now seemingly it is praiseworthy and virtuous to be altogether deficient in such matters: for it is written (Dan 10:2, 3): In those days Daniel mourned the days of three weeks, I ate no desirable bread, and neither flesh nor wine entered my mouth, neither was I anointed with ointment. Therefore insensibility is not a sin. Obj. 2: Further, man’s good is to be in accord with reason, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now abstinence from all pleasures of touch is most conducive to man’s progress in the good of reason: for it is written (Dan 1:17) that to the children who took pulse for their food (Dan 1:12), God gave knowledge, and understanding in every book and wisdom. Therefore insensibility, which rejects these pleasures altogether, is not sinful. Obj. 3: Further, that which is a very effective means of avoiding sin would seem not to be sinful. Now the most effective remedy in avoiding sin is to shun pleasures, and this pertains to insensibility. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 9) that if we deny ourselves pleasures we are less liable to sin. Therefore there is nothing vicious in insensibility. On the contrary, Nothing save vice is opposed to virtue. Now insensibility is opposed to the virtue of temperance according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 11). Therefore insensibility is a vice. I answer that, Whatever is contrary to the natural order is vicious. Now nature has introduced pleasure into the operations that are necessary for man’s life. Wherefore the natural order requires that man should make use of these pleasures, insofar as they are necessary for man’s wellbeing, as regards the preservation either of the individual

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vationem individui vel quantum ad conservationem speciei. Si quis ergo intantum delectationem refugeret quod praetermitteret ea quae sunt necessaria ad conservationem naturae peccaret, quasi ordini naturali repugnans. Et hoc pertinet ad vitium insensibilitatis. Sciendum tamen quod ab huiusmodi delectationibus consequentibus huiusmodi operationes, quandoque laudabile, vel etiam necessarium est abstinere, propter aliquem finem. Sicut propter sanitatem corporalem, aliqui abstinent a quibusdam delectationibus, cibis et potibus et venereis. Et etiam propter alicuius officii executionem, sicut athletas et milites necesse est a multis delectationibus abstinere, ut officium proprium exequantur. Et similiter poenitentes, ad recuperandam animae sanitatem, abstinentia delectabilium quasi quadam diaeta utuntur. Et homines volentes contemplationi et rebus divinis vacare, oportet quod se magis a carnalibus abstrahant. Nec aliquid praedictorum ad insensibilitatis vitium pertinet, quia sunt secundum rationem rectam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Daniel illa abstinentia a delectabilibus utebatur, non quasi propter se abhorrens delectationes, ut secundum se malas, sed propter aliquem finem laudabilem, ut scilicet idoneum se ad altitudinem contemplationis redderet, abstinendo scilicet a corporalibus delectationibus. Unde et statim ibi subditur de revelatione facta. Ad secundum dicendum quod, quia ratione homo uti non potest sine sensitivis potentiis, quae indigent organo corporali, ut in primo habitum est; necesse est quod homo sustentet corpus, ad hoc quod ratione utatur. Sustentatio autem corporis fit per operationes delectabiles. Unde non potest esse bonum rationis in homine si abstineat ab omnibus delectabilibus. Secundum tamen quod homo in exequendo actum rationis plus vel minus indiget corporali virtute, secundum hoc plus vel minus necesse habet delectabilibus corporalibus uti. Et ideo homines qui hoc officium assumpserunt ut contemplationi vacent, et bonum spirituale quasi quadam spirituali propagatione in alios transmittant, a multis delectabilibus laudabiliter abstinent, a quibus illi quibus ex officio competit operibus corporalibus et generationi carnali vacare, laudabiliter non abstinerent. Ad tertium dicendum quod delectatio fugienda est ad vitandum peccatum, non totaliter, sed ut non ultra quaeratur quam necessitas requirat.

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or of the species. Accordingly, if anyone were to reject pleasure to the extent of omitting things that are necessary for nature’s preservation, he would sin, as acting counter to the order of nature. And this pertains to the vice of insensibility. It must, however, be observed that it is sometimes praiseworthy, and even necessary for the sake of an end, to abstain from such pleasures as result from these operations. Thus, for the sake of the body’s health, certain persons refrain from pleasures of meat, drink, and sex; as also for the fulfilment of certain engagements: thus athletes and soldiers have to deny themselves many pleasures, in order to fulfill their respective duties. In like manner penitents, in order to recover health of soul, have recourse to abstinence from pleasures, as a kind of diet, and those who are desirous of giving themselves up to contemplation and Divine things need much to refrain from carnal things. Nor do any of these things pertain to the vice of insensibility, because they are in accord with right reason. Reply Obj. 1: Daniel abstained thus from pleasures, not through any horror of pleasure as though it were evil in itself, but for some praiseworthy end, in order, namely, to adapt himself to the heights of contemplation by abstaining from pleasures of the body. Hence the text goes on to tell of the revelation that he received immediately afterwards. Reply Obj. 2: Since man cannot use his reason without his sensitive powers, which need a bodily organ, as stated in the First Part (Q. 84, AA. 7, 8), man needs to sustain his body in order that he may use his reason. Now the body is sustained by means of operations that afford pleasure: wherefore the good of reason cannot be in a man if he abstain from all pleasures. Yet this need for using pleasures of the body will be greater or less, according as man needs more or less the powers of his body in accomplishing the act of reason. Wherefore it is commendable for those who undertake the duty of giving themselves to contemplation, and of imparting to others a spiritual good, by a kind of spiritual procreation, as it were, to abstain from many pleasures, but not for those who are in duty bound to bodily occupations and carnal procreation. Reply Obj. 3: In order to avoid sin, pleasure must be shunned, not altogether, but so that it is not sought more than necessity requires.

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Q. 142, A. 2

Article 2 Whether intemperance is a childish sin? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intemperantia non sit puerile peccatum. Quia super illud Matth. XVIII, nisi conversi fueritis sicut parvuli etc., dicit Hieronymus quod parvulus non perseverat in iracundia, laesus non meminit, videns pulchram mulierem non delectatur, quod contrariatur intemperantiae. Ergo intemperantia non est puerile peccatum. Praeterea, pueri non habent nisi concupiscentias naturales. Sed circa naturales concupiscentias parum aliqui peccant per intemperantiam, ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic. Ergo intemperantia non est peccatum puerile. Praeterea, pueri sunt nutriendi et fovendi. Sed concupiscentia et delectatio, circa quae est intemperantia, est semper diminuenda et extirpanda, secundum illud Coloss. III, mortificate membra vestra super terram, quae sunt concupiscentia, et cetera. Ergo intemperantia non est puerile peccatum. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod nomen intemperantiae ferimus ad puerilia peccata. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid dicitur esse puerile dupliciter. Uno modo, quia convenit pueris. Et sic non intendit philosophus dicere quod peccatum intemperantiae sit puerile. Alio modo, secundum quandam similitudinem. Et hoc modo peccata intemperantiae puerilia dicuntur. Peccatum enim intemperantiae est peccatum superfluae concupiscentiae, quae assimilatur puero quantum ad tria primo quidem, quantum ad id quod uterque appetit. Sicut enim puer, ita et concupiscentia appetit aliquid turpe. Cuius ratio est quia pulchrum in rebus humanis attenditur prout aliquid est ordinatum secundum rationem, unde Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., quod pulchrum est quod consentaneum est hominis excellentiae in eo in quo natura eius a reliquis animantibus differt. Puer autem non attendit ad ordinem rationis. Et similiter concupiscentia non audit rationem, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Secundo conveniunt quantum ad eventum. Puer enim, si suae voluntati dimittatur, crescit in propria voluntate, unde dicitur Eccli. XXX, equus indomitus evadit durus, et filius remissus evadet praeceps. Ita etiam et concupiscentia, si ei satisfiat, maius robur accipit, unde Augustinus dicit, in VIII Confess., dum servitur libidini, facta est consuetudo, et dum consuetudini non resistitur, facta est necessitas. Tertio, quantum ad remedium quod utrique praebetur. Puer enim emendatur per hoc quod coercetur, unde dicitur Prov. XXIII, noli subtrahere a puero disciplinam, tu virga percuties eum, et animam eius de Inferno liberabis. Et similiter, dum concupiscentiae resistitur, reducitur ad debitum honestatis modum. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, in VI mu-

Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not a childish sin. For Jerome in commenting on Matt. 18:3, Unless you be converted, and become as little children, says that a child persists not in anger, is unmindful of injuries, takes no pleasure in seeing a beautiful woman, all of which is contrary to intemperance. Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin. Obj. 2: Further, children have none but natural desires. Now in respect of natural desires few sin by intemperance, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11). Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin. Obj. 3: Further, children should be fostered and nourished: whereas concupiscence and pleasure, about which intemperance is concerned, are always to be thwarted and uprooted, according to Col. 3:5, Mortify . . . your members upon the earth, which are . . . concupiscence, etc. Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that we apply the term intemperance to childish faults. I answer that, A thing is said to be childish for two reasons. First, because it is becoming to children, and the Philosopher does not mean that the sin of intemperance is childish in this sense. Second, by way of likeness, and it is in this sense that sins of intemperance are said to be childish. For the sin of intemperance is one of unchecked concupiscence, which is likened to a child in three ways. First, as regards that which they both desire, for like a child concupiscence desires something disgraceful. This is because in human affairs a thing is beautiful according as it harmonizes with reason. Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) under the heading Comeliness is twofold, that the beautiful is that which is in keeping with man’s excellence insofar as his nature differs from other animals. Now a child does not attend to the order of reason; and in like manner concupiscence does not listen to reason, according to Ethic. vii, 6. Second, they are alike as to the result. For a child, if left to his own will, becomes more self-willed: hence it is written (Sir 30:8): A horse not broken becometh stubborn, and a child left to himself will become headstrong. So, too, concupiscence, if indulged, gathers strength: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 5): Lust served became a custom, and custom not resisted became necessity. Third, as to the remedy which is applied to both. For a child is corrected by being restrained; hence it is written (Prov 23:13, 14): Withhold not correction from a child . . . Thou shalt beat him with a rod, and deliver his soul from Hell. In like manner by resisting concupiscence we moderate it according to the demands of virtue. Augustine indicates this when he says (Music. vi, 11) that if the mind be lifted up to spiritual things, and re-

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Temperance

sicae, quod, mente in spiritualia suspensa atque ibi fixa et manente, consuetudinis, scilicet carnalis concupiscentiae. Impetus frangitur, et paulatim repressus extinguitur. Maior enim erat cum sequeremur, non omnino nullus, sed certe minor, cum refrenamus. Et ideo philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod quemadmodum puerum oportet secundum praeceptum paedagogi vivere, sic et concupiscibile consonare rationi. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit secundum illum modum quo puerile dicitur id quod in pueris invenitur. Sic autem non dicitur peccatum intemperantiae puerile, sed secundum similitudinem, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod concupiscentia aliqua potest dici naturalis dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum suum genus. Et sic temperantia et intemperantia sunt circa concupiscentias naturales, sunt enim circa concupiscentias ciborum et venereorum, quae ordinantur ad conservationem naturae. Alio modo potest dici concupiscentia naturalis quantum ad speciem eius quod natura ad sui conservationem requirit. Et sic non multum contingit peccare circa naturales concupiscentias. Natura enim non requirit nisi id per quod subvenitur necessitati naturae, in cuius desiderio non contingit esse peccatum, nisi solum secundum quantitatis excessum; et secundum hoc solum peccatur circa naturalem concupiscentiam, ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic. Alia vero, circa quae plurimum peccatur, sunt quaedam concupiscentiae incitamenta, quae hominum curiositas adinvenit, sicut cibi curiose praeparati, et mulieres ornatae. Et quamvis ista non multum requirant pueri, nihilominus tamen intemperantia dicitur puerile peccatum ratione iam dicta. Ad tertium dicendum quod id quod ad naturam pertinet in pueris est augmentandum et fovendum. Quod autem pertinet ad defectum rationis in eis non est fovendum, sed emendandum, ut dictum est.

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main fixed thereon, the impulse of custom, i.e., carnal concupiscence, is broken, and being suppressed is gradually weakened: for it was stronger when we followed it, and though not wholly destroyed, it is certainly less strong when we curb it. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that as a child ought to live according to the direction of his tutor, so ought the concupiscible to accord with reason. Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes the term childish as denoting what is observed in children. It is not in this sense that the sin of intemperance is said to be childish, but by way of likeness, as stated above. Reply Obj. 2: A desire may be said to be natural in two ways. First, with regard to its genus, and thus temperance and intemperance are about natural desires, since they are about desires of food and sex, which are directed to the preservation of nature. Second, a desire may be called natural with regard to the species of the thing that nature requires for its own preservation; and in this way it does not happen often that one sins in the matter of natural desires, for nature requires only that which supplies its need, and there is no sin in desiring this, save only where it is desired in excess as to quantity. This is the only way in which sin can occur with regard to natural desires, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11). There are other things in respect of which sins frequently occur, and these are certain incentives to desire devised by human curiosity, such as the nice (curiosa) preparation of food, or the adornment of women. And though children do not affect these things much, yet intemperance is called a childish sin for the reason given above. Reply Obj. 3: That which regards nature should be nourished and fostered in children, but that which pertains to the lack of reason in them should not be fostered, but corrected, as stated above.

Article 3 Whether cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod timiditas sit maius vitium quam intemperantia. Ex hoc enim aliquod vitium vituperatur quod opponitur bono virtutis. Sed timiditas opponitur fortitudini, quae est nobilior virtus quam temperantia, cui opponitur intemperantia, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo timiditas est maius vitium quam intemperantia. Praeterea, quanto aliquis deficit in eo quod difficilius vincitur, tanto minus vituperatur, unde philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod si quis a fortibus et superexcellentibus delectationibus vincitur vel tristitiis, non est ad-

Objection 1: It would seem that cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance. For a vice deserves reproach through being opposed to the good of virtue. Now cowardice is opposed to fortitude, which is a more excellent virtue than temperance, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 141, A. 8). Therefore cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance. Obj. 2: Further, the greater the difficulty to be surmounted, the less is a man to be reproached for failure, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that it is no wonder, in fact it is pardonable, if a man is mastered by

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Q. 142, A. 3

mirabile, sed condonabile. Sed difficilius videtur vincere delectationes quam alias passiones, unde in II Ethic. dicitur quod difficilius est contra voluptatem pugnare quam contra iram, quae videtur esse fortior quam timor. Ergo intemperantia, quae vincitur a delectatione, minus peccatum est quam timiditas, quae vincitur a timore.

strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains. Now seemingly it is more difficult to control pleasures than other passions; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3, that it is more difficult to contend against pleasure than against anger, which would seem to be stronger than fear. Therefore intemperance, which is overcome by pleasure, is a less grievous sin than cowardice, which is overcome by fear. Praeterea, de ratione peccati est quod sit voluntaObj. 3: Further, it is essential to sin that it be voluntary. rium. Sed timiditas est magis voluntaria quam intempe- Now cowardice is more voluntary than intemperance, since rantia, nullus enim concupiscit intemperatus esse; aliqui no man desires to be intemperate, whereas some desire to autem concupiscunt fugere mortis pericula, quod perti- avoid dangers of death, which pertains to cowardice. Therenet ad timiditatem. Ergo timiditas est gravius peccatum fore cowardice is a more grievous sin than intemperance.

quam intemperantia. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod intemperantia assimilatur magis voluntario quam timiditas. Ergo plus habet de ratione peccati. Respondeo dicendum quod unum vitium potest alteri comparari dupliciter, uno modo, ex parte materiae vel obiecti; alio modo, ex parte ipsius hominis peccantis. Et utroque modo intemperantia est gravius vitium quam timiditas. Primo namque ex parte materiae. Nam timiditas refugit pericula mortis, ad quae vitanda inducit maxima necessitas conservandae vitae. Intemperantia autem est circa delectationes, quarum appetitus non est adeo necessarius ad vitae conservationem, quia, ut dictum est, intemperantia magis est circa quasdam appositas delectationes seu concupiscentias quam circa concupiscentias seu delectationes naturales. Quanto autem illud quod commovet ad peccandum videtur esse magis necessarium, tanto peccatum levius est. Et ideo intemperantia est gravius vitium quam timiditas ex parte obiecti sive materiae moventis. Similiter etiam et ex parte ipsius hominis peccantis. Et hoc triplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia quanto ille qui peccat magis est compos suae mentis, tanto gravius peccat, unde alienatis non imputantur peccata. Timores autem et tristitiae graves, et maxime in periculis mortis, stupefaciunt mentem hominis. Quod non facit delectatio, quae movet ad intemperantiam. Secundo, quia quanto aliquod peccatum est magis voluntarium, tanto est gravius. Intemperantia autem habet plus de voluntario quam timiditas. Et hoc duplici ratione. Uno modo, quia ea quae per timorem fiunt principium habent ab exteriori impellente, unde non sunt simpliciter voluntaria, sed mixta, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Ea autem quae per delectationem fiunt sunt simpliciter voluntaria. Alio modo, quia ea quae sunt intemperati sunt magis voluntaria in particulari, minus autem voluntaria in universali, nullus enim vellet intemperatus esse; allicitur tamen homo a singularibus delectabilibus, quae intemperatum faciunt hominem. Propter quod, ad vitandum intemperantiam maximum remedium est ut non immoretur homo circa singularium considerationem. Sed in his quae pertinent

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that intemperance seems more akin to voluntary action than cowardice. Therefore it is more sinful. I answer that, one may be compared with another in two ways. First, with regard to the matter or object; second, on the part of the man who sins: and in both ways intemperance is a more grievous sin than cowardice. First, as regards the matter. For cowardice shuns dangers of death, to avoid which the principal motive is the necessity of preserving life. On the other hand, intemperance is about pleasures, the desire of which is not so necessary for the preservation of life, because, as stated above (A. 2, ad 2), intemperance is more about certain annexed pleasures or desires than about natural desires or pleasures. Now the more necessary the motive of sin the less grievous the sin. Wherefore intemperance is a more grievous vice than cowardice, on the part of the object or motive matter.

In like manner again, on the part of the man who sins, and this for three reasons. First, because the more soundminded a man is, the more grievous his sin, wherefore sins are not imputed to those who are demented. Now grave fear and sorrow, especially in dangers of death, stun the human mind, but not so pleasure which is the motive of intemperance. Second, because the more voluntary a sin the graver it is. Now intemperance has more of the voluntary in it than cowardice has, and this for two reasons. The first is because actions done through fear have their origin in the compulsion of an external agent, so that they are not simply voluntary but mixed, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1, whereas actions done for the sake of pleasure are simply voluntary. The second reason is because the actions of an intemperate man are more voluntary individually and less voluntary generically. For no one would wish to be intemperate, yet man is enticed by individual pleasures which make of him an intemperate man. Hence the most effective remedy against intemperance is not to dwell on the consideration of singulars. It is the other way about in matters relating to cowardice: because the particular action that imposes itself on

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Temperance

ad timiditatem est e converso. Nam singula quae imminent sunt minus voluntaria, ut abiicere clipeum et alia huiusmodi, sed ipsum commune est magis voluntarium, puta fugiendo salvari. Hoc autem est simpliciter magis voluntarium quod est magis voluntarium in singularibus, in quibus est actus. Et ideo intemperantia, cum sit simpliciter magis voluntarium quam timiditas, est maius vitium. Tertio, quia contra intemperantiam potest magis de facili remedium adhiberi quam contra timiditatem, eo quod delectationes ciborum et venereorum, circa quas est intemperantia, per totam vitam occurrunt, et sine periculo potest homo circa ea exercitari ad hoc quod sit temperatus; sed pericula mortis et rarius occurrunt, et periculosius in his homo exercitatur ad timiditatem fugiendam. Et ideo intemperantia est simpliciter maius peccatum quam timiditas. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod excellentia fortitudinis supra temperantiam potest considerari dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte finis, quod pertinet ad rationem boni, quia scilicet fortitudo magis ordinatur ad bonum commune quam temperantia. Ex hac etiam parte timiditas habet quandam excellentiam supra intemperantiam, inquantum scilicet per timiditatem aliqui desistunt a defensione boni communis. Alio modo, ex parte difficultatis, inquantum scilicet difficilius est subire pericula mortis quam abstinere a quibusdam delectabilibus. Et quantum ad hoc, non oportet quod timiditas praecellat intemperantiam. Sicut enim maioris virtutis est non vinci a fortiori, ita etiam e contrario minoris vitii est a fortiori vinci, et maioris vitii a debiliori superari.

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a man is less voluntary, for instance to cast aside his shield, and the like, whereas the general purpose is more voluntary, for instance to save himself by flight. Now that which is more voluntary in the particular circumstances in which the act takes place, is simply more voluntary. Wherefore intemperance, being simply more voluntary than cowardice, is a greater vice. Third, because it is easier to find a remedy for intemperance than for cowardice, since pleasures of food and sex, which are the matter of intemperance, are of everyday occurrence, and it is possible for man without danger by frequent practice in their regard to become temperate; whereas dangers of death are of rare occurrence, and it is more dangerous for man to encounter them frequently in order to cease being a coward.

Reply Obj. 1: The excellence of fortitude in comparison with temperance may be considered from two standpoints. First, with regard to the end, which has the aspect of good: because fortitude is directed to the common good more than temperance is. And from this point of view cowardice has a certain precedence over intemperance, since by cowardice some people forsake the defense of the common good. Second, with regard to the difficulty, because it is more difficult to endure dangers of death than to refrain from any pleasures whatever: and from this point of view there is no need for cowardice to take precedence of intemperance. For just as it is a greater strength that does not succumb to a stronger force, so on the other hand to be overcome by a stronger force is proof of a lesser vice, and to succumb to a weaker force, is the proof of a greater vice. Reply Obj. 2: Love of self-preservation, for the sake of which one shuns perils of death, is much more connatural than any pleasures whatever of food and sex which are directed to the preservation of life. Hence it is more difficult to overcome the fear of dangers of death, than the desire of pleasure in matters of food and sex: although the latter is more difficult to resist than anger, sorrow, and fear, occasioned by certain other evils.

Ad secundum dicendum quod amor conservationis vitae, propter quam vitantur pericula mortis, est multo magis connaturalis quam quaecumque delectationes ciborum vel venereorum, quae ad conservationem vitae ordinantur. Et ideo difficilius est vincere timorem periculorum mortis quam concupiscentiam delectationum, quae est in cibis et venereis. Cui tamen difficilius est resistere quam irae, tristitiae et timori quorundam aliorum malorum. Ad tertium dicendum quod in timiditate consideReply Obj. 3: The voluntary, in cowardice, depends ratur magis voluntarium in universali, minus tamen in rather on a general than on a particular consideration: particulari. Et ideo in ea est magis voluntarium secun- wherefore in such cases we have the voluntary not simply dum quid, sed non simpliciter. but in a restricted sense.

Article 4 Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of sins? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pecObjection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not catum intemperantiae non sit maxime exprobrabile. Si- the most disgraceful of sins. As honor is due to virtue so cut enim honor debetur virtuti, ita exprobratio debetur is disgrace due to sin. Now some sins are more grievous

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peccato. Sed quaedam peccata sunt graviora quam intemperantia, sicut homicidium, blasphemia et alia huiusmodi. Ergo peccatum intemperantiae non est maxime exprobrabile. Praeterea, peccata quae sunt magis communia videntur esse minus exprobrabilia, eo quod de his homines minus verecundantur. Sed peccata intemperantiae sunt maxime communia, quia sunt circa ea quae communiter in usum humanae vitae veniunt, in quibus etiam plurimi peccant. Ergo peccata intemperantiae non videntur esse maxime exprobrabilia. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod temperantia et intemperantia sunt circa concupiscentias et delectationes humanas. Sunt autem quaedam concupiscentiae et delectationes turpiores concupiscentiis et delectationibus humanis, quae dicuntur bestiales et aegritudinales, ut in eodem libro philosophus dicit. Ergo intemperantia non est maxime exprobrabilis. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod intemperantia inter alia vitia videtur iuste exprobrabilis esse. Respondeo dicendum quod exprobratio opponi videtur honori et gloriae. Honor autem excellentiae debetur, ut supra habitum est, gloria autem claritatem importat. Est igitur intemperantia maxime exprobrabilis, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia maxime repugnat excellentiae hominis, est enim circa delectationes communes nobis et brutis, ut supra habitum est. Unde et in Psalmo dicitur, homo, cum in honore esset, non intellexit, comparatus est iumentis insipientibus, et similis factus est illis. Secundo, quia maxime repugnat eius claritati vel pulchritudini, inquantum scilicet in delectationibus circa quas est intemperantia, minus apparet de lumine rationis, ex qua est tota claritas et pulchritudo virtutis. Unde et huiusmodi delectationes dicuntur maxime serviles. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Gregorius dicit, vitia carnalia, quae sub intemperantia continentur, etsi sint minoris culpae, sunt tamen maioris infamiae. Nam magnitudo culpae respicit deordinationem a fine, infamia autem respicit turpitudinem, quae maxime consideratur secundum indecentiam peccantis.

Q. 142, A. 4

than intemperance: for instance murder, blasphemy, and the like. Therefore intemperance is not the most disgraceful of sins.

Obj. 2: Further, those sins which are the more common are seemingly less disgraceful, since men are less ashamed of them. Now sins of intemperance are most common, because they are about things connected with the common use of human life, and in which many happen to sin. Therefore sins of intemperance do not seem to be most disgraceful. Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) temperance and intemperance are about human desires and pleasures. Now certain desires and pleasures are more shameful than human desires and pleasures; such are brutal pleasures and those caused by disease as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore intemperance is not the most disgraceful of sins. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that intemperance is justly more deserving of reproach than other vices. I answer that, Disgrace is seemingly opposed to honor and glory. Now honor is due to excellence, as stated above (Q. 103, A. 1), and glory denotes clarity (Q. 103, A. 1, ad 3). Accordingly intemperance is most disgraceful for two reasons. First, because it is most repugnant to human excellence, since it is about pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated above (Q. 141, AA. 2, 3). Wherefore it is written (Ps 48:21): Man, when he was in honor, did not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them. Second, because it is most repugnant to man’s clarity or beauty; inasmuch as the pleasures which are the matter of intemperance dim the light of reason from which all the clarity and beauty of virtue arises: wherefore these pleasures are described as being most slavish. Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says the sins of the flesh, which are comprised under the head of intemperance, although less culpable, are more disgraceful. The reason is that culpability is measured by inordinateness in respect of the end, while disgrace regards shamefulness, which depends chiefly on the unbecomingness of the sin in respect of the sinner. Ad secundum dicendum quod consuetudo peccanReply Obj. 2: The commonness of a sin diminishes the di diminuit turpitudinem et infamiam peccati secun- shamefulness and disgrace of a sin in the opinion of men, dum opinionem hominum, non autem secundum natu- but not as regards the nature of the vices themselves.

ram ipsorum vitiorum. Ad tertium dicendum quod cum dicitur intemperantia maxime esse exprobrabilis, est intelligendum inter vitia humana, quae scilicet attenduntur secundum passiones humanae naturae aliqualiter conformes. Sed illa vitia quae excedunt modum humanae naturae, sunt magis exprobrabilia. Et tamen illa etiam videntur reduci ad genus intemperantiae secundum quendam excessum, si-

Reply Obj. 3: When we say that intemperance is most disgraceful, we mean in comparison with human vices, those, namely, that are connected with human passions which to a certain extent are in conformity with human nature. But those vices which exceed the mode of human nature are still more disgraceful. Nevertheless such vices are apparently reducible to the genus of intemperance, by way

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cut si aliquis delectaretur in comestione carnium huma- of excess: for instance, if a man delight in eating human narum, aut in coitu bestiarum aut masculorum. flesh, or in committing the unnatural vice.

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Question 143 The Parts of Temperance, in General Deinde considerandum est de partibus temperantiae. We must now consider the parts of temperance: we shall Et primo, de ipsis partibus in generali; secundo, de sin- consider these same parts (1) in general; (2) each of them in gulis earum in speciali. particular.

Article 1 Whether the parts of temperance are rightly assigned? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Tullius, in sua rhetorica, inconvenienter assignet partes temperantiae, quas dicit esse continentiam, clementiam, modestiam. Continentia enim contra virtutem dividitur, in VII Ethic. Sed temperantia continetur sub virtute. Ergo continentia non est pars temperantiae.

Objection 1: It would seem that Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) unbecomingly assigns the parts of temperance, when he asserts them to be continence, mildness, and modesty. For continence is reckoned to be distinct from virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas temperance is comprised under virtue. Therefore continence is not a part of temperance. Obj. 2: Further, mildness seemingly softens hatred or anger. But temperance is not about these things, but about pleasures of touch, as stated above (Q. 141, A. 4). Therefore mildness is not a part of temperance. Obj. 3: Further, modesty concerns external action, wherefore the Apostle says (Phil 4:5): Let your modesty be known to all men. Now external actions are the matter of justice, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 8). Therefore modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance. Obj. 4: Further, Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons many more parts of temperance: for he says that temperance results in modesty, shamefacedness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, moderation, lowliness, sobriety, purity. Andronicus also says that the companions of temperance are gravity, continence, humility, simplicity, refinement, method, contentment. Therefore it seems that Tully insufficiently reckoned the parts of temperance. I answer that, As stated above (QQ. 48, 128), a cardinal virtue may have three kinds of parts, namely integral, subjective, and potential. The integral parts of a virtue are the conditions the concurrence of which are necessary for virtue: and in this respect there are two integral parts of temperance, shamefacedness, whereby one recoils from the disgrace that is contrary to temperance, and honesty, whereby one loves the beauty of temperance. For, as stated above (Q. 141, A. 2, ad 3), temperance more than any other virtue lays claim to a certain comeliness, and the vices of intemperance excel others in disgrace.

Praeterea, clementia videtur esse mitigativa odii vel irae. Temperantia autem non est circa huiusmodi, sed circa delectationes tactus, ut dictum est. Ergo clementia non est pars temperantiae. Praeterea, modestia consistit in exterioribus actibus, unde et apostolus dicit, Philipp. IV, modestia vestra nota sit omnibus hominibus. Sed actus exteriores sunt materia iustitiae, ut supra habitum est. Ergo modestia magis est pars iustitiae quam temperantiae. Praeterea, Macrobius, super somnium Scipionis, ponit multo plures temperantiae partes, dicit enim quod temperantiam sequitur modestia, verecundia, abstinentia, castitas, honestas, moderatio, parcitas, sobrietas, pudicitia. Andronicus etiam dicit quod familiares temperantiae sunt austeritas, continentia, humilitas, simplicitas, ornatus, bona ordinatio, per se sufficientia. Videtur igitur insufficienter Tullius enumerasse temperantiae partes. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, alicuius virtutis cardinalis triplices partes esse possunt, scilicet integrales, subiectivae et potentiales. Et dicuntur partes integrales alicuius virtutis conditiones quas necesse est concurrere ad virtutem. Et secundum hoc, sunt duae partes integrales temperantiae, scilicet verecundia, per quam aliquis refugit turpitudinem temperantiae contrariam; et honestas, per quam scilicet aliquis amat pulchritudinem temperantiae. Nam sicut ex dictis patet, praecipue temperantia inter virtutes vindicat sibi quendam decorem, et vitia intemperantiae maxime turpitudinem habent. Partes autem subiectivae alicuius virtutis dicuntur The subjective parts of a virtue are its species: and the species eius. Oportet autem diversificare species virtu- species of a virtue have to be differentiated according to

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tum secundum diversitatem materiae vel obiecti. Est autem temperantia circa delectationes tactus, quae dividuntur in duo genera. Nam quaedam ordinantur ad nutrimentum. Et in his, quantum ad cibum, est abstinentia; quantum autem ad potum, proprie sobrietas. Quaedam vero ordinantur ad vim generativam. Et in his, quantum ad delectationem principalem ipsius coitus, est castitas; quantum autem ad delectationes circumstantes, puta quae sunt in osculis, tactibus et amplexibus, attenditur pudicitia. Partes autem potentiales alicuius virtutis principalis dicuntur virtutes secundariae, quae modum quem principalis virtus observat circa aliquam principalem materiam, eundem observant in quibusdam aliis materiis, in quibus non est ita difficile. Pertinet autem ad temperantiam moderari delectationes tactus, quas difficillimum est moderari. Unde quaecumque virtus moderationem quandam operatur in aliqua materia et refrenationem appetitus in aliquid tendentis, poni potest pars temperantiae sicut virtus ei adiuncta. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter, uno modo, in interioribus motibus animi; alio modo, in exterioribus motibus et actibus corporis; tertio modo, in exterioribus rebus. Praeter motum autem concupiscentiae, quem moderatur et refrenat temperantia, tres motus inveniuntur in anima tendentes in aliquid. Primus quidem est motus voluntatis commotae ex impetu passionis, et hunc motum refrenat continentia, ex qua fit ut, licet homo immoderatas concupiscentias patiatur, voluntas tamen non vincitur. Alius autem motus interior in aliquid tendens est motus spei, et audaciae, quae ipsam consequitur, et hunc motum moderatur sive refrenat humilitas. Tertius autem motus est irae tendentis in vindictam, quem refrenat mansuetudo sive clementia. Circa motus autem et actus corporales moderationem et refrenationem facit modestia. Quam Andronicus in tria dividit. Ad quorum primum pertinet discernere quid sit faciendum et quid dimittendum, et quid quo ordine sit agendum, et in hoc firmum persistere, et quantum ad hoc ponit bonam ordinationem. Aliud autem est quod homo in eo quod agit decentiam observet, et quantum ad hoc ponit ornatum. Tertium autem est in colloquiis amicorum, vel quibuscumque aliis, et quantum ad hoc ponitur austeritas. Circa exteriora vero duplex moderatio est adhibenda. Primo quidem, ut superflua non requirantur, et quantum ad hoc ponitur a Macrobio parcitas, et ab Andronico per se sufficientia. Secundo vero, ut homo non nimis exquisita requirat, et quantum ad hoc ponit Macrobius moderationem, Andronicus vero simplicitatem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod continentia differt quidem a virtute sicut imperfectum a perfecto, ut infra dicetur, et hoc modo condividitur virtuti. Convenit ta-

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the difference of matter or object. Now temperance is about pleasures of touch, which are of two kinds. For some are directed to nourishment: and in these as regards meat, there is abstinence, and as regards drink properly there is sobriety. Other pleasures are directed to the power of procreation, and in these as regards the principal pleasure of the act itself of procreation, there is chastity, and as to the pleasures incidental to the act, resulting, for instance, from kissing, touching, or fondling, we have purity. The potential parts of a principal virtue are called secondary virtues: for while the principal virtue observes the mode in some principal matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein moderation is not so difficult. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate pleasures of touch, which are most difficult to moderate. Wherefore any virtue that is effective of moderation in some matter or other, and restrains the appetite in its impulse towards something, may be reckoned a part of temperance, as a virtue annexed thereto. This happens in three ways: first, in the inward movements of the soul; second, in the outward movements and actions of the body; third, in outward things. Now besides the movement of concupiscence, which temperance moderates and restrains, we find in the soul three movements towards a particular object. In the first place there is the movement of the will when stirred by the impulse of passion: and this movement is restrained by continence, the effect of which is that, although a man suffer immoderate concupiscences, his will does not succumb to them. Another inward movement towards something is the movement of hope, and of the resultant daring, and this is moderated or restrained by humility. The third movement is that of anger, which tends towards revenge, and this is restrained by meekness or mildness. With regard to bodily movements and actions, moderation and restraint is the effect of modesty, which, according to Andronicus, has three parts. The first of these enables one to discern what to do and what not to do, and to observe the right order, and to persevere in what we do: this he assigns to method. The second is that a man observe decorum in what he does, and this he ascribes to refinement. The third has to do with the conversation or any other intercourse between a man and his friends, and this is called gravity. With regard to external things, a twofold moderation has to be observed. First, we must not desire too many, and to this Macrobius assigns lowliness, and Andronicus contentment; second, we must not be too nice in our requirements, and to this Macrobius ascribes moderation, Andronicus simplicity. Reply Obj. 1: It is true that continence differs from virtue, just as imperfect differs from perfect, as we shall state further on (Q. 165, A. 1); and in this sense it is con-

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men cum temperantia et in materia, quia est circa delectationes tactus; et in modo, quia in quadam refrenatione consistit. Et ideo convenienter ponitur pars temperantiae. Ad secundum dicendum quod clementia, sive mansuetudo, non ponitur pars temperantiae propter convenientiam materiae, sed quia convenit cum ea in modo refrenandi et moderandi, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod circa actus exteriores iustitia attendit id quod est debitum alteri. Hoc autem modestia non attendit, sed solum moderationem quandam. Et ideo non ponitur pars iustitiae, sed temperantiae. Ad quartum dicendum quod Tullius sub modestia comprehendit omnia illa quae pertinent ad moderationem corporalium motuum et exteriorum rerum; et etiam moderationem spei, quam diximus ad humilitatem pertinere.

Q. 143, A. 1

divided with virtue. Yet it has something in common with temperance both as to matter, since it is about pleasures of touch, and as to mode, since it is a kind of restraint. Hence it is suitably assigned as a part of temperance. Reply Obj. 2: Mildness or meekness is reckoned a part of temperance not because of a likeness of matter, but because they agree as to the mode of restraint and moderation as stated above. Reply Obj. 3: In the matter of external action justice considers what is due to another. Modesty does not consider this, but only a certain moderation. Hence it is reckoned a part not of justice but of temperance. Reply Obj. 4: Under modesty Tully includes whatever pertains to the moderation of bodily movements and external things, as well as the moderation of hope which we reckoned as pertaining to humility.

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Question 144 Shamefacedness Deinde considerandum est de partibus temperantiae We must now consider the parts of temperance in parin speciali. Et primo, de partibus quasi integralibus, quae ticular: and in the first place the integral parts, which are sunt verecundia et honestas. Circa verecundiam autem shamefacedness and honesty. With regard to shamefacedquaeruntur quatuor. ness there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum verecundia sit virtus. (1) Whether shamefacedness is a virtue? Secundo, de quibus sit verecundia. (2) What is its object? Tertio, a quibus homo verecundetur. (3) Who are the cause of a man being ashamed? Quarto, quorum sit verecundari. (4) What kind of people are ashamed?

Article 1 Whether shamefacedness is a virtue? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod verecundia sit virtus. Esse enim in medio secundum determinationem rationis est proprium virtutis, ut patet ex definitione virtutis quae ponitur in II Ethic. Sed verecundia consistit in tali medio, ut patet per philosophum, in II Ethic. Ergo verecundia est virtus. Praeterea, omne laudabile vel est virtus, vel ad virtutem pertinet. Sed verecundia est quiddam laudabile. Non est autem pars alicuius virtutis. Non enim est pars prudentiae, quia non est in ratione, sed in appetitu. Neque etiam est pars iustitiae, quia verecundia passionem quandam importat, iustitia autem non est circa passiones. Similiter etiam non est pars fortitudinis, quia ad fortitudinem pertinet persistere et aggredi, ad verecundiam autem refugere aliquid. Neque etiam est pars temperantiae, quia temperantia est circa concupiscentias, verecundia autem est timor quidam, ut patet per philosophum, in IV Ethic., et per Damascenum, in II libro. Ergo relinquitur quod verecundia sit virtus. Praeterea, honestum cum virtute convertitur, ut patet per Tullium, in I de Offic. Sed verecundia est quaedam pars honestatis, dicit enim Ambrosius, in I de Offic., quod verecundia socia ac familiaris est mentis placiditati, proterviam fugitans, ab omni luxu aliena, sobrietatem diligit, et honestatem fovet, et decorem requirit. Ergo verecundia est virtus. Praeterea, omne vitium opponitur alicui virtuti. Sed quaedam vitia opponuntur verecundiae, scilicet inverecundia et inordinatus stupor. Ergo verecundia est virtus.

Objection 1: It seems that shamefacedness is a virtue. For it is proper to a virtue to observe the mean as fixed by reason: this is clear from the definition of virtue given in Ethic. ii, 6. Now shamefacedness observes the mean in this way, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ii, 7). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue. Obj. 2: Further, whatever is praiseworthy is either a virtue or something connected with virtue. Now shamefacedness is praiseworthy. But it is not part of a virtue. For it is not a part of prudence, since it is not in the reason but in the appetite; nor is it a part of justice. Since shamefacedness implies a certain passion, whereas justice is not about the passions; nor again is it a part of fortitude, because it belongs to fortitude to be persistent and aggressive, while it belongs to shamefacedness to recoil from something; nor lastly is it a part of temperance, since the latter is about desires, whereas shamefacedness is a kind of fear according as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 9) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). Hence it follows that shamefacedness is a virtue. Obj. 3: Further, the honest and the virtuous are convertible according to Tully (De Offic. i, 27). Now shamefacedness is a part of honesty: for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that shamefacedness is the companion and familiar of the restful mind, averse to wantonness, a stranger to any kind of excess, the friend of sobriety and the support of what is honest, a seeker after the beautiful. Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue. Obj. 4: Further, every vice is opposed to a virtue. Now certain vices are opposed to shamefacedness, namely shamelessness and inordinate prudery. Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.

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Praeterea, ex actibus similes habitus generantur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed verecundia importat actum laudabilem. Ergo ex multis talibus actibus causatur habitus. Sed habitus laudabilium operum est virtus, ut patet per philosophum, in I Ethic. Ergo verecundia est virtus. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II et IV Ethic., dicit verecundiam non esse virtutem. Respondeo dicendum quod virtus dupliciter accipitur, proprie scilicet, et communiter. Proprie quidem virtus perfectio quaedam est, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Et ideo omne illud quod repugnat perfectioni, etiam si sit bonum, deficit a ratione virtutis. Verecundia autem repugnat perfectioni. Est enim timor alicuius turpis, quod scilicet est exprobrabile, unde Damascenus dicit quod verecundia est timor de turpi actu. Sicut autem spes est de bono possibili et arduo, ita etiam timor est de malo possibili et arduo, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Ille autem qui est perfectus secundum habitum virtutis, non apprehendit aliquod exprobrabile et turpe ad faciendum ut possibile et arduum, idest difficile ad vitandum, neque etiam actu facit aliquid turpe, unde opprobrium timeat. Unde verecundia, proprie loquendo, non est virtus, deficit enim a perfectione virtutis. Communiter autem virtus dicitur omne quod est bonum et laudabile in humanis actibus vel passionibus. Et secundum hoc, verecundia quandoque dicitur virtus, cum sit quaedam laudabilis passio. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod esse in medio non sufficit ad rationem virtutis, quamvis sit una particula posita in virtutis definitione, sed requiritur ulterius quod sit habitus electivus, idest ex electione operans. Verecundia autem non nominat habitum, sed passionem. Neque motus eius est ex electione, sed ex impetu quodam passionis. Unde deficit a ratione virtutis. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, verecundia est timor turpitudinis et exprobrationis. Dictum est autem supra quod vitium intemperantiae est turpissimum et maxime exprobrabile. Et ideo verecundia principalius pertinet ad temperantiam quam ad aliquam aliam virtutem, ratione motivi, quod est turpe, non autem secundum speciem passionis, quae est timor. Secundum tamen quod vitia aliis virtutibus opposita sunt turpia et exprobrabilia, potest etiam verecundia ad alias virtutes pertinere. Ad tertium dicendum quod verecundia fovet honestatem removendo ea quae sunt honestati contraria, non ita quod pertingat ad perfectam rationem honestatis. Ad quartum dicendum quod quilibet defectus causat vitium, non autem quodlibet bonum sufficit ad rationem virtutis. Et ideo non oportet quod omne illud cui

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Obj. 5: Further, like acts beget like habits, according to Ethic. ii, 1. Now shamefacedness implies a praiseworthy act; wherefore from many such acts a habit results. But a habit of praiseworthy deeds is a virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 9) that shamefacedness is not a virtue. I answer that, Virtue is taken in two ways, in a strict sense and in a broad sense. Taken strictly virtue is a perfection, as stated in Phys. vii, 17, 18. Wherefore anything that is inconsistent with perfection, though it be good, falls short of the notion of virtue. Now shamefacedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the fear of something base, namely of that which is disgraceful. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that shamefacedness is fear of a base action. Now just as hope is about a possible and difficult good, so is fear about a possible and arduous evil, as stated above (I-II, Q. 40, A. 1; Q. 41, A. 2; Q. 42, A. 3), when we were treating of the passions. But one who is perfect as to a virtuous habit, does not apprehend that which would be disgraceful and base to do, as being possible and arduous, that is to say difficult for him to avoid; nor does he actually do anything base, so as to be in fear of disgrace. Therefore shamefacedness, properly speaking, is not a virtue, since it falls short of the perfection of virtue. Taken, however, in a broad sense virtue denotes whatever is good and praiseworthy in human acts or passions; and in this way shamefacedness is sometimes called a virtue, since it is a praiseworthy passion. Reply Obj. 1: Observing the mean is not sufficient for the notion of virtue, although it is one of the conditions included in virtue’s definition: but it is requisite, in addition to this, that it be an elective habit, that is to say, operating from choice. Now shamefacedness denotes, not a habit but a passion, nor does its movement result from choice, but from an impulse of passion. Hence it falls short of the notion of virtue. Reply Obj. 2: As stated above, shamefacedness is fear of baseness and disgrace. Now it has been stated (Q. 142, A. 4) that the vice of intemperance is most base and disgraceful. Wherefore shamefacedness pertains more to temperance than to any other virtue, by reason of its motive cause, which is a base action though not according to the species of the passion, namely fear. Nevertheless insofar as the vices opposed to other virtues are base and disgraceful, shamefacedness may also pertain to other virtues. Reply Obj. 3: Shamefacedness fosters honesty, by removing that which is contrary thereto, but not so as to attain to the perfection of honesty. Reply Obj. 4: Every defect causes a vice, but not every good is sufficient for the notion of virtue. Consequently it does not follow that whatever is directly opposed to vice is

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directe opponitur vitium, sit virtus. Quamvis omne vitium opponatur alicui virtuti secundum suam originem. Et sic inverecundia, inquantum provenit ex nimio amore turpitudinum, opponitur temperantiae. Ad quintum dicendum quod ex multoties verecundari causatur habitus virtutis acquisitae per quam aliquis turpia vitet, de quibus est verecundia, non autem ut aliquis ulterius verecundetur. Sed ex illo habitu virtutis acquisitae sic se habet aliquis quod magis verecundaretur si materia verecundiae adesset.

Q. 144, A. 2

a virtue, although every vice is opposed to a virtue, as regards its origin. Hence shamelessness, insofar as it results from excessive love of disgraceful things, is opposed to temperance. Reply Obj. 5: Being frequently ashamed causes the habit of an acquired virtue whereby one avoids disgraceful things which are the object of shamefacedness, without continuing to be ashamed in their regard: although as a consequence of this acquired virtue, a man would be more ashamed, if confronted with the matter of shamefacedness.

Article 2 Whether shamefacedness is about a disgraceful action? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod verecundia non sit de turpi actu. Dicit enim philosophus, in IV Ethic., quod verecundia est timor ingloriationis. Sed quandoque illi qui nihil turpe operantur, ingloriationem sustinent, secundum illud Psalmi, propter te sustinui opprobrium, operuit confusio faciem meam. Ergo verecundia non est proprie de turpi actu. Praeterea, illa solum videntur esse turpia quae habent rationem peccati. Sed de quibusdam homo verecundatur quae non sunt peccata, puta si aliquis exerceat servilia opera. Ergo videtur quod verecundia non sit proprie de turpi actu. Praeterea, operationes virtutum non sunt turpes, sed pulcherrimae, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sed quandoque aliqui verecundantur aliqua opera virtutis facere, ut dicitur Luc. IX, qui erubuerit me et meos sermones, hunc filius hominis erubescet, et cetera. Ergo verecundia non est de turpi actu. Praeterea, si verecundia proprie esset de turpi actu, oporteret quod de magis turpibus homo magis verecundaretur. Sed quandoque homo plus verecundatur de his quae sunt minus peccata, cum tamen de gravissimis quibusdam peccatis glorientur, secundum illud Psalmi, quid gloriaris in malitia? Ergo verecundia non proprie est de turpi actu. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in II libro, et Gregorius Nyssenus, quod verecundia est timor in turpi actu, vel in turpi perpetrato. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de passione timoris ageretur, timor proprie est de malo arduo, quod scilicet difficile vitatur. Est autem duplex turpitudo. Una quidem vitiosa, quae scilicet consistit in deformitate actus voluntarii. Et haec, proprie loquendo, non habet rationem mali ardui, quod enim in sola voluntate consistit, non videtur esse arduum et elevatum supra hominis potestatem, et propter hoc non apprehenditur sub ratione terribilis. Et propter hoc philo-

Objection 1: It would seem that shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful action. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that shamefacedness is fear of disgrace. Now sometimes those who do nothing wrong suffer ignominy, according to Ps. 67:8, For thy sake I have borne reproach, shame hath covered my face. Therefore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action. Obj. 2: Further, nothing apparently is disgraceful but what is sinful. Yet man is ashamed of things that are not sins, for instance when he performs a menial occupation. Therefore it seems that shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action. Obj. 3: Further, virtuous deeds are not disgraceful but most beautiful according to Ethic. i, 8. Yet sometimes people are ashamed to do virtuous deeds, according to Luke 9:26, He that shall be ashamed of Me and My words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed, etc. Therefore shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful action. Obj. 4: Further, if shamefacedness were properly about a disgraceful action, it would follow that the more disgraceful the action the more ashamed would one be. Yet sometimes a man is more ashamed of lesser sins, while he glories in those which are most grievous, according to Ps. 51:3, Why dost thou glory in malice? Therefore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action. On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) and Gregory of Nyssa say that shamefacedness is fear of doing a disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful deed done. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 41, A. 2; Q. 42, A. 3), when we were treating of the passions, fear is properly about an arduous evil, one, namely, that is difficult to avoid. Now disgrace is twofold. There is the disgrace inherent to vice, which consists in the deformity of a voluntary act: and this, properly speaking, has not the character of an arduous evil. For that which depends on the will alone does not appear to be arduous and above man’s ability: wherefore it is not apprehended as fearful, and for this

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sophus dicit, in II Rhet., quod horum malorum non est timor. Alia autem est turpitudo quasi poenalis, quae quidem consistit in vituperatione alicuius, sicut quaedam claritas gloriae consistit in honoratione alicuius. Et quia huiusmodi vituperium habet rationem mali ardui, sicut honor habet rationem boni ardui; verecundia, quae est timor turpitudinis, primo et principaliter respicit vituperium seu opprobrium. Et quia vituperium proprie debetur vitio, sicut honor virtuti, ideo etiam ex consequenti verecundia respicit turpitudinem vitiosam. Unde, sicut philosophus dicit, in II Rhet., minus homo verecundatur de defectibus qui non ex eius culpa proveniunt. Respicit autem verecundia culpam dupliciter. Uno modo, ut aliquis desinat vitiosa agere, propter timorem vituperii. Alio modo, ut homo in turpibus quae agit vitet publicos conspectus, propter timorem vituperii. Quorum primum, secundum Gregorium Nyssenum, pertinet ad erubescentiam, secundum ad verecundiam, unde ipse dicit quod qui verecundatur, occultat se in his quae agit, qui vero erubescit, timet incidere in ingloriationem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verecundia proprie respicit ingloriationem secundum quod debetur culpae, quae est defectus voluntarius. Unde philosophus dicit, in II Rhet., quod omnia illa homo magis verecundatur quorum ipse est causa. Opprobria autem quae inferuntur alicui propter virtutem, virtuosus quidem contemnit, quia indigne sibi irrogantur, sicut de magnanimis philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic.; et de apostolis dicitur Act. V, quod ibant apostoli gaudentes a conspectu Concilii, quoniam digni habiti sunt pro nomine Iesu contumeliam pati. Ex imperfectione autem virtutis contingit quod aliquis verecundetur de opprobriis quae sibi inferuntur propter virtutem, quia quanto aliquis est magis virtuosus, tanto magis contemnit exteriora bona vel mala. Unde dicitur Isaiae li, noli timere opprobrium hominum. Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut honor, ut supra habitum est, quamvis non debeatur vere nisi soli virtuti, respicit tamen quandam excellentiam; ita etiam vituperium, quamvis debeatur proprie soli culpae, respicit tamen, ad minus secundum opinionem hominum, quemcumque defectum. Et ideo de paupertate et ignobilitate et servitute, et aliis huiusmodi, aliquis verecundatur. Ad tertium dicendum quod de operibus virtuosis in se consideratis non est verecundia. Contingit tamen per accidens quod aliquis de eis verecundetur, vel inquantum habentur ut vitiosa secundum hominum opinionem; vel inquantum homo refugit in operibus virtutis notam de praesumptione, aut etiam de simulatione. Ad quartum dicendum quod quandoque contingit aliqua graviora peccata minus esse verecundabilia, vel quia habent minus de ratione turpitudinis, sicut pecca-

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reason the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that such evils are not a matter of fear. The other kind of disgrace is penal so to speak, and it consists in the reproach that attaches to a person, just as the clarity of glory consists in a person being honored. And since this reproach has the character of an arduous evil, just as honor has the character of an arduous good, shamefacedness, which is fear of disgrace, regards first and foremost reproach or ignominy. And since reproach is properly due to vice, as honor is due to virtue, it follows that shamefacedness regards also the disgrace inherent to vice. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that a man is less ashamed of those defects which are not the result of any fault of his own. Now shamefacedness regards fault in two ways. In one way a man refrains from vicious acts through fear of reproach: in another way a man while doing a disgraceful deed avoids the public eye through fear of reproach. In the former case, according to Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx), we speak of a person blushing, in the latter we say that he is ashamed. Hence he says that the man who is ashamed acts in secret, but he who blushes fears to be disgraced. Reply Obj. 1: Shamefacedness properly regards disgrace as due to sin which is a voluntary defect. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that a man is more ashamed of those things of which he is the cause. Now the virtuous man despises the disgrace to which he is subject on account of virtue, because he does not deserve it; as the Philosopher says of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3). Thus we find it said of the apostles (Acts 5:41) that they (the apostles) went from the presence of the council, rejoicing that they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus. It is owing to imperfection of virtue that a man is sometimes ashamed of the reproaches which he suffers on account of virtue, since the more virtuous a man is, the more he despises external things, whether good or evil. Wherefore it is written (Isa 51:7): Fear ye not the reproach of men. Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 63, A. 3), though honor is not really due save to virtue alone, yet it regards a certain excellence: and the same applies to reproach, for though it is properly due to sin alone, yet, at least in man’s opinion, it regards any kind of defect. Hence a man is ashamed of poverty, disrepute, servitude, and the like. Reply Obj. 3: Shamefacedness does not regard virtuous deeds as such. Yet it happens accidentally that a man is ashamed of them either because he looks upon them as vicious according to human opinion, or because he is afraid of being marked as presumptuous or hypocritical for doing virtuous deeds. Reply Obj. 4: Sometimes more grievous sins are less shameful, either because they are less disgraceful, as spiritual sins in comparison with sins of the flesh, or because

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ta spiritualia quam carnalia, vel quia in quodam excessu temporalis boni se habent, sicut magis verecundatur homo de timiditate quam de audacia, et de furto quam de rapina, propter quandam speciem potestatis. Et simile est in aliis.

Q. 144, A. 3

they connote a certain abundance of some temporal good; thus a man is more ashamed of cowardice than of daring, of theft than of robbery, on account of a semblance of power. The same applies to other sins.

Article 3 Whether man is more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non magis verecundetur a personis coniunctis. Dicitur enim in II Rhet. quod homines magis erubescunt ab illis a quibus volunt in admiratione haberi. Sed hoc maxime appetit homo a melioribus, qui quandoque non sunt magis coniuncti. Ergo homo non magis erubescit de magis coniunctis. Praeterea, illi videntur esse magis coniuncti qui sunt similium operum. Sed homo non erubescit de suo peccato ab his quos scit simili peccato subiacere, quia sicut dicitur in II Rhet., quae quis ipse facit, haec proximis non vetat. Ergo homo non magis verecundatur a maxime coniunctis. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in II Rhet., quod homo magis verecundatur ab his qui propalant multis quod sciunt, sicut sunt irrisores et fabularum fictores. Sed illi qui sunt magis coniuncti non solent vitia propalare. Ergo ab eis non maxime est verecundandum. Praeterea, philosophus, ibidem, dicit quod homines maxime verecundantur ab eis inter quos in nullo defecerunt; et ab eis a quibus primo aliquid postulant; et quorum nunc primo volunt esse amici. Huiusmodi autem sunt minus coniuncti. Ergo non magis verecundatur homo de magis coniunctis. Sed contra est quod dicitur in II Rhet., quod eos qui semper aderunt, homines magis erubescunt. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum vituperium opponatur honori, sicut honor importat testimonium quoddam de excellentia alicuius, et praecipue quae est secundum virtutem; ita etiam opprobrium, cuius timor est verecundia, importat testimonium de defectu alicuius, et praecipue secundum aliquam culpam. Et ideo quanto testimonium alicuius reputatur maioris ponderis, tanto ab eo aliquis magis verecundatur. Potest autem testimonium aliquod maioris ponderis reputari vel propter eius certitudinem veritatis vel propter effectum. Certitudo autem veritatis adest testimonio alicuius propter duo. Uno quidem modo, propter rectitudinem

Objection 1: It would seem that man is not more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him. For it is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that men are more shamefaced of those from whom they desire approbation. Now men desire this especially from people of the better sort who are sometimes not connected with them. Therefore man is not more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him. Obj. 2: Further, seemingly those are more closely connected who perform like deeds. Now man is not made ashamed of his sin by those whom he knows to be guilty of the same sin, because according to Rhet. ii, 6, a man does not forbid his neighbor what he does himself. Therefore he is not more shamefaced of those who are most closely connected with him. Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that men take more shame from those who retail their information to many, such as jokers and fable-tellers. But those who are more closely connected with a man do not retail his vices. Therefore one should not take shame chiefly from them. Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that men are most liable to be made ashamed by those among whom they have done nothing amiss; by those of whom they ask something for the first time; by those whose friends they wish to become. Now these are less closely connected with us. Therefore man is not made most ashamed by those who are more closely united to him. On the contrary, It is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that man is made most ashamed by those who are to be continually with him. I answer that, Since reproach is opposed to honor, just as honor denotes attestation to someone’s excellence, especially the excellence which is according to virtue, so too reproach, the fear of which is shamefacedness, denotes attestation to a person’s defect, especially that which results from sin. Hence the more weighty a person’s attestation is considered to be, the more does he make another person ashamed. Now a person’s attestation may be considered as being more weighty, either because he is certain of the truth or because of its effect. Certitude of the truth attaches to a person’s attestations for two reasons. First on account of the rectitude of his judgment, as in the case of wise and vir-

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iudicii, sicut patet de sapientibus et virtuosis, a quibus homo et magis desiderat honorari, et magis verecundatur. Unde a pueris et bestiis nullus verecundatur, propter defectum recti iudicii qui est in eis. Alio modo, propter cognitionem eorum de quibus est testimonium, quia unusquisque bene iudicat quae cognoscit. Et sic magis verecundamur a personis coniunctis, quae magis facta nostra considerant. A peregrinis autem et omnino ignotis, ad quos facta nostra non perveniunt, nullo modo verecundamur. Ex effectu autem est aliquod testimonium magni ponderis propter iuvamentum vel nocumentum ab eo proveniens. Et ideo magis desiderant homines honorari ab his qui possunt eos iuvare, et magis verecundantur ab eis qui possunt nocere. Et inde est etiam quod, quantum ad aliquid, magis verecundamur a personis coniunctis, cum quibus semper sumus conversaturi, quasi ex hoc nobis perpetuum proveniat detrimentum. Quod autem provenit a peregrinis et transeuntibus, quasi cito pertransit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod similis ratio est propter quam verecundamur de melioribus, et de magis coniunctis. Quia sicut meliorum testimonium reputatur magis efficax propter universalem cognitionem quam habent de rebus, et immutabilem sententiam a veritate; ita etiam familiarium personarum testimonium videtur magis efficax propter hoc quia magis cognoscunt particularia quae circa nos sunt. Ad secundum dicendum quod testimonium eorum qui sunt nobis coniuncti in similitudine peccati, non reformidamus, quia non aestimamus quod defectum nostrum apprehendant ut aliquid turpe. Ad tertium dicendum quod a propalantibus verecundamur propter nocumentum inde proveniens, quod est diffamatio apud multos. Ad quartum dicendum quod etiam ab illis inter quos nihil mali fecimus, magis verecundamur, propter nocumentum sequens, quia scilicet per hoc amittimus bonam opinionem quam de nobis habebant. Et etiam quia contraria, iuxta se posita, maiora videntur, unde cum aliquis subito de aliquo quem bonum aestimavit, aliquid turpe percipit, apprehendit hoc ut turpius. Ab illis autem a quibus aliquid de novo postulamus, vel quorum nunc primo volumus esse amici, magis verecundamur, propter nocumentum inde proveniens, quod est impedimentum implendae petitionis et amicitiae consummandae.

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tuous men, by whom man is more desirous of being honored and by whom he is brought to a greater sense of shame. Hence children and the lower animals inspire no one with shame, by reason of their lack of judgment. Second, on account of his knowledge of the matter attested, because everyone judges well of what is known to him. In this way we are more liable to be made ashamed by persons connected with us, since they are better acquainted with our deeds: whereas strangers and persons entirely unknown to us, who are ignorant of what we do, inspire us with no shame at all. An attestation receives weight from its effect by reason of some advantage or harm resulting therefrom; wherefore men are more desirous of being honored by those who can be of use to them, and are more liable to be made ashamed by those who are able to do them some harm. And for this reason again, in a certain respect, persons connected with us make us more ashamed, since we are to be continually in their society, as though this entailed a continual harm to us: whereas the harm that comes from strangers and passersby ceases almost at once. Reply Obj. 1: People of the better sort make us ashamed for the same reason as those who are more closely connected with us; because just as the attestation of the better men carries more weight since they have a more universal knowledge of things, and in their judgments hold fast to the truth: so, too, the attestation of those among whom we live is more cogent since they know more about our concerns in detail. Reply Obj. 2: We fear not the attestation of those who are connected with us in the likeness of sin, because we do not think that they look upon our defect as disgraceful. Reply Obj. 3: Tale-bearers make us ashamed on account of the harm they do by making many think ill of us. Reply Obj. 4: Even those among whom we have done no wrong, make us more ashamed, on account of the harm that would follow, because, to wit, we should forfeit the good opinion they had of us: and again because when contraries are put in juxtaposition their opposition seems greater, so that when a man notices something disgraceful in one whom he esteemed good, he apprehends it as being the more disgraceful. The reason why we are made more ashamed by those of whom we ask something for the first time, or whose friends we wish to be, is that we fear to suffer some injury, by being disappointed in our request, or by failing to become their friends.

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Q. 144, A. 4

Article 4 Whether even virtuous men can be ashamed? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod etiam in virtuosis hominibus possit esse verecundia. Contrariorum enim contrarii sunt effectus. Sed illi qui sunt superabundantis malitiae non verecundantur, secundum illud Ierem. III, species meretricis facta est tibi, nescisti erubescere. Ergo illi qui sunt virtuosi magis verecundantur. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in II Rhet., quod homines non solum erubescunt vitia, sed etiam signa vitiorum. Quae quidem contingit etiam esse in virtuosis. Ergo in virtuosis potest esse verecundia. Praeterea, verecundia est timor ingloriationis. Sed contingit aliquos virtuosos ingloriosos esse, puta si falso infamantur, vel etiam indigne opprobria patiantur. Ergo verecundia potest esse in homine virtuoso. Praeterea, verecundia est pars temperantiae, ut dictum est. Pars autem non separatur a toto. Cum igitur temperantia sit in homine virtuoso, videtur quod etiam verecundia. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod verecundia non est hominis studiosi. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, verecundia est timor alicuius turpitudinis. Quod autem aliquod malum non timeatur, potest duplici ratione contingere, uno modo, quia non aestimatur ut malum; alio modo, quia non aestimatur ut possibile, vel ut difficile vitari. Et secundum hoc, verecundia in aliquo deficit dupliciter. Uno modo, quia ea quae sunt erubescibilia, non apprehenduntur ut turpia. Et hoc modo carent verecundia homines in peccatis profundati, quibus sua peccata non displicent, sed magis de eis gloriantur. Alio modo, quia non apprehendunt turpitudinem ut possibilem sibi, vel quasi non facile vitabilem. Et hoc modo senes et virtuosi verecundia carent. Sunt tamen sic dispositi ut, si in eis esset aliquid turpe, de hoc verecundarentur, unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod verecundia est ex suppositione studiosi. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod defectus verecundiae contingit in pessimis et optimis viris ex diversis causis, ut dictum est. Invenitur autem in his qui mediocriter se habent, secundum quod est in eis aliquid de amore boni, et tamen non totaliter sunt immunes a malo. Ad secundum dicendum quod ad virtuosum pertinet non solum vitare vitia, sed etiam ea quae habent speciem vitiorum, secundum illud I ad Thess. V, ab omni specie mala abstinete vos. Et philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod vitanda sunt virtuoso tam ea quae sunt mala secundum veritatem, quam ea quae sunt mala secundum opinionem.

Objection 1: It would seem that even virtuous men can be ashamed. For contraries have contrary effects. Now those who excel in wickedness are not ashamed, according to Jer. 3:3, Thou hadst a harlot’s forehead, thou wouldst not blush. Therefore those who are virtuous are more inclined to be ashamed. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that men are ashamed not only of vice, but also of the signs of evil: and this happens also in the virtuous. Therefore virtuous men can be ashamed. Obj. 3: Further, shamefacedness is fear of disgrace. Now virtuous people may happen to be ignominious, for instance if they are slandered, or if they suffer reproach undeservedly. Therefore a virtuous man can be ashamed. Obj. 4: Further, shamefacedness is a part of temperance, as stated above (Q. 143). Now a part is not separated from its whole. Since then temperance is in a virtuous man, it means that shamefacedness is also. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that a virtuous man is not shamefaced. I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 2) shamefacedness is fear of some disgrace. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil is not feared: first, because it is not reckoned an evil; second because one reckons it impossible with regard to oneself, or as not difficult to avoid. Accordingly shame may be lacking in a person in two ways. First, because the things that should make him ashamed are not deemed by him to be disgraceful; and in this way those who are steeped in sin are without shame, for instead of disapproving of their sins, they boast of them. Second, because they apprehend disgrace as impossible to themselves, or as easy to avoid. In this way the old and the virtuous are not shamefaced. Yet they are so disposed, that if there were anything disgraceful in them they would be ashamed of it. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that shame is in the virtuous hypothetically. Reply Obj. 1: Lack of shame occurs in the best and in the worst men through different causes, as stated in the Article. In the average men it is found, insofar as they have a certain love of good, and yet are not altogether free from evil. Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to the virtuous man to avoid not only vice, but also whatever has the semblance of vice, according to 1 Thess. 5:22, From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves. The Philosopher, too, says (Ethic. iv, 9) that the virtuous man should avoid not only what is really evil, but also those things that are regarded as evil.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod infamationes et opprobria virtuosus, ut dictum est, contemnit, quasi ea quibus ipse non est dignus. Et ideo de his nemo multum verecundatur. Est tamen aliquis motus verecundiae praeveniens rationem, sicut et ceterarum passionum. Ad quartum dicendum quod verecundia non est pars temperantiae quasi intrans essentiam eius, sed quasi dispositive se habens ad ipsam. Unde Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic., quod verecundia iacit prima temperantiae fundamenta, inquantum scilicet incutit horrorem turpitudinis.

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Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (A. 1, ad 1) the virtuous man despises ignominy and reproach, as being things he does not deserve, wherefore he is not much ashamed of them. Nevertheless, to a certain extent, shame, like the other passions, may forestall reason. Reply Obj. 4: Shamefacedness is a part of temperance, not as though it entered into its essence, but as a disposition to it: wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that shamefacedness lays the first foundation of temperance, by inspiring man with the horror of whatever is disgraceful.

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Question 145 Honesty Deinde considerandum est de honestate. Et circa hoc We must now consider honesty, under which head there quaeruntur quatuor. are four points of inquiry: Primo, quomodo honestum se habeat ad virtutem. (1) The relation between the honest and the virtuous; Secundo, quomodo se habeat ad decorem. (2) Its relation with the beautiful ; Tertio, quomodo se habeat ad utile et delectabile. (3) Its relation with the useful and the pleasant; Quarto, utrum honestas sit pars temperantiae. (4) Whether honesty is a part of temperance?

Article 1 Whether honesty is the same as virtue? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod honestum non sit idem virtuti. Dicit enim Tullius, in sua rhetorica honestum esse quod propter se petitur. Virtus autem non petitur propter seipsam, sed propter felicitatem, dicit enim philosophus, in I Ethic., quod felicitas est praemium virtutis et finis. Ergo honestum non est idem virtuti. Praeterea, secundum Isidorum, honestas dicitur quasi honoris status. Sed multis aliis debetur honor quam virtuti, nam virtuti proprie debetur laus, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo honestas non est idem virtuti. Praeterea, principale virtutis consistit in interiori electione, ut philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic. Honestas autem magis videtur ad exteriorem conversationem pertinere, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIV, omnia honeste et secundum ordinem fiant in vobis. Ergo honestas non est idem virtuti. Praeterea, honestas videtur consistere in exterioribus divitiis, secundum illud Eccli. XI, bona et mala, vita et mors, utraque a Deo sunt. Sed in exterioribus divitiis non consistit virtus. Ergo honestas non est idem virtuti. Sed contra est quod Tullius, in I de Offic. et in II Rhet., dividit honestum in quatuor virtutes principales, in quas etiam dividitur virtus. Ergo honestum est idem virtuti. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Isidorus dicit, honestas dicitur quasi honoris status. Unde ex hoc videtur aliquid dici honestum, quod est honore dignum. Honor autem, ut supra dictum est, excellentiae debetur. Excellentia autem hominis maxime consideratur secundum virtutem, quia est dispositio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Et ideo honestum, proprie loquendo, in idem refertur cum virtute.

Objection 1: It would seem that honesty is not the same as virtue. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) that the honest is what is desired for its own sake. Now virtue is desired, not for its own sake, but for the sake of happiness, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9) that happiness is the reward and the end of virtue. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue. Obj. 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x) honesty means an honorable state. Now honor is due to many things besides virtue, since it is praise that is the proper due of virtue (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue. Obj. 3: Further, the principal part of virtue is the interior choice, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 13). But honesty seems to pertain rather to exterior conduct, according to 1 Cor. 14:40, Let all things be done decently (honeste) and according to order among you. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue. Obj. 4: Further, honesty apparently consists in external wealth. According to Ecclus. 11:14, good things and evil, life and death are from God. But virtue does not consist in external wealth. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue. On the contrary, Tully (De Offic. i, 5; Rhet. ii, 53) divides honesty into the four principal virtues, into which virtue is also divided. Therefore honesty is the same as virtue. I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) honesty means an honorable state, wherefore a thing may be said to be honest through being worthy of honor. Now honor, as stated above (Q. 144, A. 2, ad 2), is due to excellence: and the excellence of a man is gauged chiefly according to his virtue, as stated in Phys. vii, 17. Therefore, properly speaking, honesty refers to the same thing as virtue.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., eorum quae propter se appetuntur, quaedam appetuntur solum propter se, et nunquam propter aliud, sicut felicitas, quae est ultimus finis. Quaedam vero appetuntur et propter se, inquantum habent in seipsis aliquam rationem bonitatis, etiam si nihil aliud boni per ea nobis accideret, et tamen sunt appetibilia propter aliud, inquantum scilicet perducunt nos in aliquod bonum perfectius. Et hoc modo virtutes sunt propter se appetendae. Unde Tullius dicit, in II Rhet., quod quiddam est quod sua vi nos allicit, et sua dignitate trahit, ut virtus, veritas, scientia. Et hoc sufficit ad rationem honesti.

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Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7), of those things that are desired for their own sake, some are desired for their own sake alone, and never for the sake of something else, such as happiness which is the last end; while some are desired, not only for their own sake, inasmuch as they have an aspect of goodness in themselves, even if no further good accrued to us through them, but also for the sake of something else, inasmuch as they are conducive to some more perfect good. It is thus that the virtues are desirable for their own sake: wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52) that some things allure us by their own force, and attract us by their own worth, such as virtue, truth, knowledge. And this suffices to give a thing the character of honest. Reply Obj. 2: Some of the things which are honored besides virtue are more excellent than virtue, namely God and happiness, and such like things are not so well known to us by experience as virtue which we practice day by day. Hence virtue has a greater claim to the name of honesty. Other things which are beneath virtue are honored, insofar as they are a help to the practice of virtue, such as rank, power, and riches. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that these things are honored by some people, but in truth it is only the good man who is worthy of honor. Now a man is good in respect of virtue. Wherefore praise is due to virtue insofar as the latter is desirable for the sake of something else, while honor is due to virtue for its own sake: and it is thus that virtue has the character of honesty. Reply Obj. 3: As we have stated honest denotes that to which honor is due. Now honor is an attestation to someone’s excellence, as stated above (Q. 103, AA. 1, 2). But one attests only to what one knows; and the internal choice is not made known save by external actions. Wherefore external conduct has the character of honesty, insofar as it reflects internal rectitude. For this reason honesty consists radically in the internal choice, but its expression lies in the external conduct.

Ad secundum dicendum quod eorum quae honorantur praeter virtutem, aliquid est virtute excellentius, scilicet Deus et beatitudo. Et huiusmodi non sunt ita nobis per experientiam nota sicut virtutes, secundum quas quotidie operamur. Et ideo virtus magis sibi vindicat nomen honesti. Alia vero, quae sunt infra virtutem, honorantur inquantum coadiuvant ad operationem virtutis, sicut nobilitas, potentia et divitiae. Ut enim philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., huiusmodi honorantur a quibusdam, sed secundum veritatem, solus bonus est honorandus. Bonus autem est aliquis secundum virtutem. Et ideo virtuti quidem debetur laus, secundum quod est appetibilis propter aliud, honor autem, prout est appetibilis propter seipsam. Et secundum hoc habet rationem honesti. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, honestum importat debitum honoris. Honor autem est contestatio quaedam de excellentia alicuius, ut supra dictum est. Testimonium autem non profertur nisi de rebus notis. Interior autem electio non innotescit homini nisi per exteriores actus. Et ideo exterior conversatio habet rationem honesti secundum quod est demonstrativa interioris rectitudinis. Et propter hoc, radicaliter honestas consistit in interiori electione, significative autem in exteriori conversatione. Ad quartum dicendum quod quia secundum vulReply Obj. 4: It is because the excellence of wealth is garem opinionem excellentia divitiarum facit hominem commonly regarded as making a man deserving of honor, dignum honore, inde est quod quandoque nomen hone- that sometimes the name of honesty is given to external statis ad exteriorem prosperitatem transfertur. prosperity.

Article 2 Whether the honest is the same as the beautiful? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoObjection 1: It would seem that the honest is not the nestum non sit idem quod decorum. Ratio enim honesti same as the beautiful. For the aspect of honest is derived sumitur ex appetitu, nam honestum est quod per se ap- from the appetite, since the honest is what is desirable for

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petitur. Sed decorum magis respicit aspectum, cui pla- its own sake. But the beautiful regards rather the faculty of cet. Ergo decorum non est idem quod honestum. vision to which it is pleasing. Therefore the beautiful is not the same as the honest. Praeterea, decor quandam claritatem requirit, Obj. 2: Further, beauty requires a certain clarity, which quae pertinet ad rationem gloriae. Honestum autem re- is characteristic of glory: whereas the honest regards honor. spicit honorem. Cum igitur honor et gloria differant, ut Since then honor and glory differ, as stated above (Q. 103, supra dictum est, videtur quod etiam honestum differat A. 1, ad 3), it seems also that the honest and the beautiful a decoro. differ. Praeterea, honestum est idem virtuti, ut supra Obj. 3: Further, honesty is the same as virtue, as stated dictum est. Sed aliquis decor contrariatur virtuti, unde above (A.1). But a certain beauty is contrary to virtue, dicitur Ezech. XVI, habens fiduciam in pulchritudine tua, wherefore it is written (Ezek 16:15): Trusting in thy beauty fornicata es in nomine tuo. Ergo honestum non est idem thou playest the harlot because of thy renown. Therefore the decoro. honest is not the same as the beautiful. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XII, On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor 12:23, 24): quae inhonesta sunt nostra, abundantiorem honestatem Those that are our uncomely (inhonesta) parts, have more habent, honesta autem nostra nullius egent. Vocat autem abundant comeliness (honestatem), but our comely (honesta) ibi inhonesta, membra turpia; honesta autem, membra parts have no need. Now by uncomely parts he means the pulchra. Ergo honestum et decorum idem esse videntur. baser members, and by comely parts the beautiful members. Therefore the honest and the beautiful are apparently the same. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut accipi potest ex I answer that, As may be gathered from the words of verbis Dionysii, IV cap. de Div. Nom., ad rationem pul- Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), beauty or comeliness results from chri, sive decori, concurrit et claritas et debita propor- the concurrence of clarity and due proportion. For he states tio, dicit enim quod Deus dicitur pulcher sicut universo- that God is said to be beautiful, as being the cause of the rum consonantiae et claritatis causa. Unde pulchritudo harmony and clarity of the universe. Hence the beauty of the corporis in hoc consistit quod homo habeat membra body consists in a man having his bodily limbs well proporcorporis bene proportionata, cum quadam debiti colo- tioned, together with a certain clarity of color. In like manris claritate. Et similiter pulchritudo spiritualis in hoc ner spiritual beauty consists in a man’s conduct or actions consistit quod conversatio hominis, sive actio eius, sit being well proportioned in respect of the spiritual clarity bene proportionata secundum spiritualem rationis cla- of reason. Now this is what is meant by honesty, which we ritatem. Hoc autem pertinet ad rationem honesti, quod have stated (A. 1) to be the same as virtue; and it is virtue diximus idem esse virtuti, quae secundum rationem mo- that moderates according to reason all that is connected deratur omnes res humanas. Et ideo honestum est idem with man. Wherefore honesty is the same as spiritual beauty. spirituali decori. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro octo- Hence Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): By honesty I mean gintatrium quaest., honestatem voco intelligibilem pul- intelligible beauty, which we properly designate as spiritual, chritudinem, quam spiritualem nos proprie dicimus. Et and further on he adds that many things are beautiful to the postea subdit quod sunt multa pulchra visibilia, quae mi- eye, which it would be hardly proper to call honest. nus proprie honesta appellantur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectum movens Reply Obj. 1: The object that moves the appetite is an appetitum est bonum apprehensum. Quod autem in ip- apprehended good. Now if a thing is perceived to be beautisa apprehensione apparet decorum, accipitur ut conve- ful as soon as it is apprehended, it is taken to be something niens et bonum, et ideo dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. becoming and good. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) Nom., quod omnibus est pulchrum et bonum amabile. that the beautiful and the good are beloved by all. Wherefore Unde et ipsum honestum, secundum quod habet spiri- the honest, inasmuch as it implies spiritual beauty, is an obtualem decorem, appetibile redditur. Unde et Tullius di- ject of desire, and for this reason Tully says (De Offic. i, 5): cit, in I de Offic., formam ipsam, et tanquam faciem ho- Thou perceivest the form and the features, so to speak, of honnesti vides, quae si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores, ut esty; and were it to be seen with the eye, would, as Plato deait Plato, excitaret sapientiae. clares, arouse a wondrous love of wisdom. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 103, A. 1, ad 3), est, gloria est effectus honoris, ex hoc enim quod aliquis glory is the effect of honor: because through being honored honoratur vel laudatur, redditur clarus in oculis alio- or praised, a person acquires clarity in the eyes of others. rum. Et ideo, sicut idem est honorificum et gloriosum, Wherefore, just as the same thing makes a man honorable ita etiam idem est honestum et decorum. and glorious, so is the same thing honest and beautiful.

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Q. 145, A. 3

Temperance

Ad tertium dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de pulchritudine corporali. Quamvis possit dici quod etiam propter pulchritudinem spiritualem aliquis spiritualiter fornicatur, inquantum de ipsa honestate superbit, secundum illud Ezech. XXVIII, elevatum est cor tuum in decore tuo, perdidisti sapientiam tuam in decore tuo.

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Reply Obj. 3: This argument applies to the beauty of the body: although it might be replied that to be proud of one’s honesty is to play the harlot because of one’s spiritual beauty, according to Ezech. 28:17, Thy heart was lifted up with thy beauty, thou hast lost thy wisdom in thy beauty.

Article 3 Whether the honest differs from the useful and the pleasant? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod honestum non differat ab utili et delectabili. Dicitur enim honestum quod propter se appetitur. Sed delectatio propter se appetitur, ridiculum enim videtur quaerere propter quid aliquis velit delectari, ut philosophus dicit, in X Ethic. Ergo honestum non differt a delectabili. Praeterea, divitiae sub bono utili continentur, dicit enim Tullius, in II Rhet., est aliquid non propter suam vim et naturam, sed propter fructum et utilitatem petendum, quod pecunia est. Sed divitiae habent rationem honestatis, dicitur enim Eccli. XI, paupertas et honestas (idest divitiae) a Deo sunt; et XIII, pondus super se tollit qui honestiori (idest ditiori) se communicat. Ergo honestum non differt ab utili.

Objection 1: It would seem that the honest does not differ from the useful and the pleasant. For the honest is what is desirable for its own sake. Now pleasure is desired for its own sake, for it seems ridiculous to ask a man why he wishes to be pleased, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore the honest does not differ from the pleasant. Obj. 2: Further, riches are comprised under the head of useful good: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52): There is a thing that attracts the desire not by any force of its own, nor by its very nature, but on account of its fruitfulness and utility: and that is money. Now riches come under the head of honesty, for it is written (Sir 11:14): Poverty and riches (honestas) are from God, and (Sir 13:2): He shall take a burden upon him that hath fellowship with one more honorable, i.e., richer, than himself. Therefore the honest differs not from the useful. Praeterea, Tullius probat, in libro de Offic., quod Obj. 3: Further, Tully proves (De Offic. ii, 3) that nothnihil potest esse utile quod non sit honestum. Et hoc ing can be useful unless it be honest: and Ambrose makes idem habetur per Ambrosium, in libro de Offic. Ergo uti- the same statement (De Offic. ii, 6). Therefore the useful difle non differt ab honesto. fers not from the honest. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro ocOn the contrary, Augustine says (Q. 83, qu. 30): The togintatrium quaest., honestum dicitur quod propter seip- honest is that which is desirable for its own sake: the useful sum petendum est, utile autem quod ad aliquid aliud refe- implies reference to something else.

rendum est. Respondeo dicendum quod honestum concurrit in idem subiectum cum utili et delectabili, a quibus tamen differt ratione. Dicitur enim aliquid honestum, sicut dictum est, inquantum habet quendam decorem ex ordinatione rationis. Hoc autem quod est secundum rationem ordinatum, est naturaliter conveniens homini. Unumquodque autem naturaliter delectatur in suo convenienti. Et ideo honestum est naturaliter homini delectabile, sicut de operatione virtutis philosophus probat, in I Ethic. Non tamen omne delectabile est honestum, quia potest etiam aliquid esse conveniens secundum sensum, non secundum rationem; sed hoc delectabile est praeter hominis rationem, quae perficit naturam ipsius. Ipsa etiam virtus, quae secundum se honesta est, refertur ad aliud sicut ad finem, scilicet ad felicitatem. Et secundum hoc, idem subiecto est et honestum et utile et delectabile, sed ratione differunt.

I answer that, The honest concurs in the same subject with the useful and the pleasant, but it differs from them in aspect. For, as stated above (A. 2), a thing is said to be honest, insofar as it has a certain beauty through being regulated by reason. Now whatever is regulated in accordance with reason is naturally becoming to man. Again, it is natural for a thing to take pleasure in that which is becoming to it. Wherefore an honest thing is naturally pleasing to man: and the Philosopher proves this with regard to acts of virtue (Ethic. i, 8). Yet not all that is pleasing is honest, since a thing may be becoming according to the senses, but not according to reason. A pleasing thing of this kind is beside man’s reason which perfects his nature. Even virtue itself, which is essentially honest, is referred to something else as its end, namely happiness. Accordingly the honest, the useful, and the pleasant concur in the one subject. Nevertheless they differ in aspect.

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Nam honestum dicitur secundum quod aliquid habet quandam excellentiam dignam honore propter spiritualem pulchritudinem; delectabile autem, inquantum quietat appetitum; utile autem, inquantum refertur ad aliud. In pluribus tamen est delectabile quam utile et honestum, quia omne utile et honestum est aliqualiter delectabile, sed non convertitur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod honestum dicitur quod propter se appetitur appetitu rationali, qui tendit in id quod est conveniens rationi. Delectabile autem propter se appetitur appetitu sensitivo. Ad secundum dicendum quod divitiae vocantur nomine honestatis secundum opinionem multorum, qui divitias honorant, vel inquantum ordinantur organice ad actus virtutum, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod intentio Tullii et Ambrosii dicere est quod nihil potest esse simpliciter et vere utile quod repugnat honestati, quia oportet quod repugnet ultimo fini hominis, quod est bonum secundum rationem, quamvis forte possit esse utile secundum quid, respectu alicuius finis particularis. Non autem intendunt dicere quod omne utile, in se consideratum, pertingat ad rationem honesti.

Q. 145, A. 4

For a thing is said to be honest as having a certain excellence deserving of honor on account of its spiritual beauty: while it is said to be pleasing, as bringing rest to desire, and useful, as referred to something else. The pleasant, however, extends to more things than the useful and the honest: since whatever is useful and honest is pleasing in some respect, whereas the converse does not hold (Ethic. ii, 3). Reply Obj. 1: A thing is said to be honest, if it is desired for its own sake by the rational appetite, which tends to that which is in accordance with reason: while a thing is said to be pleasant if it is desired for its own sake by the sensitive appetite. Reply Obj. 2: Riches are denominated honesty according of the opinion of the many who honor wealth: or because they are intended to be the instruments of virtuous deeds, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). Reply Obj. 3: Tully and Ambrose mean to say that nothing incompatible with honesty can be simply and truly useful, since it follows that it is contrary to man’s last end, which is a good in accordance with reason; although it may perhaps be useful in some respect, with regard to a particular end. But they do not mean to say that every useful thing as such may be classed among those that are honest.

Article 4 Whether honesty should be reckoned a part of temperance? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod honestas non debeat poni pars temperantiae. Non enim est possibile quod idem, respectu eiusdem, sit pars et totum. Sed temperantia est pars honesti, ut Tullius dicit, in II Rhet. Ergo honestas non est pars temperantiae. Praeterea, III Esdrae dicitur quod vinum praecordia facit honesta. Sed usus vini, praecipue superfluus, de quo ibi loqui videtur, magis pertinet ad intemperantiam quam ad temperantiam. Ergo honestas non est pars temperantiae. Praeterea, honestum dicitur quod est honore dignum. Sed iusti et fortes maxime honorantur, ut dicit philosophus, in I Rhet. Ergo honestas non pertinet ad temperantiam, sed magis ad iustitiam vel fortitudinem. Unde et Eleazarus dixit, ut dicitur II Machab. VI, fortiter pro gravissimis ac sanctissimis legibus honesta morte perfungor. Sed contra est quod Macrobius honestatem ponit partem temperantiae. Ambrosius etiam, in I de Offic., temperantiae specialiter honestatem attribuit. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, honestas est quaedam spiritualis pulchritudo. Pulchro autem opponitur turpe. Opposita autem maxime se in-

Objection 1: It would seem that honesty should not be reckoned a part of temperance. For it is not possible for a thing to be part and whole in respect of one same thing. Now temperance is a part of honesty, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). Therefore honesty is not a part of temperance. Obj. 2: Further, it is stated (Ezra 3:21) that wine . . . makes all thoughts honest. But the use of wine, especially in excess, in which sense the passage quoted should seemingly be taken, pertains to intemperance rather than to temperance. Therefore honesty is not a part of temperance. Obj. 3: Further, the honest is that which is deserving of honor. Now it is the just and the brave who receive most honor, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 9). Therefore honesty pertains, not to temperance, but rather to justice and fortitude: wherefore Eleazar said as related in 2 Macc. 6:28: I suffer an honorable (honesta) death, for the most venerable and most holy laws. On the contrary, Macrobius reckons honesty a part of temperance, and Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) ascribes honesty as pertaining especially to temperance. I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), honesty is a kind of spiritual beauty. Now the disgraceful is opposed to the beautiful: and opposites are most manifest of one

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Temperance

vicem manifestant. Et ideo ad temperantiam specialiter honestas pertinere videtur, quae id quod est homini turpissimum et indecentissimum repellit, scilicet brutales voluptates. Unde et in ipso nomine temperantiae maxime intelligitur bonum rationis, cuius est moderari et temperare concupiscentias pravas. Sic igitur honestas, prout speciali quadam ratione temperantiae attribuitur, ponitur pars eius non quidem subiectiva, vel sicut virtus adiuncta, sed pars integralis ipsius, sicut quaedam eius conditio. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod temperantia ponitur pars subiectiva honesti prout sumitur in sua communitate. Sic autem non ponitur temperantiae pars. Ad secundum dicendum quod vinum in ebriis facit praecordia honesta secundum eorum reputationem, quia videtur eis quod sint magni et honorandi. Ad tertium dicendum quod iustitiae et fortitudini debetur maior honor quam temperantiae propter maioris boni excellentiam. Sed temperantiae debetur maior honor propter cohibitionem vitiorum magis exprobrabilium, ut ex dictis patet. Et sic honestas magis attribuitur temperantiae, secundum regulam apostoli, I ad Cor. XII, quod inhonesta nostra maiorem habent honestatem, scilicet removentem quod inhonestum est.

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another. Wherefore seemingly honesty belongs especially to temperance, since the latter repels that which is most disgraceful and unbecoming to man, namely animal lusts. Hence by its very name temperance is most significative of the good of reason to which it belongs to moderate and temper evil desires. Accordingly honesty, as being ascribed for a special reason to temperance, is reckoned as a part thereof, not as a subjective part, nor as an annexed virtue, but as an integral part or condition attaching thereto. Reply Obj. 1: Temperance is accounted a subjective part of honesty taken in a wide sense: it is not thus that the latter is reckoned a part of temperance. Reply Obj. 2: When a man is intoxicated, the wine makes his thoughts honest according to his own reckoning because he deems himself great and deserving of honor. Reply Obj. 3: Greater honor is due to justice and fortitude than to temperance, because they excel in the point of a greater good: yet greater honor is due to temperance, because the vices which it holds in check are the most deserving of reproach, as stated above. Thus honesty is more to be ascribed to temperance according to the rule given by the Apostle (1 Cor 12:23) when he says that our uncomely parts have more abundant comeliness, which, namely, destroys whatever is uncomely.

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Question 146 Abstinence Deinde considerandum est de partibus subiectivis temperantiae. Et primo, de his quae sunt circa delectationes ciborum; secundo, de his quae sunt circa delectationes venereorum. Circa primum, considerandum est de abstinentia, quae est circa cibos et potus; et de sobrietate, quae est specialiter circa potum. Circa abstinentiam autem consideranda sunt tria, primo, de ipsa abstinentia; secundo, de actu eius, qui est ieiunium; tertio, de vitio opposito, quod est gula. Circa abstinentiam autem quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum abstinentia sit virtus. Secundo, utrum sit virtus specialis.

We must now consider the subjective parts of temperance: first, those which are about pleasures of food; second, those which are about pleasures of sex. The first consideration will include abstinence, which is about meat and drink, and sobriety, which is specifically about drink. With regard to abstinence three points have to be considered: (1) Abstinence itself; (2) its act which is fasting; (3) its opposite vice which is gluttony. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether abstinence is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a special virtue?

Article 1 Whether abstinence is a virtue? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod abstinentia non sit virtus. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. IV, non est regnum Dei in sermone, sed in virtute. In abstinentia autem non consistit regnum Dei, dicit enim apostolus, Rom. XIV, non est regnum Dei esca et potus; ubi dicit Glossa nec in abstinendo nec in manducando esse iustitiam. Ergo abstinentia non est virtus. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in X Confess., ad Deum loquens, hoc me docuisti, ut quemadmodum medicamenta, sic alimenta sumpturus accedam. Sed medicamenta moderari non pertinet ad virtutem, sed ad artem medicinae. Ergo, pari ratione, moderari alimenta, quod pertinet ad abstinentiam, non est actus virtutis, sed artis. Praeterea, omnis virtus in medio consistit, ut habetur in II Ethic. Abstinentia autem non videtur in medio consistere, sed in defectu, cum ex subtractione nominetur. Ergo abstinentia non est virtus. Praeterea, nulla virtus excludit aliam. Sed abstinentia excludit patientiam, dicit enim Gregorius, in pastorali, quod mentes abstinentium plerumque impatientia excutit a sinu tranquillitatis. Ibidem etiam dicit quod cogitationes abstinentium nonnunquam superbiae culpa transfigit, et ita excludit humilitatem. Ergo abstinentia non est virtus. Sed contra est quod dicitur II Pet. I, ministrate in fide vestra virtutem, in virtute autem scientiam, in scientia autem abstinentiam, ubi abstinentia aliis virtutibus connumeratur. Ergo abstinentia est virtus.

Objection 1: It seems that abstinence is not a virtue. For the Apostle says (1 Cor 4:20): The kingdom of God is not in speech but in power (virtute). Now the kingdom of God does not consist in abstinence, for the Apostle says (Rom 14:17): The kingdom of God is not meat and drink, where a gloss observes that justice consists neither in abstaining nor in eating. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Confess. x, 11) addressing himself to God: This hast Thou taught me, that I should set myself to take food as physic. Now it belongs not to virtue, but to the medical art to regulate medicine. Therefore, in like manner, to regulate one’s food, which belongs to abstinence, is an act not of virtue but of art. Obj. 3: Further, every virtue observes the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6, 7. But abstinence seemingly inclines not to the mean but to deficiency, since it denotes retrenchment. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue. Obj. 4: Further, no virtue excludes another virtue. But abstinence excludes patience: for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that impatience not unfrequently dislodges the abstainer’s mind from its peaceful seclusion. Likewise he says (Pastor. iii, 19) that sometimes the sin of pride pierces the thoughts of the abstainer, so that abstinence excludes humility. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue. On the contrary, It is written (2 Pet 1:5, 6): Join with your faith virtue, and with virtue knowledge, and with knowledge abstinence; where abstinence is numbered among other virtues. Therefore abstinence is a virtue.

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Temperance

Respondeo dicendum quod abstinentia ex suo nomine importat subtractionem ciborum. Dupliciter ergo nomen abstinentiae accipi potest. Uno modo, secundum quod absolute ciborum subtractionem designat. Et hoc modo abstinentia non designat neque virtutem neque actum virtutis, sed quiddam indifferens. Alio modo potest accipi secundum quod est ratione regulata. Et tunc significat vel habitum virtutis, vel actum. Et hoc significatur in praemissa auctoritate Petri, ubi dicitur in scientia abstinentiam ministrandam, ut scilicet homo a cibis abstineat prout oportet, pro congruentia hominum cum quibus vivit et personae suae, et pro valetudinis suae necessitate. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod et usus ciborum et eorum abstinentia secundum se considerata, non pertinent ad regnum Dei, dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. VIII, esca nos non commendat Deo. Neque enim, si non manducaverimus, deficiemus, neque, si manducabimus, abundabimus, scilicet spiritualiter. Utrumque autem eorum secundum quod fit rationabiliter ex fide et dilectione Dei, pertinet ad regnum Dei. Ad secundum dicendum quod moderatio ciborum secundum quantitatem et qualitatem pertinet ad artem medicinae in comparatione ad valetudinem corporis, sed secundum interiores affectiones, in comparatione ad bonum rationis, pertinet ad abstinentiam. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de quaest. Evang., non interest omnino, scilicet ad virtutem, quid alimentorum vel quantum quis accipiat, dummodo id faciat pro congruentia hominum cum quibus vivit et personae suae, et pro valetudinis suae necessitate, sed quanta facilitate et serenitate animi his valeat, cum oportet vel necesse est, carere. Ad tertium dicendum quod ad temperantiam pertinet refrenare delectationes quae nimis animum ad se alliciunt, sicut ad fortitudinem pertinet firmare animum contra timores a bono rationis repellentes. Et ideo sicut laus fortitudinis consistit in quodam excessu, et ex hoc denominantur omnes partes fortitudinis; ita etiam laus temperantiae consistit in quodam defectu, et ex hoc ipsa et omnes partes eius denominantur. Unde et abstinentia, quia pars est temperantiae, denominatur a defectu. Et tamen consistit in medio, inquantum est secundum rationem rectam. Ad quartum dicendum quod illa vitia proveniunt ex abstinentia prout non est secundum rationem rectam. Ratio enim recta facit abstinere sicut oportet, scilicet cum hilaritate mentis; et propter quod oportet, scilicet propter gloriam Dei, non propter gloriam suam.

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I answer that, Abstinence by its very name denotes retrenchment of food. Hence the term abstinence may be taken in two ways. First, as denoting retrenchment of food absolutely, and in this way it signifies neither a virtue nor a virtuous act, but something indifferent. Second, it may be taken as regulated by reason, and then it signifies either a virtuous habit or a virtuous act. This is the meaning of Peter’s words quoted above, where he says that we ought to join abstinence with knowledge, namely that in abstaining from food a man should act with due regard for those among whom he lives, for his own person, and for the requirements of health. Reply Obj. 1: The use of and abstinence from food, considered in themselves, do not pertain to the kingdom of God, since the Apostle says (1 Cor 8:8): Meat doth not commend us to God. For neither, if we eat not, shall we have the less, nor if we eat, shall we have the more, i.e., spiritually. Nevertheless they both belong to the kingdom of God, insofar as they are done reasonably through faith and love of God. Reply Obj. 2: The regulation of food, in the point of quantity and quality, belongs to the art of medicine as regards the health of the body: but in the point of internal affections with regard to the good of reason, it belongs to abstinence. Hence Augustine says (QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 11): It makes no difference whatever to virtue what or how much food a man takes, so long as he does it with due regard for the people among whom he lives, for his own person, and for the requirements of his health: but it matters how readily and uncomplainingly he does without food when bound by duty or necessity to abstain. Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to temperance to bridle the pleasures which are too alluring to the soul, just as it belongs to fortitude to strengthen the soul against fears that deter it from the good of reason. Wherefore, just as fortitude is commended on account of a certain excess, from which all the parts of fortitude take their name, so temperance is commended for a kind of deficiency, from which all its parts are denominated. Hence abstinence, since it is a part of temperance, is named from deficiency, and yet it observes the mean, insofar as it is in accord with right reason. Reply Obj. 4: Those vices result from abstinence insofar as it is not in accord with right reason. For right reason makes one abstain as one ought, i.e., with gladness of heart, and for the due end, i.e., for God’s glory and not one’s own.

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Q. 146, A. 2

Article 2 Whether abstinence is a special virtue? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod abstinentia non sit specialis virtus. Omnis enim virtus secundum seipsam est laudabilis. Sed abstinentia non est secundum se laudabilis, dicit enim Gregorius, in pastorali, quod virtus abstinentiae non nisi ex aliis virtutibus commendatur. Ergo abstinentia non est specialis virtus. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, de fide ad Petrum, quod abstinentia sanctorum est a cibo et potu, non quia aliqua creatura Dei sit mala, sed pro sola corporis castigatione. Hoc autem pertinet ad castitatem, ut ex ipso nomine apparet. Ergo abstinentia non est virtus specialis a castitate distincta. Praeterea, sicut homo debet esse contentus moderato cibo, ita et moderata veste, secundum illud I ad Tim. ult., habentes alimenta et quibus tegamur, his contenti simus. In moderatione autem vestium non est aliqua specialis virtus. Ergo neque abstinentia, quae est moderativa alimentorum. Sed contra est quod Macrobius ponit abstinentiam specialem partem temperantiae. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtus moralis conservat bonum rationis contra impetus passionum, et ideo ubi invenitur specialis ratio qua passio abstrahat a bono rationis, ibi necesse est esse specialem virtutem. Delectationes autem ciborum natae sunt abstrahere hominem a bono rationis, tum propter earum magnitudinem; tum etiam propter necessitatem ciborum, quibus homo indiget ad vitae conservationem, quam maxime homo desiderat. Et ideo abstinentia est specialis virtus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutes oportet esse connexas, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo una virtus adiuvatur et commendatur ex alia, sicut iustitia a fortitudine. Et per hunc etiam modum virtus abstinentiae commendatur ex aliis virtutibus.

Objection 1: It would seem that abstinence is not a special virtue. For every virtue is praiseworthy by itself. But abstinence is not praiseworthy by itself; for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that the virtue of abstinence is praised only on account of the other virtues. Therefore abstinence is not a special virtue. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Fide ad Pet. xlii) that the saints abstain from meat and drink, not that any creature of God is evil, but merely in order to chastise the body. Now this belongs to chastity, as its very name denotes. Therefore abstinence is not a special virtue distinct from chastity. Obj. 3: Further, as man should be content with moderate meat, so should he be satisfied with moderate clothes, according to 1 Tim. 6:8, Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we should be content. Now there is no special virtue in being content with moderate clothes. Neither, therefore, is there in abstinence which moderates food. On the contrary, Macrobius reckons abstinence as a special part of temperance. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 136, A. 1; Q. 141, A. 3) moral virtue maintains the good of reason against the onslaught of the passions: hence whenever we find a special motive why a passion departs from the good of reason, there is need of a special virtue. Now pleasures of the table are of a nature to withdraw man from the good of reason, both because they are so great, and because food is necessary to man who needs it for the maintenance of life, which he desires above all other things. Therefore abstinence is a special virtue. Reply Obj. 1: Virtues are of necessity connected together, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). Wherefore one virtue receives help and commendation from another, as justice from fortitude. Accordingly in this way the virtue of abstinence receives commendation on account of the other virtues. Reply Obj. 2: The body is chastised by means of abstinence, not only against the allurements of lust, but also against those of gluttony: since by abstaining a man gains strength for overcoming the onslaughts of gluttony, which increase in force the more he yields to them. Yet abstinence is not prevented from being a special virtue through being a help to chastity, since one virtue helps another.

Ad secundum dicendum quod per abstinentiam corpus castigatur non solum contra illecebram luxuriae, sed etiam contra illecebras gulae, quia dum homo abstinet, magis redditur fortis ad impugnationes gulae vincendas, quae tanto fortiores sunt quanto homo eis magis cedit. Et tamen non prohibetur abstinentiam esse specialem virtutem per hoc quod ad castitatem valet, quia una virtus ad aliam iuvat. Ad tertium dicendum quod usus vestimentorum Reply Obj. 3: The use of clothing was devised by art, est introductus ab arte, usus autem ciborum a natura. whereas the use of food is from nature. Hence it is more Et ideo magis debet esse virtus specialis circa modera- necessary to have a special virtue for the moderation of tionem ciborum quam circa moderationem vestimento- food than for the moderation of clothing. rum.

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Question 147 Fasting Deinde considerandum est de ieiunio. Et circa hoc We must now consider fasting: under which head there quaeruntur octo. are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum ieiunium sit actus virtutis. (1) Whether fasting is an act of virtue? Secundo, cuius virtutis sit actus. (2) Of what virtue is it the act? Tertio, utrum cadat sub praecepto. (3) Whether it is a matter of precept? Quarto, utrum aliqui excusentur ab observatione (4) Whether anyone is excused from fulfilling this huius praecepti. precept? Quinto, de tempore ieiunii. (5) The time of fasting; Sexto, utrum semel comedere requiratur ad (6) Whether it is requisite for fasting to eat but once? ieiunium. Septimo, de hora comestionis ieiunantium. (7) The hour of eating for those who fast; Octavo, de cibis a quibus debent abstinere. (8) The meats from which it is necessary to abstain.

Article 1 Whether fasting is an act of virtue? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ieiunium non sit actus virtutis. Omnis enim virtutis actus est Deo acceptus. Sed ieiunium non semper est Deo acceptum, secundum illud Isaiae LVIII, quare ieiunavimus, et non aspexisti? Ergo ieiunium non est actus virtutis. Praeterea, nullus actus virtutis recedit a medio virtutis. Sed ieiunium recedit a medio virtutis, quod quidem in virtute abstinentiae accipitur secundum hoc, ut subveniatur necessitati naturae, cui per ieiunium aliquid subtrahitur; alioquin non ieiunantes non haberent virtutem abstinentiae. Ergo ieiunium non est actus virtutis. Praeterea, illud quod communiter omnibus convenit, et bonis et malis, non est actus virtutis. Sed ieiunium est huiusmodi, quilibet enim, antequam comedat, ieiunus est. Ergo ieiunium non est actus virtutis. Sed contra est quod connumeratur aliis virtutum actibus, II ad Cor. VI, ubi apostolus dicit, in ieiuniis, in scientia, in castitate, et cetera. Respondeo dicendum quod ex hoc aliquis actus est virtuosus, quod per rationem ordinatur ad aliquod bonum honestum. Hoc autem convenit ieiunio. Assumitur enim ieiunium principaliter ad tria. Primo quidem, ad concupiscentias carnis comprimendas. Unde apostolus dicit, in auctoritate inducta, in ieiuniis, in castitate, quia per ieiunia castitas conservatur. Ut enim Hieronymus dicit, sine Cerere et Baccho friget Venus, idest, per abstinentiam cibi et potus tepescit luxuria. Secundo, assumitur ad hoc quod mens liberius elevetur ad sublimia

Objection 1: It would seem that fasting is not an act of virtue. For every act of virtue is acceptable to God. But fasting is not always acceptable to God, according to Isa. 58:3, Why have we fasted and Thou hast not regarded? Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue. Obj. 2: Further, no act of virtue forsakes the mean of virtue. Now fasting forsakes the mean of virtue, which in the virtue of abstinence takes account of the necessity of supplying the needs of nature, whereas by fasting something is retrenched therefrom: else those who do not fast would not have the virtue of abstinence. Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue. Obj. 3: Further, that which is competent to all, both good and evil, is not an act of virtue. Now such is fasting, since every one is fasting before eating. Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue. On the contrary, It is reckoned together with other virtuous acts (2 Cor 6:5, 6) where the Apostle says: In fasting, in knowledge, in chastity, etc. I answer that, An act is virtuous through being directed by reason to some virtuous (honestum) good. Now this is consistent with fasting, because fasting is practiced for a threefold purpose. First, in order to bridle the lusts of the flesh, wherefore the Apostle says (2 Cor 6:5, 6): In fasting, in chastity, since fasting is the guardian of chastity. For, according to Jerome Venus is cold when Ceres and Bacchus are not there, that is to say, lust is cooled by abstinence in meat and drink. Second, we have recourse to fasting in order that the mind may arise more freely to the contem-

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contemplanda. Unde dicitur Dan. X, quod post ieiunium trium hebdomadarum, revelationem accepit a Deo. Tertio, ad satisfaciendum pro peccatis. Unde dicitur Ioel II, convertimini ad me in toto corde vestro, in ieiunio et fletu et planctu. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, in quodam sermone de Orat. et Ieiun., ieiunium purgat mentem, sublevat sensum, carnem spiritui subiicit, cor facit contritum et humiliatum, concupiscentiae nebulas dispergit, libidinum ardores extinguit, castitatis vero lumen accendit. Unde patet quod ieiunium est actus virtutis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod contingit quod aliquis actus qui ex genere suo est virtuosus, ex aliquibus circumstantiis adiunctis redditur vitiosus. Unde ibidem dicitur, ecce in diebus ieiunii vestri invenitur voluntas vestra; et paulo post subditur, ad lites et contentiones ieiunatis, et percutitis pugno impie. Quod exponens Gregorius, in pastorali, dicit, voluntas ad laetitiam pertinet, pugnus ad iram. Incassum ergo per abstinentiam corpus atteritur, si inordinatis motibus dimissa mens vitiis dissipatur. Et Augustinus, in praedicto sermone, dicit quod ieiunium verbositatem non amat, divitias superfluitatem iudicat, superbiam spernit, humilitatem commendat, praestat homini seipsum intelligere, quod est infirmum et fragile. Ad secundum dicendum quod medium virtutis non accipitur secundum quantitatem, sed secundum rationem rectam, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ratio autem iudicat quod propter aliquam specialem causam aliquis homo minus sumat de cibo quam sibi competeret secundum statum communem, sicut propter infirmitatem vitandam, aut aliqua opera corporalia expeditius agenda. Et multo magis ratio recta hoc ordinat ad spiritualia mala vitanda et bona prosequenda. Non tamen ratio recta tantum de cibo subtrahit ut natura conservari non possit, quia, ut Hieronymus dicit, non differt utrum magno vel parvo tempore te interimas; et quod de rapina holocaustum offert qui vel ciborum nimia egestate, vel manducandi vel somni penuria, immoderate corpus affligit. Similiter etiam ratio recta non tantum de cibo subtrahit ut homo reddatur impotens ad debita opera peragenda, unde dicit Hieronymus quod rationalis homo dignitatem amittit qui ieiunium caritati, vel vigilias sensus integritati praefert. Ad tertium dicendum quod ieiunium naturae, quo quis dicitur ieiunus antequam comedat, consistit in pura negatione. Unde non potest poni actus virtutis, sed solum illud ieiunium quo quis, ex rationabili proposito, a cibis aliqualiter abstinet. Unde primum dicitur ieiunium ieiuni, secundum vero ieiunium ieiunantis, quasi ex proposito aliquid agentis.

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plation of heavenly things: hence it is related (Dan 10) of Daniel that he received a revelation from God after fasting for three weeks. Third, in order to satisfy for sins: wherefore it is written (Joel 2:12): Be converted to Me with all your heart, in fasting and in weeping and in mourning. The same is declared by Augustine in a sermon (De Orat. et Jejun.): Fasting cleanses the soul, raises the mind, subjects one’s flesh to the spirit, renders the heart contrite and humble, scatters the clouds of concupiscence, quenches the fire of lust, kindles the true light of chastity. Reply Obj. 1: An act that is virtuous generically may be rendered vicious by its connection with certain circumstances. Hence the text goes on to say: Behold in the day of your fast your own will is founded, and a little further on (Isa 58:4): You fast for debates and strife and strike with the fist wickedly. These words are expounded by Gregory (Pastor. iii, 19) as follows: The will indicates joy and the fist anger. In vain then is the flesh restrained if the mind allowed to drift to inordinate movements be wrecked by vice. And Augustine says (in the same sermon) that fasting loves not many words, deems wealth superfluous, scorns pride, commends humility, helps man to perceive what is frail and paltry.

Reply Obj. 2: The mean of virtue is measured not according to quantity but according to right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Now reason judges it expedient, on account of some special motive, for a man to take less food than would be becoming to him under ordinary circumstances, for instance in order to avoid sickness, or in order to perform certain bodily works with greater ease: and much more does reason direct this to the avoidance of spiritual evils and the pursuit of spiritual goods. Yet reason does not retrench so much from one’s food as to refuse nature its necessary support: thus Jerome says: It matters not whether thou art a long or a short time in destroying thyself, since to afflict the body immoderately, whether by excessive lack of nourishment, or by eating or sleeping too little, is to offer a sacrifice of stolen goods. In like manner right reason does not retrench so much from a man’s food as to render him incapable of fulfilling his duty. Hence Jerome says (in the same reference), Rational man forfeits his dignity, if he sets fasting before chastity, or night-watchings before the well-being of his senses. Reply Obj. 3: The fasting of nature, in respect of which a man is said to be fasting until he partakes of food, consists in a pure negation, wherefore it cannot be reckoned a virtuous act. Such is only the fasting of one who abstains in some measure from food for a reasonable purpose. Hence the former is called natural fasting (jejunium jejunii): while the latter is called the faster’s fast, because he fasts for a purpose.

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Q. 147, A. 2

Article 2 Whether fasting is an act of abstinence? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ieiunium non sit actus abstinentiae. Quia super illud Matth. XVII, hoc genus Daemoniorum etc., dicit Hieronymus, ieiunium est non solum ab escis, sed a cunctis illecebris abstinere. Sed hoc pertinet ad omnem virtutem. Ergo ieiunium non est actus specialiter abstinentiae. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in homilia Quadragesimae, quod ieiunium quadragesimale est decima totius anni. Sed dare decimas est actus religionis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo ieiunium est actus religionis, et non abstinentiae. Praeterea, abstinentia est pars temperantiae, ut dictum est. Temperantia autem contra fortitudinem dividitur, ad quam pertinet molestias sustinere, quod maxime videtur esse in ieiunio. Ergo ieiunium non est actus abstinentiae. Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit quod ieiunium est parsimonia victus, abstinentiaque ciborum. Respondeo dicendum quod eadem est materia habitus et actus. Unde omnis actus virtuosus qui est circa aliquam materiam, ad illam virtutem pertinet quae medium in illa materia constituit. Ieiunium autem attenditur in cibis, in quibus medium adinvenit abstinentia. Unde manifestum est quod ieiunium est abstinentiae actus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ieiunium proprie dictum consistit in abstinendo a cibis. Sed metaphorice dictum consistit in abstinendo a quibuslibet nocivis, quae maxime sunt peccata. Vel potest dici quod etiam ieiunium proprie dictum est abstinentia ab omnibus illecebris, quia per quaelibet vitia adiuncta desinit esse actus virtuosus, ut dictum est.

Objection 1: It would seem that fasting is not an act of abstinence. For Jerome commenting on Matt. 17:20, This kind of devil says: To fast is to abstain not only from food but also from all manner of lusts. Now this belongs to every virtue. Therefore fasting is not exclusively an act of abstinence. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says in a Lenten Homily (xvi in Evang.) that the Lenten fast is a tithe of the whole year. Now paying tithes is an act of religion, as stated above (Q. 87, A. 1). Therefore fasting is an act of religion and not of abstinence. Obj. 3: Further, abstinence is a part of temperance, as stated above (QQ. 143, 146, A. 1, ad 3). Now temperance is condivided with fortitude, to which it belongs to endure hardships, and this seems very applicable to fasting. Therefore fasting is not an act of abstinence. On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that fasting is frugality of fare and abstinence from food. I answer that, Habit and act have the same matter. Wherefore every virtuous act about some particular matter belongs to the virtue that appoints the mean in that matter. Now fasting is concerned with food, wherein the mean is appointed by abstinence. Wherefore it is evident that fasting is an act of abstinence. Reply Obj. 1: Properly speaking fasting consists in abstaining from food, but speaking metaphorically it denotes abstinence from anything harmful, and such especially is sin. We may also reply that even properly speaking fasting is abstinence from all manner of lust, since, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1), an act ceases to be virtuous by the conjunction of any vice. Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet acReply Obj. 2: Nothing prevents the act of one virtue tum unius virtutis pertinere ad aliam virtutem, secun- belonging to another virtue, insofar as it is directed to the dum quod ad eius finem ordinatur, ut ex supra dictis end of that virtue, as explained above (Q. 32, A. 1, ad 2; patet. Et secundum hoc, nihil prohibet ieiunium perti- Q. 85, A. 3). Accordingly there is no reason why fasting nere ad religionem vel ad castitatem, vel ad quamcum- should not be an act of religion, or of chastity, or of any que aliam virtutem. other virtue. Ad tertium dicendum quod ad fortitudinem, seReply Obj. 3: It belongs to fortitude as a special virtue, cundum quod est specialis virtus, non pertinet perferre to endure, not any kind of hardship, but only those conquascumque molestias, sed solum illas quae sunt circa nected with the danger of death. To endure hardships repericula mortis. Sufferre autem molestias quae sunt ex sulting from privation of pleasure of touch, belongs to temdefectu delectabilium tactus, pertinet ad temperantiam perance and its parts: and such are the hardships of fasting.

et ad partes eius. Et tales sunt molestiae ieiunii.

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Article 3 Whether fasting is a matter of precept? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ieiunium non sit in praecepto. Praecepta enim non dantur de operibus supererogationum, quae cadunt sub consilio. Sed ieiunium est opus supererogationis, alioquin, ubique et semper aequaliter esse observandum. Ergo ieiunium non cadit sub praecepto. Praeterea, quicumque transgreditur praeceptum peccat mortaliter. Si ergo ieiunium esset in praecepto, omnes non ieiunantes mortaliter peccarent. Per quod videretur magnus laqueus hominibus esse iniectus. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., quod ab ipsa Dei sapientia, homine assumpto, a quo in libertatem vocati sumus, pauca sacramenta saluberrima constituta sunt, quae societatem Christiani populi, hoc est sub uno Deo liberae multitudinis, continerent. Sed non minus videtur libertas populi Christiani impediri per multitudinem observantiarum quam per multitudinem sacramentorum, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro ad inquisitiones Ianuarii, quod quidam ipsam religionem nostram, quam manifestissimis et paucissimis celebrationum sacramentis Dei misericordia voluit esse liberam, servilibus premunt oneribus. Ergo videtur quod non debuit per Ecclesiam ieiunium sub praecepto institui. Sed contra est quod Hieronymus, ad Lucinum, dicit, de ieiuniis loquens, unaquaeque provincia abundet in suo sensu, et praecepta maiorum leges apostolicas arbitretur. Ergo ieiunium est in praecepto. Respondeo dicendum quod sicut ad saeculares principes pertinet praecepta legalia, iuris naturalis determinativa, tradere de his quae pertinent ad utilitatem communem in temporalibus rebus; ita etiam ad praelatos ecclesiasticos pertinet ea statutis praecipere quae ad utilitatem communem fidelium pertinent in spiritualibus bonis. Dictum est autem quod ieiunium utile est et ad deletionem et cohibitionem culpae, et ad elevationem mentis in spiritualia. Unusquisque autem ex naturali ratione tenetur tantum ieiuniis uti quantum sibi necessarium est ad praedicta. Et ideo ieiunium in communi cadit sub praecepto legis naturae. Sed determinatio temporis et modi ieiunandi secundum convenientiam et utilitatem populi Christiani, cadit sub praecepto iuris positivi quod est a praelatis Ecclesiae institutum. Et hoc est ieiunium Ecclesiae, aliud, naturae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ieiunium, secundum se consideratum, non nominat aliquid eligibile, sed quiddam poenale. Redditur autem eligibile secundum quod est utile ad finem aliquem. Et ideo, absolute consi-

Objection 1: It would seem that fasting is not a matter of precept. For precepts are not given about works of supererogation which are a matter of counsel. Now fasting is a work of supererogation: else it would have to be equally observed at all places and times. Therefore fasting is not a matter of precept. Obj. 2: Further, whoever infringes a precept commits a mortal sin. Therefore if fasting were a matter of precept, all who do not fast would sin mortally, and a widespreading snare would be laid for men. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 17) that the Wisdom of God having taken human nature, and called us to a state of freedom, instituted a few most salutary sacraments whereby the community of the Christian people, that is, of the free multitude, should be bound together in subjection to one God. Now the liberty of the Christian people seems to be hindered by a great number of observances no less than by a great number of sacraments. For Augustine says (Ad inquis. Januar., Ep. lv) that whereas God in His mercy wished our religion to be distinguished by its freedom and the evidence and small number of its solemn sacraments, some people render it oppressive with slavish burdens. Therefore it seems that the Church should not have made fasting a matter of precept. On the contrary, Jerome (Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi) speaking of fasting says: Let each province keep to its own practice, and look upon the commands of the elders as though they were laws of the apostles. Therefore fasting is a matter of precept. I answer that, Just as it belongs to the secular authority to make legal precepts which apply the natural law to matters of common weal in temporal affairs, so it belongs to ecclesiastical superiors to prescribe by statute those things that concern the common weal of the faithful in spiritual goods. Now it has been stated above (A. 1) that fasting is useful as atoning for and preventing sin, and as raising the mind to spiritual things. And everyone is bound by the natural dictate of reason to practice fasting as far as it is necessary for these purposes. Wherefore fasting in general is a matter of precept of the natural law, while the fixing of the time and manner of fasting as becoming and profitable to the Christian people, is a matter of precept of positive law established by ecclesiastical authority: the latter is the Church fast, the former is the fast prescribed by nature. Reply Obj. 1: Fasting considered in itself denotes something not eligible but penal: yet it becomes eligible insofar as it is useful to some end. Wherefore considered absolutely it is not binding under precept, but it is binding

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deratum, non est de necessitate praecepti, sed est de necessitate praecepti unicuique tali remedio indigenti. Et quia multitudo hominum ut plurimum indiget tali remedio, tum quia in multis omnes offendimus, ut dicitur Iac. III; tum etiam quia caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, ut dicitur Galat. V, conveniens fuit ut Ecclesia aliqua ieiunia statueret communiter ab omnibus observanda, non quasi praecepto subiiciens id quod simpliciter ad supererogationem pertinet, sed quasi in speciali determinans id quod est necessarium in communi. Ad secundum dicendum quod praecepta quae per modum communis statuti proponuntur, non eodem modo obligant omnes, sed secundum quod requiritur ad finem quem legislator intendit. Cuius auctoritatem si aliquis transgrediendo statutum contemnat; vel hoc modo transgrediatur quod impediatur finis quem intendit, peccat mortaliter talis transgressor. Si autem ex aliqua rationabili causa quis statutum non servet, praecipue in casu in quo etiam, si legislator adesset, non decerneret esse servandum, talis transgressio non constituit peccatum mortale. Et inde est quod non omnes qui omnino non servant ieiunia Ecclesiae, mortaliter peccant. Ad tertium dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de his quae neque sanctarum Scripturarum auctoritatibus continentur, nec in Conciliis episcoporum statuta inveniuntur, nec consuetudine universalis Ecclesiae roborata sunt. Ieiunia vero quae sunt in praecepto, sunt in Conciliis episcoporum statuta, et consuetudine universalis Ecclesiae roborata. Nec sunt contra libertatem populi fidelis, sed magis sunt utilia ad impediendum servitutem peccati, quae repugnat libertati spirituali; de qua dicitur, Galat. V, vos autem, fratres, in libertatem vocati estis, tantum, ne libertatem detis in occasionem carnis.

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under precept to each one that stands in need of such a remedy. And since men, for the most part, need this remedy, both because in many things we all offend (Jas 3:2), and because the flesh lusteth against the spirit (Gal 5:17), it was fitting that the Church should appoint certain fasts to be kept by all in common. In doing this the Church does not make a precept of a matter of supererogation, but particularizes in detail that which is of general obligation.

Reply Obj. 2: Those commandments which are given under the form of a general precept, do not bind all persons in the same way, but subject to the requirements of the end intended by the lawgiver. It will be a mortal sin to disobey a commandment through contempt of the lawgiver’s authority, or to disobey it in such a way as to frustrate the end intended by him: but it is not a mortal sin if one fails to keep a commandment, when there is a reasonable motive, and especially if the lawgiver would not insist on its observance if he were present. Hence it is that not all, who do not keep the fasts of the Church, sin mortally. Reply Obj. 3: Augustine is speaking there of those things that are neither contained in the authorities of Holy Scripture, nor found among the ordinances of bishops in council, nor sanctioned by the custom of the universal Church. On the other hand, the fasts that are of obligation are appointed by the councils of bishops and are sanctioned by the custom of the universal Church. Nor are they opposed to the freedom of the faithful, rather are they of use in hindering the slavery of sin, which is opposed to spiritual freedom, of which it is written (Gal 5:13): You, brethren, have been called unto liberty; only make not liberty an occasion to the flesh.

Article 4 Whether all are bound to keep the fasts of the Church? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes ad ieiunia Ecclesiae teneantur. Praecepta enim Ecclesiae obligant sicut Dei praecepta, secundum illud Lucae X, qui vos audit, me audit. Sed ad praecepta Dei servanda omnes tenentur. Ergo similiter omnes tenentur ad servanda ieiunia quae sunt ab Ecclesia instituta.

Objection 1: It would seem that all are bound to keep the fasts of the Church. For the commandments of the Church are binding even as the commandments of God, according to Luke 10:16, He that heareth you heareth Me. Now all are bound to keep the commandments of God. Therefore in like manner all are bound to keep the fasts appointed by the Church. Praeterea, maxime videntur excusari pueri a ieObj. 2: Further, children especially are seemingly not iunio, propter aetatem. Sed pueri non excusantur, dici- exempt from fasting, on account of their age: for it is written tur enim Ioel II, sanctificate ieiunium. Et postea sequitur, (Joel 2:15): Sanctify a fast, and further on (Joel 2:16): Gather congregate parvulos et sugentes ubera, ergo multo magis together the little ones, and them that suck the breasts. Much omnes alii ad ieiunia tenentur. more therefore are all others bound to keep the fasts.

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Praeterea, spiritualia sunt temporalibus praeferenda, et necessaria non necessariis. Sed opera corporalia ordinantur ad lucrum temporale, peregrinatio etiam, etsi ad spiritualia ordinetur, non est necessitatis. Cum ergo ieiunium ordinetur ad spiritualem utilitatem, et necessitatem habeat ex statuto Ecclesiae, videtur quod non sint ieiunia Ecclesiae praetermittenda propter peregrinationem vel corporalia opera.

Obj. 3: Further, spiritual things should be preferred to temporal, and necessary things to those that are not necessary. Now bodily works are directed to temporal gain; and pilgrimages, though directed to spiritual things, are not a matter of necessity. Therefore, since fasting is directed to a spiritual gain, and is made a necessary thing by the commandment of the Church, it seems that the fasts of the Church ought not to be omitted on account of a pilgrimage, or bodily works. Praeterea, magis est aliquid faciendum ex propria Obj. 4: Further, it is better to do a thing willingly than voluntate quam ex necessitate, ut patet per apostolum, II through necessity, as stated in 2 Cor. 9:7. Now the poor are ad Cor. IX. Sed pauperes solent ex necessitate ieiunare, wont to fast through necessity, owing to lack of food. Much propter defectum alimentorum. Ergo multo magis de- more therefore ought they to fast willingly.

bent ex propria voluntate ieiunare. Sed contra, videtur quod nullus iustus teneatur ieiunare. Praecepta enim Ecclesiae non obligant contra doctrinam Christi. Sed dominus dixit, Lucae V, quod non possunt filii sponsi ieiunare quandiu cum ipsis est sponsus. Est autem cum omnibus iustis, spiritualiter eos inhabitans, unde dominus dicit, Matth. ult., ecce, ego vobiscum sum usque ad consummationem saeculi. Ergo iusti ex statuto Ecclesiae non obligantur ad ieiunandum.

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, statuta communia proponuntur secundum quod multitudini conveniunt. Et ideo legislator in eis statuendis attendit id quod communiter et in pluribus accidit. Si quid autem ex speciali causa in aliquo inveniatur quod observantiae statuti repugnet, non intendit talem legislator, ad statuti observantiam obligare. In quo tamen est distinctio adhibenda. Nam si causa sit evidens, per seipsum licite potest homo statuti observantiam praeterire, praesertim consuetudine interveniente; vel si non posset de facili recursus ad superiorem haberi. Si vero causa sit dubia, debet aliquis ad superiorem recurrere qui habet potestatem in talibus dispensandi. Et hoc est observandum in ieiuniis ab Ecclesia institutis, ad quae omnes communiter obligantur, nisi in eis fuerit aliquod speciale impedimentum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praecepta Dei sunt praecepta iuris naturalis, quae secundum se sunt de necessitate salutis. Sed statuta Ecclesiae sunt de his quae non per se sunt de necessitate salutis, sed solum ex institutione Ecclesiae. Et ideo possunt esse aliqua impedimenta propter quae aliqui ad observanda ieiunia huiusmodi non tenentur. Ad secundum dicendum quod in pueris est maxime evidens causa non ieiunandi, tum propter debilitatem naturae, ex qua provenit quod indigent frequenti cibo, et non multo simul assumpto; tum etiam quia indigent multo nutrimento propter necessitatem augmenti, quod fit de residuo alimenti. Et ideo quandiu sunt in

On the contrary, It seems that no righteous man is bound to fast. For the commandments of the Church are not binding in opposition to Christ’s teaching. But our Lord said (Luke 5:34) that the children of the bridegroom cannot fast whilst the bridegroom is with them. Now He is with all the righteous by dwelling in them in a special manner, wherefore our Lord said (Matt 28:20): Behold I am with you . . . even to the consummation of the world. Therefore the righteous are not bound by the commandment of the Church to fast. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 90, A. 2; Q. 98, AA. 2, 6), general precepts are framed according to the requirements of the many. Wherefore in making such precepts the lawgiver considers what happens generally and for the most part, and he does not intend the precept to be binding on a person in whom for some special reason there is something incompatible with observance of the precept. Yet discretion must be brought to bear on the point. For if the reason be evident, it is lawful for a man to use his own judgment in omitting to fulfill the precept, especially if custom be in his favor, or if it be difficult for him to have recourse to superior authority. On the other hand, if the reason be doubtful, one should have recourse to the superior who has power to grant a dispensation in such cases. And this must be done in the fasts appointed by the Church, to which all are bound in general, unless there be some special obstacle to this observance. Reply Obj. 1: The commandments of God are precepts of the natural law, which are, of themselves, necessary for salvation. But the commandments of the Church are about matters which are necessary for salvation, not of themselves, but only through the ordinance of the Church. Hence there may be certain obstacles on account of which certain persons are not bound to keep the fasts in question. Reply Obj. 2: In children there is a most evident reason for not fasting, both on account of their natural weakness, owing to which they need to take food frequently, and not much at a time, and because they need much nourishment owing to the demands of growth, which results from the residuum of nourishment. Wherefore as long as

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statu augmenti, quod est ut in pluribus usque ad finem tertii septennii, non tenentur ad ecclesiastica ieiunia observanda. Conveniens tamen est ut etiam in hoc tempore se ad ieiunandum exerceant, plus vel minus, secundum modum suae aetatis. Quandoque tamen, magna tribulatione imminente, in signum poenitentiae arctioris, etiam pueris ieiunia indicuntur, sicut etiam de iumentis legitur Ionae III, homines et iumenta non gustent quidquam, nec aquam bibant. Ad tertium dicendum quod circa peregrinos et operarios distinguendum videtur. Quia si peregrinatio et operis labor commode differri possit aut diminui, absque detrimento corporalis salutis et exterioris status, qui requiritur ad conservationem corporalis vel spiritualis vitae, non sunt propter hoc Ecclesiae ieiunia praetermittenda. Si autem immineat necessitas statim peregrinandi et magnas diaetas faciendi; vel etiam multum laborandi, vel propter conservationem vitae corporalis, vel propter aliquid necessarium ad vitam spiritualem; et simul cum hoc non possunt Ecclesiae ieiunia observari, non obligatur homo ad ieiunandum; quia non videtur fuisse intentio Ecclesiae statuentis ieiunia, ut per hoc impediret alias pias et magis necessarias causas. Videtur tamen in talibus recurrendum esse ad superioris dispensationem, nisi forte ubi ita est consuetum; quia ex hoc ipso quod praelati dissimulant, videntur annuere. Ad quartum dicendum quod pauperes qui possunt sufficienter habere quod eis sufficiat ad unam comestionem, non excusantur propter paupertatem a ieiuniis Ecclesiae. A quibus tamen excusari videntur illi qui frustatim eleemosynas mendicant, qui non possunt simul habere quod eis ad victum sufficiat. Ad quintum dicendum quod illud verbum domini tripliciter potest exponi. Uno modo, secundum Chrysostomum, qui dicit quod discipuli, qui filii sponsi dicuntur, adhuc imbecillius dispositi erant, unde vestimento veteri comparantur, et ideo, in praesentia corporali Christi, erant magis fovendi in quadam dulcedine quam in austeritate ieiunii exercendi. Et secundum hoc, magis convenit ut cum imperfectis et novitiis in ieiuniis dispensetur quam cum antiquioribus et perfectis, ut patet in Glossa, super illud Psalmi, sicut ablactatus super matre sua. Alio modo potest dici, secundum Hieronymum, quod dominus ibi loquitur de ieiunio veterum observantiarum. Unde per hoc significat dominus quod apostoli non erant in veteribus observantiis detinendi, quos oportebat gratiae novitate perfundi. Tertio modo, secundum Augustinum, qui distinguit duplex ieiunium. Quorum unum pertinet ad humilitatem tribulationis. Et hoc non competit viris perfectis, qui dicuntur filii sponsi, unde ubi Lucas dicit, non possunt filii sponsi ieiunare, Matthaeus dicit, non possunt filii sponsi lugere. Aliud autem

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the stage of growth lasts, which as a rule lasts until they have completed the third period of seven years, they are not bound to keep the Church fasts: and yet it is fitting that even during that time they should exercise themselves in fasting, more or less, in accordance with their age. Nevertheless when some great calamity threatens, even children are commanded to fast, in sign of more severe penance, according to Jonah 3:7, Let neither men nor beasts . . . taste anything . . . nor drink water. Reply Obj. 3: Apparently a distinction should be made with regard to pilgrims and working people. For if the pilgrimage or laborious work can be conveniently deferred or lessened without detriment to the bodily health and such external conditions as are necessary for the upkeep of bodily or spiritual life, there is no reason for omitting the fasts of the Church. But if one be under the necessity of starting on the pilgrimage at once, and of making long stages, or of doing much work, either for one’s bodily livelihood, or for some need of the spiritual life, and it be impossible at the same time to keep the fasts of the Church, one is not bound to fast: because in ordering fasts the Church would not seem to have intended to prevent other pious and more necessary undertakings. Nevertheless, in such cases one ought seemingly, to seek the superior’s dispensation; except perhaps when the above course is recognized by custom, since when superiors are silent they would seem to consent. Reply Obj. 4: Those poor who can provide themselves with sufficient for one meal are not excused, on account of poverty, from keeping the fasts of the Church. On the other hand, those would seem to be exempt who beg their food piecemeal, since they are unable at any one time to have a sufficiency of food. Reply Obj. 5: This saying of our Lord may be expounded in three ways. First, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxx in Matth.), who says that the disciples, who are called children of the bridegroom, were as yet of a weakly disposition, wherefore they are compared to an old garment. Hence while Christ was with them in body they were to be fostered with kindness rather than drilled with the harshness of fasting. According to this interpretation, it is fitting that dispensations should be granted to the imperfect and to beginners, rather than to the elders and the perfect, according to a gloss on Ps. 130:2, As a child that is weaned is towards his mother. Second, we may say with Jerome that our Lord is speaking here of the fasts of the observances of the Old Law. Wherefore our Lord means to say that the apostles were not to be held back by the old observances, since they were to be filled with the newness of grace. Third, according to Augustine (De Consensu Evang. ii, 27), who states that fasting is of two kinds. One pertains to those who are humbled by disquietude, and this is not befitting perfect men, for they are called children of the bridegroom;

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est quod pertinet ad gaudium mentis in spiritualia su- hence when we read in Luke: The children of the bridegroom spensae. Et tale ieiunium convenit perfectis. cannot fast, we read in Matt. 9:15: The children of the bridegroom cannot mourn. The other pertains to the mind that rejoices in adhering to spiritual things: and this fasting is befitting the perfect.

Article 5 Whether the times for the Church fast are fittingly ascribed? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non determinentur convenienter tempora ieiunii ecclesiastici. Christus enim legitur, Matth. IV, statim post Baptismum ieiunium inchoasse. Sed nos Christum imitari debemus, secundum illud I ad Cor. IV, imitatores mei estote, sicut et ego Christi. Ergo et nos debemus ieiunium peragere statim post Epiphaniam, in qua Baptismus Christi celebratur. Praeterea, caeremonialia veteris legis non licet in nova lege observare. Sed ieiunia in quibusdam determinatis mensibus pertinent ad solemnitates veteris legis, dicitur enim Zach. VIII, ieiunium quarti, et ieiunium quinti, et ieiunium septimi, et ieiunium decimi erit domui Iudae in gaudium et laetitiam, et in solemnitates praeclaras. Ergo ieiunia specialium mensium, quae dicuntur quatuor temporum, inconvenienter in Ecclesia observantur. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, in libro de consensu Evang., sicut est ieiunium afflictionis, ita est ieiunium exultationis. Sed maxime exultatio spiritualis fidelibus imminet ex Christi resurrectione. Ergo in tempore quinquagesimae, in quo Ecclesia solemnizat propter dominicam resurrectionem, in diebus dominicalibus, in quibus memoria resurrectionis agitur, debent aliqua ieiunia indici. Sed contra est communis Ecclesiae consuetudo. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ieiunium ad duo ordinatur, scilicet ad deletionem culpae, et ad elevationem mentis in superna. Et ideo illis temporibus specialiter fuerunt ieiunia indicenda in quibus oportebat homines a peccato purgari, et mentem fidelium elevari in Deum per devotionem. Quod quidem praecipue imminet ante paschalem solemnitatem. In qua et culpae per Baptismum relaxantur, qui solemniter in vigilia Paschae celebratur, quando recolitur dominica sepultura, quia per Baptismum consepelimur Christo in mortem, ut dicitur Rom. VI. In festo etiam Paschae maxime oportet mentem hominis per devotionem elevari ad aeternitatis gloriam, quam Christus resurgendo inchoavit. Et ideo immediate ante solemnitatem paschalem Ecclesia statuit esse ieiunandum, et

Objection 1: It would seem that the times for the Church fast are unfittingly appointed. For we read (Matt 4) that Christ began to fast immediately after being baptized. Now we ought to imitate Christ, according to 1 Cor. 4:16, Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ. Therefore we ought to fast immediately after the Epiphany when Christ’s baptism is celebrated. Obj. 2: Further, it is unlawful in the New Law to observe the ceremonies of the Old Law. Now it belongs to the solemnities of the Old Law to fast in certain particular months: for it is written (Zech 8:19): The fast of the fourth month and the fast of the fifth, and the fast of the seventh, and the fast of the tenth shall be to the house of Judah, joy and gladness and great solemnities. Therefore the fast of certain months, which are called Ember days, are unfittingly kept in the Church. Obj. 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Consensu Evang. ii, 27), just as there is a fast of sorrow, so is there a fast of joy. Now it is most becoming that the faithful should rejoice spiritually in Christ’s Resurrection. Therefore during the five weeks which the Church solemnizes on account of Christ’s Resurrection, and on Sundays which commemorate the Resurrection, fasts ought to be appointed. On the contrary, stands the general custom of the Church. I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 3), fasting is directed to two things, the deletion of sin, and the raising of the mind to heavenly things. Wherefore fasting ought to be appointed specially for those times, when it behooves man to be cleansed from sin, and the minds of the faithful to be raised to God by devotion: and these things are particularly requisite before the feast of Easter, when sins are loosed by baptism, which is solemnly conferred on Eastereve, on which day our Lord’s burial is commemorated, because we are buried together with Christ by baptism unto death (Rom 6:4). Moreover at the Easter festival the mind of man ought to be devoutly raised to the glory of eternity, which Christ restored by rising from the dead, and so the Church ordered a fast to be observed immediately before the Paschal feast; and for the same reason, on the

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eadem ratione, in vigiliis praecipuarum festivitatum, in quibus praeparari nos oportet ad festa futura devote celebranda. Similiter etiam consuetudo ecclesiastica habet ut in singulis quartis anni sacri ordines conferantur (in cuius signum, dominus quatuor millia hominum de septem panibus satiavit, per quos significatur annus novi testamenti, ut Hieronymus dicit ibidem), ad quorum susceptionem oportet per ieiunium praeparari et eos qui ordinant, et illos qui ordinandi sunt, et etiam totum populum, pro cuius utilitate ordinantur. Unde et legitur, Lucae VI, quod dominus, ante discipulorum electionem, exivit in montem orare, quod exponens Ambrosius, dicit, quid te facere convenit cum vis aliquod officium pietatis adoriri quando Christus, missurus apostolos, prius oravit? Ratio autem numeri, quantum ad quadragesimale ieiunium, est triplex, secundum Gregorium. Prima quidem, quia virtus Decalogi per libros quatuor sancti Evangelii impletur, denarius autem quater ductus in quadragenarium surgit. Vel quia in hoc mortali corpore ex quatuor elementis subsistimus, per cuius voluntatem praeceptis dominicis contraimus, quae per Decalogum sunt accepta. Unde dignum est ut eandem carnem quaterdecies affligamus. Vel quia ita offerre contendimus Deo decimas dierum. Dum enim per trecentos et sexaginta dies annus ducitur, nos autem per triginta sex dies affligimur, qui sunt ieiunabiles in sex septimanis Quadragesimae, quasi anni nostri decimas Deo damus. Secundum autem Augustinum, additur quarta ratio. Nam creator est Trinitas, pater et filius et Spiritus Sanctus. Creaturae vero invisibili debetur ternarius numerus, diligere enim iubemur Deum ex toto corde, ex tota anima, ex tota mente. Creaturae vero visibili debetur quaternarius, propter calidum et frigidum, humidum et siccum. Sic ergo per denarium significantur omnes res, qui si ducatur per quaternarium, qui competit corpori, per quod administratio geritur, quadragesimum numerum conficit.

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eve of the chief festivals, because it is then that one ought to make ready to keep the coming feast devoutly. Again it is the custom in the Church for Holy Orders to be conferred every quarter of the year (in sign whereof our Lord fed four thousand men with seven loaves, which signify the New Testament year as Jerome says): and then both the ordainer, and the candidates for ordination, and even the whole people, for whose good they are ordained, need to fast in order to make themselves ready for the ordination. Hence it is related (Luke 6:12) that before choosing His disciples our Lord went out into a mountain to pray: and Ambrose commenting on these words says: What shouldst thou do, when thou desirest to undertake some pious work, since Christ prayed before sending His apostles?

With regard to the forty day’s fast, according to Gregory (Hom. xvi in Evang.) there are three reasons for the number. First, because the power of the Decalogue is accomplished in the four books of the Holy Gospels: since forty is the product of ten multiplied by four. Or because we are composed of four elements in this mortal body through whose lusts we transgress the Lord’s commandments which are delivered to us in the Decalogue. Wherefore it is fitting we should punish that same body forty times. Or, because, just as under the Law it was commanded that tithes should be paid of things, so we strive to pay God a tithe of days, for since a year is composed of three hundred and sixty-six days, by punishing ourselves for thirtysix days (namely, the fasting days during the six weeks of Lent) we pay God a tithe of our year. According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 16) a fourth reason may be added. For the Creator is the Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit: while the number three refers to the invisible creature, since we are commanded to love God, with our whole heart, with our whole soul, and with our whole mind: and the number four refers to the visible creature, by reason of heat, cold, wet and dry. Thus the number ten signifies all things, and if this be multiplied by four which refers to the body whereby we make use of things, we have the number forty. Singula vero ieiunia quatuor temporum tribus dieEach fast of the Ember days is composed of three days, bus continentur, propter numerum mensium qui com- on account of the number of months in each season: or on petit cuilibet tempori. Vel propter numerum sacrorum account of the number of Holy orders which are conferred ordinum, qui in his temporibus conferuntur. at these times. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus BaptiReply Obj. 1: Christ needed not baptism for His own smo non indiguit propter seipsum, sed ut nobis Bapti- sake, but in order to commend baptism to us. Wherefore smum commendaret. Et ideo sibi non competebat ut an- it was competent for Him to fast, not before, but after His te Baptismum suum ieiunaret, sed post Baptismum, ut baptism, in order to invite us to fast before our baptism.

nos invitaret ad ieiunandum ante nostrum Baptismum. Ad secundum dicendum quod Ecclesia non servat ieiunia quatuor temporum nec omnino eisdem temporibus quibus Iudaei, nec etiam propter causas easdem. Illi enim ieiunabant in Iulio, qui est quartus mensis ab Aprili, quem primum habent, quia tunc Moyses, descendens de monte Sina, tabulas legis confregit; et iuxta Ieremiam, muri primum rupti sunt civitatis. In quinto autem men-

Reply Obj. 2: The Church keeps the Ember fasts, neither at the very same time as the Jews, nor for the same reasons. For they fasted in July, which is the fourth month from April (which they count as the first), because it was then that Moses coming down from Mount Sinai broke the tables of the Law (Exod 32), and that, according to Jer. 39:2, the walls of the city were first broken through. In the fifth

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se, qui apud nos vocatur Augustus, cum propter exploratores seditio esset orta in populo, iussi sunt in montem non ascendere, et in hoc mense a Nabuchodonosor, et post a Tito, templum Hierosolymis est incensum. In septimo vero, qui appellatur October, Godolias occisus est, et reliquiae populi dissipatae. In decimo vero mense, qui apud nos Ianuarius dicitur, populus cum Ezechiele in captivitate positus, audivit templum esse subversum.

Ad tertium dicendum quod ieiunium exultationis ex instinctu spiritus sancti procedit, qui est spiritus libertatis. Et ideo hoc ieiunium sub praecepto cadere non debet. Ieiunia ergo quae praecepto Ecclesiae instituuntur, sunt magis ieiunia afflictionis, quae non conveniunt in diebus laetitiae. Propter quod, non est ieiunium ab Ecclesia institutum in toto paschali tempore, nec etiam in diebus dominicis. In quibus si quis ieiunaret, contra consuetudinem populi Christiani, quae, ut Augustinus dicit, est pro lege habenda; vel etiam ex aliquo errore, sicut Manichaei ieiunant quasi necessarium tale ieiunium arbitrantes, non essent a peccato immunes, quamvis ipsum ieiunium secundum se consideratum omni tempore sit laudabile, secundum quod Hieronymus dicit, ad Lucinum, utinam omni tempore ieiunare possimus.

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month, which we call August, they fasted because they were commanded not to go up on to the mountain, when the people had rebelled on account of the spies (Num 14): also in this month the temple of Jerusalem was burnt down by Nabuchodonosor (Jer 52) and afterwards by Titus. In the seventh month which we call October, Godolias was slain, and the remnants of the people were dispersed (Jer 51). In the tenth month, which we call January, the people who were with Ezechiel in captivity heard of the destruction of the temple (Ezek 4). Reply Obj. 3: The fasting of joy proceeds from the instigation of the Holy Spirit Who is the Spirit of liberty, wherefore this fasting should not be a matter of precept. Accordingly the fasts appointed by the commandment of the Church are rather fasts of sorrow which are inconsistent with days of joy. For this reason fasting is not ordered by the Church during the whole of the Paschal season, nor on Sundays: and if anyone were to fast at these times in contradiction to the custom of Christian people, which as Augustine declares (Ep. xxxvi) is to be considered as law, or even through some erroneous opinion (thus the Manichees fast, because they deem such fasting to be of obligation)— he would not be free from sin. Nevertheless fasting considered in itself is commendable at all times; thus Jerome wrote (Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi): Would that we might fast always.

Article 6 Whether it is requisite for fasting that one eat but once? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non requiratur ad ieiunium quod homo semel tantum comedat. Ieiunium enim, ut dictum est, est actus virtutis abstinentiae, quae quidem non minus observat debitam quantitatem cibi quam comestionis numerum. Non autem taxatur ieiunantibus quantitas cibi. Ergo nec numerus comestionis taxari debet. Praeterea, sicut homo nutritur cibo, ita et potu. Unde et potus ieiunium solvit, propter quod, post potum non possumus Eucharistiam accipere. Sed non est prohibitum quin pluries bibamus, diversis horis diei. Ergo etiam non debet esse prohibitum ieiunantibus quin pluries comedant. Praeterea, electuaria quidam cibi sunt. Quae tamen a multis in diebus ieiunii post comestionem sumuntur. Ergo unitas comestionis non est de ratione ieiunii. Sed in contrarium est communis consuetudo populi Christiani. Respondeo dicendum quod ieiunium ab Ecclesia instituitur ad concupiscentiam refrenandam, ita tamen quod natura salvetur. Ad hoc autem sufficere videtur

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not requisite for fasting that one eat but once. For, as stated above (A. 2), fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence, which observes due quantity of food not less than the number of meals. Now the quantity of food is not limited for those who fast. Therefore neither should the number of meals be limited. Obj. 2: Further, Just as man is nourished by meat, so is he by drink: wherefore drink breaks the fast, and for this reason we cannot receive the Eucharist after drinking. Now we are not forbidden to drink at various hours of the day. Therefore those who fast should not be forbidden to eat several times. Obj. 3: Further, digestives are a kind of food: and yet many take them on fasting days after eating. Therefore it is not essential to fasting to take only one meal. On the contrary, stands the common custom of the Christian people. I answer that, Fasting is instituted by the Church in order to bridle concupiscence, yet so as to safeguard nature. Now only one meal is seemingly sufficient for this pur-

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unica comestio, per quam homo potest et naturae satisfacere, et tamen concupiscentiae aliquid detrahit, diminuendo comestionum vices. Et ideo Ecclesiae moderatione statutum est ut semel in die a ieiunantibus comedatur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quantitas cibi non potuit eadem omnibus taxari, propter diversas corporum complexiones, ex quibus contingit quod unus maiori, alter minori indiget cibo. Sed ut plurimum omnes possunt naturae satisfacere per unicam comestionem. Ad secundum dicendum quod duplex est ieiunium. Unum quidem naturae quod requiritur ad Eucharistiae sumptionem. Et hoc solvitur per quemlibet potum, etiam aquae, post quem non licet Eucharistiam sumere. Est autem aliud ieiunium Ecclesiae, quod dicitur ieiunium ieiunantis. Et istud non solvitur nisi per ea quae Ecclesia interdicere intendit instituendo ieiunium. Non autem intendit Ecclesia interdicere abstinentiam potus, qui magis sumitur ad alterationem corporis et digestionem ciborum assumptorum quam ad nutritionem, licet aliquo modo nutriat. Et ideo licet pluries ieiunantibus bibere. Si autem quis immoderate potu utatur, potest peccare et meritum ieiunii perdere, sicut etiam si immoderate cibum in una comestione assumat. Ad tertium dicendum quod electuaria, etsi aliquo modo nutriant, non tamen principaliter assumuntur ad nutrimentum, sed ad digestionem ciborum. Unde non solvunt ieiunium, sicut nec aliarum medicinarum assumptio, nisi forte aliquis in fraudem electuaria in magna quantitate assumat per modum cibi.

Q. 147, A. 7

pose, since thereby man is able to satisfy nature; and yet he withdraws something from concupiscence by minimizing the number of meals. Therefore it is appointed by the Church, in her moderation, that those who fast should take one meal in the day. Reply Obj. 1: It was not possible to fix the same quantity of food for all, on account of the various bodily temperaments, the result being that one person needs more, and another less food: whereas, for the most part, all are able to satisfy nature by only one meal. Reply Obj. 2: Fasting is of two kinds. One is the natural fast, which is requisite for receiving the Eucharist. This is broken by any kind of drink, even of water, after which it is not lawful to receive the Eucharist. The fast of the Church is another kind and is called the fasting of the faster, and this is not broken save by such things as the Church intended to forbid in instituting the fast. Now the Church does not intend to command abstinence from drink, for this is taken more for bodily refreshment, and digestion of the food consumed, although it nourishes somewhat. It is, however, possible to sin and lose the merit of fasting, by partaking of too much drink: as also by eating immoderately at one meal.

Reply Obj. 3: Although digestives nourish somewhat they are not taken chiefly for nourishment, but for digestion. Hence one does not break one’s fast by taking them or any other medicines, unless one were to take digestives, with a fraudulent intention, in great quantity and by way of food.

Article 7 Whether the ninth hour is suitably fixed for the faster’s meal? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod hora nona non convenienter taxetur ad comedendum, his qui ieiunant. Status enim novi testamenti est perfectior quam status veteris testamenti. Sed in veteri testamento ieiunabant usque ad vesperam, dicitur enim Levit. XXIII, sabbatum est, affligetis animas vestras; et postea sequitur, a vespere usque ad vesperam celebrabitis sabbata vestra. Ergo multo magis in novo testamento ieiunium debet indici usque ad vesperam. Praeterea, ieiunium ab Ecclesia institutum omnibus imponitur. Sed non omnes possunt determinate cognoscere horam nonam. Ergo videtur quod taxatio horae nonae non debeat cadere sub statuto ieiunii. Praeterea, ieiunium est actus virtutis abstinentiae, ut supra dictum est. Sed virtus moralis non eodem modo accipit medium quoad omnes, quia quod est multum

Objection 1: It would seem that the ninth hour is not suitably fixed for the faster’s meal. For the state of the New Law is more perfect than the state of the Old Law. Now in the Old Testament they fasted until evening, for it is written (Lev 23:32): It is a sabbath . . . you shall afflict your souls, and then the text continues: From evening until evening you shall celebrate your sabbaths. Much more therefore under the New Testament should the fast be ordered until the evening. Obj. 2: Further, the fast ordered by the Church is binding on all. But all are not able to know exactly the ninth hour. Therefore it seems that the fixing of the ninth hour should not form part of the commandment to fast. Obj. 3: Further, fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence, as stated above (A. 2). Now the mean of moral virtue does not apply in the same way to all, since what is much for

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uni, est parum alteri, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo non debet ieiunantibus taxari hora nona. Sed contra est quod Concilium Cabillonense dicit, in Quadragesima nullatenus credendi sunt ieiunare qui ante manducaverint quam vespertinum celebretur officium, quod quadragesimali tempore post nonam dicitur. Ergo usque ad nonam est ieiunandum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ieiunium ordinatur ad deletionem et cohibitionem culpae. Unde oportet quod aliquid addat supra communem consuetudinem, ita tamen quod per hoc non multum natura gravetur. Est autem debita et communis consuetudo comedendi hominibus circa horam sextam, tum quia iam videtur esse completa digestio, nocturno tempore naturali calore interius revocato propter frigus noctis circumstans, et diffusio humoris per membra, cooperante ad hoc calore diei usque ad summum solis ascensum; tum etiam quia tunc praecipue natura corporis humani indiget iuvari contra exteriorem aeris calorem, ne humores interius adurantur. Et ideo, ut ieiunans aliquam afflictionem sentiat pro culpae satisfactione, conveniens hora comedendi taxatur ieiunantibus circa nonam. Convenit etiam ista hora mysterio passionis Christi, quae completa fuit hora nona, quando, inclinato capite, tradidit spiritum. Ieiunantes enim, dum suam carnem affligunt, passioni Christi conformantur, secundum illud Galat. V, qui Christi sunt, carnem suam crucifixerunt, cum vitiis et concupiscentiis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod status veteris testamenti comparatur nocti, status vero novi testamenti diei, secundum illud Rom. XIII, nox praecessit, dies autem appropinquavit. Et ideo in veteri testamento ieiunabant usque ad noctem, non autem in novo testamento. Ad secundum dicendum quod ad ieiunium requiritur hora determinata non secundum subtilem examinationem, sed secundum grossam aestimationem, sufficit enim quod sit circa horam nonam. Et hoc de facili quilibet cognoscere potest. Ad tertium dicendum quod modicum augmentum, vel etiam modicus defectus, non multum potest nocere. Non est autem magnum temporis spatium quod est ab hora sexta, in qua communiter homines comedere consueverunt, usque ad horam nonam, quae ieiunantibus determinatur. Et ideo talis taxatio temporis non multum potest alicui nocere, cuiuscumque conditionis existat. Vel, si forte propter infirmitatem vel aetatem aut aliquid huiusmodi, hoc eis in magnum gravamen cederet, esset cum eis in ieiunio dispensandum, vel ut aliquantulum praevenirent horam.

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one is little for another, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Therefore the ninth hour should not be fixed for those who fast. On the contrary, The Council of Chalons says: During Lent those are by no means to be credited with fasting who eat before the celebration of the office of Vespers, which in the Lenten season is said after the ninth hour. Therefore we ought to fast until the ninth hour. I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 3, 5), fasting is directed to the deletion and prevention of sin. Hence it ought to add something to the common custom, yet so as not to be a heavy burden to nature. Now the right and common custom is for men to eat about the sixth hour: both because digestion is seemingly finished (the natural heat being withdrawn inwardly at night-time on account of the surrounding cold of the night), and the humor spread about through the limbs (to which result the heat of the day conduces until the sun has reached its zenith), and again because it is then chiefly that the nature of the human body needs assistance against the external heat that is in the air, lest the humors be parched within. Hence, in order that those who fast may feel some pain in satisfaction for their sins, the ninth hour is suitably fixed for their meal. Moreover, this hour agrees with the mystery of Christ’s Passion, which was brought to a close at the ninth hour, when bowing His head, He gave up the ghost (John 19:30): because those who fast by punishing their flesh, are conformed to the Passion of Christ, according to Gal. 5:24, They that are Christ’s, have crucified their flesh with the vices and concupiscences. Reply Obj. 1: The state of the Old Testament is compared to the night, while the state of the New Testament is compared to the day, according to Rom. 13:12, The night is passed and the day is at hand. Therefore in the Old Testament they fasted until night, but not in the New Testament. Reply Obj. 2: Fasting requires a fixed hour based, not on a strict calculation, but on a rough estimate: for it suffices that it be about the ninth hour, and this is easy for anyone to ascertain. Reply Obj. 3: A little more or a little less cannot do much harm. Now it is not a long space of time from the sixth hour at which men for the most part are wont to eat, until the ninth hour, which is fixed for those who fast. Wherefore the fixing of such a time cannot do much harm to anyone, whatever his circumstances may be. If however this were to prove a heavy burden to a man on account of sickness, age, or some similar reason, he should be dispensed from fasting, or be allowed to forestall the hour by a little.

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Q. 147, A. 8

Article 8 Whether it is fitting that those who fast should be bidden to abstain from meat, eggs, and milk foods? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ieiunantibus indicatur abstinentia a carnibus et ovis et lacticiniis. Dictum est enim supra quod ieiunium est institutum ad concupiscentias carnis refrenandas. Sed magis concupiscentiam provocat potus vini quam esus carnium, secundum illud Prov. XX, luxuriosa res est vinum; et Ephes. V, nolite inebriari vino, in quo est luxuria. Cum ergo non interdicatur ieiunantibus potus vini, videtur quod non debeat interdici esus carnium. Praeterea, aliqui pisces ita delectabiliter comeduntur sicut quaedam animalium carnes. Sed concupiscentia est appetitus delectabilis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo in ieiunio, quod est institutum ad concupiscentiam refrenandam, sicut non interdicitur usus piscium, ita non debet interdici usus carnium. Praeterea, in quibusdam ieiuniorum diebus aliqui ovis et caseo utuntur. Ergo, pari ratione, in ieiunio quadragesimali talibus homo uti potest. Sed contra est communis fidelium consuetudo. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ieiunium ab Ecclesia est institutum ad reprimendas concupiscentias carnis. Quae quidem sunt delectabilium secundum tactum, quae consistunt in cibis et venereis. Et ideo illos cibos Ecclesia ieiunantibus interdixit qui et in comedendo maxime habent delectationem, et iterum maxime hominem ad venerea provocant. Huiusmodi autem sunt carnes animalium in terra quiescentium et respirantium, et quae ex eis procedunt, sicut lacticinia ex gressibilibus, et ova ex avibus. Quia enim huiusmodi magis conformantur humano corpori, plus delectant et magis conferunt ad humani corporis nutrimentum, et sic ex eorum comestione plus superfluit ut vertatur in materiam seminis, cuius multiplicatio est maximum incitamentum luxuriae. Et ideo ab his cibis praecipue ieiunantibus Ecclesia statuit esse abstinendum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad actum generationis tria concurrunt, scilicet calor, spiritus et humor. Ad calorem quidem maxime cooperatur vinum, et alia calefacientia corpus; ad spiritus autem videntur cooperari inflativa; sed ad humorem maxime cooperatur usus carnium, ex quibus multum de alimento generatur. Alteratio autem caloris et multiplicatio spirituum cito transit, sed substantia humoris diu manet. Et ideo magis interdicitur ieiunantibus usus carnium quam vini, vel leguminum, quae sunt inflativa. Ad secundum dicendum quod Ecclesia, ieiunium instituens, intendit ad id quod communius accidit. Esus

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that those who fast should be bidden to abstain from flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods. For it has been stated above (A. 6) that fasting was instituted as a curb on the concupiscence of the flesh. Now concupiscence is kindled by drinking wine more than by eating flesh; according to Prov. 20:1, Wine is a luxurious thing, and Eph. 5:18, Be not drunk with wine, wherein is luxury. Since then those who fast are not forbidden to drink wine, it seems that they should not be forbidden to eat flesh meat. Obj. 2: Further, some fish are as delectable to eat as the flesh of certain animals. Now concupiscence is desire of the delectable, as stated above (I-II, Q. 30, A. 1). Therefore since fasting which was instituted in order to bridle concupiscence does not exclude the eating of fish, neither should it exclude the eating of flesh meat. Obj. 3: Further, on certain fasting days people make use of eggs and cheese. Therefore one can likewise make use of them during the Lenten fast. On the contrary, stands the common custom of the faithful. I answer that, As stated above (A. 6), fasting was instituted by the Church in order to bridle the concupiscences of the flesh, which regard pleasures of touch in connection with food and sex. Wherefore the Church forbade those who fast to partake of those foods which both afford most pleasure to the palate, and besides are a very great incentive to lust. Such are the flesh of animals that take their rest on the earth, and of those that breathe the air and their products, such as milk from those that walk on the earth, and eggs from birds. For, since such like animals are more like man in body, they afford greater pleasure as food, and greater nourishment to the human body, so that from their consumption there results a greater surplus available for seminal matter, which when abundant becomes a great incentive to lust. Hence the Church has bidden those who fast to abstain especially from these foods. Reply Obj. 1: Three things concur in the act of procreation, namely, heat, spirit, and humor. Wine and other things that heat the body conduce especially to heat: flatulent foods seemingly cooperate in the production of the vital spirit: but it is chiefly the use of flesh meat which is most productive of nourishment, that conduces to the production of humor. Now the alteration occasioned by heat, and the increase in vital spirits are of short duration, whereas the substance of the humor remains a long time. Hence those who fast are forbidden the use of flesh meat rather than of wine or vegetables which are flatulent foods. Reply Obj. 2: In the institution of fasting, the Church takes account of the more common occurrences. Now, gen-

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autem carnium est magis delectabilis communiter quam esus piscium, quamvis in quibusdam aliter se habeat. Et ideo Ecclesia magis ieiunantibus prohibuit esum carnium quam esum piscium. Ad tertium dicendum quod ova et lacticinia ieiunantibus interdicuntur inquantum sunt animalibus exorta carnes habentibus. Unde principalius interdicuntur quam ova vel lacticinia. Similiter etiam inter alia ieiunia, solemnius est quadragesimale ieiunium, tum quia observatur ad imitationem Christi; tum etiam quia per ipsum disponimur ad redemptionis nostrae mysteria devote celebranda. Et ideo in quolibet ieiunio interdicitur esus carnium, in ieiunio autem quadragesimali interdicuntur universaliter etiam ova et lacticinia. Circa quorum abstinentiam in aliis ieiuniis diversae consuetudines existunt apud diversos, quas quisque observare debet, secundum morem eorum inter quos conversatur. Unde Hieronymus dicit, de ieiuniis loquens, unaquaeque provincia abundet in suo sensu, et praecepta maiorum leges apostolicas arbitretur.

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erally speaking, eating flesh meat affords more pleasure than eating fish, although this is not always the case. Hence the Church forbade those who fast to eat flesh meat, rather than to eat fish. Reply Obj. 3: Eggs and milk foods are forbidden to those who fast, for as much as they originate from animals that provide us with flesh: wherefore the prohibition of flesh meat takes precedence of the prohibition of eggs and milk foods. Again the Lenten fast is the most solemn of all, both because it is kept in imitation of Christ, and because it disposes us to celebrate devoutly the mysteries of our redemption. For this reason the eating of flesh meat is forbidden in every fast, while the Lenten fast lays a general prohibition even on eggs and milk foods. As to the use of the latter things in other fasts the custom varies among different people, and each person is bound to conform to that custom which is in vogue with those among whom he is dwelling. Hence Jerome says: Let each province keep to its own practice, and look upon the commands of the elders as though they were the laws of the apostles.

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Question 148 Gluttony Deinde considerandum est de gula. Et circa hoc We must now consider gluttony. Under this head there quaeruntur sex. are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum gula sit peccatum. (1) Whether gluttony is a sin? Secundo, utrum sit peccatum mortale. (2) Whether it is a mortal sin? Tertio, utrum sit maximum peccatorum. (3) Whether it is the greatest of sins? Quarto, de speciebus eius. (4) Its species; Quinto, utrum sit vitium capitale. (5) Whether it is a capital sin? Sexto, de filiabus eius. (6) Its daughters.

Article 1 Whether gluttony is a sin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gula non sit peccatum. Dicit enim dominus, Matth. XV, quod intrat in os, non coinquinat hominem. Sed gula est circa cibos, qui intrant in hominem. Cum ergo omne peccatum coinquinet hominem, videtur quod gula non sit peccatum. Praeterea, nullus peccat in eo quod vitare non potest. Sed gula consistit in immoderantia cibi, quam non potest homo vitare, dicit enim Gregorius, XXX Moral., quia per esum voluptas necessitati miscetur, quid necessitas petat, et quid voluptas suppetat, ignoratur; et Augustinus dicit, X Confess., quis est, domine, qui aliquantulum extra metas necessitatis cibum non sumit? Ergo gula non est peccatum. Praeterea, in quolibet genere peccati primus motus est peccatum. Sed primus motus sumendi cibum non est peccatum, alioquin fames et sitis essent peccata. Ergo gula non est peccatum. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, XXX Moral., quod ad conflictum spiritualis agonis non assurgitur, si non prius intra nosmetipsos hostis positus, gulae videlicet appetitus, edomatur. Sed interior hostis hominis est peccatum. Ergo gula est peccatum. Respondeo dicendum quod gula non nominat quemlibet appetitum edendi et bibendi, sed inordinatum. Dicitur autem appetitus inordinatus ex eo quod recedit ab ordine rationis, in quo bonum virtutis moralis consistit. Ex hoc autem dicitur aliquid esse peccatum quod virtuti contrariatur. Unde manifestum est quod gula est peccatum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod id quod intrat in hominem per modum cibi, secundum suam substantiam et naturam, non coinquinat hominem spiri-

Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a sin. For our Lord said (Matt 15:11): Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man. Now gluttony regards food which goes into a man. Therefore, since every sin defiles a man, it seems that gluttony is not a sin. Obj. 2: Further, No man sins in what he cannot avoid. Now gluttony is immoderation in food; and man cannot avoid this, for Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): Since in eating pleasure and necessity go together, we fail to discern between the call of necessity and the seduction of pleasure, and Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): Who is it, Lord, that does not eat a little more than necessary? Therefore gluttony is not a sin. Obj. 3: Further, in every kind of sin the first movement is a sin. But the first movement in taking food is not a sin, else hunger and thirst would be sinful. Therefore gluttony is not a sin. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18) that unless we first tame the enemy dwelling within us, namely our gluttonous appetite, we have not even stood up to engage in the spiritual combat. But man’s inward enemy is sin. Therefore gluttony is a sin. I answer that, Gluttony denotes, not any desire of eating and drinking, but an inordinate desire. Now desire is said to be inordinate through leaving the order of reason, wherein the good of moral virtue consists: and a thing is said to be a sin through being contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is evident that gluttony is a sin. Reply Obj. 1: That which goes into man by way of food, by reason of its substance and nature, does not defile a man spiritually. But the Jews, against whom our Lord is

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tualiter, sed Iudaei, contra quos dominus loquitur, et Manichaei opinabantur quod aliqui cibi immundos facerent, non propter figuram, sed secundum propriam naturam. Inordinata tamen ciborum concupiscentia hominem spiritualiter coinquinat. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vitium gulae non consistit in substantia cibi, sed in concupiscentia non regulata ratione. Et ideo si aliquis excedat in quantitate cibi non propter cibi concupiscentiam, sed aestimans id sibi necessarium esse, non pertinet hoc ad gulam, sed ad aliquam imperitiam. Sed hoc solum pertinet ad gulam, quod aliquis, propter concupiscentiam cibi delectabilis, scienter excedat mensuram in edendo. Ad tertium dicendum quod duplex est appetitus. Unus quidem naturalis, qui pertinet ad vires animae vegetabilis, in quibus non potest esse virtus et vitium, eo quod non possunt subiici rationi. Unde et vis appetitiva dividitur contra retentivam, digestivam, expulsivam. Et ad talem appetitum pertinet esuries et sitis. Est autem et alius appetitus sensitivus, in cuius concupiscentia vitium gulae consistit. Unde primus motus gulae importat inordinationem in appetitu sensitivo, quae non est sine peccato.

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speaking, and the Manichees deemed certain foods to make a man unclean, not on account of their signification, but by reason of their nature. It is the inordinate desire of food that defiles a man spiritually. Reply Obj. 2: As stated above, the vice of gluttony does not regard the substance of food, but in the desire thereof not being regulated by reason. Wherefore if a man exceed in quantity of food, not from desire of food, but through deeming it necessary to him, this pertains, not to gluttony, but to some kind of inexperience. It is a case of gluttony only when a man knowingly exceeds the measure in eating, from a desire for the pleasures of the palate. Reply Obj. 3: The appetite is twofold. There is the natural appetite, which belongs to the powers of the vegetal soul. In these powers virtue and vice are impossible, since they cannot be subject to reason; wherefore the appetitive power is differentiated from the powers of secretion, digestion, and excretion, and to it hunger and thirst are to be referred. Besides this there is another, the sensitive appetite, and it is in the concupiscence of this appetite that the vice of gluttony consists. Hence the first movement of gluttony denotes inordinateness in the sensitive appetite, and this is not without sin.

Article 2 Whether gluttony is a mortal sin? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gula non sit peccatum mortale. Omne enim peccatum mortale contrariatur alicui praecepto Decalogi. Quod de gula non videtur. Ergo gula non est peccatum mortale. Praeterea, omne peccatum mortale contrariatur caritati, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed gula non opponitur caritati, neque quantum ad dilectionem Dei, neque quantum ad dilectionem proximi. Ergo gula nunquam est peccatum mortale. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in sermone de Purgatorio, quoties aliquis in cibo aut potu plus accipit quam necesse est, ad minuta peccata noverit pertinere. Sed hoc pertinet ad gulam. Ergo gula computatur inter minuta, idest inter venialia peccata. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in XXX Moral., dominante gulae vitio, omne quod homines fortiter egerunt, perdunt, et dum venter non restringitur, simul cunctae virtutes obruuntur. Sed virtus non tollitur nisi per peccatum mortale. Ergo gula est peccatum mortale.

Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a mortal sin. For every mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Decalogue: and this, apparently, does not apply to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is not a mortal sin. Obj. 2: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as stated above (Q. 132, A. 3). But gluttony is not opposed to charity, neither as regards the love of God, nor as regards the love of one’s neighbor. Therefore gluttony is never a mortal sin. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory: Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is necessary, he should know that this is one of the lesser sins. But this pertains to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is accounted among the lesser, that is to say venial, sins. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): As long as the vice of gluttony has a hold on a man, all that he has done valiantly is forfeited by him: and as long as the belly is unrestrained, all virtue comes to naught. But virtue is not done away save by mortal sin. Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, viI answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the vice of gluttium gulae proprie consistit in concupiscentia inordina- tony properly consists in inordinate concupiscence. Now ta. Ordo autem rationis concupiscentiam ordinantis du- the order of reason in regulating the concupiscence may be pliciter tolli potest. Uno modo, quantum ad ea quae sunt considered from two points of view. First, with regard to

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ad finem, prout scilicet non sunt ita commensurata ut sint proportionata fini. Alio modo, quantum ad ipsum finem, prout scilicet concupiscentia hominem avertit a fine debito. Si ergo inordinatio concupiscentiae accipiatur in gula secundum aversionem a fine ultimo, sic gula erit peccatum mortale. Quod quidem contingit quando delectationi gulae inhaeret homo tanquam fini propter quem Deum contemnit, paratus scilicet contra praecepta Dei agere ut delectationes huiusmodi assequatur. Si vero in vitio gulae intelligatur inordinatio concupiscentiae tantum secundum ea quae sunt ad finem, utpote quia nimis concupiscit delectationes ciborum, non tamen ita quod propter hoc aliquid faceret contra legem Dei, est peccatum veniale. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vitium gulae habet quod sit peccatum mortale inquantum avertit a fine ultimo. Et secundum hoc, per quandam reductionem, opponitur praecepto de sanctificatione sabbati, in quo praecipitur quies in fine ultimo. Non enim omnia peccata mortalia directe contrariantur praeceptis Decalogi, sed solum illa quae iniustitiam continent, quia praecepta Decalogi specialiter pertinent ad iustitiam et partes eius, ut supra habitum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod, inquantum avertit a fine ultimo, contrariatur gula dilectioni Dei, qui est super omnia sicut finis ultimus diligendus. Et secundum hoc solum gula est peccatum mortale. Ad tertium dicendum quod illud verbum Augustini intelligitur de gula prout importat inordinationem concupiscentiae solum circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Ad quartum dicendum quod gula dicitur virtutes auferre non tam propter se, quam etiam propter vitia quae ex ea oriuntur. Dicit enim Gregorius, in pastorali, dum venter ingluvie tenditur, virtutes animae per luxuriam destruuntur.

Q. 148, A. 3

things directed to the end, inasmuch as they may be incommensurate and consequently improportionate to the end; second, with regard to the end itself, inasmuch as concupiscence turns man away from his due end. Accordingly, if the inordinate concupiscence in gluttony be found to turn man away from the last end, gluttony will be a mortal sin. This is the case when he adheres to the pleasure of gluttony as his end, for the sake of which he contemns God, being ready to disobey God’s commandments, in order to obtain those pleasures. On the other hand, if the inordinate concupiscence in the vice of gluttony be found to affect only such things as are directed to the end, for instance when a man has too great a desire for the pleasures of the palate, yet would not for their sake do anything contrary to God’s law, it is a venial sin. Reply Obj. 1: The vice of gluttony becomes a mortal sin by turning man away from his last end: and accordingly, by a kind of reduction, it is opposed to the precept of hallowing the sabbath, which commands us to rest in our last end. For mortal sins are not all directly opposed to the precepts of the Decalogue, but only those which contain injustice: because the precepts of the Decalogue pertain specially to justice and its parts, as stated above (Q. 122, A. 1). Reply Obj. 2: insofar as it turns man away from his last end, gluttony is opposed to the love of God, who is to be loved, as our last end, above all things: and only in this respect is gluttony a mortal sin. Reply Obj. 3: This saying of Augustine refers to gluttony as denoting inordinate concupiscence merely in regard of things directed to the end. Reply Obj. 4: Gluttony is said to bring virtue to naught, not so much on its own account, as on account of the vices which arise from it. For Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19): When the belly is distended by gluttony, the virtues of the soul are destroyed by lust.

Article 3 Whether gluttony is the greatest of sins? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod gula sit maximum peccatorum. Magnitudo enim peccati ex magnitudine poenae consideratur. Sed peccatum gulae est gravissime punitum, dicit enim Chrysostomus, Adam incontinentia ventris expulit a Paradiso; diluvium quod fuit tempore Noe, ipsa fecit; secundum illud Ezech. XVI, haec fuit iniquitas Sodomae, sororis tuae, saturitas panis, et cetera. Ergo peccatum gulae est maximum. Praeterea, causa in quolibet genere est potior. Sed gula videtur esse causa aliorum peccatorum, quia super illud Psalmi, qui percussit Aegyptum cum primogeni-

Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is the greatest of sins. For the grievousness of a sin is measured by the grievousness of the punishment. Now the sin of gluttony is most grievously punished, for Chrysostom says: Gluttony turned Adam out of Paradise, gluttony it was that drew down the deluge at the time of Noah. According to Ezech. 16:49, This was the iniquity of Sodom, thy sister . . . fullness of bread, etc. Therefore the sin of gluttony is the greatest of all. Obj. 2: Further, in every genus the cause is the most powerful. Now gluttony is apparently the cause of other sins, for a gloss on Ps. 135:10, Who smote Egypt with their

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tis eorum, dicit Glossa, luxuria, concupiscentia, superbia sunt ea quae venter generat. Ergo gula est gravissimum peccatorum. Praeterea, post Deum, homo debet seipsum maxime diligere, ut supra habitum est. Sed per vitium gulae homo infert sibi ipsi nocumentum, dicitur enim Eccli. XXXVII, propter crapulam multi obierunt. Ergo gula est maximum peccatorum, ad minus praeter peccata quae sunt contra Deum. Sed contra est quod vitia carnalia, inter quae computatur gula, secundum Gregorium, sunt minoris culpae. Respondeo dicendum quod gravitas alicuius peccati potest considerari tripliciter. Primo quidem, et principaliter, secundum materiam in qua peccatur. Et secundum hoc, peccata quae sunt circa res divinas sunt maxima. Unde secundum hoc, vitium gulae non erit maximum, est enim circa ea quae ad sustentationem corporis spectant. Secundo autem, ex parte peccantis. Et secundum hoc, peccatum gulae magis alleviatur quam aggravatur. Tum propter necessitatem sumptionis ciborum. Tum etiam propter difficultatem discernendi et moderandi id quod in talibus convenit. Tertio vero modo, ex parte effectus consequentis. Et secundum hoc, vitium gulae habet quandam magnitudinem, inquantum ex ea occasionantur diversa peccata. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illae poenae magis referuntur ad vitia quae sunt consecuta ex gula, vel ad gulae radicem, quam ad ipsam gulam. Nam primus homo expulsus est de Paradiso propter superbiam, ex qua processit ad actum gulae. Diluvium autem et poena Sodomorum sunt inducta propter peccata luxuriae praecedentia, ex gula occasionata. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit ex parte peccatorum quae ex gula oriuntur. Non autem oportet quod causa sit potior, nisi in causis per se. Gula autem non est causa illorum vitiorum per se, sed quasi per accidens et per occasionem. Ad tertium dicendum quod gulosus non intendit suo corpori nocumentum inferre, sed in cibo delectari, si autem nocumentum corporis sequatur, hoc est per accidens. Unde hoc non directe pertinet ad gravitatem gulae. Cuius tamen culpa aggravatur si quis corporale detrimentum incurrat propter immoderatam cibi sumptionem.

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first-born, says: Lust, concupiscence, pride are the first-born of gluttony. Therefore gluttony is the greatest of sins. Obj. 3: Further, man should love himself in the first place after God, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 4). Now man, by the vice of gluttony, inflicts an injury on himself: for it is written (Sir 37:34): By surfeiting many have perished. Therefore gluttony is the greatest of sins, at least excepting those that are against God. On the contrary, The sins of the flesh, among which gluttony is reckoned, are less culpable according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii). I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be measured in three ways. First and foremost it depends on the matter in which the sin is committed: and in this way sins committed in connection with Divine things are the greatest. From this point of view gluttony is not the greatest sin, for it is about matters connected with the nourishment of the body. Second, the gravity of a sin depends on the person who sins, and from this point of view the sin of gluttony is diminished rather than aggravated, both on account of the necessity of taking food, and on account of the difficulty of proper discretion and moderation in such matters. Third, from the point of view of the result that follows, and in this way gluttony has a certain gravity, inasmuch as certain sins are occasioned thereby. Reply Obj. 1: These punishments are to be referred to the vices that resulted from gluttony, or to the root from which gluttony sprang, rather than to gluttony itself. For the first man was expelled from Paradise on account of pride, from which he went on to an act of gluttony: while the deluge and the punishment of the people of Sodom were inflicted for sins occasioned by gluttony. Reply Obj. 2: This objection argues from the standpoint of the sins that result from gluttony. Nor is a cause necessarily more powerful, unless it be a direct cause: and gluttony is not the direct cause but the accidental cause, as it were, and the occasion of other vices. Reply Obj. 3: The glutton intends, not the harm to his body, but the pleasure of eating: and if injury results to his body, this is accidental. Hence this does not directly affect the gravity of gluttony, the guilt of which is nevertheless aggravated, if a man incur some bodily injury through taking too much food.

Article 4 Whether the species of gluttony are fittingly distinguished? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inObjection 1: It seems that the species of gluttony are convenienter species gulae distinguantur a Gregorio, unfittingly distinguished by Gregory who says (Moral. xxx, qui, XXX Moral., dicit. Quinque modis nos gulae vitium 18): The vice of gluttony tempts us in five ways. Sometimes

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tentat, aliquando namque indigentiae tempora praevenit; aliquando lautiores cibos quaerit; aliquando quae sumenda sunt praeparari accuratius appetit; aliquando in ipsa quantitate sumendi mensuram refectionis excedit; aliquando ipso aestu immensi desiderii aliquis peccat. Et continentur in hoc versu, praepropere, laute, nimis, ardenter, studiose. Praedicta enim diversificantur secundum diversas circumstantias. Sed circumstantiae, cum sint accidentia actuum, non diversificant speciem. Ergo secundum praedicta non diversificantur species gulae. Praeterea, sicut tempus est quaedam circumstantia, ita et locus. Si ergo secundum tempus una species gulae accipitur, videtur quod, pari ratione, secundum locum et alias circumstantias. Praeterea, sicut temperantia observat debitas circumstantias, ita etiam et aliae virtutes morales. Sed in vitiis quae opponuntur aliis virtutibus moralibus non distinguuntur species secundum diversas circumstantias. Ergo nec in gula. Sed contra est verbum Gregorii inductum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, gula importat inordinatam concupiscentiam edendi. In esu autem duo considerantur, scilicet ipse cibus qui comeditur, et eius comestio. Potest ergo inordinatio concupiscentiae attendi dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, quantum ad ipsum cibum qui sumitur. Et sic, quantum ad substantiam vel speciem cibi, quaerit aliquis cibos lautos, idest pretiosos; quantum ad qualitatem, quaerit cibos nimis accurate praeparatos, quod est studiose; quantum autem ad quantitatem, excedit in nimis edendo. Alio vero modo attenditur inordinatio concupiscentiae quantum ad ipsam sumptionem cibi, vel quia praevenit tempus debitum comedendi, quod est praepropere; vel quia non servat modum debitum in edendo, quod est ardenter. Isidorus vero comprehendit primum et secundum sub uno, dicens quod gulosus excedit in cibo secundum quid, quantum, quomodo et quando. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod corruptio diversarum circumstantiarum facit diversas species gulae propter diversa motiva, ex quibus moralium species diversificantur. In eo enim qui quaerit lautos cibos, excitatur concupiscentia ex ipsa specie cibi in eo vero qui praeoccupat tempus, deordinatur concupiscentia propter impatientiam morae; et idem patet in aliis. Ad secundum dicendum quod in loco et in aliis circumstantiis non invenitur aliud differens motivum pertinens ad usum cibi, quod faciat aliam speciem gulae. Ad tertium dicendum quod in quibuscumque aliis vitiis diversae circumstantiae habent diversa motiva, oportet accipi diversas species vitiorum secundum di-

Q. 148, A. 4

it forestalls the hour of need; sometimes it seeks costly meats; sometimes it requires the food to be daintily cooked; sometimes it exceeds the measure of refreshment by taking too much; sometimes we sin by the very heat of an immoderate appetite—which are contained in the following verse: Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily. For the above are distinguished according to diversity of circumstance. Now circumstances, being the accidents of an act, do not differentiate its species. Therefore the species of gluttony are not distinguished according to the aforesaid. Obj. 2: Further, as time is a circumstance, so is place. If then gluttony admits of one species in respect of time, it seems that there should likewise be others in respect of place and other circumstances. Obj. 3: Further, just as temperance observes due circumstances, so do the other moral virtues. Now the species of the vices opposed to the other moral virtues are not distinguished according to various circumstances. Neither, therefore, are the species of gluttony distinguished thus. On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory quoted above. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), gluttony denotes inordinate concupiscence in eating. Now two things are to be considered in eating, namely the food we eat, and the eating thereof. Accordingly, the inordinate concupiscence may be considered in two ways. First, with regard to the food consumed: and thus, as regards the substance or species of food a man seeks sumptuous—i.e., costly food; as regards its quality, he seeks food prepared too nicely—i.e., daintily; and as regards quantity, he exceeds by eating too much. Second, the inordinate concupiscence is considered as to the consumption of food: either because one forestalls the proper time for eating, which is to eat hastily, or one fails to observe the due manner of eating, by eating greedily. Isidore comprises the first and second under one heading, when he says that the glutton exceeds in what he eats, or in how much, how or when he eats. Reply Obj. 1: The corruption of various circumstances causes the various species of gluttony, on account of the various motives, by reason of which the species of moral things are differentiated. For in him that seeks sumptuous food, concupiscence is aroused by the very species of the food; in him that forestalls the time concupiscence is disordered through impatience of delay, and so forth. Reply Obj. 2: Place and other circumstances include no special motive connected with eating, that can cause a different species of gluttony. Reply Obj. 3: In all other vices, whenever different circumstances correspond to different motives, the difference of circumstances argues a specific difference of vice: but this

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versas circumstantias. Sed hoc non contingit in omni- does not apply to all circumstances, as stated above (I-II, bus, ut dictum est. Q. 72, A. 9).

Article 5 Whether gluttony is a capital vice? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gula non sit vitium capitale. Vitia enim capitalia dicuntur ex quibus alia oriuntur secundum rationem causae finalis. Sed cibus, circa quem est gula, non habet rationem finis, non enim propter se quaeritur, sed propter corporis nutritionem. Ergo gula non est vitium capitale. Praeterea, vitium capitale aliquam principalitatem habere videtur in ratione peccati. Sed hoc non competit gulae, quae videtur esse secundum suum genus minimum peccatorum, utpote plus appropinquans ad id quod est secundum naturam. Ergo gula non videtur esse vitium capitale. Praeterea, peccatum contingit ex hoc quod aliquis recedit a bono honesto propter aliquid utile praesenti vitae, vel delectabile sensui. Sed circa bona quae habent rationem utilis, ponitur unum tantum vitium capitale, scilicet avaritia. Ergo et circa delectationes videtur esse ponendum unum tantum vitium capitale. Ponitur autem luxuria, quae est maius vitium quam gula, et circa maiores delectationes. Ergo gula non est vitium capitale. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., computat gulam inter vitia capitalia. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, vitium capitale dicitur ex quo alia vitia oriuntur secundum rationem causae finalis, inquantum scilicet habet finem multum appetibilem, unde ex eius appetitu homines provocantur multipliciter ad peccandum. Ex hoc autem aliquis finis redditur multum appetibilis quod habet aliquam de conditionibus felicitatis, quae est naturaliter appetibilis. Pertinet autem ad rationem felicitatis delectatio, ut patet in I et X Ethic. Et ideo vitium gulae, quod est circa delectationes tactus, quae sunt praecipuae inter alias, convenienter ponitur inter vitia capitalia. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ipse cibus ordinatur quidem ad aliquid sicut ad finem, sed quia ille finis, scilicet conservatio vitae, est maxime appetibilis, quae sine cibo conservari non potest, inde etiam est quod ipse cibus est maxime appetibilis; et ad hoc fere totus labor humanae vitae ordinatur, secundum illud Eccle. VI, omnis labor hominis in ore eius. Et tamen gula magis videtur esse circa delectationes cibi quam circa cibos. Propter quod, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., quibus vilis est corporis salus, malunt vesci, in quo scilicet est delectatio, quam saturari, cum omnis finis illius voluptatis sit non sitire atque esurire.

Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a capital vice. For capital vices denote those whence, under the aspect of final cause, other vices originate. Now food, which is the matter of gluttony, has not the aspect of end, since it is sought, not for its own sake, but for the body’s nourishment. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice. Obj. 2: Further, a capital vice would seem to have a certain pre-eminence in sinfulness. But this does not apply to gluttony, which, in respect of its genus, is apparently the least of sins, seeing that it is most akin to what is. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice. Obj. 3: Further, sin results from a man forsaking the good of virtue on account of something useful to the present life, or pleasing to the senses. Now as regards goods having the aspect of utility, there is but one capital vice, namely covetousness. Therefore, seemingly, there would be but one capital vice in respect of pleasures: and this is lust, which is a greater vice than gluttony, and is about greater pleasures. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice. On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons gluttony among the capital vices. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 3), a capital vice denotes one from which, considered as final cause, i.e., as having a most desirable end, other vices originate: wherefore through desiring that end men are incited to sin in many ways. Now an end is rendered most desirable through having one of the conditions of happiness which is desirable by its very nature: and pleasure is essential to happiness, according to Ethic. i, 8; x, 3, 7, 8. Therefore the vice of gluttony, being about pleasures of touch which stand foremost among other pleasures, is fittingly reckoned among the capital vices. Reply Obj. 1: It is true that food itself is directed to something as its end: but since that end, namely the sustaining of life, is most desirable and whereas life cannot be sustained without food, it follows that food too is most desirable: indeed, nearly all the toil of man’s life is directed thereto, according to Eccles. 6:7, All the labor of man is for his mouth. Yet gluttony seems to be about pleasures of food rather than about food itself; wherefore, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. liii), with such food as is good for the worthless body, men desire to be fed, wherein namely the pleasure consists, rather than to be filled: since the whole end of that desire is this—not to thirst and not to hunger.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod finis in peccato accipitur ex parte conversionis, sed gravitas peccati accipitur ex parte aversionis. Et ideo non oportet vitium capitale, quod habet finem maxime appetibilem, habere magnam gravitatem. Ad tertium dicendum quod delectabile est appetibile secundum se. Et ideo secundum eius diversitatem ponuntur duo vitia capitalia, scilicet gula et luxuria. Utile autem non habet ex se rationem appetibilis, sed secundum quod ad aliud ordinatur. Et ideo in omnibus utilibus videtur esse una ratio appetibilitatis. Et propter hoc circa huiusmodi non ponitur nisi unum vitium capitale.

Q. 148, A. 6

Reply Obj. 2: In sin the end is ascertained with respect to the conversion, while the gravity of sin is determined with regard to the aversion. Wherefore it does not follow that the capital sin which has the most desirable end surpasses the others in gravity. Reply Obj. 3: That which gives pleasure is desirable in itself: and consequently corresponding to its diversity there are two capital vices, namely gluttony and lust. On the other hand, that which is useful is desirable, not in itself, but as directed to something else: wherefore seemingly in all useful things there is one aspect of desirability. Hence there is but one capital vice, in respect of such things.

Article 6 Whether daughters are fittingly assigned to gluttony? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter assignentur gulae quinque filiae, scilicet inepta laetitia, scurrilitas, immunditia, multiloquium, hebetudo mentis circa intelligentiam. Inepta enim laetitia consequitur omne peccatum, secundum illud Prov. II, qui laetantur cum male fecerint, et exultant in rebus pessimis. Similiter etiam hebetudo mentis invenitur in omni peccato, secundum illud Prov. XIV, errant qui operantur malum. Ergo inconvenienter ponuntur filiae gulae. Praeterea, immunditia, quae maxime consequitur gulam, videtur ad vomitum pertinere, secundum illud Isaiae XXVIII, omnes mensae repletae sunt vomitu sordium. Sed hoc non videtur esse peccatum, sed poena, vel etiam aliquid utile sub consilio cadens, secundum illud Eccli. XXXI, si coactus fueris in edendo multum, surge e medio et vome, et refrigerabit te. Ergo non debet poni inter filias gulae. Praeterea, Isidorus ponit scurrilitatem filiam luxuriae. Non ergo debet poni inter filias gulae. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., has filias gulae assignat. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, gula proprie consistit circa immoderatam delectationem quae est in cibis et potibus. Et ideo illa vitia inter filias gulae computantur quae ex immoderata delectatione cibi et potus consequuntur. Quae quidem possunt accipi vel ex parte animae, vel ex parte corporis. Ex parte autem animae, quadrupliciter. Primo quidem, quantum ad rationem, cuius acies hebetatur ex immoderantia cibi et potus. Et quantum ad hoc, ponitur filia gulae hebetudo sensus circa intelligentiam, propter fumositates ciborum perturbantes caput. Sicut et e contrario abstinentia confert ad sapientiae perceptionem, secundum illud Eccle. II, cogitavi in corde meo abstrahere a vino

Objection 1: It would seem that daughters are unfittingly assigned to gluttony, to wit, unseemly joy, scurrility, uncleanness, loquaciousness, and dullness of mind as regards the understanding. For unseemly joy results from every sin, according to Prov. 2:14, Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things. Likewise dullness of mind is associated with every sin, according to Prov. 14:22, They err that work evil. Therefore they are unfittingly reckoned to be daughters of gluttony. Obj. 2: Further, the uncleanness which is particularly the result of gluttony would seem to be connected with vomiting, according to Isa. 28:8, All tables were full of vomit and filth. But this seems to be not a sin but a punishment; or even a useful thing that is a matter of counsel, according to Ecclus. 31:25, If thou hast been forced to eat much, arise, go out, and vomit; and it shall refresh thee. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony. Obj. 3: Further, Isidore (QQ. in Deut. xvi) reckons scurrility as a daughter of lust. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony. On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to gluttony. I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 2, 3), gluttony consists properly in an immoderate pleasure in eating and drinking. Wherefore those vices are reckoned among the daughters of gluttony, which are the results of eating and drinking immoderately. These may be accounted for either on the part of the soul or on the part of the body. On the part of the soul these results are of four kinds. First, as regards the reason, whose keenness is dulled by immoderate meat and drink, and in this respect we reckon as a daughter of gluttony, dullness of sense in the understanding, on account of the fumes of food disturbing the brain. Even so, on the other hand, abstinence conduces to the penetrating power of wisdom, according to Eccles. 2:3, I thought

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carnem meam, ut animum meum transferrem ad sapientiam. Secundo, quantum ad appetitum, qui multipliciter deordinatur per immoderantiam cibi et potus, quasi sopito gubernaculo rationis. Et quantum ad hoc, ponitur inepta laetitia, quia omnes aliae inordinatae passiones ad laetitiam et tristitiam ordinantur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Et hoc est quod dicitur III Esdrae III, quod vinum omnem mentem convertit in securitatem et iucunditatem. Tertio, quantum ad inordinatum verbum. Et sic ponitur multiloquium, quia, ut Gregorius dicit, in pastorali, nisi gulae deditos immoderata loquacitas raperet, dives ille qui epulatus quotidie splendide dicitur, in lingua gravius non arderet. Quarto, quantum ad inordinatum actum. Et sic ponitur scurrilitas, idest iocularitas quaedam proveniens ex defectu rationis, quae, sicut non potest cohibere verba, ita non potest cohibere exteriores gestus. Unde Ephes. V, super illud, aut stultiloquium aut scurrilitas, dicit Glossa, quae a stultis curialitas dicitur, idest iocularitas, quae risum movere solet. Quamvis possit utrumque horum referri ad verba. In quibus contingit peccare vel ratione superfluitatis, quod pertinet ad multiloquium, vel ratione inhonestatis, quod pertinet ad scurrilitatem. Ex parte autem corporis, ponitur immunditia. Quae potest attendi sive secundum inordinatam emissionem quarumcumque superfluitatum, vel specialiter quantum ad emissionem seminis. Unde super illud Ephes. V, fornicatio autem et omnis immunditia etc., dicit Glossa, idest incontinentia pertinens ad libidinem quocumque modo. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod laetitia quae est de actu peccati vel fine, consequitur omne peccatum, maxime quod procedit ex habitu. Sed laetitia vaga incomposita, quae hic dicitur inepta, praecipue oritur ex immoderata sumptione cibi vel potus. Similiter etiam dicendum quod hebetudo sensus quantum ad eligibilia communiter invenitur in omni peccato. Sed hebetudo sensus circa speculabilia maxime procedit ex gula, ratione iam dicta. Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet utilis sit vomitus post superfluam comestionem, tamen vitiosum est quod aliquis huic necessitati se subdat per immoderantiam cibi vel potus. Potest tamen absque culpa vomitus procurari ex consilio medicinae in remedium alicuius languoris. Ad tertium dicendum quod scurrilitas procedit quidem ex actu gulae, non autem ex actu luxuriae, sed ex eius voluntate. Et ideo ad utrumque vitium potest pertinere.

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in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind in wisdom. Second, as regards the appetite, which is disordered in many ways by immoderation in eating and drinking, as though reason were fast asleep at the helm, and in this respect unseemly joy is reckoned, because all the other inordinate passions are directed to joy or sorrow, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. To this we must refer the saying of 3 Esdr. 3:20, that wine . . . gives every one a confident and joyful mind. Third, as regards inordinate words, and thus we have loquaciousness, because as Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19), unless gluttons were carried away by immoderate speech, that rich man who is stated to have feasted sumptuously every day would not have been so tortured in his tongue. Fourth, as regards inordinate action, and in this way we have scurrility, i.e., a kind of levity resulting from lack of reason, which is unable not only to bridle the speech, but also to restrain outward behavior. Hence a gloss on Eph. 5:4, Or foolish talking or scurrility, says that fools call this geniality—i.e., jocularity, because it is wont to raise a laugh. Both of these, however, may be referred to the words which may happen to be sinful, either by reason of excess which belongs to loquaciousness, or by reason of unbecomingness, which belongs to scurrility. On the part of the body, mention is made of uncleanness, which may refer either to the inordinate emission of any kind of superfluities, or especially to the emission of the semen. Hence a gloss on Eph. 5:3, But fornication and all uncleanness, says: That is, any kind of incontinence that has reference to lust. Reply Obj. 1: Joy in the act or end of sin results from every sin, especially the sin that proceeds from habit, but the random riotous joy which is described as unseemly arises chiefly from immoderate partaking of meat or drink. In like manner, we reply that dullness of sense as regards matters of choice is common to all sin, whereas dullness of sense in speculative matters arises chiefly from gluttony, for the reason given above. Reply Obj. 2: Although it does one good to vomit after eating too much, yet it is sinful to expose oneself to its necessity by immoderate meat or drink. However, it is no sin to procure vomiting as a remedy for sickness if the physician prescribes it. Reply Obj. 3: Scurrility proceeds from the act of gluttony, and not from the lustful act, but from the lustful will: wherefore it may be referred to either vice.

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Question 149 Sobriety Deinde considerandum est de sobrietate, et vitio opWe must now consider sobriety and the contrary vice, posito, scilicet ebrietate. Et circa sobrietatem quaeruntur namely drunkenness. As regards sobriety there are four quatuor. points of inquiry: Primo, quae sit materia sobrietatis. (1) What is the matter of sobriety? Secundo, utrum sit specialis virtus. (2) Whether it is a special virtue? Tertio, utrum usus vini sit licitus. (3) Whether the use of wine is lawful? Quarto, quibus praecipue competat sobrietas. (4) To whom especially is sobriety becoming?

Article 1 Whether drink is the matter of sobriety? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod materia propria sobrietatis non sit potus. Dicitur enim Rom. XII. Non plus sapere quam oportet sapere, sed sapere ad sobrietatem. Ergo sobrietas est etiam circa sapientiam, et non solum circa potum. Praeterea, Sap. VIII dicitur de Dei sapientia quod sobrietatem et prudentiam docet, iustitiam et virtutem, ubi sobrietatem ponit pro temperantia. Sed temperantia non solum est circa potus, sed etiam circa cibos et venerea. Ergo sobrietas non solum est circa potus. Praeterea, nomen sobrietatis a mensura sumptum esse videtur. Sed in omnibus quae ad nos pertinent debemus mensuram servare, unde dicitur Tit. II, sobrie et iuste et pie vivamus, ubi dicit Glossa, sobrie, in nobis, et I ad Tim. II dicitur, mulieres in habitu ornato, cum verecundia et sobrietate ornantes se, et sic videtur sobrietas esse non solum in interioribus, sed etiam in his quae pertinent ad exteriorem habitum. Non ergo propria materia sobrietatis est potus. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XXXI, aequa vita hominis vinum in sobrietate potatum. Respondeo dicendum quod virtutes quae ab aliqua generali conditione virtutis nominantur, illam materiam specialiter sibi vindicant in qua difficillimum et optimum est conditionem huiusmodi observare, sicut fortitudo pericula mortis, et temperantia delectationes tactus. Nomen autem sobrietatis sumitur a mensura, dicitur enim aliquis sobrius quasi briam, idest mensuram, servans. Et ideo illam materiam specialiter sibi sobrietas adscribit in qua maxime laudabile est mensuram servare. Huiusmodi autem est potus inebriare valens, quia eius

Objection 1: It would seem that drink is not the matter proper to sobriety. For it is written (Rom 12:3): Not to be more wise than it behooveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety. Therefore sobriety is also about wisdom, and not only about drink. Obj. 2: Further, concerning the wisdom of God, it is written (Wis 8:7) that she teacheth sobriety, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, where sobriety stands for temperance. Now temperance is not only about drink, but also about meat and sexual matters. Therefore sobriety is not only about drink. Obj. 3: Further, sobriety would seem to take its name from measure. Now we ought to be guided by the measure in all things appertaining to us: for it is written (Titus 2:12): We should live soberly and justly and godly, where a gloss remarks: Soberly, in ourselves; and (1 Tim 2:9): Women . . . in decent apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety. Consequently it would seem that sobriety regards not only the interior man, but also things appertaining to external apparel. Therefore drink is not the matter proper to sobriety. On the contrary, It is written (Sir 31:32): Wine taken with sobriety is equal life to men; if thou drink it moderately, thou shalt be sober. I answer that, When a virtue is denominated from some condition common to the virtues, the matter specially belonging to it is that in which it is most difficult and most commendable to satisfy that condition of virtue: thus fortitude is about dangers of death, and temperance about pleasures of touch. Now sobriety takes its name from measure, for a man is said to be sober because he observes the bria, i.e., the measure. Wherefore sobriety lays a special claim to that matter wherein the observance of the measure is most deserving of praise. Such matter is the drinking of intoxi-

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Q. 149, A. 2

Temperance

usus mensuratus multum confert, et modicus excessus multum laedit, quia impedit usum rationis, magis etiam quam excessus cibi. Unde dicitur Eccli. XXXI, sanitas est animae et corporis sobrius potus. Vinum multum potatum irritationem et iram et ruinas multas facit. Et ideo specialiter sobrietas attenditur circa potum, non quemcumque, sed eum qui sua fumositate natus est caput conturbare, sicut vinum et omne quod inebriare potest. Communiter autem sumendo nomen sobrietatis, potest in quacumque materia dici, sicut et supra dictum est de fortitudine et temperantia.

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cants, because the measured use thereof is most profitable, while immoderate excess therein is most harmful, since it hinders the use of reason even more than excessive eating. Hence it is written (Sir 31:37, 38): Sober drinking is health to soul and body; wine drunken with excess raiseth quarrels, and wrath and many ruins. For this reason sobriety is especially concerned with drink, not any kind of drink, but that which by reason of its volatility is liable to disturb the brain, such as wine and all intoxicants. Nevertheless, sobriety may be employed in a general sense so as to apply to any matter, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 2; Q. 141, A. 2) with regard to fortitude and temperance. Reply Obj. 1: Just as the material wine intoxicates a man as to his body, so too, speaking figuratively, the consideration of wisdom is said to be an inebriating draught, because it allures the mind by its delight, according to Ps. 22:5, My chalice which inebriateth me, how goodly is it! Hence sobriety is applied by a kind of metaphor in speaking of the contemplation of wisdom. Reply Obj. 2: All the things that belong properly to temperance are necessary to the present life, and their excess is harmful. Wherefore it behooves one to apply a measure in all such things. This is the business of sobriety: and for this reason sobriety is used to designate temperance. Yet slight excess is more harmful in drink than in other things, wherefore sobriety is especially concerned with drink.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut vinum materiale corporaliter inebriat, ita etiam metaphorice consideratio sapientiae dicitur potus inebrians, propter hoc quod sua delectatione animum allicit, secundum illud Psalmi, calix meus inebrians quam praeclarus est, et ideo circa contemplationem sapientiae per similitudinem quandam sobrietas dicitur. Ad secundum dicendum quod omnia quae ad temperantiam proprie pertinent, necessaria sunt praesenti vitae, et eorum excessus nocet. Et ideo in omnibus necessarium est adhibere mensuram, quod pertinet ad officium sobrietatis. Propter quod nomine sobrietatis temperantia significatur. Sed modicus excessus in potu plus nocet quam in aliis. Et ideo sobrietas specialiter est circa potum. Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis mensura in Reply Obj. 3: Although a measure is needful in all omnibus requiratur, non tamen sobrietas proprie in om- things, sobriety is not properly employed in connection nibus dicitur, sed in quibus mensura est maxime neces- with all things, but only in those wherein there is most need saria. for a measure.

Article 2 Whether sobriety is by itself a special virtue? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sobrietas non sit per se quaedam specialis virtus. Abstinentia enim attenditur et circa cibos et potus. Sed circa cibos specialiter non est aliqua specialis virtus. Ergo nec sobrietas, quae est circa potus, est specialis virtus. Praeterea, abstinentia et gula sunt circa delectationes tactus inquantum est sensus alimenti. Sed cibus et potus simul cedunt in alimentum, simul enim indiget animal nutriri humido et sicco. Ergo sobrietas, quae est circa potum, non est specialis virtus. Praeterea, sicut in his quae ad nutritionem pertinent distinguitur potus a cibo, ita etiam distinguuntur diversa genera ciborum et diversa genera potuum. Si ergo sobrietas esset per se quaedam specialis virtus, videtur quod circa quamlibet differentiam potus vel cibi sit quaedam specialis virtus, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo videtur quod sobrietas sit specialis virtus.

Objection 1: It would seem that sobriety is not by itself a special virtue. For abstinence is concerned with both meat and drink. Now there is no special virtue about meat. Therefore neither is sobriety, which is about drink, a special virtue. Obj. 2: Further, abstinence and gluttony are about pleasures of touch as sensitive to food. Now meat and drink combine together to make food, since an animal needs a combination of wet and dry nourishment. Therefore sobriety, which is about drink, is not a special virtue. Obj. 3: Further, just as in things pertaining to nourishment, drink is distinguished from meat, so are there various kinds of meats and of drinks. Therefore if sobriety is by itself a special virtue, seemingly there will be a special virtue corresponding to each different kind of meat or drink, which is unreasonable. Therefore it would seem that sobriety is not a special virtue.

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Sed contra est quod Macrobius ponit sobrietatem specialem partem temperantiae. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad virtutem moralem pertinet conservare bonum rationis contra ea quibus potest impediri, et ideo, ubi invenitur speciale impedimentum rationis, ibi necesse est esse specialem virtutem ad illud removendum. Potus autem inebrians habet specialem rationem impediendi rationis usum, inquantum scilicet perturbat cerebrum sua fumositate. Et ideo, ad removendum hoc impedimentum rationis, requiritur specialis virtus, quae est sobrietas. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cibus et potus communiter impedire possunt bonum rationis absorbendo eam per immoderantiam delectationis. Et quantum ad hoc, communiter circa cibum et potum est abstinentia. Sed potus inebriare valens impedit speciali ratione, ut dictum est. Et ideo requirit specialem virtutem. Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus abstinentiae non est circa cibos et potus inquantum sunt nutritiva, sed inquantum impediunt rationem. Et ideo non oportet quod specialitas virtutis attendatur secundum rationem nutritionis. Ad tertium dicendum quod in omnibus potibus inebriare valentibus est una et eadem ratio impediendi usum rationis. Et sic illa potuum diversitas per accidens se habet ad virtutem. Et propter hoc, secundum huiusmodi diversitatem virtutes non diversificantur. Et eadem ratio est de diversitate ciborum.

Q. 149, A. 3

On the contrary, Macrobius reckons sobriety to be a special part of temperance. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 146, A. 2), it belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against those things which may hinder it. Hence wherever we find a special hindrance to reason, there must needs be a special virtue to remove it. Now intoxicating drink is a special kind of hindrance to the use of reason, inasmuch as it disturbs the brain by its fumes. Wherefore in order to remove this hindrance to reason a special virtue, which is sobriety, is requisite. Reply Obj. 1: Meat and drink are alike capable of hindering the good of reason, by embroiling the reason with immoderate pleasure: and in this respect abstinence is about both meat and drink alike. But intoxicating drink is a special kind of hindrance, as stated above, wherefore it requires a special virtue. Reply Obj. 2: The virtue of abstinence is about meat and drink, considered, not as food but as a hindrance to reason. Hence it does not follow that special kinds of virtue correspond to different kinds of food. Reply Obj. 3: In all intoxicating drinks there is one kind of hindrance to the use of reason: so that the difference of drinks bears an accidental relation to virtue. Hence this difference does not call for a difference of virtue. The same applies to the difference of meats.

Article 3 Whether the use of wine is altogether unlawful? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod usus vini totaliter sit illicitus. Sine sapientia enim non potest aliquis esse in statu salutis, dicitur enim Sap. VII, neminem diligit Deus nisi qui cum sapientia inhabitat; et infra, IX, per sapientiam sanati sunt quicumque placuerunt tibi a principio. Sed usus vini impedit sapientiam, dicitur enim Eccle. II, cogitavi abstrahere a vino carnem meam, ut transferrem animam meam ad sapientiam. Ergo potus vini est universaliter illicitus. Praeterea, apostolus dicit, Rom. XIV, bonum est non manducare carnem et non bibere vinum, neque in quo frater tuus offenditur aut scandalizatur aut infirmatur. Sed cessare a bono virtutis est vitiosum, et similiter fratribus scandalum ponere. Ergo uti vino est illicitum. Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit quod vinum cum carnibus post diluvium est dedicatum, Christus autem venit in fine saeculorum, et extremitatem retraxit ad princi-

Objection 1: It would seem that the use of wine is altogether unlawful. For without wisdom, a man cannot be in the state of salvation: since it is written (Wis 7:28): God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom, and further on (Wis 9:19): By wisdom they were healed, whosoever have pleased Thee, O Lord, from the beginning. Now the use of wine is a hindrance to wisdom, for it is written (Eccl 2:3): I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind to wisdom. Therefore wine-drinking is altogether unlawful. Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom 14:21): It is good not to eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother is offended or scandalized, or made weak. Now it is sinful to forsake the good of virtue, as likewise to scandalize one’s brethren. Therefore it is unlawful to make use of wine. Obj. 3: Further, Jerome says that after the deluge wine and flesh were sanctioned: but Christ came in the last of the ages and brought back the end into line with the beginning.

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Q. 149, A. 4

Temperance

pium. Ergo, tempore Christianae legis, videtur esse illicitum vino uti. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. V, noli adhuc aquam bibere, sed modico vino utere, propter stomachum tuum et frequentes infirmitates. Et Eccli. XXXI dicitur, exultatio animae et cordis vinum moderate potatum. Respondeo dicendum quod nullus cibus vel potus, secundum se consideratus, est illicitus, secundum sententiam domini dicentis, Matth. XV, nihil quod intrat in os, coinquinat hominem. Et ideo bibere vinum, secundum se loquendo, non est illicitum. Potest tamen illicitum reddi per accidens. Quandoque quidem ex conditione bibentis, qui a vino de facili laeditur, vel qui ex speciali voto obligatur ad vinum non bibendum. Quandoque autem ex modo bibendi, quia scilicet mensuram in bibendo excedit. Quandoque autem ex parte aliorum, qui ex hoc scandalizarentur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sapientia potest haberi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum modum communem, prout sufficit ad salutem. Et sic non requiritur ad sapientiam habendam quod aliquis a vino omnino abstineat, sed quod abstineat ab immoderato usu vini. Alio modo, secundum quendam perfectionis gradum. Et sic requiritur in aliquibus, ad perfecte sapientiam percipiendam, quod omnino a vino abstineant, secundum conditiones quarundam personarum et locorum. Ad secundum dicendum quod apostolus non simpliciter dicit bonum esse abstinere a vino, sed in casu in quo ex hoc aliqui scandalizantur. Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus retrahit nos a quibusdam sicut omnino illicitis, a quibusdam vero sicut ab impedimentis perfectionis. Et hoc modo retrahit aliquos a vino studio perfectionis, sicut et a divitiis et aliis huiusmodi.

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Therefore it seems unlawful to use wine under the Christian law. On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim 5:23): Do not still drink water, but use a little wine for thy stomach’s sake, and thy frequent infirmities; and it is written (Sir 31:36): Wine drunken with moderation is the joy of the soul and the heart. I answer that, No meat or drink, considered in itself, is unlawful, according to Matt. 15:11, Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man. Wherefore it is not unlawful to drink wine as such. Yet it may become unlawful accidentally. This is sometimes owing to a circumstance on the part of the drinker, either because he is easily the worse for taking wine, or because he is bound by a vow not to drink wine: sometimes it results from the mode of drinking, because to wit he exceeds the measure in drinking: and sometimes it is on account of others who would be scandalized thereby. Reply Obj. 1: A man may have wisdom in two ways. First, in a general way, according as it is sufficient for salvation: and in this way it is required, in order to have wisdom, not that a man abstain altogether from wine, but that he abstain from its immoderate use. Second, a man may have wisdom in some degree of perfection: and in this way, in order to receive wisdom perfectly, it is requisite for certain persons that they abstain altogether from wine, and this depends on circumstances of certain persons and places. Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle does not declare simply that it is good to abstain from wine, but that it is good in the case where this would give scandal to certain people. Reply Obj. 3: Christ withdraws us from some things as being altogether unlawful, and from others as being obstacles to perfection. It is in the latter way that he withdraws some from the use of wine, that they may aim at perfection, even as from riches and the like.

Article 4 Whether sobriety is more requisite in persons of greater standing? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sobrietas magis requiratur in maioribus personis. Senectus enim excellentiam quandam homini praestat, unde et senibus reverentia et honor debetur, secundum illud Levit. XIX, coram cano capite consurge, et honora personam senis. Sed apostolus specialiter senes dicit esse ad sobrietatem exhortandos, secundum illud Tit. II, senes, ut sobrii sint. Ergo sobrietas maxime requiritur in excellentioribus personis. Praeterea, episcopus in Ecclesia excellentissimum gradum habet. Cui per apostolum indicitur sobrietas, secundum illud I ad Tim. III, oportet episcopum irrepre-

Objection 1: It would seem that sobriety is more requisite in persons of greater standing. For old age gives a man a certain standing; wherefore honor and reverence are due to the old, according to Lev. 19:32, Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man. Now the Apostle declares that old men especially should be exhorted to sobriety, according to Titus 2:2, That the aged man be sober. Therefore sobriety is most requisite in persons of standing. Obj. 2: Further, a bishop has the highest degree in the Church: and the Apostle commands him to be sober, according to 1 Tim. 3:2, It behooveth . . . a bishop to be blame-

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Sobriety

hensibilem esse, unius uxoris virum, sobrium, prudentem, et cetera. Ergo sobrietas maxime requiritur in personis excellentibus. Praeterea, sobrietas importat abstinentiam a vino. Sed vinum interdicitur regibus, qui tenent summum locum in rebus humanis, conceditur autem his qui sunt in statu deiectionis, secundum illud Prov. XXXI, noli regibus dare vinum; et postea subdit, date siceram moerentibus, et vinum his qui amaro animo sunt. Ergo sobrietas magis requiritur in excellentioribus personis. Sed contra est quod apostolus, I ad Tim. III, dicit, mulieres similiter pudicas, sobrias, et cetera. Et Tit. II dicitur, iuvenes similiter hortare ut sobrii sint. Respondeo dicendum quod virtus habet habitudinem ad duo, uno quidem modo, ad contraria vitia quae excludit, et concupiscentias quas refrenat; alio modo, ad finem in quem perducit. Sic igitur aliqua virtus magis requiritur in aliquibus duplici ratione. Uno modo, quia in eis est maior pronitas ad concupiscentias quas oportet per virtutem refrenari, et ad vitia quae per virtutem tolluntur. Et secundum hoc, sobrietas maxime requiritur in iuvenibus et mulieribus, quia in iuvenibus viget concupiscentia delectabilis, propter fervorem aetatis; in mulieribus autem non est sufficiens robur mentis ad hoc quod concupiscentiis resistant unde, secundum maximum Valerium, mulieres apud Romanos antiquitus non bibebant vinum. Alio vero modo sobrietas magis requiritur in aliquibus utpote magis necessaria ad propriam operationem ipsorum. Vinum autem immoderate sumptum praecipue impedit usum rationis. Et ideo senibus, in quibus ratio debet vigere ad aliorum eruditionem; et episcopis, seu quibuslibet Ecclesiae ministris, qui mente devota debent spiritualibus officiis insistere; et regibus, qui per sapientiam debent populum subditum gubernare, specialiter sobrietas indicitur. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.

Q. 149, A. 4

less, the husband of one wife, sober, prudent, etc. Therefore sobriety is chiefly required in persons of high standing. Obj. 3: Further, sobriety denotes abstinence from wine. Now wine is forbidden to kings, who hold the highest place in human affairs: while it is allowed to those who are in a state of affliction, according to Prov. 31:4, Give not wine to kings, and further on (Prov 31:6), Give strong drink to them that are sad, and wine to them that are grieved in mind. Therefore sobriety is more requisite in persons of standing. On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim 3:11): The women in like manner, chaste . . . sober, etc., and (Titus 2:6) Young men in like manner exhort that they be sober. I answer that, Virtue includes relationship to two things, to the contrary vices which it removes, and to the end to which it leads. Accordingly a particular virtue is more requisite in certain persons for two reasons. First, because they are more prone to the concupiscences which need to be restrained by virtue, and to the vices which are removed by virtue. In this respect, sobriety is most requisite in the young and in women, because concupiscence of pleasure thrives in the young on account of the heat of youth, while in women there is not sufficient strength of mind to resist concupiscence. Hence, according to Valerius Maximus among the ancient Romans women drank no wine. Second, sobriety is more requisite in certain persons, as being more necessary for the operations proper to them. Now immoderate use of wine is a notable obstacle to the use of reason: wherefore sobriety is specially prescribed to the old, in whom reason should be vigorous in instructing others: to bishops and all ministers of the Church, who should fulfill their spiritual duties with a devout mind; and to kings, who should rule their subjects with wisdom.

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This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Question 150 Drunkenness Deinde considerandum est de ebrietate. Et circa hoc We must now consider drunkenness. Under this head quaeruntur quatuor. there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum ebrietas sit peccatum. (1) Whether drunkenness is a sin? Secundo, utrum sit peccatum mortale. (2) Whether it is a mortal sin? Tertio, utrum sit gravissimum peccatorum. (3) Whether it is the most grievous sin? Quarto, utrum excuset a peccato. (4) Whether it excuses from sin?

Article 1 Whether drunkenness is a sin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ebrietas non sit peccatum. Omne enim peccatum habet aliud peccatum sibi oppositum, sicut timiditati audacia, et pusillanimitati praesumptio opponitur. Sed ebrietati nullum peccatum opponitur. Ergo ebrietas non est peccatum. Praeterea, omne peccatum est voluntarium. Sed nullus vult esse ebrius, quia nullus vult privari usu rationis. Ergo ebrietas non est peccatum. Praeterea, quicumque est alteri causa peccandi, peccat. Si ergo ebrietas esset peccatum, sequeretur quod illi qui alios invitant ad potum quo inebriantur, peccarent. Quod videtur esse valde durum. Praeterea, omnibus peccatis correctio debetur. Sed ebriis non adhibetur correctio, dicit enim Gregorius quod cum venia suo ingenio sunt relinquendi, ne deteriores fiant si a tali consuetudine evellantur. Ergo ebrietas non est peccatum. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. XIII, non in comessationibus et ebrietatibus. Respondeo dicendum quod ebrietas dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, prout significat ipsum defectum hominis qui accidit ex multo vino potato, ex quo fit ut non sit compos rationis. Et secundum hoc, ebrietas non nominat culpam, sed defectum poenalem consequentem ex culpa. Alio modo ebrietas potest nominare actum quo quis in hunc defectum incidit. Qui potest causare ebrietatem dupliciter. Uno modo, ex nimia vini fortitudine, praeter opinionem bibentis. Et sic etiam ebrietas potest accidere sine peccato, praecipue si non ex negligentia hominis contingat, et sic creditur Noe inebriatus fuisse, ut legitur Gen. IX. Alio modo, ex inordinata concupiscentia et usu vini. Et sic ebrietas ponitur esse peccatum. Et continetur sub gula sicut species sub genere, di-

Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is not a sin. For every sin has a corresponding contrary sin, thus timidity is opposed to daring, and presumption to pusillanimity. But no sin is opposed to drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin. Obj. 2: Further, every sin is voluntary. But no man wishes to be drunk, since no man wishes to be deprived of the use of reason. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin. Obj. 3: Further, whoever causes another to sin, sins himself. Therefore, if drunkenness were a sin, it would follow that it is a sin to ask a man to drink that which makes him drunk, which would seem very hard. Obj. 4: Further, every sin calls for correction. But correction is not applied to drunkards: for Gregory says that we must forbear with their ways, lest they become worse if they be compelled to give up the habit. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom 13:13): Not in rioting and drunkenness. I answer that, Drunkenness may be understood in two ways. First, it may signify the defect itself of a man resulting from his drinking much wine, the consequence being that he loses the use of reason. In this sense drunkenness denotes not a sin, but a penal defect resulting from a fault. Second, drunkenness may denote the act by which a man incurs this defect. This act may cause drunkenness in two ways. In one way, through the wine being too strong, without the drinker being cognizant of this: and in this way too, drunkenness may occur without sin, especially if it is not through his negligence, and thus we believe that Noah was made drunk as related in Gen. 9. In another way drunkenness may result from inordinate concupiscence and use of wine: in this way it is accounted a

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viditur enim gula in comessationem et ebrietatem, quae sin, and is comprised under gluttony as a species under its prohibet apostolus in auctoritate inducta. genus. For gluttony is divided into surfeiting and drunkenness, which are forbidden by the Apostle (Rom 13:13). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11), dicit, in III Ethic., insensibilitas, quae opponitur tempe- insensibility which is opposed to temperance is not very rantiae, non multum contingit. Et ideo tam ipsa quam common, so that like its species which are opposed to the omnes eius species, quae opponuntur diversis speciebus species of intemperance it has no name. Hence the vice opintemperantiae, nomine carent. Unde et vitium quod posed to drunkenness is unnamed; and yet if a man were opponitur ebrietati innominatum est. Et tamen si quis knowingly to abstain from wine to the extent of molesting scienter in tantum a vino abstineret ut naturam multum nature grievously, he would not be free from sin. gravaret, a culpa immunis non esset. Ad secundum dicendum quod obiectio illa proceReply Obj. 2: This objection regards the resulting dedit de defectu consequente, qui est involuntarius. Sed fect which is involuntary: whereas immoderate use of wine immoderatus usus vini est voluntarius, in quo consistit is voluntary, and it is in this that the sin consists. ratio peccati. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut ille qui inebriaReply Obj. 3: Even as he that is drunk is excused if he tur excusatur a peccato si ignorat fortitudinem vini, ita knows not the strength of the wine, so too is he that invites etiam ille qui invitat aliquem ad bibendum excusatur a another to drink excused from sin, if he be unaware that the peccato si ignoret talem esse conditionem bibentis ut ex drinker is the kind of person to be made drunk by the drink hoc potu inebrietur. Sed si ignorantia desit, neuter a pec- offered. But if ignorance be lacking neither is excused from cato excusatur. sin. Ad quartum dicendum quod aliquando correctio Reply Obj. 4: Sometimes the correction of a sinner is peccatoris est intermittenda, ne fiat inde deterior, ut su- to be foregone, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 6). Hence Auguspra dictum est. Unde Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad tine says in a letter (Ad Aurel. Episc. Ep. xxii), Meseems, Aurelium episcopum, de comessationibus et ebrietatibus such things are cured not by bitterness, severity, harshness, loquens, non aspere, quantum aestimo, non dure, non im- but by teaching rather than commanding, by advice rather periose ista tolluntur, sed magis docendo quam iubendo, than threats. Such is the course to be followed with the majormagis monendo quam minando. Sic enim agendum est ity of sinners: few are they whose sins should be treated with cum multitudine peccantium, severitas autem exercenda severity. est in peccato paucorum.

Article 2 Whether drunkenness is a mortal sin? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ebrietas non sit peccatum mortale. Augustinus enim, in sermone de Purgatorio, dicit ebrietatem esse peccatum mortale, si sit assidua. Sed assiduitas importat circumstantiam quae non trahit in aliam speciem peccati, et sic non potest in infinitum aggravare, ut de veniali faciat mortale, sicut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo, si alias ebrietas non est peccatum mortale, nec hoc etiam modo erit peccatum mortale. Praeterea, Augustinus, in eodem sermone, dicit, quoties aliquis in cibo aut potu plus accipit quam necesse est, ad minuta peccata noverit pertinere. Peccata autem minuta dicuntur venialia. Ergo ebrietas, quae causatur ex immoderato potu, est peccatum veniale. Praeterea, nullum peccatum mortale est faciendum propter medicinam. Sed aliqui superflue bibunt secundum consilium medicinae, ut postea per vomitum

Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is not a mortal sin. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory that drunkenness if indulged in assiduously, is a mortal sin. Now assiduity denotes a circumstance which does not change the species of a sin; so that it cannot aggravate a sin infinitely, and make a mortal sin of a venial sin, as shown above (I-II, Q. 88, A. 5). Therefore if drunkenness is not a mortal sin for some other reason, neither is it for this. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says: Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is necessary, he should know that this is one of the lesser sins. Now the lesser sins are called venial. Therefore drunkenness, which is caused by immoderate drink, is a venial sin. Obj. 3: Further, no mortal sin should be committed on the score of medicine. Now some drink too much at the advice of the physician, that they may be purged by vomiting;

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purgentur; et ex hoc superfluo potu sequitur ebrietas. Ergo ebrietas non est peccatum mortale. Sed contra est quod in canonibus apostolorum legitur, episcopus aut presbyter aut diaconus aleae aut ebrietati deserviens, aut desinat aut deponatur. Subdiaconus autem aut lector aut cantor similia faciens, aut desinat aut communione privetur. Similiter et laicus. Sed tales poenae non infliguntur nisi pro peccato mortali. Ergo ebrietas est peccatum mortale. Respondeo dicendum quod culpa ebrietatis, sicut dictum est, consistit in immoderato usu et concupiscentia vini. Hoc autem contingit esse tripliciter. Uno modo, sic quod nesciat potum esse immoderatum et inebriare potentem. Et sic ebrietas potest accipi sine peccato, ut dictum est. Alio modo, sic quod aliquis percipiat potum esse immoderatum, non tamen aestimet potum esse inebriare potentem. Et sic ebrietas potest esse cum peccato veniali. Tertio modo, potest contingere quod aliquis bene advertat potum esse immoderatum et inebriantem, et tamen magis vult ebrietatem incurrere quam a potu abstinere. Et talis proprie dicitur ebrius, quia moralia recipiunt speciem non ab his quae per accidens eveniunt praeter intentionem, sed ab eo quod est per se intentum. Et sic ebrietas est peccatum mortale. Quia secundum hoc, homo volens et sciens privat se usu rationis, quo secundum virtutem operatur et peccata declinat, et sic peccat mortaliter, periculo peccandi se committens. Dicit enim Ambrosius, in libro de patriarchis, vitandam dicimus ebrietatem, per quam crimina cavere non possumus, nam quae sobrii cavemus, per ebrietatem ignorantes committimus. Unde ebrietas, per se loquendo, est peccatum mortale. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod assiduitas facit ebrietatem esse peccatum mortale, non propter solam iterationem actus, sed quia non potest esse quod homo assidue inebrietur quin sciens et volens ebrietatem incurrat, dum multoties experitur fortitudinem vini, et suam habilitatem ad ebrietatem. Ad secundum dicendum quod plus sumere in cibo vel potu quam necesse sit, pertinet ad vitium gulae, quae non semper est peccatum mortale. Sed plus sumere in potu scienter usque ad ebrietatem, hoc est peccatum mortale. Unde Augustinus dicit, in X Confess., ebrietas longe est a me, misereberis ne appropinquet mihi, crapula autem nonnumquam subrepsit servo tuo. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, cibus et potus est moderandus secundum quod competit corporis valetudini. Et ideo sicut quandoque contingit ut cibus vel potus qui est moderatus sano, sit superfluus infirmo; ita etiam potest e converso contingere ut ille qui est superfluus sano, sit moderatus infirmo. Et hoc modo, cum aliquis multum comedit vel bibit secundum consilium medicinae ad vomitum provocandum, non est re-

Q. 150, A. 2

and from this excessive drink drunkenness ensues. Therefore drunkenness is not a mortal sin. On the contrary, We read in the Canons of the apostles (Can. xli, xlii): A bishop, priest or deacon who is given to drunkenness or gambling, or incites others thereto, must either cease or be deposed; a subdeacon, reader or precentor who does these things must either give them up or be excommunicated; the same applies to the laity. Now such punishments are not inflicted save for mortal sins. Therefore drunkenness is a mortal sin. I answer that, The sin of drunkenness, as stated in the foregoing Article, consists in the immoderate use and concupiscence of wine. Now this may happen to a man in three ways. First, so that he knows not the drink to be immoderate and intoxicating: and then drunkenness may be without sin, as stated above (A. 1). Second, so that he perceives the drink to be immoderate, but without knowing it to be intoxicating, and then drunkenness may involve a venial sin. Third, it may happen that a man is well aware that the drink is immoderate and intoxicating, and yet he would rather be drunk than abstain from drink. Such a man is a drunkard properly speaking, because morals take their species not from things that occur accidentally and beside the intention, but from that which is directly intended. In this way drunkenness is a mortal sin, because then a man willingly and knowingly deprives himself of the use of reason, whereby he performs virtuous deeds and avoids sin, and thus he sins mortally by running the risk of falling into sin. For Ambrose says (De Patriarch.): We learn that we should shun drunkenness, which prevents us from avoiding grievous sins. For the things we avoid when sober, we unknowingly commit through drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness, properly speaking, is a mortal sin. Reply Obj. 1: Assiduity makes drunkenness a mortal sin, not on account of the mere repetition of the act, but because it is impossible for a man to become drunk assiduously, without exposing himself to drunkenness knowingly and willingly, since he has many times experienced the strength of wine and his own liability to drunkenness. Reply Obj. 2: To take more meat or drink than is necessary belongs to the vice of gluttony, which is not always a mortal sin: but knowingly to take too much drink to the point of being drunk, is a mortal sin. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): Drunkenness is far from me: Thou wilt have mercy, that it come not near me. But full feeding sometimes hath crept upon Thy servant. Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 141, A. 6), meat and drink should be moderate in accordance with the demands of the body’s health. Wherefore, just as it happens sometimes that the meat and drink which are moderate for a healthy man are immoderate for a sick man, so too it may happen conversely, that what is excessive for a healthy man is moderate for one that is ailing. In this way when a man eats or drinks much at the physician’s advice in order to

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putandus superfluus cibus vel potus. Nec tamen requiritur ad vomitum provocandum quod sit potus inebrians, quia etiam potus aquae tepidae vomitum causat. Et ideo propter hanc causam non excusaretur aliquis ab ebrietate.

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provoke vomiting, he is not to be deemed to have taken excessive meat or drink. There is, however, no need for intoxicating drink in order to procure vomiting, since this is caused by drinking lukewarm water: wherefore this is no sufficient cause for excusing a man from drunkenness.

Article 3 Whether drunkenness is the gravest of sins? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ebrietas sit gravissimum peccatorum. Dicit enim Chrysostomus quod nihil ita est Daemoni amicum sicut ebrietas et lascivia, quae est mater omnium vitiorum. Et in decretis dicitur, dist. XXXV, ante omnia clericis vitetur ebrietas, quae omnium vitiorum radix et nutrix est. Praeterea, ex hoc dicitur aliquid esse peccatum quod bonum rationis excludit. Sed hoc maxime facit ebrietas. Ergo ebrietas est maximum peccatorum. Praeterea, magnitudo culpae ex magnitudine poenae ostenditur. Sed ebrietas videtur esse maxime punita, dicit enim Ambrosius quod non esset in homine servitus, si non fuisset ebrietas. Ergo ebrietas est maximum peccatorum. Sed contra est quod, secundum Gregorium, vitia spiritualia sunt maiora quam carnalia. Sed ebrietas continetur inter vitia carnalia ergo non est maximum peccatorum. Respondeo dicendum quod ex hoc dicitur aliquid esse malum, quod privat bonum. Unde quanto maius est bonum quod privatur per malum, tanto malum gravius est. Manifestum est autem quod bonum divinum est maius quam bonum humanum. Et ideo peccata quae sunt directe contra Deum, sunt graviora peccato ebrietatis, quod directe opponitur bono rationis humanae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad peccata intemperantiae maxime homo habet pronitatem, propter hoc quod huiusmodi concupiscentiae et delectationes sunt nobis connaturales. Et secundum hoc, dicuntur huiusmodi peccata esse maxime amica Diabolo, non quia sint aliis graviora, sed quia sunt apud homines frequentiora. Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum rationis impeditur dupliciter, uno modo, per id quod est contrarium rationi; alio modo, per id quod aufert usum rationis. Plus autem habet de ratione mali id quod contrariatur rationi, quam quod ad horam usum rationis aufert usus enim rationis potest esse et bonus et malus, qui tollitur per ebrietatem; sed bona virtutum, quae tolluntur per ea quae contrariantur rationi, sunt semper bona.

Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is the gravest of sins. For Chrysostom says (Hom. lviii in Matth.) that nothing gains the devil’s favor so much as drunkenness and lust, the mother of all the vices. And it is written in the Decretals (Dist. xxxv, can. Ante omnia): Drunkenness, more than anything else, is to be avoided by the clergy, for it foments and fosters all the vices. Obj. 2: Further, from the very fact that a thing excludes the good of reason, it is a sin. Now this is especially the effect of drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins. Obj. 3: Further, the gravity of a sin is shown by the gravity of its punishment. Now seemingly drunkenness is punished most severely; for Ambrose says that there would be no slavery, were there no drunkards. Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins. On the contrary, According to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12), spiritual vices are greater than carnal vices. Now drunkenness is one of the carnal vices. Therefore it is not the greatest of sins. I answer that, A thing is said to be evil because it removes a good. Wherefore the greater the good removed by an evil, the graver the evil. Now it is evident that a Divine good is greater than a human good. Wherefore the sins that are directly against God are graver than the sin of drunkenness, which is directly opposed to the good of human reason. Reply Obj. 1: Man is most prone to sins of intemperance, because such like concupiscences and pleasures are connatural to us, and for this reason these sins are said to find greatest favor with the devil, not for being graver than other sins, but because they occur more frequently among men. Reply Obj. 2: The good of reason is hindered in two ways: in one way by that which is contrary to reason, in another by that which takes away the use of reason. Now that which is contrary to reason has more the character of an evil, than that which takes away the use of reason for a time, since the use of reason, which is taken away by drunkenness, may be either good or evil, whereas the goods of virtue, which are taken away by things that are contrary to reason, are always good.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod servitus est consecuta ex ebrietate occasionaliter, inquantum Cham maledictionem servitutis in sua posteritate accepit propter hoc quod irrisit patrem inebriatum. Non autem servitus fuit directe poena ebrietatis.

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Reply Obj. 3: Drunkenness was the occasional cause of slavery, insofar as Cham brought the curse of slavery on to his descendants, for having laughed at his father when the latter was made drunk. But slavery was not the direct punishment of drunkenness.

Article 4 Whether drunkenness excuses from sin? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ebrietas non excuset a peccato. Dicit enim philosophus, in III Ethic., quod ebrius meretur duplices maledictiones. Ergo ebrietas magis aggravat peccatum quam excuset. Praeterea, peccatum non excusatur per peccatum, sed magis augetur. Ebrietas autem est peccatum. Ergo non excusat a peccato. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod sicut ratio hominis ligatur per ebrietatem, ita etiam ligatur per concupiscentiam. Sed concupiscentia non excusat a peccato. Ergo etiam neque ebrietas. Sed contra est quod Lot excusatur ab incestu propter ebrietatem, ut dicit Augustinus, contra Faustum. Respondeo dicendum quod in ebrietate duo attenduntur, sicut dictum est, scilicet defectus consequens, et actus praecedens. Ex parte autem defectus consequentis, in quo ligatur usus rationis, ebrietas habet excusare peccatum, inquantum causat involuntarium per ignorantiam. Sed ex parte actus praecedentis, videtur esse distinguendum. Quia si ex actu illo praecedente subsecuta est ebrietas sine peccato, tunc peccatum sequens totaliter excusatur a culpa, sicut forte accidit de Lot. Si autem actus praecedens fuit culpabilis, sic non totaliter aliquis excusatur a peccato sequenti, quod scilicet redditur voluntarium ex voluntate praecedentis actus, inquantum scilicet aliquis, dans operam rei illicitae, incidit in sequens peccatum. Diminuitur tamen peccatum sequens, sicut et diminuitur ratio voluntarii. Unde Augustinus dicit, contra Faustum, quod Lot culpandus est non quantum ille incestus, sed quantum ebrietas meruit.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus non dicit quod mereatur graviorem maledictionem ebrius, sed quod mereatur duplices maledictiones, propter duplex peccatum. Vel potest dici quod loquitur secundum legem cuiusdam Pittaci, qui, ut dicitur in II Polit., statuit quod ebrii, si percuterent, plus punirentur quam sobrii, quia pluries iniuriantur. In quo, ut ibidem Aristoteles dicit, videtur magis respexisse ad utilitatem, ut scilicet co-

Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness does not excuse from sin. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that the drunkard deserves double punishment. Therefore drunkenness aggravates a sin instead of excusing from it. Obj. 2: Further, one sin does not excuse another, but increases it. Now drunkenness is a sin. Therefore it is not an excuse for sin. Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that just as man’s reason is tied by drunkenness, so is it by concupiscence. But concupiscence is not an excuse for sin: neither therefore is drunkenness. On the contrary, According to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 43), Lot was to be excused from incest on account of drunkenness. I answer that, Two things are to be observed in drunkenness, as stated above (A. 1), namely the resulting defect and the preceding act. On the part of the resulting defect whereby the use of reason is fettered, drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, insofar as it causes an act to be involuntary through ignorance. But on the part of the preceding act, a distinction would seem necessary; because, if the drunkenness that results from that act be without sin, the subsequent sin is entirely excused from fault, as perhaps in the case of Lot. If, however, the preceding act was sinful, the person is not altogether excused from the subsequent sin, because the latter is rendered voluntary through the voluntariness of the preceding act, inasmuch as it was through doing something unlawful that he fell into the subsequent sin. Nevertheless, the resulting sin is diminished, even as the character of voluntariness is diminished. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 44) that Lot’s guilt is to be measured, not by the incest, but by his drunkenness. Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher does not say that the drunkard deserves more severe punishment, but that he deserves double punishment for his twofold sin. Or we may reply that he is speaking in view of the law of a certain Pittacus, who, as stated in Polit. ii, 9, ordered those guilty of assault while drunk to be more severely punished than if they had been sober, because they do wrong in more ways than one. In this, as Aristotle observes (Polit. ii, 9), he seems to

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hiberentur iniuriae, quam ad veniam quam oportet ha- have considered the advantage, namely of the prevention of bere de ebriis, propter hoc quod non sunt sui compotes. wrong, rather than the leniency which one should have for drunkards, seeing that they are not in possession of their faculties. Ad secundum dicendum quod ebrietas habet excuReply Obj. 2: Drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, sare peccatum non ex ea parte qua est peccatum, sed ex not in the point of its being itself a sin, but in the point of parte defectus consequentis, ut dictum est. the defect that results from it, as stated above. Ad tertium dicendum quod concupiscentia non Reply Obj. 3: Concupiscence does not altogether fetter totaliter ligat rationem, sicut ebrietas, nisi forte sit tan- the reason, as drunkenness does, unless perchance it be so ta quod faciat hominem insanire. Et tamen passio con- vehement as to make a man insane. Yet the passion of concupiscentiae diminuit peccatum, quia levius est ex infir- cupiscence diminishes sin, because it is less grievous to sin mitate quam ex malitia peccare. through weakness than through malice.

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Question 151 Chastity Deinde considerandum est de castitate. Et primo, de We must next consider chastity: (1) The virtue itself of ipsa virtute castitatis; secundo, de virginitate, quae est chastity: (2) virginity, which is a part of chastity: (3) lust, pars castitatis; tertio, de luxuria, quae est vitium oppo- which is the contrary vice. Under the first head there are situm. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum castitas sit virtus. (1) Whether chastity is a virtue? Secundo, utrum sit virtus generalis. (2) Whether it is a general virtue? Tertio, utrum sit virtus distincta ab abstinentia. (3) Whether it is a virtue distinct from abstinence? Quarto, quomodo se habeat ad pudicitiam. (4) Of its relation to purity.

Article 1 Whether chastity is a virtue? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod castitas non sit virtus. Loquimur enim nunc de virtute animae. Sed castitas videtur ad corpus pertinere, dicitur enim aliquis castus ex eo quod aliqualiter se habet ad usum quarundam corporis partium. Ergo castitas non est virtus. Praeterea, virtus est habitus voluntarius, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed castitas non videtur esse aliquid voluntarium, cum per violentiam auferri videatur mulieribus violenter oppressis. Ergo videtur quod castitas non sit virtus. Praeterea, nulla virtus est in infidelibus. Sed aliqui infideles sunt casti. Non ergo castitas est virtus. Praeterea, fructus a virtutibus distinguuntur. Sed castitas ponitur inter fructus, ut patet Galat. V. Ergo castitas non est virtus. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de decem chordis, cum debeas in virtute praecedere uxorem, quoniam castitas est virtus, tu sub uno impetu libidinis cadis, et vis uxorem tuam esse victricem. Respondeo dicendum quod nomen castitatis sumitur ex hoc quod per rationem concupiscentia castigatur, quae ad modum pueri est refrenanda, ut patet per philosophum, in III Ethic. In hoc autem ratio virtutis humanae consistit quod sit aliquid secundum rationem modificatum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde manifestum est castitatem esse virtutem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod castitas consistit quidem sicut in subiecto, in anima, sed materiam habet in corpore. Pertinet enim ad castitatem ut secundum iudicium rationis et electionem voluntatis, aliquis moderate utatur corporalibus membris.

Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is not a virtue. For here we are treating of virtues of the soul. But chastity, seemingly, belongs to the body: for a person is said to be chaste because he behaves in a certain way as regards the use of certain parts of the body. Therefore chastity is not a virtue. Obj. 2: Further, virtue is a voluntary habit, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. But chastity, apparently, is not voluntary, since it can be taken away by force from a woman to whom violence is done. Therefore it seems that chastity is not a virtue. Obj. 3: Further, there is no virtue in unbelievers. Yet some unbelievers are chaste. Therefore chastity is not a virtue. Obj. 4: Further, the fruits are distinct from the virtues. But chastity is reckoned among the fruits (Gal 5:23). Therefore chastity is not a virtue. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Decem Chord.): Whereas thou shouldst excel thy wife in virtue, since chastity is a virtue, thou yieldest to the first onslaught of lust, while thou wishest thy wife to be victorious. I answer that, Chastity takes its name from the fact that reason chastises concupiscence, which, like a child, needs curbing, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12). Now the essence of human virtue consists in being something moderated by reason, as shown above (I-II, Q. 64, A. 1). Therefore it is evident that chastity is a virtue. Reply Obj. 1: Chastity does indeed reside in the soul as its subject, though its matter is in the body. For it belongs to chastity that a man make moderate use of bodily members in accordance with the judgment of his reason and the choice of his will.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in I de Civ. Dei, proposito animi permanente, per quod etiam corpus sanctificari meruit, nec ipsi corpori aufert sanctitatem violentia libidinis alienae, quam servat perseverantia continentiae suae. Et ibidem dicit quod est virtus animi, quae comitem habet fortitudinem, qua potius quaelibet mala tolerare quam malo consentire decernit. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in IV contra Iulian., absit ut sit in aliquo vera virtus, nisi fuerit iustus. Absit autem ut sit iustus vere, nisi vivat ex fide. Et ideo concludit quod in infidelibus neque est vera castitas, neque aliqua alia virtus, quia scilicet non referuntur ad debitum finem. Et sicut ibidem subdit, non officiis, idest actibus, sed finibus a vitiis discernuntur virtutes. Ad quartum dicendum quod castitas, inquantum est quidem secundum rationem operans, habet rationem virtutis, inquantum autem habet delectationem in suo actu, connumeratur inter fructus.

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Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), So long as her mind holds to its purpose, whereby she has merited to be holy even in body, not even the violence of another’s lust can deprive her body of its holiness, which is safeguarded by her persevering continency. He also says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that in the mind there is a virtue which is the companion of fortitude, whereby it is resolved to suffer any evil whatsoever rather than consent to evil. Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), It is impossible to have any true virtue unless one be truly just; nor is it possible to be just unless one live by faith. Whence he argues that in unbelievers there is neither true chastity, nor any other virtue, because, to wit, they are not referred to the due end, and as he adds (Contra Julian. iv, 3) virtues are distinguished from vices not by their functions, i.e., their acts, but by their ends. Reply Obj. 4: Chastity is a virtue insofar as it works in accordance with reason, but insofar as it delights in its act, it is reckoned among the fruits.

Article 2 Whether chastity is a general virtue? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod castitas sit virtus generalis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de mendacio, quod castitas animi est ordinatus animi motus, non subdens maiora minoribus. Sed hoc pertinet ad quamlibet virtutem. Ergo castitas est generalis virtus. Praeterea, nomen castitatis a castigatione sumitur. Sed quilibet motus appetitivae partis debet castigari a ratione. Cum ergo per quamlibet virtutem moralem refrenetur aliquis appetitivus motus, videtur quod quaelibet virtus moralis sit castitas. Praeterea, castitati fornicatio opponitur. Sed fornicatio videtur pertinere ad omne genus peccati, dicitur enim in Psalmo, perdes omnes qui fornicantur abs te. Ergo castitas est virtus generalis. Sed contra est quod Macrobius ponit eam partem temperantiae. Respondeo dicendum quod nomen castitatis dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo, proprie. Et sic est quaedam specialis virtus, habens specialem materiam, scilicet concupiscentias delectabilium quae sunt in venereis. Alio modo nomen castitatis accipitur metaphorice. Sicut enim in corporis commixtione consistit delectatio venereorum, circa quam proprie est castitas et oppositum vitium, scilicet luxuria; ita etiam in quadam spirituali coniunctione mentis ad res aliquas consistit quaedam delectatio, circa quam est quaedam spiritualis castitas metaphorice dicta, vel etiam spiritualis fornicatio, similiter metaphorice dicta. Si enim mens hominis delectetur

Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is a general virtue. For Augustine says (De Mendacio xx) that chastity of the mind is the well-ordered movement of the mind that does not prefer the lesser to the greater things. But this belongs to every virtue. Therefore chastity is a general virtue. Obj. 2: Further, Chastity takes its name from chastisement. Now every movement of the appetitive part should be chastised by reason. Since, then, every moral virtue curbs some movement of the appetite, it seems that every moral virtue is chastity. Obj. 3: Further, chastity is opposed to fornication. But fornication seems to belong to every kind of sin: for it is written (Ps 72:27): Thou shalt destroy all them that go awhoring from Thee. Therefore chastity is a general virtue. On the contrary, Macrobius reckons it to be a part of temperance. I answer that, The word chastity is employed in two ways. First, properly; and thus it is a special virtue having a special matter, namely the concupiscences relating to venereal pleasures. Second, the word chastity is employed metaphorically: for just as a mingling of bodies conduces to venereal pleasure which is the proper matter of chastity and of lust its contrary vice, so too the spiritual union of the mind with certain things conduces to a pleasure which is the matter of a spiritual chastity metaphorically speaking, as well as of a spiritual fornication likewise metaphorically so called. For if the human mind delight in the spiritual union with that to which it behooves it to be united,

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in spirituali coniunctione ad id cui debet coniungi, scilicet ad Deum; et abstinet se ne delectabiliter aliis coniungatur, contra debitum divini ordinis, dicetur castitas spiritualis, secundum illud II ad Cor. XI, despondi vos uni viro, virginem castam exhibere Christo. Si autem delectabiliter, contra debitum divini ordinis, coniungatur mens quibuscumque aliis rebus, dicetur fornicatio spiritualis, secundum illud Ierem. III, tu autem fornicata es cum amatoribus multis. Et hoc modo accipiendo castitatem, castitas est generalis virtus, quia per quamlibet virtutem retrahitur mens humana ne rebus illicitis delectabiliter coniungatur. Principaliter tamen ratio huius castitatis consistit in caritate et in aliis virtutibus theologicis, quibus mens hominis coniungitur Deo. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de castitate metaphorice dicta. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, concupiscentia delectabilis maxime assimilatur puero, eo quod appetitus delectabilis est nobis connaturalis, et praecipue delectabilium secundum tactum, quae ordinantur ad conservationem naturae; et inde est quod, si nutriatur horum delectabilium concupiscentia per hoc quod ei consentiatur, maxime augebitur, sicut puer qui suae voluntati relinquitur. Et sic concupiscentia horum delectabilium maxime indiget castigari. Et ideo circa huiusmodi concupiscentias antonomastice dicitur castitas, sicut et fortitudo est circa ea in quibus maxime indigemus animi firmitate. Ad tertium dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de fornicatione spirituali metaphorice dicta, quae opponitur spirituali castitati, ut dictum est.

Q. 151, A. 3

namely God, and refrains from delighting in union with other things against the requirements of the order established by God, this may be called a spiritual chastity, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste virgin to Christ. If, on the other hand, the mind be united to any other things whatsoever, against the prescription of the Divine order, it will be called spiritual fornication, according to Jer. 3:1, But thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers. Taking chastity in this sense, it is a general virtue, because every virtue withdraws the human mind from delighting in a union with unlawful things. Nevertheless, the essence of this chastity consists principally in charity and the other theological virtues, whereby the human mind is united to God. Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes chastity in the metaphorical sense. Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (A. 1; Q. 142, A. 2), the concupiscence of that which gives pleasure is especially likened to a child, because the desire of pleasure is connatural to us, especially of pleasures of touch which are directed to the maintenance of nature. Hence it is that if the concupiscence of such pleasures be fostered by consenting to it, it will wax very strong, as in the case of a child left to his own will. Wherefore the concupiscence of these pleasures stands in very great need of being chastised: and consequently chastity is applied antonomastically to such like concupiscences, even as fortitude is about those matters wherein we stand in the greatest need of strength of mind. Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers spiritual fornication metaphorically so called, which is opposed to spiritual chastity, as stated.

Article 3 Whether chastity is a distinct virtue from abstinence? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod castitas non sit virtus distincta ab abstinentia. Quia circa materiam unius generis sufficit una virtus. Sed unius generis esse videntur quae pertinent ad unum sensum. Cum igitur delectatio ciborum, circa quam est abstinentia, et delectatio venereorum, circa quam est castitas, pertineant ad tactum, videtur quod castitas non sit alia virtus ab abstinentia. Praeterea, philosophus, in III Ethic., omnia vitia intemperantiae assimilat puerilibus peccatis, quae castigatione indigent. Sed castitas nominatur a castigatione vitiorum oppositorum. Ergo, cum per abstinentiam cohibeantur quaedam vitia intemperantiae, videtur quod abstinentia sit castitas. Praeterea, delectationes aliorum sensuum pertinent ad temperantiam inquantum ordinantur ad delec-

Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is not a distinct virtue from abstinence. Because where the matter is generically the same, one virtue suffices. Now it would seem that things pertaining to the same sense are of one genus. Therefore, since pleasures of the palate which are the matter of abstinence, and venereal pleasures which are the matter of chastity, pertain to the touch, it seems that chastity is not a distinct virtue from abstinence. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12) likens all vices of intemperance to childish sins, which need chastising. Now chastity takes its name from chastisement of the contrary vices. Since then certain vices are bridled by abstinence, it seems that abstinence is chastity. Obj. 3: Further, the pleasures of the other senses are the concern of temperance insofar as they refer to plea-

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tationes tactus, circa quas est temperantia. Sed delectationes ciborum, circa quas est abstinentia, ordinantur ad delectationes venereorum, circa quas est castitas, unde Hieronymus dicit, venter et genitalia sibimetipsis vicina sunt, ut ex vicinitate membrorum confederatio intelligatur vitiorum. Ergo abstinentia et castitas non sunt virtutes ab invicem distinctae.

sures of touch; which are the matter of temperance. Now pleasures of the palate, which are the matter of abstinence, are directed to venereal pleasures, which are the matter of chastity: wherefore Jerome says, commenting on Titus 1:7, Not given to wine, no striker, etc.: The belly and the organs of generation are neighbors, that the neighborhood of the organs may indicate their complicity in vice. Therefore abstinence and chastity are not distinct virtues. Sed contra est quod apostolus, II ad Cor. VI, conOn the contrary, The Apostle (2 Cor 6:5, 6) reckons numerat castitatem ieiuniis, quae ad abstinentiam perti- chastity together with fastings which pertain to abstinence.

nent. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, temperantia proprie est circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus. Et ideo oportet ut ubi sunt diversae rationes delectationis, ibi sint diversae virtutes sub temperantia comprehensae. Delectationes autem proportionantur operationibus, quarum sunt perfectiones, ut dicitur X Ethic. Manifestum est autem quod alterius generis sunt operationes pertinentes ad usum ciborum, quibus natura individui conservatur; et operationes pertinentes ad usum venereorum, quibus conservatur natura speciei. Et ideo castitas, quae est circa delectationes venereorum, est virtus distincta ab abstinentia, quae est circa delectationes ciborum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod temperantia non consistit principaliter circa delectationes tactus quantum ad iudicium sensus de tangibilibus, quod est eiusdem rationis in omnibus, sed quantum ad ipsum usum tangibilium, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Est autem alia ratio utendi cibis et potibus, et venereis. Et ideo oportet esse diversas virtutes, licet sint unius sensus. Ad secundum dicendum quod delectationes venereae sunt vehementiores et magis opprimentes rationem quam delectationes ciborum. Et propter hoc magis indigent castigatione et refrenatione, quia si eis consentiatur, magis ex hoc increscit vis concupiscentiae, et deiicitur virtus mentis. Unde dicit Augustinus, in I Soliloq., nihil esse sentio quod magis ex arce deiiciat animum virilem quam blandimenta feminae, corporumque ille contactus sine quo uxor haberi non potest. Ad tertium dicendum quod delectationes aliorum sensuum non pertinent ad naturam hominis conservandam, nisi prout ordinantur ad delectabilia tactus. Et ideo circa huiusmodi delectationes non est aliqua alia virtus sub temperantia comprehensa. Sed delectationes ciborum, quamvis aliqualiter ordinentur ad delectationes venereorum, tamen etiam per se ordinantur ad vitam hominis conservandam. Et ideo etiam per se habent specialem virtutem, quamvis illa virtus, quae abstinentia dicitur, ordinet actum suum ad finem castitatis.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 141, A. 4), temperance is properly about the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch: so that where there are different kinds of pleasure, there are different virtues comprised under temperance. Now pleasures are proportionate to the actions whose perfections they are, as stated in Ethic. ix, 4, 5: and it is evident that actions connected with the use of food whereby the nature of the individual is maintained differ generically from actions connected with the use of matters venereal, whereby the nature of the species is preserved. Therefore chastity, which is about venereal pleasures, is a distinct virtue from abstinence, which is about pleasures of the palate. Reply Obj. 1: Temperance is chiefly about pleasures of touch, not as regards the sense’s judgment concerning the objects of touch, which judgment is of uniform character concerning all such objects, but as regards the use itself of those objects, as stated in Ethic. iii, 10. Now the uses of meats, drinks, and venereal matters differ in character. Wherefore there must needs be different virtues, though they regard the one sense. Reply Obj. 2: Venereal pleasures are more impetuous, and are more oppressive on the reason than the pleasures of the palate: and therefore they are in greater need of chastisement and restraint, since if one consent to them this increases the force of concupiscence and weakens the strength of the mind. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its heights as the fondling of women, and those bodily contacts which belong to the married state. Reply Obj. 3: The pleasures of the other senses do not pertain to the maintenance of man’s nature, except insofar as they are directed to pleasures of touch. Wherefore in the matter of such pleasures there is no other virtue comprised under temperance. But the pleasures of the palate, though directed somewhat to venereal pleasures, are essentially directed to the preservation of man’s life: wherefore by their very nature they have a special virtue, although this virtue which is called abstinence directs its act to chastity as its end.

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Q. 151, A. 4

Article 4 Whether purity belongs especially to chastity? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pudicitia non pertineat specialiter ad castitatem. Dicit enim Augustinus, in I de Civ. Dei, quod pudicitia est quaedam virtus animae. Non ergo est aliquid ad castitatem pertinens, sed est per seipsam virtus a castitate distincta. Praeterea, pudicitia a pudore dicitur, qui videtur idem esse verecundiae. Sed verecundia, secundum Damascenum, est de turpi actu, quod convenit omni actui vitioso. Ergo pudicitia non magis pertinet ad castitatem quam ad alias virtutes. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod omnis intemperantia generaliter est maxime exprobrabilis. Sed ad pudicitiam pertinere videtur fugere ea quae exprobrabilia sunt. Ergo pudicitia pertinet ad omnes partes temperantiae, non autem specialiter ad castitatem. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de perseverantia, praedicanda est pudicitia, ut ab eo qui habet aures audiendi, nihil genitalibus membris illicitum perpetretur. Sed usus genitalium membrorum proprie pertinet ad castitatem. Ergo pudicitia proprie ad castitatem pertinet. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, nomen pudicitiae a pudore sumitur, in quo verecundia significatur. Et ideo oportet quod pudicitia proprie sit circa illa de quibus homines magis verecundantur. Maxime autem verecundantur homines de actibus venereis, ut Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, in tantum quod etiam concubitus coniugalis, qui honestate nuptiarum decoratur, verecundia non careat. Et hoc ideo quia motus genitalium membrorum non subditur imperio rationis, sicut motus aliorum exteriorum membrorum. Verecundatur autem homo non solum de illa mixtione venerea, sed etiam de quibuscumque signis eius, ut philosophus dicit, in II Rhet. Et ideo pudicitia attenditur proprie circa venerea, et praecipue circa signa venereorum, sicut sunt aspectus impudici, oscula et tactus. Et quia haec magis solent deprehendi, ideo pudicitia magis respicit huiusmodi exteriora signa, castitas autem magis ipsam veneream commixtionem. Et ideo pudicitia ad castitatem ordinatur, non quasi virtus ab ipsa distincta, sed sicut exprimens castitatis circumstantiam quandam. Interdum tamen unum pro alio ponitur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ibi accipit pudicitiam pro castitate. Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis omnia vitia habeant turpitudinem quandam, specialiter tamen vitia intemperantiae, ut ex supra dictis patet.

Objection 1: It would seem that purity does not belong especially to chastity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that purity is a virtue of the soul. Therefore it is not something belonging to chastity, but is of itself a virtue distinct from chastity. Obj. 2: Further, pudicitia (purity) is derived from pudor, which is equivalent to shame. Now shame, according to Damascene, is about a disgraceful act, and this is common to all sinful acts. Therefore purity belongs no more to chastity than to the other virtues. Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that every kind of intemperance is most deserving of reproach. Now it would seem to belong to purity to avoid all that is deserving of reproach. Therefore purity belongs to all the parts of temperance, and not especially to chastity. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perseverantia xx): We must give praise to purity, that he who has ears to hear, may put to none but a lawful use the organs intended for procreation. Now the use of these organs is the proper matter of chastity. Therefore purity belongs properly to chastity. I answer that, As stated above (Obj. 2), pudicitia (purity) takes its name from pudor, which signifies shame. Hence purity must needs be properly about the things of which man is most ashamed. Now men are most ashamed of venereal acts, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. Dei xiv, 18), so much so that even the conjugal act, which is adorned by the honesty of marriage, is not devoid of shame: and this because the movement of the organs of generation is not subject to the command of reason, as are the movements of the other external members. Now man is ashamed not only of this sexual union but also of all the signs thereof, as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 6). Consequently purity regards venereal matters properly, and especially the signs thereof, such as impure looks, kisses, and touches. And since the latter are more wont to be observed, purity regards rather these external signs, while chastity regards rather sexual union. Therefore purity is directed to chastity, not as a virtue distinct therefrom, but as expressing a circumstance of chastity. Nevertheless the one is sometimes used to designate the other. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is here speaking of purity as designating chastity. Reply Obj. 2: Although every vice has a certain disgrace, the vices of intemperance are especially disgraceful, as stated above (Q. 142, A. 4).

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Ad tertium dicendum quod inter vitia intempeReply Obj. 3: Among the vices of intemperance, venerantiae praecipue sunt exprobrabilia peccata venerea. real sins are most deserving of reproach, both on account of Tum propter inobedientiam genitalium membrorum. the insubordination of the genital organs, and because by Tum propter hoc quod ratio ab huiusmodi maxime ab- these sins especially, the reason is absorbed. sorbetur.

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Question 152 Virginity Deinde considerandum est de virginitate. Et circa We must now consider virginity: and under this head hoc quaeruntur quinque. there are five points of inquiry: Primo, in quo consistit virginitas. (1) In what does virginity consist? Secundo, utrum sit licita. (2) Whether it is lawful? Tertio, utrum sit virtus. (3) Whether it is a virtue? Quarto, de excellentia eius respectu matrimonii. (4) Of its excellence in comparison with marriage; Quinto, de excellentia eius respectu aliarum (5) Of its excellence in comparison with the other virtutum. virtues.

Article 1 Whether virginity consists in integrity of the flesh? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virginitas non consistat in integritate carnis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Nupt. et Concup., quod virginitas est in carne corruptibili incorruptionis perpetua meditatio. Sed meditatio non pertinet ad carnem. Ergo virginitas non consistit in carne. Praeterea, virginitas pudicitiam quandam importat. Sed Augustinus dicit, in I de Civ. Dei, quod pudicitia consistit in anima. Ergo virginitas non consistit in carnis incorruptione. Praeterea, carnis integritas videtur consistere in signaculo virginalis pudoris. Sed quandoque absque virginitatis praeiudicio frangitur illud signaculum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in I de Civ. Dei, quod membra illa possunt diversis casibus vulnerata vim perpeti; et medici aliquando, saluti opitulantes, haec ibi faciunt quae horret aspectus; obstetrix etiam virginis cuiusdam integritatem manu velut explorans, dum inspicit, perdidit. Et subdit, non opinor quemquam tam stulte sapere ut huic periisse aliquid existimet etiam de ipsius corporis sanctitate, quamvis membri illius integritate iam perdita. Ergo virginitas non consistit in carnis incorruptione. Praeterea, corruptio carnis maxime in seminis resolutione consistit, quae potest fieri sine concubitu, vel in dormiendo vel in vigilando. Sed sine concubitu non videtur perdi virginitas, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Virginit., quod virginalis integritas, et per piam continentiam ab omni concubitu immunitas, angelica portio est. Ergo virginitas non consistit in carnis incorruptione.

Objection 1: It would seem that virginity does not consist in integrity of the flesh. For Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup.) that virginity is the continual meditation on incorruption in a corruptible flesh. But meditation does not concern the flesh. Therefore virginity is not situated in the flesh. Obj. 2: Further, virginity denotes a kind of purity. Now Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that purity dwells in the soul. Therefore virginity is not incorruption of the flesh.

Obj. 3: Further, the integrity of the flesh would seem to consist in the seal of virginal purity. Yet sometimes the seal is broken without loss of virginity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that those organs may be injured through being wounded by mischance. Physicians, too, sometimes do for the sake of health that which makes one shudder to see: and a midwife has been known to destroy by touch the proof of virginity that she sought. And he adds: Nobody, I think, would be so foolish as to deem this maiden to have forfeited even bodily sanctity, though she lost the integrity of that organ. Therefore virginity does not consist in incorruption of the flesh. Obj. 4: Further, corruption of the flesh consists chiefly in resolution of the semen: and this may take place without copulation, whether one be asleep or awake. Yet seemingly virginity is not lost without copulation: for Augustine says (De Virgin. xiii) that virginal integrity and holy continency that refrains from all sexual intercourse is the portion of angels. Therefore virginity does not consist in incorruption of the flesh. Sed contra est quod Augustinus, in eodem libro, On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) dicit quod virginitas est continentia qua integritas carnis that virginity is continence whereby integrity of the flesh is

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ipsi creatori animae et carnis vovetur, consecratur, servatur. Respondeo dicendum quod nomen virginitatis a virore sumptum videtur. Et sicut illud dicitur virens in suo virore persistere quod non est ex superabundantia caloris adustionem expertum, ita etiam virginitas hoc importat, quod persona cui inest immunis sit a concupiscentiae adustione, quae esse videtur in consummatione maximae delectationis corporalis, qualis est venereorum delectatio. Unde Ambrosius dicit, in libro de virginitate, quod castitas virginalis est expers contagionis integritas. In delectatione autem venereorum tria est considerare. Unum quidem quod est ex parte corporis, scilicet violatio signaculi virginalis. Aliud autem est in quo coniungitur id quod est animae cum eo quod est corporis, scilicet ipsa resolutio seminis delectationem sensibilem causans. Tertium autem est solum ex parte animae, scilicet propositum perveniendi ad talem delectationem. In quibus tribus, id quod primo positum est, per accidens se habet ad moralem actum, qui non consideratur per se nisi secundum ea quae sunt animae. Secundum vero materialiter se habet ad actum moralem, nam sensibiles passiones sunt materia moralium actuum. Tertium vero se habet formaliter et completive, quia ratio moralium in eo quod est rationis completur. Quia igitur virginitas dicitur per remotionem praedictae corruptionis, consequens est quod integritas membri corporalis per accidens se habeat ad virginitatem. Ipsa autem immunitas a delectatione quae consistit in seminis resolutione, se habet materialiter. Ipsum autem propositum perpetuo abstinendi a tali delectatione se habet formaliter et completive in virginitate. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa definitio Augustini tangit quidem in recto id quod est formale in virginitate, nam per meditationem intelligitur propositum rationis. Quod autem additur, perpetua, non sic intelligitur quod oporteat virginem semper actu talem meditationem habere, sed quia hoc debet in proposito gerere, ut perpetuo in hoc perseveret. Id vero quod est materiale, tangitur in obliquo, cum dicitur, incorruptionis in carne corruptibili. Quod additur ad ostendendam virginitatis difficultatem, nam si caro corrumpi non posset, non esset difficile perpetuam incorruptionis meditationem habere. Ad secundum dicendum quod pudicitia est quidem essentialiter in anima, materialiter autem in carne, et similiter virginitas. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de Virginit., quod licet virginitas in carne servetur, ac per hoc corporalis sit, tamen spiritualis est quam vovet et servat continentia pietatis. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, integritas corporalis membri per accidens se habet ad virginitatem, inquantum scilicet per hoc quod ex proposito voluntatis abstinet quis a delectatione venerea, remanet

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vowed, consecrated and observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and flesh. I answer that, Virginity takes its name apparently from viror (freshness), and just as a thing is described as fresh and retaining its freshness, so long as it is not parched by excessive heat, so too, virginity denotes that the person possessed thereof is unseared by the heat of concupiscence which is experienced in achieving the greatest bodily pleasure which is that of sexual intercourse. Hence, Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 5) that virginal chastity is integrity free of pollution. Now venereal pleasures offer three points for consideration. The first is on the part of the body, viz. the violation of the seal of virginity. The second is the link between that which concerns the soul and that which concerns the body, and this is the resolution of the semen, causing sensible pleasure. The third is entirely on the part of the soul, namely the purpose of attaining this pleasure. Of these three the first is accidental to the moral act, which as such must be considered in reference to the soul. The second stands in the relation of matter to the moral act, since the sensible passions are the matters of moral acts. But the third stands in the position of form and complement, because the essence of morality is perfected in that which concerns the reason. Since then virginity consists in freedom from the aforesaid corruption, it follows that the integrity of the bodily organ is accidental to virginity; while freedom from pleasure in resolution of the semen is related thereto materially; and the purpose of perpetually abstaining from this pleasure is the formal and completive element in virginity.

Reply Obj. 1: This definition of Augustine’s expresses directly that which is formal in virginity. For meditation denotes reason’s purpose; and the addition perpetual does not imply that a virgin must always retain this meditation actually, but that she should bear in mind the purpose of always persevering therein. The material element is expressed indirectly by the words on incorruption in a corruptible body. This is added to show the difficulty of virginity: for if the flesh were incorruptible, it would not be difficult to maintain a perpetual meditation on incorruption.

Reply Obj. 2: It is true that purity, as to its essence, is in the soul; but as to its matter, it is in the body: and it is the same with virginity. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that although virginity resides in the flesh, and for this reason is a bodily quality, yet it is a spiritual thing, which a holy continency fosters and preserves. Reply Obj. 3: As stated above, the integrity of a bodily organ is accidental to virginity, insofar as a person, through purposely abstaining from venereal pleasure, retains the integrity of a bodily organ. Hence if the organ lose its integrity

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integritas in membro corporeo. Unde si contingat quod per alium modum aliquo casu membri integritas corrumpatur, non magis praeiudicat virginitati quam si corrumpatur manus aut pes. Ad quartum dicendum quod delectatio quae est ex seminis resolutione dupliciter potest contingere. Uno modo, ut procedat ex mentis proposito. Et sic tollit virginitatem, sive fiat per concubitum sive absque concubitu. Facit autem mentionem Augustinus de concubitu, quia huiusmodi resolutio communiter et naturaliter ex concubitu causatur. Alio modo potest provenire praeter propositum mentis, vel in dormiendo; vel per violentiam illatam, cui mens non consentit, quamvis caro delectationem experiatur; vel etiam ex infirmitate naturae, ut patet in his qui fluxum seminis patiuntur. Et sic non perditur virginitas, quia talis pollutio non accidit per impudicitiam, quam virginitas excludit.

Q. 152, A. 2

by chance in some other way, this is no more prejudicial to virginity than being deprived of a hand or foot.

Reply Obj. 4: Pleasure resulting from resolution of semen may arise in two ways. If this be the result of the mind’s purpose, it destroys virginity, whether copulation takes place or not. Augustine, however, mentions copulation, because such like resolution is the ordinary and natural result thereof. In another way this may happen beside the purpose of the mind, either during sleep, or through violence and without the mind’s consent, although the flesh derives pleasure from it, or again through weakness of nature, as in the case of those who are subject to a flow of semen. In such cases virginity is not forfeit, because such like pollution is not the result of impurity which excludes virginity.

Article 2 Whether virginity is unlawful? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virginitas sit illicita. Omne enim quod contrariatur praecepto legis naturae est illicitum sed sicut praeceptum legis naturae ad conservationem individui est quod tangitur Gen. II, de omni ligno quod est in Paradiso, comede; ita etiam praeceptum legis naturae est ad conservationem speciei, quod ponitur Gen. I, crescite et multiplicamini, et replete terram. Ergo, sicut peccaret qui abstineret ab omni cibo, utpote faciens contra bonum individui; ita etiam peccat qui omnino abstinet ab actu generationis, utpote faciens contra bonum speciei.

Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is unlawful. For whatever is contrary to a precept of the natural law is unlawful. Now just as the words of Gen. 2:16, Of every tree that is in paradise, thou shalt eat, indicate a precept of the natural law, in reference to the preservation of the individual, so also the words of Gen. 1:28, Increase and multiply, and fill the earth, express a precept of the natural law, in reference to the preservation of the species. Therefore just as it would be a sin to abstain from all food, as this would be to act counter to the good of the individual, so too it is a sin to abstain altogether from the act of procreation, for this is to act against the good of the species. Obj. 2: Further, whatever declines from the mean of virtue is apparently sinful. Now virginity declines from the mean of virtue, since it abstains from all venereal pleasures: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2), that he who revels in every pleasure, and abstains from not even one, is intemperate: but he who refrains from all is loutish and insensible. Therefore virginity is something sinful. Obj. 3: Further, punishment is not due save for a vice. Now in olden times those were punished who led a celibate life, as Valerius Maximus asserts. Hence according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. iii) Plato is said to have sacrificed to nature, in order that he might atone for his perpetual continency as though it were a sin. Therefore virginity is a sin.

Praeterea, omne id quod recedit a medio virtutis videtur esse vitiosum. Sed virginitas recedit a medio virtutis ab omnibus delectationibus venereis abstinens, dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod qui omni voluptate potitur, neque ab una recedit, intemperatus est; qui autem omnes fugit, agrestis est et insensibilis. Ergo virginitas est aliquid vitiosum. Praeterea, poena non debetur nisi vitio. Sed apud antiquos puniebantur secundum leges illi qui semper caelibem vitam ducebant, ut maximus Valerius dicit. Unde et Plato, secundum Augustinum, in libro de vera Relig., sacrificasse dicitur ut perpetua eius continentia tanquam peccatum aboleretur. Ergo virginitas est peccatum. Sed contra, nullum peccatum recte cadit sub conOn the contrary, No sin is a matter of direct counsilio. Sed virginitas recte cadit sub consilio, dicitur enim sel. But virginity is a matter of direct counsel: for it is writI ad Cor. VII, de virginibus autem praeceptum domini ten (1 Cor 7:25): Concerning virgins I have no command-

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non habeo, consilium autem do. Ergo virginitas non est aliquid illicitum. Respondeo dicendum quod in humanis actibus illud est vitiosum quod est praeter rationem rectam. Habet autem hoc ratio recta, ut his quae sunt ad finem utatur aliquis secundum eam mensuram qua congruit fini. Est autem triplex hominis bonum, ut dicitur in I Ethic., unum quidem quod consistit in exterioribus rebus, puta divitiis; aliud autem quod consistit in bonis corporis; tertium autem quod consistit in bonis animae, inter quae et bona contemplativae vitae sunt potiora bonis vitae activae, ut philosophus probat, in X Ethic., et dominus dicit, Lucae X, Maria optimam partem elegit. Quorum bonorum exteriora quidem ordinantur ad ea quae sunt corporis; ea vero quae sunt corporis, ad ea quae sunt animae; et ulterius ea quae sunt vitae activae, ad ea quae sunt vitae contemplativae. Pertinet igitur ad rectitudinem rationis ut aliquis utatur exterioribus bonis secundum eam mensuram qua competit corpori, et similiter de aliis. Unde si quis abstineat ab aliquibus possidendis, quae alias esset bonum possidere, ut consulat saluti corporali, vel etiam contemplationi veritatis, non esset hoc vitiosum, sed secundum rationem rectam. Et similiter si quis abstineat a delectationibus corporalibus ut liberius vacet contemplationi veritatis, pertinet hoc ad rectitudinem rationis. Ad hoc autem pia virginitas ab omni delectatione venerea abstinet, ut liberius divinae contemplationi vacet, dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. VII, mulier innupta et virgo cogitat quae domini sunt, ut sit sancta et corpore et spiritu, quae autem nupta est, cogitat quae sunt mundi, quomodo placeat viro. Unde relinquitur quod virginitas non est aliquid vitiosum, sed potius laudabile.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praeceptum habet rationem debiti, ut supra dictum est. Dupliciter autem est aliquid debitum. Uno modo ut impleatur ab uno, et hoc debitum sine peccato praeteriri non potest. Aliud autem est debitum implendum a multitudine. Et ad tale debitum implendum non tenetur quilibet de multitudine, multa enim sunt multitudini necessaria ad quae implenda unus non sufficit, sed implentur a multitudine dum unus hoc, alius illud facit. Praeceptum igitur legis naturae homini datum de comestione, necesse est quod ab unoquoque impleatur, aliter enim individuum conservari non posset. Sed praeceptum datum de generatione respicit totam multitudinem hominum, cui necessarium est non solum quod multiplicetur corporaliter, sed etiam quod spiritualiter proficiat. Et ideo sufficienter providetur humanae multitudini si quidam carnali generationi operam dent, quidam vero, ab hac abstinentes, contemplationi divinorum vacent, ad totius humani generis pulchritudinem et salutem. Sicut etiam in exercitu quidam castra custodiunt, quidam signa deferunt,

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ment of the Lord: but I give counsel. Therefore virginity is not an unlawful thing. I answer that, In human acts, those are sinful which are against right reason. Now right reason requires that things directed to an end should be used in a measure proportionate to that end. Again, man’s good is threefold as stated in Ethic. i, 8; one consisting in external things, for instance riches; another, consisting in bodily goods; the third, consisting in the goods of the soul among which the goods of the contemplative life take precedence of the goods of the active life, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. x, 7), and as our Lord declared (Luke 10:42), Mary hath chosen the better part. Of these goods those that are external are directed to those which belong to the body, and those which belong to the body are directed to those which belong to the soul; and furthermore those which belong to the active life are directed to those which belong to the life of contemplation. Accordingly, right reason dictates that one use external goods in a measure proportionate to the body, and in like manner as regards the rest. Wherefore if a man refrain from possessing certain things (which otherwise it were good for him to possess), for the sake of his body’s good, or of the contemplation of truth, this is not sinful, but in accord with right reason. In like manner if a man abstain from bodily pleasures, in order more freely to give himself to the contemplation of truth, this is in accordance with the rectitude of reason. Now holy virginity refrains from all venereal pleasure in order more freely to have leisure for Divine contemplation: for the Apostle says (1 Cor 7:34): The unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord: that she may be holy in both body and in spirit. But she that is married thinketh on the things of the world, how she may please her husband. Therefore it follows that virginity instead of being sinful is worthy of praise. Reply Obj. 1: A precept implies a duty, as stated above (Q. 122, A. 1). Now there are two kinds of duty. There is the duty that has to be fulfilled by one person; and a duty of this kind cannot be set aside without sin. The other duty has to be fulfilled by the multitude, and the fulfilment of this kind of duty is not binding on each one of the multitude. For the multitude has many obligations which cannot be discharged by the individual; but are fulfilled by one person doing this, and another doing that. Accordingly the precept of natural law which binds man to eat must needs be fulfilled by each individual, otherwise the individual cannot be sustained. On the other hand, the precept of procreation regards the whole multitude of men, which needs not only to multiply in body, but also to advance spiritually. Wherefore sufficient provision is made for the human multitude, if some betake themselves to carnal procreation, while others abstaining from this betake themselves to the contemplation of Divine things, for the beauty and welfare of the whole human race. Thus too in an army, some take sentry duty, others are standard-bearers, and others fight with the

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Q. 152, A. 3

quidam gladiis decertant, quae tamen omnia debita sunt multitudini, sed per unum impleri non possunt. Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui abstinet ab omnibus delectationibus praeter rationem rectam, quasi delectationes secundum se abhorrens, est insensibilis, sicut agricola. Virgo autem non abstinet ab omni delectatione, sed solum a delectatione venerea, et ab hac abstinet secundum rationem rectam, ut dictum est. Medium autem virtutis non secundum quantitatem, sed secundum rationem rectam determinatur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Unde de magnanimo dicitur, in IV Ethic., quod est magnitudine extremus, eo autem quod ut oportet, medius.

sword: yet all these things are necessary for the multitude, although they cannot be done by one person. Reply Obj. 2: The person who, beside the dictate of right reason, abstains from all pleasures through aversion, as it were, for pleasure as such, is insensible as a country lout. But a virgin does not refrain from every pleasure, but only from that which is venereal: and abstains therefrom according to right reason, as stated above. Now the mean of virtue is fixed with reference, not to quantity but to right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6: wherefore it is said of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3) that in point of quantity he goes to the extreme, but in point of becomingness he follows the mean. Ad tertium dicendum quod leges feruntur secunReply Obj. 3: Laws are framed according to what ocdum ea quae ut in pluribus accidunt. Hoc autem rarum curs more frequently. Now it seldom happened in olden erat apud antiquos, ut aliquis amore veritatis contem- times that anyone refrained from all venereal pleasure plandae ab omni delectatione venerea abstineret, quod through love of the contemplation of truth: as Plato alone solus Plato legitur fecisse. Unde non sacrificavit quasi is related to have done. Hence it was not through thinking hoc peccatum reputaret, sed perversae opinioni civium this a sin, that he offered sacrifice, but because he yielded to cedens, ut ibidem Augustinus dicit. the false opinion of his fellow countrymen, as Augustine remarks (De Vera Relig. iii).

Article 3 Whether virginity is a virtue? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod virginitas non sit virtus. Nulla enim virtus inest nobis a natura, ut philosophus dicit, in II Ethic. Sed virginitas inest a natura, quilibet enim mox natus virgo est. Ergo virginitas non est virtus. Praeterea, quicumque habet unam virtutem, habet omnes, ut supra habitum est. Sed aliqui habent alias virtutes qui non habent virginitatem, alioquin, cum sine virtute nullus ad regnum caelorum perveniat, nullus sine virginitate ad ipsum posset pervenire; quod esset matrimonium damnare. Ergo virginitas non est virtus. Praeterea, omnis virtus restituitur per poenitentiam. Sed virginitas non reparatur per poenitentiam, unde Hieronymus dicit, cum cetera Deus possit, non potest virginem post ruinam reparare. Ergo videtur quod virginitas non sit virtus. Praeterea, nulla virtus perditur sine peccato. Sed virginitas perditur sine peccato, scilicet per matrimonium. Ergo virginitas non est virtus. Praeterea, virginitas condividitur viduitati et pudicitiae coniugali. Sed neutrum illorum ponitur virtus. Ergo virginitas non est virtus. Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de Virginit., invitat virginitatis amor ut aliquid de virginitate dicamus, ne veluti transitu quodam perstricta videatur quae principalis est virtus.

Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is not a virtue. For no virtue is in us by nature, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1). Now virginity is in us by nature, since all are virgins when born. Therefore virginity is not a virtue. Obj. 2: Further, whoever has one virtue has all virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). Yet some have other virtues without having virginity: else, since none can go to the heavenly kingdom without virtue, no one could go there without virginity, which would involve the condemnation of marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue. Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is recovered by penance. But virginity is not recovered by penance: wherefore Jerome says: Other things God can do, but He cannot restore the virgin after her downfall. Therefore seemingly virginity is not a virtue. Obj. 4: Further, no virtue is lost without sin. Yet virginity is lost without sin, namely by marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue. Obj. 5: Further, virginity is condivided with widowhood and conjugal purity. But neither of these is a virtue. Therefore virginity is not a virtue. On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 3): Love of virginity moves us to say something about virginity, lest by passing it over we should seem to cast a slight on what is a virtue of high degree.

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Q. 152, A. 3

Temperance

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in virginitate est sicut formale et completivum propositum perpetuo abstinendi a delectatione venerea, quod quidem propositum laudabile redditur ex fine, inquantum scilicet hoc fit ad vacandum rebus divinis. Materiale autem in virginitate est integritas carnis absque omni experimento venereae delectationis. Manifestum est autem quod ubi est specialis materia habens specialem excellentiam, ibi invenitur specialis ratio virtutis, sicut patet in magnificentia, quae est circa magnos sumptus, et ex hoc est specialis virtus a liberalitate distincta, quae communiter se habet circa omnem pecuniarum usum. Hoc autem quod est conservare se immunem ab experimento venereae voluptatis, habet quandam excellentiam laudis supra hoc quod est conservare se immunem ab inordinatione venereae voluptatis. Et ideo virginitas est quaedam specialis virtus, habens se ad castitatem sicut magnificentia ad liberalitatem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homines ex sua nativitate habent id quod est materiale in virginitate, scilicet integritatem carnis immunem ab experimento venereorum. Non tamen habent id quod est formale in virginitate, ut scilicet habeant propositum servandi huiusmodi integritatem propter Deum. Et ex hoc habet rationem virtutis. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de Virginit., nec nos in virginibus praedicamus quod virgines sunt, sed quod Deo dicatae pia continentia virgines. Ad secundum dicendum quod connexio virtutum accipitur secundum id quod est formale in virtutibus, idest secundum caritatem vel secundum prudentiam, ut supra habitum est, non autem secundum id quod est materiale in virtutibus. Nihil enim prohibet alicui virtuoso suppetere materiam unius virtutis, non autem materiam alterius, sicut pauper habet materiam temperantiae, non autem materiam magnificentiae. Et hoc modo alicui habenti alias virtutes deest materia virginitatis, idest praedicta integritas carnis. Tamen potest id quod est formale in virginitate habere, ut scilicet in praeparatione mentis praedictae integritatis conservandae propositum, si hoc sibi competeret. Sicut pauper potest in praeparatione animi habere propositum magnificos sumptus faciendi, si sibi competeret, et similiter ille qui est in prosperitate habet in praeparatione animi propositum adversa aequanimiter tolerandi. Et sine hac praeparatione animi non potest esse aliquis virtuosus. Ad tertium dicendum quod virtus per poenitentiam reparari potest quantum ad id quod est formale in virtute, non autem quantum ad id quod est materiale in ipsa. Non enim si quis magnificus consumpsit suas divitias, per poenitentiam peccati restituuntur ei divitiae. Et similiter ille qui peccando virginitatem amisit, per poenitentiam non recuperat virginitatis materiam, sed recuperat virginitatis propositum.

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I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the formal and completive element in virginity is the purpose of abstaining from venereal pleasure, which purpose is rendered praiseworthy by its end, in so far, to wit, as this is done in order to have leisure for Divine things: while the material element in virginity is integrity of the flesh free of all experience of venereal pleasure. Now it is manifest that where a good action has a special matter through having a special excellence, there is a special kind of virtue: for example, magnificence which is about great expenditure is for this reason a special virtue distinct from liberality, which is about all uses of money in general. Now to keep oneself free from the experience of venereal pleasure has an excellence of its own deserving of greater praise than keeping oneself free from inordinate venereal pleasure. Wherefore virginity is a special virtue being related to chastity as magnificence to liberality. Reply Obj. 1: Men have from their birth that which is material in virginity, namely integrity of the flesh and freedom from venereal experience. But they have not that which is formal in virginity, namely the purpose of safeguarding this integrity for God’s sake, which purpose gives virginity its character of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Virgin. xi): Nor do we praise virgins for being virgins, but, because their virginity is consecrated to God by holy continency. Reply Obj. 2: Virtues are connected together by reason of that which is formal in them, namely charity, or by reason of prudence, as stated above (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 2), but not by reason of that which is material in them. For nothing hinders a virtuous man from providing the matter of one virtue, and not the matter of another virtue: thus a poor man has the matter of temperance, but not that of magnificence. It is in this way that one who has the other virtues lacks the matter of virginity, namely the aforesaid integrity of the flesh: nevertheless he can have that which is formal in virginity, his mind being so prepared that he has the purpose of safeguarding this same integrity of the flesh, should it be fitting for him to do so: even as a poor man may be so prepared in mind as to have the purpose of being magnificent in his expenditure, were he in a position to do so: or again as a prosperous man is so prepared in mind as to purpose bearing misfortune with equanimity: without which preparedness of the mind no man can be virtuous. Reply Obj. 3: Virtue can be recovered by penance as regards that which is formal in virtue, but not as to that which is material therein. For if a magnificent man has squandered all his wealth he does not recover his riches by repenting of his sin. In like manner a person who has lost virginity by sin, recovers by repenting, not the matter of virginity but the purpose of virginity.

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Circa materiam autem virginitatis est aliquid quod miraculose reparari poterit divinitus, scilicet integritas membri, quam diximus accidentaliter se ad virginitatem habere. Aliud autem est quod nec miraculo reparari potest, ut scilicet qui expertus est voluptatem veneream, fiat non expertus, non enim Deus potest facere ut ea quae facta sunt non sint facta, ut in primo habitum est. Ad quartum dicendum quod virginitas, secundum quod est virtus, importat propositum voto firmatum integritatis perpetuo servandae dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Virginit., quod per virginitatem integritas carnis ipsi creatori animae et carnis vovetur, consecratur, servatur. Unde virginitas, secundum quod est virtus, nunquam amittitur nisi per peccatum. Ad quintum dicendum quod castitas coniugalis ex hoc solo laudem habet quod abstinet ab illicitis voluptatibus, unde non habet aliquam excellentiam supra communem castitatem. Viduitas autem addit quidem aliquid supra communem castitatem, non tamen pervenit ad id quod est perfectum in materia ista, scilicet ad omnimodam immunitatem venereae voluptatis, sed sola virginitas. Et ideo sola virginitas ponitur virtus specialis, sicut supra castitatem sicut magnificentia supra liberalitatem.

Q. 152, A. 4

As regards the matter of virginity there is that which can be miraculously restored by God, namely the integrity of the organ, which we hold to be accidental to virginity: while there is something else which cannot be restored even by miracle, to wit, that one who has experienced venereal lust should cease to have had that experience. For God cannot make that which is done not to have been done, as stated in the First Part (Q. 25, A. 4). Reply Obj. 4: Virginity as a virtue denotes the purpose, confirmed by vow, of observing perpetual integrity. For Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that by virginity, integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated and observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and flesh. Hence virginity, as a virtue, is never lost without sin. Reply Obj. 5: Conjugal chastity is deserving of praise merely because it abstains from unlawful pleasures: hence no excellence attaches to it above that of chastity in general. Widowhood, however, adds something to chastity in general; but it does not attain to that which is perfect in this matter, namely to entire freedom from venereal pleasure; virginity alone achieves this. Wherefore virginity alone is accounted a virtue above chastity, even as magnificence is reckoned above liberality.

Article 4 Whether virginity is more excellent than marriage? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virginitas non sit excellentior matrimonio. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de bono coniugali, non impar meritum continentiae est in Ioanne, qui nullas expertus est nuptias, et in Abraham, qui filios generavit. Sed maioris virtutis maius est meritum. Ergo virginitas non est potior virtus quam castitas coniugalis. Praeterea, ex virtute dependet laus virtuosi. Si ergo virginitas praeferretur continentiae coniugali, videtur esse consequens quod quaelibet virgo esset laudabilior qualibet coniugata. Hoc autem est falsum. Ergo virginitas non praefertur coniugio. Praeterea, bonum commune potius est bono privato, ut patet per philosophum, in I Ethic. Sed coniugium ordinatur ad bonum commune, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de bono coniugali, quod est cibus ad salutem hominis, hoc est concubitus ad salutem humani generis. Virginitas autem ordinatur ad bonum speciale, ut scilicet vitent tribulationem carnis, quam sustinent coniugati, sicut patet per apostolum, I ad Cor. VII. Ergo virginitas non est potior continentia coniugali.

Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is not more excellent than marriage. For Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi): Continence was equally meritorious in John who remained unmarried and Abraham who begot children. Now a greater virtue has greater merit. Therefore virginity is not a greater virtue than conjugal chastity. Obj. 2: Further, the praise accorded a virtuous man depends on his virtue. If, then, virginity were preferable to conjugal continence, it would seem to follow that every virgin is to be praised more than any married woman. But this is untrue. Therefore virginity is not preferable to marriage. Obj. 3: Further, the common good takes precedence of the private good, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). Now marriage is directed to the common good: for Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): What food is to a man’s wellbeing, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the human race. On the other hand, virginity is ordered to the individual good, namely in order to avoid what the Apostle calls the tribulation of the flesh, to which married people are subject (1 Cor 7:28). Therefore virginity is not greater than conjugal continence.

449

Q. 152, A. 4

Temperance

Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de Virginit., certa ratione, et sanctarum Scripturarum auctoritate, nec peccatum esse nuptias invenimus, nec eas bono vel virginalis continentiae, vel etiam vidualis, aequamus. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut patet in libro Hieronymi contra Iovin., hic error fuit Ioviniani, qui posuit virginitatem non esse matrimonio praeferendam. Qui quidem error praecipue destruitur et exemplo Christi, qui et matrem virginem elegit, et ipse virginitatem servavit; et ex doctrina apostoli, qui, I ad Cor. VII, virginitatem consuluit tanquam melius bonum; et etiam ratione. Tum quia bonum divinum est potius bono humano. Tum quia bonum animae praefertur bono corporis. Tum etiam quia bonum contemplativae vitae praefertur bono activae. Virginitas autem ordinatur ad bonum animae secundum vitam contemplativam, quod est cogitare ea quae sunt Dei. Coniugium autem ordinatur ad bonum corporis, quod est corporalis multiplicatio generis humani, et pertinet ad vitam activam, quia vir et mulier in matrimonio viventes necesse habent cogitare quae sunt mundi, ut patet per apostolum, I ad Cor. VII. Unde indubitanter virginitas praeferenda est continentiae coniugali. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod meritum non solum pensatur ex genere actus, sed magis ex animo operantis. Habuit autem Abraham animum sic dispositum ut paratus esset virginitatem servare si esset tempus congruum. Ex quo meritum continentiae coniugalis in ipso aequatur merito continentiae virginalis in Ioanne respectu praemii substantialis, non autem respectu praemii accidentalis. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono coniugali, quod Ioannis caelibatus et Abrahae connubium pro temporum distributione Christo militaverunt, sed continentiam Ioannes etiam in opere, Abraham vero in solo habitu habebat. Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet virginitas sit melior quam continentia coniugalis, potest tamen coniugatus esse melior quam virgo, duplici ratione. Primo quidem, ex parte ipsius castitatis, si scilicet ille qui est coniugatus, habeat animum magis paratum ad virginitatem servandam, si oporteret, quam ille qui est virgo actu. Unde Augustinus instruit virginem, in libro de bono coniugali, ut dicat, ego non sum melior quam Abraham, sed melior est castitas caelibum quam castitas nuptiarum. Et rationem postea subdit, dicens, quod enim ego nunc ago, melius illi egissent, si tunc agendum esset, quod autem illi egerunt, sic ego non agerem, etiam si nunc agendum esset. Secundo, quia forte ille qui non est virgo, habet aliquam excellentiorem virtutem. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de Virginit., unde scit virgo, quamvis sollicita quae sunt domini, ne forte, propter aliquam sibi incognitam infirmitatem, non sit matura martyrio, illa vero mulier cui se praeferre gestiebat, iam possit bibere calicem dominicae passionis?

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On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. xix): Both solid reason and the authority of Holy Writ show that neither is marriage sinful, nor is it to be equaled to the good of virginal continence or even to that of widowhood. I answer that, According to Jerome (Contra Jovin. i) the error of Jovinian consisted in holding virginity not to be preferable to marriage. This error is refuted above all by the example of Christ Who both chose a virgin for His mother, and remained Himself a virgin, and by the teaching of the Apostle who (1 Cor 7) counsels virginity as the greater good. It is also refuted by reason, both because a Divine good takes precedence of a human good, and because the good of the soul is preferable to the good of the body, and again because the good of the contemplative life is better than that of the active life. Now virginity is directed to the good of the soul in respect of the contemplative life, which consists in thinking on the things of God, whereas marriage is directed to the good of the body, namely the bodily increase of the human race, and belongs to the active life, since the man and woman who embrace the married life have to think on the things of the world, as the Apostle says (1 Cor 7:34). Without doubt therefore virginity is preferable to conjugal continence. Reply Obj. 1: Merit is measured not only by the kind of action, but still more by the mind of the agent. Now Abraham had a mind so disposed, that he was prepared to observe virginity, if it were in keeping with the times for him to do so. Wherefore in him conjugal continence was equally meritorious with the virginal continence of John, as regards the essential reward, but not as regards the accidental reward. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that both the celibacy of John and the marriage of Abraham fought Christ’s battle in keeping with the difference of the times: but John was continent even in deed, whereas Abraham was continent only in habit. Reply Obj. 2: Though virginity is better than conjugal continence, a married person may be better than a virgin for two reasons. First, on the part of chastity itself; if to wit, the married person is more prepared in mind to observe virginity, if it should be expedient, than the one who is actually a virgin. Hence Augustine (De Bono Conjug. xxii) charges the virgin to say: I am no better than Abraham, although the chastity of celibacy is better than the chastity of marriage. Further on he gives the reason for this: For what I do now, he would have done better, if it were fitting for him to do it then; and what they did I would even do now if it behooved me now to do it. Second, because perhaps the person who is not a virgin has some more excellent virtue. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virgin. xliv): Whence does a virgin know the things that belong to the Lord, however solicitous she be about them, if perchance on account of some mental fault she be not yet ripe for martyrdom, whereas this woman to whom she delighted in preferring herself is already able to drink the chalice of the Lord?

450

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Virginity

Ad tertium dicendum quod bonum commune potius est bono privato si sit eiusdem generis, sed potest esse quod bonum privatum sit melius secundum suum genus. Et hoc modo virginitas Deo dicata praefertur fecunditati carnali. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de Virginit., quod fecunditas carnis, etiam illarum quae in hoc tempore nihil aliud in coniugio quam prolem requirunt quam mancipent Christo, pro amissa virginitate compensari non posse credenda est.

Q. 152, A. 5

Reply Obj. 3: The common good takes precedence of the private good, if it be of the same genus: but it may be that the private good is better generically. It is thus that the virginity that is consecrated to God is preferable to carnal fruitfulness. Hence Augustine says (De Virgin. ix): It must be confessed that the fruitfulness of the flesh, even of those women who in these times seek naught else from marriage but children in order to make them servants of Christ, cannot compensate for lost virginity.

Article 5 Whether virginity is the greatest of virtues? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virginitas sit maxima virtutum. Dicit enim Cyprianus, in libro de Virginit., nunc nobis ad virgines sermo est. Quarum quo sublimior gloria est, maior et cura. Flos est ille ecclesiastici germinis, decus atque ornamentum gratiae spiritualis, illustrior portio gregis Christi. Praeterea, maius praemium debetur maiori virtuti. Sed virginitati debetur maximum praemium, scilicet fructus centesimus, ut patet Matth. XIII, in Glossa. Ergo virginitas est maxima virtutum. Praeterea, tanto aliqua virtus est maior, quanto per eam magis aliquis Christo conformatur. Sed maxime aliquis conformatur Christo per virginitatem, dicitur enim Apoc. XIV de virginibus, quod sequuntur agnum quocumque ierit, et quod cantant canticum novum, quod nemo alius poterat dicere. Ergo virginitas est maxima virtutum. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Virginit., nemo, quantum puto, ausus fuit virginitatem praeferre monasterio. Et in eodem libro dicit, praeclarissimum testimonium perhibet ecclesiastica auctoritas, in qua fidelibus notum est quo loco martyres, et quo defunctae sanctimoniales ad altaris sacramenta recitentur. Per quod datur intelligi quod martyrium virginitati praefertur, et similiter monasterii status. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid potest dici excellentissimum dupliciter. Uno modo, in aliquo genere. Et sic virginitas est excellentissima, scilicet in genere castitatis, transcendit enim et castitatem vidualem et coniugalem. Et quia castitati antonomastice attribuitur decor, ideo virginitati per consequens attribuitur excellentissima pulchritudo. Unde et Ambrosius dicit, in libro de Virginit., pulchritudinem quis potest maiorem aestimare decore virginis, quae amatur a rege, probatur a iudice, dedicatur domino, consecratur Deo? Alio modo potest dici aliquid excellentissimum simpliciter. Et sic virginitas non est excellentissima virtutum. Semper enim finis excellit id quod est ad finem, et quanto aliquid effica-

Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is the greatest of virtues. For Cyprian says (De Virgin.): We address ourselves now to the virgins. Sublime is their glory, but no less exalted is their vocation. They are a flower of the Church’s sowing, the pride and ornament of spiritual grace, the most honored portion of Christ’s flock. Obj. 2: Further, a greater reward is due to the greater virtue. Now the greatest reward is due to virginity, namely the hundredfold fruit, according to a gloss on Matt. 13:23. Therefore virginity is the greatest of the virtues. Obj. 3: Further, the more a virtue conforms us to Christ, the greater it is. Now virginity above all conforms us to Christ; for it is declared in the Apocalypse (14:4) that virgins follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth, and (Rev 14:3) that they sing a new canticle, which no other man could say. Therefore virginity is the greatest of the virtues. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. xlvi): No one, methinks, would dare prefer virginity to martyrdom, and (De Virgin. xlv): The authority of the Church informs the faithful in no uncertain manner, so that they know in what place the martyrs and the holy virgins who have departed this life are commemorated in the Sacrament of the Altar. By this we are given to understand that martyrdom, and also the monastic state, are preferable to virginity. I answer that, A thing may excel all others in two ways. First, in some particular genus: and thus virginity is most excellent, namely in the genus of chastity, since it surpasses the chastity both of widowhood and of marriage. And because comeliness is ascribed to chastity antonomastically, it follows that surpassing beauty is ascribed to chastity. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 7): Can anyone esteem any beauty greater than a virgin’s, since she is beloved of her King, approved by her Judge, dedicated to her Lord, consecrated to her God? Second, a thing may be most excellent simply, and in this way virginity is not the most excellent of the virtues. Because the end always excels that which is directed to the end; and the more effectively

451

Q. 152, A. 5

Temperance

cius ordinatur ad finem, tanto melius est. Finis autem ex quo virginitas laudabilis redditur, est vacare rebus divinis, ut dictum est. Unde ipsae virtutes theologicae, et etiam virtus religionis, quarum actus est ipsa occupatio circa res divinas, praeferuntur virginitati. Similiter etiam vehementius operantur ad hoc quod inhaereant Deo martyres, qui ad hoc postponunt propriam vitam; et viventes in monasteriis, qui ad hoc postponunt propriam voluntatem et omnia quae possunt habere; quam virgines, quae ad hoc postponunt venereas voluptates. Et ideo virginitas non simpliciter est maxima virtutum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virgines sunt illustrior portio gregis Christi, et est earum sublimior gloria, per comparationem ad viduas et coniugatas. Ad secundum dicendum quod centesimus fructus attribuitur virginitati, secundum Hieronymum, propter excellentiam quam habet ad viduitatem, cui attribuitur sexagesimus, et ad matrimonium, cui attribuitur tricesimus. Sed sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de quaest. Evang., centesimus fructus est martyrum, sexagesimus virginum, et tricesimus coniugatorum. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod virginitas sit simpliciter maxima omnium virtutum, sed solum aliis gradibus castitatis. Ad tertium dicendum quod virgines sequuntur agnum quocumque ierit quia imitantur Christum non solum in integritate mentis, sed etiam in integritate carnis, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Virginit. Et ideo in pluribus sequuntur agnum. Non tamen oportet quod magis de propinquo, quia aliae virtutes faciunt propinquius inhaerere Deo per imitationem mentis. Canticum autem novum quod solae virgines cantant, est gaudium quod habent de integritate carnis servata.

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a thing is directed to the end, the better it is. Now the end which renders virginity praiseworthy is that one may have leisure for Divine things, as stated above (A. 4). Wherefore the theological virtues as well as the virtue of religion, the acts of which consist in being occupied about Divine things, are preferable to virginity. Moreover, martyrs work more mightily in order to cleave to God—since for this end they hold their own life in contempt; and those who dwell in monasteries—since for this end they give up their own will and all that they may possess—than virgins who renounce venereal pleasure for that same purpose. Therefore virginity is not simply the greatest of virtues. Reply Obj. 1: Virgins are the more honored portion of Christ’s flock, and their glory more sublime in comparison with widows and married women. Reply Obj. 2: The hundredfold fruit is ascribed to virginity, according to Jerome, on account of its superiority to widowhood, to which the sixtyfold fruit is ascribed, and to marriage, to which is ascribed the thirtyfold fruit. But according to Augustine (De QQ. Evang. i, 9), the hundredfold fruit is given to martyrs, the sixtyfold to virgins, and the thirtyfold to married persons. Wherefore it does not follow that virginity is simply the greatest of virtues, but only in comparison with other degrees of chastity. Reply Obj. 3: Virgins follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth, because they imitate Christ, by integrity not only of the mind but also of the flesh, as Augustine says (De Virgin. xxvii). Wherefore they follow the Lamb in more ways, but this does not imply that they follow more closely, because other virtues make us cleave to God more closely by imitation of the mind. The new hymn which virgins alone sing, is their joy at having preserved integrity of the flesh.

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Question 153 Lust Deinde considerandum est de vitio luxuriae, quod We must next consider the vice of lust which is opposed opponitur castitati. Et primo, de ipsa in generali; secun- to chastity: (1) Lust in general; (2) its species. Under the first do, de speciebus eius. Circa primum quaeruntur quin- head there are five points of inquiry: que. Primo, quid sit materia luxuriae. (1) What is the matter of lust? Secundo, utrum omnis concubitus sit illicitus. (2) Whether all copulation is unlawful? Tertio, utrum luxuria sit peccatum mortale. (3) Whether lust is a mortal sin? Quarto, utrum luxuria sit vitium capitale. (4) Whether lust is a capital vice? Quinto, de filiabus eius. (5) Concerning its daughters.

Article 1 Whether the matter of lust is only venereal desires and pleasures? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod materia luxuriae non sit solum concupiscentiae et delectationes venereae. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro Confess., quod luxuria ad satietatem atque abundantiam se cupit vocari. Sed satietas pertinet ad cibos et potus, abundantia autem ad divitias. Ergo luxuria non est proprie circa concupiscentias et voluptates venereas. Praeterea, Prov. XX dicitur, luxuriosa res est vinum. Sed vinum pertinet ad delectationem cibi et potus. Ergo circa has maxime videtur esse luxuria. Praeterea, luxuria esse dicitur libidinosae voluptatis appetitus. Sed libidinosa voluptas non solum est in venereis, sed etiam in multis aliis. Ergo luxuria non solum est circa concupiscentias et voluptates venereas. Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de vera Relig., dicitur luxuriosis, qui seminat in carne, de carne metet corruptionem. Sed seminatio carnis fit per voluptates venereas. Ergo ad has pertinet luxuria. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., luxuriosus aliquis dicitur quasi solutus in voluptates. Maxime autem voluptates venereae animum hominis solvunt. Et ideo circa voluptates venereas maxime luxuria consideratur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut temperantia principaliter quidem et proprie est circa delectationes tactus, dicitur autem ex consequenti et per similitudinem quandam in quibusdam aliis materiis; ita etiam luxuria principaliter quidem est in voluptatibus venereis, quae maxime et praecipue animum hominis resolvunt; secundario aut dicitur in quibuscumque aliis ad excessum pertinentibus. Unde Galat. V, dicit Glossa quod luxuria est quaelibet superfluitas.

Objection 1: It would seem that the matter of lust is not only venereal desires and pleasures. For Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that lust affects to be called surfeit and abundance. But surfeit regards meat and drink, while abundance refers to riches. Therefore lust is not properly about venereal desires and pleasures. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov 20:1): Wine is a lustful thing. Now wine is connected with pleasure of meat and drink. Therefore these would seem to be the matter of lust. Obj. 3: Further, lust is defined as the desire of wanton pleasure. But wanton pleasure regards not only venereal matters but also many others. Therefore lust is not only about venereal desires and pleasures. On the contrary, To the lustful it is said (De Vera Relig. iii): He that soweth in the flesh, of the flesh shall reap corruption. Now the sowing of the flesh refers to venereal pleasures. Therefore these belong to lust. I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x), a lustful man is one who is debauched with pleasures. Now venereal pleasures above all debauch a man’s mind. Therefore lust is especially concerned with such like pleasures. Reply Obj. 1: Even as temperance chiefly and properly applies to pleasures of touch, yet consequently and by a kind of likeness is referred to other matters, so too, lust applies chiefly to venereal pleasures, which more than anything else work the greatest havoc in a man’s mind, yet secondarily it applies to any other matters pertaining to excess. Hence a gloss on Gal. 5:19 says lust is any kind of surfeit.

453

Q. 153, A. 2

Temperance

Ad secundum dicendum quod vinum dicitur esse res luxuriosa, vel secundum hunc modum quo in qualibet materia abundantia ad luxuriam refertur. Vel inquantum superfluus usus vini incentivum voluptati venereae praebet. Ad tertium dicendum quod libidinosa voluptas etsi in aliis materiis dicatur, tamen specialiter hoc nomen sibi vindicant venereae delectationes, in quibus etiam specialiter libido dicitur, ut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei.

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Reply Obj. 2: Wine is said to be a lustful thing, either in the sense in which surfeit in any matter is ascribed to lust, or because the use of too much wine affords an incentive to venereal pleasure. Reply Obj. 3: Although wanton pleasure applies to other matters, the name of lust has a special application to venereal pleasures, to which also wantonness is specially applicable, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. xiv, 15, 16).

Article 2 Whether no venereal act can be without sin? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus actus venereus possit esse sine peccato. Nihil enim videtur impedire virtutem nisi peccatum. Sed omnis actus venereus maxime impedit virtutem, dicit enim Augustinus, in I Soliloq., nihil esse sentio quod magis ex arce deiiciat animum virilem quam blandimenta feminae, corporumque ille contactus. Ergo nullus actus venereus videtur esse sine peccato. Praeterea, ubicumque invenitur aliquid superfluum per quod a bono rationis receditur, hoc est vitiosum, quia virtus corrumpitur per superfluum et diminutum, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed in quolibet actu venereo est superfluitas delectationis, quae in tantum absorbet rationem quod impossibile est aliquid intelligere in ipsa, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., et sicut Hieronymus dicit, in illo actu spiritus prophetiae non tangebat corda prophetarum. Ergo nullus actus venereus potest esse sine peccato. Praeterea, causa potior est quam effectus. Sed peccatum originale in parvulis trahitur a concupiscentia, sine qua actus venereus esse non potest, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro de nuptiis et Concup. Ergo nullus actus venereus potest esse sine peccato. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono Coniug., satis responsum est haereticis, si tamen capiunt, non esse peccatum quod neque contra naturam committitur, neque contra morem, neque contra praeceptum. Et loquitur de actu venereo quo antiqui patres pluribus coniugibus utebantur. Ergo non omnis actus venereus est peccatum. Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum in humanis actibus est quod est contra ordinem rationis. Habet autem hoc rationis ordo, ut quaelibet convenienter ordinet in suum finem. Et ideo non est peccatum si per rationem homo utatur rebus aliquibus ad finem ad quem sunt, modo et ordine convenienti, dummodo ille finis sit aliquod vere bonum. Sicut autem est vere bonum quod conservetur corporalis natura unius individui, ita

Objection 1: It would seem that no venereal act can be without sin. For nothing but sin would seem to hinder virtue. Now every venereal act is a great hindrance to virtue. For Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its height as the fondling of a woman, and those bodily contacts. Therefore, seemingly, no venereal act is without sin. Obj. 2: Further, any excess that makes one forsake the good of reason is sinful, because virtue is corrupted by excess and deficiency as stated in Ethic. ii, 2. Now in every venereal act there is excess of pleasure, since it so absorbs the mind, that it is incompatible with the act of understanding, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. vii, 11); and as Jerome states, rendered the hearts of the prophets, for the moment, insensible to the spirit of prophecy. Therefore no venereal act can be without sin. Obj. 3: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. Now original sin is transmitted to children by concupiscence, without which no venereal act is possible, as Augustine declares (De Nup. et Concup. i, 24). Therefore no venereal act can be without sin. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxv): This is a sufficient answer to heretics, if only they will understand that no sin is committed in that which is against neither nature, nor morals, nor a commandment: and he refers to the act of sexual intercourse between the patriarchs of old and their several wives. Therefore not every venereal act is a sin. I answer that, A sin, in human acts, is that which is against the order of reason. Now the order of reason consists in its ordering everything to its end in a fitting manner. Wherefore it is no sin if one, by the dictate of reason, makes use of certain things in a fitting manner and order for the end to which they are adapted, provided this end be something truly good. Now just as the preservation of the bodily nature of one individual is a true good, so, too, is

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etiam est quoddam bonum excellens quod conservetur natura speciei humanae. Sicut autem ad conservationem vitae unius hominis ordinatur usus ciborum, ita etiam ad conservationem totius humani generis usus venereorum, unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono Coniug., quod est cibus ad salutem hominis, hoc est concubitus ad salutem generis. Et ideo, sicut usus ciborum potest esse absque peccato, si fiat debito modo et ordine, secundum quod competit saluti corporis; ita etiam et usus venereorum potest esse absque omni peccato, si fiat debito modo et ordine, secundum quod est conveniens ad finem generationis humanae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquid potest impedire virtutem dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad communem statum virtutis, et sic non impeditur virtus nisi per peccatum. Alio modo, quantum ad perfectum virtutis statum, et sic potest impediri virtus per aliquid quod non est peccatum, sed est minus bonum. Et hoc modo usus feminae deiicit animum, non a virtute, sed ab arce, idest perfectione virtutis. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono Coniug., sicut bonum erat quod Martha faciebat occupata circa ministerium sanctorum, sed melius quod Maria audiens verbum Dei; ita etiam bonum Susannae in castitate coniugali laudamus, sed bonum viduae Annae, et magis Mariae virginis, anteponimus. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, medium virtutis non attenditur secundum quantitatem, sed secundum quod convenit rationi rectae. Et ideo abundantia delectationis quae est in actu venereo secundum rationem ordinato, non contrariatur medio virtutis. Et praeterea ad virtutem non pertinet quantum sensus exterior delectetur, quod consequitur corporis dispositionem, sed quantum appetitus interior ad huiusmodi delectationes afficiatur. Nec hoc etiam quod ratio non potest liberum actum rationis ad spiritualia consideranda simul cum illa delectatione habere, ostendit quod actus ille sit contrarius virtuti. Non enim est contrarium virtuti si rationis actus aliquando intermittatur aliquo quod secundum rationem fit, alioquin, quod aliquis se somno tradit, esset contra virtutem. Hoc tamen quod concupiscentia et delectatio venereorum non subiacet imperio et moderationi rationis, provenit ex poena primi peccati, inquantum scilicet ratio rebellis Deo meruit habere suam carnem rebellem, ut patet per Augustinum, XIII de Civ. Dei. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, quod ex concupiscentia carnis, quae regeneratis non imputatur in peccatum, tanquam ex filia peccati, proles nascitur originali obligata peccato. Unde non sequitur quod actus ille sit peccatum, sed quod in illo actu sit aliquid poenale a peccato primo derivatum.

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the preservation of the nature of the human species a very great good. And just as the use of food is directed to the preservation of life in the individual, so is the use of venereal acts directed to the preservation of the whole human race. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): What food is to a man’s well being, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the whole human race. Wherefore just as the use of food can be without sin, if it be taken in due manner and order, as required for the welfare of the body, so also the use of venereal acts can be without sin, provided they be performed in due manner and order, in keeping with the end of human procreation. Reply Obj. 1: A thing may be a hindrance to virtue in two ways. First, as regards the ordinary degree of virtue, and as to this nothing but sin is an obstacle to virtue. Second, as regards the perfect degree of virtue, and as to this virtue may be hindered by that which is not a sin, but a lesser good. In this way sexual intercourse casts down the mind not from virtue, but from the height, i.e., the perfection of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. viii): Just as that was good which Martha did when busy about serving holy men, yet better still that which Mary did in hearing the word of God: so, too, we praise the good of Susanna’s conjugal chastity, yet we prefer the good of the widow Anna, and much more that of the Virgin Mary. Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 152, A. 2, ad 2; I-II, Q. 64, A. 2), the mean of virtue depends not on quantity but on conformity with right reason: and consequently the exceeding pleasure attaching to a venereal act directed according to reason, is not opposed to the mean of virtue. Moreover, virtue is not concerned with the amount of pleasure experienced by the external sense, as this depends on the disposition of the body; what matters is how much the interior appetite is affected by that pleasure. Nor does it follow that the act in question is contrary to virtue, from the fact that the free act of reason in considering spiritual things is incompatible with the aforesaid pleasure. For it is not contrary to virtue, if the act of reason be sometimes interrupted for something that is done in accordance with reason, else it would be against virtue for a person to set himself to sleep. That venereal concupiscence and pleasure are not subject to the command and moderation of reason, is due to the punishment of the first sin, inasmuch as the reason, for rebelling against God, deserved that its body should rebel against it, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13). Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13), the child, shackled with original sin, is born of fleshly concupiscence (which is not imputed as sin to the regenerate) as of a daughter of sin. Hence it does not follow that the act in question is a sin, but that it contains something penal resulting from the first sin.

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Article 3 Whether the lust that is about venereal acts can be a sin? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod luxuria quae est circa actus venereos, non possit esse aliquod peccatum. Per actum enim venereum semen emittitur, quod est superfluum alimenti, ut patet per philosophum, in libro de Generat. Animal. Sed in emissione aliarum superfluitatum non attenditur aliquod peccatum. Ergo neque circa actus venereos potest esse aliquod peccatum. Praeterea, quilibet potest licite uti ut libet, eo quod suum est. Sed in actu venereo homo non utitur nisi eo quod suum est, nisi forte in adulterio vel raptu. Ergo in usu venereo non potest esse peccatum. Et ita luxuria non erit peccatum. Praeterea, omne peccatum habet vitium oppositum. Sed luxuriae nullum vitium videtur esse oppositum. Ergo luxuria non est peccatum. Sed contra est quod causa est potior effectu. Sed vinum prohibetur propter luxuriam, secundum illud apostoli, Ephes. V, nolite inebriari vino, in quo est luxuria. Ergo luxuria est prohibita. Praeterea, Galat. V, enumeratur inter opera carnis. Respondeo dicendum quod quanto aliquid est magis necessarium, tanto magis oportet ut circa illud rationis ordo servetur. Unde per consequens magis est vitiosum si ordo rationis praetermittatur. Usus autem venereorum, sicut dictum est, est valde necessarius ad bonum commune, quod est conservatio humani generis. Et ideo circa hoc maxime attendi debet rationis ordo. Et per consequens, si quid circa hoc fiat praeter id quod ordo rationis habet, vitiosum erit. Hoc autem pertinet ad rationem luxuriae, ut ordinem et modum rationis excedat circa venerea. Et ideo absque dubio luxuria est peccatum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus, in eodem libro, dicit, semen est superfluum quo indigetur, dicitur enim superfluum ex eo quod residuum est operationis virtutis nutritivae, tamen indigetur eo ad opus virtutis generativae. Sed aliae superfluitates humani corporis sunt quibus non indigetur. Et ideo non refert qualitercumque emittantur, salva decentia convictus humani. Sed non est simile in seminis emissione, quae taliter debet fieri ut conveniat fini ad quem eo indigetur. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. VI, contra luxuriam loquens, empti estis pretio magno. Glorificate ergo et portate Deum in corpore vestro. Ex eo ergo quod aliquis inordinate suo corpore utitur per luxuriam, iniuriam facit domino, qui est principalis dominus corporis nostri. Unde et Augustinus dicit, in libro de decem chordis, dominus, qui gubernat ser-

Objection 1: It would seem that lust about venereal acts cannot be a sin. For the venereal act consists in the emission of semen which is the surplus from food, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. i, 18). But there is no sin attaching to the emission of other superfluities. Therefore neither can there be any sin in venereal acts. Obj. 2: Further, everyone can lawfully make what use he pleases of what is his. But in the venereal act a man uses only what is his own, except perhaps in adultery or rape. Therefore there can be no sin in venereal acts, and consequently lust is no sin. Obj. 3: Further, every sin has an opposite vice. But, seemingly, no vice is opposed to lust. Therefore lust is not a sin. On the contrary, The cause is more powerful than its effect. Now wine is forbidden on account of lust, according to the saying of the Apostle (Eph 5:18), Be not drunk with wine wherein is lust. Therefore lust is forbidden. Further, it is numbered among the works of the flesh: Gal. 5:19. I answer that, The more necessary a thing is, the more it behooves one to observe the order of reason in its regard; wherefore the more sinful it becomes if the order of reason be forsaken. Now the use of venereal acts, as stated in the foregoing Article, is most necessary for the common good, namely the preservation of the human race. Wherefore there is the greatest necessity for observing the order of reason in this matter: so that if anything be done in this connection against the dictate of reason’s ordering, it will be a sin. Now lust consists essentially in exceeding the order and mode of reason in the matter of venereal acts. Wherefore without any doubt lust is a sin. Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says in the same book (De Gener. Anim. i, 18), the semen is a surplus that is needed. For it is said to be superfluous, because it is the residue from the action of the nutritive power, yet it is needed for the work of the generative power. But the other superfluities of the human body are such as not to be needed, so that it matters not how they are emitted, provided one observe the decencies of social life. It is different with the emission of semen, which should be accomplished in a manner befitting the end for which it is needed. Reply Obj. 2: As the Apostle says (1 Cor 6:20) in speaking against lust, You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God in your body. Wherefore by inordinately using the body through lust a man wrongs God Who is the Supreme Lord of our body. Hence Augustine says (De Decem. Chord. 10): God Who thus governs His servants for their good, not

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vos suos ad utilitatem illorum, non suam, hoc praecepit, ne per illicitas voluptates corruat templum eius, quod esse coepisti. Ad tertium dicendum quod oppositum luxuriae non contingit in multis, eo quod homines magis sint proni ad delectationes. Et tamen oppositum vitium continetur sub insensibilitate. Et accidit hoc vitium in eo qui in tantum detestatur mulierum usum quod etiam uxori debitum non reddit.

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for His, made this order and commandment, lest unlawful pleasures should destroy His temple which thou hast begun to be. Reply Obj. 3: The opposite of lust is not found in many, since men are more inclined to pleasure. Yet the contrary vice is comprised under insensibility, and occurs in one who has such a dislike for sexual intercourse as not to pay the marriage debt.

Article 4 Whether lust is a capital vice? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod luxuria non sit vitium capitale. Luxuria enim videtur idem esse immunditiae, ut patet per Glossam, Ephes. V. Sed immunditia est filia gulae, ut patet per Gregorium, XXXI Moral. Ergo luxuria non est vitium capitale. Praeterea, Isidorus dicit, in libro de summo bono, quod sicut per superbiam mentis itur in prostitutionem libidinis, ita per humilitatem mentis salva fit castitas carnis. Sed contra rationem capitalis vitii esse videtur quod ex alio vitio oriatur. Ergo luxuria non est vitium capitale. Praeterea, luxuria causatur ex desperatione, secundum illud Ephes. IV, qui, desperantes, seipsos tradiderunt impudicitiae. Sed desperatio non est vitium capitale, quinimmo ponitur filia acediae, ut supra habitum est. Ergo multo minus luxuria est vitium capitale. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., ponit luxuriam inter vitia capitalia. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, vitium capitale est quod habet finem multum appetibilem, ita quod ex eius appetitu homo procedit ad multa peccata perpetranda, quae omnia ex illo vitio tanquam ex principali oriri dicuntur. Finis autem luxuriae est delectatio venereorum, quae est maxima. Unde huiusmodi delectatio est maxime appetibilis secundum appetitum sensitivum, tum propter vehementiam delectationis; tum etiam propter connaturalitatem huius concupiscentiae. Unde manifestum est quod luxuria est vitium capitale. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod immunditia, secundum quosdam, quae ponitur filia gulae, est quaedam immunditia corporalis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic obiectio non est ad propositum. Si vero accipiatur pro immunditia luxuriae, sic dicendum quod ex gula causatur materialiter, inquantum scilicet gula ministrat materiam corporalem luxuriae, non autem secundum rationem causae finalis, secundum quam potissime attenditur origo aliorum vitiorum ex vitiis capitalibus. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de inani gloria ageretur, superbia ponitur com-

Objection 1: It seems that lust is not a capital vice. For lust is apparently the same as uncleanness, according to a gloss on Eph. 5:3 (Cf. 2 Cor. 12:21). But uncleanness is a daughter of gluttony, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore lust is not a capital vice. Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that as pride of mind leads to the depravity of lust, so does humility of mind safeguard the chastity of the flesh. Now it is seemingly contrary to the nature of a capital vice to arise from another vice. Therefore lust is not a capital vice. Obj. 3: Further, lust is caused by despair, according to Eph. 4:19, Who despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness. But despair is not a capital vice; indeed, it is accounted a daughter of sloth, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 4, ad 2). Much less, therefore, is lust a capital vice. On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places lust among the capital vices. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 148, A. 5; I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3, 4), a capital vice is one that has a very desirable end, so that through desire for that end, a man proceeds to commit many sins, all of which are said to arise from that vice as from a principal vice. Now the end of lust is venereal pleasure, which is very great. Wherefore this pleasure is very desirable as regards the sensitive appetite, both on account of the intensity of the pleasure, and because such like concupiscence is connatural to man. Therefore it is evident that lust is a capital vice. Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 148, A. 6), according to some, the uncleanness which is reckoned a daughter of gluttony is a certain uncleanness of the body, and thus the objection is not to the point. If, however, it denote the uncleanness of lust, we must reply that it is caused by gluttony materially—insofar as gluttony provides the bodily matter of lust—and not under the aspect of final cause, in which respect chiefly the capital vices are said to be the cause of others. Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 132, A. 4, ad 1), when we were treating of vainglory, pride is accounted the com-

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munis mater omnium peccatorum, et ideo etiam vitia capitalia ex superbia oriuntur. Ad tertium dicendum quod a delectationibus luxuriae praecipue aliqui abstinent propter spem futurae gloriae, quam desperatio subtrahit. Et ideo causat luxuriam sicut removens prohibens, non sicut per se causa, quod videtur requiri ad vitia capitalia.

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mon mother of all sins, so that even the capital vices originate therefrom. Reply Obj. 3: Certain persons refrain from lustful pleasures chiefly through hope of the glory to come, which hope is removed by despair, so that the latter is a cause of lust, as removing an obstacle thereto, not as its direct cause; whereas this is seemingly necessary for a capital vice.

Article 5 Whether the daughters of lust are fittingly described? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter dicantur esse filiae luxuriae caecitas mentis, inconsideratio, inconstantia, praecipitatio, amor sui, odium Dei, affectus praesentis saeculi, horror vel desperatio futuri. Quia caecitas mentis et inconsideratio et praecipitatio pertinent ad imprudentiam, quae invenitur in omni peccato, sicut et prudentia in omni virtute. Ergo non debent poni speciales filiae luxuriae. Praeterea, constantia ponitur pars fortitudinis, ut supra habitum est. Sed luxuria non opponitur fortitudini, sed temperantiae. Ergo inconstantia non est filia luxuriae. Praeterea, amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei est principium omnis peccati, ut patet per Augustinum, XIV de Civ. Dei. Non ergo debet poni filia luxuriae. Praeterea, Isidorus ponit quatuor, scilicet turpiloquia, scurrilia, ludicra, stultiloquia. Ergo praedicta enumeratio videtur esse superflua. Sed contra est auctoritas Gregorii, XXXI Moral. Respondeo dicendum quod quando inferiores potentiae vehementer afficiuntur ad sua obiecta, consequens est quod superiores vires impediantur et deordinentur in suis actibus. Per vitium autem luxuriae maxime appetitus inferior, scilicet concupiscibilis, vehementer intendit suo obiecto, scilicet delectabili, propter vehementiam delectationis. Et ideo consequens est quod per luxuriam maxime superiores vires deordinentur, scilicet ratio et voluntas. Sunt autem rationis quatuor actus in agendis. Primo quidem, simplex intelligentia, quae apprehendit aliquem finem ut bonum. Et hic actus impeditur per luxuriam, secundum illud Dan. XIII, species decepit te, et concupiscentia subvertit cor tuum. Et quantum ad hoc, ponitur caecitas mentis. Secundus actus est consilium de his quae sunt agenda propter finem. Et hoc etiam impeditur per concupiscentiam luxuriae, unde Terentius dicit, in eunucho, loquens de amore libidinoso, quae res in se neque consilium neque modum habet ullum, eam consilio re-

Objection 1: It would seem that the daughters of lust are unfittingly reckoned to be blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy, rashness, self-love, hatred of God, love of this world and abhorrence or despair of a future world. For mental blindness, thoughtlessness and rashness pertain to imprudence, which is to be found in every sin, even as prudence is in every virtue. Therefore they should not be reckoned especially as daughters of lust. Obj. 2: Further, constancy is reckoned a part of fortitude, as stated above (Q. 128, ad 6; Q. 137, A. 3). But lust is contrary, not to fortitude but to temperance. Therefore inconstancy is not a daughter of lust. Obj. 3: Further, self-love extending to the contempt of God is the origin of every sin, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of lust. Obj. 4: Further, Isidore mentions four, namely, obscene, scurrilous, wanton and foolish talking. There the aforesaid enumeration would seem to be superfluous. On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). I answer that, When the lower powers are strongly moved towards their objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and disordered in their acts. Now the effect of the vice of lust is that the lower appetite, namely the concupiscible, is most vehemently intent on its object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of the vehemence of the pleasure. Consequently the higher powers, namely the reason and the will, are most grievously disordered by lust. Now the reason has four acts in matters of action. First there is simple understanding, which apprehends some end as good, and this act is hindered by lust, according to Dan. 13:56, Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath perverted thy heart. In this respect we have blindness of mind. The second act is counsel about what is to be done for the sake of the end: and this is also hindered by the concupiscence of lust. Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1), speaking of lecherous love: This thing admits of neither counsel nor moderation, thou canst not control it by counsel-

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gere non potes. Et quantum ad hoc, ponitur praecipitatio, quae importat subtractionem consilii, ut supra habitum est, tertius autem actus est iudicium de agendis. Et hoc etiam impeditur per luxuriam, dicitur enim Dan. XIII, de senibus luxuriosis, averterunt sensum suum, ut non recordarentur iudiciorum iustorum. Et quantum ad hoc, ponitur inconsideratio. Quartus autem actus est praeceptum rationis de agendo. Quod etiam impeditur per luxuriam, inquantum scilicet homo impeditur ex impetu concupiscentiae ne exequatur id quod decrevit esse faciendum. Unde Terentius dicit, in eunucho, de quodam qui dicebat se recessurum ab amica, haec verba una falsa lacrimula restringet. Ex parte autem voluntatis, consequitur duplex actus inordinatus. Quorum unus est appetitus finis. Et quantum ad hoc, ponitur amor sui, quantum scilicet ad delectationem quam inordinate appetit, et per oppositum ponitur odium Dei, inquantum scilicet prohibet delectationem concupitam. Alius autem est appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem. Et quantum ad hoc, ponitur affectus praesentis saeculi, in quo scilicet aliquis vult frui voluptate, et per oppositum ponitur desperatio futuri saeculi, quia dum nimis detinetur carnalibus delectationibus, non curat pervenire ad spirituales, sed fastidit eas. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic. intemperantia maxime corrumpit prudentiam. Et ideo vitia opposita prudentiae maxime oriuntur ex luxuria, quae est praecipua intemperantiae species. Ad secundum dicendum quod constantia in arduis et terribilibus ponitur pars fortitudinis. Sed constantiam habere in abstinendo a delectationibus pertinet ad continentiam, quae ponitur pars temperantiae, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo inconstantia quae ei opponitur, ponitur filia luxuriae. Et tamen etiam prima inconstantia ex luxuria causatur, inquantum emollit cor hominis et effeminatum reddit, secundum illud Osee IV, fornicatio, et vinum et ebrietas, aufert cor. Et Vegetius dicit, in libro de re militari, quod minus mortem metuit qui minus deliciarum novit in vita. Nec oportet, sicut saepe dictum est, quod filiae vitii capitalis cum eo in materia conveniant.

Q. 153, A. 5

ing. In this respect there is rashness, which denotes absence of counsel, as stated above (Q. 53, A. 3). The third act is judgment about the things to be done, and this again is hindered by lust. For it is said of the lustful old men (Dan 13:9): They perverted their own mind . . . that they might not . . . remember just judgments. In this respect there is thoughtlessness. The fourth act is the reason’s command about the thing to be done, and this also is impeded by lust, insofar as through being carried away by concupiscence, a man is hindered from doing what his reason ordered to be done. Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1) of a man who declared that he would leave his mistress: One little false tear will undo those words. On the part of the will there results a twofold inordinate act. One is the desire for the end, to which we refer selflove, which regards the pleasure which a man desires inordinately, while on the other hand there is hatred of God, by reason of His forbidding the desired pleasure. The other act is the desire for the things directed to the end. With regard to this there is love of this world, whose pleasures a man desires to enjoy, while on the other hand there is despair of a future world, because through being held back by carnal pleasures he cares not to obtain spiritual pleasures, since they are distasteful to him. Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), intemperance is the chief corruptive of prudence: wherefore the vices opposed to prudence arise chiefly from lust, which is the principal species of intemperance.

Reply Obj. 2: The constancy which is a part of fortitude regards hardships and objects of fear; but constancy in refraining from pleasures pertains to continence which is a part of temperance, as stated above (Q. 143). Hence the inconstancy which is opposed thereto is to be reckoned a daughter of lust. Nevertheless even the first named inconstancy arises from lust, inasmuch as the latter enfeebles a man’s heart and renders it effeminate, according to Osee 4:11, Fornication and wine and drunkenness take away the heart. Vegetius, too, says (De Re Milit. iii) that the less a man knows of the pleasures of life, the less he fears death. Nor is there any need, as we have repeatedly stated, for the daughters of a capital vice to agree with it in matter (cf. Q. 35, A. 4, ad 2; Q. 118, A. 8, ad 1; Q. 148, A. 6). Ad tertium dicendum quod amor sui quantum ad Reply Obj. 3: Self-love in respect of any goods that a quaecumque bona quae sibi aliquis appetit, est commu- man desires for himself is the common origin of all sins; but ne principium peccatorum. Sed quantum ad hoc specia- in the special point of desiring carnal pleasures for oneself, liter quod aliquis appetit sibi delectabilia carnis, ponitur it is reckoned a daughter of lust.

amor sui filia luxuriae. Ad quartum dicendum quod illa quae Isidorus ponit, sunt quidam inordinati actus exteriores, et praecipue ad locutionem pertinentes. In qua est aliquid inordinatum quadrupliciter. Uno modo, propter materiam. Et sic ponuntur turpiloquia. Quia enim ex abundantia cordis os loquitur, ut dicitur Matth. XII, luxuriosi, quo-

Reply Obj. 4: The sins mentioned by Isidore are inordinate external acts, pertaining in the main to speech; wherein there is a fourfold inordinateness. First, on account of the matter, and to this we refer obscene words: for since out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh (Matt 12:34), the lustful man, whose heart is full of lewd

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rum cor est turpibus concupiscentiis plenum, de facili ad turpia verba prorumpunt. Secundo, ex parte causae. Quia enim luxuria inconsiderationem et praecipitationem causat, consequens est quod faciat prorumpere in verba leviter et inconsiderate dicta, quae dicuntur scurrilia. Tertio, quantum ad finem. Quia enim luxuriosus delectationem quaerit, etiam verba sua ad delectationem ordinat, et sic prorumpit in verba ludicra. Quarto, quantum ad sententiam verborum, quam pervertit luxuria, propter caecitatem mentis quam causat. Et sic prorumpit in stultiloquia, utpote cum suis verbis praefert delectationes quas appetit, quibuscumque aliis rebus.

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concupiscences, readily breaks out into lewd words. Second, on account of the cause: for, since lust causes thoughtlessness and rashness, the result is that it makes a man speak without weighing or giving a thought to his words, which are described as scurrilous. Third, on account of the end: for since the lustful man seeks pleasure, he directs his speech thereto, and so gives utterance to wanton words. Fourth, on account of the sentiments expressed by his words, for through causing blindness of mind, lust perverts a man’s sentiments, and so he gives way to foolish talking, for instance, by expressing a preference for the pleasures he desires to anything else.

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Question 154 The Parts of Lust Deinde considerandum est de luxuriae partibus. Et We must now consider the parts of lust, under which circa hoc quaeruntur duodecim. head there are twelve points of inquiry: Primo, de divisione partium luxuriae. (1) Into what parts is lust divided? Secundo, utrum fornicatio simplex sit peccatum (2) Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin? mortale. Tertio, utrum sit maximum peccatorum. (3) Whether it is the greatest of sins? Quarto, utrum in tactibus et osculis et aliis (4) Whether there is mortal sin in touches, kisses and huiusmodi illecebris consistat peccatum mortale. such like seduction? Quinto, utrum nocturna pollutio sit peccatum. (5) Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin? Sexto, de stupro. (6) Of seduction; Septimo, de raptu. (7) Of rape; Octavo, de adulterio. (8) Of adultery; Nono, de incestu. (9) Of incest; Decimo, de sacrilegio. (10) Of sacrilege; Undecimo, de peccato contra naturam. (11) Of the sin against nature; Duodecimo, de ordine gravitatis in praedictis (12) Of the order of gravity in the aforesaid sins. speciebus.

Article 1 Whether six species are fittingly assigned to lust? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter assignentur sex species luxuriae, scilicet, fornicatio simplex, adulterium, incestus, stuprum, raptus et vitium contra naturam. Diversitas enim materiae non diversificat speciem. Sed praedicta divisio sumitur secundum materiae diversitatem, prout scilicet aliquis commiscetur coniugatae, vel virgini, vel alterius conditionis mulieri. Ergo videtur quod per hoc species luxuriae non diversificentur. Praeterea, species vitii unius non videntur diversificari per ea quae pertinent ad aliud vitium. Sed adulterium non differt a simplici fornicatione nisi in hoc quod aliquis accedit ad eam quae est alterius, et sic iniustitiam committit. Ergo videtur quod adulterium non debet poni species luxuriae.

Objection 1: It would seem that six species are unfittingly assigned to lust, namely, simple fornication, adultery, incest, seduction, rape, and the unnatural vice. For diversity of matter does not diversify the species. Now the aforesaid division is made with regard to diversity of matter, according as the woman with whom a man has intercourse is married or a virgin, or of some other condition. Therefore it seems that the species of lust are diversified in this way.

Obj. 2: Further, seemingly the species of one vice are not differentiated by things that belong to another vice. Now adultery does not differ from simple fornication, save in the point of a man having intercourse with one who is another’s, so that he commits an injustice. Therefore it seems that adultery should not be reckoned a species of lust. Praeterea, sicut contingit quod aliquis commisceObj. 3: Further, just as a man may happen to have intur mulieri quae est alteri viro per matrimonium obliga- tercourse with a woman who is bound to another man by ta, ita etiam contingit quod aliquis commiscetur mulieri marriage, so may it happen that a man has intercourse with quae est obligata Deo per votum. Sicut ergo adulterium a woman who is bound to God by vow. Therefore sacrilege ponitur species luxuriae, ita et sacrilegium species luxu- should be reckoned a species of lust, even as adultery is.

riae poni debet. Praeterea, ille qui est matrimonio iunctus non soObj. 4: Further, a married man sins not only if he be lum peccat si ad aliam mulierem accedat, sed etiam si with another woman, but also if he use his own wife inordi-

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sua coniuge inordinate utatur. Sed hoc peccatum sub luxuria continetur. Ergo deberet inter species luxuriae computari. Praeterea, apostolus, II ad Cor. XII, dicit, ne iterum, cum venero, humiliet me Deus apud vos, et lugeam multos ex his qui ante peccaverunt, et non egerunt poenitentiam super immunditia et fornicatione et impudicitia quam gesserunt. Ergo videtur quod etiam immunditia et impudicitia debeant poni species luxuriae, sicut et fornicatio. Praeterea, divisum non condividitur dividentibus. Sed luxuria condividitur praedictis, dicitur enim Galat. V, manifesta sunt opera carnis, quae sunt fornicatio, immunditia, impudicitia, luxuria. Ergo videtur quod inconvenienter fornicatio ponatur species luxuriae. Sed contra est quod praedicta divisio ponitur in decretis, XXXVI Caus., qu. I. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, peccatum luxuriae consistit in hoc quod aliquis non secundum rectam rationem delectatione venerea utitur. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter, uno modo, secundum materiam in qua huiusmodi delectationem quaerit; alio modo, secundum quod, materia debita existente, non observantur aliae debitae conditiones. Et quia circumstantia, inquantum huiusmodi, non dat speciem actui morali, sed eius species sumitur ab obiecto, quod est materia actus; ideo oportuit species luxuriae assignari ex parte materiae vel obiecti. Quae quidem potest non convenire rationi rectae dupliciter. Uno modo, quia habet repugnantiam ad finem venerei actus. Et sic, inquantum impeditur generatio prolis, est vitium contra naturam, quod est in omni actu venereo ex quo generatio sequi non potest. Inquantum autem impeditur debita educatio et promotio prolis natae, est fornicatio simplex, quae est soluti cum soluta. Alio modo materia in qua exercetur actus venereus, potest esse non conveniens rationi rectae per comparationem ad alios homines. Et hoc dupliciter. Primo quidem, ex parte ipsius feminae cui aliquis commiscetur, quia ei debitus honor non servatur. Et sic est incestus, qui consistit in abusu mulierum consanguinitate vel affinitate iunctarum. Secundo, ex parte eius in cuius potestate est femina. Quia si est in potestate viri, est adulterium, si autem est in potestate patris, est stuprum, si non inferatur violentia; raptus autem, si inferatur.

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nately. But the latter sin is comprised under lust. Therefore it should be reckoned among the species thereof. Obj. 5: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor 12:21): Lest again, when I come, God humble me among you, and I mourn many of them that sinned before, and have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication and lasciviousness that they have committed. Therefore it seems that also uncleanness and lasciviousness should be reckoned species of lust, as well as fornication. Obj. 6: Further, the thing divided is not to be reckoned among its parts. But lust is reckoned together with the aforesaid: for it is written (Gal 5:19): The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, lust. Therefore it seems that fornication is unfittingly reckoned a species of lust. On the contrary, The aforesaid division is given in the Decretals 36, qu. i. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 153, A. 3), the sin of lust consists in seeking venereal pleasure not in accordance with right reason. This may happen in two ways. First, in respect of the matter wherein this pleasure is sought; second, when, whereas there is due matter, other due circumstances are not observed. And since a circumstance, as such, does not specify a moral act, whose species is derived from its object which is also its matter, it follows that the species of lust must be assigned with respect to its matter or object.

Now this same matter may be discordant with right reason in two ways. First, because it is inconsistent with the end of the venereal act. In this way, as hindering the begetting of children, there is the vice against nature, which attaches to every venereal act from which generation cannot follow; and, as hindering the due upbringing and advancement of the child when born, there is simple fornication, which is the union of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman. Second, the matter wherein the venereal act is consummated may be discordant with right reason in relation to other persons; and this in two ways. First, with regard to the woman, with whom a man has connection, by reason of due honor not being paid to her; and thus there is incest, which consists in the misuse of a woman who is related by consanguinity or affinity. Second, with regard to the person under whose authority the woman is placed: and if she be under the authority of a husband, it is adultery, if under the authority of her father, it is seduction, in the absence of violence, and rape if violence be employed. Diversificantur autem istae species magis ex parte feThese species are differentiated on the part of the minae quam viri. Quia in actu venereo femina se habet woman rather than of the man, because in the venereal act sicut patiens et per modum materiae, vir autem per mo- the woman is passive and is by way of matter, whereas the dum agentis. Dictum est autem quod praedictae species man is by way of agent; and it has been stated above (Obj. 1) secundum differentiam materiae assignantur. that the aforesaid species are assigned with regard to a difference of matter.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praedicta diversitas materiae habet annexam diversitatem formalem obiecti, quae accipitur secundum diversos modos repugnantiae ad rationem rectam, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet in eodem actu diversorum vitiorum deformitates concurrere, ut supra dictum est. Et hoc modo adulterium continetur sub luxuria et sub iniustitia. Nec deformitas iniustitiae omnino per accidens se habet ad luxuriam. Ostenditur enim luxuria gravior quae in tantum concupiscentiam sequitur quod etiam in iniustitiam ducat. Ad tertium dicendum quod mulier vovens continentiam quoddam spirituale matrimonium facit cum Deo. Et ideo sacrilegium quod committitur in violatione talis mulieris, est quoddam adulterium spirituale. Et similiter alii modi sacrilegii reducuntur ad alias species luxuriae. Ad quartum dicendum quod peccatum coniugati cum sua uxore non est secundum indebitam materiam, sed secundum alias circumstantias quae non constituunt speciem moralis actus, ut dictum est. Ad quintum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Glossa ibidem, immunditia ponitur pro luxuria contra naturam. Impudicitia autem est quae fit cum liberis a viro, unde videtur ad stuprum pertinere. Vel potest dici quod impudicitia pertinet ad quosdam actus circumstantes actum venereum, sicut sunt oscula, tactus et alia huiusmodi. Ad sextum dicendum quod luxuria sumitur ibidem pro quacumque superfluitate, ut Glossa ibidem dicit.

Q. 154, A. 2

Reply Obj. 1: The aforesaid diversity of matter is connected with a formal difference of object, which difference results from different modes of opposition to right reason, as stated above. Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 7), nothing hinders the deformities of different vices concurring in the one act, and in this way adultery is comprised under lust and injustice. Nor is this deformity of injustice altogether accidental to lust: since the lust that obeys concupiscence so far as to lead to injustice, is thereby shown to be more grievous. Reply Obj. 3: Since a woman, by vowing continence, contracts a spiritual marriage with God, the sacrilege that is committed in the violation of such a woman is a spiritual adultery. In like manner, the other kinds of sacrilege pertaining to lustful matter are reduced to other species of lust. Reply Obj. 4: The sin of a husband with his wife is not connected with undue matter, but with other circumstances, which do not constitute the species of a moral act, as stated above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2). Reply Obj. 5: As a gloss says on this passage, uncleanness stands for lust against nature, while lasciviousness is a man’s abuse of boys, wherefore it would appear to pertain to seduction. We may also reply that lasciviousness relates to certain acts circumstantial to the venereal act, for instance kisses, touches, and so forth. Reply Obj. 6: According to a gloss on this passage lust there signifies any kind of excess.

Article 2 Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fornicatio simplex non sit peccatum mortale. Ea enim quae simul connumerantur, videntur esse unius rationis. Sed fornicatio connumeratur quibusdam quae non sunt peccata mortalia, dicitur enim Act. XV, abstineatis vos ab immolatis simulacrorum, et sanguine et suffocato, et fornicatione; illorum autem usus non est peccatum mortale, secundum illud I ad Tim. IV, nihil reiiciendum quod cum gratiarum actione percipitur. Ergo fornicatio non est peccatum mortale. Praeterea, nullum peccatum mortale cadit sub praecepto divino. Sed Osee I praecipitur a domino, vade, sume tibi uxorem fornicationum, et fac filios fornicationum. Ergo fornicatio non est peccatum mortale. Praeterea, nullum peccatum mortale in Scriptura sacra absque reprehensione commemoratur. Sed fornicatio simplex commemoratur in Scriptura in antiquis patribus sine reprehensione, sicut legitur Gen. XVI de

Objection 1: It would seem that simple fornication is not a mortal sin. For things that come under the same head would seem to be on a par with one another. Now fornication comes under the same head as things that are not mortal sins: for it is written (Acts 15:29): That you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication. But there is not mortal sin in these observances, according to 1 Tim. 4:4, Nothing is rejected that is received with thanksgiving. Therefore fornication is not a mortal sin. Obj. 2: Further, no mortal sin is the matter of a Divine precept. But the Lord commanded (Hos 1:2): Go take thee a wife of fornications, and have of her children of fornications. Therefore fornication is not a mortal sin. Obj. 3: Further, no mortal sin is mentioned in Holy Writ without disapprobation. Yet simple fornication is mentioned without disapprobation by Holy Writ in connection with the patriarchs. Thus we read (Gen 16:4) that

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Abraham quod accessit ad Agar, ancillam suam; et infra, XXX, legitur de Iacob quod accessit ad ancillas uxorum suarum Balam et Zelpham; et infra, XXXVIII, legitur quod Iudas accessit ad Thamar, quam aestimavit meretricem. Ergo fornicatio simplex non est peccatum mortale. Praeterea, omne peccatum mortale contrariatur caritati. Sed fornicatio simplex non contrariatur caritati, neque quantum ad dilectionem Dei, quia non est directe peccatum contra Deum; nec etiam quantum ad dilectionem proximi, quia per hoc homo nulli homini facit iniuriam. Ergo fornicatio simplex non est peccatum mortale. Praeterea, omne peccatum mortale ducit in perditionem aeternam. Hoc autem non facit fornicatio simplex, quia super illud I ad Tim. IV, pietas ad omnia utilis est, dicit Glossa Ambrosii, omnis summa disciplinae Christianae in misericordia et pietate est. Quam aliquis sequens, si lubricum carnis patitur, sine dubio vapulabit, sed non peribit. Ergo fornicatio simplex non est peccatum mortale. Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Bon. Coniug., quod est cibus ad salutem corporis, hoc est concubitus ad salutem generis. Sed non omnis inordinatus usus ciborum est peccatum mortale. Ergo nec omnis inordinatus concubitus. Quod maxime videtur de fornicatione simplici, quae minima est inter species enumeratas. Sed contra est quod dicitur Tobiae IV, attende tibi ab omni fornicatione, et praeter uxorem tuam, non patiaris crimen scire. Crimen autem importat peccatum mortale. Ergo fornicatio, et omnis concubitus qui est praeter uxorem, est peccatum mortale. Praeterea, nihil excludit a regno Dei nisi peccatum mortale. Fornicatio autem excludit, ut patet per apostolum, Galat. V, ubi, praemissa fornicatione, et quibusdam aliis vitiis, subdit, qui talia agunt, regnum Dei non possidebunt. Ergo fornicatio simplex est peccatum mortale. Praeterea, in decretis dicitur, XXII Caus., qu. I, nosse debent talem de periurio poenitentiam imponi debere qualem de adulterio et fornicatione, et de homicidio sponte commisso, et de ceteris criminalibus vitiis. Ergo fornicatio simplex est peccatum criminale, sive mortale. Respondeo dicendum quod absque omni dubio tenendum est quod fornicatio simplex sit peccatum mortale, non obstante quod Deut. XXIII, super illud, non erit meretrix etc., dicit Glossa, ad eas prohibet accedere quarum est venialis turpitudo. Non enim debet dici venialis, sed venalis, quod est proprium meretricum. Ad huius autem evidentiam, considerandum est quod peccatum mortale est omne peccatum quod committitur directe contra vitam hominis. Fornicatio autem simplex importat inordinationem quae vergit in nocumentum vitae eius qui est ex tali concubitu nasciturus. Videmus enim

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Abraham went in to his handmaid Agar; and further on (Gen 30:5, 9) that Jacob went in to Bala and Zelpha the handmaids of his wives; and again (Gen 38:18) that Judah was with Thamar whom he thought to be a harlot. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin. Obj. 4: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But simple fornication is not contrary to charity, neither as regards the love of God, since it is not a sin directly against God, nor as regards the love of our neighbor, since thereby no one is injured. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin. Obj. 5: Further, every mortal sin leads to eternal perdition. But simple fornication has not this result: because a gloss of Ambrose on 1 Tim. 4:8, Godliness is profitable to all things, says: The whole of Christian teaching is summed up in mercy and godliness: if a man conforms to this, even though he gives way to the inconstancy of the flesh, doubtless he will be punished, but he will not perish. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin. Obj. 6: Further, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi) that what food is to the well-being of the body, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the human race. But inordinate use of food is not always a mortal sin. Therefore neither is all inordinate sexual intercourse; and this would seem to apply especially to simple fornication, which is the least grievous of the aforesaid species. On the contrary, It is written (Tob 4:13): Take heed to keep thyself . . . from all fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to know a crime. Now crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore fornication and all intercourse with other than one’s wife is a mortal sin. Further, nothing but mortal sin debars a man from God’s kingdom. But fornication debars him, as shown by the words of the Apostle (Gal 5:21), who after mentioning fornication and certain other vices, adds: They who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God. Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin. Further, it is written in the Decretals (XXII, qu. i, can. Praedicandum): They should know that the same penance is to be enjoined for perjury as for adultery, fornication, and wilfull murder and other criminal offenses. Therefore simple fornication is a criminal or mortal sin. I answer that, Without any doubt we must hold simple fornication to be a mortal sin, notwithstanding that a gloss on Deut. 23:17, says: This is a prohibition against going with whores, whose vileness is venial. For instead of venial it should be venal, since such is the wanton’s trade. In order to make this evident, we must take note that every sin committed directly against human life is a mortal sin. Now simple fornication implies an inordinateness that tends to injure the life of the offspring to be born of this union. For we find in all animals where the upbringing of the offspring needs care of both male and female, that these

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in omnibus animalibus in quibus ad educationem prolis requiritur cura maris et feminae, quod in eis non est vagus concubitus, sed maris ad certam feminam, unam vel plures, sicut patet in omnibus avibus. Secus autem est in animalibus in quibus sola femina sufficit ad educationem fetus in quibus est vagus concubitus, ut patet in canibus et aliis huiusmodi animalibus. Manifestum est autem quod ad educationem hominis non solum requiritur cura matris, a qua nutritur, sed multo magis cura patris, a quo est instruendus et defendendus, et in bonis tam interioribus quam exterioribus promovendus. Et ideo contra naturam hominis est quod utatur vago concubitu, sed oportet quod sit maris ad determinatam feminam, cum qua permaneat, non per modicum tempus, sed diu, vel etiam per totam vitam. Et inde est quod naturaliter est maribus in specie humana sollicitudo de certitudine prolis, quia eis imminet educatio prolis. Haec autem certitudo tolleretur si esset vagus concubitus. Haec autem determinatio certae feminae matrimonium vocatur. Et ideo dicitur esse de iure naturali. Sed quia concubitus ordinatur ad bonum commune totius humani generis; bona autem communia cadunt sub determinatione legis, ut supra habitum est, consequens est quod ista coniunctio maris ad feminam, quae matrimonium dicitur, lege aliqua determinetur. Qualiter autem sit apud nos determinatum, in tertia parte huius operis agetur, cum de matrimonii sacramento tractabitur. Unde, cum fornicatio sit concubitus vagus, utpote praeter matrimonium existens, est contra bonum prolis educandae.

Et ideo est peccatum mortale. Nec obstat si aliquis fornicando aliquam cognoscens, sufficienter provideat proli de educatione. Quia id quod cadit sub legis determinatione, iudicatur secundum id quod communiter accidit, et non secundum id quod in aliquo casu potest accidere. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod fornicatio illis connumeratur, non quia habeat eandem rationem culpae cum aliis, sed quantum ad hoc, quod ex his quae ibi ponuntur similiter poterat dissidium generari inter Iudaeos et gentiles, et eorum unanimis consensus impediri. Quia apud gentiles fornicatio simplex non reputabatur illicita, propter corruptionem naturalis rationis, Iudaei autem, ex lege divina instructi, eam illicitam reputabant. Alia vero quae ibi ponuntur, Iudaei abominabantur propter consuetudinem legalis conversationis. Unde apostoli ea gentilibus interdixerunt, non quasi secundum se illicita, sed quasi Iudaeis abominabilia, ut etiam supra dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod fornicatio dicitur esse peccatum, inquantum est contra rationem rectam.

Q. 154, A. 2

come together not indeterminately, but the male with a certain female, whether one or several; such is the case with all birds: while, on the other hand, among those animals, where the female alone suffices for the offspring’s upbringing, the union is indeterminate, as in the case of dogs and like animals. Now it is evident that the upbringing of a human child requires not only the mother’s care for his nourishment, but much more the care of his father as guide and guardian, and under whom he progresses in goods both internal and external. Hence human nature rebels against an indeterminate union of the sexes and demands that a man should be united to a determinate woman and should abide with her a long time or even for a whole lifetime. Hence it is that in the human race the male has a natural solicitude for the certainty of offspring, because on him devolves the upbringing of the child: and this certainly would cease if the union of sexes were indeterminate. This union with a certain definite woman is called matrimony; which for the above reason is said to belong to the natural law. Since, however, the union of the sexes is directed to the common good of the whole human race, and common goods depend on the law for their determination, as stated above (I-II, Q. 90, A. 2), it follows that this union of man and woman, which is called matrimony, is determined by some law. What this determination is for us will be stated in the Third Part of this work (Suppl., Q. 50, seqq.), where we shall treat of the sacrament of matrimony. Wherefore, since fornication is an indeterminate union of the sexes, as something incompatible with matrimony, it is opposed to the good of the child’s upbringing, and consequently it is a mortal sin. Nor does it matter if a man having knowledge of a woman by fornication, make sufficient provision for the upbringing of the child: because a matter that comes under the determination of the law is judged according to what happens in general, and not according to what may happen in a particular case. Reply Obj. 1: Fornication is reckoned in conjunction with these things, not as being on a par with them in sinfulness, but because the matters mentioned there were equally liable to cause dispute between Jews and Gentiles, and thus prevent them from agreeing unanimously. For among the Gentiles, fornication was not deemed unlawful, on account of the corruption of natural reason: whereas the Jews, taught by the Divine law, considered it to be unlawful. The other things mentioned were loathsome to the Jews through custom introduced by the law into their daily life. Hence the Apostles forbade these things to the Gentiles, not as though they were unlawful in themselves, but because they were loathsome to the Jews, as stated above (I-II, Q. 103, A. 4, ad 3). Reply Obj. 2: Fornication is said to be a sin, because it is contrary to right reason. Now man’s reason is right, in-

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Ratio autem hominis recta est secundum quod regulatur voluntate divina, quae est prima et summa regula. Et ideo quod homo facit ex voluntate Dei, eius praecepto obediens, non est contra rationem rectam, quamvis videatur esse contra communem ordinem rationis, sicut etiam non est contra naturam quod miraculose fit virtute divina, quamvis sit contra communem cursum naturae. Et ideo, sicut Abraham non peccavit filium innocentem volendo occidere, propter hoc quod obedivit Deo, quamvis hoc, secundum se consideratum, sit communiter contra rectitudinem rationis humanae; ita etiam Osee non peccavit fornicando ex praecepto divino. Nec talis concubitus proprie fornicatio debet dici, quamvis fornicatio nominetur referendo ad cursum communem. Unde Augustinus dicit, III Confess., cum Deus aliquid contra morem aut pactum quorumlibet iubet, etsi nunquam ibi factum est, faciendum est. Et postea subdit, sicut enim in potestatibus societatis humanae maior potestas minori ad obediendum praeponitur, ita Deus omnibus. Ad tertium dicendum quod Abraham et Iacob ad ancillas accesserunt non quasi fornicario concubitu, ut infra patebit, cum de matrimonio agetur. Iudam autem non est necessarium a peccato excusare, qui etiam auctor fuit venditionis Ioseph. Ad quartum dicendum quod fornicatio simplex contrariatur dilectioni proximi quantum ad hoc, quod repugnat bono prolis nasciturae, ut ostensum est, dum scilicet dat operam generationi non secundum quod convenit proli nasciturae. Ad quintum dicendum quod per opera pietatis ille qui lubricum carnis patitur liberatur a perditione aeterna, inquantum per huiusmodi opera disponitur ad hoc quod gratiam consequatur per quam poeniteat, et inquantum per huiusmodi opera satisfacit de lubrico carnis commisso. Non autem ita quod, si in lubrico carnis perseveret impoenitens usque ad mortem, per pietatis opera liberetur. Ad sextum dicendum quod ex uno concubitu potest unus homo generari. Et ideo inordinatio concubitus, quae impedit bonum prolis nasciturae, ex ipso genere actus est peccatum mortale, et non solum ex inordinatione concupiscentiae. Ex una autem comestione non impeditur bonum totius vitae unius hominis, et ideo actus gulae ex suo genere non est peccatum mortale. Esset tamen si quis scienter cibum comederet qui totam conditionem vitae eius immutaret, sicut patet de Adam. Nec tamen fornicatio est minimum peccatorum quae sub luxuria continentur. Minus enim est concubitus cum uxore qui fit ex libidine.

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sofar as it is ruled by the Divine Will, the first and supreme rule. Wherefore that which a man does by God’s will and in obedience to His command, is not contrary to right reason, though it may seem contrary to the general order of reason: even so, that which is done miraculously by the Divine power is not contrary to nature, though it be contrary to the usual course of nature. Therefore just as Abraham did not sin in being willing to slay his innocent son, because he obeyed God, although considered in itself it was contrary to right human reason in general, so, too, Osee sinned not in committing fornication by God’s command. Nor should such a copulation be strictly called fornication, though it be so called in reference to the general course of things. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): When God commands a thing to be done against the customs or agreement of any people, though it were never done by them heretofore, it is to be done; and afterwards he adds: For as among the powers of human society, the greater authority is obeyed in preference to the lesser, so must God in preference to all. Reply Obj. 3: Abraham and Jacob went in to their handmaidens with no purpose of fornication, as we shall show further on when we treat of matrimony (Suppl., Q. 65, A. 5, ad 2). As to Judah there is no need to excuse him, for he also caused Joseph to be sold. Reply Obj. 4: Simple fornication is contrary to the love of our neighbor, because it is opposed to the good of the child to be born, as we have shown, since it is an act of generation accomplished in a manner disadvantageous to the future child. Reply Obj. 5: A person, who, while given to works of piety, yields to the inconstancy of the flesh, is freed from eternal loss, insofar as these works dispose him to receive the grace to repent, and because by such works he makes satisfaction for his past inconstancy; but not so as to be freed by pious works, if he persist in carnal inconstancy impenitent until death. Reply Obj. 6: One copulation may result in the begetting of a man, wherefore inordinate copulation, which hinders the good of the future child, is a mortal sin as to the very genus of the act, and not only as to the inordinateness of concupiscence. On the other hand, one meal does not hinder the good of a man’s whole life, wherefore the act of gluttony is not a mortal sin by reason of its genus. It would, however, be a mortal sin, if a man were knowingly to partake of a food which would alter the whole condition of his life, as was the case with Adam. Nor is it true that fornication is the least of the sins comprised under lust, for the marriage act that is done out of sensuous pleasure is a lesser sin.

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Q. 154, A. 3

Article 3 Whether fornication is the most grievous of sins? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod fornicatio sit gravissimum peccatum. Tanto enim videtur peccatum gravius, quanto ex maiori libidine procedit. Sed maxima libido est in fornicatione dicitur enim in Glossa, I ad Cor. VI, quod ardor libidinis in luxuria est maximus. Ergo videtur quod fornicatio sit gravissimum peccatum. Praeterea, tanto aliquis gravius peccat, quanto in rem sibi magis coniunctam delinquit, sicut gravius peccat qui percutit patrem quam qui percutit extraneum. Sed sicut dicitur I Cor. VI, qui fornicatur, in corpus suum peccat, quod est homini coniunctissimum. Ergo videtur quod fornicatio sit gravissimum peccatum. Praeterea, quanto aliquod bonum est maius, tanto peccatum quod contra illud committitur videtur esse gravius. Sed peccatum fornicationis videtur esse contra bonum totius humani generis, ut ex praedictis patet. Est etiam contra Christum, secundum illud I ad Cor. VI, tollens membra Christi, faciam membra meretricis? Ergo fornicatio est gravissimum peccatum. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit quod peccata carnalia sunt minoris culpae quam peccata spiritualia. Respondeo dicendum quod gravitas peccati alicuius attendi potest dupliciter, uno modo, secundum se; alio modo, secundum accidens. Secundum se quidem attenditur gravitas peccati ex ratione suae speciei, quae consideratur secundum bonum cui peccatum opponitur. Fornicatio autem est contra bonum hominis nascituri. Et ideo est gravius peccatum secundum speciem suam peccatis quae sunt contra bona exteriora, sicut est furtum et alia huiusmodi, minus autem peccatis quae sunt directe contra Deum, et peccato quod est contra vitam hominis iam nati, sicut est homicidium. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod libido quae aggravat peccatum est quae consistit in inclinatione voluntatis. Libido autem quae est in appetitu sensitivo diminuit peccatum, quia quanto aliquis ex maiori passione impulsus peccat, tanto levius est peccatum. Et hoc modo in fornicatione libido est maxima. Et inde est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de agone Christiano, quod inter omnia Christianorum certamina, duriora sunt praelia castitatis, ubi est quotidiana pugna, sed rara victoria. Et Isidorus dicit, in libro de summo bono, quod magis per carnis luxuriam humanum genus subditur Diabolo quam per aliquod aliud, quia scilicet difficilius est vincere vehementiam huius passionis. Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui fornicatur dicitur peccare in corpus suum, non solum quia fornica-

Objection 1: It would seem that fornication is the most grievous of sins. For seemingly a sin is the more grievous according as it proceeds from a greater sensuous pleasure. Now the greatest sensuous pleasure is in fornication, for a gloss on 1 Cor. 7:9 says that the flame of sensuous pleasure is most fierce in lust. Therefore it seems that fornication is the gravest of sins. Obj. 2: Further, a sin is the more grievous that is committed against a person more closely united to the sinner: thus he sins more grievously who strikes his father than one who strikes a stranger. Now according to 1 Cor. 6:18, He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body, which is most intimately connected with a man. Therefore it seems that fornication is the most grievous of sins. Obj. 3: Further, the greater a good is, the graver would seem to be the sin committed against it. Now the sin of fornication is seemingly opposed to the good of the whole human race, as appears from what was said in the foregoing Article. It is also against Christ, according to 1 Cor. 6:15, Shall I . . . take the members of Christ, and make them the members of a harlot? Therefore fornication is the most grievous of sins. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 12) that the sins of the flesh are less grievous than spiritual sins. I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be measured in two ways, first with regard to the sin in itself, second with regard to some accident. The gravity of a sin is measured with regard to the sin itself, by reason of its species, which is determined according to the good to which that sin is opposed. Now fornication is contrary to the good of the child to be born. Wherefore it is a graver sin, as to its species, than those sins which are contrary to external goods, such as theft and the like; while it is less grievous than those which are directly against God, and sins that are injurious to the life of one already born, such as murder. Reply Obj. 1: The sensual pleasure that aggravates a sin is that which is in the inclination of the will. But the sensual pleasure that is in the sensitive appetite, lessens sin, because a sin is the less grievous according as it is committed under the impulse of a greater passion. It is in this way that the greatest sensual pleasure is in fornication. Hence Augustine says (De Agone Christiano) that of all a Christian’s conflicts, the most difficult combats are those of chastity; wherein the fight is a daily one, but victory rare: and Isidore declares (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that mankind is subjected to the devil by carnal lust more than by anything else, because, to wit, the vehemence of this passion is more difficult to overcome. Reply Obj. 2: The fornicator is said to sin against his own body, not merely because the pleasure of fornication

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tionis delectatio consummatur in carne, quod etiam in gula accidit, sed etiam quia contra bonum proprii corporis agit qui fornicatur, inquantum scilicet indebite illud resolvit et inquinat, et alteri commiscet. Nec tamen propter hoc sequitur quod fornicatio sit peccatum gravissimum, quia ratio in homine praevalet corpori; unde, si sit peccatum magis repugnans rationi, gravius erit. Ad tertium dicendum quod peccatum fornicationis est contra bonum speciei humanae inquantum impedit generationem singularem unius hominis nascituri. Magis autem pertingit ad rationem speciei qui actu iam participat speciem quam qui est potentia homo. Et secundum hoc etiam homicidium est gravius quam fornicatio et omnes luxuriae species, tanquam magis bono speciei humanae repugnans. Bonum etiam divinum est maius bono speciei humanae. Et ideo etiam peccata quae sunt contra Deum, sunt maiora. Nec fornicatio est directe peccatum in Deum, quasi fornicator Dei offensam intendat, sed ex consequenti, sicut et omnia peccata mortalia. Sicut enim membra corporis nostri sunt membra Christi, ita etiam et spiritus noster est unum cum Christo, secundum illud I ad Cor. VI, qui adhaeret Deo, unus spiritus est. Unde etiam peccata spiritualia sunt magis contra Christum quam fornicatio.

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is consummated in the flesh, which is also the case in gluttony, but also because he acts against the good of his own body by an undue resolution and defilement thereof, and an undue association with another. Nor does it follow from this that fornication is the most grievous sin, because in man reason is of greater value than the body, wherefore if there be a sin more opposed to reason, it will be more grievous. Reply Obj. 3: The sin of fornication is contrary to the good of the human race, insofar as it is prejudicial to the individual begetting of the one man that may be born. Now one who is already an actual member of the human species attains to the perfection of the species more than one who is a man potentially, and from this point of view murder is a more grievous sin than fornication and every kind of lust, through being more opposed to the good of the human species. Again, a Divine good is greater than the good of the human race: and therefore those sins also that are against God are more grievous. Moreover, fornication is a sin against God, not directly as though the fornicator intended to offend God, but consequently, in the same way as all mortal sins. And just as the members of our body are Christ’s members, so too, our spirit is one with Christ, according to 1 Cor. 6:17, He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit. Wherefore also spiritual sins are more against Christ than fornication is.

Article 4 Whether there can be mortal sin in touches and kisses? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in tactibus et osculis non consistat peccatum mortale. Apostolus enim, ad Ephes. V, dicit, fornicatio autem et omnis immunditia, aut avaritia, ne nominetur in vobis, sicut decet sanctos. Subdit autem, aut turpitudo, Glossa, ut in osculis et amplexibus; aut stultiloquium, ut blanda verba; aut scurrilitas, quae a stultis curialitas dicitur, idest iocularitas. Postea autem subdit, hoc enim scitote, intelligentes, quod omnis fornicator aut immundus aut avarus, quod est idolorum servitus, non habet haereditatem in regno Christi et Dei, ubi non replicat de turpitudine, sicut nec de stultiloquio aut scurrilitate. Ergo ista non sunt peccata mortalia. Praeterea, fornicatio dicitur esse peccatum mortale ex hoc quod per eam impeditur bonum prolis generandae et educandae. Sed ad hoc nihil operantur oscula et tactus, sive amplexus. Ergo in his non contingit esse peccatum mortale. Praeterea, illa quae sunt secundum se peccata mortalia, nunquam possunt bene fieri. Sed oscula et tactus et huiusmodi possunt quandoque fieri absque peccato. Ergo non sunt secundum se peccata mortalia.

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no mortal sin in touches and kisses. For the Apostle says (Eph 5:3): Fornication and all uncleanness, or covetousness, let it not so much as be named among you, as becometh saints, then he adds: Or obscenity (which a gloss refers to kissing and fondling), or foolish talking (as soft speeches), or scurrility (which fools call geniality—i.e., jocularity), and afterwards he continues (Eph 5:5): For know ye this and understand that no fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person (which is the serving of idols), hath inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God, thus making no further mention of obscenity, as neither of foolish talking or scurrility. Therefore these are not mortal sins. Obj. 2: Further, fornication is stated to be a mortal sin as being prejudicial to the good of the future child’s begetting and upbringing. But these are not affected by kisses and touches or blandishments. Therefore there is no mortal sin in these. Obj. 3: Further, things that are mortal sins in themselves can never be good actions. Yet kisses, touches, and the like can be done sometimes without sin. Therefore they are not mortal sins in themselves.

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Sed contra, minus est aspectus libidinosus quam tactus, amplexus vel osculum. Sed aspectus libidinosus est peccatum mortale, secundum illud Matth. V, qui viderit mulierem ad concupiscendum eam, iam moechatus est eam in corde suo. Ergo multo magis osculum libidinosum, et alia huiusmodi, sunt peccata mortalia. Praeterea, Cyprianus, ad Pomponium de virginitate, dicit, certe ipse concubitus, ipse amplexus, ipsa confabulatio et osculatio, et coniacentium duorum turpis et foeda dormitio, quantum dedecoris et criminis confitentur. Ergo per praedicta homo fit reus criminis, idest peccati mortalis. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid dicitur esse peccatum mortale dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum speciem suam. Et hoc modo osculum, amplexus vel tactus, secundum suam rationem non nominant peccatum mortale. Possunt enim haec absque libidine fieri, vel propter consuetudinem patriae, vel propter aliquam necessitatem aut rationabilem causam. Alio modo dicitur aliquid esse peccatum mortale ex sua causa, sicut ille qui dat eleemosynam ut aliquem inducat ad haeresim, mortaliter peccat propter intentionem corruptam. Dictum est autem supra quod consensus in delectationem peccati mortalis est peccatum mortale, et non solum consensus in actum. Et ideo, cum fornicatio sit peccatum mortale, et multo magis aliae luxuriae species, consequens est quod consensus in delectationem talis peccati sit peccatum mortale, et non solum consensus in actum. Et ideo, cum oscula et amplexus et huiusmodi propter delectationem huiusmodi fiant, consequens est quod sint peccata mortalia. Et sic solum dicuntur libidinosa. Unde huiusmodi, secundum quod libidinosa sunt, sunt peccata mortalia. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus ideo non resumit illa tria, quia non habent rationem peccati nisi secundum quod ordinantur ad praecedentia. Ad secundum dicendum quod oscula et tactus, quamvis secundum se non impediant bonum prolis humanae, procedunt tamen ex libidine, quae est radix huius impedimenti. Et ex hoc habent rationem peccati mortalis. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa concludit quod huiusmodi non sunt peccata secundum suam speciem.

Q. 154, A. 5

On the contrary, A lustful look is less than a touch, a caress or a kiss. But according to Matt. 5:28, Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her hath already committed adultery with her in his heart. Much more therefore are lustful kisses and other like things mortal sins. Further, Cyprian says (Ad Pompon, de Virgin., Ep. lxii), By their very intercourse, their blandishments, their converse, their embraces, those who are associated in a sleep that knows neither honor nor shame, acknowledge their disgrace and crime. Therefore by doing these things a man is guilty of a crime, that is, of mortal sin. I answer that, A thing is said to be a mortal sin in two ways. First, by reason of its species, and in this way a kiss, caress, or touch does not, of its very nature, imply a mortal sin, for it is possible to do such things without lustful pleasure, either as being the custom of one’s country, or on account of some obligation or reasonable cause. Second, a thing is said to be a mortal sin by reason of its cause: thus he who gives an alms, in order to lead someone into heresy, sins mortally on account of his corrupt intention. Now it has been stated above (I-II, Q. 74, A. 8), that it is a mortal sin not only to consent to the act, but also to the delectation of a mortal sin. Wherefore since fornication is a mortal sin, and much more so the other kinds of lust, it follows that in such like sins not only consent to the act but also consent to the pleasure is a mortal sin. Consequently, when these kisses and caresses are done for this delectation, it follows that they are mortal sins, and only in this way are they said to be lustful. Therefore insofar as they are lustful, they are mortal sins.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle makes no further mention of these three because they are not sinful except as directed to those that he had mentioned before. Reply Obj. 2: Although kisses and touches do not by their very nature hinder the good of the human offspring, they proceed from lust, which is the source of this hindrance: and on this account they are mortally sinful. Reply Obj. 3: This argument proves that such things are not mortal sins in their species.

Article 5 Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nocObjection 1: It would seem that nocturnal pollution turna pollutio sit peccatum. Meritum enim et demeri- is a sin. For the same things are the matter of merit and tum habent fieri circa idem. Sed dormiens potest mereri, demerit. Now a man may merit while he sleeps, as was sicut patet de Salomone, qui dormiens a domino donum the case with Solomon, who while asleep obtained the gift

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sapientiae impetravit, ut dicitur III Reg. III, et II Paralip. I. Ergo in dormiendo potest aliquis demereri. Et ita videtur quod nocturna pollutio sit peccatum. Praeterea, quicumque habet usum rationis, potest peccare. Sed in dormiendo aliquis habet usum rationis, quia frequenter aliquis in somnis ratiocinatur, et praeeligit unum alteri, consentiens vel dissentiens. Ergo in dormiendo potest aliquis peccare. Et ita propter somnum nocturna pollutio non impeditur quin sit peccatum, cum ex genere actus sit peccatum. Praeterea, frustra increpatur et instruitur qui non potest vel agere secundum rationem vel contra rationem. Sed homo in somnis instruitur a Deo et increpatur, secundum illud Iob XXXIII, per somnium, in visione nocturna, quando sopor solet occupare homines, tunc aperit aures virorum, et erudiens eos instruit disciplina. Ergo in somnis potest aliquis agere secundum rationem vel contra rationem, quod est bene agere vel peccare. Et sic videtur quod pollutio nocturna sit peccatum. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., ipsa phantasia quae fit in cogitatione sermocinantis, cum expressa fuerit in visione somniantis, ut inter illam et veram coniunctionem corporum non discernatur, continue movetur caro et sequitur quod eum motum sequi solet, cum hoc tam sine peccato fiat, quam sine peccato a vigilantibus dicitur quod, ut diceretur, sine dubio cogitatum est. Respondeo dicendum quod nocturna pollutio dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, secundum se. Et hoc modo non habet rationem peccati. Omne enim peccatum dependet ex iudicio rationis, quia etiam primus motus sensualitatis non habet quod sit peccatum nisi inquantum iudicio rationis reprimi potest. Et ideo, sublato iudicio rationis, tollitur ratio peccati. In dormiendo autem ratio non habet liberum iudicium, nullus enim est dormiens qui non intendat aliquibus similitudinibus phantasmatum velut rebus ipsis, ut patet ex his quae in primo dicta sunt. Et ideo id quod agit homo dormiens, qui non habet liberum iudicium rationis, non imputatur ei ad culpam, sicut nec illud quod agit furiosus aut amens. Alio modo potest considerari nocturna pollutio per comparationem ad suam causam. Quae potest esse triplex. Una quidem corporalis. Cum enim humor seminalis superabundat in corpore; vel cum facta est humoris resolutio, vel per nimiam calefactionem corporis, vel per quamcumque aliam commotionem; somniat dormiens ea quae pertinent ad expulsionem huiusmodi humoris abundantis vel resoluti, sicut etiam accidit quando natura gravatur ex aliqua alia superfluitate; ita quod quandoque formantur in imaginatione phantasmata pertinentia ad emissionem talium superfluitatum. Si igitur superabundantia talis humoris sit ex causa culpabili, puta cum est ex superfluitate cibi vel potus; tunc nocturna pollu-

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of wisdom from the Lord (3 Kgs 3:2, Par. 1). Therefore a man may demerit while asleep; and thus nocturnal pollution would seem to be a sin. Obj. 2: Further, whoever has the use of reason can sin. Now a man has the use of reason while asleep, since in our sleep we frequently discuss matters, choose this rather than that, consenting to one thing, or dissenting to another. Therefore one may sin while asleep, so that nocturnal pollution is not prevented by sleep from being a sin, seeing that it is a sin according to its genus. Obj. 3: Further, it is useless to reprove and instruct one who cannot act according to or against reason. Now man, while asleep, is instructed and reproved by God, according to Job 33:15, 16, By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep is wont to lay hold of men . . . Then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn. Therefore a man, while asleep, can act according to or against his reason, and this is to do good or sinful actions, and thus it seems that nocturnal pollution is a sin. On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 15): When the same image that comes into the mind of a speaker presents itself to the mind of the sleeper, so that the latter is unable to distinguish the imaginary from the real union of bodies, the flesh is at once moved, with the result that usually follows such motions; and yet there is as little sin in this as there is in speaking and therefore thinking about such things while one is awake. I answer that, Nocturnal pollution may be considered in two ways. First, in itself; and thus it has not the character of a sin. For every sin depends on the judgment of reason, since even the first movement of the sensuality has nothing sinful in it, except insofar as it can be suppressed by reason; wherefore in the absence of reason’s judgment, there is no sin in it. Now during sleep reason has not a free judgment. For there is no one who while sleeping does not regard some of the images formed by his imagination as though they were real, as stated above in the First Part (Q. 84, A. 8, ad 2). Wherefore what a man does while he sleeps and is deprived of reason’s judgment, is not imputed to him as a sin, as neither are the actions of a maniac or an imbecile. Second, nocturnal pollution may be considered with reference to its cause. This may be threefold. One is a bodily cause. For when there is excess of seminal humor in the body, or when the humor is disintegrated either through overheating of the body or some other disturbance, the sleeper dreams things that are connected with the discharge of this excessive or disintegrated humor: the same thing happens when nature is cumbered with other superfluities, so that phantasms relating to the discharge of those superfluities are formed in the imagination. Accordingly if this excess of humor be due to a sinful cause (for instance excessive eating or drinking), nocturnal pollution has the character of sin from its cause: whereas if the excess or disinte-

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tio habet rationem culpae ex sua causa. Si autem superabundantia vel resolutio talis humoris non sit ex aliqua causa culpabili, tunc nocturna pollutio non est culpabilis, nec in se nec in causa sua. Alia vero causa nocturnae pollutionis potest esse animalis interior, puta cum ex cogitatione praecedenti contingit aliquem dormientem pollui. Cogitatio autem quae in vigilia praecessit, quandoque est pure speculativa, puta cum aliquis causa disputationis cogitat de peccatis carnalibus, quandoque autem est cum aliqua affectione vel concupiscentiae vel horroris. Contingit autem magis pollutio nocturna ex cogitatione carnalium vitiorum quae fuit cum concupiscentia talium delectationum, quia ex hoc remanet quoddam vestigium et inclinatio in anima, ita quod dormiens facilius inducitur in sua imaginatione ad assentiendum actibus ex quibus sequitur pollutio. Secundum hoc philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod inquantum paulatim pertranseunt quidam motus a vigilantibus ad dormientes, meliora fiunt phantasmata studiosorum quam quorumlibet, et Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod propter bonam animae affectionem, quaedam eius merita etiam in somnis clarent. Et sic patet quod nocturna pollutio habet rationem culpae ex parte suae causae. Quandoque tamen contingit quod ex praecedenti cogitatione carnalium actuum etiam speculativa, vel si sit cum horrore, sequitur in somnis pollutio. Et tunc non habet rationem culpae, nec in se nec in sua causa. Tertia vero causa est spiritualis extrinseca, puta cum ex operatione Daemonis commoventur phantasmata dormientis in ordine ad talem effectum. Et hoc quidem quandoque est cum peccato praecedenti, scilicet negligentia praeparandi se contra Daemonis illusiones, unde et in sero cantatur, hostemque nostrum comprime, ne polluantur corpora. Quandoque vero est absque omni culpa hominis, ex sola nequitia Daemonis, sicut in collationibus patrum legitur de quodam quod semper in diebus festis pollutionem nocturnam patiebatur, hoc Diabolo procurante, ut impediretur a sacra communione. Sic igitur patet quod nocturna pollutio nunquam est peccatum, quandoque tamen est sequela peccati praecedentis.

Q. 154, A. 5

gration of these superfluities be not due to a sinful cause, nocturnal pollution is not sinful, neither in itself nor in its cause.

A second cause of nocturnal pollution is on the part of the soul and the inner man: for instance when it happens to the sleeper on account of some previous thought. For the thought which preceded while he was awake, is sometimes purely speculative, for instance when one thinks about the sins of the flesh for the purpose of discussion; while sometimes it is accompanied by a certain emotion either of concupiscence or of abhorrence. Now nocturnal pollution is more apt to arise from thinking about carnal sins with concupiscence for such pleasures, because this leaves its trace and inclination in the soul, so that the sleeper is more easily led in his imagination to consent to acts productive of pollution. In this sense the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that insofar as certain movements in some degree pass from the waking state to the state of sleep, the dreams of good men are better than those of any other people: and Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 15) that even during sleep, the soul may have conspicuous merit on account of its good disposition. Thus it is evident that nocturnal pollution may be sinful on the part of its cause. On the other hand, it may happen that nocturnal pollution ensues after thoughts about carnal acts, though they were speculative, or accompanied by abhorrence, and then it is not sinful, neither in itself nor in its cause. The third cause is spiritual and external; for instance when by the work of a devil the sleeper’s phantasms are disturbed so as to induce the aforesaid result. Sometimes this is associated with a previous sin, namely the neglect to guard against the wiles of the devil. Hence the words of the hymn at even: Our enemy repress, that so our bodies no uncleanness know. On the other hand, this may occur without any fault on man’s part, and through the wickedness of the devil alone. Thus we read in the Collationes Patrum (Coll. xxii, 6) of a man who was ever wont to suffer from nocturnal pollution on festivals, and that the devil brought this about in order to prevent him from receiving Holy Communion. Hence it is manifest that nocturnal pollution is never a sin, but is sometimes the result of a previous sin. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Salomon non Reply Obj. 1: Solomon did not merit to receive wismeruit in dormiendo sapientiam a Deo, sed fuit signum dom from God while he was asleep. He received it in token praecedentis desiderii, propter quod dicitur talis petitio of his previous desire. It is for this reason that his petition Deo placuisse, ut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad is stated to have been pleasing to God (3 Kgs 3:10), as AuLitt. gustine observes (Gen ad lit. xii, 15). Ad secundum dicendum quod, secundum quod viReply Obj. 2: The use of reason is more or less hinres sensitivae interiores magis vel minus opprimuntur a dered in sleep, according as the inner sensitive powers are somno, propter vaporis turbulentiam vel puritatem, se- more or less overcome by sleep, on account of the violence cundum hoc usus rationis magis vel minus impeditur in or attenuation of the evaporations. Nevertheless it is always dormiendo. Semper tamen quantum ad aliquid impedi- hindered somewhat, so as to be unable to elicit a judgment

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tur, ut non possit omnino liberum iudicium habere, ut in prima parte dictum est. Et ideo non imputatur ei ad culpam quod tunc agit. Ad tertium dicendum quod apprehensio rationis non ita impeditur in somno sicut eius iudicium, quod perficitur per conversionem ad sensibilia, quae sunt prima principia cognitionis humanae. Et ideo nihil prohibet hominem secundum rationem apprehendere aliquid de novo in dormiendo, vel ex ipsis reliquiis praecedentium cogitationum et phantasmatibus oblatis, vel etiam ex revelatione divina, aut immissione Angeli boni vel mali.

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altogether free, as stated in the First Part (Q. 84, A. 8, ad 2). Therefore what it does then is not imputed to it as a sin. Reply Obj. 3: Reason’s apprehension is not hindered during sleep to the same extent as its judgment, for this is accomplished by reason turning to sensible objects, which are the first principles of human thought. Hence nothing hinders man’s reason during sleep from apprehending anew something arising out of the traces left by his previous thoughts and phantasms presented to him, or again through Divine revelation, or the interference of a good or bad angel.

Article 6 Whether seduction should be reckoned a species of lust? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod stuprum non debeat poni una species luxuriae. Stuprum enim importat illicitam virginum deflorationem; ut habetur in decretis, XXXVI Caus., qu. I. Sed hoc potest esse soluti cum soluta, quod pertinet ad fornicationem. Ergo stuprum non debet poni species luxuriae a fornicatione distincta. Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit, in libro de patriarchis, nemo sibi blandiatur de legibus hominum, omne stuprum adulterium est. Sed specierum ex opposito divisarum una non continetur sub alia. Cum ergo adulterium ponatur species luxuriae, videtur quod stuprum species luxuriae poni non debet. Praeterea, inferre alicui iniuriam videtur magis ad iniustitiam quam ad luxuriam pertinere. Sed ille qui stuprum committit, iniuriam facit alteri, scilicet patri puellae quam corrumpit, qui potest ad animum suam iniuriam revocare, et agere actione iniuriarum contra stupratorem. Ergo stuprum non debet poni species luxuriae. Sed contra est quod stuprum proprie consistit in actu venereo quo virgo defloratur. Cum igitur luxuria proprie sit circa venerea, videtur quod stuprum sit species luxuriae. Respondeo dicendum quod ubi circa materiam alicuius vitii occurrit aliqua specialis deformitas, ibi debet poni determinata species illius vitii. Luxuria autem est peccatum circa venerea existens, ut supra dictum est. In virgine autem sub custodia patris existente quaedam deformitas specialis occurrit si corrumpatur. Tum ex parte puellae, quae, ex hoc quod violatur, nulla pactione coniugali praecedente, impeditur a legitimo matrimonio consequendo et ponitur in via meretricandi, a quo retrahebatur ne signaculum virginitatis amitteret. Tum etiam ex parte patris, qui de eius custodia sollicitudinem gerit,

Objection 1: It would seem that seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust. For seduction denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin, according to the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1). But this may occur between an unmarried man and an unmarried woman, which pertains to fornication. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust, distinct from fornication. Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Patriarch.): Let no man be deluded by human laws: all seduction is adultery. Now a species is not contained under another that is differentiated in opposition to it. Therefore since adultery is a species of lust, it seems that seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust. Obj. 3: Further, to do a person an injury would seem to pertain to injustice rather than to lust. Now the seducer does an injury to another, namely the violated maiden’s father, who can take the injury as personal to himself, and sue the seducer for damages. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust. On the contrary, Seduction consists properly in the venereal act whereby a virgin is violated. Therefore, since lust is properly about venereal actions, it would seem that seduction is a species of lust. I answer that, When the matter of a vice has a special deformity, we must reckon it to be a determinate species of that vice. Now lust is a sin concerned with venereal matter, as stated above (Q. 153, A. 1). And a special deformity attaches to the violation of a virgin who is under her father’s care: both on the part of the maid, who through being violated without any previous compact of marriage is both hindered from contracting a lawful marriage and is put on the road to a wanton life from which she was withheld lest she should lose the seal of virginity: and on the part of the father, who is her guardian, according to Ecclus. 42:11, Keep

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secundum illud Eccli. XLII, super filiam luxuriosam confirma custodiam, nequando faciat te in opprobrium venire inimicis. Et ideo manifestum est quod stuprum, quod importat illicitam virginum deflorationem sub cura parentum existentium, est determinate luxuriae species. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis virgo sit soluta a vinculo matrimoniali, non tamen est soluta a patria potestate. Habet etiam speciale impedimentum fornicarii concubitus virginitatis signum, quod non debet nisi per matrimonium auferri. Unde stuprum non est fornicatio simplex, sed concubitus qui fit cum meretricibus, idest mulieribus iam corruptis, ut patet per Glossam, II ad Cor. XII, super illud, qui non egerunt poenitentiam super immunditia et fornicatione et cetera. Ad secundum dicendum quod Ambrosius ibi aliter accipit stuprum, prout scilicet communiter sumitur pro omni peccato luxuriae. Unde stuprum ibi nominat concubitum viri coniugati cum quacumque alia muliere praeter uxorem. Quod patet ex hoc quod subdit, nec viro licet quod mulieri non licet. Et hoc modo etiam accipitur Num. V, ubi dicitur, si latet adulterium, et testibus argui non potest, quia non est inventa in stupro, et cetera. Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet unum peccatum ex adiunctione alterius deformius fieri. Fit autem deformius peccatum luxuriae ex peccato iniustitiae, quia videtur concupiscentia esse inordinatior quae a delectabili non abstinet ut iniuriam vitet. Habet autem duplicem iniuriam annexam. Unam quidem ex parte virginis, quam etsi non vi corrumpat, tamen eam seducit; et sic tenetur ei satisfacere. Unde dicitur Exod. XXII, si seduxerit quis virginem nondum desponsatam, dormieritque cum ea, dotabit eam, et habebit uxorem. Si autem pater virginis dare noluerit, reddet pecuniam iuxta modum dotis quam virgines accipere consueverunt. Aliam vero iniuriam facit patri puellae. Unde et ei secundum legem tenetur ad poenam. Dicitur enim Deut. XXII, si invenerit vir puellam virginem, quae non habet sponsum, et apprehendens concubuerit cum illa, et res ad iudicium venerit, dabit qui dormivit cum ea patri puellae quinquaginta siclos argenti, et habebit eam uxorem, et quia humiliavit illam, non poterit dimittere eam cunctis diebus vitae suae. Et hoc ideo, ne videatur ludibrium fecisse, ut Augustinus dicit.

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a sure watch over a shameless daughter, lest at any time she make thee become a laughing-stock to thy enemies. Therefore it is evident that seduction which denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin, while still under the guardianship of her parents, is a determinate species of lust. Reply Obj. 1: Although a virgin is free from the bond of marriage, she is not free from her father’s power. Moreover, the seal of virginity is a special obstacle to the intercourse of fornication, in that it should be removed by marriage only. Hence seduction is not simple fornication, since the latter is intercourse with harlots, women, namely, who are no longer virgins, as a gloss observes on 2 Cor. 12: And have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication, etc. Reply Obj. 2: Ambrose here takes seduction in another sense, as applicable in a general way to any sin of lust. Wherefore seduction, in the words quoted, signifies the intercourse between a married man and any woman other than his wife. This is clear from his adding: Nor is it lawful for the husband to do what the wife may not. In this sense, too, we are to understand the words of Num. 5:13: If the adultery is secret, and cannot be provided by witnesses, because she was not found in adultery (stupro). Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents a sin from having a greater deformity through being united to another sin. Now the sin of lust obtains a greater deformity from the sin of injustice, because the concupiscence would seem to be more inordinate, seeing that it refrains not from the pleasurable object so that it may avoid an injustice. In fact a twofold injustice attaches to it. One is on the part of the virgin, who, though not violated by force, is nevertheless seduced, and thus the seducer is bound to compensation. Hence it is written (Exod 22:16, 17): If a man seduce a virgin not yet espoused, and lie with her, he shall endow her and have her to wife. If the maid’s father will not give her to him, he shall give money according to the dowry, which virgins are wont to receive. The other injury is done to the maid’s father: wherefore the seducer is bound by the Law to a penalty in his regard. For it is written (Deut 22:28, 29): If a man find a damsel that is a virgin, who is not espoused, and taking her, lie with her, and the matter come to judgment: he that lay with her shall give to the father of the maid fifty sicles of silver, and shall have her to wife, and because he hath humbled her, he may not put her away all the days of his life: and this, lest he should prove to have married her in mockery, as Augustine observes.

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Article 7 Whether rape is a species of lust, distinct from seduction? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod raptus non sit species luxuriae distincta a stupro. Dicit enim Isidorus, in libro Etymol., quod stuprum, idest raptus, proprie est illicitus coitus, a corrumpendo dictus, unde et qui raptu potitur, stupro fruitur. Ergo videtur quod raptus non debeat poni species luxuriae distincta a stupro. Praeterea, raptus videtur quandam violentiam importare, dicitur enim in decretis, XXXVI Caus., qu. I, quod raptus committitur cum puella violenter a domo patris abducitur, ut, corrupta, in uxorem habeatur. Sed hoc quod violentia alicui inferatur, per accidens se habet ad luxuriam, quae per se respicit delectationem concubitus. Ergo videtur quod raptus non debeat poni determinata species luxuriae. Praeterea, peccatum luxuriae per matrimonium cohibetur, dicitur enim I ad Cor. VII, propter fornicationem, unusquisque suam habeat. Sed raptus impedit matrimonium sequens, dicitur enim in Concilio Meldensi, placuit ut hi qui rapiunt feminas, vel furantur vel seducunt, eas nullatenus habeant uxores, quamvis eas postmodum nuptialiter cum consensu parentum suorum susceperint. Ergo raptus non est determinata species luxuriae a stupro distincta. Praeterea, aliquis potest cognoscere suam sponsam absque peccato luxuriae. Sed raptus potest committi si aliquis violenter sponsam suam auferat de domo parentum et eam carnaliter cognoscat. Ergo raptus non debet poni determinata species luxuriae. Sed contra est quod raptus est illicitus coitus, ut Isidorus dicit. Sed hoc pertinet ad peccatum luxuriae. Ergo raptus est species luxuriae. Respondeo dicendum quod raptus, prout nunc de eo loquimur, est species luxuriae. Et quandoque quidem in idem concurrit cum stupro; quandoque autem invenitur raptus sine stupro; quandoque vero stuprum sine raptu. Concurrunt quidem in idem, quando aliquis violentiam infert ad virginem illicite deflorandam. Quae quidem violentia quandoque infertur tam ipsi virgini quam patri, quandoque autem infertur patri, sed non virgini, puta cum ipsa consentit ut per violentiam de domo patris abstrahatur. Differt etiam violentia raptus alio modo, quia quandoque puella violenter abducitur a domo parentum et violenter corrumpitur; quandoque autem, etsi violenter abducatur, non tamen violenter corrumpitur, sed de voluntate virginis, sive corrumpatur fornicario concubitu, sive matrimoniali. Qualitercumque enim violentia adsit, salvatur ratio raptus. Invenitur autem raptus sine stupro, puta si aliquis rapiat viduam vel

Objection 1: It would seem that rape is not a species of lust, distinct from seduction. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 26) that seduction (stuprum), or rape, properly speaking, is unlawful intercourse, and takes its name from its causing corruption: wherefore he that is guilty of rape is a seducer. Therefore it seems that rape should not be reckoned a species of lust distinct from seduction. Obj. 2: Further, rape, apparently, implies violence. For it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 ) that rape is committed when a maid is taken away by force from her father’s house that after being violated she may be taken to wife. But the employment of force is accidental to lust, for this essentially regards the pleasure of intercourse. Therefore it seems that rape should not be reckoned a determinate species of lust. Obj. 3: Further, the sin of lust is curbed by marriage: for it is written (1 Cor 7:2): For fear of fornication, let every man have his own wife. Now rape is an obstacle to subsequent marriage, for it was enacted in the council of Meaux: We decree that those who are guilty of rape, or of abducting or seducing women, should not have those women in marriage, although they should have subsequently married them with the consent of their parents. Therefore rape is not a determinate species of lust distinct from seduction. Obj. 4: Further, a man may have knowledge of his newly married wife without committing a sin of lust. Yet he may commit rape if he take her away by force from her parents’ house, and have carnal knowledge of her. Therefore rape should not be reckoned a determinate species of lust. On the contrary, Rape is unlawful sexual intercourse, as Isidore states (Etym. v, 26). But this pertains to the sin of lust. Therefore rape is a species of lust. I answer that, Rape, in the sense in which we speak of it now, is a species of lust: and sometimes it coincides with seduction; sometimes there is rape without seduction, and sometimes seduction without rape. They coincide when a man employs force in order unlawfully to violate a virgin. This force is employed sometimes both towards the virgin and towards her father; and sometimes towards the father and not to the virgin, for instance if she allows herself to be taken away by force from her father’s house. Again, the force employed in rape differs in another way, because sometimes a maid is taken away by force from her parents’ house, and is forcibly violated: while sometimes, though taken away by force, she is not forcibly violated, but of her own consent, whether by act of fornication or by the act of marriage: for the conditions of rape remain no matter how force is employed. There is rape without seduction if a man abduct a widow or one who is not

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puellam corruptam. Unde Symmachus Papa dicit, raptores viduarum vel virginum, ob immanitatem facinoris tanti, detestamur. Stuprum vero sine raptu invenitur, quando aliquis absque violentiae illatione virginem illicite deflorat. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia raptus plerumque cum stupro in idem concurrit, ideo quandoque unum pro alio ponitur. Ad secundum dicendum quod illatio violentiae videtur procedere ex magnitudine concupiscentiae, ex qua aliquis non refugit periculo se iniicere violentiae inferendae. Ad tertium dicendum quod aliter est dicendum in raptu puellarum quae sunt aliis desponsatae, et aliter de raptu illarum quae non sunt aliis desponsatae. Illae enim quae sunt aliis desponsatae restituendae sunt sponsis, qui in eis ex ipsa desponsatione ius habent. Illae autem quae non sunt aliis desponsatae, restituendae sunt primo patriae potestati, et tunc, de voluntate parentum, licite possunt eas in uxores accipere. Si tamen aliter fiat, illicite matrimonium contrahitur, tenetur enim quicumque rem rapit ad eius restitutionem. Nec tamen raptus dirimit matrimonium iam contractum, etsi impediat contrahendum. Quod autem dicitur in praedicto Concilio, dictum est in detestationem illius criminis, et est abrogatum. Unde Hieronymus contrarium dicit. Tria, inquit, legitima coniugia in Scripturis leguntur. Primum est, virgo casta in virginitate viro data legitime. Secundum est, virgo in civitate deprehensa a viro et illi per vim copulata, si voluerit pater eius, dotabit eam iste vir quantum iudicaverit pater, et dabit pretium pudicitiae eius. Tertium autem est, quando aufertur ei et alteri traditur de voluntate patris.

Vel potest intelligi de illis quae sunt aliis desponsatae, et maxime per verba de praesenti. Ad quartum dicendum quod sponsus ex ipsa desponsatione habet aliquod ius in sua sponsa. Et ideo, quamvis peccet violentiam inferendo, excusatur tamen a crimine raptus. Unde Gelasius Papa dicit, lex illa praeteritorum principum ibi raptum dixit esse commissum, ubi puella de cuius nuptiis nihil actum fuerat, videbatur abducta.

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a virgin. Hence Pope Symmachus says, We abhor abductors whether of widows or of virgins on account of the heinousness of their crime. There is seduction without rape when a man, without employing force, violates a virgin unlawfully. Reply Obj. 1: Since rape frequently coincides with seduction, the one is sometimes used to signify the other. Reply Obj. 2: The employment of force would seem to arise from the greatness of concupiscence, the result being that a man does not fear to endanger himself by offering violence. Reply Obj. 3: The rape of a maiden who is promised in marriage is to be judged differently from that of one who is not so promised. For one who is promised in marriage must be restored to her betrothed, who has a right to her in virtue of their betrothal: whereas one that is not promised to another must first of all be restored to her father’s care, and then the abductor may lawfully marry her with her parents’ consent. Otherwise the marriage is unlawful, since whosoever steals a thing he is bound to restore it. Nevertheless rape does not dissolve a marriage already contracted, although it is an impediment to its being contracted. As to the decree of the council in question, it was made in abhorrence of this crime, and has been abrogated. Wherefore Jerome declares the contrary: Three kinds of lawful marriage, says he, are mentioned in Holy Writ. The first is that of a chaste maiden given away lawfully in her maidenhood to a man. The second is when a man finds a maiden in the city, and by force has carnal knowledge of her. If the father be willing, the man shall endow her according to the father’s estimate, and shall pay the price of her purity. The third is, when the maiden is taken away from such a man, and is given to another at the father’s will. We may also take this decree to refer to those who are promised to others in marriage, especially if the betrothal be expressed by words in the present tense. Reply Obj. 4: The man who is just married has, in virtue of the betrothal, a certain right in her: wherefore, although he sins by using violence, he is not guilty of the crime of rape. Hence Pope Gelasius says: This law of bygone rulers stated that rape was committed when a maiden, with regard to whose marriage nothing had so far been decided, was taken away by force.

Article 8 Whether adultery is a determinate species of lust, distinct from the other species? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod adulObjection 1: It would seem that adultery is not a deterium non sit determinata species luxuriae ab aliis di- terminate species of lust, distinct from the other species. stincta. Dicitur enim adulterium ex eo quod aliquis ad For adultery takes its name from a man having intercourse

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alteram accedit praeter suam, sicut dicit quaedam Glossa super Exodum. Sed alia mulier praeter suam potest esse diversarum conditionum, scilicet vel virgo in potestate patris existens, vel meretrix, vel cuiuscumque alterius conditionis. Ergo videtur quod adulterium non sit species luxuriae ab aliis distincta. Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit quod nihil interest ex qua causa quis insaniat. Unde Sixtus Pythagoricus, adulter, inquit, est amator ardentior in suam uxorem. Et pari ratione, in quamlibet aliam mulierem. Sed in omni luxuria est amor ardentior debito. Ergo adulterium invenitur in omni luxuria. Non ergo debet poni luxuriae species.

Praeterea, ubi est eadem ratio deformitatis, ibi non videtur esse alia species peccati. Sed in stupro et adulterio videtur esse eadem ratio deformitatis, quia utrobique violatur mulier alienae potestati subiecta. Ergo adulterium non est determinata species luxuriae ab aliis distincta. Sed contra est quod Leo Papa dicit quod adulterium committitur cum, propriae libidinis instinctu vel alienae consensu, cum altero vel altera contra pactum coniugale concumbitur. Sed hoc importat specialem deformitatem luxuriae. Ergo adulterium est determinata species luxuriae. Respondeo dicendum quod adulterium, sicut ipsum nomen sonat, est accessus ad alienum torum. In quo quidem dupliciter contra castitatem et humanae generationis bonum aliquis delinquit, primo quidem, inquantum accedit ad mulierem non sibi matrimonio copulatam, quod requiritur ad bonum prolis propriae educandae; alio modo, quia accedit ad mulierem alteri per matrimonium copulatam, et sic impedit bonum prolis alienae. Eadem ratio est de muliere coniugata quae per adulterium corrumpitur. Unde dicitur Eccli. XXIII, omnis mulier relinquens virum suum, peccabit, primo enim, in lege altissimi incredibilis fuit, in qua scilicet praecipitur, non moechaberis; et secundo, virum suum derelinquit, in quo facit contra certitudinem prolis eius; tertio, in adulterio fornicata est, et ex alio viro filios statuit sibi, quod est contra bonum propriae prolis. Sed primum est commune in omnibus peccatis mortalibus, alia vero duo specialiter pertinent ad deformitatem adulterii. Unde manifestum est quod adulterium est determinata species luxuriae, utpote specialem deformitatem habens circa actus venereos. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille qui habet uxorem, si ad aliam accedit, peccatum eius potest denominari vel ex parte sua, et sic semper est adulterium, quia contra fidem matrimonii agit, vel ex parte mulieris ad quam accedit. Et sic quandoque est adulterium, puta cum coniugatus accedit ad uxorem alterius, quando-

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with a woman who is not his own, according to a gloss on Ex. 20:14. Now a woman who is not one’s own may be of various conditions, namely either a virgin, or under her father’s care, or a harlot, or of any other description. Therefore it seems that adultery is not a species of lust distinct from the others. Obj. 2: Further, Jerome says: It matters not for what reason a man behaves as one demented. Hence Sixtus the Pythagorean says in his Maxims: He that is insatiable of his wife is an adulterer, and in like manner one who is over enamored of any woman. Now every kind of lust includes a too ardent love. Therefore adultery is in every kind of lust: and consequently it should not be reckoned a species of lust. Obj. 3: Further, where there is the same kind of deformity, there would seem to be the same species of sin. Now, apparently, there is the same kind of deformity in seduction and adultery: since in either case a woman is violated who is under another person’s authority. Therefore adultery is not a determinate species of lust, distinct from the others. On the contrary, Pope Leo says that adultery is sexual intercourse with another man or woman in contravention of the marriage compact, whether through the impulse of one’s own lust, or with the consent of the other party. Now this implies a special deformity of lust. Therefore adultery is a determinate species of lust. I answer that, Adultery, as its name implies, is access to another’s marriage-bed (ad alienum torum). By so doing a man is guilty of a twofold offense against chastity and the good of human procreation. First, by accession to a woman who is not joined to him in marriage, which is contrary to the good of the upbringing of his own children. Second, by accession to a woman who is united to another in marriage, and thus he hinders the good of another’s children. The same applies to the married woman who is corrupted by adultery. Wherefore it is written (Sir 23:32, 33): Every woman . . . that leaveth her husband . . . shall be guilty of sin. For first she hath been unfaithful to the law of the Most High (since there it is commanded: Thou shalt not commit adultery); and second, she hath offended against her husband, by making it uncertain that the children are his: third, she hath fornicated in adultery, and hath gotten children of another man, which is contrary to the good of her offspring. The first of these, however, is common to all mortal sins, while the two others belong especially to the deformity of adultery. Hence it is manifest that adultery is a determinate species of lust, through having a special deformity in venereal acts. Reply Obj. 1: If a married man has intercourse with another woman, his sin may be denominated either with regard to him, and thus it is always adultery, since his action is contrary to the fidelity of marriage, or with regard to the woman with whom he has intercourse; and thus sometimes it is adultery, as when a married man has intercourse

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que autem habet rationem stupri, vel alicuius alterius, secundum diversas conditiones mulierum ad quas accedit. Dictum est autem supra quod species luxuriae accipiuntur secundum diversas mulierum conditiones. Ad secundum dicendum quod matrimonium specialiter est ordinatum ad bonum humanae prolis, sicut dictum est. Adulterium autem specialiter matrimonio contrariatur, inquantum violat matrimonii fidem, quam quis coniugi debet. Et quia ille qui est ardentior amator uxoris, facit contra bonum matrimonii, inhoneste eo utens, licet fidem non violet; ideo aliqualiter potest adulter nominari; et magis quam ille qui est ardentior amator alterius mulieris. Ad tertium dicendum quod uxor est in potestate viri sicut ei matrimonio copulata, puella autem est sub potestate patris sicut per eum matrimonio copulanda. Et ideo alio modo contra bonum matrimonii est peccatum adulterii, et alio modo peccatum stupri. Et propter hoc ponuntur diversae luxuriae species. De aliis autem ad adulterium pertinentibus dicetur in tertia parte, cum de matrimonio tractabitur.

Q. 154, A. 9

with another’s wife; and sometimes it has the character of seduction, or of some other sin, according to various conditions affecting the woman with whom he has intercourse: and it has been stated above (A. 1) that the species of lust correspond to the various conditions of women. Reply Obj. 2: Matrimony is specially ordained for the good of human offspring, as stated above (A. 2). But adultery is specially opposed to matrimony, in the point of breaking the marriage faith which is due between husband and wife. And since the man who is too ardent a lover of his wife acts counter to the good of marriage if he use her indecently, although he be not unfaithful, he may in a sense be called an adulterer; and even more so than he that is too ardent a lover of another woman. Reply Obj. 3: The wife is under her husband’s authority, as united to him in marriage: whereas the maid is under her father’s authority, as one who is to be married by that authority. Hence the sin of adultery is contrary to the good of marriage in one way, and the sin of seduction in another; wherefore they are reckoned to differ specifically. Of other matters concerning adultery we shall speak in the Third Part, when we treat of matrimony.

Article 9 Whether incest is a determinate species of lust? Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod incestus non sit species determinata luxuriae. Incestus enim dicitur per privationem castitatis. Sed castitati universaliter opponitur luxuria. Ergo videtur quod incestus non sit species luxuriae, sed sit universaliter ipsa luxuria. Praeterea, in decretis dicitur, XXXVI, qu. I, quod incestus est consanguinearum vel affinium abusus. Sed affinitas differt a consanguinitate. Ergo incestus non est una species luxuriae, sed plures. Praeterea, illud quod de se non importat aliquam deformitatem, non constituit aliquam determinatam speciem vitii. Sed accedere ad consanguineas vel affines non est secundum se deforme, alias, nullo tempore licuisset. Ergo incestus non est determinata species luxuriae. Sed contra est quod species luxuriae distinguuntur secundum conditiones mulierum quibus aliqui abutuntur. Sed incestu importatur specialis conditio mulierum, quia est abusus consanguinearum vel affinium, ut dictum est. Ergo incestus est determinata species luxuriae. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ibi necesse est inveniri determinatam speciem luxuriae, ubi

Objection 1: It would seem that incest is not a determinate species of lust. For incest takes its name from being a privation of chastity. But all kinds of lust are opposed to chastity. Therefore it seems that incest is not a species of lust, but is lust itself in general. Obj. 2: Further, it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1) that incest is intercourse between a man and a woman related by consanguinity or affinity. Now affinity differs from consanguinity. Therefore it is not one but several species of lust. Obj. 3: Further, that which does not, of itself, imply a deformity, does not constitute a determinate species of vice. But intercourse between those who are related by consanguinity or affinity does not, of itself, contain any deformity, else it would never have been lawful. Therefore incest is not a determinate species of lust. On the contrary, The species of lust are distinguished according to the various conditions of women with whom a man has unlawful intercourse. Now incest implies a special condition on the part of the woman, because it is unlawful intercourse with a woman related by consanguinity or affinity as stated (Obj. 2). Therefore incest is a determinate species of lust. I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 6) wherever we find something incompatible with the right use of vene-

477

Q. 154, A. 9

Temperance

invenitur aliquid repugnans debito usui venereorum. In usu autem consanguinearum vel affinium invenitur aliquid incongruum commixtioni venereae, triplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia naturaliter homo debet quandam honorificentiam parentibus, et per consequens aliis consanguineis, qui ex eisdem parentibus de propinquo originem trahunt, in tantum quod apud antiquos, ut maximus Valerius refert, non erat fas filium simul cum patre balneari, ne scilicet se invicem nudos conspicerent. Manifestum est autem secundum praedicta quod in actibus venereis maxime consistit quaedam turpitudo honorificentiae contraria, unde de his homines verecundantur. Et ideo incongruum est quod commixtio venerea fiat talium personarum ad invicem. Et haec causa videtur exprimi Levit. XVIII, ubi dicitur, mater tua est, non revelabis turpitudinem eius. Et idem postea dicit in aliis. Secunda ratio est quia personas sanguine coniunctas necesse est ad invicem simul conversari. Unde si homines non arcerentur a commixtione venerea, nimia opportunitas daretur hominibus venereae commixtionis, et sic animi hominum nimis emollescerent per luxuriam. Et ideo in veteri lege illae personae specialiter videntur esse prohibitae quas necesse est simul commorari. Tertia ratio est quia per hoc impediretur multiplicatio amicorum, dum enim homo uxorem extraneam accipit, iunguntur sibi quadam speciali amicitia omnes consanguinei uxoris, ac si essent consanguinei sui. Unde Augustinus dicit, XV de Civ. Dei, habita est ratio rectissima caritatis ut homines, quibus esset utilis atque honesta concordia, diversarum vicissitudinum vinculis necterentur, nec unus in uno multas haberet, sed singulae spargerentur in singulos. Addit autem Aristoteles quartam rationem, in II Politic., quia cum naturaliter homo consanguineam diligat, si adderetur amor qui est ex commixtione venerea, fieret nimius ardor amoris, et maximum libidinis incentivum; quod castitati repugnat. Unde manifestum est quod incestus est determinata luxuriae species. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod abusus coniunctarum personarum maxime induceret corruptelam castitatis, tum propter opportunitatem; tum etiam propter nimium ardorem amoris, ut dictum est. Et ideo antonomastice abusus talium personarum vocatur incestus. Ad secundum dicendum quod persona affinis coniungitur alicui propter personam consanguinitate coniunctam. Et ideo, quia unum est propter alterum, eiusdem rationis inconvenientiam facit consanguinitas et affinitas.

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real actions, there must needs be a determinate species of lust. Now sexual intercourse with women related by consanguinity or affinity is unbecoming to venereal union on three counts. First, because man naturally owes a certain respect to his parents and therefore to his other blood relations, who are descended in near degree from the same parents: so much so indeed that among the ancients, as Valerius Maximus relates, it was not deemed right for a son to bathe with his father, lest they should see one another naked. Now from what has been said (Q. 142, A. 4; Q. 151, A. 4), it is evident that in venereal acts there is a certain shamefulness inconsistent with respect, wherefore men are ashamed of them. Wherefore it is unseemly that such persons should be united in venereal intercourse. This reason seems to be indicated (Lev 18:7) where we read: She is thy mother, thou shalt not uncover her nakedness, and the same is expressed further on with regard to others. The second reason is because blood relations must needs live in close touch with one another. Wherefore if they were not debarred from venereal union, opportunities of venereal intercourse would be very frequent and thus men’s minds would be enervated by lust. Hence in the Old Law the prohibition was apparently directed specially to those persons who must needs live together. The third reason is, because this would hinder a man from having many friends: since through a man taking a stranger to wife, all his wife’s relations are united to him by a special kind of friendship, as though they were of the same blood as himself. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16): The demands of charity are most perfectly satisfied by men uniting together in the bonds that the various ties of friendship require, so that they may live together in a useful and becoming amity; nor should one man have many relationships in one, but each should have one. Aristotle adds another reason (2 Polit. ii): for since it is natural that a man should have a liking for a woman of his kindred, if to this be added the love that has its origin in venereal intercourse, his love would be too ardent and would become a very great incentive to lust: and this is contrary to chastity. Hence it is evident that incest is a determinate species of lust. Reply Obj. 1: Unlawful intercourse between persons related to one another would be most prejudicial to chastity, both on account of the opportunities it affords, and because of the excessive ardor of love, as stated in the Article. Wherefore the unlawful intercourse between such persons is called incest antonomastically. Reply Obj. 2: Persons are related by affinity through one who is related by consanguinity: and therefore since the one depends on the other, consanguinity and affinity entail the same kind of unbecomingness.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod in commixtione personarum coniunctarum aliquid est quod est secundum se indecens et repugnans naturali rationi, sicut quod commixtio fiat inter parentes et filios, quorum est per se et immediata cognatio, nam filii naturaliter honorem debent parentibus. Unde philosophus dicit, in IX de Animal., quod quidam equus, quia deceptus fuit ut matri commisceretur, seipsum praecipitavit, quasi prae horrore, eo quod etiam animalibus aliquibus inest naturalis reverentia ad parentes. Aliae vero personae quae non coniunguntur secundum seipsas, sed per ordinem ad parentes, non habent ita ex seipsis indecentiam sed variatur circa hoc decentia vel indecentia secundum consuetudinem et legem humanam vel divinam. Quia, ut dictum est, usus venereorum, quia ordinatur ad bonum commune, subiacet legi. Et ideo, sicut Augustinus dicit, XV de Civ. Dei, commixtio sororum et fratrum, quanto fuit antiquior, compellente necessitate, tanto postea facta est damnabilior, religione prohibente.

Q. 154, A. 10

Reply Obj. 3: There is something essentially unbecoming and contrary to natural reason in sexual intercourse between persons related by blood, for instance between parents and children who are directly and immediately related to one another, since children naturally owe their parents honor. Hence the Philosopher instances a horse (De Animal. ix, 47) which covered its own mother by mistake and threw itself over a precipice as though horrified at what it had done, because some animals even have a natural respect for those that have begotten them. There is not the same essential unbecomingness attaching to other persons who are related to one another not directly but through their parents: and, as to this, becomingness or unbecomingness varies according to custom, and human or Divine law: because, as stated above (A. 2), sexual intercourse, being directed to the common good, is subject to law. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16), whereas the union of brothers and sisters goes back to olden times, it became all the more worthy of condemnation when religion forbade it.

Article 10 Whether sacrilege can be a species of lust? Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacrilegium non possit esse species luxuriae. Eadem enim species non invenitur sub diversis generibus non subalternatim positis. Sed sacrilegium est species irreligiositatis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo sacrilegium non potest poni species luxuriae. Praeterea, in decretis, XXXVI Caus., qu. I, sacrilegium non ponitur inter alia quae ponuntur species luxuriae. Ergo videtur quod non sit luxuriae species. Praeterea, sicut per luxuriam contingit aliquid fieri contra aliquam rem sacram, ita etiam per alia vitiorum genera. Sed sacrilegium non ponitur species gulae, aut alterius alicuius huiusmodi vitii. Ergo etiam non debet poni species luxuriae. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XV de Civ. Dei, quod sicut iniquum est aviditate possidendi transgredi limitem agrorum, ita etiam iniquum est libidine concumbendi subvertere limitem morum. Sed transgredi limitem agrorum in rebus sacris est peccatum sacrilegii. Ergo, pari ratione, subvertere limitem morum libidine concumbendi in rebus sacris, facit sacrilegii vitium. Sed libido concumbendi pertinet ad luxuriam. Ergo sacrilegium est luxuriae species. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, actus unius virtutis vel vitii ordinatus ad finem alterius, assumit speciem illius, sicut furtum quod propter adulterium committitur, transit in speciem adulterii. Mani-

Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege cannot be a species of lust. For the same species is not contained under different genera that are not subalternated to one another. Now sacrilege is a species of irreligion, as stated above (Q. 99, A. 2). Therefore sacrilege cannot be reckoned a species of lust. Obj. 2: Further, the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 ), do not place sacrilege among other sins which are reckoned species of lust. Therefore it would seem not to be a species of lust. Obj. 3: Further, something derogatory to a sacred thing may be done by the other kinds of vice, as well as by lust. But sacrilege is not reckoned a species of gluttony, or of any other similar vice. Therefore neither should it be reckoned a species of lust. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16) that if it is wicked, through covetousness, to go beyond one’s earthly bounds, how much more wicked is it through venereal lust to transgress the bounds of morals! Now to go beyond one’s earthly bounds in sacred matters is a sin of sacrilege. Therefore it is likewise a sin of sacrilege to overthrow the bounds of morals through venereal desire in sacred matters. But venereal desire pertains to lust. Therefore sacrilege is a species of lust. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 6, 7), the act of a virtue or vice, that is directed to the end of another virtue or vice, assumes the latter’s species: thus, theft committed for the sake of adultery, passes into the species

479

Q. 154, A. 11

Temperance

festum est autem quod observatio castitatis secundum quod ordinatur ad cultum Dei, sit actus religionis, ut patet in illis qui vovent et servant virginitatem, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro de virginitate. Unde manifestum est quod etiam luxuria, secundum quod violat aliquid ad divinum cultum pertinens, pertinet ad speciem sacrilegii. Et secundum hoc, sacrilegium potest poni species luxuriae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod luxuria secundum quod ordinatur ad finem alterius vitii, efficitur illius vitii species. Et sic aliqua luxuriae species potest etiam esse species irreligiositatis, sicut cuiusdam superioris generis. Ad secundum dicendum quod ibi enumerantur illa quae sunt species luxuriae secundum seipsa, sacrilegium autem est species luxuriae secundum quod ordinatur ad finem alterius vitii. Et potest concurrere cum diversis speciebus luxuriae. Si enim aliquis abutatur persona coniuncta sibi secundum spiritualem cognationem, committit sacrilegium ad modum incestus. Si autem abutatur virgine Deo sacrata, inquantum est sponsa Christi, est sacrilegium per modum adulterii; inquantum vero est sub spiritualis patris cura constituta, erit quoddam spirituale stuprum; et si violentia inferatur, erit spiritualis raptus, qui etiam secundum leges civiles gravius punitur quam alius raptus. Unde Iustinianus imperator dicit, si quis, non dicam rapere, sed attentare tantummodo, matrimonii iungendi causa, sacratissimas virgines ausus fuerit, capitali poena feriatur. Ad tertium dicendum quod sacrilegium committitur in re sacrata. Res autem sacrata est vel persona sacrata quae concupiscitur ad concubitum, et sic pertinet ad luxuriam. Vel quae concupiscitur ad possidendum, et sic pertinet ad iniustitiam. Potest etiam ad iram pertinere sacrilegium, puta si aliquis ex ira iniuriam inferat personae sacrae. Vel, si gulose cibum sacratum assumat, sacrilegium committit. Specialius tamen sacrilegium attribuitur luxuriae, quae opponitur castitati, ad cuius observantiam aliquae personae specialiter consecrantur.

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of adultery. Now it is evident that as Augustine states (De Virgin. 8), the observance of chastity, by being directed to the worship of God, becomes an act of religion, as in the case of those who vow and keep chastity. Wherefore it is manifest that lust also, by violating something pertaining to the worship of God, belongs to the species of sacrilege: and in this way sacrilege may be accounted a species of lust. Reply Obj. 1: Lust, by being directed to another vice as its end, becomes a species of that vice: and so a species of lust may be also a species of irreligion, as of a higher genus. Reply Obj. 2: The enumeration referred to, includes those sins which are species of lust by their very nature: whereas sacrilege is a species of lust insofar as it is directed to another vice as its end, and may coincide with the various species of lust. For unlawful intercourse between persons mutually united by spiritual relationship, is a sacrilege after the manner of incest. Intercourse with a virgin consecrated to God, inasmuch as she is the spouse of Christ, is sacrilege resembling adultery. If the maiden be under her father’s authority, it will be spiritual seduction; and if force be employed it will be spiritual rape, which kind of rape even the civil law punishes more severely than others. Thus the Emperor Justinian says: If any man dare, I will not say to rape, but even to tempt a consecrated virgin with a view to marriage, he shall be liable to capital punishment. Reply Obj. 3: Sacrilege is committed on a consecrated thing. Now a consecrated thing is either a consecrated person, who is desired for sexual intercourse, and thus it is a kind of lust, or it is desired for possession, and thus it is a kind of injustice. Sacrilege may also come under the head of anger, for instance, if through anger an injury be done to a consecrated person. Again, one may commit a sacrilege by partaking gluttonously of sacred food. Nevertheless, sacrilege is ascribed more specially to lust which is opposed to chastity for the observance of which certain persons are specially consecrated.

Article 11 Whether the unnatural vice is a species of lust? Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitium contra naturam non sit species luxuriae. Quia in praedicta enumeratione specierum luxuriae nulla fit mentio de vitio contra naturam. Ergo non est species luxuriae. Praeterea, luxuria opponitur virtuti, et ita sub malitia continetur. Sed vitium contra naturam non continetur sub malitia, sed sub bestialitate, ut patet per philoso-

Objection 1: It would seem that the unnatural vice is not a species of lust. For no mention of the vice against nature is made in the enumeration given above (A. 1, Obj. 1). Therefore it is not a species of lust. Obj. 2: Further, lust is contrary to virtue; and so it is comprised under vice. But the unnatural vice is comprised not under vice, but under bestiality, according to the

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phum, in VII Ethic. Ergo vitium contra naturam non est species luxuriae. Praeterea, luxuria consistit circa actus ad generationem humanam ordinatos, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed vitium contra naturam consistit circa actus ex quibus non potest generatio sequi. Ergo vitium contra naturam non est species luxuriae. Sed contra est quod, II ad Cor. XII, connumeratur aliis luxuriae speciebus, ubi dicitur, non egerunt poenitentiam super immunditia et fornicatione et impudicitia, ubi dicit Glossa, immunditia, idest, luxuria contra naturam. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ibi est determinata luxuriae species ubi specialis ratio deformitatis occurrit quae facit indecentem actum venereum. Quod quidem potest esse dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, quia repugnat rationi rectae, quod est commune in omni vitio luxuriae. Alio modo, quia etiam, super hoc, repugnat ipsi ordini naturali venerei actus qui convenit humanae speciei, quod dicitur vitium contra naturam. Quod quidem potest pluribus modis contingere. Uno quidem modo, si absque omni concubitu, causa delectationis venereae, pollutio procuretur, quod pertinet ad peccatum immunditiae, quam quidam mollitiem vocant. Alio modo, si fiat per concubitum ad rem non eiusdem speciei, quod vocatur bestialitas. Tertio modo, si fiat per concubitum ad non debitum sexum, puta masculi ad masculum vel feminae ad feminam, ut apostolus dicit, ad Rom. I, quod dicitur sodomiticum vitium. Quarto, si non servetur naturalis modus concumbendi, aut quantum ad instrumentum non debitum; aut quantum ad alios monstruosos et bestiales concumbendi modos. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ibi enumerantur species luxuriae quae non repugnant humanae naturae. Et ideo praetermittitur vitium contra naturam. Ad secundum dicendum quod bestialitas differt a malitia, quae humanae virtuti opponitur, per quendam excessum circa eandem materiam. Et ideo ad idem genus reduci potest. Ad tertium dicendum quod luxuriosus non intendit generationem humanam, sed delectationem veneream, quam potest aliquis experiri sine actibus ex quibus sequitur humana generatio. Et hoc est quod quaeritur in vitio contra naturam.

Q. 154, A. 12

Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore the unnatural vice is not a species of lust. Obj. 3: Further, lust regards acts directed to human generation, as stated above (Q. 153, A. 2): Whereas the unnatural vice concerns acts from which generation cannot follow. Therefore the unnatural vice is not a species of lust. On the contrary, It is reckoned together with the other species of lust (2 Cor 12:21) where we read: And have not done penance for the uncleanness, and fornication, and lasciviousness, where a gloss says: Lasciviousness, i.e., unnatural lust. I answer that, As stated above (AA. 6, 9) wherever there occurs a special kind of deformity whereby the venereal act is rendered unbecoming, there is a determinate species of lust. This may occur in two ways: First, through being contrary to right reason, and this is common to all lustful vices; second, because, in addition, it is contrary to the natural order of the venereal act as becoming to the human race: and this is called the unnatural vice. This may happen in several ways. First, by procuring pollution, without any copulation, for the sake of venereal pleasure: this pertains to the sin of uncleanness which some call effeminacy. Second, by copulation with a thing of undue species, and this is called bestiality. Third, by copulation with an undue sex, male with male, or female with female, as the Apostle states (Rom 1:27): and this is called the vice of sodomy. Fourth, by not observing the natural manner of copulation, either as to undue means, or as to other monstrous and bestial manners of copulation.

Reply Obj. 1: There we enumerated the species of lust that are not contrary to human nature: wherefore the unnatural vice was omitted. Reply Obj. 2: Bestiality differs from vice, for the latter is opposed to human virtue by a certain excess in the same matter as the virtue, and therefore is reducible to the same genus. Reply Obj. 3: The lustful man intends not human generation but venereal pleasures. It is possible to have this without those acts from which human generation follows: and it is that which is sought in the unnatural vice.

Article 12 Whether the unnatural vice is the greatest sin among the species of lust? Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Objection 1: It would seem that the unnatural vice is vitium contra naturam non sit maximum peccatum in- not the greatest sin among the species of lust. For the more ter species luxuriae. Tanto enim aliquod peccatum est a sin is contrary to charity the graver it is. Now adultery, se-

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Temperance

gravius, quanto magis contrariatur caritati. Sed magis videntur contrariari caritati proximi adulterium et stuprum et raptus, quae vergunt in iniuriam proximi, quam peccata contra naturam, per quae nullus alteri iniuriatur. Ergo peccatum contra naturam non est maximum inter species luxuriae. Praeterea, illa peccata videntur esse gravissima quae contra Deum committuntur. Sed sacrilegium directe committitur contra Deum, quia vergit in iniuriam divini cultus. Ergo sacrilegium est gravius peccatum quam vitium contra naturam. Praeterea, tanto aliquod peccatum videtur esse gravius, quanto exercetur in personam quam magis diligere debemus. Sed secundum ordinem caritatis magis debemus diligere personas nobis coniunctas, quae polluuntur per incestum, quam personas extraneas, quae interdum polluuntur per vitium contra naturam. Ergo incestus est gravius peccatum quam vitium contra naturam. Praeterea, si vitium contra naturam est gravissimum, videtur quod tanto est gravius quanto est magis contra naturam. Sed maxime videtur esse contra naturam peccatum immunditiae seu mollitiei, quia hoc maxime videtur esse secundum naturam, ut alterum sit agens et alterum patiens. Ergo, secundum hoc, immunditia esset gravissimum inter vitia contra naturam. Hoc autem est falsum. Non ergo vitia contra naturam sunt gravissima inter peccata luxuriae. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Adulterin. coniugiis, quod omnium horum, peccatorum scilicet quae ad luxuriam pertinent, pessimum est quod contra naturam fit. Respondeo dicendum quod in quolibet genere pessima est principii corruptio, ex quo alia dependent. Principia autem rationis sunt ea quae sunt secundum naturam, nam ratio, praesuppositis his quae sunt a natura determinata, disponit alia secundum quod convenit. Et hoc apparet tam in speculativis quam in operativis. Et ideo, sicut in speculativis error circa ea quorum cognitio est homini naturaliter indita, est gravissimus et turpissimus; ita in agendis agere contra ea quae sunt secundum naturam determinata, est gravissimum et turpissimum. Quia ergo in vitiis quae sunt contra naturam transgreditur homo id quod est secundum naturam determinatum circa usum venereum, inde est quod in tali materia hoc peccatum est gravissimum. Post quod est incestus, qui, sicut dictum est, est contra naturalem reverentiam quam personis coniunctis debemus.

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duction and rape which are injurious to our neighbor are seemingly more contrary to the love of our neighbor, than unnatural sins, by which no other person is injured. Therefore the unnatural sin is not the greatest among the species of lust. Obj. 2: Further, sins committed against God would seem to be the most grievous. Now sacrilege is committed directly against God, since it is injurious to the Divine worship. Therefore sacrilege is a graver sin than the unnatural vice. Obj. 3: Further, seemingly, a sin is all the more grievous according as we owe a greater love to the person against whom that sin is committed. Now the order of charity requires that a man love more those persons who are united to him—and such are those whom he defiles by incest— than persons who are not connected with him, and whom in certain cases he defiles by the unnatural vice. Therefore incest is a graver sin than the unnatural vice. Obj. 4: Further, if the unnatural vice is most grievous, the more it is against nature the graver it would seem to be. Now the sin of uncleanness or effeminacy would seem to be most contrary to nature, since it would seem especially in accord with nature that agent and patient should be distinct from one another. Hence it would follow that uncleanness is the gravest of unnatural vices. But this is not true. Therefore unnatural vices are not the most grievous among sins of lust. On the contrary, Augustine says (De adult. conjug. ) that of all these, namely the sins belonging to lust, that which is against nature is the worst.

I answer that, In every genus, worst of all is the corruption of the principle on which the rest depend. Now the principles of reason are those things that are according to nature, because reason presupposes things as determined by nature, before disposing of other things according as it is fitting. This may be observed both in speculative and in practical matters. Wherefore just as in speculative matters the most grievous and shameful error is that which is about things the knowledge of which is naturally bestowed on man, so in matters of action it is most grave and shameful to act against things as determined by nature. Therefore, since by the unnatural vices man transgresses that which has been determined by nature with regard to the use of venereal actions, it follows that in this matter this sin is gravest of all. After it comes incest, which, as stated above (A. 9), is contrary to the natural respect which we owe persons related to us. Per alias autem luxuriae species praeteritur solum id With regard to the other species of lust they imply a quod est secundum rationem rectam determinatum, ex transgression merely of that which is determined by right praesuppositione tamen naturalium principiorum. Ma- reason, on the presupposition, however, of natural princigis autem repugnat rationi quod aliquis venereis utatur ples. Now it is more against reason to make use of the venenon solum contra id quod convenit proli generandae, real act not only with prejudice to the future offspring, but

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sed etiam cum iniuria alterius. Et ideo fornicatio simplex, quae committitur sine iniuria alterius personae, est minima inter species luxuriae. Maior autem iniuria est si quis abutatur muliere alterius potestati subiecta ad usum generationis, quam ad solam custodiam. Et ideo adulterium est gravius quam stuprum. Et utrumque aggravatur per violentiam. Propter quod, raptus virginis est gravius quam stuprum, et raptus uxoris quam adulterium. Et haec etiam omnia aggravantur secundum rationem sacrilegii, ut supra dictum est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut ordo rationis rectae est ab homine, ita ordo naturae est ab ipso Deo. Et ideo in peccatis contra naturam, in quibus ipse ordo naturae violatur, fit iniuria ipsi Deo, ordinatori naturae. Unde Augustinus dicit, III Confess., flagitia quae sunt contra naturam, ubique ac semper detestanda atque punienda sunt, qualia Sodomitarum fuerunt, quae si omnes gentes facerent, eodem criminis reatu divina lege tenerentur, quae non sic fecit homines ut se illo uterentur modo. Violatur quippe ipsa societas quae cum Deo nobis esse debet, cum eadem natura cuius ille auctor est, libidinis perversitate polluitur. Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam vitia contra naturam sunt contra Deum, ut dictum est. Et tanto sunt graviora quam sacrilegii corruptela, quanto ordo naturae humanae inditus est prior et stabilior quam quilibet alius ordo superadditus. Ad tertium dicendum quod unicuique individuo magis est coniuncta natura speciei quam quodcumque aliud individuum. Et ideo peccata quae fiunt contra naturam speciei, sunt graviora. Ad quartum dicendum quod gravitas in peccato magis attenditur ex abusu alicuius rei quam ex omissione debiti usus. Et ideo inter vitia contra naturam infimum locum tenet peccatum immunditiae, quod consistit in sola omissione concubitus ad alterum. Gravissimum autem est peccatum bestialitatis, ubi non servatur debita species. Unde super illud Gen. XXXVII, accusavit fratres suos crimine pessimo, dicit Glossa, quod cum pecoribus miscebantur. Post hoc autem est vitium sodomiticum, ubi non servatur debitus sexus. Post hoc autem est peccatum ex eo quod non servatur debitus modus concumbendi. Magis autem si non sit debitum vas, quam si sit inordinatio secundum aliqua alia pertinentia ad modum concubitus.

Q. 154, A. 12

also so as to injure another person besides. Wherefore simple fornication, which is committed without injustice to another person, is the least grave among the species of lust. Then, it is a greater injustice to have intercourse with a woman who is subject to another’s authority as regards the act of generation, than as regards merely her guardianship. Wherefore adultery is more grievous than seduction. And both of these are aggravated by the use of violence. Hence rape of a virgin is graver than seduction, and rape of a wife than adultery. And all these are aggravated by coming under the head of sacrilege, as stated above (A. 10, ad 2). Reply Obj. 1: Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds from man, so the order of nature is from God Himself: wherefore in sins contrary to nature, whereby the very order of nature is violated, an injury is done to God, the Author of nature. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): Those foul offenses that are against nature should be everywhere and at all times detested and punished, such as were those of the people of Sodom, which should all nations commit, they should all stand guilty of the same crime, by the law of God which hath not so made men that they should so abuse one another. For even that very intercourse which should be between God and us is violated, when that same nature, of which He is the Author, is polluted by the perversity of lust. Reply Obj. 2: Vices against nature are also against God, as stated above (ad 1), and are so much more grievous than the depravity of sacrilege, as the order impressed on human nature is prior to and more firm than any subsequently established order. Reply Obj. 3: The nature of the species is more intimately united to each individual, than any other individual is. Wherefore sins against the specific nature are more grievous. Reply Obj. 4: Gravity of a sin depends more on the abuse of a thing than on the omission of the right use. Wherefore among sins against nature, the lowest place belongs to the sin of uncleanness, which consists in the mere omission of copulation with another. While the most grievous is the sin of bestiality, because use of the due species is not observed. Hence a gloss on Gen. 37:2, He accused his brethren of a most wicked crime, says that they copulated with cattle. After this comes the sin of sodomy, because use of the right sex is not observed. Lastly comes the sin of not observing the right manner of copulation, which is more grievous if the abuse regards the vas than if it affects the manner of copulation in respect of other circumstances.

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Question 155 Continence Deinde considerandum est de partibus potentialibus We must next consider the potential parts of tempertemperantiae. Et primo, de continentia; secundo, de cle- ance: (1) continence; (2) clemency; (3) modesty. Under the mentia; tertio, de modestia. Circa primum, consideran- first head we must consider continence and incontinence. dum est de continentia, et de incontinentia. Circa conti- With regard to continence there are four points of inquiry: nentiam quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum continentia sit virtus. (1) Whether continence is a virtue? Secundo, quae sit materia eius. (2) What is its matter? Tertio, quid sit eius subiectum. (3) What is its subject? Quarto, de comparatione eius ad temperantiam. (4) Of its comparison with temperance.

Article 1 Whether continence is a virtue? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod continentia non sit virtus. Species enim non condividitur generi. Sed continentia condividitur virtuti, ut patet per philosophum, in VII Ethic. Ergo continentia non est virtus. Praeterea, nullus utendo virtute peccat, quia secundum Augustinum, in libro de Lib. Arbit., virtus est qua nemo male utitur. Sed aliquis continendo potest peccare, puta si desideret aliquod bonum facere et ab eo se contineat. Ergo continentia non est virtus. Praeterea, nulla virtus retrahit hominem a licitis, sed solum ab illicitis. Sed continentia retrahit hominem a licitis, dicit enim Glossa Galat. V, quod per continentiam aliquis se etiam a licitis abstinet. Ergo continentia non est virtus. Sed contra, omnis habitus laudabilis videtur esse virtus. Sed continentia est huiusmodi, dicit enim Andronicus quod continentia est habitus invictus a delectatione. Ergo continentia est virtus. Respondeo dicendum quod nomen continentiae dupliciter sumitur a diversis. Quidam enim continentiam nominant per quam aliquis ab omni delectatione venerea abstinet, unde et apostolus, Galat. V, continentiam castitati coniungit. Et sic continentia perfecta principalis quidem est virginitas, secundaria vero viduitas. Unde secundum hoc, eadem ratio est de continentia quae de virginitate, quam supra diximus virtutem. Alii vero dicunt continentiam esse per quam aliquis resistit concupiscentiis pravis, quae in eo vehementes existunt. Et hoc modo accipit philosophus continentiam, VII Ethic. Et hoc etiam modo accipitur continentia in

Objection 1: It would seem that continence is not a virtue. For species and genus are not co-ordinate members of the same division. But continence is co-ordinated with virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1, 9). Therefore continence is not a virtue. Obj. 2: Further, no one sins by using a virtue, since, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18, 19), a virtue is a thing that no one makes ill use of. Yet one may sin by containing oneself: for instance, if one desire to do a good, and contain oneself from doing it. Therefore continence is not a virtue. Obj. 3: Further, no virtue withdraws man from that which is lawful, but only from unlawful things: for a gloss on Gal. 5:23, Faith, modesty, etc., says that by continence a man refrains even from things that are lawful. Therefore continence is not a virtue. On the contrary, Every praiseworthy habit would seem to be a virtue. Now such is continence, for Andronicus says that continence is a habit unconquered by pleasure. Therefore continence is a virtue. I answer that, The word continence is taken by various people in two ways. For some understand continence to denote abstention from all venereal pleasure: thus the Apostle joins continence to chastity (Gal 5:23). In this sense perfect continence is virginity in the first place, and widowhood in the second. Wherefore the same applies to continence understood thus, as to virginity which we have stated above (Q. 152, A. 3) to be a virtue. Others, however, understand continence as signifying that whereby a man resists evil desires, which in him are vehement. In this sense the Philosopher takes continence (Ethic. vii, 7), and thus also it is used in the Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. xii, 10,

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collationibus patrum. Hoc autem modo continentia habet aliquid de ratione virtutis, inquantum scilicet ratio firmata est contra passiones, ne ab eis deducatur, non tamen attingit ad perfectam rationem virtutis moralis, secundum quam etiam appetitus sensitivus subditur rationi sic ut in eo non insurgant vehementes passiones rationi contrariae. Et ideo philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod continentia non est virtus, sed quaedam mixta, inquantum scilicet aliquid habet de virtute et in aliquo deficit a virtute. Largius tamen accipiendo nomen virtutis pro quolibet principio laudabilium operum, possumus dicere continentiam esse virtutem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus condividit continentiam virtuti quantum ad hoc in quo deficit a virtute. Ad secundum dicendum quod homo proprie est id quod est secundum rationem. Et ideo ex hoc dicitur aliquis in seipso se tenere, quod tenet se in eo quod convenit rationi. Quod autem pertinet ad perversitatem rationis, non est conveniens rationi. Unde ille solus continens vere dicitur qui tenet se in eo quod est secundum rationem rectam, non autem in eo quod est secundum rationem perversam. Rationi autem rectae opponuntur concupiscentiae pravae, sicut et rationi perversae opponuntur concupiscentiae bonae. Et ideo proprie et vere continens est qui persistit in ratione recta abstinens a concupiscentiis pravis, non autem qui persistit in ratione perversa abstinens a concupiscentiis bonis, sed hic magis potest dici obstinatus in malo. Ad tertium dicendum quod Glossa ibi loquitur de continentia secundum primum modum, secundum quem continentia nominat quandam virtutem perfectam, quae non solum abstinet ab illicitis bonis, sed etiam a quibusdam licitis minus bonis, ut totaliter intendatur perfectioribus bonis.

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11). In this way continence has something of the nature of a virtue, in so far, to wit, as the reason stands firm in opposition to the passions, lest it be led astray by them: yet it does not attain to the perfect nature of a moral virtue, by which even the sensitive appetite is subject to reason so that vehement passions contrary to reason do not arise in the sensitive appetite. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that continence is not a virtue but a mixture, inasmuch as it has something of virtue, and somewhat falls short of virtue. If, however, we take virtue in a broad sense, for any principle of commendable actions, we may say that continence is a virtue. Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher includes continence in the same division with virtue insofar as the former falls short of virtue. Reply Obj. 2: Properly speaking, man is that which is according to reason. Wherefore from the very fact that a man holds (tenet se) to that which is in accord with reason, he is said to contain himself. Now whatever pertains to perversion of reason is not according to reason. Hence he alone is truly said to be continent who stands to that which is in accord with right reason, and not to that which is in accord with perverse reason. Now evil desires are opposed to right reason, even as good desires are opposed to perverse reason. Wherefore he is properly and truly continent who holds to right reason, by abstaining from evil desires, and not he who holds to perverse reason, by abstaining from good desires: indeed, the latter should rather be said to be obstinate in evil. Reply Obj. 3: The gloss quoted takes continence in the first sense, as denoting a perfect virtue, which refrains not merely from unlawful goods, but also from certain lawful things that are lesser goods, in order to give its whole attention to the more perfect goods.

Article 2 Whether desires for pleasures of touch are the matter of continence? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod materia continentiae non sint concupiscentiae delectationum tactus. Dicit enim Ambrosius, in I de Offic., quod generale decorum ita est ac si aequabilem formam atque universitatem honestatis habeat in omni actu suo continentem. Sed non omnis actus humanus pertinet ad delectationes tactus. Ergo continentia non est solum circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus. Praeterea, nomen continentiae ex hoc sumitur quod aliquis tenet se in bono rationis rectae, sicut dictum est. Sed quaedam aliae passiones vehementius ab-

Objection 1: It would seem that desires for pleasures of touch are not the matter of continence. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 46): General decorum by its consistent form and the perfection of what is virtuous is restrained in its every action. But not every human act pertains to the delights of touch. Therefore continence is not only about the desires of the delight of touch. Obj. 2: Further, continence takes its name from a man standing for the good of right reason, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). Now other passions lead men astray from right

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ducunt hominem a ratione recta quam concupiscentiae delectabilium tactus, sicut timor periculorum mortis, qui stupefacit hominem; et ira, quae est insaniae similis, ut Seneca dicit. Ergo continentia non dicitur proprie circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus. Praeterea, Tullius dicit, in II Rhet., quod continentia est per quam cupiditas consilii gubernatione regitur. Cupiditas autem magis consuevit dici divitiarum quam delectabilium tactus, secundum illud I ad Tim. ult., radix omnium malorum cupiditas. Ergo continentia non est proprie circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus. Praeterea, delectationes tactus non solum sunt in rebus venereis, sed etiam in esu. Sed continentia solum circa usum venereorum consuevit dici. Ergo non est propria materia eius concupiscentia delectationum tactus. Praeterea, inter delectationes tactus quaedam sunt, non humanae, sed bestiales, tam in cibis, utpote si quis delectaretur in esu carnium humanarum; quam etiam in venereis, puta in abusu bestiarum vel puerorum. Sed circa huiusmodi non est continentia, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Non ergo propria materia continentiae sunt concupiscentiae delectationum tactus. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod continentia et incontinentia sunt circa eadem circa quae temperantia et intemperantia. Sed temperantia et intemperantia sunt circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus, ut supra habitum est. Ergo etiam continentia et incontinentia sunt circa eandem materiam. Respondeo dicendum quod nomen continentiae refrenationem quandam importat, inquantum scilicet tenet se aliquis ne passiones sequatur. Et ideo proprie continentia dicitur circa illas passiones quae impellunt ad aliquid prosequendum, in quibus laudabile est ut ratio retrahat hominem a prosequendo, non autem proprie est circa illas passiones quae important retractionem quandam, sicut timor et alia huiusmodi; in his enim laudabile est firmitatem servare in prosequendo quod ratio dictat ut supra dictum est. Est autem considerandum quod naturales inclinationes principia sunt omnium supervenientium, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo passiones tanto vehementius impellunt ad aliquid prosequendum, quanto magis sequuntur inclinationem naturae. Quae praecipue inclinat ad ea quae sunt sibi necessaria, vel ad conservationem individui, sicut sunt cibi; vel ad conservationem speciei, sicut sunt actus venerei. Quorum delectationes ad tactum pertinent. Et ideo continentia et incontinentia proprie dicuntur circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut nomen temperantiae potest communiter accipi in quacumque materia, proprie tamen dicitur in illa materia in qua est optimum hominem refrenari; ita etiam continentia proprie dicitur in materia in qua est optimum et difficillimum

Q. 155, A. 2

reason with greater vehemence than the desire for pleasures of touch: for instance, the fear of mortal dangers, which stupefies a man, and anger which makes him behave like a madman, as Seneca remarks. Therefore continence does not properly regard the desires for pleasures of touch. Obj. 3: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54): It is continence that restrains cupidity with the guiding hand of counsel. Now cupidity is generally used to denote the desire for riches rather than the desire for pleasures of touch, according to 1 Tim. 6:10, Cupidity (philargyria), is the root of all evils. Therefore continence is not properly about the desires for pleasures of touch. Obj. 4: Further, there are pleasures of touch not only in venereal matters but also in eating. But continence is wont to be applied only to the use of venereal matters. Therefore the desire for pleasures of touch is not its proper matter. Obj. 5: Further, among pleasures of touch some are not human but bestial, both as regards food—for instance, the pleasure of eating human flesh; and as regards venereal matters—for instance the abuse of animals or boys. But continence is not about such like things, as stated in Ethic. vii, 5. Therefore desires for pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of continence. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that continence and incontinence are about the same things as temperance and intemperance. Now temperance and intemperance are about the desires for pleasures of touch, as stated above (Q. 141, A. 4). Therefore continence and incontinence are also about that same matter. I answer that, Continence denotes, by its very name, a certain curbing, insofar as a man contains himself from following his passions. Hence continence is properly said in reference to those passions which urge a man towards the pursuit of something, wherein it is praiseworthy that reason should withhold man from pursuing: whereas it is not properly about those passions, such as fear and the like, which denote some kind of withdrawal: since in these it is praiseworthy to remain firm in pursuing what reason dictates, as stated above (Q. 123, AA. 3, 4). Now it is to be observed that natural inclinations are the principles of all supervening inclinations, as stated above (I, Q. 60, A. 2). Wherefore the more they follow the inclination of nature, the more strongly do the passions urge to the pursuance of an object. Now nature inclines chiefly to those things that are necessary to it, whether for the maintenance of the individual, such as food, or for the maintenance of the species, such as venereal acts, the pleasures of which pertain to the touch. Therefore continence and incontinence refer properly to desires for pleasures of touch. Reply Obj. 1: Just as temperance may be used in a general sense in connection with any matter; but is properly applied to that matter wherein it is best for man to be curbed: so, too, continence properly speaking regards that matter wherein it is best and most difficult to contain one-

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continere, scilicet in concupiscentiis delectationum tactus. Communiter autem et secundum quid potest dici in quacumque alia materia. Et hoc modo utitur Ambrosius nomine continentiae. Ad secundum dicendum quod circa timorem non proprie laudatur continentia, sed magis firmitas animi, quam fortitudo importat. Ira autem impetum quidem facit ad aliquid prosequendum, iste tamen impetus magis sequitur apprehensionem animalem, prout scilicet aliquis apprehendit se esse ab alio laesum, quam inclinationem naturalem. Et ideo dicitur quidem aliquis secundum quid continens irae, non tamen simpliciter. Ad tertium dicendum quod huiusmodi exteriora bona, sicut honores, divitiae et huiusmodi, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., videntur quidem secundum se esse eligibilia, non autem quasi necessaria ad conservationem naturae. Et ideo circa ea non dicimus simpliciter aliquos continentes vel incontinentes, sed secundum quid, apponendo quod sint continentes vel incontinentes vel lucri, vel honoris, vel alicuius huiusmodi. Et ideo vel Tullius communiter usus est nomine continentiae, prout comprehendit sub se etiam continentiam secundum quid, vel accipit cupiditatem stricte pro concupiscentia delectabilium tactus. Ad quartum dicendum quod delectationes venereorum sunt vehementiores quam delectationes ciborum. Et ideo circa venerea magis consuevimus continentiam et incontinentiam dicere quam circa cibos, licet, secundum philosophum, circa utrumque possit dici. Ad quintum dicendum quod continentia est bonum rationis humanae, et ideo attenditur circa passiones quae possunt esse homini connaturales. Unde philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod si aliquis tenens puerum concupiscat eum vel comedere, vel ad venereorum inconvenientem delectationem, sive sequatur concupiscentiam sive non, non dicetur simpliciter continens, sed secundum quid.

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self, namely desires for pleasures of touch, and yet in a general sense and relatively may be applied to any other matter: and in this sense Ambrose speaks of continence. Reply Obj. 2: Properly speaking we do not speak of continence in relation to fear, but rather of firmness of mind which fortitude implies. As to anger, it is true that it begets an impulse to the pursuit of something, but this impulse follows an apprehension of the soul—insofar as a man apprehends that someone has injured him—rather than an inclination of nature. Wherefore a man may be said to be continent of anger, relatively but not simply. Reply Obj. 3: External goods, such as honors, riches and the like, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4), seem to be objects of choice in themselves indeed, but not as being necessary for the maintenance of nature. Wherefore in reference to such things we speak of a person as being continent or incontinent, not simply, but relatively, by adding that they are continent or incontinent in regard to wealth, or honor and so forth. Hence Tully either understood continence in a general sense, as including relative continence, or understood cupidity in a restricted sense as denoting desire for pleasures of touch. Reply Obj. 4: Venereal pleasures are more vehement than pleasures of the palate: wherefore we are wont to speak of continence and incontinence in reference to venereal matters rather than in reference to food; although according to the Philosopher they are applicable to both. Reply Obj. 5: Continence is a good of the human reason: wherefore it regards those passions which can be connatural to man. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that if a man were to lay hold of a child with desire of eating him or of satisfying an unnatural passion whether he follow up his desire or not, he is said to be continent, not absolutely, but relatively.

Article 3 Whether the subject of continence is the concupiscible power? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod subiectum continentiae sit vis concupiscibilis. Subiectum enim alicuius virtutis oportet esse proportionatum materiae. Sed materia continentiae, sicut dictum est, sunt concupiscentiae delectabilium tactus, quae pertinent ad vim concupiscibilem. Ergo continentia est in vi concupiscibili. Praeterea, opposita sunt circa idem. Sed incontinentia est in concupiscibili, cuius passiones superant rationem, dicit enim Andronicus quod incontinentia est

Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of continence is the concupiscible power. For the subject of a virtue should be proportionate to the virtue’s matter. Now the matter of continence, as stated (A. 2), is desires for the pleasures of touch, which pertain to the concupiscible power. Therefore continence is in the concupiscible power. Obj. 2: Further, Opposites are referred to one same thing. But incontinence is in the concupiscible, whose passions overcome reason, for Andronicus says that incontinence is

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malitia concupiscibilis, secundum quam eligit pravas delectationes, prohibente rationali. Ergo et continentia, pari ratione, est in concupiscibili. Praeterea, subiectum virtutis humanae vel est ratio, vel vis appetitiva, quae dividitur in voluntatem, concupiscibilem et irascibilem. Sed continentia non est in ratione, quia sic esset virtus intellectualis. Neque etiam est in voluntate, quia continentia est circa passiones, quae non sunt in voluntate. Nec etiam est in irascibili, quia non est proprie circa passiones irascibilis, ut dictum est. Ergo relinquitur quod sit in concupiscibili. Sed contra, omnis virtus in aliqua potentia existens aufert malum actum illius potentiae. Sed continentia non aufert malum actum concupiscibilis, habet enim continens concupiscentias pravas, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic. Ergo continentia non est in concupiscibili.

Q. 155, A. 3

the evil inclination of the concupiscible, by following which it chooses wicked pleasures in disobedience to reason. Therefore continence is likewise in the concupiscible. Obj. 3: Further, the subject of a human virtue is either the reason, or the appetitive power, which is divided into the will, the concupiscible and the irascible. Now continence is not in the reason, for then it would be an intellectual virtue; nor is it in the will, since continence is about the passions which are not in the will; nor again is it in the irascible, because it is not properly about the passions of the irascible, as stated above (A. 2, ad 2). Therefore it follows that it is in the concupiscible. On the contrary, Every virtue residing in a certain power removes the evil act of that power. But continence does not remove the evil act of the concupiscible: since the continent man has evil desires, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9). Therefore continence is not in the concupiscible power. I answer that, Every virtue while residing in a subject, makes that subject have a different disposition from that which it has while subjected to the opposite vice. Now the concupiscible has the same disposition in one who is continent and in one who is incontinent, since in both of them it breaks out into vehement evil desires. Wherefore it is manifest that continence is not in the concupiscible as its subject. Again the reason has the same disposition in both, since both the continent and the incontinent have right reason, and each of them, while undisturbed by passion, purposes not to follow his unlawful desires. Now the primary difference between them is to be found in their choice: since the continent man, though subject to vehement desires, chooses not to follow them, because of his reason; whereas the incontinent man chooses to follow them, although his reason forbids. Hence continence must needs reside in that power of the soul, whose act it is to choose; and that is the will, as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 1). Reply Obj. 1: Continence has for its matter the desires for pleasures of touch, not as moderating them (this belongs to temperance which is in the concupiscible), but its business with them is to resist them. For this reason it must be in another power, since resistance is of one thing against another. Reply Obj. 2: The will stands between reason and the concupiscible, and may be moved by either. In the continent man it is moved by the reason, in the incontinent man it is moved by the concupiscible. Hence continence may be ascribed to the reason as to its first mover, and incontinence to the concupiscible power: though both belong immediately to the will as their proper subject.

Respondeo dicendum quod omnis virtus in aliquo subiecto existens facit illud differre a dispositione quam habet dum subiicitur opposito vitio. Concupiscibilis autem eodem modo se habet in eo qui est continens, et in eo qui est incontinens, quia in utroque prorumpit ad concupiscentias pravas vehementes. Unde manifestum est quod continentia non est in concupiscibili sicut in subiecto. Similiter etiam ratio eodem modo se habet in utroque, quia tam continens quam incontinens habet rationem rectam; et uterque, extra passionem existens, gerit in proposito concupiscentias illicitas non sequi. Prima autem differentia eorum invenitur in electione, quia continens, quamvis patiatur vehementes concupiscentias, tamen eligit non sequi eas, propter rationem; incontinens autem eligit sequi eas, non obstante contradictione rationis. Et ideo oportet quod continentia sit, sicut in subiecto, in illa vi animae cuius actus est electio. Et haec est voluntas, ut supra habitum est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod continentia habet materiam concupiscentias delectationum tactus, non sicut quas moderetur, quod pertinet ad temperantiam, quae est in concupiscibili, sed est circa eas quasi eis resistens. Unde oportet quod sit in alia vi, quia resistentia est alterius ad alterum. Ad secundum dicendum quod voluntas media est inter rationem et concupiscibilem, et potest ab utroque moveri. In eo autem qui est continens, movetur a ratione, in eo autem qui est incontinens, movetur a concupiscibili. Et ideo continentia potest attribui rationi sicut primo moventi, et incontinentia concupiscibili, quamvis utrumque immediate pertineat ad voluntatem sicut ad proprium subiectum. Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet passiones non Reply Obj. 3: Although the passions are not in the will sint in voluntate sicut in subiecto, est tamen in potestate as their subject, yet it is in the power of the will to resist voluntatis eis resistere et hoc modo voluntas continentis them: thus it is that the will of the continent man resists deresistit concupiscentiis. sires.

489

Q. 155, A. 4

Temperance

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Article 4 Whether continence is better than temperance? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod continentia sit melior quam temperantia. Dicitur enim Eccli. XXVI, omnis autem ponderatio non est digna continentis animae. Ergo nulla virtus potest continentiae adaequari. Praeterea, quanto aliqua virtus meretur maius praemium, tanto potior est. Sed continentia videtur mereri maius praemium, dicitur enim II ad Tim. II, non coronabitur nisi qui legitime certaverit; magis autem certat continens, qui patitur vehementes concupiscentias pravas, quam temperatus, qui non habet eas vehementes. Ergo continentia est potior virtus quam temperantia. Praeterea, voluntas est dignior potentia quam vis concupiscibilis. Sed continentia est in voluntate, temperantia autem in vi concupiscibili, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo continentia est potior virtus quam temperantia. Sed contra est quod Tullius et Andronicus ponunt continentiam adiunctam temperantiae sicut principali virtuti. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, nomen continentiae dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo, secundum quod importat cessationem ab omnibus delectationibus venereis. Et sic sumendo nomen continentiae, continentia est potior temperantia simpliciter dicta, ut patet ex his quae supra dicta sunt de praeeminentia virginitatis ad castitatem simpliciter dictam. Alio modo potest accipi nomen continentiae secundum quod importat resistentiam rationis ad concupiscentias pravas quae sunt in homine vehementes. Et secundum hoc, temperantia est multo potior quam continentia. Quia bonum virtutis laudabile est ex eo quod est secundum rationem. Plus autem viget bonum rationis in eo qui est temperatus, in quo etiam ipse appetitus sensitivus est subiectus rationi et quasi a ratione edomitus, quam in eo qui est continens, in quo appetitus sensitivus vehementer resistit rationi per concupiscentias pravas. Unde continentia comparatur ad temperantiam sicut imperfectum ad perfectum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, secundum quod accipitur continentia prout abstinet ab omnibus venereis. Et hoc modo dicitur quod omnis ponderatio non est digna animae continentis, in genere castitatis, quia nec etiam fecunditas carnis, quae quaeritur in matrimonio, adaequatur continentiae virginali vel viduali, ut supra dictum est. Alio modo potest intelligi secundum quod nomen continentiae accipitur communiter pro omni abstinentia a rebus illicitis. Et sic dicitur quod omnis ponderatio non

Objection 1: It would seem that continence is better than temperance. For it is written (Sir 26:20): No price is worthy of a continent soul. Therefore no virtue can be equalled to continence. Obj. 2: Further, the greater the reward a virtue merits, the greater the virtue. Now continence apparently merits the greater reward; for it is written (2 Tim 2:5): He . . . is not crowned, except he strive lawfully, and the continent man, since he is subject to vehement evil desires, strives more than the temperate man, in whom these things are not vehement. Therefore continence is a greater virtue than temperance. Obj. 3: Further, the will is a more excellent power than the concupiscible. But continence is in the will, whereas temperance is in the concupiscible, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore continence is a greater virtue than temperance. On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) and Andronicus reckon continence to be annexed to temperance, as to a principal virtue. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), continence has a twofold signification. In one way it denotes cessation from all venereal pleasures; and if continence be taken in this sense, it is greater than temperance considered absolutely, as may be gathered from what we said above (Q. 152, A. 5) concerning the preeminence of virginity over chastity considered absolutely. In another way continence may be taken as denoting the resistance of the reason to evil desires when they are vehement in a man: and in this sense temperance is far greater than continence, because the good of a virtue derives its praise from that which is in accord with reason. Now the good of reason flourishes more in the temperate man than in the continent man, because in the former even the sensitive appetite is obedient to reason, being tamed by reason so to speak, whereas in the continent man the sensitive appetite strongly resists reason by its evil desires. Hence continence is compared to temperance, as the imperfect to the perfect. Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted may be understood in two ways. First in reference to the sense in which continence denotes abstinence from all things venereal: and thus it means that no price is worthy of a continent soul, in the genus of chastity; since not even the fruitfulness of the flesh which is the purpose of marriage is equalled to the continence of virginity or of widowhood, as stated above (Q. 152, AA. 4, 5). Second it may be understood in reference to the general sense in which continence denotes any abstinence from things unlawful: and thus it means that no

490

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Continence

Q. 155, A. 4

est digna animae continentis, quia non respicit aestima- price is worthy of a continent soul, because its value is not tionem auri vel argenti, quae commutantur ad pondus. measured with gold or silver, which are appreciable according to weight. Ad secundum dicendum quod magnitudo concuReply Obj. 2: The strength or weakness of concupispiscentiae, seu debilitas eius, ex duplici causa procede- cence may proceed from two causes. For sometimes it is re potest. Quandoque enim procedit ex causa corpo- owing to a bodily cause: because some people by their natrali. Quidam enim ex naturali complexione sunt magis ural temperament are more prone to concupiscence than proni ad concupiscendum quam alii. Et iterum quidam others; and again opportunities for pleasure which inflame habent opportunitates delectationum, concupiscentiam the concupiscence are nearer to hand for some people than inflammantes, magis paratas quam alii. Et talis debili- for others. Such like weakness of concupiscence dimintas concupiscentiae diminuit meritum, magnitudo vero ishes merit, whereas strength of concupiscence increases it. auget. Quandoque vero debilitas vel magnitudo concu- On the other hand, weakness or strength of concupiscence piscentiae provenit ex causa spirituali laudabili, puta ex arises from a praiseworthy spiritual cause, for instance the vehementia caritatis vel fortitudine rationis, sicut est in vehemence of charity, or the strength of reason, as in the homine temperato. Et hoc modo debilitas concupiscen- case of a temperate man. In this way weakness of concutiae auget meritum, ratione suae causae, magnitudo vero piscence, by reason of its cause, increases merit, whereas minuit. strength of concupiscence diminishes it. Ad tertium dicendum quod voluntas propinquior Reply Obj. 3: The will is more akin to the reason than est rationi quam vis concupiscibilis. Unde bonum ra- the concupiscible power is. Wherefore the good of reason— tionis, ex quo virtus laudatur, maius esse ostenditur ex on account of which virtue is praised by the very fact that hoc quod pertingit non solum usque ad voluntatem, sed it reaches not only to the will but also to the concupiscible etiam usque ad vim concupiscibilem, quod accidit in eo power, as happens in the temperate man—is shown to be qui est temperatus, quam si pertingat solum ad volunta- greater than if it reach only to the will, as in the case of one tem, ut accidit in eo qui est continens. who is continent.

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Question 156 Incontinence Deinde considerandum est de incontinentia. Et circa We must now consider incontinence: and under this hoc quaeruntur quatuor. head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum incontinentia pertineat ad animam, (1) Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the vel ad corpus. body? Secundo, utrum incontinentia sit peccatum. (2) Whether incontinence is a sin? Tertio, de comparatione incontinentiae ad (3) The comparison between incontinence and intemperantiam. intemperance; Quarto, quis sit turpior, utrum incontinens irae, vel (4) Which is the worse, incontinence in anger, or incontinens concupiscentiae. incontinence in desire?

Article 1 Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod incontinentia non pertineat ad animam, sed ad corpus. Diversitas enim sexuum non est ex parte animae, sed ex parte corporis. Sed diversitas sexuum facit diversitatem circa incontinentiam, dicit enim philosophus, in VII Ethic., quod mulieres non dicuntur neque continentes neque incontinentes. Ergo continentia non pertinet ad animam, sed ad corpus. Praeterea, illud quod pertinet ad animam, non sequitur corporis complexiones. Sed incontinentia sequitur corporis complexionem, dicit enim philosophus, in VII Ethic., quod maxime acuti, idest cholerici, et melancholici secundum irrefrenatam concupiscentiam sunt incontinentes. Ergo incontinentia pertinet ad corpus. Praeterea, victoria magis pertinet ad eum qui vincit quam ad eum qui vincitur. Sed ex hoc dicitur aliquis esse incontinens quod caro concupiscens adversus spiritum superat ipsum. Ergo incontinentia magis pertinet ad carnem quam ad animam. Sed contra est quod homo differt a bestiis principaliter secundum animam. Differt autem secundum rationem continentiae et incontinentiae, bestias autem dicimus neque continentes neque incontinentes, ut patet per philosophum, in VII Ethic. Ergo incontinentia maxime est ex parte animae. Respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque attribuitur magis ei quod est causa per se quam ei quod solam occasionem praestat. Id autem quod est ex parte corporis, solum occasionem incontinentiae praestat. Ex dispositione enim corporis potest contingere quod insurgant passiones vehementes in appetitu sensitivo, qui est virtus corporei organi, sed huiusmodi passiones,

Objection 1: It would seem that incontinence pertains not to the soul but to the body. For sexual diversity comes not from the soul but from the body. Now sexual diversity causes diversity of incontinence: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that women are not described either as continent or as incontinent. Therefore incontinence pertains not to the soul but to the body. Obj. 2: Further, that which pertains to the soul does not result from the temperament of the body. But incontinence results from the bodily temperament: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that it is especially people of a quick or choleric and atrabilious temper whose incontinence is one of unbridled desire. Therefore incontinence regards the body. Obj. 3: Further, victory concerns the victor rather than the vanquished. Now a man is said to be incontinent, because the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and overcomes it. Therefore incontinence pertains to the flesh rather than to the soul. On the contrary, Man differs from beast chiefly as regards the soul. Now they differ in respect of continence and incontinence, for we ascribe neither continence nor incontinence to the beasts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore incontinence is chiefly on the part of the soul. I answer that, Things are ascribed to their direct causes rather than to those which merely occasion them. Now that which is on the part of the body is merely an occasional cause of incontinence; since it is owing to a bodily disposition that vehement passions can arise in the sensitive appetite which is a power of the organic body. Yet these passions, however vehement they be, are not the suf-

493

Q. 156, A. 1

Temperance

quantumcumque vehementes, non sunt sufficiens causa incontinentiae sed occasio sola; eo quod, durante usu rationis, semper homo potest passionibus resistere. Si vero passiones adeo increscant quod totaliter auferant usum rationis, sicut accidit in his qui propter vehementiam passionum amentiam incurrunt, non remanebit ratio continentiae neque incontinentiae, quia non salvatur in eis iudicium rationis, quod continens servat et incontinens deserit. Et sic relinquitur quod per se causa incontinentiae sit ex parte animae, quae ratione passioni non resistit. Quod quidem fit duobus modis, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic. Uno modo, quando anima passionibus cedit antequam ratio consilietur, quae quidem vocatur irrefrenata incontinentia, vel praevolatio. Alio modo, quando non permanet homo in his quae consiliata sunt, eo quod debiliter est firmatus in eo quod ratio iudicavit, unde et haec incontinentia vocatur debilitas. Et sic patet quod incontinentia principaliter ad animam pertinet. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima humana est corporis forma, et habet quasdam vires corporeis organis utentes, quarum operationes aliquid conferunt etiam ad illa opera animae quae sunt sine corporeis instrumentis, idest ad actum intellectus et voluntatis, inquantum scilicet intellectus a sensu accipit, et voluntas impellitur a passione appetitus sensitivi. Et secundum hoc, quia femina secundum corpus habet quandam debilem complexionem, fit ut in pluribus quod etiam debiliter inhaereat quibuscumque inhaeret, etsi raro in aliquibus aliter accidat, secundum illud Proverb. ult., mulierem fortem quis inveniet? Et quia id quod est parvum vel debile reputatur quasi nullum, inde est quod philosophus loquitur de mulieribus quasi non habentibus iudicium rationis firmum, quamvis in aliquibus mulieribus contrarium accidat. Et propter hoc dicit quod mulieres non dicimus continentes, quia non ducunt, quasi habentes solidam rationem, sed ducuntur, quasi de facili sequentes passiones. Ad secundum dicendum quod ex impetu passionis contingit quod aliquis statim passionem sequatur, ante consilium rationis. Impetus autem passionis provenire potest vel ex velocitate, sicut in cholericis; vel ex vehementia, sicut in melancholicis, qui propter terrestrem complexionem vehementissime inflammantur. Sicut et e contrario contingit quod aliquis non persistat in eo quod consiliatum est, ex eo quod debiliter inhaeret, propter mollitiem complexionis, ut de mulieribus dictum est. Quod etiam videtur in phlegmaticis contingere, propter eandem causam sicut etiam in mulieribus. Haec autem accidunt inquantum ex complexione corporis datur aliqua incontinentiae occasio, non autem causa sufficiens, ut dictum est.

IIa-IIae

ficient cause of incontinence, but are merely the occasion thereof, since, so long as the use of reason remains, man is always able to resist his passions. If, however, the passions gain such strength as to take away the use of reason altogether—as in the case of those who become insane through the vehemence of their passions—the essential conditions of continence or incontinence cease, because such people do not retain the judgment of reason, which the continent man follows and the incontinent forsakes. From this it follows that the direct cause of incontinence is on the part of the soul, which fails to resist a passion by the reason. This happens in two ways, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7): first, when the soul yields to the passions, before the reason has given its counsel; and this is called unbridled incontinence or impetuosity: second, when a man does not stand to what has been counselled, through holding weakly to reason’s judgment; wherefore this kind of incontinence is called weakness. Hence it is manifest that incontinence pertains chiefly to the soul. Reply Obj. 1: The human soul is the form of the body, and has certain powers which make use of bodily organs. The operations of these organs conduce somewhat to those operations of the soul which are accomplished without bodily instruments, namely to the acts of the intellect and of the will, insofar as the intellect receives from the senses, and the will is urged by passions of the sensitive appetite. Accordingly, since woman, as regards the body, has a weak temperament, the result is that for the most part, whatever she holds to, she holds to it weakly; although in rare cases the opposite occurs, according to Prov. 31:10, Who shall find a valiant woman? And since small and weak things are accounted as though they were not the Philosopher speaks of women as though they had not the firm judgment of reason, although the contrary happens in some women. Hence he states that we do not describe women as being continent, because they are vacillating through being unstable of reason, and are easily led so that they follow their passions readily. Reply Obj. 2: It is owing to the impulse of passion that a man at once follows his passion before his reason counsels him. Now the impulse of passion may arise either from its quickness, as in bilious persons, or from its vehemence, as in the melancholic, who on account of their earthy temperament are most vehemently aroused. Even so, on the other hand, a man fails to stand to that which is counselled, because he holds to it in weakly fashion by reason of the softness of his temperament, as we have stated with regard to woman (ad 1). This is also the case with phlegmatic temperaments, for the same reason as in women. And these results are due to the fact that the bodily temperament is an occasional but not a sufficient cause of incontinence, as stated above.

494

IIa-IIae

Incontinence

Q. 156, A. 2

Ad tertium dicendum quod concupiscentia carnis Reply Obj. 3: In the incontinent man concupiscence of in eo qui est incontinens, superat spiritum non ex neces- the flesh overcomes the spirit, not necessarily, but through sitate, sed per quandam negligentiam spiritus non resi- a certain negligence of the spirit in not resisting strongly. stentis fortiter.

Article 2 Whether incontinence is a sin? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod incontinentia non sit peccatum. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arbit., nullus peccat in eo quod vitare non potest. Sed incontinentiam nullus potest ex seipso vitare, secundum illud Sap. VIII, scio quod non possum esse continens nisi Deus det. Ergo incontinentia non est peccatum. Praeterea, omne peccatum in ratione videtur consistere. Sed in eo qui est incontinens, vincitur iudicium rationis. Ergo incontinentia non est peccatum. Praeterea, nullus peccat ex eo quod vehementer Deum amat. Sed ex vehementia divini amoris aliquis fit incontinens, dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod Paulus per incontinentiam divini amoris dixit, vivo ego, iam non ego. Ergo incontinentia non est peccatum. Sed contra est quod connumeratur aliis peccatis, II ad Tim. III, ubi dicitur, criminatores, incontinentes, immites, et cetera. Ergo incontinentia est peccatum. Respondeo dicendum quod incontinentia potest attendi circa aliquid tripliciter. Uno modo, proprie et simpliciter. Et sic incontinentia attenditur circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus, sicut et intemperantia, ut supra dictum est de continentia. Et hoc modo incontinentia est peccatum, duplici ratione, uno modo, ex eo quod incontinens recedit ab eo quod est secundum rationem; alio modo, ex eo quod se immergit quibusdam turpibus delectationibus. Et ideo philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod incontinentia vituperatur non solum sicut peccatum, quod scilicet est per recessum a ratione, sed sicut malitia quaedam, inquantum scilicet pravas concupiscentias sequitur. Alio modo incontinentia dicitur circa aliquid, proprie quidem, inquantum homo recedit ab eo quod est secundum rationem, sed non simpliciter, puta cum aliquis non servat modum rationis in concupiscentia honoris, divitiarum et aliorum huiusmodi, quae secundum se videntur esse bona; circa quae non est incontinentia simpliciter, sed secundum quid, sicut supra de continentia dictum est. Et sic incontinentia est peccatum, non ex eo quod aliquis ingerat se pravis concupiscentiis, sed eo quod non servat modum debitum rationis, etiam in concupiscentia rerum per se appetendarum. Tertio modo incontinentia dicitur esse circa aliquid non proprie, sed secundum similitudinem, puta circa

Objection 1: It would seem that incontinence is not a sin. For as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): No man sins in what he cannot avoid. Now no man can by himself avoid incontinence, according to Wis. 8:21, I know that I could not . . . be continent, except God gave it. Therefore incontinence is not a sin. Obj. 2: Further, apparently every sin originates in the reason. But the judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man. Therefore incontinence is not a sin. Obj. 3: Further, no one sins in loving God vehemently. Now a man becomes incontinent through the vehemence of divine love: for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that Paul, through incontinence of divine love, exclaimed: I live, now not I (Gal 2:20). Therefore incontinence is not a sin. On the contrary, It is numbered together with other sins (2 Tim 3:3) where it is written: Slanderers, incontinent, unmerciful, etc. Therefore incontinence is a sin. I answer that, Incontinence about a matter may be considered in two ways. First it may be considered properly and simply: and thus incontinence is about concupiscences of pleasures of touch, even as intemperance is, as we have said in reference to continence (Q. 155, A. 2). In this way incontinence is a sin for two reasons: first, because the incontinent man goes astray from that which is in accord with reason; second, because he plunges into shameful pleasures. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that incontinence is censurable not only because it is wrong—that is, by straying from reason—but also because it is wicked—that is, by following evil desires. Second, incontinence about a matter is considered, properly—inasmuch as it is a straying from reason—but not simply; for instance when a man does not observe the mode of reason in his desire for honor, riches, and so forth, which seem to be good in themselves. About such things there is incontinence, not simply but relatively, even as we have said above in reference to continence (Q. 155, A. 2, ad 3). In this way incontinence is a sin, not from the fact that one gives way to wicked desires, but because one fails to observe the mode of reason even in the desire for things that are of themselves desirable.

Third, incontinence is said to be about a matter, not properly, but metaphorically, for instance about the desires

495

Q. 156, A. 3

Temperance

concupiscentias eorum quibus non potest aliquis male uti, puta circa concupiscentias virtutum. Circa quas potest dici aliquis esse incontinens per similitudinem, quia sicut ille qui est incontinens totaliter ducitur per concupiscentiam malam, ita aliquis totaliter ducitur per concupiscentiam bonam, quae est secundum rationem. Et talis incontinentia non est peccatum, sed pertinet ad perfectionem virtutis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo potest vitare peccatum et facere bonum, non tamen sine divino auxilio, secundum illud Ioan. XV, sine me nihil potestis facere. Unde per hoc quod homo indiget divino auxilio ad hoc quod sit continens, non excluditur quin incontinentia sit peccatum, quia, ut dicitur in III Ethic., quae per amicos possumus, aliqualiter per nos possumus. Ad secundum dicendum quod in eo qui est incontinens vincitur iudicium rationis, non quidem ex necessitate, quod auferret rationem peccati, sed ex negligentia quadam hominis non firmiter intendentis ad resistendum passioni per iudicium rationis quod habet. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de incontinentia per similitudinem dicta, et non proprie.

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for things of which one cannot make an evil use, such as the desire for virtue. A man may be said to be incontinent in these matters metaphorically, because just as the incontinent man is entirely led by his evil desire, even so is a man entirely led by his good desire which is in accord with reason. Such like incontinence is no sin, but pertains to the perfection of virtue. Reply Obj. 1: Man can avoid sin and do good, yet not without God’s help, according to John 15:5: Without Me you can do nothing. Wherefore the fact that man needs God’s help in order to be continent, does not show incontinence to be no sin, for, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, what we can do by means of a friend we do, in a way, ourselves. Reply Obj. 2: The judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man, not necessarily, for then he would commit no sin, but through a certain negligence on account of his not standing firm in resisting the passion by holding to the judgment formed by his reason. Reply Obj. 3: This argument takes incontinence metaphorically and not properly.

Article 3 Whether the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod incontinens plus peccet quam intemperatus. Tanto enim aliquis videtur gravius peccare, quanto magis contra conscientiam agit, secundum illud Luc. XII, servus sciens voluntatem domini sui et faciens digna plagis, vapulabit multis. Sed incontinens magis videtur agere contra conscientiam quam intemperatus, quia, ut dicitur in VII Ethic., incontinens, sciens quoniam prava sunt quae concupiscit, nihilominus agit, propter passionem; intemperatus autem iudicat ea quae concupiscit esse bona. Ergo incontinens gravius peccat quam intemperatus.

Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate. For, seemingly, the more a man acts against his conscience, the more gravely he sins, according to Luke 12:47, That servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes. Now the incontinent man would seem to act against his conscience more than the intemperate because, according to Ethic. vii, 3, the incontinent man, though knowing how wicked are the things he desires, nevertheless acts through passion, whereas the intemperate man judges what he desires to be good. Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate. Praeterea, quanto aliquod peccatum gravius est, Obj. 2: Further, apparently, the graver a sin is, the more tanto videtur esse minus sanabile, unde et peccata in incurable it is: wherefore the sins against the Holy Spirit, spiritum sanctum, quae sunt gravissima, dicuntur esse being most grave, are declared to be unpardonable. Now irremissibilia. Sed peccatum incontinentiae videtur es- the sin of incontinence would appear to be more incurable se insanabilius quam peccatum intemperantiae. Sanatur than the sin of intemperance. For a person’s sin is cured enim peccatum alicuius per admonitionem et correctio- by admonishment and correction, which seemingly are no nem, quae nihil videtur conferre incontinenti, qui scit se good to the incontinent man, since he knows he is doing male agere, et nihilominus male agit, intemperato autem wrong, and does wrong notwithstanding: whereas it seems videtur quod bene agat, et sic aliquid ei conferre posset to the intemperate man that he is doing well, so that it were admonitio. Ergo videtur quod incontinens gravius pec- good for him to be admonished. Therefore it would appear cet quam intemperatus. that the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.

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Praeterea, quanto aliquis ex maiori libidine peccat, tanto gravius peccat. Sed incontinens peccat ex maiori libidine quam intemperatus, quia incontinens habet vehementes concupiscentias, quas non semper habet intemperatus. Ergo incontinens magis peccat quam intemperatus. Sed contra est quod impoenitentia aggravat omne peccatum, unde Augustinus, in libro de Verb. Dom., dicit quod impoenitentia est peccatum in spiritum sanctum. Sed sicut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., intemperatus non est poenitivus, immanet enim electioni, incontinens autem omnis est poenitivus. Ergo intemperatus gravius peccat quam incontinens. Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum, secundum Augustinum, praecipue in voluntate consistit, voluntas enim est qua peccatur et recte vivitur. Et ideo ubi est maior inclinatio voluntatis ad peccandum, ibi est gravius peccatum. In eo autem qui est intemperatus, voluntas inclinatur ad peccandum ex propria electione, quae procedit ex habitu per consuetudinem acquisito. In eo autem qui est incontinens, voluntas inclinatur ad peccandum ex aliqua passione. Et quia passio cito transit, habitus autem est qualitas difficile mobilis, inde est quod incontinens statim poenitet, transeunte passione, quod non accidit de intemperato, quinimmo gaudet se peccasse, eo quod operatio peccati est sibi facta connaturalis secundum habitum. Unde de his dicitur Proverb. II, quod laetantur cum male fecerint, et exultant in rebus pessimis. Unde patet quod intemperatus est multo peior quam incontinens, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ignorantia intellectus quandoque quidem praecedit inclinationem appetitus, et causat eam. Et sic, quanto est maior ignorantia, tanto magis peccatum diminuit, vel totaliter excusat, inquantum causat involuntarium. Alio modo e converso ignorantia rationis sequitur inclinationem appetitus. Et talis ignorantia quanto est maior, tanto peccatum est gravius, quia ostenditur inclinatio appetitus esse maior. Ignorantia autem tam incontinentis quam intemperati provenit ex eo quod appetitus est in aliquid inclinatus, sive per passionem, sicut in incontinente; sive per habitum, sicut in intemperato. Maior autem ignorantia causatur ex hoc in intemperato quam in incontinente. Et uno quidem modo, quantum ad durationem. Quia in incontinente durat illa ignorantia solum passione durante, sicut accessio febris tertianae durat, durante commotione humoris. Ignorantia autem intemperati durat assidue, propter permanentiam habitus, unde assimilatur phthisicae, vel cuicumque morbo continuo, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic. Alio autem modo est maior ignorantia intemperati, quantum ad id quod ignoratur. Nam ignorantia incontinentis attenditur quantum ad aliquod particulare eligibile, prout scilicet aestimat hoc nunc es-

Q. 156, A. 3

Obj. 3: Further, the more eagerly man sins, the more grievous his sin. Now the incontinent sins more eagerly than the intemperate, since the incontinent man has vehement passions and desires, which the intemperate man does not always have. Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate. On the contrary, Impenitence aggravates every sin: wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. serm. xi, 12, 13) that impenitence is a sin against the Holy Spirit. Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) the intemperate man is not inclined to be penitent, for he holds on to his choice: but every incontinent man is inclined to repentance. Therefore the intemperate man sins more gravely than the incontinent. I answer that, According to Augustine sin is chiefly an act of the will, because by the will we sin and live aright. Consequently where there is a greater inclination of the will to sin, there is a graver sin. Now in the intemperate man, the will is inclined to sin in virtue of its own choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired through custom: whereas in the incontinent man, the will is inclined to sin through a passion. And since passion soon passes, whereas a habit is a disposition difficult to remove, the result is that the incontinent man repents at once, as soon as the passion has passed; but not so the intemperate man; in fact he rejoices in having sinned, because the sinful act has become connatural to him by reason of his habit. Wherefore in reference to such persons it is written (Prov 2:14) that they are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things. Hence it follows that the intemperate man is much worse than the incontinent, as also the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 7). Reply Obj. 1: Ignorance in the intellect sometimes precedes the inclination of the appetite and causes it, and then the greater the ignorance, the more does it diminish or entirely excuse the sin, insofar as it renders it involuntary. On the other hand, ignorance in the reason sometimes follows the inclination of the appetite, and then such like ignorance, the greater it is, the graver the sin, because the inclination of the appetite is shown thereby to be greater. Now in both the incontinent and the intemperate man, ignorance arises from the appetite being inclined to something, either by passion, as in the incontinent, or by habit, as in the intemperate. Nevertheless greater ignorance results thus in the intemperate than in the incontinent. In one respect as regards duration, since in the incontinent man this ignorance lasts only while the passion endures, just as an attack of intermittent fever lasts as long as the humor is disturbed: whereas the ignorance of the intemperate man endures without ceasing, on account of the endurance of the habit, wherefore it is likened to phthisis or any chronic disease, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 8). In another respect the ignorance of the intemperate man is greater as regards the thing ignored. For the ignorance of the incontinent man regards some particular detail of choice (insofar

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Temperance

se eligendum, sed intemperatus habet ignorantiam circa ipsum finem, inquantum scilicet iudicat hoc esse bonum, ut irrefrenate concupiscentias sequatur. Unde philosophus, in VII Ethic., dicit quod incontinens est melior intemperato, quia salvatur in eo optimum principium, scilicet recta existimatio de fine. Ad secundum dicendum quod ad sanationem incontinentis non sufficit sola cognitio, sed requiritur interius auxilium gratiae concupiscentiam mitigantis, et adhibetur etiam exterius remedium admonitionis et correctionis, ex quibus aliquis incipit concupiscentiis resistere, ex quo concupiscentia debilitatur, ut supra dictum est. Et iisdem etiam modis potest sanari intemperatus, sed difficilior est eius sanatio, propter duo. Quorum primum est ex parte rationis, quae corrupta est circa aestimationem ultimi finis, quod se habet sicut principium in demonstrativis, difficilius autem reducitur ad veritatem ille qui errat circa principium, et similiter in operativis ille qui errat circa finem. Aliud autem est ex parte inclinationis appetitus, quae in intemperato est ex habitu, qui difficile tollitur, inclinatio autem incontinentis est ex passione, quae facilius reprimi potest.

Ad tertium dicendum quod libido voluntatis, quae auget peccatum, maior est in intemperato quam in incontinente, ut ex dictis patet. Sed libido concupiscentiae appetitus sensitivi quandoque maior est in incontinente, quia incontinens non peccat nisi a gravi concupiscentia; sed intemperatus etiam ex levi concupiscentia peccat, et quandoque eam praevenit. Et ideo philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod magis intemperatum vituperamus, quia non concupiscens, vel quiete, idest remisse concupiscens, persequitur delectationes. Quid enim faceret si adesset concupiscentia iuvenilis?

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as he deems that he must choose this particular thing now): whereas the intemperate man’s ignorance is about the end itself, inasmuch as he judges this thing good, in order that he may follow his desires without being curbed. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7, 8) that the incontinent man is better than the intemperate, because he retains the best principle, to wit, the right estimate of the end. Reply Obj. 2: Mere knowledge does not suffice to cure the incontinent man, for he needs the inward assistance of grace which quenches concupiscence, besides the application of the external remedy of admonishment and correction, which induce him to begin to resist his desires, so that concupiscence is weakened, as stated above (Q. 142, A. 2). By these same means the intemperate man can be cured. But his curing is more difficult, for two reasons. The first is on the part of reason, which is corrupt as regards the estimate of the last end, which holds the same position as the principle in demonstrations. Now it is more difficult to bring back to the truth one who errs as to the principle; and it is the same in practical matters with one who errs in regard to the end. The other reason is on the part of the inclination of the appetite: for in the intemperate man this proceeds from a habit, which is difficult to remove, whereas the inclination of the incontinent man proceeds from a passion, which is more easily suppressed. Reply Obj. 3: The eagerness of the will, which increases a sin, is greater in the intemperate man than in the incontinent, as explained above. But the eagerness of concupiscence in the sensitive appetite is sometimes greater in the incontinent man, because he does not sin except through vehement concupiscence, whereas the intemperate man sins even through slight concupiscence and sometimes forestalls it. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that we blame more the intemperate man, because he pursues pleasure without desiring it or with calm, i.e., slight desire. For what would he have done if he had desired it with passion?

Article 4 Whether the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod incontinens irae sit peior quam incontinens concupiscentiae. Quanto enim difficilius est resistere passioni, tanto incontinentia videtur esse levior, unde philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., non enim, si quis a fortibus et superexcellentibus delectationibus vincitur vel tristitiis, est admirabile, sed condonabile. Sed, sicut Heraclitus dixit, difficilius est pugnare contra concupiscentiam quam contra iram. Ergo levior est incontinentia concupiscentiae quam incontinentia irae.

Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire. For the more difficult it is to resist the passion, the less grievous, apparently is incontinence: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): It is not wonderful, indeed it is pardonable if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains. Now, as Heraclitus says, it is more difficult to resist desire than anger. Therefore incontinence of desire is less grievous than incontinence of anger.

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Praeterea, si passio per suam vehementiam totaliter auferat iudicium rationis, omnino excusatur aliquis a peccato, sicut patet in eo qui incidit ex passione in furiam. Sed plus remanet de iudicio rationis in eo qui est incontinens irae, quam in eo qui est incontinens concupiscentiae, iratus enim aliqualiter audit rationem, non autem concupiscens, ut patet per philosophum, in VII Ethic. Ergo incontinens irae est peior quam incontinens concupiscentiae. Praeterea, tanto aliquod peccatum videtur esse gravius, quanto est periculosius. Sed incontinentia irae videtur esse periculosior, quia perducit hominem ad maius peccatum, scilicet ad homicidium, quod est gravius peccatum quam adulterium, ad quod perducit incontinentia concupiscentiae. Ergo incontinentia irae est gravior quam incontinentia concupiscentiae. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod minus turpis est incontinentia irae quam incontinentia concupiscentiae. Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum incontinentiae potest dupliciter considerari. Uno modo, ex parte passionis ex qua ratio superatur. Et sic incontinentia concupiscentiae est turpior quam incontinentia irae, quia motus concupiscentiae habet maiorem inordinationem quam motus irae. Et hoc propter quatuor, quae philosophus tangit in VII Ethic. Primo quidem, quia motus irae participat aliqualiter ratione, inquantum scilicet iratus tendit ad vindicandum iniuriam sibi factam, quod aliqualiter ratio dictat, sed non perfecte, quia non intendit debitum modum vindictae. Sed motus concupiscentiae totaliter est secundum sensum, et nullo modo secundum rationem. Secundo, quia motus irae magis consequitur corporis complexionem, propter velocitatem motus cholerae, quae intendit ad iram. Unde magis est in promptu quod ille qui est secundum complexionem corporis dispositus ad irascendum, irascatur, quam quod ille qui est dispositus ad concupiscendum, concupiscat. Unde etiam frequentius ex iracundis nascuntur iracundi quam ex concupiscentibus concupiscentes. Quod autem provenit ex naturali corporis dispositione, reputatur magis venia dignum. Tertio, quia ira quaerit manifeste operari. Sed concupiscentia quaerit latebras, et dolose subintrat. Quarto, quia concupiscens delectabiliter operatur, sed iratus quasi quadam tristitia praecedente coactus.

Q. 156, A. 4

Obj. 2: Further, one is altogether excused from sin if the passion be so vehement as to deprive one of the judgment of reason, as in the case of one who becomes demented through passion. Now he that is incontinent in anger retains more of the judgment of reason, than one who is incontinent in desire: since anger listens to reason somewhat, but desire does not as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire. Obj. 3: Further, the more dangerous a sin the more grievous it is. Now incontinence of anger would seem to be more dangerous, since it leads a man to a greater sin, namely murder, for this is a more grievous sin than adultery, to which incontinence of desire leads. Therefore incontinence of anger is graver than incontinence of desire.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that incontinence of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of desire. I answer that, The sin of incontinence may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the passion which occasions the downfall of reason. In this way incontinence of desire is worse than incontinence of anger, because the movement of desire is more inordinate than the movement of anger. There are four reasons for this, and the Philosopher indicates them, Ethic. vii, 6: First, because the movement of anger partakes somewhat of reason, since the angry man tends to avenge the injury done to him, and reason dictates this in a certain degree. Yet he does not tend thereto perfectly, because he does not intend the due mode of vengeance. On the other hand, the movement of desire is altogether in accord with sense and nowise in accord with reason. Second, because the movement of anger results more from the bodily temperament owing to the quickness of the movement of the bile which tends to anger. Hence one who by bodily temperament is disposed to anger is more readily angry than one who is disposed to concupiscence is liable to be concupiscent: wherefore also it happens more often that the children of those who are disposed to anger are themselves disposed to anger, than that the children of those who are disposed to concupiscence are also disposed to concupiscence. Now that which results from the natural disposition of the body is deemed more deserving of pardon. Third, because anger seeks to work openly, whereas concupiscence is fain to disguise itself and creeps in by stealth. Fourth, because he who is subject to concupiscence works with pleasure, whereas the angry man works as though forced by a certain previous displeasure. Alio modo potest considerari peccatum incontinenSecond, the sin of incontinence may be considered with tiae quantum ad malum in quod quis incidit a ratio- regard to the evil into which one falls through forsaking ne discedens. Et sic incontinentia irae est, ut plurimum, reason; and thus incontinence of anger is, for the most part, gravior, quia ducit in ea quae pertinent ad proximi no- more grievous, because it leads to things that are harmful to cumentum. one’s neighbor.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod difficilius est assidue pugnare contra delectationem quam contra iram, quia concupiscentia est magis continua, sed ad horam difficilius est resistere irae, propter eius impetum. Ad secundum dicendum quod concupiscentia dicitur esse sine ratione, non quia totaliter auferat iudicium rationis, sed quia in nullo procedit secundum iudicium rationis. Et ex hoc est turpior. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit ex parte eorum in quae incontinens deducitur.

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Reply Obj. 1: It is more difficult to resist pleasure perseveringly than anger, because concupiscence is enduring. But for the moment it is more difficult to resist anger, on account of its impetuousness. Reply Obj. 2: Concupiscence is stated to be without reason, not as though it destroyed altogether the judgment of reason, but because nowise does it follow the judgment of reason: and for this reason it is more disgraceful. Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers incontinence with regard to its result.

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Question 157 Clemency and Meekness Deinde considerandum est de clementia et mansueWe must next consider clemency and meekness, and the tudine, et vitiis oppositis. Circa ipsas autem virtutes contrary vices. Concerning the virtues themselves there are quaeruntur quatuor. four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum clementia et mansuetudo sint idem. (1) Whether clemency and meekness are altogether identical? Secundo, utrum utraque earum sit virtus. (2) Whether each of them is a virtue? Tertio, utrum utraque earum sit pars temperantiae. (3) Whether each is a part of temperance? Quarto, de comparatione earum ad alias virtutes. (4) Of their comparison with the other virtues.

Article 1 Whether clemency and meekness are absolutely the same? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod clementia et mansuetudo sint penitus idem. Mansuetudo enim est moderativa irarum, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Ira autem est appetitus vindictae. Cum ergo clementia sit lenitas superioris adversus inferiorem in constituendis poenis, ut Seneca dicit, in II de clementia; per poenas autem fit vindicta, videtur quod clementia et mansuetudo sint idem. Praeterea, Tullius dicit, in II Rhet., quod clementia est virtus per quam animus concitatus in odium alicuius, benignitate retinetur, et sic videtur quod clementia sit moderativa odii. Sed odium, ut Augustinus dicit, causatur ab ira, circa quam est mansuetudo. Ergo videtur quod mansuetudo et clementia sint idem. Praeterea, idem vitium non contrariatur diversis virtutibus. Sed idem vitium opponitur mansuetudini et clementiae, scilicet crudelitas. Ergo videtur quod mansuetudo et clementia sint penitus idem. Sed contra est quod secundum praedictam definitionem Senecae, clementia est lenitas superioris adversus inferiorem. Mansuetudo autem non solum est superioris ad inferiorem, sed cuiuslibet ad quemlibet. Ergo mansuetudo et clementia non sunt penitus idem. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in II Ethic., virtus moralis consistit circa passiones et actiones. Passiones autem interiores sunt actionum exteriorum principia, aut etiam impedimenta. Et ideo virtutes quae moderantur passiones quodammodo concurrunt in eundem effectum cum virtutibus quae moderantur actiones, licet specie differant. Sicut ad iustitiam proprie pertinet cohibere hominem a furto, ad quod aliquis inclinatur per inordinatum amorem vel concupiscentiam

Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are absolutely the same. For meekness moderates anger, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5). Now anger is desire of vengeance. Since, then, clemency is leniency of a superior in inflicting punishment on an inferior, as Seneca states (De Clementia ii, 3), and vengeance is taken by means of punishment, it would seem that clemency and meekness are the same. Obj. 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that clemency is a virtue whereby the mind is restrained by kindness when unreasonably provoked to hatred of a person, so that apparently clemency moderates hatred. Now, according to Augustine, hatred is caused by anger; and this is the matter of meekness and clemency. Therefore seemingly clemency and meekness are absolutely the same. Obj. 3: Further, the same vice is not opposed to different virtues. But the same vice, namely cruelty, is opposed to meekness and clemency. Therefore it seems that meekness and clemency are absolutely the same. On the contrary, According to the aforesaid definition of Seneca (Obj. 1) clemency is leniency of a superior towards an inferior: whereas meekness is not merely of superior to inferior, but of each to everyone. Therefore meekness and clemency are not absolutely the same. I answer that, As stated in Ethic. ii, 3, a moral virtue is about passions and actions. Now internal passions are principles of external actions, and are likewise obstacles thereto. Wherefore virtues that moderate passions, to a certain extent, concur towards the same effect as virtues that moderate actions, although they differ specifically. Thus it belongs properly to justice to restrain man from theft, whereunto he is inclined by immoderate love or desire of money, which is restrained by liberality; so that liberality

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Temperance

pecuniae, quae moderantur per liberalitatem, et ideo liberalitas concurrit cum iustitia in hoc effectu qui est abstinere a furto. Et hoc etiam considerandum est in proposito. Nam ex passione irae provocatur aliquis ad hoc quod graviorem inferat poenam. Ad clementiam autem pertinet directe quod sit diminutiva poenarum, quod quidem impediri posset per excessum irae. Et ideo mansuetudo, inquantum refrenat impetum irae, concurrit in eundem effectum cum clementia. Differunt tamen ab invicem, inquantum clementia est moderativa exterioris punitionis, mansuetudo autem proprie diminuit passionem irae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod mansuetudo proprie respicit ipsum vindictae appetitum. Sed clementia respicit ipsas poenas quae exterius adhibentur ad vindictam. Ad secundum dicendum quod affectus hominis inclinatur ad minorationem eorum quae homini per se non placent. Ex hoc autem quod aliquis amat aliquem, contingit quod non placet ei per se poena eius, sed solum in ordine ad aliud, puta ad iustitiam, vel ad correctionem eius qui punitur. Et ideo ex amore provenit quod aliquis sit promptus ad diminuendum poenas, quod pertinet ad clementiam, et ex odio impeditur talis diminutio. Et propter hoc Tullius dicit quod animus concitatus in odium, scilicet ad gravius puniendum, per clementiam retinetur, ne scilicet acriorem poenam inferat, non quod clementia sit directe odii moderativa, sed poenae. Ad tertium dicendum quod mansuetudini, quae est directe circa iras proprie opponitur vitium iracundiae, quod importat excessum irae. Sed crudelitas importat excessum in puniendo. Unde dicit Seneca, in II de Clem., quod crudeles vocantur qui puniendi causam habent, modum non habent. Qui autem in poenis hominum propter se delectantur, etiam sine causa, possunt dici saevi vel feri, quasi affectum humanum non habentes, ex quo naturaliter homo diligit hominem.

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concurs with justice towards the effect, which is abstention from theft. This applies to the case in point; because through the passion of anger a man is provoked to inflict a too severe punishment, while it belongs directly to clemency to mitigate punishment, and this might be prevented by excessive anger. Consequently meekness, insofar as it restrains the onslaught of anger, concurs with clemency towards the same effect; yet they differ from one another, inasmuch as clemency moderates external punishment, while meekness properly mitigates the passion of anger. Reply Obj. 1: Meekness regards properly the desire itself of vengeance; whereas clemency regards the punishment itself which is applied externally for the purpose of vengeance. Reply Obj. 2: Man’s affections incline to the moderation of things that are unpleasant to him in themselves. Now it results from one man loving another that he takes no pleasure in the latter’s punishment in itself, but only as directed to something else, for instance justice, or the correction of the person punished. Hence love makes one quick to mitigate punishment—and this pertains to clemency—while hatred is an obstacle to such mitigation. For this reason Tully says that the mind provoked to hatred that is to punish too severely, is restrained by clemency, from inflicting too severe a punishment, so that clemency directly moderates not hatred but punishment. Reply Obj. 3: The vice of anger, which denotes excess in the passion of anger, is properly opposed to meekness, which is directly concerned with the passion of anger; while cruelty denotes excess in punishing. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that those are called cruel who have reason for punishing, but lack moderation in punishing. Those who delight in a man’s punishment for its own sake may be called savage or brutal, as though lacking the human feeling that leads one man to love another.

Article 2 Whether both clemency and meekness are virtues? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod neque clementia neque mansuetudo sit virtus. Nulla enim virtus alteri virtuti opponitur. Sed utraque videtur opponi severitati, quae est quaedam virtus. Ergo neque clementia neque mansuetudo est virtus. Praeterea, virtus corrumpitur per superfluum et diminutum. Sed tam clementia quam mansuetudo in diminutione quadam consistunt, nam clementia est diminutiva poenarum, mansuetudo autem est diminutiva irae. Ergo neque clementia neque mansuetudo est virtus.

Objection 1: It would seem that neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue. For no virtue is opposed to another virtue. Yet both of these are apparently opposed to severity, which is a virtue. Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue. Obj. 2: Further, Virtue is destroyed by excess and defect. But both clemency and meekness consist in a certain decrease; for clemency decreases punishment, and meekness decreases anger. Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.

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Praeterea, mansuetudo, sive mititas, ponitur, Matth. V, inter beatitudines; et inter fructus, Galat. V. Sed virtutes differunt et a beatitudinibus et a fructibus. Ergo non continetur sub virtute. Sed contra est quod Seneca dicit, in II de Clem., clementiam et mansuetudinem omnes boni viri praestabunt. Sed virtus est proprie quae pertinet ad bonos viros, nam virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo clementia et mansuetudo sunt virtutes. Respondeo dicendum quod ratio virtutis moralis consistit in hoc quod appetitus rationi subdatur, ut patet per philosophum, in I Ethic. Hoc autem servatur tam in clementia quam in mansuetudine, nam clementia in diminuendo poenas aspicit ad rationem, ut Seneca dicit, in II de Clem.; similiter etiam mansuetudo secundum rationem rectam moderatur iras, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Unde manifestum est quod tam clementia quam mansuetudo est virtus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod mansuetudo non directe opponitur severitati, nam mansuetudo est circa iras, severitas autem attenditur circa exteriorem inflictionem poenarum. Unde secundum hoc, videretur magis opponi clementiae, quae etiam circa exteriorem punitionem consideratur, ut dictum est. Non tamen opponitur, eo quod utrumque est secundum rationem rectam. Nam severitas inflexibilis est circa inflictionem poenarum quando hoc recta ratio requirit, clementia autem diminutiva est poenarum etiam secundum rationem rectam, quando scilicet oportet, et in quibus oportet. Et ideo non sunt opposita, quia non sunt circa idem. Ad secundum dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in IV Ethic., habitus qui medium tenet in ira, est innominatus; et ideo virtus nominatur a diminutione irae, quae significatur nomine mansuetudinis, eo quod virtus propinquior est diminutioni quam superabundantiae, propter hoc quod naturalius est homini appetere vindictam iniuriarum illatarum quam ab hoc deficere; quia vix alicui nimis parvae videntur iniuriae sibi illatae, ut dicit Sallustius. Clementia autem est diminutiva poenarum, non quidem in respectu ad id quod est secundum rationem rectam, sed in respectu ad id quod est secundum legem communem, quam respicit iustitia legalis, sed propter aliqua particularia considerata, clementia diminuit poenas, quasi decernens hominem non esse magis puniendum. Unde dicit Seneca, in II de Clem., clementia hoc primum praestat, ut quos dimittit, nihil aliud illos pati debuisse pronuntiat, venia vero debitae poenae remissio est. Ex quo patet quod clementia comparatur ad severitatem sicut epieikeia ad iustitiam legalem, cuius pars est severitas quantum ad inflictionem poenarum secundum legem. Differt tamen clementia ab epieikeia, ut infra dicetur.

Q. 157, A. 2

Obj. 3: Further, meekness or mildness is included (Matt 5:4) among the beatitudes, and (Gal 5:23) among the fruits. Now the virtues differ from the beatitudes and fruits. Therefore they are not comprised under virtue. On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 5): Every good man is conspicuous for his clemency and meekness. Now it is virtue properly that belongs to a good man, since virtue it is that makes its possessor good, and renders his works good also (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore clemency and meekness are virtues. I answer that, The nature of moral virtue consists in the subjection of appetite to reason, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Now this is verified both in clemency and in meekness. For clemency, in mitigating punishment, is guided by reason, according to Seneca (De Clementia ii, 5), and meekness, likewise, moderates anger according to right reason, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Wherefore it is manifest that both clemency and meekness are virtues. Reply Obj. 1: Meekness is not directly opposed to severity; for meekness is about anger. On the other hand, severity regards the external infliction of punishment, so that accordingly it would seem rather to be opposed to clemency, which also regards external punishing, as stated above (A. 1). Yet they are not really opposed to one another, since they are both according to right reason. For severity is inflexible in the infliction of punishment when right reason requires it; while clemency mitigates punishment also according to right reason, when and where this is requisite. Wherefore they are not opposed to one another as they are not about the same thing. Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5), the habit that observes the mean in anger is unnamed; so that the virtue is denominated from the diminution of anger, and is designated by the name of meekness. For the virtue is more akin to diminution than to excess, because it is more natural to man to desire vengeance for injuries done to him, than to be lacking in that desire, since scarcely anyone belittles an injury done to himself, as Sallust observes. As to clemency, it mitigates punishment, not in respect of that which is according to right reason, but as regards that which is according to common law, which is the object of legal justice: yet on account of some particular consideration, it mitigates the punishment, deciding, as it were, that a man is not to be punished any further. Hence Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 1): Clemency grants this, in the first place, that those whom she sets free are declared immune from all further punishment; and remission of punishment due amounts to a pardon. Wherefore it is clear that clemency is related to severity as equity to legal justice, whereof severity is a part, as regards the infliction of punishment in accordance with the law. Yet clemency differs from equity, as we shall state further on (A. 3, ad 1).

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Ad tertium dicendum quod beatitudines sunt acReply Obj. 3: The beatitudes are acts of virtue: while tus virtutum, fructus autem sunt delectationes de actibus the fruits are delights in virtuous acts. Wherefore nothing virtutum. Et ideo nihil prohibet mansuetudinem poni et hinders meekness being reckoned both virtue, and beativirtutem et beatitudinem et fructum. tude and fruit.

Article 3 Whether the aforesaid virtues are parts of temperance? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod praedictae virtutes non sint partes temperantiae. Clementia enim est diminutiva poenarum, ut dictum est. Hoc autem philosophus, in V Ethic., attribuit epieikeiae, quae pertinet ad iustitiam, ut supra habitum est. Ergo videtur quod clementia non sit pars temperantiae. Praeterea, temperantia est circa concupiscentias. Mansuetudo autem et clementia non respiciunt concupiscentias, sed magis iram et vindictam. Non ergo debent poni partes temperantiae. Praeterea, Seneca dicit, in II de Clem., cui voluptati saevitia est, possumus insaniam vocare. Hoc autem opponitur clementiae et mansuetudini. Cum ergo insania opponatur prudentiae, videtur quod clementia et mansuetudo sint partes prudentiae, magis quam temperantiae. Sed contra est quod Seneca dicit, in II de Clem., quod clementia est temperantia animi in potestate ulciscendi. Tullius etiam ponit clementiam partem temperantiae. Respondeo dicendum quod partes assignantur virtutibus principalibus secundum quod imitantur ipsas in aliquibus materiis secundariis, quantum ad modum ex quo principaliter dependet laus virtutis, unde et nomen accipit, sicut modus et nomen iustitiae in quadam aequalitate consistit; fortitudinis autem in quadam firmitate; temperantiae autem in quadam refrenatione, inquantum scilicet refrenat concupiscentias vehementissimas delectationum tactus. Clementia autem et mansuetudo similiter in quadam refrenatione consistit, quia scilicet clementia est diminutiva poenarum, mansuetudo vero est mitigativa irae, ut ex dictis patet. Et ideo tam clementia quam mansuetudo adiunguntur temperantiae sicut virtuti principali. Et secundum hoc ponuntur partes ipsius. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in diminutione poenarum duo sunt consideranda. Quorum unum est quod diminutio poenarum fiat secundum intentionem legislatoris, licet non secundum verba legis. Et secundum hoc, pertinet ad epieikeiam. Aliud autem est quaedam moderatio affectus, ut homo non utatur sua potestate in inflictione poenarum. Et hoc proprie pertinet ad clementiam, propter quod Seneca dicit quod est temperantia animi in potestate ulciscendi. Et haec quidem

Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid virtues are not parts of temperance. For clemency mitigates punishment, as stated above (A. 2). But the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) ascribes this to equity, which pertains to justice, as stated above (Q. 120, A. 2). Therefore seemingly clemency is not a part of temperance. Obj. 2: Further, temperance is concerned with concupiscences; whereas meekness and clemency regard, not concupiscences, but anger and vengeance. Therefore they should not be reckoned parts of temperance. Obj. 3: Further, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4): A man may be said to be of unsound mind when he takes pleasure in cruelty. Now this is opposed to clemency and meekness. Since then an unsound mind is opposed to prudence, it seems that clemency and meekness are parts of prudence rather than of temperance. On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that clemency is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge. Tully also (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons clemency a part of temperance. I answer that, Parts are assigned to the principal virtues, insofar as they imitate them in some secondary matter as to the mode whence the virtue derives its praise and likewise its name. Thus the mode and name of justice consist in a certain equality, those of fortitude in a certain strength of mind, those of temperance in a certain restraint, inasmuch as it restrains the most vehement concupiscences of the pleasures of touch. Now clemency and meekness likewise consist in a certain restraint, since clemency mitigates punishment, while meekness represses anger, as stated above (AA. 1, 2). Therefore both clemency and meekness are annexed to temperance as principal virtue, and accordingly are reckoned to be parts thereof.

Reply Obj. 1: Two points must be considered in the mitigation of punishment. One is that punishment should be mitigated in accordance with the lawgiver’s intention, although not according to the letter of the law; and in this respect it pertains to equity. The other point is a certain moderation of a man’s inward disposition, so that he does not exercise his power of inflicting punishment. This belongs properly to clemency, wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that it is temperance of the soul in exercising the

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moderatio animi provenit ex quadam dulcedine affectus, qua quis abhorret omne illud quod potest alium tristare. Et ideo dicit Seneca quod clementia est quaedam lenitas animi. Nam e contrario austeritas animi videtur esse in eo qui non veretur alios contristare.

Ad secundum dicendum quod adiunctio virtutum secundariarum ad principales magis attenditur secundum modum virtutis, qui est quasi quaedam forma eius, quam secundum materiam. Mansuetudo autem et clementia conveniunt cum temperantia in modo, ut dictum est, licet non conveniant in materia. Ad tertium dicendum quod insania dicitur per corruptionem sanitatis. Sicut autem sanitas corporalis corrumpitur per hoc quod corpus recedit a debita complexione humanae speciei, ita etiam insania secundum animam accipitur per hoc quod anima humana recedit a debita dispositione humanae speciei. Quod quidem contingit et secundum rationem, puta cum aliquis usum rationis amittit, et quantum ad vim appetitivam, puta cum aliquis amittit affectum humanum, secundum quem homo naturaliter est omni homini amicus, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Insania autem quae excludit usum rationis, opponitur prudentiae. Sed quod aliquis delectetur in poenis hominum, dicitur esse insania, quia per hoc videtur homo privatus affectu humano, quem sequitur clementia.

Q. 157, A. 4

power of taking revenge. This moderation of soul comes from a certain sweetness of disposition, whereby a man recoils from anything that may be painful to another. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that clemency is a certain smoothness of the soul; for, on the other hand, there would seem to be a certain roughness of soul in one who fears not to pain others. Reply Obj. 2: The annexation of secondary to principal virtues depends on the mode of virtue, which is, so to speak, a kind of form of the virtue, rather than on the matter. Now meekness and clemency agree with temperance in mode, as stated above, though they agree not in matter. Reply Obj. 3: Unsoundness is corruption of soundness. Now just as soundness of body is corrupted by the body lapsing from the condition due to the human species, so unsoundness of mind is due to the mind lapsing from the disposition due to the human species. This occurs both in respect of the reason, as when a man loses the use of reason, and in respect of the appetitive power, as when a man loses that humane feeling whereby every man is naturally friendly towards all other men (Ethic. viii, 1). The unsoundness of mind that excludes the use of reason is opposed to prudence. But that a man who takes pleasure in the punishment of others is said to be of unsound mind, is because he seems on this account to be devoid of the humane feeling which gives rise to clemency.

Article 4 Whether clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod clementia et mansuetudo sint potissimae virtutes. Laus enim virtutis praecipue consistit ex hoc quod ordinat hominem ad beatitudinem, quae in Dei cognitione consistit. Sed mansuetudo maxime ordinat hominem ad Dei cognitionem, dicitur enim Iac. I, in mansuetudine suscipite insitum verbum; et Eccli. V, esto mansuetus ad audiendum verbum Dei; et Dionysius dicit, in epistola ad Demophil., Moysen propter multam mansuetudinem Dei apparitione dignum habitum. Ergo mansuetudo est potissima virtutum. Praeterea, tanto virtus aliqua potior esse videtur, quanto magis acceptatur a Deo et ab hominibus. Sed mansuetudo maxime videtur acceptari a Deo, dicitur enim Eccli. I, quod beneplacitum est Deo fides et mansuetudo. Unde et specialiter ad suae mansuetudinis imitationem Christus nos invitat, dicens, discite a me, quia mitis sum et humilis corde, et Hilarius dicit quod per mansuetudinem mentis nostrae habitat Christus in nobis. Est etiam hominibus acceptissima, unde dicitur Eccli.

Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues. For virtue is deserving of praise chiefly because it directs man to happiness that consists in the knowledge of God. Now meekness above all directs man to the knowledge of God: for it is written (Jas 1:21): With meekness receive the ingrafted word, and (Sir 5:13): Be meek to hear the word of God. Again, Dionysius says (Ep. viii ad Demophil.) that Moses was deemed worthy of the Divine apparition on account of his great meekness. Therefore meekness is the greatest of virtues. Obj. 2: Further, seemingly a virtue is all the greater according as it is more acceptable to God and men. Now meekness would appear to be most acceptable to God. For it is written (Sir 1:34, 35): That which is agreeable to God is faith and meekness; wherefore Christ expressly invites us to be meek like unto Himself (Matt 11:29), where He says: Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart; and Hilary declares that Christ dwells in us by our meekness of soul. Again, it is most acceptable to men; where-

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III, fili, in mansuetudine perfice opera tua, et super hominum gloria diligeris. Propter quod et Proverb. XX dicitur quod clementia thronus regius roboratur. Ergo mansuetudo et clementia sunt potissimae virtutes. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. domini in monte, quod mites sunt qui cedunt improbitatibus, et non resistunt in malo, sed vincunt in bono malum. Hoc autem videtur pertinere ad misericordiam vel pietatem, quae videtur esse potissima virtutum, quia super illud I ad Tim. IV, pietas ad omnia utilis est, dicit Glossa Ambrosii quod omnis summa religionis Christianae in pietate consistit. Ergo mansuetudo et clementia sunt maximae virtutes. Sed contra est, quia non ponuntur virtutes principales, sed adiunguntur alteri virtuti quasi principaliori. Respondeo dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquas virtutes non esse potissimas simpliciter nec quoad omnia, sed secundum quid et in aliquo genere. Non est autem possibile quod clementia et mansuetudo sint potissimae virtutes simpliciter. Quia laus earum attenditur in hoc quod retrahunt a malo, inquantum scilicet diminuunt iram vel poenam. Perfectius autem est consequi bonum quam carere malo. Et ideo virtutes quae simpliciter ordinant in bonum, sicut fides, spes, caritas, et etiam prudentia et iustitia, sunt simpliciter maiores virtutes quam clementia et mansuetudo. Sed secundum quid, nihil prohibet mansuetudinem et clementiam habere quandam excellentiam inter virtutes quae resistunt affectionibus pravis. Nam ira, quam mitigat mansuetudo, propter suum impetum maxime impedit animum hominis ne libere iudicet veritatem. Et propter hoc, mansuetudo maxime facit hominem esse compotem sui, unde dicitur Eccli. X, fili, in mansuetudine serva animam tuam. Quamvis concupiscentiae delectationum tactus sint turpiores, et magis continue infestent, propter quod temperantia magis ponitur virtus principalis, ut ex dictis patet. Clementia vero, in hoc quod diminuit poenas, maxime videtur accedere ad caritatem, quae est potissima virtutum, per quam bona operamur ad proximos et eorum mala impedimus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod mansuetudo praeparat hominem ad Dei cognitionem removendo impedimentum. Et hoc dupliciter. Primo quidem faciendo hominem compotem sui per diminutionem irae, ut dictum est. Alio modo, quia ad mansuetudinem pertinet quod homo non contradicat verbis veritatis, quod plerumque aliqui faciunt ex commotione irae. Et ideo Augustinus dicit, in II de Doct. Christ., quod mitescere est non contradicere divinae Scripturae, sive intellectae, si aliqua vitia nostra percutit; sive non intellectae, quasi nos melius et verius sapere et praecipere possemus. Ad secundum dicendum quod mansuetudo et clementia reddunt hominem Deo et hominibus acceptum,

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fore it is written (Sir 3:19): My son, do thy works in meekness, and thou shalt be beloved above the glory of men: for which reason it is also declared (Prov 20:28) that the King’s throne is strengthened by clemency. Therefore meekness and clemency are the greatest of virtues. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 2) that the meek are they who yield to reproaches, and resist not evil, but overcome evil by good. Now this seems to pertain to mercy or piety which would seem to be the greatest of virtues: because a gloss of Ambrose on 1 Tim. 4:8, Piety is profitable to all things, observes that piety is the sum total of the Christian religion. Therefore meekness and clemency are the greatest virtues. On the contrary, They are not reckoned as principal virtues, but are annexed to another, as to a principal, virtue. I answer that, Nothing prevents certain virtues from being greatest, not indeed simply, nor in every respect, but in a particular genus. It is impossible for clemency or meekness to be absolutely the greatest virtues, since they owe their praise to the fact that they withdraw a man from evil, by mitigating anger or punishment. Now it is more perfect to obtain good than to lack evil. Wherefore those virtues like faith, hope, charity, and likewise prudence and justice, which direct one to good simply, are absolutely greater virtues than clemency and meekness. Yet nothing prevents clemency and meekness from having a certain restricted excellence among the virtues which resist evil inclinations. For anger, which is mitigated by meekness, is, on account of its impetuousness, a very great obstacle to man’s free judgment of truth: wherefore meekness above all makes a man self-possessed. Hence it is written (Sir 10:31): My son, keep thy soul in meekness. Yet the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch are more shameful, and harass more incessantly, for which reason temperance is more rightly reckoned as a principal virtue. as stated above (Q. 141, A. 7, ad 2). As to clemency, inasmuch as it mitigates punishment, it would seem to approach nearest to charity, the greatest of the virtues, since thereby we do good towards our neighbor, and hinder his evil. Reply Obj. 1: Meekness disposes man to the knowledge of God, by removing an obstacle; and this in two ways. First, because it makes man self-possessed by mitigating his anger, as stated above; second, because it pertains to meekness that a man does not contradict the words of truth, which many do through being disturbed by anger. Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7): To be meek is not to contradict Holy Writ, whether we understand it, if it condemn our evil ways, or understand it not, as though we might know better and have a clearer insight of the truth. Reply Obj. 2: Meekness and clemency make us acceptable to God and men, insofar as they concur with charity,

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secundum quod concurrunt in eundem effectum cum caritate, quae est maxima virtutum, scilicet in subtrahendo mala proximorum. Ad tertium dicendum quod misericordia et pietas conveniunt quidem cum mansuetudine et clementia, inquantum concurrunt in eundem effectum, qui est prohibere mala proximorum. Differunt tamen quantum ad motivum. Nam pietas removet mala proximorum ex reverentia quam habet ad aliquem superiorem, puta Deum vel parentem. Misericordia vero removet mala proximorum ex hoc quod in eis aliquis contristatur inquantum aestimat eas ad se pertinere, ut supra dictum est, quod provenit ex amicitia, quae facit amicos de eisdem gaudere et tristari. Mansuetudo vero hoc facit inquantum removet iram incitantem ad vindictam. Clementia vero hoc facit ex animi lenitate, inquantum iudicat esse aequum ut aliquis non amplius puniatur.

Q. 157, A. 4

the greatest of the virtues, towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our neighbor’s evils. Reply Obj. 3: Mercy and piety agree indeed with meekness and clemency by concurring towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our neighbor’s evils. Nevertheless they differ as to motive. For piety relieves a neighbor’s evil through reverence for a superior, for instance God or one’s parents: mercy relieves a neighbor’s evil, because this evil is displeasing to one, insofar as one looks upon it as affecting oneself, as stated above (Q. 30, A. 2): and this results from friendship which makes friends rejoice and grieve for the same things: meekness does this, by removing anger that urges to vengeance, and clemency does this through leniency of soul, insofar as it judges equitable that a person be no further punished.

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Question 158 Anger Deinde considerandum est de vitiis oppositis. Et priWe must next consider the contrary vices: (1) Anger mo, de iracundia, quae opponitur mansuetudini; secun- that is opposed to meekness; (2) Cruelty that is opposed do, de crudelitate, quae opponitur clementiae. Circa ira- to clemency. Concerning anger there are eight points of incundiam quaeruntur octo. quiry: Primo, utrum irasci possit aliquando esse licitum. (1) Whether it is lawful to be angry? Secundo, utrum ira sit peccatum. (2) Whether anger is a sin? Tertio, utrum sit peccatum mortale. (3) Whether it is a mortal sin? Quarto, utrum sit gravissimum peccatorum. (4) Whether it is the most grievous of sins? Quinto, de speciebus irae. (5) Of its species; Sexto, utrum ira sit vitium capitale. (6) Whether anger is a capital vice? Septimo, quae sint filiae eius. (7) Of its daughters; Octavo, utrum habeat vitium oppositum. (8) Whether it has a contrary vice?

Article 1 Whether it is lawful to be angry? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod irasci non possit esse licitum. Hieronymus enim, exponens illud Matth. V, qui irascitur fratri suo etc., dicit, in quibusdam codicibus additur, sine causa, ceterum in veris definita sententia est, et ira penitus tollitur. Ergo irasci nullo modo est licitum. Praeterea, secundum Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom., malum animae est sine ratione esse. Sed ira semper est sine ratione. Dicit enim philosophus, in VII Ethic., quod ira non perfecte audit rationem. Et Gregorius dicit, V Moral., quod cum tranquillitatem mentis ira diverberat, dilaniatam quodammodo scissamque perturbat. Et Cassianus dicit, in libro de institutis coenobiorum, qualibet ex causa iracundiae motus effervens, excaecat oculum cordis. Ergo irasci semper est malum. Praeterea, ira est appetitus vindictae, ut dicit Glossa super Levit. XIX, non oderis fratrem tuum in corde tuo. Sed appetere ultionem non videtur esse licitum, sed hoc Deo est reservandum, secundum illud Deut. XXXII, mea est ultio. Ergo videtur quod irasci semper sit malum. Praeterea, omne illud quod abducit nos a divina similitudine, est malum. Sed irasci semper abducit nos a divina similitudine, quia Deus cum tranquillitate iudicat, ut habetur Sap. XII. Ergo irasci semper est malum. Sed contra est quod Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., qui sine causa irascitur, reus erit, qui vero cum causa, non erit reus. Nam si ira non fuerit, nec doctrina

Objection 1: It would seem that it cannot be lawful to be angry. For Jerome in his exposition on Matt. 5:22, Whosoever is angry with his brother, etc. says: Some codices add ‘without cause.’ However, in the genuine codices the sentence is unqualified, and anger is forbidden altogether. Therefore it is nowise lawful to be angry. Obj. 2: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), The soul’s evil is to be without reason. Now anger is always without reason: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that anger does not listen perfectly to reason; and Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that when anger sunders the tranquil surface of the soul, it mangles and rends it by its riot; and Cassian says (De Inst. Coenob. viii, 6): From whatever cause it arises, the angry passion boils over and blinds the eye of the mind. Therefore it is always evil to be angry. Obj. 3: Further, anger is desire for vengeance according to a gloss on Lev. 19:17, Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart. Now it would seem unlawful to desire vengeance, since this should be left to God, according to Deut. 32:35, Revenge is Mine. Therefore it would seem that to be angry is always an evil. Obj. 4: Further, all that makes us depart from likeness to God is evil. Now anger always makes us depart from likeness to God, since God judges with tranquillity according to Wis. 12:18. Therefore to be angry is always an evil. On the contrary, Chrysostom says: He that is angry without cause, shall be in danger; but he that is angry with cause, shall not be in danger: for without anger, teaching will

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proficit, nec iudicia stant, nec crimina compescuntur. Ergo irasci non semper est malum. Respondeo dicendum quod ira, proprie loquendo, est passio quaedam appetitus sensitivi, a qua vis irascibilis denominatur, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Est autem hoc considerandum circa passiones animae, quod dupliciter in eis potest malum inveniri. Uno modo, ex ipsa specie passionis. Quae quidem consideratur secundum obiectum passionis. Sicut invidia secundum suam speciem importat quoddam malum, est enim tristitia de bono aliorum, quod secundum se rationi repugnat. Et ideo invidia, mox nominata, sonat aliquid mali, ut philosophus dicit, in II Ethic. Hoc autem non convenit irae, quae est appetitus vindictae, potest enim vindicta et bene et male appeti. Alio modo invenitur malum in aliqua passione secundum quantitatem ipsius, idest secundum superabundantiam vel defectum ipsius. Et sic potest malum in ira inveniri, quando scilicet aliquis irascitur plus vel minus, praeter rationem rectam. Si autem aliquis irascatur secundum rationem rectam, tunc irasci est laudabile. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Stoici iram et omnes alias passiones nominabant affectus quosdam praeter ordinem rationis existentes, et secundum hoc, ponebant iram et omnes alias passiones esse malas, ut supra dictum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Et secundum hoc accipit iram Hieronymus, loquitur enim de ira qua quis irascitur contra proximum quasi malum eius intendens. Sed secundum Peripateticos, quorum sententiam magis approbat Augustinus, in IX de Civ. Dei, ira et aliae passiones animae dicuntur motus appetitus sensitivi, sive sint moderatae secundum rationem sive non. Et secundum hoc, ira non semper est mala. Ad secundum dicendum quod ira dupliciter se potest habere ad rationem. Uno quidem modo, antecedenter. Et sic trahit rationem a sua rectitudine, unde habet rationem mali. Alio modo, consequenter prout scilicet appetitus sensitivus movetur contra vitia secundum ordinem rationis. Et haec ira est bona, quae dicitur ira per zelum. Unde Gregorius dicit, in V Moral., curandum summopere est ne ira, quae ut instrumentum virtutis assumitur, menti dominetur, ne quasi domina praeeat, sed velut ancilla ad obsequium parata, a rationis tergo nunquam recedat. Haec autem ira, etsi in ipsa executione actus iudicium rationis aliqualiter impediat, non tamen rectitudinem rationis tollit. Unde Gregorius, ibidem, dicit quod ira per zelum turbat rationis oculum, sed ira per vitium excaecat. Non autem est contra rationem virtutis ut intermittatur deliberatio rationis in executione eius quod est a ratione deliberatum. Quia etiam ars impediretur in suo actu si, dum debet agere, deliberaret de agendis. Ad tertium dicendum quod appetere vindictam propter malum eius qui puniendus est, illicitum est. Sed

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be useless, judgments unstable, crimes unchecked. Therefore to be angry is not always an evil. I answer that, Properly speaking anger is a passion of the sensitive appetite, and gives its name to the irascible power, as stated above (I-II, Q. 46, A. 1) when we were treating of the passions. Now with regard to the passions of the soul, it is to be observed that evil may be found in them in two ways. First by reason of the passion’s very species, which is derived from the passion’s object. Thus envy, in respect of its species, denotes an evil, since it is displeasure at another’s good, and such displeasure is in itself contrary to reason: wherefore, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 6), the very mention of envy denotes something evil. Now this does not apply to anger, which is the desire for revenge, since revenge may be desired both well and ill. Second, evil is found in a passion in respect of the passion’s quantity, that is in respect of its excess or deficiency; and thus evil may be found in anger, when, to wit, one is angry, more or less than right reason demands. But if one is angry in accordance with right reason, one’s anger is deserving of praise. Reply Obj. 1: The Stoics designated anger and all the other passions as emotions opposed to the order of reason; and accordingly they deemed anger and all other passions to be evil, as stated above (I-II, Q. 24, A. 2) when we were treating of the passions. It is in this sense that Jerome considers anger; for he speaks of the anger whereby one is angry with one’s neighbor, with the intent of doing him a wrong. But, according to the Peripatetics, to whose opinion Augustine inclines (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), anger and the other passions of the soul are movements of the sensitive appetite, whether they be moderated or not, according to reason: and in this sense anger is not always evil. Reply Obj. 2: Anger may stand in a twofold relation to reason. First, antecedently; in this way it withdraws reason from its rectitude, and has therefore the character of evil. Second, consequently, inasmuch as the movement of the sensitive appetite is directed against vice and in accordance with reason, this anger is good, and is called zealous anger. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): We must beware lest, when we use anger as an instrument of virtue, it overrule the mind, and go before it as its mistress, instead of following in reason’s train, ever ready, as its handmaid, to obey. This latter anger, although it hinder somewhat the judgment of reason in the execution of the act, does not destroy the rectitude of reason. Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that zealous anger troubles the eye of reason, whereas sinful anger blinds it. Nor is it incompatible with virtue that the deliberation of reason be interrupted in the execution of what reason has deliberated: since art also would be hindered in its act, if it were to deliberate about what has to be done, while having to act. Reply Obj. 3: It is unlawful to desire vengeance considered as evil to the man who is to be punished, but it is

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appetere vindictam propter vitiorum correctionem et bonum iustitiae conservandum, laudabile est. Et in hoc potest tendere appetitus sensitivus inquantum movetur a ratione. Et dum vindicta secundum ordinem iudicii fit, a Deo fit, cuius minister est potestas puniens, ut dicitur Rom. XIII. Ad quartum dicendum quod Deo assimilari possumus et debemus in appetitu boni, sed in modo appetendi ei omnino assimilari non possumus; quia in Deo non est appetitus sensitivus, sicut in nobis, cuius motus debet rationi deservire. Unde Gregorius dicit, in V Moral., quod tunc robustius ratio contra vitia erigitur, cum ira subdita rationi famulatur.

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praiseworthy to desire vengeance as a corrective of vice and for the good of justice; and to this the sensitive appetite can tend, insofar as it is moved thereto by the reason: and when revenge is taken in accordance with the order of judgment, it is God’s work, since he who has power to punish is God’s minister, as stated in Rom. 13:4. Reply Obj. 4: We can and ought to be like to God in the desire for good; but we cannot be altogether likened to Him in the mode of our desire, since in God there is no sensitive appetite, as in us, the movement of which has to obey reason. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that anger is more firmly erect in withstanding vice, when it bows to the command of reason.

Article 2 Whether anger is a sin? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non sit peccatum. Peccando enim demeremur. Sed passionibus non demeremur, sicut neque vituperamur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo nulla passio est peccatum. Ira autem est passio, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Ergo ira non est peccatum. Praeterea, in omni peccato est conversio ad aliquod commutabile bonum. Sed per iram non convertitur aliquis ad aliquod bonum commutabile, sed in malum alicuius. Ergo ira non est peccatum. Praeterea, nullus peccat in eo quod vitare non potest, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed iram homo vitare non potest, quia super illud Psalmi, irascimini et nolite peccare, dicit Glossa quod motus irae non est in potestate nostra. Philosophus etiam dicit, in VII Ethic., quod iratus cum tristitia operatur, tristitia autem est contraria voluntati. Ergo ira non est peccatum. Praeterea, peccatum est contra naturam, ut Damascenus dicit, in II libro. Sed irasci non est contra naturam hominis, cum sit actus naturalis potentiae quae est irascibilis. Unde et Hieronymus dicit, in quadam epistola, quod irasci est hominis. Ergo ira non est peccatum. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. IV, omnis indignatio et ira tollatur a vobis. Respondeo dicendum quod ira, sicut dictum est, proprie nominat quandam passionem. Passio autem appetitus sensitivi intantum est bona inquantum ratione regulatur, si autem ordinem rationis excludat, est mala. Ordo autem rationis in ira potest attendi quantum ad duo. Primo quidem, quantum ad appetibile in quod tendit, quod est vindicta. Unde si aliquis appetat quod secundum ordinem rationis fiat vindicta, est laudabilis irae appetitus, et vocatur ira per zelum. Si autem aliquis appetat quod fiat vindicta qualitercumque contra ordinem

Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a sin. For we demerit by sinning. But we do not demerit by the passions, even as neither do we incur blame thereby, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Consequently no passion is a sin. Now anger is a passion as stated above (I-II, Q. 46, A. 1) in the treatise on the passions. Therefore anger is not a sin. Obj. 2: Further, in every sin there is conversion to some mutable good. But in anger there is conversion not to a mutable good, but to a person’s evil. Therefore anger is not a sin. Obj. 3: Further, No man sins in what he cannot avoid, as Augustine asserts. But man cannot avoid anger, for a gloss on Ps. 4:5, Be ye angry and sin not, says: The movement of anger is not in our power. Again, the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. vii, 6) that the angry man acts with displeasure. Now displeasure is contrary to the will. Therefore anger is not a sin. Obj. 4: Further, sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene. But it is not contrary to man’s nature to be angry, and it is the natural act of a power, namely the irascible; wherefore Jerome says in a letter that to be angry is the property of man. Therefore it is not a sin to be angry. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph 4:31): Let all indignation and anger . . . be put away from you. I answer that, Anger, as stated above (A. 1), is properly the name of a passion. A passion of the sensitive appetite is good insofar as it is regulated by reason, whereas it is evil if it set the order of reason aside. Now the order of reason, in regard to anger, may be considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the appetible object to which anger tends, and that is revenge. Wherefore if one desire revenge to be taken in accordance with the order of reason, the desire of anger is praiseworthy, and is called zealous anger. On the other hand, if one desire the taking of

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rationis; puta si appetat puniri eum qui non meruit, vel ultra quam meruit, vel etiam non secundum legitimum ordinem, vel non propter debitum finem, qui est conservatio iustitiae et correctio culpae, erit appetitus irae vitiosus. Et nominatur ira per vitium.

Alio modo attenditur ordo rationis circa iram quantum ad modum irascendi, ut scilicet motus irae non immoderate fervescat, nec interius nec exterius. Quod quidem si praetermittatur, non erit ira absque peccato, etiam si aliquis appetat iustam vindictam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia passio potest esse regulata ratione vel non regulata, ideo secundum passionem absolute consideratam non importatur ratio meriti vel demeriti, seu laudis vel vituperii. Secundum tamen quod est regulata ratione, potest habere rationem meritorii et laudabilis, et e contrario, secundum quod non est regulata ratione, potest habere rationem demeriti et vituperabilis. Unde et philosophus ibidem dicit quod laudatur vel vituperatur qui aliqualiter irascitur. Ad secundum dicendum quod iratus non appetit malum alterius propter se, sed propter vindictam, in quam convertitur appetitus eius sicut in quoddam commutabile bonum. Ad tertium dicendum quod homo est dominus suorum actuum per arbitrium rationis. Et ideo motus qui praeveniunt iudicium rationis, non sunt in potestate hominis in generali, ut scilicet nullus eorum insurgat, quamvis ratio possit quemlibet singulariter impedire ne insurgat. Et secundum hoc dicitur quod motus irae non est in potestate hominis, ita scilicet quod nullus insurgat. Quia tamen aliqualiter est in hominis potestate, non totaliter perdit rationem peccati, si sit inordinatus. Quod autem philosophus dicit, iratum cum tristitia operari, non est sic intelligendum quasi tristetur de eo quod irascitur, sed quia tristatur de iniuria quam aestimat sibi illatam, et ex hac tristitia movetur ad appetendum vindictam. Ad quartum dicendum quod irascibilis in homine naturaliter subiicitur rationi. Et ideo actus eius intantum est homini naturalis inquantum est secundum rationem, inquantum vero est praeter ordinem rationis, est contra hominis naturam.

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vengeance in any way whatever contrary to the order of reason, for instance if he desire the punishment of one who has not deserved it, or beyond his deserts, or again contrary to the order prescribed by law, or not for the due end, namely the maintaining of justice and the correction of defaults, then the desire of anger will be sinful, and this is called sinful anger. Second, the order of reason in regard to anger may be considered in relation to the mode of being angry, namely that the movement of anger should not be immoderately fierce, neither internally nor externally; and if this condition be disregarded, anger will not lack sin, even though just vengeance be desired. Reply Obj. 1: Since passion may be either regulated or not regulated by reason, it follows that a passion considered absolutely does not include the notion of merit or demerit, of praise or blame. But as regulated by reason, it may be something meritorious and deserving of praise; while on the other hand, as not regulated by reason, it may be demeritorious and blameworthy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that it is he who is angry in a certain way, that is praised or blamed. Reply Obj. 2: The angry man desires the evil of another, not for its own sake but for the sake of revenge, towards which his appetite turns as to a mutable good. Reply Obj. 3: Man is master of his actions through the judgment of his reason, wherefore as to the movements that forestall that judgment, it is not in man’s power to prevent them as a whole, i.e., so that none of them arise, although his reason is able to check each one, if it arise. Accordingly it is stated that the movement of anger is not in man’s power, to the extent namely that no such movement arise. Yet since this movement is somewhat in his power, it is not entirely sinless if it be inordinate. The statement of the Philosopher that the angry man acts with displeasure, means that he is displeased, not with his being angry, but with the injury which he deems done to himself: and through this displeasure he is moved to seek vengeance. Reply Obj. 4: The irascible power in man is naturally subject to his reason, wherefore its act is natural to man, insofar as it is in accord with reason, and insofar as it is against reason, it is contrary to man’s nature.

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Q. 158, A. 3

Article 3 Whether all anger is a mortal sin? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis ira sit peccatum mortale. Dicitur enim Iob V, virum stultum interficit iracundia, et loquitur de interfectione spirituali, a qua peccatum mortale denominatur. Ergo ira est peccatum mortale. Praeterea, nihil meretur damnationem aeternam nisi peccatum mortale. Sed ira meretur damnationem aeternam, dicit enim dominus, Matth. V, omnis qui irascitur fratri suo, reus erit iudicio; ubi dicit Glossa quod per illa tria, quae ibi tanguntur, scilicet, iudicium, Concilium et Gehennam, diversae mansiones in aeterna damnatione, pro modo peccati, singulariter exprimuntur. Ergo ira est peccatum mortale.

Objection 1: It would seem that all anger is a mortal sin. For it is written (Job 5:2): Anger killeth the foolish man, and he speaks of the spiritual killing, whence mortal sin takes its name. Therefore all anger is a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing save mortal sin is deserving of eternal condemnation. Now anger deserves eternal condemnation; for our Lord said (Matt 5:22): Whosoever is angry with his brother shall be in danger of the judgment: and a gloss on this passage says that the three things mentioned there, namely judgment, council, and hell-fire, signify in a pointed manner different abodes in the state of eternal damnation corresponding to various sins. Therefore anger is a mortal sin. Praeterea, quidquid contrariatur caritati est pecObj. 3: Further, whatsoever is contrary to charity is a catum mortale. Sed ira de se contrariatur caritati, ut pa- mortal sin. Now anger is of itself contrary to charity, as tet per Hieronymum, super illud Matth. V, qui irascitur Jerome declares in his commentary on Matt. 5:22, Whosofratri suo etc., ubi dicit quod hoc est contra proximi di- ever is angry with his brother, etc. where he says that this is lectionem. Ergo ira est peccatum mortale. contrary to the love of your neighbor. Therefore anger is a mortal sin. Sed contra est quod super illud Psalmi, irascimiOn the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 4:5, Be ye angry and ni et nolite peccare, dicit Glossa, venialis est ira quae non sin not, says: Anger is venial if it does not proceed to action.

perducitur ad effectum. Respondeo dicendum quod motus irae potest esse inordinatus et peccatum dupliciter, sicut dictum est. Uno modo, ex parte appetibilis, utpote cum aliquis appetit iniustam vindictam. Et sic ex genere suo ira est peccatum mortale, quia contrariatur caritati et iustitiae. Potest tamen contingere quod talis appetitus sit peccatum veniale propter imperfectionem actus. Quae quidem imperfectio attenditur vel ex parte appetentis, puta cum motus irae praevenit iudicium rationis, vel etiam ex parte appetibilis, puta cum aliquis appetit in aliquo modico se vindicare, quod quasi nihil est reputandum, ita quod etiam si actu inferatur, non esset peccatum mortale; puta si aliquis parum trahat aliquem puerum per capillos, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Alio modo potest esse motus irae inordinatus quantum ad modum irascendi, utpote si nimis ardenter irascatur interius, vel si nimis exterius manifestet signa irae. Et sic ira secundum se non habet ex suo genere rationem peccati mortalis. Potest tamen contingere quod sit peccatum mortale, puta si ex vehementia irae aliquis excidat a dilectione Dei et proximi.

I answer that, The movement of anger may be inordinate and sinful in two ways, as stated above (A. 2). First, on the part of the appetible object, as when one desires unjust revenge; and thus anger is a mortal sin in the point of its genus, because it is contrary to charity and justice. Nevertheless such like anger may happen to be a venial sin by reason of the imperfection of the act. This imperfection is considered either in relation to the subject desirous of vengeance, as when the movement of anger forestalls the judgment of his reason; or in relation to the desired object, as when one desires to be avenged in a trifling matter, which should be deemed of no account, so that even if one proceeded to action, it would not be a mortal sin, for instance by pulling a child slightly by the hair, or by some other like action. Second, the movement of anger may be inordinate in the mode of being angry, for instance, if one be too fiercely angry inwardly, or if one exceed in the outward signs of anger. In this way anger is not a mortal sin in the point of its genus; yet it may happen to be a mortal sin, for instance if through the fierceness of his anger a man fall away from the love of God and his neighbor. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex illa auctoritate Reply Obj. 1: It does not follow from the passage non habetur quod omnis ira sit peccatum mortale, sed quoted that all anger is a mortal sin, but that the foolish are quod stulti per iracundiam spiritualiter occiduntur, in- killed spiritually by anger, because, through not checking quantum scilicet, non refrenando per rationem motum the movement of anger by their reason, they fall into mortal irae, dilabuntur in aliqua peccata mortalia, puta in blas- sins, for instance by blaspheming God or by doing injury to phemiam Dei vel in iniuriam proximi. their neighbor.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod dominus verbum illud dixit de ira, quasi superaddens ad illud verbum legis, qui occiderit, reus erit iudicio. Unde loquitur ibi dominus de motu irae quo quis appetit proximi occisionem, aut quamcumque gravem laesionem, cui appetitui si consensus rationis superveniat, absque dubio erit peccatum mortale. Ad tertium dicendum quod in illo casu in quo ira contrariatur caritati, est peccatum mortale, sed hoc non semper accidit, ut ex dictis patet.

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Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord said this of anger, by way of addition to the words of the Law: Whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgment (Matt 5:21). Consequently our Lord is speaking here of the movement of anger wherein a man desires the killing or any grave injury of his neighbor: and should the consent of reason be given to this desire, without doubt it will be a mortal sin. Reply Obj. 3: In the case where anger is contrary to charity, it is a mortal sin, but it is not always so, as appears from what we have said.

Article 4 Whether anger is the most grievous sin? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira sit gravissimum peccatum. Dicit enim Chrysostomus quod nihil est turpius visu furentis, et nihil deformius severo visu, et multo magis, anima. Ergo ira est gravissimum peccatum. Praeterea, quanto aliquod peccatum est magis nocivum, tanto videtur esse peius, quia sicut Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., malum dicitur aliquid quod nocet. Ira autem maxime nocet, quia aufert homini rationem, per quam est dominus sui ipsius; dicit enim Chrysostomus quod irae et insaniae nihil est medium, sed ira temporaneus est quidam Daemon, magis autem et Daemonium habente difficilius. Ergo ira est gravissimum peccatum. Praeterea, interiores motus diiudicantur secundum exteriores effectus. Sed effectus irae est homicidium, quod est gravissimum peccatum. Ergo ira est gravissimum peccatum. Sed contra est quod ira comparatur ad odium sicut festuca ad trabem, dicit enim Augustinus, in regula, ne ira crescat in odium, et trabem faciat de festuca. Non ergo ira est gravissimum peccatum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, inordinatio irae secundum duo attenditur, scilicet secundum indebitum appetibile, et secundum indebitum modum irascendi. Quantum igitur ad appetibile quod iratus appetit, videtur esse ira minimum peccatorum. Appetit enim ira malum poenae alicuius sub ratione boni quod est vindicta. Et ideo ex parte mali quod appetit, convenit peccatum irae cum illis peccatis quae appetunt malum proximi, puta cum invidia et odio, sed odium appetit absolute malum alicuius, inquantum huiusmodi; invidus autem appetit malum alterius propter appetitum propriae gloriae; sed iratus appetit malum alterius sub ratione iustae vindictae. Ex quo patet quod odium est gravius quam invidia, et invidia quam ira, quia peius est appetere malum sub ratione mali quam sub ratione boni; et

Objection 1: It would seem that anger is the most grievous sin. For Chrysostom says that nothing is more repulsive than the look of an angry man, and nothing uglier than a ruthless face, and most of all than a cruel soul. Therefore anger is the most grievous sin. Obj. 2: Further, the more hurtful a sin is, the worse it would seem to be; since, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), a thing is said to be evil because it hurts. Now anger is most hurtful, because it deprives man of his reason, whereby he is master of himself; for Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii in Joan.) that anger differs in no way from madness; it is a demon while it lasts, indeed more troublesome than one harassed by a demon. Therefore anger is the most grievous sin. Obj. 3: Further, inward movements are judged according to their outward effects. Now the effect of anger is murder, which is a most grievous sin. Therefore anger is a most grievous sin. On the contrary, Anger is compared to hatred as the mote to the beam; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): Lest anger grow into hatred and a mote become a beam. Therefore anger is not the most grievous sin. I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 2), the inordinateness of anger is considered in a twofold respect, namely with regard to an undue object, and with regard to an undue mode of being angry. As to the appetible object which it desires, anger would seem to be the least of sins, for anger desires the evil of punishment for some person, under the aspect of a good that is vengeance. Hence on the part of the evil which it desires the sin of anger agrees with those sins which desire the evil of our neighbor, such as envy and hatred; but while hatred desires absolutely another’s evil as such, and the envious man desires another’s evil through desire of his own glory, the angry man desires another’s evil under the aspect of just revenge. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is more grievous than envy, and envy than anger: since it is worse to desire evil as an evil, than as a

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peius est appetere malum sub ratione boni exterioris, quod est honor vel gloria, quam sub ratione rectitudinis iustitiae. Sed ex parte boni sub cuius ratione appetit iratus malum, convenit ira cum peccato concupiscentiae, quod tendit in aliquod bonum. Et quantum ad hoc etiam, absolute loquendo, peccatum irae videtur esse minus quam concupiscentiae, quanto melius est bonum iustitiae, quod appetit iratus, quam bonum delectabile vel utile, quod appetit concupiscens. Unde philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod incontinens concupiscentiae est turpior quam incontinens irae. Sed quantum ad inordinationem quae est secundum modum irascendi, ira habet quandam excellentiam, propter vehementiam et velocitatem sui motus, secundum illud Proverb. XXVII, ira non habet misericordiam, nec erumpens furor, et impetum concitati spiritus ferre quis poterit? Unde Gregorius dicit, in V Moral., irae suae stimulis accensum cor palpitat, corpus tremit, lingua se praepedit, facies ignescit, exasperantur oculi, et nequaquam recognoscuntur noti, ore quidem clamorem format, sed sensus quid loquitur, ignorat. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Chrysostomus loquitur de turpitudine quantum ad gestus exteriores, qui proveniunt ex impetu irae. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit secundum inordinatum motum irae, qui provenit ex eius impetu, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod homicidium non minus provenit ex odio vel invidia quam ex ira. Ira tamen levior est, inquantum attendit rationem iustitiae, ut dictum est.

Q. 158, A. 5

good; and to desire evil as an external good such as honor or glory, than under the aspect of the rectitude of justice. On the part of the good, under the aspect of which the angry man desires an evil, anger concurs with the sin of concupiscence that tends to a good. In this respect again, absolutely speaking, the sin of anger is apparently less grievous than that of concupiscence, according as the good of justice, which the angry man desires, is better than the pleasurable or useful good which is desired by the subject of concupiscence. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that the incontinent in desire is more disgraceful than the incontinent in anger. On the other hand, as to the inordinateness which regards the mode of being angry, anger would seem to have a certain pre-eminence on account of the strength and quickness of its movement, according to Prov. 27:4, Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth: and who can bear the violence of one provoked? Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): The heart goaded by the pricks of anger is convulsed, the body trembles, the tongue entangles itself, the face is inflamed, the eyes are enraged and fail utterly to recognize those whom we know: the tongue makes sounds indeed, but there is no sense in its utterance. Reply Obj. 1: Chrysostom is alluding to the repulsiveness of the outward gestures which result from the impetuousness of anger. Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the inordinate movement of anger, that results from its impetuousness, as stated above. Reply Obj. 3: Murder results from hatred and envy no less than from anger: yet anger is less grievous, inasmuch as it considers the aspect of justice, as stated above.

Article 5 Whether the Philosopher suitably assigns the species of anger? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter determinentur species iracundiae a philosopho, in IV Ethic., ubi dicit quod iracundorum quidam sunt acuti, quidam amari, quidam difficiles sive graves. Quia secundum ipsum, amari dicuntur quorum ira difficile solvitur et multo tempore manet. Sed hoc videtur pertinere ad circumstantiam temporis. Ergo videtur quod etiam secundum alias circumstantias possunt accipi aliae species irae. Praeterea, difficiles, sive graves, dicit esse quorum ira non commutatur sine cruciatu vel punitione. Sed hoc etiam pertinet ad insolubilitatem irae. Ergo videtur quod idem sint difficiles et amari.

Objection 1: It would seem that the species of anger are unsuitably assigned by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) where he says that some angry persons are choleric, some sullen, and some ill-tempered or stern. According to him, a person is said to be sullen whose anger is appeased with difficulty and endures a long time. But this apparently pertains to the circumstance of time. Therefore it seems that anger can be differentiated specifically in respect also of the other circumstances. Obj. 2: Further, he says (Ethic. iv, 5) that ill-tempered or stern persons are those whose anger is not appeased without revenge, or punishment. Now this also pertains to the unquenchableness of anger. Therefore seemingly the illtempered is the same as bitterness.

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Temperance

Praeterea, dominus, Matth. V, ponit tres gradus irae, cum dicit, qui irascitur fratri suo; et, qui dixerit fratri suo, raca; et, qui dixerit fratri suo, fatue qui quidem gradus ad praedictas species non referuntur. Ergo videtur quod praedicta divisio irae non sit conveniens.

Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit quod tres sunt irascibilitatis species, scilicet ira quae vocatur fellea; et mania, quae dicitur insania; et furor. Quae tria videntur esse eadem tribus praemissis, nam iram felleam dicit esse quae principium et motum habet, quod philosophus attribuit acutis; maniam vero dicit esse iram quae permanet et in vetustatem devenit, quod philosophus attribuit amaris; furorem autem dicit esse iram quae observat tempus in supplicium, quod philosophus attribuit difficilibus. Et eandem etiam divisionem ponit Damascenus, in II libro. Ergo praedicta philosophi distinctio est conveniens. Respondeo dicendum quod praedicta distinctio potest referri vel ad passionem irae, vel etiam ad ipsum peccatum irae. Quomodo autem referatur ad passionem irae, supra habitum est, cum de passione irae ageretur. Et sic praecipue videtur poni a Gregorio Nysseno et Damasceno. Nunc autem oportet accipere distinctionem harum specierum secundum quod pertinent ad peccatum irae, prout ponitur a philosopho. Potest enim inordinatio irae ex duobus attendi. Primo quidem, ex ipsa irae origine. Et hoc pertinet ad acutos, qui nimis cito irascuntur, et ex qualibet levi causa. Alio modo, ex ipsa irae duratione, eo scilicet quod ira nimis perseverat. Quod quidem potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo, quia causa irae, scilicet iniuria illata, nimis manet in memoria hominis, unde ex hoc homo diutinam tristitiam concipit; et ideo sunt sibi ipsis graves et amari. Alio modo contingit ex parte ipsius vindictae, quam aliquis obstinato appetitu quaerit et hoc pertinet ad difficiles sive graves, qui non dimittunt iram quousque puniant.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in speciebus praedictis non principaliter consideratur tempus, sed facilitas hominis ad iram, vel firmitas in ira. Ad secundum dicendum quod utrique, scilicet amari et difficiles, habent iram diuturnam, sed propter aliam causam. Nam amari habent iram permanentem propter permanentiam tristitiae, quam interius tenent clausam, et quia non prorumpunt ad exteriora iracundiae signa, non possunt persuaderi ab aliis; nec ex seipsis recedunt ab ira, nisi prout diuturnitate temporis tristitia aboletur, et sic deficit ira. Sed in difficilibus est ira diutur-

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Obj. 3: Further, our Lord mentions three degrees of anger, when He says (Matt 5:22): Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council, and whosoever shall say to his brother, Thou fool. But these degrees are not referable to the aforesaid species. Therefore it seems that the above division of anger is not fitting. On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa says there are three species of irascibility, namely, the anger which is called wrath, and ill-will which is a disease of the mind, and rancour. Now these three seem to coincide with the three aforesaid. For wrath he describes as having beginning and movement, and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) ascribes this to choleric persons: ill-will he describes as an anger that endures and grows old, and this the Philosopher ascribes to sullenness; while he describes rancour as reckoning the time for vengeance, which tallies with the Philosopher’s description of the ill-tempered. The same division is given by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16). Therefore the aforesaid division assigned by the Philosopher is not unfitting. I answer that, The aforesaid distinction may be referred either to the passion, or to the sin itself of anger. We have already stated when treating of the passions (I-II, Q. 46, A. 8) how it is to be applied to the passion of anger. And it would seem that this is chiefly what Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene had in view. Here, however, we have to take the distinction of these species in its application to the sin of anger, and as set down by the Philosopher. For the inordinateness of anger may be considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the origin of anger, and this regards choleric persons, who are angry too quickly and for any slight cause. Second, in relation to the duration of anger, for that anger endures too long; and this may happen in two ways. In one way, because the cause of anger, to wit, the inflicted injury, remains too long in a man’s memory, the result being that it gives rise to a lasting displeasure, wherefore he is grievous and sullen to himself. In another way, it happens on the part of vengeance, which a man seeks with a stubborn desire: this applies to illtempered or stern people, who do not put aside their anger until they have inflicted punishment. Reply Obj. 1: It is not time, but a man’s propensity to anger, or his pertinacity in anger, that is the chief point of consideration in the aforesaid species. Reply Obj. 2: Both sullen and ill-tempered people have a long-lasting anger, but for different reasons. For a sullen person has an abiding anger on account of an abiding displeasure, which he holds locked in his breast; and as he does not break forth into the outward signs of anger, others cannot reason him out of it, nor does he of his own accord lay aside his anger, except his displeasure wear away with time and thus his anger cease. On the other hand, the anger of

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na propter vehemens desiderium vindictae. Et ideo tem- ill-tempered persons is long-lasting on account of their inpore non digeritur, sed per solam punitionem quiescit. tense desire for revenge, so that it does not wear out with time, and can be quelled only by revenge. Ad tertium dicendum quod gradus irae quos doReply Obj. 3: The degrees of anger mentioned by our minus ponit, non pertinent ad diversas irae species, sed Lord do not refer to the different species of anger, but coraccipiuntur secundum processum humani actus. In qui- respond to the course of the human act. For the first degree bus primo aliquid in corde concipitur. Et quantum ad is an inward conception, and in reference to this He says: hoc dicit, qui irascitur fratri suo. Secundum autem est Whosoever is angry with his brother. The second degree is cum per aliqua signa exteriora manifestatur exterius, when the anger is manifested by outward signs, even beetiam antequam prorumpat in effectum. Et quantum ad fore it breaks out into effect; and in reference to this He says: hoc dicit, qui dixerit fratri suo, raca, quod est interiectio Whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca! which is an angry irascentis. Tertius gradus est quando peccatum interius exclamation. The third degree is when the sin conceived inconceptum ad effectum perducitur. Est autem effectus wardly breaks out into effect. Now the effect of anger is anirae nocumentum alterius sub ratione vindictae. Mini- other’s hurt under the aspect of revenge; and the least of mum autem nocumentorum est quod fit solo verbo. Et hurts is that which is done by a mere word; wherefore in ideo quantum ad hoc dicit, qui dixerit fratri suo, fatue. Et reference to this He says: Whosoever shall say to his brother sic patet quod secundum addit supra primum, et tertium Thou fool! Consequently it is clear that the second adds to supra utrumque. Unde si primum est peccatum mortale, the first, and the third to both the others; so that, if the first in casu in quo dominus loquitur, sicut dictum est, mul- is a mortal sin, in the case referred to by our Lord, as stated to magis alia. Et ideo singulis eorum ponuntur corre- above (A. 3, ad 2), much more so are the others. Wherespondentia aliqua pertinentia ad condemnationem. Sed fore some kind of condemnation is assigned as correspondin primo ponitur iudicium, quod minus est, quia, ut Au- ing to each one of them. In the first case judgment is asgustinus dicit, in iudicio adhuc defensionis locus datur. signed, and this is the least severe, for as Augustine says, In secundo vero ponit Concilium, in quo iudices inter se where judgment is to be delivered, there is an opportunity for conferunt quo supplicio damnari oporteat. In tertio po- defense: in the second case council is assigned, whereby the nit Gehennam ignis, quae est certa damnatio. judges deliberate together on the punishment to be inflicted: to the third case is assigned hell-fire, i.e., decisive condemnation.

Article 6 Whether anger should be reckoned among the capital vices? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non debeat poni inter vitia capitalia. Ira enim ex tristitia nascitur. Sed tristitia est vitium capitale, quod dicitur acedia. Ergo ira non debet poni vitium capitale. Praeterea, odium est gravius peccatum quam ira. Ergo magis debet poni vitium capitale quam ira. Praeterea, super illud Proverb. XXIX, vir iracundus provocat rixas, dicit Glossa, ianua est omnium vitiorum iracundia, qua clausa, virtutibus intrinsecus dabitur quies; aperta, ad omne facinus armabitur animus. Nullum autem vitium capitale est principium omnium peccatorum, sed quorundam determinate. Ergo ira non debet poni inter vitia capitalia. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., ponit iram inter vitia capitalia. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex praemissis patet, vitium capitale dicitur ex quo multa vitia oriuntur. Habet autem hoc ira, quod ex ea multa vitia oriri possint, duplici ratione. Primo, ex parte sui obiecti, quod multum habet de ratione appetibilitatis, inquantum sci-

Objection 1: It would seem that anger should not be reckoned among the capital sins. For anger is born of sorrow which is a capital vice known by the name of sloth. Therefore anger should not be reckoned a capital vice. Obj. 2: Further, hatred is a graver sin than anger. Therefore it should be reckoned a capital vice rather than anger. Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Prov. 29:22, An angry man provoketh quarrels, says: Anger is the door to all vices: if it be closed, peace is ensured within to all the virtues; if it be opened, the soul is armed for every crime. Now no capital vice is the origin of all sins, but only of certain definite ones. Therefore anger should not be reckoned among the capital vices. On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places anger among the capital vices. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 3, 4), a capital vice is defined as one from which many vices arise. Now there are two reasons for which many vices can arise from anger. The first is on the part of its object which has much of the aspect of desirability, insofar as revenge is de-

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licet vindicta appetitur sub ratione iusti et honesti, quod sua dignitate allicit, ut supra habitum est. Alio modo, ex suo impetu, quo mentem praecipitat ad inordinata quaecumque agenda. Unde manifestum est quod ira est vitium capitale. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa tristitia ex qua oritur ira, ut plurimum, non est acediae vitium, sed passio tristitiae, quae consequitur ex iniuria illata. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, ad rationem vitii capitalis pertinet quod habeat finem multum appetibilem, ut sic propter appetitum eius multa peccata committantur. Ira autem, quae appetit malum sub ratione boni, habet finem magis appetibilem quam odium, quod appetit malum sub ratione mali. Et ideo magis est vitium capitale ira quam odium.

sired under the aspect of just or honest, which is attractive by its excellence, as stated above (A. 4). The second is on the part of its impetuosity, whereby it precipitates the mind into all kinds of inordinate action. Therefore it is evident that anger is a capital vice. Reply Obj. 1: The sorrow whence anger arises is not, for the most part, the vice of sloth, but the passion of sorrow, which results from an injury inflicted. Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 118, A. 7; Q. 148, A. 5; Q. 153, A. 4; I-II, Q. 84, A. 4), it belongs to the notion of a capital vice to have a most desirable end, so that many sins are committed through the desire thereof. Now anger, which desires evil under the aspect of good, has a more desirable end than hatred has, since the latter desires evil under the aspect of evil: wherefore anger is more a capital vice than hatred is. Ad tertium dicendum quod ira dicitur esse ianReply Obj. 3: Anger is stated to be the door to the vices ua vitiorum per accidens, scilicet removendo prohibens, accidentally, that is by removing obstacles, to wit by hinidest impediendo iudicium rationis, per quod homo re- dering the judgment of reason, whereby man is withdrawn trahitur a malis. Directe autem et per se est causa aliquo- from evil. It is, however, directly the cause of certain special rum specialium peccatorum, quae dicuntur filiae eius. sins, which are called its daughters.

Article 7 Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to anger? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter assignentur sex filiae irae, quae sunt rixa, tumor mentis, contumelia, clamor, indignatio, blasphemia. Blasphemia enim ponitur ab Isidoro filia superbiae. Non ergo debet poni filia irae. Praeterea, odium nascitur ex ira, ut Augustinus dicit, in regula. Ergo deberet numerari inter filias irae. Praeterea, tumor mentis videtur idem esse quod superbia. Superbia autem non est filia alicuius vitii, sed mater omnium vitiorum, ut Gregorius dicit, XXXI Moral. Ergo tumor mentis non debet numerari inter filias irae. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., assignat has filias irae. Respondeo dicendum quod ira potest tripliciter considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod est in corde. Et sic ex ira nascuntur duo vitia. Unum quidem ex parte eius contra quem homo irascitur, quem reputat indignum ut sibi tale quid fecerit. Et sic ponitur indignatio. Aliud autem vitium est ex parte sui ipsius, inquantum scilicet excogitat diversas vias vindictae, et talibus cogitationibus animum suum replet, secundum illud Iob XV, nunquid sapiens implebit ardore stomachum suum. Et sic ponitur tumor mentis.

Objection 1: It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly assigned to anger, namely quarreling, swelling of the mind, contumely, clamor, indignation and blasphemy. For blasphemy is reckoned by Isidore to be a daughter of pride. Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of anger. Obj. 2: Further, hatred is born of anger, as Augustine says in his rule (Ep. ccxi). Therefore it should be placed among the daughters of anger. Obj. 3: Further, a swollen mind would seem to be the same as pride. Now pride is not the daughter of a vice, but the mother of all vices, as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore swelling of the mind should not be reckoned among the daughters of anger. On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to anger. I answer that, Anger may be considered in three ways. First, as consisting in thought, and thus two vices arise from anger. One is on the part of the person with whom a man is angry, and whom he deems unworthy (indignum) of acting thus towards him, and this is called indignation. The other vice is on the part of the man himself, insofar as he devises various means of vengeance, and with such like thoughts fills his mind, according to Job 15:2, Will a wise man . . . fill his stomach with burning heat? And thus we have swelling of the mind.

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Alio modo consideratur ira secundum quod est in ore. Et sic ex ira duplex inordinatio procedit. Una quidem secundum hoc quod homo in modo loquendi iram suam demonstrat, sicut dictum est de eo qui dicit fratri suo, raca. Et sic ponitur clamor, per quem intelligitur inordinata et confusa locutio. Alia autem est inordinatio secundum quod aliquis prorumpit in verba iniuriosa. Quae quidem si sint contra Deum, erit blasphemia; si autem contra proximum, contumelia. Tertio modo consideratur ira secundum quod procedit usque ad factum. Et sic ex ira oriuntur rixae, per quas intelliguntur omnia nocumenta quae facto proximis inferuntur ex ira. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod blasphemia in quam aliquis prorumpit deliberata mente, procedit ex superbia hominis contra Deum se erigentis, quia, ut dicitur Eccli. X, initium superbiae hominis apostatare a Deo; idest, recedere a veneratione eius est prima superbiae pars, et ex hoc oritur blasphemia. Sed blasphemia in quam aliquis prorumpit ex commotione animi, procedit ex ira. Ad secundum dicendum quod odium, etsi aliquando nascatur ex ira, tamen habet aliquam priorem causam ex qua directius oritur, scilicet tristitiam, sicut e contrario amor nascitur ex delectatione. Ex tristitia autem illata quandoque in iram, quandoque in odium aliquis movetur. Unde convenientius fuit quod odium poneretur oriri ex acedia quam ex ira. Ad tertium dicendum quod tumor mentis non accipitur hic pro superbia, sed pro quodam conatu sive audacia hominis intentantis vindictam. Audacia autem est vitium fortitudini oppositum.

Q. 158, A. 8

Second, anger may be considered, as expressed in words: and thus a twofold disorder arises from anger. One is when a man manifests his anger in his manner of speech, as stated above (A. 5, ad 3) of the man who says to his brother, Raca: and this refers to clamor, which denotes disorderly and confused speech. The other disorder is when a man breaks out into injurious words, and if these be against God, it is blasphemy, if against one’s neighbor, it is contumely. Third, anger may be considered as proceeding to deeds; and thus anger gives rise to quarrels, by which we are to understand all manner of injuries inflicted on one’s neighbor through anger. Reply Obj. 1: The blasphemy into which a man breaks out deliberately proceeds from pride, whereby a man lifts himself up against God: since, according to Ecclus. 10:14, the beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God, i.e., to fall away from reverence for Him is the first part of pride; and this gives rise to blasphemy. But the blasphemy into which a man breaks out through a disturbance of the mind, proceeds from anger. Reply Obj. 2: Although hatred sometimes arises from anger, it has a previous cause, from which it arises more directly, namely displeasure, even as, on the other hand, love is born of pleasure. Now through displeasure, a man is moved sometimes to anger, sometimes to hatred. Wherefore it was fitting to reckon that hatred arises from sloth rather than from anger. Reply Obj. 3: Swelling of the mind is not taken here as identical with pride, but for a certain effort or daring attempt to take vengeance; and daring is a vice opposed to fortitude.

Article 8 Whether there is a vice opposed to anger, resulting from lack of anger? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliquod vitium oppositum iracundiae, proveniens ex defectu irae. Nihil enim est vitiosum per quod homo Deo similatur. Sed per hoc quod homo omnino est sine ira, similatur Deo, qui cum tranquillitate iudicat. Ergo non videtur quod sit vitiosum omnino ira carere. Praeterea, defectus eius quod ad nihil est utile, non est vitiosus. Sed motus irae ad nihil est utilis, ut probat Seneca in libro quem fecit de ira. Ergo videtur quod defectus irae non sit vitiosus. Praeterea, malum hominis, secundum Dionysium, est praeter rationem esse. Sed, subtracto omni motu irae, adhuc remanet integrum iudicium rationis. Ergo nullus defectus irae vitium causat.

Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a vice opposed to anger, resulting from lack of anger. For no vice makes us like to God. Now by being entirely without anger, a man becomes like to God, Who judges with tranquillity (Wis 12:18). Therefore seemingly it is not a vice to be altogether without anger. Obj. 2: Further, it is not a vice to lack what is altogether useless. But the movement of anger is useful for no purpose, as Seneca proves in the book he wrote on anger (De Ira i, 9, seqq.). Therefore it seems that lack of anger is not a vice. Obj. 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), man’s evil is to be without reason. Now the judgment of reason remains unimpaired, if all movement of anger be done away. Therefore no lack of anger amounts to a vice.

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Sed contra est quod Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., qui cum causa non irascitur, peccat. Patientia enim irrationabilis vitia seminat, negligentiam nutrit, et non solum malos, sed etiam bonos invitat ad malum. Respondeo dicendum quod ira dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, simplex motus voluntatis quo aliquis non ex passione, sed ex iudicio rationis poenam infligit. Et sic defectus irae absque dubio est peccatum. Et hoc modo ira accipitur in verbis Chrysostomi, qui dicit ibidem, iracundia quae cum causa est, non est iracundia, sed iudicium. Iracundia enim proprie intelligitur commotio passionis, qui autem cum causa irascitur, ira illius non est ex passione. Ideo iudicare dicitur, non irasci. Alio modo accipitur ira pro motu appetitus sensitivi, qui est cum passione et transmutatione corporali. Et hic quidem motus ex necessitate consequitur in homine ad simplicem motum voluntatis, quia naturaliter appetitus inferior sequitur motum appetitus superioris, nisi aliquid repugnet. Et ideo non potest totaliter deficere motus irae in appetitu sensitivo, nisi per subtractionem vel debilitatem voluntarii motus. Et ideo ex consequenti etiam defectus passionis irae vitiosus est, sicut et defectus voluntarii motus ad puniendum secundum iudicium rationis.

On the contrary, Chrysostom says: He who is not angry, whereas he has cause to be, sins. For unreasonable patience is the hotbed of many vices, it fosters negligence, and incites not only the wicked but even the good to do wrong. I answer that, Anger may be understood in two ways. In one way, as a simple movement of the will, whereby one inflicts punishment, not through passion, but in virtue of a judgment of the reason: and thus without doubt lack of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which anger is taken in the saying of Chrysostom, for he says (Hom. xi in Matth.): Anger, when it has a cause, is not anger but judgment. For anger, properly speaking, denotes a movement of passion: and when a man is angry with reason, his anger is no longer from passion: wherefore he is said to judge, not to be angry. In another way anger is taken for a movement of the sensitive appetite, which is with passion resulting from a bodily transmutation. This movement is a necessary sequel, in man, to the movement of his will, since the lower appetite necessarily follows the movement of the higher appetite, unless there be an obstacle. Hence the movement of anger in the sensitive appetite cannot be lacking altogether, unless the movement of the will be altogether lacking or weak. Consequently lack of the passion of anger is also a vice, even as the lack of movement in the will directed to punishment by the judgment of reason. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille qui totaliter Reply Obj. 1: He that is entirely without anger when non irascitur cum debet irasci, imitatur quidem Deum he ought to be angry, imitates God as to lack of passion, but quantum ad carentiam passionis, non autem quantum not as to God’s punishing by judgment.

ad hoc quod Deus ex iudicio punit. Ad secundum dicendum quod passio irae utilis est, sicut et omnes alii motus appetitus sensitivi, ad hoc quod homo promptius exequatur id quod ratio dictat. Alioquin, frustra esset in homine appetitus sensitivus, cum tamen natura nihil faciat frustra. Ad tertium dicendum quod in eo qui ordinate agit, iudicium rationis non solum est causa simplicis motus voluntatis, sed etiam passionis appetitus sensitivi, ut dictum est, et ideo, sicut remotio effectus est signum remotionis causae, ita etiam remotio irae est signum remotionis iudicii rationis.

Reply Obj. 2: The passion of anger, like all other movements of the sensitive appetite, is useful, as being conducive to the more prompt execution of reason’s dictate: else, the sensitive appetite in man would be to no purpose, whereas nature does nothing without purpose. Reply Obj. 3: When a man acts inordinately, the judgment of his reason is cause not only of the simple movement of the will but also of the passion in the sensitive appetite, as stated above. Wherefore just as the removal of the effect is a sign that the cause is removed, so the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason is lacking.

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Question 159 Cruelty Deinde considerandum est de crudelitate. Et circa We must now consider cruelty, under which head there hoc quaeruntur duo. are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum crudelitas opponatur clementiae. (1) Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency? Secundo, de comparatione eius ad saevitiam vel (2) Of its comparison with savagery or brutality. feritatem.

Article 1 Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod crudelitas non opponatur clementiae. Dicit enim Seneca, in II de Clement., quod illi vocantur crudeles qui excedunt modum in puniendo, quod contrariatur iustitiae. Clementia autem non ponitur pars iustitiae, sed temperantiae. Ergo crudelitas non videtur opponi clementiae. Praeterea, Ierem. VI dicitur, crudelis est, et non miserebitur, et sic videtur quod crudelitas opponatur misericordiae. Sed misericordia non est idem clementiae, ut supra dictum est. Ergo crudelitas non opponitur clementiae. Praeterea, clementia consideratur circa inflictionem poenarum, ut dictum est. Sed crudelitas consideratur etiam in subtractione beneficiorum, secundum illud Proverb. XI, qui crudelis est, propinquos abiicit. Ergo crudelitas non opponitur clementiae. Sed contra est quod dicit Seneca, in II de Clement., quod opponitur clementiae crudelitas, quae nihil aliud est quam atrocitas animi in exigendis poenis. Respondeo dicendum quod nomen crudelitatis a cruditate sumptum esse videtur. Sicut autem ea quae sunt decocta et digesta, solent habere suavem et dulcem saporem; ita illa quae sunt cruda, habent horribilem et asperum saporem. Dictum est autem supra quod clementia importat quandam animi lenitatem sive dulcedinem, per quam aliquis est diminutivus poenarum. Unde directe crudelitas clementiae opponitur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut diminutio poenarum quae est secundum rationem, pertinet ad epieikeiam, sed ipsa dulcedo affectus ex qua homo ad hoc inclinatur, pertinet ad clementiam; ita etiam superexcessus poenarum, quantum ad id quod exterius agitur, pertinet ad iniustitiam; sed quantum ad austeritatem animi per quam aliquis fit promptus ad poenas augendas, pertinet ad crudelitatem.

Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty is not opposed to clemency. For Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that those are said to be cruel who exceed in punishing, which is contrary to justice. Now clemency is reckoned a part, not of justice but of temperance. Therefore apparently cruelty is not opposed to clemency. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Jer 6:23): They are cruel, and will have no mercy; so that cruelty would seem opposed to mercy. Now mercy is not the same as clemency, as stated above (Q. 157, A. 4, ad 3). Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency. Obj. 3: Further, clemency is concerned with the infliction of punishment, as stated above (Q. 157, A. 1): whereas cruelty applies to the withdrawal of beneficence, according to Prov. 11:17, But he that is cruel casteth off even his own kindred. Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency. On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that the opposite of clemency is cruelty, which is nothing else but hardness of heart in exacting punishment. I answer that, Cruelty apparently takes its name from cruditas (rawness). Now just as things when cooked and prepared are wont to have an agreeable and sweet savor, so when raw they have a disagreeable and bitter taste. Now it has been stated above (Q. 157, A. 3, ad 1; A. 4, ad 3) that clemency denotes a certain smoothness or sweetness of soul, whereby one is inclined to mitigate punishment. Hence cruelty is directly opposed to clemency. Reply Obj. 1: Just as it belongs to equity to mitigate punishment according to reason, while the sweetness of soul which inclines one to this belongs to clemency: so too, excess in punishing, as regards the external action, belongs to injustice; but as regards the hardness of heart, which makes one ready to increase punishment, belongs to cruelty.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod misericordia et clementia conveniunt in hoc quod utraque refugit et abhorret miseriam alienam, aliter tamen et aliter. Nam ad misericordiam pertinet miseriae subvenire per beneficii collationem, ad clementiam autem pertinet miseriam diminuere per subtractionem poenarum. Et quia crudelitas superabundantiam in exigendis poenis importat, directius opponitur clementiae quam misericordiae. Tamen, propter similitudinem harum virtutum, accipitur quandoque crudelitas pro immisericordia. Ad tertium dicendum quod crudelitas ibi accipitur pro immisericordia, ad quam pertinet beneficia non largiri. Quamvis etiam dici possit quod ipsa beneficii subtractio quaedam poena est.

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Reply Obj. 2: Mercy and clemency concur in this, that both shun and recoil from another’s unhappiness, but in different ways. For it belongs to mercy to relieve another’s unhappiness by a beneficent action, while it belongs to clemency to mitigate another’s unhappiness by the cessation of punishment. And since cruelty denotes excess in exacting punishment, it is more directly opposed to clemency than to mercy; yet on account of the mutual likeness of these virtues, cruelty is sometimes taken for mercilessness. Reply Obj. 3: Cruelty is there taken for mercilessness, which is lack of beneficence. We may also reply that withdrawal of beneficence is in itself a punishment.

Article 2 Whether cruelty differs from savagery or brutality? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod crudelitas a saevitia sive feritate non differat. Uni enim virtuti, ex una parte, unum vitium videtur esse oppositum. Sed clementiae per superabundantiam opponitur et crudelitas et saevitia. Ergo videtur quod saevitia et crudelitas sint idem. Praeterea, Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., quod severus dicitur quasi saevus et verus, quia sine pietate tenet iustitiam, et sic saevitia videtur excludere remissionem poenarum in iudiciis, quod pertinet ad pietatem. Hoc autem dictum est ad crudelitatem pertinere. Ergo crudelitas est idem quod saevitia. Praeterea, sicut virtuti opponitur aliquod vitium in excessu, ita etiam et in defectu, quod quidem contrariatur et virtuti, quae est in medio, et vitio quod est in excessu. Sed idem vitium ad defectum pertinens opponitur et crudelitati et saevitiae, videlicet remissio vel dissolutio, dicit enim Gregorius, XX Moral., sit amor, sed non emolliens, sit rigor, sed non exasperans. Sit zelus, sed non immoderate saeviens, sit pietas, sed non plus quam expediat parcens. Ergo saevitia est idem crudelitati. Sed contra est quod Seneca dicit, in II de Clement., quod ille qui non laesus, nec peccatori irascitur, non dicitur crudelis, sed ferus sive saevus. Respondeo dicendum quod nomen saevitiae et feritatis a similitudine ferarum accipitur, quae etiam saevae dicuntur. Huiusmodi enim animalia nocent hominibus ut ex eorum corporibus pascantur, non ex aliqua iustitiae causa, cuius consideratio pertinet ad solam rationem. Et ideo, proprie loquendo, feritas vel saevitia di-

Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty differs not from savagery or brutality. For seemingly one vice is opposed in one way to one virtue. Now both savagery and cruelty are opposed to clemency by way of excess. Therefore it would seem that savagery and cruelty are the same. Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that severity is as it were savagery with verity, because it holds to justice without attending to piety: so that savagery would seem to exclude that mitigation of punishment in delivering judgment which is demanded by piety. Now this has been stated to belong to cruelty (A. 1, ad 1). Therefore cruelty is the same as savagery. Obj. 3: Further, just as there is a vice opposed to a virtue by way of excess, so is there a vice opposed to it by way of deficiency, which latter is opposed both to the virtue which is the mean, and to the vice which is in excess. Now the same vice pertaining to deficiency is opposed to both cruelty and savagery, namely remission or laxity. For Gregory says (Moral. xx, 5): Let there be love, but not that which enervates, let there be severity, but without fury, let there be zeal without unseemly savagery, let there be piety without undue clemency. Therefore savagery is the same as cruelty. On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that a man who is angry without being hurt, or with one who has not offended him, is not said to be cruel, but to be brutal or savage. I answer that, Savagery and brutality take their names from a likeness to wild beasts which are also described as savage. For animals of this kind attack man that they may feed on his body, and not for some motive of justice the consideration of which belongs to reason alone. Wherefore, properly speaking, brutality or savagery applies

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citur secundum quam aliquis in poenis inferendis non considerat aliquam culpam eius qui punitur, sed solum hoc quod delectatur in hominum cruciatu. Et sic patet quod continetur sub bestialitate, nam talis delectatio non est humana, sed bestialis, proveniens vel ex mala consuetudine vel ex corruptione naturae, sicut et aliae huiusmodi bestiales affectiones. Sed crudelitas attendit culpam in eo qui punitur, sed excedit modum in puniendo. Et ideo crudelitas differt a saevitia sive feritate sicut malitia humana a bestialitate, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod clementia est virtus humana, unde directe sibi opponitur crudelitas, quae est malitia humana. Sed saevitia vel feritas continetur sub bestialitate. Unde non directe opponitur clementiae, sed superexcellentiori virtuti, quam philosophus vocat heroicam vel divinam, quae secundum nos videtur pertinere ad dona spiritus sancti. Unde potest dici quod saevitia directe opponitur dono pietatis. Ad secundum dicendum quod severus non dicitur simpliciter saevus, quia hoc sonat in vitium, sed dicitur saevus circa veritatem, propter aliquam similitudinem saevitiae, quae non est diminutiva poenarum. Ad tertium dicendum quod remissio in puniendo non est vitium nisi inquantum praetermittitur ordo iustitiae, quo aliquis debet puniri propter culpam, quam excedit crudelitas. Saevitia autem penitus hunc ordinem non attendit. Unde remissio punitionis directe opponitur crudelitati, non autem saevitiae.

Q. 159, A. 2

to those who in inflicting punishment have not in view a default of the person punished, but merely the pleasure they derive from a man’s torture. Consequently it is evident that it is comprised under bestiality: for such like pleasure is not human but bestial, and resulting as it does either from evil custom, or from a corrupt nature, as do other bestial emotions. On the other hand, cruelty not only regards the default of the person punished, but exceeds in the mode of punishing: wherefore cruelty differs from savagery or brutality, as human wickedness differs from bestiality, as stated in Ethic. vii, 5. Reply Obj. 1: Clemency is a human virtue; wherefore directly opposed to it is cruelty which is a form of human wickedness. But savagery or brutality is comprised under bestiality, wherefore it is directly opposed not to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue, which the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5) calls heroic or god-like, which according to us, would seem to pertain to the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Consequently we may say that savagery is directly opposed to the gift of piety. Reply Obj. 2: A severe man is not said to be simply savage, because this implies a vice; but he is said to be savage as regards the truth, on account of some likeness to savagery which is not inclined to mitigate punishment. Reply Obj. 3: Remission of punishment is not a vice, except it disregard the order of justice, which requires a man to be punished on account of his offense, and which cruelty exceeds. On the other hand, cruelty disregards this order altogether. Wherefore remission of punishment is opposed to cruelty, but not to savagery.

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Question 160 Modesty Deinde considerandum est de modestia. Et primo, de We must now consider modesty: and (1) Modesty in ipsa in communi; secundo, de singulis quae sub ea con- general; (2) Each of its species. Under the first head there tinentur. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum modestia sit pars temperantiae. (1) Whether modesty is a part of temperance? Secundo, quae sit materia modestiae. (2) What is the matter of modesty?

Article 1 Whether modesty is a part of temperance? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod modestia non sit pars temperantiae. Modestia enim a modo dicitur. Sed in omnibus virtutibus requiritur modus, nam virtus ordinatur ad bonum; bonum autem, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura boni, consistit in modo, specie et ordine. Ergo modestia est generalis virtus. Non ergo debet poni pars temperantiae. Praeterea, laus temperantiae praecipue videtur consistere ex quadam moderatione. Ab hac autem sumitur nomen modestiae. Ergo modestia est idem quod temperantia, et non pars eius. Praeterea, modestia videtur consistere circa proximorum correctionem, secundum illud II ad Tim. II, servum Dei non oportet litigare, sed mansuetum esse ad omnes, cum modestia corripientem eos qui resistunt veritati. Sed correctio delinquentium est actus iustitiae vel caritatis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo videtur quod modestia magis sit pars iustitiae quam temperantiae. Sed contra est quod Tullius ponit modestiam partem temperantiae. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, temperantia moderationem adhibet circa ea in quibus difficillimum est moderari, scilicet circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus. Ubicumque autem est aliqua virtus specialiter circa aliquod maximum, oportet esse aliam virtutem circa ea quae mediocriter se habent, eo quod oportet quantum ad omnia vitam hominis secundum virtutes regulatam esse, sicut supra dictum est quod magnificentia est circa magnos sumptus pecuniarum, praeter quam est necessaria liberalitas, quae fit circa mediocres sumptus. Unde necessarium est quod sit quaedam virtus moderativa in aliis mediocribus, in quibus non est ita difficile moderari. Et haec virtus vocatur modestia, et adiungitur temperantiae sicut principali. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nomen commune quandoque appropriatur his quae sunt infima, sicut no-

Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is not a part of temperance. For modesty is denominated from mode. Now mode is requisite in every virtue: since virtue is directed to good; and good, according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni 3), consists in mode, species, and order. Therefore modesty is a general virtue, and consequently should not be reckoned a part of temperance. Obj. 2: Further, temperance would seem to be deserving of praise chiefly on account of its moderation. Now this gives modesty its name. Therefore modesty is the same as temperance, and not one of its parts. Obj. 3: Further, modesty would seem to regard the correction of our neighbor, according to 2 Tim. 2:24, 25, The servant of the Lord must not wrangle, but be mild towards all men . . . with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth. Now admonishing wrong-doers is an act of justice or of charity, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 1). Therefore seemingly modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance. On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons modesty as a part of temperance. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 141, A. 4; Q. 157, A. 3), temperance brings moderation into those things wherein it is most difficult to be moderate, namely the concupiscences of pleasures of touch. Now whenever there is a special virtue about some matter of very great moment, there must needs be another virtue about matters of lesser import: because the life of man requires to be regulated by the virtues with regard to everything: thus it was stated above (Q. 134, A. 3, ad 1), that while magnificence is about great expenditure, there is need in addition for liberality, which is concerned with ordinary expenditure. Hence there is need for a virtue to moderate other lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult. This virtue is called modesty, and is annexed to temperance as its principal. Reply Obj. 1: When a name is common to many it is sometimes appropriated to those of the lowest rank; thus

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Q. 160, A. 2

Temperance

men commune Angelorum appropriatur infimo ordini Angelorum. Ita etiam et modus, qui communiter observatur in qualibet virtute, appropriatur specialiter virtuti quae in minimis modum ponit. Ad secundum dicendum quod aliqua temperatione indigent propter suam vehementiam, sicut vinum forte temperatur, sed moderatio requiritur in omnibus. Et ideo temperantia magis se habet ad passiones vehementes, modestia vero ad mediocres. Ad tertium dicendum quod modestia ibi accipitur a modo communiter sumpto, prout requiritur in omnibus virtutibus.

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the common name of angel is appropriated to the lowest order of angels. In the same way, mode which is observed by all virtues in common, is specially appropriated to the virtue which prescribes the mode in the slightest things. Reply Obj. 2: Some things need tempering on account of their strength, thus we temper strong wine. But moderation is necessary in all things: wherefore temperance is more concerned with strong passions, and modesty about weaker passions. Reply Obj. 3: Modesty is to be taken there for the general moderation which is necessary in all virtues.

Article 2 Whether modesty is only about outward actions? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod modestia sit solum circa exteriores actiones. Interiores enim motus passionum aliis noti esse non possunt. Sed apostolus, Philipp. IV, mandat ut modestia nostra nota sit omnibus hominibus. Ergo modestia est solum circa exteriores actiones. Praeterea, virtutes quae sunt circa passiones, distinguuntur a virtute iustitiae, quae est circa operationes. Sed modestia videtur esse una virtus. Si ergo est circa operationes exteriores, non erit circa aliquas interiores passiones. Praeterea, nulla virtus una et eadem est circa ea quae pertinent ad appetitum, quod est proprium virtutum moralium; et circa ea quae pertinent ad cognitionem, quae est proprie virtutum intellectualium; neque etiam circa ea quae pertinent ad irascibilem, et concupiscibilem. Si ergo modestia est una virtus, non potest esse circa omnia praedicta. Sed contra, in omnibus praedictis oportet observari modum, a quo modestia dicitur. Ergo circa omnia praedicta est modestia. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, modestia differt a temperantia in hoc quod temperantia est moderativa eorum quae difficillimum est refrenare, modestia autem est moderativa eorum quae in hoc mediocriter se habent. Diversimode autem aliqui de modestia videntur esse locuti. Ubicumque enim consideraverunt aliquam specialem rationem boni vel difficultatis in moderando, illud subtraxerunt modestiae, relinquentes modestiam circa minora. Manifestum est autem omnibus quod refrenatio delectationum tactus specialem quandam difficultatem habet. Unde omnes temperantiam a modestia distinxerunt. Sed praeter hoc, Tullius consideravit quoddam speciale bonum esse in moderatione poenarum. Et ideo etiam clementiam subtraxit modestiae, ponens mode-

Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is only about outward actions. For the inward movements of the passions cannot be known to other persons. Yet the Apostle enjoins (Phil 4:5): Let your modesty be known to all men. Therefore modesty is only about outward actions. Obj. 2: Further, the virtues that are about the passions are distinguished from justice which is about operations. Now modesty is seemingly one virtue. Therefore, if it be about outward works, it will not be concerned with inward passions. Obj. 3: Further, no one same virtue is both about things pertaining to the appetite—which is proper to the moral virtues—and about things pertaining to knowledge—which is proper to the intellectual virtues—and again about things pertaining to the irascible and concupiscible faculties. Therefore, if modesty be one virtue, it cannot be about all these things. On the contrary, In all these things it is necessary to observe the mode whence modesty takes its name. Therefore modesty is about all of them. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), modesty differs from temperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where restraint is most difficult, while modesty moderates those that present less difficulty. Authorities seem to have had various opinions about modesty. For wherever they found a special kind of good or a special difficulty of moderation, they withdrew it from the province of modesty, which they confined to lesser matters. Now it is clear to all that the restraint of pleasures of touch presents a special difficulty: wherefore all distinguished temperance from modesty. In addition to this, moreover, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) considered that there was a special kind of good in the moderation of punishment; wherefore he severed clemency

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stiam circa omnia quae relinquuntur moderanda. Quae quidem videntur esse quatuor. Quorum unum est motus animi ad aliquam excellentiam, quem moderatur humilitas. Secundum autem est desiderium eorum quae pertinent ad cognitionem, et in hoc moderatur studiositas, quae opponitur curiositati. Tertium autem, quod pertinet ad corporales motus et actiones, ut scilicet decenter et honeste fiant, tam in his quae serio, quam in his quae ludo aguntur. Quartum autem est quod pertinet ad exteriorem apparatum, puta in vestibus et aliis huiusmodi. Sed circa quaedam eorum alii posuerunt quasdam speciales virtutes sicut Andronicus mansuetudinem, simplicitatem et humilitatem, et alia huiusmodi, de quibus supra dictum est. Aristoteles etiam circa delectationes ludorum posuit eutrapeliam. Quae omnia continentur sub modestia, secundum quod a Tullio accipitur. Et hoc modo modestia se habet non solum circa exteriores actiones, sed etiam circa interiores. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus loquitur de modestia prout est circa exteriora. Et tamen etiam interiorum moderatio manifestari potest per quaedam exteriora signa. Ad secundum dicendum quod sub modestia continentur diversae virtutes, quae a diversis assignantur. Unde nihil prohibet modestiam esse circa ea quae requirunt diversas virtutes. Et tamen non est tanta diversitas inter partes modestiae ad invicem, quanta est iustitiae, quae est circa operationes, ad temperantiam, quae est circa passiones, quia in actionibus et passionibus in quibus non est aliqua excellens difficultas ex parte materiae, sed solum ex parte moderationis, non attenditur virtus nisi una, scilicet secundum rationem moderationis. Et per hoc etiam patet responsio ad tertium.

Q. 160, A. 2

also from modesty, and held modesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters that require moderation. These seemingly are of four kinds. One is the movement of the mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated by humility. The second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, and this is moderated by studiousness which is opposed to curiosity. The third regards bodily movements and actions, which require to be done becomingly and honestly, whether we act seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward show, for instance in dress and the like. To some of these matters, however, other authorities appointed certain special virtues: thus Andronicus mentions meekness, simplicity, humility, and other kindred virtues, of which we have spoken above (Q. 143); while Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) assigned eutrapelia to pleasures in games, as stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 5). All these are comprised under modesty as understood by Tully; and in this way modesty regards not only outward but also inward actions. Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle speaks of modesty as regarding externals. Nevertheless the moderation of the inner man may be shown by certain outward signs. Reply Obj. 2: Various virtues assigned by various authorities are comprised under modesty. Wherefore nothing prevents modesty from regarding matters which require different virtues. Yet there is not so great a difference between the various parts of modesty, as there is between justice, which is about operations, and temperance, which is about passions, because in actions and passions that present no great difficulty on the part of the matter, but only on the part of moderation, there is but one virtue, one namely for each kind of moderation. Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection also is clear.

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Question 161 Humility Deinde considerandum est de speciebus modestiae. We must consider next the species of modesty: (1) HuEt primo, de humilitate, et superbia, quae ei opponitur; mility, and pride which is opposed to it; (2) Studiousness, secundo, de studiositate, et curiositate sibi opposita; ter- and its opposite, Curiosity; (3) Modesty as affecting words tio, de modestia secundum quod est in verbis vel factis; or deeds; (4) Modesty as affecting outward attire. quarto, de modestia secundum quod est circa exteriorem cultum. Circa humilitatem quaeruntur sex. Concerning humility there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum humilitas sit virtus. (1) Whether humility is a virtue? Secundo, utrum consistat in appetitu, vel in iudicio (2) Whether it resides in the appetite, or in the rationis. judgment of reason? Tertio, utrum aliquis per humilitatem se debeat (3) Whether by humility one ought to subject oneself omnibus subiicere. to all men? Quarto, utrum sit pars modestiae vel temperantiae. (4) Whether it is a part of modesty or temperance? Quinto, de comparatione eius ad alias virtutes. (5) Of its comparison with the other virtues; Sexto, de gradibus humilitatis. (6) Of the degrees of humility.

Article 1 Whether humility is a virtue? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod humilitas non sit virtus. Virtus enim importat rationem boni. Sed humilitas videtur importare rationem mali poenalis, secundum illud Psalmi. Humiliaverunt in compedibus pedes eius. Ergo humilitas non est virtus. Praeterea, virtus et vitium opponuntur. Sed humilitas quandoque sonat in vitium, dicitur enim Eccli. XIX, est qui nequiter se humiliat. Ergo humilitas non est virtus. Praeterea, nulla virtus opponitur alii virtuti. Sed humilitas videtur opponi virtuti magnanimitatis, quae tendit in magna, humilitas autem ipsa refugit. Ergo videtur quod humilitas non sit virtus. Praeterea, virtus est dispositio perfecti, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Sed humilitas videtur esse imperfectorum, unde et Deo non convenit humiliari, qui nulli subiici potest. Ergo videtur quod humilitas non sit virtus. Praeterea, omnis virtus moralis est circa actiones vel passiones, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed humilitas non connumeratur a philosopho inter virtutes quae sunt circa passiones, nec etiam continetur sub iustitia, quae est circa actiones. Ergo videtur quod non sit virtus. Sed contra est quod Origenes dicit, exponens illud Luc. I, respexit humilitatem ancillae suae, proprie in Scripturis una de virtutibus humilitas praedicatur, ait

Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a virtue. For virtue conveys the notion of a good. But humility conveys the notion of a penal evil, according to Ps. 104:18, They humbled his feet in fetters. Therefore humility is not a virtue. Obj. 2: Further, virtue and vice are mutually opposed. Now humility seemingly denotes a vice, for it is written (Sir 19:23): There is one that humbleth himself wickedly. Therefore humility is not a virtue. Obj. 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But humility is apparently opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which aims at great things, whereas humility shuns them. Therefore it would seem that humility is not a virtue. Obj. 4: Further, virtue is the disposition of that which is perfect (Phys. vii, text. 17). But humility seemingly belongs to the imperfect: wherefore it becomes not God to be humble, since He can be subject to none. Therefore it seems that humility is not a virtue. Obj. 5: Further, every moral virtue is about actions and passions, according to Ethic. ii, 3. But humility is not reckoned by the Philosopher among the virtues that are about passions, nor is it comprised under justice which is about actions. Therefore it would seem not to be a virtue. On the contrary, Origen commenting on Luke 1:48, He hath regarded the humility of His handmaid, says (Hom. viii in Luc.): One of the virtues, humility, is particularly com-

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quippe salvator, discite a me, quia mitis sum et humilis corde. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de passionibus ageretur, bonum arduum habet aliquid unde attrahit appetitum, scilicet ipsam rationem boni, et habet aliquid retrahens, scilicet ipsam difficultatem adipiscendi, secundum quorum primum insurgit motus spei, et secundum aliud motus desperationis. Dictum est autem supra quod circa motus appetitivos qui se habent per modum impulsionis, oportet esse virtutem moralem moderantem et refrenantem, circa illos autem qui se habent per modum retractionis, oportet esse virtutem moralem firmantem et impellentem. Et ideo circa appetitum boni ardui necessaria est duplex virtus. Una quidem quae temperet et refrenet animum, ne immoderate tendat in excelsa, et hoc pertinet ad virtutem humilitatis. Alia vero quae firmat animum contra desperationem, et impellit ipsum ad prosecutionem magnorum secundum rationem rectam, et haec est magnanimitas. Et sic patet quod humilitas est quaedam virtus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., humilis dicitur quasi humi acclinis, idest, imis inhaerens. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, ex principio extrinseco, puta cum aliquis ab alio deiicitur. Et sic humilitas est poena. Alio modo, a principio intrinseco. Et hoc potest fieri quandoque quidem bene, puta cum aliquis, considerans suum defectum, tenet se in infimis secundum suum modum; sicut Abraham dixit ad dominum, Gen. XVIII, loquar ad dominum meum, cum sim pulvis et cinis. Et hoc modo humilitas ponitur virtus. Quandoque autem potest fieri male, puta cum homo, honorem suum non intelligens, comparat se iumentis insipientibus, et fit similis illis. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, humilitas, secundum quod est virtus, in sui ratione importat quandam laudabilem deiectionem ad ima. Hoc autem quandoque fit solum secundum signa exteriora, secundum fictionem. Unde haec est falsa humilitas, de qua Augustinus dicit, in quadam epistola, quod est magna superbia, quia scilicet videtur tendere ad excellentiam gloriae. Quandoque autem fit secundum interiorem motum animae. Et secundum hoc humilitas proprie ponitur virtus, quia virtus non consistit in exterioribus, sed principaliter in interiori electione mentis, ut patet per philosophum, in libro Ethicorum. Ad tertium dicendum quod humilitas reprimit appetitum, ne tendat in magna praeter rationem rectam. Magnanimitas autem animum ad magna impellit secundum rationem rectam. Unde patet quod magnanimitas non opponitur humilitati, sed conveniunt in hoc quod utraque est secundum rationem rectam.

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mended in Holy Writ; for our Savior said: ‘Learn of Me, because I am meek, and humble of heart.’ I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2) when we were treating of the passions, the difficult good has something attractive to the appetite, namely the aspect of good, and likewise something repulsive to the appetite, namely the difficulty of obtaining it. In respect of the former there arises the movement of hope, and in respect of the latter, the movement of despair. Now it has been stated above (I-II, Q. 61, A. 2) that for those appetitive movements which are a kind of impulse towards an object, there is need of a moderating and restraining moral virtue, while for those which are a kind of recoil, there is need, on the part of the appetite, of a moral virtue to strengthen it and urge it on. Wherefore a twofold virtue is necessary with regard to the difficult good: one, to temper and restrain the mind, lest it tend to high things immoderately; and this belongs to the virtue of humility: and another to strengthen the mind against despair, and urge it on to the pursuit of great things according to right reason; and this is magnanimity. Therefore it is evident that humility is a virtue. Reply Obj. 1: As Isidore observes (Etym. x), a humble man is so called because he is, as it were, humo acclinis, i.e., inclined to the lowest place. This may happen in two ways. First, through an extrinsic principle, for instance when one is cast down by another, and thus humility is a punishment. Second, through an intrinsic principle: and this may be done sometimes well, for instance when a man, considering his own failings, assumes the lowest place according to his mode: thus Abraham said to the Lord (Gen 18:27), I will speak to my Lord, whereas I am dust and ashes. In this way humility is a virtue. Sometimes, however, this may be ill-done, for instance when man, not understanding his honor, compares himself to senseless beasts, and becomes like to them (Ps 48:13). Reply Obj. 2: As stated (ad 1), humility, insofar as it is a virtue, conveys the notion of a praiseworthy self-abasement to the lowest place. Now this is sometimes done merely as to outward signs and pretense: wherefore this is false humility, of which Augustine says in a letter (Ep. cxlix) that it is grievous pride, since to wit, it would seem to aim at excellence of glory. Sometimes, however, this is done by an inward movement of the soul, and in this way, properly speaking, humility is reckoned a virtue, because virtue does not consist in externals, but chiefly in the inward choice of the mind, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5). Reply Obj. 3: Humility restrains the appetite from aiming at great things against right reason: while magnanimity urges the mind to great things in accord with right reason. Hence it is clear that magnanimity is not opposed to humility: indeed they concur in this, that each is according to right reason.

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Ad quartum dicendum quod perfectum dicitur aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, simpliciter, in quo scilicet nullus defectus invenitur, nec secundum suam naturam, nec per respectum ad aliquid aliud. Et sic solus Deus est perfectus, cui secundum naturam divinam non competit humilitas, sed solum secundum naturam assumptam. Alio modo potest dici aliquid perfectum secundum quid, puta secundum suam naturam, vel secundum statum aut tempus. Et hoc modo homo virtuosus est perfectus. Cuius tamen perfectio in comparatione ad Deum deficiens invenitur, secundum illud Isaiae XL, omnes gentes, quasi non sint, sic sunt coram eo. Et sic cuilibet homini potest convenire humilitas. Ad quintum dicendum quod philosophus intendebat agere de virtutibus secundum quod ordinantur ad vitam civilem, in qua subiectio unius hominis ad alterum secundum legis ordinem determinatur, et ideo continetur sub iustitia legali. Humilitas autem, secundum quod est specialis virtus, praecipue respicit subiectionem hominis ad Deum, propter quem etiam aliis humiliando se subiicit.

Q. 161, A. 2

Reply Obj. 4: A thing is said to be perfect in two ways. First absolutely; such a thing contains no defect, neither in its nature nor in respect of anything else, and thus God alone is perfect. To Him humility is fitting, not as regards His Divine nature, but only as regards His assumed nature. Second, a thing may be said to be perfect in a restricted sense, for instance in respect of its nature or state or time. Thus a virtuous man is perfect: although in comparison with God his perfection is found wanting, according to the word of Isa. 40:17, All nations are before Him as if they had no being at all. In this way humility may be competent to every man. Reply Obj. 5: The Philosopher intended to treat of virtues as directed to civic life, wherein the subjection of one man to another is defined according to the ordinance of the law, and consequently is a matter of legal justice. But humility, considered as a special virtue, regards chiefly the subjection of man to God, for Whose sake he humbles himself by subjecting himself to others.

Article 2 Whether humility has to do with the appetite? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod humilitas non consistat circa appetitum, sed magis circa iudicium rationis. Humilitas enim superbiae opponitur. Sed superbia maxime consistit in his quae pertinent ad cognitionem. Dicit enim Gregorius, XXXIV Moral., quod superbia, cum exterius usque ad corpus extenditur, prius per oculos indicatur; unde etiam in Psalmo dicitur, domine, non est exaltatum cor meum, neque elati sunt oculi mei, oculi autem maxime deserviunt cognitioni. Ergo videtur quod humilitas maxime sit circa cognitionem, quam de se aliquis aestimat parvam. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Virginit., quod humilitas pene tota disciplina Christiana est. Nihil ergo quod in disciplina Christiana continetur, repugnat humilitati. Sed in disciplina Christiana admonemur ad appetendum meliora, secundum illud I ad Cor. XII, aemulamini charismata meliora. Ergo ad humilitatem non pertinet reprimere appetitum arduorum, sed magis aestimationem. Praeterea, ad eandem virtutem pertinet refrenare superfluum motum, et firmare animum contra superfluam retractionem, sicut eadem fortitudo est quae refrenat audaciam, et quae firmat animum contra timorem. Sed magnanimitas firmat animum contra difficultates quae accidunt in prosecutione magnorum. Si ergo humilitas refrenaret appetitum magnorum, sequeretur quod humilitas non esset virtus distincta a magnanimi-

Objection 1: It would seem that humility concerns, not the appetite but the judgment of reason. Because humility is opposed to pride. Now pride concerns things pertaining to knowledge: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 22) that pride, when it extends outwardly to the body, is first of all shown in the eyes: wherefore it is written (Ps 130:1), Lord, my heart is not exalted, nor are my eyes lofty. Now eyes are the chief aids to knowledge. Therefore it would seem that humility is chiefly concerned with knowledge, whereby one thinks little of oneself. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that almost the whole of Christian teaching is humility. Consequently nothing contained in Christian teaching is incompatible with humility. Now Christian teaching admonishes us to seek the better things, according to 1 Cor. 12:31, Be zealous for the better gifts. Therefore it belongs to humility to restrain not the desire of difficult things but the estimate thereof. Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the same virtue both to restrain excessive movement, and to strengthen the soul against excessive withdrawal: thus fortitude both curbs daring and fortifies the soul against fear. Now it is magnanimity that strengthens the soul against the difficulties that occur in the pursuit of great things. Therefore if humility were to curb the desire of great things, it would follow that humility is not a distinct virtue from magnanimity, which is

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Temperance

tate. Quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo humilitas consistit circa appetitum magnorum, sed magis circa aestimationem. Praeterea, Andronicus ponit humilitatem circa exteriorem cultum, dicit enim quod humilitas est habitus non superabundans sumptibus et praeparationibus. Ergo non est circa motum appetitus. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Poenit., quod humilis est qui eligit abiici in domo domini, magis quam habitare in tabernaculis peccatorum. Sed electio pertinet ad appetitum. Ergo humilitas consistit circa appetitum, magis quam circa aestimationem. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad humilitatem proprie pertinet ut aliquis reprimat seipsum, ne feratur in ea quae sunt supra se. Ad hoc autem necessarium est ut aliquis cognoscat id in quo deficit a proportione eius quod suam virtutem excedit. Et ideo cognitio proprii defectus pertinet ad humilitatem sicut regula quaedam directiva appetitus. Sed in ipso appetitu consistit humilitas essentialiter. Et ideo dicendum est quod humilitas proprie est moderativa motus appetitus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod extollentia oculorum est quoddam signum superbiae, inquantum excludit reverentiam et timorem. Consueverunt enim timentes et verecundati maxime oculos deprimere, quasi non audentes se aliis comparare. Non autem ex hoc sequitur quod humilitas essentialiter circa cognitionem consistat. Ad secundum dicendum quod tendere in aliqua maiora ex propriarum virium confidentia, humilitati contrariatur. Sed quod aliquis ex confidentia divini auxilii in maiora tendat, hoc non est contra humilitatem, praesertim cum ex hoc aliquis magis apud Deum exaltetur quod ei se magis per humilitatem subiicit. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de Poenit., aliud est levare se ad Deum, aliud est levare se contra Deum. Qui ante illum se proiicit, ab illo erigitur, qui adversus illum se erigit, ab illo proiicitur. Ad tertium dicendum quod in fortitudine invenitur eadem ratio refrenandi audaciam et firmandi animum contra timorem, utriusque enim ratio est ex hoc quod homo debet bonum rationis periculis mortis praestare. Sed in refrenando praesumptionem spei, quod pertinet ad humilitatem, et in firmando animum contra desperationem, quod pertinet ad magnanimitatem, est alia et alia ratio. Nam ratio firmandi animum contra desperationem est adeptio proprii boni, ne scilicet, desperando, homo se indignum reddat bono quod sibi competebat. Sed in reprimendo praesumptionem spei, ratio praecipua sumitur ex reverentia divina, ex qua contingit ut homo non plus sibi attribuat quam sibi competat secundum gradum quem est a Deo sortitus. Unde humilitas praecipue videtur importare subiectionem hominis ad Deum. Et propter hoc Augustinus, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, humilitatem, quam intelligit

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evidently false. Therefore humility is concerned, not with the desire but with the estimate of great things. Obj. 4: Further, Andronicus assigns humility to outward show; for he says that humility is the habit of avoiding excessive expenditure and parade. Therefore it is not concerned with the movement of the appetite. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Poenit.) that the humble man is one who chooses to be an abject in the house of the Lord, rather than to dwell in the tents of sinners. But choice concerns the appetite. Therefore humility has to do with the appetite rather than with the estimative power. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), it belongs properly to humility, that a man restrain himself from being borne towards that which is above him. For this purpose he must know his disproportion to that which surpasses his capacity. Hence knowledge of one’s own deficiency belongs to humility, as a rule guiding the appetite. Nevertheless humility is essentially in the appetite itself; and consequently it must be said that humility, properly speaking, moderates the movement of the appetite. Reply Obj. 1: Lofty eyes are a sign of pride, inasmuch as it excludes respect and fear: for fearing and respectful persons are especially wont to lower the eyes, as though not daring to compare themselves with others. But it does not follow from this that humility is essentially concerned with knowledge. Reply Obj. 2: It is contrary to humility to aim at greater things through confiding in one’s own powers: but to aim at greater things through confidence in God’s help, is not contrary to humility; especially since the more one subjects oneself to God, the more is one exalted in God’s sight. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi): It is one thing to raise oneself to God, and another to raise oneself up against God. He that abases himself before Him, him He raiseth up; he that raises himself up against Him, him He casteth down. Reply Obj. 3: In fortitude there is the same reason for restraining daring and for strengthening the soul against fear: since the reason in both cases is that man should set the good of reason before dangers of death. But the reason for restraining presumptuous hope which pertains to humility is not the same as the reason for strengthening the soul against despair. Because the reason for strengthening the soul against despair is the acquisition of one’s proper good lest man, by despair, render himself unworthy of a good which was competent to him; while the chief reason for suppressing presumptuous hope is based on divine reverence, which shows that man ought not to ascribe to himself more than is competent to him according to the position in which God has placed him. Wherefore humility would seem to denote in the first place man’s subjection to God; and for this reason Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) ascribes humility, which he understands by

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per paupertatem spiritus, attribuit dono timoris, quo homo Deum reveretur. Et inde est quod fortitudo aliter se habet ad audaciam quam humilitas ad spem. Nam fortitudo plus utitur audacia quam eam reprimat, unde superabundantia est ei similior quam defectus. Humilitas autem plus reprimit spem vel fiduciam de seipso quam ea utatur, unde magis opponitur sibi superabundantia quam defectus. Ad quartum dicendum quod superabundantia in exterioribus sumptibus et praeparationibus solet ad quandam iactantiam fieri, quae per humilitatem reprimitur. Et quantum ad hoc, secundario consistit in exterioribus, prout sunt signa interioris appetitivi motus.

Q. 161, A. 3

poverty of spirit, to the gift of fear whereby man reveres God. Hence it follows that the relation of fortitude to daring differs from that of humility to hope. Because fortitude uses daring more than it suppresses it: so that excess of daring is more like fortitude than lack of daring is. On the other hand, humility suppresses hope or confidence in self more than it uses it; wherefore excessive self-confidence is more opposed to humility than lack of confidence is. Reply Obj. 4: Excess in outward expenditure and parade is wont to be done with a view of boasting, which is suppressed by humility. Accordingly humility has to do, in a secondary way, with externals, as signs of the inward movement of the appetite.

Article 3 Whether one ought, by humility, to subject oneself to all men? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non debeat se omnibus per humilitatem subiicere. Quia, sicut dictum est, humilitas praecipue consistit in subiectione hominis ad Deum. Sed id quod debetur Deo, non est homini exhibendum, ut patet in omnibus actibus latriae. Ergo homo per humilitatem non debet se homini subiicere. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Nat. et gratia, humilitas collocanda est in parte veritatis, non in parte falsitatis. Sed aliqui sunt in supremo statu, qui si se inferioribus subiicerent, absque falsitate hoc fieri non posset. Ergo homo non debet se omnibus per humilitatem subiicere. Praeterea, nullus debet facere id quod vergat in detrimentum salutis alterius. Sed si aliquis per humilitatem se alteri subiiciat, quandoque hoc verget in detrimentum illius cui se subiicit, qui ex hoc superbiret vel contemneret, unde Augustinus dicit, in regula, ne, dum nimium servatur humilitas, regendi frangatur auctoritas. Ergo homo non debet se per humilitatem omnibus subiicere. Sed contra est quod dicitur Philipp. II, in humilitate superiores sibi invicem arbitrantes. Respondeo dicendum quod in homine duo possunt considerari, scilicet id quod est Dei, et id quod est hominis. Hominis autem est quidquid pertinet ad defectum, sed Dei est quidquid pertinet ad salutem et perfectionem, secundum illud Osee XIII, perditio tua, Israel, ex me tantum auxilium tuum. Humilitas autem, sicut dictum est, proprie respicit reverentiam qua homo Deo subiicitur. Et ideo quilibet homo, secundum id quod suum est, debet se cuilibet proximo subiicere quantum ad id quod est Dei in ipso. Non autem hoc requirit humilitas, ut aliquis id quod est Dei in seipso, subiiciat ei quod

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not, by humility, to subject oneself to all men. For, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3), humility consists chiefly in man’s subjection to God. Now one ought not to offer to a man that which is due to God, as is the case with all acts of religious worship. Therefore, by humility, one ought not to subject oneself to man. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Nat. et Gratia xxxiv): Humility should take the part of truth, not of falsehood. Now some men are of the highest rank, who cannot, without falsehood, subject themselves to their inferiors. Therefore one ought not, by humility, to subject oneself to all men. Obj. 3: Further no one ought to do that which conduces to the detriment of another’s spiritual welfare. But if a man subject himself to another by humility, this is detrimental to the person to whom he subjects himself; for the latter might wax proud, or despise the other. Hence Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): Lest through excessive humility the superior lose his authority. Therefore a man ought not, by humility, to subject himself to all. On the contrary, It is written (Phil 2:3): In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves. I answer that, We may consider two things in man, namely that which is God’s, and that which is man’s. Whatever pertains to defect is man’s: but whatever pertains to man’s welfare and perfection is God’s, according to the saying of Osee 13:9, Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me. Now humility, as stated above (A. 1, ad 5; A. 2, ad 3), properly regards the reverence whereby man is subject to God. Wherefore every man, in respect of that which is his own, ought to subject himself to every neighbor, in respect of that which the latter has of God’s: but humility does not require a man to subject what he has of God’s to

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apparet esse Dei in altero. Nam illi qui dona Dei participant, cognoscunt se ea habere, secundum illud I ad Cor. II, ut sciamus quae a Deo donata sunt nobis. Et ideo absque praeiudicio humilitatis possunt dona quae ipsi acceperunt, praeferre donis Dei quae aliis apparent collata, sicut apostolus, ad Ephes. III, dicit, aliis generationibus non est agnitum filiis hominum, sicut nunc revelatum est sanctis apostolis eius. Similiter etiam non hoc requirit humilitas, ut aliquis id quod est suum in seipso, subiiciat ei quod est hominis in proximo. Alioquin, oporteret ut quilibet reputaret se magis peccatorem quolibet alio, cum tamen apostolus absque praeiudicio humilitatis dicat, Galat. II, nos natura Iudaei, et non ex gentibus peccatores. Potest tamen aliquis reputare aliquid boni esse in proximo quod ipse non habet, vel aliquid mali in se esse quod in alio non est, ex quo potest ei se subiicere per humilitatem.

that which may seem to be God’s in another. For those who have a share of God’s gifts know that they have them, according to 1 Cor. 2:12: That we may know the things that are given us from God. Wherefore without prejudice to humility they may set the gifts they have received from God above those that others appear to have received from Him; thus the Apostle says (Eph 3:5): (The mystery of Christ) was not known to the sons of men as it is now revealed to His holy apostles. In like manner, humility does not require a man to subject that which he has of his own to that which his neighbor has of man’s: otherwise each one would have to esteem himself a greater sinner than anyone else: whereas the Apostle says without prejudice to humility (Gal 2:15): We by nature are Jews, and not of the Gentiles, sinners. Nevertheless a man may esteem his neighbor to have some good which he lacks himself, or himself to have some evil which another has not: by reason of which, he may subject himself to him with humility. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non solum debeReply Obj. 1: We must not only revere God in Himself, mus Deum revereri in seipso, sed etiam id quod est eius but also that which is His in each one, although not with the debemus revereri in quolibet, non tamen eodem modo same measure of reverence as we revere God. Wherefore we reverentiae quo reveremur Deum. Et ideo per humili- should subject ourselves with humility to all our neighbors tatem debemus nos subiicere omnibus proximis propter for God’s sake, according to 1 Pet. 2:13, Be ye subject . . . to Deum, secundum illud I Pet. II, subiecti estote omni hu- every human creature for God’s sake; but to God alone do we manae creaturae propter Deum, latriam tamen soli Deo owe the worship of latria.

debemus exhibere. Ad secundum dicendum quod, si nos praeferamus id quod est Dei in proximo, ei quod est proprium in nobis, non possumus incurrere falsitatem. Unde super illud Philipp. II, superiores invicem arbitrantes, dicit Glossa, non hoc ita debemus aestimare ut nos aestimare fingamus, sed vere aestimemus posse aliquid esse occultum in alio quo nobis superior sit, etiam si bonum nostrum, quo illo videmur superiores esse, non sit occultum. Ad tertium dicendum quod humilitas, sicut et ceterae virtutes, praecipue interius in anima consistit. Et ideo potest homo secundum interiorem actum animae alteri se subiicere, sine hoc quod occasionem habeat alicuius quod pertineat ad detrimentum suae salutis. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, in regula, timore coram Deo praelatus substratus sit pedibus vestris. Sed in exterioribus humilitatis actibus, sicut et in actibus ceterarum virtutum, est debita moderatio adhibenda, ne possint vergere in detrimentum alterius. Si autem aliquis quod debet faciat, et alii ex hoc occasionem sumant peccati, non imputatur humiliter agenti, quia ille non scandalizat, quamvis alter scandalizetur.

Reply Obj. 2: If we set what our neighbor has of God’s above that which we have of our own, we cannot incur falsehood. Wherefore a gloss on Phil. 2:3, Esteem others better than themselves, says: We must not esteem by pretending to esteem; but we should in truth think it possible for another person to have something that is hidden to us and whereby he is better than we are, although our own good whereby we are apparently better than he, be not hidden. Reply Obj. 3: Humility, like other virtues, resides chiefly inwardly in the soul. Consequently a man, by an inward act of the soul, may subject himself to another, without giving the other man an occasion of detriment to his spiritual welfare. This is what Augustine means in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): With fear, the superior should prostrate himself at your feet in the sight of God. On the other hand, due moderation must be observed in the outward acts of humility even as of other virtues, lest they conduce to the detriment of others. If, however, a man does as he ought, and others take therefrom an occasion of sin, this is not imputed to the man who acts with humility; since he does not give scandal, although others take it.

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Q. 161, A. 4

Article 4 Whether humility is a part of modesty or temperance? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod humilitas non sit pars modestiae vel temperantiae. Humilitas enim praecipue respicit reverentiam qua quis subiicitur Deo, ut dictum est. Sed ad virtutem theologicam pertinet quod habeat Deum pro obiecto. Ergo humilitas magis debet poni virtus theologica quam pars temperantiae seu modestiae. Praeterea, temperantia est in concupiscibili. Humilitas autem videtur esse in irascibili, sicut et superbia, quae ei opponitur, cuius obiectum est arduum. Ergo videtur quod humilitas non sit pars temperantiae vel modestiae. Praeterea, humilitas et magnanimitas circa eadem sunt, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed magnanimitas non ponitur pars temperantiae, sed magis fortitudinis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo videtur quod humilitas non sit pars temperantiae vel modestiae. Sed contra est quod Origenes dicit, super Lucam, si vis nomen huius audire virtutis, quomodo etiam a philosophis appelletur, ausculta eandem esse humilitatem quam respicit Deus, quae ab illis metriotes dicitur, idest mensuratio sive moderatio, quae manifeste pertinet ad modestiam et temperantiam. Ergo humilitas est pars modestiae et temperantiae. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in assignando partes virtutibus praecipue attenditur similitudo quantum ad modum virtutis. Modus autem temperantiae, ex quo maxime laudem habet, est refrenatio vel repressio impetus alicuius passionis. Et ideo omnes virtutes refrenantes sive reprimentes impetus aliquarum affectionum, vel actiones moderantes, ponuntur partes temperantiae. Sicut autem mansuetudo reprimit motum irae, ita etiam humilitas reprimit motum spei, qui est motus spiritus in magna tendentis. Et ideo, sicut mansuetudo ponitur pars temperantiae, ita etiam humilitas. Unde et philosophus, in IV Ethic., eum qui tendit in parva secundum suum modum, dicit non esse magnanimum, sed temperatum, quem nos humilem dicere possumus. Et inter alias partes temperantiae, ratione superius dicta, continetur sub modestia, prout Tullius de ea loquitur, inquantum scilicet humilitas nihil est aliud quam quaedam moderatio spiritus. Unde et I Pet. III dicitur, in incorruptibilitate quieti ac modesti spiritus.

Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a part of modesty or temperance. For humility regards chiefly the reverence whereby one is subject to God, as stated above (A. 3). Now it belongs to a theological virtue to have God for its object. Therefore humility should be reckoned a theological virtue rather than a part of temperance or modesty.

Obj. 2: Further, temperance is in the concupiscible, whereas humility would seem to be in the irascible, just as pride which is opposed to it, and whose object is something difficult. Therefore apparently humility is not a part of temperance or modesty. Obj. 3: Further, humility and magnanimity are about the same object, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). But magnanimity is reckoned a part, not of temperance but of fortitude, as stated above (Q. 129, A. 5). Therefore it would seem that humility is not a part of temperance or modesty. On the contrary, Origen says (Hom. viii super Luc.): If thou wilt hear the name of this virtue, and what it was called by the philosophers, know that humility which God regards is the same as what they called metriotes, i.e., measure or moderation. Now this evidently pertains to modesty or temperance. Therefore humility is a part of modesty or temperance. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 137, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 157, A. 3, ad 2), in assigning parts to a virtue we consider chiefly the likeness that results from the mode of the virtue. Now the mode of temperance, whence it chiefly derives its praise, is the restraint or suppression of the impetuosity of a passion. Hence whatever virtues restrain or suppress, and the actions which moderate the impetuosity of the emotions, are reckoned parts of temperance. Now just as meekness suppresses the movement of anger, so does humility suppress the movement of hope, which is the movement of a spirit aiming at great things. Wherefore, like meekness, humility is accounted a part of temperance. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a man who aims at small things in proportion to his mode is not magnanimous but temperate, and such a man we may call humble. Moreover, for the reason given above (Q. 160, A. 2), among the various parts of temperance, the one under which humility is comprised is modesty as understood by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54), inasmuch as humility is nothing else than a moderation of spirit: wherefore it is written (1 Pet 3:4): In the incorruptibility of a quiet and meek spirit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutes theoloReply Obj. 1: The theological virtues, whose object is gicae, quae sunt circa ultimum finem, qui est primum our last end, which is the first principle in matters of apprincipium in appetibilibus, sunt causae omnium alia- petite, are the causes of all the other virtues. Hence the fact

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rum virtutum. Unde ex hoc quod humilitas causatur ex reverentia divina, non excluditur quin humilitas sit pars modestiae vel temperantiae. Ad secundum dicendum quod partes principalibus virtutibus assignantur, non secundum convenientiam in subiecto vel in materia, sed secundum convenientiam in modo formali, ut dictum est. Et ideo, licet humilitas sit in irascibili sicut in subiecto, ponitur tamen pars modestiae et temperantiae propter modum. Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet magnanimitas et humilitas in materia conveniant, differunt tamen in modo, ratione cuius magnanimitas ponitur pars fortitudinis, humilitas autem pars temperantiae.

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that humility is caused by reverence for God does not prevent it from being a part of modesty or temperance. Reply Obj. 2: Parts are assigned to a principal virtue by reason of a sameness, not of subject or matter, but of formal mode, as stated above (Q. 137, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 157, A. 3, ad 2). Consequently, although humility is in the irascible as its subject, it is assigned as a part of modesty or temperance by reason of its mode. Reply Obj. 3: Although humility and magnanimity agree as to matter, they differ as to mode, by reason of which magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude, and humility a part of temperance.

Article 5 Whether humility is the greatest of the virtues? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod humilitas sit potissima virtutum. Dicit enim Chrysostomus, exponens illud quod dicitur Luc. XVIII de Pharisaeo et publicano, quod, si mixta delictis humilitas tam facile currit ut iustitiam superbiae coniunctam transeat, si iustitiae coniunxeris eam, quo non ibit? Assistet ipsi tribunali divino in medio Angelorum. Et sic patet quod humilitas praefertur iustitiae. Sed iustitia vel est praeclarissima virtutum, vel includit in se omnes virtutes, ut patet per philosophum, in V Ethic. Ergo humilitas est maxima virtutum. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Verb. Dom., cogitas magnam fabricam construere celsitudinis? De fundamento prius cogita humilitatis. Ex quo videtur quod humilitas sit fundamentum omnium virtutum. Ergo videtur esse potior aliis. Praeterea, maiori virtuti maius debetur praemium. Sed humilitati debetur maximum praemium, quia qui se humiliat, exaltabitur, ut dicitur Luc. XIV. Ergo humilitas est maxima virtutum. Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., tota vita Christi in terris, per hominem quem suscipere dignatus est, disciplina morum fuit. Praecipue humilitatem suam imitandam proposuit. Dicens, Matth. XI, discite a me, quia mitis sum et humilis corde. Et Gregorius dicit, in Pastoral., quod argumentum redemptionis nostrae inventa est humilitas Dei. Ergo humilitas videtur esse maxima virtutum.

Objection 1: It would seem that humility is the greatest of the virtues. For Chrysostom, expounding the story of the Pharisee and the publican (Luke 18), says that if humility is such a fleet runner even when hampered by sin that it overtakes the justice that is the companion of pride, whither will it not reach if you couple it with justice? It will stand among the angels by the judgment seat of God. Hence it is clear that humility is set above justice. Now justice is either the most exalted of all the virtues, or includes all virtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore humility is the greatest of the virtues. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom.): Are you thinking of raising the great fabric of spirituality? Attend first of all to the foundation of humility. Now this would seem to imply that humility is the foundation of all virtue. Therefore apparently it is greater than the other virtues. Obj. 3: Further, the greater virtue deserves the greater reward. Now the greatest reward is due to humility, since he that humbleth himself shall be exalted (Luke 14:11). Therefore humility is the greatest of virtues. Obj. 4: Further, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 16), Christ’s whole life on earth was a lesson in moral conduct through the human nature which He assumed. Now He especially proposed His humility for our example, saying (Matt 11:29): Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart. Moreover, Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 1) that the lesson proposed to us in the mystery of our redemption is the humility of God. Therefore humility would seem to be the greatest of virtues. Sed contra est quod caritas praefertur omnibus On the contrary, Charity is set above all the virtues, virtutibus, secundum illud Coloss. III, super omnia, cari- according to Col. 3:14, Above all . . . things have charity. tatem habete. Non ergo humilitas est maxima virtutum. Therefore humility is not the greatest of virtues. Respondeo dicendum quod bonum humanae virI answer that, The good of human virtue pertains tutis in ordine rationis consistit. Qui quidem principali- to the order of reason: which order is considered chiefly

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ter attenditur respectu finis. Unde virtutes theologicae, quae habent ultimum finem pro obiecto, sunt potissimae. Secundario autem attenditur prout secundum rationem finis ordinantur ea quae sunt ad finem. Et haec quidem ordinatio essentialiter consistit in ipsa ratione ordinante, participative autem in appetitu per rationem ordinato. Quam quidem ordinationem universaliter facit iustitia, praesertim legalis. Ordinationi autem facit hominem bene subiectum humilitas in universali quantum ad omnia, quaelibet autem alia virtus quantum ad aliquam materiam specialem. Et ideo post virtutes theologicas; et virtutes intellectuales, quae respiciunt ipsam rationem; et post iustitiam, praesertim legalem; potior ceteris est humilitas. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod humilitas iustitiae non praefertur, sed iustitiae cui superbia coniungitur, quae iam desinit esse virtus. Sicut e contrario peccatum per humilitatem remittitur, nam et de publicano dicitur, Luc. XVIII, quod merito humilitatis descendit iustificatus in domum suam. Unde et Chrysostomus dicit, geminas bigas mihi accommodes, alteram quidem iustitiae et superbiae; alteram vero peccati et humilitatis. Et videbis peccatum praevertens iustitiam, non propriis, sed humilitatis coniugae viribus, aliud vero par videbis devictum, non fragilitate iustitiae, sed mole et tumore superbiae. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut ordinata virtutum congregatio per quandam similitudinem aedificio comparatur, ita etiam illud quod est primum in acquisitione virtutum, fundamento comparatur, quod primum in aedificio iacitur. Virtutes autem verae infunduntur a Deo. Unde primum in acquisitione virtutum potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum removentis prohibens. Et sic humilitas primum locum tenet, inquantum scilicet expellit superbiam, cui Deus resistit, et praebet hominem subditum et semper patulum ad suscipiendum influxum divinae gratiae, inquantum evacuat inflationem superbiae; ut dicitur Iac. IV, quod Deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam. Et secundum hoc, humilitas dicitur spiritualis aedificii fundamentum. Alio modo est aliquid primum in virtutibus directe, per quod scilicet iam ad Deum acceditur. Primus autem accessus ad Deum est per fidem, secundum illud Heb. XI, accedentem ad Deum oportet credere. Et secundum hoc, fides ponitur fundamentum, nobiliori modo quam humilitas. Ad tertium dicendum quod contemnenti terrena promittuntur caelestia, sicut contemnentibus divitias terrenas promittuntur caelestes thesauri, secundum illud Matth. VI, nolite thesaurizare vobis thesauros in terra, sed thesaurizate vobis thesauros in coelo; et similiter contemnentibus mundi gaudia promittuntur consolationes caelestes, secundum illud Matth. V, beati qui lugent, quoniam ipsi consolabuntur. Et eodem modo humilitati promittitur spiritualis exaltatio, non quia ipsa sola eam

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in reference to the end: wherefore the theological virtues are the greatest because they have the last end for their object. Secondarily, however, it is considered in reference to the ordering of the means to the end. This ordinance, as to its essence, is in the reason itself from which it issues, but by participation it is in the appetite ordered by the reason; and this ordinance is the effect of justice, especially of legal justice. Now humility makes a man a good subject to ordinance of all kinds and in all matters; while every other virtue has this effect in some special matter. Therefore after the theological virtues, after the intellectual virtues which regard the reason itself, and after justice, especially legal justice, humility stands before all others. Reply Obj. 1: Humility is not set before justice, but before that justice which is coupled with pride, and is no longer a virtue; even so, on the other hand, sin is pardoned through humility: for it is said of the publican (Luke 18:14) that through the merit of his humility he went down into his house justified. Hence Chrysostom says: Bring me a pair of two-horse chariots: in the one harness pride with justice, in the other sin with humility: and you will see that sin outrunning justice wins not by its own strength, but by that of humility: while you will see the other pair beaten, not by the weakness of justice, but by the weight and size of pride. Reply Obj. 2: Just as the orderly assembly of virtues is, by reason of a certain likeness, compared to a building, so again that which is the first step in the acquisition of virtue is likened to the foundation, which is first laid before the rest of the building. Now the virtues are in truth infused by God. Wherefore the first step in the acquisition of virtue may be understood in two ways. First by way of removing obstacles: and thus humility holds the first place, inasmuch as it expels pride, which God resisteth, and makes man submissive and ever open to receive the influx of Divine grace. Hence it is written (Jas 4:6): God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace to the humble. In this sense humility is said to be the foundation of the spiritual edifice. Second, a thing is first among virtues directly, because it is the first step towards God. Now the first step towards God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6, He that cometh to God must believe. In this sense faith is the foundation in a more excellent way than humility. Reply Obj. 3: To him that despises earthly things, heavenly things are promised: thus heavenly treasures are promised to those who despise earthly riches, according to Matt. 6:19, 20, Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth . . . but lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven. Likewise heavenly consolations are promised to those who despise worldly joys, according to Matt. 4:5, Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted. In the same way spiritual uplifting is promised to humility, not that humility alone

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mereatur, sed quia eius est proprium contemnere sublimitatem terrenam. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de poenitentia, ne putes eum qui se humiliat, semper iacere, cum dictum sit, exaltabitur. Et ne opineris eius exaltationem in oculis hominum per sublimitates fieri corporales. Ad quartum dicendum quod ideo Christus praecipue humilitatem nobis commendavit, quia per hoc maxime removetur impedimentum humanae salutis, quae consistit in hoc quod homo ad caelestia et spiritualia tendat, a quibus homo impeditur dum in terrenis magnificari studet. Et ideo dominus, ut impedimentum salutis auferret, exteriorem celsitudinem contemnendam monstravit per humilitatis exempla. Et sic humilitas est quasi quaedam dispositio ad liberum accessum hominis in spiritualia et divina bona. Sicut ergo perfectio est potior dispositione, ita etiam caritas et aliae virtutes quibus homo directe movetur in Deum, sunt potiores humilitate.

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merits it, but because it is proper to it to despise earthly uplifting. Wherefore Augustine says (De Poenit.): Think not that he who humbles himself remains for ever abased, for it is written: ‘He shall be exalted.’ And do not imagine that his exaltation in men’s eyes is effected by bodily uplifting. Reply Obj. 4: The reason why Christ chiefly proposed humility to us, was because it especially removes the obstacle to man’s spiritual welfare consisting in man’s aiming at heavenly and spiritual things, in which he is hindered by striving to become great in earthly things. Hence our Lord, in order to remove an obstacle to our spiritual welfare, showed by giving an example of humility, that outward exaltation is to be despised. Thus humility is, as it were, a disposition to man’s untrammeled access to spiritual and divine goods. Accordingly as perfection is greater than disposition, so charity, and other virtues whereby man approaches God directly, are greater than humility.

Article 6 Whether twelve degrees of humility are fittingly distinguished in the Rule of the blessed Benedict? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur duodecim gradus humilitatis qui in regula beati Benedicti ponuntur, quorum primus est, corde et corpore semper humilitatem ostendere, defixis in terram aspectibus; secundus, ut pauca verba, et rationabilia loquatur aliquis, non clamosa voce; tertius, ut non sit facilis aut promptus in risum; quartus, taciturnitas usque ad interrogationem; quintus, tenere quod habet communis monasterii regula; sextus, credere et pronuntiare se omnibus viliorem; septimus, ad omnia indignum et inutilem se confiteri et credere; octavus, confessio peccatorum; nonus, pro obedientia in duris et asperis patientiam amplecti; decimus, ut cum obedientia se subdat maiori; undecimus, ut voluntatem propriam non delectetur implere; duodecimus, ut Deum timeat, et memor sit omnium quae praecepit. Enumerantur enim hic quaedam quae ad alias virtutes pertinent, sicut obedientia et patientia. Enumerantur etiam aliqua quae ad falsam opinionem pertinere videntur, quae nulli virtuti potest competere, scilicet quod aliquis pronuntiet se omnibus viliorem, quod ad omnia indignum et inutilem se confiteatur et credat. Ergo inconvenienter ista ponuntur inter gradus humilitatis. Praeterea, humilitas ab interioribus ad exteriora procedit, sicut et ceterae virtutes. Inconvenienter igitur praemittuntur in praemissis gradibus illa quae pertinent ad exteriores actus, his quae pertinent ad interiores. Praeterea, Anselmus, in libro de similitudinibus, ponit septem humilitatis gradus, quorum primus est,

Objection 1: It would seem that the twelve degrees of humility that are set down in the Rule of the Blessed Benedict are unfittingly distinguished. The first is to be humble not only in heart, but also to show it in one’s very person, one’s eyes fixed on the ground; the second is to speak few and sensible words, and not to be loud of voice; the third is not to be easily moved, and disposed to laughter; the fourth is to maintain silence until one is asked; the fifth is to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery; the sixth is to believe and acknowledge oneself viler than all; the seventh is to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all purposes; the eighth is to confess one’s sin; the ninth is to embrace patience by obeying under difficult and contrary circumstances; the tenth is to subject oneself to a superior; the eleventh is not to delight in fulfilling one’s own desires; the twelfth is to fear God and to be always mindful of everything that God has commanded. For among these there are some things pertaining to the other virtues, such as obedience and patience. Again there are some that seem to involve a false opinion—and this is inconsistent with any virtue—namely to declare oneself more despicable than all men, and to confess and believe oneself to be in all ways worthless and unprofitable. Therefore these are unfittingly placed among the degrees of humility. Obj. 2: Further, humility proceeds from within to externals, as do other virtues. Therefore in the aforesaid degrees, those which concern outward actions are unfittingly placed before those which pertain to inward actions. Obj. 3: Further, Anselm (De Simil. ci, seqq.) gives seven degrees of humility, the first of which is to acknowledge one-

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contemptibilem se esse cognoscere; secundus, de hoc dolere; tertius, hoc confiteri; quartus, hoc persuadere, ut scilicet velit hoc credi; quintus, ut patienter sustineat hoc dici; sextus, ut patiatur contemptibiliter se tractari; septimus, ut hoc amet. Ergo videntur praemissi gradus esse superflui. Praeterea, Matth. III dicit Glossa, perfecta humilitas tres habet gradus. Primus est subdere se maiori, et non praeferre se aequali, qui est sufficiens. Secundus est subdere se aequali, nec praeferre se minori, et hic dicitur abundans. Tertius gradus est subesse minori, in quo est omnis iustitia. Ergo praemissi gradus videntur esse superflui.

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Virginit., mensura humilitatis cuique ex mensura ipsius magnitudinis data est, cui est periculosa superbia, quae amplius amplioribus insidiatur. Sed mensura magnitudinis humanae non potest sub certo numero graduum determinari. Ergo videtur quod non possint determinati gradus humilitatis assignari. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, humilitas essentialiter in appetitu consistit, secundum quod aliquis refrenat impetum animi sui, ne inordinate tendat in magna, sed regulam habet in cognitione, ut scilicet aliquis non se existimet esse supra id quod est. Et utriusque principium et radix est reverentia quam quis habet ad Deum. Ex interiori autem dispositione humilitatis procedunt quaedam exteriora signa in verbis et factis et gestibus, quibus id quod interius latet manifestatur, sicut et in ceteris virtutibus accidit, nam ex visu cognoscitur vir, et ab occursu faciei sensatus, ut dicitur Eccli. XIX. Et ideo in praedictis gradibus humilitatis ponitur aliquid quod pertinet ad humilitatis radicem, scilicet duodecimus gradus, qui est, ut homo Deum timeat, et memor sit omnium quae praecepit. Ponitur etiam aliquid pertinens ad appetitum, ne scilicet in propriam excellentiam inordinate tendat. Quod quidem fit tripliciter. Uno modo, ut non sequatur homo propriam voluntatem, quod pertinet ad undecimum gradum. Alio modo, ut regulet eam secundum superioris arbitrium, quod pertinet ad gradum decimum. Tertio modo, ut ab hoc non desistat propter dura et aspera quae occurrunt, et hoc pertinet ad nonum. Ponuntur etiam quaedam pertinentia ad existimationem hominis recognoscentis suum defectum. Et hoc tripliciter. Uno quidem modo, per hoc quod proprios defectus recognoscat et confiteatur, quod pertinet ad octavum gradum. Secundo, ut ex consideratione sui defectus aliquis insufficientem se existimet ad maiora, quod pertinet ad septimum. Tertio, ut quantum ad hoc sibi alios praeferat, quod pertinet ad sextum. Ponuntur etiam quaedam quae pertinent ad exteriora signa. Quorum unum est in factis, ut scilicet homo

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self contemptible; the second, to grieve for this; the third, to confess it; the fourth, to convince others of this, that is to wish them to believe it; the fifth, to bear patiently that this be said of us; the sixth, to suffer oneself to be treated with contempt; the seventh, to love being thus treated. Therefore the aforesaid degrees would seem to be too numerous. Obj. 4: Further, a gloss on Matt. 3:15 says: Perfect humility has three degrees. The first is to subject ourselves to those who are above us, and not to set ourselves above our equals: this is sufficient. The second is to submit to our equals, and not to set ourselves before our inferiors; this is called abundant humility. The third degree is to subject ourselves to inferiors, and in this is perfect righteousness. Therefore the aforesaid degrees would seem to be too numerous. Obj. 5: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi): The measure of humility is apportioned to each one according to his rank. It is imperiled by pride, for the greater a man is the more liable is he to be entrapped. Now the measure of a man’s greatness cannot be fixed according to a definite number of degrees. Therefore it would seem that it is not possible to assign the aforesaid degrees to humility. I answer that, As stated above (A. 2) humility has essentially to do with the appetite, insofar as a man restrains the impetuosity of his soul, from tending inordinately to great things: yet its rule is in the cognitive faculty, in that we should not deem ourselves to be above what we are. Also, the principle and origin of both these things is the reverence we bear to God. Now the inward disposition of humility leads to certain outward signs in words, deeds, and gestures, which manifest that which is hidden within, as happens also with the other virtues. For a man is known by his look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, by his countenance (Sir 19:26). Wherefore the aforesaid degrees of humility include something regarding the root of humility, namely the twelfth degree, that a man fear God and bear all His commandments in mind. Again, they include certain things with regard to the appetite, lest one aim inordinately at one’s own excellence. This is done in three ways. First, by not following one’s own will, and this pertains to the eleventh degree; second, by regulating it according to one’s superior judgment, and this applies to the tenth degree; third, by not being deterred from this on account of the difficulties and hardships that come in our way, and this belongs to the ninth degree. Certain things also are included referring to the estimate a man forms in acknowledging his own deficiency, and this in three ways. First by acknowledging and avowing his own shortcomings; this belongs to the eighth degree: second, by deeming oneself incapable of great things, and this pertains to the seventh degree: third, that in this respect one should put others before oneself, and this belongs to the sixth degree. Again, some things are included that refer to outward signs. One of these regards deeds, namely that in one’s work

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non recedat in suis operibus a via communi, quod pertinet ad quintum. Alia duo sunt in verbis, ut scilicet homo non praeripiat tempus loquendi, quod pertinet ad quartum; nec excedat modum in loquendo, quod pertinet ad secundum. Alia vero consistunt in exterioribus gestibus, puta in reprimendo extollentiam oculorum, quod pertinet ad primum; et in cohibendo exterius risum et alia ineptae laetitiae signa, quod pertinet ad tertium. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquis absque falsitate potest se credere et pronuntiare omnibus viliorem, secundum defectus occultos quos in se recognoscit, et dona Dei quae in aliis latent. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de Virginit., existimate aliquos in occulto superiores, quibus estis in manifesto meliores. Similiter etiam absque falsitate potest aliquis confiteri et credere ad omnia se inutilem et indignum, secundum proprias vires, ut sufficientiam suam totam in Deum referat, secundum illud II ad Cor. III, non quod sufficientes simus cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est. Non est autem inconveniens quod ea quae ad alias virtutes pertinent, humilitati adscribantur. Quia sicut unum vitium oritur ex alio, ita naturali ordine actus unius virtutis procedit ex actu alterius. Ad secundum dicendum quod homo ad humilitatem pervenit per duo. Primo quidem et principaliter, per gratiae donum. Et quantum ad hoc, interiora praecedunt exteriora. Aliud autem est humanum studium, per quod homo prius exteriora cohibet, et postmodum pertingit ad extirpandum interiorem radicem. Et secundum hunc ordinem assignantur hic humilitatis gradus. Ad tertium dicendum quod omnes gradus quos Anselmus ponit, reducuntur ad opinionem et manifestationem et voluntatem propriae abiectionis. Nam primus gradus pertinet ad cognitionem proprii defectus. Sed quia vituperabile esset si quis proprium defectum amaret, hoc per secundum gradum excluditur. Sed ad manifestationem sui defectus pertinent tertius et quartus gradus, ut scilicet aliquis non solum simpliciter suum defectum enuntiet, sed etiam persuadeat. Alii autem tres gradus pertinent ad appetitum. Qui excellentiam exteriorem non quaerit, sed exteriorem abiectionem vel aequanimiter patitur, sive in verbis sive in factis, quia, sicut Gregorius dicit, in registro, non grande est his nos esse humiles a quibus honoramur, quia et hoc saeculares quilibet faciunt, sed illis maxime humiles esse debemus a quibus aliqua patimur. Et hoc pertinet ad quintum et sextum gradum. Vel etiam desideranter exteriorem abiectionem amplectitur, quod pertinet ad septimum gradum. Et sic omnes isti gradus continentur sub sexto et septimo superius enumeratis. Ad quartum dicendum quod illi gradus accipiuntur non ex parte ipsius rei, idest secundum naturam hu-

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one should not depart from the ordinary way; this applies to the fifth degree. Two others have reference to words, namely that one should not be in a hurry to speak, which pertains to the fourth degree, and that one be not immoderate in speech, which refers to the second. The others have to do with outward gestures, for instance in restraining haughty looks, which regards the first, and in outwardly checking laughter and other signs of senseless mirth, and this belongs to the third degree. Reply Obj. 1: It is possible, without falsehood, to deem and avow oneself the most despicable of men, as regards the hidden faults which we acknowledge in ourselves, and the hidden gifts of God which others have. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. lii): Bethink you that some persons are in some hidden way better than you, although outwardly you are better than they. Again, without falsehood one may avow and believe oneself in all ways unprofitable and useless in respect of one’s own capability, so as to refer all one’s sufficiency to God, according to 2 Cor. 3:5, Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is from God. And there is nothing unbecoming in ascribing to humility those things that pertain to other virtues, since, just as one vice arises from another, so, by a natural sequence, the act of one virtue proceeds from the act of another. Reply Obj. 2: Man arrives at humility in two ways. First and chiefly by a gift of grace, and in this way the inner man precedes the outward man. The other way is by human effort, whereby he first of all restrains the outward man, and afterwards succeeds in plucking out the inward root. It is according to this order that the degrees of humility are here enumerated. Reply Obj. 3: All the degrees mentioned by Anselm are reducible to knowledge, avowal, and desire of one’s own abasement. For the first degree belongs to the knowledge of one’s own deficiency; but since it would be wrong for one to love one’s own failings, this is excluded by the second degree. The third and fourth degrees regard the avowal of one’s own deficiency; namely that not merely one simply assert one’s failing, but that one convince another of it. The other three degrees have to do with the appetite, which seeks, not outward excellence, but outward abasement, or bears it with equanimity, whether it consist of words or deeds. For as Gregory says (Regist. ii, 10, Ep. 36), there is nothing great in being humble towards those who treat us with regard, for even worldly people do this: but we should especially be humble towards those who make us suffer, and this belongs to the fifth and sixth degrees: or the appetite may even go so far as lovingly to embrace external abasement, and this pertains to the seventh degree; so that all these degrees are comprised under the sixth and seventh mentioned above. Reply Obj. 4: These degrees refer, not to the thing itself, namely the nature of humility, but to the degrees

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militatis, sed per comparationem ad gradus hominum, qui sunt vel maiores vel minores vel aequales. Ad quintum dicendum quod etiam illa ratio procedit ex gradibus humilitatis non secundum ipsam naturam rei, secundum quam assignantur praemissi gradus, sed secundum diversas hominum conditiones.

Q. 161, A. 6

among men, who are either of higher or lower or of equal degree. Reply Obj. 5: This argument also considers the degrees of humility not according to the nature of the thing, in respect of which the aforesaid degrees are assigned, but according to the various conditions of men.

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Question 162 Pride Deinde considerandum est de superbia. Et primo, de We must next consider pride, and (1) pride in general; superbia in communi; secundo, de peccato primi homi- (2) the first man’s sin, which we hold to have been pride. nis, quod ponitur esse superbia. Circa primum quaerun- Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: tur octo. Primo, utrum superbia sit peccatum. (1) Whether pride is a sin? Secundo, utrum sit vitium speciale. (2) Whether it is a special vice? Tertio, in quo sit sicut in subiecto. (3) Wherein does it reside as in its subject? Quarto, de speciebus eius. (4) Of its species; Quinto, utrum sit peccatum mortale. (5) Whether it is a mortal sin? Sexto, utrum sit gravissimum omnium peccatorum. (6) Whether it is the most grievous of all sins? Septimo, de ordine eius ad alia peccata. (7) Of its relation to other sins; Octavo, utrum debeat poni vitium capitale. (8) Whether it should be reckoned a capital vice?

Article 1 Whether pride is a sin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod superbia non sit peccatum. Nullum enim peccatum est repromissum a Deo, promittit enim Deus quod ipse facturus est; non est autem auctor peccati. Sed superbia connumeratur inter repromissiones divinas, dicitur enim Isaiae LX, ponam te in superbiam saeculorum, gaudium in generatione et generationem. Ergo superbia non est peccatum. Praeterea, appetere divinam similitudinem non est peccatum, hoc enim naturaliter appetit quaelibet creatura, et in hoc optimum eius consistit. Et praecipue hoc convenit rationali creaturae, quae facta est ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei. Sed sicut dicitur in libro sententiarum prosperi, superbia est amor propriae excellentiae, per quam homo Deo similatur, qui est excellentissimus, unde dicit Augustinus, in II Confess., superbia celsitudinem imitatur, cum tu sis unus super omnia Deus excelsus. Ergo superbia non est peccatum. Praeterea, peccatum non solum contrariatur virtuti, sed etiam opposito vitio, ut patet per philosophum, in II Ethic. Sed nullum vitium invenitur oppositum esse superbiae. Ergo superbia non est peccatum. Sed contra est quod dicitur Tobiae IV, superbiam nunquam in tuo sensu aut in tuo verbo dominari permittas. Respondeo dicendum quod superbia nominatur ex hoc quod aliquis per voluntatem tendit supra id quod est, unde dicit Isidorus, in libro Etymol., superbus dictus est quia super vult videri quam est, qui enim vult super-

Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a sin. For no sin is the object of God’s promise. For God’s promises refer to what He will do; and He is not the author of sin. Now pride is numbered among the Divine promises: for it is written (Isa 60:15): I will make thee to be an everlasting pride, a joy unto generation and generation. Therefore pride is not a sin. Obj. 2: Further, it is not a sin to wish to be like unto God: for every creature has a natural desire for this; and especially does this become the rational creature which is made to God’s image and likeness. Now it is said in Prosper’s Lib. Sent. 294, that pride is love of one’s own excellence, whereby one is likened to God who is supremely excellent. Hence Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): Pride imitates exaltedness; whereas Thou alone art God exalted over all. Therefore pride is not a sin. Obj. 3: Further, a sin is opposed not only to a virtue but also to a contrary vice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But no vice is found to be opposed to pride. Therefore pride is not a sin. On the contrary, It is written (Tob 4:14): Never suffer pride to reign in thy mind or in thy words. I answer that, Pride (superbia) is so called because a man thereby aims higher (supra) than he is; wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x): A man is said to be proud, because he wishes to appear above (super) what he really is; for he

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Q. 162, A. 1

Temperance

gredi quod est, superbus est. Habet autem hoc ratio recta, ut voluntas uniuscuiusque feratur in id quod est proportionatum sibi. Et ideo manifestum est quod superbia importat aliquid quod adversatur rationi rectae. Hoc autem facit rationem peccati, quia secundum Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom., malum animae est praeter rationem esse. Unde manifestum est quod superbia est peccatum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod superbia dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, ex eo quod supergreditur regulam rationis. Et sic dicimus eam esse peccatum. Alio modo potest superbia nominari simpliciter a superexcessu. Et secundum hoc, omne superexcedens potest nominari superbia. Et ita repromittitur a Deo superbia, quasi quidam superexcessus bonorum. Unde et Glossa Hieronymi dicit, ibidem, quod est superbia bona, et mala. Quamvis etiam dici possit quod superbia ibi accipitur materialiter pro abundantia rerum de quibus possunt homines superbire. Ad secundum dicendum quod eorum quae naturaliter homo appetit, ratio est ordinatrix, et ita, si aliquis a regula rationis recedit, vel in plus vel in minus, erit talis appetitus vitiosus; sicut patet de appetitu cibi, qui naturaliter desideratur. Superbia autem appetit excellentiam in excessu ad rationem rectam, unde Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod superbia est perversae celsitudinis appetitus. Et inde est etiam quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, superbia perverse imitatur Deum. Odit namque cum sociis aequalitatem sub illo, sed imponere vult sociis dominationem suam pro illo. Ad tertium dicendum quod superbia directe opponitur virtuti humilitatis, quae quodammodo circa eadem magnanimitati existit, ut supra dictum est. Unde et vitium quod opponitur superbiae in defectum vergens, propinquum est vitio pusillanimitatis, quae opponitur magnanimitati secundum defectum. Nam sicut ad magnanimitatem pertinet impellere animum ad magna, contra desperationem; ita ad humilitatem pertinet retrahere animum ab inordinato appetitu magnorum, contra praesumptionem. Pusillanimitas autem, si importet defectum a prosecutione magnorum, proprie opponitur magnanimitati per modum defectus; si autem importet applicationem animi ad aliqua viliora quam hominem deceant, opponetur humilitati secundum defectum, utrumque enim ex animi parvitate procedit. Sicut et e contrario superbia potest secundum superexcessum et magnanimitati et humilitati opponi, secundum rationes diversas, humilitati quidem, secundum quod subiectionem aspernatur; magnanimitati autem, secundum quod inordinate ad magna se extendit. Sed quia su-

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who wishes to overstep beyond what he is, is proud. Now right reason requires that every man’s will should tend to that which is proportionate to him. Therefore it is evident that pride denotes something opposed to right reason, and this shows it to have the character of sin, because according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 4), the soul’s evil is to be opposed to reason. Therefore it is evident that pride is a sin. Reply Obj. 1: Pride (superbia) may be understood in two ways. First, as overpassing (supergreditur) the rule of reason, and in this sense we say that it is a sin. Second, it may simply denominate super-abundance; in which sense any super-abundant thing may be called pride: and it is thus that God promises pride as significant of superabundant good. Hence a gloss of Jerome on the same passage (Isa 61:6) says that there is a good and an evil pride. It may also be replied that pride there signifies abundance of those things in which men may take pride. Reply Obj. 2: Reason has the direction of those things for which man has a natural appetite; so that if the appetite wander from the rule of reason, whether by excess or by default, it will be sinful, as is the case with the appetite for food which man desires naturally. Now pride is the appetite for excellence in excess of right reason. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13) that pride is the desire for inordinate exaltation: and hence it is that, as he asserts (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13; xix, 12), pride imitates God inordinately: for it hath equality of fellowship under Him, and wishes to usurp His dominion over our fellow-creatures. Reply Obj. 3: Pride is directly opposed to the virtue of humility, which, in a way, is concerned about the same matter as magnanimity, as stated above (Q. 161, A. 1, ad 3). Hence the vice opposed to pride by default is akin to the vice of pusillanimity, which is opposed by default to magnanimity. For just as it belongs to magnanimity to urge the mind to great things against despair, so it belongs to humility to withdraw the mind from the inordinate desire of great things against presumption. Now pusillanimity, if we take it for a deficiency in pursuing great things, is properly opposed to magnanimity by default; but if we take it for the mind’s attachment to things beneath what is becoming to a man, it is opposed to humility by default; since each proceeds from a smallness of mind. In the same way, on the other hand, pride may be opposed by excess, both to magnanimity and humility, from different points of view: to humility, inasmuch as it scorns subjection, to magnanimity, inasmuch as it tends to great things inordinately. Since, however, pride implies a certain elation, it is more directly opposed to humility, even as pusillanimity, which denotes

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Q. 162, A. 2

perbia superioritatem quandam importat, directius op- littleness of soul in tending towards great things, is more diponitur humilitati, sicut et pusillanimitas, quae importat rectly opposed to magnanimity. parvitatem animi in magna tendentis, directius opponitur magnanimitati.

Article 2 Whether pride is a special sin? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod superbia non sit speciale peccatum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Nat. et gratia, quod sine superbiae appellatione, nullum peccatum invenies. Et prosper dicit, in libro de vita Contemplat., nullum peccatum absque superbia potest, vel potuit esse, aut poterit. Ergo superbia est generale peccatum. Praeterea, Iob XXXIII, ut avertat hominem ab iniquitate, dicit Glossa quod contra conditorem superbire est eius praecepta peccando transcendere. Sed secundum Ambrosium, omne peccatum est transgressio legis divinae et caelestium inobedientia mandatorum. Ergo omne peccatum est superbia. Praeterea, omne peccatum speciale alicui speciali virtuti opponitur. Sed superbia opponitur omnibus virtutibus, dicit enim Gregorius, XXXIV Moral., superbia nequaquam est unius virtutis extinctione contenta, per cuncta animae membra se erigit, et quasi generalis ac pestifer morbus, corpus omne corrumpit. Et Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., quod est ruina omnium virtutum ergo superbia non est speciale peccatum. Praeterea, omne peccatum speciale habet specialem materiam. Sed superbia habet generalem materiam, dicit enim Gregorius, XXXIV Moral., quod alter intumescit auro, alter eloquio, alter infimis et terrenis rebus, alter summis caelestibusque virtutibus. Ergo superbia non est speciale peccatum, sed generale. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Nat. et gratia, quaerat, et inveniet, secundum legem Dei, superbiam esse peccatum multum discretum ab aliis vitiis. Genus autem non distinguitur a suis speciebus. Ergo superbia non est generale peccatum, sed speciale. Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum superbiae dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, secundum propriam speciem, quam habet ex ratione proprii obiecti. Et hoc modo superbia est speciale peccatum, quia habet speciale obiectum, est enim inordinatus appetitus propriae excellentiae, ut dictum est. Alio modo potest considerari secundum redundantiam quandam in alia peccata. Et secundum hoc, habet quandam generalitatem, inquantum scilicet ex superbia oriri possunt omnia peccata, duplici ratione. Uno modo, per se, inquantum scilicet alia peccata ordinantur ad finem superbiae, qui

Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a special sin. For Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that you will find no sin that is not labelled pride; and Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. iii, 2) that without pride no sin is, or was, or ever will be possible. Therefore pride is a general sin.

Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Job 33:17, That He may withdraw man from wickedness, says that a man prides himself when he transgresses His commandments by sin. Now according to Ambrose, every sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience of the heavenly commandments. Therefore every sin is pride. Obj. 3: Further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue. But pride is opposed to all the virtues, for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23): Pride is by no means content with the destruction of one virtue; it raises itself up against all the powers of the soul, and like an all-pervading and poisonous disease corrupts the whole body; and Isidore says (Etym. ) that it is the downfall of all virtues. Therefore pride is not a special sin. Obj. 4: Further, every special sin has a special matter. Now pride has a general matter, for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that one man is proud of his gold, another of his eloquence: one is elated by mean and earthly things, another by sublime and heavenly virtues. Therefore pride is not a special but a general sin. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix): If he look into the question carefully, he will find that, according to God’s law, pride is a very different sin from other vices. Now the genus is not different from its species. Therefore pride is not a general but a special sin. I answer that, The sin of pride may be considered in two ways. First with regard to its proper species, which it has under the aspect of its proper object. In this way pride is a special sin, because it has a special object: for it is inordinate desire of one’s own excellence, as stated (A. 1, ad 2). Second, it may be considered as having a certain influence towards other sins. In this way it has somewhat of a generic character, inasmuch as all sins may arise from pride, in two ways. First directly, through other sins being directed to the end of pride which is one’s own excellence, to which may be directed anything that is inordinately desired. Second,

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Q. 162, A. 2

Temperance

est propria excellentia, ad quam potest ordinari omne id quod quis inordinate appetit. Alio modo, indirecte et quasi per accidens, scilicet removendo prohibens, inquantum scilicet per superbiam homo contemnit divinam legem, per quam prohibetur a peccando; secundum illud Ierem. II, confregisti iugum, rupisti vincula, dixisti, non serviam. Sciendum tamen quod ad hanc generalitatem superbiae pertinet quod omnia vitia ex superbia interdum oriri possunt, non autem ad eam pertinet quod omnia vitia semper ex superbia oriantur. Quamvis enim omnia praecepta legis possit aliquis transgredi qualicumque peccato ex contemptu, qui pertinet ad superbiam; non tamen semper ex contemptu aliquis praecepta divina transgreditur, sed quandoque ex ignorantia, quandoque ex infirmitate. Et inde est quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Nat. et gratia, multa perperam fiunt, quae non fiunt superbe. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus illa verba inducit, in libro de Nat. et gratia, non ex persona sua, sed ex persona alterius, contra quem disputat. Unde et postmodum improbat ea, ostendens quod non semper ex superbia peccatur. Potest tamen dici quod auctoritates illae intelliguntur quantum ad exteriorem effectum superbiae, qui est transgredi praecepta, quod invenitur in quolibet peccato, non autem quantum ad interiorem actum superbiae, qui est contemptus praecepti. Non enim semper peccatum fit ex contemptu, sed quandoque ex ignorantia, quandoque ex infirmitate, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod quandoque aliquis committit aliquod peccatum secundum effectum, sed non secundum affectum, sicut ille qui ignoranter occidit patrem, committit parricidium secundum effectum, sed non secundum affectum, quia hoc non intendebat. Et secundum hoc, transgredi praeceptum Dei dicitur esse contra Deum superbire, secundum effectum quidem semper, non autem semper secundum affectum. Ad tertium dicendum quod peccatum aliquod potest corrumpere virtutem dupliciter. Uno modo, per directam contrarietatem ad virtutem. Et hoc modo superbia non corrumpit quamlibet virtutem, sed solam humilitatem, sicut et quodlibet aliud speciale peccatum corrumpit specialem virtutem sibi oppositam, contrarium agendo. Alio modo peccatum aliquod corrumpit virtutem abutendo ipsa virtute. Et sic superbia corrumpit quamlibet virtutem, inquantum scilicet ex ipsis virtutibus sumit occasionem superbiendi, sicut et quibuslibet aliis rebus ad excellentiam pertinentibus. Unde non sequitur quod sit generale peccatum. Ad quartum dicendum quod superbia attendit specialem rationem obiecti, quae tamen inveniri potest in

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indirectly and accidentally as it were, that is by removing an obstacle, since pride makes a man despise the Divine law which hinders him from sinning, according to Jer. 2:20, Thou hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and thou saidst: I will not serve.

It must, however, be observed that this generic character of pride admits of the possibility of all vices arising from pride sometimes, but it does not imply that all vices originate from pride always. For though one may break the commandments of the Law by any kind of sin, through contempt which pertains to pride, yet one does not always break the Divine commandments through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance, and sometimes through weakness: and for this reason Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that many things are done amiss which are not done through pride. Reply Obj. 1: These words are introduced by Augustine into his book De Nat. et Grat., not as being his own, but as those of someone with whom he is arguing. Hence he subsequently disproves the assertion, and shows that not all sins are committed through pride. We might, however, reply that these authorities must be understood as referring to the outward effect of pride, namely the breaking of the commandments, which applies to every sin, and not to the inward act of pride, namely contempt of the commandment. For sin is committed, not always through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance, sometimes through weakness, as stated above. Reply Obj. 2: A man may sometimes commit a sin effectively, but not affectively; thus he who, in ignorance, slays his father, is a parricide effectively, but not affectively, since he did not intend it. Accordingly he who breaks God’s commandment is said to pride himself against God, effectively always, but not always affectively.

Reply Obj. 3: A sin may destroy a virtue in two ways. In one way by direct contrariety to a virtue, and thus pride does not corrupt every virtue, but only humility; even as every special sin destroys the special virtue opposed to it, by acting counter thereto. In another way a sin destroys a virtue, by making ill use of that virtue: and thus pride destroys every virtue, insofar as it finds an occasion of pride in every virtue, just as in everything else pertaining to excellence. Hence it does not follow that it is a general sin.

Reply Obj. 4: Pride regards a special aspect in its object, which aspect may be found in various matters: for it is

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Q. 162, A. 3

diversis materiis. Est enim inordinatus amor propriae inordinate love of one’s excellence, and excellence may be excellentiae, excellentia autem potest in diversis rebus found in various things. inveniri.

Article 3 Whether the subject of pride is the irascible faculty? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod superbia non sit in irascibili sicut in subiecto. Dicit enim Gregorius, XXIII Moral., obstaculum veritatis tumor mentis est, quia, dum inflat, obnubilat. Sed cognitio veritatis non pertinet ad irascibilem, sed ad vim rationalem. Ergo superbia non est in irascibili. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, XXIV Moral., quod superbi non eorum vitam considerant quibus se humiliando postponant, sed quibus superbiendo se praeferant, et sic videtur superbia ex indebita consideratione procedere. Sed consideratio non pertinet ad irascibilem, sed potius ad rationalem. Ergo superbia non est in irascibili, sed potius in rationali. Praeterea, superbia non solum quaerit excellentiam in rebus sensibilibus, sed etiam in rebus spiritualibus et intelligibilibus ipsa etiam principaliter consistit in contemptu Dei, secundum illud Eccli. X, initium superbiae hominis est apostatare a Deo. Sed irascibilis, cum sit pars appetitus sensitivi, non potest se extendere in Deum et in intelligibilia. Ergo superbia non potest esse in irascibili. Praeterea, ut dicitur in libro sententiarum prosperi, superbia est amor propriae excellentiae. Sed amor non est in irascibili, sed in concupiscibili. Ergo superbia non est in irascibili. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, in II Moral., ponit contra superbiam donum timoris. Timor autem pertinet ad irascibilem. Ergo superbia est in irascibili. Respondeo dicendum quod subiectum cuiuslibet virtutis vel vitii oportet inquirere ex proprio obiecto, non enim potest esse aliud obiectum habitus vel actus nisi quod est obiectum potentiae quae utrique subiicitur. Proprium autem obiectum superbiae est arduum, est enim appetitus propriae excellentiae, ut dictum est. Unde oportet quod superbia aliquo modo ad vim irascibilem pertineat. Sed irascibilis dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, proprie. Et sic est pars appetitus sensitivi, sicut et ira proprie sumpta est quaedam passio sensitivi appetitus. Alio modo, potest accipi irascibilis largius, ut scilicet pertineat etiam ad appetitum intellectivum, cui etiam quandoque attribuitur ira, prout scilicet attribuimus iram Deo et Angelis, non quidem secundum passionem, sed secundum iudicium iustitiae iudicantis. Et tamen irascibilis sic communiter dicta non est potentia

Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of pride is not the irascible faculty. For Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17): A swollen mind is an obstacle to truth, for the swelling shuts out the light. Now the knowledge of truth pertains, not to the irascible but to the rational faculty. Therefore pride is not in the irascible. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 8) that the proud observe other people’s conduct not so as to set themselves beneath them with humility, but so as to set themselves above them with pride: wherefore it would seem that pride originates in undue observation. Now observation pertains not to the irascible but to the rational faculty. Obj. 3: Further, pride seeks pre-eminence not only in sensible things, but also in spiritual and intelligible things: while it consists essentially in the contempt of God, according to Ecclus. 10:14, The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God. Now the irascible, since it is a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot extend to God and things intelligible. Therefore pride cannot be in the irascible. Obj. 4: Further, as stated in Prosper’s Liber Sententiarum, sent. 294, Pride is love of one’s own excellence. But love is not in the irascible, but in the concupiscible. Therefore pride is not in the irascible. On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. ii, 49) opposes pride to the gift of fear. Now fear belongs to the irascible. Therefore pride is in the irascible. I answer that, The subject of any virtue or vice is to be ascertained from its proper object: for the object of a habit or act cannot be other than the object of the power, which is the subject of both. Now the proper object of pride is something difficult, for pride is the desire of one’s own excellence, as stated above (AA. 1, 2). Wherefore pride must needs pertain in some way to the irascible faculty. Now the irascible may be taken in two ways. First in a strict sense, and thus it is a part of the sensitive appetite, even as anger, strictly speaking, is a passion of the sensitive appetite. Second, the irascible may be taken in a broader sense, so as to belong also to the intellective appetite, to which also anger is sometimes ascribed. It is thus that we attribute anger to God and the angels, not as a passion, but as denoting the sentence of justice pronouncing judgment. Nevertheless the irascible understood in this broad sense is not dis-

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distincta a concupiscibili, ut patet ex his quae in primo dicta sunt. Si ergo arduum quod est obiectum superbiae, esset solum aliquid sensibile, in quod posset tendere appetitus sensitivus, oporteret quod superbia esset in irascibili quae est pars appetitus sensitivi. Sed quia arduum quod respicit superbia, communiter invenitur et in sensibilibus et in spiritualibus rebus necesse est dicere quod subiectum superbiae sit irascibilis non solum proprie sumpta, prout est pars appetitus sensitivi, sed etiam communius accepta, prout invenitur in appetitu intellectivo. Unde et in Daemonibus superbia ponitur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cognitio veritatis est duplex. Una pure speculativa. Et hanc superbia indirecte impedit, subtrahendo causam. Superbus enim neque Deo suum intellectum subiicit, ut ab eo veritatis cognitionem percipiat, secundum illud Matth. XI, abscondisti haec a sapientibus et prudentibus, idest a superbis, qui sibi sapientes et prudentes videntur, et revelasti ea parvulis, idest humilibus. Neque etiam ab hominibus addiscere dignantur, cum tamen dicatur, Eccli. VI, si inclinaveris aurem tuam. Scilicet humiliter audiendo, excipies doctrinam. Alia autem est cognitio veritatis affectiva. Et talem cognitionem veritatis directe impedit superbia. Quia superbi, dum delectantur in propria excellentia, excellentiam veritatis fastidiunt, ut Gregorius dicit, XXIII Moral., quod superbi et secreta quaedam intelligendo percipiunt, et eorum dulcedinem experiri non possunt, et si noverint quomodo sunt, ignorant quomodo sapiunt. Unde et Proverb. XI dicitur, ubi humilitas, ibi sapientia. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, humilitas attendit ad regulam rationis rectae, secundum quam aliquis veram existimationem de se habet. Hanc autem regulam rectae rationis non attendit superbia, sed de se maiora existimat quam sint. Quod contingit ex inordinato appetitu propriae excellentiae, quia quod quis vehementer desiderat, facile credit. Et ex hoc etiam eius appetitus in altiora fertur quam sibi conveniant. Et ideo quaecumque ad hoc conferant quod aliquis existimet se supra id quod est, inducunt hominem ad superbiam. Quorum unum est quod aliquis consideret defectus aliorum, sicut e contrario Gregorius, ibidem, dicit quod sancti viri virtutum consideratione vicissim sibi alios praeferunt. Ex hoc ergo non habetur quod superbia sit in rationali, sed quod aliqua causa eius in ratione existat. Ad tertium dicendum quod superbia non est solum in irascibili secundum quod est pars appetitus sensitivi, sed prout communius irascibilis accipitur, ut dictum est. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, amor praecedit omnes alias animi affectiones, et est causa earum. Et ideo potest poni pro

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tinct from the concupiscible power, as stated above in the First Part (Q. 59, A. 4; I-II, Q. 82, A. 5, ad 1 and 2). Consequently if the difficult thing which is the object of pride, were merely some sensible object, whereto the sensitive appetite might tend, pride would have to be in the irascible which is part of the sensitive appetite. But since the difficult thing which pride has in view is common both to sensible and to spiritual things, we must needs say that the subject of pride is the irascible not only strictly so called, as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also in its wider acceptation, as applicable to the intellective appetite. Wherefore pride is ascribed also to the demons. Reply Obj. 1: Knowledge of truth is twofold. One is purely speculative, and pride hinders this indirectly by removing its cause. For the proud man subjects not his intellect to God, that he may receive the knowledge of truth from Him, according to Matt. 11:25, Thou hast hid these things from the wise and the prudent, i.e., from the proud, who are wise and prudent in their own eyes, and hast revealed them to little ones, i.e., to the humble. Nor does he deign to learn anything from man, whereas it is written (Sir 6:34): If thou wilt incline thy ear, thou shalt receive instruction. The other knowledge of truth is affective, and this is directly hindered by pride, because the proud, through delighting in their own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth; thus Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17) that the proud, although certain hidden truths be conveyed to their understanding, cannot realize their sweetness: and if they know of them they cannot relish them. Hence it is written (Prov 11:2): Where humility is there also is wisdom. Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 161, AA. 2, 6), humility observes the rule of right reason whereby a man has true self-esteem. Now pride does not observe this rule of right reason, for he esteems himself greater than he is: and this is the outcome of an inordinate desire for his own excellence, since a man is ready to believe what he desires very much, the result being that his appetite is borne towards things higher than what become him. Consequently whatsoever things lead a man to inordinate self-esteem lead him to pride: and one of those is the observing of other people’s failings, just as, on the other hand, in the words of Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 17), holy men, by a like observation of other people’s virtues, set others above themselves. Accordingly the conclusion is not that pride is in the rational faculty, but that one of its causes is in the reason. Reply Obj. 3: Pride is in the irascible, not only as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also as having a more general signification, as stated above. Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), love precedes all other emotions of the soul, and is their cause, wherefore it may be employed to denote any of the

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qualibet aliarum affectionum. Et secundum hoc, superbia dicitur esse amor propriae excellentiae, inquantum ex amore causatur inordinata praesumptio alios superandi, quod proprie pertinet ad superbiam.

Q. 162, A. 4

other emotions. It is in this sense that pride is said to be love of one’s own excellence, inasmuch as love makes a man presume inordinately on his superiority over others, and this belongs properly to pride.

Article 4 Whether the four species of pride are fittingly assigned by Gregory? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter assignentur quatuor superbiae species quas Gregorius assignat, XXIII Moral., dicens, quatuor quippe sunt species quibus omnis tumor arrogantium demonstratur, cum bonum aut a semetipsis habere se aestimant; aut, si sibi datum desuper credunt, pro suis hoc accepisse meritis putant; aut cum iactant se habere quod non habent; aut, despectis ceteris, singulariter videri appetunt habere quod habent. Superbia enim est vitium distinctum ab infidelitate, sicut etiam humilitas est virtus distincta a fide. Sed quod aliquis existimet bonum se non habere a Deo, vel quod bonum gratiae habeat ex meritis propriis, ad infidelitatem pertinet. Ergo non debent poni species superbiae. Praeterea, idem non debet poni species diversorum generum. Sed iactantia ponitur species mendacii, ut supra habitum est. Non ergo debet poni species superbiae. Praeterea, quaedam alia videntur ad superbiam pertinere quae hic non connumerantur. Dicit enim Hieronymus quod nihil est tam superbum quam ingratum videri. Et Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod excusare se de peccato commisso ad superbiam pertinet. Praesumptio etiam, qua quis tendit ad assequendum aliquid quod supra se est, maxime ad superbiam pertinere videtur. Non ergo sufficienter praedicta divisio comprehendit superbiae species. Praeterea, inveniuntur aliae divisiones superbiae. Dividit enim Anselmus exaltationem superbiae, dicens quod quaedam est in voluntate, quaedam in sermone, quaedam in operatione. Bernardus etiam ponit duodecim gradus superbiae, qui sunt, curiositas, mentis levitas, inepta laetitia, iactantia, singularitas, arrogantia, praesumptio, defensio peccatorum, simulata confessio, rebellio, libertas, peccandi consuetudo. Quae non videntur comprehendi sub speciebus a Gregorio assignatis. Ergo videtur quod inconvenienter assignentur. In contrarium sufficiat auctoritas Gregorii. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, superbia importat immoderatum excellentiae appetitum, qui scilicet non est secundum rationem rectam. Est autem considerandum quod quaelibet excellentia consequitur aliquod bonum habitum. Quod quidem potest

Objection 1: It seems that the four species of pride are unfittingly assigned by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxiii, 6): There are four marks by which every kind of pride of the arrogant betrays itself; either when they think that their good is from themselves, or if they believe it to be from above, yet they think that it is due to their own merits; or when they boast of having what they have not, or despise others and wish to appear the exclusive possessors of what they have. For pride is a vice distinct from unbelief, just as humility is a distinct virtue from faith. Now it pertains to unbelief, if a man deem that he has not received his good from God, or that he has the good of grace through his own merits. Therefore this should not be reckoned a species of pride. Obj. 2: Further, the same thing should not be reckoned a species of different genera. Now boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as stated above (Q. 110, A. 2; Q. 112). Therefore it should not be accounted a species of pride. Obj. 3: Further, some other things apparently pertain to pride, which are not mentioned here. For Jerome says that nothing is so indicative of pride as to show oneself ungrateful: and Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 14) that it belongs to pride to excuse oneself of a sin one has committed. Again, presumption whereby one aims at having what is above one, would seem to have much to do with pride. Therefore the aforesaid division does not sufficiently account for the different species of pride. Obj. 4: Further, we find other divisions of pride. For Anselm divides the uplifting of pride, saying that there is pride of will, pride of speech, and pride of deed. Bernard also reckons twelve degrees of pride, namely curiosity, frivolity of mind, senseless mirth, boasting, singularity, arrogance, presumption, defense of one’s sins, deceitful confession, rebelliousness, license, sinful habit. Now these apparently are not comprised under the species mentioned by Gregory. Therefore the latter would seem to be assigned unfittingly. On the contrary, The authority of Gregory suffices. I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 2, 3), pride denotes immoderate desire of one’s own excellence, a desire, to wit, that is not in accord with right reason. Now it must be observed that all excellence results from a good possessed. Such a good may be considered in three ways.

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considerari tripliciter. Uno modo, secundum se. Manifestum est enim quod quanto maius est bonum quod quis habet, tanto per hoc maiorem excellentiam consequitur. Et ideo cum aliquis attribuit sibi maius bonum quam habeat, consequens est quod eius appetitus tendit in excellentiam propriam ultra modum sibi convenientem. Et sic est tertia superbiae species, cum scilicet aliquis iactat se habere quod non habet. Alio modo, ex parte causae, prout excellentius est quod aliquod bonum insit alicui a seipso, quam quod insit ei ab alio. Et ideo cum aliquis aestimat bonum quod habet ab alio, ac si haberet a seipso, fertur per consequens appetitus eius in propriam excellentiam supra suum modum. Est autem dupliciter aliquis causa sui boni, uno modo, efficienter; alio modo, meritorie. Et secundum hoc sumuntur duae primae superbiae species, scilicet, cum quis a semetipso habere aestimat quod a Deo habet; vel, cum propriis meritis sibi datum desuper credit. Tertio modo, ex parte modi habendi, prout excellentior aliquis redditur ex hoc quod aliquod bonum excellentius ceteris possidet. Unde et ex hoc etiam fertur inordinate appetitus in propriam excellentiam. Et secundum hoc sumitur quarta species superbiae, quae est cum aliquis, despectis ceteris, singulariter vult videri. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vera existimatio potest corrumpi dupliciter. Uno modo, in universali. Et sic, in his quae ad finem pertinent, corrumpitur vera existimatio per infidelitatem. Alio modo, in aliquo particulari eligibili. Et hoc non facit infidelitatem. Sicut ille qui fornicatur, aestimat pro tempore illo bonum esse sibi fornicari, nec tamen est infidelis, sicut esset si in universali diceret fornicationem esse bonam. Et ita etiam est in proposito. Nam dicere in universali aliquod bonum esse quod non est a Deo, vel gratiam hominibus pro meritis dari, pertinet ad infidelitatem. Sed quod aliquis, ex inordinato appetitu propriae excellentiae, ita de bonis suis glorietur ac si ea a se haberet vel ex meritis propriis, pertinet ad superbiam, et non ad infidelitatem, proprie loquendo. Ad secundum dicendum quod iactantia ponitur species mendacii quantum ad exteriorem actum, quo quis falso sibi attribuit quod non habet. Sed quantum ad interiorem cordis arrogantiam, ponitur a Gregorio species superbiae. Ad tertium dicendum quod ingratus est qui sibi attribuit quod ab alio habet. Unde duae primae superbiae species ad ingratitudinem pertinent. Quod autem aliquis se excuset de peccato quod habet, pertinet ad tertiam speciem, quia per hoc aliquis sibi attribuit bonum innocentiae, quod non habet. Quod autem aliquis prae-

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First, in itself. For it is evident that the greater the good that one has, the greater the excellence that one derives from it. Hence when a man ascribes to himself a good greater than what he has, it follows that his appetite tends to his own excellence in a measure exceeding his competency: and thus we have the third species of pride, namely boasting of having what one has not. Second, it may be considered with regard to its cause, insofar as to have a thing of oneself is more excellent than to have it of another. Hence when a man esteems the good he has received of another as though he had it of himself, the result is that his appetite is borne towards his own excellence immoderately. Now one is cause of one’s own good in two ways, efficiently and meritoriously: and thus we have the first two species of pride, namely when a man thinks he has from himself that which he has from God, or when he believes that which he has received from above to be due to his own merits. Third, it may be considered with regard to the manner of having it, insofar as a man obtains greater excellence through possessing some good more excellently than other men; the result again being that his appetite is borne inordinately towards his own excellence: and thus we have the fourth species of pride, which is when a man despises others and wishes to be singularly conspicuous. Reply Obj. 1: A true judgment may be destroyed in two ways. First, universally: and thus in matters of faith, a true judgment is destroyed by unbelief. Second, in some particular matter of choice, and unbelief does not do this. Thus a man who commits fornication, judges that for the time being it is good for him to commit fornication; yet he is not an unbeliever, as he would be, were he to say that universally fornication is good. It is thus in the question in point: for it pertains to unbelief to assert universally that there is a good which is not from God, or that grace is given to men for their merits, whereas, properly speaking, it belongs to pride and not to unbelief, through inordinate desire of one’s own excellence, to boast of one’s goods as though one had them of oneself, or of one’s own merits. Reply Obj. 2: Boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as regards the outward act whereby a man falsely ascribes to himself what he has not: but as regards the inward arrogance of the heart it is reckoned by Gregory to be a species of pride. Reply Obj. 3: The ungrateful man ascribes to himself what he has from another: wherefore the first two species of pride pertain to ingratitude. To excuse oneself of a sin one has committed, belongs to the third species, since by so doing a man ascribes to himself the good of innocence which he has not. To aim presumptuously at what is above one,

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sumptuose tendit in id quod supra ipsum est, praecipue videtur ad quartam speciem pertinere, secundum quam aliquis vult aliis praeferri. Ad quartum dicendum quod illa tria quae ponit Anselmus, accipiuntur secundum progressum peccati cuiuslibet, quod primo, corde concipitur; secundo, ore profertur; tertio, opere perficitur. Illa autem duodecim quae ponit Bernardus, sumuntur per oppositum ad duodecim gradus humilitatis, de quibus supra habitum est. Nam primus gradus humilitatis est, corde et corpore semper humilitatem ostendere, defixis in terram aspectibus. Cui opponitur curiositas, per quam aliquis curiose ubique et inordinate circumspicit. Secundus gradus humilitatis est, ut pauca verba et rationabilia loquatur aliquis, non clamosa voce. Contra quem opponitur levitas mentis, per quam scilicet homo superbe se habet in verbo. Tertius gradus humilitatis est, ut non sit facilis aut promptus in risu. Cui opponitur inepta laetitia. Quartus gradus humilitatis est taciturnitas usque ad interrogationem. Cui opponitur iactantia. Quintus gradus humilitatis est, tenere quod communis regula monasterii habet. Cui opponitur singularitas, per quam scilicet aliquis sanctior vult apparere. Sextus gradus humilitatis est, credere et pronuntiare se omnibus viliorem. Cui opponitur arrogantia, per quam scilicet homo se aliis praefert. Septimus gradus humilitatis est, ad omnia inutilem et indignum se confiteri et credere. Cui opponitur praesumptio, per quam scilicet aliquis reputat se sufficientem ad maiora. Octavus gradus humilitatis est confessio peccatorum. Cui opponitur defensio peccatorum. Nonus gradus est, in duris et asperis patientiam amplecti. Cui opponitur simulata confessio, per quam scilicet aliquis non vult subire poenam pro peccatis, quae simulate confitetur. Decimus gradus humilitatis est obedientia. Cui opponitur rebellio. Undecimus autem gradus est, ut homo non delectetur facere propriam voluntatem. Cui opponitur libertas, per quam scilicet homo delectatur libere facere quod vult. Ultimus autem gradus humilitatis est timor Dei. Cui opponitur peccandi consuetudo, quae implicat Dei contemptum.

Q. 162, A. 4

would seem to belong chiefly to the fourth species, which consists in wishing to be preferred to others.

Reply Obj. 4: The three mentioned by Anselm correspond to the progress of any particular sin: for it begins by being conceived in thought, then is uttered in word, and third is accomplished in deed. The twelve degrees mentioned by Bernard are reckoned by way of opposition to the twelve degrees of humility, of which we have spoken above (Q. 161, A. 6). For the first degree of humility is to be humble in heart, and to show it in one’s very person, one’s eyes fixed on the ground: and to this is opposed curiosity, which consists in looking around in all directions curiously and inordinately. The second degree of humility is to speak few and sensible words, and not to be loud of voice: to this is opposed frivolity of mind, by which a man is proud of speech. The third degree of humility is not to be easily moved and disposed to laughter, to which is opposed senseless mirth. The fourth degree of humility is to maintain silence until one is asked, to which is opposed boasting. The fifth degree of humility is to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery, to which is opposed singularity, whereby a man wishes to seem more holy than others. The sixth degree of humility is to believe and acknowledge oneself viler than all, to which is opposed arrogance, whereby a man sets himself above others. The seventh degree of humility is to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all purposes, to which is opposed presumption, whereby a man thinks himself capable of things that are above him. The eighth degree of humility is to confess one’s sins, to which is opposed defense of one’s sins. The ninth degree is to embrace patience by obeying under difficult and contrary circumstances, to which is opposed deceitful confession, whereby a man being unwilling to be punished for his sins confesses them deceitfully. The tenth degree of humility is obedience, to which is opposed rebelliousness. The eleventh degree of humility is not to delight in fulfilling one’s own desires; to this is opposed license, whereby a man delights in doing freely whatever he will. The last degree of humility is fear of God: to this is opposed the habit of sinning, which implies contempt of God. In his autem duodecim gradibus tanguntur non soIn these twelve degrees not only are the species of pride lum superbiae species, sed etiam quaedam antecedentia indicated, but also certain things that precede and follow et consequentia, sicut etiam supra de humilitate dictum them, as we have stated above with regard to humility est. (Q. 161, A. 6).

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Article 5 Whether pride is a mortal sin? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod superbia non sit peccatum mortale. Quia super illud Psalmi, domine Deus meus si feci istud, dicit Glossa, scilicet universale peccatum, quod est superbia. Si igitur superbia esset peccatum mortale, omne peccatum esset mortale. Praeterea, omne peccatum contrariatur caritati. Sed peccatum superbiae non videtur contrariari caritati, neque quantum ad dilectionem Dei, neque quantum ad dilectionem proximi, quia excellentia quam quis inordinate per superbiam appetit, non semper contrariatur honori Dei aut utilitati proximi. Ergo superbia non est peccatum mortale. Praeterea, omne peccatum mortale contrariatur virtuti. Sed superbia non contrariatur virtuti, sed potius ex ea oritur, quia, ut Gregorius dicit, XXXIV Moral., aliquando homo ex summis caelestibusque virtutibus intumescit. Ergo superbia non est peccatum mortale. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, in eodem libro, dicit quod evidentissimum reproborum signum superbia est, at contra, humilitas electorum. Sed homines non fiunt reprobi pro peccatis venialibus. Ergo superbia non est peccatum veniale, sed mortale. Respondeo dicendum quod superbia humilitati opponitur. Humilitas autem proprie respicit subiectionem hominis ad Deum, ut supra dictum est. Unde e contrario superbia proprie respicit defectum huius subiectionis, secundum scilicet quod aliquis se extollit supra id quod est sibi praefixum secundum divinam regulam vel mensuram; contra id quod apostolus dicit, nos autem non in immensum gloriamur, sed secundum mensuram qua mensus est nobis Deus. Et ideo dicitur Eccli. X, quod initium superbiae hominis est apostatare a Deo, scilicet, in hoc radix superbiae consideratur, quod homo aliqualiter non subditur Deo et regulae ipsius. Manifestum est autem quod hoc ipsum quod est non subiici Deo, habet rationem peccati mortalis, hoc enim est averti a Deo. Unde consequens est quod superbia, secundum suum genus, sit peccatum mortale. Sicut tamen in aliis quae ex suo genere sunt peccata mortalia, puta in fornicatione et adulterio, sunt aliqui motus qui sunt peccata venialia propter eorum imperfectionem, quia scilicet praeveniunt rationis iudicium et sunt praeter eius consensum; ita etiam et circa superbiam accidit quod aliqui motus superbiae sunt peccata venialia, dum eis ratio non consentit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, superbia non est universale peccatum secundum suam essentiam, sed per quandam redundantiam,

Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a mortal sin. For a gloss on Ps. 7:4, O Lord my God, if I have done this thing, says: Namely, the universal sin which is pride. Therefore if pride were a mortal sin, so would every sin be.

Obj. 2: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But pride is apparently not contrary to charity, neither as to the love of God, nor as to the love of one’s neighbor, because the excellence which, by pride, one desires inordinately, is not always opposed to God’s honor, or our neighbor’s good. Therefore pride is not a mortal sin. Obj. 3: Further, every mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But pride is not opposed to virtue; on the contrary, it arises therefrom, for as Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23), sometimes a man is elated by sublime and heavenly virtues. Therefore pride is not a mortal sin. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that pride is a most evident sign of the reprobate, and contrariwise, humility of the elect. But men do not become reprobate on account of venial sins. Therefore pride is not a venial but a mortal sin. I answer that, Pride is opposed to humility. Now humility properly regards the subjection of man to God, as stated above (Q. 161, A. 1, ad 5). Hence pride properly regards lack of this subjection, insofar as a man raises himself above that which is appointed to him according to the Divine rule or measure, against the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor 10:13), But we will not glory beyond our measure; but according to the measure of the rule which God hath measured to us. Wherefore it is written (Sir 10:14): The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God because, to wit, the root of pride is found to consist in man not being, in some way, subject to God and His rule. Now it is evident that not to be subject to God is of its very nature a mortal sin, for this consists in turning away from God: and consequently pride is, of its genus, a mortal sin. Nevertheless just as in other sins which are mortal by their genus (for instance fornication and adultery) there are certain motions that are venial by reason of their imperfection (through forestalling the judgment of reason, and being without its consent), so too in the matter of pride it happens that certain motions of pride are venial sins, when reason does not consent to them. Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 2) pride is a general sin, not by its essence but by a kind of influence, insofar as all sins may have their origin in pride. Hence it does not fol-

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inquantum scilicet ex superbia omnia peccata oriri possunt. Unde non sequitur quod omnia peccata sint mortalia, sed solum quando oriuntur ex superbia completa, quam diximus esse peccatum mortale. Ad secundum dicendum quod superbia semper quidem contrariatur dilectioni divinae, inquantum scilicet superbus non se subiicit divinae regulae prout debet. Et quandoque etiam contrariatur dilectioni proximi, inquantum scilicet aliquis inordinate se praefert proximo, aut ab eius subiectione se subtrahit. In quo etiam derogatur divinae regulae, ex qua sunt hominum ordines instituti, prout scilicet unus eorum sub alio esse debet. Ad tertium dicendum quod superbia non oritur ex virtutibus sicut ex causa per se, sed sicut ex causa per accidens, inquantum scilicet aliquis ex virtutibus occasiones superbiae sumit. Nihil autem prohibet quin unum contrariorum sit alterius causa per accidens, ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Unde etiam et de ipsa humilitate aliqui superbiunt.

Q. 162, A. 6

low that all sins are mortal, but only such as arise from perfect pride, which we have stated to be a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Pride is always contrary to the love of God, inasmuch as the proud man does not subject himself to the Divine rule as he ought. Sometimes it is also contrary to the love of our neighbor; when, namely, a man sets himself inordinately above his neighbor: and this again is a transgression of the Divine rule, which has established order among men, so that one ought to be subject to another. Reply Obj. 3: Pride arises from virtue, not as from its direct cause, but as from an accidental cause, insofar as a man makes a virtue an occasion for pride. And nothing prevents one contrary from being the accidental cause of another, as stated in Phys. viii, 1. Hence some are even proud of their humility.

Article 6 Whether pride is the most grievous of sins? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod superbia non sit gravissimum peccatorum. Quanto enim aliquod peccatum difficilius cavetur, tanto videtur esse levius. Sed superbia difficillime cavetur, quia sicut Augustinus dicit, in regula, cetera peccata in malis operibus exercentur, ut fiant, superbia vero bonis operibus insidiatur, ut pereant. Ergo superbia non est gravissimum peccatum. Praeterea, maius malum maiori bono opponitur, ut philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic. Sed humilitas, cui opponitur superbia, non est maxima virtutum, ut supra habitum est. Ergo et vitia quae opponuntur maioribus virtutibus, puta infidelitas, desperatio, odium Dei, homicidium, et alia huiusmodi, sunt graviora peccata quam superbia. Praeterea, maius malum non punitur per minus malum. Sed superbia interdum punitur per alia peccata, ut patet Rom. I, ubi dicitur quod philosophi propter elationem cordis traditi sunt in reprobum sensum, ut faciant quae non conveniunt. Ergo superbia non est gravissimum peccatorum. Sed contra est quod super illud Psalmi, superbi inique agebant usquequaque, dicit Glossa, maximum peccatum in homine est superbia. Respondeo dicendum quod in peccato duo attenduntur, scilicet conversio ad commutabile bonum, quae materialiter se habet in peccato; et aversio a bono incommutabili, quae est formalis et completiva peccati. Ex

Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the most grievous of sins. For the more difficult a sin is to avoid, the less grievous it would seem to be. Now pride is most difficult to avoid; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), Other sins find their vent in the accomplishment of evil deeds, whereas pride lies in wait for good deeds to destroy them. Therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins. Obj. 2: Further, The greater evil is opposed to the greater good, as the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. viii, 10). Now humility to which pride is opposed is not the greatest of virtues, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 5). Therefore the vices that are opposed to greater virtues, such as unbelief, despair, hatred of God, murder, and so forth, are more grievous sins than pride. Obj. 3: Further, the greater evil is not punished by a lesser evil. But pride is sometimes punished by other sins according to Rom. 1:28, where it is stated that on account of their pride of heart, men of science were delivered to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not convenient. Therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins. On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 118:51, The proud did iniquitously, says: The greatest sin in man is pride. I answer that, Two things are to be observed in sin, conversion to a mutable good, and this is the material part of sin; and aversion from the immutable good, and this gives sin its formal aspect and complement. Now on the

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parte autem conversionis, non habet superbia quod sit maximum peccatorum, quia celsitudo, quam superbus inordinate appetit, secundum suam rationem non habet maximam repugnantiam ad bonum virtutis. Sed ex parte aversionis, superbia habet maximam gravitatem, quia in aliis peccatis homo a Deo avertitur vel propter ignorantiam, vel propter infirmitatem, sive propter desiderium cuiuscumque alterius boni; sed superbia habet aversionem a Deo ex hoc ipso quod non vult Deo et eius regulae subiici. Unde Boetius dicit quod, cum omnia vitia fugiant a Deo, sola superbia se Deo opponit. Propter quod etiam specialiter dicitur Iac. IV, quod Deus superbis resistit. Et ideo averti a Deo et eius praeceptis, quod est quasi consequens in aliis peccatis, per se ad superbiam pertinet, cuius actus est Dei contemptus. Et quia id quod est per se, semper est potius eo quod est per aliud, consequens est quod superbia sit gravissimum peccatorum secundum suum genus, quia excedit in aversione, quae formaliter complet peccatum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquod peccatum difficile cavetur dupliciter. Uno modo, propter vehementiam impugnationis, sicut ira vehementer impugnat propter suum impetum. Et adhuc difficilius est resistere concupiscentiae, propter eius connaturalitatem, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Et talis difficultas vitandi peccatum gravitatem peccati diminuit, quia quanto aliquis minoris tentationis impetu cadit, tanto gravius peccat, ut Augustinus dicit. Alio modo difficile est vitare aliquod peccatum propter eius latentiam. Et hoc modo superbiam difficile est vitare, quia etiam ex ipsis bonis occasionem sumit, ut dictum est. Et ideo signanter Augustinus dicit quod bonis operibus insidiatur et in Psalmo dicitur, in via hac qua ambulabam, absconderunt superbi laqueum mihi. Et ideo motus superbiae occulte subrepens non habet maximam gravitatem, antequam per iudicium rationis deprehendatur. Sed postquam deprehensus fuerit per rationem, tunc facile evitatur. Tum ex consideratione propriae infirmitatis, secundum illud Eccli. X, quid superbit terra et cinis? Tum etiam ex consideratione magnitudinis divinae, secundum illud Iob XV, quid tumet contra Deum spiritus tuus? Tum etiam ex imperfectione bonorum de quibus homo superbit, secundum illud Isaiae XL, omnis caro faenum, et omnis gloria eius quasi flos agri; et infra, LXIV, quasi pannus menstruatae universae iustitiae nostrae. Ad secundum dicendum quod oppositio vitii ad virtutem attenditur secundum obiectum, quod consideratur ex parte conversionis. Et secundum hoc superbia non habet quod sit maximum peccatorum, sicut nec humilitas quod sit maxima virtutum. Sed ex parte aversionis est maximum, utpote aliis peccatis magnitudinem praestans. Nam per hoc ipsum infidelitatis peccatum

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part of the conversion, there is no reason for pride being the greatest of sins, because uplifting which pride covets inordinately, is not essentially most incompatible with the good of virtue. But on the part of the aversion, pride has extreme gravity, because in other sins man turns away from God, either through ignorance or through weakness, or through desire for any other good whatever; whereas pride denotes aversion from God simply through being unwilling to be subject to God and His rule. Hence Boethius says that while all vices flee from God, pride alone withstands God; for which reason it is specially stated (Jas 4:6) that God resisteth the proud. Wherefore aversion from God and His commandments, which is a consequence as it were in other sins, belongs to pride by its very nature, for its act is the contempt of God. And since that which belongs to a thing by its nature is always of greater weight than that which belongs to it through something else, it follows that pride is the most grievous of sins by its genus, because it exceeds in aversion which is the formal complement of sin. Reply Obj. 1: A sin is difficult to avoid in two ways. First, on account of the violence of its onslaught; thus anger is violent in its onslaught on account of its impetuosity; and still more difficult is it to resist concupiscence, on account of its connaturality, as stated in Ethic. ii, 3, 9. A difficulty of this kind in avoiding sin diminishes the gravity of the sin; because a man sins the more grievously, according as he yields to a less impetuous temptation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 12, 15). Second, it is difficult to avoid a sin, on account of its being hidden. In this way it is difficult to avoid pride, since it takes occasion even from good deeds, as stated (A. 5, ad 3). Hence Augustine says pointedly that it lies in wait for good deeds; and it is written (Ps 141:4): In the way wherein I walked, the proud have hidden a snare for me. Hence no very great gravity attaches to the movement of pride while creeping in secretly, and before it is discovered by the judgment of reason: but once discovered by reason, it is easily avoided, both by considering one’s own infirmity, according to Ecclus. 10:9, Why is earth and ashes proud? and by considering God’s greatness, according to Job 15:13, Why doth thy spirit swell against God? as well as by considering the imperfection of the goods on which man prides himself, according to Isa. 40:6, All flesh is grass, and all the glory thereof as the flower of the field; and farther on (Isa 64:6), all our justices are become like the rag of a menstruous woman. Reply Obj. 2: Opposition between a vice and a virtue is inferred from the object, which is considered on the part of conversion. In this way pride has no claim to be the greatest of sins, as neither has humility to be the greatest of virtues. But it is the greatest on the part of aversion, since it brings greatness upon other sins. For unbelief, by the very fact of its arising out of proud contempt, is rendered more

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gravius redditur, si ex superbiae contemptu procedat, quam si ex ignorantia vel infirmitate proveniat. Et idem dicendum est de desperatione et aliis huiusmodi. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut in syllogismis ducentibus ad impossibile quandoque aliquis convincitur per hoc quod ducitur ad inconveniens magis manifestum; ita etiam, ad convincendum superbiam hominum, Deus aliquos punit permittens eos ruere in peccata carnalia, quae, etsi sint minora, tamen manifestiorem turpitudinem continent. Unde Isidorus dicit, in libro de summo bono, omni vitio deteriorem esse superbiam, seu propter quod a summis personis et primis assumitur; seu quod de opere iustitiae et virtutis exoritur, minusque culpa eius sentitur. Luxuria vero carnis ideo notabilis omnibus est, quoniam statim per se turpis est. Et tamen, dispensante Deo, superbia minor est, sed qui detinetur superbia et non sentit, labitur in carnis luxuriam, ut per hanc humiliatus, a confusione exurgat. Ex quo etiam patet gravitas peccati superbiae. Sicut enim medicus sapiens in remedium maioris morbi patitur infirmum in leviorem morbum incidere, ita etiam peccatum superbiae gravius esse ostenditur ex hoc ipso quod pro eius remedio Deus permittit ruere hominem in alia peccata.

Q. 162, A. 7

grievous than if it be the outcome of ignorance or weakness. The same applies to despair and the like. Reply Obj. 3: Just as in syllogisms that lead to an impossible conclusion one is sometimes convinced by being faced with a more evident absurdity, so too, in order to overcome their pride, God punishes certain men by allowing them to fall into sins of the flesh, which though they be less grievous are more evidently shameful. Hence Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 38) that pride is the worst of all vices; whether because it is appropriate to those who are of highest and foremost rank, or because it originates from just and virtuous deeds, so that its guilt is less perceptible. On the other hand, carnal lust is apparent to all, because from the outset it is of a shameful nature: and yet, under God’s dispensation, it is less grievous than pride. For he who is in the clutches of pride and feels it not, falls into the lusts of the flesh, that being thus humbled he may rise from his abasement. From this indeed the gravity of pride is made manifest. For just as a wise physician, in order to cure a worse disease, allows the patient to contract one that is less dangerous, so the sin of pride is shown to be more grievous by the very fact that, as a remedy, God allows men to fall into other sins.

Article 7 Whether pride is the first sin of all? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod superbia non sit primum omnium peccatorum. Primum enim salvatur in omnibus consequentibus. Sed non omnia peccata sunt cum superbia, nec oriuntur ex superbia, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Nat. et gratia, quod multa perperam fiunt quae non fiunt superbe. Ergo superbia non est primum omnium peccatorum. Praeterea, Eccli. X dicitur quod initium superbiae est apostatare a Deo. Ergo apostasia a Deo est prius quam superbia. Praeterea, ordo peccatorum esse videtur secundum ordinem virtutum. Sed humilitas non est prima virtutum, sed magis fides. Ergo superbia non est primum peccatorum. Praeterea, II ad Tim. III, dicitur, mali homines et seductores proficiunt in peius, et ita videtur quod principium malitiae hominis non sit a maximo peccatorum. Sed superbia est maximum peccatorum, ut dictum est. Non est igitur primum peccatum. Praeterea, id quod est secundum apparentiam et fictionem, est posterius eo quod est secundum verita-

Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the first sin of all. For the first is maintained in all that follows. Now pride does not accompany all sins, nor is it the origin of all: for Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xx) that many things are done amiss which are not done with pride. Therefore pride is not the first sin of all. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Sir 10:14) that the beginning of . . . pride is to fall off from God. Therefore falling away from God precedes pride. Obj. 3: Further, the order of sins would seem to be according to the order of virtues. Now, not humility but faith is the first of all virtues. Therefore pride is not the first sin of all. Obj. 4: Further, it is written (2 Tim 3:13): Evil men and seducers shall grow worse and worse; so that apparently man’s beginning of wickedness is not the greatest of sins. But pride is the greatest of sins as stated in the foregoing Article. Therefore pride is not the first sin. Obj. 5: Further, resemblance and pretense come after the reality. Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that pride

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tem. Sed philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod superbus est fictor fortitudinis et audaciae. Ergo vitium audaciae est prius vitio superbiae. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. X, initium omnis peccati superbia. Respondeo dicendum quod illud quod est per se, est primum in quolibet genere. Dictum est autem supra quod aversio a Deo, quae formaliter complet rationem peccati, pertinet ad superbiam per se, ad alia autem peccata ex consequenti. Et inde est quod superbia habet rationem primi; et est etiam principium omnium peccatorum, ut supra dictum est, cum de causis peccati ageretur, ex parte aversionis, quae est principalior in peccato. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod superbia dicitur esse omnis peccati initium, non quia quodlibet peccatum singulariter ex superbia oriatur, sed quia quodlibet genus peccati natum est ex superbia oriri. Ad secundum dicendum quod apostatare a Deo dicitur esse superbiae humanae initium, non quasi aliquod aliud peccatum a superbia existens, sed quia est prima superbiae pars. Dictum est enim quod superbia principaliter respicit subiectionem divinam, quam contemnit, ex consequenti autem contemnit subiici creaturae propter Deum. Ad tertium dicendum quod non oportet esse eundem ordinem virtutum et vitiorum. Nam vitium est corruptivum virtutis. Id autem quod est primum in generatione, est postremum in corruptione. Et ideo, sicut fides est prima virtutum, ita infidelitas est ultimum peccatorum, ad quam homo quandoque per alia peccata perducitur. Super illud Psalmi, exinanite, exinanite usque ad fundamentum in ea, dicit Glossa quod coacervatione vitiorum subrepit diffidentia. Et apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. I, quod quidam, repellentes conscientiam bonam, circa fidem naufragaverunt. Ad quartum dicendum quod superbia dicitur esse gravissimum peccatum ex eo quod per se competit peccato, ex quo attenditur gravitas in peccato. Et ideo superbia causat gravitatem aliorum peccatorum. Contingit ergo ante superbiam esse aliqua peccata leviora, quae scilicet ex ignorantia vel infirmitate committuntur. Sed inter gravia peccata primum est superbia, sicut causa per quam alia peccata aggravantur. Et quia id quod est primum in causando, est etiam ultimum in recedendo; ideo super illud Psalmi, emundabor a delicto maximo, dicit Glossa, hoc est, a delicto superbiae, quod est ultimum redeuntibus ad Deum, et primum recedentibus. Ad quintum dicendum quod philosophus ponit superbiam circa fictionem fortitudinis, non quia solum in hoc consistat, sed quia per hoc homo maxime reputat se posse excellentiam apud homines consequi, si audax vel fortis videatur.

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apes fortitude and daring. Therefore the vice of daring precedes the vice of pride. On the contrary, It is written (Sir 10:15): Pride is the beginning of all sin. I answer that, The first thing in every genus is that which is essential. Now it has been stated above (A. 6) that aversion from God, which is the formal complement of sin, belongs to pride essentially, and to other sins, consequently. Hence it is that pride fulfils the conditions of a first thing, and is the beginning of all sins, as stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 2), when we were treating of the causes of sin on the part of the aversion which is the chief part of sin. Reply Obj. 1: Pride is said to be the beginning of all sin, not as though every sin originated from pride, but because any kind of sin is naturally liable to arise from pride. Reply Obj. 2: To fall off from God is said to be the beginning of pride, not as though it were a distinct sin from pride, but as being the first part of pride. For it has been said above (A. 5) that pride regards chiefly subjection to God which it scorns, and in consequence it scorns to be subject to a creature for God’s sake. Reply Obj. 3: There is no need for the order of virtues to be the same as that of vices. For vice is corruptive of virtue. Now that which is first to be generated is the last to be corrupted. Wherefore as faith is the first of virtues, so unbelief is the last of sins, to which sometimes man is led by other sins. Hence a gloss on Ps. 136:7, Rase it, rase it, even to the foundation thereof, says that by heaping vice upon vice a man will lapse into unbelief, and the Apostle says (1 Tim 1:19) that some rejecting a good conscience have made shipwreck concerning the faith. Reply Obj. 4: Pride is said to be the most grievous of sins because that which gives sin its gravity is essential to pride. Hence pride is the cause of gravity in other sins. Accordingly previous to pride there may be certain less grievous sins that are committed through ignorance or weakness. But among the grievous sins the first is pride, as the cause whereby other sins are rendered more grievous. And as that which is the first in causing sins is the last in the withdrawal from sin, a gloss on Ps. 18:13, I shall be cleansed from the greatest sin, says: Namely from the sin of pride, which is the last in those who return to God, and the first in those who withdraw from God. Reply Obj. 5: The Philosopher associates pride with feigned fortitude, not that it consists precisely in this, but because man thinks he is more likely to be uplifted before men, if he seem to be daring or brave.

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Q. 162, A. 8

Article 8 Whether pride should be reckoned a capital vice? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod superbia debeat poni vitium capitale. Isidorus enim, et etiam Cassianus, enumerant superbiam inter vitia capitalia. Praeterea, superbia videtur esse idem inani gloriae, quia utraque excellentiam quaerit. Sed inanis gloria ponitur vitium capitale. Ergo etiam superbia debet poni vitium capitale. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Virginit., quod superbia invidiam parit, nec unquam est sine tali comite. Sed invidia ponitur vitium capitale, ut supra habitum est. Ergo multo magis superbia. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., non enumerat superbiam inter vitia capitalia. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, superbia dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, secundum se, prout scilicet est quoddam speciale peccatum; alio modo, secundum quod habet quandam universalem influentiam in omnia peccata. Vitia autem capitalia ponuntur esse quaedam specialia peccata, ex quibus multa genera peccatorum oriuntur. Et ideo quidam, considerantes superbiam secundum quod est quoddam speciale peccatum, connumeraverunt eam aliis vitiis capitalibus. Gregorius vero, considerans universalem eius influentiam quam habet in omnia vitia, ut dictum est, non connumeravit eam aliis capitalibus vitiis, sed posuit eam reginam omnium vitiorum et matrem. Unde Gregorius dicit, in XXXI Moral., ipsa vitiorum regina superbia, cum devictum plene cor ceperit, mox illud septem principalibus vitiis, quasi quibusdam suis ducibus, devastandum tradit, ex quibus vitiorum multitudines oriuntur. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. Ad secundum dicendum quod superbia non est idem inani gloriae, sed causa eius. Nam superbia inordinate excellentiam appetit, sed inanis gloria appetit excellentiae manifestationem. Ad tertium dicendum quod ex hoc quod invidia, quae est vitium capitale, oritur ex superbia, non sequitur quod superbia sit vitium capitale, sed quod sit aliquid principalius capitalibus vitiis.

Objection 1: It would seem that pride should be reckoned a capital vice, since Isidore and Cassian number pride among the capital vices. Obj. 2: Further, pride is apparently the same as vainglory, since both covet excellence. Now vainglory is reckoned a capital vice. Therefore pride also should be reckoned a capital vice. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that pride begets envy, nor is it ever without this companion. Now envy is reckoned a capital vice, as stated above (Q. 36, A. 4). Much more therefore is pride a capital vice. On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) does not include pride among the capital vices. I answer that, As stated above (AA. 2, 5, ad 1) pride may be considered in two ways; first in itself, as being a special sin; second, as having a general influence towards all sins. Now the capital vices are said to be certain special sins from which many kinds of sin arise. Wherefore some, considering pride in the light of a special sin, numbered it together with the other capital vices. But Gregory, taking into consideration its general influence towards all vices, as explained above (A. 2, Obj. 3), did not place it among the capital vices, but held it to be the queen and mother of all the vices. Hence he says (Moral. xxxi, 45): Pride, the queen of vices, when it has vanquished and captured the heart, forthwith delivers it into the hands of its lieutenants the seven principal vices, that they may despoil it and produce vices of all kinds.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. Reply Obj. 2: Pride is not the same as vainglory, but is the cause thereof: for pride covets excellence inordinately: while vainglory covets the outward show of excellence. Reply Obj. 3: The fact that envy, which is a capital vice, arises from pride, does not prove that pride is a capital vice, but that it is still more principal than the capital vices themselves.

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Question 163 The First Man’s Sin Deinde considerandum est de peccato primi homiWe must now consider the first man’s sin which was nis, quod fuit per superbiam. Et primo, de peccato eius; pride: and (1) his sin; (2) its punishment; (3) the temptasecundo, de poena peccati; tertio, de tentatione qua in- tion whereby he was led to sin. ductus est ad peccandum. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum primum peccatum hominis fuerit (1) Whether pride was the first man’s first sin? superbia. Secundo, quid primus homo peccando appetierit. (2) What the first man coveted by sinning? Tertio, utrum eius peccatum fuerit gravius omnibus (3) Whether his sin was more grievous than all other aliis peccatis. sins? Quarto, quis plus peccaverit, utrum vir vel mulier. (4) Which sinned more grievously, the man or the woman?

Article 1 Whether pride was the first man’s first sin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod superbia non fuerit primi hominis peccatum. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. V, quod per inobedientiam unius hominis peccatores constituti sunt multi. Sed primi hominis peccatum est ex quo omnes peccatores constituti sunt originali peccato. Ergo inobedientia fuit primi hominis peccatum, et non superbia. Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit, super Luc., quod eo ordine Diabolus Christum tentavit quo primum hominem deiecit. Sed Christus primo tentatus est de gula, ut patet Matth. IV, cum ei dictum est, si filius Dei es, dic ut lapides isti panes fiant. Ergo primum peccatum primi hominis non fuit superbia, sed gula. Praeterea, homo Diabolo suggerente peccavit. Sed Diabolus tentans hominem scientiam repromisit, ut patet Gen. III. Ergo prima inordinatio hominis fuit per appetitum scientiae, quod pertinet ad curiositatem. Ergo curiositas fuit peccatum primum, et non superbia. Praeterea, super illud I ad Tim. II, mulier seducta in praevaricatione fuit, dicit Glossa, hanc seductionem proprie appellavit apostolus, per quam id quod suadebatur, cum falsum esset, verum putatum est, scilicet quod Deus lignum illud ideo tangere prohibuerit, quod sciebat eos, si tetigissent, velut deos futuros; tanquam eis divinitatem invideret qui eos homines fecerat. Sed hoc credere pertinet ad infidelitatem. Ergo primum peccatum hominis fuit infidelitas, et non superbia.

Objection 1: It would seem that pride was not the first man’s first sin. For the Apostle says (Rom 5:19) that by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners. Now the first man’s first sin is the one by which all men were made sinners in the point of original sin. Therefore disobedience, and not pride, was the first man’s first sin. Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says, commenting on Luke 4:3, And the devil said to Him, that the devil in tempting Christ observed the same order as in overcoming the first man. Now Christ was first tempted to gluttony, as appears from Matt. 4:3, where it was said to Him: If thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread. Therefore the first man’s first sin was not pride but gluttony. Obj. 3: Further, man sinned at the devil’s suggestion. Now the devil in tempting man promised him knowledge (Gen 3:5). Therefore inordinateness in man was through the desire of knowledge, which pertains to curiosity. Therefore curiosity, and not pride, was the first sin. Obj. 4: Further, a gloss on 1 Tim. 2:14, The woman being seduced was in the transgression, says: The Apostle rightly calls this seduction, for they were persuaded to accept a falsehood as being true; namely that God had forbidden them to touch that tree, because He knew that if they touched it, they would be like gods, as though He who made them men, begrudged them the godhead . . . Now it pertains to unbelief to believe such a thing. Therefore man’s first sin was unbelief and not pride.

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Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. X, initium omnis peccati superbia. Sed peccatum primi hominis est initium omnis peccati, secundum illud Rom. V, per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit. Ergo primum peccatum hominis fuit superbia. Respondeo dicendum quod ad unum peccatum multi motus concurrere possunt, inter quos ille habet rationem primi peccati in quo primo inordinatio invenitur. Manifestum est autem quod primo invenitur inordinatio in motu interiori animae quam in actu exteriori corporis, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in I de Civ. Dei, non amittitur corporis sanctitas manente animae sanctitate. Inter motus autem interiores, prius movetur appetitus in finem quam in id quod quaeritur propter finem. Et ideo ibi fuit primum peccatum hominis ubi potuit esse primus appetitus inordinati finis. Sic autem homo erat in statu innocentiae institutus ut nulla esset rebellio carnis ad spiritum. Unde non potuit esse prima inordinatio appetitus humani ex hoc quod appetierit aliquod sensibile bonum, in quod carnis concupiscentia tendit praeter ordinem rationis. Relinquitur igitur quod prima inordinatio appetitus humani fuit ex hoc quod aliquod bonum spirituale inordinate appetiit. Non autem inordinate appetivisset, appetendo illud secundum suam mensuram ex divina regula praestitutam. Unde relinquitur quod primum peccatum eius fuit in hoc quod appetiit quoddam spirituale bonum supra suam mensuram. Quod pertinet ad superbiam. Unde manifestum est quod primum peccatum hominis fuit superbia. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc quod homo divino praecepto non obediret, non fuit propter se ab eo volitum, quia hoc non posset contingere nisi praesupposita inordinatione voluntatis. Relinquitur ergo quod voluerit propter aliquid aliud. Primum autem quod inordinate voluit fuit propria excellentia. Et ideo inobedientia in eo causata fuit ex superbia. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, ad Orosium, quod homo elatus superbia, suasioni serpentis obediens, praecepta Dei contempsit. Ad secundum dicendum quod in peccato primorum parentum etiam gula locum habuit, dicitur enim Gen. III, vidit mulier quod lignum esset bonum ad vescendum, et pulchrum oculis, aspectuque delectabile, et tulit de fructu eius, et comedit. Non tamen ipsa bonitas et pulchritudo cibi fuit primum motivum ad peccandum, sed potius suasio serpentis, qui dixit, aperientur oculi vestri, et eritis sicut dii; quod appetendo, superbiam mulier incurrit. Et ideo peccatum gulae derivatum est ex peccato superbiae. Ad tertium dicendum quod appetitus scientiae causatus fuit in primis parentibus ex inordinato appetitu excellentiae. Unde et in verbis serpentis praemittitur, eritis sicut dii; et postea subditur, scientes bonum et malum.

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On the contrary, It is written (Sir 10:15): Pride is the beginning of all sin. Now man’s first sin is the beginning of all sin, according to Rom. 5:12, By one man sin entered into this world. Therefore man’s first sin was pride. I answer that, Many movements may concur towards one sin, and the character of sin attaches to that one in which inordinateness is first found. And it is evident that inordinateness is in the inward movement of the soul before being in the outward act of the body; since, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), the sanctity of the body is not forfeited so long as the sanctity of the soul remains. Also, among the inward movements, the appetite is moved towards the end before being moved towards that which is desired for the sake of the end; and consequently man’s first sin was where it was possible for his appetite to be directed to an inordinate end. Now man was so appointed in the state of innocence, that there was no rebellion of the flesh against the spirit. Wherefore it was not possible for the first inordinateness in the human appetite to result from his coveting a sensible good, to which the concupiscence of the flesh tends against the order of reason. It remains therefore that the first inordinateness of the human appetite resulted from his coveting inordinately some spiritual good. Now he would not have coveted it inordinately, by desiring it according to his measure as established by the Divine rule. Hence it follows that man’s first sin consisted in his coveting some spiritual good above his measure: and this pertains to pride. Therefore it is evident that man’s first sin was pride. Reply Obj. 1: Man’s disobedience to the Divine command was not willed by man for his own sake, for this could not happen unless one presuppose inordinateness in his will. It remains therefore that he willed it for the sake of something else. Now the first thing he coveted inordinately was his own excellence; and consequently his disobedience was the result of his pride. This agrees with the statement of Augustine, who says (Ad Oros ) that man puffed up with pride obeyed the serpent’s prompting, and scorned God’s commands. Reply Obj. 2: Gluttony also had a place in the sin of our first parents. For it is written (Gen 3:6): The woman saw that the tree was good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold, and she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat. Yet the very goodness and beauty of the fruit was not their first motive for sinning, but the persuasive words of the serpent, who said (Gen 3:5): Your eyes shall be opened and you shall be as Gods: and it was by coveting this that the woman fell into pride. Hence the sin of gluttony resulted from the sin of pride. Reply Obj. 3: The desire for knowledge resulted in our first parents from their inordinate desire for excellence. Hence the serpent began by saying: You shall be as Gods, and added: Knowing good and evil.

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Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XI super Gen. ad Litt., verbis serpentis mulier non crederet a bona atque utili re divinitus se fuisse prohibitos, nisi iam inesset menti amor ille propriae potestatis, et quaedam de se superba praesumptio. Quod non est sic intelligendum quasi superbia praecesserit suasionem serpentis, sed quia statim post suasionem serpentis, invasit mentem eius elatio, ex qua consecutum est ut crederet verum esse quod Daemon dicebat.

Q. 163, A. 2

Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (Gen ad lit. xi, 30), the woman had not believed the serpent’s statement that they were debarred by God from a good and useful thing, were her mind not already filled with the love of her own power, and a certain proud self-presumption. This does not mean that pride preceded the promptings of the serpent, but that as soon as the serpent had spoken his words of persuasion, her mind was puffed up, the result being that she believed the demon to have spoken truly.

Article 2 Whether the first man’s pride consisted in his coveting God’s likeness? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod superbia primi hominis non fuerit in hoc quod appetierit divinam similitudinem. Nullus enim peccat appetendo id quod sibi competit secundum suam naturam. Sed similitudo Dei competit homini secundum suam naturam, dicitur enim Gen. I, faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. Ergo non peccavit divinam similitudinem appetendo. Praeterea, in hoc videtur primus homo divinam similitudinem appetiisse, ut scientia boni et mali potiretur, hoc enim ei a serpente suggerebatur, eritis sicut dii, scientes bonum et malum. Sed appetitus scientiae est homini naturalis, secundum illud philosophi, in principio Metaphys., omnes homines natura scire desiderant. Ergo non peccavit appetendo divinam similitudinem. Praeterea, nullus sapiens eligit id quod est impossibile. Primus autem homo sapientia praeditus erat, secundum illud Eccli. XVII, disciplina intellectus replevit illos. Cum ergo omne peccatum consistat in appetitu deliberato, qui est electio, videtur quod primus homo non peccaverit appetendo aliquid impossibile. Sed impossibile est esse hominem similem Deo, secundum illud Exodi XV, quis similis tui in fortibus, domine? Ergo primus homo non peccavit appetendo divinam similitudinem. Sed contra est quod super illud Psalmi, quae non rapui, tunc exsolvebam, dicit Augustinus, Adam et Eva rapere voluerunt divinitatem, et perdiderunt felicitatem.

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man’s pride did not consist in his coveting the Divine likeness. For no one sins by coveting that which is competent to him according to his nature. Now God’s likeness is competent to man according to his nature: for it is written (Gen 1:26): Let us make man to our image and likeness. Therefore he did not sin by coveting God’s likeness. Obj. 2: Further, it would seem that man coveted God’s likeness in order that he might obtain knowledge of good and evil: for this was the serpent’s suggestion: You shall be as Gods knowing good and evil. Now the desire of knowledge is natural to man, according to the saying of the Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics i, 1: All men naturally desire knowledge. Therefore he did not sin by coveting God’s likeness. Obj. 3: Further, no wise man chooses the impossible. Now the first man was endowed with wisdom, according to Ecclus. 17:5, He filled them with the knowledge of understanding. Since then every sin consists in a deliberate act of the appetite, namely choice, it would seem that the first man did not sin by coveting something impossible. But it is impossible for man to be like God, according to the saying of Ex. 15:11, Who is like to Thee among the strong, O Lord? Therefore the first man did not sin by coveting God’s likeness. On the contrary, Augustine commenting on Ps. 68:5, Then did I restore that which I took not away, says: Adam and Eve wished to rob the Godhead and they lost happiness. I answer that, likeness is twofold. One is a likeness of absolute equality: and such a likeness to God our first parents did not covet, since such a likeness to God is not conceivable to the mind, especially of a wise man.

Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est similitudo. Una omnimodae aequiparantiae. Et hanc similitudinem ad Deum primi parentes non appetierunt, quia talis similitudo ad Deum non cadit in apprehensione, praecipue sapientis. Alia autem est similitudo imitationis, qualis possiThe other is a likeness of imitation, such as is possibilis est creaturae ad Deum, inquantum videlicet par- ble for a creature in reference to God, insofar as the creaticipat aliquid de similitudine ipsius secundum suum ture participates somewhat of God’s likeness according to

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Q. 163, A. 2

Temperance

modum. Unde Dionysius dicit, in IX cap. de Div. Nom., eadem similia sunt Deo, et dissimilia, hoc quidem secundum contingentem imitationem; hoc autem secundum quod causata minus habent a causa. Quodlibet autem bonum in creatura existens est quaedam participata similitudo primi boni. Et ideo ex hoc ipso quod homo appetiit aliquod spirituale bonum supra suam mensuram, ut dictum est, consequens est quod appetierit divinam similitudinem inordinate. Considerandum tamen est quod appetitus proprie est rei non habitae. Bonum autem spirituale secundum quod creatura rationalis participat divinam similitudinem, potest secundum tria attendi. Primo quidem, secundum ipsum esse naturae. Et talis similitudo ab ipso creationis principio fuit impressa et homini, de quo dicitur, Gen. I, quod fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem suam; et Angelo, de quo dicitur, Ezech. XXVIII, tu signaculum similitudinis. Secundo vero, quantum ad cognitionem. Et hanc etiam similitudinem in sui creatione Angelus accepit, unde in praemissis verbis, cum dictum esset, tu signaculum similitudinis, statim subditur, plenus sapientia. Sed primus homo in sua creatione istam similitudinem nondum actu adeptus erat, sed solum in potentia. Tertio, quantum ad potestatem operandi. Et hanc similitudinem nondum erant in actu assecuti neque Angelus neque homo in ipso creationis principio, quia utrique restabat aliquid agendum quo ad beatitudinem perveniret. Et ideo cum uterque, scilicet Diabolus et primus homo, inordinate divinam similitudinem appetierint, neuter eorum peccavit appetendo similitudinem naturae. Sed primus homo peccavit principaliter appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad scientiam boni et mali, sicut serpens ei suggessit, ut scilicet per virtutem propriae naturae determinaret sibi quid esset bonum et quid malum ad agendum; vel etiam ut per seipsum praecognosceret quid sibi boni vel mali esset futurum. Et secundario peccavit appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad propriam potestatem operandi, ut scilicet virtute propriae naturae operaretur ad beatitudinem consequendam, unde Augustinus dicit, XI super Gen. ad Litt., quod menti mulieris inhaesit amor propriae potestatis. Sed Diabolus peccavit appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad potestatem, unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., quod magis voluit sua potentia frui quam Dei. Veruntamen quantum ad aliquid uterque Deo aequiparari appetiit, inquantum scilicet uterque sibi inniti voluit, contempto divinae regulae ordine. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de similitudine naturae, ex cuius appetitu homo non peccavit, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod appetere similitudinem Dei absolute quantum ad scientiam, non est pecca-

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its measure. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): The same things are like and unlike to God; like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated; unlike, according as an effect falls short of its cause. Now every good existing in a creature is a participated likeness of the first good. Wherefore from the very fact that man coveted a spiritual good above his measure, as stated in the foregoing Article, it follows that he coveted God’s likeness inordinately. It must, however, be observed that the proper object of the appetite is a thing not possessed. Now spiritual good, insofar as the rational creature participates in the Divine likeness, may be considered in reference to three things. First, as to natural being: and this likeness was imprinted from the very outset of their creation, both on man—of whom it is written (Gen 1:26) that God made man to His image and likeness—and on the angel, of whom it is written (Ezek 28:12): Thou wast the seal of resemblance. Second, as to knowledge: and this likeness was bestowed on the angel at his creation, wherefore immediately after the words just quoted, Thou wast the seal of resemblance, we read: Full of wisdom. But the first man, at his creation, had not yet received this likeness actually but only in potentiality. Third, as to the power of operation: and neither angel nor man received this likeness actually at the very outset of his creation, because to each there remained something to be done whereby to obtain happiness. Accordingly, while both (namely the devil and the first man) coveted God’s likeness inordinately, neither of them sinned by coveting a likeness of nature. But the first man sinned chiefly by coveting God’s likeness as regards knowledge of good and evil, according to the serpent’s instigation, namely that by his own natural power he might decide what was good, and what was evil for him to do; or again that he should of himself foreknow what good and what evil would befall him. Secondarily he sinned by coveting God’s likeness as regards his own power of operation, namely that by his own natural power he might act so as to obtain happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xi, 30) that the woman’s mind was filled with love of her own power. On the other hand, the devil sinned by coveting God’s likeness, as regards power. Wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 13) that he wished to enjoy his own power rather than God’s. Nevertheless both coveted somewhat to be equal to God, insofar as each wished to rely on himself in contempt of the order of the Divine rule. Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the likeness of nature: and man did not sin by coveting this, as stated. Reply Obj. 2: It is not a sin to covet God’s likeness as to knowledge, absolutely; but to covet this likeness inordi-

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tum. Sed appetere huiusmodi similitudinem inordinate, idest supra suam mensuram, peccatum est. Unde super illud Psalmi, Deus quis similis erit tibi, dicit Augustinus, qui per se vult esse Deus, perverse vult esse similis Deo, ut Diabolus, qui noluit sub eo esse; et homo, qui ut servus noluit tenere praecepta. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de similitudine aequiparantiae.

Q. 163, A. 3

nately, that is, above one’s measure, this is a sin. Hence Augustine commenting on Ps. 70:18, O God, who is like Thee? says: He who desires to be of himself, even as God is of no one, wishes wickedly to be like God. Thus did the devil, who was unwilling to be subject to Him, and man who refused to be, as a servant, bound by His command. Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the likeness of equality.

Article 3 Whether the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum primorum parentum fuerit ceteris gravius. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, magna fuit in peccando iniquitas, ubi tanta fuit in non peccando facilitas. Sed primi parentes maximam habuerunt facilitatem ad non peccandum, quia nihil habebant intrinsecus quod eos ad peccandum impelleret. Ergo peccatum primorum parentum fuit ceteris gravius. Praeterea, poena proportionatur culpae. Sed peccatum primorum parentum gravissime est punitum, quia ex ipso mors introivit in hunc mundum, ut apostolus dicit, Rom. V. Ergo peccatum illud fuit gravius aliis peccatis. Praeterea, primum in quolibet genere videtur esse maximum, ut dicitur in II Metaphys. Sed peccatum primorum parentum fuit primum inter alia peccata hominum. Ergo fuit maximum. Sed contra est quod Origenes dicit, non arbitror quod aliquis ex his qui in summo perfectoque constiterunt gradu, ad subitum evacuetur ac decidat, sed paulatim et per partes defluere eum necesse est. Sed primi parentes in summo perfectoque gradu consistebant. Non ergo eorum primum peccatum fuit maximum omnium peccatorum. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex gravitas in peccato attendi potest. Una quidem, ex ipsa specie peccati, sicut dicimus adulterium esse gravius peccatum simplici fornicatione. Alia autem est gravitas peccati quae attenditur secundum aliquam circumstantiam loci, vel personae, aut temporis. Prima autem gravitas essentialior est peccato, et principalior. Unde secundum eam magis peccatum dicitur grave quam secundum aliam. Dicendum est igitur quod peccatum primi hominis non fuit gravius omnibus aliis peccatis humanis secundum speciem peccati. Etsi enim superbia secundum suum genus habeat quandam excellentiam inter alia peccata, maior tamen

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15): Great was the wickedness in sinning, when it was so easy to avoid sin. Now it was very easy for our first parents to avoid sin, because they had nothing within them urging them to sin. Therefore the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins. Obj. 2: Further, punishment is proportionate to guilt. Now the sin of our first parents was most severely punished, since by it death entered into this world, as the Apostle says (Rom 5:12). Therefore that sin was more grievous than other sins. Obj. 3: Further, the first in every genus is seemingly the greatest (Metaph. ii, 4). Now the sin of our first parents was the first among sins of men. Therefore it was the greatest. On the contrary, Origen says: I think that a man who stands on the highest step of perfection cannot fail or fall suddenly: this can happen only by degrees and little by little. Now our first parents were established on the highest and perfect grade. Therefore their first sin was not the greatest of all sins. I answer that, There is a twofold gravity to be observed in sin. One results from the very species of the sin: thus we say that adultery is a graver sin than simple fornication. The other gravity of sin results from some circumstance of place, person, or time. The former gravity is more essential to sin and is of greater moment: hence a sin is said to be grave in respect of this gravity rather than of the other. Accordingly we must say that the first man’s sin was not graver than all other sins of men, as regards the species of the sin. For though pride, of its genus, has a certain preeminence over other sins, yet the pride whereby one denies or blasphemes God is greater than the pride whereby one

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Q. 163, A. 4

Temperance

est superbia qua quis Deum negat vel blasphemat, quam superbia qua quis inordinate divinam similitudinem appetit, qualis fuit superbia primorum parentum, ut dictum est. Sed secundum conditionem personarum peccantium, peccatum illud habuit maximam gravitatem, propter perfectionem status ipsorum. Et ideo dicendum est quod illud peccatum fuit quidem secundum quid gravissimum, sed non simpliciter. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de gravitate peccati ex circumstantia peccantis. Ad secundum dicendum quod magnitudo poenae quae consecuta est ad illud primum peccatum, non correspondet ei secundum quantitatem propriae speciei, sed inquantum fuit primum, quia ex hoc interrupta est innocentia primi status, qua subtracta, deordinata est tota natura humana. Ad tertium dicendum quod in his quae sunt per se ordinata, oportet id quod est primum esse maximum. Talis autem ordo non attenditur in peccatis, sed unum per accidens sequitur post aliud. Unde non sequitur quod primum peccatum sit maximum.

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covets God’s likeness inordinately, such as the pride of our first parents, as stated (A. 2).

But if we consider the circumstances of the persons who sinned, that sin was most grave on account of the perfection of their state. We must accordingly conclude that this sin was most grievous relatively but not simply. Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the gravity of sin as resulting from the person of the sinner. Reply Obj. 2: The severity of the punishment awarded to that first sin corresponds to the magnitude of the sin, not as regards its species but as regards its being the first sin: because it destroyed the innocence of our original state, and by robbing it of innocence brought disorder upon the whole human nature. Reply Obj. 3: Where things are directly subordinate, the first must needs be the greatest. Such is not the order among sins, for one follows from another accidentally. And thus it does not follow that the first sin is the greatest.

Article 4 Whether Adam’s sin was more grievous than Eve’s? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum Adae fuit gravius quam peccatum Evae. Dicitur enim I ad Tim. II, quod Adam non est seductus, mulier autem seducta in praevaricatione fuit, et sic videtur quod peccatum mulieris fuerit ex ignorantia, peccatum autem viri ex certa scientia. Sed huiusmodi peccatum est gravius, secundum illud Luc. XII, ille servus qui cognovit voluntatem domini sui et non fecit secundum voluntatem eius, vapulabit multis, qui autem non cognovit et fecit digna plagis, vapulabit paucis. Ergo Adam gravius peccavit quam Eva. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de decem chordis, si caput est vir, melius debet vivere, et praecedere in omnibus bonis factis uxorem suam, ut illa imitetur virum. Sed ille qui melius debet facere, si peccet, gravius peccat. Ergo Adam gravius peccavit quam Eva.

Objection 1: It would seem that Adam’s sin was more grievous than Eve’s. For it is written (1 Tim 2:14): Adam was not seduced, but the woman being seduced was in the transgression: and so it would seem that the woman sinned through ignorance, but the man through assured knowledge. Now the latter is the graver sin, according to Luke 12:47, 48, That servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes: but he that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes. Therefore Adam’s sin was more grievous than Eve’s. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Decem Chordis 3): If the man is the head, he should live better, and give an example of good deeds to his wife, that she may imitate him. Now he who ought to do better, sins more grievously, if he commit a sin. Therefore Adam sinned more grievously than Eve. Praeterea, peccatum in spiritum sanctum videtur Obj. 3: Further, the sin against the Holy Spirit would esse gravissimum. Sed Adam videtur in spiritum sanc- seem to be the most grievous. Now Adam, apparently, tum peccasse, quia peccavit cogitans de divina miseri- sinned against the Holy Spirit, because while sinning he cordia, quod pertinet ad peccatum praesumptionis. Er- relied on God’s mercy, and this pertains to the sin of go videtur quod Adam gravius peccavit quam Eva. presumption. Therefore it seems that Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.

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Sed contra est quod poena respondet culpae. Sed On the contrary, Punishment corresponds to guilt. mulier gravius est punita quam vir, ut patet Gen. III. Er- Now the woman was more grievously punished than the go gravius peccavit quam vir. man, as appears from Gen. 3. Therefore she sinned more grievously than the man. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, graI answer that, As stated (A. 3), the gravity of a sin devitas peccati principalius attenditur secundum pecca- pends on the species rather than on a circumstance of that ti speciem quam secundum personae circumstantiam. sin. Accordingly we must assert that, if we consider the conDicendum est ergo quod, si consideremus conditionem dition attaching to these persons, the man’s sin is the more personae utriusque, scilicet mulieris et viri, peccatum vi- grievous, because he was more perfect than the woman. ri est gravius, quia erat perfectior muliere. Sed quantum ad ipsum genus peccati, utriusque pecAs regards the genus itself of the sin, the sin of each is catum aequale dicitur, quia utriusque peccatum fuit su- considered to be equal, for each sinned by pride. Hence Auperbia. Unde Augustinus dicit, XI super Gen. ad Litt., gustine says (Gen ad lit. xi, 35): Eve in excusing herself bequod mulier excusavit peccatum suum in impari sexu, trays disparity of sex, though parity of pride. sed pari fastu. Sed quantum ad speciem superbiae, gravius peccavit But as regards the species of pride, the woman sinned mulier, triplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia maior elatio more grievously, for three reasons. First, because she was fuit mulieris quam viri. Mulier enim credidit verum esse more puffed up than the man. For the woman believed in quod serpens suasit, scilicet quod Deus prohibuit ligni the serpent’s persuasive words, namely that God had foresum ne ad eius similitudinem pervenirent, et ita, dum bidden them to eat of the tree, lest they should become like per esum ligni vetiti Dei similitudinem consequi voluit, to Him; so that in wishing to attain to God’s likeness by eatsuperbia eius ad hoc se erexit quod contra Dei volunta- ing of the forbidden fruit, her pride rose to the height of detem aliquid voluit obtinere. Sed vir non credidit hoc es- siring to obtain something against God’s will. On the other se verum. Unde non voluit consequi divinam similitudi- hand, the man did not believe this to be true; wherefore he nem contra Dei voluntatem, sed in hoc superbivit, quod did not wish to attain to God’s likeness against God’s will: voluit eam consequi per seipsum. Secundo, quia mulier but his pride consisted in wishing to attain thereto by his non solum ipsa peccavit, sed etiam viro peccatum sug- own power. Second, the woman not only herself sinned, but gessit. Unde peccavit et in Deum et in proximum. Tertio, suggested sin to the man; wherefore she sinned against both in hoc quod peccatum viri diminutum est ex hoc quod in God and her neighbor. Third, the man’s sin was diminished peccatum consensit amicabili quadam benevolentia, qua by the fact that, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xi, 42), he plerumque fit ut offendatur Deus ne homo ex amico fiat consented to the sin out of a certain friendly good-will, on acinimicus, quod eum facere non debuisse divinae sententiae count of which a man sometimes will offend God rather than exitus indicavit, ut Augustinus dicit, XI Sup. Gen. ad lit- make an enemy of his friend. That he ought not to have done teram. so is shown by the just issue of the Divine sentence. Et sic patet quod peccatum mulieris fuit gravius It is therefore evident that the woman’s sin was more quam peccatum viri. grievous than the man’s. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa seductio muReply Obj. 1: The woman was deceived because she lieris ex praecedenti elevatione subsecuta est. Et ideo was first of all puffed up with pride. Wherefore her ignotalis ignorantia non excusat, sed aggravat peccatum, in- rance did not excuse, but aggravated her sin, insofar as it quantum scilicet ignorando in maiorem elationem erec- was the cause of her being puffed up with still greater pride. ta est. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit ex Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the circumcircumstantia conditionis personae, ex qua peccatum vi- stance of personal condition, on account of which the man’s ri fuit gravius secundum quid. sin was more grievous than the woman’s. Ad tertium dicendum quod vir non cogitavit de diReply Obj. 3: The man’s reliance on God’s mercy did vina misericordia usque ad contemptum divinae iusti- not reach to contempt of God’s justice, wherein consists the tiae, quod facit peccatum in spiritum sanctum, sed quia, sin against the Holy Spirit, but as Augustine says (Gen ad ut Augustinus dicit, XI super Gen. ad Litt., inexpertus di- lit. xi), it was due to the fact that, having had no experience vinae severitatis, credidit illud peccatum esse veniale, id of God’s severity, he thought the sin to be venial, i.e., easily est de facili remissibile. forgiven.

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Question 164 The Punishments of the First Man’s Sin Deinde considerandum est de poena primi peccati. We must now consider the punishments of the first sin; Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, de morte, quae est and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) poena communis. Secundo, de aliis particularibus poe- Death, which is the common punishment; (2) the other nis quae in Genesi assignantur. particular punishments mentioned in Genesis.

Article 1 Whether death is the punishment of our first parents’ sin? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mors non sit poena peccati primorum parentum. Illud enim quod est homini naturale, non potest dici poena peccati, quia peccatum non perficit naturam, sed vitiat. Mors autem est homini naturalis, quod patet ex hoc quod corpus eius ex contrariis componitur; et ex hoc etiam quod mortale ponitur in definitione hominis. Ergo mors non est poena peccati primorum parentum. Praeterea, mors et alii corporales defectus similiter inveniuntur in homine sicut et in aliis animalibus, secundum illud Eccle. III, unus interitus est hominis et iumentorum, et aequa utriusque conditio. Sed in animalibus brutis mors non est poena peccati. Ergo etiam neque in hominibus. Praeterea, peccatum primorum parentum fuit specialium personarum. Sed mors consequitur totam humanam naturam. Ergo non videtur esse poena peccati primorum parentum. Praeterea, omnes aequaliter derivantur a primis parentibus. Si igitur mors esset poena peccati primorum parentum, sequeretur quod omnes homines aequaliter mortem paterentur. Quod patet esse falsum, quia quidam citius aliis, et gravius moriuntur. Ergo mors non est poena primi peccati. Praeterea, malum poenae est a Deo, ut supra habitum est. Sed mors non videtur esse a Deo, dicitur enim Sap. I, quod Deus mortem non fecit. Ergo mors non est poena primi peccati. Praeterea, poenae non videntur esse meritoriae, nam meritum continetur sub bono, poena autem sub malo. Sed mors quandoque est meritoria, sicut patet de morte martyrum. Ergo videtur quod mors non sit poena. Praeterea, poena videtur esse afflictiva. Sed mors non potest esse afflictiva, ut videtur, quia quando mors

Objection 1: It would seem that death is not the punishment of our first parents’ sin. For that which is natural to man cannot be called a punishment of sin, because sin does not perfect nature but vitiates it. Now death is natural to man: and this is evident both from the fact that his body is composed of contraries, and because mortal is included in the definition of man. Therefore death is not a punishment of our first parents’ sin. Obj. 2: Further, death and other bodily defects are similarly found in man as well as in other animals, according to Eccles. 3:19, The death of man and of beasts is one, and the condition of them both equal. But in dumb animals death is not a punishment of sin. Therefore neither is it so in men. Obj. 3: Further, the sin of our first parents was the sin of particular individuals: whereas death affects the entire human nature. Therefore it would seem that it is not a punishment of our first parents’ sin. Obj. 4: Further, all are equally descended from our first parents. Therefore if death were the punishment of our first parents’ sin, it would follow that all men would suffer death in equal measure. But this is clearly untrue, since some die sooner, and some more painfully, than others. Therefore death is not the punishment of the first sin. Obj. 5: Further, the evil of punishment is from God, as stated above (I, Q. 48, A. 6; Q. 49, A. 2). But death, apparently, is not from God: for it is written (Wis 1:13): God made not death. Therefore death is not the punishment of the first sin. Obj. 6: Further, seemingly, punishments are not meritorious, since merit is comprised under good, and punishment under evil. Now death is sometimes meritorious, as in the case of a martyr’s death. Therefore it would seem that death is not a punishment. Obj. 7: Further, punishment would seem to be painful. But death apparently cannot be painful, since man does not

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est, homo non sentit; quando autem non est, sentiri non potest. Ergo mors non est poena peccati. Praeterea, si mors esset poena peccati, statim fuisset ad peccatum consecuta. Sed hoc non est verum, nam primi parentes post peccatum diu vixerunt, ut patet Gen. IV. Ergo mors non videtur esse poena peccati.

feel it when he is dead, and he cannot feel it when he is not dying. Therefore death is not a punishment of sin. Obj. 8: Further, if death were a punishment of sin, it would have followed sin immediately. But this is not true, for our first parents lived a long time after their sin (Gen 5:5). Therefore, seemingly, death is not a punishment of sin. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, per On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom 5:12): By unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, et one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death.

per peccatum mors. Respondeo dicendum quod, si aliquis propter culpam suam privetur aliquo beneficio sibi dato, carentia illius beneficii est poena culpae illius. Sicut autem in primo dictum est, homini in prima sui institutione hoc beneficium fuit collatum divinitus, ut quandiu mens eius esset Deo subiecta, inferiores vires animae subiicerentur rationali menti, et corpus animae subiiceretur. Sed quia mens hominis per peccatum a divina subiectione recessit, consecutum est ut nec inferiores vires totaliter rationi subiicerentur, unde tanta est rebellio carnalis appetitus ad rationem; nec etiam corpus totaliter subiiceretur animae, unde consequitur mors, et alii corporales defectus. Vita enim et incolumitas corporis consistit in hoc quod subiiciatur animae, sicut perfectibile suae perfectioni, unde, per oppositum, mors et aegritudo, et quilibet corporalis defectus, pertinet ad defectum subiectionis corporis ad animam. Unde patet quod, sicut rebellio carnalis appetitus ad spiritum est poena peccati primorum parentum, ita etiam et mors et omnes corporales defectus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod naturale dicitur quod ex principiis naturae causatur. Naturae autem per se principia sunt forma et materia. Forma autem hominis est anima rationalis, quae de se est immortalis. Et ideo mors non est naturalis homini ex parte suae formae. Materia autem hominis est corpus tale quod est ex contrariis compositum, ad quod sequitur ex necessitate corruptibilitas. Et quantum ad hoc, mors est homini naturalis. Haec tamen conditio in materia humani corporis est consequens ex necessitate materiae, quia oportebat corpus humanum esse organum tactus, et per consequens medium inter tangibilia; et hoc non poterat esse nisi esset ex contrariis compositum, ut patet per philosophum, in II de anima. Non autem est conditio secundum quam materia adaptetur formae, quia, si esset possibile, cum forma sit incorruptibilis, potius oporteret materiam incorruptibilem esse. Sicut quod serra sit ferrea, competit formae et actioni ipsius, ut per duritiem sit apta ad secandum, sed quod sit potens rubiginem contrahere, consequitur ex necessitate talis materiae, et non secundum electionem agentis; nam si artifex posset, faceret ex ferro serram quae rubiginem non posset contrahere. Deus autem, qui est conditor hominis, omnipotens est. Unde ademit suo beneficio ab homine primitus institu-

I answer that, If any one, on account of his fault, be deprived of a favor bestowed on him the privation of that favor is a punishment of that fault. Now as we stated in the First Part (Q. 95, A. 1; Q. 97, A. 1), God bestowed this favor on man, in his primitive state, that as long as his mind was subject to God, the lower powers of his soul would be subject to his rational mind, and his body to his soul. But inasmuch as through sin man’s mind withdrew from subjection to God, the result was that neither were his lower powers wholly subject to his reason, whence there followed so great a rebellion of the carnal appetite against the reason: nor was the body wholly subject to the soul; whence arose death and other bodily defects. For life and soundness of body depend on the body being subject to the soul, as the perfectible is subject to its perfection. Consequently, on the other hand, death, sickness, and all defects of the body are due to the lack of the body’s subjection to the soul. It is therefore evident that as the rebellion of the carnal appetite against the spirit is a punishment of our first parents’ sin, so also are death and all defects of the body. Reply Obj. 1: A thing is said to be natural if it proceeds from the principles of nature. Now the essential principles of nature are form and matter. The form of man is his rational soul, which is, of itself, immortal: wherefore death is not natural to man on the part of his form. The matter of man is a body such as is composed of contraries, of which corruptibility is a necessary consequence, and in this respect death is natural to man. Now this condition attached to the nature of the human body results from a natural necessity, since it was necessary for the human body to be the organ of touch, and consequently a mean between objects of touch: and this was impossible, were it not composed of contraries, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 11). On the other hand, this condition is not attached to the adaptability of matter to form because, if it were possible, since the form is incorruptible, its matter should rather be incorruptible. In the same way a saw needs to be of iron, this being suitable to its form and action, so that its hardness may make it fit for cutting. But that it be liable to rust is a necessary result of such a matter and is not according to the agent’s choice; for, if the craftsman were able, of the iron he would make a saw that would not rust. Now God Who is the author of man is all-powerful, wherefore when He first made man, He conferred on him the favor of being exempt from the neces-

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to necessitatem moriendi ex tali materia consequentem. Quod tamen beneficium subtractum est per peccatum primorum parentum. Et sic mors et est naturalis, propter conditionem materiae, et est poenalis, propter amissionem divini beneficii praeservantis a morte. Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo illa hominis ad alia animalia attenditur quantum ad conditionem materiae, idest quantum ad corpus ex contrariis compositum, non autem quantum ad formam. Nam anima hominis est immortalis, brutorum vero animalium animae sunt mortales. Ad tertium dicendum quod primi parentes fuerunt instituti a Deo non solum sicut quaedam personae singulares, sed sicut quaedam principia totius humanae naturae ab eis in posteros derivandae simul cum beneficio divino praeservante a morte. Et ideo per eorum peccatum tota humana natura in posteris tali beneficio destituta, mortem incurrit. Ad quartum dicendum quod aliquis defectus ex peccato consequitur dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum poenae taxatae a iudice. Et talis defectus aequalis debet esse in his ad quos aequaliter pertinet peccatum. Alius autem defectus est qui ex huiusmodi poena per accidens consequitur, sicut quod aliquis pro sua culpa excaecatus, cadat in via. Et talis defectus culpae non proportionatur, nec ab homine iudice pensatur, qui non potest fortuitos eventus praecognoscere. Sic igitur poena taxata pro primo peccato, proportionaliter ei respondens, fuit subtractio divini beneficii quo rectitudo et integritas humanae naturae conservabatur. Defectus autem consequentes subtractionem huius beneficii, sunt mors et aliae poenalitates praesentis vitae. Et ideo non oportet huiusmodi poenas aequales esse in his ad quos aequaliter pertinet primum peccatum. Verum quia Deus praescius est omnium futurorum eventuum, ex dispensatione divinae providentiae huiusmodi poenalitates diversimode in diversis inveniuntur, non quidem propter aliqua merita praecedentia hanc vitam, ut Origenes posuit (hoc enim est contra id quod dicitur Rom. IX, cum nondum aliquid boni aut mali egissent; est etiam contra hoc quod in primo ostensum est, quod anima non est creata ante corpus); sed vel in poenam paternorum peccatorum, inquantum filius est quaedam res patris, unde frequenter parentes puniuntur in prole; vel etiam propter remedium salutis eius qui huiusmodi poenalitatibus subditur, ut scilicet per hoc a peccatis arceatur, vel etiam de virtutibus non superbiat, et per patientiam coronetur.

Q. 164, A. 1

sity resulting from such a matter: which favor, however, was withdrawn through the sin of our first parents. Accordingly death is both natural on account of a condition attaching to matter, and penal on account of the loss of the Divine favor preserving man from death. Reply Obj. 2: This likeness of man to other animals regards a condition attaching to matter, namely the body being composed of contraries. But it does not regard the form, for man’s soul is immortal, whereas the souls of dumb animals are mortal.

Reply Obj. 3: Our first parents were made by God not only as particular individuals, but also as principles of the whole human nature to be transmitted by them to their posterity, together with the Divine favor preserving them from death. Hence through their sin the entire human nature, being deprived of that favor in their posterity, incurred death. Reply Obj. 4: A twofold defect arises from sin. One is by way of a punishment appointed by a judge: and such a defect should be equal in those to whom the sin pertains equally. The other defect is that which results accidentally from this punishment; for instance, that one who has been deprived of his sight for a sin he has committed, should fall down in the road. Such a defect is not proportionate to the sin, nor does a human judge take it into account, since he cannot foresee chance happenings. Accordingly, the punishment appointed for the first sin and proportionately corresponding thereto, was the withdrawal of the Divine favor whereby the rectitude and integrity of human nature was maintained. But the defects resulting from this withdrawal are death and other penalties of the present life. Wherefore these punishments need not be equal in those to whom the first sin equally appertains. Nevertheless, since God foreknows all future events, Divine providence has so disposed that these penalties are apportioned in different ways to various people. This is not on account of any merits or demerits previous to this life, as Origen held: for this is contrary to the words of Rom. 9:11, When they . . . had not done any good or evil; and also contrary to statements made in the First Part (Q. 90, A. 4; Q. 118, A. 3), namely that the soul is not created before the body: but either in punishment of their parents’ sins, inasmuch as the child is something belonging to the father, wherefore parents are often punished in their children; or again it is for a remedy intended for the spiritual welfare of the person who suffers these penalties, to wit that he may thus be turned away from his sins, or lest he take pride in his virtues, and that he may be crowned for his patience. Ad quintum dicendum quod mors dupliciter poReply Obj. 5: Death may be considered in two ways. test considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod est quod- First, as an evil of human nature, and thus it is not of God, dam malum humanae naturae. Et sic non est ex Deo, sed but is a defect befalling man through his fault. Second, as est defectus quidam incidens ex culpa humana. Alio mo- having an aspect of good, namely as being a just punishdo potest considerari secundum quod habet quandam ment, and thus it is from God. Wherefore Augustine says

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rationem boni, prout scilicet est quaedam iusta poena. Et sic est a Deo. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro Retractat., quod Deus non est auctor mortis, nisi inquantum est poena. Ad sextum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIII de Civ. Dei, quemadmodum iniusti male utuntur non tantum malis, verum etiam bonis; ita iusti bene utuntur non tantum bonis, sed etiam malis. Hinc fit ut et mali male lege utantur, quamvis sit lex bonum, et boni bene moriantur, quamvis sit mors malum. Inquantum igitur sancti bene morte utuntur, fit eis mors meritoria. Ad septimum dicendum quod mors dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, pro ipsa privatione vitae. Et sic mors sentiri non potest, cum sit privatio sensus et vitae. Et sic non est poena sensus, sed poena damni. Alio modo, secundum quod nominat ipsam corruptionem quae terminatur ad privationem praedictam. De corruptione autem, sicut et de generatione, dupliciter loqui possumus. Uno modo, secundum quod est terminus alterationis. Et sic in ipso instanti in quo primo privatur vita, dicitur inesse mors. Et secundum hoc etiam, mors non est poena sensus. Alio modo corruptio potest accipi cum alteratione praecedente, prout dicitur aliquis mori dum movetur in mortem; sicut dicitur aliquid generari dum movetur in generatum esse. Et sic mors potest esse afflictiva. Ad octavum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, super Gen. ad Litt., quamvis annos multos primi parentes postea vixerint, illo tamen die mori coeperunt quo mortis legem, qua in senium veterascerent, acceperunt.

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(Retract. i, 21) that God is not the author of death, except insofar as it is a punishment.

Reply Obj. 6: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 5), just as the wicked abuse not only evil but also good things, so do the righteous make good use not only of good but also of evil things. Hence it is that both evil men make evil use of the law, though the law is good, while good men die well, although death is an evil. Wherefore inasmuch as holy men make good use of death, their death is to them meritorious. Reply Obj. 7: Death may be considered in two ways. First, as the privation of life, and thus death cannot be felt, since it is the privation of sense and life. In this way it involves not pain of sense but pain of loss. Second, it may be considered as denoting the corruption which ends in the aforesaid privation. Now we may speak of corruption even as of generation in two ways: in one way as being the term of alteration, and thus in the first instant in which life departs, death is said to be present. In this way also death has no pain of sense. In another way corruption may be taken as including the previous alteration: thus a person is said to die, when he is in motion towards death; just as a thing is said to be engendered, while in motion towards the state of having been engendered: and thus death may be painful. Reply Obj. 8: According to Augustine (Gen ad lit. ), although our first parents lived thereafter many years, they began to die on the day when they heard the death-decree, condemning them to decline to old age.

Article 2 Whether the particular punishments of our first parents are suitably appointed in Scripture? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter particulares poenae primorum parentum determinentur in Scriptura. Non enim debet assignari ut poena peccati id quod etiam sine peccato esset. Sed dolor in pariendo esset, ut videtur, etiam sine peccato, hoc enim requirit dispositio feminei sexus, ut proles nasci non possit sine dolore parientis. Similiter etiam subiectio mulieris ad virum consequitur perfectionem virilis sexus et imperfectionem muliebris. Germinatio etiam spinarum et tribulorum ad naturam terrae pertinet, quae fuisset etiam sine peccato. Non ergo huiusmodi sunt convenientes poenae primi peccati. Praeterea, illud quod pertinet ad dignitatem alicuius, non videtur ad poenam eius pertinere. Sed multi-

Objection 1: It would seem that the particular punishments of our first parents are unsuitably appointed in Scripture. For that which would have occurred even without sin should not be described as a punishment for sin. Now seemingly there would have been pain in childbearing, even had there been no sin: for the disposition of the female sex is such that offspring cannot be born without pain to the bearer. Likewise the subjection of woman to man results from the perfection of the male, and the imperfection of the female sex. Again it belongs to the nature of the earth to bring forth thorns and thistles, and this would have occurred even had there been no sin. Therefore these are unsuitable punishments of the first sin. Obj. 2: Further, that which pertains to a person’s dignity does not, seemingly, pertain to his punishment. But

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plicatio conceptus pertinet ad dignitatem mulieris. Ergo the multiplying of conceptions pertains to a woman’s dignity. non debet poni quasi mulieris poena. Therefore it should not be described as the woman’s punishment. Praeterea, poena peccati primorum parentum ad Obj. 3: Further, the punishment of our first parents’ sin omnes derivatur, sicut de morte dictum est. Sed non om- is transmitted to all, as we have stated with regard to death nium mulierum multiplicantur conceptus, nec omnes (A. 1). But all women’s conceptions are not multiplied, nor viri in sudore vultus sui pane vescuntur. Non ergo ista does every man eat bread in the sweat of his face. Therefore sunt convenientes poenae primi peccati. these are not suitable punishments of the first sin. Praeterea, locus Paradisi propter hominem factus Obj. 4: Further, the place of paradise was made for man. erat. Sed nihil debet esse frustra in rerum ordine. Ergo Now nothing in the order of things should be without purvidetur quod non fuerit conveniens hominis poena quod pose. Therefore it would seem that the exclusion of man a Paradiso excluderetur. from paradise was not a suitable punishment of man. Praeterea, locus ille Paradisi terrestris de se diciObj. 5: Further, this place of the earthly paradise is said tur esse inaccessibilis. Frustra ergo apposita sunt alia im- to be naturally inaccessible. Therefore it was useless to put pedimenta, ne homo illuc reverteretur, scilicet Cherubin other obstacles in the way lest man should return thither, to et gladius flammeus atque versatilis. wit the cherubim, and the flaming sword turning every way. Praeterea, homo post peccatum statim necessitati Obj. 6: Further, immediately after his sin man was submortis fuit addictus, et ita beneficio ligni vitae non pote- ject to the necessity of dying, so that he could not be rerat ad immortalitatem reparari. Frustra ergo ei esus ligni stored to immortality by the beneficial tree of life. Therevitae interdicitur. Cum dicitur Gen. III, videte, ne forte fore it was useless to forbid him to eat of the tree of life, as sumat de ligno vitae, et vivat in aeternum. instanced by the words of Gen. 3:22: See, lest perhaps he . . . take . . . of the tree of life . . . and live for ever. Praeterea, insultare misero videtur misericordiae Obj. 7: Further, to mock the unhappy seems inconet clementiae repugnare, quae maxime in Scriptura Deo sistent with mercy and clemency, which are most of all attribuitur, secundum illud Psalmi, miserationes eius su- ascribed to God in Scripture, according to Ps. 144:9, His per omnia opera eius. Ergo inconvenienter ponitur do- tender mercies are over all His works. Therefore God is unminum insultasse primis parentibus per peccatum iam becomingly described as mocking our first parents, already in miseriam deductis, ubi dicitur, ecce, Adam quasi unus reduced through sin to unhappy straits, in the words of ex nobis factus est, sciens bonum et malum. Gen. 3:22, Behold Adam is become as one of Us, knowing good and evil. Praeterea, vestitus ad necessitatem hominis pertiObj. 8: Further, clothes are necessary to man, like food, net, sicut et cibus, secundum illud I ad Tim. ult., haben- according to 1 Tim. 6:8, Having food, and wherewith to be tes alimenta et quibus tegamur, his contenti sumus. Ergo, covered, with these we are content. Therefore just as food sicut cibus primis parentibus fuit attributus ante pecca- was appointed to our first parents before their sin, so also tum, ita etiam et vestitus attribui debuit. Inconvenienter should clothing have been ascribed to them. Therefore afergo post peccatum dicitur eis Deus tunicas pelliceas fe- ter their sin it was unsuitable to say that God made for them cisse. garments of skin. Praeterea, poena quae peccato alicui adhibetur, Objection 9: Further, the punishment inflicted for a debet plus habere in malo quam emolumentum quod sin should outweigh in evil the gain realized through the quis ex peccato consequitur, alioquin, per poenam non sin: else the punishment would not deter one from sinning. deterreretur aliquis a peccato. Sed primi parentes ex pec- Now through sin our first parents gained in this, that their cato consecuti sunt quod eorum oculi aperirentur, ut eyes were opened, according to Gen. 3:7. But this outweighs dicitur Gen. III. Hoc autem praeponderat in bono om- in good all the penal evils which are stated to have resulted nibus malis poenalibus quae ponuntur ex peccato con- from sin. Therefore the punishments resulting from our secuta. Inconvenienter igitur describuntur poenae pec- first parents’ sin are unsuitably described. catum primorum parentum consequentes. In contrarium est quod huiusmodi poenae sunt On the contrary, These punishments were apdivinitus taxatae, qui omnia facit in numero, pondere et pointed by God, Who does all things, in number, weight, mensura, ut dicitur Sap. XI. and measure (Wis 11:21). Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, priI answer that, As stated in the foregoing Article, mi parentes propter suum peccatum privati sunt bene- on account of their sin, our first parents were deprived ficio divino quo humanae naturae integritas in eis con- of the Divine favor, whereby the integrity of human naservabatur, per cuius subtractionem humana natura in ture was maintained in them, and by the withdrawal of defectus poenales incidit. Et ideo dupliciter puniti fue- this favor human nature incurred penal defects. Hence they

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runt. Primo quidem, quantum ad hoc quod subtractum fuit eis id quod integritatis statui competebat, scilicet locus terrestris Paradisi, quod significatur Gen. III, cum dicitur, et emisit eum Deus de Paradiso voluptatis. Et quia ad illum statum primae innocentiae per seipsum redire non poterat, convenienter apposita sunt impedimenta ne rediret ad ea quae primo statui competebant, scilicet a cibo, ne sumeret de ligno vitae; et a loco, collocavit Deus ante Paradisum Cherubin et flammeum gladium. Secundo autem puniti fuerunt quantum ad hoc quod attributa sunt eis ea quae naturae conveniunt tali beneficio destitutae. Et hoc quidem et quantum ad corpus, et quantum ad animam. Quantum quidem ad corpus, ad quod pertinet differentia sexus, alia poena attributa est mulieri, alia viro. Mulieri quidem attributa est poena secundum duo propter quae viro coniungitur, quae sunt generatio prolis, et communicatio operum pertinentium ad domesticam conversationem. Quantum autem ad generationem prolis, punita fuit dupliciter. Primo quidem, quantum ad taedia quae sustinet portando prolem conceptam, et hoc significatur cum dicitur, multiplicabo aerumnas tuas et conceptus tuos. Et quantum ad dolorem quem patitur in pariendo, et quantum ad hoc dicitur, in dolore paries. Quantum vero ad domesticam conversationem, punitur secundum hoc quod subiicitur dominationi viri, per hoc quod dicitur, sub viri potestate eris.

Sicut autem ad mulierem pertinet ut subdatur viro in his quae ad domesticam conversationem pertinent, ita ad virum pertinet quod necessaria vitae procuret. Et circa hoc punitur tripliciter. Primo quidem, per terrae sterilitatem, cum dicitur, maledicta terra in opere tuo. Secundo, per laboris anxietatem, sine qua fructus terrae non percipit, unde dicitur, in labore comedes de ea cunctis diebus vitae tuae. Tertio, quantum ad impedimenta quae proveniunt terram colentibus, unde dicitur, spinas et tribulos germinabit tibi. Similiter etiam ex parte animae triplex eorum poena describitur. Primo quidem, quantum ad confusionem quam passi sunt de rebellione carnis ad spiritum, unde dicitur, aperti sunt oculi amborum, et cognoverunt se esse nudos. Secundo, quantum ad increpationem propriae culpae, per hoc quod dicitur, ecce, Adam factus est quasi unus ex nobis. Tertio, quantum ad commemorationem futurae mortis, secundum quod ei dictum est, pulvis es, et in pulverem reverteris. Ad quod etiam pertinet quod Deus fecit eis tunicas pelliceas, in signum mortalitatis eorum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in statu innocentiae fuisset partus absque dolore. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, sic ad pariendum non doloris gemitus,

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were punished in two ways. In the first place by being deprived of that which was befitting the state of integrity, namely the place of the earthly paradise: and this is indicated (Gen 3:23) where it is stated that God sent him out of the paradise of pleasure. And since he was unable, of himself, to return to that state of original innocence, it was fitting that obstacles should be placed against his recovering those things that were befitting his original state, namely food (lest he should take of the tree of life) and place; for God placed before . . . paradise . . . Cherubim, and a flaming sword. Second, they were punished by having appointed to them things befitting a nature bereft of the aforesaid favor: and this as regards both the body and the soul. With regard to the body, to which pertains the distinction of sex, one punishment was appointed to the woman and another to the man. To the woman punishment was appointed in respect of two things on account of which she is united to the man; and these are the begetting of children, and community of works pertaining to family life. As regards the begetting of children, she was punished in two ways: first in the weariness to which she is subject while carrying the child after conception, and this is indicated in the words (Gen 3:16), I will multiply thy sorrows, and thy conceptions; second, in the pain which she suffers in giving birth, and this is indicated by the words (Gen 3:16), In sorrow shalt thou bring forth. As regards family life she was punished by being subjected to her husband’s authority, and this is conveyed in the words (Gen 3:16), Thou shalt be under thy husband’s power. Now, just as it belongs to the woman to be subject to her husband in matters relating to the family life, so it belongs to the husband to provide the necessaries of that life. In this respect he was punished in three ways. First, by the barrenness of the earth, in the words (Gen 3:17), Cursed is the earth in thy work. Second, by the cares of his toil, without which he does not win the fruits of the earth; hence the words (Gen 3:17), With labor and toil shalt thou eat thereof all the days of thy life. Third, by the obstacles encountered by the tillers of the soil, wherefore it is written (Gen 3:18), Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee. Likewise a triple punishment is ascribed to them on the part of the soul. First, by reason of the confusion they experienced at the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit; hence it is written (Gen 3:7): The eyes of them both were opened; and . . . they perceived themselves to be naked. Second, by the reproach for their sin, indicated by the words (Gen 3:22), Behold Adam is become as one of Us. Third, by the reminder of their coming death, when it was said to him (Gen 3:19): Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return. To this also pertains that God made them garments of skin, as a sign of their mortality. Reply Obj. 1: In the state of innocence child-bearing would have been painless: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): Just as, in giving birth, the mother would then be re-

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sed maturitatis impulsus feminea viscera relaxaret, sicut ad concipiendum non libidinis appetitus, sed voluntarius usus naturam utramque coniungeret. Subiectio autem mulieris ad virum intelligenda est in poenam mulieris esse inducta, non quantum ad regimen, quia etiam ante peccatum vir caput mulieris fuisset et eius gubernator existeret, sed prout mulier, contra propriam voluntatem, necesse habet viri voluntati parere. Spinas autem et tribulos terra germinasset, si homo non peccasset, in cibum animalium, non autem in hominis poenam, quia scilicet per eorum exortum nullus labor aut punctio homini operanti in terra accideret, ut Augustinus dicit, super Gen. ad Litt. Quamvis Alcuinus dicat quod ante peccatum terra omnino spinas et tribulos non germinasset. Sed primum melius est. Ad secundum dicendum quod multitudo conceptuum inducitur in poenam mulieris, non propter ipsam procreationem prolis, quae etiam ante peccatum fuisset, sed propter multitudinem afflictionum, quae mulier patitur ex hoc quod portat fetum conceptum. Unde signanter coniungitur, multiplicabo aerumnas tuas et conceptus tuos. Ad tertium dicendum quod illae poenae aliqualiter ad omnes pertinent. Quaecumque enim mulier concipit, necesse est quod aerumnas patiatur et cum dolore pariat, praeter beatam virginem, quae sine corruptione concepit et sine dolore peperit, quia eius conceptio non fuit secundum legem naturae a primis parentibus derivata. Si autem aliqua non concipit neque parit, patitur sterilitatis defectum, qui praeponderat poenis praedictis. Similiter etiam oportet ut quicumque terram operatur, in sudore vultus comedat panem. Et qui ipsi per se agriculturam non exercent, in aliis laboribus occupantur, homo enim nascitur ad laborem, ut dicitur Iob V, et sic panem ab aliis in sudore vultus elaboratum manducant. Ad quartum dicendum quod locus ille Paradisi terrestris, quamvis non serviat homini ad usum, servit tamen ei ad documentum, dum cognoscit propter peccatum se tali loco fuisse privatum; et dum per ea quae corporaliter in illo Paradiso sunt, instruuntur de his quae pertinent ad Paradisum caelestem, quo aditus homini praeparatur per Christum. Ad quintum dicendum quod, salvis spiritualis sensus mysteriis, locus ille praecipue videtur esse inaccessibilis propter vehementiam aestus in locis intermediis ex propinquitate solis. Et hoc significatur per flammeum gladium, qui versatilis dicitur, propter proprietatem motus circularis huiusmodi aestum causantis. Et quia motus corporalis creaturae disponitur ministerio Angelorum, ut patet per Augustinum, III de Trin.; convenienter etiam simul cum gladio versatili Cherubin adiungitur, ad custodiendam viam ligni vitae. Unde Augustinus di-

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lieved not by groans of pain, but by the instigations of maturity, so in bearing and conceiving the union of both sexes would be one not of lustful desire but of deliberate action. The subjection of the woman to her husband is to be understood as inflicted in punishment of the woman, not as to his headship (since even before sin the man was the head and governor of the woman), but as to her having now to obey her husband’s will even against her own. If man had not sinned, the earth would have brought forth thorns and thistles to be the food of animals, but not to punish man, because their growth would bring no labor or punishment for the tiller of the soil, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. iii, 18). Alcuin, however, holds that, before sin, the earth brought forth no thorns and thistles, whatever: but the former opinion is the better. Reply Obj. 2: The multiplying of her conceptions was appointed as a punishment to the woman, not on account of the begetting of children, for this would have been the same even before sin, but on account of the numerous sufferings to which the woman is subject, through carrying her offspring after conception. Hence it is expressly stated: I will multiply thy sorrows, and thy conceptions. Reply Obj. 3: These punishments affect all somewhat. For any woman who conceives must needs suffer sorrows and bring forth her child with pain: except the Blessed Virgin, who conceived without corruption, and bore without pain, because her conceiving was not according to the law of nature, transmitted from our first parents. And if a woman neither conceives nor bears, she suffers from the defect of barrenness, which outweighs the aforesaid punishments. Likewise whoever tills the soil must needs eat his bread in the sweat of his brow: while those who do not themselves work on the land, are busied with other labors, for man is born to labor (Job 5:7): and thus they eat the bread for which others have labored in the sweat of their brow. Reply Obj. 4: Although the place of the earthly paradise avails not man for his use, it avails him for a lesson; because he knows himself deprived of that place on account of sin, and because by the things that have a bodily existence in that paradise, he is instructed in things pertaining to the heavenly paradise, the way to which is prepared for man by Christ. Reply Obj. 5: Apart from the mysteries of the spiritual interpretation, this place would seem to be inaccessible, chiefly on account of the extreme heat in the middle zone by reason of the nighness of the sun. This is denoted by the flaming sword, which is described as turning every way, as being appropriate to the circular movement that causes this heat. And since the movements of corporal creatures are set in order through the ministry of the angels, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4), it was fitting that, besides the sword turning every way, there should be cherubim to

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cit, XI super Gen. ad Litt., hoc per caelestes potestates etiam in Paradiso visibili factum esse credendum est, ut per angelicum ministerium esset illic quaedam ignea custodia. Ad sextum dicendum quod homo, si post peccatum de ligno vitae comedisset, non propter hoc immortalitatem recuperasset, sed beneficio illius cibi potuisset vitam magis prolongare. Unde quod dicitur, et vivat in aeternum, sumitur ibi aeternum pro diuturno. Hoc autem non expediebat homini, ut in miseria huius vitae diutius permaneret. Ad septimum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XI super Gen. ad Litt., verba Dei non tam sunt primis parentibus insultantis, quam ceteros, ne ita superbiant, deterrentis, propter quos ista conscripta sunt, quia scilicet non solum Adam non fuit factus qualis fieri voluit, sed nec illud quod factus fuerat, conservavit. Ad octavum dicendum quod vestitus necessarius est homini secundum statum praesentis miseriae, propter duo, primo quidem, propter defectum ab exterioribus nocumentis, puta intemperie caloris et frigoris; secundo, ad tegumentum ignominiae, ne turpitudo membrorum appareat in quibus praecipue manifestatur rebellio carnis ad spiritum. Haec autem duo in primo statu non erant. Quia in statu illo corpus hominis non poterat per aliquid extrinsecum laedi, ut in primo dictum est. Nec etiam erat in statu illo aliqua turpitudo in corpore hominis quae confusionem induceret, unde dicitur Genesi, erat autem uterque nudus, Adam scilicet et uxor eius, et non erubescebant. Alia autem ratio est de cibo, qui est necessarius ad fomentum caloris naturalis et ad corporis augmentum. Ad nonum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XI super Gen. ad Litt., non est credendum quod primi parentes essent producti clausis oculis, praecipue cum de muliere dicatur quod vidit lignum, quod esset pulchrum et bonum ad vescendum. Aperti ergo sunt oculi amborum ad aliquid intuendum et cogitandum quod antea nunquam adverterant, scilicet ad invicem concupiscendum, quod ante non fuerat.

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keep the way of the tree of life. Hence Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xi, 40): It is to be believed that even in the visible paradise this was done by heavenly powers indeed, so that there was a fiery guard set there by the ministry of angels. Reply Obj. 6: After sin, if man had of the tree of life, he would not thereby have recovered immortality, but by means of that beneficial food he might have prolonged his life. Hence in the words And live for ever, for ever signifies for a long time. For it was not expedient for man to remain longer in the unhappiness of this life. Reply Obj. 7: According to Augustine (Gen ad lit. xi, 39), these words of God are not so much a mockery of our first parents as a deterrent to others, for whose benefit these things are written, lest they be proud likewise, because Adam not only failed to become that which he coveted to be, but did not keep that to which he was made. Reply Obj. 8: Clothing is necessary to man in his present state of unhappiness for two reasons. First, to supply a deficiency in respect of external harm caused by, for instance, extreme heat or cold. Second, to hide his ignominy and to cover the shame of those members wherein the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit is most manifest. Now these two motives do not apply to the primitive state. because then man’s body could not be hurt by any outward thing, as stated in the First Part (Q. 97, A. 2), nor was there in man’s body anything shameful that would bring confusion on him. Hence it is written (Gen 2:23): And they were both naked, to wit Adam and his wife, and were not ashamed. The same cannot be said of food, which is necessary to entertain the natural heat, and to sustain the body. Reply Obj. 9: As Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xi, 31), We must not imagine that our first parents were created with their eyes closed, especially since it is stated that the woman saw that the tree was fair, and good to eat. Accordingly the eyes of both were opened so that they saw and thought on things which had not occurred to their minds before, this was a mutual concupiscence such as they had not hitherto.

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Question 165 Our First Parents’ Temptation Deinde considerandum est de tentatione primorum We must now consider our first parents’ temptation, parentum. Circa quam quaeruntur duo. concerning which there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum fuerit conveniens quod homo a (1) Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the Diabolo tentaretur. devil? Secundo, de modo et ordine illius tentationis. (2) Of the manner and order of that temptation.

Article 1 Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit conveniens ut homo a Diabolo tentaretur. Eadem enim poena finalis debetur peccato Angeli et peccato hominis, secundum illud Matth. XXV, ite, maledicti, in ignem aeternum, qui paratus est Diabolo et Angelis eius. Sed primum peccatum Angeli non fuit ex aliqua tentatione exteriori. Ergo nec primum peccatum hominis debuit esse ex aliqua tentatione exteriori. Praeterea, Deus, praescius futurorum, sciebat quod homo per tentationem Daemonis in peccatum deiiceretur, et sic bene sciebat quod non expediebat ei quod tentaretur. Ergo videtur quod non fuerit conveniens quod permitteret eum tentari. Praeterea, quod aliquis impugnatorem habeat, ad poenam pertinere videtur, sicut et e contrario ad praemium pertinere videtur quod impugnatio subtrahatur, secundum illud Prov. XVI, cum placuerint domino viae hominis, inimicos quoque eius convertet ad pacem. Sed poena non debet praecedere culpam. Ergo inconveniens fuit quod homo ante peccatum tentaretur. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XXXIV, qui non est tentatus, qualia scit? Respondeo dicendum quod divina sapientia disponit omnia suaviter, ut dicitur Sap. VIII, inquantum scilicet sua providentia singulis attribuit quae eis competunt secundum suam naturam; quia, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., providentiae non est naturam corrumpere, sed salvare. Hoc autem pertinet ad conditionem humanae naturae, ut ab aliis creaturis iuvari vel impediri possit. Unde conveniens fuit ut Deus hominem in statu innocentiae et tentari permitteret per malos Angelos, et iuvari eum faceret per bonos. Ex speciali autem beneficio gratiae hoc erat ei collatum, ut nulla creatura exterior ei posset nocere contra propriam voluntatem, per quam etiam tentationi Daemonis resistere poterat.

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for man to be tempted by the devil. For the same final punishment is appointed to the angels’ sin and to man’s, according to Matt. 25:41, Go you cursed into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels. Now the angels’ first sin did not follow a temptation from without. Therefore neither should man’s first sin have resulted from an outward temptation. Obj. 2: Further, God, Who foreknows the future, knew that through the demon’s temptation man would fall into sin, and thus He knew full well that it was not expedient for man to be tempted. Therefore it would seem unfitting for God to allow him to be tempted. Obj. 3: Further, it seems to savor of punishment that anyone should have an assailant, just as on the other hand the cessation of an assault is akin to a reward. Now punishment should not precede fault. Therefore it was unfitting for man to be tempted before he sinned.

On the contrary, It is written (Sir 34:11): He that hath not been tempted, what manner of things doth he know? I answer that, God’s wisdom orders all things sweetly (Wis 8:1), inasmuch as His providence appoints to each one that which is befitting it according to its nature. For as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), It belongs to providence not to destroy, but to maintain, nature. Now it is a condition attaching to human nature that one creature can be helped or impeded by another. Wherefore it was fitting that God should both allow man in the state of innocence to be tempted by evil angels, and should cause him to be helped by good angels. And by a special favor of grace, it was granted him that no creature outside himself could harm him against his own will, whereby he was able even to resist the temptation of the demon.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod supra naturam humanam est aliqua natura in qua potest malum culpae inveniri, non autem supra naturam angelicam. Tentare autem inducendo ad malum, non est nisi iam depravati per culpam. Et ideo conveniens fuit ut homo per Angelum malum tentaretur ad peccandum, sicut etiam, secundum naturae ordinem, per Angelum bonum promovetur ad perfectionem. Angelus autem a suo superiori, scilicet a Deo, in bono perfici potuit, non autem ad peccandum induci, quia, sicut dicitur Iac. I, Deus intentator malorum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Deus sciebat quod homo per tentationem in peccatum esset deiiciendus, ita etiam sciebat quod per liberum arbitrium resistere poterat tentatori. Hoc autem requirebat conditio naturae ipsius, ut propriae voluntati relinqueretur, secundum illud Eccli. XV, Deus reliquit hominem in manu consilii sui. Unde Augustinus dicit, XI super Gen. ad Litt., non mihi videtur magnae laudis futurum fuisse hominem, si propterea posset bene vivere quia nemo male vivere suaderet, cum et in natura posse, et in potestate haberet velle non consentire suadenti. Ad tertium dicendum quod impugnatio cui cum difficultate resistitur, poenalis est. Sed homo in statu innocentiae poterat absque omni difficultate tentationi resistere. Et ideo impugnatio tentatoris poenalis ei non fuit.

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Reply Obj. 1: Above the human nature there is another that admits of the possibility of the evil of fault: but there is not above the angelic nature. Now only one that is already become evil through sin can tempt by leading another into evil. Hence it was fitting that by an evil angel man should be tempted to sin, even as according to the order of nature he is moved forward to perfection by means of a good angel. An angel could be perfected in good by something above him, namely by God, but he could not thus be led into sin, because according to James 1:13, God is not a tempter of evils. Reply Obj. 2: Just as God knew that man, through being tempted, would fall into sin, so too He knew that man was able, by his free will, to resist the tempter. Now the condition attaching to man’s nature required that he should be left to his own will, according to Ecclus. 15:14, God left man in the hand of his own counsel. Hence Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xi, 4): It seems to me that man would have had no prospect of any special praise, if he were able to lead a good life simply because there was none to persuade him to lead an evil life; since both by nature he had the power, and in his power he had the will, not to consent to the persuader. Reply Obj. 3: An assault is penal if it be difficult to resist it: but, in the state of innocence, man was able, without any difficulty, to resist temptation. Consequently the tempter’s assault was not a punishment to man.

Article 2 Whether the manner and order of the first temptation was fitting? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit conveniens modus et ordo primae tentationis. Sicut enim ordine naturae Angelus erat superior homine, ita et vir erat perfectior muliere. Sed peccatum pervenit ab Angelo ad hominem. Ergo, pari ratione, debuit pervenire a viro in mulierem, ut scilicet mulier per virum tentaretur, et non e converso. Praeterea, tentatio primorum parentum fuit per suggestionem. Potest autem Diabolus suggerere homini etiam absque aliqua exteriori sensibili creatura. Cum ergo primi parentes essent spirituali mente praediti, minus sensibilibus quam intelligibilibus inhaerentes, convenientius fuisset quod solum spirituali tentatione homo tentaretur quam exteriori. Praeterea, non potest convenienter aliquis malum suggerere nisi per aliquid quod appareat bonum. Sed multa alia animalia habent maiorem apparentiam boni quam serpens. Non ergo convenienter tentatus fuit homo a Diabolo per serpentem.

Objection 1: It would seem that the manner and order of the first temptation was not fitting. For just as in the order of nature the angel was above man, so was the man above the woman. Now sin came upon man through an angel: therefore in like manner it should have come upon the woman through the man; in other words the woman should have been tempted by the man, and not the other way about. Obj. 2: Further, the temptation of our first parents was by suggestion. Now the devil is able to make suggestions to man without making use of an outward sensible creature. Since then our first parents were endowed with a spiritual mind, and adhered less to sensible than to intelligible things, it would have been more fitting for man to be tempted with a merely spiritual, instead of an outward, temptation. Obj. 3: Further, one cannot fittingly suggest an evil except through some apparent good. But many other animals have a greater appearance of good than the serpent has. Therefore man was unfittingly tempted by the devil through a serpent.

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Praeterea, serpens est animal irrationale. Sed animali irrationali non competit sapientia nec locutio, nec poena. Ergo inconvenienter inducitur serpens esse callidior cunctis animalibus, vel, prudentissimus omnium bestiarum, secundum aliam translationem. Inconvenienter etiam inducitur fuisse mulieri locutus, et a Deo punitus. Sed contra est quod id quod est primum in aliquo genere, debet esse proportionatum his quae in eodem genere consequuntur. Sed in quolibet peccato invenitur ordo primae tentationis, inquantum videlicet praecedit in sensualitate, quae per serpentem significatur, peccati concupiscentia; in ratione inferiori, quae significatur per mulierem, delectatio; in ratione superiori, quae significatur per virum, consensus peccati; ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin. Ergo congruus fuit ordo primae tentationis. Respondeo dicendum quod homo compositus est ex duplici natura, intellectiva scilicet et sensitiva. Et ideo Diabolus in tentatione hominis usus est incitamento ad peccandum dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, ex parte intellectus, inquantum promisit divinitatis similitudinem per scientiae adeptionem, quam homo naturaliter desiderat. Alio modo, ex parte sensus. Et sic usus est his sensibilibus rebus quae maximam habent affinitatem ad hominem, partim quidem in eadem specie, tentans virum per mulierem; partim vero in eodem genere, tentans mulierem per serpentem; partim vero ex genere propinquo, proponens pomum ligni vetiti ad edendum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in actu tentationis Diabolus erat sicut principale agens, sed mulier assumebatur quasi instrumentum tentationis ad deiiciendum virum. Tum quia mulier erat infirmior viro, unde magis seduci poterat. Tum etiam, propter coniunctionem eius ad virum, maxime per eam Diabolus poterat virum seducere. Non autem est eadem ratio principalis agentis et instrumenti. Nam principale agens oportet esse potius, quod non requiritur in agente instrumentali. Ad secundum dicendum quod suggestio qua spiritualiter Diabolus aliquid homini suggerit, ostendit Diabolus plus habere potestatis in homine quam suggestio exterior, quia per suggestionem interiorem immutatur a Diabolo saltem hominis phantasia, sed per suggestionem exteriorem immutatur sola exterior creatura. Diabolus autem minimum potestatis habebat in homine ante peccatum et ideo non potuit eum interiori suggestione, sed solum exteriori tentare. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XI super Gen. ad Litt., non debemus opinari quod serpentem sibi, per quem tentaret, Diabolus eligeret. Sed, cum esset in illo decipiendi cupiditas, non nisi per illud animal potuit per quod posse permissus est.

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Obj. 4: Further, the serpent is an irrational animal. Now wisdom, speech, and punishment are not befitting an irrational animal. Therefore the serpent is unfittingly described (Gen 3:1) as more subtle than any of the beasts of the earth, or as the most prudent of all beasts according to another version: and likewise is unfittingly stated to have spoken to the woman, and to have been punished by God. On the contrary, That which is first in any genus should be proportionate to all that follow it in that genus. Now in every kind of sin we find the same order as in the first temptation. For, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12), it begins with the concupiscence of sin in the sensuality, signified by the serpent; extends to the lower reason, by pleasure, signified by the woman; and reaches to the higher reason by consent in the sin, signified by the man. Therefore the order of the first temptation was fitting. I answer that, Man is composed of a twofold nature, intellective and sensitive. Hence the devil, in tempting man, made use of a twofold incentive to sin: one on the part of the intellect, by promising the Divine likeness through the acquisition of knowledge which man naturally desires to have; the other on the part of sense. This he did by having recourse to those sensible things, which are most akin to man, partly by tempting the man through the woman who was akin to him in the same species; partly by tempting the woman through the serpent, who was akin to them in the same genus; partly by suggesting to them to eat of the forbidden fruit, which was akin to them in the proximate genus. Reply Obj. 1: In the act of tempting the devil was by way of principal agent; whereas the woman was employed as an instrument of temptation in bringing about the downfall of the man, both because the woman was weaker than the man, and consequently more liable to be deceived, and because, on account of her union with man, the devil was able to deceive the man especially through her. Now there is no parity between principal agent and instrument, because the principal agent must exceed in power, which is not requisite in the instrumental agent. Reply Obj. 2: A suggestion whereby the devil suggests something to man spiritually, shows the devil to have more power against man than outward suggestion has, since by an inward suggestion, at least, man’s imagination is changed by the devil; whereas by an outward suggestion, a change is wrought merely on an outward creature. Now the devil had a minimum of power against man before sin, wherefore he was unable to tempt him by inward suggestion, but only by outward suggestion. Reply Obj. 3: According to Augustine (Gen ad lit. xi, 3), We are not to suppose that the devil chose the serpent as his means of temptation; but as he was possessed of the lust of deceit, he could only do so by the animal he was allowed to use for that purpose.

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Temperance

Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XI super Gen. ad Litt., serpens dictus est astutus, vel callidus, sive prudens, propter astutiam Diaboli, quae in illo agebat dolum, sicut dicitur prudens vel astuta lingua quam prudens vel astutus movet ad aliquid prudenter vel astute suadendum. Neque etiam serpens verborum sonos intelligebat qui ex illo fiebant ad mulierem, neque enim conversa credenda est anima eius in naturam rationalem. Quandoquidem nec ipsi homines, quorum rationalis natura est, cum Daemon in eis loquitur, sciunt quid loquantur. Sic ergo locutus est serpens homini sicut asina in qua sedebat Balaam, locuta est homini, nisi quod illud fuit opus diabolicum, hoc angelicum. Unde serpens non est interrogatus cur hoc fecerit, quia non in sua natura ipse id fecerat, sed Diabolus in illo, qui iam ex peccato suo igni destinatus fuerat sempiterno. Quod autem serpenti dicitur, ad eum qui per serpentem operatus est, refertur.

Et sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro super Gen. contra Manichaeos, nunc quidem eius poena, idest Diaboli, dicitur qua nobis cavendus est, non ea quae ultimo iudicio reservatur. Per hoc enim quod ei dicitur, maledictus es inter omnia animantia et bestias terrae, pecora illi praeponuntur, non in potestate, sed in conservatione naturae suae, quia pecora non amiserunt beatitudinem aliquam caelestem, quam nunquam habuerunt, sed in sua natura quam acceperunt, peragunt vitam. Dicitur etiam ei, pectore et ventre repes, secundum aliam litteram. Ubi nomine pectoris significatur superbia, quia ibi dominatur impetus animae, nomine autem ventris significatur carnale desiderium, quia haec pars mollior sentitur in corpore. His autem rebus serpit ad eos quos vult decipere. Quod autem dicitur, terram comedes cunctis diebus vitae tuae, duobus modis intelligi potest. Vel, ad te pertinebunt quos terrena cupiditate deceperis, idest peccatores, qui terrae nomine significantur. Vel tertium genus tentationis his verbis figuratur, quod est curiositas, terram enim qui manducat, profunda et tenebrosa penetrat. Per hoc autem quod inimicitiae ponuntur inter ipsum et mulierem, ostenditur non posse nos a Diabolo tentari nisi per illam animalem partem quae quasi mulieris imaginem in homine ostendit. Semen autem Diaboli est perversa suggestio, semen mulieris, fructus boni operis, quod perversae suggestioni resistit. Et ideo observat serpens plantam mulieris, ut, si quando in illicita illabitur, delectatio illam capiat, et illa observat caput eius, ut eum in ipso initio malae suasionis excludat.

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Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (Gen ad lit. xi, 29), The serpent is described as most prudent or subtle, on account of the cunning of the devil, who wrought his wiles in it: thus, we speak of a prudent or cunning tongue, because it is the instrument of a prudent or cunning man in advising something prudently or cunningly. Nor indeed (Gen ad lit. xi, 28) did the serpent understand the sounds which were conveyed through it to the woman; nor again are we to believe that its soul was changed into a rational nature, since not even men, who are rational by nature, know what they say when a demon speaks in them. Accordingly (Gen ad lit. xi, 29) the serpent spoke to man, even as the ass on which Balaam sat spoke to him, except that the former was the work of a devil, whereas the latter was the work of an angel. Hence (Gen ad lit. xi, 36) the serpent was not asked why it had done this, because it had not done this in its own nature, but the devil in it, who was already condemned to everlasting fire on account of his sin: and the words addressed to the serpent were directed to him who wrought through the serpent. Moreover, as again Augustine says (Super Gen. contra Manich. ii, 17, 18), his, that is, the devil’s, punishment mentioned here is that for which we must be on our guard against him, not that which is reserved till the last judgment. For when it was said to him: ‘Thou art cursed among all cattle and beasts of the earth,’ the cattle are set above him, not in power, but in the preservation of their nature, since the cattle lost no heavenly bliss, seeing that they never had it, but they continue to live in the nature which they received. It is also said to him: ‘Upon thy breast and belly shalt thou creep,’ according to another version Here the breast signifies pride, because it is there that the impulse of the soul dominates, while the belly denotes carnal desire, because this part of the body is softest to the touch: and on these he creeps to those whom he wishes to deceive. The words, ‘Earth shalt thou eat all the days of thy life’ may be understood in two ways. Either ‘Those shall belong to thee, whom thou shalt deceive by earthly lust,’ namely sinners who are signified under the name of earth, or a third kind of temptation, namely curiosity, is signified by these words: for to eat earth is to look into things deep and dark. The putting of enmities between him and the woman means that we cannot be tempted by the devil, except through that part of the soul which bears or reflects the likeness of a woman. The seed of the devil is the temptation to evil, the seed of the woman is the fruit of good works, whereby the temptation to evil is resisted. Wherefore the serpent lies in wait for the woman’s heel, that if at any time she fall away towards what is unlawful, pleasure may seize hold of her: and she watches his head that she may shut him out at the very outset of the evil temptation.

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Question 166 Studiousness Deinde considerandum est de studiositate, et curiosiWe must next consider studiousness and its opposite, tate sibi opposita. Circa studiositatem autem quaeruntur curiosity. Concerning studiousness there are two points of duo. inquiry: Primo, quae sit materia studiositatis. (1) What is the matter of studiousness? Secundo, utrum sit pars temperantiae. (2) Whether it is a part of temperance?

Article 1 Whether the proper matter of studiousness is knowledge? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod materia studiositatis non sit proprie cognitio. Studiosus enim dicitur aliquis ex eo quod adhibet studium aliquibus rebus. Sed in qualibet materia debet homo studium adhibere, ad hoc quod recte faciat quod est faciendum. Ergo videtur quod non sit specialis materia studiositatis cognitio. Praeterea, studiositas curiositati opponitur. Sed curiositas, quae a cura dicitur, potest esse etiam circa ornatum vestium, et circa alia huiusmodi quae pertinent ad corpus, unde apostolus dicit, Rom. XIII, carnis curam ne feceritis in desideriis. Ergo studiositas non est solum circa cognitionem. Praeterea, Ierem. VI dicitur, a minori usque ad maiorem, omnes avaritiae student. Sed avaritia non est proprie circa cognitionem, sed magis circa possessionem divitiarum, ut supra habitum est. Ergo studiositas, quae a studio dicitur, non est proprie circa cognitionem. Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. XXVII, stude sapientiae, fili mi, et laetifica cor meum, ut possis respondere sermonem. Sed eadem studiositas est quae laudatur ut virtus, et ad quam lex invitat. Ergo studiositas proprie est circa cognitionem. Respondeo dicendum quod studium praecipue importat vehementem applicationem mentis ad aliquid. Mens autem non applicatur ad aliquid nisi cognoscendo illud. Unde per prius mens applicatur ad cognitionem, secundario autem applicatur ad ea in quibus homo per cognitionem dirigitur. Et ideo studium per prius respicit cognitionem, et per posterius quaecumque alia ad quae operanda directione cognitionis indigemus. Virtutes autem proprie sibi attribuunt illam materiam circa quam primo et principaliter sunt, sicut fortitudo pericula mor-

Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not the proper matter of studiousness. For a person is said to be studious because he applies study to certain things. Now a man ought to apply study to every matter, in order to do aright what has to be done. Therefore seemingly knowledge is not the special matter of studiousness. Obj. 2: Further, studiousness is opposed to curiosity. Now curiosity, which is derived from cura (care), may also refer to elegance of apparel and other such things, which regard the body; wherefore the Apostle says (Rom 13:14): Make not provision (curam) for the flesh in its concupiscences. Obj. 3: Further it is written (Jer 6:13): From the least of them even to the greatest, all study covetousness. Now covetousness is not properly about knowledge, but rather about the possession of wealth, as stated above (Q. 118, A. 2). Therefore studiousness, which is derived from study, is not properly about knowledge. On the contrary, It is written (Prov 27:11): Study wisdom, my son, and make my heart joyful, that thou mayest give an answer to him that reproacheth. Now study, which is commended as a virtue, is the same as that to which the Law urges. Therefore studiousness is properly about knowledge. I answer that, Properly speaking, study denotes keen application of the mind to something. Now the mind is not applied to a thing except by knowing that thing. Wherefore the mind’s application to knowledge precedes its application to those things to which man is directed by his knowledge. Hence study regards knowledge in the first place, and as a result it regards any other things the working of which requires to be directed by knowledge. Now the virtues lay claim to that matter about which they are first and foremost; thus fortitude is concerned about dangers of death,

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Temperance

tis, et temperantia delectationem tactus. Et ideo studiositas proprie dicitur circa cognitionem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod circa alias materias non potest aliquid recte fieri, nisi secundum quod est praeordinatum per rationem cognoscentem. Et ideo per prius studiositas cognitionem respicit, cuicumque materiae studium adhibeatur. Ad secundum dicendum quod ex affectu hominis trahitur mens eius ad intendendum his ad quae afficitur, secundum illud Matth. VI, ubi est thesaurus tuus, ibi est et cor tuum. Et quia ad ea quibus caro fovetur, maxime homo afficitur, consequens est quod cogitatio hominis versetur praecipue circa ea quibus caro fovetur, ut scilicet homo inquirat qualiter homo optime possit carni suae subvenire. Et secundum hoc, curiositas ponitur circa ea quae ad carnem pertinent, ratione eorum quae ad cognitionem pertinent. Ad tertium dicendum quod avaritia inhiat ad lucra conquirenda, ad quod maxime necessaria est quaedam peritia terrenarum rerum. Et secundum hoc, studium attribuitur his quae ad avaritiam spectant.

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and temperance about pleasures of touch. Therefore studiousness is properly ascribed to knowledge. Reply Obj. 1: Nothing can be done aright as regards other matters, except insofar as is previously directed by the knowing reason. Hence studiousness, to whatever matter it be applied, has a prior regard for knowledge. Reply Obj. 2: Man’s mind is drawn, on account of his affections, towards the things for which he has an affection, according to Matt. 6:21, Where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also. And since man has special affection for those things which foster the flesh, it follows that man’s thoughts are concerned about things that foster his flesh, so that man seeks to know how he may best sustain his body. Accordingly curiosity is accounted to be about things pertaining to the body by reason of things pertaining to knowledge. Reply Obj. 3: Covetousness craves the acquisition of gain, and for this it is very necessary to be skilled in earthly things. Accordingly studiousness is ascribed to things pertaining to covetousness.

Article 2 Whether studiousness is a part of temperance? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod studiositas non sit temperantiae pars. Studiosus enim dicitur aliquis secundum studiositatem. Sed universaliter omnis virtuosus vocatur studiosus, ut patet per philosophum, qui frequenter sic utitur nomine studiosi. Ergo studiositas est generalis virtus, et non est pars temperantiae. Praeterea, studiositas, sicut dictum est, ad cognitionem pertinet. Sed cognitio non pertinet ad virtutes morales, quae sunt in appetitiva animae parte, sed magis ad intellectuales, quae sunt in parte cognoscitiva, unde et sollicitudo est actus prudentiae, ut supra habitum est. Ergo studiositas non est pars temperantiae.

Objection 1: It would seem that studiousness is not a part of temperance. For a man is said to be studious by reason of his studiousness. Now all virtuous persons without exception are called studious according to the Philosopher, who frequently employs the term studious (spoudaios) in this sense (Ethic. ix, 4, 8, 9). Therefore studiousness is a general virtue, and not a part of temperance. Obj. 2: Further, studiousness, as stated (A. 1), pertains to knowledge. But knowledge has no connection with the moral virtues which are in the appetitive part of the soul, and pertains rather to the intellectual virtues which are in the cognitive part: wherefore solicitude is an act of prudence as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9). Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance. Praeterea, virtus quae ponitur pars alicuius prinObj. 3: Further, a virtue that is ascribed as part of a cipalis virtutis, assimilatur ei quantum ad modum. Sed principal virtue resembles the latter as to mode. Now stustudiositas non assimilatur temperantiae quantum ad diousness does not resemble temperance as to mode, bemodum. Quia temperantiae nomen sumitur ex quadam cause temperance takes its name from being a kind of rerefrenatione, unde magis opponitur vitio quod est in ex- straint, wherefore it is more opposed to the vice that is in cessu. Nomen autem studiositatis sumitur e contrario ex excess: whereas studiousness is denominated from being applicatione animae ad aliquid, unde magis videtur op- the application of the mind to something, so that it would poni vitio quod est in defectu, scilicet negligentiae stu- seem to be opposed to the vice that is in default, namely, dendi, quam vitio quod est in excessu, scilicet curiosita- neglect of study, rather than to the vice which is in excess, ti. Unde, propter horum similitudinem, dicit Isidorus, in namely curiosity. Wherefore, on account of its resemblance

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Q. 166, A. 2

libro Etymol., quod studiosus dicitur quasi studiis curio- to the latter, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a studious man is one sus. Ergo studiositas non est pars temperantiae. who is curious to study. Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de On the contrary, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. moribus Eccle., curiosi esse prohibemur, quod magnae 21): We are forbidden to be curious: and this is a great temperantiae munus est. Sed curiositas prohibetur per gift that temperance bestows. Now curiosity is prevented by studiositatem moderatam. Ergo studiositas est pars tem- moderate studiousness. Therefore studiousness is a part of perantiae. temperance. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, I answer that, As stated above (Q. 141, AA. 3, 4, 5), ad temperantiam pertinet moderari motum appetitus, it belongs to temperance to moderate the movement of the ne superflue tendat in id quod naturaliter concupiscitur. appetite, lest it tend excessively to that which is desired natSicut autem naturaliter homo concupiscit delectationes urally. Now just as in respect of his corporeal nature man ciborum et venereorum secundum naturam corpora- naturally desires the pleasures of food and sex, so, in respect lem, ita secundum animam naturaliter desiderat cogno- of his soul, he naturally desires to know something; thus the scere aliquid, unde et philosophus dicit, in I Metaphys., Philosopher observes at the beginning of his Metaphysics quod omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant. (i, 1): All men have a natural desire for knowledge. Moderatio autem huius appetitus pertinet ad virtuThe moderation of this desire pertains to the virtue of tem studiositatis. Unde consequens est quod studiositas studiousness; wherefore it follows that studiousness is a posit pars potentialis temperantiae, sicut virtus secundaria tential part of temperance, as a subordinate virtue annexed ei adiuncta ut principali virtuti. Et comprehenditur sub to a principal virtue. Moreover, it is comprised under modmodestia, ratione superius dicta. esty for the reason given above (Q. 160, A. 2). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prudentia est Reply Obj. 1: Prudence is the complement of all the completiva omnium virtutum moralium, ut dicitur in moral virtues, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Consequently, insoVI Ethic. Inquantum igitur cognitio prudentiae ad om- far as the knowledge of prudence pertains to all the virtues, nes virtutes pertinet, intantum nomen studiositatis, quae the term studiousness, which properly regards knowledge, proprie circa cognitionem est, ad omnes virtutes deriva- is applied to all the virtues. tur. Ad secundum dicendum quod actus cognoscitivae Reply Obj. 2: The act of a cognitive power is comvirtutis imperatur a vi appetitiva, quae est motiva om- manded by the appetitive power, which moves all the pownium virium, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo circa co- ers, as stated above (I-II, Q. 9, A. 1). Wherefore knowledge gnitionem duplex bonum potest attendi. Unum quidem, regards a twofold good. One is connected with the act of quantum ad ipsum actum cognitionis. Et tale bonum knowledge itself; and this good pertains to the intellectual pertinet ad virtutes intellectuales, ut scilicet homo cir- virtues, and consists in man having a true estimate about ca singula aestimet verum. Aliud autem est bonum quod each thing. The other good pertains to the act of the appetpertinet ad actum appetitivae virtutis, ut scilicet homo itive power, and consists in man’s appetite being directed habeat appetitum rectum applicandi vim cognoscitivam aright in applying the cognitive power in this or that way sic vel aliter, ad hoc vel ad illud. Et hoc pertinet ad virtu- to this or that thing. And this belongs to the virtue of seritem studiositatis. Unde computatur inter virtutes mora- ousness. Wherefore it is reckoned among the moral virtues. les. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut philosophus diReply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 93) in cit, in II Ethic., ad hoc quod homo fiat virtuosus, oportet order to be virtuous we must avoid those things to which quod servet se ab his ad quae maxime inclinat natura. Et we are most naturally inclined. Hence it is that, since nature inde est quod, quia natura praecipue inclinat ad timen- inclines us chiefly to fear dangers of death, and to seek pleadum mortis pericula et ad sectandum delectabilia carnis, sures of the flesh, fortitude is chiefly commended for a cerquod laus virtutis fortitudinis praecipue consistit in qua- tain steadfast perseverance against such dangers, and temdam firmitate persistendi contra huiusmodi pericula, et perance for a certain restraint from pleasures of the flesh. laus virtutis temperantiae in quadam refrenatione a de- But as regards knowledge, man has contrary inclinations. lectabilibus carnis. Sed quantum ad cognitionem, est in For on the part of the soul, he is inclined to desire knowlhomine contraria inclinatio. Quia ex parte animae, incli- edge of things; and so it behooves him to exercise a praisenatur homo ad hoc quod cognitionem rerum desideret, worthy restraint on this desire, lest he seek knowledge imet sic oportet ut homo laudabiliter huiusmodi appetitum moderately: whereas on the part of his bodily nature, man refrenet, ne immoderate rerum cognitioni intendat. Ex is inclined to avoid the trouble of seeking knowledge. Acparte vero naturae corporalis, homo inclinatur ad hoc cordingly, as regards the first inclination studiousness is a ut laborem inquirendi scientiam vitet. Quantum igitur kind of restraint, and it is in this sense that it is reckoned

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ad primum, studiositas in refrenatione consistit, et secundum hoc ponitur pars temperantiae. Sed quantum ad secundum laus huius virtutis consistit in quadam vehementia intentionis ad scientiam rerum percipiendam, et ex hoc nominatur. Primum autem est essentialius huic virtuti quam secundum. Nam appetitus cognoscendi per se respicit cognitionem, ad quam ordinatur studiositas. Sed labor addiscendi est impedimentum quoddam cognitionis, unde respicitur ab hac virtute per accidens, quasi removendo prohibens.

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a part of temperance. But as to the second inclination, this virtue derives its praise from a certain keenness of interest in seeking knowledge of things; and from this it takes its name. The former is more essential to this virtue than the latter: since the desire to know directly regards knowledge, to which studiousness is directed, whereas the trouble of learning is an obstacle to knowledge, wherefore it is regarded by this virtue indirectly, as by that which removes an obstacle.

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Question 167 Curiosity Deinde considerandum est de curiositate. Et circa We must next consider curiosity, under which head hoc quaeruntur duo. there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum vitium curiositatis possit esse in (1) Whether the vice of curiosity can regard intellective cognitione intellectiva. knowledge? Secundo, utrum sit in cognitione sensitiva. (2) Whether it is about sensitive knowledge?

Article 1 Whether curiosity can be about intellective knowledge? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod circa cognitionem intellectivam non possit esse curiositas. Quia secundum philosophum, in II Ethic., in his quae secundum se sunt bona vel mala, non possunt accipi medium et extrema. Sed cognitio intellectiva secundum se est bona, in hoc enim perfectio hominis videtur consistere, ut intellectus eius de potentia reducatur in actum, quod fit per cognitionem veritatis. Dionysius etiam dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod bonum animae humanae est secundum rationem esse, cuius perfectio in cognitione veritatis consistit. Ergo circa cognitionem intellectivam non potest esse vitium curiositatis. Praeterea, illud per quod homo similatur Deo, et quod a Deo consequitur, non potest esse malum. Sed quaecumque abundantia cognitionis a Deo est, secundum illud Eccli. I, omnis sapientia a domino Deo est. Et Sap. VII dicitur, ipse dedit mihi horum quae sunt scientiam veram, ut sciam dispositionem orbis terrarum et virtutes elementorum, et cetera. Per hoc etiam homo Deo assimilatur, quod veritatem cognoscit, quia omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius, ut habetur ad Heb. IV. Unde et I Reg. II dicitur quod Deus scientiarum dominus est, ergo, quantumcumque abundet cognitio veritatis, non est mala, sed bona. Appetitus autem boni non est vitiosus. Ergo circa intellectivam cognitionem veritatis non potest esse vitium curiositatis. Praeterea, si circa aliquam intellectivam cognitionem posset esse curiositatis vitium, praecipue esset circa philosophicas scientias. Sed eis intendere non videtur esse vitiosum, dicit enim Hieronymus, super Danielem, qui de mensa et vino regis noluerunt comedere ne polluantur, si sapientiam atque doctrinam Babyloniorum scirent esse peccatum, nunquam acquiescerent discere quod non licebat. Et Augustinus dicit, in II de Doctr. Christ., quod, si qua vera philosophi dixerunt, ab eis sunt, tanquam ab iniustis possessoribus, in usum nostrum vindicanda. Non

Objection 1: It would seem that curiosity cannot be about intellective knowledge. Because, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), there can be no mean and extremes in things which are essentially good. Now intellective knowledge is essentially good: because man’s perfection would seem to consist in his intellect being reduced from potentiality to act, and this is done by the knowledge of truth. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the good of the human soul is to be in accordance with reason, whose perfection consists in knowing the truth. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about intellective knowledge. Obj. 2: Further, that which makes man like to God, and which he receives from God, cannot be an evil. Now all abundance of knowledge is from God, according to Ecclus. 1:1, All wisdom is from the Lord God, and Wis. 7:17, He hath given me the true knowledge of things that are, to know the disposition of the whole world, and the virtues of the elements, etc. Again, by knowing the truth man is likened to God, since all things are naked and open to His eyes (Heb 4:13), and the Lord is a God of all knowledge (1 Kgs 2:3). Therefore however abundant knowledge of truth may be, it is not evil but good. Now the desire of good is not sinful. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about the intellective knowledge of truth. Obj. 3: Further, if the vice of curiosity can be about any kind of intellective knowledge, it would be chiefly about the philosophical sciences. But, seemingly, there is no sin in being intent on them: for Jerome says (Super Daniel 1:8): Those who refused to partake of the king’s meat and wine, lest they should be defiled, if they had considered the wisdom and teaching of the Babylonians to be sinful, would never have consented to learn that which was unlawful: and Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 40) that if the philosophers made any true statements, we must claim them for our own use, as

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ergo circa cognitionem intellectivam potest esse curiositas vitiosa. Sed contra est quod Hieronymus dicit, nonne vobis videtur in vanitate sensus et obscuritate mentis ingredi qui diebus ac noctibus in dialectica arte torquetur, qui physicus perscrutator oculos trans caelum levat? Sed vanitas sensus et obscuritas mentis est vitiosa. Ergo circa intellectivas scientias potest esse curiositas vitiosa. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, studiositas non est directe circa ipsam cognitionem, sed circa appetitum et studium cognitionis acquirendae. Aliter autem est iudicandum de ipsa cognitione veritatis, et aliter de appetitu et studio veritatis cognoscendae. Ipsa enim veritatis cognitio, per se loquendo, bona est. Potest autem per accidens esse mala, ratione scilicet alicuius consequentis, vel inquantum scilicet aliquis de cognitione veritatis superbit, secundum illud I ad Cor. VIII, scientia inflat; vel inquantum homo utitur cognitione veritatis ad peccandum. Sed ipse appetitus vel studium cognoscendae veritatis potest habere rectitudinem vel perversitatem. Uno quidem modo, prout aliquis tendit suo studio in cognitionem veritatis prout per accidens coniungitur ei malum, sicut illi qui student ad scientiam veritatis ut exinde superbiant. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccle., sunt qui, desertis virtutibus, et nescientes quid sit Deus et quanta sit maiestas semper eodem modo manentis naturae, magnum aliquid se agere putant si universam istam corporis molem quam mundum nuncupamus, curiosissime intentissimeque perquirant. Unde etiam tanta superbia gignitur ut in ipso caelo, de quo saepe disputant, sibimet habitare videantur. Similiter etiam illi qui student addiscere aliquid ad peccandum, vitiosum studium habent, secundum illud Ierem. IX, docuerunt linguam suam loqui mendacium, ut inique agerent, laboraverunt. Alio autem modo potest esse vitium ex ipsa inordinatione appetitus et studii addiscendi veritatem. Et hoc quadrupliciter. Uno modo, inquantum per studium minus utile retrahuntur a studio quod eis ex necessitate incumbit. Unde Hieronymus dicit, sacerdotes, dimissis Evangeliis et prophetiis, videmus comoedias legere, et amatoria bucolicorum versuum verba cantare. Alio modo, inquantum studet aliquis addiscere ab eo a quo non licet, sicut patet de his qui aliqua futura a Daemonibus perquirunt, quae est superstitiosa curiositas. De quo Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., nescio an philosophi impedirentur a fide vitio curiositatis in percunctandis Daemonibus. Tertio, quando homo appetit cognoscere veritatem circa creaturas non referendo ad debitum finem, scilicet ad cognitionem Dei. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., quod in consideratione creaturarum non est

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from unjust possessors. Therefore curiosity about intellective knowledge cannot be sinful. On the contrary, Jerome says: Is it not evident that a man who day and night wrestles with the dialectic art, the student of natural science whose gaze pierces the heavens, walks in vanity of understanding and darkness of mind? Now vanity of understanding and darkness of mind are sinful. Therefore curiosity about intellective sciences may be sinful. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 166, A. 2, ad 2) studiousness is directly, not about knowledge itself, but about the desire and study in the pursuit of knowledge. Now we must judge differently of the knowledge itself of truth, and of the desire and study in the pursuit of the knowledge of truth. For the knowledge of truth, strictly speaking, is good, but it may be evil accidentally, by reason of some result, either because one takes pride in knowing the truth, according to 1 Cor. 8:1, Knowledge puffeth up, or because one uses the knowledge of truth in order to sin. On the other hand, the desire or study in pursuing the knowledge of truth may be right or wrong. First, when one tends by his study to the knowledge of truth as having evil accidentally annexed to it, for instance those who study to know the truth that they may take pride in their knowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): Some there are who forsaking virtue, and ignorant of what God is, and of the majesty of that nature which ever remains the same, imagine they are doing something great, if with surpassing curiosity and keenness they explore the whole mass of this body which we call the world. So great a pride is thus begotten, that one would think they dwelt in the very heavens about which they argue. In like manner, those who study to learn something in order to sin are engaged in a sinful study, according to the saying of Jer. 9:5, They have taught their tongue to speak lies, they have labored to commit iniquity. Second, there may be sin by reason of the appetite or study directed to the learning of truth being itself inordinate; and this in four ways. First, when a man is withdrawn by a less profitable study from a study that is an obligation incumbent on him; hence Jerome says: We see priests forsaking the gospels and the prophets, reading stage-plays, and singing the love songs of pastoral idylls. Second, when a man studies to learn of one, by whom it is unlawful to be taught, as in the case of those who seek to know the future through the demons. This is superstitious curiosity, of which Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 4): Maybe, the philosophers were debarred from the faith by their sinful curiosity in seeking knowledge from the demons. Third, when a man desires to know the truth about creatures, without referring his knowledge to its due end, namely, the knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29) that in studying creatures, we must not be

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vana et peritura curiositas exercenda, sed gradus ad immortalia et semper manentia faciendus. Quarto modo, inquantum aliquis studet ad cognoscendam veritatem supra proprii ingenii facultatem, quia per hoc homines de facili in errores labuntur. Unde dicitur Eccli. III, altiora te ne quaesieris, et fortiora ne scrutatus fueris, et in pluribus operibus eius ne fueris curiosus; et postea sequitur, multos enim supplantavit suspicio eorum, et in vanitate detinuit sensus eorum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bonum hominis consistit in cognitione veri, non tamen summum hominis bonum consistit in cognitione cuiuslibet veri, sed in perfecta cognitione summae veritatis, ut patet per philosophum, in X Ethic. Et ideo potest esse vitium in cognitione aliquorum verorum, secundum quod talis appetitus non debito modo ordinatur ad cognitionem summae veritatis, in qua consistit summa felicitas. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa ostendit quod cognitio veritatis secundum se sit bona, non tamen per hoc excluditur quin possit aliquis cognitione veritatis abuti ad malum, vel etiam inordinate cognitionem veritatis appetere; quia etiam oportet appetitum boni debito modo regulatum esse. Ad tertium dicendum quod studium philosophiae secundum se est licitum et laudabile, propter veritatem quam philosophi perceperunt, Deo illis revelante, ut dicitur Rom. I. Sed quia quidam philosophi abutuntur ad fidei impugnationem, ideo apostolus dicit, ad Coloss. II, videte ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam et inanem scientiam, secundum traditionem hominum, et non secundum Christum. Et Dionysius dicit, in epistola ad Polycarpum, de quibusdam philosophis, quod divinis non sancte contra divina utuntur, per sapientiam Dei tentantes expellere divinam venerationem.

Q. 167, A. 2

moved by empty and perishable curiosity; but we should ever mount towards immortal and abiding things. Fourth, when a man studies to know the truth above the capacity of his own intelligence, since by so doing men easily fall into error: wherefore it is written (Sir 3:22): Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability . . . and in many of His works be not curious, and further on (Sir 3:26), For . . . the suspicion of them hath deceived many, and hath detained their minds in vanity. Reply Obj. 1: Man’s good consists in the knowledge of truth; yet man’s sovereign good consists, not in the knowledge of any truth, but in the perfect knowledge of the sovereign truth, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7, 8). Hence there may be sin in the knowledge of certain truths, insofar as the desire of such knowledge is not directed in due manner to the knowledge of the sovereign truth, wherein supreme happiness consists. Reply Obj. 2: Although this argument shows that the knowledge of truth is good in itself, this does not prevent a man from misusing the knowledge of truth for an evil purpose, or from desiring the knowledge of truth inordinately, since even the desire for good should be regulated in due manner. Reply Obj. 3: The study of philosophy is in itself lawful and commendable, on account of the truth which the philosophers acquired through God revealing it to them, as stated in Rom. 1:19. Since, however, certain philosophers misuse the truth in order to assail the faith, the Apostle says (Col 2:8): Beware lest any man cheat you by philosophy and vain deceit, according to the tradition of men . . . and not according to Christ: and Dionysius says (Ep. vii ad Polycarp.) of certain philosophers that they make an unholy use of divine things against that which is divine, and by divine wisdom strive to destroy the worship of God.

Article 2 Whether the vice of curiosity is about sensitive knowledge? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitium curiositatis non sit circa sensitivam cognitionem. Sicut enim aliqua cognoscuntur per sensum visus, ita etiam aliqua cognoscuntur per sensum tactus et gustus. Sed circa tangibilia et gustabilia non ponitur vitium curiositatis, sed magis vitium luxuriae aut gulae. Ergo videtur quod nec circa ea quae cognoscuntur per visum, sit vitium curiositatis. Praeterea, curiositas esse videtur in inspectione ludorum, unde Augustinus dicit, in VI Confess., quod, quodam pugnae casu, cum clamor ingens totius populi vehementer Alypium pulsasset, curiositate victus, aperuit oculos. Sed inspectio ludorum non videtur esse vitiosa,

Objection 1: It would seem that the vice of curiosity is not about sensitive knowledge. For just as some things are known by the sense of sight, so too are some things known by the senses of touch and taste. Now the vice concerned about objects of touch and taste is not curiosity but lust or gluttony. Therefore seemingly neither is the vice of curiosity about things known by the sight. Obj. 2: Further, curiosity would seem to refer to watching games; wherefore Augustine says (Confess. vi, 8) that when a fall occurred in the fight, a mighty cry of the whole people struck him strongly, and overcome by curiosity Alypius opened his eyes. But it does not seem to be sinful to watch

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Q. 167, A. 2

Temperance

quia huiusmodi inspectio delectabilis redditur propter repraesentationem, in qua homo naturaliter delectatur, ut philosophus dicit, in sua poetria. Non ergo circa sensibilium cognitionem est vitium curiositatis. Praeterea, ad curiositatem pertinere videtur actus proximorum perquirere, ut dicit Beda. Sed perquirere facta aliorum non videtur esse vitiosum, quia sicut dicitur Eccli. XVII, unicuique mandavit Deus de proximo suo. Ergo vitium curiositatis non est in huiusmodi particularibus sensibilibus cognoscendis. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., quod concupiscentia oculorum reddit homines curiosos. Ut autem dicit Beda, concupiscentia oculorum est non solum in discendis magicis artibus, sed etiam in contemplandis spectaculis, et in dignoscendis et carpendis vitiis proximorum, quae sunt quaedam particularia sensibilia. Cum ergo concupiscentia oculorum sit quoddam vitium, sicut etiam superbia vitae et concupiscentia carnis, contra quae dividitur, I Ioan. II; videtur quod vitium curiositatis sit circa sensibilium cognitionem. Respondeo dicendum quod cognitio sensitiva ordinatur ad duo. Uno enim modo, tam in hominibus quam in aliis animalibus, ordinatur ad corporis sustentationem, quia per huiusmodi cognitionem homines et alia animalia vitant nociva, et conquirunt ea quae sunt necessaria ad corporis sustentationem. Alio modo, specialiter in homine ordinatur ad cognitionem intellectivam, vel speculativam vel practicam. Apponere ergo studium circa sensibilia cognoscenda, dupliciter potest esse vitiosum. Uno modo, inquantum cognitio sensitiva non ordinatur in aliquid utile, sed potius avertit hominem ab aliqua utili consideratione. Unde Augustinus dicit, in X Confess., canem currentem post leporem iam non specto cum in circo fit. At vero in agro, si casu transeam, avertit me fortassis ab aliqua magna cogitatione, atque ad se convertit illa venatio, et nisi iam mihi demonstrata infirmitate mea, cito admoneas, vanus hebesco. Alio modo, inquantum cognitio sensitiva ordinatur ad aliquod noxium, sicut inspectio mulieris ordinatur ad concupiscendum; et diligens inquisitio eorum quae ab aliis fiunt, ordinatur ad detrahendum. Si quis autem cognitioni sensibilium intendit ordinate, propter necessitatem sustentandae naturae, vel propter studium intelligendae veritatis, est virtuosa studiositas circa sensibilem cognitionem.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod luxuria et gula sunt circa delectationes quae sunt in usu rerum tangibilium. Sed circa delectationem cognitionis omnium sensuum est curiositas. Et vocatur concupiscentia oculorum, quia oculi sunt ad cognoscendum in sensibus principales, unde omnia sensibilia videri dicuntur, ut Augustinus di-

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games, because it gives pleasure on account of the representation, wherein man takes a natural delight, as the Philosopher states (Poet. vi). Therefore the vice of curiosity is not about the knowledge of sensible objects. Obj. 3: Further, it would seem to pertain to curiosity to inquire into our neighbor’s actions, as Bede observes. Now, seemingly, it is not a sin to inquire into the actions of others, because according to Ecclus. 17:12, God gave to every one of them commandment concerning his neighbor. Therefore the vice of curiosity does not regard the knowledge of such like particular sensible objects. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 38) that concupiscence of the eyes makes men curious. Now according to Bede (Comment. in 1 John, 2:16) concupiscence of the eyes refers not only to the learning of magic arts, but also to sight-seeing, and to the discovery and dispraise of our neighbor’s faults, and all these are particular objects of sense. Therefore since concupiscence of the eves is a sin, even as concupiscence of the flesh and pride of life, which are members of the same division (1 John 2:16), it seems that the vice of curiosity is about the knowledge of sensible things. I answer that, The knowledge of sensible things is directed to two things. For in the first place, both in man and in other animals, it is directed to the upkeep of the body, because by knowledge of this kind, man and other animals avoid what is harmful to them, and seek those things that are necessary for the body’s sustenance. In the second place, it is directed in a manner special to man, to intellective knowledge, whether speculative or practical. Accordingly to employ study for the purpose of knowing sensible things may be sinful in two ways. First, when the sensitive knowledge is not directed to something useful, but turns man away from some useful consideration. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 35), I go no more to see a dog coursing a hare in the circus; but in the open country, if I happen to be passing, that coursing haply will distract me from some weighty thought, and draw me after it . . . and unless Thou, having made me see my weakness, didst speedily admonish me, I become foolishly dull. Second, when the knowledge of sensible things is directed to something harmful, as looking on a woman is directed to lust: even so the busy inquiry into other people’s actions is directed to detraction. On the other hand, if one be ordinately intent on the knowledge of sensible things by reason of the necessity of sustaining nature, or for the sake of the study of intelligible truth, this studiousness about the knowledge of sensible things is virtuous. Reply Obj. 1: Lust and gluttony are about pleasures arising from the use of objects of touch, whereas curiosity is about pleasures arising from the knowledge acquired through all the senses. According to Augustine (Confess. x, 35) it is called concupiscence of the eyes because the sight is the sense chiefly used for obtaining knowledge, so that all sen-

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Q. 167, A. 2

cit, in X Confess. Et sicut Augustinus ibidem subdit, ex hoc evidentius discernitur quid voluptatis, quid curiositatis agatur per sensus, quod voluptas pulchra, suavia, canora, sapida, lenia sectatur; curiositas autem etiam his contraria, tentandi causa, non ad subeundam molestiam, sed experiendi noscendique libidinem.

sible things are said to be seen, and as he says further on: By this it may more evidently be discerned wherein pleasure and wherein curiosity is the object of the senses; for pleasure seeketh objects beautiful, melodious, fragrant, savory, soft; but curiosity, for trial’s sake, seeketh even the contraries of these, not for the sake of suffering annoyance, but out of the lust of experiment and knowledge. Ad secundum dicendum quod inspectio spectacuReply Obj. 2: Sight-seeing becomes sinful, when it lorum vitiosa redditur inquantum per hoc homo fit pro- renders a man prone to the vices of lust and cruelty on nus ad vitia vel lasciviae vel crudelitatis, per ea quae ibi account of things he sees represented. Hence Chrysostom repraesentantur. Unde Chrysostomus dicit quod adulte- says that such sights make men adulterers and shameless.

ros et inverecundos constituunt tales inspectiones. Ad tertium dicendum quod prospicere facta aliorum bono animo, vel ad utilitatem propriam, ut scilicet homo ex bonis operibus proximi provocetur ad melius, vel etiam ad utilitatem illius, ut scilicet corrigatur si quid ab eo agitur vitiose, secundum regulam caritatis et debitum officii, est laudabile, secundum illud Heb. X, considerate vos invicem in provocationem caritatis et bonorum operum. Sed quod aliquis intendit ad consideranda vitia proximorum ad despiciendum vel detrahendum, vel saltem inutiliter inquietandum, est vitiosum. Unde dicitur Prov. XXIV, ne insidieris et quaeras iniquitatem in domo iusti, neque vastes requiem eius.

Reply Obj. 3: One may watch other people’s actions or inquire into them, with a good intent, either for one’s own good—that is in order to be encouraged to better deeds by the deeds of our neighbor—or for our neighbor’s good— that is in order to correct him, if he do anything wrong, according to the rule of charity and the duty of one’s position. This is praiseworthy, according to Heb. 10:24, Consider one another to provoke unto charity and to good works. But to observe our neighbor’s faults with the intention of looking down upon them, or of detracting them, or even with no further purpose than that of disturbing them, is sinful: hence it is written (Prov 24:15), Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest.

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Question 168 Modesty in the Outward Movements of the Body Deinde considerandum est de modestia secundum We must next consider modesty as consisting in the outquod consistit in exterioribus motibus corporis. Et circa ward movements of the body, and under this head there are hoc quaeruntur quatuor. four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum in exterioribus motibus corporis qui (1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in the serio aguntur, possit esse virtus et vitium. outward movements of the body that are done seriously? Secundo, utrum possit esse aliqua virtus circa (2) Whether there can be a virtue about playful actiones ludi. actions? Tertio, de peccato quod fit ex excessu ludi. (3) Of the sin consisting in excess of play; Quarto, de peccato ex defectu ludi. (4) Of the sin consisting in lack of play.

Article 1 Whether any virtue regards the outward movements of the body? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in exterioribus motibus corporis non sit aliqua virtus. Omnis enim virtus pertinet ad spiritualem animae decorem, secundum illud Psalmi, omnis gloria eius filiae regis ab intus, Glossa, idest, in conscientia. Sed motus corporales non sunt ab intus, sed exterius. Ergo circa huiusmodi motus non potest esse virtus. Praeterea, virtutes non sunt nobis a natura, ut patet per philosophum, in II Ethic. Sed motus corporales exteriores sunt hominibus a natura, secundum quam quidam sunt velocis motus et quidam tardi motus, et idem est de aliis differentiis exteriorum motuum. Ergo circa tales motus non attenditur aliqua virtus. Praeterea, omnis virtus moralis est circa actiones quae sunt ad alterum, sicut iustitia, vel circa passiones, sicut temperantia et fortitudo. Sed exteriores motus corporales non sunt ad alterum usum, neque etiam sunt passiones. Ergo circa eos non est aliqua virtus. Praeterea, in omni opere virtutis est studium adhibendum, ut supra dictum est. Sed adhibere studium in dispositione exteriorum motuum est vituperabile, dicit enim Ambrosius, in I de Offic., est gressus probabilis in quo sit species auctoritatis, gravitatisque pondus, tranquillitatis vestigium, ita tamen si studium desit atque affectatio, sed motus sit purus ac simplex. Ergo videtur quod circa compositionem exteriorum motuum non consistat virtus. Sed contra est quod decor honestatis pertinet ad virtutem. Sed compositio exteriorum motuum pertinet ad decorem honestatis, dicit enim Ambrosius, in I de Offic., sicut molliculum et infractum aut vocis sonum aut ge-

Objection 1: It would seem that no virtue regards the outward movements of the body. For every virtue pertains to the spiritual beauty of the soul, according to Ps. 44:14, All the glory of the king’s daughter is within, and a gloss adds, namely, in the conscience. Now the movements of the body are not within, but without. Therefore there can be no virtue about them. Obj. 2: Further, Virtues are not in us by nature, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1). But outward bodily movements are in man by nature, since it is by nature that some are quick, and some slow of movement, and the same applies to other differences of outward movements. Therefore there is no virtue about movements of this kind. Obj. 3: Further, every moral virtue is either about actions directed to another person, as justice, or about passions, as temperance and fortitude. Now outward bodily movements are not directed to another person, nor are they passions. Therefore no virtue is connected with them. Obj. 4: Further, study should be applied to all works of virtue, as stated above (Q. 166, A. 1, Obj. 1; A. 2, ad 1). Now it is censurable to apply study to the ordering of one’s outward movements: for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): A becoming gait is one that reflects the carriage of authority, has the tread of gravity, and the foot-print of tranquillity: yet so that there be neither study nor affectation, but natural and artless movement. Therefore seemingly there is no virtue about the style of outward movements. On the contrary, The beauty of honesty pertains to virtue. Now the style of outward movements pertains to the beauty of honesty. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): The sound of the voice and the gesture of the body are distasteful

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stum corporis non probo, ita neque agrestem aut rusticum. Naturam imitemur, effigies eius formula disciplinae, forma honestatis est. Ergo circa compositionem exteriorum motuum est virtus. Respondeo dicendum quod virtus moralis consistit in hoc quod ea quae sunt hominis per rationem ordinantur. Manifestum est autem quod exteriores motus hominis sunt per rationem ordinabiles, quia ad imperium rationis exteriora membra moventur. Unde manifestum est quod circa horum motuum ordinationem virtus moralis consistit ordinatio autem horum motuum attenditur quantum ad duo, uno quidem modo, secundum convenientiam personae; alio modo, secundum convenientiam ad exteriores personas, negotia seu loca. Unde dicit Ambrosius, in I de Offic., hoc est pulchritudinem vivendi tenere, convenientia cuique sexui et personae reddere, et hoc pertinet ad primum. Quantum autem ad secundum, subditur, hic ordo gestorum optimus, hic ornatus ad omnem actionem accommodus. Et ideo circa huiusmodi exteriores motus ponit Andronicus duo. Scilicet ornatum, qui respicit convenientiam personae, unde dicit quod est scientia circa decens in motu et habitudine. Et bonam ordinationem, quae respicit convenientiam ad diversa negotia et ea quae circumstant, unde dicit quod est experientia separationis, idest distinctionis, actionum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod motus exteriores sunt quaedam signa interioris dispositionis, secundum illud Eccli. XIX, amictus corporis, et risus dentium, et ingressus hominis, enuntiant de illo. Et Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic., quod habitus mentis in corporis statu cernitur, et quod vox quaedam animi est corporis motus. Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis ex naturali dispositione habeat homo aptitudinem ad hanc vel illam dispositionem exteriorum motuum, tamen quod deest naturae, potest suppleri ex industria rationis. Unde Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic., motum natura informat, si quid sane in natura vitii est, industria emendet. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, exteriores motus sunt quaedam signa interioris dispositionis, quae praecipue attenditur secundum animae passiones. Et ideo moderatio exteriorum motuum requirit moderationem interiorum passionum. Unde Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic., quod hinc, scilicet ex motibus exterioribus, homo cordis nostri absconditus aut levior aut iactanctior aut turbidior, aut gravior et constantior et purior et maturior aestimatur. Per motus etiam exteriores alii homines de nobis iudicium capiunt, secundum illud Eccli. XIX, ex visu cognoscitur vir, et ab occursu faciei cognoscitur sensatus. Et ideo moderatio exteriorum motuum quodammodo ad alios ordinatur, secundum illud quod Augustinus dicit, in regula, in omnibus motibus vestris nihil fiat quod cuiusquam offendat aspectum, sed

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to me, whether they be unduly soft and nerveless, or coarse and boorish. Let nature be our model; her reflection is gracefulness of conduct and beauty of honesty. Therefore there is a virtue about the style of outward movement. I answer that, Moral virtue consists in the things pertaining to man being directed by his reason. Now it is manifest that the outward movements of man are dirigible by reason, since the outward members are set in motion at the command of reason. Hence it is evident that there is a moral virtue concerned with the direction of these movements. Now the direction of these movements may be considered from a twofold standpoint. First, in respect of fittingness to the person; second, in respect of fittingness to externals, whether persons, business, or place. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): Beauty of conduct consists in becoming behavior towards others, according to their sex and person, and this regards the first. As to the second, he adds: This is the best way to order our behavior, this is the polish becoming to every action. Hence Andronicus ascribes two things to these outward movements: namely taste (ornatus) which regards what is becoming to the person, wherefore he says that it is the knowledge of what is becoming in movement and behavior; and methodicalness (bona ordinatio) which regards what is becoming to the business in hand, and to one’s surroundings, wherefore he calls it the practical knowledge of separation, i.e., of the distinction of acts. Reply Obj. 1: Outward movements are signs of the inward disposition, according to Ecclus. 19:27, The attire of the body, and the laughter of the teeth, and the gait of the man, show what he is; and Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18) that the habit of mind is seen in the gesture of the body, and that the body’s movement is an index of the soul. Reply Obj. 2: Although it is from natural disposition that a man is inclined to this or that style of outward movement, nevertheless what is lacking to nature can be supplied by the efforts of reason. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): Let nature guide the movement: and if nature fail in any respect, surely effort will supply the defect. Reply Obj. 3: As stated (ad 1) outward movements are indications of the inward disposition, and this regards chiefly the passions of the soul. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18) that from these things, i.e., the outward movements, the man that lies hidden in our hearts is esteemed to be either frivolous, or boastful, or impure, or on the other hand sedate, steady, pure, and free from blemish. It is moreover from our outward movements that other men form their judgment about us, according to Ecclus. 19:26, A man is known by his look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, is known by his countenance. Hence moderation of outward movements is directed somewhat to other persons, according to the saying of Augustine in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), In all your movements, let nothing be done to offend the eye of another, but only that which is becoming to

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Q. 168, A. 2

quod vestram deceat sanctitatem. Et ideo moderatio exteriorum motuum potest reduci ad duas virtutes quas philosophus tangit in IV Ethic. Inquantum enim per exteriores motus ordinamur ad alios, pertinet exteriorum motuum moderatio ad amicitiam vel affabilitatem, quae attenditur circa delectationes et tristitias quae sunt in verbis et factis in ordine ad alios quibus homo convivit. Inquantum vero exteriores motus sunt signa interioris dispositionis, pertinet eorum moderatio ad virtutem veritatis, secundum quam aliquis talem se exhibet in verbis et factis qualis est interius.

the holiness of your state. Wherefore the moderation of outward movements may be reduced to two virtues, which the Philosopher mentions in Ethic. iv, 6, 7. For, insofar as by outward movements we are directed to other persons, the moderation of our outward movements belongs to friendliness or affability. This regards pleasure or pain which may arise from words or deeds in reference to others with whom a man comes in contact. And, insofar as outward movements are signs of our inward disposition, their moderation belongs to the virtue of truthfulness, whereby a man, by word and deed, shows himself to be such as he is inwardly. Ad quartum dicendum quod in compositione exReply Obj. 4: It is censurable to study the style of teriorum motuum studium vituperatur per quod aliquis one’s outward movements, by having recourse to pretense fictione quadam in exterioribus motibus utitur, ita quod in them, so that they do not agree with one’s inward dispointeriori dispositioni non conveniant. Debet tamen tale sition. Nevertheless it behooves one to study them, so that if studium adhiberi ut, si quid in eis inordinatum est, cor- they be in any way inordinate, this may be corrected. Hence rigatur. Unde Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic., ars desit, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): Let them be without artifice, non desit correctio. but not without correction.

Article 2 Whether there can be a virtue about games? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in ludis non possit esse aliqua virtus. Dicit enim Ambrosius, in I de Offic., dominus ait, vae, vobis qui ridetis, quia flebitis. Non solum ergo profusos, sed etiam omnes iocos declinandos arbitror. Sed illud quod potest virtuose fieri, non est totaliter declinandum. Non ergo circa ludos potest esse virtus. Praeterea, virtus est quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur, ut supra habitum est. Sed Chrysostomus dicit, non dat Deus ludere, sed Diabolus. Audi quid ludentes passi sunt, sedit populus manducare et bibere, et surrexerunt ludere. Ergo circa ludos non potest esse virtus. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod operationes ludi non ordinantur in aliquid aliud. Sed ad virtutem requiritur ut propter aliquid eligens operetur, sicut patet per philosophum, in II Ethic. Ergo circa ludos non potest esse aliqua virtus. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in II musicae, volo tandem tibi parcas, nam sapientem decet interdum remittere aciem rebus agendis intentam. Sed ista remissio animi a rebus agendis fit per ludicra verba et facta. Ergo his uti interdum ad sapientem et virtuosum pertinet. Philosophus etiam ponit virtutem eutrapeliae circa ludos, quam nos possumus dicere iucunditatem. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut homo indiget corporali quiete ad corporis refocillationem, quod non potest continue laborare, propter hoc quod habet fini-

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be a virtue about games. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 23): Our Lord said: ‘Woe to you who laugh, for you shall weep.’ Wherefore I consider that all, and not only excessive, games should be avoided. Now that which can be done virtuously is not to be avoided altogether. Therefore there cannot be a virtue about games. Obj. 2: Further, Virtue is that which God forms in us, without us, as stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). Now Chrysostom says: It is not God, but the devil, that is the author of fun. Listen to what happened to those who played: ‘The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up to play.’ Therefore there can be no virtue about games. Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 6) that playful actions are not directed to something else. But it is a requisite of virtue that the agent in choosing should direct his action to something else, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4). Therefore there can be no virtue about games. On the contrary, Augustine says (Music. ii, 15): I pray thee, spare thyself at times: for it becomes a wise man sometimes to relax the high pressure of his attention to work. Now this relaxation of the mind from work consists in playful words or deeds. Therefore it becomes a wise and virtuous man to have recourse to such things at times. Moreover the Philosopher assigns to games the virtue of eutrapelia, which we may call pleasantness. I answer that, Just as man needs bodily rest for the body’s refreshment, because he cannot always be at work, since his power is finite and equal to a certain fixed amount

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tam virtutem, quae determinatis laboribus proportionatur; ita etiam est ex parte animae, cuius etiam est virtus finita ad determinatas operationes proportionata, et ideo, quando ultra modum suum in aliquas operationes se extendit, laborat, et ex hoc fatigatur, praesertim quia in operationibus animae simul etiam laborat corpus, inquantum scilicet anima, etiam intellectiva, utitur viribus per organa corporea operantibus. Sunt autem bona sensibilia connaturalia homini. Et ideo, quando anima supra sensibilia elevatur operibus rationis intenta, nascitur exinde quaedam fatigatio animalis, sive homo intendat operibus rationis practicae, sive speculativae. Magis tamen si operibus contemplationis intendat, quia per hoc magis a sensibilibus elevatur, quamvis forte in aliquibus operibus exterioribus rationis practicae maior labor corporis consistat. In utrisque tamen tanto aliquis magis animaliter fatigatur, quanto vehementius operibus rationis intendat. Sicut autem fatigatio corporalis solvitur per corporis quietem, ita etiam oportet quod fatigatio animalis solvatur per animae quietem. Quies autem animae est delectatio, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Et ideo oportet remedium contra fatigationem animalem adhibere per aliquam delectationem, intermissa intentione ad insistendum studio rationis. Sicut in collationibus patrum legitur quod beatus Evangelista Ioannes, cum quidam scandalizarentur quod eum cum suis discipulis ludentem invenerunt, dicitur mandasse uni eorum, qui arcum gerebat, ut sagittam traheret. Quod cum pluries fecisset, quaesivit utrum hoc continue facere posset. Qui respondit quod, si hoc continue faceret, arcus frangeretur. Unde beatus Ioannes subintulit quod similiter animus hominis frangeretur, si nunquam a sua intentione relaxaretur. Huiusmodi autem dicta vel facta, in quibus non quaeritur nisi delectatio animalis, vocantur ludicra vel iocosa. Et ideo necesse est talibus interdum uti, quasi ad quandam animae quietem. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod in huius vitae conversatione quaedam requies cum ludo habetur, et ideo oportet interdum aliquibus talibus uti. Circa quae tamen tria videntur praecipue esse cavenda. Quorum primum et principale est quod praedicta delectatio non quaeratur in aliquibus operationibus vel verbis turpibus vel nocivis. Unde Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., quod unum genus iocandi est illiberale, petulans, flagitiosum, obscenum. Aliud autem attendendum est, ne totaliter gravitas animae resolvatur. Unde Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic., caveamus ne, dum relaxare animum volumus, solvamus omnem harmoniam, quasi concentum quendam bonorum operum. Et Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., quod sicut pueris non omnem ludendi licentiam damus, sed eam quae ab honestatis actionibus non sit aliena; sic

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of labor, so too is it with his soul, whose power is also finite and equal to a fixed amount of work. Consequently when he goes beyond his measure in a certain work, he is oppressed and becomes weary, and all the more since when the soul works, the body is at work likewise, insofar as the intellective soul employs forces that operate through bodily organs. Now sensible goods are connatural to man, and therefore, when the soul arises above sensibles, through being intent on the operations of reason, there results in consequence a certain weariness of soul, whether the operations with which it is occupied be those of the practical or of the speculative reason. Yet this weariness is greater if the soul be occupied with the work of contemplation, since thereby it is raised higher above sensible things; although perhaps certain outward works of the practical reason entail a greater bodily labor. In either case, however, one man is more soul-wearied than another, according as he is more intensely occupied with works of reason. Now just as weariness of the body is dispelled by resting the body, so weariness of the soul must needs be remedied by resting the soul: and the soul’s rest is pleasure, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 2; I-II, Q. 31, A. 1, ad 2). Consequently, the remedy for weariness of soul must needs consist in the application of some pleasure, by slackening the tension of the reason’s study. Thus in the Conferences of the Fathers (xxiv, 21), it is related of Blessed John the Evangelist, that when some people were scandalized on finding him playing together with his disciples, he is said to have told one of them who carried a bow to shoot an arrow. And when the latter had done this several times, he asked him whether he could do it indefinitely, and the man answered that if he continued doing it, the bow would break. Whence the Blessed John drew the inference that in like manner man’s mind would break if its tension were never relaxed. Now such like words or deeds wherein nothing further is sought than the soul’s delight, are called playful or humorous. Hence it is necessary at times to make use of them, in order to give rest, as it were, to the soul. This is in agreement with the statement of the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 8) that in the intercourse of this life there is a kind of rest that is associated with games: and consequently it is sometimes necessary to make use of such things. Nevertheless it would seem that in this matter there are three points which require especial caution. The first and chief is that the pleasure in question should not be sought in indecent or injurious deeds or words. Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 29) that one kind of joke is discourteous, insolent, scandalous, obscene. Another thing to be observed is that one lose not the balance of one’s mind altogether. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 20): We should beware lest, when we seek relaxation of mind, we destroy all that harmony which is the concord of good works: and Tully says (De Offic. i, 29), that, Just as we do not allow children to enjoy absolute freedom in their games, but only that which is consistent

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in ipso ioco aliquod probi ingenii lumen eluceat. Tertio autem est attendendum, sicut et in omnibus aliis humanis actibus, ut congruat personae et tempori et loco, et secundum alias circumstantias debite ordinetur, ut scilicet sit et tempore et homine dignus, ut Tullius dicit, ibidem. Huiusmodi autem secundum regulam rationis ordinantur. Habitus autem secundum rationem operans est virtus moralis. Et ideo circa ludos potest esse aliqua virtus, quam philosophus eutrapeliam nominat. Et dicitur aliquis eutrapelus a bona versione, quia scilicet bene convertit aliqua dicta vel facta in solatium. Et inquantum per hanc virtutem homo refrenatur ab immoderantia ludorum, sub modestia continetur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, iocosa debent congruere negotiis et personis. Unde et Tullius dicit, in I Rhet., quod quando auditores sunt defatigati, non est inutile ab aliqua re nova aut ridicula oratorem incipere, si tamen rei dignitas non adimit iocandi facultatem. Doctrina autem sacra maximis rebus intendit, secundum illud Prov. VIII, audite, quoniam de rebus magnis locutura sum. Unde Ambrosius non excludit universaliter iocum a conversatione humana, sed a doctrina sacra. Unde praemittit, licet interdum honesta ioca ac suavia sint, tamen ab ecclesiastica abhorrent regula, quoniam quae in Scripturis sanctis non reperimus, ea quem ad modum usurpare possumus? Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum illud Chrysostomi est intelligendum de illis qui inordinate ludis utuntur, et praecipue eorum qui finem in delectatione ludi constituunt, sicut de quibusdam dicitur Sap. XV, aestimaverunt esse ludum vitam nostram. Contra quod dicit Tullius, in I de Offic., non ita generati a natura sumus ut ad ludum et iocum facti esse videamur, sed ad severitatem potius, et ad quaedam studia graviora atque maiora. Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsae operationes ludi, secundum suam speciem, non ordinantur ad aliquem finem. Sed delectatio quae in talibus actibus habetur, ordinatur ad quandam animae recreationem et quietem. Et secundum hoc, si moderate fiat, licet uti ludo. Unde Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., ludo et ioco uti quidem licet, sed, sicut somno et quietibus ceteris, tunc cum gravibus seriisque rebus satisfecerimus.

Q. 168, A. 3

with good behavior, so our very fun should reflect something of an upright mind. Third, we must be careful, as in all other human actions, to conform ourselves to persons, time, and place, and take due account of other circumstances, so that our fun befit the hour and the man, as Tully says (De Offic. i, 29). Now these things are directed according to the rule of reason: and a habit that operates according to reason is virtue. Therefore there can be a virtue about games. The Philosopher gives it the name of wittiness (eutrapelia), and a man is said to be pleasant through having a happy turn of mind, whereby he gives his words and deeds a cheerful turn: and inasmuch as this virtue restrains a man from immoderate fun, it is comprised under modesty. Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, fun should fit with business and persons; wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. i, 17) that when the audience is weary, it will be useful for the speaker to try something novel or amusing, provided that joking be not incompatible with the gravity of the subject. Now the sacred doctrine is concerned with things of the greatest moment, according to Prov. 8:6, Hear, for I will speak of great things. Wherefore Ambrose does not altogether exclude fun from human speech, but from the sacred doctrine; hence he begins by saying: Although jokes are at times fitting and pleasant, nevertheless they are incompatible with the ecclesiastical rule; since how can we have recourse to things which are not to be found in Holy Writ? Reply Obj. 2: This saying of Chrysostom refers to the inordinate use of fun, especially by those who make the pleasure of games their end; of whom it is written (Wis 15:12): They have accounted our life a pastime. Against these Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): We are so begotten by nature that we appear to be made not for play and fun, but rather for hardships, and for occupations of greater gravity and moment. Reply Obj. 3: Playful actions themselves considered in their species are not directed to an end: but the pleasure derived from such actions is directed to the recreation and rest of the soul, and accordingly if this be done with moderation, it is lawful to make use of fun. Hence Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): It is indeed lawful to make use of play and fun, but in the same way as we have recourse to sleep and other kinds of rest, then only when we have done our duty by grave and serious matters.

Article 3 Whether there can be sin in the excess of play? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in suObjection 1: It would seem that there cannot be sin in perfluitate ludi non possit esse peccatum. Illud enim the excess of play. For that which is an excuse for sin is not quod excusat a peccato, non videtur esse peccatum. Sed held to be sinful. Now play is sometimes an excuse for sin, ludus quandoque excusat a peccato, multa enim, si se- for many things would be grave sins if they were done se-

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rio fierent, gravia peccata essent, quae quidem, ioco facta, vel nulla vel levia sunt. Ergo videtur quod in superabundantia ludi non sit peccatum. Praeterea, omnia alia vitia reducuntur ad septem vitia capitalia, ut Gregorius dicit, XXXI Moral. Sed superabundantia in lucis non videtur reduci ad aliquod capitalium vitiorum. Ergo videtur quod non sit peccatum. Praeterea, maxime histriones in ludo videntur superabundare, qui totam vitam suam ordinant ad ludendum. Si ergo superabundantia ludi esset peccatum, tunc omnes histriones essent in statu peccati. Peccarent etiam omnes qui eorum ministerio uterentur, vel qui eis aliqua largirentur, tanquam peccati fautores. Quod videtur esse falsum. Legitur enim in vitis patrum, quod beato Paphnutio revelatum est quod quidam ioculator futurus erat sibi consors in vita futura. Sed contra est quod, super illud Prov. XIV, risus dolori miscebitur et extrema gaudii luctus occupat, dicit Glossa, luctus perpetuus. Sed in superfluitate ludi est inordinatus risus et inordinatum gaudium. Ergo est ibi peccatum mortale, cui soli debetur luctus perpetuus. Respondeo dicendum quod in omni eo quod est dirigibile secundum rationem, superfluum dicitur quod regulam rationis excedit, diminutum autem dicitur aliquid secundum quod deficit a regula rationis. Dictum est autem quod ludicra sive iocosa verba vel facta sunt dirigibilia secundum rationem. Et ideo superfluum in ludo accipitur quod excedit regulam rationis. Quod quidem potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo, ex ipsa specie actionum quae assumuntur in ludum, quod quidem iocandi genus secundum Tullium dicitur esse illiberale, petulans, flagitiosum, obscenum, quando scilicet utitur aliquis, causa ludi, turpibus verbis vel factis, vel etiam his quae vergunt in proximi nocumentum, quae de se sunt peccata mortalia. Et sic, patet quod excessus in ludo est peccatum mortale. Alio autem modo potest esse excessus in ludo secundum defectum debitarum circumstantiarum, puta cum aliqui utuntur ludo vel temporibus vel locis indebitis, aut etiam praeter convenientiam negotii seu personae. Et hoc quidem quandoque potest esse peccatum mortale, propter vehementiam affectus ad ludum, cuius delectationem praeponit aliquis dilectioni Dei, ita quod contra praeceptum Dei vel Ecclesiae talibus ludis uti non refugiat. Quandoque autem est peccatum veniale, puta cum aliquis non tantum afficitur ad ludum quod propter hoc vellet aliquid contra Deum committere. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliqua sunt peccata propter solam intentionem, quia scilicet in iniuriam alicuius fiunt, quam quidem intentionem excludit ludus, cuius intentio ad delectationem fertur, non ad iniuriam alicuius. Et in talibus ludus excusat a peccato, vel peccatum diminuit. Quaedam vero sunt quae secundum suam

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riously, whereas if they be done in fun, are either no sin or but slightly sinful. Therefore it seems that there is no sin in excessive play. Obj. 2: Further, all other vices are reducible to the seven capital vices, as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 17). But excess of play does not seem reducible to any of the capital vices. Therefore it would seem not to be a sin. Obj. 3: Further, comedians especially would seem to exceed in play, since they direct their whole life to playing. Therefore if excess of play were a sin, all actors would be in a state of sin; moreover all those who employ them, as well as those who make them any payment, would sin as accomplices of their sin. But this would seem untrue; for it is related in the Lives of the Fathers (ii. 16; viii. 63) that is was revealed to the Blessed Paphnutius that a certain jester would be with him in the life to come. On the contrary, A gloss on Prov. 14:13, Laughter shall be mingled with sorrow and mourning taketh hold of the end of joy, remarks: A mourning that will last for ever. Now there is inordinate laughter and inordinate joy in excessive play. Therefore there is mortal sin therein, since mortal sin alone is deserving of everlasting mourning. I answer that, In all things dirigible according to reason, the excessive is that which goes beyond, and the deficient is that which falls short of the rule of reason. Now it has been stated (A. 2) that playful or jesting words or deeds are dirigible according to reason. Wherefore excessive play is that which goes beyond the rule of reason: and this happens in two ways. First, on account of the very species of the acts employed for the purpose of fun, and this kind of jesting, according to Tully (De Offic. i, 29), is stated to be discourteous, insolent, scandalous, and obscene, when to wit a man, for the purpose of jesting, employs indecent words or deeds, or such as are injurious to his neighbor, these being of themselves mortal sins. And thus it is evident that excessive play is a mortal sin. Second, there may be excess in play, through lack of due circumstances: for instance when people make use of fun at undue times or places, or out of keeping with the matter in hand, or persons. This may be sometimes a mortal sin on account of the strong attachment to play, when a man prefers the pleasure he derives therefrom to the love of God, so as to be willing to disobey a commandment of God or of the Church rather than forego such like amusements. Sometimes, however, it is a venial sin, for instance where a man is not so attached to amusement as to be willing for its sake to do anything in disobedience to God. Reply Obj. 1: Certain things are sinful on account of the intention alone, because they are done in order to injure someone. Such an intention is excluded by their being done in fun, the intention of which is to please, not to injure: in these cases fun excuses from sin, or diminishes it. Other things, however, are sins according to their species,

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speciem sunt peccata, sicut homicidium, fornicatio et similia. Et talia non excusantur per ludum, quinimmo ex his ludus redditur flagitiosus et obscenus. Ad secundum dicendum quod superfluitas in ludo pertinet ad ineptam laetitiam, quam Gregorius dicit esse filiam gulae. Unde Exod. XXXII dicitur, sedit populus manducare et bibere, et surrexerunt ludere. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ludus est necessarius ad conversationem humanae vitae. Ad omnia autem quae sunt utilia conversationi humanae, deputari possunt aliqua officia licita. Et ideo etiam officium histrionum, quod ordinatur ad solatium hominibus exhibendum, non est secundum se illicitum, nec sunt in statu peccati, dummodo moderate ludo utantur, idest, non utendo aliquibus illicitis verbis vel factis ad ludum, et non adhibendo ludum negotiis et temporibus indebitis. Et quamvis in rebus humanis non utantur alio officio per comparationem ad alios homines, tamen per comparationem ad seipsos et ad Deum, alias habent seriosas et virtuosas operationes, puta dum orant, et suas passiones et operationes componunt, et quandoque etiam pauperibus eleemosynas largiuntur. Unde illi qui moderate eis subveniunt, non peccant, sed iusta faciunt, mercedem ministerii eorum eis attribuendo. Si qui autem superflue sua in tales consumunt, vel etiam sustentant illos histriones qui illicitis ludis utuntur, peccant, quasi eos in peccato foventes. Unde Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., quod donare res suas histrionibus vitium est immane. Nisi forte aliquis histrio esset in extrema necessitate, in qua esset ei subveniendum. Dicit enim Ambrosius, in libro de Offic., pasce fame morientem. Quisquis enim pascendo hominem servare poteris, si non paveris, occidisti.

Q. 168, A. 4

such as murder, fornication, and the like: and fun is no excuse for these; in fact they make fun scandalous and obscene. Reply Obj. 2: Excessive play pertains to senseless mirth, which Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) calls a daughter of gluttony. Wherefore it is written (Exod 32:6): The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up to play. Reply Obj. 3: As stated (A. 2), play is necessary for the intercourse of human life. Now whatever is useful to human intercourse may have a lawful employment ascribed to it. Wherefore the occupation of play-actors, the object of which is to cheer the heart of man, is not unlawful in itself; nor are they in a state of sin provided that their playing be moderated, namely that they use no unlawful words or deeds in order to amuse, and that they do not introduce play into undue matters and seasons. And although in human affairs, they have no other occupation in reference to other men, nevertheless in reference to themselves, and to God, they perform other actions both serious and virtuous, such as prayer and the moderation of their own passions and operations, while sometimes they give alms to the poor. Wherefore those who maintain them in moderation do not sin but act justly, by rewarding them for their services. On the other hand, if a man spends too much on such persons, or maintains those comedians who practice unlawful mirth, he sins as encouraging them in their sin. Hence Augustine says (Tract. c. in Joan.) that to give one’s property to comedians is a great sin, not a virtue; unless by chance some play-actor were in extreme need, in which case one would have to assist him, for Ambrose says (De Offic. ): Feed him that dies of hunger; for whenever thou canst save a man by feeding him, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain him.

Article 4 Whether there is a sin in lack of mirth? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in defectu ludi non consistat aliquod peccatum. Nullum enim peccatum indicitur poenitenti. Sed Augustinus dicit, de poenitente loquens, cohibeat se a ludis, a spectaculis saeculi, qui perfectam vult consequi remissionis gratiam. Ergo in defectu ludi non est aliquod peccatum. Praeterea, nullum peccatum ponitur in commendatione sanctorum. Sed in commendatione quorundam ponitur quod a ludo abstinuerunt, dicitur enim Ierem. XV, non sedi in Concilio ludentium; et Tobiae III dicitur, nunquam cum ludentibus miscui me, neque cum his qui in levitate ambulant, participem me praebui. Ergo in defectu ludi non potest esse peccatum. Praeterea, Andronicus ponit austeritatem, quam inter virtutes numerat, esse habitum secundum quem ali-

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no sin in lack of mirth. For no sin is prescribed to a penitent. But Augustine speaking of a penitent says (De Vera et Falsa Poenit. 15): Let him refrain from games and the sights of the world, if he wishes to obtain the grace of a full pardon. Therefore there is no sin in lack of mirth. Obj. 2: Further, no sin is included in the praise given to holy men. But some persons are praised for having refrained from mirth; for it is written (Jer 15:17): I sat not in the assembly of jesters, and (Tob 3:17): Never have I joined myself with them that play; neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in lightness. Therefore there can be no sin in the lack of mirth. Obj. 3: Further, Andronicus counts austerity to be one of the virtues, and he describes it as a habit whereby a man

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Q. 168, A. 4

Temperance

qui neque afferunt aliis delectationes collocutionum, neque ab aliis recipiunt. Sed hoc pertinet ad defectum ludi. Ergo defectus ludi magis pertinet ad virtutem quam ad vitium. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II et IV Ethic., ponit defectum in ludo esse vitiosum. Respondeo dicendum quod omne quod est contra rationem in rebus humanis, vitiosum est. Est autem contra rationem ut aliquis se aliis onerosum exhibeat, puta dum nihil delectabile exhibet, et etiam delectationes aliorum impedit. Unde Seneca dicit, sic te geras sapienter ut nullus te habeat tanquam asperum, nec contemnat quasi vilem. Illi autem qui in ludo deficiunt, neque ipsi dicunt aliquod ridiculum; et dicentibus molesti sunt, quia scilicet moderatos aliorum ludos non recipiunt. Et ideo tales vitiosi sunt, et dicuntur duri et agrestes, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Sed quia ludus est utilis propter delectationem et quietem; delectatio autem et quies non propter se quaeruntur in humana vita, sed propter operationem, ut dicitur in X Ethic., defectus ludi minus est vitiosus quam ludi superexcessus. Unde philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic., quod pauci amici propter delectationem sunt habendi, quia parum de delectatione sufficit ad vitam, quasi pro condimento; sicut parum de sale sufficit in cibo. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia poenitentibus luctus indicitur pro peccatis, ideo interdicitur eis ludus. Nec hoc pertinet ad vitium defectus, quia hoc ipsum est secundum rationem quod in eis ludus diminuatur. Ad secundum dicendum quod Ieremias ibi loquitur secundum congruentiam temporis cuius status magis luctum requirebat. Unde subdit, solus sedebam, quoniam amaritudine replevisti me. Quod autem dicitur Tobiae III, pertinet ad ludum superfluum. Quod patet ex eo quod sequitur, neque cum his qui in levitate ambulant participem me praebui. Ad tertium dicendum quod austeritas, secundum quod est virtus, non excludit omnes delectationes, sed superfluas et inordinatas. Unde videtur pertinere ad affabilitatem, quam philosophus amicitiam nominat, vel ad eutrapeliam, sive iucunditatem. Et tamen nominat et definit eam sic secundum convenientiam ad temperantiam, cuius est delectationes reprimere.

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neither gives nor receives the pleasures of conversation. Now this pertains to the lack of mirth. Therefore the lack of mirth is virtuous rather than sinful. On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8) reckons the lack of mirth to be a vice. I answer that, In human affairs whatever is against reason is a sin. Now it is against reason for a man to be burdensome to others, by offering no pleasure to others, and by hindering their enjoyment. Wherefore Seneca says (De Quat. Virt., cap. De Continentia): Let your conduct be guided by wisdom so that no one will think you rude, or despise you as a cad. Now a man who is without mirth, not only is lacking in playful speech, but is also burdensome to others, since he is deaf to the moderate mirth of others. Consequently they are vicious, and are said to be boorish or rude, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 8). Since, however, mirth is useful for the sake of the rest and pleasures it affords; and since, in human life, pleasure and rest are not in quest for their own sake, but for the sake of operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 6, it follows that lack of mirth is less sinful than excess thereof. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 10): We should make few friends for the sake of pleasure, since but little sweetness suffices to season life, just as little salt suffices for our meat. Reply Obj. 1: Mirth is forbidden the penitent because he is called upon to mourn for his sins. Nor does this imply a vice in default, because this very diminishment of mirth in them is in accordance with reason. Reply Obj. 2: Jeremias speaks there in accordance with the times, the state of which required that man should mourn; wherefore he adds: I sat alone, because Thou hast filled me with threats. The words of Tobias 3 refer to excessive mirth; and this is evident from his adding: Neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in lightness. Reply Obj. 3: Austerity, as a virtue, does not exclude all pleasures, but only such as are excessive and inordinate; wherefore it would seem to pertain to affability, which the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6) calls friendliness, or eutrapelia, otherwise wittiness. Nevertheless he names and defines it thus in respect of its agreement with temperance, to which it belongs to restrain pleasure.

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Question 169 Modesty in the Outward Apparel Deinde considerandum est de modestia secundum We must now consider modesty as connected with the quod consistit in exteriori apparatu. Et circa hoc quae- outward apparel, and under this head there are two points runtur duo. of inquiry: Primo, utrum circa exteriorem apparatum possit (1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection esse virtus et vitium. with outward apparel? Secundo, utrum mulieres mortaliter peccent in (2) Whether women sin mortally by excessive superfluo ornatu. adornment?

Article 1 Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward apparel? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod circa exteriorem ornatum non possit esse virtus et vitium. Exterior enim ornatus non est in nobis a natura, unde et secundum diversitatem temporum et locorum variantur. Unde Augustinus dicit, in III de Doct. Christ., quod talares et manicatas tunicas habere apud veteres Romanos flagitium erat, nunc autem honesto loco natis non eas habere flagitium est. Sed sicut philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., naturalis inest nobis aptitudo ad virtutes. Ergo circa huiusmodi non est virtus et vitium. Praeterea, si circa exteriorem cultum esset virtus et vitium, oporteret quod superfluitas in talibus esset vitiosa, et etiam defectus vitiosus. Sed superfluitas in cultu exteriori non videtur esse vitiosa, quia etiam sacerdotes et ministri altaris in sacro ministerio pretiosissimis vestibus utuntur. Similiter etiam defectus in talibus non videtur esse vitiosus, quia in laudem quorundam dicitur, Heb. XI, circuierunt in melotis et in pellibus caprinis. Non ergo videtur quod in talibus possit esse virtus et vitium. Praeterea, omnis virtus aut est theologica, aut moralis, aut intellectualis. Sed circa huiusmodi non consistit virtus intellectualis, quae perficit in aliqua cognitione veritatis. Similiter etiam nec est ibi virtus theologica, quae habet Deum pro obiecto. Nec etiam est ibi aliqua virtutum moralium quas philosophus tangit. Ergo videtur quod circa huiusmodi cultum non possit esse virtus et vitium. Sed contra, honestas ad virtutem pertinet. Sed in exteriori cultu consideratur quaedam honestas, dicit enim Ambrosius, in I de Offic., decor corporis non sit affectatus, sed naturalis; simplex, neglectus magis quam expeditus; non pretiosis et albentibus adiutus vestimentis,

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be virtue and vice in connection with outward apparel. For outward adornment does not belong to us by nature, wherefore it varies according to different times and places. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12) that among the ancient Romans it was scandalous for one to wear a cloak with sleeves and reaching to the ankles, whereas now it is scandalous for anyone hailing from a reputable place to be without them. Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1) there is in us a natural aptitude for the virtues. Therefore there is no virtue or vice about such things. Obj. 2: Further, if there were virtue and vice in connection with outward attire, excess in this matter would be sinful. Now excess in outward attire is not apparently sinful, since even the ministers of the altar use most precious vestments in the sacred ministry. Likewise it would seem not to be sinful to be lacking in this, for it is said in praise of certain people (Heb 11:37): They wandered about in sheepskins and in goatskins. Therefore it seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in this matter. Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or moral, or intellectual. Now an intellectual virtue is not conversant with matter of this kind, since it is a perfection regarding the knowledge of truth. Nor is there a theological virtue connected therewith, since that has God for its object; nor are any of the moral virtues enumerated by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), connected with it. Therefore it seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in connection with this kind of attire. On the contrary, Honesty pertains to virtue. Now a certain honesty is observed in the outward apparel; for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 19): The body should be bedecked naturally and without affectation, with simplicity, with negligence rather than nicety, not with costly and dazzling apparel,

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Q. 169, A. 1

Temperance

sed communibus, ut honestati vel necessitati nihil desit, nihil accedat nitori. Ergo in exteriori cultu potest esse virtus et vitium. Respondeo dicendum quod in ipsis rebus exterioribus quibus homo utitur, non est aliquod vitium, sed ex parte hominis qui immoderate utitur eis. Quae quidem immoderantia potest esse dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, per comparationem ad consuetudinem hominum cum quibus aliquis vivit. Unde dicit Augustinus, in III Confess., quae contra mores hominum sunt flagitia, pro morum diversitate vitanda sunt, ut pactum inter se civitatis et gentis consuetudine vel lege firmatum, nulla civis aut peregrini libidine violetur. Turpis enim est omnis pars universo suo non congruens. Alio modo potest esse immoderatio in usu talium rerum ex inordinato affectu utentis, ex quo quandoque contingit quod homo nimis libidinose talibus utatur, sive secundum consuetudinem eorum cum quibus vivit, sive etiam praeter eorum consuetudinem. Unde Augustinus dicit, in III de Doct. Christ., in usu rerum abesse oportet libidinem, quae non solum ipsa eorum inter quos vivit consuetudine nequiter abutitur; sed etiam saepe fines eius egressa, foeditatem suam, quae inter claustra morum solemnium latitabat, flagitiosissima eruptione manifestat. Contingit autem ista inordinatio affectus tripliciter, quantum ad superabundantiam. Uno modo, per hoc quod aliquis ex superfluo cultu vestium hominum gloriam quaerit, prout scilicet vestes et alia huiusmodi pertinent ad quendam ornatum. Unde Gregorius dicit, in quadam homilia, sunt nonnulli qui cultum subtilium pretiosarumque vestium non putant esse peccatum. Quod videlicet si culpa non esset nequaquam sermo Dei tam vigilanter exprimeret quod dives qui torquebatur apud Inferos, bysso et purpura indutus fuisset. Nemo quippe vestimenta pretiosa, scilicet excedentia proprium statum, nisi ad inanem gloriam quaerit. Alio modo, secundum quod homo per superfluum cultum vestium quaerit delicias, secundum quod vestis ordinatur ad corporis fomentum. Tertio modo, secundum quod nimiam sollicitudinem apponit ad exteriorem vestium cultum, etiam si non sit aliqua inordinatio ex parte finis. Et secundum hoc, Andronicus ponit tres virtutes circa exteriorem cultum. Scilicet, humilitatem, quae excludit intentionem gloriae. Unde dicit quod humilitas est habitus non superabundans in sumptibus et praeparationibus. Et per se sufficientiam, quae excludit intentionem deliciarum. Unde dicit quod per se sufficientia est habitus contentus quibus oportet, et determinativa eorum quae ad vivere convenit (secundum illud apostoli, I ad Tim. ult., habentes alimenta et quibus tegamur, his contenti simus). Et simplicitatem, quae excludit super-

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but with ordinary clothes, so that nothing be lacking to honesty and necessity, yet nothing be added to increase its beauty. Therefore there can be virtue and vice in the outward attire. I answer that, It is not in the outward things themselves which man uses, that there is vice, but on the part of man who uses them immoderately. This lack of moderation occurs in two ways. First, in comparison with the customs of those among whom one lives; wherefore Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): Those offenses which are contrary to the customs of men, are to be avoided according to the customs generally prevailing, so that a thing agreed upon and confirmed by custom or law of any city or nation may not be violated at the lawless pleasure of any, whether citizen or foreigner. For any part, which harmonizeth not with its whole, is offensive. Second, the lack of moderation in the use of these things may arise from the inordinate attachment of the user, the result being that a man sometimes takes too much pleasure in using them, either in accordance with the custom of those among whom he dwells or contrary to such custom. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): We must avoid excessive pleasure in the use of things, for it leads not only wickedly to abuse the customs of those among whom we dwell, but frequently to exceed their bounds, so that, whereas it lay hidden, while under the restraint of established morality, it displays its deformity in a most lawless outbreak. In point of excess, this inordinate attachment occurs in three ways. First when a man seeks glory from excessive attention to dress; insofar as dress and such like things are a kind of ornament. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xl in Ev.): There are some who think that attention to finery and costly dress is no sin. Surely, if this were no fault, the word of God would not say so expressly that the rich man who was tortured in hell had been clothed in purple and fine linen. No one, forsooth, seeks costly apparel (such, namely, as exceeds his estate) save for vainglory. Second, when a man seeks sensuous pleasure from excessive attention to dress, insofar as dress is directed to the body’s comfort. Third, when a man is too solicitous in his attention to outward apparel.

Accordingly Andronicus reckons three virtues in connection with outward attire; namely humility, which excludes the seeking of glory, wherefore he says that humility is the habit of avoiding excessive expenditure and parade; contentment, which excludes the seeking of sensuous pleasure, wherefore he says that contentedness is the habit that makes a man satisfied with what is suitable, and enables him to determine what is becoming in his manner of life (according to the saying of the Apostle, 1 Tim. 6:8): Having food and wherewith to be covered, with these let us be content;—

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Modesty in the Outward Apparel

Q. 169, A. 1

fluam sollicitudinem talium. Unde dicit quod simplicitas and simplicity, which excludes excessive solicitude about est habitus contentus his quae contingunt. such things, wherefore he says that simplicity is a habit that makes a man contented with what he has. Ex parte autem defectus similiter potest esse duplex In the point of deficiency there may be inordinate atinordinatio secundum affectum. Uno quidem modo, ex tachment in two ways. First, through a man’s neglect to give negligentia hominis qui non adhibet studium vel labo- the requisite study or trouble to the use of outward apparel. rem ad hoc quod exteriori cultu utatur secundum quod Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that it is a oportet. Unde philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod ad mark of effeminacy to let one’s cloak trail on the ground to mollitiem pertinet quod aliquis trahat vestimentum per avoid the trouble of lifting it up. Second, by seeking glory terram, ut non laboret elevando ipsum. Alio modo, ex eo from the very lack of attention to outward attire. Hence Auquod ipsum defectum exterioris cultus ad gloriam ordi- gustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12) that not only nant. Unde dicit Augustinus, in libro de Serm. Dom. in the glare and pomp of outward things, but even dirt and the monte, non in solo rerum corporearum nitore atque pom- weeds of mourning may be a subject of ostentation, all the pa, sed etiam in ipsis sordibus et luctuosis esse posse iac- more dangerous as being a decoy under the guise of God’s sertantiam, et eo periculosiorem quo sub nomine servitutis vice; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that both excess Dei decipit. Et philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod su- and inordinate defect are a subject of ostentation. perabundantia et inordinatus defectus ad iactantiam pertinet. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis ipse culReply Obj. 1: Although outward attire does not come tus exterior non sit a natura, tamen ad naturalem ratio- from nature, it belongs to natural reason to moderate it; nem pertinet ut exteriorem cultum moderetur. Et secun- so that we are naturally inclined to be the recipients of the dum hoc, innati sumus hanc virtutem suscipere, quae virtue that moderates outward raiment. exteriorem cultum moderatur. Ad secundum dicendum quod illi qui in dignitatiReply Obj. 2: Those who are placed in a position of bus constituuntur, vel etiam ministri altaris, pretiosio- dignity, or again the ministers of the altar, are attired in ribus vestibus quam ceteri induuntur, non propter sui more costly apparel than others, not for the sake of their gloriam, sed ad significandam excellentiam sui ministe- own glory, but to indicate the excellence of their office or rii vel cultus divini. Et ideo in eis non est vitiosum. Un- of the Divine worship: wherefore this is not sinful in them. de Augustinus dicit, in III de Doct. Christ., quisquis sic Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): Whoever utitur exterioribus rebus ut metas consuetudinis bonorum uses outward things in such a way as to exceed the bounds inter quos versatur excedat, aut aliquid significat, aut fla- observed by the good people among whom he dwells, either gitiosus est, dum scilicet propter delicias vel ostentatio- signifies something by so doing, or is guilty of sin, inasmuch nem talibus utitur. as he uses these things for sensual pleasure or ostentation. Similiter etiam ex parte defectus contingit esse pecLikewise there may be sin on the part of deficiency: alcatum, non tamen semper qui vilioribus quam ceteri though it is not always a sin to wear coarser clothes than vestibus utitur, peccat. Si enim hoc faciat propter iactan- other people. For, if this be done through ostentation or tiam vel superbiam, ut se ceteris praeferat, vitium super- pride, in order to set oneself above others, it is a sin of sustitionis est. Si autem hoc faciat propter macerationem perstition; whereas, if this be done to tame the flesh, or to carnis vel humiliationem spiritus, ad virtutem tempe- humble the spirit, it belongs to the virtue of temperance. rantiae pertinet. Unde Augustinus dicit, in III de Doct. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): Whoever Christ., quisquis restrictius rebus utitur quam se habeant uses transitory things with greater restraint than is custommores eorum cum quibus vivit, aut temperans aut super- ary with those among whom he dwells, is either temperate or stitiosus est. Praecipue autem competit vilibus vestimen- superstitious. Especially, however, is the use of coarse raitis uti his qui alios verbo et exemplo ad poenitentiam ment befitting to those who by word and example urge othhortantur, sicut fuerunt prophetae, de quibus apostolus ers to repentance, as did the prophets of whom the Aposibi loquitur. Unde quaedam Glossa dicit, Matth. III, qui tle is speaking in the passage quoted. Wherefore a gloss on poenitentiam praedicat, habitum poenitentiae praetendit. Matt. 3:4, says: He who preaches penance, wears the garb of penance. Ad tertium dicendum quod huiusmodi exterior Reply Obj. 3: This outward apparel is an indication cultus indicium quoddam est conditionis humanae. Et of man’s estate; wherefore excess, deficiency, and mean ideo excessus et defectus et medium in talibus possunt therein, are referable to the virtue of truthfulness, which the reduci ad virtutem veritatis, quam philosophus ponit Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) assigns to deeds and words, which circa facta et dicta quibus aliquid de statu hominis signi- are indications of something connected with man’s estate. ficatur.

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Q. 169, A. 2

Temperance

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Article 2 Whether the adornment of women is devoid of mortal sin? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ornatus mulierum non sit sine peccato mortali. Omne enim quod est contra praeceptum divinae legis, est peccatum mortale. Sed ornatus mulierum est contra praeceptum divinae legis, dicitur enim I Pet. III, quarum, scilicet mulierum sit non extrinsecus capillatura, aut circumdatio auri, aut indumenti vestimentorum cultus. Ubi dicit Glossa Cypriani, serico et purpura indutae Christum sincere induere non possunt, auro et margaritis adornatae et monilibus, ornamenta mentis et corporis perdiderunt. Sed hoc non fit nisi per peccatum mortale. Ergo ornatus mulierum non potest esse sine peccato mortali. Praeterea, Cyprianus dicit, in libro de habitu Virgin., non virgines tantum aut viduas, sed et nuptas puto et omnes omnino feminas admonendas, quod opus Dei et facturam eius et plasma adulterare nullo modo debeant, adhibito flavo colore vel nigro pulvere vel rubore, aut quolibet lineamenta nativa corrumpente medicamine. Et postea subdit, manus Deo inferunt, quando illud quod ille formavit, reformare contendunt. Impugnatio ista est divini operis, praevaricatio est veritatis. Deum videre non poteris, quando oculi tibi non sunt quos Deus fecit, sed quos Diabolus infecit, de inimico tuo compta, cum illo pariter arsura. Sed hoc non debetur nisi peccato mortali. Ergo ornatus mulieris non est sine peccato mortali. Praeterea, sicut non congruit mulieri quod veste virili utatur, ita etiam ei non competit quod inordinato ornatu utatur. Sed primum est peccatum, dicitur enim Deut. XXII, non induatur mulier veste virili, nec vir veste muliebri. Ergo videtur quod etiam superfluus ornatus mulierum sit peccatum mortale. Sed contra est quia secundum hoc videretur quod artifices huiusmodi ornamenta praeparantes mortaliter peccarent. Respondeo dicendum quod circa ornatum mulierum sunt eadem attendenda quae supra communiter dicta sunt circa exteriorem cultum, et insuper quiddam aliud speciale, quod scilicet muliebris cultus viros ad lasciviam provocat, secundum illud Prov. VII, ecce, mulier occurrit illi ornatu meretricio praeparata ad decipiendas animas. Potest tamen mulier licite operam dare ad hoc quod viro suo placeat, ne per eius contemptum in adulterium labatur. Unde dicitur I ad Cor. VII, quod mulier quae nupta est cogitat quae sunt mundi, quomodo placeat viro. Et ideo si mulier coniugata ad hoc se ornet ut viro suo placeat, potest hoc facere absque peccato.

Objection 1: It would seem that the adornment of women is not devoid of mortal sin. For whatever is contrary to a precept of the Divine law is a mortal sin. Now the adornment of women is contrary to a precept of the Divine law; for it is written (1 Pet 3:3): Whose, namely women’s, adorning, let it not be the outward plaiting of the hair, or the wearing of gold, or the putting on of apparel. Wherefore a gloss of Cyprian says: Those who are clothed in silk and purple cannot sincerely put on Christ: those who are bedecked with gold and pearls and trinkets have forfeited the adornments of mind and body. Now this is not done without a mortal sin. Therefore the adornment of women cannot be devoid of mortal sin. Obj. 2: Further, Cyprian says (De Habit. Virg.): I hold that not only virgins and widows, but also wives and all women without exception, should be admonished that nowise should they deface God’s work and fabric, the clay that He has fashioned, with the aid of yellow pigments, black powders or rouge, or by applying any dye that alters the natural features. And afterwards he adds: They lay hands on God, when they strive to reform what He has formed. This is an assault on the Divine handiwork, a distortion of the truth. Thou shalt not be able to see God, having no longer the eyes that God made, but those the devil has unmade; with him shalt thou burn on whose account thou art bedecked. But this is not due except to mortal sin. Therefore the adornment of women is not devoid of mortal sin. Obj. 3: Further, just as it is unbecoming for a woman to wear man’s clothes, so is it unbecoming for her to adorn herself inordinately. Now the former is a sin, for it is written (Deut 22:5): A woman shall not be clothed with man’s apparel, neither shall a man use woman’s apparel. Therefore it seems that also the excessive adornment of women is a mortal sin. Obj. 4: On the contrary, If this were true it would seem that the makers of these means of adornment sin mortally. I answer that, As regards the adornment of women, we must bear in mind the general statements made above (A. 1) concerning outward apparel, and also something special, namely that a woman’s apparel may incite men to lust, according to Prov. 7:10, Behold a woman meeteth him in harlot’s attire, prepared to deceive souls. Nevertheless a woman may use means to please her husband, lest through despising her he fall into adultery. Hence it is written (1 Cor 7:34) that the woman that is married thinketh on the things of the world, how she may please her husband. Wherefore if a married woman adorn herself in order to please her husband she can do this without sin.

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Modesty in the Outward Apparel

Illae autem mulieres quae viros non habent, nec volunt habere, et sunt in statu non habendi, non possunt absque peccato appetere placere virorum aspectibus ad concupiscendum, quia hoc est dare eis incentivum peccandi. Et si quidem hac intentione se ornent ut alios provocent, ad concupiscentiam, mortaliter peccant. Si autem ex quadam levitate, vel etiam ex vanitate propter quandam iactantiam, non semper est peccatum mortale, sed quandoque veniale. Et eadem ratio, quantum ad hoc, est de viris. Unde Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Possidium, nolo ut de ornamentis auri vel vestis praeproperam habeas in prohibendo sententiam, nisi in eos qui neque coniugati sunt, neque coniugari cupientes, cogitare debent quomodo placeant Deo. Illi autem cogitant quae sunt mundi, quomodo placeant vel viri uxoribus, vel mulieres maritis, nisi quod capillos nudare feminas, quas etiam caput velare apostolus iubet, nec maritatas decet. In quo tamen possent aliquae a peccato excusari, quando hoc non fieret ex aliqua vanitate, sed propter contrariam consuetudinem, quamvis talis consuetudo non sit laudabilis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Glossa ibidem dicit, mulieres eorum qui in tribulatione erant, contemnebant viros, et ut aliis placerent, se pulchre ornabant, quod fieri apostolus prohibet. In quo etiam casu loquitur Cyprianus, non autem prohibet mulieribus coniugatis ornari ut placeant viris, ne detur eis occasio peccandi cum aliis. Unde I ad Tim. dicit apostolus, mulieres in habitu ornato, cum verecundia et sobrietate ornantes se, non in tortis crinibus, aut auro aut margaritis aut veste pretiosa, per quod datur intelligi quod sobrius et moderatus ornatus non prohibetur mulieribus, sed superfluus et inverecundus et impudicus. Ad secundum dicendum quod mulierum fucatio, de qua Cyprianus loquitur, est quaedam species fictionis, quae non potest esse sine peccato. Unde Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Possidium, fucari figmentis, quo rubicundior vel candidior appareat, adulterina fallacia est, qua non dubito etiam ipsos maritos se nolle decipi, quibus solis permittendae sunt feminae ornari, secundum veniam, non secundum imperium. Non tamen semper talis fucatio est cum peccato mortali, sed solum quando fit propter lasciviam, vel in Dei contemptum, in quibus casibus loquitur Cyprianus. Sciendum tamen quod aliud est fingere pulchritudinem non habitam, et aliud est occultare turpitudinem ex aliqua causa provenientem, puta aegritudine vel aliquo huiusmodi. Hoc enim est licitum, quia secundum apostolum, I ad Cor., quae putamus ignobiliora esse membra corporis, his honorem abundantiorem circundamus. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, cultus exterior debet competere conditioni personae secundum communem consuetudinem. Et ideo de se vitiosum

Q. 169, A. 2

But those women who have no husband nor wish to have one, or who are in a state of life inconsistent with marriage, cannot without sin desire to give lustful pleasure to those men who see them, because this is to incite them to sin. And if indeed they adorn themselves with this intention of provoking others to lust, they sin mortally; whereas if they do so from frivolity, or from vanity for the sake of ostentation, it is not always mortal, but sometimes venial. And the same applies to men in this respect. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ccxlv ad Possid.): I do not wish you to be hasty in forbidding the wearing of gold or costly attire except in the case of those who being neither married nor wishful to marry, should think how they may please God: whereas the others think on the things of the world, either husbands how they may please their wives, or wives how they may please their husbands, except that it is unbecoming for women though married to uncover their hair, since the Apostle commands them to cover the head. Yet in this case some might be excused from sin, when they do this not through vanity but on account of some contrary custom: although such a custom is not to be commended. Reply Obj. 1: As a gloss says on this passage, The wives of those who were in distress despised their husbands, and decked themselves that they might please other men: and the Apostle forbids this. Cyprian is speaking in the same sense; yet he does not forbid married women to adorn themselves in order to please their husbands, lest the latter be afforded an occasion of sin with other women. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim 2:9): Women . . . in ornate apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety, not with plaited hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly attire: whence we are given to understand that women are not forbidden to adorn themselves soberly and moderately but to do so excessively, shamelessly, and immodestly. Reply Obj. 2: Cyprian is speaking of women painting themselves: this is a kind of falsification, which cannot be devoid of sin. Wherefore Augustine says (Ep. ccxlv ad Possid.): To dye oneself with paints in order to have a rosier or a paler complexion is a lying counterfeit. I doubt whether even their husbands are willing to be deceived by it, by whom alone (i.e., the husbands) are they to be permitted, but not ordered, to adorn themselves. However, such painting does not always involve a mortal sin, but only when it is done for the sake of sensuous pleasure or in contempt of God, and it is to like cases that Cyprian refers. It must, however, be observed that it is one thing to counterfeit a beauty one has not, and another to hide a disfigurement arising from some cause such as sickness or the like. For this is lawful, since according to the Apostle (1 Cor 12:23), Such as we think to be the less honorable members of the body, about these we put more abundant honor. Reply Obj. 3: As stated in the foregoing Article, outward apparel should be consistent with the estate of the person, according to the general custom. Hence it is in itself

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Q. 169, A. 2

Temperance

est quod mulier utatur veste virili aut e converso, et praecipue quia hoc potest esse causa lasciviae. Et specialiter prohibetur in lege, quia gentiles tali mutatione habitus utebantur ad idololatriae superstitionem. Potest tamen quandoque hoc fieri sine peccato propter aliquam necessitatem, vel causa occultandi ab hostibus, vel propter defectum alterius vestimenti, vel propter aliquid aliud huiusmodi. Ad quartum dicendum quod, si qua ars est ad faciendum aliqua opera quibus homines uti non possunt absque peccato, per consequens artifices talia faciendo peccarent, utpote praebentes directe aliis occasionem peccandi, puta si quis fabricaret idola, vel aliqua ad cultum idololatriae pertinentia. Si qua vero ars sit cuius operibus homines possunt bene et male uti, sicut gladii, sagittae et alia huiusmodi, usus talium artium non est peccatum, et eae solae artes sunt dicendae. Unde Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., eas solas oportet artes vocare quae necessariorum, et eorum quae continent vitam nostram, sunt tributivae et constructivae. Si tamen operibus alicuius artis ut pluries aliqui male uterentur, quamvis de se non sint illicitae, sunt tamen per officium principis a civitate extirpandae, secundum documenta Platonis. Quia ergo mulieres licite se possunt ornare, vel ut conservent decentiam sui status, vel etiam aliquid superaddere ut placeant viris; consequens est quod artifices talium ornamentorum non peccant in usu talis artis, nisi forte inveniendo aliqua superflua et curiosa. Unde Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., quod etiam ab arte calceorum et textorum multa abscidere oportet. Etenim ad luxuriam deduxerunt necessitatem eius corrumpentes, artem male arti commiscentes.

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sinful for a woman to wear man’s clothes, or vice versa; especially since this may be a cause of sensuous pleasure; and it is expressly forbidden in the Law (Deut 22) because the Gentiles used to practice this change of attire for the purpose of idolatrous superstition. Nevertheless this may be done sometimes without sin on account of some necessity, either in order to hide oneself from enemies, or through lack of other clothes, or for some similar motive. Reply Obj. 4: In the case of an art directed to the production of goods which men cannot use without sin, it follows that the workmen sin in making such things, as directly affording others an occasion of sin; for instance, if a man were to make idols or anything pertaining to idolatrous worship. But in the case of an art the products of which may be employed by man either for a good or for an evil use, such as swords, arrows, and the like, the practice of such an art is not sinful. These alone should be called arts; wherefore Chrysostom says: The name of art should be applied to those only which contribute towards and produce necessaries and mainstays of life. In the case of an art that produces things which for the most part some people put to an evil use, although such arts are not unlawful in themselves, nevertheless, according to the teaching of Plato, they should be extirpated from the State by the governing authority. Accordingly, since women may lawfully adorn themselves, whether to maintain the fitness of their estate, or even by adding something thereto, in order to please their husbands, it follows that those who make such means of adornment do not sin in the practice of their art, except perhaps by inventing means that are superfluous and fantastic. Hence Chrysostom says (Super Matth.) that even the shoemakers’ and clothiers’ arts stand in need of restraint, for they have lent their art to lust, by abusing its needs, and debasing art by art.

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Question 170 The Precepts of Temperance Deinde considerandum est de praeceptis temperantiae. Et primo, de praeceptis ipsius temperantiae. Secundo, de praeceptis partium eius.

We must next consider the precepts of temperance: (1) The precepts of temperance itself; (2) The precepts of its parts.

Article 1 Whether the precepts of temperance are suitably given in the divine law? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta temperantiae inconvenienter in lege divina tradantur. Fortitudo enim est potior virtus quam temperantia, ut supra dictum est. Sed nullum praeceptum fortitudinis ponitur inter praecepta Decalogi, quae sunt potiora legis praecepta. Ergo inconvenienter inter praecepta Decalogi ponitur prohibitio adulterii, quod contrariatur temperantiae, ut ex supra dictis patet.

Praeterea, temperantia non solum est circa venerea, sed etiam circa delectationem ciborum et potuum. Sed inter praecepta Decalogi non prohibetur aliquod vitium pertinens ad delectationem ciborum et potuum, neque etiam pertinens ad aliquam aliam speciem luxuriae. Ergo neque etiam debet poni aliquod praeceptum prohibens adulterium, quod pertinet ad delectationem venereorum. Praeterea, principalius est in intentione legislatoris inducere ad virtutes quam vitia prohibere, ad hoc enim vitia prohibentur, ut virtutum impedimenta tollantur. Sed praecepta Decalogi sunt principalia in lege divina. Ergo inter praecepta Decalogi magis debuit poni praeceptum aliquod affirmativum directe inducens ad virtutem temperantiae, quam praeceptum negativum prohibens adulterium, quod ei directe opponitur. In contrarium est auctoritas Scripturae. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. I, finis praecepti caritas est, ad quam duobus praeceptis inducimur pertinentibus ad dilectionem Dei et proximi. Et ideo illa praecepta in Decalogo ponuntur quae directius ordinantur ad dilectionem Dei et proximi. Inter vitia autem temperantiae opposita, maxime dilectioni proximi videtur opponi adulterium, per quod aliquis usurpat sibi rem alienam, abutendo scilicet uxore

Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of temperance are unsuitably given in the Divine law. Because fortitude is a greater virtue than temperance, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 12; Q. 141, A. 8; I-II, Q. 66, A. 4). Now there is no precept of fortitude among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the most important among the precepts of the Law. Therefore it was unfitting to include among the precepts of the decalogue the prohibition of adultery, which is contrary to temperance, as stated above (Q. 154, AA. 1, 8). Obj. 2: Further, temperance is not only about venereal matters, but also about pleasures of meat and drink. Now the precepts of the decalogue include no prohibition of a vice pertaining to pleasures of meat and drink, or to any other species of lust. Neither, therefore, should they include a precept prohibiting adultery, which pertains to venereal pleasure. Obj. 3: Further, in the lawgiver’s intention inducement to virtue precedes the prohibition of vice, since vices are forbidden in order that obstacles to virtue may be removed. Now the precepts of the decalogue are the most important in the Divine law. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue should have included an affirmative precept directly prescribing the virtue of temperance, rather than a negative precept forbidding adultery which is directly opposed thereto. On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture in the decalogue (Exod 20:14, 17). I answer that, As the Apostle says (1 Tim 1:5), the end of the commandment is charity, which is enjoined upon us in the two precepts concerning the love of God and of our neighbor. Wherefore the decalogue contains those precepts which tend more directly to the love of God and of our neighbor. Now among the vices opposed to temperance, adultery would seem most of all opposed to the love of our neighbor, since thereby a man lays hold of another’s

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Temperance

proximi. Et ideo inter praecepta Decalogi praecipue prohibetur adulterium, non solum secundum quod opere exercetur, sed etiam secundum quod corde concupiscitur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod inter species vitiorum quae opponuntur fortitudini, nulla est quae ita directe contrarietur dilectioni proximi sicut adulterium, quod est species luxuriae, quae temperantiae contrariatur. Et tamen vitium audaciae, quod opponitur fortitudini, quandoque solet esse causa homicidii, quod inter praecepta Decalogi prohibetur, dicitur enim Eccli. VIII, cum audace non eas in via, ne forte gravet mala sua in te. Ad secundum dicendum quod gula directe non opponitur dilectioni proximi, sicut adulterium, neque etiam aliqua alia species luxuriae. Non enim tanta fit iniuria patri per stuprum virginis, quae non est eius connubio deputata, quanta fit iniuria viro per adulterium, cuius corporis potestatem ipse habet, non uxor. Ad tertium dicendum quod praecepta Decalogi, ut supra dictum est, sunt quaedam universalia divinae legis principia, unde oportet ea esse communia. Non potuerunt autem aliqua praecepta communia affirmativa de temperantia dari, quia usus eius variatur secundum diversa tempora, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono Coniug., et secundum diversas hominum leges et consuetudines.

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property for his own use, by abusing his neighbor’s wife. Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue include a special prohibition of adultery, not only as committed in deed, but also as desired in thought. Reply Obj. 1: Among the species of vices opposed to fortitude there is not one that is so directly opposed to the love of our neighbor as adultery, which is a species of lust that is opposed to temperance. And yet the vice of daring, which is opposed to fortitude, is wont to be sometimes the cause of murder, which is forbidden by one of the precepts of the decalogue: for it is written (Sir 8:18): Go not on the way with a bold man lest he burden thee with his evils. Reply Obj. 2: Gluttony is not directly opposed to the love of our neighbor, as adultery is. Nor indeed is any other species of lust, for a father is not so wronged by the seduction of the virgin over whom he has no connubial right, as is the husband by the adultery of his wife, for he, not the wife herself, has power over her body. Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 122, AA. 1, 4) the precepts of the decalogue are universal principles of the Divine law; hence they need to be common precepts. Now it was not possible to give any common affirmative precepts of temperance, because the practice of temperance varies according to different times, as Augustine remarks (De Bono Conjug. xv, 7), and according to different human laws and customs.

Article 2 Whether the precepts of the virtues annexed to temperance are suitably given in the divine law? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter tradantur in divina lege praecepta de virtutibus annexis temperantiae. Praecepta enim Decalogi, ut dictum est, sunt quaedam universalia principia totius legis divinae. Sed superbia est initium omnis peccati, ut dicitur Eccli. X. Ergo inter praecepta Decalogi debuit aliquod poni prohibitivum superbiae. Praeterea, illa praecepta maxime debent in Decalogo poni per quae homines maxime inclinantur ad legis impletionem, quia ista videntur esse principalia. Sed per humilitatem, per quam homo Deo subiicitur, maxime videtur homo disponi ad observantiam divinae legis, unde obedientia inter gradus humilitatis computatur, ut supra habitum est. Et idem etiam videtur esse dicendum de mansuetudine, per quam fit ut homo divinae Scripturae non contradicat, ut Augustinus dicit, in II de Doct. Christ. Ergo videtur quod de humilitate et mansuetudine aliqua praecepta in Decalogo poni debuerunt. Praeterea, dictum est quod adulterium in Decalogo prohibetur quia contrariatur dilectioni proximi. Sed

Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the virtues annexed to temperance are unsuitably given in the Divine law. For the precepts of the Decalogue, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3), are certain universal principles of the whole Divine law. Now pride is the beginning of all sin, according to Ecclus. 10:15. Therefore among the precepts of the Decalogue there should have been one forbidding pride. Obj. 2: Further, a place before all should have been given in the decalogue to those precepts by which men are especially induced to fulfill the Law, because these would seem to be the most important. Now since humility subjects man to God, it would seem most of all to dispose man to the fulfilment of the Divine law; wherefore obedience is accounted one of the degrees of humility, as stated above (Q. 161, A. 6); and the same apparently applies to meekness, the effect of which is that a man does not contradict the Divine Scriptures, as Augustine observes (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7). Therefore it seems that the Decalogue should have contained precepts of humility and meekness. Obj. 3: Further, it was stated in the foregoing Article that adultery is forbidden in the decalogue, because it is

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etiam inordinatio exteriorum motuum, quae contrariatur modestiae, dilectioni proximi opponitur, unde Augustinus dicit, in regula, in omnibus motibus vestris nihil fiat quod cuiusquam offendat aspectum. Ergo videtur quod etiam huiusmodi inordinatio debuit prohiberi per aliquod praeceptum Decalogi. In contrarium sufficit auctoritas Scripturae. Respondeo dicendum quod virtutes temperantiae annexae dupliciter considerari possunt, uno modo, secundum se; alio modo, secundum suos effectus. Secundum se quidem, non habent directam habitudinem ad dilectionem Dei vel proximi, sed magis respiciunt quandam moderationem eorum quae ad ipsum hominem pertinent. Quantum autem ad effectus suos, possunt respicere dilectionem Dei vel proximi. Et secundum hoc, aliqua praecepta in Decalogo ponuntur pertinentia ad prohibendum effectus vitiorum oppositorum temperantiae partibus, sicut ex ira, quae opponitur mansuetudini, procedit interdum aliquis ad homicidium, quod in Decalogo prohibetur, vel ad subtrahendum debitum honorem parentibus. Quod etiam potest ex superbia provenire, ex qua etiam multi transgrediuntur praecepta primae tabulae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod superbia est initium peccati, sed latens in corde, cuius etiam inordinatio non perpenditur communiter ab omnibus. Unde eius prohibitio non debuit poni inter praecepta Decalogi, quae sunt sicut prima principia per se nota. Ad secundum dicendum quod praecepta quae inducunt ad observantiam legis, praesupponunt iam legem. Unde non possunt esse prima legis praecepta, ut in Decalogo ponantur. Ad tertium dicendum quod inordinatio exteriorum motuum non pertinet ad offensam proximi secundum ipsam speciem actus, sicut homicidium, adulterium et furtum, quae in Decalogo prohibentur, sed solum secundum quod sunt signa interioris inordinationis, ut supra dictum est.

Q. 170, A. 2

contrary to the love of our neighbor. But inordinateness of outward movements, which is contrary to modesty, is opposed to neighborly love: wherefore Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxii): In all your movements let nothing be done to offend the eye of any person whatever. Therefore it seems that this kind of inordinateness should also have been forbidden by a precept of the Decalogue. On the contrary, suffices the authority of Scripture. I answer that, The virtues annexed to temperance may be considered in two ways: first, in themselves; second, in their effects. Considered in themselves they have no direct connection with the love of God or of our neighbor; rather do they regard a certain moderation of things pertaining to man himself. But considered in their effects, they may regard the love of God or of our neighbor: and in this respect the decalogue contains precepts that relate to the prohibition of the effects of the vices opposed to the parts of temperance. Thus the effect of anger, which is opposed to meekness, is sometimes that a man goes on to commit murder (and this is forbidden in the Decalogue), and sometimes that he refuses due honor to his parents, which may also be the result of pride, which leads many to transgress the precepts of the first table. Reply Obj. 1: Pride is the beginning of sin, but it lies hidden in the heart; and its inordinateness is not perceived by all in common. Hence there was no place for its prohibition among the precepts of the Decalogue, which are like first self-evident principles. Reply Obj. 2: Those precepts which are essentially an inducement to the observance of the Law presuppose the Law to be already given, wherefore they cannot be first precepts of the Law so as to have a place in the Decalogue. Reply Obj. 3: Inordinate outward movement is not injurious to one’s neighbor, if we consider the species of the act, as are murder, adultery, and theft, which are forbidden in the decalogue; but only as being signs of an inward inordinateness, as stated above (Q. 168, A. 1, ad 1, 3).

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Question 171 Prophecy Postquam dictum est de singulis virtutibus et vitiis quae pertinent ad omnium hominum conditiones et status, nunc considerandum est de his quae specialiter ad aliquos homines pertinent. Invenitur autem differentia inter homines, secundum ea quae ad habitus et actus animae rationalis pertinent, tripliciter. Uno quidem modo, secundum diversas gratias gratis datas, quia, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XII, divisiones gratiarum sunt, et alii datur per spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae, et cetera. Alia vero differentia est secundum diversas vitas, activam scilicet et contemplativam, quae accipitur secundum diversa operationum studia. Unde et ibidem dicitur quod divisiones operationum sunt. Aliud enim est studium operationis in Martha, quae sollicita erat et laborabat circa frequens ministerium, quod pertinet ad vitam activam, aliud autem in Maria, quae, sedens secus pedes domini, audiebat verbum illius, quod pertinet ad contemplativam, ut habetur Luc. X. Tertio modo, secundum diversitatem officiorum et statuum, prout dicitur Ephes. IV, et ipse dedit quosdam quidem apostolos, quosdam autem prophetas, alios vero Evangelistas, alios autem pastores et doctores. Quod pertinet ad diversa ministeria, de quibus dicitur, I ad Cor. XII, divisiones ministrationum sunt. Est autem attendendum circa gratias gratis datas, de quibus occurrit consideratio prima, quod quaedam eorum pertinent ad cognitionem; quaedam vero ad locutionem; quaedam vero ad operationem. Omnia vero quae ad cognitionem pertinent, sub prophetia comprehendi possunt. Nam prophetica revelatio se extendit non solum ad futuros hominum eventus, sed etiam ad res divinas, et quantum ad ea quae proponuntur omnibus credenda, quae pertinent ad fidem, et quantum ad altiora mysteria, quae sunt perfectorum, quae pertinent ad sapientiam; est etiam prophetica revelatio de his quae pertinent ad spirituales substantias, a quibus vel ad bonum vel ad malum inducimur, quod pertinet ad discretionem spirituum; extendit etiam se ad directionem humanorum actuum, quod pertinet ad scientiam; ut infra patebit. Et ideo primo occurrit considerandum de prophetia; et de raptu, qui est quidam prophetiae gradus. De prophetia autem quadruplex consideratio occurrit, quarum prima est de essentia eius; secunda, de causa ipsius; tertia, de modo propheticae cognitionis; quarta, de divisione prophetiae. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum prophetia pertineat ad cognitionem.

After treating individually of all the virtues and vices that pertain to men of all conditions and estates, we must now consider those things which pertain especially to certain men. Now there is a triple difference between men as regards things connected with the soul’s habits and acts. First, in reference to the various gratuitous graces, according to 1 Cor. 12:4, 7: There are diversities of graces . . . and to one . . . by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, etc. Another difference arises from the diversities of life, namely the active and the contemplative life, which correspond to diverse purposes of operation, wherefore it is stated (1 Cor 12:4, 7) that there are diversities of operations. For the purpose of operation in Martha, who was busy about much serving, which pertains to the active life, differed from the purpose of operation in Mary, who sitting . . . at the Lord’s feet, heard His word (Luke 10:39, 40), which pertains to the contemplative life. A third difference corresponds to the various duties and states of life, as expressed in Eph. 4:11, And He gave some apostles; and some prophets; and other some evangelists; and other some pastors and doctors: and this pertains to diversity of ministries, of which it is written (1 Cor 12:5): There are diversities of ministries. With regard to gratuitous graces, which are the first object to be considered, it must be observed that some of them pertain to knowledge, some to speech, and some to operation. Now all things pertaining to knowledge may be comprised under prophecy, since prophetic revelation extends not only to future events relating to man, but also to things relating to God, both as to those which are to be believed by all and are matters of faith, and as to yet higher mysteries, which concern the perfect and belong to wisdom. Again, prophetic revelation is about things pertaining to spiritual substances, by whom we are urged to good or evil; this pertains to the discernment of spirits. Moreover it extends to the direction of human acts, and this pertains to knowledge, as we shall explain further on (Q. 177). Accordingly we must first of all consider prophecy, and rapture which is a degree of prophecy. Prophecy admits of four heads of consideration: (1) its essence; (2) its cause; (3) the mode of prophetic knowledge; (4) the division of prophecy.

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Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge?

Q. 171, A. 1

Gratuitous Graces

Secundo, utrum sit habitus. Tertio, utrum sit solum futurorum contingentium. Quarto, utrum propheta cognoscat omnia prophetabilia. Quinto, utrum propheta discernat ea quae divinitus percipit, ab his quae proprio spiritu videt.

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(2) Whether it is a habit? (3) Whether it is only about future contingencies? (4) Whether a prophet knows all possible matters of prophecy? (5) Whether a prophet distinguishes that which he perceives by the gift of God, from that which he perceives by his own spirit? (6) Whether anything false can be the matter of prophecy?

Sexto, utrum prophetiae possit subesse falsum.

Article 1 Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prophetia non pertineat ad cognitionem. Dicitur enim Eccli. XLVIII, quod corpus Elisei mortuum prophetavit, et infra, XLIX, dicitur de Ioseph quod ossa ipsius visitata, sunt, et post mortem prophetavit. Sed in corpore vel ossibus post mortem non remanet aliqua cognitio. Ergo prophetia non pertinet ad cognitionem. Praeterea, I ad Cor. XIV dicitur, qui prophetat, hominibus loquitur ad aedificationem. Sed locutio est effectus cognitionis, non autem est ipsa cognitio. Ergo videtur quod prophetia non pertinet ad cognitionem. Praeterea, omnis cognoscitiva perfectio excludit stultitiam et insaniam. Sed haec simul possunt esse cum prophetia, dicitur enim Osee IX, scitote, Israel, stultum prophetam, insanum. Ergo prophetia non est cognoscitiva perfectio. Praeterea, sicut revelatio pertinet ad intellectum, ita inspiratio videtur pertinere ad affectum, eo quod importat motionem quandam. Sed prophetia dicitur esse inspiratio vel revelatio, secundum Cassiodorum. Ergo videtur quod prophetia non magis pertineat ad intellectum quam ad affectum. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Reg. IX, qui enim propheta dicitur hodie, vocabatur olim videns. Sed visio pertinet ad cognitionem. Ergo prophetia ad cognitionem pertinet. Respondeo dicendum quod prophetia primo et principaliter consistit in cognitione, quia videlicet cognoscunt quaedam quae sunt procul remota ab hominum cognitione. Unde possunt dici prophetae a phanos, quod est apparitio, quia scilicet eis aliqua quae sunt procul, apparent. Et propter hoc, ut Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., in veteri testamento appellabantur videntes, quia videbant ea quae ceteri non videbant, et prospiciebant quae in mysterio abscondita erant. Unde et gentilitas eos appellabat vates, a vi mentis. Sed quia, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XII, unicuique datur manifestatio spiritus ad utilitatem; et infra, XIV, dicitur,

Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy does not pertain to knowledge. For it is written (Sir 48:14) that after death the body of Eliseus prophesied, and further on (Sir 49:18) it is said of Joseph that his bones were visited, and after death they prophesied. Now no knowledge remains in the body or in the bones after death. Therefore prophecy does not pertain to knowledge. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (1 Cor 14:3): He that prophesieth, speaketh to men unto edification. Now speech is not knowledge itself, but its effect. Therefore it would seem that prophecy does not pertain to knowledge. Obj. 3: Further, every cognitive perfection excludes folly and madness. Yet both of these are consistent with prophecy; for it is written (Hos 9:7): Know ye, O Israel, that the prophet was foolish and mad. Therefore prophecy is not a cognitive perfection. Obj. 4: Further, just as revelation regards the intellect, so inspiration regards, apparently, the affections, since it denotes a kind of motion. Now prophecy is described as inspiration or revelation, according to Cassiodorus. Therefore it would seem that prophecy does not pertain to the intellect more than to the affections. On the contrary, It is written (1 Kgs 9:9): For he that is now called a prophet, in time past was called a seer. Now sight pertains to knowledge. Therefore prophecy pertains to knowledge. I answer that, Prophecy first and chiefly consists in knowledge, because, to wit, prophets know things that are far (procul) removed from man’s knowledge. Wherefore they may be said to take their name from phanos, apparition, because things appear to them from afar. Wherefore, as Isidore states (Etym. vii, 8), In the Old Testament, they were called Seers, because they saw what others saw not, and surveyed things hidden in mystery. Hence among heathen nations they were known as vates, on account of their power of mind (vi mentis), (ibid. viii, 7). Since, however, it is written (1 Cor 12:7): The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit, and fur-

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ad aedificationem Ecclesiae quaerite ut abundetis, inde est quod prophetia secundario consistit in locutione, prout prophetae ea quae divinitus edocti cognoscunt, ad aedificationem aliorum annuntiant, secundum illud Isaiae XXI, quae audivi a domino exercituum, Deo Israel, annuntiavi vobis. Et secundum hoc, ut Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., possunt dici prophetae quasi praefatores, eo quod porro fantur, idest, a remotis fantur, et de futuris vera praedicunt. Ea autem quae supra humanam cognitionem divinitus revelantur, non possunt confirmari ratione humana, quam excedunt, sed operatione virtutis divinae, secundum illud Marci ult., praedicaverunt ubique, domino cooperante et sermonem confirmante sequentibus signis. Unde tertio ad prophetiam pertinet operatio miraculorum, quasi confirmatio quaedam propheticae Annuntiationis. Unde dicitur Deut. ult., non surrexit propheta ultra in Israel sicut Moyses, quem nosset dominus facie ad faciem, in omnibus signis atque portentis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritates illae loquuntur de prophetia quantum ad hoc tertium, quod assumitur ut prophetiae argumentum. Ad secundum dicendum quod apostolus ibi loquitur quantum ad propheticam enuntiationem. Ad tertium dicendum quod illi qui dicuntur prophetae insani et stulti, non sunt veri prophetae, sed falsi, de quibus dicitur Ierem. XXIII, nolite audire verba prophetarum qui prophetant vobis et decipiunt vos, visionem cordis sui loquuntur, non de ore domini; et Ezech. XIII, haec dicit dominus, vae prophetis insipientibus, qui sequuntur spiritum suum, et nihil vident. Ad quartum dicendum quod in prophetia requiritur quod intentio mentis elevetur ad percipienda divina, unde dicitur Ezech. II, fili hominis, sta super pedes tuos, et loquar tecum. Haec autem elevatio intentionis fit spiritu sancto movente, unde ibi subditur, et ingressus est in me spiritus, et statuit me super pedes meos. Postquam autem intentio mentis elevata est ad superna, percipit divina, unde subditur, et audivi loquentem ad me. Sic igitur ad prophetiam requiritur inspiratio quantum ad mentis elevationem, secundum illud Iob XXXII, inspiratio omnipotentis dat intelligentiam, revelatio autem, quantum ad ipsam perceptionem divinorum, in quo perficitur prophetia; per ipsam removetur obscuritatis et ignorantiae velamen, secundum illud Iob XII, qui revelat profunda de tenebris.

Q. 171, A. 1

ther on (1 Cor 14:12): Seek to abound unto the edification of the Church, it follows that prophecy consists secondarily in speech, insofar as the prophets declare for the instruction of others, the things they know through being taught of God, according to the saying of Isa. 21:10, That which I have heard of the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel, I have declared unto you. Accordingly, as Isidore says (Etym. viii, 7), prophets may be described as praefatores (foretellers), because they tell from afar (porro fantur), that is, speak from a distance, and foretell the truth about things to come. Now those things above human ken which are revealed by God cannot be confirmed by human reason, which they surpass as regards the operation of the Divine power, according to Mk. 16:20, They . . . preached everywhere, the Lord working withal and confirming the word with signs that followed. Hence, third, prophecy is concerned with the working of miracles, as a kind of confirmation of the prophetic utterances. Wherefore it is written (Deut 34:10, 11): There arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face, in all the signs and wonders. Reply Obj. 1: These passages speak of prophecy in reference to the third point just mentioned, which regards the proof of prophecy. Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle is speaking there of the prophetic utterances. Reply Obj. 3: Those prophets who are described as foolish and mad are not true but false prophets, of whom it is said (Jer 3:16): Hearken not to the words of the prophets that prophesy to you, and deceive you; they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord, and (Ezek 13:3): Woe to the foolish prophets, that follow their own spirit, and see nothing. Reply Obj. 4: It is requisite to prophecy that the intention of the mind be raised to the perception of Divine things: wherefore it is written (Ezek 2:1): Son of man, stand upon thy feet, and I will speak to thee. This raising of the intention is brought about by the motion of the Holy Spirit, wherefore the text goes on to say: And the Spirit entered into me . . . and He set me upon my feet. After the mind’s intention has been raised to heavenly things, it perceives the things of God; hence the text continues: And I heard Him speaking to me. Accordingly inspiration is requisite for prophecy, as regards the raising of the mind, according to Job 32:8, The inspiration of the Almighty giveth understanding: while revelation is necessary, as regards the very perception of Divine things, whereby prophecy is completed; by its means the veil of darkness and ignorance is removed, according to Job 12:22, He discovereth great things out of darkness.

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Q. 171, A. 2

Gratuitous Graces

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Article 2 Whether prophecy is a habit? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prophetia sit habitus. Quia ut dicitur in II Ethic., tria sunt in anima, potentia, passio et habitus. Sed prophetia non est potentia, quia sic inesset omnibus hominibus, quibus potentiae animae sunt communes. Similiter etiam non est passio, quia passiones pertinent ad vim appetitivam, ut supra habitum est; prophetia autem pertinet principaliter ad cognitionem, ut dictum est. Ergo prophetia est habitus. Praeterea, omnis perfectio animae quae non semper est in actu, est habitus. Sed prophetia est quaedam animae perfectio, non autem semper est in actu, alioquin non diceretur dormiens propheta. Ergo videtur quod prophetia sit habitus. Praeterea, prophetia computatur inter gratias gratis datas. Sed gratia est habituale quiddam in anima, ut supra habitum est. Ergo prophetia est habitus. Sed contra, habitus est quo quis agit cum voluerit, ut dicit Commentator, in III de anima. Sed aliquis non potest uti prophetia cum voluerit, sicut patet IV Reg. III, de Eliseo, quem cum Iosaphat de futuris requireret, et prophetiae spiritus ei deesset, psaltem fecit applicari, ut prophetiae ad hunc spiritus per laudem psalmodiae descenderet, atque eius animum de venturis repleret, ut Gregorius dicit, super Ezech. Ergo prophetia non est habitus.

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. V, omne quod manifestatur, lumen est, quia videlicet, sicut manifestatio corporalis visionis fit per lumen corporale, ita etiam manifestatio visionis intellectualis fit per lumen intellectuale. Oportet ergo ut manifestatio proportionetur lumini per quod fit, sicut effectus proportionatur suae causae. Cum ergo prophetia pertineat ad cognitionem quae supra naturalem rationem existit, ut dictum est; consequens est quod ad prophetiam requiratur quoddam lumen intelligibile excedens lumen naturalis rationis, unde dicitur Mich. VII, cum sedero in tenebris, dominus lux mea est. Lumen autem dupliciter alicui inesse potest, uno modo, per modum formae permanentis, sicut lumen corporale est in sole et in igne; alio modo, per modum cuiusdam passionis sive impressionis transeuntis, sicut lumen est in aere. Lumen autem propheticum non inest intellectui prophetae per modum formae permanentis, alias oporteret quod semper prophetae adesset facultas prophetandi, quod patet esse falsum, dicit enim Gregorius, super Ezech., aliquando prophetiae spiritus deest prophetis, nec semper eorum mentibus praesto est, quatenus, cum hunc non habent, se

Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is a habit. For according to Ethic. ii, 5, There are three things in the soul, power, passion, and habit. Now prophecy is not a power, for then it would be in all men, since the powers of the soul are common to them. Again it is not a passion, since the passions belong to the appetitive faculty, as stated above (I-II, Q. 22, A. 2); whereas prophecy pertains principally to knowledge, as stated in the foregoing Article. Therefore prophecy is a habit. Obj. 2: Further, every perfection of the soul, which is not always in act, is a habit. Now prophecy is a perfection of the soul; and it is not always in act, else a prophet could not be described as asleep. Therefore seemingly prophecy is a habit. Obj. 3: Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces. Now grace is something in the soul, after the manner of a habit, as stated above (I-II, Q. 110, A. 2). Therefore prophecy is a habit. On the contrary, A habit is something whereby we act when we will, as the Commentator says (De Anima iii). But a man cannot make use of prophecy when he will, as appears in the case of Eliseus (4 Kgs 3:15), who on Josaphat inquiring of him concerning the future, and the spirit of prophecy failing him, caused a minstrel to be brought to him, that the spirit of prophecy might come down upon him through the praise of psalmody, and fill his mind with things to come, as Gregory observes (Hom. i super Ezech.). Therefore prophecy is not a habit. I answer that, As the Apostle says (Eph 5:13), all that is made manifest is light, because, to wit, just as the manifestation of the material sight takes place through material light, so too the manifestation of intellectual sight takes place through intellectual light. Accordingly manifestation must be proportionate to the light by means of which it takes place, even as an effect is proportionate to its cause. Since then prophecy pertains to a knowledge that surpasses natural reason, as stated above (A. 1), it follows that prophecy requires an intellectual light surpassing the light of natural reason. Hence the saying of Micah 7:8: When I sit in darkness, the Lord is my light. Now light may be in a subject in two ways: first, by way of an abiding form, as material light is in the sun, and in fire; second, by way of a passion, or passing impression, as light is in the air. Now the prophetic light is not in the prophet’s intellect by way of an abiding form, else a prophet would always be able to prophesy, which is clearly false. For Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): Sometimes the spirit of prophecy is lacking to the prophet, nor is it always within the call of his mind, yet so that in its absence he knows that its presence is due to a gift. Hence Eliseus said of the Sunamite woman (4 Kgs 4:27):

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Prophecy

hunc agnoscant ex dono habere cum habent. Unde Eliseus dixit de muliere Sunamite, IV Reg., anima eius in amaritudine est, et dominus celavit a me et non indicavit mihi. Et huius ratio est quia lumen intellectuale in aliquo existens per modum formae permanentis et perfectae, perficit intellectum principaliter ad cognoscendum principium eorum quae per illud lumen manifestantur, sicut per lumen intellectus agentis praecipue intellectus cognoscit prima principia omnium eorum quae naturaliter cognoscuntur. Principium autem eorum quae ad supernaturalem cognitionem pertinent, quae per prophetiam manifestantur, est ipse Deus, qui per essentiam a prophetis non videtur. Videtur autem a beatis in patria, in quibus huiusmodi lumen inest per modum cuiusdam formae permanentis et perfectae, secundum illud Psalmi, in lumine tuo videbimus lumen. Relinquitur ergo quod lumen propheticum insit animae prophetae per modum cuiusdam passionis vel impressionis transeuntis. Et hoc significatur Exod. XXXIII, cumque transibit gloria mea, ponam te in foramine petrae, et cetera. Et III Reg. XIX, dicitur ad Eliam, egredere, et sta in monte coram domino, et ecce, dominus transit, et cetera. Et inde est quod, sicut aer semper indiget nova illuminatione, ita etiam mens prophetae semper indiget nova revelatione, sicut discipulus qui nondum est adeptus principia artis, indiget ut de singulis instruatur. Unde et Isaiae l dicitur, mane erigit mihi aurem, et audiam quasi magistrum. Et hoc etiam ipse modus loquendi prophetiam designat, secundum quod dicitur quod locutus est dominus ad talem vel talem prophetam, aut quod factum est verbum domini, sive manus domini super eum. Habitus autem est forma permanens. Unde manifestum est quod prophetia, proprie loquendo, non est habitus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa divisio philosophi non comprehendit absolute omnia quae sunt in anima, sed ea quae possunt esse principia moralium actuum, qui quandoque fiunt ex passione, quandoque autem ex habitu, quandoque autem ex potentia nuda, ut patet in his qui ex iudicio rationis aliquid operantur antequam habeant habitum. Potest tamen prophetia ad passionem reduci, si tamen nomen passionis pro qualibet receptione accipiatur; prout philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intelligere pati quoddam est. Sicut enim in cognitione naturali intellectus possibilis patitur ex lumine intellectus agentis, ita etiam in cognitione prophetica intellectus humanus patitur ex illustratione divini luminis.

Q. 171, A. 2

Her soul is in anguish, and the Lord hath hid it from me, and hath not told me. The reason for this is that the intellectual light that is in a subject by way of an abiding and complete form, perfects the intellect chiefly to the effect of knowing the principle of the things manifested by that light; thus by the light of the active intellect the intellect knows chiefly the first principles of all things known naturally. Now the principle of things pertaining to supernatural knowledge, which are manifested by prophecy, is God Himself, Whom the prophets do not see in His essence, although He is seen by the blessed in heaven, in whom this light is by way of an abiding and complete form, according to Ps. 35:10, In Thy light we shall see light.

It follows therefore that the prophetic light is in the prophet’s soul by way of a passion or transitory impression. This is indicated Ex. 33:22: When my glory shall pass, I will set thee in a hole of the rock, etc., and 3 Kings 19:11: Go forth and stand upon the mount before the Lord; and behold the Lord passeth, etc. Hence it is that even as the air is ever in need of a fresh enlightening, so too the prophet’s mind is always in need of a fresh revelation; thus a disciple who has not yet acquired the principles of an art needs to have every detail explained to him. Wherefore it is written (Isa 1:4): In the morning He wakeneth my ear, so that I may hear Him as a master. This is also indicated by the very manner in which prophecies are uttered: thus it is stated that the Lord spake to such and such a prophet, or that the word of the Lord, or the hand of the Lord was made upon him. But a habit is an abiding form. Wherefore it is evident that, properly speaking, prophecy is not a habit.

Reply Obj. 1: This division of the Philosopher’s does not comprise absolutely all that is in the soul, but only such as can be principles of moral actions, which are done sometimes from passion, sometimes from habit, sometimes from mere power, as in the case of those who perform an action from the judgment of their reason before having the habit of that action. However, prophecy may be reduced to a passion, provided we understand passion to denote any kind of receiving, in which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that to understand is, in a way, to be passive. For just as, in natural knowledge, the possible intellect is passive to the light of the active intellect, so too in prophetic knowledge the human intellect is passive to the enlightening of the Divine light. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut in rebus corReply Obj. 2: Just as in corporeal things, when a pasporalibus, abeunte passione, remanet quaedam habilitas sion ceases, there remains a certain aptitude to a repetition ad hoc quod iterum patiatur, sicut lignum semel inflam- of the passion—thus wood once ignited is more easily igmatum facilius iterum inflammatur; ita etiam in intel- nited again, so too in the prophet’s intellect, after the actual lectu prophetae, cessante actuali illustratione, remanet enlightenment has ceased, there remains an aptitude to be

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Q. 171, A. 3

Gratuitous Graces

quaedam habilitas ad hoc quod facilius iterato illustretur. Sicut etiam mens semel ad devotionem excitata, facilius postmodum ad devotionem pristinam revocatur, propter quod Augustinus, in libro de orando Deum, dicit esse necessarias crebras orationes, ne concepta devotio totaliter exstinguatur. Potest tamen dici quod aliquis dicitur propheta etiam cessante actuali prophetica illustratione, ex deputatione divina, secundum illud Ierem. I, et prophetam in gentibus dedi te. Ad tertium dicendum quod omne donum gratiae hominem elevat ad aliquid quod est supra naturam humanam. Quod quidem potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad substantiam actus, sicut miracula facere, et cognoscere incerta et occulta divinae sapientiae. Et ad hos actus non datur homini donum gratiae habituale. Alio modo est aliquid supra naturam humanam quantum ad modum actus, non autem quantum ad substantiam ipsius, sicut diligere Deum, et cognoscere eum in speculo creaturarum. Et ad hoc datur donum gratiae habituale.

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enlightened anew —thus when the mind has once been aroused to devotion, it is more easily recalled to its former devotion. Hence Augustine says (De orando Deum. Ep. cxxx, 9) that our prayers need to be frequent, lest devotion be extinguished as soon as it is kindled. We might, however, reply that a person is called a prophet, even while his prophetic enlightenment ceases to be actual, on account of his being deputed by God, according to Jer. 1:5, And I made thee a prophet unto the nations. Reply Obj. 3: Every gift of grace raises man to something above human nature, and this may happen in two ways. First, as to the substance of the act—for instance, the working of miracles, and the knowledge of the uncertain and hidden things of Divine wisdom—and for such acts man is not granted a habitual gift of grace. Second, a thing is above human nature as to the mode but not the substance of the act—for instance to love God and to know Him in the mirror of His creatures—and for this a habitual gift of grace is bestowed.

Article 3 Whether prophecy is only about future contingencies? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod prophetia sit solum futurorum contingentium. Dicit enim Cassiodorus quod prophetia est inspiratio vel revelatio divina rerum eventus immobili veritate denuntians. Sed eventus pertinet ad contingentia futura. Ergo de solis contingentibus futuris fit revelatio prophetica. Praeterea, gratia prophetiae dividitur contra sapientiam et fidem quae sunt de divinis; et discretionem spirituum, quae est de spiritibus creatis; et scientiam, quae est de rebus humanis; ut patet I ad Cor. XII. Habitus autem et actus distinguuntur secundum obiecta, ut patet per ea quae supra dicta sunt. Ergo videtur quod de nullo pertinente ad aliquod horum sit prophetia. Relinquitur ergo quod sit solum de futuris contingentibus.

Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is only about future contingencies. For Cassiodorus says that prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue of things with unchangeable truth. Now issues pertain to future contingencies. Therefore the prophetic revelation is about future contingencies alone. Obj. 2: Further, according to 1 Cor. 12, the grace of prophecy is differentiated from wisdom and faith, which are about Divine things; and from the discernment of spirits, which is about created spirits; and from knowledge, which is about human things. Now habits and acts are differentiated by their objects, as stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Therefore it seems that the object of prophecy is not connected with any of the above. Therefore it follows that it is about future contingencies alone. Praeterea, diversitas obiecti causat diversitatem Obj. 3: Further, difference of object causes difference of speciei, ut ex supra dictis patet. Si ergo prophetia quae- species, as stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Therefore, if one dam sit de futuris contingentibus, quaedam autem de prophecy is about future contingencies, and another about quibusdam aliis rebus, videtur sequi quod non sit eadem other things, it would seem to follow that these are different species prophetiae. species of prophecy. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, super EzeOn the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) ch., quod prophetia quaedam est de futuro, sicut id quod that some prophecies are about the future, for instance dicitur Isaiae VII, ecce, virgo concipiet et pariet filium; (Isa 7:14), ‘Behold a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son’; quaedam de praeterito, sicut id quod dicitur Gen. I, in some are about the past, as (Gen 1:1), ‘In the beginning God principio creavit Deus caelum et terram; quaedam de created heaven and earth’; some are about the present, as praesenti, sicut id quod dicitur I ad Cor. XIV, si omnes (1 Cor 14:24, 25), If all prophesy, and there come in one that

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prophetent, intret autem quis infidelis, occulta cordis eius manifesta fiunt. Non ergo est prophetia solum de contingentibus futuris. Respondeo dicendum quod manifestatio quae fit per aliquod lumen, ad omnia illa se extendere potest quae illi lumini subiiciuntur, sicut visio corporalis se extendit ad omnes colores, et cognitio naturalis animae se extendit ad omnia illa quae subduntur lumini intellectus agentis. Cognitio autem prophetica est per lumen divinum, quo possunt omnia cognosci, tam divina quam humana, tam spiritualia quam corporalia. Et ideo revelatio prophetica ad omnia huiusmodi se extendit. Sicut de his quae pertinent ad Dei excellentiam et Angelorum, spirituum ministerio revelatio prophetica facta est, ut Isaiae VI, ubi dicitur, vidi dominum sedentem super solium excelsum et elevatum. Eius etiam prophetia continet ea quae pertinent ad corpora naturalia, secundum illud Isaiae XL, quis mensus est pugillo aquas, et cetera? Continet etiam ea quae ad mores hominum pertinent, secundum illud Isaiae LVIII, frange esurienti panem tuum, et cetera. Continet etiam ea quae pertinent ad futuros eventus, secundum illud Isaiae XLVII, venient tibi subito haec duo in die una, sterilitas et viduitas. Considerandum tamen quod, quia prophetia est de his quae procul a nostra cognitione sunt, tanto aliqua magis proprie ad prophetiam pertinent, quanto longius a cognitione humana existunt. Horum autem est triplex gradus. Quorum unus est eorum quae sunt procul a cognitione huius hominis, sive secundum sensum sive secundum intellectum, non autem a cognitione omnium hominum. Sicut sensu cognoscit aliquis homo quae sunt sibi praesentia secundum locum, quae tamen alius humano sensu, utpote sibi absentia, non cognoscit, et sic Eliseus prophetice cognovit quae Giezi, discipulus eius, in absentia fecerat, ut habetur IV Reg. V. Et similiter cogitationes cordis unius alteri prophetice manifestantur, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XIV. Et per hunc modum etiam ea quae unus scit demonstrative, alii possunt prophetice revelari. Secundus autem gradus est eorum quae excedunt universaliter cognitionem omnium hominum, non quia secundum se non sint cognoscibilia, sed propter defectum cognitionis humanae, sicut mysterium Trinitatis. Quod revelatum est per Seraphim dicentia, sanctus, sanctus, sanctus, etc., ut habetur Isaiae VI. Ultimus autem gradus est eorum quae sunt procul ab omnium hominum cognitione quia in seipsis non sunt cognoscibilia, ut contingentia futura, quorum veritas non est determinata. Et quia quod est universaliter et secundum se, potius est eo quod est particulariter et per aliud; ideo ad prophetiam propriissime pertinet revelatio eventuum futurorum, unde et nomen prophetiae sumi videtur. Unde Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod, cum ideo prophetia dicta sit quod futura praedicat, quan-

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believeth not . . . the secrets of his heart are made manifest. Therefore prophecy is not about future contingencies alone. I answer that, A manifestation made by means of a certain light can extend to all those things that are subject to that light: thus the body’s sight extends to all colors, and the soul’s natural knowledge extends to whatever is subject to the light of the active intellect. Now prophetic knowledge comes through a Divine light, whereby it is possible to know all things both Divine and human, both spiritual and corporeal; and consequently the prophetic revelation extends to them all. Thus by the ministry of spirits a prophetic revelation concerning the perfections of God and the angels was made to Isa. 6:1, where it is written, I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated. Moreover his prophecy contains matters referring to natural bodies, according to the words of Isa. 40:12, Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of His hand, etc. It also contains matters relating to human conduct, according to Isa. 58:1, Deal thy bread to the hungry, etc.; and besides this it contains things pertaining to future events, according to Isa. 47:9, Two things shall come upon thee suddenly in one day, barrenness and widowhood. Since, however, prophecy is about things remote from our knowledge, it must be observed that the more remote things are from our knowledge the more pertinent they are to prophecy. Of such things there are three degrees. One degree comprises things remote from the knowledge, either sensitive or intellective, of some particular man, but not from the knowledge of all men; thus a particular man knows by sense things present to him locally, which another man does not know by human sense, since they are removed from him. Thus Eliseus knew prophetically what his disciple Giezi had done in his absence (4 Kgs 5:26), and in like manner the secret thoughts of one man are manifested prophetically to another, according to 1 Cor. 14:25; and again in this way what one man knows by demonstration may be revealed to another prophetically. The second degree comprises those things which surpass the knowledge of all men without exception, not that they are in themselves unknowable, but on account of a defect in human knowledge; such as the mystery of the Trinity, which was revealed by the Seraphim saying: Holy, Holy, Holy, etc. (Isa 6:3). The last degree comprises things remote from the knowledge of all men, through being in themselves unknowable; such are future contingencies, the truth of which is indeterminate. And since that which is predicated universally and by its very nature, takes precedence of that which is predicated in a limited and relative sense, it follows that revelation of future events belongs most properly to prophecy, and from this prophecy apparently takes its name. Hence Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): And since

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do de praeterito vel praesenti loquitur, rationem sui nominis amittit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prophetia ibi definitur secundum id quod proprie significatur nomine prophetiae. Et per hunc etiam modum prophetia dividitur contra alias gratias gratis datas. Unde patet responsio ad secundum. Quamvis possit dici quod omnia quae sub prophetia cadunt, conveniunt in hac ratione quod non sunt ab homine cognoscibilia nisi per revelationem divinam. Ea vero quae pertinent ad sapientiam et scientiam et interpretationem sermonum, possunt naturali ratione ab homine cognosci, sed altiori modo manifestantur per illustrationem divini luminis. Fides autem etsi sit de invisibilibus homini, tamen ad ipsam non pertinet eorum cognitio quae creduntur, sed quod homo per certitudinem assentiat his quae sunt ab aliis cognita. Ad tertium dicendum quod formale in cognitione prophetica est lumen divinum, a cuius unitate prophetia habet unitatem speciei, licet sint diversa quae per lumen divinum prophetice manifestantur.

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a prophet is so called because he foretells the future, his name loses its significance when he speaks of the past or present. Reply Obj. 1: Prophecy is there defined according to its proper signification; and it is in this sense that it is differentiated from the other gratuitous graces. Reply Obj. 2: This is evident from what has just been said. We might also reply that all those things that are the matter of prophecy have the common aspect of being unknowable to man except by Divine revelation; whereas those that are the matter of wisdom, knowledge, and the interpretation of speeches, can be known by man through natural reason, but are manifested in a higher way through the enlightening of the Divine light. As to faith, although it is about things invisible to man, it is not concerned with the knowledge of the things believed, but with a man’s certitude of assent to things known by others. Reply Obj. 3: The formal element in prophetic knowledge is the Divine light, which being one, gives unity of species to prophecy, although the things prophetically manifested by the Divine light are diverse.

Article 4 Whether by the divine revelation a prophet knows all that can be known prophetically? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod propheta per divinam inspirationem cognoscat omnia quae possunt prophetice cognosci. Dicitur enim Amos III, non faciet dominus Deus verbum, nisi revelaverit secretum suum ad servos suos prophetas. Sed omnia quae prophetice revelantur, sunt verba divinitus facta. Nihil ergo eorum est quod non reveletur prophetae. Praeterea, Dei perfecta sunt opera, ut dicitur Deut. XXXII. Sed prophetia est divina revelatio, ut dictum est. Ergo est perfecta. Quod non esset nisi omnia prophetabilia prophetae revelarentur, quia perfectum est cui nihil deest, ut dicitur in III Physic. Ergo prophetae omnia prophetabilia revelantur.

Objection 1: It would seem that by the Divine revelation a prophet knows all that can be known prophetically. For it is written (Amos 3:7): The Lord God doth nothing without revealing His secret to His servants the prophets. Now whatever is revealed prophetically is something done by God. Therefore there is not one of them but what is revealed to the prophet. Obj. 2: Further, God’s works are perfect (Deut 32:4). Now prophecy is a Divine revelation, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore it is perfect; and this would not be so unless all possible matters of prophecy were revealed prophetically, since the perfect is that which lacks nothing (Phys. iii, 6). Therefore all possible matters of prophecy are revealed to the prophet. Praeterea, lumen divinum, quod causat propheObj. 3: Further, the Divine light which causes prophecy tiam, est potentius quam lumen naturalis rationis, ex is more powerful than the light of natural reason which is quo causatur humana scientia. Sed homo qui habet ali- the cause of human science. Now a man who has acquired quam scientiam, cognoscit omnia quae ad illam scien- a science knows whatever pertains to that science; thus a tiam pertinent, sicut grammaticus cognoscit omnia grammarian knows all matters of grammar. Therefore it grammaticalia. Ergo videtur quod propheta cognoscat would seem that a prophet knows all matters of prophecy.

omnia prophetabilia. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod aliquando spiritus prophetiae ex praesenti tangit animum prophetantis, et ex futuro nequaquam tangit, aliquando autem ex praesenti non tangit, et ex futuro tangit. Non ergo propheta cognoscit omnia prophetabilia.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that sometimes the spirit of prophecy indicates the present to the prophet’s mind and nowise the future; and sometimes it points not to the present but to the future. Therefore the prophet does not know all matters of prophecy.

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Respondeo dicendum quod diversa non est necesse esse simul nisi propter aliquid unum in quo connectuntur et a quo dependent, sicut supra habitum est quod virtutes omnes necesse est esse simul propter prudentiam vel caritatem. Omnia autem quae per aliquod principium cognoscuntur, connectuntur in illo principio et ab eo dependent. Et ideo qui cognoscit perfecte principium secundum totam eius virtutem, simul cognoscit omnia quae per illud principium cognoscuntur. Ignorato autem communi principio vel communiter apprehenso, nulla necessitas est simul omnia cognoscendi, sed unumquodque eorum per se oportet manifestari, et per consequens aliqua eorum possunt cognosci, et alia non cognosci. Principium autem eorum quae divino lumine prophetice manifestantur, est ipsa veritas prima, quam prophetae in seipsa non vident. Et ideo non oportet quod omnia prophetabilia cognoscant, sed quilibet eorum cognoscit ex eis aliqua, secundum specialem revelationem huius vel illius rei. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus omnia quae sunt necessaria ad instructionem fidelis populi, revelat prophetis, non tamen omnia omnibus, sed quaedam uni, quaedam alii. Ad secundum dicendum quod prophetia est sicut quiddam imperfectum in genere divinae revelationis, unde dicitur I ad Cor. XIII, quod prophetiae evacuabuntur, et quod ex parte prophetamus, idest imperfecte. Perfectio autem divinae revelationis erit in patria, unde subditur, cum venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est. Unde non oportet quod propheticae revelationi nihil desit, sed quod nihil desit eorum ad quae prophetia ordinatur. Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui habet aliquam scientiam, cognoscit principia illius scientiae, ex quibus omnia quae sunt illius scientiae dependent. Et ideo qui perfecte habet habitum alicuius scientiae, scit omnia quae ad illam scientiam pertinent. Sed per prophetiam non cognoscitur in seipso principium propheticalium cognitionum quod est Deus. Unde non est similis ratio.

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I answer that, Things which differ from one another need not exist simultaneously, save by reason of some one thing in which they are connected and on which they depend: thus it has been stated above (I-II, Q. 65, AA. 1, 2) that all the virtues must needs exist simultaneously on account of prudence and charity. Now all the things that are known through some principle are connected in that principle and depend thereon. Hence he who knows a principle perfectly, as regards all to which its virtue extends, knows at the same time all that can be known through that principle; whereas if the common principle is unknown, or known only in a general way, it does not follow that one knows all those things at the same time, but each of them has to be manifested by itself, so that consequently some of them may be known, and some not. Now the principle of those things that are prophetically manifested by the Divine light is the first truth, which the prophets do not see in itself. Wherefore there is no need for their knowing all possible matters of prophecy; but each one knows some of them according to the special revelation of this or that matter. Reply Obj. 1: The Lord reveals to the prophets all things that are necessary for the instruction of the faithful; yet not all to every one, but some to one, and some to another. Reply Obj. 2: Prophecy is by way of being something imperfect in the genus of Divine revelation: hence it is written (1 Cor 13:8) that prophecies shall be made void, and that we prophesy in part, i.e., imperfectly. The Divine revelation will be brought to its perfection in heaven; wherefore the same text continues (1 Cor 113:10): When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away. Consequently it does not follow that nothing is lacking to prophetic revelation, but that it lacks none of those things to which prophecy is directed. Reply Obj. 3: He who has a science knows the principles of that science, whence whatever is pertinent to that science depends; wherefore to have the habit of a science perfectly, is to know whatever is pertinent to that science. But God Who is the principle of prophetic knowledge is not known in Himself through prophecy; wherefore the comparison fails.

Article 5 Whether the prophet always distinguishes what he says by his own spirit from what he says by the prophetic spirit? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod proObjection 1: It would seem that the prophet always pheta discernat semper quid dicat per spiritum pro- distinguishes what he says by his own spirit from what prium, et quid per spiritum prophetiae. Dicit enim he says by the prophetic spirit. For Augustine states (ConAugustinus, in VI Confess., quod mater sua dicebat di- fess. vi, 13) that his mother said she could, through a cer-

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scernere se, nescio quo sapore, quem verbis explicare non poterat, quid interesset inter Deum revelantem et inter animam suam somniantem. Sed prophetia est revelatio divina, ut dictum est. Ergo propheta semper discernit id quod dicit per spiritum prophetiae, ab eo quod loquitur spiritu proprio. Praeterea, Deus non praecipit aliquid impossibile, sicut Hieronymus dicit. Praecipitur autem prophetis, Ierem. XXIII, propheta qui habet somnium, narret somnium, et qui habet sermonem meum, loquatur sermonem meum vere. Ergo propheta potest discernere quid habeat per spiritum prophetiae, ab eo quod aliter videt. Praeterea, maior est certitudo quae est per divinum lumen quam quae est per lumen rationis naturalis. Sed per lumen rationis naturalis ille qui habet scientiam, pro certo scit se habere. Ergo ille qui habet prophetiam per lumen divinum, multo magis certus est se habere. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., sciendum est quod aliquando prophetae sancti, dum consuluntur, ex magno usu prophetandi quaedam ex suo spiritu proferunt, et se haec ex prophetiae spiritu dicere suspicantur. Respondeo dicendum quod mens prophetae dupliciter a Deo instruitur, uno modo, per expressam revelationem; alio modo, per quendam instinctum, quem interdum etiam nescientes humanae mentes patiuntur, ut Augustinus dicit, II super Gen. ad Litt. De his ergo quae expresse per spiritum prophetiae propheta, cognoscit, maximam certitudinem habet, et pro certo habet quod haec sibi sunt divinitus revelata. Unde dicitur Ierem. XXVI, in veritate misit me dominus ad vos, ut loquerer in aures vestras omnia verba haec. Alioquin, si de hoc ipse certitudinem non haberet, fides, quae dictis prophetarum innititur, certa non esset. Et signum propheticae certitudinis accipere possumus ex hoc quod Abraham, admonitus in prophetica visione, se praeparavit ad filium unigenitum immolandum, quod nullatenus fecisset nisi de divina revelatione fuisset certissimus. Sed ad ea quae cognoscit per instinctum, aliquando sic se habet ut non plene discernere possit utrum hoc cogitaverit aliquo divino instinctu, vel per spiritum proprium. Non autem omnia quae cognoscimus divino instinctu, sub certitudine prophetica nobis manifestantur, talis enim instinctus est quiddam imperfectum in genere prophetiae. Et hoc modo intelligendum est verbum Gregorii. Ne tamen ex hoc error possit accidere per spiritum sanctum citius correcti, ab eo quae vera sunt audiunt, et semetipsos, quia falsa dixerint, reprehendunt, ut ibidem Gregorius subdit.

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tain feeling, which in words she could not express, discern betwixt Divine revelations, and the dreams of her own soul. Now prophecy is a Divine revelation, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore the prophet always distinguishes what he says by the spirit of prophecy, from what he says by his own spirit. Obj. 2: Further, God commands nothing impossible, as Jerome says. Now the prophets were commanded (Jer 23:28): The prophet that hath a dream, let him tell a dream; and he that hath My word, let him speak My word with truth. Therefore the prophet can distinguish what he has through the spirit of prophecy from what he sees otherwise. Obj. 3: Further, the certitude resulting from a Divine light is greater than that which results from the light of natural reason. Now he that has science, by the light of natural reason knows for certain that he has it. Therefore he that has prophecy by a Divine light is much more certain that he has it. On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): It must be observed that sometimes the holy prophets, when consulted, utter certain things by their own spirit, through being much accustomed to prophesying, and think they are speaking by the prophetic spirit. I answer that, The prophet’s mind is instructed by God in two ways: in one way by an express revelation, in another way by a most mysterious instinct to which the human mind is subjected without knowing it, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. ii, 17). Accordingly the prophet has the greatest certitude about those things which he knows by an express revelation, and he has it for certain that they are revealed to him by God; wherefore it is written (Jer 26:15): In truth the Lord sent me to you, to speak all these words in your hearing. Else, were he not certain about this, the faith which relies on the utterances of the prophet would not be certain. A sign of the prophet’s certitude may be gathered from the fact that Abraham being admonished in a prophetic vision, prepared to sacrifice his only-begotten son, which he nowise would have done had he not been most certain of the Divine revelation. On the other hand, his position with regard to the things he knows by instinct is sometimes such that he is unable to distinguish fully whether his thoughts are conceived of Divine instinct or of his own spirit. And those things which we know by Divine instinct are not all manifested with prophetic certitude, for this instinct is something imperfect in the genus of prophecy. It is thus that we are to understand the saying of Gregory. Lest, however, this should lead to error, they are very soon set aright by the Holy Spirit, and from Him they hear the truth, so that they reproach themselves for having said what was untrue, as Gregory adds (Hom. i super Ezech.).

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Primae autem rationes procedunt quantum ad ea The arguments set down in the first place consider quae prophetico spiritu revelantur. Unde patet responsio the revelation that is made by the prophetic spirit; wheread omnia obiecta. fore the answer to all the objections is clear.

Article 6 Whether things known or declared prophetically can be false? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae prophetice cognoscuntur vel annuntiantur, possint esse falsa. Prophetia enim est de futuris contingentibus, ut dictum est, sed futura contingentia possunt non evenire, alioquin ex necessitate contingerent. Ergo prophetiae potest subesse falsum. Praeterea, Isaias prophetice praenuntiavit Ezechiae dicens, dispone domui tuae, quia morieris tu, et non vives, et tamen additi sunt vitae eius postea quindecim anni, ut habetur IV Reg. XX, et Isaiae XXXVIII. Similiter etiam Ierem. XVIII, dominus dicit, repente loquar adversum gentem et adversum regnum, ut eradicem et destruam et disperdam illud. Si poenitentiam egerit gens illa a malo suo quod locutus sum adversus eam, agam et ego poenitentiam super malo quod cogitavi ut facerem ei. Et hoc apparet per exemplum Ninivitarum, secundum illud Ionae III, misertus est dominus super malitiam quam dixit ut faceret eis, et non fecit. Ergo prophetiae potest subesse falsum. Praeterea, omnis conditionalis cuius antecedens est necessarium absolute, consequens est necessarium absolute, quia ita se habet consequens in conditionali ad antecedens, sicut conclusio ad praemissas in syllogismo; ex necessariis autem nunquam contingit syllogizare nisi necessarium, ut probatur in I posteriorum. Sed si prophetiae non potest subesse falsum, oportet hanc conditionalem esse veram, si aliquid est prophetatum, erit. Huius autem conditionalis antecedens est necessarium absolute, cum sit de praeterito. Ergo et consequens erit necessarium absolute. Quod est inconveniens, quia sic prophetia non esset contingentium. Falsum est ergo quod prophetiae non possit subesse falsum.

Objection 1: It would seem that things known or declared prophetically can be false. For prophecy is about future contingencies, as stated above (A. 3). Now future contingencies may possibly not happen; else they would happen of necessity. Therefore the matter of prophecy can be false. Obj. 2: Further, Isaias prophesied to Ezechias saying (Isa 38:1): Take order with thy house, for thou shalt surely die, and shalt not live, and yet fifteen years were added to his life (4 Kgs 20:6). Again the Lord said (Jer 18:7, 8): I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do them. This is instanced in the example of the Ninevites, according to John 3:10: The Lord had mercy with regard to the evil which He had said that He would do to them, and He did it not. Therefore the matter of prophecy can be false.

Obj. 3: Further, in a conditional proposition, whenever the antecedent is absolutely necessary, the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the consequent of a conditional proposition stands in the same relation to the antecedent, as the conclusion to the premises in a syllogism, and a syllogism whose premises are necessary always leads to a necessary conclusion, as we find proved in I Poster. 6. But if the matter of a prophecy cannot be false, the following conditional proposition must needs be true: If a thing has been prophesied, it will be. Now the antecedent of this conditional proposition is absolutely necessary, since it is about the past. Therefore the consequent is also necessary absolutely; yet this is unfitting, for then prophecy would not be about contingencies. Therefore it is untrue that the matter of prophecy cannot be false. Sed contra est quod Cassiodorus dicit, quod proOn the contrary, Cassiodorus says that prophecy phetia est inspiratio vel revelatio divina, rerum eventus is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue immobili veritate denuntians. Non autem esset immobilis of things with invariable truth. Now the truth of prophecy veritas prophetiae si posset ei falsum subesse. Ergo non would not be invariable, if its matter could be false. Therepotest ei subesse falsum. fore nothing false can come under prophecy. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, I answer that, As may be gathered from what has prophetia est quaedam cognitio intellectui prophetae been said (AA. 1, 3, 5), prophecy is a kind of knowledge impressa ex revelatione divina per modum cuiusdam impressed under the form of teaching on the prophet’s indoctrinae. Veritas autem eadem est cognitionis in disci- tellect, by Divine revelation. Now the truth of knowledge pulo et in docente, quia cognitio addiscentis est simili- is the same in disciple and teacher since the knowledge of

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tudo cognitionis docentis; sicut et in rebus naturalibus forma generati est similitudo quaedam formae generantis. Et per hunc etiam modum Hieronymus dicit quod prophetia est quoddam signum divinae praescientiae. Oportet igitur eandem esse veritatem propheticae cognitionis et enuntiationis quae est cognitionis divinae, cui impossibile est subesse falsum, ut in primo habitum est. Unde prophetiae non potest subesse falsum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, certitudo divinae praescientiae non excludit contingentiam singularium futurorum, quia fertur in ea secundum quod sunt praesentia et iam determinata ad unum. Et ideo etiam prophetia, quae est divinae praescientiae similitudo impressa vel signum, sua immobili veritate futurorum contingentiam non excludit. Ad secundum dicendum quod divina praescientia respicit futura secundum duo, scilicet secundum quod sunt in seipsis, inquantum scilicet ipsa praesentialiter intuetur; et secundum quod sunt in suis causis, inquantum scilicet videt ordinem causarum ad effectus. Et quamvis contingentia futura, prout sunt in seipsis, sint determinata ad unum; tamen prout sunt in suis causis, non sunt determinata, quin possint aliter evenire. Et quamvis ista duplex cognitio semper in intellectu divino coniungatur, non tamen semper coniungitur in revelatione prophetica, quia impressio agentis non semper adaequat eius virtutem. Unde quandoque revelatio prophetica est impressa quaedam similitudo divinae praescientiae prout inspicit ipsa futura contingentia in seipsis. Et talia sic eveniunt sicut prophetantur, sicut illud Isaiae VII, ecce, virgo concipiet. Quandoque vero prophetica revelatio est impressa similitudo divinae praescientiae prout cognoscit ordinem causarum ad effectus. Et tunc quandoque aliter evenit quam prophetetur. Nec tamen prophetiae subest falsum, nam sensus prophetiae est quod inferiorum causarum dispositio, sive naturalium sive humanorum actuum, hoc habet ut talis effectus eveniat. Et secundum hoc intelligitur verbum Isaiae dicentis, morieris, et non vives, idest, dispositio corporis tui ad mortem ordinatur; et quod dicitur Ionae III, adhuc quadraginta dies, et Ninive subvertetur, idest, hoc merita eius exigunt, ut subvertatur. Dicitur autem Deus poenitere metaphorice, inquantum ad modum poenitentis se habet, prout scilicet mutat sententiam, etsi non mutet consilium.

Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia eadem est veritas prophetiae et divinae praescientiae, ut dictum est, hoc modo ista conditionalis est vera, si aliquid est prophetatum, erit, sicut ista, si aliquid est praescitum, erit. In utraque enim antecedens est impossibile non esse. Unde et consequens est necessarium, non secundum quod est

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the disciple is a likeness of the knowledge of the teacher, even as in natural things the form of the thing generated is a likeness of the form of the generator. Jerome speaks in this sense when he says that prophecy is the seal of the Divine foreknowledge. Consequently the same truth must needs be in prophetic knowledge and utterances, as in the Divine knowledge, under which nothing false can possibly come, as stated in the First Part (Q. 16, A. 8). Therefore nothing false can come under prophecy. Reply Obj. 1: As stated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 13) the certitude of the Divine foreknowledge does not exclude the contingency of future singular events, because that knowledge regards the future as present and already determinate to one thing. Wherefore prophecy also, which is an impressed likeness or seal of the Divine foreknowledge, does not by its unchangeable truth exclude the contingency of future things. Reply Obj. 2: The Divine foreknowledge regards future things in two ways. First, as they are in themselves, in so far, to wit, as it sees them in their presentiality: second, as in their causes, inasmuch as it sees the order of causes in relation to their effects. And though future contingencies, considered as in themselves, are determinate to one thing, yet, considered as in their causes, they are not so determined but that they can happen otherwise. Again, though this twofold knowledge is always united in the Divine intellect, it is not always united in the prophetic revelation, because an imprint made by an active cause is not always on a par with the virtue of that cause. Hence sometimes the prophetic revelation is an imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge, insofar as the latter regards future contingencies in themselves: and such things happen in the same way as foretold, for example this saying of Isa. 7:14: Behold a virgin shall conceive. Sometimes, however, the prophetic revelation is an imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge as knowing the order of causes to effects; and then at times the event is otherwise than foretold. Yet the prophecy does not cover a falsehood, for the meaning of the prophecy is that inferior causes, whether they be natural causes or human acts, are so disposed as to lead to such a result. In this way we are to understand the saying of Isa. 38:1: Thou shalt die, and not live; in other words, The disposition of thy body has a tendency to death: and the saying of Jonah 3:4, Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be destroyed, that is to say, Its merits demand that it should be destroyed. God is said to repent, metaphorically, inasmuch as He bears Himself after the manner of one who repents, by changing His sentence, although He changes not His counsel. Reply Obj. 3: Since the same truth of prophecy is the same as the truth of Divine foreknowledge, as stated above, the conditional proposition: If this was prophesied, it will be, is true in the same way as the proposition: If this was foreknown, it will be: for in both cases it is impossible for the antecedent not to be. Hence the consequent is necessary, con-

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futurum respectu nostri, sed ut consideratur in suo prae- sidered, not as something future in our regard, but as being senti, prout subiicitur praescientiae divinae, ut in primo present to the Divine foreknowledge, as stated in the First dictum est. Part (Q. 14, A. 13, ad 2).

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Question 172 The Cause of Prophecy Deinde considerandum est de causa prophetiae. Et We must now consider the cause of prophecy. Under circa hoc quaeruntur sex. this head there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum prophetia sit naturalis. (1) Whether prophecy is natural? Secundo, utrum sit a Deo mediantibus Angelis. (2) Whether it is from God by means of the angels? Tertio, utrum ad prophetiam requiratur dispositio (3) Whether a natural disposition is requisite for naturalis. prophecy? Quarto, utrum requiratur bonitas morum. (4) Whether a good life is requisite? Quinto, utrum sit aliqua prophetia a Daemonibus. (5) Whether any prophecy is from the demons? Sexto, utrum prophetae Daemonum aliquando (6) Whether prophets of the demons ever tell what is dicant verum. true?

Article 1 Whether prophecy can be natural? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prophetia possit esse naturalis. Dicit enim Gregorius in IV Dialog., quod ipsa aliquando animarum vis sua subtilitate aliquid praevidet. Et Augustinus dicit, in XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod animae humanae, secundum quod a sensibus corporis abstrahitur competit futura praevidere. Hoc autem pertinet ad prophetiam. Ergo anima naturaliter potest assequi prophetiam. Praeterea, cognitio animae humanae magis viget in vigilando quam in dormiendo. Sed in dormiendo quidam naturaliter praevident quaedam futura, ut patet per philosophum, in libro de somno et Vigil. Ergo multo magis potest homo naturaliter futura praecognoscere. Praeterea, homo secundum suam naturam est perfectior animalibus brutis. Sed quaedam animalia bruta habent praecognitionem futurorum ad se pertinentium, sicut formicae praecognoscunt pluvias futuras, quod patet ex hoc quod ante pluviam incipiunt grana in foramen reponere; et similiter etiam pisces praecognoscunt tempestates futuras, ut perpenditur ex eorum motu, dum loca tempestuosa declinant. Ergo multo magis homines naturaliter praecognoscere possunt futura ad se pertinentia, de quibus est prophetia. Est ergo prophetia a natura. Praeterea, Prov. XXIX dicitur, cum prophetia defecerit, dissipabitur populus, et sic patet quod prophetia necessaria est ad hominum conservationem. Sed natura non deficit in necessariis. Ergo videtur quod prophetia sit a natura. Sed contra est quod dicitur II Pet. I, non enim voluntate humana allata est aliquando prophetia, sed spiri-

Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy can be natural. For Gregory says (Dial. iv, 26) that sometimes the mere strength of the soul is sufficiently cunning to foresee certain things: and Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 13) that the human soul, according as it is withdrawn from the sense of the body, is able to foresee the future. Now this pertains to prophecy. Therefore the soul can acquire prophecy naturally. Obj. 2: Further, the human soul’s knowledge is more alert while one wakes than while one sleeps. Now some, during sleep, naturally foresee the future, as the Philosopher asserts (De Somn. et Vigil. ). Much more therefore can a man naturally foreknow the future. Obj. 3: Further, man, by his nature, is more perfect than dumb animals. Yet some dumb animals have foreknowledge of future things that concern them. Thus ants foreknow the coming rains, which is evident from their gathering grain into their nest before the rain commences; and in like manner fish foreknow a coming storm, as may be gathered from their movements in avoiding places exposed to storm. Much more therefore can men foreknow the future that concerns themselves, and of such things is prophecy. Therefore prophecy comes from nature. Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Prov 29:18): When prophecy shall fail, the people shall be scattered abroad; wherefore it is evident that prophecy is necessary for the stability of the human race. Now nature does not fail in necessaries. Therefore it seems that prophecy is from nature. On the contrary, It is written (2 Pet 1:21): For prophecy came not by the will of man at any time, but the

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tu sancto inspirante, locuti sunt sancti Dei homines. Ergo holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Spirit. Therefore prophetia non est a natura, sed ex dono spiritus sancti. prophecy comes not from nature, but through the gift of the Holy Spirit. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, I answer that, As stated above (Q. 171, A. 6, ad 2) prophetica praecognitio potest esse de futuris dupliciter, prophetic foreknowledge may regard future things in two uno modo, secundum quod sunt in seipsis; alio mo- ways: in one way, as they are in themselves; in another way, do, secundum quod sunt in suis causis. Praecognoscere as they are in their causes. Now, to foreknow future things, autem futura secundum quod sunt in seipsis, est pro- as they are in themselves, is proper to the Divine intellect, to prium divini intellectus, cuius aeternitati sunt omnia Whose eternity all things are present, as stated in the First praesentia, ut in primo dictum est. Et ideo talis prae- Part (Q. 14, A. 13). Wherefore such like foreknowledge of cognitio futurorum non potest esse a natura, sed solum the future cannot come from nature, but from Divine reveex revelatione divina. Futura vero in suis causis possunt lation alone. On the other hand, future things can be forepraecognosci naturali cognitione etiam ab homine, sicut known in their causes with a natural knowledge even by medicus praecognoscit sanitatem vel mortem futuram man: thus a physician foreknows future health or death in in aliquibus causis, quarum ordinem ad tales effectus ex- certain causes, through previous experimental knowledge perimento praecognoverunt. Et talis praecognitio futu- of the order of those causes to such effects. Such like knowlrorum potest intelligi esse in homine a natura dupliciter. edge of the future may be understood to be in a man by naUno modo, sic quod statim anima, ex eo quod in seipsa ture in two ways. In one way that the soul, from that which habet, possit futura praecognoscere. Et sic sicut Augu- it holds, is able to foreknow the future, and thus Augustine stinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quidam voluerunt says (Gen ad lit. xii, 13): Some have deemed the human soul animam humanam habere quandam vim divinationis in to contain a certain power of divination. This seems to be in seipsa. Et hoc videtur esse secundum opinionem Pla- accord with the opinion of Plato, who held that our souls tonis, qui posuit quod animae habent omnium rerum have knowledge of all things by participating in the ideas; cognitionem per participationem idearum, sed ista co- but that this knowledge is obscured in them by union with gnitio obnubilatur in eis per coniunctionem corporis, the body; yet in some more, in others less, according to a in quibusdam tamen plus, in quibusdam vero minus, difference in bodily purity. According to this it might be secundum corporis puritatem diversam. Et secundum said that men, whose souls are not much obscured through hoc, posset dici quod homines habentes animas non union with the body, are able to foreknow such like fumultum obtenebratas ex corporum unione, possunt talia ture things by their own knowledge. Against this opinion futura praecognoscere secundum propriam scientiam. Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 13): How is it that the soul Contra hoc autem obiicit Augustinus, cur non semper cannot always have this power of divination, since it always potest, scilicet vim divinationis habere anima, cum sem- wishes to have it? per velit? Sed quia verius esse videtur quod anima ex sensibiliSince, however, it seems truer, according to the opinion bus cognitionem acquirat, secundum sententiam Aristo- of Aristotle, that the soul acquires knowledge from sensitelis, ut in primo dictum est; ideo melius est dicendum bles, as stated in the First Part (Q. 84, A. 6), it is better to alio modo, quod praecognitionem talium futurorum ho- have recourse to another explanation, and to hold that men mines non habent sed, acquirere possunt per viam ex- have no such foreknowledge of the future, but that they can perimentalem; in qua iuvantur per naturalem disposi- acquire it by means of experience, wherein they are helped tionem secundum quam in homine invenitur perfectio by their natural disposition, which depends on the perfecvirtutis imaginativae et claritas intelligentiae. tion of a man’s imaginative power, and the clarity of his understanding. Et tamen haec praecognitio futurorum differt a priNevertheless this latter foreknowledge of the future difma, quae habetur ex revelatione divina, dupliciter. Primo fers in two ways from the former, which comes through quidem, quia prima potest esse quorumcumque even- Divine revelation. First, because the former can be about tuum, et infallibiliter. Haec autem praecognitio quae na- any events whatever, and this infallibly; whereas the latter turaliter haberi potest, est circa quosdam effectus ad foreknowledge, which can be had naturally, is about cerquos se potest extendere experientia humana. Secundo, tain effects, to which human experience may extend. Secquia prima prophetia est secundum immobilem verita- ond, because the former prophecy is according to the untem, non autem secunda, sed potest ei subesse falsum. changeable truth, while the latter is not, and can cover a Prima autem praecognitio proprie pertinet ad prophe- falsehood. Now the former foreknowledge, and not the lattiam, non secunda, quia, sicut supra dictum est, pro- ter, properly belongs to prophecy, because, as stated above phetica cognitio est eorum quae excedunt universaliter (Q. 171, A. 3), prophetic knowledge is of things which natuhumanam cognitionem. Et ideo dicendum est quod pro- rally surpass human knowledge. Consequently we must say

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phetia simpliciter dicta non potest esse a natura, sed solum ex revelatione divina. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima, quando abstrahitur a corporalibus, aptior redditur ad percipiendum influxum spiritualium substantiarum, et etiam ad percipiendum subtiles motus qui ex impressionibus causarum naturalium in imaginatione humana relinquuntur, a quibus percipiendis anima impeditur cum fuerit circa sensibilia occupata. Et ideo Gregorius dicit quod anima quando appropinquat ad mortem, praecognoscit quaedam futura subtilitate suae naturae, prout scilicet percipit etiam modicas impressiones. Aut etiam cognoscit futura revelatione angelica. Non autem propria virtute. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., si hoc esset, tunc haberet quandocumque vellet, in sua potestate futura praecognoscere, quod patet esse falsum. Ad secundum dicendum quod praecognitio futurorum quae fit in somnis, est aut ex revelatione substantiarum spiritualium, aut ex causa corporali, ut dictum est cum de divinationibus ageretur. Utrumque autem melius potest fieri in dormientibus quam in vigilantibus, quia anima vigilantis est occupata circa exteriora sensibilia, unde minus potest percipere subtiles impressiones vel spiritualium substantiarum vel etiam causarum naturalium. Quantum tamen ad perfectionem iudicii, plus viget ratio in vigilando quam in dormiendo. Ad tertium dicendum quod bruta etiam animalia non habent praecognitionem futurorum effectuum nisi secundum quod ex suis causis praecognoscuntur, ex quibus eorum phantasiae moventur. Et magis quam hominum, quia phantasiae hominum, maxime in vigilando, disponuntur magis secundum rationem quam secundum impressionem naturalium causarum. Ratio autem facit in homine multo abundantius id quod in brutis facit impressio causarum naturalium. Et adhuc magis adiuvat hominem divina gratia prophetas inspirans. Ad quartum dicendum quod lumen propheticum se extendit etiam ad directiones humanorum actuum. Et secundum hoc, prophetia necessaria est ad populi gubernationem. Et praecipue in ordine ad cultum divinum, ad quem natura non sufficit, sed requiritur gratia.

Q. 172, A. 2

that prophecy strictly so called cannot be from nature, but only from Divine revelation. Reply Obj. 1: When the soul is withdrawn from corporeal things, it becomes more adapted to receive the influence of spiritual substances, and also is more inclined to receive the subtle motions which take place in the human imagination through the impression of natural causes, whereas it is hindered from receiving them while occupied with sensible things. Hence Gregory says (Dial. iv, 26) that the soul, at the approach of death, foresees certain future things, by reason of the subtlety of its nature, inasmuch as it is receptive even of slight impressions. Or again, it knows future things by a revelation of the angels; but not by its own power, because according to Augustine (Gen ad lit. xii, 13), if this were so, it would be able to foreknow the future whenever it willed, which is clearly false. Reply Obj. 2: Knowledge of the future by means of dreams, comes either from the revelation of spiritual substances, or from a corporeal cause, as stated above (Q. 95, A. 6), when we were treating of divination. Now both these causes are more applicable to a person while asleep than while awake, because, while awake, the soul is occupied with external sensibles, so that it is less receptive of the subtle impressions either of spiritual substances, or even of natural causes; although as regards the perfection of judgment, the reason is more alert in waking than in sleeping. Reply Obj. 3: Even dumb animals have no foreknowledge of future events, except as these are foreknown in their causes, whereby their imagination is moved more than man’s, because man’s imagination, especially in waking, is more disposed according to reason than according to the impression of natural causes. Yet reason effects much more amply in man, that which the impression of natural causes effects in dumb animals; and Divine grace by inspiring the prophecy assists man still more. Reply Obj. 4: The prophetic light extends even to the direction of human acts; and in this way prophecy is requisite for the government of a people, especially in relation to Divine worship; since for this nature is not sufficient, and grace is necessary.

Article 2 Whether prophetic revelation comes through the angels? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Objection 1: It would seem that prophetic revelaprophetica revelatio non fiat per Angelos. Dicitur enim tion does not come through the angels. For it is written Sap. VII, quod sapientia Dei in animas sanctas se trans- (Wis 7:27) that Divine wisdom conveyeth herself into holy fert, et amicos Dei et prophetas constituit. Sed amicos Dei souls, and maketh the friends of God, and the prophets. Now

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constituit immediate. Ergo etiam prophetas facit imme- wisdom makes the friends of God immediately. Therefore it diate, non mediantibus Angelis. also makes the prophets immediately, and not through the medium of the angels. Praeterea, prophetia ponitur inter gratias gratis Obj. 2: Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gradatas. Sed gratiae gratis datae sunt a spiritu sancto, se- tuitous graces. But the gratuitous graces are from the Holy cundum illud, divisiones gratiarum sunt, idem autem spi- Spirit, according to 1 Cor. 12:4, There are diversities of ritus. Non ergo prophetica revelatio fit Angelo mediante. graces, but the same Spirit. Therefore the prophetic revelation is not made by means of an angel. Praeterea, Cassiodorus dicit quod prophetia est Obj. 3: Further, Cassiodorus says that prophecy is a Didivina revelatio. Si autem fieret per Angelos, diceretur vine revelation: whereas if it were conveyed by the angels, it angelica revelatio. Non ergo prophetia fit per Angelos. would be called an angelic revelation. Therefore prophecy is not bestowed by means of the angels. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. Cael. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): Hier., divinas visiones gloriosi patres nostri adepti sunt Our glorious fathers received Divine visions by means of the per medias caelestes virtutes. Loquitur autem ibi de visio- heavenly powers; and he is speaking there of prophetic vinibus propheticis. Ergo revelatio prophetica fit Angelis sions. Therefore prophetic revelation is conveyed by means mediantibus. of the angels. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom 13:1), Rom. XIII, quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt. Habet autem Things that are of God are well ordered. Now the Divine hoc divinitatis ordo, sicut Dionysius dicit, ut infima per ordering, according to Dionysius, is such that the lowest media disponat. Angeli autem medii sunt inter Deum et things are directed by middle things. Now the angels hold a homines, utpote plus participantes de perfectione divi- middle position between God and men, in that they have a nae bonitatis quam homines. Et ideo illuminationes et greater share in the perfection of the Divine goodness than revelationes divinae a Deo ad homines per Angelos de- men have. Wherefore the Divine enlightenments and reveferuntur. Prophetica autem cognitio fit secundum illu- lations are conveyed from God to men by the angels. Now minationem et revelationem divinam. Unde manifestum prophetic knowledge is bestowed by Divine enlightenment est quod fiat per Angelos. and revelation. Therefore it is evident that it is conveyed by the angels. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caritas, secundum Reply Obj. 1: Charity which makes man a friend of quam fit homo amicus Dei, est perfectio voluntatis, in God, is a perfection of the will, in which God alone can quam solus Deus imprimere potest. Sed prophetia est form an impression; whereas prophecy is a perfection of the perfectio intellectus, in quem etiam Angelus potest im- intellect, in which an angel also can form an impression, as primere, ut in primo dictum est. Et ideo non est similis stated in the First Part (Q. 111, A. 1), wherefore the comratio de utroque. parison fails between the two. Ad secundum dicendum quod gratiae gratis datae Reply Obj. 2: The gratuitous graces are ascribed to the attribuuntur spiritui sancto sicut primo principio, qui ta- Holy Spirit as their first principle: yet He works grace of this men operatur huiusmodi gratias in hominibus mediante kind in men by means of the angels. ministerio Angelorum. Ad tertium dicendum quod operatio instrumenti Reply Obj. 3: The work of the instrument is ascribed attribuitur principali agenti, in cuius virtute instrumen- to the principal agent by whose power the instrument acts. tum agit. Et quia minister est sicut instrumentum, idcir- And since a minister is like an instrument, prophetic revco prophetica revelatio, quae fit ministerio Angelorum, elation, which is conveyed by the ministry of the angels, is dicitur esse divina. said to be Divine.

Article 3 Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad prophetiam requiratur dispositio naturalis. Prophetia enim recipitur in propheta secundum dispositionem recipientis. Quia super illud Amos I, dominus de Sion rugiet, dicit Glossa Hieronymi, naturale est ut omnes qui

Objection 1: It would seem that a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy. For prophecy is received by the prophet according to the disposition of the recipient, since a gloss of Jerome on Amos 1:2, The Lord will roar from Zion, says: Anyone who wishes to make a comparison naturally

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volunt rem rei comparare, ex eis rebus sumant comparationes quas sunt experti et in quibus sunt nutriti, verbi gratia, nautae suos inimicos ventis, damnum naufragio comparant. Sic et Amos, qui fuit pastor pecorum timorem Dei rugitui leonis assimilat. Sed quod recipitur in aliquo secundum modum recipientis, requirit naturalem dispositionem. Ergo prophetia requirit naturalem dispositionem. Praeterea, speculatio prophetiae est altior quam scientiae acquisitae. Sed indispositio naturalis impedit speculationem scientiae acquisitae, multi enim, ex indispositione naturali pertingere non possunt ad scientiarum speculamina capienda. Multo ergo magis requiritur ad contemplationem propheticam. Praeterea, indispositio naturalis magis impedit aliquem quam impedimentum accidentale. Sed per aliquid accidentale superveniens impeditur speculatio prophetiae, dicit enim Hieronymus, super Matth., quod tempore illo quo coniugales actus geruntur, praesentia spiritus sancti non dabitur, etiam si propheta esse videatur qui officio generationis obsequitur. Ergo multo magis indispositio naturalis impedit prophetiam. Et sic videtur quod bona dispositio naturalis ad prophetiam requiratur. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in homilia Pentecostes, implet scilicet Spiritus Sanctus, citharaedum puerum, et Psalmistam facit, pastorem armentorum sycomoros vellicantem, et prophetam facit. Non ergo requiritur aliqua praecedens dispositio ad prophetiam, sed dependet ex sola voluntate spiritus sancti, de quo dicitur, I ad Cor. XII, haec omnia operatur unus atque idem spiritus, dividens singulis prout vult. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, prophetia vere et simpliciter dicta est ex inspiratione divina, quae autem est ex causa naturali, non dicitur prophetia nisi secundum quid. Est autem considerandum quod, sicut Deus, quia est causa universalis in agendo, non praeexigit materiam, nec aliquam materiae dispositionem, in corporalibus effectibus, sed simul potest et materiam et dispositionem et formam inducere; ita etiam in effectibus spiritualibus non praeexigit aliquam dispositionem, sed potest simul cum effectu spirituali inducere dispositionem convenientem, qualis requireretur secundum ordinem naturae. Et ulterius posset etiam simul per creationem producere ipsum subiectum, ut scilicet animam in ipsa sui creatione disponeret ad prophetiam, et daret ei gratiam prophetalem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod indifferens est ad prophetiam quibuscumque similitudinibus res prophetica exprimatur. Et ideo hoc ex operatione divina non immutatur circa prophetam. Removetur autem divina virtute; si quid prophetiae repugnat.

Q. 172, A. 3

turns to those things of which he has experience, and among which his life is spent. For example, sailors compare their enemies to the winds, and their losses to a shipwreck. In like manner Amos, who was a shepherd, likens the fear of God to that which is inspired by the lion’s roar. Now that which is received by a thing according to the mode of the recipient requires a natural disposition. Therefore prophecy requires a natural disposition. Obj. 2: Further, the considerations of prophecy are more lofty than those of acquired science. Now natural indisposition hinders the considerations of acquired science, since many are prevented by natural indisposition from succeeding to grasp the speculations of science. Much more therefore is a natural disposition requisite for the contemplation of prophecy. Obj. 3: Further, natural indisposition is a much greater obstacle than an accidental impediment. Now the considerations of prophecy are hindered by an accidental occurrence. For Jerome says in his commentary on Matthew that at the time of the marriage act, the presence of the Holy Spirit will not be vouchsafed, even though it be a prophet that fulfils the duty of procreation. Much more therefore does a natural indisposition hinder prophecy; and thus it would seem that a good natural disposition is requisite for prophecy. On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (xxx in Ev.): He, namely the Holy Spirit, fills the boy harpist and makes him a Psalmist; He fills the herdsman plucking wild figs, and makes him a prophet. Therefore prophecy requires no previous disposition, but depends on the will alone of the Holy Spirit, of Whom it is written (1 Cor 12:2): All these things, one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as He will. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), prophecy in its true and exact sense comes from Divine inspiration; while that which comes from a natural cause is not called prophecy except in a relative sense. Now we must observe that as God Who is the universal efficient cause requires neither previous matter nor previous disposition of matter in His corporeal effects, for He is able at the same instant to bring into being matter and disposition and form, so neither does He require a previous disposition in His spiritual effects, but is able to produce both the spiritual effect and at the same time the fitting disposition as requisite according to the order of nature. More than this, He is able at the same time, by creation, to produce the subject, so as to dispose a soul for prophecy and give it the prophetic grace, at the very instant of its creation. Reply Obj. 1: It matters not to prophecy by what comparisons the thing prophesied is expressed; and so the Divine operation makes no change in a prophet in this respect. Yet if there be anything in him incompatible with prophecy, it is removed by the Divine power.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod speculatio scientiae fit ex causa naturali. Natura autem non potest operari nisi dispositione praecedente in materia. Quod non est dicendum de Deo, qui est prophetiae causa. Ad tertium dicendum quod aliqua naturalis indispositio, si non removeretur, impedire posset prophetalem revelationem, puta si aliquis esset totaliter sensu naturali destitutus. Sicut etiam impeditur aliquis ab actu prophetandi per aliquam vehementem passionem vel irae vel concupiscentiae, qualis est in coitu vel per quamcumque aliam passionem. Sed talem indispositionem naturalem removet virtus divina, quae est prophetiae causa.

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Reply Obj. 2: The considerations of science proceed from a natural cause, and nature cannot work without a previous disposition in matter. This cannot be said of God Who is the cause of prophecy. Reply Obj. 3: A natural indisposition, if not removed, might be an obstacle to prophetic revelation, for instance if a man were altogether deprived of the natural senses. In the same way a man might be hindered from the act of prophesying by some very strong passion, whether of anger, or of concupiscence as in coition, or by any other passion. But such a natural indisposition as this is removed by the Divine power, which is the cause of prophecy.

Article 4 Whether a good life is requisite for prophecy? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonitas morum requiratur ad prophetiam. Dicitur enim Sap. VII, quod sapientia Dei per nationes in animas sanctas se transfert, et amicos Dei et prophetas constituit. Sed sanctitas non potest esse sine bonitate morum et sine gratia gratum faciente. Ergo prophetia non potest esse sine bonitate morum et gratia gratum faciente. Praeterea, secreta non revelantur nisi amicis, secundum illud Ioan. XV, vos autem dixi amicos, quia omnia quaecumque audivi a patre meo, nota feci vobis. Sed prophetis Deus sua secreta revelat, ut dicitur Amos III. Ergo videtur quod prophetae sint Dei amici. Quod non potest esse sine caritate. Ergo videtur quod prophetia non possit esse sine caritate, quae non est sine gratia gratum faciente. Praeterea, Matth. VII dicitur, attendite a falsis prophetis, qui veniunt ad vos in vestimentis ovium, intrinsecus autem sunt lupi rapaces. Sed quicumque sunt sine gratia interius, videntur esse lupi rapaces. Ergo omnes sunt falsi prophetae. Nullus est ergo verus propheta nisi bonus per gratiam. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in libro de Somn. et Vigil., quod si divinatio somniorum est a Deo, inconveniens est eam immittere quibuslibet, et non optimis viris. Sed constat donum prophetiae esse a Deo. Ergo donum prophetiae non datur nisi optimis viris. Sed contra est quod Matth. VII, his qui dixerant domine nonne in nomine suo prophetavimus? Respondetur, nunquam novi vos. Novit autem dominus eos qui sunt eius, ut dicitur II ad Tim. II. Ergo prophetia potest esse in his qui non sunt Dei per gratiam. Respondeo dicendum quod bonitas morum potest attendi secundum duo, uno quidem modo, secundum interiorem eius radicem, quae est gratia gratum faciens;

Objection 1: It would seem that a good life is requisite for prophecy. For it is written (Wis 7:27) that the wisdom of God through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls, and maketh the friends of God, and prophets. Now there can be no holiness without a good life and sanctifying grace. Therefore prophecy cannot be without a good life and sanctifying grace. Obj. 2: Further, secrets are not revealed save to a friend, according to John 15:15, But I have called you friends, because all things whatsoever I have heard of My Father, I have made known to you. Now God reveals His secrets to the prophets (Amos 3:7). Therefore it would seem that the prophets are the friends of God; which is impossible without charity. Therefore seemingly prophecy cannot be without charity; and charity is impossible without sanctifying grace. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt 7:15): Beware of false prophets, who come to you in the clothing of sheep, but inwardly they are ravening wolves. Now all who are without grace are likened inwardly to a ravening wolf, and consequently all such are false prophets. Therefore no man is a true prophet except he be good by grace. Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. ) that if interpretation of dreams is from God, it is unfitting for it to be bestowed on any but the best. Now it is evident that the gift of prophecy is from God. Therefore the gift of prophecy is vouchsafed only to the best men. On the contrary, To those who had said, Lord, have we not prophesied in Thy name? this reply is made: I never knew you (Matt 7:22, 23). Now the Lord knoweth who are His (2 Tim 2:19). Therefore prophecy can be in those who are not God’s by grace. I answer that, A good life may be considered from two points of view. First, with regard to its inward root, which is sanctifying grace. Second, with regard to the in-

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alio autem modo, quantum ad interiores animae passiones et exteriores actiones. Gratia autem gratum faciens ad hoc principaliter datur ut anima hominis Deo per caritatem coniungatur, unde Augustinus dicit, in XV de Trin., nisi impertiatur cuique Spiritus Sanctus, ut eum Dei et proximi faciat amatorem, ille a sinistra non transfertur ad dexteram. Unde quidquid potest esse sine caritate, potest esse sine gratia gratum faciente et per consequens sine bonitate morum. Prophetia autem potest esse sine caritate. Quod apparet ex duobus. Primo quidem, ex actu utriusque, nam prophetia pertinet ad intellectum cuius actus praecedit actum voluntatis, quam perficit caritas. Unde apostolus, I ad Cor. XIII, prophetiam connumerat aliis ad intellectum pertinentibus quae possunt sine caritate haberi. Secundo, ex fine utriusque, datur enim prophetia ad utilitatem Ecclesiae, sicut et aliae gratiae gratis datae secundum illud apostoli, I ad Cor. XII, unicuique datur manifestatio spiritus ad utilitatem; non autem ordinatur directe ad hoc quod affectus ipsius prophetae coniungatur Deo, ad quod ordinatur caritas. Et ideo prophetia potest esse sine bonitate morum, quantum ad primam radicem huius bonitatis. Si vero consideremus bonitatem morum secundum passiones animae et actiones exteriores, secundum hoc impeditur aliquis a prophetia per morum malitiam. Nam ad prophetiam requiritur maxima mentis elevatio ad spiritualium contemplationem, quae quidem impeditur per vehementiam passionum, et per inordinatam occupationem rerum exteriorum. Unde et de filiis prophetarum legitur IV Reg. IV, quod simul habitabant cum Eliseo, quasi solitariam vitam ducentes, ne mundanis occupationibus impedirentur a dono prophetiae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod donum prophetiae aliquando datur homini et propter utilitatem aliorum, et propter propriae mentis illustrationem. Et hi sunt in quorum animas sapientia divina per gratiam gratum facientem se transferens, amicos Dei et prophetas eos constituit. Quidam vero consequuntur donum prophetiae solum ad utilitatem aliorum. Qui sunt quasi instrumenta divinae operationis. Unde Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., prophetare, vel virtutes facere et Daemonia eiicere, interdum non est eius meriti qui operatur, sed vel invocatio nominis Christi hoc agit; vel ob condemnationem eorum qui invocant, vel utilitatem eorum qui vident et audiunt, conceditur. Ad secundum dicendum quod Gregorius, exponens illud, dicit dum audita superna caelestia amamus, amata iam novimus, quia amor ipse notitia est. Omnia ergo eis nota fecerat, quia, a terrenis desideriis immutati, amoris summi facibus ardebant. Et hoc modo non revelantur semper secreta divina prophetis.

Q. 172, A. 4

ward passions of the soul and the outward actions. Now sanctifying grace is given chiefly in order that man’s soul may be united to God by charity. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18): A man is not transferred from the left side to the right, unless he receive the Holy Spirit, by Whom he is made a lover of God and of his neighbor. Hence whatever can be without charity can be without sanctifying grace, and consequently without goodness of life. Now prophecy can be without charity; and this is clear on two counts. First, on account of their respective acts: for prophecy pertains to the intellect, whose act precedes the act of the will, which power is perfected by charity. For this reason the Apostle (1 Cor 13) reckons prophecy with other things pertinent to the intellect, that can be had without charity. Second, on account of their respective ends. For prophecy like other gratuitous graces is given for the good of the Church, according to 1 Cor. 12:7, The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit; and is not directly intended to unite man’s affections to God, which is the purpose of charity. Therefore prophecy can be without a good life, as regards the first root of this goodness. If, however, we consider a good life, with regard to the passions of the soul, and external actions, from this point of view an evil life is an obstacle to prophecy. For prophecy requires the mind to be raised very high in order to contemplate spiritual things, and this is hindered by strong passions, and the inordinate pursuit of external things. Hence we read of the sons of the prophets (4 Kgs 4:38) that they dwelt together with Eliseus, leading a solitary life, as it were, lest worldly employment should be a hindrance to the gift of prophecy. Reply Obj. 1: Sometimes the gift of prophecy is given to a man both for the good of others, and in order to enlighten his own mind; and such are those whom Divine wisdom, conveying itself by sanctifying grace to their minds, maketh the friends of God, and prophets. Others, however, receive the gift of prophecy merely for the good of others. Hence Jerome commenting on Matt. 7:22, says: Sometimes prophesying, the working of miracles, and the casting out of demons are accorded not to the merit of those who do these things, but either to the invoking the name of Christ, or to the condemnation of those who invoke, and for the good of those who see and hear.

Reply Obj. 2: Gregory expounding this passage says: Since we love the lofty things of heaven as soon as we hear them, we know them as soon as we love them, for to love is to know. Accordingly He had made all things known to them, because having renounced earthly desires they were kindled by the torches of perfect love. In this way the Divine secrets are not always revealed to prophets. Ad tertium dicendum quod non omnes mali sunt Reply Obj. 3: Not all wicked men are ravening wolves, lupi rapaces, sed solum illi qui intendunt aliis nocere, but only those whose purpose is to injure others. For

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dicit enim Chrysostomus, super Matth., quod Catholici doctores, etsi fuerint peccatores, servi quidem carnis dicuntur, non tamen lupi rapaces, quia non habent propositum perdere Christianos. Et quia prophetia ordinatur ad utilitatem aliorum, manifestum est tales esse falsos prophetas, quia ad hoc non mittuntur a Deo. Ad quartum dicendum quod dona divina non semper dantur optimis simpliciter, sed quandoque illis qui sunt optimi quantum ad talis doni perceptionem. Et sic Deus donum prophetiae illis dat quibus optimum iudicat dare.

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Chrysostom says that Catholic teachers, though they be sinners, are called slaves of the flesh, but never ravening wolves, because they do not purpose the destruction of Christians. And since prophecy is directed to the good of others, it is manifest that such are false prophets, because they are not sent for this purpose by God. Reply Obj. 4: God’s gifts are not always bestowed on those who are simply the best, but sometimes are vouchsafed to those who are best as regards the receiving of this or that gift. Accordingly God grants the gift of prophecy to those whom He judges best to give it to.

Article 5 Whether any prophecy comes from the demons? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla prophetia sit a Daemonibus. Prophetia enim est divina revelatio, ut Cassiodorus dicit. Sed illud quod fit a Daemone, non est divinum. Ergo nulla prophetia potest esse a Daemone. Praeterea, ad propheticam cognitionem requiritur aliqua illuminatio, ut supra dictum est. Sed Daemones non illuminant intellectum humanum, ut supra dictum est in primo. Ergo nulla prophetia potest esse a Daemonibus. Praeterea, non est efficax signum quod etiam ad contraria se habet. Sed prophetia est signum confirmationis fidei, unde super illud Rom. XII, sive prophetiam secundum rationem fidei, dicit Glossa, nota quod in numeratione gratiarum a prophetia incipit, quae est prima probatio quod fides nostra sit rationabilis, quia credentes, accepto spiritu, prophetabant. Non ergo prophetia a Daemonibus dari potest. Sed contra est quod dicitur III Reg. XVIII, congrega ad me universum Israel in monte Carmeli, et prophetas Baal trecentos quinquaginta, prophetasque lucorum quadringentos, qui comedunt de mensa Iezabel. Sed tales erant Daemonum cultores. Ergo videtur quod etiam a Daemonibus sit aliqua prophetia. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, prophetia importat cognitionem quandam procul existentem a cognitione humana. Manifestum est autem quod intellectus superioris ordinis aliqua cognoscere potest quae sunt remota a cognitione intellectus inferioris. Supra intellectum autem humanum est non solum intellectus divinus, sed etiam intellectus Angelorum bonorum et malorum, secundum naturae ordinem. Et ideo quaedam cognoscunt Daemones, etiam sua naturali cognitione, quae sunt remota ab hominum cognitione, quae possunt hominibus revelare. Simpliciter autem et maxime remota sunt quae solus Deus cognoscit.

Objection 1: It would seem that no prophecy comes from the demons. For prophecy is a Divine revelation, according to Cassiodorus. But that which is done by a demon is not Divine. Therefore no prophecy can be from a demon. Obj. 2: Further, some kind of enlightenment is requisite for prophetic knowledge, as stated above (Q. 171, AA. 2, 3). Now the demons do not enlighten the human intellect, as stated above in the First Part (Q. 119, A. 3). Therefore no prophecy can come from the demons. Obj. 3: Further, a sign is worthless if it betokens contraries. Now prophecy is a sign in confirmation of faith; wherefore a gloss on Rom. 12:6, Either prophecy to be used according to the rule of faith, says: Observe that in reckoning the graces, he begins with prophecy, which is the first proof of the reasonableness of our faith; since believers, after receiving the Spirit, prophesied. Therefore prophecy cannot be bestowed by the demons. On the contrary, It is written (3 Kgs 18:19): Gather unto me all Israel unto mount Carmel, and the prophets of Baal four hundred and fifty, and the prophets of the grove four hundred, who eat at Jezebel’s table. Now these were worshippers of demons. Therefore it would seem that there is also a prophecy from the demons. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 171, A. 1), prophecy denotes knowledge far removed from human knowledge. Now it is evident that an intellect of a higher order can know some things that are far removed from the knowledge of an inferior intellect. Again, above the human intellect there is not only the Divine intellect, but also the intellects of good and bad angels according to the order of nature. Hence the demons, even by their natural knowledge, know certain things remote from men’s knowledge, which they can reveal to men: although those things which God alone knows are remote simply and most of all.

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Et ideo prophetia proprie et simpliciter dicta fit solum per revelationem divinam. Sed et ipsa revelatio facta per Daemones, potest secundum quid dici prophetia. Unde illi quibus aliquid per Daemones revelatur, non dicuntur in Scripturis prophetae simpliciter, sed cum aliqua additione, puta, prophetae falsi, vel, prophetae idolorum. Unde Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt., cum malus spiritus arripit hominem in haec, scilicet visa aut daemoniacos facit, aut arreptitios, aut falsos prophetas.

Accordingly prophecy, properly and simply, is conveyed by Divine revelations alone; yet the revelation which is made by the demons may be called prophecy in a restricted sense. Wherefore those men to whom something is revealed by the demons are styled in the Scriptures as prophets, not simply, but with an addition, for instance as false prophets, or prophets of idols. Hence Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 19): When the evil spirit lays hold of a man for such purposes as these, namely visions, he makes him either devilish, or possessed, or a false prophet. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Cassiodorus ibi Reply Obj. 1: Cassiodorus is here defining prophecy in definit prophetiam proprie et simpliciter dictam. its proper and simple acceptation. Ad secundum dicendum quod Daemones ea quae Reply Obj. 2: The demons reveal what they know to sciunt hominibus manifestant, non quidem per illumi- men, not by enlightening the intellect, but by an imaginationem intellectus, sed per aliquam imaginariam vi- nary vision, or even by audible speech; and in this way this sionem, aut etiam sensibiliter colloquendo. Et in hoc de- prophecy differs from true prophecy.

ficit haec prophetia a vera. Ad tertium dicendum quod aliquibus signis, etiam exterioribus, discerni potest prophetia Daemonum a prophetia divina. Unde dicit Chrysostomus, super Matth., quod quidam prophetant in spiritu Diaboli, quales sunt divinatores, sed sic discernuntur, quoniam Diabolus interdum falsa dicit, Spiritus Sanctus nunquam. Unde dicitur Deut. XVIII, si tacita cogitatione responderis, quomodo possum intelligere verbum quod non est locutus dominus? Hoc habebis signum, quod in nomine domini propheta ille praedixerit, et non evenerit, hoc dominus non est locutus.

Reply Obj. 3: The prophecy of the demons can be distinguished from Divine prophecy by certain, and even outward, signs. Hence Chrysostom says that some prophesy by the spirit of the devil, such as diviners, but they may be discerned by the fact that the devil sometimes utters what is false, the Holy Spirit never. Wherefore it is written (Deut 18:21, 22): If in silent thought thou answer: How shall I know the word that the Lord hath spoken? Thou shalt have this sign: Whatsoever that same prophet foretelleth in the name of the Lord, and it come not to pass, that thing the Lord hath not spoken.

Article 6 Whether the prophets of the demons ever foretell the truth? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prophetae Daemonum nunquam vera praedicant. Dicit enim Ambrosius quod omne verum, a quocumque dicatur, a spiritu sancto est. Sed prophetae Daemonum non loquuntur a spiritu sancto, quia non est conventio Christi ad Belial, ut dicitur II ad Cor. VI. Ergo videtur quod tales nunquam vera praenuntiant. Praeterea, sicut veri prophetae inspirantur a spiritu veritatis, ita prophetae Daemonum inspirantur a spiritu mendacii, secundum illud III Reg. ult., egrediar, et ero spiritus mendax in ore omnium prophetarum eius. Sed prophetae inspirati a spiritu sancto nunquam loquuntur falsum, ut supra habitum est. Ergo prophetae Daemonum nunquam loquuntur verum. Praeterea, Ioan. VIII dicitur de Diabolo quod, cum loquitur mendacium, ex propriis loquitur, quia Diabolus est mendax, et pater eius, idest mendacii. Sed inspirando prophetas suos Diabolus non loquitur nisi ex propriis, non enim instituitur minister Dei ad verita-

Objection 1: It would seem that the prophets of the demons never foretell the truth. For Ambrose says that every truth, by whomsoever spoken, is from the Holy Spirit. Now the prophets of the demons do not speak from the Holy Spirit, because there is no concord between Christ and Belial (2 Cor 6:15). Therefore it would seem that they never foretell the truth. Obj. 2: Further, just as true prophets are inspired by the Spirit of truth, so the prophets of the demons are inspired by the spirit of untruth, according to 3 Kings 22:22, I will go forth, and be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. Now the prophets inspired by the Holy Spirit never speak false, as stated above (Q. 111, A. 6). Therefore the prophets of the demons never speak truth. Obj. 3: Further, it is said of the devil (John 8:44) that when he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own, for the devil is a liar, and the father thereof, i.e., of lying. Now by inspiring his prophets, the devil speaks only of his own, for he is not appointed God’s minister to declare the truth, since

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tem enuntiandam, quia non est conventio lucis ad tenebras, ut dicitur II ad Cor. VI. Ergo prophetae Daemonum nunquam vera praedicunt. Sed contra est quod, Num. XXII, dicit quaedam Glossa quod Balaam divinus erat, Daemonum scilicet ministerio, et arte magica, nonnunquam futura praenoscebat. Sed ipse multa praenuntiavit vera, sicut est id quod habetur Num. XXIV, orietur stella ex Iacob, et consurget virga de Israel. Ergo etiam prophetae Daemonum praenuntiant vera. Respondeo dicendum quod sicut se habet bonum in rebus, ita verum in cognitione. Impossibile est autem inveniri aliquid in rebus quod totaliter bono privetur. Unde etiam impossibile est esse aliquam cognitionem quae totaliter sit falsa, absque admixtione alicuius veritatis. Unde et Beda dicit quod nulla falsa est doctrina quae non aliquando aliqua vera falsis intermisceat. Unde et ipsa doctrina Daemonum, qua suos prophetas instruunt, aliqua vera continet, per quae receptibilis redditur, sic enim intellectus ad falsum deducitur per apparentiam veritatis, sicut voluntas ad malum per apparentiam bonitatis. Unde et Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., concessum est Diabolo interdum vera dicere, ut mendacium suum rara veritate commendet. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prophetae Daemonum non semper loquuntur ex Daemonum revelatione, sed interdum ex inspiratione divina, sicut manifeste legitur de Balaam, cui dicitur dominus esse locutus, Num. XXII, licet esset propheta Daemonum. Quia Deus utitur etiam malis ad utilitatem bonorum. Unde et per prophetas Daemonum aliqua vera praenuntiat, tum ut credibilior fiat veritas, quae etiam ex adversariis testimonium habet; tum etiam quia, dum homines talibus credunt, per eorum dicta magis ad veritatem inducuntur. Unde etiam Sibyllae multa vera praedixerunt de Christo. Sed et quando prophetae Daemonum a Daemonibus instruuntur, aliqua vera praedicunt, quandoque quidem virtute propriae naturae, cuius auctor est Spiritus Sanctus; quandoque etiam revelatione bonorum spirituum, ut patet per Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt. Et sic etiam illud verum quod Daemones enuntiant, a spiritu sancto est. Ad secundum dicendum quod verus propheta semper inspiratur a spiritu veritatis, in quo nihil est falsitatis, et ideo nunquam dicit falsum. Propheta autem falsitatis non semper instruitur a spiritu falsitatis, sed quandoque etiam inspiratur a spiritu veritatis. Ipse etiam spiritus falsitatis quandoque enuntiat vera, quandoque falsa, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod propria Daemonum esse dicuntur illa quae habent a seipsis, scilicet mendacia et peccata. Quae autem pertinent ad propriam naturam, non habent a seipsis, sed a Deo. Per virtutem autem pro-

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light hath no fellowship with darkness (2 Cor 6:14). Therefore the prophets of the demons never foretell the truth. On the contrary, A gloss on Num. 22:14, says that Balaam was a diviner, for he sometimes foreknew the future by help of the demons and the magic art. Now he foretold many true things, for instance that which is to be found in Num. 24:17: A star shall rise out of Jacob, and a scepter shall spring up from Israel. Therefore even the prophets of the demons foretell the truth. I answer that, As the good is in relation to things, so is the true in relation to knowledge. Now in things it is impossible to find one that is wholly devoid of good. Wherefore it is also impossible for any knowledge to be wholly false, without some mixture of truth. Hence Bede says that no teaching is so false that it never mingles truth with falsehood. Hence the teaching of the demons, with which they instruct their prophets, contains some truths whereby it is rendered acceptable. For the intellect is led astray to falsehood by the semblance of truth, even as the will is seduced to evil by the semblance of goodness. Wherefore Chrysostom says: The devil is allowed sometimes to speak true things, in order that his unwonted truthfulness may gain credit for his lie. Reply Obj. 1: The prophets of the demons do not always speak from the demons’ revelation, but sometimes by Divine inspiration. This was evidently the case with Balaam, of whom we read that the Lord spoke to him (Num 22:12), though he was a prophet of the demons, because God makes use even of the wicked for the profit of the good. Hence He foretells certain truths even by the demons’ prophets, both that the truth may be rendered more credible, since even its foes bear witness to it, and also in order that men, by believing such men, may be more easily led on to truth. Wherefore also the Sibyls foretold many true things about Christ. Yet even when the demons’ prophets are instructed by the demons, they foretell the truth, sometimes by virtue of their own nature, the author of which is the Holy Spirit, and sometimes by revelation of the good spirits, as Augustine declares (Gen ad lit. xii, 19): so that even then this truth which the demons proclaim is from the Holy Spirit. Reply Obj. 2: A true prophet is always inspired by the Spirit of truth, in Whom there is no falsehood, wherefore He never says what is not true; whereas a false prophet is not always instructed by the spirit of untruth, but sometimes even by the Spirit of truth. Even the very spirit of untruth sometimes declares true things, sometimes false, as stated above. Reply Obj. 3: Those things are called the demons’ own, which they have of themselves, namely lies and sins; while they have, not of themselves but of God, those things which belong to them by nature: and it is by virtue of their own na-

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priae naturae quandoque vera praenuntiant, ut dictum est. Utitur etiam eis Deus ad veritatis manifestationem per ipsos fiendam, dum divina mysteria eis per Angelos revelantur, ut dictum est.

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ture that they sometimes foretell the truth, as stated above (ad 1). Moreover God makes use of them to make known the truth which is to be accomplished through them, by revealing Divine mysteries to them through the angels, as already stated (Gen ad lit. xii, 19; I, Q. 109, A. 4, ad 1).

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Question 173 The Manner of Prophetic Knowledge Deinde considerandum est de modo cognitionis proWe must now consider the manner in which prophetic pheticae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. knowledge is conveyed, and under this head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum prophetae videant ipsam Dei (1) Whether the prophets see God’s very essence? essentiam. Secundo, utrum revelatio prophetica fiat per (2) Whether the prophetic revelation is effected by the influentiam aliquarum specierum, vel per solam infusion of certain species, or by the infusion of influentiam luminis. Divine light alone? Tertio, utrum prophetica revelatio semper sit cum (3) Whether prophetic revelation is always alienatione a sensibus. accompanied by abstraction from the senses? Quarto, utrum prophetia semper sit cum cognitione (4) Whether prophecy is always accompanied by eorum quae prophetantur. knowledge of the things prophesied?

Article 1 Whether the prophets see the very essence of God? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prophetae ipsam Dei essentiam videant. Quia super illud Isaiae XXXVIII, dispone domui tuae etc., dicit Glossa, prophetae in ipso libro praescientiae Dei, in quo omnia scripta sunt, legere possunt. Sed praescientia Dei est ipsa eius essentia. Ergo prophetae vident ipsam Dei essentiam. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in IX de Trin., quod in illa aeterna veritate, ex qua temporalia facta sunt omnia, formam secundum quam sumus, et secundum quam operamur, visu mentis aspicimus. Sed prophetae altissimam inter omnes homines habent divinorum cognitionem. Ergo ipsi maxime divinam essentiam vident. Praeterea, futura contingentia praecognoscuntur a prophetis secundum immobilem veritatem. Sic autem non sunt nisi in ipso Deo. Ergo prophetae ipsum Deum vident. Sed contra est quod visio divinae essentiae non evacuatur in patria. Prophetia autem evacuatur, ut habetur I ad Cor. XIII. Ergo prophetia non fit per visionem divinae essentiae. Respondeo dicendum quod prophetia importat cognitionem divinam ut procul existentem, unde et de prophetis dicitur, Heb. XI, quod erant a longe aspicientes. Illi autem qui sunt in patria, in statu beatitudinis existentes, non vident ut a remotis, sed quasi ex propinquo, secundum illud Psalmi, habitabunt recti cum vultu tuo. Unde manifestum est quod cognitio prophetica alia est a cognitione perfecta, quae erit in patria. Unde et distin-

Objection 1: It would seem that the prophets see the very essence of God, for a gloss on Isa. 38:1, Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die and not live, says: Prophets can read in the book of God’s foreknowledge in which all things are written. Now God’s foreknowledge is His very essence. Therefore prophets see God’s very essence. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 7) that in that eternal truth from which all temporal things are made, we see with the mind’s eye the type both of our being and of our actions. Now, of all men, prophets have the highest knowledge of Divine things. Therefore they, especially, see the Divine essence. Obj. 3: Further, future contingencies are foreknown by the prophets with unchangeable truth. Now future contingencies exist thus in God alone. Therefore the prophets see God Himself. On the contrary, The vision of the Divine essence is not made void in heaven; whereas prophecy is made void (1 Cor 13:8). Therefore prophecy is not conveyed by a vision of the Divine essence. I answer that, Prophecy denotes Divine knowledge as existing afar off. Wherefore it is said of the prophets (Heb 11:13) that they were beholding . . . afar off. But those who are in heaven and in the state of bliss see, not as from afar off, but rather, as it were, from near at hand, according to Ps. 139:14, The upright shall dwell with Thy countenance. Hence it is evident that prophetic knowledge differs from the perfect knowledge, which we shall have in heaven, so

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guitur ab ea sicut imperfectum a perfecto, et ea adve- that it is distinguished therefrom as the imperfect from the niente evacuatur, ut patet per apostolum, I ad Cor. XIII. perfect, and when the latter comes the former is made void, as appears from the words of the Apostle (1 Cor 13:10). Fuerunt autem quidam qui, cognitionem prophetiSome, however, wishing to discriminate between cam a cognitione beatorum distinguere volentes, dixe- prophetic knowledge and the knowledge of the blessed, runt quod prophetae viderunt ipsam divinam essentiam, have maintained that the prophets see the very essence of quam vocant speculum aeternitatis, non tamen secun- God (which they call the mirror of eternity), not, however, dum quod est obiectum beatorum, sed secundum quod in the way in which it is the object of the blessed, but as consunt in ea rationes futurorum eventuum. Quod quidem taining the types of future events. But this is altogether imest omnino impossibile. Deus enim est obiectum bea- possible. For God is the object of bliss in His very essence, titudinis secundum ipsam sui essentiam, secundum id according to the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): Happy quod Augustinus dicit, in V Confess., beatus est qui te whoso knoweth Thee, though he know not these, i.e., creascit, etiam si illa, idest creaturas, nesciat. Non est autem tures. Now it is not possible to see the types of creatures in possibile quod aliquis videat rationes creaturarum in ip- the very essence of God without seeing It, both because the sa divina essentia, ita quod eam non videat. Tum quia Divine essence is Itself the type of all things that are made— ipsa divina essentia est ratio omnium quae fiunt, ratio the ideal type adding nothing to the Divine essence save autem idealis non addit super divinam essentiam nisi only a relationship to the creature—and because knowledge respectum ad creaturam. Tum etiam quia prius est co- of a thing in itself—and such is the knowledge of God as the gnoscere aliquid in se, quod est cognoscere Deum ut est object of heavenly bliss—precedes knowledge of that thing obiectum beatitudinis, quam cognoscere illud per com- in its relation to something else—and such is the knowledge parationem ad alterum, quod est cognoscere Deum se- of God as containing the types of things. Consequently it is cundum rationes rerum in ipso existentes. Et ideo non impossible for prophets to see God as containing the types potest esse quod prophetae videant Deum secundum ra- of creatures, and yet not as the object of bliss. Therefore we tiones creaturarum, et non prout est obiectum beatitudi- must conclude that the prophetic vision is not the vision of nis. Et ideo dicendum est quod visio prophetica non est the very essence of God, and that the prophets do not see visio ipsius divinae essentiae, nec in ipsa divina essentia in the Divine essence Itself the things they do see, but that vident ea quae vident, sed in quibusdam similitudinibus, they see them in certain images, according as they are ensecundum illustrationem divini luminis. lightened by the Divine light. Unde Dionysius dicit, IV cap. Cael. Hier., de visioWherefore Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv), in speaking of nibus propheticis loquens, quod sapiens theologus visio- prophetic visions, says that the wise theologian calls that vinem illam dicit esse divinam quae fit per similitudinem re- sion divine which is effected by images of things lacking a bodrum forma corporali carentium, ex reductione videntium ily form through the seer being rapt in divine things. And in divina. Et huiusmodi similitudines divino lumine il- these images illumined by the Divine light have more of the lustratae magis habent rationem speculi quam Dei es- nature of a mirror than the Divine essence: since in a mirsentia. Nam in speculo resultant species ab aliis rebus, ror images are formed from other things, and this cannot be quod non potest dici de Deo. Sed huiusmodi illustra- said of God. Yet the prophet’s mind thus enlightened may tio mentis prophetice potest dici speculum, inquantum be called a mirror, insofar as a likeness of the truth of the resultat ibi similitudo veritatis divinae praescientiae et Divine foreknowledge is formed therein, for which reason propter hoc dicitur speculum aeternitatis, quasi reprae- it is called the mirror of eternity, as representing God’s foresentans Dei praescientiam, qui in sua aeternitate omnia knowledge, for God in His eternity sees all things as present praesentialiter videt, ut dictum est. before Him, as stated above (Q. 172, A. 1). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prophetae dicunReply Obj. 1: The prophets are said to read the book tur inspicere in libro praescientiae Dei, inquantum ex ip- of God’s foreknowledge, inasmuch as the truth is reflected sa Dei praescientia resultat veritas in mentem prophetae. from God’s foreknowledge on the prophet’s mind. Ad secundum dicendum quod in prima veritate Reply Obj. 2: Man is said to see in the First Truth the dicitur homo videre propriam formam, qua existit, in- type of his existence, insofar as the image of the First Truth quantum primae veritatis similitudo refulget in mente shines forth on man’s mind, so that he is able to know himhumana, ex quo anima habet quod seipsam cognoscat. self. Ad tertium dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod in Reply Obj. 3: From the very fact that future continDeo futura contingentia sunt secundum immobilem ve- gencies are in God according to unalterable truth, it follows ritatem, potest imprimere menti prophetae similem co- that God can impress a like knowledge on the prophet’s gnitionem, absque eo quod prophetae Deum per essen- mind without the prophet seeing God in His essence. tiam videant.

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Q. 173, A. 2

Article 2 Whether, in prophetic revelation, new species of things are impressed on the prophet’s mind, or merely a new light? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in prophetica revelatione non imprimantur divinitus menti prophetae novae rerum species, sed solum novum lumen. Quia sicut dicit Glossa Hieronymi, Amos I, prophetae utuntur similitudinibus rerum in quibus conversati sunt. Sed si visio prophetica fieret per aliquas species de novo impressas, nihil operaretur ibi praecedens conversatio. Ergo non imprimuntur aliquae species de novo in animam prophetae, sed solum propheticum lumen. Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., visio imaginaria non facit prophetam, sed solum visio intellectualis, unde etiam Dan. X dicitur quod intelligentia opus est in visione. Sed visio intellectualis, sicut in eodem libro dicitur, non fit per aliquas similitudines, sed per ipsam rerum veritatem. Ergo videtur quod prophetica revelatio non fiat per impressionem aliquarum specierum. Praeterea, per donum prophetiae Spiritus Sanctus exhibet homini id quod est supra facultatem naturae. Sed formare quascumque rerum species potest homo ex facultate naturali. Ergo videtur quod in prophetica revelatione non infundantur aliquae species rerum, sed solum intelligibile lumen. Sed contra est quod dicitur Osee XII, ego visiones multiplicavi eis, et in manibus prophetarum assimilatus sum. Sed multiplicatio visionum non fit secundum lumen intelligibile, quod est commune in omni prophetica visione, sed solum secundum diversitatem specierum, secundum quas etiam est assimilatio. Ergo videtur quod in prophetica revelatione imprimuntur novae species rerum, et non solum intelligibile lumen. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., cognitio prophetica maxime ad mentem pertinet. Circa cognitionem autem humanae mentis duo oportet considerare, scilicet acceptionem, sive repraesentationem rerum; et iudicium de rebus praesentatis. Repraesentantur autem menti humanae res aliquae secundum aliquas species, et secundum naturae ordinem, primo oportet quod species praesententur sensui; secundo, imaginationi; tertio, intellectui possibili, qui immutatur a speciebus phantasmatum secundum illustrationem intellectus agentis. In imaginatione autem non solum sunt formae rerum sensibilium secundum quod accipiuntur a sensu, sed transmutatur diversimode, vel propter aliquam transmutationem corporalem, sicut accidit in dormientibus et furiosis; vel etiam secundum imperium rationis disponuntur phantasmata in ordine ad id quod est intelligendum. Sicut enim ex diversa ordinatione earundem litterarum accipiuntur diversi

Objection 1: It would seem that in prophetic revelation no new species of things are impressed on the prophet’s mind, but only a new light. For a gloss of Jerome on Amos 1:2 says that prophets draw comparisons from things with which they are conversant. But if prophetic vision were effected by means of species newly impressed, the prophet’s previous experience of things would be inoperative. Therefore no new species are impressed on the prophet’s soul, but only the prophetic light. Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (Gen ad lit. xii, 9), It is not imaginative but intellective vision that makes the prophet; wherefore it is declared (Dan 10:1) that there is need of understanding in a vision. Now intellective vision, as stated in the same book (Gen ad lit. xii, 6) is not effected by means of images, but by the very truth of things. Therefore it would seem that prophetic revelation is not effected by impressing species on the soul. Obj. 3: Further, by the gift of prophecy the Holy Spirit endows man with something that surpasses the faculty of nature. Now man can by his natural faculties form all kinds of species of things. Therefore it would seem that in prophetic revelation no new species of things are impressed, but merely an intellectual light. On the contrary, It is written (Hos 12:10): I have multiplied their visions, and I have used similitudes, by the ministry of the prophets. Now multiplicity of visions results, not from a diversity of intellectual light, which is common to every prophetic vision, but from a diversity of species, whence similitudes also result. Therefore it seems that in prophetic revelation new species of things are impressed, and not merely an intellectual light. I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 9), Prophetic knowledge pertains most of all to the intellect. Now two things have to be considered in connection with the knowledge possessed by the human mind, namely the acceptance or representation of things, and the judgment of the things represented. Now things are represented to the human mind under the form of species: and according to the order of nature, they must be represented first to the senses, second to the imagination, third to the passive intellect, and these are changed by the species derived from the phantasms, which change results from the enlightening action of the active intellect. Now in the imagination there are the forms of sensible things not only as received from the senses, but also transformed in various ways, either on account of some bodily transformation (as in the case of people who are asleep or out of their senses), or through the coordination of the phantasms, at the command of reason, for the purpose of understanding something. For just as the

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intellectus, ita etiam secundum diversam dispositionem various arrangements of the letters of the alphabet convey phantasmatum resultant in intellectu diversae species various ideas to the understanding, so the various coordiintelligibiles. nations of the phantasms produce various intelligible species of the intellect. Iudicium autem humanae mentis fit secundum vim As to the judgment formed by the human mind, it deintellectualis luminis. pends on the power of the intellectual light. Per donum autem prophetiae confertur aliquid huNow the gift of prophecy confers on the human mind manae menti supra id quod pertinet ad naturalem facul- something which surpasses the natural faculty in both these tatem, quantum ad utrumque, scilicet et quantum ad iu- respects, namely as to the judgment which depends on the dicium, per influxum intellectualis luminis; et quantum inflow of intellectual light, and as to the acceptance or repad acceptionem seu repraesentationem rerum, quae fit resentation of things, which is effected by means of certain per aliquas species. Et quantum ad hoc secundum, po- species. Human teaching may be likened to prophetic revtest assimilari doctrina humana revelationi propheticae, elation in the second of these respects, but not in the first. non autem quantum ad primum, homo enim suo disci- For a man represents certain things to his disciple by signs pulo repraesentat aliquas res per signa locutionum, non of speech, but he cannot enlighten him inwardly as God autem potest interius illuminare, sicut facit Deus. does. Horum autem duorum primum principalius est in But it is the first of these two that holds the chief place prophetia, quia iudicium est completivum cognitionis. in prophecy, since judgment is the complement of knowlEt ideo, si cui fiat divinitus repraesentatio aliquarum re- edge. Wherefore if certain things are divinely represented rum per similitudines imaginarias, ut Pharaoni et Na- to any man by means of imaginary likenesses, as hapbuchodonosor; aut etiam per similitudines corporales, pened to Pharaoh (Gen 41:1–7) and to Nabuchodonosor sicut Baltassar, non est talis censendus propheta, nisi il- (Dan 4:1–2), or even by bodily likenesses, as happened to luminetur eius mens ad iudicandum; sed talis apparitio Balthasar (Dan 5:5), such a man is not to be considered a est quiddam imperfectum in genere prophetiae, unde a prophet, unless his mind be enlightened for the purpose of quibusdam vocatur casus prophetiae, sicut et divinatio judgment; and such an apparition is something imperfect somniorum. Erit autem propheta si solummodo intel- in the genus of prophecy. Wherefore some have called this lectus eius illuminetur ad diiudicandum etiam ea quae prophetic ecstasy, and such is divination by dreams. And ab aliis imaginarie visa sunt, ut patet de Ioseph, qui ex- yet a man will be a prophet, if his intellect be enlightened posuit somnium Pharaonis. Sed sicut Augustinus dicit, merely for the purpose of judging of things seen in imagXII super Gen. ad Litt., maxime propheta est qui utroque ination by others, as in the case of Joseph who interpreted praecellit, ut videat in spiritu corporalium rerum significa- Pharaoh’s dream. But, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 9), tivas similitudines; et eas vivacitate mentis intelligat. Especially is he a prophet who excels in both respects, so, to wit, as to see in spirit likenesses significant of things corporeal, and understand them by the quickness of his intellect. Repraesentantur autem divinitus menti prophetae Now sensible forms are divinely presented to the quandoque quidem mediante sensu exterius, quaedam prophet’s mind, sometimes externally by means of formae sensibiles, sicut Daniel vidit Scripturam parietis, the senses—thus Daniel saw the writing on the wall ut legitur Dan. V. Quandoque autem per formas imagi- (Dan 5:25)—sometimes by means of imaginary forms, einarias, sive omnino divinitus impressas, non per sensum ther of exclusively Divine origin and not received through acceptas, puta si alicui caeco nato imprimerentur in ima- the senses (for instance, if images of colors were imprinted ginatione colorum similitudines; vel etiam divinitus or- on the imagination of one blind from birth), or divinely dinatas ex his quae a sensibus sunt acceptae, sicut Iere- coordinated from those derived from the senses—thus mias vidit ollam succensam a facie Aquilonis, ut habetur Jeremiah saw the boiling caldron . . . from the face of the Ierem. I. Sive etiam imprimendo species intelligibiles ip- north (Jer 1:13)—or by the direct impression of intelligible si menti, sicut patet de his qui accipiunt scientiam vel sa- species on the mind, as in the case of those who receive inpientiam infusam, sicut Salomon et apostoli. fused scientific knowledge or wisdom, such as Solomon or the apostles. Lumen autem intelligibile quandoque quidem imBut intellectual light is divinely imprinted on the human primitur menti humanae divinitus ad diiudicandum ea mind—sometimes for the purpose of judging of things seen quae ab aliis visa sunt, sicut dictum est de Ioseph; et si- by others, as in the case of Joseph, quoted above, and of the cut patet de apostolis, quibus dominus aperuit sensum apostles whose understanding our Lord opened that they ut intelligerent Scripturas, ut dicitur Luc. XXIV; et ad might understand the scriptures (Luke 24:45); and to this hoc pertinet interpretatio sermonum. Sive etiam ad diiu- pertains the interpretation of speeches—sometimes for the dicandum secundum divinam veritatem ea quae cursu purpose of judging according to Divine truth, of the things

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naturali homo apprehendit. Sive etiam ad diiudicandum which a man apprehends in the ordinary course of nature— veraciter et efficaciter ea quae agenda sunt, secundum il- sometimes for the purpose of discerning truthfully and eflud Isaiae LXIII, spiritus domini ductor eius fuit. ficaciously what is to be done, according to Isa. 63:14, The Spirit of the Lord was their leader. Sic igitur patet quod prophetica revelatio quandoque Hence it is evident that prophetic revelation is conveyed quidem fit per solam luminis influentiam, quandoque sometimes by the mere infusion of light, sometimes by imautem per species de novo impressas, vel aliter ordina- printing species anew, or by a new coordination of species. tas. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dictum Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, sometimes in prophetic est, quando in prophetica revelatione divinitus ordinan- revelation imaginary species previously derived from the tur species imaginariae praeacceptae a sensu secundum senses are divinely coordinated so as to accord with the congruentiam ad veritatem revelandam, tunc conversa- truth to be revealed, and then previous experience is operatio praecedens aliquid operatur ad ipsas similitudines, tive in the production of the images, but not when they are non autem quando totaliter ab extrinseco imprimuntur. impressed on the mind wholly from without. Ad secundum dicendum quod visio intellectualis Reply Obj. 2: Intellectual vision is not effected by non fit secundum aliquas similitudines corporales et means of bodily and individual images, but by an intelliindividuales, fit tamen secundum aliquam similitudi- gible image. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 11) that nem intelligibilem, unde Augustinus dicit, IX de Trin., the soul possesses a certain likeness of the species known to quod habet animus nonnullam speciei notae similitudi- it. Sometimes this intelligible image is, in prophetic revnem. Quae quidem similitudo intelligibilis in revelatione elation, imprinted immediately by God, sometimes it reprophetica aliquando immediate a Deo imprimitur, ali- sults from pictures in the imagination, by the aid of the quando autem ex formis imaginatis resultat secundum prophetic light, since a deeper truth is gathered from these adiutorium prophetici luminis; quia ex eisdem formis pictures in the imagination by means of the enlightenment imaginatis subtilior conspicitur veritas secundum illu- of the higher light. strationem altioris luminis. Ad tertium dicendum quod quascumque formas Reply Obj. 3: It is true that man is able by his natural imaginatas naturali virtute homo potest formare, abso- powers to form all kinds of pictures in the imagination, by lute huiusmodi formas considerando, non tamen ut sint simply considering these pictures, but not so that they be ordinatae ad repraesentandas intelligibiles veritates quae directed to the representation of intelligible truths that surhominis intellectum excedunt, sed ad hoc necessarium pass his intellect, since for this purpose he needs the assisest auxilium supernaturalis luminis. tance of a supernatural light.

Article 3 Whether the prophetic vision is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod visio prophetica semper fiat cum abstractione a sensibus. Dicitur enim Num. XII, si quis fuerit inter vos propheta domini, in visione apparebo ei, vel per somnium loquar ad illum. Sed sicut Glossa dicit, in principio Psalterii, visio quae est per somnia et visiones, est per ea quae videntur dici vel fieri. Cum autem aliqua videntur dici vel fieri quae non dicuntur vel fiunt, est alienatio a sensibus. Ergo prophetia semper fit cum alienatione a sensibus.

Objection 1: It would seem that the prophetic vision is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses. For it is written (Num 12:6): If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream. Now a gloss says at the beginning of the Psalter, a vision that takes place by dreams and apparitions consists of things which seem to be said or done. But when things seem to be said or done, which are neither said nor done, there is abstraction from the senses. Therefore prophecy is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses. Praeterea, quando una virtus multum intenditur Obj. 2: Further, when one power is very intent on its in sua operatione, alia potentia abstrahitur a suo actu, si- own operation, other powers are drawn away from theirs; cut illi qui vehementer intendunt ad aliquid audiendum, thus men who are very intent on hearing something fail to non percipiunt visu ea quae coram ipsis fiunt. Sed in vi- see what takes place before them. Now in the prophetic visione prophetica maxime intellectus elevatur et intendi- sion the intellect is very much uplifted, and intent on its act.

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tur in suo actu. Ergo videtur quod semper fiat cum abstractione a sensibus. Praeterea, impossibile est idem simul ad oppositas partes converti. Sed in visione prophetica mens convertitur ad accipiendum a superiori. Ergo non potest simul converti ad sensibilia. Necessarium ergo videtur quod revelatio prophetica semper fit cum abstractione a sensibus. Sed contra est quod dicitur I ad Cor. XIV, spiritus prophetarum prophetis subiecti sunt. Sed hoc esse non posset, si propheta non esset sui compos, a sensibus alienatus existens. Ergo videtur quod prophetica visio non fiat cum alienatione a sensibus. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, prophetica revelatio fit secundum quatuor, scilicet secundum influxum intelligibilis luminis, secundum immissionem intelligibilium specierum, secundum impressionem vel ordinationem imaginabilium formarum, et secundum expressionem formarum sensibilium. Manifestum est autem quod non fit abstractio a sensibus quando aliquid repraesentatur menti prophetae per species sensibiles, sive ad hoc specialiter formatas divinitus, sicut rubus ostensus Moysi, et Scriptura ostensa Danieli; sive etiam per alias causas productas, ita tamen quod secundum divinam providentiam ad aliquid prophetice significandum ordinetur, sicut per arcam Noe significabatur Ecclesia. Similiter etiam non est necesse ut fiat alienatio ab exterioribus sensibus per hoc quod mens prophetae illustratur intelligibili lumine, aut formatur intelligibilibus speciebus, quia in nobis perfectum iudicium intellectus habetur per conversionem ad sensibilia, quae sunt prima nostrae cognitionis principia, ut in primo habitum est. Sed quando fit revelatio prophetica secundum formas imaginarias, necesse est fieri abstractionem a sensibus, ut talis apparitio phantasmatum non referatur ad ea quae exterius sentiuntur. Sed abstractio a sensibus quandoque fit perfecte, ut scilicet nihil homo sensibus percipiat. Quandoque autem imperfecte, ut scilicet aliquid percipiat sensibus, non tamen plene discernat ea quae exterius percipit ab his quae imaginabiliter videt, unde Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., sic videntur quae in spiritu fiunt imagines corporum, quemadmodum corpora per corpus, ita ut simul cernatur et homo aliquis praesens, et absens alius spiritu, tanquam oculis.

Talis tamen alienatio a sensibus non fit in prophetis cum aliqua inordinatione naturae, sicut in arreptitiis vel furiosis, sed per aliquam causam ordinatam, vel naturalem, sicut per somnum; vel animalem, sicut per ve-

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Therefore it seems that the prophetic vision is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses. Obj. 3: Further, the same thing cannot, at the same time, tend in opposite directions. Now in the prophetic vision the mind tends to the acceptance of things from above, and consequently it cannot at the same time tend to sensible objects. Therefore it would seem necessary for prophetic revelation to be always accompanied by abstraction from the senses. Obj. 4: On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor 14:32): The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets. Now this were impossible if the prophet were not in possession of his faculties, but abstracted from his senses. Therefore it would seem that prophetic vision is not accompanied by abstraction from the senses. I answer that, As stated in the foregoing Article, the prophetic revelation takes place in four ways: namely, by the infusion of an intelligible light, by the infusion of intelligible species, by impression or coordination of pictures in the imagination, and by the outward presentation of sensible images. Now it is evident that there is no abstraction from the senses, when something is presented to the prophet’s mind by means of sensible species—whether these be divinely formed for this special purpose, as the bush shown to Moses (Exod 3:2), and the writing shown to Daniel (Dan 5:)—or whether they be produced by other causes; yet so that they are ordained by Divine providence to be prophetically significant of something, as, for instance, the Church was signified by the ark of Noah. Again, abstraction from the external senses is not rendered necessary when the prophet’s mind is enlightened by an intellectual light, or impressed with intelligible species, since in us the perfect judgment of the intellect is effected by its turning to sensible objects, which are the first principles of our knowledge, as stated in the First Part (Q. 84, A. 6). When, however, prophetic revelation is conveyed by images in the imagination, abstraction from the senses is necessary lest the things thus seen in imagination be taken for objects of external sensation. Yet this abstraction from the senses is sometimes complete, so that a man perceives nothing with his senses; and sometimes it is incomplete, so that he perceives something with his senses, yet does not fully discern the things he perceives outwardly from those he sees in imagination. Hence Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 12): Those images of bodies which are formed in the soul are seen just as bodily things themselves are seen by the body, so that we see with our eyes one who is present, and at the same time we see with the soul one who is absent, as though we saw him with our eyes. Yet this abstraction from the senses takes place in the prophets without subverting the order of nature, as is the case with those who are possessed or out of their senses; but is due to some well-ordered cause. This cause may be natu-

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Q. 173, A. 4

hementiam contemplationis, sicut de Petro legitur, Act. X, quod, cum oraret in caenaculo, factus est in excessu mentis; vel virtute divina rapiente, secundum illud Ezech. I, facta est super eum manus domini.

ral—for instance, sleep—or spiritual—for instance, the intenseness of the prophets’ contemplation; thus we read of Peter (Acts 10:9) that while he was praying in the supperroom he fell into an ecstasy—or he may be carried away by the Divine power, according to the saying of Ezechiel 1:3: The hand of the Lord was upon him. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted refers to prophets in loquitur de prophetis quibus imprimebantur vel ordi- whom imaginary pictures were formed or coordinated, einabantur imaginariae formae, vel in dormiendo, quod ther while asleep, which is denoted by the word dream, or significatur per somnium; vel in vigilando, quod signi- while awake, which is signified by the word vision.

ficatur per visionem. Ad secundum dicendum quod quando mens intenditur in suo actu circa absentia, quae sunt a sensibus remota, tunc propter vehementiam intentionis sequitur alienatio a sensibus. Sed quando mens intenditur in suo actu circa dispositionem vel iudicium sensibilium, non oportet quod a sensibus abstrahatur. Ad tertium dicendum quod motus mentis prophetice non est secundum virtutem propriam, sed secundum virtutem superioris influxus. Et ideo, quando ex superiori influxu mens prophetae inclinatur ad iudicandum vel disponendum aliquid circa sensibilia, non fit alienatio a sensibus, sed solum quando elevatur mens ad contemplandum aliqua sublimiora. Ad quartum dicendum quod spiritus prophetarum dicuntur esse subiecti prophetis, quantum ad propheticam enuntiationem, de qua ibi apostolus loquitur; quia scilicet ex proprio sensu loquuntur ea quae viderunt, non mente perturbata, sicut arreptitii, ut dixerunt Priscilla, et Montanus. Sed in ipsa prophetica revelatione potius ipsi subiiciuntur spiritui prophetiae, idest dono prophetico.

Reply Obj. 2: When the mind is intent, in its act, upon distant things which are far removed from the senses, the intensity of its application leads to abstraction from the senses; but when it is intent, in its act, upon the coordination of or judgment concerning objects of sense, there is no need for abstraction from the senses. Reply Obj. 3: The movement of the prophetic mind results not from its own power, but from a power acting on it from above. Hence there is no abstraction from the senses when the prophet’s mind is led to judge or coordinate matters relating to objects of sense, but only when the mind is raised to the contemplation of certain more lofty things. Reply Obj. 4: The spirit of the prophets is said to be subject to the prophets as regards the prophetic utterances to which the Apostle refers in the words quoted; because, to wit, the prophets in declaring what they have seen speak their own mind, and are not thrown off their mental balance, like persons who are possessed, as Priscilla and Montanus maintained. But as regards the prophetic revelation itself, it would be more correct to say that the prophets are subject to the spirit of prophecy, i.e., to the prophetic gift.

Article 4 Whether prophets always know the things which they prophesy? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prophetae semper cognoscant ea quae prophetant. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quibus signa per aliquas rerum corporalium similitudines demonstrabantur in spiritu, nisi accessisset mentis officium ut etiam intelligerentur, nondum erat prophetia. Sed ea quae intelliguntur, non possunt esse incognita. Ergo propheta non ignorat ea quae prophetat. Praeterea, lumen prophetiae est excellentius quam lumen rationis naturalis. Sed quicumque lumine naturali habet scientiam, non ignorat ea quae scit. Ergo quicumque lumine prophetico aliqua enuntiat, non potest ea ignorare.

Objection 1: It would seem that the prophets always know the things which they prophesy. For, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 9), Those to whom signs were shown in spirit by means of the likenesses of bodily things, had not the gift of prophecy, unless the mind was brought into action, so that those signs were also understood by them. Now what is understood cannot be unknown. Therefore the prophet is not ignorant of what he prophesies. Obj. 2: Further, the light of prophecy surpasses the light of natural reason. Now one who possesses a science by his natural light, is not ignorant of his scientific acquirements. Therefore he who utters things by the prophetic light cannot ignore them.

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Praeterea, prophetia ordinatur ad hominum illuminationem, unde dicitur II Pet. I. Habetis propheticum sermonem, cui bene facitis attendentes quasi lucernae lucenti in caliginoso loco. Sed nihil potest alios illuminare nisi in se sit illuminatum. Ergo videtur quod propheta prius illuminatur ad cognoscendum ea quae aliis enuntiat. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. XI. Hoc autem a semetipso Caiphas non dixit, sed, cum esset pontifex anni illius, prophetavit quia Iesus moriturus erat pro gente, et cetera. Sed hoc Caiphas non cognovit. Ergo non omnis qui prophetat cognoscit ea quae prophetat. Respondeo dicendum quod in revelatione prophetica movetur mens prophetae a spiritu sancto sicut instrumentum deficiens respectu principalis agentis. Movetur autem mens prophetae non solum ad aliquid apprehendendum, sed etiam ad aliquid loquendum vel ad aliquid faciendum, et quandoque quidem ad omnia tria simul, quandoque autem ad duo horum, quandoque vero ad unum tantum. Et quodlibet horum contingit esse cum aliquo cognitionis defectu. Nam cum mens prophetae movetur ad aliquid aestimandum vel apprehendendum, quandoque quidem inducitur ad hoc quod solum apprehendat rem illam, quandoque autem ulterius ad hoc quod cognoscat haec sibi esse divinitus revelata. Similiter etiam quandoque movetur mens prophetae ad aliquid loquendum, ita quod intelligat id quod per haec verba Spiritus Sanctus intendit, sicut David, qui dicebat, II Reg. XXIII, spiritus domini locutus est per me, quandoque autem ille cuius mens movetur ad aliqua verba depromenda, non intelligit quid Spiritus Sanctus per haec verba intendat, sicut patet de Caipha, Ioan. XI. Similiter etiam cum Spiritus Sanctus movet mentem alicuius ad aliquid faciendum quandoque quidem intelligit quid hoc significet, sicut patet de Ieremia, qui abscondit lumbare in Euphraten, ut habetur Ierem. XIII, quandoque vero non intelligunt, sicut milites dividentes vestimenta Christi non intelligebant quid significaret. Cum ergo aliquis cognoscit se moveri a spiritu sancto ad aliquid aestimandum, vel significandum verbo vel facto, hoc proprie ad prophetiam pertinet. Cum autem movetur, sed non cognoscit, non est perfecta prophetia, sed quidam instinctus propheticus. Sciendum tamen quod, quia mens prophetae est instrumentum deficiens, sicut dictum est et veri prophetae non omnia cognoscunt quae in eorum visis aut verbis aut etiam factis Spiritus Sanctus intendit. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam primae rationes loquuntur de veris prophetis, quorum mens divinitus illustratur perfecte.

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Obj. 3: Further, prophecy is directed for man’s enlightenment; wherefore it is written (2 Pet 1:19): We have the more firm prophetical word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a light that shineth in a dark place. Now nothing can enlighten others unless it be lightsome in itself. Therefore it would seem that the prophet is first enlightened so as to know what he declares to others. On the contrary, It is written (John 11:51): And this he (Caiphas) spoke, not of himself, but being the High Priest of that year, he prophesied that Jesus should die for the nation, etc. Now Caiphas knew this not. Therefore not every prophet knows what he prophesies. I answer that, In prophetic revelation the prophet’s mind is moved by the Holy Spirit, as an instrument that is deficient in regard to the principal agent. Now the prophet’s mind is moved not only to apprehend something, but also to speak or to do something; sometimes indeed to all these three together, sometimes to two, sometimes to one only, and in each case there may be a defect in the prophet’s knowledge. For when the prophet’s mind is moved to think or apprehend a thing, sometimes he is led merely to apprehend that thing, and sometimes he is further led to know that it is divinely revealed to him.

Again, sometimes the prophet’s mind is moved to speak something, so that he understands what the Holy Spirit means by the words he utters; like David who said (2 Kgs 23:2): The Spirit of the Lord hath spoken by me; while, on the other hand, sometimes the person whose mind is moved to utter certain words knows not what the Holy Spirit means by them, as was the case with Caiphas (John 11:51). Again, when the Holy Spirit moves a man’s mind to do something, sometimes the latter understands the meaning of it, like Jeremias who hid his loin-cloth in the Euphrates (Jer 13:1–11); while sometimes he does not understand it— thus the soldiers, who divided Christ’s garments, understood not the meaning of what they did. Accordingly, when a man knows that he is being moved by the Holy Spirit to think something, or signify something by word or deed, this belongs properly to prophecy; whereas when he is moved, without his knowing it, this is not perfect prophecy, but a prophetic instinct. Nevertheless it must be observed that since the prophet’s mind is a defective instrument, as stated above, even true prophets know not all that the Holy Spirit means by the things they see, or speak, or even do. And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections, since the arguments given at the beginning refer to true prophets whose minds are perfectly enlightened from above.

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Question 174 The Division of Prophecy Deinde considerandum est de divisione prophetiae. We must now consider the division of prophecy, and Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. under this head there are six points of inquiry: Primo, de divisione prophetiae in suas species. (1) The division of prophecy into its species; Secundo, utrum sit altior prophetia quae est sine (2) Whether the more excellent prophecy is that which imaginaria visione. is without imaginative vision? Tertio, de diversitate graduum prophetiae. (3) The various degrees of prophecy; Quarto, utrum Moyses fuit eximius prophetarum. (4) Whether Moses was the greatest of the prophets? Quinto, utrum aliquis comprehensor possit esse (5) Whether a comprehensor can be a prophet? propheta. Sexto, utrum prophetia creverit per temporis (6) Whether prophecy advanced in perfection as time processum. went on?

Article 1 Whether prophecy is fittingly divided into the prophecy of divine predestination, of foreknowledge, and of denunciation? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter dividatur prophetia in Glossa super Matth. I, ecce virgo in utero habebit, ubi dicitur quod prophetia alia est ex praedestinatione Dei, quam necesse est omnibus modis evenire, ut sine nostro impleatur arbitrio, ut haec de qua hic agitur; alia est ex praescientia Dei, cui nostrum admiscetur arbitrium; alia est quae comminatio dicitur quae fit ob signum divinae animadversionis. Illud enim quod consequitur omnem prophetiam, non debet poni ut membrum dividens prophetiam. Sed omnis prophetia est secundum praescientiam divinam, quia prophetae legunt in libro praescientiae, ut dicit Glossa, Isaiae XXXVIII. Ergo videtur quod non debeat poni una species prophetiae quae est secundum praescientiam. Praeterea, sicuti aliquid prophetatur secundum comminationem, ita etiam secundum promissionem, et utraque variatur. Dicitur enim Ierem. XVIII, repente loquar adversum gentem et adversum regnum, ut eradicem et destruam et disperdam illud, si poenitentiam egerit gens illa a malo suo, agam et ego poenitentiam, et hoc pertinet ad prophetiam comminationis. Et postea subdit de prophetia promissionis, subito loquar de gente et de regno, ut aedificem et plantem illud, si fecerit malum in oculis meis, poenitentiam agam super bono quod locutus sum ut facerem ei. Ergo, sicut ponitur prophetia comminationis, ita debet poni prophetia promissionis.

Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is unfittingly divided according to a gloss on Matt. 1:23, Behold a virgin shall be with child, where it is stated that one kind of prophecy proceeds from the Divine predestination, and must in all respects be accomplished so that its fulfillment is independent of our will, for instance the one in question. Another prophecy proceeds from God’s foreknowledge: and into this our will enters. And another prophecy is called denunciation, which is significative of God’s disapproval. For that which results from every prophecy should not be reckoned a part of prophecy. Now all prophecy is according to the Divine foreknowledge, since the prophets read in the book of foreknowledge, as a gloss says on Isa. 38:1. Therefore it would seem that prophecy according to foreknowledge should not be reckoned a species of prophecy. Obj. 2: Further, just as something is foretold in denunciation, so is something foretold in promise, and both of these are subject to alteration. For it is written (Jer 18:7, 8): I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of their evil, I also will repent—and this pertains to the prophecy of denunciation, and afterwards the text continues in reference to the prophecy of promise (Jer 18:9, 10): I will suddenly speak of a nation and of a kingdom, to build up and plant it. If it shall do evil in My sight . . . I will repent of the good that I have spoken to do unto it. Therefore as there is reckoned to be a prophecy of denunciation, so should there be a prophecy of promise.

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Q. 174, A. 1

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Praeterea, Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., prophetiae genera sunt septem. Primum genus, extasis, quod est mentis excessus, sicut vidit Petrus vas submissum de caelo cum variis animalibus. Secundum genus, visio, sicut apud Isaiam dicentem, vidi dominum sedentem, et cetera. Tertium genus est somnium, sicut Iacob scalam dormiens vidit. Quartum genus est per nubem, sicut ad Moysen loquitur Deus. Quintum genus, vox de caelo, sicut ad Abraham sonuit dicens, ne mittas manum in puerum. Sextum genus, accepta parabola, sicut apud Balaam. Septimum genus, repletio spiritus sancti, sicut pene apud omnes prophetas. Ponit etiam tria genera visionum, unum, secundum oculos corporis; alterum, secundum spiritum imaginarium; tertium, per intuitum mentis. Sed haec non exprimuntur in prius dicta divisione. Ergo est insufficiens. Sed contra est auctoritas Hieronymi, cuius dicitur esse Glossa. Respondeo dicendum quod species habituum et actuum in moralibus distinguuntur secundum obiecta. Obiectum autem prophetiae est id quod est in cognitione divina supra humanam facultatem existens. Et ideo secundum horum differentiam distinguitur prophetia in diversas species, secundum prius dictam divisionem. Dictum est autem supra quod futurum est in divina cognitione dupliciter. Uno modo, prout est in sua causa. Et sic accipitur prophetia comminationis, quae non semper impletur, sed per eam praenuntiatur ordo causae ad effectus, qui quandoque, aliis supervenientibus, impeditur. Alio modo, praecognoscit Deus aliqua in seipsis. Vel ut fienda ab ipso. Et horum est prophetia praedestinationis, quia, secundum Damascenum, Deus praedestinat ea quae non sunt in nobis. Vel ut fienda per liberum arbitrium hominis. Et sic est prophetia praescientiae. Quae potest esse bonorum et malorum, quod non contingit de prophetia praedestinationis, quae est bonorum tantum. Et quia praedestinatio sub praescientia comprehenditur, ideo in Glossa, in principio Psalterii, ponitur tantum duplex prophetiae species, scilicet secundum praescientiam, et secundum comminationem.

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Obj. 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. vii, 8): There are seven kinds of prophecy. The first is an ecstasy, which is the transport of the mind: thus Peter saw a vessel descending from heaven with all manner of beasts therein. The second kind is a vision, as we read in Isaias, who says (Isa 6:1): ‘I saw the Lord sitting,’ etc. The third kind is a dream: thus Jacob in a dream, saw a ladder. The fourth kind is from the midst of a cloud: thus God spake to Moses. The fifth kind is a voice from heaven, as that which called to Abraham saying (Gen 22:11): ‘Lay not thy hand upon the boy.’ The sixth kind is taking up a parable, as in the example of Balaam (Num 23:7; 24:15). The seventh kind is the fullness of the Holy Spirit, as in the case of nearly all the prophets. Further, he mentions three kinds of vision: one by the eyes of the body, another by the soul’s imagination, a third by the eyes of the mind. Now these are not included in the aforesaid division. Therefore it is insufficient. On the contrary, stands the authority of Jerome to whom the gloss above quoted is ascribed. I answer that, The species of moral habits and acts are distinguished according to their objects. Now the object of prophecy is something known by God and surpassing the faculty of man. Wherefore, according to the difference of such things, prophecy is divided into various species, as assigned above. Now it has been stated above (Q. 71, A. 6, ad 2) that the future is contained in the Divine knowledge in two ways. First, as in its cause: and thus we have the prophecy of denunciation, which is not always fulfilled; but it foretells the relation of cause to effect, which is sometimes hindered by some other occurrence supervening. Second, God foreknows certain things in themselves—either as to be accomplished by Himself, and of such things is the prophecy of predestination, since, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 30), God predestines things which are not in our power—or as to be accomplished through man’s freewill, and of such is the prophecy of foreknowledge. This may regard either good or evil, which does not apply to the prophecy of predestination, since the latter regards good alone. And since predestination is comprised under foreknowledge, the gloss in the beginning of the Psalter assigns only two species to prophecy, namely of foreknowledge, and of denunciation. Reply Obj. 1: Foreknowledge, properly speaking, denotes precognition of future events in themselves, and in this sense it is reckoned a species of prophecy. But insofar as it is used in connection with future events, whether as in themselves, or as in their causes, it is common to every species of prophecy.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praescientia proprie dicitur praecognitio futurorum eventuum prout in seipsis sunt, et secundum hoc ponitur species prophetiae. Prout autem dicitur respectu futurorum eventuum sive secundum quod in seipsis sunt sive secundum quod sunt in causis suis, communiter se habet ad omnem speciem prophetiae. Ad secundum dicendum quod prophetia promisReply Obj. 2: The prophecy of promise is included in sionis comprehenditur sub prophetia comminationis, the prophecy of denunciation, because the aspect of truth is quia eadem ratio est veritatis in utraque. Denominatur the same in both. But it is denominated in preference from

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tamen magis a comminatione, quia Deus pronior est ad relaxandum poenam quam ad subtrahendum promissa beneficia. Ad tertium dicendum quod Isidorus distinguit prophetiam secundum modum prophetandi. Qui quidem potest distingui vel secundum potentias cognoscitivas in homine, quae sunt sensus, imaginatio et intellectus. Et sic sumitur triplex visio, quam ponit tam ipse quam Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt. Vel potest sumi secundum differentiam prophetici influxus. Qui quidem, quantum ad illustrationem intellectus, significatur per repletionem spiritus sancti, quam septimo loco ponit. Quantum vero ad impressionem formarum imaginabilium, ponit tria, scilicet somnium, quod ponit tertio loco; et visionem, quae fit in vigilando respectu quorumcumque communium, quam ponit in secundo loco; et extasim, quae fit per elevationem mentis in aliqua altiora, quam ponit primo loco. Quantum vero ad sensibilia signa, ponit tria. Quia sensibile signum aut est aliqua res corporea exterius apparens visui, sicut nubes, quam ponit quarto loco. Aut est vox exterius formata ad auditum hominis delata, quam ponit quinto loco. Aut est vox per hominem formata cum similitudine alicuius rei, quod pertinet ad parabolam, quam ponit sexto loco.

Q. 174, A. 2

denunciation, because God is more inclined to remit punishment than to withdraw promised blessings. Reply Obj. 3: Isidore divides prophecy according to the manner of prophesying. Now we may distinguish the manner of prophesying—either according to man’s cognitive powers, which are sense, imagination, and intellect, and then we have the three kinds of vision mentioned both by him and by Augustine (Gen ad lit. xii, 6, 7)—or according to the different ways in which the prophetic current is received. Thus as regards the enlightening of the intellect there is the fullness of the Holy Spirit which he mentions in the seventh place. As to the imprinting of pictures on the imagination he mentions three, namely dreams, to which he gives the third place; vision, which occurs to the prophet while awake and regards any kind of ordinary object, and this he puts in the second place; and ecstasy, which results from the mind being uplifted to certain lofty things, and to this he assigns the first place. As regards sensible signs he reckons three kinds of prophecy, because a sensible sign is—either a corporeal thing offered externally to the sight, such as a cloud, which he mentions in the fourth place—or a voice sounding from without and conveyed to man’s hearing—this he puts in the fifth place—or a voice proceeding from a man, conveying something under a similitude, and this pertains to the parable to which he assigns the sixth place.

Article 2 Whether the prophecy which is accompanied by intellective and imaginative vision is more excellent than that which is accompanied by intellective vision alone? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod excellentior sit prophetia quae habet visionem intellectualem et imaginariam, quam ea quae habet visionem intellectualem tantum. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt., et habetur in Glossa, I ad Cor. XIV, super illud, spiritus autem loquitur mysteria, minus est propheta qui rerum significatarum solo spiritu videt imagines; et magis est propheta qui solo earum intellectu est praeditus; sed maxime propheta est qui in utroque praecellit. Hoc autem pertinet ad prophetam qui simul habet intellectualem et imaginariam visionem. Ergo huiusmodi prophetia est altior. Praeterea, quanto virtus alicuius rei est maior, tanto ad magis distantia se extendit. Sed lumen propheticum principaliter ad mentem pertinet, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo perfectior videtur esse prophetia quae derivatur usque ad imaginationem, quam illa quae existit in solo intellectu.

Objection 1: It would seem that the prophecy which has intellective and imaginative vision is more excellent than that which is accompanied by intellective vision alone. For Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 9): He is less a prophet, who sees in spirit nothing but the signs representative of things, by means of the images of things corporeal: he is more a prophet, who is merely endowed with the understanding of these signs; but most of all is he a prophet, who excels in both ways, and this refers to the prophet who has intellective together with imaginative vision. Therefore this kind of prophecy is more excellent. Obj. 2: Further, the greater a thing’s power is, the greater the distance to which it extends. Now the prophetic light pertains chiefly to the mind, as stated above (Q. 173, A. 2). Therefore apparently the prophecy that extends to the imagination is greater than that which is confined to the intellect.

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Praeterea, Hieronymus, in prologo libri regum, distinguit prophetas contra Hagiographos. Omnes autem illi quos prophetas nominat, puta Isaias, Ieremias et alii huiusmodi, simul cum intellectuali visione imaginariam habuerunt, non autem illi qui dicuntur Hagiographi, sicut ex inspiratione spiritus sancti scribentes, sicut Iob, David, Salomon et huiusmodi. Ergo videtur quod magis proprie dicuntur prophetae illi qui habent simul visionem imaginariam cum intellectuali, quam illi qui habent intellectualem tantum. Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, I cap. Cael. Hier., quod impossibile est nobis superlucere divinum radium, nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvelatum. Sed prophetica revelatio fit per immissionem divini radii. Ergo videtur quod non possit esse absque phantasmatum velaminibus. Sed contra est quod Glossa dicit, in principio Psalterii, quod ille modus prophetiae ceteris est dignior, quando scilicet ex sola spiritus sancti inspiratione, remoto omni exteriori adminiculo facti vel dicti vel visionis vel somnii, prophetatur. Respondeo dicendum quod dignitas eorum quae sunt ad finem, praecipue consideratur ex fine. Finis autem prophetiae est manifestatio alicuius veritatis supra hominem existentis. Unde quanto huiusmodi manifestatio est potior, tanto prophetia est dignior. Manifestum est autem quod manifestatio veritatis divinae quae fit secundum nudam contemplationem ipsius veritatis, potior est quam illa quae fit sub similitudine corporalium rerum, magis enim appropinquat ad visionem patriae, secundum quam in essentia Dei veritas conspicitur. Et inde est quod prophetia per quam aliqua supernaturalis veritas conspicitur nude secundum intellectualem veritatem, est dignior quam illa in qua veritas supernaturalis manifestatur per similitudinem corporalium rerum secundum imaginariam visionem. Et ex hoc etiam ostenditur mens prophetae sublimior, sicut in doctrina humana auditor ostenditur esse melioris intellectus qui veritatem intelligibilem a magistro nude prolatam capere potest, quam ille qui indiget sensibilibus exemplis ad hoc manuduci. Unde in commendationem prophetiae David dicitur, II Reg. XXIII, mihi locutus est fortis Israel; et postea subdit, sicut lux aurorae, oriente sole, mane absque nubibus rutilat.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quando aliqua supernaturalis veritas revelanda est per similitudines corporales, tunc magis est propheta qui utrumque habet, scilicet lumen intellectuale et imaginariam visionem, quam ille qui habet alterum tantum, quia perfectior est prophetia. Et quantum ad hoc loquitur Augustinus. Sed illa prophetia in qua revelatur nude intelligibilis veritas, est omnibus potior.

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Obj. 3: Further, Jerome (Prol. in Lib. Reg.) distinguishes the prophets from the sacred writers. Now all those whom he calls prophets (such as Isaias, Jeremias, and the like) had intellective together with imaginative vision: but not those whom he calls sacred writers, as writing by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit (such as Job, David, Solomon, and the like). Therefore it would seem more proper to call prophets those who had intellective together with imaginative vision, than those who had intellective vision alone. Obj. 4: Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that it is impossible for the Divine ray to shine on us, except as screened round about by the many-colored sacred veils. Now the prophetic revelation is conveyed by the infusion of the divine ray. Therefore it seems that it cannot be without the veils of phantasms. On the contrary, A gloss says at the beginning of the Psalter that the most excellent manner of prophecy is when a man prophesies by the mere inspiration of the Holy Spirit, apart from any outward assistance of deed, word, vision, or dream. I answer that, The excellence of the means is measured chiefly by the end. Now the end of prophecy is the manifestation of a truth that surpasses the faculty of man. Wherefore the more effective this manifestation is, the more excellent the prophecy. But it is evident that the manifestation of divine truth by means of the bare contemplation of the truth itself, is more effective than that which is conveyed under the similitude of corporeal things, for it approaches nearer to the heavenly vision whereby the truth is seen in God’s essence. Hence it follows that the prophecy whereby a supernatural truth is seen by intellectual vision, is more excellent than that in which a supernatural truth is manifested by means of the similitudes of corporeal things in the vision of the imagination. Moreover the prophet’s mind is shown thereby to be more lofty: even as in human teaching the hearer, who is able to grasp the bare intelligible truth the master propounds, is shown to have a better understanding than one who needs to be taken by the hand and helped by means of examples taken from objects of sense. Hence it is said in commendation of David’s prophecy (2 Kgs 23:3): The strong one of Israel spoke to me, and further on (2 Kgs 23:4): As the light of the morning, when the sun riseth, shineth in the morning without clouds. Reply Obj. 1: When a particular supernatural truth has to be revealed by means of corporeal images, he that has both, namely the intellectual light and the imaginary vision, is more a prophet than he that has only one, because his prophecy is more perfect; and it is in this sense that Augustine speaks as quoted above. Nevertheless the prophecy in which the bare intelligible truth is revealed is greater than all.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod aliud est iudicium de his quae propter se quaeruntur, et de his quae quaeruntur propter aliud. In his enim quae propter se quaeruntur, quanto virtus agentis ad plura et remotiora se extendit, tanto potior est, sicut medicus reputatur melior qui potest plures, et magis a sanitate distantes sanare. In his autem quae non quaeruntur nisi propter aliud, quanto agens potest ex paucioribus et propinquioribus ad suum intentum pervenire, tanto videtur esse maioris virtutis, sicut magis laudatur medicus qui per pauciora et leviora potest sanare infirmum. Visio autem imaginaria in cognitione prophetica non requiritur propter se, sed propter manifestationem intelligibilis veritatis. Et ideo tanto potior est prophetia, quanto minus ea indiget.

Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse simpliciter melius, quod tamen minus proprie recipit alicuius praedicationem, sicut cognitio patriae est nobilior quam cognitio viae, quae tamen magis proprie dicitur fides, eo quod nomen fidei importat imperfectionem cognitionis. Similiter autem prophetia importat quandam obscuritatem et remotionem ab intelligibili veritate. Et ideo magis proprie dicuntur prophetae qui vident per imaginariam visionem, quamvis illa prophetia sit nobilior quae est per intellectualem visionem, dum tamen sit eadem veritas utrobique revelata. Si vero lumen intellectuale alicui divinitus infundatur non ad cognoscendum aliqua supernaturalia, sed ad iudicandum secundum certitudinem veritatis divinae ea quae humana ratione cognosci possunt; sic talis prophetia intellectualis est infra illam quae est cum imaginaria visione ducente in supernaturalem veritatem; cuiusmodi prophetiam habuerunt omnes illi qui numerantur in ordine prophetarum. Qui etiam ex hoc specialiter dicuntur prophetae, quia prophetico officio fungebantur, unde et ex persona domini loquebantur, dicentes ad populum, haec dicit dominus; quod non faciebant illi qui Hagiographa conscripserunt, quorum plures loquebantur frequentius de his quae humana ratione cognosci possunt, non quasi ex persona Dei, sed ex persona propria, cum adiutorio tamen divini luminis. Ad quartum dicendum quod illustratio divini radii in vita praesenti non fit sine velaminibus phantasmatum qualiumcumque, quia connaturale est homini, secundum statum praesentis vitae, ut non intelligat sine phantasmate. Quandoque tamen sufficiunt phantasmata quae communi modo a sensibus abstrahuntur, nec exigitur aliqua visio imaginaria divinitus procurata. Et sic dicitur revelatio prophetica fieri sine imaginaria visione.

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Reply Obj. 2: The same judgment does not apply to things that are sought for their own sake, as to things sought for the sake of something else. For in things sought for their own sake, the agent’s power is the more effective according as it extends to more numerous and more remote objects; even so a physician is thought more of, if he is able to heal more people, and those who are further removed from health. On the other hand, in things sought only for the sake of something else, that agent would seem to have greater power, who is able to achieve his purpose with fewer means and those nearest to hand: thus more praise is awarded the physician who is able to heal a sick person by means of fewer and more gentle remedies. Now, in the prophetic knowledge, imaginary vision is required, not for its own sake, but on account of the manifestation of the intelligible truth. Wherefore prophecy is all the more excellent according as it needs it less. Reply Obj. 3: The fact that a particular predicate is applicable to one thing and less properly to another, does not prevent this latter from being simply better than the former: thus the knowledge of the blessed is more excellent than the knowledge of the wayfarer, although faith is more properly predicated of the latter knowledge, because faith implies an imperfection of knowledge. In like manner prophecy implies a certain obscurity, and remoteness from the intelligible truth; wherefore the name of prophet is more properly applied to those who see by imaginary vision. And yet the more excellent prophecy is that which is conveyed by intellectual vision, provided the same truth be revealed in either case. If, however, the intellectual light be divinely infused in a person, not that he may know some supernatural things, but that he may be able to judge, with the certitude of divine truth, of things that can be known by human reason, such intellectual prophecy is beneath that which is conveyed by an imaginary vision leading to a supernatural truth. It was this kind of prophecy that all those had who are included in the ranks of the prophets, who moreover were called prophets for the special reason that they exercised the prophetic calling officially. Hence they spoke as God’s representatives, saying to the people: Thus saith the Lord: but not so the authors of the sacred writings, several of whom treated more frequently of things that can be known by human reason, not in God’s name, but in their own, yet with the assistance of the Divine light withal. Reply Obj. 4: In the present life the enlightenment by the divine ray is not altogether without any veil of phantasms, because according to his present state of life it is unnatural to man not to understand without a phantasm. Sometimes, however, it is sufficient to have phantasms abstracted in the usual way from the senses without any imaginary vision divinely vouchsafed, and thus prophetic vision is said to be without imaginary vision.

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Article 3 Whether the degrees of prophecy can be distinguished according to the imaginary vision? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod gradus prophetiae non possint distingui secundum visionem imaginariam. Gradus enim alicuius rei non attenditur secundum id quod est propter aliud, sed secundum id quod est propter se. In prophetia autem propter quaeritur visio intellectualis, propter aliud autem visio imaginaria, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod gradus prophetiae non distinguantur secundum imaginariam visionem, sed solum secundum intellectualem. Praeterea, unius prophetae videtur esse unus gradus prophetiae. Sed uni prophetae fit revelatio secundum diversas imaginarias visiones. Ergo diversitas imaginariae visionis non diversificat gradus prophetiae. Praeterea, secundum Glossam, in principio Psalterii, prophetia consistit in dictis et factis, somnio et visione. Non ergo debet prophetiae gradus magis distingui secundum imaginariam visionem, ad quam pertinet visio et somnium, quam secundum dicta et facta. Sed contra est quod medium diversificat gradus cognitionis, sicut scientia propter quid est altior, eo quod est per nobilius medium, quam scientia quia, vel etiam quam opinio. Sed visio imaginaria in cognitione prophetica est sicut quoddam medium. Ergo gradus prophetiae distingui debent secundum imaginariam visionem. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, prophetia in qua per lumen intelligibile revelatur aliqua supernaturalis veritas per imaginariam visionem, medium gradum tenet inter illam prophetiam in qua revelatur supernaturalis veritas absque imaginaria visione, et illam in qua per lumen intelligibile absque imaginaria visione dirigitur homo ad ea cognoscenda vel agenda quae pertinent ad humanam conversationem. Magis autem est proprium prophetiae cognitio quam operatio. Et ideo infimus gradus prophetiae est cum aliquis ex interiori instinctu movetur ad aliqua exterius facienda, sicut de Samsone dicitur, Iudic. XV, quod irruit spiritus domini in eum, et sicut solent ad ardorem ignis ligna consumi, ita et vincula quibus ligatus erat, dissipata sunt et soluta. Secundus autem gradus prophetiae est cum aliquis ex interiori lumine illustratur ad cognoscendum aliqua quae tamen non excedunt limites naturalis cognitionis, sicut dicitur de Salomone, III Reg. IV, quod locutus est parabolas, et disputavit super lignis, a cedro quae est in Libano usque ad hyssopum quae egreditur de pariete, et disseruit de iumentis et volucribus et reptilibus et piscibus. Et hoc totum fuit ex divina inspiratione, nam praemittitur, de-

Objection 1: It would seem that the degrees of prophecy cannot be distinguished according to the imaginary vision. For the degrees of a thing bear relation to something that is on its own account, not on account of something else. Now, in prophecy, intellectual vision is sought on its own account, and imaginary vision on account of something else, as stated above (A. 2, ad 2). Therefore it would seem that the degrees of prophecy are distinguished not according to imaginary, but only according to intellectual, vision. Obj. 2: Further, seemingly for one prophet there is one degree of prophecy. Now one prophet receives revelation through various imaginary visions. Therefore a difference of imaginary visions does not entail a difference of prophecy. Obj. 3: Further, according to a gloss, prophecy consists of words, deeds, dreams, and visions. Therefore the degrees of prophecy should not be distinguished according to imaginary vision, to which vision and dreams pertain, rather than according to words and deeds. On the contrary, The medium differentiates the degrees of knowledge: thus science based on direct proofs is more excellent than science based on indirect premises or than opinion, because it comes through a more excellent medium. Now imaginary vision is a kind of medium in prophetic knowledge. Therefore the degrees of prophecy should be distinguished according to imaginary vision. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 173, A. 2), the prophecy wherein, by the intelligible light, a supernatural truth is revealed through an imaginary vision, holds the mean between the prophecy wherein a supernatural truth is revealed without imaginary vision, and that wherein through the intelligible light and without an imaginary vision, man is directed to know or do things pertaining to human conduct. Now knowledge is more proper to prophecy than is action; wherefore the lowest degree of prophecy is when a man, by an inward instinct, is moved to perform some outward action. Thus it is related of Samson (Judg 15:14) that the Spirit of the Lord came strongly upon him, and as the flax is wont to be consumed at the approach of fire, so the bands with which he was bound were broken and loosed. The second degree of prophecy is when a man is enlightened by an inward light so as to know certain things, which, however, do not go beyond the bounds of natural knowledge: thus it is related of Solomon (3 Kgs 4:32, 33) that he spoke . . . parables . . . and he treated about trees from the cedar that is in Libanus unto the hyssop that cometh out of the wall, and he discoursed of beasts and of fowls, and of creeping things and of fishes: and all of this came from di-

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Q. 174, A. 3

dit Deus sapientiam Salomoni, et prudentiam multam ni- vine inspiration, for it was stated previously (3 Kgs 4:29): mis. God gave to Solomon wisdom and understanding exceeding much. Hi tamen duo gradus sunt infra prophetiam proprie Nevertheless these two degrees are beneath prophecy dictam, quia non attingunt ad supernaturalem verita- properly so called, because they do not attain to supertem. Illa autem prophetia in qua manifestatur superna- natural truth. The prophecy wherein supernatural truth is turalis veritas per imaginariam visionem, diversificatur manifested through imaginary vision is differentiated first primo, secundum differentiam somnii, quod fit in dor- according to the difference between dreams which occur miendo; et visionis, quae fit in vigilando. Quae pertinet during sleep, and vision which occurs while one is awake. ad altiorem gradum prophetiae, quia maior vis prophe- The latter belongs to a higher degree of prophecy, since tici luminis esse videtur quae animam occupatam cir- the prophetic light that draws the soul away to superca sensibilia in vigilando abstrahit ad supernaturalia, natural things while it is awake and occupied with senquam illa quae animam hominis abstractam a sensi- sible things would seem to be stronger than that which bilibus invenit in dormiendo. Secundo autem diversi- finds a man’s soul asleep and withdrawn from objects of ficantur gradus prophetiae quantum ad expressionem sense. Second the degrees of this prophecy are differensignorum imaginabilium quibus veritas intelligibilis ex- tiated according to the expressiveness of the imaginary primitur. Et quia signa maxime expressa intelligibilis signs whereby the intelligible truth is conveyed. And since veritatis sunt verba ideo altior gradus prophetiae videtur words are the most expressive signs of intelligible truth, it quando propheta audit verba exprimentia intelligibilem would seem to be a higher degree of prophecy when the veritatem, sive in vigilando sive in dormiendo, quam prophet, whether awake or asleep, hears words expressive quando videt aliquas res significativas veritatis, sicut of an intelligible truth, than when he sees things significaseptem spicae plenae significant septem annos uberta- tive of truth, for instance the seven full ears of corn sigtis. In quibus etiam signis tanto videtur prophetia esse nified seven years of plenty (Gen 41:22, 26). In such like altior, quanto signa sunt magis expressa, sicut quod Ie- signs prophecy would seem to be the more excellent, acremias vidit incendium civitatis sub similitudine ollae cording as the signs are more expressive, for instance when succensae, sicut dicitur Ierem. I. Tertio autem ostenditur Jeremias saw the burning of the city under the figure of esse altior gradus prophetiae quando propheta non so- a boiling cauldron (Jer 1:13). Third, it is evidently a still lum videt signa verborum vel factorum, sed etiam videt, higher degree of prophecy when a prophet not only sees in vigilando vel in dormiendo, aliquem sibi colloquen- signs of words or deeds, but also, either awake or asleep, tem aut aliquid demonstrantem, quia per hoc ostenditur sees someone speaking or showing something to him, since quod mens prophetae magis appropinquat ad causam this proves the prophet’s mind to have approached nearer to revelantem. Quarto autem potest attendi altitudo gradus the cause of the revelation. Fourth, the height of a degree of prophetalis ex conditione eius qui videtur. Nam altior prophecy may be measured according to the appearance of gradus prophetiae est si ille qui loquitur vel demonstrat, the person seen: for it is a higher degree of prophecy, if he videatur, in vigilando vel dormiendo, in specie Angeli, who speaks or shows something to the waking or sleeping quam si videatur in specie hominis. Et adhuc altior si prophet be seen by him under the form of an angel, than if videatur, in dormiendo vel vigilando, in specie Dei, se- he be seen by him under the form of man: and higher still is cundum illud Isaiae VI, vidi dominum sedentem. it, if he be seen by the prophet whether asleep or awake, under the appearance of God, according to Isa. 6:1, I saw the Lord sitting. Super omnes autem hos gradus est tertium genus But above all these degrees there is a third kind of prophetiae, in quo intelligibilis veritas et supernaturalis prophecy, wherein an intelligible and supernatural truth is absque imaginaria visione ostenditur. Quae tamen exce- shown without any imaginary vision. However, this goes dit rationem prophetiae proprie dictae, ut dictum est. Et beyond the bounds of prophecy properly so called, as ideo consequens est quod gradus prophetiae proprie dic- stated above (A. 2, ad 3); and consequently the degrees of tae distinguantur secundum imaginariam visionem. prophecy are properly distinguished according to imaginary vision. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod discretio luminis Reply Obj. 1: We are unable to know how to distinintelligibilis non potest a nobis cognosci nisi secundum guish the intellectual light, except by means of imaginary or quod iudicatur per aliqua signa imaginaria vel sensibilia. sensible signs. Hence the difference in the intellectual light Et ideo ex diversitate imaginatorum perpenditur diversi- is gathered from the difference in the things presented to tas intellectualis luminis. the imagination. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 171, A. 2), prophecy est, prophetia non est per modum habitus immanentis, is by way, not of an abiding habit, but of a transitory pas-

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sed magis per modum passionis transeuntis. Unde non est inconveniens quod uni et eidem prophetae fiat revelatio prophetica diversis vicibus secundum diversos gradus. Ad tertium dicendum quod dicta et facta de quibus ibi fit mentio, non pertinent ad revelationem prophetiae, sed ad denuntiationem, quae fit secundum dispositionem eorum quibus denuntiatur id quod prophetae revelatum est; et hoc fit quandoque per dicta, quandoque per facta. Denuntiatio autem et operatio miraculorum consequenter se habent ad prophetiam, ut supra dictum est.

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sion; wherefore there is nothing inconsistent if one and the same prophet, at different times, receive various degrees of prophetic revelation. Reply Obj. 3: The words and deeds mentioned there do not pertain to the prophetic revelation, but to the announcement, which is made according to the disposition of those to whom that which is revealed to the prophet is announced; and this is done sometimes by words, sometimes by deeds. Now this announcement, and the working of miracles, are something consequent upon prophecy, as stated above (Q. 171, A. 1).

Article 4 Whether Moses was the greatest of the prophets? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Moyses non fuerit excellentior omnibus prophetis. Dicit enim Glossa, in principio Psalterii, quod David dicitur propheta per excellentiam. Non ergo Moyses fuit excellentissimus omnium. Praeterea, maiora miracula facta sunt per Iosue, qui fecit stare solem et lunam, ut habetur Iosue X, et per Isaiam, qui fecit retrocedere solem, ut habetur Isaiae XXXVIII, quam per Moysen, qui divisit mare rubrum. Similiter etiam per Eliam, de quo dicitur, Eccli. XLVIII, quis poterit tibi similiter gloriari, qui sustulisti mortuum ab Inferis? Non ergo Moyses fuit excellentissimus prophetarum. Praeterea, Matth. XI dicitur quod inter natos mulierum non surrexit maior Ioanne Baptista. Non ergo Moyses fuit excellentior omnibus prophetis. Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. ult., non surrexit propheta ultra in Israel sicut Moyses. Respondeo dicendum quod, licet quantum ad aliquid aliquis alius prophetarum fuerit maior Moyse, simpliciter tamen Moyses fuit omnibus maior. In prophetia enim, sicut ex praedictis patet, consideratur et cognitio, tam secundum visionem intellectualem quam secundum visionem imaginariam; et denuntiatio; et confirmatio per miracula. Moyses ergo fuit aliis excellentior, primo quidem, quantum ad visionem intellectualem, eo quod vidit ipsam Dei essentiam, sicut Paulus in raptu; sicut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt. Unde dicitur, Num. XII, quod palam, non per aenigmata Deum videt. Secundo, quantum ad imaginariam visionem, quam quasi ad nutum habebat, non solum audiens verba, sed etiam videns loquentem, etiam in specie Dei, non solum in dormiendo, sed etiam in vigilando. Unde dicitur Exod. XXXIII, quod loquebatur ei dominus facie ad faciem,

Objection 1: It would seem that Moses was not the greatest of the prophets. For a gloss at the beginning of the Psalter says that David is called the prophet by way of excellence. Therefore Moses was not the greatest of all. Obj. 2: Further, greater miracles were wrought by Josue, who made the sun and moon to stand still (Josh 10:12–14), and by Isaias, who made the sun to turn back (Isa 38:8), than by Moses, who divided the Red Sea (Exod 14:21). In like manner greater miracles were wrought by Elias, of whom it is written (Sir 48:4, 5): Who can glory like to thee? Who raisedst up a dead man from below. Therefore Moses was not the greatest of the prophets. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt 11:11) that there hath not risen, among them that are born of women, a greater than John the Baptist. Therefore Moses was not greater than all the prophets. On the contrary, It is written (Deut 34:10): There arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses. I answer that, Although in some respect one or other of the prophets was greater than Moses, yet Moses was simply the greatest of all. For, as stated above (A. 3; Q. 171, A. 1), in prophecy we may consider not only the knowledge, whether by intellectual or by imaginary vision, but also the announcement and the confirmation by miracles. Accordingly Moses was greater than the other prophets. First, as regards the intellectual vision, since he saw God’s very essence, even as Paul in his rapture did, according to Augustine (Gen ad lit. xii, 27). Hence it is written (Num 12:8) that he saw God plainly and not by riddles. Second, as regards the imaginary vision, which he had at his call, as it were, for not only did he hear words, but also saw one speaking to him under the form of God, and this not only while asleep, but even when he was awake. Hence it is written (Exod 33:11) that the Lord spoke to Moses face to

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sicut homo solet loqui cum amico suo. Tertio, quantum ad denuntiationem, quia loquebatur toti populo fidelium ex persona Dei quasi de novo legem proponens; alii vero prophetae loquebantur ad populum in persona Dei quasi inducentes ad observantiam legis Moysi, secundum illud Malach. IV, mementote legis Moysi, servi mei. Quarto, quantum ad operationem miraculorum, quae fecit toti uni populo infidelium. Unde dicitur Deut. ult., non surrexit ultra propheta in Israel sicut Moyses, quem nosset dominus facie ad faciem, in omnibus signis atque portentis quae per eum misit ut faceret in terra Aegypti, Pharaoni et omnibus servis eius, universaeque terrae illius. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prophetia David ex propinquo attingit visionem Moysi quantum ad visionem intellectualem, quia uterque accepit revelationem intelligibilis et supernaturalis veritatis absque imaginaria visione. Visio tamen Moysi fuit excellentior quantum ad cognitionem divinitatis, sed David plenius cognovit et expressit mysteria incarnationis Christi. Ad secundum dicendum quod illa signa illorum prophetarum fuerunt maiora secundum substantiam facti, sed tamen miracula Moysi fuerunt maiora secundum modum faciendi, quia sunt facta toti populo. Ad tertium dicendum quod Ioannes pertinet ad novum testamentum, cuius ministri praeferuntur etiam ipsi Moysi, quasi magis revelate speculantes, ut habetur II ad Cor. III.

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face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend. Third, as regards announcement, since he spoke to the whole of the faithful people in the person of God as setting forth the new law; other prophets spoke in the person of God as leading to the observance of the law of Moses, according to Malach. IV, remember the law of Moses, my servant. Fourth, as regards the working of miracles which he wrought on a whole nation of unbelievers. Wherefore it is written (Deut 34:10, 11): There arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face: in all the signs and wonders, which He sent by him, to do in the land of Egypt to Pharaoh, and to all his servants, and to his whole land. Reply Obj. 1: The prophecy of David approaches near to the vision of Moses, as regards the intellectual vision, because both received a revelation of intelligible and supernatural truth, without any imaginary vision. Yet the vision of Moses was more excellent as regards the knowledge of the Godhead; while David more fully knew and expressed the mysteries of Christ’s incarnation. Reply Obj. 2: These signs of the prophets mentioned were greater as to the substance of the thing done; yet the miracles of Moses were greater as regards the way in which they were done, since they were wrought on a whole people. Reply Obj. 3: John belongs to the New Testament, whose ministers take precedence even of Moses, since they are spectators of a fuller revelation, as stated in 2 Cor. 3.

Article 5 Whether there is a degree of prophecy in the blessed? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod etiam aliquis gradus prophetiae est in beatis. Moyses enim, ut dictum est, vidit divinam essentiam. Qui tamen propheta dicitur. Ergo, pari ratione, beati possunt dici prophetae. Praeterea, prophetia est divina revelatio. Sed divinae revelationes fiunt etiam Angelis beatis. Ergo etiam Angeli beati possunt dici prophetae. Praeterea, Christus ab instanti conceptionis fuit comprehensor. Et tamen ipse prophetam se nominat, Matth. XIII, ubi dicit, non est propheta sine honore nisi in patria sua. Ergo etiam comprehensores et beati possunt dici prophetae. Praeterea, de Samuele dicitur, Eccli. XLVI, exaltavit vocem eius de terra in prophetia, delere impietatem gentis. Ergo, eadem ratione, alii sancti post mortem possunt dici prophetae. Sed contra est quod II Pet. I, sermo propheticus comparatur lucernae lucenti in caliginoso loco. Sed in beatis nulla est caligo. Ergo non possunt dici prophetae.

Objection 1: It would seem that there is a degree of prophecy in the blessed. For, as stated above (A. 4), Moses saw the Divine essence, and yet he is called a prophet. Therefore in like manner the blessed can be called prophets. Obj. 2: Further, prophecy is a divine revelation. Now divine revelations are made even to the blessed angels. Therefore even blessed angels can be prophets. Obj. 3: Further, Christ was a comprehensor from the moment of His conception; and yet He calls Himself a prophet (Matt 13:57), when He says: A prophet is not without honor, save in his own country. Therefore even comprehensors and the blessed can be called prophets. Obj. 4: Further, it is written of Samuel (Sir 46:23): He lifted up his voice from the earth in prophecy to blot out the wickedness of the nation. Therefore other saints can likewise be called prophets after they have died. On the contrary, The prophetic word is compared (2 Pet 1:19) to a light that shineth in a dark place. Now there is no darkness in the blessed. Therefore they cannot be called prophets.

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Respondeo dicendum quod prophetia importat visionem quandam alicuius supernaturalis veritatis ut procul existentis. Quod quidem contingit esse dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius cognitionis, quia videlicet veritas supernaturalis non cognoscitur in seipsa, sed in aliquibus suis effectibus. Et adhuc erit magis procul si hoc fit per figuras corporalium rerum, quam per intelligibiles effectus. Et talis maxime est visio prophetica quae fit per similitudines corporalium rerum. Alio modo visio est procul ex parte ipsius videntis, qui scilicet non est totaliter in ultimam perfectionem adductus, secundum illud II ad Cor. V, quandiu in corpore sumus, peregrinamur a domino. Neutro autem modo beati sunt procul. Unde non possunt dici prophetae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod visio illa Moysi fuit raptim, per modum passionis, non autem permanens, per modum beatitudinis. Unde adhuc videns erat procul. Propter hoc, non totaliter talis visio amittit rationem prophetiae. Ad secundum dicendum quod Angelis fit revelatio divina non sicut procul existentibus, sed sicut iam totaliter Deo coniunctis. Unde talis revelatio non habet rationem prophetiae. Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus simul erat comprehensor et viator. Inquantum ergo erat comprehensor, non competit sibi ratio prophetiae, sed solum inquantum erat viator. Ad quartum dicendum quod etiam Samuel nondum pervenerat ad statum beatitudinis. Unde et, si voluntate Dei ipsa anima Samuelis Sauli eventum belli praenuntiavit, Deo sibi hoc revelante, pertinet ad rationem prophetiae. Non est autem eadem ratio de sanctis qui sunt modo in patria. Nec obstat quod arte Daemonum hoc dicitur factum. Quia etsi Daemones animam alicuius sancti evocare non possunt, neque cogere ad aliquid agendum; potest tamen hoc fieri divina virtute ut, dum Daemon consulitur, ipse Deus per suum nuntium veritatem enuntiat, sicut per Eliam veritatem respondit nuntiis regis qui mittebantur ad consulendum Deum Accaron, ut habetur IV Reg. I. Quamvis etiam dici possit quod non fuerit anima Samuelis, sed Daemon ex persona eius loquens, quem sapiens Samuelem nominat, et eius praenuntiationem prophetiam, secundum opinionem Saulis et adstantium, qui ita opinabantur.

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I answer that, Prophecy denotes vision of some supernatural truth as being far remote from us. This happens in two ways. First, on the part of the knowledge itself, because, to wit, the supernatural truth is not known in itself, but in some of its effects; and this truth will be more remote if it be known by means of images of corporeal things, than if it be known in its intelligible effects; and such most of all is the prophetic vision, which is conveyed by images and likenesses of corporeal things. Second, vision is remote on the part of the seer, because, to wit, he has not yet attained completely to his ultimate perfection, according to 2 Cor. 5:6, While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord. Now in neither of these ways are the blessed remote; wherefore they cannot be called prophets. Reply Obj. 1: This vision of Moses was interrupted after the manner of a passion, and was not permanent like the beatific vision, wherefore he was as yet a seer from afar. For this reason his vision did not entirely lose the character of prophecy. Reply Obj. 2: The divine revelation is made to the angels, not as being far distant, but as already wholly united to God; wherefore their revelation has not the character of prophecy. Reply Obj. 3: Christ was at the same time comprehensor and wayfarer. Consequently the notion of prophecy is not applicable to Him as a comprehensor, but only as a wayfarer. Reply Obj. 4: Samuel had not yet attained to the state of blessedness. Wherefore although by God’s will the soul itself of Samuel foretold to Saul the issue of the war as revealed to him by God, this pertains to the nature of prophecy. It is not the same with the saints who are now in heaven. Nor does it make any difference that this is stated to have been brought about by the demons’ art, because although the demons are unable to evoke the soul of a saint, or to force it to do any particular thing, this can be done by the power of God, so that when the demon is consulted, God Himself declares the truth by His messenger: even as He gave a true answer by Elias to the King’s messengers who were sent to consult the god of Accaron (4 Kgs 1). It might also be replied that it was not the soul of Samuel, but a demon impersonating him; and that the wise man calls him Samuel, and describes his prediction as prophetic, in accordance with the thoughts of Saul and the bystanders who were of this opinion.

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Article 6 Whether the degrees of prophecy change as time goes on? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gradus prophetiae varientur secundum temporis processum. Prophetia enim ordinatur ad cognitionem divinorum, ut ex dictis patet. Sed sicut Gregorius dicit, per successiones temporum crevit divinae cognitionis augmentum. Ergo et gradus prophetiae secundum processum temporum debent distingui. Praeterea, revelatio prophetica fit per modum divinae allocutionis ad hominem, a prophetis autem ea quae sunt eis revelata denuntiantur et verbo et scripto. Dicitur autem I Reg. III, quod ante Samuelem, sermo domini erat pretiosus, idest rarus, qui tamen postea ad multos factus est. Similiter etiam non inveniuntur libri prophetarum esse conscripti ante tempus Isaiae, cui dictum est, sume tibi librum grandem, et scribe in eo stylo hominis, ut patet Isaiae VIII, post quod tempus plures prophetae suas prophetias conscripserunt. Ergo videtur quod secundum processum temporum profecerit prophetiae gradus. Praeterea, dominus dicit, Matth. XI, lex et prophetae usque ad Ioannem prophetaverunt. Postmodum autem fuit donum prophetiae in discipulis Christi multo excellentius quam fuerit in antiquis prophetis, secundum illud Ephes. III, aliis generationibus non est agnitum filiis hominum, scilicet mysterium Christi, sicut nunc revelatum est sanctis apostolis eius et prophetis in spiritu. Ergo videtur quod secundum processum temporis creverit prophetiae gradus. Sed contra est quia Moyses fuit excellentissimus prophetarum, ut dictum est, qui tamen alios prophetas praecessit. Ergo gradus prophetiae non profecit secundum temporis processum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, prophetia ordinatur ad cognitionem divinae veritatis, per cuius contemplationem non solum in fide instruimur, sed etiam in nostris operibus gubernamur, secundum illud Psalmi, emitte lucem tuam et veritatem tuam, ipsa me deduxerunt. Fides autem nostra in duobus principaliter consistit, primo quidem in vera Dei cognitione, secundum illud Heb. XI, accedentem ad Deum oportet credere quia est; secundo, in mysterio incarnationis Christi, secundum illud Ioan. XIV, creditis in Deum, et in me credite. Si ergo de prophetia loquamur inquantum ordinatur ad fidem deitatis, sic quidem crevit secundum tres temporum distinctiones, scilicet ante legem, sub lege, et sub gratia. Nam ante legem, Abraham et alii patres prophetice sunt instructi de his quae pertinent ad fidem deitatis. Unde et prophetae nominantur, secundum illud Psalmi, in prophetis meis nolite malignari, quod specialiter dicitur propter Abraham et Isaac. Sub lege autem,

Objection 1: It would seem that the degrees of prophecy change as time goes on. For prophecy is directed to the knowledge of Divine things, as stated above (A. 2). Now according to Gregory (Hom. in Ezech.), Knowledge of God went on increasing as time went on. Therefore degrees of prophecy should be distinguished according to the process of time. Obj. 2: Further, prophetic revelation is conveyed by God speaking to man; while the prophets declared both in words and in writing the things revealed to them. Now it is written (1 Kgs 3:1) that before the time of Samuel the word of the Lord was precious, i.e., rare; and yet afterwards it was delivered to many. In like manner the books of the prophets do not appear to have been written before the time of Isaias, to whom it was said (Isa 8:1): Take thee a great book and write in it with a man’s pen, after which many prophets wrote their prophecies. Therefore it would seem that in course of time the degree of prophecy made progress. Obj. 3: Further, our Lord said (Matt 11:13): The prophets and the law prophesied until John; and afterwards the gift of prophecy was in Christ’s disciples in a much more excellent manner than in the prophets of old, according to Eph. 3:5, In other generations the mystery of Christ was not known to the sons of men, as it is now revealed to His holy apostles and prophets in the Spirit. Therefore it would seem that in course of time the degree of prophecy advanced. On the contrary, As stated above (A. 4), Moses was the greatest of the prophets, and yet he preceded the other prophets. Therefore prophecy did not advance in degree as time went on. I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), prophecy is directed to the knowledge of Divine truth, by the contemplation of which we are not only instructed in faith, but also guided in our actions, according to Ps. 42:3, Send forth Thy light and Thy truth: they have conducted me. Now our faith consists chiefly in two things: first, in the true knowledge of God, according to Heb. 11:6, He that cometh to God must believe that He is; second, in the mystery of Christ’s incarnation, according to John 14:1, You believe in God, believe also in Me. Accordingly, if we speak of prophecy as directed to the Godhead as its end, it progressed according to three divisions of time, namely before the law, under the law, and under grace. For before the law, Abraham and the other patriarchs were prophetically taught things pertinent to faith in the Godhead. Hence they are called prophets, according to Ps. 104:15, Do no evil to My prophets, which words are said especially on behalf of Abraham and Isaac. Under the Law prophetic revelation of things pertinent to faith in the

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facta est revelatio prophetica de his quae pertinent ad fidem deitatis excellentius quam ante, quia iam oportebat circa hoc instrui non solum speciales personas aut quasdam familias, sed totum populum. Unde dominus dicit Moysi, Exod. VI, ego dominus, qui apparui Abraham, Isaac et Iacob in Deo omnipotente, et nomen meum Adonai non indicavi eis, quia scilicet praecedentes patres fuerunt instructi in communi de omnipotentia unius Dei, sed Moyses postea plenius fuit instructus de simplicitate divinae essentiae, cum dictum est ei, Exod. III, ego sum qui sum; quod quidem nomen significatur a Iudaeis per hoc nomen Adonai, propter venerationem illius ineffabilis nominis. Postmodum vero, tempore gratiae, ab ipso filio Dei revelatum est mysterium Trinitatis, secundum illud Matth. ult., euntes, docete omnes gentes, baptizantes eos in nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti. In singulis tamen statibus prima revelatio excellentior fuit. Prima autem revelatio ante legem facta est Abrahae, cuius tempore coeperunt homines a fide unius Dei deviare, ad idololatriam declinando, ante autem non erat necessaria talis revelatio, omnibus in cultu unius Dei persistentibus. Isaac vero facta est inferior revelatio, quasi fundata super revelatione facta Abrahae, unde dictum est ei, Gen. XXVI, ego sum Deus patris tui Abraham. Et similiter ad Iacob dictum, Gen. XXVIII, ego sum Deus Abraham, patris tui, et Deus Isaac. Similiter etiam in statu legis, prima revelatio facta Moysi fuit excellentior, supra quam fundatur omnis alia prophetarum revelatio. Ita etiam in tempore gratiae, super revelatione facta apostolis de fide unitatis et Trinitatis fundatur tota fides Ecclesiae, secundum illud Matth. XVI, super hanc petram, scilicet confessionis tuae, aedificabo Ecclesiam meam.

Quantum vero ad fidem incarnationis Christi, manifestum est quod quanto fuerunt Christo propinquiores, sive ante sive post, ut plurimum, plenius de hoc instructi fuerunt. Post tamen plenius quam ante, ut apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. III. Quantum vero ad directionem humanorum actuum, prophetica revelatio diversificata est, non secundum temporis processum, sed secundum conditionem negotiorum, quia, ut dicitur Prov. XXIX, cum defecerit prophetia, dissipabitur populus. Et ideo quolibet tempore instructi sunt homines divinitus de agendis, secundum quod erat expediens ad salutem electorum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dictum Gregorii est intelligendum de tempore ante Christi incarnationem, quantum ad cognitionem huius mysterii. Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut Augustinus dicit, XVIII de Civ. Dei, quemadmodum regni Assyriorum primo tempore extitit Abraham, cui promissiones apertissimae fierent; ita in Occidentalis Babylonis, idest

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Godhead was made in a yet more excellent way than hitherto, because then not only certain special persons or families but the whole people had to be instructed in these matters. Hence the Lord said to Moses (Exod 6:2, 3): I am the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, by the name of God almighty, and My name Adonai I did not show to them; because previously the patriarchs had been taught to believe in a general way in God, one and Almighty, while Moses was more fully instructed in the simplicity of the Divine essence, when it was said to him (Exod 3:14): I am Who am; and this name is signified by Jews in the word Adonai on account of their veneration for that unspeakable name. Afterwards in the time of grace the mystery of the Trinity was revealed by the Son of God Himself, according to Matt. 28:19: Going . . . teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. In each state, however, the most excellent revelation was that which was given first. Now the first revelation, before the Law, was given to Abraham, for it was at that time that men began to stray from faith in one God by turning aside to idolatry, whereas hitherto no such revelation was necessary while all persevered in the worship of one God. A less excellent revelation was made to Isaac, being founded on that which was made to Abraham. Wherefore it was said to him (Gen 26:24): I am the God of Abraham thy father, and in like manner to Jacob (Gen 28:13): I am the God of Abraham thy father, and the God of Isaac. Again in the state of the Law the first revelation which was given to Moses was more excellent, and on this revelation all the other revelations to the prophets were founded. And so, too, in the time of grace the entire faith of the Church is founded on the revelation vouchsafed to the apostles, concerning the faith in one God and three Persons, according to Matt. 16:18, On this rock, i.e., of thy confession, I will build My Church. As to the faith in Christ’s incarnation, it is evident that the nearer men were to Christ, whether before or after Him, the more fully, for the most part, were they instructed on this point, and after Him more fully than before, as the Apostle declares (Eph 3:5). As regards the guidance of human acts, the prophetic revelation varied not according to the course of time, but according as circumstances required, because as it is written (Prov 29:18), When prophecy shall fail, the people shall be scattered abroad. Wherefore at all times men were divinely instructed about what they were to do, according as it was expedient for the spiritual welfare of the elect. Reply Obj. 1: The saying of Gregory is to be referred to the time before Christ’s incarnation, as regards the knowledge of this mystery. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 27), Just as in the early days of the Assyrian kingdom promises were made most explicitly to Abraham, so at the outset of the western Babylon, which is Rome, and under its sway Christ

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Romanae urbis, exordio qua imperante fuerat Christus venturus, in quo implerentur illa promissa, oracula prophetarum, non solum loquentium verum etiam scribentium, in tantae rei futurae testimonium, solverentur, scilicet promissiones Abrahae factae. Cum enim prophetae nunquam fere defuissent populo Israel ex quo ibi reges esse coeperunt, in usum tantummodo eorum fuere, non gentium. Quando autem Scriptura manifestius prophetica condebatur, quae gentibus quandoque prodesset, tunc condebatur haec civitas, scilicet Romana, quae gentibus imperaret. Ideo autem maxime tempore regum oportuit prophetas in illo populo abundare, quia tunc populus non opprimebatur ab alienigenis, sed proprium regem habebat, et ideo oportebat per prophetas eum instrui de agendis, quasi libertatem habentem. Ad tertium dicendum quod prophetae praenuntiantes Christi adventum non potuerunt durare nisi usque ad Ioannem, qui praesentialiter Christum digito demonstravit. Et tamen, ut Hieronymus ibidem dicit, non hoc dicitur ut post Ioannem excludat prophetas, legimus enim in actibus apostolorum et Agabum prophetasse, et quatuor virgines filias Philippi. Ioannes etiam librum propheticum conscripsit de fine Ecclesiae. Et singulis temporibus non defuerunt aliqui prophetiae spiritum habentes, non quidem ad novam doctrinam fidei depromendam, sed ad humanorum actuum directionem, sicut Augustinus refert, V de Civ. Dei, quod Theodosius Augustus ad Ioannem in Aegypti eremo constitutum, quem prophetandi spiritu praeditum fama crebrescente didicerat, misit, et ab eo nuntium victoriae certissimum accepit.

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was to come, in Whom were to be fulfilled the promises made through the prophetic oracles testifying in word and writing to that great event to come, the promises, namely, which were made to Abraham. For while prophets were scarcely ever lacking to the people of Israel from the time that they began to have kings, it was exclusively for their benefit, not for that of the nations. But when those prophetic writings were being set up with greater publicity, which at some future time were to benefit the nations, it was fitting to begin when this city, Rome to wit, was being built, which was to govern the nations. The reason why it behooved that nation to have a number of prophets especially at the time of the kings, was that then it was not over-ridden by other nations, but had its own king; wherefore it behooved the people, as enjoying liberty, to have prophets to teach them what to do. Reply Obj. 3: The prophets who foretold the coming of Christ could not continue further than John, who with his finger pointed to Christ actually present. Nevertheless as Jerome says on this passage, This does not mean that there were no more prophets after John. For we read in the Acts of the apostles that Agabus and the four maidens, daughters of Philip, prophesied. John, too, wrote a prophetic book about the end of the Church; and at all times there have not been lacking persons having the spirit of prophecy, not indeed for the declaration of any new doctrine of faith, but for the direction of human acts. Thus Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 26) that the emperor Theodosius sent to John who dwelt in the Egyptian desert, and whom he knew by his ever-increasing fame to be endowed with the prophetic spirit: and from him he received a message assuring him of victory.

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Question 175 Rapture Deinde considerandum est de raptu. Et circa hoc We must now consider rapture. Under this head there quaeruntur sex. are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum anima hominis rapiatur ad divina. (1) Whether the soul of man is carried away to things divine? Secundo, utrum raptus pertineat ad vim (2) Whether rapture pertains to the cognitive or to the cognoscitivam vel appetitivam. appetitive power? Tertio, utrum Paulus in raptu viderit Dei essentiam. (3) Whether Paul when in rapture saw the essence of God? Quarto, utrum fuerit alienatus a sensibus. (4) Whether he was withdrawn from his senses? Quinto, utrum totaliter fuerit anima a corpore (5) Whether, when in that state, his soul was wholly separata in statu illo. separated from his body? Sexto, quid circa hoc scivit, et quid ignoravit. (6) What did he know, and what did he not know about this matter?

Article 1 Whether the soul of man is carried away to things divine? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima hominis non rapiatur ad divina. Definitur enim a quibusdam raptus, ab eo quod est secundum naturam, in id quod est supra naturam, vi superioris naturae elevatio. Est autem secundum naturam hominis ut ad divina elevetur, dicit enim Augustinus, in I Confess., fecisti nos, domine, ad te, et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te. Non ergo hominis anima rapitur ad divina.

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of man is not carried away to things divine. For some define rapture as an uplifting by the power of a higher nature, from that which is according to nature to that which is above nature. Now it is in accordance with man’s nature that he be uplifted to things divine; for Augustine says at the beginning of his Confessions: Thou madest us, Lord, for Thyself, and our heart is restless, till it rest in Thee. Therefore man’s soul is not carried away to things divine. Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, VIII cap. de Div. Nom., Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii) that quod iustitia Dei in hoc attenditur, quod omnibus re- God’s justice is seen in this that He treats all things accordbus distribuit secundum suum modum et dignitatem. Sed ing to their mode and dignity. But it is not in accordance quod aliquis elevetur supra id quod est secundum na- with man’s mode and worth that he be raised above what he turam, non pertinet ad modum hominis vel dignitatem. is according to nature. Therefore it would seem that man’s Ergo videtur quod non rapiatur mens hominis a Deo in soul is not carried away to things divine.

divina. Praeterea, raptus quandam violentiam importat. Sed Deus non regit nos per violentiam et coacte, ut Damascenus dicit. Non ergo mens hominis rapitur ad divina. Sed contra est quod, II ad Cor. XII, dicit apostolus, scio hominem in Christo raptum usque ad tertium caelum, ubi dicit Glossa, raptum, idest, contra naturam elevatum. Respondeo dicendum quod raptus violentiam quandam importat, ut dictum est. Violentum autem dicitur, cuius principium est extra, nil conferente eo qui vim patitur, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Confert autem unumquo-

Obj. 3: Further, rapture denotes violence of some kind. But God rules us not by violence or force, as Damascene says. Therefore man’s soul is not carried away to things divine. On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor 12:2): I know a man in Christ . . . rapt even to the third heaven. On which words a gloss says: Rapt, that is to say, uplifted contrary to nature. I answer that, Rapture denotes violence of a kind as stated above (Obj. 3); and the violent is that which has its principle without, and in which he that suffers violence concurs not at all (Ethic. iii, 1). Now everything concurs in that

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dque ad id in quod tendit secundum propriam inclinationem, vel voluntariam vel naturalem. Et ideo oportet quod ille qui rapitur ab aliquo exteriori, rapiatur in aliquid quod est diversum ab eo in quod eius inclinatio tendit. Quae quidem diversitas potest attendi dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, quantum ad finem inclinationis, puta si lapis, qui naturaliter inclinatur ad hoc quod feratur deorsum, proiiciatur sursum. Alio modo, quantum ad modum tendendi, puta si lapis velocius proiiciatur deorsum quam sit motus eius naturalis. Sic igitur et anima hominis dicitur rapi in id quod est praeter naturam, uno modo, quantum ad terminum raptus, puta quando rapitur ad poenas, secundum illud Psalmi, ne quando rapiat, et non sit qui eripiat. Alio modo, quantum ad modum homini connaturalem, qui est ut per sensibilia intelligat veritatem. Et ideo, quando abstrahitur a sensibilium apprehensione, dicitur rapi, etiam si elevetur ad ea ad quae naturaliter ordinatur, dum tamen hoc non fiat ex propria intentione; sicut accidit in somno, qui est secundum naturam, unde non potest proprie raptus dici.

Huiusmodi autem abstractio, ad quaecumque fiat, potest ex triplici causa contingere. Uno modo, ex causa corporali, sicut patet in his qui propter aliquam infirmitatem alienationem patiuntur. Secundo modo, ex virtute Daemonum, sicut patet in arreptitiis. Tertio, ex virtute divina. Et sic loquimur nunc de raptu, prout scilicet aliquis spiritu divino elevatur ad aliqua supernaturalia, cum abstractione a sensibus, secundum illud Ezech. VIII, spiritus elevavit me inter terram et caelum, et adduxit me in Ierusalem, in visionibus Dei. Sciendum tamen quod rapi quandoque dicitur aliquis non solum propter alienationem a sensibus, sed etiam propter alienationem ab his quibus intendebat, sicut cum aliquis patitur evagationem mentis praeter propositum. Sed hoc non ita proprie dicitur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod naturale est homini ut in divina tendat per sensibilium apprehensionem, secundum illud Rom. I, invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt conspiciuntur. Sed iste modus quod aliquis elevetur ad divina cum abstractione a sensibus, non est homini naturalis. Ad secundum dicendum quod ad modum et dignitatem hominis pertinet quod ad divina elevetur, ex hoc ipso quod homo factus est ad imaginem Dei. Et quia bonum divinum in infinitum excedit humanam facultatem, indiget homo ut supernaturaliter ad illud bonum capessendum adiuvetur, quod fit per quodcumque bene-

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to which it tends in accordance with its proper inclination, whether voluntary or natural. Wherefore he who is carried away by some external agent, must be carried to something different from that to which his inclination tends. This difference arises in two ways: in one way from the end of the inclination—for instance a stone, which is naturally inclined to be borne downwards, may be thrown upwards; in another way from the manner of tending—for instance a stone may be thrown downwards with greater velocity than consistent with its natural movement. Accordingly man’s soul also is said to be carried away, in a twofold manner, to that which is contrary to its nature: in one way, as regards the term of transport—as when it is carried away to punishment, according to Ps. 49:22, Lest He snatch you away, and there be none to deliver you; in another way, as regards the manner connatural to man, which is that he should understand the truth through sensible things. Hence when he is withdrawn from the apprehension of sensibles, he is said to be carried away, even though he be uplifted to things whereunto he is directed naturally: provided this be not done intentionally, as when a man betakes himself to sleep which is in accordance with nature, wherefore sleep cannot be called rapture, properly speaking. This withdrawal, whatever its term may be, may arise from a threefold cause. First, from a bodily cause, as happens to those who suffer abstraction from the senses through weakness: second, by the power of the demons, as in those who are possessed: third, by the power of God. In this last sense we are now speaking of rapture, whereby a man is uplifted by the spirit of God to things supernatural, and withdrawn from his senses, according to Ezech. 8:3, The spirit lifted me up between the earth and the heaven, and brought me in the vision of God into Jerusalem. It must be observed, however, that sometimes a person is said to be carried away, not only through being withdrawn from his senses, but also through being withdrawn from the things to which he was attending, as when a person’s mind wanders contrary to his purpose. But this is to use the expression in a less proper signification. Reply Obj. 1: It is natural to man to tend to divine things through the apprehension of things sensible, according to Rom. 1:20, The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. But the mode, whereby a man is uplifted to divine things and withdrawn from his senses, is not natural to man. Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to man’s mode and dignity that he be uplifted to divine things, from the very fact that he is made to God’s image. And since a divine good infinitely surpasses the faculty of man in order to attain that good, he needs the divine assistance which is bestowed on him in every gift of grace. Hence it is not contrary to nature, but

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ficium gratiae. Unde quod sic elevetur mens a Deo per raptum, non est contra naturam, sed supra facultatem naturae. Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum Damasceni est intelligendum quantum ad ea quae sunt per hominem facienda. Quantum vero ad ea quae excedunt liberi arbitrii facultatem, necesse est quod homo quadam fortiori operatione elevetur. Quae quidem quantum ad aliquid potest dici coactio, si scilicet attendatur modus operationis, non autem si attendatur terminus operationis, in quem natura hominis et eius intentio ordinatur.

Q. 175, A. 2

above the faculty of nature that man’s mind be thus uplifted in rapture by God. Reply Obj. 3: The saying of Damascene refers to those things which a man does by himself. But as to those things which are beyond the scope of the free-will, man needs to be uplifted by a stronger operation, which in a certain respect may be called force if we consider the mode of operation, but not if we consider its term to which man is directed both by nature and by his intention.

Article 2 Whether rapture pertains to the cognitive rather than to the appetitive power? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod raptus magis pertineat ad vim appetitivam quam ad cognoscitivam. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., est autem extasim faciens divinus amor. Sed amor pertinet ad vim appetitivam. Ergo et extasis sive raptus. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in II Dialog., quod ille qui porcos pavit, vagatione mentis et immunditiae sub semetipso cecidit, Petrus vero, quem Angelus solvit eiusque mentem in extasi rapuit, extra se quidem, sed supra semetipsum fuit. Sed ille filius prodigus per affectum in inferiora dilapsus est. Ergo etiam et illi qui rapiuntur in superiora, per affectum hoc patiuntur. Praeterea, super illud Psalmi, in te, domine, speravi, non confundar in aeternum, dicit Glossa, in expositione tituli, extasis Graece, Latine dicitur excessus mentis, qui fit duobus modis, vel pavore terrenorum, vel mente rapta ad superna et inferiorum oblita. Sed pavor terrenorum ad affectum pertinet. Ergo etiam raptus mentis ad superna, qui ex opposito ponitur, pertinet ad affectum.

Sed contra est quod super illud Psalmi, ego dixi in excessu meo, omnis homo mendax, dicit Glossa, dicitur hic extasis, cum mens non pavore alienatur, sed aliqua inspiratione revelationis sursum assumitur. Sed revelatio pertinet ad vim intellectivam. Ergo extasis sive raptus. Respondeo dicendum quod de raptu dupliciter loqui possumus. Uno modo, quantum ad id in quod aliquis rapitur. Et sic, proprie loquendo, raptus non potest pertinere ad vim appetitivam, sed solum ad cognoscitivam. Dictum est enim quod raptus est praeter propriam inclinationem eius quod rapitur. Ipse autem motus appetitivae virtutis est quaedam inclinatio in bonum appetibile. Unde, proprie loquendo, ex hoc quod homo appetit aliquid, non rapitur, sed per se movetur.

Objection 1: It would seem that rapture pertains to the appetitive rather than to the cognitive power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): The Divine love causes ecstasy. Now love pertains to the appetitive power. Therefore so does ecstasy or rapture. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 3) that he who fed the swine debased himself by a dissipated mind and an unclean life; whereas Peter, when the angel delivered him and carried him into ecstasy, was not beside himself, but above himself. Now the prodigal son sank into the depths by his appetite. Therefore in those also who are carried up into the heights it is the appetite that is affected. Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Ps. 30:1, In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped, let me never be confounded, says in explaining the title: Ekstasis in Greek signifies in Latin excessus mentis, an aberration of the mind. This happens in two ways, either through dread of earthly things or through the mind being rapt in heavenly things and forgetful of this lower world. Now dread of earthly things pertains to the appetite. Therefore rapture of the mind in heavenly things, being placed in opposition to this dread, also pertains to the appetite. On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 115:2, I said in my excess: Every man is a liar, says: We speak of ecstasy, not when the mind wanders through fear, but when it is carried aloft on the wings of revelation. Now revelation pertains to the intellective power. Therefore ecstasy or rapture does also. I answer that, We can speak of rapture in two ways. First, with regard to the term of rapture, and thus, properly speaking, rapture cannot pertain to the appetitive, but only to the cognitive power. For it was stated (A. 1) that rapture is outside the inclination of the person who is rapt; whereas the movement of the appetitive power is an inclination to an appetible good. Wherefore, properly speaking, in desiring something, a man is not rapt, but is moved by himself.

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Alio modo potest considerari raptus quantum ad suam causam. Et sic potest habere causam ex parte appetitivae virtutis. Ex hoc enim ipso quod appetitus ad aliquid vehementer afficitur, potest contingere quod ex violentia affectus homo ab omnibus aliis alienetur. Habet etiam effectum in appetitiva virtute, cum scilicet aliquis delectatur in his ad quae rapitur. Unde et apostolus dixit se raptum, non solum ad tertium caelum, quod pertinet ad contemplationem intellectus, sed etiam in Paradisum, quod pertinet ad affectum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod raptus addit aliquid supra extasim. Nam extasis importat simpliciter excessum a seipso, secundum quem scilicet aliquis extra suam ordinationem ponitur, sed raptus supra hoc addit violentiam quandam. Potest igitur extasis ad vim appetitivam pertinere, puta cum alicuius appetitus tendit in ea quae extra ipsum sunt. Et secundum hoc Dionysius dicit quod divinus amor facit extasim, inquantum scilicet facit appetitum hominis tendere in res amatas. Unde postea subdit quod etiam ipse Deus, qui est omnium causa, per abundantiam amativae bonitatis extra seipsum fit per providentiam ad omnia existentia. Quamvis etiam si expresse hoc diceretur de raptu, non designaretur nisi quod amor esset causa raptus. Ad secundum dicendum quod in homine est duplex appetitus, scilicet intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas, et sensitivus, qui dicitur sensualitas. Est autem proprium homini ut appetitus inferior subdatur appetitui superiori, et superior moveat inferiorem. Dupliciter ergo homo secundum appetitum potest fieri extra seipsum. Uno modo, quando appetitus intellectivus totaliter in divina tendit, praetermissis his in quae inclinat appetitus sensitivus. Et sic dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod Paulus ex virtute divini amoris extasim faciente, dixit, vivo ego, iam non ego, vivit vero in me Christus. Alio modo, quando, praetermisso appetitu superiori, homo totaliter fertur in ea quae pertinent ad appetitum inferiorem. Et sic ille qui porcos pavit, sub semetipso cecidit, et iste excessus vel extasis plus appropinquat ad rationem raptus quam primus, quia scilicet appetitus superior est magis homini proprius; unde, quando homo ex violentia appetitus inferioris abstrahitur a motu appetitus superioris, magis abstrahitur ab eo quod est sibi proprium. Quia tamen non est ibi violentia, quia voluntas potest resistere passioni, deficit a vera ratione raptus, nisi forte tam vehemens sit passio quod usum rationis totaliter tollat, sicut contingit in his qui propter vehementiam irae vel amoris insaniunt. Considerandum tamen quod uterque excessus secundum appetitum existens, potest causare excessum cognoscitivae virtutis vel quia mens ad quaedam intel-

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Second, rapture may be considered with regard to its cause, and thus it may have a cause on the part of the appetitive power. For from the very fact that the appetite is strongly affected towards something, it may happen, owing to the violence of his affection, that a man is carried away from everything else. Moreover, it has an effect on the appetitive power, when for instance a man delights in the things to which he is rapt. Hence the Apostle said that he was rapt, not only to the third heaven—which pertains to the contemplation of the intellect—but also into paradise, which pertains to the appetite. Reply Obj. 1: Rapture adds something to ecstasy. For ecstasy means simply a going out of oneself by being placed outside one’s proper order; while rapture denotes a certain violence in addition. Accordingly ecstasy may pertain to the appetitive power, as when a man’s appetite tends to something outside him, and in this sense Dionysius says that the Divine love causes ecstasy, inasmuch as it makes man’s appetite tend to the object loved. Hence he says afterwards that even God Himself, the cause of all things, through the overflow of His loving goodness, goes outside Himself in His providence for all beings. But even if this were said expressly of rapture, it would merely signify that love is the cause of rapture. Reply Obj. 2: There is a twofold appetite in man; to wit, the intellective appetite which is called the will, and the sensitive appetite known as the sensuality. Now it is proper to man that his lower appetite be subject to the higher appetite, and that the higher move the lower. Hence man may become outside himself as regards the appetite, in two ways. In one way, when a man’s intellective appetite tends wholly to divine things, and takes no account of those things whereto the sensitive appetite inclines him; thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that Paul being in ecstasy through the vehemence of Divine love exclaimed: I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me. In another way, when a man tends wholly to things pertaining to the lower appetite, and takes no account of his higher appetite. It is thus that he who fed the swine debased himself ; and this latter kind of going out of oneself, or being beside oneself, is more akin than the former to the nature of rapture because the higher appetite is more proper to man. Hence when through the violence of his lower appetite a man is withdrawn from the movement of his higher appetite, it is more a case of being withdrawn from that which is proper to him. Yet, because there is no violence therein, since the will is able to resist the passion, it falls short of the true nature of rapture, unless perchance the passion be so strong that it takes away entirely the use of reason, as happens to those who are mad with anger or love. It must be observed, however, that both these excesses affecting the appetite may cause an excess in the cognitive power, either because the mind is carried away to certain

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ligibilia rapiatur alienata a sensibus; vel quia rapiatur ad aliquam imaginariam visionem seu phantasticam apparitionem. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut amor est motus appetitus respectu boni, ita timor motus appetitus respectu mali. Unde eadem ratione ex utroque potest causari excessus mentis, praesertim cum timor ex amore causetur, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei.

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intelligible objects, through being drawn away from objects of sense, or because it is caught up into some imaginary vision or fanciful apparition. Reply Obj. 3: Just as love is a movement of the appetite with regard to good, so fear is a movement of the appetite with regard to evil. Wherefore either of them may equally cause an aberration of mind; and all the more since fear arises from love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9).

Article 3 Whether Paul, when in rapture, saw the essence of God? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Paulus in raptu non viderit Dei essentiam. Sicut enim de Paulo legitur quod est raptus usque ad tertium caelum, ita et de Petro legitur, Act. X, quod cecidit super eum mentis excessus. Sed Petrus in suo excessu non vidit Dei essentiam, sed quandam imaginariam visionem. Ergo videtur quod nec Paulus Dei essentiam viderit. Praeterea, visio Dei facit hominem beatum. Sed Paulus in illo raptu non fuit beatus, alioquin nunquam ad vitae huius miseriam rediisset, sed corpus eius fuisset per redundantiam ab anima glorificatum, sicut erit in sanctis post resurrectionem; quod patet esse falsum. Ergo Paulus in raptu non vidit Dei essentiam.

Objection 1: It would seem that Paul, when in rapture, did not see the essence of God. For just as we read of Paul that he was rapt to the third heaven, so we read of Peter (Acts 10:10) that there came upon him an ecstasy of mind. Now Peter, in his ecstasy, saw not God’s essence but an imaginary vision. Therefore it would seem that neither did Paul see the essence of God. Obj. 2: Further, the vision of God is beatific. But Paul, in his rapture, was not beatified; else he would never have returned to the unhappiness of this life, but his body would have been glorified by the overflow from his soul, as will happen to the saints after the resurrection, and this clearly was not the case. Therefore Paul when in rapture saw not the essence of God. Praeterea, fides et spes esse non possunt simul Obj. 3: Further, according to 1 Cor. 13:10–12, faith cum visione divinae essentiae, ut habetur I ad Cor. XIII, and hope are incompatible with the vision of the Divine sed Paulus in statu illo habuit fidem et spem. Ergo non essence. But Paul when in this state had faith and hope. vidit Dei essentiam. Therefore he saw not the essence of God. Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. Obj. 4: Further, as Augustine states (Gen ad lit. xii, 6, ad Litt., secundum visionem imaginariam quaedam si- 7), Pictures of bodies are seen in the imaginary vision. Now militudines corporum videntur. Sed Paulus videtur in Paul is stated (2 Cor 12:2, 4) to have seen certain pictures in raptu quasdam similitudines vidisse, puta tertii caeli et his rapture, for instance of the third heaven and of paradise. Paradisi, ut habetur II ad Cor. XII. Ergo videtur esse rap- Therefore he would seem to have been rapt to an imaginary tus ad imaginariam visionem, magis quam ad visionem vision rather than to the vision of the Divine essence.

divinae essentiae. Sed contra est quod Augustinus determinat, in libro de videndo Deum ad Paulinam, quod ipsa Dei substantia a quibusdam videri potuit in hac vita positis, sicut a Moyse, et Paulo, qui raptus audivit ineffabilia verba, quae non licet homini loqui. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt Paulum in raptu non vidisse ipsam Dei essentiam, sed quandam refulgentiam claritatis ipsius. Sed contrarium manifeste Augustinus determinat, non solum in libro de videndo Deum, sed etiam XII super Gen. ad Litt., et habetur in Glossa, II ad Cor. XII. Et hoc etiam ipsa verba apostoli designant. Dicit enim se audisse ineffabilia verba, quae non licet homini loqui, huiusmodi autem videntur ea quae pertinent ad visionem beatorum, quae

On the contrary, Augustine (Ep. CXLVII, 13; ad Paulin., de videndo Deum) concludes that possibly God’s very substance was seen by some while yet in this life: for instance by Moses, and by Paul who in rapture heard unspeakable words, which it is not granted unto man to utter. I answer that, Some have said that Paul, when in rapture, saw not the very essence of God, but a certain reflection of His clarity. But Augustine clearly comes to an opposite decision, not only in his book (De videndo Deum), but also in Gen. ad lit. xii, 28 (quoted in a gloss on 2 Cor. 12:2). Indeed the words themselves of the Apostle indicate this. For he says that he heard secret words, which it is not granted unto man to utter: and such would seem to be words pertaining to the vision of the blessed, which transcends the

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excedit statum viae, secundum illud Isaiae LXIV, oculus non vidit, Deus, absque te, quae praeparasti diligentibus te. Et ideo convenientius dicitur quod Deum per essentiam vidit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod mens humana divinitus rapitur ad contemplandam veritatem divinam, tripliciter. Uno modo, ut contempletur eam per similitudines quasdam imaginarias. Et talis fuit excessus mentis qui cecidit supra Petrum. Alio modo, ut contempletur veritatem divinam per intelligibiles effectus, sicut fuit excessus David dicentis, ego dixi in excessu meo, omnis homo mendax. Tertio, ut contempletur eam in sua essentia. Et talis fuit raptus Pauli, et etiam Moysi. Et satis congruenter, nam sicut Moyses fuit primus doctor Iudaeorum, ita Paulus fuit primus doctor gentium. Ad secundum dicendum quod divina essentia videri ab intellectu creato non potest nisi per lumen gloriae, de quo dicitur in Psalmo, in lumine tuo videbimus lumen. Quod tamen dupliciter participari potest. Uno modo, per modum formae immanentis, et sic beatos facit sanctos in patria. Alio modo, per modum cuiusdam passionis transeuntis, sicut dictum est de lumine prophetiae. Et hoc modo lumen illud fuit in Paulo, quando raptus fuit. Et ideo ex tali visione non fuit simpliciter beatus, ut fieret redundantia ad corpus, sed solum secundum quid. Et ideo talis raptus aliquo modo ad prophetiam pertinet. Ad tertium dicendum quod quia Paulus in raptu non fuit beatus habitualiter, sed solum habuit actum beatorum; consequens est ut simul tunc in eo non fuerit actus fidei, fuit tamen in eo simul fidei habitus. Ad quartum dicendum quod nomine tertii caeli potest uno modo intelligi aliquid corporeum. Et sic tertium caelum est caelum Empyreum, quod dicitur tertium respectu caeli aerei et caeli siderei; vel potius respectu caeli siderei et respectu caeli aquei sive crystallini. Et dicitur raptus ad tertium caelum, non quia raptus sit ad videndum similitudinem alicuius rei corporeae, sed propter hoc quod locus ille est contemplationis beatorum. Unde Glossa dicit, II ad Cor. XII, quod tertium est spirituale caelum, ubi Angeli et sanctae animae fruuntur Dei contemplatione. Ad quod cum dicit se raptum, significat quod Deus ostendit ei vitam in qua videndus est in aeternum. Alio modo per tertium caelum potest intelligi aliqua visio supermundana. Quae potest dici tertium caelum triplici ratione. Uno modo, secundum ordinem potentiarum cognoscitivarum, ut primum caelum dicatur visio supermundana corporalis, quae fit per sensum, sicut visa est manus scribentis in pariete, Dan. V; secundum autem caelum sit visio imaginaria, puta quam vidit Isaias, et Ioannes in Apocalypsi; tertium vero caelum dicatur visio intellectualis, ut Augustinus exponit, XII super Gen. ad Litt. Secundo modo potest dici tertium caelum

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state of the wayfarer, according to Isa. 64:4, Eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that love Thee. Therefore it is more becoming to hold that he saw God in His essence. Reply Obj. 1: Man’s mind is rapt by God to the contemplation of divine truth in three ways. First, so that he contemplates it through certain imaginary pictures, and such was the ecstasy that came upon Peter. Second, so that he contemplates the divine truth through its intelligible effects; such was the ecstasy of David, who said (Ps 115:11): I said in my excess: Every man is a liar. Third, so that he contemplates it in its essence. Such was the rapture of Paul, as also of Moses; and not without reason, since as Moses was the first Teacher of the Jews, so was Paul the first Teacher of the gentiles. Reply Obj. 2: The Divine essence cannot be seen by a created intellect save through the light of glory, of which it is written (Ps 35:10): In Thy light we shall see light. But this light can be shared in two ways. First by way of an abiding form, and thus it beatifies the saints in heaven. Second, by way of a transitory passion, as stated above (Q. 171, A. 2) of the light of prophecy; and in this way that light was in Paul when he was in rapture. Hence this vision did not beatify him simply, so as to overflow into his body, but only in a restricted sense. Consequently this rapture pertains somewhat to prophecy. Reply Obj. 3: Since, in his rapture, Paul was beatified not as to the habit, but only as to the act of the blessed, it follows that he had not the act of faith at the same time, although he had the habit. Reply Obj. 4: In one way by the third heaven we may understand something corporeal, and thus the third heaven denotes the empyrean, which is described as the third, in relation to the aerial and starry heavens, or better still, in relation to the aqueous and crystalline heavens. Moreover Paul is stated to be rapt to the third heaven, not as though his rapture consisted in the vision of something corporeal, but because this place is appointed for the contemplation of the blessed. Hence the gloss on 2 Cor. 12 says that the third heaven is a spiritual heaven, where the angels and the holy souls enjoy the contemplation of God: and when Paul says that he was rapt to this heaven he means that God showed him the life wherein He is to be seen forevermore. In another way the third heaven may signify a supramundane vision. Such a vision may be called the third heaven in three ways. First, according to the order of the cognitive powers. In this way the first heaven would indicate a supramundane bodily vision, conveyed through the senses; thus was seen the hand of one writing on the wall (Dan 5:5); the second heaven would be an imaginary vision such as Isaias saw, and John in the Apocalypse; and the third heaven would denote an intellectual vision according to Augustine’s explanation (Gen ad lit. xii, 26, 28, 34). Sec-

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Q. 175, A. 4

secundum ordinem cognoscibilium, ut primum caelum dicatur cognitio caelestium corporum; secundum cognitio caelestium spirituum; tertium, cognitio ipsius Dei. Tertio potest dici tertium caelum contemplatio Dei secundum gradus cognitionis qua Deus videtur, quorum primus pertinet ad Angelos infimae hierarchiae, secundus ad Angelos mediae, tertius ad Angelos supremae, ut dicit Glossa, II ad Cor. XII.

ond, the third heaven may be taken according to the order of things knowable, the first heaven being the knowledge of heavenly bodies, the second the knowledge of heavenly spirits, the third the knowledge of God Himself. Third, the third heaven may denote the contemplation of God according to the degrees of knowledge whereby God is seen. The first of these degrees belongs to the angels of the lowest hierarchy, the second to the angels of the middle hierarchy, the third to the angels of the highest hierarchy, according to the gloss on 2 Cor. 12. Et quia visio Dei non potest esse sine delectatione, And since the vision of God cannot be without delight, propterea non solum se dicit raptum ad tertium caelum, he says that he was not only rapt to the third heaven by rearatione contemplationis, sed etiam in Paradisum, ratio- son of his contemplation, but also into Paradise by reason ne delectationis consequentis. of the consequent delight.

Article 4 Whether Paul, when in rapture, was withdrawn from his senses? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Paulus in raptu non fuerit alienatus a sensibus. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt., cur non credamus quod tanto apostolo, doctori gentium, rapto usque ad ipsam excellentissimam visionem, voluerit Deus demonstrare vitam in qua, post hanc vitam, vivendum est in aeternum? Sed in illa vita futura sancti, post resurrectionem, videbunt Dei essentiam absque hoc quod fiat abstractio a sensibus corporis. Ergo nec in Paulo fuit huiusmodi abstractio facta. Praeterea, Christus vere viator fuit, et continue visione divinae essentiae fruebatur, nec tamen fiebat abstractio a sensibus. Ergo nec fuit necessarium quod in Paulo fieret abstractio a sensibus, ad hoc quod Dei essentiam videret. Praeterea, Paulus, postquam Deum per essentiam viderat, memor fuit illorum quae in illa visione conspexerat, unde dicebat, II ad Cor. XII, audivit arcana verba, quae non licet homini loqui. Sed memoria ad partem sensitivam pertinet, ut patet per philosophum, in libro de Mem. et Remin. Ergo videtur quod et Paulus, videndo Dei essentiam, non fuit alienatus a sensibus. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., nisi ab hac vita quisque quodammodo moriatur, sive omnino exiens de corpore, sive aversus et alienatus a corporeis sensibus, in illam non subvehitur visionem. Respondeo dicendum quod divina essentia non potest ab homine videri per aliam vim cognoscitivam quam per intellectum. Intellectus autem humanus non convertitur ad sensibilia nisi mediantibus phantasmatibus, per quae species intelligibiles a sensibilibus acci-

Objection 1: It would seem that Paul, when in rapture, was not withdrawn from his senses. For Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 28): Why should we not believe that when so great an apostle, the teacher of the gentiles, was rapt to this most sublime vision, God was willing to vouchsafe him a glimpse of that eternal life which is to take the place of the present life? Now in that future life after the resurrection the saints will see the Divine essence without being withdrawn from the senses of the body. Therefore neither did such a withdrawal take place in Paul. Obj. 2: Further, Christ was truly a wayfarer, and also enjoyed an uninterrupted vision of the Divine essence, without, however, being withdrawn from His senses. Therefore there was no need for Paul to be withdrawn from his senses in order for him to see the essence of God. Obj. 3: Further, after seeing God in His essence, Paul remembered what he had seen in that vision; hence he said (2 Cor 12:4): He heard secret words, which it is not granted to man to utter. Now the memory belongs to the sensitive faculty according to the Philosopher (De Mem. et Remin. i). Therefore it seems that Paul, while seeing the essence of God, was not withdrawn from his senses. On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 27): Unless a man in some way depart this life, whether by going altogether out of his body or by turning away and withdrawing from his carnal senses, so that he truly knows not as the Apostle said, whether he be in the body or out of the body, he is not rapt and caught up into that vision. I answer that, The Divine essence cannot be seen by man through any cognitive power other than the intellect. Now the human intellect does not turn to intelligible objects except by means of the phantasms which it takes from the senses through the intelligible species; and it is in con-

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pit, et in quibus considerans de sensibilibus iudicat et ea disponit. Et ideo in omni operatione qua intellectus noster abstrahitur a phantasmatibus, necesse est quod abstrahatur a sensibus. Intellectus autem hominis, in statu viae, necesse est quod a phantasmatibus abstrahatur, si videat Dei essentiam. Non enim per aliquod phantasma potest Dei essentia videri; quinimmo nec per aliquam speciem intelligibilem creatam, quia essentia Dei in infinitum excedit non solum omnia corpora, quorum sunt phantasmata, sed etiam omnem intelligibilem creaturam. Oportet autem, cum intellectus hominis elevatur ad altissimam Dei essentiae visionem, ut tota mentis intentio illuc advocetur, ita scilicet quod nihil intelligat aliud ex phantasmatibus, sed totaliter feratur in Deum. Unde impossibile est quod homo in statu viae videat Deum per essentiam sine abstractione a sensibus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, post resurrectionem in beatis Dei essentiam videntibus fiet redundantia ab intellectu ad inferiores vires, et usque ad corpus. Unde, secundum ipsam regulam divinae visionis, anima intendet et phantasmatibus et sensibilibus. Talis autem redundantia non fit in his qui rapiuntur, sicut dictum est. Et ideo non est similis ratio. Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus animae Christi erat glorificatus per habituale lumen gloriae, quo divinam essentiam videbat multo amplius quam aliquis Angelus vel homo. Erat autem viator propter corporis passibilitatem, secundum quam paulo minus ab Angelis minorabatur, ut dicitur ad Heb. II, dispensative, et non propter aliquem defectum ex parte intellectus. Unde non est similis ratio de eo et de aliis viatoribus. Ad tertium dicendum quod Paulus, postquam cessavit videre Deum per essentiam, memor fuit illorum quae in illa visione cognoverat, per aliquas species intelligibiles habitualiter ex hoc in eius intellectu relictas, sicut etiam, abeunte sensibili, remanent aliquae impressiones in anima, quas postea convertens ad phantasmata, memorabatur. Unde nec totam illam cognitionem aut cogitare poterat, aut verbis exprimere.

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sidering these phantasms that the intellect judges of and coordinates sensible objects. Hence in any operation that requires abstraction of the intellect from phantasms, there must be also withdrawal of the intellect from the senses. Now in the state of the wayfarer it is necessary for man’s intellect, if it see God’s essence, to be withdrawn from phantasms. For God’s essence cannot be seen by means of a phantasm, nor indeed by any created intelligible species, since God’s essence infinitely transcends not only all bodies, which are represented by phantasms, but also all intelligible creatures. Now when man’s intellect is uplifted to the sublime vision of God’s essence, it is necessary that his mind’s whole attention should be summoned to that purpose in such a way that he understand naught else by phantasms, and be absorbed entirely in God. Therefore it is impossible for man while a wayfarer to see God in His essence without being withdrawn from his senses. Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 3, Obj. 2), after the resurrection, in the blessed who see God in His essence, there will be an overflow from the intellect to the lower powers and even to the body. Hence it is in keeping with the rule itself of the divine vision that the soul will turn towards phantasms and sensible objects. But there is no such overflow in those who are raptured, as stated (A. 3, Obj. 2, ad 2), and consequently the comparison fails. Reply Obj. 2: The intellect of Christ’s soul was glorified by the habit of the light of glory, whereby He saw the Divine essence much more fully than an angel or a man. He was, however, a wayfarer on account of the passibility of His body, in respect of which He was made a little lower than the angels (Heb 2:9), by dispensation, and not on account of any defect on the part of His intellect. Hence there is no comparison between Him and other wayfarers. Reply Obj. 3: Paul, after seeing God in His essence, remembered what he had known in that vision, by means of certain intelligible species that remained in his intellect by way of habit; even as in the absence of the sensible object, certain impressions remain in the soul which it recollects when it turns to the phantasms. And so this was the knowledge that he was unable wholly to think over or express in words.

Article 5 Whether, while in this State, Paul’s soul was wholly separated from his body? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Pauli in statu illo fuerit totaliter a corpore separata. Dicit enim apostolus, II ad Cor. V, quandiu sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a domino, per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem. Sed Paulus in statu illo non pe-

Objection 1: It would seem that, while in this state, Paul’s soul was wholly separated from his body. For the Apostle says (2 Cor 5:6, 7): While we are in the body we are absent from the Lord. For we walk by faith, and not by sight. Now, while in that state, Paul was not absent from the Lord,

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regrinabatur a domino, quia videbat Deum per speciem, ut dictum est. Ergo non erat in corpore. Praeterea, potentia animae non potest elevari supra eius essentiam, in qua radicatur. Sed intellectus, qui est potentia animae, in raptu fuit a corporalibus abstractus per elevationem ad divinam contemplationem. Ergo multo magis essentia animae fuit separata a corpore. Praeterea, vires animae vegetabilis sunt magis materiales quam vires animae sensitivae. Sed oportebat intellectum abstrahi a viribus animae sensitivae, ut dictum est, ad hoc quod rapiatur ad videndum divinam essentiam. Ergo multo magis oportebat quod abstraheretur a viribus animae vegetabilis. Quarum operatione cessante, iam nullo modo anima remanet corpori coniuncta. Ergo videtur quod oportuit in raptu Pauli animam totaliter a corpore esse separatam. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Paulinam de videndo Deum, non est incredibile, sic quibusdam sanctis nondum ita defunctis ut sepelienda eorum cadavera remanerent, istam excellentiam revelationis fuisse concessam, ut scilicet viderent Deum per essentiam. Non igitur fuit necessarium ut in raptu Pauli anima eius totaliter separaretur a corpore. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in raptu de quo nunc loquimur, virtute divina elevatur homo ab eo quod est secundum naturam in id quod est supra naturam. Et ideo duo considerare oportet, primo quidem, quid sit homini secundum naturam; secundo, quid divina virtute sit in homine fiendum supra naturam. Ex hoc autem quod anima corpori unitur tanquam naturalis forma ipsius, convenit animae naturalis habitudo ad hoc quod per conversionem ad phantasmata intelligat. Quod ab ea non aufertur divina virtute in raptu, quia non mutatur status eius, ut dictum est. Manente autem hoc statu, aufertur ab anima actualis conversio ad phantasmata et sensibilia, ne impediatur eius elevatio in id quod excedit omnia phantasmata, ut dictum est. Et ideo in raptu non fuit necessarium quod anima sic separaretur a corpore ut ei non uniretur quasi forma, fuit autem necessarium intellectum eius abstrahi a phantasmatibus et sensibilium perceptione. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Paulus in raptu illo peregrinabatur a domino quantum ad statum, quia adhuc erat in statu viatoris, non autem quoad actum, quo videbat Deum per speciem, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ad secundum dicendum quod potentia animae virtute naturali non elevatur supra modum convenientem essentiae eius. Virtute tamen divina potest in aliquid altius elevari, sicut corpus per violentiam fortioris virtutis elevatur supra locum convenientem sibi secundum speciem suae naturae.

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for he saw Him by a species, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore he was not in the body. Obj. 2: Further, a power of the soul cannot be uplifted above the soul’s essence wherein it is rooted. Now in this rapture the intellect, which is a power of the soul, was withdrawn from its bodily surroundings through being uplifted to divine contemplation. Much more therefore was the essence of the soul separated from the body. Obj. 3: Further, the forces of the vegetative soul are more material than those of the sensitive soul. Now in order for him to be rapt to the vision of God, it was necessary for him to be withdrawn from the forces of the sensitive soul, as stated above (A. 4). Much more, therefore, was it necessary for him to be withdrawn from the forces of the vegetative soul. Now when these forces cease to operate, the soul is no longer in any way united to the body. Therefore it would seem that in Paul’s rapture it was necessary for the soul to be wholly separated from the body. On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. CXLVII, 13, ad Paulin.; de videndo Deum): It is not incredible that this sublime revelation (namely, that they should see God in His essence) was vouchsafed certain saints, without their departing this life so completely as to leave nothing but a corpse for burial. Therefore it was not necessary for Paul’s soul, when in rapture, to be wholly separated from his body. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1, Obj. 1), in the rapture of which we are speaking now, man is uplifted by God’s power, from that which is according to nature to that which is above nature. Wherefore two things have to be considered: first, what pertains to man according to nature; second, what has to be done by God in man above his nature. Now, since the soul is united to the body as its natural form, it belongs to the soul to have a natural disposition to understand by turning to phantasms; and this is not withdrawn by the divine power from the soul in rapture, since its state undergoes no change, as stated above (A. 3, ad 2, 3). Yet, this state remaining, actual conversion to phantasms and sensible objects is withdrawn from the soul, lest it be hindered from being uplifted to that which transcends all phantasms, as stated above (A. 4). Therefore it was not necessary that his soul in rapture should be so separated from the body as to cease to be united thereto as its form; and yet it was necessary for his intellect to be withdrawn from phantasms and the perception of sensible objects. Reply Obj. 1: In this rapture Paul was absent from the Lord as regards his state, since he was still in the state of a wayfarer, but not as regards the act by which he saw God by a species, as stated above (A. 3, ad 2, 3). Reply Obj. 2: A faculty of the soul is not uplifted by the natural power above the mode becoming the essence of the soul; but it can be uplifted by the divine power to something higher, even as a body by the violence of a stronger power is lifted up above the place befitting it according to its specific nature.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod vires animae vegetabilis non operantur ex intentione animae, sicut vires sensitivae, sed per modum naturae. Et ideo non requiritur ad raptum abstractio ab eis, sicut a potentiis sensitivis, per quarum operationes minueretur intentio animae circa intellectivam cognitionem.

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Reply Obj. 3: The forces of the vegetative soul do not operate through the soul being intent thereon, as do the sensitive forces, but by way of nature. Hence in the case of rapture there is no need for withdrawal from them, as from the sensitive powers, whose operations would lessen the intentness of the soul on intellective knowledge.

Article 6 Did Paul know whether his soul were separated from his body? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Paulus non ignoraverit an eius anima fuerit a corpore separata. Dicit enim ipse, II ad Cor. XII, scio hominem in Christo raptum usque ad tertium caelum. Sed homo nominat compositum ex anima et corpore, raptus etiam differt a morte. Videtur ergo quod ipse sciverit animam non fuisse per mortem a corpore separatam, praesertim quia hoc communiter a doctoribus ponitur. Praeterea, ex eisdem apostoli verbis patet quod ipse scivit quo raptus fuerit, quia in tertium caelum. Sed ex hoc sequitur quod scivit utrum fuerit in corpore vel non. Quia si scivit tertium caelum esse aliquid corporeum, consequens est quod sciverit animam suam non esse a corpore separatam, quia visio rei corporeae non potest fieri nisi per corpus. Ergo videtur quod non ignoraverit an anima fuerit a corpore separata. Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., ipse in raptu vidit illa visione Deum qua vident sancti in patria. Sed sancti, ex hoc ipso quod vident Deum, sciunt an animae eorum sint a corporibus separatae. Ergo et Paulus hoc scivit. Sed contra est quod dicitur II ad Cor. XII, sive in corpore sive extra corpus, nescio, Deus scit. Respondeo dicendum quod huius quaestionis veritatem accipere oportet ex ipsis apostoli verbis, quibus dicit se aliquid scire, scilicet se raptum esse usque ad tertium caelum; et aliquid nescire, scilicet utrum in corpore aut extra corpus. Quod quidem potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ut hoc quod dicitur, sive in corpore sive extra corpus, non referatur ad ipsum esse hominis rapti, quasi ignoraverit an anima eius esset in corpore vel non, sed ad modum raptus, ut scilicet ignoraverit an corpus eius fuerit simul raptum cum anima in tertium caelum, vel non, sed solum anima, sicut Ezech. VIII dicitur quod adductus est in visionibus Dei in Ierusalem. Et hunc intellectum fuisse cuiusdam Iudaei, exprimit Hieronymus, in prologo super Danielem, ubi dicit, denique et apostolum nostrum, scilicet dicebat Iudaeus, non fuisse ausum affirmare se in corpore raptum, sed dixisse, sive in corpore sive extra corpus, nescio.

Objection 1: It would seem that Paul was not ignorant whether his soul were separated from his body. For he says (2 Cor 12:2): I know a man in Christ rapt even to the third heaven. Now man denotes something composed of soul and body; and rapture differs from death. Seemingly therefore he knew that his soul was not separated from his body by death, which is the more probable seeing that this is the common opinion of the Doctors. Obj. 2: Further, it appears from the same words of the Apostle that he knew whither he was rapt, since it was to the third heaven. Now this shows that he knew whether he was in the body or not, for if he knew the third heaven to be something corporeal, he must have known that his soul was not separated from his body, since a corporeal thing cannot be an object of sight save through the body. Therefore it would seem that he was not ignorant whether his soul were separated from his body. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 28) that when in rapture, he saw God with the same vision as the saints see Him in heaven. Now from the very fact that the saints see God, they know whether their soul is separated from their body. Therefore Paul too knew this. On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor 12:3): Whether in the body, or out of the body, I know not, God knoweth. I answer that, The true answer to this question must be gathered from the Apostle’s very words, whereby he says he knew something, namely that he was rapt even to the third heaven, and that something he knew not, namely whether he were in the body or out of the body. This may be understood in two ways. First, the words whether in the body or out of the body may refer not to the very being of the man who was rapt (as though he knew not whether his soul were in his body or not), but to the mode of rapture, so that he ignored whether his body besides his soul, or, on the other hand, his soul alone, were rapt to the third heaven. Thus Ezechiel is stated (Ezek 8:3) to have been brought in the vision of God into Jerusalem. This was the explanation of a certain Jew according to Jerome (Prolog. super Daniel.), where he says that lastly our Apostle (thus said the Jew) durst not assert that he was rapt in his body, but said: ‘Whether in the body or out of the body, I know not.’

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Sed hunc sensum improbat Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt., per hoc quod apostolus dicit se scivisse se esse raptum usque in tertium caelum. Sciebat ergo verum esse tertium caelum illud in quod raptus fuit, et non similitudinem imaginariam tertii caeli alioquin, si tertium caelum nominavit phantasma tertii caeli, pari ratione dicere potuit se in corpore raptum, nominans corpus proprii corporis phantasma, quale apparet in somniis. Si autem sciebat esse vere tertium caelum, sciebat ergo utrum esset aliquid spirituale et incorporeum, et sic non poterat corpus eius illuc rapi, aut esset aliquid corporeum, et sic anima non posset illuc sine corpore rapi, nisi separaretur a corpore. Et ideo oportet secundum alium sensum intelligere, ut scilicet apostolus sciverit quod fuit raptus secundum animam et non secundum corpus; nesciverit tamen qualiter se haberet anima ad corpus, utrum scilicet fuerit sine corpore vel non. Sed circa hoc diversimode aliqui loquuntur. Quidam enim dicunt quod apostolus scivit quod anima sua erat corpori unita ut forma, sed nescivit utrum esset passus, alienationem a sensibus; vel etiam utrum esset facta abstractio ab operibus animae vegetabilis. Sed quod fuerit facta abstractio a sensibus, hoc non potuit ignorare, ex quo scivit se raptum. Quod autem fuerit facta abstractio ab operibus animae vegetabilis, non erat tantum aliquid ut de hoc oporteret tam sollicitam fieri mentionem. Unde relinquitur quod nescivit apostolus utrum anima eius fuerit coniuncta corpori ut forma, vel a corpore separata per mortem. Quidam autem, hoc concedentes, dicunt quod apostolus tunc non perpendit quando rapiebatur, quia tota eius intentio conversa erat in Deum, sed postmodum percepit, considerans ea quae viderat. Sed hoc etiam contrariatur verbis apostoli, qui distinguit in verbis suis praeteritum a futuro. Dicit enim in praesenti se scire quod fuit raptus ante annos quatuordecim, et se in praesenti nescire utrum in corpore fuerit vel extra corpus. Et ideo dicendum est quod et prius et postea nescivit utrum eius anima fuerit a corpore separata. Unde Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., post longam inquisitionem concludens, restat ergo fortasse ut hoc ipsum eum ignorasse intelligamus, utrum, quando in tertium caelum raptus est, in corpore fuerit anima, quomodo est anima in corpore cum corpus vivere dicitur, sive vigilantis sive dormientis sive in extasi a sensibus corporis alienati; an omnino de corpore exierit, ut mortuum corpus iaceret. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per synecdochen quandoque pars hominis homo nominatur, et praecipue anima, quae est pars hominis eminentior. Quamvis etiam possit intelligi eum quem raptum dicit, non tunc

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Augustine, however, disapproves of this explanation (Gen ad lit. xii, 3 seqq.) for this reason that the Apostle states that he knew he was rapt even to the third heaven. Wherefore he knew it to be really the third heaven to which he was rapt, and not an imaginary likeness of the third heaven: otherwise if he gave the name of third heaven to an imaginary third heaven, in the same way he might state that he was rapt in the body, meaning, by body, an image of his body, such as appears in one’s dreams. Now if he knew it to be really the third heaven, it follows that either he knew it to be something spiritual and incorporeal, and then his body could not be rapt thither; or he knew it to be something corporeal, and then his soul could not be rapt thither without his body, unless it were separated from his body. Consequently we must explain the matter otherwise, by saying that the Apostle knew himself to be rapt both in soul and body, but that he ignored how his soul stood in relation to his body, to wit, whether it were accompanied by his body or not. Here we find a diversity of opinions. For some say that the Apostle knew his soul to be united to his body as its form, but ignored whether it were abstracted from its senses, or again whether it were abstracted from the operations of the vegetative soul. But he could not but know that it was abstracted from the senses, seeing that he knew himself to be rapt; and as to his being abstracted from the operation of the vegetative soul, this was not of such importance as to require him to be so careful in mentioning it. It follows, then, that the Apostle ignored whether his soul were united to his body as its form, or separated from it by death. Some, however, granting this say that the Apostle did not consider the matter while he was in rapture, because he was wholly intent upon God, but that afterwards he questioned the point, when taking cognizance of what he had seen. But this also is contrary to the Apostle’s words, for he there distinguishes between the past and what happened subsequently, since he states that at the present time he knows that he was rapt fourteen years ago, and that at the present time he knows not whether he was in the body or out of the body. Consequently we must assert that both before and after he ignored whether his soul were separated from his body. Wherefore Augustine (Gen ad lit. xii, 5), after discussing the question at length, concludes: Perhaps then we must infer that he ignored whether, when he was rapt to the third heaven, his soul was in his body (in the same way as the soul is in the body, when we speak of a living body either of a waking or of a sleeping man, or of one that is withdrawn from his bodily senses during ecstasy), or whether his soul went out of his body altogether, so that his body lay dead. Reply Obj. 1: Sometimes by the figure of synecdoche a part of man, especially the soul which is the principal part, denotes a man. Or again we might take this to mean that he whom he states to have been rapt was a man not at the time

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fuisse hominem quando raptus fuit, sed post annos quatuordecim, unde dicit scio hominem; non dicit, scio raptum hominem. Nihil etiam prohiberet mortem divinitus procuratam raptum dici. Et sicut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., dubitante inde apostolo, quis nostrum inde certus esse potuit? Unde qui super hoc loquuntur, magis coniecturaliter quam per certitudinem loquuntur. Ad secundum dicendum quod apostolus scivit vel illud caelum esse quid incorporeum, vel aliquid incorporeum a se visum in illo caelo tamen hoc poterat fieri per intellectum eius, etiam si anima eius non esset a corpore separata. Ad tertium dicendum quod visio Pauli in raptu quantum ad aliquid fuit similis visioni beatorum, scilicet quantum ad id quod videbatur, et quantum ad aliquid dissimilis, scilicet quantum ad modum videndi, quia non ita perfecte vidit sicut sancti qui sunt in patria. Unde Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., apostolo arrepto a carnis sensibus in tertium caelum, hoc defuit ad plenam perfectamque cognitionem rerum quae Angelis inest, quod sive in corpore sive extra corpus esset, nesciebat. Hoc itaque non deerit cum, receptis corporibus in resurrectione mortuorum, cum corruptibile hoc induerit incorruptionem.

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of his rapture, but fourteen years afterwards: for he says I know a man, not I know a rapt man. Again nothing hinders death brought about by God being called rapture; and thus Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 3): If the Apostle doubted the matter, who of us will dare to be certain about it? Wherefore those who have something to say on this subject speak with more conjecture than certainty. Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle knew that either the heaven in question was something incorporeal, or that he saw something incorporeal in that heaven; yet this could be done by his intellect, even without his soul being separated from his body. Reply Obj. 3: Paul’s vision, while he was in rapture, was like the vision of the blessed in one respect, namely as to the thing seen; and, unlike, in another respect, namely as to the mode of seeing, because he saw not so perfectly as do the saints in heaven. Hence Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 36): Although, when the Apostle was rapt from his carnal senses to the third heaven, he lacked that full and perfect knowledge of things which is in the angels, in that he knew not whether he was in the body, or out of the body, this will surely not be lacking after reunion with the body in the resurrection of the dead, when this corruptible will put on incorruption.

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Question 176 The Grace of Tongues Deinde considerandum est de gratiis gratis datis We must now consider those gratuitous graces that perquae pertinent ad locutionem. Et primo, de gratia lin- tain to speech, and (1) the grace of tongues; (2) the grace of guarum; secundo, de gratia sermonis sapientiae seu the word of wisdom and knowledge. Under the first head scientiae. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum per gratiam linguarum homo (1) Whether by the grace of tongues a man acquires the adipisceretur scientiam omnium linguarum. knowledge of all languages? Secundo, de comparatione huius doni ad gratiam (2) Of the comparison between this gift and the grace prophetiae. of prophecy.

Article 1 Whether those who received the gift of tongues spoke in every language? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod illi qui consequebantur donum linguarum, non loquebantur omnibus linguis. Illud enim quod divina virtute aliquibus conceditur, optimum est in suo genere, sicut dominus aquam convertit in vinum bonum, sicut dicitur Ioan. II. Sed illi qui habuerunt donum linguarum, melius loquebantur in propria lingua, dicit enim Glossa, ad Heb. I, non esse mirandum quod epistola ad Hebraeos maiore relucet facundia quam aliae, cum naturale sit unicuique plus in sua quam in aliena lingua valere. Ceteras enim epistolas apostolus peregrino, idest Graeco sermone composuit, hanc autem scripsit Hebraica lingua. Non ergo per gratiam gratis datam apostoli acceperunt scientiam omnium linguarum. Praeterea, natura non facit per multa quod potest fieri per unum, et multo minus Deus, qui ordinatius quam natura operatur. Sed poterat Deus facere quod, unam linguam loquentes, eius discipuli ab omnibus intelligerentur, unde super illud Act. II, audiebat unusquisque linguam suam illos loquentes, dicit Glossa, quia linguis omnibus loquebantur, vel sua, idest Hebraica lingua loquentes, ab omnibus intelligebantur, ac si propriis singulorum loquerentur. Ergo videtur quod non habuerunt scientiam loquendi omnibus linguis. Praeterea, omnes gratiae derivantur a Christo in corpus eius, quod est Ecclesia, secundum illud Ioan. I, de plenitudine eius omnes accepimus. Sed Christus non legitur fuisse locutus nisi una lingua. Nec etiam nunc fideles singuli nisi una lingua loquuntur. Ergo videtur quod discipuli Christi non acceperunt ad hoc gratiam, ut omnibus linguis loquerentur. Sed contra est quod dicitur Act. II, quod repleti sunt omnes spiritu sancto, et coeperunt loqui variis linguis,

Objection 1: It seems that those who received the gift of tongues did not speak in every language. For that which is granted to certain persons by the divine power is the best of its kind: thus our Lord turned the water into good wine, as stated in John 2:10. Now those who had the gift of tongues spoke better in their own language; since a gloss on Heb. 1, says that it is not surprising that the epistle to the Hebrews is more graceful in style than the other epistles, since it is natural for a man to have more command over his own than over a strange language. For the Apostle wrote the other epistles in a foreign, namely the Greek, idiom; whereas he wrote this in the Hebrew tongue. Therefore the apostles did not receive the knowledge of all languages by a gratuitous grace. Obj. 2: Further, nature does not employ many means where one is sufficient; and much less does God Whose work is more orderly than nature’s. Now God could make His disciples to be understood by all, while speaking one tongue: hence a gloss on Acts 2:6, Every man heard them speak in his own tongue, says that they spoke in every tongue, or speaking in their own, namely the Hebrew language, were understood by all, as though they spoke the language proper to each. Therefore it would seem that they had not the knowledge to speak in all languages. Obj. 3: Further, all graces flow from Christ to His body, which is the Church, according to John 1:16, Of His fullness we all have received. Now we do not read that Christ spoke more than one language, nor does each one of the faithful now speak save in one tongue. Therefore it would seem that Christ’s disciples did not receive the grace to the extent of speaking in all languages. On the contrary, It is written (Acts 2:4) that they were all filled with the Holy Spirit, and they began to speak

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prout Spiritus Sanctus dabat eloqui illis, ubi dicit Glossa Gregorii quod Spiritus Sanctus super discipulos in igneis linguis apparuit, et eis omnium linguarum scientiam dedit. Respondeo dicendum quod primi discipuli Christi ad hoc fuerunt ab ipso electi ut, per universum orbem discurrentes, fidem eius ubique praedicarent, secundum illud Matth. ult., euntes, docete omnes gentes. Non autem erat conveniens ut qui mittebantur ad alios instruendos, indigerent ab aliis instrui qualiter aliis loquerentur, vel qualiter quae alii loquebantur intelligerent. Praesertim quia isti qui mittebantur erant unius gentis, scilicet Iudaeae, secundum illud Isaiae XXVII, qui egredientur impetu a Iacob, implebunt faciem orbis semine. Illi etiam qui mittebantur pauperes et impotentes erant, nec de facili a principio reperissent qui eorum verba aliis fideliter interpretarentur, vel verba aliorum eis exponerent, maxime quia ad infideles mittebantur. Et ideo necessarium fuit ut super hoc eis divinitus provideretur per donum linguarum, ut sicut, gentibus ad idololatriam declinantibus, introducta est diversitas linguarum sicut dicitur Gen. XI; ita etiam, quando erant gentes ad cultum unius Dei revocandae, contra huiusmodi diversitatem remedium adhiberetur per donum linguarum.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur I ad Cor. XII, manifestatio spiritus datur ad utilitatem. Et ideo sufficienter et Paulus et alii apostoli fuerunt instructi divinitus in linguis omnium gentium, quantum requirebatur ad fidei doctrinam. Sed quantum ad quaedam quae superadduntur humana arte ad ornatum et elegantiam locutionis, apostolus instructus erat in propria lingua, non autem in aliena. Sicut etiam et in sapientia et scientia fuerunt sufficienter instructi quantum requirebat doctrina fidei, non autem quantum ad omnia quae per scientiam acquisitam cognoscuntur, puta de conclusionibus arithmeticae vel geometriae. Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis utrumque fieri potuisset, scilicet quod per unam linguam loquentes ab omnibus intelligerentur, aut quod omnibus loquerentur; tamen convenientius fuit quod ipsi omnibus linguis loquerentur, quia hoc pertinebat ad perfectionem scientiae ipsorum, per quam non solum loqui, sed intelligere poterant quae ab aliis dicebantur. Si autem omnes unam eorum linguam intellexissent, hoc vel fuisset per scientiam illorum qui eos loquentes intelligerent, vel fuisset quasi quaedam illusio, dum aliorum verba aliter ad aliorum aures perferrentur quam ipsi ea proferrent. Et ideo Glossa dicit, Act. II, quod maiori miraculo factum est quod ipsi omnium linguarum generibus loquerentur. Et Paulus dicit, I ad Cor. XIV, gratias Deo, quod omnium vestrum lingua loquor.

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with diverse tongues, according as the Holy Spirit gave them to speak; on which passage a gloss of Gregory says that the Holy Spirit appeared over the disciples under the form of fiery tongues, and gave them the knowledge of all tongues. I answer that, Christ’s first disciples were chosen by Him in order that they might disperse throughout the whole world, and preach His faith everywhere, according to Matt. 28:19, Going . . . teach ye all nations. Now it was not fitting that they who were being sent to teach others should need to be taught by others, either as to how they should speak to other people, or as to how they were to understand those who spoke to them; and all the more seeing that those who were being sent were of one nation, that of Judea, according to Isa. 27:6, When they shall rush out from Jacob . . . they shall fill the face of the world with seed. Moreover those who were being sent were poor and powerless; nor at the outset could they have easily found someone to interpret their words faithfully to others, or to explain what others said to them, especially as they were sent to unbelievers. Consequently it was necessary, in this respect, that God should provide them with the gift of tongues; in order that, as the diversity of tongues was brought upon the nations when they fell away to idolatry, according to Gen. 11, so when the nations were to be recalled to the worship of one God a remedy to this diversity might be applied by the gift of tongues. Reply Obj. 1: As it is written (1 Cor 12:7), The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit; and consequently both Paul and the other apostles were divinely instructed in the languages of all nations sufficiently for the requirements of the teaching of the faith. But as regards the grace and elegance of style which human art adds to a language, the Apostle was instructed in his own, but not in a foreign tongue. Even so they were sufficiently instructed in wisdom and scientific knowledge, as required for teaching the faith, but not as to all things known by acquired science, for instance the conclusions of arithmetic and geometry. Reply Obj. 2: Although either was possible, namely that, while speaking in one tongue they should be understood by all, or that they should speak in all tongues, it was more fitting that they should speak in all tongues, because this pertained to the perfection of their knowledge, whereby they were able not only to speak, but also to understand what was said by others. Whereas if their one language were intelligible to all, this would either have been due to the knowledge of those who understood their speech, or it would have amounted to an illusion, since a man’s words would have had a different sound in another’s ears, from that with which they were uttered. Hence a gloss says on Acts 2:6 that it was a greater miracle that they should speak all kinds of tongues; and Paul says (1 Cor 14:18): I thank my God I speak with all your tongues.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus in propria persona uni soli genti praedicaturus erat, scilicet Iudaeis. Et ideo, quamvis ipse absque dubio perfectissime haberet scientiam omnium linguarum, non tamen oportuit quod omnibus linguis loqueretur. Ideo autem, ut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., cum et modo Spiritus Sanctus accipiatur, nemo loquitur linguis omnium gentium, quia iam ipsa Ecclesia linguis omnium gentium loquitur, in qua qui non est, non accipit spiritum sanctum.

Q. 176, A. 2

Reply Obj. 3: Christ in His own person purposed preaching to only one nation, namely the Jews. Consequently, although without any doubt He possessed most perfectly the knowledge of all languages, there was no need for Him to speak in every tongue. And therefore, as Augustine says (Tract. xxxii in Joan.), whereas even now the Holy Spirit is received, yet no one speaks in the tongues of all nations, because the Church herself already speaks the languages of all nations: since whoever is not in the Church, receives not the Holy Spirit.

Article 2 Whether the gift of tongues is more excellent than the grace of prophecy? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod donum linguarum sit excellentius quam gratia prophetiae. Quae enim sunt melioribus propria, videntur esse meliora, secundum philosophum, in III Topic. Sed donum linguarum est proprium novi testamenti, unde cantatur in sequentia Pentecostes, ipse hodie apostolos Christi donans munere insolito et cunctis inaudito saeculis. Prophetia autem magis competit veteri testamento, secundum illud Heb. I, multifariam multisque modis olim Deus loquens patribus in prophetis. Ergo videtur quod donum linguarum sit excellentius quam donum prophetiae. Praeterea, illud per quod ordinamur ad Deum, videtur excellentius esse eo per quod ordinamur ad homines. Sed per donum linguarum homo ordinatur ad Deum, per prophetiam autem ad homines, dicitur enim I ad Cor. XIV, qui loquitur lingua, non hominibus loquitur, sed Deo, qui autem prophetat, hominibus loquitur ad aedificationem. Ergo videtur quod donum linguarum sit excellentius quam donum prophetiae. Praeterea, donum linguarum habitualiter permanet in habente ipsum, et habet homo in potestate uti eo cum voluerit, unde dicitur I ad Cor. XIV, gratias ago Deo meo quod omnium vestrum lingua loquor. Non autem sic est de dono prophetiae, ut supra dictum est. Ergo donum linguarum videtur esse excellentius quam donum prophetiae. Praeterea, interpretatio sermonum videtur contineri sub prophetia, quia Scripturae eodem spiritu exponuntur quo sunt editae. Sed interpretatio sermonum, I ad Cor. XII, ponitur post genera linguarum. Ergo videtur quod donum linguarum sit excellentius quam donum prophetiae, maxime quantum ad aliquam eius partem. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIV, maior est qui prophetat quam qui loquitur linguis.

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the grace of prophecy. For, seemingly, better things are proper to better persons, according to the Philosopher (Topic. iii, 1). Now the gift of tongues is proper to the New Testament, hence we sing in the sequence of Pentecost: On this day Thou gavest Christ’s apostles an unwonted gift, a marvel to all time: whereas prophecy is more pertinent to the Old Testament, according to Heb. 1:1, God Who at sundry times and in diverse manners spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets. Therefore it would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift of prophecy. Obj. 2: Further, that whereby we are directed to God is seemingly more excellent than that whereby we are directed to men. Now, by the gift of tongues, man is directed to God, whereas by prophecy he is directed to man; for it is written (1 Cor 14:2, 3): He that speaketh in a tongue, speaketh not unto men, but unto God . . . but he that prophesieth, speaketh unto men unto edification. Therefore it would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift of prophecy. Obj. 3: Further, the gift of tongues abides like a habit in the person who has it, and he can use it when he will; wherefore it is written (1 Cor 14:18): I thank my God I speak with all your tongues. But it is not so with the gift of prophecy, as stated above (Q. 171, A. 2). Therefore the gift of tongues would seem to be more excellent than the gift of prophecy. Obj. 4: Further, the interpretation of speeches would seem to be contained under prophecy, because the Scriptures are expounded by the same Spirit from Whom they originated. Now the interpretation of speeches is placed after diverse kinds of tongues (1 Cor 12:10). Therefore it seems that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift of prophecy, particularly as regards a part of the latter. On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor 14:5): Greater is he that prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues.

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Respondeo dicendum quod donum prophetiae excedit donum linguarum tripliciter. Primo quidem, quia donum linguarum refertur ad diversas voces proferendas, quae sunt signa alicuius intelligibilis veritatis, cuius etiam signa sunt quaedam ipsa phantasmata quae secundum imaginariam visionem apparent; unde et Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt., comparat donum linguarum visioni imaginariae. Dictum est autem supra quod donum prophetiae consistit in ipsa illuminatione mentis ad cognoscendum intelligibilem veritatem. Unde sicut prophetica illuminatio excellentior est quam imaginaria visio, ut supra habitum est; ita etiam excellentior est prophetia quam donum linguarum secundum se consideratum. Secundo, quia donum prophetiae pertinet ad rerum notitiam, quae est nobilior quam notitia vocum, ad quam pertinet donum linguarum. Tertio, quia donum prophetiae est utilius. Et hoc quidem probat apostolus, I ad Cor. XIV, tripliciter. Primo quidem, quia prophetia est utilior ad aedificationem Ecclesiae, ad quam qui loquitur linguis nihil prodest, nisi expositio subsequatur. Secundo, quantum ad ipsum loquentem, qui si acciperet ut loqueretur diversis linguis sine hoc quod intelligeret (quod pertinet ad propheticum donum), mens eius non aedificaretur. Tertio, quantum ad infideles, propter quos praecipue videtur esse datum donum linguarum, qui quidem forte eos qui loquerentur linguis reputarent insanos; sicut et Iudaei reputaverunt ebrios apostolos linguis loquentes, ut dicitur Act. II. Per prophetias autem infidelis convinceretur, manifestatis absconditis cordis eius.

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I answer that, The gift of prophecy surpasses the gift of tongues, in three ways. First, because the gift of tongues regards the utterance of certain words, which signify an intelligible truth, and this again is signified by the phantasms which appear in an imaginary vision; wherefore Augustine compares (Gen ad lit. xii, 8) the gift of tongues to an imaginary vision. On the other hand, it has been stated above (Q. 173, A. 2) that the gift of prophecy consists in the mind itself being enlightened so as to know an intelligible truth. Wherefore, as the prophetic enlightenment is more excellent than the imaginary vision, as stated above (Q. 174, A. 2), so also is prophecy more excellent than the gift of tongues considered in itself. Second, because the gift of prophecy regards the knowledge of things, which is more excellent than the knowledge of words, to which the gift of tongues pertains. Third, because the gift of prophecy is more profitable. The Apostle proves this in three ways (1 Cor 14); first, because prophecy is more profitable to the edification of the Church, for which purpose he that speaketh in tongues profiteth nothing, unless interpretation follow (1 Cor 14:4, 5). Second, as regards the speaker himself, for if he be enabled to speak in diverse tongues without understanding them, which pertains to the gift of prophecy, his own mind would not be edified (1 Cor 14:7–14). Third, as to unbelievers for whose especial benefit the gift of tongues seems to have been given; since perchance they might think those who speak in tongues to be mad (1 Cor 14:23), for instance the Jews deemed the apostles drunk when the latter spoke in various tongues (Acts 2:13): whereas by prophecies the unbeliever is convinced, because the secrets of his heart are made manifest (Acts 2:25). Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 174, A. 3, ad 1), it belongs to the excellence of prophecy that a man is not only enlightened by an intelligible light, but also that he should perceive an imaginary vision: and so again it belongs to the perfection of the Holy Spirit’s operation, not only to fill the mind with the prophetic light, and the imagination with the imaginary vision, as happened in the Old Testament, but also to endow the tongue with external erudition, in the utterance of various signs of speech. All this is done in the New Testament, according to 1 Cor. 14:26, Every one of you hath a psalm, hath a doctrine, hath a tongue, hath a revelation, i.e., a prophetic revelation. Reply Obj. 2: By the gift of prophecy man is directed to God in his mind, which is more excellent than being directed to Him in his tongue. He that speaketh in a tongue is said to speak not unto men, i.e., to men’s understanding or profit, but unto God’s understanding and praise. On the other hand, by prophecy a man is directed both to God and to man; wherefore it is the more perfect gift.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad excellentiam prophetiae pertinet quod aliquis non solum illuminetur intelligibili lumine, sed etiam percipiat imaginariam visionem. Ita etiam ad perfectionem operationis spiritus sancti pertinet quod non solum impleat mentem lumine prophetico et phantasiam imaginaria visione, sicut erat in veteri testamento, sed etiam exterius linguam erudiat ad varia signa locutionum proferenda. Quod totum fit in novo testamento, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIV, unusquisque vestrum Psalmum habet, doctrinam habet, linguam habet, Apocalypsim, idest propheticam revelationem, habet. Ad secundum dicendum quod per donum prophetiae homo ordinatur ad Deum secundum mentem, quod est nobilius quam ordinari ad eum secundum linguam. Dicitur autem quod ille qui loquitur lingua non loquitur hominibus, idest, ad intellectum hominum vel utilitatem eorum, sed ad intellectum solius Dei et ad laudem eius. Sed per prophetiam ordinatur aliquis et ad Deum et ad proximum. Unde est perfectius donum. Ad tertium dicendum quod revelatio prophetica se Reply Obj. 3: Prophetic revelation extends to the extendit ad omnia supernaturalia cognoscenda. Unde ex knowledge of all things supernatural; wherefore from its

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eius perfectione contingit quod in statu imperfectionis huius vitae non potest haberi perfecte per modum habitus, sed imperfecte per modum passionis cuiusdam. Sed donum linguarum se extendit ad cognitionem quandam particularem, scilicet vocum humanarum. Et ideo non repugnat imperfectioni huius vitae quod perfecte et habitualiter habeatur. Ad quartum dicendum quod interpretatio sermonum potest reduci ad donum prophetiae, inquantum scilicet mens illuminatur ad intelligendum et exponendum quaecumque sunt in sermonibus obscura, sive propter difficultatem rerum significatarum, sive etiam propter ipsas voces ignotas quae proferuntur, sive etiam propter similitudines rerum adhibitas; secundum illud Dan. V, audivi de te quod possis obscura interpretari et ligata dissolvere. Unde interpretatio sermonum est potior quam donum linguarum, ut patet per id quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIV, maior est qui prophetat quam qui loquitur linguis, nisi forte interpretetur. Postponitur autem interpretatio sermonum dono linguarum, quia etiam ad interpretandum diversa linguarum genera interpretatio sermonum se extendit.

Q. 176, A. 2

very perfection it results that in this imperfect state of life it cannot be had perfectly by way of habit, but only imperfectly by way of passion. On the other hand, the gift of tongues is confined to a certain particular knowledge, namely of human words; wherefore it is not inconsistent with the imperfection of this life, that it should be had perfectly and by way of habit. Reply Obj. 4: The interpretation of speeches is reducible to the gift of prophecy, inasmuch as the mind is enlightened so as to understand and explain any obscurities of speech arising either from a difficulty in the things signified, or from the words uttered being unknown, or from the figures of speech employed, according to Dan. 5:16, I have heard of thee, that thou canst interpret obscure things, and resolve difficult things. Hence the interpretation of speeches is more excellent than the gift of tongues, as appears from the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor 14:5), Greater is he that prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues; unless perhaps he interpret. Yet the interpretation of speeches is placed after the gift of tongues, because the interpretation of speeches extends even to the interpretation of diverse kinds of tongues.

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Question 177 The Gratuitous Grace Consisting in Words Deinde considerandum est de gratia gratis data quae We must now consider the gratuitous grace that atconsistit in sermone, de qua dicitur I ad Cor. XII, alii da- taches to words; of which the Apostle says (1 Cor 12:8): To tur per spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae. Et one . . . by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, and to ancirca hoc quaeruntur duo. other the word of knowledge. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum in sermone consistat aliqua gratia (1) Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words? gratis data. Secundo, quibus haec gratia competit. (2) To whom is the grace becoming?

Article 1 Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in sermone non consistat aliqua gratia gratis data. Gratia enim datur ad id quod excedit facultatem naturae. Sed ex naturali ratione adinventa est ars rhetorica, per quam aliquis potest sic dicere ut doceat, ut delectet, ut flectat, sicut Augustinus dicit, in IV de Doct. Christ. Hoc autem pertinet ad gratiam sermonis. Ergo videtur quod gratia sermonis non sit gratia gratis data. Praeterea, omnis gratia ad regnum Dei pertinet. Sed apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. IV, non in sermone est regnum Dei, sed in virtute. Ergo in sermone non consistit aliqua gratia gratis data. Praeterea, nulla gratia datur ex meritis, quia si ex operibus, iam non est gratia, ut dicitur Rom. XI. Sed sermo datur alicui ex meritis, dicit enim Gregorius, exponens illud Psalmi, ne auferas de ore meo verbum veritatis, quod verbum veritatis omnipotens Deus facientibus tribuit, et non facientibus tollit. Ergo videtur quod donum sermonis non sit gratia gratis data.

Objection 1: It would seem that a gratuitous grace does not attach to words. For grace is given for that which surpasses the faculty of nature. But natural reason has devised the art of rhetoric whereby a man is able to speak so as to teach, please, and persuade, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iv, 12). Now this belongs to the grace of words. Therefore it would seem that the grace of words is not a gratuitous grace. Obj. 2: Further, all grace pertains to the kingdom of God. But the Apostle says (1 Cor 4:20): The kingdom of God is not in speech, but in power. Therefore there is no gratuitous grace connected with words. Obj. 3: Further, no grace is given through merit, since if by works, it is not now of grace (Rom 11:6). But the word is sometimes given to a man on his merits. For Gregory says (Moral. xi, 15) in explanation of Ps. 118:43, Take not Thou the word of truth utterly out of my mouth that the word of truth is that which Almighty God gives to them that do it, and takes away from them that do it not. Therefore it would seem that the gift of the word is not a gratuitous grace. Obj. 4: Further, it behooves man to declare in words things pertaining to the virtue of faith, no less than those pertaining to the gift of wisdom or of knowledge. Therefore if the word of wisdom and the word of knowledge are reckoned gratuitous graces, the word of faith should likewise be placed among the gratuitous graces. On the contrary, It is written (Sir 6:5): A gracious tongue in a good man shall abound. Now man’s goodness is by grace. Therefore graciousness in words is also by grace.

Praeterea, sicut necesse est quod homo per sermonem pronuntiet ea quae pertinent ad donum sapientiae vel scientiae, ita etiam ea quae pertinent ad virtutem fidei. Ergo, si ponitur sermo sapientiae et sermo scientiae gratia gratis data, pari ratione deberet poni sermo fidei inter gratias gratis datas. Sed in contrarium est quod dicitur Eccli. VI, lingua eucharis, idest gratiosa, in bono homine abundabit. Sed bonitas hominis est ex gratia. Ergo etiam et gratiositas sermonis. Respondeo dicendum quod gratiae gratis datae I answer that, The gratuitous graces are given for the dantur ad utilitatem aliorum, ut supra dictum est. Co- profit of others, as stated above (I-II, Q. 111, AA. 1, 4). Now gnitio autem quam aliquis a Deo accipit, in utilitatem the knowledge a man receives from God cannot be turned

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alterius converti non posset nisi mediante locutione. Et quia Spiritus Sanctus non deficit in aliquo quod pertineat ad Ecclesiae utilitatem, etiam providet membris Ecclesiae in locutione, non solum ut aliquis sic loquatur ut a diversis possit intelligi, quod pertinet ad donum linguarum; sed etiam quod efficaciter loquatur, quod pertinet ad gratiam sermonis. Et hoc tripliciter. Primo quidem, ad instruendum intellectum, quod fit dum aliquis sic loquitur quod doceat. Secundo, ad movendum affectum, ut scilicet libenter audiat verbum Dei, quod fit dum aliquis sic loquitur quod auditores delectet. Quod non debet aliquis quaerere propter favorem suum, sed ut homines alliciantur ad audiendum verbum Dei. Tertio, ad hoc quod aliquis amet ea quae verbis significantur, et velit ea implere, quod fit dum aliquis sic loquitur quod auditorem flectat. Ad quod quidem efficiendum Spiritus Sanctus utitur lingua hominis quasi quodam instrumento, ipse autem est qui perficit operationem interius. Unde Gregorius dicit, in homilia Pentecostes, nisi corda auditorum Spiritus Sanctus repleat, ad aures corporis vox docentium incassum sonat. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut miraculose Deus quandoque operatur quodam excellentiori modo etiam ea quae natura potest operari, ita etiam Spiritus Sanctus excellentius operatur per gratiam sermonis id quod potest ars operari inferiori modo. Ad secundum dicendum quod apostolus ibi loquitur de sermone qui innititur humanae eloquentiae, absque virtute spiritus sancti. Unde praemisit, cognoscam, non sermonem eorum qui inflati sunt, sed virtutem. Et de seipso praemiserat supra, II, sermo meus et praedicatio mea non fuit in persuasibilibus humanae sapientiae verbis, sed in ostensione spiritus et virtutis. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, gratia sermonis datur alicui ad utilitatem aliorum. Unde quandoque subtrahitur propter auditoris culpam, quandoque autem propter culpam ipsius loquentis. Bona autem opera utriusque non merentur directe hanc gratiam, sed solum impediunt huius gratiae impedimenta. Nam etiam gratia gratum faciens subtrahitur propter culpam, non tamen eam meretur aliquis per bona opera, per quae tamen tollitur gratiae impedimentum. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, gratia sermonis ordinatur ad utilitatem aliorum. Quod autem aliquis fidem suam aliis communicet, fit per sermonem scientiae seu sapientiae, unde Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin., quod scire quemadmodum fides et piis opituletur et contra impios defendatur, videtur apostolus scientiam appellare. Et ideo non oportuit quod poneret sermonem fidei, sed suffecit ponere sermonem scientiae et sapientiae.

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to another’s profit, except by means of speech. And since the Holy Spirit does not fail in anything that pertains to the profit of the Church, He provides also the members of the Church with speech; to the effect that a man not only speaks so as to be understood by different people, which pertains to the gift of tongues, but also speaks with effect, and this pertains to the grace of the word. This happens in three ways. First, in order to instruct the intellect, and this is the case when a man speaks so as to teach. Second, in order to move the affections, so that a man willingly hearkens to the word of God. This is the case when a man speaks so as to please his hearers, not indeed with a view to his own favor, but in order to draw them to listen to God’s word. Third, in order that men may love that which is signified by the word, and desire to fulfill it, and this is the case when a man so speaks as to sway his hearers. In order to effect this the Holy Spirit makes use of the human tongue as of an instrument; but He it is Who perfects the work within. Hence Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (Hom. xxx in Ev.): Unless the Holy Spirit fill the hearts of the hearers, in vain does the voice of the teacher resound in the ears of the body. Reply Obj. 1: Even as by a miracle God sometimes works in a more excellent way those things which nature also can work, so too the Holy Spirit effects more excellently by the grace of words that which art can effect in a less efficient manner. Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle is speaking there of the word that relies on human eloquence without the power of the Holy Spirit. Wherefore he says just before (1 Cor 4:19): I . . . will know, not the speech of them that are puffed up, but the power: and of himself he had already said (1 Cor 2:4): My speech and my preaching was not in the persuasive words of human wisdom, but in the showing of the spirit and power. Reply Obj. 3: As stated above, the grace of the word is given to a man for the profit of others. Hence it is withdrawn sometimes through the fault of the hearer, and sometimes through the fault of the speaker. The good works of either of them do not merit this grace directly, but only remove the obstacles thereto. For sanctifying grace also is withdrawn on account of a person’s fault, and yet he does not merit it by his good works, which, however, remove the obstacles to grace. Reply Obj. 4: As stated above, the grace of the word is directed to the profit of others. Now if a man communicates his faith to others this is by the word of knowledge or of wisdom. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that to know how faith may profit the godly and be defended against the ungodly, is apparently what the Apostle means by knowledge. Hence it was not necessary for him to mention the word of faith, but it was sufficient for him to mention the word of knowledge and of wisdom.

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Q. 177, A. 2

Article 2 Whether the grace of the word of wisdom and knowledge is becoming to women? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia sermonis sapientiae et scientiae pertineat etiam ad mulieres. Ad huiusmodi enim gratiam pertinet doctrina, sicut dictum est. Sed docere competit mulieri, dicitur enim Prov. IV, unigenitus fui coram matre mea, et docebat me. Ergo haec gratia competit mulieribus. Praeterea, maior est gratia prophetiae quam gratia sermonis, sicut maior est contemplatio veritatis quam eius enuntiatio. Sed prophetia conceditur mulieribus, sicut legitur Iudic. IV de Debbora; et IV Reg. XXII, de Holda, prophetissa, uxore Sellum; et Act. XXI, de quatuor filiabus Philippi. Apostolus etiam dicit, I ad Cor. XI, omnis mulier orans aut prophetans, et cetera. Ergo videtur quod multo magis gratia sermonis competit mulieri. Praeterea, I Petri IV dicitur, unusquisque, sicut accepit gratiam, in alterutrum illam administrantes. Sed quaedam mulieres accipiunt gratiam sapientiae et scientiae, quam non possunt aliis administrare nisi per gratiam sermonis. Ergo gratia sermonis competit mulieribus. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIV, mulieres in Ecclesiis taceant; et I ad Tim. II, docere mulieri non permitto. Hoc autem praecipue pertinet ad gratiam sermonis. Ergo gratia sermonis non competit mulieribus. Respondeo dicendum quod sermone potest aliquis uti dupliciter. Uno modo, private ad unum vel paucos, familiariter colloquendo. Et quantum ad hoc, gratia sermonis potest competere mulieribus. Alio modo, publice alloquendo totam Ecclesiam. Et hoc mulieri non conceditur. Primo quidem, et principaliter, propter conditionem feminei sexus, qui debet esse subditus viro, ut patet Gen. III. Docere autem et persuadere publice in Ecclesia non pertinet ad subditos, sed ad praelatos. Magis tamen viri subditi ex commissione possunt exequi, quia non habent huiusmodi subiectionem ex naturali sexu, sicut mulieres, sed ex aliquo accidentaliter supervenienti. Secundo, ne animi hominum alliciantur ad libidinem. Dicitur enim Eccli. IX, colloquium illius quasi ignis exardescit. Tertio, quia, ut communiter, mulieres non sunt in sapientia perfectae, ut eis possit convenienter publica doctrina committi. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa auctoritas loquitur de doctrina privata, qua mater filium erudit. Ad secundum dicendum quod gratia prophetiae attenditur secundum mentem illuminatam a Deo, ex qua parte non est in hominibus sexuum differentia, secundum illud Coloss. III, induentes novum hominem, qui re-

Objection 1: It would seem that the grace of the word of wisdom and knowledge is becoming even to women. For teaching is pertinent to this grace, as stated in the foregoing Article. Now it is becoming to a woman to teach; for it is written (Prov 4:3, 4): I was an only son in the sight of my mother, and she taught me. Therefore this grace is becoming to women. Obj. 2: Further, the grace of prophecy is greater than the grace of the word, even as the contemplation of truth is greater than its utterance. But prophecy is granted to women, as we read of Deborah (Judg 4:4), and of Holda the prophetess, the wife of Sellum (4 Kgs 22:14), and of the four daughters of Philip (Acts 21:9). Moreover the Apostle says (1 Cor 11:5): Every woman praying or prophesying, etc. Much more therefore would it seem that the grace of the word is becoming to a woman. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (1 Pet 4:10): As every man hath received grace ministering the same one to another. Now some women receive the grace of wisdom and knowledge, which they cannot minister to others except by the grace of the word. Therefore the grace of the word is becoming to women. On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor 14:34): Let women keep silence in the churches, and (1 Tim 2:12): I suffer not a woman to teach. Now this pertains especially to the grace of the word. Therefore the grace of the word is not becoming to women. I answer that, Speech may be employed in two ways: in one way privately, to one or a few, in familiar conversation, and in this respect the grace of the word may be becoming to women; in another way, publicly, addressing oneself to the whole church, and this is not permitted to women. First and chiefly, on account of the condition attaching to the female sex, whereby woman should be subject to man, as appears from Gen. 3:16. Now teaching and persuading publicly in the church belong not to subjects but to the prelates (although men who are subjects may do these things if they be so commissioned, because their subjection is not a result of their natural sex, as it is with women, but of some thing supervening by accident). Second, lest men’s minds be enticed to lust, for it is written (Sir 9:11): Her conversation burneth as fire. Third, because as a rule women are not perfected in wisdom, so as to be fit to be intrusted with public teaching. Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted speaks of private teaching whereby a father instructs his son. Reply Obj. 2: The grace of prophecy consists in God enlightening the mind, on the part of which there is no difference of sex among men, according to Col. 3:10, 11, Putting on the new man, him who is renewed unto knowl-

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Q. 177, A. 2

Gratuitous Graces

novatur secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum, ibi non est masculus et femina. Sed gratia sermonis pertinet ad instructionem hominum, inter quos differentia sexuum invenitur. Unde non est similis ratio de utroque. Ad tertium dicendum quod gratiam divinitus acceptam diversimode aliqui administrant, secundum diversitatem conditionis ipsorum. Unde mulieres, si gratiam sapientiae aut scientiae habeant, possunt eam administrare secundum privatam doctrinam, non autem secundum publicam.

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edge, according to the image of Him that created him, where there is neither male nor female. Now the grace of the word pertains to the instruction of men among whom the difference of sex is found. Hence the comparison fails. Reply Obj. 3: The recipients of a divinely conferred grace administer it in different ways according to their various conditions. Hence women, if they have the grace of wisdom or of knowledge, can administer it by teaching privately but not publicly.

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Question 178 The Grace of Miracles Deinde considerandum est de gratia miraculorum. We must next consider the grace of miracles, under Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. which head there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum sit aliqua gratia gratis data faciendi (1) Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracula. miracles? Secundo, quibus conveniat. (2) To whom is it becoming?

Article 1 Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla gratia gratis data ordinetur ad miracula facienda. Omnis enim gratia ponit aliquid in eo cui datur. Sed operatio miraculorum non ponit aliquid in anima hominis cui datur, quia etiam ad tactum corporis mortui miracula fiunt; sicut legitur IV Reg. XIII, quod quidam proiecerunt cadaver in sepulcro Elisei, quod cum tetigisset ossa Elisei, revixit homo et stetit super pedes suos. Ergo operatio miraculorum non pertinet ad gratiam gratis datam. Praeterea, gratiae gratis datae sunt a spiritu sancto, secundum illud I ad Cor. XII, divisiones gratiarum sunt, idem autem spiritus. Sed operatio miraculorum fit etiam a spiritu immundo, secundum illud Matth. XXIV, surgent pseudochristi et pseudoprophetae, et dabunt signa et prodigia magna. Ergo videtur quod operatio miraculorum non pertineat ad gratiam gratis datam. Praeterea, miracula distinguuntur per signa et prodigia sive portenta, et per virtutes. Inconvenienter ergo ponitur operatio virtutum potius gratia gratis data quam operatio prodigiorum sive signorum. Praeterea, miraculosa reparatio sanitatis per divinam virtutem fit. Ergo non debet distingui gratia sanitatum ab operatione virtutum. Praeterea, operatio miraculorum consequitur fidem, vel facientis, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIII, si habuero omnem fidem, ita ut montes transferam; sive etiam aliorum, propter quos miracula fiunt, unde dicitur Matth. XIII, et non fecit ibi virtutes multas, propter incredulitatem illorum. Si ergo fides ponitur gratia gratis data, superfluum est praeter hoc ponere aliam gratiam gratis datam operationem signorum. Sed contra est quod apostolus, I ad Cor. XII, inter alias gratias gratis datas, dicit, alii datur gratia sanitatum, alii operatio virtutum.

Objection 1: It would seem that no gratuitous grace is directed to the working of miracles. For every grace puts something in the one to whom it is given (Cf. I-II, Q. 90, A. 1). Now the working of miracles puts nothing in the soul of the man who receives it since miracles are wrought at the touch even of a dead body. Thus we read (4 Kgs 13:21) that some . . . cast the body into the sepulchre of Eliseus. And when it had touched the bones of Eliseus, the man came to life, and stood upon his feet. Therefore the working of miracles does not belong to a gratuitous grace. Obj. 2: Further, the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Spirit, according to 1 Cor. 12:4, There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit. Now the working of miracles is effected even by the unclean spirit, according to Matt. 24:24, There shall arise false Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders. Therefore it would seem that the working of miracles does not belong to a gratuitous grace. Obj. 3: Further, miracles are divided into signs, wonders or portents, and virtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to reckon the working of miracles a gratuitous grace, any more than the working of signs and wonders. Obj. 4: Further, the miraculous restoring to health is done by the power of God. Therefore the grace of healing should not be distinguished from the working of miracles. Obj. 5: Further, the working of miracles results from faith—either of the worker, according to 1 Cor. 13:2, If I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, or of other persons for whose sake miracles are wrought, according to Matt. 13:58, And He wrought not many miracles there, because of their unbelief. Therefore, if faith be reckoned a gratuitous grace, it is superfluous to reckon in addition the working of signs as another gratuitous grace. On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor 12:9, 10) says that among other gratuitous graces, to another is given the grace of healing . . . to another, the working of miracles.

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Gratuitous Graces

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Spiritus Sanctus sufficienter providet Ecclesiae in his quae sunt utilia ad salutem, ad quod ordinantur gratiae gratis datae. Sicut autem oportet quod notitia quam quis divinitus accipit, in notitiam aliorum deducatur per donum linguarum et per gratiam sermonis; ita necesse est quod sermo prolatus confirmetur, ad hoc quod credibilis fiat. Hoc autem fit per operationem miraculorum, secundum illud Marci ult., et sermonem confirmante sequentibus signis. Et hoc rationabiliter. Naturale enim est homini ut veritatem intelligibilem per sensibiles effectus deprehendat. Unde sicut ductu naturalis rationis homo pervenire potest in aliquam Dei notitiam per effectus naturales, ita per aliquos supernaturales effectus, qui miracula dicuntur, in aliquam supernaturalem cognitionem credendorum homo adducitur. Et ideo operatio miraculorum pertinet ad gratiam gratis datam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut prophetia se extendit ad omnia quae supernaturaliter cognosci possunt, ita operatio virtutum se extendit ad omnia quae supernaturaliter fieri possunt. Quorum quidem causa est divina omnipotentia, quae nulli creaturae communicari potest. Et ideo impossibile est quod principium operandi miracula sit aliqua qualitas habitualiter manens in anima. Sed tamen hoc potest contingere, quod sicut mens prophetae movetur ex inspiratione divina ad aliquid supernaturaliter cognoscendum, ita etiam mens miracula facientis moveatur ad faciendum aliquid ad quod sequitur effectus miraculi, quod Deus sua virtute facit. Quod quandoque quidem fit praecedente oratione, sicut cum Petrus Tabitham mortuam suscitavit, ut habetur Act. IX, quandoque etiam non praecedente manifesta oratione, sed Deo ad nutum hominis operante, sicut Petrus Ananiam et Saphiram mentientes morti increpando tradidit, ut dicitur Act. V. Unde Gregorius dicit, in II Dialog., quod sancti aliquando ex potestate, aliquando exhibent miracula ex postulatione. Utrolibet tamen modo Deus principaliter operatur, qui utitur instrumentaliter vel interiori motu hominis, vel eius locutione, vel etiam aliquo exteriori, actu, seu etiam aliquo contactu corporali corporis, etiam mortui. Unde Iosue X, cum Iosue dixisset, quasi ex potestate, sol, contra Gabaon non movearis, subditur postea, non fuit antea et post tam longa dies, obediente Deo voci hominis. Ad secundum dicendum quod ibi loquitur dominus de miraculis quae fienda sunt tempore Antichristi, de quibus apostolus dicit, II ad Thessal. II, quod adventus Antichristi erit secundum operationem Satanae, in omni virtute et signis et prodigiis mendacibus. Et sicut Augustinus dicit, XX de Civ. Dei, ambigi solet utrum propterea dicta sint signa et prodigia mendacii quoniam mortales sensus per phantasmata decepturus est, ut quod non facit, facere videatur, an quia illa, etiam si erunt vera prodigia, ad mendacium pertrahent. Vera autem dicuntur, quia ip-

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I answer that, As stated above (Q. 177, A. 1), the Holy Spirit provides sufficiently for the Church in matters profitable unto salvation, to which purpose the gratuitous graces are directed. Now just as the knowledge which a man receives from God needs to be brought to the knowledge of others through the gift of tongues and the grace of the word, so too the word uttered needs to be confirmed in order that it be rendered credible. This is done by the working of miracles, according to Mk. 16:20, And confirming the word with signs that followed: and reasonably so. For it is natural to man to arrive at the intelligible truth through its sensible effects. Wherefore just as man led by his natural reason is able to arrive at some knowledge of God through His natural effects, so is he brought to a certain degree of supernatural knowledge of the objects of faith by certain supernatural effects which are called miracles. Therefore the working of miracles belongs to a gratuitous grace. Reply Obj. 1: Just as prophecy extends to whatever can be known supernaturally, so the working of miracles extends to all things that can be done supernaturally; the cause whereof is the divine omnipotence which cannot be communicated to any creature. Hence it is impossible for the principle of working miracles to be a quality abiding as a habit in the soul. On the other hand, just as the prophet’s mind is moved by divine inspiration to know something supernaturally, so too is it possible for the mind of the miracle worker to be moved to do something resulting in the miraculous effect which God causes by His power. Sometimes this takes place after prayer, as when Peter raised to life the dead Tabitha (Acts 9:40): sometimes without any previous prayer being expressed, as when Peter by upbraiding the lying Ananias and Saphira delivered them to death (Acts 5:4, 9). Hence Gregory says (Dial. ii, 30) that the saints work miracles, sometimes by authority, sometimes by prayer. In either case, however, God is the principal worker, for He uses instrumentally either man’s inward movement, or his speech, or some outward action, or again the bodily contact of even a dead body. Thus when Josue had said as though authoritatively (Josh 10:12): Move not, O sun, toward Gabaon, it is said afterwards (Josh 10:14): There was not before or after so long a day, the Lord obeying the voice of a man.

Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord is speaking there of the miracles to be wrought at the time of Antichrist, of which the Apostle says (2 Thess 2:9) that the coming of Antichrist will be according to the working of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders. To quote the words of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 19), it is a matter of debate whether they are called signs and lying wonders, because he will deceive the senses of mortals by imaginary visions, in that he will seem to do what he does not, or because, though they be real wonders, they will seduce into falsehood them that believe. They are

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sae res verae erunt, sicut magi Pharaonis fecerunt veras ranas et veros serpentes. Non autem habebunt veram rationem miraculi, quia fient virtute naturalium causarum, sicut in prima parte dictum est. Sed operatio miraculorum quae attribuitur gratiae gratis datae, fit virtute divina, ad hominum utilitatem. Ad tertium dicendum quod in miraculis duo possunt attendi. Unum quidem est id quod fit, quod quidem est aliquid excedens facultatem naturae. Et secundum hoc, miracula dicuntur virtutes. Aliud est id propter quod miracula fiunt, scilicet ad manifestandum aliquid supernaturale. Et secundum hoc, communiter dicuntur signa, propter excellentiam autem, dicuntur portenta vel prodigia, quasi procul aliquid ostendentia. Ad quartum dicendum quod gratia sanitatum commemoratur seorsum, quia per eam confertur homini aliquod beneficium, scilicet corporalis sanitatis, praeter beneficium commune quod exhibetur in omnibus miraculis, ut scilicet homines adducantur in Dei notitiam. Ad quintum dicendum quod operatio miraculorum attribuitur fidei propter duo. Primo quidem, quia ordinatur ad fidei confirmationem. Secundo, quia procedit ex Dei omnipotentia, cui fides innititur. Et tamen, sicut praeter gratiam fidei necessaria est gratia sermonis ad fidei instructionem, ita etiam necessaria est operatio miraculorum ad fidei confirmationem.

Q. 178, A. 2

said to be real, because the things themselves will be real, just as Pharaoh’s magicians made real frogs and real serpents; but they will not be real miracles, because they will be done by the power of natural causes, as stated in the First Part (Q. 114, A. 4); whereas the working of miracles which is ascribed to a gratuitous grace, is done by God’s power for man’s profit. Reply Obj. 3: Two things may be considered in miracles. One is that which is done: this is something surpassing the faculty of nature, and in this respect miracles are called virtues. The other thing is the purpose for which miracles are wrought, namely the manifestation of something supernatural, and in this respect they are commonly called signs: but on account of some excellence they receive the name of wonder or prodigy, as showing something from afar (procul). Reply Obj. 4: The grace of healing is mentioned separately, because by its means a benefit, namely bodily health, is conferred on man in addition to the common benefit bestowed in all miracles, namely the bringing of men to the knowledge of God. Reply Obj. 5: The working of miracles is ascribed to faith for two reasons. First, because it is directed to the confirmation of faith, second, because it proceeds from God’s omnipotence on which faith relies. Nevertheless, just as besides the grace of faith, the grace of the word is necessary that people may be instructed in the faith, so too is the grace of miracles necessary that people may be confirmed in their faith.

Article 2 Whether the wicked can work miracles? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mali non possint facere miracula. Miracula enim perpetrantur per orationem, sicut dictum est. Sed oratio peccatoris non est exaudibilis, secundum illud Ioan. IX, scimus quia peccatores Deus non audit. Et Prov. XXVIII dicitur, qui declinat aurem suam ne audiat legem, oratio sua erit execrabilis. Ergo videtur quod mali miracula facere non possint. Praeterea, miracula attribuuntur fidei, secundum illud Matth. XVII, si habueritis fidem sicut granum sinapis, dicetis monti huic, transi hinc, et transibit. Fides autem sine operibus mortua est, ut dicitur Iac. II, et sic non videtur quod habeat propriam operationem. Ergo videtur quod mali, qui non sunt bonorum operum, miracula facere non possunt. Praeterea, miracula sunt quaedam divina testimonia, secundum illud Heb. II, contestante Deo signis et portentis et variis virtutibus. Unde et in Ecclesia aliqui ca-

Objection 1: It would seem that the wicked cannot work miracles. For miracles are wrought through prayer, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1). Now the prayer of a sinner is not granted, according to John 9:31, We know that God doth not hear sinners, and Prov. 28:9, He that turneth away his ear from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an abomination. Therefore it would seem that the wicked cannot work miracles. Obj. 2: Further, miracles are ascribed to faith, according to Matt. 17:19, If you have faith as a grain of mustard seed you shall say to this mountain: Remove from hence hither, and it shall remove. Now faith without works is dead, according to James 2:20, so that, seemingly, it is devoid of its proper operation. Therefore it would seem that the wicked, since they do not good works, cannot work miracles. Obj. 3: Further, miracles are divine attestations, according to Heb. 2:4, God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders and diverse miracles: wherefore in the Church the

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Gratuitous Graces

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nonizantur per testimonia miraculorum. Sed Deus non canonization of certain persons is based on the attestation potest esse testis falsitatis. Ergo videtur quod mali homi- of miracles. Now God cannot bear witness to a falsehood. nes non possint miracula facere. Therefore it would seem that wicked men cannot work miracles. Praeterea, boni sunt Deo coniunctiores quam Obj. 4: Further, the good are more closely united to mali. Sed non omnes boni faciunt miracula. Ergo multo God than the wicked. But the good do not all work miraminus mali faciunt. cles. Much less therefore do the wicked. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor 13:2): If si habuero omnem fidem, ita ut montes transferam, cari- I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, tatem autem non habuero, nihil sum. Sed quicumque non and have not charity, I am nothing. Now whosoever has not habet caritatem, est malus, quia hoc solum donum spiri- charity is wicked, because this gift alone of the Holy Spirit tus sancti est quod dividit inter filios regni et filios perditio- distinguishes the children of the kingdom from the children of nis, ut Augustinus dicit, XV de Trin. Ergo videtur quod perdition, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18). Therefore it etiam mali possunt miracula facere. would seem that even the wicked can work miracles. Respondeo dicendum quod miraculorum aliqua I answer that, Some miracles are not true but imagquidem non sunt vera, sed phantastica facta, quibus sci- inary deeds, because they delude man by the appearance of licet ludificatur homo, ut videatur ei aliquid quod non that which is not; while others are true deeds, yet they have est. Quaedam vero sunt vera facta, sed non vere habent not the character of a true miracle, because they are done rationem miraculi, quae fiunt virtute aliquarum natura- by the power of some natural cause. Both of these can be lium causarum. Et haec duo possunt fieri per Daemones, done by the demons, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). ut supra dictum est. Sed vera miracula non possunt fieri nisi virtute diviTrue miracles cannot be wrought save by the power of na, operatur enim ea Deus ad hominum utilitatem. Et God, because God works them for man’s benefit, and this hoc dupliciter, uno quidem modo, ad veritatis praedi- in two ways: in one way for the confirmation of truth decatae confirmationem; alio modo, ad demonstrationem clared, in another way in proof of a person’s holiness, which sanctitatis alicuius quem Deus vult hominibus propone- God desires to propose as an example of virtue. In the first re in exemplum virtutis. Primo autem modo, miracula way miracles can be wrought by any one who preaches the possunt fieri per quemcumque qui veram fidem praedi- true faith and calls upon Christ’s name, as even the wicked cat et nomen Christi invocat, quod etiam interdum per do sometimes. In this way even the wicked can work miramalos fit. Et secundum hunc modum, etiam mali pos- cles. Hence Jerome commenting on Matt. 7:22, Have not we sunt miracula facere. Unde super illud Matth. VII, non- prophesied in Thy name? says: Sometimes prophesying, the ne in nomine tuo prophetavimus etc. dicit Hieronymus, working of miracles, and the casting out of demons are acprophetare, vel virtutes facere et Daemonia eiicere, inter- corded not to the merit of those who do these things, but to dum non est eius meriti qui operatur, sed invocatio nomi- the invoking of Christ’s name, that men may honor God, by nis Christi hoc agit, ut homines Deum honorent, ad cuius invoking Whom such great miracles are wrought. invocationem fiunt tanta miracula. Secundo autem modo, non fiunt miracula nisi a In the second way miracles are not wrought except by sanctis, ad quorum sanctitatem demonstrandam mira- the saints, since it is in proof of their holiness that miracles cula fiunt vel in vita eorum vel etiam post mortem, sive are wrought during their lifetime or after death, either by per eos sive per alios. Legitur enim Act. XIX, quod Deus themselves or by others. For we read (Acts 19:11, 12) that faciebat virtutes per manus Pauli, et etiam desuper langui- God wrought by the hand of Paul . . . miracles and even there dos deferebantur a corpore eius sudaria, et recedebant ab were brought from his body to the sick, handkerchiefs . . . and eis languores. Et sic etiam nihil prohibet per aliquem pec- the diseases departed from them. In this way indeed there is catorem miracula fieri ad invocationem alicuius sancti. nothing to prevent a sinner from working miracles by inQuae tamen miracula non dicitur ille facere, sed ille ad voking a saint; but the miracle is ascribed not to him, but to cuius sanctitatem demonstrandam haec fierent. the one in proof of whose holiness such things are done. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dicReply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 83, A. 16) when we tum est, cum de oratione ageretur, oratio in impetran- were treating of prayer, the prayer of impetration relies not do non innititur merito, sed divinae misericordiae, quae on merit but on God’s mercy, which extends even to the etiam ad malos se extendit. Et ideo etiam quandoque wicked, wherefore the prayers even of sinners are somepeccatorum oratio a Deo exauditur. Unde Augustinus times granted by God. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xliv in dicit, super Ioan., quod illud verbum caecus locutus est Joan.) that the blind man spoke these words before he was quasi adhuc inunctus, idest nondum perfecte illumina- anointed, that is, before he was perfectly enlightened; since tus, nam peccatores exaudit Deus. Quod autem dicitur God does hear sinners. When it is said that the prayer of

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quod oratio non audientis legem est execrabilis, intelligendum est quantum est ex merito peccatoris. Sed interdum impetrat ex misericordia Dei, vel propter salutem eius qui orat, sicut auditus est publicanus, ut dicitur Luc. XVIII; vel etiam propter salutem aliorum et gloriam Dei. Ad secundum dicendum quod fides sine operibus dicitur esse mortua quantum ad ipsum credentem, qui per eam non vivit vita gratiae. Nihil autem prohibet quod res viva operetur per instrumentum mortuum, sicut homo operatur per baculum. Et hoc modo Deus operatur per fidem hominis peccatoris instrumentaliter. Ad tertium dicendum quod miracula semper sunt vera testimonia eius ad quod inducuntur. Unde a malis qui falsam doctrinam enuntiant, nunquam fiunt vera miracula ad confirmationem suae doctrinae, quamvis quandoque fieri possint ad commendationem nominis Christi, quod invocant, et virtute sacramentorum quae exhibent. Ab his autem qui veram doctrinam enuntiant, fiunt quandoque vera miracula ad confirmationem doctrinae, non autem ad testificationem sanctitatis. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., aliter magi faciunt miracula, aliter boni Christiani, aliter mali, magi per privatos contractus cum Daemonibus, boni Christiani per publicam iustitiam, mali Christiani per signa publicae iustitiae. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, ideo non omnibus sanctis ista attribuuntur, ne perniciosissimo errore decipiantur infirmi, aestimantes in talibus factis esse maiora dona quam in operibus iustitiae, quibus vita aeterna comparatur.

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one who hears not the law is an abomination, this must be understood so far as the sinner’s merit is concerned; yet it is sometimes granted, either for the spiritual welfare of the one who prays—as the publican was heard (Luke 18:14)— or for the good of others and for God’s glory. Reply Obj. 2: Faith without works is said to be dead, as regards the believer, who lives not, by faith, with the life of grace. But nothing hinders a living thing from working through a dead instrument, as a man through a stick. It is thus that God works while employing instrumentally the faith of a sinner. Reply Obj. 3: Miracles are always true witnesses to the purpose for which they are wrought. Hence wicked men who teach a false doctrine never work true miracles in confirmation of their teaching, although sometimes they may do so in praise of Christ’s name which they invoke, and by the power of the sacraments which they administer. If they teach a true doctrine, sometimes they work true miracles as confirming their teaching, but not as an attestation of holiness. Hence Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79): Magicians work miracles in one way, good Christians in another, wicked Christians in another. Magicians by private compact with the demons, good Christians by their manifest righteousness, evil Christians by the outward signs of righteousness. Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79), The reason why these are not granted to all holy men is lest by a most baneful error the weak be deceived into thinking such deeds to imply greater gifts than the deeds of righteousness whereby eternal life is obtained.

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Question 179 The Division of Life into Active and Contemplative Consequenter considerandum est de vita activa et contemplativa. Ubi quadruplex consideratio occurrit, quarum prima est de divisione vitae per activam et contemplativam; secunda, de vita contemplativa; tertia, de vita activa; quarta, de comparatione vitae activae ad contemplativam. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum vita convenienter dividatur per activam et contemplativam. Secundo, utrum divisio sit sufficiens.

We must next consider active and contemplative life. This consideration will be fourfold: (1) Of the division of life into active and contemplative; (2) Of the contemplative life; (3) Of the active life; (4) Of the comparison between the active and the contemplative life. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative? (2) Whether this is an adequate division?

Article 1 Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita non convenienter dividatur per activam et contemplativam. Anima enim est principium vitae per suam essentiam, dicit enim philosophus, in II de anima, quod vivere viventibus est esse. Actionis autem et contemplationis principium est anima per suas potentias. Ergo videtur quod vita non convenienter dividatur per activam et contemplativam. Praeterea, inconvenienter dividitur prius per differentias posterioris. Activum autem et contemplativum, sive speculativum et practicum, sunt differentiae intellectus, ut patet in III de anima. Vivere autem est prius quam intelligere, nam vivere inest viventibus primo secundum animam vegetabilem, ut patet per philosophum, in II de anima. Ergo inconvenienter dividitur vita per activam et contemplativam. Praeterea, nomen vitae importat motum, ut patet per Dionysium, VI cap. de Div. Nom. Sed contemplatio consistit magis in quiete, secundum illud Sap. VIII, intrans in domum meam, conquiescam cum illa. Ergo videtur quod vita non convenienter dividatur per activam et contemplativam. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, super Ezech., dicit, duae sunt vitae in quibus nos omnipotens Deus per sacrum eloquium erudit, activa videlicet et contemplativa.

Objection 1: It would seem that life is not fittingly divided into active and contemplative. For the soul is the principle of life by its essence: since the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that in living things to live is to be. Now the soul is the principle of action and contemplation by its powers. Therefore it would seem that life is not fittingly divided into active and contemplative.

Obj. 2: Further, the division of that which comes afterwards is unfittingly applied to that which comes first. Now active and contemplative, or speculative and practical, are differences of the intellect (De Anima iii, 10); while to live comes before to understand, since to live comes first to living things through the vegetative soul, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative. Obj. 3: Further, the word life implies movement, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vi): whereas contemplation consists rather in rest, according to Wis. 8:16: When I enter into my house, I shall repose myself with her. Therefore it would seem that life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative. On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv super Ezech.): There is a twofold life wherein Almighty God instructs us by His holy word, the active life and the contemplative. Respondeo dicendum quod illa proprie dicuntur I answer that, Properly speaking, those things are viventia quae ex seipsis moventur seu operantur. Illud said to live whose movement or operation is from within autem maxime convenit alicui secundum seipsum, quod themselves. Now that which is proper to a thing and to est proprium ei, et ad quod maxime inclinatur. Et ideo which it is most inclined is that which is most becoming unumquodque vivens ostenditur vivere ex operatione si- to it from itself; wherefore every living thing gives proof of

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Gratuitous Graces

bi maxime propria, ad quam maxime inclinatur, sicut plantarum vita dicitur in hoc consistere quod nutriuntur et generant; animalium vero in hoc quod sentiunt et moventur; hominum vero in hoc quod intelligunt et secundum rationem agunt. Unde etiam et in hominibus vita uniuscuiusque hominis videtur esse id in quo maxime delectatur, et cui maxime intendit, et in hoc praecipue vult quilibet convivere amico, ut dicitur in IX Ethic. Quia ergo quidam homines praecipue intendunt contemplationi veritatis, quidam principaliter intendunt exterioribus actionibus, inde est quod vita hominis convenienter dividitur per activam et contemplativam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod propria forma uniuscuiusque faciens ipsum esse in actu, est principium propriae operationis ipsius. Et ideo vivere dicitur esse viventium ex eo quod viventia per hoc quod habent esse per suam formam, tali modo operantur. Ad secundum dicendum quod vita universaliter sumpta non dividitur per activam et contemplativam, sed vita hominis, qui speciem sortitur ex hoc quod habet intellectum. Et ideo eadem est divisio intellectus et vitae humanae. Ad tertium dicendum quod contemplatio habet quidem quietem ab exterioribus motibus, nihilominus tamen ipsum contemplari est quidam motus intellectus, prout quaelibet operatio dicitur motus; secundum quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod sentire et intelligere sunt motus quidam, prout motus dicitur actus perfecti. Et hoc modo Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., ponit tres motus animae contemplantis, scilicet rectum, circularem et obliquum.

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its life by that operation which is most proper to it, and to which it is most inclined. Thus the life of plants is said to consist in nourishment and generation; the life of animals in sensation and movement; and the life of men in their understanding and acting according to reason. Wherefore also in men the life of every man would seem to be that wherein he delights most, and on which he is most intent; thus especially does he wish to associate with his friends (Ethic. ix, 12). Accordingly since certain men are especially intent on the contemplation of truth, while others are especially intent on external actions, it follows that man’s life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative. Reply Obj. 1: Each thing’s proper form that makes it actually to be is properly that thing’s principle of operation. Hence to live is, in living things, to be, because living things through having being from their form, act in such and such a way. Reply Obj. 2: Life in general is not divided into active and contemplative, but the life of man, who derives his species from having an intellect, wherefore the same division applies to intellect and human life. Reply Obj. 3: It is true that contemplation enjoys rest from external movements. Nevertheless to contemplate is itself a movement of the intellect, insofar as every operation is described as a movement; in which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that sensation and understanding are movements of a kind, insofar as movement is defined the act of a perfect thing. In this way Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) ascribes three movements to the soul in contemplation, namely, straight, circular, and oblique.

Article 2 Whether life is adequately divided into active and contemplative? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita non sufficienter dividatur per activam et contemplativam. Philosophus enim, in I Ethic. dicit quod tres sunt vitae maxime excellentes, scilicet voluptuosa, civilis, quae videtur esse eadem activae, et contemplativa. Insufficienter ergo dividitur vita per activam et contemplativam. Praeterea, Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, ponit tria vitae genera, scilicet otiosum, quod pertinet ad contemplationem; actuosum, quod pertinet ad vitam activam; et addit tertium ex utroque compositum. Ergo videtur quod insufficienter dividatur vita per activam et contemplativam. Praeterea, vita hominis diversificatur secundum quod homines diversis actionibus student. Sed plura

Objection 1: It would seem that life is not adequately divided into active and contemplative. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5) that there are three most prominent kinds of life, the life of pleasure, the civil which would seem to be the same as the active, and the contemplative life. Therefore the division of life into active and contemplative would seem to be inadequate. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1, 2, 3, 19) mentions three kinds of life, namely the life of leisure which pertains to the contemplative, the busy life which pertains to the active, and a third composed of both. Therefore it would seem that life is inadequately divided into active and contemplative. Obj. 3: Further, man’s life is diversified according to the diverse actions in which men are occupied. Now there are

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quam duo sunt humanarum actionum studia. Ergo videtur quod vita debeat in plura membra dividi quam in activum et contemplativum. Sed contra est quod istae duae vitae significantur per duas uxores Iacob, activa quidem per Liam, contemplativa vero per Rachelem; et per duas mulieres quae dominum hospitio receperunt, contemplativa quidem per Mariam, activa vero per Martham; ut Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral. Non autem esset haec congrua significatio si essent plures quam duae vitae. Ergo sufficienter dividitur vita per activam et contemplativam. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, divisio ista datur de vita humana, quae quidem attenditur secundum intellectum. Intellectus autem dividitur per activum et contemplativum, quia finis intellectivae cognitionis vel est ipsa cognitio veritatis, quod pertinet ad intellectum contemplativum; vel est aliqua exterior actio, quod pertinet ad intellectum practicum sive activum. Et ideo vita etiam sufficienter dividitur per activam et contemplativam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vita voluptuosa ponit finem in delectatione corporali, quae communis est nobis et brutis. Unde, sicut philosophus ibidem dicit, est vita bestialis. Propter quod, non comprehenditur sub praesenti divisione, prout vita humana dividitur in activam et contemplativam. Ad secundum dicendum quod media conficiuntur ex extremis, et ideo virtute continentur in eis, sicut tepidum in calido et frigido, et pallidum in albo et nigro. Et similiter sub activo et contemplativo comprehenditur id quod est ex utroque compositum. Et tamen, sicut in quolibet mixto praedominatur aliquod simplicium, ita etiam in medio genere vitae superabundat quandoque quidem contemplativum, quandoque vero activum. Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia studia humanarum actionum, si ordinentur ad necessitatem praesentis vitae secundum rationem rectam, pertinent ad vitam activam, quae per ordinatas actiones consulit necessitati vitae praesentis. Si autem deserviant concupiscentiae cuicumque, pertinent ad vitam voluptuosam, quae non continetur sub vita activa. Humana vero studia quae ordinantur ad considerationem veritatis, pertinent ad vitam contemplativam.

Q. 179, A. 2

more than two occupations of human actions. Therefore it would seem that life should be divided into more kinds than the active and the contemplative. On the contrary, These two lives are signified by the two wives of Jacob; the active by Lia, and the contemplative by Rachel: and by the two hostesses of our Lord; the contemplative life by Mary, and the active life by Martha, as Gregory declares (Moral. vi, 37). Now this signification would not be fitting if there were more than two lives. Therefore life is adequately divided into active and contemplative. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1, ad 2), this division applies to the human life as derived from the intellect. Now the intellect is divided into active and contemplative, since the end of intellective knowledge is either the knowledge itself of truth, which pertains to the contemplative intellect, or some external action, which pertains to the practical or active intellect. Therefore life too is adequately divided into active and contemplative. Reply Obj. 1: The life of pleasure places its end in pleasures of the body, which are common to us and dumb animals; wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), it is the life of a beast. Hence it is not included in this division of the life of a man into active and contemplative. Reply Obj. 2: A mean is a combination of extremes, wherefore it is virtually contained in them, as tepid in hot and cold, and pale in white and black. In like manner active and contemplative comprise that which is composed of both. Nevertheless as in every mixture one of the simples predominates, so too in the mean state of life sometimes the contemplative, sometimes the active element, abounds. Reply Obj. 3: All the occupations of human actions, if directed to the requirements of the present life in accord with right reason, belong to the active life which provides for the necessities of the present life by means of wellordered activity. If, on the other hand, they minister to any concupiscence whatever, they belong to the life of pleasure, which is not comprised under the active life. Those human occupations that are directed to the consideration of truth belong to the contemplative life.

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Question 180 The Contemplative Life Deinde considerandum est de vita contemplativa. Et We must now consider the contemplative life, under circa hoc quaeruntur octo. which head there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum vita contemplativa pertineat tantum (1) Whether the contemplative life pertains to the ad intellectum, an consistat etiam in affectu. intellect only, or also to the affections? Secundo, utrum ad vitam contemplativam (2) Whether the moral virtues pertain to the pertineant virtutes morales. contemplative life? Tertio, utrum vita contemplativa consistat solum in (3) Whether the contemplative life consists in one uno actu, aut in pluribus. action or in several? Quarto, utrum ad vitam contemplativam pertineat (4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever consideratio cuiuscumque veritatis. pertains to the contemplative life? Quinto, utrum vita contemplativa hominis in hoc (5) Whether the contemplative life of man in this state statu possit elevari usque ad Dei visionem. can arise to the vision of God? Sexto, de motibus contemplationis quos Dionysius (6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by assignat, quarto capitulo de divinis nominibus. Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv); Septimo, de delectatione contemplationis. (7) Of the pleasure of contemplation; Octavo, de duratione contemplationis. (8) Of the duration of contemplation.

Article 1 Whether the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections, and pertains wholly to the intellect? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita contemplativa nihil habeat in affectu, sed totum in intellectu. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Metaphys., quod finis contemplationis est veritas. Veritas autem pertinet ad intellectum totaliter. Ergo videtur quod vita contemplativa totaliter in intellectu consistat. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., quod Rachel, quae interpretatur visum principium, vitam contemplativam significat. Sed visio principii pertinet proprie ad intellectum. Ergo vita contemplativa proprie ad intellectum pertinet. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit. Super Ezech. Quod ad vitam contemplativam pertinet ab exteriori actione quiescere. Sed vis affectiva sive appetitiva inclinat ad exteriores actiones. Ergo videtur quod vita contemplativa non pertineat aliquo modo ad vim appetitivam. Sed contra est quod Gregorius ibidem dicit, quod contemplativa vita est caritatem Dei et proximi tota mente retinere, et soli desiderio conditoris inhaerere. Sed desiderium et amor ad vim affectivam sive appetitivam pertinet, ut supra habitum est. Ergo etiam vita contemplativa habet aliquid in vi affectiva sive appetitiva.

Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections and pertains wholly to the intellect. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, text. 3 ) that the end of contemplation is truth. Now truth pertains wholly to the intellect. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life wholly regards the intellect. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37; Hom. xix in Ezech.) that Rachel, which is interpreted ‘vision of the principle’, signifies the contemplative life. Now the vision of a principle belongs properly to the intellect. Therefore the contemplative life belongs properly to the intellect. Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it belongs to the contemplative life, to rest from external action. Now the affective or appetitive power inclines to external actions. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the appetitive power. On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the contemplative life is to cling with our whole mind to the love of God and our neighbor, and to desire nothing beside our Creator. Now desire and love pertain to the affective or appetitive power, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 2; Q. 26, A. 2). Therefore the contemplative life has also something to do with the affective or appetitive power.

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Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vita contemplativa illorum esse dicitur qui principaliter intendunt ad contemplationem veritatis. Intentio autem est actus voluntatis, ut supra habitum est, quia intentio est de fine, qui est voluntatis obiectum. Et ideo vita contemplativa, quantum ad ipsam essentiam actionis, pertinet ad intellectum, quantum autem ad id quod movet ad exercendum talem operationem, pertinet ad voluntatem, quae movet omnes alias potentias, et etiam intellectum, ad suum actum, ut supra dictum est. Movet autem vis appetitiva ad aliquid inspiciendum, vel sensibiliter vel intelligibiliter, quandoque quidem propter amorem rei visae, quia, ut dicitur Matth. VI, ubi est thesaurus tuus, ibi est et cor tuum, quandoque autem propter amorem ipsius cognitionis quam quis ex inspectione consequitur. Et propter hoc Gregorius constituit vitam contemplativam in caritate Dei, inquantum scilicet aliquis ex dilectione Dei inardescit ad eius pulchritudinem conspiciendam. Et quia unusquisque delectatur cum adeptus fuerit id quod amat, ideo vita contemplativa terminatur ad delectationem, quae est in affectu, ex qua etiam amor intenditur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod veritas est finis contemplationis, habet rationem boni appetibilis et amabilis et delectantis. Et secundum hoc pertinet ad vim appetitivam. Ad secundum dicendum quod ad ipsam visionem primi principii, scilicet Dei, incitat amor ipsius. Unde Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod vita contemplativa, calcatis curis omnibus, ad videndam faciem sui creatoris inardescit. Ad tertium dicendum quod vis appetitiva movet non solum membra corporalia ad exteriores actiones exercendas, sed etiam intellectum ad exercendum operationem contemplationis, ut dictum est.

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I answer that, As stated above (Q. 179, A. 1) theirs is said to be the contemplative who are chiefly intent on the contemplation of truth. Now intention is an act of the will, as stated above (I-II, Q. 12, A. 1), because intention is of the end which is the object of the will. Consequently the contemplative life, as regards the essence of the action, pertains to the intellect, but as regards the motive cause of the exercise of that action it belongs to the will, which moves all the other powers, even the intellect, to their actions, as stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4; I-II, Q. 9, A. 1). Now the appetitive power moves one to observe things either with the senses or with the intellect, sometimes for love of the thing seen because, as it is written (Matt 6:21), where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also, sometimes for love of the very knowledge that one acquires by observation. Wherefore Gregory makes the contemplative life to consist in the love of God, inasmuch as through loving God we are aflame to gaze on His beauty. And since everyone delights when he obtains what he loves, it follows that the contemplative life terminates in delight, which is seated in the affective power, the result being that love also becomes more intense. Reply Obj. 1: From the very fact that truth is the end of contemplation, it has the aspect of an appetible good, both lovable and delightful, and in this respect it pertains to the appetitive power. Reply Obj. 2: We are urged to the vision of the first principle, namely God, by the love thereof; wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the contemplative life tramples on all cares and longs to see the face of its Creator. Reply Obj. 3: The appetitive power moves not only the bodily members to perform external actions, but also the intellect to practice the act of contemplation, as stated above.

Article 2 Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales pertineant ad vitam contemplativam. Dicit enim Gregorius, super Ezech., quod contemplativa vita est caritatem quidem Dei et proximi tota mente retinere. Sed omnes virtutes morales, de quarum actibus dantur praecepta legis, reducuntur ad dilectionem Dei et proximi, quia plenitudo legis est dilectio, ut dicitur Rom. XIII. Ergo videtur quod virtutes morales pertineant ad vitam contemplativam. Praeterea, contemplativa vita praecipue ordinatur ad Dei contemplationem, dicit enim Gregorius, super Ezech., quod, calcatis curis omnibus, ad videndum faciem

Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the contemplative life is to cling to the love of God and our neighbor with the whole mind. Now all the moral virtues, since their acts are prescribed by the precepts of the Law, are reducible to the love of God and of our neighbor, for love . . . is the fulfilling of the Law (Rom 13:10). Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life. Obj. 2: Further, the contemplative life is chiefly directed to the contemplation of God; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the mind tramples on all cares and longs to

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sui creatoris inardescit. Sed ad hoc nullus potest pervenire nisi per munditiam, quam causat virtus moralis, dicitur enim Matth. V, beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt; et Heb. XII, pacem sequimini cum omnibus, et sanctimoniam, sine qua nemo videbit Deum. Ergo videtur quod virtutes morales pertineant ad vitam contemplativam. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod contemplativa vita speciosa est in animo unde significatur per Rachelem, de qua dicitur, Gen. XXIX, quod erat pulchra facie. Sed pulchritudo animi attenditur secundum virtutes morales, et praecipue secundum temperantiam, ut Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic. Ergo videtur quod virtutes morales pertineant ad vitam contemplativam. Sed contra est quod virtutes morales ordinantur ad exteriores actiones. Sed Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., quod ad contemplativam vitam pertinet ab exteriori actione quiescere. Ergo virtutes morales non pertinent ad vitam contemplativam. Respondeo dicendum quod ad vitam contemplativam potest aliquid pertinere dupliciter, uno modo, essentialiter; alio modo, dispositive. Essentialiter quidem virtutes morales non pertinent ad vitam contemplativam. Quia finis contemplativae vitae est consideratio veritatis. Ad virtutes autem morales scire quidem, quod pertinet ad considerationem veritatis, parvam potestatem habet, ut philosophus dicit, in II Ethic. Unde et ipse, in X Ethic., virtutes morales dicit pertinere ad felicitatem activam, non autem ad contemplativam. Dispositive autem virtutes morales pertinent ad vitam contemplativam. Impeditur enim actus contemplationis, in quo essentialiter consistit vita contemplativa, et per vehementiam passionum, per quam abstrahitur intentio animae ab intelligibilibus ad sensibilia; et per tumultus exteriores. Virtutes autem morales impediunt vehementiam passionum, et sedant exteriorum occupationum tumultus. Et ideo virtutes morales dispositive ad vitam contemplativam pertinent. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vita contemplativa habet motivum ex parte affectus, et secundum hoc dilectio Dei et proximi requiritur ad vitam contemplativam. Causae autem moventes non intrant essentiam rei, sed disponunt et perficiunt rem. Unde non sequitur quod virtutes morales essentialiter pertineant ad vitam contemplativam. Ad secundum dicendum quod sanctimonia, idest munditia, causatur ex virtutibus quae sunt circa passiones impedientes puritatem rationis. Pax autem causatur ex iustitia, quae est circa operationes, secundum illud Isaiae XXXII, opus iustitiae pax, inquantum scilicet ille qui ab iniuriis aliorum abstinet, subtrahit litigiorum et tumultuum occasiones. Et sic virtutes morales disponunt ad vitam contemplativam, inquantum causant pacem et munditiam.

Q. 180, A. 2

gaze on the face of its Creator. Now no one can accomplish this without cleanness of heart, which is a result of moral virtue. For it is written (Matt 5:8): Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God: and (Heb 12:14): Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God. Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life. Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the contemplative life gives beauty to the soul, wherefore it is signified by Rachel, of whom it is said (Gen 29:17) that she was of a beautiful countenance. Now the beauty of the soul consists in the moral virtues, especially temperance, as Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43, 45, 46). Therefore it seems that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life. On the contrary, The moral virtues are directed to external actions. Now Gregory says (Moral. vi ) that it belongs to the contemplative life to rest from external action. Therefore the moral virtues do not pertain to the contemplative life. I answer that, A thing may belong to the contemplative life in two ways, essentially or dispositively. The moral virtues do not belong to the contemplative life essentially, because the end of the contemplative life is the consideration of truth: and as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4), knowledge, which pertains to the consideration of truth, has little influence on the moral virtues: wherefore he declares (Ethic. x, 8) that the moral virtues pertain to active but not to contemplative happiness. On the other hand, the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life dispositively. For the act of contemplation, wherein the contemplative life essentially consists, is hindered both by the impetuosity of the passions which withdraw the soul’s intention from intelligible to sensible things, and by outward disturbances. Now the moral virtues curb the impetuosity of the passions, and quell the disturbance of outward occupations. Hence moral virtues belong dispositively to the contemplative life. Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1), the contemplative life has its motive cause on the part of the affections, and in this respect the love of God and our neighbor is requisite to the contemplative life. Now motive causes do not enter into the essence of a thing, but dispose and perfect it. Wherefore it does not follow that the moral virtues belong essentially to the contemplative life. Reply Obj. 2: Holiness or cleanness of heart is caused by the virtues that are concerned with the passions which hinder the purity of the reason; and peace is caused by justice which is about operations, according to Isa. 32:17, The work of justice shall be peace: since he who refrains from wronging others lessens the occasions of quarrels and disturbances. Hence the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative life by causing peace and cleanness of heart.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod pulchritudo, sicut supra dictum est, consistit in quadam claritate et debita proportione. Utrumque autem horum radicaliter in ratione invenitur, ad quam pertinet et lumen manifestans, et proportionem debitam in aliis ordinare. Et ideo in vita contemplativa, quae consistit in actu rationis, per se et essentialiter invenitur pulchritudo. Unde Sap. VIII de contemplatione sapientiae dicitur, amator factus sum formae illius. In virtutibus autem moralibus invenitur pulchritudo participative, inquantum scilicet participant ordinem rationis, et praecipue in temperantia, quae reprimit concupiscentias maxime lumen rationis obscurantes. Et inde est quod virtus castitatis maxime reddit hominem aptum ad contemplationem, inquantum delectationes venereae maxime deprimunt mentem ad sensibilia, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro Soliloquiorum.

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Reply Obj. 3: Beauty, as stated above (Q. 145, A. 2), consists in a certain clarity and due proportion. Now each of these is found radically in the reason; because both the light that makes beauty seen, and the establishing of due proportion among things belong to reason. Hence since the contemplative life consists in an act of the reason, there is beauty in it by its very nature and essence; wherefore it is written (Wis 8:2) of the contemplation of wisdom: I became a lover of her beauty. On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by participation, insofar as they participate in the order of reason; and especially is it in temperance, which restrains the concupiscences which especially darken the light of reason. Hence it is that the virtue of chastity most of all makes man apt for contemplation, since venereal pleasures most of all weigh the mind down to sensible objects, as Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10).

Article 3 Whether there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad vitam contemplativam pertineant diversi actus. Richardus enim de sancto Victore distinguit inter contemplationem, meditationem et cogitationem. Sed omnia ista videntur ad vitam contemplativam pertinere. Ergo videtur quod vitae contemplativae sint diversi actus. Praeterea, apostolus, II ad Cor. III, dicit, nos autem, revelata facie gloriam domini speculantes, transformamur in eandem claritatem. Sed hoc pertinet ad vitam contemplativam. Ergo, praeter tria praedicta, etiam speculatio ad vitam contemplativam pertinet. Praeterea, Bernardus dicit, in libro de Consid., quod prima et maxima contemplatio est admiratio maiestatis. Sed admiratio, secundum Damascenum, ponitur species timoris. Ergo videtur quod plures actus ad vitam contemplativam requirantur. Praeterea, ad vitam contemplativam pertinere dicuntur oratio, lectio et meditatio. Pertinet etiam ad vitam contemplativam auditus, nam de Maria, per quam vita contemplativa significatur, dicitur, Luc. X, quod sedens secus pedes domini, audiebat verba illius. Ergo videtur quod plures actus ad vitam contemplativam requirantur. Sed contra est quod vita hic dicitur operatio cui homo principaliter intendit. Si igitur sunt plures operationes vitae contemplativae, non erit una vita contemplativa, sed plures. Respondeo dicendum quod de vita contemplativa nunc loquimur secundum quod ad hominem pertinet.

Objection 1: It would seem that there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life. For Richard of St. Victor distinguishes between contemplation, meditation, and cogitation. Yet all these apparently pertain to contemplation. Therefore it would seem that there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life. Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor 3:18): But we . . . beholding (speculantes) the glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the same clarity. Now this belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore in addition to the three aforesaid, vision (speculatio) belongs to the contemplative life. Obj. 3: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that the first and greatest contemplation is admiration of the Majesty. Now according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) admiration is a kind of fear. Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the contemplative life. Obj. 4: Further, Prayer, reading, and meditation are said to belong to the contemplative life. Again, hearing belongs to the contemplative life: since it is stated that Mary (by whom the contemplative life is signified) sitting . . . at the Lord’s feet, heard His word (Luke 10:39). Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the contemplative life. On the contrary, Life signifies here the operation on which a man is chiefly intent. Wherefore if there are several operations of the contemplative life, there will be, not one, but several contemplative lives. I answer that, We are now speaking of the contemplative life as applicable to man. Now according to Diony-

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Haec est autem differentia inter hominem et Angelum, ut patet per Dionysium, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod Angelus simplici apprehensione veritatem intuetur, homo autem quodam processu ex multis pertingit ad intuitum simplicis veritatis. Sic igitur vita contemplativa unum quidem actum habet in quo finaliter perficitur, scilicet contemplationem veritatis, a quo habet unitatem, habet autem multos actus quibus pervenit ad hunc actum finalem. Quorum quidam pertinent ad acceptionem principiorum, ex quibus procedit ad contemplationem veritatis; alii autem pertinent ad deductionem principiorum in veritatem cuius cognitio inquiritur; ultimus autem completivus actus est ipsa contemplatio veritatis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cogitatio, secundum Richardum de sancto Victore, pertinere videtur ad multorum inspectionem, ex quibus aliquis colligere intendit unam simplicem veritatem. Unde sub cogitatione comprehendi possunt et perceptiones sensuum, ad cognoscendum aliquos effectus; et imaginationes; et discursus rationis circa diversa signa, vel quaecumque perducentia in cognitionem veritatis intentae. Quamvis secundum Augustinum, XIV de Trin., cogitatio dici possit omnis actualis operatio intellectus. Meditatio vero pertinere videtur ad processum rationis ex principiis aliquibus pertingentis ad veritatis alicuius contemplationem. Et ad idem pertinet consideratio, secundum Bernardum. Quamvis secundum philosophum, in II de anima, omnis operatio intellectus consideratio dicatur. Sed contemplatio pertinet ad ipsum simplicem intuitum veritatis. Unde idem Richardus dicit quod contemplatio est perspicax et liber animi contuitus in res perspiciendas; meditatio autem est intuitus animi in veritatis inquisitione occupatus; cogitatio autem est animi respectus ad evagationem pronus. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Glossa Augustini ibidem, speculantes dicit a speculo, non a specula. Videre autem aliquid per speculum est videre causam per effectum, in quo eius similitudo relucet. Unde speculatio ad meditationem reduci videtur. Ad tertium dicendum quod admiratio est species timoris consequens apprehensionem alicuius rei excedentis nostram facultatem. Unde admiratio est actus consequens contemplationem sublimis veritatis. Dictum est enim quod contemplatio in affectu terminatur. Ad quartum dicendum quod homo ad cognitionem veritatis pertingit dupliciter. Uno modo, per ea quae ab alio accipit. Et sic quidem, quantum ad ea quae homo a Deo accipit, necessaria est oratio, secundum illud Sap. VII, invocavi, et venit in me spiritus sapientiae. Quantum vero ad ea quae accipit ab homine, necessarius est auditus, secundum quod accipit ex voce loquentis; et lectio, secundum quod accipit ex eo quod per Scripturam

Q. 180, A. 3

sius (Div. Nom. vii) between man and angel there is this difference, that an angel perceives the truth by simple apprehension, whereas man arrives at the perception of a simple truth by a process from several premises. Accordingly, then, the contemplative life has one act wherein it is finally completed, namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it derives its unity. Yet it has many acts whereby it arrives at this final act. Some of these pertain to the reception of principles, from which it proceeds to the contemplation of truth; others are concerned with deducing from the principles, the truth, the knowledge of which is sought; and the last and crowning act is the contemplation itself of the truth. Reply Obj. 1: According to Richard of St. Victor cogitation would seem to regard the consideration of the many things from which a person intends to gather one simple truth. Hence cogitation may comprise not only the perceptions of the senses in taking cognizance of certain effects, but also the imaginations. And again the reason’s discussion of the various signs or of anything that conduces to the truth in view: although, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7), cogitation may signify any actual operation of the intellect. Meditation would seem to be the process of reason from certain principles that lead to the contemplation of some truth: and consideration has the same meaning, according to Bernard (De Consid. ii, 2), although, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), every operation of the intellect may be called consideration. But contemplation regards the simple act of gazing on the truth; wherefore Richard says again (De Grat. Contempl. i, 4) that contemplation is the soul’s clear and free dwelling upon the object of its gaze; meditation is the survey of the mind while occupied in searching for the truth: and cogitation is the mind’s glance which is prone to wander. Reply Obj. 2: According to a gloss of Augustine on this passage, beholding (speculatio) denotes seeing in a mirror (speculo), not from a watch-tower (specula). Now to see a thing in a mirror is to see a cause in its effect wherein its likeness is reflected. Hence beholding would seem to be reducible to meditation. Reply Obj. 3: Admiration is a kind of fear resulting from the apprehension of a thing that surpasses our faculties: hence it results from the contemplation of the sublime truth. For it was stated above (A. 1) that contemplation terminates in the affections. Reply Obj. 4: Man reaches the knowledge of truth in two ways. First, by means of things received from another. In this way, as regards the things he receives from God, he needs prayer, according to Wis. 7:7, I called upon God, and the spirit of wisdom came upon me: while as regards the things he receives from man, he needs hearing, insofar as he receives from the spoken word, and reading, insofar as he receives from the tradition of Holy Writ. Second, he needs

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est traditum. Alio modo, necessarium est quod adhibeat to apply himself by his personal study, and thus he requires proprium studium. Et sic requiritur meditatio. meditation.

Article 4 Whether the contemplative life consists only in the contemplation of God, or also in the consideration of any truth whatever? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita contemplativa non solum consistat in contemplatione Dei, sed etiam in consideratione cuiuscumque veritatis. Dicitur enim in Psalmo, mirabilia opera tua, et anima mea cognoscet nimis. Sed cognitio divinorum operum fit per aliquam veritatis contemplationem. Ergo videtur quod ad vitam contemplativam pertineat non solum divinam veritatem, sed etiam quamlibet aliam contemplari. Praeterea, Bernardus, in libro de Consid., dicit quod prima contemplatio est admiratio maiestatis; secunda est iudiciorum Dei; tertia est beneficiorum ipsius; quarta est promissorum. Sed inter haec quatuor solum primum pertinet ad divinam veritatem, alia vero tria pertinent ad effectus ipsius. Ergo vita contemplativa non solum consistit in consideratione divinae veritatis, sed etiam in consideratione veritatis circa divinos effectus. Praeterea Richardus de sancto Victore distinguit sex species contemplationum, quarum prima est secundum solam imaginationem, dum attendimus res corporales; secunda autem est in imaginatione secundum rationem, prout scilicet sensibilium ordinem et dispositionem consideramus; tertia est in ratione secundum imaginationem, quando scilicet per inspectionem rerum visibilium ad invisibilia sublevamur; quarta autem est in ratione secundum rationem, quando scilicet animus intendit invisibilibus, quae imaginatio non novit; quinta autem est supra rationem, quando ex divina revelatione cognoscimus quae humana ratione comprehendi non possunt; sexta autem est supra rationem et praeter rationem, quando scilicet ex divina illuminatione cognoscimus ea quae humanae rationi repugnare videntur, sicut ea quae dicuntur de mysterio Trinitatis. Sed solum ultimum videtur ad divinam veritatem pertinere. Ergo contemplatio non solum respicit divinam veritatem, sed etiam eam quae in creaturis consideratur. Praeterea, in vita contemplativa quaeritur contemplatio veritatis inquantum est perfectio hominis. Sed quaelibet veritas est perfectio humani intellectus. Ergo in qualibet contemplatione veritatis consistit vita contemplativa. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., quod in contemplatione principium, quod Deus est, quaeritur.

Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life consists not only in the contemplation of God, but also in the consideration of any truth. For it is written (Ps 138:14): Wonderful are Thy works, and my soul knoweth right well. Now the knowledge of God’s works is effected by any contemplation of the truth. Therefore it would seem that it pertains to the contemplative life to contemplate not only the divine truth, but also any other. Obj. 2: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that contemplation consists in admiration first of God’s majesty, second of His judgments, third of His benefits, fourth of His promises. Now of these four the first alone regards the divine truth, and the other three pertain to His effects. Therefore the contemplative life consists not only in the contemplation of the divine truth, but also in the consideration of truth regarding the divine effects. Obj. 3: Further, Richard of St. Victor distinguishes six species of contemplation. The first belongs to the imagination alone, and consists in thinking of corporeal things. The second is in the imagination guided by reason, and consists in considering the order and disposition of sensible objects. The third is in the reason based on the imagination; when, to wit, from the consideration of the visible we rise to the invisible. The fourth is in the reason and conducted by the reason, when the mind is intent on things invisible of which the imagination has no cognizance. The fifth is above the reason, but not contrary to reason, when by divine revelation we become cognizant of things that cannot be comprehended by the human reason. The sixth is above reason and contrary to reason; when, to wit, by the divine enlightening we know things that seem contrary to human reason, such as the doctrine of the mystery of the Trinity. Now only the last of these would seem to pertain to the divine truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth regards not only the divine truth, but also that which is considered in creatures. Obj. 4: Further, in the contemplative life the contemplation of truth is sought as being the perfection of man. Now any truth is a perfection of the human intellect. Therefore the contemplative life consists in the contemplation of any truth. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that in contemplation we seek the principle which is God.

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Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, ad vitam contemplativam pertinet aliquid dupliciter, uno modo, principaliter; alio modo, secundario vel dispositive. Principaliter quidem ad vitam contemplativam pertinet contemplatio divinae veritatis, quia huiusmodi contemplatio est finis totius humanae vitae. Unde Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., quod contemplatio Dei promittitur nobis actionum omnium finis, atque aeterna perfectio gaudiorum. Quae quidem in futura vita erit perfecta, quando videbimus eum facie ad faciem, unde et perfecte beatos faciet. Nunc autem contemplatio divinae veritatis competit nobis imperfecte, videlicet per speculum et in aenigmate, unde per eam fit nobis quaedam inchoatio beatitudinis, quae hic incipit ut in futuro terminetur. Unde et philosophus, in X Ethic., in contemplatione optimi intelligibilis ponit ultimam felicitatem hominis. Sed quia per divinos effectus in Dei contemplationem manuducimur, secundum illud Rom. I, invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur, inde est quod etiam contemplatio divinorum effectuum secundario ad vitam contemplativam pertinet, prout scilicet ex hoc manuducitur homo in Dei cognitionem. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., quod in creaturarum consideratione non vana et peritura curiositas est exercenda, sed gradus ad immortalia et semper manentia faciendus. Sic igitur ex praemissis patet quod ordine quodam quatuor ad vitam contemplativam pertinent, primo quidem, virtutes morales; secundo autem, alii actus praeter contemplationem; tertio vero, contemplatio divinorum effectuum; quarto vero completivum est ipsa contemplatio divinae veritatis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod David cognitionem operum Dei quaerebat ut ex hoc manuduceretur in Deum. Unde alibi dicit, meditabor in omnibus operibus tuis, et in factis manuum tuarum meditabor, expandi manus meas ad te. Ad secundum dicendum quod ex consideratione divinorum iudiciorum manuducitur homo in contemplationem divinae iustitiae, ex consideratione autem divinorum beneficiorum et promissorum, manuducitur homo in cognitionem divinae misericordiae seu bonitatis, quasi per effectus exhibitos vel exhibendos. Ad tertium dicendum quod per illa sex designantur gradus quibus per creaturas in Dei contemplationem ascenditur. Nam in primo gradu ponitur perceptio ipsorum sensibilium; in secundo vero gradu ponitur progressus a sensibilibus ad intelligibilia; in tertio vero gradu ponitur diiudicatio sensibilium secundum intelligibilia; in quarto vero gradu ponitur absoluta consideratio intelligibilium in quae per sensibilia pervenitur; in quinto vero gradu ponitur contemplatio intelligibilium quae per sensibilia inveniri non possunt, sed per ratio-

Q. 180, A. 4

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), a thing may belong to the contemplative life in two ways: principally, and secondarily, or dispositively. That which belongs principally to the contemplative life is the contemplation of the divine truth, because this contemplation is the end of the whole human life. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that the contemplation of God is promised us as being the goal of all our actions and the everlasting perfection of our joys. This contemplation will be perfect in the life to come, when we shall see God face to face, wherefore it will make us perfectly happy: whereas now the contemplation of the divine truth is competent to us imperfectly, namely through a glass and in a dark manner (1 Cor 13:12). Hence it bestows on us a certain inchoate beatitude, which begins now and will be continued in the life to come; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 7) places man’s ultimate happiness in the contemplation of the supreme intelligible good. Since, however, God’s effects show us the way to the contemplation of God Himself, according to Rom. 1:20, The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, it follows that the contemplation of the divine effects also belongs to the contemplative life, inasmuch as man is guided thereby to the knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxix) that in the study of creatures we must not exercise an empty and futile curiosity, but should make them the stepping-stone to things unperishable and everlasting. Accordingly it is clear from what has been said (AA. 1, 2, 3) that four things pertain, in a certain order, to the contemplative life; first, the moral virtues; second, other acts exclusive of contemplation; third, contemplation of the divine effects; fourth, the complement of all which is the contemplation of the divine truth itself. Reply Obj. 1: David sought the knowledge of God’s works, so that he might be led by them to God; wherefore he says elsewhere (Ps 142:5, 6): I meditated on all Thy works: I meditated upon the works of Thy hands: I stretched forth my hands to Thee. Reply Obj. 2: By considering the divine judgments man is guided to the consideration of the divine justice; and by considering the divine benefits and promises, man is led to the knowledge of God’s mercy or goodness, as by effects already manifested or yet to be vouchsafed. Reply Obj. 3: These six denote the steps whereby we ascend by means of creatures to the contemplation of God. For the first step consists in the mere consideration of sensible objects; the second step consists in going forward from sensible to intelligible objects; the third step is to judge of sensible objects according to intelligible things; the fourth is the absolute consideration of the intelligible objects to which one has attained by means of sensibles; the fifth is the contemplation of those intelligible objects that are unattainable by means of sensibles, but which the reason

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nem capi possunt; in sexto gradu ponitur consideratio intelligibilium quae ratio nec invenire nec capere potest, quae scilicet pertinent ad sublimem contemplationem divinae veritatis, in qua finaliter contemplatio perficitur. Ad quartum dicendum quod ultima perfectio humani intellectus est veritas divina, aliae autem veritates perficiunt intellectum in ordine ad veritatem divinam.

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is able to grasp; the sixth step is the consideration of such intelligible things as the reason can neither discover nor grasp, which pertain to the sublime contemplation of divine truth, wherein contemplation is ultimately perfected. Reply Obj. 4: The ultimate perfection of the human intellect is the divine truth: and other truths perfect the intellect in relation to the divine truth.

Article 5 Whether in the present state of life the contemplative life can reach to the vision of the divine essence? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita contemplativa, secundum statum huius vitae, possit pertingere ad visionem divinae essentiae. Quia, ut habetur Gen. XXXII, Iacob dixit, vidi Deum facie ad faciem, et salva facta est anima mea. Sed visio faciei est visio divinae essentiae. Ergo videtur quod aliquis per contemplationem in praesenti vita possit se extendere ad videndum Deum per essentiam. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., quod viri contemplativi ad semetipsos introrsus redeunt, in eo quod spiritualia rimantur, et nequaquam secum rerum corporalium umbras trahunt, vel fortasse tractas manu discretionis abigunt, sed incircumscriptum lumen videre cupientes, cunctas circumscriptionis suae imagines deprimunt, et in eo quod super se contingere appetunt, vincunt quod sunt. Sed homo non impeditur a visione divinae essentiae, quae est lumen incircumscriptum, nisi per hoc quod necesse habet intendere corporalibus phantasmatibus. Ergo videtur quod contemplatio praesentis vitae potest se extendere ad videndum incircumscriptum lumen per essentiam. Praeterea, Gregorius, in II Dialog., dicit, animae videnti creatorem angusta est omnis creatura. Vir ergo Dei, scilicet beatus Benedictus, qui in turri globum igneum, Angelos quoque ad caelos redeuntes videbat, haec procul dubio cernere non nisi in Dei lumine poterat. Sed beatus Benedictus adhuc praesenti vita vivebat. Ergo contemplatio praesentis vitae potest se extendere ad videndam Dei essentiam. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quandiu in hac mortali carne vivitur, nullus ita in contemplationis virtute proficit ut in ipso incircumscripti luminis radio mentis oculos infigat. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., nemo videns Deum vivit ista vita qua mortaliter vivitur in istis sensibus corporis, sed nisi ab hac vita quisque quodammodo moriatur, sive omnino exiens de corpore sive alienatus a carnalibus sensibus, in illam non subvehitur visionem. Quae supra diligentius

Objection 1: It would seem that in the present state of life the contemplative life can reach to the vision of the Divine essence. For, as stated in Gen. 32:30, Jacob said: I have seen God face to face, and my soul has been saved. Now the vision of God’s face is the vision of the Divine essence. Therefore it would seem that in the present life one may come, by means of contemplation, to see God in His essence. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that contemplative men withdraw within themselves in order to explore spiritual things, nor do they ever carry with them the shadows of things corporeal, or if these follow them they prudently drive them away: but being desirous of seeing the incomprehensible light, they suppress all the images of their limited comprehension, and through longing to reach what is above them, they overcome that which they are. Now man is not hindered from seeing the Divine essence, which is the incomprehensible light, save by the necessity of turning to corporeal phantasms. Therefore it would seem that the contemplation of the present life can extend to the vision of the incomprehensible light in its essence. Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 35): All creatures are small to the soul that sees its Creator: wherefore when the man of God, the blessed Benedict, to wit, saw a fiery globe in the tower and angels returning to heaven, without doubt he could only see such things by the light of God. Now the blessed Benedict was still in this life. Therefore the contemplation of the present life can extend to the vision of the essence of God. On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): As long as we live in this mortal flesh, no one reaches such a height of contemplation as to fix the eyes of his mind on the ray itself of incomprehensible light. I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 27), No one seeing God lives this mortal life wherein the bodily senses have their play: and unless in some way he depart this life, whether by going altogether out of his body, or by withdrawing from his carnal senses, he is not caught up into that vision. This has been carefully discussed above (Q. 175,

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pertractata sunt, ubi dictum est de raptu; et in primo, ubi actum est de Dei visione. Sic igitur dicendum est quod in hac vita potest esse aliquis dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum actum, inquantum scilicet actualiter utitur sensibus corporis. Et sic nullo modo contemplatio praesentis vitae potest pertingere ad videndum Dei essentiam. Alio modo potest esse aliquis in hac vita potentialiter, et non secundum actum, inquantum scilicet anima eius est corpori mortali coniuncta ut forma, ita tamen quod non utatur corporis sensibus, aut etiam imaginatione, sicut accidit in raptu. Et sic potest contemplatio huius vitae pertingere ad visionem divinae essentiae. Unde supremus gradus contemplationis praesentis vitae est qualem habuit Paulus in raptu, secundum quem fuit medio modo se habens inter statum praesentis vitae et futurae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Dionysius, in epistola ad Caium monachum, dicit, si aliquis videns Deum intellexit quod vidit, non ipsum vidit, sed aliquid eorum quae sunt eius. Et Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod nequaquam omnipotens Deus iam in sua claritate conspicitur, sed quiddam sub illa speculatur anima, unde recta proficiat, et post ad visionis eius gloriam pertingat. Per hoc ergo quod Iacob dixit, vidi Deum facie ad faciem, non est intelligendum quod Dei essentiam viderit, sed quod formam, scilicet imaginariam, vidit in qua Deus locutus est ei. Vel, quia per faciem quemlibet agnoscimus, cognitionem Dei faciem eius vocavit, sicut Glossa Gregorii ibidem dicit. Ad secundum dicendum quod contemplatio humana, secundum statum praesentis vitae, non potest esse absque phantasmatibus, quia connaturale est homini ut species intelligibiles in phantasmatibus videat, sicut philosophus dicit, in III de anima. Sed tamen intellectualis cognitio non sistit in ipsis phantasmatibus, sed in eis contemplatur puritatem intelligibilis veritatis. Et hoc non solum in cognitione naturali, sed etiam in eis quae per revelationem cognoscimus, dicit enim Dionysius, I cap. Cael. Hier., quod Angelorum hierarchias manifestat nobis divina claritas in quibusdam symbolis figuratis; ex cuius virtute restituimur in simplum radium, idest in simplicem cognitionem intelligibilis veritatis. Et sic intelligendum est quod Gregorius dicit, quod contemplantes corporalium rerum umbras non secum trahunt, quia videlicet in eis non sistit eorum contemplatio, sed potius in consideratione intelligibilis veritatis. Ad tertium dicendum quod ex verbis illis Gregorii non datur intelligi quod beatus Benedictus Deum in illa visione per essentiam viderit, sed vult ostendere quod, quia videnti creatorem angusta est omnis creatura, consequens est quod per illustrationem divini luminis de facili possint quaecumque videri. Unde subdit, quamlibet enim parum de luce creatoris aspexerit, breve ei fit omne quod creatum est.

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AA. 4, 5), where we spoke of rapture, and in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 2), where we treated of the vision of God. Accordingly we must state that one may be in this life in two ways. First, with regard to act, that is to say by actually making use of the bodily senses, and thus contemplation in the present life can nowise attain to the vision of God’s essence. Second, one may be in this life potentially and not with regard to act, that is to say, when the soul is united to the mortal body as its form, yet so as to make use neither of the bodily senses, nor even of the imagination, as happens in rapture; and in this way the contemplation of the present life can attain to the vision of the Divine essence. Consequently the highest degree of contemplation in the present life is that which Paul had in rapture, whereby he was in a middle state between the present life and the life to come. Reply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Ep. i ad Caium. Monach.), If anyone seeing God, understood what he saw, he saw not God Himself, but something belonging to God. And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): By no means is God seen now in His glory; but the soul sees something of lower degree, and is thereby refreshed so that afterwards it may attain to the glory of vision. Accordingly the words of Jacob, I saw God face to face do not imply that he saw God’s essence, but that he saw some shape, imaginary of course, wherein God spoke to him. Or, since we know a man by his face, by the face of God he signified his knowledge of Him, according to a gloss of Gregory on the same passage. Reply Obj. 2: In the present state of life human contemplation is impossible without phantasms, because it is connatural to man to see the intelligible species in the phantasms, as the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, 7). Yet intellectual knowledge does not consist in the phantasms themselves, but in our contemplating in them the purity of the intelligible truth: and this not only in natural knowledge, but also in that which we obtain by revelation. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that the Divine glory shows us the angelic hierarchies under certain symbolic figures, and by its power we are brought back to the single ray of light, i.e., to the simple knowledge of the intelligible truth. It is in this sense that we must understand the statement of Gregory that contemplatives do not carry along with them the shadows of things corporeal, since their contemplation is not fixed on them, but on the consideration of the intelligible truth. Reply Obj. 3: By these words Gregory does not imply that the blessed Benedict, in that vision, saw God in His essence, but he wishes to show that because all creatures are small to him that sees God, it follows that all things can easily be seen through the enlightenment of the Divine light. Wherefore he adds: For however little he may see of the Creator’s light, all created things become petty to him.

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Article 6 Whether the operation of contemplation is fittingly divided into a threefold movement: circular, straight and oblique? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter operatio contemplationis distinguatur per tres motus, circularem rectum et obliquum, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Contemplatio enim ad quietem pertinet, secundum illud Sap. VIII, intrans in domum meam, conquiescam cum illa. Sed motus quieti opponitur. Non ergo operationes contemplativae vitae per motus designari debent. Praeterea, actio contemplativae vitae ad intellectum pertinet, secundum quem homo cum Angelis convenit. Sed in Angelis aliter assignat Dionysius hos motus quam in anima. Dicit enim motum circularem Angeli esse secundum illuminationes pulchri et boni. Motum autem circularem animae secundum plura determinat. Quorum primum est introitus animae ab exterioribus ad seipsam; secundum est quaedam convolutio virtutum ipsius, per quam anima liberatur ab errore et ab exteriori occupatione; tertium autem est unio ad ea quae supra se sunt. Similiter etiam differenter describit motum rectum utriusque. Nam rectum motum Angeli dicit esse secundum quod procedit ad subiectorum providentiam. Motum autem rectum animae ponit in duobus, primo quidem, in hoc quod progreditur ad ea quae sunt circa ipsam; secundo autem, in hoc quod ab exterioribus ad simplices contemplationes elevatur. Sed et motum obliquum diversimode in utrisque determinat. Nam obliquum motum in Angelis assignat ex hoc quod, providendo minus habentibus, manent in identitate circa Deum. Obliquum autem motum animae assignat ex eo quod anima illuminatur divinis cognitionibus rationabiliter et diffuse. Non ergo videntur convenienter assignari operationes contemplationis per modos praedictos.

Praeterea, Richardus de sancto Victore, in libro de Contempl., ponit multas alias differentias motuum, ad similitudinem volatilium caeli. Quarum quaedam nunc ad altiora se attollunt, nunc autem in inferiora demerguntur, et hoc saepius repetere videntur; aliae vero dextrorsum vel sinistrorsum divertunt multoties; quaedam vero moventur in anteriora vel posteriora frequenter; aliae vero quasi in gyrum vertuntur, secundum latiores vel contractiores circuitus; quaedam vero quasi immobiliter suspensae in uno loco manent. Ergo videtur quod non sint solum tres motus contemplationis. In contrarium est auctoritas Dionysii.

Objection 1: It would seem that the operation of contemplation is unfittingly divided into a threefold movement, circular, straight, and oblique (Div. Nom. iv). For contemplation pertains exclusively to rest, according to Wis. 8:16, When I go into my house, I shall repose myself with her. Now movement is opposed to rest. Therefore the operations of the contemplative life should not be described as movements. Obj. 2: Further, the action of the contemplative life pertains to the intellect, whereby man is like the angels. Now Dionysius describes these movements as being different in the angels from what they are in the soul. For he says (Div. Nom. iv) that the circular movement in the angel is according to his enlightenment by the beautiful and the good. On the other hand, he assigns the circular movement of the soul to several things: the first of which is the withdrawal of the soul into itself from externals; the second is a certain concentration of its powers, whereby it is rendered free of error and of outward occupation; and the third is union with those things that are above it. Again, he describes differently their respective straight movements. For he says that the straight movement of the angel is that by which he proceeds to the care of those things that are beneath him. On the other hand, he describes the straight movement of the soul as being twofold: first, its progress towards things that are near it; second, its uplifting from external things to simple contemplation. Further, he assigns a different oblique movement to each. For he assigns the oblique movement of the angels to the fact that while providing for those who have less they remain unchanged in relation to God: whereas he assigns the oblique movement of the soul to the fact that the soul is enlightened in Divine knowledge by reasoning and discoursing. Therefore it would seem that the operations of contemplation are unfittingly assigned according to the ways mentioned above. Obj. 3: Further, Richard of St. Victor (De Contempl. i, 5) mentions many other different movements in likeness to the birds of the air. For some of these rise at one time to a great height, at another swoop down to earth, and they do so repeatedly; others fly now to the right, now to the left again and again; others go forwards or lag behind many times; others fly in a circle now more now less extended; and others remain suspended almost immovably in one place. Therefore it would seem that there are only three movements of contemplation. On the contrary, stands the authority of Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).

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Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, operatio intellectus, in qua contemplatio essentialiter consistit, motus dicitur secundum quod motus est actus perfecti, ut philosophus dicit, in III de anima. Quia enim per sensibilia in cognitionem intelligibilium devenimus, operationes autem sensibiles sine motu non fiunt, inde est quod etiam operationes intelligibiles quasi motus quidam describuntur, et secundum similitudinem diversorum motuum earum differentia assignatur. In motibus autem corporalibus perfectiores et primi sunt locales, ut probatur in VIII Physic. Et ideo sub eorum similitudine potissime operationes intelligibiles describuntur. Quorum quidem sunt tres differentiae, nam quidam est circularis, secundum quem aliquid movetur uniformiter circa idem centrum; alius autem est rectus, secundum quem aliquid procedit ab uno in aliud, tertius autem est obliquus, quasi compositus ex utroque. Et ideo in operationibus intelligibilibus id quod simpliciter habet uniformitatem, attribuitur motui circulari; operatio autem intelligibilis secundum quam proceditur de uno in aliud, attribuitur motui recto; operatio autem intelligibilis habens aliquid uniformitatis simul cum processu ad diversa, attribuitur motui obliquo.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 119, A. 1, ad 3), the operation of the intellect, wherein contemplation essentially consists, is called a movement, insofar as movement is the act of a perfect thing, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 1). Since, however, it is through sensible objects that we come to the knowledge of intelligible things, and since sensible operations do not take place without movement, the result is that even intelligible operations are described as movements, and are differentiated in likeness to various movements. Now of bodily movements, local movements are the most perfect and come first, as proved in Phys. viii, 7; wherefore the foremost among intelligible operations are described by being likened to them. These movements are of three kinds; for there is the circular movement, by which a thing moves uniformly round one point as center; another is the straight movement, by which a thing goes from one point to another; the third is oblique, being composed as it were of both the others. Consequently, in intelligible operations, that which is simply uniform is compared to circular movement; the intelligible operation by which one proceeds from one point to another is compared to the straight movement; while the intelligible operation which unites something of uniformity with progress to various points is compared to the oblique movement. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod motus corporales Reply Obj. 1: External bodily movements are opposed exteriores opponuntur quieti contemplationis, quae in- to the quiet of contemplation, which consists in rest from telligitur esse ab exterioribus occupationibus. Sed motus outward occupations: but the movements of intellectual opintelligibilium operationum ad ipsam quietem contem- erations belong to the quiet of contemplation.

plationis pertinent. Ad secundum dicendum quod homo convenit in intellectu cum Angelis in genere, sed vis intellectiva est multo altior in Angelo quam in homine. Et ideo alio modo oportet hos motus in animabus et in Angelis assignare, secundum quod diversimode se habent ad uniformitatem. Intellectus enim Angeli habet cognitionem uniformem secundum duo, primo quidem, quia non acquirit intelligibilem veritatem ex varietate rerum compositarum; secundo, quia non intelligit veritatem intelligibilem discursive, sed simplici intuitu. Intellectus vero animae a sensibilibus rebus accipit intelligibilem veritatem; et cum quodam discursu rationis eam intelligit. Et ideo Dionysius motum circularem in Angelis assignat inquantum uniformiter et indesinenter, absque principio et fine, intuentur Deum, sicut motus circularis, carens principio et fine, uniformiter est circa idem centrum. In anima vero, antequam ad istam uniformitatem perveniatur, exigitur quod duplex eius difformitas amoveatur. Primo quidem, illa quae est ex diversitate exteriorum rerum, prout scilicet relinquit exteriora. Et hoc est quod primo ponit in motu circulari animae introitum ipsius ab exterioribus ad seipsam. Secundo autem oportet quod removeatur secunda difformitas, quae est per discursum rationis. Et hoc idem contingit secundum

Reply Obj. 2: Man is like the angels in intellect generically, but the intellective power is much higher in the angel than in man. Consequently these movements must be ascribed to souls and angels in different ways, according as they are differently related to uniformity. For the angelic intellect has uniform knowledge in two respects. First, because it does not acquire intelligible truth from the variety of composite objects; second, because it understands the truth of intelligible objects not discursively, but by simple intuition. On the other hand, the intellect of the soul acquires intelligible truth from sensible objects, and understands it by a certain discoursing of the reason. Wherefore Dionysius assigns the circular movement of the angels to the fact that their intuition of God is uniform and unceasing, having neither beginning nor end: even as a circular movement having neither beginning nor end is uniformly around the one same center. But on the part of the soul, ere it arrive at this uniformity, its twofold lack of uniformity needs to be removed. First, that which arises from the variety of external things: this is removed by the soul withdrawing from externals, and so the first thing he mentions regarding the circular movement of the soul is the soul’s withdrawal into itself from external objects. Second, another lack of uniformity requires to be removed from the

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quod omnes operationes animae reducuntur ad simplicem contemplationem intelligibilis veritatis. Et hoc est quod secundo dicit, quod necessaria est uniformis convolutio intellectualium virtutum ipsius, ut scilicet, cessante discursu, figatur eius intuitus in contemplatione unius simplicis veritatis. Et in hac operatione animae non est error, sicut patet quod circa intellectum primorum principiorum non erratur, quae simplici intuitu cognoscimus. Et tunc, istis duobus praemissis, tertio ponitur uniformitas conformis Angelis, secundum quod, praetermissis omnibus in sola Dei contemplatione persistit. Et hoc est quod dicit, deinde, sicut uniformis facta, unite, idest conformiter, unitis virtutibus, ad pulchrum et bonum manuducitur. Motus autem rectus in Angelis accipi non potest secundum hoc quod in considerando procedat ab uno in aliud, sed solum secundum ordinem suae providentiae, secundum scilicet quod Angelus superior inferiores illuminat per medios. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod in directum moventur Angeli quando procedunt ad subiectorum providentiam, recta omnia transeuntes, idest, secundum ea quae secundum rectum ordinem disponuntur. Sed rectum motum ponit in anima secundum hoc quod ab exterioribus sensibilibus procedit ad intelligibilium cognitionem. Obliquum autem motum ponit in Angelo, compositum ex recto et circulari, inquantum secundum contemplationem Dei inferioribus provident. In anima autem ponit motum obliquum, similiter ex recto et circulari compositum, prout illuminationibus divinis ratiocinando utitur.

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soul, and this is owing to the discoursing of reason. This is done by directing all the soul’s operations to the simple contemplation of the intelligible truth, and this is indicated by his saying in the second place that the soul’s intellectual powers must be uniformly concentrated, in other words that discoursing must be laid aside and the soul’s gaze fixed on the contemplation of the one simple truth. In this operation of the soul there is no error, even as there is clearly no error in the understanding of first principles which we know by simple intuition. Afterwards these two things being done, he mentions third the uniformity which is like that of the angels, for then all things being laid aside, the soul continues in the contemplation of God alone. This he expresses by saying: Then being thus made uniform unitedly, i.e., conformably, by the union of its powers, it is conducted to the good and the beautiful. The straight movement of the angel cannot apply to his proceeding from one thing to another by considering them, but only to the order of his providence, namely to the fact that the higher angel enlightens the lower angels through the angels that are intermediate. He indicates this when he says: The angel’s movement takes a straight line when he proceeds to the care of things subject to him, taking in his course whatever things are direct, i.e., in keeping with the dispositions of the direct order. Whereas he ascribes the straight movement in the soul to the soul’s proceeding from exterior sensibles to the knowledge of intelligible objects. The oblique movement in the angels he describes as being composed of the straight and circular movements, inasmuch as their care for those beneath them is in accordance with their contemplation of God: while the oblique movement in the soul he also declares to be partly straight and partly circular, insofar as in reasoning it makes use of the light received from God. Reply Obj. 3: These varieties of movement that are taken from the distinction between above and below, right and left, forwards and backwards, and from varying circles, are all comprised under either straight oblique movement, because they all denote discursions of reason. For if the reason pass from the genus to the species, or from the part to the whole, it will be, as he explains, from above to below: if from one opposite to another, it will be from right to left; if from the cause to the effect, it will be backwards and forwards; if it be about accidents that surround a thing near at hand or far remote, the movement will be circular. The discoursing of reason from sensible to intelligible objects, if it be according to the order of natural reason, belongs to the straight movement; but if it be according to the Divine enlightenment, it will belong to the oblique movement as explained above (ad 2). That alone which he describes as immobility belongs to the circular movement.

Ad tertium dicendum quod illae diversitates motuum quae accipiuntur secundum differentiam eius quod est sursum et deorsum, dextrorsum et sinistrorsum, ante et retro, et secundum diversos circuitus, omnes continentur sub motu recto vel obliquo. Nam per omnes designatur discursus rationis. Qui quidem si sit a genere ad speciem, vel a toto ad partem, erit, ut ipse exponit, secundum sursum et deorsum. Si vero sit ab uno oppositorum in aliud, erit secundum dextrorsum et sinistrorsum. Si vero sit a causis in effectus, erit ante et retro. Si vero sit secundum accidentia quae circumstant rem, propinqua vel remota, erit circuitus. Discursus autem rationis, quando est a sensibilibus ad intelligibilia secundum ordinem naturalis rationis, pertinet ad motum rectum; quando autem est secundum illuminationes divinas, pertinet ad motum obliquum; ut ex dictis patet. Sola autem immobilitas quam ponit, pertinet ad motum circularem. Unde patet quod Dionysius multo sufficientius et Wherefore it is evident that Dionysius describes the subtilius motus contemplationis describit. movement of contemplation with much greater fullness and depth.

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Q. 180, A. 7

Article 7 Whether there is delight in contemplation? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod contemplatio delectationem non habeat. Delectatio enim ad vim appetitivam pertinet. Sed contemplatio principaliter consistit in intellectu. Ergo videtur quod delectatio non pertineat ad contemplationem. Praeterea, omnis contentio et omne certamen impedit delectationem. Sed in contemplatione est contentio et certamen, dicit enim Gregorius, super Ezech., quod anima, cum contemplari Deum nititur, velut in quodam certamine posita, modo quasi exsuperat, quia intelligendo et sentiendo, de incircumscripto lumine aliquid degustat, modo succumbit, quia degustando iterum deficit. Ergo vita contemplativa non habet delectationem. Praeterea, delectatio sequitur operationem perfectam, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Sed contemplatio viae est imperfecta, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIII, videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate. Ergo videtur quod vita contemplativa delectationem non habeat. Praeterea, laesio corporalis delectationem impedit. Sed contemplatio inducit laesionem corporalem, unde Gen. XXXII dicitur quod Iacob, postquam dixerat, vidi dominum facie ad faciem, claudicabat pede, eo quod tetigerit nervum femoris eius et obstupuerit. Ergo videtur quod in vita contemplativa non sit delectatio. Sed contra est quod de contemplatione sapientiae dicitur, Sap. VIII, non habet amaritudinem conversatio illius, nec taedium convictus eius, sed laetitiam et gaudium. Et Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod contemplativa vita amabilis valde dulcedo est. Respondeo dicendum quod aliqua contemplatio potest esse delectabilis dupliciter. Uno modo, ratione ipsius operationis, quia unicuique delectabilis est operatio sibi conveniens secundum propriam naturam vel habitum. Contemplatio autem veritatis competit homini secundum suam naturam, prout est animal rationale. Ex quo contingit quod omnes homines ex natura scire desiderant, et per consequens in cognitione veritatis delectantur. Et adhuc magis fit hoc delectabile habenti habitum sapientiae et scientiae, ex quo accidit quod sine difficultate aliquis contemplatur. Alio modo contemplatio redditur delectabilis ex parte obiecti, inquantum scilicet aliquis rem amatam contemplatur, sicut etiam accidit in visione corporali quod delectabilis redditur non solum ex eo quod ipsum videre est delectabile, sed ex eo etiam quod videt quis personam amatam. Quia ergo vita contemplativa praecipue consistit in contemplatione Dei, ad quam movet caritas, ut dictum est; inde est quod in vita contemplativa non solum est delectatio ratione ipsius contemplationis, sed ratione ipsius divini amoris.

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no delight in contemplation. For delight belongs to the appetitive power; whereas contemplation resides chiefly in the intellect. Therefore it would seem that there is no delight in contemplation. Obj. 2: Further, all strife and struggle is a hindrance to delight. Now there is strife and struggle in contemplation. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that when the soul strives to contemplate God, it is in a state of struggle; at one time it almost overcomes, because by understanding and feeling it tastes something of the incomprehensible light, and at another time it almost succumbs, because even while tasting, it fails. Therefore there is no delight in contemplation. Obj. 3: Further, delight is the result of a perfect operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 4. Now the contemplation of wayfarers is imperfect, according to 1 Cor. 13:12, We see now through a glass in a dark manner. Therefore seemingly there is no delight in the contemplative life. Obj. 4: Further, a lesion of the body is an obstacle to delight. Now contemplation causes a lesion of the body; wherefore it is stated (Gen 32) that after Jacob had said (Gen 32:30), ‘I have seen God face to face’ . . . he halted on his foot (Gen 32:31) . . . because he touched the sinew of his thigh and it shrank (Gen 32:32). Therefore seemingly there is no delight in contemplation. On the contrary, It is written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis 8:16): Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness: and Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable. I answer that, There may be delight in any particular contemplation in two ways. First by reason of the operation itself, because each individual delights in the operation which befits him according to his own nature or habit. Now contemplation of the truth befits a man according to his nature as a rational animal: the result being that all men naturally desire to know, so that consequently they delight in the knowledge of truth. And more delightful still does this become to one who has the habit of wisdom and knowledge, the result of which is that he contemplates without difficulty. Second, contemplation may be delightful on the part of its object, insofar as one contemplates that which one loves; even as bodily vision gives pleasure, not only because to see is pleasurable in itself, but because one sees a person whom one loves. Since, then, the contemplative life consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, of which charity is the motive, as stated above (AA. 1, 2, ad 1), it follows that there is delight in the contemplative life, not only by reason of the contemplation itself, but also by reason of the Divine love.

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Q. 180, A. 7

Gratuitous Graces

Et quantum ad utrumque eius delectatio omnem delectationem humanam excedit. Nam et delectatio spiritualis potior est quam carnalis, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur, et ipse amor quo ex caritate Deus diligitur, omnem amorem excedit. Unde et in Psalmo dicitur, gustate, et videte quoniam suavis est dominus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vita contemplativa, licet essentialiter consistat in intellectu, principium tamen habet in affectu, inquantum videlicet aliquis ex caritate ad Dei contemplationem incitatur. Et quia finis respondet principio inde est quod etiam terminus et finis contemplativae vitae habetur in affectu, dum scilicet aliquis in visione rei amatae delectatur, et ipsa delectatio rei visae amplius excitat amorem. Unde Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod cum quis ipsum quem amat viderit, in amorem ipsius amplius ignescit. Et haec est ultima perfectio contemplativae vitae, ut scilicet non solum divina veritas videatur, sed etiam ut ametur. Ad secundum dicendum quod contentio vel certamen quod provenit ex contrarietate exterioris rei, impedit illius rei delectationem, non enim aliquis delectatur in re contra quam pugnat. Sed in re pro qua quis pugnat, cum eam homo adeptus fuerit, ceteris paribus, magis in ea delectatur, sicut Augustinus dicit, in VIII Confess., quod quanto fuit maius periculum in praelio, tanto maius est gaudium in triumpho. Non est autem in contemplatione contentio et certamen ex contrarietate veritatis quam contemplamur, sed ex defectu nostri intellectus, et ex corruptibili corpore, quod nos ad inferiora retrahit, secundum illud Sap. IX, corpus, quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam, et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitantem. Et inde est quod quando homo pertingit ad contemplationem veritatis, ardentius eam amat, sed magis odit proprium defectum a gravitate corruptibilis corporis, ut dicat cum apostolo, infelix ego homo. Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Unde et Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., cum Deus iam per desiderium et intellectum cognoscitur, omnem voluptatem carnis arefacit. Ad tertium dicendum quod contemplatio Dei in hac vita imperfecta est respectu contemplationis patriae, et similiter delectatio contemplationis viae est imperfecta respectu delectationis contemplationis patriae, de qua dicitur in Psalmo, de torrente voluptatis tuae potabis eos. Sed contemplatio divinorum quae habetur in via, etsi sit imperfecta, est tamen delectabilior omni alia contemplatione quantumcumque perfecta, propter excellentiam rei contemplatae. Unde philosophus dicit, in I de partibus Animal., accidit circa illas honorabiles existentes et divinas substantias minores nobis existere theorias. Sed etsi secundum modicum attingamus eas, tamen, propter honorabilitatem cognoscendi, delectabilius aliquid habent quam quae apud nos omnia. Et hoc est etiam

IIa-IIae

In both respects the delight thereof surpasses all human delight, both because spiritual delight is greater than carnal pleasure, as stated above (I-II, Q. 31, A. 5), when we were treating of the passions, and because the love whereby God is loved out of charity surpasses all love. Hence it is written (Ps 33:9): O taste and see that the Lord is sweet. Reply Obj. 1: Although the contemplative life consists chiefly in an act of the intellect, it has its beginning in the appetite, since it is through charity that one is urged to the contemplation of God. And since the end corresponds to the beginning, it follows that the term also and the end of the contemplative life has its being in the appetite, since one delights in seeing the object loved, and the very delight in the object seen arouses a yet greater love. Wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that when we see one whom we love, we are so aflame as to love him more. And this is the ultimate perfection of the contemplative life, namely that the Divine truth be not only seen but also loved. Reply Obj. 2: Strife or struggle arising from the opposition of an external thing, hinders delight in that thing. For a man delights not in a thing against which he strives: but in that for which he strives; when he has obtained it, other things being equal, he delights yet more: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3) that the more peril there was in the battle, the greater the joy in the triumph. But there is no strife or struggle in contemplation on the part of the truth which we contemplate, though there is on the part of our defective understanding and our corruptible body which drags us down to lower things, according to Wis. 9:15, The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that museth upon many things. Hence it is that when man attains to the contemplation of truth, he loves it yet more, while he hates the more his own deficiency and the weight of his corruptible body, so as to say with the Apostle (Rom 7:24): Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? Wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): When God is once known by desire and understanding, He withers all carnal pleasure in us. Reply Obj. 3: The contemplation of God in this life is imperfect in comparison with the contemplation in heaven; and in like manner the delight of the wayfarer’s contemplation is imperfect as compared with the delight of contemplation in heaven, of which it is written (Ps 35:9): Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy pleasure. Yet, though the contemplation of Divine things which is to be had by wayfarers is imperfect, it is more delightful than all other contemplation however perfect, on account of the excellence of that which is contemplated. Hence the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal. i, 5): We may happen to have our own little theories about those sublime beings and godlike substances, and though we grasp them but feebly, nevertheless so elevating is the knowledge that they give us more delight

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Contemplative Life

quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., contemplativa vita amabilis valde dulcedo est, quae super semetipsam animam rapit, caelestia aperit, spiritualia mentis oculis patefacit. Ad quartum dicendum quod Iacob post contemplationem uno pede claudicabat, quia necesse est ut, debilitato amore saeculi, convalescat aliquis ad amorem Dei, ut Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., et ideo, post agnitionem suavitatis Dei, unus in nobis sanus pes remanet, atque alius claudicat. Omnis enim qui uno pede claudicat, solum illi pedi innititur quem sanum habet.

Q. 180, A. 8

than any of those things that are round about us: and Gregory says in the same sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): The contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable; for it carries the soul away above itself, it opens heaven and discovers the spiritual world to the eyes of the mind. Reply Obj. 4: After contemplation Jacob halted with one foot, because we need to grow weak in the love of the world ere we wax strong in the love of God, as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.). Thus when we have known the sweetness of God, we have one foot sound while the other halts; since every one who halts on one foot leans only on that foot which is sound.

Article 8 Whether the contemplative life is continuous? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita contemplativa non sit diuturna. Vita enim contemplativa essentialiter consistit in his quae ad intellectum pertinent. Sed omnes intellectivae perfectiones huius vitae evacuantur, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIII, sive prophetiae evacuabuntur, sive linguae cessabunt, sive scientia destruetur. Ergo vita contemplativa evacuatur. Praeterea, dulcedinem contemplationis aliquis homo raptim et pertranseunter degustat. Unde Augustinus dicit, in X Confess., intromittis me in affectum multum inusitatum introrsus ad nescio quam dulcedinem, sed redeo in haec aerumnosis ponderibus. Gregorius etiam dicit, in V Moral., exponens illud Iob IV, cum spiritus me praesente transiret, in suavitate, inquit, contemplationis intimae non diu mens figitur, quia ad semetipsam, ipsa immensitate luminis reverberata, revocatur. Ergo vita contemplativa non est diuturna. Praeterea, illud quod non est homini connaturale, non potest esse diuturnum. Vita autem contemplativa est melior quam secundum hominem, ut philosophus dicit, in X Ethic. Ergo videtur quod vita contemplativa non sit diuturna. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Luc. X, Maria optimam partem elegit, quae non auferetur ab ea. Quia, ut Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., contemplativa hic incipitur, ut in caelesti patria perficiatur. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid potest dici diuturnum dupliciter, uno modo, secundum suam naturam; alio modo, quoad nos. Secundum se quidem manifestum est quod vita contemplativa diuturna est, dupliciter. Uno modo, eo quod versatur circa incorruptibilia et immobilia. Alio modo, quia non habet contrarietatem, delectationi enim quae est in considerando, nihil est

Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life is not continuous. For the contemplative life consists essentially in things pertaining to the intellect. Now all the intellectual perfections of this life will be made void, according to 1 Cor. 13:8, Whether prophecies shall be made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge shall be destroyed. Therefore the contemplative life is made void. Obj. 2: Further, a man tastes the sweetness of contemplation by snatches and for a short time only: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x, 40), Thou admittest me to a most unwonted affection in my inmost soul, to a strange sweetness . . . yet through my grievous weight I sink down again. Again, Gregory commenting on the words of Job 4:15, When a spirit passed before me, says (Moral. v, 33): The mind does not remain long at rest in the sweetness of inward contemplation, for it is recalled to itself and beaten back by the very immensity of the light. Therefore the contemplative life is not continuous. Obj. 3: Further, that which is not connatural to man cannot be continuous. Now the contemplative life, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 7), is better than the life which is according to man. Therefore seemingly the contemplative life is not continuous. On the contrary, our Lord said (Luke 10:42): Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her, since as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.), the contemplative life begins here so that it may be perfected in our heavenly home. I answer that, A thing may be described as continuous in two ways: first, in regard to its nature; second, in regard to us. It is evident that in regard to itself contemplative life is continuous for two reasons: first, because it is about incorruptible and unchangeable things; second, because it has no contrary, for there is nothing contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, as stated in Topic. i, 13. But even in

701

Q. 180, A. 8

Gratuitous Graces

contrarium, ut dicitur in I Topic. Sed quoad nos etiam vita contemplativa diuturna est. Tum quia competit nobis secundum actionem incorruptibilis partis animae, scilicet secundum intellectum, unde potest post hanc vitam durare. Alio modo, quia in operibus contemplativae corporaliter non laboramus, unde magis in huiusmodi operibus continue persistere possumus, sicut philosophus dicit, in X Ethic. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod modus contemplandi non est idem hic et in patria; sed vita contemplativa dicitur manere ratione caritatis, in qua habet et principium et finem. Et hoc est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., contemplativa hic incipit, ut in caelesti patria perficiatur, quia amoris ignis, qui hic ardere inchoat, cum ipsum quem amat viderit, in amore ipsius amplius ignescit. Ad secundum dicendum quod nulla actio potest diu durare in sui summo. Summum autem contemplationis est ut attingat ad uniformitatem divinae contemplationis, ut dicit Dionysius, sicut supra positum est. Unde etsi quantum ad hoc contemplatio diu durare non possit, tamen quantum ad alios contemplationis actus potest diu durare. Ad tertium dicendum quod philosophus dicit vitam contemplativam esse supra hominem, quia competit nobis secundum hoc quod aliquid divinum est in nobis, scilicet intellectus. Qui est incorruptibilis et impassibilis secundum se, et ideo actio eius potest esse diuturnior.

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our regard contemplative life is continuous—both because it is competent to us in respect of the incorruptible part of the soul, namely the intellect, wherefore it can endure after this life—and because in the works of the contemplative life we work not with our bodies, so that we are the more able to persevere in the works thereof, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. x, 7). Reply Obj. 1: The manner of contemplation is not the same here as in heaven: yet the contemplative life is said to remain by reason of charity, wherein it has both its beginning and its end. Gregory speaks in this sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): The contemplative life begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home, because the fire of love which begins to burn here is aflame with a yet greater love when we see Him Whom we love. Reply Obj. 2: No action can last long at its highest pitch. Now the highest point of contemplation is to reach the uniformity of Divine contemplation, according to Dionysius, and as we have stated above (A. 6, ad 2). Hence although contemplation cannot last long in this respect, it can be of long duration as regards the other contemplative acts. Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher declares the contemplative life to be above man, because it befits us so far as there is in us something divine (Ethic. x, 7), namely the intellect, which is incorruptible and impassible in itself, wherefore its act can endure longer.

702

Question 181 The Active Life Deinde considerandum est de vita activa. Et circa hoc We must now consider the active life, under which head quaeruntur quatuor. there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum omnia opera virtutum moralium (1) Whether all the works of the moral virtues pertain pertineant ad vitam activam. to the active life? Secundo, utrum prudentia pertineat ad vitam (2) Whether prudence pertains to the active life? activam. Tertio, utrum doctrina pertineat ad vitam activam. (3) Whether teaching pertains to the active life? Quarto, de diuturnitate vitae activae. (4) Of the duration of the active life.

Article 1 Whether all the actions of the moral virtues pertain to the active life? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes actus virtutum moralium pertineant ad vitam activam. Vita enim activa videtur consistere solum in his quae sunt ad alterum, dicit enim Gregorius, super Ezech., quod activa vita est panem esurienti tribuere, et in fine, multis enumeratis quae ad alterum pertinent, subdit, et quae singulis quibusque expediunt dispensare. Sed non per omnes actus virtutum moralium ordinamur ad alios, sed solum secundum iustitiam et partes eius, ut ex supra dictis patet. Non ergo actus omnium virtutum moralium pertinent ad vitam activam. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod per Liam, quae fuit lippa sed fecunda, significatur vita activa, quae, dum occupatur in opere, minus videt; sed dum modo per verbum, modo per exemplum ad imitationem suam proximos accendit, multos in bono opere filios generat. Hoc autem magis videtur pertinere ad caritatem, per quam diligimus proximum, quam ad virtutes morales. Ergo videtur quod actus virtutum moralium non pertineant ad vitam activam. Praeterea, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales disponunt ad vitam contemplativam. Sed dispositio et perfectio pertinent ad idem. Ergo videtur quod virtutes morales non pertineant ad vitam activam. Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro de summo bono, in activa vita prius per exercitium boni operis cuncta exhaurienda sunt vitia, ut in contemplativa iam pura mentis acie ad contemplandum Deum quisque pertranseat. Sed cuncta vitia non exhauriuntur nisi per actus virtutum moralium. Ergo actus virtutum moralium ad vitam activam pertinent.

Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of the moral virtues do not all pertain to the active life. For seemingly the active life regards only our relations with other persons: hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the active life is to give bread to the hungry, and after mentioning many things that regard our relations with other people he adds finally, and to give to each and every one whatever he needs. Now we are directed in our relations to others, not by all the acts of moral virtues, but only by those of justice and its parts, as stated above (Q. 58, AA. 2, 8; I-II, Q. 60, AA. 2, 3). Therefore the acts of the moral virtues do not all pertain to the active life. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that Lia who was blear-eyed but fruitful signifies the active life: which being occupied with work, sees less, and yet since it urges one’s neighbor both by word and example to its imitation it begets a numerous offspring of good deeds. Now this would seem to belong to charity, whereby we love our neighbor, rather than to the moral virtues. Therefore seemingly the acts of moral virtue do not pertain to the active life. Obj. 3: Further, as stated above (Q. 180, A. 2), the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative life. Now disposition and perfection belong to the same thing. Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues do not pertain to the active life. On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 15): In the active life all vices must first of all be extirpated by the practice of good works, in order that in the contemplative life the mind’s eye being purified one may advance to the contemplation of the Divine light. Now all vices are not extirpated save by acts of the moral virtues. Therefore the acts of the moral virtues pertain to the active life.

703

Q. 181, A. 2

Gratuitous Graces

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, vita activa et contemplativa distinguuntur secundum diversa studia hominum intendentium ad diversos fines, quorum unum est consideratio veritatis, quae est finis vitae contemplativae, aliud autem est exterior operatio, ad quam ordinatur vita activa. Manifestum est autem quod in virtutibus moralibus non principaliter quaeritur contemplatio veritatis, sed ordinantur ad operandum, unde philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod ad virtutem scire quidem parum aut nihil potest. Unde manifestum est quod virtutes morales pertinent essentialiter ad vitam activam. Unde et philosophus, in X Ethic., virtutes morales ordinat ad felicitatem activam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod inter virtutes morales praecipua est iustitia, qua aliquis ad alterum ordinatur, ut philosophus probat, in V Ethic. Unde vita activa describitur per ea quae ad alterum ordinantur, non quia in his solum, sed quia in his principalius consistit.

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I answer that, As stated above (Q. 179, A. 1) the active and the contemplative life differ according to the different occupations of men intent on different ends: one of which occupations is the consideration of the truth; and this is the end of the contemplative life, while the other is external work to which the active life is directed. Now it is evident that the moral virtues are directed chiefly, not to the contemplation of truth but to operation. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that for virtue knowledge is of little or no avail. Hence it is clear that the moral virtues belong essentially to the active life; for which reason the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 8) subordinates the moral virtues to active happiness.

Reply Obj. 1: The chief of the moral virtues is justice by which one man is directed in his relations towards another, as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, 1). Hence the active life is described with reference to our relations with other people, because it consists in these things, not exclusively, but principally. Ad secundum dicendum quod per actus omnium Reply Obj. 2: It is possible, by the acts of all the moral virtutum moralium potest aliquis proximos suo exemplo virtues, for one to direct one’s neighbor to good by example: dirigere ad bonum, quod Gregorius ibidem attribuit vi- and this is what Gregory here ascribes to the active life.

tae activae. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut virtus quae ordinatur in finem alterius virtutis, transit quodammodo in speciem eius; ita etiam quando aliquis utitur his quae sunt vitae activae solum prout disponunt ad contemplationem, comprehenduntur sub vita contemplativa. In his autem qui operibus virtutum moralium intendunt tanquam secundum se bonis, non autem tanquam disponentibus ad vitam contemplativam, virtutes morales pertinent ad vitam activam. Quamvis etiam dici possit quod vita activa dispositio sit ad contemplativam.

Reply Obj. 3: Even as the virtue that is directed to the end of another virtue passes, as it were, into the species of the latter virtue, so again when a man makes use of things pertaining to the active life, merely as dispositions to contemplation, such things are comprised under the contemplative life. On the other hand, when we practice the works of the moral virtues, as being good in themselves, and not as dispositions to the contemplative life, the moral virtues belong to the active life. It may also be replied, however, that the active life is a disposition to the contemplative life.

Article 2 Whether prudence pertains to the active life? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non pertineat ad vitam activam. Sicut enim vita contemplativa pertinet ad vim cognitivam, ita activa ad vim appetitivam. Prudentia autem non pertinet ad vim appetitivam, sed magis ad cognitivam. Ergo prudentia non pertinet ad vitam activam. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod activa vita, dum occupatur in opere, minus videt, unde significatur per Liam, quae lippos oculos habebat. Prudentia autem requirit claros oculos, ut recte iudicet homo de agendis. Ergo videtur quod prudentia non pertineat ad vitam activam.

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not pertain to the active life. For just as the contemplative life belongs to the cognitive power, so the active life belongs to the appetitive power. Now prudence belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive power. Therefore prudence does not belong to the active life. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the active life being occupied with work, sees less, wherefore it is signified by Lia who was blear-eyed. But prudence requires clear eyes, so that one may judge aright of what has to be done. Therefore it seems that prudence does not pertain to the active life.

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Active Life

Praeterea, prudentia media est inter virtutes morales et intellectuales. Sed sicut virtutes morales pertinent ad vitam activam, ut dictum est, ita intellectuales ad contemplativam. Ergo videtur quod prudentia pertineat neque ad vitam activam neque ad contemplativam, sed ad medium vivendi genus quod Augustinus ponit, XIX de Civ. Dei. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in X Ethic., prudentiam pertinere dicit ad felicitatem activam, ad quam pertinent virtutes morales. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, id quod ordinatur ad aliud sicut ad finem, praecipue in moralibus, trahitur in speciem eius ad quod ordinatur, sicut ille qui moechatur ut furetur, magis dicitur fur quam moechus, secundum philosophum, in V Ethic. Manifestum est autem quod cognitio prudentiae ordinatur ad operationes virtutum moralium sicut ad finem, est enim recta ratio agibilium, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Unde et fines virtutum moralium sunt principia prudentiae, sicut in eodem libro philosophus dicit. Sicut ergo dictum est quod virtutes morales in eo qui ordinat eas ad quietem contemplationis, pertinent ad vitam contemplativam; ita cognitio prudentiae, quae de se ordinatur ad operationes virtutum moralium, directe pertinet ad vitam activam. Si tamen prudentia proprie sumatur, secundum quod de ea philosophus loquitur. Si autem sumatur communius, prout scilicet comprehendit qualemcumque humanam cognitionem, sic prudentia quantum ad aliquam sui partem pertineret ad vitam contemplativam, secundum quod Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., quod qui acutissime et celerrime potest et videre verum et explicare rationem, is prudentissimus et sapientissimus rite haberi solet. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod operationes morales specificantur ex fine, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo ad vitam contemplativam illa cognitio pertinet quae finem habet in ipsa cognitione veritatis, cognitio autem prudentiae, quae magis habet finem in actu appetitivae virtutis, pertinet ad vitam activam. Ad secundum dicendum quod occupatio exterior facit hominem minus videre in rebus intelligibilibus, quae sunt separatae a sensibilibus, in quibus operationes activae vitae consistunt. Sed tamen occupatio exterior activae vitae facit hominem magis clare videre in iudicio agibilium, quod pertinet ad prudentiam. Tum propter experientiam. Tum propter mentis attentionem, quia, ubi intenderis, ibi ingenium valet, ut Sallustius dicit. Ad tertium dicendum quod prudentia dicitur esse media inter virtutes intellectuales et morales quantum ad hoc, quod in subiecto convenit cum virtutibus intellectualibus, in materia autem totaliter convenit cum moralibus. Illud autem tertium genus vivendi medium est

Q. 181, A. 2

Obj. 3: Further, prudence stands between the moral and the intellectual virtues. Now just as the moral virtues belong to the active life, as stated above (A. 1), so do the intellectual virtues pertain to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that prudence pertains neither to the active nor to the contemplative life, but to an intermediate kind of life, of which Augustine makes mention (De Civ. Dei xix, 2, 3, 19). On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that prudence pertains to active happiness, to which the moral virtues belong. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1, ad 3; I-II, Q. 18, A. 6), if one thing be directed to another as its end, it is drawn, especially in moral matters, to the species of the thing to which it is directed: for instance he who commits adultery that he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2). Now it is evident that the knowledge of prudence is directed to the works of the moral virtues as its end, since it is right reason applied to action (Ethic. vi, 5); so that the ends of the moral virtues are the principles of prudence, as the Philosopher says in the same book. Accordingly, as it was stated above (A. 1, ad 3) that the moral virtues in one who directs them to the quiet of contemplation belong to the contemplative life, so the knowledge of prudence, which is of itself directed to the works of the moral virtues, belongs directly to the active life, provided we take prudence in its proper sense as the Philosopher speaks of it. If, however, we take it in a more general sense, as comprising any kind of human knowledge, then prudence, as regards a certain part thereof, belongs to the contemplative life. In this sense Tully (De Offic. i, 5) says that the man who is able most clearly and quickly to grasp the truth and to unfold his reasons, is wont to be considered most prudent and wise. Reply Obj. 1: Moral works take their species from their end, as stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 4, 6), wherefore the knowledge pertaining to the contemplative life is that which has its end in the very knowledge of truth; whereas the knowledge of prudence, through having its end in an act of the appetitive power, belongs to the active life. Reply Obj. 2: External occupation makes a man see less in intelligible things, which are separated from sensible objects with which the works of the active life are concerned. Nevertheless the external occupation of the active life enables a man to see more clearly in judging of what is to be done, which belongs to prudence, both on account of experience, and on account of the mind’s attention, since brains avail when the mind is attentive as Sallust observes. Reply Obj. 3: Prudence is said to be intermediate between the intellectual and the moral virtues because it resides in the same subject as the intellectual virtues, and has absolutely the same matter as the moral virtues. But this third kind of life is intermediate between the active and the

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Q. 181, A. 3

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inter activam vitam et contemplativam quantum ad ea contemplative life as regards the things about which it is occirca quae occupatur, quia quandoque occupatur in con- cupied, because it is occupied sometimes with the contemtemplatione veritatis, quandoque autem occupatur circa plation of the truth, sometimes with eternal things. exteriora.

Article 3 Whether teaching is a work of the active or of the contemplative life? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod docere non sit actus vitae activae, sed contemplativae. Dicit enim Gregorius, super Ezech., quod viri perfecti bona caelestia quae contemplari potuerunt, fratribus denuntiant, eorumque animos in amorem intimae claritatis accendunt. Sed hoc pertinet ad doctrinam. Ergo docere est actus vitae contemplativae. Praeterea, ad idem genus vitae videtur reduci actus et habitus. Sed docere est actus sapientiae, dicit enim philosophus, in principio Metaphys., quod signum scientis est posse docere. Cum ergo sapientia vel scientia pertineat ad vitam contemplativam, videtur quod etiam doctrina ad vitam contemplativam pertineat. Praeterea, sicut contemplatio est actus vitae contemplativae, ita et oratio. Sed oratio qua quis orat pro alio, nihilominus pertinet ad vitam contemplativam. Ergo quod aliquis veritatem meditatam in alterius notitiam per doctrinam deducat, videtur ad vitam contemplativam pertinere. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., activa vita est panem esurienti tribuere, verbo sapientiae nescientem docere. Respondeo dicendum quod actus doctrinae habet duplex obiectum, fit enim doctrina per locutionem; locutio autem est signum audibile interioris conceptus. Est igitur unum obiectum doctrinae id quod est materia sive obiectum interioris conceptionis. Et quantum ad hoc obiectum, quandoque doctrina pertinet ad vitam activam, quandoque ad contemplativam, ad activam quidem, quando homo interius concipit aliquam veritatem ut per eam in exteriori actione dirigatur; ad contemplativam autem, quando homo interius concipit aliquam veritatem intelligibilem in cuius consideratione et amore delectatur. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis Dom., eligant sibi partem meliorem, scilicet vitae contemplativae; vacent verbo, inhient doctrinae dulcedini, occupentur circa scientiam salutarem, ubi manifeste dicit doctrinam ad vitam contemplativam pertinere. Aliud vero obiectum doctrinae est ex parte sermonis audibilis. Et sic obiectum doctrinae est ipse audiens. Et quantum ad hoc obiectum, omnis doctrina pertinet ad vitam activam, ad quam pertinent exteriores actiones.

Objection 1: It would seem that teaching is a work not of the active but of the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that the perfect who have been able to contemplate heavenly goods, at least through a glass, proclaim them to their brethren, whose minds they inflame with love for their hidden beauty. But this pertains to teaching. Therefore teaching is a work of the contemplative life. Obj. 2: Further, act and habit would seem to be referable to the same kind of life. Now teaching is an act of wisdom: for the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1) that to be able to teach is an indication of knowledge. Therefore since wisdom or knowledge pertain to the contemplative life, it would seem that teaching also belongs to the contemplative life. Obj. 3: Further, prayer, no less than contemplation, is an act of the contemplative life. Now prayer, even when one prays for another, belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that it belongs also to the contemplative life to acquaint another, by teaching him, of the truth we have meditated. On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): The active life is to give bread to the hungry, to teach the ignorant the words of wisdom. I answer that, The act of teaching has a twofold object. For teaching is conveyed by speech, and speech is the audible sign of the interior concept. Accordingly one object of teaching is the matter or object of the interior concept; and as to this object teaching belongs sometimes to the active, sometimes to the contemplative life. It belongs to the active life, when a man conceives a truth inwardly, so as to be directed thereby in his outward action; but it belongs to the contemplative life when a man conceives an intelligible truth, in the consideration and love whereof he delights. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ, 1): Let them choose for themselves the better part, namely the contemplative life, let them be busy with the word, long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy themselves with salutary knowledge, thus stating clearly that teaching belongs to the contemplative life. The other object of teaching is on the part of the speech heard, and thus the object of teaching is the hearer. As to this object all doctrine belongs to the active life to which external actions pertain.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa expresse loquitur de doctrina quantum ad materiam, prout versatur circa considerationem et amorem veritatis. Ad secundum dicendum quod habitus et actus communicant in obiecto. Et ideo manifeste illa ratio procedit ex parte materiae interioris conceptus. In tantum enim ad sapientem vel scientem pertinet posse docere, in quantum potest interiorem conceptum verbis exprimere, ad hoc quod possit alium adducere ad intellectum veritatis. Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui orat pro alio, nihil agit erga illum pro quo orat, sed solum erga Deum, qui est intelligibilis veritas. Sed ille qui alium docet, aliquid circa eum agit exteriori actione. Unde non est similis ratio de utroque.

Q. 181, A. 4

Reply Obj. 1: The authority quoted speaks expressly of doctrine as to its matter, insofar as it is concerned with the consideration and love of truth. Reply Obj. 2: Habit and act have a common object. Hence this argument clearly considers the matter of the interior concept. For it pertains to the man having wisdom and knowledge to be able to teach, insofar as he is able to express his interior concept in words, so as to bring another man to understand the truth. Reply Obj. 3: He who prays for another does nothing towards the man for whom he prays, but only towards God Who is the intelligible truth; whereas he who teaches another does something in his regard by external action. Hence the comparison fails.

Article 4 Whether the active life remains after this life? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita activa maneat post hanc vitam. Ad vitam enim activam pertinent actus virtutum moralium, ut dictum est. Sed virtutes morales permanent post hanc vitam, ut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin. Ergo vita activa permanet post hanc vitam. Praeterea, docere alios pertinet ad vitam activam, ut dictum est. Sed in futura vita, in qua similes erimus Angelis, poterit esse doctrina, sicut et in Angelis esse videtur, quorum unus alium illuminat, purgat et perficit, quod refertur ad scientiae assumptionem, ut patet per Dionysium, VII cap. Cael. Hier. Ergo videtur quod vita activa remanet post hanc vitam. Praeterea, illud quod de se est durabilius, magis videtur posse post hanc vitam remanere. Sed vita activa videtur esse de se durabilior, dicit enim Gregorius, super Ezech., quod in vita activa fixi permanere possumus, in contemplativa autem intenta mente manere nullo modo valemus. Ergo multo magis vita activa potest manere post hanc vitam quam contemplativa. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., cum praesenti saeculo vita aufertur activa, contemplativa autem hic incipitur ut in caelesti patria perficiatur. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, activa vita habet finem in exterioribus actibus, qui si referuntur ad quietem contemplationis, iam pertinent ad vitam contemplativam. In futura autem vita beatorum cessabit occupatio exteriorum actuum, et si qui actus exteriores sint, referentur ad finem contemplationis. Ut enim Augustinus dicit, in fine de Civ. Dei, ibi vacabimus et videbimus; videbimus et amabimus; amabimus et laudabimus. Et in eodem libro praemittit quod Deus ibi sine

Objection 1: It would seem that the active life remains after this life. For the acts of the moral virtues belong to the active life, as stated above (A. 1). But the moral virtues endure after this life according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9). Therefore the active life remains after this life. Obj. 2: Further, teaching others belongs to the active life, as stated above (A. 3). But in the life to come when we shall be like the angels, teaching will be possible: even as apparently it is in the angels of whom one enlightens, cleanses, and perfects another, which refers to the receiving of knowledge, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore it would seem that the active life remains after this life. Obj. 3: Further, the more lasting a thing is in itself, the more is it able to endure after this life. But the active life is seemingly more lasting in itself: for Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that we can remain fixed in the active life, whereas we are nowise able to maintain an attentive mind in the contemplative life. Therefore the active life is much more able than the contemplative to endure after this life. On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): The active life ends with this world, but the contemplative life begins here, to be perfected in our heavenly home. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the active life has its end in external actions: and if these be referred to the quiet of contemplation, for that very reason they belong to the contemplative life. But in the future life of the blessed the occupation of external actions will cease, and if there be any external actions at all, these will be referred to contemplation as their end. For, as Augustine says at the end of De Civitate Dei xxii, 30, there we shall rest and we shall see, we shall see and love, we shall love and praise. And he had said

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Q. 181, A. 4

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fine videbitur, sine fastidio amabitur, sine fatigatione lau- before (De Civ. Dei xxii, 30) that there God will be seen withdabitur. Hoc munus, hic affectus, hic actus erit omnibus. out end, loved without wearying, praised without tiring: such will be the occupation of all, the common love, the universal activity. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dicReply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 136, A. 1, ad 1), the tum est, virtutes morales manebunt non secundum ac- moral virtues will remain not as to those actions which are tus quos habent circa ea quae sunt ad finem, sed secun- about the means, but as to the actions which are about the dum actus quos habent circa finem. Huiusmodi autem end. Such acts are those that conduce to the quiet of conactus sunt secundum quod constituunt quietem contem- templation, which in the words quoted above Augustine plationis. Quam Augustinus in praemissis verbis signifi- denotes by rest, and this rest excludes not only outward discat per vacationem, quae est intelligenda non solum ab turbances but also the inward disturbance of the passions. exterioribus tumultibus, sed etiam ab interiori perturbatione passionum. Ad secundum dicendum quod vita contemplativa, Reply Obj. 2: The contemplative life, as stated above sicut supra dictum est, praecipue consistit in contempla- (Q. 180, A. 4), consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, tione Dei. Et quantum ad hoc, unus Angelus alium non and as to this, one angel does not teach another, since acdocet, quia, ut dicitur Matth. XVIII de Angelis pusillo- cording to Matt. 18:10, the little ones’ angels, who belong to rum, qui sunt inferioris ordinis, quod semper vident fa- the lower order, always see the face of the Father; and so, in ciem patris. Et sic etiam in futura vita nullus hominum the life to come, no man will teach another of God, but we alium docebit de Deo, sed omnes videbimus eum sicuti shall all see Him as He is (1 John 3:2). This is in keeping with est, ut habetur I Ioan. III. Et hoc est quod dicitur Ierem. the saying of Jeremiah 31:34: They shall teach no more evXXXI, non docebit ultra vir proximum suum, dicens, co- ery man his neighbor . . . saying: Know the Lord: for all shall gnosce dominum, omnes enim cognoscent me, a minimo know me, from the least of them even to the greatest. eorum usque ad maximum. Sed de his quae pertinent ad dispensationem miniBut as regards things pertaining to the dispensation of steriorum Dei, unus Angelus docet alium, purgando, il- the mysteries of God, one angel teaches another by cleansluminando et perficiendo. Et secundum hoc, aliquid ha- ing, enlightening, and perfecting him: and thus they have bent de vita activa quandiu mundus durat, ex hoc quod something of the active life so long as the world lasts, from administrationi inferioris creaturae intendunt. Quod si- the fact that they are occupied in administering to the creagnificatur per hoc quod Iacob vidit Angelos in scala tures below them. This is signified by the fact that Jacob ascendentes, quod pertinet ad contemplationem, et de- saw angels ascending the ladder—which refers to contemscendentes, quod pertinet ad actionem. Sed sicut dicit plation—and descending—which refers to action. NeverGregorius, II Moral., non sic a divina visione foris exeunt theless, as Gregory remarks (Moral. ii, 3), they do not wanut internae contemplationis gaudiis priventur. Et ideo in der abroad from the Divine vision, so as to be deprived of the eis non distinguitur vita activa a contemplativa, sicut in joys of inward contemplation. Hence in them the active life nobis, qui per opera activa impedimur a contemplatione. does not differ from the contemplative life as it does in us for whom the works of the active life are a hindrance to contemplation. Non autem promittitur nobis similitudo Angelorum Nor is the likeness to the angels promised to us as requantum ad administrationem inferioris creaturae, quae gards the administering to lower creatures, for this is comnobis non competit secundum ordinem naturae nostrae, petent to us not by reason of our natural order, as it is to the sicut competit Angelis, sed secundum visionem Dei. angels, but by reason of our seeing God. Ad tertium dicendum quod durabilitas vitae actiReply Obj. 3: That the durability of the active life in the vae in statu praesenti excedens durabilitatem vitae con- present state surpasses the durability of the contemplative templativae, non provenit ex proprietate utriusque vitae life arises not from any property of either life considered secundum se consideratae, sed ex defectu nostro, qui ex in itself, but from our own deficiency, since we are withcorporis gravitate retrahimur ab altitudine contempla- held from the heights of contemplation by the weight of tionis. Unde ibidem subdit Gregorius quod ipsa sua in- the body. Hence Gregory adds (Moral. ii, 3) that the mind firmitate ab immensitate tantae celsitudinis repulsus ani- through its very weakness being repelled from that immense mus in semetipso relabitur. height recoils on itself.

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Question 182 The Active Life in Comparison with the Contemplative Life Deinde considerandum est de comparatione vitae We must now consider the active life in comparison activae ad contemplativam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur qua- with the contemplative life, under which head there are tuor. four points of inquiry: Primo, quae sit potior sive dignior. (1) Which of them is of greater import or excellence? Secundo, quae sit maioris meriti. (2) Which of them has the greater merit? Tertio, utrum vita contemplativa impediatur per (3) Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the activam. active life? Quarto, de ordine utriusque. (4) Of their order.

Article 1 Whether the active life is more excellent than the contemplative? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita activa sit potior quam contemplativa. Quod enim est meliorum, videtur esse melius, ut philosophus dicit, in III Topic. Sed vita activa pertinet ad maiores, scilicet ad praelatos, qui sunt in honore et potestate constituti, unde Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod in actione non amandus est honor in hac vita, sive potentia. Ergo videtur quod vita activa sit potior quam contemplativa. Praeterea, in omnibus habitibus et actibus praecipere pertinet ad potiorem, sicut militaris, tanquam potior, praecipit frenorum factrici. Sed ad vitam activam pertinet disponere et praecipere de contemplativa, ut patet per id quod dicitur Moysi, Exod. XIX, descende, et contestare populum, ne forte velit transcendere propositos terminos ad videndum Deum. Ergo vita activa est potior quam contemplativa. Praeterea, nullus debet abstrahi a maiori ut applicetur minoribus, apostolus enim dicit, I ad Cor. XII, aemulamini charismata meliora. Sed aliqui abstrahuntur a statu vitae contemplativae et occupantur circa vitam activam, ut patet de illis qui transferuntur ad statum praelationis. Ergo videtur quod vita activa sit potior quam contemplativa. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Luc. X, Maria optimam partem elegit, quae non auferetur ab ea. Per Mariam autem significatur vita contemplativa. Ergo contemplativa vita potior est quam activa. Respondeo dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid secundum se esse excellentius quod tamen secundum aliquid ab alio superatur. Dicendum est ergo quod vita

Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is more excellent than the contemplative. For that which belongs to better men would seem to be worthier and better, as the Philosopher says (Top. iii, 1). Now the active life belongs to persons of higher rank, namely prelates, who are placed in a position of honor and power; wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that in our actions we must not love honor or power in this life. Therefore it would seem that the active life is more excellent than the contemplative. Obj. 2: Further, in all habits and acts, direction belongs to the more important; thus the military art, being the more important, directs the art of the bridle-maker. Now it belongs to the active life to direct and command the contemplative, as appears from the words addressed to Moses (Exod 19:21), Go down and charge the people, lest they should have a mind to pass the fixed limits to see the Lord. Therefore the active life is more excellent than the contemplative. Obj. 3: Further, no man should be taken away from a greater thing in order to be occupied with lesser things: for the Apostle says (1 Cor 12:31): Be zealous for the better gifts. Now some are taken away from the state of the contemplative life to the occupations of the active life, as in the case of those who are transferred to the state of prelacy. Therefore it would seem that the active life is more excellent than the contemplative. On the contrary, Our Lord said (Luke 10:42): Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her. Now Mary figures the contemplative life. Therefore the contemplative life is more excellent than the active. I answer that, Nothing prevents certain things being more excellent in themselves, whereas they are surpassed by another in some respect. Accordingly we must re-

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contemplativa simpliciter melior est quam activa. Quod philosophus, in X Ethic., probat octo rationibus. Quarum prima est, quia vita contemplativa convenit homini secundum illud quod est optimum in ipso, scilicet secundum intellectum, et respectu propriorum obiectorum, scilicet intelligibilium, vita autem activa occupatur circa exteriora. Unde Rachel, per quam significatur vita contemplativa, interpretatur visum principium, vita autem activa significatur per Liam, quae erat lippis oculis, ut Gregorius dicit, VI Moral. Secundo, quia vita contemplativa potest esse magis continua, licet non quantum ad summum contemplationis gradum, sicut supra dictum est. Unde et Maria, per quam significatur vita contemplativa, describitur secus pedes domini assidue sedens. Tertio, quia maior est delectatio vitae contemplativae quam activae. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis Dom., quod Martha turbabatur, Maria epulabatur. Quarto, quia in vita contemplativa est homo magis sibi sufficiens, quia paucioribus ad eam indiget. Unde dicitur Luc. X, Martha, Martha, sollicita es et turbaris erga plurima. Quinto, quia vita contemplativa magis propter se diligitur, vita autem activa ad aliud ordinatur. Unde in Psalmo dicitur, unam petii a domino, hanc requiram, ut inhabitem in domo domini omnibus diebus vitae meae, ut videam voluntatem domini. Sexto, quia vita contemplativa consistit in quadam vacatione et quiete, secundum illud Psalmi, vacate, et videte quoniam ego sum Deus. Septimo, quia vita contemplativa est secundum divina, vita autem activa secundum humana. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis Dom., in principio erat verbum, ecce quod Maria audiebat. Verbum caro factum est, ecce cui Martha ministrabat. Octavo, quia vita contemplativa est secundum id quod est magis proprium homini, idest secundum intellectum, in operationibus autem vitae activae communicant etiam inferiores vires, quae sunt nobis et brutis communes. Unde in Psalmo, postquam dictum est, homines et iumenta salvabis, domine, subditur id quod est hominibus speciale, in lumine tuo videbimus lumen. Nonam rationem addit dominus, Luc. X, cum dicit, optimam partem elegit Maria, quae non auferetur ab ea. Quod exponens Augustinus, in libro de verbis Dom., dicit, non tu malam, sed illa meliorem. Audi unde meliorem, quia non auferetur ab ea. A te auferetur aliquando onus necessitatis, aeterna est dulcedo veritatis.

Secundum quid tamen, et in casu, magis est eligenda vita activa, propter necessitatem praesentis vitae. Sicut etiam philosophus dicit, in III Topic., quod philosophari est melius quam ditari, sed ditari melius est necessitatem patienti.

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ply that the contemplative life is simply more excellent than the active: and the Philosopher proves this by eight reasons (Ethic. x, 7, 8). The first is, because the contemplative life becomes man according to that which is best in him, namely the intellect, and according to its proper objects, namely things intelligible; whereas the active life is occupied with externals. Hence Rachael, by whom the contemplative life is signified, is interpreted the vision of the principle, whereas as Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) the active life is signified by Lia who was blear-eyed. The second reason is because the contemplative life can be more continuous, although not as regards the highest degree of contemplation, as stated above (Q. 180, A. 8, ad 2; Q. 181, A. 4, ad 3), wherefore Mary, by whom the contemplative life is signified, is described as sitting all the time at the Lord’s feet. Third, because the contemplative life is more delightful than the active; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. ciii) that Martha was troubled, but Mary feasted. Fourth, because in the contemplative life man is more self-sufficient, since he needs fewer things for that purpose; wherefore it was said (Luke 10:41): Martha, Martha, thou art careful and art troubled about many things. Fifth, because the contemplative life is loved more for its own sake, while the active life is directed to something else. Hence it is written (Ps 36:4): One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, that I may see the delight of the Lord. Sixth, because the contemplative life consists in leisure and rest, according to Ps. 45:11, Be still and see that I am God. Seventh, because the contemplative life is according to Divine things, whereas active life is according to human things; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ): ‘In the beginning was the Word’: to Him was Mary hearkening: ‘The Word was made flesh’: Him was Martha serving. Eighthly, because the contemplative life is according to that which is most proper to man, namely his intellect; whereas in the works of the active life the lower powers also, which are common to us and brutes, have their part; wherefore (Ps 35:7) after the words, Men and beasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord, that which is special to man is added (Ps 35:10): In Thy light we shall see light. Our Lord adds a ninth reason (Luke 10:42) when He says: Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her, which words Augustine (De Verb. Dom. Serm. ciii) expounds thus: Not—Thou hast chosen badly but—She has chosen better. Why better? Listen—because it shall not be taken away from her. But the burden of necessity shall at length be taken from thee: whereas the sweetness of truth is eternal. Yet in a restricted sense and in a particular case one should prefer the active life on account of the needs of the present life. Thus too the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2): It is better to be wise than to be rich, yet for one who is in need, it is better to be rich . . .

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad praelatos non solum pertinet vita activa, sed etiam debent esse excellentes in vita contemplativa. Unde Gregorius dicit, in pastorali, sit rector actione praecipuus, prae cunctis in contemplatione suspensus. Ad secundum dicendum quod vita contemplativa in quadam animi libertate consistit. Dicit enim Gregorius, super Ezech., quod vita contemplativa ad quandam mentis libertatem transit, temporalia non cogitans, sed aeterna. Et Boetius dicit, in V de Consolat., humanas animas liberiores esse necesse est cum se in mentis divinae speculatione conservant, minus vero, cum dilabuntur ad corpora. Unde patet quod vita activa non directe praecipit vitae contemplativae, sed, disponendo ad vitam contemplativam, praecipit quaedam opera vitae activae; in quo magis servit contemplativae vitae quam dominetur. Et hoc est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod activa vita servitus, contemplativa autem libertas vocatur. Ad tertium dicendum quod ad opera vitae activae interdum aliquis a contemplatione avocatur propter aliquam necessitatem praesentis vitae, non tamen hoc modo quod cogatur aliquis totaliter contemplationem deserere. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, otium sanctum quaerit caritas veritatis, negotium iustum, scilicet vitae activae, suscipit necessitas caritatis. Quam sarcinam si nullus imponit, percipiendae atque intuendae vacandum est veritati. Si autem imponitur, suscipienda est, propter caritatis necessitatem. Sed nec sic omnino veritatis delectatio deserenda est, ne subtrahatur illa suavitas, et opprimat ista necessitas. Et sic patet quod, cum aliquis a contemplativa vita ad activam vocatur, non hoc fit per modum subtractionis, sed per modum additionis.

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Reply Obj. 1: Not only the active life concerns prelates, they should also excel in the contemplative life; hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 1): A prelate should be foremost in action, more uplifted than others in contemplation. Reply Obj. 2: The contemplative life consists in a certain liberty of mind. For Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech.) that the contemplative life obtains a certain freedom of mind, for it thinks not of temporal but of eternal things. And Boethius says (De Consol. v, 2): The soul of man must needs be more free while it continues to gaze on the Divine mind, and less so when it stoops to bodily things. Wherefore it is evident that the active life does not directly command the contemplative life, but prescribes certain works of the active life as dispositions to the contemplative life; which it accordingly serves rather than commands. Gregory refers to this when he says (Hom. iii in Ezech.) that the active life is bondage, whereas the contemplative life is freedom. Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes a man is called away from the contemplative life to the works of the active life, on account of some necessity of the present life, yet not so as to be compelled to forsake contemplation altogether. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity undertake an honest toil, the work namely of the active life. If no one imposes this burden upon us we must devote ourselves to the research and contemplation of truth, but if it be imposed on us, we must bear it because charity demands it of us. Yet even then we must not altogether forsake the delights of truth, lest we deprive ourselves of its sweetness, and this burden overwhelm us. Hence it is clear that when a person is called from the contemplative life to the active life, this is done by way not of subtraction but of addition.

Article 2 Whether the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita activa sit maioris meriti quam contemplativa. Meritum enim dicitur respectu mercedis. Merces autem debetur labori, secundum illud I ad Cor. III, unusquisque propriam mercedem accipiet secundum suum laborem. Sed vitae activae attribuitur labor, contemplativae vero quies, dicit enim Gregorius, super Ezech., omnis qui ad Deum convertitur, prius necesse est ut desudet in labore, idest Liam accipiat, ut post ad videndum principium in Rachel amplexibus requiescat. Ergo vita activa est maioris meriti quam contemplativa. Praeterea, vita contemplativa est quaedam inchoatio futurae felicitatis. Unde super illud Ioan. ult., sic eum volo manere donec veniam, dicit Augustinus, hoc apertius dici potest, perfecta me sequatur actio, informata

Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative. For merit implies relation to meed; and meed is due to labor, according to 1 Cor. 3:8, Every man shall receive his own reward according to his own labor. Now labor is ascribed to the active life, and rest to the contemplative life; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): Whosoever is converted to God must first of all sweat from labor, i.e., he must take Lia, that afterwards he may rest in the embraces of Rachel so as to see the principle. Therefore the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative. Obj. 2: Further, the contemplative life is a beginning of the happiness to come; wherefore Augustine commenting on John 21:22, So I will have him to remain till I come, says (Tract. cxxiv in Joan.): This may be expressed more clearly:

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meae passionis exemplo, inchoata vero contemplatio maneat donec venio, perficienda cum venero. Et Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod contemplativa vita hic incipitur, ut in caelesti patria perficiatur. Sed in illa futura vita non erit status merendi, sed recipiendi pro meritis. Ergo vita contemplativa minus videtur habere de ratione meriti quam vita activa, sed plus habet de ratione praemii.

Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod nullum sacrificium est Deo magis acceptum quam zelus animarum. Sed per zelum animarum aliquis se convertit ad studia activae vitae. Ergo videtur quod vita contemplativa non sit maioris meriti quam activa. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., magna sunt activae vitae merita, sed contemplativae potiora. Respondeo dicendum quod radix merendi est caritas, sicut supra habitum est. Cum autem caritas consistat in dilectione Dei et proximi, sicut supra habitum est, diligere Deum secundum se est magis meritorium quam diligere proximum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo illud quod directius pertinet ad dilectionem Dei, magis est meritorium ex suo genere quam id quod directe pertinet ad dilectionem proximi propter Deum. Vita autem contemplativa directe et immediate pertinet ad dilectionem Dei, dicit enim Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod otium sanctum, scilicet contemplativae vitae, quaerit caritas veritatis, scilicet divinae; cui potissime vita contemplativa insistit, sicut dictum est. Vita autem activa ordinatur directius ad dilectionem proximi, quia satagit circa frequens ministerium, ut dicitur Luc. X. Et ideo ex suo genere contemplativa vita est maioris meriti quam activa. Et hoc est quod Gregorius dicit, in III Homil. Ezech., contemplativa est maior merito quam activa, quia haec in usu praesentis operis laborat, in quo scilicet necesse est proximis subvenire; illa vero sapore intimo venturam iam requiem degustat, scilicet in contemplatione Dei.

Potest tamen contingere quod aliquis in operibus vitae activae plus meretur quam alius in operibus vitae contemplativae, puta si propter abundantiam divini amoris, ut eius voluntas impleatur propter ipsius gloriam, interdum sustinet a dulcedine divinae contemplationis ad tempus separari. Sicut apostolus dicebat, Rom. IX, optabam ego ipse anathema esse a Christo pro fratribus meis, quod exponens Chrysostomus, in libro de Compunct., dicit, ita totam mentem eius demerserat amor Christi, ut etiam hoc quod ei prae ceteris omnibus amabilius erat, esse cum Christo, rursus idipsum, quia ita placeret Christo, contemneret. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod labor exterior operatur ad augmentum praemii accidentalis, sed aug-

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Let perfect works follow Me conformed to the example of My passion, and let contemplation begun here remain until I come, that it may be perfected when I shall come. And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that contemplation begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home. Now the life to come will be a state not of meriting but of receiving the reward of our merits. Therefore the contemplative life would seem to have less of the character of merit than the active, but more of the character of reward. Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech.) that no sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls. Now by the zeal for souls a man turns to the occupations of the active life. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life is not of greater merit than the active. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): Great are the merits of the active life, but greater still those of the contemplative. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, Q. 114, A. 4), the root of merit is charity; and, while, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1), charity consists in the love of God and our neighbor, the love of God is by itself more meritorious than the love of our neighbor, as stated above (Q. 27, A. 8). Wherefore that which pertains more directly to the love of God is generically more meritorious than that which pertains directly to the love of our neighbor for God’s sake. Now the contemplative life pertains directly and immediately to the love of God; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that the love of the Divine truth seeks a holy leisure, namely of the contemplative life, for it is that truth above all which the contemplative life seeks, as stated above (Q. 181, A. 4, ad 2). On the other hand, the active life is more directly concerned with the love of our neighbor, because it is busy about much serving (Luke 10:40). Wherefore the contemplative life is generically of greater merit than the active life. This is moreover asserted by Gregory (Hom. iii in Ezech.): The contemplative life surpasses in merit the active life, because the latter labors under the stress of present work, by reason of the necessity of assisting our neighbor, while the former with heartfelt relish has a foretaste of the coming rest, i.e., the contemplation of God. Nevertheless it may happen that one man merits more by the works of the active life than another by the works of the contemplative life. For instance through excess of Divine love a man may now and then suffer separation from the sweetness of Divine contemplation for the time being, that God’s will may be done and for His glory’s sake. Thus the Apostle says (Rom 9:3): I wished myself to be an anathema from Christ, for my brethren; which words Chrysostom expounds as follows (De Compunct. i, 7): His mind was so steeped in the love of Christ that, although he desired above all to be with Christ, he despised even this, because thus he pleased Christ. Reply Obj. 1: External labor conduces to the increase of the accidental reward; but the increase of merit with

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mentum meriti respectu praemii essentialis consistit principaliter in caritate. Cuius quoddam signum est labor exterior toleratus propter Christum, sed multo expressius eius signum est quod aliquis, praetermissis omnibus quae ad hanc vitam pertinent, soli divinae contemplationi vacare delectetur. Ad secundum dicendum quod in statu felicitatis futurae homo pervenit ad perfectum, et ideo non relinquitur locus proficiendi per meritum. Si tamen relinqueretur, esset efficacius meritum, propter caritatem maiorem. Sed contemplatio praesentis vitae cum quadam imperfectione est, et adhuc habet quo proficiat. Et ideo non tollit rationem merendi, sed augmentum meriti facit, propter maius exercitium caritatis divinae. Ad tertium dicendum quod sacrificium spiritualiter Deo offertur cum aliquid ei exhibetur. Inter omnia autem bona hominis Deus maxime acceptat bonum humanae animae, ut hoc sibi in sacrificium offeratur. Offerre autem debet aliquis Deo, primo quidem, animam suam, secundum illud Eccli. XXX, miserere animae tuae placens Deo, secundo autem, animas aliorum, secundum illud Apoc. ult., qui audit, dicat, veni. Quanto autem homo animam suam vel alterius propinquius Deo coniungit, tanto sacrificium est Deo magis acceptum. Unde magis acceptum est Deo quod aliquis animam suam et aliorum applicet contemplationi, quam actioni. Per hoc ergo quod dicitur quod nullum sacrificium est Deo magis acceptum quam zelus animarum, non praefertur meritum vitae activae merito vitae contemplativae, sed ostenditur magis esse meritorium si quis offerat Deo animam suam et aliorum, quam quaecumque alia exteriora dona.

Q. 182, A. 3

regard to the essential reward consists chiefly in charity, whereof external labor borne for Christ’s sake is a sign. Yet a much more expressive sign thereof is shown when a man, renouncing whatsoever pertains to this life, delights to occupy himself entirely with Divine contemplation. Reply Obj. 2: In the state of future happiness man has arrived at perfection, wherefore there is no room for advancement by merit; and if there were, the merit would be more efficacious by reason of the greater charity. But in the present life contemplation is not without some imperfection, and can always become more perfect; wherefore it does not remove the idea of merit, but causes a yet greater merit on account of the practice of greater Divine charity. Reply Obj. 3: A sacrifice is rendered to God spiritually when something is offered to Him; and of all man’s goods, God specially accepts that of the human soul when it is offered to Him in sacrifice. Now a man ought to offer to God, in the first place, his soul, according to Ecclus. 30:24, Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God; in the second place, the souls of others, according to Apoc. 22:17, He that heareth, let him say: Come. And the more closely a man unites his own or another’s soul to God, the more acceptable is his sacrifice to God; wherefore it is more acceptable to God that one apply one’s own soul and the souls of others to contemplation than to action. Consequently the statement that no sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls, does not mean that the merit of the active life is preferable to the merit of the contemplative life, but that it is more meritorious to offer to God one’s own soul and the souls of others, than any other external gifts.

Article 3 Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita contemplativa impediatur per activam. Ad vitam enim contemplativam necessaria est quaedam vacatio mentis, secundum illud Psalmi, vacate, et videte quoniam ego sum Deus. Sed vita activa habet inquietudinem, secundum illud Luc. X, Martha, Martha, sollicita es et turbaris erga plurima. Ergo vita activa contemplativam impedit. Praeterea, ad vitam contemplativam requiritur claritas visionis. Sed vita activa impedit visionis claritatem, dicit enim Gregorius, super Ezech., quod lippa est et fecunda, quia, dum occupatur in opere, minus videt. Ergo vita activa impedit contemplativam.

Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by the active life. For the contemplative life requires a certain stillness of mind, according to Ps. 45:11, Be still, and see that I am God; whereas the active life involves restlessness, according to Luke 10:41, Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many things. Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative. Obj. 2: Further, clearness of vision is a requisite for the contemplative life. Now active life is a hindrance to clear vision; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it is bleareyed and fruitful, because the active life, being occupied with work, sees less. Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative. Praeterea, unum contrariorum impeditur per Obj. 3: Further, one contrary hinders the other. Now aliud. Sed vita activa et contemplativa videntur contra- the active and the contemplative life are apparently conrietatem habere ad invicem, quia vita activa occupatur trary to one another, since the active life is busy about many

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circa plurima, vita autem contemplativa insistit ad contemplandum unum, unde et ex opposito dividuntur. Ergo videtur quod vita contemplativa impediatur per activam. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., qui contemplationis arcem tenere desiderant, prius se in campo per exercitium operis probent. Respondeo dicendum quod vita activa potest considerari quantum ad duo. Uno modo, quantum ad ipsum studium et exercitium exteriorum actionum. Et sic manifestum est quod vita activa impedit contemplativam, inquantum impossibile est quod aliquis simul occupetur circa exteriores actiones, et divinae contemplationi vacet. Alio modo potest considerari vita activa quantum ad hoc quod interiores animae passiones componit et ordinat. Et quantum ad hoc, vita activa adiuvat ad contemplationem, quae impeditur per inordinationem interiorum passionum. Unde Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., cum contemplationis arcem aliqui tenere desiderant, prius se in campo per exercitium operis probent, ut sollicite sciant si nulla iam mala proximis irrogant, si irrogata a proximis aequanimiter portant, si obiectis bonis temporalibus nequaquam mens laetitia solvitur, si subtractis non nimio maerore sauciantur. Ac deinde perpendant si, cum ad semetipsos introrsus redeunt, in eo quod spiritualia rimantur, nequaquam secum rerum corporalium umbras trahunt, vel fortasse tractas manu discretionis abigunt. Ex hoc ergo exercitium vitae activae confert ad contemplativam, quod quietat interiores passiones, ex quibus phantasmata proveniunt, per quae contemplatio impeditur.

things, while the contemplative life attends to the contemplation of one; wherefore they differ in opposition to one another. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by the active. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): Those who wish to hold the fortress of contemplation, must first of all train in the camp of action. I answer that, The active life may be considered from two points of view. First, as regards the attention to and practice of external works: and thus it is evident that the active life hinders the contemplative, insofar as it is impossible for one to be busy with external action, and at the same time give oneself to Divine contemplation. Second, active life may be considered as quieting and directing the internal passions of the soul; and from this point of view the active life is a help to the contemplative, since the latter is hindered by the inordinateness of the internal passions. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): Those who wish to hold the fortress of contemplation must first of all train in the camp of action. Thus after careful study they will learn whether they no longer wrong their neighbor, whether they bear with equanimity the wrongs their neighbors do to them, whether their soul is neither overcome with joy in the presence of temporal goods, nor cast down with too great a sorrow when those goods are withdrawn. In this way they will know when they withdraw within themselves, in order to explore spiritual things, whether they no longer carry with them the shadows of the things corporeal, or, if these follow them, whether they prudently drive them away. Hence the work of the active life conduces to the contemplative, by quelling the interior passions which give rise to the phantasms whereby contemplation is hindered. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam ratioThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections; for nes illae procedunt quantum ad ipsam occupationem these arguments consider the occupation itself of external exteriorum actuum, non autem quantum ad effectum, actions, and not the effect which is the quelling of the pasqui est moderatio passionum. sions.

Article 4 Whether the active life precedes the contemplative? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita activa non sit prior quam contemplativa. Vita enim contemplativa directe pertinet ad dilectionem Dei, vita autem activa ad dilectionem proximi. Sed dilectio Dei praecedit dilectionem proximi, inquantum proximus propter Deum diligitur. Ergo videtur quod etiam vita contemplativa sit prior quam activa. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., sciendum est quod, sicut bonus ordo vivendi est ut ab activa in contemplativam tendatur, ita plerumque utiliter a contempla-

Objection 1: It would seem that the active life does not precede the contemplative. For the contemplative life pertains directly to the love of God; while the active life pertains to the love of our neighbor. Now the love of God precedes the love of our neighbor, since we love our neighbor for God’s sake. Seemingly therefore the contemplative life also precedes the active life. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): It should be observed that while a well-ordered life proceeds from action to contemplation, sometimes it is useful for the

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tiva animus ad activam reflectitur. Non ergo simpliciter vita activa est prior quam contemplativa. Praeterea, ea quae diversis competunt, non videntur ex necessitate ordinem habere. Sed vita activa et contemplativa diversis competunt, dicit enim Gregorius, in VI Moral., saepe qui contemplari Deum quieti poterant, occupationibus pressi ceciderunt, et saepe qui occupati bene humanis usibus viverent, gladio suae quietis extincti sunt. Non ergo vita activa prior est quam contemplativa.

Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in III Homil. Ezech., activa vita prior est tempore quam contemplativa, quia ex bono opere tenditur ad contemplationem. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid dicitur esse prius dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum suam naturam. Et hoc modo vita contemplativa est prior quam activa, inquantum prioribus et melioribus insistit. Unde et activam vitam movet et dirigit, ratio enim superior, quae contemplationi deputatur, comparatur ad inferiorem, quae deputatur actioni, sicut vir ad mulierem, quae est per virum regenda, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin. Alio modo est aliquid prius quoad nos, quod scilicet est prius in via generationis. Et hoc modo vita activa est prior quam contemplativa, quia disponit ad contemplativam, ut ex supra dictis patet. Dispositio enim in via generationis praecedit formam, quae simpliciter et secundum naturam est prior. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vita contemplativa non ordinatur ad qualemcumque Dei dilectionem, sed ad perfectam. Sed vita activa necessaria est ad dilectionem proximi qualemcumque. Unde Gregorius dicit, in III Homil. Ezech., sine contemplativa vita intrare possunt ad caelestem patriam qui bona quae possunt, operari non negligunt, sine activa autem intrare non possunt, si negligunt bona operari quae possunt. Ex quo etiam patet quod vita activa praecedit contemplativam, sicut id quod est commune omnium, praecedit in via generationis id quod est proprium perfectorum. Ad secundum dicendum quod a vita activa proceditur ad vitam contemplativam secundum ordinem generationis, a vita autem contemplativa reditur ad vitam activam per viam directionis, ut scilicet vita activa per contemplationem dirigatur. Sicut etiam per operationes acquiritur habitus, et per habitum acquisitum perfectius aliquis operatur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ad tertium dicendum quod illi qui sunt proni ad passiones propter eorum impetum ad agendum, sunt similiter magis apti ad vitam activam propter spiritus inquietudinem. Unde dicit Gregorius, in VI Moral., quod

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soul to turn from the contemplative to the active life. Therefore the active is not simply prior to the contemplative. Obj. 3: Further, it would seem that there is not necessarily any order between things that are suitable to different subjects. Now the active and the contemplative life are suitable to different subjects; for Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): Often those who were able to contemplate God so long as they were undisturbed have fallen when pressed with occupation; and frequently they who might live advantageously occupied with the service of their fellow-creatures are killed by the sword of their inaction. The active life therefore is not prior to the contemplative. But on the contrary is what Gregory says (III Homil. Ezech.), the active life is prior to the contemplative with respect to time, because by a good deed it is drawn toward contemplation. I answer that, A thing is said to precede in two ways. First, with regard to its nature; and in this way the contemplative life precedes the active, inasmuch as it applies itself to things which precede and are better than others, wherefore it moves and directs the active life. For the higher reason which is assigned to contemplation is compared to the lower reason which is assigned to action, and the husband is compared to his wife, who should be ruled by her husband, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3, 7, 12). Second, a thing precedes with regard to us, because it comes first in the order of generation. In this way the active precedes the contemplative life, because it disposes one to it, as stated above (A. 1; Q. 181, A. 1, ad 3); and, in the order of generation, disposition precedes form, although the latter precedes simply and according to its nature. Reply Obj. 1: The contemplative life is directed to the love of God, not of any degree, but to that which is perfect; whereas the active life is necessary for any degree of the love of our neighbor. Hence Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech.): Without the contemplative life it is possible to enter the heavenly kingdom, provided one omit not the good actions we are able to do; but we cannot enter therein without the active life, if we neglect to do the good we can do. From this it is also evident that the active precedes the contemplative life, as that which is common to all precedes, in the order of generation, that which is proper to the perfect. Reply Obj. 2: Progress from the active to the contemplative life is according to the order of generation; whereas the return from the contemplative life to the active is according to the order of direction, insofar as the active life is directed by the contemplative. Even thus habit is acquired by acts, and by the acquired habit one acts yet more perfectly, as stated in Ethic. ii, 7. Reply Obj. 3: He that is prone to yield to his passions on account of his impulse to action is simply more apt for the active life by reason of his restless spirit. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that there be some so restless that when

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nonnulli ita inquieti sunt ut, si vacationem laboris habuerint, gravius laborent, quia tanto deteriores cordis tumultus tolerant, quanto eis licentius ad cogitationes vacat. Quidam vero habent naturaliter animi puritatem et quietem, per quam ad contemplationem sunt apti, qui si totaliter actionibus deputentur, detrimentum sustinebunt. Unde Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., quod quorundam hominum ita otiosae mentes sunt ut, si eos labor occupationis excipiat, in ipsa operationis inchoatione succumbant. Sed, sicut ipse postea subdit, saepe et pigras mentes amor ad opus excitat; et inquietas in contemplatione timor refrenat. Unde et illi qui sunt magis apti ad activam vitam, possunt per exercitium activae ad contemplativam praeparari, et illi nihilominus qui sunt magis ad contemplativam apti, possunt exercitia vitae activae subire, ut per hoc ad contemplationem paratiores reddantur.

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they are free from labor they labor all the more, because the more leisure they have for thought, the worse interior turmoil they have to bear. Others, on the contrary, have the mind naturally pure and restful, so that they are apt for contemplation, and if they were to apply themselves wholly to action, this would be detrimental to them. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that some are so slothful of mind that if they chance to have any hard work to do they give way at the very outset. Yet, as he adds further on, often . . . love stimulates slothful souls to work, and fear restrains souls that are disturbed in contemplation. Consequently those who are more adapted to the active life can prepare themselves for the contemplative by the practice of the active life; while nonetheless, those who are more adapted to the contemplative life can take upon themselves the works of the active life, so as to become yet more apt for contemplation.

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Question 183 Man’s Various Duties and States in General Consequenter considerandum est de diversitate staWe must next consider man’s various states and duties. tuum et officiorum humanorum. Et primo consideran- We shall consider (1) man’s duties and states in general; (2) dum est de officiis et statibus hominum in generali; se- the state of the perfect in particular. cundo, specialiter de statu perfectorum. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, quid faciat in hominibus statum. (1) What constitutes a state among men? Secundo, utrum in hominibus debeant esse diversi (2) Whether among men there should be various states status, sive diversa officia. and duties? Tertio, de differentia officiorum. Quarto, de (3) Of the diversity of duties; (4) Of the diversity of differentia statuum. states.

Article 1 Whether the notion of a state denotes a condition of freedom or servitude? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod status in sui ratione non importet conditionem libertatis vel servitutis. Status enim a stando dicitur. Sed stare dicitur aliquis ratione rectitudinis, unde dicitur Ezech. II, fili hominis, sta super pedes tuos; et Gregorius dicit, in VII Moral., ab omni statu rectitudinis dispereunt qui per noxia verba dilabuntur sed rectitudinem spiritualem acquirit homo per hoc quod subiicit suam voluntatem Deo, unde super illud Psalmi, rectos decet collaudatio, dicit Glossa, recti sunt qui dirigunt cor suum secundum voluntatem Dei. Ergo videtur quod sola obedientia divinorum mandatorum sufficiat ad rationem status. Praeterea, nomen status immobilitatem importare videtur, secundum illud I ad Cor. XV, stabiles estote et immobiles. Unde Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., lapis quadrus est, et quasi ex omni latere statum habet, qui casum in aliqua permutatione non habet. Sed virtus est quae facit immobiliter operari, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo videtur quod ex omni operatione virtuosa aliquis statum nanciscatur. Praeterea, nomen status videtur ad quandam altitudinem pertinere, nam ex hoc aliquis stat quod in altum erigitur. Sed per diversa officia aliquis fit altior altero. Similiter etiam per gradus vel ordines diversos diversimode homines in quadam altitudine constituuntur. Ergo sola diversitas graduum vel ordinum vel officiorum sufficit ad diversificandum statum. Sed contra est quod in decretis, Caus. II, qu. VI, dicitur, si quando in causa capitali vel causa status interpellatum fuerit non per exploratores, sed per seipsos est agendum, ubi causa status appellatur pertinens ad liber-

Objection 1: It would seem that the notion of a state does not denote a condition of freedom or servitude. For state takes its name from standing. Now a person is said to stand on account of his being upright; and Gregory says (Moral. vii, 17): To fall by speaking harmful words is to forfeit entirely the state of righteousness. But a man acquires spiritual uprightness by submitting his will to God; wherefore a gloss on Ps. 32:1, Praise becometh the upright, says: The upright are those who direct their heart according to God’s will. Therefore it would seem that obedience to the Divine commandments suffices alone for the notion of a state. Obj. 2: Further, the word state seems to denote immobility according to 1 Cor. 15:48, Be ye steadfast (stabiles) and immovable; wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xxi in Ezech.): The stone is foursquare, and is stable on all sides, if no disturbance will make it fall. Now it is virtue that enables us to act with immobility, according to Ethic. ii, 4. Therefore it would seem that a state is acquired by every virtuous action. Obj. 3: Further, the word state seems to indicate height of a kind; because to stand is to be raised upwards. Now one man is made higher than another by various duties; and in like manner men are raised upwards in various ways by various grades and orders. Therefore the mere difference of grades, orders, or duties suffices for a difference of states. On the contrary, It is thus laid down in the Decretals (II, qu. vi, can. Si Quando): Whenever anyone intervene in a cause where life or state is at stake he must do so, not by a proxy, but in his own person; and state here has reference to

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tatem vel ad servitutem. Ergo videtur quod non variet statum hominis nisi id quod pertinet ad libertatem vel servitutem. Respondeo dicendum quod status, proprie loquendo, significat quandam positionis differentiam secundum quam aliquis disponitur secundum modum suae naturae, cum quadam immobilitate. Est enim naturale homini ut caput eius in superiora tendat, et pedes in terra firmentur, et cetera membra media convenienti ordine disponantur, quod quidem non accidit si homo iaceat vel sedeat vel accumbat, sed solum quando erectus stat. Nec rursus stare dicitur si moveatur, sed quando quiescit. Et inde est quod etiam in ipsis humanis actionibus dicitur negotium aliquem statum habere secundum ordinem propriae dispositionis, cum quadam immobilitate seu quiete. Unde et circa homines, ea quae de facili circa eos variantur et extrinseca sunt, non constituunt statum, puta quod aliquis sit dives vel pauper, in dignitate constitutus vel plebeius, vel si quid aliud est huiusmodi, unde et in iure civili dicitur quod ei qui a senatu amovetur, magis dignitas quam status aufertur. Sed solum illud videtur ad statum hominis pertinere quod respicit obligationem personae hominis, prout scilicet aliquis est sui iuris vel alieni, et hoc non ex aliqua causa levi vel de facili mutabili, sed ex aliquo permanente. Et hoc est quod pertinet ad rationem libertatis vel servitutis. Unde status pertinet proprie ad libertatem vel servitutem, sive in spiritualibus sive in civilibus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod rectitudo, inquantum huiusmodi, non pertinet ad rationem status, sed solum inquantum est connaturalis homini, simul addita quadam quiete. Unde in aliis animalibus non requiritur rectitudo ad hoc quod stare dicantur. Nec etiam homines stare dicuntur, quantumcumque sint recti, nisi quiescant. Ad secundum dicendum quod immobilitas non sufficit ad rationem status. Nam etiam sedens et iacens quiescunt, qui tamen non dicuntur stare. Ad tertium dicendum quod officium dicitur per comparationem ad actum; gradus autem dicitur secundum ordinem superioritatis et inferioritatis; sed ad statum requiritur immobilitas in eo quod pertinet ad conditionem personae.

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freedom or servitude. Therefore it would seem that nothing differentiates a man’s state, except that which refers to freedom or servitude. I answer that, State, properly speaking, denotes a kind of position, whereby a thing is disposed with a certain immobility in a manner according with its nature. For it is natural to man that his head should be directed upwards, his feet set firmly on the ground, and his other intermediate members disposed in becoming order; and this is not the case if he lie down, sit, or recline, but only when he stands upright: nor again is he said to stand, if he move, but only when he is still. Hence it is again that even in human acts, a matter is said to have stability (statum) in reference to its own disposition in the point of a certain immobility or restfulness. Consequently matters which easily change and are extrinsic to them do not constitute a state among men, for instance that a man be rich or poor, of high or low rank, and so forth. Wherefore in the civil law (Lib. Cassius ff. De Senatoribus) it is said that if a man be removed from the senate, he is deprived of his dignity rather than of his state. But that alone seemingly pertains to a man’s state, which regards an obligation binding his person, in so far, to wit, as a man is his own master or subject to another, not indeed from any slight or unstable cause, but from one that is firmly established; and this is something pertaining to the nature of freedom or servitude. Therefore state properly regards freedom or servitude whether in spiritual or in civil matters. Reply Obj. 1: Uprightness as such does not pertain to the notion of state, except insofar as it is connatural to man with the addition of a certain restfulness. Hence other animals are said to stand without its being required that they should be upright; nor again are men said to stand, however upright their position be, unless they be still. Reply Obj. 2: Immobility does not suffice for the notion of state; since even one who sits or lies down is still, and yet he is not said to stand. Reply Obj. 3: Duty implies relation to act; while grades denote an order of superiority and inferiority. But state requires immobility in that which regards a condition of the person himself.

Article 2 Whether there should be different duties or states in the Church? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Objection 1: It would seem that there should not be Ecclesia non debeat esse diversitas officiorum vel sta- different duties or states in the Church. For distinction is tuum. Diversitas enim unitati repugnat. Sed fideles Chri- opposed to unity. Now the faithful of Christ are called to sti ad unitatem vocantur, secundum illud Ioan. XVII, ut unity according to John 17:21, 22: That they . . . may be one

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sint unum in nobis, sicut et nos unum sumus. Ergo in Ecclesia non debet esse diversitas officiorum vel statuum. Praeterea, natura non facit per multa quod potest per unum facere. Sed operatio gratiae est multo ordinatior quam operatio naturae. Ergo convenientius esset quod ea quae pertinent ad actus gratiae, per eosdem homines administrarentur, ita ut non esset in Ecclesia diversitas officiorum et statuum. Praeterea, bonum Ecclesiae maxime videtur in pace consistere, secundum illud Psalmi, qui posuit fines tuos pacem. Et II ad Cor. ult. dicitur, pacem habete, et Deus pacis erit vobiscum. Sed diversitas est impeditiva pacis, quam similitudo causare videtur, secundum illud Eccli. XIII, omne animal diligit simile sibi. Et philosophus dicit, in VII Polit., quod modica differentia facit in civitate dissidium. Ergo videtur quod non oporteat in Ecclesia esse diversitatem statuum et officiorum. Sed contra est quod in Psalmo in laudem Ecclesiae dicitur quod est circumamicta varietate, ubi dicit Glossa quod doctrina apostolorum, et confessione martyrum, et puritate virginum et lamento poenitentium, ornatur regina, idest Ecclesia. Respondeo dicendum quod diversitas statuum et officiorum in Ecclesia ad tria pertinet. Primo quidem, ad perfectionem ipsius Ecclesiae. Sicut enim in rerum naturalium ordine perfectio, quae in Deo simpliciter et uniformiter invenitur, in universitate creaturarum inveniri non potuit nisi difformiter et multipliciter ita etiam plenitudo gratiae, quae in Christo sicut in capite adunatur, ad membra eius diversimode redundat, ad hoc quod corpus Ecclesiae sit perfectum. Et hoc est quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. IV, ipse dedit quosdam quidem apostolos, quosdam autem prophetas, alios vero Evangelistas, alios autem pastores et doctores, ad consummationem sanctorum. Secundo autem pertinet ad necessitatem actionum quae sunt in Ecclesia necessariae. Oportet autem ad diversas actiones diversos homines deputari, ad hoc quod expeditius et sine confusione omnia peragantur. Et hoc est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. XII, sicut in uno corpore multa membra habemus, omnia autem membra non eundem actum habent, ita multi unum corpus sumus in Christo. Tertio hoc pertinet ad dignitatem et pulchritudinem Ecclesiae, quae in quodam ordine consistit. Unde dicitur III Reg. X, quod videns regina Saba omnem sapientiam Salomonis, et habitacula servorum et ordines ministrantium, non habebat ultra spiritum. Unde et apostolus dicit, II ad Tim. II, quod in magna domo non solum sunt vasa aurea et argentea, sed et lignea et fictilia. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod diversitas statuum et officiorum non impedit Ecclesiae unitatem, quae perficitur per unitatem fidei et caritatis et mutuae subministrationis, secundum illud apostoli, ad Ephes. IV, ex

Q. 183, A. 2

in Us . . . as We also are one. Therefore there should not be a distinction of duties and states in the Church. Obj. 2: Further, nature does not employ many means where one suffices. But the working of grace is much more orderly than the working of nature. Therefore it were more fitting for things pertaining to the operations of grace to be administered by the same persons, so that there would not be a distinction of duties and states in the Church. Obj. 3: Further, the good of the Church seemingly consists chiefly in peace, according to Ps. 147:3, Who hath placed peace in thy borders, and 2 Cor. 13:11, Have peace, and the God of peace . . . shall be with you. Now distinction is a hindrance to peace, for peace would seem to result from likeness, according to Ecclus. 13:19, Every beast loveth its like, while the Philosopher says (Polit. vii, 5) that a little difference causes dissension in a state. Therefore it would seem that there ought not to be a distinction of states and duties in the Church. On the contrary, It is written in praise of the Church (Ps 44:10) that she is surrounded with variety: and a gloss on these words says that the Queen, namely the Church, is bedecked with the teaching of the apostles, the confession of martyrs, the purity of virgins, the sorrowings of penitents. I answer that, The difference of states and duties in the Church regards three things. In the first place it regards the perfection of the Church. For even as in the order of natural things, perfection, which in God is simple and uniform, is not to be found in the created universe except in a multiform and manifold manner, so too, the fullness of grace, which is centered in Christ as head, flows forth to His members in various ways, for the perfecting of the body of the Church. This is the meaning of the Apostle’s words (Eph 4:11, 12): He gave some apostles, and some prophets, and other some evangelists, and other some pastors and doctors for the perfecting of the saints. Second, it regards the need of those actions which are necessary in the Church. For a diversity of actions requires a diversity of men appointed to them, in order that all things may be accomplished without delay or confusion; and this is indicated by the Apostle (Rom 12:4, 5), As in one body we have many members, but all the members have not the same office, so we being many are one body in Christ. Third, this belongs to the dignity and beauty of the Church, which consist in a certain order; wherefore it is written (3 Kgs 10:4, 5) that when the queen of Saba saw all the wisdom of Solomon . . . and the apartments of his servants, and the order of his ministers . . . she had no longer any spirit in her. Hence the Apostle says (2 Tim 2:20) that in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth. Reply Obj. 1: The distinction of states and duties is not an obstacle to the unity of the Church, for this results from the unity of faith, charity, and mutual service, according to the saying of the Apostle (Eph 4:16): From whom

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quo totum corpus est compactum, scilicet per fidem, et connexum, scilicet per caritatem, per omnem iuncturam subministrationis, dum scilicet unus alii servit. Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut natura non facit per multa quod potest facere per unum, ita etiam non coarctat in unum id ad quod multa requiruntur, secundum illud apostoli, I ad Cor. XII, si totum corpus oculus, ubi auditus? Unde et in Ecclesia, quae est corpus Christi, oportuit membra diversificari secundum diversa officia, status et gradus. Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut in corpore naturali membra diversa continentur in unitate per virtutem spiritus vivificantis quo abscedente membra corporis separantur; ita etiam in corpore Ecclesiae conservatur pax diversorum membrorum virtute spiritus sancti, qui corpus Ecclesiae vivificat, ut habetur Ioan. VI. Unde apostolus dicit, Ephes. IV, solliciti servare unitatem spiritus in vinculo pacis. Discedit autem aliquis ab hac unitate spiritus dum quaerit quae sibi sunt propria, sicut etiam in terrena civitate pax tollitur ex hoc quod cives singuli quae sua sunt quaerunt. Alioquin, per officiorum et statuum distinctionem tam mentis quam in civitate terrena magis pax conservatur, inquantum per haec plures sunt qui communicant actibus publicis. Unde et apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XII, quod Deus sic temperavit ut non sit schisma in corpore, sed pro invicem sollicita sint membra.

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the whole body being compacted, namely by faith, and fitly joined together, namely by charity, by what every joint supplieth, namely by one man serving another. Reply Obj. 2: Just as nature does not employ many means where one suffices, so neither does it confine itself to one where many are required, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor 12:17), If the whole body were the eye, where would be the hearing? Hence there was need in the Church, which is Christ’s body, for the members to be differentiated by various duties, states, and grades. Reply Obj. 3: Just as in the natural body the various members are held together in unity by the power of the quickening spirit, and are dissociated from one another as soon as that spirit departs, so too in the Church’s body the peace of the various members is preserved by the power of the Holy Spirit, Who quickens the body of the Church, as stated in John 6:64. Hence the Apostle says (Eph 4:3): Careful to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace. Now a man departs from this unity of spirit when he seeks his own; just as in an earthly kingdom peace ceases when the citizens seek each man his own. Besides, the peace both of mind and of an earthly commonwealth is the better preserved by a distinction of duties and states, since thereby the greater number have a share in public actions. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor 12:24, 25) that God hath tempered (the body) together that there might be no schism in the body, but the members might be mutually careful one for another.

Article 3 Whether duties differ according to their actions? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod officia non distinguantur per actus. Sunt enim infinitae diversitates humanorum actuum, tam in spiritualibus quam in temporalibus. Sed infinitorum non potest esse certa distinctio. Ergo per diversitates actuum non potest esse humanorum officiorum certa distinctio. Praeterea, vita activa et contemplativa secundum actus distinguuntur, ut dictum est. Sed alia videtur esse distinctio officiorum a distinctione vitarum. Non ergo officia distinguuntur per actus.

Objection 1: It would seem that duties do not differ according to their actions. For there are infinite varieties of human acts both in spirituals and in temporals. Now there can be no certain distinction among things that are infinite in number. Therefore human duties cannot be differentiated according to a difference of acts. Obj. 2: Further, the active and the contemplative life differ according to their acts, as stated above (Q. 179, A. 1). But the distinction of duties seems to be other than the distinction of lives. Therefore duties do not differ according to their acts. Praeterea, ordines etiam ecclesiastici et status et Obj. 3: Further, even ecclesiastical orders, states, and gradus per actus distingui videntur. Si ergo officia distin- grades seemingly differ according to their acts. If, then, duguantur per actus, videtur sequi quod eadem sit distinc- ties differ according to their acts it would seem that duties, tio officiorum, graduum et statuum. Hoc autem est fal- grades, and states differ in the same way. Yet this is not true, sum, quia diversimode in suas partes dividuntur. Non since they are divided into their respective parts in different ergo videtur quod officia distinguantur per actus. ways. Therefore duties do not differ according to their acts. Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro EtyOn the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that offimol., quod officium ab efficiendo est dictum, quasi effi- cium (duty) takes its name from efficere (to effect), as though cium, propter decorem sermonis una mutata littera. Sed it were instead of efficium, by the change of one letter for the

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efficere pertinet ad actionem. Ergo officia per actus distinguuntur. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, diversitas in membris Ecclesiae ad tria ordinatur, scilicet ad perfectionem, actionem et decorem. Et secundum haec tria triplex distinctio diversitatis fidelium accipi potest. Una quidem per respectum ad perfectionem. Et secundum hoc accipitur differentia statuum, prout quidam sunt aliis perfectiores. Alia vero distinctio accipitur per respectum ad actionem. Et haec est distinctio officiorum, dicuntur enim in diversis officiis esse qui sunt ad diversas actiones deputati. Alia autem, per respectum ad ordinem pulchritudinis ecclesiasticae. Et secundum hoc accipitur differentia graduum, prout scilicet, etiam in eodem statu vel officio, unus est alio superior. Unde et in Psalmo dicitur, secundum aliam litteram, Deus in gradibus eius cognoscetur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod materialis diversitas humanorum actuum est infinita. Et secundum hanc non distinguuntur officia, sed secundum formalem diversitatem, quae accipitur secundum diversas species actuum; secundum quam actus hominis non sunt infiniti. Ad secundum dicendum quod vita dicitur absolute. Et ideo diversitas vitarum accipitur secundum diversos actus qui conveniunt homini secundum seipsum. Sed efficientia, a qua sumitur nomen officii, ut dictum est, importat actionem tendentem in aliud, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. Et ideo officia distinguuntur proprie secundum actus qui referuntur ad alios, sicut dicitur doctor habere officium, vel iudex, et sic de aliis. Et ideo Isidorus dicit quod officium est ut quisque illa agat quae nulli officiant, id est noceant, sed prosint omnibus. Ad tertium dicendum quod diversitas statuum, officiorum et graduum secundum diversa sumitur, ut dictum est. Contingit tamen quod ista tria in eodem concurrant, puta, cum aliquis deputatur ad aliquem actum altiorem, simul ex hoc habet et officium et gradum; et ulterius quandoque perfectionis statum, propter actus sublimitatem sicut patet de episcopo. Ordines autem ecclesiastici specialiter distinguuntur secundum officia divina, dicit enim Isidorus, in libro Etymol., officiorum plurima genera sunt, sed praecipuum illud est quod in sacris divinisque rebus habetur.

Q. 183, A. 4

sake of the sound. But effecting pertains to action. Therefore duties differ according to their acts. I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), difference among the members of the Church is directed to three things: perfection, action, and beauty; and according to these three we may distinguish a threefold distinction among the faithful. One, with regard to perfection, and thus we have the difference of states, in reference to which some persons are more perfect than others. Another distinction regards action and this is the distinction of duties: for persons are said to have various duties when they are appointed to various actions. A third distinction regards the order of ecclesiastical beauty: and thus we distinguish various grades according as in the same state or duty one person is above another. Hence according to a variant text it is written (Ps 47:4): In her grades shall God be known. Reply Obj. 1: The material diversity of human acts is infinite. It is not thus that duties differ, but by their formal diversity which results from diverse species of acts, and in this way human acts are not infinite. Reply Obj. 2: Life is predicated of a thing absolutely: wherefore diversity of lives results from a diversity of acts which are becoming to man considered in himself. But efficiency, whence we have the word office (as stated above), denotes action tending to something else according to Metaph. ix, text. 16. Hence offices differ properly in respect of acts that are referred to other persons; thus a teacher is said to have an office, and so is a judge, and so forth. Wherefore Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that to have an office is to be officious, i.e., harmful to no one, but to be useful to all. Reply Obj. 3: Differences of state, offices and grades are taken from different things, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). Yet these three things may concur in the same subject: thus when a person is appointed to a higher action, he attains thereby both office and grade, and sometimes, besides this, a state of perfection, on account of the sublimity of the act, as in the case of a bishop. The ecclesiastical orders are particularly distinct according to divine offices. For Isidore says (Etym. vi): There are various kinds of offices; but the foremost is that which relates to sacred and Divine things.

Article 4 Whether the difference of states applies to those who are beginning, progressing, or perfect? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod difObjection 1: It would seem that the difference of ferentia statuum non attendatur secundum incipientes, states does not apply to those who are beginning, progressproficientes et perfectos. Diversorum enim diversae sunt ing, or perfect. For diverse genera have diverse species and species et differentiae. Sed secundum hanc differentiam differences. Now this difference of beginning, progress, and

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inchoationis, profectus et perfectionis, dividuntur gradus caritatis, ut supra habitum est, cum de caritate ageretur. Ergo videtur quod secundum hoc non sit accipienda differentia statuum. Praeterea, status, sicut dictum est, respicit conditionem servitutis vel libertatis. Ad quam non videtur pertinere praedicta differentia incipientium, proficientium et perfectorum. Ergo inconvenienter status per ista dividitur. Praeterea, incipientes, proficientes et perfecti distingui videntur secundum magis et minus, quod videtur magis pertinere ad rationem gradus. Sed alia est divisio graduum et statuum, ut supra dictum est. Non ergo convenienter dividitur status secundum incipientes, proficientes et perfectos. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in Moral., tres sunt modi conversorum, inchoatio, medietas atque perfectio. Et super Ezech. dicit quod alia sunt virtutis exordia, aliud profectus, aliud perfectio. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, status libertatem respicit vel servitutem. Invenitur autem in rebus spiritualibus duplex servitus et duplex libertas. Una quidem est servitus peccati, altera vero est servitus iustitiae; similiter etiam est duplex libertas, una quidem a peccato, alia vero a iustitia; ut patet per apostolum, qui dicit, Rom. VI, cum servi essetis peccati, liberi fuistis iustitiae, nunc autem, liberati a peccato, servi estis facti Deo. Est autem servitus peccati vel iustitiae, cum aliquis vel ex habitu peccati ad malum inclinatur, vel ex habitu iustitiae ad bonum. Similiter etiam libertas a peccato est cum aliquis ab inclinatione peccati non superatur, libertas autem a iustitia est cum aliquis propter amorem iustitiae non retardatur a malo. Veruntamen, quia homo secundum naturalem rationem ad iustitiam inclinatur, peccatum autem est contra naturalem rationem, consequens est quod libertas a peccato sit vera libertas, quae coniungitur servituti iustitiae, quia per utrumque tendit homo in id quod est conveniens sibi. Et similiter vera servitus est servitus peccati, cui coniungitur libertas a iustitia, quia scilicet per hoc homo impeditur ab eo quod est proprium sibi. Hoc autem quod homo efficiatur servus iustitiae vel peccati, contingit per humanum studium, sicut apostolus ibidem dicit, cui exhibetis vos servos ad obediendum, servi eius estis cui obedistis, sive peccati, ad mortem; sive obeditionis, ad iustitiam. In omni autem humano studio est accipere principium, medium et terminum. Et ideo consequens est quod status spiritualis servitutis et libertatis secundum tria distinguatur, scilicet secundum principium, ad quod pertinet status incipientium; et medium, ad quod pertinet status proficientium; et terminum, ad quem pertinet status perfectorum.

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perfection is applied to the degrees of charity, as stated above (Q. 24, A. 9), where we were treating of charity. Therefore it would seem that the differences of states should not be assigned in this manner. Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 1), state regards a condition of servitude or freedom, which apparently has no connection with the aforesaid difference of beginning, progress, and perfection. Therefore it is unfitting to divide state in this way. Obj. 3: Further, the distinction of beginning, progress, and perfection seems to refer to more and less, and this seemingly implies the notion of grades. But the distinction of grades differs from that of states, as we have said above (AA. 2, 3). Therefore state is unfittingly divided according to beginning, progress, and perfection. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 11): There are three states of the converted, the beginning, the middle, and the perfection; and (Hom. xv in Ezech.): Other is the beginning of virtue, other its progress, and other still its perfection. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1) state regards freedom or servitude. Now in spiritual things there is a twofold servitude and a twofold freedom: for there is the servitude of sin and the servitude of justice; and there is likewise a twofold freedom, from sin, and from justice, as appears from the words of the Apostle (Rom 6:20, 22), When you were the servants of sin, you were free men to justice . . . but now being made free from sin, you are . . . become servants to God. Now the servitude of sin or justice consists in being inclined to evil by a habit of sin, or inclined to good by a habit of justice: and in like manner freedom from sin is not to be overcome by the inclination to sin, and freedom from justice is not to be held back from evil for the love of justice. Nevertheless, since man, by his natural reason, is inclined to justice, while sin is contrary to natural reason, it follows that freedom from sin is true freedom which is united to the servitude of justice, since they both incline man to that which is becoming to him. In like manner true servitude is the servitude of sin, which is connected with freedom from justice, because man is thereby hindered from attaining that which is proper to him. That a man become the servant of justice or sin results from his efforts, as the Apostle declares (Rom 6:16): To whom you yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants you are whom you obey, whether it be of sin unto death, or of obedience unto justice. Now in every human effort we can distinguish a beginning, a middle, and a term; and consequently the state of spiritual servitude and freedom is differentiated according to these things, namely, the beginning—to which pertains the state of beginners— the middle, to which pertains the state of the proficient— and the term, to which belongs the state of the perfect.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod libertas a peccato fit per caritatem, quae diffunditur in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, ut dicitur Rom. V, et inde est quod dicitur II ad Cor. III, ubi spiritus domini, ibi libertas. Et ideo eadem est divisio caritatis, et statuum pertinentium ad spiritualem libertatem. Ad secundum dicendum quod incipientes, proficientes et perfecti, secundum quod per hoc status diversi distinguuntur, dicuntur homines non secundum quodcumque studium, sed secundum studium eorum quae pertinent ad spiritualem libertatem vel servitutem, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut prius dictum est, nihil prohibet in idem concurrere gradum et statum. Nam et in rebus mundanis illi qui sunt liberi non solum sunt alterius status quam servi, sed etiam sunt altioris gradus.

Q. 183, A. 4

Reply Obj. 1: Freedom from sin results from charity which is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, Who is given to us (Rom 5:5). Hence it is written (2 Cor 3:17): Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. Wherefore the same division applies to charity as to the state of those who enjoy spiritual freedom. Reply Obj. 2: Men are said to be beginners, proficient, and perfect (so far as these terms indicate different states), not in relation to any occupation whatever, but in relation to such occupations as pertain to spiritual freedom or servitude, as stated above (A. 1). Reply Obj. 3: As already observed (A. 3, ad 3), nothing hinders grade and state from concurring in the same subject. For even in earthly affairs those who are free, not only belong to a different state from those who are in service, but are also of a different grade.

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Question 184 The State of Perfection in General Deinde considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad statum perfectionis, ad quem alii status ordinantur. Nam consideratio officiorum, quantum quidem ad alios actus, pertinet ad legispositores; quantum autem ad sacra ministeria, pertinet ad considerationem ordinum, de quibus in tertia parte agetur. Circa statum autem perfectorum triplex consideratio occurrit, primo quidem, de statu perfectionis in communi; secundo, de his quae pertinent ad perfectionem episcoporum; tertio, de his quae pertinent ad perfectionem religiosorum. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum perfectio attendatur secundum caritatem. Secundo, utrum aliquis possit esse perfectus in hac vita. Tertio, utrum perfectio huius vitae consistat principaliter in consiliis, vel in praeceptis. Quarto, utrum quicumque est perfectus, sit in statu perfectionis. Quinto, utrum praelati et religiosi specialiter sint in statu perfectionis. Sexto, utrum omnes praelati sint in statu perfectionis. Septimo, quis status sit perfectior, utrum religiosorum vel episcoporum. Octavo, de comparatione religiosorum ad plebanos et archidiaconos.

We must now consider those things that pertain to the state of perfection whereto the other states are directed. For the consideration of offices in relation to other acts belongs to the legislator; and in relation to the sacred ministry it comes under the consideration of orders of which we shall treat in the Third Part. Concerning the state of the perfect, a three-fold consideration presents itself: (1) The state of perfection in general; (2) Things relating to the perfection of bishops; (3) Things relating to the perfection of religious. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether perfection bears any relation to charity? (2) Whether one can be perfect in this life? (3) Whether the perfection of this life consists chiefly in observing the counsels or the commandments? (4) Whether whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection? (5) Whether especially prelates and religious are in the state of perfection? (6) Whether all prelates are in the state of perfection? (7) Which is the more perfect, the episcopal or the religious state? (8) The comparison between religious and parish priests and archdeacons.

Article 1 Whether the perfection of the Christian life consists chiefly in charity? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod perfectio Christianae vitae non attendatur specialiter secundum caritatem. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XIV, malitia autem parvuli estote, sensibus autem perfecti. Sed caritas non pertinet ad sensum, sed magis ad affectum. Ergo videtur quod perfectio Christianae vitae non consistat principaliter in caritate. Praeterea, ad Ephes. ult. dicitur, accipite armaturam Dei, ut possitis resistere in die malo, et in omnibus perfecti stare. De armatura autem Dei subiungit dicens, state succincti lumbos vestros in veritate, et induite loricam iustitiae, in omnibus sumentes scutum fidei. Ergo

Objection 1: It would seem that the perfection of the Christian life does not consist chiefly in charity. For the Apostle says (1 Cor 14:20): In malice be children, but in sense be perfect. But charity regards not the senses but the affections. Therefore it would seem that the perfection of the Christian life does not chiefly consist in charity. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Eph 6:13): Take unto you the armor of God, that you may be able to resist in the evil day, and to stand in all things perfect; and the text continues (Eph 6:14, 16), speaking of the armor of God: Stand therefore having your loins girt about with truth, and having on

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perfectio Christianae vitae non solum attenditur secun- the breast-plate of justice . . . in all things taking the shield of dum caritatem, sed etiam secundum alias virtutes. faith. Therefore the perfection of the Christian life consists not only in charity, but also in other virtues. Praeterea, virtutes specificantur per actus, sicut et Obj. 3: Further, virtues like other habits, are specified alii habitus. Sed Iac. I dicitur quod patientia opus perfec- by their acts. Now it is written (Jas 1:4) that patience hath tum habet. Ergo videtur quod status perfectionis atten- a perfect work. Therefore seemingly the state of perfection datur magis secundum patientiam. consists more specially in patience. Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Coloss. III, super On the contrary, It is written (Col 3:14): Above all omnia, caritatem habete, quae est vinculum perfectionis, things have charity, which is the bond of perfection, because quia scilicet omnes alias virtutes quodammodo ligat in it binds, as it were, all the other virtues together in perfect unitatem perfectam. unity. Respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque dicitur I answer that, A thing is said to be perfect insofar esse perfectum inquantum attingit proprium finem, qui as it attains its proper end, which is the ultimate perfection est ultima rei perfectio. Caritas autem est quae unit nos thereof. Now it is charity that unites us to God, Who is the Deo, qui est ultimus finis humanae mentis, quia qui ma- last end of the human mind, since he that abideth in charity net in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo, ut dicitur I abideth in God, and God in him (1 John 4:16). Therefore the Ioan. IV. Et ideo secundum caritatem specialiter atten- perfection of the Christian life consists radically in charity. ditur perfectio vitae Christianae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod perfectio humaReply Obj. 1: The perfection of the human senses norum sensuum praecipue in hoc videtur consistere ut would seem to consist chiefly in their concurring together in unitatem veritatis conveniant, secundum illud I ad in the unity of truth, according to 1 Cor. 1:10, That you be Cor. I, sitis perfecti in eodem sensu et in eadem scientia. perfect in the same mind (sensu), and in the same judgment. Hoc autem fit per caritatem, quae consensum in homi- Now this is effected by charity which operates consent in us nibus operatur. Et ideo etiam perfectio sensuum radica- men. Wherefore even the perfection of the senses consists liter in perfectione caritatis radicatur. radically in the perfection of charity. Ad secundum dicendum quod dupliciter potest diReply Obj. 2: A man may be said to be perfect in two ci aliquis perfectus. Uno modo, simpliciter, quae quidem ways. First, simply: and this perfection regards that which perfectio attenditur secundum id quod pertinet ad ip- belongs to a thing’s nature, for instance an animal may be sam rei naturam; puta si dicatur animal perfectum quan- said to be perfect when it lacks nothing in the disposition do nihil ei deficit ex dispositione membrorum, et aliis of its members and in such things as are necessary for an huiusmodi quae requiruntur ad vitam animalis. Alio animal’s life. Second, a thing is said to be perfect relatively: modo dicitur aliquid perfectum secundum quid, quae and this perfection regards something connected with the quidem perfectio attenditur secundum aliquid exterius thing externally, such as whiteness or blackness or someadiacens, puta in albedine vel nigredine, vel aliquo hu- thing of the kind. Now the Christian life consists chiefly in iusmodi. Vita autem Christiana specialiter in caritate charity whereby the soul is united to God; wherefore it is consistit, per quam anima Deo coniungitur, unde dicitur written (1 John 3:14): He that loveth not abideth in death. I Ioan. III, qui non diligit, manet in morte. Et ideo secun- Hence the perfection of the Christian life consists simply dum caritatem simpliciter attenditur perfectio Christia- in charity, but in the other virtues relatively. And since that nae vitae, sed secundum alias virtutes secundum quid. which is simply, is paramount and greatest in comparison Et quia id quod est simpliciter est principium et maxi- with other things, it follows that the perfection of charity mum respectu aliorum, inde est quod perfectio caritatis is paramount in relation to the perfection that regards the est principium respectu perfectionis quae attenditur se- other virtues. cundum alias virtutes. Ad tertium dicendum quod patientia dicitur haReply Obj. 3: Patience is stated to have a perfect work bere opus perfectum in ordine ad caritatem, inquantum in relation to charity, insofar as it is an effect of the abunscilicet ex abundantia caritatis provenit quod aliquis pa- dance of charity that a man bears hardships patiently, actienter toleret adversa, secundum illud Rom. VIII, quis cording to Rom. 8:35, Who . . . shall separate us from the love nos separabit a caritate Dei? Tribulatio? An angustia? et of Christ? Shall tribulation? Or distress? etc. cetera.

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Q. 184, A. 2

Article 2 Whether any one can be perfect in this life? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus in hac vita possit esse perfectus. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XIII, cum venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est. Sed in hac vita non evacuatur quod ex parte est, manet enim in hac vita fides et spes, quae sunt ex parte. Ergo nullus in hac vita est perfectus. Praeterea, perfectum est cui nihil deest, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed nullus est in hac vita cui non desit aliquid, dicitur enim Iac. III, in multis offendimus omnes; et in Psalmo dicitur, imperfectum meum viderunt oculi tui. Ergo nullus est in hac vita perfectus. Praeterea, perfectio vitae Christianae, sicut dictum est, attenditur secundum caritatem, quae sub se comprehendit dilectionem Dei et proximi. Sed quantum ad dilectionem Dei, non potest aliquis perfectam caritatem in hac vita habere, quia, ut Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., amoris ignis, qui hic ardere inchoat, cum ipsum quem amat viderit, in amorem ipsius amplius ignescit. Neque etiam quantum ad dilectionem proximi, quia non possumus in hac vita omnes proximos actualiter diligere, etsi habitualiter eos diligamus; dilectio autem habitualis imperfecta est. Ergo videtur quod nullus in hac vita possit esse perfectus. Sed contra est quia lex divina non inducit ad impossibile. Inducit autem ad perfectionem secundum illud Matth. V, estote perfecti, sicut et pater vester caelestis perfectus est. Ergo videtur quod aliquis in hac vita possit esse perfectus. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, perfectio Christianae vitae in caritate consistit. Importat autem perfectio quandam universalitatem, quia, ut dicitur in III Physic., perfectum est cui nihil deest, potest ergo triplex perfectio considerari. Una quidem absoluta, quae attenditur non solum secundum totalitatem ex parte diligentis, sed etiam ex parte diligibilis, prout scilicet Deus tantum diligitur quantum diligibilis est. Et talis perfectio non est possibilis alicui creaturae, sed competit soli Deo, in quo bonum integraliter et essentialiter invenitur. Alia autem est perfectio quae attenditur secundum totalitatem absolutam ex parte diligentis, prout scilicet affectus secundum totum suum posse semper actualiter tendit in Deum. Et talis perfectio non est possibilis in via, sed erit in patria. Tertia autem perfectio est, quae neque attenditur secundum totalitatem ex parte diligibilis, neque secundum totalitatem ex parte diligentis quantum ad hoc quod semper actu feratur in Deum, sed quantum ad hoc quod excludantur ea quae repugnant motui dilectionis in Deum; sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro octogintatrium

Objection 1: It would seem that none can be perfect in this life. For the Apostle says (1 Cor 13:10): When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away. Now in this life that which is in part is not done away; for in this life faith and hope, which are in part, remain. Therefore none can be perfect in this life. Obj. 2: Further, The perfect is that which lacks nothing (Phys. iii, 6). Now there is no one in this life who lacks nothing; for it is written (Jas 3:2): In many things we all offend; and (Ps 138:16): Thy eyes did see my imperfect being. Therefore none is perfect in this life. Obj. 3: Further, the perfection of the Christian life, as stated (A. 1), relates to charity, which comprises the love of God and of our neighbor. Now, neither as to the love of God can one have perfect charity in this life, since according to Gregory (Hom. xiv in Ezech.), the furnace of love which begins to burn here, will burn more fiercely when we see Him Whom we love; nor as to the love of our neighbor, since in this life we cannot love all our neighbors actually, even though we love them habitually; and habitual love is imperfect. Therefore it seems that no one can be perfect in this life. On the contrary, The Divine law does not prescribe the impossible. Yet it prescribes perfection according to Matt. 5:48, Be you . . . perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect. Therefore seemingly one can be perfect in this life. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the perfection of the Christian life consists in charity. Now perfection implies a certain universality because according to Phys. iii, 6, the perfect is that which lacks nothing. Hence we may consider a threefold perfection. One is absolute, and answers to a totality not only on the part of the lover, but also on the part of the object loved, so that God be loved as much as He is lovable. Such perfection as this is not possible to any creature, but is competent to God alone, in Whom good is wholly and essentially. Another perfection answers to an absolute totality on the part of the lover, so that the affective faculty always actually tends to God as much as it possibly can; and such perfection as this is not possible so long as we are on the way, but we shall have it in heaven. The third perfection answers to a totality neither on the part of the object served, nor on the part of the lover as regards his always actually tending to God, but on the part of the lover as regards the removal of obstacles to the movement of love towards God, in which sense Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII, qu. 36) that carnal desire is the bane of char-

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quaest., quod venenum caritatis est cupiditas, perfectio nulla cupiditas. Et talis perfectio potest in hac vita haberi. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, inquantum ab affectu hominis excluditur omne illud quod caritati contrariatur, sicut est peccatum mortale. Et sine tali perfectione caritas esse non potest. Unde est de necessitate salutis. Alio modo, inquantum ab affectu hominis excluditur non solum illud quod est caritati contrarium, sed etiam omne illud quod impedit ne affectus mentis totaliter dirigatur ad Deum. Sine qua perfectione caritas esse potest, puta in incipientibus et proficientibus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus ibi loquitur de perfectione patriae, quae non est in via possibilis. Ad secundum dicendum quod illi qui sunt in hac vita perfecti, in multis dicuntur offendere secundum peccata venialia, quae consequuntur ex infirmitate praesentis vitae. Et quantum ad hoc etiam habent aliquid imperfectum, per comparationem ad perfectionem patriae. Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut modus praesentis vitae non patitur ut homo semper actu feratur in Deum, ita etiam non patitur quod actu feratur in omnes proximos singillatim, sed sufficit quod feratur communiter in omnes in universali, et in singulos habitualiter et secundum animi praeparationem. Potest autem etiam circa dilectionem proximi duplex perfectio attendi sicut et circa dilectionem Dei. Una quidem, sine qua caritas esse non potest, ut scilicet homo nihil habeat in affectu quod sit contrarium dilectioni proximi. Alia autem, sine qua caritas inveniri potest, quae quidem attenditur tripliciter. Primo quidem, secundum extensionem dilectionis, ut scilicet aliquis non solum diligat amicos et notos, sed etiam extraneos, et ulterius inimicos. Hoc enim, ut Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., est perfectorum filiorum Dei. Secundo, secundum intensionem, quae ostenditur ex his quae homo propter proximum contemnit; ut scilicet homo non solum contemnat exteriora bona propter proximum, sed etiam afflictiones corporales, et ulterius mortem, secundum illud Ioan. XV, maiorem dilectionem nemo habet quam ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis. Tertio, quantum ad effectum dilectionis, ut scilicet homo proximis impendat non solum temporalia beneficia, sed etiam spiritualia, et ulterius seipsum, secundum illud apostoli, II ad Cor. XII, ego autem libentissime impendam, et superimpendar ipse pro animabus vestris.

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ity; to have no carnal desires is the perfection of charity. Such perfection as this can be had in this life, and in two ways. First, by the removal from man’s affections of all that is contrary to charity, such as mortal sin; and there can be no charity apart from this perfection, wherefore it is necessary for salvation. Second, by the removal from man’s affections not only of whatever is contrary to charity, but also of whatever hinders the mind’s affections from tending wholly to God. Charity is possible apart from this perfection, for instance in those who are beginners and in those who are proficient. Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking there of heavenly perfection which is not possible to those who are on the way. Reply Obj. 2: Those who are perfect in this life are said to offend in many things with regard to venial sins, which result from the weakness of the present life: and in this respect they have an imperfect being in comparison with the perfection of heaven. Reply Obj. 3: As the conditions of the present life do not allow of a man always tending actually to God, so neither does it allow of his tending actually to each individual neighbor; but it suffices for him to tend to all in common and collectively, and to each individual habitually and according to the preparedness of his mind. Now in the love of our neighbor, as in the love of God we may observe a twofold perfection: one without which charity is impossible, and consisting in one’s having in one’s affections nothing that is contrary to the love of one’s neighbor; and another without which it is possible to have charity. The latter perfection may be considered in three ways. First, as to the extent of love, through a man loving not only his friends and acquaintances but also strangers and even his enemies, for as Augustine says (Enchiridion lxxiii) this is a mark of the perfect children of God. Second, as to the intensity of love, which is shown by the things which man despises for his neighbor’s sake, through his despising not only external goods for the sake of his neighbor, but also bodily hardships and even death, according to John 15:13, Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends. Third, as to the effect of love, so that a man will surrender not only temporal but also spiritual goods and even himself, for his neighbor’s sake, according to the words of the Apostle (2 Cor 12:15), But I most gladly will spend and be spent myself for your souls.

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Q. 184, A. 3

Article 3 Whether, in this life, perfection consists in the observance of the commandments or of the counsels? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod perfectio viae non consistit in praeceptis, sed in consiliis. Dicit enim dominus, Matth. XIX, si vis perfectus esse, vade et vende omnia quae habes et da pauperibus, et veni, sequere me. Sed istud est consilium. Ergo perfectio attenditur secundum consilia, et non secundum praecepta. Praeterea, ad observantiam praeceptorum omnes tenentur, cum sint de necessitate salutis. Si ergo perfectio Christianae vitae consistat in praeceptis, sequitur quod perfectio sit de necessitate salutis, et quod omnes ad eam teneantur. Quod patet esse falsum. Praeterea, perfectio Christianae vitae attenditur secundum caritatem, ut dictum est. Sed perfectio caritatis non videtur consistere in observantia praeceptorum, quia perfectionem caritatis praecedit et augmentum et inchoatio ipsius, ut patet per Augustinum, super canonicam Ioan.; non autem potest caritas inchoari ante observationem praeceptorum, quia, ut dicitur Ioan. XIV, si quis diligit me, sermonem meum servabit. Ergo perfectio vitae non attenditur secundum praecepta, sed secundum consilia. Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. VI, diliges dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo. Et Levit. XIX dicitur, diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum. Haec autem sunt duo praecepta de quibus dominus dicit, Matth. XXII in his duobus praeceptis pendet lex et prophetae. Perfectio autem caritatis, secundum quam dicitur vita Christiana esse perfecta, attenditur secundum hoc quod Deum ex toto corde diligamus et proximum sicut nos ipsos. Ergo videtur quod perfectio consistat in observantia praeceptorum. Respondeo dicendum quod perfectio dicitur in aliquo consistere dupliciter, uno modo, per se et essentialiter; alio modo, secundario et accidentaliter. Per se quidem et essentialiter consistit perfectio Christianae vitae in caritate, principaliter quidem secundum dilectionem Dei, secundario autem secundum dilectionem proximi, de quibus dantur praecepta principalia divinae legis, ut dictum est. Non autem dilectio Dei et proximi cadit sub praecepto secundum aliquam mensuram, ita quod id quod est plus sub consilio remaneat, ut patet ex ipsa forma praecepti, quae perfectionem demonstrat, ut cum dicitur, diliges dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo, totum enim et perfectum idem sunt, secundum philosophum, in III Physic.; et cum dicitur, diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum, unusquisque enim seipsum maxime diligit. Et hoc ideo est quia finis praecepti caritas est, ut apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. I, in fine autem non adhibetur aliqua mensura, sed solum in his quae sunt ad finem,

Objection 1: It would seem that, in this life, perfection consists in the observance not of the commandments but of the counsels. For our Lord said (Matt 19:21): If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all thou hast, and give to the poor . . . and come, follow Me. Now this is a counsel. Therefore perfection regards the counsels and not the precepts. Obj. 2: Further, all are bound to the observance of the commandments, since this is necessary for salvation. Therefore, if the perfection of the Christian life consists in observing the commandments, it follows that perfection is necessary for salvation, and that all are bound thereto; and this is evidently false. Obj. 3: Further, the perfection of the Christian life is gauged according to charity, as stated above (A. 1). Now the perfection of charity, seemingly, does not consist in the observance of the commandments, since the perfection of charity is preceded both by its increase and by its beginning, as Augustine says (Super Canonic. Joan. Tract. ix). But the beginning of charity cannot precede the observance of the commandments, since according to John 14:23, If any one love Me, he will keep My word. Therefore the perfection of life regards not the commandments but the counsels. On the contrary, It is written (Deut 6:5): Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and (Lev 19:18): Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself ; and these are the commandments of which our Lord said (Matt 22:40): On these two commandments dependeth the whole law and the prophets. Now the perfection of charity, in respect of which the Christian life is said to be perfect, consists in our loving God with our whole heart, and our neighbor as ourselves. Therefore it would seem that perfection consists in the observance of the precepts. I answer that, Perfection is said to consist in a thing in two ways: in one way, primarily and essentially; in another, secondarily and accidentally. Primarily and essentially the perfection of the Christian life consists in charity, principally as to the love of God, secondarily as to the love of our neighbor, both of which are the matter of the chief commandments of the Divine law, as stated above. Now the love of God and of our neighbor is not commanded according to a measure, so that what is in excess of the measure be a matter of counsel. This is evident from the very form of the commandment, pointing, as it does, to perfection— for instance in the words, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart: since the whole is the same as the perfect, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 6), and in the words, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, since every one loves himself most. The reason of this is that the end of the commandment is charity, according to the Apostle (1 Tim 1:5); and the end is not subject to a measure, but

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ut philosophus dicit, in I Polit.; sicut medicus non adhibet mensuram quantum sanet, sed quanta medicina vel diaeta utatur ad sanandum. Et sic patet quod perfectio essentialiter consistit in praeceptis. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de perfectione iustitiae, cur ergo non praeciperetur homini ista perfectio, quamvis eam in hac vita nemo habeat?

Secundario autem et instrumentaliter perfectio consistit in consiliis. Quae omnia, sicut et praecepta, ordinantur ad caritatem, sed aliter et aliter. Nam praecepta alia ordinantur ad removendum ea quae sunt caritati contraria, cum quibus scilicet caritas esse non potest, consilia autem ordinantur ad removendum impedimenta actus caritatis, quae tamen caritati non contrariantur, sicut est matrimonium, occupatio negotiorum saecularium, et alia huiusmodi. Unde Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quaecumque mandat Deus, ex quibus unum est, non moechaberis; et quaecumque non iubentur, sed speciali consilio monentur, ex quibus unum est, bonum est homini mulierem non tangere, tunc recte fiunt cum referuntur ad diligendum Deum et proximum propter Deum, et in hoc saeculo et in futuro. Et inde est quod in collationibus patrum dicit abbas Moyses, ieiunia, vigiliae, meditatio Scripturarum, nuditas ac privatio omnium facultatum, non perfectio, sed perfectionis instrumenta sunt quia non in ipsis consistit disciplinae illius finis, sed per illa pervenitur ad finem. Et supra praemisit quod ad perfectionem caritatis istis gradibus conscendere nitimur.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in illis verbis domini aliquid ponitur quasi via ad perfectionem, hoc scilicet quod dicitur, vade et vende omnia quae habes et da pauperibus, aliud autem subditur in quo perfectio consistit, scilicet quod dicit, et sequere me. Unde Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., quod quia non sufficit tantum relinquere, Petrus iungit quod perfectum est, idest, secuti sumus te. Ambrosius autem, super illud Luc. V, sequere me, dicit, sequi iubet non corporis gressu, sed mentis affectu, quod fit per caritatem. Et ideo ex ipso modo loquendi apparet quod consilia sunt quaedam instrumenta perveniendi ad perfectionem, dum dicitur, si vis perfectus esse, vade et vende etc., quasi dicat, hoc faciendo ad hunc finem pervenies. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Perfect. Iustit., perfectio caritatis homini in hac vita praecipitur, quia recte non curritur si quo currendum est nesciatur. Quomodo autem sciretur, si nullis praeceptis ostenderetur? Cum autem id quod cadit sub praecepto diversimode possit impleri, non efficitur transgressor praecepti aliquis ex hoc quod non optimo modo implet, sed sufficit quod quocumque modo

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only such things as are directed to the end, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 3); thus a physician does not measure the amount of his healing, but how much medicine or diet he shall employ for the purpose of healing. Consequently it is evident that perfection consists essentially in the observance of the commandments; wherefore Augustine says (De Perf. Justit. viii): Why then should not this perfection be prescribed to man, although no man has it in this life? Secondarily and instrumentally, however, perfection consists in the observance of the counsels, all of which, like the commandments, are directed to charity; yet not in the same way. For the commandments, other than the precepts of charity, are directed to the removal of things contrary to charity, with which, namely, charity is incompatible, whereas the counsels are directed to the removal of things that hinder the act of charity, and yet are not contrary to charity, such as marriage, the occupation of worldly business, and so forth. Hence Augustine says (Enchiridion cxxi): Whatever things God commands, for instance, ‘Thou shalt not commit adultery,’ and whatever are not commanded, yet suggested by a special counsel, for instance, ‘It is good for a man not to touch a woman,’ are then done aright when they are referred to the love of God, and of our neighbor for God’s sake, both in this world and in the world to come. Hence it is that in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, cap. vii) the abbot Moses says: Fastings, watchings, meditating on the Scriptures, penury and loss of all one’s wealth, these are not perfection but means to perfection, since not in them does the school of perfection find its end, but through them it achieves its end, and he had already said that we endeavor to ascend by these steps to the perfection of charity. Reply Obj. 1: In this saying of our Lord something is indicated as being the way to perfection by the words, Go, sell all thou hast, and give to the poor; and something else is added wherein perfection consists, when He said, And follow Me. Hence Jerome in his commentary on Matt. 19:27, says that since it is not enough merely to leave, Peter added that which is perfect: ‘And have followed Thee’; and Ambrose, commenting on Luke 5:27, Follow Me, says: He commands him to follow, not with steps of the body, but with devotion of the soul, which is the effect of charity. Wherefore it is evident from the very way of speaking that the counsels are means of attaining to perfection, since it is thus expressed: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell, etc., as though He said: By so doing thou shalt accomplish this end. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Perf. Justit. viii), The perfection of charity is prescribed to man in this life, because one runs not right unless one knows whither to run. And how shall we know this if no commandment declares it to us? And since that which is a matter of precept can be fulfilled variously, one does not break a commandment through not fulfilling it in the best way, but it is enough to fulfill it in any way whatever. Now the perfection of Divine

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impleat illud. Perfectio autem divinae dilectionis universaliter quidem cadit sub praecepto, ita quod etiam perfectio patriae non excluditur ab illo praecepto, ut Augustinus dicit, sed transgressionem praecepti evadit qui quocumque modo perfectionem divinae dilectionis attingit. Est aut infimus divinae dilectionis gradus ut nihil supra eum, aut contra eum, aut aequaliter ei diligatur, a quo gradu perfectionis qui deficit, nullo modo implet praeceptum. Est autem aliquis gradus perfectae dilectionis qui non potest impleri in via, ut dictum est, a quo qui deficit, manifestum est quod non est transgressor praecepti. Et similiter non est transgressor praecepti qui non attingit ad medios perfectionis gradus, dummodo attingat ad infimum. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut homo habet quandam perfectionem suae naturae statim cum nascitur, quae pertinet ad rationem speciei, est autem alia perfectio ad quam per augmentum adducitur, ita etiam est quaedam perfectio caritatis pertinens ad ipsam speciem caritatis, ut scilicet Deus super omnia diligatur et nihil contra eum ametur; est autem alia perfectio caritatis, etiam in hac vita, ad quam aliquis per aliquod spirituale augmentum pervenit, ut puta cum homo etiam a rebus licitis abstinet, ut liberius divinis obsequiis vacet.

Q. 184, A. 4

love is a matter of precept for all without exception, so that even the perfection of heaven is not excepted from this precept, as Augustine says (De Perf. Justit. viii), and one escapes transgressing the precept, in whatever measure one attains to the perfection of Divine love. The lowest degree of Divine love is to love nothing more than God, or contrary to God, or equally with God, and whoever fails from this degree of perfection nowise fulfils the precept. There is another degree of the Divine love, which cannot be fulfilled so long as we are on the way, as stated above (A. 2), and it is evident that to fail from this is not to be a transgressor of the precept; and in like manner one does not transgress the precept, if one does not attain to the intermediate degrees of perfection, provided one attain to the lowest. Reply Obj. 3: Just as man has a certain perfection of his nature as soon as he is born, which perfection belongs to the very essence of his species, while there is another perfection which he acquires by growth, so again there is a perfection of charity which belongs to the very essence of charity, namely that man love God above all things, and love nothing contrary to God, while there is another perfection of charity even in this life, whereto a man attains by a kind of spiritual growth, for instance when a man refrains even from lawful things, in order more freely to give himself to the service of God.

Article 4 Whether whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod quicumque est perfectus, sit in statu perfectionis. Sicut enim per augmentum corporale pervenitur ad perfectionem corporalem, ita per augmentum spirituale pervenitur ad perfectionem spiritualem, ut dictum est. Sed post augmentum corporale aliquis dicitur esse in statu perfectae aetatis. Ergo etiam videtur quod post augmentum spirituale, cum quis iam adeptus est perfectionem, sit in statu perfectionis. Praeterea, eadem ratione qua aliquid movetur de contrario in contrarium, movetur etiam aliquid de minori ad maius, ut dicitur in V Physic. Sed quando aliquis transmutatur de peccato ad gratiam, dicitur mutare statum, prout distinguitur status culpae et status gratiae. Ergo videtur quod, pari ratione, cum aliquis proficit de minori gratia ad maiorem quousque perveniat ad perfectum, quod adipiscatur perfectionis statum. Praeterea, statum adipiscitur aliquis ex hoc quod a servitute liberatur. Sed per caritatem aliquis liberatur a servitute peccati, quia universa delicta operit caritas, ut dicitur Prov. X. Sed perfectus dicitur aliquis secun-

Objection 1: It would seem that whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection. For, as stated above (A. 3, ad 3), just as bodily perfection is reached by bodily growth, so spiritual perfection is acquired by spiritual growth. Now after bodily growth one is said to have reached the state of perfect age. Therefore seemingly also after spiritual growth, when one has already reached spiritual perfection, one is in the state of perfection. Obj. 2: Further, according to Phys. v, 2, movement from one contrary to another has the same aspect as movement from less to more. Now when a man is changed from sin to grace, he is said to change his state, insofar as the state of sin differs from the state of grace. Therefore it would seem that in the same manner, when one progresses from a lesser to a greater grace, so as to reach the perfect degree, one is in the state of perfection. Obj. 3: Further, a man acquires a state by being freed from servitude. But one is freed from the servitude of sin by charity, because charity covereth all sins (Prov 10:12). Now one is said to be perfect on account of charity, as stated

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dum caritatem, ut dictum est. Ergo videtur quod quicumque habeat perfectionem, ex hoc ipso habeat perfectionis statum. Sed contra est quod aliqui sunt in statu perfectionis qui omnino caritate et gratia carent, sicut mali episcopi aut mali religiosi. Ergo videtur quod e contrario aliqui habent perfectionem vitae qui tamen non habent perfectionis statum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, status proprie pertinet ad conditionem libertatis vel servitutis. Spiritualis autem libertas aut servitus potest in homine attendi dupliciter, uno modo, secundum id quod interius agitur; alio modo, secundum id quod agitur exterius. Et quia, ut dicitur I Reg. XVI, homines vident ea quae parent, sed Deus intuetur cor, inde est quod secundum interiorem hominis dispositionem accipitur conditio spiritualis status in homine per comparationem ad iudicium divinum, secundum autem ea quae exterius aguntur, accipitur spiritualis status in homine per comparationem ad Ecclesiam. Et sic nunc de statibus loquimur, prout scilicet ex diversitate statuum quaedam Ecclesiae pulchritudo consurgit. Est autem considerandum quod, quantum ad homines, ad hoc quod aliquis adipiscatur statum libertatis vel servitutis, requiritur, primo quidem, aliqua obligatio vel absolutio. Non enim ex hoc quod aliquis servit alicui, efficitur servus, quia etiam liberi serviunt secundum illud Galat. V, per caritatem spiritus servite invicem. Neque etiam ex hoc quod aliquis desinit servire, efficitur liber, sicut patet de servis fugitivis. Sed ille proprie est servus qui obligatur ad serviendum, et ille est liber qui a servitute absolvitur. Secundo requiritur quod obligatio praedicta cum aliqua solemnitate fiat, sicut et ceteris quae inter homines obtinent perpetuam firmitatem, quaedam solemnitas adhibetur. Sic igitur et in statu perfectionis proprie dicitur esse aliquis, non ex hoc quod habet actum dilectionis perfectae, sed ex hoc quod obligat se perpetuo, cum aliqua solemnitate, ad ea quae sunt perfectionis. Contingit etiam quod aliqui se obligant qui non servant, et aliqui implent ad quod non se obligaverunt, ut patet Matth. XXI de duobus filiis, quorum unus patri dicenti, operare in vinea, respondit nolo, postea abiit; alter autem respondens ait, eo, et non ivit. Et ideo nihil prohibet aliquos esse perfectos qui non sunt in statu perfectionis, et aliquos esse in statu perfectionis qui non sunt perfecti.

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above (A. 1). Therefore, seemingly, whoever has perfection, for this very reason has the state of perfection. On the contrary, Some are in the state of perfection, who are wholly lacking in charity and grace, for instance wicked bishops or religious. Therefore it would seem that on the other hand some have the perfection of life, who nevertheless have not the state of perfection. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 183, A. 1), state properly regards a condition of freedom or servitude. Now spiritual freedom or servitude may be considered in man in two ways: first, with respect to his internal actions; second, with respect to his external actions. And since according to 1 Kings 16:7, man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart, it follows that with regard to man’s internal disposition we consider his spiritual state in relation to the Divine judgment, while with regard to his external actions we consider man’s spiritual state in relation to the Church. It is in this latter sense that we are now speaking of states, namely insofar as the Church derives a certain beauty from the variety of states.

Now it must be observed, that so far as men are concerned, in order that any one attain to a state of freedom or servitude there is required first of all an obligation or a release. For the mere fact of serving someone does not make a man a slave, since even the free serve, according to Gal. 5:13, By charity of the spirit serve one another: nor again does the mere fact of ceasing to serve make a man free, as in the case of a runaway slave; but properly speaking a man is a slave if he be bound to serve, and a man is free if he be released from service. Second, it is required that the aforesaid obligation be imposed with a certain solemnity; even as a certain solemnity is observed in other matters which among men obtain a settlement in perpetuity. Accordingly, properly speaking, one is said to be in the state of perfection, not through having the act of perfect love, but through binding himself in perpetuity and with a certain solemnity to those things that pertain to perfection. Moreover it happens that some persons bind themselves to that which they do not keep, and some fulfill that to which they have not bound themselves, as in the case of the two sons (Matt 21:28, 30), one of whom when his father said: Work in my vineyard, answered: I will not, and afterwards . . . he went, while the other answering said: I go . . . and he went not. Wherefore nothing hinders some from being perfect without being in the state of perfection, and some in the state of perfection without being perfect. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per augmentum Reply Obj. 1: By bodily growth a man progresses in corporale aliquis proficit in his quae pertinent ad natu- things pertaining to nature, wherefore he attains to the state ram, et ideo adipiscitur naturae statum, praesertim quia of nature; especially since what is according to nature is, quod est secundum naturam, quodammodo immutabile in a way, unchangeable, inasmuch as nature is determinate est, inquantum natura determinatur ad unum. Et simi- to one thing. In like manner by inward spiritual growth a liter per augmentum spirituale interius aliquis adipisci- man reaches the state of perfection in relation to the Divine

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tur perfectionis statum quantum ad divinum iudicium. Sed quantum ad distinctiones ecclesiasticorum statuum, non adipiscitur aliquis statum perfectionis nisi per augmentum in his quae exterius aguntur. Ad secundum dicendum quod illa etiam ratio procedit quantum ad interiorem statum. Et tamen, cum aliquis transit de peccato ad gratiam, transit de servitute ad libertatem, quod non contingit per simplicem profectum gratiae, nisi cum aliquis se obligat ad ea quae sunt gratiae. Ad tertium dicendum quod illa etiam ratio procedit quantum ad interiorem statum. Et tamen, licet caritas variet conditionem spiritualis servitutis et libertatis, hoc tamen non facit caritatis augmentum.

Q. 184, A. 5

judgment. But as regards the distinctions of ecclesiastical states, a man does not reach the state of perfection except by growth in respect of external actions. Reply Obj. 2: This argument also regards the interior state. Yet when a man passes from sin to grace, he passes from servitude to freedom; and this does not result from a mere progress in grace, except when a man binds himself to things pertaining to grace. Reply Obj. 3: Again this argument considers the interior state. Nevertheless, although charity causes the change of condition from spiritual servitude to spiritual freedom, an increase of charity has not the same effect.

Article 5 Whether religious and prelates are in the state of perfection? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praelati et religiosi non sint in statu perfectionis. Status enim perfectionis distinguitur contra statum incipientium et proficientium. Sed non sunt aliqua genera hominum deputata specialiter statui proficientium vel incipientium. Ergo videtur quod nec etiam debeant esse aliqua genera hominum deputata statui perfectionis. Praeterea, status exterior debet interiori statui respondere, alioquin incurritur mendacium, quod non solum est in falsis verbis, sed etiam in simulatis operibus, ut Ambrosius dicit, in quodam sermone. Sed multi sunt praelati vel religiosi qui non habent interiorem perfectionem caritatis. Si ergo omnes religiosi et praelati sunt in statu perfectionis, sequeretur quod quicumque eorum non sunt perfecti, sint in peccato mortali, tanquam simulatores et mendaces. Praeterea, perfectio secundum caritatem attenditur, ut supra habitum est. Sed perfectissima caritas videtur esse in martyribus, secundum illud Ioan. XV, maiorem dilectionem nemo habet quam ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis. Et super illud Heb. XII, nondum enim usque ad sanguinem etc., dicit Glossa, perfectior in hac vita dilectio nulla est ea ad quam sancti martyres pervenerunt, qui contra peccatum usque ad sanguinem certaverunt. Ergo videtur quod magis debeat attribui perfectionis status martyribus quam religiosis et episcopis. Sed contra est quod Dionysius, in V cap. Eccles. Hier., attribuit perfectionem episcopis tanquam perfectoribus. Et in VI cap. eiusdem libri, attribuit perfectionem religiosis, quos vocat monachos vel Therapeutas, idest, Deo famulantes, tanquam perfectis.

Objection 1: It would seem that prelates and religious are not in the state of perfection. For the state of perfection differs from the state of the beginners and the proficient. Now no class of men is specially assigned to the state of the proficient or of the beginners. Therefore it would seem that neither should any class of men be assigned to the state of perfection. Obj. 2: Further, the outward state should answer to the inward, else one is guilty of lying, which consists not only in false words, but also in deceitful deeds, according to Ambrose in one of his sermons (xxx de Tempore). Now there are many prelates and religious who have not the inward perfection of charity. Therefore, if all religious and prelates are in the state of perfection, it would follow that all of them that are not perfect are in mortal sin, as deceivers and liars. Obj. 3: Further, as stated above (A. 1), perfection is measured according to charity. Now the most perfect charity would seem to be in the martyrs, according to John 15:13, Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends: and a gloss on Heb. 12:4, For you have not yet resisted unto blood, says: In this life no love is more perfect than that to which the holy martyrs attained, who strove against sin even unto blood. Therefore it would seem that the state of perfection should be ascribed to the martyrs rather than to religious and bishops. On the contrary, Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) ascribes perfection to bishops as being perfecters, and (Eccl. Hier. vi) to religious (whom he calls monks or therapeutai, i.e., servants of God) as being perfected.

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Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad statum perfectionis requiritur obligatio perpetua ad ea quae sunt perfectionis, cum aliqua solemnitate. Utrumque autem horum competit et religiosis et episcopis. Religiosi enim voto se adstringunt ad hoc quod a rebus saecularibus abstineant quibus licite uti poterant, ad hoc quod liberius Deo vacent, in quo consistit perfectio praesentis vitae. Unde Dionysius dicit, VI cap. Eccles. Hier., de religiosis loquens, alii quidem Therapeutas, idest famulos, ex Dei puro servitio et famulatu, alii vero monachos ipsos nominant, ex indivisibili et singulari vita uniente ipsos, indivisibilium sanctis convolutionibus, idest contemplationibus, ad deiformem unitatem et amabilem Deo perfectionem. Horum etiam obligatio fit cum quadam solemnitate professionis et benedictionis. Unde et ibidem subdit Dionysius, propter quod, perfectam ipsis donans gratiam, sancta legislatio quadam ipsos dignata est sanctificativa invocatione. Similiter etiam et episcopi obligant se ad ea quae sunt perfectionis, pastorale assumentes officium, ad quod pertinet ut animam suam ponat pastor pro ovibus suis, sicut dicitur Ioan. X. Unde apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. ult., confessus es bonam confessionem coram multis testibus, idest in tua ordinatione, ut Glossa ibidem dicit. Adhibetur etiam quaedam solemnitas consecrationis simul cum professione praedicta, secundum illud II ad Tim. I, resuscites gratiam Dei quae est in te per impositionem manuum mearum, quod Glossa exponit de gratia episcopali. Et Dionysius dicit, V cap. Eccles. Hier., quod summus sacerdos, idest episcopus, in sua ordinatione habet eloquiorum super caput sanctissimam superpositionem, ut significetur quod ipse est participativus integre totius hierarchiae virtutis, et quod ipse non solum sit illuminativus omnium quae pertinent ad sanctas locutiones et actiones, sed quod etiam haec aliis tradat. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod inchoatio et augmentum non quaeritur propter se, sed propter perfectionem. Et ideo ad solum perfectionis statum aliqui homines cum quadam obligatione et solemnitate assumuntur. Ad secundum dicendum quod homines statum perfectionis assumunt, non quasi profitentes se esse perfectos, sed quasi profitentes se ad perfectionem tendere. Unde et apostolus dicit, ad Philipp. III, non quod iam comprehenderim, aut perfectus sim, sequor autem, si quo modo comprehendam. Et postea subdit, quicumque ergo perfecti sumus, hoc sentiamus. Unde non committit aliquis mendacium vel simulationem ex hoc quod non est perfectus qui statum perfectionis assumit, sed ex eo quod ab intentione perfectionis animum revocat. Ad tertium dicendum quod martyrium in actu perfectissimo caritatis consistit. Actus autem perfectionis non sufficit ad statum faciendum, ut dictum est.

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I answer that, As stated above (A. 4), there is required for the state of perfection a perpetual obligation to things pertaining to perfection, together with a certain solemnity. Now both these conditions are competent to religious and bishops. For religious bind themselves by vow to refrain from worldly affairs, which they might lawfully use, in order more freely to give themselves to God, wherein consists the perfection of the present life. Hence Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi), speaking of religious: Some call them therapeutai, i.e., servants, on account of their rendering pure service and homage to God; others call them monachoi, on account of the indivisible and single-minded life which by their being wrapped in, i.e., contemplating, indivisible things, unites them in a Godlike union and a perfection beloved of God. Moreover, the obligation in both cases is undertaken with a certain solemnity of profession and consecration; wherefore Dionysius adds (Eccl. Hier. vi): Hence the holy legislation in bestowing perfect grace on them accords them a hallowing invocation. In like manner bishops bind themselves to things pertaining to perfection when they take up the pastoral duty, to which it belongs that a shepherd lay down his life for his sheep, according to John 10:15. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim 6:12): Thou . . . hast confessed a good confession before many witnesses, that is to say, when he was ordained, as a gloss says on this passage. Again, a certain solemnity of consecration is employed together with the aforesaid profession, according to 2 Tim. 1:6: Stir up the grace of God which is in thee by the imposition of my hands, which the gloss ascribes to the grace of the episcopate. And Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v) that when the high priest, i.e., the bishop, is ordained, he receives on his head the most holy imposition of the sacred oracles, whereby it is signified that he is a participator in the whole and entire hierarchical power, and that not only is he the enlightener in all things pertaining to his holy discourses and actions, but that he also confers this on others. Reply Obj. 1: Beginning and increase are sought not for their own sake, but for the sake of perfection; hence it is only to the state of perfection that some are admitted under certain obligations and with solemnity. Reply Obj. 2: Those who enter the state of perfection do not profess to be perfect, but to tend to perfection. Hence the Apostle says (Phil 3:12): Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect; but I follow after, if I may by any means apprehend: and afterwards (Phil 3:15): Let us therefore as many as are perfect, be thus minded. Hence a man who takes up the state of perfection is not guilty of lying or deceit through not being perfect, but through withdrawing his mind from the intention of reaching perfection. Reply Obj. 3: Martyrdom is the most perfect act of charity. But an act of perfection does not suffice to make the state of perfection, as stated above (A. 4).

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Q. 184, A. 6

Article 6 Whether all ecclesiastical prelates are in the state of perfection? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes praelati ecclesiastici sint in statu perfectionis. Dicit enim Hieronymus, super Epist. ad Tit., olim idem presbyter qui et episcopus, et postea subdit, sicut ergo presbyteri sciunt se Ecclesiae consuetudine ei qui sibi praepositus fuerit, esse subiectos; ita episcopi noverint se magis consuetudine quam dispensationis dominicae veritate presbyteris esse maiores, et in communi debere Ecclesiam regere. Sed episcopi sunt in statu perfectionis. Ergo et presbyteri habentes curam animarum. Praeterea, sicut episcopi suscipiunt curam animarum cum consecratione, ita etiam et presbyteri curati, et etiam archidiaconi, de quibus, super illud Act. VI, considerate, fratres, viros boni testimonii septem etc., dicit Glossa, hic decernebant apostoli per Ecclesiam constitui septem diacones, qui essent sublimioris gradus, et quasi columnae proximi circa aram. Ergo videtur quod ipsi etiam sint in statu perfectionis. Praeterea, sicut episcopi obligantur ad hoc quod animam suam ponant pro ovibus suis, ita et presbyteri curati et archidiaconi. Sed hoc pertinet ad perfectionem caritatis, ut dictum est. Ergo videtur quod etiam presbyteri curati et archidiaconi sint in statu perfectionis. Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, V cap. Eccles. Hier., pontificum quidem ordo consummativus est et perfectivus; sacerdotum autem illuminativus et lucidativus; ministrantium vero purgativus et discretivus. Ex quo patet quod perfectio solis episcopis attribuitur. Respondeo dicendum quod in presbyteris et diaconibus habentibus curam animarum, duo possunt considerari, scilicet ordo, et cura. Ordo autem ipse ordinatur ad quendam actum in divinis officiis; unde supra dictum est quod distinctio ordinum sub distinctione officiorum continetur. Unde per hoc quod aliqui accipiunt sacrum ordinem, accipiunt potestatem quosdam sacros actus perficiendi, non autem obligantur ex hoc ipso ad ea quae sunt perfectionis, nisi quatenus, apud Occidentalem Ecclesiam, in susceptione sacri ordinis emittitur continentiae votum, quod est unum eorum quae ad perfectionem pertinent, ut infra dicetur. Unde patet quod ex hoc quod aliquis accipit sacrum ordinem, non ponitur simpliciter in statu perfectionis, quamvis interior perfectio ad hoc requiratur quod aliquis digne huiusmodi actus exerceat. Similiter etiam nec ex parte curae quam suscipiunt, ponuntur in statu perfectionis. Non enim obligantur ex hoc ipso vinculo perpetui voti ad hoc quod curam animarum retineant, sed possunt eam deserere, vel tran-

Objection 1: It would seem that all ecclesiastical prelates are in a state of perfection. For Jerome commenting on Titus 1:5, Ordain . . . in every city, etc. says: Formerly priest was the same as bishop, and afterwards he adds: Just as priests know that by the custom of the Church they are subject to the one who is placed over them, so too, bishops should recognize that, by custom rather than by the very ordinance of our Lord, they are above the priests, and are together the rightful governors of the Church. Now bishops are in the state of perfection. Therefore those priests also are who have the cure of souls. Obj. 2: Further, just as bishops together with their consecration receive the cure of souls, so also do parish priests and archdeacons, of whom a gloss on Acts 6:3, Brethren, look ye out . . . seven men of good reputation, says: The apostles decided here to appoint throughout the Church seven deacons, who were to be of a higher degree, and as it were the supports of that which is nearest to the altar. Therefore it would seem that these also are in the state of perfection. Obj. 3: Further, just as bishops are bound to lay down their life for their sheep, so too are parish priests and archdeacons. But this belongs to the perfection of charity, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3). Therefore it would seem that parish priests and archdeacons also are in the state of perfection. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v): The order of pontiffs is consummative and perfecting, that of the priests is illuminative and light-giving, that of the ministers is cleansing and discretive. Hence it is evident that perfection is ascribed to bishops only. I answer that, In priests and deacons having cure of souls two things may be considered, namely their order and their cure. Their order is directed to some act in the Divine offices. Wherefore it has been stated above (Q. 183, A. 3, ad 3) that the distinction of orders is comprised under the distinction of offices. Hence by receiving a certain order a man receives the power of exercising certain sacred acts, but he is not bound on this account to things pertaining to perfection, except insofar as in the Western Church the receiving of a sacred order includes the taking of a vow of continence, which is one of the things pertaining to perfection, as we shall state further on (Q. 186, A. 4). Therefore it is clear that from the fact that a man receives a sacred order a man is not placed simply in the state of perfection, although inward perfection is required in order that one exercise such acts worthily. In like manner, neither are they placed in the state of perfection on the part of the cure which they take upon themselves. For they are not bound by this very fact under the obligation of a perpetual vow to retain the cure of

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seundo ad religionem, etiam absque licentia episcopi, ut habetur in decretis, XIX Caus. qu. II; et etiam, cum licentia episcopi, potest aliquis archidiaconatum vel parochiam dimittere et simplicem praebendam accipere sine cura. Quod nullo modo liceret si esset in statu perfectionis, nemo enim mittens manum ad aratrum et aspiciens retro, aptus est regno Dei, ut dicitur Luc. IX. Episcopi autem, quia sunt in statu perfectionis, non nisi auctoritate summi pontificis, ad quem etiam pertinet in votis perpetuis dispensare, possunt episcopalem curam deserere, et ex certis causis, ut infra dicetur. Unde manifestum est quod non omnes praelati sunt in statu perfectionis, sed soli episcopi. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod de presbytero et episcopo dupliciter loqui possumus. Uno modo, quantum ad nomen. Et sic olim non distinguebantur episcopi et presbyteri. Nam episcopi dicuntur ex eo quod superintendunt, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, presbyteri autem in Graeco dicuntur quasi seniores. Unde et apostolus communiter utitur nomine presbyterorum quantum ad utrosque, cum dicit, I ad Tim. V, qui bene praesunt presbyteri, duplici honore digni habeantur. Et similiter etiam nomine episcoporum, unde dicit, Act. XX, presbyteris Ecclesiae Ephesinae loquens, attendite vobis et universo gregi, in quo vos Spiritus Sanctus posuit episcopos regere Ecclesiam Dei. Sed secundum rem, semper inter eos fuit distinctio, etiam tempore apostolorum, ut patet per Dionysium, V cap. Eccles. Hier. Et Luc. X, super illud, post haec autem designavit dominus etc., dicit Glossa, sicut in apostolis forma est episcoporum, sic in septuagintaduobus discipulis forma est presbyterorum secundi ordinis. Postmodum tamen, ad schisma vitandum, necessarium fuit ut etiam nomina distinguerentur, ut scilicet maiores dicerentur episcopi. Minores autem dicuntur presbyteri. Dicere autem presbyteros non differre ab episcopis, inter dogmata haeretica numerat Augustinus, in libro de Haeres., ubi dicit quod Aeriani dicebant presbyterum ab episcopo nulla differentia debere discerni. Ad secundum dicendum quod episcopi principaliter habent curam omnium suae dioecesis, presbyteri autem curati et archidiaconi habent aliquas subministrationes sub episcopis. Unde super illud I ad Cor. XII, alii opitulationes, alii gubernationes, dicit Glossa, opitulationes, idest, eos qui maioribus ferunt opem, ut Titus apostolo, vel archidiaconi episcopis. Gubernationes, scilicet minorum personarum praelationes, ut presbyteri sunt, qui plebi documento sunt. Et Dionysius dicit, V cap. Eccles. Hier., quod sicut universam hierarchiam videmus in Iesu terminatam, ita unamquamque in proprio divino hierarcha, idest episcopo. Et XVI, qu. I, dicitur, omnibus presbyteris et diaconibus attendendum est ut nihil absque proprii episcopi licentia agant. Ex quo patet quod ita se

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souls; but they can surrender it—either by entering religion, even without their bishop’s permission (cf. Decret. xix, qu. 2, can. Duae sunt)—or again an archdeacon may with his bishop’s permission resign his arch-deaconry or parish, and accept a simple prebend without cure, which would be nowise lawful, if he were in the state of perfection; for no man putting his hand to the plough and looking back is fit for the kingdom of God (Luke 9:62). On the other hand bishops, since they are in the state of perfection, cannot abandon the episcopal cure, save by the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff (to whom alone it belongs also to dispense from perpetual vows), and this for certain causes, as we shall state further on (Q. 185, A. 4). Wherefore it is manifest that not all prelates are in the state of perfection, but only bishops. Reply Obj. 1: We may speak of priest and bishop in two ways. First, with regard to the name: and thus formerly bishops and priests were not distinct. For bishops are so called because they watch over others, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei xix, 19); while the priests according to the Greek are elders. Hence the Apostle employs the term priests in reference to both, when he says (1 Tim 5:17): Let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor; and again he uses the term bishops in the same way, wherefore addressing the priests of the Church of Ephesus he says (Acts 20:28): Take heed to yourselves and to the whole flock, wherein the Holy Spirit hath placed you bishops, to rule the church of God. But as regards the thing signified by these terms, there was always a difference between them, even at the time of the apostles. This is clear on the authority of Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v), and of a gloss on Luke 10:1, After these things the Lord appointed, etc. which says: Just as the apostles were made bishops, so the seventy-two disciples were made priests of the second order. Subsequently, however, in order to avoid schism, it became necessary to distinguish even the terms, by calling the higher ones bishops and the lower ones priests. But to assert that priests nowise differ from bishops is reckoned by Augustine among heretical doctrines (De Haeres. liii), where he says that the Arians maintained that no distinction existed between a priest and a bishop. Reply Obj. 2: Bishops have the chief cure of the sheep of their diocese, while parish priests and archdeacons exercise an inferior ministry under the bishops. Hence a gloss on 1 Cor. 12:28, to one, helps, to another, governments, says: Helps, namely assistants to those who are in authority, as Titus was to the Apostle, or as archdeacons to the bishop; governments, namely persons of lesser authority, such as priests who have to instruct the people: and Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v) that just as we see the whole hierarchy culminating in Jesus, so each office culminates in its respective godlike hierarch or bishop. Also it is said (XVI, qu. i, can. Cunctis): Priests and deacons must all take care not to do anything without their bishop’s permission. Wherefore it is evident that they stand in relation to their bishop as wardens or

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habent ad episcopum sicut ballivi vel praepositi ad regem. Et propter hoc, sicut in mundanis potestatibus solus rex solemnem benedictionem accipit, alii vero per simplicem commissionem instituuntur; ita etiam in Ecclesia cura episcopalis cum solemnitate consecrationis committitur, cura autem archidiaconatus vel plebanatus cum simplici iniunctione. Consecrantur tamen in susceptione ordinis, etiam antequam curam habeant. Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut plebani et archidiaconi non habent principaliter curam, sed administrationem quandam secundum quod eis ab episcopo committitur; ita etiam ad eos non pertinet principaliter pastorale officium, nec obligatio ponendi animam pro ovibus, sed inquantum participant de cura. Unde magis habent quoddam officium ad perfectionem pertinens, quam obtineant perfectionis statum.

Q. 184, A. 7

mayors to the king; and for this reason, just as in earthly governments the king alone receives a solemn blessing, while others are appointed by simple commission, so too in the Church the episcopal cure is conferred with the solemnity of consecration, while the archdeacon or parish priest receives his cure by simple appointment; although they are consecrated by receiving orders before having a cure. Reply Obj. 3: As parish priests and archdeacons have not the chief cure, but a certain ministry as committed to them by the bishop, so the pastoral office does not belong to them in chief, nor are they bound to lay down their life for the sheep, except insofar as they have a share in their cure. Hence we should say that they have an office pertaining to perfection rather than that they attain the state of perfection.

Article 7 Whether the religious state is more perfect than that of prelates? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod status religiosorum sit perfectior quam status praelatorum. Dominus enim dicit, Matth. XIX, si vis perfectus esse, vade et vende omnia quae habes et da pauperibus, quod faciunt religiosi. Non autem ad hoc tenentur episcopi, dicitur enim XII, qu. I, episcopi de rebus propriis vel acquisitis, vel quidquid de proprio habent, heredibus suis derelinquant. Ergo religiosi sunt in perfectiori statu quam episcopi. Praeterea, perfectio principalius consistit in dilectione Dei quam in dilectione proximi. Sed status religiosorum directe ordinatur ad dilectionem Dei, unde et ex Dei servitio et famulatu nominantur, ut Dionysius dicit, VI cap. Eccles. Hier. Status autem episcoporum videtur ordinari ad dilectionem proximi, cuius curae superintendunt, unde et nominantur, ut patet per Augustinum, XIX de Civ. Dei. Ergo videtur quod status religiosorum sit perfectior quam status episcoporum. Praeterea, status religiosorum ordinatur ad vitam contemplativam, quae potior est quam vita activa, ad quam ordinatur status episcoporum, dicit enim Gregorius, in Pastoral., quod per activam vitam prodesse proximis cupiens Isaias officium praedicationis appetiit, per contemplationem vero Ieremias, amori conditoris sedulo inhaerere desiderans, ne mitti ad praedicandum debeat, contradicit. Ergo videtur quod status religiosorum sit perfectior quam status episcoporum. Sed contra, nulli licet a maiori statu ad minorem transire, hoc enim esset retro aspicere. Sed potest aliquis a statu religionis transire ad statum episcopalem, dici-

Objection 1: It would seem that the religious state is more perfect than that of prelates. For our Lord said (Matt 19:21): If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell all thou hast, and give to the poor; and religious do this. But bishops are not bound to do so; for it is said (XII, qu. i, can. Episcopi de rebus): Bishops, if they wish, may bequeath to their heirs their personal or acquired property, and whatever belongs to them personally. Therefore religious are in a more perfect state than bishops. Obj. 2: Further, perfection consists more especially in the love of God than in the love of our neighbor. Now the religious state is directly ordered to the love of God, wherefore it takes its name from service and homage to God, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi); whereas the bishop’s state would seem to be ordered to the love of our neighbor, of whose cure he is the warden, and from this he takes his name, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei. xix, 19). Therefore it would seem that the religious state is more perfect than that of bishops. Obj. 3: Further, the religious state is directed to the contemplative life, which is more excellent than the active life to which the episcopal state is directed. For Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7) that Isaias wishing to be of profit to his neighbor by means of the active life desired the office of preaching, whereas Jeremias, who was fain to hold fast to the love of his Creator, exclaimed against being sent to preach. Therefore it would seem that the religious state is more perfect than the episcopal state. On the contrary, It is not lawful for anyone to pass from a more excellent to a less excellent state; for this would be to look back. Yet a man may pass from the religious to

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tur enim XVIII, qu. I, quod sacra ordinatio de monacho episcopum facit. Ergo status episcoporum est perfectior quam religiosorum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., semper agens praestantius est patiente. In genere autem perfectionis, episcopi, secundum Dionysium, se habent ut perfectores, religiosi autem ut perfecti, quorum unum pertinet ad actionem, alterum autem ad passionem. Unde manifestum est quod status perfectionis potius est in episcopis quam in religiosis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod abrenuntiatio propriarum facultatum dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, secundum quod est in actu. Et sic in ea non consistit essentialiter perfectio, sed est quoddam perfectionis instrumentum, sicut supra dictum est. Et ideo nihil prohibet statum perfectionis esse sine abrenuntiatione propriorum. Sic etiam dicendum est de aliis exterioribus observantiis. Alio modo potest considerari secundum praeparationem animi, ut scilicet homo sit paratus, si opus fuerit, omnia dimittere vel distribuere. Et hoc pertinet directe ad perfectionem. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de quaest. Evang., ostendit dominus filios sapientiae intelligere non in abstinendo nec in manducando esse iustitiam, sed in aequanimitate tolerandi inopiam. Unde et apostolus dicit, scio abundare et penuriam pati. Ad hoc autem maxime tenentur episcopi, quod omnia sua pro honore Dei et salute sui gregis contemnant, cum opus fuerit, vel pauperibus sui gregis largiendo, vel rapinam bonorum suorum cum gaudio sustinendo. Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod episcopi intendunt his quae pertinent ad proximorum dilectionem, provenit ex abundantia dilectionis divinae. Unde dominus primo a Petro quaesivit an eum diligeret, et postea ei gregis curam commisit. Et Gregorius dicit, in Pastoral., si dilectionis est testimonium cura pastoris, quisquis, virtutibus pollens, gregem Dei renuit pascere, pastorem summum convincitur non amare. Hoc autem est maioris dilectionis signum, ut homo propter amicum etiam alii serviat, quam etiam si soli amico velit servire. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Gregorius dicit, in Pastoral., sit praesul actione praecipuus, prae cunctis contemplatione suspensus, quia ad ipsos pertinet non solum propter seipsos, sed etiam propter instructionem aliorum contemplari. Unde Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod de perfectis viris post contemplationem suam redeuntibus dicitur, memoriam suavitatis tuae eructabunt.

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the episcopal state, for it is said (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that the holy ordination makes a monk to be a bishop. Therefore the episcopal state is more perfect than the religious. I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 16), the agent is ever more excellent than the patient. Now in the genus of perfection according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v, vi), bishops are in the position of perfecters, whereas religious are in the position of being perfected; the former of which pertains to action, and the latter to passion. Whence it is evident that the state of perfection is more excellent in bishops than in religious. Reply Obj. 1: Renunciation of one’s possessions may be considered in two ways. First, as being actual: and thus it is not essential, but a means, to perfection, as stated above (A. 3). Hence nothing hinders the state of perfection from being without renunciation of one’s possessions, and the same applies to other outward practices. Second, it may be considered in relation to one’s preparedness, in the sense of being prepared to renounce or give away all: and this belongs directly to perfection. Hence Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 11): Our Lord shows that the children of wisdom understand righteousness to consist neither in eating nor in abstaining, but in bearing want patiently. Wherefore the Apostle says (Phil 4:12): I know . . . both to abound and to suffer need. Now bishops especially are bound to despise all things for the honor of God and the spiritual welfare of their flock, when it is necessary for them to do so, either by giving to the poor of their flock, or by suffering with joy the being stripped of their own goods. Reply Obj. 2: That bishops are busy about things pertaining to the love of their neighbor, arises out of the abundance of their love of God. Hence our Lord asked Peter first of all whether he loved Him, and afterwards committed the care of His flock to him. And Gregory says (Pastor. i, 5): If the pastoral care is a proof of love, he who refuses to feed God’s flock, though having the means to do so, is convicted of not loving the supreme Pastor. And it is a sign of greater love if a man devotes himself to others for his friend’s sake, than if he be willing only to serve his friend. Reply Obj. 3: As Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 1), A prelate should be foremost in action, and more uplifted than others in contemplation, because it is incumbent on him to contemplate, not only for his own sake, but also for the purpose of instructing others. Hence Gregory applies (Hom. v in Ezech.) the words of Ps. 144:7, They shall publish the memory . . . of Thy sweetness, to perfect men returning after their contemplation.

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State of Perfection in General

Q. 184, A. 8

Article 8 Whether parish priests and archdeacons are more perfect than religious? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod etiam presbyteri curati et archidiaconi sint maioris perfectionis quam religiosi. Dicit enim Chrysostomus, in suo dialogo, si talem mihi aliquem adducas monachum qualis, ut secundum exaggerationem dicam, Elias fuit, non tamen illi comparandus est qui, traditus populis et multorum peccata ferre compulsus, immobilis perseverat et fortis. Et parum post dicit, si quis mihi proponeret optionem ubi mallem placere, in officio sacerdotali an in solitudine monachorum, sine comparatione eligerem illud quod prius dixi. Et in eodem libro dicit, si quis bene administrato sacerdotio illius propositi, scilicet monachalis, sudores conferat, tantum eos distare reperiet quantum inter privatum distat et regem. Ergo videtur quod sacerdotes habentes curam animarum sint perfectiores religiosis. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Valerium, cogitet religiosa prudentia tua nihil esse in hac vita, maxime hoc tempore, difficilius, laboriosius, periculosius episcopi aut presbyteri aut diaconi officio, sed apud Deum nihil beatius, si eo modo militetur quo noster imperator iubet. Non ergo religiosi sunt perfectiores presbyteris aut diaconibus. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, ad Aurelium, nimis dolendum est, si ad tam ruinosam superbiam monachos subrigimus, et tam gravi contumelia clericos dignos putamus, ut scilicet dicatur quod malus monachus bonus clericus est, cum aliquando bonus etiam monachus vix bonum clericum faciat. Et paulo ante praemittit, non esse viam dandam servis Dei, idest monachis, ut se facilius putent eligi ad aliquid melius, scilicet clericatum, si facti fuerint deteriores, scilicet abiecto monachatu. Ergo videtur quod illi qui sunt in statu clericali, sint perfectiores religiosis. Praeterea, non licet de statu maiori ad minorem transire. Sed de statu monastico transire licet ad officium presbyteri curam habentis, ut patet XVI, qu. I, ex decreto Gelasii Papae, qui dicit, si quis monachus fuerit qui, venerabilis vitae merito, sacerdotio dignus praevideatur; et abbas sub cuius imperio regi Christo militat, illum fieri presbyterum petierit, ab episcopo debet eligi, et in loco quo iudicaverit ordinari. Et Hieronymus dicit, ad rusticum monachum, sic vive in monasterio ut clericus esse merearis. Ergo presbyteri curati et archidiaconi sunt perfectiores religiosis.

Objection 1: It would seem that also parish priests and archdeacons are more perfect than religious. For Chrysostom says in his Dialogue (De Sacerdot. vi): Take for example a monk, such as Elias, if I may exaggerate somewhat, he is not to be compared with one who, cast among the people and compelled to carry the sins of many, remains firm and strong. A little further on he says: If I were given the choice, where would I prefer to please, in the priestly office, or in the monastic solitude, without hesitation I should choose the former. Again in the same book (ch. 5) he says: If you compare the toils of this project, namely of the monastic life, with a well-employed priesthood, you will find them as far distant from one another as a common citizen is from a king. Therefore it would seem that priests who have the cure of souls are more perfect than religious. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (ad Valerium, Ep. xxi): Let thy religious prudence observe that in this life, and especially at these times, there is nothing so difficult, so onerous, so perilous as the office of bishop, priest, or deacon; while in God’s sight there is no greater blessing, if one engage in the fight as ordered by our Commander-in-chief. Therefore religious are not more perfect than priests or deacons. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Ep. lx, ad Aurel.): It would be most regrettable, were we to exalt monks to such a disastrous degree of pride, and deem the clergy deserving of such a grievous insult, as to assert that ‘a bad monk is a good cleric,’ since sometimes even a good monk makes a bad cleric. And a little before this he says that God’s servants, i.e., monks, must not be allowed to think that they may easily be chosen for something better, namely the clerical state, if they should become worse thereby, namely by leaving the monastic state. Therefore it would seem that those who are in the clerical state are more perfect than religious. Obj. 4: Further, it is not lawful to pass from a more perfect to a less perfect state. Yet it is lawful to pass from the monastic state to a priestly office with a cure attached, as appears (XVI, qu. i, can. Si quis monachus) from a decree of Pope Gelasius, who says: If there be a monk, who by the merit of his exemplary life is worthy of the priesthood, and the abbot under whose authority he fights for Christ his King, ask that he be made a priest, the bishop shall take him and ordain him in such place as he shall choose fitting. And Jerome says (Ad Rustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): In the monastery so live as to deserve to be a clerk. Therefore parish priests and archdeacons are more perfect than religious. Praeterea, episcopi sunt in statu perfectiori quam Obj. 5: Further, bishops are in a more perfect state than religiosi, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed presbyteri curati et religious, as shown above (A. 7). But parish priests and archidiaconi, ex eo quod habent curam animarum, si- archdeacons, through having cure of souls, are more like miliores sunt episcopis quam religiosi. Ergo sunt maioris bishops than religious are. Therefore they are more perfect.

perfectionis.

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Q. 184, A. 8

Gratuitous Graces

Praeterea, virtus consistit circa difficile et bonum, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed difficilius est quod aliquis bene vivat in officio presbyteri curati vel archidiaconi quam in statu religionis. Ergo presbyteri curati vel archidiaconi sunt perfectioris virtutis quam religiosi. Sed contra est quod dicitur XIX, qu. II, cap. duae, si quis in Ecclesia sua sub episcopo populum retinet et saeculariter vivit, si, afflatus spiritu sancto, in aliquo monasterio vel regulari canonica salvari se voluerit, quia lege privata ducitur, nulla ratio exigit ut publica constringatur. Sed non ducitur aliquis a lege spiritus sancti, quae ibi dicitur lex privata, nisi in aliquid perfectius. Ergo videtur quod religiosi sint perfectiores quam archidiaconi vel presbyteri curati. Respondeo dicendum quod comparatio supereminentiae non habet locum inter aliquos ex ea parte in qua conveniunt, sed ex ea parte in qua differunt. In presbyteris autem curatis et archidiaconis tria est considerare, scilicet statum, ordinem et officium. Ad statum pertinet quod saeculares sunt; ad ordinem, quod sunt sacerdotes vel diaconi; ad officium, quod curam animarum habent sibi commissam. Si igitur ex alia parte ponamus statu religiosum, ordine diaconum vel sacerdotem, officio curam animarum habentem, sicut plerique monachi et canonici regulares habent, in primo quidem excellit, in aliis autem par erit. Si autem differat secundus a primo statu et officio, conveniat autem ordine, sicut sunt religiosi sacerdotes et diaconi curam animarum non habentes, manifestum est quod secundus primo erit statu quidem excellentior officio autem minor, ordine vero aequalis. Est ergo considerandum quae praeeminentia potior sit, utrum status, vel officii. Circa quod duo attendenda videntur, scilicet bonitas et difficultas. Si ergo fiat comparatio secundum bonitatem, sic praefertur status religionis officio presbyteri curati vel archidiaconi, quia religiosus totam vitam suam obligat ad perfectionis studium; presbyter autem curatus vel archidiaconus non obligat totam vitam suam ad curam animarum, sicut episcopus; nec etiam ei competit principalem curam subditorum habere, sicut episcopis; sed quaedam particularia circa curam animarum eorum officio committuntur, ut ex dictis patet. Et ideo comparatio status religionis ad eorum officium est sicut universalis ad particulare, et sicut holocausti ad sacrificium, quod est minus holocausto, ut patet per Gregorium, super Ezech. Unde et XIX, qu. I, dicitur, clericis qui monachorum propositum appetunt, quia meliorem vitam sequi cupiunt, liberos eis ab episcopo in monasteriis oportet largiri ingressus. Sed haec comparatio intelligenda est secundum genus operis. Nam secundum caritatem operantis, contin-

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Obj. 6: Further, virtue is concerned with the difficult and the good (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is more difficult to lead a good life in the office of parish priest or archdeacon than in the religious state. Therefore parish priests and archdeacons have more perfect virtue than religious. On the contrary, It is stated (XIX, qu. ii, cap. Duae): If a man while governing the people in his church under the bishop and leading a secular life is inspired by the Holy Spirit to desire to work out his salvation in a monastery or under some canonical rule, since he is led by a private law, there is no reason why he should be constrained by a public law. Now a man is not led by the law of the Holy Spirit, which is here called a private law, except to something more perfect. Therefore it would seem that religious are more perfect than archdeacons or parish priests. I answer that, When we compare things in the point of supereminence, we look not at that in which they agree, but at that wherein they differ. Now in parish priests and archdeacons three things may be considered, their state, their order, and their office. It belongs to their state that they are seculars, to their order that they are priests or deacons, to their office that they have the cure of souls committed to them. Accordingly, if we compare these with one who is a religious by state, a deacon or priest by order, having the cure of souls by office, as many monks and canons regular have, this one will excel in the first point, and in the other points he will be equal. But if the latter differ from the former in state and office, but agree in order, such as religious priests and deacons not having the cure of souls, it is evident that the latter will be more excellent than the former in state, less excellent in office, and equal in order. We must therefore consider which is the greater, preeminence of state or of office; and here, seemingly, we should take note of two things, goodness and difficulty. Accordingly, if we make the comparison with a view to goodness, the religious state surpasses the office of parish priest or archdeacon, because a religious pledges his whole life to the quest of perfection, whereas the parish priest or archdeacon does not pledge his whole life to the cure of souls, as a bishop does, nor is it competent to him, as it is to a bishop, to exercise the cure of souls in chief, but only in certain particulars regarding the cure of souls committed to his charge, as stated above (A. 6, ad 2). Wherefore the comparison of their religious state with their office is like the comparisons of the universal with the particular, and of a holocaust with a sacrifice which is less than a holocaust according to Gregory (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Hence it is said (XIX, qu. i, can. Clerici qui monachorum): Clerics who wish to take the monastic vows through being desirous of a better life must be allowed by their bishops the free entrance into the monastery. This comparison, however, must be considered as regarding the genus of the deed; for as regards the charity of

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State of Perfection in General

Q. 184, A. 8

git quandoque quod opus ex genere suo minus existens, the doer it happens sometimes that a deed which is of less magis est meritorium, si ex maiori caritate fiat. account in its genus is of greater merit if it be done out of greater charity. Si vero attendatur difficultas bene conversandi in reOn the other hand, if we consider the difficulty of leadligione, et in officio habentis curam animarum, sic dif- ing a good life in religion, and in the office of one having ficilius est bene conversari cum cura animarum, prop- the cure of souls, in this way it is more difficult to lead a ter exteriora pericula, quamvis conversatio religionis sit good life together with the exercise of the cure of souls, difficilior quantum ad ipsum genus operis, propter arcti- on account of outward dangers: although the religious life tudinem observantiae regularis. Si vero religiosus etiam is more difficult as regards the genus of the deed, by reaordine careat, sicut patet de conversis religionum, sic son of the strictness of religious observance. If, however, manifestum est excellere praeeminentiam ordinis quan- the religious is also without orders, as in the case of relitum ad dignitatem, quia per sacrum ordinem aliquis gious lay brethren, then it is evident that the pre-eminence deputatur ad dignissima ministeria, quibus ipsi Christo of order excels in the point of dignity, since by holy orders servitur in sacramento altaris, ad quod requiritur maior a man is appointed to the most august ministry of serving sanctitas interior quam requirat etiam religionis status; Christ Himself in the sacrament of the altar. For this requia, sicut Dionysius dicit, VI cap. Eccles. Hier., mona- quires a greater inward holiness than that which is requisite sticus ordo debet sequi sacerdotales ordines, et ad eorum for the religious state, since as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. imitationem in divina ascendere. Unde gravius peccat, vi) the monastic order must follow the priestly orders, and ceteris paribus, clericus in sacris ordinibus constitutus, ascend to Divine things in imitation of them. Hence, other si aliquid contrarium sanctitati agat, quam aliquis reli- things being equal, a cleric who is in holy orders, sins more giosus qui non habet ordinem sacrum, quamvis laicus grievously if he do something contrary to holiness than a religiosus teneatur ad observantias regulares, ad quas illi religious who is not in holy orders: although a religious who qui sunt in sacris ordinibus non tenentur. is not in orders is bound to regular observance to which persons in holy orders are not bound. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad illas auctoriReply Obj. 1: We might answer briefly these quotatates Chrysostomi breviter responderi posset quod non tions from Chrysostom by saying that he speaks not of a loquitur de sacerdote curato minoris ordinis, sed de epi- priest of lesser order who has the cure of souls, but of a scopo, qui dicitur summus sacerdos. Et hoc convenit in- bishop, who is called a high-priest; and this agrees with the tentioni illius libri, in quo consolatur se et Basilium de purpose of that book wherein he consoles himself and Basil hoc quod erant in episcopos electi. Sed hoc praetermis- in that they were chosen to be bishops. We may, however, so, dicendum est quod loquitur quantum ad difficulta- pass this over and reply that he speaks in view of the diffitem. Praemittit enim, cum fuerit gubernator in mediis culty. For he had already said: When the pilot is surrounded fluctibus et de tempestate navem liberare potuerit, tunc by the stormy sea and is able to bring the ship safely out of the merito testimonium perfecti gubernatoris ab omnibus pro- tempest, then he deserves to be acknowledged by all as a permeretur. Et post concludit quod supra positum est de fect pilot; and afterwards he concludes, as quoted, with remonacho, qui non est comparandus illi qui, traditus po- gard to the monk, who is not to be compared with one who, pulis, immobilis perseverat, et subdit causam, quia sicut cast among the people . . . remains firm; and he gives the reain tranquillitate, ita in tempestate gubernavit seipsum. son why, because both in the calm and in the storm he piEx quo nihil aliud ostendi potest nisi quod periculo- loted himself to safety. This proves nothing more than that sior est status habentis curam animarum quam mona- the state of one who has the cure of souls is fraught with chi, in maiori autem periculo innocentem se servare est more danger than the monastic state; and to keep oneself maioris virtutis indicium. Sed hoc etiam ad magnitudi- innocent in face of a greater peril is proof of greater virtue. nem virtutis pertinet, quod aliquis vitet pericula religio- On the other hand, it also indicates greatness of virtue if a nem intrando. Unde non dicit quod mallet esse in officio man avoid dangers by entering religion; hence he does not sacerdotali quam in solitudine monachorum, sed quod say that he would prefer the priestly office to the monastic mallet placere in hoc quam in illo, quia hoc est maioris solitude, but that he would rather please in the former than virtutis argumentum. in the latter, since this is a proof of greater virtue. Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam illa auctoriReply Obj. 2: This passage quoted from Augustine also tas Augustini manifeste loquitur quantum ad difficulta- clearly refers to the question of difficulty which proves the tem, quae ostendit magnitudinem virtutis in his qui bene greatness of virtue in those who lead a good life, as stated conversantur, sicut dictum est. above (ad 1). Ad tertium dicendum quod Augustinus ibi comReply Obj. 3: Augustine there compares monks with parat monachos clericis quantum ad distantiam ordinis, clerics as regards the pre-eminence of order, not as regards non quantum ad distantiam religionis et saecularis vitae. the distinction between religious and secular life.

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Q. 184, A. 8

Gratuitous Graces

Ad quartum dicendum quod illi qui a statu religionis assumuntur ad curam animarum, cum prius essent in sacris ordinibus constituti assequuntur aliquid quod prius non habebant, scilicet officium curae, non autem deponunt quod prius habebant, scilicet religionis statum; dicitur enim in decretis, XVI causa, qu. I, de monachis qui, diu morantes in monasteriis, si postea ad clericatus ordines pervenerint, statuimus non debere eos a priori proposito discedere. Sed presbyteri curati vel archidiaconi, quando religionem ingrediuntur, curam deponunt ut adipiscantur perfectionem status. Unde ex hoc ipso excellentia ex parte religionis ostenditur. In hoc autem quod religiosi laici assumuntur ad clericatum et sacros ordines, manifeste promoventur ad melius, sicut supra dictum est. Et hoc ostenditur ex ipso modo loquendi, cum Hieronymus dicit, sic in monasterio vive ut clericus esse merearis.

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Reply Obj. 4: Those who are taken from the religious state to receive the cure of souls, being already in sacred orders, attain to something they had not hitherto, namely the office of the cure, yet they do not put aside what they had already. For it is said in the Decretals (XVI, qu. i, can. De Monachis): With regard to those monks who after long residence in a monastery attain to the order of clerics, we bid them not to lay aside their former purpose.

On the other hand, parish priests and archdeacons, when they enter religion, resign their cure, in order to enter the state of perfection. This very fact shows the excellence of the religious life. When religious who are not in orders are admitted to the clerical state and to the sacred orders, they are clearly promoted to something better, as stated; this is indicated by the very way in which Jerome expresses himself: So live in the monastery as to deserve to be a clerk. Ad quintum dicendum quod presbyteri curati et Reply Obj. 5: Parish priests and archdeacons are more archidiaconi sunt similiores episcopis quam religiosi like bishops than religious are, in a certain respect, namely quantum ad aliquid, scilicet quantum ad curam anima- as regards the cure of souls which they have subordinately; rum, quam secundario habent. Sed quantum ad perpe- but as regards the obligation in perpetuity, religious are tuam obligationem, quae requiritur ad statum perfectio- more like a bishop, as appears from what we have said nis, similiores sunt episcopo religiosi, ut ex supra dictis above (AA. 5, 6).

patet. Ad sextum dicendum quod difficultas quae est ex arduitate operis, addit ad perfectionem virtutis. Difficultas autem quae provenit ex exterioribus impedimentis, quandoque quidem diminuit perfectionem virtutis, puta cum aliquis non tantum virtutem amat ut impedimenta virtutis declinare velit, secundum illud apostoli, I ad Cor. IX, omnis qui in agone contendit, ab omnibus se abstinet. Quandoque vero est signum perfectionis virtutis, puta cum alicui ex inopinato vel ex necessaria causa impedimenta virtutis occurrunt, propter quae tamen a virtute non declinat. In statu autem religionis est maior difficultas ex arduitate operum, sed in his qui in saeculo vivunt qualitercumque, est maior difficultas ex impedimentis virtutis, quae religiosi provide vitaverunt.

Reply Obj. 6: The difficulty that arises from the arduousness of the deed adds to the perfection of virtue; but the difficulty that results from outward obstacles sometimes lessens the perfection of virtue—for instance, when a man loves not virtue so much as to wish to avoid the obstacles to virtue, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor 9:25), Everyone that striveth for the mastery refraineth himself from all things: and sometimes it is a sign of perfect virtue—for instance, when a man forsakes not virtue, although he is hindered in the practice of virtue unawares or by some unavoidable cause. In the religious state there is greater difficulty arising from the arduousness of deeds; whereas for those who in any way at all live in the world, there is greater difficulty resulting from obstacles to virtue, which obstacles the religious has had the foresight to avoid.

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Question 185 Things Pertaining to the Episcopal State Deinde considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad We must now consider things pertaining to the episcostatum episcoporum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. pal state. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum liceat episcopatum appetere. (1) Whether it is lawful to desire the office of a bishop? Secundo, utrum liceat episcopatum finaliter (2) Whether it is lawful to refuse the office of bishop recusare. definitively? Tertio, utrum oporteat ad episcopatum eligere (3) Whether the better man should be chosen for the meliorem. episcopal office? Quarto, utrum episcopus possit ad religionem (4) Whether a bishop may pass over to the religious transire. state? Quinto, utrum liceat ei corporaliter suos subditos (5) Whether he may lawfully abandon his subjects in a deserere. bodily manner? Sexto, utrum possit habere proprium. (6) Whether he can have anything of his own? Septimo, utrum peccet mortaliter bona ecclesiastica (7) Whether he sins mortally by not distributing pauperibus non erogando. ecclesiastical goods to the poor? Octavo, utrum religiosi qui ad episcopatum (8) Whether religious who are appointed to the assumuntur, teneantur ad observantias regulares. episcopal office are bound to religious observances?

Article 1 Whether it is lawful to desire the office of a bishop? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod liceat episcopatum appetere. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Tim. III, qui episcopatum desiderat, bonum opus desiderat. Sed licitum et laudabile est bonum opus desiderare. Ergo etiam laudabile est desiderare episcopatum. Praeterea, status episcoporum est perfectior quam status religiosorum, ut supra habitum est. Sed laudabile est quod aliquis desideret ad statum religionis transire. Ergo etiam laudabile est quod aliquis appetat ad episcopatum promoveri. Praeterea, Prov. XI dicitur, qui abscondit frumenta, maledicetur in populis, benedictio autem super caput vendentium. Sed ille qui est idoneus et vita et scientia ad episcopatum, videtur frumenta spiritualia abscondere si se ab episcopatu subtrahat, per hoc autem quod episcopatum accipit, ponitur in statu frumenta spiritualia dispensandi. Ergo videtur quod laudabile sit episcopatum appetere, et vituperabile ipsum refugere. Praeterea, facta sanctorum quae in Scriptura narrantur, proponuntur nobis in exemplum, secundum illud Rom. XV, quaecumque scripta sunt, ad nostram doctrinam scripta sunt. Sed legitur Isaiae VI, quod Isaias se obtulit ad officium praedicationis, quae praecipue com-

Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to desire the office of a bishop. For the Apostle says (1 Tim 3:1): He that desires the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work. Now it is lawful and praiseworthy to desire a good work. Therefore it is even praiseworthy to desire the office of a bishop. Obj. 2: Further, the episcopal state is more perfect than the religious, as we have said above (Q. 184, A. 7). But it is praiseworthy to desire to enter the religious state. Therefore it is also praiseworthy to desire promotion to the episcopal state. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov 11:26): He that hideth up corn shall be cursed among the people; but a blessing upon the head of them that sell. Now a man who is apt, both in manner of life and by knowledge, for the episcopal office, would seem to hide up the spiritual corn, if he shun the episcopal state, whereas by accepting the episcopal office he enters the state of a dispenser of spiritual corn. Therefore it would seem praiseworthy to desire the office of a bishop, and blameworthy to refuse it. Obj. 4: Further, the deeds of the saints related in Holy Writ are set before us as an example, according to Rom. 15:4, What things soever were written, were written for our learning. Now we read (Isa 6:8) that Isaias offered himself for the office of preacher, which belongs chiefly to bish-

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Q. 185, A. 1

Gratuitous Graces

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petit episcopis. Ergo videtur quod appetere episcopatum sit laudabile. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, locus superior, sine quo populus regi non potest, etsi administretur ut decet, tamen indecenter appetitur. Respondeo dicendum quod in episcopatu tria possunt considerari. Quorum unum est principale et finale, scilicet episcopalis operatio, per quam utilitati proximorum intendit, secundum illud Ioan. ult., pasce oves meas. Aliud autem est altitudo gradus, quia episcopus super alios constituitur, secundum illud Matth. XXIV, fidelis servus et prudens, quem constituit dominus super familiam suam. Tertium autem est quod consequenter se habet ad ista, scilicet reverentia et honor, et sufficientia temporalium, secundum illud I ad Tim. V, qui bene praesunt presbyteri, duplici honore digni habeantur. Appetere igitur episcopatum ratione huiusmodi circumstantium bonorum, manifestum est quod est illicitum, et pertinet ad cupiditatem vel ambitionem. Unde contra Pharisaeos dominus dicit, Matth. XXIII, amant primos accubitus in cenis et primas cathedras in synagogis, salutationes in foro, et vocari ab hominibus, Rabbi. Quantum autem ad secundum, scilicet ad celsitudinem gradus, appetere episcopatum est praesumptuosum. Unde dominus, Matth. XX, arguit discipulos primatum quaerentes, dicens, scitis quia principes gentium dominantur eorum, ubi Chrysostomus dicit quod per hoc ostendit quod gentile est primatus cupere; et sic gentium comparatione eorum animam aestuantem convertit. Sed appetere proximis prodesse est secundum se laudabile et virtuosum. Verum quia, prout est episcopalis actus, habet annexam gradus celsitudinem, praesumptuosum videtur quod aliquis praeesse appetat ad hoc quod subditis prosit, nisi manifesta necessitate imminente, sicut Gregorius dicit, in Pastoral., quod tunc laudabile erat episcopatum quaerere, quando per hunc quemque dubium non erat ad supplicia graviora pervenire, unde non de facili inveniebatur qui hoc onus assumeret; praesertim cum aliquis caritatis zelo divinitus ad hoc incitatur, sicut Gregorius dicit, in Pastoral., quod Isaias, prodesse proximis cupiens, laudabiliter officium praedicationis appetiit.

ops. Therefore it would seem praiseworthy to desire the office of a bishop. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): The higher place, without which the people cannot be ruled, though it be filled becomingly, is unbecomingly desired. I answer that, Three things may be considered in the episcopal office. One is principal and final, namely the bishop’s work, whereby the good of our neighbor is intended, according to John 21:17, Feed My sheep. Another thing is the height of degree, for a bishop is placed above others, according to Matt. 24:45, A faithful and a wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family. The third is something resulting from these, namely reverence, honor, and a sufficiency of temporalities, according to 1 Tim. 5:17, Let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor. Accordingly, to desire the episcopal office on account of these incidental goods is manifestly unlawful, and pertains to covetousness or ambition. Wherefore our Lord said against the Pharisees (Matt 23:6, 7): They love the first places at feasts, and the first chairs in the synagogues, and salutations in the market-place, and to be called by men, Rabbi. As regards the second, namely the height of degree, it is presumptuous to desire the episcopal office. Hence our Lord reproved His disciples for seeking precedence, by saying to them (Matt 20:25): You know that the princes of the gentiles lord it over them. Here Chrysostom says (Hom. lxv in Matth.) that in these words He points out that it is heathenish to seek precedence; and thus by comparing them to the gentiles He converted their impetuous soul. On the other hand, to desire to do good to one’s neighbor is in itself praiseworthy, and virtuous. Nevertheless, since considered as an episcopal act it has the height of degree attached to it, it would seem that, unless there be manifest and urgent reason for it, it would be presumptuous for any man to desire to be set over others in order to do them good. Thus Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8) that it was praiseworthy to seek the office of a bishop when it was certain to bring one into graver dangers. Wherefore it was not easy to find a person to accept this burden, especially seeing that it is through the zeal of charity that one divinely instigated to do so, according to Gregory, who says (Pastor. i, 7) that Isaias, being desirous of profiting his neighbor, commendably desired the office of preacher. Potest tamen absque praesumptione quilibet appeteNevertheless, anyone may, without presumption, desire re talia opera facere, si eum contingeret in tali officio es- to do such like works if he should happen to be in that ofse; vel etiam se esse dignum ad talia opera exequenda, ita fice, or to be worthy of doing them; so that the object of his quod opus bonum cadat sub desiderio, non autem pri- desire is the good work and not the precedence in dignity. matus dignitatis. Unde Chrysostomus dicit, super Mat- Hence Chrysostom says: It is indeed good to desire a good th., opus quidem desiderare bonum, bonum est, primatum work, but to desire the primacy of honor is vanity. For priautem honoris concupiscere vanitas est. Primatus enim fu- macy seeks one that shuns it, and abhors one that desires it.

gientem se desiderat, desiderantem se horret. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Gregorius Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8), When the dicit, in Pastoral., illo tempore hoc dixit apostolus quo il- Apostle said this he who was set over the people was the first le qui plebibus praeerat, primus ad martyrii tormenta du- to be dragged to the torments of martyrdom, so that there

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cebatur, et sic nihil aliud erat quod in episcopatu appeti posset nisi bonum opus. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod apostolus dicens, qui episcopatum desiderat, bonum opus desiderat, exponere voluit quid sit episcopatus, quia nomen operis est, non honoris. Scopos quidem intentio est. Ergo episcopein, si velimus Latine superintendere possumus dicere, ut intelligat non se esse episcopum qui praeesse dilexerit, non prodesse. In actione enim, ut parum ante praemittit, non amandus est honor in hac vita sive potentia, quoniam omnia vana sunt sub sole, sed opus ipsum quod per eundem honorem vel potentiam fit. Et tamen, ut Gregorius dicit, in Pastoral., laudans desiderium, scilicet boni operis, in pavorem vertit protinus quod laudavit, cum subiungit, oportet autem episcopum irreprehensibilem esse, quasi dicat, laudo quod quaeritis, sed discite quid quaeratis. Ad secundum dicendum quod non est eadem ratio de statu religionis et statu episcopali, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia ad statum episcopalem praeexigitur vitae perfectio, ut patet per hoc quod dominus a Petro exquisivit si plus eum ceteris diligeret, antequam ei committeret pastorale officium. Sed ad statum religionis non praeexigitur perfectio, sed est via in perfectionem unde et dominus, Matth. XIX, non dixit, si es perfectus, vade et vende omnia quae habes, sed, si vis esse perfectus. Et huius differentiae ratio est quia, secundum Dionysium, perfectio pertinet active ad episcopum, sicut ad perfectorem, ad monachum autem passive, sicut ad perfectum. Requiritur autem quod sit perfectus aliquis ad hoc quod possit alios ad perfectionem adducere, quod non praeexigitur ab eo qui debet ad perfectionem adduci. Est autem praesumptuosum quod aliquis perfectum se reputet, non autem quod aliquis ad perfectionem tendat. Secundo, quia ille qui statum religionis assumit, se aliis subiicit ad spiritualia capienda, et hoc cuilibet licet. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, a studio cognoscendae veritatis nemo prohibetur, quod ad laudabile pertinet otium. Sed ille qui transit ad statum episcopalem, sublimatur ad hoc quod aliis provideat. Et hanc sublimationem nullus debet sibi assumere, secundum illud Heb. V, nemo assumit sibi honorem, sed qui vocatur a Deo. Et Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., primatum Ecclesiae concupiscere neque iustum est neque utile. Quis enim sapiens vult ultro se subiicere servituti et periculo tali ut det rationem pro omni Ecclesia, nisi forte qui non timet Dei iudicium, abutens primatu ecclesiastico saeculariter, ut scilicet convertat ipsum in saecularem? Ad tertium dicendum quod dispensatio spiritualium frumentorum non est facienda secundum arbitrium cuiuslibet, sed principaliter quidem secundum arbitrium et dispositionem Dei; secundario autem secundum arbitrium superiorum praelatorum, ex quorum persona dicitur, I ad Cor. IV, sic nos existimet homo ut mi-

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was nothing to be desired in the episcopal office, save the good work. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that when the Apostle said, ‘Whoever desireth the office of bishop, desireth a good work,’ he wished to explain what the episcopacy is: for it denotes work and not honor: since skopos signifies ‘watching.’ Wherefore if we like we may render episkopein by the Latin superintendere (to watch over): thus a man may know himself to be no bishop if he loves to precede rather than to profit others. For, as he observed shortly before, In our actions we should seek, not honor nor power in this life, since all things beneath the sun are vanity, but the work itself which that honor or power enables us to do. Nevertheless, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8), while praising the desire (namely of the good work) he forthwith turns this object of praise into one of fear, when he adds: It behooveth . . . a bishop to be blameless, as though to say: I praise what you seek, but learn first what it is you seek. Reply Obj. 2: There is no parity between the religious and the episcopal state, for two reasons. First, because perfection of life is a prerequisite of the episcopal state, as appears from our Lord asking Peter if he loved Him more than the others, before committing the pastoral office to him, whereas perfection is not a prerequisite of the religious state, since the latter is the way to perfection. Hence our Lord did not say (Matt 19:21): If thou art perfect, go, sell all thou hast, but If thou wilt be perfect. The reason for this difference is because, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. vi), perfection pertains actively to the bishop, as the perfecter, but to the monk passively as one who is perfected: and one needs to be perfect in order to bring others to perfection, but not in order to be brought to perfection. Now it is presumptuous to think oneself perfect, but it is not presumptuous to tend to perfection. Second, because he who enters the religious state subjects himself to others for the sake of a spiritual profit, and anyone may lawfully do this. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): No man is debarred from striving for the knowledge of truth, since this pertains to a praiseworthy ease. On the other hand, he who enters the episcopal state is raised up in order to watch over others, and no man should seek to be raised thus, according to Heb. 5:4, Neither doth any man take the honor to himself, but he that is called by God: and Chrysostom says: To desire supremacy in the Church is neither just nor useful. For what wise man seeks of his own accord to submit to such servitude and peril, as to have to render an account of the whole Church? None save him who fears not God’s judgment, and makes a secular abuse of his ecclesiastical authority, by turning it to secular uses. Reply Obj. 3: The dispensing of spiritual corn is not to be carried on in an arbitrary fashion, but chiefly according to the appointment and disposition of God, and in the second place according to the appointment of the higher prelates, in whose person it is said (1 Cor 4:1): Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers

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nistros Christi, et dispensatores mysteriorum Dei. Et ideo non intelligitur ille abscondere frumenta spiritualia cui non competit ex officio, nec ei a superiori iniungitur, si ab aliorum correctione aut gubernatione desistat, sed solum tunc intelligitur abscondere, si dispensationem negligat cum ei ex officio incumbat, vel si officium, cum ei iniungitur, pertinaciter recipere renuat. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, otium sanctum quaerit caritas veritatis, negotium iustum suscipit necessitas caritatis. Quam sarcinam si nullus imponit, percipiendae atque intuendae vacandum est veritati. Si autem imponitur, suscipienda est, propter caritatis necessitatem. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Gregorius dicit, in Pastoral., Isaias, qui mitti voluit, ante se per altaris calculum purgatum vidit, ne non purgatus adire quisque sacra ministeria audeat. Quia ergo valde difficile est purgatum se quemlibet posse cognoscere, praedicationis officium tutius declinatur.

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of the mysteries of God. Wherefore a man is not deemed to hide spiritual corn if he avoids governing or correcting others, and is not competent to do so, neither in virtue of his office nor of his superior’s command; thus alone is he deemed to hide it, when he neglects to dispense it while under obligation to do so in virtue of his office, or obstinately refuses to accept the office when it is imposed on him. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity undertake an honest labor. If no one imposes this burden upon us, we must devote ourselves to the research and contemplation of truth, but if it be imposed on us, we must bear it because charity demands it of us. Reply Obj. 4: As Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7), Isaias, who wishing to be sent, knew himself to be already cleansed by the live coal taken from the altar, shows us that no one should dare uncleansed to approach the sacred ministry. Since, then, it is very difficult for anyone to be able to know that he is cleansed, it is safer to decline the office of preacher.

Article 2 Whether it is lawful for a man to refuse absolutely an appointment to the episcopate? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod liceat episcopatum iniunctum omnino recusare. Ut enim Gregorius dicit, in Pastoral., per activam vitam prodesse proximis cupiens Isaias, officium praedicationis appetit, per contemplationem vero Ieremias amori conditoris sedulo inhaerere desiderans, ne mitti ad praedicandum debeat, contradicit. Nullus autem peccat si meliora nolit deserere ut minus bonis inhaereat. Cum ergo amor Dei praeemineat dilectioni proximi, et vita contemplativa praeferatur vitae activae, ut ex supra dictis patet, videtur quod non peccat ille qui omnino episcopatum recusat.

Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to refuse absolutely an appointment to the episcopate. For as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7), Isaias wishing to be of profit to his neighbor by means of the active life, desired the office of preaching, whereas Jeremias who was fain to hold fast to the love of his Creator by contemplation exclaimed against being sent to preach. Now no man sins by being unwilling to forgo better things in order to adhere to things that are not so good. Since then the love of God surpasses the love of our neighbor, and the contemplative life is preferable to the active, as shown above (Q. 25, A. 1; Q. 26, A. 2; Q. 182, A. 1) it would seem that a man sins not if he refuse absolutely the episcopal office. Praeterea, sicut Gregorius dicit, valde difficile est Obj. 2: Further, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7), It is very ut aliquis se purgatum possit cognoscere, nec debet aliquis difficult for anyone to be able to know that he is cleansed: non purgatus sacra ministeria adire. Si ergo aliquis se non nor should anyone uncleansed approach the sacred ministry. sentiat esse purgatum, quantumcumque sibi episcopale Therefore if a man perceives that he is not cleansed, howiniungatur officium, non debet illud suscipere. ever urgently the episcopal office be enjoined him, he ought not to accept it. Praeterea, de beato Marco Hieronymus dicit, in Obj. 3: Further, Jerome (Prologue, super Marc.) says prologo super Marcum, quod amputasse sibi post fidem that it is related of the Blessed Mark that after receiving the pollicem dicitur, ut sacerdotio reprobus haberetur. Et simi- faith he cut off his thumb that he might be excluded from the liter aliqui votum emittunt ut nunquam episcopatum ac- priesthood. Likewise some take a vow never to accept a bishcipiant. Sed eiusdem rationis est ponere impedimentum opric. Now to place an obstacle to a thing amounts to the ad aliquid, et omnino recusare illud. Ergo videtur quod same as refusing it altogether. Therefore it would seem that absque peccato possit aliquis omnino episcopatum recu- one may, without sin, refuse the episcopal office absolutely.

sare.

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Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, ad Eudoxium, si qua opera vestra mater Ecclesia desideraverit, nec elatione avida suscipiatis, nec blandiente desidia respuatis. Postea subdit, neque otium vestrum necessitatibus Ecclesiae praeponatis, cui parturienti si nulli boni ministrare vellent, quomodo nasceremini non inveniretis. Respondeo dicendum quod in assumptione episcopatus duo sunt consideranda, primo quidem, quid deceat hominem appetere secundum propriam voluntatem; secundo, quid hominem deceat facere ad voluntatem alterius. Quantum igitur ad propriam voluntatem, convenit homini principaliter insistere propriae saluti, sed quod aliorum saluti intendat, hoc convenit homini ex dispositione alterius potestatem habentis, sicut ex supra dictis patet. Unde sicut ad inordinationem voluntatis pertinet quod aliquis proprio motu feratur in hoc quod aliorum gubernationi praeficiatur; ita etiam ad inordinationem voluntatis pertinet quod aliquis omnino, contra superioris iniunctionem, praedictum gubernationis officium finaliter recuset, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia hoc repugnat caritati proximorum, quorum utilitati se aliquis debet exponere pro loco et tempore. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod negotium iustum suscipit necessitas caritatis. Secundo, quia hoc repugnat humilitati, per quam aliquis superiorum mandatis se subiicit. Unde Gregorius dicit, in Pastoral., quod tunc ante Dei oculos vera est humilitas, cum ad respuendum hoc quod utiliter subire praecipitur, pertinax non est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quamvis, simpliciter et absolute loquendo, vita contemplativa potior sit quam activa, et amor Dei quam dilectio proximi; tamen ex alia parte bonum multitudinis praeferendum est bono unius. Unde Augustinus dicit, in verbis praemissis, neque otium vestrum necessitatibus Ecclesiae praeponatis. Praesertim quia et hoc ipsum ad dilectionem Dei pertinet quod aliquis ovibus Christi curam pastoralem impendat. Unde super illud Ioan. ult., pasce oves meas, dicit Augustinus, sit amoris officium pascere dominicum gregem, sicut fuit timoris indicium negare pastorem. Similiter etiam praelati non sic transferuntur ad vitam activam ut contemplativam deserant. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod, si imponatur sarcina pastoralis officii, nec sic deserenda est delectatio veritatis, quae scilicet in contemplatione habetur. Ad secundum dicendum quod nullus tenetur obedire praelato ad aliquod illicitum, sicut patet ex his quae supra dicta sunt de obedientia. Potest ergo contingere quod ille cui iniungitur praelationis officium, in se aliquid sentiat per quod non liceat ei praelationem accipere. Hoc autem impedimentum quandoque quidem removeri potest per ipsummet cui pastoralis cura iniungitur, puta si habeat peccandi propositum, quod potest

Q. 185, A. 2

On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. xlviii ad Eudox.): If Mother Church requires your service, neither accept with greedy conceit, nor refuse with fawning indolence; and afterwards he adds: Nor prefer your ease to the needs of the Church: for if no good men were willing to assist her in her labor, you would seek in vain how we could be born of her. I answer that, Two things have to be considered in the acceptance of the episcopal office: first, what a man may fittingly desire according to his own will; second, what it behooves a man to do according to the will of another. As regards his own will it becomes a man to look chiefly to his own spiritual welfare, whereas that he look to the spiritual welfare of others becomes a man according to the appointment of another having authority, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). Hence just as it is a mark of an inordinate will that a man of his own choice incline to be appointed to the government of others, so too it indicates an inordinate will if a man definitively refuse the aforesaid office of government in direct opposition to the appointment of his superior: and this for two reasons. First, because this is contrary to the love of our neighbor, for whose good a man should offer himself according as place and time demand: hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that the demands of charity undertake an honest labor. Second, because this is contrary to humility, whereby a man submits to his superior’s commands: hence Gregory says (Pastor. i, 6): In God’s sight humility is genuine when it does not obstinately refuse to submit to what is usefully prescribed. Reply Obj. 1: Although simply and absolutely speaking the contemplative life is more excellent than the active, and the love of God better than the love of our neighbor, yet, on the other hand, the good of the many should be preferred to the good of the individual. Wherefore Augustine says in the passage quoted above: Nor prefer your own ease to the needs of the Church, and all the more since it belongs to the love of God that a man undertake the pastoral care of Christ’s sheep. Hence Augustine, commenting on John 21:17, Feed My sheep, says (Tract. cxxiii in Joan.): Be it the task of love to feed the Lord’s flock, even as it was the mark of fear to deny the Shepherd. Moreover prelates are not transferred to the active life, so as to forsake the contemplative; wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that if the burden of the pastoral office be imposed, we must not abandon the delights of truth, which are derived from contemplation. Reply Obj. 2: No one is bound to obey his superior by doing what is unlawful, as appears from what was said above concerning obedience (Q. 104, A. 5). Accordingly it may happen that he who is appointed to the office of prelate perceive something in himself on account of which it is unlawful for him to accept a prelacy. But this obstacle may sometimes be removed by the very person who is appointed to the pastoral cure—for instance, if he have a purpose to

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deserere. Et propter hoc non excusatur quin finaliter teneatur obedire praelato iniungenti. Quandoque vero impedimentum ex quo fit ei illicitum pastorale officium, non potest ipse removere, sed praelatus qui iniungit, puta si sit irregularis vel excommunicatus. Et tunc debet defectum suum praelato iniungenti ostendere, qui si impedimentum removere voluerit, tenetur humiliter obedire. Unde Exodi IV, cum Moyses dixisset, obsecro, domine, non sum eloquens ab heri et nudius tertius, dominus respondit ad eum, ego ero in ore tuo, doceboque te quid loquaris. Quandoque vero non potest removeri impedimentum nec per iniungentem nec per eum cui iniungitur, sicut si archiepiscopus non possit super irregularitate dispensare. Unde subditus non tenetur ei obedire ad suscipiendum episcopatum, vel etiam sacros ordines, si sit irregularis.

Ad tertium dicendum quod accipere episcopatum non est de se necessarium ad salutem, sed fit necessarium ex superioris praecepto. His autem quae sic sunt necessaria ad salutem, potest aliquis impedimentum licite apponere antequam fiat praeceptum, alioquin, non liceret alicui transire ad secundas nuptias, ne per hoc impediretur a susceptione episcopatus vel sacri ordinis. Non autem hoc liceret in his quae per se sunt de necessitate salutis. Unde beatus Marcus non contra praeceptum egit sibi digitum amputando, quamvis credibile sit ex instinctu spiritus sancti hoc fecisse, sine quo non licet alicui sibi manus iniicere. Qui autem votum emittit de non suscipiendo episcopatum, si per hoc intendat se obligare ad hoc quod nec per obedientiam superioris praelati accipiat, illicite vovet. Si autem intendit ad hoc se obligare ut, quantum est de se, episcopatum non quaerat; nec suscipiat, nisi necessitate imminente, licitum est votum, quia vovet se facturum id quod hominem facere decet.

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sin, he may abandon it—and for this reason he is not excused from being bound to obey definitely the superior who has appointed him. Sometimes, however, he is unable himself to remove the impediment that makes the pastoral office unlawful to him, yet the prelate who appoints him can do so—for instance, if he be irregular or excommunicate. In such a case he ought to make known his defect to the prelate who has appointed him; and if the latter be willing to remove the impediment, he is bound humbly to obey. Hence when Moses had said (Exod 4:10): I beseech thee, Lord, I am not eloquent from yesterday, and the day before, the Lord answered (Exod 4:12): I will be in thy mouth, and I will teach thee what thou shalt speak. At other times the impediment cannot be removed, neither by the person appointing nor by the one appointed—for instance, if an archbishop be unable to dispense from an irregularity; wherefore a subject, if irregular, would not be bound to obey him by accepting the episcopate or even sacred orders. Reply Obj. 3: It is not in itself necessary for salvation to accept the episcopal office, but it becomes necessary by reason of the superior’s command. Now one may lawfully place an obstacle to things thus necessary for salvation, before the command is given; else it would not be lawful to marry a second time, lest one should thus incur an impediment to the episcopate or holy orders. But this would not be lawful in things necessary for salvation. Hence the Blessed Mark did not act against a precept by cutting off his finger, although it is credible that he did this by the instigation of the Holy Spirit, without which it would be unlawful for anyone to lay hands on himself. If a man take a vow not to accept the bishop’s office, and by this intend to bind himself not even to accept it in obedience to his superior prelate, his vow is unlawful; but if he intend to bind himself, so far as it lies with him, not to seek the episcopal office, nor to accept it except under urgent necessity, his vow is lawful, because he vows to do what it becomes a man to do.

Article 3 Whether he that is appointed to the episcopate ought to be better than others? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod oporteat eum qui ad episcopatum assumitur, esse ceteris meliorem. Dominus enim Petrum, cui commissurus erat pastorale officium, examinavit si se diligeret plus ceteris. Sed ex hoc aliquis melior est quod Deum plus diligit. Ergo videtur quod ad episcopatum non sit assumendus nisi ille qui est ceteris melior. Praeterea, Symmachus Papa dicit, vilissimus computandus est, nisi scientia et sanctitate praecellat, qui est dignitate praestantior. Sed ille qui praecellit scientia et

Objection 1: It would seem that one who is appointed to the episcopate ought to be better than others. For our Lord, when about to commit the pastoral office to Peter, asked him if he loved Him more than the others. Now a man is the better through loving God the more. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to be appointed to the episcopal office except he be better than others. Obj. 2: Further, Pope Symmachus says (can. Vilissimus I, qu. 1): A man is of very little worth who though excelling in dignity, excels not in knowledge and holiness. Now he who

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sanctitate, est melior. Ergo non debet aliquis ad episco- excels in knowledge and holiness is better. Therefore a man patum assumi nisi sit ceteris melior. ought not to be appointed to the episcopate unless he be better than others. Praeterea, in quolibet genere minora per maiora Obj. 3: Further, in every genus the lesser are governed reguntur, sicut corporalia reguntur per spiritualia, et in- by the greater, as corporeal things are governed by things feriora corpora per superiora, ut Augustinus dicit, in III spiritual, and the lower bodies by the higher, as Augustine de Trin. Sed episcopus assumitur ad regimen aliorum. says (De Trin. iii, 3). Now a bishop is appointed to govern Ergo debet esse ceteris melior. others. Therefore he should be better than others. Sed contra est quod decretalis dicit quod sufficit On the contrary, The Decretal says that it suffices to eligere bonum, nec oportet eligere meliorem. choose a good man, nor is it necessary to choose the better man. Respondeo dicendum quod circa assumptionem I answer that, In designating a man for the episcoalicuius ad episcopatum, aliquid est considerandum ex pal office, something has to be considered on the part of the parte eius qui assumitur, et aliquid ex parte eius qui as- person designate, and something on the part of the desigsumit. Ex parte enim eius qui assumit, vel eligendo vel nator. For on the part of the designator, whether by elecprovidendo, requiritur quod fideliter divina ministeria tion or by appointment, it is required that he choose such dispenset. Quae quidem dispensari debent ad utilitatem a one as will dispense the divine mysteries faithfully. These Ecclesiae, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIV, ad aedificatio- should be dispensed for the good of the Church, accordnem Ecclesiae quaerite ut abundetis, non autem mini- ing to 1 Cor. 14:12, Seek to abound unto the edifying of the steria divina hominibus committuntur propter eorum Church; and the divine mysteries are not committed to men remunerationem, quam expectare debent in futuro. Et for their own meed, which they should await in the life to ideo ille qui debet aliquem eligere in episcopum, vel de come. Consequently he who has to choose or appoint one eo providere, non tenetur assumere meliorem simplici- for a bishop is not bound to take one who is best simply, ter, quod est secundum caritatem, sed meliorem quoad i.e., according to charity, but one who is best for governing regimen Ecclesiae, qui scilicet possit Ecclesiam et in- the Church, one namely who is able to instruct, defend, and struere et defendere et pacifice gubernare. Unde contra govern the Church peacefully. Hence Jerome, commenting quosdam Hieronymus dicit quod quidam non quaerunt on Titus 1:5, says against certain persons that some seek to eos in Ecclesia columnas erigere quos plus cognoscant Ec- erect as pillars of the Church, not those whom they know to be clesiae prodesse, sed quos vel ipsi amant, vel quorum sunt more useful to the Church, but those whom they love more, or obsequiis deliniti, vel pro quibus maiorum quispiam roga- those by whose obsequiousness they have been cajoled or unverit, et, ut deteriora taceam, qui ut clerici fierent muneri- done, or for whom some person in authority has spoken, and, bus impetrarunt. not to say worse than this, have succeeded by means of gifts in being made clerics. Hoc autem pertinet ad acceptionem personarum, Now this pertains to the respect of persons, which in quae in talibus est grave peccatum. Unde super illud Iac. such matters is a grave sin. Wherefore a gloss of Augustine II, fratres mei, nolite in personarum acceptione etc., di- on James 2:1, Brethren, have not . . . with respect of persons, cit Glossa Augustini, si hanc distantiam sedendi et standi says: If this distinction of sitting and standing be referred to ad honores ecclesiasticos referamus, non est putandum le- ecclesiastical honors, we must not deem it a slight sin to ‘have ve esse peccatum in personarum acceptione habere fidem the faith of the Lord of glory with respect of persons.’ For who domini gloriae. Quis enim ferat eligi divitem ad sedem ho- would suffer a rich man to be chosen for the Church’s seat of noris Ecclesiae, contempto paupere instructiore et sanctio- honor, in despite of a poor man who is better instructed and re? holier? Ex parte autem eius qui assumitur, non requiritur On the part of the person appointed, it is not required quod reputet se aliis meliorem, hoc enim esset superbum that he esteem himself better than others, for this would et praesumptuosum, sed sufficit quod nihil in se inveniat be proud and presumptuous; but it suffices that he perceive per quod illicitum ei reddatur assumere praelationis of- nothing in himself which would make it unlawful for him ficium. Unde licet Petrus interrogatus esset an dominum to take up the office of prelate. Hence although Peter was plus ceteris diligeret, in sua responsione non se praetulit asked by our Lord if he loved Him more than the others, he ceteris, sed respondit simpliciter quod Christum amaret. did not, in his reply, set himself before the others, but answered simply that he loved Christ. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus in Petro Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord knew that, by His own besciebat ex suo munere esse idoneitatem etiam quantum stowal, Peter was in other respects fitted to govern the ad alia, Ecclesiam gubernandi. Et ideo eum de amplio- Church: wherefore He questioned him about his greater ri dilectione examinavit ad ostendendum quod, ubi alias love, to show that when we find a man otherwise fitted for

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invenitur homo idoneus ad Ecclesiae regimen, praecipue attendi debet in ipso eminentia divinae dilectionis. Ad secundum dicendum quod auctoritas illa est intelligenda quantum ad studium illius qui in dignitate est constitutus, debet enim ad hoc intendere ut talem se exhibeat ut ceteros et scientia et sanctitate praecellat. Unde Gregorius dicit, in Pastoral., tantum debet actionem populi actio transcendere praesulis, quantum distare solet a grege vita pastoris. Non autem sibi imputandum est si ante praelationem excellentior non fuit, ut ex hoc debeat vilissimus reputari. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dicitur I ad Cor. XII, divisiones gratiarum et ministrationum et operationum sunt. Unde nihil prohibet aliquem esse magis idoneum ad officium regiminis qui tamen non excellit in gratia sanctitatis. Secus autem est in regimine ordinis naturalis, in quo id quod est superius naturae ordine, ex hoc ipso habet maiorem idoneitatem ad hoc quod inferiora disponat.

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the government of the Church, we must look chiefly to his pre-eminence in the love of God. Reply Obj. 2: This statement refers to the pursuits of the man who is placed in authority. For he should aim at showing himself to be more excellent than others in both knowledge and holiness. Wherefore Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 1), The occupations of a prelate ought to excel those of the people, as much as the shepherd’s life excels that of his flock. But he is not to be blamed and looked upon as worthless if he excelled not before being raised to the prelacy. Reply Obj. 3: According to 1 Cor. 12:4 seqq., There are diversities of graces . . . and . . . of ministries . . . and . . . of operations. Hence nothing hinders one from being more fitted for the office of governing, who does not excel in the grace of holiness. It is otherwise in the government of the natural order, where that which is higher in the natural order is for that very reason more fitted to dispose of those that are lower.

Article 4 Whether a bishop may lawfully forsake the episcopal cure, in order to enter religion? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod episcopus non possit licite curam episcopalem deserere, ut ad religionem se transferat. Nulli enim de statu perfectiori licet ad minus perfectum statum transire, hoc enim est respicere retro, quod est damnabile, secundum domini sententiam dicentis, Luc. IX, nemo mittens manum ad aratrum et aspiciens retro, aptus est regno Dei. Sed status episcopalis est perfectior quam status religionis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo, sicut non licet de statu religionis redire ad saeculum, ita non licet de statu episcopali ad religionem transire. Praeterea, ordo gratiae est decentior quam ordo naturae. Sed secundum naturam, non movetur idem ad contraria, puta, si lapis naturaliter deorsum movetur, non potest naturaliter a deorsum redire in sursum. Sed secundum ordinem gratiae, licet transire de statu religionis ad statum episcopalem. Ergo non licet e converso de statu episcopali redire ad statum religionis.

Objection 1: It seems that a bishop cannot lawfully forsake his episcopal cure in order to enter religion. For no one can lawfully pass from a more perfect to a less perfect state; since this is to look back, which is condemned by the words of our Lord (Luke 9:62), No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God. Now the episcopal state is more perfect than the religious, as shown above (Q. 184, A. 7). Therefore just as it is unlawful to return to the world from the religious state, so is it unlawful to pass from the episcopal to the religious state.

Obj. 2: Further, the order of grace is more congruous than the order of nature. Now according to nature a thing is not moved in contrary directions; thus if a stone be naturally moved downwards, it cannot naturally return upwards from below. But according to the order of grace it is lawful to pass from the religious to the episcopal state. Therefore it is not lawful to pass contrariwise from the episcopal to the religious state. Praeterea, nihil in operibus gratiae debet esse Obj. 3: Further, in the works of grace nothing should be otiosum. Sed ille qui est semel in episcopum consecra- inoperative. Now when once a man is consecrated bishop tus, perpetuo retinet spiritualem potestatem conferendi he retains in perpetuity the spiritual power of giving orders ordines, et alia huiusmodi faciendi quae ad episcopale and doing like things that pertain to the episcopal office: officium pertinent, quae quidem potestas otiosa remane- and this power would seemingly remain inoperative in one re videtur in eo qui curam episcopalem dimittit. Ergo vi- who gives up the episcopal cure. Therefore it would seem detur quod episcopus non possit curam episcopalem di- that a bishop may not forsake the episcopal cure and enter mittere et ad religionem transire. religion.

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Sed contra, nullus cogitur ad id quod est secundum se illicitum. Sed illi qui petunt cessionem a cura episcopali, ad cedendum compelluntur, ut patet extra, de Renunt., cap. quidam. Ergo videtur quod deserere curam episcopalem non sit illicitum. Respondeo dicendum quod perfectio episcopalis status in hoc consistit quod aliquis ex divina dilectione se obligat ad hoc quod saluti proximorum insistat. Et ideo tandiu obligatur ad hoc quod curam pastoralem retineat, quandiu potest subditis sibi commissis proficere ad salutem. Quam quidem negligere non debet, neque propter divinae contemplationis quietem, cum apostolus propter necessitatem subditorum etiam a contemplatione futurae vitae se differri patienter toleraret; secundum illud Philipp. I, ecce, quid eligam ignoro. Coarctor enim e duobus, desiderium habens dissolvi et esse cum Christo, multo magis melius est; permanere autem in carne est necessarium propter vos. Et hoc confidens, scio quia manebo. Neque etiam propter quaecumque adversa vitanda vel lucra conquirenda, quia, sicut dicitur Ioan. X, bonus pastor animam suam ponit pro ovibus suis. Contingit tamen quandoque quod episcopus impeditur procurare subditorum salutem, multipliciter. Quandoque quidem propter proprium defectum, vel conscientiae, sicut si sit homicida vel simoniacus; vel etiam corporis, puta si sit senex vel infirmus; vel etiam scientiae quae sufficiat ad curam regiminis; vel etiam irregularitatis, puta si sit bigamus. Quandoque autem propter defectum subditorum, in quibus non potest proficere. Unde Gregorius dicit, in II Dialog., ibi aequanimiter portandi sunt mali, ubi inveniuntur aliqui qui adiuventur boni. Ubi autem omnimodo fructus de bonis deest, fit aliquando de malis labor supervacuus. Unde saepe agitur in animo perfectorum quod, cum laborem suum sine fructu esse considerant, in loco alio ad laborem cum fructu migrant. Quandoque autem contingit ex parte aliorum, puta cum de praelatione alicuius grave scandalum suscitatur. Nam, ut apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. VIII, si esca scandalizat fratrem meum, non manducabo carnes in aeternum. Dum tamen scandalum non oriatur ex malitia aliquorum volentium fidem aut iustitiam Ecclesiae conculcare. Propter huiusmodi enim scandalum non est cura pastoralis dimittenda, secundum illud Matth. XV, sinite illos, scilicet qui scandalizabantur de veritate doctrinae Christi, caeci sunt duces caecorum. Oportet tamen quod, sicut curam regiminis assumit aliquis per providentiam superioris praelati, ita etiam per eius auctoritatem, ex causis praedictis, deserat susceptam. Unde extra, de Renunt., dicit Innocentius III, si pennas habeas quibus satagas in solitudinem avolare, ita tamen adstrictae sunt nexibus praeceptorum ut liberum non habeas, absque nostra permissione, volatum. Soli enim Papae licet dispensare in voto perpetuo, quo quis

Q. 185, A. 4

On the contrary, No man is compelled to do what is in itself unlawful. Now those who seek to resign their episcopal cure are compelled to resign (Extra, de Renunt. cap. Quidam). Therefore apparently it is not unlawful to give up the episcopal cure. I answer that, The perfection of the episcopal state consists in this that for love of God a man binds himself to work for the salvation of his neighbor, wherefore he is bound to retain the pastoral cure so long as he is able to procure the spiritual welfare of the subjects entrusted to his care: a matter which he must not neglect—neither for the sake of the quiet of divine contemplation, since the Apostle, on account of the needs of his subjects, suffered patiently to be delayed even from the contemplation of the life to come, according to Phil. 1:22–25, What I shall choose I know not, but I am straitened between two, having a desire to be dissolved, and to be with Christ, a thing by far better. But to abide still in the flesh is needful for you. And having this confidence, I know that I shall abide; nor for the sake of avoiding any hardships or of acquiring any gain whatsoever, because as it is written (John 10:11), the good shepherd giveth his life for his sheep. At times, however, it happens in several ways that a bishop is hindered from procuring the spiritual welfare of his subjects. Sometimes on account of his own defect, either of conscience (for instance if he be guilty of murder or simony), or of body (for example if he be old or infirm), or of irregularity arising, for instance, from bigamy. Sometimes he is hindered through some defect in his subjects, whom he is unable to profit. Hence Gregory says (Dial. ii, 3): The wicked must be borne patiently, when there are some good who can be succored, but when there is no profit at all for the good, it is sometimes useless to labor for the wicked. Wherefore the perfect when they find that they labor in vain are often minded to go elsewhere in order to labor with fruit. Sometimes again this hindrance arises on the part of others, as when scandal results from a certain person being in authority: for the Apostle says (1 Cor 8:13): If meat scandalize my brother, I will never eat flesh: provided, however, the scandal is not caused by the wickedness of persons desirous of subverting the faith or the righteousness of the Church; because the pastoral cure is not to be laid aside on account of scandal of this kind, according to Matt. 15:14, Let them alone, those namely who were scandalized at the truth of Christ’s teaching, they are blind, and leaders of the blind. Nevertheless just as a man takes upon himself the charge of authority at the appointment of a higher superior, so too it behooves him to be subject to the latter’s authority in laying aside the accepted charge for the reasons given above. Hence Innocent III says (Extra, de Renunt., cap. Nisi cum pridem): Though thou hast wings wherewith thou art anxious to fly away into solitude, they are so tied by the bonds of authority, that thou art not free to fly without our permis-

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se ad curam subditorum adstrinxit episcopatum susci- sion. For the Pope alone can dispense from the perpetual piens. vow, by which a man binds himself to the care of his subjects, when he took upon himself the episcopal office. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod perfectio reliReply Obj. 1: The perfection of religious and that of giosorum et episcoporum secundum diversa attenditur. bishops are regarded from different standpoints. For it beNam ad perfectionem religionis pertinet studium quod longs to the perfection of a religious to occupy oneself in quis adhibet ad propriam salutem. Ad perfectionem au- working out one’s own salvation, whereas it belongs to the tem episcopalis status pertinet adhibere studium ad pro- perfection of a bishop to occupy oneself in working for the ximorum salutem. Et ideo, quandiu potest esse aliquis salvation of others. Hence so long as a man can be useful utilis proximorum saluti, retrocederet si ad statum reli- to the salvation of his neighbor, he would be going back, if gionis vellet transire, ut solum suae saluti insisteret, qui he wished to pass to the religious state, to busy himself only se obligavit ad hoc quod non solum suam salutem, sed with his own salvation, since he has bound himself to work etiam aliorum procuraret. Unde Innocentius III dicit, in not only for his own but also for others’ salvation. Wheredecretali praedicta, quod facilius indulgetur ut monachus fore Innocent III says in the Decretal quoted above that it is ad praesulatum ascendat, quam praesul ad monachatum more easily allowable for a monk to ascend to the episcopacy, descendat, sed si salutem aliorum procurare non possit, than for a bishop to descend to the monastic life. If, however, conveniens est ut suae saluti intendat. he be unable to procure the salvation of others it is meet he should seek his own. Ad secundum dicendum quod propter nullum imReply Obj. 2: On account of no obstacle should a man pedimentum debet homo praetermittere studium suae forego the work of his own salvation, which pertains to the salutis, quod pertinet ad religionis statum. Potest au- religious state. But there may be an obstacle to the procurtem esse aliquod impedimentum procurandae salutis ing of another’s salvation; wherefore a monk may be raised alienae. Et ideo monachus potest ad statum episcopa- to the episcopal state wherein he is able also to work out tus assumi, in quo etiam suae salutis curam agere po- his own salvation. And a bishop, if he be hindered from test. Potest etiam episcopus, si impedimentum alienae procuring the salvation of others, may enter the religious salutis procurandae interveniat, ad religionem transire. life, and may return to his bishopric should the obstacle Et impedimento cessante, potest iterato ad episcopatum cease, for instance by the correction of his subjects, cessaassumi, puta per correctionem subditorum, vel per se- tion of the scandal, healing of his infirmity, removal of his dationem scandali, vel per curationem infirmitatis, aut ignorance by sufficient instruction. Again, if he owed his depulsa ignorantia per instructionem sufficientem. Vel promotion to simony of which he was in ignorance, and reetiam, si simoniace sit promotus eo ignorante, si se ad re- signing his episcopate entered the religious life, he can be gularem vitam, episcopatu dimisso, transtulerit, poterit reappointed to another bishopric. On the other hand, if a iterato ad alium episcopatum promoveri. Si vero aliquis man be deposed from the episcopal office for some sin, and propter culpam sit ab episcopatu depositus, et in mo- confined in a monastery that he may do penance, he cannasterium detrusus ad poenitentiam peragendam, non not be reappointed to a bishopric. Hence it is stated (VII, potest iterato ad episcopatum revocari. Unde dicitur VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): The holy synod orders that any qu. I, praecipit sancta synodus ut quicumque de pontificali man who has been degraded from the episcopal dignity to the dignitate ad monachorum vitam et poenitentiae descende- monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no means rit locum, nequaquam ad pontificatum resurgat. rise again to the episcopate. Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam in rebus naturaReply Obj. 3: Even in natural things power remains inlibus, propter impedimentum superveniens potentia re- active on account of a supervening obstacle, for instance the manet absque actu, sicut propter infirmitatem oculi ces- act of sight ceases through an affliction of the eye. So neisat actus visionis. Et ita etiam non est inconveniens si, ther is it unreasonable if, through the occurrence of some propter exterius impedimentum superveniens, potestas obstacle from without, the episcopal power remain without episcopalis remaneat absque actu. the exercise of its act.

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Q. 185, A. 5

Article 5 Whether it is lawful for a bishop on account of bodily persecution to abandon the flock committed to his care? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non liceat episcopo, propter aliquam persecutionem, corporaliter deserere gregem sibi commissum. Dicit enim dominus, Ioan. X, quod ille est mercenarius, et non vere pastor, qui videt lupum venientem, et dimittit oves et fugit. Dicit autem Gregorius, in homilia, quod lupus super oves venit, cum quilibet iniustus et raptor fideles quosque atque humiles opprimit. Si ergo propter persecutionem alicuius tyranni, episcopus gregem sibi commissum corporaliter deserat, videtur quod sit mercenarius, et non pastor. Praeterea, Prov. VI dicitur, fili, si sponderis pro amico tuo, defixisti apud extraneum manum tuam, et postea subdit, discurre, festina, suscita amicum tuum. Quod exponens Gregorius, in Pastoral., dicit, spondere pro amico est animam alienam in periculo suae conversationis accipere. Quisquis autem ad vivendum aliis in exemplum praeponitur, non solum ut ipse vigilet, sed etiam ut amicum suscitet, admonetur. Sed hoc non potest facere si corporaliter deserat gregem. Ergo videtur quod episcopus non debeat, causa persecutionis, corporaliter suum gregem deserere. Praeterea, ad perfectionem episcopalis status pertinet quod proximis curam impendat. Sed non licet ei qui est statum perfectionis professus, ut omnino deserat ea quae sunt perfectionis. Ergo videtur quod non licet episcopo se corporaliter subtrahere ab executione sui officii, nisi forte ut operibus perfectionis in monasterio vacet. Sed contra est quod dominus apostolis, quorum successores sunt episcopi, mandavit, Matth. X, si vos persecuti fuerint in una civitate, fugite in aliam. Respondeo dicendum quod in qualibet obligatione praecipue attendi debet obligationis finis. Obligant autem se episcopi ad exequendum pastorale officium propter subditorum salutem. Et ideo, ubi subditorum salus exigit personae pastoris praesentiam, non debet pastor personaliter suum gregem deserere, neque propter aliquod commodum temporale, neque etiam propter aliquod personale periculum imminens, cum bonus pastor animam suam ponere teneatur pro ovibus suis. Si vero subditorum saluti possit sufficienter in absentia pastoris per alium provideri, tunc licet pastori, vel propter aliquod Ecclesiae commodum, vel propter personae periculum, corporaliter gregem deserere. Unde Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Honoratum, fugiant

Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful for a bishop, on account of some temporal persecution, to withdraw his bodily presence from the flock committed to his care. For our Lord said (John 10:12) that he is a hireling and no true shepherd, who seeth the wolf coming, and leaveth the sheep and flieth: and Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ev.) that the wolf comes upon the sheep when any man by his injustice and robbery oppresses the faithful and the humble. Therefore if, on account of the persecution of a tyrant, a bishop withdraws his bodily presence from the flock entrusted to his care, it would seem that he is a hireling and not a shepherd. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov 6:1): My son, if thou be surety for thy friend, thou hast engaged fast thy hand to a stranger, and afterwards (Prov 6:3): Run about, make haste, stir up thy friend. Gregory expounds these words and says (Pastor. iii, 4): To be surety for a friend, is to vouch for his good conduct by engaging oneself to a stranger. And whoever is put forward as an example to the lives of others, is warned not only to watch but even to rouse his friend. Now he cannot do this if he withdraw his bodily presence from his flock. Therefore it would seem that a bishop should not on account of persecution withdraw his bodily presence from his flock. Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the perfection of the bishop’s state that he devote himself to the care of his neighbor. Now it is unlawful for one who has professed the state of perfection to forsake altogether the things that pertain to perfection. Therefore it would seem unlawful for a bishop to withdraw his bodily presence from the execution of his office, except perhaps for the purpose of devoting himself to works of perfection in a monastery. On the contrary, our Lord commanded the apostles, whose successors bishops are (Matt 10:23): When they shall persecute you in this city, flee into another. I answer that, In any obligation the chief thing to be considered is the end of the obligation. Now bishops bind themselves to fulfill the pastoral office for the sake of the salvation of their subjects. Consequently when the salvation of his subjects demands the personal presence of the pastor, the pastor should not withdraw his personal presence from his flock, neither for the sake of some temporal advantage, nor even on account of some impending danger to his person, since the good shepherd is bound to lay down his life for his sheep. On the other hand, if the salvation of his subjects can be sufficiently provided for by another person in the absence of the pastor, it is lawful for the pastor to withdraw his bodily presence from his flock, either for the sake of some advantage to the Church, or on account of some dan-

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de civitate in civitatem servi Christi, quando eorum quisque specialiter a persecutoribus quaeritur, ut ab aliis, qui non ita quaeruntur, non deseratur Ecclesia. Cum autem omnium est commune periculum, hi qui aliis indigent, non deserantur ab his quibus indigent. Si enim perniciosum est nautam in tranquillitate navem deserere, quanto magis in fluctibus, ut dicit Nicolaus Papa, et habetur VII, qu. I.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille tanquam mercenarius fugit qui commodum temporale, vel etiam salutem corporalem, spirituali saluti proximorum praeponit. Unde Gregorius dicit, in homilia, stare in periculo ovium non potest qui in eo quod ovibus praeest, non oves diligit, sed lucrum terrenum quaerit, et ideo opponere se contra periculum trepidat, ne hoc quod diligit amittat. Ille autem qui ad evitandum periculum recedit absque detrimento gregis, non tanquam mercenarius fugit. Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui spondet pro aliquo, si per se implere non possit, sufficit ut per alium impleat. Unde praelatus, si habet impedimentum propter quod non possit personaliter curae subditorum intendere, suae sponsioni satisfacit si per alium provideat. Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui ad episcopatum assumitur, assumit statum perfectionis secundum aliquod perfectionis genus, a quo si impediatur, ad aliud genus perfectionis non tenetur, ut scilicet necesse sit eum ad statum religionis transire. Imminet tamen sibi necessitas ut animum retineat intendendi proximorum saluti si opportunitas adsit et necessitas requirat.

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ger to his person. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ccxxviii ad Honorat.): Christ’s servants may flee from one city to another, when one of them is specially sought out by persecutors: in order that the Church be not abandoned by others who are not so sought for. When, however, the same danger threatens all, those who stand in need of others must not be abandoned by those whom they need. For if it is dangerous for the helmsman to leave the ship when the sea is calm, how much more so when it is stormy, as Pope Nicholas I says (cf. VII, qu. i, can. Sciscitaris). Reply Obj. 1: To flee as a hireling is to prefer temporal advantage or one’s bodily welfare to the spiritual welfare of one’s neighbor. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ev.): A man cannot endanger himself for the sake of his sheep, if he uses his authority over them not through love of them but for the sake of earthly gain: wherefore he fears to stand in the way of danger lest he lose what he loves. But he who, in order to avoid danger, leaves the flock without endangering the flock, does not flee as a hireling. Reply Obj. 2: If he who is surety for another be unable to fulfill his engagement, it suffices that he fulfill it through another. Hence if a superior is hindered from attending personally to the care of his subjects, he fulfils his obligation if he do so through another. Reply Obj. 3: When a man is appointed to a bishopric, he embraces the state of perfection as regards one kind of perfection; and if he be hindered from the practice thereof, he is not bound to another kind of perfection, so as to be obliged to enter the religious state. Yet he is under the obligation of retaining the intention of devoting himself to his neighbor’s salvation, should an opportunity offer, and necessity require it of him.

Article 6 Whether it is lawful for a bishop to have property of his own? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod episcopo non liceat aliquid proprium possidere. Dominus enim dicit, Matth. XIX, si vis perfectus esse, vade et vende omnia quae habes et da pauperibus, et veni, sequere me, ex quo videtur quod voluntaria paupertas ad perfectionem requiratur. Sed episcopi assumuntur ad statum perfectionis. Ergo videtur quod non liceat eis proprium possidere. Praeterea, episcopi in Ecclesia tenent locum apostolorum, ut dicit Glossa, Luc. X. Sed apostolis dominus praecepit ut nihil proprium possiderent, secundum illud Matth. X, nolite possidere aurum neque argentum, neque pecuniam in zonis vestris. Unde et Petrus, pro se et pro aliis apostolis, dicit, ecce, nos reliquimus omnia et secuti sumus te, Matth. XIX. Ergo videtur quod episcopi te-

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful for a bishop to have property of his own. For our Lord said (Matt 19:21): If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all thou hast, and give to the poor . . . and come, follow Me; whence it would seem to follow that voluntary poverty is requisite for perfection. Now bishops are in the state of perfection. Therefore it would seem unlawful for them to possess anything as their own. Obj. 2: Further, bishops take the place of the apostles in the Church, according to a gloss on Luke 10:1. Now our Lord commanded the apostles to possess nothing of their own, according to Matt. 10:9, Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses; wherefore Peter said for himself and the other apostles (Matt 19:27): Behold we have left all things and have followed Thee. Therefore it would seem that

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neantur ad huius mandati observantiam, ut nihil proprium possideant. Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit, ad Nepotianum, cleros Graece, Latine sors appellatur. Propterea clerici dicuntur, quia de sorte domini sunt, vel quia ipse dominus sors, idest pars, clericorum est. Qui autem dominum possidet, nihil extra Deum habere potest. Si autem aurum, si argentum, si possessiones, si variam supellectilem habet, cum istis partibus non dignatur dominus fieri pars eius. Ergo videtur quod non solum episcopi, sed etiam clerici debeant proprio carere. Sed contra est quod dicitur XII, qu. I, episcopus de rebus propriis vel acquisitis, vel quidquid de proprio habet, heredibus suis derelinquat. Respondeo dicendum quod ad ea quae sunt supererogationis nullus tenetur, nisi se specialiter ad illud voto adstringat. Unde Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Paulinam et Armentarium, quia iam vovisti, iam te obstrinxisti, aliud tibi facere non licet. Priusquam esses voti reus, liberum fuit quod esses inferior. Manifestum est autem quod vivere absque proprio supererogationis est, non enim cadit sub praecepto, sed sub consilio. Unde cum, Matth. XIX, dixisset dominus adolescenti, si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata, postea superaddendo subdidit, si vis perfectus esse, vade et vende omnia quae habes et da pauperibus. Non autem episcopi in sua ordinatione ad hoc se obligant ut absque proprio vivant, nec etiam vivere absque proprio ex necessitate requiritur ad pastorale officium, ad quod se obligant. Et ideo non tenentur episcopi ad hoc quod sine proprio vivant.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra habitum est, perfectio Christianae vitae non consistit essentialiter in voluntaria paupertate, sed voluntaria paupertas instrumentaliter operatur ad perfectionem vitae. Unde non oportet quod ubi est maior paupertas, ibi sit maior perfectio. Quinimmo potest esse summa perfectio cum magna opulentia, nam Abraham, cui dictum est, Gen. XVII, ambula coram me et esto perfectus, legitur dives fuisse. Ad secundum dicendum quod verba illa domini tripliciter possunt intelligi. Uno modo, mystice, ut non possideamus aurum neque argentum, idest, ut praedicatores non innitantur principaliter sapientiae et eloquentiae temporali; ut Hieronymus exponit. Alio modo, sicut Augustinus exponit, in libro de consensu Evangelist., ut intelligatur hoc dominum non praecipiendo, sed magis permittendo dixisse. Permisit enim eis ut absque auro et argento et aliis sumptibus ad praedicandum irent, accepturi sumptus vitae ab his quibus praedicabant. Unde subdit, dignus est enim operarius cibo suo. Ita tamen quod, si aliquis propriis sump-

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bishops are bound to keep this command, and to possess nothing of their own. Obj. 3: Further, Jerome says (Ep. lii ad Nepotian.): The Greek kleros denotes the Latin sors. Hence clerics are so called either because they are of the Lord’s estate, or because the Lord Himself is the estate, i.e., portion of clerics. Now he that possesses the Lord, can have nothing besides God; and if he have gold and silver, possessions, and chattels of all kinds, with such a portion the Lord does not vouchsafe to be his portion also. Therefore it would seem that not only bishops but even clerics should have nothing of their own. On the contrary, It is stated (XII, qu. i, can. Episcopi de rebus): Bishops, if they wish, may bequeath to their heirs their personal or acquired property, and whatever belongs to them personally. I answer that, No one is bound to works of supererogation, unless he binds himself specially thereto by vow. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Paulin. et Arment.): Since you have taken the vow, you have already bound yourself, you can no longer do otherwise. Before you were bound by the vow, you were free to submit. Now it is evident that to live without possessing anything is a work of supererogation, for it is a matter not of precept but of counsel. Wherefore our Lord after saying to the young man: If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments, said afterwards by way of addition: If thou wilt be perfect go sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor (Matt 19:17, 21). Bishops, however, do not bind themselves at their ordination to live without possessions of their own; nor indeed does the pastoral office, to which they bind themselves, make it necessary for them to live without anything of their own. Therefore bishops are not bound to live without possessions of their own. Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 184, A. 3, ad 1) the perfection of the Christian life does not essentially consist in voluntary poverty, but voluntary poverty conduces instrumentally to the perfection of life. Hence it does not follow that where there is greater poverty there is greater perfection; indeed the highest perfection is compatible with great wealth, since Abraham, to whom it was said (Gen 17:1): Walk before Me and be perfect, is stated to have been rich (Gen 13:2). Reply Obj. 2: This saying of our Lord can be understood in three ways. First, mystically, that we should possess neither gold nor silver means that the preacher should not rely chiefly on temporal wisdom and eloquence; thus Jerome expounds the passage. Second, according to Augustine’s explanation (De Consens. Ev. ii, 30), we are to understand that our Lord said this not in command but in permission. For he permitted them to go preaching without gold or silver or other means, since they were to receive the means of livelihood from those to whom they preached; wherefore He added: For the workman is worthy of his meat. And yet if anyone were to use

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tibus uteretur in praedicatione Evangelii, ad supererogationem pertineret, sicut Paulus de seipso dicit, I ad Cor. IX. Tertio modo, secundum quod Chrysostomus exponit, ut intelligatur illa dominum discipulis praecepisse quantum ad illam missionem qua mittebantur ad praedicandum Iudaeis, ut per hoc exercerentur ad confidendum de virtute ipsius, qui eis absque sumptibus provideret. Ex quo tamen non obligabantur ipsi, vel successores eorum, ut absque propriis sumptibus Evangelium praedicarent. Nam et de Paulo legitur, II ad Cor. XI, quod ab aliis Ecclesiis stipendium accipiebat ad praedicandum Corinthiis, et sic patet quod aliquid possidebat ab aliis sibi missum. Stultum autem videtur dicere quod tot sancti pontifices, sicut Athanasius, Ambrosius, Augustinus, illa praecepta transgressi fuissent, si ad ea observanda se crederent obligari.

his own means in preaching the Gospel, this would be a work of supererogation, as Paul says in reference to himself (1 Cor 9:12, 15). Third, according to the exposition of Chrysostom (Hom. ii in Rom. xvi, 3) we are to understand that our Lord laid these commands on His disciples in reference to the mission on which they were sent to preach to the Jews, so that they might be encouraged to trust in His power, seeing that He provided for their wants without their having means of their own. But it does not follow from this that they, or their successors, were obliged to preach the Gospel without having means of their own: since we read of Paul (2 Cor 11:8) that he received wages of other churches for preaching to the Corinthians, wherefore it is clear that he possessed something sent to him by others. And it seems foolish to say that so many holy bishops as Athanasius, Ambrose, and Augustine would have disobeyed these commandments if they believed themselves bound to observe them. Ad tertium dicendum quod omnis pars est minor Reply Obj. 3: Every part is less than the whole. Actoto. Ille ergo cum Deo alias partes habet, cuius studium cordingly a man has other portions together with God, if he diminuitur circa ea quae sunt Dei, dum intendit his quae becomes less intent on things pertaining to God by occupysunt mundi. Sic autem non debent nec episcopi nec cle- ing himself with things of the world. Now neither bishops rici proprium possidere, ut, dum curant propria, defec- nor clerics ought thus to possess means of their own, that tum faciant in his quae pertinent ad cultum divinum. while busy with their own they neglect those that concern the worship of God.

Article 7 Whether bishops sin mortally if they distribute not to the poor the ecclesiastical goods which accrue to them? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod episcopi mortaliter peccent si bona ecclesiastica quae procurant, pauperibus non largiantur. Dicit enim Ambrosius, exponens illud Luc. XII, hominis cuiusdam divitis uberes fructus ager attulit, nemo proprium dicat quod est commune, plus quam sufficiat sumptui, violenter obtentum est. Et postea subdit, neque minus est criminis habenti tollere quam, cum possis et abundas, denegare indigentibus. Sed violenter tollere alienum est peccatum mortale. Ergo episcopi mortaliter peccant si ea quae eis supersunt, pauperibus non largiantur. Praeterea, Isaiae III, super illud, rapina pauperum in domo vestra, dicit Glossa Hieronymi quod bona ecclesiastica sunt pauperum. Sed quicumque id quod est alterius sibi reservat aut aliis dat, peccat mortaliter et tenetur ad restitutionem. Ergo, si episcopi bona ecclesiastica quae eis superfluunt, sibi retineant vel consanguineis vel amicis largiantur, videtur quod teneantur ad restitutionem.

Objection 1: It would seem that bishops sin mortally if they distribute not to the poor the ecclesiastical goods which they acquire. For Ambrose expounding Luke 12:16, The land of a certain . . . man brought forth plenty of fruits, says: Let no man claim as his own that which he has taken and obtained by violence from the common property in excess of his requirements; and afterwards he adds: It is not less criminal to take from him who has, than, when you are able and have plenty to refuse him who has not. Now it is a mortal sin to take another’s property by violence. Therefore bishops sin mortally if they give not to the poor that which they have in excess. Obj. 2: Further, a gloss of Jerome on Isa. 3:14, The spoil of the poor is in your house, says that ecclesiastical goods belong to the poor. Now whoever keeps for himself or gives to others that which belongs to another, sins mortally and is bound to restitution. Therefore if bishops keep for themselves, or give to their relations or friends, their surplus of ecclesiastical goods, it would seem that they are bound to restitution.

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Praeterea, multo magis aliquis potest de rebus Ecclesiae ea quae sunt sibi necessaria accipere, quam superflua congregare. Sed Hieronymus dicit, in epistola ad Damasum Papam, clericos illos convenit Ecclesiae stipendiis sustentari quibus parentum et propinquorum nulli suffragantur, qui autem bonis parentum et opibus sustentari possunt, si quod pauperum est accipiunt, sacrilegium incurrunt. Unde et apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. V, si quis fidelis habet viduas, subministret illis, et non gravetur Ecclesia, ut his quae vere viduae sunt sufficiat. Ergo multo magis episcopi mortaliter peccant si ea quae eis superfluunt de bonis ecclesiasticis, pauperibus non largiantur.

Sed contra est quod plures episcopi ea quae supersunt non largiuntur pauperibus, sed expendere videntur laudabiliter ad reditus Ecclesiae ampliandos. Respondeo dicendum quod aliter est dicendum de propriis bonis, quae episcopi possidere possunt, et de bonis ecclesiasticis. Nam propriorum bonorum verum dominium habent. Unde ex ipsa rerum conditione non obligantur ut eas aliis conferant, sed possunt vel sibi retinere, vel aliis pro libitu elargiri. Possunt tamen in earum dispensatione peccare, vel propter inordinationem affectus, per quam contingit quod vel sibi plura conferant quam oporteat; vel etiam aliis non subveniant secundum quod requirit debitum caritatis. Non tamen tenetur ad restitutionem, quia huiusmodi res sunt eius dominio deputatae. Sed ecclesiasticorum bonorum sunt dispensatores vel procuratores, dicit enim Augustinus, ad Bonifacium, si privatum possidemus quod nobis sufficiat, non illa nostra sunt, sed illorum quorum procurationem gerimus, non proprietatem nobis usurpatione damnabili vindicemus. Ad dispensatorem autem requiritur bona fides, secundum illud I ad Cor. IV, hic iam quaeritur inter dispensatores ut fidelis quis inveniatur. Sunt autem bona ecclesiastica non solum in usus pauperum, sed etiam ad cultum divinum et necessitates ministrorum expendenda. Unde dicitur XII, qu. II, de reditibus Ecclesiae vel oblatione fidelium, sola episcopo ex his una portio emittatur; duae ecclesiasticis fabricis et erogationi pauperum profuturae a presbytero, sub periculo sui ordinis, ministrentur; ultima clericis, pro singulorum meritis, dividatur. Si ergo distincta sint bona quae debent in usum episcopi cedere, ab his quae sunt pauperibus et ministris et cultui Ecclesiae eroganda; et aliquid sibi retinuerit episcopus de his quae sunt pauperibus eroganda, vel in usum ministrorum aut in cultum divinum expendenda, non est dubium quod contra fidem dispensationis agit, et mortaliter peccat, et ad restitutionem tenetur.

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Obj. 3: Further, much more may one take what is necessary for oneself from the goods of the Church, than accumulate a surplus therefrom. Yet Jerome says in a letter to Pope Damasus: It is right that those clerics who receive no goods from their parents and relations should be supported from the funds of the Church. But those who have sufficient income from their parents and their own possessions, if they take what belongs to the poor, they commit and incur the guilt of sacrilege. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim 5:16): If any of the faithful have widows, let him minister to them, and let not the Church be charged, that there may be sufficient for them that are widows indeed. Much more therefore do bishops sin mortally if they give not to the poor the surplus of their ecclesiastical goods. On the contrary, Many bishops do not give their surplus to the poor, but would seem commendably to lay it out so as to increase the revenue of the Church. I answer that, The same is not to be said of their own goods which bishops may possess, and of ecclesiastical goods. For they have real dominion over their own goods; wherefore from the very nature of the case they are not bound to give these things to others, and may either keep them for themselves or bestow them on others at will. Nevertheless they may sin in this disposal by inordinate affection, which leads them either to accumulate more than they should, or not to assist others, in accordance with the demands of charity; yet they are not bound to restitution, because such things are entrusted to their ownership. On the other hand, they hold ecclesiastical goods as dispensers or trustees. For Augustine says (Ep. clxxxv ad Bonif.): If we possess privately what is enough for us, other things belong not to us but to the poor, and we have the dispensing of them; but we can claim ownership of them only by wicked theft. Now dispensing requires good faith, according to 1 Cor. 4:2, Here now it is required among the dispensers that a man be found faithful. Moreover ecclesiastical goods are to be applied not only to the good of the poor, but also to the divine worship and the needs of its ministers. Hence it is said (XII, qu. ii, can. de reditibus): Of the Church’s revenues or the offerings of the faithful only one part is to be assigned to the bishop, two parts are to be used by the priest, under pain of suspension, for the ecclesiastical fabric, and for the benefit of the poor; the remaining part is to be divided among the clergy according to their respective merits. Accordingly if the goods which are assigned to the use of the bishop are distinct from those which are appointed for the use of the poor, or the ministers, or for the ecclesiastical worship, and if the bishop keeps back for himself part of that which should be given to the poor, or to the ministers for their use, or expended on the divine worship, without doubt he is an unfaithful dispenser, sins mortally, and is bound to restitution.

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De his autem quae sunt specialiter suo usui deputata, videtur esse eadem ratio quae est de propriis bonis, ut scilicet propter immoderatum affectum et usum peccet quidem, si immoderata sibi retineat, et aliis non subveniat sicut requirit debitum caritatis. Si vero non sint praedicta bona distincta, eorum distributio fidei eius committitur. Et si quidem in modico deficiat vel superabundet, potest hoc fieri absque bonae fidei detrimento, quia non potest homo in talibus punctaliter accipere illud quod fieri oportet. Si vero sit multus excessus, non potest latere, unde videtur bonae fidei repugnare. Et ideo non est absque peccato mortali, dicitur enim Matth. XXIV, quod, si dixerit malus servus in corde suo, moram facit dominus meus venire, quod pertinet ad divini iudicii contemptum; et coeperit percutere conservos suos, quod pertinet ad superbiam; manducet autem et bibat cum ebriosis, quod pertinet ad luxuriam, veniet dominus servi illius in die qua non sperat, et dividet eum, scilicet a societate bonorum, et partem eius ponet cum hypocritis, scilicet in Inferno. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum illud Ambrosii non solum est referendum ad dispensationem ecclesiasticarum rerum, sed quorumcumque bonorum ex quibus tenetur aliquis, debito caritatis, providere necessitatem patientibus. Non tamen potest determinari quando sit ista necessitas quae ad peccatum mortale obliget, sicut nec cetera particularia quae in humanis actibus considerantur. Horum enim determinatio relinquitur humanae prudentiae. Ad secundum dicendum quod bona Ecclesiarum non sunt solum expendenda in usus pauperum, sed etiam in alios usus, ut dictum est. Et ideo si de eo quod usui episcopi vel alicuius clerici est deputatum, velit aliquis sibi subtrahere et consanguineis vel aliis dare, non peccat, dummodo id faciat moderate, idest, ut non indigeant, non autem ut ditiores inde fiant. Unde Ambrosius dicit, in libro de Offic., est approbanda liberalitas, ut proximos seminis tui ne despicias, si egere cognoscas, non tamen ut illi ditiores fieri velint ex eo quod tu potes conferre inopibus. Ad tertium dicendum quod non omnia bona Ecclesiarum sunt pauperibus largienda, nisi forte in articulo necessitatis, in quo etiam, pro redemptione captivorum et aliis necessitatibus pauperum, vasa cultui divino dicata distrahuntur, ut Ambrosius dicit. Et in tali necessitate peccaret clericus si vellet de rebus Ecclesiae vivere, dummodo haberet patrimonialia bona, de quibus vivere possit. Ad quartum dicendum quod bona Ecclesiarum usibus pauperum deservire debent. Et ideo si quis, necessitate non imminente providendi pauperibus, de his quae superfluunt ex proventibus Ecclesiae possessiones

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But as regards those goods which are deputed to his private use, the same apparently applies as to his own property, namely that he sins through immoderate attachment thereto or use thereof, if he exceeds moderation in what he keeps for himself, and fails to assist others according to the demands of charity. On the other hand, if no distinction is made in the aforesaid goods, their distribution is entrusted to his good faith; and if he fail or exceed in a slight degree, this may happen without prejudice to his good faith, because in such matters a man cannot possibly decide precisely what ought to be done. On the other hand, if the excess be very great he cannot be ignorant of the fact; consequently he would seem to be lacking in good faith, and is guilty of mortal sin. For it is written (Matt 24:48–51) that if that evil servant shall say in his heart: My lord is long a-coming, which shows contempt of God’s judgment, and shall begin to strike his fellowservants, which is a sign of pride, and shall eat and drink with drunkards, which proceeds from lust, the lord of that servant shall come in a day that he hopeth not . . . and shall separate him, namely from the fellowship of good men, and appoint his portion with hypocrites, namely in hell. Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Ambrose refers to the administration not only of ecclesiastical things but also of any goods whatever from which a man is bound, as a duty of charity, to provide for those who are in need. But it is not possible to state definitely when this need is such as to impose an obligation under pain of mortal sin, as is the case in other points of detail that have to be considered in human acts: for the decision in such matters is left to human prudence. Reply Obj. 2: As stated above the goods of the Church have to be employed not only for the use of the poor, but also for other purposes. Hence if a bishop or cleric wish to deprive himself of that which is assigned to his own use, and give it to his relations or others, he sins not so long as he observes moderation, so, to wit, that they cease to be in want without becoming the richer thereby. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): It is a commendable liberality if you overlook not your kindred when you know them to be in want; yet not so as to wish to make them rich with what you can give to the poor. Reply Obj. 3: The goods of churches should not all be given to the poor, except in a case of necessity: for then, as Ambrose says (De Offic. ii, 28), even the vessels consecrated to the divine worship are to be sold for the ransom of prisoners, and other needs of the poor. In such a case of necessity a cleric would sin if he chose to maintain himself on the goods of the Church, always supposing him to have a patrimony of his own on which to support himself. Reply Obj. 4: The goods of the churches should be employed for the good of the poor. Consequently a man is to be commended if, there being no present necessity for helping the poor, he spends the surplus from the Church rev-

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emat, vel in thesauro reponat in futurum utilitati Ecclesiae et necessitatibus pauperum, laudabiliter facit. Si vero necessitas immineat pauperibus erogandi, superflua cura est et inordinata ut aliquis in futurum conservet, quod dominus prohibet, Matth. VI, dicens, nolite solliciti esse in crastinum.

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enue, in buying property, or lays it by for some future use connected with the Church or the needs of the poor. But if there be a pressing need for helping the poor, to lay by for the future is a superfluous and inordinate saving, and is forbidden by our Lord Who said (Matt 6:34): Be . . . not solicitous for the morrow.

Article 8 Whether religious who are raised to the episcopate are bound to religious observances? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod religiosi qui promoventur in episcopos, non teneantur ad observantias regulares. Dicitur enim XVIII, qu. I, quod monachum canonica electio a iugo regulae monasticae professionis absolvit, et sacra ordinatio de monacho episcopum facit. Sed observantiae regulares pertinent ad iugum regulae. Ergo religiosi qui in episcopum assumuntur, non tenentur ad observantias regulares. Praeterea, ille qui ab inferiori ad superiorem gradum ascendit, non videtur teneri ad ea quae sunt inferioris gradus, sicut supra dictum est quod religiosus non tenetur ad observanda vota quae in saeculo fecit. Sed religiosus qui assumitur ad episcopatum, ascendit ad aliquid maius, ut supra habitum est. Ergo videtur quod non obligetur episcopus ad ea quae tenebatur observare in statu religionis. Praeterea, maxime religiosi obligari videntur ad obedientiam, et ad hoc quod sine proprio vivant. Sed religiosi qui assumuntur ad episcopatum, non tenentur obedire praelatis suarum religionum, quia sunt eis superiores. Nec etiam videntur teneri ad paupertatem, quia, sicut in decreto supra inducto dicitur, quem sacra ordinatio de monacho episcopum facit, velut legitimus heres, paternam sibi hereditatem iure vindicandi potestatem habeat. Interdum etiam conceditur eis testamenta conficere. Ergo multo minus tenentur ad alias observantias regulares. Sed contra est quod dicitur in decretis, XVI, qu. I, de monachis qui diu morantes in monasteriis, si postea ad clericatus ordines pervenerint, statuimus non debere eos a priori proposito discedere. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, status religionis ad perfectionem pertinet quasi quaedam via in perfectionem tendendi, status autem episcopalis ad perfectionem pertinet tanquam quoddam perfectionis magisterium. Unde status religionis comparatur ad statum episcopalem sicut disciplina ad magisterium, et dispositio ad perfectionem. Dispositio autem non tollitur, perfectione adveniente, nisi forte quantum ad id in quo perfectioni repugnat; quantum autem ad id

Objection 1: It would seem that religious who are raised to the episcopate are not bound to religious observances. For it is said (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that a canonical election loosens a monk from the yoke imposed by the rule of the monastic profession, and the holy ordination makes of a monk a bishop. Now the regular observances pertain to the yoke of the rule. Therefore religious who are appointed bishops are not bound to religious observances. Obj. 2: Further, he who ascends from a lower to a higher degree is seemingly not bound to those things which pertain to the lower degree: thus it was stated above (Q. 88, A. 12, ad 1) that a religious is not bound to keep the vows he made in the world. But a religious who is appointed to the episcopate ascends to something greater, as stated above (Q. 84, A. 7). Therefore it would seem that a bishop is not bound to those things whereto he was bound in the state of religion. Obj. 3: Further, religious would seem to be bound above all to obedience, and to live without property of their own. But religious who are appointed bishops, are not bound to obey the superiors of their order, since they are above them; nor apparently are they bound to poverty, since according to the decree quoted above (Obj. 1) when the holy ordination has made of a monk a bishop he enjoys the right, as the lawful heir, of claiming his paternal inheritance. Moreover they are sometimes allowed to make a will. Much less therefore are they bound to other regular observances. On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XVI, qu. i, can. De Monachis): With regard to those who after long residence in a monastery attain to the order of clerics, we bid them not to lay aside their former purpose. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1, ad 2) the religious state pertains to perfection, as a way of tending to perfection, while the episcopal state pertains to perfection, as a professorship of perfection. Hence the religious state is compared to the episcopal state, as the school to the professorial chair, and as disposition to perfection. Now the disposition is not voided at the advent of perfection, except as regards what perchance is incompatible with perfection, whereas as to that wherein it is in accord with perfection, it

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quod perfectioni congruit, magis confirmatur. Sicut discipulo, cum ad magisterium pervenerit, non congruit quod sit auditor, congruit tamen sibi quod legat et meditetur, etiam magis quam ante. Sic igitur dicendum est quod, si qua sunt in regularibus observantiis quae non impediant pontificale officium, sed magis valeant ad perfectionis custodiam, sicut est continentia, paupertas et alia huiusmodi, ad haec remanet religiosus, etiam factus episcopus, obligatus; et per consequens, ad portandum habitum suae religionis, qui est huius obligationis signum. Si qua vero sunt in observantiis regularibus quae officio pontificali repugnent, sicut est solitudo, silentium, et aliquae abstinentiae vel vigiliae graves, ex quibus impotens corpore redderetur ad exequendum pontificale officium, ad huiusmodi observanda non tenetur. In aliis tamen potest dispensatione uti, secundum quod requirit necessitas personae vel officii, vel conditio hominum cum quibus vivit, per modum quo etiam praelati religionum in talibus secum dispensant. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille qui fit de monacho episcopus, absolvitur a iugo monasticae professionis, non quantum ad omnia, sed quantum ad illa quae officio pontificali repugnant, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod vota saecularis vitae se habent ad vota religionis sicut particulare ad universale, ut supra habitum est. Sed vota religionis se habent ad pontificalem dignitatem sicut dispositio ad perfectionem. Particulare autem superfluit, habito universali, sed dispositio adhuc necessaria est, perfectione obtenta. Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc est per accidens quod episcopi religiosi obedire praelatis suarum religionum non tenentur, quia sibi subditi esse desierunt, sicut et ipsi praelati religionum. Manet tamen adhuc obligatio voti virtualiter, ita scilicet quod, si eis legitime aliquis praeficeretur, obedire tenerentur, inquantum tenentur obedire statutis regulae per modum praedictum, et suis superioribus, si quos habent. Proprium autem nullo modo habere possunt. Non enim hereditatem paternam vindicant quasi propriam, sed quasi Ecclesiae debitam. Unde ibidem subditur quod, postquam episcopus ordinatur, ad altare ad quod sanctificatur, quod acquirere potuit restituat. Testamentum autem nullo modo facere potest, quia sola dispensatio ei committitur rerum ecclesiasticarum, quae morte finitur, ex qua incipit testamentum valere, ut apostolus dicit, ad Heb. IX. Si tamen ex concessione Papae testamentum faciat, non intelligitur ex proprio facere testamentum, sed apostolica auctoritate intelligi-

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is confirmed the more. Thus when the scholar has become a professor it no longer becomes him to be a listener, but it becomes him to read and meditate even more than before. Accordingly we must assert that if there be among religious observances any that instead of being an obstacle to the episcopal office, are a safeguard of perfection, such as continence, poverty, and so forth, a religious, even after he has been made a bishop, remains bound to observe these, and consequently to wear the habit of his order, which is a sign of this obligation. On the other hand, a man is not bound to keep such religious observances as may be incompatible with the episcopal office, for instance solitude, silence, and certain severe abstinences or watchings and such as would render him bodily unable to exercise the episcopal office. For the rest he may dispense himself from them, according to the needs of his person or office, and the manner of life of those among whom he dwells, in the same way as religious superiors dispense themselves in such matters. Reply Obj. 1: He who from being a monk becomes a bishop is loosened from the yoke of the monastic profession, not in everything, but in those that are incompatible with the episcopal office, as stated above. Reply Obj. 2: The vows of those who are living in the world are compared to the vows of religion as the particular to the universal, as stated above (Q. 88, A. 12, ad 1). But the vows of religion are compared to the episcopal dignity as disposition to perfection. Now the particular is superfluous when one has the universal, whereas the disposition is still necessary when perfection has been attained. Reply Obj. 3: It is accidental that religious who are bishops are not bound to obey the superiors of their order, because, to wit, they have ceased to be their subjects; even as those same religious superiors. Nevertheless the obligation of the vow remains virtually, so that if any person be lawfully set above them, they would be bound to obey them, inasmuch as they are bound to obey both the statutes of their rule in the way mentioned above, and their superiors if they have any. As to property they can nowise have it. For they claim their paternal inheritance not as their own, but as due to the Church. Hence it is added (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that after he has been ordained bishop at the altar to which he is consecrated and appointed according to the holy canons, he must restore whatever he may acquire. Nor can he make any testament at all, because he is entrusted with the sole administration of things ecclesiastical, and this ends with his death, after which a testament comes into force according to the Apostle (Heb 9:17). If, however, by the Pope’s permission he make a will, he is not to be understood to bequeath property of his own, but we are to un-

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tur esse ampliata potestas suae dispensationis, ut eius di- derstand that by apostolic authority the power of his adspensatio possit valere post mortem. ministration has been prolonged so as to remain in force after his death.

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Question 186 Those Things in Which the Religious State Properly Consists Deinde considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad statum religionis. Circa quod occurrit quadruplex consideratio, quarum prima est de his in quibus principaliter consistit religionis status; secunda, de his quae religiosis licite convenire possunt; tertia, de distinctione religionum; quarta, de religionis ingressu. Circa primum quaeruntur decem. Primo, utrum religiosorum status sit perfectus. Secundo, utrum religiosi teneantur ad omnia consilia. Tertio, utrum voluntaria paupertas requiratur ad religionem. Quarto, utrum requiratur continentia. Quinto, utrum requiratur obedientia. Sexto, utrum requiratur quod haec cadant sub voto.

We must now consider things pertaining to the religious state: which consideration will be fourfold. In the first place we shall consider those things in which the religious state consists chiefly; second, those things which are lawfully befitting to religious; third, the different kinds of religious orders; fourth, the entrance into the religious state. Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether the religious state is perfect? (2) Whether religious are bound to all the counsels? (3) Whether voluntary poverty is required for the religious state? (4) Whether continency is necessary? (5) Whether obedience is necessary? (6) Whether it is necessary that these should be the matter of a vow? (7) Of the sufficiency of these vows; (8) Of their comparison one with another; (9) Whether a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses a statute of his rule? (10) Whether, other things being equal, a religious sins more grievously by the same kind of sin than a secular person?

Septimo, de sufficientia horum votorum. Octavo, de comparatione eorum ad invicem. Nono, utrum religiosus semper mortaliter peccet quando transgreditur statutum suae regulae. Decimo, utrum, ceteris paribus, in eodem genere peccati plus peccet religiosus quam saecularis.

Article 1 Whether religion implies a state of perfection? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod religio non importet statum perfectionis. Illud enim quod est de necessitate salutis, non videtur ad statum perfectionis pertinere. Sed religio est de necessitate salutis, quia per eam uni vero Deo religamur, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro de vera Relig.; vel religio dicitur ex eo quod Deum reeligimus, quem amiseramus negligentes, ut Augustinus dicit in X de Civ. Dei. Ergo videtur quod religio non nominet perfectionis statum. Praeterea, religio, secundum Tullium, est quae naturae divinae cultum et caeremoniam affert. Sed afferre Deo cultum et caeremoniam magis videtur pertinere ad ministeria sacrorum ordinum quam ad diversitatem statuum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo videtur quod religio non nominet perfectionis statum.

Objection 1: It would seem that religion does not imply a state of perfection. For that which is necessary for salvation does not seemingly pertain to perfection. But religion is necessary for salvation, whether because thereby we are bound (religamur) to the one almighty God, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55), or because it takes its name from our returning (religimus) to God Whom we had lost by neglecting Him, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3). Therefore it would seem that religion does not denote the state of perfection. Obj. 2: Further, religion according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) is that which offers worship and ceremony to the Divine nature. Now the offering of worship and ceremony to God would seem to pertain to the ministry of holy orders rather than to the diversity of states, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 2; Q. 183, A. 3). Therefore it would seem that religion does not denote the state of perfection.

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Praeterea, status perfectionis distinguitur contra statum incipientium et proficientium. Sed etiam in religione sunt aliqui incipientes et aliqui proficientes. Ergo religio non nominat perfectionis statum. Praeterea, religio videtur esse poenitentiae locus, dicitur enim in decretis, VII, qu. I, praecipit sancta synodus ut quicumque de pontificali dignitate ad monachorum vitam et poenitentiae descenderit locum, nunquam ad pontificatum resurgat. Sed locus poenitentiae opponitur statui perfectionis, unde Dionysius, VI cap. Eccles. Hier., ponit poenitentes in infimo loco, scilicet inter purgandos. Ergo videtur quod religio non sit status perfectionis. Sed contra est quod in collationibus patrum, dicit abbas Moyses, de religiosis loquens, ieiuniorum inediam, vigilias, labores, corporis nuditatem, lectionem, ceterasque virtutes debere nos suscipere noverimus, ut ad perfectionem caritatis istis gradibus possimus conscendere. Sed ea quae ad humanos actus pertinent, ab intentione finis speciem et nomen recipiunt. Ergo religiosi pertinent ad statum perfectionis. Dionysius etiam, VI cap. Eccles. Hier., dicit eos qui nominantur Dei famuli, ex Dei puro servitio et famulatu uniri ad amabilem perfectionem. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, id quod communiter multis convenit, antonomastice attribuitur ei cui per excellentiam convenit, sicut nomen fortitudinis vindicat sibi illa virtus quae circa difficillima firmitatem animi servat, et temperantiae nomen vindicat sibi illa virtus quae temperat maximas delectationes. Religio autem, ut supra habitum est, est quaedam virtus per quam aliquis ad Dei servitium et cultum aliquid exhibet. Et ideo antonomastice religiosi dicuntur illi qui se totaliter mancipant divino servitio, quasi holocaustum Deo offerentes. Unde Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., sunt quidam qui nihil sibimetipsis reservant, sed sensum, linguam, vitam atque substantiam quam perceperunt, omnipotenti Deo immolant. In hoc autem perfectio hominis consistit quod totaliter Deo inhaereat, sicut ex supra dictis patet. Et secundum hoc, religio perfectionis statum nominat. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod exhibere aliqua ad cultum Dei est de necessitate salutis, sed quod aliquis totaliter se et sua divino cultui deputet, ad perfectionem pertinet. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de virtute religionis ageretur, ad religionem pertinent non solum oblationes sacrificiorum, et alia huiusmodi quae sunt religioni propria, sed etiam actus omnium virtutum, secundum quod referuntur ad Dei servitium et honorem, efficiuntur actus religionis. Et se-

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Obj. 3: Further, the state of perfection is distinct from the state of beginners and that of the proficient. But in religion also some are beginners, and some are proficient. Therefore religion does not denote the state of perfection. Obj. 4: Further, religion would seem a place of repentance; for it is said in the Decrees (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): The holy synod orders that any man who has been degraded from the episcopal dignity to the monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no means rise again to the episcopate. Now a place of repentance is opposed to the state of perfection; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. vi) places penitents in the lowest place, namely among those who are to be cleansed. Therefore it would seem that religion is not the state of perfection. On the contrary, In the Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. i, 7) abbot Moses speaking of religious says: We must recognize that we have to undertake the hunger of fasting, watchings, bodily toil, privation, reading, and other acts of virtue, in order by these degrees to mount to the perfection of charity. Now things pertaining to human acts are specified and denominated from the intention of the end. Therefore religious belong to the state of perfection. Moreover Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi) that those who are called servants of God, by reason of their rendering pure service and subjection to God, are united to the perfection beloved of Him. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 141, A. 2) that which is applicable to many things in common is ascribed antonomastically to that to which it is applicable by way of excellence. Thus the name of fortitude is claimed by the virtue which preserves the firmness of the mind in regard to most difficult things, and the name of temperance, by that virtue which tempers the greatest pleasures. Now religion as stated above (Q. 81, A. 2; A. 3, ad 2) is a virtue whereby a man offers something to the service and worship of God. Wherefore those are called religious antonomastically, who give themselves up entirely to the divine service, as offering a holocaust to God. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.): Some there are who keep nothing for themselves, but sacrifice to almighty God their tongue, their senses, their life, and the property they possess. Now the perfection of man consists in adhering wholly to God, as stated above (Q. 184, A. 2), and in this sense religion denotes the state of perfection. Reply Obj. 1: To offer something to the worship of God is necessary for salvation, but to offer oneself wholly, and one’s possessions to the worship of God belongs to perfection. Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 81, A. 1, ad 1; A. 4, ad 1, 2; Q. 85, A. 3) when we were treating of the virtue of religion, religion has reference not only to the offering of sacrifices and other like things that are proper to religion, but also to the acts of all the virtues which insofar as these are referred to God’s service and honor become acts of reli-

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cundum hoc, si aliquis totam vitam suam divino servitio deputet, tota vita sua ad religionem pertinebit. Et secundum hoc, ex vita religiosa quam ducunt, religiosi dicuntur qui sunt in statu perfectionis. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, religio nominat statum perfectionis ex intentione finis. Unde non oportet quod quicumque est in religione, iam sit perfectus, sed quod ad perfectionem tendat. Unde super illud Matth. XIX, si vis perfectus esse etc., dicit Origenes quod ille qui mutavit pro divitiis paupertatem ut fiat perfectus, non in ipso tempore quo tradiderit bona sua pauperibus, fiet omnino perfectus, sed ex illa die incipiet speculatio Dei adducere eum ad omnes virtutes. Et hoc modo in religione non omnes sunt perfecti, sed quidam incipientes, quidam proficientes.

gion. Accordingly if a man devotes his whole life to the divine service, his whole life belongs to religion, and thus by reason of the religious life that they lead, those who are in the state of perfection are called religious. Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 184, AA. 4, 6), religion denotes the state of perfection by reason of the end intended. Hence it does not follow that whoever is in the state of perfection is already perfect, but that he tends to perfection. Hence Origen commenting on Matt. 19:21, If thou wilt be perfect, etc., says (Tract. viii in Matth.) that he who has exchanged riches for poverty in order to become perfect does not become perfect at the very moment of giving his goods to the poor; but from that day the contemplation of God will begin to lead him to all the virtues. Thus all are not perfect in religion, but some are beginners, some proficient. Ad quartum dicendum quod religionis status prinReply Obj. 4: The religious state was instituted chiefly cipaliter est institutus ad perfectionem adipiscendam that we might obtain perfection by means of certain exerper quaedam exercitia quibus tolluntur impedimenta cises, whereby the obstacles to perfect charity are removed. perfectae caritatis. Sublatis autem impedimentis perfec- By the removal of the obstacles of perfect charity, much tae caritatis, multo magis exciduntur occasiones pec- more are the occasions of sin cut off, for sin destroys charity cati, per quod totaliter tollitur caritas. Unde, cum ad altogether. Wherefore since it belongs to penance to cut out poenitentem pertineat causas peccatorum excidere, ex the causes of sin, it follows that the religious state is a most consequenti status religionis est convenientissimus poe- fitting place for penance. Hence (XXXIII, qu. ii, cap. Adnitentiae locus. Unde in decretis, XXXIII, qu. II, cap. monere) a man who had killed his wife is counseled to enter admonere, consulitur cuidam qui uxorem occiderat, ut a monastery which is described as better and lighter, rather potius monasterium ingrediatur, quod dicit esse melius than to do public penance while remaining in the world.

et levius, quam poenitentiam publicam agat remanendo in saeculo.

Article 2 Whether every religious is bound to keep all the counsels? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod quilibet religiosus teneatur ad omnia consilia. Quicumque enim profitetur statum aliquem, tenetur ad ea quae illi statui conveniunt. Sed quilibet religiosus profitetur statum perfectionis. Ergo quilibet religiosus tenetur ad omnia consilia, quae ad perfectionis statum pertinent. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod ille qui praesens saeculum deserit et agit bona quae valet, quasi iam Aegypto derelicto, sacrificium praebet in eremo. Sed deserere saeculum specialiter pertinet ad religiosos. Ergo etiam eorum est agere omnia bona quae valent. Et ita videtur quod quilibet eorum teneatur ad omnia consilia implenda. Praeterea, si non requiritur ad statum perfectionis quod aliquis omnia consilia impleat, sufficiens esse videtur si quaedam consilia impleat. Sed hoc falsum est, quia multi in saeculari vita existentes aliqua consilia implent, ut patet de his qui continentiam servant. Ergo videtur quod quilibet religiosus, qui est in statu perfec-

Objection 1: It would seem that every religious is bound to keep all the counsels. For whoever professes a certain state of life is bound to observe whatever belongs to that state. Now each religious professes the state of perfection. Therefore every religious is bound to keep all the counsels that pertain to the state of perfection. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.) that he who renounces this world, and does all the good he can, is like one who has gone out of Egypt and offers sacrifice in the wilderness. Now it belongs specially to religious to renounce the world. Therefore it belongs to them also to do all the good they can; and so it would seem that each of them is bound to fulfill all the counsels. Obj. 3: Further, if it is not requisite for the state of perfection to fulfill all the counsels, it would seem enough to fulfill some of them. But this is false, since some who lead a secular life fulfill some of the counsels, for instance those who observe continence. Therefore it would seem that every religious who is in the state of perfection is bound to

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tionis, teneatur ad omnia quae sunt perfectionis. Huiusmodi autem sunt omnia consilia. Sed contra, ad ea quae sunt supererogationis non tenetur aliquis nisi ex propria obligatione. Sed quilibet religiosus obligat se ad aliqua determinata, quidam ad haec, quidam ad illa. Non ergo omnes tenentur ad omnia. Respondeo dicendum quod ad perfectionem aliquid pertinet tripliciter. Uno modo, essentialiter. Et sic, sicut supra dictum est, ad perfectionem pertinet perfecta observantia praeceptorum caritatis. Alio modo ad perfectionem pertinet aliquid consequenter sicut illa quae consequuntur ex perfectione caritatis, puta quod aliquis maledicenti benedicat et alia huiusmodi impleat, quae, etsi secundum praeparationem animi sint in praecepto, ut scilicet impleantur quando necessitas requirit, tamen ex superabundantia caritatis procedit quod etiam extra necessitatem quandoque talia impleantur. Tertio modo pertinet aliquid ad perfectionem instrumentaliter et dispositive, sicut paupertas, continentia, abstinentia et alia huiusmodi. Dictum est autem quod ipsa perfectio caritatis est finis status religionis, status autem religionis est quaedam disciplina vel exercitium ad perfectionem perveniendi. Ad quam quidem aliqui pervenire nituntur exercitiis diversis, sicut etiam medicus ad sanandum uti potest diversis medicamentis. Manifestum est autem quod illi qui operatur ad finem, non ex necessitate convenit quod iam assecutus sit finem, sed requiritur quod per aliquam viam tendat in finem. Et ideo ille qui statum religionis assumit, non tenetur habere perfectam caritatem, sed tenetur ad hoc tendere et operam dare ut habeat caritatem perfectam. Et eadem ratione, non tenetur ad hoc quod illa impleat quae perfectionem caritatis consequuntur, tenetur autem ut ad ea implenda intendat. Contra quod facit contemnens. Unde non peccat si ea praetermittat, sed si ea contemnat. Similiter etiam non tenetur ad omnia exercitia quibus ad perfectionem pervenitur, sed ad illa determinate quae sunt ei taxata secundum regulam quam professus est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille qui transit ad religionem, non profitetur se esse perfectum, sed profitetur se adhibere studium ad perfectionem consequendam, sicut etiam ille qui intrat scholas, non profitetur se scientem, sed profitetur se studentem ad scientiam acquirendam. Unde sicut Augustinus dicit, VIII de Civ. Dei, Pythagoras noluit profiteri se sapientem, sed sapientiae amatorem. Et ideo religiosus non est transgressor professionis si non sit perfectus, sed solum si contemnat ad perfectionem tendere. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut diligere Deum ex toto corde tenentur omnes, est tamen aliqua perfec-

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fulfill whatever pertains to perfection: and such are the counsels. On the contrary, one is not bound, unless one bind oneself, to do works of supererogation. But every religious does not bind himself to keep all the counsels, but to certain definite ones, some to some, others to others. Therefore all are not bound to keep all of them. I answer that, A thing pertains to perfection in three ways. First, essentially, and thus, as stated above (Q. 184, A. 3) the perfect observance of the precepts of charity belongs to perfection. Second, a thing belongs to perfection consequently: such are those things that result from the perfection of charity, for instance to bless them that curse you (Luke 6:27), and to keep counsels of a like kind, which though they be binding as regards the preparedness of the mind, so that one has to fulfill them when necessity requires, yet are sometimes fulfilled, without there being any necessity, through superabundance of charity. Third, a thing belongs to perfection instrumentally and dispositively, as poverty, continence, abstinence, and the like. Now it has been stated (A. 1) that the perfection of charity is the end of the religious state. And the religious state is a school or exercise for the attainment of perfection, which men strive to reach by various practices, just as a physician may use various remedies in order to heal. But it is evident that for him who works for an end it is not necessary that he should already have attained the end, but it is requisite that he should by some means tend thereto. Hence he who enters the religious state is not bound to have perfect charity, but he is bound to tend to this, and use his endeavors to have perfect charity. For the same reason he is not bound to fulfill those things that result from the perfection of charity, although he is bound to intend to fulfill them: against which intention he acts if he contemns them, wherefore he sins not by omitting them but by contempt of them. In like manner he is not bound to observe all the practices whereby perfection may be attained, but only those which are definitely prescribed to him by the rule which he has professed. Reply Obj. 1: He who enters religion does not make profession to be perfect, but he professes to endeavor to attain perfection; even as he who enters the schools does not profess to have knowledge, but to study in order to acquire knowledge. Wherefore as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii, 2), Pythagoras was unwilling to profess to be a wise man, but acknowledged himself, a lover of wisdom. Hence a religious does not violate his profession if he be not perfect, but only if he despises to tend to perfection. Reply Obj. 2: Just as, though all are bound to love God with their whole heart, yet there is a certain wholeness of

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tionis totalitas quae sine peccato praetermitti non potest, aliqua autem quae sine peccato praetermittitur, dum tamen desit contemptus, ut supra dictum est, ita etiam omnes, tam religiosi quam saeculares, tenentur aliqualiter facere quidquid boni possunt, omnibus enim communiter dicitur, Eccle. IX, quidquid potest manus tua, instanter operare; est tamen aliquis modus hoc praeceptum implendi quo peccatum vitatur, si scilicet homo faciat quod potest secundum quod requirit conditio sui status; dummodo contemptus non adsit agendi meliora, per quem animus obfirmatur contra spiritualem profectum. Ad tertium dicendum quod quaedam consilia sunt quae si praetermitterentur, tota vita hominis implicaretur negotiis saecularibus, puta si aliquis haberet proprium, vel matrimonio uteretur, aut aliquid huiusmodi faceret quod pertinet ad essentialia religionis vota. Et ideo ad omnia talia consilia observanda religiosi tenentur. Sunt autem quaedam consilia de quibusdam particularibus melioribus actibus, quae praetermitti possunt absque hoc quod vita hominis saecularibus actibus implicetur. Unde non oportet quod ad omnia talia religiosi teneantur.

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perfection which cannot be omitted without sin, and another wholeness which can be omitted without sin (Q. 184, A. 2, ad 3), provided there be no contempt, as stated above (ad 1), so too, all, both religious and seculars, are bound, in a certain measure, to do whatever good they can, for to all without exception it is said (Eccl 9:10): Whatsoever thy hand is able to do, do it earnestly. Yet there is a way of fulfilling this precept, so as to avoid sin, namely if one do what one can as required by the conditions of one’s state of life: provided there be no contempt of doing better things, which contempt sets the mind against spiritual progress. Reply Obj. 3: There are some counsels such that if they be omitted, man’s whole life would be taken up with secular business; for instance if he have property of his own, or enter the married state, or do something of the kind that regards the essential vows of religion themselves; wherefore religious are bound to keep all such like counsels. Other counsels there are, however, about certain particular better actions, which can be omitted without one’s life being taken up with secular actions; wherefore there is no need for religious to be bound to fulfill all of them.

Article 3 Whether poverty is required for religious perfection? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod paupertas non requiratur ad perfectionem religionis. Non enim videtur ad statum perfectionis pertinere illud quod illicite fit. Sed quod homo omnia sua relinquat, videtur esse illicitum, apostolus enim, II ad Cor. VIII, dat formam fidelibus eleemosynas faciendi, dicens, si voluntas prompta est, secundum id quod habet, accepta est, idest, ut necessaria retineatis; et postea subdit, non ut aliis sit remissio, vobis autem tribulatio, Glossa, idest, paupertas. Et super illud I ad Tim. VI, habentes alimenta et quibus tegamur, dicit Glossa, etsi nihil intulerimus vel ablaturi simus, non tamen omnino abiicienda sunt haec temporalia. Ergo videtur quod voluntaria paupertas non requiratur ad perfectionem religionis. Praeterea, quicumque se exponit periculo, peccat. Sed ille qui, omnibus suis relictis, voluntariam paupertatem sectatur, exponit se periculo, et spirituali, secundum illud Prov. XXX, ne forte, egestate compulsus, furer et periurem nomen Dei mei, et Eccli. XXVII, propter inopiam multi perierunt; et etiam corporali, dicitur enim Eccle. VII, sicut protegit sapientia, sic protegit et pecunia. Et philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod videtur quaedam perditio ipsius hominis esse corruptio divitiarum, quia per has

Objection 1: It would seem that poverty is not required for religious perfection. For that which it is unlawful to do does not apparently belong to the state of perfection. But it would seem to be unlawful for a man to give up all he possesses; since the Apostle (2 Cor 8:12) lays down the way in which the faithful are to give alms saying: If the will be forward, it is accepted according to that which a man hath, i.e., you should keep back what you need, and afterwards he adds (2 Cor 8:13): For I mean not that others should be eased, and you burthened, i.e., with poverty, according to a gloss. Moreover a gloss on 1 Tim. 6:8, Having food, and wherewith to be covered, says: Though we brought nothing, and will carry nothing away, we must not give up these temporal things altogether. Therefore it seems that voluntary poverty is not requisite for religious perfection. Obj. 2: Further, whosoever exposes himself to danger sins. But he who renounces all he has and embraces voluntary poverty exposes himself to danger—not only spiritual, according to Prov. 30:9, Lest perhaps . . . being compelled by poverty, I should steal and forswear the name of my God, and Ecclus. 27:1, Through poverty many have sinned—but also corporal, for it is written (Eccl 7:13): As wisdom is a defense, so money is a defense, and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that the waste of property appears to be a sort of ruining of

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homo vivit. Ergo videtur quod voluntaria paupertas non one’s self, since thereby man lives. Therefore it would seem requiratur ad perfectionem religiosae vitae. that voluntary poverty is not requisite for the perfection of religious life. Praeterea, virtus in medio consistit, ut dicitur in Obj. 3: Further, Virtue observes the mean, as stated in II Ethic. Sed ille qui omnia dimittit per voluntariam pau- Ethic. ii, 6. But he who renounces all by voluntary poverty pertatem, non videtur in medio consistere, sed magis in seems to go to the extreme rather than to observe the mean. extremo. Ergo non agit virtuose. Et ita hoc non pertinet Therefore he does not act virtuously: and so this does not ad vitae perfectionem. pertain to the perfection of life. Praeterea, ultima perfectio hominis in beatitudiObj. 4: Further, the ultimate perfection of man conne consistit. Sed divitiae conferunt ad beatitudinem, di- sists in happiness. Now riches conduce to happiness; for it is citur enim Eccli. XXXI, beatus est dives qui inventus est written (Sir 31:8): Blessed is the rich man that is found withsine macula. Et philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod divi- out blemish, and the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) that riches tiae organice deserviunt ad felicitatem. Ergo voluntaria contribute instrumentally to happiness. Therefore voluntary paupertas non requiritur ad perfectionem religionis. poverty is not requisite for religious perfection. Praeterea, status episcoporum est perfectior Obj. 5: Further, the episcopal state is more perfect than quam status religionis. Sed episcopi possunt proprium the religious state. But bishops may have property, as stated habere, ut supra habitum est. Ergo et religiosi. above (Q. 185, A. 6). Therefore religious may also. Praeterea, dare eleemosynam est opus maxime Obj. 6: Further, almsgiving is a work most acceptable to Deo acceptum, et, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, medica- God, and as Chrysostom says (Hom. ix in Ep. ad Hebr.), is a mentum quod maxime in poenitentia operatur. Sed pau- most effective remedy in repentance. Now poverty excludes pertas excludit eleemosynarum largitionem. Ergo vi- almsgiving. Therefore it would seem that poverty does not detur quod paupertas ad perfectionem religionis non pertain to religious perfection. pertineat. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, VIII Moral., On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. viii, 26): sunt nonnulli iustorum qui, ad comprehendendum cul- There are some of the righteous who bracing themselves up men perfectionis accincti, dum altiora interius appetunt, to lay hold of the very height of perfection, while they aim exterius cuncta derelinquunt. Sed accingi ad comprehen- at higher objects within, abandon all things without. Now, as dendum culmen perfectionis proprie pertinet ad religio- stated above, (AA. 1, 2), it belongs properly to religious to sos, ut dictum est. Ergo eis competit ut per voluntariam brace themselves up in order to lay hold of the very height paupertatem cuncta exterius derelinquant. of perfection. Therefore it belongs to them to abandon all outward things by voluntary poverty. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), the religious status religionis est quoddam exercitium et disciplina state is an exercise and a school for attaining to the perfecper quam pervenitur ad perfectionem caritatis. Ad quod tion of charity. For this it is necessary that a man wholly quidem necessarium est quod aliquis affectum suum to- withdraw his affections from worldly things; since Augustaliter abstrahat a rebus mundanis, dicit enim Augusti- tine says (Confess. x, 29), speaking to God: Too little doth he nus, in X Confess., ad Deum loquens, minus te amat qui love Thee, who loves anything with Thee, which he loveth not tecum aliquid amat quod non propter te amat. Unde et for Thee. Wherefore he says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that greater in libro octogintatrium quaest., dicit Augustinus quod charity means less cupidity, perfect charity means no cupidnutrimentum caritatis est imminutio cupiditatis, perfec- ity. Now the possession of worldly things draws a man’s tio, nulla cupiditas. Ex hoc autem quod aliquis res mun- mind to the love of them: hence Augustine says (Ep. xxxi danas possidet, allicitur animus eius ad earum amorem. ad Paulin. et Theras.) that we are more firmly attached to Unde Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Paulinum et Thera- earthly things when we have them than when we desire them: siam, quod terrena diliguntur arctius adepta quam concu- since why did that young man go away sad, save because he pita. Nam unde iuvenis ille tristis discessit, nisi quia ma- had great wealth? For it is one thing not to wish to lay hold of gnas habebat divitias? Aliud est enim nolle incorporare what one has not, and another to renounce what one already quae desunt, aliud iam incorporata divellere, illa enim ve- has; the former are rejected as foreign to us, the latter are cut lut extranea repudiantur; ista velut membra praeciduntur. off as a limb. And Chrysostom says (Hom. lxiii in Matth.) Et Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., quod appositio di- that the possession of wealth kindles a greater flame and the vitiarum maiorem accendit flammam, et vehementior fit desire for it becomes stronger. cupido. Et inde est quod ad perfectionem caritatis acquirenHence it is that in the attainment of the perfection of dam, primum fundamentum est voluntaria paupertas, charity the first foundation is voluntary poverty, whereby ut aliquis absque proprio vivat, dicente domino, Matth. a man lives without property of his own, according to the

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XIX, si vis perfectus esse, vade et vende omnia quae habes saying of our Lord (Matt 19:21), If thou wilt be perfect, go, et da pauperibus, et veni, sequere me. sell all thou hast, and give to the poor . . . and come, follow Me. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Glossa ibiReply Obj. 1: As the gloss adds, When the Apostle said dem subdit, non ideo dixit apostolus (scilicet, ut vobis non this (namely ‘not that you should be burthened,’ i.e., with sit tribulatio, idest paupertas), quin melius esset, sed infir- poverty), he did not mean that it were better not to give: but mis timet, quos sic dare monet ut egestatem non patian- he feared for the weak, whom he admonished so to give as tur. Unde similiter etiam ex Glossa alia non est intelli- not to suffer privation. Hence in like manner the other gloss gendum quod non liceat omnia temporalia abiicere, sed means not that it is unlawful to renounce all one’s tempoquod hoc non ex necessitate requiritur. Unde et Ambro- ral goods, but that this is not required of necessity. Wheresius dicit, in I de Offic., dominus non vult, scilicet ex ne- fore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): Our Lord does not wish, cessitate praecepti, simul effundi opes, sed dispensari, nisi namely does not command us to pour out our wealth all at forte ut Eliseus boves suos occidit et pavit pauperes ex eo once, but to dispense it; or perhaps to do as did Eliseus who quod habuit, ut nulla cura teneretur domestica. slew his oxen, and fed the poor with that which was his own so that no household care might hold him back. Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui omnia sua Reply Obj. 2: He who renounces all his possessions for dimittit propter Christum, non exponit se periculo, ne- Christ’s sake exposes himself to no danger, neither spirique spirituali neque corporali. Spirituale enim pericu- tual nor corporal. For spiritual danger ensues from poverty lum ex paupertate provenit quando non est voluntaria, when the latter is not voluntary; because those who are quia ex affectu aggregandi pecunias, quem patiuntur il- unwillingly poor, through the desire of money-getting, fall li qui involuntarie sunt pauperes, incidit homo in multa into many sins, according to 1 Tim. 6:9, They that will bepeccata; secundum illud I ad Tim. ult., qui volunt divi- come rich, fall into temptation and into the snare of the tes fieri, incidunt in tentationem et in laqueum Diabo- devil. This attachment is put away by those who embrace li. Iste autem affectus deponitur ab his qui voluntariam voluntary poverty, but it gathers strength in those who paupertatem sequuntur, magis autem dominatur in his have wealth, as stated above. Again bodily danger does not qui divitias possident, ut ex dictis patet. Corporale etiam threaten those who, intent on following Christ, renounce periculum non imminet illis qui, intentione sequendi all their possessions and entrust themselves to divine provChristum, omnia sua relinquunt, divinae providentiae se idence. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, committentes. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. 17): Those who seek first the kingdom of God and His justice Dom. in monte, quaerentibus regnum Dei et iustitiam are not weighed down by anxiety lest they lack what is neceseius non debet subesse sollicitudo ne necessaria desint. sary. Ad tertium dicendum quod medium virtutis, seReply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, cundum philosophum, in II Ethic., accipitur secundum 6), the mean of virtue is taken according to right reason, not rationem rectam, non secundum quantitatem rei. Et according to the quantity of a thing. Consequently whatideo quidquid potest fieri secundum rationem rectam, ever may be done in accordance with right reason is not non est vitiosum ex magnitudine quantitatis, sed magis rendered sinful by the greatness of the quantity, but all virtuosum. Esset autem praeter rationem rectam si quis the more virtuous. It would, however, be against right reaomnia sua consumeret in intemperantiam, vel absque son to throw away all one’s possessions through intemperutilitate. Est autem secundum rationem rectam quod ali- ance, or without any useful purpose; whereas it is in acquis divitias abiiciat ut contemplationi sapientiae vacet, cordance with right reason to renounce wealth in order to quod etiam philosophi quidam fecisse leguntur. Dicit devote oneself to the contemplation of wisdom. Even cerenim Hieronymus, in epistola ad Paulinum, Crates il- tain philosophers are said to have done this; for Jerome says le Thebanus, homo quondam ditissimus, cum ad philoso- (Ep. xlviii ad Paulin.): The famous Theban, Crates, once a phandum Athenas pergeret, magnum auri pondus abie- very wealthy man, when he was going to Athens to study phicit, nec putavit se posse simul divitias et virtutes possidere. losophy, cast away a large amount of gold; for he considered Unde multo magis secundum rationem rectam est ut ho- that he could not possess both gold and virtue at the same mo omnia sua relinquat ad hoc quod Christum perfecte time. Much more therefore is it according to right reason sequatur. Unde Hieronymus dicit, in epistola ad rusti- for a man to renounce all he has, in order perfectly to follow cum monachum, nudum Christum nudus sequere. Christ. Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rust. Monach.): Poor thyself, follow Christ poor. Ad quartum dicendum quod duplex est beatitudo Reply Obj. 4: Happiness or felicity is twofold. One is sive felicitas, una quidem perfecta, quam expectamus in perfect, to which we look forward in the life to come; the futura vita; alia autem imperfecta, secundum quam ali- other is imperfect, in respect of which some are said to qui dicuntur in hac vita beati. Praesentis autem vitae fe- be happy in this life. The happiness of this life is twofold,

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licitas est duplex, una quidem secundum vitam activam, alia vero secundum vitam contemplativam, ut patet per philosophum, in X Ethic. Ad felicitatem igitur vitae activae, quae consistit in exterioribus operationibus, divitiae instrumentaliter coadiuvant, quia, ut philosophus dicit, in I Ethic. multa operamur per amicos, per divitias et per civilem potentiam, sicut per quaedam organa. Ad felicitatem autem contemplativae vitae non multum operantur, sed magis impediunt, inquantum sua sollicitudine impediunt animi quietem, quae maxime necessaria est contemplanti. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod ad actiones multis opus est, speculanti vero nullo talium, scilicet exteriorum bonorum, ad operationem necessitas, sed impedimenta sunt ad speculationem. Ad futuram vero beatitudinem ordinatur aliquis per caritatem. Et quia voluntaria paupertas est efficax exercitium perveniendi ad perfectam caritatem, ideo multum valet ad caelestem beatitudinem consequendam, unde et dominus, Matth. XIX, dicit, vade et vende omnia quae habes et da pauperibus, et habebis thesaurum in caelo. Divitiae autem habitae per se quidem natae sunt perfectionem caritatis impedire, principaliter alliciendo animum et distrahendo unde dicitur, Matth. XIII, quod sollicitudo saeculi et fallacia divitiarum suffocat verbum Dei; quia, ut Gregorius dicit, dum bonum desiderium ad cor intrare non sinunt, quasi aditum flatus vitalis necant. Et ideo difficile est caritatem inter divitias conservare. Unde dominus dicit, Matth. XIX, quod dives difficile intrabit in regnum caelorum. Quod quidem intelligendum est de eo qui actu habet divitias, nam de eo qui affectum in divitiis ponit, dicit hoc esse impossibile, secundum expositionem Chrisostomi, cum subdit, facilius est camelum per foramen acus transire quam divitem intrare in regnum caelorum. Et ideo non simpliciter dives dicitur esse beatus, sed, qui inventus est sine macula et post aurum non abiit. Et hoc, quia rem difficilem fecit, unde subditur, quis est hic. Et laudabimus eum? Fecit enim mirabilia in vita sua, ut scilicet, inter divitias positus, divitias non amaret.

Ad quintum dicendum quod status episcopalis non ordinatur ad perfectionem adipiscendam, sed potius ut ex perfectione quam quis habet, alios gubernet, non solum ministrando spiritualia, sed etiam temporalia. Quod pertinet ad vitam activam, in qua multa operanda occurrunt instrumentaliter per divitias, ut dictum est. Et ideo ab episcopis, qui profitentur gubernationem gregis Christi, non exigitur quod proprio careant, sicut exigitur a religiosis, qui profitentur disciplinam perfectionis acquirendae.

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one is according to the active life, the other according to the contemplative life, as the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. x, 7, 8). Now wealth conduces instrumentally to the happiness of the active life which consists in external actions, because as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8), We do many things by friends, by riches, by political influence, as it were by instruments. On the other hand, it does not conduce to the happiness of the contemplative life, rather is it an obstacle thereto, inasmuch as the anxiety it involves disturbs the quiet of the soul, which is most necessary to one who contemplates. Hence it is that the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. x, 8) that for actions many things are needed, but the contemplative man needs no such things, namely external goods, for his operation; in fact they are obstacles to his contemplation. Man is directed to future happiness by charity; and since voluntary poverty is an efficient exercise for the attaining of perfect charity, it follows that it is of great avail in acquiring the happiness of heaven. Wherefore our Lord said (Matt 19:21): Go, sell all thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven. Now riches once they are possessed are in themselves of a nature to hinder the perfection of charity, especially by enticing and distracting the mind. Hence it is written (Matt 13:22) that the care of this world and the deceitfulness of riches choketh up the word of God, for as Gregory says (Hom. xv in Ev.), by preventing the good desire from entering into the heart, they destroy life at its very outset. Consequently it is difficult to safeguard charity amidst riches: wherefore our Lord said (Matt 19:23) that a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven, which we must understand as referring to one who actually has wealth, since He says that this is impossible for him who places his affection in riches, according to the explanation of Chrysostom (Hom. lxiii in Matth.), for He adds (Matt 19:24): It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven. Hence it is not said simply that the rich man is blessed, but the rich man that is found without blemish, and that hath not gone after gold, and this because he has done a difficult thing, wherefore the text continues (Matt 19:9): Who is he? and we will praise him; for he hath done wonderful things in his life, namely by not loving riches though placed in the midst of them. Reply Obj. 5: The episcopal state is not directed to the attainment of perfection, but rather to the effect that, in virtue of the perfection which he already has, a man may govern others, by administering not only spiritual but also temporal things. This belongs to the active life, wherein many things occur that may be done by means of wealth as an instrument, as stated (ad 4). Wherefore it is not required of bishops, who make profession of governing Christ’s flock, that they have nothing of their own, whereas it is required of religious who make profession of learning to obtain perfection.

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Ad sextum dicendum quod abrenuntiatio propriarum divitiarum comparatur ad eleemosynarum largitionem sicut universale ad particulare, et holocaustum ad sacrificium. Unde Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod illi qui ex possessis rebus subsidia egentibus ministrant, in bonis quae faciunt sacrificium offerunt, quia aliquid Deo immolant, et aliquid sibi reservant, qui vero nihil sibi reservant, offerunt holocaustum, quod est maius sacrificio. Unde etiam Hieronymus, contra Vigilant., dicit, quod autem asserit eos melius facere qui utantur rebus suis et paulatim fructus possessionum pauperibus dividant, non a me eis, sed a Deo respondetur, si vis perfectus esse, et cetera. Et postea subdit, iste quem tu laudas, secundus et tertius gradus est, quem et nos recipimus, dummodo sciamus prima secundis et tertiis praeferenda. Et ideo, ad excludendum errorem Vigilantii, dicitur in libro de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, bonum est facultates cum dispensatione pauperibus erogare, melius est, pro intentione sequendi dominum, insimul donare, et, absolutum sollicitudine, egere cum Christo.

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Reply Obj. 6: The renouncement of one’s own wealth is compared to almsgiving as the universal to the particular, and as the holocaust to the sacrifice. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.) that those who assist the needy with the things they possess, by their good deeds offer sacrifice, since they offer up something to God and keep back something for themselves; whereas those who keep nothing for themselves offer a holocaust which is greater than a sacrifice. Wherefore Jerome also says (Contra Vigilant.): When you declare that those do better who retain the use of their possessions, and dole out the fruits of their possessions to the poor, it is not I but the Lord Who answers you; If thou wilt be perfect, etc., and afterwards he goes on to say: This man whom you praise belongs to the second and third degree, and we too commend him: provided we acknowledge the first as to be preferred to the second and third. For this reason in order to exclude the error of Vigilantius it is said (De Eccl. Dogm. xxxviii): It is a good thing to give away one’s goods by dispensing them to the poor: it is better to give them away once for all with the intention of following the Lord, and, free of solicitude, to be poor with Christ.

Article 4 Whether perpetual continence is required for religious perfection? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod perpetua continentia non requiratur ad perfectionem religionis. Omnis enim Christianae vitae perfectio ab apostolis Christi coepit. Sed apostoli continentiam non videntur servasse, ut patet de Petro, qui socrum legitur habuisse, Matth. VIII. Ergo videtur quod ad perfectionem religionis non requiratur perpetua continentia. Praeterea, primum perfectionis exemplar nobis in Abraham ostenditur, cui dominus dixit, Gen. XVII, ambula coram me, et esto perfectus. Sed exemplatum non oportet quod excedat exemplar. Ergo non requiritur ad perfectionem religionis perpetua continentia. Praeterea, illud quod requiritur ad perfectionem religionis, in omni religione invenitur. Sunt autem aliqui religiosi qui uxoribus utuntur. Non ergo religionis perfectio exigit perpetuam continentiam. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. VII, mundemus nos ab omni inquinamento carnis et spiritus, perficientes sanctificationem nostram in timore Dei. Sed munditia carnis et spiritus conservatur per continentiam, dicitur enim I ad Cor. VII, mulier innupta et virgo cogitat quae domini sunt, ut sit sancta corpore et spiritu. Ergo perfectio religionis requirit continentiam.

Objection 1: It would seem that perpetual continence is not required for religious perfection. For all perfection of the Christian life began with Christ’s apostles. Now the apostles do not appear to have observed continence, as evidenced by Peter, of whose mother-in-law we read Matt. 8:14. Therefore it would seem that perpetual continence is not requisite for religious perfection. Obj. 2: Further, the first example of perfection is shown to us in the person of Abraham, to whom the Lord said (Gen 17:1): Walk before Me, and be perfect. Now the copy should not surpass the example. Therefore perpetual continence is not requisite for religious perfection. Obj. 3: Further, that which is required for religious perfection is to be found in every religious order. Now there are some religious who lead a married life. Therefore religious perfection does not require perpetual continence. On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor 7:1): Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit, perfecting sanctification in the fear of God. Now cleanness of flesh and spirit is safeguarded by continence, for it is said (1 Cor 7:34): The unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord that she may be holy both in spirit and in body. Therefore religious perfection requires continence. Respondeo dicendum quod ad statum religionis reI answer that, The religious state requires the requiritur subtractio eorum per quae homo impeditur ne moval of whatever hinders man from devoting himself en-

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totaliter feratur ad Dei servitium. Usus autem carnalis copulae retrahit animum ne totaliter feratur in Dei servitium, dupliciter. Uno modo, propter vehementiam delectationis, ex cuius frequenti experientia augetur concupiscentia, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in III Ethic. Et inde est quod usus venereorum retrahit animam ab illa perfecta intentione tendendi in Deum. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., nihil esse sentio quod magis ex arce deiiciat animum virilem quam blandimenta feminae, corporumque ille contactus sine quo uxor haberi non potest. Alio modo, propter sollicitudinem quam ingerit homini de gubernatione uxoris et filiorum, et rerum temporalium quae ad eorum sustentationem sufficiant. Unde apostolus dicit quod qui sine uxore est, sollicitus est quae sunt domini, quomodo placeat Deo, qui autem cum uxore est, sollicitus est quae sunt mundi, quomodo placeat uxori. Et ideo continentia perpetua requiritur ad perfectionem religionis, sicut et voluntaria paupertas. Unde sicut damnatus est Vigilantius, qui adaequavit divitias paupertati; ita damnatus est Iovinianus, qui adaequavit matrimonium virginitati. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod perfectio non solum paupertatis, sed etiam continentiae, introducta est per Christum, qui dicit, Matth. XIX, sunt eunuchi qui castraverunt seipsos propter regnum caelorum, et postea subdit, qui potest capere, capiat. Et ne alicui spes perveniendi ad perfectionem tolleretur, assumpsit ad perfectionis statum etiam illos quos invenit matrimonio iunctos. Non autem poterat absque iniuria fieri quod viri uxores desererent, sicut absque iniuria fiebat quod homines divitias relinquerent. Et ideo Petrum, quem invenit matrimonio iunctum, non separavit ab uxore. Ioannem tamen nubere volentem a nuptiis revocavit. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono Coniug., melior est castitas caelibum quam castitas nuptiarum, quarum Abraham unam habebat in usu, ambas in habitu. Caste quippe coniugaliter vixit, esse autem castus sine coniugio potuit, sed tunc non oportuit. Nec tamen quia antiqui patres perfectionem animi simul cum divitiis et matrimonio habuerunt, quod ad magnitudinem virtutis pertinebat, propter hoc infirmiores quique debent praesumere se tantae virtutis esse ut cum divitiis et matrimonio possint ad perfectionem pervenire, sicut nec aliquis praesumit hostes inermis invadere quia Samson cum mandibula asini multos hostium peremit. Nam illi patres, si tempus fuisset continentiae et paupertatis servandae, studiosius hoc implessent. Ad tertium dicendum quod illi modi vivendi secundum quos homines matrimonio utuntur, non sunt simpliciter et absolute loquendo religiones, sed secundum quid, inquantum scilicet in aliquo participant quaedam quae ad statum religionis pertinent.

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tirely to God’s service. Now the use of sexual union hinders the mind from giving itself wholly to the service of God, and this for two reasons. First, on account of its vehement delectation, which by frequent repetition increases concupiscence, as also the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii, 12): and hence it is that the use of venery withdraws the mind from that perfect intentness on tending to God. Augustine expresses this when he says (Solil. i, 10): I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its height as the fondling of women, and those bodily contacts which belong to the married state. Second, because it involves man in solicitude for the control of his wife, his children, and his temporalities which serve for their upkeep. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor 7:32, 33): He that is without a wife is solicitous for the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please God: but he that is with a wife is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife. Therefore perpetual continence, as well as voluntary poverty, is requisite for religious perfection. Wherefore just as Vigilantius was condemned for equaling riches to poverty, so was Jovinian condemned for equaling marriage to virginity. Reply Obj. 1: The perfection not only of poverty but also of continence was introduced by Christ Who said (Matt 19:12): There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs, for the kingdom of heaven, and then added: He that can take, let him take it. And lest anyone should be deprived of the hope of attaining perfection, he admitted to the state of perfection those even who were married. Now the husbands could not without committing an injustice forsake their wives, whereas men could without injustice renounce riches. Wherefore Peter whom He found married, He severed not from his wife, while He withheld from marriage John who wished to marry. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxii), The chastity of celibacy is better than the chastity of marriage, one of which Abraham had in use, both of them in habit. For he lived chastely, and he might have been chaste without marrying, but it was not requisite then. Nevertheless if the patriarchs of old had perfection of mind together with wealth and marriage, which is a mark of the greatness of their virtue, this is no reason why any weaker person should presume to have such great virtue that he can attain to perfection though rich and married; as neither does a man unarmed presume to attack his enemy, because Samson slew many foes with the jaw-bone of an ass. For those fathers, had it been seasonable to observe continence and poverty, would have been most careful to observe them. Reply Obj. 3: Such ways of living as admit of the use of marriage are not the religious life simply and absolutely speaking, but in a restricted sense, insofar as they have a certain share in those things that belong to the religious state.

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Q. 186, A. 5

Article 5 Whether obedience belongs to religious perfection? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod obedientia non pertineat ad perfectionem religionis. Illa enim videntur ad perfectionem religionis pertinere quae sunt supererogationis, ad quae non omnes tenentur. Sed ad obediendum praelatis suis omnes tenentur, secundum illud apostoli, Hebr. ult., obedite praepositis vestris, et subiacete eis. Ergo videtur quod obedientia non pertineat ad perfectionem religionis. Praeterea, obedientia proprie pertinere videtur ad eos qui debent regi sensu alieno, quod est indiscretorum. Sed apostolus dicit, ad Heb. V, quod perfectorum est solidus cibus, qui pro consuetudine exercitatos habent sensus ad discretionem boni et mali. Ergo videtur quod obedientia non pertineat ad statum perfectorum. Praeterea, si obedientia requireretur ad perfectionem religionis, oporteret quod omnibus religiosis conveniret. Non autem omnibus convenit, sunt enim quidam religiosi solitariam vitam agentes, qui non habent superiores, quibus obediant. Praelati etiam religionum ad obedientiam non videntur teneri. Ergo obedientia non videtur pertinere ad perfectionem religionis. Praeterea, si votum obedientiae ad religionem requireretur, consequens esset quod religiosi tenerentur praelatis suis in omnibus obedire, sicut et per votum continentiae tenentur ab omnibus venereis abstinere. Sed non tenentur obedire in omnibus, ut supra habitum est, cum de virtute obedientiae ageretur. Ergo votum obedientiae non requiritur ad religionem. Praeterea, illa servitia sunt Deo maxime accepta quae liberaliter et non ex necessitate fiunt, secundum illud II ad Cor. IX, non ex tristitia aut ex necessitate. Sed illa quae ex obedientia fiunt, fiunt ex necessitate praecepti. Ergo laudabilius fiunt bona opera quae quis propria sponte facit. Votum ergo obedientiae non competit religioni, per quam homines quaerunt ad meliora promoveri. Sed contra, perfectio religionis maxime consistit in imitatione Christi, secundum illud Matth. XIX, si vis perfectus esse, vade et vende omnia quae habes et da pauperibus, et veni, sequere me. Sed in Christo maxime commendatur obedientia, secundum illud Philip. II, factus est obediens usque ad mortem. Ergo videtur quod obedientia pertineat ad perfectionem religionis. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, status religionis est quaedam disciplina vel exercitium tendendi in perfectionem. Quicumque autem instruuntur vel exercitantur ut perveniant ad aliquem finem, oportet quod directionem alicuius sequantur, secundum

Objection 1: It would seem that obedience does not belong to religious perfection. For those things seemingly belong to religious perfection, which are works of supererogation and are not binding upon all. But all are bound to obey their superiors, according to the saying of the Apostle (Heb 13:17), Obey your prelates, and be subject to them. Therefore it would seem that obedience does not belong to religious perfection. Obj. 2: Further, obedience would seem to belong properly to those who have to be guided by the sense of others, and such persons are lacking in discernment. Now the Apostle says (Heb 5:14) that strong meat is for the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses exercised to the discerning of good and evil. Therefore it would seem that obedience does not belong to the state of the perfect. Obj. 3: Further, if obedience were requisite for religious perfection, it would follow that it is befitting to all religious. But it is not becoming to all; since some religious lead a solitary life, and have no superior whom they obey. Again religious superiors apparently are not bound to obedience. Therefore obedience would seem not to pertain to religious perfection. Obj. 4: Further, if the vow of obedience were requisite for religion, it would follow that religious are bound to obey their superiors in all things, just as they are bound to abstain from all venery by their vow of continence. But they are not bound to obey them in all things, as stated above (Q. 104, A. 5), when we were treating of the virtue of obedience. Therefore the vow of obedience is not requisite for religion. Obj. 5: Further, those services are most acceptable to God which are done freely and not of necessity, according to 2 Cor. 9:7, Not with sadness or of necessity. Now that which is done out of obedience is done of necessity of precept. Therefore those good works are more deserving of praise which are done of one’s own accord. Therefore the vow of obedience is unbecoming to religion whereby men seek to attain to that which is better. On the contrary, Religious perfection consists chiefly in the imitation of Christ, according to Matt. 19:21, If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all thou hast, and give to the poor, and follow Me. Now in Christ obedience is commended above all according to Phil. 2:8, He became obedient unto death. Therefore seemingly obedience belongs to religious perfection. I answer that, As stated above (AA. 2, 3), the religious state is a school and exercise for tending to perfection. Now those who are being instructed or exercised in order to attain a certain end must needs follow the direction of someone under whose control they are instructed or

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cuius arbitrium instruantur vel exercitentur, quasi discipuli sub magistro. Et ideo oportet quod religiosi, in his quae pertinent ad religiosam vitam, alicuius instructioni et imperio subdantur. Unde et VII, qu. I, dicitur, monachorum vita subiectionis habet verbum et discipulatus. Imperio autem et instructioni alterius subiicitur homo per obedientiam. Et ideo obedientia requiritur ad religionis perfectionem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obedire praelatis in his quae pertinent ad necessitatem virtutis, non est supererogationis, sed omnibus commune, sed obedire in his quae pertinent ad exercitium perfectionis, pertinet proprie ad religiosos. Et comparatur ista obedientia ad aliam sicut universale ad particulare. Illi enim qui in saeculo vivunt, aliquid sibi retinent et aliquid Deo largiuntur, et secundum hoc obedientiae praelatorum subduntur. Illi vero qui vivunt in religione, totaliter se et sua tribuunt Deo, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde obedientia eorum est universalis. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., homines exercitantes se in operibus perveniunt ad aliquos habitus, quos cum acquisierint, eosdem actus maxime possunt operari. Sic igitur obediendo illi qui non sunt perfectionem adepti, ad perfectionem perveniunt. Illi autem qui iam sunt perfectionem adepti, maxime prompti sunt ad obediendum, non quasi indigentes dirigi ad perfectionem acquirendam; sed quasi per hoc se conservantes in eo quod ad perfectionem pertinet. Ad tertium dicendum quod subiectio religiosorum principaliter attenditur ad episcopos, qui comparantur ad eos sicut perfectores ad perfectos, ut patet per Dionysium, VI cap. Eccles. Hier., ubi etiam dicit quod monachorum ordo pontificum consummativis virtutibus mancipatur, et divinis eorum illuminationibus edocetur. Unde ab episcoporum obedientia nec eremitae, nec etiam praelati religionum excusantur. Et si a dioecesanis episcopis totaliter vel in parte sunt exempti, obligantur tamen ad obediendum summo pontifici, non solum in his quae sunt communia aliis, sed etiam in his quae specialiter pertinent ad disciplinam religionis. Ad quartum dicendum quod votum obedientiae ad religionem pertinens se extendit ad dispositionem totius humanae vitae. Et secundum hoc, votum obedientiae habet quandam universalitatem, licet non se extendat ad omnes particulares actus; quorum quidam ad religionem non pertinent, quia non sunt de rebus pertinentibus ad dilectionem Dei et proximi, sicut confricatio barbae vel levatio festucae de terra et similia, quae non cadunt sub voto vel sub obedientia; quidam vero etiam contrariantur religioni. Nec est simile de voto continentiae, per quam excluduntur actus omnino perfectioni religionis contrarii.

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exercised so as to attain that end as disciples under a master. Hence religious need to be placed under the instruction and command of someone as regards things pertaining to the religious life; wherefore it is said (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): The monastic life denotes subjection and discipleship. Now one man is subjected to another’s command and instruction by obedience: and consequently obedience is requisite for religious perfection. Reply Obj. 1: To obey one’s superiors in matters that are essential to virtue is not a work of supererogation, but is common to all: whereas to obey in matters pertaining to the practice of perfection belongs properly to religious. This latter obedience is compared to the former as the universal to the particular. For those who live in the world, keep something for themselves, and offer something to God; and in the latter respect they are under obedience to their superiors: whereas those who live in religion give themselves wholly and their possessions to God, as stated above (AA. 1, 3). Hence their obedience is universal. Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1, 2), by performing actions we contract certain habits, and when we have acquired the habit we are best able to perform the actions. Accordingly those who have not attained to perfection, acquire perfection by obeying, while those who have already acquired perfection are most ready to obey, not as though they need to be directed to the acquisition of perfection, but as maintaining themselves by this means in that which belongs to perfection. Reply Obj. 3: The subjection of religious is chiefly in reference to bishops, who are compared to them as perfecters to perfected, as Dionysius states (Eccl. Hier. vi), where he also says that the monastic order is subjected to the perfecting virtues of the bishops, and is taught by their godlike enlightenment. Hence neither hermits nor religious superiors are exempt from obedience to bishops; and if they be wholly or partly exempt from obedience to the bishop of the diocese, they are nevertheless bound to obey the Sovereign Pontiff, not only in matters affecting all in common, but also in those which pertain specially to religious discipline. Reply Obj. 4: The vow of obedience taken by religious, extends to the disposition of a man’s whole life, and in this way it has a certain universality, although it does not extend to all individual acts. For some of these do not belong to religion, through not being of those things that concern the love of God and of our neighbor, such as rubbing one’s beard, lifting a stick from the ground and so forth, which do not come under a vow nor under obedience; and some are contrary to religion. Nor is there any comparison with continence whereby acts are excluded which are altogether contrary to religion.

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Ad quintum dicendum quod necessitas coactionis facit involuntarium, et ideo excludit rationem laudis et meriti. Sed necessitas consequens obedientiam non est necessitas coactionis, sed liberae voluntatis, inquantum homo vult obedire, licet forte non vellet illud quod mandatur, secundum se consideratum, implere. Et ideo, quia necessitati aliqua faciendi quae secundum se non placent, per votum obedientiae homo se subiicit propter Deum; ex hoc ipso ea quae facit sunt Deo magis accepta, etiam si sint minora, quia nihil maius homo potest Deo dare quam quod propriam voluntatem propter ipsum alterius voluntati subiiciat. Unde in collationibus patrum dicitur deterrimum genus monachorum esse Sarabaitas, qui, suas necessitates curantes, absoluti a seniorum iugo, habent libertatem agendi quod libitum fuerit, et tamen magis quam hi qui in coenobiis degunt, in operibus diebus ac noctibus consumuntur.

Q. 186, A. 6

Reply Obj. 5: The necessity of coercion makes an act involuntary and consequently deprives it of the character of praise or merit; whereas the necessity which is consequent upon obedience is a necessity not of coercion but of a free will, inasmuch as a man is willing to obey, although perhaps he would not be willing to do the thing commanded considered in itself. Wherefore since by the vow of obedience a man lays himself under the necessity of doing for God’s sake certain things that are not pleasing in themselves, for this very reason that which he does is the more acceptable to God, though it be of less account, because man can give nothing greater to God, than by subjecting his will to another man’s for God’s sake. Hence in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xviii, 7) it is stated that the Sarabaitae are the worst class of monks, because through providing for their own needs without being subject to superiors, they are free to do as they will; and yet day and night they are more busily occupied in work than those who live in monasteries.

Article 6 Whether it is requisite for religious perfection that poverty, continence, and obedience should come under a vow? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non requiratur ad perfectionem religionis quod praedicta tria, scilicet paupertas, continentia et obedientia, cadant sub voto. Disciplina enim perfectionis assumendae ex traditione domini est accepta. Sed dominus, dans formam perfectionis, Matth. XIX, dixit, si vis perfectus esse, vade et vende omnia quae habes et da pauperibus, nulla mentione facta de voto. Ergo videtur quod votum non requiratur ad disciplinam religionis. Praeterea, votum consistit in quadam promissione Deo facta, unde Eccle. V, cum dixisset sapiens, si quid vovisti Deo, ne moreris reddere, statim subdit, displicet enim ei infidelis et stulta promissio. Sed ubi est exhibitio rei, non requiritur promissio. Ergo sufficit ad perfectionem religionis quod aliquis servet paupertatem, continentiam et obedientiam, absque voto. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, ad Pollentium, de Adulterin. Coniug., ea sunt in nostris officiis gratiora quae, cum liceret nobis etiam non impendere, tamen causa dilectionis impendimus. Sed ea quae fiunt sine voto, licet non impendere, quod non licet de his quae fiunt cum voto. Ergo videtur gratius esse Deo si quis paupertatem, continentiam et obedientiam absque voto servaret. Non ergo votum requiritur ad perfectionem religionis. Sed contra est quod in veteri lege Nazaraei cum voto sanctificabantur, secundum illud Num. VI, vir sive mulier cum fecerit votum ut sanctificetur, et se voluerit domino consecrare, et cetera. Per eos autem significantur illi qui ad perfectionis summam pertingunt, ut dicit Glossa

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not requisite for religious perfection that the three aforesaid, namely poverty, continence, and obedience, should come under a vow. For the school of perfection is founded on the principles laid down by our Lord. Now our Lord in formulating perfection (Matt 19:21) said: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all thou hast, and give to the poor, without any mention of a vow. Therefore it would seem that a vow is not necessary for the school of religion. Obj. 2: Further, a vow is a promise made to God, wherefore (Eccl 5:3) the wise man after saying: If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it, adds at once, for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth Him. But when a thing is being actually given there is no need for a promise. Therefore it suffices for religious perfection that one keep poverty, continence, and obedience without vowing them. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Ad Pollent., de Adult. Conjug. i, 14): The services we render are more pleasing when we might lawfully not render them, yet do so out of love. Now it is lawful not to render a service which we have not vowed, whereas it is unlawful if we have vowed to render it. Therefore seemingly it is more pleasing to God to keep poverty, continence, and obedience without a vow. Therefore a vow is not requisite for religious perfection. On the contrary, In the Old Law the Nazareans were consecrated by vow according to Num. 6:2, When a man or woman shall make a vow to be sanctified and will consecrate themselves to the Lord, etc. Now these were a figure of those who attain the summit of perfection, as a gloss

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Gregorii ibidem. Ergo votum requiritur ad statum perfectionis. Respondeo dicendum quod ad religiosos pertinet quod sint in statu perfectionis, sicut ex supra dictis patet. Ad statum autem perfectionis requiritur obligatio ad ea quae sunt perfectionis. Quae quidem Deo fit per votum. Manifestum est autem ex praemissis quod ad perfectionem Christianae vitae pertinet paupertas, continentia et obedientia. Et ideo religionis status requirit ut ad haec tria aliquis voto obligetur. Unde Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., cum quis omne quod habet, omne quod vivit, omne quod sapit, omnipotenti Deo voverit, holocaustum est, quod quidem pertinere postea dicit ad eos qui praesens saeculum deserunt. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad perfectionem vitae dominus pertinere dixit quod aliquis eum sequatur, non qualitercumque, sed ut ulterius retro non abiret, unde ipse dicit, Luc. IX, nemo mittens manum ad aratrum et respiciens retro, aptus est regno Dei. Et quamvis quidam de discipulis eius retrorsum abierint, tamen Petrus, loco aliorum, domino interroganti, nunquid et vos vultis abire? Respondit, domine, ad quem ibimus? Unde et Augustinus dicit, in libro de consensu Evangelist., quod, sicut Matthaeus et Marcus narrant, Petrus et Andreas, non subductis ad terram navibus, tanquam causa redeundi, secuti sunt eum, sed tanquam iubentem ut sequerentur. Haec autem immobilitas sequelae Christi firmatur per votum. Et ideo votum requiritur ad perfectionem religionis. Ad secundum dicendum quod perfectio religionis requirit, sicut Gregorius dicit, ut aliquis omne quod vivit Deo exhibeat. Sed homo non potest totam vitam suam actu Deo exhibere, quia non est tota simul, sed successive agitur. Unde non aliter homo potest totam vitam Deo exhibere nisi per voti obligationem. Ad tertium dicendum quod inter alia quae licet nobis non impendere, est etiam propria libertas, quam homo ceteris rebus cariorem habet. Unde cum aliquis propria sponte voto sibi adimit libertatem abstinendi ab his quae ad Dei servitium pertinent, hoc fit Deo acceptissimum. Unde Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Armentarium et Paulinam, non te vovisse poeniteat, immo gaude iam tibi non licere quod cum tuo detrimento licuisset. Felix necessitas quae in meliora compellit.

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of Gregory states. Therefore a vow is requisite for religious perfection. I answer that, It belongs to religious to be in the state of perfection, as shown above (Q. 184, A. 5). Now the state of perfection requires an obligation to whatever belongs to perfection: and this obligation consists in binding oneself to God by means of a vow. But it is evident from what has been said (AA. 3, 4, 5) that poverty, continence, and obedience belong to the perfection of the Christian life. Consequently the religious state requires that one be bound to these three by vow. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.): When a man vows to God all his possessions, all his life, all his knowledge, it is a holocaust; and afterwards he says that this refers to those who renounce the present world. Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord declared that it belongs to the perfection of life that a man follow Him, not anyhow, but in such a way as not to turn back. Wherefore He says again (Luke 9:62): No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God. And though some of His disciples went back, yet when our Lord asked (John 6:68, 69), Will you also go away?, Peter answered for the others: Lord, to whom shall we go? Hence Augustine says (De Consensu Ev. ii, 17) that as Matthew and Mark relate, Peter and Andrew followed Him after drawing their boats on to the beach, not as though they purposed to return, but as following Him at His command. Now this unwavering following of Christ is made fast by a vow: wherefore a vow is requisite for religious perfection. Reply Obj. 2: As Gregory says (Moral. ii) religious perfection requires that a man give his whole life to God. But a man cannot actually give God his whole life, because that life taken as a whole is not simultaneous but successive. Hence a man cannot give his whole life to God otherwise than by the obligation of a vow. Reply Obj. 3: Among other services that we can lawfully give, is our liberty, which is dearer to man than aught else. Consequently when a man of his own accord deprives himself by vow of the liberty of abstaining from things pertaining to God’s service, this is most acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Paulin. et Arment.): Repent not of thy vow; rejoice rather that thou canst no longer do lawfully, what thou mightest have done lawfully but to thy own cost. Happy the obligation that compels to better things.

Article 7 Whether it is right to say that religious perfection consists in these three vows? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inObjection 1: It would seem that it is not right to say convenienter dicatur in his tribus votis consistere reli- that religious perfection consists in these three vows. For gionis perfectionem. Perfectio enim vitae magis consistit the perfection of life consists of inward rather than of outin interioribus quam in exterioribus actibus, secundum ward acts, according to Rom. 14:17, The Kingdom of God is

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illud Rom. XIV, non est regnum Dei esca et potus, sed iustitia et pax et gaudium in spiritu sancto. Sed per votum religionis aliquis obligatur ad ea quae sunt perfectionis. Ergo magis deberent ad religionem pertinere vota interiorum actuum, puta contemplationis, dilectionis Dei et proximi, et aliorum huiusmodi, quam votum paupertatis, continentiae et obedientiae, quae pertinent ad exteriores actus. Praeterea, praedicta tria cadunt sub voto religionis inquantum pertinent ad quoddam exercitium tendendi in perfectionem. Sed multa alia sunt in quibus religiosi exercitantur, sicut abstinentia, vigiliae et alia huiusmodi. Ergo videtur quod inconvenienter ista tria vota dicantur essentialiter ad statum perfectionis pertinere. Praeterea, per votum obedientiae aliquis obligatur ad omnia implenda, secundum praeceptum superioris, quae ad exercitium perfectionis pertinent. Ergo sufficit votum obedientiae, absque aliis duobus votis. Praeterea, ad exteriora bona pertinent non solum divitiae, sed etiam honores. Si ergo per votum paupertatis religiosi terrenas divitias abdicant, debet esse etiam aliud votum per quod honores mundanos contemnant. Sed contra est quod dicitur extra, de statu monachorum, quod custodia castitatis et abdicatio proprietatis sunt annexa regulae monachali.

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not meat and drink, but justice and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit. Now the religious vow binds a man to things belonging to perfection. Therefore vows of inward actions, such as contemplation, love of God and our neighbor, and so forth, should pertain to the religious state, rather than the vows of poverty, continence, and obedience which refer to outward actions. Obj. 2: Further, the three aforesaid come under the religious vow, insofar as they belong to the practice of tending to perfection. But there are many other things that religious practice, such as abstinence, watchings, and the like. Therefore it would seem that these three vows are incorrectly described as pertaining to the state of perfection.

Obj. 3: Further, by the vow of obedience a man is bound to do according to his superior’s command whatever pertains to the practice of perfection. Therefore the vow of obedience suffices without the two other vows. Obj. 4: Further, external goods comprise not only riches but also honors. Therefore, if religious, by the vow of poverty, renounce earthly riches, there should be another vow whereby they may despise worldly honors. On the contrary, It is stated (Extra, de Statu Monach., cap. Cum ad monasterium) that the keeping of chastity and the renouncing of property are affixed to the monastic rule. Respondeo dicendum quod religionis status potest I answer that, The religious state may be considconsiderari tripliciter, uno modo, secundum quod est ered in three ways. First, as being a practice of tending to quoddam exercitium tendendi in perfectionem carita- the perfection of charity: second, as quieting the human tis; alio modo, secundum quod quietat humanum ani- mind from outward solicitude, according to 1 Cor. 7:32: I mum ab exterioribus sollicitudinibus, secundum illud I would have you to be without solicitude: third, as a holocaust ad Cor. VII, volo vos sine sollicitudine esse; tertio modo, whereby a man offers himself and his possessions wholly secundum quod est quoddam holocaustum, per quod to God; and in corresponding manner the religious state is aliquis totaliter se et sua offert Deo. Et secundum hoc, ex constituted by these three vows.

his tribus votis integratur religionis status. Primo enim, quantum ad exercitium perfectionis, requiritur quod aliquis a se removeat illa per quae posset impediri ne totaliter eius affectus tendat in Deum, in quo consistit perfectio caritatis. Huiusmodi autem sunt tria. Primo quidem, cupiditas exteriorum bonorum. Quae tollitur per votum paupertatis. Secundum autem est concupiscentia sensibilium delectationum, inter quas praecellunt delectationes venereae. Quae excluduntur per votum continentiae. Tertium autem est inordinatio voluntatis humanae. Quae excluditur per votum obedientiae. Similiter autem sollicitudinis saecularis inquietudo praecipue ingeritur homini circa tria. Primo quidem, circa dispensationem exteriorum rerum. Et haec sollicitudo per votum paupertatis homini aufertur. Secundo, circa gubernationem uxoris et filiorum. Quae amputatur per votum continentiae. Tertio, circa

First, as regards the practice of perfection a man is required to remove from himself whatever may hinder his affections from tending wholly to God, for it is in this that the perfection of charity consists. Such hindrances are of three kinds. First, the attachment to external goods, which is removed by the vow of poverty; second, the concupiscence of sensible pleasures, chief among which are venereal pleasures, and these are removed by the vow of continence; third, the inordinateness of the human will, and this is removed by the vow of obedience. In like manner the disquiet of worldly solicitude is aroused in man in reference especially to three things. First, as regards the dispensing of external things, and this solicitude is removed from man by the vow of poverty; second, as regards the control of wife and children, which is cut away by the vow of continence; third, as regards the disposal of one’s own actions, which is

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dispositionem propriorum actuum. Quae amputatur per votum obedientiae, quo aliquis se alterius dispositioni committit. Similiter etiam holocaustum est cum aliquis totum quod habet, offert Deo, ut Gregorius dicit, super Ezech. Habet autem homo triplex bonum, secundum philosophum, in I Ethic. Primo quidem, exteriorum rerum. Quas quidem totaliter aliquis Deo offert per votum voluntariae paupertatis. Secundo autem, bonum proprii corporis. Quod aliquis praecipue offert Deo per votum continentiae, quo abrenuntiat maximis delectationibus corporis. Tertium autem bonum est animae. Quod aliquis totaliter Deo offert per obedientiam, qua aliquis offert Deo propriam voluntatem, per quam homo utitur omnibus potentiis et habitibus animae. Et ideo convenienter ex tribus votis status religionis integratur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, status religionis ordinatur sicut ad finem ad perfectionem caritatis, ad quam pertinent omnes interiores actus virtutum, quarum mater est caritas, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIII, caritas patiens est, benigna est, et cetera. Et ideo interiores actus virtutum, puta humilitatis, patientiae et huiusmodi, non cadunt sub voto religionis, quod ordinatur ad ipsos sicut ad finem. Ad secundum dicendum quod omnes aliae religionum observantiae ordinantur ad praedicta tria principalia vota. Nam si qua sunt instituta in religionibus ad procurandum victum, puta labor, mendicitas vel alia huiusmodi, referuntur ad paupertatem, ad cuius conservationem religiosi per hos modos victum suum procurant. Alia vero, quibus corpus maceratur, sicut vigiliae, ieiunia et si qua sunt huiusmodi, directe ordinantur ad votum continentiae observandum. Si qua vero sunt in religionibus instituta pertinentia ad humanos actus, quibus aliquis ordinatur ad religionis finem, scilicet ad dilectionem Dei et proximi, puta lectio, oratio, visitatio infirmorum, vel si quid aliud est huiusmodi, comprehenduntur sub voto obedientiae, quod pertinet ad voluntatem, quae secundum dispositionem alterius suos actus ordinat in finem. Determinatio autem habitus pertinet ad omnia tria vota, tanquam signum obligationis. Unde habitus regularis simul datur, vel benedicitur, cum professione. Ad tertium dicendum quod per obedientiam aliquis offert Deo suam voluntatem, cui etsi subiiciantur omnia humana, quaedam tamen sunt quae specialiter sibi tantum subduntur, scilicet actiones humanae, nam passiones pertinent etiam ad appetitum sensitivum. Et ideo ad cohibendum passiones carnalium delectationum et exteriorum appetibilium impedientes perfectionem vitae, necessarium fuit votum continentiae et paupertatis, sed ad disponendum actiones proprias secundum quod requirit perfectionis status, requiritur votum obedientiae.

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eliminated by the vow of obedience, whereby a man commits himself to the disposal of another. Again, A holocaust is the offering to God of all that one has, according to Gregory (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Now man has a threefold good, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 8). First, the good of external things, which he wholly offers to God by the vow of voluntary poverty: second, the good of his own body, and this good he offers to God especially by the vow of continence, whereby he renounces the greatest bodily pleasures. The third is the good of the soul, which man wholly offers to God by the vow of obedience, whereby he offers God his own will by which he makes use of all the powers and habits of the soul. Therefore the religious state is fittingly constituted by the three vows. Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1), the end whereunto the religious vow is directed is the perfection of charity, since all the interior acts of virtue belong to charity as to their mother, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, Charity is patient, is kind, etc. Hence the interior acts of virtue, for instance, humility, patience, and so forth, do not come under the religious vow, but this is directed to them as its end. Reply Obj. 2: All other religious observances are directed to the three aforesaid principal vows; for if any of them are ordained for the purpose of procuring a livelihood, such as labor, questing, and so on, they are to be referred to poverty; for the safeguarding of which religious seek a livelihood by these means. Other observances whereby the body is chastised, such as watching, fasting, and the like, are directly ordained for the observance of the vow of continence. And such religious observances as regard human actions whereby a man is directed to the end of religion, namely the love of God and his neighbor (such as reading, prayer, visiting the sick, and the like), are comprised under the vow of obedience that applies to the will, which directs its actions to the end according to the ordering of another person. The distinction of habit belongs to all three vows, as a sign of being bound by them: wherefore the religious habit is given or blessed at the time of profession. Reply Obj. 3: By obedience a man offers to God his will, to which though all human affairs are subject, yet some are subject to it alone in a special manner, namely human actions, since passions belong also to the sensitive appetite. Wherefore in order to restrain the passions of carnal pleasures and of external objects of appetite, which hinder the perfection of life, there was need for the vows of continence and poverty; but for the ordering of one’s own actions accordingly as the state of perfection requires, there was need for the vow of obedience.

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Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., honor proprie et secundum veritatem non debetur nisi virtuti, sed quia exteriora bona instrumentaliter deserviunt ad quosdam actus virtutum, ex consequenti etiam eorum excellentiae honor aliquis exhibetur; et praecipue a vulgo, quod solam excellentiam exteriorem recognoscit. Honorem igitur qui a Deo et sanctis viris hominibus exhibetur propter virtutem, prout dicitur in Psalmo, mihi autem nimis honorati sunt amici tui, Deus, non competit religiosis abrenuntiare, qui ad perfectionem virtutis tendunt. Honori autem qui exhibetur exteriori excellentiae, abrenuntiant ex hoc ipso quod saecularem vitam derelinquunt. Unde ad hoc non requiritur speciale votum.

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Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), strictly and truly speaking honor is not due save to virtue. Since, however, external goods serve instrumentally for certain acts of virtue, the consequence is that a certain honor is given to their excellence especially by the common people who acknowledge none but outward excellence. Therefore since religious tend to the perfection of virtue it becomes them not to renounce the honor which God and all holy men accord to virtue, according to Ps. 138:17, But to me Thy friends, O God, are made exceedingly honorable. On the other hand, they renounce the honor that is given to outward excellence, by the very fact that they withdraw from a worldly life: hence no special vow is needed for this.

Article 8 Whether the vow of obedience is the chief of the three religious vows? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod votum obedientiae non sit potissimum inter tria vota religionis. Perfectio enim religiosae vitae a Christo sumpsit exordium. Sed Christus specialiter dedit consilium de paupertate, non autem invenitur dedisse consilium de obedientia. Ergo votum paupertatis est potius quam votum obedientiae. Praeterea, Eccli. XXVI dicitur quod omnis ponderatio non est digna animae continentis. Sed votum dignioris rei est eminentius. Ergo votum continentiae est eminentius quam votum obedientiae. Praeterea, quanto aliquod votum est potius, tanto videtur esse magis indispensabile. Sed vota paupertatis et continentiae sunt adeo annexa regulae monachali ut contra ea nec summus pontifex possit licentiam indulgere, sicut dicit quaedam decretalis, de statu monachorum, qui tamen potest indulgere ut religiosus non obediat suo praelato. Ergo videtur quod votum obedientiae sit minus voto paupertatis et continentiae. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, XXXV Moral., obedientia victimis iure praeponitur, quia per victimas aliena caro, per obedientiam vero voluntas propria mactatur. Sed vota religionis sunt quaedam holocausta, sicut supra dictum est. Ergo votum obedientiae est praecipuum inter omnia religionis vota. Respondeo dicendum quod votum obedientiae est praecipuum inter tria vota religionis. Et hoc, triplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia per votum obedientiae aliquid maius homo offert Deo, scilicet ipsam voluntatem, quae est potior quam corpus proprium, quod offert homo Deo per continentiam; et quam res exteriores, quas offert homo Deo per votum paupertatis. Unde illud quod

Objection 1: It would seem that the vow of obedience is not the chief of the three religious vows. For the perfection of the religious life was inaugurated by Christ. Now Christ gave a special counsel of poverty; whereas He is not stated to have given a special counsel of obedience. Therefore the vow of poverty is greater than the vow of obedience. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Sir 26:20) that no price is worthy of a continent soul. Now the vow of that which is more worthy is itself more excellent. Therefore the vow of continence is more excellent than the vow of obedience. Obj. 3: Further, the greater a vow the more indispensable it would seem to be. Now the vows of poverty and continence are so inseparable from the monastic rule, that not even the Sovereign Pontiff can allow them to be broken, according to a Decretal (De Statu Monach., cap. Cum ad monasterium): yet he can dispense a religious from obeying his superior. Therefore it would seem that the vow of obedience is less than the vow of poverty and continence. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv, 14): Obedience is rightly placed before victims, since by victims another’s flesh, but by obedience one’s own will, is sacrificed. Now the religious vows are holocausts, as stated above (AA. 1, 3, ad 6). Therefore the vow of obedience is the chief of all religious vows. I answer that, The vow of obedience is the chief of the three religious vows, and this for three reasons. First, because by the vow of obedience man offers God something greater, namely his own will; for this is of more account than his own body, which he offers God by continence, and than external things, which he offers God by the vow of poverty. Wherefore that which is done out of obedi-

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fit ex obedientia, est magis Deo acceptum quam id quod fit per propriam voluntatem, secundum quod Hieronymus dicit, ad rusticum monachum, ad illud tendit oratio, ut doceam te non tuo arbitrio dimittendum; et post pauca, non facias quod vis, comedas quod iuberis, habeas quantum acceperis, vestiaris quod datur. Unde et ieiunium non redditur Deo acceptum cum propria voluntate, secundum illud Isaiae LVIII, ecce, in diebus ieiunii vestri invenitur voluntas vestra. Secundo, quia votum obedientiae continet sub se alia vota, sed non convertitur. Nam religiosus etsi teneatur ex voto continentiam servare et paupertatem, tamen haec etiam sub obedientia cadunt, ad quam pertinent multa alia praeter continentiam et paupertatem. Tertio, quia votum obedientiae proprie se extendit ad actus propinquos fini religionis. Quanto autem aliquid propinquius est fini, tanto melius est. Et inde etiam est quod votum obedientiae est religioni essentialius. Si enim aliquis, absque voto obedientiae, voluntariam paupertatem et continentiam etiam voto servet, non propter hoc pertinet ad statum religionis, qui praefertur etiam ipsi virginitati ex voto observatae; dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Virginitat., nemo, quantum puto, ausus fuerit virginitatem praeferre monasterio. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod consilium obedientiae includitur in ipsa Christi sequela, qui enim obedit, sequitur alterius voluntatem. Et ideo magis pertinet ad perfectionem quam votum paupertatis, quia, ut Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., id quod perfectionis est addidit Petrus, cum dixit, et secuti sumus te. Ad secundum dicendum quod ex verbo illo non habetur quod continentia praeferatur omnibus aliis actibus virtuosis, sed coniugali castitati; vel etiam exterioribus divitiis auri et argenti, quae pondere mensurantur. Vel per continentiam intelligitur universaliter abstinentia ab omni malo, ut supra habitum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod Papa in voto obedientiae non potest sic cum religioso dispensare ut nulli praelato teneatur obedire in his quae ad perfectionem vitae pertinent, non enim potest eum a sua obedientia eximere. Potest tamen eum eximere ab inferioris praelati subiectione. Quod non est in voto obedientiae dispensare.

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ence is more acceptable to God than that which is done of one’s own will, according to the saying of Jerome (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic Monach.): My words are intended to teach you not to rely on your own judgment: and a little further on he says: You may not do what you will; you must eat what you are bidden to eat, you may possess as much as you receive, clothe yourself with what is given to you. Hence fasting is not acceptable to God if it is done of one’s own will, according to Isa. 58:3, Behold in the day of your fast your own will is found. Second, because the vow of obedience includes the other vows, but not vice versa: for a religious, though bound by vow to observe continence and poverty, yet these also come under obedience, as well as many other things besides the keeping of continence and poverty. Third, because the vow of obedience extends properly to those acts that are closely connected with the end of religion; and the more closely a thing is connected with the end, the better it is. It follows from this that the vow of obedience is more essential to the religious life. For if a man without taking a vow of obedience were to observe, even by vow, voluntary poverty and continence, he would not therefore belong to the religious state, which is to be preferred to virginity observed even by vow; for Augustine says (De Virgin. xlvi): No one, methinks, would prefer virginity to the monastic life. Reply Obj. 1: The counsel of obedience was included in the very following of Christ, since to obey is to follow another’s will. Consequently it is more pertinent to perfection than the vow of poverty, because as Jerome, commenting on Matt. 19:27, Behold we have left all things, observes, Peter added that which is perfect when he said: And have followed Thee. Reply Obj. 2: The words quoted mean that continence is to be preferred, not to all other acts of virtue, but to conjugal chastity, or to external riches of gold and silver which are measured by weight. Or again continence is taken in a general sense for abstinence from all evil, as stated above (Q. 155, A. 4, ad 1). Reply Obj. 3: The Pope cannot dispense a religious from his vow of obedience so as to release him from obedience to every superior in matters relating to the perfection of life, for he cannot exempt him from obedience to himself. He can, however, exempt him from subjection to a lower superior, but this is not to dispense him from his vow of obedience.

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Article 9 Whether a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses the things contained in his rule? Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod religiosus semper peccet mortaliter transgrediendo ea quae sunt in regula. Facere enim contra votum est peccatum damnabile, ut patet per id quod apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. V, quod viduae quae volunt nubere. Damnationem habent, quia primam fidem irritam fecerunt. Sed religiosi voto professionis ad regulam adstringuntur. Ergo peccant mortaliter transgrediendo ea quae in regula continentur. Praeterea, regula imponitur religioso sicut lex quaedam. Sed ille qui transgreditur praeceptum legis, peccat mortaliter. Ergo videtur quod monachus transgrediens ea quae sunt in regula, peccet mortaliter. Praeterea, contemptus inducit peccatum mortale. Sed quicumque frequenter aliquid iterat quod non debet facere, videtur ex contemptu peccare. Ergo videtur quod, si religiosus frequenter transgrediatur id quod est in regula, peccet mortaliter. Sed contra est quod status religionis est securior quam status saecularis vitae, unde Gregorius, in principio Moral., comparat vitam saecularem mari fluctuanti, vitam autem religionis portui tranquillo. Sed si quaelibet transgressio eorum quae in regula continentur, religiosum obligaret ad peccatum mortale, status religionis esset periculosissimus, propter multitudinem observantiarum. Non ergo quaelibet transgressio eorum quae in regula continentur, est peccatum mortale. Respondeo dicendum quod in regula continetur aliquid dupliciter, sicut ex dictis patet. Uno modo, sicut finis regulae, puta ea quae pertinent ad actus virtutum. Et horum transgressio, quantum ad ea quae cadunt communiter sub praecepto, obligat ad mortale. Quantum vero ad ea quae excedunt communiter necessitatem praecepti, non obligat ad mortale, nisi propter contemptum, quia, sicut supra dictum est, religiosus non tenetur esse perfectus. Sed ad perfectionem tendere, cui contrariatur perfectionis contemptus. Alio modo continetur aliquid in regula pertinens ad exterius exercitium, sicut sunt omnes exteriores observantiae. Inter quas sunt quaedam ad quas obligatur religiosus ex voto professionis. Votum autem professionis respicit principaliter tria praedicta, scilicet paupertatem, continentiam et obedientiam, alia vero omnia ad haec ordinantur. Et ideo transgressio horum trium obligat ad mortale. Aliorum autem transgressio non obligat ad mortale, nisi vel propter contemptum regulae, quia hoc directe contrariaretur professioni, per quam aliquis vovit regularem vitam, vel propter praeceptum, sive oretenus a

Objection 1: It would seem that a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses the things contained in his rule. For to break a vow is a sin worthy of condemnation, as appears from 1 Tim. 5:11, 12, where the Apostle says that widows who will marry have damnation, because they have made void their first faith. But religious are bound to a rule by the vows of their profession. Therefore they sin mortally by transgressing the things contained in their rule. Obj. 2: Further, the rule is enjoined upon a religious in the same way as a law. Now he who transgresses a precept of law sins mortally. Therefore it would seem that a monk sins mortally if he transgresses the things contained in his rule. Obj. 3: Further, contempt involves a mortal sin. Now whoever repeatedly does what he ought not to do seems to sin from contempt. Therefore it would seem that a religious sins mortally by frequently transgressing the things contained in his rule. On the contrary, The religious state is safer than the secular state; wherefore Gregory at the beginning of his Morals compares the secular life to the stormy sea, and the religious life to the calm port. But if every transgression of the things contained in his rule were to involve a religious in mortal sin, the religious life would be fraught with danger of account of its multitude of observances. Therefore not every transgression of the things contained in the rule is a mortal sin. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1, ad 1, 2), a thing is contained in the rule in two ways. First, as the end of the rule, for instance things that pertain to the acts of the virtues; and the transgression of these, as regards those which come under a common precept, involves a mortal sin; but as regards those which are not included in the common obligation of a precept, the transgression thereof does not involve a mortal sin, except by reason of contempt, because, as stated above (A. 2), a religious is not bound to be perfect, but to tend to perfection, to which the contempt of perfection is opposed. Second, a thing is contained in the rule through pertaining to the outward practice, such as all external observances, to some of which a religious is bound by the vow of his profession. Now the vow of profession regards chiefly the three things aforesaid, namely poverty, continence, and obedience, while all others are directed to these. Consequently the transgression of these three involves a mortal sin, while the transgression of the others does not involve a mortal sin, except either by reason of contempt of the rule (since this is directly contrary to the profession whereby a man vows to live according to the rule), or by reason of a

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praelato factum sive in regula expressum, quia hoc esset precept, whether given orally by a superior, or expressed in facere contra obedientiae votum. the rule, since this would be to act contrary to the vow of obedience. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille qui profitetur Reply Obj. 1: He who professes a rule does not vow to regulam, non vovet servare omnia quae sunt in regu- observe all the things contained in the rule, but he vows the la, sed vovet regularem vitam quae essentialiter consi- regular life which consists essentially in the three aforesaid stit in tribus praedictis. Unde et in quibusdam religio- things. Hence in certain religious orders precaution is taken nibus cautius aliqui profitentur, non quidem regulam, to profess, not the rule, but to live according to the rule, sed, vivere secundum regulam, idest, tendere ad hoc i.e., to tend to form one’s conduct in accordance with the quod aliquis mores suos informet secundum regulam si- rule as a kind of model; and this is set aside by contempt. cut secundum quoddam exemplar. Et hoc tollitur per Yet greater precaution is observed in some religious orders contemptum. In quibusdam autem religionibus, adhuc by professing obedience according to the rule, so that only cautius profitentur obedientiam secundum regulam, ita that which is contrary to a precept of the rule is contrary quod professioni non contrariatur nisi id quod est con- to the profession, while the transgression or omission of tra praeceptum regulae. Transgressio vero vel omissio other things binds only under pain of venial sin, because, aliorum obligat solum ad peccatum veniale. Quia, sicut as stated above (A. 7, ad 2), such things are dispositions to dictum est, huiusmodi sunt dispositiones ad principalia the chief vows. And venial sin is a disposition to mortal, as vota, peccatum autem veniale est dispositio ad mortale, stated above (I-II, Q. 88, A. 3), inasmuch as it hinders those ut supra dictum est, inquantum impedit ea quibus ali- things whereby a man is disposed to keep the chief precepts quis disponitur ad observanda principalia praecepta le- of Christ’s law, namely the precepts of charity. gis Christi, quae sunt praecepta caritatis. In aliqua tamen religione, scilicet ordinis fratrum There is also a religious order, that of the Friars Preachpraedicatorum, transgressio talis vel omissio ex suo ge- ers, where such like transgressions or omissions do not, nere non obligat ad culpam neque mortalem neque ve- by their very nature, involve sin, either mortal or venial; nialem, sed solum ad poenam taxatam sustinendam, but they bind one to suffer the punishment affixed thereto, quia per hunc modum ad talia observanda obligantur. because it is in this way that they are bound to observe Qui tamen possent venialiter vel mortaliter peccare ex such things. Nevertheless they may sin venially or mortally negligentia vel libidine, seu contemptu. through neglect, concupiscence, or contempt. Ad secundum dicendum quod non omnia quae Reply Obj. 2: Not all the contents of the law are set continentur in lege traduntur per modum praecepti, sed forth by way of precept; for some are expressed under the quaedam proponuntur per modum ordinationis cuiu- form of ordinance or statute binding under pain of a fixed sdam, vel statuti obligantis ad certam poenam, sicut in punishment. Accordingly, just as in the civil law the translege civili non facit semper dignum poena mortis corpo- gression of a legal statute does not always render a man deralis transgressio legalis statuti. Ita nec in lege Ecclesiae serving of bodily death, so neither in the law of the Church omnes ordinationes vel statuta obligant ad mortale. Et si- does every ordinance or statute bind under mortal sin; and militer nec omnia statuta regulae. the same applies to the statutes of the rule. Ad tertium dicendum quod tunc committit aliReply Obj. 3: An action or transgression proceeds quis vel transgreditur ex contemptu, quando voluntas from contempt when a man’s will refuses to submit to the eius renuit subiici ordinationi legis vel regulae, et ex ordinance of the law or rule, and from this he proceeds hoc procedit ad faciendum contra legem vel regulam. to act against the law or rule. On the other hand, he does Quando autem e converso, propter aliquam particula- not sin from contempt, but from some other cause, when rem causam, puta concupiscentiam vel iram, inducitur he is led to do something against the ordinance of the law ad aliquid faciendum contra statuta legis vel regulae, non or rule through some particular cause such as concupispeccat ex contemptu, sed ex aliqua alia causa, etiam si cence or anger, even though he often repeat the same kind frequenter ex eadem causa, vel alia simili, peccatum ite- of sin through the same or some other cause. Thus Augusret. Sicut etiam Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura et tine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that not all sins are commitgratia, quod non omnia peccata committuntur ex con- ted through proud contempt. Nevertheless the frequent reptemptu superbiae. Frequentia tamen peccati dispositive etition of a sin leads dispositively to contempt, according to inducit ad contemptum, secundum illud Prov. XVIII, the words of Prov. 18:3, The wicked man, when he is come impius, cum in profundum venerit, contemnit. into the depth of sins, contemneth.

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Those Things in Which the Religious State Properly Consists Q. 186, A. 10

Article 10 Whether a religious sins more grievously than a secular by the same kind of sin? Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod religiosus eodem genere peccati non gravius peccet quam saecularis. Dicitur enim II Paralip. XXX, dominus bonus propitiabitur cunctis qui in toto corde requirunt dominum Deum patrum suorum, et non imputabitur eis quod minus sanctificati sunt. Sed magis videntur religiosi ex toto corde dominum Deum patrum suorum sequi quam saeculares, qui ex parte se et sua Deo dant et ex parte sibi reservant, ut Gregorius dicit, super Ezech. Ergo videtur quod minus imputetur eis si in aliquo a sanctificatione deficiant. Praeterea, ex hoc quod aliquis bona opera facit, minus contra peccata eius Deus irascitur, dicitur enim II Paralip. XIX, impio praebes auxilium, et his qui oderunt dominum amicitia iungeris, et idcirco iram quidem domini merebaris, sed bona opera inventa sunt in te. Religiosi autem plura bona opera faciunt quam saeculares. Ergo, si aliqua peccata faciunt, minus contra eos Deus irascitur. Praeterea, praesens vita sine peccato non transigitur, secundum illud Iac. III, in multis offendimus omnes. Si ergo peccata religiosorum essent graviora peccatis saecularium, sequeretur quod religiosi essent peioris conditionis quam saeculares. Et sic non esset sanum consilium ad religionem transire. Sed contra est quod de maiori malo magis esset dolendum. Sed de peccatis eorum qui sunt in statu sanctitatis et perfectionis, maxime videtur esse dolendum, dicitur enim Ierem. XXIII, contritum est cor meum in medio mei; et postea subdit, propheta namque et sacerdos polluti sunt, et in domo mea vidi malum eorum. Ergo religiosi, et alii qui sunt in statu perfectionis, ceteris paribus, gravius peccant. Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum quod a religiosis committitur, potest esse gravius peccato saecularium eiusdem speciei, tripliciter. Uno modo, si sit contra votum religionis, puta si religiosus fornicetur vel furetur, quia fornicando facit contra votum continentiae, et furando facit contra votum paupertatis, et non solum contra praeceptum divinae legis. Secundo, si ex contemptu peccet, quia ex hoc videtur esse magis ingratus divinis beneficiis, quibus est sublimatus ad statum perfectionis. Sicut apostolus dicit, Heb. X, quod fidelis graviora meretur supplicia, ex hoc quod, peccando, filium Dei conculcat per contemptum. Unde et dominus conqueritur, Ierem. XI, quid est quod dilectus meus in domo mea facit scelera multa? Tertio modo, peccatum religiosi potest esse maius propter scandalum, quia ad vitam eius plu-

Objection 1: It would seem that a religious does not sin more grievously than a secular by the same kind of sin. For it is written (2 Paralip. 30:18, 19): The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all them who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers, and will not impute it to them that they are not sanctified. Now religious apparently follow the Lord the God of their fathers with their whole heart rather than seculars, who partly give themselves and their possessions to God and reserve part for themselves, as Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Therefore it would seem that it is less imputed to them if they fall short somewhat of their sanctification. Obj. 2: Further, God is less angered at a man’s sins if he does some good deeds, according to 2 Paralip. 19:2, 3, Thou helpest the ungodly, and thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord, and therefore thou didst deserve indeed the wrath of the Lord: but good works are found in thee. Now religious do more good works than seculars. Therefore if they commit any sins, God is less angry with them. Obj. 3: Further, this present life is not carried through without sin, according to James 3:2, In many things we all offend. Therefore if the sins of religious were more grievous than those of seculars it would follow that religious are worse off than seculars: and consequently it would not be a wholesome counsel to enter religion. On the contrary, The greater the evil the more it would seem to be deplored. But seemingly the sins of those who are in the state of holiness and perfection are the most deplorable, for it is written (Jer 23:9): My heart is broken within me, and afterwards (Jer 23:11): For the prophet and the priest are defiled; and in My house I have found their wickedness. Therefore religious and others who are in the state of perfection, other things being equal, sin more grievously. I answer that, A sin committed by a religious may be in three ways more grievous than a like sin committed by a secular. First, if it be against his religious vow; for instance if he be guilty of fornication or theft, because by fornication he acts against the vow of continence, and by theft against the vow of poverty; and not merely against a precept of the divine law. Second, if he sin out of contempt, because thereby he would seem to be the more ungrateful for the divine favors which have raised him to the state of perfection. Thus the Apostle says (Heb 10:29) that the believer deserveth worse punishments who through contempt tramples under foot the Son of God. Hence the Lord complains (Jer 11:15): What is the meaning that My beloved hath wrought much wickedness in My house? Third, the sin of a religious may be greater on account of scandal, because

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res respiciunt. Unde dicitur Ierem. XXIII, in prophetis Ierusalem vidi similitudinem adulterii et iter mendacii, et confortaverunt manus pessimorum, ut non converteretur unusquisque a malitia sua. Si vero religiosus non ex contemptu, sed ex infirmitate vel ignorantia, aliquod peccatum quod non est contra votum suae professionis, committit absque scandalo, puta in occulto, levius peccat eodem genere peccati quam saecularis. Quia peccatum eius, si sit leve, quasi absorbetur ex multis bonis operibus quae facit. Et si sit mortale, facilius ab eo resurgit. Primo quidem, propter intentionem quam habet erectam ad Deum, quae, etsi ad horam intercipiatur, de facili ad pristina reparatur. Unde super illud Psalmi, cum ceciderit non collidetur, dicit Origenes, iniustus si peccaverit, non poenitet, et peccatum suum emendare nescit. Iustus autem scit emendare, scit corrigere, sicut ille qui dixerat, nescio hominem, paulo post, cum respectus fuisset a domino, flere coepit amarissime; et ille qui de tecto mulierem viderat et concupierat eam, dicere novit, peccavi et malum coram te feci. Iuvatur etiam sociis ad resurgendum, secundum illud Eccle. IV, si unus ceciderit, ab altero fulcietur. Vae soli, quia, si ceciderit, non habet sublevantem.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur de his quae per infirmitatem vel ignorantiam committuntur, non autem de his quae committuntur per contemptum. Ad secundum dicendum quod Iosaphat etiam, cui verba illa dicuntur, non ex malitia, sed ex quadam infirmitate humanae affectionis peccavit. Ad tertium dicendum quod iusti non de facili peccant ex contemptu sed quandoque labuntur in aliquod peccatum ex ignorantia vel infirmitate, a quo de facili relevantur. Si autem ad hoc perveniant quod ex contemptu peccent, efficiuntur pessimi et maxime incorrigibiles, secundum illud Ierem. II, confregisti iugum, diripuisti vincula, dixisti, non serviam. In omni colle sublimi, et sub omni ligno frondoso, tu prosternebaris meretrix. Unde Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad plebem Hipponens., ex quo Deo servire coepi, quomodo difficile sum expertus meliores quam qui in monasteriis profecerunt, ita non sum expertus peiores quam qui in monasteriis ceciderunt.

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many take note of his manner of life: wherefore it is written (Jer 23:14): I have seen the likeness of adulterers, and the way of lying in the Prophets of Jerusalem; and they strengthened the hands of the wicked, that no man should return from his evil doings. On the other hand, if a religious, not out of contempt, but out of weakness or ignorance, commit a sin that is not against the vow of his profession, without giving scandal (for instance if he commit it in secret) he sins less grievously in the same kind of sin than a secular, because his sin if slight is absorbed as it were by his many good works, and if it be mortal, he more easily recovers from it. First, because he has a right intention towards God, and though it be intercepted for the moment, it is easily restored to its former object. Hence Origen commenting on Ps. 36:24, When he shall fall he shall not be bruised, says (Hom. iv in Ps. 36): The wicked man, if he sin, repents not, and fails to make amends for his sin. But the just man knows how to make amends and recover himself; even as he who had said: ‘I know not the man,’ shortly afterwards when the Lord had looked on him, knew to shed most bitter tears, and he who from the roof had seen a woman and desired her knew to say: ‘I have sinned and done evil before Thee.’ Second, he is assisted by his fellowreligious to rise again, according to Eccles. 4:10, If one fall he shall be supported by the other: woe to him that is alone, for when he falleth he hath none to lift him up. Reply Obj. 1: The words quoted refer to things done through weakness or ignorance, but not to those that are done out of contempt. Reply Obj. 2: Josaphat also, to whom these words were addressed, sinned not out of contempt, but out of a certain weakness of human affection. Reply Obj. 3: The just sin not easily out of contempt; but sometimes they fall into a sin through ignorance or weakness from which they easily arise. If, however, they go so far as to sin out of contempt, they become most wicked and incorrigible, according to the word of Jer. 2:20: Thou hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and thou hast said: ‘I will not serve.’ For on every high hill and under every green tree thou didst prostitute thyself. Hence Augustine says (Ep. lxxviii ad Pleb. Hippon.): From the time I began to serve God, even as I scarcely found better men than those who made progress in monasteries, so have I not found worse than those who in the monastery have fallen.

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Question 187 Those Things That are Competent to Religious Deinde considerandum est de his quae competunt We must now consider the things that are competent religiosis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. to religious; and under this head there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum liceat eis docere, praedicare, et alia (1) Whether it is lawful for them to teach, preach, and huiusmodi facere. do like things? Secundo, utrum liceat eis de negotiis saecularibus se (2) Whether it is lawful for them to meddle in secular intromittere. business? Tertio, utrum teneantur manibus operari. (3) Whether they are bound to manual labor? Quarto, utrum liceat eis de eleemosynis vivere. (4) Whether it is lawful for them to live on alms? Quinto, utrum liceat eis mendicare. (5) Whether it is lawful for them to quest? Sexto, utrum liceat eis vestimenta ceteris viliora (6) Whether it is lawful for them to wear coarser deferre. clothes than other persons?

Article 1 Whether it is lawful for religious to teach, preach, and the like? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod religiosis non liceat docere, praedicare, et alia huiusmodi facere. Dicitur enim VII, qu. I, in quodam statuto Constantinopolitanae synodi, monachorum vita subiectionis habet verbum et discipulatus, non docendi, vel praesidendi, vel pascendi alios. Hieronymus etiam dicit, ad Riparium et desiderium, monachus non doctoris, sed plangentis habet officium. Leo etiam Papa dicit, ut habetur XVI, qu. I, praeter domini sacerdotes, nullus audeat praedicare, sive monachus sive laicus ille sit qui cuiuslibet scientiae nomine gloriatur. Sed non licet transgredi proprium officium et statutum Ecclesiae. Ergo videtur quod religiosis non liceat docere, praedicare, et alia huiusmodi facere. Praeterea, in statuto Nicaenae synodi, quod ponitur XVI, qu. I, sic dicitur, firmiter et indissolubiliter omnibus praecipimus, ut aliquis monachus poenitentiam nemini tribuat, nisi invicem sibi, ut iustum est. Mortuum non sepeliat, nisi monachum secum in monasterio commorantem, vel si fortuito quemcumque advenientium fratrum ibi mori contigerit. Sed sicut ista pertinent ad officium clericorum, ita etiam praedicare et docere. Ergo, cum alia sit causa monachi, et alia clerici, sicut Hieronymus dicit, ad Heliodorum; videtur quod non liceat religiosis praedicare et docere, et alia huiusmodi facere. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in Regist., nemo potest ecclesiasticis obsequiis deservire, et in monastica regula ordinate persistere, et habetur XVI, qu. I. Sed monachi tenentur in monastica regula ordinate persistere. Ergo videtur quod non possint ecclesiasticis obsequiis deser-

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to teach, preach, and the like. For it is said (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam) in an ordinance of a synod of Constantinople: The monastic life is one of subjection and discipleship, not of teaching, authority, or pastoral care. And Jerome says (ad Ripar. et Desider.): A monk’s duty is not to teach but to lament. Again Pope Leo says, Let none dare to preach save the priests of the Lord, be he monk or layman, and no matter what knowledge he may boast of having. Now it is not lawful to exceed the bounds of one’s office or transgress the ordinance of the Church. Therefore seemingly it is unlawful for religious to teach, preach, and the like. Obj. 2: Further, in an ordinance of the Council of Nicea (cf. XVI, qu. i, can. Placuit) it is laid down as follows: It is our absolute and peremptory command addressed to all that monks shall not hear confessions except of one another, as is right, that they shall not bury the dead except those dwelling with them in the monastery, or if by chance a brother happen to die while on a visit. But just as the above belong to the duty of clerics, so also do preaching and teaching. Therefore since the business of a monk differs from that of a cleric, as Jerome says (Ep. xiv ad Heliod.), it would seem unlawful for religious to preach, teach, and the like. Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Regist. v, Ep. 1): No man can fulfill ecclesiastical duties, and keep consistently to the monastic rule: and this is quoted XVI, qu. i, can. Nemo potest. Now monks are bound to keep consistently to the monastic rule. Therefore it would seem that they cannot

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vire. Docere autem et praedicare pertinent ad ecclesiastica obsequia. Ergo videtur quod non liceat eis praedicare aut docere, aut aliquid huiusmodi facere. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, et habetur causa et quaestione eadem, ex auctoritate huius decreti, quod apostolico moderamine et pietatis officio a nobis est constitutum, sacerdotibus monachis, apostolorum figuram tenentibus, liceat praedicare, baptizare, communionem dare, pro peccatoribus orare, poenitentiam imponere, atque peccata solvere. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid dicitur non licere alicui dupliciter. Uno modo, quia habet in se quod contrariatur ei quod dicitur non licere, sicut nulli homini licet peccare, quia habet in se quilibet homo rationem et obligationem ad legem Dei, quibus contrariatur peccatum. Et hoc modo dicitur alicui non licere praedicare vel docere, vel aliquid huiusmodi facere, quia habet in se aliquid quod his repugnat, vel ratione praecepti, sicut his qui sunt irregulares, ex statuto Ecclesiae, non licet ascendere ad sacros ordines; vel propter peccatum, secundum illud Psalmi, peccatori autem dixit Deus, quare tu enarras iustitias meas? Hoc autem modo, non est illicitum religiosis praedicare, docere, et alia huiusmodi facere. Tum quia ex voto vel praecepto regulae non obligantur ad hoc quod ab his abstineant. Tum etiam quia non redduntur ad haec minus idonei ex aliquo peccato commisso, sed magis idonei, ex exercitio sanctitatis quod assumpserunt. Stultum autem est dicere ut per hoc quod aliquis in sanctitate promovetur, efficiatur minus idoneus ad spiritualia officia exercenda. Et ideo stulta est quorundam opinio dicentium quod ipse status religionis impedimentum affert talia exequendi. Quorum errorem Bonifacius Papa rationibus supra dictis excludit, dicens, ut habetur XVI, qu. I, sunt nonnulli, nullo dogmate fulti, audacissimo quidem zelo magis amaritudinis quam dilectionis inflammati, asserentes monachos, quia mundo mortui sunt et Deo vivunt, sacerdotalis officii potentia indignos. Sed omnino labuntur. Quod ostendit, primo quidem, quia non contrariatur regulae, subdit enim, neque enim beatus Benedictus, monachorum praeceptor almificus, huiuscemodi rei aliquo modo fuit interdictor. Et similiter nec in aliis regulis hoc prohibetur. Secundo improbat praedictum errorem ex idoneitate monachorum, cum in fine capituli subdit, quanto quisque est excellentior, tanto et in illis, scilicet spiritualibus operibus, potentior.

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fulfill ecclesiastical duties, whereof teaching and preaching are a part. Therefore seemingly it is unlawful for them to preach, teach, and do similar things. On the contrary, Gregory is quoted (XVI, qu. i, can. Ex auctoritate) as saying: By authority of this decree framed in virtue of our apostolic power and the duty of our office, be it lawful to monk priests who are configured to the apostles, to preach, baptize, give communion, pray for sinners, impose penance, and absolve from sin.

I answer that, A thing is declared to be unlawful to a person in two ways. First, because there is something in him contrary to that which is declared unlawful to him: thus to no man is it lawful to sin, because each man has in himself reason and an obligation to God’s law, to which things sin is contrary. And in this way it is said to be unlawful for a person to preach, teach, or do like things, because there is in him something incompatible with these things, either by reason of a precept—thus those who are irregular by ordinance of the Church may not be raised to the sacred orders—or by reason of sin, according to Ps. 49:16, But to the sinner God hath said: Why dost thou declare My justice? In this way it is not unlawful for religious to preach, teach, and do like things, both because they are bound neither by vow nor by precept of their rule to abstain from these things, and because they are not rendered less apt for these things by any sin committed, but on the contrary they are the more apt through having taken upon themselves the practice of holiness. For it is foolish to say that a man is rendered less fit for spiritual duties through advancing himself in holiness; and consequently it is foolish to declare that the religious state is an obstacle to the fulfilment of such like duties. This error is rejected by Pope Boniface for the reasons given above. His words which are quoted (XVI, qu. i, can. Sunt nonnulli) are these: There are some who without any dogmatic proof, and with extreme daring, inspired with a zeal rather of bitterness than of love, assert that monks though they be dead to the world and live to God, are unworthy of the power of the priestly office, and that they cannot confer penance, nor christen, nor absolve in virtue of the power divinely bestowed on them in the priestly office. But they are altogether wrong. He proves this first because it is not contrary to the rule; thus he continues: For neither did the Blessed Benedict the saintly teacher of monks forbid this in any way, nor is it forbidden in other rules. Second, he refutes the above error from the usefulness of the monks, when he adds at the end of the same chapter: The more perfect a man is, the more effective is he in these, namely in spiritual works. Alio modo dicitur aliquid non licere alicui, non propSecond, a thing is said to be unlawful for a man, not on ter contrarium quod habeat, sed propter hoc quod ei de- account of there being in him something contrary thereto, ficit unde illud possit, sicut diacono non licet Missam but because he lacks that which enables him to do it: thus celebrare, quia non habet ordinem sacerdotalem; et pre- it is unlawful for a deacon to say mass, because he is not sbytero non licet sententiam ferre, quia non habet epi- in priestly orders; and it is unlawful for a priest to deliver

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Those Things That are Competent to Religious

scopalem auctoritatem. In quibus tamen est distinguendum. Quia ea quae sunt ordinis, committi non possunt nisi ei qui ordinem habet, sicut diacono non potest committi quod celebret Missam, nisi fiat sacerdos. Ea vero quae sunt iurisdictionis, committi possunt eis qui non habent ordinariam iurisdictionem, sicut prolatio sententiae committitur ab episcopo simplici sacerdoti. Et hoc modo dicitur non licere monachis et aliis religiosis praedicare, docere, et alia huiusmodi facere, quia status religionis non dat eis potestatem haec faciendi. Possunt tamen ista facere si ordinem accipiant vel ordinariam iurisdictionem, aut etiam si eis committantur ea quae sunt iurisdictionis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex verbis illis habetur quod monachi, ex hoc quod sunt monachi, non nanciscuntur potestatem talia faciendi, non autem quod ex hoc quod sunt monachi, habeant aliquid contrarium executioni talium actuum. Ad secundum dicendum quod illud etiam statutum Nicaeni Concilii praecipit ut monachi non usurpent sibi, ex hoc quod sunt monachi, potestatem huiusmodi actus exercendi. Non autem prohibet quin ista possint eis committi. Ad tertium dicendum quod ista duo se non compatiuntur, quod aliquis ordinariam curam ecclesiasticorum officiorum habeat, et monasticam regulam in monasterio servet. Per hoc tamen non excluditur quin monachi et alii religiosi possint interdum circa ecclesiastica officia occupari ex commissione praelatorum qui ordinariam curam habent, et praecipue illi quorum religiones ad hoc sunt specialiter institutae, ut infra dicetur.

Q. 187, A. 2

judgment because he lacks the episcopal authority. Here, however, a distinction must be made. Because those things which are a matter of an order, cannot be deputed to one who has not the order, whereas matters of jurisdiction can be deputed to those who have not ordinary jurisdiction: thus the delivery of a judgment is deputed by the bishop to a simple priest. In this sense it is said to be unlawful for monks and other religious to preach, teach, and so forth, because the religious state does not give them the power to do these things. They can, however, do them if they receive orders, or ordinary jurisdiction, or if matters of jurisdiction be delegated to them. Reply Obj. 1: It results from the words quoted that the fact of their being monks does not give monks the power to do these things, yet it does not involve in them anything contrary to the performance of these acts. Reply Obj. 2: Again, this ordinance of the Council of Nicea forbids monks to claim the power of exercising those acts on the ground of their being monks, but it does not forbid those acts being delegated to them. Reply Obj. 3: These two things are incompatible, namely, the ordinary cure of ecclesiastical duties, and the observance of the monastic rule in a monastery. But this does not prevent monks and other religious from being sometimes occupied with ecclesiastical duties through being deputed thereto by superiors having ordinary cure; especially members of religious orders that are especially instituted for that purpose, as we shall say further on (Q. 188, A. 4).

Article 2 Whether it is lawful for religious to occupy themselves with secular business? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod religiosis non liceat saecularia negotia tractare. Dicitur enim in praedicto decreto Bonifacii Papae quod beatus Benedictus eos saecularium negotiorum edixit expertes fore. Quod quidem apostolicis documentis, et omnium sanctorum patrum institutis, non solum monachis, sed etiam canonicis omnibus imperatur, secundum illud II ad Tim. II, nemo militans Deo implicat se saecularibus negotiis. Sed omnibus religiosis imminet quod militent Deo. Ergo non licet eis saecularia negotia exercere. Praeterea, I ad Thessal. IV, dicit apostolus, operam detis ut quieti sitis, et ut negotium vestrum agatis, Glossa, dimissis alienis, quod vobis utile est in emendationem vi-

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to occupy themselves with secular business. For in the decree quoted above (A. 1) of Pope Boniface it is said that the Blessed Benedict bade them to be altogether free from secular business; and this is most explicitly prescribed by the apostolic doctrine and the teaching of all the Fathers, not only to religious, but also to all the canonical clergy, according to 2 Tim. 2:4, No man being a soldier to God, entangleth himself with secular business. Now it is the duty of all religious to be soldiers of God. Therefore it is unlawful for them to occupy themselves with secular business. Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Thess 4:11): That you use your endeavor to be quiet, and that you do your own business, which a gloss explains thus—by refraining from

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tae. Sed religiosi specialiter assumunt studium emenda- other people’s affairs, so as to be the better able to attend to tionis vitae. Ergo non debent saecularia negotia exercere. the amendment of your own life. Now religious devote themselves in a special way to the amendment of their life. Therefore they should not occupy themselves with secular business. Praeterea, super illud Matth. I, ecce qui mollibus Obj. 3: Further, Jerome, commenting on Matt. 11:8, Bevestiuntur in domibus regum sunt, dicit Hieronymus, ex hold they that are clothed in soft garments are in the houses hoc ostendit rigidam vitam et austeram praedicationem of kings, says: Hence we gather that an austere life and severe vitare debere aulas regum, et mollium hominum palatia preaching should avoid the palaces of kings and the mansions declinare. Sed necessitas saecularium negotiorum ingerit of the voluptuous. But the needs of secular business induce hominem ad frequentandum regum palatia. Ergo non li- men to frequent the palaces of kings. Therefore it is unlawcet religiosis aliqua negotia saecularia pertractare. ful for religious to occupy themselves with secular business. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. ult., On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom 16:1): commendo vobis Phoeben, sororem nostram, et postea I commend to you Phoebe our Sister, and further on subdit, et assistatis ei in quocumque negotio vestri indi- (Rom 16:2), that you assist her in whatsoever business she guerit. shall have need of you. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, I answer that, As stated above (Q. 186, AA. 1, 7, status religionis est ordinatus ad perfectionem caritatis ad 1), the religious state is directed to the attainment of the consequendam. Ad quam quidem principaliter pertinet perfection of charity, consisting principally in the love of Dei dilectio, secundario autem dilectio proximi. Et ideo God and secondarily in the love of our neighbor. Consereligiosi praecipue et propter se debent intendere ad hoc quently that which religious intend chiefly and for its own quod Deo vacent. Si autem necessitas proximis immi- sake is to give themselves to God. Yet if their neighbor be neat, eorum negotia ex caritate agere debent, secundum in need, they should attend to his affairs out of charity, acillud Galat. VI, alter alterius onera portate, et sic adim- cording to Gal. 6:2, Bear ye one another’s burthens: and so plebitis legem Christi, quia et in hoc ipso quod proximis you shall fulfill the law of Christ, since through serving their serviunt propter Deum, dilectioni divinae obsequuntur. neighbor for God’s sake, they are obedient to the divine Unde dicitur Iac. I, religio munda et immaculata apud love. Hence it is written (Jas 1:27): Religion clean and undeDeum et patrem haec est, visitare pupillos et viduas in tri- filed before God and the Father, is this: to visit the fatherless bulatione eorum, Glossa, idest, succurrere eis qui carent and widows in their tribulation, which means, according to praesidio in tempore necessitatis. a gloss, to assist the helpless in their time of need. Est ergo dicendum quod causa cupiditatis saeculaWe must conclude therefore that it is unlawful for either ria negotia gerere nec monachis nec clericis licet. Causa monks or clerics to carry on secular business from motives vero caritatis se negotiis saecularibus, cum debita mo- of avarice; but from motives of charity, and with their suderatione, ingerere possunt, secundum superioris licen- perior’s permission, they may occupy themselves with due tiam, et ministrando et dirigendo. Unde dicitur in de- moderation in the administration and direction of secular cretis, dist. LXXXVIII, decrevit sancta synodus nullum business. Wherefore it is said in the Decretals (Dist. xxxviii, deinceps clericum aut possessiones conducere, aut negotiis can. Decrevit): The holy synod decrees that henceforth no saecularibus se permiscere, nisi propter curam pupillorum cleric shall buy property or occupy himself with secular busiaut orphanorum aut viduarum, aut si forte episcopus ci- ness, save with a view to the care of the fatherless, orphans, vitatis ecclesiasticarum rerum sollicitudinem eum habere or widows, or when the bishop of the city commands him to praecipiat. Eadem autem ratio est de religiosis et clericis, take charge of the business connected with the Church. And quia utrisque similiter negotia saecularia interdicuntur, the same applies to religious as to clerics, because they are ut dictum est. both debarred from secular business on the same grounds, as stated above. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod monachis interdiReply Obj. 1: Monks are forbidden to occupy themcuntur tractare saecularia negotia propter cupiditatem, selves with secular business from motives of avarice, but non autem propter caritatem. not from motives of charity. Ad secundum dicendum quod non est curiositas, Reply Obj. 2: To occupy oneself with secular business sed caritas, si propter necessitatem aliquis se negotiis im- on account of another’s need is not officiousness but charmisceat. ity. Ad tertium dicendum quod frequentare palatia reReply Obj. 3: To haunt the palaces of kings from mogum propter delicias vel gloriam vel cupiditatem, non tives of pleasure, glory, or avarice is not becoming to relicompetit religiosis, sed ea adire propter pias causas com- gious, but there is nothing unseemly in their visiting them petit eis. Unde dicitur IV Reg. IV, quod Eliseus dixit ad from motives of piety. Hence it is written (4 Kgs 4:13): Hast

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mulierem, nunquid habes negotium, et vis ut loquar regi vel principi militiae? Similiter etiam convenit religiosis adire regum palatia ad eos arguendos et dirigendos, sicut Ioannes Baptista arguebat Herodem, ut dicitur Matth. XIV.

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thou any business, and wilt thou that I speak to the king or to the general of the army? Likewise it becomes religious to go to the palaces of kings to rebuke and guide them, even as John the Baptist rebuked Herod, as related in Matt. 14:4.

Article 3 Whether religious are bound to manual labor? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod religiosi manibus operari teneantur. Non enim excusantur religiosi ab observantia praeceptorum. Sed operari manibus est in praecepto, secundum illud I ad Thess. IV, operemini manibus vestris, sicut praecepimus vobis. Unde et Augustinus, in libro de operibus Monach., dicit, ceterum quis ferat homines contumaces, idest religiosos non operantes, de quibus ibi loquitur, saluberrimis apostoli monitis resistentes, non sicut infirmiores tolerari, sed sicut sanctiores praedicari? Ergo videtur quod religiosi teneantur manibus operari. Praeterea, II ad Thess. III, super illud, si quis non vult operari, nec manducet, dicit Glossa, dicunt quidam de operibus spiritualibus hoc apostolum praecepisse non de opere corporali, in quo agricolae vel opifices laborant; et infra, sed superfluo conantur et sibi et ceteris caliginem adducere, ut quod utiliter caritas monet, non solum facere nolint, sed nec etiam intelligere; et infra, vult servos Dei corporaliter operari unde vivant. Sed praecipue religiosi servi Dei nominantur, utpote se totaliter divino servitio mancipantes, sicut patet per Dionysium, VI cap. Eccles. Hier. Ergo videtur quod teneantur manibus operari. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de operibus Monach., quid agant qui operari corporaliter nolunt, scire desidero. Orationibus, inquiunt, et Psalmis, et lectionibus et verbo Dei. Sed quod per ista non excusentur, ostendit per singula. Nam primo, de oratione dicit, citius exauditur una obedientis oratio quam decem millia contemptoris, illos contemptores intelligens et indignos exaudiri, qui manibus non operantur. Secundo, de divinis laudibus subdit, cantica vero divina cantare etiam manibus operantes facile possunt. Tertio, subiungit de lectione, qui autem se dicunt vacare lectioni, nonne illic inveniunt quod praecipit apostolus? Quae est ergo ista perversitas, lectioni nolle obtemperare, dum vult ei vacare? Quarto, subiungit de praedicatione, si autem alicui sermo erogandus est, et ita occupat ut manibus operari non vacet, nunquid hoc omnes in monasterio possunt? Quando ergo non omnes possunt, cur sub hoc obtentu omnes vacare volunt? Quanquam, si omnes possent, vicissitudine facere deberent, non solum ut ceteri necessariis operibus occupa-

Objection 1: It would seem that religious are bound to manual labor. For religious are not exempt from the observance of precepts. Now manual labor is a matter of precept according to 1 Thess. 4:11, Work with your own hands as we commanded you; wherefore Augustine says (De Oper. Monach. xxx): But who can allow these insolent men, namely religious that do no work, of whom he is speaking there, who disregard the most salutary admonishment of the Apostle, not merely to be borne with as being weaker than others, but even to preach as though they were holier than others. Therefore it would seem that religious are bound to manual labor. Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:10, If any man will not work, neither let him eat, says: Some say that this command of the Apostle refers to spiritual works, and not to the bodily labor of the farmer or craftsman; and further on: But it is useless for them to try to hide from themselves and from others the fact that they are unwilling not only to fulfill, but even to understand the useful admonishments of charity; and again: He wishes God’s servants to make a living by working with their bodies. Now religious especially are called servants of God, because they give themselves entirely to the service of God, as Dionysius asserts (Eccl. Hier. vi). Therefore it would seem that they are bound to manual labor. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Oper. Monach. xvii): I would fain know how they would occupy themselves, who are unwilling to work with their body. We occupy our time, say they, with prayers, psalms, reading, and the word of God. Yet these things are no excuse, and he proves this, as regards each in particular. For in the first place, as to prayer, he says: One prayer of the obedient man is sooner granted than ten thousand prayers of the contemptuous: meaning that those are contemptuous and unworthy to be heard who work not with their hands. Second, as to the divine praises he adds: Even while working with their hands they can easily sing hymns to God. Third, with regard to reading, he goes on to say: Those who say they are occupied in reading, do they not find there what the Apostle commanded? What sort of perverseness is this, to wish to read but not to obey what one reads? Fourth, he adds in reference to preaching: If one has to speak, and is so busy that he cannot spare time for manual work, can all in the monastery do this? And since all cannot do this, why should all make this a pretext for being exempt?

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rentur, sed etiam quia sufficit ut multis audientibus unus loquatur. Ergo videtur quod religiosi non debent cessare ab opere manuali propter huiusmodi opera spiritualia quibus vacant.

Praeterea, Luc. XII, super illud, vendite quae possidetis etc., dicit Glossa, non tantum cibos vestros communicate pauperibus, sed etiam vendite possessiones vestras, ut, omnibus vestris semel pro domino spretis, postea labore manuum operemini unde vivatis vel eleemosynam faciatis. Sed ad religiosos pertinet proprie omnia sua relinquere. Ergo videtur quod etiam eorum sit de labore manuum suarum vivere et eleemosynas facere. Praeterea, religiosi praecipue videntur teneri apostolorum vitam imitari, quia statum perfectionis profitentur. Sed apostoli manibus propriis laborabant, secundum illud I ad Cor. IV, laboramus operantes manibus nostris. Ergo videtur quod religiosi teneantur manibus operari. Sed contra, ad praecepta observanda quae communiter omnibus proponuntur, eodem modo tenentur religiosi et saeculares. Sed praeceptum de opere manuali communiter omnibus proponitur, ut patet II ad Thess. III, subtrahatis vos ab omni fratre ambulante inordinate, etc. (fratrem autem nominat quemlibet Christianum, sicut et I ad Cor. VII, si quis frater habet uxorem infidelem, etc.); et ibidem dicitur, si quis non vult operari, nec manducet. Non ergo religiosi magis tenentur manibus operari quam saeculares. Respondeo dicendum quod labor manualis ad quatuor ordinatur. Primo quidem, et principaliter, ad victum quaerendum. Unde primo homini dictum est, in sudore vultus tui vesceris pane tuo. Et in Psalmo, labores manuum tuarum quia manducabis, et cetera. Secundo, ordinatur ad tollendum otium, ex quo multa mala oriuntur. Unde dicitur Eccli. XXXIII, mittes servum in operationem, ne vacet, multam enim malitiam docuit otiositas. Tertio, ordinatur ad concupiscentiae refrenationem, inquantum per hoc maceratur corpus. Unde II ad Cor. VI, dicitur, in laboribus, in ieiuniis, in vigiliis, in castitate. Quarto autem, ordinatur ad eleemosynas faciendas. Unde dicitur, ad Ephes. IV, qui furabatur, iam non furetur, magis autem laboret, operando manibus suis quod bonum est, ut habeat unde tribuat necessitatem patienti. Secundum ergo quod labor manualis ordinatur ad victum quaerendum, cadit sub necessitate praecepti prout est necessarium ad talem finem, quod enim ordinatur ad finem, a fine necessitatem habet; ut scilicet in tantum sit necessarium in quantum sine eo finis esse non potest. Et ideo qui non habet aliunde unde possit vivere, tenetur manibus operari, cuiuscumque sit conditionis. Et hoc significant verba apostoli dicentis, qui non vult operari, nec manducet, quasi diceret, ea necessitate tenetur ali-

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And even if all were able, they should do so by turns, not only so that the others may be occupied in other works, but also because it suffices that one speak while many listen. Therefore it would seem that religious should not desist from manual labor on account of such like spiritual works to which they devote themselves. Obj. 4: Further, a gloss on Luke 12:33, Sell what you possess, says: Not only give your clothes to the poor, but sell what you possess, that having once for all renounced all your possessions for the Lord’s sake, you may henceforth work with the labor of your hands, so as to have wherewith to live or to give alms. Now it belongs properly to religious to renounce all they have. Therefore it would seem likewise to belong to them to live and give alms through the labor of their hands. Obj. 5: Further, religious especially would seem to be bound to imitate the life of the apostles, since they profess the state of perfection. Now the apostles worked with their own hands, according to 1 Cor. 4:12: We labor, working with our own hands. Therefore it would seem that religious are bound to manual labor. On the contrary, Those precepts that are commonly enjoined upon all are equally binding on religious and seculars. But the precept of manual labor is enjoined upon all in common, as appears from 2 Thess. 3:6, Withdraw yourselves from every brother walking disorderly, etc. (for by brother he signifies every Christian, according to 1 Cor. 7:12, If any brother have a wife that believeth not). Now it is written in the same passage (2 Thess 3:10): If any man will not work, neither let him eat. Therefore religious are not bound to manual labor any more than seculars are. I answer that, Manual labor is directed to four things. First and principally to obtain food; wherefore it was said to the first man (Gen 3:19): In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, and it is written (Ps 127:2): For thou shalt eat the labors of thy hands. Second, it is directed to the removal of idleness whence arise many evils; hence it is written (Sir 33:28, 29): Send thy slave to work, that he be not idle, for idleness hath taught much evil. Third, it is directed to the curbing of concupiscence, inasmuch as it is a means of afflicting the body; hence it is written (2 Cor 6:5, 6): In labors, in watchings, in fastings, in chastity. Fourth, it is directed to almsgiving, wherefore it is written (Eph 4:28): He that stole, let him now steal no more; but rather let him labor, working with his hands the thing which is good, that he may have something to give to him that suffereth need. Accordingly, insofar as manual labor is directed to obtaining food, it comes under a necessity of precept insofar as it is necessary for that end: since that which is directed to an end derives its necessity from that end, being, in effect, so far necessary as the end cannot be obtained without it. Consequently he who has no other means of livelihood is bound to work with his hands, whatever his condition may be. This is signified by the words of the Apostle: If any man will not work, neither let him eat, as though to say: The necessity

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quis ad manibus operandum, qua tenetur ad manducandum. Unde si quis absque manducatione posset vitam transigere, non teneretur manibus operari. Et eadem ratio est de illis qui habent alias unde licite vivere possint. Non enim intelligitur aliquis posse facere quod non licite facere potest. Unde et apostolus non invenitur opus manuum praecepisse nisi ad excludendum peccatum eorum qui illicite victum acquirebant. Nam primo quidem praecepit apostolus opus manuale ad evitandum furtum, ut patet ad Ephes. IV, qui furabatur, iam non furetur, magis autem laboret operando manibus suis. Secundo, ad vitandum cupiditatem alienarum rerum, unde dicit, I ad Thess. IV, operemini manibus vestris, sicut praecepimus vobis, ut honeste ambuletis ad illos qui foris sunt. Tertio, ad evitandum turpia negotia, ex quibus aliqui victum acquirunt, unde II ad Thess. III, dicit, cum essemus apud vos, hoc denuntiabamus vobis, quoniam si quis non vult operari, non manducet. Audivimus enim quosdam inter vos ambulare inquiete, nihil operantes, sed curiose agentes, Glossa, qui foeda cura necessaria sibi provident. His autem qui huiusmodi sunt, denuntiamus et obsecramus ut cum silentio operantes panem suum manducent. Unde Hieronymus dicit, super Epist. ad Galat., quod apostolus hoc dixit non tam officio docentis quam vitio gentis. Sciendum tamen quod sub opere manuali intelliguntur omnia humana officia ex quibus homines licite victum lucrantur, sive manibus, sive pedibus, sive lingua fiant, vigiles enim et cursores, et alia huiusmodi de suo labore viventes, intelliguntur de operibus manuum vivere. Quia enim manus est organum organorum, per opus manuum omnis operatio intelligitur de qua aliquis potest licite victum lucrari. Secundum autem quod opus manuale ordinatur ad otium tollendum, vel ad corporis macerationem, non cadit sub necessitate praecepti secundum se consideratum, quia multis aliis modis potest vel caro macerari, vel etiam otium tolli, quam per opus manuale. Maceratur enim caro per ieiunia et vigilias. Et otium tollitur per meditationes sanctarum Scripturarum et laudes divinas, unde super illud Psalmi, defecerunt oculi mei in eloquium tuum, dicit Glossa, non est otiosus qui verbo Dei tantum studet, nec pluris est qui extra operatur quam qui studium cognoscendae veritatis exercet. Et ideo propter has causas religiosi non tenentur ad opera manualia, sicut nec saeculares, nisi forte ad haec per statuta sui ordinis obligentur; sicut Hieronymus dicit, in epistola ad rusticum monachum, Aegyptiorum monasteria hunc tenent morem, ut nullum absque opere aut labore suscipiant, non tam propter victus necessitatem quam propter animae salutem, ne vagentur perniciosis cogitationibus. Inquantum vero opus manuale ordinatur ad eleemosynas faciendas, non cadit sub necessitate praecepti, nisi forte in aliquo casu in quo ex necessitate aliquis eleemosynas facere te-

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of manual labor is the necessity of meat. So that if one could live without eating, one would not be bound to work with one’s hands. The same applies to those who have no other lawful means of livelihood: since a man is understood to be unable to do what he cannot do lawfully. Wherefore we find that the Apostle prescribed manual labor merely as a remedy for the sin of those who gained their livelihood by unlawful means. For the Apostle ordered manual labor first of all in order to avoid theft, as appears from Eph. 4:28, He that stole, let him now steal no more; but rather let him labor, working with his hands. Second, to avoid the coveting of others’ property, wherefore it is written (1 Thess 4:11): Work with your own hands, as we commanded you, and that you walk honestly towards them that are without. Third, to avoid the discreditable pursuits whereby some seek a livelihood. Hence he says (2 Thess 3:10–12): When we were with you, this we declared to you: that if any man will not work, neither let him eat. For we have heard that there are some among you who walk disorderly, working not at all, but curiously meddling (namely, as a gloss explains it, who make a living by meddling in unlawful things). Now we charge them that are such, and beseech them . . . that working with silence, they would eat their own bread. Hence Jerome states (Super epist. ad Galat.) that the Apostle said this not so much in his capacity of teacher as on account of the faults of the people. It must, however, be observed that under manual labor are comprised all those human occupations whereby man can lawfully gain a livelihood, whether by using his hands, his feet, or his tongue. For watchmen, couriers, and such like who live by their labor, are understood to live by their handiwork: because, since the hand is the organ of organs, handiwork denotes all kinds of work, whereby a man may lawfully gain a livelihood. Insofar as manual labor is directed to the removal of idleness, or the affliction of the body, it does not come under a necessity of precept if we consider it in itself, since there are many other means besides manual labor of afflicting the body or of removing idleness: for the flesh is afflicted by fastings and watchings, and idleness is removed by meditation on the Holy Scriptures and by the divine praises. Hence a gloss on Ps. 118:82, My eyes have failed for Thy word, says: He is not idle who meditates only on God’s word; nor is he who works abroad any better than he who devotes himself to the study of knowing the truth. Consequently for these reasons religious are not bound to manual labor, as neither are seculars, except when they are so bound by the statutes of their order. Thus Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic Monach.): The Egyptian monasteries are wont to admit none unless they work or labor, not so much for the necessities of life, as for the welfare of the soul, lest it be led astray by wicked thoughts. But insofar as manual labor is directed to almsgiving, it does not come under the necessity of precept, save perchance in some particular case, when a man is under an obligation to give alms, and has no other means of

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neretur, et non posset alias habere unde pauperibus subveniret. In quo casu obligarentur similiter religiosi et saeculares ad opera manualia exequenda. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud praeceptum quod ab apostolo proponitur, est de iure naturali. Unde super illud II ad Thess. III ut subtrahatis vos ab omni fratre inordinate ambulante, dicit Glossa, aliter quam ordo naturae exigit, loquitur autem ibi de his qui ab opere manuali cessabant. Unde et natura manus homini dedit loco armorum et tegumentorum, quae aliis animalibus tribuit, ut scilicet per manus haec et omnia necessaria conquirant. Ex quo patet quod communiter ad hoc praeceptum tenentur et religiosi et saeculares, sicut ad omnia alia legis naturalis praecepta. Non tamen peccant quicumque manibus non operantur. Quia ad illa praecepta legis naturae quae pertinent ad bonum multorum, non tenentur singuli, sed sufficit quod unus vacet huic officio, alius alii, puta quod quidam sint opifices, quidam agricolae, quidam iudices, quidam doctores, et sic de aliis; secundum illud apostoli, I ad Cor. XII. Si totum corpus oculus, ubi auditus? Et si totum auditus, ubi odoratus? Ad secundum dicendum quod Glossa illa sumitur ab Augustino, in libro de operibus Monach., in quo loquitur contra monachos quosdam qui dicebant non esse licitum servis Dei manibus operari, propter hoc quod dominus dicit, Matth. VI, nolite solliciti esse animae vestrae, quid manducetis. Nec tamen per haec verba inducitur necessitas religiosis manibus operandi, si habent aliunde unde vivere possint. Quod patet per hoc quod subdit, vult servos Dei corporaliter operari unde vivant. Hoc autem non magis pertinet ad religiosos quam ad saeculares. Quod patet ex duobus. Primo quidem, ex ipso modo loquendi quo apostolus utitur, dicens, subtrahatis vos ab omni fratre ambulante inordinate. Fratres enim omnes Christianos vocat, nondum enim erant tunc temporis religiones institutae. Secundo, quia religiosi non tenentur ad alia quam saeculares nisi propter regulae professionem. Et ideo, si in statutis regulae non contineatur aliquid de opere manuali, non tenentur aliter ad operandum manibus religiosi quam saeculares. Ad tertium dicendum quod illis operibus spiritualibus quae ibi tangit Augustinus, potest aliquis vocare dupliciter, uno modo, quasi deserviens utilitati communi; alio modo, quasi insistens utilitati privatae. Illi ergo qui praedictis spiritualibus operibus publice vacant, excusantur per huiusmodi opera spiritualia ab opere manuali, duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia oportet eos totaliter esse occupatos circa huiusmodi opera. Secundo, quia huiusmodi opera exercentibus debetur subministratio victus ab his quorum utilitati deserviunt. Illi vero qui praedictis operibus non quasi publicis, sed quasi privatis vacant, nec oportet quod per huiusmo-

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having the wherewithal to assist the poor: for in such a case religious would be bound as well as seculars to do manual labor. Reply Obj. 1: This command of the Apostle is of natural law: wherefore a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:6, That you withdraw yourselves from every brother walking disorderly, says, otherwise than the natural order requires, and he is speaking of those who abstained from manual labor. Hence nature has provided man with hands instead of arms and clothes, with which she has provided other animals, in order that with his hands he may obtain these and all other necessaries. Hence it is clear that this precept, even as all the precepts of the natural law, is binding on both religious and seculars alike. Yet not everyone sins that works not with his hands, because those precepts of the natural law which regard the good of the many are not binding on each individual, but it suffices that one person apply himself to this business and another to that; for instance, that some be craftsmen, others husbandmen, others judges, and others teachers, and so forth, according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor 12:17), If the whole body were the eye, where would be the hearing? If the whole were the hearing, where would be the smelling? Reply Obj. 2: This gloss is taken from Augustine’s De Operibus Monachorum, cap. 21, where he speaks against certain monks who declared it to be unlawful for the servants of God to work with their hands, on account of our Lord’s saying (Matt 6:25): Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat. Nevertheless his words do not imply that religious are bound to work with their hands, if they have other means of livelihood. This is clear from his adding: He wishes the servants of God to make a living by working with their bodies. Now this does not apply to religious any more than to seculars, which is evident for two reasons. First, on account of the way in which the Apostle expresses himself, by saying: That you withdraw yourselves from every brother walking disorderly. For he calls all Christians brothers, since at that time religious orders were not as yet founded. Second, because religious have no other obligations than what seculars have, except as required by the rule they profess: wherefore if their rule contain nothing about manual labor, religious are not otherwise bound to manual labor than seculars are. Reply Obj. 3: A man may devote himself in two ways to all the spiritual works mentioned by Augustine in the passage quoted: in one way with a view to the common good, in another with a view to his private advantage. Accordingly those who devote themselves publicly to the aforesaid spiritual works are thereby exempt from manual labor for two reasons: first, because it behooves them to be occupied exclusively with such like works; second, because those who devote themselves to such works have a claim to be supported by those for whose advantage they work. On the other hand, those who devote themselves to such works not publicly but privately as it were, ought not

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di opera a manualibus operibus abstrahantur, nec etiam fit eis debitum ut de stipendiis fidelium vivant. Et de talibus loquitur Augustinus. Quod enim dicit, cantica divina decantare manibus operantes possunt, exemplo opificum, qui fabulis linguas dant cum tamen manus ab opere non recedant, manifestum est quod non potest intelligi de his qui horas canonicas in Ecclesia decantant; sed intelligitur de his qui Psalmos vel hymnos dicunt quasi privatas orationes. Similiter quod dicit de lectione et oratione, referendum est ad orationes et lectiones privatas, quas etiam laici interdum faciunt, non autem ad illos qui publicas orationes in Ecclesia faciunt, vel etiam publicas lectiones in scholis legunt. Unde non dicit, qui dicunt se vacare doctrinae vel instructioni, sed, qui dicunt se vacare lectioni. Similiter autem de praedicatione loquitur, non quae fit publice ad populum, sed quae specialiter fit ad unum vel paucos per modum privatae admonitionis. Unde signanter dicit, si alicui sermo erogandus est, nam, sicut Glossa dicit, I ad Cor. II, sermo est qui privatim fit, praedicatio quae fit in communi. Ad quartum dicendum quod illi qui omnia propter Deum spernunt, tenentur manibus operari quando non habent alias unde vivant, vel unde eleemosynas faciant in casu in quo facere eleemosynam cadit sub praecepto, non autem aliter, ut dictum est. Et secundum hoc loquitur Glossa inducta. Ad quintum dicendum quod hoc quod apostoli manibus laboraverunt, quandoque quidem fuit necessitatis, quandoque vero supererogationis. Necessitatis quidem, quando ab aliis victum invenire non poterant, unde super illud I ad Cor. IV, laboramus operantes manibus nostris, dicit Glossa, quia nemo dat nobis. Supererogationis autem, ut patet per id quod habetur I ad Cor. IX, ubi dicit apostolus quod non usus est potestate quam habebat vivendi de Evangelio. Hac autem supererogatione utebatur apostolus tribus de causis. Primo quidem, ut occasionem praedicandi auferret pseudoapostolis, qui propter sola temporalia praedicabant. Unde dicit, II ad Cor. XI, quod autem facio, et faciam, ut amputem eorum occasionem, et cetera. Secundo, ad evitandum gravamen eorum quibus praedicabat. Unde dicit, II ad Cor. XII, quid minus habuistis prae ceteris Ecclesiis, nisi quod ego ipse non gravavi vos? Tertio, ad dandum exemplum operandi otiosis. Unde II ad Thess. III, dicit, nocte et die operantes, ut formam daremus vobis ad imitandum nos. Quod tamen apostolus non faciebat in locis in quibus habebat facultatem quotidie praedicandi, sicut Athenis, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de operibus monachorum. Non autem propter hoc religiosi tenentur apostolum in hoc imitari, cum non teneantur ad omnes supererogationes. Unde nec alii apostoli manibus operabantur.

Q. 187, A. 3

on that account to be exempt from manual labor, nor have they a claim to be supported by the offerings of the faithful, and it is of these that Augustine is speaking. For when he says: They can sing hymns to God even while working with their hands; like the craftsmen who give tongue to fable telling without withdrawing their hands from their work, it is clear that he cannot refer to those who sing the canonical hours in the church, but to those who tell psalms or hymns as private prayers. Likewise what he says of reading and prayer is to be referred to the private prayer and reading which even lay people do at times, and not to those who perform public prayers in the church, or give public lectures in the schools. Hence he does not say: Those who say they are occupied in teaching and instructing, but: Those who say they are occupied in reading. Again he speaks of that preaching which is addressed, not publicly to the people, but to one or a few in particular by way of private admonishment. Hence he says expressly: If one has to speak. For according to a gloss on 1 Cor. 2:4, Speech is addressed privately, preaching to many. Reply Obj. 4: Those who despise all for God’s sake are bound to work with their hands, when they have no other means of livelihood, or of almsgiving (should the case occur where almsgiving were a matter of precept), but not otherwise, as stated in the Article. It is in this sense that the gloss quoted is to be understood. Reply Obj. 5: That the apostles worked with their hands was sometimes a matter of necessity, sometimes a work of supererogation. It was of necessity when they failed to receive a livelihood from others. Hence a gloss on 1 Cor. 4:12, We labor, working with our own hands, adds, because no man giveth to us. It was supererogation, as appears from 1 Cor. 9:12, where the Apostle says that he did not use the power he had of living by the Gospel. The Apostle had recourse to this supererogation for three motives. First, in order to deprive the false apostles of the pretext for preaching, for they preached merely for a temporal advantage; hence he says (2 Cor 11:12): But what I do, that I will do that I may cut off the occasion from them, etc. Second, in order to avoid burdening those to whom he preached; hence he says (2 Cor 12:13): What is there that you have had less than the other churches, but that I myself was not burthensome to you? Third, in order to give an example of work to the idle; hence he says (2 Thess 3:8, 9): We worked night and day . . . that we might give ourselves a pattern unto you, to imitate us. However, the Apostle did not do this in places like Athens where he had facilities for preaching daily, as Augustine observes (De Oper. Monach. xviii). Yet religious are not for this reason bound to imitate the Apostle in this matter, since they are not bound to all works of supererogation: wherefore neither did the other apostles work with their hands.

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Article 4 Whether it is lawful for religious to live on alms? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod religiosis non liceat de eleemosynis vivere. Apostolus enim, I ad Tim. V, praecipit ut viduae quae possunt aliunde sustentari, non vivant de eleemosynis Ecclesiae, ut Ecclesia sufficiat illis quae vere viduae sunt. Et Hieronymus dicit, ad Damasum Papam, quod qui bonis parentum et opibus sustentari possunt, si quod pauperum est accipiunt, sacrilegium profecto committunt, et per abusionem talium iudicium sibi manducant et bibunt. Sed religiosi possunt de labore manuum sustentari, si sint validi. Ergo videtur quod peccent eleemosynas pauperum comedendo.

Praeterea, vivere de sumptibus fidelium est merces deputata praedicantibus Evangelium pro suo labore vel opere, secundum illud Matth. X, dignus est operarius cibo suo. Sed praedicare Evangelium non pertinet ad religiosos, sed maxime ad praelatos, qui sunt pastores et doctores. Ergo religiosi non possunt licite vivere de eleemosynis fidelium. Praeterea, religiosi sunt in statu perfectionis. Sed perfectius est dare eleemosynas quam accipere, dicitur enim Act. XX, beatius est magis dare quam accipere. Ergo non debent de eleemosynis vivere, sed magis ex operibus manuum suarum eleemosynas dare. Praeterea, ad religiosos pertinet impedimenta virtutis et occasiones peccati vitare. Sed acceptio eleemosynarum praebet occasionem peccati, et impedit virtutis actum. Unde super illud II ad Thess. ult., ut nosmetipsos formam daremus vobis etc., dicit Glossa, qui frequenter ad alienam mensam comedit otio deditus, aduletur necesse est pascenti se. Dicitur etiam Exod. XXIII, ne accipias munera, quae excaecant prudentes et mutant verba iustorum. Et Prov. XXII dicitur, qui accipit mutuum, servus est faenerantis, quod est religioni contrarium, unde super illud II ad Thess. III, ut nosmetipsos formam daremus etc., dicit Glossa, religio nostra ad libertatem homines advocat. Ergo videtur quod religiosi non debeant de eleemosynis vivere. Praeterea, religiosi praecipue tenentur imitari apostolorum perfectionem, unde apostolus dicit, ad Philipp. III, quicumque perfecti sumus, hoc sentiamus. Sed apostolus nolebat vivere de sumptibus fidelium, ut occasionem auferret pseudoapostolis, sicut ipse dicit, II ad Cor. XI, et ne scandalum poneretur infirmis, ut patet I ad Cor. IX. Ergo videtur quod propter easdem causas religiosi debeant abstinere ne de eleemosynis vivant. Unde et Augustinus dicit, in libro de operibus Monach., amputetis occasionem turpium nundinarum, quibus existimatio vestra laeditur et infirmis offendiculum ponitur, et

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to live on alms. For the Apostle (1 Tim 5:16) forbids those widows who have other means of livelihood to live on the alms of the Church, so that the Church may have sufficient for them that are widows indeed. And Jerome says to Pope Damasus that those who have sufficient income from their parents and their own possessions, if they take what belongs to the poor they commit and incur the guilt of sacrilege, and by the abuse of such things they eat and drink judgment to themselves. Now religious if they be able-bodied can support themselves by the work of their hands. Therefore it would seem that they sin if they consume the alms belonging to the poor. Obj. 2: Further, to live at the expense of the faithful is the stipend appointed to those who preach the Gospel in payment of their labor or work, according to Matt. 10:10: The workman is worthy of his meat. Now it belongs not to religious to preach the Gospel, but chiefly to prelates who are pastors and teachers. Therefore religious cannot lawfully live on the alms of the faithful. Obj. 3: Further, religious are in the state of perfection. But it is more perfect to give than to receive alms; for it is written (Acts 20:35): It is a more blessed thing to give, rather than to receive. Therefore they should not live on alms, but rather should they give alms of their handiwork. Obj. 4: Further, it belongs to religious to avoid obstacles to virtue and occasions of sin. Now the receiving of alms offers an occasion of sin, and hinders an act of virtue; hence a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:9, That we might give ourselves a pattern unto you, says: He who through idleness eats often at another’s table, must needs flatter the one who feeds him. It is also written (Exod 23:8): Neither shalt thou take bribes which . . . blind the wise, and pervert the words of the just, and (Prov 22:7): The borrower is servant to him that lendeth. This is contrary to religion, wherefore a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:9, That we might give ourselves a pattern, etc., says, our religion calls men to liberty. Therefore it would seem that religious should not live on alms. Obj. 5: Further, religious especially are bound to imitate the perfection of the apostles; wherefore the Apostle says (Phil 3:15): Let us . . . as many as are perfect, be thus minded. But the Apostle was unwilling to live at the expense of the faithful, either in order to cut off the occasion from the false apostles as he himself says (2 Cor 11:12), or to avoid giving scandal to the weak, as appears from 1 Cor. 9:12. It would seem therefore that religious ought for the same reasons to refrain from living on alms. Hence Augustine says (De Oper. Monach. 28): Cut off the occasion of disgraceful marketing whereby you lower yourselves in the esteem of others,

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Q. 187, A. 4

ostendite hominibus non vos in otio facilem victum, sed and give scandal to the weak: and show men that you seek not per angustam et arctam viam regnum Dei quaerere. an easy livelihood in idleness, but the kingdom of God by the narrow and strait way. Sed contra est quod, sicut Gregorius dicit, in libro On the contrary, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 1): The Dialog., beatus Benedictus tribus annis, in specu perma- Blessed Benedict after leaving his home and parents dwelt nens, de his quae a Romano monacho ministrabantur, for three years in a cave, and while there lived on the food refectus est, postquam domum parentesque reliquerat. brought to him by a monk from Rome. Nevertheless, alEt tamen, validus corpore existens, non legitur de labore though he was able-bodied, we do not read that he sought manuum victum quaesivisse. Ergo religiosi licite possunt to live by the labor of his hands. Therefore religious may de eleemosynis vivere. lawfully live on alms. Respondeo dicendum quod unicuique licet vivere I answer that, A man may lawfully live on what is de eo quod suum est vel sibi debitum. Fit autem aliquid his or due to him. Now that which is given out of liberalicuius ex liberalitate donantis. Et ideo religiosi et clerici ality becomes the property of the person to whom it is quorum monasteriis vel Ecclesiis, ex munificentia prin- given. Wherefore religious and clerics whose monasteries cipum vel quorumcumque fidelium sunt facultates col- or churches have received from the munificence of princes latae ex quibus sustententur, possunt de eis vivere lici- or of any of the faithful any endowment whatsoever for te, absque hoc quod manibus laborent. Et tamen certum their support, can lawfully live on such endowment withest eos de eleemosynis vivere. Unde et similiter, si ali- out working with their hands, and yet without doubt they qua mobilia religiosis a fidelibus conferantur, possunt de live on alms. Wherefore in like manner if religious receive eis licite vivere, stultum est enim dicere quod aliquis in movable goods from the faithful they can lawfully live on eleemosynam possit accipere magnas possessiones, non them. For it is absurd to say that a person may accept an autem panem vel parvam pecuniam. Sed quia huiusmo- alms of some great property but not bread or some small di beneficia religiosis videntur esse collata ad hoc quod sum of money. Nevertheless since these gifts would seem to liberius religiosis actibus insistere possint, quorum cu- be bestowed on religious in order that they may have more piunt se fore participes qui temporalia subministrant, leisure for religious works, in which the donors of temporedderetur eis usus praedictorum donorum illicitus si ab ral goods wish to have a share, the use of such gifts would actibus religiosis desisterent, quia sic, quantum est de se, become unlawful for them if they abstained from religious defraudarent intentionem eorum qui talia beneficia con- works, because in that case, so far as they are concerned, tulerunt. they would be thwarting the intention of those who bestowed those gifts. Debitum autem est aliquid alicui dupliciter. Uno moA thing is due to a person in two ways. First, on acdo, propter necessitatem, quae facit omnia communia, count of necessity, which makes all things common, as Amut Ambrosius dicit. Et ideo, si religiosi necessitatem pa- brose asserts. Consequently if religious be in need they can tiantur, licite possunt de eleemosynis vivere. Quae qui- lawfully live on alms. Such necessity may occur in three dem necessitas potest esse, primo quidem, propter cor- ways. First, through weakness of body, the result being that poris infirmitatem, ex qua contingit quod non possint they are unable to make a living by working with their sibi labore manuum victum quaerere. Secundo, si illud hands. Second, because that which they gain by their handquod ex opere manuali conquirunt, eis ad victum non iwork is insufficient for their livelihood: wherefore Augussufficiat. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de operibus tine says (De Oper. Monach. xvii) that the good works of the Monach., quod bona opera fidelium subsidio supplendo- faithful should not leave God’s servants who work with their rum necessariorum deesse non debent illis servis Dei qui hands without a supply of necessaries, that when the hour manibus operantur, ut horae quibus ad expediendum ani- comes for them to nourish their souls, so as to make it immum ita vacatur ut illa corporalia opera geri non pos- possible for them to do these corporal works, they be not opsint, non opprimant egestate. Tertio, propter pristinam pressed by want. Third, because of the former mode of life conversationem eorum qui non consueverunt manibus of those who were unwont to work with their hands: wherelaborare. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de operibus fore Augustine says (De Oper. Monach. xxi) that if they had Monach., quod si habebant aliquid in saeculo quo facile in the world the wherewithal easily to support this life withsine opificio sustentarent istam vitam, quod, conversi ad out working, and gave it to the needy when they were conDeum, indigentibus dispertiti sunt; et credenda est eorum verted to God, we must credit their weakness and bear with infirmitas, et ferenda. Solent enim tales, languidius educa- it. For those who have thus been delicately brought up are ti, laborem operum corporalium sustinere non posse. wont to be unable to bear the toil of bodily labor. Alio modo efficitur aliquid alicui debitum ex eo quod In another way a thing becomes due to a person through ipse exhibet, sive sit aliquid temporale sive spirituale, se- his affording others something whether temporal or spiricundum illud I ad Cor. IX, si nos vobis spiritualia semi- tual, according to 1 Cor. 9:11, If we have sown unto you spir-

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navimus, non magnum est si carnalia vestra metamus. Et secundum hoc, quadrupliciter possunt religiosi de eleemosynis vivere quasi sibi debitis. Primo, si praedicent auctoritate praelatorum. Secundo, si sint ministri altaris. Quia, ut dicitur I ad Cor. IX, qui altari deserviunt, cum altari participantur, ita et dominus ordinavit his qui Evangelium denuntiant, de Evangelio vivere. Et Augustinus dicit, in libro de operibus Monach., si Evangelistae sunt, fateor, habent (potestatem vivendi de sumptibus fidelium), si ministri altaris, dispensatores sacramentorum, bene sibi istam non arrogant, sed plane vindicant potestatem. Et hoc ideo, quia sacramentum altaris, ubicumque agatur, commune est toti populo fidelium. Tertio, si insistant studio sacrae Scripturae ad communem utilitatem totius Ecclesiae. Unde Hieronymus dicit, contra Vigilantium, haec in Iudaea usque hodie perseverat consuetudo, non solum apud nos sed etiam apud Hebraeos, ut qui in lege domini meditantur die ac nocte, et patrem non habent in terra nisi solum Deum, totius orbis foveantur ministeriis. Quarto, si bona temporalia quae habebant monasterio largiuntur, possunt de eleemosynis monasterio factis vivere. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de operibus Monach., quod his qui, relicta vel distributa sive ampla sive qualicumque opulentia, inter pauperes Christi pia et salubri humilitate numerari volunt, vicem sustentandae vitae eorum res ipsa communis et fraterna caritas debet. Qui laudabiliter agunt si manibus operentur. Quod si nolint, quis audeat eos cogere? Nec est attendendum, ut ibidem subditur, in quibus monasteriis vel in quo loco indigentibus fratribus quisquis hoc quod habebat impenderit, omnium enim Christianorum una respublica est.

Si vero aliqui sint religiosi qui absque necessitate et utilitate quam afferant, velint otiosi de eleemosynis quae dantur pauperibus vivere, hoc est eis illicitum. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de operibus Monach., plerumque ad professionem servitutis Dei ex conditione servili aliqui veniunt, et ex vita rusticana, et ex opificum exercitatione et plebeio labore, de quibus non apparet utrum ex proposito servitutis Dei venerint, an, vitam inopem et laboriosam fugientes, vacui pasci atque vestiri velint, et insuper honorari a quibus contemni conterique consueverunt. Tales ergo se, quominus operentur, de infirmitate corporis excusare non possunt, praeteritae quippe vitae consuetudine convincuntur. Et postea subdit, si nolunt operari, nec manducent. Neque propterea ad pietatem divites humiliantur, ut pauperes ad superbiam extollantur, nullo enim modo decet ut in ea vita ubi senatores fiunt laboriosi, fiant opifices otiosi; et quo veniunt, relictis deliciis suis, qui fuerunt praediorum domini, ibi sint rustici delicati.

IIa-IIae

itual things, is it a great matter if we reap your carnal things? And in this sense religious may live on alms as being due to them in four ways. First, if they preach by the authority of the prelates. Second, if they be ministers of the altar, according to 1 Cor. 9:13, 14, They that serve the altar partake with the altar. So also the Lord ordained that they who preach the Gospel should live by the Gospel. Hence Augustine says (De Oper. Monach. xxi): If they be gospelers, I allow, they have (a claim to live at the charge of the faithful): if they be ministers of the altar and dispensers of the sacraments, they need not insist on it, but it is theirs by perfect right. The reason for this is because the sacrament of the altar wherever it be offered is common to all the faithful. Third, if they devote themselves to the study of Holy Writ to the common profit of the whole Church. Wherefore Jerome says (Contra Vigil. xiii): It is still the custom in Judea, not only among us but also among the Hebrews, for those who meditate on the law of the Lord day and night, and have no other share on earth but God alone, to be supported by the subscriptions of the synagogues and of the whole world. Fourth, if they have endowed the monastery with the goods they possessed, they may live on the alms given to the monastery. Hence Augustine says (De Oper. Monach. xxv) that those who renouncing or distributing their means, whether ample or of any amount whatever, have desired with pious and salutary humility to be numbered among the poor of Christ, have a claim on the community and on brotherly love to receive a livelihood in return. They are to be commended indeed if they work with their hands, but if they be unwilling, who will dare to force them? Nor does it matter, as he goes on to say, to which monasteries, or in what place any one of them has bestowed his goods on his needy brethren; for all Christians belong to one commonwealth. On the other hand, in the default of any necessity, or of their affording any profit to others, it is unlawful for religious to wish to live in idleness on the alms given to the poor. Hence Augustine says (De Oper. Monach. xxii): Sometimes those who enter the profession of God’s service come from a servile condition of life, from tilling the soil or working at some trade or lowly occupation. In their case it is not so clear whether they came with the purpose of serving God, or of evading a life of want and toil with a view to being fed and clothed in idleness, and furthermore to being honored by those by whom they were wont to be despised and downtrodden. Such persons surely cannot excuse themselves from work on the score of bodily weakness, for their former mode of life is evidence against them. And he adds further on (De Oper. Monach. xxv): If they be unwilling to work, neither let them eat. For if the rich humble themselves to piety, it is not that the poor may be exalted to pride; since it is altogether unseemly that in a life wherein senators become laborers, laborers should become idle, and that where the lords of the manor have come after renouncing their ease, the serfs should live in comfort.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritates illae sunt intelligendae tempore necessitatis, quando scilicet non posset aliter pauperibus subveniri. Tunc enim tenerentur non solum ab eleemosynis accipiendis desistere, sed etiam sua, si qua haberent, largiri ad pauperum sustentationem. Ad secundum dicendum quod praelatis competit praedicatio ex officio, religiosis autem potest competere ex commissione. Et ita, cum laborent in agro dominico, possunt exinde vivere, secundum illud II ad Tim. II, laborantem agricolam oportet primum de fructibus percipere; ubi dicit Glossa, scilicet praedicatorem, qui in agro Ecclesiae ligone verbi Dei excolit corda auditorum. Possunt etiam de eleemosynis vivere qui praedicatoribus ministrant. Unde super illud Rom. XV, si spiritualium eorum participes facti sunt gentiles, debent et in carnalibus ministrare eis, dicit Glossa, scilicet Iudaeis, qui miserunt praedicatores ab Hierosolymis. Et tamen sunt etiam aliae causae ex quibus alicui debetur ut de sumptibus fidelium vivat, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod, ceteris paribus, dare est perfectius quam accipere. Et tamen dare vel relinquere omnia sua pro Christo, et modica accipere ad sustentationem vitae, melius est quam dare particulariter aliqua pauperibus, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ad quartum dicendum quod accipere munera ad divitias augmentandas, vel accipere victum ab alio sibi non debitum absque utilitate et necessitate, praestat occasionem peccati. Quod non habet locum in religiosis, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ad quintum dicendum quod, quando apparet manifesta necessitas et utilitas propter quam aliqui religiosi de eleemosynis vivunt absque opere manuali, non scandalizantur ex hoc infirmi, sed malitiosi, more Pharisaeorum, quorum scandalum contemnendum dominus docet, Matth. XV. Sed si non esset evidens necessitas et utilitas, posset exinde generari scandalum infirmis, quod esset vitandum. Idem tamen scandalum imminere potest de his qui facultatibus communibus otiosi utuntur.

Q. 187, A. 5

Reply Obj. 1: These authorities must be understood as referring to cases of necessity, that is to say, when there is no other means of succoring the poor: for then they would be bound not only to refrain from accepting alms, but also to give what they have for the support of the needy. Reply Obj. 2: Prelates are competent to preach in virtue of their office, but religious may be competent to do so in virtue of delegation; and thus when they work in the field of the Lord, they may make their living thereby, according to 2 Tim. 2:6, The husbandman that laboreth must first partake of the fruits, which a gloss explains thus, that is to say, the preacher, who in the field of the Church tills the hearts of his hearers with the plough of God’s word. Those also who minister to the preachers may live on alms. Hence a gloss on Rom. 15:27, If the Gentiles have been made partakers of their spiritual things, they ought also in carnal things to minister to them, says, namely, to the Jews who sent preachers from Jerusalem. There are moreover other reasons for which a person has a claim to live at the charge of the faithful, as stated above. Reply Obj. 3: Other things being equal, it is more perfect to give than to receive. Nevertheless to give or to give up all one’s possessions for Christ’s sake, and to receive a little for one’s livelihood is better than to give to the poor part by part, as stated above (Q. 186, A. 3, ad 6). Reply Obj. 4: To receive gifts so as to increase one’s wealth, or to accept a livelihood from another without having a claim to it, and without profit to others or being in need oneself, affords an occasion of sin. But this does not apply to religious, as stated above. Reply Obj. 5: Whenever there is evident necessity for religious living on alms without doing any manual work, as well as an evident profit to be derived by others, it is not the weak who are scandalized, but those who are full of malice like the Pharisees, whose scandal our Lord teaches us to despise (Matt 15:12–14). If, however, these motives of necessity and profit be lacking, the weak might possibly be scandalized thereby; and this should be avoided. Yet the same scandal might be occasioned through those who live in idleness on the common revenues.

Article 5 Whether it is lawful for religious to beg? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod religiosis non liceat mendicare. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de operibus Monach., tam multos hypocritas sub habitu monachorum usquequaque dispersit callidissimus hostis, circueuntes provincias, et postea subdit, omnes petunt, omnes exigunt aut sumptus lucrosae egestatis, aut si-

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to beg. For Augustine says (De Oper. Monach. xxviii): The most cunning foe has scattered on all sides a great number of hypocrites wearing the monastic habit, who go wandering about the country, and afterwards he adds: They all ask, they all demand to be supported in their profitable penury, or to be

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mulatae pretium sanctitatis. Ergo videtur quod vita religiosorum mendicantium sit reprobanda. Praeterea, I ad Thess. IV dicitur, operemini manibus vestris, sicut praecepimus vobis, ut honeste ambuletis ad eos qui foris sunt, et nullius aliquid desideretis, ubi Glossa dicit, ideo opus est agendum, et non otiandum, quia honestum est, et quasi lux, ad infideles, et non desiderabitis rem alterius, nedum rogetis vel tollatis aliquid. Et II ad Thess. III, super illud, si quis non vult operari etc., dicit, vult servos Dei corporaliter operari unde vivant, ut non compellantur egestate necessaria petere. Sed hoc est mendicare. Ergo videtur quod illicitum sit, praetermisso opere manuali, mendicare.

Praeterea, illud quod est in lege prohibitum et iustitiae contrarium, non competit religiosis. Sed mendicare est prohibitum in lege divina, dicitur enim Deut. XV, omnino indigens et mendicus non erit inter vos; et in Psalmo, non vidi iustum derelictum, nec semen eius quaerens panem. Sed secundum iura civilia punitur validus mendicans, ut habetur codice, de validis mendicantibus. Ergo non competit religiosis mendicare. Praeterea, verecundia est de turpi, ut Damascenus dicit. Sed Ambrosius dicit, in libro de Offic., quod verecundia petendi ingenuos prodit natales. Ergo mendicare est turpe. Non ergo religiosis competit. Praeterea, maxime de eleemosynis vivere competit praedicantibus Evangelium, secundum domini statutum, ut supra dictum est. Eis tamen non competit mendicare, quia super illud II ad Tim. II, laborantem agricolam etc., dicit Glossa, vult apostolus quod Evangelista intelligat quod necessaria sumere ab eis in quibus laborat, non est mendicitas, sed potestas. Ergo videtur quod religiosis non competat mendicare. Sed contra est quod religiosis competit vivere ad imitationem Christi. Sed Christus mendicavit, secundum illud Psalmi, ego autem mendicus sum et pauper; ubi dicit Glossa, hoc dicit Christus de se ex forma servi; et infra, mendicus est qui ab alio petit, et pauper est qui sibi non sufficit. Et in alio Psalmo, ego egenus et pauper sum, ubi dicit Glossa, ego sum egenus, idest petens; et pauper, idest insufficiens mihi, quia mundanas copias non habeo. Et Hieronymus dicit, in quadam epistola, cave ne, domino tuo mendicante, scilicet Christo, alienas divitias congeras. Ergo conveniens est religiosis mendicare. Respondeo dicendum quod circa mendicitatem duo possunt considerari. Unum quidem ex parte actus ipsius mendicationis, quae habet quandam abiectionem sibi coniunctam, illi enim videntur abiectissimi inter homines esse qui non solum sunt pauperes, sed in tantum sunt egentes quod necesse habent ab aliis victum

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paid for a pretended holiness. Therefore it would seem that the life of mendicant religious is to be condemned. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (1 Thess 4:11): That you . . . work with your own hands as we commanded you, and that you walk honestly towards them that are without: and that you want nothing of any man’s: and a gloss on this passage says: You must work and not be idle, because work is both honorable and a light to the unbeliever: and you must not covet that which belongs to another, and much less beg or take anything. Again a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:10, If any man will not work, etc. says: He wishes the servants of God to work with the body, so as to gain a livelihood, and not be compelled by want to ask for necessaries. Now this is to beg. Therefore it would seem unlawful to beg while omitting to work with one’s hands. Obj. 3: Further, that which is forbidden by law and contrary to justice, is unbecoming to religious. Now begging is forbidden in the divine law; for it is written (Deut 15:4): There shall be no poor nor beggar among you, and (Ps 36:25): I have not seen the just forsaken, nor his seed seeking bread. Moreover an able-bodied mendicant is punished by civil law, according to the law (XI, xxvi, de Valid. Mendicant.). Therefore it is unfitting for religious to beg. Obj. 4: Further, Shame is about that which is disgraceful, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). Now Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30) that to be ashamed to beg is a sign of good birth. Therefore it is disgraceful to beg: and consequently this is unbecoming to religious. Obj. 5: Further, according to our Lord’s command it is especially becoming to preachers of the Gospel to live on alms, as stated above (A. 4). Yet it is not becoming that they should beg, since a gloss on 2 Tim. 2:6, The husbandman, that laboreth, etc. says: The Apostle wishes the gospeler to understand that to accept necessaries from those among whom he labors is not mendicancy but a right. Therefore it would seem unbecoming for religious to beg. On the contrary, It becomes religious to live in imitation of Christ. Now Christ was a mendicant, according to Ps. 39:18, But I am a beggar and poor; where a gloss says: Christ said this of Himself as bearing the ‘form of a servant,’ and further on: A beggar is one who entreats another, and a poor man is one who has not enough for himself. Again it is written (Ps 69:6): I am needy and poor; where a gloss says: ‘Needy,’ that is a suppliant; ‘and poor,’ that is, not having enough for myself, because I have no worldly wealth. And Jerome says in a letter: Beware lest whereas thy Lord, i.e., Christ, begged, thou amass other people’s wealth. Therefore it becomes religious to beg. I answer that, Two things may be considered in reference to mendicancy. The first is on the part of the act itself of begging, which has a certain abasement attaching to it; since of all men those would seem most abased who are not only poor, but are so needy that they have to receive their meat from others. In this way some deserve

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acquirere. Et secundum hoc, causa humilitatis aliqui laudabiliter mendicant, sicut et alia assumunt quae ad abiectionem quandam pertinent, quasi efficacissimam medicinam contra superbiam, quam vel in seipsis, vel etiam in aliis per exemplum exstinguere volunt. Sicut enim infirmitas quae est ex superexcessu caloris, efficacissime sanatur per ea quae in frigiditate excedunt; ita etiam pronitas ad superbiam efficacissime curatur per ea quae multum abiecta videntur. Et ideo dicitur in decretis, de Poenit., dist. II, cap. si quis semel, exercitia humilitatis sunt, si quis se vilioribus officiis subdat, et ministeriis indignioribus tradat, ita namque arrogantiae et humanae gloriae vitium curari poterit. Unde Hieronymus, in epistola ad Oceanum, commendat Fabiolam de hoc quod optabat ut, suis divitiis pariter effusis pro Christo, stipes acciperet. Quod etiam beatus Alexius perfecit, qui, omnibus suis propter Christum dimissis, gaudebat se etiam a servis suis eleemosynas accepisse. Et de beato Arsenio legitur, in vitis patrum, quod gratias egit de hoc quod, necessitate cogente, oportuit eum eleemosynam petere. Unde et in poenitentiam pro gravibus culpis iniungitur aliquibus ut peregrinentur mendicantes. Sed quia humilitas, sicut et ceterae virtutes, absque discretione esse non debet, ita oportet discrete mendicitatem ad humiliationem assumere, ut ex hoc homo notam cupiditatis non incurrat, vel cuiuscumque alterius indecentis. Alio modo potest considerari mendicitas ex parte eius quod quis mendicando acquirit. Et sic ad mendicandum potest homo ex duobus induci. Uno modo, ex cupiditate habendi divitias vel victum otiosum. Et talis mendicitas est illicita. Alio modo, ex necessitate vel utilitate. Ex necessitate quidem, sicut cum aliquis non potest aliunde habere unde vivat, nisi mendicet. Ex utilitate autem, sicut cum aliquis intendit ad aliquid utile perficiendum quod sine eleemosynis fidelium facere non potest, sicut petuntur eleemosynae pro constructione pontis vel Ecclesiae, vel quibuscumque aliis operibus quae vergunt in utilitatem communem; sicut scholares, ut possint vacare studio sapientiae. Et hoc modo mendicitas est licita, sicut saecularibus, ita et religiosis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur expresse de his qui ex cupiditate mendicant. Ad secundum dicendum quod prima Glossa loquitur de petitione quae fit ex cupiditate, ut patet ex verbis apostoli. Secunda autem Glossa loquitur de illis qui absque omni utilitate quam faciant, necessaria petunt ut otiosi vivant. Non autem otiose vivit qui qualitercumque utiliter vivit. Ad tertium dicendum quod ex illo praecepto legis divinae non prohibetur alicui mendicare, sed prohibetur divitibus ne tam tenaces sint ut propter hoc aliqui egestate mendicare cogantur. Lex autem civilis imponit poenam validis mendicantibus qui non propter utilitatem vel necessitatem mendicant.

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praise for begging out of humility, just as they abase themselves in other ways, as being the most efficacious remedy against pride which they desire to quench either in themselves or in others by their example. For just as a disease that arises from excessive heat is most efficaciously healed by things that excel in cold, so proneness to pride is most efficaciously healed by those things which savor most of abasement. Hence it is said in the Decretals (II, cap. Si quis semel, de Poenitentia): To condescend to the humblest duties, and to devote oneself to the lowliest service is an exercise of humility; for thus one is able to heal the disease of pride and human glory. Hence Jerome praises Fabiola (Ep. lxxvii ad ocean.) for that she desired to receive alms, having poured forth all her wealth for Christ’s sake. The Blessed Alexis acted in like manner, for, having renounced all his possessions for Christ’s sake he rejoiced in receiving alms even from his own servants. It is also related of the Blessed Arsenius in the Lives of the Fathers (v, 6) that he gave thanks because he was forced by necessity to ask for alms. Hence it is enjoined to some people as a penance for grievous sins to go on a pilgrimage begging. Since, however, humility like the other virtues should not be without discretion, it behooves one to be discreet in becoming a mendicant for the purpose of humiliation, lest a man thereby incur the mark of covetousness or of anything else unbecoming. Second, mendicancy may be considered on the part of that which one gets by begging: and thus a man may be led to beg by a twofold motive. First, by the desire to have wealth or meat without working for it, and such like mendicancy is unlawful; second, by a motive of necessity or usefulness. The motive is one of necessity if a man has no other means of livelihood save begging; and it is a motive of usefulness if he wishes to accomplish something useful, and is unable to do so without the alms of the faithful. Thus alms are besought for the building of a bridge, or church, or for any other work whatever that is conducive to the common good: thus scholars may seek alms that they may devote themselves to the study of wisdom. In this way mendicancy is lawful to religious no less than to seculars. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking there explicitly of those who beg from motives of covetousness. Reply Obj. 2: The first gloss speaks of begging from motives of covetousness, as appears from the words of the Apostle; while the second gloss speaks of those who without effecting any useful purpose, beg their livelihood in order to live in idleness. On the other hand, he lives not idly who in any way lives usefully. Reply Obj. 3: This precept of the divine law does not forbid anyone to beg, but it forbids the rich to be so stingy that some are compelled by necessity to beg. The civil law imposes a penalty on able-bodied mendicants who beg from motives neither of utility nor of necessity.

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Ad quartum dicendum quod duplex est turpitudo, una inhonestatis; alia exterioris defectus, sicut turpe est homini esse infirmum vel pauperem. Et talem turpitudinem habet mendicitas. Unde non pertinet ad culpam, sed ad humilitatem pertinere potest, ut dictum est. Ad quintum dicendum quod praedicantibus ex debito debetur victus ab his quibus praedicant. Si tamen non quasi sibi debitum, sed quasi gratis dandum mendicando petere velint, ad maiorem utilitatem pertinet.

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Reply Obj. 4: Disgrace is twofold; one arises from lack of honesty, the other from an external defect, thus it is disgraceful for a man to be sick or poor. Such like uncomeliness of mendicancy does not pertain to sin, but it may pertain to humility, as stated above. Reply Obj. 5: Preachers have the right to be fed by those to whom they preach: yet if they wish to seek this by begging so as to receive it as a free gift and not as a right this will be a mark of greater humility.

Article 6 Whether it is lawful for religious to wear coarser clothes than others? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non liceat religiosis vilioribus vestibus uti quam ceteris. Quia secundum apostolum, I ad Thess. ult., ab omni specie mala abstinere debemus. Sed vilitas vestium habet speciem mali. Dicit enim dominus, Matth. VII, attendite a falsis prophetis, qui veniunt ad vos in vestimentis ovium. Et super illud Apoc. VI, ecce equus pallidus etc., dicit Glossa, videns Diabolus nec per apertas tribulationes nec per apertas haereses se posse proficere, praemittit falsos fratres, qui sub habitu religionis obtinent naturam nigri et rufi equi, pervertendo fidem. Ergo videtur quod religiosi non debeant vilibus vestibus uti. Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit, ad Nepotianum, vestes pullas, idest nigras, aeque vita ut candidas. Ornatus et sordes pari modo fugiendi sunt, quia alterum delicias, alterum gloriam redolet. Ergo videtur quod, cum inanis gloria sit gravius peccatum quam deliciarum usus, quod religiosi, qui debent ad perfectiora tendere, magis debent vitare vestes viles quam pretiosas. Praeterea, religiosi maxime intendere debent operibus poenitentiae. Sed in operibus poenitentiae non est utendum exterioribus signis tristitiae, sed magis signis laetitiae, dicit enim dominus, Matth. VI, cum ieiunatis, nolite fieri, sicut hypocritae, tristes; et postea subdit, tu autem cum ieiunas, unge caput tuum et faciem tuam lava. Quod exponens Augustinus, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, dicit, in hoc capitulo maxime animadvertendum est non in solo rerum corporearum nitore atque pompa, sed etiam in ipsis sordibus luctuosis esse posse iactantiam, et eo periculosiorem, quo sub nomine servitutis Dei decipit. Ergo videtur quod religiosi non debeant vilioribus vestibus indui. Sed contra est quod, Heb. XI, apostolus dicit, circuierunt in melotis, in pellibus caprinis, Glossa, ut Elias et alii. Et in decretis, XXI, qu. IV, dicitur, si inventi fuerint deridentes eos qui vilibus et religiosis vestibus amicti

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to wear coarser clothes than others. For according to the Apostle (1 Thess 5:22) we ought to refrain from all appearance of evil. Now coarseness of clothes has an appearance of evil; for our Lord said (Matt 7:15): Beware of false prophets who come to you in the clothing of sheep: and a gloss on Apoc. 6:8, Behold a pale horse, says: The devil finding that he cannot succeed, neither by outward afflictions nor by manifest heresies, sends in advance false brethren, who under the guise of religion assume the characteristics of the black and red horses by corrupting the faith. Therefore it would seem that religious should not wear coarse clothes. Obj. 2: Further, Jerome says (Ep. lii ad Nepotian.): Avoid somber, i.e., black, equally with glittering apparel. Fine and coarse clothes are equally to be shunned, for the one exhales pleasure, the other vainglory. Therefore, since vainglory is a graver sin than the use of pleasure, it would seem that religious who should aim at what is more perfect ought to avoid coarse rather than fine clothes. Obj. 3: Further, religious should aim especially at doing works of penance. Now in works of penance we should use, not outward signs of sorrow, but rather signs of joy; for our Lord said (Matt 6:16): When you fast, be not, as the hypocrites, sad, and afterwards He added: But thou, when thou fastest, anoint thy head and wash thy face. Augustine commenting on these words (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12): In this chapter we must observe that not only the glare and pomp of outward things, but even the weeds of mourning may be a subject of ostentation, all the more dangerous as being a decoy under the guise of God’s service. Therefore seemingly religious ought not to wear coarse clothes. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb 11:37): They wandered about in sheep-skins, in goat-skins, and a gloss adds—as Elias and others. Moreover it is said in the Decretal XXI, qu. iv, can. Omnis jactantia: If any persons be

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sunt, corrigantur. Priscis enim temporibus omnis sacratus found to deride those who wear coarse and religious apparel vir cum mediocri ac vili veste conversabatur. they must be reproved. For in the early times all those who were consecrated to God went about in common and coarse apparel. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus diI answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. cit, in III de Doct. Christ., in omnibus exterioribus rebus iii, 12), in all external things, it is not the use but the intention non usus rerum, sed libido utentis in culpa est ad quam of the user that is at fault. In order to judge of this it is necdiscernendam, attendendum est quod habitus vilis vel essary to observe that coarse and homely apparel may be incultus dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, prout considered in two ways. First, as being a sign of a man’s disest signum quoddam dispositionis vel status humani, position or condition, because according to Ecclus. 19:27, quia, ut dicitur Eccli. XIX, amictus hominis annuntiat the attire . . . of the man shows what he is. In this way coarsede eo, et secundum hoc, vilitas habitus est quandoque ness of attire is sometimes a sign of sorrow: wherefore those signum tristitiae. Unde et homines in tristitia existen- who are beset with sorrow are wont to wear coarser clothes, tes solent vilioribus vestibus uti, sicut e contrario in just as on the other hand in times of festivity and joy they tempore solemnitatis et gaudii utuntur cultioribus vesti- wear finer clothes. Hence penitents make use of coarse apmentis. Unde et poenitentes vilibus vestibus induuntur, parel, for example, the king (Jonah 3:6) who was clothed ut patet Ionae III, de rege, qui indutus est sacco; et III with sack-cloth, and Achab (3 Kgs 21:27) who put hair-cloth Reg. XXI, de Achab, qui operuit Cilicio carnem suam. upon his flesh. Sometimes, however, it is a sign of the conQuandoque vero est signum contemptus divitiarum et tempt of riches and worldly ostentation. Wherefore Jerome mundani fastus unde Hieronymus dicit, ad rusticum says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustico Monach.): Let your somber attire monachum, sordes vestium candidae mentis indicia sunt, indicate your purity of mind, your coarse robe prove your vilis tunica contemptum saeculi probat. Ita dumtaxat ne contempt of the world, yet so that your mind be not inflated animus tumeat, ne habitus sermoque dissentiant. Et se- withal, lest your speech belie your habit. In both these ways cundum utrumque horum, competit religiosis vilitas ve- it is becoming for religious to wear coarse attire, since relistium, quia religio est status poenitentiae et contemptus gion is a state of penance and of contempt of worldly glory. mundanae gloriae. Sed quod aliquis velit hoc aliis significare, continBut that a person wish to signify this to others arises git propter tria. Uno modo, ad sui humiliationem, si- from three motives. First, in order to humble himself: for cut enim ex splendore vestium animus hominis eleva- just as a man’s mind is uplifted by fine clothes, so is it humtur, ita ex humilitate vestium humiliatur. Unde de Achab, bled by lowly apparel. Hence speaking of Achab who put qui carnem suam Cilicio induit, dixit dominus ad Eliam, hair-cloth on his flesh, the Lord said to Elias: Hast thou nonne vidisti Achab humiliatum coram me, ut habetur not seen Achab humbled before Me? (3 Kgs 21:29). SecIII Reg. XXI. Alio modo, propter exemplum aliorum. ond, in order to set an example to others; wherefore a Unde super illud Matth. III, habebat vestimentum de pi- gloss on Matt. 3:4, (John) had his garments of camel’s hair, lis camelorum etc., dicit Glossa, qui poenitentiam praedi- says: He who preaches penance is clothed in the habit of cat, habitum poenitentiae praetendit. Tertio modo, prop- penance. Third, on account of vainglory; thus Augustine ter inanem gloriam, sicut Augustinus dicit quod in ipsis says (cf. Obj. 3) that even the weeds of mourning may be a sordibus luctuosis potest esse iactantia. subject of ostentation. Duobus ergo primis modis, laudabile est abiectis veAccordingly in the first two ways it is praiseworthy to stibus uti, tertio vero modo, est vitiosum. wear humble apparel, but in the third way it is sinful. Alio autem modo potest considerari habitus vilis et Second, coarse and homely attire may be considered as incultus secundum quod procedit ex avaritia vel ex ne- the result of covetousness or negligence, and thus also it is gligentia. Et sic etiam ad vitium pertinet. sinful. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vilitas vestium de Reply Obj. 1: Coarseness of attire has not of itself the se non habet speciem mali, immo potius speciem boni, appearance of evil, indeed it has more the appearance of scilicet contemptus mundanae gloriae. Et inde est quod good, namely of the contempt of worldly glory. Hence it mali sub vilitate vestium suam malitiam occultant. Unde is that wicked persons hide their wickedness under coarse Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, quod clothing. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte non ideo debent oves odisse vestimentum suum, quod ple- ii, 24) that the sheep should not dislike their clothing for the rumque illo se occultant lupi. reason that the wolves sometimes hide themselves under it. Ad secundum dicendum quod Hieronymus ibi loReply Obj. 2: Jerome is speaking there of the coarse atquitur de vestibus vilibus quae deferuntur propter hu- tire that is worn on account of human glory. manam gloriam.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod, secundum doctrinam domini, in operibus sanctitatis nihil homines facere debent propter apparentiam. Quod praecipue contingit quando aliquis aliquid novum facit. Unde Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., orans nihil novum faciat quod aspiciant homines, vel clamando, vel pectus percutiendo, vel manus expandendo, quia scilicet ex ipsa novitate homines reddunt intentos ad considerandum. Nec tamen omnis novitas intentos faciens homines ad considerandum, reprehensibilis est. Potest enim et bene et male fieri. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, quod qui in professione Christianitatis inusitato squalore ac sordibus intentos in se oculos hominum facit, cum id voluntate faciat, non necessitate patiatur, ceteris eius operibus potest cognosci utrum hoc contemptu superflui cultus, an ambitione aliqua faciat. Maxime autem videntur hoc non ex ambitione facere religiosi, qui habitum vilem deferunt quasi signum suae professionis, qua contemptum mundi profitentur.

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Reply Obj. 3: According to our Lord’s teaching men should do no deeds of holiness for the sake of show: and this is especially the case when one does something strange. Hence Chrysostom says: While praying a man should do nothing strange, so as to draw the gaze of others, either by shouting or striking his breast, or casting up his hands, because the very strangeness draws people’s attention to him. Yet blame does not attach to all strange behavior that draws people’s attention, for it may be done well or ill. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12) that in the practice of the Christian religion when a man draws attention to himself by unwonted squalor and shabbiness, since he acts thus voluntarily and not of necessity, we can gather from his other deeds whether his behavior is motivated by contempt of excessive dress or by affectation. Religious, however, would especially seem not to act thus from affectation, since they wear a coarse habit as a sign of their profession whereby they profess contempt of the world.

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Question 188 The Different Kinds of Religious Life Deinde considerandum est de differentia religionum. We must now consider the different kinds of religious Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. life, and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum sint diversae religiones, vel una (1) Whether there are different kinds of religious life or tantum. only one? Secundo, utrum aliqua religio institui possit ad (2) Whether a religious order can be established for the opera vitae activae. works of the active life? Tertio, utrum aliqua religio institui possit ad bella (3) Whether a religious order can be directed to gerenda. soldiering? Quarto, utrum possit institui aliqua religio ad (4) Whether a religious order can be established for praedicandum, et huiusmodi opera exercenda. preaching and the exercise of like works? Quinto, utrum possit aliqua religio institui ad (5) Whether a religious order can be established for the studium scientiae. study of science? Sexto, utrum religio quae ordinatur ad vitam (6) Whether a religious order that is directed to the contemplativam, sit potior ea quae ordinatur ad contemplative life is more excellent than one that is vitam activam. directed to the active life? Septimo, utrum habere aliquid in communi (7) Whether religious perfection is diminished by diminuat de perfectione religionis. possessing something in common? Octavo, utrum religio solitariorum sit praeferenda (8) Whether the religious life of solitaries is to be religioni in societate viventium. preferred to the religious life of those who live in community?

Article 1 Whether there is only one religious order? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit nisi una tantum religio. In eo enim quod totaliter et perfecte habetur, diversitas esse non potest, propter quod, non potest esse nisi unum primum summum bonum, ut in primo habitum est. Sed sicut Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., cum quis omne quod habet, omne quod vivit, omne quod sapit, omnipotenti Deo voverit, holocaustum est, sine quo religio esse non dicitur. Ergo videtur quod non sint multae religiones, sed una tantum. Praeterea, ea quae in essentialibus conveniunt, non diversificantur nisi per accidens. Sed sine tribus votis essentialibus religioni non est aliqua religio, ut supra habitum est. Ergo videtur quod religiones specie non diversificentur, sed solum per accidens. Praeterea, status perfectionis competit et religiosis et episcopis, ut supra habitum est. Sed episcopatus non diversificatur specie, sed est ubique unus, unde Hieronymus dicit, ad Evandrum episcopum, ubicumque fuerit episcopus, sive Romae sive Eugubio sive Constantino-

Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one religious order. For there can be no diversity in that which is possessed wholly and perfectly; wherefore there can be only one sovereign good, as stated in the First Part (Q. 6, AA. 2, 3, 4). Now as Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.), when a man vows to Almighty God all that he has, all his life, all his knowledge, it is a holocaust, without which there is no religious life. Therefore it would seem that there are not many religious orders but only one. Obj. 2: Further, things which agree in essentials differ only accidentally. Now there is no religious order without the three essential vows of religion, as stated above (Q. 186, AA. 6, 7). Therefore it would seem that religious orders differ not specifically, but only accidentally. Obj. 3: Further, the state of perfection is competent both to religious and to bishops, as stated above (Q. 185, AA. 5, 7). Now the episcopate is not diversified specifically, but is one wherever it may be; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxlvi ad Evan.): Wherever a bishop is, whether at Rome, or

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poli sive Rhegio, eiusdem meriti est, eiusdem et sacerdotii. Gubbio, or Constantinople, or Reggio, he has the same excelErgo, pari ratione, una sola est religio. lence, the same priesthood. Therefore in like manner there is but one religious order. Praeterea, ab Ecclesia tollendum est omne id Obj. 4: Further, anything that may lead to confusion quod confusionem inducere potest. Sed ex diversitate re- should be removed from the Church. Now it would seem ligionis videtur quaedam confusio posse induci in popu- that a diversity of religious orders might confuse the Chrislo Christiano, ut decretalis quaedam dicit, quae habetur tian people, as stated in the Decretal de Statu Monach. et de statu monachorum et canonicorum regularium. Ergo Canon. Reg. Therefore seemingly there ought not to be difvidetur quod non debeant esse diversae religiones. ferent religious orders. Sed contra est quod in Psalmo describitur ad orOn the contrary, It is written (Ps 44:10) that it pernatum reginae pertinere quod sit circumamicta varieta- tains to the adornment of the queen that she is surrounded te. with variety. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis I answer that, As stated above (Q. 186, A, 7; Q. 187, patet, status religionis est quoddam exercitium quo ali- A. 2), the religious state is a training school wherein one quis exercetur ad perfectionem caritatis. Sunt autem di- aims by practice at the perfection of charity. Now there are versa caritatis opera quibus homo vacare potest, sunt various works of charity to which a man may devote himetiam diversi modi exercitiorum. Et ideo religiones di- self; and there are also various kinds of exercise. Wherefore stingui possunt dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum diver- religious orders may be differentiated in two ways. First, acsitatem eorum ad quae ordinantur, sicut si una religio cording to the different things to which they may be diordinetur ad peregrinos hospitio suscipiendos, et alia ad rected: thus one may be directed to the lodging of pilgrims, visitandos vel redimendos captivos. Alio modo, potest another to visiting or ransoming captives. Second, there esse diversitas religionum secundum diversitatem exer- may be various religious orders according to the diversity of citiorum, puta quod in una religione castigatur corpus practices; thus in one religious order the body is chastised per abstinentias ciborum, in alia per exercitium operum by abstinence in food, in another by the practice of manual manualium, vel per nuditatem, vel per aliquid aliud hu- labor, scantiness of clothes, or the like. iusmodi. Sed quia finis est potissimum in unoquoque, maior Since, however, the end imports most in every matter, est religionum diversitas quae attenditur secundum di- religious orders differ more especially according to their versos fines ad quos religiones ordinantur, quam quae various ends than according to their various practices. attenditur secundum diversa exercitia. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc est commune Reply Obj. 1: The obligation to devote oneself wholly in omni religione, quod aliquis totaliter se debet praebe- to God’s service is common to every religious order; hence re ad serviendum Deo. Unde ex hac parte non est diver- religious do not differ in this respect, as though in one resitas inter religiones, ut scilicet in una religione aliquis ligious order a person retained some one thing of his own, retineat aliquid sui, et in alia aliud. Est autem diversitas and in another order some other thing. But the difference secundum diversa in quibus homo potest Deo servire, et is in respect of the different things wherein one may serve secundum quod ad hoc se potest homo diversimode di- God, and whereby a man may dispose himself to the service sponere. of God. Ad secundum dicendum quod tria essentialia vota Reply Obj. 2: The three essential vows of religion perreligionis pertinent ad exercitium religionis sicut quae- tain to the practice of religion as principles to which all dam principalia ad quae omnia alia reducuntur, ut su- other matters are reduced, as stated above (Q. 186, A. 7). pra dictum est. Ad observandum autem unumquodque But there are various ways of disposing oneself to the obeorum diversimode aliquis se disponere potest, puta ad servance of each of them. For instance one disposes oneself votum continentiae servandum se disponit aliquis per to observe the vow of continence, by solitude of place, by loci solitudinem, per abstinentiam, per mutuam societa- abstinence, by mutual fellowship, and by many like means. tem, et per multa alia huiusmodi. Et secundum hoc patet Accordingly it is evident that the community of the essenquod communitas essentialium votorum compatitur di- tial vows is compatible with diversity of religious life, both versitatem religionis, tum propter diversas dispositiones; on account of the different dispositions and on account of tum etiam propter diversos fines, ut ex supra dictis patet. the different ends, as explained above. Ad tertium dicendum quod in his quae ad perfecReply Obj. 3: In matters relating to perfection, the tionem pertinent, episcopus se habet per modum agen- bishop stands in the position of agent, and the religious as tis, religiosi autem per modum patientis, ut supra dic- passive, as stated above (Q. 184, A. 7). Now the agent, even tum est. Agens autem, etiam in naturalibus, quanto est in natural things, the higher it is, is so much the more one, superius, tanto est magis unum, ea vero quae patiun- whereas the things that are passive are various. Hence with

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tur, sunt diversa. Unde rationabiliter est unus episcopalis status, religiones vero diversae. Ad quartum dicendum quod confusio opponitur distinctioni et ordini. Sic ergo ex multitudine religionum induceretur confusio, si ad idem et eodem modo diversae religiones essent, absque utilitate et necessitate. Unde, ut hoc non fiat, salubriter institutum est ne nova religio, nisi auctoritate summi pontificis, instituatur.

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reason the episcopal state is one, while religious orders are many. Reply Obj. 4: Confusion is opposed to distinction and order. Accordingly the multitude of religious orders would lead to confusion, if different religious orders were directed to the same end and in the same way, without necessity or utility. Wherefore to prevent this happening it has been wholesomely forbidden to establish a new religious order without the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff.

Article 2 Whether a religious order should be established for the works of the active life? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla religio institui debeat ad opera activae vitae. Omnis enim religio pertinet ad perfectionis statum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed perfectio religiosi status consistit in contemplatione divinorum, dicit enim Dionysius, VI cap. Eccles. Hier., quod nominantur ex Dei puro servitio et famulatu, et indivisibili et singulari vita uniente eos indivisibilium sanctis convolutionibus, idest contemplationibus, ad deiformem unitatem et amabilem Deo perfectionem. Ergo videtur quod nulla religio institui possit ad opera activae vitae.

Praeterea, idem iudicium videtur esse de monachis et de canonicis regularibus, ut habetur extra, de postulando, ex parte, et de statu Monach., quod Dei timorem, dicitur quod a sanctorum monachorum consortio non putantur seiuncti. Et eadem ratio videtur esse de omnibus aliis religiosis. Sed monachorum religio est instituta ad vitam contemplativam, unde Hieronymus dicit, ad Paulinum, si cupis esse quod diceris, monachus, idest solus, quid facis in urbibus? Et idem habetur extra, de Renunt., nisi cum pridem; et de regularibus, licet quibusdam. Ergo videtur quod omnis religio ordinetur ad vitam contemplativam, et nulla ad activam.

Praeterea, vita activa ad praesens saeculum pertinet. Sed omnes religiosi saeculum deserere dicuntur, unde Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., qui praesens saeculum deserit et agit bona quae valet, quasi iam Aegypto derelicto, sacrificium praebet in eremo. Ergo videtur quod nulla religio possit ordinari ad vitam activam. Sed contra est quod dicitur Iac. I, religio munda et immaculata apud Deum et patrem haec est, visitare pupillos et viduas in tribulatione eorum. Sed hoc pertinet ad

Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order should be established for the works of the active life. For every religious order belongs to the state of perfection, as stated above (Q. 184, A. 5; Q. 186, A. 1). Now the perfection of the religious state consists in the contemplation of divine things. For Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi) that they are called servants of God by reason of their rendering pure service and subjection to God, and on account of the indivisible and singular life which unites them by holy reflections, i.e., contemplations, on invisible things, to the Godlike unity and the perfection beloved of God. Therefore seemingly no religious order should be established for the works of the active life. Obj. 2: Further, seemingly the same judgment applies to canons regular as to monks, according to Extra, De Postul., cap. Ex parte; and De Statu Monach., cap. Quod Dei timorem: for it is stated that they are not considered to be separated from the fellowship of monks: and the same would seem to apply to all other religious. Now the monastic rule was established for the purpose of the contemplative life; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. lviii ad Paulin.): If you wish to be what you are called, a monk, i.e., a solitary, what business have you in a city? The same is found stated in Extra, De Renuntiatione, cap. Nisi cum pridem; and De Regular., cap. Licet quibusdam. Therefore it would seem that every religious order is directed to the contemplative life, and none to the active life. Obj. 3: Further, the active life is concerned with the present world. Now all religious are said to renounce the world; wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.): He who renounces this world, and does all the good he can, is like one who has gone out of Egypt and offers sacrifice in the wilderness. Therefore it would seem that no religious order can be directed to the active life. On the contrary, It is written (Jas 1:27): Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father, is this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation. Now this be-

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vitam activam. Ergo convenienter religio potest ordinari ad vitam activam. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, religionis status ordinatur ad perfectionem caritatis, quae se extendit ad dilectionem Dei et proximi. Ad dilectionem autem Dei directe pertinet vita contemplativa, quae soli Deo vacare desiderat, ad dilectionem autem proximi pertinet vita activa, quae deservit necessitatibus proximorum. Et sicut ex caritate diligitur proximus propter Deum, ita etiam obsequium delatum in proximos redundat in Deum, secundum illud Matth. XXV, quod uni ex minimis meis fecistis, mihi fecistis. Unde et huiusmodi obsequia proximis facta, inquantum ad Deum referuntur, dicuntur esse sacrificia quaedam, secundum illud Heb. ult., beneficentiae et communionis nolite oblivisci, talibus enim hostiis promeretur Deus. Et quia ad religionem proprie pertinet sacrificium Deo offerre, ut supra habitum est, consequens est quod convenienter religiones quaedam ad opera vitae activae ordinantur. Unde et in collationibus patrum, abbas Nesteros, distinguens diversa religionum studia, dicit, quidam summam intentionis suae erga eremi secreta et cordis constituunt puritatem; quidam erga institutionem fratrum et coenobiorum curam; quosdam xenodochii, idest hospitalitatis, delectat obsequium. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Dei servitium et famulatus salvatur etiam in operibus vitae activae, quibus aliquis servit proximo propter Deum, sicut dictum est. In quibus etiam salvatur singularitas vitae, non quantum ad hoc quod homo cum hominibus non conversetur; sed quantum ad hoc quod homo singulariter his intendat quae ad divinum obsequium spectant. Et dum religiosi operibus vitae activae insistunt intuitu Dei, consequens est quod in eis actio ex contemplatione divinorum derivetur. Unde non privantur omnino fructu contemplativae vitae. Ad secundum dicendum quod eadem est ratio de monachis et omnibus aliis religiosis quantum ad ea quae sunt communia omni religioni, puta quod totaliter se dedicent divinis obsequiis, et quod essentialia religionis vota observent, et quod a saecularibus negotiis se abstineant. Sed non oportet similitudinem esse quantum ad alia quae sunt propria monasticae professioni, quae specialiter ad vitam contemplativam ordinantur. Unde in praeinducta decretali de postulando non dicitur simpliciter quod sit idem iudicium de canonicis regularibus quod de monachis, sed, quantum ad supradicta, scilicet quod in forensibus causis officio advocationis non utantur. Et in decretali inducta de statu monachorum, postquam praemiserat quod non putantur a consortio monachorum seiuncti canonici regulares, subditur, regulae tamen inserviunt laxiori. Ex quo patet quod non ad omnia tenentur ad quae monachi.

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longs to the active life. Therefore religious life can be fittingly directed to the active life. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the religious state is directed to the perfection of charity, which extends to the love of God and of our neighbor. Now the contemplative life which seeks to devote itself to God alone belongs directly to the love of God, while the active life, which ministers to our neighbor’s needs, belongs directly to the love of one’s neighbor. And just as out of charity we love our neighbor for God’s sake, so the services we render our neighbor redound to God, according to Matt. 25:40, What you have done to one of these My least brethren, you did it to Me. Consequently those services which we render our neighbor, insofar as we refer them to God, are described as sacrifices, according to Heb. 13:16, Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God’s favor is obtained. And since it belongs properly to religion to offer sacrifice to God, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 1, ad 1; A. 4, ad 1), it follows that certain religious orders are fittingly directed to the works of the active life. Wherefore in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xiv, 4) the Abbot Nesteros in distinguishing the various aims of religious orders says: Some direct their intention exclusively to the hidden life of the desert and purity of heart; some are occupied with the instruction of the brethren and the care of the monasteries; while others delight in the service of the guesthouse, i.e., in hospitality. Reply Obj. 1: Service and subjection rendered to God are not precluded by the works of the active life, whereby a man serves his neighbor for God’s sake, as stated in the Article. Nor do these works preclude singularity of life; not that they involve man’s living apart from his fellow-men, but in the sense that each man individually devotes himself to things pertaining to the service of God; and since religious occupy themselves with the works of the active life for God’s sake, it follows that their action results from their contemplation of divine things. Hence they are not entirely deprived of the fruit of the contemplative life. Reply Obj. 2: The same judgment applies to monks and to all other religious, as regards things common to all religious orders: for instance as regards their devoting themselves wholly to the divine service, their observance of the essential vows of religion, and their refraining from worldly business. But it does not follow that this likeness extends to other things that are proper to the monastic profession, and are directed especially to the contemplative life. Hence in the aforesaid Decretal, De Postulando, it is not simply stated that the same judgment applies to canons regular as to monks, but that it applies in matters already mentioned, namely that they are not to act as advocates in lawsuits. Again the Decretal quoted, De Statu Monach., after the statement that canons regular are not considered to be separated from the fellowship of monks, goes on to say: Nevertheless they obey an easier rule. Hence it is evident that they are not bound to all that monks are bound.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod dupliciter aliquis potest esse in saeculo, uno modo, per praesentiam corporalem; alio modo, per mentis affectum. Unde et discipulis suis dominus dicit, ego elegi vos de mundo, de quibus tamen ad patrem loquitur dicens, hi in mundo sunt, et ego ad te venio. Quamvis igitur religiosi qui circa opera activae vitae occupantur, sint in saeculo secundum praesentiam corporalem, non tamen sunt in saeculo quantum ad mentis affectum, quia in exterioribus occupantur non quasi quaerentes aliquid in mundo, sed solum propter divinum obsequium; utuntur enim hoc mundo tanquam non utentes, ut dicitur I ad Cor. VII. Unde et Iac. I, postquam dictum est quod religio munda et immaculata est visitare pupillos et viduas, subditur, et immaculatum se custodire ab hoc saeculo, ut scilicet affectu in rebus saeculi non detineatur.

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Reply Obj. 3: A man may be in the world in two ways: in one way by his bodily presence, in another way by the bent of his mind. Hence our Lord said to His disciples (John 15:19): I have chosen you out of the world, and yet speaking of them to His Father He said (John 17:11): These are in the world, and I come to Thee. Although, then, religious who are occupied with the works of the active life are in the world as to the presence of the body, they are not in the world as regards their bent of mind, because they are occupied with external things, not as seeking anything of the world, but merely for the sake of serving God: for they . . . use this world, as if they used it not, to quote 1 Cor. 7:31. Hence (Jas 1:27) after it is stated that religion clean and undefiled . . . is . . . to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation, it is added, and to keep one’s self unspotted from this world, namely to avoid being attached to worldly things.

Article 3 Whether a religious order can be directed to soldiering? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla religio ordinari possit ad militandum. Omnis enim religio pertinet ad statum perfectionis. Sed ad perfectionem vitae Christianae pertinet quod dominus dicit, Matth. V, ego dico vobis, non resistere malo, sed si quis percusserit te in unam maxillam, praebe ei et alteram, quod repugnat officio militari. Ergo nulla religio potest institui ad militandum. Praeterea, gravior est compugnatio corporalium praeliorum quam concertationes verborum quae in advocationibus fiunt. Sed religiosis interdicitur officio advocationis uti, ut patet in decretali de postulando supra inducta. Ergo videtur quod multo minus aliqua religio possit institui ad militandum. Praeterea, status religionis est status poenitentiae, ut supra dictum est. Sed poenitentibus, secundum iura, interdicitur militia, dicitur enim in decretis, de Poenit., dist. V, contrarium omnino est ecclesiasticis regulis, post poenitentiae actionem, redire ad militiam saecularem. Ergo nulla religio congrue institui potest ad militandum. Praeterea, nulla religio institui potest ad aliquid iniustum. Sed sicut Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., iustum bellum est quod ex edicto imperiali geritur. Cum igitur religiosi sint quaedam privatae personae, videtur quod non liceat eis bellum gerere. Et ita ad hoc non potest institui aliqua religio. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, ad Bonifacium, noli existimare neminem Deo placere posse qui armis bellicis ministrat. In his erat sanctus David, cui do-

Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order can be directed to soldiering. For all religious orders belong to the state of perfection. Now our Lord said with reference to the perfection of Christian life (Matt 5:39): I say to you not to resist evil; but if one strike thee on the right cheek, turn to him also the other, which is inconsistent with the duties of a soldier. Therefore no religious order can be established for soldiering. Obj. 2: Further, the bodily encounter of the battlefield is more grievous than the encounter in words that takes place between counsel at law. Yet religious are forbidden to plead at law, as appears from the Decretal De Postulando quoted above (A. 2, Obj. 2). Therefore it is much less seemly for a religious order to be established for soldiering. Obj. 3: Further, the religious state is a state of penance, as we have said above (Q. 187, A. 6). Now according to the code of laws soldiering is forbidden to penitents. For it is said in the Decretal De Poenit., Dist. v, cap. 3: It is altogether opposed to the rules of the Church, to return to worldly soldiering after doing penance. Therefore it is unfitting for any religious order to be established for soldiering. Obj. 4: Further, no religious order may be established for an unjust object. But as Isidore says (Etym. xviii, 1), A just war is one that is waged by order of the emperor. Since then religious are private individuals, it would seem unlawful for them to wage war; and consequently no religious order may be established for this purpose. On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. clxxxix; ad Bonifac.), Beware of thinking that none of those can please God who handle war-like weapons. Of such was holy David

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minus magnum testimonium perhibuit. Sed ad hoc sunt to whom the Lord gave great testimony. Now religious orders institutae religiones ut homines Deo placeant. Ergo nihil are established in order that men may please God. Thereprohibet aliquam religionem institui ad militandum. fore nothing hinders the establishing of a religious order for the purpose of soldiering. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, reliI answer that, As stated above (A. 2), a religious orgio institui potest non solum ad opera contemplativae der may be established not only for the works of the convitae, sed etiam ad opera vitae activae, inquantum per- templative life, but also for the works of the active life, intinent ad subventionem proximorum et obsequium Dei, sofar as they are concerned in helping our neighbor and in non autem inquantum pertinent ad aliquid mundanum the service of God, but not insofar as they are directed to tenendum. Potest autem officium militare ordinari ad a worldly object. Now the occupation of soldiering may be subventionem proximorum, non solum quantum ad pri- directed to the assistance of our neighbor, not only as revatas personas, sed etiam quantum ad totius reipubli- gards private individuals, but also as regards the defense of cae defensionem, unde de Iuda Machabaeo dicitur, I Ma- the whole commonwealth. Hence it is said of Judas Machchab. III, quod praeliabatur praelium Israel cum laetitia, abeus (1 Macc 3:2, 3) that he fought with cheerfulness the et dilatavit gloriam populo suo. Ordinari etiam potest ad battle of Israel, and he got his people great honor. It can conservationem divini cultus, unde ibidem subditur Iu- also be directed to the upkeep of divine worship, wherefore dam dixisse, nos pugnabimus pro animabus nostris et le- (1 Macc 3:21) Judas is stated to have said: We will fight for gibus nostris; et infra, XIII, dicit Simon, vos scitis quanta our lives and our laws, and further on (1 Macc 13:3) Simon ego et fratres mei et domus patris mei fecimus pro legibus said: You know what great battles I and my brethren, and the et pro sanctis praelia. house of my father, have fought for the laws and the sanctuary. Unde convenienter institui potest aliqua religio ad Hence a religious order may be fittingly established for militandum, non quidem propter aliquid mundanum, soldiering, not indeed for any worldly purpose, but for the sed propter defensionem divini cultus et publicae salu- defense of divine worship and public safety, or also of the tis; vel etiam pauperum et oppressorum, secundum illud poor and oppressed, according to Ps. 81:4: Rescue the poor, Psalmi, eripite pauperem, et egenum de manu peccatoris and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner. liberate. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquis potest non Reply Obj. 1: Not to resist evil may be understood in resistere malo dupliciter. Uno modo, condonando pro- two ways. First, in the sense of forgiving the wrong done to priam iniuriam. Et sic potest ad perfectionem pertinere, oneself, and thus it may pertain to perfection, when it is exquando ita fieri expedit ad salutem aliorum. Alio modo, pedient to act thus for the spiritual welfare of others. Sectolerando patienter iniurias aliorum. Et hoc ad imper- ond, in the sense of tolerating patiently the wrongs done to fectionem pertinet, vel etiam ad vitium, si aliquis potest others: and this pertains to imperfection, or even to vice, if convenienter iniurianti resistere. Unde Ambrosius dicit, one be able to resist the wrongdoer in a becoming manner. in libro de Offic., fortitudo quae bello tuetur a barbaris Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 27): The courage whereby a patriam, vel domi defendit infirmos, vel a latronibus so- man in battle defends his country against barbarians, or procios, plena iustitia est. Sicut etiam ibidem dicit dominus, tects the weak at home, or his friends against robbers is full quae tua sunt, ne repetas, et tamen, si aliquis non repete- of justice: even so our Lord says in the passage quoted, . . . ret ea quae sunt aliorum, si ad eum pertineat, peccaret. thy goods, ask them not again. If, however, a man were not Homo enim laudabiliter donat sua, non autem aliena. to demand the return of that which belongs to another, he Et multo minus ea quae sunt Dei, non sunt negligenda, would sin if it were his business to do so: for it is praisequia, ut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., iniurias Dei worthy to give away one’s own, but not another’s property. dissimulare nimis est impium. And much less should the things of God be neglected, for as Chrysostom says, it is most wicked to overlook the wrongs done to God. Ad secundum dicendum quod exercere advocatioReply Obj. 2: It is inconsistent with any religious order nis officium propter aliquid mundanum, repugnat om- to act as counsel at law for a worldly object, but it is not inni religioni, non autem si hoc aliquis exerceat, secun- consistent to do so at the orders of one’s superior and in fadum dispositionem sui praelati, pro monasterio suo, ut vor of one’s monastery, as stated in the same Decretal, or for in eadem decretali subditur. Neque etiam pro defensio- the defense of the poor and widows. Wherefore it is said in ne pauperum aut viduarum, unde in decretis, dist. LXX- the Decretals (Dist. lxxxviii, cap. 1): The holy synod has deXVIII, dicitur, decrevit sancta synodus nullum deinceps creed that henceforth no cleric is to buy property or occupy clericum aut possessiones conducere, aut negotiis saecula- himself with secular business, save with a view to the care of ribus se permiscere, nisi propter curam pupillorum, et ce- the fatherless . . . and widows. Likewise to be a soldier for the

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tera. Et similiter militare propter aliquid mundanum est omni religioni contrarium, non autem militare propter obsequium Dei. Ad tertium dicendum quod militia saecularis interdicitur poenitentibus, sed militia quae est propter Dei obsequium, imponitur alicui in poenitentiam; sicut patet de his quibus iniungitur ut militent in subsidium terrae sanctae. Ad quartum dicendum quod religio non sic instituitur ad militandum quod religiosis propria auctoritate liceat bella gerere, sed solum auctoritate principum vel Ecclesiae.

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sake of some worldly object is contrary to all religious life, but this does not apply to those who are soldiers for the sake of God’s service. Reply Obj. 3: Worldly soldiering is forbidden to penitents, but the soldiering which is directed to the service of God is imposed as a penance on some people, as in the case of those upon whom it is enjoined to take arms in defense of the Holy Land. Reply Obj. 4: The establishment of a religious order for the purpose of soldiering does not imply that the religious can wage war on their own authority; but they can do so only on the authority of the sovereign or of the Church.

Article 4 Whether a religious order can be established for preaching or hearing confessions? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla religio possit institui ad praedicandum vel confessiones audiendum. Dicitur enim VII, qu. I, monachorum vita subiectionis habet verbum et discipulatus, non docendi vel praesidendi vel pascendi alios, et eadem ratio esse videtur de aliis religiosis. Sed praedicare et confessiones audire est pascere vel docere alios. Non ergo ad hoc aliqua religio potest institui. Praeterea, illud ad quod religio instituitur, videtur esse maxime proprium religioni, ut supra dictum est. Sed praedicti actus non sunt proprii religiosorum, sed potius praelatorum. Non ergo ad huiusmodi actus potest aliqua religio institui. Praeterea, inconveniens videtur quod auctoritas praedicandi et confessiones audiendi infinitis hominibus committatur. Sed non est certus numerus eorum qui in religione aliqua recipiuntur. Ergo inconveniens est quod aliqua religio instituatur ad actus praedictos. Praeterea, praedicatoribus debetur victus a fidelibus Christi, ut patet I ad Cor. IX. Si ergo committitur praedicationis officium alicui religioni ad hoc institutae, sequetur quod fideles Christi teneantur ad exhibendum sumptus infinitis personis, quod cedit in magnum eorum gravamen. Non ergo debet aliqua religio institui ad huiusmodi actus exercendos. Praeterea, institutio Ecclesiae debet sequi institutionem Christi. Sed Christus primo misit ad praedicandum duodecim apostolos, ut habetur Luc. IX; et postea misit septuagintaduos discipulos, ut habetur Luc. X; et sicut Glossa ibidem dicit, apostolorum formam tenent episcopi, septuagintaduorum discipulorum minores presbyteri, scilicet curati. Ergo, praeter episcopos et pre-

Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order may be established for preaching, or hearing confessions. For it is said (VII, qu. i ): The monastic life is one of subjection and discipleship, not of teaching, authority, or pastoral care, and the same apparently applies to religious. Now preaching and hearing confessions are the actions of a pastor and teacher. Therefore a religious order should not be established for this purpose. Obj. 2: Further, the purpose for which a religious order is established would seem to be something most proper to the religious life, as stated above (A. 1). Now the aforesaid actions are not proper to religious but to bishops. Therefore a religious order should not be established for the purpose of such actions. Obj. 3: Further, it seems unfitting that the authority to preach and hear confessions should be committed to an unlimited number of men; and there is no fixed number of those who are received into a religious order. Therefore it is unfitting for a religious order to be established for the purpose of the aforesaid actions. Obj. 4: Further, preachers have a right to receive their livelihood from the faithful of Christ, according to 1 Cor. 9. If then the office of preaching be committed to a religious order established for that purpose, it follows that the faithful of Christ are bound to support an unlimited number of persons, which would be a heavy burden on them. Therefore a religious order should not be established for the exercise of these actions. Obj. 5: Further, the organization of the Church should be in accordance with Christ’s institution. Now Christ sent first the twelve apostles to preach, as related in Luke 9, and afterwards He sent the seventy-two disciples, as stated in Luke 10. Moreover, according to the gloss of Bede on And after these things (Luke 10:1), the apostles are represented by the bishops, the seventy-two disciples by the lesser priests,

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sbyteros parochiales, non debet aliqua religio institui ad i.e., the parish priests. Therefore in addition to bishops and praedicandum vel ad confessiones audiendum. parish priests, no religious order should be established for the purpose of preaching and hearing confessions. Sed contra est quod in collationibus patrum, abOn the contrary, In the Conferences of the Fathers bas Nesteros, de diversitate religionum loquens, dicit, (Coll. xiv, 4), Abbot Nesteros, speaking of the various kinds quidam eligentes aegrotantium curam, alii intercessionem of religious orders, says: Some choosing the care of the sick, quae pro miseris atque oppressis impenditur exequentes, others devoting themselves to the relief of the afflicted and opaut doctrinae instantes, aut eleemosynas pauperibus lar- pressed, or applying themselves to teaching, or giving alms to gientes, inter magnos ac summos viros, pro affectu suo the poor, have been most highly esteemed on account of their ac pietate, viguerunt. Ergo, sicut ad aegrotantium curam devotion and piety. Therefore just as a religious order may aliqua religio potest institui, ita etiam ad docendum po- be established for the care of the sick, so also may one be pulum per praedicationem et alia huiusmodi opera. established for teaching the people by preaching and like works. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, conI answer that, As stated above (A. 2), it is fitting for a venienter religio institui potest ad opera vitae activae, se- religious order to be established for the works of the active cundum quod ordinantur ad utilitatem proximorum, et life, insofar as they are directed to the good of our neighad obsequium Dei, et conservationem divini cultus. Ma- bor, the service of God, and the upkeep of divine worship. gis autem procuratur utilitas proximorum per ea quae Now the good of our neighbor is advanced by things perpertinent ad spiritualem animae salutem, quam per ea taining to the spiritual welfare of the soul rather than by quae pertinent ad subveniendum corporali necessitati, things pertaining to the supplying of bodily needs, in proquanto spiritualia corporalibus sunt potiora, unde su- portion to the excellence of spiritual over corporal things. pra dictum est quod eleemosynae spirituales sunt cor- Hence it was stated above (Q. 32, A. 3) that spiritual works poralibus potiores. Hoc etiam magis pertinet ad obse- of mercy surpass corporal works of mercy. Moreover this is quium Dei, cui nullum sacrificium est magis acceptum more pertinent to the service of God, to Whom no sacriquam zelus animarum, ut Gregorius dicit, super Ezech. fice is more acceptable than zeal for souls, as Gregory says Maius etiam est spiritualibus armis contra errores hae- (Hom. xii in Ezech.). Furthermore, it is a greater thing to reticorum et tentationes Daemonum fideles defendere, employ spiritual arms in defending the faithful against the quam corporalibus armis populum fidelem tueri. Et ideo errors of heretics and the temptations of the devil, than to convenientissimum est ad praedicandum, et ad alia quae protect the faithful by means of bodily weapons. Therefore pertinent ad salutem animarum, aliquam religionem in- it is most fitting for a religious order to be established for stitui. preaching and similar works pertaining to the salvation of souls. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille qui operatur Reply Obj. 1: He who works by virtue of another, acts ex virtute alterius, agit per modum instrumenti. Mini- as an instrument. And a minister is like an animated instruster autem est sicut instrumentum animatum, ut phi- ment, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2 ). Hence if a man losophus dicit, in I Polit. Unde quod aliquis auctorita- preach or do something similar by the authority of his sute praelatorum praedicet, vel alia huiusmodi faciat, non periors, he does not rise above the degree of discipleship or supergreditur discipulatus vel subiectionis gradum, qui subjection, which is competent to religious. competit religiosis. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut religiones aliReply Obj. 2: Some religious orders are established for quae instituuntur ad militandum, non quidem ut mili- soldiering, to wage war, not indeed on their own authority, tent auctoritate propria, sed auctoritate principum vel but on that of the sovereign or of the Church who are comEcclesiae, quibus ex officio competit, sicut dictum est; ita petent to wage war by virtue of their office, as stated above etiam religiones instituuntur ad praedicandum et con- (A. 3, ad 4). In the same way certain religious orders are esfessiones audiendum, non quidem propria auctoritate, tablished for preaching and hearing confessions, not indeed sed auctoritate praelatorum superiorum et inferiorum, by their own authority, but by the authority of the higher ad quos ex officio pertinet. Et ita subvenire praelatis in and lower superiors, to whom these things belong by virtue tali ministerio est huiusmodi religionis proprium. of their office. Consequently to assist one’s superiors in such a ministry is proper to a religious order of this kind. Ad tertium dicendum quod a praelatis non conReply Obj. 3: Bishops do not allow these religious sevceditur talibus religiosis ut quilibet indifferenter possit erally and indiscriminately to preach or hear confessions, praedicare vel confessiones audire, sed secundum mode- but according to the discretion of the religious superiors, or rationem eorum qui huiusmodi religionibus praeficiun- according to their own appointment. tur; vel secundum taxationem ipsorum praelatorum.

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Ad quartum dicendum quod plebs fidelis non tenetur ex debito iuris ad sumptus ministrandos nisi ordinariis praelatis, qui propter hoc decimas et oblationes fidelium recipiunt et alios ecclesiasticos reditus. Sed si aliqui gratis in huiusmodi actibus velint fidelibus ministrare, non potestative ab eis sumptus exigentes, non propter hoc gravantur fideles, quia et ipsi possunt liberaliter recompensare temporalem subventionem, ad quam, etsi non teneantur ex debito iuris, tenentur tamen ex debito caritatis; non autem ita quod eis sit tribulatio, aliis autem remissio, ut dicitur II ad Cor. VIII. Si tamen non invenirentur qui gratis se huiusmodi obsequiis manciparent, tenerentur ordinarii praelati, si ipsi non sufficerent alios ad hoc idoneos quaerere, quibus sumptus ipsi ministrarent. Ad quintum dicendum quod formam septuagintaduorum discipulorum non solum tenent presbyteri curati, sed quicumque alii minoris ordinis episcopis in eorum officio subserviant. Non enim legitur quod septuagintaduobus discipulis dominus aliquas determinatas parochias assignaret, sed quod mittebat eos ante faciem suam in omnem civitatem et locum quo erat ipse venturus. Opportunum autem fuit ut, praeter ordinarios praelatos, alii assumerentur ad huiusmodi officia, propter multitudinem fidelis populi, et difficultatem inveniendi sufficientes personas distribuendas singulis plebibus. Sicut etiam et religiones ad militandum necesse fuit institui, propter defectum saecularium principum ad resistendum infidelibus in aliquibus terris.

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Reply Obj. 4: The faithful are not bound by law to contribute to the support of other than their ordinary prelates, who receive the tithes and offerings of the faithful for that purpose, as well as other ecclesiastical revenues. But if some men are willing to minister to the faithful by exercising the aforesaid acts gratuitously, and without demanding payment as of right, the faithful are not burdened thereby because their temporal contributions can be liberally repaid by those men, nor are they bound by law to contribute, but by charity, and yet not so that they be burdened thereby and others eased, as stated in 2 Cor. 8:13. If, however, none be found to devote themselves gratuitously to services of this kind, the ordinary prelate is bound, if he cannot suffice by himself, to seek other suitable persons and support them himself. Reply Obj. 5: The seventy-two disciples are represented not only by the parish priests, but by all those of lower order who in any way assist the bishops in their office. For we do not read that our Lord appointed the seventy-two disciples to certain fixed parishes, but that He sent them two and two before His face into every city and place whither He Himself was to come. It was fitting, however, that in addition to the ordinary prelates others should be chosen for these duties on account of the multitude of the faithful, and the difficulty of finding a sufficient number of persons to be appointed to each locality, just as it was necessary to establish religious orders for military service, on account of the secular princes being unable to cope with unbelievers in certain countries.

Article 5 Whether a religious order should be established for the purpose of study? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit instituenda aliqua religio ad studendum. Dicitur enim in Psalmo, quoniam non cognovi litteraturam, introibo in potentias domini, Glossa, idest, in virtutem Christianam. Sed perfectio Christianae virtutis maxime videtur ad religiosos pertinere. Ergo eorum non est studio litterarum insistere. Praeterea, illud quod est dissensionis principium, religiosis non competit, qui in unitatem pacis congregantur. Sed studium dissensionem inducit, unde et in philosophis subsecuta est diversitas sectarum. Unde et Hieronymus, super Epist. ad Tit., dicit, antequam, Diaboli instinctu, studia in religione fierent, et diceretur in populis, ego sum Pauli, ego Apollo, ego Cephae, et cetera. Ergo videtur quod nulla religio debeat institui ad studendum. Praeterea, professio Christianae religionis differre debet a professione gentilium. Sed apud gentiles aliqui

Objection 1: It would seem that a religious order should not be established for the purpose of study. For it is written (Ps 70:15, 16): Because I have not known letters, I will enter into the powers of the Lord, i.e., Christian virtue, according to a gloss. Now the perfection of Christian virtue, seemingly, pertains especially to religious. Therefore it is not for them to apply themselves to the study of letters. Obj. 2: Further, that which is a source of dissent is unbecoming to religious, who are gathered together in the unity of peace. Now study leads to dissent: wherefore different schools of thought arose among the philosophers. Hence Jerome (Super Epist. ad Tit. 1:5) says: Before a diabolical instinct brought study into religion, and people said: I am of Paul, I of Apollo, I of Cephas, etc. Therefore it would seem that no religious order should be established for the purpose of study. Obj. 3: Further, those who profess the Christian religion should profess nothing in common with the Gentiles.

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philosophiam profitebantur. Et nunc etiam aliqui saecu- Now among the Gentiles were some who professed philoslares dicuntur aliquarum scientiarum professores. Non ophy, and even now some secular persons are known as ergo religiosis competit studium litterarum. professors of certain sciences. Therefore the study of letters does not become religious. Sed contra est quod Hieronymus, in epistola ad On the contrary, Jerome (Ep. liii ad Paulin.) urges Paulinum, invitat eum ad discendum in statu monasti- him to acquire learning in the monastic state, saying: Let us co, dicens, discamus in terris quorum scientia nobis per- learn on earth those things the knowledge of which will reseverat in caelis. Et infra, quidquid quaesieris, tecum scire main in heaven, and further on: Whatever you seek to know, conabor. I will endeavor to know with you. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, reI answer that As stated above (A. 2), religion may be ligio potest ordinari ad vitam activam, et ad vitam ordained to the active and to the contemplative life. Now contemplativam. Inter opera autem vitae activae, prin- chief among the works of the active life are those which are cipaliora sunt illa quae ordinantur directe ad salutem directly ordained to the salvation of souls, such as preachanimarum, sicut praedicare et alia huiusmodi. Competit ing and the like. Accordingly the study of letters is becomergo studium litterarum religioni tripliciter. Primo qui- ing to the religious life in three ways. First, as regards that dem, quantum ad id quod est proprium contemplativae which is proper to the contemplative life, to which the study vitae. Ad quam studium litterarum dupliciter adiuvat. of letters helps in a twofold manner. In one way by helping Uno modo, directe coadiuvando ad contemplandum, il- directly to contemplate, namely by enlightening the intelluminando scilicet intellectum. Vita enim contemplativa lect. For the contemplative life of which we are now speakde qua nunc loquimur, principaliter ordinatur ad consi- ing is directed chiefly to the consideration of divine things, derationem divinorum, ut supra habitum est, in qua di- as stated above (Q. 180, A. 4), to which consideration man rigitur homo ad considerandum divina. Unde in laudem is directed by study; for which reason it is said in praise of viri iusti dicitur in Psalmo, quod in lege domini medi- the righteous (Ps 1:2) that he shall meditate day and night tabitur die ac nocte. Et Eccli. XXXIX dicitur, sapientiam on the law of the Lord, and (Sir 39:1): The wise man will antiquorum exquiret sapiens, et in prophetis vacabit. Alio seek out the wisdom of all the ancients, and will be occumodo, studium litterarum iuvat contemplativam vitam pied in the prophets. In another way the study of letters is indirecte removendo contemplationis pericula, scilicet a help to the contemplative life indirectly, by removing the errores, qui in contemplatione divinorum frequenter ac- obstacles to contemplation, namely the errors which in the cidunt his qui Scripturas ignorant, sicut in collationibus contemplation of divine things frequently beset those who patrum legitur quod abbas Serapion, propter simplici- are ignorant of the scriptures. Thus we read in the Contatem, incidit in errorem Anthropomorphitarum, idest ferences of the Fathers (Coll. x, 3) that the Abbot Seraeorum qui Deum habere humanam formam arbitrantur. pion through simplicity fell into the error of the AnthroUnde dicit Gregorius, in VI Moral., quod nonnulli, dum pomorphites, who thought that God had a human shape. plus exquirunt contemplando quam capiunt, usque ad Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi) that some through seeking perversa dogmata erumpunt, et dum veritatis esse discipu- in contemplation more than they are able to grasp, fall away li humiliter negligunt, magistri errorum fiunt. Et propter into perverse doctrines, and by failing to be the humble discihoc dicitur Eccle. II, cogitavi in corde meo abstrahere a ples of truth become the masters of error. Hence it is written vino carnem meam, ut animum meum transferrem ad sa- (Eccl 2:3): I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from pientiam, devitaremque stultitiam. wine, that I might turn my mind to wisdom and might avoid folly. Secundo, necessarium est studium litterarum religioSecond, the study of letters is necessary in those relini institutae ad praedicandum et ad alia huiusmodi ex- gious orders that are founded for preaching and other like ercendum. Unde apostolus dicit, Tit. I, de episcopo, ad works; wherefore the Apostle (Titus 1:9), speaking of bishcuius officium huiusmodi actus pertinent, amplectentem ops to whose office these acts belong, says: Embracing that eum qui secundum doctrinam est fidelem sermonem, ut faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be potens sit exhortari in doctrina sana, et eos qui contra- able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsaydicunt arguere. Nec obstat quod apostoli absque studio ers. Nor does it matter that the apostles were sent to preach litterarum ad praedicandum sunt missi, quia, ut Hiero- without having studied letters, because, as Jerome says (Ep. nymus dicit, in epistola ad Paulinum, quidquid aliis ex- liii ad Paulin.), whatever others acquire by exercise and daily ercitatio et quotidiana in lege meditatio tribuere solet, illis meditation in God’s law, was taught them by the Holy Spirit. Spiritus Sanctus suggerebat. Tertio, studium litterarum religioni congruit quanThird, the study of letters is becoming to religious as retum ad id quod est omni religioni commune. Valet enim gards that which is common to all religious orders. For it ad vitandum carnis lasciviam. Unde Hieronymus dicit, helps us to avoid the lusts of the flesh; wherefore Jerome

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ad rusticum monachum, ama Scripturarum studia, et carnis vitia non amabis. Avertit enim animum a cogitatione lasciviae, et carnem macerat, propter studii laborem, secundum illud Eccli. XXXI, vigilia honestatis tabefaciet carnes. Valet etiam ad auferendum cupiditatem divitiarum. Unde Sap. VII dicitur, divitias nihil esse dixi in comparatione illius. Et I Machab. XII dicitur, nos autem nullo horum indiguimus, scilicet exteriorum subsidiorum, habentes solatio sanctos libros qui in manibus nostris sunt. Valet etiam ad obedientiae documentum. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de operibus Monach., quae est ista perversitas, lectioni nolle obtemperare, dum vult ei vacare? Et ideo manifestum est quod congrue potest institui religio ad studium litterarum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Glossa ibi exponit de littera veteris legis, de qua apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. III, littera occidit. Unde non cognoscere litteraturam est non approbare litteralem circumcisionem et ceteras carnales observantias. Ad secundum dicendum quod studium ad scientiam ordinatur, quae sine caritate inflat, et per consequens dissensiones facit, secundum illud Prov. XIII, inter superbos semper sunt iurgia; sed cum caritate aedificat, et concordiam parit. Unde I ad Cor. I, apostolus, cum dixisset, divites facti estis in omni verbo et in omni scientia, postmodum subdit, idipsum dicatis omnes, et non sint in vobis schismata. Hieronymus tamen non loquitur ibi de studiis litterarum, sed de studiis dissensionum, quae per haereticos et schismaticos intraverunt in religione Christiana. Ad tertium dicendum quod philosophi profitebantur studia litterarum quantum ad saeculares doctrinas. Sed religiosis competit principaliter intendere studio litterarum pertinentium ad doctrinam quae secundum pietatem est, ut dicitur Tit. I. Aliis autem doctrinis intendere non pertinet ad religiosos, quorum tota vita divinis obsequiis mancipatur, nisi inquantum ordinantur ad sacram doctrinam. Unde Augustinus dicit, in fine musicae, nos, dum negligendos esse non aestimamus quos haeretici rationum et scientiae fallaci pollicitatione decipiunt, tardius incedimus consideratione ipsarum viarum. Quod tamen facere non auderemus, nisi multos pios Ecclesiae filios, eadem refellendorum haereticorum necessitate, fecisse videremus.

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says (Ep. cxxv ad Rust. Monach.): Love the science of the Scriptures and thou shalt have no love for carnal vice. For it turns the mind away from lustful thoughts, and tames the flesh on account of the toil that study entails according to Ecclus. 31:1, Watching for riches consumeth the flesh. It also helps to remove the desire of riches, wherefore it is written (Wis 7:8): I . . . esteemed riches nothing in comparison with her, and (1 Macc 12:9): We needed none of these things, namely assistance from without, having for our comfort the holy books that are in our hands. It also helps to teach obedience, wherefore Augustine says (De Oper. Monach. xvii): What sort of perverseness is this, to wish to read, but not to obey what one reads? Hence it is clearly fitting that a religious order be established for the study of letters. Reply Obj. 1: This commentary of the gloss is an exposition of the Old Law of which the Apostle says (2 Cor 3:6): The letter killeth. Hence not to know letters is to disapprove of the circumcision of the letter and other carnal observances. Reply Obj. 2: Study is directed to knowledge which, without charity, puffeth up, and consequently leads to dissent, according to Prov. 13:10, Among the proud there are always dissensions: whereas, with charity, it edifieth and begets concord. Hence the Apostle after saying (1 Cor 1:5): You are made rich . . . in all utterance and in all knowledge, adds (1 Cor 1:10): That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you. But Jerome is not speaking here of the study of letters, but of the study of dissensions which heretics and schismatics have brought into the Christian religion. Reply Obj. 3: The philosophers professed the study of letters in the matter of secular learning: whereas it becomes religious to devote themselves chiefly to the study of letters in reference to the doctrine that is according to godliness (Titus 1:1). It becomes not religious, whose whole life is devoted to the service of God, to seek for other learning, save insofar as it is referred to the sacred doctrine. Hence Augustine says at the end of De Musica vi, 17: Whilst we think that we should not overlook those whom heretics delude by the deceitful assurance of reason and knowledge, we are slow to advance in the consideration of their methods. Yet we should not be praised for doing this, were it not that many holy sons of their most loving mother the Catholic Church had done the same under the necessity of confounding heretics.

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Article 6 Whether a religious order devoted to the contemplative life is more excellent than one given to the active life? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod religio quae vacat vitae contemplativae, non sit potior ea quae vacat operationibus vitae activae. Dicitur enim extra, de regularibus et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. licet, sicut maius bonum minori bono praeponitur, ita communis utilitas speciali utilitati praefertur, et in hoc casu recte praeponitur doctrina silentio, sollicitudo contemplationi, et labor quieti. Sed religio est melior quae ad maius bonum ordinatur. Ergo videtur quod religiones quae ordinantur ad vitam activam, sint potiores illis quae ordinantur ad vitam contemplativam. Praeterea, omnis religio ordinatur ad perfectionem caritatis, ut supra habitum est. Sed super illud Heb. XII, nondum usque ad sanguinem restitistis, dicit Glossa, perfectior in hac vita dilectio nulla est ea ad quam sancti martyres pervenerunt, qui contra peccatum usque ad sanguinem certaverunt. Certare autem usque ad sanguinem competit religionibus quae ad militiam ordinantur, quae tamen pertinent ad vitam activam. Ergo videtur quod huiusmodi religiones sint potissimae. Praeterea, tanto videtur esse aliqua religio perfectior, quanto est arctior. Sed nihil prohibet aliquas religiones ad vitam activam ordinatas esse arctioris observantiae quam illae quae ordinantur ad vitam contemplativam. Ergo sunt potiores. Sed contra est quod dominus, Luc. X, dicit optimam partem esse Mariae, per quam vita contemplativa significatur. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, differentia unius religionis ad aliam principaliter quidem attenditur ex parte finis, secundario autem ex parte exercitii. Et quia non potest aliquid dici altero potius nisi secundum id in quo ab eo differt, ideo excellentia unius religionis super aliam principaliter quidem attenditur secundum religionis finem, secundario autem secundum exercitium. Diversimode tamen secundum utrumque comparatio attenditur, nam comparatio quae est secundum finem est absoluta, eo quod finis propter se quaeritur; comparatio autem quae est secundum exercitium, est respectiva, quia exercitium non quaeritur propter se, sed propter finem. Et ideo illa religio alteri praefertur quae ordinatur ad finem absolute potiorem, vel quia est maius bonum; vel quia ad plura bona ordinatur. Si vero sit finis idem, secundario attenditur praeeminentia religionis, non secundum quantitatem exercitii, sed secundum proportionem eius ad finem intentum. Unde et in collationibus patrum introducitur sententia beati Antonii, qui praetulit discretionem, per quam ali-

Objection 1: It would seem that a religious order which is devoted to the contemplative life is not more excellent than one which is given to the active life. For it is said (Extra, de Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Licet), quoting the words of Innocent III: Even as a greater good is preferred to a lesser, so the common profit takes precedence of private profit: and in this case teaching is rightly preferred to silence, responsibility to contemplation, work to rest. Now the religious order which is directed to the greater good is better. Therefore it would seem that those religious orders that are directed to the active life are more excellent than those which are directed to the contemplative life. Obj. 2: Further, every religious order is directed to the perfection of charity, as stated above (AA. 1, 2). Now a gloss on Heb. 12:4, For you have not yet resisted unto blood, says: In this life there is no more perfect love than that to which the holy martyrs attained, who fought against sin unto blood. Now to fight unto blood is becoming those religious who are directed to military service, and yet this pertains to the active life. Therefore it would seem that religious orders of this kind are the most excellent. Obj. 3: Further, seemingly the stricter a religious order is, the more excellent it is. But there is no reason why certain religious orders directed to the active life should not be of stricter observance than those directed to the contemplative life. Therefore they are more excellent. On the contrary, our Lord said (Luke 10:42) that the best part was Mary’s, by whom the contemplative life is signified. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the difference between one religious order and another depends chiefly on the end, and secondarily on the exercise. And since one thing cannot be said to be more excellent than another save in respect of that in which it differs therefrom, it follows that the excellence of one religious order over another depends chiefly on their ends, and secondarily on their respective exercises. Nevertheless each of these comparisons is considered in a different way. For the comparison with respect to the end is absolute, since the end is sought for its own sake; whereas the comparison with respect to exercise is relative, since exercise is sought not for its own sake, but for the sake of the end. Hence a religious order is preferable to another, if it be directed to an end that is absolutely more excellent either because it is a greater good or because it is directed to more goods. If, however, the end be the same, the excellence of one religious order over another depends secondarily, not on the amount of exercise, but on the proportion of the exercise to the end in view. Wherefore in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. ii, 2) Blessed Antony is

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quis omnia moderatur, et ieiuniis et vigiliis et omnibus quoted, as preferring discretion whereby a man moderates huiusmodi observantiis. all his actions, to fastings, watchings, and all such observances. Sic ergo dicendum est quod opus vitae activae est Accordingly we must say that the work of the active life duplex. Unum quidem quod ex plenitudine contem- is twofold. One proceeds from the fullness of contemplaplationis derivatur, sicut doctrina et praedicatio. Un- tion, such as teaching and preaching. Wherefore Gregory de et Gregorius dicit, in V Homil. super Ezech., quod says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that the words of Ps. 144:7, They de perfectis viris post contemplationem suam redeunti- shall publish the memory of . . . Thy sweetness, refer to perbus dicitur, memoriam suavitatis tuae eructabunt. Et hoc fect men returning from their contemplation. And this work praefertur simplici contemplationi. Sicut enim maius est is more excellent than simple contemplation. For even as it illuminare quam lucere solum, ita maius est contempla- is better to enlighten than merely to shine, so is it better to ta aliis tradere quam solum contemplari. Aliud autem est give to others the fruits of one’s contemplation than merely opus activae vitae quod totaliter consistit in occupatio- to contemplate. The other work of the active life consists enne exteriori, sicut eleemosynas dare, hospites recipere, et tirely in outward occupation, for instance almsgiving, realia huiusmodi. Quae sunt minora operibus contempla- ceiving guests, and the like, which are less excellent than tionis, nisi forte in casu necessitatis, ut ex supra dictis the works of contemplation, except in cases of necessity, as patet. Sic ergo summum gradum in religionibus tenent stated above (Q. 182, A. 1). Accordingly the highest place quae ordinantur ad docendum et praedicandum. Quae in religious orders is held by those which are directed to et propinquissimae sunt perfectioni episcoporum, sicut teaching and preaching, which, moreover, are nearest to et in aliis rebus fines primorum coniunguntur principiis the episcopal perfection, even as in other things the end of secundorum, ut Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom. that which is first is in conjunction with the beginning of that Secundum autem gradum tenent illae quae ordinantur which is second, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. vii). The secad contemplationem. Tertius est earum quae occupantur ond place belongs to those which are directed to contemcirca exteriores actiones. plation, and the third to those which are occupied with external actions. In singulis autem horum graduum potest attendi Moreover, in each of these degrees it may be noted that praeeminentia secundum quod una religio ordinatur ad one religious order excels another through being directed altiorem actum in eodem genere, sicut inter opera acti- to higher action in the same genus; thus among the works vae, potius est redimere captivos quam recipere hospi- of the active life it is better to ransom captives than to retes; et in operibus contemplativae, potior est oratio quam ceive guests, and among the works of the contemplative life lectio. Potest etiam attendi praeeminentia, si una earum prayer is better than study. Again one will excel another if ad plura horum ordinetur quam alia, vel si convenientio- it be directed to more of these actions than another, or if it ra statuta habeat ad finem propositum consequendum. have statutes more adapted to the attainment of the end in view. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod decretalis illa loReply Obj. 1: This Decretal refers to the active life as quitur de vita activa prout ordinatur ad salutem anima- directed to the salvation of souls. rum. Ad secundum dicendum quod religiones quae inReply Obj. 2: Those religious orders that are estabstituuntur propter militiam, directius ordinantur ad hoc lished for the purpose of military service aim more diquod effundant sanguinem hostium, quam ad hoc quod rectly at shedding the enemy’s blood than at the shedding of eorum sanguis fundatur, quod proprie martyribus com- their own, which latter is more properly competent to marpetit. Nihil tamen prohibet huiusmodi religiosos in ali- tyrs. Yet there is no reason why religious of this description quo casu meritum martyrii consequi, et in hoc praefer- should not acquire the merit of martyrdom in certain cases, ri aliis religiosis, sicut et opera activa interdum in aliquo and in this respect stand higher than other religious; even casu praeferuntur contemplationi. as in some cases the works of the active life take precedence of contemplation. Ad tertium dicendum quod arctitudo observantiaReply Obj. 3: Strictness of observances, as the Blessed rum non est id quod praecipue in religione commen- Antony remarks (Conferences of the Fathers; Coll. ii, 2), is datur, ut beatus Antonius dicit. Et Isaiae LVIII dicitur, not the chief object of commendation in a religious order; nunquid hoc est ieiunium quod elegi, per diem affligere and it is written (Isa 58:5): Is this such a fast as I have choanimam suam? Assumitur tamen in religione ut necessa- sen, for a man to afflict his soul for a day? Nevertheless it is ria ad carnis macerationem, quae, si sine discretione fit, adopted in religious life as being necessary for taming the periculum deficiendi habet annexum, sicut beatus An- flesh, which if done without discretion, is liable to make us tonius dicit. Et ideo non est potior religio ex hoc quod fail altogether, as the Blessed Antony observes. Wherefore a

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habet arctiores observantias, sed ex hoc quod ex maiori discretione sunt eius observantiae ordinatae ad finem religionis. Sicut ad continentiam efficacius ordinatur maceratio carnis per abstinentiam cibi et potus, quae pertinent ad famem et sitim, quam per subtractionem vestium, quae pertinent ad frigus et nuditatem; et quam per corporalem laborem.

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religious order is not more excellent through having stricter observances, but because its observances are directed by greater discretion to the end of religion. Thus the taming of the flesh is more efficaciously directed to continence by means of abstinence in meat and drink, which pertain to hunger and thirst, than by the privation of clothing, which pertains to cold and nakedness, or by bodily labor.

Article 7 Whether religious perfection is diminished by possessing something in common? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod habere aliquid in communi diminuat perfectionem religionis. Dicit enim dominus, Matth. XIX, si vis perfectus esse, vade et vende omnia quae habes et da pauperibus, ex quo patet quod carere mundanis divitiis pertineat ad perfectionem vitae Christianae. Sed illi qui habent aliquid in communi, non carent mundanis divitiis. Ergo videtur quod non attingant omnino ad perfectionem Christianae vitae. Praeterea, ad perfectionem consiliorum pertinet ut homo mundana sollicitudine careat, unde et apostolus, I ad Cor. VII, dans consilium de virginitate, dicit, volo vos sine sollicitudine esse. Sed ad sollicitudinem praesentis vitae pertinet quod aliqui reservent sibi aliquid in futurum, quam quidem sollicitudinem dominus discipulis prohibet, Matth. VI, dicens, nolite solliciti esse in crastinum. Ergo videtur quod habere aliquid in communi diminuat perfectionem Christianae vitae. Praeterea, divitiae communes quodammodo pertinent ad singulos qui sunt in communitate, unde Hieronymus, ad Heliodorum episcopum, dicit de quibusdam, sunt ditiores monachi quam fuerant saeculares; possident opes sub Christo paupere, quas sub locuplete Diabolo non habuerant; suspirat eos Ecclesia divites, quos tenuit mundus ante mendicos. Sed quod aliquis habeat divitias proprias derogat perfectioni religionis. Ergo etiam perfectioni religionis derogat quod aliquid in communi habeatur. Praeterea, Gregorius narrat, in III Dialog., de quodam sanctissimo viro Isaac, quod, cum ei discipuli humiliter innuerent ut pro usu monasterii possessiones quae offerebantur acciperet, ille, sollicitus suae paupertatis custos, fortem sententiam tenebat, dicens, monachus qui in terra possessiones quaerit, monachus non est. Quod intelligitur de communibus possessionibus, quae pro communi usu monasterii ei offerebantur. Ergo videtur quod habere aliquid in communi tollat perfectionem religionis.

Objection 1: It would seem that religious perfection is diminished by possessing something in common. For our Lord said (Matt 19:21): If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all thou hast and give to the poor. Hence it is clear that to lack worldly wealth belongs to the perfection of Christian life. Now those who possess something in common do not lack worldly wealth. Therefore it would seem that they do not quite reach to the perfection of Christian life. Obj. 2: Further, the perfection of the counsels requires that one should be without worldly solicitude; wherefore the Apostle in giving the counsel of virginity said (1 Cor 7:32): I would have you to be without solicitude. Now it belongs to the solicitude of the present life that certain people keep something to themselves for the morrow; and this solicitude was forbidden His disciples by our Lord (Matt 6:34) saying: Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow. Therefore it would seem that the perfection of Christian life is diminished by having something in common. Obj. 3: Further, possessions held in common belong in some way to each member of the community; wherefore Jerome (Ep. lx ad Heliod. Episc.) says in reference to certain people: They are richer in the monastery than they had been in the world; though serving the poor Christ they have wealth which they had not while serving the rich devil; the Church rejects them now that they are rich, who in the world were beggars. But it is derogatory to religious perfection that one should possess wealth of one’s own. Therefore it is also derogatory to religious perfection to possess anything in common. Obj. 4: Further, Gregory (Dial. iii, 14) relates of a very holy man named Isaac, that when his disciples humbly signified that he should accept the possessions offered to him for the use of the monastery, he being solicitous for the safeguarding of his poverty, held firmly to his opinion, saying: A monk who seeks earthly possessions is no monk at all: and this refers to possessions held in common, and which were offered him for the common use of the monastery. Therefore it would seem destructive of religious perfection to possess anything in common.

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Praeterea, dominus, perfectionem religionis discipulis tradens, Matth. X, dicit nolite possidere aurum neque argentum, neque pecuniam in zonis vestris, non peram in via, per quod, ut Hieronymus dicit, arguit philosophos qui vulgo appellantur Bactroperitae, quod, contemptores saeculi et omnia pro nihilo ducentes, cellarium secum vehant. Ergo videtur quod reservare aliquid, sive in proprio sive in communi, diminuat perfectionem religionis.

Sed contra est quod prosper dicit, in libro de vita Contempl., et habetur XII, qu. I, satis ostenditur et propria debere propter perfectionem contemni, et sine impedimento perfectionis, Ecclesiae posse facultates, quae sunt profecto communia, possidere. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, perfectio non consistit essentialiter in paupertate, sed in Christi sequela, secundum illud Hieronymi super Matth., quia non sufficit omnia relinquere, addidit Petrus quod perfectum est, idest, secuti sumus te, paupertas autem est sicut instrumentum vel exercitium perveniendi ad perfectionem. Unde in collationibus patrum, abbas Moyses dicit, ieiunia, vigiliae, meditatio Scripturarum, nuditas, ac privatio omnium facultatum, non perfectio, sed perfectionis instrumenta sunt est autem privatio omnium facultatum, sive paupertas, perfectionis instrumentum, inquantum per remotionem divitiarum tolluntur quaedam caritatis impedimenta. Quae sunt praecipue tria. Quorum primum est sollicitudo, quam secum divitiae afferunt. Unde dominus dicit, Matth. XIII, qui autem est seminatus in spinis, hic est qui verbum audit, et sollicitudo saeculi istius et fallacia divitiarum suffocat verbum secundum autem est divitiarum amor, qui ex divitiis possessis augetur. Unde Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., quod quia divitiae habitae difficile contemnuntur, non dixit dominus, Matth. XIX, impossibile est divitem intrare in regnum caelorum, sed, difficile. Tertium autem est inanis gloria vel elatio, quae ex divitiis nascitur, secundum illud Psalmi, qui confidunt in virtute sua, et in multitudine divitiarum suarum gloriantur. Horum ergo trium primum a divitiis separari non potest totaliter, sive sint magnae sive parvae, necesse est enim hominem aliqualiter sollicitari de acquirendis vel conservandis exterioribus rebus. Sed si res exteriores non quaerantur vel habeantur nisi in modica quantitate, quantum sufficiunt ad simplicem victum, talis sollicitudo non multum impedit hominem. Unde nec perfectioni repugnat Christianae vitae. Non enim omnis sollicitudo a domino interdicitur, sed superflua et nociva, unde super illud Matth. VI, nolite solliciti esse animae vestrae, quid manducetis, etc., dicit Augustinus, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, non hoc dicit, ut ista non procurent quan-

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Obj. 5: Further, our Lord in prescribing religious perfection to His disciples, said (Matt 10:9, 10): Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses, nor script for your journey. By these words, as Jerome says in his commentary, He reproves those philosophers who are commonly called Bactroperatae who as despising the world and valuing all things at naught carried their pantry about with them. Therefore it would seem derogatory to religious perfection that one should keep something whether for oneself or for the common use. On the contrary, Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. ix) and his words are quoted (XII, qu. 1, can. Expedit): It is sufficiently clear both that for the sake of perfection one should renounce having anything of one’s own, and that the possession of revenues, which are of course common property, is no hindrance to the perfection of the Church. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 184, A. 3, ad 1; Q. 185, A. 6, ad 1), perfection consists, essentially, not in poverty, but in following Christ, according to the saying of Jerome (Super Matth. xix, 27): Since it is not enough to leave all, Peter adds that which is perfect, namely, ‘We have followed Thee,’ while poverty is like an instrument or exercise for the attainment of perfection. Hence in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, 7) the abbot Moses says: Fastings, watchings, meditating on the Scriptures, poverty, and privation of all one’s possessions are not perfection, but means of perfection. Now the privation of one’s possessions, or poverty, is a means of perfection, inasmuch as by doing away with riches we remove certain obstacles to charity; and these are chiefly three. The first is the cares which riches bring with them; wherefore our Lord said (Matt 13:22): That which was sown among thorns, is he that heareth the word, and the care of this world, and the deceitfulness of riches, choketh up the word. The second is the love of riches, which increases with the possession of wealth; wherefore Jerome says (Super Matth. xix, 23) that since it is difficult to despise riches when we have them, our Lord did not say: ‘It is impossible for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven,’ but: ‘It is difficult.’ The third is vainglory or elation which results from riches, according to Ps. 48:7, They that trust in their own strength, and glory in the multitude of their riches. Accordingly the first of these three cannot be altogether separated from riches whether great or small. For man must needs take a certain amount of care in acquiring or keeping external things. But so long as external things are sought or possessed only in a small quantity, and as much as is required for a mere livelihood, such like care does not hinder one much; and consequently is not inconsistent with the perfection of Christian life. For our Lord did not forbid all care, but only such as is excessive and hurtful; wherefore Augustine, commenting on Matt. 6:25, Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat, says (De Serm. in Monte): In saying this He does not forbid them to procure these things in-

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tum necessitatis est, sed ut non ista intueantur, et propter ista faciant quidquid in Evangelii praedicatione facere iubentur. Sed abundans divitiarum possessio abundantiorem sollicitudinem ingerit, per quam animus hominis multum distrahitur et impeditur, ne totaliter feratur in Dei obsequium. Alia vero duo, scilicet amor divitiarum et elatio seu gloriatio de divitiis, non consequuntur nisi abundantes divitias. Differt tamen circa hoc utrum divitiae, abundantes vel moderatae, in proprio vel in communi habeantur. Nam sollicitudo quae circa proprias divitias adhibetur, pertinet ad amorem privatum, quo quis se temporaliter amat, sed sollicitudo quae adhibetur circa res communes, pertinet ad amorem caritatis, quae non quaerit quae sua sunt, sed communibus intendit. Et quia religio ad perfectionem caritatis ordinatur, quam perficit amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui; habere aliquid proprium repugnat perfectioni religionis. Sed sollicitudo quae adhibetur circa bona communia, pertinere potest ad caritatem, licet etiam per hoc impediri possit aliquis altior caritatis actus, puta contemplationis divinae aut instructionis proximorum. Ex quo patet quod habere superabundantes divitias in communi, sive in rebus mobilibus sive immobilibus, est impedimentum perfectionis, licet non totaliter excludat eam. Habere autem de rebus exterioribus in communi, sive mobilibus sive immobilibus, quantum sufficit ad simplicem victum, perfectionem religionis non impedit, si consideretur paupertas in comparatione ad communem finem religionum, qui est vacare divinis obsequiis. Si autem consideretur per comparationem ad speciales fines religionum, sic, praesupposito tali fine, paupertas maior vel minor est religioni accommoda, et tanto erit unaquaeque religio secundum paupertatem perfectior, quanto habet paupertatem magis proportionatam suo fini. Manifestum est enim quod ad exteriora et corporalia opera vitae activae indiget homo copia exteriorum rerum, ad contemplationem autem pauca requiruntur. Unde philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod ad actiones multis opus est, et quanto utique maiores sunt et meliores, pluribus, speculanti autem nullo talium ad operationem necessitas sed solis necessariis indiget; alia vero impedimenta sunt ad speculationem. Sic igitur patet quod religio quae ordinatur ad actiones corporales activae vitae, puta ad militandum vel ad hospitalitatem sectandam, imperfecta esset si communibus careret divitiis. Religiones autem quae ad contemplativam vitam ordinantur, tanto perfectiores sunt, quanto eorum paupertas minorem eis sollicitudinem temporalium ingerit. Tanto autem sollicitudo temporalium rerum magis impedit religionem, quanto sollicitudo spiritualium maior ad religionem requiritur. Manifestum est autem quod maiorem sollicitudinem spiritualium requirit religio quae est instituta ad contemplandum et contemplata aliis tradendum per doctrinam

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sofar as they needed them, but to be intent on them, and for their sake to do whatever they are bidden to do in preaching the Gospel. Yet the possession of much wealth increases the weight of care, which is a great distraction to man’s mind and hinders him from giving himself wholly to God’s service. The other two, however, namely the love of riches and taking pride or glorying in riches, result only from an abundance of wealth. Nevertheless it makes a difference in this matter if riches, whether abundant or moderate, be possessed in private or in common. For the care that one takes of one’s own wealth, pertains to love of self, whereby a man loves himself in temporal matters; whereas the care that is given to things held in common pertains to the love of charity which seeketh not her own, but looks to the common good. And since religion is directed to the perfection of charity, and charity is perfected in the love of God extending to contempt of self, it is contrary to religious perfection to possess anything in private. But the care that is given to common goods may pertain to charity, although it may prove an obstacle to some higher act of charity, such as divine contemplation or the instructing of one’s neighbor. Hence it is evident that to have excessive riches in common, whether in movable or in immovable property, is an obstacle to perfection, though not absolutely incompatible with it; while it is not an obstacle to religious perfection to have enough external things, whether movables or immovables, as suffice for a livelihood, if we consider poverty in relation to the common end of religious orders, which is to devote oneself to the service of God. But if we consider poverty in relation to the special end of any religious order, then this end being presupposed, a greater or lesser degree of poverty is adapted to that religious order; and each religious order will be the more perfect in respect of poverty, according as it professes a poverty more adapted to its end. For it is evident that for the purpose of the outward and bodily works of the active life a man needs the assistance of outward things, whereas few are required for contemplation. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that many things are needed for action, and the more so, the greater and nobler the actions are. But the contemplative man requires no such things for the exercise of his act: he needs only the necessaries; other things are an obstacle to his contemplation. Accordingly it is clear that a religious order directed to the bodily actions of the active life, such as soldiering or the lodging of guests, would be imperfect if it lacked common riches; whereas those religious orders which are directed to the contemplative life are the more perfect, according as the poverty they profess burdens them with less care for temporal things. And the care of temporal things is so much a greater obstacle to religious life as the religious life requires a greater care of spiritual things. Now it is manifest that a religious order established for the purpose of contemplating and of giving to others the fruits of one’s contemplation by teaching and preaching, re-

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et praedicationem, quam illa quae est instituta ad contemplandum tantum. Unde talem religionem decet paupertas talis quae minimam sollicitudinem ingerat. Manifestum est autem quod minimam sollicitudinem ingerit conservare res usui hominum necessarias, tempore congruo procuratas. Et ideo tribus gradibus religionum supra positis triplex gradus paupertatis competit. Nam illis religionibus quae ordinantur ad corporales actiones activae vitae, competit habere abundantiam divitiarum communium. Illis autem religionibus quae sunt ordinatae ad contemplandum, magis competit habere possessiones moderatas, nisi simul oporteat tales religiosos, per se vel per alios, hospitalitatem tenere et pauperibus subvenire. Illis autem quae ordinantur ad contemplata aliis tradendum, competit vitam habere maxime ab exterioribus sollicitudinibus expeditam. Quod quidem fit dum modica quae sunt necessaria vitae, congruo tempore procurata, conservantur. Et hoc dominus, paupertatis institutor, docuit suo exemplo, habebat enim loculos, Iudae commissos, in quibus recondebantur ei oblata, ut habetur Ioan. XII. Nec obstat quod Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., si quis obiicere voluerit, quomodo Iudas in loculis pecuniam portabat? Respondebimus, quia rem pauperum in usus suos convertere nefas putavit, scilicet solvendo tributum, quia inter illos pauperes praecipui erant eius discipuli, in quorum necessitates pecunia loculorum Christi expendebatur. Dicitur enim Ioan. IV, quod discipuli abierant in civitatem ut cibos emerent, et Ioan. XIII dicitur quod discipuli putabant, quia loculos habebat Iudas, quod dixisset ei Iesus, eme quae opus sunt nobis ad diem festum; aut ut egenis aliquid daret. Ex quo patet quod conservare pecuniam, aut quascumque alias res communes, ad sustentationem religiosorum congregationis eiusdem, vel quorumcumque aliorum pauperum, est conforme perfectioni, quam Christus docuit suo exemplo. Sed et discipuli, post resurrectionem, a quibus omnis religio sumpsit originem, pretia praediorum conservabant, et distribuebant unicuique prout cuique opus erat. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ex illo verbo domini non intelligitur quod ipsa paupertas sit perfectio, sed perfectionis instrumentum, et, sicut ostensum est, minimum inter tria principalia instrumenta perfectionis; nam votum continentiae praeeminet voto paupertatis, et votum obedientiae praefertur utrique. Quia vero instrumentum non propter se quaeritur, sed propter finem, non tanto aliquid fit melius quanto maius est instrumentum, sed quanto magis est fini proportionatum, sicut medicus non tanto magis sanat quanto maiorem dat medicinam, sed quanto medicina est magis proportionata morbo. Sic igitur non oportet quod religio tanto sit perfectior quanto maiorem habet paupertatem, sed quanto eius paupertas est magis proportionata communi fini et speciali. Et si daretur quod

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quires greater care of spiritual things than one that is established for contemplation only. Wherefore it becomes a religious order of this kind to embrace a poverty that burdens one with the least amount of care. Again it is clear that to keep what one has acquired at a fitting time for one’s necessary use involves the least burden of care. Wherefore a threefold degree of poverty corresponds to the three aforesaid degrees of religious life. For it is fitting that a religious order which is directed to the bodily actions of the active life should have an abundance of riches in common; that the common possession of a religious order directed to contemplation should be more moderate, unless the said religious be bound, either themselves or through others, to give hospitality or to assist the poor; and that those who aim at giving the fruits of their contemplation to others should have their life most exempt from external cares; this being accomplished by their laying up the necessaries of life procured at a fitting time. This, our Lord, the Founder of poverty, taught by His example. For He had a purse which He entrusted to Judas, and in which were kept the things that were offered to Him, as related in John 12:6. Nor should it be argued that Jerome (Super Matth. xvii, 26) says: If anyone object that Judas carried money in the purse, we answer that He deemed it unlawful to spend the property of the poor on His own uses, namely by paying the tax—because among those poor His disciples held a foremost place, and the money in Christ’s purse was spent chiefly on their needs. For it is stated (John 4:8) that His disciples were gone into the city to buy meats, and (John 13:29) that the disciples thought, because Judas had the purse, that Jesus had said to him: But those things which we have need of for the festival day, or that he should give something to the poor. From this it is evident that to keep money by, or any other common property for the support of religious of the same order, or of any other poor, is in accordance with the perfection which Christ taught by His example. Moreover, after the resurrection, the disciples from whom all religious orders took their origin kept the price of the lands, and distributed it according as each one had need (Acts 4:34, 35). Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 184, A. 3, ad 1), this saying of our Lord does not mean that poverty itself is perfection, but that it is the means of perfection. Indeed, as shown above (Q. 186, A. 8), it is the least of the three chief means of perfection; since the vow of continence excels the vow of poverty, and the vow of obedience excels them both. Since, however, the means are sought not for their own sake, but for the sake of the end, a thing is better, not for being a greater instrument, but for being more adapted to the end. Thus a physician does not heal the more the more medicine he gives, but the more the medicine is adapted to the disease. Accordingly it does not follow that a religious order is the more perfect, according as the poverty it professes is more perfect, but according as its poverty is more adapted to the end both common and special. Granted even

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excessus paupertatis faceret religionem perfectiorem secundum hoc quod est pauperior, non tamen faceret eam perfectiorem simpliciter posset enim esse quod alia religio excederet in his quae pertinent ad continentiam et obedientiam, et sic esset simpliciter perfectior, quia quod in melioribus excedit, est simpliciter melius. Ad secundum dicendum quod per hoc quod dominus dicit, nolite solliciti esse in crastinum, non intelligitur quod nihil reservetur in futurum. Hoc enim periculosum esse beatus Antonius, in collationibus patrum, ostendit, dicens quod privationem omnium facultatum ita sectantes ut ex ipsis nec unius quidem diei victum sibimet, unumve denarium superesse paterentur, et alia huiusmodi facientes, ita vidimus repente deceptos ut arreptum opus non potuerint congruo exitu terminare. Et ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de operibus Monach., si hoc verbum domini, nolite solliciti esse in crastinum, ita intelligatur ut nihil in crastinum reponatur, non poterunt ista servare qui se per multos dies a conspectu hominum separatos includunt, viventes in magna intentione orationum. Et postea subdit, an forte, quo sunt sanctiores, eo sunt volucribus dissimiliores? Et postea subdit, si enim urgeantur ex Evangelio ut nihil reponant in crastinum, respondent, cur ergo ipse dominus loculos habuit, ubi pecuniam collectam reponeret? Cur tanto ante, fame imminente, frumenta sanctis patribus missa sunt? Cur apostoli indigentiae sanctorum necessaria procurarunt?

Quod ergo dicitur, nolite solliciti esse in crastinum, secundum Hieronymum, sic exponitur, sufficit nobis praesentis temporis cogitatio, futura, quae incerta sunt, Deo relinquamus. Secundum Chrysostomum, sic, sufficit labor quem pateris propter necessaria, noli de superfluis laborare. Secundum Augustinum, sic, cum aliquid boni operamur, non temporalia, quae significantur per crastinum, sed aeterna cogitemus. Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum Hieronymi habet locum ubi sunt superabundantes divitiae quae habentur quasi propriae, vel per quarum abusum etiam singuli de communitate superbiunt et lasciviunt. Non autem habet locum in divitiis moderatis communiter conservatis ad solam sustentationem vitae, qua singuli indigent, eadem enim est ratio quod singuli utantur his quae pertinent ad necessaria vitae, et quod communiter conserventur. Ad quartum dicendum quod Isaac possessiones renuebat recipere, quia timebat ne per hoc ad superfluas divitias veniretur, per quarum abusum impediretur religionis perfectio. Unde Gregorius ibidem subdit, sic metuebat paupertatem suae securitatis perdere, sicut avari divites solent perituras divitias custodire. Non autem legi-

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that the religious order which exceeds others in poverty be more perfect insofar as it is poorer, this would not make it more perfect simply. For possibly some other religious order might surpass it in matters relating to continence, or obedience, and thus be more perfect simply, since to excel in better things is to be better simply. Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord’s words (Matt 6:34), Be not solicitous for tomorrow, do not mean that we are to keep nothing for the morrow; for the Blessed Antony shows the danger of so doing, in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. ii, 2), where he says: It has been our experience that those who have attempted to practice the privation of all means of livelihood, so as not to have the wherewithal to procure themselves food for one day, have been deceived so unawares that they were unable to finish properly the work they had undertaken. And, as Augustine says (De Oper. Monach. xxiii), if this saying of our Lord, ‘Be not solicitous for tomorrow,’ means that we are to lay nothing by for the morrow, those who shut themselves up for many days from the sight of men, and apply their whole mind to a life of prayer, will be unable to provide themselves with these things. Again he adds afterwards: Are we to suppose that the more holy they are, the less do they resemble the birds? And further on (De Oper. Monach. xxiv): For if it be argued from the Gospel that they should lay nothing by, they answer rightly: Why then did our Lord have a purse, wherein He kept the money that was collected? Why, in days long gone by, when famine was imminent, was grain sent to the holy fathers? Why did the apostles thus provide for the needs of the saints? Accordingly the saying: Be not solicitous for tomorrow, according to Jerome (Super Matth.) is to be rendered thus: It is enough that we think of the present; the future being uncertain, let us leave it to God: according to Chrysostom, It is enough to endure the toil for necessary things, labor not in excess for unnecessary things: according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17): When we do any good action, we should bear in mind not temporal things which are denoted by the morrow, but eternal things. Reply Obj. 3: The saying of Jerome applies where there are excessive riches, possessed in private as it were, or by the abuse of which even the individual members of a community wax proud and wanton. But they do not apply to moderate wealth, set by for the common use, merely as a means of livelihood of which each one stands in need. For it amounts to the same that each one makes use of things pertaining to the necessaries of life, and that these things be set by for the common use. Reply Obj. 4: Isaac refused to accept the offer of possessions, because he feared lest this should lead him to have excessive wealth, the abuse of which would be an obstacle to religious perfection. Hence Gregory adds (Dial. iii, 14): He was as afraid of forfeiting the security of his poverty, as the rich miser is careful of his perishable wealth. It is not,

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tur quod renuerit recipere aliqua necessaria ad vitae sustentationem communiter conservanda. Ad quintum dicendum quod philosophus, in I Polit., dicit panem et vinum et alia huiusmodi esse divitias naturales, pecunias vero divitias artificiales. Et inde est quod quidam philosophi nolebant uti pecunia, sed aliis rebus, quasi secundum naturam viventes. Et ideo Hieronymus, ibidem, per sententiam domini, qui similiter utrumque interdicit, ostendit quod in idem redit habere pecuniam, et alias res necessarias vitae. Et tamen, licet dominus huiusmodi non portari in via ab his qui ad praedicandum mittebantur, ordinaverit, non tamen ea in communi conservari prohibuit. Qualiter tamen illa verba domini sint intelligenda, supra ostensum est.

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however, related that he refused to accept such things as are commonly necessary for the upkeep of life. Reply Obj. 5: The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5, 6) that bread, wine, and the like are natural riches, while money is artificial riches. Hence it is that certain philosophers declined to make use of money, and employed other things, living according to nature. Wherefore Jerome shows by the words of our Lord, Who equally forbade both, that it comes to the same to have money and to possess other things necessary for life. And though our Lord commanded those who were sent to preach not to carry these things on the way, He did not forbid them to be possessed in common. How these words of our Lord should be understood has been shown above (Q. 185, A. 6 ad 2; I-II, Q. 108, A. 2, ad 3).

Article 8 Whether the religious life of those who live in community is more perfect than that of those who lead a solitary life? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod perfectior sit religio in societate viventium quam agentium solitariam vitam. Dicitur enim Eccle. IV, melius est duos esse quam unum, habent enim emolumentum societatis suae. Ergo videtur perfectior esse religio in societate viventium. Praeterea, Matth. XVIII dicitur, ubi fuerint duo vel tres congregati in nomine meo, ibi sum ego in medio eorum. Sed nihil potest esse melius quam Christi societas. Ergo videtur quod vivere in congregatione sit melius quam ducere solitariam vitam. Praeterea, inter alia religionis vota, votum obedientiae excellentius est, et humilitas est maxime Deo accepta. Sed obedientia et humilitas magis observatur in communi conversatione quam in solitudine. Dicit enim Hieronymus, in epistola ad rusticum monachum, in solitudine cito subrepit superbia, dormit quando voluerit, facit quod voluerit. E contrario autem ipse docet eum qui in societate vivit, dicens, non facias quod vis, comedas quod iuberis, habeas quantum acceperis, subiiciaris cui non vis, servias fratribus, praepositum monasterii timeas ut Deum, diligas ut parentem. Ergo videtur quod religio viventium in societate sit perfectior ea quae solitariam vitam agit. Praeterea, dominus dicit, Luc. XI, nemo accendit lucernam et in abscondito ponit, neque sub modio. Sed illi qui solitariam vitam agunt, videntur esse in abscondito positi, nihil utilitatis hominibus afferentes. Ergo videtur quod eorum religio non sit perfectior.

Objection 1: It would seem that the religious life of those who live in community is more perfect than that of those who lead a solitary life. For it is written (Eccl 4:9): It is better . . . that two should be together, than one; for they have the advantage of their society. Therefore the religious life of those who live in community would seem to be more perfect. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Matt 18:20): Where there are two or three gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them. But nothing can be better than the fellowship of Christ. Therefore it would seem better to live in community than in solitude. Obj. 3: Further, the vow of obedience is more excellent than the other religious vows; and humility is most acceptable to God. Now obedience and humility are better observed in company than in solitude; for Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic. Monach.): In solitude pride quickly takes man unawares, he sleeps as much as he will, he does what he likes; whereas when instructing one who lives in community, he says: You may not do what you will, you must eat what you are bidden to eat, you may possess so much as you receive, you must obey one you prefer not to obey, you must be a servant to your brethren, you must fear the superior of the monastery as God, love him as a father. Therefore it would seem that the religious life of those who live in community is more perfect than that of those who lead a solitary life. Obj. 4: Further, our Lord said (Luke 11:33): No man lighteth a candle and putteth it in a hidden place, nor under a bushel. Now those who lead a solitary life are seemingly in a hidden place, and to be doing no good to any man. Therefore it would seem that their religious life is not more perfect.

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Praeterea, id quod est contra naturam hominis, non videtur ad perfectionem virtutis pertinere. Sed homo naturaliter est animal sociale, ut philosophus dicit, in I Polit. Ergo videtur quod agere solitariam vitam non sit perfectius quam agere vitam socialem. Sed contra est quod Augustinus, in libro de operibus Monach., illos sanctiores esse dicit qui, a conspectu hominum separati, nulli ad se praebent accessum, viventes in magna intentione orationum. Respondeo dicendum quod solitudo, sicut et paupertas, non est ipsa essentia perfectionis, sed perfectionis instrumentum, unde in collationibus patrum, dicit abbas Moyses quod pro puritate cordis, solitudo sectanda est, sicut et ieiunia et alia huiusmodi. Manifestum est autem quod solitudo non est instrumentum congruum actioni, sed contemplationi, secundum illud Osee II, ducam eam in solitudinem, et loquar ad cor eius. Unde non congruit religionibus quae sunt ordinatae ad opera vitae activae, sive corporalia sive spiritualia, nisi forte ad tempus, exemplo Christi qui, ut dicitur Luc. VI, exiit in montem orare et erat pernoctans in oratione Dei. Competit autem religionibus quae sunt ad contemplationem ordinatae. Considerandum tamen est quod id quod est solitarium, debet esse sibi per se sufficiens. Hoc autem est cui nihil deest, quod pertinet ad rationem perfecti. Et ideo solitudo competit contemplanti qui iam ad perfectum pervenit. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, ex solo divino munere, sicut patet de Ioanne Baptista, qui fuit repletus spiritu sancto adhuc ex utero matris suae; unde et cum adhuc puer esset, erat in desertis, ut dicitur Luc. I. Alio modo, per exercitium virtuosi actus, secundum illud Heb. V, perfectorum est solidus cibus, eorum qui pro consuetudine exercitatos habent sensus ad discretionem boni et mali. Ad exercitium autem huiusmodi iuvatur homo ex aliorum societate, dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad intellectum, ut instruatur in his quae sunt contemplanda, unde Hieronymus dicit, ad rusticum monachum, mihi placet ut habeas sacrum contubernium, nec ipse te doceas. Secundo, quantum ad affectum, ut scilicet noxiae affectiones hominis reprimantur exemplo et correctione aliorum, quia ut dicit Gregorius, XXX Moral., super illud, cui dedi in solitudine domum, quid prodest solitudo corporis, si solitudo defuerit cordis? Et ideo vita socialis necessaria est ad exercitium perfectionis, solitudo autem competit iam perfectis. Unde Hieronymus dicit, ad rusticum monachum, solitariam vitam comprehendimus minime, quam semper laudabimus, sed de ludo monasteriorum huiusmodi volumus egredi milites quos rudimenta

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Obj. 5: Further, that which is in accord with man’s nature is apparently more pertinent to the perfection of virtue. But man is naturally a social animal, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1). Therefore it would seem that to lead a solitary life is not more perfect than to lead a community life. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Oper. Monach. xxiii) that those are holier who keep themselves aloof from the approach of all, and give their whole mind to a life of prayer. I answer that, Solitude, like poverty, is not the essence of perfection, but a means thereto. Hence in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, 7) the Abbot Moses says that solitude, even as fasting and other like things, is a sure means of acquiring purity of heart. Now it is evident that solitude is a means adapted not to action but to contemplation, according to Osee 2:14, I . . . will lead her into solitude ; and I will speak to her heart. Wherefore it is not suitable to those religious orders that are directed to the works whether corporal or spiritual of the active life; except perhaps for a time, after the example of Christ, Who as Luke relates (6:12), went out into a mountain to pray; and He passed the whole night in the prayer of God. On the other hand, it is suitable to those religious orders that are directed to contemplation. It must, however, be observed that what is solitary should be self-sufficing by itself. Now such a thing is one that lacks nothing, and this belongs to the idea of a perfect thing. Wherefore solitude befits the contemplative who has already attained to perfection. This happens in two ways: in one way by the gift only of God, as in the case of John the Baptist, who was filled with the Holy Spirit even from his mother’s womb (Luke 1:11), so that he was in the desert even as a boy; in another way by the practice of virtuous action, according to Heb. 5:14: Strong meat is for the perfect; for them who by custom have their senses exercised to the discerning of good and evil. Now man is assisted in this practice by the fellowship of others in two ways. First, as regards his intellect, to the effect of his being instructed in that which he has to contemplate; wherefore Jerome says (ad Rustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): It pleases me that you have the fellowship of holy men, and teach not yourself. Second, as regards the affections, seeing that man’s noisome affections are restrained by the example and reproof which he receives from others; for as Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 23), commenting on the words, To whom I have given a house in the wilderness (Job 39:6), What profits solitude of the body, if solitude of the heart be lacking? Hence a social life is necessary for the practice of perfection. Now solitude befits those who are already perfect; wherefore Jerome says (ad Rustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): Far from condemning the solitary life, we have often commended

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non terreant, qui specimen conversationis suae multo tem- it. But we wish the soldiers who pass from the monastic school pore dederint. to be such as not to be deterred by the hard noviciate of the desert, and such as have given proof of their conduct for a considerable time. Sicut igitur id quod iam perfectum est, praeeminet ei Accordingly, just as that which is already perfect surquod ad perfectionem exercetur; ita vita solitariorum, si passes that which is being schooled in perfection, so the life debite assumatur, praeeminet vitae sociali. Si autem abs- of the solitaries, if duly practiced, surpasses the community que praecedenti exercitio talis vita assumatur, est pericu- life. But if it be undertaken without the aforesaid practice, losissima, nisi per divinam gratiam suppleatur quod in it is fraught with very great danger, unless the grace of God aliis per exercitium acquiritur, sicut patet de beatis An- supply that which others acquire by practice, as in the case tonio et Benedicto. of the Blessed Antony and the Blessed Benedict. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Salomon ostenReply Obj. 1: Solomon shows that two are better than dit melius esse quod sint duo simul quam unus, propter one, on account of the help which one affords the other eiauxilium quod unus habet ab alio, vel ad sublevandum ther by lifting him up, or by warming him, i.e., giving him vel ad fovendum vel ad spiritualiter calefaciendum. Quo spiritual heat (Eccl 4:10, 11). But those who have already atquidem auxilio iam non indigent qui sunt perfectionem tained to perfection do not require this help. assecuti. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicitur I Ioan. Reply Obj. 2: According to 1 John 4:16, He that abideth IV, qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo. Si- in charity abideth in God and God in him. Wherefore just cut ergo Christus est in medio eorum qui sibi invicem as Christ is in the midst of those who are united together per dilectionem proximi sociantur, ita habitat in corde in the fellowship of brotherly love, so does He dwell in the eius qui divinae contemplationi insistit per dilectionem heart of the man who devotes himself to divine contemplaDei. tion through love of God. Ad tertium dicendum quod actu obedire est neReply Obj. 3: Actual obedience is required of those cessarium his qui indigent exerceri secundum directio- who need to be schooled according to the direction of othnem aliorum ad perfectionem capiendam. Sed illi qui ers in the attainment of perfection; but those who are aliam perfecti sunt, spiritu Dei sufficienter aguntur, ut non ready perfect are sufficiently led by the spirit of God so that indigeant actu aliis obedire. Habent tamen obedientiam they need not to obey others actually. Nevertheless they in praeparatione animi. have obedience in the preparedness of the mind. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus diReply Obj. 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19), cit, in XIX de Civ. Dei, a studio cognoscendae veritatis ne- no one is forbidden to seek the knowledge of truth, for this mo prohibetur, quod ad laudabile pertinet otium. Quod pertains to a praiseworthy leisure. That a man be placed on autem aliquis super candelabrum ponatur, non pertinet a candlestick, does not concern him but his superiors, and if ad ipsum, sed ad eius superiores. Quae sarcina si non im- this burden is not placed on us, as Augustine goes on to say ponatur, ut Augustinus ibidem subdit, contemplandae (De Civ. Dei xix, 19), we must devote ourselves to the contemveritati vacandum est, ad quam plurimum valet solitudo. plation of truth, for which purpose solitude is most helpful. Et tamen illi qui solitariam vitam agunt, multum utiles Nevertheless, those who lead a solitary life are most useful sunt generi humano. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de to mankind. Hence, referring to them, Augustine says (De moribus Ecclesiae, de his loquens, pane solo, qui eis per Morib. Eccl. xxxi): They dwell in the most lonely places, concerta intervalla temporum affertur, et aqua contenti, de- tent to live on water and the bread that is brought to them sertissimas terras incolunt, perfruentes colloquio Dei, cui from time to time, enjoying colloquy with God to whom they puris mentibus inhaeserunt. Videntur autem nonnullis res have adhered with a pure mind. To some they seem to have humanas plus quam oporteret deseruisse, non intelligenti- renounced human intercourse more than is right: but these bus quantum nobis eorum animus in orationibus prosit, et understand not how much such men profit us by the spirit of vita ad exemplum, quorum corpora videre non sinimur. their prayers, what an example to us is the life of those whom we are forbidden to see in the body. Ad quintum dicendum quod homo potest solitaReply Obj. 5: A man may lead a solitary life for two rius vivere dupliciter. Uno modo, quasi societatem hu- motives. One is because he is unable, as it were, to bear with manam non ferens propter animi saevitiam, et hoc est human fellowship on account of his uncouthness of mind; bestiale. Alio modo, per hoc quod totaliter divinis rebus and this is beast-like. The other is with a view to adhering inhaeret, et hoc est supra hominem. Et ideo philosophus wholly to divine things; and this is superhuman. Hence the dicit, in I Polit., quod ille qui aliis non communicat, est Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that he who associates not with bestia aut Deus, idest divinus vir. others is either a beast or a god, i.e., a godly man.

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Question 189 The Entrance into Religious Life Deinde considerandum est de ingressu religionis. Et We must now consider the entrance into religious life. circa hoc quaeruntur decem. Under this head there are ten points of inquiry: Primo, utrum illi qui non sunt exercitati in (1) Whether those who are not practiced in the observantia praeceptorum, debeant religionem observance of the commandments should enter ingredi. religion? Secundo, utrum liceat aliquos voto obligare ad (2) Whether it is lawful for a person to be bound by religionis ingressum. vow to enter religion? Tertio, utrum illi qui voto obligantur ad religionis (3) Whether those who are bound by vow to enter ingressum, teneantur votum implere. religion are bound to fulfill their vow? Quarto, utrum illi qui vovent religionem intrare, (4) Whether those who vow to enter religion are bound teneantur ibi perpetuo remanere. to remain there in perpetuity? Quinto, utrum pueri sint recipiendi in religione. (5) Whether children should be received into religion? Sexto, utrum propter parentum obsequium aliqui (6) Whether one should be withheld from entering debeant retrahi a religionis ingressu. religion through deference to one’s parents? Septimo, utrum presbyteri curati vel archidiaconi (7) Whether parish priests or archdeacons may enter possint ad religionem transire. religion? Octavo, utrum de una religione possit aliquis (8) Whether one may pass from one religious order to transire ad aliam. another? Nono, utrum aliquis debeat alios inducere ad (9) Whether one ought to induce others to enter religionis ingressum. religion? Decimo, utrum requiratur magna deliberatio cum (10) Whether serious deliberation with one’s relations consanguineis et amicis ad religionis ingressum. and friends is requisite for entrance into religion?

Article 1 Whether those who are not practiced in keeping the commandments should enter religion? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non debeant religionem ingredi nisi qui sunt in praeceptis exercitati. Dominus enim consilium perfectionis dedit adolescenti qui dixerat se praecepta a iuventute servasse. Sed a Christo sumpsit initium omnis religio. Ergo videtur quod non sunt ad religionem admittendi nisi qui sunt in praeceptis exercitati. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., nemo repente fit summus, sed in bona conversatione a minimis quis inchoat, ut ad magna perveniat. Sed magna sunt consilia, quae pertinent ad perfectionem vitae, minora autem sunt praecepta, quae pertinent ad communem iustitiam. Ergo videtur quod non debent aliqui, ad observantiam consiliorum, religionem intrare, nisi prius fuerint in praeceptis exercitati.

Objection 1: It would seem that none should enter religion but those who are practiced in the observance of the commandments. For our Lord gave the counsel of perfection to the young man who said that he had kept the commandments from his youth. Now all religious orders originate from Christ. Therefore it would seem that none should be allowed to enter religion but those who are practiced in the observance of the commandments. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xv in Ezech., and Moral. xxii): No one comes suddenly to the summit; but he must make a beginning of a good life in the smallest matters, so as to accomplish great things. Now the great things are the counsels which pertain to the perfection of life, while the lesser things are the commandments which belong to common righteousness. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to enter religion for the purpose of keeping the counsels, unless one be already practiced in the observance of the precepts.

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Praeterea, sicut sacri ordines habent quandam excellentiam in Ecclesia, ita et status religionis. Sed sicut Gregorius scribit Siagrio episcopo, et habetur in decretis, dist. XLVIII, ordinate ad ordines accedendum est, nam casum appetit qui ad summi loci fastigia, postpositis gradibus, per abrupta quaerit ascensum. Scimus enim quod aedificati parietes non prius tignorum pondus accipiunt, nisi a novitatis suae humore siccentur, ne, si ante pondera quam solidentur accipiant, cunctam simul fabricam deponant. Ergo videtur quod non debent aliqui ad religionem transire nisi in praeceptis exercitati. Praeterea, super illud Psalmi, sicut ablactatus super matre sua, dicit Glossa, in utero matris Ecclesiae primo concipimur, dum fidei rudimentis instruimur; deinde in lucem edimur, dum per Baptismum regeneramur; deinde quasi manibus Ecclesiae portamur et lacte nutrimur, cum post Baptismum bonis operibus informamur et lacte spiritualis doctrinae nutrimur, proficiendo donec, iam grandiusculi, a lacte matris accedamus ad mensam patris; idest, a simplici doctrina, ubi praedicatur verbum caro factum, accedamus ad verbum patris in principio apud Deum. Et postea subdit quod nuper baptizati in sabbato sancto, quasi manibus Ecclesiae gestantur et lacte nutriuntur usque ad Pentecosten, quo tempore nulla difficilia indicuntur, non ieiunatur, non media nocte surgitur, postea, spiritu Paraclito confirmati, quasi ablactati, incipiunt ieiunare et alia difficilia servare. Multi vero hunc ordinem pervertunt, ut haeretici et schismatici, se ante tempus a lacte separantes, unde exstinguuntur. Sed hunc ordinem pervertere videntur illi qui religionem intrant, vel alios ad intrandum inducunt, antequam sint in faciliori observantia praeceptorum exercitati. Ergo videtur quod sint haeretici vel schismatici.

Praeterea, a prioribus ad posteriora est transeundum. Sed praecepta sunt priora consiliis, quia sunt communiora, utpote a quibus non convertitur consequentia essendi, quicumque enim servat consilia, servat praecepta, sed non convertitur. Congruus autem ordo est ut a prioribus ad posteriora transeatur. Ergo non debet aliquis transire ad observantiam consiliorum in religione, nisi prius sit exercitatus in praeceptis.

Sed contra est quod dominus Matthaeum publicanum, qui in observantia praeceptorum exercitatus non erat, advocavit ad consiliorum observantiam, dicitur enim Luc. V, quod, relictis omnibus, secutus est eum. Ergo non est necessarium quod ante aliquis exerceatur

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Obj. 3: Further, the religious state, like the holy orders, has a place of eminence in the Church. Now, as Gregory writes to the bishop Siagrius, order should be observed in ascending to orders. For he seeks a fall who aspires to mount to the summit by overpassing the steps. For we are well aware that walls when built receive not the weight of the beams until the new fabric is rid of its moisture, lest if they should be burdened with weight before they are seasoned they bring down the whole building (Dist. xlviii, can. Sicut neophytus). Therefore it would seem that one should not enter religion unless one be practiced in the observance of the precepts. Obj. 4: Further, a gloss on Ps. 130:2, As a child that is weaned is towards his mother, says: First we are conceived in the womb of Mother Church, by being taught the rudiments of faith. Then we are nourished as it were in her womb, by progressing in those same elements. Afterwards we are brought forth to the light by being regenerated in baptism. Then the Church bears us as it were in her hands and feeds us with milk, when after baptism we are instructed in good works and are nourished with the milk of simple doctrine while we progress; until having grown out of infancy we leave our mother’s milk for a father’s control, that is to say, we pass from simple doctrine, by which we are taught the Word made flesh, to the Word that was in the beginning with God. Afterwards it goes on to say: For those who are just baptized on Holy Saturday are borne in the hands of the Church as it were and fed with milk until Pentecost, during which time nothing arduous is prescribed, no fasts, no rising at midnight. Afterwards they are confirmed by the Paraclete Spirit, and being weaned so to speak, begin to fast and keep other difficult observances. Many, like the heretics and schismatics, have perverted this order by being weaned before the time. Hence they have come to naught. Now this order is apparently perverted by those who enter religion, or induce others to enter religion, before they are practiced in the easier observance of the commandments. Therefore they would seem to be heretics or schismatics. Obj. 5: Further, one should proceed from that which precedes to that which follows after. Now the commandments precede the counsels, because they are more universal, for the implication of the one by the other is not convertible, since whoever keeps the counsels keeps the commandments, but the converse does not hold. Seeing then that the right order requires one to pass from that which comes first to that which comes after, it follows that one ought not to pass to the observance of the counsels in religion, without being first of all practiced in the observance of the commandments. On the contrary, Matthew the publican who was not practiced in the observance of the commandments was called by our Lord to the observance of the counsels. For it is stated (Luke 5:28) that leaving all things he . . . followed Him. Therefore it is not necessary for a person to be prac-

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in observantia praeceptorum quam transeat ad perfectionem consiliorum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, status religionis est quoddam spirituale exercitium ad consequendum perfectionem caritatis, quod quidem fit inquantum per religionis observantias auferuntur impedimenta perfectae caritatis. Haec autem sunt quae implicant affectum hominis ad terrena. Per hoc autem quod affectus hominis implicatur ad terrena, non solum impeditur perfectio caritatis, sed interdum etiam ipsa caritas perditur, dum per inordinatam conversionem ad bona temporalia homo avertitur ab incommutabili bono mortaliter peccando. Unde patet quod religionis observantiae, sicut tollunt impedimenta perfectae caritatis, ita etiam tollunt occasiones peccandi, sicut patet quod per ieiunium et vigilias et obedientiam et alia huiusmodi, retrahitur homo a peccatis gulae et luxuriae, et a quibuscumque aliis peccatis. Et ideo ingredi religionem non solum expedit his qui sunt exercitati in praeceptis, ut ad maiorem perfectionem perveniant, sed etiam his qui non sunt exercitati, ut facilius peccata vitent et perfectionem assequantur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., mentitus est adolescens dicens, haec omnia servavi a iuventute mea. Si enim quod positum est in mandatis, diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum, opere complesset, quomodo postea, audiens, vade et vende omnia quae habes et da pauperibus, tristis recessit? Sed intelligendum est eum mentitum esse quantum ad perfectam observantiam huius praecepti. Unde Origenes, super Matth., dicit quod scriptum est in Evangelio secundum Hebraeos, quod cum dominus dixisset ei, vade et vende omnia quae habes, coepit dives scalpere caput suum. Et dixit ad eum dominus, quomodo dicis, feci legem et prophetas? Est in lege, diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum, et ecce, multi fratres tui, filii Abrahae, amicti sunt stercore, morientes prae fame; et domus tua plena est multis bonis, et non egreditur aliquid omnino ex ea ad eos. Itaque dominus, redarguens eum, dicit, si vis perfectus esse, et cetera. Impossibile est enim implere mandatum quod dicit, diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum, et esse divitem, et maxime, tantas possessiones habere. Quod est intelligendum de perfecta impletione huius praecepti. Imperfecte autem et communi modo verum est eum observasse praecepta. Perfectio enim principaliter in observantia praeceptorum caritatis consistit, ut supra habitum est. Ut ergo dominus ostenderet perfectionem consiliorum utilem esse et innocentibus et peccatoribus, non solum vocavit adolescentem innocentem, sed etiam Matthaeum peccatorem. Et tamen Matthaeus secutus est vocantem, non autem adolescens, quia facilius convertuntur ad religionem peccatores quam illi qui de sua innocentia

Q. 189, A. 1

ticed in the observance of the commandments before passing to the perfection of the counsels. I answer that, As shown above (Q. 188, A. 1), the religious state is a spiritual schooling for the attainment of the perfection of charity. This is accomplished through the removal of the obstacles to perfect charity by religious observances; and these obstacles are those things which attach man’s affections to earthly things. Now the attachment of man’s affections to earthly things is not only an obstacle to the perfection of charity, but sometimes leads to the loss of charity, when through turning inordinately to temporal goods man turns away from the immutable good by sinning mortally. Hence it is evident that the observances of the religious state, while removing the obstacles to perfect charity, remove also the occasions of sin: for instance, it is clear that fasting, watching, obedience, and the like withdraw man from sins of gluttony and lust and all other manner of sins. Consequently it is right that not only those who are practiced in the observance of the commandments should enter religion in order to attain to yet greater perfection, but also those who are not practiced, in order the more easily to avoid sin and attain to perfection. Reply Obj. 1: Jerome (Super Matth. xix, 20) says: The young man lies when he says: ‘All these have I kept from my youth.’ For if he had fulfilled this commandment, ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,’ why did he go away sad when he heard: Go, sell all thou hast and give to the poor? But this means that he lied as to the perfect observance of this commandment. Hence Origen says (Tract. viii super Matth.) that it is written in the Gospel according to the Hebrews that when our Lord had said to him: ‘Go, sell all thou hast,’ the rich man began to scratch his head; and that our Lord said to him: How sayest thou: I have fulfilled the law and the prophets, seeing that it is written in the law: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself? Behold many of thy brethren, children of Abraham, are clothed in filth, and die of hunger, whilst thy house is full of all manner of good things, and nothing whatever hath passed thence to them. And thus our Lord reproves him saying: If thou wilt be perfect, go, etc. For it is impossible to fulfill the commandment which says, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, and to be rich, especially to have such great wealth. This also refers to the perfect fulfilment of this precept. On the other hand, it is true that he kept the commandments imperfectly and in a general way. For perfection consists chiefly in the observance of the precepts of charity, as stated above (Q. 184, A. 3). Wherefore in order to show that the perfection of the counsels is useful both to the innocent and to sinners, our Lord called not only the innocent youth but also the sinner Matthew. Yet Matthew obeyed His call, and the youth obeyed not, because sinners are converted to the religious life more easily than those who presume

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praesumunt, quibus dicit dominus, Matth. XXI, publica- on their innocency. It is to the former that our Lord says ni et meretrices praecedunt vos in regnum Dei. (Matt 21:31): The publicans and the harlots shall go into the kingdom of God before you. Ad secundum dicendum quod summum et infiReply Obj. 2: The highest and the lowest place can be mum tripliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, in eodem sta- taken in three ways. First, in reference to the same state and tu et in eodem homine. Et sic manifestum est quod ne- the same man; and thus it is evident that no one comes to mo repente fit summus, quia unusquisque recte vivens the summit suddenly, since every man that lives aright, prototo tempore vitae suae proficit, ut ad summum perve- gresses during the whole course of his life, so as to arrive at niat. Alio modo, per comparationem ad diversos status. the summit. Second, in comparison with various states; and Et sic non oportet ut quicumque vult ad superiorem sta- thus he who desires to reach to a higher state need not betum pervenire, a minori incipiat, sicut non oportet ut qui gin from a lower state: for instance, if a man wish to be a vult esse clericus, prius in laicali vita exerceatur. Tertio cleric he need not first of all be practiced in the life of a laymodo, quantum ad diversas personas. Et sic manifestum man. Third, in comparison with different persons; and in est quod unus statim incipit, non solum ab altiori statu, this way it is clear that one man begins straightway not only sed etiam ab altiori gradu sanctitatis quam sit summum from a higher state, but even from a higher degree of holiad quod alius pervenit per totam vitam suam. Unde Gre- ness, than the highest degree to which another man attains gorius dicit, in II Dialog., omnes cognoscant, Benedictus throughout his whole life. Hence Gregory says (Dial. ii, 1): puer conversationis gratiam a quanta perfectione coepis- All are agreed that the boy Benedict began at a high degree of set. grace and perfection in his daily life. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 184, A. 6) the holy est, sacri ordines praeexigunt sanctitatem, sed status orders prerequire holiness, whereas the religious state is a religionis est exercitium quoddam ad sanctitatem as- school for the attainment of holiness. Hence the burden of sequendam. Unde pondus ordinum imponendum est orders should be laid on the walls when these are already parietibus iam per sanctitatem desiccatis, sed pondus seasoned with holiness, whereas the burden of religion seareligionis desiccat parietes, idest homines, ab humore vi- sons the walls, i.e., men, by drawing out the damp of vice. tiorum. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut manifeste ex Reply Obj. 4: It is manifest from the words of this verbis illius Glossae apparet, principaliter loquitur de or- gloss that it is chiefly a question of the order of doctrine, dine doctrinae, prout transeundum est a facilioribus ad insofar as one has to pass from easy matter to that which difficiliora. Unde quod dicit haereticos et schismaticos is more difficult. Hence it is clear from what follows that hunc ordinem pervertere, manifestum est ex sequenti- the statement that certain heretics and schismatics have perbus ad ordinem doctrinae pertinere. Sequitur enim, hic verted this order refers to the order of doctrine. For it convero se servasse, scilicet praedictum ordinem, dicit, con- tinues thus: But he says that he has kept these things, namely stringens se maledicto, sic, quasi, non modo in aliis fui the aforesaid order, binding himself by an oath. Thus I was humilis, sed etiam in scientia. Quia humiliter sentiebam, humble not only in other things but also in knowledge, for ‘I prius nutritus lacte, quod est verbum caro factum, ut sic was humbly minded’; because I was first of all fed with milk, crescerem ad panem Angelorum, idest ad verbum quod which is the Word made flesh, so that I grew up to partake est in principio apud Deum. Exemplum autem quod in of the bread of angels, namely the Word that is in the beginmedio interponitur, quod noviter baptizatis non indici- ning with God. The example which is given in proof, of the tur ieiunium usque ad Pentecosten, ostendit quod non newly baptized not being commanded to fast until Pentesunt ex necessitate ad difficilia cogendi antequam per cost, shows that no difficult things are to be laid on them spiritum sanctum interius ad hoc instigentur ut difficilia as an obligation before the Holy Spirit inspires them inpropria voluntate assumant. Unde et post Pentecosten, wardly to take upon themselves difficult things of their own post receptionem spiritus sancti, ieiunium celebrat Ec- choice. Hence after Pentecost and the receiving of the Holy clesia. Spiritus autem sanctus, sicut Ambrosius dicit, su- Spirit the Church observes a fast. Now the Holy Spirit, acper Luc., non arcetur aetatibus, non finitur morte, non ex- cording to Ambrose (Super Luc. 1:15), is not confined to any cluditur alvo. Et Gregorius dicit, in homilia Pentecostes, particular age; He ceases not when men die, He is not eximplet citharaedum puerum, et Psalmistam facit, implet cluded from the maternal womb. Gregory also in a homily puerum abstinentem, et iudicem senum facit. Et postea for Pentecost (xxx in Ev.) says: He fills the boy harpist and subdit, nulla ad discendum mora agitur, omne quod vol- makes him a psalmist: He fills the boy abstainer and makes uerit, mox ut tetigerit mentem, docet. Et sicut dicitur Ec- him a wise judge, and afterwards he adds: No time is needed cle. VIII, non est in hominis ditione prohibere spiritum. Et to learn whatsoever He will, for He teaches the mind by the apostolus, I ad Thess. V, monet, spiritum nolite extingue- merest touch. Again it is written (Eccl 8:8), It is not in man’s

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re. Et Act. VII, contra quosdam dicitur, vos semper spiri- power to stop the Spirit, and the Apostle admonishes us tui sancto restitistis. (1 Thess 5:19): Extinguish not the Spirit, and (Acts 7:51) it is said against certain persons: You always resist the Holy Spirit. Ad quintum dicendum quod praeceptorum quaeReply Obj. 5: There are certain chief precepts which dam sunt principalia, quae sunt fines et praeceptorum et are the ends, so to say, of the commandments and counconsiliorum, scilicet praecepta caritatis. Ad quae consilia sels. These are the precepts of charity, and the counsels are ordinantur, non ita quod sine consiliis servari non pos- directed to them, not that these precepts cannot be obsint, sed ut per consilia perfectius observentur. Alia vero served without keeping the counsels, but that the keeping of sunt praecepta secundaria, quae ordinantur ad praecep- the counsels conduces to the better observance of the preta caritatis ut sine quibus caritatis praecepta observa- cepts. The other precepts are secondary and are directed to ri non possunt omnino. Sic igitur perfecta observan- the precepts of charity; in such a way that unless one obtia praeceptorum caritatis praecedit intentione consilia, serve them it is altogether impossible to keep the precepts sed interdum tempore sequitur. Hic est enim ordo finis of charity. Accordingly in the intention the perfect obserrespectu eorum quae sunt ad finem. Observantia vero vance of the precepts of charity precedes the counsels, and praeceptorum caritatis secundum communem modum, yet sometimes it follows them in point of time. For such et similiter alia praecepta, comparantur ad consilia sicut is the order of the end in relation to things directed to the commune ad proprium, quia observantia praeceptorum end. But the observance in a general way of the precepts of potest esse sine consiliis, sed non convertitur. Sic ergo charity together with the other precepts, is compared to the observantia praeceptorum communiter sumpta, prae- counsels as the common to the proper, because one can obcedit naturae ordine consilia, non tamen oportet quod serve the precepts without observing the counsels, but not tempore, quia non est aliquid prius in genere quam sit in vice versa. Hence the common observance of the precepts aliqua specierum. Observantia vero praeceptorum sine precedes the counsels in the order of nature; but it does not consiliis ordinatur ad observantiam praeceptorum cum follow that it precedes them in point of time, for a thing is consiliis sicut species imperfecta ad perfectam, sicut ani- not in the genus before being in one of the species. But the mal irrationale ad rationale. Perfectum autem est natu- observance of the precepts apart from the counsels is diraliter prius imperfecto, natura enim, ut Boetius dicit, a rected to the observance of the precepts together with the perfectis sumit initium. Nec tamen oportet quod prius counsels; as an imperfect to a perfect species, even as the irobserventur praecepta sine consiliis et postea cum consi- rational to the rational animal. Now the perfect is naturally liis, sicut non oportet quod aliquis prius sit asinus quam prior to the imperfect, since nature, as Boethius says (De sit homo, vel quod prius sit coniugatus quam sit virgo. Et Consol. iii, 10), begins with perfect things. And yet it is not similiter non oportet quod aliquis prius servet praecepta necessary for the precepts first of all to be observed without in saeculo quam transeat ad religionem, praesertim quia the counsels, and afterwards with the counsels, just as it is conversatio saecularis non disponit ad perfectionem re- not necessary for one to be an ass before being a man, or ligionis, sed magis impedit. married before being a virgin. In like manner it is not necessary for a person first of all to keep the commandments in the world before entering religion; especially as the worldly life does not dispose one to religious perfection, but is more an obstacle thereto.

Article 2 Whether one ought to be bound by vow to enter religion? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non debeant aliqui voto obligari ad religionis ingressum. Per professionem enim aliquis voto religioni adstringitur. Sed ante professionem conceditur annus probationis, secundum regulam beati Benedicti, et secundum statutum Innocentii IV, qui etiam prohibuit, ante annum probationis completum, eos per professionem religioni ad-

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to be bound by vow to enter religion. For in making his profession a man is bound by the religious vow. Now before profession a year of probation is allowed, according to the rule of the Blessed Benedict (lviii) and according to the decree of Innocent IV who moreover forbade anyone to be bound to the religious life by profession before completing the year

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stringi. Ergo videtur quod multo minus adhuc in saeculo of probation. Therefore it would seem that much less ought existentes debeant voto ad religionem obligari. anyone while yet in the world to be bound by vow to enter religion. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in registro, et habetur Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 15): Jews in decretis, dist. XLV, quod Iudaei, non vi, sed libera should be persuaded to be converted, not by compulsion but voluntate ut convertantur suadendi sunt. Sed implere id of their own free will (Dist. xlv, can. De Judaeis). Now one is quod vovetur, necessitatis est. Ergo non sunt aliqui obli- compelled to fulfill what one has vowed. Therefore no one gandi ad religionis ingressum. should be bound by vow to enter religion. Praeterea, nullus debet alteri praebere occasioObj. 3: Further, no one should give another an occasion nem ruinae, unde Exod. XXI dicitur, si quis aperuerit of falling; wherefore it is written (Exod 21:33, 34): If a man cisternam, cecideritque bos vel asinus in eam, dominus ci- open a pit . . . and an ox or an ass fall into it, the owner of sternae reddet pretium iumentorum. Sed ex hoc quod ali- the pit shall pay the price of the beasts. Now through being qui obligantur ad religionem per votum, frequenter ali- bound by vow to enter religion it often happens that people qui ruunt in desperationem et in diversa peccata. Ergo fall into despair and various sins. Therefore it would seem videtur quod non sint aliqui ad religionis ingressum vo- that one ought not to be bound by vow to enter religion. to obligandi. Sed contra est quod in Psalmo dicitur, vovete, et On the contrary, It is written, (Ps 75:12): Vow ye, reddite domino Deo vestro, ubi dicit Glossa quod quae- and pay to the Lord your God; and a gloss of Augustine dam sunt vota propria singulorum, ut castitas, virginitas says that some vows concern the individual, such as vows of et huiusmodi, ad haec ergo vovenda nos invitat. Sed Scrip- chastity, virginity, and the like. Consequently Holy Scripture tura sacra non invitat nisi ad id quod est melius. Ergo invites us to vow these things. But Holy Scripture invites us melius est quod aliquis voto se obliget ad religionis in- only to that which is better. Therefore it is better to bind gressum. oneself by vow to enter religion. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, I answer that, As stated above (Q. 88, A. 6), when we cum de voto ageretur, unum et idem opus ex voto factum were treating of vows, one and the same work done in fulfilest laudabilius quam si sine voto fiat. Tum quia vovere est ment of a vow is more praiseworthy than if it be done apart actus religionis, quae habet quandam excellentiam inter from a vow, both because to vow is an act of religion, which virtutes. Tum quia per votum firmatur voluntas hominis has a certain pre-eminence among the virtues, and because ad bonum faciendum, et sicut peccatum est gravius ex a vow strengthens a man’s will to do good; and just as a sin is hoc quod procedit ex voluntate obstinata in malum, ita more grievous through proceeding from a will obstinate in bonum opus est laudabilius ex hoc quod procedit ex vo- evil, so a good work is the more praiseworthy through proluntate confirmata in bonum per votum. Et ideo obligari ceeding from a will confirmed in good by means of a vow. voto ad religionis ingressum est secundum se laudabile. Therefore it is in itself praiseworthy to bind oneself by vow to enter religion. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod duplex est religioReply Obj. 1: The religious vow is twofold. One is the nis votum. Unum solemne, quod hominem facit mona- solemn vow which makes a man a monk or a brother in chum vel alterius religionis fratrem, quod vocatur pro- some other religious order. This is called the profession, and fessio. Et tale votum debet praecedere annus probationis, such a vow should be preceded by a year’s probation, as the ut probat obiectio. Aliud autem est votum simplex, ex objection proves. The other is the simple vow which does quo aliquis non fit monachus vel religiosus, sed solum not make a man a monk or a religious, but only binds him obligatus ad religionis ingressum. Et ante tale votum non to enter religion, and such a vow need not be preceded by a oportet praecedere probationis annum. year’s probation. Ad secundum dicendum quod auctoritas illa GreReply Obj. 2: The words quoted from Gregory must be gorii intelligitur de violentia absoluta. Necessitas autem understood as referring to absolute violence. But the comquae ex obligatione voti requiritur, non est necessitas ab- pulsion arising from the obligation of a vow is not absolute soluta, sed necessitas ex fine, quia scilicet, post votum, necessity, but a necessity of end, because after such a vow non potest aliquis finem salutis consequi nisi impleat vo- one cannot attain to the end of salvation unless one fulfill tum. Talis autem necessitas non est vitanda, quinimmo, that vow. Such a necessity is not to be avoided; indeed, as ut Augustinus dicit, ad Armentarium et Paulinam, felix Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Armentar. et Paulin.), happy est necessitas quae ad meliora transmittit. is the necessity that compels us to better things. Ad tertium dicendum quod vovere religionis inReply Obj. 3: The vow to enter religion is a strengthengressum est quaedam confirmatio voluntatis ad meliora. ing of the will for better things, and consequently, considEt ideo, quantum est de se, non dat homini occasionem ered in itself, instead of giving a man an occasion of falling, ruinae, sed magis subtrahit. Sed si aliquis voti transgres- withdraws him from it. But if one who breaks a vow falls

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sor gravius ruat, hoc non derogat bonitati voti, sicut nec more grievously, this does not derogate from the goodness derogat bonitati Baptismi quod aliqui post Baptismum of the vow, as neither does it derogate from the goodness gravius peccant. of Baptism that some sin more grievously after being baptized.

Article 3 Whether one who is bound by a vow to enter religion is under an obligation of entering religion? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ille qui obligatus est voto ad religionis ingressum, non teneatur intrare. Dicitur enim in decretis, XVII, qu. II, Consaldus presbyter, quondam infirmitatis passione pressus, monachum se fieri promisit, non tamen monasterio aut abbati se tradidit, nec promissionem scripsit, sed beneficium Ecclesiae in manu advocati refutavit, ac postquam convaluit, monachum se negavit fieri. Et postea subdit, iudicamus ut praefatus presbyter beneficium et altaria recipiat et quiete retineat. Hoc autem non esset, si teneretur religionem intrare. Ergo videtur quod non teneatur aliquis implere votum quo se ad religionis ingressum obligavit.

Objection 1: It would seem that one who is bound by the vow to enter religion is not under an obligation of entering religion. For it is said in the Decretals (XVII, qu. ii, can. Consaldus): Consaldus, a priest under pressure of sickness and emotional fervour, promised to become a monk. He did not, however, bind himself to a monastery or abbot; nor did he commit his promise to writing, but he renounced his benefice in the hands of a notary; and when he was restored to health he refused to become a monk. And afterwards it is added: We adjudge and by apostolic authority we command that the aforesaid priest be admitted to his benefice and sacred duties, and that he be allowed to retain them in peace. Now this would not be if he were bound to enter religion. Therefore it would seem that one is not bound to keep one’s vow of entering religion. Praeterea, nullus tenetur facere id quod non est Obj. 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is not in his in sua potestate. Sed quod aliquis religionem ingredia- power. Now it is not in a person’s power to enter religion, tur, non est in potestate ipsius, sed requiritur ad hoc as- since this depends on the consent of those whom he wishes sensus eorum ad quos debet transire. Ergo videtur quod to join. Therefore it would seem that a man is not obliged to non teneatur aliquis implere votum quo se ad religionis fulfill the vow by which he bound himself to enter religion.

ingressum obligavit. Praeterea, per votum minus utile non potest derogari voto magis utili. Sed per impletionem voti religionis impediri posset impletio voti crucis in subsidium terrae sanctae, quod videtur esse utilius, quia per hoc votum consequitur homo remissionem peccatorum. Ergo videtur quod votum quo quis se obligavit ad religionis ingressum, non sit ex necessitate implendum. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccle. V, si quid vovisti Deo, ne moreris reddere, displicet enim Deo infidelis et stulta promissio. Et super illud Psalmi, vovete et reddite domino Deo vestro, dicit Glossa, vovere voluntati consulitur, sed post voti promissionem, redditio necessario exigitur. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de voto ageretur, votum est promissio Deo facta de his quae ad Deum pertinent. Ut autem Gregorius dicit, in epistola ad Bonifacium, si inter homines solent bonae fidei contractus nulla ratione dissolvi, quanto magis ista pollicitatio quam cum Deo pepigit, solvi sine vindicta non poterit. Et ideo ad implendum id quod homo vovit, ex necessitate tenetur, dummodo sit aliquid quod ad Deum pertineat.

Obj. 3: Further, a less useful vow cannot remit a more useful one. Now the fulfilment of a vow to enter religion might hinder the fulfilment of a vow to take up the cross in defense of the Holy Land; and the latter apparently is the more useful vow, since thereby a man obtains the forgiveness of his sins. Therefore it would seem that the vow by which a man has bound himself to enter religion is not necessarily to be fulfilled. On the contrary, It is written (Eccl 5:3): If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him; and a gloss on Ps. 75:12, Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God, says: To vow depends on the will: but after the vow has been taken the fulfilment is of obligation. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 88, A. 1), when we were treating of vows, a vow is a promise made to God in matters concerning God. Now, as Gregory says in a letter to Boniface: If among men of good faith contracts are wont to be absolutely irrevocable, how much more shall the breaking of this promise given to God be deserving of punishment! Therefore a man is under an obligation to fulfill what he has vowed, provided this be something pertaining to God.

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Manifestum est autem quod ingressus religionis maxime ad Deum pertinet, quia per hoc homo totaliter se mancipat divinis obsequiis, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde relinquitur quod ille qui se obligat ad religionis ingressum, teneatur religionem ingredi, secundum quod se voto obligare intendit, ita scilicet quod, si intendit se absolute obligare, tenetur quam citius poterit ingredi, legitimo impedimento cessante; si autem ad certum tempus, vel sub certa conditione, tenetur religionem ingredi tempore adveniente, vel conditione existente. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille presbyter non fecerat votum solemne, sed simplex. Unde non erat monachus effectus, ut cogi deberet de iure in monasterio remanere et Ecclesiam dimittere. Tamen in foro conscientiae esset sibi consulendum quod, omnibus dimissis, religionem intraret. Unde extra, de voto et voti Redempt., cap. per tuas, consulitur episcopo Gratianopolitano, qui post votum religionis episcopatum assumpserat, voto non impleto, ut, si suam sanare desideraret conscientiam, regimen Ecclesiae resignaret, et redderet altissimo vota sua. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de voto ageretur, ille qui se voto obligavit ad certae religionis ingressum, tenetur facere quantum in se est ut in illa religione recipiatur. Et si quidem intendit se simpliciter ad religionem obligare, si non recipitur in una religione, tenetur ire ad aliam. Si vero intendit se obligare specialiter ad unam solum, non tenetur nisi secundum modum suae obligationis. Ad tertium dicendum quod votum religionis, cum sit perpetuum, est maius quam votum peregrinationis terrae sanctae, quod est temporale. Et sicut Alexander III dicit, et habetur extra, de voto et voti Redempt., reus fracti voti aliquatenus non habetur qui temporale obsequium in perpetuam noscitur religionis observantiam commutare. Rationabiliter autem dici potest quod etiam per ingressum religionis aliquis consequatur remissionem omnium peccatorum. Si enim aliquibus eleemosynis factis homo potest statim satisfacere de peccatis suis, secundum illud Dan. IV, peccata tua eleemosynis redime; multo magis in satisfactionem pro omnibus peccatis sufficit quod aliquis se totaliter divinis obsequiis mancipet per religionis ingressum, quae excedit omne genus satisfactionis, etiam publicae poenitentiae, ut habetur in decretis, XXXIII Caus., qu. II, cap. admonere; sicut etiam holocaustum excedit sacrificium, ut Gregorius dicit, super Ezech. Unde in vitis patrum legitur quod eandem gratiam consequuntur religionem ingredientes quam consequuntur baptizati. Si tamen non absolverentur per hoc ab omni reatu poenae, nihilominus ingressus religionis

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Now it is evident that entrance into religion pertains very much to God, since thereby man devotes himself entirely to the divine service, as stated above (Q. 186, A. 1). Hence it follows that he who binds himself to enter religion is under an obligation to enter religion according as he intends to bind himself by his vow: so that if he intend to bind himself absolutely, he is obliged to enter as soon as he can, through the cessation of a lawful impediment; whereas if he intend to bind himself to a certain fixed time, or under a certain fixed condition, he is bound to enter religion when the time comes or the condition is fulfilled. Reply Obj. 1: This priest had made, not a solemn, but a simple vow. Hence he was not a monk in effect, so as to be bound by law to dwell in a monastery and renounce his cure. However, in the court of conscience one ought to advise him to renounce all and enter religion. Hence (Extra, De Voto et Voti Redemptione, cap. Per tuas) the Bishop of Grenoble, who had accepted the episcopate after vowing to enter religion, without having fulfilled his vow, is counseled that if he wish to heal his conscience he should renounce the government of his see and pay his vows to the Most High. Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 88, A. 3, ad 2), when we were treating of vows, he who has bound himself by vow to enter a certain religious order is bound to do what is in his power in order to be received in that order; and if he intend to bind himself simply to enter the religious life, if he be not admitted to one, he is bound to go to another; whereas if he intend to bind himself only to one particular order, he is bound only according to the measure of the obligation to which he has engaged himself. Reply Obj. 3: The vow to enter religion being perpetual is greater than the vow of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, which is a temporal vow; and as Alexander III says (Extra, De Voto et Voti Redemptione, cap. Scripturae), he who exchanges a temporary service for the perpetual service of religion is in no way guilty of breaking his vow. Moreover it may be reasonably stated that also by entrance into religion a man obtains remission of all his sins. For if by giving alms a man may forthwith satisfy for his sins, according to Dan. 4:24, Redeem thou thy sins with alms, much more does it suffice to satisfy for all his sins that a man devote himself wholly to the divine service by entering religion, for this surpasses all manner of satisfaction, even that of public penance, according to the Decretals (XXXIII, qu. i, cap. Admonere) just as a holocaust exceeds a sacrifice, as Gregory declares (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Hence we read in the Lives of the Fathers (vi, 1) that by entering religion one receives the same grace as by being baptized. And yet even if one were not thereby absolved from all debt of punishment, nevertheless the entrance into religion is more profitable than a pilgrimage to the Holy Land,

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utilior est quam peregrinatio terrae sanctae quantum ad as regards the advancement in good, which is preferable to promotionem in bonum, quae praeponderat absolutioni absolution from punishment. a poena.

Article 4 Whether he who has vowed to enter religion is bound to remain in religion in perpetuity? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ille qui vovet religionem ingredi, teneatur perpetuo in religione permanere. Melius est enim religionem non ingredi quam post ingressum exire, secundum illud II Pet. II, melius erat illis veritatem non cognoscere quam post agnitam retroire. Et Luc. IX dicitur, nemo mittens manum ad aratrum et aspiciens retro, aptus est regno Dei. Sed ille qui voto se obligavit ad religionis ingressum, tenetur ingredi, ut dictum est. Ergo etiam tenetur perpetuo remanere. Praeterea, quilibet debet vitare id ex quo scandalum sequitur et aliis datur malum exemplum. Sed ex hoc quod aliquis, post religionis ingressum, egreditur et ad saeculum redit, malum exemplum et scandalum aliis generatur, qui retrahuntur ab ingressu et provocantur ad exitum. Ergo videtur quod ille qui ingreditur religionem ut votum impleat quod prius fecit, teneatur ibi perpetuo remanere. Praeterea, votum religionis reputatur votum perpetuum, et ideo temporalibus votis praefertur, ut dictum est. Hoc autem non esset, si aliquis, voto religionis emisso, ingrederetur cum proposito exeundi. Videtur ergo quod ille qui vovet religionis ingressum, teneatur in religione etiam perpetuo remanere. Sed contra est, quia votum professionis, propter hoc quod obligat hominem ad hoc quod perpetuo in religione remaneat, praeexigit annum probationis, qui non praeexigitur ad votum simplex quo aliquis se obligat ad religionis ingressum. Ergo videtur quod ille qui vovet religionem intrare, propter hoc non teneatur ibi perpetuo remanere. Respondeo dicendum quod obligatio voti ex voluntate procedit, nam vovere voluntatis est, ut Augustinus dicit. In tantum ergo fertur obligatio voti in quantum se extendit voluntas et intentio voventis. Si igitur vovens intendit se obligare non solum ad ingressum religionis, sed ad perpetuo remanendum, tenetur perpetuo remanere. Si autem intendit se obligare ad ingressum religionis causa experiendi, cum libertate remanendi vel non remanendi, manifestum est quod remanere non tenetur. Si vero in vovendo simpliciter de ingressu religionis cogitavit, absque hoc quod cogitaret de libertate exitus vel de perpetuitate remanendi, videtur obligari ad ingres-

Objection 1: It would seem that he who has vowed to enter religion, is bound in perpetuity to remain in religion. For it is better not to enter religion than to leave after entering, according to 2 Pet. 2:21, It had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it to turn back, and Luke 9:62, No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God. But he who bound himself by the vow to enter religion, is under the obligation to enter, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore he is also bound to remain for always. Obj. 2: Further, everyone is bound to avoid that which gives rise to scandal, and is a bad example to others. Now by leaving after entering religion a man gives a bad example and is an occasion of scandal to others, who are thereby withdrawn from entering or incited to leave. Therefore it seems that he who enters religion in order to fulfill a vow which he had previously taken, is bound to remain evermore. Obj. 3: Further, the vow to enter religion is accounted a perpetual vow: wherefore it is preferred to temporal vows, as stated above (A. 3, ad 3; Q. 88, A. 12, ad 1). But this would not be so if a person after vowing to enter religion were to enter with the intention of leaving. It seems, therefore, that he who vows to enter religion is bound also to remain in perpetuity. On the contrary, The vow of religious profession, for the reason that it binds a man to remain in religion for evermore, has to be preceded by a year of probation; whereas this is not required before the simple vow whereby a man binds himself to enter religion. Therefore it seems that he who vows to enter religion is not for that reason bound to remain there in perpetuity. I answer that, The obligation of a vow proceeds from the will: because to vow is an act of the will according to Augustine. Consequently the obligation of a vow extends as far as the will and intention of the person who takes the vow. Accordingly if in vowing he intend to bind himself not only to enter religion, but also to remain there evermore, he is bound to remain in perpetuity. If, on the other hand, he intend to bind himself to enter religion for the purpose of trial, while retaining the freedom to remain or not remain, it is clear that he is not bound to remain. If, however, in vowing he thought merely of entering religion, without thinking of being free to leave, or of remaining in perpetu-

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sum secundum formam iuris communis, quae est ut in- ity, it would seem that he is bound to enter religion accordgredientibus detur probationis annus. Unde non tenetur ing to the form prescribed by common law, which is that perpetuo in religione remanere. those who enter should be given a year’s probation. Wherefore he is not bound to remain for ever. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod melius est intrare Reply Obj. 1: It is better to enter religion with the purreligionem animo probandi, quam penitus non intrare, pose of making a trial than not to enter at all, because by quia per hoc disponitur ad perpetuo remanendum. Nec so doing one disposes oneself to remain always. Nor is a tamen intelligitur aliquis retro ire vel aspicere, nisi quan- person accounted to turn or to look back, save when he do praetermittit id ad quod se obligavit. Alioquin qui- omits to do that which he engaged to do: else whoever does cumque per aliquod tempus facit aliquod bonum opus, a good work for a time, would be unfit for the kingdom of si non semper id faciat, esset ineptus regno Dei, quod pa- God, unless he did it always, which is evidently false. tet esse falsum. Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui religionem Reply Obj. 2: A man who has entered religion gives ingreditur, si exeat, praesertim ex aliqua rationabili cau- neither scandal nor bad example by leaving, especially if he sa, non generat scandalum nec dat malum exemplum. Et do so for a reasonable motive; and if others are scandalsi alius scandalizatur, erit scandalum passivum ex parte ized, it will be passive scandal on their part, and not active eius, non autem scandalum activum ex parte exeuntis, scandal on the part of the person leaving, since in doing quia fecit quod licitum erat ei facere, et quod expedie- so, he has done what was lawful, and expedient on account bat propter rationabilem causam, puta infirmitatem aut of some reasonable motive, such as sickness, weakness, and debilitatem aut aliquid huiusmodi. the like. Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui intrat ut staReply Obj. 3: He who enters with the purpose of leavtim exeat, non videtur satisfacere voto suo, quia ipse in ing forthwith, does not seem to fulfill his vow, since this vovendo hoc non intendit. Et ideo tenetur mutare pro- was not his intention in vowing. Hence he must change that positum, ut saltem velit experiri an ei expediat in religio- purpose, at least so as to wish to try whether it is good for ne remanere. Non autem tenetur ad perpetuo remanen- him to remain in religion, but he is not bound to remain for dum. evermore.

Article 5 Whether children should be received in religion? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pueri non sint recipiendi in religione. Quia extra, de regularibus et Transeunt. ad Relig., dicitur, nullus tondeatur, nisi legitima aetate et spontanea voluntate. Sed pueri non videntur habere legitimam aetatem nec spontaneam voluntatem, quia non habent perfecte usum rationis. Ergo videtur quod non sint in religione recipiendi. Praeterea, status religionis videtur esse status poenitentiae, unde et religio dicitur a religando vel reeligendo, ut Augustinus dicit, X de Civ. Dei. Sed pueris non convenit poenitentia. Ergo videtur quod non debeant religionem intrare. Praeterea, sicut aliquis obligatur iuramento, ita et voto. Sed pueri, ante annos quatuordecim, non debent obligari iuramento, ut habetur in decretis, XXII Caus., qu. V, cap. pueri, et cap. honestum. Ergo videtur quod nec etiam sint voto obligandi. Praeterea, illicitum videtur esse obligare aliquem tali obligatione quae posset iuste irritari. Sed si aliqui impuberes obligant se religioni, possunt retrahi a parentibus vel tutoribus, dicitur enim in decretis, XX Caus., qu.

Objection 1: It would seem that children ought not to be received in religion. Because it is said (Extra, De Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Nullus): No one should be tonsured unless he be of legal age and willing. But children, seemingly, are not of legal age; nor have they a will of their own, not having perfect use of reason. Therefore it seems that they ought not to be received in religion. Obj. 2: Further, the state of religion would seem to be a state of repentance; wherefore religion is derived from religare (to bind) or from re-eligere (to choose again), as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 3 ). But repentance does not become children. Therefore it seems that they should not enter religion. Obj. 3: Further, the obligation of a vow is like that of an oath. But children under the age of fourteen ought not to be bound by oath (Decret. XXII, qu. v, cap. Pueri and cap. Honestum.). Therefore it would seem that neither should they be bound by vow. Obj. 4: Further, it is seemingly unlawful to bind a person to an obligation that can be justly canceled. Now if any persons of unripe age bind themselves to religion, they can be withdrawn by their parents or guardians. For it is writ-

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II, quod puella si ante duodecim aetatis annos sponte sua sacrum velamen assumpserit, possunt statim parentes eius vel tutores id factum irritum facere, si voluerint. Illicitum est ergo pueros, praesertim ante pubertatis annos, ad religionem recipere vel obligare. Sed contra est quod dominus, Matth. XIX, dicit, sinite parvulos, et nolite eos prohibere venire ad me. Quod exponens Origenes, super Matth., dicit quod discipuli Iesu, priusquam discant rationem iustitiae, reprehendunt eos qui pueros et infantes offerunt Christo, dominus autem exhortatur discipulos suos condescendere utilitatibus puerorum. Hoc ergo attendere debemus, ne, aestimatione sapientiae excellentioris, contemnamus, quasi magni, pusillos Ecclesiae, prohibentes pueros venire ad Iesum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex est religionis votum. Unum simplex, quod consistit in sola promissione Deo facta, quae ex interiori mentis deliberatione procedit. Et hoc votum habet efficaciam ex iure divino. Quae tamen dupliciter tolli potest. Uno modo, per defectum deliberationis, ut patet in furiosis, quorum vota non sunt obligatoria, ut habetur extra, de regularibus et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. sicut tenor. Et eadem est ratio de pueris qui nondum habent debitum usum rationis, per quem sunt doli capaces, quem quidem pueri habent, ut frequentius, circa quartumdecimum annum, puellae vero circa duodecimum, qui dicuntur anni pubertatis. In quibusdam tamen anticipatur, et in quibusdam tardatur, secundum diversam dispositionem naturae. Alio modo impeditur efficacia simplicis voti, si aliquis Deo voveat quod non est propriae potestatis, puta si servus, etiam usum rationis habens, voveat se religionem intrare, aut etiam ordinetur, ignorante domino; potest enim hoc dominus revocare, ut habetur in decretis, dist. LIV, cap. si servus. Et quia puer vel puella, infra pubertatis annos, naturaliter sunt in potestate patris quantum ad dispositionem suae vitae, poterit pater votum eorum revocare vel acceptare, si sibi placuerit, ut expresse dicitur de muliere, Num. XXX. Sic igitur si puer, ante annos pubertatis, simplex votum emittat, antequam habeat plenum usum rationis, non obligatur ex voto. Si autem habeat usum rationis ante annos pubertatis, obligatur quidem quantum in se est, ex suo voto, tamen potest obligatio removeri per auctoritatem patris, in cuius potestate adhuc existit; quia ordinatio legis, qua unus homo subditur alteri, respicit id quod in pluribus accidit. Si vero annos pubertatis excedat, non potest revocari auctoritate parentum; si tamen nondum haberet plenum usum rationis, non obligaretur quoad Deum. Aliud autem est votum solemne, quod facit monachum vel religiosum. Quod quidem subditur ordinationi

Q. 189, A. 5

ten in the Decretals (XX, qu. ii, can. Puella) that if a maid under twelve years of age shall take the sacred veil of her own accord, her parents or guardians, if they choose, can at once declare the deed null and void. It is therefore unlawful for children, especially of unripe age, to be admitted or bound to religion. On the contrary, our Lord said (Matt 19:14): Suffer the little children, and forbid them not to come to Me. Expounding these words Origen says (Tract. vii in Matth.) that the disciples of Jesus before they have been taught the conditions of righteousness, rebuke those who offer children and babes to Christ: but our Lord urges His disciples to stoop to the service of children. We must therefore take note of this, lest deeming ourselves to excel in wisdom we despise the Church’s little ones, as though we were great, and forbid the children to come to Jesus. I answer that, As stated above (A. 2, ad 1), the religious vow is twofold. One is the simple vow consisting in a mere promise made to God, and proceeding from the interior deliberation of the mind. Such a vow derives its efficacy from the divine law. Nevertheless it may encounter a twofold obstacle. First, through lack of deliberation, as in the case of the insane, whose vows are not binding. The same applies to children who have not reached the required use of reason, so as to be capable of guile, which use boys attain, as a rule, at about the age of fourteen, and girls at the age of twelve, this being what is called the age of puberty, although in some it comes earlier and in others it is delayed, according to the various dispositions of nature. Second, the efficacy of a simple vow encounters an obstacle, if the person who makes a vow to God is not his own master; for instance, if a slave, though having the use of reason, vows to enter religion, or even is ordained, without the knowledge of his master: for his master can annul this, as stated in the Decretals (Dist. LIV, cap. Si servus). And since boys and girls under the age of puberty are naturally in their father’s power as regards the disposal of their manner of life, their father may either cancel or approve their vow, if it please him to do so, as it is expressly said with regard to a woman (Num 30:4). Accordingly if before reaching the age of puberty a child makes a simple vow, not yet having full use of reason, he is not bound in virtue of the vow; but if he has the use of reason before reaching the age of puberty, he is bound, so far as he is concerned, by his vow; yet this obligation may be removed by his father’s authority, under whose control he still remains, because the ordinance of the law whereby one man is subject to another considers what happens in the majority of cases. If, however, the child has passed the age of puberty, his vow cannot be annulled by the authority of his parents; though if he has not the full use of reason, he would not be bound in the sight of God. The other is the solemn vow which makes a man a monk or a religious. Such a vow is subject to the ordinance of the

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Ecclesiae, propter solemnitatem quam habet annexam. Et quia Ecclesia respicit id quod in pluribus est, professio ante tempus pubertatis facta, quantumcumque aliquis habeat usum rationis plenum, ut sit doli capax, non habet suum effectum, ut faciat profitentem esse iam religiosum. Et tamen, licet ante annos pubertatis profiteri non possint, possunt tamen, cum voluntate parentum, in religione recipi ut nutriantur ibidem, sicut de Ioanne Baptista legitur, Luc. I, quod puer crescebat, et confortabatur spiritu, et erat in desertis. Unde, sicut Gregorius dicit, in II Dialog., beato Benedicto Romani nobiles suos filios omnipotenti Deo nutriendos dare coeperunt. Quod est valde expediens, secundum illud Thren. III, bonum est viro cum portaverit iugum ab adolescentia sua. Unde ex communi consuetudine pueri applicantur illis officiis vel artibus in quibus sunt vitam acturi. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod legitima aetas ad hoc quod aliquis tondeatur cum voto solemni religionis, est tempus pubertatis, in quo homo potest uti spontanea voluntate. Sed ante annos pubertatis potest esse legitima aetas ad hoc quod aliquis tondeatur in religione nutriendus. Ad secundum dicendum quod religionis status principaliter ordinatur ad perfectionem consequendam, ut supra habitum est. Et secundum hoc, convenit pueris, qui de facili imbuuntur. Ex consequenti autem dicitur esse status poenitentiae, inquantum per observantiam religionis peccatorum occasiones tolluntur, ut supra dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod pueri, sicut non coguntur ad iurandum, ut canon dicit, ita non coguntur ad vovendum. Si tamen voto vel iuramento se adstrinxerint ad aliquid faciendum, obligantur quoad Deum, si habeant usum rationis, licet non obligentur quoad Ecclesiam ante quatuordecim annos. Ad quartum dicendum quod Num. XXX non reprehenditur mulier in puellari aetate constituta, si voveat absque consensu parentum, potest tamen revocari a parentibus. Ex quo patet quod non peccat vovendo, sed intelligitur se voto obligare quantum in se est, absque praeiudicio auctoritatis paternae.

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Church, on account of the solemnity attached to it. And since the Church considers what happens in the majority of cases, a profession made before the age of puberty, however much the person who makes profession may have the use of reason, or be capable of guile, does not take effect so as to make him a religious (Extra, De Regular., etc., cap. Significatum est). Nevertheless, although they cannot be professed before the age of puberty, they can, with the consent of their parents, be received into religion to be educated there: thus it is related of John the Baptist (Luke 1:80) that the child grew and was strengthened in spirit, and was in the deserts. Hence, as Gregory states (Dial. ii, 3), the Roman nobles began to give their sons to the blessed Benedict to be nurtured for Almighty God; and this is most fitting, according to Lam. 3:27, It is good for a man when he has borne the yoke from his youth. It is for this reason that by common custom children are made to apply themselves to those duties or arts with which they are to pass their lives. Reply Obj. 1: The legal age for receiving the tonsure and taking the solemn vow of religion is the age of puberty, when a man is able to make use of his own will; but before the age of puberty it is possible to have reached the lawful age to receive the tonsure and be educated in a religious house. Reply Obj. 2: The religious state is chiefly directed to the attachment of perfection, as stated above (Q. 186, A. 1, ad 4); and accordingly it is becoming to children, who are easily drawn to it. But as a consequence it is called a state of repentance, inasmuch as occasions of sin are removed by religious observances, as stated above (Q. 186, A. 1, ad 4). Reply Obj. 3: Even as children are not bound to take oaths (as the canon states), so are they not bound to take vows. If, however, they bind themselves by vow or oath to do something, they are bound in God’s sight, if they have the use of reason, but they are not bound in the sight of the Church before reaching the age of fourteen. Reply Obj. 4: A woman who has not reached the age of puberty is not rebuked (Num 30:4) for taking a vow without her parents’ consent: but the vow can be made void by her parents. Hence it is evident that she does not sin in vowing. But we are given to understand that she binds herself by vow, so far as she may, without prejudice to her parents’ authority.

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Entrance into Religious Life

Q. 189, A. 6

Article 6 Whether one ought to be withdrawn from entering religion through deference to one’s parents? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod propter obsequium parentum debeant aliqui retrahi ab ingressu religionis. Non enim licet praetermittere id quod est necessitatis, ut fiat id quod est liberum voluntati. Sed obsequi parentibus cadit sub necessitate praecepti quod datur de honoratione parentum, Exod. XX, unde et apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. V, si qua vidua filios aut nepotes habet, discat primum domum suam regere, et mutuam vicem reddere parentibus. Ingredi autem religionem est liberum voluntati. Ergo videtur quod non debeat aliquis praetermittere parentum obsequium propter religionis ingressum. Praeterea, maior videtur esse subiectio filii ad parentes quam servi ad dominum, quia filiatio est naturalis; servitus autem ex maledictione peccati, ut patet Gen. IX. Sed servus non potest praetermittere obsequium domini sui ut religionem ingrediatur aut sacrum ordinem assumat, sicut habetur in decretis, dist. LIV, si servus. Ergo multo minus filius potest obsequium patris praetermittere ut ingrediatur religionem. Praeterea, maiori debito obligatur aliquis parentibus quam his quibus debet pecuniam. Sed illi qui debent pecuniam aliquibus, non possunt religionem ingredi, dicit enim Gregorius, in Regist., et habetur in decretis, dist. LIII, quod si hi qui sunt rationibus publicis obligati, quandoque monasterium petunt, nullo modo suscipiendi sunt, nisi prius a negotiis publicis fuerint absoluti. Ergo videtur quod multo minus filii possunt religionem ingredi, praetermisso paterno obsequio. Sed contra est quod Matth. IV dicitur quod Iacobus et Ioannes, relictis retibus et patre, secuti sunt dominum. Ex quo, ut Hilarius dicit, docemur, Christum secuturi, et saecularis vitae sollicitudine et paternae domus consuetudine non teneri. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de pietate ageretur, parentes habent rationem principii, inquantum huiusmodi, et ideo per se eis convenit ut filiorum curam habeant. Et propter hoc, non liceret alicui filios habenti religionem ingredi, omnino praetermissa cura filiorum idest, non proviso qualiter educari possint, dicitur enim I ad Tim. V, quod si quis suorum curam non habet, fidem negavit, et est infideli deterior. Per accidens tamen parentibus convenit ut a filiis adiuventur, inquantum scilicet sunt in necessitate aliqua constituti. Et ideo dicendum est quod, parentibus in necessitate existentibus ita quod eis commode aliter quam per obsequium filiorum subveniri non possit, non licet filiis, praetermisso parentum obsequio, religionem intrare. Si vero non sint in tali necessitate ut filiorum

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought to be withdrawn from entering religion through deference to one’s parents. For it is not lawful to omit that which is of obligation in order to do that which is optional. Now deference to one’s parents comes under an obligation of the precept concerning the honoring of our parents (Exod 20:12); wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim 5:4): If any widow have children or grandchildren, let her learn first to govern her own house, and to make a return of duty to her parents. But the entrance to religion is optional. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to omit deference to one’s parents for the sake of entering religion. Obj. 2: Further, seemingly the subjection of a son to his father is greater than that of a slave to his master, since sonship is natural, while slavery results from the curse of sin, as appears from Gen. 9:25. Now a slave cannot set aside the service of his master in order to enter religion or take holy orders, as stated in the Decretals (Dist. LIV, cap. Si servus). Much less therefore can a son set aside the deference due to his father in order to enter religion. Obj. 3: Further, a man is more indebted to his parents than to those to whom he owes money. Now persons who owe money to anyone cannot enter religion. For Gregory says (Regist. viii, Ep. 5) that those who are engaged in trade must by no means be admitted into a monastery, when they seek admittance, unless first of all they withdraw from public business (Dist. liii, can. Legem). Therefore seemingly much less may children enter religion in despite of their duty to their parents. On the contrary, It is related (Matt 4:22) that James and John left their nets and father, and followed our Lord. By this, says Hilary (Can. iii in Matth.), we learn that we who intend to follow Christ are not bound by the cares of the secular life, and by the ties of home. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 101, A. 2, ad 2) when we were treating of piety, parents as such have the character of a principle, wherefore it is competent to them as such to have the care of their children. Hence it is unlawful for a person having children to enter religion so as altogether to set aside the care for their children, namely without providing for their education. For it is written (1 Tim 5:8) that if any man have not care of his own . . . he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel. Nevertheless it is accidentally competent to parents to be assisted by their children, in so far, to wit, as they are placed in a condition of necessity. Consequently we must say that when their parents are in such need that they cannot fittingly be supported otherwise than by the help of their children, these latter may not lawfully enter religion in despite of their duty to their parents. If, however, the par-

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obsequio multum indigeant, possunt, praetermisso parentum obsequio, filii religionem intrare, etiam contra praeceptum parentum, quia post annos pubertatis, quilibet ingenuus libertatem habet quantum ad ea quae pertinent ad dispositionem sui status, praesertim in his quae sunt divini obsequii; et magis est obtemperandum patri spirituum, ut vivamus, quam parentibus carnis, ut apostolus, Heb. XII, dicit. Unde dominus, ut legitur Matth. VIII et Luc. IX, reprehendit discipulum qui nolebat eum statim sequi intuitu paternae sepulturae, erant enim alii per quos illud opus impleri poterat, ut Chrysostomus dicit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praeceptum de honoratione parentum non solum se extendit ad corporalia obsequia, sed etiam ad spiritualia, et ad reverentiam exhibendam. Et ideo etiam illi qui sunt in religione implere possunt praeceptum de honoratione parentum, pro eis orando, et eis reverentiam et auxilium impendendo, secundum quod religiosos decet. Quia etiam illi qui in saeculo vivunt, diversimode parentes honorant, secundum eorum conditionem. Ad secundum dicendum quod, quia servitus est in poenam peccati inducta, ideo per servitutem aliquid adimitur homini quod alias ei competeret, ne scilicet libere de sua persona possit disponere, servus enim id quod est, domini est. Sed filius non patitur detrimentum ex hoc quod subiectus est patri, quin possit de sua persona libere disponere transferendo se ad obsequium Dei, quod maxime pertinet ad hominis bonum. Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui est obligatus ad aliquid certum, non potest illud licite praetermittere, facultate exstante. Et ideo si aliquis sit obligatus ut alicui rationem ponat, vel ut certum debitum reddat, non potest hoc licite praetermittere ut religionem ingrediatur. Si tamen debeat aliquam pecuniam et non habeat unde reddat, tenetur facere quod potest, ut scilicet cedat bonis suis creditori. Propter pecuniam autem persona liberi hominis, secundum iura civilia, non obligatur, sed solum res, quia persona liberi hominis superat omnem aestimationem pecuniae. Unde potest licite, exhibitis rebus suis, religionem intrare, nec tenetur in saeculo remanere ut procuret unde debitum reddat.

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ents’ necessity be not such as to stand in great need of their children’s assistance, the latter may, in despite of the duty they owe their parents, enter religion even against their parents’ command, because after the age of puberty every freeman enjoys freedom in things concerning the ordering of his state of life, especially in such as belong to the service of God, and we should more obey the Father of spirits that we may live, as says the Apostle (Heb 12:9), than obey our parents. Hence as we read (Matt 8:22; Luke 9:62) our Lord rebuked the disciple who was unwilling to follow him forthwith on account of his father’s burial: for there were others who could see to this, as Chrysostom remarks. Reply Obj. 1: The commandment of honoring our parents extends not only to bodily but also to spiritual service, and to the paying of deference. Hence even those who are in religion can fulfill the commandment of honoring their parents, by praying for them and by revering and assisting them, as becomes religious, since even those who live in the world honor their parents in different ways as befits their condition.

Reply Obj. 2: Since slavery was imposed in punishment of sin, it follows that by slavery man forfeits something which otherwise he would be competent to have, namely the free disposal of his person, for a slave belongs wholly to his master. On the other hand, the son, through being subject to his father, is not hindered from freely disposing of his person by transferring himself to the service of God; which is most conducive to man’s good. Reply Obj. 3: He who is under a certain fixed obligation cannot lawfully set it aside so long as he is able to fulfill it. Wherefore if a person is under an obligation to give an account to someone or to pay a certain fixed debt, he cannot lawfully evade this obligation in order to enter religion. If, however, he owes a sum of money, and has not wherewithal to pay the debt, he must do what he can, namely by surrendering his goods to his creditor. According to civil law money lays an obligation not on the person of a freeman, but on his property, because the person of a freeman is above all pecuniary consideration. Hence, after surrendering his property, he may lawfully enter religion, nor is he bound to remain in the world in order to earn the means of paying the debt. Filius autem non tenetur ad aliquod speciale debitum On the other hand, he does not owe his father a spepatri, nisi forte in casu necessitatis, ut dictum est. cial debt, except as may arise in a case of necessity, as stated above.

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Entrance into Religious Life

Q. 189, A. 7

Article 7 Whether parish priests may lawfully enter religion? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod presbyteri curati non possunt licite religionem ingredi. Dicit enim Gregorius, in Pastoral., quod ille qui curam animarum suscipit, terribiliter admonetur cum dicitur, fili mi, si spoponderis pro amico tuo, defixisti apud extraneum manum tuam. Et subdit, spondere namque pro amico est animam alienam in periculo suae conversationis accipere. Sed ille qui obligatur homini pro aliquo debito, non potest intrare religionem nisi solvat id quod debet, si possit. Cum ergo sacerdos possit curam animarum agere, ad quam se obligavit in periculo animae suae, videtur quod non liceat ei, praetermissa cura animarum, religionem intrare. Praeterea, quod uni licet, pari ratione omnibus similibus licet. Sed si omnes presbyteri habentes curam animarum religionem intrarent, remanerent plebes absque cura pastorum, quod esset inconveniens. Ergo videtur quod presbyteri curati non possint licite religionem intrare. Praeterea, inter actus ad quos religiones ordinantur, praecipui sunt illi quibus aliquis contemplata aliis tradit. Huiusmodi autem actus competunt presbyteris curatis et archidiaconis, quibus ex officio competit praedicare et confessiones audire. Ergo videtur quod non liceat presbytero curato vel archidiacono transire ad religionem. Sed contra est quod in decretis, XIX Caus., qu. II, cap. duae sunt leges, dicitur, si quis clericorum in Ecclesia sua sub episcopo populum retinet et saeculariter vivit, si, afflatus spiritu sancto, in aliquo monasterio vel regulari canonica salvari se voluerit, etiam episcopo suo contradicente, eat liber, nostra auctoritate. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, obligatio voti perpetui praefertur omni alii obligationi. Obligari autem voto perpetuo et solemni ad vacandum divinis obsequiis, competit proprie episcopis et religiosis. Presbyteri autem curati et archidiaconi non obligantur voto perpetuo et solemni ad curam animarum retinendam, sicut ad hoc obligantur episcopi. Unde episcopi praesulatum non possunt deserere quacumque occasione, absque auctoritate Romani pontificis, ut habetur extra, de regularibus et Transeuntib. ad Relig., cap. licet, archidiaconi autem et presbyteri curati possunt libere abrenuntiare episcopo curam eis commissam, absque speciali licentia Papae, qui solus potest in votis perpetuis dispensare. Unde manifestum est quod archidiaconis et presbyteris curatis licet ad religionem transire. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod presbyteri curati et archidiaconi obligaverunt se ad curam agendam subditorum quandiu retinent archidiaconatum vel paro-

Objection 1: It would seem that parish priests cannot lawfully enter religion. For Gregory says (Past. iii, 4) that he who undertakes the cure of souls, receives an awful warning in the words: ‘My son, if thou be surety for thy friend, thou hast engaged fast thy hand to a stranger’ (Prov 6:1); and he goes on to say, because to be surety for a friend is to take charge of the soul of another on the surety of one’s own behavior. Now he who is under an obligation to a man for a debt, cannot enter religion, unless he pay what he owes, if he can. Since then a priest is able to fulfill the cure of souls, to which obligation he has pledged his soul, it would seem unlawful for him to lay aside the cure of souls in order to enter religion. Obj. 2: Further, what is lawful to one is likewise lawful to all. But if all priests having cure of souls were to enter religion, the people would be left without a pastor’s care, which would be unfitting. Therefore it seems that parish priests cannot lawfully enter religion. Obj. 3: Further, chief among the acts to which religious orders are directed are those whereby a man gives to others the fruit of his contemplation. Now such acts are competent to parish priests and archdeacons, whom it becomes by virtue of their office to preach and hear confessions. Therefore it would seem unlawful for a parish priest or archdeacon to pass over to religion. On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XIX, qu. ii, cap. Duae sunt leges): If a man, while governing the people in his church under the bishop and leading a secular life, is inspired by the Holy Spirit to desire to work out his salvation in a monastery or under some canonical rule, even though his bishop withstand him, we authorize him to go freely. I answer that, As stated above (A. 3, ad 3; Q. 88, A. 12, ad 1), the obligation of a perpetual vow stands before every other obligation. Now it belongs properly to bishops and religious to be bound by perpetual vow to devote themselves to the divine service, while parish priests and archdeacons are not, as bishops are, bound by a perpetual and solemn vow to retain the cure of souls. Wherefore bishops cannot lay aside their bishopric for any pretext whatever, without the authority of the Roman Pontiff (Extra, De Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Licet): whereas archdeacons and parish priests are free to renounce in the hands of the bishop the cure entrusted to them, without the Pope’s special permission, who alone can dispense from perpetual vows. Therefore it is evident that archdeacons and parish priests may lawfully enter religion. Reply Obj. 1: Parish priests and archdeacons have bound themselves to the care of their subjects, as long as they retain their archdeaconry or parish, but they did not

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chiam. Non autem obligaverunt se ad hoc quod perpetuo archidiaconatum vel parochiam teneant. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Hieronymus dicit, contra Vigilantium, quamvis a te linguae vipereae morsus saevissimos patiantur, scilicet religiosi, quibus argumentaris, et dicis, si omnes se clauserint et fuerint in solitudine, quis celebrabit Ecclesias? Quis saeculares homines lucrifaciet? Quis peccantes ad virtutes poterit exhortari? Hoc enim modo, si omnes tecum fatui sint, sapiens esse quis poterit? Et virginitas non erit approbanda, si enim virgines omnes fuerint et nuptiae non erunt, interibit genus humanum. Rara est virtus, nec a pluribus appetitur. Patet ergo quod hic timor stultus est, puta, sicut si aliquis timeret haurire aquam, ne flumen deficeret.

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bind themselves to retain their archdeaconry or parish for ever. Reply Obj. 2: As Jerome says (Contra Vigil.): Although they, namely religious, are sorely smitten by thy poisonous tongue, about whom you argue, saying; ‘If all shut themselves up and live in solitude, who will go to church? who will convert worldlings? who will be able to urge sinners to virtue?’ If this holds true, if all are fools with thee, who can be wise? Nor will virginity be commendable, for if all be virgins, and none marry, the human race will perish. Virtue is rare, and is not desired by many. It is therefore evident that this is a foolish alarm; thus might a man fear to draw water lest the river run dry.

Article 8 Whether it is lawful to pass from one religious order to another? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non liceat de una religione transire ad aliam, etiam arctiorem. Dicit enim apostolus, Heb. X, neque deserentes collectionem nostram, sicut est consuetudinis quibusdam, Glossa, qui scilicet vel timore persecutionis cedunt, vel propria praesumptione a peccatoribus vel imperfectis, ut iusti videantur, recedunt. Sed hoc videntur facere qui de una religione transeunt ad aliam perfectiorem. Ergo videtur hoc esse illicitum. Praeterea, professio monachorum est arctior quam professio regularium canonicorum, ut habetur extra, de statu Monach. et Canonic. Regul. cap. quod Dei timorem. Sed non licet alicui transire de statu canonicorum regularium ad statum monachorum, dicitur enim in decretis, XIX Caus., qu. III, mandamus, et universaliter interdicimus, ne quis canonicus regulariter professus, nisi, quod absit, publice lapsus fuerit, monachus efficiatur. Ergo videtur quod non liceat alicui transire de una religione ad aliam maiorem. Praeterea, tandiu aliquis obligatur ad implendum quod vovit, quandiu potest licite illud implere, sicut, si aliquis vovit continentiam servare, etiam post contractum matrimonium per verba de praesenti, ante carnalem copulam, tenetur implere votum, quia hoc potest facere religionem intrando. Si ergo aliquis licite potest de una religione transire ad aliam, tenebitur hoc facere, si ante hoc voverit existens in saeculo. Quod videtur esse inconveniens, quia ex hoc plerumque scandalum generari posset. Ergo non potest aliquis religiosus de una religione transire ad aliam arctiorem.

Objection 1: It seems unlawful to pass from one religious order to another, even a stricter one. For the Apostle says (Heb 10:25): Not forsaking our assembly, as some are accustomed; and a gloss observes: Those namely who yield through fear of persecution, or who presuming on themselves withdraw from the company of sinners or of the imperfect, that they may appear to be righteous. Now those who pass from one religious order to another more perfect one would seem to do this. Therefore this is seemingly unlawful. Obj. 2: Further, the profession of monks is stricter than that of canons regular (Extra, De Statu Monach. et Canonic. Reg., cap. Quod Dei timorem). But it is unlawful for anyone to pass from the state of canon regular to the monastic state. For it is said in the Decretals (XIX, qu. iii, can. Mandamus): We ordain and without any exception forbid any professed canon regular to become a monk, unless (which God forbid) he have fallen into public sin. Therefore it would seem unlawful for anyone to pass from one religious order to another of higher rank. Obj. 3: Further, a person is bound to fulfill what he has vowed, as long as he is able lawfully to do so; thus if a man has vowed to observe continence, he is bound, even after contracting marriage by words in the present tense, to fulfill his vow so long as the marriage is not consummated, because he can fulfill the vow by entering religion. Therefore if a person may lawfully pass from one religious order to another, he will be bound to do so if he vowed it previously while in the world. But this would seem objectionable, since in many cases it might give rise to scandal. Therefore a religious may not pass from one religious order to another stricter one. Sed contra est quod dicitur in decretis, XX Caus., On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XX, qu. qu. IV, virgines sacrae si, pro lucro animae suae, propter iv, can. Virgines): If sacred virgins design for the good of their

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districtiorem vitam, ad aliud monasterium pergere disposuerunt, ibique commanere decreverunt, synodus concedit. Et eadem ratio videtur esse de quibuscumque religiosis. Ergo potest aliquis licite transire de una religione ad aliam. Respondeo dicendum quod transire de religione ad religionem, nisi propter magnam utilitatem vel necessitatem, non est laudabile. Tum quia ex hoc plerumque scandalizantur illi qui relinquuntur. Tum etiam quia facilius proficit aliquis in religione quam consuevit, quam in illa quam non consuevit, ceteris paribus. Unde in collationibus patrum abbas Nesteros dicit, unicuique utile est ut secundum propositum quod elegit, summo studio ac diligentia ad operis arrepti perfectionem pervenire festinet, et nequaquam a sua, quam semel elegit, professione discedat. Et postea, rationem assignans, subdit, impossibile namque est unum eumdemque hominem simul universis fulciri virtutibus. Quas si quis voluerit pariter attentare, in id incidere eum necesse est ut, dum omnem sequitur, nullam integre consequatur. Diversae enim religiones praeeminent secundum diversa virtutum opera. Potest tamen aliquis laudabiliter de una religione transire ad aliam, triplici ex causa. Primo quidem, zelo perfectioris religionis. Quae quidem excellentia, ut supra dictum est, non attenditur secundum solam arctitudinem, sed principaliter secundum id ad quod religio ordinatur; secundario vero secundum discretionem observantiarum debito fini proportionatarum. Secundo, propter declinationem religionis debita perfectione. Puta, si in aliqua religione altiori incipiant religiosi remissius vivere, laudabiliter transit aliquis ad religionem etiam minorem, si melius observetur, sicut in collationibus patrum dicit abbas Ioannes de seipso quod a vita solitaria, in qua professus fuerat, transiit ad minorem, scilicet eorum qui vivunt in societate, propter hoc quod vita eremitica coeperat declinare et laxius observari. Tertio, propter infirmitatem vel debilitatem, ex qua interdum provenit quod non potest aliquis arctioris religionis statuta servare, posset autem observare statuta religionis laxioris. Sed in his tribus casibus est differentia. Nam in primo casu, debet quidem, propter humilitatem, licentiam petere, quae tamen ei negari non potest, dummodo constet illam religionem esse altiorem; si vero de hoc probabiliter dubitetur, est in hoc superioris iudicium requirendum; ut habetur extra, de Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. licet. Similiter requiritur superioris iudicium in secundo casu. In tertio vero casu est etiam dispensatio necessaria.

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soul to pass to another monastery on account of a stricter life, and decide to remain there, the holy synod allows them to do so: and the same would seem to apply to any religious. Therefore one may lawfully pass from one religious order to another. I answer that, It is not commendable to pass from one religious order to another: both because this frequently gives scandal to those who remain; and because, other things being equal, it is easier to make progress in a religious order to which one is accustomed than in one to which one is not habituated. Hence in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xiv, 5) Abbot Nesteros says: It is best for each one that he should, according to the resolve he has made, hasten with the greatest zeal and care to reach the perfection of the work he has undertaken, and nowise forsake the profession he has chosen. And further on he adds (cap. 6) by way of reason: For it is impossible that one and the same man should excel in all the virtues at once, since if he endeavor to practice them equally, he will of necessity, while trying to attain them all, end in acquiring none of them perfectly: because the various religious orders excel in respect of various works of virtue. Nevertheless one may commendably pass from one religious order to another for three reasons. First, through zeal for a more perfect religious life, which excellence depends, as stated above (Q. 188, A. 6), not merely on severity, but chiefly on the end to which a religious order is directed, and secondarily on the discretion whereby the observances are proportionate to the due end. Second, on account of a religious order falling away from the perfection it ought to have: for instance, if in a more severe religious order, the religious begin to live less strictly, it is commendable for one to pass even to a less severe religious order if the observance is better. Hence in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xix, 3, 5, 6) Abbot John says of himself that he had passed from the solitary life, in which he was professed, to a less severe life, namely of those who lived in community, because the hermetical life had fallen into decline and laxity. Third, on account of sickness or weakness, the result of which sometimes is that one is unable to keep the ordinances of a more severe religious order, though able to observe those of a less strict religion. There is, however, a difference in these three cases. For in the first case one ought, on account of humility, to seek permission: yet this cannot be denied, provided it be certain that this other religion is more severe. And if there be a probable doubt about this, one should ask one’s superior to decide (Extra, De Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Licet). In like manner the superior’s decision should be sought in the second case. In the third case it is also necessary to have a dispensation.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illi qui ad altiorem Reply Obj. 1: Those who pass to a stricter religious religionem transeunt, non faciunt hoc praesumptuose, order, do so not out of presumption that they may appear ut iusti videantur, sed devote, ut iustiores fiant. righteous, but out of devotion, that they may become more righteous. Ad secundum dicendum quod utraque religio, sciReply Obj. 2: Religious orders whether of monks or of licet monachorum et canonicorum regularium, ordina- canons regular are destined to the works of the contemplatur ad opera vitae contemplativae. Inter quae praecipua tive life. Chief among these are those which are performed sunt ea quae aguntur in divinis mysteriis, ad quae ordi- in the divine mysteries, and these are the direct object of natur directe ordo canonicorum regularium, quibus per the orders of canons regular, the members of which are esse competit ut sint clerici religiosi. Sed ad religionem sentially religious clerics. On the other hand, monastic remonachorum non per se competit quod sint clerici, ut ligious are not essentially clerics, according to the Decrehabetur in decretis, XVI, qu. I. Et ideo, quamvis ordo tals (XVI, qu. i, cap. Alia causa). Hence although monastic monachorum sit arctioris observantiae, si monachi es- orders are more severe, it would be lawful, supposing the sent laici, liceret transire ab ordine monachorum ad or- members to be lay monks, to pass from the monastic ordinem canonicorum regularium, secundum illud Hiero- der to an order of canons regular, according to the statenymi, ad rusticum monachum, sic vive in monasterio ut ment of Jerome (Ep. cxxv, ad Rustic. Monach.): So live in clericus esse merearis, non autem e converso, ut habetur the monastery as to deserve to become a cleric; but not conin decretis, XIX Caus., qu. III, in decreto inducto. Sed si versely, as expressed in the Decretal quoted (XIX, qu. iii). monachi sint clerici sacris mysteriis obsequentes, habent If, however, the monks be clerics devoting themselves to id quod est canonicorum regularium cum maiori arcti- the sacred ministry, they have this in common with canons tudine. Et ideo transire licitum erit de ordine canonico- regular coupled with greater severity, and consequently it rum regularium ad ordinem monachorum, petita tamen will be lawful to pass from an order of canons regular to a superioris licentia, ut dicitur XIX, qu. III, cap. statuimus. monastic order, provided withal that one seek the superior’s permission (XIX, qu. iii; cap. Statuimus). Ad tertium dicendum quod votum solemne quo Reply Obj. 3: The solemn vow whereby a person is quis obligatur minori religioni, est fortius quam votum bound to a less strict order, is more binding than the simsimplex quo quis adstringitur maiori religioni, post vo- ple vow whereby a person is bound to a stricter order. For if tum enim simplex, si contraheret aliquis matrimonium, after taking a simple vow a person were to be married, his non dirimeretur, sicut post votum solemne. Et ideo il- marriage would not be invalid, as it would be after his takle qui iam professus est in minori religione, non tenetur ing a solemn vow. Consequently a person who is professed implere votum simplex quod emisit de intrando maio- in a less severe order is not bound to fulfill a simple vow he rem religionem. has taken on entering a more severe order.

Article 9 Whether one ought to induce others to enter religion? Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus debeat alios inducere ad religionem intrandum. Mandat enim beatus Benedictus, in regula sua, quod venientibus ad religionem non sit facilis praebendus ingressus, sed probandum est an spiritus a Deo sint. Et hoc etiam docet Cassianus, in IV Lib. de institutis Coenob. Multo ergo minus licet aliquem ad religionem inducere. Praeterea, Matth. XXIII, dominus dicit, vae vobis. Qui circuitis mare et aridam ut faciatis unum proselytum, et, cum factus fuerit, facitis eum filium Gehennae duplo quam vos. Sed hoc videntur facere qui homines ad religionem inducunt. Ergo videtur hoc esse vituperabile.

Objection 1: It would seem that no one ought to induce others to enter religion. For the blessed Benedict prescribes in his Rule (lviii) that those who seek to enter religion must not easily be admitted, but spirits must be tested whether they be of God; and Cassian has the same instruction (De Inst. Coenob. iv, 3). Much less therefore is it lawful to induce anyone to enter religion. Obj. 2: Further, our Lord said (Matt 23:15): Woe to you . . . because you go round about the sea and the land to make one proselyte, and when he is made you make him the child of hell twofold more than yourselves. Now thus would seem to do those who induce persons to enter religion. Therefore this would seem blameworthy. Praeterea, nullus debet inducere aliquem ad id Obj. 3: Further, no one should induce another to do quod pertinet ad eius detrimentum. Sed ille qui inducit what is to his prejudice. But those who are induced to enter

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aliquem ad religionem, quandoque ex hoc incurrit detrimentum, quia quandoque sunt obligati ad maiorem religionem. Ergo videtur quod non sit laudabile inducere aliquos ad religionem. Sed contra est quod dicitur Exod. XXVI, cortina cortinam trahat. Debet ergo unus homo alium trahere ad Dei obsequium. Respondeo dicendum quod inducentes alios ad religionem non solum non peccant, sed magnum praemium merentur, dicitur enim Iac. ult., qui converti fecerit peccatorem ab errore viae suae, liberat animam eius a morte, et operit multitudinem peccatorum; et Dan. XII dicitur, qui ad iustitiam erudiunt plurimos, quasi stellae in perpetuas aeternitates. Posset tamen contingere circa huiusmodi inductionem triplex inordinatio. Primo quidem, si violenter aliquis alium ad religionem cogeret, quod prohibetur, in decretis, XX, qu. III. Secundo, si aliquis simoniace alium ad religionem trahat, muneribus datis, ut prohibetur in decretis, qu. II, cap. quam pio. Nec tamen ad hoc pertinet si aliquis alicui pauperi necessaria ministret in saeculo, nutriens eum ad religionem, vel si, sine pacto, aliqua munuscula tribuat ad familiaritatem captandam. Tertio, si mendaciis eum alliciat. Imminet enim sic inducto periculum ne, cum se deceptum invenerit, retrocedat; et sic fiant novissima hominis illius peiora prioribus, ut dicitur Matth. XII.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illis qui ad religionem inducuntur, nihilominus reservatur probationis tempus, in quo difficultates religionis experiuntur. Et sic non facilis aditus eis datur ad religionis ingressum. Ad secundum dicendum quod, secundum Hilarium, verbum illud domini praenuntiativum fuit perversi studii Iudaeorum quo, post Christi praedicationem, gentiles vel etiam Christianos ad Iudaicum ritum trahendo, faciunt dupliciter Gehennae filios, quia scilicet et peccata pristina quae commiserunt, eis in Iudaismo non dimittuntur et nihilominus incurrunt Iudaicae perfidiae reatum. Et secundum hoc, non facit ad propositum. Secundum Hieronymum autem, hoc refertur ad Iudaeos etiam pro statu illo in quo legalia observari licebat, quantum ad hoc quod ille qui ab eis ad Iudaismum convertebatur, dum esset gentilis, simpliciter errabat; videns autem magistrorum vitia, revertitur ad vomitum suum, et, gentilis factus, quasi praevaricator, maiori poena fit dignus. Ex quo patet quod trahere alios ad cultum Dei, vel ad religionem, non vituperatur, sed hoc solum quod aliquis ei quem convertit det malum exemplum, unde peior efficiatur.

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religion, sometimes take harm therefrom, for sometimes they are under obligation to enter a stricter religion. Therefore it would not seem praiseworthy to induce others to enter religion. On the contrary, It is written (Exod 26:3, seqq. ): Let one curtain draw the other. Therefore one man should draw another to God’s service. I answer that, Those who induce others to enter religion not only do not sin, but merit a great reward. For it is written (Jas 5:20): He who causeth a sinner to be converted from the error of his way, shall save his soul from death, and shall cover a multitude of sins; and (Dan 12:3): They that instruct many to justice shall be as stars for all eternity. Nevertheless such inducement may be affected by a threefold inordinateness. First, if one person force another by violence to enter religion: and this is forbidden in the Decretals (XX, qu. iii, cap. Praesens). Second, if one person persuade another simoniacally to enter religion, by giving him presents: and this is forbidden in the Decretal (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam pio). But this does not apply to the case where one provides a poor person with necessaries by educating him in the world for the religious life; or when without any compact one gives a person little presents for the sake of good fellowship. Third, if one person entices another by lies: for it is to be feared that the person thus enticed may turn back on finding himself deceived, and thus the last state of that man may become worse than the first (Luke 11:26). Reply Obj. 1: Those who are induced to enter religion have still a time of probation wherein they make a trial of the hardships of religion, so that they are not easily admitted to the religious life. Reply Obj. 2: According to Hilary (Can. xxiv in Matth.) this saying of our Lord was a forecast of the wicked endeavors of the Jews, after the preaching of Christ, to draw Gentiles or even Christians to observe the Jewish ritual, thereby making them doubly children of hell, because, to wit, they were not forgiven the former sins which they committed while adherents of Judaism, and furthermore they incurred the guilt of Jewish perfidy; and thus interpreted these words have nothing to do with the case in point. According to Jerome, however, in his commentary on this passage of Matthew, the reference is to the Jews even at the time when it was yet lawful to keep the legal observances, insofar as he whom they converted to Judaism from paganism, was merely misled; but when he saw the wickedness of his teachers, he returned to his vomit, and becoming a pagan deserved greater punishment for his treachery. Hence it is manifest that it is not blameworthy to draw others to the service of God or to the religious life, but only when one gives a bad example to the person converted, whence he becomes worse.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod in maiori includitur minus. Et ideo ille qui est obligatus voto vel iuramento ad ingressum minoris religionis, potest licite induci ad hoc quod ad maiorem religionem transeat, nisi sit aliquid speciale quod impediat, puta infirmitas, vel spes maioris profectus in minori religione. Ille vero qui est obligatus voto vel iuramento ad ingressum maioris religionis, non potest licite induci ad minorem religionem, nisi ex aliqua speciali causa evidenti, et hoc cum dispensatione superioris.

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Reply Obj. 3: The lesser is included in the greater. Wherefore a person who is bound by vow or oath to enter a lesser order, may be lawfully induced to enter a greater one, unless there be some special obstacle, such as ill-health, or the hope of making greater progress in the lesser order. On the other hand, one who is bound by vow or oath to enter a greater order, cannot be lawfully induced to enter a lesser order, except for some special and evident motive, and then with the superior’s dispensation.

Article 10 Whether it is praiseworthy to enter religion without taking counsel of many, and previously deliberating for a long time? Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit laudabile quod aliquis religionem ingrediatur absque multorum consilio, et diuturna deliberatione praecedente. Dicitur enim I Ioan. IV, nolite credere omni spiritui, sed probate spiritus, si ex Deo sunt. Sed quandoque propositum religionis intrandae non est ex Deo, cum frequenter per exitum religionis dissolvatur; dicitur autem Act. V, si est ex Deo consilium hoc aut opus, non poteritis dissolvere illud. Ergo videtur quod, magna examinatione praecedente, debeant aliqui religionem intrare. Praeterea, Prov. XXV dicitur, causam tuam tracta cum amico tuo. Sed maxime videtur hominis esse causa quae pertinet ad mutationem status. Ergo videtur quod non debeat aliquis religionem intrare, nisi prius cum amicis suis tractet. Praeterea, dominus, Luc. XIV, inducit similitudinem de homine qui vult turrim aedificare, quod prius sedens computat sumptus qui sunt ei necessarii, si habeat ad perficiendum, ne insultetur ei, quia hic homo incoepit aedificare, et non potuit consummare. Sumptus autem ad turrim aedificandam, ut Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Laetum, nihil est aliud quam ut renuntiet unusquisque omnibus quae sunt eius. Contingit autem quandoque quod hoc multi non possunt, et similiter alias religionis observantias portare, in cuius figura, I Reg. XVII dicitur quod David non poterat incedere cum armis Saulis, quia non habebat usum. Ergo videtur quod non debeat aliquis religionem intrare, nisi diuturna deliberatione praemissa, et multorum consilio habito. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. IV, quod ad vocationem domini, Petrus et Andreas, continuo, relictis retibus, secuti sunt eum. Ubi Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., talem obedientiam Christus quaerit a nobis ut neque instanti tempore remoremur. Respondeo dicendum quod diuturna deliberatio et multorum consilia requiruntur in magnis et dubiis, ut

Objection 1: It would not seem praiseworthy to enter religion without taking counsel of many, and previously deliberating for a long time. For it is written (1 John 4:1): Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits if they be of God. Now sometimes a man’s purpose of entering religion is not of God, since it often comes to naught through his leaving the religious life; for it is written (Acts 5:38, 39): If this counsel or this work be of God, you cannot overthrow it. Therefore it would seem that one ought to make a searching inquiry before entering religion. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov 25:9): Treat thy cause with thy friend. Now a man’s cause would seem to be especially one that concerns a change in his state of life. Therefore seemingly one ought not to enter religion without discussing the matter with one’s friends. Obj. 3: Further, our Lord (Luke 14:28) in making a comparison with a man who has a mind to build a tower, says that he doth first sit down and reckon the charges that are necessary, whether he have wherewithal to finish it, lest he become an object of mockery, for that this man began to build and was not able to finish. Now the wherewithal to build the tower, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Laetum ccxliii), is nothing less than that each one should renounce all his possessions. Yet it happens sometimes that many cannot do this, nor keep other religious observances; and in signification of this it is stated (1 Kgs 17:39) that David could not walk in Saul’s armor, for he was not used to it. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to enter religion without long deliberation beforehand and taking counsel of many. On the contrary, It is stated (Matt 4:20) that upon our Lord’s calling them, Peter and Andrew immediately leaving their nets, followed Him. Here Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Matth.): Such obedience as this does Christ require of us, that we delay not even for a moment. I answer that, Long deliberation and the advice of many are required in great matters of doubt, as the Philoso-

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philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., in his autem quae sunt certa et determinata, non requiritur consilium. Circa ingressum autem religionis tria possunt considerari. Primo quidem, ipse religionis ingressus secundum se. Et sic certum est quod ingressus religionis est melius bonum, et qui de hoc dubitat, quantum est in se, derogat Christo, qui hoc consilium dedit. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de Verb. Dom., vocat te oriens, idest Christus, et tu attendis occidentem, idest ad hominem mortalem et errare potentem. Alio modo potest considerari religionis ingressus per comparationem ad vires eius qui est religionem ingressurus. Et sic etiam non est locus dubitationis de ingressu religionis, quia illi qui religionem ingrediuntur, non confidunt sua virtute se posse subsistere, sed auxilio virtutis divinae; secundum illud Isaiae XL, qui sperant in domino, mutabunt fortitudinem, assument pennas sicut aquilae, current et non laborabunt, ambulabunt et non deficient. Si tamen sit aliquod speciale impedimentum, puta infirmitas corporalis vel onera debitorum, vel aliqua huiusmodi, in his requiritur deliberatio, et consilium cum his de quibus speratur quod prosint et non impediant. Unde dicitur Eccli. XXXVII, cum viro irreligioso tracta de sanctitate, et cum iniusto de iustitia, quasi dicat, non, unde sequitur, non attendas his in omni consilio, sed cum viro sancto assiduus esto. In quibus tamen non est diuturna deliberatio habenda. Unde Hieronymus dicit, in epistola ad Paulinum, festina, quaeso, te, et haerenti in salo naviculae funem magis praecide quam solve. Tertio autem potest considerari modus religionem intrandi, et quam religionem aliquis ingredi debeat. Et de talibus potest etiam haberi consilium cum his qui non impediant. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum dicitur, probate spiritus si ex Deo sunt, locum habet in his quae dubia sunt utrum spiritus Dei sit. Sicut dubium potest esse his qui iam sunt in religione, utrum ille qui religioni se offert, spiritu Dei ducatur, an simulate accedat, et ideo debent accedentem probare, utrum divino spiritu moveatur. Sed illi qui ad religionem accedit, non potest esse dubium an propositum de ingressu religionis in corde eius exortum sit a spiritu Dei, cuius est ducere hominem in terram rectam. Nec propter hoc ostenditur non esse ex Deo, quod aliqui retrocedunt. Non enim omne quod est a Deo, est incorruptibile, alioquin, creaturae corruptibiles non essent ex Deo, ut Manichaei dicunt; neque etiam aliqui qui habent a Deo gratiam, possent illam amittere, quod etiam est haereticum. Sed consilium Dei est indissolubile, quo etiam corruptibilia et mutabilia facit, secundum illud Isaiae XLVI, consilium meum stabit, et omnis voluntas mea fiet. Et ideo propositum de ingressu religio-

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pher says (Ethic. iii, 3); while advice is unnecessary in matters that are certain and fixed. Now with regard to entering religion three points may be considered. First, the entrance itself into religion, considered by itself; and thus it is certain that entrance into religion is a greater good, and to doubt about this is to disparage Christ Who gave this counsel. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. c, 2): The East, that is Christ, calleth thee, and thou turnest to the West, namely mortal and fallible man. Second, the entrance into religion may be considered in relation to the strength of the person who intends to enter. And here again there is no room for doubt about the entrance to religion, since those who enter religion trust not to be able to stay by their own power, but by the assistance of the divine power, according to Isa. 40:31, They that hope in the Lord shall renew their strength, they shall take wings as eagles, they shall run and not be weary, they shall walk and not faint. Yet if there be some special obstacle (such as bodily weakness, a burden of debts, or the like) in such cases a man must deliberate and take counsel with such as are likely to help and not hinder him. Hence it is written (Sir 37:12): Treat with a man without religion concerning holiness, with an unjust man concerning justice, meaning that one should not do so, wherefore the text goes on (Sir 37:14, 15), Give no heed to these in any matter of counsel, but be continually with a holy man. In these matters, however, one should not take long deliberation. Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. and Paulin. liii): Hasten, I pray thee, cut off rather than loosen the rope that holds the boat to the shore. Third, we may consider the way of entering religion, and which order one ought to enter, and about such matters also one may take counsel of those who will not stand in one’s way. Reply Obj. 1: The saying: Try the spirits, if they be of God, applies to matters admitting of doubt whether the spirits be of God; thus those who are already in religion may doubt whether he who offers himself to religion be led by the spirit of God, or be moved by hypocrisy. Wherefore they must try the postulant whether he be moved by the divine spirit. But for him who seeks to enter religion there can be no doubt but that the purpose of entering religion to which his heart has given birth is from the spirit of God, for it is His spirit that leads man into the land of uprightness (Ps 142:10). Nor does this prove that it is not of God that some turn back; since not all that is of God is incorruptible: else corruptible creatures would not be of God, as the Manicheans hold, nor could some who have grace from God lose it, which is also heretical. But God’s counsel whereby He makes even things corruptible and changeable, is imperishable according to Isa. 46:10, My counsel shall stand and all My will shall be done. Hence the purpose of entering religion needs not to be tried whether it be of God, because

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nis non indiget probatione utrum sit a Deo, quia certa discussione non egent, ut dicit Glossa, super illud I ad Thess. ult., omnia probate. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, ut dicitur Galat. V; ita etiam frequenter amici carnales adversantur profectui spirituali, secundum illud Mich. VII, inimici hominis domestici eius. Unde Cyrillus, exponens illud Luc. IX, permitte me renuntiare his qui domi sunt, dicit, quaerere renuntiare his qui domi sunt, ostendit quod utcumque divisus sit, nam communicare proximis, et consulere nolentes aequa sapere, indicat adhuc utcumque languentem et recedentem. Propter quod, audit a domino, nemo, cum posuerit manum ad aratrum et aspexerit retro, habilis est ad regnum Dei. Aspicit enim retro qui dilationem quaerit occasione redeundi domum et cum propinquis conferendi. Ad tertium dicendum quod per aedificationem turris significatur perfectio Christianae vitae. Abrenuntiatio autem propriorum est sumptus ad aedificandam turrim. Nullus autem dubitat vel deliberat an velit habere sumptus, vel an possit turrim aedificare si sumptus habeat, sed hoc sub deliberatione ponitur, an aliquis sumptus habeat. Similiter sub deliberatione cadere non oportet utrum aliquis debeat abrenuntiare omnibus quae possidet, vel si, hoc faciendo, ad perfectionem pervenire possit. Sed hoc cadit sub deliberatione, utrum hoc quod facit, sit abrenuntiare omnibus quae possidet, quia nisi abrenuntiaverit, quod est sumptus habere, non potest, ut ibidem subditur, Christi esse discipulus, quod est turrim aedificare. Timor autem eorum qui trepidant an per religionis ingressum possint ad perfectionem pervenire, est irrationabilis; et multorum exemplo convincitur. Unde Augustinus dicit, VIII Confess., aperiebatur ab ea parte qua intenderam faciem, et quo transire trepidabam, casta dignitas continentiae, honeste blandiens ut venirem neque dubitarem, et extendens ad me suscipiendum et amplectendum pias manus plenas gregibus bonorum exemplorum. Ibi tot pueri et puellae; ibi iuventus multa et omnis aetas, et graves viduae et virgines anus. Irridebat me irrisione exhortatoria, quasi diceret, tu non poteris quod isti et istae? An isti et istae in semetipsis possunt, et non in domino Deo suo? Quid in te stas, et non stas? Proiice te in eum. Noli metuere, non se subtrahet, ut cadas. Proiice te securus, et excipiet te et sanabit te.

Exemplum autem illud quod inducitur de David, non facit ad propositum. Quia arma Saulis, sicut Glossa dicit, sunt legis sacramenta, tanquam onerantia, religio autem est suave iugum Christi, quia, ut Gregorius dicit, in IV Moral., quid grave mentis nostrae cervicibus imponit qui

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it requires no further demonstration, as a gloss says on 1 Thess. 5:21, Prove all things. Reply Obj. 2: Even as the flesh lusteth against the spirit (Gal 5:17), so too carnal friends often thwart our spiritual progress, according to Mic. 7:6, A man’s enemies are they of his own household. Wherefore Cyril expounding Luke 9:61, Let me first take my leave of them that are at my house, says: By asking first to take his leave of them that were at his house, he shows he was somewhat of two minds. For to communicate with his neighbors, and consult those who are unwilling to relish righteousness, is an indication of weakness and turning back. Hence he hears our Lord say: ‘No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God,’ because he looks back who seeks delay in order to go home and confer with his kinsfolk. Reply Obj. 3: The building of the tower signifies the perfection of Christian life; and the renunciation of one’s possessions is the wherewithal to build this tower. Now no one doubts or deliberates about wishing to have the wherewithal, or whether he is able to build the tower if he have the wherewithal, but what does come under deliberation is whether one has the wherewithal. Again it need not be a matter of deliberation whether one ought to renounce all that one has, or whether by so doing one may be able to attain to perfection; whereas it is a matter of deliberation whether that which one is doing amounts to the renunciation of all that he has, since unless he does renounce (which is to have the wherewithal) he cannot, as the text goes on to state, be Christ’s disciple, and this is to build the tower. The misgiving of those who hesitate as to whether they may be able to attain to perfection by entering religion is shown by many examples to be unreasonable. Hence Augustine says (Confess. viii, 11): On that side whither I had set my face, and whither I trembled to go, there appeared to me the chaste dignity of continency . . . honestly alluring me to come and doubt not, and stretching forth to receive and embrace me, her holy hands full of multitudes of good examples. There were so many young men and maidens here, a multitude of youth and every age, grave widows and aged virgins . . . And she smiled at me with a persuasive mockery as though to say: Canst not thou what these youths and these maidens can? Or can they either in themselves, and not rather in the Lord their God? . . . Why standest thou in thyself, and so standest not? Cast thyself upon Him; fear not, He will not withdraw Himself that thou shouldst fall. Cast thyself fearlessly upon Him: He will receive and will heal thee. The example quoted of David is not to the point, because the arms of Saul, as a gloss on the passage observes, are the sacraments of the Law, as being burdensome: whereas religion is the sweet yoke of Christ, for as Gregory says (Moral. iv, 33), what burden does He lay on the shoulders

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vitare omne desiderium quod perturbat praecipit, qui de- of the mind, Who commands us to shun all troublesome declinari laboriosa mundi huius itinera monet? sires, Who warns us to turn aside from the rough paths of this world? Quod quidem suave iugum super se tollentibus reTo those indeed who take this sweet yoke upon themfectionem divinae fruitionis repromittit, et sempiternam selves He promises the refreshment of the divine fruition requiem animarum. and the eternal rest of their souls. Ad quam nos perducat ipse qui promisit, Iesus ChriTo which may He Who made this promise bring us, Jestus, dominus noster, qui est super omnia Deus benedic- sus Christ our Lord, Who is over all things God blessed for tus in saecula. Amen. ever. Amen.

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