Summa Theologiae Prima Pars, 50-119 (Latin-English Opera Omnia) [Bilingual ed.] 1623400074, 9781623400071

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Saint Thomas Aquinas

Summa Theologiae Prima Pars, 50–119

Translated by Fr. Laurence Shapcote, op

Summa Theologiae Volume 14 Latin/English Edition of the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas

Aquinas Institute, Inc. Green Bay, Wisconsin 2017

This printing was funded in part by donations made in memory of: Marcus Berquist, Rose Johanna Trumbull, John and Mary Deignan, Thomas and Eleanor Sullivan, Ann C. Arcidi, and Fr. John T. Feeney and his sister Mary This printing was also made possible by donations from Kevin Bergdorf, Patricia Lynch, Josh and Holly Harnisch, and by donations made in honor of the Studentate Community of the Dominican Province of St. Albert the Great, USA, Fr. Brian McMaster, Dr. Brian Cutter, and in gratitude to the Very Rev. Romanus Cessario, op, stm

Published with the ecclesiastical approval of The Most Reverend Paul D. Etienne, dd, stl Bishop of Cheyenne Given on July 16, 2015

Copyright © 2017 Aquinas Institute, Inc. 240 E Falcon Hill Way Green Bay, WI 54302 www.TheAquinasInstitute.org Printed in the United States of America

Thomas Aquinas, St., 1225?–1274 Summa Theologiae Prima Pars, 50–119 / Saint Thomas Aquinas; edited by The Aquinas Institute; translated by Fr. Laurence Shapcote, O.P. p. cm. ISBN 978-1-62340-207-5 1. Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, 1225?–1274 — Summa theologiae — Prima Pars — 50–119. 2. Catholic Church — Doctrines — Early works to 1800. 3. Theology, Doctrinal — Early works to 1800. I. Title. II. Series BX1749.T512 2015 230΄.2--dc23

2012953830

Notes on the Text

Latin Text of St. Thomas The Latin text used in this volume is based on the Leonine Edition, transcribed and revised by The Aquinas Institute.

English Translation of St. Thomas The English translation of the Summa Theologiae was prepared by Fr. Laurence Shapcote, op (1864–1947), of the English Dominican Province. It has been edited and revised by The Aquinas Institute.

The Aquinas Institute requests your assistance in the continued perfection of these texts. If you discover any errors, please send us a note by email: [email protected]

Dedicated with love to Our Lady of Mt. Carmel

Contents Question 50 – The Substance of the Angels Absolutely 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Whether an angel is altogether incorporeal? .......................................................................................................1 Whether an angel is composed of matter and form?...........................................................................................3 Whether the angels exist in any great number?...................................................................................................5 Whether the angels differ in species?...................................................................................................................8 Whether the angels are incorruptible?.................................................................................................................9

Question 51 – Angels in Comparison with Bodies 1. Whether the angels have bodies naturally united to them?...............................................................................11 2. Whether angels assume bodies? ........................................................................................................................13 3. Whether the angels exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed? ..............................................................14

Question 52 – Angels in Relation to Place 1. Whether an angel is in a place?..........................................................................................................................19 2. Whether an angel can be in several places at once?...........................................................................................20 3. Whether several angels can be at the same time in the same place?..................................................................21

Question 53 – The Local Movement of the Angels 1. Whether an angel can be moved locally?...........................................................................................................23 2. Whether an angel passes through intermediate space? .....................................................................................25 3. Whether the movement of an angel is instantaneous? ......................................................................................27

Question 54 – The Knowledge of the Angels 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Whether an angel’s act of understanding is his substance?................................................................................31 Whether in the angel to understand is to exist? ................................................................................................33 Whether an angel’s power of intelligence is different from his essence?............................................................34 Whether there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel?..........................................................................35 Whether there is only intellectual knowledge in the angels? .............................................................................36

Question 55 – The Medium of the Angelic Knowledge 1. Whether the angels know all things by their substance? ...................................................................................39 2. Whether the angels understand by species drawn from things? .......................................................................41 3. Whether the higher angels understand by more universal species than the lower angels? ...............................42

Question 56 – Angelic Knowledge of Immaterial Things 1. Whether an angel knows himself?.....................................................................................................................45 2. Whether one angel knows another? ..................................................................................................................46 3. Whether an angel knows God by his own natural principles? ..........................................................................48

Question 57 – Angelic Knowledge of Material Things 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Whether the angels know material things?........................................................................................................51 Whether an angel knows singulars? ..................................................................................................................52 Whether angels know the future? ......................................................................................................................55 Whether angels know thoughts of the heart? ....................................................................................................56 Whether the angels know the mysteries of grace? .............................................................................................58

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Question 58 – The Mode of Angelic Knowledge 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Whether the angel’s intellect is sometimes in potentiality? ...............................................................................61 Whether an angel can understand many things at the same time? ...................................................................62 Whether an angel’s knowledge is discursive? ....................................................................................................64 Whether the angels understand by composing and dividing?...........................................................................65 Whether there can be falsehood in the intellect of an angel? ............................................................................67 Whether there is a morning and an evening knowledge in the angels?.............................................................68 Whether the morning and evening knowledge are one? ...................................................................................70

Question 59 – The Will of the Angels 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether there is will in the angels?...................................................................................................................73 Whether in the angels the will differs from the intellect? ..................................................................................75 Whether there is free-will in the angels? ...........................................................................................................76 Whether there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels?.........................................................78

Question 60 – The Love or Dilection of the Angels 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Whether there is natural love or dilection in an angel? .....................................................................................81 Whether there is love of choice in the angels? ...................................................................................................82 Whether the angel loves himself with both natural love, and love of choice? ...................................................84 Whether an angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself? ............................................................85 Whether an angel by natural love loves God more than he loves himself? .......................................................86

Question 61 – The Production of the Angels in the Nature 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether the angels have a cause of their existence?..........................................................................................91 Whether the angel was produced by God from eternity? ..................................................................................92 Whether the angels were created before the corporeal world? ..........................................................................93 Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven? ..............................................................................94

Question 62 – The Perfection of the Angels in Grace and Glory 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Whether the angels were created in beatitude? .................................................................................................97 Whether an angel needs grace in order to turn to God? ...................................................................................99 Whether the angels were created in grace?......................................................................................................100 Whether an angel merits his beatitude? ..........................................................................................................102 Whether the angel obtained beatitude immediately after one act of merit? ....................................................103 Whether the angels receive grace and glory according to the degree of their natural gifts?............................105 Whether natural knowledge and love remain in the beatified angels? ............................................................106 Whether a beatified angel can sin? ..................................................................................................................107 Whether the beatified angels advance in beatitude?........................................................................................108

Question 63 – The Malice of the Angels with Regard to Sin 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Whether the evil of fault can be in the angels? ................................................................................................111 Whether only the sin of pride and envy can exist in an angel?........................................................................113 Whether the devil desired to be as God? .........................................................................................................115 Whether any demons are naturally wicked?....................................................................................................116 Whether the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his creation? .......................118 Whether there was any interval between the creation and the fall of the angel? .............................................120 Whether the highest angel among those who sinned was the highest of all? ..................................................121 Whether the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning? .....................................................123 Whether the angels who sinned were more than those who stood firm? ........................................................125

Question 64 – The Punishment of the Demons 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether the demons’ intellect is darkened by privation of the knowledge of all truth? .................................127 Whether the will of the demons is obstinate in evil? .......................................................................................130 Whether there is sorrow in the demons?.........................................................................................................132 Whether our atmosphere is the demons’ place of punishment?......................................................................133

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Question 65 – The Work of Creation of Corporeal Creatures 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether corporeal creatures are from God? ...................................................................................................137 Whether corporeal things were made on account of God’s goodness?............................................................139 Whether corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the angels? .............................141 Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels? ..........................................................................................142

Question 66 – The Order of Creation towards Distinction 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation? ......................................................145 Whether the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same? ...................................................................148 Whether the empyrean heaven was created at the same time as formless matter? .........................................151 Whether time was created simultaneously with formless matter? ..................................................................153

Question 67 – The Work of Distinction in Itself, and the Work of the First Day 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether the word ‘light’ is used in its proper sense in speaking of spiritual things? ......................................155 Whether light is a body? ..................................................................................................................................156 Whether light is a quality? ...............................................................................................................................157 Whether the production of light is fittingly assigned to the first day?.............................................................159

Question 68 – The Work of the Second Day 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether the firmament was made on the second day? ...................................................................................163 Whether there are waters above the firmament? .............................................................................................166 Whether the firmament divides waters from waters?......................................................................................168 Whether there is only one heaven?..................................................................................................................170

Question 69 – The Work of the Third Day 1. Whether it was fitting that the gathering together of the waters should take place on the third day?.............173 2. Whether it was fitting that the production of plants should take place on the third day?...............................176

Question 70 – The Work of Adornment, and of the Fourth Day 1. Whether the lights ought to have been produced on the fourth day? .............................................................179 2. Whether the cause assigned for the production of the lights is reasonable? ...................................................182 3. Whether the lights of heaven are living beings? ..............................................................................................183

Question 71 – The Work of the Fifth Day 1. Whether the work of the fifth day was fittingly described? .............................................................................187

Question 72 – The Work of the Sixth Day 1. Whether the work of the sixth day was fittingly described? ............................................................................191

Question 73 – The Things that Belong to the Seventh Day 1. Whether the completion of the divine works ought to be ascribed to the seventh day? .................................195 2. Whether God rested on the seventh day from all his work?............................................................................197 3. Whether blessing and sanctifying are due to the seventh day? .......................................................................198

Question 74 – All the Seven Days in Common 1. Whether these days are sufficiently enumerated?............................................................................................201 2. Whether all these days are one day? ................................................................................................................203 3. Whether scripture uses suitable words to express the work of the six days? ...................................................205

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Question 75 – Man, Who is Composed of a Spiritual and Corporeal Substance 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Whether the soul is a body?.............................................................................................................................209 Whether the human soul is something subsistent? .........................................................................................211 Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?.........................................................................................213 Whether the soul is man? ................................................................................................................................214 Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?........................................................................................216 Whether the human soul is corruptible? .........................................................................................................218 Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?.......................................................................................220

Question 76 – The Union of Body and Soul 1. Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form? ..............................................................223 2. Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied according to the number of bodies?.....................................228 3. Whether besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another, namely, the sensitive and nutritive?..........................................................................................232 4. Whether in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul?..............................................................235 5. Whether the intellectual soul is properly united to such a body?....................................................................238 6. Whether the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental dispositions?............240 7. Whether the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body? ..............................................................242 8. Whether the soul is in each part of the body? .................................................................................................243

Question 77 – The Powers of the Soul in General 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Whether the essence of the soul is its power?..................................................................................................247 Whether there are several powers of the soul? ................................................................................................250 Whether the powers are distinguished by their acts and objects? ...................................................................251 Whether there is an order among the soul’s powers? ......................................................................................253 Whether all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject? ................................................................255 Whether the powers of the soul flow from its essence? ...................................................................................256 Whether one power of the soul arises from another?......................................................................................258 Whether all the powers remain in the soul when separated from the body? ..................................................259

Question 78 – The Specific Powers of the Soul 1. Whether there are to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul?.......................................................261 2. Whether the parts of the vegetative soul are fittingly described as the nutritive, augmentative, and generative?..............................................................................................................................................264 3. Whether the five exterior senses are properly distinguished? .........................................................................266 4. Whether the interior senses are suitably distinguished?..................................................................................269

Question 79 – The Intellectual Powers 1. Whether the intellect is a power of the soul, or its very essence? ....................................................................273 2. Whether the intellect is a passive power? ........................................................................................................275 3. Whether there is an active intellect? ................................................................................................................277 4. Whether the active intellect is something in the soul? ....................................................................................278 5. Whether the active intellect is one in all? ........................................................................................................281 6. Whether memory is in the intellectual part of the soul? .................................................................................282 7. Whether the intellectual memory is a power distinct from the intellect?........................................................285 8. Whether the reason is a distinct power from the intellect? .............................................................................286 9. Whether the higher and lower reason are distinct powers?.............................................................................287 10. Whether intelligence is a power distinct from intellect?................................................................................290 11. Whether the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers?...........................................................291 12. Whether synderesis is a special power of the soul distinct from the others?.................................................293 13. Whether conscience be a power?...................................................................................................................294

Question 80 – The Appetitive Powers in General 1. Whether the appetite is a special power of the soul? .......................................................................................297 2. Whether the sensitive and intellectual appetites are distinct powers?.............................................................298

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Question 81 – The Power of Sensuality 1. Whether sensuality is only appetitive, or also cognitive? ................................................................................301 2. Whether the sensitive appetite is divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers? ................302 3. Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason? ....................................................................304

Question 82 – The Will 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Whether the will desires something of necessity? ...........................................................................................307 Whether the will desires whatever it desires from necessity? ..........................................................................308 Whether the will is a higher power than the intellect? ....................................................................................310 Whether the will moves the intellect?..............................................................................................................312 Whether we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite?...........................314

Question 83 – Free Will 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether man has free-will? ............................................................................................................................317 Whether free-will is a power?..........................................................................................................................319 Whether free-will is an appetitive power, or cognitive? ..................................................................................321 Whether free-will is a power distinct from the will? .......................................................................................322

Question 84 – The Soul’s Knowledge When Joined to the Body 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect? ...................................................................................326 Whether the soul understands corporeal things through its essence?.............................................................328 Whether the soul understands all things through innate species? ..................................................................330 Whether the intelligible species are derived by the soul from certain separate forms? ...................................332 Whether the intellectual soul knows material things in the eternal types? .....................................................335 Whether intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things?...................................................................337 Whether the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without turning to the phantasms? ..............................................................................................340 8. Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered through suspension of the sensitive powers?...................342

Question 85 – The Mode and Order of Understanding 1. Whether our intellect understands corporeal and material things by abstraction from phantasms?..............345 2. Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood? .............................................................................................................................349 3. Whether the more universal is first in our intellectual cognition? ..................................................................351 4. Whether we can understand many things at the same time? ..........................................................................355 5. Whether our intellect understands by composition and division? ..................................................................356 6. Whether the intellect can be false? ..................................................................................................................358 7. Whether one person can understand one and the same thing better than another can? ................................359 8. Whether the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible? ..........................................................360

Question 86 – What Our Intellect Knows In Material Things 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether our intellect knows singulars? ..........................................................................................................363 Whether our intellect can know the infinite? ..................................................................................................364 Whether our intellect can know contingent things?........................................................................................366 Whether our intellect can know the future? ....................................................................................................367

Question 87 – The Soul’s Knowledge of Itself and All Within Itself 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether the intellectual soul knows itself by its essence? ...............................................................................371 Whether our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence?..............................................................374 Whether our intellect knows its own act?........................................................................................................375 Whether the intellect understands the act of the will? ....................................................................................377

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Question 88 – How the Human Soul Knows What is Above Itself 1. Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand immaterial substances in themselves?..379 2. Whether our intellect can understand immaterial substances through its knowledge of material things?.....383 3. Whether God is the first object known by the human mind? .........................................................................385

Question 89 – The Knowledge of the Separated Soul 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Whether the separated soul can understand nothing at all? ...........................................................................387 Whether the separated soul understands separate substances?.......................................................................390 Whether the separated soul knows all natural things? ....................................................................................391 Whether the separated soul knows singulars?.................................................................................................393 Whether the habit of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul? .............................................394 Whether the act of knowledge acquired here remains in the separated soul? .................................................396 Whether local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul? ..........................................................397 Whether separated souls know what takes place on earth?.............................................................................398

Question 90 – The First Production of Man’s Soul 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether the soul was made or was of God’s substance? .................................................................................401 Whether the soul was produced by creation?..................................................................................................403 Whether the rational soul is produced by God immediately, or by the instrumentality of the angels?...........404 Whether the human soul was produced before the body? ..............................................................................405

Question 91 – The Production of the First Man’s Body 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether the body of the first man was made of the slime of the earth? .........................................................407 Whether the human body was immediately produced by God? .....................................................................409 Whether the body of man was given an apt disposition? ................................................................................411 Whether the production of the human body is fittingly described in Scripture? ............................................413

Question 92 – The Production of the Woman 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether the woman should have been made in the first production of things?.............................................415 Whether woman should have been made from man? .....................................................................................417 Whether the woman was fittingly made from the rib of man? ........................................................................418 Whether the woman was formed immediately by God? .................................................................................419

Question 93 – The End or Term of the Production of Man, As to the Image and Likeness of God 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Whether the image of God is in man?.............................................................................................................421 Whether the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures? ..................................................................422 Whether the angels are more to the image of God than man is?.....................................................................424 Whether the image of God is found in every man?.........................................................................................425 Whether the image of God is in man according to the Trinity of Persons?.....................................................427 Whether the image of God is in man as regards the mind only?.....................................................................428 Whether the image of God is to be found in the acts of the soul? ...................................................................431 Whether the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul only by comparison with God as its object?..............433 Whether ‘likeness’ is properly distinguished from ‘image’?.............................................................................435

Question 94 – The State or Condition of the First Man as to His Intellect 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether the first man saw God through his essence?.....................................................................................439 Whether Adam in the state of innocence saw the angels through their essence?............................................441 Whether the first man knew all things?...........................................................................................................443 Whether man in his first state could be deceived? ..........................................................................................445

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Question 95 – Things Pertaining to the First Man’s Will 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether the first man was created in grace? ...................................................................................................447 Whether passions existed in the soul of the first man?....................................................................................449 Whether Adam had all the virtues? .................................................................................................................450 Whether the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are?.....................................................452

Question 96 – The Mastership Belonging to Man in the State of Innocence 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether Adam in the state of innocence had mastership over the animals? ..................................................455 Whether man had mastership over all other creatures? ..................................................................................457 Whether men were equal in the state of innocence? .......................................................................................458 Whether in the state of innocence man would have been master over man?..................................................459

Question 97 – The Bodily Condition of the First Man, as to the Preservation of the Individual 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether in the state of innocence man would have been immortal? .............................................................461 Whether in the state of innocence man would have been passible? ................................................................462 Whether in the state of innocence man needed food? ....................................................................................464 Whether the tree of life could have been the cause of immortality?................................................................465

Question 98 – The Preservation of the Species 1. Whether generation existed in the state of innocence? ...................................................................................469 2. Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation by coition?..........................................470

Question 99 – The Condition of the Offspring as to the Body 1. Whether in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of body, as to the use of its members, immediately after birth? ................................................................................................475 2. Whether, in the primitive state, women would have been born? ....................................................................477

Question 100 – The Condition of the Offspring as Regards Righteousness 1. Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?...................................................................479 2. Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness? ..................480

Question 101 – The Condition of the Offspring as Regards Knowledge 1. Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge? ........................483 2. Whether children would have had perfect use of reason at birth? ..................................................................484

Question 102 – Man’s Abode, Which is Paradise 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether paradise is a corporeal place? ...........................................................................................................487 Whether paradise was a place adapted to be the abode of man?.....................................................................489 Whether man was placed in paradise to dress it and keep it? .........................................................................491 Whether man was created in paradise? ...........................................................................................................492

Question 103 – The Government of Things in General 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Whether the world is governed by anyone?.....................................................................................................493 Whether the end of the government of the world is something outside the world?........................................495 Whether the world is governed by one? ..........................................................................................................496 Whether the effect of government is one or many? .........................................................................................497 Whether all things are subject to the divine government? ..............................................................................498 Whether all things are immediately governed by God? ..................................................................................500 Whether anything can happen outside the order of the divine government? .................................................502 Whether anything can resist the order of the divine government?..................................................................503

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Question 104 – The Special Effects of the Divine Government 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether creatures need to be kept in being by God?......................................................................................505 Whether God preserves every creature immediately?.....................................................................................508 Whether God can annihilate anything? ..........................................................................................................510 Whether anything is annihilated? ...................................................................................................................511

Question 105 – The Change of Creatures by God 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Whether God can move the matter immediately to the form?........................................................................513 Whether God can move a body immediately? ................................................................................................514 Whether God moves the created intellect immediately? .................................................................................516 Whether God can move the created will?........................................................................................................518 Whether God works in every agent? ...............................................................................................................519 Whether God can do anything outside the established order of nature? ........................................................521 Whether whatever God does outside the natural order is miraculous? ..........................................................522 Whether one miracle is greater than another? ................................................................................................524

Question 106 – How One Creature Moves Another 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether one angel enlightens another? ..........................................................................................................525 Whether one angel moves another angel’s will? ..............................................................................................527 Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel? .............................................................................529 Whether the superior angel enlightens the inferior as regards all he himself knows?.....................................530

Question 107 – The Speech of the Angels 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Whether one angel speaks to another? ............................................................................................................533 Whether the inferior angel speaks to the superior? .........................................................................................535 Whether an angel speaks to God? ...................................................................................................................536 Whether local distance influences the angelic speech?....................................................................................537 Whether all the angels know what one speaks to another? .............................................................................538

Question 108 – The Angelic Degrees of Hierarchies and Orders 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Whether all the angels are of one hierarchy? ...................................................................................................539 Whether there are several orders in one hierarchy? ........................................................................................541 Whether there are many angels in one order? .................................................................................................542 Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders comes from the angelic nature? .......................................544 Whether the orders of the angels are properly named? ...................................................................................545 Whether the grades of the orders are properly assigned? ................................................................................549 Whether the orders will outlast the day of judgment?.....................................................................................552 Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders? ........................................................................................554

Question 109 – The Ordering of the Bad Angels 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether there are orders among the demons?................................................................................................557 Whether among the demons there is precedence? ..........................................................................................558 Whether there is enlightenment in the demons?.............................................................................................559 Whether the good angels have precedence over the bad angels?.....................................................................560

Question 110 – How Angels Preside Over Corporeal Creatures 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels? ............................................................................563 Whether corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel? ...........................................................................565 Whether bodies obey the angels as regards local motion? ..............................................................................567 Whether angels can work miracles? ................................................................................................................568

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Question 111 – The Action of the Angels on Man 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether an angel can enlighten man? ............................................................................................................571 Whether the angels can change the will of man?.............................................................................................573 Whether an angel can change man’s imagination? ..........................................................................................574 Whether an angel can change the human senses? ...........................................................................................576

Question 112 – The Mission of the Angels 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether the angels are sent on works of ministry?.........................................................................................579 Whether all the angels are sent in ministry?....................................................................................................581 Whether all the angels who are sent, assist? ....................................................................................................583 Whether all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent? ................................................................................584

Question 113 – The Guardianship of the Good Angels 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Whether men are guarded by the angels?........................................................................................................587 Whether each man is guarded by an angel? ....................................................................................................589 Whether to guard men belongs only to the lowest order of angels? ................................................................590 Whether angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men?.......................................................................591 Whether an angel is appointed to guard a man from his birth? ......................................................................593 Whether a guardian angel ever forsakes a man whom he is appointed to guard? ...........................................594 Whether angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard? ........................................................................595 Whether there can be strife or discord among the angels?..............................................................................596

Question 114 – The Assaults of the Demons 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Whether men are assailed by the demons?......................................................................................................599 Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?.........................................................................................................600 Whether all sins are due to the temptation of the devil? .................................................................................601 Whether demons can lead men astray by means of real miracles?..................................................................603 Whether a demon who is overcome by man, is for this reason hindered from making further assaults?.......605

Question 115 – The Action of the Corporeal Creature 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Whether a body can be active? ........................................................................................................................607 Whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter?...........................................................................610 Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of what is produced in bodies here below? .................................612 Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions?.......................................................................614 Whether heavenly bodies can act on the demons? ..........................................................................................615 Whether heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action? ...............................................617

Question 116 – Fate 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether fate exists?.........................................................................................................................................621 Whether fate is in created things? ...................................................................................................................623 Whether fate is unchangeable? ........................................................................................................................624 Whether all things are subject to fate?.............................................................................................................625

Question 117 – Things Pertaining to the Action of Man 1. 2. 3. 4.

Whether one man can teach another? .............................................................................................................627 Whether man can teach the angels? ................................................................................................................630 Whether man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter?............................................................632 Whether the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally? ..............................................................633

Question 118 – The Production of Man from Man as to the Soul 1. Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen, or created by God? ..............................................635 2. Whether the intellectual soul is produced from the semen? ...........................................................................638 3. Whether human souls were created together at the beginning of the world? .................................................640

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Question 119 – The Propagation of Man as to the Body 1. Whether some part of the food is changed into true human nature?..............................................................643 2. Whether the semen is produced from surplus food or from the substance of the begetter? ...........................648

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Summa Theologiae Prima Pars, 50–119

Question 50 The Substance of the Angels Absolutely Post haec considerandum est de distinctione corporalis et spiritualis creaturae. Et primo, de creatura pure spirituali, quae in Scriptura sacra angelus nominatur; secundo, de creatura pure corporali; tertio, de creatura composita ex corporali et spirituali, quae est homo. Circa vero angelos, considerandum est primo de his quae pertinent ad eorum substantiam; secundo, de his quae pertinent ad eorum intellectum; tertio, de his quae pertinent ad eorum voluntatem; quarto, de his quae pertinent ad eorum creationem. De substantia autem eorum considerandum est et absolute, et per comparationem ad corporalia. Circa substantiam vero eorum absolute, quinque quaeruntur. Primo, utrum sit aliqua creatura omnino spiritualis, et penitus incorporea. Secundo, supposito quod angelus sit talis, quaeritur utrum angelus sit compositus ex materia et forma. Tertio, quaeritur de multitudine eorum. Quarto, de differentia ipsorum ab invicem. Quinto, de immortalitate, seu incorruptibilitate ipsorum.

Now we consider the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures: first, the purely spiritual creature which in Holy Scripture is called angel; second, the creature wholly corporeal; third, the composite creature, corporeal and spiritual, which is man. Concerning the angels, we consider first what belongs to their substance; second, what belongs to their intellect; third, what belongs to their will; fourth, what belongs to their creation. Their substance we consider absolutely and in relation to corporeal things. Concerning their substance absolutely considered, there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is any entirely spiritual creature, altogether incorporeal? (2) Supposing that an angel is such, we ask whether it is composed of matter and form? (3) We ask concerning their number. (4) Of their difference from each other. (5) Of their immortality or incorruptibility.

Article 1 Whether an angel is altogether incorporeal? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus non sit omnino incorporeus. Illud enim quod est incorporeum solum quoad nos, et non quoad Deum, non est incorporeum simpliciter. Sed Damascenus dicit, in libro II, quod angelus incorporeus et immaterialis dicitur quantum ad nos, sed comparatus ad Deum, corporeus et materialis invenitur. Non ergo est incorporeus simpliciter. Praeterea, nihil movetur nisi corpus, ut probatur in VI Physic. Sed Damascenus dicit ibidem quod angelus est substantia intellectualis semper mobilis. Angelus ergo est substantia corporea. Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit, in libro de spiritu sancto, Omnis creatura certis suae naturae circumscripta est limitibus. Circumscribi autem proprium est corporum. Ergo omnis creatura est corporea. Angeli autem sunt Dei creaturae, ut patet in Psalmo CXLVIII, Laudate Dominum, omnes angeli eius; et postea subditur, Quo-

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not entirely incorporeal. For what is incorporeal only as regards ourselves, and not in relation to God, is not absolutely incorporeal. But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that an angel is said to be incorporeal and immaterial as regards us; but compared to God it is corporeal and material. Therefore he is not simply incorporeal. Obj. 2: Further, nothing is moved except a body, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vi, 32). But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that an angel is an ever movable intellectual substance. Therefore an angel is a corporeal substance. Obj. 3: Further, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): Every creature is limited within its own nature. But to be limited belongs to bodies. Therefore, every creature is corporeal. Now angels are God’s creatures, as appears from Ps. 148:2: Praise ye the Lord, all His angels; and, farther on (verse 4), For He spoke, and they were made; He com-

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niam ipse dixit, et facta sunt, ipse mandavit, et creata sunt. Ergo angeli sunt corporei. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo CIII, Qui facit angelos suos spiritus. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere aliquas creaturas incorporeas. Id enim quod praecipue in rebus creatis Deus intendit est bonum quod consistit in assimilatione ad Deum. Perfecta autem assimilatio effectus ad causam attenditur, quando effectus imitatur causam secundum illud per quod causa producit effectum; sicut calidum facit calidum. Deus autem creaturam producit per intellectum et voluntatem, ut supra ostensum est. Unde ad perfectionem universi requiritur quod sint aliquae creaturae intellectuales. Intelligere autem non potest esse actus corporis, nec alicuius virtutis corporeae, quia omne corpus determinatur ad hic et nunc. Unde necesse est ponere, ad hoc quod universum sit perfectum, quod sit aliqua incorporea creatura. Antiqui autem, ignorantes vim intelligendi, et non distinguentes inter sensum et intellectum, nihil esse existimaverunt in mundo, nisi quod sensu et imaginatione apprehendi potest. Et quia sub imaginatione non cadit nisi corpus, existimaverunt quod nullum ens esset nisi corpus; ut Philosophus dicit in IV Physic. Et ex his processit Sadducaeorum error, dicentium non esse spiritum.

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manded, and they were created. Therefore angels are corporeal. On the contrary, It is said (Ps 103:4): Who makes His angels spirits. I answer that, There must be some incorporeal creatures. For what is principally intended by God in creatures is good, and this consists in assimilation to God Himself. And the perfect assimilation of an effect to a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the cause according to that whereby the cause produces the effect; as heat makes heat. Now, God produces the creature by His intellect and will (Q. 14, A. 8; Q. 19, A. 4). Hence the perfection of the universe requires that there should be intellectual creatures. Now intelligence cannot be the action of a body, nor of any corporeal faculty; for every body is limited to here and now. Hence the perfection of the universe requires the existence of an incorporeal creature.

The ancients, however, not properly realizing the force of intelligence, and failing to make a proper distinction between sense and intellect, thought that nothing existed in the world but what could be apprehended by sense and imagination. And because bodies alone fall under imagination, they supposed that no being existed except bodies, as the Philosopher observes (Phys. iv, 52,57). Thence came the error of the Sadducees, who said there was no spirit (Acts 23:8). Sed hoc ipsum quod intellectus est altior sensu, raBut the very fact that intellect is above sense is a reasontionabiliter ostendit esse aliquas res incorporeas, a solo able proof that there are some incorporeal things compreintellectu comprehensibiles. hensible by the intellect alone. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod substantiae incorReply Obj. 1: Incorporeal substances rank between poreae medium sunt inter Deum et creaturas corporeas. God and corporeal creatures. Now the medium compared Medium autem comparatum ad unum extremum, vide- to one extreme appears to be the other extreme, as what is tur alterum extremum; sicut tepidum comparatum cali- tepid compared to heat seems to be cold; and thus it is said do, videtur frigidum. Et hac ratione dicitur quod angeli, that angels, compared to God, are material and corporeal, Deo comparati, sunt materiales et corporei, non quod in not, however, as if anything corporeal existed in them.

eis sit aliquid de natura corporea. Ad secundum dicendum quod motus ibi accipitur prout intelligere et velle motus quidam dicuntur. Dicitur ergo angelus substantia semper mobilis, quia semper est actu intelligens, non quandoque actu et quandoque potentia, sicut nos. Unde patet quod ratio procedit ex aequivoco. Ad tertium dicendum quod circumscribi terminis localibus est proprium corporum, sed circumscribi terminis essentialibus est commune cuilibet creaturae, tam corporali quam spirituali. Unde dicit Ambrosius, in libro de Spir. Sanct., quod licet quaedam locis corporalibus non contineantur, circumscriptione tamen substantiae non carent.

Reply Obj. 2: Movement is there taken in the sense in which it is applied to intelligence and will. Therefore an angel is called an ever mobile substance, because he is ever actually intelligent, and not as if he were sometimes actually and sometimes potentially, as we are. Hence it is clear that the objection rests on an equivocation. Reply Obj. 3: To be circumscribed by local limits belongs to bodies only; whereas to be circumscribed by essential limits belongs to all creatures, both corporeal and spiritual. Hence Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7) that although some things are not contained in corporeal place, still they are none the less circumscribed by their substance.

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Q. 50, A. 2

Article 2 Whether an angel is composed of matter and form? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus sit compositus ex materia et forma. Omne enim quod continetur sub aliquo genere, est compositum ex genere et differentia, quae, adveniens generi, constituit speciem. Sed genus sumitur ex materia, differentia vero ex forma, ut patet in VIII Metaphys. Ergo omne quod est in genere, est compositum ex materia et forma. Sed angelus est in genere substantiae. Ergo est compositus ex materia et forma. Praeterea, in quocumque inveniuntur proprietates materiae, ibi invenitur materia. Proprietates autem materiae sunt recipere et substare; unde dicit Boetius, in libro de Trin., quod forma simplex subiectum esse non potest. Haec autem inveniuntur in angelo. Ergo angelus est compositus ex materia et forma. Praeterea, forma est actus. Quod ergo est forma tantum, est actus purus. Sed angelus non est actus purus, hoc enim solius Dei est. Ergo non est forma tantum, sed habet formam in materia. Praeterea, forma proprie limitatur et finitur per materiam. Forma ergo quae non est in materia, est forma infinita. Sed forma angeli non est infinita, quia omnis creatura finita est. Ergo forma angeli est in materia. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod primae creaturae sicut incorporales et immateriales intelliguntur. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam ponunt angelos esse compositos ex materia et forma. Et hanc opinionem astruere nititur Avicebron in libro Fontis Vitae. Supponit enim quod quaecumque distinguuntur secundum intellectum, sint etiam in rebus distincta. In substantia autem incorporea intellectus apprehendit aliquid per quod distinguitur a substantia corporea, et aliquid per quod cum ea convenit. Unde ex hoc vult concludere quod illud per quod differt substantia incorporea a corporea, sit ei quasi forma, et illud quod subiicitur huic formae distinguenti quasi commune, sit materia eius. Et propter hoc ponit quod eadem est materia universalis spiritualium et corporalium, ut intelligatur quod forma incorporeae substantiae sic sit impressa in materia spiritualium, sicut forma quantitatis est impressa in materia corporalium. Sed primo aspectu apparet esse impossibile unam esse materiam spiritualium et corporalium. Non enim est possibile quod forma spiritualis et corporalis recipiatur in una parte materiae, quia sic una et eadem res numero esset corporalis et spiritualis. Unde relinquitur quod alia pars materiae sit quae recipit formam corporalem, et alia quae recipit formam spiritualem. Materiam autem dividi in partes non contingit nisi secundum quod intelligi-

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is composed of matter and form. For everything which is contained under any genus is composed of the genus, and of the difference which added to the genus makes the species. But the genus comes from the matter, and the difference from the form (Metaph. xiii, 6). Therefore everything which is in a genus is composed of matter and form. But an angel is in the genus of substance. Therefore he is composed of matter and form. Obj. 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter exist, there is matter. Now the properties of matter are to receive and to substand; whence Boethius says (De Trin.) that a simple form cannot be a subject: and the above properties are found in the angel. Therefore an angel is composed of matter and form. Obj. 3: Further, form is act. So what is form only is pure act. But an angel is not pure act, for this belongs to God alone. Therefore an angel is not form only, but has a form in matter. Obj. 4: Further, form is properly limited and perfected by matter. So the form which is not in matter is an infinite form. But the form of an angel is not infinite, for every creature is finite. Therefore the form of an angel is in matter. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): The first creatures are understood to be as immaterial as they are incorporeal. I answer that, Some assert that the angels are composed of matter and form; which opinion Avicebron endeavored to establish in his book of the Fount of Life. For he supposes that whatever things are distinguished by the intellect are really distinct. Now as regards incorporeal substance, the intellect apprehends that which distinguishes it from corporeal substance, and that which it has in common with it. Hence he concludes that what distinguishes incorporeal from corporeal substance is a kind of form to it, and whatever is subject to this distinguishing form, as it were something common, is its matter. Therefore, he asserts that the universal matter of spiritual and corporeal things is the same; so that it must be understood that the form of incorporeal substance is impressed in the matter of spiritual things, in the same way as the form of quantity is impressed in the matter of corporeal things. But one glance is enough to show that there cannot be one matter of spiritual and of corporeal things. For it is not possible that a spiritual and a corporeal form should be received into the same part of matter, otherwise one and the same thing would be corporeal and spiritual. Hence it would follow that one part of matter receives the corporeal form, and another receives the spiritual form. Matter, however, is not divisible into parts except as regarded un-

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tur sub quantitate, qua remota, remanet substantia indivisibilis, ut dicitur in I Physic. Sic igitur relinquitur quod materia spiritualium sit subiecta quantitati, quod est impossibile. Impossibile est ergo quod una sit materia corporalium et spiritualium. Sed adhuc ulterius impossibile est quod substantia intellectualis habeat qualemcumque materiam. Operatio enim cuiuslibet rei est secundum modum substantiae eius. Intelligere autem est operatio penitus immaterialis. Quod ex eius obiecto apparet, a quo actus quilibet recipit speciem et rationem; sic enim unumquodque intelligitur, inquantum a materia abstrahitur; quia formae in materia sunt individuales formae, quas intellectus non apprehendit secundum quod huiusmodi. Unde relinquitur quod omnis substantia intellectualis est omnino immaterialis. Non est autem necessarium quod ea quae distinguuntur secundum intellectum, sint distincta in rebus, quia intellectus non apprehendit res secundum modum rerum, sed secundum modum suum. Unde res materiales, quae sunt infra intellectum nostrum, simpliciori modo sunt in intellectu nostro, quam sint in seipsis. Substantiae autem angelicae sunt supra intellectum nostrum. Unde intellectus noster non potest attingere ad apprehendendum eas secundum quod sunt in seipsis; sed per modum suum, secundum quod apprehendit res compositas. Et sic etiam apprehendit Deum, ut supra dictum est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod differentia est quae constituit speciem. Unumquodque autem constituitur in specie, secundum quod determinatur ad aliquem specialem gradum in entibus, quia species rerum sunt sicut numeri, qui differunt per additionem et subtractionem unitatis, ut dicitur in VIII Metaphys. In rebus autem materialibus aliud est quod determinat ad specialem gradum, scilicet forma, et aliud quod determinatur, scilicet materia, unde ab alio sumitur genus, et ab alio differentia. Sed in rebus immaterialibus non est aliud determinans et determinatum, sed unaquaeque earum secundum seipsam tenet determinatum gradum in entibus. Et ideo genus et differentia in eis non accipitur secundum aliud et aliud, sed secundum unum et idem. Quod tamen differt secundum considerationem nostram, inquantum enim intellectus noster considerat illam rem ut indeterminate, accipitur in eis ratio generis; inquantum vero considerat ut determinate, accipitur ratio differentiae. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa ponitur in libro Fontis Vitae, et esset necessaria, si idem esset modus quo recipit intellectus, et quo recipit materia. Sed hoc patet esse falsum. Materia enim recipit formam, ut secundum ipsam constituatur in esse alicuius speciei, vel aeris, vel ignis, vel cuiuscumque alterius. Sic autem intellectus non recipit formam, alioquin verificaretur opinio

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der quantity; and without quantity substance is indivisible, as Aristotle says (Phys. i, 15). Therefore it would follow that the matter of spiritual things is subject to quantity; which cannot be. Therefore it is impossible that corporeal and spiritual things should have the same matter. It is, further, impossible for an intellectual substance to have any kind of matter. For the operation belonging to anything is according to the mode of its substance. Now to understand is an altogether immaterial operation, as appears from its object, whence any act receives its species and nature. For a thing is understood according to its degree of immateriality; because forms that exist in matter are individual forms which the intellect cannot apprehend as such. Hence it must be that every individual substance is altogether immaterial. But things distinguished by the intellect are not necessarily distinguished in reality; because the intellect does not apprehend things according to their mode, but according to its own mode. Hence material things which are below our intellect exist in our intellect in a simpler mode than they exist in themselves. Angelic substances, on the other hand, are above our intellect; and hence our intellect cannot attain to apprehend them, as they are in themselves, but by its own mode, according as it apprehends composite things; and in this way also it apprehends God (Q. 3).

Reply Obj. 1: It is difference which constitutes the species. Now everything is constituted in a species according as it is determined to some special grade of being because the species of things are like numbers, which differ by addition and subtraction of unity, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, 10). But in material things there is one thing which determines to a special grade, and that is the form; and another thing which is determined, and this is the matter; and hence from the latter the genus is derived, and from the former the difference. Whereas in immaterial things there is no separate determinator and thing determined; each thing by its own self holds a determinate grade in being; and therefore in them genus and difference are not derived from different things, but from one and the same. Nevertheless, this differs in our mode of conception; for, inasmuch as our intellect considers it as indeterminate, it derives the idea of their genus; and inasmuch as it considers it determinately, it derives the idea of their difference. Reply Obj. 2: This reason is given in the book on the Fount of Life, and it would be cogent, supposing that the receptive mode of the intellect and of matter were the same. But this is clearly false. For matter receives the form, that thereby it may be constituted in some species, either of air, or of fire, or of something else. But the intellect does not receive the form in the same way; otherwise the opinion of

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Empedoclis, qui posuit quod terram terra cognoscimus, et ignem igne. Sed forma intelligibilis est in intellectu secundum ipsam rationem formae, sic enim cognoscitur ab intellectu. Unde talis receptio non est receptio materiae, sed est receptio substantiae immaterialis.

Q. 50, A. 3

Empedocles (De Anima i, 5, 26) would be true, to the effect that we know earth by earth, and fire by fire. But the intelligible form is in the intellect according to the very nature of a form; for as such is it so known by the intellect. Hence such a way of receiving is not that of matter, but of an immaterial substance. Reply Obj. 3: Although there is no composition of matter and form in an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. And this can be made evident if we consider the nature of material things which contain a twofold composition. The first is that of form and matter, whereby the nature is constituted. Such a composite nature is not its own existence but existence is its act. Hence the nature itself is related to its own existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if there be no matter, and supposing that the form itself subsists without matter, there nevertheless still remains the relation of the form to its very existence, as of potentiality to act. And such a kind of composition is understood to be in the angels; and this is what some say, that an angel is composed of, whereby he is, and what is, or existence, and what is, as Boethius says. For what is, is the form itself subsisting; and the existence itself is whereby the substance is; as the running is whereby the runner runs. But in God existence and what is are not different as was explained above (Q. 3, A. 4). Hence God alone is pure act. Reply Obj. 4: Every creature is simply finite, inasmuch as its existence is not absolutely subsisting, but is limited to some nature to which it belongs. But there is nothing against a creature being considered relatively infinite. Material creatures are infinite on the part of matter, but finite in their form, which is limited by the matter which receives it. But immaterial created substances are finite in their being; whereas they are infinite in the sense that their forms are not received in anything else; as if we were to say, for example, that whiteness existing separate is infinite as regards the nature of whiteness, forasmuch as it is not contracted to any one subject; while its being is finite as determined to some one special nature.

Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet in angelo non sit compositio formae et materiae, est tamen in eo actus et potentia. Quod quidem manifestum potest esse ex consideratione rerum materialium, in quibus invenitur duplex compositio. Prima quidem formae et materiae, ex quibus constituitur natura aliqua. Natura autem sic composita non est suum esse, sed esse est actus eius. Unde ipsa natura comparatur ad suum esse sicut potentia ad actum. Subtracta ergo materia, et posito quod ipsa forma subsistat non in materia, adhuc remanet comparatio formae ad ipsum esse ut potentiae ad actum. Et talis compositio intelligenda est in angelis. Et hoc est quod a quibusdam dicitur, quod angelus est compositus ex quo est et quod est, vel ex esse et quod est, ut Boetius dicit, nam quod est est ipsa forma subsistens; ipsum autem esse est quo substantia est, sicut cursus est quo currens currit. Sed in Deo non est aliud esse et quod est, ut supra ostensum est. Unde solus Deus est actus purus.

Ad quartum dicendum quod omnis creatura est finita simpliciter, inquantum esse eius non est absolutum subsistens, sed limitatur ad naturam aliquam cui advenit. Sed nihil prohibet aliquam creaturam esse secundum quid infinitam. Creaturae autem materiales habent infinitatem ex parte materiae, sed finitatem ex parte formae, quae limitatur per materiam in qua recipitur. Substantiae autem immateriales creatae sunt finitae secundum suum esse, sed infinitae secundum quod eorum formae non sunt receptae in alio. Sicut si diceremus albedinem separatam existentem esse infinitam quantum ad rationem albedinis, quia non contrahitur ad aliquod subiectum; esse tamen eius esset finitum, quia determinatur ad aliquam naturam specialem. Et propter hoc dicitur in libro de Causis, quod intelliWhence it is said (De Causis, prop. 16) that intelligence gentia est finita superius, inquantum scilicet recipit esse is finite from above, as receiving its being from above itself, a suo superiori; sed est infinita inferius, inquantum non and is infinite from below, as not received in any matter. recipitur in aliqua materia.

Article 3 Whether the angels exist in any great number? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeObjection 1: It would seem that the angels are not li non sint in aliquo magno numero. Numerus enim spe- in great numbers. For number is a species of quantity, and cies quantitatis est, et sequitur divisionem continui. Hoc follows the division of a continuous body. But this cannot autem non potest esse in angelis cum sint incorporei, ut be in the angels, since they are incorporeal, as was shown

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supra ostensum est. Ergo angeli non possunt esse in aliquo magno numero. Praeterea, quanto aliquid est magis propinquum uni, tanto minus est multiplicatum, ut in numeris apparet. Natura autem angelica inter alias naturas creatas est Deo propinquior. Cum ergo Deus sit maxime unus, videtur quod in natura angelica inveniatur minimum de multitudine. Praeterea, proprius effectus separatarum substantiarum videtur esse motus corporum caelestium. Sed motus corporum caelestium sunt secundum aliquem determinatum numerum paucum, qui a nobis comprehendi potest. Ergo angeli non sunt in maiori multitudine, quam motus corporum caelestium. Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod propter radios divinae bonitatis subsistunt intelligibiles et intellectuales omnes substantiae. Sed radius non multiplicatur nisi secundum diversitatem recipientium. Non autem potest dici quod materia sit receptiva intelligibilis radii, cum substantiae intellectuales sint immateriales, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo videtur quod multiplicatio substantiarum intellectualium non possit esse nisi secundum exigentiam primorum corporum, scilicet caelestium, ut ad ea quodammodo processus praedictorum radiorum terminetur. Et sic idem quod prius.

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above (A. 1). Therefore the angels cannot exist in any great number. Obj. 2: Further, the more a thing approaches to unity, so much the less is it multiplied, as is evident in numbers. But among other created natures the angelic nature approaches nearest to God. Therefore since God is supremely one, it seems that there is the least possible number in the angelic nature. Obj. 3: Further, the proper effect of the separate substances seems to be the movements of the heavenly bodies. But the movements of the heavenly bodies fall within some small determined number, which we can apprehend. Therefore the angels are not in greater number than the movements of the heavenly bodies. Obj. 4: Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that all intelligible and intellectual substances subsist because of the rays of the divine goodness. But a ray is only multiplied according to the different things that receive it. Now it cannot be said that their matter is receptive of an intelligible ray, since intellectual substances are immaterial, as was shown above (A. 2). Therefore it seems that the multiplication of intellectual substances can only be according to the requirements of the first bodies—that is, of the heavenly ones, so that in some way the shedding form of the aforesaid rays may be terminated in them; and hence the same conclusion is to be drawn as before. On the contrary, It is said (Dan 7:10): Thousands of thousands ministered to Him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him. I answer that, There have been various opinions with regard to the number of the separate substances. Plato contended that the separate substances are the species of sensible things; as if we were to maintain that human nature is a separate substance of itself: and according to this view it would have to be maintained that the number of the separate substances is the number of the species of sensible things. Aristotle, however, rejects this view (Metaph. i, 31) because matter is of the very nature of the species of sensible things. Consequently the separate substances cannot be the exemplar species of these sensible things; but have their own fixed natures, which are higher than the natures of sensible things. Nevertheless Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, 43) that those more perfect natures bear relation to these sensible things, as that of mover and end; and therefore he strove to find out the number of the separate substances according to the number of the first movements. But since this appears to militate against the teachings of Sacred Scripture, Rabbi Moses the Jew, wishing to bring both into harmony, held that the angels, in so far as they are styled immaterial substances, are multiplied according to the number of heavenly movements or bodies, as Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, 43); while he contended that in the Scriptures even men bearing a divine message are styled angels; and again, even the powers of natural things, which

Sed contra est quod dicitur Dan. VII, millia millium ministrabant ei, et decies millies centena millia assistebant ei. Respondeo dicendum quod circa numerum substantiarum separatarum, diversi diversis viis processerunt. Plato enim posuit substantias separatas esse species rerum sensibilium, utpote si poneremus ipsam naturam humanam esse separatam. Et secundum hoc oportebat dicere quod substantiae separatae sint secundum numerum specierum sensibilium. Sed hanc positionem improbat Aristoteles, ex eo quod materia est de ratione speciei horum sensibilium. Unde substantiae separatae non possunt esse species exemplares horum sensibilium, sed habent quasdam naturas altiores naturis rerum sensibilium. Posuit tamen Aristoteles quod illae naturae perfectiores habent ordinem ad sensibilia ista, secundum rationem moventis et finis. Et ideo secundum numerum primorum motuum, conatus est adinvenire numerum substantiarum separatarum. Sed quia hoc videtur repugnare documentis sacrae Scripturae, Rabbi Moyses, Iudaeus, volens utrumque concordare, posuit quod angeli, secundum quod dicuntur substantiae immateriales, multiplicantur secundum numerum motuum vel corporum caelestium, secundum Aristotelem. Sed posuit quod angeli in Scriptura dicuntur etiam homines divina annuntiantes; et iterum virtutes rerum naturalium, quae Dei omnipotentiam mani-

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festant. Sed hoc est alienum a consuetudine Scripturae, manifest God’s almighty power. It is, however, quite foreign quod virtutes rerum irrationabilium angeli nominentur. to the custom of the Scriptures for the powers of irrational things to be designated as angels. Unde dicendum est quod etiam angeli secundum Hence it must be said that the angels, even inasmuch quod sunt immateriales substantiae, in quadam multi- as they are immaterial substances, exist in exceeding great tudine maxima sunt, omnem materialem multitudinem number, far beyond all material multitude. This is what excedentes. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius, XIV cap. Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiv): There are many blessed Caelest. Hierarch., multi sunt beati exercitus superna- armies of the heavenly intelligences, surpassing the weak rum mentium, infirmam et constrictam excedentes no- and limited reckoning of our material numbers. The reason strorum materialium numerorum commensurationem. Et whereof is this, because, since it is the perfection of the unihuius ratio est quia, cum perfectio universi sit illud quod verse that God chiefly intends in the creation of things, the praecipue Deus intendit in creatione rerum, quanto ali- more perfect some things are, in so much greater an excess qua sunt magis perfecta tanto in maiori excessu sunt are they created by God. Now, as in bodies such excess is creata a Deo. Sicut autem in corporibus attenditur ex- observed in regard to their magnitude, so in things incorcessus secundum magnitudinem, ita in rebus incorpo- poreal is it observed in regard to their multitude. We see, reis potest attendi excessus secundum multitudinem. in fact, that incorruptible bodies exceed corruptible bodies Videmus autem quod corpora incorruptibilia, quae sunt almost incomparably in magnitude; for the entire sphere of perfectiora inter corpora, excedunt quasi incomparabili- things active and passive is something very small in comter secundum magnitudinem corpora corruptibilia, nam parison with the heavenly bodies. Hence it is reasonable to tota sphaera activorum et passivorum est aliquid mo- conclude that the immaterial substances as it were incomdicum respectu corporum caelestium. Unde rationabile parably exceed material substances as to multitude. est quod substantiae immateriales excedant secundum multitudinem substantias materiales, quasi incomparabiliter. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in angelis non est Reply Obj. 1: In the angels number is not that of disnumerus qui est quantitas discreta, causatus ex divisione crete quantity, brought about by division of what is concontinui, sed causatus ex distinctione formarum, prout tinuous, but that which is caused by distinction of forms; multitudo est de transcendentibus, ut supra dictum est. according as multitude is reckoned among the transcendentals, as was said above (Q. 30, A. 3; Q. 11). Ad secundum dicendum quod ex hoc quod natura Reply Obj. 2: From the angelic nature being the nighangelica est Deo propinqua, oportet quod habeat mini- est unto God, it must needs have least of multitude in its mum de multitudine in sui compositione, non autem ita composition, but not so as to be found in few subjects. quod in paucis salvetur. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa est AristoReply Obj. 3: This is Aristotle’s argument (Metaph. xii, telis in XII Metaphys; et ex necessitate concluderet, si 44), and it would conclude necessarily if the separate subsubstantiae separatae essent propter substantias corpo- stances were made for corporeal substances. For thus the rales, sic enim frustra essent immateriales substantiae, immaterial substances would exist to no purpose, unless nisi ex eis aliquis motus in rebus corporalibus appareret. some movement from them were to appear in corporeal Non est autem hoc verum, quod substantiae immateria- things. But it is not true that the immaterial substances exles sint propter corporales, quia finis nobilior est his quae ist on account of the corporeal, because the end is nobler sunt ad finem. Unde etiam Aristoteles dicit ibidem quod than the means to the end. Hence Aristotle says (Metaph. haec ratio non est necessaria, sed probabilis. Coactus au- xii, 44) that this is not a necessary argument, but a probatem fuit hac ratione uti, quia ad cognoscendum intelligi- ble one. He was forced to make use of this argument, since bilia non possumus pervenire nisi per sensibilia. only through sensible things can we come to know intelligible ones. Ad quartum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit seReply Obj. 4: This argument comes from the opinion cundum opinionem eorum qui causam distinctionis re- of such as hold that matter is the cause of the distinction of rum ponebant esse materiam. Hoc autem improbatum things; but this was refuted above (Q. 47, A. 1). Accordingly, est. Unde multiplicatio angelorum neque secundum ma- the multiplication of the angels is not to be taken according teriam, neque secundum corpora est accipienda, sed se- to matter, nor according to bodies, but according to the dicundum divinam sapientiam, diversos ordines immate- vine wisdom devising the various orders of immaterial subrialium substantiarum excogitantem. stances.

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Q. 50, A. 4

Angels

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Article 4 Whether the angels differ in species? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli non differant specie. Cum enim differentia sit nobilior genere, quaecumque conveniunt secundum id quod est nobilissimum in eis, conveniunt in ultima differentia constitutiva; et ita sunt eadem secundum speciem. Sed omnes angeli conveniunt in eo quod est nobilissimum in eis, scilicet in intellectualitate. Ergo omnes angeli sunt unius speciei. Praeterea, magis et minus non diversificant speciem. Sed angeli non videntur differre ad invicem nisi secundum magis et minus; prout scilicet unus alio est simplicior, et perspicacioris intellectus. Ergo angeli non differunt specie. Praeterea, anima et angelus ex opposito dividuntur. Sed omnes animae sunt unius speciei. Ergo et angeli.

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels do not differ in species. For since the difference is nobler than the ‘genus,’ all things which agree in what is noblest in them, agree likewise in their ultimate constitutive difference; and so they are the same according to species. But all angels agree in what is noblest in them—that is to say, in intellectuality. Therefore all the angels are of one species. Obj. 2: Further, more and less do not change a species. But the angels seem to differ only from one another according to more and less—namely, as one is simpler than another, and of keener intellect. Therefore the angels do not differ specifically. Obj. 3: Further, soul and angel are contra-distinguished mutually from each other. But all souls are of the one species. So therefore are the angels. Obj. 4: Further, the more perfect a thing is in nature, the more ought it to be multiplied. But this would not be so if there were but one individual under one species. Therefore there are many angels of one species. On the contrary, In things of one species there is no such thing as first and second, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iii, 2). But in the angels even of the one order there are first, middle, and last, as Dionysius says (Hier. Ang. x). Therefore the angels are not of the same species. I answer that, Some have said that all spiritual substances, even souls, are of the one species. Others, again, that all the angels are of the one species, but not souls; while others allege that all the angels of one hierarchy, or even of one order, are of the one species. But this is impossible. For such things as agree in species but differ in number, agree in form, but are distinguished materially. If, therefore, the angels be not composed of matter and form, as was said above (A. 2), it follows that it is impossible for two angels to be of one species; just as it would be impossible for there to be several whitenesses apart, or several humanities, since whitenesses are not several, except in so far as they are in several substances.

Praeterea, quanto aliquid est perfectius in natura, tanto magis debet multiplicari. Hoc autem non esset, si in una specie esset unum tantum individuum. Ergo multi angeli sunt unius speciei. Sed contra est quod in his quae sunt unius speciei, non est invenire prius et posterius, ut dicitur in III Metaphys. Sed in angelis, etiam unius ordinis, sunt primi et medii et ultimi, ut dicit Dionysius, X cap. Ang. Hier. Ergo angeli non sunt eiusdem speciei. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt omnes substantias spirituales esse unius speciei, etiam animas. Alii vero quod omnes angeli sunt unius speciei, sed non animae. Quidam vero quod omnes angeli unius hierarchiae, aut etiam unius ordinis. Sed hoc est impossibile. Ea enim quae conveniunt specie et differunt numero, conveniunt in forma, et distinguuntur materialiter. Si ergo angeli non sunt compositi ex materia et forma, ut dictum est supra, sequitur quod impossibile sit esse duos angelos unius speciei. Sicut etiam impossibile esset dicere quod essent plures albedines separatae, aut plures humanitates; cum albedines non sint plures nisi secundum quod sunt in pluribus substantiis. Si tamen angeli haberent materiam, nec sic possent esse plures angeli unius speciei. Sic enim oporteret quod principium distinctionis unius ab alio esset materia, non quidem secundum divisionem quantitatis, cum sint incorporei, sed secundum diversitatem potentiarum. Quae quidem diversitas materiae causat diversitatem non solum speciei, sed generis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod differentia est nobilior genere, sicut determinatum indeterminato et proprium communi; non autem sicut alia et alia natura. Alioquin oporteret quod omnia animalia irrationalia es-

And if the angels had matter, not even then could there be several angels of one species. For it would be necessary for matter to be the principle of distinction of one from the other, not, indeed, according to the division of quantity, since they are incorporeal, but according to the diversity of their powers; and such diversity of matter causes diversity not merely of species, but of genus. Reply Obj. 1: Difference is nobler than genus, as the determined is more noble than the undetermined, and the proper than the common, but not as one nature is nobler than another; otherwise it would be necessary that all irra-

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Substance of the Angels Absolutely

sent unius speciei; vel quod esset in eis aliqua alia perfectior forma quam anima sensibilis. Differunt ergo specie animalia irrationalia secundum diversos gradus determinatos naturae sensitivae. Et similiter omnes angeli differunt specie secundum diversos gradus naturae intellectivae. Ad secundum dicendum quod magis et minus, secundum quod causantur ex intensione et remissione unius formae, non diversificant speciem. Sed secundum quod causantur ex formis diversorum graduum, sic diversificant speciem, sicut si dicamus quod ignis est perfectior aere. Et hoc modo angeli diversificantur secundum magis et minus. Ad tertium dicendum quod bonum speciei praeponderat bono individui. Unde multo melius est quod multiplicentur species in angelis, quam quod multiplicentur individua in una specie. Ad quartum dicendum quod multiplicatio secundum numerum, cum in infinitum protendi possit, non intenditur ab agente, sed sola multiplicatio secundum speciem, ut supra dictum est. Unde perfectio naturae angelicae requirit multiplicationem specierum, non autem multiplicationem individuorum in una specie.

Q. 50, A. 5

tional animals be of the same species; or that there should be in them some form which is higher than the sensible soul. Therefore irrational animals differ in species according to the various determined degrees of sensitive nature; and in like manner all the angels differ in species according to the diverse degrees of intellectual nature. Reply Obj. 2: More and less change the species, not according as they are caused by the intensity or remissness of one form, but according as they are caused by forms of diverse degrees; for instance, if we say that fire is more perfect than air: and in this way the angels are diversified according to more or less. Reply Obj. 3: The good of the species preponderates over the good of the individual. Hence it is much better for the species to be multiplied in the angels than for individuals to be multiplied in the one species. Reply Obj. 4: Numerical multiplication, since it can be drawn out infinitely, is not intended by the agent, but only specific multiplication, as was said above (Q. 47, A. 3). Hence the perfection of the angelic nature calls for the multiplying of species, but not for the multiplying of individuals in one species.

Article 5 Whether the angels are incorruptible? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli non sint incorruptibiles. Dicit enim Damascenus de angelo, quod est substantia intellectualis, gratia et non natura immortalitatem suscipiens. Praeterea, Plato dicit, in Timaeo, O dii deorum, quorum opifex idem paterque ego, opera siquidem vos mea, dissolubilia natura, me tamen ita volente indissolubilia. Hos autem deos non aliud quam angelos intelligere potest. Ergo angeli natura sua sunt corruptibiles. Praeterea, secundum Gregorium, omnia in nihilum deciderent, nisi ea manus omnipotentis conservaret. Sed quod in nihilum redigi potest, est corruptibile. Ergo, cum angeli sint a Deo facti, videtur quod sint corruptibiles secundum suam naturam.

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not incorruptible; for Damascene, speaking of the angel, says (De Fide Orth. ii, 3) that he is an intellectual substance, partaking of immortality by favor, and not by nature. Obj. 2: Further, Plato says in the Timaeus: O gods of gods, whose maker and father am I: You are indeed my works, dissoluble by nature, yet indissoluble because I so will it. But gods such as these can only be understood to be the angels. Therefore the angels are corruptible by their nature Obj. 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xvi), all things would tend towards nothing, unless the hand of the Almighty preserved them. But what can be brought to nothing is corruptible. Therefore, since the angels were made by God, it would appear that they are corruptible of their own nature. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that Div. Nom., quod intellectuales substantiae vitam habent the intellectual substances have unfailing life, being free from indeficientem, ab universa corruptione, morte et materia all corruption, death, matter, and generation.

et generatione mundae existentes. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere angelos secundum suam naturam esse incorruptibiles. Cuius ratio est, quia nihil corrumpitur nisi per hoc, quod forma eius a materia separatur, unde, cum angelus sit ipsa forma subsistens, ut ex dictis patet, impossibile est

I answer that, It must necessarily be maintained that the angels are incorruptible of their own nature. The reason for this is, that nothing is corrupted except by its form being separated from the matter. Hence, since an angel is a subsisting form, as is clear from what was said above (A. 2),

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Q. 50, A. 5

Angels

quod eius substantia sit corruptibilis. Quod enim convenit alicui secundum se, nunquam ab eo separari potest, ab eo autem cui convenit per aliud, potest separari, separato eo secundum quod ei conveniebat. Rotunditas enim a circulo separari non potest, quia convenit ei secundum seipsum, sed aeneus circulus potest amittere rotunditatem per hoc, quod circularis figura separatur ab aere. Esse autem secundum se competit formae, unumquodque enim est ens actu secundum quod habet formam. Materia vero est ens actu per formam. Compositum igitur ex materia et forma desinit esse actu per hoc, quod forma separatur a materia. Sed si ipsa forma subsistat in suo esse, sicut est in angelis, ut dictum est, non potest amittere esse. Ipsa igitur immaterialitas angeli est ratio quare angelus est incorruptibilis secundum suam naturam. Et huius incorruptibilitatis signum accipi potest ex eius intellectuali operatione, quia enim unumquodque operatur secundum quod est actu, operatio rei indicat modum esse ipsius. Species autem et ratio operationis ex obiecto comprehenditur. Obiectum autem intelligibile, cum sit supra tempus, est sempiternum. Unde omnis substantia intellectualis est incorruptibilis secundum suam naturam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Damascenus accipit immortalitatem perfectam, quae includit omnimodam immutabilitatem, quia omnis mutatio est quaedam mors, ut Augustinus dicit. Perfectam autem immutabilitatem angeli non nisi per gratiam assequuntur, ut infra patebit. Ad secundum dicendum quod Plato per deos intelligit corpora caelestia, quae existimabat esse ex elementis composita, et ideo secundum suam naturam dissolubilia, sed voluntate divina semper conservantur in esse. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, quoddam necessarium est quod habet causam suae necessitatis. Unde non repugnat necessario nec incorruptibili, quod esse eius dependeat ab alio sicut a causa. Per hoc ergo quod dicitur quod omnia deciderent in nihilum nisi continerentur a Deo, et etiam angeli, non datur intelligi quod in angelis sit aliquod corruptionis principium, sed quod esse angeli dependeat a Deo sicut a causa. Non autem dicitur aliquid esse corruptibile, per hoc quod Deus possit illud in non esse redigere, subtrahendo suam conservationem, sed per hoc quod in seipso aliquod principium corruptionis habet, vel contrarietatem vel saltem potentiam materiae.

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it is impossible for its substance to be corruptible. For what belongs to anything considered in itself can never be separated from it; but what belongs to a thing, considered in relation to something else, can be separated, when that something else is taken away, in view of which it belonged to it. Roundness can never be taken from the circle, because it belongs to it of itself; but a bronze circle can lose roundness, if the bronze be deprived of its circular shape. Now to be belongs to a form considered in itself; for everything is an actual being according to its form: whereas matter is an actual being by the form. Consequently a subject composed of matter and form ceases to be actually when the form is separated from the matter. But if the form subsists in its own being, as happens in the angels, as was said above (A. 2), it cannot lose its being. Therefore, the angel’s immateriality is the cause why it is incorruptible by its own nature. A token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from its intellectual operation; for since everything acts according as it is actual, the operation of a thing indicates its mode of being. Now the species and nature of the operation is understood from the object. But an intelligible object, being above time, is everlasting. Hence every intellectual substance is incorruptible of its own nature. Reply Obj. 1: Damascene is dealing with perfect immortality, which includes complete immutability; since every change is a kind of death, as Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii). The angels obtain perfect immutability only by favor, as will appear later (Q. 62). Reply Obj. 2: By the expression ‘gods’ Plato understands the heavenly bodies, which he supposed to be made up of elements, and therefore dissoluble of their own nature; yet they are forever preserved in existence by the Divine will. Reply Obj. 3: As was observed above (Q. 44, A. 1) there is a kind of necessary thing which has a cause of its necessity. Hence it is not repugnant to a necessary or incorruptible being to depend for its existence on another as its cause. Therefore, when it is said that all things, even the angels, would lapse into nothing, unless preserved by God, it is not to be gathered therefrom that there is any principle of corruption in the angels; but that the nature of the angels is dependent upon God as its cause. For a thing is said to be corruptible not merely because God can reduce it to nonexistence, by withdrawing His act of preservation; but also because it has some principle of corruption within itself, or some contrariety, or at least the potentiality of matter.

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Question 51 Angels in Comparison with Bodies Deinde quaeritur de angelis per comparationem ad corporalia. Et primo, de comparatione angelorum ad corpora; secundo, de comparatione angelorum ad loca corporalia; tertio, de comparatione angelorum ad motum localem. Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum angeli habeant corpora naturaliter sibi unita. Secundo, utrum assumant corpora. Tertio, utrum in corporibus assumptis exerceant opera vitae.

We next inquire about the angels in comparison with corporeal things; and in the first place about their comparison with bodies; second, of the angels in comparison with corporeal places; and, third, of their comparison with local movement. Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether angels have bodies naturally united to them? (2) Whether they assume bodies? (3) Whether they exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?

Article 1 Whether the angels have bodies naturally united to them? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli habeant corpora naturaliter sibi unita. Dicit enim Origenes, in libro Peri Archon, solius Dei, idest patris et filii et spiritus sancti, naturae illud proprium est, ut sine materiali substantia et absque ulla corporeae adiectionis societate, intelligatur existere. Bernardus etiam dicit, in VI Homilia super Cant., demus Deo soli, sicut immortalitatem sic incorporeitatem, cuius natura sola, neque propter se neque propter alium, solatio indiget instrumenti corporei. Liquet autem omnem spiritum creatum corporeo indigere solatio. Augustinus etiam dicit, super Gen. ad Litt., Daemones aerea dicuntur animalia, quia corporum aereorum natura vigent. Eadem autem est natura daemonis et angeli. Ergo angeli habent corpora naturaliter sibi unita. Praeterea, Gregorius, in homilia Epiphaniae, nominat angelum rationale animal. Omne autem animal componitur ex corpore et anima. Ergo angeli habent corpora naturaliter sibi unita. Praeterea, perfectior est vita in angelis quam in animabus. Sed anima non solum vivit, sed etiam vivificat corpus. Ergo angeli vivificant corpora naturaliter sibi unita. Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod angeli sicut incorporales intelliguntur. Respondeo dicendum quod angeli non habent corpora sibi naturaliter unita. Quod enim accidit alicui naturae, non invenitur universaliter in natura illa, sicut habere alas, quia non est de ratione animalis, non convenit omni animali. Cum autem intelligere non sit actus

Objection 1: It would seem that angels have bodies naturally united to them. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): It is God’s attribute alone—that is, it belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as a property of nature, that He is understood to exist without any material substance and without any companionship of corporeal addition. Bernard likewise says (Hom. vi. super Cant.): Let us assign incorporeity to God alone even as we do immortality, whose nature alone, neither for its own sake nor on account of anything else, needs the help of any corporeal organ. But it is clear that every created spirit needs corporeal substance. Augustine also says (Gen ad lit. iii): The demons are called animals of the atmosphere because their nature is akin to that of aerial bodies. But the nature of demons and angels is the same. Therefore angels have bodies naturally united to them. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory (Hom. x in Ev.) calls an angel a rational animal. But every animal is composed of body and soul. Therefore angels have bodies naturally united to them. Obj. 3: Further, life is more perfect in the angels than in souls. But the soul not only lives, but gives life to the body. Therefore the angels animate bodies which are naturally united to them. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the angels are understood to be incorporeal. I answer that, The angels have not bodies naturally united to them. For whatever belongs to any nature as an accident is not found universally in that nature; thus, for instance, to have wings, because it is not of the essence of an animal, does not belong to every animal. Now since to un-

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Q. 51, A. 1

Angels

corporis nec alicuius virtutis corporeae, ut infra patebit, habere corpus unitum non est de ratione substantiae intellectualis inquantum huiusmodi, sed accidit alicui substantiae intellectuali propter aliquid aliud; sicut humanae animae competit uniri corpori, quia est imperfecta et in potentia existens in genere intellectualium substantiarum, non habens in sui natura plenitudinem scientiae, sed acquirens eam per sensus corporeos a sensibilibus rebus, ut infra dicetur. In quocumque autem genere invenitur aliquid imperfectum, oportet praeexistere aliquid perfectum in genere illo. Sunt igitur aliquae substantiae perfectae intellectuales in natura intellectuali, non indigentes acquirere scientiam a sensibilibus rebus. Non igitur omnes substantiae intellectuales sunt unitae corporibus; sed aliquae sunt a corporibus separatae. Et has dicimus angelos. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, quorundam opinio fuit quod omne ens esset corpus. Et ex hac existimatione derivatum videtur, quod aliqui existimaverunt nullas substantias incorporeas esse nisi corporibus unitas; adeo quod quidam etiam posuerunt Deum esse animam mundi, ut Augustinus narrat in VII de Civ. Dei. Sed quia hoc fidei Catholicae repugnat, quae ponit Deum super omnia exaltatum, secundum illud Psalmi VIII, elevata est magnificentia tua super caelos, Origenes, hoc de Deo dicere recusans, de aliis secutus est aliorum opinionem; sicut et in multis aliis deceptus fuit, sequens antiquorum philosophorum opiniones. Verbum autem Bernardi potest exponi, quod spiritus creati indigeant corporali instrumento, non naturaliter unito, sed ad aliquid assumpto, ut infra dicetur. Augustinus autem loquitur non asserendo, sed opinione Platonicorum utens, qui ponebant esse quaedam animalia aerea, quae daemones nominabant. Ad secundum dicendum quod Gregorius nominat angelum rationale animal metaphorice, propter similitudinem rationis. Ad tertium dicendum quod vivificare effective simpliciter perfectionis est. Unde et Deo convenit, secundum illud I Reg. II, dominus mortificat et vivificat. Sed vivificare formaliter est substantiae quae est pars alicuius naturae, et non habentis in se integram naturam speciei. Unde substantia intellectualis quae non est unita corpori, est perfectior quam ea quae est corpori unita.

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derstand is not the act of a body, nor of any corporeal energy, as will be shown later (Q. 75, A. 2), it follows that to have a body united to it is not of the nature of an intellectual substance, as such; but it is accidental to some intellectual substance on account of something else. Even so it belongs to the human soul to be united to a body, because it is imperfect and exists potentially in the genus of intellectual substances, not having the fullness of knowledge in its own nature, but acquiring it from sensible things through the bodily senses, as will be explained later on (Q. 84, A. 6; Q. 89, A. 1). Now whenever we find something imperfect in any genus we must presuppose something perfect in that genus. Therefore in the intellectual nature there are some perfectly intellectual substances, which do not need to acquire knowledge from sensible things. Consequently not all intellectual substances are united to bodies; but some are quite separated from bodies, and these we call angels. Reply Obj. 1: As was said above (Q. 50, A. 1), it was the opinion of some that every being is a body; and consequently some seem to have thought that there were no incorporeal substances existing except as united to bodies; so much so that some even held that God was the soul of the world, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei vii). As this is contrary to Catholic Faith, which asserts that God is exalted above all things, according to Ps. 8:2: Thy magnificence is exalted beyond the heavens; Origen, while refusing to say such a thing of God, followed the above opinion of others regarding the other substances; being deceived here as he was also in many other points, by following the opinions of the ancient philosophers. Bernard’s expression can be explained, that the created spirit needs some bodily instrument, which is not naturally united to it, but assumed for some purpose, as will be explained (A. 2). Augustine speaks, not as asserting the fact, but merely using the opinion of the Platonists, who maintained that there are some aerial animals, which they termed demons. Reply Obj. 2: Gregory calls the angel a rational animal metaphorically, on account of the likeness to the rational nature. Reply Obj. 3: To give life effectively is a perfection simply speaking; hence it belongs to God, as is said (1 Kgs 2:6): The Lord killeth, and maketh alive. But to give life formally belongs to a substance which is part of some nature, and which has not within itself the full nature of the species. Hence an intellectual substance which is not united to a body is more perfect than one which is united to a body.

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Angels in Comparison with Bodies

Q. 51, A. 2

Article 2 Whether angels assume bodies? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli non assumant corpora. In opere enim angeli nihil est superfluum; sicut neque in opere naturae. Sed superfluum esset quod angeli corpora assumerent, angelus enim non indiget corpore, cum eius virtus omnem virtutem corporis excedat. Ergo angelus non assumit corpus. Praeterea, omnis assumptio ad aliquam unionem terminatur, quia assumere dicitur quasi ad se sumere. Sed corpus non unitur angelo ut formae, sicut dictum est. Ex eo autem quod unitur sibi ut motori, non dicitur assumi, alioquin sequeretur quod omnia corpora mota ab angelis, essent ab eis assumpta. Ergo angeli non assumunt corpora. Praeterea, angeli non assumunt corpora de terra vel aqua, quia non subito disparerent; neque iterum de igne, quia comburerent ea quae contingerent; neque iterum ex aere, quia aer infigurabilis est et incolorabilis. Ergo angeli corpora non assumunt. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XVI de Civ. Dei, quod angeli in assumptis corporibus Abrahae apparuerunt. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt angelos nunquam corpora assumere, sed omnia quae in Scripturis divinis leguntur de apparitionibus angelorum, contigisse in visione prophetiae, hoc est secundum imaginationem. Sed hoc repugnat intentioni Scripturae. Illud enim quod imaginaria visione videtur, est in sola imaginatione videntis, unde non videtur indifferenter ab omnibus. Scriptura autem divina sic introducit interdum angelos apparentes, ut communiter ab omnibus viderentur; sicut angeli apparentes Abrahae, visi sunt ab eo et tota familia eius, et a Loth, et a civibus Sodomorum. Similiter angelus qui apparuit Tobiae, ab omnibus videbatur. Ex quo manifestum fit huiusmodi contigisse secundum corpoream visionem, qua videtur id quod positum est extra videntem, unde ab omnibus videri potest. Tali autem visione non videtur nisi corpus. Cum igitur angeli neque corpora sint, neque habeant corpora naturaliter sibi unita, ut ex dictis patet, relinquitur quod interdum corpora assumant.

Objection 1: It would seem that angels do not assume bodies. For there is nothing superfluous in the work of an angel, as there is nothing of the kind in the work of nature. But it would be superfluous for the angels to assume bodies, because an angel has no need for a body, since his own power exceeds all bodily power. Therefore an angel does not assume a body. Obj. 2: Further, every assumption is terminated in some union; because to assume implies a taking to oneself. But a body is not united to an angel as to a form, as stated (A. 1); while in so far as it is united to the angel as to a mover, it is not said to be assumed, otherwise it would follow that all bodies moved by the angels are assumed by them. Therefore the angels do not assume bodies. Obj. 3: Further, angels do not assume bodies from the earth or water, or they could not suddenly disappear; nor again from fire, otherwise they would burn whatever things they touched; nor again from air, because air is without shape or color. Therefore the angels do not assume bodies. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi) that angels appeared to Abraham under assumed bodies. I answer that, Some have maintained that the angels never assume bodies, but that all that we read in Scripture of apparitions of angels happened in prophetic vision—that is, according to imagination.

But this is contrary to the intent of Scripture; for whatever is beheld in imaginary vision is only in the beholder’s imagination, and consequently is not seen by everybody. Yet Divine Scripture from time to time introduces angels so apparent as to be seen commonly by all; just as the angels who appeared to Abraham were seen by him and by his whole family, by Lot, and by the citizens of Sodom; in like manner the angel who appeared to Tobias was seen by all present. From all this it is clearly shown that such apparitions were beheld by bodily vision, whereby the object seen exists outside the person beholding it, and can accordingly be seen by all. Now by such a vision only a body can be beheld. Consequently, since the angels are not bodies, nor have they bodies naturally united with them, as is clear from what has been said (A. 1; Q. 50, A. 1), it follows that they sometimes assume bodies. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod angeli non inReply Obj. 1: Angels need an assumed body, not for digent corpore assumpto propter seipsos, sed propter themselves, but on our account; that by conversing familnos; ut familiariter cum hominibus conversando, de- iarly with men they may give evidence of that intellectual monstrent intelligibilem societatem quam homines ex- companionship which men expect to have with them in the pectant cum eis habendam in futura vita. Hoc etiam life to come. Moreover that angels assumed bodies under quod angeli corpora assumpserunt in veteri testamento, the Old Law was a figurative indication that the Word of fuit quoddam figurale indicium quod verbum Dei as- God would take a human body; because all the apparitions

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Q. 51, A. 3

Angels

sumpturum esset corpus humanum, omnes enim apparitiones veteris testamenti ad illam apparitionem ordinatae fuerunt, qua filius Dei apparuit in carne. Ad secundum dicendum quod corpus assumptum unitur angelo, non quidem ut formae, neque solum ut motori; sed sicut motori repraesentato per corpus mobile assumptum. Sicut enim in sacra Scriptura proprietates rerum intelligibilium sub similitudinibus rerum sensibilium describuntur, ita corpora sensibilia divina virtute sic formantur ab angelis, ut congruant ad repraesentandum angeli intelligibiles proprietates. Et hoc est angelum assumere corpus. Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet aer, in sua raritate manens, non retineat figuram neque colorem; quando tamen condensatur, et figurari et colorari potest, sicut patet in nubibus. Et sic angeli assumunt corpora ex aere, condensando ipsum virtute divina, quantum necesse est ad corporis assumendi formationem.

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in the Old Testament were ordained to that one whereby the Son of God appeared in the flesh. Reply Obj. 2: The body assumed is united to the angel not as its form, nor merely as its mover, but as its mover represented by the assumed movable body. For as in the Sacred Scripture the properties of intelligible things are set forth by the likenesses of things sensible, in the same way by Divine power sensible bodies are so fashioned by angels as fittingly to represent the intelligible properties of an angel. And this is what we mean by an angel assuming a body. Reply Obj. 3: Although air as long as it is in a state of rarefaction has neither shape nor color, yet when condensed it can both be shaped and colored as appears in the clouds. Even so the angels assume bodies of air, condensing it by the Divine power in so far as is needful for forming the assumed body.

Article 3 Whether the angels exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli in corporibus assumptis opera vitae exerceant. Angelos enim veritatis non decet aliqua fictio. Esset autem fictio, si corpus ab eis assumptum, quod vivum videtur et opera vitae habens, non haberet huiusmodi. Ergo angeli in assumpto corpore opera vitae exercent. Praeterea, in operibus angeli non sunt aliqua frustra. Frustra autem in corpore assumpto per angelum formarentur oculi et nares et alia sensuum instrumenta, nisi per ea angelus sentiret. Ergo angelus sentit per corpus assumptum. Quod est propriissimum opus vitae.

Praeterea, moveri motu processivo est unum de operibus vitae, ut patet in II de Anima. Manifeste autem angeli apparent in assumptis corporibus moveri. Dicitur enim Gen. XVIII, quod Abraham simul gradiebatur, deducens angelos qui ei apparuerant. Et angelus Tobiae quaerenti, nosti viam quae ducit in civitatem Medorum? Respondit, novi, et omnia itinera eius frequenter ambulavi. Ergo angeli in corporibus assumptis frequenter exercent opera vitae. Praeterea, locutio est opus viventis, fit enim per vocem, quae est sonus ab ore animalis prolatus, ut dicitur in II de Anima. Manifestum est autem ex multis locis Scripturae, angelos in assumptis corporibus locutos fuisse. Ergo in corporibus assumptis exercent opera vitae.

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels exercise functions of life in assumed bodies. For pretence is unbecoming in angels of truth. But it would be pretence if the body assumed by them, which seems to live and to exercise vital functions, did not possess these functions. Therefore the angels exercise functions of life in the assumed body. Obj. 2: Further, in the works of the angels there is nothing without a purpose. But eyes, nostrils, and the other instruments of the senses, would be fashioned without a purpose in the body assumed by the angel, if he perceived nothing by their means. Consequently, the angel perceives by the assumed body; and this is the most special function of life. Obj. 3: Further, to move hither and thither is one of the functions of life, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii). But the angels are manifestly seen to move in their assumed bodies. For it was said (Gen 18:16) that Abraham walked with the angels, who had appeared to him, bringing them on the way; and when Tobias said to the angel (Tob 5:7, 8): Knowest thou the way that leadeth to the city of Medes? he answered: I know it; and I have often walked through all the ways thereof. Therefore the angels often exercise functions of life in assumed bodies. Obj. 4: Further, speech is the function of a living subject, for it is produced by the voice, while the voice itself is a sound conveyed from the mouth. But it is evident from many passages of Sacred Scripture that angels spoke in assumed bodies. Therefore in their assumed bodies they exercise functions of life.

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Praeterea, comedere est proprium opus animalis, unde dominus post resurrectionem, in argumentum resumptae vitae, cum discipulis manducavit, ut habetur Lucae ultimo. Sed angeli in assumptis corporibus apparentes comederunt, et Abraham eis cibos obtulit, quos tamen prius adoraverat, ut habetur Gen. XVIII. Ergo angeli in assumptis corporibus exercent opera vitae. Praeterea, generare hominem est actus vitae. Sed hoc competit angelis in assumptis corporibus, dicitur enim Gen. VI, postquam ingressi sunt filii Dei ad filias hominum, illaeque genuerunt, isti sunt potentes a saeculo viri famosi. Ergo angeli exercent opera vitae in corporibus assumptis. Sed contra, corpora assumpta ab angelis non vivunt, ut supra dictum est. Ergo nec opera vitae per ea exerceri possunt. Respondeo dicendum quod quaedam opera viventium habent aliquid commune cum aliis operibus, ut locutio, quae est opus viventis, convenit cum aliis sonis inanimatorum, inquantum est sonus; et progressio cum aliis motibus, inquantum est motus. Quantum ergo ad id quod est commune utrisque operibus, possunt opera vitae fieri ab angelis per corpora assumpta. Non autem quantum ad id quod est proprium viventium, quia secundum Philosophum, in libro de Somn. et Vig., cuius est potentia, eius est actio; unde nihil potest habere opus vitae, quod non habet vitam, quae est potentiale principium talis actionis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut non est contra veritatem quod in Scriptura intelligibilia sub figuris sensibilibus describuntur, quia hoc non dicitur ad adstruendum quod intelligibilia sint sensibilia, sed per figuras sensibilium proprietates intelligibilium secundum similitudinem quandam dantur intelligi; ita non repugnat veritati sanctorum angelorum quod corpora ab eis assumpta videntur homines viventes, licet non sint. Non enim assumuntur nisi ut per proprietates hominis et operum hominis spirituales proprietates angelorum et eorum spiritualia opera designentur. Quod non ita congrue fieret, si veros homines assumerent, quia proprietates eorum ducerent in ipsos homines, non in angelos. Ad secundum dicendum quod sentire est totaliter opus vitae, unde nullo modo est dicendum quod angeli per organa assumptorum corporum sentiant. Nec tamen superflue sunt formata. Non enim ad hoc sunt formata, ut per ea sentiatur, sed ad hoc ut per huiusmodi organa virtutes spirituales angelorum designentur; sicut per oculum designatur virtus cognitiva angeli, et per alia membra aliae eius virtutes, ut Dionysius docet, ult. cap. Cael. Hier. Ad tertium dicendum quod motus qui est a motore coniuncto, est proprium opus vitae. Sic autem non mo-

Q. 51, A. 3

Obj. 5: Further, eating is a purely animal function. Hence the Lord after His Resurrection ate with His disciples in proof of having resumed life (Luke 24). Now when angels appeared in their assumed bodies they ate, and Abraham offered them food, after having previously adored them as God (Gen 18). Therefore the angels exercise functions of life in assumed bodies. Obj. 6: Further, to beget offspring is a vital act. But this has befallen the angels in their assumed bodies; for it is related: After the sons of God went in to the daughters of men, and they brought forth children, these are the mighty men of old, men of renown (Gen 6:4). Consequently the angels exercised vital functions in their assumed bodies. On the contrary, The bodies assumed by angels have no life, as was stated in the previous article (ad 3). Therefore they cannot exercise functions of life through assumed bodies. I answer that, Some functions of living subjects have something in common with other operations; just as speech, which is the function of a living creature, agrees with other sounds of inanimate things, in so far as it is sound; and walking agrees with other movements, in so far as it is movement. Consequently vital functions can be performed in assumed bodies by the angels, as to that which is common in such operations; but not as to that which is special to living subjects; because, according to the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vig. i), that which has the faculty has the action. Hence nothing can have a function of life except what has life, which is the potential principle of such action. Reply Obj. 1: As it is in no wise contrary to truth for intelligible things to be set forth in Scripture under sensible figures, since it is not said for the purpose of maintaining that intelligible things are sensible, but in order that properties of intelligible things may be understood according to similitude through sensible figures; so it is not contrary to the truth of the holy angels that through their assumed bodies they appear to be living men, although they are really not. For the bodies are assumed merely for this purpose, that the spiritual properties and works of the angels may be manifested by the properties of man and of his works. This could not so fittingly be done if they were to assume true men; because the properties of such men would lead us to men, and not to angels. Reply Obj. 2: Sensation is entirely a vital function. Consequently it can in no way be said that the angels perceive through the organs of their assumed bodies. Yet such bodies are not fashioned in vain; for they are not fashioned for the purpose of sensation through them, but to this end, that by such bodily organs the spiritual powers of the angels may be made manifest; just as by the eye the power of the angel’s knowledge is pointed out, and other powers by the other members, as Dionysius teaches (Coel. Hier.). Reply Obj. 3: Movement coming from a united mover is a proper function of life; but the bodies assumed by the

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ventur corpora assumpta ab eis, quia angeli non sunt eorum formae. Moventur tamen angeli per accidens, motis huiusmodi corporibus, cum sint in eis sicut motores in mobilibus, et ita sunt hic quod non alibi, quod de Deo dici non potest. Unde licet Deus non moveatur, motis his in quibus est, quia ubique est; angeli tamen moventur per accidens ad motum corporum assumptorum. Non autem ad motum corporum caelestium, etiamsi sint in eis sicut motores in mobilibus, quia corpora caelestia non recedunt de loco secundum totum; nec determinatur spiritui moventi orbem locus secundum aliquam determinatam partem substantiae orbis, quae nunc est in oriente, nunc in occidente; sed secundum determinatum situm, quia semper est in oriente virtus movens, ut dicitur in VIII Physic.

angels are not thus moved, since the angels are not their forms. Yet the angels are moved accidentally, when such bodies are moved, since they are in them as movers are in the moved; and they are here in such a way as not to be elsewhere, which cannot be said of God. Accordingly, although God is not moved when the things are moved in which He exists, since He is everywhere; yet the angels are moved accidentally according to the movement of the bodies assumed. But they are not moved according to the movement of the heavenly bodies, even though they be in them as the movers in the thing moved, because the heavenly bodies do not change place in their entirety; nor for the spirit which moves the world is there any fixed locality according to any restricted part of the world’s substance, which now is in the east, and now in the west, but according to a fixed quarter; because the moving energy is always in the east, as stated in Phys. viii, text 84. Ad quartum dicendum quod angeli proprie non loReply Obj. 4: Properly speaking, the angels do not talk quuntur per corpora assumpta, sed est aliquid simile lo- through their assumed bodies; yet there is a semblance of cutioni, inquantum formant sonos in aere similes voci- speech, in so far as they fashion sounds in the air like to hubus humanis. man voices. Ad quintum dicendum quod nec etiam comedere, Reply Obj. 5: Properly speaking, the angels cannot be proprie loquendo, angelis convenit, quia comestio im- said to eat, because eating involves the taking of food conportat sumptionem cibi convertibilis in substantiam co- vertible into the substance of the eater.

medentis. Et quamvis in corpus Christi post resurrectionem cibus non converteretur, sed resolveretur in praeiacentem materiam, tamen Christus habebat corpus talis naturae in quod posset cibus converti, unde fuit vera comestio. Sed cibus assumptus ab angelis neque convertebatur in corpus assumptum, neque corpus illud talis erat naturae in quod posset alimentum converti, unde non fuit vera comestio, sed figurativa spiritualis comestionis. Et hoc est quod angelus dixit, Tob. XII, cum essem vobiscum, videbar quidem manducare et bibere, sed ego potu invisibili et cibo utor. Abraham autem obtulit eis cibos, existimans eos homines esse; in quibus tamen Deum venerabatur, sicut solet Deus esse in prophetis, ut Augustinus dicit, XVI de Civ. Dei. Ad sextum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XV de Civ. Dei, multi se expertos, vel ab expertis audisse confirmant, Silvanos et Faunos, quos vulgus incubos vocat, improbos saepe extitisse mulieribus et earum expetisse atque peregisse concubitum. Unde hoc negare impudentiae videtur. Sed angeli Dei sancti nullo modo sic labi ante diluvium potuerunt. Unde per filios Dei intelliguntur filii Seth, qui boni erant, filias autem hominum nominat Scriptura eas quae natae erant de stirpe Cain. Neque mirandum est quod de eis gigantes nasci potuerunt, neque enim omnes gigantes fuerunt, sed multo plures ante diluvium quam post.

Although after the Resurrection food was not converted into the substance of Christ’s body, but resolved into preexisting matter; nevertheless Christ had a body of such a true nature that food could be changed into it; hence it was a true eating. But the food taken by angels was neither changed into the assumed body, nor was the body of such a nature that food could be changed into it; consequently, it was not a true eating, but figurative of spiritual eating. This is what the angel said to Tobias: When I was with you, I seemed indeed to eat and to drink; but I use an invisible meat and drink (Tob 12:19). Abraham offered them food, deeming them to be men, in whom, nevertheless, he worshipped God, as God is wont to be in the prophets, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi). Reply Obj. 6: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv): Many persons affirm that they have had the experience, or have heard from such as have experienced it, that the Satyrs and Fauns, whom the common folk call incubi, have often presented themselves before women, and have sought and procured intercourse with them. Hence it is folly to deny it. But God’s holy angels could not fall in such fashion before the deluge. Hence by the sons of God are to be understood the sons of Seth, who were good; while by the daughters of men the Scripture designates those who sprang from the race of Cain. Nor is it to be wondered at that giants should be born of them; for they were not all giants, albeit there were many more before than after the deluge.

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Si tamen ex coitu daemonum aliqui interdum nascuntur, hoc non est per semen ab eis decisum, aut a corporibus assumptis, sed per semen alicuius hominis ad hoc acceptum, utpote quod idem daemon qui est succubus ad virum, fiat incubus ad mulierem; sicut et aliarum rerum semina assumunt ad aliquarum rerum generationem, ut Augustinus dicit, III de Trin.; ut sic ille qui nascitur non sit filius daemonis, sed illius hominis cuius est semen acceptum.

Q. 51, A. 3

Still if some are occasionally begotten from demons, it is not from the seed of such demons, nor from their assumed bodies, but from the seed of men taken for the purpose; as when the demon assumes first the form of a woman, and afterwards of a man; just as they take the seed of other things for other generating purposes, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii), so that the person born is not the child of a demon, but of a man.

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Question 52 Angels in Relation to Place Deinde quaeritur de loco angeli. Et circa hoc quaeWe now inquire into the place of the angels. Touching runtur tria. this there are three subjects of inquiry: Primo, utrum angelus sit in loco. (1) Is the angel in a place? Secundo, utrum possit esse in pluribus locis simul. (2) Can he be in several places at once? Tertio, utrum plures angeli possint esse in eodem (3) Can several angels be in the same place? loco.

Article 1 Whether an angel is in a place? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus non sit in loco. Dicit enim Boetius, in libro de Hebd., communis animi conceptio apud sapientes est, incorporalia in loco non esse. Et Aristoteles, in IV Physic., dicit quod non omne quod est, est in loco, sed mobile corpus. Sed angelus non est corpus, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo angelus non est in loco. Praeterea, locus est quantitas positionem habens. Omne ergo quod est in loco, habet aliquem situm. Sed habere situm non potest convenire angelo, cum substantia sua sit immunis a quantitate, cuius propria differentia est positionem habere. Ergo angelus non est in loco. Praeterea, esse in loco est mensurari loco et contineri a loco, ut patet per Philosophum in IV Physic. Sed angelus non potest mensurari neque contineri a loco, quia continens est formalius contento, sicut aer aqua, ut dicitur in IV Physic. Ergo angelus non est in loco. Sed contra est quod in collecta dicitur, Angeli tui sancti, habitantes in ea, nos in pace custodiant. Respondeo dicendum quod angelo convenit esse in loco, aequivoce tamen dicitur angelus esse in loco, et corpus. Corpus enim est in loco per hoc, quod applicatur loco secundum contactum dimensivae quantitatis. Quae quidem in angelis non est; sed est in eis quantitas virtualis. Per applicationem igitur virtutis angelicae ad aliquem locum qualitercumque, dicitur angelus esse in loco corporeo. Et secundum hoc patet quod non oportet dicere quod angelus commensuretur loco; vel quod habeat situm in continuo. Haec enim conveniunt corpori locato, prout est quantum quantitate dimensiva. Similiter etiam non oportet propter hoc, quod contineatur a loco. Nam substantia incorporea sua virtute contingens rem corpoream, continet ipsam, et non continetur ab ea, ani-

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not in a place. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): The common opinion of the learned is that things incorporeal are not in a place. And again, Aristotle observes (Phys. iv, 48,57) that it is not everything existing which is in a place, but only a movable body. But an angel is not a body, as was shown above (Q. 50). Therefore an angel is not in a place. Obj. 2: Further, place is a quantity having position. But everything which is in a place has some position. Now to have a position cannot befit an angel, since his substance is devoid of quantity, the proper difference of which is to have a position. Therefore an angel is not in a place. Obj. 3: Further, to be in a place is to be measured and to be contained by such place, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 14,119). But an angel can neither be measured nor contained by a place, because the container is more formal than the contained; as air with regard to water (Phys. iv, 35,49). Therefore an angel is not in a place. On the contrary, It is said in the Collect: Let Thy holy angels who dwell herein, keep us in peace. I answer that, It is befitting an angel to be in a place; yet an angel and a body are said to be in a place in quite a different sense. A body is said to be in a place in such a way that it is applied to such place according to the contact of dimensive quantity; but there is no such quantity in the angels, for theirs is a virtual one. Consequently an angel is said to be in a corporeal place by application of the angelic power in any manner whatever to any place. Accordingly there is no need for saying that an angel can be deemed commensurate with a place, or that he occupies a space in the continuous; for this is proper to a located body which is endowed with dimensive quantity. In similar fashion it is not necessary on this account for the angel to be contained by a place; because an incorporeal substance virtually contains the thing with which it comes into con-

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ma enim est in corpore ut continens, et non ut conten- tact, and is not contained by it: for the soul is in the body ta. Et similiter angelus dicitur esse in loco corporeo, non as containing it, not as contained by it. In the same way an ut contentum, sed ut continens aliquo modo. angel is said to be in a place which is corporeal, not as the thing contained, but as somehow containing it. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. And hereby we have the answers to the objections.

Article 2 Whether an angel can be in several places at once? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus possit esse in pluribus locis simul. Angelus enim non est minoris virtutis quam anima. Sed anima est simul in pluribus locis, quia est tota in qualibet parte corporis, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo angelus potest esse in pluribus locis simul. Praeterea, angelus est in corpore assumpto; et cum assumat corpus continuum, videtur quod sit in qualibet eius parte. Sed secundum partes eius considerantur diversa loca. Ergo angelus est simul in pluribus locis. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit quod ubi angelus operatur, ibi est. Sed aliquando operatur simul in pluribus locis, ut patet de angelo subvertente Sodomam, Gen. XIX. Ergo angelus potest esse in pluribus locis simul. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, quod angeli, dum sunt in caelo, non sunt in terra. Respondeo dicendum quod angelus est virtutis et essentiae finitae. Divina autem virtus et essentia infinita est, et est universalis causa omnium, et ideo sua virtute omnia contingit, et non solum in pluribus locis est, sed ubique. Virtus autem angeli, quia finita est, non se extendit ad omnia, sed ad aliquid unum determinatum. Oportet enim quidquid comparatur ad unam virtutem, ut unum aliquid comparari ad ipsam. Sicut igitur universum ens comparatur ut unum aliquid ad universalem Dei virtutem, ita et aliquod particulare ens comparatur ut aliquid unum ad angeli virtutem. Unde cum angelus sit in loco per applicationem virtutis suae ad locum, sequitur quod non sit ubique, nec in pluribus locis, sed in uno loco tantum. Circa hoc tamen aliqui decepti sunt. Quidam enim, imaginationem transcendere non valentes, cogitaverunt indivisibilitatem angeli ad modum indivisibilitatis puncti, et inde crediderunt quod angelus non posset esse nisi in loco punctali. Sed manifeste decepti sunt. Nam punctum est indivisibile habens situm, sed angelus est indivisibile extra genus quantitatis et situs existens. Unde non est necesse quod determinetur ei unus locus indivisibilis secundum situm; sed vel divisibilis vel indivisibilis, vel maior vel minor, secundum quod voluntarie applicat

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel can be in several places at once. For an angel is not less endowed with power than the soul. But the soul is in several places at once, for it is entirely in every part of the body, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi). Therefore an angel can be in several places at once. Obj. 2: Further, an angel is in the body which he assumes; and, since the body which he assumes is continuous, it would appear that he is in every part thereof. But according to the various parts there are various places. Therefore the angel is at one time in various places. Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that where the angel operates, there he is. But occasionally he operates in several places at one time, as is evident from the angel destroying Sodom (Gen 19:25). Therefore an angel can be in several places at the one time. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that while the angels are in heaven, they are not on earth. I answer that, An angel’s power and nature are finite, whereas the Divine power and essence, which is the universal cause of all things, is infinite: consequently God through His power touches all things, and is not merely present in some places, but is everywhere. Now since the angel’s power is finite, it does not extend to all things, but to one determined thing. For whatever is compared with one power must be compared therewith as one determined thing. Consequently since all being is compared as one thing to God’s universal power, so is one particular being compared as one with the angelic power. Hence, since the angel is in a place by the application of his power to the place, it follows that he is not everywhere, nor in several places, but in only one place. Some, however, have been deceived in this matter. For some who were unable to go beyond the reach of their imaginations supposed the indivisibility of the angel to be like that of a point; consequently they thought that an angel could be only in a place which is a point. But they were manifestly deceived, because a point is something indivisible, yet having its situation; whereas the angel is indivisible, and beyond the genus of quantity and situation. Consequently there is no occasion for determining in his regard one indivisible place as to situation: any place which is ei-

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Angels in Relation to Place

Q. 52, A. 3

suam virtutem ad corpus maius vel minus. Et sic totum ther divisible or indivisible, great or small suffices, accordcorpus cui per suam virtutem applicatur, correspondet ei ing as to his own free-will he applies his power to a great or ut unus locus. to a small body. So the entire body to which he is applied by his power, corresponds as one place to him. Nec tamen oportet quod si aliquis angelus movet caeNeither, if any angel moves the heavens, is it necessary lum, quod sit ubique. Primo quidem, quia non applica- for him to be everywhere. First of all, because his power is tur virtus eius nisi ad id quod primo ab ipso movetur, applied only to what is first moved by him. Now there is one una autem pars caeli est in qua primo est motus, scili- part of the heavens in which there is movement first of all, cet pars orientis, unde etiam Philosophus, in VIII Phy- namely, the part to the east: hence the Philosopher (Phys. sic., virtutem motoris caelorum attribuit parti orientis. vii, 84) attributes the power of the heavenly mover to the Secundo, quia non ponitur a philosophis quod una sub- part which is in the east. Second, because philosophers do stantia separata moveat omnes orbes immediate. Unde not hold that one separate substance moves all the spheres non oportet quod sit ubique. immediately. Hence it need not be everywhere. Sic igitur patet quod diversimode esse in loco conveSo, then, it is evident that to be in a place appertains nit corpori, et angelo, et Deo. Nam corpus est in loco cir- quite differently to a body, to an angel, and to God. For cumscriptive, quia commensuratur loco. Angelus autem a body is in a place in a circumscribed fashion, since it is non circumscriptive, cum non commensuretur loco, sed measured by the place. An angel, however, is not there in definitive, quia ita est in uno loco, quod non in alio. Deus a circumscribed fashion, since he is not measured by the autem neque circumscriptive neque definitive, quia est place, but definitively, because he is in a place in such a ubique. manner that he is not in another. But God is neither circumscriptively nor definitively there, because He is everywhere. Et per hoc patet de facili responsio ad obiecta, quia From this we can easily gather an answer to the objectotum illud cui immediate applicatur virtus angeli, repu- tions: because the entire subject to which the angelic power tatur ut unus locus eius, licet sit continuum. is immediately applied, is reputed as one place, even though it be continuous.

Article 3 Whether several angels can be at the same time in the same place? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod plures angeli possint simul esse in eodem loco. Plura enim corpora non possunt esse simul in eodem loco, quia replent locum. Sed angeli non replent locum, quia solum corpus replet locum, ut non sit vacuum, ut patet per Philosophum, in IV Physic. Ergo plures angeli possunt esse in uno loco. Praeterea, plus differt angelus et corpus quam duo angeli. Sed angelus et corpus sunt simul in eodem loco, quia nullus locus est qui non sit plenus sensibili corpore, ut probatur in IV Physic. Ergo multo magis duo angeli possunt esse in eodem loco. Praeterea, anima est in qualibet parte corporis, secundum Augustinum. Sed daemones, licet non illabantur mentibus, illabuntur tamen interdum corporibus, et sic anima et daemon sunt simul in eodem loco. Ergo, eadem ratione, quaecumque aliae spirituales substantiae. Sed contra, duae animae non sunt in eodem corpore. Ergo, pari ratione, neque duo angeli in eodem loco.

Objection 1: It would seem that several angels can be at the same time in the same place. For several bodies cannot be at the same time in the same place, because they fill the place. But the angels do not fill a place, because only a body fills a place, so that it be not empty, as appears from the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 52,58). Therefore several angels can be in the one place. Obj. 2: Further, there is a greater difference between an angel and a body than there is between two angels. But an angel and a body are at the one time in the one place: because there is no place which is not filled with a sensible body, as we find proved in Phys. iv, text. 58. Much more, then, can two angels be in the same place. Obj. 3: Further, the soul is in every part of the body, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi). But demons, although they do not obsess souls, do obsess bodies occasionally; and thus the soul and the demon are at the one time in the same place; and consequently for the same reason all other spiritual substances. On the contrary, There are not two souls in the same body. Therefore for a like reason there are not two angels in the same place.

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Q. 52, A. 3

Angels

Respondeo dicendum quod duo angeli non sunt simul in eodem loco. Et ratio huius est, quia impossibile est quod duae causae completae sint immediatae unius et eiusdem rei. Quod patet in omni genere causarum, una enim est forma proxima unius rei, et unum est proximum movens, licet possint esse plures motores remoti. Nec habet instantiam de pluribus trahentibus navem, quia nullus eorum est perfectus motor, cum virtus uniuscuiusque sit insufficiens ad movendum; sed omnes simul sunt in loco unius motoris, inquantum omnes virtutes eorum aggregantur ad unum motum faciendum. Unde cum angelus dicatur esse in loco per hoc quod virtus eius immediate contingit locum per modum continentis perfecti, ut dictum est, non potest esse nisi unus angelus in uno loco. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod plures angelos esse in uno loco non impeditur propter impletionem loci, sed propter aliam causam, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod angelus et corpus non eodem modo sunt in loco, unde ratio non sequitur. Ad tertium dicendum quod nec etiam daemon et anima comparantur ad corpus secundum eandem habitudinem causae; cum anima sit forma, non autem daemon. Unde ratio non sequitur.

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I answer that, There are not two angels in the same place. The reason of this is because it is impossible for two complete causes to be the causes immediately of one and the same thing. This is evident in every class of causes: for there is one proximate form of one thing, and there is one proximate mover, although there may be several remote movers. Nor can it be objected that several individuals may row a boat, since no one of them is a perfect mover, because no one man’s strength is sufficient for moving the boat; while all together are as one mover, in so far as their united strengths all combine in producing the one movement. Hence, since the angel is said to be in one place by the fact that his power touches the place immediately by way of a perfect container, as was said (A. 1), there can be but one angel in one place. Reply Obj. 1: Several angels are not hindered from being in the same place because of their filling the place; but for another reason, as has been said. Reply Obj. 2: An angel and a body are not in a place in the same way; hence the conclusion does not follow. Reply Obj. 3: Not even a demon and a soul are compared to a body according to the same relation of causality; since the soul is its form, while the demon is not. Hence the inference does not follow.

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Question 53 The Local Movement of the Angels Consequenter considerandum est de motu locali anWe must next consider the local movement of the angelorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. gels; under which heading there are three points of inquiry: Primo, utrum angelus possit moveri localiter. (1) Whether an angel can be moved locally. Secundo, utrum moveatur de loco ad locum, (2) Whether in passing from place to place he passes pertranseundo medium. through intervening space? Tertio, utrum motus angeli sit in tempore vel in (3) Whether the angel’s movement is in time or instanti. instantaneous?

Article 1 Whether an angel can be moved locally? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus non possit moveri localiter. Ut enim probat Philosophus in VI Physic., nullum impartibile movetur, quia dum aliquid est in termino a quo, non movetur; nec etiam dum est in termino ad quem, sed tunc mutatum est, unde relinquitur quod omne quod movetur, dum movetur, partim est in termino a quo, et partim in termino ad quem. Sed angelus est impartibilis. Ergo angelus non potest moveri localiter. Praeterea, motus est actus imperfecti, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed angelus beatus non est imperfectus. Ergo angelus beatus non movetur localiter. Praeterea, motus non est nisi propter indigentiam. Sed sanctorum angelorum nulla est indigentia. Ergo sancti angeli localiter non moventur. Sed contra, eiusdem rationis est angelum beatum moveri, et animam beatam moveri. Sed necesse est dicere animam beatam localiter moveri, cum sit articulus fidei quod Christus secundum animam, descendit ad Inferos. Ergo angelus beatus movetur localiter. Respondeo dicendum quod angelus beatus potest moveri localiter. Sed sicut esse in loco aequivoce convenit corpori et angelo, ita etiam et moveri secundum locum. Corpus enim est in loco, inquantum continetur sub loco, et commensuratur loco. Unde oportet quod etiam motus corporis secundum locum, commensuretur loco, et sit secundum exigentiam eius. Et inde est quod secundum continuitatem magnitudinis est continuitas motus; et secundum prius et posterius in magnitudine, est prius et posterius in motu locali corporis, ut dicitur in IV Physic. Sed angelus non est in loco ut commensuratus et contentus, sed magis ut continens. Unde motus angeli in

Objection 1: It seems that an angel cannot be moved locally. For, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, 32, 86), nothing which is devoid of parts is moved; because, while it is in the term wherefrom, it is not moved; nor while it is in the term whereto, for it is then already moved; consequently it remains that everything which is moved, while it is being moved, is partly in the term wherefrom and partly in the term whereto. But an angel is without parts. Therefore an angel cannot be moved locally. Obj. 2: Further, movement is the act of an imperfect being, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, 14). But a beatified angel is not imperfect. Consequently a beatified angel is not moved locally. Obj. 3: Further, movement is simply because of want. But the holy angels have no want. Therefore the holy angels are not moved locally. On the contrary, It is the same thing for a beatified angel to be moved as for a beatified soul to be moved. But it must necessarily be said that a blessed soul is moved locally, because it is an article of faith that Christ’s soul descended into Hell. Therefore a beatified angel is moved locally. I answer that, A beatified angel can be moved locally. As, however, to be in a place belongs equivocally to a body and to an angel, so likewise does local movement. For a body is in a place in so far as it is contained under the place, and is commensurate with the place. Hence it is necessary for local movement of a body to be commensurate with the place, and according to its exigency. Hence it is that the continuity of movement is according to the continuity of magnitude; and according to priority and posteriority of local movement, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv, 99). But an angel is not in a place as commensurate and contained, but rather as containing it. Hence it is not neces-

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Q. 53, A. 1

Angels

loco, non oportet quod commensuretur loco, nec quod sit secundum exigentiam eius, ut habeat continuitatem ex loco; sed est motus non continuus. Quia enim angelus non est in loco nisi secundum contactum virtutis, ut dictum est, necesse est quod motus angeli in loco nihil aliud sit quam diversi contactus diversorum locorum successive et non simul, quia angelus non potest simul esse in pluribus locis, ut supra dictum est. Huiusmodi autem contactus non est necessarium esse continuos. Potest tamen in huiusmodi contactibus continuitas quaedam inveniri. Quia, ut dictum est, nihil prohibet angelo assignare locum divisibilem, per contactum suae virtutis; sicut corpori assignatur locus divisibilis, per contactum suae magnitudinis. Unde sicut corpus successive, et non simul, dimittit locum in quo prius erat, et ex hoc causatur continuitas in motu locali eius; ita etiam angelus potest dimittere successive locum divisibilem in quo prius erat, et sic motus eius erit continuus. Et potest etiam totum locum simul dimittere, et toti alteri loco simul se applicare, et sic motus eius non erit continuus.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa ratio dupliciter deficit in proposito. Primo quidem, quia demonstratio Aristotelis procedit de indivisibili secundum quantitatem, cui respondet locus de necessitate indivisibilis. Quod non potest dici de angelo. Secundo, quia demonstratio Aristotelis procedit de motu continuo. Si enim motus non esset continuus, posset dici quod aliquid movetur dum est in termino a quo, et dum est in termino ad quem, quia ipsa successio diversorum ubi circa eandem rem, motus diceretur; unde in quolibet illorum ubi res esset, illa posset dici moveri. Sed continuitas motus hoc impedit, quia nullum continuum est in termino suo, ut patet, quia linea non est in puncto. Et ideo oportet quod illud quod movetur, non sit totaliter in altero terminorum, dum movetur; sed partim in uno, et partim in altero. Secundum ergo quod motus angeli non est continuus, demonstratio Aristotelis non procedit in proposito.

Sed secundum quod motus angeli ponitur continuus, sic concedi potest quod angelus, dum movetur, partim est in termino a quo, et partim in termino ad quem (ut tamen partialitas non referatur ad substantiam angeli, sed ad locum), quia in principio sui motus continui, angelus est in toto loco divisibili a quo incipit moveri; sed dum est in ipso moveri, est in parte primi loci quem deserit, et in parte secundi loci quem occupat. Et hoc quidem quod possit occupare partes duorum locorum, competit angelo ex hoc quod potest occupare locum divisibilem per applicationem suae virtutis, sicut corpus

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sary for the local movement of an angel to be commensurate with the place, nor for it to be according to the exigency of the place, so as to have continuity therefrom; but it is a non-continuous movement. For since the angel is in a place only by virtual contact, as was said above (Q. 52, A. 1), it follows necessarily that the movement of an angel in a place is nothing else than the various contacts of various places successively, and not at once; because an angel cannot be in several places at one time, as was said above (Q. 52, A. 2). Nor is it necessary for these contacts to be continuous. Nevertheless a certain kind of continuity can be found in such contacts. Because, as was said above (Q. 52, A. 1), there is nothing to hinder us from assigning a divisible place to an angel according to virtual contact; just as a divisible place is assigned to a body by contact of magnitude. Hence as a body successively, and not all at once, quits the place in which it was before, and thence arises continuity in its local movement; so likewise an angel can successively quit the divisible place in which he was before, and so his movement will be continuous. And he can all at once quit the whole place, and in the same instant apply himself to the whole of another place, and thus his movement will not be continuous. Reply Obj. 1: This argument fails of its purpose for a twofold reason. First of all, because Aristotle’s demonstration deals with what is indivisible according to quantity, to which responds a place necessarily indivisible. And this cannot be said of an angel. Second, because Aristotle’s demonstration deals with movement which is continuous. For if the movement were not continuous, it might be said that a thing is moved where it is in the term wherefrom, and while it is in the term whereto: because the very succession of wheres, regarding the same thing, would be called movement: hence, in whichever of those wheres the thing might be, it could be said to be moved. But the continuity of movement prevents this; because nothing which is continuous is in its term, as is clear, because the line is not in the point. Therefore it is necessary for the thing moved to be not totally in either of the terms while it is being moved; but partly in the one, and partly in the other. Therefore, according as the angel’s movement is not continuous, Aristotle’s demonstration does not hold good. But according as the angel’s movement is held to be continuous, it can be so granted, that, while an angel is in movement, he is partly in the term wherefrom, and partly in the term whereto (yet so that such partiality be not referred to the angel’s substance, but to the place); because at the outset of his continuous movement the angel is in the whole divisible place from which he begins to be moved; but while he is actually in movement, he is in part of the first place which he quits, and in part of the second place which he occupies. This very fact that he can occupy the parts of two places appertains to the angel from this, that he can oc-

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Local Movement of the Angels

Q. 53, A. 2

per applicationem magnitudinis. Unde sequitur de corpore mobili secundum locum, quod sit divisibile secundum magnitudinem; de angelo autem, quod virtus eius possit applicari alicui divisibili.

cupy a divisible place by applying his power; as a body does by application of magnitude. Hence it follows regarding a body which is movable according to place, that it is divisible according to magnitude; but regarding an angel, that his power can be applied to something which is divisible. Ad secundum dicendum quod motus existentis in Reply Obj. 2: The movement of that which is in potenpotentia, est actus imperfecti. Sed motus qui est secun- tiality is the act of an imperfect agent. But the movement dum applicationem virtutis, est existentis in actu, quia which is by application of energy is the act of one in act: bevirtus rei est secundum quod actu est. cause energy implies actuality. Ad tertium dicendum quod motus existentis in Reply Obj. 3: The movement of that which is in potenpotentia, est propter indigentiam suam, sed motus ex- tiality is the act of an imperfect but the movement of what is istentis in actu, non est propter indigentiam suam, in act is not for any need of its own, but for another’s need. sed propter indigentiam alterius. Et hoc modo angelus, In this way, because of our need, the angel is moved locally, propter indigentiam nostram, localiter movetur, secun- according to Heb. 1:14: They are all ministering spirits, sent dum illud Heb. I, omnes sunt administratorii spiritus, in to minister for them who receive the inheritance of salvation.

ministerium missi propter eos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis.

Article 2 Whether an angel passes through intermediate space? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus non transeat per medium. Omne enim quod pertransit medium, prius pertransit locum sibi aequalem, quam maiorem. Locus autem aequalis angeli, qui est indivisibilis, est locus punctalis. Si ergo angelus in suo motu pertransit medium, oportet quod numeret puncta infinita suo motu, quod est impossibile. Praeterea, angelus est simplicioris substantiae quam anima nostra. Sed anima nostra sua cogitatione potest transire de uno extremo in aliud, non pertranseundo medium, possum enim cogitare Galliam et postea Syriam, nihil cogitando de Italia, quae est in medio. Ergo multo magis angelus potest de uno extremo transire ad aliud, non per medium. Sed contra, si angelus movetur de uno loco ad alium, quando est in termino ad quem, non movetur, sed mutatus est. Sed ante omne mutatum esse praecedit mutari, ergo alicubi existens movebatur. Sed non movebatur dum erat in termino a quo. Movebatur ergo dum erat in medio. Et ita oportet quod pertranseat medium.

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, motus localis angeli potest esse continuus, et non continuus. Si ergo sit continuus, non potest angelus moveri de uno extremo in alterum, quin transeat per medium, quia, ut dicitur in V Physic., medium est in quod prius venit quod continue mutatur, quam in quod mutatur ultimum; ordo enim prioris et posterioris in motu continuo,

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not pass through intermediate space. For everything that passes through a middle space first travels along a place of its own dimensions, before passing through a greater. But the place responding to an angel, who is indivisible, is confined to a point. Therefore if the angel passes through middle space, he must reckon infinite points in his movement: which is not possible. Obj. 2: Further, an angel is of simpler substance than the soul. But our soul by taking thought can pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle: for I can think of France and afterwards of Syria, without ever thinking of Italy, which stands between them. Therefore much more can an angel pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle. On the contrary, If the angel be moved from one place to another, then, when he is in the term whither, he is no longer in motion, but is changed. But a process of changing precedes every actual change: consequently he was being moved while existing in some place. But he was not moved so long as he was in the term whence. Therefore, he was moved while he was in mid-space: and so it was necessary for him to pass through intervening space. I answer that, As was observed above in the preceding article, the local motion of an angel can be continuous, and non-continuous. If it be continuous, the angel cannot pass from one extreme to another without passing through the mid-space; because, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. v, 22; vi, 77), The middle is that into which a thing which is continually moved comes, before arriving at the last into

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Q. 53, A. 2

Angels

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est secundum ordinem prioris et posterioris in magnitu- which it is moved; because the order of first and last in condine, ut dicitur in IV Physic. tinuous movement is according to the order of the first and last in magnitude, as he says (Phys. iv, 99). Si autem motus angeli non sit continuus, possibile But if an angel’s movement be not continuous, it is posest quod pertranseat de aliquo extremo in aliud, non sible for him to pass from one extreme to another withpertransito medio. Quod sic patet. Inter quaelibet enim out going through the middle: which is evident thus. Beduo extrema loca sunt infinita loca media; sive accipian- tween the two extreme limits there are infinite intermediate tur loca divisibilia, sive indivisibilia. Et de indivisibilibus places; whether the places be taken as divisible or as indiquidem manifestum est, quia inter quaelibet duo puncta visible. This is clearly evident with regard to places which sunt infinita puncta media, cum nulla duo puncta conse- are indivisible; because between every two points there are quantur se invicem sine medio, ut in VI Physic. probatur. infinite intermediate points, since no two points follow one another without a middle, as is proved in Phys. vi, text. 1. De locis autem divisibilibus necesse est etiam hoc And the same must of necessity be said of divisible dicere. Et hoc demonstratur ex motu continuo alicuius places: and this is shown from the continuous movement of corporis. Corpus enim non movetur de loco ad locum a body. For a body is not moved from place to place except nisi in tempore. In toto autem tempore mensurante mo- in time. But in the whole time which measures the movetum corporis, non est accipere duo nunc, in quibus cor- ment of a body, there are not two nows in which the body pus quod movetur non sit in alio et alio loco, quia si moved is not in one place and in another; for if it were in in uno et eodem loco esset in duobus nunc, sequeretur one and the same place in two nows, it would follow that it quod ibi quiesceret; cum nihil aliud sit quiescere quam would be at rest there; since to be at rest is nothing else than in loco eodem esse nunc et prius. Cum igitur inter pri- to be in the same place now and previously. Therefore since mum nunc et ultimum temporis mensurantis motum, there are infinite nows between the first and the last now of sint infinita nunc, oportet quod inter primum locum, a the time which measures the movement, there must be infiquo incipit moveri, et ultimum locum, ad quem termi- nite places between the first from which the movement benatur motus, sint infinita loca. gins, and the last where the movement ceases. Et hoc sic etiam sensibiliter apparet. Sit enim unum This again is made evident from sensible experience. Let corpus unius palmi, et sit via per quam transit, duorum there be a body of a palm’s length, and let there be a plane palmorum, manifestum est quod locus primus, a quo measuring two palms, along which it travels; it is evident incipit motus, est unius palmi; et locus, ad quem ter- that the first place from which the movement starts is that minatur motus, est alterius palmi. Manifestum est au- of the one palm; and the place wherein the movement ends tem quod, quando incipit moveri, paulatim deserit pri- is that of the other palm. Now it is clear that when it bemum palmum, et subintrat secundum. Secundum ergo gins to move, it gradually quits the first palm and enters the quod dividitur magnitudo palmi, secundum hoc multi- second. According, then, as the magnitude of the palm is plicantur loca media, quia quodlibet punctum signatum divided, even so are the intermediate places multiplied; bein magnitudine primi palmi, est principium unius loci; cause every distinct point in the magnitude of the first palm et punctum signatum in magnitudine alterius palmi, est is the beginning of a place, and a distinct point in the magterminus eiusdem. Unde cum magnitudo sit divisibilis nitude of the other palm is the limit of the same. Accordin infinitum, et puncta sint etiam infinita in potentia in ingly, since magnitude is infinitely divisible and the points qualibet magnitudine; sequitur quod inter quaelibet duo in every magnitude are likewise infinite in potentiality, it loca sint infinita loca media. follows that between every two places there are infinite intermediate places. Mobile autem infinitatem mediorum locorum non Now a movable body only exhausts the infinity of the consumit nisi per continuitatem motus, quia sicut loca intermediate places by the continuity of its movement; bemedia sunt infinita in potentia, ita et in motu continuo cause, as the intermediate places are infinite in potentialest accipere infinita quaedam in potentia. Si ergo motus ity, so likewise must there be reckoned some infinitudes in non sit continuus, omnes partes motus erunt numeratae movement which is continuous. Consequently, if the movein actu. Si ergo mobile quodcumque moveatur motu non ment be not continuous, then all the parts of the movement continuo, sequitur quod vel non transeat omnia media, will be actually numbered. If, therefore, any movable body vel quod actu numeret media infinita, quod est impossi- be moved, but not by continuous movement, it follows, bile. Sic igitur secundum quod motus angeli non est con- either that it does not pass through all the intermediate tinuus, non pertransit omnia media. places, or else that it actually numbers infinite places: which is not possible. Accordingly, then, as the angel’s movement is not continuous, he does not pass through all intermediate places.

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Q. 53, A. 3

Hoc autem, scilicet moveri de extremo in extremum et non per medium, potest convenire angelo sed non corpori. Quia corpus mensuratur et continetur sub loco, unde oportet quod sequatur leges loci in suo motu. Sed substantia angeli non est subdita loco ut contenta, sed est superior eo ut continens, unde in potestate eius est applicare se loco prout vult, vel per medium vel sine medio.

Now, the actual passing from one extreme to the other, without going through the mid-space, is quite in keeping with an angel’s nature; but not with that of a body, because a body is measured by and contained under a place; hence it is bound to follow the laws of place in its movement. But an angel’s substance is not subject to place as contained thereby, but is above it as containing it: hence it is under his control to apply himself to a place just as he wills, either through or without the intervening place. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod locus angeli non Reply Obj. 1: The place of an angel is not taken as accipitur ei aequalis secundum magnitudinem, sed se- equal to him according to magnitude, but according to concundum contactum virtutis, et sic locus angeli potest es- tact of power: and so the angel’s place can be divisible, and se divisibilis, et non semper punctalis. Sed tamen loca is not always a mere point. Yet even the intermediate dimedia etiam divisibilia, sunt infinita, ut dictum est, sed visible places are infinite, as was said above: but they are consumuntur per continuitatem motus, ut patet ex prae- consumed by the continuity of the movement, as is evident dictis. from the foregoing. Ad secundum dicendum quod angelus dum moveReply Obj. 2: While an angel is moved locally, his tur localiter, applicatur eius essentia diversis locis, ani- essence is applied to various places: but the soul’s essence mae autem essentia non applicatur rebus quas cogitat, is not applied to the things thought of, but rather the things sed potius res cogitatae sunt in ipsa. Et ideo non est si- thought of are in it. So there is no comparison.

mile. Ad tertium dicendum quod in motu continuo mutatum esse non est pars moveri, sed terminus; unde oportet quod moveri sit ante mutatum esse. Et ideo oportet quod talis motus sit per medium. Sed in motu non continuo mutatum esse est pars, sicut unitas est pars numeri, unde successio diversorum locorum, etiam sine medio, constituit talem motum.

Reply Obj. 3: In continuous movement the actual change is not a part of the movement, but its conclusion; hence movement must precede change. Accordingly such movement is through the mid-space. But in movement which is not continuous, the change is a part, as a unit is a part of number: hence the succession of the various places, even without the mid-space, constitutes such movement.

Article 3 Whether the movement of an angel is instantaneous? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod motus angeli sit in instanti. Quanto enim virtus motoris fuerit fortior, et mobile minus resistens motori, tanto motus est velocior. Sed virtus angeli moventis seipsum, improportionabiliter excedit virtutem moventem aliquod corpus. Proportio autem velocitatum est secundum minorationem temporis. Omne autem tempus omni tempori proportionabile est. Si igitur aliquod corpus movetur in tempore, angelus movetur in instanti. Praeterea, motus angeli simplicior est quam aliqua mutatio corporalis. Sed aliqua mutatio corporalis est in instanti, ut illuminatio, tum quia non illuminatur aliquid successive, sicut calefit successive; tum quia radius non prius pertingit ad propinquum quam ad remotum. Ergo multo magis motus angeli est in instanti. Praeterea, si angelus movetur in tempore de loco ad locum, manifestum est quod in ultimo instanti illius

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel’s movement is instantaneous. For the greater the power of the mover, and the less the moved resist the mover, the more rapid is the movement. But the power of an angel moving himself exceeds beyond all proportion the power which moves a body. Now the proportion of velocities is reckoned according to the lessening of the time. But between one length of time and any other length of time there is proportion. If therefore a body is moved in time, an angel is moved in an instant. Obj. 2: Further, the angel’s movement is simpler than any bodily change. But some bodily change is effected in an instant, such as illumination; both because the subject is not illuminated successively, as it gets hot successively; and because a ray does not reach sooner what is near than what is remote. Much more therefore is the angel’s movement instantaneous. Obj. 3: Further, if an angel be moved from place to place in time, it is manifest that in the last instant of such time

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temporis est in termino ad quem; in toto autem tempore praecedenti, aut est in loco immediate praecedenti, qui accipitur ut terminus a quo; aut partim in uno et partim in alio. Si autem partim in uno et partim in alio, sequitur quod sit partibilis, quod est impossibile. Ergo in toto tempore praecedenti est in termino a quo. Ergo quiescit ibi, cum quiescere sit in eodem esse nunc et prius, ut dictum est. Et sic sequitur quod non moveatur nisi in ultimo instanti temporis. Sed contra, in omni mutatione est prius et posterius. Sed prius et posterius motus numeratur secundum tempus. Ergo omnis motus est in tempore, etiam motus angeli; cum in eo sit prius et posterius. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt motum localem angeli esse in instanti. Dicebant enim quod, cum angelus movetur de uno loco ad alium, in toto tempore praecedenti angelus est in termino a quo, in ultimo autem instanti illius temporis est in termino ad quem. Nec oportet esse aliquod medium inter duos terminos; sicut non est aliquod medium inter tempus et terminum temporis. Inter duo autem nunc temporis, est tempus medium, unde dicunt quod non est dare ultimum nunc in quo fuit in termino a quo. Sicut in illuminatione, et in generatione substantiali ignis, non est dare ultimum instans in quo aer fuit tenebrosus, vel in quo materia fuit sub privatione formae ignis, sed est dare ultimum tempus, ita quod in ultimo illius temporis est vel lumen in aere, vel forma ignis in materia. Et sic illuminatio et generatio substantialis dicuntur motus instantanei. Sed hoc non habet locum in proposito. Quod sic ostenditur. De ratione enim quietis est quod quiescens non aliter se habeat nunc et prius, et ideo in quolibet nunc temporis mensurantis quietem, quiescens est in eodem et in primo, et in medio, et in ultimo. Sed de ratione motus est quod id quod movetur, aliter se habeat nunc et prius, et ideo in quolibet nunc temporis mensurantis motum, mobile se habet in alia et alia dispositione, unde oportet quod in ultimo nunc habeat formam quam prius non habebat. Et sic patet quod quiescere in toto tempore in aliquo, puta in albedine, est esse in illo in quolibet instanti illius temporis; unde non est possibile ut aliquid in toto tempore praecedenti quiescat in uno termino et postea in ultimo instanti illius temporis sit in alio termino. Sed hoc est possibile in motu, quia moveri in toto aliquo tempore, non est esse in eadem dispositione in quolibet instanti illius temporis. Igitur omnes huiusmodi mutationes instantaneae sunt termini motus continui, sicut generatio est terminus alterationis materiae, et illuminatio terminus motus localis corporis illuminantis.

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he is in the term whereto: but in the whole of the preceding time, he is either in the place immediately preceding, which is taken as the term wherefrom; or else he is partly in the one, and partly in the other, it follows that he is divisible; which is impossible. Therefore during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term wherefrom. Therefore he rests there: since to be at rest is to be in the same place now and previously, as was said (A. 2). Therefore it follows that he is not moved except in the last instant of time. On the contrary, In every change there is a before and after. Now the before and after of movement is reckoned by time. Consequently every movement, even of an angel, is in time, since there is a before and after in it. I answer that, Some have maintained that the local movement of an angel is instantaneous. They said that when an angel is moved from place to place, during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term wherefrom; but in the last instant of such time he is in the term whereto. Nor is there any need for a medium between the terms, just as there is no medium between time and the limit of time. But there is a mid-time between two nows of time: hence they say that a last now cannot be assigned in which it was in the term wherefrom, just as in illumination, and in the substantial generation of fire, there is no last instant to be assigned in which the air was dark, or in which the matter was under the privation of the form of fire: but a last time can be assigned, so that in the last instant of such time there is light in the air, or the form of fire in the matter. And so illumination and substantial generation are called instantaneous movements. But this does not hold good in the present case; and it is shown thus. It is of the nature of rest that the subject in repose be not otherwise disposed now than it was before: and therefore in every now of time which measures rest, the subject reposing is in the same where in the first, in the middle, and in the last now. On the other hand, it is of the very nature of movement for the subject moved to be otherwise now than it was before: and therefore in every now of time which measures movement, the movable subject is in various dispositions; hence in the last now it must have a different form from what it had before. So it is evident that to rest during the whole time in some (disposition), for instance, in whiteness, is to be in it in every instant of such time. Hence it is not possible for anything to rest in one term during the whole of the preceding time, and afterwards in the last instant of that time to be in the other term. But this is possible in movement: because to be moved in any whole time, is not to be in the same disposition in every instant of that time. Therefore all instantaneous changes of the kind are terms of a continuous movement: just as generation is the term of the alteration of matter, and illumination is the term of the local movement of the illuminating body.

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Motus autem localis angeli non est terminus alicuius alterius motus continui, sed est per seipsum, a nullo alio motu dependens. Unde impossibile est dicere quod in toto tempore sit in aliquo loco, et in ultimo nunc sit in alio loco. Sed oportet assignare nunc in quo ultimo fuit in loco praecedenti. Ubi autem sunt multa nunc sibi succedentia, ibi de necessitate est tempus, cum tempus nihil aliud sit quam numeratio prioris et posterioris in motu. Unde relinquitur quod motus angeli sit in tempore. In continuo quidem tempore, si sit motus eius continuus; in non continuo autem, si motus sit non continuus (utroque enim modo contingit esse motum angeli, ut dictum est), continuitas enim temporis est ex continuitate motus, ut dicitur in IV Physic. Sed istud tempus, sive sit tempus continuum sive non, non est idem cum tempore quod mensurat motum caeli, et quo mensurantur omnia corporalia, quae habent mutabilitatem ex motu caeli. Motus enim angeli non dependet ex motu caeli. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si tempus motus angeli non sit continuum, sed successio quaedam ipsorum nunc, non habebit proportionem ad tempus quod mensurat motum corporalium, quod est continuum, cum non sit eiusdem rationis. Si vero sit continuum, est quidem proportionabile, non quidem propter proportionem moventis et mobilis sed propter proportionem magnitudinum in quibus est motus. Et praeterea, velocitas motus angeli non est secundum quantitatem suae virtutis; sed secundum determinationem suae voluntatis. Ad secundum dicendum quod illuminatio est terminus motus; et est alteratio, non motus localis, ut intelligatur lumen moveri prius ad propinquum, quam ad remotum. Motus autem angeli est localis, et non est terminus motus. Unde non est simile. Ad tertium dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de tempore continuo. Tempus autem motus angeli potest esse non continuum. Et sic angelus in uno instanti potest esse in uno loco, et in alio instanti in alio loco, nullo tempore intermedio existente. Si autem tempus motus angeli sit continuum, angelus in toto tempore praecedenti ultimum nunc, variatur per infinita loca, ut prius expositum est. Est tamen partim in uno locorum continuorum et partim in alio, non quod substantia illius sit partibilis; sed quia virtus sua applicatur ad partem primi loci et ad partem secundi, ut etiam supra dictum est.

Q. 53, A. 3

Now the local movement of an angel is not the term of any other continuous movement, but is of itself, depending upon no other movement. Consequently it is impossible to say that he is in any place during the whole time, and that in the last now he is in another place: but some now must be assigned in which he was last in the preceding place. But where there are many nows succeeding one another, there is necessarily time; since time is nothing else than the reckoning of before and after in movement. It remains, then, that the movement of an angel is in time. It is in continuous time if his movement be continuous, and in noncontinuous time if his movement is non-continuous for, as was said (A. 1), his movement can be of either kind, since the continuity of time comes of the continuity of movement, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv, 99). But that time, whether it be continuous or not, is not the same as the time which measures the movement of the heavens, and whereby all corporeal things are measured, which have their changeableness from the movement of the heavens; because the angel’s movement does not depend upon the movement of the heavens. Reply Obj. 1: If the time of the angel’s movement be not continuous, but a kind of succession of ‘nows,’ it will have no proportion to the time which measures the movement of corporeal things, which is continuous; since it is not of the same nature. If, however, it be continuous, it is indeed proportionable, not, indeed, because of the proportion of the mover and the movable, but on account of the proportion of the magnitudes in which the movement exists. Besides, the swiftness of the angel’s movement is not measured by the quantity of his power, but according to the determination of his will. Reply Obj. 2: Illumination is the term of a movement; and is an alteration, not a local movement, as though the light were understood to be moved to what is near, before being moved to what is remote. But the angel’s movement is local, and, besides, it is not the term of movement; hence there is no comparison. Reply Obj. 3: This objection is based on continuous time. But the same time of an angel’s movement can be noncontinuous. So an angel can be in one place in one instant, and in another place in the next instant, without any time intervening. If the time of the angel’s movement be continuous, he is changed through infinite places throughout the whole time which precedes the last ‘now’; as was already shown (A. 2). Nevertheless he is partly in one of the continuous places, and partly in another, not because his substance is susceptible of parts, but because his power is applied to a part of the first place and to a part of the second, as was said above (A. 2).

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Question 54 The Knowledge of the Angels Consideratis his quae ad substantiam angeli pertinent, procedendum est ad cognitionem ipsius. Haec autem consideratio erit quadripartita, nam primo considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad virtutem cognoscitivam angeli; secundo, de his quae pertinent ad medium cognoscendi ipsius; tertio, de his quae ab eo cognoscuntur; quarto, de modo cognitionis ipsorum. Circa primum quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum intelligere angeli sit sua substantia. Secundo, utrum eius esse sit suum intelligere. Tertio, utrum eius substantia sit sua virtus intellectiva. Quarto, utrum in angelis sit intellectus agens et possibilis. Quinto, utrum in eis sit aliqua alia potentia cognoscitiva quam intellectus.

After considering what belongs to the angel’s substance, we now proceed to his knowledge. This investigation will be fourfold. In the first place inquiry must be made into his power of knowledge: second, into his medium of knowledge: third, into the objects known: and fourth, into the manner whereby he knows them. Under the first heading there are five points of inquiry: (1) Is the angel’s understanding his substance? (2) Is his being his understanding? (3) Is his substance his power of intelligence? (4) Is there in the angels an active and a passive intellect? (5) Is there in them any other power of knowledge besides the intellect?

Article 1 Whether an angel’s act of understanding is his substance? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intelligere angeli sit eius substantia. Angelus enim est sublimior et simplicior quam intellectus agens animae. Sed substantia intellectus agentis est sua actio; ut patet in III de Anima per Aristotelem, et eius Commentatorem. Ergo, multo fortius, substantia angeli est sua actio, quae est intelligere. Praeterea, Philosophus dicit, in XII Metaphys., quod actio intellectus est vita. Sed cum vivere sit esse viventibus, ut dicitur in II de Anima, videtur quod vita sit essentia. Ergo actio intellectus est essentia intelligentis angeli. Praeterea, si extrema sunt unum, medium non differt ab eis, quia extremum magis distat ab extremo, quam medium. Sed in angelo idem est intellectus et intellectum, ad minus inquantum intelligit essentiam suam. Ergo intelligere, quod cadit medium inter intellectum et rem intellectam, est idem cum substantia angeli intelligentis.

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel’s act of understanding is his substance. For the angel is both higher and simpler than the active intellect of a soul. But the substance of the active intellect is its own action; as is evident from Aristotle (De Anima iii) and from his Commentator. Therefore much more is the angel’s substance his action— that is, his act of understanding. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, 39) that the action of the intellect is life. But since in living things to live is to be, as he says (De Anima ii, 37), it seems that life is essence. Therefore the action of the intellect is the essence of an angel who understands. Obj. 3: Further, if the extremes be one, then the middle does not differ from them; because extreme is farther from extreme than the middle is. But in an angel the intellect and the object understood are the same, at least in so far as he understands his own essence. Therefore the act of understanding, which is between the intellect and the thing understood, is one with the substance of the angel who understands. Sed contra, plus differt actio rei a substantia eius, On the contrary, The action of anything differs quam ipsum esse eius. Sed nullius creati suum esse est more from its substance than does its existence. But no sua substantia, hoc enim solius Dei proprium est, ut creature’s existence is its substance, for this belongs to God

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ex superioribus patet. Ergo neque angeli, neque alterius only, as is evident from what was said above (Q. 3, A. 4). creaturae, sua actio est eius substantia. Therefore neither the action of an angel, nor of any other creature, is its substance. Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est quod I answer that, It is impossible for the action of an anactio angeli, vel cuiuscumque alterius creaturae, sit eius gel, or of any creature, to be its own substance. For an acsubstantia. Actio enim est proprie actualitas virtutis; si- tion is properly the actuality of a power; just as existence is cut esse est actualitas substantiae vel essentiae. Impos- the actuality of a substance or of an essence. Now it is imsibile est autem quod aliquid quod non est purus actus, possible for anything which is not a pure act, but which has sed aliquid habet de potentia admixtum, sit sua actuali- some admixture of potentiality, to be its own actuality: betas, quia actualitas potentialitati repugnat. Solus autem cause actuality is opposed to potentiality. But God alone is Deus est actus purus. Unde in solo Deo sua substantia pure act. Hence only in God is His substance the same as est suum esse et suum agere. His existence and His action. Praeterea, si intelligere angeli esset sua substantia, Besides, if an angel’s act of understanding were his suboporteret quod intelligere angeli esset subsistens. Intel- stance, it would be necessary for it to be subsisting. Now ligere autem subsistens non potest esse nisi unum; si- a subsisting act of intelligence can be but one; just as an cut nec aliquod abstractum subsistens. Unde unius ange- abstract thing that subsists. Consequently an angel’s subli substantia non distingueretur neque a substantia Dei, stance would neither be distinguished from God’s subquae est ipsum intelligere subsistens; neque a substantia stance, which is His very act of understanding subsisting in alterius angeli. itself, nor from the substance of another angel. Si etiam angelus ipse esset suum intelligere, non posAlso, if the angel were his own act of understanding, sent esse gradus in intelligendo perfectius et minus per- there could then be no degrees of understanding more or fecte, cum hoc contingat propter diversam participatio- less perfectly; for this comes about through the diverse parnem ipsius intelligere. ticipation of the act of understanding. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod Reply Obj. 1: When the active intellect is said to be its intellectus agens est sua actio, est praedicatio non per es- own action, such predication is not essential, but concomisentiam, sed per concomitantiam, quia cum sit in actu tant, because, since its very nature consists in act, instantly, eius substantia, statim quantum est in se, concomitatur so far as lies in itself, action accompanies it: which cannot ipsam actio. Quod non est de intellectu possibili, qui non be said of the passive intellect, for this has no actions until habet actiones nisi postquam fuerit factus in actu. after it has been reduced to act. Ad secundum dicendum quod vita non hoc modo Reply Obj. 2: The relation between life and to live is se habet ad vivere, sicut essentia ad esse; sed sicut cursus not the same as that between essence and to be; but rather ad currere, quorum unum significat actum in abstrac- as that between a race and to run, one of which signifies to, aliud in concreto. Unde non sequitur si vivere sit es- the act in the abstract, and the other in the concrete. Hence se, quod vita sit essentia. Quamvis etiam quandoque vita it does not follow, if to live is to be, that life is essence. Alpro essentia ponatur; secundum quod Augustinus dicit, though life is sometimes put for the essence, as Augustine in libro de Trin., quod memoria et intelligentia et voluntas says (De Trin. x), Memory and understanding and will are sunt una essentia, una vita. Sed sic non accipitur a Philo- one essence, one life: yet it is not taken in this sense by the sopho cum dicit quod actio intellectus est vita. Philosopher, when he says that the act of the intellect is life. Ad tertium dicendum quod actio quae transit in Reply Obj. 3: The action which is transient, passing to aliquid extrinsecum, est realiter media inter agens et su- some extrinsic object, is really a medium between the agent biectum recipiens actionem. Sed actio quae manet in and the subject receiving the action. The action which reagente, non est realiter medium inter agens et obiectum, mains within the agent, is not really a medium between the sed secundum modum significandi tantum, realiter vero agent and the object, but only according to the manner of consequitur unionem obiecti cum agente. Ex hoc enim expression; for it really follows the union of the object with quod intellectum fit unum cum intelligente, consequitur the agent. For the act of understanding is brought about by intelligere, quasi quidam effectus differens ab utroque. the union of the object understood with the one who understands it, as an effect which differs from both.

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Knowledge of the Angels

Q. 54, A. 2

Article 2 Whether in the angel to understand is to exist? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intelligere angeli sit eius esse. Vivere enim viventibus est esse, ut dicitur in II de Anima. Sed intelligere est quoddam vivere, ut in eodem dicitur. Ergo intelligere angeli est eius esse. Praeterea, sicut se habet causa ad causam, ita effectus ad effectum. Sed forma per quam angelus est, est eadem cum forma per quam intelligit ad minus seipsum. Ergo eius intelligere est idem cum suo esse. Sed contra, intelligere angeli est motus eius; ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed esse non est motus. Ergo esse angeli non est intelligere eius. Respondeo dicendum quod actio angeli non est eius esse, neque actio alicuius creaturae. Duplex enim est actionis genus, ut dicitur IX Metaphys. Una scilicet actio est quae transit in aliquid exterius, inferens ei passionem, sicut urere et secare. Alia vero actio est quae non transit in rem exteriorem, sed manet in ipso agente, sicut sentire, intelligere et velle, per huiusmodi enim actionem non immutatur aliquid extrinsecum, sed totum in ipso agente agitur. De prima ergo actione manifestum est quod non potest esse ipsum esse agentis, nam esse agentis significatur intra ipsum, actio autem talis est effluxus in actum ab agente. Secunda autem actio de sui ratione habet infinitatem, vel simpliciter, vel secundum quid. Simpliciter quidem, sicut intelligere, cuius obiectum est verum, et velle, cuius obiectum est bonum, quorum utrumque convertitur cum ente; et ita intelligere et velle, quantum est de se, habent se ad omnia; et utrumque recipit speciem ab obiecto. Secundum quid autem infinitum est sentire, quod se habet ad omnia sensibilia, sicut visus ad omnia visibilia. Esse autem cuiuslibet creaturae est determinatum ad unum secundum genus et speciem, esse autem solius Dei est simpliciter infinitum, in se omnia comprehendens, ut dicit Dionysius, V cap. de Div. Nom. Unde solum esse divinum est suum intelligere et suum velle. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vivere quandoque sumitur pro ipso esse viventis, quandoque vero pro operatione vitae, idest per quam demonstratur aliquid esse vivens. Et hoc modo Philosophus dicit quod intelligere est vivere quoddam, ibi enim distinguit diversos gradus viventium secundum diversa opera vitae. Ad secundum dicendum quod ipsa essentia angeli est ratio totius sui esse, non autem est ratio totius sui intelligere, quia non omnia intelligere potest per suam essentiam. Et ideo secundum propriam rationem, inquan-

Objection 1: It would seem that in the angel to understand is to exist. For in living things to live is to be, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, text. 37). But to understand is in a sense to live (De Anima ii, text. 37). Therefore in the angel to understand is to exist. Obj. 2: Further, cause bears the same relation to cause, as effect to effect. But the form whereby the angel exists is the same as the form by which he understands at least himself. Therefore in the angel to understand is to exist. On the contrary, The angel’s act of understanding is his movement, as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But to exist is not movement. Therefore in the angel to be is not to understand. I answer that, The action of the angel, as also the action of any creature, is not his existence. For as it is said (Metaph. ix, text. 16), there is a twofold class of action; one which passes out to something beyond, and causes passion in it, as burning and cutting; and another which does not pass outwards, but which remains within the agent, as to feel, to understand, to will; by such actions nothing outside is changed, but the whole action takes place within the agent. It is quite clear regarding the first kind of action that it cannot be the agent’s very existence: because the agent’s existence is signified as within him, while such an action denotes something as issuing from the agent into the thing done. But the second action of its own nature has infinity, either simple or relative. As an example of simple infinity, we have the act to understand, of which the object is the true; and the act to will, of which the object is the good; each of which is convertible with being; and so, to understand and to will, of themselves, bear relation to all things, and each receives its species from its object. But the act of sensation is relatively infinite, for it bears relation to all sensible things; as sight does to all things visible. Now the being of every creature is restricted to one in genus and species; God’s being alone is simply infinite, comprehending all things in itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Hence the Divine nature alone is its own act of understanding and its own act of will. Reply Obj. 1: Life is sometimes taken for the existence of the living subject: sometimes also for a vital operation, that is, for one whereby something is shown to be living. In this way the Philosopher says that to understand is, in a sense, to live: for there he distinguishes the various grades of living things according to the various functions of life. Reply Obj. 2: The essence of an angel is the reason of his entire existence, but not the reason of his whole act of understanding, since he cannot understand everything by his essence. Consequently in its own specific nature as

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Q. 54, A. 3

Angels

tum est talis essentia, comparatur ad ipsum esse angeli. Sed ad eius intelligere comparatur secundum rationem universalioris obiecti, scilicet veri vel entis. Et sic patet quod, licet sit eadem forma, non tamen secundum eandem rationem est principium essendi et intelligendi. Et propter hoc non sequitur quod in angelo sit idem esse et intelligere.

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such an essence, it is compared to the existence of the angel, whereas to his act of understanding it is compared as included in the idea of a more universal object, namely, truth and being. Thus it is evident, that, although the form is the same, yet it is not the principle of existence and of understanding according to the same formality. On this account it does not follow that in the angel ‘to be’ is the same as ‘to understand.’

Article 3 Whether an angel’s power of intelligence is different from his essence? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus vel potentia intellectiva in angelo non sit aliud quam sua essentia. Mens enim et intellectus nominant potentiam intellectivam. Sed Dionysius in pluribus locis suorum librorum, nominat ipsos angelos intellectus et mentes. Ergo angelus est sua potentia intellectiva. Praeterea, si potentia intellectiva in angelo est aliquid praeter eius essentiam, oportet quod sit accidens, hoc enim dicimus esse accidens alicuius, quod est praeter eius essentiam. Sed forma simplex subiectum esse non potest, ut Boetius dicit, in libro de Trin. Ergo angelus non esset forma simplex, quod est contra praemissa. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII Confess., quod Deus fecit angelicam naturam prope se, materiam autem primam prope nihil, ex quo videtur quod angelus sit simplicior quam materia prima, utpote Deo propinquior. Sed materia prima est sua potentia. Ergo multo magis angelus est sua potentia intellectiva. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, XI cap. Angel. Hier., quod angeli dividuntur in substantiam, virtutem et operationem. Ergo aliud est in eis substantia, et aliud virtus, et aliud operatio. Respondeo dicendum quod nec in angelo nec in aliqua creatura, virtus vel potentia operativa est idem quod sua essentia. Quod sic patet. Cum enim potentia dicatur ad actum, oportet quod secundum diversitatem actuum sit diversitas potentiarum, propter quod dicitur quod proprius actus respondet propriae potentiae. In omni autem creato essentia differt a suo esse, et comparatur ad ipsum sicut potentia ad actum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Actus autem ad quem comparatur potentia operativa, est operatio. In angelo autem non est idem intelligere et esse, nec aliqua alia operatio aut in ipso aut in quocumque alio creato, est idem quod eius esse. Unde essentia angeli non est eius potentia intellectiva, nec alicuius creati essentia est eius operativa potentia.

Objection 1: It would seem that in an angel the power or faculty of understanding is not different from his essence. For, mind and intellect express the power of understanding. But in many passages of his writings, Dionysius styles angels intellects and minds. Therefore the angel is his own power of intelligence. Obj. 2: Further, if the angel’s power of intelligence be anything besides his essence, then it must needs be an accident; for that which is besides the essence of anything, we call its accident. But a simple form cannot be a subject, as Boethius states (De Trin. 1). Thus an angel would not be a simple form, which is contrary to what has been previously said (Q. 50, A. 2). Obj. 3: Further, Augustine (Confess. xii) says, that God made the angelic nature nigh unto Himself, while He made primary matter nigh unto nothing; from this it would seem that the angel is of a simpler nature than primary matter, as being closer to God. But primary matter is its own power. Therefore much more is an angel his own power of intelligence. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xi) that the angels are divided into substance, power, and operation. Therefore substance, power, and operation, are all distinct in them. I answer that, Neither in an angel nor in any creature, is the power or operative faculty the same as its essence: which is made evident thus. Since every power is ordained to an act, then according to the diversity of acts must be the diversity of powers; and on this account it is said that each proper act responds to its proper power. But in every creature the essence differs from the existence, and is compared to it as potentiality is to act, as is evident from what has been already said (Q. 44, A. 1). Now the act to which the operative power is compared is operation. But in the angel to understand is not the same as to exist, nor is any operation in him, nor in any other created thing, the same as his existence. Hence the angel’s essence is not his power of intelligence: nor is the essence of any creature its power of operation.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod angelus dicitur intellectus et mens, quia tota eius cognitio est intellectualis. Cognitio autem animae partim est intellectualis, et partim sensitiva. Ad secundum dicendum quod forma simplex quae est actus purus, nullius accidentis potest esse subiectum, quia subiectum comparatur ad accidens ut potentia ad actum. Et huiusmodi est solus Deus. Et de tali forma loquitur ibi Boetius. Forma autem simplex quae non est suum esse, sed comparatur ad ipsum ut potentia ad actum, potest esse subiectum accidentis, et praecipue eius quod consequitur speciem, huiusmodi enim accidens pertinet ad formam (accidens vero quod est individui, non consequens totam speciem, consequitur materiam, quae est individuationis principium). Et talis forma simplex est angelus. Ad tertium dicendum quod potentia materiae est ad ipsum esse substantiale, et non potentia operativa, sed ad esse accidentale. Unde non est simile.

Q. 54, A. 4

Reply Obj. 1: An angel is called intellect and mind, because all his knowledge is intellectual: whereas the knowledge of a soul is partly intellectual and partly sensitive. Reply Obj. 2: A simple form which is pure act cannot be the subject of accident, because subject is compared to accident as potentiality is to act. God alone is such a form: and of such is Boethius speaking there. But a simple form which is not its own existence, but is compared to it as potentiality is to act, can be the subject of accident; and especially of such accident as follows the species: for such accident belongs to the form—whereas an accident which belongs to the individual, and which does not belong to the whole species, results from the matter, which is the principle of individuation. And such a simple form is an angel. Reply Obj. 3: The power of matter is a potentiality in regard to substantial being itself, whereas the power of operation regards accidental being. Hence there is no comparison.

Article 4 Whether there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in angelo sit intellectus agens et possibilis. Dicit enim Philosophus, in III de Anima, quod sicut in omni natura est aliquid quo est omnia fieri, et aliquid quo est omnia facere, ita etiam in anima. Sed angelus est natura quaedam. Ergo in eo est intellectus agens et possibilis. Praeterea, recipere est proprium intellectus possibilis, illuminare autem est proprium intellectus agentis, ut patet in III de Anima. Sed angelus recipit illuminationem a superiori, et illuminat inferiorem. Ergo in eo est intellectus agens et possibilis. Sed contra est quod in nobis intellectus agens et possibilis est per comparationem ad phantasmata; quae quidem comparantur ad intellectum possibilem ut colores ad visum, ad intellectum autem agentem ut colores ad lumen, ut patet ex III de Anima. Sed hoc non est in angelo. Ergo in angelo non est intellectus agens et possibilis. Respondeo dicendum quod necessitas ponendi intellectum possibilem in nobis, fuit propter hoc, quod nos invenimur quandoque intelligentes in potentia et non in actu, unde oportet esse quandam virtutem, quae sit in potentia ad intelligibilia ante ipsum intelligere, sed reducitur in actum eorum cum fit sciens, et ulterius cum fit considerans. Et haec virtus vocatur intellectus possibilis.

Objection 1: It would seem that there is both an active and a passive intellect in an angel. The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 17) that, in the soul, just as in every nature, there is something whereby it can become all things, and there is something whereby it can make all things. But an angel is a kind of nature. Therefore there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel. Obj. 2: Further, the proper function of the passive intellect is to receive; whereas to enlighten is the proper function of the active intellect, as is made clear in De Anima iii, text. 2, 3, 18. But an angel receives enlightenment from a higher angel, and enlightens a lower one. Therefore there is in him an active and a passive intellect. On the contrary, The distinction of active and passive intellect in us is in relation to the phantasms, which are compared to the passive intellect as colors to the sight; but to the active intellect as colors to the light, as is clear from De Anima iii, text. 18. But this is not so in the angel. Therefore there is no active and passive intellect in the angel. I answer that, The necessity for admitting a passive intellect in us is derived from the fact that we understand sometimes only in potentiality, and not actually. Hence there must exist some power, which, previous to the act of understanding, is in potentiality to intelligible things, but which becomes actuated in their regard when it apprehends them, and still more when it reflects upon them. This is the power which is denominated the passive intellect.

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Q. 54, A. 5

Angels

Necessitas autem ponendi intellectum agentem fuit, quia naturae rerum materialium, quas nos intelligimus, non subsistunt extra animam immateriales et intelligibiles in actu, sed sunt solum intelligibiles in potentia, extra animam existentes, et ideo oportuit esse aliquam virtutem, quae faceret illas naturas intelligibiles actu. Et haec virtus dicitur intellectus agens in nobis. Utraque autem necessitas deest in angelis. Quia neque sunt quandoque intelligentes in potentia tantum, respectu eorum quae naturaliter intelligunt, neque intelligibilia eorum sunt intelligibilia in potentia, sed in actu; intelligunt enim primo et principaliter res immateriales, ut infra patebit. Et ideo non potest in eis esse intellectus agens et possibilis, nisi aequivoce. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Philosophus intelligit ista duo esse in omni natura in qua contingit esse generari vel fieri, ut ipsa verba demonstrant. In angelo autem non generatur scientia, sed naturaliter adest. Unde non oportet ponere in eis agens et possibile. Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus agentis est illuminare non quidem alium intelligentem, sed intelligibilia in potentia, inquantum per abstractionem facit ea intelligibilia actu. Ad intellectum autem possibilem pertinet esse in potentia respectu naturalium cognoscibilium, et quandoque fieri actu. Unde quod angelus illuminat angelum, non pertinet ad rationem intellectus agentis. Neque ad rationem intellectus possibilis pertinet, quod illuminatur de supernaturalibus mysteriis, ad quae cognoscenda quandoque est in potentia. Si quis autem velit haec vocare intellectum agentem et possibilem, aequivoce dicet, nec de nominibus est curandum.

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The necessity for admitting an active intellect is due to this—that the natures of the material things which we understand do not exist outside the soul, as immaterial and actually intelligible, but are only intelligible in potentiality so long as they are outside the soul. Consequently it is necessary that there should be some power capable of rendering such natures actually intelligible: and this power in us is called the active intellect. But each of these necessities is absent from the angels. They are neither sometimes understanding only in potentiality, with regard to such things as they naturally apprehend; nor, again, are their intelligible objects intelligible in potentiality, but they are actually such; for they first and principally understand immaterial things, as will appear later (Q. 84, A. 7; Q. 85, A. 1). Therefore there cannot be an active and a passive intellect in them, except equivocally. Reply Obj. 1: As the words themselves show, the Philosopher understands those two things to be in every nature in which there chances to be generation or making. Knowledge, however, is not generated in the angels, but is present naturally. Hence there is no need for admitting an active and a passive intellect in them. Reply Obj. 2: It is the function of the active intellect to enlighten, not another intellect, but things which are intelligible in potentiality, in so far as by abstraction it makes them to be actually intelligible. It belongs to the passive intellect to be in potentiality with regard to things which are naturally capable of being known, and sometimes to apprehend them actually. Hence for one angel to enlighten another does not belong to the notion of an active intellect: neither does it belong to the passive intellect for the angel to be enlightened with regard to supernatural mysteries, to the knowledge of which he is sometimes in potentiality. But if anyone wishes to call these by the names of active and passive intellect, he will then be speaking equivocally; and it is not about names that we need trouble.

Article 5 Whether there is only intellectual knowledge in the angels? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge of the angelis non sit sola intellectiva cognitio. Dicit enim Au- angels is not exclusively intellectual. For Augustine says (De gustinus, VIII de Civ. Dei, quod in angelis est vita quae Civ. Dei viii) that in the angels there is life which underintelligit et sentit. Ergo in eis est potentia sensitiva. stands and feels. Therefore there is a sensitive faculty in them as well. Praeterea, Isidorus dicit quod angeli multa noveObj. 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono) that the runt per experientiam. Experientia autem fit ex multis angels have learnt many things by experience. But experimemoriis, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Ergo in eis est etiam ence comes of many remembrances, as stated in Metaph. i, memorativa potentia. 1. Consequently they have likewise a power of memory. Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., Obj. 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that there quod in daemonibus est phantasia proterva. Phantasia is a sort of perverted phantasy in the demons. But phantasy autem ad vim imaginativam pertinet. Ergo in daemoni- belongs to the imaginative faculty. Therefore the power of

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bus est vis imaginativa. Et eadem ratione in angelis, quia sunt eiusdem naturae. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in Homilia de Ascensione, quod homo sentit cum pecoribus, et intelligit cum angelis. Respondeo dicendum quod in anima nostra sunt quaedam vires, quarum operationes per organa corporea exercentur, et huiusmodi vires sunt actus quarundam partium corporis, sicut est visus in oculo, et auditus in aure. Quaedam vero vires animae nostrae sunt, quarum operationes per organa corporea non exercentur, ut intellectus et voluntas, et huiusmodi non sunt actus aliquarum partium corporis. Angeli autem non habent corpora sibi naturaliter unita, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde de viribus animae non possunt eis competere nisi intellectus et voluntas. Et hoc etiam Commentator dicit, XII Metaphys., quod substantiae separatae dividuntur in intellectum et voluntatem. Et hoc convenit ordini universi, ut suprema creatura intellectualis sit totaliter intellectiva; et non secundum partem, ut anima nostra. Et propter hoc etiam angeli vocantur intellectus et mentes, ut supra dictum est. Ad ea vero quae in contrarium obiiciuntur, potest dupliciter responderi. Uno modo, quod auctoritates illae loquuntur secundum opinionem illorum qui posuerunt angelos et daemones habere corpora naturaliter sibi unita. Qua opinione frequenter Augustinus in libris suis utitur, licet eam asserere non intendat, unde dicit, XXI de Civ. Dei, quod super hac inquisitione non est multum laborandum. Alio modo potest dici, quod auctoritates illae, et consimiles, sunt intelligendae per quandam similitudinem. Quia cum sensus certam apprehensionem habeat de proprio sensibili, est in usu loquentium ut etiam secundum certam apprehensionem intellectus aliquid sentire dicamur. Unde etiam sententia nominatur. Experientia vero angelis attribui potest per similitudinem cognitorum, etsi non per similitudinem virtutis cognoscitivae. Est enim in nobis experientia, dum singularia per sensum cognoscimus, angeli autem singularia cognoscunt, ut infra patebit, sed non per sensum. Sed tamen memoria in angelis potest poni, secundum quod ab Augustino ponitur in mente; licet non possit eis competere secundum quod ponitur pars animae sensitivae. Similiter dicendum quod phantasia proterva attribuitur daemonibus, ex eo quod habent falsam practicam existimationem de vero bono, deceptio autem in nobis proprie fit secundum phantasiam, per quam interdum similitudinibus rerum inhaeremus sicut rebus ipsis, ut patet in dormientibus et amentibus.

Q. 54, A. 5

the imagination is in the demons; and for the same reason it is in the angels, since they are of the same nature. On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. 29 in Ev.) that man senses in common with the brutes, and understands with the angels. I answer that, In our soul there are certain powers whose operations are exercised by corporeal organs; such powers are acts of sundry parts of the body, as sight of the eye, and hearing of the ear. There are some other powers of the soul whose operations are not performed through bodily organs, as intellect and will: these are not acts of any parts of the body. Now the angels have no bodies naturally joined to them, as is manifest from what has been said already (Q. 51, A. 1). Hence of the soul’s powers only intellect and will can belong to them. The Commentator (Metaph. xii) says the same thing, namely, that the separated substances are divided into intellect and will. And it is in keeping with the order of the universe for the highest intellectual creature to be entirely intelligent; and not in part, as is our soul. For this reason the angels are called intellects and minds, as was said above (A. 3, ad 1). A twofold answer can be returned to the contrary objections. First, it may be replied that those authorities are speaking according to the opinion of such men as contended that angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them. Augustine often makes use of this opinion in his books, although he does not mean to assert it; hence he says (De Civ. Dei xxi) that such an inquiry does not call for much labor. Second, it may be said that such authorities and the like are to be understood by way of similitude. Because, since sense has a sure apprehension of its proper sensible object, it is a common usage of speech, when we understand something for certain, to say that we sense it. And hence it is that we use the word sentence. Experience can be attributed to the angels according to the likeness of the things known, although not by likeness of the faculty knowing them. We have experience when we know single objects through the senses: the angels likewise know single objects, as we shall show (Q. 57, A. 2), yet not through the senses. But memory can be allowed in the angels, according as Augustine (De Trin. x) puts it in the mind; although it cannot belong to them in so far as it is a part of the sensitive soul. In like fashion ‘a perverted phantasy’ is attributed to demons, since they have a false practical estimate of what is the true good; while deception in us comes properly from the phantasy, whereby we sometimes hold fast to images of things as to the things themselves, as is manifest in sleepers and lunatics.

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Question 55 The Medium of the Angelic Knowledge Consequenter quaeritur de medio cognitionis angeNext in order, the question arises as to the medium of licae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. the angelic knowledge. Under this heading there are three points of inquiry: Primo, utrum angeli cognoscant omnia per suam (1) Do the angels know everything by their substance, substantiam, vel per aliquas species. or by some species? Secundo, si per species, utrum per species (2) If by species, is it by connatural species, or is it by connaturales, vel per species a rebus acceptas. such as they have derived from things? Tertio, utrum angeli superiores cognoscant per (3) Do the higher angels know by more universal species magis universales, quam inferiores. species than the lower angels?

Article 1 Whether the angels know all things by their substance? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli cognoscant omnia per suam substantiam. Dicit enim Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod angeli sciunt ea quae sunt in terra, secundum propriam naturam mentis. Sed natura angeli est eius essentia. Ergo angelus per suam essentiam res cognoscit. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum, in XII Metaphys., et in III de Anima, in his quae sunt sine materia, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur. Id autem quod intelligitur est idem intelligenti ratione eius quo intelligitur. Ergo in his quae sunt sine materia, sicut sunt angeli, id quo intelligitur est ipsa substantia intelligentis.

Praeterea, omne quod est in altero, est in eo per modum eius in quo est. Sed angelus habet naturam intellectualem. Ergo quidquid est in ipso, est in eo per modum intelligibilem. Sed omnia sunt in eo, quia inferiora in entibus sunt in superioribus essentialiter, superiora vero sunt in inferioribus participative; et ideo dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod Deus tota in totis congregat, idest omnia in omnibus. Ergo angelus omnia in sua substantia cognoscit. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, in eodem capite, quod angeli illuminantur rationibus rerum. Ergo cognoscunt per rationes rerum, et non per propriam substantiam. Respondeo dicendum quod illud quo intellectus intelligit, comparatur ad intellectum intelligentem ut forma eius, quia forma est quo agens agit. Oportet autem, ad hoc quod potentia perfecte compleatur per formam, quod omnia contineantur sub forma, ad quae

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know all things by their substance. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the angels, according to the proper nature of a mind, know the things which are happening upon earth. But the angel’s nature is his essence. Therefore the angel knows things by his essence. Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, text. 51; De Anima iii, text. 15), in things which are without matter, the intellect is the same as the object understood. But the object understood is the same as the one who understands it, as regards that whereby it is understood. Therefore in things without matter, such as the angels, the medium whereby the object is understood is the very substance of the one understanding it. Obj. 3: Further, everything which is contained in another is there according to the mode of the container. But an angel has an intellectual nature. Therefore whatever is in him is there in an intelligible mode. But all things are in him: because the lower orders of beings are essentially in the higher, while the higher are in the lower participatively: and therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that God enfolds the whole in the whole, i.e., all in all. Therefore the angel knows all things in his substance. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the angels are enlightened by the forms of things. Therefore they know by the forms of things, and not by their own substance. I answer that, The medium through which the intellect understands, is compared to the intellect understanding it as its form, because it is by the form that the agent acts. Now in order that the faculty may be perfectly completed by the form, it is necessary for all things to which

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Q. 55, A. 1

Angels

potentia se extendit. Et inde est quod in rebus corruptibilibus forma non perfecte complet potentiam materiae, quia potentia materiae ad plura se extendit quam sit continentia formae huius vel illius. Potentia autem intellectiva angeli se extendit ad intelligendum omnia, quia obiectum intellectus est ens vel verum commune. Ipsa autem essentia angeli non comprehendit in se omnia, cum sit essentia determinata ad genus et ad speciem. Hoc autem proprium est essentiae divinae, quae infinita est, ut in se simpliciter omnia comprehendat perfecte. Et ideo solus Deus cognoscit omnia per suam essentiam. Angelus autem per suam essentiam non potest omnia cognoscere; sed oportet intellectum eius aliquibus speciebus perfici ad res cognoscendas. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum dicitur angelum secundum suam naturam res cognoscere, ly secundum non determinat medium cognitionis, quod est similitudo cogniti; sed virtutem cognoscitivam, quae convenit angelo secundum suam naturam. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut sensus in actu est sensibile in actu, ut dicitur in III de Anima, non ita quod ipsa vis sensitiva sit ipsa similitudo sensibilis quae est in sensu, sed quia ex utroque fit unum sicut ex actu et potentia; ita et intellectus in actu dicitur esse intellectum in actu, non quod substantia intellectus sit ipsa similitudo per quam intelligit, sed quia illa similitudo est forma eius. Idem est autem quod dicitur, in his quae sunt sine materia, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur, ac si diceretur quod intellectus in actu est intellectum in actu, ex hoc enim aliquid est intellectum in actu quod est immateriale. Ad tertium dicendum quod ea quae sunt infra angelum, et ea quae sunt supra ipsum, sunt quodammodo in substantia eius, non quidem perfecte, neque secundum propriam rationem, cum angeli essentia, finita existens, secundum propriam rationem ab aliis distinguatur; sed secundum quandam rationem communem. In essentia autem Dei sunt omnia perfecte et secundum propriam rationem, sicut in prima et universali virtute operativa, a qua procedit quidquid est in quacumque re vel proprium vel commune. Et ideo Deus per essentiam suam habet propriam cognitionem de rebus omnibus, non autem angelus, sed solam communem.

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the faculty extends to be contained under the form. Hence it is that in things which are corruptible, the form does not perfectly complete the potentiality of the matter: because the potentiality of the matter extends to more things than are contained under this or that form. But the intellective power of the angel extends to understanding all things: because the object of the intellect is universal being or universal truth. The angel’s essence, however, does not comprise all things in itself, since it is an essence restricted to a genus and species. This is proper to the Divine essence, which is infinite, simply and perfectly to comprise all things in Itself. Therefore God alone knows all things by His essence. But an angel cannot know all things by his essence; and his intellect must be perfected by some species in order to know things. Reply Obj. 1: When it is said that the angel knows things according to his own nature, the words according to do not determine the medium of such knowledge, since the medium is the similitude of the thing known; but they denote the knowing power, which belongs to the angel of his own nature. Reply Obj. 2: As the sense in act is the sensible in act, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 53, not so that the sensitive power is the sensible object’s likeness contained in the sense, but because one thing is made from both as from act and potentiality: so likewise the intellect in act is said to be the thing understood in act, not that the substance of the intellect is itself the similitude by which it understands, but because that similitude is its form. Now, it is precisely the same thing to say in things which are without matter, the intellect is the same thing as the object understood, as to say that the intellect in act is the thing understood in act; for a thing is actually understood, precisely because it is immaterial. Reply Obj. 3: The things which are beneath the angel, and those which are above him, are in a measure in his substance, not indeed perfectly, nor according to their own proper formality—because the angel’s essence, as being finite, is distinguished by its own formality from other things—but according to some common formality. Yet all things are perfectly and according to their own formality in God’s essence, as in the first and universal operative power, from which proceeds whatever is proper or common to anything. Therefore God has a proper knowledge of all things by His own essence: and this the angel has not, but only a common knowledge.

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Q. 55, A. 2

Article 2 Whether the angels understand by species drawn from things? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli intelligant per species a rebus acceptas. Omne enim quod intelligitur, per aliquam sui similitudinem in intelligente intelligitur. Similitudo autem alicuius in altero existens, aut est ibi per modum exemplaris, ita quod illa similitudo sit causa rei, aut est ibi per modum imaginis, ita quod sit causata a re. Oportet igitur quod omnis scientia intelligentis vel sit causa rei intellectae, vel causata a re. Sed scientia angeli non est causa rerum existentium in natura, sed sola divina scientia. Ergo oportet quod species per quas intelligit intellectus angelicus, sint a rebus acceptae. Praeterea, lumen angelicum est fortius quam lumen intellectus agentis in anima. Sed lumen intellectus agentis abstrahit species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus. Ergo lumen intellectus angelici potest abstrahere species etiam ab ipsis rebus sensibilibus. Et ita nihil prohibet dicere quod angelus intelligat per species a rebus acceptas. Praeterea, species quae sunt in intellectu, indifferenter se habent ad praesens et distans, nisi quatenus a rebus sensibilibus accipiuntur. Si ergo angelus non intelligit per species a rebus acceptas, eius cognitio indifferenter se haberet ad propinqua et distantia, et ita frustra secundum locum moveretur. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod angeli non congregant divinam cognitionem a rebus divisibilibus, aut a sensibilibus. Respondeo dicendum quod species per quas angeli intelligunt, non sunt a rebus acceptae, sed eis connaturales. Sic enim oportet intelligere distinctionem et ordinem spiritualium substantiarum, sicut est distinctio et ordo corporalium. Suprema autem corpora habent potentiam in sui natura totaliter perfectam per formam, in corporibus autem inferioribus potentia materiae non totaliter perficitur per formam, sed accipit nunc unam, nunc aliam formam, ab aliquo agente. Similiter et inferiores substantiae intellectivae, scilicet animae humanae, habent potentiam intellectivam non completam naturaliter; sed completur in eis successive, per hoc quod accipiunt species intelligibiles a rebus. Potentia vero intellectiva in substantiis spiritualibus superioribus, idest in angelis, naturaliter completa est per species intelligibiles, inquantum habent species intelligibiles connaturales ad omnia intelligenda quae naturaliter cognoscere possunt. Et hoc etiam ex ipso modo essendi huiusmodi substantiarum apparet. Substantiae enim spirituales inferiores, scilicet animae, habent esse affine corpori, in-

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels understand by species drawn from things. For everything understood is apprehended by some likeness within him who understands it. But the likeness of the thing existing in another is there either by way of an exemplar, so that the likeness is the cause of the thing; or else by way of an image, so that it is caused by such thing. All knowledge, then, of the person understanding must either be the cause of the object understood, or else caused by it. Now the angel’s knowledge is not the cause of existing things; that belongs to the Divine knowledge alone. Therefore it is necessary for the species, by which the angelic mind understands, to be derived from things. Obj. 2: Further, the angelic light is stronger than the light of the active intellect of the soul. But the light of the active intellect abstracts intelligible species from phantasms. Therefore the light of the angelic mind can also abstract species from sensible things. So there is nothing to hinder us from saying that the angel understands through species drawn from things. Obj. 3: Further, the species in the intellect are indifferent to what is present or distant, except in so far as they are taken from sensible objects. Therefore, if the angel does not understand by species drawn from things, his knowledge would be indifferent as to things present and distant; and so he would be moved locally to no purpose. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the angels do not gather their Divine knowledge from things divisible or sensible. I answer that, The species whereby the angels understand are not drawn from things, but are connatural to them. For we must observe that there is a similarity between the distinction and order of spiritual substances and the distinction and order of corporeal substances. The highest bodies have in their nature a potentiality which is fully perfected by the form; whereas in the lower bodies the potentiality of matter is not entirely perfected by the form, but receives from some agent, now one form, now another. In like fashion also the lower intellectual substances —that is to say, human souls—have a power of understanding which is not naturally complete, but is successively completed in them by their drawing intelligible species from things. But in the higher spiritual substances—that is, the angels—the power of understanding is naturally complete by intelligible species, in so far as they have such species connatural to them, so as to understand all things which they can know naturally. The same is evident from the manner of existence of such substances. The lower spiritual substances—that is, souls—have a nature akin to a body, in so far as they

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quantum sunt corporum formae, et ideo ex ipso modo essendi competit eis ut a corporibus, et per corpora suam perfectionem intelligibilem consequantur, alioquin frustra corporibus unirentur. Substantiae vero superiores, idest angeli, sunt a corporibus totaliter absolutae, immaterialiter et in esse intelligibili subsistentes, et ideo suam perfectionem intelligibilem consequuntur per intelligibilem effluxum, quo a Deo species rerum cognitarum acceperunt simul cum intellectuali natura. Unde Augustinus dicit, II super Gen. ad Litt., quod cetera, quae infra angelos sunt, ita creantur, ut prius fiant in cognitione rationalis creaturae, ac deinde in genere suo.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in mente angeli sunt similitudines creaturarum, non quidem ab ipsis creaturis acceptae, sed a Deo, qui est creaturarum causa, et in quo primo similitudines rerum existunt. Unde Augustinus dicit, in eodem libro, quod sicut ratio qua creatura conditur, prius est in verbo Dei quam ipsa creatura quae conditur, sic et eiusdem rationis cognitio prius fit in creatura intellectuali, ac deinde est ipsa conditio creaturae. Ad secundum dicendum quod de extremo ad extremum non pervenitur nisi per medium. Esse autem formae in imaginatione, quod est quidem sine materia, non tamen sine materialibus conditionibus, medium est inter esse formae quae est in materia, et esse formae quae est in intellectu per abstractionem a materia et a conditionibus materialibus. Unde quantumcumque sit potens intellectus angelicus, non posset formas materiales reducere ad esse intelligibile, nisi prius reduceret eas ad esse formarum imaginatarum. Quod est impossibile, cum careat imaginatione, ut dictum est. Dato etiam quod posset abstrahere species intelligibiles a rebus materialibus, non tamen abstraheret, quia non indigeret eis, cum habeat species intelligibiles connaturales. Ad tertium dicendum quod cognitio angeli indifferenter se habet ad distans et propinquum secundum locum. Non tamen propter hoc motus eius localis est frustra, non enim movetur localiter ad cognitionem accipiendam, sed ad operandum aliquid in loco.

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are the forms of bodies: and consequently from their very mode of existence it behooves them to seek their intelligible perfection from bodies, and through bodies; otherwise they would be united with bodies to no purpose. On the other hand, the higher substances—that is, the angels— are utterly free from bodies, and subsist immaterially and in their own intelligible nature; consequently they attain their intelligible perfection through an intelligible outpouring, whereby they received from God the species of things known, together with their intellectual nature. Hence Augustine says (Gen ad lit. ii, 8): The other things which are lower than the angels are so created that they first receive existence in the knowledge of the rational creature, and then in their own nature. Reply Obj. 1: There are images of creatures in the angel’s mind, not, indeed derived from creatures, but from God, Who is the cause of creatures, and in Whom the likenesses of creatures first exist. Hence Augustine says (Gen ad lit. ii, 8) that, As the type, according to which the creature is fashioned, is in the Word of God before the creature which is fashioned, so the knowledge of the same type exists first in the intellectual creature, and is afterwards the very fashioning of the creature. Reply Obj. 2: To go from one extreme to the other it is necessary to pass through the middle. Now the nature of a form in the imagination, which form is without matter but not without material conditions, stands midway between the nature of a form which is in matter, and the nature of a form which is in the intellect by abstraction from matter and from material conditions. Consequently, however powerful the angelic mind might be, it could not reduce material forms to an intelligible condition, except it were first to reduce them to the nature of imagined forms; which is impossible, since the angel has no imagination, as was said above (Q. 54, A. 5). Even granted that he could abstract intelligible species from material things, yet he would not do so; because he would not need them, for he has connatural intelligible species. Reply Obj. 3: The angel’s knowledge is quite indifferent as to what is near or distant. Nevertheless his local movement is not purposeless on that account: for he is not moved to a place for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, but for the purpose of operation.

Article 3 Whether the higher angels understand by more universal species than the lower angels? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod supeObjection 1: It would seem that the higher angels do riores angeli non intelligant per species magis universa- not understand by more universal species than the lower les quam inferiores. Universale enim esse videtur quod angels. For the universal, seemingly, is what is abstracted a particularibus abstrahitur. Sed angeli non intelligunt from particulars. But angels do not understand by species

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per species a rebus abstractas. Ergo non potest dici quod species intellectus angelici sint magis vel minus universales. Praeterea, quod cognoscitur in speciali, perfectius cognoscitur quam quod cognoscitur in universali, quia cognoscere aliquid in universali est quodammodo medium inter potentiam et actum. Si ergo angeli superiores cognoscunt per formas magis universales quam inferiores, sequitur quod angeli superiores habeant scientiam magis imperfectam quam inferiores. Quod est inconveniens. Praeterea, idem non potest esse propria ratio multorum. Sed si angelus superior cognoscat per unam formam universalem diversa, quae inferior angelus cognoscit per plures formas speciales, sequitur quod angelus superior utitur una forma universali ad cognoscendum diversa. Ergo non poterit habere propriam cognitionem de utroque. Quod videtur inconveniens. Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, XII cap. Angel. Hier., quod superiores angeli participant scientiam magis in universali quam inferiores. Et in libro de causis dicitur quod angeli superiores habent formas magis universales. Respondeo dicendum quod ex hoc sunt in rebus aliqua superiora, quod sunt uni primo, quod est Deus, propinquiora et similiora. In Deo autem tota plenitudo intellectualis cognitionis continetur in uno, scilicet in essentia divina, per quam Deus omnia cognoscit. Quae quidem intelligibilis plenitudo in intellectibus creatis inferiori modo et minus simpliciter invenitur. Unde oportet quod ea quae Deus cognoscit per unum, inferiores intellectus cognoscant per multa, et tanto amplius per plura, quanto amplius intellectus inferior fuerit. Sic igitur quanto angelus fuerit superior, tanto per pauciores species universitatem intelligibilium apprehendere poterit. Et ideo oportet quod eius formae sint universaliores, quasi ad plura se extendentes unaquaeque earum. Et de hoc exemplum aliqualiter in nobis perspici potest. Sunt enim quidam, qui veritatem intelligibilem capere non possunt, nisi eis particulatim per singula explicetur, et hoc quidem ex debilitate intellectus eorum contingit. Alii vero, qui sunt fortioris intellectus, ex paucis multa capere possunt. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod accidit universali ut a singularibus abstrahatur, inquantum intellectus illud cognoscens a rebus cognitionem accipit. Si vero sit aliquis intellectus a rebus cognitionem non accipiens, universale ab eo cognitum non erit abstractum a rebus, sed quodammodo ante res praeexistens, vel secundum ordinem causae, sicut universales rerum rationes sunt in verbo Dei; vel saltem ordine naturae, sicut universales rerum rationes sunt in intellectu angelico. Ad secundum dicendum quod cognoscere aliquid in universali, dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte rei

Q. 55, A. 3

abstracted from things. Therefore it cannot be said that the species of the angelic intellect are more or less universal. Obj. 2: Further, whatever is known in detail is more perfectly known than what is known generically; because to know anything generically is, in a fashion, midway between potentiality and act. If, therefore, the higher angels know by more universal species than the lower, it follows that the higher have a more imperfect knowledge than the lower; which is not befitting. Obj. 3: Further, the same cannot be the proper type of many. But if the higher angel knows various things by one universal form, which the lower angel knows by several special forms, it follows that the higher angel uses one universal form for knowing various things. Therefore he will not be able to have a proper knowledge of each; which seems unbecoming. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii) that the higher angels have a more universal knowledge than the lower. And in De Causis it is said that the higher angels have more universal forms. I answer that, For this reason are some things of a more exalted nature, because they are nearer to and more like unto the first, which is God. Now in God the whole plenitude of intellectual knowledge is contained in one thing, that is to say, in the Divine essence, by which God knows all things. This plenitude of knowledge is found in created intellects in a lower manner, and less simply. Consequently it is necessary for the lower intelligences to know by many forms what God knows by one, and by so many forms the more according as the intellect is lower. Thus the higher the angel is, by so much the fewer species will he be able to apprehend the whole mass of intelligible objects. Therefore his forms must be more universal; each one of them, as it were, extending to more things. An example of this can in some measure be observed in ourselves. For some people there are who cannot grasp an intelligible truth, unless it be explained to them in every part and detail; this comes of their weakness of intellect: while there are others of stronger intellect, who can grasp many things from few. Reply Obj. 1: It is accidental to the universal to be abstracted from particulars, in so far as the intellect knowing it derives its knowledge from things. But if there be an intellect which does not derive its knowledge from things, the universal which it knows will not be abstracted from things, but in a measure will be pre-existing to them; either according to the order of causality, as the universal ideas of things are in the Word of God; or at least in the order of nature, as the universal ideas of things are in the angelic mind. Reply Obj. 2: To know anything universally can be taken in two senses. In one way, on the part of the thing

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cognitae, ut scilicet cognoscatur solum universalis natura rei. Et sic cognoscere aliquid in universali est imperfectius, imperfecte enim cognosceret hominem, qui cognosceret de eo solum quod est animal. Alio modo, ex parte medii cognoscendi. Et sic perfectius est cognoscere aliquid in universali, perfectior enim est intellectus qui per unum universale medium potest singula propria cognoscere, quam qui non potest. Ad tertium dicendum quod idem non potest esse plurium propria ratio adaequata. Sed si sit excellens, potest idem accipi ut propria ratio et similitudo diversorum. Sicut in homine est universalis prudentia quantum ad omnes actus virtutum; et potest accipi ut propria ratio et similitudo particularis prudentiae quae est in leone ad actus magnanimitatis, et eius quae est in vulpe ad actus cautelae, et sic de aliis. Similiter essentia divina accipitur, propter sui excellentiam, ut propria ratio singulorum, quia est in ea unde sibi singula similentur secundum proprias rationes. Et eodem modo dicendum est de ratione universali quae est in mente angeli, quod per eam, propter eius excellentiam, multa cognosci possunt propria cognitione.

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known, namely, that only the universal nature of the thing is known. To know a thing thus is something less perfect: for he would have but an imperfect knowledge of a man who only knew him to be an animal. In another way, on the part of the medium of such knowledge. In this way it is more perfect to know a thing in the universal; for the intellect, which by one universal medium can know each of the things which are properly contained in it, is more perfect than one which cannot. Reply Obj. 3: The same cannot be the proper and adequate type of several things. But if it be eminent, then it can be taken as the proper type and likeness of many. Just as in man, there is a universal prudence with respect to all the acts of the virtues; which can be taken as the proper type and likeness of that prudence which in the lion leads to acts of magnanimity, and in the fox to acts of wariness; and so on of the rest. The Divine essence, on account of Its eminence, is in like fashion taken as the proper type of each thing contained therein: hence each one is likened to It according to its proper type. The same applies to the universal form which is in the mind of the angel, so that, on account of its excellence, many things can be known through it with a proper knowledge.

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Question 56 Angelic Knowledge of Immaterial Things Deinde quaeritur de cognitione angelorum ex parte We now inquire into the knowledge of the angels with rerum quas cognoscunt. Et primo, de cognitione rerum regard to the objects known by them. We shall treat of their immaterialium; secundo, de cognitione rerum materia- knowledge, first, of immaterial things, second of things malium. terial. Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry: Primo, utrum angelus cognoscat seipsum. (1) Does an angel know himself? Secundo, utrum unus cognoscat alium. (2) Does one angel know another? Tertio, utrum angelus per sua naturalia cognoscat (3) Does the angel know God by his own natural Deum. principles?

Article 1 Whether an angel knows himself? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus seipsum non cognoscat. Dicit enim Dionysius, VI cap. Angel. Hier., quod angeli ignorant proprias virtutes. Cognita autem substantia, cognoscitur virtus. Ergo angelus non cognoscit suam essentiam. Praeterea, angelus est quaedam substantia singularis, alioquin non ageret, cum actus sint singularium subsistentium. Sed nullum singulare est intelligibile. Ergo non potest intelligi. Et ita, cum angelo non adsit nisi intellectiva cognitio, non poterit aliquis angelus cognoscere seipsum. Praeterea, intellectus movetur ab intelligibili, quia intelligere est quoddam pati, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Sed nihil movetur aut patitur a seipso; ut in rebus corporalibus apparet. Ergo angelus non potest intelligere seipsum. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, II super Gen. ad Litt., quod angelus in ipsa sua conformatione, hoc est illustratione veritatis, cognovit seipsum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, obiectum aliter se habet in actione quae manet in agente, et in actione quae transit in aliquid exterius. Nam in actione quae transit in aliquid exterius, obiectum sive materia in quam transit actus, est separata ab agente, sicut calefactum a calefaciente, et aedificatum ab aedificante. Sed in actione quae manet in agente, oportet ad hoc quod procedat actio, quod obiectum uniatur agenti, sicut oportet quod sensibile uniatur sensui, ad hoc quod sentiat actu. Et ita se habet obiectum unitum potentiae ad huiusmodi actionem, sicut forma quae est principium actionis in aliis agentibus, sicut enim calor est princi-

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not know himself. For Dionysius says that the angels do not know their own powers (Coel. Hier. vi). But, when the substance is known, the power is known. Therefore an angel does not know his own essence. Obj. 2: Further, an angel is a single substance, otherwise he would not act, since acts belong to single subsistences. But nothing single is intelligible. Therefore, since the angel possesses only knowledge which is intellectual, no angel can know himself. Obj. 3: Further, the intellect is moved by the intelligible object: because, as stated in De Anima iii, 4 understanding is a kind of passion. But nothing is moved by or is passive to itself; as appears in corporeal things. Therefore the angel cannot understand himself. On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. ii) that the angel knew himself when he was established, that is, enlightened by truth. I answer that, As is evident from what has been previously said (Q. 14, A. 2; Q. 54, A. 2), the object is on a different footing in an immanent, and in a transient, action. In a transient action the object or matter into which the action passes is something separate from the agent, as the thing heated is from what gave it heat, and the building from the builder; whereas in an immanent action, for the action to proceed, the object must be united with the agent; just as the sensible object must be in contact with sense, in order that sense may actually perceive. And the object which is united to a faculty bears the same relation to actions of this kind as does the form which is the principle of action in

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pium formale calefactionis in igne, ita species rei visae other agents: for, as heat is the formal principle of heating in est principium formale visionis in oculo. the fire, so is the species of the thing seen the formal principle of sight to the eye. Sed considerandum est quod huiusmodi species obIt must, however, be borne in mind that this image of iecti quandoque est in potentia tantum in cognoscitiva the object exists sometimes only potentially in the knowvirtute, et tunc est cognoscens in potentia tantum; et ad ing faculty; and then there is only knowledge in potentialhoc quod actu cognoscat, requiritur quod potentia co- ity; and in order that there may be actual knowledge, it is gnoscitiva reducatur in actum speciei. Si autem semper required that the faculty of knowledge be actuated by the eam actu habeat, nihilominus per eam cognoscere po- species. But if it always actually possesses the species, it test absque aliqua mutatione vel receptione praecedenti. can thereby have actual knowledge without any preceding Ex quo patet quod moveri ab obiecto non est de ratione change or reception. From this it is evident that it is not of cognoscentis inquantum est cognoscens, sed inquantum the nature of knower, as knowing, to be moved by the obest potentia cognoscens. ject, but as knowing in potentiality. Nihil autem differt, ad hoc quod forma sit princiNow, for the form to be the principle of the action, it pium actionis, quod ipsa forma sit alii inhaerens, et quod makes no difference whether it be inherent in something sit per se subsistens, non enim minus calor calefaceret else, or self-subsisting; because heat would give forth heat si esset per se subsistens, quam calefacit inhaerens. Sic none the less if it were self-subsisting, than it does by inigitur et si aliquid in genere intelligibilium se habeat ut hering in something else. So therefore, if in the order of informa intelligibilis subsistens, intelliget seipsum. Ange- telligible beings there be any subsisting intelligible form, it lus autem, cum sit immaterialis, est quaedam forma sub- will understand itself. And since an angel is immaterial, he sistens, et per hoc intelligibilis actu. Unde sequitur quod is a subsisting form; and, consequently, he is actually intelper suam formam, quae est sua substantia, seipsum in- ligible. Hence it follows that he understands himself by his telligat. form, which is his substance. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod littera illa est anReply Obj. 1: That is the text of the old translation, tiquae translationis, quae corrigitur per novam, in qua which is amended in the new one, and runs thus: furtherdicitur, praeterea et ipsos, scilicet angelos, cognovisse more they, that is to say the angels, knew their own powproprias virtutes; loco cuius habebatur in alia translatio- ers: instead of which the old translation read—‘and furtherne, et adhuc et eos ignorare proprias virtutes. Quamvis more they do not know their own powers.’ Although even etiam littera antiquae translationis salvari possit quan- the letter of the old translation might be kept in this respect, tum ad hoc, quod angeli non perfecte cognoscunt suam that the angels do not know their own power perfectly; acvirtutem, secundum quod procedit ab ordine divinae sa- cording as it proceeds from the order of the Divine Wispientiae, quae est angelis incomprehensibilis. dom, Which to the angels is incomprehensible. Ad secundum dicendum quod singularium quae Reply Obj. 2: We have no knowledge of single corposunt in rebus corporalibus, non est intellectus, apud nos, real things, not because of their particularity, but on acnon ratione singularitatis, sed ratione materiae, quae est count of the matter, which is their principle of individuain eis individuationis principium. Unde si aliqua singu- tion. Accordingly, if there be any single things subsisting laria sunt sine materia subsistentia, sicut sunt angeli, illa without matter, as the angels are, there is nothing to prevent nihil prohibet intelligibilia esse actu. them from being actually intelligible. Ad tertium dicendum quod moveri et pati conveReply Obj. 3: It belongs to the intellect, in so far as it is nit intellectui secundum quod est in potentia. Unde non in potentiality, to be moved and to be passive. Hence this habet locum in intellectu angelico; maxime quantum ad does not happen in the angelic intellect, especially as rehoc quod intelligit seipsum. Actio etiam intellectus non gards the fact that he understands himself. Besides the acest eiusdem rationis cum actione quae in corporalibus tion of the intellect is not of the same nature as the action invenitur, in aliam materiam transeunte. found in corporeal things, which passes into some other matter.

Article 2 Whether one angel knows another? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not unus angelus alium non cognoscat. Dicit enim Philoso- know another. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. phus, in III de Anima, quod si intellectus humanus ha- 4), that if the human intellect were to have in itself any one

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beret in se aliquam naturam de numero naturarum rerum sensibilium, illa natura interius existens prohiberet apparere extranea, sicut etiam si pupilla esset colorata aliquo colore, non posset videre omnem colorem. Sed sicut se habet intellectus humanus ad cognoscendas res corporeas, ita se habet intellectus angelicus ad cognoscendas res immateriales. Cum igitur intellectus angelicus habeat in se aliquam naturam determinatam de numero illarum naturarum, videtur quod alias cognoscere non possit. Praeterea, in libro de Causis dicitur quod omnis intelligentia sit quod est supra se, inquantum est causata ab eo; et quod est sub se, inquantum est causa eius. Sed unus angelus non est causa alterius. Ergo unus angelus non cognoscit alium. Praeterea, unus angelus non potest cognoscere alium per essentiam ipsius angeli cognoscentis, cum omnis cognitio sit secundum rationem similitudinis, essentia autem angeli cognoscentis non est similis essentiae angeli cogniti nisi in genere, ut ex supra dictis patet; unde sequeretur quod unus angelus non haberet de alio cognitionem propriam, sed generalem tantum. Similiter etiam non potest dici quod unus angelus cognoscat alium per essentiam angeli cogniti, quia illud quo intellectus intelligit, est intrinsecum intellectui; sola autem Trinitas illabitur menti. Similiter etiam dici non potest quod unus cognoscat alium per speciem, quia illa species non differret ab angelo intellecto, cum utrumque sit immateriale. Nullo igitur modo videtur quod unus angelus possit intelligere alium. Praeterea, si unus angelus intelligit alium, aut hoc esset per speciem innatam, et sic sequeretur quod, si Deus nunc de novo crearet aliquem angelum, quod non posset cognosci ab his qui nunc sunt. Aut per speciem acquisitam a rebus, et sic sequeretur quod angeli superiores non possent cognoscere inferiores, a quibus nihil accipiunt. Nullo igitur modo videtur quod unus angelus alium cognoscat. Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de Causis, quod omnis intelligentia scit res quae non corrumpuntur. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, II super Gen. ad Litt., ea quae in verbo Dei ab aeterno praeextiterunt, dupliciter ab eo effluxerunt, uno modo, in intellectum angelicum; alio modo, ut subsisterent in propriis naturis. In intellectum autem angelicum processerunt per hoc, quod Deus menti angelicae impressit rerum similitudines, quas in esse naturali produxit. In verbo autem Dei ab aeterno extiterunt non solum rationes rerum corporalium, sed etiam rationes omnium spiritualium creaturarum. Sic igitur unicuique spiritualium creaturarum a verbo Dei impressae sunt omnes rationes rerum omnium, tam corporalium quam spiritualium. Ita tamen

Q. 56, A. 2

of the sensible things, then such a nature existing within it would prevent it from apprehending external things; as likewise, if the pupil of the eye were colored with some particular color, it could not see every color. But as the human intellect is disposed for understanding corporeal things, so is the angelic mind for understanding immaterial things. Therefore, since the angelic intellect has within itself some one determinate nature from the number of such natures, it would seem that it cannot understand other natures. Obj. 2: Further, it is stated in De Causis that every intelligence knows what is above it, in so far as it is caused by it; and what is beneath it, in so far as it is its cause. But one angel is not the cause of another. Therefore one angel does not know another. Obj. 3: Further, one angel cannot be known to another angel by the essence of the one knowing; because all knowledge is effected by way of a likeness. But the essence of the angel knowing is not like the essence of the angel known, except generically; as is clear from what has been said before (Q. 50, A. 4; Q. 55, A. 1, ad 3). Hence, it follows that one angel would not have a particular knowledge of another, but only a general knowledge. In like manner it cannot be said that one angel knows another by the essence of the angel known; because that whereby the intellect understands is something within the intellect; whereas the Trinity alone can penetrate the mind. Again, it cannot be said that one angel knows the other by a species; because that species would not differ from the angel understood, since each is immaterial. Therefore in no way does it appear that one angel can understand another. Obj. 4: Further, if one angel did understand another, this would be either by an innate species; and so it would follow that, if God were now to create another angel, such an angel could not be known by the existing angels; or else he would have to be known by a species drawn from things; and so it would follow that the higher angels could not know the lower, from whom they receive nothing. Therefore in no way does it seem that one angel knows another. On the contrary, We read in De Causis that every intelligence knows the things which are not corrupted. I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen ad lit. lit. ii), such things as pre-existed from eternity in the Word of God, came forth from Him in two ways: first, into the angelic mind; and second, so as to subsist in their own natures. They proceeded into the angelic mind in such a way, that God impressed upon the angelic mind the images of the things which He produced in their own natural being. Now in the Word of God from eternity there existed not only the forms of corporeal things, but likewise the forms of all spiritual creatures. So in every one of these spiritual creatures, the forms of all things, both corporeal and spiritual, were impressed by the Word of God; yet so that in ev-

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Angels

quod unicuique angelo impressa est ratio suae speciei secundum esse naturale et intelligibile simul, ita scilicet quod in natura suae speciei subsisteret, et per eam se intelligeret, aliarum vero naturarum, tam spiritualium quam corporalium, rationes sunt ei impressae secundum esse intelligibile tantum, ut videlicet per huiusmodi species impressas, tam creaturas corporales quam spirituales cognosceret. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod naturae spirituales angelorum ab invicem distinguuntur ordine quodam, sicut supra dictum est. Et sic natura unius angeli non prohibet intellectum ipsius a cognoscendis aliis naturis angelorum, cum tam superiores quam inferiores habeant affinitatem cum natura eius, differentia existente tantum secundum diversos gradus perfectionis. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio causae et causati non facit ad hoc quod unus angelus alium cognoscat, nisi ratione similitudinis, inquantum causa et causatum sunt similia. Et ideo, si inter angelos ponatur similitudo absque causalitate, remanebit in uno cognitio alterius. Ad tertium dicendum quod unus angelus cognoscit alium per speciem eius in intellectu suo existentem, quae differt ab angelo cuius similitudo est, non secundum esse materiale et immateriale, sed secundum esse naturale et intentionale. Nam ipse angelus est forma subsistens in esse naturali, non autem species eius quae est in intellectu alterius angeli, sed habet ibi esse intelligibile tantum. Sicut etiam et forma coloris in pariete habet esse naturale, in medio autem deferente habet esse intentionale tantum. Ad quartum dicendum quod Deus unamquamque creaturam fecit proportionatam universo quod facere disposuit. Et ideo, si Deus instituisset facere plures angelos vel plures naturas rerum, plures species intelligibiles mentibus angelicis impressisset. Sicut si aedificator voluisset facere maiorem domum, fecisset maius fundamentum. Unde eiusdem rationis est quod Deus adderet aliquam creaturam universo, et aliquam speciem intelligibilem angelo.

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ery angel there was impressed the form of his own species according to both its natural and its intelligible condition, so that he should subsist in the nature of his species, and understand himself by it; while the forms of other spiritual and corporeal natures were impressed in him only according to their intelligible natures, so that by such impressed species he might know corporeal and spiritual creatures. Reply Obj. 1: The spiritual natures of the angels are distinguished from one another in a certain order, as was already observed (Q. 50, A. 4, ad 1, 2). So the nature of an angel does not hinder him from knowing the other angelic natures, since both the higher and lower bear affinity to his nature, the only difference being according to their various degrees of perfection. Reply Obj. 2: The nature of cause and effect does not lead one angel to know another, except on account of likeness, so far as cause and effect are alike. Therefore if likeness without causality be admitted in the angels, this will suffice for one to know another. Reply Obj. 3: One angel knows another by the species of such angel existing in his intellect, which differs from the angel whose image it is, not according to material and immaterial nature, but according to natural and intentional existence. The angel is himself a subsisting form in his natural being; but his species in the intellect of another angel is not so, for there it possesses only an intelligible existence. As the form of color on the wall has a natural existence; but, in the deferent medium, it has only intentional existence. Reply Obj. 4: God made every creature proportionate to the universe which He determined to make. Therefore had God resolved to make more angels or more natures of things, He would have impressed more intelligible species in the angelic minds; as a builder who, if he had intended to build a larger house, would have made larger foundations. Hence, for God to add a new creature to the universe, means that He would add a new intelligible species to an angel.

Article 3 Whether an angel knows God by his own natural principles? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli per sua naturalia Deum cognoscere non possint. Dicit enim Dionysius, I cap. de Div. Nom., quod Deus est super omnes caelestes mentes incomprehensibili virtute collocatus. Et postea subdit quod, quia est supra omnem substantiam, ab omni cognitione est segregatus. Praeterea, Deus in infinitum distat ab intellectu angeli. Sed in infinitum distantia non possunt attingi.

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels cannot know God by their natural principles. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that God by His incomprehensible might is placed above all heavenly minds. Afterwards he adds that, since He is above all substances, He is remote from all knowledge. Obj. 2: Further, God is infinitely above the intellect of an angel. But what is infinitely beyond cannot be reached.

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Q. 56, A. 3

Ergo videtur quod angelus per sua naturalia non possit Deum cognoscere. Praeterea, I Cor. XIII dicitur, videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem. Ex quo videtur quod sit duplex Dei cognitio, una, qua videtur per sui essentiam, secundum quam dicitur videri facie ad faciem; alia, secundum quod videtur in speculo creaturarum. Sed primam Dei cognitionem angelus habere non potuit per sua naturalia, ut supra ostensum est. Visio autem specularis angelis non convenit, quia non accipiunt divinam cognitionem e rebus sensibilibus, ut dicit Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo angeli per sua naturalia Deum cognoscere non possunt.

Therefore it appears that an angel cannot know God by his natural principles. Obj. 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor 13:12): We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face. From this it appears that there is a twofold knowledge of God; the one, whereby He is seen in His essence, according to which He is said to be seen face to face; the other whereby He is seen in the mirror of creatures. As was already shown (Q. 12, A. 4), an angel cannot have the former knowledge by his natural principles. Nor does vision through a mirror belong to the angels, since they do not derive their knowledge of God from sensible things, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the angels cannot know God by their natural powers. Sed contra, angeli sunt potentiores in cognoscenOn the contrary, The angels are mightier in knowldo quam homines. Sed homines per sua naturalia Deum edge than men. Yet men can know God through their natucognoscere possunt; secundum illud Rom. I, Quod no- ral principles; according to Rom. 1:19: what is known of God tum est Dei, manifestum est in illis. Ergo multo magis an- is manifest in them. Therefore much more so can the angels.

geli. Respondeo dicendum quod angeli aliquam cognitionem de Deo habere possunt per sua naturalia. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod aliquid tripliciter cognoscitur. Uno modo, per praesentiam suae essentiae in cognoscente, sicut si lux videatur in oculo, et sic dictum est quod angelus intelligit seipsum. Alio modo, per praesentiam suae similitudinis in potentia cognoscitiva, sicut lapis videtur ab oculo per hoc quod similitudo eius resultat in oculo. Tertio modo, per hoc quod similitudo rei cognitae non accipitur immediate ab ipsa re cognita, sed a re alia, in qua resultat, sicut cum videmus hominem in speculo. Primae igitur cognitioni assimilatur divina cognitio, qua per essentiam suam videtur. Et haec cognitio Dei non potest adesse creaturae alicui per sua naturalia, ut supra dictum est. Tertiae autem cognitioni assimilatur cognitio qua nos cognoscimus Deum in via, per similitudinem eius in creaturis resultantem; secundum illud Rom. I, invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur. Unde et dicimur Deum videre in speculo. Cognitio autem qua angelus per sua naturalia cognoscit Deum, media est inter has duas; et similatur illi cognitioni qua videtur res per speciem ab ea acceptam. Quia enim imago Dei est in ipsa natura angeli impressa per suam essentiam, angelus Deum cognoscit, inquantum est similitudo Dei. Non tamen ipsam essentiam Dei videt, quia nulla similitudo creata est sufficiens ad repraesentandam divinam essentiam. Unde magis ista cognitio tenet se cum speculari, quia et ipsa natura angelica est quoddam speculum divinam similitudinem repraesentans.

I answer that, The angels can have some knowledge of God by their own principles. In evidence whereof it must be borne in mind that a thing is known in three ways: first, by the presence of its essence in the knower, as light can be seen in the eye; and so we have said that an angel knows himself—second, by the presence of its similitude in the power which knows it, as a stone is seen by the eye from its image being in the eye—third, when the image of the object known is not drawn directly from the object itself, but from something else in which it is made to appear, as when we behold a man in a mirror.

To the first-named class that knowledge of God is likened by which He is seen through His essence; and knowledge such as this cannot accrue to any creature from its natural principles, as was said above (Q. 12, A. 4). The third class comprises the knowledge whereby we know God while we are on earth, by His likeness reflected in creatures, according to Rom. 1:20: The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. Hence, too, we are said to see God in a mirror. But the knowledge, whereby according to his natural principles the angel knows God, stands midway between these two; and is likened to that knowledge whereby a thing is seen through the species abstracted from it. For since God’s image is impressed on the very nature of the angel in his essence, the angel knows God in as much as he is the image of God. Yet he does not behold God’s essence; because no created likeness is sufficient to represent the Divine essence. Such knowledge then approaches rather to the specular kind; because the angelic nature is itself a kind of mirror representing the Divine image. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Dionysius loquiReply Obj. 1: Dionysius is speaking of the knowledge tur de cognitione comprehensionis, ut expresse eius ver- of comprehension, as his words expressly state. In this way ba ostendunt. Et sic a nullo intellectu creato cognoscitur. God is not known by any created intellect.

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Q. 56, A. 3

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Ad secundum dicendum quod propter hoc quod intellectus et essentia angeli in infinitum distant a Deo, sequitur quod non possit ipsum comprehendere, nec per suam naturam eius essentiam videre. Non tamen sequitur propter hoc, quod nullam eius cognitionem habere possit, quia sicut Deus in infinitum distat ab angelo, ita cognitio quam Deus habet de seipso, in infinitum distat a cognitione quam angelus habet de eo. Ad tertium dicendum quod cognitio quam naturaliter angelus habet de Deo, est media inter utramque cognitionem, et tamen magis se tenet cum una, ut supra dictum est.

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Reply Obj. 2: Since an angel’s intellect and essence are infinitely remote from God, it follows that he cannot comprehend Him; nor can he see God’s essence through his own nature. Yet it does not follow on that account that he can have no knowledge of Him at all: because, as God is infinitely remote from the angel, so the knowledge which God has of Himself is infinitely above the knowledge which an angel has of Him. Reply Obj. 3: The knowledge which an angel naturally has of God is midway between these two kinds of knowledge; nevertheless it approaches more to one of them, as was said above.

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Question 57 Angelic Knowledge of Material Things Deinde quaeritur de his materialibus quae ab angelis We next investigate the material objects which are cognoscuntur. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. known by the angels. Under this heading there are five points of inquiry: Primo, utrum angeli cognoscant naturas rerum (1) Whether the angels know the natures of material materialium. things? Secundo, utrum cognoscant singularia. (2) Whether they know single things? Tertio, utrum cognoscant futura. (3) Whether they know the future? Quarto, utrum cognoscant cogitationes cordium. (4) Whether they know secret thoughts? Quinto, utrum cognoscant omnia mysteria gratiae. (5) Whether they know all mysteries of grace?

Article 1 Whether the angels know material things? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli non cognoscant res materiales. Intellectum enim est perfectio intelligentis. Res autem materiales non possunt esse perfectiones angelorum, cum sint infra ipsos. Ergo angeli non cognoscunt res materiales. Praeterea, visio intellectualis est eorum quae sunt in anima per sui essentiam, ut dicitur in Glossa, II ad Cor. XII. Sed res materiales non possunt esse in anima hominis, vel in mente angeli, per suas essentias. Ergo non possunt intellectuali visione cognosci, sed solum imaginaria, qua apprehenduntur similitudines corporum; et sensibili, quae est de ipsis corporibus. In angelis autem non est visio imaginaria et sensibilis, sed solum intellectualis. Ergo angeli materialia cognoscere non possunt. Praeterea, res materiales non sunt intelligibiles in actu, sed sunt cognoscibiles apprehensione sensus et imaginationis; quae non est in angelis. Ergo angeli materialia non cognoscunt. Sed contra, quidquid potest inferior virtus, potest virtus superior. Sed intellectus hominis, qui est ordine naturae infra intellectum angeli, potest cognoscere res materiales. Ergo multo fortius intellectus angeli. Respondeo dicendum quod talis est ordo in rebus, quod superiora in entibus sunt perfectiora inferioribus, et quod in inferioribus continetur deficienter et partialiter et multipliciter, in superioribus continetur eminenter et per quandam totalitatem et simplicitatem. Et ideo in Deo, sicut in summo rerum vertice, omnia supersubstantialiter praeexistunt secundum ipsum suum simplex esse, ut Dionysius dicit, in libro de Div. Nom. angeli autem inter ceteras creaturas sunt Deo propinquiores

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels do not know material things. For the object understood is the perfection of him who understands it. But material things cannot be the perfections of angels, since they are beneath them. Therefore the angels do not know material things. Obj. 2: Further, intellectual vision is only of such things as exist within the soul by their essence, as is said in the gloss. But the material things cannot enter by their essence into man’s soul, nor into the angel’s mind. Therefore they cannot be known by intellectual vision, but only by imaginary vision, whereby the images of bodies are apprehended, and by sensible vision, which regards bodies in themselves. Now there is neither imaginary nor sensible vision in the angels, but only intellectual. Therefore the angels cannot know material things. Obj. 3: Further, material things are not actually intelligible, but are knowable by apprehension of sense and of imagination, which does not exist in angels. Therefore angels do not know material things. On the contrary, Whatever the lower power can do, the higher can do likewise. But man’s intellect, which in the order of nature is inferior to the angel’s, can know material things. Therefore much more can the mind of an angel. I answer that, The established order of things is for the higher beings to be more perfect than the lower; and for whatever is contained deficiently, partially, and in manifold manner in the lower beings, to be contained in the higher eminently, and in a certain degree of fullness and simplicity. Therefore, in God, as in the highest source of things, all things pre-exist supersubstantially in respect of His simple Being itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1). But among other creatures the angels are nearest to God, and resem-

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et similiores, unde et plura participant ex bonitate divina, et perfectius, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. Cael. Hier. Sic igitur omnia materialia in ipsis angelis praeexistunt, simplicius quidem et immaterialius quam in ipsis rebus; multiplicius autem et imperfectius quam in Deo. Omne autem quod est in aliquo; est in eo per modum eius in quo est. Angeli autem secundum suam naturam sunt intellectuales. Et ideo, sicut Deus per suam essentiam materialia cognoscit, ita angeli ea cognoscunt per hoc quod sunt in eis per suas intelligibiles species. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectum est perfectio intelligentis secundum speciem intelligibilem quam habet in intellectu. Et sic species intelligibiles quae sunt in intellectu angeli, sunt perfectiones et actus intellectus angelici. Ad secundum dicendum quod sensus non apprehendit essentias rerum, sed exteriora accidentia tantum. Similiter neque imaginatio, sed apprehendit solas similitudines corporum. Intellectus autem solus apprehendit essentias rerum. Unde in III de Anima dicitur quod obiectum intellectus est quod quid est, circa quod non errat, sicut neque sensus circa proprium sensibile. Sic ergo essentiae rerum materialium sunt in intellectu hominis vel angeli, ut intellectum est in intelligente, et non secundum esse suum reale. Quaedam vero sunt quae sunt in intellectu vel in anima secundum utrumque esse. Et utrorumque est visio intellectualis. Ad tertium dicendum quod, si angelus acciperet cognitionem rerum materialium ab ipsis rebus materialibus, oporteret quod faceret eas intelligibiles actu, abstrahendo eas. Non autem accipit cognitionem earum a rebus materialibus, sed per species actu intelligibiles rerum sibi connaturales, rerum materialium notitiam habet; sicut intellectus noster secundum species quas intelligibiles facit abstrahendo.

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ble Him most; hence they share more fully and more perfectly in the Divine goodness, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Consequently, all material things pre-exist in the angels more simply and less materially even than in themselves, yet in a more manifold manner and less perfectly than in God. Now whatever exists in any subject, is contained in it after the manner of such subject. But the angels are intellectual beings of their own nature. Therefore, as God knows material things by His essence, so do the angels know them, forasmuch as they are in the angels by their intelligible species. Reply Obj. 1: The thing understood is the perfection of the one who understands, by reason of the intelligible species which he has in his intellect. And thus the intelligible species which are in the intellect of an angel are perfections and acts in regard to that intellect. Reply Obj. 2: Sense does not apprehend the essences of things, but only their outward accidents. In like manner neither does the imagination; for it apprehends only the images of bodies. The intellect alone apprehends the essences of things. Hence it is said (De Anima iii, text. 26) that the object of the intellect is what a thing is, regarding which it does not err; as neither does sense regarding its proper sensible object. So therefore the essences of material things are in the intellect of man and angels, as the thing understood is in him who understands, and not according to their real natures. But some things are in an intellect or in the soul according to both natures; and in either case there is intellectual vision. Reply Obj. 3: If an angel were to draw his knowledge of material things from the material things themselves, he would require to make them actually intelligible by a process of abstraction. But he does not derive his knowledge of them from the material things themselves; he has knowledge of material things by actually intelligible species of things, which species are connatural to him; just as our intellect has, by species which it makes intelligible by abstraction.

Article 2 Whether an angel knows singulars? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus singularia non cognoscat. Dicit enim Philosophus, in I Physic., quod sensus est singularium, ratio vero (vel intellectus) universalium. In angelis autem non est vis cognoscitiva nisi intellectiva, ut ex superioribus patet. Ergo singularia non cognoscunt.

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not know singulars. For the Philosopher says (Poster. i, text. 22): The sense has for its object singulars, but the intellect, universals. Now, in the angels there is no power of understanding save the intellectual power, as is evident from what was said above (Q. 54, A. 5). Consequently they do not know singulars. Praeterea, omnis cognitio est per assimilationem Obj. 2: Further, all knowledge comes about by some asaliquam cognoscentis ad cognitum. Sed non videtur similation of the knower to the object known. But it is not

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quod possit esse aliqua assimilatio angeli ad singulare inquantum est singulare, cum angelus sit immaterialis, ut supra dictum est, singularitatis vero principium sit materia. Ergo angelus non potest cognoscere singularia. Praeterea, si angelus scit singularia, aut per species singulares, aut per species universales. Non per singulares, quia sic oporteret quod haberet species infinitas. Neque per universales, quia universale non est sufficiens principium cognoscendi singulare inquantum est singulare, cum in universali singularia non cognoscantur nisi in potentia. Ergo angelus non cognoscit singularia. Sed contra, nullus potest custodire quod non cognoscit. Sed angeli custodiunt homines singulares, secundum illud Psalmi XC, Angelis suis mandavit de te, et cetera. Ergo angeli cognoscunt singularia. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam totaliter subtraxerunt angelis singularium cognitionem. Sed hoc primo quidem derogat Catholicae fidei, quae ponit haec inferiora administrari per angelos, secundum illud Heb. I, Omnes sunt administratorii spiritus. Si autem singularium notitiam non haberent, nullam providentiam habere possent de his quae in hoc mundo aguntur; cum actus singularium sint. Et hoc est contra illud quod dicitur Eccle. V, Ne dicas coram angelo, non est providentia. Secundo, etiam derogat philosophiae documentis, secundum quae ponuntur angeli motores caelestium orbium, et quod eos moveant secundum intellectum et voluntatem. Et ideo alii dixerunt quod angelus habet quidem cognitionem singularium, sed in causis universalibus, ad quas reducuntur particulares omnes effectus, sicut si astrologus iudicet de aliqua eclipsi futura, per dispositiones caelestium motuum. Sed haec positio praedicta inconvenientia non evadit, quia sic cognoscere singulare in causis universalibus, non est cognoscere ipsum ut est singulare, hoc est ut est hic et nunc. Astrologus enim cognoscens eclipsim futuram per computationem caelestium motuum, scit eam in universali; et non prout est hic et nunc, nisi per sensum accipiat. Administratio autem et providentia et motus sunt singularium, prout sunt hic et nunc. Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod, sicut homo cognoscit diversis viribus cognitivis omnia rerum genera, intellectu quidem universalia et immaterialia, sensu autem singularia et corporalia; ita angelus per unam intellectivam virtutem utraque cognoscit. Hoc enim rerum ordo habet, quod quanto aliquid est superius, tanto habeat virtutem magis unitam et ad plura se extendentem, sicut in ipso homine patet quod sensus communis, qui est superior quam sensus proprius, licet sit unica potentia, omnia cognoscit quae quinque sensibus exterioribus cognoscuntur, et quaedam alia quae nullus sensus exterior

Q. 57, A. 2

possible for any assimilation to exist between an angel and a singular object, in so far as it is singular; because, as was observed above (Q. 50, A. 2), an angel is immaterial, while matter is the principle of singularity. Therefore the angel cannot know singulars. Obj. 3: Further, if an angel does know singulars, it is either by singular or by universal species. It is not by singular species; because in this way he would require to have an infinite number of species. Nor is it by universal species; since the universal is not the sufficient principle for knowing the singular as such, because singular things are not known in the universal except potentially. Therefore the angel does not know singulars. On the contrary, No one can guard what he does not know. But angels guard individual men, according to Ps. 90:11: He hath given His angels charge over Thee. Consequently the angels know singulars. I answer that, Some have denied to the angels all knowledge of singulars. In the first place this derogates from the Catholic faith, which asserts that these lower things are administered by angels, according to Heb. 1:14: They are all ministering spirits. Now, if they had no knowledge of singulars, they could exercise no provision over what is going on in this world; since acts belong to individuals: and this is against the text of Eccles. 5:5: Say not before the angel: There is no providence. Second, it is also contrary to the teachings of philosophy, according to which the angels are stated to be the movers of the heavenly spheres, and to move them according to their knowledge and will. Consequently others have said that the angel possesses knowledge of singulars, but in their universal causes, to which all particular effects are reduced; as if the astronomer were to foretell a coming eclipse from the dispositions of the movements of the heavens. This opinion does not escape the aforesaid implications; because, to know a singular, merely in its universal causes, is not to know it as singular, that is, as it exists here and now. The astronomer, knowing from computation of the heavenly movements that an eclipse is about to happen, knows it in the universal; yet he does not know it as taking place now, except by the senses. But administration, providence and movement are of singulars, as they are here and now existing. Therefore, it must be said differently, that, as man by his various powers of knowledge knows all classes of things, apprehending universals and immaterial things by his intellect, and things singular and corporeal by the senses, so an angel knows both by his one mental power. For the order of things runs in this way, that the higher a thing is, so much the more is its power united and far-reaching: thus in man himself it is manifest that the common sense which is higher than the proper sense, although it is but one faculty, knows everything apprehended by the five outward senses, and some other things which no outer sense knows; for ex-

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cognoscit, scilicet differentiam albi et dulcis. Et simile etiam est in aliis considerare. Unde cum angelus naturae ordine sit supra hominem, inconveniens est dicere quod homo quacumque sua potentia cognoscat aliquid, quod angelus per unam vim suam cognoscitivam, scilicet intellectum, non cognoscat. Unde Aristoteles pro inconvenienti habet ut litem, quam nos scimus, Deus ignoret; ut patet in I de Anima, et in III Metaphys. Modus autem quo intellectus angeli singularia cognoscit, ex hoc considerari potest quod, sicut a Deo effluunt res ut subsistant in propriis naturis, ita etiam ut sint in cognitione angelica. Manifestum est autem quod a Deo effluit in rebus non solum illud quod ad naturam universalem pertinet, sed etiam ea quae sunt individuationis principia, est enim causa totius substantiae rei, et quantum ad materiam et quantum ad formam. Et secundum quod causat, sic et cognoscit, quia scientia eius est causa rei, ut supra ostensum est. Sicut igitur Deus per essentiam suam, per quam omnia causat, est similitudo omnium, et per eam omnia cognoscit non solum quantum ad naturas universales, sed etiam quantum ad singularitatem; ita angeli per species a Deo inditas, res cognoscunt non solum quantum ad naturam universalem, sed etiam secundum earum singularitatem, inquantum sunt quaedam repraesentationes multiplicatae illius unicae et simplicis essentiae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Philosophus loquitur de intellectu nostro, qui non intelligit res nisi abstrahendo; et per ipsam abstractionem a materialibus conditionibus, id quod abstrahitur, fit universale. Hic autem modus intelligendi non convenit angelis, ut supra dictum est, et ideo non est eadem ratio. Ad secundum dicendum quod secundum suam naturam angeli non assimilantur rebus materialibus sicut assimilatur aliquid alicui secundum convenientiam in genere vel in specie, aut in accidente; sed sicut superius habet similitudinem cum inferiori, ut sol cum igne. Et per hunc etiam modum in Deo est similitudo omnium, et quantum ad formam et quantum ad materiam, inquantum in ipso praeexistit ut in causa quidquid in rebus invenitur. Et eadem ratione species intellectus angeli, quae sunt quaedam derivatae similitudines a divina essentia, sunt similitudines rerum non solum quantum ad formam, sed etiam quantum ad materiam. Ad tertium dicendum quod angeli cognoscunt singularia per formas universales, quae tamen sunt similitudines rerum et quantum ad principia universalia, et quantum ad individuationis principia. Quomodo autem per eandem speciem possint multa cognosci iam supra dictum est.

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ample, the difference between white and sweet. The same is to be observed in other cases. Accordingly, since an angel is above man in the order of nature, it is unreasonable to say that a man knows by any one of his powers something which an angel by his one faculty of knowledge, namely, the intellect, does not know. Hence Aristotle pronounces it ridiculous to say that a discord, which is known to us, should be unknown to God (De Anima i, text. 80; Metaph. text. 15). The manner in which an angel knows singular things can be considered from this, that, as things proceed from God in order that they may subsist in their own natures, so likewise they proceed in order that they may exist in the angelic mind. Now it is clear that there comes forth from God not only whatever belongs to their universal nature, but likewise all that goes to make up their principles of individuation; since He is the cause of the entire substance of the thing, as to both its matter and its form. And for as much as He causes, does He know; for His knowledge is the cause of a thing, as was shown above (Q. 14, A. 8). Therefore as by His essence, by which He causes all things, God is the likeness of all things, and knows all things, not only as to their universal natures, but also as to their singularity; so through the species imparted to them do the angels know things, not only as to their universal nature, but likewise in their individual conditions, in so far as they are the manifold representations of that one simple essence. Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of our intellect, which apprehends only by a process of abstraction; and by such abstraction from material conditions the thing abstracted becomes a universal. Such a manner of understanding is not in keeping with the nature of the angels, as was said above (Q. 55, A. 2, A. 3 ad 1), and consequently there is no comparison. Reply Obj. 2: It is not according to their nature that the angels are likened to material things, as one thing resembles another by agreement in genus, species, or accident; but as the higher bears resemblance to the lower, as the sun does to fire. Even in this way there is in God a resemblance of all things, as to both matter and form, in so far as there pre-exists in Him as in its cause whatever is to be found in things. For the same reason, the species in the angel’s intellect, which are images drawn from the Divine essence, are the images of things not only as to their form, but also as to their matter. Reply Obj. 3: Angels know singulars by universal forms, which nevertheless are the images of things both as to their universal, and as to their individuating principles. How many things can be known by the same species, has been already stated above (Q. 55, A. 3, ad 3).

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Article 3 Whether angels know the future? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli cognoscant futura. Angeli enim potentiores sunt in cognoscendo quam homines. Sed homines aliqui cognoscunt multa futura. Ergo multo fortius angeli. Praeterea, praesens et futurum sunt differentiae temporis. Sed intellectus angeli est supra tempus, parificatur enim intelligentia aeternitati, idest aevo, ut dicitur in libro de Causis. Ergo quantum ad intellectum angeli, non differunt praeteritum et futurum; sed indifferenter cognoscit utrumque. Praeterea, angelus non cognoscit per species acceptas a rebus, sed per species innatas universales. Sed species universales aequaliter se habent ad praesens, praeteritum et futurum. Ergo videtur quod angeli indifferenter cognoscant praeterita et praesentia et futura. Praeterea, sicut aliquid dicitur distans secundum tempus, ita secundum locum. Sed angeli cognoscunt distantia secundum locum. Ergo etiam cognoscunt distantia secundum tempus futurum. Sed contra, id quod est proprium signum divinitatis, non convenit angelis. Sed cognoscere futura est proprium signum divinitatis; secundum illud Isaiae XLI, Annuntiate quae ventura sunt in futurum, et sciemus quod dii estis vos. Ergo angeli non cognoscunt futura. Respondeo dicendum quod futurum dupliciter potest cognosci. Uno modo, in causa sua. Et sic futura quae ex necessitate ex causis suis proveniunt, per certam scientiam cognoscuntur, ut solem oriri cras. Quae vero ex suis causis proveniunt ut in pluribus, cognoscuntur non per certitudinem, sed per coniecturam; sicut medicus praecognoscit sanitatem infirmi. Et iste modus cognoscendi futura adest angelis; et tanto magis quam nobis, quanto magis rerum causas et universalius et perfectius cognoscunt; sicut medici qui acutius vident causas, melius de futuro statu aegritudinis prognosticantur. Quae vero proveniunt ex causis suis ut in paucioribus, penitus sunt ignota, sicut casualia et fortuita.

Alio modo cognoscuntur futura in seipsis. Et sic solius Dei est futura cognoscere, non solum quae ex necessitate proveniunt, vel ut in pluribus, sed etiam casualia et fortuita, quia Deus videt omnia in sua aeternitate, quae, cum sit simplex, toti tempori adest, et ipsum concludit. Et ideo unus Dei intuitus fertur in omnia quae aguntur per totum tempus sicut in praesentia, et videt omnia ut in seipsis sunt; sicut supra dictum est cum de Dei scientia ageretur. Angelicus autem intellectus, et quilibet intellectus creatus, deficit ab aeternitate divina. Unde non

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know future events. For angels are mightier in knowledge than men. But some men know many future events. Therefore much more do the angels. Obj. 2: Further, the present and the future are differences of time. But the angel’s intellect is above time; because, as is said in De Causis, an intelligence keeps pace with eternity, that is, aeviternity. Therefore, to the angel’s mind, past and future are not different, but he knows each indifferently. Obj. 3: Further, the angel does not understand by species derived from things, but by innate universal species. But universal species refer equally to present, past, and future. Therefore it appears that the angels know indifferently things past, present, and future. Obj. 4: Further, as a thing is spoken of as distant by reason of time, so is it by reason of place. But angels know things which are distant according to place. Therefore they likewise know things distant according to future time. On the contrary, Whatever is the exclusive sign of the Divinity, does not belong to the angels. But to know future events is the exclusive sign of the Divinity, according to Isa. 41:23: Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods. Therefore the angels do not know future events. I answer that, The future can be known in two ways. First, it can be known in its cause. And thus, future events which proceed necessarily from their causes, are known with sure knowledge; as that the sun will rise tomorrow. But events which proceed from their causes in the majority of cases, are not known for certain, but conjecturally; thus the doctor knows beforehand the health of the patient. This manner of knowing future events exists in the angels, and by so much the more than it does in us, as they understand the causes of things both more universally and more perfectly; thus doctors who penetrate more deeply into the causes of an ailment can pronounce a surer verdict on the future issue thereof. But events which proceed from their causes in the minority of cases are quite unknown; such as casual and chance events. In another way future events are known in themselves. To know the future in this way belongs to God alone; and not merely to know those events which happen of necessity, or in the majority of cases, but even casual and chance events; for God sees all things in His eternity, which, being simple, is present to all time, and embraces all time. And therefore God’s one glance is cast over all things which happen in all time as present before Him; and He beholds all things as they are in themselves, as was said before when dealing with God’s knowledge (Q. 14, A. 13). But the mind

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potest ab aliquo intellectu creato cognosci futurum, ut of an angel, and every created intellect, fall far short of est in suo esse. God’s eternity; hence the future as it is in itself cannot be known by any created intellect. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homines non coReply Obj. 1: Men cannot know future things except gnoscunt futura nisi in causis suis, vel Deo revelante. Et in their causes, or by God’s revelation. The angels know the sic angeli multo subtilius futura cognoscunt. future in the same way, but much more distinctly. Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet intellectus anReply Obj. 2: Although the angel’s intellect is above geli sit supra tempus quo mensurantur corporales mo- that time according to which corporeal movements are tus, est tamen in intellectu angeli tempus secundum reckoned, yet there is a time in his mind according to the successionem intelligibilium conceptionum; secundum succession of intelligible concepts; of which Augustine says quod dicit Augustinus, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., quod (Gen ad lit. viii) that God moves the spiritual creature acDeus movet spiritualem creaturam per tempus. Et ita, cording to time. And thus, since there is succession in the cum sit successio in intellectu angeli, non omnia quae angel’s intellect, not all things that happen through all time, aguntur per totum tempus, sunt ei praesentia. are present to the angelic mind. Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet species quae sunt Reply Obj. 3: Although the species in the intellect of in intellectu angeli, quantum est de se, aequaliter se ha- an angel, in so far as they are species, refer equally to things beant ad praesentia, praeterita et futura; tamen praesen- present, past, and future; nevertheless the present, past, and tia, praeterita et futura non aequaliter se habent ad ra- future do not bear the same relations to the species. Present tiones. Quia ea quae praesentia sunt, habent naturam things have a nature according to which they resemble the per quam assimilantur speciebus quae sunt in mente an- species in the mind of an angel: and so they can be known geli, et sic per eas cognosci possunt. Sed quae futura thereby. Things which are yet to come have not yet a nasunt, nondum habent naturam per quam illis assimilen- ture whereby they are likened to such species; consequently, tur, unde per eas cognosci non possunt. they cannot be known by those species. Ad quartum dicendum quod distantia secundum Reply Obj. 4: Things distant according to place are allocum sunt iam in rerum natura, et participant aliquam ready existing in nature; and share in some species, whose speciem, cuius similitudo est in angelo, quod non est ve- image is in the angel; whereas this is not true of future rum de futuris, ut dictum est. Et ideo non est simile. things, as has been stated. Consequently there is no comparison.

Article 4 Whether angels know thoughts of the heart? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli cognoscant cogitationes cordium. Dicit enim Gregorius, in Moralibus, super illud Iob XXVIII, non aequabitur ei aurum vel vitrum, quod tunc, scilicet in beatitudine resurgentium, unus erit perspicabilis alteri sicut ipse sibi, et cum uniuscuiusque intellectus attenditur, simul conscientia penetratur. Sed resurgentes erunt similes angelis, sicut habetur Matth. XXII. Ergo unus angelus potest videre id quod est in conscientia alterius. Praeterea, sicut se habent figurae ad corpora, ita se habent species intelligibiles ad intellectum. Sed viso corpore, videtur eius figura. Ergo visa substantia intellectuali, videtur species intelligibilis quae est in ipsa. Ergo, cum angelus videat alium angelum, et etiam animam, videtur quod possit videre cogitationem utriusque. Praeterea, ea quae sunt in intellectu nostro, sunt similiora angelo quam ea quae sunt in phantasia, cum haec sint intellecta in actu, illa vero in potentia tantum. Sed ea quae sunt in phantasia, possunt cognosci ab an-

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know secret thoughts. For Gregory (Moral. xviii), explaining Job 28:17: Gold or crystal cannot equal it, says that then, namely in the bliss of those rising from the dead, one shall be as evident to another as he is to himself, and when once the mind of each is seen, his conscience will at the same time be penetrated. But those who rise shall be like the angels, as is stated (Matt 22:30). Therefore an angel can see what is in another’s conscience. Obj. 2: Further, intelligible species bear the same relation to the intellect as shapes do to bodies. But when the body is seen its shape is seen. Therefore, when an intellectual substance is seen, the intelligible species within it is also seen. Consequently, when one angel beholds another, or even a soul, it seems that he can see the thoughts of both. Obj. 3: Further, the ideas of our intellect resemble the angel more than do the images in our imagination; because the former are actually understood, while the latter are understood only potentially. But the images in our

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gelo sicut corporalia, cum phantasia sit virtus corporis. imagination can be known by an angel as corporeal things Ergo videtur quod angelus possit cognoscere cogitatio- are known: because the imagination is a corporeal faculty. nes intellectus. Therefore it seems that an angel can know the thoughts of the intellect. Sed contra, quod est proprium Dei, non conveOn the contrary, What is proper to God does not nit angelis. Sed cognoscere cogitationes cordium est pro- belong to the angels. But it is proper to God to read the seprium Dei, secundum illud Ierem. XVII, Pravum est cor crets of hearts, according to Jer. 17:9: The heart is perverse hominis et inscrutabile, quis cognoscet illud? Ego, domi- above all things, and unsearchable; who can know it? I am the nus, scrutans corda. Ergo angeli non cognoscunt secreta Lord, Who search the heart. Therefore angels do not know cordium. the secrets of hearts. Respondeo dicendum quod cogitatio cordis dupliI answer that, A secret thought can be known in two citer potest cognosci. Uno modo, in suo effectu. Et sic ways: first, in its effect. In this way it can be known not only non solum ab angelo, sed etiam ab homine cognosci po- by an angel, but also by man; and with so much the greater test; et tanto subtilius, quanto effectus huiusmodi fue- subtlety according as the effect is the more hidden. For rit magis occultus. Cognoscitur enim cogitatio interdum thought is sometimes discovered not merely by outward non solum per actum exteriorem, sed etiam per im- act, but also by change of countenance; and doctors can tell mutationem vultus, et etiam medici aliquas affectiones some passions of the soul by the mere pulse. Much more animi per pulsum cognoscere possunt. Et multo magis then can angels, or even demons, the more deeply they penangeli, vel etiam daemones, quanto subtilius huiusmo- etrate those occult bodily modifications. Hence Augustine di immutationes occultas corporales perpendunt. Un- says (De divin. daemon.) that demons sometimes with the de Augustinus dicit, in libro de Divinatione Daemonum, greatest faculty learn man’s dispositions, not only when exquod aliquando hominum dispositiones, non solum vo- pressed by speech, but even when conceived in thought, when ce prolatas, verum etiam cogitatione conceptas, cum signa the soul expresses them by certain signs in the body; although quaedam in corpore exprimuntur ex animo, tota facilitate (Retract. ii, 30) he says it cannot be asserted how this is done. perdiscunt, quamvis in libro Retract. hoc dicat non esse asserendum quomodo fiat. Alio modo possunt cognosci cogitationes, prout sunt In another way thoughts can be known as they are in in intellectu; et affectiones, prout sunt in voluntate. Et sic the mind, and affections as they are in the will: and thus solus Deus cogitationes cordium et affectiones volunta- God alone can know the thoughts of hearts and affections tum cognoscere potest. Cuius ratio est, quia voluntas ra- of wills. The reason of this is, because the rational creature tionalis creaturae soli Deo subiacet; et ipse solus in eam is subject to God only, and He alone can work in it Who is operari potest, qui est principale eius obiectum, ut ul- its principal object and last end: this will be developed later timus finis; et hoc magis infra patebit. Et ideo ea quae (Q. 63, A. 1; Q. 105, A. 5). Consequently all that is in the in voluntate sunt, vel quae ex voluntate sola dependent, will, and all things that depend only on the will, are known soli Deo sunt nota. Manifestum est autem quod ex so- to God alone. Now it is evident that it depends entirely on la voluntate dependet quod aliquis actu aliqua conside- the will for anyone actually to consider anything; because a ret, quia cum aliquis habet habitum scientiae, vel species man who has a habit of knowledge, or any intelligible speintelligibiles in eo existentes, utitur eis cum vult. Et ideo cies, uses them at will. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor 2:11): dicit Apostolus, I Cor. II, quod quae sunt hominis, nemo For what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of novit nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est. a man that is in him? Ad primum ergo dicendum quod modo cogitatio Reply Obj. 1: In the present life one man’s thought unius hominis non cognoscitur ab alio, propter duplex is not known by another owing to a twofold hindrance; impedimentum, scilicet propter grossitiem corporis, et namely, on account of the grossness of the body, and bepropter voluntatem claudentem sua secreta. Primum au- cause the will shuts up its secrets. The first obstacle will be tem obstaculum tolletur in resurrectione, nec est in an- removed at the Resurrection, and does not exist at all in gelis. Sed secundum impedimentum manebit post resur- the angels; while the second will remain, and is in the anrectionem, et est modo in angelis. Et tamen qualitatem gels now. Nevertheless the brightness of the body will show mentis, quantum ad quantitatem gratiae et gloriae, re- forth the quality of the soul; as to its amount of grace and praesentabit claritas corporis. Et sic unus mentem alte- of glory. In this way one will be able to see the mind of anrius videre poterit. other. Ad secundum dicendum quod, etsi unus angelus, Reply Obj. 2: Although one angel sees the intelligible species intelligibiles alterius videat, per hoc quod modus species of another, by the fact that the species are proporintelligibilium specierum, secundum maiorem et mino- tioned to the rank of these substances according to greater

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rem universalitatem, proportionatur nobilitati substantiarum; non tamen sequitur quod unus cognoscat quomodo alius illis intelligibilibus speciebus utitur actualiter considerando. Ad tertium dicendum quod appetitus brutalis non est dominus sui actus, sed sequitur impressionem alterius causae corporalis vel spiritualis. Quia igitur angeli cognoscunt res corporales et dispositiones earum, possunt per haec cognoscere quod est in appetitu et in apprehensione phantastica brutorum animalium; et etiam hominum, secundum quod in eis quandoque appetitus sensitivus procedit in actum, sequens aliquam impressionem corporalem, sicut in brutis semper est. Non tamen oportet quod angeli cognoscant motum appetitus sensitivi et apprehensionem phantasticam hominis, secundum quod moventur a voluntate et ratione, quia etiam inferior pars animae participat aliqualiter rationem, sicut obediens imperanti, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Nec tamen sequitur quod, si angelus cognoscit quod est in appetitu sensitivo vel phantasia hominis, quod cognoscat id quod est in cogitatione vel voluntate, quia intellectus vel voluntas non subiacet appetitui sensitivo et phantasiae, sed potest eis diversimode uti.

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or lesser universality, yet it does not follow that one knows how far another makes use of them by actual consideration.

Reply Obj. 3: The appetite of the brute does not control its act, but follows the impression of some other corporeal or spiritual cause. Since, therefore, the angels know corporeal things and their dispositions, they can thereby know what is passing in the appetite or in the imaginative apprehension of the brute beasts, and even of man, in so far as the sensitive appetite sometimes, through following some bodily impression, influences his conduct, as always happens in brutes. Yet the angels do not necessarily know the movement of the sensitive appetite and the imaginative apprehension of man in so far as these are moved by the will and reason; because, even the lower part of the soul has some share of reason, as obeying its ruler, as is said in Ethics iii, 12. But it does not follow that, if the angel knows what is passing through man’s sensitive appetite or imagination, he knows what is in the thought or will: because the intellect or will is not subject to the sensitive appetite or the imagination, but can make various uses of them.

Article 5 Whether the angels know the mysteries of grace? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli mysteria gratiae cognoscant. Quia inter omnia mysteria excellentius est mysterium incarnationis Christi. Sed hoc angeli cognoverunt a principio, dicit enim Augustinus, V super Gen. ad Litt., quod sic fuit hoc mysterium absconditum a saeculis in Deo, ut tamen innotesceret principibus et potestatibus in caelestibus. Et dicit Apostolus, I ad Tim. III, quod apparuit angelis illud magnum sacramentum pietatis. Ergo angeli mysteria gratiae cognoscunt. Praeterea, rationes omnium mysteriorum gratiae in divina sapientia continentur. Sed angeli vident ipsam Dei sapientiam, quae est eius essentia. Ergo angeli mysteria gratiae cognoscunt. Praeterea, prophetae per angelos instruuntur, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. Angel. Hier. Sed prophetae mysteria gratiae cognoverunt, dicitur enim Amos III, non faciet dominus verbum, nisi revelaverit secretum ad servos suos, prophetas. Ergo angeli mysteria gratiae cognoscunt. Sed contra est quod nullus discit illud quod cognoscit. Sed angeli, etiam supremi, quaerunt de divinis mysteriis gratiae, et ea discunt, dicitur enim VII cap. Cael. Hier., quod sacra Scriptura inducit quasdam caelestes essentias ad ipsum Iesum quaestionem facientes, et

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know mysteries of grace. For, the mystery of the Incarnation is the most excellent of all mysteries. But the angels knew of it from the beginning; for Augustine says (Gen ad lit. v, 19): This mystery was hidden in God through the ages, yet so that it was known to the princes and powers in heavenly places. And the Apostle says (1 Tim 3:16): That great mystery of godliness appeared unto angels. Therefore the angels know the mysteries of grace. Obj. 2: Further, the reasons of all mysteries of grace are contained in the Divine wisdom. But the angels behold God’s wisdom, which is His essence. Therefore they know the mysteries of grace. Obj. 3: Further, the prophets are enlightened by the angels, as is clear from Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv). But the prophets knew mysteries of grace; for it is said (Amos 3:7): For the Lord God doth nothing without revealing His secret to His servants the prophets. Therefore angels know the mysteries of grace. On the contrary, No one learns what he knows already. Yet even the highest angels seek out and learn mysteries of grace. For it is stated (Coel. Hier. vii) that Sacred Scripture describes some heavenly essences as questioning Jesus, and learning from Him the knowledge of His Divine work

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addiscentes scientiam divinae eius operationis pro nobis, et Iesum eas sine medio docentem; ut patet Isaiae LXIII, ubi quaerentibus angelis, quis est iste qui venit de Edom? Respondit Iesus, ego, qui loquor iustitiam. Ergo angeli non cognoscunt mysteria gratiae. Respondeo dicendum quod in angelis est cognitio duplex. Una quidem naturalis, secundum quam cognoscunt res tum per essentiam suam, tum etiam per species innatas. Et hac cognitione mysteria gratiae angeli cognoscere non possunt. Haec enim mysteria ex pura Dei voluntate dependent, si autem unus angelus non potest cognoscere cogitationes alterius ex voluntate eius dependentes, multo minus potest cognoscere ea quae ex sola Dei voluntate dependent. Et sic argumentatur Apostolus, I Cor. II, quae sunt hominis, nemo novit nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est. Ita et quae sunt Dei, nemo novit nisi spiritus Dei. Est autem alia angelorum cognitio, quae eos beatos facit, qua vident verbum et res in verbo. Et hac quidem visione cognoscunt mysteria gratiae, non quidem omnia, nec aequaliter omnes sed secundum quod Deus voluerit eis revelare; secundum illud Apostoli, I Cor. II, nobis autem revelavit Deus per spiritum suum. Ita tamen quod superiores angeli, perspicacius divinam sapientiam contemplantes, plura mysteria et altiora in ipsa Dei visione cognoscunt, quae inferioribus manifestant, eos illuminando. Et horum etiam mysteriorum quaedam a principio suae creationis cognoverunt; quaedam vero postmodum, secundum quod eorum officiis congruit, edocentur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod de mysterio incarnationis Christi dupliciter contingit loqui. Uno modo, in generali, et sic omnibus revelatum est a principio suae beatitudinis. Cuius ratio est, quia hoc est quoddam generale principium, ad quod omnia eorum officia ordinantur, omnes enim sunt administratorii spiritus, ut dicitur Heb. I, in ministerium missi propter eos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis; quod quidem fit per incarnationis mysterium. Unde oportuit de hoc mysterio omnes a principio communiter edoceri. Alio modo possumus loqui de mysterio incarnationis quantum ad speciales conditiones. Et sic non omnes angeli a principio de omnibus sunt edocti, immo quidam, etiam superiores angeli, postmodum didicerunt, ut patet per auctoritatem Dionysii inductam. Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet angeli beati divinam sapientiam contemplentur, non tamen eam comprehendunt. Et ideo non oportet quod cognoscant quidquid in ea latet. Ad tertium dicendum quod quidquid prophetae cognoverunt de mysteriis gratiae per revelationem divinam, multo excellentius est angelis revelatum. Et licet prophetis ea quae Deus facturus erat circa salutem humani generis, in generali revelaverit; quaedam tamen

Q. 57, A. 5

for us; and Jesus as teaching them directly: as is evident in Isa. 63:1, where, on the angels asking, Who is he who cometh up from Edom? Jesus answered, It is I, Who speak justice. Therefore the angels do not know mysteries of grace. I answer that, There is a twofold knowledge in the angel. The first is his natural knowledge, according to which he knows things both by his essence, and by innate species. By such knowledge the angels cannot know mysteries of grace. For these mysteries depend upon the pure will of God: and if an angel cannot learn the thoughts of another angel, which depend upon the will of such angel, much less can he ascertain what depends entirely upon God’s will. The Apostle reasons in this fashion (1 Cor 2:11): No one knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him. So, the things also that are of God no man knoweth but the Spirit of God. There is another knowledge of the angels, which renders them happy; it is the knowledge whereby they see the Word, and things in the Word. By such vision they know mysteries of grace, but not all mysteries: nor do they all know them equally; but just as God wills them to learn by revelation; as the Apostle says (1 Cor 2:10): But to us God hath revealed them through His Spirit; yet so that the higher angels beholding the Divine wisdom more clearly, learn more and deeper mysteries in the vision of God, which mysteries they communicate to the lower angels by enlightening them. Some of these mysteries they knew from the very beginning of their creation; others they are taught afterwards, as befits their ministrations. Reply Obj. 1: One can speak in two ways of the mystery of the Incarnation. First of all, in general; and in this way it was revealed to all from the commencement of their beatitude. The reason of this is, that this is a kind of general principle to which all their duties are ordered. For all are ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation (Heb 1:14); and this is brought about by the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence it was necessary for all of them to be instructed in this mystery from the very beginning. We can speak of the mystery of the Incarnation in another way, as to its special conditions. Thus not all the angels were instructed on all points from the beginning; even the higher angels learned these afterwards, as appears from the passage of Dionysius already quoted. Reply Obj. 2: Although the angels in bliss behold the Divine wisdom, yet they do not comprehend it. So it is not necessary for them to know everything hidden in it. Reply Obj. 3: Whatever the prophets knew by revelation of the mysteries of grace, was revealed in a more excellent way to the angels. And although God revealed in general to the prophets what He was one day to do regarding the salvation of the human race, still the apostles knew

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specialia apostoli circa hoc cognoverunt, quae prophetae non cognoverant; secundum illud Ephes. III, potestis, legentes, intelligere prudentiam meam in mysterio Christi, quod aliis generationibus non est agnitum, sicut nunc revelatum est sanctis apostolis eius. Inter ipsos etiam prophetas, posteriores cognoverunt quod priores non cognoverant; secundum illud Psalmi CXVIII, super senes intellexi. Et Gregorius dicit quod per successiones temporum, crevit divinae cognitionis augmentum.

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some particulars of the same, which the prophets did not know. Thus we read (Eph 3:4, 5): As you reading, may understand my knowledge in the mystery of Christ, which in other generations was not known to the sons of men, as it is now revealed to His holy apostles. Among the prophets also, the later ones knew what the former did not know; according to Ps. 118:100: I have had understanding above ancients, and Gregory says: The knowledge of Divine things increased as time went on (Hom. xvi in Ezech.).

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Question 58 The Mode of Angelic Knowledge Post haec considerandum est de modo angelicae coAfter the foregoing we have now to treat of the mode gnitionis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur septem. of the angelic knowledge, concerning which there are seven points of inquiry: Primo, utrum intellectus angeli quandoque sit in (1) Whether the angel’s intellect be sometimes in potentia, quandoque in actu. potentiality, and sometimes in act? Secundo, utrum angelus possit simul intelligere (2) Whether the angel can understand many things at multa. the same time? Tertio, utrum intelligat discurrendo. (3) Whether the angel’s knowledge is discursive? Quarto, utrum intelligat componendo et dividendo. (4) Whether he understands by composing and dividing? Quinto, utrum in intellectu angeli possit esse falsitas. (5) Whether there can be error in the angel’s intellect? Sexto, utrum cognitio angeli possit dici matutina et (6) Whether his knowledge can be styled as morning vespertina. and evening? Septimo, utrum sit eadem cognitio matutina et (7) Whether the morning and evening knowledge are vespertina, vel diversae. the same, or do they differ?

Article 1 Whether the angel’s intellect is sometimes in potentiality? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus angeli quandoque sit in potentia. Motus enim est actus existentis in potentia, ut dicitur III Physic. Sed mentes angelicae intelligendo moventur, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo mentes angelicae quandoque sunt in potentia. Praeterea, cum desiderium sit rei non habitae, possibilis tamen haberi, quicumque desiderat aliquid intelligere, est in potentia ad illud. Sed I Petri I, dicitur, in quem desiderant angeli prospicere. Ergo intellectus angeli quandoque est in potentia. Praeterea, in libro de Causis dicitur quod intelligentia intelligit secundum modum suae substantiae. Sed substantia angeli habet aliquid de potentia permixtum. Ergo quandoque intelligit in potentia. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, II super Gen. ad Litt., quod angeli, ex quo creati sunt, ipsa verbi aeternitate, sancta et pia contemplatione perfruuntur. Sed intellectus contemplans non est in potentia, sed in actu. Ergo intellectus angeli non est in potentia. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus dicit, in III de Anima et in VIII Physic., intellectus dupliciter est in potentia, uno modo, sicut ante addiscere vel

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel’s intellect is sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in act. For movement is the act of what is in potentiality, as stated in Phys. iii, 6. But the angels’ minds are moved by understanding, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore the angelic minds are sometimes in potentiality. Obj. 2: Further, since desire is of a thing not possessed but possible to have, whoever desires to know anything is in potentiality thereto. But it is said (1 Pet 1:12): On Whom the angels desire to look. Therefore the angel’s intellect is sometimes in potentiality. Obj. 3: Further, in the book De Causis it is stated that an intelligence understands according to the mode of its substance. But the angel’s intelligence has some admixture of potentiality. Therefore it sometimes understands potentially. On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. ii): Since the angels were created, in the eternity of the Word, they enjoy holy and devout contemplation. Now a contemplating intellect is not in potentiality, but in act. Therefore the intellect of an angel is not in potentiality. I answer that, As the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, text. 8; Phys. viii, 32), the intellect is in potentiality in two ways; first, as before learning or discovering, that is, before it

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Q. 58, A. 2

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invenire, idest antequam habeat habitum scientiae; alio modo dicitur esse in potentia, sicut cum iam habet habitum scientiae, sed non considerat. Primo igitur modo, intellectus angeli nunquam est in potentia respectu eorum ad quae eius cognitio naturalis se extendere potest. Sicut enim corpora superiora, scilicet caelestia, non habent potentiam ad esse, quae non sit completa per actum; ita caelestes intellectus, scilicet angeli, non habent aliquam intelligibilem potentiam, quae non sit totaliter completa per species intelligibiles connaturales eis. Sed quantum ad ea quae eis divinitus revelantur, nihil prohibet intellectus eorum esse in potentia, quia sic etiam corpora caelestia sunt in potentia quandoque ut illuminentur a sole. Secundo vero modo, intellectus angeli potest esse in potentia ad ea quae cognoscit naturali cognitione, non enim omnia quae naturali cognitione cognoscit, semper actu considerat. Sed ad cognitionem verbi, et eorum quae in verbo videt, nunquam hoc modo est in potentia, quia semper actu intuetur verbum, et ea quae in verbo videt. In hac enim visione eorum beatitudo consistit, beatitudo autem non consistit in habitu, sed in actu, ut dicit Philosophus, in I Ethic. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod motus ibi non sumitur secundum quod est actus imperfecti, idest existentis in potentia; sed secundum quod est actus perfecti, idest existentis in actu. Sic enim intelligere et sentire dicuntur motus, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Ad secundum dicendum quod desiderium illud angelorum non excludit rem desideratam, sed eius fastidium. Vel dicuntur desiderare Dei visionem, quantum ad novas revelationes, quas pro opportunitate negotiorum a Deo recipiunt. Ad tertium dicendum quod in substantia angeli non est aliqua potentia denudata ab actu. Et similiter nec intellectus angeli sic est in potentia, quod sit absque actu.

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has the habit of knowledge; second, as when it possesses the habit of knowledge, but does not actually consider. In the first way an angel’s intellect is never in potentiality with regard to the things to which his natural knowledge extends. For, as the higher, namely, the heavenly, bodies have no potentiality to existence, which is not fully actuated, in the same way the heavenly intellects, the angels, have no intelligible potentiality which is not fully completed by connatural intelligible species. But with regard to things divinely revealed to them, there is nothing to hinder them from being in potentiality: because even the heavenly bodies are at times in potentiality to being enlightened by the sun. In the second way an angel’s intellect can be in potentiality with regard to things learnt by natural knowledge; for he is not always actually considering everything that he knows by natural knowledge. But as to the knowledge of the Word, and of the things he beholds in the Word, he is never in this way in potentiality; because he is always actually beholding the Word, and the things he sees in the Word. For the bliss of the angels consists in such vision; and beatitude does not consist in habit, but in act, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8). Reply Obj. 1: Movement is taken there not as the act of something imperfect, that is, of something existing in potentiality, but as the act of something perfect, that is, of one actually existing. In this way understanding and feeling are termed movements, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 28. Reply Obj. 2: Such desire on the part of the angels does not exclude the object desired, but weariness thereof. Or they are said to desire the vision of God with regard to fresh revelations, which they receive from God to fit them for the tasks which they have to perform. Reply Obj. 3: In the angel’s substance there is no potentiality divested of act. In the same way, the angel’s intellect is never so in potentiality as to be without act.

Article 2 Whether an angel can understand many things at the same time? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus non possit simul multa intelligere. Dicit enim Philosophus, II Topic., quod contingit multa scire, sed unum tantum intelligere. Praeterea, nihil intelligitur nisi secundum quod intellectus formatur per speciem intelligibilem, sicut corpus formatur per figuram. Sed unum corpus non potest formari diversis figuris. Ergo unus intellectus non potest simul intelligere diversa intelligibilia.

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot understand many things at the same time. For the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 4) that it may happen that we know many things, but understand only one. Obj. 2: Further, nothing is understood unless the intellect be informed by an intelligible species; just as the body is formed by shape. But one body cannot be formed into many shapes. Therefore neither can one intellect simultaneously understand various intelligible things.

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Praeterea, intelligere est motus quidam. Nullus autem motus terminatur ad diversos terminos. Ergo non contingit simul multa intelligere. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, IV sup. Gen. ad Litt., Potentia spiritualis mentis angelicae cuncta quae voluerit, facillime simul comprehendit. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ad unitatem motus requiritur unitas termini, ita ad unitatem operationis requiritur unitas obiecti. Contingit autem aliqua accipi ut plura, et ut unum; sicut partes alicuius continui. Si enim unaquaeque per se accipiatur, plures sunt, unde et non una operatione, nec simul accipiuntur per sensum et intellectum. Alio modo accipiuntur secundum quod sunt unum in toto, et sic simul et una operatione cognoscuntur tam per sensum quam per intellectum, dum totum continuum consideratur, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Et sic etiam intellectus noster simul intelligit subiectum et praedicatum, prout sunt partes unius propositionis; et duo comparata, secundum quod conveniunt in una comparatione. Ex quo patet quod multa, secundum quod sunt distincta, non possunt simul intelligi; sed secundum quod uniuntur in uno intelligibili, sic simul intelliguntur. Unumquodque autem est intelligibile in actu, secundum quod eius similitudo est in intellectu. Quaecumque igitur per unam speciem intelligibilem cognosci possunt, cognoscuntur ut unum intelligibile; et ideo simul cognoscuntur. Quae vero per diversas species intelligibiles cognoscuntur, ut diversa intelligibilia capiuntur. Angeli igitur ea cognitione qua cognoscunt res per verbum, omnia cognoscunt una intelligibili specie, quae est essentia divina. Et ideo quantum ad talem cognitionem, omnia simul cognoscunt, sicut et in patria non erunt volubiles nostrae cogitationes, ab aliis in alia euntes atque redeuntes, sed omnem scientiam nostram simul uno conspectu videbimus, ut Augustinus dicit in XV de Trin. Ea vero cognitione qua cognoscunt res per species innatas, omnia illa simul possunt intelligere, quae una specie cognoscuntur; non autem illa quae diversis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intelligere multa ut unum, est quodammodo unum intelligere. Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus formatur per intelligibilem speciem quam apud se habet. Et ideo sic potest una specie intelligibili multa simul intelligibilia intueri, sicut unum corpus per unam figuram potest simul multis corporibus assimilari. Ad tertium dicendum sicut ad primum.

Q. 58, A. 2

Obj. 3: Further, to understand is a kind of movement. But no movement terminates in various terms. Therefore many things cannot be understood altogether. On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. iv, 32): The spiritual faculty of the angelic mind comprehends most easily at the same time all things that it wills. I answer that, As unity of term is requisite for unity of movement, so is unity of object required for unity of operation. Now it happens that several things may be taken as several or as one; like the parts of a continuous whole. For if each of the parts be considered severally they are many: consequently neither by sense nor by intellect are they grasped by one operation, nor all at once. In another way they are taken as forming one in the whole; and so they are grasped both by sense and intellect all at once and by one operation; as long as the entire continuous whole is considered, as is stated in De Anima iii, text. 23. In this way our intellect understands together both the subject and the predicate, as forming parts of one proposition; and also two things compared together, according as they agree in one point of comparison. From this it is evident that many things, in so far as they are distinct, cannot be understood at once; but in so far as they are comprised under one intelligible concept, they can be understood together. Now everything is actually intelligible according as its image is in the intellect. All things, then, which can be known by one intelligible species, are known as one intelligible object, and therefore are understood simultaneously. But things known by various intelligible species, are apprehended as different intelligible objects. Consequently, by such knowledge as the angels have of things through the Word, they know all things under one intelligible species, which is the Divine essence. Therefore, as regards such knowledge, they know all things at once: just as in heaven our thoughts will not be fleeting, going and returning from one thing to another, but we shall survey all our knowledge at the same time by one glance, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16). But by that knowledge wherewith the angels know things by innate species, they can at one time know all things which can be comprised under one species; but not such as are under various species. Reply Obj. 1: To understand many things as one, is, so to speak, to understand one thing. Reply Obj. 2: The intellect is informed by the intelligible species which it has within it. So it can behold at the same time many intelligible objects under one species; as one body can by one shape be likened to many bodies. To the third objection the answer is the same as the first.

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Article 3 Whether an angel’s knowledge is discursive? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus cognoscat discurrendo. Discursus enim intellectus attenditur secundum hoc, quod unum per aliud cognoscitur. Sed angeli cognoscunt unum per aliud, cognoscunt enim creaturas per Verbum. Ergo intellectus angeli cognoscit discurrendo. Praeterea, quidquid potest virtus inferior, potest et virtus superior. Sed intellectus humanus potest syllogizare, et in effectibus causas cognoscere, secundum quae discursus attenditur. Ergo intellectus angeli, qui superior est ordine naturae, multo magis hoc potest. Praeterea, Isidorus dicit quod daemones per experientiam multa cognoscunt. Sed experimentalis cognitio est discursiva, ex multis enim memoriis fit unum experimentum, et ex multis experimentis fit unum universale, ut dicitur in fine Poster., et in principio Metaphys. Ergo cognitio angelorum est discursiva. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod angeli non congregant divinam cognitionem a sermonibus diffusis, neque ab aliquo communi ad ista specialia simul aguntur. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut saepius dictum est, angeli illum gradum tenent in substantiis spiritualibus, quem corpora caelestia in substantiis corporeis, nam et caelestes mentes a Dionysio dicuntur. Est autem haec differentia inter caelestia et terrena corpora, quod corpora terrena per mutationem et motum adipiscuntur suam ultimam perfectionem, corpora vero caelestia statim, ex ipsa sua natura, suam ultimam perfectionem habent. Sic igitur et inferiores intellectus, scilicet hominum, per quendam motum et discursum intellectualis operationis perfectionem in cognitione veritatis adipiscuntur; dum scilicet ex uno cognito in aliud cognitum procedunt. Si autem statim in ipsa cognitione principii noti, inspicerent quasi notas omnes conclusiones consequentes, in eis discursus locum non haberet. Et hoc est in angelis, quia statim in illis quae primo naturaliter cognoscunt, inspiciunt omnia quaecumque in eis cognosci possunt. Et ideo dicuntur intellectuales, quia etiam apud nos, ea quae statim naturaliter apprehenduntur, intelligi dicuntur; unde intellectus dicitur habitus primorum principiorum. Animae vero humanae, quae veritatis notitiam per quendam discursum acquirunt, rationales vocantur. Quod quidem contingit ex debilitate intellectualis luminis in eis. Si enim haberent plenitudinem intellectualis luminis, sicut angeli, statim in primo aspectu principiorum totam virtutem eorum comprehenderent, intuendo quidquid ex eis syllogizari posset.

Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge of an angel is discursive. For the discursive movement of the mind comes from one thing being known through another. But the angels know one thing through another; for they know creatures through the Word. Therefore the intellect of an angel knows by discursive method. Obj. 2: Further, whatever a lower power can do, the higher can do. But the human intellect can syllogize, and know causes in effects; all of which is the discursive method. Therefore the intellect of the angel, which is higher in the order of nature, can with greater reason do this. Obj. 3: Further, Isidore (De sum. bono i, 10) says that demons learn more things by experience. But experimental knowledge is discursive: for, one experience comes of many remembrances, and one universal from many experiences, as Aristotle observes (Poster. ii; Metaph. vii). Therefore an angel’s knowledge is discursive. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the angels do not acquire Divine knowledge from separate discourses, nor are they led to something particular from something common. I answer that, As has often been stated (A. 1; Q. 55, A. 1), the angels hold that grade among spiritual substances which the heavenly bodies hold among corporeal substances: for Dionysius calls them heavenly minds (loc. cit.). Now, the difference between heavenly and earthly bodies is this, that earthly bodies obtain their last perfection by chance and movement: while the heavenly bodies have their last perfection at once from their very nature. So, likewise, the lower, namely, the human, intellects obtain their perfection in the knowledge of truth by a kind of movement and discursive intellectual operation; that is to say, as they advance from one known thing to another. But, if from the knowledge of a known principle they were straightway to perceive as known all its consequent conclusions, then there would be no discursive process at all. Such is the condition of the angels, because in the truths which they know naturally, they at once behold all things whatsoever that can be known in them. Therefore they are called intellectual beings: because even with ourselves the things which are instantly grasped by the mind are said to be understood; hence intellect is defined as the habit of first principles. But human souls which acquire knowledge of truth by the discursive method are called rational; and this comes of the feebleness of their intellectual light. For if they possessed the fullness of intellectual light, like the angels, then in the first aspect of principles they would at once comprehend their whole range, by perceiving whatever could be reasoned out from them.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod discursus quendam motum nominat. Omnis autem motus est de uno priori in aliud posterius. Unde discursiva cognitio attenditur secundum quod ex aliquo prius noto devenitur in cognitionem alterius posterius noti, quod prius erat ignotum. Si autem in uno inspecto simul aliud inspiciatur, sicut in speculo inspicitur simul imago rei et res, non est propter hoc cognitio discursiva. Et hoc modo cognoscunt angeli res in Verbo. Ad secundum dicendum quod angeli syllogizare possunt, tanquam syllogismum cognoscentes; et in causis effectus vident, et in effectibus causas, non tamen ita quod cognitionem veritatis ignotae acquirant syllogizando ex causis in causata, et ex causatis in causas. Ad tertium dicendum quod experientia in angelis et daemonibus dicitur secundum quandam similitudinem, prout scilicet cognoscunt sensibilia praesentia; tamen absque omni discursu.

Q. 58, A. 4

Reply Obj. 1: Discursion expresses movement of a kind. Now all movement is from something before to something after. Hence discursive knowledge comes about according as from something previously known one attains to the knowledge of what is afterwards known, and which was previously unknown. But if in the thing perceived something else be seen at the same time, as an object and its image are seen simultaneously in a mirror, it is not discursive knowledge. And in this way the angels know things in the Word. Reply Obj. 2: The angels can syllogize, in the sense of knowing a syllogism; and they see effects in causes, and causes in effects: yet they do not acquire knowledge of an unknown truth in this way, by syllogizing from causes to effect, or from effect to cause. Reply Obj. 3: Experience is affirmed of angels and demons simply by way of similitude, forasmuch as they know sensible things which are present, yet without any discursion withal.

Article 4 Whether the angels understand by composing and dividing? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli intelligant componendo et dividendo. Ubi enim est multitudo intellectuum, ibi est compositio intellectuum, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Sed in intellectu angeli est multitudo intellectuum, cum per diversas species diversa intelligat, et non omnia simul. Ergo in intellectu angeli est compositio et divisio. Praeterea, plus distat negatio ab affirmatione, quam quaecumque duae naturae oppositae, quia prima distinctio est per affirmationem et negationem. Sed aliquas naturas distantes angelus non cognoscit per unum, sed per diversas species, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo oportet quod affirmationem et negationem cognoscat per diversa. Et ita videtur quod angelus intelligat componendo et dividendo. Praeterea, locutio est signum intellectus. Sed angeli hominibus loquentes, proferunt affirmativas et negativas enuntiationes, quae sunt signa compositionis et divisionis in intellectu; ut ex multis locis sacrae Scripturae apparet. Ergo videtur quod angelus intelligat componendo et dividendo. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod virtus intellectualis angelorum resplendet conspicaci divinorum intellectuum simplicitate. Sed simplex intelligentia est sine compositione et divisione, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Ergo angelus intelligit sine compositione et divisione.

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels understand by composing and dividing. For, where there is multiplicity of things understood, there is composition of the same, as is said in De Anima iii, text. 21. But there is a multitude of things understood in the angelic mind; because angels apprehend different things by various species, and not all at one time. Therefore there is composition and division in the angel’s mind. Obj. 2: Further, negation is far more remote from affirmation than any two opposite natures are; because the first of distinctions is that of affirmation and negation. But the angel knows certain distant natures not by one, but by diverse species, as is evident from what was said (A. 2). Therefore he must know affirmation and negation by diverse species. And so it seems that he understands by composing and dividing. Obj. 3: Further, speech is a sign of the intellect. But in speaking to men, angels use affirmative and negative expressions, which are signs of composition and of division in the intellect; as is manifest from many passages of Sacred Scripture. Therefore it seems that the angel understands by composing and dividing. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the intellectual power of the angel shines forth with the clear simplicity of divine concepts. But a simple intelligence is without composition and division. Therefore the angel understands without composition or division.

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Q. 58, A. 4

Angels

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in intellectu ratiocinante comparatur conclusio ad principium, ita in intellectu componente et dividente comparatur praedicatum ad subiectum. Si enim intellectus statim in ipso principio videret conclusionis veritatem, nunquam intelligeret discurrendo vel ratiocinando. Similiter si intellectus statim in apprehensione quidditatis subiecti, haberet notitiam de omnibus quae possunt attribui subiecto vel removeri ab eo, nunquam intelligeret componendo et dividendo, sed solum intelligendo quod quid est. Sic igitur patet quod ex eodem provenit quod intellectus noster intelligit discurrendo, et componendo et dividendo, ex hoc scilicet, quod non statim in prima apprehensione alicuius primi apprehensi, potest inspicere quidquid in eo virtute continetur. Quod contingit ex debilitate luminis intellectualis in nobis, sicut dictum est. Unde cum in angelo sit lumen intellectuale perfectum, cum sit speculum purum et clarissimum, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom.; relinquitur quod angelus, sicut non intelligit ratiocinando, ita non intelligit componendo et dividendo. Nihilominus tamen compositionem et divisionem enuntiationum intelligit, sicut et ratiocinationem syllogismorum, intelligit enim composita simpliciter, et mobilia immobiliter, et materialia immaterialiter. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non qualiscumque multitudo intellectuum compositionem causat, sed multitudo illorum intellectuum quorum unum attribuitur alteri, vel removetur ab altero. Angelus autem, intelligendo quidditatem alicuius rei, simul intelligit quidquid ei attribui potest vel removeri ab ea. Unde intelligendo quod quid est, intelligit quidquid nos intelligere possumus et componendo et dividendo, per unum suum simplicem intellectum. Ad secundum dicendum quod diversae quidditates rerum minus differunt, quantum ad rationem existendi, quam affirmatio et negatio. Tamen quantum ad rationem cognoscendi, affirmatio et negatio magis conveniunt, quia statim per hoc quod cognoscitur veritas affirmationis, cognoscitur falsitas negationis oppositae. Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc quod angeli loquuntur enuntiationes affirmativas et negativas, manifestat quod angeli cognoscunt compositionem et divisionem, non autem quod cognoscant componendo et dividendo, sed simpliciter cognoscendo quod quid est.

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I answer that, As in the intellect, when reasoning, the conclusion is compared with the principle, so in the intellect composing and dividing, the predicate is compared with the subject. For if our intellect were to see at once the truth of the conclusion in the principle, it would never understand by discursion and reasoning. In like manner, if the intellect in apprehending the quiddity of the subject were at once to have knowledge of all that can be attributed to, or removed from, the subject, it would never understand by composing and dividing, but only by understanding the essence. Thus it is evident that for the self-same reason our intellect understands by discursion, and by composing and dividing, namely, that in the first apprehension of anything newly apprehended it does not at once grasp all that is virtually contained in it. And this comes from the weakness of the intellectual light within us, as has been said (A. 3). Hence, since the intellectual light is perfect in the angel, for he is a pure and most clear mirror, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), it follows that as the angel does not understand by reasoning, so neither does he by composing and dividing. Nevertheless, he understands the composition and the division of enunciations, just as he apprehends the reasoning of syllogisms: for he understands simply, such things as are composite, things movable immovably, and material things immaterially. Reply Obj. 1: Not every multitude of things understood causes composition, but a multitude of such things understood that one of them is attributed to, or denied of, another. When an angel apprehends the nature of anything, he at the same time understands whatever can be either attributed to it, or denied of it. Hence, in apprehending a nature, he by one simple perception grasps all that we can learn by composing and dividing. Reply Obj. 2: The various natures of things differ less as to their mode of existing than do affirmation and negation. Yet, as to the way in which they are known, affirmation and negation have something more in common; because directly the truth of an affirmation is known, the falsehood of the opposite negation is known also. Reply Obj. 3: The fact that angels use affirmative and negative forms of speech, shows that they know both composition and division: yet not that they know by composing and dividing, but by knowing simply the nature of a thing.

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Q. 58, A. 5

Article 5 Whether there can be falsehood in the intellect of an angel? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in intellectu angeli possit esse falsitas. Protervitas enim ad falsitatem pertinet. Sed in daemonibus est phantasia proterva, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo videtur quod in angelorum intellectu possit esse falsitas. Praeterea, nescientia est causa falsae aestimationis. Sed in angelis potest esse nescientia, ut Dionysius dicit, VI cap. Eccles. Hier. Ergo videtur quod in eis possit esse falsitas. Praeterea, omne quod cadit a veritate sapientiae, et habet rationem depravatam, habet falsitatem vel errorem in suo intellectu. Sed hoc Dionysius dicit de daemonibus, VII cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo videtur quod in intellectu angelorum possit esse falsitas. Sed contra, Philosophus dicit, III de Anima, quod intellectus semper verus est. Augustinus etiam dicit, in libro Octoginta trium Quaest., quod nihil intelligitur nisi verum. Sed angeli non cognoscunt aliquid nisi intelligendo. Ergo in angeli cognitione non potest esse deceptio et falsitas. Respondeo dicendum quod huius quaestionis veritas aliquatenus ex praemissa dependet. Dictum est enim quod angelus non intelligit componendo et dividendo, sed intelligendo quod quid est. Intellectus autem circa quod quid est semper verus est, sicut et sensus circa proprium obiectum, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Sed per accidens in nobis accidit deceptio et falsitas intelligendo quod quid est, scilicet secundum rationem alicuius compositionis, vel cum definitionem unius rei accipimus ut definitionem alterius; vel cum partes definitionis sibi non cohaerent, sicut si accipiatur pro definitione alicuius rei, animal quadrupes volatile (nullum enim animal tale est); et hoc quidem accidit in compositis, quorum definitio ex diversis sumitur, quorum unum est materiale ad aliud. Sed intelligendo quidditates simplices, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys., non est falsitas, quia vel totaliter non attinguntur, et nihil intelligimus de eis; vel cognoscuntur ut sunt. Sic igitur per se non potest esse falsitas aut error aut deceptio in intellectu alicuius angeli; sed per accidens contingit. Alio tamen modo quam in nobis. Nam nos componendo et dividendo quandoque ad intellectum quidditatis pervenimus, sicut cum dividendo vel demonstrando definitionem investigamus. Quod quidem in angelis non contingit; sed per quod quid est rei cognoscunt omnes enuntiationes ad illam rem pertinentes. Manifestum est autem quod quidditas rei potest esse principium cognoscendi respectu eorum quae naturali-

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be falsehood in the angel’s intellect. For perversity appertains to falsehood. But, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), there is a perverted fancy in the demons. Therefore it seems that there can be falsehood in the intellect of the angels. Obj. 2: Further, nescience is the cause of estimating falsely. But, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi), there can be nescience in the angels. Therefore it seems there can be falsehood in them. Obj. 3: Further, everything which falls short of the truth of wisdom, and which has a depraved reason, has falsehood or error in its intellect. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) affirms this of the demons. Therefore it seems that there can be error in the minds of the angels. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 41) that the intelligence is always true. Augustine likewise says (83 Questions, Q. 32) that nothing but what is true can be the object of intelligence Therefore there can be neither deception nor falsehood in the angel’s knowledge. I answer that, The truth of this question depends partly upon what has gone before. For it has been said (A. 4) that an angel understands not by composing and dividing, but by understanding what a thing is. Now the intellect is always true as regards what a thing is, just as the sense regarding its proper object, as is said in De Anima iii, text. 26. But by accident, deception and falsehood creep in, when we understand the essence of a thing by some kind of composition, and this happens either when we take the definition of one thing for another, or when the parts of a definition do not hang together, as if we were to accept as the definition of some creature, a four-footed flying beast, for there is no such animal. And this comes about in things composite, the definition of which is drawn from diverse elements, one of which is as matter to the other. But there is no room for error in understanding simple quiddities, as is stated in Metaph. ix, text. 22; for either they are not grasped at all, and so we know nothing respecting them; or else they are known precisely as they exist. So therefore, no falsehood, error, or deception can exist of itself in the mind of any angel; yet it does so happen accidentally; but very differently from the way it befalls us. For we sometimes get at the quiddity of a thing by a composing and dividing process, as when, by division and demonstration, we seek out the truth of a definition. Such is not the method of the angels; but through the (knowledge of the) essence of a thing they know everything that can be said regarding it. Now it is quite evident that the quiddity of a thing can be a source of knowledge with regard to ev-

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Q. 58, A. 6

Angels

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ter conveniunt rei vel ab ea removentur, non autem eo- erything belonging to such thing, or excluded from it; but rum quae a supernaturali Dei ordinatione dependent. not of what may be dependent on God’s supernatural ordinance. Angeli igitur boni, habentes rectam voluntatem, per Consequently, owing to their upright will, from their cognitionem quidditatis rei non iudicant de his quae na- knowing the nature of every creature, the good angels form turaliter ad rem pertinent, nisi salva ordinatione divina. no judgments as to the nature of the qualities therein, save Unde in eis non potest esse falsitas aut error. Daemo- under the Divine ordinance; hence there can be no error nes vero, per voluntatem perversam subducentes intel- or falsehood in them. But since the minds of demons are lectum a divina sapientia, absolute interdum de rebus iu- utterly perverted from the Divine wisdom, they at times dicant secundum naturalem conditionem. Et in his quae form their opinions of things simply according to the natunaturaliter ad rem pertinent, non decipiuntur. Sed deci- ral conditions of the same. Nor are they ever deceived as to pi possunt quantum ad ea quae supernaturalia sunt, si- the natural properties of anything; but they can be misled cut si considerans hominem mortuum, iudicet eum non with regard to supernatural matters; for example, on seeing resurrecturum; et si videns hominem Christum, iudicet a dead man, they may suppose that he will not rise again, or, eum non esse Deum. on beholding Christ, they may judge Him not to be God. Et per hoc patet responsio ad ea quae utrinque From all this the answers to the objections of both obiiciuntur. Nam protervitas daemonum est secundum sides of the question are evident. For the perversity of the quod non subduntur divinae sapientiae. Nescientia au- demons comes of their not being subject to the Divine tem est in angelis, non respectu naturalium cognoscibi- wisdom; while nescience is in the angels as regards things lium, sed supernaturalium. Patet etiam quod intellectus knowable, not naturally but supernaturally. It is, furthereius quod quid est semper est verus, nisi per accidens, se- more, evident that their understanding of what a thing is, cundum quod indebite ordinatur ad aliquam composi- is always true, save accidentally, according as it is, in an untionem vel divisionem. due manner, referred to some composition or division.

Article 6 Whether there is a morning and an evening knowledge in the angels? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in angelis non sit vespertina neque matutina cognitio. Vespere enim et mane admixtionem tenebrarum habent. Sed in cognitione angeli non est aliqua tenebrositas; cum non sit ibi error vel falsitas. Ergo cognitio angeli non debet dici matutina vel vespertina. Praeterea, inter vespere et mane cadit nox; et inter mane et vespere cadit meridies. Si igitur in angelis cadit cognitio matutina et vespertina, pari ratione videtur quod in eis debeat esse meridiana et nocturna cognitio.

Praeterea, cognitio distinguitur secundum differentiam cognitorum, unde in III de Anima dicit Philosophus quod scientiae secantur quemadmodum et res. Triplex autem est esse rerum, scilicet in Verbo, in propria natura, et in intelligentia angelica, ut Augustinus dicit, II super Gen. ad Litt. Ergo, si ponatur cognitio matutina in angelis et vespertina, propter esse rerum in Verbo et in propria natura; debet etiam in eis poni tertia cognitio, propter esse rerum in intelligentia angelica.

Objection 1: It would seem that there is neither an evening nor a morning knowledge in the angels; because evening and morning have an admixture of darkness. But there is no darkness in the knowledge of an angel; since there is no error nor falsehood. Therefore the angelic knowledge ought not to be termed morning and evening knowledge. Obj. 2: Further, between evening and morning the night intervenes; while noonday falls between morning and evening. Consequently, if there be a morning and an evening knowledge in the angels, for the same reason it appears that there ought to be a noonday and a night knowledge. Obj. 3: Further, knowledge is diversified according to the difference of the objects known: hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 38), The sciences are divided just as things are. But there is a threefold existence of things: to wit, in the Word; in their own natures; and in the angelic knowledge, as Augustine observes (Gen ad lit. ii, 8). If, therefore, a morning and an evening knowledge be admitted in the angels, because of the existence of things in the Word, and in their own nature, then there ought to be admitted a third class of knowledge, on account of the existence of things in the angelic mind.

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Sed contra est quod Augustinus, IV super Gen. ad Litt., et XI de Civ. Dei, distinguit cognitionem angelorum per matutinam et vespertinam. Respondeo dicendum quod hoc quod dicitur de cognitione matutina et vespertina in angelis, introductum est ab Augustino, qui sex dies in quibus Deus legitur fecisse cuncta, Gen. I, intelligi vult non hos usitatos dies qui solis circuitu peraguntur, cum sol quarto die factus legatur; sed unum diem, scilicet cognitionem angelicam sex rerum generibus praesentatam. Sicut autem in die consueto mane est principium diei, vespere autem terminus, ita cognitio ipsius primordialis esse rerum, dicitur cognitio matutina, et haec est secundum quod res sunt in Verbo. Cognitio autem ipsius esse rei creatae secundum quod in propria natura consistit, dicitur cognitio vespertina, nam esse rerum fluit a Verbo sicut a quodam primordiali principio, et hic effluxus terminatur ad esse rerum quod in propria natura habent. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vespere et mane non accipiuntur in cognitione angelica secundum similitudinem ad admixtionem tenebrarum; sed secundum similitudinem principii et termini. Vel dicendum quod nihil prohibet, ut dicit Augustinus IV super Gen. ad Litt., aliquid in comparatione ad unum dici lux, et in comparatione ad aliud dici tenebra. Sicut vita fidelium et iustorum, in comparatione ad impios, dicitur lux, secundum illud Ephes. V, fuistis aliquando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in domino; quae tamen vita fidelium, in comparatione ad vitam gloriae, tenebrosa dicitur, secundum illud II Petri I, habetis propheticum sermonem, cui bene facitis attendentes quasi lucernae lucenti in caliginoso loco. Sic igitur cognitio angeli qua cognoscit res in propria natura, dies est per comparationem ad ignorantiam vel errorem, sed obscura est per comparationem ad visionem Verbi. Ad secundum dicendum quod matutina et vespertina cognitio ad diem pertinet, idest ad angelos illuminatos, qui sunt distincti a tenebris, idest a malis angelis. Angeli autem boni, cognoscentes creaturam, non in ea figuntur, quod esset tenebrescere et noctem fieri; sed hoc ipsum referunt ad laudem Dei, in quo sicut in principio omnia cognoscunt. Et ideo post vesperam non ponitur nox, sed mane, ita quod mane sit finis praecedentis diei et principium sequentis, inquantum angeli cognitionem praecedentis operis ad laudem Dei referunt. Meridies autem sub nomine diei comprehenditur, quasi medium inter duo extrema. Vel potest meridies referri ad cognitionem ipsius Dei, qui non habet principium nec finem. Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam ipsi angeli creaturae sunt. Unde esse rerum in intelligentia angelica comprehenditur sub vespertina cognitione, sicut et esse rerum in propria natura.

Q. 58, A. 6

On the contrary, Augustine (Gen ad lit. iv, 22, 31; De Civ. Dei xii, 7, 20) divides the knowledge of the angels into morning and evening knowledge. I answer that, The expression morning and evening knowledge was devised by Augustine; who interprets the six days wherein God made all things, not as ordinary days measured by the solar circuit, since the sun was only made on the fourth day, but as one day, namely, the day of angelic knowledge as directed to six classes of things. As in the ordinary day, morning is the beginning, and evening the close of day, so, their knowledge of the primordial being of things is called morning knowledge; and this is according as things exist in the Word. But their knowledge of the very being of the thing created, as it stands in its own nature, is termed evening knowledge; because the being of things flows from the Word, as from a kind of primordial principle; and this flow is terminated in the being which they have in themselves. Reply Obj. 1: Evening and morning knowledge in the angelic knowledge are not taken as compared to an admixture of darkness, but as compared to beginning and end. Or else it can be said, as Augustine puts it (Gen ad lit. iv, 23), that there is nothing to prevent us from calling something light in comparison with one thing, and darkness with respect to another. In the same way the life of the faithful and the just is called light in comparison with the wicked, according to Eph. 5:8: You were heretofore darkness; but now, light in the Lord: yet this very life of the faithful, when set in contrast to the life of glory, is termed darkness, according to 2 Pet. 1:19: You have the firm prophetic word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a light that shineth in a dark place. So the angel’s knowledge by which he knows things in their own nature, is day in comparison with ignorance or error; yet it is dark in comparison with the vision of the Word. Reply Obj. 2: The morning and evening knowledge belong to the day, that is, to the enlightened angels, who are quite apart from the darkness, that is, from the evil spirits. The good angels, while knowing the creature, do not adhere to it, for that would be to turn to darkness and to night; but they refer this back to the praise of God, in Whom, as in their principle, they know all things. Consequently after evening there is no night, but morning; so that morning is the end of the preceding day, and the beginning of the following, in so far as the angels refer to God’s praise their knowledge of the preceding work. Noonday is comprised under the name of day, as the middle between the two extremes. Or else the noon can be referred to their knowledge of God Himself, Who has neither beginning nor end. Reply Obj. 3: The angels themselves are also creatures. Accordingly the existence of things in the angelic knowledge is comprised under evening knowledge, as also the existence of things in their own nature.

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Q. 58, A. 7

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Article 7 Whether the morning and evening knowledge are one? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod una sit cognitio vespertina et matutina. Dicitur enim Gen. I, factum est vespere et mane dies unus. Sed per diem intelligitur cognitio angelica, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo una et eadem est cognitio in angelis matutina et vespertina. Praeterea, impossibile est unam potentiam simul duas operationes habere. Sed angeli semper sunt in actu cognitionis matutinae, quia semper vident Deum et res in Deo, secundum illud Matth. XVIII, Angeli eorum semper vident faciem patris mei et cetera. Ergo, si cognitio vespertina esset alia a matutina, nullo modo angelus posset esse in actu cognitionis vespertinae. Praeterea, Apostolus dicit, I Cor. XIII, cum venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est. Sed si cognitio vespertina sit alia a matutina, comparatur ad ipsam sicut imperfectum ad perfectum. Ergo non poterit simul vespertina cognitio esse cum matutina. In contrarium est quod dicit Augustinus, IV super Gen. ad Litt., quod multum interest inter cognitionem rei cuiuscumque in verbo Dei, et cognitionem eius in natura eius, ut illud merito pertineat ad diem, hoc ad vesperam. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, cognitio vespertina dicitur, qua angeli cognoscunt res in propria natura. Quod non potest ita intelligi quasi ex propria rerum natura cognitionem accipiant, ut haec praepositio in indicet habitudinem principii, quia non accipiunt angeli cognitionem a rebus, ut supra habitum est. Relinquitur igitur quod hoc quod dicitur in propria natura, accipiatur secundum rationem cogniti, secundum quod subest cognitioni; ut scilicet cognitio vespertina in angelis dicatur secundum quod cognoscunt esse rerum quod habent res in propria natura. Quod quidem per duplex medium cognoscunt, scilicet per species innatas, et per rationes rerum in Verbo existentes. Non enim, videndo Verbum, cognoscunt solum illud esse rerum quod habent in Verbo; sed illud esse quod habent in propria natura; sicut Deus per hoc quod videt se, cognoscit esse rerum quod habent in propria natura. Si ergo dicatur cognitio vespertina secundum quod cognoscunt esse rerum quod habent in propria natura, videndo Verbum; sic una et eadem secundum essentiam est cognitio vespertina et matutina, differens solum secundum cognita. Si vero cognitio vespertina dicatur secundum quod angeli cognoscunt esse rerum quod habent in propria natura, per formas innatas; sic alia est cognitio vespertina et matutina. Et ita

Objection 1: It would seem that the morning and the evening knowledge are one. For it is said (Gen 1:5): There was evening and morning, one day. But by the expression day the knowledge of the angels is to be understood, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. iv, 23). Therefore the morning and evening knowledge of the angels are one and the same. Obj. 2: Further, it is impossible for one faculty to have two operations at the same time. But the angels are always using their morning knowledge; because they are always beholding God and things in God, according to Matt. 18:10: Their angels always see the face of my father et cetera. Therefore, if the evening knowledge were different from the morning, the angel could never exercise his evening knowledge. Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor 13:10): When that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away. But, if the evening knowledge be different from the morning, it is compared to it as the less perfect to the perfect. Therefore the evening knowledge cannot exist together with the morning knowledge. On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. iv, 24): There is a vast difference between knowing anything as it is in the Word of God, and as it is in its own nature; so that the former belongs to the day, and the latter to the evening. I answer that, As was observed (A. 6), the evening knowledge is that by which the angels know things in their proper nature. This cannot be understood as if they drew their knowledge from the proper nature of things, so that the preposition in denotes the form of a principle; because, as has been already stated (Q. 55, A. 2), the angels do not draw their knowledge from things. It follows, then, that when we say in their proper nature we refer to the aspect of the thing known in so far as it is an object of knowledge; that is to say, that the evening knowledge is in the angels in so far as they know the being of things which those things have in their own nature. Now they know this through a twofold medium, namely, by innate ideas, or by the forms of things existing in the Word. For by beholding the Word, they know not merely the being of things as existing in the Word, but the being as possessed by the things themselves; as God by contemplating Himself sees that being which things have in their own nature. It, therefore, it be called evening knowledge, in so far as when the angels behold the Word, they know the being which things have in their proper nature, then the morning and the evening knowledge are essentially one and the same, and only differ as to the things known. If it be called evening knowledge, in so far as through innate ideas they know the being which things have in their own natures, then the morning and the

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videtur intelligere Augustinus, cum unam ponat imperfectam respectu alterius. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut numerus sex dierum, secundum intellectum Augustini, accipitur secundum sex genera rerum quae cognoscuntur ab angelis; ita unitas diei accipitur secundum unitatem rei cognitae, quae tamen diversis cognitionibus cognosci potest. Ad secundum dicendum quod duae operationes possunt simul esse unius potentiae, quarum una ad aliam refertur; ut patet cum voluntas simul vult et finem et ea quae sunt ad finem, et intellectus simul intelligit principia et conclusiones per principia, quando iam scientiam acquisivit. Cognitio autem vespertina in angelis refertur ad matutinam, ut Augustinus dicit. Unde nihil prohibet utramque simul esse in angelis.

Ad tertium dicendum quod, veniente perfecto, evacuatur imperfectum quod ei opponitur, sicut fides, quae est eorum quae non videntur, evacuatur visione veniente. Sed imperfectio vespertinae cognitionis non opponitur perfectioni matutinae. Quod enim cognoscatur aliquid in seipso, non est oppositum ei quod cognoscatur in sua causa. Nec iterum quod aliquid cognoscatur per duo media, quorum unum est perfectius et aliud imperfectius, aliquid repugnans habet, sicut ad eandem conclusionem habere possumus et medium demonstrativum et dialecticum. Et similiter eadem res potest sciri ab angelo per Verbum increatum, et per speciem innatam.

Q. 58, A. 7

evening knowledge differ. Thus Augustine seems to understand it when he assigns one as inferior to the other. Reply Obj. 1: The six days, as Augustine understands them, are taken as the six classes of things known by the angels; so that the day’s unit is taken according to the unit of the thing understood; which, nevertheless, can be apprehended by various ways of knowing it. Reply Obj. 2: There can be two operations of the same faculty at the one time, one of which is referred to the other; as is evident when the will at the same time wills the end and the means to the end; and the intellect at the same instant perceives principles and conclusions through those principles, when it has already acquired knowledge. As Augustine says (Gen ad lit. iv, 24), the evening knowledge is referred to the morning knowledge in the angels; hence there is nothing to hinder both from being at the same time in the angels. Reply Obj. 3: On the coming of what is perfect, the opposite imperfect is done away: just as faith, which is of the things that are not seen, is made void when vision succeeds. But the imperfection of the evening knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of the morning knowledge. For that a thing be known in itself, is not opposite to its being known in its cause. Nor, again, is there any inconsistency in knowing a thing through two mediums, one of which is more perfect and the other less perfect; just as we can have a demonstrative and a probable medium for reaching the same conclusion. In like manner a thing can be known by the angel through the uncreated Word, and through an innate idea.

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Question 59 The Will of the Angels Consequenter considerandum est de his quae pertiIn the next place we must treat of things concerning the nent ad voluntatem angelorum. Et primo considerabi- will of the angels. In the first place we shall treat of the will mus de ipsa voluntate; secundo, de motu eius, qui est itself; second, of its movement, which is love. amor sive dilectio. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Under the first heading there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum in angelis sit voluntas. (1) Whether there is will in the angels? Secundo, utrum voluntas angeli sit ipsa natura (2) Whether the will of the angel is his nature, or his eorum, vel etiam ipse intellectus eorum. intellect? Tertio, utrum in angelis sit liberum arbitrium. (3) Is there free-will in the angels? Quarto, utrum in eis sit irascibilis et concupiscibilis. (4) Is there an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in them?

Article 1 Whether there is will in the angels? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in angelis non sit voluntas. Quia, ut dicit Philosophus, in III de Anima, voluntas in ratione est. Sed in angelis non est ratio, sed aliquid superius ratione. Ergo in angelis non est voluntas, sed aliquid superius voluntate. Praeterea, voluntas sub appetitu continetur, ut patet per Philosophum, in III de Anima. Sed appetitus est imperfecti, est enim eius quod nondum habetur. Cum igitur in angelis, maxime in beatis, non sit aliqua imperfectio, videtur quod non sit in eis voluntas.

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no will in the angels. For as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42), The will is in the reason. But there is no reason in the angels, but something higher than reason. Therefore there is no will in the angels, but something higher than the will. Obj. 2: Further, the will is comprised under the appetite, as is evident from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42). But the appetite argues something imperfect; because it is a desire of something not as yet possessed. Therefore, since there is no imperfection in the angels, especially in the blessed ones, it seems that there is no will in them. Praeterea, Philosophus dicit, in III de Anima, Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, text. quod voluntas est movens motum, movetur enim ab ap- 54) that the will is a mover which is moved; for it is moved petibili intellecto. Sed angeli sunt immobiles; cum sint by the appetible object understood. Now the angels are imincorporei. Ergo in angelis non est voluntas. movable, since they are incorporeal. Therefore there is no will in the angels. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X Lib. de On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11,12) Trin., quod imago Trinitatis invenitur in mente secun- that the image of the Trinity is found in the soul accorddum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. Imago ing to memory, understanding, and will. But God’s image autem Dei invenitur non solum in mente humana, sed is found not only in the soul of man, but also in the anetiam in mente angelica; cum etiam mens angelica sit ca- gelic mind, since it also is capable of knowing God. Therepax Dei. Ergo in angelis est voluntas. fore there is will in the angels. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere in I answer that, We must necessarily place a will in angelis voluntatem. Ad cuius evidentiam, consideran- the angels. In evidence thereof, it must be borne in mind dum est quod, cum omnia procedant ex voluntate divi- that, since all things flow from the Divine will, all things in na, omnia suo modo per appetitum inclinantur in bo- their own way are inclined by appetite towards good, but num, sed diversimode. Quaedam enim inclinantur in in different ways. Some are inclined to good by their natubonum, per solam naturalem habitudinem, absque co- ral inclination, without knowledge, as plants and inanimate gnitione, sicut plantae et corpora inanimata. Et talis in- bodies. Such inclination towards good is called a natural clinatio ad bonum vocatur appetitus naturalis. Quaedam appetite. Others, again, are inclined towards good, but with

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vero ad bonum inclinantur cum aliqua cognitione; non quidem sic quod cognoscant ipsam rationem boni, sed cognoscunt aliquod bonum particulare; sicut sensus, qui cognoscit dulce et album et aliquid huiusmodi. Inclinatio autem hanc cognitionem sequens, dicitur appetitus sensitivus. Quaedam vero inclinantur ad bonum cum cognitione qua cognoscunt ipsam boni rationem; quod est proprium intellectus. Et haec perfectissime inclinantur in bonum; non quidem quasi ab alio solummodo directa in bonum, sicut ea quae cognitione carent; neque in bonum particulariter tantum, sicut ea in quibus est sola sensitiva cognitio; sed quasi inclinata in ipsum universale bonum. Et haec inclinatio dicitur voluntas. Unde cum angeli per intellectum cognoscant ipsam universalem rationem boni, manifestum est quod in eis sit voluntas. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliter ratio transcendit sensum, et aliter intellectus rationem. Ratio enim transcendit sensum, secundum diversitatem cognitorum, nam sensus est particularium, ratio vero universalium. Et ideo oportet quod sit alius appetitus tendens in bonum universale, qui debetur rationi; et alius tendens in bonum particulare, qui debetur sensui. Sed intellectus et ratio differunt quantum ad modum cognoscendi, quia scilicet intellectus cognoscit simplici intuitu, ratio vero discurrendo de uno in aliud. Sed tamen ratio per discursum pervenit ad cognoscendum illud, quod intellectus sine discursu cognoscit, scilicet universale. Idem est ergo obiectum quod appetitivae proponitur et ex parte rationis, et ex parte intellectus. Unde in angelis, qui sunt intellectuales tantum, non est appetitus superior voluntate. Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet nomen appetitivae partis sit sumptum ab appetendo ea quae non habentur, tamen appetitiva pars non solum ad haec se extendit, sed etiam ad multa alia. Sicut et nomen lapidis sumptum est a laesione pedis, cum tamen lapidi non hoc solum conveniat. Similiter irascibilis potentia denominatur ab ira; cum tamen in ea sint plures aliae passiones, ut spes et audacia et huiusmodi. Ad tertium dicendum quod voluntas dicitur movens motum, secundum quod velle est motus quidam, et intelligere; cuiusmodi motum nihil prohibet in angelis esse, quia talis motus est actus perfecti, ut dicitur in III de Anima.

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some knowledge; not that they know the aspect of goodness, but that they apprehend some particular good; as in the sense, which knows the sweet, the white, and so on. The inclination which follows this apprehension is called a sensitive appetite. Other things, again, have an inclination towards good, but with a knowledge whereby they perceive the aspect of goodness; this belongs to the intellect. This is most perfectly inclined towards what is good; not, indeed, as if it were merely guided by another towards some particular good only, like things devoid of knowledge, nor towards some particular good only, as things which have only sensitive knowledge, but as inclined towards good in general. Such inclination is termed will. Accordingly, since the angels by their intellect know the universal aspect of goodness, it is manifest that there is a will in them. Reply Obj. 1: Reason surpasses sense in a different way from that in which intellect surpasses reason. Reason surpasses sense according to the diversity of the objects known; for sense judges of particular objects, while reason judges of universals. Therefore there must be one appetite tending towards good in the abstract, which appetite belongs to reason; and another with a tendency towards particular good, which appetite belongs to sense. But intellect and reason differ as to their manner of knowing; because the intellect knows by simple intuition, while reason knows by a process of discursion from one thing to another. Nevertheless by such discursion reason comes to know what intellect learns without it, namely, the universal. Consequently the object presented to the appetitive faculty on the part of reason and on the part of intellect is the same. Therefore in the angels, who are purely intellectual, there is no appetite higher than the will. Reply Obj. 2: Although the name of the appetitive part is derived from seeking things not yet possessed, yet the appetitive part reaches out not to these things only, but also to many other things; thus the name of a stone is derived from injuring the foot, though not this alone belongs to a stone. In the same way the irascible faculty is so denominated from anger; though at the same time there are several other passions in it, as hope, daring, and the rest. Reply Obj. 3: The will is called a mover which is moved, according as to will and to understand are termed movements of a kind; and there is nothing to prevent movement of this kind from existing in the angels, since such movement is the act of a perfect agent, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 28.

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Q. 59, A. 2

Article 2 Whether in the angels the will differs from the intellect? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in angelis non differat voluntas ab intellectu et natura. Angelus enim est simplicior quam corpus naturale. Sed corpus naturale per suam formam inclinatur in suum finem, qui est eius bonum. Ergo multo magis angelus. Forma autem angeli est vel natura ipsa in qua subsistit, vel species quae est in intellectu eius. Ergo angelus inclinatur in bonum per naturam suam, et per speciem intelligibilem. Haec autem inclinatio ad bonum pertinet ad voluntatem. Voluntas igitur angeli non est aliud quam eius natura vel intellectus. Praeterea, obiectum intellectus est verum, voluntatis autem bonum. Bonum autem et verum non differunt realiter, sed secundum rationem tantum. Ergo voluntas et intellectus non differunt realiter. Praeterea, distinctio communis et proprii non diversificat potentias, eadem enim potentia visiva est coloris et albedinis. Sed bonum et verum videntur se habere sicut commune et proprium, nam verum est quoddam bonum, scilicet intellectus. Ergo voluntas, cuius obiectum est bonum, non differt ab intellectu, cuius obiectum est verum. Sed contra, voluntas in angelis est bonorum tantum. Intellectus autem est bonorum et malorum, cognoscunt enim utrumque. Ergo voluntas in angelis est aliud quam eius intellectus. Respondeo dicendum quod voluntas in angelis est quaedam virtus vel potentia, quae nec est ipsa eorum natura, nec eorum intellectus. Et quod non sit eorum natura, apparet ex hoc, quod natura vel essentia alicuius rei intra ipsam rem comprehenditur, quidquid ergo se extendit ad id quod est extra rem, non est rei essentia. Unde videmus in corporibus naturalibus, quod inclinatio quae est ad esse rei, non est per aliquid superadditum essentiae; sed per materiam, quae appetit esse antequam illud habeat, et per formam, quae tenet rem in esse postquam fuerit. Sed inclinatio ad aliquid extrinsecum, est per aliquid essentiae superadditum, sicut inclinatio ad locum est per gravitatem vel levitatem, inclinatio autem ad faciendum sibi simile est per qualitates activas. Voluntas autem habet inclinationem in bonum naturaliter. Unde ibi solum est idem essentia et voluntas, ubi totaliter bonum continetur in essentia volentis; scilicet in Deo, qui nihil vult extra se nisi ratione suae bonitatis. Quod de nulla creatura potest dici; cum bonum infinitum sit extra essentiam cuiuslibet creati. Unde nec voluntas angeli, nec alterius creaturae, potest esse idem quod eius essentia.

Objection 1: It would seem that in the angel the will does not differ from the intellect and from the nature. For an angel is more simple than a natural body. But a natural body is inclined through its form towards its end, which is its good. Therefore much more so is the angel. Now the angel’s form is either the nature in which he subsists, or else it is some species within his intellect. Therefore the angel inclines towards the good through his own nature, or through an intelligible species. But such inclination towards the good belongs to the will. Therefore the will of the angel does not differ from his nature or his intellect. Obj. 2: Further, the object of the intellect is the true, while the object of the will is the good. Now the good and the true differ, not really but only logically. Therefore will and intellect are not really different. Obj. 3: Further, the distinction of common and proper does not differentiate the faculties; for the same power of sight perceives color and whiteness. But the good and the true seem to be mutually related as common to particular; for the true is a particular good, to wit, of the intellect. Therefore the will, whose object is the good, does not differ from the intellect, whose object is the true. On the contrary, The will in the angels regards good things only, while their intellect regards both good and bad things, for they know both. Therefore the will of the angels is distinct from their intellect. I answer that, In the angels the will is a special faculty or power, which is neither their nature nor their intellect. That it is not their nature is manifest from this, that the nature or essence of a thing is completely comprised within it: whatever, then, extends to anything beyond it, is not its essence. Hence we see in natural bodies that the inclination to being does not come from anything superadded to the essence, but from the matter which desires being before possessing it, and from the form which keeps it in such being when once it exists. But the inclination towards something extrinsic comes from something superadded to the essence; as tendency to a place comes from gravity or lightness, while the inclination to make something like itself comes from the active qualities. Now the will has a natural tendency towards good. Consequently there alone are essence and will identified where all good is contained within the essence of him who wills; that is to say, in God, Who wills nothing beyond Himself except on account of His goodness. This cannot be said of any creature, because infinite goodness is quite foreign to the nature of any created thing. Accordingly, neither the will of the angel, nor that of any creature, can be the same thing as its essence.

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Similiter nec potest esse idem quod intellectus angeli vel hominis. Nam cognitio fit per hoc quod cognitum est in cognoscente, unde ea ratione se extendit eius intellectus in id quod est extra se, secundum quod illud quod extra ipsum est per essentiam, natum est aliquo modo in eo esse. Voluntas vero se extendit in id quod extra se est, secundum quod quadam inclinatione quodammodo tendit in rem exteriorem. Alterius autem virtutis est, quod aliquid habeat in se quod est extra se, et quod ipsum tendat in rem exteriorem. Et ideo oportet quod in qualibet creatura sit aliud intellectus et voluntas. Non autem in Deo, qui habet et ens universale et bonum universale in seipso. Unde tam voluntas quam intellectus est eius essentia. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod corpus naturale per formam substantialem inclinatur in esse suum, sed in exterius inclinatur per aliquid additum, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod potentiae non diversificantur secundum materialem distinctionem obiectorum, sed secundum formalem distinctionem, quae attenditur secundum rationem obiecti. Et ideo diversitas secundum rationem boni et veri, sufficit ad diversitatem intellectus et voluntatis. Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia bonum et verum convertuntur secundum rem, inde est quod et bonum ab intellectu intelligitur sub ratione veri, et verum a voluntate appetitur sub ratione boni. Sed tamen diversitas rationum ad diversificandum potentias sufficit, ut dictum est.

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In like manner neither can the will be the same thing as the intellect of angel or man. Because knowledge comes about in so far as the object known is within the knower; consequently the intellect extends itself to what is outside it, according as what, in its essence, is outside it is disposed to be somehow within it. On the other hand, the will goes out to what is beyond it, according as by a kind of inclination it tends, in a manner, to what is outside it. Now it belongs to one faculty to have within itself something which is outside it, and to another faculty to tend to what is outside it. Consequently intellect and will must necessarily be different powers in every creature. It is not so with God, for He has within Himself universal being, and the universal good. Therefore both intellect and will are His nature. Reply Obj. 1: A natural body is moved to its own being by its substantial form: while it is inclined to something outside by something additional, as has been said. Reply Obj. 2: Faculties are not differentiated by any material difference of their objects, but according to their formal distinction, which is taken from the nature of the object as such. Consequently the diversity derived from the notion of good and true suffices for the difference of intellect from will. Reply Obj. 3: Because the good and the true are really convertible, it follows that the good is apprehended by the intellect as something true; while the true is desired by the will as something good. Nevertheless, the diversity of their aspects is sufficient for diversifying the faculties, as was said above (ad 2).

Article 3 Whether there is free-will in the angels? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in angelis non sit liberum arbitrium. Actus enim liberi arbitrii est eligere. Sed electio non potest esse in angelis, cum electio sit appetitus praeconsiliati, consilium autem est inquisitio quaedam ut dicitur in III Ethic.; Angeli autem non cognoscunt inquirendo, quia hoc pertinet ad discursum rationis. Ergo videtur quod in angelis non sit liberum arbitrium. Praeterea, liberum arbitrium se habet ad utrumlibet. Sed ex parte intellectus non est aliquid se habens ad utrumlibet in angelis, quia intellectus eorum non fallitur in naturalibus intelligibilibus, ut dictum est. Ergo nec ex parte appetitus liberum arbitrium in eis esse potest.

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no free-will in the angels. For the act of free-will is to choose. But there can be no choice with the angels, because choice is the desire of something after taking counsel, while counsel is a kind of inquiry, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. But the angels’ knowledge is not the result of inquiring, for this belongs to the discursiveness of reason. Therefore it appears that there is no freewill in the angels. Obj. 2: Further, free-will implies indifference to alternatives. But in the angels on the part of their intellect there is no such indifference; because, as was observed already (Q. 58, A. 5), their intellect is not deceived as to things which are naturally intelligible to them. Therefore neither on the part of their appetitive faculty can there be free-will. Praeterea, ea quae sunt naturalia in angelis, conObj. 3: Further, the natural endowments of the angels veniunt eis secundum magis et minus, quia in superio- belong to them according to degrees of more or less; beribus angelis natura intellectualis est perfectior quam in cause in the higher angels the intellectual nature is more

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inferioribus. Liberum autem arbitrium non recipit magis et minus. Ergo in angelis non est liberum arbitrium. Sed contra, libertas arbitrii ad dignitatem hominis pertinet. Sed angeli digniores sunt hominibus. Ergo libertas arbitrii, cum sit in hominibus, multo magis est in angelis. Respondeo dicendum quod quaedam sunt quae non agunt ex aliquo arbitrio, sed quasi ab aliis acta et mota, sicut sagitta a sagittante movetur ad finem. Quaedam vero agunt quodam arbitrio, sed non libero, sicut animalia irrationalia, ovis enim fugit lupum ex quodam iudicio, quo existimat eum sibi noxium; sed hoc iudicium non est sibi liberum, sed a natura inditum. Sed solum id quod habet intellectum, potest agere iudicio libero, inquantum cognoscit universalem rationem boni, ex qua potest iudicare hoc vel illud esse bonum. Unde ubicumque est intellectus, est liberum arbitrium. Et sic patet liberum arbitrium esse in angelis etiam excellentius quam in hominibus, sicut et intellectum.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Philosophus loquitur de electione secundum quod est hominis. Sicut autem aestimatio hominis in speculativis differt ab aestimatione angeli in hoc, quod una est absque inquisitione, alia vero per inquisitionem; ita et in operativis. Unde in angelis est electio; non tamen cum inquisitiva deliberatione consilii, sed per subitam acceptionem veritatis. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, cognitio fit per hoc quod cognita sunt in cognoscente. Ad imperfectionem autem alicuius rei pertinet, si non sit in ea id quod natum est in ea esse. Unde angelus non esset perfectus in sua natura, si intellectus eius non esset determinatus ad omnem veritatem quam naturaliter cognoscere potest. Sed actus appetitivae virtutis est per hoc quod affectus inclinatur ad rem exteriorem. Non autem dependet perfectio rei ex omni re ad quam inclinatur, sed solum ex superiori. Et ideo non pertinet ad imperfectionem angeli, si non habet voluntatem determinatam respectu eorum quae infra ipsum sunt. Pertineret autem ad imperfectionem eius, si indeterminate se haberet ad illud quod supra ipsum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod liberum arbitrium nobiliori modo est in superioribus angelis, quam in inferioribus, sicut et iudicium intellectus. Tamen verum est quod ipsa libertas, secundum quod in ea consideratur quaedam remotio coactionis, non suscipit magis et minus, quia privationes et negationes non remittuntur nec intenduntur per se, sed solum per suam causam, vel secundum aliquam affirmationem adiunctam.

Q. 59, A. 3

perfect than in the lower. But the free-will does not admit of degrees. Therefore there is no free-will in them. On the contrary, Free-will is part of man’s dignity. But the angels’ dignity surpasses that of men. Therefore, since free-will is in men, with much more reason is it in the angels. I answer that, Some things there are which act, not from any previous judgment, but, as it were, moved and made to act by others; just as the arrow is directed to the target by the archer. Others act from some kind of judgment; but not from free-will, such as irrational animals; for the sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of judgment whereby it esteems it to be hurtful to itself: such a judgment is not a free one, but implanted by nature. Only an agent endowed with an intellect can act with a judgment which is free, in so far as it apprehends the common note of goodness; from which it can judge this or the other thing to be good. Consequently, wherever there is intellect, there is free-will. It is therefore manifest that just as there is intellect, so is there free-will in the angels, and in a higher degree of perfection than in man. Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of choice, as it is in man. As a man’s estimate in speculative matters differs from an angel’s in this, that the one needs not to inquire, while the other does so need; so is it in practical matters. Hence there is choice in the angels, yet not with the inquisitive deliberation of counsel, but by the sudden acceptance of truth. Reply Obj. 2: As was observed already (A. 2), knowledge is effected by the presence of the known within the knower. Now it is a mark of imperfection in anything not to have within it what it should naturally have. Consequently an angel would not be perfect in his nature, if his intellect were not determined to every truth which he can know naturally. But the act of the appetitive faculty comes of this, that the affection is directed to something outside. Yet the perfection of a thing does not come from everything to which it is inclined, but only from something which is higher than it. Therefore it does not argue imperfection in an angel if his will be not determined with regard to things beneath him; but it would argue imperfection in him, were he to be indeterminate to what is above him. Reply Obj. 3: Free-will exists in a nobler manner in the higher angels than it does in the lower, as also does the judgment of the intellect. Yet it is true that liberty, in so far as the removal of compulsion is considered, is not susceptible of greater and less degree; because privations and negations are not lessened nor increased directly of themselves; but only by their cause, or through the addition of some qualification.

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Article 4 Whether there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in angelis sit irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod in daemonibus est furor irrationabilis et concupiscentia amens. Sed daemones eiusdem naturae sunt cum angelis, quia peccatum non mutavit in eis naturam. Ergo in angelis est irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Praeterea, amor et gaudium in concupiscibili sunt; ira vero, spes et timor in irascibili. Sed haec attribuuntur angelis bonis et malis in Scripturis. Ergo in angelis est irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Praeterea, virtutes quaedam dicuntur esse in irascibili et concupiscibili; sicut caritas et temperantia videntur esse in concupiscibili, spes autem et fortitudo in irascibili. Sed virtutes hae sunt in angelis. Ergo in angelis est concupiscibilis et irascibilis. Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, in III de Anima, quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt in parte sensitiva; quae non est in angelis. Ergo in eis non est irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Respondeo dicendum quod intellectivus appetitus non dividitur per irascibilem et concupiscibilem, sed solum appetitus sensitivus. Cuius ratio est quia cum potentiae non distinguantur secundum distinctionem materialem obiectorum, sed solum secundum rationem formalem obiecti; si alicui potentiae respondeat aliquod obiectum secundum rationem communem, non erit distinctio potentiarum secundum diversitatem propriorum quae sub illo communi continentur. Sicut si proprium obiectum potentiae visivae est color secundum rationem coloris, non distinguuntur plures potentiae visivae secundum differentiam albi et nigri, sed si proprium obiectum alicuius potentiae esset album inquantum album, distingueretur potentia visiva albi a potentia visiva nigri. Manifestum est autem ex dictis quod obiectum appetitus intellectivi, qui voluntas dicitur, est bonum secundum communem boni rationem, nec potest esse aliquis appetitus nisi boni. Unde in parte intellectiva appetitus non dividitur secundum distinctionem aliquorum particularium bonorum; sicut dividitur appetitus sensitivus, qui non respicit bonum secundum communem rationem, sed quoddam particulare bonum. Unde, cum in angelis non sit nisi appetitus intellectivus, eorum appetitus non distinguitur per irascibilem et concupiscibilem, sed remanet indivisus; et vocatur voluntas.

Objection 1: It would seem that there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that in the demons there is unreasonable fury and wild concupiscence. But demons are of the same nature as angels; for sin has not altered their nature. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels. Obj. 2: Further, love and joy are in the concupiscible; while anger, hope, and fear are in the irascible appetite. But in the Sacred Scriptures these things are attributed both to the good and to the wicked angels. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels. Obj. 3: Further, some virtues are said to reside in the irascible appetite and some in the concupiscible: thus charity and temperance appear to be in the concupiscible, while hope and fortitude are in the irascible. But these virtues are in the angels. Therefore there is both a concupiscible and an irascible appetite in the angels. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42) that the irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part, which does not exist in angels. Consequently there is no irascible or concupiscible appetite in the angels. I answer that, The intellective appetite is not divided into irascible and concupiscible; only the sensitive appetite is so divided. The reason of this is because, since the faculties are distinguished from one another not according to the material but only by the formal distinction of objects, if to any faculty there respond an object according to some common idea, there will be no distinction of faculties according to the diversity of the particular things contained under that common idea. Just as if the proper object of the power of sight be color as such, then there are not several powers of sight distinguished according to the difference of black and white: whereas if the proper object of any faculty were white, as white, then the faculty of seeing white would be distinguished from the faculty of seeing black. Now it is quite evident from what has been said (A. 1; Q. 16, A. 1), that the object of the intellective appetite, otherwise known as the will, is good according to the common aspect of goodness; nor can there be any appetite except of what is good. Hence, in the intellective part, the appetite is not divided according to the distinction of some particular good things, as the sensitive appetite is divided, which does not crave for what is good according to its common aspect, but for some particular good object. Accordingly, since there exists in the angels only an intellective appetite, their appetite is not distinguished into irascible and concupiscible, but remains undivided; and it is called the will.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod furor et concupiscentia metaphorice dicuntur esse in daemonibus, sicut et ira quandoque Deo attribuitur, propter similitudinem effectus. Ad secundum dicendum quod amor et gaudium, secundum quod sunt passiones, sunt in concupiscibili, sed secundum quod nominant simplicem voluntatis actum, sic sunt in intellectiva parte; prout amare est velle bonum alicui, et gaudere est quiescere voluntatem in aliquo bono habito. Et universaliter nihil horum dicitur de angelis secundum passionem, ut Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei. Ad tertium dicendum quod caritas, secundum quod est virtus, non est in concupiscibili, sed in voluntate. Nam obiectum concupiscibilis est bonum delectabile secundum sensum, huiusmodi autem non est bonum divinum, quod est obiectum caritatis. Et eadem ratione dicendum est quod spes non est in irascibili, quia obiectum irascibilis est quoddam arduum quod est sensibile, circa quod non est spes quae est virtus, sed circa arduum divinum. Temperantia autem, secundum quod est virtus humana, est circa concupiscentias delectabilium sensibilium, quae pertinent ad vim concupiscibilem. Et similiter fortitudo est circa audacias et timores quae sunt in irascibili. Et ideo temperantia, secundum quod est virtus humana, est in concupiscibili, et fortitudo in irascibili.

Sed hoc modo non sunt in angelis. Non enim in eis sunt passiones concupiscentiarum, vel timoris et audaciae, quas oporteat per temperantiam et fortitudinem regulare. Sed temperantia in eis dicitur, secundum quod moderate suam voluntatem exhibent secundum regulam divinae voluntatis. Et fortitudo in eis dicitur, secundum quod voluntatem divinam firmiter exequuntur. Quod totum fit per voluntatem; et non per irascibilem et concupiscibilem.

Q. 59, A. 4

Reply Obj. 1: Fury and concupiscence are metaphorically said to be in the demons, as anger is sometimes attributed to God;—on account of the resemblance in the effect. Reply Obj. 2: Love and joy, in so far as they are passions, are in the concupiscible appetite, but in so far as they express a simple act of the will, they are in the intellective part: in this sense to love is to wish well to anyone; and to be glad is for the will to repose in some good possessed. Universally speaking, none of these things is said of the angels, as by way of passions; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix). Reply Obj. 3: Charity, as a virtue, is not in the concupiscible appetite, but in the will; because the object of the concupiscible appetite is the good as delectable to the senses. But the Divine goodness, which is the object of charity, is not of any such kind. For the same reason it must be said that hope does not exist in the irascible appetite; because the object of the irascible appetite is something arduous belonging to the sensible order, which the virtue of hope does not regard; since the object of hope is arduous and divine. Temperance, however, considered as a human virtue, deals with the desires of sensible pleasures, which belong to the concupiscible faculty. Similarly, fortitude regulates daring and fear, which reside in the irascible part. Consequently temperance, in so far as it is a human virtue, resides in the concupiscible part, and fortitude in the irascible. But they do not exist in the angels in this manner. For in them there are no passions of concupiscence, nor of fear and daring, to be regulated by temperance and fortitude. But temperance is predicated of them according as in moderation they display their will in conformity with the Divine will. Fortitude is likewise attributed to them, in so far as they firmly carry out the Divine will. All of this is done by their will, and not by the irascible or concupiscible appetite.

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Question 60 The Love or Dilection of the Angels Deinde considerandum est de actu voluntatis, qui est The next subject for our consideration is that act of the amor sive dilectio, nam omnis actus appetitivae virtutis will which is love or dilection; because every act of the apex amore seu dilectione derivatur. petitive faculty comes of love. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Under this heading there are five points of inquiry: Primo, utrum in angelis sit dilectio naturalis. (1) Whether there is natural love in the angels? Secundo, utrum in eis sit dilectio electiva. (2) Whether there is in them love of choice? Tertio, utrum angelus diligat seipsum dilectione (3) Whether the angel loves himself with natural love naturali an electiva. or with love of choice? Quarto, utrum unus angelus diligat alium dilectione (4) Whether one angel loves another with natural love naturali sicut seipsum. as he loves himself? Quinto, utrum angelus naturali dilectione diligat (5) Whether the angel loves God more than self with Deum plus quam seipsum. natural love?

Article 1 Whether there is natural love or dilection in an angel? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in angelis non sit amor vel dilectio naturalis. Amor enim naturalis dividitur contra intellectualem; ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed amor angeli est intellectualis. Ergo non est naturalis. Praeterea, ea quae amant amore naturali, magis aguntur quam agant, nihil enim habet dominium suae naturae. Sed angeli non aguntur, sed agunt; cum sint liberi arbitrii, ut ostensum est. Ergo in angelis non est amor seu dilectio naturalis. Praeterea, omnis dilectio aut est recta, aut non recta. Dilectio autem recta pertinet ad caritatem, dilectio autem non recta pertinet ad iniquitatem. Neutrum autem horum pertinet ad naturam, quia caritas est supra naturam, iniquitas autem est contra naturam. Ergo nulla dilectio naturalis est in angelis. Sed contra est quod dilectio sequitur cognitionem, nihil enim amatur nisi cognitum, ut Augustinus dicit, X de Trin. Sed in angelis est cognitio naturalis. Ergo et dilectio naturalis. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est in angelis ponere dilectionem naturalem. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod semper prius salvatur in posteriori. Natura autem prior est quam intellectus, quia natura cuiuscumque rei est essentia eius. Unde id quod est naturae, oportet salvari etiam in habentibus intellectum.

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no natural love or dilection in the angels. For, natural love is contradistinguished from intellectual love, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But an angel’s love is intellectual. Therefore it is not natural. Obj. 2: Further, those who love with natural love are more acted upon than active in themselves; for nothing has control over its own nature. Now the angels are not acted upon, but act of themselves; because they possess free-will, as was shown above (Q. 59, A. 3). Consequently there is no natural love in them. Obj. 3: Further, every love is either ordinate or inordinate. Now ordinate love belongs to charity; while inordinate love belongs to wickedness. But neither of these belongs to nature; because charity is above nature, while wickedness is against nature. Therefore there is no natural love in the angels. On the contrary, Love results from knowledge; for, nothing is loved except it be first known, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But there is natural knowledge in the angels. Therefore there is also natural love. I answer that, We must necessarily place natural love in the angels. In evidence of this we must bear in mind that what comes first is always sustained in what comes after it. Now nature comes before intellect, because the nature of every subject is its essence. Consequently whatever belongs to nature must be preserved likewise in such subjects as have intellect.

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Est autem hoc commune omni naturae, ut habeat aliquam inclinationem, quae est appetitus naturalis vel amor. Quae tamen inclinatio diversimode invenitur in diversis naturis, in unaquaque secundum modum eius. Unde in natura intellectuali invenitur inclinatio naturalis secundum voluntatem; in natura autem sensitiva, secundum appetitum sensitivum, in natura vero carente cognitione, secundum solum ordinem naturae in aliquid. Unde cum angelus sit natura intellectualis, oportet quod in voluntate eius sit naturalis dilectio. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectualis amor dividitur contra naturalem qui est solum naturalis, inquantum est naturae quae non addit supra rationem naturae perfectionem sensus aut intellectus. Ad secundum dicendum quod omnia quae sunt in toto mundo, aguntur ab aliquo, praeter primum agens, quod ita agit quod nullo modo ab alio agitur, in quo est idem natura et voluntas. Et ideo non est inconveniens si angelus agatur, inquantum inclinatio naturalis est sibi indita ab auctore suae naturae. Non tamen sic agitur quod non agat; cum habeat liberam voluntatem. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut cognitio naturalis semper est vera ita dilectio naturalis semper est recta, cum amor naturalis nihil aliud sit quam inclinatio naturae indita ab auctore naturae. Dicere ergo quod inclinatio naturalis non sit recta, est derogare auctori naturae. Alia tamen est rectitudo naturalis dilectionis, et alia est rectitudo caritatis et virtutis, quia una rectitudo est perfectiva alterius. Sicut etiam alia est veritas naturalis cognitionis; et alia est veritas cognitionis infusae vel acquisitae.

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But it is common to every nature to have some inclination; and this is its natural appetite or love. This inclination is found to exist differently in different natures; but in each according to its mode. Consequently, in the intellectual nature there is to be found a natural inclination coming from the will; in the sensitive nature, according to the sensitive appetite; but in a nature devoid of knowledge, only according to the tendency of the nature to something. Therefore, since an angel is an intellectual nature, there must be a natural love in his will. Reply Obj. 1: Intellectual love is contradistinguished from that natural love, which is merely natural, in so far as it belongs to a nature which has not likewise the perfection of either sense or intellect. Reply Obj. 2: All things in the world are moved to act by something else except the First Agent, Who acts in such a manner that He is in no way moved to act by another; and in Whom nature and will are the same. So there is nothing unfitting in an angel being moved to act in so far as such natural inclination is implanted in him by the Author of his nature. Yet he is not so moved to act that he does not act himself, because he has free-will. Reply Obj. 3: As natural knowledge is always true, so is natural love well regulated; because natural love is nothing else than the inclination implanted in nature by its Author. To say that a natural inclination is not well regulated, is to derogate from the Author of nature. Yet the rectitude of natural love is different from the rectitude of charity and virtue: because the one rectitude perfects the other; even so the truth of natural knowledge is of one kind, and the truth of infused or acquired knowledge is of another.

Article 2 Whether there is love of choice in the angels? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in angelis non sit dilectio electiva. Dilectio enim electiva videtur esse amor rationalis, cum electio sequatur consilium, quod in inquisitione consistit, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Sed rationalis amor dividitur contra intellectualem (qui est proprius angelorum); ut dicitur IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo in angelis non est dilectio electiva. Praeterea, in angelis non est nisi cognitio naturalis, praeter cognitionem infusam, quia non discurrunt de principiis ad acquirendum conclusiones. Et sic ad omnia quae naturaliter cognoscere possunt, sic se habent sicut intellectus noster ad prima principia quae naturaliter cognoscere potest. Sed dilectio sequitur cognitionem, ut dictum est. Ergo in angelis, praeter dilectionem gratuitam, non est nisi dilectio naturalis. Non ergo electiva.

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no love of choice in the angels. For love of choice appears to be rational love; since choice follows counsel, which lies in inquiry, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Now rational love is contrasted with intellectual, which is proper to angels, as is said (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore there is no love of choice in the angels. Obj. 2: Further, the angels have only natural knowledge besides such as is infused: since they do not proceed from principles to acquire the knowledge of conclusions. Hence they are disposed to everything they can know, as our intellect is disposed towards first principles, which it can know naturally. Now love follows knowledge, as has been already stated (A. 1; Q. 16, A. 1). Consequently, besides their infused love, there is only natural love in the angels. Therefore there is no love of choice in them.

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Sed contra, naturalibus neque meremur neque demeremur. Sed angeli sua dilectione aliqua merentur, vel demerentur. Ergo in eis est aliqua dilectio electiva. Respondeo dicendum quod in angelis est quaedam dilectio naturalis et quaedam electiva. Et naturalis dilectio in eis est principium electivae, quia semper id quod pertinet ad prius, habet rationem principii; unde, cum natura sit primum quod est in unoquoque, oportet quod id quod ad naturam pertinet, sit principium in quolibet. Et hoc apparet in homine et quantum ad intellectum, et quantum ad voluntatem. Intellectus enim cognoscit principia naturaliter, et ex hac cognitione causatur in homine scientia conclusionum, quae non cognoscuntur naturaliter ab homine, sed per inventionem vel doctrinam. Similiter in voluntate finis hoc modo se habet, sicut principium in intellectu, ut dicitur in II Physic. Unde voluntas naturaliter tendit in suum finem ultimum, omnis enim homo naturaliter vult beatitudinem. Et ex hac naturali voluntate causantur omnes aliae voluntates, cum quidquid homo vult, velit propter finem. Dilectio igitur boni quod homo naturaliter vult sicut finem, est dilectio naturalis, dilectio autem ab hac derivata, quae est boni quod diligitur propter finem, est dilectio electiva. Hoc tamen differenter se habet ex parte intellectus, et voluntatis. Quia, sicut supra dictum est, cognitio intellectus fit secundum quod res cognitae sunt in cognoscente. Est autem ex imperfectione intellectualis naturae in homine, quod non statim eius intellectus naturaliter habet omnia intelligibilia, sed quaedam, a quibus in alia quodammodo movetur. Sed actus appetitivae virtutis est, e converso, secundum ordinem appetentis ad res. Quarum quaedam sunt secundum se bona, et ideo secundum se appetibilia, quaedam vero habent rationem bonitatis ex ordine ad aliud, et sunt appetibilia propter aliud. Unde non est ex imperfectione appetentis, quod aliquid appetat naturaliter ut finem, et aliquid per electionem, ut ordinatur in finem. Quia igitur natura intellectualis in angelis perfecta est, invenitur in eis sola cognitio naturalis, non autem ratiocinativa, sed invenitur in eis dilectio et naturalis et electiva.

Haec autem dicta sunt, praetermissis his quae supra naturam sunt, horum enim natura non est principium sufficiens. De his autem infra dicetur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non omnis dilectio electiva est amor rationalis, secundum quod rationalis amor dividitur contra intellectualem. Dicitur enim sic amor rationalis, qui sequitur cognitionem ratiocinativam, non omnis autem electio consequitur discursum

Q. 60, A. 2

On the contrary, We neither merit nor demerit by our natural acts. But by their love the angels merit or demerit. Therefore there is love of choice in them. I answer that, There exists in the angels a natural love, and a love of choice. Their natural love is the principle of their love of choice; because, what belongs to that which precedes, has always the nature of a principle. Wherefore, since nature is first in everything, what belongs to nature must be a principle in everything. This is clearly evident in man, with respect to both his intellect and his will. For the intellect knows principles naturally; and from such knowledge in man comes the knowledge of conclusions, which are known by him not naturally, but by discovery, or by teaching. In like manner, the end acts in the will in the same way as the principle does in the intellect, as is laid down in Phys. ii, text. 89. Consequently the will tends naturally to its last end; for every man naturally wills happiness: and all other desires are caused by this natural desire; since whatever a man wills he wills on account of the end. Therefore the love of that good, which a man naturally wills as an end, is his natural love; but the love which comes of this, which is of something loved for the end’s sake, is the love of choice. There is however a difference on the part of the intellect and on the part of the will. Because, as was stated already (Q. 59, A. 2), the mind’s knowledge is brought about by the inward presence of the known within the knower. It comes of the imperfection of man’s intellectual nature that his mind does not simultaneously possess all things capable of being understood, but only a few things from which he is moved in a measure to grasp other things. The act of the appetitive faculty, on the contrary, follows the inclination of man towards things; some of which are good in themselves, and consequently are appetible in themselves; others being good only in relation to something else, and being appetible on account of something else. Consequently it does not argue imperfection in the person desiring, for him to seek one thing naturally as his end, and something else from choice as ordained to such end. Therefore, since the intellectual nature of the angels is perfect, only natural and not deductive knowledge is to be found in them, but there is to be found in them both natural love and love of choice. In saying all this, we are passing over all that regards things which are above nature, since nature is not the sufficient principle thereof: but we shall speak of them later on (Q. 62). Reply Obj. 1: Not all love of choice is rational love, according as rational is distinguished from intellectual love. For rational love is so called which follows deductive knowledge: but, as was said above (Q. 59, A. 3, ad 1), when treating of free-will, every choice does not follow a discur-

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rationis, ut supra dictum est, cum de libero arbitrio age- sive act of the reason; but only human choice. Consequently retur; sed solum electio hominis. Unde ratio non sequi- the conclusion does not follow. tur. Ad secundum patet responsio ex dictis. The reply to the second objection follows from what has been said.

Article 3 Whether the angel loves himself with both natural love, and love of choice? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus non diligat seipsum dilectione naturali et electiva. Dilectio enim naturalis est ipsius finis, sicut dictum est; dilectio autem electiva, eorum quae sunt ad finem. Sed idem non potest esse finis et ad finem, respectu eiusdem. Ergo non potest esse eiusdem dilectio naturalis et electiva. Praeterea, amor est virtus unitiva et concretiva, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed unitio et concretio est diversorum in unum reductorum. Ergo non potest angelus diligere seipsum. Praeterea, dilectio est quidam motus. Sed omnis motus in alterum tendit. Ergo videtur quod angelus non possit amare seipsum dilectione naturali, nec electiva.

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel does not love himself both with natural love and a love of choice. For, as was said (A. 2), natural love regards the end itself; while love of choice regards the means to the end. But the same thing, with regard to the same, cannot be both the end and a means to the end. Therefore natural love and the love of choice cannot have the same object. Obj. 2: Further, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv): Love is a uniting and a binding power. But uniting and binding imply various things brought together. Therefore the angel cannot love himself. Obj. 3: Further, love is a kind of movement. But every movement tends towards something else. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot love himself with either natural or elective love. Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, IX Ethic., On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8): quod amicabilia quae sunt ad alterum, veniunt ex amica- Love for others comes of love for oneself.

bilibus quae sunt ad seipsum. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum amor sit boni, bonum autem sit et in substantia et in accidente, ut patet I Ethic., dupliciter aliquid amatur, uno modo, ut bonum subsistens; alio modo, ut bonum accidentale sive inhaerens. Illud quidem amatur ut bonum subsistens, quod sic amatur ut ei aliquis velit bonum. Ut bonum vero accidentale seu inhaerens amatur id quod desideratur alteri, sicut amatur scientia, non ut ipsa sit bona, sed ut habeatur. Et hunc modum amoris quidam nominaverunt concupiscentiam, primum vero amicitiam. Manifestum est autem quod in rebus cognitione carentibus, unumquodque naturaliter appetit consequi id quod est sibi bonum; sicut ignis locum sursum. Unde et angelus et homo naturaliter appetunt suum bonum et suam perfectionem. Et hoc est amare seipsum. Unde naturaliter tam angelus quam homo diligit seipsum, inquantum aliquod bonum naturali appetitu sibi desiderat. Inquantum vero sibi desiderat aliquod bonum per electionem, intantum amat seipsum dilectione electiva. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod angelus aut homo non diligit se dilectione naturali et electiva secundum idem; sed secundum diversa, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut plus est esse unum quam uniri, ita amor magis est unus ad seipsum,

I answer that, Since the object of love is good, and good is to be found both in substance and in accident, as is clear from Ethic. i, 6, a thing may be loved in two ways; first of all as a subsisting good; and second as an accidental or inherent good. That is loved as a subsisting good, which is so loved that we wish well to it. But that which we wish unto another, is loved as an accidental or inherent good: thus knowledge is loved, not that any good may come to it but that it may be possessed. This kind of love has been called by the name concupiscence while the first is called friendship. Now it is manifest that in things devoid of knowledge, everything naturally seeks to procure what is good for itself; as fire seeks to mount upwards. Consequently both angel and man naturally seek their own good and perfection. This is to love self. Hence angel and man naturally love self, in so far as by natural appetite each desires what is good for self. On the other hand, each loves self with the love of choice, in so far as from choice he wishes for something which will benefit himself. Reply Obj. 1: It is not under the same but under quite different aspects that an angel or a man loves self with natural and with elective love, as was observed above. Reply Obj. 2: As to be one is better than to be united, so there is more oneness in love which is directed to self

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quam ad diversa quae ei uniuntur. Sed ideo Dionysius usus fuit nomine unitionis et concretionis, ut ostenderet derivationem amoris a se in alia, sicut ab uno derivatur unitio. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut amor est actio manens in agente, ita est motus manens in amante, non autem tendens in aliquid aliud ex necessitate; sed potest reflecti super amantem, ut amet seipsum, sicut et cognitio reflectitur in cognoscentem, ut cognoscat seipsum.

Q. 60, A. 4

than in love which unites one to others. Dionysius used the terms uniting and binding in order to show the derivation of love from self to things outside self; as uniting is derived from unity. Reply Obj. 3: As love is an action which remains within the agent, so also is it a movement which abides within the lover, but does not of necessity tend towards something else; yet it can be reflected back upon the lover so that he loves himself; just as knowledge is reflected back upon the knower, in such a way that he knows himself.

Article 4 Whether an angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus angelus non diligat naturali dilectione alium sicut seipsum. Dilectio enim sequitur cognitionem. Sed unus angelus non cognoscit alium sicut seipsum, quia seipsum cognoscit per suam essentiam, alium vero per eius similitudinem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod unus angelus non diligat alium sicut seipsum. Praeterea, causa est potior causato, et principium eo quod ex principio derivatur. Sed dilectio quae est ad alium, derivatur ab ea quae est ad seipsum; sicut dicit Philosophus, IX Ethic. Ergo angelus non diligit alium sicut seipsum, sed seipsum magis. Praeterea, dilectio naturalis est alicuius tanquam finis; et non potest removeri. Sed unus angelus non est finis alterius; et iterum haec dilectio potest removeri, ut patet in daemonibus, qui non diligunt bonos angelos. Ergo unus angelus non diligit alium naturali dilectione sicut seipsum. Sed contra est, quia illud quod invenitur in omnibus, etiam ratione carentibus, videtur esse naturale. Sed sicut dicitur Eccli. XIII, omne animal diligit sibi simile. Ergo angelus diligit naturaliter alium sicut seipsum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, angelus et homo naturaliter seipsum diligit. Illud autem quod est unum cum aliquo, est ipsummet, unde unumquodque diligit id quod est unum sibi. Et si quidem sit unum sibi unione naturali, diligit illud dilectione naturali, si vero sit unum secum unione non naturali, diligit ipsum dilectione non naturali. Sicut homo diligit civem suum dilectione politicae virtutis; consanguineum autem suum dilectione naturali, inquantum est unum cum eo in principio generationis naturalis. Manifestum est autem quod id quod est unum cum aliquo, genere vel specie, est unum per naturam. Et ideo dilectione naturali quaelibet res diligit id quod est secum unum secundum speciem, inquantum diligit speciem suam. Et hoc etiam apparet in his quae cognitio-

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself. For love follows knowledge. But an angel does not know another as he knows himself: because he knows himself by his essence, while he knows another by his similitude, as was said above (Q. 56, AA. 1, 2). Therefore it seems that one angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself. Obj. 2: Further, the cause is more powerful than the effect; and the principle than what is derived from it. But love for another comes of love for self, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore one angel does not love another as himself, but loves himself more. Obj. 3: Further, natural love is of something as an end, and is unremovable. But no angel is the end of another; and again, such love can be severed from him, as is the case with the demons, who have no love for the good angels. Therefore an angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself. On the contrary, That seems to be a natural property which is found in all, even in such as devoid of reason. But, every beast loves its like, as is said, Ecclus. 13:19. Therefore an angel naturally loves another as he loves himself. I answer that, As was observed (A. 3), both angel and man naturally love self. Now what is one with a thing, is that thing itself: consequently every thing loves what is one with itself. So, if this be one with it by natural union, it loves it with natural love; but if it be one with it by nonnatural union, then it loves it with non-natural love. Thus a man loves his fellow townsman with a social love, while he loves a blood relation with natural affection, in so far as he is one with him in the principle of natural generation. Now it is evident that what is generically or specifically one with another, is the one according to nature. And so everything loves another which is one with it in species, with a natural affection, in so far as it loves its own species. This is manifest even in things devoid of knowledge: for fire has

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ne carent, nam ignis naturalem inclinationem habet ut communicet alteri suam formam, quod est bonum eius; sicut naturaliter inclinatur ad hoc quod quaerat bonum suum, ut esse sursum. Sic ergo dicendum est quod unus angelus diligit alium naturali dilectione, inquantum convenit cum eo in natura. Sed inquantum convenit cum eo in aliquibus aliis vel etiam inquantum differt ab eo secundum quaedam alia, non diligit eum naturali dilectione. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc quod dico sicut seipsum, potest uno modo determinare cognitionem seu dilectionem ex parte cogniti et dilecti. Et sic cognoscit alium sicut seipsum, quia cognoscit alium esse, sicut cognoscit seipsum esse. Alio modo potest determinare cognitionem et dilectionem ex parte diligentis et cognoscentis. Et sic non cognoscit alium sicut seipsum, quia se cognoscit per suam essentiam, alium autem non per eius essentiam. Et similiter non diligit alium sicut seipsum, quia seipsum diligit per suam voluntatem, alium autem non diligit per eius voluntatem. Ad secundum dicendum quod ly sicut non designat aequalitatem, sed similitudinem. Cum enim dilectio naturalis super unitatem naturalem fundetur, illud quod est minus unum cum eo, naturaliter minus diligit. Unde naturaliter plus diligit quod est unum numero, quam quod est unum specie vel genere. Sed naturale est quod similem dilectionem habeat ad alium sicut ad seipsum, quantum ad hoc, quod sicut seipsum diligit inquantum vult sibi bonum, ita alium diligat inquantum vult eius bonum. Ad tertium dicendum quod dilectio naturalis dicitur esse ipsius finis, non tanquam cui aliquis velit bonum; sed tanquam bonum quod quis vult sibi, et per consequens alii, inquantum est unum sibi. Nec ista dilectio naturalis removeri potest etiam ab angelis malis, quin dilectionem naturalem habeant ad alios angelos, inquantum cum eis communicant in natura. Sed odiunt eos, inquantum diversificantur secundum iustitiam et iniustitiam.

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a natural inclination to communicate its form to another thing, wherein consists this other thing’s good; as it is naturally inclined to seek its own good, namely, to be borne upwards. So then, it must be said that one angel loves another with natural affection, in so far as he is one with him in nature. But so far as an angel has something else in common with another angel, or differs from him in other respects, he does not love him with natural love. Reply Obj. 1: The expression ‘as himself ’ can in one way qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the one known and loved: and thus one angel knows another as himself, because he knows the other to be even as he knows himself to be. In another way the expression can qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the knower and lover. And thus one angel does not know another as himself, because he knows himself by his essence, and the other not by the other’s essence. In like manner he does not love another as he loves himself, because he loves himself by his own will; but he does not love another by the other’s will. Reply Obj. 2: The expression as does not denote equality, but likeness. For since natural affection rests upon natural unity, the angel naturally loves less what is less one with him. Consequently he loves more what is numerically one with himself, than what is one only generically or specifically. But it is natural for him to have a like love for another as for himself, in this respect, that as he loves self in wishing well to self, so he loves another in wishing well to him.

Reply Obj. 3: Natural love is said to be of the end, not as of that end to which good is willed, but rather as of that good which one wills for oneself, and in consequence for another, as united to oneself. Nor can such natural love be stripped from the wicked angels, without their still retaining a natural affection towards the good angels, in so far as they share the same nature with them. But they hate them, in so far as they are unlike them according to righteousness and unrighteousness.

Article 5 Whether an angel by natural love loves God more than he loves himself? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus naturali dilectione non diligat Deum plus quam seipsum. Quia, ut dictum est, dilectio naturalis fundatur super unione naturali. Sed natura divina maxime distat a natura angeli. Ergo naturali dilectione angelus minus diligit Deum quam se, vel etiam alium angelum. Praeterea, propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis. Sed naturali dilectione quilibet diligit alium

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel does not love God by natural love more than he loves himself. For, as was stated (A. 4), natural love rests upon natural union. Now the Divine nature is far above the angelic nature. Therefore, according to natural love, the angel loves God less than self, or even than another angel. Obj. 2: Further, That on account of which a thing is such, is yet more so. But every one loves another with natural love

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propter se, unumquodque enim diligit aliquid inquantum est bonum sibi. Ergo dilectione naturali angelus non diligit Deum plus quam seipsum. Praeterea, natura reflectitur in seipsam, videmus enim quod omne agens naturaliter agit ad conservationem sui. Non autem reflecteretur in seipsam natura, si tenderet in aliud plus quam in seipsam. Non ergo naturali dilectione diligit angelus Deum plus quam se. Praeterea, hoc videtur esse proprium caritatis, ut aliquis Deum plus quam seipsum diligat. Sed dilectio caritatis non est naturalis in angelis, sed diffunditur in cordibus eorum per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est eis, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei. Ergo non diligunt Deum angeli dilectione naturali plus quam seipsos. Praeterea, dilectio naturalis semper manet, manente natura. Sed diligere Deum plus quam seipsum non manet in peccante angelo vel homine, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, fecerunt civitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad Dei contemptum, caelestem vero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui. Ergo diligere Deum supra seipsum non est naturale. Sed contra, omnia moralia legis praecepta sunt de lege naturae. Sed praeceptum de diligendo Deum supra seipsum, est praeceptum morale legis. Ergo est de lege naturae. Ergo dilectione naturali angelus diligit Deum supra seipsum. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod angelus naturali dilectione diligit Deum plus quam se, amore concupiscentiae, quia scilicet plus appetit sibi bonum divinum quam bonum suum. Et quodammodo amore amicitiae, inquantum scilicet Deo vult naturaliter angelus maius bonum quam sibi, vult enim naturaliter Deum esse Deum, se autem vult habere naturam propriam. Sed simpliciter loquendo, naturali dilectione plus diligit se quam Deum, quia intensius et principalius naturaliter diligit se quam Deum. Sed falsitas huius opinionis manifeste apparet, si quis in rebus naturalibus consideret ad quid res naturaliter moveatur, inclinatio enim naturalis in his quae sunt sine ratione, demonstrat inclinationem naturalem in voluntate intellectualis naturae. Unumquodque autem in rebus naturalibus, quod secundum naturam hoc ipsum quod est, alterius est, principalius et magis inclinatur in id cuius est, quam in seipsum. Et haec inclinatio naturalis demonstratur ex his quae naturaliter aguntur, quia unumquodque, sicut agitur naturaliter, sic aptum natum est agi, ut dicitur in II Physic. Videmus enim quod naturaliter pars se exponit, ad conservationem totius, sicut manus exponitur ictui, absque deliberatione, ad conservationem totius corporis. Et quia ratio imitatur naturam, huiusmodi inclinationem invenimus in virtutibus politicis, est enim virtuosi civis, ut se exponat mortis pericu-

Q. 60, A. 5

for his own sake: because one thing loves another as good for itself. Therefore the angel does not love God more than self with natural love. Obj. 3: Further, nature is self-centered in its operation; for we behold every agent acting naturally for its own preservation. But nature’s operation would not be selfcentered were it to tend towards anything else more than to nature itself. Therefore the angel does not love God more than himself from natural love. Obj. 4: Further, it is proper to charity to love God more than self. But to love from charity is not natural to the angels; for it is poured out upon their hearts by the Holy Spirit Who is given to them, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9). Therefore the angels do not love God more than themselves by natural love. Obj. 5: Further, natural love lasts while nature endures. But the love of God more than self does not remain in the angel or man who sins; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv), Two loves have made two cities; namely love of self unto the contempt of God has made the earthly city; while love of God unto the contempt of self has made the heavenly city. Therefore it is not natural to love God more than self. On the contrary, All the moral precepts of the law come of the law of nature. But the precept of loving God more than self is a moral precept of the law. Therefore, it is of the law of nature. Consequently from natural love the angel loves God more than himself. I answer that, There have been some who maintained that an angel loves God more than himself with natural love, both as to the love of concupiscence, through his seeking the Divine good for himself rather than his own good; and, in a fashion, as to the love of friendship, in so far as he naturally desires a greater good to God than to himself; because he naturally wishes God to be God, while as for himself, he wills to have his own nature. But absolutely speaking, out of the natural love he loves himself more than he does God, because he naturally loves himself before God, and with greater intensity. The falsity of such an opinion stands in evidence, if one but consider whither natural movement tends in the natural order of things; because the natural tendency of things devoid of reason shows the nature of the natural inclination residing in the will of an intellectual nature. Now, in natural things, everything which, as such, naturally belongs to another, is principally, and more strongly inclined to that other to which it belongs, than towards itself. Such a natural tendency is evidenced from things which are moved according to nature: because according as a thing is moved naturally, it has an inborn aptitude to be thus moved, as stated in Phys. ii, text. 78. For we observe that the part naturally exposes itself in order to safeguard the whole; as, for instance, the hand is without deliberation exposed to the blow for the whole body’s safety. And since reason copies nature, we find the same inclination among the so-

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lo pro totius reipublicae conservatione; et si homo esset cial virtues; for it behooves the virtuous citizen to expose naturalis pars huius civitatis, haec inclinatio esset ei na- himself to the danger of death for the public weal of the turalis. state; and if man were a natural part of the city, then such inclination would be natural to him. Quia igitur bonum universale est ipse Deus, et sub Consequently, since God is the universal good, and unhoc bono continetur etiam angelus et homo et omnis der this good both man and angel and all creatures are comcreatura, quia omnis creatura naturaliter, secundum id prised, because every creature in regard to its entire being quod est, Dei est; sequitur quod naturali dilectione etiam naturally belongs to God, it follows that from natural love angelus et homo plus et principalius diligat Deum quam angel and man alike love God before themselves and with seipsum. Alioquin, si naturaliter plus seipsum diligeret a greater love. Otherwise, if either of them loved self more quam Deum, sequeretur quod naturalis dilectio esset than God, it would follow that natural love would be perperversa; et quod non perficeretur per caritatem, sed de- verse, and that it would not be perfected but destroyed by strueretur. charity. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit Reply Obj. 1: Such reasoning holds good of things adin his quae ex aequo dividuntur, quorum unum non est equately divided whereof one is not the cause of the exisalteri ratio existendi et bonitatis, in talibus enim unum- tence and goodness of the other; for in such natures each quodque diligit naturaliter magis seipsum quam alte- loves itself naturally more than it does the other, inasmuch rum, inquantum est magis sibi ipsi unum quam alteri. as it is more one with itself than it is with the other. But Sed in illis quorum unum est tota ratio existendi et bo- where one is the whole cause of the existence and goodness nitatis alii, magis diligitur naturaliter tale alterum quam of the other, that one is naturally more loved than self; beipsum; sicut dictum est quod unaquaeque pars diligit cause, as we said above, each part naturally loves the whole naturaliter totum plus quam se. Et quodlibet singula- more than itself: and each individual naturally loves the re naturaliter diligit plus bonum suae speciei, quam bo- good of the species more than its own individual good. Now num suum singulare. Deus autem non solum est bonum God is not only the good of one species, but is absolutely the unius speciei, sed est ipsum universale bonum simpli- universal good; hence everything in its own way naturally citer. Unde unumquodque suo modo naturaliter diligit loves God more than itself. Deum plus quam seipsum. Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod Reply Obj. 2: When it is said that God is loved by an Deus diligitur ab angelo inquantum est ei bonus, si ly in- angel in so far as He is good to the angel, if the expression quantum dicat finem, sic falsum est, non enim diligit na- in so far denotes an end, then it is false; for he does not natturaliter Deum propter bonum suum, sed propter ipsum urally love God for his own good, but for God’s sake. If it Deum. Si vero dicat rationem amoris ex parte amantis, denotes the nature of love on the lover’s part, then it is true; sic verum est, non enim esset in natura alicuius quod for it would not be in the nature of anyone to love God, examaret Deum, nisi ex eo quod unumquodque dependet cept from this—that everything is dependent on that good a bono quod est Deus. which is God. Ad tertium dicendum quod natura reflectitur in Reply Obj. 3: Nature’s operation is self-centered not seipsam non solum quantum ad id quod est ei singulare, merely as to certain particular details, but much more as to sed multo magis quantum ad commune, inclinatur enim what is common; for everything is inclined to preserve not unumquodque ad conservandum non solum suum indi- merely its individuality, but likewise its species. And much viduum, sed etiam suam speciem. Et multo magis habet more has everything a natural inclination towards what is naturalem inclinationem unumquodque in id quod est the absolutely universal good. bonum universale simpliciter. Ad quartum dicendum quod Deus, secundum Reply Obj. 4: God, in so far as He is the universal good, quod est universale bonum, a quo dependet omne bo- from Whom every natural good depends, is loved by everynum naturale, diligitur naturali dilectione ab unoquo- thing with natural love. So far as He is the good which of its que. Inquantum vero est bonum beatificans naturaliter very nature beatifies all with supernatural beatitude, He is omnes supernaturali beatitudine, sic diligitur dilectione loved with the love of charity. caritatis. Ad quintum dicendum quod, cum in Deo sit unum Reply Obj. 5: Since God’s substance and universal et idem eius substantia et bonum commune, omnes qui goodness are one and the same, all who behold God’s vident ipsam Dei essentiam, eodem motu dilectionis essence are by the same movement of love moved towards moventur in ipsam Dei essentiam prout est ab aliis di- the Divine essence as it is distinct from other things, and acstincta, et secundum quod est quoddam bonum com- cording as it is the universal good. And because He is natumune. Et quia inquantum est bonum commune, natu- rally loved by all so far as He is the universal good, it is im-

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raliter amatur ab omnibus; quicumque videt eum per essentiam, impossibile est quin diligat ipsum. Sed illi qui non vident essentiam eius, cognoscunt eum per aliquos particulares effectus, qui interdum eorum voluntati contrariantur. Et sic hoc modo dicuntur odio habere Deum, cum tamen, inquantum est bonum commune omnium, unumquodque naturaliter diligat plus Deum quam seipsum.

Q. 60, A. 5

possible that whoever sees Him in His essence should not love Him. But such as do not behold His essence, know Him by some particular effects, which are sometimes opposed to their will. So in this way they are said to hate God; yet nevertheless, so far as He is the universal good of all, every thing naturally loves God more than itself.

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Question 61 The Production of the Angels in the Nature Post ea quae praemissa sunt de natura angelorum, et cognitione et voluntate eorum, restat considerandum de eorum creatione, sive universaliter de eorum exordio. Et haec consideratio est tripartita. Nam primo considerabimus quomodo producti sunt in esse naturae; secundo, quomodo perfecti sunt in gratia vel gloria; tertio, quomodo aliqui ex eis facti sunt mali. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum angelus habeat causam sui esse. Secundo, utrum angelus sit ab aeterno. Tertio, utrum angelus sit creatus ante corporalem creaturam. Quarto, utrum angeli fuerint creati in caelo Empyreo.

After dealing with the nature of the angels, their knowledge and will, it now remains for us to treat of their creation, or, speaking in a general way, of their origin. Such consideration is threefold. In the first place we must see how they were brought into natural existence; second, how they were made perfect in grace or glory; and third, how some of them became wicked. Under the first heading there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the angel has a cause of his existence? (2) Whether he has existed from eternity? (3) Whether he was created before corporeal creatures? (4) Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?

Article 1 Whether the angels have a cause of their existence? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli non habeant causam sui esse. De his enim quae sunt a Deo creata, agitur Genesis I. Sed nulla mentio fit ibi de angelis. Ergo angeli non sunt creati a Deo. Praeterea, Philosophus dicit, in VIII Metaphys., quod si aliqua substantia sit forma sine materia, statim per seipsam est ens et unum, et non habet causam quae faciat eam ens et unum. Sed angeli sunt formae immateriales, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo non habent causam sui esse. Praeterea, omne quod fit ab aliquo agente, per hoc quod fit, accipit formam ab eo. Sed angeli, cum sint formae, non accipiunt formam ab aliquo agente. Ergo angeli non habent causam agentem. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo CXLVIII, Laudate eum, omnes angeli eius. Et postea subdit, Quoniam ipse dixit, et facta sunt. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere et angelos, et omne id quod praeter Deum est, a Deo factum esse. Solus enim Deus est suum esse, in omnibus autem aliis differt essentia rei et esse eius, ut ex superioribus patet. Et ex hoc manifestum est quod solus Deus est ens per suam essentiam, omnia vero alia sunt entia per participationem. Omne autem quod est per participationem causatur ab eo quod est per essentiam, sicut om-

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels have no cause of their existence. For the first chapter of Genesis treats of things created by God. But there is no mention of angels. Therefore the angels were not created by God. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 16) that if any substance be a form without matter, straightway it has being and unity of itself, and has no cause of its being and unity. But the angels are immaterial forms, as was shown above (Q. 50, A. 2). Therefore they have no cause of their being. Obj. 3: Further, whatever is produced by any agent, from the very fact of its being produced, receives form from it. But since the angels are forms, they do not derive their form from any agent. Therefore the angels have no active cause. On the contrary, It is said (Ps 148:2): Praise ye Him, all His angels; and further on, verse 5: For He spoke and they were made. I answer that, It must be affirmed that angels and everything existing, except God, were made by God. God alone is His own existence; while in everything else the essence differs from the existence, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 4). From this it is clear that God alone exists of His own essence: while all other things have their existence by participation. Now whatever exists by participation is caused by what exists essentially; as everything ignited is

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ne ignitum causatur ab igne. Unde necesse est angelos a Deo creatos esse. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus dicit, in XI de Civ. Dei, quod angeli non sunt praetermissi in illa prima rerum creatione, sed significantur nomine caeli, aut etiam lucis. Ideo autem vel praetermissi sunt, vel nominibus rerum corporalium significati, quia Moyses rudi populo loquebatur, qui nondum capere poterat incorpoream naturam; et si eis fuisset expressum aliquas res esse super omnem naturam corpoream, fuisset eis occasio idololatriae, ad quam proni erant, et a qua Moyses eos praecipue revocare intendebat.

caused by fire. Consequently the angels, of necessity, were made by God. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 50) that the angels were not passed over in that account of the first creation of things, but are designated by the name heavens or of light. And they were either passed over, or else designated by the names of corporeal things, because Moses was addressing an uncultured people, as yet incapable of understanding an incorporeal nature; and if it had been divulged that there were creatures existing beyond corporeal nature, it would have proved to them an occasion of idolatry, to which they were inclined, and from which Moses especially meant to safeguard them. Ad secundum dicendum quod substantiae quae Reply Obj. 2: Substances that are subsisting forms sunt formae subsistentes, non habent causam aliquam have no ‘formal’ cause of their existence and unity, nor such formalem sui esse et suae unitatis, nec causam agentem active cause as produces its effect by changing the matper transmutationem materiae de potentia in actum, sed ter from a state of potentiality to actuality; but they have a habent causam producentem totam substantiam. cause productive of their entire substance. Et per hoc patet solutio ad tertium. From this the solution of the third difficulty is manifest.

Article 2 Whether the angel was produced by God from eternity? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus sit productus a Deo ab aeterno. Deus enim est causa angeli per suum esse, non enim agit per aliquid additum suae essentiae. Sed esse eius est aeternum. Ergo ab aeterno angelos produxit. Praeterea, omne quod quandoque est et quandoque non est, subiacet tempori. Sed angelus est supra tempus, ut dicitur in libro de Causis. Ergo angelus non quandoque est, et quandoque non est, sed semper.

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel was produced by God from eternity. For God is the cause of the angel by His being: for He does not act through something besides His essence. But His being is eternal. Therefore He produced the angels from eternity. Obj. 2: Further, everything which exists at one period and not at another, is subject to time. But the angel is above time, as is laid down in the book De Causis. Therefore the angel is not at one time existing and at another nonexisting, but exists always. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine (De Trin. xiii) proves the soul’s incorruptibility by the fact that the mind is capable of truth. But as truth is incorruptible, so is it eternal. Therefore the intellectual nature of the soul and of the angel is not only incorruptible, but likewise eternal. On the contrary, It is said (Prov 8:22), in the person of begotten Wisdom: The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from the beginning. But, as was shown above (A. 1), the angels were made by God. Therefore at one time the angels were not. I answer that, God alone, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, is from eternity. Catholic Faith holds this without doubt; and everything to the contrary must be rejected as heretical. For God so produced creatures that He made them from nothing; that is, after they had not been.

Praeterea, Augustinus probat incorruptibilitatem animae per hoc, quod per intellectum est capax veritatis. Sed sicut veritas est incorruptibilis, ita est aeterna. Ergo natura intellectualis et animae et angeli, non solum est incorruptibilis, sed etiam aeterna. Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. VIII, ex persona sapientiae genitae, Dominus possedit me ab initio viarum suarum, antequam quidquam faceret a principio. Sed angeli sunt facti a Deo, ut ostensum est. Ergo angeli aliquando non fuerunt. Respondeo dicendum quod solus Deus, pater et filius et Spiritus Sanctus, est ab aeterno. Hoc enim fides Catholica indubitanter tenet; et omne contrarium est sicut haereticum refutandum. Sic enim Deus creaturas produxit, quod eas ex nihilo fecit, idest postquam nihil fuerat. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod esse Dei est ipsum Reply Obj. 1: God’s being is His will. So the fact that eius velle. Per hoc ergo quod Deus produxit angelos et God produced the angels and other creatures by His being

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alias creaturas per suum esse, non excluditur quin eas produxerit per suam voluntatem. Voluntas autem Dei non de necessitate se habet ad productionem creaturarum, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo produxit et quae voluit, et quando voluit. Ad secundum dicendum quod angelus est supra tempus quod est numerus motus caeli, quia est supra omnem motum corporalis naturae. Non tamen est supra tempus quod est numerus successionis esse eius post non esse, et etiam quod est numerus successionis quae est in operationibus eius. Unde Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., quod Deus movet creaturam spiritualem per tempus. Ad tertium dicendum quod angeli et animae intellectivae, ex hoc ipso quod habent naturam per quam sunt capaces veritatis, sunt incorruptibiles. Sed hanc naturam non habuerunt ab aeterno; sed data fuit eis a Deo quando ipse voluit. Unde non sequitur quod angeli sint ab aeterno.

Q. 61, A. 3

does not exclude that He made them also by His will. But, as was shown above (Q. 19, A. 3; Q. 46, A. 1), God’s will does not act by necessity in producing creatures. Therefore He produced such as He willed, and when He willed. Reply Obj. 2: An angel is above that time which is the measure of the movement of the heavens; because he is above every movement of a corporeal nature. Nevertheless he is not above time which is the measure of the succession of his existence after his non-existence, and which is also the measure of the succession which is in his operations. Hence Augustine says (Gen ad lit. viii, 20,21) that God moves the spiritual creature according to time. Reply Obj. 3: Angels and intelligent souls are incorruptible by the very fact of their having a nature whereby they are capable of truth. But they did not possess this nature from eternity; it was bestowed upon them when God Himself willed it. Consequently it does not follow that the angels existed from eternity.

Article 3 Whether the angels were created before the corporeal world? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli fuerint creati ante mundum corporeum. Dicit enim Hieronymus, super Epistolam ad Titum, Sex millia nondum nostri temporis complentur annorum; et quanta tempora, quantasque saeculorum origines fuisse arbitrandum est, in quibus angeli, throni, dominationes, ceterique ordines Deo servierunt? Damascenus etiam dicit, in II libro, quidam dicunt quod ante omnem creationem geniti sunt angeli; ut theologus dicit Gregorius, primum quidem excogitavit angelicas virtutes et caelestes, et excogitatio opus eius fuit. Praeterea, angelica natura est media inter naturam divinam et naturam corpoream. Sed natura divina est ab aeterno, natura autem corporea ex tempore. Ergo natura angelica facta est ante creationem temporis, et post aeternitatem. Praeterea, plus distat natura angelica a natura corporali, quam una natura corporalis ab alia. Sed una natura corporalis fuit facta ante aliam, unde et sex dies productionis rerum in principio Genesis describuntur. Ergo multo magis natura angelica facta est ante omnem naturam corporalem. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. Non autem hoc esset verum, si aliquid creasset antea. Ergo angeli non sunt ante naturam corpoream creati. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc invenitur duplex sanctorum doctorum sententia, illa tamen probabilior videtur, quod angeli simul cum creatura corpo-

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were created before the corporeal world. For Jerome says (In Ep. ad Tit. i, 2): Six thousand years of our time have not yet elapsed; yet how shall we measure the time, how shall we count the ages, in which the Angels, Thrones, Dominations, and the other orders served God? Damascene also says (De Fide Orth. ii): Some say that the angels were begotten before all creation; as Gregory the Theologian declares, He first of all devised the angelic and heavenly powers, and the devising was the making thereof. Obj. 2: Further, the angelic nature stands midway between the Divine and the corporeal natures. But the Divine nature is from eternity; while corporeal nature is from time. Therefore the angelic nature was produced ere time was made, and after eternity. Obj. 3: Further, the angelic nature is more remote from the corporeal nature than one corporeal nature is from another. But one corporeal nature was made before another; hence the six days of the production of things are set forth in the opening of Genesis. Much more, therefore, was the angelic nature made before every corporeal nature. On the contrary, It is said (Gen 1:1): In the beginning God created heaven and earth. Now, this would not be true if anything had been created previously. Consequently the angels were not created before corporeal nature. I answer that, There is a twofold opinion on this point to be found in the writings of the Fathers. The more probable one holds that the angels were created at the same

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rea sunt creati. Angeli enim sunt quaedam pars universi, non enim constituunt per se unum universum, sed tam ipsi quam creatura corporea in constitutionem unius universi conveniunt. Quod apparet ex ordine unius creaturae ad aliam, ordo enim rerum ad invicem est bonum universi. Nulla autem pars perfecta est a suo toto separata. Non est igitur probabile ut Deus, cuius perfecta sunt opera, ut dicitur Deut. XXXII, creaturam angelicam seorsum ante alias creaturas creaverit. Quamvis contrarium non sit reputandum erroneum; praecipue propter sententiam Gregorii Nazianzeni, cuius tanta est in doctrina Christiana auctoritas, ut nullus unquam eius dictis calumniam inferre praesumpserit, sicut nec Athanasii documentis, ut Hieronymus dicit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Hieronymus loquitur secundum sententiam doctorum Graecorum, qui omnes hoc concorditer sentiunt, quod angeli sunt ante mundum corporeum creati. Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus non est aliqua pars universi, sed est supra totum universum, praehabens in se eminentiori modo totam universi perfectionem. Angelus autem est pars universi. Unde non est eadem ratio. Ad tertium dicendum quod creaturae corporeae omnes sunt unum in materia, sed angeli non conveniunt in materia cum creatura corporea. Unde, creata materia corporalis creaturae, omnia quodammodo sunt creata, non autem, creatis angelis, esset ipsum universum creatum. Si vero contrarium teneatur, quod dicitur Gen. I, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram exponendum est, in principio, idest in filio, vel in principio temporis, non autem in principio, idest ante quod nihil, nisi dicatur, ante quod nihil in genere corporalium creaturarum.

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time as corporeal creatures. For the angels are part of the universe: they do not constitute a universe of themselves; but both they and corporeal natures unite in constituting one universe. This stands in evidence from the relationship of creature to creature; because the mutual relationship of creatures makes up the good of the universe. But no part is perfect if separate from the whole. Consequently it is improbable that God, Whose works are perfect, as it is said Deut. 32:4, should have created the angelic creature before other creatures. At the same time the contrary is not to be deemed erroneous; especially on account of the opinion of Gregory Nazianzen, whose authority in Christian doctrine is of such weight that no one has ever raised objection to his teaching, as is also the case with the doctrine of Athanasius, as Jerome says. Reply Obj. 1: Jerome is speaking according to the teaching of the Greek Fathers; all of whom hold the creation of the angels to have taken place previously to that of the corporeal world. Reply Obj. 2: God is not a part of, but far above, the whole universe, possessing within Himself the entire perfection of the universe in a more eminent way. But an angel is a part of the universe. Hence the comparison does not hold. Reply Obj. 3: All corporeal creatures are one in matter; while the angels do not agree with them in matter. Consequently the creation of the matter of the corporeal creature involves in a manner the creation of all things; but the creation of the angels does not involve creation of the universe. If the contrary view be held, then in the text of Gen. 1, In the beginning God created heaven and earth, the words, In the beginning, must be interpreted, In the Son, or In the beginning of time: but not, In the beginning, before which there was nothing, unless we say Before which there was nothing of the nature of corporeal creatures.

Article 4 Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli non sint creati in caelo Empyreo. Angeli enim sunt substantiae incorporeae. Sed substantia incorporea non dependet a corpore secundum suum esse, et per consequens neque secundum suum fieri. Ergo angeli non sunt creati in loco corporeo. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, III super Gen. ad Litt., quod angeli fuerunt creati in superiori parte aeris. Non ergo in caelo Empyreo.

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were not created in the empyrean heaven. For the angels are incorporeal substances. Now a substance which is incorporeal is not dependent upon a body for its existence; and as a consequence, neither is it for its creation. Therefore the angels were not created in any corporeal place. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine remarks (Gen ad lit. iii, 10), that the angels were created in the upper atmosphere: therefore not in the empyrean heaven.

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Praeterea, caelum Empyreum dicitur esse caelum supremum. Si igitur angeli creati fuissent in caelo Empyreo, non convenisset eis in superius caelum ascendere. Quod est contra id quod ex persona angeli peccantis dicitur Isaiae XIV, ascendam in caelum. Sed contra est quod Strabus dicit, super illud, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, caelum non visibile firmamentum hic appellat, sed Empyreum, idest igneum vel intellectuale, quod non ab ardore, sed a splendore dicitur, quod statim factum, angelis est repletum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ex creaturis corporalibus et spiritualibus unum universum constituitur. Unde sic creatae sunt spirituales creaturae, quod ad creaturam corporalem aliquem ordinem habent, et toti creaturae corporali praesident. Unde conveniens fuit quod angeli in supremo corpore crearentur, tanquam toti naturae corporeae praesidentes; sive id dicatur caelum Empyreum, sive qualitercumque nominetur. Unde Isidorus dicit quod supremum caelum est caelum angelorum, super illud Deut. X, domini Dei tui est caelum, et caelum caeli. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod angeli non sunt creati in loco corporeo, quasi dependentes a corpore secundum suum esse vel secundum suum fieri, potuisset enim Deus angelos ante totam creaturam corporalem creasse, ut multi sancti doctores tenent. Sed facti sunt in loco corporeo, ad ostendendum ordinem eorum ad naturam corpoream, et quod sua virtute corpora contingunt. Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus forte per supremam partem aeris intelligit supremam partem caeli, cum quo aer quandam convenientiam habet propter suam subtilitatem et diaphaneitatem. Vel loquitur non de omnibus angelis, sed de illis qui peccaverunt, qui secundum quosdam fuerunt de inferioribus ordinibus. Nihil autem prohibet dicere quod superiores angeli, habentes virtutem elevatam et universalem supra omnia corpora, sint in supremo creaturae corporeae creati; alii vero, habentes virtutes magis particulares, sint creati in inferioribus corporibus. Ad tertium dicendum quod loquitur ibi non de caelo aliquo corporeo, sed de caelo sanctae Trinitatis, in quod angelus peccans ascendere voluit, dum voluit aliquo modo Deo aequiparari, ut infra patebit.

Q. 61, A. 4

Obj. 3: Further, the empyrean heaven is said to be the highest heaven. If therefore the angels were created in the empyrean heaven, it would not beseem them to mount up to a still higher heaven. And this is contrary to what is said in Isaias, speaking in the person of the sinning angel: I will ascend into heaven (Isa 14:13). On the contrary, Strabus, commenting on the text In the beginning God created heaven and earth, says: By heaven he does not mean the visible firmament, but the empyrean, that is, the fiery or intellectual firmament, which is not so styled from its heat, but from its splendor; and which was filled with angels directly it was made. I answer that, As was observed (A. 3), the universe is made up of corporeal and spiritual creatures. Consequently spiritual creatures were so created as to bear some relationship to the corporeal creature, and to rule over every corporeal creature. Hence it was fitting for the angels to be created in the highest corporeal place, as presiding over all corporeal nature; whether it be styled the empyrean heaven, or whatever else it be called. So Isidore says that the highest heaven is the heaven of the angels, explaining the passage of Deut. 10:14: Behold heaven is the Lord’s thy God, and the heaven of heaven. Reply Obj. 1: The angels were created in a corporeal place, not as if depending upon a body either as to their existence or as to their being made; because God could have created them before all corporeal creation, as many holy Doctors hold. They were made in a corporeal place in order to show their relationship to corporeal nature, and that they are by their power in touch with bodies. Reply Obj. 2: By the uppermost atmosphere Augustine possibly means the highest part of heaven, to which the atmosphere has a kind of affinity owing to its subtlety and transparency. Or else he is not speaking of all the angels; but only of such as sinned, who, in the opinion of some, belonged to the inferior orders. But there is nothing to hinder us from saying that the higher angels, as having an exalted and universal power over all corporeal things, were created in the highest place of the corporeal creature; while the other angels, as having more restricted powers, were created among the inferior bodies. Reply Obj. 3: Isaias is not speaking there of any corporeal heaven, but of the heaven of the Blessed Trinity; unto which the sinning angel wished to ascend, when he desired to be equal in some manner to God, as will appear later on (Q. 63, A. 3).

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Question 62 The Perfection of the Angels in Grace and Glory Consequenter investigandum est quomodo angeli In due sequence we have to inquire how the angels were facti sunt in esse gratiae vel gloriae. Et circa hoc quae- made in the order of grace and of glory; under which headruntur novem. ing there are nine points of inquiry: Primo, utrum angeli fuerint in sua creatione beati. (1) Were the angels created in beatitude? Secundo, utrum indiguerint gratia ad hoc quod ad (2) Did they need grace in order to turn to God? Deum converterentur. Tertio, utrum fuerint creati in gratia. (3) Were they created in grace? Quarto, utrum suam beatitudinem meruerint. (4) Did they merit their beatitude? Quinto, utrum statim post meritum beatitudinem (5) Did they at once enter into beatitude after merit? adepti fuerint. Sexto, utrum gratiam et gloriam secundum (6) Did they receive grace and glory according to their capacitatem suorum naturalium receperint. natural capacities? Septimo, utrum post consecutionem gloriae (7) After entering glory, did their natural love and remanserit in eis dilectio et cognitio naturalis. knowledge remain? Octavo, utrum postmodum potuerint peccare. (8) Could they have sinned afterwards? Nono, utrum post adeptionem gloriae potuerint (9) After entering into glory, could they advance proficere. farther?

Article 1 Whether the angels were created in beatitude? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli fuerint creati beati. Dicitur enim in libro de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus, quod angeli qui in illa in qua creati sunt beatitudine perseverant, non natura possident bonum quod habent. Sunt ergo angeli creati in beatitudine. Praeterea, natura angelica est nobilior quam creatura corporalis. Sed creatura corporalis statim in principio suae creationis fuit creata formata et perfecta; nec informitas praecessit in ea formationem tempore, sed natura tantum, ut Augustinus dicit, I super Gen. ad Litt. Ergo nec naturam angelicam creavit Deus informem et imperfectam. Sed eius formatio et perfectio est per beatitudinem, secundum quod fruitur Deo. Ergo fuit creata beata. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, super Gen. ad Litt., ea quae leguntur facta in operibus sex dierum, simul facta fuerunt, et sic oportet quod statim a principio creationis rerum fuerint omnes illi sex dies. Sed in illis sex diebus, secundum eius expositionem, mane fuit cognitio angelica secundum quam cognoverunt Verbum et res in Verbo. Ergo statim a principio creationis cognoverunt Verbum et res in Verbo. Sed angeli beati sunt per

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were created in beatitude. For it is stated (De Eccl. Dogm. xxix) that the angels who continue in the beatitude wherein they were created, do not of their nature possess the excellence they have. Therefore the angels were created in beatitude. Obj. 2: Further, the angelic nature is nobler than the corporeal creature. But the corporeal creature straightway from its creation was made perfect and complete; nor did its lack of form take precedence in time, but only in nature, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. i, 15). Therefore neither did God create the angelic nature imperfect and incomplete. But its formation and perfection are derived from its beatitude, whereby it enjoys God. Therefore it was created in beatitude. Obj. 3: Further, according to Augustine (Gen ad lit. iv, 34; v, 5), the things which we read of as being made in the works of the six days, were made together at one time; and so all the six days must have existed instantly from the beginning of creation. But, according to his exposition, in those six days, the morning was the angelic knowledge, according to which they knew the Word and things in the Word. Therefore straightway from their creation they knew

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hoc quod Verbum vident. Ergo statim a principio suae the Word, and things in the Word. But the bliss of the angels creationis angeli fuerunt beati. comes of seeing the Word. Consequently the angels were in beatitude straightway from the very beginning of their creation. Sed contra, de ratione beatitudinis est stabilitas siOn the contrary, To be established or confirmed in ve confirmatio in bono. Sed angeli non statim ut crea- good is of the nature of beatitude. But the angels were not ti sunt, fuerunt confirmati in bono, quod casus quorun- confirmed in good as soon as they were created; the fall of dam ostendit. Non ergo angeli in sua creatione fuerunt some of them shows this. Therefore the angels were not in beati. beatitude from their creation. Respondeo dicendum quod nomine beatitudinis I answer that, By the name of beatitude is underintelligitur ultima perfectio rationalis seu intellectualis stood the ultimate perfection of rational or of intellectual naturae, et inde est quod naturaliter desideratur, quia nature; and hence it is that it is naturally desired, since unumquodque naturaliter desiderat suam ultimam per- everything naturally desires its ultimate perfection. Now fectionem. Ultima autem perfectio rationalis seu intel- there is a twofold ultimate perfection of rational or of inlectualis naturae est duplex. Una quidem, quam potest tellectual nature. The first is one which it can procure of its assequi virtute suae naturae, et haec quodammodo bea- own natural power; and this is in a measure called beatititudo vel felicitas dicitur. Unde et Aristoteles perfectis- tude or happiness. Hence Aristotle (Ethic. x) says that man’s simam hominis contemplationem, qua optimum intel- ultimate happiness consists in his most perfect contemplaligibile, quod est Deus, contemplari potest in hac vita, tion, whereby in this life he can behold the best intelligible dicit esse ultimam hominis felicitatem. Sed super hanc object; and that is God. Above this happiness there is still felicitatem est alia felicitas, quam in futuro expectamus, another, which we look forward to in the future, whereby qua videbimus Deum sicuti est. Quod quidem est supra we shall see God as He is. This is beyond the nature of every cuiuslibet intellectus creati naturam, ut supra ostensum created intellect, as was shown above (Q. 12, A. 4). est. Sic igitur dicendum est quod, quantum ad primam So, then, it remains to be said, that, as regards this first beatitudinem, quam angelus assequi virtute suae natu- beatitude, which the angel could procure by his natural rae potuit, fuit creatus beatus. Quia perfectionem hu- power, he was created already blessed. Because the angel iusmodi angelus non acquirit per aliquem motum di- does not acquire such beatitude by any progressive action, scursivum, sicut homo, sed statim ei adest propter suae as man does, but, as was observed above (Q. 58, AA. 3, 4), is naturae dignitatem, ut supra dictum est. Sed ultimam straightway in possession thereof, owing to his natural digbeatitudinem, quae facultatem naturae excedit, angeli nity. But the angels did not have from the beginning of their non statim in principio suae creationis habuerunt, quia creation that ultimate beatitude which is beyond the power haec beatitudo non est aliquid naturae, sed naturae finis; of nature; because such beatitude is no part of their nature, et ideo non statim eam a principio debuerunt habere. but its end; and consequently they ought not to have it immediately from the beginning. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod beatitudo ibi acReply Obj. 1: Beatitude is there taken for that natural cipitur pro illa perfectione naturali quam angelus habuit perfection which the angel had in the state of innocence. in statu innocentiae. Ad secundum dicendum quod creatura corporaReply Obj. 2: The corporeal creature instantly in the lis statim in principio suae creationis habere non potuit beginning of its creation could not have the perfection to perfectionem ad quam per suam operationem perdu- which it is brought by its operation; consequently, accordcitur, unde, secundum Augustinum, germinatio planta- ing to Augustine (Gen ad. lit. v, 4, 23; viii, 3), the growing rum ex terra non statim fuit in primis operibus, in qui- of plants from the earth did not take place at once among bus virtus sola germinativa plantarum data est terrae. the first works, in which only the germinating power of the Et similiter creatura angelica in principio suae creationis plants was bestowed upon the earth. In the same way, the habuit perfectionem suae naturae; non autem perfectio- angelic creature in the beginning of its existence had the nem ad quam per suam operationem pervenire debebat. perfection of its nature; but it did not have the perfection to which it had to come by its operation. Ad tertium dicendum quod angelus duplicem haReply Obj. 3: The angel has a twofold knowledge of bet Verbi cognitionem, unam naturalem, et aliam glo- the Word; the one which is natural, and the other accordriae, naturalem quidem, qua cognoscit Verbum per eius ing to glory. He has a natural knowledge whereby he knows similitudinem in sua natura relucentem; cognitionem the Word through a similitude thereof shining in his navero gloriae, qua cognoscit Verbum per suam essentiam. ture; and he has a knowledge of glory whereby he knows Et utraque cognoscit angelus res in Verbo, sed natura- the Word through His essence. By both kinds of knowl-

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li quidem cognitione imperfecte, cognitione vero gloriae perfecte. Prima ergo cognitio rerum in Verbo affuit angelo a principio suae creationis, secunda vero non, sed quando facti sunt beati per conversionem ad bonum. Et haec proprie dicitur cognitio matutina.

Q. 62, A. 2

edge the angel knows things in the Word; imperfectly by his natural knowledge, and perfectly by his knowledge of glory. Therefore the first knowledge of things in the Word was present to the angel from the outset of his creation; while the second was not, but only when the angels became blessed by turning to the good. And this is properly termed their morning knowledge.

Article 2 Whether an angel needs grace in order to turn to God? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus non indiguerit gratia ad hoc quod converteretur in Deum. Ad ea enim quae naturaliter possumus, gratia non indigemus. Sed naturaliter angelus convertitur in Deum, quia naturaliter Deum diligit, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo angelus non indiguit gratia ad hoc quod converteretur in Deum. Praeterea, ad ea tantum videmur indigere auxilio, quae sunt difficilia. Sed converti ad Deum non erat difficile angelo; cum nihil esset in eo quod huic conversioni repugnaret. Ergo angelus non indiguit auxilio gratiae ad hoc quod converteretur in Deum. Praeterea, converti ad Deum est se ad gratiam praeparare, unde Zach. I, dicitur, convertimini ad me, et ego convertar ad vos. Sed nos non indigemus gratia ad hoc quod nos ad gratiam praeparemus, quia sic esset abire in infinitum. Ergo non indiguit gratia angelus ad hoc quod converteretur in Deum. Sed contra, per conversionem ad Deum angelus pervenit ad beatitudinem. Si igitur non indiguisset gratia ad hoc quod converteretur in Deum, sequeretur quod non indigeret gratia ad habendam vitam aeternam. Quod est contra illud Apostoli, Rom. VI, gratia Dei vita aeterna. Respondeo dicendum quod angeli indiguerunt gratia ad hoc quod converterentur in Deum, prout est obiectum beatitudinis. Sicut enim superius dictum est, naturalis motus voluntatis est principium omnium eorum quae volumus. Naturalis autem inclinatio voluntatis est ad id quod est conveniens secundum naturam. Et ideo, si aliquid sit supra naturam, voluntas in id ferri non potest, nisi ab aliquo alio supernaturali principio adiuta. Sicut patet quod ignis habet naturalem inclinationem ad calefaciendum, et ad generandum ignem, sed generare carnem est supra naturalem virtutem ignis, unde ignis ad hoc nullam inclinationem habet, nisi secundum quod movetur ut instrumentum ab anima nutritiva. Ostensum est autem supra, cum de Dei cognitione ageretur, quod videre Deum per essentiam, in quo ultima beatitudo rationalis creaturae consistit, est supra

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel had no need of grace in order to turn to God. For, we have no need of grace for what we can accomplish naturally. But the angel naturally turns to God: because he loves God naturally, as is clear from what has been said (Q. 60, A. 5). Therefore an angel did not need grace in order to turn to God. Obj. 2: Further, seemingly we need help only for difficult tasks. Now it was not a difficult task for the angel to turn to God; because there was no obstacle in him to such turning. Therefore the angel had no need of grace in order to turn to God. Obj. 3: Further, to turn oneself to God is to dispose oneself for grace; hence it is said (Zech 1:3): Turn ye to Me, and I will turn to you. But we do not stand in need of grace in order to prepare ourselves for grace: for thus we should go on to infinity. Therefore the angel did not need grace to turn to God. On the contrary, It was by turning to God that the angel reached to beatitude. If, then, he had needed no grace in order to turn to God, it would follow that he did not require grace in order to possess everlasting life. But this is contrary to the saying of the Apostle (Rom 6:23): The grace of God is life everlasting. I answer that, The angels stood in need of grace in order to turn to God, as the object of beatitude. For, as was observed above (Q. 60, A. 2), the natural movement of the will is the principle of all things that we will. But the will’s natural inclination is directed towards what is in keeping with its nature. Therefore, if there is anything which is above nature, the will cannot be inclined towards it, unless helped by some other supernatural principle. Thus it is clear that fire has a natural tendency to give forth heat, and to generate fire; whereas to generate flesh is beyond the natural power of fire; consequently, fire has no tendency thereto, except in so far as it is moved instrumentally by the nutritive soul. Now it was shown above (Q. 12, AA. 4, 5), when we were treating of God’s knowledge, that to see God in His essence, wherein the ultimate beatitude of the rational creature con-

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naturam cuiuslibet intellectus creati. Unde nulla creatura rationalis potest habere motum voluntatis ordinatum ad illam beatitudinem, nisi mota a supernaturali agente. Et hoc dicimus auxilium gratiae. Et ideo dicendum est quod angelus in illam beatitudinem voluntate converti non potuit, nisi per auxilium gratiae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod angelus naturaliter diligit Deum, inquantum est principium naturalis esse. Hic autem loquimur de conversione ad Deum, inquantum est beatificans per suae essentiae visionem. Ad secundum dicendum quod difficile est quod transcendit potentiam. Sed hoc contingit esse dupliciter. Uno modo, quia transcendit potentiam secundum suum naturalem ordinem. Et tunc, si ad hoc possit pervenire aliquo auxilio, dicitur difficile; si autem nullo modo, dicitur impossibile, sicut impossibile est hominem volare. Alio modo transcendit aliquid potentiam, non secundum ordinem naturalem potentiae, sed propter aliquod impedimentum potentiae adiunctum. Sicut ascendere non est contra naturalem ordinem potentiae animae motivae, quia anima, quantum est de se, nata est movere in quamlibet partem, sed impeditur ab hoc propter corporis gravitatem; unde difficile est homini ascendere. Converti autem ad beatitudinem ultimam, homini quidem est difficile et quia est supra naturam, et quia habet impedimentum ex corruptione corporis et infectione peccati. Sed angelo est difficile propter hoc solum quod est supernaturale. Ad tertium dicendum quod quilibet motus voluntatis in Deum, potest dici conversio in ipsum. Et ideo triplex est conversio in Deum. Una quidem per dilectionem perfectam, quae est creaturae iam Deo fruentis. Et ad hanc conversionem requiritur gratia consummata. Alia conversio est, quae est meritum beatitudinis. Et ad hanc requiritur habitualis gratia, quae est merendi principium. Tertia conversio est, per quam aliquis praeparat se ad gratiam habendam. Et ad hanc non exigitur aliqua habitualis gratia, sed operatio Dei ad se animam convertentis, secundum illud Thren. ult., converte nos, domine, ad te, et convertemur. Unde patet quod non est procedere in infinitum.

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sists, is beyond the nature of every created intellect. Consequently no rational creature can have the movement of the will directed towards such beatitude, except it be moved thereto by a supernatural agent. This is what we call the help of grace. Therefore it must be said that an angel could not of his own will be turned to such beatitude, except by the help of grace. Reply Obj. 1: The angel loves God naturally, so far as God is the author of his natural being. But here we are speaking of turning to God, so far as God bestows beatitude by the vision of His essence. Reply Obj. 2: A thing is difficult which is beyond a power; and this happens in two ways. First of all, because it is beyond the natural capacity of the power. Thus, if it can be attained by some help, it is said to be difficult; but if it can in no way be attained, then it is impossible; thus it is impossible for a man to fly. In another way a thing may be beyond the power, not according to the natural order of such power, but owing to some intervening hindrance; as to mount upwards is not contrary to the natural order of the motive power of the soul; because the soul, considered in itself, can be moved in any direction; but is hindered from so doing by the weight of the body; consequently it is difficult for a man to mount upwards. To be turned to his ultimate beatitude is difficult for man, both because it is beyond his nature, and because he has a hindrance from the corruption of the body and infection of sin. But it is difficult for an angel, only because it is supernatural. Reply Obj. 3: Every movement of the will towards God can be termed a conversion to God. And so there is a threefold turning to God. The first is by the perfect love of God; this belongs to the creature enjoying the possession of God; and for such conversion, consummate grace is required. The next turning to God is that which merits beatitude; and for this there is required habitual grace, which is the principle of merit. The third conversion is that whereby a man disposes himself so that he may have grace; for this no habitual grace is required; but the operation of God, Who draws the soul towards Himself, according to Lament. 5:21: Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted. Hence it is clear that there is no need to go on to infinity.

Article 3 Whether the angels were created in grace? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were not non sint creati in gratia. Dicit enim Augustinus, II super created in grace. For Augustine says (Gen ad lit. ii, 8) that Gen. ad Litt., quod angelica natura primo erat informi- the angelic nature was first made without form, and was ter creata, et caelum dicta, postmodum vero formata est, called heaven: but afterwards it received its form, and was

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et lux appellata. Sed haec formatio est per gratiam. Ergo non sunt creati in gratia. Praeterea, gratia inclinat creaturam rationalem in Deum. Si igitur angelus in gratia creatus fuisset, nullus angelus fuisset a Deo aversus. Praeterea, gratia medium est inter naturam et gloriam. Sed angeli non fuerunt beati in sua creatione. Ergo videtur quod nec etiam creati sint in gratia, sed primo in natura tantum; postea autem adepti sunt gratiam; et ultimo facti sunt beati. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XII de Civ. Dei, bonam voluntatem quis fecit in angelis, nisi ille qui eos cum sua voluntate, idest cum amore casto quo illi adhaerent, creavit, simul in eis condens naturam et largiens gratiam? Respondeo dicendum quod, quamvis super hoc sint diversae opiniones, quibusdam dicentibus quod creati sunt angeli in naturalibus tantum, aliis vero quod sunt creati in gratia; hoc tamen probabilius videtur tenendum, et magis dictis sanctorum consonum est, quod fuerunt creati in gratia gratum faciente. Sic enim videmus quod omnia quae processu temporis per opus divinae providentiae, creatura sub Deo operante, sunt producta, in prima rerum conditione producta sunt secundum quasdam seminales rationes, ut Augustinus dicit, super Gen. ad Litt.; sicut arbores et animalia et alia huiusmodi. Manifestum est autem quod gratia gratum faciens hoc modo comparatur ad beatitudinem, sicut ratio seminalis in natura ad effectum naturalem, unde I Ioan. III, gratia semen Dei nominatur. Sicut igitur, secundum opinionem Augustini, ponitur quod statim in prima creatione corporalis creaturae inditae sunt ei seminales rationes omnium naturalium effectuum, ita statim a principio sunt angeli creati in gratia. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod informitas illa angeli potest intelligi vel per comparationem ad formationem gloriae, et sic praecessit tempore informitas formationem. Vel per comparationem ad formationem gratiae, et sic non praecessit ordine temporis, sed ordine naturae; sicut etiam de formatione corporali Augustinus ponit. Ad secundum dicendum quod omnis forma inclinat suum subiectum secundum modum naturae eius. Modus autem naturalis intellectualis naturae est, ut libere feratur in ea quae vult. Et ideo inclinatio gratiae non imponit necessitatem, sed habens gratiam potest ea non uti, et peccare. Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis gratia sit medium inter naturam et gloriam ordine naturae tamen ordine temporis in natura creata non debuit simul esse gloria cum natura, quia est finis operationis ipsius naturae per gratiam adiutae. Gratia autem non se habet ut finis operationis, quia non est ex operibus; sed ut princi-

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then called light. But such formation comes from grace. Therefore they were not created in grace. Obj. 2: Further, grace turns the rational creature towards God. If, therefore, the angel had been created in grace, no angel would ever have turned away from God. Obj. 3: Further, grace comes midway between nature and glory. But the angels were not beatified in their creation. Therefore it seems that they were not created in grace; but that they were first created in nature only, and then received grace, and that last of all they were beatified. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), Who wrought the good will of the angels? Who, save Him Who created them with His will, that is, with the pure love wherewith they cling to Him; at the same time building up their nature and bestowing grace on them? I answer that, Although there are conflicting opinions on this point, some holding that the angels were created only in a natural state, while others maintain that they were created in grace; yet it seems more probable, and more in keeping with the sayings of holy men, that they were created in sanctifying grace. For we see that all things which, in the process of time, being created by the work of Divine Providence, were produced by the operation of God, were created in the first fashioning of things according to seedlike forms, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. viii, 3), such as trees, animals, and the rest. Now it is evident that sanctifying grace bears the same relation to beatitude as the seedlike form in nature does to the natural effect; hence (1 John 3:9) grace is called the seed of God. As, then, in Augustine’s opinion it is contended that the seedlike forms of all natural effects were implanted in the creature when corporeally created, so straightway from the beginning the angels were created in grace. Reply Obj. 1: Such absence of form in the angels can be understood either by comparison with their formation in glory; and so the absence of formation preceded formation by priority of time. Or else it can be understood of the formation according to grace: and so it did not precede in the order of time, but in the order of nature; as Augustine holds with regard to the formation of corporeal things (Gen ad lit. i, 15). Reply Obj. 2: Every form inclines the subject after the mode of the subject’s nature. Now it is the mode of an intellectual nature to be inclined freely towards the objects it desires. Consequently the movement of grace does not impose necessity; but he who has grace can fail to make use of it, and can sin. Reply Obj. 3: Although in the order of nature grace comes midway between nature and glory, nevertheless, in the order of time, in created nature, glory is not simultaneous with nature; because glory is the end of the operation of nature helped by grace. But grace stands not as the end of operation, because it is not of works, but as the princi-

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pium bene operandi. Et ideo statim cum natura gratiam ple of right operation. Therefore it was fitting for grace to dare conveniens fuit. be given straightway with nature.

Article 4 Whether an angel merits his beatitude? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus beatus suam beatitudinem non meruerit. Meritum enim est ex difficultate actus meritorii. Sed nullam difficultatem angelus habuit ad bene operandum. Ergo bona operatio non fuit ei meritoria. Praeterea, naturalibus non meremur. Sed naturale fuit angelo quod converteretur ad Deum. Ergo per hoc non meruit beatitudinem. Praeterea, si angelus beatus beatitudinem suam meruit, aut ergo antequam eam haberet, aut post. Sed non ante, quia, ut multis videtur, ante non habuit gratiam, sine qua nullum est meritum. Nec etiam post, quia sic etiam modo mereretur, quod videtur esse falsum, quia sic minor angelus merendo ad superioris angeli gradum posset pertingere, et non essent stabiles distinctiones graduum gratiae; quod est inconveniens. Non ergo angelus beatus suam beatitudinem meruit. Sed contra, Apoc. XXI, dicitur quod mensura angeli, in illa caelesti Ierusalem, est mensura hominis. Sed homo ad beatitudinem pertingere non potest nisi per meritum. Ergo neque angelus. Respondeo dicendum quod soli Deo beatitudo perfecta est naturalis quia idem est sibi esse et beatum esse. Cuiuslibet autem creaturae esse beatum non est natura, sed ultimus finis. Quaelibet autem res ad ultimum finem per suam operationem pertingit. Quae quidem operatio in finem ducens, vel est factiva finis, quando finis non excedit virtutem eius quod operatur propter finem, sicut medicatio est factiva sanitatis, vel est meritoria finis, quando finis excedit virtutem operantis propter finem, unde expectatur finis ex dono alterius. Beatitudo autem ultima excedit et naturam angelicam et humanam, ut ex dictis patet. Unde relinquitur quod tam homo quam angelus suam beatitudinem meruerit.

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel did not merit his beatitude. For merit arises from the difficulty of the meritorious act. But the angel experienced no difficulty in acting rightly. Therefore righteous action was not meritorious for him. Obj. 2: Further, we do not merit by merely natural operations. But it was quite natural for the angel to turn to God. Therefore he did not thereby merit beatitude. Obj. 3: Further, if a beatified angel merited his beatitude, he did so either before he had it, or else afterwards. But it was not before; because, in the opinion of many, he had no grace before whereby to merit it. Nor did he merit it afterwards, because thus he would be meriting it now; which is clearly false, because in that case a lower angel could by meriting rise up to the rank of a higher, and the distinct degrees of grace would not be permanent; which is not admissible. Consequently the angel did not merit his beatitude. On the contrary, It is stated (Rev 21:17) that the measure of the angel in that heavenly Jerusalem is the measure of a man. But man can only reach beatitude by merit. Therefore the same is the case with the angel. I answer that, Perfect beatitude is natural only to God, because existence and beatitude are one and the same thing in Him. Beatitude, however, is not of the nature of the creature, but is its end. Now everything attains its last end by its operation. Such operation leading to the end is either productive of the end, when such end is not beyond the power of the agent working for the end, as the healing art is productive of health; or else it is deserving of the end, when such end is beyond the capacity of the agent striving to attain it; wherefore it is looked for from another’s bestowing. Now it is evident from what has gone before (AA. 1, 2; Q. 12, AA. 4, 5) that ultimate beatitude exceeds both the angelic and the human nature. It remains, then, that both man and angel merited their beatitude. And if the angel was created in grace, without which there is no merit, there would be no difficulty in saying that he merited beatitude: as also, if one were to say that he had grace in any way before he had glory.

Et si quidem angelus in gratia creatus fuit, sine qua nullum est meritum, absque difficultate dicere possumus quod suam beatitudinem meruerit. Et similiter si quis diceret quod qualitercumque gratiam habuerit antequam gloriam. Si vero gratiam non habuit antequam esset beatus, sic But if he had no grace before entering upon beatitude, oportet dicere quod beatitudinem absque merito habuit, it would then have to be said that he had beatitude withsicut nos gratiam. Quod tamen est contra rationem bea- out merit, even as we have grace. This, however, is quite for-

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titudinis, quae habet rationem finis, et est praemium vir- eign to the idea of beatitude; which conveys the notion of tutis, ut etiam Philosophus dicit, in I Ethic. an end, and is the reward of virtue, as even the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). Vel oportet dicere quod angeli merentur beatitudiOr else it will have to be said, as some others have mainnem per ea quae iam beati operantur in divinis mini- tained, that the angels merit beatitude by their present minsteriis, ut alii dixerunt. Quod tamen est contra rationem istrations, while in beatitude. This is quite contrary, again, meriti, nam meritum habet rationem viae ad finem, ei to the notion of merit: since merit conveys the idea of a autem qui iam est in termino, non convenit moveri ad means to an end; while what is already in its end cannot, terminum; et sic nullus meretur quod iam habet. properly speaking, be moved towards such end; and so no one merits to produce what he already enjoys. Vel oportet dicere quod unus et idem actus converOr else it will have to be said that one and the same act sionis in Deum, inquantum est ex libero arbitrio, est of turning to God, so far as it comes of free-will, is meritomeritorius; et inquantum pertingit ad finem, est fruitio rious; and so far as it attains the end, is the fruition of beatbeata. Sed nec hoc etiam videtur esse conveniens, quia itude. Even this view will not stand, because free-will is not liberum arbitrium non est sufficiens causa meriti, unde the sufficient cause of merit; and, consequently, an act canactus non potest esse meritorius secundum quod est ex not be meritorious as coming from free-will, except in so libero arbitrio, nisi inquantum est gratia informatus; non far as it is informed by grace; but it cannot at the same time autem simul potest informari gratia imperfecta, quae est be informed by imperfect grace, which is the principle of principium merendi, et gratia perfecta, quae est prin- meriting, and by perfect grace, which is the principle of encipium fruendi. Unde non videtur esse possibile quod joying. Hence it does not appear to be possible for anyone simul fruatur, et suam fruitionem mereatur. to enjoy beatitude, and at the same time to merit it. Et ideo melius dicendum est quod gratiam habuit Consequently it is better to say that the angel had grace angelus antequam esset beatus, per quam beatitudinem ere he was admitted to beatitude, and that by such grace he meruit. merited beatitude. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod difficultas bene Reply Obj. 1: The angel’s difficulty of working righoperandi non est in angelis ex aliqua contrarietate, vel teously does not come from any contrariety or hindrance impedimento naturalis virtutis; sed ex hoc quod opus of natural powers; but from the fact that the good work is aliquod bonum est supra virtutem naturae. beyond his natural capacity. Ad secundum dicendum quod conversione naturaReply Obj. 2: An angel did not merit beatitude by natli angelus non meruit beatitudinem, sed conversione ca- ural movement towards God; but by the movement of charritatis, quae est per gratiam. ity, which comes of grace. Ad tertium patet responsio ex dictis. The answer to the Third Objection is evident from what we have said.

Article 5 Whether the angel obtained beatitude immediately after one act of merit? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus non statim post unum actum meritorium beatitudinem habuerit. Difficilius enim est homini bene operari quam angelo. Sed homo non praemiatur statim post unum actum. Ergo neque angelus. Praeterea, angelus statim in principio suae creationis, et in instanti, actum aliquem habere potuit, cum etiam corpora naturalia in ipso instanti suae creationis moveri incipiant, et si motus corporis in instanti esse posset, sicut opera intellectus et voluntatis, in primo instanti suae generationis motum haberent. Si ergo angelus per unum motum suae voluntatis beatitudinem meruit, in primo instanti suae creationis meruit beatitudinem. Si ergo eorum beatitudo non retardatur, statim in primo instanti fuerunt beati.

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel did not possess beatitude instantly after one act of merit. For it is more difficult for a man to do well than for an angel. But man is not rewarded at once after one act of merit. Therefore neither was the angel. Obj. 2: Further, an angel could act at once, and in an instant, from the very outset of his creation, for even natural bodies begin to be moved in the very instant of their creation; and if the movement of a body could be instantaneous, like operations of mind and will, it would have movement in the first instant of its generation. Consequently, if the angel merited beatitude by one act of his will, he merited it in the first instant of his creation; and so, if their beatitude was not retarded, then the angels were in beatitude in the first instant.

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Praeterea, inter multum distantia oportet esse multa media. Sed status beatitudinis angelorum multum distat a statu naturae eorum, medium autem inter utrumque est meritum. Oportuit igitur quod per multa media angelus ad beatitudinem perveniret. Sed contra, anima hominis et angelus similiter ad beatitudinem ordinantur, unde sanctis promittitur aequalitas angelorum Luc. XX. Sed anima a corpore separata, si habeat meritum beatitudinis, statim beatitudinem consequitur, nisi aliud sit impedimentum. Ergo pari ratione et angelus. Sed statim in primo actu caritatis habuit meritum beatitudinis. Ergo, cum in eo non esset aliquod impedimentum, statim ad beatitudinem pervenit per solum unum actum meritorium. Respondeo dicendum quod angelus post primum actum caritatis quo beatitudinem meruit, statim beatus fuit. Cuius ratio est, quia gratia perficit naturam secundum modum naturae, sicut et omnis perfectio recipitur in perfectibili secundum modum eius. Est autem hoc proprium naturae angelicae, quod naturalem perfectionem non per discursum acquirat, sed statim per naturam habeat, sicut supra ostensum est. Sicut autem ex sua natura angelus habet ordinem ad perfectionem naturalem, ita ex merito habet ordinem ad gloriam. Et ita statim post meritum in angelo fuit beatitudo consecuta. Meritum autem beatitudinis, non solum in angelo, sed etiam in homine esse potest per unicum actum, quia quolibet actu caritate informato homo beatitudinem meretur. Unde relinquitur quod statim post unum actum caritate informatum, angelus beatus fuit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo secundum suam naturam non statim natus est ultimam perfectionem adipisci, sicut angelus. Et ideo homini longior via data est ad merendum beatitudinem, quam angelo. Ad secundum dicendum quod angelus est supra tempus rerum corporalium, unde instantia diversa in his quae ad angelos pertinent, non accipiuntur nisi secundum successionem in ipsorum actibus. Non autem potuit simul in eis esse actus meritorius beatitudinis, et actus beatitudinis, qui est fruitio; cum unus sit gratiae imperfectae, et alius gratiae consummatae. Unde relinquitur quod oportet diversa instantia accipi, in quorum uno meruerit beatitudinem, et in alio fuerit beatus. Ad tertium dicendum quod de natura angeli est, quod statim suam perfectionem consequatur ad quam ordinatur. Et ideo non requiritur nisi unus actus meritorius; qui ea ratione medium dici potest, quia secundum ipsum angelus ad beatitudinem ordinatur.

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Obj. 3: Further, there must be many intervals between things which are far apart. But the beatific state of the angels is very far remote from their natural condition: while merit comes midway between. Therefore the angel would have to pass through many stages of merit in order to reach beatitude. On the contrary, Man’s soul and an angel are ordained alike for beatitude: consequently equality with angels is promised to the saints. Now the soul separated from the body, if it has merit deserving beatitude, enters at once into beatitude, unless there be some obstacle. Therefore so does an angel. Now an angel instantly, in his first act of charity, had the merit of beatitude. Therefore, since there was no obstacle within him, he passed at once into beatitude by only one meritorious act. I answer that, The angel was beatified instantly after the first act of charity, whereby he merited beatitude. The reason whereof is because grace perfects nature according to the manner of the nature; as every perfection is received in the subject capable of perfection, according to its mode. Now it is proper to the angelic nature to receive its natural perfection not by passing from one stage to another; but to have it at once naturally, as was shown above (A. 1; Q. 58, AA. 3, 4). But as the angel is of his nature inclined to natural perfection, so is he by merit inclined to glory. Hence instantly after merit the angel secured beatitude. Now the merit of beatitude in angel and man alike can be from merely one act; because man merits beatitude by every act informed by charity. Hence it remains that an angel was beatified straightway after one act of charity. Reply Obj. 1: Man was not intended to secure his ultimate perfection at once, like the angel. Hence a longer way was assigned to man than to the angel for securing beatitude. Reply Obj. 2: The angel is above the time of corporeal things; hence the various instants regarding the angels are not to be taken except as reckoning the succession of their acts. Now their act which merited beatitude could not be in them simultaneously with the act of beatitude, which is fruition; since the one belongs to imperfect grace, and the other to consummate grace. Consequently, it remains for different instants to be conceived, in one of which the angel merited beatitude, and in another was beatified. Reply Obj. 3: It is of the nature of an angel instantly to attain the perfection unto which he is ordained. Consequently, only one meritorious act is required; which act can so far be called an interval as through it the angel is brought to beatitude.

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Perfection of the Angels in Grace and Glory

Q. 62, A. 6

Article 6 Whether the angels receive grace and glory according to the degree of their natural gifts? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli non sint consecuti gratiam et gloriam secundum quantitatem suorum naturalium. Gratia enim ex mera Dei voluntate datur. Ergo et quantitas gratiae dependet ex voluntate Dei, et non ex quantitate naturalium. Praeterea, magis propinquum videtur ad gratiam actus humanus quam natura, quia actus humanus praeparatorius est ad gratiam. Sed gratia non est ex operibus, ut dicitur Rom. XI. Multo igitur minus quantitas gratiae in angelis est secundum quantitatem naturalium. Praeterea, homo et angelus pariter ordinantur ad beatitudinem vel gratiam. Sed homini non datur plus de gratia secundum gradum naturalium. Ergo nec angelo. Sed contra est quod Magister dicit, III dist. II Sent., quod angeli qui natura magis subtiles, et sapientia amplius perspicaces creati sunt, hi etiam maioribus gratiae muneribus praediti sunt. Respondeo dicendum quod rationabile est quod secundum gradum naturalium angelis data sint dona gratiarum et perfectio beatitudinis. Cuius quidem ratio ex duobus accipi potest. Primo quidem ex parte ipsius Dei, qui per ordinem suae sapientiae diversos gradus in angelica natura constituit. Sicut autem natura angelica facta est a Deo ad gratiam et beatitudinem consequendam, ita etiam gradus naturae angelicae ad diversos gradus gratiae et gloriae ordinari videntur, ut puta, si aedificator lapides polit ad construendam domum, ex hoc ipso quod aliquos pulchrius et decentius aptat, videtur eos ad honoratiorem partem domus ordinare. Sic igitur videtur quod Deus angelos quos altioris naturae fecit, ad maiora gratiarum dona et ampliorem beatitudinem ordinaverit.

Secundo apparet idem ex parte ipsius angeli. Non enim angelus est compositus ex diversis naturis, ut inclinatio unius naturae impetum alterius impediat aut retardet; sicut in homine accidit, in quo motus intellectivae partis aut retardatur aut impeditur ex inclinatione partis sensitivae. Quando autem non est aliquid quod retardet aut impediat, natura secundum totam suam virtutem movetur. Et ideo rationabile est quod angeli qui meliorem naturam habuerunt, etiam fortius et efficacius ad Deum sint conversi. Hoc autem etiam in hominibus contingit, quod secundum intensionem conversionis in Deum datur maior gratia et gloria. Unde videtur quod angeli qui habuerunt meliora naturalia, habuerunt plus de gratia et gloria. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut gratia est ex mera Dei voluntate, ita etiam et natura angeli. Et sicut

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels did not receive grace and glory according to the degree of their natural gifts. For grace is bestowed of God’s absolute will. Therefore the degree of grace depends on God’s will, and not on the degree of their natural gifts. Obj. 2: Further, a moral act seems to be more closely allied with grace than nature is; because a moral act is preparatory to grace. But grace does not come of works, as is said Rom. 11:6. Therefore much less does the degree of grace depend upon the degree of their natural gifts. Obj. 3: Further, man and angel are alike ordained for beatitude or grace. But man does not receive more grace according to the degree of his natural gifts. Therefore neither does the angel. On the contrary, Is the saying of the Master of the Sentences (Sent. ii, D, 3) that those angels who were created with more subtle natures and of keener intelligence in wisdom, were likewise endowed with greater gifts of grace. I answer that, It is reasonable to suppose that gifts of graces and perfection of beatitude were bestowed on the angels according to the degree of their natural gifts. The reason for this can be drawn from two sources. First of all, on the part of God, Who, in the order of His wisdom, established various degrees in the angelic nature. Now as the angelic nature was made by God for attaining grace and beatitude, so likewise the grades of the angelic nature seem to be ordained for the various degrees of grace and glory; just as when, for example, the builder chisels the stones for building a house, from the fact that he prepares some more artistically and more fittingly than others, it is clear that he is setting them apart for the more ornate part of the house. So it seems that God destined those angels for greater gifts of grace and fuller beatitude, whom He made of a higher nature. Second, the same is evident on the part of the angel. The angel is not a compound of different natures, so that the inclination of the one thwarts or retards the tendency of the other; as happens in man, in whom the movement of his intellective part is either retarded or thwarted by the inclination of his sensitive part. But when there is nothing to retard or thwart it, nature is moved with its whole energy. So it is reasonable to suppose that the angels who had a higher nature, were turned to God more mightily and efficaciously. The same thing happens in men, since greater grace and glory are bestowed according to the greater earnestness of their turning to God. Hence it appears that the angels who had the greater natural powers, had the more grace and glory. Reply Obj. 1: As grace comes of God’s will alone, so likewise does the nature of the angel: and as God’s will or-

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Q. 62, A. 7

Angels

naturam Dei voluntas ordinavit ad gratiam ita et gradus naturae ad gradus gratiae. Ad secundum dicendum quod actus rationalis creaturae sunt ab ipsa; sed natura est immediate a Deo. Unde magis videtur quod gratia detur secundum gradum naturae, quam ex operibus. Ad tertium dicendum quod diversitas naturalium aliter est in angelis, qui differunt specie; et aliter in hominibus, qui differunt solo numero. Differentia enim secundum speciem est propter finem, sed differentia secundum numerum est propter materiam. In homine etiam est aliquid quod potest impedire vel retardare motum intellectivae naturae, non autem in angelis. Unde non est eadem ratio de utroque.

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dained nature for grace, so did it ordain the various degrees of nature to the various degrees of grace. Reply Obj. 2: The acts of the rational creature are from the creature itself; whereas nature is immediately from God. Accordingly it seems rather that grace is bestowed according to degree of nature than according to works. Reply Obj. 3: Diversity of natural gifts is in one way in the angels, who are themselves different specifically; and in quite another way in men, who differ only numerically. For specific difference is on account of the end; while numerical difference is because of the matter. Furthermore, there is something in man which can thwart or impede the movement of his intellective nature; but not in the angels. Consequently the argument is not the same for both.

Article 7 Whether natural knowledge and love remain in the beatified angels? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in angelis beatis non remaneat cognitio et dilectio naturalis. Quia, ut dicitur I Cor. XIII, cum venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est. Sed dilectio et cognitio naturalis est imperfecta respectu cognitionis et dilectionis beatae. Ergo adveniente beatitudine, naturalis cognitio et dilectio cessat. Praeterea, ubi unum sufficit, aliud superflue existit. Sed sufficit in angelis beatis cognitio et dilectio gloriae. Superfluum ergo esset quod remaneret in eis cognitio et dilectio naturalis. Praeterea, eadem potentia non habet simul duos actus; sicut nec una linea terminatur ex eadem parte ad duo puncta. Sed angeli beati sunt semper in actu cognitionis et dilectionis beatae, felicitas enim non est secundum habitum, sed secundum actum, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo nunquam in angelis potest esse cognitio et dilectio naturalis. Sed contra, quandiu manet natura aliqua, manet operatio eius. Sed beatitudo non tollit naturam; cum sit perfectio eius. Ergo non tollit naturalem cognitionem et dilectionem. Respondeo dicendum quod in angelis beatis remanet cognitio et dilectio naturalis. Sicut enim se habent principia operationum ad invicem, ita se habent et operationes ipsae. Manifestum est autem quod natura ad beatitudinem comparatur sicut primum ad secundum, quia beatitudo naturae additur. Semper autem oportet salvari primum in secundo. Unde oportet quod natura salvetur in beatitudine. Et similiter oportet quod in actu beatitudinis salvetur actus naturae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod perfectio adveniens tollit imperfectionem sibi oppositam. Imperfectio

Objection 1: It would seem that natural knowledge and love do not remain in the beatified angels. For it is said (1 Cor 13:10): When that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away. But natural love and knowledge are imperfect in comparison with beatified knowledge and love. Therefore, in beatitude, natural knowledge and love cease. Obj. 2: Further, where one suffices, another is superfluous. But the knowledge and love of glory suffice for the beatified angels. Therefore it would be superfluous for their natural knowledge and love to remain. Obj. 3: Further, the same faculty has not two simultaneous acts, as the same line cannot, at the same end, be terminated in two points. But the beatified angels are always exercising their beatified knowledge and love; for, as is said Ethic. i, 8, happiness consists not in habit, but in act. Therefore there can never be natural knowledge and love in the angels. On the contrary, So long as a nature endures, its operation remains. But beatitude does not destroy nature, since it is its perfection. Therefore it does not take away natural knowledge and love. I answer that, Natural knowledge and love remain in the angels. For as principles of operations are mutually related, so are the operations themselves. Now it is manifest that nature is to beatitude as first to second; because beatitude is superadded to nature. But the first must ever be preserved in the second. Consequently nature must be preserved in beatitude: and in like manner the act of nature must be preserved in the act of beatitude. Reply Obj. 1: The advent of a perfection removes the opposite imperfection. Now the imperfection of nature is

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autem naturae non opponitur perfectioni beatitudinis, sed substernitur ei, sicut imperfectio potentiae substernitur perfectioni formae, et non tollitur potentia per formam, sed tollitur privatio, quae opponitur formae. Et similiter etiam imperfectio cognitionis naturalis non opponitur perfectioni cognitionis gloriae, nihil enim prohibet simul aliquid cognoscere per diversa media, sicut simul potest aliquid cognosci per medium probabile, et demonstrativum. Et similiter potest angelus simul Deum cognoscere per essentiam Dei, quod pertinet ad cognitionem gloriae, et per essentiam propriam, quod pertinet ad cognitionem naturae. Ad secundum dicendum quod ea quae sunt beatitudinis, per se sufficiunt. Sed ad hoc quod sint, praeexigunt ea quae sunt naturae, quia nulla beatitudo est per se subsistens, nisi beatitudo increata. Ad tertium dicendum quod duae operationes non possunt esse simul unius potentiae, nisi una ad aliam ordinetur. Cognitio autem et dilectio naturalis ordinantur ad cognitionem et dilectionem gloriae. Unde nihil prohibet in angelo simul esse et cognitionem et dilectionem naturalem, et cognitionem et dilectionem gloriae.

Q. 62, A. 8

not opposed to the perfection of beatitude, but underlies it; as the imperfection of the power underlies the perfection of the form, and the power is not taken away by the form, but the privation which is opposed to the form. In the same way, the imperfection of natural knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of the knowledge in glory; for nothing hinders us from knowing a thing through various mediums, as a thing may be known at the one time through a probable medium and through a demonstrative one. In like manner, an angel can know God by His essence, and this appertains to his knowledge of glory; and at the same time he can know God by his own essence, which belongs to his natural knowledge. Reply Obj. 2: All things which make up beatitude are sufficient of themselves. But in order for them to exist, they presuppose the natural gifts; because no beatitude is selfsubsisting, except the uncreated beatitude. Reply Obj. 3: There cannot be two operations of the one faculty at the one time, except the one be ordained to the other. But natural knowledge and love are ordained to the knowledge and love of glory. Accordingly there is nothing to hinder natural knowledge and love from existing in the angel conjointly with those of glory.

Article 8 Whether a beatified angel can sin? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus beatus peccare possit. Beatitudo enim non tollit naturam, ut dictum est. Sed de ratione naturae creatae est quod possit deficere. Ergo angelus beatus potest peccare. Praeterea, potestates rationales sunt ad opposita, ut Philosophus dicit. Sed voluntas angeli beati non desinit esse rationalis. Ergo se habet ad bonum et malum.

Objection 1: It would seem that a beatified angel can sin. For, as as said above (A. 7), beatitude does not do away with nature. But it is of the very notion of created nature, that it can fail. Therefore a beatified angel can sin.

Obj. 2: Further, the rational powers are referred to opposites, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. iv, text. 3). But the will of the angel in beatitude does not cease to be rational. Therefore it is inclined towards good and evil. Praeterea, ad libertatem arbitrii pertinet quod hoObj. 3: Further, it belongs to the liberty of free-will for mo possit eligere bonum et malum. Sed libertas arbitrii man to be able to choose good or evil. But the freedom of non minuitur in angelis beatis. Ergo possunt peccare. will is not lessened in the beatified angels. Therefore they can sin. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XI super On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xi) Gen. ad Litt., quod illa natura quae peccare non potest in that there is in the holy angels that nature which cannot sin. sanctis angelis est. Ergo sancti angeli peccare non pos- Therefore the holy angels cannot sin.

sunt. Respondeo dicendum quod angeli beati peccare non possunt. Cuius ratio est, quia eorum beatitudo in hoc consistit, quod per essentiam Deum vident. Essentia autem Dei est ipsa essentia bonitatis. Unde hoc modo se habet angelus videns Deum ad ipsum Deum, sicut se habet quicumque non videns Deum ad communem rationem boni. Impossibile est autem quod aliquis quidquam

I answer that, The beatified angels cannot sin. The reason for this is, because their beatitude consists in seeing God through His essence. Now, God’s essence is the very essence of goodness. Consequently the angel beholding God is disposed towards God in the same way as anyone else not seeing God is to the common form of goodness. Now it is impossible for any man either to will or to

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Q. 62, A. 9

Angels

velit vel operetur, nisi attendens ad bonum; vel quod velit divertere a bono, inquantum huiusmodi. Angelus igitur beatus non potest velle vel agere, nisi attendens ad Deum. Sic autem volens vel agens non potest peccare. Unde angelus beatus nullo modo peccare potest. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bonum creatum, in se consideratum, deficere potest. Sed ex coniunctione perfecta ad bonum increatum, qualis est coniunctio beatitudinis, adipiscitur quod peccare non possit, ratione iam dicta. Ad secundum dicendum quod virtutes rationales se habent ad opposita in illis ad quae non ordinantur naturaliter, sed quantum ad illa ad quae naturaliter ordinantur, non se habent ad opposita. Intellectus enim non potest non assentire principiis naturaliter notis, et similiter voluntas non potest non adhaerere bono inquantum est bonum, quia in bonum naturaliter ordinatur sicut in suum obiectum. Voluntas igitur angeli se habet ad opposita, quantum ad multa facienda vel non facienda. Sed quantum ad ipsum Deum, quem vident esse ipsam essentiam bonitatis, non se habent ad opposita; sed secundum ipsum ad omnia diriguntur, quodcumque oppositorum eligant. Quod sine peccato est. Ad tertium dicendum quod liberum arbitrium sic se habet ad eligendum ea quae sunt ad finem, sicut se habet intellectus ad conclusiones. Manifestum est autem quod ad virtutem intellectus pertinet, ut in diversas conclusiones procedere possit secundum principia data, sed quod in aliquam conclusionem procedat praetermittendo ordinem principiorum, hoc est ex defectu ipsius. Unde quod liberum arbitrium diversa eligere possit servato ordine finis, hoc pertinet ad perfectionem libertatis eius, sed quod eligat aliquid divertendo ab ordine finis, quod est peccare, hoc pertinet ad defectum libertatis. Unde maior libertas arbitrii est in angelis, qui peccare non possunt, quam in nobis, qui peccare possumus.

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do anything except aiming at what is good; or for him to wish to turn away from good precisely as such. Therefore the beatified angel can neither will nor act, except as aiming towards God. Now whoever wills or acts in this manner cannot sin. Consequently the beatified angel cannot sin. Reply Obj. 1: Created good, considered in itself, can fail. But from its perfect union with the uncreated good, such as is the union of beatitude, it is rendered unable to sin, for the reason already alleged. Reply Obj. 2: The rational powers are referred to opposites in the things to which they are not inclined naturally; but as to the things whereunto they have a natural tendency, they are not referred to opposites. For the intellect cannot but assent to naturally known principles; in the same way, the will cannot help clinging to good, formally as good; because the will is naturally ordained to good as to its proper object. Consequently the will of the angels is referred to opposites, as to doing many things, or not doing them. But they have no tendency to opposites with regard to God Himself, Whom they see to be the very nature of goodness; but in all things their aim is towards God, whichever alternative they choose, that is not sinful. Reply Obj. 3: Free-will in its choice of means to an end is disposed just as the intellect is to conclusions. Now it is evident that it belongs to the power of the intellect to be able to proceed to different conclusions, according to given principles; but for it to proceed to some conclusion by passing out of the order of the principles, comes of its own defect. Hence it belongs to the perfection of its liberty for the free-will to be able to choose between opposite things, keeping the order of the end in view; but it comes of the defect of liberty for it to choose anything by turning away from the order of the end; and this is to sin. Hence there is greater liberty of will in the angels, who cannot sin, than there is in ourselves, who can sin.

Article 9 Whether the beatified angels advance in beatitude? Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli beati in beatitudine proficere possint. Caritas enim est principium merendi. Sed in angelis est perfecta caritas. Ergo angeli beati possunt mereri. Crescente autem merito, et praemium beatitudinis crescit. Ergo angeli beati in beatitudine proficere possunt. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Doctr. Christ., quod Deus utitur nobis ad nostram utilitatem, et ad suam bonitatem. Et similiter angelis, quibus utitur in ministeriis spiritualibus; cum sint administratorii spiritus, in ministerium missi propter eos qui haereditatem ca-

Objection 1: It would seem that the beatified angels can advance in beatitude. For charity is the principle of merit. But there is perfect charity in the angels. Therefore the beatified angels can merit. Now, as merit increases, the reward of beatitude increases. Therefore the beatified angels can progress in beatitude. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i) that God makes use of us for our own gain, and for His own goodness. The same thing happens to the angels, whom He uses for spiritual ministrations; since they are all ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of

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piunt salutis, ut dicitur Heb. I. Non autem hoc esset ad eorum utilitatem, si per hoc non mererentur nec in beatitudine proficerent. Relinquitur ergo quod angeli beati et mereri, et in beatitudine proficere possunt. Praeterea, ad imperfectionem pertinet quod ille qui non est in summo, non possit proficere. Sed angeli non sunt in summo. Si ergo ad maius proficere non possunt, videtur quod in eis sit imperfectio et defectus. Quod est inconveniens. Sed contra est quod mereri et proficere pertinent ad statum viae. Sed angeli non sunt viatores, sed comprehensores. Ergo angeli beati non possunt mereri, nec in beatitudine proficere. Respondeo dicendum quod in unoquoque motu motoris intentio fertur in aliquid determinatum, ad quod mobile perducere intendit, intentio enim est de fine cui repugnat infinitum. Manifestum est autem quod, cum creatura rationalis per suam virtutem consequi non possit suam beatitudinem, quae in visione Dei consistit, ut ex superioribus patet; indiget ut ad beatitudinem a Deo moveatur. Oportet igitur quod sit aliquid determinatum, ad quod quaelibet creatura rationalis dirigatur sicut in ultimum finem. Et hoc quidem determinatum non potest esse, in divina visione, quantum ad ipsum quod videtur, quia summa veritas ab omnibus beatis secundum diversos gradus conspicitur. Sed quantum ad modum visionis, praefigitur diversimode terminus ex intentione dirigentis in finem. Non enim possibile est quod, sicut rationalis creatura producitur ad videndum summam essentiam, ita producatur ad summum modum visionis, qui est comprehensio, hic enim modus soli Deo competere potest, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed cum infinita efficacia requiratur ad Deum comprehendendum, creaturae vero efficacia in videndo non possit esse nisi finita; ab infinito autem finitum quodlibet infinitis gradibus distet; infinitis modis contingit creaturam rationalem intelligere Deum vel clarius vel minus clare. Et sicut beatitudo consistit in ipsa visione, ita gradus beatitudinis in certo modo visionis. Sic igitur unaquaeque creatura rationalis a Deo perducitur ad finem beatitudinis, ut etiam ad determinatum gradum beatitudinis perducatur ex praedestinatione Dei. Unde consecuto illo gradu, ad altiorem transire non potest. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod mereri est eius quod movetur ad finem. Movetur autem ad finem creatura rationalis, non solum patiendo, sed etiam operando. Et si quidem finis ille subsit virtuti rationalis creaturae, operatio illa dicetur acquisitiva illius finis, sicut homo meditando acquirit scientiam, si vero finis non sit in potestate eius, sed ab alio expectetur, operatio erit meritoria finis. Ei autem quod est in ultimo termino, non

Q. 62, A. 9

salvation (Heb 1:14). This would not be for their profit were they not to merit thereby, nor to advance to beatitude. It remains, then, that the beatified angels can merit, and can advance in beatitude. Obj. 3: Further, it argues imperfection for anyone not occupying the foremost place not to be able to advance. But the angels are not in the highest degree of beatitude. Therefore if unable to ascend higher, it would appear that there is imperfection and defect in them; which is not admissible. On the contrary, Merit and progress belong to this present condition of life. But angels are not wayfarers travelling towards beatitude; they are already in possession of beatitude. Consequently the beatified angels can neither merit nor advance in beatitude. I answer that, In every movement the mover’s intention is centered upon one determined end, to which he intends to lead the movable subject; because intention looks to the end, to which infinite progress is repugnant. Now it is evident, since the rational creature cannot of its own power attain to its beatitude, which consists in the vision of God, as is clear from what has gone before (Q. 12, A. 4), that it needs to be moved by God towards its beatitude. Therefore there must be some one determined thing to which every rational creature is directed as to its last end. Now this one determinate object cannot, in the vision of God, consist precisely in that which is seen; for the Supreme Truth is seen by all the blessed in various degrees: but it is on the part of the mode of vision, that diverse terms are fixed beforehand by the intention of Him Who directs towards the end. For it is impossible that as the rational creature is led on to the vision of the Supreme Essence, it should be led on in the same way to the supreme mode of vision, which is comprehension, for this belongs to God only; as is evident from what was said above (Q. 12, A. 7; Q. 14, A. 3). But since infinite efficacy is required for comprehending God, while the creature’s efficacy in beholding is only finite; and since every finite being is in infinite degrees removed from the infinite; it comes to pass that the rational creature understands God more or less clearly according to infinite degrees. And as beatitude consists in vision, so the degree of vision lies in a determinate mode of the vision. Therefore every rational creature is so led by God to the end of its beatitude, that from God’s predestination it is brought even to a determinate degree of beatitude. Consequently, when that degree is once secured, it cannot pass to a higher degree. Reply Obj. 1: Merit belongs to a subject which is moving towards its end. Now the rational creature is moved towards its end, not merely passively, but also by working actively. If the end is within the power of the rational creature, then its action is said to procure the end; as man acquires knowledge by reflection: but if the end be beyond its power, and is looked for from another, then the action will be meritorious of such end. But what is already in the ultimate term

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convenit moveri, sed mutatum esse. Unde caritatis imperfectae, quae est viae, est mereri, caritatis autem perfectae non est mereri, sed potius praemio frui. Sicut et in habitibus acquisitis, operatio praecedens habitum est acquisitiva habitus, quae vero est ex habitu iam acquisito, est operatio iam perfecta cum delectatione. Et similiter actus caritatis perfectae non habet rationem meriti, sed magis est de perfectione praemii. Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquid dicitur utile dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut quod est in via ad finem, et sic utile est meritum beatitudinis. Alio modo, sicut pars est utilis ad totum, ut paries ad domum. Et hoc modo ministeria angelorum sunt utilia angelis beatis, inquantum sunt quaedam pars beatitudinis ipsorum, diffundere enim perfectionem habitam in alia, hoc est de ratione perfecti inquantum est perfectum. Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet angelus beatus non sit in summo gradu beatitudinis simpliciter, est tamen in ultimo quantum ad seipsum, secundum praedestinationem divinam. Potest tamen augeri angelorum gaudium de salute eorum qui per ipsorum ministerium salvantur; secundum illud Luc. XV, gaudium est angelis Dei super uno peccatore poenitentiam agente. Sed hoc gaudium ad praemium accidentale pertinet, quod quidem augeri potest usque ad diem iudicii. Unde quidam dicunt quod, quantum ad praemium accidentale, etiam mereri possunt. Sed melius est ut dicatur quod nullo modo aliquis beatus mereri potest, nisi sit simul viator et comprehensor, ut Christus, qui solus fuit viator et comprehensor. Praedictum enim gaudium magis acquirunt ex virtute beatitudinis, quam illud mereantur.

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is not said to be moved, but to have been moved. Consequently, to merit belongs to the imperfect charity of this life; whereas perfect charity does not merit but rather enjoys the reward. Even as in acquired habits, the operation preceding the habit is productive of the habit; but the operation from an acquired habit is both perfect and enjoyable. In the same way the act of perfect charity has no quality of merit, but belongs rather to the perfection of the reward. Reply Obj. 2: A thing can be termed useful in two ways. First of all, as being on the way to an end; and so the merit of beatitude is useful. Second, as the part is useful for the whole; as the wall for a house. In this way the angelic ministerings are useful for the beatified angels, inasmuch as they are a part of their beatitude; for to pour out acquired perfection upon others is of the nature of what is perfect, considered as perfect. Reply Obj. 3: Although a beatified angel is not absolutely in the highest degree of beatitude, yet, in his own regard he is in the highest degree, according to Divine predestination. Nevertheless the joy of the angels can be increased with regard to the salvation of such as are saved by their ministrations, according to Luke 15:10: There is joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing penance. Such joy belongs to their accidental reward, which can be increased unto judgment day. Hence some writers say that they can merit as to their accidental reward. But it is better to say that the Blessed can in no wise merit without being at the same time a wayfarer and a comprehensor; like Christ, Who alone was such. For the Blessed acquire such joy from the virtue of their beatitude, rather than merit it.

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Question 63 The Malice of the Angels with Regard to Sin Deinde considerandum est quomodo angeli facti In the next place we must consider how angels became sunt mali. Et primo, quantum ad malum culpae; secun- evil: first of all with regard to the evil of fault; and second, do, quantum ad malum poenae. as to the evil of punishment. Circa primum quaeruntur novem. Under the first heading there are nine points for consideration: Primo, utrum malum culpae in angelo esse possit. (1) Can there be evil of fault in the angels? Secundo, cuiusmodi peccata in eis esse possunt. (2) What kind of sins can be in them? Tertio, quid appetendo angelus peccavit. (3) What did the angel seek in sinning? Quarto, supposito quod aliqui peccato propriae (4) Supposing that some became evil by a sin of their voluntatis facti sunt mali, utrum aliqui own choosing, are any of them naturally evil? naturaliter sint mali. Quinto, supposito quod non, utrum aliquis eorum (5) Supposing that it is not so, could any one of them in primo instanti suae creationis potuerit esse become evil in the first instant of his creation by an malus per actum propriae voluntatis. act of his own will? Sexto, supposito quod non, utrum aliqua mora (6) Supposing that he did not, was there any interval fuerit inter creationem et lapsum. between his creation and fall? Septimo, utrum supremus inter cadentes, fuerit (7) Was the highest of them who fell, absolutely the simpliciter inter omnes angelos summus. highest among the angels? Octavo, utrum peccatum primi angeli fuerit aliis (8) Was the sin of the foremost angel the cause of the aliqua causa peccandi. others sinning? Nono, utrum tot ceciderint, quot remanserunt. (9) Did as many sin as remained steadfast?

Article 1 Whether the evil of fault can be in the angels? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod malum culpae in angelis esse non possit. Quia malum non potest esse nisi in his quae sunt in potentia, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys., subiectum enim privationis est ens in potentia. Sed angeli, cum sint formae subsistentes, non habent esse in potentia. Ergo in eis non potest esse malum. Praeterea, angeli sunt digniores quam corpora caelestia. Sed in corporibus caelestibus non potest esse malum, ut philosophi dicunt. Ergo neque in angelis. Praeterea, id quod est naturale, semper inest. Sed naturale est angelis quod moveantur motu dilectionis in Deum. Ergo hoc ab eis removeri non potest. Sed diligendo Deum non peccant. Ergo angeli peccare non possunt. Praeterea, appetitus non est nisi boni, vel apparentis boni. Sed in angelis non potest esse apparens bonum, quod non sit verum bonum, quia in eis vel omnino error esse non potest, vel saltem non potest praecedere

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no evil of fault in the angels. For there can be no evil except in things which are in potentiality, as is said by the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, text. 19), because the subject of privation is a being in potentiality. But the angels have not being in potentiality, since they are subsisting forms. Therefore there can be no evil in them. Obj. 2: Further, the angels are higher than the heavenly bodies. But philosophers say that there cannot be evil in the heavenly bodies. Therefore neither can there be in the angels. Obj. 3: Further, what is natural to a thing is always in it. But it is natural for the angels to be moved by the movement of love towards God. Therefore such love cannot be withdrawn from them. But in loving God they do not sin. Consequently the angels cannot sin. Obj. 4: Further, desire is only of what is good or apparently good. Now for the angels there can be no apparent good which is not a true good; because in them either there can be no error at all, or at least not before guilt. Therefore

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culpam. Ergo angeli non possunt appetere nisi id quod est vere bonum. Sed nullus, appetendo id quod est vere bonum, peccat. Ergo angelus appetendo non peccat. Sed contra est quod dicitur Iob IV, in angelis suis reperit pravitatem. Respondeo dicendum quod tam angelus quam quaecumque creatura rationalis, si in sua sola natura consideretur, potest peccare, et cuicumque creaturae hoc convenit ut peccare non possit, hoc habet ex dono gratiae, non ex conditione naturae. Cuius ratio est, quia peccare nihil est aliud quam declinare a rectitudine actus quam debet habere; sive accipiatur peccatum in naturalibus, sive in artificialibus, sive in moralibus. Solum autem illum actum a rectitudine declinare non contingit, cuius regula est ipsa virtus agentis. Si enim manus artificis esset ipsa regula incisionis, nunquam posset artifex nisi recte lignum incidere, sed si rectitudo incisionis sit ab alia regula, contingit incisionem esse rectam et non rectam. Divina autem voluntas sola est regula sui actus, quia non ad superiorem finem ordinatur. Omnis autem voluntas cuiuslibet creaturae rectitudinem in suo actu non habet, nisi secundum quod regulatur a voluntate divina, ad quam pertinet ultimus finis, sicut quaelibet voluntas inferioris debet regulari secundum voluntatem superioris, ut voluntas militis secundum voluntatem ducis exercitus. Sic igitur in sola voluntate divina peccatum esse non potest, in qualibet autem voluntate creaturae potest esse peccatum, secundum conditionem suae naturae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in angelis non est potentia ad esse naturale. Est tamen in eis potentia secundum intellectivam partem, ad hoc quod convertantur in hoc vel in illud. Et quantum ad hoc, potest in eis esse malum. Ad secundum dicendum quod corpora caelestia non habent operationem nisi naturalem. Et ideo sicut in natura eorum non potest esse corruptionis malum, ita nec in actione naturali eorum potest esse malum inordinationis. Sed supra actionem naturalem in angelis est actio liberi arbitrii, secundum quam contingit in eis esse malum. Ad tertium dicendum quod naturale est angelo quod convertatur motu dilectionis in Deum, secundum quod est principium naturalis esse. Sed quod convertatur in ipsum secundum quod est obiectum beatitudinis supernaturalis, hoc est ex amore gratuito, a quo averti potuit peccando. Ad quartum dicendum quod peccatum in actu liberi arbitrii contingit esse dupliciter. Uno modo, ex hoc quod aliquod malum eligitur, sicut homo peccat eligendo adulterium, quod secundum se est malum. Et tale peccatum semper procedit ex aliqua ignorantia vel errore, alioquin id quod est malum, non eligeretur ut bonum. Errat quidem adulter in particulari, eligens hanc

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the angels can desire only what it truly good. But no one sins by desiring what is truly good. Consequently the angel does not sin by desire. On the contrary, It is said (Job 4:18): In His angels He found wickedness. I answer that, An angel or any other rational creature considered in his own nature, can sin; and to whatever creature it belongs not to sin, such creature has it as a gift of grace, and not from the condition of nature. The reason of this is, because sinning is nothing else than a deviation from that rectitude which an act ought to have; whether we speak of sin in nature, art, or morals. That act alone, the rule of which is the very virtue of the agent, can never fall short of rectitude. Were the craftsman’s hand the rule itself engraving, he could not engrave the wood otherwise than rightly; but if the rightness of engraving be judged by another rule, then the engraving may be right or faulty. Now the Divine will is the sole rule of God’s act, because it is not referred to any higher end. But every created will has rectitude of act so far only as it is regulated according to the Divine will, to which the last end is to be referred: as every desire of a subordinate ought to be regulated by the will of his superior; for instance, the soldier’s will, according to the will of his commanding officer. Thus only in the Divine will can there be no sin; whereas there can be sin in the will of every creature; considering the condition of its nature. Reply Obj. 1: In the angels there is no potentiality to natural existence. Yet there is potentiality in their intellective part, as regards their being inclined to this or the other object. In this respect there can be evil in them. Reply Obj. 2: The heavenly bodies have none but a natural operation. Therefore as there can be no evil of corruption in their nature; so neither can there be evil of disorder in their natural action. But besides their natural action there is the action of free-will in the angels, by reason of which evil may be in them. Reply Obj. 3: It is natural for the angel to turn to God by the movement of love, according as God is the principle of his natural being. But for him to turn to God as the object of supernatural beatitude, comes of infused love, from which he could be turned away by sinning. Reply Obj. 4: Mortal sin occurs in two ways in the act of free-will. First, when something evil is chosen; as man sins by choosing adultery, which is evil of itself. Such sin always comes of ignorance or error; otherwise what is evil would never be chosen as good. The adulterer errs in the particular, choosing this delight of an inordinate act as something good to be performed now, from the inclina-

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delectationem inordinati actus quasi aliquod bonum ad nunc agendum, propter inclinationem passionis aut habitus; etiam si in universali non erret, sed veram de hoc sententiam teneat. Hoc autem modo in angelo peccatum esse non potuit, quia nec in angelis sunt passiones, quibus ratio aut intellectus ligetur, ut ex supra dictis patet; nec iterum primum peccatum habitus praecedere potuit ad peccatum inclinans. Alio modo contingit peccare per liberum arbitrium, eligendo aliquid quod secundum se est bonum, sed non cum ordine debitae mensurae aut regulae; ita quod defectus inducens peccatum sit solum ex parte electionis, quae non habet debitum ordinem, non ex parte rei electae; sicut si aliquis eligeret orare, non attendens ad ordinem ab Ecclesia institutum. Et huiusmodi peccatum non praeexigit ignorantiam, sed absentiam solum considerationis eorum quae considerari debent. Et hoc modo angelus peccavit, convertendo se per liberum arbitrium ad proprium bonum, absque ordine ad regulam divinae voluntatis.

Q. 63, A. 2

tion of passion or of habit; even though he does not err in his universal judgment, but retains a right opinion in this respect. In this way there can be no sin in the angel; because there are no passions in the angels to fetter reason or intellect, as is manifest from what has been said above (Q. 59, A. 4); nor, again, could any habit inclining to sin precede their first sin. In another way sin comes of free-will by choosing something good in itself, but not according to proper measure or rule; so that the defect which induces sin is only on the part of the choice which is not properly regulated, but not on the part of the thing chosen; as if one were to pray, without heeding the order established by the Church. Such a sin does not presuppose ignorance, but merely absence of consideration of the things which ought to be considered. In this way the angel sinned, by seeking his own good, from his own free-will, insubordinately to the rule of the Divine will.

Article 2 Whether only the sin of pride and envy can exist in an angel? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in angelis non possit esse solum peccatum superbiae et invidiae. In quemcumque enim cadit delectatio alicuius peccati, potest cadere peccatum illud. Sed daemones delectantur etiam in obscenitatibus carnalium peccatorum, ut Augustinus dicit, II de Civ. Dei. Ergo in daemonibus etiam peccata carnalia possunt esse. Praeterea, sicut superbia et invidia sunt peccata spiritualia, ita acedia et avaritia et ira. Sed spiritui conveniunt peccata spiritualia, sicut et carni peccata carnalia. Ergo non solum superbia et invidia in angelis esse possunt, sed etiam acedia et avaritia. Praeterea, secundum Gregorium, in Moralibus, ex superbia nascuntur plura vitia, et similiter ex invidia. Posita autem causa, ponitur effectus. Si ergo superbia et invidia in angelis esse possunt, pari ratione et alia vitia in eis esse possunt. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV libro de Civ. Dei, quod Diabolus non est fornicator aut ebriosus, neque aliquid huiusmodi, est tamen superbus et invidus. Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum aliquod in aliquo esse potest dupliciter, uno modo, secundum reatum; alio modo, secundum affectum. Secundum reatum quidem omnia peccata in daemonibus esse contingit, quia dum homines ad omnia peccata inducunt, omnium peccatorum reatum incurrunt. Secundum affectum vero illa solum peccata in malis angelis esse possunt, ad quae contingit affici spiritualem naturam. Spiritualem autem

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be other sins in the angels besides those of pride and envy. Because whosoever can delight in any kind of sin, can fall into the sin itself. But the demons delight even in the obscenities of carnal sins; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3). Therefore there can also be carnal sins in the demons. Obj. 2: Further, as pride and envy are spiritual sins, so are sloth, avarice, and anger. But spiritual sins are concerned with the spirit, just as carnal sins are with the flesh. Therefore not only can there be pride and envy in the angels; but likewise sloth and avarice. Obj. 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi), many vices spring from pride; and in like manner from envy. But, if the cause is granted, the effect follows. If, therefore, there can be pride and envy in the angels, for the same reason there can likewise be other vices in them. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3) that the devil is not a fornicator nor a drunkard, nor anything of the like sort; yet he is proud and envious. I answer that, Sin can exist in a subject in two ways: first of all by actual guilt, and second by affection. As to guilt, all sins are in the demons; since by leading men to sin they incur the guilt of all sins. But as to affection only those sins can be in the demons which can belong to a spiritual nature. Now a spiritual nature cannot be affected by such pleasures as appertain to bodies, but only by such as are in keeping with spiritual things; because nothing is af-

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naturam affici non contingit ad bona quae sunt propria corpori, sed ad ea quae in rebus spiritualibus inveniri possunt, nihil enim afficitur nisi ad id quod suae naturae potest esse quodam modo conveniens. In spiritualibus autem bonis non potest esse peccatum dum aliquis ad ea afficitur, nisi per hoc quod in tali affectu superioris regula non servatur. Et hoc est peccatum superbiae, non subdi superiori in eo quo debet. Unde peccatum primum angeli non potest esse aliud quam superbia. Sed consequenter potuit in eis esse etiam invidia. Eiusdem enim rationis est quod affectus tendat in aliquid appetendum, et quod renitatur opposito. Invidus autem ex hoc de bono alterius dolet, inquantum bonum alterius aestimat sui boni impedimentum. Non autem bonum alterius poterat aestimari impedimentum boni affectati per angelum malum, nisi inquantum affectavit excellentiam singularem, quae quidem singularitas per alterius excellentiam cessat. Et ideo post peccatum superbiae consecutum est in angelo peccante malum invidiae, secundum quod de bono hominis doluit; et etiam de excellentia divina, secundum quod eo Deus contra voluntatem ipsius Diaboli utitur in gloriam divinam.

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fected except with regard to something which is in some way suited to its nature. But there can be no sin when anyone is incited to good of the spiritual order; unless in such affection the rule of the superior be not kept. Such is precisely the sin of pride—not to be subject to a superior when subjection is due. Consequently the first sin of the angel can be none other than pride.

Yet, as a consequence, it was possible for envy also to be in them, since for the appetite to tend to the desire of something involves on its part resistance to anything contrary. Now the envious man repines over the good possessed by another, inasmuch as he deems his neighbor’s good to be a hindrance to his own. But another’s good could not be deemed a hindrance to the good coveted by the wicked angel, except inasmuch as he coveted a singular excellence, which would cease to be singular because of the excellence of some other. So, after the sin of pride, there followed the evil of envy in the sinning angel, whereby he grieved over man’s good, and also over the Divine excellence, according as against the devil’s will God makes use of man for the Divine glory. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod daemones non deReply Obj. 1: The demons do not delight in the oblectantur in obscenitatibus carnalium peccatorum; quasi scenities of the sins of the flesh, as if they themselves were ipsi afficiantur ad delectationes carnales, sed hoc totum disposed to carnal pleasures: it is wholly through envy that ex invidia procedit, quod in peccatis hominum quibu- they take pleasure in all sorts of human sins, so far as these scumque delectantur, inquantum sunt impedimenta hu- are hindrances to a man’s good.

mani boni. Ad secundum dicendum quod avaritia, secundum quod est speciale peccatum, est immoderatus appetitus rerum temporalium quae veniunt in usum vitae humanae, quaecumque pecunia aestimari possunt, et ad ista non afficiuntur daemones, sicut nec ad delectationes carnales. Unde avaritia proprie sumpta in eis esse non potest. Sed si avaritia dicatur omnis immoderata cupiditas habendi quodcumque bonum creatum, sic avaritia continetur in superbia quae est in daemonibus. Ira vero cum quadam passione est, sicut et concupiscentia. Unde ipsa in daemonibus esse non potest nisi metaphorice. Acedia vero est quaedam tristitia, qua homo redditur tardus ad spirituales actus propter corporalem laborem; qui daemonibus non competit. Et sic patet quod sola superbia et invidia sunt pure spiritualia peccata, quae daemonibus competere possunt, ita tamen quod invidia non sumatur pro passione, sed pro voluntate renitente bono alterius. Ad tertium dicendum quod sub invidia et superbia, prout in daemonibus ponuntur, comprehenduntur omnia peccata quae ab illis derivantur.

Reply Obj. 2: Avarice, considered as a special kind of sin, is the immoderate greed of temporal possessions which serve the use of human life, and which can be estimated in value of money; to these demons are not at all inclined, any more than they are to carnal pleasures. Consequently avarice properly so called cannot be in them. But if every immoderate greed of possessing any created good be termed avarice, in this way avarice is contained under the pride which is in the demons. Anger implies passion, and so does concupiscence; consequently they can only exist metaphorically in the demons. Sloth is a kind of sadness, whereby a man becomes sluggish in spiritual exercises because they weary the body; which does not apply to the demons. So it is evident that pride and envy are the only spiritual sins which can be found in demons; yet so that envy is not to be taken for a passion, but for a will resisting the good of another. Reply Obj. 3: Under envy and pride, as found in the demons, are comprised all other sins derived from them.

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Q. 63, A. 3

Article 3 Whether the devil desired to be as God? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus non appetierit esse ut Deus. Illud enim quod non cadit in apprehensione, non cadit in appetitu, cum bonum apprehensum moveat appetitum vel sensibilem, vel rationalem, vel intellectualem (in solo enim huiusmodi appetitu contingit esse peccatum). Sed creaturam aliquam esse aequalem Deo, non cadit in apprehensione, implicat enim contradictionem, quia necesse est finitum esse infinitum, si aequatur infinito. Ergo angelus non potuit appetere esse ut Deus. Praeterea, illud quod est finis naturae, absque peccato appeti potest. Sed assimilari Deo est finis in quem tendit naturaliter quaelibet creatura. Si ergo angelus appetiit esse ut Deus, non per aequalitatem, sed per similitudinem, videtur quod in hoc non peccaverit. Praeterea, angelus in maiori plenitudine sapientiae conditus est quam homo. Sed nullus homo, nisi omnino amens, eligit esse aequalis angelo, nedum Deo, quia electio non est nisi possibilium, de quibus est consilium. Ergo multo minus peccavit angelus appetendo esse ut Deus. Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae XIV, ex persona Diaboli, ascendam in caelum, et ero similis altissimo. Et Augustinus dicit in libro de Quaestionibus Vet. Test., quod elatione inflatus, voluit dici Deus. Respondeo dicendum quod angelus, absque omni dubio, peccavit appetendo esse ut Deus. Sed hoc potest intelligi dupliciter, uno modo, per aequiparantiam; alio modo, per similitudinem. Primo quidem modo, non potuit appetere esse ut Deus, quia scivit hoc esse impossibile, naturali cognitione; nec primum actum peccandi in ipso praecessit vel habitus vel passio ligans cognoscitivam ipsius virtutem, ut in particulari deficiens eligeret impossibile, sicut in nobis interdum accidit. Et tamen, dato quod esset possibile, hoc esset contra naturale desiderium. Inest enim unicuique naturale desiderium ad conservandum suum esse, quod non conservaretur, si transmutaretur in alteram naturam. Unde nulla res quae est in inferiori gradu naturae, potest appetere superioris naturae gradum, sicut asinus non appetit esse equus, quia si transferretur in gradum superioris naturae, iam ipsum non esset. Sed in hoc imaginatio decipitur, quia enim homo appetit esse in altiori gradu quantum ad aliqua accidentalia, quae possunt crescere absque corruptione subiecti, aestimatur quod possit appetere altiorem gradum naturae, in quem pervenire non posset nisi esse desineret. Manifestum est autem quod Deus excedit angelum, non secundum aliqua accidentalia, sed secundum gradum naturae, et etiam unus angelus alium. Unde impos-

Objection 1: It would seem that the devil did not desire to be as God. For what does not fall under apprehension, does not fall under desire; because the good which is apprehended moves the appetite, whether sensible, rational, or intellectual; and sin consists only in such desire. But for any creature to be God’s equal does not fall under apprehension, because it implies a contradiction; for if the finite equals the infinite, then it would itself be infinite. Therefore an angel could not desire to be as God. Obj. 2: Further, the natural end can always be desired without sin. But to be likened unto God is the end to which every creature naturally tends. If, therefore, the angel desired to be as God, not by equality, but by likeness, it would seem that he did not thereby sin. Obj. 3: Further, the angel was created with greater fullness of wisdom than man. But no man, save a fool, ever makes choice of being the equal of an angel, still less of God; because choice regards only things which are possible, regarding which one takes deliberation. Therefore much less did the angel sin by desiring to be as God. On the contrary, It is said, in the person of the devil (Isa 14:13, 14), I will ascend into heaven . . . I will be like the Most High. And Augustine (De Qu. Vet. Test. cxiii) says that being inflated with pride, he wished to be called God. I answer that, Without doubt the angel sinned by seeking to be as God. But this can be understood in two ways: first, by equality; second, by likeness. He could not seek to be as God in the first way; because by natural knowledge he knew that this was impossible: and there was no habit preceding his first sinful act, nor any passion fettering his mind, so as to lead him to choose what was impossible by failing in some particular; as sometimes happens in ourselves. And even supposing it were possible, it would be against the natural desire; because there exists in everything the natural desire of preserving its own nature; which would not be preserved were it to be changed into another nature. Consequently, no creature of a lower order can ever covet the grade of a higher nature; just as an ass does not desire to be a horse: for were it to be so upraised, it would cease to be itself. But herein the imagination plays us false; for one is liable to think that, because a man seeks to occupy a higher grade as to accidentals, which can increase without the destruction of the subject, he can also seek a higher grade of nature, to which he could not attain without ceasing to exist. Now it is quite evident that God surpasses the angels, not merely in accidentals, but also in degree of nature; and one angel, another. Consequently it is impossible for one

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sibile est quod angelus inferior appetat esse aequalis superiori; nedum quod appetat esse aequalis Deo. Appetere autem esse ut Deus per similitudinem, contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad id in quo aliquid natum est Deo assimilari. Et sic, si aliquis quantum ad hoc appetat esse Deo similis, non peccat, dummodo similitudinem Dei debito ordine appetat adipisci, ut scilicet eam a Deo habeat. Peccaret vero si quis etiam appeteret secundum iustitiam esse similis Deo, quasi propria virtute, et non ex virtute Dei. Alio vero modo potest aliquis appetere similis esse Deo, quantum ad hoc in quo non natus est assimilari; sicut si quis appeteret creare caelum et terram, quod est proprium Dei; in quo appetitu esset peccatum. Et hoc modo Diabolus appetiit esse ut Deus. Non ut ei assimilaretur quantum ad hoc quod est nulli subesse simpliciter, quia sic etiam suum non esse appeteret, cum nulla creatura esse possit nisi per hoc quod sub Deo esse participat. Sed in hoc appetiit esse similis Deo, quia appetiit ut finem ultimum beatitudinis id ad quod virtute suae naturae poterat pervenire, avertens suum appetitum a beatitudine supernaturali, quae est ex gratia Dei. Vel si appetiit ut ultimum finem illam Dei similitudinem quae datur ex gratia, voluit hoc habere per virtutem suae naturae, non ex divino auxilio secundum Dei dispositionem. Et hoc consonat dictis Anselmi, qui dicit quod appetiit illud ad quod pervenisset si stetisset. Et haec duo quodammodo in idem redeunt, quia secundum utrumque appetiit finalem beatitudinem per suam virtutem habere, quod est proprium Dei.

angel of lower degree to desire equality with a higher; and still more to covet equality with God. To desire to be as God according to likeness can happen in two ways. In one way, as to that likeness whereby everything is made to be likened unto God. And so, if anyone desire in this way to be Godlike, he commits no sin; provided that he desires such likeness in proper order, that is to say, that he may obtain it of God. But he would sin were he to desire to be like unto God even in the right way, as of his own, and not of God’s power. In another way one may desire to be like unto God in some respect which is not natural to one; as if one were to desire to create heaven and earth, which is proper to God; in which desire there would be sin. It was in this way that the devil desired to be as God. Not that he desired to resemble God by being subject to no one else absolutely; for so he would be desiring his own ‘not-being’; since no creature can exist except by holding its existence under God. But he desired resemblance with God in this respect—by desiring, as his last end of beatitude, something which he could attain by the virtue of his own nature, turning his appetite away from supernatural beatitude, which is attained by God’s grace. Or, if he desired as his last end that likeness of God which is bestowed by grace, he sought to have it by the power of his own nature; and not from Divine assistance according to God’s ordering. This harmonizes with Anselm’s opinion, who says that he sought that to which he would have come had he stood fast. These two views in a manner coincide; because according to both, he sought to have final beatitude of his own power, whereas this is proper to God alone. Quia vero quod est per se, est principium et causa Since, then, what exists of itself is the cause of what eius quod est per aliud, ex hoc etiam consecutum est exists of another, it follows from this furthermore that he quod appetiit aliquem principatum super alia habere. In sought to have dominion over others; wherein he also perquo etiam perverse voluit Deo assimilari. versely wished to be like unto God. Et per hoc patet responsio ad omnia obiecta. From this we have the answer to all the objections.

Article 4 Whether any demons are naturally wicked? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliqui daemones sint naturaliter mali. Dicit enim Porphyrius, ut Augustinus introducit X de Civ. Dei, quod est quoddam genus daemonum natura fallax, simulans deos et animas defunctorum. Sed esse fallacem est esse malum. Ergo aliqui daemones sunt naturaliter mali. Praeterea, sicut angeli sunt creati a Deo, ita et homines. Sed aliqui homines sunt naturaliter mali, de quibus dicitur Sap. XII, erat eorum malitia naturalis. Ergo et angeli aliqui possunt esse naturaliter mali.

Objection 1: It would seem that some demons are naturally wicked. For Porphyry says, as quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11): There is a class of demons of crafty nature, pretending that they are gods and the souls of the dead. But to be deceitful is to be evil. Therefore some demons are naturally wicked. Obj. 2: Further, as the angels are created by God, so are men. But some men are naturally wicked, of whom it is said (Wis 12:10): Their malice is natural. Therefore some angels may be naturally wicked.

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Praeterea, aliqua animalia irrationalia habent quasdam naturales malitias, sicut vulpes naturaliter est subdola, et lupus naturaliter est rapax, et tamen sunt creaturae Dei. Ergo et daemones, licet sint creaturae Dei, possunt esse naturaliter mali. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod daemones non sunt natura mali. Respondeo dicendum quod omne quod est, inquantum est et naturam habet aliquam, in bonum aliquod naturaliter tendit, utpote ex principio bono existens, quia semper effectus convertitur in suum principium. Contingit autem alicui bono particulari aliquod malum esse adiunctum, sicut igni coniungitur hoc malum quod est esse consumptivum aliorum, sed bono universali nullum malum potest esse adiunctum. Si ergo aliquid sit cuius natura ordinetur in aliquod bonum particulare, potest naturaliter tendere in aliquod malum, non inquantum malum, sed per accidens, inquantum est coniunctum cuidam bono. Si vero aliquid sit cuius natura ordinetur in aliquod bonum secundum communem boni rationem, hoc secundum suam naturam non potest tendere in aliquod malum. Manifestum est autem quod quaelibet natura intellectualis habet ordinem in bonum universale, quod potest apprehendere, et quod est obiectum voluntatis. Unde cum daemones sint substantiae intellectuales, nullo modo possunt habere inclinationem naturalem in aliquod quodcumque malum. Et ideo non possunt esse naturaliter mali. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ibidem reprehendit Porphyrium de hoc quod dixit quod daemones erant naturaliter fallaces, dicens eos non esse naturaliter fallaces, sed propria voluntate. Porphyrius autem hac ratione posuit daemones esse natura fallaces, quia ponebat daemones esse animalia habentia naturam sensitivam. Natura autem sensitiva ordinatur ad aliquod bonum particulare, cui potest esse coniunctum malum. Et secundum hoc, aliquam inclinationem naturalem habere possunt ad malum; per accidens tamen, inquantum malum est coniunctum bono. Ad secundum dicendum quod malitia aliquorum hominum potest dici naturalis, vel propter consuetudinem, quae est altera natura; vel propter naturalem inclinationem ex parte naturae sensitivae, ad aliquam inordinatam passionem, sicut quidam dicuntur naturaliter iracundi vel concupiscentes; non autem ex parte naturae intellectualis. Ad tertium dicendum quod animalia bruta secundum naturam sensitivam habent naturalem inclinationem ad quaedam particularia bona, quibus coniuncta sunt aliqua mala; sicut vulpes ad quaerendum victum sagaciter, cui adiungitur dolositas. Unde esse dolosum non est malum vulpi, cum sit ei naturale; sicut nec esse furiosum est malum cani, sicut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom.

Q. 63, A. 4

Obj. 3: Further, some irrational animals have wicked dispositions by nature: thus the fox is naturally sly, and the wolf naturally rapacious; yet they are God’s creatures. Therefore, although the demons are God’s creatures, they may be naturally wicked. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the demons are not naturally wicked. I answer that, Everything which exists, so far as it exists and has a particular nature, tends naturally towards some good; since it comes from a good principle; because the effect always reverts to its principle. Now a particular good may happen to have some evil connected with it; thus fire has this evil connected with it that it consumes other things: but with the universal good no evil can be connected. If, then, there be anything whose nature is inclined towards some particular good, it can tend naturally to some evil; not as evil, but accidentally, as connected with some good. But if anything of its nature be inclined to good in general, then of its own nature it cannot be inclined to evil. Now it is manifest that every intellectual nature is inclined towards good in general, which it can apprehend and which is the object of the will. Hence, since the demons are intellectual substances, they can in no wise have a natural inclination towards any evil whatsoever; consequently they cannot be naturally evil.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine rebukes Porphyry for saying that the demons are naturally deceitful; himself maintaining that they are not naturally so, but of their own will. Now the reason why Porphyry held that they are naturally deceitful was that, as he contended, demons are animals with a sensitive nature. Now the sensitive nature is inclined towards some particular good, with which evil may be connected. In this way, then, it can have a natural inclination to evil; yet only accidentally, inasmuch as evil is connected with good. Reply Obj. 2: The malice of some men can be called natural, either because of custom which is a second nature; or on account of the natural proclivity on the part of the sensitive nature to some inordinate passion, as some people are said to be naturally wrathful or lustful; but not on the part of the intellectual nature. Reply Obj. 3: Brute beasts have a natural inclination in their sensitive nature towards certain particular goods, with which certain evils are connected; thus the fox in seeking its food has a natural inclination to do so with a certain skill coupled with deceit. Wherefore it is not evil in the fox to be sly, since it is natural to him; as it is not evil in the dog to be fierce, as Dionysius observes (De Div. Nom. iv).

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Article 5 Whether the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his creation? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus in primo instanti suae creationis fuerit malus per culpam propriae voluntatis. Dicitur enim Ioan. VIII, de diabolo, ille homicida erat ab initio. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, I super Gen. ad Litt., informitas creaturae non praecessit formationem tempore, sed origine tantum. Per caelum autem quod legitur primo creatum, ut ipse dicit in II libro, intelligitur natura angelica informis; per hoc autem quod dicitur quod Deus dixit, fiat lux, et facta est lux, intelligitur formatio eius per conversionem ad Verbum; simul ergo natura angeli creata est, et facta est lux. Sed simul dum facta est lux, distincta est a tenebris, per quas intelliguntur angeli peccantes. Ergo in primo instanti suae creationis quidam angeli fuerunt beati, et quidam peccaverunt.

Praeterea, peccatum opponitur merito. Sed in primo instanti suae creationis aliqua natura intellectualis potest mereri; sicut anima Christi, vel etiam ipsi boni angeli. Ergo et daemones in primo instanti suae creationis potuerunt peccare. Praeterea, natura angelica virtuosior est quam natura corporea. Sed res corporalis statim in primo instanti suae creationis incipit habere suam operationem; sicut ignis in primo instanti quo generatus est, incipit moveri sursum. Ergo et angelus in primo instanti suae creationis potuit operari. Aut ergo habuit operationem rectam, aut non rectam. Si rectam, cum gratiam habuerint, per eam meruerunt beatitudinem. In angelis autem statim ad meritum sequitur praemium, ut supra dictum est. Ergo fuissent statim beati, et ita nunquam peccassent, quod est falsum. Relinquitur ergo quod in primo instanti, non recte operando, peccaverunt. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. Inter ea autem erant etiam daemones. Ergo et daemones aliquando fuerunt boni. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt quod statim daemones in primo instanti suae creationis mali fuerunt, non quidem per naturam, sed per peccatum propriae voluntatis, quia ex quo est factus Diabolus, iustitiam recusavit. Cui sententiae, ut Augustinus dicit, XI de Civ. Dei, quisquis acquiescit, non cum illis haereticis sapit, idest Manichaeis, qui dicunt quod diabolus habet naturam mali. Sed quia haec opinio auctoritati Scripturae contradicit (dicitur enim, sub figura principis Babylonis, de Diabolo, Isaiae XIV, quomodo cecidisti, Lucifer,

Objection 1: It would seem that the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his creation. For it is said of the devil (John 8:44): He was a murderer from the beginning. Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (Gen ad lit. i, 15), the lack of form in the creature did not precede its formation in order of time, but merely in order of nature. Now according to him (Gen ad lit. ii, 8), the heaven, which is said to have been created in the beginning, signifies the angelic nature while as yet not fully formed: and when it is said that God said: Be light made: and light was made, we are to understand the full formation of the angel by turning to the Word. Consequently, the nature of the angel was created, and light was made, in the one instant. But at the same moment that light was made, it was made distinct from darkness, whereby the angels who sinned are denoted. Therefore in the first instant of their creation some of the angels were made blessed, and some sinned. Obj. 3: Further, sin is opposed to merit. But some intellectual nature can merit in the first instant of its creation; as the soul of Christ, or also the good angels. Therefore the demons likewise could sin in the first instant of their creation. Obj. 4: Further, the angelic nature is more powerful than the corporeal nature. But a corporeal thing begins to have its operation in the first instant of its creation; as fire begins to move upwards in the first instant it is produced. Therefore the angel could also have his operation in the first instant of his creation. Now this operation was either ordinate or inordinate. If ordinate, then, since he had grace, he thereby merited beatitude. But with the angels the reward follows immediately upon merit; as was said above (Q. 62, A. 5). Consequently they would have become blessed at once; and so would never have sinned, which is false. It remains, then, that they sinned by inordinate action in their first instant. On the contrary, It is written (Gen 1:31): God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good. But among them were also the demons. Therefore the demons were at some time good. I answer that, Some have maintained that the demons were wicked straightway in the first instant of their creation; not by their nature, but by the sin of their own will; because, as soon as he was made, the devil refused righteousness. To this opinion, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 13), if anyone subscribes, he does not agree with those Manichean heretics who say that the devil’s nature is evil of itself. Since this opinion, however, is in contradiction with the authority of Scripture—for it is said of the devil under the figure of the prince of Babylon (Isa 14:12): How

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qui mane oriebaris? Et Ezech. XXVIII, in deliciis Paradisi Dei fuisti dicitur ad Diabolum sub persona regis Tyri), ideo a magistris haec opinio tanquam erronea rationabiliter reprobata est. Unde aliqui dixerunt quod angeli in primo instanti suae creationis peccare potuerunt, sed non peccaverunt. Sed haec opinio etiam a quibusdam improbatur ea ratione quia, cum duae operationes se consequuntur, impossibile videtur quod in eodem nunc utraque operatio terminetur. Manifestum est autem quod peccatum angeli fuit operatio creatione posterior. Terminus autem creationis est ipsum esse angeli; terminus vero operationis peccati est quod sunt mali. Impossibile ergo videtur quod in primo instanti quo angelus esse coepit, fuerit malus. Sed haec ratio non videtur sufficiens. Habet enim solum locum in motibus temporalibus, qui successive aguntur; sicut si motus localis sequitur ad alterationem, non potest in eodem instanti terminari alteratio et localis motus. Sed si sunt mutationes instantaneae, simul et in eodem instanti potest esse terminus primae et secundae mutationis; sicut in eodem instanti in quo illuminatur luna a sole, illuminatur aer a luna. Manifestum est autem quod creatio est instantanea; et similiter motus liberi arbitrii in angelis; non enim indigent collatione et discursu rationis, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde nihil prohibet simul et in eodem instanti esse terminum creationis, et terminum liberi arbitrii.

Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod impossibile fuit angelum in primo instanti peccasse per inordinatum actum liberi arbitrii. Quamvis enim res aliqua in primo instanti quo esse incipit, simul incipere possit operari; tamen illa operatio quae simul incipit cum esse rei, est ei ab agente a quo habet esse; sicut moveri sursum inest igni a generante. Unde si aliqua res habeat esse ab agente deficiente, quod possit esse causa defectivae actionis, poterit in primo instanti in quo incipit esse, habere defectivam operationem; sicut si tibia quae nascitur clauda ex debilitate seminis, statim incipiat claudicare. Agens autem quod angelos in esse produxit, scilicet Deus, non potest esse causa peccati. Unde non potest dici quod Diabolus in primo instanti suae creationis fuerit malus.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XI de Civ. Dei, cum dicitur quod Diabolus ab initio peccat, non ab initio ex quo creatus est, peccare putandus est, sed ab initio peccati; scilicet quia nunquam a peccato suo recessit. Ad secundum dicendum quod illa distinctio lucis et tenebrarum, secundum quod per tenebras peccata

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art thou fallen . . . O Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning! and it is said to the devil in the person of the King of Tyre (Ezek 28:13): Thou wast in the pleasures of the paradise of God,—consequently, this opinion was reasonably rejected by the masters as erroneous. Hence others have said that the angels, in the first instant of their creation, could have sinned, but did not. Yet this view also is repudiated by some, because, when two operations follow one upon the other, it seems impossible for each operation to terminate in the one instant. Now it is clear that the angel’s sin was an act subsequent to his creation. But the term of the creative act is the angel’s very being, while the term of the sinful act is the being wicked. It seems, then, an impossibility for the angel to have been wicked in the first instant of his existence. This argument, however, does not satisfy. For it holds good only in such movements as are measured by time, and take place successively; thus, if local movement follows a change, then the change and the local movement cannot be terminated in the same instant. But if the changes are instantaneous, then all at once and in the same instant there can be a term to the first and the second change; thus in the same instant in which the moon is lit up by the sun, the atmosphere is lit up by the moon. Now, it is manifest that creation is instantaneous; so also is the movement of free-will in the angels; for, as has been already stated, they have no occasion for comparison or discursive reasoning (Q. 58, A. 3). Consequently, there is nothing to hinder the term of creation and of free-will from existing in the same instant. We must therefore reply that, on the contrary, it was impossible for the angel to sin in the first instant by an inordinate act of free-will. For although a thing can begin to act in the first instant of its existence, nevertheless, that operation which begins with the existence comes of the agent from which it drew its nature; just as upward movement in fire comes of its productive cause. Therefore, if there be anything which derives its nature from a defective cause, which can be the cause of a defective action, it can in the first instant of its existence have a defective operation; just as the leg, which is defective from birth, through a defect in the principle of generation, begins at once to limp. But the agent which brought the angels into existence, namely, God, cannot be the cause of sin. Consequently it cannot be said that the devil was wicked in the first instant of his creation. Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), when it is stated that the devil sins from the beginning, he is not to be thought of as sinning from the beginning wherein he was created, but from the beginning of sin: that is to say, because he never went back from his sin. Reply Obj. 2: That distinction of light and darkness, whereby the sins of the demons are understood by the term

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daemonum intelliguntur, accipienda est secundum Dei praescientiam. Unde Augustinus dicit, XI de Civ. Dei, quod solus lucem ac tenebras discernere potuit, qui potuit etiam, priusquam caderent, praescire casuros. Ad tertium dicendum quod quidquid est in merito, est a Deo, et ideo in primo instanti suae creationis angelus mereri potuit. Sed non est similis ratio de peccato, ut dictum est. Ad quartum dicendum quod Deus non discrevit inter angelos ante aversionem quorundam et conversionem aliorum, ut Augustinus dicit, XI de Civ. Dei, et ideo omnes in gratia creati in primo instanti meruerunt. Sed quidam eorum statim impedimentum praestiterunt suae beatitudinis, praecedens meritum mortificantes. Et ideo beatitudine quam meruerunt, sunt privati.

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darkness, must be taken as according to God’s foreknowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), that He alone could discern light and darkness, Who also could foreknow, before they fell, those who would fall. Reply Obj. 3: All that is in merit is from God; and consequently an angel could merit in the first instant of his creation. The same reason does not hold good of sin; as has been said. Reply Obj. 4: God did not distinguish between the angels before the turning away of some of them, and the turning of others to Himself, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15). Therefore, as all were created in grace, all merited in their first instant. But some of them at once placed an impediment to their beatitude, thereby destroying their preceding merit; and consequently they were deprived of the beatitude which they had merited.

Article 6 Whether there was any interval between the creation and the fall of the angel? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliqua mora fuerit inter creationem et lapsum angeli. Dicitur enim Ezech. XXVIII, ambulasti perfectus in viis tuis a die conceptionis tuae, donec inventa est iniquitas in te. Sed ambulatio, cum sit motus continuus, requirit aliquam moram. Ergo aliqua mora fuit inter creationem Diaboli et eius lapsum. Praeterea, Origenes dicit quod serpens antiquus non statim supra pectus et ventrem suum ambulavit; per quod intelligitur eius peccatum. Ergo Diabolus non statim post primum instans suae creationis peccavit. Praeterea, posse peccare commune est homini et angelo. Fuit autem aliqua mora inter formationem hominis et eius peccatum. Ergo, pari ratione, fuit aliqua mora inter formationem Diaboli et eius peccatum. Praeterea, aliud instans fuit in quo Diabolus peccavit, ab instanti in quo creatus fuit. Sed inter quaelibet duo instantia cadit tempus medium. Ergo aliqua mora fuit inter creationem eius et lapsum. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. VIII, de Diabolo, quod in veritate non stetit. Et sicut Augustinus dicit, XI de Civ. Dei, oportet ut hoc sic accipiamus, quod in veritate fuerit, sed non permanserit. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc est duplex opinio. Sed probabilior, et sanctorum dictis magis consona est, quod statim post primum instans suae creationis Diabolus peccaverit. Et hoc necesse est dicere, si ponatur quod in primo instanti suae creationis in actum liberi arbitrii proruperit, et cum gratia fuerit creatus, ut supra diximus. Cum enim angeli per unum actum meritorium ad beatitudinem perveniant, ut supra dictum est,

Objection 1: It would seem that there was some interval between the angel’s creation and his fall. For, it is said (Ezek 28:15): Thou didst walk perfect in thy ways from the day of thy creation until iniquity was found in thee. But since walking is continuous movement, it requires an interval. Therefore there was some interval between the devil’s creation and his fall. Obj. 2: Further, Origen says (Hom. i in Ezech.) that the serpent of old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly; which refers to his sin. Therefore the devil did not sin at once after the first instant of his creation. Obj. 3: Further, capability of sinning is common alike to man and angel. But there was some delay between man’s formation and his sin. Therefore, for the like reason there was some interval between the devil’s formation and his sin. Obj. 4: Further, the instant wherein the devil sinned was distinct from the instant wherein he was created. But there is a middle time between every two instants. Therefore there was an interval between his creation and his fall. On the contrary, It is said of the devil (John 8:44): He stood not in the truth: and, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), we must understand this in the sense, that he was in the truth, but did not remain in it. I answer that, There is a twofold opinion on this point. But the more probable one, which is also more in harmony with the teachings of the Saints, is that the devil sinned at once after the first instant of his creation. This must be maintained if it be held that he elicited an act of free-will in the first instant of his creation, and that he was created in grace; as we have said (Q. 62, A. 3). For since the angels attain beatitude by one meritorious act, as was said

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Malice of the Angels with Regard to Sin

Q. 63, A. 7

si Diabolus in primo instanti, in gratia creatus, meruit, above (Q. 62, A. 5), if the devil, created in grace, merited in statim post primum instans beatitudinem accepisset, ni- the first instant, he would at once have received beatitude si statim impedimentum praestitisset peccando. after that first instant, if he had not placed an impediment by sinning. Si vero ponatur quod angelus in gratia creatus non If, however, it be contended that the angel was not crefuerit; vel quod in primo instanti actum liberi arbitrii ated in grace, or that he could not elicit an act of free-will in non potuerit habere; nihil prohibet aliquam moram fuis- the first instant, then there is nothing to prevent some interse inter creationem et lapsum. val being interposed between his creation and fall. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per motus corReply Obj. 1: Sometimes in Holy Scripture spiritual porales, qui per tempus mensurantur, quandoque in instantaneous movements are represented by corporeal sacra Scriptura intelliguntur metaphorice motus spiri- movements which are measured by time. In this way by tuales instantanei. Et sic per ambulationem intelligitur walking we are to understand the movement of free-will motus liberi arbitrii tendentis in bonum. tending towards good. Ad secundum dicendum quod Origenes dicit quod Reply Obj. 2: Origen says, The serpent of old did not serpens antiquus non a principio, nec statim supra pectus from the first walk upon his breast and belly, because of the ambulavit, propter primum instans, in quo malus non first instant in which he was not wicked. fuit. Ad tertium dicendum quod angelus habet liberum Reply Obj. 3: An angel has an inflexible free-will afarbitrium inflexibile post electionem, et ideo nisi sta- ter once choosing; consequently, if after the first instant, in tim post primum instans, in quo naturalem motum ha- which he had a natural movement to good, he had not at buit ad bonum, impedimentum beatitudini praestitisset, once placed a barrier to beatitude, he would have been confuisset firmatus in bono. Sed non est simile de homine. firmed in good. It is not so with man; and therefore the arEt ideo ratio non sequitur. gument does not hold good. Ad quartum dicendum quod inter quaelibet duo Reply Obj. 4: It is true to say that there is a middle time instantia esse tempus medium, habet veritatem inquan- between every two instants, so far as time is continuous, as tum tempus est continuum, ut probatur in VI Physic. it is proved Phys. vi, text. 2. But in the angels, who are not Sed in angelis, qui non sunt subiecti caelesti motui, qui subject to the heavenly movement, which is primarily meaprimo per tempus continuum mensuratur, tempus acci- sured by continuous time, time is taken to mean the succespitur pro ipsa successione operationum intellectus, vel sion of their mental acts, or of their affections. So the first etiam affectus. Sic igitur instans primum in angelis in- instant in the angels is understood to respond to the operatelligitur respondere operationi mentis angelicae, qua se tion of the angelic mind, whereby it introspects itself by its in seipsam convertit per vespertinam cognitionem, quia evening knowledge because on the first day evening is menin primo die commemoratur vespere, sed non mane. Et tioned, but not morning. This operation was good in them haec quidem operatio in omnibus bona fuit. Sed ab hac all. From such operation some of them were converted to operatione quidam per matutinam cognitionem ad lau- the praise of the Word by their morning knowledge while dem Verbi sunt conversi, quidam vero, in seipsis rema- others, absorbed in themselves, became night, swelling up nentes, facti sunt nox, per superbiam intumescentes, ut with pride, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. iv, 24). Hence the Augustinus dicit, IV super Gen. ad Litt. Et sic prima ope- first act was common to them all; but in their second they ratio fuit omnibus communis; sed in secunda sunt di- were separated. Consequently they were all of them good in screti. Et ideo in primo instanti omnes fuerunt boni; sed the first instant; but in the second the good were set apart in secundo fuerunt boni a malis distincti. from the wicked.

Article 7 Whether the highest angel among those who sinned was the highest of all? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ille angelus qui fuit supremus inter peccantes, non fuerit supremus inter omnes. Dicitur enim de eo Ezech. XXVIII, tu Cherub extentus et protegens, posui te in monte sancto Dei. Sed ordo Cherubim est sub ordine Seraphim, ut Dionysius dicit, VII cap. Ang. Hier. Ergo angelus qui fuit

Objection 1: It would seem that the highest among the angels who sinned was not the highest of all. For it is stated (Ezek 28:14): Thou wast a cherub stretched out, and protecting, and I set thee in the holy mountain of God. Now the order of the Cherubim is under the order of the Seraphim, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi, vii). Therefore,

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Q. 63, A. 7

Angels

supremus inter peccantes, non fuit supremus inter omnes. Praeterea, Deus fecit naturam intellectualem propter beatitudinem consequendam. Si igitur angelus qui fuit supremus inter omnes, peccavit, sequitur quod ordinatio divina fuerit frustrata in nobilissima creatura. Quod est inconveniens. Praeterea, quanto aliquid magis inclinatur in aliquid, tanto minus potest ab illo deficere. Sed angelus quanto est superior, tanto magis inclinatur in Deum. Ergo minus potest a Deo peccando deficere. Et sic videtur quod angelus qui peccavit, non fuerit supremus inter omnes, sed de inferioribus. Sed contra est quod dicit Gregorius, in Homilia de Centum Ovibus, quod primus angelus qui peccavit, dum cunctis agminibus angelorum praelatus, eorum claritatem transcenderet, ex eorum comparatione clarior fuit. Respondeo dicendum quod in peccato est duo considerare, scilicet pronitatem ad peccandum; et motivum ad peccandum. Si ergo consideremus in angelis pronitatem ad peccandum, minus videtur quod peccaverint superiores angeli, quam inferiores. Et propter hoc Damascenus dicit quod maior eorum qui peccaverunt, fuit terrestri ordini praelatus. Et videtur haec opinio consonare positioni Platonicorum, quam Augustinus recitat in Lib. de Civ. Dei VIII et X. Dicebant enim quod omnes dii erant boni, sed daemonum quidam boni, quidam mali; deos nominantes substantias intellectuales quae sunt a globo lunari superius, daemones vero substantias intellectuales quae sunt a globo lunari inferius, superiores hominibus ordine naturae. Nec est abiicienda haec opinio tanquam a fide aliena, quia tota creatura corporalis administratur a Deo per angelos, ut Augustinus dicit, III de Trin.; unde nihil prohibet dicere inferiores angelos divinitus distributos esse ad administrandum inferiora corpora, superiores vero ad administrandum corpora superiora, supremos vero ad assistendum Deo. Et secundum hoc Damascenus dicit quod illi qui ceciderunt, fuerunt de inferioribus, in quorum etiam ordine aliqui boni angeli permanserunt. Si vero consideretur motivum ad peccandum, maius invenitur in superioribus quam in inferioribus. Fuit enim daemonum peccatum superbia, ut supra dictum est; cuius motivum est excellentia, quae fuit maior in superioribus. Et ideo Gregorius dicit quod ille qui peccavit, fuit superior inter omnes. Et hoc videtur probabilius. Quia peccatum angeli non processit ex aliqua pronitate, sed ex solo libero arbitrio, unde magis videtur consideranda esse ratio quae sumitur a motivo ad peccandum. Non est tamen inde alii opinioni praeiudicandum, quia etiam in principe inferiorum angelorum potuit esse aliquod motivum ad peccandum.

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the highest angel among those who sinned was not the highest of all. Obj. 2: Further, God made intellectual nature in order that it might attain to beatitude. If therefore the highest of the angels sinned, it follows that the Divine ordinance was frustrated in the noblest creature, which is unfitting. Obj. 3: Further, the more a subject is inclined towards anything, so much the less can it fall away from it. But the higher an angel is, so much the more is he inclined towards God. Therefore so much the less can he turn away from God by sinning. And so it seems that the angel who sinned was not the highest of all, but one of the lower angels. On the contrary, Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.) says that the chief angel who sinned, being set over all the hosts of angels, surpassed them in brightness, and was by comparison the most illustrious among them. I answer that, Two things have to be considered in sin, namely, the proneness to sin, and the motive for sinning. If, then, in the angels we consider the proneness to sin, it seems that the higher angels were less likely to sin than the lower. On this account Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), that the highest of those who sinned was set over the terrestrial order. This opinion seems to agree with the view of the Platonists, which Augustine quotes (De Civ. Dei vii, 6, 7; x, 9, 10, 11). For they said that all the gods were good; whereas some of the demons were good, and some bad; naming as ‘gods’ the intellectual substances which are above the lunar sphere, and calling by the name of demons the intellectual substances which are beneath it, yet higher than men in the order of nature. Nor is this opinion to be rejected as contrary to faith; because the whole corporeal creation is governed by God through the angels, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5). Consequently there is nothing to prevent us from saying that the lower angels were divinely set aside for presiding over the lower bodies, the higher over the higher bodies; and the highest to stand before God. And in this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that they who fell were of the lower grade of angels; yet in that order some of them remained good. But if the motive for sinning be considered, we find that it existed in the higher angels more than in the lower. For, as has been said (A. 2), the demons’ sin was pride; and the motive of pride is excellence, which was greater in the higher spirits. Hence Gregory says that he who sinned was the very highest of all. This seems to be the more probable view: because the angels’ sin did not come of any proneness, but of free choice alone. Consequently that argument seems to have the more weight which is drawn from the motive in sinning. Yet this must not be prejudicial to the other view; because there might be some motive for sinning in him also who was the chief of the lower angels.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Cherubim interpretatur plenitudo scientiae; Seraphim autem interpretatur ardentes sive incedentes. Et sic patet quod Cherubim denominatur a scientia, quae potest esse cum mortali peccato; Seraphim vero denominatur ab ardore caritatis, quae cum peccato mortali esse non potest. Et ideo primus angelus peccans non est denominatus Seraphim, sed Cherubim. Ad secundum dicendum quod divina intentio non frustratur nec in his qui peccant, nec in his qui salvantur, utrorumque enim eventum Deus praecognoscit, et ex utroque habet gloriam, dum hos ex sua bonitate salvat, illos ex sua iustitia punit. Ipsa vero creatura intellectualis, dum peccat, a fine debito deficit. Nec hoc est inconveniens in quacumque creatura sublimi, sic enim creatura intellectualis instituta est a Deo, ut in eius arbitrio positum sit agere propter finem. Ad tertium dicendum quod quantacumque inclinatio ad bonum fuerit in supremo angelo, tamen ei necessitatem non inducebat. Unde potuit per liberum arbitrium eam non sequi.

Q. 63, A. 8

Reply Obj. 1: Cherubim is interpreted fullness of knowledge, while Seraphim means those who are on fire, or who set on fire. Consequently Cherubim is derived from knowledge, which is compatible with mortal sin; but Seraphim is derived from the heat of charity, which is incompatible with mortal sin. Therefore the first angel who sinned is called, not a Seraph, but a Cherub. Reply Obj. 2: The Divine intention is not frustrated either in those who sin, or in those who are saved; for God knows beforehand the end of both; and He procures glory from both, saving these of His goodness, and punishing those of His justice. But the intellectual creature, when it sins, falls away from its due end. Nor is this unfitting in any exalted creature; because the intellectual creature was so made by God, that it lies within its own will to act for its end. Reply Obj. 3: However great was the inclination towards good in the highest angel, there was no necessity imposed upon him: consequently it was in his power not to follow it.

Article 8 Whether the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum primi angeli peccantis non fuit aliis causa peccandi. Causa enim prior est causato. Sed omnes simul peccaverunt, ut Damascenus dicit. Ergo peccatum unius non fuit aliis causa peccandi. Praeterea, primum peccatum angeli non potest esse nisi superbia, ut supra dictum est. Sed superbia excellentiam quaerit. Magis autem excellentiae repugnat quod aliquis inferiori subdatur, quam superiori, et sic non videtur quod daemones peccaverint per hoc quod voluerunt subesse alicui superiorum angelorum, potius quam Deo. Sic autem peccatum unius angeli fuisset aliis causa peccandi, si eos ad hoc induxisset ut sibi subiicerentur. Non ergo videtur quod peccatum primi angeli fuerit causa peccandi aliis. Praeterea, maius peccatum est velle subesse alteri contra Deum, quam contra Deum alteri velle praeesse, quia minus habet de motivo ad peccandum. Si ergo peccatum primi angeli fuit aliis causa peccandi in hoc, quod eos ut sibi subiicerentur induxit, gravius peccassent inferiores angeli quam supremus, quod est contra hoc quod super illud Psalmi CIII, draco iste quem formasti, dicit Glossa, qui ceteris in esse erat excellentior, factus est in malitia maior. Non ergo peccatum primi angeli fuit aliis causa peccandi.

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of the others sinning. For the cause precedes the effect. But, as Damascene observes (De Fide Orth. ii), they all sinned at one time. Therefore the sin of one was not the cause of the others’ sinning. Obj. 2: Further, an angel’s first sin can only be pride, as was shown above (A. 2). But pride seeks excellence. Now it is more contrary to excellence for anyone to be subject to an inferior than to a superior; and so it does not appear that the angels sinned by desiring to be subject to a higher angel rather than to God. Yet the sin of one angel would have been the cause of the others sinning, if he had induced them to be his subjects. Therefore it does not appear that the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning. Obj. 3: Further, it is a greater sin to wish to be subject to another against God, than to wish to be over another against God; because there is less motive for sinning. If, therefore, the sin of the foremost angel was the cause of the others sinning, in that he induced them to subject themselves to him, then the lower angels would have sinned more deeply than the highest one; which is contrary to a gloss on Ps. 103:26: This dragon which Thou hast formed— He who was the more excellent than the rest in nature, became the greater in malice. Therefore the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of the others sinning.

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Q. 63, A. 8

Angels

Sed contra est quod dicitur Apoc. XII, quod draco traxit secum tertiam partem stellarum. Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum primi angeli fuit aliis causa peccandi, non quidem cogens, sed quadam quasi exhortatione inducens. Cuius signum ex hoc apparet, quod omnes daemones illi supremo subduntur; ut manifeste apparet per illud quod dicit dominus, Matth. XXV, ite, maledicti, in ignem aeternum, qui paratus est Diabolo et angelis eius. Habet enim hoc ordo divinae iustitiae, ut cuius suggestioni aliquis consentit in culpa, eius potestati subdatur in poena; secundum illud II Petr. II, a quo quis superatus est, huic servus addictus est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet simul daemones peccaverint, tamen peccatum unius potuit esse aliis causa peccandi. Angelus enim non indiget ad eligendum vel exhortandum vel etiam consentiendum, temporis mora; sicut homo, qui deliberatione indiget ad eligendum et ad consentiendum, et locutione vocali ad exhortandum, quorum utrumque tempore agitur. Manifestum est autem quod etiam homo simul dum aliquid iam corde concepit, in eodem instanti incipit loqui. Et in ultimo instanti locutionis, in quo aliquis sensum loquentis capit, potest assentire ei quod dicitur, ut patet maxime in primis conceptionibus, quas quisque probat auditas. Sublato ergo tempore locutionis et deliberationis quod in nobis requiritur, in eodem instanti in quo primus angelus suam affectionem intelligibili locutione expressit, possibile fuit aliis in eam consentire. Ad secundum dicendum quod superbus, ceteris paribus, magis vult subesse superiori quam inferiori. Sed si aliquam excellentiam consequatur sub inferiori, quam sub superiori consequi non possit, magis eligit inferiori subesse quam superiori. Sic igitur non fuit contra superbiam daemonum quod subesse inferiori voluerunt, in eius principatum consentientes; ad hoc eum principem et ducem habere volentes, ut virtute naturali suam ultimam beatitudinem consequerentur; praesertim quia supremo angelo naturae ordine etiam tunc subiecti erant.

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On the contrary, It is said (Rev 12:4) that the dragon drew with him the third part of the stars of heaven. I answer that, The sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning; not as compelling them, but as inducing them by a kind of exhortation. A token thereof appears in this, that all the demons are subjects of that highest one; as is evident from our Lord’s words: Go, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels (Matt 25:41). For the order of Divine justice exacts that whosoever consents to another’s evil suggestion, shall be subjected to him in his punishment; according to 2 Pet. 2:19: By whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave. Reply Obj. 1: Although the demons all sinned in the one instant, yet the sin of one could be the cause of the rest sinning. For the angel needs no delay of time for choice, exhortation, or consent, as man, who requires deliberation in order to choose and consent, and vocal speech in order to exhort; both of which are the work of time. And it is evident that even man begins to speak in the very instant when he takes thought; and in the last instant of speech, another who catches his meaning can assent to what is said; as is especially evident with regard to primary concepts, which everyone accepts directly they are heard.

Taking away, then, the time for speech and deliberation which is required in us, in the same instant in which the highest angel expressed his affection by intelligible speech, it was possible for the others to consent thereto. Reply Obj. 2: Other things being equal, the proud would rather be subject to a superior than to an inferior. Yet he chooses rather to be subject to an inferior than to a superior, if he can procure an advantage under an inferior which he cannot under a superior. Consequently it was not against the demons’ pride for them to wish to serve an inferior by yielding to his rule; for they wanted to have him as their prince and leader, so that they might attain their ultimate beatitude of their own natural powers; especially because in the order of nature they were even then subject to the highest angel. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum Reply Obj. 3: As was observed above (Q. 62, A. 6), an est, angelus non habet aliquid retardans, sed secundum angel has nothing in him to retard his action, and with his suam totam virtutem movetur in illud ad quod movetur, whole might he is moved to whatsoever he is moved, be sive in bonum sive in malum. Quia igitur supremus an- it good or bad. Consequently since the highest angel had gelus maiorem habuit naturalem virtutem quam inferio- greater natural energy than the lower angels, he fell into sin res, intensiori motu in peccatum prolapsus est. Et ideo with intenser energy, and therefore he became the greater factus est etiam in malitia maior. in malice.

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Malice of the Angels with Regard to Sin

Q. 63, A. 9

Article 9 Whether the angels who sinned were more than those who stood firm? Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod plures peccaverunt de angelis, quam permanserunt. Quia, ut dicit Philosophus, malum est ut in pluribus, bonum ut in paucioribus. Praeterea, iustitia et peccatum eadem ratione inveniuntur in angelis et hominibus. Sed in hominibus plures inveniuntur mali quam boni; secundum illud Eccle. I, stultorum infinitus est numerus. Ergo pari ratione in angelis. Praeterea, angeli distinguuntur secundum personas, et secundum ordines. Si igitur plures personae angelicae remanserunt, videtur etiam quod non de omnibus ordinibus aliqui peccaverunt. Sed contra est quod dicitur IV Reg. VI, plures nobiscum sunt quam cum illis; quod exponitur de bonis angelis qui sunt nobiscum in auxilium, et de malis qui nobis adversantur. Respondeo dicendum quod plures angeli permanserunt quam peccaverunt. Quia peccatum est contra naturalem inclinationem, ea vero quae contra naturam fiunt, ut in paucioribus accidunt; natura enim consequitur suum effectum vel semper, vel ut in pluribus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Philosophus loquitur quantum ad homines, in quibus malum contingit ex hoc quod sequuntur bona sensibilia, quae sunt pluribus nota, deserto bono rationis, quod paucioribus notum est. In angelis autem non est nisi natura intellectualis. Unde non est similis ratio. Et per hoc patet responsio ad secundum. Ad tertium dicendum quod secundum illos qui dicunt quod Diabolus maior fuit de inferiori ordine angelorum, qui praesunt terrestribus, manifestum est quod non de quolibet ordine ceciderunt, sed de infimo tantum. Secundum vero illos qui ponunt maiorem Diabolum de supremo fuisse ordine, probabile est quod de quolibet ordine aliqui ceciderunt; sicut et in quemlibet ordinem homines assumuntur in supplementum ruinae angelicae. In quo etiam magis comprobatur libertas liberi arbitrii, quae secundum quemlibet gradum creaturae in malum flecti potest. In sacra Scriptura tamen nomina quorundam ordinum, ut Seraphim et thronorum, daemonibus non attribuuntur; quia haec nomina sumuntur ab ardore caritatis et ab inhabitatione Dei, quae non possunt esse cum peccato mortali. Attribuuntur autem eis nomina Cherubim, potestatum et principatuum, quia haec nomina sumuntur a scientia et potentia, quae bonis malisque possunt esse communia.

Objection 1: It would seem that more angels sinned than stood firm. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): Evil is in many, but good is in few. Obj. 2: Further, justice and sin are to be found in the same way in men and in angels. But there are more wicked men to be found than good; according to Eccles. 1:15: The number of fools is infinite. Therefore for the same reason it is so with the angels. Obj. 3: Further, the angels are distinguished according to persons and orders. Therefore if more angelic persons stood firm, it would appear that those who sinned were not from all the orders. On the contrary, It is said (4 Kgs 6:16): There are more with us than with them: which is expounded of the good angels who are with us to aid us, and the wicked spirits who are our foes. I answer that, More angels stood firm than sinned. Because sin is contrary to the natural inclination; while that which is against the natural order happens with less frequency; for nature procures its effects either always, or more often than not. Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking with regard to men, in whom evil comes to pass from seeking after sensible pleasures, which are known to most men, and from forsaking the good dictated by reason, which good is known to the few. In the angels there is only an intellectual nature; hence the argument does not hold. And from this we have the answer to the second difficulty. Reply Obj. 3: According to those who hold that the chief devil belonged to the lower order of the angels, who are set over earthly affairs, it is evident that some of every order did not fall, but only those of the lowest order. According to those who maintain that the chief devil was of the highest order, it is probable that some fell of every order; just as men are taken up into every order to supply for the angelic ruin. In this view the liberty of free-will is more established; which in every degree of creature can be turned to evil. In the Sacred Scripture, however, the names of some orders, as of Seraphim and Thrones, are not attributed to demons; since they are derived from the ardor of love and from God’s indwelling, which are not consistent with mortal sin. Yet the names of Cherubim, Powers, and Principalities are attributed to them; because these names are derived from knowledge and from power, which can be common to both good and bad.

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Question 64 The Punishment of the Demons Consequenter quaeritur de poena daemonum. Et cirIt now remains as a sequel to deal with the punishment ca hoc quaeruntur quatuor. of the demons; under which heading there are four points of inquiry: Primo, de obtenebratione intellectus. (1) Of their darkness of intellect; Secundo, de obstinatione voluntatis. (2) Of their obstinacy of will; Tertio, de dolore ipsorum. (3) Of their grief; Quarto, de loco poenali ipsorum. (4) Of their place of punishment.

Article 1 Whether the demons’ intellect is darkened by privation of the knowledge of all truth? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus daemonis sit obtenebratus per privationem cognitionis omnis veritatis. Si enim aliquam veritatem cognoscerent, maxime cognoscerent seipsos, quod est cognoscere substantias separatas. Hoc autem eorum miseriae non convenit, cum ad magnam beatitudinem pertinere videatur, intantum quod quidam ultimam beatitudinem hominis posuerunt in cognoscendo substantias separatas. Ergo daemones privantur omni cognitione veritatis. Praeterea, id quod est manifestissimum in natura, videtur esse maxime manifestum angelis, sive bonis sive malis. Quod enim non sit nobis maxime manifestum, contingit ex debilitate intellectus nostri a phantasmatibus accipientis, sicut ex debilitate oculi noctuae contingit quod non possit videre lumen solis. Sed daemones non possunt cognoscere Deum, qui est secundum se manifestissimus, cum sit in summo veritatis, eo quod non habent mundum cor, quo solo videtur Deus. Ergo nec alia cognoscere possunt. Praeterea, cognitio rerum angelis conveniens est duplex, secundum Augustinum, scilicet matutina, et vespertina. Sed cognitio matutina non competit daemonibus, quia non vident res in Verbo, nec etiam cognitio vespertina, quia cognitio vespertina refert res cognitas ad laudem creatoris (unde post vespere fit mane, ut dicitur Gen. I). Ergo daemones non possunt cognitionem de rebus habere. Praeterea, angeli in sua conditione cognoverunt mysterium regni Dei, ut Augustinus dicit, V super Gen. ad Litt. Sed daemones hac cognitione privati sunt, quia si cognovissent, nequaquam dominum gloriae crucifixis-

Objection 1: It would seem that the demons’ intellect is darkened by being deprived of the knowledge of all truth. For if they knew any truth at all, they would most of all know themselves; which is to know separated substances. But this is not in keeping with their unhappiness: for this seems to belong to great happiness, insomuch as that some writers have assigned as man’s last happiness the knowledge of the separated substances. Therefore the demons are deprived of all knowledge of truth. Obj. 2: Further, what is most manifest in its nature, seems to be specially manifest to the angels, whether good or bad. That the same is not manifest with regard to ourselves, comes from the weakness of our intellect which draws its knowledge from phantasms; as it comes from the weakness of its eye that the owl cannot behold the light of the sun. But the demons cannot know God, Who is most manifest of Himself, because He is the sovereign truth; and this is because they are not clean of heart, whereby alone can God be seen. Therefore neither can they know other things. Obj. 3: Further, according to Augustine (Gen ad lit. iv, 22), the proper knowledge of the angels is twofold; namely, morning and evening. But the demons have no morning knowledge, because they do not see things in the Word; nor have they the evening knowledge, because this evening knowledge refers the things known to the Creator’s praise (hence, after evening comes morning). Therefore the demons can have no knowledge of things. Obj. 4: Further, the angels at their creation knew the mystery of the kingdom of God, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. v, 19; De Civ. Dei xi). But the demons are deprived of such knowledge: for if they had known it, they would never

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sent, ut dicitur I Cor. II. Ergo, pari ratione, omni alia co- have crucified the Lord of glory, as is said 1 Cor. 2:8. Theregnitione veritatis sunt privati. fore, for the same reason, they are deprived of all other knowledge of truth. Praeterea, quamcumque veritatem aliquis scit, Obj. 5: Further, whatever truth anyone knows is known aut cognoscit eam naturaliter, sicut nos cognoscimus either naturally, as we know first principles; or by derivprima principia; aut accipiendo ab alio, sicut quae sci- ing it from someone else, as we know by learning; or by mus addiscendo; aut per experientiam longi temporis, long experience, as the things we learn by discovery. Now, sicut quae scimus inveniendo. Sed daemones non pos- the demons cannot know the truth by their own nature, sunt cognoscere veritatem per suam naturam, quia ab eis because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 33), the good divisi sunt boni angeli sicut lux a tenebris, ut Augustinus angels are separated from them as light is from darkness; dicit; omnis autem manifestatio fit per lumen, ut dicitur and every manifestation is made through light, as is said Ephes. V. Similiter etiam neque per revelationem, neque Eph. 5:13. In like manner they cannot learn by revelation, addiscendo a bonis angelis, quia non est conventio lucis nor by learning from the good angels: because there is no ad tenebras, ut dicitur II Cor. VI. Neque etiam per expe- fellowship of light with darkness (2 Cor 6:14). Nor can they rientiam longi temporis, quia experientia a sensu oritur. learn by long experience: because experience comes of the Ergo nulla in eis est cognitio veritatis. senses. Consequently there is no knowledge of truth in them. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that, Div. Nom., quod data daemonibus angelica dona nequa- certain gifts were bestowed upon the demons which, we say, quam mutata esse dicimus, sed sunt integra et splendidis- have not been changed at all, but remain entire and most brilsima. Inter ista autem naturalia dona est cognitio verita- liant. Now, the knowledge of truth stands among those nattis. Ergo in eis est aliqua veritatis cognitio. ural gifts. Consequently there is some knowledge of truth in them. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est cognitio veI answer that, The knowledge of truth is twofold: ritatis, una quidem quae habetur per gratiam; alia vero one which comes of nature, and one which comes of grace. quae habetur per naturam. Et ista quae habetur per gra- The knowledge which comes of grace is likewise twofold: tiam, est duplex, una quae est speculativa tantum, sicut the first is purely speculative, as when Divine secrets are cum alicui aliqua secreta divinorum revelantur; alia vero imparted to an individual; the other is effective, and proquae est affectiva, producens amorem Dei; et haec pro- duces love for God; which knowledge properly belongs to prie pertinet ad donum sapientiae. the gift of wisdom. Harum autem trium cognitionum prima in daemoOf these three kinds of knowledge the first was neither nibus nec est ablata, nec diminuta. Consequitur enim ip- taken away nor lessened in the demons. For it follows from sam naturam angeli, qui secundum suam naturam est the very nature of the angel, who, according to his nature, quidam intellectus vel mens; propter simplicitatem au- is an intellect or mind: since on account of the simplicity of tem suae substantiae, a natura eius aliquid subtrahi non his substance, nothing can be withdrawn from his nature, potest, ut sic per subtractionem naturalium puniatur, si- so as to punish him by subtracting from his natural powcut homo punitur per subtractionem manus aut pedis ers, as a man is punished by being deprived of a hand or aut alicuius huiusmodi. Et ideo dicit Dionysius quod do- a foot or of something else. Therefore Dionysius says (Div. na naturalia in eis integra manent. Unde naturalis co- Nom. iv) that the natural gifts remain entire in them. Congnitio in eis non est diminuta. Secunda autem cognitio, sequently their natural knowledge was not diminished. The quae est per gratiam, in speculatione consistens, non est second kind of knowledge, however, which comes of grace, in eis totaliter ablata, sed diminuta, quia de huiusmo- and consists in speculation, has not been utterly taken away di secretis divinis tantum revelatur eis quantum oportet, from them, but lessened; because, of these Divine secrets vel mediantibus angelis, vel per aliqua temporalia divinae only so much is revealed to them as is necessary; and that virtutis effecta, ut dicit Augustinus, IX de Civ. Dei; non is done either by means of the angels, or through some temautem sicut ipsis sanctis angelis, quibus plura et clarius poral workings of Divine power, as Augustine says (De Civ. revelantur in ipso Verbo. A tertia vero cognitione sunt Dei ix, 21); but not in the same degree as to the holy angels, totaliter privati, sicut et a caritate. to whom many more things are revealed, and more fully, in the Word Himself. But of the third knowledge, as likewise of charity, they are utterly deprived. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod felicitas consistit Reply Obj. 1: Happiness consists in self-application to in applicatione ad id quod superius est. Substantiae au- something higher. The separated substances are above us in tem separatae sunt ordine naturae supra nos, unde ali- the order of nature; hence man can have happiness of a kind qualis ratio felicitatis esse potest homini si cognoscat by knowing the separated substances, although his perfect

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substantias separatas; licet perfecta eius felicitas sit in cognoscendo primam substantiam, scilicet Deum. Sed substantiae separatae cognoscere substantiam separatam est connaturale, sicut et nobis cognoscere naturas sensibiles. Unde sicut in hoc non est felicitas hominis, quod cognoscat naturas sensibiles; ita non est felicitas angeli in hoc, quod cognoscat substantias separatas. Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod est manifestissimum in natura, est nobis occultum propter hoc quod excedit proportionem intellectus nostri; et non solum propter hoc quod intellectus noster accipit a phantasmatibus. Excedit autem divina substantia non solum proportionem intellectus humani, sed etiam intellectus angelici. Unde nec ipse angelus secundum suam naturam, potest cognoscere Dei substantiam. Potest tamen altiorem cognitionem de Deo habere per suam naturam quam homo, propter perfectionem sui intellectus. Et talis cognitio Dei remanet etiam in daemonibus. Licet enim non habeant puritatem quae est per gratiam, habent tamen puritatem naturae, quae sufficit ad cognitionem Dei quae eis competit ex natura. Ad tertium dicendum quod creatura tenebra est, comparata excellentiae divini luminis, et ideo cognitio creaturae in propria natura, vespertina dicitur. Vespere enim est tenebris adiunctum, habet tamen aliquid de luce, cum autem totaliter deficit lux, est nox. Sic igitur et cognitio rerum in propria natura, quando refertur ad laudem creatoris, ut in bonis angelis, habet aliquid de luce divina, et potest dici vespertina, si autem non referatur in Deum, sicut in daemonibus, non dicitur vespertina, sed nocturna. Unde et in Genesi I, legitur quod tenebras quas Deus a luce separavit, vocavit noctem.

Ad quartum dicendum quod mysterium regni Dei, quod est impletum per Christum, omnes quidem angeli a principio aliquo modo cognoverunt; maxime ex quo beatificati sunt visione Verbi, quam daemones nunquam habuerunt. Non tamen omnes angeli cognoverunt perfecte, neque aequaliter. Unde daemones multo minus, Christo existente in mundo, perfecte mysterium incarnationis cognoverunt. Non enim innotuit eis, ut Augustinus dicit, sicut angelis sanctis, qui Verbi participata aeternitate perfruuntur, sed sicut eis terrendis innotescendum fuit per quaedam temporalia effecta. Si autem perfecte et per certitudinem cognovissent ipsum esse filium Dei, et effectum passionis eius, nunquam dominum gloriae crucifigi procurassent. Ad quintum dicendum quod daemones tribus modis cognoscunt veritatem aliquam. Uno modo, subtilitate suae naturae, quia licet sint obtenebrati per privationem luminis gratiae, sunt tamen lucidi lumine intellectualis naturae. Secundo, per revelationem a

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happiness consists in knowing the first substance, namely, God. But it is quite natural for one separate substance to know another; as it is natural for us to know sensible natures. Hence, as man’s happiness does not consist in knowing sensible natures; so neither does the angel’s happiness consist in knowing separated substances. Reply Obj. 2: What is most manifest in its nature is hidden from us by its surpassing the bounds of our intellect; and not merely because our intellect draws knowledge from phantasms. Now the Divine substance surpasses the proportion not only of the human intellect, but even of the angelic. Consequently, not even an angel can of his own nature know God’s substance. Yet on account of the perfection of his intellect he can of his nature have a higher knowledge of God than man can have. Such knowledge of God remains also in the demons. Although they do not possess the purity which comes with grace, nevertheless they have purity of nature; and this suffices for the knowledge of God which belongs to them from their nature. Reply Obj. 3: The creature is darkness in comparison with the excellence of the Divine light; and therefore the creature’s knowledge in its own nature is called evening knowledge. For the evening is akin to darkness, yet it possesses some light: but when the light fails utterly, then it is night. So then the knowledge of things in their own nature, when referred to the praise of the Creator, as it is in the good angels, has something of the Divine light, and can be called evening knowledge; but if it be not referred to God, as is the case with the demons, it is not called evening, but nocturnal knowledge. Accordingly we read in Gen. 1:5 that the darkness, which God separated from the light, He called night. Reply Obj. 4: All the angels had some knowledge from the very beginning respecting the mystery of God’s kingdom, which found its completion in Christ; and most of all from the moment when they were beatified by the vision of the Word, which vision the demons never had. Yet all the angels did not fully and equally apprehend it; hence the demons much less fully understood the mystery of the Incarnation, when Christ was in the world. For, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 21), It was not manifested to them as it was to the holy angels, who enjoy a participated eternity of the Word; but it was made known by some temporal effects, so as to strike terror into them. For had they fully and certainly known that He was the Son of God and the effect of His passion, they would never have procured the crucifixion of the Lord of glory. Reply Obj. 5: The demons know a truth in three ways: first of all by the subtlety of their nature; for although they are darkened by privation of the light of grace, yet they are enlightened by the light of their intellectual nature: second, by revelation from the holy angels; for while not agreeing

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sanctis angelis; cum quibus non conveniunt quidem per conformitatem voluntatis; conveniunt autem similitudine intellectualis naturae, secundum quam possunt accipere quod ab aliis manifestatur. Tertio modo cognoscunt per experientiam longi temporis; non quasi a sensu accipientes; sed dum in rebus singularibus completur similitudo eius speciei intelligibilis quam sibi naturaliter habent inditam, aliqua cognoscunt praesentia, quae non praecognoverunt futura, ut supra de cognitione angelorum dictum est.

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with them in conformity of will, they do agree, nevertheless, by their likeness of intellectual nature, according to which they can accept what is manifested by others: third, they know by long experience; not as deriving it from the senses; but when the similitude of their innate intelligible species is completed in individual things, they know some things as present, which they previously did not know would come to pass, as we said when dealing with the knowledge of the angels (Q. 57, A. 3, ad 3).

Article 2 Whether the will of the demons is obstinate in evil? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas daemonum non sit obstinata in malo. Libertas enim arbitrii ad naturam intellectualis naturae pertinet, quae manet in daemonibus, ut dictum est. Sed libertas arbitrii per se et prius ordinatur ad bonum quam ad malum. Ergo voluntas daemonis non est ita obstinata in malo, quin possit redire ad bonum. Praeterea, maior est misericordia Dei, quae est infinita, quam daemonis malitia, quae est finita. A malitia autem culpae ad bonitatem iustitiae nullus redit nisi per Dei misericordiam. Ergo etiam daemones a statu malitiae possunt redire ad statum iustitiae. Praeterea, si daemones habent voluntatem obstinatam in malo, maxime haberent eam obstinatam in peccato quo peccaverunt. Sed illud peccatum in eis nunc non manet, scilicet superbia, quia nec motivum manet, scilicet excellentia. Ergo daemon non est obstinatus in malitia. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit quod homo per alium reparari potuit, quia per alium cecidit. Sed daemones inferiores per primum ceciderunt, ut supra dictum est. Ergo eorum casus per alium reparari potest. Ergo non sunt in malitia obstinati. Praeterea, quicumque est in malitia obstinatus, nunquam aliquod bonum opus operatur. Sed daemon aliqua bona opera facit, confitetur enim veritatem, dicens Christo, scio quia sis sanctus Dei, Marc. I, Daemones etiam credunt et contremiscunt, ut dicitur Iacob. II; Dionysius etiam dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod bonum et optimum concupiscunt, esse, vivere et intelligere. Ergo non sunt obstinati in malitia. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXIII, superbia eorum qui te oderunt, ascendit semper; quod de daemonibus exponitur. Ergo semper obstinati in malitia perseverant. Respondeo dicendum quod Origenis positio fuit quod omnis voluntas creaturae, propter libertatem arbi-

Objection 1: It would seem that the will of the demons is not obstinate in evil. For liberty of will belongs to the nature of an intellectual being, which nature remains in the demons, as we said above (A. 1). But liberty of will is directly and first ordained to good rather than to evil. Therefore the demons’ will is not so obstinate in evil as not to be able to return to what is good. Obj. 2: Further, since God’s mercy is infinite, it is greater than the demons’ malice, which is finite. But no one returns from the malice of sin to the goodness of justice save through God’s mercy. Therefore the demons can likewise return from their state of malice to the state of justice. Obj. 3: Further, if the demons have a will obstinate in evil, then their will would be especially obstinate in the sin whereby they fell. But that sin, namely, pride, is in them no longer; because the motive for the sin no longer endures, namely, excellence. Therefore the demon is not obstinate in malice. Obj. 4: Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv) that man can be reinstated by another, since he fell through another. But, as was observed already (Q. 63, A. 8), the lower demons fell through the highest one. Therefore their fall can be repaired by another. Consequently they are not obstinate in malice. Obj. 5: Further, whoever is obstinate in malice, never performs any good work. But the demon performs some good works: for he confesses the truth, saying to Christ: I know Who Thou art, the holy one of God (Mark 1:24). The demons also believe and tremble (Jas 2:19). And Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv), that they desire what is good and best, which is, to be, to live, to understand. Therefore they are not obstinate in malice. On the contrary, It is said (Ps 73:23): The pride of them that hate Thee, ascendeth continually; and this is understood of the demons. Therefore they remain ever obstinate in their malice. I answer that, It was Origen’s opinion that every will of the creature can by reason of free-will be inclined to good

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trii, potest flecti et in bonum et in malum, excepta anima Christi propter unionem Verbi. Sed haec positio tollit veritatem beatitudinis a sanctis angelis et hominibus, quia stabilitas sempiterna est de ratione verae beatitudinis; unde et vita aeterna nominatur. Repugnat etiam auctoritati Scripturae sacrae, quae daemones et homines malos in supplicium aeternum mittendos, bonos autem in vitam aeternam transferendos pronuntiat, Matth. XXV. Unde haec positio est tanquam erronea reputanda; et tenendum est firmiter, secundum fidem Catholicam, quod et voluntas bonorum angelorum confirmata est in bono, et voluntas daemonum obstinata est in malo. Causam autem huius obstinationis oportet accipere, non ex gravitate culpae, sed ex conditione naturae status. Hoc enim est hominibus mors, quod angelis casus, ut Damascenus dicit. Manifestum est autem quod omnia mortalia peccata hominum, sive sint magna sive sint parva, ante mortem sunt remissibilia; post mortem vero, irremissibilia, et perpetuo manentia. Ad inquirendum ergo causam huiusmodi obstinationis, considerandum est quod vis appetitiva in omnibus proportionatur apprehensivae a qua movetur, sicut mobile motori. Appetitus enim sensitivus est boni particularis, voluntas vero universalis, ut supra dictum est; sicut etiam sensus apprehensivus est singularium, intellectus vero universalium. Differt autem apprehensio angeli ab apprehensione hominis in hoc, quod angelus apprehendit immobiliter per intellectum, sicut et nos immobiliter apprehendimus prima principia, quorum est intellectus, homo vero per rationem apprehendit mobiliter, discurrendo de uno ad aliud, habens viam procedendi ad utrumque oppositorum. Unde et voluntas hominis adhaeret alicui mobiliter, quasi potens etiam ab eo discedere et contrario adhaerere, voluntas autem angeli adhaeret fixe et immobiliter. Et ideo, si consideretur ante adhaesionem, potest libere adhaerere et huic et opposito (in his scilicet quae non naturaliter vult), sed postquam iam adhaesit, immobiliter adhaeret. Et ideo consuevit dici quod liberum arbitrium hominis flexibile est ad oppositum et ante electionem, et post; liberum autem arbitrium angeli est flexibile ad utrumque oppositum ante electionem, sed non post. Sic igitur et boni angeli, semper adhaerentes iustitiae, sunt in illa confirmati, mali vero, peccantes, sunt in peccato obstinati. De obstinatione vero hominum damnatorum infra dicetur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod boni et mali angeli habent liberum arbitrium, sed secundum modum et conditionem suae naturae, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod misericordia Dei liberat a peccato poenitentes. Illi vero qui poenitentiae capaces non sunt, immobiliter malo adhaerentes, per divinam misericordiam non liberantur.

Q. 64, A. 2

and evil; with the exception of the soul of Christ on account of the union of the Word. Such a statement deprives angels and saints of true beatitude, because everlasting stability is of the very nature of true beatitude; hence it is termed life everlasting. It is also contrary to the authority of Sacred Scripture, which declares that demons and wicked men shall be sent into everlasting punishment, and the good brought into everlasting life. Consequently such an opinion must be considered erroneous; while according to Catholic Faith, it must be held firmly both that the will of the good angels is confirmed in good, and that the will of the demons is obstinate in evil. We must seek for the cause of this obstinacy, not in the gravity of the sin, but in the condition of their nature or state. For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), death is to men, what the fall is to the angels. Now it is clear that all the mortal sins of men, grave or less grave, are pardonable before death; whereas after death they are without remission and endure for ever. To find the cause, then, of this obstinacy, it must be borne in mind that the appetitive power is in all things proportioned to the apprehensive, whereby it is moved, as the movable by its mover. For the sensitive appetite seeks a particular good; while the will seeks the universal good, as was said above (Q. 59, A. 1); as also the sense apprehends particular objects, while the intellect considers universals. Now the angel’s apprehension differs from man’s in this respect, that the angel by his intellect apprehends immovably, as we apprehend immovably first principles which are the object of the habit of intelligence; whereas man by his reason apprehends movably, passing from one consideration to another; and having the way open by which he may proceed to either of two opposites. Consequently man’s will adheres to a thing movably, and with the power of forsaking it and of clinging to the opposite; whereas the angel’s will adheres fixedly and immovably. Therefore, if his will be considered before its adhesion, it can freely adhere either to this or to its opposite (namely, in such things as he does not will naturally); but after he has once adhered, he clings immovably. So it is customary to say that man’s free-will is flexible to the opposite both before and after choice; but the angel’s freewill is flexible either opposite before the choice, but not after. Therefore the good angels who adhered to justice, were confirmed therein; whereas the wicked ones, sinning, are obstinate in sin. Later on we shall treat of the obstinacy of men who are damned (Suppl., Q. 98, AA. 1, 2). Reply Obj. 1: The good and wicked angels have freewill, but according to the manner and condition of their state, as has been said. Reply Obj. 2: God’s mercy delivers from sin those who repent. But such as are not capable of repenting, cling immovably to sin, and are not delivered by the Divine mercy.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod adhuc manet in Diabolo peccatum quo primo peccavit, quantum ad appetitum; licet non quantum ad hoc quod credat se posse obtinere. Sicut si aliquis credat se posse facere homicidium, et velit facere, et postea adimatur ei potestas; nihilominus voluntas homicidii in eo manere potest, ut velit fecisse, vel velit facere si posset. Ad quartum dicendum quod non est tota causa quare peccatum hominis sit remissibile, quia alio suggerente peccavit. Et ideo ratio non sequitur. Ad quintum dicendum quod actus daemonis est duplex. Quidam scilicet ex voluntate deliberata procedens, et hic proprie potest dici actus eius. Et talis actus daemonis semper est malus, quia etsi aliquando aliquod bonum faciat, non tamen bene facit; sicut dum veritatem dicit ut decipiat, et dum non voluntarie credit et confitetur, sed rerum evidentia coactus. Alius autem actus daemonis est naturalis; qui bonus esse potest, et attestatur bonitati naturae. Et tamen etiam tali bono actu abutuntur ad malum.

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Reply Obj. 3: The devil’s first sin still remains in him according to desire; although not as to his believing that he can obtain what he desired. Even so, if a man were to believe that he can commit murder, and wills to commit it, and afterwards the power is taken from him; nevertheless, the will to murder can stay with him, so that he would he had done it, or still would do it if he could. Reply Obj. 4: The fact that man sinned from another’s suggestion, is not the whole cause of man’s sin being pardonable. Consequently the argument does not hold good. Reply Obj. 5: A demon’s act is twofold. One comes of deliberate will; and this is properly called his own act. Such an act on the demon’s part is always wicked; because, although at times he does something good, yet he does not do it well; as when he tells the truth in order to deceive; and when he believes and confesses, yet not willingly, but compelled by the evidence of things. Another kind of act is natural to the demon; this can be good and bears witness to the goodness of nature. Yet he abuses even such good acts to evil purpose.

Article 3 Whether there is sorrow in the demons? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor non sit in daemonibus. Cum enim dolor et gaudium opponantur, non possunt esse simul in eodem. Sed in daemonibus est gaudium, dicit enim Augustinus, contra Manichaeos, Diabolus potestatem habet in eos qui Dei praecepta contemnunt, et de hac tam infelici potestate laetatur. Ergo in daemonibus non est dolor. Praeterea, dolor est causa timoris, de his enim timemus dum futura sunt, de quibus dolemus dum praesentia sunt. Sed in daemonibus non est timor; secundum illud Iob XLI, factus est ut nullum timeret. Ergo in daemonibus non est dolor. Praeterea, dolere de malo est bonum. Sed daemones non possunt bene facere. Ergo non possunt dolere, ad minus de malo culpae; quod pertinet ad vermem conscientiae. Sed contra est quod peccatum daemonis est gravius quam peccatum hominis. Sed homo punitur dolore pro delectatione peccati; secundum illud Apoc. XVIII, quantum glorificavit se et in deliciis fuit, tantum date ei tormentum et luctum. Ergo multo magis Diabolus, qui maximo se glorificavit, punitur doloris luctu. Respondeo dicendum quod timor, dolor, gaudium, et huiusmodi, secundum quod sunt passiones, in daemonibus esse non possunt, sic enim sunt propriae ap-

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no sorrow in the demons. For since sorrow and joy are opposites, they cannot be together in the same subject. But there is joy in the demons: for Augustine writing against the Manichees (De Gen. Contra Manich. ii, 17) says: The devil has power over them who despise God’s commandments, and he rejoices over this sinister power. Therefore there is no sorrow in the demons. Obj. 2: Further, sorrow is the cause of fear, for those things cause fear while they are future, which cause sorrow when they are present. But there is no fear in the demons, according to Job 41:24, Who was made to fear no one. Therefore there is no grief in the demons. Obj. 3: Further, it is a good thing to be sorry for evil. But the demons can do no good action. Therefore they cannot be sorry, at least for the evil of sin; which applies to the worm of conscience. On the contrary, The demon’s sin is greater than man’s sin. But man is punished with sorrow on account of the pleasure taken in sin, according to Apoc. 18:7, As much as she hath glorified herself, and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her. Consequently much more is the devil punished with the grief of sorrow, because he especially glorified himself. I answer that, Fear, sorrow, joy, and the like, so far as they are passions, cannot exist in the demons; for thus they are proper to the sensitive appetite, which is a power in a

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petitus sensitivi, qui est virtus in organo corporali. Sed secundum quod nominant simplices actus voluntatis, sic possunt esse in daemonibus. Et necesse est dicere quod in eis sit dolor. Quia dolor, secundum quod significat simplicem actum voluntatis, nihil est aliud quam renisus voluntatis ad id quod est vel non est. Patet autem quod daemones multa vellent non esse quae sunt, et esse quae non sunt, vellent enim, cum sint invidi, damnari eos qui salvantur. Unde oportet dicere quod in eis sit dolor, et praecipue quia de ratione poenae est, quod voluntati repugnet. Privantur etiam beatitudine quam naturaliter appetunt; et in multis eorum iniqua voluntas cohibetur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod gaudium et dolor de eodem sunt opposita, non autem de diversis. Unde nihil prohibet unum simul dolere de uno, et gaudere de alio; et maxime secundum quod dolor et gaudium important simplices voluntatis actus; quia non solum in diversis, sed etiam in una et eadem re potest esse aliquid quod volumus, et aliquid quod nolumus. Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut in daemonibus est dolor de praesenti, ita et timor de futuro. Quod autem dicitur, factus est ut nullum timeret, intelligitur de timore Dei cohibente a peccato. Alibi, namque scriptum est quod daemones credunt et contremiscunt. Ad tertium dicendum quod dolere de malo culpae propter se attestatur voluntatis bonitati, cui malum culpae opponitur. Dolere autem de malo poenae, vel de malo culpae propter poenam, attestatur bonitati naturae, cui malum poenae opponitur. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod dolor amissi boni in supplicio, testis est naturae bonae. Daemon ergo, cum perversae sit voluntatis et obstinatae, de malo culpae non dolet.

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corporeal organ. According, however, as they denote simple acts of the will, they can be in the demons. And it must be said that there is sorrow in them; because sorrow, as denoting a simple act of the will, is nothing else than the resistance of the will to what is, or to what is not. Now it is evident that the demons would wish many things not to be, which are, and others to be, which are not: for, out of envy, they would wish others to be damned, who are saved. Consequently, sorrow must be said to exist in them: and especially because it is of the very notion of punishment for it to be repugnant to the will. Moreover, they are deprived of happiness, which they desire naturally; and their wicked will is curbed in many respects. Reply Obj. 1: Joy and sorrow about the same thing are opposites, but not about different things. Hence there is nothing to hinder a man from being sorry for one thing, and joyful for another; especially so far as sorrow and joy imply simple acts of the will; because, not merely in different things, but even in one and the same thing, there can be something that we will, and something that we will not. Reply Obj. 2: As there is sorrow in the demons over present evil, so also there is fear of future evil. Now when it is said, He was made to fear no one, this is to be understood of the fear of God which restrains from sin. For it is written elsewhere that the devils believe and tremble (Jas 2:19). Reply Obj. 3: To be sorry for the evil of sin on account of the sin bears witness to the goodness of the will, to which the evil of sin is opposed. But to be sorry for the evil of punishment, or for the evil of sin on account of the punishment, bears witness to the goodness of nature, to which the evil of punishment is opposed. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13) that sorrow for good lost by punishment, is the witness to a good nature. Consequently, since the demon has a perverse and obstinate will, he is not sorry for the evil of sin.

Article 4 Whether our atmosphere is the demons’ place of punishment? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aer iste non sit locus poenalis daemonum. Daemon enim est natura spiritualis. Natura autem spiritualis non afficitur loco. Ergo nullus locus est daemonibus poenalis. Praeterea, peccatum hominis non est gravius quam peccatum daemonis. Sed locus poenalis hominis est Infernus. Ergo multo magis daemonis. Ergo non aer caliginosus. Praeterea, daemones puniuntur poena ignis. Sed in aere caliginoso non est ignis. Ergo aer caliginosus non est locus poenae daemonum.

Objection 1: It would seem that this atmosphere is not the demons’ place of punishment. For a demon is a spiritual nature. But a spiritual nature is not affected by place. Therefore there is no place of punishment for demons. Obj. 2: Further, man’s sin is not graver than the demons’. But man’s place of punishment is hell. Much more, therefore, is it the demons’ place of punishment; and consequently not the darksome atmosphere. Obj. 3: Further, the demons are punished with the pain of fire. But there is no fire in the darksome atmosphere. Therefore the darksome atmosphere is not the place of punishment for the demons.

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Angels

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III super Gen. ad Litt., quod aer caliginosus est quasi carcer daemonibus usque ad tempus iudicii. Respondeo dicendum quod angeli, secundum suam naturam, medii sunt inter Deum et homines. Habet autem hoc divinae providentiae ratio, quod inferiorum bonum per superiora procuret. Bonum autem hominis dupliciter procuratur per divinam providentiam. Uno modo directe, dum scilicet aliquis inducitur ad bonum et retrahitur a malo, et hoc decenter fit per angelos bonos. Alio modo indirecte, dum scilicet aliquis exercetur, impugnatus, per impugnationem contrarii. Et hanc procurationem boni humani conveniens fuit per malos angelos fieri, ne totaliter post peccatum ab utilitate naturalis ordinis exciderent. Sic ergo daemonibus duplex locus poenalis debetur. Unus quidem ratione suae culpae, et hic est Infernus. Alius autem ratione exercitationis humanae, et sic debetur eis caliginosus aer. Procuratio autem salutis humanae protenditur usque ad diem iudicii, unde et usque tunc durat ministerium angelorum et exercitatio daemonum. Unde et usque tunc et boni angeli ad nos huc mittuntur, et daemones in hoc aere caliginoso sunt ad nostrum exercitium, licet eorum aliqui etiam nunc in Inferno sint, ad torquendum eos quos ad malum induxerunt; sicut et aliquis boni angeli sunt cum animabus sanctis in caelo. Sed post diem iudicii omnes mali, tam homines quam angeli, in Inferno erunt; boni vero in caelo. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod locus non est poenalis angelo aut animae, quasi afficiens alterando naturam; sed quasi afficiens voluntatem contristando, dum angelus vel anima apprehendit se esse in loco non convenienti suae voluntati. Ad secundum dicendum quod anima secundum ordinem naturae non praefertur alteri animae, sicut daemones ordine naturae praeferuntur hominibus. Unde non est similis ratio. Ad tertium dicendum quod aliqui dixerunt usque ad diem iudicii differri poenam sensibilem tam daemonum quam animarum, et similiter beatitudinem sanctorum differri usque ad diem iudicii; quod est erroneum, et repugnans Apostoli sententiae, qui dicit, II Cor. V, si terrestris domus nostra huius habitationis dissolvatur, domum habemus in caelo. Alii vero, licet hoc non concedant de animabus, concedunt tamen de daemonibus. Sed melius est dicendum quod idem iudicium sit de malis animabus et malis angelis; sicut idem iudicium est de bonis animabus et bonis angelis. Unde dicendum est quod, sicut locus caelestis pertinet ad gloriam angelorum, tamen gloria eorum non minuitur cum ad nos veniunt, quia considerant illum locum esse suum (eo modo quo dicimus honorem episcopi non minui dum actu non sedet in cathedra); similiter

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On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. iii, 10), that the darksome atmosphere is as a prison to the demons until the judgment day. I answer that, The angels in their own nature stand midway between God and men. Now the order of Divine providence so disposes, that it procures the welfare of the inferior orders through the superior. But man’s welfare is disposed by Divine providence in two ways: first of all, directly, when a man is brought unto good and withheld from evil; and this is fittingly done through the good angels. In another way, indirectly, as when anyone assailed is exercised by fighting against opposition. It was fitting for this procuring of man’s welfare to be brought about through the wicked spirits, lest they should cease to be of service in the natural order. Consequently a twofold place of punishment is due to the demons: one, by reason of their sin, and this is hell; and another, in order that they may tempt men, and thus the darksome atmosphere is their due place of punishment. Now the procuring of men’s salvation is prolonged even to the judgment day: consequently, the ministry of the angels and wrestling with demons endure until then. Hence until then the good angels are sent to us here; and the demons are in this dark atmosphere for our trial: although some of them are even now in hell, to torment those whom they have led astray; just as some of the good angels are with the holy souls in heaven. But after the judgment day all the wicked, both men and angels, will be in hell, and the good in heaven. Reply Obj. 1: A place is not penal to angel or soul as if affecting the nature by changing it, but as affecting the will by saddening it: because the angel or the soul apprehends that it is in a place not agreeable to its will. Reply Obj. 2: One soul is not set over another in the order of nature, as the demons are over men in the order of nature; consequently there is no parallel. Reply Obj. 3: Some have maintained that the pain of sense for demons and souls is postponed until the judgment day: and that the beatitude of the saints is likewise postponed until the judgment day. But this is erroneous, and contrary to the teaching of the Apostle (2 Cor 5:1): If our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, we have a house in heaven. Others, again, while not admitting the same of souls, admit it as to demons. But it is better to say that the same judgment is passed upon wicked souls and wicked angels, even as on good souls and good angels. Consequently, it must be said that, although a heavenly place belongs to the glory of the angels, yet their glory is not lessened by their coming to us, for they consider that place to be their own; in the same way as we say that the bishop’s honor is not lessened while he is not actually sitting on his

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dicendum est quod daemones licet non actu alligentur gehennali igni, dum sunt in aere isto caliginoso, tamen ex hoc ipso quod sciunt illam alligationem sibi deberi, eorum poena non diminuitur. Unde dicitur in quadam Glossa Iacobi III, quod portant secum ignem Gehennae quocumque vadant. Nec est contra hoc, quod rogaverunt dominum ut non mitteret eos in abyssum, ut dicitur Lucae VIII, quia hoc petierunt reputantes sibi poenam, si excluderentur a loco in quo possunt hominibus nocere. Unde Marci V, dicitur quod deprecabantur eum ne expelleret eos extra regionem.

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throne. In like manner it must be said, that although the demons are not actually bound within the fire of hell while they are in this dark atmosphere, nevertheless their punishment is none the less; because they know that such confinement is their due. Hence it is said in a gloss upon James 3:6: They carry fire of hell with them wherever they go. Nor is this contrary to what is said (Luke 8:31), They besought the Lord not to cast them into the abyss; for they asked for this, deeming it to be a punishment for them to be cast out of a place where they could injure men. Hence it is stated, They besought Him that He would not expel them out of the country (Mark 5:10).

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Question 65 The Work of Creation of Corporeal Creatures Post considerationem spiritualis creaturae, considerandum est de creatura corporali. In cuius productione tria opera Scriptura commemorat, scilicet opus creationis, cum dicitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, etc.; opus distinctionis, cum dicitur, divisit lucem a tenebris, et aquas quae sunt supra firmamentum, ab aquis quae sunt sub firmamento; et opus ornatus, cum dicitur, fiant luminaria in firmamento et cetera. Primo ergo considerandum est de opere creationis; secundo, de opere distinctionis; tertio, de opere ornatus.

Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum creatura corporalis sit a Deo. Secundo, utrum sit facta propter bonitatem Dei. Tertio, utrum sit facta a Deo mediantibus angelis. Quarto, utrum formae corporum sint ab angelis, an immediate a Deo.

From the consideration of spiritual creatures we proceed to that of corporeal creatures, in the production of which, as Holy Scripture makes mention, three works are found, namely, the work of creation, as given in the words, In the beginning God created heaven and earth; the work of distinction as given in the words, He divided the light from the darkness, and the waters that are above the firmament from the waters that are under the firmament; and the work of adornment, expressed thus, Let there be lights in the firmament. First, then, we must consider the work of creation; second, the work of distinction; and third, the work of adornment. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether corporeal creatures are from God? (2) Whether they were created on account of God’s goodness? (3) Whether they were created by God through the medium of the angels? (4) Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels or immediately from God?

Article 1 Whether corporeal creatures are from God? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod creatura corporalis non sit a Deo. Dicitur enim Eccle. III, didici quod omnia quae fecit Deus, perseverant in aeternum. Sed corpora visibilia non perseverant in aeternum, dicitur enim II Cor. IV, quae videntur temporalia sunt; quae autem non videntur, aeterna. Ergo Deus non fecit corpora visibilia. Praeterea, Gen. I, dicitur, vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. Sed creaturae corporales sunt malae, experimur enim eas in multis noxias, ut patet in multis serpentibus, in aestu solis, et huiusmodi; ideo autem aliquid dicitur malum, quia nocet. Creaturae igitur corporales non sunt a Deo. Praeterea, id quod est a Deo, non retrahit a Deo, sed ducit in ipsum. Sed creaturae corporales retrahunt a Deo, unde Apostolus dicit, II Cor. IV, non contemplantibus nobis quae videntur. Ergo creaturae corporales non sunt a Deo. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo CXLV, qui fecit caelum et terram, mare, et omnia quae in eis sunt.

Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures are not from God. For it is said (Eccl 3:14): I have learned that all the works which God hath made, continue for ever. But visible bodies do not continue for ever, for it is said (2 Cor 4:18): The things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal. Therefore God did not make visible bodies. Obj. 2: Further, it is said (Gen 1:31): God saw all things that He had made, and they were very good. But corporeal creatures are evil, since we find them harmful in many ways; as may be seen in serpents, in the sun’s heat, and other things. Now a thing is called evil, in so far as it is harmful. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God. Obj. 3: Further, what is from God does not withdraw us from God, but leads us to Him. But corporeal creatures withdraw us from God. Hence the Apostle (2 Cor 4:18): While we look not at the things which are seen. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God. On the contrary, It is said (Ps 145:6): Who made heaven and earth, the sea, and all things that are in them.

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Work of the Six Days

Respondeo dicendum quod quorundam haereticorum positio est, quod visibilia ista non sunt creata a bono Deo, sed a malo principio. Et ad argumentum sui erroris assumunt quod Apostolus dicit II, Cor. IV, Deus huius saeculi excaecavit mentes infidelium. Haec autem positio est omnino impossibilis. Si enim diversa in aliquo uniantur, necesse est huius unionis causam esse aliquam, non enim diversa secundum se uniuntur. Et inde est quod, quandocumque in diversis invenitur aliquid unum, oportet quod illa diversa illud unum ab aliqua una causa recipiant; sicut diversa corpora calida habent calorem ab igne. Hoc autem quod est esse, communiter invenitur in omnibus rebus, quantumcumque diversis. Necesse est ergo esse unum essendi principium, a quo esse habeant quaecumque sunt quocumque modo, sive sint invisibilia et spiritualia, sive sint visibilia et corporalia. Dicitur autem Diabolus esse Deus huius saeculi, non creatione, sed quia saeculariter viventes ei serviunt; eo modo loquendi quo Apostolus loquitur, ad Philipp. III, quorum Deus venter est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes creaturae Dei secundum aliquid in aeternum perseverant, ad minus secundum materiam, quia creaturae nunquam in nihilum redigentur, etiam si sint corruptibiles. Sed quanto creaturae magis appropinquant ad Deum, qui est omnino immobilis, tanto magis sunt immobiles. Nam creaturae corruptibiles in perpetuum manent secundum materiam, sed mutantur secundum formam substantialem. Creaturae vero incorruptibiles permanent quidem secundum substantiam, sed sunt mutabiles secundum alia, puta secundum locum, ut corpora caelestia; vel secundum affectiones, ut creaturae spirituales. Quod autem Apostolus dicit, quae videntur, temporalia sunt, etsi verum sit etiam quantum ad ipsas res in se consideratas, secundum quod omnis creatura visibilis subiacet tempori, vel secundum suum esse vel secundum suum motum; tamen Apostolus intendit loqui de visibilibus secundum quod sunt hominis praemia. Nam praemia hominis quae sunt in istis rebus visibilibus, temporaliter transeunt, quae autem sunt in rebus invisibilibus, permanent in aeternum. Unde et supra praemiserat, aeternum gloriae pondus operatur in nobis. Ad secundum dicendum quod creatura corporalis, secundum suam naturam, est bona, sed non est bonum universale, sed est quoddam bonum particulare et contractum, secundum quam particularitatem et contractionem sequitur in ea contrarietas, per quam unum contrariatur alteri, licet utrumque in se sit bonum. Quidam autem, aestimantes res non ex earum natura, sed ex suo proprio commodo, quaecumque sibi nociva sunt, simpliciter mala arbitrantur, non considerantes quod id quod est uni nocivum quantum ad aliquid, vel alteri vel

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I answer that, Certain heretics maintain that visible things are not created by the good God, but by an evil principle, and allege in proof of their error the words of the Apostle (2 Cor 4:4), The god of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers. But this position is altogether untenable. For, if things that differ agree in some point, there must be some cause for that agreement, since things diverse in nature cannot be united of themselves. Hence whenever in different things some one thing common to all is found, it must be that these different things receive that one thing from some one cause, as different bodies that are hot receive their heat from fire. But being is found to be common to all things, however otherwise different. There must, therefore, be one principle of being from which all things in whatever way existing have their being, whether they are invisible and spiritual, or visible and corporeal. But the devil is called the god of this world, not as having created it, but because worldlings serve him, of whom also the Apostle says, speaking in the same sense, Whose god is their belly (Phil. 3:19). Reply Obj. 1: All the creatures of God in some respects continue for ever, at least as to matter, since what is created will never be annihilated, even though it be corruptible. And the nearer a creature approaches God, Who is immovable, the more it also is immovable. For corruptible creatures endure for ever as regards their matter, though they change as regards their substantial form. But incorruptible creatures endure with respect to their substance, though they are mutable in other respects, such as place; for instance, the heavenly bodies; or the affections, as spiritual creatures. But the Apostle’s words, The things which are seen are temporal, though true even as regards such things considered in themselves (in so far as every visible creature is subject to time, either as to being or as to movement), are intended to apply to visible things in so far as they are offered to man as rewards. For such rewards, as consist in these visible things, are temporal; while those that are invisible endure for ever. Hence he said before (2 Cor 4:17): It worketh for us . . . an eternal weight of glory.

Reply Obj. 2: Corporeal creatures according to their nature are good, though this good is not universal, but partial and limited, the consequence of which is a certain opposition of contrary qualities, though each quality is good in itself. To those, however, who estimate things, not by the nature thereof, but by the good they themselves can derive therefrom, everything which is harmful to themselves seems simply evil. For they do not reflect that what is in some way injurious to one person, to another is beneficial, and that even to themselves the same thing may be evil in

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eidem quantum ad aliquid est proficuum. Quod nequaquam esset, si secundum se corpora essent mala et noxia. Ad tertium dicendum quod creaturae, quantum est de se, non retrahunt a Deo, sed in ipsum ducunt, quia invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur, ut dicitur Rom. I. Sed quod avertant a Deo, hoc est ex culpa eorum qui insipienter eis utuntur. Unde dicitur Sap. XIV, quod creaturae factae sunt in muscipulam pedibus insipientium. Et hoc ipsum quod sic a Deo abducunt, attestatur quod sunt a Deo. Non enim abducunt insipientes a Deo, nisi alliciendo secundum aliquid boni in eis existens, quod habent a Deo.

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some respects, but good in others. And this could not be, if bodies were essentially evil and harmful. Reply Obj. 3: Creatures of themselves do not withdraw us from God, but lead us to Him; for the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made (Rom 1:20). If, then, they withdraw men from God, it is the fault of those who use them foolishly. Thus it is said (Wis 14:11): Creatures are turned into a snare to the feet of the unwise. And the very fact that they can thus withdraw us from God proves that they came from Him, for they cannot lead the foolish away from God except by the allurements of some good that they have from Him.

Article 2 Whether corporeal things were made on account of God’s goodness? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod creatura corporalis non sit facta propter Dei bonitatem. Dicitur enim Sap. I, creavit Deus ut essent omnia. Ergo omnia sunt creata propter suum proprium esse, et non propter Dei bonitatem. Praeterea, bonum habet rationem finis. Ergo id quod est magis bonum in rebus, est finis minus boni. Creatura autem spiritualis comparatur ad corporalem, sicut maius bonum ad minus bonum. Ergo creatura corporalis est propter spiritualem, et non propter Dei bonitatem. Praeterea, iustitia non dat inaequalia nisi inaequalibus. Sed Deus est iustus. Ergo ante omnem inaequalitatem a Deo creatam, est inaequalitas a Deo non creata. Sed inaequalitas a Deo non creata, non potest esse nisi quae est ex libero arbitrio. Ergo omnis inaequalitas sequitur ex diversis motibus liberi arbitrii. Creaturae autem corporales sunt inaequales spiritualibus. Ergo creaturae corporales sunt factae propter aliquos motus liberi arbitrii, et non propter Dei bonitatem. Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. XVI, universa propter semetipsum operatus est dominus. Respondeo dicendum quod Origenes posuit quod creatura corporalis non est facta ex prima Dei intentione, sed ad poenam creaturae spiritualis peccantis. Posuit enim quod Deus a principio creaturas spirituales solas fecit, et omnes aequales. Quarum, cum essent liberi arbitrii, quaedam conversae sunt in Deum, et secundum quantitatem conversionis sortitae sunt maiorem vel minorem gradum, in sua simplicitate remanentes. Quaedam vero, aversae a Deo, alligatae sunt corporibus diversis, secundum modum aversionis a Deo. Quae quidem positio erronea est. Primo quidem, quia contrariatur Scripturae, quae, enarrata productione cuiuslibet speciei creaturae corporalis subiungit, vidit

Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were not made on account of God’s goodness. For it is said (Wis 1:14) that God created all things that they might be. Therefore all things were created for their own being’s sake, and not on account of God’s goodness. Obj. 2: Further, good has the nature of an end; therefore the greater good in things is the end of the lesser good. But spiritual creatures are related to corporeal creatures, as the greater good to the lesser. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are created for the sake of spiritual creatures, and not on account of God’s goodness. Obj. 3: Further, justice does not give unequal things except to the unequal. Now God is just: therefore inequality not created by God must precede all inequality created by Him. But an inequality not created by God can only arise from free-will, and consequently all inequality results from the different movements of free-will. Now, corporeal creatures are unequal to spiritual creatures. Therefore the former were made on account of movements of free-will, and not on account of God’s goodness. On the contrary, It is said (Prov 16:4): The Lord hath made all things for Himself. I answer that, Origen laid down that corporeal creatures were not made according to God’s original purpose, but in punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he maintained that God in the beginning made spiritual creatures only, and all of equal nature; but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to God, and, according to the measure of their conversion, were given a higher or a lower rank, retaining their simplicity; while others turned from God, and became bound to different kinds of bodies according to the degree of their turning away. But this position is erroneous. In the first place, because it is contrary to Scripture, which, after narrating the production of each kind of corporeal creatures, subjoins, God

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Deus quia hoc esset bonum; quasi diceret quod unumquodque ideo factum est, quia bonum est ipsum esse. Secundum autem opinionem Origenis, creatura corporalis facta est, non quia bonum est eam esse, sed ut malum alterius puniretur. Secundo, quia sequeretur quod mundi corporalis dispositio quae nunc est, esset a casu. Si enim ideo corpus solis tale factum est, ut congrueret alicui peccato spiritualis creaturae puniendo; si plures creaturae spirituales similiter peccassent sicut illa propter cuius peccatum puniendum ponit solem creatum, sequeretur quod essent plures soles in mundo. Et idem esset de aliis. Haec autem sunt omnino inconvenientia. Unde haec positione remota tanquam erronea, considerandum est quod ex omnibus creaturis constituitur totum universum sicut totum ex partibus. Si autem alicuius totius et partium eius velimus finem assignare, inveniemus primo quidem, quod singulae partes sunt propter suos actus; sicut oculus ad videndum. Secundo vero, quod pars ignobilior est propter nobiliorem; sicut sensus propter intellectum, et pulmo propter cor. Tertio vero, omnes partes sunt propter perfectionem totius, sicut et materia propter formam, partes enim sunt quasi materia totius. Ulterius autem, totus homo est propter aliquem finem extrinsecum, puta ut fruatur Deo. Sic igitur et in partibus universi, unaquaeque creatura est propter suum proprium actum et perfectionem. Secundo autem, creaturae ignobiliores sunt propter nobiliores sicut creaturae quae sunt infra hominem, sunt propter hominem. Ulterius autem, singulae creaturae sunt propter perfectionem totius universi. Ulterius autem, totum universum, cum singulis suis partibus, ordinatur in Deum sicut in finem, inquantum in eis per quandam imitationem divina bonitas repraesentatur ad gloriam Dei, quamvis creaturae rationales speciali quodam modo supra hoc habeant finem Deum, quem attingere possunt sua operatione, cognoscendo et amando. Et sic patet quod divina bonitas est finis omnium corporalium. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in hoc ipso quod creatura aliqua habet esse, repraesentat divinum esse et bonitatem eius. Et ideo per hoc quod Deus creavit omnia ut essent, non excluditur quin creaverit omnia propter suam bonitatem. Ad secundum dicendum quod finis proximus non excludit finem ultimum. Unde per hoc quod creatura corporalis facta est quodammodo propter spiritualem, non removetur quin sit facta propter Dei bonitatem. Ad tertium dicendum quod aequalitas iustitiae locum habet in retribuendo, iustum enim est quod aequalibus aequalia retribuantur. Non autem habet locum in prima rerum institutione. Sicut enim artifex eiusdem generis lapides in diversis partibus aedificii ponit absque

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saw that it was good (Gen 1), as if to say that everything was brought into being for the reason that it was good for it to be. But according to Origen’s opinion, the corporeal creature was made, not because it was good that it should be, but that the evil in another might be punished. Second, because it would follow that the arrangement, which now exists, of the corporeal world would arise from mere chance. For it the sun’s body was made what it is, that it might serve for a punishment suitable to some sin of a spiritual creature, it would follow, if other spiritual creatures had sinned in the same way as the one to punish whom the sun had been created, that many suns would exist in the world; and so of other things. But such a consequence is altogether inadmissible. Hence we must set aside this theory as false, and consider that the entire universe is constituted by all creatures, as a whole consists of its parts. Now if we wish to assign an end to any whole, and to the parts of that whole, we shall find, first, that each and every part exists for the sake of its proper act, as the eye for the act of seeing; second, that less honorable parts exist for the more honorable, as the senses for the intellect, the lungs for the heart; and, third, that all parts are for the perfection of the whole, as the matter for the form, since the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole. Furthermore, the whole man is on account of an extrinsic end, that end being the fruition of God. So, therefore, in the parts of the universe also every creature exists for its own proper act and perfection, and the less noble for the nobler, as those creatures that are less noble than man exist for the sake of man, whilst each and every creature exists for the perfection of the entire universe. Furthermore, the entire universe, with all its parts, is ordained towards God as its end, inasmuch as it imitates, as it were, and shows forth the Divine goodness, to the glory of God. Reasonable creatures, however, have in some special and higher manner God as their end, since they can attain to Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him. Thus it is plain that the Divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things. Reply Obj. 1: In the very fact of any creature possessing being, it represents the Divine being and Its goodness. And, therefore, that God created all things, that they might have being, does not exclude that He created them for His own goodness. Reply Obj. 2: The proximate end does not exclude the ultimate end. Therefore that corporeal creatures were, in a manner, made for the sake of the spiritual, does not prevent their being made on account of God’s goodness. Reply Obj. 3: Equality of justice has its place in retribution, since equal rewards or punishments are due to equal merit or demerit. But this does not apply to things as at first instituted. For just as an architect, without injustice, places stones of the same kind in different parts of a

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iniustitia, non propter aliquam diversitatem in lapidibus praecedentem, sed attendens ad perfectionem totius aedificii, quae non esset nisi lapides diversimode in aedificio collocarentur; sic et Deus a principio, ut esset perfectio in universo, diversas et inaequales creaturas instituit, secundum suam sapientiam, absque iniustitia, nulla tamen praesupposita meritorum diversitate.

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building, not on account of any antecedent difference in the stones, but with a view to securing that perfection of the entire building, which could not be obtained except by the different positions of the stones; even so, God from the beginning, to secure perfection in the universe, has set therein creatures of various and unequal natures, according to His wisdom, and without injustice, since no diversity of merit is presupposed.

Article 3 Whether corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the angels? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod creatura corporalis sit producta a Deo mediantibus angelis. Sicut enim res gubernantur per divinam sapientiam, ita omnia sunt per Dei sapientiam facta; secundum illud Psalmi CIII, omnia in sapientia fecisti. Sed ordinare est sapientis, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Unde in gubernatione rerum, inferiora per superiora reguntur quodam ordine, ut Augustinus dicit, III de Trin. Ergo et in rerum productione talis ordo fuit, quod creatura corporalis, tanquam inferior, per spiritualem, tanquam superiorem, est producta. Praeterea, diversitas effectuum demonstrat diversitatem causarum, quia idem semper facit idem. Si ergo omnes creaturae, tam spirituales quam corporales, sunt immediate a Deo productae, nulla esset inter creaturas diversitas, nec una magis distaret a Deo quam alia. Quod patet esse falsum, cum propter longe distare a Deo dicat Philosophus quaedam corruptibilia esse. Praeterea, ad producendum effectum finitum, non requiritur virtus infinita. Sed omne corpus finitum est. Ergo per finitam virtutem spiritualis creaturae produci potuit; et productum fuit, quia in talibus non differt esse et posse; praesertim quia nulla dignitas competens alicui secundum suam naturam, ei denegatur, nisi forte ob culpam. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, per quae creatura corporalis intelligitur. Ergo creatura corporalis est immediate a Deo producta. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt gradatim res a Deo processisse, ita scilicet quod ab eo immediate processit prima creatura, et illa produxit aliam; et sic inde usque ad creaturam corpoream. Sed haec positio est impossibilis. Quia prima corporalis creaturae productio est per creationem per quam etiam ipsa materia producitur, imperfectum enim est prius quam

Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the angels. For, as all things are governed by the Divine wisdom, so by it were all things made, according to Ps. 103:24: Thou hast made all things in wisdom. But it belongs to wisdom to ordain, as stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 2). Hence in the government of things the lower is ruled by the higher in a certain fitting order, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4). Therefore in the production of things it was ordained that the corporeal should be produced by the spiritual, as the lower by the higher. Obj. 2: Further, diversity of effects shows diversity of causes, since like always produces like. If then all creatures, both spiritual and corporeal, were produced immediately by God, there would be no diversity in creatures, for one would not be further removed from God than another. But this is clearly false; for the Philosopher says that some things are corruptible because they are far removed from God (De Gen. et Corrup. ii, text. 59). Obj. 3: Further, infinite power is not required to produce a finite effect. But every corporeal thing is finite. Therefore, it could be, and was, produced by the finite power of spiritual creatures: for in suchlike beings there is no distinction between what is and what is possible: especially as no dignity befitting a nature is denied to that nature, unless it be in punishment of a fault. On the contrary, It is said (Gen 1:1): In the beginning God created heaven and earth; by which are understood corporeal creatures. These, therefore, were produced immediately by God. I answer that, Some have maintained that creatures proceeded from God by degrees, in such a way that the first creature proceeded from Him immediately, and in its turn produced another, and so on until the production of corporeal creatures. But this position is untenable, since the first production of corporeal creatures is by creation, by which matter itself is produced: for in the act of coming into be-

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perfectum in fieri, impossibile est autem aliquid creari ing the imperfect must be made before the perfect: and it nisi a solo Deo. is impossible that anything should be created, save by God alone. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod quanIn proof whereof it must be borne in mind that the to aliqua causa est superior, tanto ad plura se extendit in higher the cause, the more numerous the objects to which causando. Semper autem id quod substernitur in rebus, its causation extends. Now the underlying principle in invenitur communius quam id quod informat et restrin- things is always more universal than that which informs git ipsum, sicut esse quam vivere, et vivere quam intel- and restricts it; thus, being is more universal than living, ligere, et materia quam forma. Quanto ergo aliquid est living than understanding, matter than form. The more magis substratum, tanto a superiori causa directe pro- widely, then, one thing underlies others, the more directly cedit. Id ergo quod est primo substratum in omnibus, does that thing proceed from a higher cause. Thus the thing proprie pertinet ad causalitatem supremae causae. Nulla that underlies primarily all things, belongs properly to the igitur secunda causa potest aliquid producere, non prae- causality of the supreme cause. Therefore no secondary supposito in re producta aliquo quod causatur a supe- cause can produce anything, unless there is presupposed in riori causa. Creatio autem est productio alicuius rei se- the thing produced something that is caused by a higher cundum suam totam substantiam, nullo praesupposito cause. But creation is the production of a thing in its enquod sit vel increatum vel ab aliquo creatum. Unde re- tire substance, nothing being presupposed either uncreated linquitur quod nihil potest aliquid creare nisi solus Deus, or created. Hence it remains that nothing can create exqui est prima causa. Et ideo ut Moyses ostenderet cor- cept God alone, Who is the first cause. Therefore, in order pora omnia immediate a Deo creata, dixit, in principio to show that all bodies were created immediately by God, creavit Deus caelum et terram. Moses said: In the beginning God created heaven and earth. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in productione reReply Obj. 1: In the production of things an order exrum est aliquis ordo, non quidem ut una creatura creetur ists, but not such that one creature is created by another, for ab alia (hoc enim impossibile est); sed ita quod ex divina that is impossible; but rather such that by the Divine wissapientia diversi gradus in creaturis, constituuntur. dom diverse grades are constituted in creatures. Ad secundum dicendum quod ipse Deus unus, absReply Obj. 2: God Himself, though one, has knowlque suae simplicitatis detrimento, diversorum cognosci- edge of many and different things without detriment to tivus est, ut supra ostensum est. Et ideo etiam est, secun- the simplicity of His nature, as has been shown above dum diversa cognita, diversorum productorum causa (Q. 15, A. 2); so that by His wisdom He is the cause of diper suam sapientiam, sicut et artifex, apprehendendo di- verse things as known by Him, even as an artificer, by apversas formas, producit diversa artificiata. prehending diverse forms, produces diverse works of art. Ad tertium dicendum quod quantitas virtutis Reply Obj. 3: The amount of the power of an agent is agentis non solum mensuratur secundum rem factam, measured not only by the thing made, but also by the mansed etiam secundum modum faciendi, quia unum et ner of making it; for one and the same thing is made in one idem aliter fit et a maiori, et a minori virtute. Producere way by a higher power, in another by a lower. But the proautem aliquid finitum hoc modo ut nihil praesuppona- duction of finite things, where nothing is presupposed as tur, est virtutis infinitae. Unde nulli creaturae competere existing, is the work of infinite power, and, as such, can bepotest. long to no creature.

Article 4 Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod formae corporum sint ab angelis. Dicit enim Boetius, in libro de Trin., quod a formis quae sunt sine materia, veniunt formae quae sunt in materia. Formae autem quae sunt sine materia, sunt substantiae spirituales, formae autem quae sunt in materia, sunt formae corporum. Ergo formae corporum sunt a spiritualibus substantiis. Praeterea, omne quod est per participationem, reducitur ad id quod est per essentiam. Sed spirituales

Objection 1: It would seem that the forms of bodies come from the angels. For Boethius says (De Trin. i): From forms that are without matter come the forms that are in matter. But forms that are without matter are spiritual substances, and forms that are in matter are the forms of bodies. Therefore, the forms of bodies are from spiritual substances. Obj. 2: Further, all that is such by participation is reduced to that which is such by its essence. But spiritual sub-

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substantiae per suam essentiam sunt formae, creaturae autem corporales participant formas. Ergo formae corporalium rerum sunt a spiritualibus substantiis derivatae. Praeterea, spirituales substantiae magis habent virtutem causandi quam corpora caelestia. Sed corpora caelestia causant formas in istis inferioribus, unde dicuntur esse generationis et corruptionis causa. Ergo multo magis a spiritualibus substantiis formae quae sunt in materia, derivantur. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod non est putandum angelis ad nutum servire hanc corporalem materiam, sed potius Deo. Illi autem ad nutum dicitur servire corporalis materia, a quo speciem recipit. Non ergo formae corporales sunt ab angelis, sed a Deo. Respondeo dicendum quod opinio fuit quorundam quod omnes formae corporales deriventur a substantiis spiritualibus quas angelos dicimus. Et hoc quidem dupliciter aliqui posuerunt. Plato enim posuit formas quae sunt in materia corporali, derivari et formari a formis sine materia subsistentibus, per modum participationis cuiusdam. Ponebat enim hominem quendam immaterialiter subsistentem, et similiter equum, et sic de aliis, ex quibus constituuntur haec singularia sensibilia, secundum quod in materia corporali remanet quaedam impressio ab illis formis separatis, per modum assimilationis cuiusdam, quam participationem vocabat. Et secundum ordinem formarum ponebant Platonici ordinem substantiarum separatarum, puta quod una substantia separata est quae est equus, quae est causa omnium equorum; supra quam est quaedam vita separata, quam dicebant per se vitam et causam omnis vitae; et ulterius quandam quam nominabant ipsum esse, et causam omnis esse. Avicenna vero et quidam alii non posuerunt formas rerum corporalium in materia per se subsistere, sed solum in intellectu. A formis ergo in intellectu creaturarum spiritualium existentibus (quas quidem ipsi intelligentias, nos autem angelos dicimus), dicebant procedere omnes formas quae sunt in materia corporali, sicut a formis quae sunt in mente artificis, procedunt formae artificiatorum. Et in idem videtur redire quod quidam moderni haeretici ponunt, dicentes quidem Deum creatorem omnium, sed materiam corporalem a Diabolo formatam et per varias species distinctam. Omnes autem hae opiniones ex una radice processisse videntur. Quaerebant enim causam formarum, ac si ipsae formae fierent secundum seipsas. Sed sicut probat Aristoteles in VII Metaphys., id quod proprie fit, est compositum; formae autem corruptibilium rerum habent ut aliquando sint, aliquando non sint, absque hoc quod ipsae generentur aut corrumpantur, sed compositis gene-

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stances are forms essentially, whereas corporeal creatures have forms by participation. Therefore the forms of corporeal things are derived from spiritual substances. Obj. 3: Further, spiritual substances have more power of causation than the heavenly bodies. But the heavenly bodies give form to things here below, for which reason they are said to cause generation and corruption. Much more, therefore, are material forms derived from spiritual substances. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): We must not suppose that this corporeal matter serves the angels at their nod, but rather that it obeys God thus. But corporeal matter may be said thus to serve that from which it receives its form. Corporeal forms, then, are not from the angels, but from God. I answer that, It was the opinion of some that all corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances, which we call the angels. And there are two ways in which this has been stated. For Plato held that the forms of corporeal matter are derived from, and formed by, forms immaterially subsisting, by a kind of participation. Thus he held that there exists an immaterial man, and an immaterial horse, and so forth, and that from such the individual sensible things that we see are constituted, in so far as in corporeal matter there abides the impression received from these separate forms, by a kind of assimilation, or as he calls it, participation (Phaedo xlix). And, according to the Platonists, the order of forms corresponds to the order of those separate substances; for example, that there is a single separate substance, which is horse and the cause of all horses, whilst above this is separate life, or per se life, as they term it, which is the cause of all life, and that above this again is that which they call being itself, which is the cause of all being. Avicenna, however, and certain others, have maintained that the forms of corporeal things do not subsist per se in matter, but in the intellect only. Thus they say that from forms existing in the intellect of spiritual creatures (called intelligences by them, but angels by us) proceed all the forms of corporeal matter, as the form of his handiwork proceeds from the forms in the mind of the craftsman. This theory seems to be the same as that of certain heretics of modern times, who say that God indeed created all things, but that the devil formed corporeal matter, and differentiated it into species. But all these opinions seem to have a common origin; they all, in fact, sought for a cause of forms as though the form were of itself brought into being. Whereas, as Aristotle (Metaph. vii, text. 26, 27, 28) proves, what is, properly speaking, made, is the composite. Now, such are the forms of corruptible things that at one time they exist and at another exist not, without being themselves generated or cor-

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ratis aut corruptis, quia etiam formae non habent esse, sed composita habent esse per eas, sic enim alicui competit fieri, sicut et esse. Et ideo, cum simile fiat a suo simili, non est quaerenda causa formarum corporalium aliqua forma immaterialis; sed aliquod compositum, secundum quod hic ignis generatur ab hoc igne. Sic igitur formae corporales causantur, non quasi influxae ab aliqua immateriali forma, sed quasi materia reducta de potentia in actum ab aliquo agente composito.

Sed quia agens compositum, quod est corpus, movetur a substantia spirituali creata, ut Augustinus dicit III de Trin.; sequitur ulterius quod etiam formae corporales a substantiis spiritualibus deriventur, non tanquam influentibus formas, sed tanquam moventibus ad formas. Ulterius autem reducuntur in Deum, sicut in primam causam, etiam species angelici intellectus, quae sunt quaedam seminales rationes corporalium formarum. In prima autem corporalis creaturae productione non consideratur aliqua transmutatio de potentia in actum. Et ideo formae corporales quas in prima productione corpora habuerunt, sunt immediate a Deo productae, cui soli ad nutum obedit materia, tanquam propriae causae. Unde ad hoc significandum, Moyses singulis operibus praemittit, dixit Deus fiat hoc vel illud; in quo significatur formatio rerum per verbum Dei facta, a quo, secundum Augustinum, est omnis forma et compago et concordia partium. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Boetius intelligit per formas quae sunt sine materia, rationes rerum quae sunt in mente divina, sicut etiam Apostolus dicit, Heb. XI, fide credimus aptata esse saecula verbo Dei, ut ex invisibilibus visibilia fierent. Si tamen per formas quae sunt sine materia, intelligit angelos, dicendum est quod ab eis veniunt formae quae sunt in materia, non per influxum, sed per motum. Ad secundum dicendum quod formae participatae in materia reducuntur, non ad formas aliquas per se subsistentes rationis eiusdem, ut Platonici posuerunt; sed ad formas intelligibiles vel intellectus angelici, a quibus per motum procedunt; vel ulterius ad rationes intellectus divini, a quibus etiam formarum semina sunt rebus creatis indita, ut per motum in actum educi possint. Ad tertium dicendum quod corpora caelestia causant formas in istis inferioribus, non influendo, sed movendo.

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rupted, but by reason of the generation or corruption of the composite; since even forms have not being, but composites have being through forms: for, according to a thing’s mode of being, is the mode in which it is brought into being. Since, then, like is produced from like, we must not look for the cause of corporeal forms in any immaterial form, but in something that is composite, as this fire is generated by that fire. Corporeal forms, therefore, are caused, not as emanations from some immaterial form, but by matter being brought from potentiality into act by some composite agent. But since the composite agent, which is a body, is moved by a created spiritual substance, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4, 5), it follows further that even corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances, not emanating from them, but as the term of their movement. And, further still, the species of the angelic intellect, which are, as it were, the seminal types of corporeal forms, must be referred to God as the first cause. But in the first production of corporeal creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can have taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that bodies had when first produced came immediately form God, whose bidding alone matter obeys, as its own proper cause. To signify this, Moses prefaces each work with the words, God said, Let this thing be, or that, to denote the formation of all things by the Word of God, from Whom, according to Augustine, is all form and fitness and concord of parts. Reply Obj. 1: By immaterial forms Boethius understands the types of things in the mind of God. Thus the Apostle says (Heb 11:3): By faith we understand that the world was framed by the Word of God; that from invisible things visible things might be made. But if by immaterial forms he understands the angels, we say that from them come material forms, not by emanation, but by motion. Reply Obj. 2: Forms received into matter are to be referred, not to self-subsisting forms of the same type, as the Platonists held, but either to intelligible forms of the angelic intellect, from which they proceed by movement, or, still higher, to the types in the Divine intellect, by which the seeds of forms are implanted in created things, that they may be able to be brought by movement into act. Reply Obj. 3: The heavenly bodies inform earthly ones by movement, not by emanation.

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Question 66 The Order of Creation towards Distinction Deinde considerandum est de opere distinctionis. Et We must next consider the work of distinction; first, the primo considerandum est de ordine creationis ad di- ordering of creation towards distinction; second, the disstinctionem; secundo, de ipsa distinctione secundum se. tinction itself. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum informitas materiae creatae (1) Whether formlessness of created matter preceded praecesserit tempore distinctionem ipsius. in time its formation? Secundo, utrum sit una materia omnium (2) Whether the matter of all corporeal things is the corporalium. same? Tertio, utrum caelum Empyreum sit concreatum (3) Whether the empyrean heaven was created materiae informi. contemporaneously with formless matter? Quarto, utrum tempus sit eidem concreatum. (4) Whether time was created simultaneously with it?

Article 1 Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod informitas materiae tempore praecesserit formationem ipsius. Dicitur enim Gen. 1, terra erat inanis et vacua, sive invisibilis et incomposita, secundum aliam litteram; per quod designatur informitas materiae, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo materia fuit aliquando informis, antequam formaretur. Praeterea, natura in sua operatione Dei operationem imitatur; sicut causa secunda imitatur causam primam. Sed in operatione naturae informitas tempore praecedit formationem. Ergo et in operatione Dei. Praeterea, materia potior est accidente, quia materia est pars substantiae. Sed Deus potest facere quod accidens sit sine subiecto; ut patet in sacramento altaris. Ergo potuit facere quod materia esset sine forma. Sed contra, imperfectio effectus attestatur imperfectioni agentis. Sed Deus est agens perfectissimum, unde de eo dicitur, Deut. XXXII, Dei perfecta sunt opera. Ergo opus ab eo creatum nunquam fuit informe. Praeterea, creaturae corporalis formatio facta fuit per opus distinctionis. Distinctioni autem opponitur confusio, sicut et formationi informitas. Si ergo informitas praecessit tempore formationem materiae, sequitur a principio fuisse confusionem corporalis creaturae, quam antiqui vocaverunt chaos. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc sunt diversae opiniones sanctorum. Augustinus enim vult quod informitas materiae corporalis non praecesserit tempore formationem ipsius, sed solum origine vel ordine na-

Objection 1: It would seem that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation. For it is said (Gen 1:2): The earth was void and empty, or invisible and shapeless, according to another version; by which is understood the formlessness of matter, as Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12). Therefore matter was formless until it received its form. Obj. 2: Further, nature in its working imitates the working of God, as a secondary cause imitates a first cause. But in the working of nature formlessness precedes form in time. It does so, therefore, in the Divine working. Obj. 3: Further, matter is higher than accident, for matter is part of substance. But God can effect that accident exist without substance, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. He could, therefore, cause matter to exist without form. On the contrary, An imperfect effect proves imperfection in the agent. But God is an agent absolutely perfect; wherefore it is said of Him (Deut 32:4): The works of God are perfect. Therefore the work of His creation was at no time formless. Further, the formation of corporeal creatures was effected by the work of distinction. But confusion is opposed to distinction, as formlessness to form. If, therefore, formlessness preceded in time the formation of matter, it follows that at the beginning confusion, called by the ancients chaos, existed in the corporeal creation. I answer that, On this point holy men differ in opinion. Augustine for instance (Gen ad lit. i, 15), believes that the formlessness of matter was not prior in time to its formation, but only in origin or the order of nature, whereas

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turae. Alii vero, ut Basilius, Ambrosius et Chrysostomus, volunt quod informitas materiae tempore praecesserit formationem. Et quamvis hae opiniones videantur esse contrariae, tamen parum ab invicem differunt, aliter enim accipit informitatem materiae Augustinus quam alii. Augustinus enim accipit informitatem materiae pro carentia omnis formae. Et sic impossibile est dicere quod informitas materiae tempore praecesserit vel formationem ipsius, vel distinctionem. Et de formatione quidem manifestum est. Si enim materia informis praecessit duratione, haec erat iam in actu, hoc enim duratio importat, creationis enim terminus est ens actu. Ipsum autem quod est actus, est forma. Dicere igitur materiam praecedere sine forma, est dicere ens actu sine actu, quod implicat contradictionem. Nec etiam potest dici quod habuit aliquam formam communem et postmodum supervenerunt ei formae diversae, quibus sit distincta. Quia hoc esset idem cum opinione antiquorum naturalium, qui posuerunt materiam primam esse aliquod corpus in actu, puta ignem, aerem aut aquam, aut aliquod medium. Ex quo sequebatur quod fieri non esset nisi alterari. Quia cum illa forma praecedens daret esse in actu in genere substantiae, et faceret esse hoc aliquid; sequebatur quod superveniens forma non faceret simpliciter ens actu, sed ens actu hoc, quod est proprium formae accidentalis; et sic sequentes formae essent accidentia, secundum quae non attenditur generatio, sed alteratio. Unde oportet dicere quod materia prima neque fuit creata omnino sine forma, neque sub forma una communi, sed sub formis distinctis. Et ita, si informitas materiae referatur ad conditionem primae materiae, quae secundum se non habet aliquam formam, informitas materiae non praecessit formationem seu distinctionem ipsius tempore, ut Augustinus dicit, sed origine seu natura tantum, eo modo quo potentia est prior actu, et pars toto. Alii vero sancti accipiunt informitatem, non secundum quod excludit omnem formam, sed secundum quod excludit istam formositatem et decorem qui nunc apparet in corporea creatura. Et secundum hoc dicunt quod informitas materiae corporalis duratione praecessit formationem eiusdem. Et sic secundum hoc, quantum ad aliquid cum eis Augustinus concordat, et quantum aliquid discordat, ut infra patebit. Et quantum ex littera Genesis I, accipi potest, triplex formositas deerat, propter quod dicebatur creatura corporalis informis. Deerat enim a toto corpore diaphano, quod dicitur caelum, pulchritudo lucis, unde dicitur quod tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi. Deerat autem terrae duplex pulchritudo. Una, quam habet ex hoc quod est aquis discooperta, et quantum ad hoc dicitur quod terra erat inanis, sive invisibilis, quia corporali aspectui patere non poterat, propter aquas undique eam coope-

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others, as Basil (Hom. ii In Hexaem.), Ambrose (In Hexaem. i), and Chrysostom (Hom. ii In Gen.), hold that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation. And although these opinions seem mutually contradictory, in reality they differ but little; for Augustine takes the formlessness of matter in a different sense from the others. In his sense it means the absence of all form, and if we thus understand it we cannot say that the formlessness of matter was prior in time either to its formation or to its distinction. As to formation, the argument is clear. For if formless matter preceded in duration, it already existed; for this is implied by duration, since the end of creation is being in act: and act itself is a form. To say, then, that matter preceded, but without form, is to say that being existed actually, yet without act, which is a contradiction in terms. Nor can it be said that it possessed some common form, on which afterwards supervened the different forms that distinguish it. For this would be to hold the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers, who maintained that primary matter was some corporeal thing in act, as fire, air, water, or some intermediate substance. Hence, it followed that to be made means merely to be changed; for since that preceding form bestowed actual substantial being, and made some particular thing to be, it would result that the supervening form would not simply make an actual being, but ‘this’ actual being; which is the proper effect of an accidental form. Thus the consequent forms would be merely accidents, implying not generation, but alteration. Hence we must assert that primary matter was not created altogether formless, nor under any one common form, but under distinct forms. And so, if the formlessness of matter be taken as referring to the condition of primary matter, which in itself is formless, this formlessness did not precede in time its formation or distinction, but only in origin and nature, as Augustine says; in the same way as potentiality is prior to act, and the part to the whole. But the other holy writers understand by formlessness, not the exclusion of all form, but the absence of that beauty and comeliness which are now apparent in the corporeal creation. Accordingly they say that the formlessness of corporeal matter preceded its form in duration. And so, when this is considered, it appears that Augustine agrees with them in some respects, and in others disagrees, as will be shown later (Q. 69, A. 1; Q. 74, A. 2). As far as may be gathered from the text of Genesis, a threefold beauty was wanting to corporeal creatures, for which reason they are said to be without form. For the beauty of light was wanting to all that transparent body which we call the heavens, whence it is said that darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the earth lacked beauty in two ways: first, that beauty which it acquired when its watery veil was withdrawn, and so we read that the earth was void, or invisible, inasmuch as the waters covered and

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rientes. Alia vero, quam habet ex hoc quod est ornata herbis et plantis, et ideo dicitur quod erat vacua, vel incomposita, idest non ornata, secundum aliam litteram. Et sic, cum praemisisset duas naturas creatas, scilicet caelum et terram, informitatem caeli expressit per hoc quod dixit, tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi, secundum quod sub caelo etiam aer includitur, informitatem vero terrae, per hoc quod dixit, terra erat inanis et vacua. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod terra aliter accipitur in loco isto ab Augustino, et ab aliis sanctis. Augustinus enim vult quod nomine terrae et aquae significetur in hoc loco ipsa materia prima. Non enim poterat Moyses rudi populo primam materiam exprimere, nisi sub similitudine rerum eis notarum. Unde et sub multiplici similitudine eam exprimit, non vocans eam tantum aquam vel tantum terram, ne videatur secundum rei veritatem materia prima esse vel terra vel aqua. Habet tamen similitudinem cum terra, inquantum subsidet formis; et cum aqua, inquantum est apta formari diversis formis. Secundum hoc ergo, dicitur terra inanis et vacua, vel invisibilis et incomposita, quia materia per formam cognoscitur (unde in se considerata dicitur invisibilis vel inanis), et eius potentia per formam repletur (unde et Plato materiam dicit esse locum). Alii vero sancti per terram intelligunt ipsum elementum, quae qualiter, secundum eos, erat informis, dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod natura producit effectum in actu de ente in potentia, et ideo oportet ut in eius operatione potentia tempore praecedat actum, et informitas formationem. Sed Deus producit ens actu ex nihilo, et ideo statim potest producere rem perfectam, secundum magnitudinem suae virtutis. Ad tertium dicendum quod accidens, cum sit forma, est actus quidam, materia autem secundum id quod est, est ens in potentia. Unde magis repugnat esse in actu materiae sine forma, quam accidenti sine subiecto. Ad primum vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, dicendum est quod si, secundum alios sanctos, informitas tempore praecessit formationem materiae, non fuit hoc ex impotentia Dei; sed ex eius sapientia, ut ordo servaretur in rerum conditione, dum ex imperfecto ad perfectum adducerentur. Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam antiquorum naturalium posuerunt confusionem excludentem omnem distinctionem; praeter hoc quod Anaxagoras posuit solum intellectum distinctum et immixtum. Sed ante opus distinctionis Scriptura sacra ponit multiplicem distinctionem. Primo quidem, caeli et terrae (in quo ostenditur distinctio etiam secundum materiam, ut infra patebit), et hoc cum dicit, in principio Deus creavit caelum

Q. 66, A. 1

concealed it from view; second, that which it derives from being adorned by herbs and plants, for which reason it is called empty, or, according to another reading, shapeless— that is, unadorned. Thus after mention of two created natures, the heaven and the earth, the formlessness of the heaven is indicated by the words, darkness was upon the face of the deep, since the air is included under heaven; and the formlessness of the earth, by the words, the earth was void and empty. Reply Obj. 1: The word earth is taken differently in this passage by Augustine, and by other writers. Augustine holds that by the words earth and water, in this passage, primary matter itself is signified on account of its being impossible for Moses to make the idea of such matter intelligible to an ignorant people, except under the similitude of wellknown objects. Hence he uses a variety of figures in speaking of it, calling it not water only, nor earth only, lest they should think it to be in very truth water or earth. At the same time it has so far a likeness to earth, in that it is susceptible of form, and to water in its adaptability to a variety of forms. In this respect, then, the earth is said to be void and empty, or invisible and shapeless, that matter is known by means of form. Hence, considered in itself, it is called invisible or void, and its potentiality is completed by form; thus Plato says that matter is place. But other holy writers understand by earth the element of earth, and we have said (A. 1) how, in this sense, the earth was, according to them, without form. Reply Obj. 2: Nature produces effect in act from being in potentiality; and consequently in the operations of nature potentiality must precede act in time, and formlessness precede form. But God produces being in act out of nothing, and can, therefore, produce a perfect thing in an instant, according to the greatness of His power. Reply Obj. 3: Accident, inasmuch as it is a form, is a kind of act; whereas matter, as such, is essentially being in potentiality. Hence it is more repugnant that matter should be in act without form, than for accident to be without subject. In reply to the first argument in the contrary sense, we say that if, according to some holy writers, formlessness was prior in time to the informing of matter, this arose, not from want of power on God’s part, but from His wisdom, and from the design of preserving due order in the disposition of creatures by developing perfection from imperfection. In reply to the second argument, we say that certain of the ancient natural philosophers maintained confusion devoid of all distinction; except Anaxagoras, who taught that the intellect alone was distinct and without admixture. But previous to the work of distinction Holy Scripture enumerates several kinds of differentiation, the first being that of the heaven from the earth, in which even a material distinction is expressed, as will be shown later

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et terram. Secundo, distinctionem elementorum quantum ad formas suas, per hoc quod nominat terram et aquam. Aerem autem et ignem non nominat, quia non est ita manifestum rudibus, quibus Moyses loquebatur, huiusmodi esse corpora, sicut manifestum est de terra et aqua. Quamvis Plato aerem intellexerit significari per hoc quod dicitur spiritus domini (quia etiam aer spiritus dicitur), ignem vero intellexerit significari per caelum (quod igneae naturae esse dixit), ut Augustinus refert in VIII libro de Civ. Dei. Sed Rabbi Moyses, in aliis cum Platone concordans, dicit ignem significari per tenebras, quia, ut dicit, in propria sphaera ignis non lucet. Sed magis videtur esse conveniens quod prius dictum est, quia spiritus domini in Scriptura non nisi pro spiritu sancto consuevit poni. Qui aquis superferri dicitur, non corporaliter, sed sicut voluntas artificis superfertur materiae quam vult formare. Tertia distinctio significatur secundum situm. Quia terra erat sub aquis, quibus invisibilis reddebatur, aer vero, qui est subiectum tenebrarum, significatur fuisse super aquas, per hoc quod dicitur, tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi. Quid autem distinguendum remaneret, ex sequentibus apparebit.

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(A. 3; Q. 68, A. 1). This is signified by the words, In the beginning God created heaven and earth. The second distinction mentioned is that of the elements according to their forms, since both earth and water are named. That air and fire are not mentioned by name is due to the fact that the corporeal nature of these would not be so evident as that of earth and water, to the ignorant people to whom Moses spoke. Plato (Timaeus xxvi), nevertheless, understood air to be signified by the words, Spirit of God, since spirit is another name for air, and considered that by the word heaven is meant fire, for he held heaven to be composed of fire, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei viii, 11). But Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii), though otherwise agreeing with Plato, says that fire is signified by the word darkness, since, said he, fire does not shine in its own sphere. However, it seems more reasonable to hold to what we stated above; because by the words Spirit of God Scripture usually means the Holy Spirit, Who is said to move over the waters, not, indeed, in bodily shape, but as the craftsman’s will may be said to move over the material to which he intends to give a form. The third distinction is that of place; since the earth is said to be under the waters that rendered it invisible, whilst the air, the subject of darkness, is described as being above the waters, in the words: Darkness was upon the face of the deep. The remaining distinctions will appear from what follows (Q. 71).

Article 2 Whether the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod una sit materia informis omnium corporalium. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII Confess., duo reperio quae fecisti, unum quod erat formatum, alterum quod erat informe; et hoc dicit esse terram invisibilem et incompositam, per quam dicit significari materiam rerum corporalium. Ergo una est materia omnium corporalium. Praeterea, Philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quod illa quae sunt unum in genere, sunt unum in materia. Sed omnia corporalia conveniunt in genere corporis. Ergo omnium corporalium est una materia. Praeterea, diversus actus fit in diversa potentia, et unus in una. Sed omnium corporum est una forma, scilicet corporeitas. Ergo omnium corporalium est materia una. Praeterea, materia in se considerata, est solum in potentia. Sed distinctio est per formas. Ergo materia in se considerata, est una tantum omnium corporalium. Sed contra, quaecumque conveniunt in materia, sunt transmutabilia ad invicem, et agunt et patiuntur ab invicem, ut dicitur in I de Gen. Sed corpora caelestia et

Objection 1: It would seem that the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): I find two things Thou hast made, one formed, the other formless, and he says that the latter was the earth invisible and shapeless, whereby, he says, the matter of all corporeal things is designated. Therefore the matter of all corporeal things is the same. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 10): Things that are one in genus are one in matter. But all corporeal things are in the same genus of body. Therefore the matter of all bodies is the same. Obj. 3: Further, different acts befit different potentialities, and the same act befits the same potentiality. But all bodies have the same form, corporeity. Therefore all bodies have the same matter. Obj. 4: Further, matter, considered in itself, is only in potentiality. But distinction is due to form. Therefore matter considered in itself is the same in all corporeal things. On the contrary, Things of which the matter is the same are mutually interchangeable and mutually active or passive, as is said (De Gener. i, text. 50). But heavenly and

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inferiora non sic se habent ad invicem. Ergo eorum materia non est una. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc fuerunt diversae opiniones philosophorum. Plato enim, et omnes philosophi ante Aristotelem, posuerunt omnia corpora esse de natura quatuor elementorum. Unde cum quatuor elementa communicent in una materia, ut mutua generatio et corruptio in eis ostendit; per consequens sequebatur quod omnium corporum sit materia una. Quod autem quaedam corpora sint incorruptibilia, Plato adscribebat non conditioni materiae, sed voluntati artificis, scilicet Dei, quem introducit corporibus caelestibus dicentem, natura vestra estis dissolubilia, voluntate autem mea indissolubilia, quia voluntas mea maior est nexu vestro. Hanc autem positionem Aristoteles reprobat, per motus naturales corporum. Cum enim corpus caeleste habeat naturalem motum diversum a naturali motu elementorum, sequitur quod eius natura sit alia a natura quatuor elementorum. Et sicut motus circularis, qui est proprius corporis caelestis, caret contrarietate, motus autem elementorum sunt invicem contrarii, ut qui est sursum ei qui est deorsum, ita corpus caeleste est absque contrarietate, corpora vero elementaria sunt cum contrarietate. Et quia corruptio et generatio sunt ex contrariis, sequitur quod secundum suam naturam corpus caeleste sit incorruptibile, elementa vero sunt corruptibilia. Sed non obstante hac differentia corruptibilitatis et incorruptibilitatis naturalis, Avicebron posuit unam materiam omnium corporum, attendens ad unitatem formae corporalis. Sed si forma corporeitatis esset una forma per se, cui supervenirent aliae formae, quibus corpora distinguuntur, haberet necessitatem quod dicitur. Quia illa forma immutabiliter materiae inhaereret, et quantum ad illam esset omne corpus incorruptibile; sed corruptio accideret per remotionem sequentium formarum, quae non esset corruptio simpliciter, sed secundum quid, quia privationi substerneretur aliquod ens actu. Sicut etiam accidebat antiquis naturalibus, qui ponebant subiectum corporum aliquod ens actu, puta ignem aut aerem aut aliquid huiusmodi. Supposito autem quod nulla forma quae sit in corpore corruptibili remaneat ut substrata generationi et corruptioni, sequitur de necessitate quod non sit eadem materia corporum corruptibilium et incorruptibilium. Materia enim, secundum id quod est, est in potentia ad formam. Oportet ergo quod materia, secundum se considerata, sit in potentia ad formam omnium illorum quorum est materia communis. Per unam autem formam non fit in actu nisi quantum ad illam formam. Remanet ergo in potentia quantum ad omnes alias formas. Nec hoc excluditur, si una illarum formarum sit perfectior et continens in se virtute alias. Quia potentia, quantum est de se, in-

Q. 66, A. 2

earthly bodies do not act upon each other mutually. Therefore their matter is not the same. I answer that, On this question the opinions of philosophers have differed. Plato and all who preceded Aristotle held that all bodies are of the nature of the four elements. Hence because the four elements have one common matter, as their mutual generation and corruption prove, it followed that the matter of all bodies is the same. But the fact of the incorruptibility of some bodies was ascribed by Plato, not to the condition of matter, but to the will of the artificer, God, Whom he represents as saying to the heavenly bodies: By your own nature you are subject to dissolution, but by My will you are indissoluble, for My will is more powerful than the link that binds you together. But this theory Aristotle (De Caelo i, text. 5) disproves by the natural movements of bodies. For since, he says, the heavenly bodies have a natural movement, different from that of the elements, it follows that they have a different nature from them. For movement in a circle, which is proper to the heavenly bodies, is not by contraries, whereas the movements of the elements are mutually opposite, one tending upwards, another downwards: so, therefore, the heavenly body is without contrariety, whereas the elemental bodies have contrariety in their nature. And as generation and corruption are from contraries, it follows that, whereas the elements are corruptible, the heavenly bodies are incorruptible. But in spite of this difference of natural corruption and incorruption, Avicebron taught unity of matter in all bodies, arguing from their unity of form. And, indeed, if corporeity were one form in itself, on which the other forms that distinguish bodies from each other supervene, this argument would necessarily be true; for this form of corporeity would inhere in matter immutably and so far all bodies would be incorruptible. But corruption would then be merely accidental through the disappearance of successive forms—that is to say, it would be corruption, not pure and simple, but partial, since a being in act would subsist under the transient form. Thus the ancient natural philosophers taught that the substratum of bodies was some actual being, such as air or fire. But supposing that no form exists in corruptible bodies which remains subsisting beneath generation and corruption, it follows necessarily that the matter of corruptible and incorruptible bodies is not the same. For matter, as it is in itself, is in potentiality to form. Considered in itself, then, it is in potentiality in respect to all those forms to which it is common, and in receiving any one form it is in act only as regards that form. Hence it remains in potentiality to all other forms. And this is the case even where some forms are more perfect than others, and contain these others virtually in themselves. For potentiality in itself is indifferent with respect to perfec-

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differenter se habet ad perfectum et imperfectum, unde sicut quando est sub forma imperfecta, est in potentia ad formam perfectam, ita e converso. Sic ergo materia, secundum quod est sub forma incorruptibilis corporis, erit adhuc in potentia ad formam corruptibilis corporis. Et cum non habeat eam in actu, erit simul sub forma et privatione, quia carentia formae in eo quod est in potentia ad formam, est privatio. Haec autem dispositio est corruptibilis corporis. Impossibile ergo est quod corporis corruptibilis et incorruptibilis per naturam, sit una materia. Nec tamen dicendum est, ut Averroes fingit, quod ipsum corpus caeleste sit materia caeli, ens in potentia ad ubi et non ad esse; et forma eius est substantia separata quae unitur ei ut motor. Quia impossibile est ponere aliquod ens actu, quin vel ipsum totum sit actus et forma, vel habeat actum seu formam. Remota ergo per intellectum substantia separata quae ponitur motor, si corpus caeleste non est habens formam, quod est componi ex forma et subiecto formae, sequitur quod sit totum forma et actus. Omne autem tale est intellectum in actu; quod de corpore caelesti dici non potest, cum sit sensibile. Relinquitur ergo quod materia corporis caelestis, secundum se considerata, non est in potentia nisi ad formam quam habet. Nec refert ad propositum quaecumque sit illa, sive anima, sive aliquid aliud. Unde illa forma sic perficit illam materiam, quod nullo modo in ea remanet potentia ad esse, sed ad ubi tantum, ut Aristoteles dicit. Et sic non est eadem materia corporis caelestis et elementorum, nisi secundum analogiam, secundum quod conveniunt in ratione potentiae.

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tion and imperfection, so that under an imperfect form it is in potentiality to a perfect form, and vice versa. Matter, therefore, whilst existing under the form of an incorruptible body, would be in potentiality to the form of a corruptible body; and as it does not actually possess the latter, it has both form and the privation of form; for want of a form in that which is in potentiality thereto is privation. But this condition implies corruptibility. It is therefore impossible that bodies by nature corruptible, and those by nature incorruptible, should possess the same matter.

Neither can we say, as Averroes imagines, that a heavenly body itself is the matter of the heaven—being in potentiality with regard to place, though not to being, and that its form is a separate substance united to it as its motive force. For it is impossible to suppose any being in act, unless in its totality it be act and form, or be something which has act or form. Setting aside, then, in thought, the separate substance stated to be endowed with motive power, if the heavenly body is not something having form—that is, something composed of a form and the subject of that form—it follows that in its totality it is form and act. But every such thing is something actually understood, which the heavenly bodies are not, being sensible. It follows, then, that the matter of the heavenly bodies, considered in itself, is in potentiality to that form alone which it actually possesses. Nor does it concern the point at issue to inquire whether this is a soul or any other thing. Hence this form perfects this matter in such a way that there remains in it no potentiality with respect to being, but only to place, as Aristotle says. So, then, the matter of the heavenly bodies and of the elements is not the same, except by analogy, in so far as they agree in the character of potentiality. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus sequiReply Obj. 1: Augustine follows in this the opinion of tur in hoc opinionem Platonis, non ponentis quintam es- Plato, who does not admit a fifth essence. Or we may say sentiam. Vel dicendum quod materia informis est una that formless matter is one with the unity of order, as all unitate ordinis, sicut omnia corpora sunt unum in ordi- bodies are one in the order of corporeal creatures.

ne creaturae corporeae. Ad secundum dicendum quod si genus consideretur physice, corruptibilia et incorruptibilia non sunt in eodem genere, propter diversum modum potentiae in eis, ut dicitur X Metaphys. Secundum autem logicam considerationem, est unum genus omnium corporum, propter unam rationem corporeitatis. Ad tertium dicendum quod forma corporeitatis non est una in omnibus corporibus, cum non sit alia a formis quibus corpora distinguuntur, ut dictum est. Ad quartum dicendum quod, cum potentia dicatur ad actum, ens in potentia est diversum ex hoc ipso quod ordinatur ad diversum actum; sicut visus ad colorem, et auditus ad sonum. Unde ex hoc ipso materia caelestis corporis est alia a materia elementi, quia non est in potentia ad formam elementi.

Reply Obj. 2: If genus is taken in a physical sense, corruptible and incorruptible things are not in the same genus, on account of their different modes of potentiality, as is said in Metaph. x, text. 26. Logically considered, however, there is but one genus of all bodies, since they are all included in the one notion of corporeity. Reply Obj. 3: The form of corporeity is not one and the same in all bodies, being no other than the various forms by which bodies are distinguished, as stated above. Reply Obj. 4: As potentiality is directed towards act, potential beings are differentiated by their different acts, as sight is by color, hearing by sound. Therefore for this reason the matter of the celestial bodies is different from that of the elemental, because the matter of the celestial is not in potentiality to an elemental form.

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Q. 66, A. 3

Article 3 Whether the empyrean heaven was created at the same time as formless matter? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod caelum Empyreum non sit concreatum materiae informi. Caelum enim Empyreum, si est aliquid, oportet quod sit corpus sensibile. Omne autem corpus sensibile est mobile. Caelum autem Empyreum non est mobile, quia motus eius deprehenderetur per motum alicuius corporis apparentis; quod minime apparet. Non ergo caelum Empyreum est aliquid materiae informi concreatum. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in III de Trin., quod inferiora corpora per superiora quodam ordine reguntur. Si ergo caelum Empyreum est quoddam supremum corpus, oportet quod habeat aliquam influentiam in haec inferiora corpora. Sed hoc non videtur, praesertim si ponatur immobile, cum nullum corpus moveat nisi motum. Non est ergo caelum Empyreum materiae informi concreatum.

Objection 1: It would seem that the empyrean heaven was not created at the same time as formless matter. For the empyrean, if it is anything at all, must be a sensible body. But all sensible bodies are movable, and the empyrean heaven is not movable. For if it were so, its movement would be ascertained by the movement of some visible body, which is not the case. The empyrean heaven, then, was not created contemporaneously with formless matter. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that the lower bodies are governed by the higher in a certain order. If, therefore, the empyrean heaven is the highest of bodies, it must necessarily exercise some influence on bodies below it. But this does not seem to be the case, especially as it is presumed to be without movement; for one body cannot move another unless itself also be moved. Therefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless matter. Obj. 3: Further, if it is held that the empyrean heaven is the place of contemplation, and not ordained to natural effects; on the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): In so far as we mentally apprehend eternal things, so far are we not of this world; from which it is clear that contemplation lifts the mind above the things of this world. Corporeal place, therefore, cannot be the seat of contemplation. Obj. 4: Further, among the heavenly bodies exists a body, partly transparent and partly luminous, which we call the sidereal heaven. There exists also a heaven wholly transparent, called by some the aqueous or crystalline heaven. If, then, there exists a still higher heaven, it must be wholly luminous. But this cannot be, for then the air would be constantly illuminated, and there would be no night. Therefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless matter. On the contrary, Strabus says that in the passage, In the beginning God created heaven and earth, heaven denotes not the visible firmament, but the empyrean or fiery heaven. I answer that, The empyrean heaven rests only on the authority of Strabus and Bede, and also of Basil; all of whom agree in one respect, namely, in holding it to be the place of the blessed. Strabus and Bede say that as soon as created it was filled with angels; and Basil says: Just as the lost are driven into the lowest darkness, so the reward for worthy deeds is laid up in the light beyond this world, where the just shall obtain the abode of rest.

Si dicatur quod caelum Empyreum est locus contemplationis, non ordinatum ad naturales effectus, contra, Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin., quod nos, secundum quod mente aliquid aeternum capimus, non in hoc mundo sumus; ex quo patet quod contemplatio mentem supra corporalia elevat. Non ergo contemplationi locus corporeus deputatur. Praeterea, inter corpora caelestia invenitur aliquod corpus partim diaphanum et partim lucidum, scilicet caelum sidereum. Invenitur etiam aliquod caelum totum diaphanum, quod aliqui nominant caelum aqueum vel crystallinum. Si ergo est aliud superius caelum, oportet quod sit totum lucidum. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia sic continue aer illuminaretur, nec unquam nox esset. Non ergo caelum Empyreum materiae informi est concreatum. Sed contra est quod Strabus dicit, quod cum dicitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, caelum dicit non visibile firmamentum, sed Empyreum, idest igneum. Respondeo dicendum quod caelum Empyreum non invenitur positum nisi per auctoritates Strabi et Bedae, et iterum per auctoritatem Basilii. In cuius positione quantum ad aliquid conveniunt, scilicet quantum ad hoc quod sit locus beatorum. Dicit enim Strabus, et etiam Beda, quod statim factum angelis est repletum. Basilius etiam dicit, in II Hexaem., sicut damnati in tenebras ultimas abiguntur ita remuneratio pro dignis operibus restauratur in ea luce quae est extra mundum, ubi beati quietis domicilium sortientur. Differunt tamen quantum ad rationem ponendi. But they differ in the reasons on which they base Nam Strabus et Beda ponunt caelum Empyreum ea ra- their statement. Strabus and Bede teach that there is an tione, quia firmamentum, per quod caelum sidereum empyrean heaven, because the firmament, which they take

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intelligunt, non in principio sed secunda die dicitur factum. Basilius vero ea ratione ponit, ne videatur simpliciter Deus opus suum a tenebris inchoasse; quod Manichaei calumniantur, Deum veteris testamenti Deum tenebrarum nominantes. Hae autem rationes non sunt multum cogentes. Nam quaestio de firmamento quod legitur factum in secunda die, aliter solvitur, ab Augustino et ab aliis sanctis. Quaestio autem de tenebris solvitur, secundum Augustinum, per hoc quod informitas (quae per tenebras significatur) non praecessit duratione formationem, sed origine. Secundum alios vero, cum tenebrae non sint creatura aliqua, sed privatio lucis, divinam sapientiam attestatur, ut ea quae produxit ex nihilo, primo in statu imperfectionis institueret, et postmodum ea perduceret ad perfectum. Potest autem convenientior ratio sumi ex ipsa conditione gloriae. Expectatur enim in futura remuneratione duplex gloria, scilicet spiritualis, et corporalis, non solum in corporibus humanis glorificandis, sed etiam in toto mundo innovando. Inchoata est autem spiritualis gloria ab ipso mundi principio in beatitudine angelorum, quorum aequalitas sanctis promittitur. Unde conveniens fuit ut etiam a principio corporalis gloria inchoaretur in aliquo corpore, quod etiam a principio fuerit absque servitute corruptionis et mutabilitatis, et totaliter lucidum; sicut tota creatura corporalis expectatur post resurrectionem futura. Et ideo illud caelum dicitur Empyreum, idest igneum, non ab ardore, sed a splendore. Sciendum est autem quod Augustinus, X de Civ. Dei, dicit quod Porphyrius discernebat a daemonibus angelos, ut aerea loca esse daemonum, aetherea vero vel Empyrea diceret angelorum. Sed Porphyrius, tanquam Platonicus, caelum istud sidereum igneum esse existimabat, et ideo Empyreum nominabat; vel aethereum, secundum quod nomen aetheris sumitur ab inflammatione, et non secundum quod sumitur a velocitate motus, ut Aristoteles dicit. Quod pro tanto dictum sit, ne aliquis opinetur Augustinum caelum Empyreum posuisse sicut nunc ponitur a modernis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod corpora sensibilia sunt mobilia secundum ipsum statum mundi, quia per motum creaturae corporalis procuratur electorum multiplicatio. Sed in ultima consummatione gloriae cessabit corporum motus. Et talem oportuit esse a principio dispositionem caeli Empyrei. Ad secundum dicendum quod satis probabile est quod caelum Empyreum, secundum quosdam, cum sit ordinatum ad statum gloriae, non habet influentiam in inferiora corpora, quae sunt sub alio ordine, utpote ordinata ad naturalem rerum decursum. Probabilius tamen videtur dicendum quod, sicut supremi angeli, qui assi-

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to mean the sidereal heaven, is said to have been made, not in the beginning, but on the second day: whereas the reason given by Basil is that otherwise God would seem to have made darkness His first work, as the Manicheans falsely assert, when they call the God of the Old Testament the God of darkness. These reasons, however, are not very cogent. For the question of the firmament, said to have been made on the second day, is solved in one way by Augustine, and in another by other holy writers. But the question of the darkness is explained according to Augustine, by supposing that formlessness, signified by darkness, preceded form not by duration, but by origin. According to others, however, since darkness is no creature, but a privation of light, it is a proof of Divine wisdom, that the things it created from nothing it produced first of all in an imperfect state, and afterwards brought them to perfection. But a better reason can be drawn from the state of glory itself. For in the reward to come a two-fold glory is looked for, spiritual and corporeal, not only in the human body to be glorified, but in the whole world which is to be made new. Now the spiritual glory began with the beginning of the world, in the blessedness of the angels, equality with whom is promised to the saints. It was fitting, then, that even from the beginning, there should be made some beginning of bodily glory in something corporeal, free at the very outset from the servitude of corruption and change, and wholly luminous, even as the whole bodily creation, after the Resurrection, is expected to be. So, then, that heaven is called the empyrean, i.e., fiery, not from its heat, but from its brightness. It is to be noticed, however, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 9, 27) says that Porphyry sets the demons apart from the angels by supposing that the former inhabit the air, the latter the ether, or empyrean. But Porphyry, as a Platonist, held the heaven, known as sidereal, to be fiery, and therefore called it empyrean or ethereal, taking ethereal to denote the burning of flame, and not as Aristotle understands it, swiftness of movement (De Coel. i, text. 22). This much has been said to prevent anyone from supposing that Augustine maintained an empyrean heaven in the sense understood by modern writers. Reply Obj. 1: Sensible corporeal things are movable in the present state of the world, for by the movement of corporeal creatures is secured the multiplication of the elements. But when glory is finally consummated, the movement of bodies will cease. And such must have been from the beginning the condition of the empyrean. Reply Obj. 2: It is sufficiently probable, as some assert, that the empyrean heaven, having the state of glory for its ordained end, does not influence inferior bodies of another order—those, namely, that are directed only to natural ends. Yet it seems still more probable that it does influence bodies that are moved, though itself motionless, just

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stunt, habent influentiam super medios et ultimos, qui mittuntur, quamvis ipsi non mittantur, secundum Dionysium; ita caelum Empyreum habet influentiam super corpora quae moventur, licet ipsum non moveatur. Et propter hoc potest dici quod influit in primum caelum quod movetur, non aliquid transiens et adveniens per motum, sed aliquid fixum et stabile; puta virtutem continendi et causandi, vel aliquid huiusmodi ad dignitatem pertinens. Ad tertium dicendum quod locus corporeus deputatur contemplationi non propter necessitatem, sed propter congruitatem, ut exterior claritas interiori conveniat. Unde Basilius dicit quod ministrator spiritus non poterat degere in tenebris; sed in luce et laetitia decentem sibi habitum possidebat. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Basilius dicit in II Hexaem., constat factum esse caelum rotunditate conclusum, habens corpus spissum et adeo validum, ut possit ea quae extrinsecus habentur, ab interioribus separare. Ob hoc necessario post se regionem relictam carentem luce constituit, utpote fulgore qui superradiabat excluso. Sed quia corpus firmamenti, etsi sit solidum, est tamen diaphanum, quod lumen non impedit (ut patet per hoc, quod lumen stellarum videmus non obstantibus mediis caelis); potest aliter dici quod habet lucem caelum Empyreum non condensatam, ut radios emittat, sicut corpus solis, sed magis subtilem. Vel habet claritatem gloriae, quae non est conformis cum claritate naturali.

Q. 66, A. 4

as angels of the highest rank, who assist, influence those of lower degree who act as messengers, though they themselves are not sent, as Dionysius teaches (Coel. Hier. xii). For this reason it may be said that the influence of the empyrean upon that which is called the first heaven, and is moved, produces therein not something that comes and goes as a result of movement, but something of a fixed and stable nature, as the power of conservation or causation, or something of the kind pertaining to dignity. Reply Obj. 3: Corporeal place is assigned to contemplation, not as necessary, but as congruous, that the splendor without may correspond to that which is within. Hence Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) says: The ministering spirit could not live in darkness, but made his habitual dwelling in light and joy. Reply Obj. 4: As Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem.): It is certain that the heaven was created spherical in shape, of dense body, and sufficiently strong to separate what is outside it from what it encloses. On this account it darkens the region external to it, the light by which itself is lit up being shut out from that region. But since the body of the firmament, though solid, is transparent, for that it does not exclude light (as is clear from the fact that we can see the stars through the intervening heavens), we may also say that the empyrean has light, not condensed so as to emit rays, as the sun does, but of a more subtle nature. Or it may have the brightness of glory which differs from mere natural brightness.

Article 4 Whether time was created simultaneously with formless matter? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod tempus non sit concreatum materiae informi. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII Confess., ad Deum loquens, duo reperio quae fecisti carentia temporibus, scilicet materiam primam corporalem, et naturam angelicam. Non ergo tempus est concreatum materiae informi. Praeterea, tempus dividitur per diem et noctem. Sed a principio nec nox nec dies erat, sed postmodum, cum divisit Deus lucem a tenebris. Ergo a principio non erat tempus. Praeterea, tempus est numerus motus firmamenti, quod legitur factum secundo die. Ergo non a principio erat tempus. Praeterea, motus est prior tempore. Magis igitur deberet numerari inter primo creata motus, quam tempus. Praeterea, sicut tempus est mensura extrinseca, ita et locus. Non ergo magis debet computari inter primo creata tempus, quam locus.

Objection 1: It would seem that time was not created simultaneously with formless matter. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): I find two things that Thou didst create before time was, the primary corporeal matter, and the angelic nature. Therefore time was not created with formless matter. Obj. 2: Further, time is divided by day and night. But in the beginning there was neither day nor night, for these began when God divided the light from the darkness. Therefore in the beginning time was not. Obj. 3: Further, time is the measure of the firmament’s movement; and the firmament is said to have been made on the second day. Therefore in the beginning time was not. Obj. 4: Further, movement precedes time, and therefore should be reckoned among the first things created, rather than time. Obj. 5: Further, as time is the extrinsic measure of created things, so is place. Place, then, as truly as time, must be reckoned among the things first created.

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Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, super Gen. ad Litt., quod spiritualis et corporalis creatura est creata in principio temporis. Respondeo dicendum quod communiter dicitur quatuor esse primo creata, scilicet naturam angelicam, caelum Empyreum, materiam corporalem informem, et tempus. Sed attendendum est quod hoc dictum non procedit secundum Augustini opinionem. Augustinus enim ponit duo primo creata, scilicet naturam angelicam et materiam corporalem, nulla mentione facta de caelo Empyreo. Haec autem duo, scilicet natura angelica et materia informis, praecedunt formationem non duratione, sed natura. Et sicut natura praecedunt formationem, ita etiam et motum et tempus. Unde tempus non potest eis connumerari. Procedit autem praedicta connumeratio secundum opinionem aliorum sanctorum, ponentium quod informitas materiae duratione praecessit formationem, et tunc pro illa duratione necesse est ponere tempus aliquod; aliter enim mensura durationis accipi non posset. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus hoc dicit ea ratione qua natura angelica et materia informis praecedunt origine, seu natura, tempus. Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut, secundum alios sanctos, materia erat quodammodo informis, et postea fuit formata; ita tempus quodammodo fuit informe, et postmodum formatum, et distinctum per diem et noctem. Ad tertium dicendum quod, si motus firmamenti non statim a principio incoepit, tunc tempus quod praecessit, non erat numerus motus firmamenti, sed cuiuscumque primi motus. Accidit enim tempori quod sit numerus motus firmamenti, inquantum hic motus est primus motuum, si autem esset alius motus primus, illius motus esset tempus mensura, quia omnia mensurantur primo sui generis. Oportet autem dicere statim a principio fuisse aliquem motum, ad minus secundum successionem conceptionum et affectionum in mente angelica. Motum autem non est intelligere sine tempore, cum nihil aliud sit tempus quam numerus prioris et posterioris in motu.

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On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. i, 3): Both spiritual and corporeal creatures were created at the beginning of time. I answer that, It is commonly said that the first things created were these four—the angelic nature, the empyrean heaven, formless corporeal matter, and time. It must be observed, however, that this is not the opinion of Augustine. For he (Confess. xii, 12) specifies only two things as first created—the angelic nature and corporeal matter— making no mention of the empyrean heaven. But these two, namely, the angelic nature and formless matter, precede the formation, by nature only, and not by duration; and therefore, as they precede formation, so do they precede movement and time. Time, therefore, cannot be included among them. But the enumeration above given is that of other holy writers, who hold that the formlessness of matter preceded by duration its form, and this view postulates the existence of time as the measure of duration: for otherwise there would be no such measure. Reply Obj. 1: The teaching of Augustine rests on the opinion that the angelic nature and formless matter precede time by origin or nature. Reply Obj. 2: As in the opinion of some holy writers matter was in some measure formless before it received its full form, so time was in a manner formless before it was fully formed and distinguished into day and night.

Reply Obj. 3: If the movement of the firmament did not begin immediately from the beginning, then the time that preceded was the measure, not of the firmament’s movement, but of the first movement of whatsoever kind. For it is accidental to time to be the measure of the firmament’s movement, in so far as this is the first movement. But if the first movement was another than this, time would have been its measure, for everything is measured by the first of its kind. And it must be granted that forthwith from the beginning, there was movement of some kind, at least in the succession of concepts and affections in the angelic mind: while movement without time cannot be conceived, since time is nothing else than the measure of priority and succession in movement. Ad quartum dicendum quod inter primo creata Reply Obj. 4: Among the first created things are to be computantur ea quae habent generalem habitudinem ad reckoned those which have a general relationship to things. res. Et ideo computari debuit tempus, quod habet ratio- And, therefore, among these time must be included, as havnem communis mensurae, non autem motus, qui com- ing the nature of a common measure; but not movement, paratur solum ad subiectum mobile. which is related only to the movable subject. Ad quintum dicendum quod locus intelligitur in Reply Obj. 5: Place is implied as existing in the caelo Empyreo omnia continente. Et quia locus est de empyrean heaven, this being the boundary of the universe. permanentibus, concreatus est totus simul. Tempus au- And since place has reference to things permanent, it was tem, quod non est permanens, concreatum est in suo created at once in its totality. But time, as not being permaprincipio, sicut etiam modo nihil est accipere in actu de nent, was created in its beginning: even as actually we cantempore nisi nunc. not lay hold of any part of time save the now.

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Question 67 The Work of Distinction in Itself, and the Work of the First Day Consequenter considerandum est de opere distincWe must consider next the work of distinction in itself. tionis secundum se et primo, de opere primae diei; se- First, the work of the first day; second, the work of the seccundo, de opere secundae diei; tertio, de opere tertiae. ond day; third, the work of the third day. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum lux proprie in spiritualibus dici possit. (1) Whether the word light is used in its proper sense in speaking of spiritual things? Secundo, utrum lux corporalis sit corpus. (2) Whether light, in corporeal things, is itself corporeal? Tertio, utrum sit qualitas. (3) Whether light is a quality? Quarto, utrum conveniens fuit prima die fieri lucem. (4) Whether light was fittingly made on the first day?

Article 1 Whether the word ‘light’ is used in its proper sense in speaking of spiritual things? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lux proprie in spiritualibus dicatur. Dicit enim Augustinus, IV super Gen. ad Litt., quod in spiritualibus melior et certior lux est, et quod Christus non sic dicitur lux quo modo lapis, sed illud proprie, hoc figurative. Praeterea, Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., ponit lumen inter nomina intelligibilia Dei. Nomina autem intelligibilia proprie dicuntur in spiritualibus. Ergo lux proprie dicitur in spiritualibus. Praeterea, Apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. V, omne quod manifestatur, lumen est. Sed manifestatio magis proprie est in spiritualibus quam in corporalibus. Ergo et lux. Sed contra est quod Ambrosius, in libro de Fide, ponit splendorem inter ea quae de Deo metaphorice dicuntur. Respondeo dicendum quod de aliquo nomine dupliciter convenit loqui, uno modo, secundum primam eius impositionem; alio modo, secundum usum nominis. Sicut patet in nomine visionis, quod primo impositum est ad significandum actum sensus visus; sed propter dignitatem et certitudinem huius sensus, extensum est hoc nomen, secundum usum loquentium, ad omnem cognitionem aliorum sensuum (dicimus enim, vide quomodo sapit, vel quomodo redolet, vel quomodo est calidum); et ulterius etiam ad cognitionem intellectus, secundum illud Matth. V, beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt. Et similiter dicendum est de nomine lucis. Nam primo quidem est institutum ad significandum id quod facit manifestationem in sensu visus,

Objection 1: It would seem that light is used in its proper sense in spiritual things. For Augustine says (Gen ad lit. iv, 28) that in spiritual things light is better and surer: and that Christ is not called Light in the same sense as He is called the Stone; the former is to be taken literally, and the latter metaphorically. Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) includes Light among the intellectual names of God. But such names are used in their proper sense in spiritual things. Therefore light is used in its proper sense in spiritual matters. Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Eph 5:13): All that is made manifest is light. But to be made manifest belongs more properly to spiritual things than to corporeal. Therefore also does light. On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii) that Splendor is among those things which are said of God metaphorically. I answer that, Any word may be used in two ways— that is to say, either in its original application or in its more extended meaning. This is clearly shown in the word sight, originally applied to the act of the sense, and then, as sight is the noblest and most trustworthy of the senses, extended in common speech to all knowledge obtained through the other senses. Thus we say, Seeing how it tastes, or smells, or burns. Further, sight is applied to knowledge obtained through the intellect, as in those words: Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God (Matt 5:8). And thus it is with the word light. In its primary meaning it signifies that which makes manifest to the sense of sight; afterwards it was extended to that which makes manifest to cognition of any kind. If, then, the word is taken in its strict and primary

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postmodum autem extensum est ad significandum omne illud quod facit manifestationem secundum quamcumque cognitionem. Si ergo accipiatur nomen luminis secundum suam primam impositionem, metaphorice in spiritualibus dicitur, ut Ambrosius dicit. Si autem accipiatur secundum quod est in usu loquentium ad omnem manifestationem extensum, sic proprie in spiritualibus dicitur. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.

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meaning, it is to be understood metaphorically when applied to spiritual things, as Ambrose says (De Fide ii). But if taken in its common and extended use, as applied to manifestation of every kind, it may properly be applied to spiritual things.

The answer to the objections will sufficiently appear from what has been said.

Article 2 Whether light is a body? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lux Objection 1: It would seem that light is a body. For sit corpus. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Lib. Arbit., Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 5) that light takes the first quod lux in corporibus primum tenet locum. Ergo lux est place among bodies. Therefore light is a body. corpus. Praeterea, Philosophus dicit quod lumen est speObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. v, 2) that cies ignis. Sed ignis est corpus. Ergo lumen est corpus. light is a species of fire. But fire is a body, and therefore so is light. Praeterea, ferri, intersecari, et reflecti est proprie Obj. 3: Further, the powers of movement, intersection, corporum, haec autem omnia attribuuntur lumini vel and reflection belong properly to bodies; and all these are radio. Coniunguntur etiam diversi radii et separantur, ut attributes of light and its rays. Moreover, different rays Dionysius dicit, II cap. de Div. Nom., quod etiam vide- of light, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii), are united and tur non nisi corporibus convenire posse. Ergo lumen est separated, which seems impossible unless they are bodies. corpus. Therefore light is a body. Sed contra, duo corpora non possunt simul esse in On the contrary, Two bodies cannot occupy the eodem loco. Sed lumen est simul cum aere. Ergo lumen same place simultaneously. But this is the case with light non est corpus. and air. Therefore light is not a body. Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est lumen I answer that, Light cannot be a body, for three eviesse corpus. Quod quidem apparet tripliciter. Primo qui- dent reasons. First, on the part of place. For the place of any dem, ex parte loci. Nam locus cuiuslibet corporis est one body is different from that of any other, nor is it possialius a loco alterius corporis, nec est possibile, secundum ble, naturally speaking, for any two bodies of whatever nanaturam, duo corpora esse simul in eodem loco, qualia- ture, to exist simultaneously in the same place; since conticumque corpora sint; quia contiguum requirit distinc- guity requires distinction of place. tionem in situ. Secundo, apparet idem ex ratione motus. Si enim luThe second reason is from movement. For if light were a men esset corpus, illuminatio esset motus localis corpo- body, its diffusion would be the local movement of a body. ris. Nullus autem motus localis corporis potest esse in Now no local movement of a body can be instantaneous, instanti, quia omne quod movetur localiter, necesse est as everything that moves from one place to another must quod prius perveniat ad medium magnitudinis quam ad pass through the intervening space before reaching the end: extremum. Illuminatio autem fit in instanti. Nec potest whereas the diffusion of light is instantaneous. Nor can it be dici quod fiat in tempore imperceptibili. Quia in parvo argued that the time required is too short to be perceived; spatio posset tempus latere, in magno autem spatio, puta for though this may be the case in short distances, it canab oriente in occidentem, tempus latere non posset; sta- not be so in distances so great as that which separates the tim enim cum sol est in puncto orientis, illuminatur to- East from the West. Yet as soon as the sun is at the horitum hemisphaerium usque ad punctum oppositum. Est zon, the whole hemisphere is illuminated from end to end. etiam aliud considerandum ex parte motus. Quia om- It must also be borne in mind on the part of movement that ne corpus habet motum naturalem determinatum, mo- whereas all bodies have their natural determinate movetus autem illuminationis est ad omnem partem, nec ma- ment, that of light is indifferent as regards direction, workgis secundum circulum quam secundum rectitudinem. ing equally in a circle as in a straight line. Hence it appears

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Unde manifestum est quod illuminatio non est motus localis alicuius corporis. Tertio, apparet idem ex parte generationis et corruptionis. Si enim lumen esset corpus, quando aer obtenebrescit per absentiam luminaris, sequeretur quod corpus luminis corrumperetur, et quod materia eius acciperet aliam formam. Quod non apparet, nisi aliquis dicat etiam tenebras esse corpus. Nec etiam apparet ex qua materia tantum corpus, quod replet medium hemisphaerium, quotidie generetur. Ridiculum est etiam dicere quod ad solam absentiam luminaris, tantum corpus corrumpatur. Si quis etiam dicat quod non corrumpitur, sed simul cum sole accedit et circumfertur, quid dici poterit de hoc, quod ad interpositionem alicuius corporis circa candelam, tota domus obscuratur? Nec videtur quod lumen congregetur circa candelam, quia non apparet ibi maior claritas post quam ante. Quia ergo omnia haec non solum rationi, sed sensui etiam repugnant, dicendum est quod impossibile est lumen esse corpus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus accipit lucem pro corpore lucido in actu, scilicet pro igne, quod inter quatuor elementa nobilissimum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod Aristoteles lumen nominat ignem in propria materia, sicut ignis in materia aerea dicitur flamma, et in materia terrea dicitur carbo. Non tamen est multum curandum de eis exemplis quae Aristoteles inducit in libris logicalibus, quia inducit ea ut probabilia secundum opinionem aliorum. Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia illa attribuuntur lumini metaphorice, sicut etiam possent attribui calori. Quia enim motus localis est naturaliter primus motuum, ut probatur in VIII Physic., utimur nominibus pertinentibus ad motum localem, in alteratione et in omnibus motibus, sicut etiam nomen distantiae derivatum est a loco ad omnia contraria, ut dicitur in X Metaphys.

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that the diffusion of light is not the local movement of a body. The third reason is from generation and corruption. For if light were a body, it would follow that whenever the air is darkened by the absence of the luminary, the body of light would be corrupted, and its matter would receive a new form. But unless we are to say that darkness is a body, this does not appear to be the case. Neither does it appear from what matter a body can be daily generated large enough to fill the intervening hemisphere. Also it would be absurd to say that a body of so great a bulk is corrupted by the mere absence of the luminary. And should anyone reply that it is not corrupted, but approaches and moves around with the sun, we may ask why it is that when a lighted candle is obscured by the intervening object the whole room is darkened? It is not that the light is condensed round the candle when this is done, since it burns no more brightly then than it burned before. Since, therefore, these things are repugnant, not only to reason, but to common sense, we must conclude that light cannot be a body. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine takes light to be a luminous body in act—in other words, to be fire, the noblest of the four elements. Reply Obj. 2: Aristotle pronounces light to be fire existing in its own proper matter: just as fire in aerial matter is flame, or in earthly matter is burning coal. Nor must too much attention be paid to the instances adduced by Aristotle in his works on logic, as he merely mentions them as the more or less probable opinions of various writers. Reply Obj. 3: All these properties are assigned to light metaphorically, and might in the same way be attributed to heat. For because movement from place to place is naturally first in the order of movement, as is proved in Phys. viii, text. 55, we use terms belonging to local movement in speaking of alteration and movement of all kinds. For even the word distance is derived from the idea of remoteness of place, to that of all contraries, as is said Metaph. x, text. 13.

Article 3 Whether light is a quality? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod lux non sit qualitas. Omnis enim qualitas permanet in subiecto etiam postquam agens discesserit; sicut calor in aqua postquam removetur ab igne. Sed lumen non remanet in aere recedente luminari. Ergo lumen non est qualitas. Praeterea, omnis qualitas sensibilis habet contrarium; sicut calido contrariatur frigidum, et albo nigrum.

Objection 1: It would seem that light is not a quality. For every quality remains in its subject, though the active cause of the quality be removed, as heat remains in water removed from the fire. But light does not remain in the air when the source of light is withdrawn. Therefore light is not a quality. Obj. 2: Further, every sensible quality has its opposite, as cold is opposed to heat, blackness to whiteness. But this

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Sed lumini nihil est contrarium, tenebra enim est privatio luminis. Ergo lumen non est qualitas sensibilis. Praeterea, causa est potior effectu. Sed lux caelestium corporum causat formas substantiales in istis inferioribus. Dat etiam esse spirituale coloribus, quia facit eos visibiles actu. Ergo lux non est aliqua qualitas sensibilis, sed magis substantialis forma, aut spiritualis. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in libro I, quod lux est quaedam qualitas. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod lumen in aere non habet esse naturale, sicut color in pariete; sed esse intentionale, sicut similitudo coloris in aere. Sed hoc non potest esse, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia lumen denominat aerem, fit enim aer luminosus in actu. Color vero non denominat ipsum, non enim dicitur aer coloratus. Secundo, quia lumen habet effectum in natura, quia per radios solis calefiunt corpora. Intentiones autem non causant transmutationes naturales. Alii vero dixerunt quod lux est forma substantialis solis. Sed hoc etiam apparet impossibile, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia nulla forma substantialis est per se sensibilis, quia quod quid est est obiectum intellectus, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Lux autem est secundum se visibilis. Secundo, quia impossibile est ut id quod est forma substantialis in uno, sit forma accidentalis in alio, quia formae substantiali per se convenit constituere in specie; unde semper et in omnibus adest ei. Lux autem non est forma substantialis aeris, alioquin, ea recedente, corrumperetur. Unde non potest esse forma substantialis solis. Dicendum est ergo quod, sicut calor est qualitas activa consequens formam substantialem ignis, ita lux est qualitas activa consequens formam substantialem solis, vel cuiuscumque alterius corporis a se lucentis, si aliquod aliud tale est. Cuius signum est, quod radii diversarum stellarum habent diversos effectus, secundum diversas naturas corporum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum qualitas consequatur formam substantialem, diversimode se habet subiectum ad receptionem qualitatis, sicut se habet ad receptionem formae. Cum enim materia perfecte recipit formam, firmiter stabilitur etiam qualitas consequens formam; sicut si aqua convertatur in ignem. Cum vero forma substantialis recipitur imperfecte, secundum inchoationem quandam, qualitas consequens manet quidem aliquandiu, sed non semper; sicut patet in aqua calefacta, quae redit ad suam naturam. Sed illuminatio non fit per aliquam transmutationem materiae ad susceptionem formae substantialis, ut fiat quasi inchoatio aliqua

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is not the case with light since darkness is merely a privation of light. Light therefore is not a sensible quality. Obj. 3: Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But the light of the heavenly bodies is a cause of substantial forms of earthly bodies, and also gives to colors their immaterial being, by making them actually visible. Light, then, is not a sensible quality, but rather a substantial or spiritual form. On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. i) says that light is a species of quality. I answer that, Some writers have said that the light in the air has not a natural being such as the color on a wall has, but only an intentional being, as a similitude of color in the air. But this cannot be the case for two reasons. First, because light gives a name to the air, since by it the air becomes actually luminous. But color does not do this, for we do not speak of the air as colored. Second, because light produces natural effects, for by the rays of the sun bodies are warmed, and natural changes cannot be brought about by mere intentions. Others have said that light is the sun’s substantial form, but this also seems impossible for two reasons. First, because substantial forms are not of themselves objects of the senses; for the object of the intellect is what a thing is, as is said De Anima iii, text. 26: whereas light is visible of itself. In the second place, because it is impossible that what is the substantial form of one thing should be the accidental form of another; since substantial forms of their very nature constitute species: wherefore the substantial form always and everywhere accompanies the species. But light is not the substantial form of air, for if it were, the air would be destroyed when light is withdrawn. Hence it cannot be the substantial form of the sun. We must say, then, that as heat is an active quality consequent on the substantial form of fire, so light is an active quality consequent on the substantial form of the sun, or of another body that is of itself luminous, if there is any such body. A proof of this is that the rays of different stars produce different effects according to the diverse natures of bodies. Reply Obj. 1: Since quality is consequent upon substantial form, the mode in which the subject receives a quality differs as the mode differs in which a subject receives a substantial form. For when matter receives its form perfectly, the qualities consequent upon the form are firm and enduring; as when, for instance, water is converted into fire. When, however, substantial form is received imperfectly, so as to be, as it were, in process of being received, rather than fully impressed, the consequent quality lasts for a time but is not permanent; as may be seen when water which has been heated returns in time to its natural state. But light is not produced by the transmutation of matter, as though

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formae. Et ideo lumen non remanet nisi ad praesentiam matter were in receipt of a substantial form, and light were agentis. a certain inception of substantial form. For this reason light disappears on the disappearance of its active cause. Ad secundum dicendum quod accidit luci quod Reply Obj. 2: It is accidental to light not to have a connon habeat contrarium, inquantum est qualitas naturalis trary, forasmuch as it is the natural quality of the first corprimi corporis alterantis, quod est a contrarietate elon- poreal cause of change, which is itself removed from congatum. trariety. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut calor agit ad forReply Obj. 3: As heat acts towards perfecting the form mam ignis quasi instrumentaliter in virtute formae sub- of fire, as an instrumental cause, by virtue of the substanstantialis, ita lumen agit quasi instrumentaliter in virtute tial form, so does light act instrumentally, by virtue of the corporum caelestium ad producendas formas substan- heavenly bodies, towards producing substantial forms; and tiales, et ad hoc quod faciat colores visibiles actu, in- towards rendering colors actually visible, inasmuch as it is quantum est qualitas primi corporis sensibilis. a quality of the first sensible body.

Article 4 Whether the production of light is fittingly assigned to the first day? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter lucis productio in prima die ponatur. Est enim lux qualitas quaedam, ut dictum est. Qualitas autem, cum sit accidens, non habet rationem primi, sed magis rationem postremi. Non ergo prima die debet poni productio lucis. Praeterea, per lucem distinguitur nox a die. Hoc autem fit per solem, qui ponitur factus die quarta. Ergo non debuit poni productio lucis prima die. Praeterea, nox et dies fit per circularem motum corporis lucidi. Sed circularis motus est proprius firmamenti, quod legitur factum die secunda. Ergo non debuit poni in prima die productio lucis distinguentis noctem et diem. Si dicatur quod intelligitur de luce spirituali, contra, lux quae legitur facta prima die, facit distinctionem a tenebris. Sed non erant in principio spirituales tenebrae, quia etiam daemones fuerunt a principio boni, ut supra dictum est. Non ergo prima die debuit poni productio lucis. Sed contra, id sine quo non potest esse dies, oportuit fieri in prima die. Sed sine luce non potest esse dies. Ergo oportuit lucem fieri prima die. Respondeo dicendum quod de productione lucis est duplex opinio. Augustino enim videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Moysen praetermisisse spiritualis creaturae productionem. Et ideo dicit quod, cum dicitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, per caelum intelligitur spiritualis natura adhuc informis, per terram autem intelligitur materia informis corporalis creaturae. Et quia natura spiritualis dignior est quam corporalis,

Objection 1: It would seem that the production of light is not fittingly assigned to the first day. For light, as stated above (A. 3), is a quality. But qualities are accidents, and as such should have, not the first, but a subordinate place. The production of light, then, ought not to be assigned to the first day. Obj. 2: Further, it is light that distinguishes night from day, and this is effected by the sun, which is recorded as having been made on the fourth day. Therefore the production of light could not have been on the first day. Obj. 3: Further, night and day are brought about by the circular movement of a luminous body. But movement of this kind is an attribute of the firmament, and we read that the firmament was made on the second day. Therefore the production of light, dividing night from day, ought not to be assigned to the first day. Obj. 4: Further, if it be said that spiritual light is here spoken of, it may be replied that the light made on the first day dispels the darkness. But in the beginning spiritual darkness was not, for even the demons were in the beginning good, as has been shown (Q. 63, A. 5). Therefore the production of light ought not to be assigned to the first day. On the contrary, That without which there could not be day, must have been made on the first day. But there can be no day without light. Therefore light must have been made on the first day. I answer that, There are two opinions as to the production of light. Augustine seems to say (De Civ. Dei xi, 9,33) that Moses could not have fittingly passed over the production of the spiritual creature, and therefore when we read, In the beginning God created heaven and earth, a spiritual nature as yet formless is to be understood by the word heaven, and formless matter of the corporeal creature by the word earth. And spiritual nature was formed first, as being

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fuit prius formanda. Formatio igitur spiritualis naturae significatur in productione lucis, ut intelligatur de luce spirituali; formatio enim naturae spiritualis est per hoc quod illuminatur ut adhaereat verbo Dei. Aliis autem videtur quod sit praetermissa a Moyse productio spiritualis creaturae. Sed huius rationem diversimode assignant. Basilius enim dicit quod Moyses principium narrationis suae fecit a principio quod ad tempus pertinet sensibilium rerum; sed spiritualis natura, idest angelica, praetermittitur, quia fuit ante creata. Chrysostomus autem assignat aliam rationem. Quia Moyses loquebatur rudi populo, qui nihil nisi corporalia poterat capere; quem etiam ab idololatria revocare volebat. Assumpsissent autem idololatriae occasionem, si propositae fuissent eis aliquae substantiae supra omnes corporeas creaturas, eas enim reputassent deos, cum etiam proni essent ad hoc quod solem et lunam et stellas colerent tanquam deos; quod eis inhibetur Deut. IV. Praemissa autem fuerat Gen. I, circa creaturam corporalem multiplex informitas, una quidem in hoc quod dicebatur, terra erat inanis et vacua; alia vero in hoc quod dicebatur, tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi. Necessarium autem fuit ut informitas tenebrarum primo removeretur per lucis productionem, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia lux, ut dictum est, est qualitas primi corporis, unde secundum eam primo fuit mundus formandus. Secundo, propter communitatem lucis, communicant enim in ea inferiora corpora cum superioribus. Sicut autem in cognitione proceditur a communioribus, ita etiam in operatione, nam prius generatur vivum quam animal, et animal quam homo, ut dicitur in libro de Gener. Animal. Sic ergo oportuit ordinem divinae sapientiae manifestari, ut primo inter opera distinctionis produceretur lux, tanquam primi corporis forma, et tanquam communior.

Basilius autem ponit tertiam rationem, quia per lucem omnia alia manifestantur. Potest et quarta ratio addi, quae in obiiciendo est tacta, quia dies non potest esse sine luce; unde oportuit in prima die fieri lucem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum opinionem quae ponit informitatem materiae duratione praecedere formationem, oportet dicere quod materia a principio fuerit creata sub formis substantialibus; postmodum vero fuerit formata secundum aliquas conditiones accidentales, inter quas primum locum obtinet lux. Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam dicunt lucem illam fuisse quandam nubem lucidam, quae postmodum, facto sole, in materiam praeiacentem rediit. Sed istud non est conveniens. Quia Scriptura in principio

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of higher dignity than corporeal. The forming, therefore, of this spiritual nature is signified by the production of light, that is to say, of spiritual light. For a spiritual nature receives its form by the enlightenment whereby it is led to adhere to the Word of God. Other writers think that the production of spiritual creatures was purposely omitted by Moses, and give various reasons. Basil says that Moses begins his narrative from the beginning of time which belongs to sensible things; but that the spiritual or angelic creation is passed over, as created beforehand. Chrysostom gives as a reason for the omission that Moses was addressing an ignorant people, to whom material things alone appealed, and whom he was endeavoring to withdraw from the service of idols. It would have been to them a pretext for idolatry if he had spoken to them of natures spiritual in substance and nobler than all corporeal creatures; for they would have paid them Divine worship, since they were prone to worship as gods even the sun, moon, and stars, which was forbidden them (Deut 4). But mention is made of several kinds of formlessness, in regard to the corporeal creature. One is where we read that the earth was void and empty, and another where it is said that darkness was upon the face of the deep. Now it seems to be required, for two reasons, that the formlessness of darkness should be removed first of all by the production of light. In the first place because light is a quality of the first body, as was stated (A. 3), and thus by means of light it was fitting that the world should first receive its form. The second reason is because light is a common quality. For light is common to terrestrial and celestial bodies. But as in knowledge we proceed from general principles, so do we in work of every kind. For the living thing is generated before the animal, and the animal before the man, as is shown in De Gener. Anim. ii, 3. It was fitting, then, as an evidence of the Divine wisdom, that among the works of distinction the production of light should take first place, since light is a form of the primary body, and because it is a more common quality. Basil, indeed, adds a third reason: that all other things are made manifest by light. And there is yet a fourth, already touched upon in the objections; that day cannot be unless light exists, which was made therefore on the first day. Reply Obj. 1: According to the opinion of those who hold that the formlessness of matter preceded its form in duration, matter must be held to have been created at the beginning with substantial forms, afterwards receiving those that are accidental, among which light holds the first place. Reply Obj. 2: In the opinion of some the light here spoken of was a kind of luminous nebula, and that on the making of the sun this returned to the matter of which it had been formed. But this cannot well be maintained, as in

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Genesis commemorat institutionem naturae, quae post- the beginning of Genesis Holy Scripture records the institumodum perseverat, unde non debet dici quod aliquid tion of that order of nature which henceforth is to endure. tunc factum fuerit, quod postmodum esse desierit. We cannot, then, say that what was made at that time afterwards ceased to exist. Et ideo alii dicunt quod illa nubes lucida adhuc reOthers, therefore, held that this luminous nebula conmanet, et est coniuncta soli, ut ab eo discerni non possit. tinues in existence, but so closely attached to the sun as to Sed secundum hoc, illa nubes superflua remaneret, nihil be indistinguishable. But this is as much as to say that it is autem est vanum in operibus Dei. superfluous, whereas none of God’s works have been made in vain. Et ideo alii dicunt quod ex illa nube formatum est On this account it is held by some that the sun’s body corpus solis. Sed hoc etiam dici non potest, si ponatur was made out of this nebula. This, too, is impossible to corpus solis non esse de natura quatuor elementorum, those at least who believe that the sun is different in its nased esse incorruptibile per naturam quia secundum hoc, ture from the four elements, and naturally incorruptible. materia eius non potest esse sub alia forma. For in that case its matter cannot take on another form. Et ideo est dicendum, ut Dionysius dicit IV cap. de I answer, then, with Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), that the Div. Nom., quod illa lux fuit lux solis, sed adhuc informis, light was the sun’s light, formless as yet, being already the quantum ad hoc, quod iam erat substantia solis, et ha- solar substance, and possessing illuminative power in a bebat virtutem illuminativam in communi; sed postmo- general way, to which was afterwards added the special and dum data est ei specialis et determinata virtus ad parti- determinative power required to produce determinate efculares effectus. Et secundum hoc, in productione huius fects. Thus, then, in the production of this light a triple dislucis distincta est lux a tenebris, quantum ad tria. Primo tinction was made between light and darkness. First, as to quidem, quantum ad causam, secundum quod in sub- the cause, forasmuch as in the substance of the sun we have stantia solis erat causa luminis, in opacitate autem terrae the cause of light, and in the opaque nature of the earth causa tenebrarum. Secundo, quantum ad locum, quia in the cause of darkness. Second, as to place, for in one hemiuno hemisphaerio erat lumen, in alio tenebrae. Tertio, sphere there was light, in the other darkness. Third, as to quantum ad tempus, quia in eodem hemisphaerio se- time; because there was light for one part of time and darkcundum unam partem temporis erat lumen, secundum ness for another in the same hemisphere; and this is signialiam tenebrae. Et hoc est quod dicitur, lucem vocavit fied by the words, He called the light day, and the darkness diem, et tenebras noctem. night. Ad tertium dicendum quod Basilius dicit lucem et Reply Obj. 3: Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) that day tenebras tunc fuisse per emissionem et contractionem and night were then caused by expansion and contraction luminis, et non per motum. Sed contra hoc obiicit Au- of light, rather than by movement. But Augustine objects to gustinus quod nulla ratio esset huius vicissitudinis emit- this (Gen ad lit. i), that there was no reason for this vicissitendi et retrahendi luminis; cum homines et animalia tude of expansion and contraction since there were neither non essent, quorum usibus hoc deserviret. Et praeterea men nor animals on the earth at that time, for whose serhoc non habet natura corporis lucidi, ut retrahat lumen vice this was required. Nor does the nature of a luminous in sui praesentia, sed miraculose potest hoc fieri, in pri- body seem to admit of the withdrawal of light, so long as ma autem institutione naturae non quaeritur miracu- the body is actually present; though this might be effected lum, sed quid natura rerum habeat, ut Augustinus dicit. by a miracle. As to this, however, Augustine remarks (Gen ad lit. i) that in the first founding of the order of nature we must not look for miracles, but for what is in accordance with nature. Et ideo dicendum est quod duplex est motus in caeWe hold, then, that the movement of the heavens is lo. Unus communis toti caelo, qui facit diem et noctem, twofold. Of these movements, one is common to the enet iste videtur institutus primo die. Alius autem est, qui tire heaven, and is the cause of day and night. This, as it diversificatur per diversa corpora; secundum quos mo- seems, had its beginning on the first day. The other varies in tus fit diversitas dierum ad invicem, et mensium et anno- proportion as it affects various bodies, and by its variations rum. Et ideo in prima die fit mentio de sola distinctione is the cause of the succession of days, months, and years. noctis et diei, quae fit per motum communem. In quarta Thus it is, that in the account of the first day the distincautem die fit mentio de diversitate dierum et temporum tion between day and night alone is mentioned; this dis-

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et annorum, cum dicitur, ut sint in tempora et dies et an- tinction being brought about by the common movement of nos; quae quidem diversitas fit per motus proprios. the heavens. The further distinction into successive days, seasons, and years recorded as begun on the fourth day, in the words, let them be for seasons, and for days, and years, is due to proper movements. Ad quartum dicendum quod, secundum AugustiReply Obj. 4: As Augustine teaches (Confess. xii; Gen. num, informitas non praecedit formationem duratione. ad lit. 1, 15), formlessness did not precede forms in duraUnde oportet dicere quod per lucis productionem in- tion; and so we must understand the production of light telligatur formatio spiritualis creaturae non quae est per to signify the formation of spiritual creatures, not, indeed, gloriam perfecta, cum qua creata non fuit; sed quae est with the perfection of glory, in which they were not creper gratiam perfecta, cum qua creata fuit, ut dictum est. ated, but with the perfection of grace, which they possessed Per hanc ergo lucem facta est divisio a tenebris, idest ab from their creation as said above (Q. 62, A. 3). Thus the diinformitate alterius creaturae non formatae. vision of light from darkness will denote the distinction of the spiritual creature from other created things as yet without form. Vel, si tota creatura simul formata fuit, facta est diBut if all created things received their form at the same stinctio a tenebris spiritualibus, non quae tunc essent time, the darkness must be held to mean the spiritual dark(quia Diabolus non fuit creatus malus); sed quas Deus ness of the wicked, not as existing from the beginning but futuras praevidit. such as God foresaw would exist.

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Question 68 The Work of the Second Day Deinde considerandum est de opere secundae diei. We must next consider the work of the second day. UnEt circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. der this head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum firmamentum sit factum secunda die. (1) Whether the firmament was made on the second day? Secundo, utrum aliquae aquae sint supra (2) Whether there are waters above the firmament? firmamentum. Tertio, utrum firmamentum dividat aquas ab aquis. (3) Whether the firmament divides waters from waters? Quarto, utrum sit unum caelum tantum, vel plures. (4) Whether there is more than one heaven?

Article 1 Whether the firmament was made on the second day? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod firmamentum non sit factum secunda die. Dicitur enim Gen. I, vocavit Deus firmamentum caelum. Sed caelum factum est ante omnem diem, ut patet cum dicitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. Ergo firmamentum non est factum secunda die. Praeterea, opera sex dierum ordinantur secundum ordinem divinae sapientiae. Non conveniret autem divinae sapientiae, ut posterius faceret quod est naturaliter prius. Firmamentum autem est naturaliter prius aqua et terra, de quibus tamen fit mentio ante formationem lucis, quae fuit prima die. Non ergo firmamentum factum est secunda die. Praeterea, omne quod est factum per sex dies, formatum est ex materia prius creata ante omnem diem. Sed firmamentum non potuit formari ex materia praeexistente, quia sic esset generabile et corruptibile. Ergo firmamentum non est factum secunda die. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, dixit Deus, fiat firmamentum. Et postea sequitur, et factum est vespere et mane dies secundus. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus docet, in huiusmodi quaestionibus duo sunt observanda. Primo quidem, ut veritas Scripturae inconcusse teneatur. Secundo, cum Scriptura divina multipliciter exponi possit, quod nulli expositioni aliquis ita praecise inhaereat quod, si certa ratione constiterit hoc esse falsum, quod aliquis sensum Scripturae esse asserere praesumat, ne Scriptura ex hoc ab infidelibus derideatur, et ne eis via credendi praecludatur. Sciendum est ergo quod hoc quod legitur firmamentum secunda die factum, dupliciter intelligi potest. Uno

Objection 1: It would seem that the firmament was not made on the second day. For it is said (Gen 1:8): God called the firmament heaven. But the heaven existed before days, as is clear from the words, In the beginning God created heaven and earth. Therefore the firmament was not made on the second day. Obj. 2: Further, the work of the six days is ordered conformably to the order of Divine wisdom. Now it would ill become the Divine wisdom to make afterwards that which is naturally first. But though the firmament naturally precedes the earth and the waters, these are mentioned before the formation of light, which was on the first day. Therefore the firmament was not made on the second day. Obj. 3: Further, all that was made in the six days was formed out of matter created before days began. But the firmament cannot have been formed out of pre-existing matter, for if so it would be liable to generation and corruption. Therefore the firmament was not made on the second day. On the contrary, It is written (Gen 1:6): God said: let there be a firmament, and further on (verse 8); And the evening and morning were the second day. I answer that, In discussing questions of this kind two rules are to be observed, as Augustine teaches (Gen ad lit. i, 18). The first is, to hold the truth of Scripture without wavering. The second is that since Holy Scripture can be explained in a multiplicity of senses, one should adhere to a particular explanation, only in such measure as to be ready to abandon it, if it be proved with certainty to be false; lest Holy Scripture be exposed to the ridicule of unbelievers, and obstacles be placed to their believing. We say, therefore, that the words which speak of the firmament as made on the second day can be understood in

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modo, de firmamento in quo sunt sidera. Et secundum hoc, oportet nos diversimode exponere secundum diversas opiniones hominum de firmamento. Quidam enim dixerunt firmamentum illud esse ex elementis compositum. Et haec fuit opinio Empedoclis, qui tamen dixit ideo illud corpus indissolubile esse, quia in eius compositione lis non erat sed amicitia tantum. Alii vero dixerunt firmamentum esse de natura quatuor elementorum non quasi ex elementis compositum, sed quasi elementum simplex. Et haec opinio fuit Platonis, qui posuit corpus caeleste esse elementum ignis. Alii vero dixerunt caelum non esse de natura quatuor elementorum, sed esse quintum corpus, praeter quatuor elementa. Et haec est opinio Aristotelis. Secundum igitur primam opinionem, absolute posset concedi quod firmamentum factum fuerit secunda die, etiam secundum suam substantiam. Nam ad opus creationis pertinet producere ipsam elementorum substantiam, ad opus autem distinctionis et ornatus pertinet formare aliqua ex praeexistentibus elementis. Secundum vero opinionem Platonis, non est conveniens quod firmamentum credatur secundum suam substantiam esse factum secunda die. Nam facere firmamentum, secundum hoc, est producere elementum ignis. Productio autem elementorum pertinet ad opus creationis, secundum eos qui ponunt informitatem materiae tempore praecedere formationem, quia formae elementorum sunt quae primo adveniunt materiae. Multo autem minus secundum opinionem Aristotelis poni potest quod firmamentum secundum suam substantiam sit secunda die productum, secundum quod per istos dies successio temporis designatur. Quia caelum, cum sit secundum suam naturam incorruptibile, habet materiam quae non potest subesse alteri formae, unde impossibile est quod firmamentum sit factum ex materia prius tempore existente. Unde productio substantiae firmamenti ad opus creationis pertinet. Sed aliqua formatio eius, secundum has duas opiniones, pertinet ad opus secundae diei, sicut etiam Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod lumen solis fuit informe in primo triduo, et postea fuit in quarta die formatum. Si autem per istos dies non designetur temporis successio, sed solum ordo naturae, ut Augustinus vult; nihil prohibebit dicere, secundum quamcumque harum opinionum, formationem secundum substantiam firmamenti ad secundam diem pertinere. Potest autem et alio modo intelligi, ut per firmamentum quod legitur secunda die factum, non intelligatur firmamentum illud in quo fixae sunt stellae, sed illa pars aeris in qua condensantur nubes. Et dicitur firmamentum propter spissitudinem aeris in parte illa, nam quod est spissum et solidum, dicitur esse corpus firmum, ad

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two senses. They may be understood, first, of the starry firmament, on which point it is necessary to set forth the different opinions of philosophers. Some of these believed it to be composed of the elements; and this was the opinion of Empedocles, who, however, held further that the body of the firmament was not susceptible of dissolution, because its parts are, so to say, not in disunion, but in harmony. Others held the firmament to be of the nature of the four elements, not, indeed, compounded of them, but being as it were a simple element. Such was the opinion of Plato, who held that element to be fire. Others, again, have held that the heaven is not of the nature of the four elements, but is itself a fifth body, existing over and above these. This is the opinion of Aristotle (De Coel. i, text. 6,32). According to the first opinion, it may, strictly speaking, be granted that the firmament was made, even as to substance, on the second day. For it is part of the work of creation to produce the substance of the elements, while it belongs to the work of distinction and adornment to give forms to the elements that pre-exist. But the belief that the firmament was made, as to its substance, on the second day is incompatible with the opinion of Plato, according to whom the making of the firmament implies the production of the element of fire. This production, however, belongs to the work of creation, at least, according to those who hold that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation, since the first form received by matter is the elemental. Still less compatible with the belief that the substance of the firmament was produced on the second day is the opinion of Aristotle, seeing that the mention of days denotes succession of time, whereas the firmament, being naturally incorruptible, is of a matter not susceptible of change of form; wherefore it could not be made out of matter existing antecedently in time. Hence to produce the substance of the firmament belongs to the work of creation. But its formation, in some degree, belongs to the second day, according to both opinions: for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), the light of the sun was without form during the first three days, and afterwards, on the fourth day, received its form. If, however, we take these days to denote merely sequence in the natural order, as Augustine holds (Gen ad lit. iv, 22,24), and not succession in time, there is then nothing to prevent our saying, whilst holding any one of the opinions given above, that the substantial formation of the firmament belongs to the second day. Another possible explanation is to understand by the firmament that was made on the second day, not that in which the stars are set, but the part of the atmosphere where the clouds are collected, and which has received the name firmament from the firmness and density of the air. For a body is called firm, that is dense and solid, thereby

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differentiam corporis mathematici, ut dicit Basilius. Et secundum hanc expositionem, nihil repugnans sequitur cuicumque opinioni. Unde Augustinus, II super Gen. ad Litt., hanc expositionem commendans, dicit, hanc considerationem laude dignissimam iudico; quod enim dixit, neque est contra fidem, et in promptu, posito documento, credi potest. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum Chrysostomum, primo Moyses summarie dixit quid Deus fecit, praemittens, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, postea per partes explicavit. Sicut si quis dicat, hic artifex fecit domum istam, et postea subdat, primo fecit fundamenta, et postea erexit parietes, tertio superposuit tectum. Et sic non oportet nos aliud caelum intelligere, cum dicitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram; et cum dicitur quod secunda die factum est firmamentum.

differing from a mathematical body as is remarked by Basil (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). If, then, this explanation is adopted, none of these opinions will be found repugnant to reason. Augustine, in fact (Gen ad lit. ii, 4), recommends it thus: I consider this view of the question worthy of all commendation, as neither contrary to faith nor difficult to be proved and believed. Reply Obj. 1: According to Chrysostom (Hom. iii in Genes.), Moses prefaces his record by speaking of the works of God collectively, in the words, In the beginning God created heaven and earth, and then proceeds to explain them part by part; in somewhat the same way as one might say: This house was constructed by that builder, and then add: First, he laid the foundations, then built the walls, and third, put on the roof. In accepting this explanation we are, therefore, not bound to hold that a different heaven is spoken of in the words: In the beginning God created heaven and earth, and when we read that the firmament was made on the second day. Potest etiam dici aliud esse caelum quod legitur in We may also say that the heaven recorded as created in principio creatum, et quod legitur secunda die factum. the beginning is not the same as that made on the second Et hoc diversimode. Nam secundum Augustinum, cae- day; and there are several senses in which this may be unlum quod legitur primo die factum, est natura spiritua- derstood. Augustine says (Gen ad lit. i, 9) that the heaven lis informis, caelum autem quod legitur secunda die fac- recorded as made on the first day is the formless spiritual tum, est caelum corporeum. nature, and that the heaven of the second day is the corporeal heaven. Secundum vero Bedam et Strabum, caelum quod leAccording to Bede (Hexaem. i) and Strabus, the heaven gitur primo die factum, est caelum Empyreum, firma- made on the first day is the empyrean, and the firmament mentum vero quod legitur secunda die factum, est cae- made on the second day, the starry heaven.

lum sidereum. Secundum vero Damascenum, caelum quod legitur prima die factum, est quoddam caelum sphaericum sine stellis, de quo philosophi loquuntur, dicentes ipsum esse nonam sphaeram et mobile primum, quod movetur motu diurno, per firmamentum vero factum secunda die, intelligitur caelum sidereum. Secundum autem aliam expositionem, quam Augustinus tangit, caelum prima die factum, est etiam ipsum caelum sidereum, per firmamentum vero secunda die factum, intelligitur spatium aeris in quo nubes condensantur, quod etiam caelum aequivoce dicitur. Et ideo, ad aequivocationem designandam, signanter dicitur, vocavit Deus firmamentum caelum; sicut et supra dixerat, vocavit lucem diem (quia dies etiam pro spatio vigintiquatuor horarum ponitur). Et idem est in aliis observandum, ut Rabbi Moyses dicit.

According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii), that of the first day was spherical in form and without stars, the same, in fact, that the philosophers speak of, calling it the ninth sphere, and the primary movable body that moves with diurnal movement: while by the firmament made on the second day he understands the starry heaven. According to another theory, touched upon by Augustine, the heaven made on the first day was the starry heaven, and the firmament made on the second day was that region of the air where the clouds are collected, which is also called heaven, but equivocally. And to show that the word is here used in an equivocal sense, it is expressly said that God called the firmament heaven; just as in a preceding verse it said that God called the light day (since the word day is also used to denote a space of twenty-four hours). Other instances of a similar use occur, as pointed out by Rabbi Moses. Ad secundum et tertium patet solutio ex supra The second and third objections are sufficiently andictis. swered by what has been already said.

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Article 2 Whether there are waters above the firmament? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aquae non sunt supra firmamentum. Aqua enim est naturaliter gravis. Locus autem proprius gravis non est esse sursum, sed solum deorsum. Ergo aquae non sunt supra firmamentum. Praeterea, naturaliter aqua est fluida. Sed quod est fluidum, non potest consistere super corpus rotundum, ut experimento patet. Ergo, cum firmamentum sit corpus rotundum, aqua non potest esse supra firmamentum. Praeterea, aqua, cum sit elementum, ordinatur ad generationem corporis mixti; sicut imperfectum ordinatur ad perfectum. Sed supra firmamentum non est locus mixtionis, sed supra terram. Ergo frustra aqua esset supra firmamentum. Nihil autem in operibus Dei est frustra. Ergo aquae non sunt supra firmamentum. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, quod divisit aquas quae erant supra firmamentum, ab his quae erant sub firmamento. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, II super Gen. ad Litt., maior est Scripturae huius auctoritas quam omnis humani ingenii capacitas. Unde quomodo et quales aquae ibi sint, eas tamen ibi esse, minime dubitamus. Quales autem sint illae aquae, non eodem modo ab omnibus assignatur. Origenes enim dicit quod aquae illae quae super caelos sunt, sunt spirituales substantiae, unde in Psalmo CXLVIII, dicitur, aquae quae super caelos sunt, laudent nomen domini; et Dan. III, benedicite, aquae omnes quae super caelos sunt, domino. Sed ad hoc respondet Basilius, in III Hexaem., quod hoc non dicitur eo quod aquae sint rationales creaturae; sed quia consideratio earum, prudenter a sensum habentibus contemplata, glorificationem perficit creatoris. Unde ibidem dicitur idem de igne et grandine et huiusmodi, de quibus constat quod non sunt rationales creaturae. Dicendum est ergo quod sunt aquae corporales. Sed quales aquae sint, oportet diversimode definire, secundum diversam de firmamento sententiam. Si enim per firmamentum intelligitur caelum sidereum quod ponitur esse de natura quatuor elementorum, pari ratione et aquae quae super caelos sunt eiusdem naturae poterunt credi cum elementaribus aquis. Si autem per firmamentum intelligatur caelum sidereum quod non sit de natura quatuor elementorum, tunc et aquae illae quae sunt supra firmamentum, non erunt de natura elementarium aquarum, sed sicut, secundum Strabum, dicitur caelum Empyreum, idest igneum, propter solum splendorem; ita dicetur aliud caelum aqueum propter solam diaphaneitatem, quod est supra caelum sidereum. Posi-

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not waters above the firmament. For water is heavy by nature, and heavy things tend naturally downwards, not upwards. Therefore there are not waters above the firmament. Obj. 2: Further, water is fluid by nature, and fluids cannot rest on a sphere, as experience shows. Therefore, since the firmament is a sphere, there cannot be water above it.

Obj. 3: Further, water is an element, and appointed to the generation of composite bodies, according to the relation in which imperfect things stand towards perfect. But bodies of composite nature have their place upon the earth, and not above the firmament, so that water would be useless there. But none of God’s works are useless. Therefore there are not waters above the firmament. On the contrary, It is written (Gen 1:7): (God) divided the waters that were under the firmament, from those that were above the firmament. I answer with Augustine (Gen ad lit. ii, 5) that, These words of Scripture have more authority than the most exalted human intellect. Hence, whatever these waters are, and whatever their mode of existence, we cannot for a moment doubt that they are there. As to the nature of these waters, all are not agreed. Origen says (Hom. i in Gen.) that the waters that are above the firmament are spiritual substances. Wherefore it is written (Ps 148:4): Let the waters that are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord, and (Dan 3:60): Ye waters that are above the heavens, bless the Lord. To this Basil answers (Hom. iii in Hexaem.) that these words do not mean that these waters are rational creatures, but that the thoughtful contemplation of them by those who understand fulfils the glory of the Creator. Hence in the same context, fire, hail, and other like creatures, are invoked in the same way, though no one would attribute reason to these. We must hold, then, these waters to be material, but their exact nature will be differently defined according as opinions on the firmament differ. For if by the firmament we understand the starry heaven, and as being of the nature of the four elements, for the same reason it may be believed that the waters above the heaven are of the same nature as the elemental waters. But if by the firmament we understand the starry heaven, not, however, as being of the nature of the four elements, then the waters above the firmament will not be of the same nature as the elemental waters, but just as, according to Strabus, one heaven is called empyrean, that is, fiery, solely on account of its splendor: so this other heaven will be called aqueous solely on account of its transparence; and this heaven is above

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to etiam quod firmamentum sit alterius naturae praeter quatuor elementa, adhuc potest dici quod aquas dividit, si per aquam non elementum aquae, sed materiam informem corporum intelligamus, ut Augustinus dicit, super Gen. contra Manich., quia secundum hoc, quidquid est inter corpora, dividit aquas ab aquis. Si autem per firmamentum intelligatur pars aeris in qua nubes condensantur, sic aquae quae supra firmamentum sunt, sunt aquae quae, vaporabiliter resolutae, supra aliquam partem aeris elevantur ex quibus pluviae generantur. Dicere enim quod aquae vaporabiliter resolutae eleventur supra caelum sidereum, ut quidam dixerunt, quorum opinionem Augustinus tangit in II super Gen. ad Litt. est omnino impossibile. Tum propter soliditatem caeli. Tum propter regionem ignis mediam, quae huiusmodi vapores consumeret. Tum quia locus quo feruntur levia et rara, est infra concavum orbis lunae. Tum etiam quia sensibiliter apparet vapores non elevari usque ad cacumina quorundam montium. Quod etiam dicunt de rarefactione corporis in infinitum, propter hoc quod corpus est in infinitum divisibile, vanum est. Non enim corpus naturale in infinitum dividitur aut rarefit, sed usque ad certum terminum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quibusdam videtur ratio illa solvenda per hoc, quod aquae, quamvis sint naturaliter graves, virtute tamen divina super caelos continentur. Sed hanc solutionem Augustinus excludit, II Lib. super Gen. ad Litt., dicens quod nunc quemadmodum Deus instituit naturas rerum convenit quaerere; non quid in eis ad miraculum suae potentiae velit operari. Unde aliter dicendum est quod, secundum duas ultimas opiniones de aquis et firmamento, patet solutio ex praemissis. Secundum autem primam opinionem, oportet ponere alium ordinem in elementis quam Aristoteles ponat; ut quaedam aquae spissae sint circa terram, quaedam vero tenues circa caelum; ut sic se habeant illae ad caelum, sicut istae ad terram.

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the starry heaven. Again, if the firmament is held to be of other nature than the elements, it may still be said to divide the waters, if we understand by water not the element but formless matter. Augustine, in fact, says (Super Gen. cont. Manich. i, 5,7) that whatever divides bodies from bodies can be said to divide waters from waters. If, however, we understand by the firmament that part of the air in which the clouds are collected, then the waters above the firmament must rather be the vapors resolved from the waters which are raised above a part of the atmosphere, and from which the rain falls. But to say, as some writers alluded to by Augustine (Gen ad lit. ii, 4), that waters resolved into vapor may be lifted above the starry heaven, is a mere absurdity. The solid nature of the firmament, the intervening region of fire, wherein all vapor must be consumed, the tendency in light and rarefied bodies to drift to one spot beneath the vault of the moon, as well as the fact that vapors are perceived not to rise even to the tops of the higher mountains, all to go to show the impossibility of this. Nor is it less absurd to say, in support of this opinion, that bodies may be rarefied infinitely, since natural bodies cannot be infinitely rarefied or divided, but up to a certain point only. Reply Obj. 1: Some have attempted to solve this difficulty by supposing that in spite of the natural gravity of water, it is kept in its place above the firmament by the Divine power. Augustine (Gen ad lit. ii, 1) however will not admit this solution, but says It is our business here to inquire how God has constituted the natures of His creatures, not how far it may have pleased Him to work on them by way of miracle. We leave this view, then, and answer that according to the last two opinions on the firmament and the waters the solution appears from what has been said. According to the first opinion, an order of the elements must be supposed different from that given by Aristotle, that is to say, that the waters surrounding the earth are of a dense consistency, and those around the firmament of a rarer consistency, in proportion to the respective density of the earth and of the heaven. Or by the water, as stated, we may understand the matter of bodies to be signified. Reply Obj. 2: The solution is clear from what has been said, according to the last two opinions. But according to the first opinion, Basil gives two replies (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). He answers first, that a body seen as concave beneath need not necessarily be rounded, or convex, above. Second, that the waters above the firmament are not fluid, but exist outside it in a solid state, as a mass of ice, and that this is the crystalline heaven of some writers.

Vel quod per aquam intelligatur materia corporum, ut dictum est. Ad secundum etiam patet solutio ex praemissis, secundum duas ultimas opiniones. Secundum vero primam, respondet Basilius dupliciter. Uno modo, quia non est necessarium ut omne quod in concavo apparet rotundum, sit etiam supra rotundum secundum convexum. Secundo, quia aquae quae sunt supra caelos, non sunt fluidae; sed quasi glaciali soliditate circa caelum firmatae. Unde et a quibusdam dicuntur caelum crystallinum. Ad tertium dicendum quod, secundum tertiam Reply Obj. 3: According to the third opinion given, the opinionem, aquae sunt supra firmamentum vaporabi- waters above the firmament have been raised in the form liter elevatae propter utilitatem pluviarum. Secundum of vapors, and serve to give rain to the earth. But accordvero secundam opinionem, aquae sunt supra firma- ing to the second opinion, they are above the heaven that

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mentum, idest caelum totum diaphanum absque stellis. Quod quidam ponunt primum mobile, quod revolvit totum caelum motu diurno, ut operetur per motum diurnum continuitatem generationis, sicut caelum in quo sunt sidera, per motum qui est secundum zodiacum, operatur diversitatem generationis et corruptionis, per accessum et recessum, et per diversas virtutes stellarum. Secundum vero primam opinionem, aquae sunt ibi, ut Basilius dicit, ad contemperandum calorem caelestium corporum. Cuius signum acceperunt aliqui, ut Augustinus dicit, quod stella Saturni, propter vicinitatem aquarum superiorum, est frigidissima.

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is wholly transparent and starless. This, according to some, is the primary mobile, the cause of the daily revolution of the entire heaven, whereby the continuance of generation is secured. In the same way the starry heaven, by the zodiacal movement, is the cause whereby different bodies are generated or corrupted, through the rising and setting of the stars, and their various influences. But according to the first opinion these waters are set there to temper the heat of the celestial bodies, as Basil supposes (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). And Augustine says (Gen ad lit. ii, 5) that some have considered this to be proved by the extreme cold of Saturn owing to its nearness to the waters that are above the firmament.

Article 3 Whether the firmament divides waters from waters? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod firmamentum non dividat aquas ab aquis. Unius enim corporis secundum speciem, est unus locus naturalis. Sed omnis aqua omni aquae est eadem specie, ut dicit Philosophus. Non ergo aquae ab aquis sunt distinguendae secundum locum. Si dicatur quod aquae illae quae sunt supra firmamentum, sunt alterius speciei ab aquis quae sunt sub firmamento, contra, ea quae sunt secundum speciem diversa, non indigent aliquo alio distinguente. Si ergo aquae superiores et inferiores specie differunt, firmamentum eas ab invicem non distinguit. Praeterea, illud videtur aquas ab aquis distinguere, quod ex utraque parte ab aquis contingitur; sicut si aliquis paries fabricetur in medio fluminis. Manifestum est autem quod aquae inferiores non pertingunt usque ad firmamentum. Ergo non dividit firmamentum aquas ab aquis. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, fiat firmamentum in medio aquarum, et dividat aquas ab aquis. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquis, considerando superficie tenus litteram Genesis, posset talem imaginationem concipere, secundum quorundam antiquorum philosophorum positionem. Posuerunt enim quidam aquam esse quoddam infinitum corpus, et omnium aliorum corporum principium. Quam quidem immensitatem aquarum accipere posset in nomine abyssi, cum dicitur quod tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi. Ponebant etiam quod istud caelum sensibile quod videmus, non continet infra se omnia corporalia; sed est infinitum aquarum corpus supra caelum. Et ita posset aliquis dicere quod firmamentum caeli dividit aquas exteriores ab aquis interioribus, idest ab omnibus corporibus quae in-

Objection 1: It would seem that the firmament does not divide waters from waters. For bodies that are of one and the same species have naturally one and the same place. But the Philosopher says (Topic. i, 6): All water is the same species. Water therefore cannot be distinct from water by place. Obj. 2: Further, should it be said that the waters above the firmament differ in species from those under the firmament, it may be argued, on the contrary, that things distinct in species need nothing else to distinguish them. If then, these waters differ in species, it is not the firmament that distinguishes them. Obj. 3: Further, it would appear that what distinguishes waters from waters must be something which is in contact with them on either side, as a wall standing in the midst of a river. But it is evident that the waters below do not reach up to the firmament. Therefore the firmament does not divide the waters from the waters. On the contrary, It is written (Gen 1:6): Let there be a firmament made amidst the waters; and let it divide the waters from the waters. I answer that, The text of Genesis, considered superficially, might lead to the adoption of a theory similar to that held by certain philosophers of antiquity, who taught that water was a body infinite in dimension, and the primary element of all bodies. Thus in the words, Darkness was upon the face of the deep, the word deep might be taken to mean the infinite mass of water, understood as the principle of all other bodies. These philosophers also taught that not all corporeal things are confined beneath the heaven perceived by our senses, but that a body of water, infinite in extent, exists above that heaven. On this view the firmament of heaven might be said to divide the waters without from those within—that is to say, from all bodies under the

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fra caelum continentur, quorum principium aquam ponebant. Sed quia ista positio per veras rationes falsa deprehenditur, non est dicendum hunc esse intellectum Scripturae. Sed considerandum est quod Moyses rudi populo loquebatur, quorum imbecillitati condescendens, illa solum eis proposuit, quae manifeste sensui apparent. Omnes autem, quantumcumque rudes, terram et aquam esse corpora sensu deprehendunt. Aer autem non percipitur ab omnibus esse corpus, intantum quod etiam quidam philosophi aerem dixerunt nihil esse, plenum aere vacuum nominantes. Et ideo Moyses de aqua et terra mentionem facit expressam, aerem autem non expresse nominat, ne rudibus quoddam ignotum proponeret. Ut tamen capacibus veritatem exprimeret, dat locum intelligendi aerem, significans ipsum quasi aquae annexum, cum dicit quod tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi; per quod datur intelligi super faciem aquae esse aliquod corpus diaphanum quod est subiectum lucis et tenebrarum.

Sic igitur sive per firmamentum intelligamus caelum in quo sunt sidera, sive spatium aeris nubilosum, convenienter dicitur quod firmamentum dividit aquas ab aquis, secundum quod per aquam materia informis significatur; vel secundum quod omnia corpora diaphana sub nomine aquarum intelliguntur. Nam caelum sidereum distinguit corpora inferiora diaphana a superioribus. Aer vero nubilosus distinguit superiorem aeris partem, in qua generantur pluviae et huiusmodi impressiones, ab inferiori parte aeris, quae aquae connectitur, et sub nomine aquarum intelligitur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si per firmamentum intelligatur caelum sidereum, aquae superiores non sunt eiusdem speciei cum inferioribus. Si autem per firmamentum intelligatur nubilosus aer, tunc utraeque aquae sunt eiusdem speciei. Et deputantur tunc duo loca aquis non eadem ratione; sed locus superior est locus generationis aquarum, locus autem inferior est locus quietis earum. Ad secundum dicendum quod, si accipiantur aquae diversae secundum speciem, firmamentum dicitur dividere aquas ab aquis, non sicut causa faciens divisionem; sed sicut terminus utrarumque aquarum. Ad tertium dicendum quod Moyses, propter invisibilitatem aeris et similium corporum, omnia huiusmodi corpora sub aquae nomine comprehendit. Et sic manifestum est quod ex utraque parte firmamenti, qualitercumque accepti, sunt aquae.

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heaven, since they took water to be the principle of them all. As, however, this theory can be shown to be false by solid reasons, it cannot be held to be the sense of Holy Scripture. It should rather be considered that Moses was speaking to ignorant people, and that out of condescension to their weakness he put before them only such things as are apparent to sense. Now even the most uneducated can perceive by their senses that earth and water are corporeal, whereas it is not evident to all that air also is corporeal, for there have even been philosophers who said that air is nothing, and called a space filled with air a vacuum. Moses, then, while he expressly mentions water and earth, makes no express mention of air by name, to avoid setting before ignorant persons something beyond their knowledge. In order, however, to express the truth to those capable of understanding it, he implies in the words: Darkness was upon the face of the deep, the existence of air as attendant, so to say, upon the water. For it may be understood from these words that over the face of the water a transparent body was extended, the subject of light and darkness, which, in fact, is the air. Whether, then, we understand by the firmament the starry heaven, or the cloudy region of the air, it is true to say that it divides the waters from the waters, according as we take water to denote formless matter, or any kind of transparent body, as fittingly designated under the name of waters. For the starry heaven divides the lower transparent bodies from the higher, and the cloudy region divides that higher part of the air, where the rain and similar things are generated, from the lower part, which is connected with the water and included under that name. Reply Obj. 1: If by the firmament is understood the starry heaven, the waters above are not of the same species as those beneath. But if by the firmament is understood the cloudy region of the air, both these waters are of the same species, and two places are assigned to them, though not for the same purpose, the higher being the place of their begetting, the lower, the place of their repose. Reply Obj. 2: If the waters are held to differ in species, the firmament cannot be said to divide the waters, as the cause of their division, but only as the boundary of each. Reply Obj. 3: On account of the air and other similar bodies being invisible, Moses includes all such bodies under the name of water, and thus it is evident that waters are found on each side of the firmament, whatever be the sense in which the word is used.

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Article 4 Whether there is only one heaven? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sit unum caelum tantum. Caelum enim contra terram dividitur, cum dicitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. Sed terra est una tantum. Ergo et caelum est unum tantum. Praeterea, omne quod constat ex tota sua materia est unum tantum. Sed caelum est huiusmodi, ut probat Philosophus in I de Caelo. Ergo caelum est unum tantum. Praeterea, quidquid dicitur de pluribus univoce, dicitur de eis secundum unam rationem communem. Sed si sunt plures caeli, caelum dicitur univoce de pluribus, quia si aequivoce, non proprie dicerentur plures caeli. Oportet ergo, si dicuntur plures caeli, quod sit aliqua ratio communis, secundum quam caeli dicantur. Hanc autem non est assignare. Non est ergo dicendum quod sint plures caeli. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo CXLVIII, Laudate eum, caeli caelorum. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc videtur esse quaedam diversitas inter Basilium et Chrysostomum. Dicit enim Chrysostomus non esse nisi unum caelum; et quod pluraliter dicitur, caeli caelorum, hoc est propter proprietatem linguae Hebraeae, in qua consuetum est ut caelum solum pluraliter significetur; sicut sunt etiam multa nomina in Latino quae singulari carent. Basilius autem, et Damascenus sequens eum, dicunt plures esse caelos. Sed haec diversitas magis est in voce quam in re. Nam Chrysostomus unum caelum nominat totum corpus quod est supra terram et aquam, nam etiam aves, quae volant in aere, dicuntur propter hoc volucres caeli. Sed quia in isto corpore sunt multae distinctiones, propter hoc Basilius posuit plures caelos. Ad distinctionem ergo caelorum sciendam, considerandum est quod caelum tripliciter dicitur in Scripturis. Quandoque enim dicitur proprie et naturaliter. Et sic dicitur caelum corpus aliquod sublime, et luminosum actu vel potentia, et incorruptibile per naturam. Et secundum hoc, ponuntur tres caeli. Primum totaliter lucidum, quod vocant Empyreum. Secundum totaliter diaphanum, quod vocant caelum aqueum vel crystallinum. Tertium partim diaphanum et partim lucidum actu, quod vocant caelum sidereum, et dividitur in octo sphaeras, scilicet in sphaeram stellarum fixarum, et septem sphaeras planetarum; quae possunt dici octo caeli. Secundo dicitur caelum per participationem alicuius proprietatis caelestis corporis, scilicet sublimitatis et luminositatis actu vel potentia. Et sic totum illud spatium

Objection 1: It would seem that there is only one heaven. For the heaven is contrasted with the earth, in the words, In the beginning God created heaven and earth. But there is only one earth. Therefore there is only one heaven. Obj. 2: Further, that which consists of the entire sum of its own matter, must be one; and such is the heaven, as the Philosopher proves (De Coel. i, text. 95). Therefore there is but one heaven. Obj. 3: Further, whatever is predicated of many things univocally is predicated of them according to some common notion. But if there are more heavens than one, they are so called univocally, for if equivocally only, they could not properly be called many. If, then, they are many, there must be some common notion by reason of which each is called heaven, but this common notion cannot be assigned. Therefore there cannot be more than one heaven. On the contrary, It is said (Ps 148:4): Praise Him, ye heavens of heavens. I answer that, On this point there seems to be a diversity of opinion between Basil and Chrysostom. The latter says that there is only one heaven (Hom. iv in Gen.), and that the words ‘heavens of heavens’ are merely the translation of the Hebrew idiom according to which the word is always used in the plural, just as in Latin there are many nouns that are wanting in the singular. On the other hand, Basil (Hom. iii in Hexaem.), whom Damascene follows (De Fide Orth. ii), says that there are many heavens. The difference, however, is more nominal than real. For Chrysostom means by the one heaven the whole body that is above the earth and the water, for which reason the birds that fly in the air are called birds of heaven. But since in this body there are many distinct parts, Basil said that there are more heavens than one. In order, then, to understand the distinction of heavens, it must be borne in mind that Scripture speaks of heaven in a threefold sense. Sometimes it uses the word in its proper and natural meaning, when it denotes that body on high which is luminous actually or potentially, and incorruptible by nature. In this body there are three heavens; the first is the empyrean, which is wholly luminous; the second is the aqueous or crystalline, wholly transparent; and the third is called the starry heaven, in part transparent, and in part actually luminous, and divided into eight spheres. One of these is the sphere of the fixed stars; the other seven, which may be called the seven heavens, are the spheres of the planets. In the second place, the name heaven is applied to a body that participates in any property of the heavenly body, as sublimity and luminosity, actual or potential. Thus Dam-

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quod est ab aquis usque ad orbem lunae, Damascenus ponit unum caelum, nominans illud aereum. Et sic, secundum eum, sunt tres caeli, aereum, sidereum, et aliud superius, de quo intelligit quod Apostolus legitur raptus usque ad tertium caelum. Sed quia istud spatium continet duo elementa, scilicet ignis et aeris, et in utroque eorum vocatur superior et inferior regio; ideo istud caelum Rabanus distinguit in quatuor, supremam regionem ignis nominans caelum igneum; inferiorem vero regionem, caelum Olympium, ab altitudine cuiusdam montis qui vocatur Olympus; supremam vero regionem aeris vocavit caelum aethereum, propter inflammationem; inferiorem vero regionem, caelum aereum. Et sic, cum isti quatuor caeli tribus superioribus connumerantur, fiunt in universo, secundum Rabanum, septem caeli corporei. Tertio dicitur caelum metaphorice. Et sic quandoque ipsa sancta Trinitas dicitur caelum, propter eius spiritualem sublimitatem et lucem. De quo caelo exponitur Diabolum dixisse, ascendam in caelum, idest ad aequalitatem Dei. Quandoque etiam spiritualia bona in quibus est sanctorum remuneratio, propter eorum eminentiam caeli nominantur; ubi dicitur, merces vestra multa est in caelis, ut Augustinus exponit.

Quandoque vero tria genera supernaturalium visionum, scilicet corporalis, imaginariae et intellectualis tres caeli nominantur. De quibus Augustinus exponit quod Paulus est raptus usque ad tertium caelum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod terra se habet ad caelum, ut centrum ad circumferentiam. Circa unum autem centrum possunt esse multae circumferentiae. Unde una terra existente, multi caeli ponuntur. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de caelo, secundum quod importat universitatem creaturarum corporalium. Sic enim est unum caelum tantum. Ad tertium dicendum quod in omnibus caelis invenitur communiter sublimitas et aliqua luminositas, ut ex dictis patet.

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ascene (De Fide Orth. ii) holds as one heaven all the space between the waters and the moon’s orb, calling it the aerial. According to him, then, there are three heavens, the aerial, the starry, and one higher than both these, of which the Apostle is understood to speak when he says of himself that he was rapt to the third heaven. But since this space contains two elements, namely, fire and air, and in each of these there is what is called a higher and a lower region. Rabanus subdivides this space into four distinct heavens. The higher region of fire he calls the fiery heaven; the lower, the Olympian heaven from a lofty mountain of that name: the higher region of air he calls, from its brightness, the ethereal heaven; the lower, the aerial. When, therefore, these four heavens are added to the three enumerated above, there are seven corporeal heavens in all, in the opinion of Rabanus. Third, there are metaphorical uses of the word heaven, as when this name is applied to the Blessed Trinity, Who is the Light and the Most High Spirit. It is explained by some, as thus applied, in the words, I will ascend into heaven; whereby the evil spirit is represented as seeking to make himself equal with God. Sometimes also spiritual blessings, the recompense of the Saints, from being the highest of all good gifts, are signified by the word heaven, and, in fact, are so signified, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte), in the words, Your reward is very great in heaven (Matt 5:12). Again, three kinds of supernatural visions, bodily, imaginative, and intellectual, are called sometimes so many heavens, in reference to which Augustine (Gen ad lit. xii) expounds Paul’s rapture to the third heaven. Reply Obj. 1: The earth stands in relation to the heaven as the centre of a circle to its circumference. But as one center may have many circumferences, so, though there is but one earth, there may be many heavens. Reply Obj. 2: The argument holds good as to the heaven, in so far as it denotes the entire sum of corporeal creation, for in that sense it is one. Reply Obj. 3: All the heavens have in common sublimity and some degree of luminosity, as appears from what has been said.

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Question 69 The Work of the Third Day Deinde considerandum est de opere tertiae diei. Et We next consider the work of the third day. Under this circa hoc quaeruntur duo. head there are two points of inquiry: Primo, de congregatione aquarum. (1) About the gathering together of the waters. Secundo, de productione plantarum. (2) About the production of plants.

Article 1 Whether it was fitting that the gathering together of the waters should take place on the third day? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aquarum congregatio non convenienter dicatur facta tertia die. Ea enim quae facta sunt prima et secunda die, verbo factionis exprimuntur, dicitur enim, dixit Deus fiat lux, et, fiat firmamentum. Sed tertia dies condividitur duabus primis. Ergo opus tertiae diei debuit exprimi verbo factionis, et non solum verbo congregationis.

Praeterea, terra prius undique erat aquis cooperta, propter hoc enim invisibilis dicebatur. Non erat ergo aliquis locus super terram, in quo aquae congregari possent. Praeterea, quae non sunt continuata ad invicem, non habent unum locum. Sed non omnes aquae habent ad invicem continuitatem. Ergo non sunt omnes aquae congregatae in unum locum. Praeterea, congregatio ad motum localem pertinet. Sed aquae naturaliter videntur fluentes, et ad mare currentes. Non ergo fuit necessarium ad hoc divinum praeceptum adhiberi. Praeterea, terra etiam in principio suae creationis nominatur, cum dicitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. Inconvenienter ergo dicitur tertia die nomen terrae impositum. Sed in contrarium sufficit auctoritas Scripturae. Respondeo dicendum quod hic oportet aliter dicere secundum expositionem Augustini, et aliorum sanctorum. Augustinus enim in omnibus his operibus non ponit durationis ordinem, sed solum originis et naturae. Dicit enim primo creatam naturam spiritualem informem, et naturam corporalem absque omni forma (quam dicit primo significari nomine terrae et aquae), non quia haec informitas formationem praecesserit tempore, sed

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that the gathering together of the waters should take place on the third day. For what was made on the first and second days is expressly said to have been made in the words, God said: Be light made, and Let there be a firmament made.But the third day is contradistinguished from the first and the second days. Therefore the work of the third day should have been described as a making not as a gathering together. Obj. 2: Further, the earth hitherto had been completely covered by the waters, wherefore it was described as invisible. There was then no place on the earth to which the waters could be gathered together. Obj. 3: Further, things which are not in continuous contact cannot occupy one place. But not all the waters are in continuous contact, and therefore all were not gathered together into one place. Obj. 4: Further, a gathering together is a mode of local movement. But the waters flow naturally, and take their course towards the sea. In their case, therefore, a Divine precept of this kind was unnecessary. Obj. 5: Further, the earth is given its name at its first creation by the words, In the beginning God created heaven and earth. Therefore the imposition of its name on the third day seems to be recorded without necessity. On the contrary, The authority of Scripture suffices. I answer that, It is necessary to reply differently to this question according to the different interpretations given by Augustine and other holy writers. In all these works, according to Augustine (Gen ad lit. i, 15; iv, 22, 34; De Gen. Contr. Manich. i, 5, 7), there is no order of duration, but only of origin and nature. He says that the formless spiritual and formless corporeal natures were created first of all, and that the latter are at first indicated by the words earth

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origine tantum. Neque una formatio, secundum eum, and water. Not that this formlessness preceded formation, praecessit aliam duratione; sed solum naturae ordine. in time, but only in origin; nor yet that one formation preceded another in duration, but merely in the order of nature. Secundum quem ordinem necesse fuit ut primo poAgreeably, then, to this order, the formation of the highneretur formatio supremae naturae, scilicet spiritualis, est or spiritual nature is recorded in the first place, where it per hoc quod legitur prima die lux facta. Sicut autem spi- is said that light was made on the first day. For as the spiriritualis natura praeeminet corporali, ita superiora cor- tual nature is higher than the corporeal, so the higher bodpora praeeminent inferioribus. Unde secundo loco tan- ies are nobler than the lower. Hence the formation of the gitur formatio superiorum corporum, cum dicitur, fiat higher bodies is indicated in the second place, by the words, firmamentum; per quod intelligitur impressio formae Let there be made a firmament, by which is to be undercaelestis in materiam informem, non prius existentem stood the impression of celestial forms on formless matter, tempore, sed origine tantum. Tertio vero loco ponitur that preceded with priority not of time, but of origin only. impressio formarum elementarium in materiam infor- But in the third place the impression of elemental forms mem, non tempore, sed origine praecedentem. Unde per on formless matter is recorded, also with a priority of orihoc quod dicitur, congregentur aquae, et appareat arida, gin only. Therefore the words, Let the waters be gathered tointelligitur quod materiae corporali impressa est forma gether, and the dry land appear, mean that corporeal matsubstantialis aquae, per quam competit sibi talis motus; ter was impressed with the substantial form of water, so as et forma substantialis terrae, per quam competit sibi sic to have such movement, and with the substantial form of videri. earth, so as to have such an appearance. Sed secundum alios sanctos, in his operibus etiam According, however, to other holy writers, an order of ordo durationis attenditur, ponunt enim quod, informi- duration in the works is to be understood, by which is tas materiae tempore praecessit formationem, et una for- meant that the formlessness of matter precedes its formamatio aliam. Sed informitas materiae, secundum eos, tion, and one form another, in order of time. Nevertheless, non intelligitur carentia omnis formae quia iam erat cae- they do not hold that the formlessness of matter implies lum et aqua et terra (quae tria nominantur tanquam the total absence of form, since heaven, earth, and water almanifeste sensu perceptibilia), sed intelligitur informitas ready existed, since these three are named as already clearly materiae carentia debitae distinctionis, et consummatae perceptible to the senses; rather they understand by formcuiusdam pulchritudinis. lessness the want of due distinction and of perfect beauty. Et secundum haec tria nomina, posuit Scriptura tres And in respect of these three Scripture mentions three informitates. Ad caelum enim, quod est superius, per- kinds of formlessness. Heaven, the highest of them, was tinet informitas tenebrarum, quia ex eo est origo lumi- without form so long as darkness filled it, because it was the nis. Informitas vero aquae, quae est media, significatur source of light. The formlessness of water, which holds the nomine abyssi, quia hoc nomen significat quandam im- middle place, is called the deep, because, as Augustine says mensitatem inordinatam aquarum, ut Augustinus dicit, (Contr. Faust. xxii, 11), this word signifies the mass of waContra Faustum. Informitas vero terrae tangitur in hoc ters without order. Third, the formless state of the earth is quod dicitur, quod terra erat invisibilis vel inanis, per touched upon when the earth is said to be void or invisible, hoc quod erat aquis cooperta. because it was covered by the waters. Sic igitur formatio supremi corporis facta est priThus, then, the formation of the highest body took place ma die. Et quia tempus sequitur motum caeli, tempus on the first day. And since time results from the movement autem est numerus motus supremi corporis; per huius- of the heaven, and is the numerical measure of the movemodi formationem facta est distinctio temporis, noctis ment of the highest body, from this formation resulted the scilicet et diei. Secundo vero die formatum est medium distinction of time, namely, that of night and day. On the corpus, scilicet aqua, per firmamentum accipiens quan- second day the intermediate body, water, was formed, redam distinctionem et ordinem (ita quod sub nomine ceiving from the firmament a sort of distinction and oraquae etiam alia comprehenduntur, ut supra dictum est). der (so that water be understood as including certain other Tertio vero die formatum est ultimum corpus, scilicet things, as explained above (Q. 68, A. 3)). On the third day terra, per hoc quod discooperta est aquis; et facta est the earth, the lowest body, received its form by the withdistinctio in infimo, quae dicitur terrae et maris. Un- drawal of the waters, and there resulted the distinction in de satis congrue, sicut informitatem terrae expresserat the lowest body, namely, of land and sea. Hence Scripture, dicens quod terra erat invisibilis vel inanis, ita eius for- having clearly expressed the formless state of the earth, by mationem exprimit per hoc quod dicit, et appareat arida. saying that it was invisible or void, expresses the manner in which it received its form by the equally suitable words, Let the dry land appear.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum, ideo in opere tertiae diei non utitur Scriptura verbo factionis, sicut in praecedentibus operibus, ut ostendatur quod superiores formae, scilicet spirituales angelorum, et caelestium corporum, sunt perfectae in esse et stabiles; formae vero inferiorum corporum sunt imperfectae et mobiles. Et ideo per congregationem aquarum et apparentiam aridae, impressio talium formarum designatur, aqua enim est labiliter fluxa, terra stabiliter fixa, ut ipse dicit in II super Gen. ad Litt. Secundum vero alios, dicendum est quod opus tertiae diei est perfectum secundum solum motum localem. Et ideo non oportuit quod Scriptura uteretur verbo factionis. Ad secundum patet solutio secundum Augustinum, quia non oportet dicere quod terra primo esset cooperta aquis, et postmodum sint aquae congregatae; sed quod in tali congregatione fuerunt productae.

Secundum vero alios, tripliciter respondetur, ut Augustinus dicit, I super Gen. ad Litt. Uno modo, ut aquae in maiorem altitudinem sint elevatae in loco ubi sunt congregatae. Nam mare esse altius terra experimento compertum est in mari rubro, ut Basilius dicit. Secundo, ut dicatur quod rarior aqua velut nebula, terras tegebat, quae congregatione densata est. Tertio modo, ut dicatur quod terra potuit aliquas partes praebere concavas, quibus confluentes aquae reciperentur. Inter quas prima videtur probabilior. Ad tertium dicendum quod omnes aquae unum terminum habent, scilicet mare, in quod confluunt vel manifestis vel occultis meatibus. Et propter hoc dicuntur aquae congregari in unum locum. Vel dicit unum locum, non simpliciter, sed per comparationem ad locum terrae siccae; ut sit sensus, congregentur aquae in unum locum, idest, seorsum a terra sicca. Nam ad designandam pluralitatem locorum aquae, subdit quod congregationes aquarum appellavit maria. Ad quartum dicendum quod iussio Dei naturalem motum corporibus praebet. Unde dicitur quod suis naturalibus motibus faciunt verbum eius. Vel potest dici quod naturale esset quod aqua undique esset circa terram, sicut aer undique est circa aquam et terram; sed propter necessitatem finis, ut scilicet animalia et plantae essent super terram, oportuit quod aliqua pars terrae esset discooperta aquis. Quod quidem aliqui philosophi attribuunt actioni solis, per elevationem vaporum desiccantis terram. Sed sacra Scriptura attribuit hoc potestati divinae, non solum in Genesi, sed etiam in Iob XXXVIII, ubi ex persona domini dicitur,

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Reply Obj. 1: According to Augustine, Scripture does not say of the work of the third day, that it was made, as it says of those that precede, in order to show that higher and spiritual forms, such as the angels and the heavenly bodies, are perfect and stable in being, whereas inferior forms are imperfect and mutable. Hence the impression of such forms is signified by the gathering of the waters, and the appearing of the land. For water, to use Augustine’s words, glides and flows away, the earth abides (Gen ad lit. ii, 11). Others, again, hold that the work of the third day was perfected on that day only as regards movement from place to place, and that for this reason Scripture had no reason to speak of it as made. Reply Obj. 2: This argument is easily solved, according to Augustine’s opinion (De Gen. Contr. Manich. i), because we need not suppose that the earth was first covered by the waters, and that these were afterwards gathered together, but that they were produced in this very gathering together. But according to the other writers there are three solutions, which Augustine gives (Gen ad lit. i, 12). The first supposes that the waters are heaped up to a greater height at the place where they were gathered together, for it has been proved in regard to the Red Sea, that the sea is higher than the land, as Basil remarks (Hom. iv in Hexaem.). The second explains the water that covered the earth as being rarefied or nebulous, which was afterwards condensed when the waters were gathered together. The third suggests the existence of hollows in the earth, to receive the confluence of waters. Of the above the first seems the most probable. Reply Obj. 3: All the waters have the sea as their goal, into which they flow by channels hidden or apparent, and this may be the reason why they are said to be gathered together into one place. Or, one place is to be understood not simply, but as contrasted with the place of the dry land, so that the sense would be, Let the waters be gathered together in one place, that is, apart from the dry land. That the waters occupied more places than one seems to be implied by the words that follow, The gathering together of the waters He called Seas. Reply Obj. 4: The Divine command gives bodies their natural movement and by these natural movements they are said to fulfill His word. Or we may say that it was according to the nature of water completely to cover the earth, just as the air completely surrounds both water and earth; but as a necessary means towards an end, namely, that plants and animals might be on the earth, it was necessary for the waters to be withdrawn from a portion of the earth. Some philosophers attribute this uncovering of the earth’s surface to the action of the sun lifting up the vapors and thus drying the land. Scripture, however, attributes it to the Divine power, not

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circumdedi mare terminis meis; et Ierem. V, me ergo non only in the Book of Genesis, but also Job 38:10 where in the timebitis, ait dominus, qui posui arenam terminum mari? person of the Lord it is said, I set My bounds around the sea, and Jer. 5:22, where it is written: Will you not then fear Me, saith the Lord, who have set the sand a bound for the sea? Ad quintum dicendum quod, secundum AugustiReply Obj. 5: According to Augustine (De Gen. Contr. num, per terram de qua primo fiebat mentio, intelligitur Manich. i), primary matter is meant by the word earth, materia prima, nunc autem intelligitur ipsum elemen- where first mentioned, but in the present passage it is to be tum terrae. taken for the element itself. Vel potest dici, secundum Basilium, quod primo noAgain it may be said with Basil (Hom. iv in Hexaem.), minabatur terra secundum naturam suam, nunc autem that the earth is mentioned in the first passage in respect nominatur ex sua principali proprietate, quae est sicci- of its nature, but here in respect of its principal property, tas. Unde dicitur quod vocavit aridam, terram. namely, dryness. Wherefore it is written: He called the dry land, Earth. Vel potest dici, secundum Rabbi Moysen, quod ubiIt may also be said with Rabbi Moses, that the exprescumque dicitur vocavit, significatur aequivocatio nomi- sion, He called, denotes throughout an equivocal use of the nis. Unde prius dictum est quod vocavit lucem, diem, name imposed. Thus we find it said at first that He called the propter hoc quod etiam dies vocatur spatium viginti- light Day: for the reason that later on a period of twentyquatuor horarum, secundum quod ibidem dicitur, fac- four hours is also called day, where it is said that there was tum est vespere et mane dies unus. Similiter dicitur quod evening and morning, one day. In like manner it is said that firmamentum, idest aerem, vocavit caelum, quia etiam the firmament, that is, the air, He called heaven: for that caelum dicitur quod est primo creatum. Similiter etiam which was first created was also called heaven. And here, dicitur hic quod aridam, idest illam partem quae est di- again, it is said that the dry land, that is, the part from which scooperta aquis, vocavit terram, prout distinguitur con- the waters had withdrawn, He called, Earth, as distinct from tra mare, quamvis communi nomine terra vocetur, si- the sea; although the name earth is equally applied to that ve sit aquis cooperta, sive discooperta. Intelligitur autem which is covered with waters or not. So by the expression ubique per hoc quod dicitur vocavit, idest, dedit natu- He called we are to understand throughout that the naram vel proprietatem ut possit sic vocari. ture or property He bestowed corresponded to the name He gave.

Article 2 Whether it was fitting that the production of plants should take place on the third day? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod plantarum productio inconvenienter tertia die facta legatur. Plantae enim habent vitam sicut et animalia. Sed productio animalium non ponitur inter opera distinctionis, sed pertinet ad opus ornatus. Ergo nec productio plantarum commemorari debuit in tertia die, quae pertinet ad opus distinctionis. Praeterea, illud quod pertinet ad maledictionem terrae, non debuit commemorari cum formatione terrae. Sed productio quarundam plantarum pertinet ad maledictionem terrae; secundum illud Gen. III, maledicta terra in opere tuo, spinas et tribulos germinabit tibi. Ergo productio plantarum universaliter non debuit commemorari in tertia die, quae pertinet ad formationem terrae. Praeterea, sicut plantae adhaerent terrae, ita etiam lapides et metalla; et tamen non fit mentio de eis in

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that the production of plants should take place on the third day. For plants have life, as animals have. But the production of animals belongs to the work, not of distinction, but of adornment. Therefore the production of plants, as also belonging to the work of adornment, ought not to be recorded as taking place on the third day, which is devoted to the work of distinction. Obj. 2: Further, a work by which the earth is accursed should have been recorded apart from the work by which it receives its form. But the words of Gen. 3:17, Cursed is the earth in thy work, thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee, show that by the production of certain plants the earth was accursed. Therefore the production of plants in general should not have been recorded on the third day, which is concerned with the work of formation. Obj. 3: Further, as plants are firmly fixed to the earth, so are stones and metals, which are, nevertheless, not men-

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terrae formatione. Ergo nec plantae fieri debuerunt tertia die. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, protulit terra herbam virentem; et postea sequitur, factum est vespere et mane dies tertius. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in tertia die informitas terrae removetur. Duplex autem informitas circa terram describebatur, una, quod erat invisibilis vel inanis, quia erat aquis cooperta; alia, quod erat incomposita sive vacua, idest non habens debitum decorem, qui acquiritur terrae ex plantis eam quodammodo vestientibus. Et ideo utraque informitas in hac tertia die removetur, prima quidem, per hoc quod aquae congregatae sunt in unum locum, et apparuit arida; secunda vero, per hoc quod protulit terra herbam virentem. Sed tamen circa productionem plantarum, aliter opinatur Augustinus ab aliis. Alii enim expositores dicunt quod plantae productae sunt actu in suis speciebus in hac tertia die, secundum quod superficies litterae sonat. Augustinus autem, V sup. Gen. ad Litt., dicit quod causaliter tunc dictum est produxisse terram herbam et lignum, idest producendi accepisse virtutem. Et hoc quidem confirmat auctoritate Scripturae. Dicitur enim Gen. II, istae sunt generationes caeli et terrae, quando creata sunt, in die quo Deus fecit caelum et terram, et omne virgultum agri, antequam oriretur in terra, omnemque herbam regionis, priusquam germinaret. Ante ergo quam orirentur super terram, factae sunt causaliter in terra. Confirmat autem hoc etiam ratione. Quia in illis primis diebus condidit Deus creaturam originaliter vel causaliter, a quo opere postmodum requievit, qui tamen postmodum, secundum administrationem rerum conditarum per opus propagationis, usque modo operatur. Producere autem plantas ex terra, ad opus propagationis pertinet. Non ergo in tertia die productae sunt plantae in actu, sed causaliter tantum.

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tioned in the work of formation. Plants, therefore, ought not to have been made on the third day. On the contrary, It is said (Gen 1:12): The earth brought forth the green herb, after which there follows, The evening and the morning were the third day. I answer that, On the third day, as said (A. 1), the formless state of the earth comes to an end. But this state is described as twofold. On the one hand, the earth was invisible or void, being covered by the waters; on the other hand, it was shapeless or empty, that is, without that comeliness which it owes to the plants that clothe it, as it were, with a garment. Thus, therefore, in either respect this formless state ends on the third day: first, when the waters were gathered together into one place and the dry land appeared; second, when the earth brought forth the green herb.

But concerning the production of plants, Augustine’s opinion differs from that of others. For other commentators, in accordance with the surface meaning of the text, consider that the plants were produced in act in their various species on this third day; whereas Augustine (Gen ad lit. v, 5; viii, 3) says that the earth is said to have then produced plants and trees in their causes, that is, it received then the power to produce them. He supports this view by the authority of Scripture, for it is said (Gen 2:4, 5): These are the generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were created, in the day that . . . God made the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field before it sprung up in the earth, and every herb of the ground before it grew. Therefore, the production of plants in their causes, within the earth, took place before they sprang up from the earth’s surface. And this is confirmed by reason, as follows. In these first days God created all things in their origin or causes, and from this work He subsequently rested. Yet afterwards, by governing His creatures, in the work of propagation, He worketh until now. Now the production of plants from the earth is a work of propagation, and therefore they were not produced in act on the third day, but in their causes only. Quamvis, secundum alios, dici possit quod prima However, in accordance with other writers, it may be institutio specierum ad opera sex dierum pertinet, sed said that the first constitution of species belongs to the work quod ex speciebus primo institutis generatio similium in of the six days, but the reproduction among them of like specie procedat, hoc iam pertinet ad rerum administra- from like, to the government of the universe. And Scriptionem. Et hoc est quod Scriptura dicit, antequam ori- ture indicates this in the words, before it sprung up in the retur super terram, vel antequam germinaret; idest, an- earth, and before it grew, that is, before like was produced tequam ex similibus similia producerentur, sicut nunc from like; just as now happens in the natural course by naturaliter fieri videmus secundum viam seminationis. the production of seed. Wherefore Scripture says pointedly Unde signanter Scriptura dicit, germinet terra herbam vi- (Gen 1:11): Let the earth bring forth the green herb, and such rentem et facientem semen, quia scilicet sunt productae as may seed, as indicating the production of perfect species, perfectae species plantarum, ex quibus semina aliarum from which the seed of others should arise. Nor does the orirentur. Nec refert ubicumque habeant vim seminati- question where the seminal power may reside, whether in vam, utrum scilicet in radice, vel in stipite, vel in fructu. root, stem, or fruit, affect the argument. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vita in plantis est Reply Obj. 1: Life in plants is hidden, since they lack occulta, quia carent motu locali et sensu, quibus ani- sense and local movement, by which the animate and the matum ab inanimato maxime distinguitur. Et ideo, quia inanimate are chiefly discernible. And therefore, since they

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immobiliter terrae inhaerent, earum productio ponitur quasi quaedam terrae formatio. Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam ante illam maledictionem, spinae et tribuli producti erant vel virtute vel actu. Sed non erant producti homini in poenam; ut scilicet terra quam propter cibum coleret, infructuosa quaedam et noxia germinaret. Unde dictum est, germinabit tibi. Ad tertium dicendum quod Moyses ea tantum proposuit quae in manifesto apparent, sicut iam dictum est. Corpora autem mineralia habent generationem occultam in visceribus terrae. Et iterum, non habent manifestam distinctionem a terra, sed quaedam terrae species videntur. Et ideo de eis mentionem non fecit.

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are firmly fixed in the earth, their production is treated as a part of the earth’s formation. Reply Obj. 2: Even before the earth was accursed, thorns and thistles had been produced, either virtually or actually. But they were not produced in punishment of man; as though the earth, which he tilled to gain his food, produced unfruitful and noxious plants. Hence it is said: Shall it bring forth to thee. Reply Obj. 3: Moses put before the people such things only as were manifest to their senses, as we have said (Q. 67, A. 4; Q. 68, A. 3). But minerals are generated in hidden ways within the bowels of the earth. Moreover they seem hardly specifically distinct from earth, and would seem to be species thereof. For this reason, therefore, he makes no mention of them.

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Question 70 The Work of Adornment, and of the Fourth Day Consequenter considerandum est de opere ornatus. Et primo, de singulis diebus secundum se; secundo, de omnibus sex diebus in communi. Circa primum ergo, considerandum est primo de opere quartae diei, secundo, de opere quintae; tertio, de opere sextae; quarto, de iis quae pertinent ad septimum diem. Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo, de productione luminarium. Secundo, de fine productionis eorum. Tertio, utrum sint animata.

We must next consider the work of adornment, first as to each day by itself, second as to all seven days in general. In the first place, then, we consider the work of the fourth day, second, that of the fifth day, third, that of the sixth day, and fourth, such matters as belong to the seventh day. Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) As to the production of the lights; (2) As to the end of their production; (3) Whether they are living beings?

Article 1 Whether the lights ought to have been produced on the fourth day? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod luminaria non debuerint produci quarta die. Luminaria enim sunt corpora incorruptibilia naturaliter. Ergo eorum materia non potest esse absque formis eorum. Sed eorum materia producta est in opere creationis, ante omnem diem. Ergo et eorum formae. Non ergo sunt facta quarta die. Praeterea, luminaria sunt quasi vasa luminis. Sed lux est facta prima die. Ergo luminaria fieri debuerunt prima die, et non quarta. Praeterea, sicut plantae fixae sunt in terra, ita luminaria fixa sunt in firmamento, unde Scriptura dicit quod posuit ea in firmamento. Sed productio plantarum simul describitur cum formatione terrae, cui inhaerent. Ergo et productio luminarium simul debuit poni, secunda die, cum productione firmamenti. Praeterea, sol et luna et alia luminaria sunt causae plantarum. Sed naturali ordine causa praecedit effectum. Ergo luminaria non debuerunt fieri quarta die, sed tertia vel ante. Praeterea, multae stellae, secundum astrologos, sunt luna maiores. Non ergo tantum sol et luna debuerunt poni duo magna luminaria. Sed in contrarium sufficit auctoritas Scripturae. Respondeo dicendum quod in recapitulatione divinorum operum, Scriptura sic dicit, igitur perfecti sunt caeli et terra, et omnis ornatus eorum. In quibus verbis triplex opus intelligi potest, scilicet opus creationis, per

Objection 1: It would seem that the lights ought not to have been produced on the fourth day. For the heavenly luminaries are by nature incorruptible bodies: wherefore their matter cannot exist without their form. But as their matter was produced in the work of creation, before there was any day, so therefore were their forms. It follows, then, that the lights were not produced on the fourth day. Obj. 2: Further, the luminaries are, as it were, vessels of light. But light was made on the first day. The luminaries, therefore, should have been made on the first day, not on the fourth. Obj. 3: Further, the lights are fixed in the firmament, as plants are fixed in the earth. For, the Scripture says: He set them in the firmament. But plants are described as produced when the earth, to which they are attached, received its form. The lights, therefore, should have been produced at the same time as the firmament, that is to say, on the second day. Obj. 4: Further, plants are an effect of the sun, moon, and other heavenly bodies. Now, cause precedes effect in the order of nature. The lights, therefore, ought not to have been produced on the fourth day, but on the third day. Obj. 5: Further, as astronomers say, there are many stars larger than the moon. Therefore the sun and the moon alone are not correctly described as the two great lights. On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture. I answer that, In recapitulating the Divine works, Scripture says (Gen 2:1): So the heavens and the earth were finished and all the furniture of them, thereby indicating that the work was threefold. In the first work, that of creation,

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quod caelum et terra producta leguntur, sed informia. Et opus distinctionis, per quod caelum et terra sunt perfecta, sive per formas substantiales attributas materiae omnino informi, ut Augustinus vult; sive quantum ad convenientem decorem et ordinem, ut alii sancti dicunt. Et his duobus operibus additur ornatus. Et differt ornatus a perfectione. Nam perfectio caeli et terrae ad ea pertinere videtur quae caelo et terrae sunt intrinseca, ornatus vero ad ea quae sunt a caelo et terra distincta. Sicut homo perficitur per proprias partes et formas, ornatur autem per vestimenta, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Distinctio autem aliquorum maxime manifestatur per motum localem, quo ab invicem separantur. Et ideo ad opus ornatus pertinet productio illarum rerum quae habent motum in caelo et in terra. Sicut autem supra dictum est, de tribus fit mentio in creatione, scilicet de caelo et aqua et terra. Et haec tria etiam formantur per opus distinctionis tribus diebus, primo die, caelum; secundo die distinguuntur aquae; tertio die fit distinctio in terra, maris et aridae. Et similiter in opere ornatus, primo die, qui est quartus, producuntur luminaria, quae moventur in caelo, ad ornatum ipsius. Secundo die, qui est quintus, aves et pisces, ad ornatum medii elementi, quia habent motum in aere et aqua, quae pro uno accipiuntur. Tertio die, qui est sextus, producuntur animalia quae habent motum in terra, ad ornatum ipsius.

Sed sciendum est quod in productione luminarium non discordat Augustinus ab aliis sanctis. Dicit enim luminaria esse facta in actu, non in virtute tantum, non enim habet firmamentum virtutem productivam luminarium, sicut habet terra virtutem productivam plantarum. Unde Scriptura non dicit, producat firmamentum luminaria; sicut dicit, germinet terra herbam virentem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum, nulla difficultas ex hoc oritur. Non enim ponit successionem temporis in istis operibus, et ideo non oportet dicere quod materia luminarium fuerit sub alia forma. Secundum etiam eos qui ponunt caelestia corpora ex natura quatuor elementorum, nulla difficultas accidit, quia potest dici quod sunt formata ex praeiacenti materia, sicut animalia et plantae. Sed secundum eos qui ponunt corpora caelestia esse alterius naturae ab elementis et incorruptibilia per naturam, oportet dicere quod substantia luminarium a principio fuit creata; sed prius erat informis, et nunc formatur; non quidem forma substantiali, sed per collationem determinatae virtutis. Ideo tamen non fit mentio a principio de eis, sed solum quarta die, ut Chrysostomus dicit, ut per hoc

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the heaven and the earth were produced, but as yet without form. In the second, or work of distinction, the heaven and the earth were perfected, either by adding substantial form to formless matter, as Augustine holds (Gen ad lit. ii, 11), or by giving them the order and beauty due to them, as other holy writers suppose. To these two works is added the work of adornment. Which is distinct from perfection. For the perfection of the heaven and the earth regards, seemingly, those things that belong to them intrinsically, but the adornment, those that are extrinsic, just as the perfection of a man lies in his proper parts and forms, and his adornment, in clothing or such like. Now just as distinction of certain things is made most evident by their local movement, as separating one from another; so the work of adornment is set forth by the production of things having movement in the heavens, and upon the earth. But it has been stated above (Q. 69, A. 1), that three things are recorded as created, namely, the heaven, the water, and the earth; and these three received their form from the three days’ work of distinction, so that heaven was formed on the first day; on the second day the waters were separated; and on the third day, the earth was divided into sea and dry land. So also is it in the work of adornment; on the first day of this work, which is the fourth of creation, are produced the lights, to adorn the heaven by their movements; on the second day, which is the fifth, birds and fishes are called into being, to make beautiful the intermediate element, for they move in air and water, which are here taken as one; while on the third day, which is the sixth, animals are brought forth, to move upon the earth and adorn it. It must also here be noted that Augustine’s opinion (Gen ad lit. v, 5) on the production of lights is not at variance with that of other holy writers, since he says that they were made actually, and not merely virtually, for the firmament has not the power of producing lights, as the earth has of producing plants. Wherefore Scripture does not say: Let the firmament produce lights, though it says: Let the earth bring forth the green herb. Reply Obj. 1: In Augustine’s opinion there is no difficulty here; for he does not hold a succession of time in these works, and so there was no need for the matter of the lights to exist under another form. Nor is there any difficulty in the opinion of those who hold the heavenly bodies to be of the nature of the four elements, for it may be said that they were formed out of matter already existing, as animals and plants were formed. For those, however, who hold the heavenly bodies to be of another nature from the elements, and naturally incorruptible, the answer must be that the lights were substantially created at the beginning, but that their substance, at first formless, is formed on this day, by receiving not its substantial form, but a determination of power. As to the fact that the lights are not mentioned as existing from the beginning, but only as made on the fourth day,

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removeat populum ab idololatria, ostendens luminaria Chrysostom (Hom. vi in Gen.) explains this by the need of non esse deos, ex quo nec a principio fuerunt. guarding the people from the danger of idolatry: since the lights are proved not to be gods, by the fact that they were not from the beginning. Ad secundum dicendum quod, secundum AugustiReply Obj. 2: No difficulty exists if we follow Augusnum, nulla sequitur difficultas, quia lux de qua prima die tine in holding the light made on the first day to be spiritual, facta est mentio, fuit lux spiritualis; nunc autem fit lux and that made on this day to be corporeal. If, however, the corporalis. Si autem lux primo die facta intelligitur lux light made on the first day is understood to be itself corpocorporalis, oportet dicere quod lux primo die fuit pro- real, then it must be held to have been produced on that ducta secundum communem lucis naturam, quarto au- day merely as light in general; and that on the fourth day tem die attributa est luminaribus determinata virtus ad the lights received a definite power to produce determinate determinatos effectus; secundum quod videmus alios ef- effects. Thus we observe that the rays of the sun have one effectus habere radium solis, et alios radium lunae, et sic fect, those of the moon another, and so forth. Hence, speakde aliis. Et propter hanc determinationem virtutis, dicit ing of such a determination of power, Dionysius (Div. Nom. Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod lumen solis, quod iv) says that the sun’s light which previously was without primo erat informe, quarto die formatum est. form, was formed on the fourth day. Ad tertium dicendum quod, secundum PtolomaeReply Obj. 3: According to Ptolemy the heavenly luum, luminaria non sunt fixa in sphaeris, sed habent mo- minaries are not fixed in the spheres, but have their own tum seorsum a motu sphaerarum. Unde Chrysostomus movement distinct from the movement of the spheres. dicit quod non ideo dicitur quod posuit ea in firmamen- Wherefore Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Gen.) that He is to, quia ibi sint fixa; sed quia iusserit ut ibi essent; si- said to have set them in the firmament, not because He cut posuit hominem in Paradiso, ut ibi esset. Sed secun- fixed them there immovably, but because He bade them to dum opinionem Aristotelis, stellae fixae sunt in orbibus, be there, even as He placed man in Paradise, to be there. et non moventur nisi motu orbium, secundum rei veri- In the opinion of Aristotle, however, the stars are fixed in tatem. Tamen motus luminarium sensu percipitur, non their orbits, and in reality have no other movement but autem motus sphaerarum. Moyses autem, rudi populo that of the spheres; and yet our senses perceive the movecondescendens, secutus est quae sensibiliter apparent, ut ment of the luminaries and not that of the spheres (De Coel. dictum est. Si autem sit aliud firmamentum quod factum ii, text. 43). But Moses describes what is obvious to sense, est secunda die, ab eo in quo posita sunt sidera, secun- out of condescension to popular ignorance, as we have aldum distinctionem naturae, licet sensus non discernat, ready said (Q. 67, A. 4; Q. 68, A. 3). The objection, howquem Moyses sequitur, ut dictum est; cessat obiectio. ever, falls to the ground if we regard the firmament made Nam firmamentum factum est secunda die, quantum ad on the second day as having a natural distinction from that inferiorem partem. In firmamento autem posita sunt si- in which the stars are placed, even though the distinction dera quarta die, quantum ad superiorem partem; ut to- is not apparent to the senses, the testimony of which Moses tum pro uno accipiatur, secundum quod sensui apparet. follows, as stated above (De Coel. ii, text. 43). For although to the senses there appears but one firmament; if we admit a higher and a lower firmament, the lower will be that which was made on the second day, and on the fourth the stars were fixed in the higher firmament. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Basilius, Reply Obj. 4: In the words of Basil (Hom. v in Hexpraemittitur productio plantarum luminaribus, ad ex- aem.), plants were recorded as produced before the sun cludendam idololatriam. Qui enim credunt luminaria and moon, to prevent idolatry, since those who believe esse deos, dicunt quod primordialem originem habent the heavenly bodies to be gods, hold that plants originate plantae a luminaribus. Quamvis, ut Chrysostomus dicit, primarily from these bodies. Although as Chrysostom resicut agricola cooperatur ad productionem plantarum, marks (Hom. vi in Gen.), the sun, moon, and stars cooperita etiam et luminaria per suos motus. ate in the work of production by their movements, as the husbandman cooperates by his labor. Ad quintum dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus Reply Obj. 5: As Chrysostom says, the two lights are dicit, dicuntur duo luminaria magna non tam quantita- called great, not so much with regard to their dimensions te, quam efficacia et virtute. Quia etsi aliae stellae sint as to their influence and power. For though the stars be of maiores quantitate quam luna, tamen effectus lunae ma- greater bulk than the moon, yet the influence of the moon gis sentitur in istis inferioribus. Et etiam secundum sen- is more perceptible to the senses in this lower world. Moresum maior apparet. over, as far as the senses are concerned, its apparent size is greater.

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Article 2 Whether the cause assigned for the production of the lights is reasonable? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter causa productionis luminarium describatur. Dicitur enim Ierem. X, a signis caeli nolite metuere, quae gentes timent. Non ergo luminaria in signa facta sunt. Praeterea, signum contra causam dividitur. Sed luminaria sunt causa eorum quae hic aguntur. Ergo non sunt signa. Praeterea, distinctio temporum et dierum incoepit a primo die. Non ergo facta sunt luminaria in tempora et dies et annos, idest in horum distinctionem. Praeterea, nihil fit propter vilius se, quia finis est melior iis quae sunt ad finem. Sed luminaria sunt meliora quam terra. Non ergo facta sunt ut illuminent terram. Praeterea, luna non praeest nocti quando est prima. Probabile autem est quod luna facta fuerit prima, sic enim homines incipiunt computare. Ergo luna non est facta ut praesit nocti. In contrarium sufficit auctoritas Scripturae. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est supra, creatura aliqua corporalis potest dici esse facta vel propter actum proprium, vel propter aliam creaturam, vel propter totum universum, vel propter gloriam Dei. Sed Moyses, ut populum ab idololatria revocaret, illam solam causam tetigit, secundum quod sunt facta ad utilitatem hominum. Unde dicitur Deut. IV, ne forte, elevatis oculis ad caelum, videas solem et lunam et omnia astra caeli, et errore deceptus adores ea et colas, quae creavit dominus Deus in ministerium cunctis gentibus. Hoc autem ministerium explicat in principio Genesis per tria. Primo enim provenit utilitas hominibus ex luminaribus quantum ad visum, qui est directivus in operibus, et maxime utilis ad cognoscendas res. Et quantum ad hoc, dicit, ut luceant in firmamento, et illuminent terram. Secundo, quantum ad vicissitudines temporum, quibus et fastidium tollitur et valetudo conservatur, et necessaria victui oriuntur, quae non essent, si semper esset aut aestas aut hiems. Et quantum ad hoc, dicit, ut sint in tempora et dies et annos. Tertio, quantum ad opportunitatem negotiorum et operum, inquantum ex luminaribus caeli accipitur significatio pluviosi temporis vel sereni quae sunt apta diversis negotiis. Et quantum ad hoc dicit, ut sint in signa. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod luminaria sunt in signa corporalium transmutationum, non autem eorum quae dependent ex libero arbitrio. Ad secundum dicendum quod per causam sensibilem quandoque ducimur in cognitionem effectus occul-

Objection 1: It would seem that the cause assigned for the production of the lights is not reasonable. For it is said (Jer 10:2): Be not afraid of the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear. Therefore the heavenly lights were not made to be signs. Obj. 2: Further, sign is contradistinguished from cause. But the lights are the cause of what takes place upon the earth. Therefore they are not signs. Obj. 3: Further, the distinction of seasons and days began from the first day. Therefore the lights were not made for seasons, and days, and years, that is, in order to distinguish them. Obj. 4: Further, nothing is made for the sake of that which is inferior to itself, since the end is better than the means (Topic. iii). But the lights are nobler than the earth. Therefore they were not made to enlighten it. Obj. 5: Further, the new moon cannot be said to rule the night. But such it probably did when first made; for men begin to count from the new moon. The moon, therefore, was not made to rule the night. On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture. I answer that, As we have said above (Q. 65, A. 2), a corporeal creature can be considered as made either for the sake of its proper act, or for other creatures, or for the whole universe, or for the glory of God. Of these reasons only that which points out the usefulness of these things to man, is touched upon by Moses, in order to withdraw his people from idolatry. Hence it is written (Deut 4:19): Lest perhaps lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the moon and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error thou adore and serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of all nations. Now, he explains this service at the beginning of Genesis as threefold. First, the lights are of service to man, in regard to sight, which directs him in his works, and is most useful for perceiving objects. In reference to this he says: Let them shine in the firmament and give life to the earth. Second, as regards the changes of the seasons, which prevent weariness, preserve health, and provide for the necessities of food; all of which things could not be secured if it were always summer or winter. In reference to this he says: Let them be for seasons, and for days, and years. Third, as regards the convenience of business and work, in so far as the lights are set in the heavens to indicate fair or foul weather, as favorable to various occupations. And in this respect he says: Let them be for signs. Reply Obj. 1: The lights in the heaven are set for signs of changes effected in corporeal creatures, but not of those changes which depend upon the free-will. Reply Obj. 2: We are sometimes brought to the knowledge of hidden effects through their sensible causes, and

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ti, sicut et e converso. Unde nihil prohibet causam sensibilem esse signum. Ideo tamen potius dicit signa quam causas, ut occasionem idololatriae tolleret. Ad tertium dicendum quod in prima die facta est communis distinctio temporis per diem et noctem, secundum motum diurnum, qui est communis totius caeli; qui potest intelligi incoepisse primo die. Sed speciales distinctiones dierum et temporum, secundum quod dies est calidior die, et tempus tempore, et annus anno, fiunt secundum speciales motus stellarum; qui possunt intelligi quarto die incoepisse.

conversely. Hence nothing prevents a sensible cause from being a sign. But he says signs, rather than causes, to guard against idolatry. Reply Obj. 3: The general division of time into day and night took place on the first day, as regards the diurnal movement, which is common to the whole heaven and may be understood to have begun on that first day. But the particular distinctions of days and seasons and years, according as one day is hotter than another, one season than another, and one year than another, are due to certain particular movements of the stars: which movements may have had their beginning on the fourth day. Ad quartum dicendum quod in illuminatione terReply Obj. 4: Light was given to the earth for the serrae intelligitur utilitas hominis, qui secundum animam vice of man, who, by reason of his soul, is nobler than the praefertur corporibus luminarium. Nihil tamen prohi- heavenly bodies. Nor is it untrue to say that a higher creabet dici quod dignior creatura facta est propter inferio- ture may be made for the sake of a lower, considered not in rem, non secundum quod in se consideratur sed secun- itself, but as ordained to the good of the universe.

dum quod ordinatur ad integritatem universi. Ad quintum dicendum quod luna, quando est perfecta, oritur vespere et occidit mane, et sic praeest nocti. Et satis probabile est quod luna fuerit facta plena; sicut et herbae factae sunt in sua perfectione, facientes semen, et similiter animalia et homo. Licet enim naturali processu ab imperfecto ad perfectum deveniatur, simpliciter tamen perfectum prius est imperfecto. Augustinus tamen hoc non asserit, quia dicit non esse inconveniens quod Deus imperfecta fecerit, quae postmodum ipse perfecit.

Reply Obj. 5: When the moon is at its perfection it rises in the evening and sets in the morning, and thus it rules the night, and it was probably made in its full perfection as were plants yielding seed, as also were animals and man himself. For although the perfect is developed from the imperfect by natural processes, yet the perfect must exist simply before the imperfect. Augustine, however (Gen ad lit. ii), does not say this, for he says that it is not unfitting that God made things imperfect, which He afterwards perfected.

Article 3 Whether the lights of heaven are living beings? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod luminaria caeli sint animata. Superius enim corpus nobilioribus ornamentis ornari debet. Sed ea quae pertinent ad ornatum inferiorum corporum, sunt animata; scilicet pisces, aves, et terrestria animalia. Ergo et luminaria, quae pertinent ad ornatum caeli. Praeterea, nobilioris corporis nobilior est forma. Sed sol et luna et alia luminaria sunt nobiliora quam corpora plantarum et animalium. Ergo habent nobiliorem formam. Nobilissima autem forma est anima, quae est principium vitae, quia, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de Vera Relig., quaelibet substantia vivens naturae ordine praefertur substantiae non viventi. Ergo luminaria caeli sunt animata. Praeterea, causa nobilior est effectu. Sed sol et luna et alia luminaria sunt causa vitae, ut patet maxime in animalibus ex putrefactione generatis, quae virtute solis

Objection 1: It would seem that the lights of heaven are living beings. For the nobler a body is, the more nobly it should be adorned. But a body less noble than the heaven, is adorned with living beings, with fish, birds, and the beasts of the field. Therefore the lights of heaven, as pertaining to its adornment, should be living beings also. Obj. 2: Further, the nobler a body is, the nobler must be its form. But the sun, moon, and stars are nobler bodies than plants or animals, and must therefore have nobler forms. Now the noblest of all forms is the soul, as being the first principle of life. Hence Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxix) says: Every living substance stands higher in the order of nature than one that has not life. The lights of heaven, therefore, are living beings. Obj. 3: Further, a cause is nobler than its effect. But the sun, moon, and stars are a cause of life, as is especially evidenced in the case of animals generated from putrefac-

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et stellarum vitam consequuntur. Ergo multo magis cor- tion, which receive life from the power of the sun and stars. pora caelestia vivunt et sunt animata. Much more, therefore, have the heavenly bodies a living soul. Praeterea, motus caeli et caelestium corporum Obj. 4: Further, the movement of the heaven and the sunt naturales, ut patet in I de Caelo. Motus autem na- heavenly bodies are natural (De Coel. i, text. 7, 8): and natuturalis est a principio intrinseco. Cum igitur principium ral movement is from an intrinsic principle. Now the prinmotus caelestium corporum sit aliqua substantia appre- ciple of movement in the heavenly bodies is a substance hensiva, quae movetur sicut desiderans a desiderato, ut capable of apprehension, and is moved as the desirer is dicitur in XII Metaphys.; videtur quod principium ap- moved by the object desired (Metaph. xii, text. 36). Thereprehendens sit principium intrinsecum corporibus cae- fore, seemingly, the apprehending principle is intrinsic to lestibus. Ergo sunt animata. the heavenly bodies: and consequently they are living beings. Praeterea, primum mobile est caelum. In genere Obj. 5: Further, the first of movables is the heaven. autem mobilium, primum est movens seipsum, ut pro- Now, of all things that are endowed with movement the first batur in VIII Physic., quia quod est per se, prius est eo moves itself, as is proved in Phys. viii, text. 34, because, what quod est per aliud. Sola autem animata movent seipsa, is such of itself precedes that which is by another. But only ut in eodem libro ostenditur. Ergo corpora caelestia sunt beings that are living move themselves, as is shown in the animata. same book (text. 27). Therefore the heavenly bodies are living beings. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit in libro II, On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), nullus animatos caelos vel luminaria aestimet; inanimati Let no one esteem the heavens or the heavenly bodies to be livenim sunt et insensibiles. ing things, for they have neither life nor sense. Respondeo dicendum quod circa istam quaestioI answer that, Philosophers have differed on this nem apud philosophos fuit diversa opinio. Anaxagoras question. Anaxagoras, for instance, as Augustine mentions enim, ut Augustinus refert Lib. XVIII de Civ. Dei, factus (De Civ. Dei xviii, 41), was condemned by the Athenians for est reus apud Athenienses, quia dixit solem esse lapidem teaching that the sun was a fiery mass of stone, and neither a ardentem, negans utique ipsum esse Deum, vel aliquid god nor even a living being. On the other hand, the Platonanimatum. Platonici vero posuerunt corpora caelestia ists held that the heavenly bodies have life. Nor was there animata. Similiter etiam apud doctores fidei, fuit circa less diversity of opinion among the Doctors of the Church. hoc diversa opinio. Origenes enim posuit corpora cae- It was the belief of Origen (Peri Archon i) and Jerome that lestia animata. Hieronymus etiam idem sentire videtur, these bodies were alive, and the latter seems to explain in exponens illud Eccle. I, lustrans universa, per circuitum that sense the words (Eccl 1:6), The spirit goeth forward, surpergit spiritus. Basilius vero et Damascenus asserunt cor- veying all places round about. But Basil (Hom. iii, vi in Hexpora caelestia non esse animata. Augustinus vero sub aem.) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii) maintain that the dubio dereliquit, in neutram partem declinans, ut patet heavenly bodies are inanimate. Augustine leaves the matin II supra Gen. ad Litt.; et in Enchirid., ubi etiam dicit ter in doubt, without committing himself to either theory, quod, si sunt animata caelestia corpora, pertinent ad so- though he goes so far as to say that if the heavenly bodies cietatem angelorum eorum animae. are really living beings, their souls must be akin to the angelic nature (Gen ad lit. ii, 18; Enchiridion lviii). In hac autem opinionum diversitate, ut veritas aliIn examining the truth of this question, where such diquatenus innotescat, considerandum est quod unio ani- versity of opinion exists, we shall do well to bear in mind mae et corporis non est propter corpus, sed propter that the union of soul and body exists for the sake of the animam, non enim forma est propter materiam, sed e soul and not of the body; for the form does not exist for converso. Natura autem et virtus animae deprehenditur the matter, but the matter for the form. Now the nature and ex eius operatione, quae etiam quodammodo est finis power of the soul are apprehended through its operation, eius. Invenitur autem corpus necessarium ad aliquam which is to a certain extent its end. Yet for some of these operationem animae, quae mediante corpore exercetur; operations, as sensation and nutrition, our body is a necessicut patet in operibus animae sensitivae et nutritivae. sary instrument. Hence it is clear that the sensitive and nuUnde necesse est tales animas unitas esse corporibus tritive souls must be united to a body in order to exercise propter suas operationes. their functions. Est autem aliqua operatio animae, quae non exerThere are, however, operations of the soul, which are cetur corpore mediante, sed tamen ex corpore aliquod not exercised through the medium of the body, though the adminiculum tali operationi exhibetur; sicut per corpus body ministers, as it were, to their production. The intelexhibentur animae humanae phantasmata, quibus indi- lect, for example, makes use of the phantasms derived from

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get ad intelligendum. Unde etiam talem animam necesse est corpori uniri propter suam operationem, licet contingat ipsam separari. Manifestum est autem quod anima caelestis corporis non potest habere operationes nutritivae animae, quae sunt nutrire, augere et generare, huiusmodi enim operationes non competunt corpori incorruptibili per naturam. Similiter etiam nec operationes animae sensitivae corpori caelesti conveniunt, quia omnes sensus fundantur super tactum, qui est apprehensivus qualitatum elementarium. Omnia etiam organa potentiarum sensitivarum requirunt determinatam proportionem secundum commixtionem aliquam elementorum, a quorum natura corpora caelestia ponuntur remota. Relinquitur ergo quod de operationibus animae nulla potest competere animae caelesti nisi duae, intelligere et movere, nam appetere consequitur sensum et intellectum, et cum utroque ordinatur. Intellectualis autem operatio, cum non exerceatur per corpus, non indiget corpore nisi inquantum ei per sensus ministrantur phantasmata. Operationes autem sensitivae animae corporibus caelestibus non conveniunt, ut dictum est. Sic igitur propter operationem intellectualem, anima caelesti corpori non uniretur. Relinquitur ergo quod propter solam motionem.

Ad hoc autem quod moveat, non oportet quod uniatur ei ut forma; sed per contactum virtutis, sicut motor unitur mobili. Unde Aristoteles, libro VIII Physic., postquam ostendit quod primum movens seipsum componitur ex duabus partibus, quarum una est movens et alia mota; assignans quomodo hae duae partes uniantur, dicit quod per contactum vel duorum ad invicem, si utrumque sit corpus, vel unius ad alterum et non e converso, si unum sit corpus et aliud non corpus. Platonici etiam animas corporibus uniri non ponebant nisi per contactum virtutis, sicut motor mobili. Et sic per hoc quod Plato ponit corpora caelestia animata, nihil aliud datur intelligi, quam quod substantiae spirituales uniuntur corporibus caelestibus ut motores mobilibus. Quod autem corpora caelestia moveantur ab aliqua substantia apprehendente, et non solum a natura, sicut gravia et levia, patet ex hoc, quod natura non movet nisi ad unum, quo habito quiescit, quod in motu corporum caelestium non apparet. Unde relinquitur quod moventur ab aliqua substantia apprehendente; Augustinus etiam dicit, III de Trin., corpora omnia administrari a Deo per spiritum vitae. Sic igitur patet quod corpora caelestia non sunt animata eo modo quo plantae et animalia, sed aequivoce. Unde inter ponentes ea esse animata, et ponentes ea ina-

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the bodily senses, and thus far is dependent on the body, although capable of existing apart from it. It is not, however, possible that the functions of nutrition, growth, and generation, through which the nutritive soul operates, can be exercised by the heavenly bodies, for such operations are incompatible with a body naturally incorruptible. Equally impossible is it that the functions of the sensitive soul can appertain to the heavenly body, since all the senses depend on the sense of touch, which perceives elemental qualities, and all the organs of the senses require a certain proportion in the admixture of elements, whereas the nature of the heavenly bodies is not elemental. It follows, then, that of the operations of the soul the only ones left to be attributed to the heavenly bodies are those of understanding and moving; for appetite follows both sensitive and intellectual perception, and is in proportion thereto. But the operations of the intellect, which does not act through the body, do not need a body as their instrument, except to supply phantasms through the senses. Moreover, the operations of the sensitive soul, as we have seen, cannot be attributed to the heavenly bodies. Accordingly, the union of a soul to a heavenly body cannot be for the purpose of the operations of the intellect. It remains, then, only to consider whether the movement of the heavenly bodies demands a soul as the motive power. Not that the soul, in order to move the heavenly body, need be united to the latter as its form; but by contact of power, as a mover is united to that which he moves. Wherefore Aristotle (Phys. viii, text. 42, 43), after showing that the first mover is made up of two parts, the moving and the moved, goes on to show the nature of the union between these two parts. This, he says, is effected by contact which is mutual if both are bodies; on the part of one only, if one is a body and the other not. The Platonists explain the union of soul and body in the same way, as a contact of a moving power with the object moved, and since Plato holds the heavenly bodies to be living beings, this means nothing else but that substances of spiritual nature are united to them, and act as their moving power. A proof that the heavenly bodies are moved by the direct influence and contact of some spiritual substance, and not, like bodies of specific gravity, by nature, lies in the fact that whereas nature moves to one fixed end which having attained, it rests; this does not appear in the movement of heavenly bodies. Hence it follows that they are moved by some intellectual substances. Augustine appears to be of the same opinion when he expresses his belief that all corporeal things are ruled by God through the spirit of life (De Trin. iii, 4). From what has been said, then, it is clear that the heavenly bodies are not living beings in the same sense as plants and animals, and that if they are called so, it can only be

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nimata, parva vel nulla differentia invenitur in re, sed in equivocally. It will also be seen that the difference of opinvoce tantum. ion between those who affirm, and those who deny, that these bodies have life, is not a difference of things but of words. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad ornatum pertiReply Obj. 1: Certain things belong to the adornment nent aliqua secundum proprium motum. Et quantum ad of the universe by reason of their proper movement; and hoc, luminaria caeli conveniunt cum aliis quae ad orna- in this way the heavenly luminaries agree with others that tum pertinent, quia moventur a substantia vivente. conduce to that adornment, for they are moved by a living substance. Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliReply Obj. 2: One being may be nobler than another quid esse nobilius simpliciter, quod tamen non est no- absolutely, but not in a particular respect. While, then, it is bilius quantum ad aliquid. Forma ergo caelestis corpo- not conceded that the souls of heavenly bodies are nobler ris, etsi non sit simpliciter nobilior anima animalis, est than the souls of animals absolutely it must be conceded tamen nobilior quantum ad rationem formae, perficit that they are superior to them with regard to their respecenim totaliter suam materiam, ut non sit in potentia ad tive forms, since their form perfects their matter entirely, aliam formam; quod anima non facit. Quantum etiam which is not in potentiality to other forms; whereas a soul ad motum, moventur corpora caelestia a nobilioribus does not do this. Also as regards movement the power that motoribus. moves the heavenly bodies is of a nobler kind. Ad tertium dicendum quod corpus caeleste, cum Reply Obj. 3: Since the heavenly body is a mover sit movens motum, habet rationem instrumenti, quod moved, it is of the nature of an instrument, which acts in agit in virtute principalis agentis. Et ideo ex virtute sui virtue of the agent: and therefore since this agent is a living motoris, qui est substantia vivens, potest causare vitam. substance the heavenly body can impart life in virtue of that agent. Ad quartum dicendum quod motus corporis caeReply Obj. 4: The movements of the heavenly bodlestis est naturalis, non propter principium activum, sed ies are natural, not on account of their active principle, but propter principium passivum, quia scilicet habet in sua on account of their passive principle; that is to say, from a natura aptitudinem ut tali motu ab intellectu moveatur. certain natural aptitude for being moved by an intelligent power. Ad quintum dicendum quod caelum dicitur moveReply Obj. 5: The heaven is said to move itself in as far re seipsum, inquantum componitur ex motore et mobi- as it is compounded of mover and moved; not by the union li, non sicut ex forma et materia, sed secundum contac- of the mover, as the form, with the moved, as the matter, tum virtutis, ut dictum est. Et hoc etiam modo potest but by contact with the motive power, as we have said. So dici quod eius motor est principium intrinsecum, ut sic far, then, the principle that moves it may be called intrinsic, etiam motus caeli possit dici naturalis ex parte principii and consequently its movement natural with respect to that activi; sicut motus voluntarius dicitur esse naturalis ani- active principle; just as we say that voluntary movement is mali inquantum est animal, ut dicitur in VIII Physic. natural to the animal as animal (Phys. viii, text. 27).

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Question 71 The Work of the Fifth Day Deinde considerandum est de opere quintae diei.

We must next consider the work of the fifth day.

Article 1 Whether the work of the fifth day was fittingly described? Et videtur quod inconvenienter hoc opus describatur. Illud enim aquae producunt, ad cuius productionem sufficit virtus aquae. Sed virtus aquae non sufficit ad productionem omnium piscium et avium, cum videamus plura eorum generari ex semine. Non ergo convenienter dicitur, producant aquae reptile animae viventis, et volatile super terram. Praeterea, pisces et aves non tantum producuntur ex aqua, sed in eorum compositione videtur magis terra dominari quam aqua, quia corpora eorum naturaliter moventur ad terram; unde et in terra quiescunt. Non ergo convenienter dicitur pisces et aves ex aqua produci. Praeterea, sicut pisces habent motum in aquis, ita et aves in aere. Si ergo pisces ex aquis producuntur, aves non deberent produci ex aquis, sed ex aere. Praeterea, non omnes pisces reptant in aquis, cum quidem habeant pedes, quibus gradiuntur in terra, sicut vituli marini. Non ergo sufficienter productio piscium designatur in hoc quod dicitur, producant aquae reptile animae viventis. Praeterea, animalia terrestria sunt perfectiora avibus et piscibus. Quod patet ex hoc quod habent membra magis distincta, et perfectiorem generationem, generant enim animalia, sed pisces et aves generant ova. Perfectiora autem praecedunt in ordine naturae. Non ergo quinta die debuerunt fieri pisces et aves, ante animalia terrestria. In contrarium sufficit auctoritas Scripturae. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, opus ornatus per ordinem respondet ordini distinctionis. Unde sicut inter tres dies distinctioni deputatos, media, quae est secunda, deputatur distinctioni medii corporis, scilicet aquae; ita inter tres dies deputatos ad opus ornatus, media, idest quinta, deputatur ad ornatum medii corporis, per productionem avium et piscium. Unde sicut Moyses in quarta die nominat luminaria et lucem, ut designet quod quarta dies respondet primae, in qua dixerat lucem factam; ita in hac quinta die facit mentio-

Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described. For the waters produce that which the power of water suffices to produce. But the power of water does not suffice for the production of every kind of fishes and birds since we find that many of them are generated from seed. Therefore the words, Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life, and the fowl that may fly over the earth, do not fittingly describe this work. Obj. 2: Further, fishes and birds are not produced from water only, but earth seems to predominate over water in their composition, as is shown by the fact that their bodies tend naturally to the earth and rest upon it. It is not, then, fittingly said that fishes and birds are produced from water. Obj. 3: Further, fishes move in the waters, and birds in the air. If, then, fishes are produced from the waters, birds ought to be produced from the air, and not from the waters. Obj. 4: Further, not all fishes creep through the waters, for some, as seals, have feet and walk on land. Therefore the production of fishes is not sufficiently described by the words, Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life. Obj. 5: Further, land animals are more perfect than birds and fishes which appears from the fact that they have more distinct limbs, and generation of a higher order. For they bring forth living beings, whereas birds and fishes bring forth eggs. But the more perfect has precedence in the order of nature. Therefore fishes and birds ought not to have been produced on the fifth day, before land animals. On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture. I answer that, As said above, (Q. 70, A. 1), the order of the work of adornment corresponds to the order of the work of distinction. Hence, as among the three days assigned to the work of distinction, the middle, or second, day is devoted to the work of distinction of water, which is the intermediate body, so in the three days of the work of adornment, the middle day, which is the fifth, is assigned to the adornment of the intermediate body, by the production of birds and fishes. As, then, Moses makes mention of the lights and the light on the fourth day, to show that the

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nem de aquis et de firmamento caeli, ut designet quod fourth day corresponds to the first day on which he had said quinta dies respondet secundae. that the light was made, so on this fifth day he mentions the waters and the firmament of heaven to show that the fifth day corresponds to the second. Sed sciendum est quod, sicut in productione plantaIt must, however, be observed that Augustine differs rum differt Augustinus ab aliis, ita et in productione pi- from other writers in his opinion about the production scium et avium. Alii enim dicunt pisces et aves quinta of fishes and birds, as he differs about the production of die esse productos in actu, Augustinus autem dicit, V su- plants. For while others say that fishes and birds were proper Gen. ad Litt., quod quinta die aquarum natura pro- duced on the fifth day actually, he holds that the nature of duxit pisces et aves potentialiter. the waters produced them on that day potentially. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Avicenna posuit Reply Obj. 1: It was laid down by Avicenna that anomnia animalia posse generari ex aliquali elementorum imals of all kinds can be generated by various minglings commixtione absque semine, etiam per viam naturae. of the elements, and naturally, without any kind of seed. Sed hoc videtur inconveniens. Quia natura determina- This, however, seems repugnant to the fact that nature protis mediis procedit ad suos effectus, unde illa quae natu- duces its effects by determinate means, and consequently, raliter generantur ex semine, non possunt naturaliter si- those things that are naturally generated from seed canne semine generari. Et ideo dicendum est aliter, quod in not be generated naturally in any other way. It ought, then, naturali generatione animalium, principium activum est rather to be said that in the natural generation of all animals virtus formativa quae est in semine, in iis quae ex semine that are generated from seed, the active principle lies in the generantur; loco cuius virtutis, in iis quae ex putrefactio- formative power of the seed, but that in the case of animals ne generantur, est virtus caelestis corporis. Materiale au- generated from putrefaction, the formative power is the intem principium in utrorumque animalium generatione, fluence of the heavenly bodies. The material principle, howest aliquod elementum vel elementatum. In prima au- ever, in the generation of either kind of animals, is either tem rerum institutione, fuit principium activum verbum some element, or something compounded of the elements. Dei, quod ex materia elementari produxit animalia vel But at the first beginning of the world the active principle in actu, secundum alios sanctos; vel virtute, secundum was the Word of God, which produced animals from mateAugustinum. Non quod aqua aut terra habeat in se vir- rial elements, either in act, as some holy writers say, or virtutem producendi omnia animalia, ut Avicenna posuit, tually, as Augustine teaches. Not as though the power possed quia hoc ipsum quod ex materia elementari, virtute sessed by water or earth of producing all animals resides in seminis vel stellarum, possunt animalia produci, est ex the earth and the water themselves, as Avicenna held, but virtute primitus elementis data. in the power originally given to the elements of producing them from elemental matter by the power of seed or the influence of the stars. Ad secundum dicendum quod corpora avium et piReply Obj. 2: The bodies of birds and fishes may be scium possunt dupliciter considerari. Uno modo, secun- considered from two points of view. If considered in themdum se. Et sic necesse est quod in eis magis terrestre selves, it will be evident that the earthly element must preelementum dominetur, quia ad hoc quod fiat contem- dominate, since the element that is least active, namely, the peratio mixtionis in corpore animalis necesse est quod earth, must be the most abundant in quantity in order that quantitative abundet in eo elementum quod est minus the mingling may be duly tempered in the body of the anactivum, scilicet terra. Sed si considerentur secundum imal. But if considered as by nature constituted to move quod sunt nata moveri talibus motibus, sic habent affi- with certain specific motions, thus they have some special nitatem quandam cum corporibus in quibus moventur. affinity with the bodies in which they move; and hence the Et sic eorum generatio hic describitur. words in which their generation is described. Ad tertium dicendum quod aer, quia insensibilis Reply Obj. 3: The air, as not being so apparent to the est, non per seipsum connumeratur, sed cum aliis, par- senses, is not enumerated by itself, but with other things: tim quidem cum aqua, quantum ad inferiorem partem, partly with the water, because the lower region of the air is quae exhalationibus aquae ingrossatur; partim etiam thickened by watery exhalations; partly with the heaven as cum caelo, quantum ad superiorem partem. Aves autem to the higher region. But birds move in the lower part of the motum habent in inferiori parte aeris, et ideo sub firma- air, and so are said to fly beneath the firmament, even if the mento caeli volare dicuntur, etiam si firmamentum pro firmament be taken to mean the region of clouds. Hence nebuloso aere accipiatur. Et ideo productio avium aquae the production of birds is ascribed to the water. adscribitur. Ad quartum dicendum quod natura de uno extreReply Obj. 4: Nature passes from one extreme to anmo ad aliud transit per media. Et ideo inter terrestria et other through the medium; and therefore there are crea-

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aquatica animalia sunt quaedam media, quae communicant cum utrisque; et computantur cum illis cum quibus magis communicant, secundum id quod cum eis communicant; non secundum id quod communicant cum alio extremo. Tamen, ut includantur omnia huiusmodi quae habent aliquid speciale inter pisces, subiungit, postquam dixerat, producant aquae reptile animae viventis, creavit Deus cete grandia, et cetera.

Q. 71, A. 1

tures of intermediate type between the animals of the air and those of the water, having something in common with both; and they are reckoned as belonging to that class to which they are most allied, through the characters possessed in common with that class, rather than with the other. But in order to include among fishes all such intermediate forms as have special characters like to theirs, the words, Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life, are followed by these: God created great whales, etc. Ad quintum dicendum quod productio horum aniReply Obj. 5: The order in which the production of malium ordinatur secundum ordinem corporum quae these animals is given has reference to the order of those eis ornantur, magis quam secundum propriam dignita- bodies which they are set to adorn, rather than to the supetem. Et tamen, in via generationis, ab imperfectioribus riority of the animals themselves. Moreover, in generation ad perfectiora pervenitur. also the more perfect is reached through the less perfect.

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Question 72 The Work of the Sixth Day Deinde quaeritur de opere sextae diei.

We must now consider the work of the sixth day.

Article 1 Whether the work of the sixth day was fittingly described? Et videtur quod inconvenienter describatur. Sicut enim aves et pisces habent viventem animam, ita etiam et animalia terrestria; non autem terrestria animalia sunt ipsa anima vivens. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur, producat terra animam viventem; sed debuit dici, producat terra quadrupedia animae viventis. Praeterea, genus non debet dividi contra speciem. Sed iumenta et bestiae sub quadrupedibus computantur. Inconvenienter ergo quadrupedia connumerantur iumentis et bestiis. Praeterea, sicut alia animalia sunt in determinato genere et specie, ita et homo. Sed in factione hominis non fit mentio de suo genere vel specie. Ergo nec in productione aliorum animalium debuit fieri mentio de genere vel specie, cum dicitur, in genere suo, vel specie sua. Praeterea, animalia terrestria magis sunt similia homini, qui a Deo dicitur benedici, quam aves et pisces. Cum igitur aves et pisces dicantur benedici, multo fortius hoc dici debuit de aliis animalibus. Praeterea, quaedam animalia generantur ex putrefactione, quae est corruptio quaedam. Corruptio autem non convenit primae institutioni rerum. Non ergo animalia debuerunt in prima rerum institutione produci. Praeterea, quaedam animalia sunt venenosa et homini noxia. Nihil autem debuit esse homini nocivum ante peccatum. Ergo huiusmodi animalia vel omnino fieri a Deo non debuerunt, qui est bonorum auctor, vel non debuerunt fieri ante peccatum. In contrarium sufficit auctoritas Scripturae. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in die quinto ornatur medium corpus, et respondet secundae diei, ita in sexto die ornatur ultimum corpus, scilicet terra, per productionem animalium terrestrium, et respondet tertiae diei. Unde utrobique fit mentio de terra. Et hic etiam, secundum Augustinum, animalia terrestria producuntur potentialiter, secundum vero alios sanctos, in actu.

Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described. For as birds and fishes have a living soul, so also have land animals. But these animals are not themselves living souls. Therefore the words, Let the earth bring forth the living creature, should rather have been, Let the earth bring forth the living four-footed creatures. Obj. 2: Further, a genus ought not to be opposed to its species. But beasts and cattle are quadrupeds. Therefore quadrupeds ought not to be enumerated as a class with beasts and cattle. Obj. 3: Further, as animals belong to a determinate genus and species, so also does man. But in the making of man nothing is said of his genus and species, and therefore nothing ought to have been said about them in the production of other animals, whereas it is said according to its genus and in its species. Obj. 4: Further, land animals are more like man, whom God is recorded to have blessed, than are birds and fishes. But as birds and fishes are said to be blessed, this should have been said, with much more reason, of the other animals as well. Obj. 5: Further, certain animals are generated from putrefaction, which is a kind of corruption. But corruption is repugnant to the first founding of the world. Therefore such animals should not have been produced at that time. Obj. 6: Further, certain animals are poisonous, and injurious to man. But there ought to have been nothing injurious to man before man sinned. Therefore such animals ought not to have been made by God at all, since He is the Author of good; or at least not until man had sinned. On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture. I answer that, As on the fifth day the intermediate body, namely, the water, is adorned, and thus that day corresponds to the second day; so the sixth day, on which the lowest body, or the earth, is adorned by the production of land animals, corresponds to the third day. Hence the earth is mentioned in both places. And here again Augustine says (Gen ad lit. v) that the production was potential, and other holy writers that it was actual.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Basilius dicit, diversus gradus vitae qui in diversis viventibus invenitur, ex modo loquendi Scripturae colligi potest. Plantae enim habent imperfectissimam vitam et occultam. Unde in earum productione nulla mentio fit de vita, sed solum de generatione, quia secundum hanc solum invenitur actus vitae in eis; nutritiva enim et augmentativa generativae deserviunt, ut infra dicetur. Inter animalia vero, perfectiora sunt, communiter loquendo, terrestria avibus et piscibus, non quod pisces memoria careant, ut Basilius dicit, et Augustinus improbat; sed propter distinctionem membrorum, et perfectionem generationis (quantum autem ad aliquas sagacitates, etiam aliqua animalia imperfecta magis vigent, ut apes et formicae).

Et ideo pisces vocat, non animam viventem, sed reptile animae viventis, sed terrena animalia vocat animam viventem, propter perfectionem vitae in eis, ac si pisces sint corpora habentia aliquid animae, terrestria vero animalia, propter perfectionem vitae, sint quasi animae dominantes corporibus. Perfectissimus autem gradus vitae est in homine. Et ideo vitam hominis non dicit produci a terra vel aqua, sicut ceterorum animalium, sed a Deo.

Ad secundum dicendum quod per iumenta, vel pecora, intelliguntur animalia domestica, quae homini serviunt qualitercumque. Per bestias autem intelliguntur animalia saeva, ut ursi et leones. Per reptilia vero, animalia quae vel non habent pedes quibus eleventur a terra, ut serpentes; vel habent breves, quibus parum elevantur, ut lacertae et tortucae et huiusmodi. Sed quia sunt quaedam animalia quae sub nullo horum comprehenduntur, ut cervi et capreae, ut etiam ista comprehenderentur, addidit quadrupedia. Vel quadrupedia praemisit quasi genus, et alia subiunxit quasi species, sunt enim etiam quaedam reptilia quadrupedia, ut lacertae et tortucae. Ad tertium dicendum quod in aliis animalibus et plantis mentionem fecit de genere et specie, ut designaret generationes similium ex similibus. In homine autem non fuit necessarium ut hoc diceretur, quia quod praemissum fuit de aliis, etiam de homine intelligi potest. Vel quia animalia et plantae producuntur secundum genus et speciem suam, quasi longe a similitudine divina remota, homo autem dicitur formatus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei. Ad quartum dicendum quod benedictio Dei dat virtutem multiplicandi per generationem. Et ideo quod positum est in avibus et piscibus, quae primo occurrunt, non fuit necessarium repeti in terrenis animalibus, sed intelligitur. In hominibus autem iteratur benedictio, quia

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Reply Obj. 1: The different grades of life which are found in different living creatures can be discovered from the various ways in which Scripture speaks of them, as Basil says (Hom. viii in Hexaem.). The life of plants, for instance, is very imperfect and difficult to discern, and hence, in speaking of their production, nothing is said of their life, but only their generation is mentioned, since only in generation is a vital act observed in them. For the powers of nutrition and growth are subordinate to the generative life, as will be shown later on (Q. 78, A. 2). But amongst animals, those that live on land are, generally speaking, more perfect than birds and fishes, not because the fish is devoid of memory, as Basil upholds (Hom. viii in Hexaem.) and Augustine rejects (Gen ad lit. iii), but because their limbs are more distinct and their generation of a higher order, (yet some imperfect animals, such as bees and ants, are more intelligent in certain ways). Scripture, therefore, does not call fishes living creatures, but creeping creatures having life; whereas it does call land animals living creatures on account of their more perfect life, and seems to imply that fishes are merely bodies having in them something of a soul, whilst land animals, from the higher perfection of their life, are, as it were, living souls with bodies subject to them. But the life of man, as being the most perfect grade, is not said to be produced, like the life of other animals, by earth or water, but immediately by God. Reply Obj. 2: By cattle, domestic animals are signified, which in any way are of service to man: but by beasts, wild animals such as bears and lions are designated. By creeping things those animals are meant which either have no feet and cannot rise from the earth, as serpents, or those whose feet are too short to lift them far from the ground, as the lizard and tortoise. But since certain animals, as deer and goats, seem to fall under none of these classes, the word quadrupeds is added. Or perhaps the word quadruped is used first as being the genus, to which the others are added as species, for even some reptiles, such as lizards and tortoises, are four-footed. Reply Obj. 3: In other animals, and in plants, mention is made of genus and species, to denote the generation of like from like. But it was unnecessary to do so in the case of man, as what had already been said of other creatures might be understood of him. Again, animals and plants may be said to be produced according to their kinds, to signify their remoteness from the Divine image and likeness, whereas man is said to be made to the image and likeness of God. Reply Obj. 4: The blessing of God gives power to multiply by generation, and, having been mentioned in the preceding account of the making of birds and fishes, could be understood of the beasts of the earth, without requiring to be repeated. The blessing, however, is repeated in the case of

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in eis est quaedam specialis multiplicationis ratio, propter complendum numerum electorum, et ne quisquam diceret in officio gignendi filios ullum esse peccatum. Plantae vero nullum habent propagandae prolis affectum, ac sine ullo sensu generant, unde indignae iudicatae sunt benedictionis verbis. Ad quintum dicendum quod, cum generatio unius sit corruptio alterius, quod ex corruptione ignobiliorum generentur nobiliora, non repugnat primae rerum institutioni. Unde animalia quae generantur ex corruptione rerum inanimatarum vel plantarum, potuerunt tunc generari. Non autem quae generantur ex corruptione animalium, tunc potuerunt produci, nisi potentialiter tantum. Ad sextum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in I super Gen. contra Manichaeos, si in alicuius opificis officinam imperitus intraverit, videt ibi multa instrumenta quorum causas ignorat, et si multum est insipiens, superflua putat. Iam vero si in fornacem incautus ceciderit, aut ferramento aliquo acuto se vulneraverit, noxia existimat ibi esse multa, quorum usum quia novit artifex, insipientiam eius irridet. Sic in hoc mundo quidam audent multa reprehendere, quorum causas non vident, multa enim, etsi domui nostrae non sunt necessaria, eis tamen completur universitatis integritas. Homo autem ante peccatum ordinate fuisset usus rebus mundi. Unde animalia venenosa ei noxia non fuissent.

Q. 72, A. 1

man, since in him generation of children has a special relation to the number of the elect, and to prevent anyone from saying that there was any sin whatever in the act of begetting children. As to plants, since they experience neither desire of propagation, nor sensation in generating, they are deemed unworthy of a formal blessing. Reply Obj. 5: Since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, it was not incompatible with the first formation of things, that from the corruption of the less perfect the more perfect should be generated. Hence animals generated from the corruption of inanimate things, or of plants, may have been generated then. But those generated from corruption of animals could not have been produced then otherwise than potentially. Reply Obj. 6: In the words of Augustine (Super. Gen. contr. Manich. i): If an unskilled person enters the workshop of an artificer he sees in it many appliances of which he does not understand the use, and which, if he is a foolish fellow, he considers unnecessary. Moreover, should he carelessly fall into the fire, or wound himself with a sharp-edged tool, he is under the impression that many of the things there are hurtful; whereas the craftsman, knowing their use, laughs at his folly. And thus some people presume to find fault with many things in this world, through not seeing the reasons for their existence. For though not required for the furnishing of our house, these things are necessary for the perfection of the universe. And, since man before he sinned would have used the things of this world conformably to the order designed, poisonous animals would not have injured him.

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Question 73 The Things that Belong to the Seventh Day Deinde considerandum est de iis quae pertinent ad We must next consider the things that belong to the sevseptimum diem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. enth day. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: Primo, de completione operum. (1) About the completion of the works; Secundo, de requie Dei. (2) About the resting of God; Tertio, de benedictione et sanctificatione huius diei. (3) About the blessing and sanctifying of this day.

Article 1 Whether the completion of the divine works ought to be ascribed to the seventh day? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod completio divinorum operum non debeat septimo diei adscribi. Omnia enim quae in hoc saeculo aguntur, ad divina opera pertinent. Sed consummatio saeculi erit in fine mundi, ut habetur Matth. XIII. Tempus etiam incarnationis Christi est cuiusdam completionis tempus, unde dicitur tempus plenitudinis, Gal. IV. Et ipse Christus moriens dixit, consummatum est, ut dicitur Ioan. XIX. Non ergo completio divinorum operum competit diei septimo. Praeterea, quicumque complet opus suum, aliquid facit. Sed Deus non legitur septimo die aliquid fecisse, quinimmo ab omni opere quievisse. Ergo completio operum non competit septimo diei. Praeterea, non dicitur aliquid esse completum, cui multa superadduntur, nisi forte sint illa superflua, quia perfectum dicitur cui nihil deest eorum quae debet habere. Sed post septimum diem multa sunt facta, et productio multorum individuorum; et etiam quarumdam novarum specierum, quae frequenter apparent praecipue in animalibus ex putrefactione generatis. Quotidie etiam Deus novas animas creat. Novum etiam fuit incarnationis opus, de quo dicitur Ierem. XXXI, novum faciet dominus super terram. Nova etiam sunt miraculosa opera, de quibus dicitur Eccli. XXXVI, innova signa, et immuta mirabilia. Innovabuntur etiam omnia in glorificatione sanctorum, secundum illud Apoc. XXI, et dixit qui sedebat in throno, ecce nova facio omnia. Completio ergo divinorum operum non debet attribui septimo diei. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, complevit Deus die septimo opus suum quod fecerat. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est rei perfectio, prima, et secunda. Prima quidem perfectio est, se-

Objection 1: It would seem that the completion of the Divine works ought not to be ascribed to the seventh day. For all things that are done in this world belong to the Divine works. But the consummation of the world will be at the end of the world (Matt 13:39, 40). Moreover, the time of Christ’s Incarnation is a time of completion, wherefore it is called the time of fullness (Gal 4:4). And Christ Himself, at the moment of His death, cried out, It is consummated (John 19:30). Hence the completion of the Divine works does not belong to the seventh day. Obj. 2: Further, the completion of a work is an act in itself. But we do not read that God acted at all on the seventh day, but rather that He rested from all His work. Therefore the completion of the works does not belong to the seventh day. Obj. 3: Further, nothing is said to be complete to which many things are added, unless they are merely superfluous, for a thing is called perfect to which nothing is wanting that it ought to possess. But many things were made after the seventh day, as the production of many individual beings, and even of certain new species that are frequently appearing, especially in the case of animals generated from putrefaction. Also, God creates daily new souls. Again, the work of the Incarnation was a new work, of which it is said (Jer 31:22): The Lord hath created a new thing upon the earth. Miracles also are new works, of which it is said (Eccl 36:6): Renew thy signs, and work new miracles. Moreover, all things will be made new when the Saints are glorified, according to Apoc. 21:5: And He that sat on the throne said: Behold I make all things new. Therefore the completion of the Divine works ought not to be attributed to the seventh day. On the contrary, It is said (Gen 2:2): On the seventh day God ended His work which He had made. I answer that, The perfection of a thing is twofold, the first perfection and the second perfection. The first per-

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cundum quod res in sua substantia est perfecta. Quae quidem perfectio est forma totius, quae ex integritate partium consurgit. Perfectio autem secunda est finis. Finis autem vel est operatio, sicut finis citharistae est citharizare, vel est aliquid ad quod per operationem pervenitur, sicut finis aedificatoris est domus, quam aedificando facit. Prima autem perfectio est causa secundae, quia forma est principium operationis. Ultima autem perfectio, quae est finis totius universi, est perfecta beatitudo sanctorum; quae erit in ultima consummatione saeculi. Prima autem perfectio, quae est in integritate universi, fuit in prima rerum institutione. Et haec deputatur septimo diei. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, perfectio prima est causa secundae. Ad beatitudinem autem consequendam duo requiruntur, natura et gratia. Ipsa ergo beatitudinis perfectio erit in fine mundi, ut dictum est. Sed ista consummatio praecessit causaliter, quantum ad naturam quidem, in prima rerum institutione, quantum ad gratiam vero, in incarnatione Christi, quia gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum facta est, ut dicitur Ioan. I. Sic igitur in septima die fuit consummatio naturae; in incarnatione Christi, consummatio gratiae; in fine mundi, consummatio gloriae. Ad secundum dicendum quod septima die Deus aliquid operatus est, non novam creaturam condendo, sed creaturam administrando, et ad propriam operationem eam movendo, quod iam aliqualiter pertinet ad inchoationem quandam secundae perfectionis. Et ideo consummatio operum, secundum nostram translationem, attribuitur diei septimae. Sed secundum aliam translationem, attribuitur diei sextae. Et utrumque potest stare. Quia consummatio quae est secundum integritatem partium universi, competit sextae diei, consummatio quae est secundum operationem partium, competit septimae. Vel potest dici quod in motu continuo, quandiu aliquid potest moveri ulterius, non dicitur motus perfectus ante quietem, quies enim demonstrat motum consummatum. Deus autem poterat plures creaturas facere, praeter illas quas fecerat sex diebus. Unde hoc ipso quod cessavit novas creaturas condere in septima die, dicitur opus suum consummasse.

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fection is that according to which a thing is substantially perfect, and this perfection is the form of the whole; which form results from the whole having its parts complete. But the second perfection is the end, which is either an operation, as the end of the harpist is to play the harp; or something that is attained by an operation, as the end of the builder is the house that he makes by building. But the first perfection is the cause of the second, because the form is the principle of operation. Now the final perfection, which is the end of the whole universe, is the perfect beatitude of the Saints at the consummation of the world; and the first perfection is the completeness of the universe at its first founding, and this is what is ascribed to the seventh day. Reply Obj. 1: The first perfection is the cause of the second, as above said. Now for the attaining of beatitude two things are required, nature and grace. Therefore, as said above, the perfection of beatitude will be at the end of the world. But this consummation existed previously in its causes, as to nature, at the first founding of the world, as to grace, in the Incarnation of Christ. For, Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ (John 1:17). So, then, on the seventh day was the consummation of nature, in Christ’s Incarnation the consummation of grace, and at the end of the world will be the consummation of glory. Reply Obj. 2: God did act on the seventh day, not by creating new creatures, but by directing and moving His creatures to the work proper to them, and thus He made some beginning of the second perfection. So that, according to our version of the Scripture, the completion of the works is attributed to the seventh day, though according to another it is assigned to the sixth. Either version, however, may stand, since the completion of the universe as to the completeness of its parts belongs to the sixth day, but its completion as regards their operation, to the seventh.

It may also be added that in continuous movement, so long as any movement further is possible, movement cannot be called completed till it comes to rest, for rest denotes consummation of movement. Now God might have made many other creatures besides those which He made in the six days, and hence, by the fact that He ceased making them on the seventh day, He is said on that day to have consummated His work. Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil postmodum a Reply Obj. 3: Nothing entirely new was afterwards Deo factum est totaliter novum, quin aliqualiter in ope- made by God, but all things subsequently made had in a ribus sex dierum praecesserit. Quaedam enim praeex- sense been made before in the work of the six days. Some titerunt materialiter, sicut quod Deus de costa Adae things, indeed, had a previous experience materially, as the formavit mulierem. Quaedam vero praeextiterunt in rib from the side of Adam out of which God formed Eve; operibus sex dierum, non solum materialiter, sed etiam whilst others existed not only in matter but also in their causaliter, sicut individua quae nunc generantur, prae- causes, as those individual creatures that are now generated cesserunt in primis individuis suarum specierum. Spe- existed in the first of their kind. Species, also, that are new, if cies etiam novae, si quae apparent, praeextiterunt in any such appear, existed beforehand in various active pow-

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quibusdam activis virtutibus, sicut et animalia ex putrefactione generata producuntur ex virtutibus stellarum et elementorum quas a principio acceperunt, etiam si novae species talium animalium producantur. Animalia etiam quaedam secundum novam speciem aliquando oriuntur ex commixtione animalium diversorum secundum speciem, sicut cum ex asino et equa generatur mulus, et haec etiam praecesserunt causaliter in operibus sex dierum. Quaedam vero praecesserunt secundum similitudinem; sicut animae quae nunc creantur. Et similiter incarnationis opus, quia, ut dicitur Philipp. II, filius Dei est in similitudinem hominum factus. Gloria etiam spiritualis secundum similitudinem praecessit in angelis, corporalis vero in caelo, praecipue Empyreo. Unde dicitur Eccle. I, nihil sub sole novum; iam enim praecessit in saeculis quae fuerunt ante nos.

Q. 73, A. 2

ers; so that animals, and perhaps even new species of animals, are produced by putrefaction by the power which the stars and elements received at the beginning. Again, animals of new kinds arise occasionally from the connection of individuals belonging to different species, as the mule is the offspring of an ass and a mare; but even these existed previously in their causes, in the works of the six days. Some also existed beforehand by way of similitude, as the souls now created. And the work of the Incarnation itself was thus foreshadowed, for as we read (Phil. 2:7), the Son of God was made in the likeness of men. And again, the glory that is spiritual was anticipated in the angels by way of similitude; and that of the body in the heaven, especially the empyrean. Hence it is written (Eccl 1:10), Nothing under the sun is new, for it hath already gone before, in the ages that were before us.

Article 2 Whether God rested on the seventh day from all his work? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus septima die non requievit ab omni suo opere. Dicitur enim Ioan. V, pater meus usque modo operatur, et ego operor. Non ergo septima die requievit ab omni opere. Praeterea, requies motui opponitur; vel labori qui interdum causatur ex motu. Sed Deus immobiliter, et absque labore sua opera produxit. Non ergo dicendum est septima die a suo opere requievisse. Si dicatur quod Deus requievit die septima quia fecit hominem requiescere, contra, requies contraponitur eius operationi. Sed quod dicitur, Deus creavit vel fecit hoc vel illud, non exponitur quod Deus hominem fecit creare aut facere. Ergo nec convenienter exponi potest, ut dicatur Deus requievisse, quia fecit hominem requiescere. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, requievit Deus die septimo ab omni opere quod patrarat. Respondeo dicendum quod quies proprie opponitur motui; et per consequens labori, qui ex motu consurgit. Quamvis autem motus proprie acceptus sit corporum, tamen nomen motus etiam ad spiritualia derivatur dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod omnis operatio motus dicitur, sic enim et divina bonitas quodammodo movetur et procedit in res, secundum quod se eis communicat, ut Dionysius dicit, II cap. de Div. Nom. Alio modo, desiderium in aliud tendens quidam motus dicitur. Unde et requies dupliciter accipitur, uno modo, pro cessatione ab operibus; alio modo, pro impletione desiderii. Et utroque modo dicitur Deus requievisse die septima. Primo quidem, quia die septima cessavit novas

Objection 1: It would seem that God did not rest on the seventh day from all His work. For it is said (John 5:17), My Father worketh until now, and I work. God, then, did not rest on the seventh day from all His work. Obj. 2: Further, rest is opposed to movement, or to labor, which movement causes. But, as God produced His work without movement and without labor, He cannot be said to have rested on the seventh day from His work. Obj. 3: Further, should it be said that God rested on the seventh day by causing man to rest; against this it may be argued that rest is set down in contradistinction to His work; now the words God created or made this thing or the other cannot be explained to mean that He made man create or make these things. Therefore the resting of God cannot be explained as His making man to rest. On the contrary, It is said (Gen 2:2): God rested on the seventh day from all the work which He had done. I answer that, Rest is, properly speaking, opposed to movement, and consequently to the labor that arises from movement. But although movement, strictly speaking, is a quality of bodies, yet the word is applied also to spiritual things, and in a twofold sense. On the one hand, every operation may be called a movement, and thus the Divine goodness is said to move and go forth to its object, in communicating itself to that object, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii). On the other hand, the desire that tends to an object outside itself, is said to move towards it. Hence rest is taken in two senses, in one sense meaning a cessation from work, in the other, the satisfying of desire. Now, in either sense God is said to have rested on the seventh day. First, because He ceased from creating new

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creaturas condere, nihil enim postea fecit, quod non aliquo modo praecesserit in primis operibus, ut dictum est. Alio modo, secundum quod rebus conditis ipse non indigebat, sed seipso fruendo beatus est. Unde post conditionem omnium operum, non dicitur quod in suis operibus requievit, quasi eis ad suam beatitudinem indigens, sed ab eis requievit, utique in seipso, quia ipse sufficit sibi et implet desiderium suum. Et quamvis ab aeterno in seipso requieverit, tamen quod post opera condita in seipso requievit, hoc pertinet ad septimum diem. Et hoc est ab operibus requiescere, ut Augustinus dicit, super Gen. ad Litt.

creatures on that day, for, as said above (A. 1, ad 3), He made nothing afterwards that had not existed previously, in some degree, in the first works; second, because He Himself had no need of the things that He had made, but was happy in the fruition of Himself. Hence, when all things were made He is not said to have rested in His works, as though needing them for His own happiness, but to have rested from them, as in fact resting in Himself, as He suffices for Himself and fulfils His own desire. And even though from all eternity He rested in Himself, yet the rest in Himself, which He took after He had finished His works, is that rest which belongs to the seventh day. And this, says Augustine, is the meaning of God’s resting from His works on that day (Gen ad lit. iv). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus usque modo Reply Obj. 1: God indeed worketh until now by preoperatur, conservando et administrando creaturam con- serving and providing for the creatures He has made, but ditam, non autem novam creaturam condendo. not by the making of new ones. Ad secundum dicendum quod requies non opponiReply Obj. 2: Rest is here not opposed to labor or to tur labori sive motui, sed productioni novarum rerum, et movement, but to the production of new creatures, and to desiderio in aliud tendenti, ut dictum est. the desire tending to an external object. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Deus in solo se Reply Obj. 3: Even as God rests in Himself alone and requiescit, et se fruendo beatus est; ita et nos per solam is happy in the enjoyment of Himself, so our own sole hapDei fruitionem beati efficimur. Et sic etiam facit nos a piness lies in the enjoyment of God. Thus, also, He makes suis et nostris operibus in seipso requiescere. Est ergo us find rest in Himself, both from His works and our own. conveniens expositio, ut dicatur Deus requievisse, quia It is not, then, unreasonable to say that God rested in givnos requiescere facit. Sed non est haec sola ponenda, sed ing rest to us. Still, this explanation must not be set down as alia expositio est principalior et prior. the only one, and the other is the first and principal explanation.

Article 3 Whether blessing and sanctifying are due to the seventh day? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod benedictio et sanctificatio non debeatur diei septimae. Tempus enim aliquod consuevit dici benedictum aut sanctum, propter aliquod bonum quod in illo tempore evenit; aut propter hoc quod aliquod malum vitatur; sed Deo nihil accrescit aut deperit, sive operetur, sive ab operando cesset. Non ergo specialis benedictio et sanctificatio debetur diei septimae. Praeterea, benedictio a bonitate dicitur. Sed bonum est diffusivum et communicativum sui, secundum Dionysium. Ergo magis debuerunt benedici dies in quibus creaturas produxit, quam ille dies in quo a producendis creaturis cessavit.

Objection 1: It would seem that blessing and sanctifying are not due to the seventh day. For it is usual to call a time blessed or holy for that some good thing has happened in it, or some evil been avoided. But whether God works or ceases from work nothing accrues to Him or is lost to Him. Therefore no special blessing or sanctifying are due to the seventh day.

Obj. 2: Further, the Latin benedictio is derived from bonitas. But it is the nature of good to spread and communicate itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The days, therefore, in which God produced creatures deserved a blessing rather than the day on which He ceased producing them. Praeterea, superius in singulis creaturis quaedam Obj. 3: Further, over each creature a blessing was probenedictio commemorata est, dum in singulis operibus nounced, as upon each work it was said, God saw that it was dictum est, vidit Deus quod esset bonum. Non oportuit good. Therefore it was not necessary that after all had been igitur quod post omnium productionem, dies septima produced, the seventh day should be blessed.

benediceretur.

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Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, benedixit Deus diei septimo, et sanctificavit illum, quia in illo cessaverat ab omni opere suo. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, requies Dei in die septima dupliciter accipitur. Primo quidem, quantum ad hoc, quod cessavit a novis operibus condendis, ita tamen quod creaturam conditam conservat et administrat. Alio modo, secundum quod post opera requievit in seipso. Quantum ergo ad primum, competit septimae diei benedictio. Quia, sicut supra dictum est, benedictio ad multiplicationem pertinet, unde dictum est creaturis quas benedixit, crescite et multiplicamini. Multiplicatio autem rerum fit per administrationem creaturae, secundum quam ex similibus similia generantur. Quantum vero ad secundum, competit septimae diei sanctificatio. Maxime enim sanctificatio cuiuslibet attenditur in hoc quod in Deo requiescit, unde et res Deo dedicatae sanctae dicuntur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non propter hoc dies septimus sanctificatur, quia Deo possit aliquid accrescere vel decrescere, sed quia creaturis aliquid accrescit per multiplicationem et quietem in Deo. Ad secundum dicendum quod in primis sex diebus productae sunt res in suis primis causis. Sed postea ex illis primis causis res multiplicantur et conservantur, quod etiam ad bonitatem divinam pertinet. Cuius etiam perfectio in hoc maxime ostenditur quod in ipsa sola et ipse requiescit, et nos requiescere possumus, ea fruentes. Ad tertium dicendum quod bonum quod in singulis diebus commemoratur, pertinet ad primam naturae institutionem, benedictio autem diei septimae pertinet ad naturae propagationem.

Q. 73, A. 3

On the contrary, It is written (Gen 2:3), God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it, because in it He had rested from all His work. I answer that, As said above (A. 2), God’s rest on the seventh day is understood in two ways. First, in that He ceased from producing new works, though He still preserves and provides for the creatures He has made. Second, in that after all His works He rested in Himself. According to the first meaning, then, a blessing befits the seventh day, since, as we explained (Q. 72, ad 4), the blessing referred to the increase by multiplication; for which reason God said to the creatures which He blessed: Increase and multiply. Now, this increase is effected through God’s Providence over His creatures, securing the generation of like from like. And according to the second meaning, it is right that the seventh day should have been sanctified, since the special sanctification of every creature consists in resting in God. For this reason things dedicated to God are said to be sanctified. Reply Obj. 1: The seventh day is said to be sanctified not because anything can accrue to God, or be taken from Him, but because something is added to creatures by their multiplying, and by their resting in God. Reply Obj. 2: In the first six days creatures were produced in their first causes, but after being thus produced, they are multiplied and preserved, and this work also belongs to the Divine goodness. And the perfection of this goodness is made most clear by the knowledge that in it alone God finds His own rest, and we may find ours in its fruition. Reply Obj. 3: The good mentioned in the works of each day belongs to the first institution of nature; but the blessing attached to the seventh day, to its propagation.

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Question 74 All the Seven Days in Common Deinde quaeritur de omnibus septem diebus in comWe next consider all the seven days in common: and muni. Et quaeruntur tria. there are three points of inquiry: Primo, de sufficientia horum dierum. (1) As to the sufficiency of these days; Secundo, utrum sint unus dies, vel plures. (2) Whether they are all one day, or more than one? Tertio, de quibusdam modis loquendi quibus (3) As to certain modes of speaking which Scripture Scriptura utitur, enarrando opera sex dierum. uses in narrating the works of the six days.

Article 1 Whether these days are sufficiently enumerated? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sufficienter isti dies enumerentur. Non minus enim distinguitur opus creationis ab operibus distinctionis et ornatus, quam haec duo opera ab invicem. Sed alii dies deputantur distinctioni, et alii ornatui. Ergo etiam alii dies debent assignari creationi. Praeterea, aer et ignis sunt nobiliora elementa quam terra et aqua. Sed unus dies deputatur distinctioni aquae, et alius distinctioni terrae. Ergo alii dies debent deputari distinctioni ignis et aeris. Praeterea, non minus distant volucres et pisces, quam volucres et terrestria animalia. Homo etiam plus distat ab aliis animalibus, quam alia quaecumque animalia ab invicem. Sed alius dies deputatur productioni piscium maris, et alius productioni animalium terrae. Ergo et alius dies debet deputari productioni avium caeli, et alius productioni hominis. Sed contra, videtur quod aliqui dies superflue assignentur. Lumen enim ad luminaria se habet ut accidens ad subiectum. Simul autem producitur subiectum cum proprio accidente. Non ergo alia die debuit produci lux, et alia luminaria. Praeterea, dies isti deputantur primae institutioni mundi. Sed in septima die nihil primitus est institutum. Ergo septima dies non debet aliis connumerari. Respondeo dicendum quod ratio distinctionis horum dierum ex praemissis potest esse manifesta. Oportuit enim primo distingui partes mundi; et postmodum singulas partes ornari, per hoc quod quasi suis habitatoribus replentur. Secundum ergo alios sanctos, in creatura corporali tres partes designantur, prima, quae significatur nomine

Objection 1: It would seem that these days are not sufficiently enumerated. For the work of creation is no less distinct from the works of distinction and adornment than these two works are from one another. But separate days are assigned to distinction and to adornment, and therefore separate days should be assigned to creation. Obj. 2: Further, air and fire are nobler elements than earth and water. But one day is assigned to the distinction of water, and another to the distinction of the land. Therefore, other days ought to be devoted to the distinction of fire and air. Obj. 3: Further, fish differ from birds as much as birds differ from the beasts of the earth, whereas man differs more from other animals than all animals whatsoever differ from each other. But one day is devoted to the production of fishes, and another to that of the beast of the earth. Another day, then, ought to be assigned to the production of birds and another to that of man. Obj. 4: Further, it would seem, on the other hand, that some of these days are superfluous. Light, for instance, stands to the luminaries in the relation of accident to subject. But the subject is produced at the same time as the accident proper to it. The light and the luminaries, therefore, ought not to have been produced on different days. Obj. 5: Further, these days are devoted to the first instituting of the world. But as on the seventh day nothing was instituted, that day ought not to be enumerated with the others. I answer that, The reason of the distinction of these days is made clear by what has been said above (Q. 70, A. 1), namely, that the parts of the world had first to be distinguished, and then each part adorned and filled, as it were, by the beings that inhabit it. Now the parts into which the corporeal creation is divided are three, according to some holy writers, these parts

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caeli; media, quae significatur nomine aquae; et infima, quae significatur nomine terrae. Unde et secundum Pythagoricos, perfectio in tribus ponitur, principio, medio et fine, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Prima ergo pars distinguitur prima die, et ornatur quarta; media distinguitur secunda die, et ornatur quinta; infima distinguitur tertia die, et ornatur sexta. Augustinus vero convenit quidem cum eis in ultimis tribus diebus, differt autem in tribus primis. Quia secundum eum, in primo die formatur creatura spiritualis, in duobus aliis creatura corporalis; ita quod in secundo corpora superiora, in tertio corpora inferiora. Et sic perfectio divinorum operum respondet perfectioni senarii numeri, qui consurgit ex suis partibus aliquotis simul iunctis; quae quidem partes sunt unum, duo, tria. Una enim dies deputatur formationi creaturae spiritualis, duae formationi creaturae corporalis, et tres ornatui. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum, opus creationis pertinet ad productionem materiae informis, et naturae spiritualis informis. Quae quidem duo sunt extra tempus, ut ipse dicit in XII Confess., et ideo creatio utriusque ponitur ante omnem diem. Sed secundum alios sanctos, potest dici quod opus distinctionis et ornatus attenditur secundum aliquam mutationem creaturae, quae tempore mensuratur. Opus autem creationis consistit in sola divina actione in instanti rerum substantiam producentis. Et ideo quodlibet opus distinctionis et ornatus dicitur factum in die, creatio autem dicitur facta in principio, quod sonat aliquid indivisibile. Ad secundum dicendum quod ignis et aer, quia non distinguuntur a vulgo, inter partes mundi non sunt expresse nominata a Moyse; sed computantur cum medio, scilicet aqua, maxime quantum ad inferiorem aeris partem; quantum vero ad superiorem, computantur cum caelo, ut Augustinus dicit. Ad tertium dicendum quod productio animalium recitatur secundum quod sunt in ornatum partium mundi. Et ideo dies productionis animalium distinguuntur vel uniuntur, secundum hanc convenientiam vel differentiam, qua conveniunt vel differunt in ornando aliquam partem mundi. Ad quartum dicendum quod prima die facta est natura lucis in aliquo subiecto. Sed quarto die facta dicuntur luminaria, non quia eorum substantia sit de novo producta; sed quia sunt aliquo modo formata, quo prius non erant, ut supra dictum est. Ad quintum dicendum quod septimae diei, secundum Augustinum, deputatur aliquid post omnia quae sex diebus attribuuntur, scilicet quod Deus a suis operibus in seipso requiescit. Et ideo oportuit post sex dies fieri mentionem de septimo.

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being the heaven, or highest part, the water, or middle part, and the earth, or the lowest part. Thus the Pythagoreans teach that perfection consists in three things, the beginning, the middle, and the end. The first part, then, is distinguished on the first day, and adorned on the fourth, the middle part distinguished on the middle day, and adorned on the fifth, and the third part distinguished on the third day, and adorned on the sixth. But Augustine, while agreeing with the above writers as to the last three days, differs as to the first three, for, according to him, spiritual creatures are formed on the first day, and corporeal on the two others, the higher bodies being formed on the first of these two days, and the lower on the second. Thus, then, the perfection of the Divine works corresponds to the perfection of the number six, which is the sum of its aliquot parts, one, two, three; since one day is assigned to the forming of spiritual creatures, two to that of corporeal creatures, and three to the work of adornment. Reply Obj. 1: According to Augustine, the work of creation belongs to the production of formless matter, and of the formless spiritual nature, both of which are outside of time, as he himself says (Confess. xii, 12). Thus, then, the creation of either is set down before there was any day. But it may also be said, following other holy writers, that the works of distinction and adornment imply certain changes in the creature which are measurable by time; whereas the work of creation lies only in the Divine act producing the substance of beings instantaneously. For this reason, therefore, every work of distinction and adornment is said to take place in a day, but creation in the beginning which denotes something indivisible. Reply Obj. 2: Fire and air, as not distinctly known by the unlettered, are not expressly named by Moses among the parts of the world, but reckoned with the intermediate part, or water, especially as regards the lowest part of the air; or with the heaven, to which the higher region of air approaches, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. ii, 13). Reply Obj. 3: The production of animals is recorded with reference to their adorning the various parts of the world, and therefore the days of their production are separated or united according as the animals adorn the same parts of the world, or different parts. Reply Obj. 4: The nature of light, as existing in a subject, was made on the first day; and the making of the luminaries on the fourth day does not mean that their substance was produced anew, but that they then received a form that they had not before, as said above (Q. 70, ad 2). Reply Obj. 5: According to Augustine (Gen ad lit. iv, 15), after all that has been recorded that is assigned to the six days, something distinct is attributed to the seventh— namely, that on it God rested in Himself from His works: and for this reason it was right that the seventh day should be mentioned after the six.

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Q. 74, A. 2

Secundum vero alios, potest dici quod in septimo die It may also be said, with the other writers, that the world mundus habuit quendam novum statum, ut scilicet ei ni- entered on the seventh day upon a new state, in that nothhil adderetur de novo. Et ideo post sex dies ponitur sep- ing new was to be added to it, and that therefore the sevtima, deputata cessationi ab opere. enth day is mentioned after the six, from its being devoted to cessation from work.

Article 2 Whether all these days are one day? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes isti dies sint unus dies. Dicitur enim Gen. II, istae sunt generationes caeli et terrae, quando creata sunt, in die quo fecit dominus caelum et terram, et omne virgultum agri, antequam oriretur in terra. Unus ergo est dies in quo fecit caelum et terram et omne virgultum agri. Sed caelum et terram fecit in prima die, vel potius ante omnem diem; virgultum autem agri, tertia die. Ergo unus est primus dies et tertius, et pari ratione, omnes alii.

Praeterea, Eccli. XVIII, dicitur, qui vivit in aeternum, creavit omnia simul. Sed hoc non esset, si dies horum operum essent plures, quia plures dies non sunt simul. Ergo non sunt plures dies, sed unus tantum. Praeterea, die septimo cessavit Deus a novis operibus condendis. Si ergo septima dies est alia ab aliis diebus, sequitur quod illam diem non fecerit. Quod est inconveniens. Praeterea, totum opus quod uni diei adscribitur, in instanti perfecit, cum in singulis operibus dicatur, dixit, et factum est. Si igitur sequens opus in diem alium reservasset, sequeretur quod in residua parte illius diei cessasset ab opere, quod esset superfluum. Non igitur est alius dies sequentis operis, a die operis praecedentis.

Objection 1: It would seem that all these days are one day. For it is written (Gen 2:4, 5): These are the generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were created, in the day that the Lord . . . made the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field, before it sprung up in the earth. Therefore the day in which God made the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field, is one and the same day. But He made the heaven and the earth on the first day, or rather before there was any day, but the plant of the field He made on the third day. Therefore the first and third days are but one day, and for a like reason all the rest. Obj. 2: Further, it is said (Sir 18:1): He that liveth for ever, created all things together. But this would not be the case if the days of these works were more than one. Therefore they are not many but one only. Obj. 3: Further, on the seventh day God ceased from all new works. If, then, the seventh day is distinct from the other days, it follows that He did not make that day; which is not admissible. Obj. 4: Further, the entire work ascribed to one day God perfected in an instant, for with each work are the words (God) said . . . . and it was . . . done. If, then, He had kept back His next work to another day, it would follow that for the remainder of a day He would have ceased from working and left it vacant, which would be superfluous. The day, therefore, of the preceding work is one with the day of the work that follows. On the contrary, It is written (Gen 1), The evening and the morning were the second day . . . the third day, and so on. But where there is a second and third there are more than one. There was not, therefore, only one day. I answer that, On this question Augustine differs from other expositors. His opinion is that all the days that are called seven, are one day represented in a sevenfold aspect (Gen ad lit. iv, 22; De Civ. Dei xi, 9; Ad Orosium xxvi); while others consider there were seven distinct days, not one only. Now, these two opinions, taken as explaining the literal text of Genesis, are certainly widely different.

Sed contra est quod Gen. I dicitur, factum est vespere et mane dies secundus, et dies tertius, et sic de aliis. Secundum autem et tertium dici non potest, ubi est unum tantum. Ergo non fuit unus dies tantum. Respondeo dicendum quod in hac quaestione Augustinus ab aliis expositoribus dissentit. Augustinus enim vult, et super Gen. ad Litt., et XI de Civ. Dei, et ad Orosium, quod omnes qui dicuntur septem dies, sunt unus dies septempliciter rebus praesentatus. Alii vero expositores sentiunt quod fuerunt septem dies diversi, et non unus tantum. Hae autem duae opiniones, si referantur ad expositionem litterae Genesis, magnam diversitatem habent. Nam secundum Augustinum, per diem intelligitur For Augustine understands by the word day, the knowlcognitio mentis angelicae; ut sic primus dies sit cogni- edge in the mind of the angels, and hence, according to him, to primi divini operis, secundus dies cognitio secundi the first day denotes their knowledge of the first of the Di-

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Work of the Six Days

operis, et sic de aliis. Et dicitur unumquodque opus esse factum in aliqua die, quia nihil Deus produxit in rerum natura, quod non impresserit menti angelicae. Quae quidem multa simul potest cognoscere, praecipue in verbo, in quo omnis angelorum cognitio perficitur et terminatur. Et sic distinguitur dies secundum naturalem ordinem rerum cognitarum, non secundum successionem cognitionis, aut secundum successionem productionis rerum. Cognitio autem angelica proprie et vere dies nominari potest, cum lux, quae est causa diei, proprie in spiritualibus, secundum Augustinum, inveniatur. Secundum vero alios, per istos dies et successio dierum temporalium ostenditur, et successio productionis rerum. Sed si istae duae opiniones referantur ad modum productionis rerum, non invenitur magna differentia. Et hoc propter duo in quibus, exponendo, diversificatur Augustinus ab aliis, ut ex supra dictis patet. Primo quidem, quia Augustinus per terram et aquam prius creatam, intelligit materiam corporalem totaliter informem, per factionem autem firmamenti, et congregationem aquarum, et apparitionem aridae, intelligit impressionem formarum in materiam corporalem. Alii vero sancti per terram et aquam primo creatas, intelligunt ipsa elementa mundi, sub propriis formis existentia, per sequentia autem opera, aliquam distinctionem in corporibus prius existentibus, ut supra dictum est. Secundo autem differunt quantum ad productionem plantarum et animalium, quae alii ponunt in opere sex dierum esse producta in actu; Augustinus vero potentialiter tantum. In hoc ergo quod Augustinus ponit opera sex dierum esse simul facta, sequitur idem modus productionis rerum. Nam secundum utrosque, in prima rerum productione materia erat sub formis substantialibus elementorum, et secundum utrosque, in prima rerum institutione non fuerunt animalia et plantae in actu. Sed remanet differentia quantum ad quatuor. Quia secundum alios sanctos, post primam productionem creaturae, fuit aliquod tempus in quo non erat lux; item in quo non erat firmamentum formatum; item in quo non erat terra discooperta aquis; et in quo non erant formata caeli luminaria, quod est quartum. Quae non oportet ponere secundum expositionem Augustini. Ut igitur neutri sententiae praeiudicetur, utriusque rationibus respondendum est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in die in quo creavit Deus caelum et terram, creavit etiam omne virgultum agri, non in actu, sed antequam oriretur super terram, idest potentialiter. Quod Augustinus adscribit tertiae diei, alii vero primae rerum institutioni.

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vine works, the second day their knowledge of the second work, and similarly with the rest. Thus, then, each work is said to have been wrought in some one of these days, inasmuch as God wrought nothing in the universe without impressing the knowledge thereof on the angelic mind; which can know many things at the same time, especially in the Word, in Whom all angelic knowledge is perfected and terminated. So the distinction of days denotes the natural order of the things known, and not a succession in the knowledge acquired, or in the things produced. Moreover, angelic knowledge is appropriately called day, since light, the cause of day, is to be found in spiritual things, as Augustine observes (Gen ad lit. iv, 28). In the opinion of the others, however, the days signify a succession both in time, and in the things produced. If, however, these two explanations are looked at as referring to the mode of production, they will be found not greatly to differ, if the diversity of opinion existing on two points, as already shown (Q. 67, A. 1; Q. 69, A. 1), between Augustine and other writers is taken into account. First, because Augustine takes the earth and the water as first created, to signify matter totally without form; but the making of the firmament, the gathering of the waters, and the appearing of dry land, to denote the impression of forms upon corporeal matter. But other holy writers take the earth and the water, as first created, to signify the elements of the universe themselves existing under the proper forms, and the works that follow to mean some sort of distinction in bodies previously existing, as also has been shown (Q. 67, AA. 1, 4; Q. 69, A. 1). Second, some writers hold that plants and animals were produced actually in the work of the six days; Augustine, that they were produced potentially. Now the opinion of Augustine, that the works of the six days were simultaneous, is consistent with either view of the mode of production. For the other writers agree with him that in the first production of things matter existed under the substantial form of the elements, and agree with him also that in the first instituting of the world animals and plants did not exist actually. There remains, however, a difference as to four points; since, according to the latter, there was a time, after the production of creatures, in which light did not exist, the firmament had not been formed, and the earth was still covered by the waters, nor had the heavenly bodies been formed, which is the fourth difference; which are not consistent with Augustine’s explanation. In order, therefore, to be impartial, we must meet the arguments of either side. Reply Obj. 1: On the day on which God created the heaven and the earth, He created also every plant of the field, not, indeed, actually, but before it sprung up in the earth, that is, potentially. And this work Augustine ascribes to the third day, but other writers to the first instituting of the world.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus creavit omnia simul, quantum ad rerum substantiam quodammodo informem. Sed quantum ad formationem quae facta est per distinctionem et ornatum, non simul. Unde signanter utitur verbo creationis. Ad tertium dicendum quod in die septimo cessavit Deus a novis operibus condendis, non autem a propagandis quibusdam ex aliis, ad quam propagationem pertinet quod post primum diem alii succedunt. Ad quartum dicendum quod non est ex impotentia Dei, quasi indigentis tempore ad operandum, quod omnia non sunt simul distincta et ornata, sed ut ordo servaretur in rerum institutione. Et ideo oportuit ut diversis statibus mundi diversi dies deservirent. Semper autem per sequens opus novus perfectionis status mundo est additus. Ad quintum dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum, ille ordo dierum referendus est ad naturalem ordinem operum quae diebus attribuuntur.

Q. 74, A. 3

Reply Obj. 2: God created all things together so far as regards their substance in some measure formless. But He did not create all things together, so far as regards that formation of things which lies in distinction and adornment. Hence the word creation is significant. Reply Obj. 3: On the seventh day God ceased from making new things, but not from providing for their increase, and to this latter work it belongs that the first day is succeeded by other days. Reply Obj. 4: All things were not distinguished and adorned together, not from a want of power on God’s part, as requiring time in which to work, but that due order might be observed in the instituting of the world. Hence it was fitting that different days should be assigned to the different states of the world, as each succeeding work added to the world a fresh state of perfection. Reply Obj. 5: According to Augustine, the order of days refers to the natural order of the works attributed to the days.

Article 3 Whether scripture uses suitable words to express the work of the six days? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Scriptura non utatur convenientibus verbis ad exprimendum opera sex dierum. Sicut enim lux et firmamentum et huiusmodi opera per Dei verbum sunt facta, ita caelum et terra, quia omnia per ipsum facta sunt, ut dicitur Ioan. I. Ergo in creatione caeli et terrae debuit fieri mentio de verbo Dei, sicut in aliis operibus. Praeterea, aqua est creata a Deo, quae tamen creata non commemoratur. Insufficienter ergo rerum creatio describitur. Praeterea, sicut dicitur Gen. I, vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. In singulis ergo operibus debuit dici, vidit Deus quod esset bonum. Inconvenienter ergo praetermittitur in opere creationis, et in opere secundae diei. Praeterea, spiritus Dei est Deus. Deo autem non competit ferri, nec situm habere. Inconvenienter ergo dicitur quod spiritus Dei ferebatur super aquas. Praeterea, nullus facit quod iam factum est. Inconvenienter ergo, postquam dictum est, dixit Deus, fiat firmamentum, et factum est ita, subditur, et fecit Deus firmamentum. Et similiter in aliis operibus. Praeterea, vespere et mane non sufficienter dividunt diem, cum sint plures partes diei. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur quod factum est vespere et mane dies secundus, vel tertius.

Objection 1: It would seem the Scripture does not use suitable words to express the works of the six days. For as light, the firmament, and other similar works were made by the Word of God, so were the heaven and the earth. For all things were made by Him (John 1:3). Therefore in the creation of heaven and earth, as in the other works, mention should have been made of the Word of God. Obj. 2: Further, the water was created by God, yet its creation is not mentioned. Therefore the creation of the world is not sufficiently described. Obj. 3: Further, it is said (Gen 1:31): God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good. It ought, then, to have been said of each work, God saw that it was good. The omission, therefore, of these words in the work of creation and in that of the second day, is not fitting. Obj. 4: Further, the Spirit of God is God Himself. But it does not befit God to move and to occupy place. Therefore the words, The Spirit of God moved over the waters, are unbecoming. Obj. 5: Further, what is already made is not made over again. Therefore to the words, God said: Let the firmament be made . . . and it was so, it is superfluous to add, God made the firmament. And the like is to be said of other works. Obj. 6: Further, evening and morning do not sufficiently divide the day, since the day has many parts. Therefore the words, The evening and morning were the second day or, the third day, are not suitable.

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Praeterea, secundo et tertio non convenienter correspondet unum, sed primum. Debuit ergo dici, factum est vespere et mane dies primus, ubi dicitur dies unus. Respondeo dicendum ad primum, quod secundum Augustinum, persona filii commemoratur tam in prima rerum creatione, quam in rerum distinctione et ornatu; aliter tamen et aliter. Distinctio enim et ornatus pertinet ad rerum formationem. Sicut autem formatio artificiatorum est per formam artis quae est in mente artificis, quae potest dici intelligibile verbum ipsius; ita formatio totius creaturae est per verbum Dei. Et ideo in opere distinctionis et ornatus fit mentio de verbo. In creatione autem commemoratur filius ut principium, cum dicitur, in principio creavit Deus, quia per creationem intelligitur productio informis materiae. Secundum vero alios, qui ponunt primo creata elementa sub propriis formis, oportet aliter dici. Basilius enim dicit quod per hoc quod dicitur, dixit Deus, importatur divinum imperium. Prius autem oportuit produci creaturam quae obediret, quam fieri mentionem de divino imperio. Ad secundum dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum, per caelum intelligitur spiritualis natura informis; per terram autem materia informis omnium corporum. Et sic nulla creatura est praetermissa. Secundum Basilium vero, ponuntur caelum et terra tanquam duo extrema, ut ex his intelligantur media; praecipue quia omnium mediorum motus vel est ad caelum ut levium, vel ad terram, ut gravium. Alii vero dicunt quod sub nomine terrae comprehendere solet Scriptura omnia quatuor elementa. Unde in Psalmo CXLVIII, postquam dictum est, Laudate dominum de terra, subditur, ignis, grando, nix, glacies. Ad tertium dicendum quod in opere creationis ponitur aliquid correspondens ei quod dicitur in opere distinctionis et ornatus, vidit Deus hoc vel illud esse bonum. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod Spiritus Sanctus amor est. Duo autem sunt, ut Augustinus dicit I super Gen. ad Litt., propter quae Deus amat creaturam suam, scilicet ut sit, et ut permaneat. Ut ergo esset quod permaneret, dicitur quod spiritus Dei ferebatur super aquam (secundum quod per aquam materia informis intelligitur; sicut amor artificis fertur super materiam aliquam, ut ex ea formet opus), ut autem maneret quod fecerat, dicitur, vidit Deus quod esset bonum. In hoc enim significatur quaedam complacentia Dei opificis in re facta, non quod alio modo cognosceret, aut placeret ei creatura iam facta, quam antequam faceret.

Et sic in utroque opere creationis et formationis, Trinitas personarum insinuatur. In creatione quidem, per-

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Obj. 7: Further, first, not one, corresponds to second and third. It should therefore have been said that, The evening and the morning were the first day, rather than one day. Reply Obj. 1: According to Augustine (Gen ad lit. i, 4), the person of the Son is mentioned both in the first creation of the world, and in its distinction and adornment, but differently in either place. For distinction and adornment belong to the work by which the world receives its form. But as the giving form to a work of art is by means of the form of the art in the mind of the artist, which may be called his intelligible word, so the giving form to every creature is by the word of God; and for this reason in the works of distinction and adornment the Word is mentioned. But in creation the Son is mentioned as the beginning, by the words, In the beginning God created, since by creation is understood the production of formless matter. But according to those who hold that the elements were created from the first under their proper forms, another explanation must be given; and therefore Basil says (Hom. ii, iii in Hexaem.) that the words, God said, signify a Divine command. Such a command, however, could not have been given before creatures had been produced that could obey it. Reply Obj. 2: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 33), by the heaven is understood the formless spiritual nature, and by the earth, the formless matter of all corporeal things, and thus no creature is omitted. But, according to Basil (Hom. i in Hexaem.), the heaven and the earth, as the two extremes, are alone mentioned, the intervening things being left to be understood, since all these move heavenwards, if light, or earthwards, if heavy. And others say that under the word, earth, Scripture is accustomed to include all the four elements as after the words (Ps 148:7,8), Praise the Lord from the earth, is added, fire, hail, snow, and ice. Reply Obj. 3: In the account of the creation there is found something to correspond to the words, God saw that it was good, used in the work of distinction and adornment, and this appears from the consideration that the Holy Spirit is Love. Now, there are two things, says Augustine (Gen ad lit. i, 8), which came from God’s love of His creatures, their existence and their permanence. That they might then exist, and exist permanently, the Spirit of God, it is said, moved over the waters—that is to say, over that formless matter, signified by water, even as the love of the artist moves over the materials of his art, that out of them he may form his work. And the words, God saw that it was good, signify that the things that He had made were to endure, since they express a certain satisfaction taken by God in His works, as of an artist in his art: not as though He knew the creature otherwise, or that the creature was pleasing to Him otherwise, than before He made it. Thus in either work, of creation and of formation, the Trinity of Persons is implied. In creation the Person of the

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sona patris per Deum creantem; persona filii, per principium in quo creavit; spiritus sancti, qui superfertur aquis. In formatione vero, persona patris in Deo dicente; persona vero filii, in verbo quo dicitur; persona spiritus sancti, in complacentia qua vidit Deus esse bonum quod factum erat.

In opere vero secundae diei non ponitur, vidit Deus quod esset bonum, quia opus distinctionis aquarum tunc inchoatur, et in tertio die perficitur, unde quod ponitur in tertia die, refertur etiam ad secundam. Vel, quia distinctio quae ponitur secunda die, est de his quae non sunt manifesta populo, ideo huiusmodi approbatione Scriptura non utitur. Vel iterum propter hoc, quod per firmamentum intelligitur aer nubilosus, qui non est de partibus permanentibus in universo, seu de partibus principalibus mundi. Et has tres rationes Rabbi Moyses ponit. Quidam autem assignant rationem mysticam ex parte numeri. Quia binarius ab unitate recedit, unde opus secundae diei non approbatur.

Ad quartum dicendum quod Rabbi Moyses per spiritum domini intelligit aerem vel ventum, sicut et Plato intellexit. Et dicit quod dicitur spiritus domini, secundum quod Scriptura consuevit ubique flatum ventorum Deo attribuere. Sed secundum sanctos, per spiritum domini intelligitur Spiritus Sanctus. Qui dicitur superferri aquae, idest materiae informi secundum Augustinum, ne facienda opera sua propter indigentiae necessitatem putaretur Deus amare, indigentiae enim amor rebus quas diligit subiicitur. Commode, autem factum est, ut prius insinuaretur aliquid inchoatum, cui superferri diceretur, non enim superfertur loco, sed praeexcellente potentia, ut Augustinus dicit I super Gen. ad Litt. Secundum Basilium vero, super ferebatur elemento aquae; idest, fovebat et vivificabat aquarum naturam, ad similitudinem gallinae cubantis, vitalem virtutem his quae foventur iniiciens. Habet enim aqua praecipue vitalem virtutem, quia plurima animalia generantur in aqua, et omnium animalium semina sunt humida. Vita etiam spiritualis datur per aquam Baptismi, unde dicitur Ioan. III, nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et spiritu sancto.

Ad quintum dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum, per illa tria designatur triplex esse rerum, primo quidem esse rerum in verbo, per hoc quod dixit, fiat; secundo, esse rerum in mente angelica per hoc quod dixit, factum est; tertio, esse rerum in propria natura, per hoc

Q. 74, A. 3

Father is indicated by God the Creator, the Person of the Son by the beginning, in which He created, and the Person of the Holy Spirit by the Spirit that moved over the waters. But in the formation, the Person of the Father is indicated by God that speaks, and the Person of the Son by the Word in which He speaks, and the Person of the Holy Spirit by the satisfaction with which God saw that what was made was good. And if the words, God saw that it was good, are not said of the work of the second day, this is because the work of distinguishing the waters was only begun on that day, but perfected on the third. Hence these words, that are said of the third day, refer also to the second. Or it may be that Scripture does not use these words of approval of the second day’s work, because this is concerned with the distinction of things not evident to the senses of mankind. Or, again, because by the firmament is simply understood the cloudy region of the air, which is not one of the permanent parts of the universe, nor of the principal divisions of the world. The above three reasons are given by Rabbi Moses, and to these may be added a mystical one derived from numbers and assigned by some writers, according to whom the work of the second day is not marked with approval because the second number is an imperfect number, as receding from the perfection of unity. Reply Obj. 4: Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii) understands by the Spirit of the Lord, the air or the wind, as Plato also did, and says that it is so called according to the custom of Scripture, in which these things are throughout attributed to God. But according to the holy writers, the Spirit of the Lord signifies the Holy Spirit, Who is said to move over the water—that is to say, over what Augustine holds to mean formless matter, lest it should be supposed that God loved of necessity the works He was to produce, as though He stood in need of them. For love of that kind is subject to, not superior to, the object of love. Moreover, it is fittingly implied that the Spirit moved over that which was incomplete and unfinished, since that movement is not one of place, but of pre-eminent power, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. i, 7). It is the opinion, however, of Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) that the Spirit moved over the element of water, fostering and quickening its nature and impressing vital power, as the hen broods over her chickens. For water has especially a life-giving power, since many animals are generated in water, and the seed of all animals is liquid. Also the life of the soul is given by the water of baptism, according to John 3:5: Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. Reply Obj. 5: According to Augustine (Gen ad lit. i, 8), these three phrases denote the threefold being of creatures; first, their being in the Word, denoted by the command Let . . . be made; second, their being in the angelic mind, signified by the words, It was . . . done; third, their being in their

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quod dixit, fecit. Et quia in primo die describitur forma- proper nature, by the words, He made. And because the fortio angelorum, non fuit necesse ut ibi adderetur, fecit. mation of the angels is recorded on the first day, it was not necessary there to add, He made. Secundum alios vero, potest dici quod in hoc quod It may also be said, following other writers, that the dicit, dixit Deus fiat, importatur imperium Dei de fa- words, He said, and Let . . . be made, denote God’s comciendo. Per hoc autem quod dicit, factum est, importatur mand, and the words, It was done, the fulfilment of that complementum operis. Oportuit autem ut subderetur command. But as it was necessary, for the sake of those esquomodo factum fuit, praecipue propter illos qui dixe- pecially who have asserted that all visible things were made runt omnia visibilia per angelos facta. Et ideo ad hoc by the angels, to mention how things were made, it is added, removendum, subditur quod ipse Deus fecit. Unde in in order to remove that error, that God Himself made them. singulis operibus, postquam dicitur, et factum est, ali- Hence, in each work, after the words, It was done, some act quis actus Dei subditur; vel fecit, vel distinxit, vel vocavit, of God is expressed by some such words as, He made, or, He vel aliquid huiusmodi. divided, or, He called. Ad sextum dicendum quod, secundum AugustiReply Obj. 6: According to Augustine (Gen ad lit. iv, num, per vespere et mane intelligitur vespertina et ma- 22, 30), by the evening and the morning are understood the tutina cognitio in angelis, de quibus dictum est supra. evening and the morning knowledge of the angels, which has been explained (Q. 58, A. 6, 7). Vel, secundum Basilium, totum tempus consuevit But, according to Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.), the entire denominari a principaliori parte, scilicet a die, secun- period takes its name, as is customary, from its more impordum quod dixit Iacob, dies peregrinationis meae, nulla tant part, the day. An instance of this is found in the words mentione facta de nocte. Vespere autem et mane ponun- of Jacob, The days of my pilgrimage, where night is not mentur ut termini diei; cuius mane est principium, sed ve- tioned at all. But the evening and the morning are menspere finis. tioned as being the ends of the day, since day begins with morning and ends with evening. Vel quia per vespere designatur principium noctis, Or because evening denotes the beginning of night, and per mane principium diei. Congruum autem fuit, ut ubi morning the beginning of day. It seems fitting, also, that commemoratur prima distinctio rerum, sola principia where the first distinction of creatures is described, divitemporum designarentur. Praemittitur autem vespere, sions of time should be denoted only by what marks their quia, cum a luce dies incoeperit, prius occurrit termi- beginning. And the reason for mentioning the evening first nus lucis, quod est vespere, quam terminus tenebrarum is that as the evening ends the day, which begins with the et noctis, quod est mane. light, the termination of the light at evening precedes the termination of the darkness, which ends with the morning. Vel, secundum Chrysostomum, ut designetur quod But Chrysostom’s explanation is that thereby it is indies naturalis non terminatur in vespere, sed in mane. tended to show that the natural day does not end with the evening, but with the morning (Hom. v in Gen.). Ad septimum dicendum quod dicitur unus dies in Reply Obj. 7: The words one day are used when day is prima diei institutione, ad designandum quod viginti first instituted, to denote that one day is made up of twentyquatuor horarum spatia pertinent ad unum diem. Unde four hours. Hence, by mentioning one, the measure of a per hoc quod dicitur unus, praefigitur mensura diei na- natural day is fixed. turalis. Vel propter hoc, ut significaret diem consummari per Another reason may be to signify that a day is comreditum solis ad unum et idem punctum. pleted by the return of the sun to the point from which it commenced its course. Vel quia completo septenario dierum, reditur ad priAnd yet another, because at the completion of a week mum diem, qui est unus cum octavo. Et has tres rationes of seven days, the first day returns which is one with the Basilius assignat. eighth day. The three reasons assigned above are those given by Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.).

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Question 75 Man, Who is Composed of a Spiritual and Corporeal Substance Post considerationem creaturae spiritualis et corporalis, considerandum est de homine, qui ex spirituali et corporali substantia componitur. Et primo, de natura ipsius hominis; secundo, de eius productione. Naturam autem hominis considerare pertinet ad theologum ex parte animae, non autem ex parte corporis, nisi secundum habitudinem quam habet corpus ad animam. Et ideo prima consideratio circa animam versabitur. Et quia, secundum Dionysium, XI cap. Angel. Hier., tria inveniuntur in substantiis spiritualibus, scilicet essentia, virtus et operatio; primo considerabimus ea quae pertinent ad essentiam animae; secundo, ea quae pertinent ad virtutem sive potentias eius; tertio, ea quae pertinent ad operationem eius. Circa primum duplex occurrit consideratio, quarum prima est de ipsa anima secundum se; secunda, de unione eius ad corpus. Circa primum quaeruntur septem. Primo, utrum anima sit corpus. Secundo, utrum anima humana sit aliquid subsistens. Tertio, utrum animae brutorum sint subsistentes. Quarto, utrum anima sit homo; vel magis homo sit aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore. Quinto, utrum sit composita ex materia et forma. Sexto, utrum anima humana sit incorruptibilis. Septimo, utrum anima sit eiusdem speciei cum angelo.

Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we now proceed to treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual and corporeal substance. We shall treat first of the nature of man, and second of his origin. Now the theologian considers the nature of man in relation to the soul; but not in relation to the body, except in so far as the body has relation to the soul. Hence the first object of our consideration will be the soul. And since Dionysius (Ang. Hier. xi) says that three things are to be found in spiritual substances—essence, power, and operation—we shall treat first of what belongs to the essence of the soul; second, of what belongs to its power; third, of what belongs to its operation. Concerning the first, two points have to be considered; the first is the nature of the soul considered in itself; the second is the union of the soul with the body. Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry. (1) Whether the soul is a body? (2) Whether the human soul is a subsistence? (3) Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent? (4) Whether the soul is man, or is man composed of soul and body? (5) Whether the soul is composed of matter and form? (6) Whether the soul is incorruptible? (7) Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?

Article 1 Whether the soul is a body? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima sit corpus. Anima enim est motor corporis. Non autem est movens non motum. Tum quia videtur quod nihil possit movere nisi moveatur, quia nihil dat alteri quod non habet, sicut quod non est calidum non calefacit. Tum quia, si aliquid est movens non motum, causat motum sempiternum et eodem modo se habentem, ut probatur in VIII Physic., quod non apparet in motu animalis, qui est ab anima. Ergo anima est movens mo-

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is a body. For the soul is the moving principle of the body. Nor does it move unless moved. First, because seemingly nothing can move unless it is itself moved, since nothing gives what it has not; for instance, what is not hot does not give heat. Second, because if there be anything that moves and is not moved, it must be the cause of eternal, unchanging movement, as we find proved in Phys. viii, 6; and this does not appear to be the case in the movement of an animal, which

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tum. Sed omne movens motum est corpus. Ergo anima is caused by the soul. Therefore the soul is a mover moved. est corpus. But every mover moved is a body. Therefore the soul is a body. Praeterea, omnis cognitio fit per aliquam similiObj. 2: Further, all knowledge is caused by means of a tudinem. Non potest autem esse similitudo corporis ad likeness. But there can be no likeness of a body to an incorrem incorpoream. Si igitur anima non esset corpus, non poreal thing. If, therefore, the soul were not a body, it could posset cognoscere res corporeas. not have knowledge of corporeal things. Praeterea, moventis ad motum oportet esse aliObj. 3: Further, between the mover and the moved quem contactum. Contactus autem non est nisi corpo- there must be contact. But contact is only between bodies. rum. Cum igitur anima moveat corpus, videtur quod Since, therefore, the soul moves the body, it seems that the anima sit corpus. soul must be a body. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6) that quod anima simplex dicitur respectu corporis, quia mole the soul is simple in comparison with the body, inasmuch as non diffunditur per spatium loci. it does not occupy space by its bulk. Respondeo dicendum quod ad inquirendum de naI answer that, To seek the nature of the soul, we must tura animae, oportet praesupponere quod anima dici- premise that the soul is defined as the first principle of life tur esse primum principium vitae in his quae apud nos of those things which live: for we call living things animate, vivunt; animata enim viventia dicimus, res vero ina- and those things which have no life, inanimate. Now life nimatas vita carentes. Vita autem maxime manifesta- is shown principally by two actions, knowledge and movetur duplici opere, scilicet cognitionis et motus. Horum ment. The philosophers of old, not being able to rise above autem principium antiqui philosophi, imaginationem their imagination, supposed that the principle of these actranscendere non valentes, aliquod corpus ponebant; so- tions was something corporeal: for they asserted that only la corpora res esse dicentes, et quod non est corpus, nihil bodies were real things; and that what is not corporeal is esse. Et secundum hoc, animam aliquod corpus esse di- nothing: hence they maintained that the soul is something cebant. Huius autem opinionis falsitas licet multipliciter corporeal. This opinion can be proved to be false in many ostendi possit tamen uno utemur, quo et communius et ways; but we shall make use of only one proof, based on certius patet animam corpus non esse. universal and certain principles, which shows clearly that the soul is not a body. Manifestum est enim quod non quodcumque vitalis It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is a operationis principium est anima, sic enim oculus esset soul, for then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle of anima, cum sit quoddam principium visionis; et idem vision; and the same might be applied to the other instruesset dicendum de aliis animae instrumentis. Sed pri- ments of the soul: but it is the first principle of life, which mum principium vitae dicimus esse animam. Quamvis we call the soul. Now, though a body may be a principle of autem aliquod corpus possit esse quoddam principium life, as the heart is a principle of life in an animal, yet nothvitae, sicut cor est principium vitae in animali; tamen ing corporeal can be the first principle of life. For it is clear non potest esse primum principium vitae aliquod cor- that to be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, does not pus. Manifestum est enim quod esse principium vitae, belong to a body as such; since, if that were the case, every vel vivens, non convenit corpori ex hoc quod est corpus, body would be a living thing, or a principle of life. Therefore alioquin omne corpus esset vivens, aut principium vitae. a body is competent to be a living thing or even a principle Convenit igitur alicui corpori quod sit vivens, vel etiam of life, as such a body. Now that it is actually such a body, principium vitae, per hoc quod est tale corpus. Quod it owes to some principle which is called its act. Therefore autem est actu tale, habet hoc ab aliquo principio quod the soul, which is the first principle of life, is not a body, but dicitur actus eius. Anima igitur, quae est primum princi- the act of a body; thus heat, which is the principle of calepium vitae, non est corpus, sed corporis actus, sicut ca- faction, is not a body, but an act of a body. lor, qui est principium calefactionis, non est corpus, sed quidam corporis actus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum omne quod Reply Obj. 1: As everything which is in motion must movetur ab alio moveatur, quod non potest in infinitum be moved by something else, a process which cannot be procedere, necesse est dicere quod non omne movens prolonged indefinitely, we must allow that not every mover movetur. Cum enim moveri sit exire de potentia in ac- is moved. For, since to be moved is to pass from potentum, movens dat id quod habet mobili, inquantum facit tiality to actuality, the mover gives what it has to the thing ipsum esse in actu. Sed sicut ostenditur in VIII Physic., moved, inasmuch as it causes it to be in act. But, as is est quoddam movens penitus immobile, quod nec per se shown in Phys. viii, 6, there is a mover which is altogether nec per accidens movetur, et tale movens potest move- immovable, and not moved either essentially, or acciden-

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re motum semper uniformem. Est autem aliud movens, quod non movetur per se, sed movetur per accidens, et propter hoc non movet motum semper uniformem. Et tale movens est anima. Est autem aliud movens, quod per se movetur, scilicet corpus. Et quia antiqui naturales nihil esse credebant nisi corpora, posuerunt quod omne movens movetur, et quod anima per se movetur, et est corpus. Ad secundum dicendum quod non est necessarium quod similitudo rei cognitae sit actu in natura cognoscentis, sed si aliquid sit quod prius est cognoscens in potentia et postea in actu, oportet quod similitudo cogniti non sit actu in natura cognoscentis, sed in potentia tantum; sicut color non est actu in pupilla, sed in potentia tantum. Unde non oportet quod in natura animae sit similitudo rerum corporearum in actu; sed quod sit in potentia ad huiusmodi similitudines. Sed quia antiqui naturales nesciebant distinguere inter actum et potentiam, ponebant animam esse corpus, ad hoc quod cognosceret corpus; et ad hoc quod cognosceret omnia corpora, quod esset composita ex principiis omnium corporum. Ad tertium dicendum quod est duplex contactus, quantitatis et virtutis. Primo modo, corpus non tangitur nisi a corpore. Secundo modo, corpus potest tangi a re incorporea quae movet corpus.

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tally; and such a mover can cause an invariable movement. There is, however, another kind of mover, which, though not moved essentially, is moved accidentally; and for this reason it does not cause an invariable movement; such a mover, is the soul. There is, again, another mover, which is moved essentially—namely, the body. And because the philosophers of old believed that nothing existed but bodies, they maintained that every mover is moved; and that the soul is moved directly, and is a body. Reply Obj. 2: The likeness of a thing known is not of necessity actually in the nature of the knower; but given a thing which knows potentially, and afterwards knows actually, the likeness of the thing known must be in the nature of the knower, not actually, but only potentially; thus color is not actually in the pupil of the eye, but only potentially. Hence it is necessary, not that the likeness of corporeal things should be actually in the nature of the soul, but that there be a potentiality in the soul for such a likeness. But the ancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between actuality and potentiality; and so they held that the soul must be a body in order to have knowledge of a body; and that it must be composed of the principles of which all bodies are formed in order to know all bodies. Reply Obj. 3: There are two kinds of contact; of quantity, and of power. By the former a body can be touched only by a body; by the latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves that body.

Article 2 Whether the human soul is something subsistent? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima humana non sit aliquid subsistens. Quod enim est subsistens, dicitur hoc aliquid. Anima autem non est hoc aliquid, sed compositum ex anima et corpore. Ergo anima non est aliquid subsistens. Praeterea, omne quod est subsistens, potest dici operari. Sed anima non dicitur operari, quia, ut dicitur in I de Anima, dicere animam sentire aut intelligere, simile est ac si dicat eam aliquis texere vel aedificare. Ergo anima non est aliquid subsistens. Praeterea, si anima esset aliquid subsistens, esset aliqua eius operatio sine corpore. Sed nulla est eius operatio sine corpore, nec etiam intelligere, quia non contingit intelligere sine phantasmate, phantasma autem non est sine corpore. Ergo anima humana non est aliquid subsistens. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin. Quisquis videt mentis naturam et esse substantiam, et non esse corpoream, videt eos qui opinantur eam esse corpoream, ob hoc errare, quod adiungunt ei ea sine qui-

Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul is not something subsistent. For that which subsists is said to be this particular thing. Now this particular thing is said not of the soul, but of that which is composed of soul and body. Therefore the soul is not something subsistent. Obj. 2: Further, everything subsistent operates. But the soul does not operate; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), to say that the soul feels or understands is like saying that the soul weaves or builds. Therefore the soul is not subsistent. Obj. 3: Further, if the soul were subsistent, it would have some operation apart from the body. But it has no operation apart from the body, not even that of understanding: for the act of understanding does not take place without a phantasm, which cannot exist apart from the body. Therefore the human soul is not something subsistent. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 7): Who understands that the nature of the soul is that of a substance and not that of a body, will see that those who maintain the corporeal nature of the soul, are led astray through

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bus nullam possunt cogitare naturam, scilicet corporum phantasias. Natura ergo mentis humanae non solum est incorporea, sed etiam substantia, scilicet aliquid subsistens. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere id quod est principium intellectualis operationis, quod dicimus animam hominis, esse quoddam principium incorporeum et subsistens. Manifestum est enim quod homo per intellectum cognoscere potest naturas omnium corporum. Quod autem potest cognoscere aliqua, oportet ut nihil eorum habeat in sua natura, quia illud quod inesset ei naturaliter impediret cognitionem aliorum; sicut videmus quod lingua infirmi quae infecta est cholerico et amaro humore, non potest percipere aliquid dulce, sed omnia videntur ei amara. Si igitur principium intellectuale haberet in se naturam alicuius corporis, non posset omnia corpora cognoscere. Omne autem corpus habet aliquam naturam determinatam. Impossibile est igitur quod principium intellectuale sit corpus. Et similiter impossibile est quod intelligat per organum corporeum, quia etiam natura determinata illius organi corporei prohiberet cognitionem omnium corporum; sicut si aliquis determinatus color sit non solum in pupilla, sed etiam in vase vitreo, liquor infusus eiusdem coloris videtur. Ipsum igitur intellectuale principium, quod dicitur mens vel intellectus, habet operationem per se, cui non communicat corpus. Nihil autem potest per se operari, nisi quod per se subsistit. Non enim est operari nisi entis in actu, unde eo modo aliquid operatur, quo est. Propter quod non dicimus quod calor calefacit, sed calidum. Relinquitur igitur animam humanam, quae dicitur intellectus vel mens, esse aliquid incorporeum et subsistens. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc aliquid potest accipi dupliciter, uno modo, pro quocumque subsistente, alio modo, pro subsistente completo in natura alicuius speciei. Primo modo, excludit inhaerentiam accidentis et formae materialis, secundo modo, excludit etiam imperfectionem partis. Unde manus posset dici hoc aliquid primo modo, sed non secundo modo. Sic igitur, cum anima humana sit pars speciei humanae, potest dici hoc aliquid primo modo, quasi subsistens, sed non secundo modo, sic enim compositum ex anima et corpore dicitur hoc aliquid. Ad secundum dicendum quod verba illa Aristoteles dicit non secundum propriam sententiam, sed secundum opinionem illorum qui dicebant quod intelligere est moveri; ut patet ex iis quae ibi praemittit. Vel dicendum quod per se agere convenit per se existenti. Sed per se existens quandoque potest dici aliquid si non sit inhaerens ut accidens vel ut forma materialis, etiam si sit pars. Sed proprie et per se subsistens dicitur quod neque est praedicto modo inhaerens, neque est

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associating with the soul those things without which they are unable to think of any nature—i.e., imaginary pictures of corporeal things. Therefore the nature of the human intellect is not only incorporeal, but it is also a substance, that is, something subsistent. I answer that, It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent. For it is clear that by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. Now whatever knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of anything else. Thus we observe that a sick man’s tongue being vitiated by a feverish and bitter humor, is insensible to anything sweet, and everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if the intellectual principle contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies. Now every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is likewise impossible for it to understand by means of a bodily organ; since the determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies; as when a certain determinate color is not only in the pupil of the eye, but also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase seems to be of that same color.

Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an operation per se apart from the body. Now only that which subsists can have an operation per se. For nothing can operate but what is actual: for which reason we do not say that heat imparts heat, but that what is hot gives heat. We must conclude, therefore, that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent. Reply Obj. 1: This particular thing can be taken in two senses. First, for anything subsistent; second, for that which subsists, and is complete in a specific nature. The former sense excludes the inherence of an accident or of a material form; the latter excludes also the imperfection of the part, so that a hand can be called this particular thing in the first sense, but not in the second. Therefore, as the human soul is a part of human nature, it can indeed be called this particular thing, in the first sense, as being something subsistent; but not in the second, for in this sense, what is composed of body and soul is said to be this particular thing. Reply Obj. 2: Aristotle wrote those words as expressing not his own opinion, but the opinion of those who said that to understand is to be moved, as is clear from the context. Or we may reply that to operate per se belongs to what exists per se. But for a thing to exist per se, it suffices sometimes that it be not inherent, as an accident or a material form; even though it be part of something. Nevertheless, that is rightly said to subsist per se, which is neither in-

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pars. Secundum quem modum oculus aut manus non posset dici per se subsistens; et per consequens nec per se operans. Unde et operationes partium attribuuntur toti per partes. Dicimus enim quod homo videt per oculum, et palpat per manum, aliter quam calidum calefacit per calorem, quia calor nullo modo calefacit, proprie loquendo. Potest igitur dici quod anima intelligit, sicut oculus videt, sed magis proprie dicitur quod homo intelligat per animam.

herent in the above sense, nor part of anything else. In this sense, the eye or the hand cannot be said to subsist per se; nor can it for that reason be said to operate per se. Hence the operation of the parts is through each part attributed to the whole. For we say that man sees with the eye, and feels with the hand, and not in the same sense as when we say that what is hot gives heat by its heat; for heat, strictly speaking, does not give heat. We may therefore say that the soul understands, as the eye sees; but it is more correct to say that man understands through the soul. Ad tertium dicendum quod corpus requiritur ad Reply Obj. 3: The body is necessary for the action of actionem intellectus, non sicut organum quo talis actio the intellect, not as its origin of action, but on the part of exerceatur, sed ratione obiecti, phantasma enim compa- the object; for the phantasm is to the intellect what color is ratur ad intellectum sicut color ad visum. Sic autem in- to the sight. Neither does such a dependence on the body digere corpore non removet intellectum esse subsisten- prove the intellect to be non-subsistent; otherwise it would tem, alioquin animal non esset aliquid subsistens, cum follow that an animal is non-subsistent, since it requires exindigeat exterioribus sensibilibus ad sentiendum. ternal objects of the senses in order to perform its act of perception.

Article 3 Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod animae brutorum animalium sint subsistentes. Homo enim convenit in genere cum aliis animalibus. Sed anima hominis est aliquid subsistens, ut ostensum est. Ergo et animae aliorum animalium sunt subsistentes. Praeterea, similiter se habet sensitivum ad sensibilia, sicut intellectivum et intelligibilia. Sed intellectus intelligit intelligibilia sine corpore. Ergo et sensus apprehendit sensibilia sine corpore. Animae autem brutorum animalium sunt sensitivae. Ergo sunt subsistentes, pari ratione qua et anima hominis, quae est intellectiva.

Praeterea, brutorum animalium anima movet corpus. Corpus autem non movet, sed movetur. Anima ergo bruti animalis habet aliquam operationem sine corpore. Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de Eccl. Dogmat., solum hominem credimus habere animam substantivam; animalium vero animae non sunt substantivae. Respondeo dicendum quod antiqui philosophi nullam distinctionem ponebant inter sensum et intellectum, et utrumque corporeo principio attribuebant, ut dictum est. Plato autem distinxit inter intellectum et sensum; utrumque tamen attribuit principio incorporeo, ponens quod, sicut intelligere, ita et sentire convenit animae secundum seipsam. Et ex hoc sequebatur quod etiam animae brutorum animalium sint subsistentes. Sed Aristoteles posuit quod solum intelligere, in-

Objection 1: It would seem that the souls of brute animals are subsistent. For man is of the same genus as other animals; and, as we have just shown (A. 2), the soul of man is subsistent. Therefore the souls of other animals are subsistent. Obj. 2: Further, the relation of the sensitive faculty to sensible objects is like the relation of the intellectual faculty to intelligible objects. But the intellect, apart from the body, apprehends intelligible objects. Therefore the sensitive faculty, apart from the body, perceives sensible objects. Therefore, since the souls of brute animals are sensitive, it follows that they are subsistent; just as the human intellectual soul is subsistent. Obj. 3: Further, the soul of brute animals moves the body. But the body is not a mover, but is moved. Therefore the soul of brute animals has an operation apart from the body. On the contrary, Is what is written in the book De Eccl. Dogm. xvi, xvii: Man alone we believe to have a subsistent soul: whereas the souls of animals are not subsistent. I answer that, The ancient philosophers made no distinction between sense and intellect, and referred both to a corporeal principle, as has been said (A. 1). Plato, however, drew a distinction between intellect and sense; yet he referred both to an incorporeal principle, maintaining that sensing, just as understanding, belongs to the soul as such. From this it follows that even the souls of brute animals are subsistent. But Aristotle held that of the operations of the soul, understanding alone is performed without a corporeal

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ter opera animae, sine organo corporeo exercetur. Sentire vero, et consequentes operationes animae sensitivae, manifeste accidunt cum aliqua corporis immutatione; sicut in videndo immutatur pupilla per speciem coloris; et idem apparet in aliis. Et sic manifestum est quod anima sensitiva non habet aliquam operationem propriam per seipsam, sed omnis operatio sensitivae animae est coniuncti. Ex quo relinquitur quod, cum animae brutorum animalium per se non operentur, non sint subsistentes, similiter enim unumquodque habet esse et operationem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo, etsi conveniat in genere cum aliis animalibus, specie tamen differt, differentia autem speciei attenditur secundum differentiam formae. Nec oportet quod omnis differentia formae faciat generis diversitatem. Ad secundum dicendum quod sensitivum quodammodo se habet ad sensibilia sicut intellectivum ad intelligibilia, inquantum scilicet utrumque est in potentia ad sua obiecta. Sed quodammodo dissimiliter se habent, inquantum sensitivum patitur a sensibili cum corporis immutatione, unde excellentia sensibilium corrumpit sensum. Quod in intellectu non contingit, nam intellectus intelligens maxima intelligibilium, magis potest postmodum intelligere minora. Si vero in intelligendo fatigetur corpus, hoc est per accidens, in quantum intellectus indiget operatione virium sensitivarum, per quas ei phantasmata praeparantur.

Ad tertium dicendum quod vis motiva est duplex. Una quae imperat motum, scilicet appetitiva. Et huius operatio in anima sensitiva non est sine corpore; sed ira et gaudium et omnes huiusmodi passiones sunt cum aliqua corporis immutatione. Alia vis motiva est exequens motum, per quam membra redduntur habilia ad obediendum appetitui, cuius actus non est movere, sed moveri. Unde patet quod movere non est actus animae sensitivae sine corpore.

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organ. On the other hand, sensation and the consequent operations of the sensitive soul are evidently accompanied with change in the body; thus in the act of vision, the pupil of the eye is affected by a reflection of color: and so with the other senses. Hence it is clear that the sensitive soul has no per se operation of its own, and that every operation of the sensitive soul belongs to the composite. Wherefore we conclude that as the souls of brute animals have no per se operations, they are not subsistent. For the operation of anything follows the mode of its being. Reply Obj. 1: Although man is of the same genus as other animals, he is of a different species. Specific difference is derived from the difference of form; nor does every difference of form necessarily imply a diversity of genus. Reply Obj. 2: The relation of the sensitive faculty to the sensible object is in one way the same as that of the intellectual faculty to the intelligible object, in so far as each is in potentiality to its object. But in another way their relations differ, inasmuch as the impression of the object on the sense is accompanied with change in the body; so that excessive strength of the sensible corrupts sense; a thing that never occurs in the case of the intellect. For an intellect that understands the highest of intelligible objects is more able afterwards to understand those that are lower. If, however, in the process of intellectual operation the body is weary, this result is accidental, inasmuch as the intellect requires the operation of the sensitive powers in the production of the phantasms. Reply Obj. 3: Motive power is of two kinds. One, the appetitive power, commands motion. The operation of this power in the sensitive soul is not apart from the body; for anger, joy, and passions of a like nature are accompanied by a change in the body. The other motive power is that which executes motion in adapting the members for obeying the appetite; and the act of this power does not consist in moving, but in being moved. Whence it is clear that to move is not an act of the sensitive soul without the body.

Article 4 Whether the soul is man? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima sit homo. Dicitur enim II ad Cor. IV, licet is qui foris est noster homo corrumpatur, tamen is qui intus est, renovatur de die in diem. Sed id quod est intus in homine, est anima. Ergo anima est homo interior. Praeterea, anima humana est substantia quaedam. Non autem est substantia universalis. Ergo est substantia particularis. Ergo est hypostasis vel persona. Sed

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is man. For it is written (2 Cor 4:16): Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed day by day. But that which is within man is the soul. Therefore the soul is the inward man. Obj. 2: Further, the human soul is a substance. But it is not a universal substance. Therefore it is a particular substance. Therefore it is a hypostasis or a person; and it can

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non nisi humana. Ergo anima est homo, nam persona humana est homo. Sed contra est quod Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, commendat Varronem, qui hominem nec animam solam, nec solum corpus, sed animam simul et corpus esse arbitrabatur. Respondeo dicendum quod animam esse hominem dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, quod homo sit anima, sed hic homo non sit anima, sed compositum ex anima et corpore, puta Socrates. Quod ideo dico, quia quidam posuerunt solam formam esse de ratione speciei, materiam vero esse partem individui, et non speciei. Quod quidem non potest esse verum. Nam ad naturam speciei pertinet id quod significat definitio. Definitio autem in rebus naturalibus non significat formam tantum, sed formam et materiam. Unde materia est pars speciei in rebus naturalibus, non quidem materia signata, quae est principium individuationis; sed materia communis. Sicut enim de ratione huius hominis est quod sit ex hac anima et his carnibus et his ossibus; ita de ratione hominis est quod sit ex anima et carnibus et ossibus. Oportet enim de substantia speciei esse quidquid est communiter de substantia omnium individuorum sub specie contentorum. Alio vero modo potest intelligi sic, quod etiam haec anima sit hic homo. Et hoc quidem sustineri posset, si poneretur quod animae sensitivae operatio esset eius propria sine corpore, quia omnes operationes quae attribuuntur homini, convenirent soli animae; illud autem est unaquaeque res, quod operatur operationes illius rei. Unde illud est homo, quod operatur operationes hominis. Ostensum est autem quod sentire non est operatio animae tantum. Cum igitur sentire sit quaedam operatio hominis, licet non propria, manifestum est quod homo non est anima tantum, sed est aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore. Plato vero, ponens sentire esse proprium animae, ponere potuit quod homo esset anima utens corpore. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum Philosophum in IX Ethic., illud potissime videtur esse unumquodque, quod est principale in ipso, sicut quod facit rector civitatis, dicitur civitas facere. Et hoc modo aliquando quod est principale in homine, dicitur homo, aliquando quidem pars intellectiva, secundum rei veritatem, quae dicitur homo interior; aliquando vero pars sensitiva cum corpore, secundum aestimationem quorundam, qui solum circa sensibilia detinentur. Et hic dicitur homo exterior. Ad secundum dicendum quod non quaelibet substantia particularis est hypostasis vel persona, sed quae habet completam naturam speciei. Unde manus vel pes non potest dici hypostasis vel persona. Et similiter nec anima, cum sit pars speciei humanae.

Q. 75, A. 4

only be a human person. Therefore the soul is man; for a human person is a man. On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 3) commends Varro as holding that man is not a mere soul, nor a mere body; but both soul and body. I answer that, The assertion the soul is man, can be taken in two senses. First, that man is a soul; though this particular man, Socrates, for instance, is not a soul, but composed of soul and body. I say this, forasmuch as some held that the form alone belongs to the species; while matter is part of the individual, and not the species. This cannot be true; for to the nature of the species belongs what the definition signifies; and in natural things the definition does not signify the form only, but the form and the matter. Hence in natural things the matter is part of the species; not, indeed, signate matter, which is the principle of individuality; but the common matter. For as it belongs to the notion of this particular man to be composed of this soul, of this flesh, and of these bones; so it belongs to the notion of man to be composed of soul, flesh, and bones; for whatever belongs in common to the substance of all the individuals contained under a given species, must belong to the substance of the species. It may also be understood in this sense, that this soul is this man; and this could be held if it were supposed that the operation of the sensitive soul were proper to it, apart from the body; because in that case all the operations which are attributed to man would belong to the soul only; and whatever performs the operations proper to a thing, is that thing; wherefore that which performs the operations of a man is man. But it has been shown above (A. 3) that sensation is not the operation of the soul only. Since, then, sensation is an operation of man, but not proper to him, it is clear that man is not a soul only, but something composed of soul and body. Plato, through supposing that sensation was proper to the soul, could maintain man to be a soul making use of the body. Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8), a thing seems to be chiefly what is principal in it; thus what the governor of a state does, the state is said to do. In this way sometimes what is principal in man is said to be man; sometimes, indeed, the intellectual part which, in accordance with truth, is called the inward man; and sometimes the sensitive part with the body is called man in the opinion of those whose observation does not go beyond the senses. And this is called the outward man. Reply Obj. 2: Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a person, but that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence a hand, or a foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a person; nor, likewise, is the soul alone so called, since it is a part of the human species.

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Article 5 Whether the soul is composed of matter and form? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima sit composita ex materia et forma. Potentia enim contra actum dividitur. Sed omnia quaecumque sunt in actu, participant primum actum, qui Deus est; per cuius participationem omnia sunt et bona et entia et viventia, ut patet per doctrinam Dionysii in libro de Div. Nom. Ergo quaecumque sunt in potentia, participant primam potentiam. Sed prima potentia est materia prima. Cum ergo anima humana sit quodammodo in potentia, quod apparet ex hoc quod homo quandoque est intelligens in potentia; videtur quod anima humana participet materiam primam tanquam partem sui. Praeterea, in quocumque inveniuntur proprietates materiae, ibi invenitur materia. Sed in anima inveniuntur proprietates materiae, quae sunt subiici et transmutari, subiicitur enim scientiae et virtuti, et mutatur de ignorantia ad scientiam, et de vitio ad virtutem. Ergo in anima est materia. Praeterea, illa quae non habent materiam, non habent causam sui esse, ut dicitur in VIII Metaphys. Sed anima habet causam sui esse, quia creatur a Deo. Ergo anima habet materiam. Praeterea, quod non habet materiam, sed est forma tantum, est actus purus et infinitus. Hoc autem solius Dei est. Ergo anima habet materiam. Sed contra est quod Augustinus probat, in VII super Gen. ad Litt., quod anima non est facta nec ex materia corporali, nec ex materia spirituali. Respondeo dicendum quod anima non habet materiam. Et hoc potest considerari dupliciter. Primo quidem, ex ratione animae in communi. Est enim de ratione animae, quod sit forma alicuius corporis. Aut igitur est forma secundum se totam; aut secundum aliquam partem sui. Si secundum se totam, impossibile est quod pars eius sit materia, si dicatur materia aliquod ens in potentia tantum, quia forma, inquantum forma, est actus; id autem quod est in potentia tantum, non potest esse pars actus, cum potentia repugnet actui, utpote contra actum divisa. Si autem sit forma secundum aliquam partem sui, illam partem, dicemus esse animam, et illam materiam cuius primo est actus, dicemus esse primum animatum. Secundo, specialiter ex ratione humanae animae, inquantum est intellectiva. Manifestum est enim quod omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum recipientis. Sic autem cognoscitur unumquodque, sicut forma eius est in cognoscente; anima autem intellectiva cognoscit rem aliquam in sua natura absolute, puta lapidem inquantum est lapis absolute. Est igitur forma lapidis absolute, secundum propriam rationem formalem, in anima intellectiva. Anima igitur intellectiva est forma

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is composed of matter and form. For potentiality is opposed to actuality. Now, whatsoever things are in actuality participate of the First Act, which is God; by participation of Whom, all things are good, are beings, and are living things, as is clear from the teaching of Dionysius (Div. Nom. v). Therefore whatsoever things are in potentiality participate of the first potentiality. But the first potentiality is primary matter. Therefore, since the human soul is, after a manner, in potentiality; which appears from the fact that sometimes a man is potentially understanding; it seems that the human soul must participate of primary matter, as part of itself. Obj. 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter are found, there matter is. But the properties of matter are found in the soul—namely, to be a subject, and to be changed, for it is a subject to science, and virtue; and it changes from ignorance to knowledge and from vice to virtue. Therefore matter is in the soul. Obj. 3: Further, things which have no matter, have no cause of their existence, as the Philosopher says in Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6). But the soul has a cause of its existence, since it is created by God. Therefore the soul has matter. Obj. 4: Further, what has no matter, and is a form only, is a pure act, and is infinite. But this belongs to God alone. Therefore the soul has matter. On the contrary, Augustine (Gen ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) proves that the soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual matter. I answer that, The soul has no matter. We may consider this question in two ways. First, from the notion of a soul in general; for it belongs to the notion of a soul to be the form of a body. Now, either it is a form by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue of some part of itself. If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it is impossible that any part of it should be matter, if by matter we understand something purely potential: for a form, as such, is an act; and that which is purely potentiality cannot be part of an act, since potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being opposite thereto. If, however, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that part the soul: and that matter, which it actualizes first, we call the primary animate. Second, we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that whatever is received into something is received according to the condition of the recipient. Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the knower. But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely: for instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and therefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal idea, is in the intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual soul itself is an ab-

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absoluta, non autem aliquid compositum ex materia et forma. Si enim anima intellectiva esset composita ex materia et forma, formae rerum reciperentur in ea ut individuales, et sic non cognosceret nisi singulare, sicut accidit in potentiis sensitivis, quae recipiunt formas rerum in organo corporali, materia enim est principium individuationis formarum. Relinquitur ergo quod anima intellectiva, et omnis intellectualis substantia cognoscens formas absolute, caret compositione formae et materiae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod primus actus est universale principium omnium actuum, quia est infinitum, virtualiter in se omnia praehabens, ut dicit Dionysius. Unde participatur a rebus, non sicut pars, sed secundum diffusionem processionis ipsius. Potentia autem, cum sit receptiva actus, oportet quod actui proportionetur. Actus vero recepti, qui procedunt a primo actu infinito et sunt quaedam participationes eius, sunt diversi. Unde non potest esse potentia una quae recipiat omnes actus, sicut est unus actus influens omnes actus participatos, alioquin potentia receptiva adaequaret potentiam activam primi actus. Est autem alia potentia receptiva in anima intellectiva, a potentia receptiva materiae primae, ut patet ex diversitate receptorum, nam materia prima recipit formas individuales, intellectus autem recipit formas absolutas. Unde talis potentia in anima intellectiva existens, non ostendit quod anima sit composita ex materia et forma. Ad secundum dicendum quod subiici et transmutari convenit materiae secundum quod est in potentia. Sicut ergo est alia potentia intellectus, et alia potentia materiae primae, ita est alia ratio subiiciendi et transmutandi. Secundum hoc enim intellectus subiicitur scientiae, et transmutatur de ignorantia ad scientiam, secundum quod est in potentia ad species intelligibiles. Ad tertium dicendum quod forma est causa essendi materiae, et agens, unde agens, inquantum reducit materiam in actum formae transmutando, est ei causa essendi. Si quid autem est forma subsistens, non habet esse per aliquod formale principium, nec habet causam transmutantem de potentia in actum. Unde post verba praemissa, Philosophus concludit quod in his quae sunt composita ex materia et forma, nulla est alia causa nisi movens ex potestate ad actum, quaecumque vero non habent materiam, omnia simpliciter sunt quod vere entia aliquid. Ad quartum dicendum quod omne participatum comparatur ad participans ut actus eius. Quaecumque autem forma creata per se subsistens ponatur, oportet quod participet esse, quia etiam ipsa vita, vel quidquid sic diceretur, participat ipsum esse, ut dicit Dionysius, V cap. de Div. Nom. Esse autem participatum finitur ad capacitatem participantis. Unde solus Deus, qui est ipsum

Q. 75, A. 5

solute form, and not something composed of matter and form. For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be received into it as individuals, and so it would only know the individual: just as it happens with the sensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal organ; since matter is the principle by which forms are individualized. It follows, therefore, that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form. Reply Obj. 1: The First Act is the universal principle of all acts; because It is infinite, virtually precontaining all things, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Wherefore things participate of It not as a part of themselves, but by diffusion of Its processions. Now as potentiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act. But the acts received which proceed from the First Infinite Act, and are participations thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot be one potentiality which receives all acts, as there is one act, from which all participated acts are derived; for then the receptive potentiality would equal the active potentiality of the First Act. Now the receptive potentiality in the intellectual soul is other than the receptive potentiality of first matter, as appears from the diversity of the things received by each. For primary matter receives individual forms; whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms. Hence the existence of such a potentiality in the intellectual soul does not prove that the soul is composed of matter and form. Reply Obj. 2: To be a subject and to be changed belong to matter by reason of its being in potentiality. As, therefore, the potentiality of the intelligence is one thing and the potentiality of primary matter another, so in each is there a different reason of subjection and change. For the intelligence is subject to knowledge, and is changed from ignorance to knowledge, by reason of its being in potentiality with regard to the intelligible species. Reply Obj. 3: The form causes matter to be, and so does the agent; wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far as it actualizes it by transmuting it to the act of a form. A subsistent form, however, does not owe its existence to some formal principle, nor has it a cause transmuting it from potentiality to act. So after the words quoted above, the Philosopher concludes, that in things composed of matter and form there is no other cause but that which moves from potentiality to act; while whatsoever things have no matter are simply beings at once. Reply Obj. 4: Everything participated is compared to the participator as its act. But whatever created form be supposed to subsist per se, must have existence by participation; for even life, or anything of that sort, is a participator of existence, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Now participated existence is limited by the capacity of the participator; so that God alone, Who is His own existence, is pure

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suum esse, est actus purus et infinitus. In substantiis vero intellectualibus est compositio ex actu et potentia; non quidem ex materia et forma, sed ex forma et esse participato. Unde a quibusdam dicuntur componi ex quo est et quod est, ipsum enim esse est quo aliquid est.

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act and infinite. But in intellectual substances there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of matter and form, but of form and participated existence. Wherefore some say that they are composed of that whereby they are and that which they are; for existence itself is that by which a thing is.

Article 6 Whether the human soul is corruptible? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima humana sit corruptibilis. Quorum enim est simile principium et similis processus, videtur esse similis finis. Sed simile est principium generationis hominum et iumentorum, quia de terra facta sunt. Similis est etiam vitae processus in utrisque, quia similiter spirant omnia, et nihil habet homo iumento amplius, ut dicitur Eccle. III. Ergo, ut ibidem concluditur, unus est interitus hominis et iumentorum, et aequa utriusque conditio. Sed anima brutorum animalium est corruptibilis. Ergo et anima humana est corruptibilis. Praeterea, omne quod est ex nihilo, vertibile est in nihilum, quia finis debet respondere principio. Sed sicut dicitur Sap. II, ex nihilo nati sumus, quod verum est non solum quantum ad corpus, sed etiam quantum ad animam. Ergo ut ibidem concluditur, post hoc erimus tanquam non fuerimus, etiam secundum animam. Praeterea, nulla res est sine propria operatione. Sed propria operatio animae, quae est intelligere cum phantasmate, non potest esse sine corpore, nihil enim sine phantasmate intelligit anima; phantasma autem non est sine corpore, ut dicitur in libro de Anima. Ergo anima non potest remanere, destructo corpore. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod animae humanae habent ex bonitate divina quod sint intellectuales et quod habeant substantialem vitam inconsumptibilem. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere animam humanam, quam dicimus intellectivum principium, esse incorruptibilem. Dupliciter enim aliquid corrumpitur, uno modo, per se; alio modo, per accidens. Impossibile est autem aliquid subsistens generari aut corrumpi per accidens, idest aliquo generato vel corrupto. Sic enim competit alicui generari et corrumpi, sicut et esse, quod per generationem acquiritur et per corruptionem amittitur. Unde quod per se habet esse, non potest generari vel corrumpi nisi per se, quae vero non subsistunt, ut accidentia et formae materiales, dicuntur fieri et corrumpi per generationem et corruptionem compositorum. Ostensum est autem supra quod animae bru-

Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul is corruptible. For those things that have a like beginning and process seemingly have a like end. But the beginning, by generation, of men is like that of animals, for they are made from the earth. And the process of life is alike in both; because all things breathe alike, and man hath nothing more than the beast, as it is written (Eccl 3:19). Therefore, as the same text concludes, the death of man and beast is one, and the condition of both is equal. But the souls of brute animals are corruptible. Therefore, also, the human soul is corruptible. Obj. 2: Further, whatever is out of nothing can return to nothingness; because the end should correspond to the beginning. But as it is written (Wis 2:2), We are born of nothing; which is true, not only of the body, but also of the soul. Therefore, as is concluded in the same passage, After this we shall be as if we had not been, even as to our soul. Obj. 3: Further, nothing is without its own proper operation. But the operation proper to the soul, which is to understand through a phantasm, cannot be without the body. For the soul understands nothing without a phantasm; and there is no phantasm without the body as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1). Therefore the soul cannot survive the dissolution of the body. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that human souls owe to Divine goodness that they are intellectual, and that they have an incorruptible substantial life. I answer that, We must assert that the intellectual principle which we call the human soul is incorruptible. For a thing may be corrupted in two ways—per se, and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any substance to be generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by the generation or corruption of something else. For generation and corruption belong to a thing, just as existence belongs to it, which is acquired by generation and lost by corruption. Therefore, whatever has existence per se cannot be generated or corrupted except per se; while things which do not subsist, such as accidents and material forms, acquire existence or lose it through the generation or corruption of composite things. Now it was shown above (AA. 2, 3) that the souls of

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torum non sunt per se subsistentes, sed sola anima humana. Unde animae brutorum corrumpuntur, corruptis corporibus, anima autem humana non posset corrumpi, nisi per se corrumperetur. Quod quidem omnino est impossibile non solum de ipsa, sed de quolibet subsistente quod est forma tantum. Manifestum est enim quod id quod secundum se convenit alicui, est inseparabile ab ipso. Esse autem per se convenit formae, quae est actus. Unde materia secundum hoc acquirit esse in actu, quod acquirit formam, secundum hoc autem accidit in ea corruptio, quod separatur forma ab ea. Impossibile est autem quod forma separetur a seipsa. Unde impossibile est quod forma subsistens desinat esse. Dato etiam quod anima esset ex materia et forma composita, ut quidam dicunt, adhuc oporteret ponere eam incorruptibilem. Non enim invenitur corruptio nisi ubi invenitur contrarietas, generationes enim et corruptiones ex contrariis et in contraria sunt; unde corpora caelestia, quia non habent materiam contrarietati subiectam, incorruptibilia sunt. In anima autem intellectiva non potest esse aliqua contrarietas. Recipit enim secundum modum sui esse, ea vero quae in ipsa recipiuntur, sunt absque contrarietate; quia etiam rationes contrariorum in intellectu non sunt contrariae, sed est una scientia contrariorum. Impossibile est ergo quod anima intellectiva sit corruptibilis. Potest etiam huius rei accipi signum ex hoc, quod unumquodque naturaliter suo modo esse desiderat. Desiderium autem in rebus cognoscentibus sequitur cognitionem. Sensus autem non cognoscit esse nisi sub hic et nunc, sed intellectus apprehendit esse absolute, et secundum omne tempus. Unde omne habens intellectum naturaliter desiderat esse semper. Naturale autem desiderium non potest esse inane. Omnis igitur intellectualis substantia est incorruptibilis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Salomon inducit rationem illam ex persona insipientium, ut exprimitur Sap. II. Quod ergo dicitur quod homo et alia animalia habent simile generationis principium, verum est quantum ad corpus, similiter enim de terra facta sunt omnia animalia. Non autem quantum ad animam, nam anima brutorum producitur ex virtute aliqua corporea, anima vero humana a Deo. Et ad hoc significandum dicitur Gen., quantum ad alia animalia, producat terra animam viventem, quantum vero ad hominem, dicitur quod inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae. Et ideo concluditur Eccle. ult., revertatur pulvis in terram suam, unde erat, et spiritus redeat ad Deum qui dedit illum. Similiter processus vitae est similis quantum ad corpus; ad quod pertinet quod dicitur in Eccle., similiter spirant omnia; et Sap. II, fumus et flatus est in naribus nostris et cetera. Sed non est similis processus quantum ad animam, quia ho-

Q. 75, A. 6

brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the human soul is; so that the souls of brutes are corrupted, when their bodies are corrupted; while the human soul could not be corrupted unless it were corrupted per se. This, indeed, is impossible, not only as regards the human soul, but also as regards anything subsistent that is a form alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing by virtue of itself is inseparable from it; but existence belongs to a form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore matter acquires actual existence as it acquires the form; while it is corrupted so far as the form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form to be separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a subsistent form to cease to exist. Granted even that the soul is composed of matter and form, as some pretend, we should nevertheless have to maintain that it is incorruptible. For corruption is found only where there is contrariety; since generation and corruption are from contraries and into contraries. Wherefore the heavenly bodies, since they have no matter subject to contrariety, are incorruptible. Now there can be no contrariety in the intellectual soul; for it receives according to the manner of its existence, and those things which it receives are without contrariety; for the notions even of contraries are not themselves contrary, since contraries belong to the same knowledge. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual soul to be corruptible. Moreover we may take a sign of this from the fact that everything naturally aspires to existence after its own manner. Now, in things that have knowledge, desire ensues upon knowledge. The senses indeed do not know existence, except under the conditions of here and now, whereas the intellect apprehends existence absolutely, and for all time; so that everything that has an intellect naturally desires always to exist. But a natural desire cannot be in vain. Therefore every intellectual substance is incorruptible. Reply Obj. 1: Solomon reasons thus in the person of the foolish, as expressed in the words of Wisdom 2. Therefore the saying that man and animals have a like beginning in generation is true of the body; for all animals alike are made of earth. But it is not true of the soul. For the souls of brutes are produced by some power of the body; whereas the human soul is produced by God. To signify this it is written as to other animals: Let the earth bring forth the living soul (Gen 1:24): while of man it is written (Gen 2:7) that He breathed into his face the breath of life. And so in the last chapter of Ecclesiastes (12:7) it is concluded: (Before) the dust return into its earth from whence it was; and the spirit return to God Who gave it. Again the process of life is alike as to the body, concerning which it is written (Eccl 3:19): All things breathe alike, and (Wis 2:2), The breath in our nostrils is smoke. But the process is not alike of the soul; for man is intelligent, whereas animals are not. Hence it is false to

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mo intelligit, non autem animalia bruta. Unde falsum est quod dicitur, nihil habet homo iumento amplius. Et ideo similis est interitus quantum ad corpus, sed non quantum ad animam. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut posse creari dicitur aliquid non per potentiam passivam, sed solum per potentiam activam creantis, qui ex nihilo potest aliquid producere; ita cum dicitur aliquid vertibile in nihil, non importatur in creatura potentia ad non esse, sed in creatore potentia ad hoc quod esse non influat. Dicitur autem aliquid corruptibile per hoc, quod inest ei potentia ad non esse. Ad tertium dicendum quod intelligere cum phantasmate est propria operatio animae secundum quod corpori est unita. Separata autem a corpore habebit alium modum intelligendi, similem aliis substantiis a corpore separatis, ut infra melius patebit.

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say: Man has nothing more than beasts. Thus death comes to both alike as to the body, but not as to the soul.

Reply Obj. 2: As a thing can be created by reason, not of a passive potentiality, but only of the active potentiality of the Creator, Who can produce something out of nothing, so when we say that a thing can be reduced to nothing, we do not imply in the creature a potentiality to non-existence, but in the Creator the power of ceasing to sustain existence. But a thing is said to be corruptible because there is in it a potentiality to non-existence. Reply Obj. 3: To understand through a phantasm is the proper operation of the soul by virtue of its union with the body. After separation from the body it will have another mode of understanding, similar to other substances separated from bodies, as will appear later on (Q. 89, A. 1).

Article 7 Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima et angelus sint unius speciei. Unumquodque enim ordinatur ad proprium finem per naturam suae speciei, per quam habet inclinationem ad finem. Sed idem est finis animae et angeli, scilicet beatitudo aeterna. Ergo sunt unius speciei. Praeterea, ultima differentia specifica est nobilissima, quia complet rationem speciei. Sed nihil est nobilius in angelo et anima quam intellectuale esse. Ergo conveniunt anima et angelus in ultima differentia specifica. Ergo sunt unius speciei. Praeterea, anima ab angelo differre non videtur nisi per hoc, quod est corpori unita. Corpus autem, cum sit extra essentiam animae, non videtur ad eius speciem pertinere. Ergo anima et angelus sunt unius speciei. Sed contra, quorum sunt diversae operationes naturales, ipsa differunt specie. Sed animae et angeli sunt diversae operationes naturales, quia ut dicit Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom., mentes angelicae simplices et beatos intellectus habent, non de visibilibus congregantes divinam cognitionem; cuius contrarium postmodum de anima dicit. Anima igitur et angelus non sunt unius speciei. Respondeo dicendum quod Origenes posuit omnes animas humanas et angelos esse unius speciei. Et hoc ideo, quia posuit diversitatem gradus in huiusmodi substantiis inventam, accidentalem, utpote ex libero arbitrio provenientem, ut supra dictum est.

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is of the same species as an angel. For each thing is ordained to its proper end by the nature of its species, whence is derived its inclination for that end. But the end of the soul is the same as that of an angel—namely, eternal happiness. Therefore they are of the same species. Obj. 2: Further, the ultimate specific difference is the noblest, because it completes the nature of the species. But there is nothing nobler either in an angel or in the soul than their intellectual nature. Therefore the soul and the angel agree in the ultimate specific difference: therefore they belong to the same species. Obj. 3: Further, it seems that the soul does not differ from an angel except in its union with the body. But as the body is outside the essence of the soul, it seems that it does not belong to its species. Therefore the soul and angel are of the same species. On the contrary, Things which have different natural operations are of different species. But the natural operations of the soul and of an angel are different; since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), Angelic minds have simple and blessed intelligence, not gathering their knowledge of Divine things from visible things. Subsequently he says the contrary to this of the soul. Therefore the soul and an angel are not of the same species. I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon iii, 5) held that human souls and angels are all of the same species; and this because he supposed that in these substances the difference of degree was accidental, as resulting from their free-will: as we have seen above (Q. 47, A. 2).

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Quod non potest esse, quia in substantiis incorporeis non potest esse diversitas secundum numerum absque diversitate secundum speciem, et absque naturali inaequalitate. Quia si non sint compositae ex materia et forma, sed sint formae subsistentes, manifestum est quod necesse erit in eis esse diversitatem in specie. Non enim potest intelligi quod aliqua forma separata sit nisi una unius speciei, sicut si esset albedo separata, non posset esse nisi una tantum; haec enim albedo non differt ab illa nisi per hoc, quod est huius vel illius. Diversitas autem secundum speciem semper habet diversitatem naturalem concomitantem, sicut in speciebus colorum unus est perfectior altero, et similiter in aliis. Et hoc ideo, quia differentiae dividentes genus sunt contrariae; contraria autem se habent secundum perfectum et imperfectum, quia principium contrarietatis est privatio et habitus ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Idem etiam sequeretur, si huiusmodi substantiae essent compositae ex materia et forma. Si enim materia huius distinguitur a materia illius, necesse est quod vel forma sit principium distinctionis materiae, ut scilicet materiae sint diversae propter habitudinem ad diversas formas, et tunc sequitur adhuc diversitas secundum speciem et inaequalitas naturalis. Vel materia erit principium distinctionis formarum; nec poterit dici materia haec alia ab illa, nisi secundum divisionem quantitativam, quae non habet locum in substantiis incorporeis, cuiusmodi sunt angelus et anima. Unde non potest esse quod angelus et anima sint unius speciei. Quomodo autem sint plures animae unius speciei infra ostendetur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de fine proximo et naturali. Beatitudo autem aeterna est finis ultimus et supernaturalis. Ad secundum dicendum quod differentia specifica ultima est nobilissima, inquantum est maxime determinata, per modum quo actus est nobilior potentia. Sic autem intellectuale non est nobilissimum, quia est indeterminatum et commune ad multos intellectualitatis gradus, sicut sensibile ad multos gradus in esse sensibili. Unde sicut non omnia sensibilia sunt unius speciei, ita nec omnia intellectualia. Ad tertium dicendum quod corpus non est de essentia animae, sed anima ex natura suae essentiae habet quod sit corpori unibilis. Unde nec proprie anima est in specie; sed compositum. Et hoc ipsum quod anima quodammodo indiget corpore ad suam operationem, ostendit quod anima tenet inferiorem gradum intellectualitatis quam angelus, qui corpori non unitur.

Q. 75, A. 7

But this cannot be; for in incorporeal substances there cannot be diversity of number without diversity of species and inequality of nature; because, as they are not composed of matter and form, but are subsistent forms, it is clear that there is necessarily among them a diversity of species. For a separate form cannot be understood otherwise than as one of a single species; thus, supposing a separate whiteness to exist, it could only be one; forasmuch as one whiteness does not differ from another except as in this or that subject. But diversity of species is always accompanied with a diversity of nature; thus in species of colors one is more perfect than another; and the same applies to other species, because differences which divide a genus are contrary to one another. Contraries, however, are compared to one another as the perfect to the imperfect, since the principle of contrariety is habit, and privation thereof, as is written, Metaph. x (Did. ix, 4). The same would follow if the aforesaid substances were composed of matter and form. For if the matter of one be distinct from the matter of another, it follows that either the form is the principle of the distinction of matter—that is to say, that the matter is distinct on account of its relation to diverse forms; and even then there would result a difference of species and inequality of nature: or else the matter is the principle of the distinction of forms. But one matter cannot be distinct from another, except by a distinction of quantity, which has no place in these incorporeal substances, such as an angel and the soul; so that it is not possible for the angel and the soul to be of the same species. How it is that there can be many souls of one species will be explained later (Q. 76, A. 2, ad 1). Reply Obj. 1: This argument proceeds from the proximate and natural end. Eternal happiness is the ultimate and supernatural end. Reply Obj. 2: The ultimate specific difference is the noblest because it is the most determinate, in the same way as actuality is nobler than potentiality. Thus, however, the intellectual faculty is not the noblest, because it is indeterminate and common to many degrees of intellectuality; as the sensible faculty is common to many degrees in the sensible nature. Hence, as all sensible things are not of one species, so neither are all intellectual things of one species. Reply Obj. 3: The body is not of the essence of the soul; but the soul by the nature of its essence can be united to the body, so that, properly speaking, not the soul alone, but the composite, is the species. And the very fact that the soul in a certain way requires the body for its operation, proves that the soul is endowed with a grade of intellectuality inferior to that of an angel, who is not united to a body.

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Question 76 The Union of Body and Soul Deinde considerandum est de unione animae ad corWe now consider the union of the soul with the body; pus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum intellectivum principium uniatur (1) Whether the intellectual principle is united to the corpori ut forma. body as its form? Secundo, utrum intellectivum principium numero (2) Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied multiplicetur secundum multiplicationem numerically according to the number of bodies; or corporum; vel sit unus intellectus omnium is there one intelligence for all men? hominum. Tertio, utrum in corpore cuius forma est principium (3) Whether in the body the form of which is an intellectivum, sit aliqua alia anima. intellectual principle, there is some other soul? Quarto, utrum sit in eo aliqua alia forma (4) Whether in the body there is any other substantial substantialis. form? Quinto, quale debeat esse corpus cuius intellectivum (5) Of the qualities required in the body of which the principium est forma. intellectual principle is the form; Sexto, utrum tali corpori uniatur mediante aliquo (6) Whether it be united to such a body by means of alio corpore. another body? Septimo, utrum mediante aliquo accidente. (7) Whether by means of an accident? Octavo, utrum anima sit tota in qualibet parte (8) Whether the soul is wholly in each part of the body? corporis.

Article 1 Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectivum principium non uniatur corpori ut forma. Dicit enim Philosophus, in III de Anima, quod intellectus est separatus, et quod nullius corporis est actus. Non ergo unitur corpori ut forma. Praeterea, omnis forma determinatur secundum naturam materiae cuius est forma, alioquin non requireretur proportio inter materiam et formam. Si ergo intellectus uniretur corpori ut forma, cum omne corpus habeat determinatam naturam, sequeretur quod intellectus haberet determinatam naturam. Et sic non esset omnium cognoscitivus, ut ex superioribus patet, quod est contra rationem intellectus. Non ergo intellectus unitur corpori ut forma. Praeterea, quaecumque potentia receptiva est actus alicuius corporis, recipit formam materialiter et individualiter, quia receptum est in recipiente secundum modum recipientis. Sed forma rei intellectae non recipitur in intellectu materialiter et individualiter, sed magis immaterialiter et universaliter, alioquin intellectus non esset cognoscitivus immaterialium et universalium, sed

Objection 1: It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that the intellect is separate, and that it is not the act of any body. Therefore it is not united to the body as its form. Obj. 2: Further, every form is determined according to the nature of the matter of which it is the form; otherwise no proportion would be required between matter and form. Therefore if the intellect were united to the body as its form, since every body has a determinate nature, it would follow that the intellect has a determinate nature; and thus, it would not be capable of knowing all things, as is clear from what has been said (Q. 75, A. 2); which is contrary to the nature of the intellect. Therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form. Obj. 3: Further, whatever receptive power is an act of a body, receives a form materially and individually; for what is received must be received according to the condition of the receiver. But the form of the thing understood is not received into the intellect materially and individually, but rather immaterially and universally: otherwise the intellect would not be capable of the knowledge of immaterial and

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singularium tantum, sicut et sensus. Intellectus ergo non unitur corpori ut forma. Praeterea, eiusdem est potentia et actio, idem enim est quod potest agere, et quod agit. Sed actio intellectualis non est alicuius corporis, ut ex superioribus patet. Ergo nec potentia intellectiva est alicuius corporis potentia. Sed virtus sive potentia non potest esse abstractior vel simplicior quam essentia a qua virtus vel potentia derivatur. Ergo nec substantia intellectus est corporis forma. Praeterea, id quod per se habet esse, non unitur corpori ut forma, quia forma est quo aliquid est; et sic ipsum esse formae non est ipsius formae secundum se. Sed intellectivum principium habet secundum se esse, et est subsistens, ut supra dictum est. Non ergo unitur corpori ut forma. Praeterea, id quod inest alicui rei secundum se, semper inest ei. Sed formae secundum se inest uniri materiae, non enim per accidens aliquod, sed per essentiam suam est actus materiae; alioquin ex materia et forma non fieret unum substantialiter, sed accidentaliter. Forma ergo non potest esse sine propria materia. Sed intellectivum principium, cum sit incorruptibile, ut supra ostensum est, remanet corpori non unitum, corpore corrupto. Ergo intellectivum principium non unitur corpori ut forma. Sed contra, secundum Philosophum, in VIII Metaphys., differentia sumitur a forma rei. Sed differentia constitutiva hominis est rationale; quod dicitur de homine ratione intellectivi principii. Intellectivum ergo principium est forma hominis. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere quod intellectus, qui est intellectualis operationis principium, sit humani corporis forma. Illud enim quo primo aliquid operatur, est forma eius cui operatio attribuitur, sicut quo primo sanatur corpus, est sanitas, et quo primo scit anima, est scientia; unde sanitas est forma corporis, et scientia animae. Et huius ratio est, quia nihil agit nisi secundum quod est actu, unde quo aliquid est actu, eo agit. Manifestum est autem quod primum quo corpus vivit, est anima. Et cum vita manifestetur secundum diversas operationes in diversis gradibus viventium, id quo primo operamur unumquodque horum operum vitae, est anima, anima enim est primum quo nutrimur, et sentimus, et movemur secundum locum; et similiter quo primo intelligimus. Hoc ergo principium quo primo intelligimus, sive dicatur intellectus sive anima intellectiva, est forma corporis. Et haec est demonstratio Aristotelis in II de Anima. Si quis autem velit dicere animam intellectivam non esse corporis formam, oportet quod inveniat modum

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universal objects, but only of individuals, like the senses. Therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form. Obj. 4: Further, power and action have the same subject; for the same subject is what can, and does, act. But the intellectual action is not the action of a body, as appears from above (Q. 75, A. 2). Therefore neither is the intellectual faculty a power of the body. But virtue or power cannot be more abstract or more simple than the essence from which the faculty or power is derived. Therefore neither is the substance of the intellect the form of a body. Obj. 5: Further, whatever has per se existence is not united to the body as its form; because a form is that by which a thing exists: so that the very existence of a form does not belong to the form by itself. But the intellectual principle has per se existence and is subsistent, as was said above (Q. 75, A. 2). Therefore it is not united to the body as its form. Obj. 6: Further, whatever exists in a thing by reason of its nature exists in it always. But to be united to matter belongs to the form by reason of its nature; because form is the act of matter, not by an accidental quality, but by its own essence; otherwise matter and form would not make a thing substantially one, but only accidentally one. Therefore a form cannot be without its own proper matter. But the intellectual principle, since it is incorruptible, as was shown above (Q. 75, A. 6), remains separate from the body, after the dissolution of the body. Therefore the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form. On the contrary, According to the Philosopher, Metaph. viii (Did. vii 2), difference is derived from the form. But the difference which constitutes man is rational, which is applied to man on account of his intellectual principle. Therefore the intellectual principle is the form of man. I answer that, We must assert that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. For that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be attributed: for instance, that whereby a body is primarily healed is health, and that whereby the soul knows primarily is knowledge; hence health is a form of the body, and knowledge is a form of the soul. The reason is because nothing acts except so far as it is in act; wherefore a thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now it is clear that the first thing by which the body lives is the soul. And as life appears through various operations in different degrees of living things, that whereby we primarily perform each of all these vital actions is the soul. For the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment, sensation, and local movement; and likewise of our understanding. Therefore this principle by which we primarily understand, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form of the body. This is the demonstration used by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2). But if anyone says that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body he must first explain how it is that this ac-

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quo ista actio quae est intelligere, sit huius hominis actio, experitur enim unusquisque seipsum esse qui intelligit. Attribuitur autem aliqua actio alicui tripliciter, ut patet per Philosophum, V Physic., dicitur enim movere aliquid aut agere vel secundum se totum, sicut medicus sanat; aut secundum partem, sicut homo videt per oculum; aut per accidens, sicut dicitur quod album aedificat, quia accidit aedificatori esse album. Cum igitur dicimus Socratem aut Platonem intelligere, manifestum est quod non attribuitur ei per accidens, attribuitur enim ei inquantum est homo, quod essentialiter praedicatur de ipso. Aut ergo oportet dicere quod Socrates intelligit secundum se totum, sicut Plato posuit, dicens hominem esse animam intellectivam, aut oportet dicere quod intellectus sit aliqua pars Socratis. Et primum quidem stare non potest, ut supra ostensum est, propter hoc quod ipse idem homo est qui percipit se et intelligere et sentire, sentire autem non est sine corpore, unde oportet corpus aliquam esse hominis partem. Relinquitur ergo quod intellectus quo Socrates intelligit, est aliqua pars Socratis ita quod intellectus aliquo modo corpori Socratis uniatur. Hanc autem unionem Commentator, in III de Anima, dicit esse per speciem intelligibilem. Quae quidem habet duplex subiectum, unum scilicet intellectum possibilem; et aliud ipsa phantasmata quae sunt in organis corporeis. Et sic per speciem intelligibilem continuatur intellectus possibilis corpori huius vel illius hominis. Sed ista continuatio vel unio non sufficit ad hoc quod actio intellectus sit actio Socratis. Et hoc patet per similitudinem in sensu, ex quo Aristoteles procedit ad considerandum ea quae sunt intellectus. Sic enim se habent phantasmata ad intellectum, ut dicitur in III de Anima, sicut colores ad visum. Sicut ergo species colorum sunt in visu, ita species phantasmatum sunt in intellectu possibili. Patet autem quod ex hoc quod colores sunt in pariete, quorum similitudines sunt in visu, actio visus non attribuitur parieti, non enim dicimus quod paries videat, sed magis quod videatur. Ex hoc ergo quod species phantasmatum sunt in intellectu possibili, non sequitur quod Socrates, in quo sunt phantasmata, intelligat; sed quod ipse, vel eius phantasmata intelligantur. Quidam autem dicere voluerunt quod intellectus unitur corpori ut motor; et sic ex intellectu et corpore fit unum, ut actio intellectus toti attribui possit. Sed hoc est multipliciter vanum. Primo quidem, quia intellectus non movet corpus nisi per appetitum, cuius motus praesupponit operationem intellectus. Non ergo quia movetur Socrates ab intellectu, ideo intelligit, sed potius e converso, quia intelligit, ideo ab intellectu movetur Socrates.

Q. 76, A. 1

tion of understanding is the action of this particular man; for each one is conscious that it is himself who understands. Now an action may be attributed to anyone in three ways, as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. v, 1); for a thing is said to move or act, either by virtue of its whole self, for instance, as a physician heals; or by virtue of a part, as a man sees by his eye; or through an accidental quality, as when we say that something that is white builds, because it is accidental to the builder to be white. So when we say that Socrates or Plato understands, it is clear that this is not attributed to him accidentally; since it is ascribed to him as man, which is predicated of him essentially. We must therefore say either that Socrates understands by virtue of his whole self, as Plato maintained, holding that man is an intellectual soul; or that intelligence is a part of Socrates. The first cannot stand, as was shown above (Q. 75, A. 4), for this reason, that it is one and the same man who is conscious both that he understands, and that he senses. But one cannot sense without a body: therefore the body must be some part of man. It follows therefore that the intellect by which Socrates understands is a part of Socrates, so that in some way it is united to the body of Socrates. The Commentator held that this union is through the intelligible species, as having a double subject, in the possible intellect, and in the phantasms which are in the corporeal organs. Thus through the intelligible species the possible intellect is linked to the body of this or that particular man. But this link or union does not sufficiently explain the fact, that the act of the intellect is the act of Socrates. This can be clearly seen from comparison with the sensitive faculty, from which Aristotle proceeds to consider things relating to the intellect. For the relation of phantasms to the intellect is like the relation of colors to the sense of sight, as he says in De Anima iii, 5,7. Therefore, as the species of colors are in the sight, so are the species of phantasms in the possible intellect. Now it is clear that because the colors, the images of which are in the sight, are on a wall, the action of seeing is not attributed to the wall: for we do not say that the wall sees, but rather that it is seen. Therefore, from the fact that the species of phantasms are in the possible intellect, it does not follow that Socrates, in whom are the phantasms, understands, but that he or his phantasms are understood. Some, however, tried to maintain that the intellect is united to the body as its motor; and hence that the intellect and body form one thing so that the act of the intellect could be attributed to the whole. This is, however, absurd for many reasons. First, because the intellect does not move the body except through the appetite, the movement of which presupposes the operation of the intellect. The reason therefore why Socrates understands is not because he is moved by his intellect, but rather, contrariwise, he is moved by his intellect because he understands.

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Secundo quia, cum Socrates sit quoddam individuum in natura cuius essentia est una, composita ex materia et forma; si intellectus non sit forma eius, sequitur quod sit praeter essentiam eius; et sic intellectus comparabitur ad totum Socratem sicut motor ad motum. Intelligere autem est actio quiescens in agente, non autem transiens in alterum, sicut calefactio. Non ergo intelligere potest attribui Socrati propter hoc quod est motus ab intellectu. Tertio, quia actio motoris nunquam attribuitur moto nisi sicut instrumento, sicut actio carpentarii serrae. Si igitur intelligere attribuitur Socrati quia est actio motoris eius, sequitur quod attribuatur ei sicut instrumento. Quod est contra Philosophum, qui vult quod intelligere non sit per instrumentum corporeum.

Quarto quia, licet actio partis attribuatur toti, ut actio oculi homini; nunquam tamen attribuitur alii parti, nisi forte per accidens, non enim dicimus quod manus videat, propter hoc quod oculus videt. Si ergo ex intellectu et Socrate dicto modo fit unum, actio intellectus non potest attribui Socrati. Si vero Socrates est totum quod componitur ex unione intellectus ad reliqua quae sunt Socratis, et tamen intellectus non unitur aliis quae sunt Socratis nisi sicut motor; sequitur quod Socrates non sit unum simpliciter, et per consequens nec ens simpliciter; sic enim aliquid est ens, quomodo et unum. Relinquitur ergo solus modus quem Aristoteles ponit, quod hic homo intelligit, quia principium intellectivum est forma ipsius. Sic ergo ex ipsa operatione intellectus apparet quod intellectivum principium unitur corpori ut forma. Potest etiam idem manifestari ex ratione speciei humanae. Natura enim uniuscuiusque rei ex eius operatione ostenditur. Propria autem operatio hominis, inquantum est homo, est intelligere, per hanc enim omnia animalia transcendit. Unde et Aristoteles, in libro Ethic., in hac operatione, sicut in propria hominis, ultimam felicitatem constituit. Oportet ergo quod homo secundum illud speciem sortiatur, quod est huius operationis principium. Sortitur autem unumquodque speciem per propriam formam. Relinquitur ergo quod intellectivum principium sit propria hominis forma. Sed considerandum est quod, quanto forma est nobilior, tanto magis dominatur materiae corporali, et minus ei immergitur, et magis sua operatione vel virtute excedit eam. Unde videmus quod forma mixti corporis habet aliquam operationem quae non causatur ex qualitatibus elementaribus. Et quanto magis proceditur in nobilitate formarum, tanto magis invenitur virtus formae materiam elementarem excedere, sicut anima vegetabilis plus

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Second, because since Socrates is an individual in a nature of one essence composed of matter and form, if the intellect be not the form, it follows that it must be outside the essence, and then the intellect is to the whole Socrates as a motor to the thing moved. Whereas the act of intellect remains in the agent, and does not pass into something else, as does the action of heating. Therefore the action of understanding cannot be attributed to Socrates for the reason that he is moved by his intellect. Third, because the action of a motor is never attributed to the thing moved, except as to an instrument; as the action of a carpenter to a saw. Therefore if understanding is attributed to Socrates, as the action of what moves him, it follows that it is attributed to him as to an instrument. This is contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher, who holds that understanding is not possible through a corporeal instrument (De Anima iii, 4). Fourth, because, although the action of a part be attributed to the whole, as the action of the eye is attributed to a man; yet it is never attributed to another part, except perhaps indirectly; for we do not say that the hand sees because the eye sees. Therefore if the intellect and Socrates are united in the above manner, the action of the intellect cannot be attributed to Socrates. If, however, Socrates be a whole composed of a union of the intellect with whatever else belongs to Socrates, and still the intellect be united to those other things only as a motor, it follows that Socrates is not one absolutely, and consequently neither a being absolutely, for a thing is a being according as it is one. There remains, therefore, no other explanation than that given by Aristotle—namely, that this particular man understands, because the intellectual principle is his form. Thus from the very operation of the intellect it is made clear that the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form. The same can be clearly shown from the nature of the human species. For the nature of each thing is shown by its operation. Now the proper operation of man as man is to understand; because he thereby surpasses all other animals. Whence Aristotle concludes (Ethic. x, 7) that the ultimate happiness of man must consist in this operation as properly belonging to him. Man must therefore derive his species from that which is the principle of this operation. But the species of anything is derived from its form. It follows therefore that the intellectual principle is the proper form of man. But we must observe that the nobler a form is, the more it rises above corporeal matter, the less it is merged in matter, and the more it excels matter by its power and its operation; hence we find that the form of a mixed body has another operation not caused by its elemental qualities. And the higher we advance in the nobility of forms, the more we find that the power of the form excels the elementary matter; as the vegetative soul excels the form of the metal, and

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quam forma metalli, et anima sensibilis plus quam anima vegetabilis. Anima autem humana est ultima in nobilitate formarum. Unde intantum sua virtute excedit materiam corporalem, quod habet aliquam operationem et virtutem in qua nullo modo communicat materia corporalis. Et haec virtus dicitur intellectus. Est autem attendendum quod, si quis poneret animam componi ex materia et forma, nullo modo posset dicere animam esse formam corporis. Cum enim forma sit actus, materia vero sit ens in potentia tantum; nullo modo id quod est ex materia et forma compositum, potest esse alterius forma secundum se totum. Si autem secundum aliquid sui sit forma, id quod est forma dicimus animam, et id cuius est forma dicimus primum animatum, ut supra dictum est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in II Physic., ultima formarum naturalium, ad quam terminatur consideratio philosophi naturalis, scilicet anima humana, est quidem separata, sed tamen in materia; quod ex hoc probat, quia homo ex materia generat hominem, et sol. Separata quidem est secundum virtutem intellectivam, quia virtus intellectiva non est virtus alicuius organi corporalis, sicut virtus visiva est actus oculi; intelligere enim est actus qui non potest exerceri per organum corporale, sicut exercetur visio. Sed in materia est inquantum ipsa anima cuius est haec virtus, est corporis forma, et terminus generationis humanae. Sic ergo Philosophus dicit in III de Anima quod intellectus est separatus, quia non est virtus alicuius organi corporalis. Et per hoc patet responsio ad secundum et tertium. Sufficit enim ad hoc quod homo possit intelligere omnia per intellectum, et ad hoc quod intellectus intelligat immaterialia et universalia, quod virtus intellectiva non est corporis actus.

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the sensitive soul excels the vegetative soul. Now the human soul is the highest and noblest of forms. Wherefore it excels corporeal matter in its power by the fact that it has an operation and a power in which corporeal matter has no share whatever. This power is called the intellect. It is well to remark that if anyone holds that the soul is composed of matter and form, it would follow that in no way could the soul be the form of the body. For since the form is an act, and matter is only in potentiality, that which is composed of matter and form cannot be the form of another by virtue of itself as a whole. But if it is a form by virtue of some part of itself, then that part which is the form we call the soul, and that of which it is the form we call the primary animate, as was said above (Q. 75, A. 5). Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the ultimate natural form to which the consideration of the natural philosopher is directed is indeed separate; yet it exists in matter. He proves this from the fact that man and the sun generate man from matter. It is separate indeed according to its intellectual power, because the intellectual power does not belong to a corporeal organ, as the power of seeing is the act of the eye; for understanding is an act which cannot be performed by a corporeal organ, like the act of seeing. But it exists in matter so far as the soul itself, to which this power belongs, is the form of the body, and the term of human generation. And so the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that the intellect is separate, because it is not the faculty of a corporeal organ.

From this it is clear how to answer the Second and Third objections: since, in order that man may be able to understand all things by means of his intellect, and that his intellect may understand immaterial things and universals, it is sufficient that the intellectual power be not the act of the body. Ad quartum dicendum quod humana anima non Reply Obj. 4: The human soul, by reason of its perest forma in materia corporali immersa, vel ab ea tota- fection, is not a form merged in matter, or entirely emliter comprehensa, propter suam perfectionem. Et ideo braced by matter. Therefore there is nothing to prevent nihil prohibet aliquam eius virtutem non esse corpo- some power thereof not being the act of the body, although ris actum; quamvis anima secundum suam essentiam sit the soul is essentially the form of the body.

corporis forma. Ad quintum dicendum quod anima illud esse in quo ipsa subsistit, communicat materiae corporali, ex qua et anima intellectiva fit unum, ita quod illud esse quod est totius compositi, est etiam ipsius animae. Quod non accidit in aliis formis, quae non sunt subsistentes. Et propter hoc anima humana remanet in suo esse, destructo corpore, non autem aliae formae. Ad sextum dicendum quod secundum se convenit animae corpori uniri, sicut secundum se convenit corpori levi esse sursum. Et sicut corpus leve manet quidem leve cum a loco proprio fuerit separatum, cum aptitudi-

Reply Obj. 5: The soul communicates that existence in which it subsists to the corporeal matter, out of which and the intellectual soul there results unity of existence; so that the existence of the whole composite is also the existence of the soul. This is not the case with other non-subsistent forms. For this reason the human soul retains its own existence after the dissolution of the body; whereas it is not so with other forms. Reply Obj. 6: To be united to the body belongs to the soul by reason of itself, as it belongs to a light body by reason of itself to be raised up. And as a light body remains light, when removed from its proper place, retaining mean-

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ne tamen et inclinatione ad proprium locum; ita anima humana manet in suo esse cum fuerit a corpore separata, habens aptitudinem et inclinationem naturalem ad corporis unionem.

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while an aptitude and an inclination for its proper place; so the human soul retains its proper existence when separated from the body, having an aptitude and a natural inclination to be united to the body.

Article 2 Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied according to the number of bodies? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectivum principium non multiplicetur secundum multiplicationem corporum, sed sit unus intellectus in omnibus hominibus. Nulla enim substantia immaterialis multiplicatur secundum numerum in una specie. Anima autem humana est substantia immaterialis, non enim est composita ex materia et forma, ut supra ostensum est. Non ergo sunt multae in una specie. Sed omnes homines sunt unius speciei. Est ergo unus intellectus omnium hominum. Praeterea, remota causa, removetur effectus. Si ergo secundum multiplicationem corporum multiplicarentur animae humanae, consequens videretur quod, remotis corporibus, multitudo animarum non remaneret, sed ex omnibus animabus remaneret aliquod unum solum. Quod est haereticum, periret enim differentia praemiorum et poenarum. Praeterea, si intellectus meus est alius ab intellectu tuo, intellectus meus est quoddam individuum, et similiter intellectus tuus, particularia enim sunt quae differunt numero et conveniunt in una specie. Sed omne quod recipitur in aliquo, est in eo per modum recipientis. Ergo species rerum in intellectu meo et tuo reciperentur individualiter, quod est contra rationem intellectus, qui est cognoscitivus universalium. Praeterea, intellectum est in intellectu intelligente. Si ergo intellectus meus est alius ab intellectu tuo, oportet quod aliud sit intellectum a me, et aliud sit intellectum a te. Et ita erit individualiter numeratum, et intellectum in potentia tantum, et oportebit abstrahere intentionem communem ab utroque, quia a quibuslibet diversis contingit abstrahere aliquod commune intelligibile. Quod est contra rationem intellectus, quia sic non videretur distingui intellectus a virtute imaginativa. Videtur ergo relinqui quod sit unus intellectus omnium hominum. Praeterea, cum discipulus accipit scientiam a magistro, non potest dici quod scientia magistri generet scientiam in discipulo, quia sic etiam scientia esset forma activa, sicut calor; quod patet esse falsum. Videtur ergo quod eadem numero scientia quae est in magistro, communicetur discipulo. Quod esse non potest, nisi sit

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual principle is not multiplied according to the number of bodies, but that there is one intellect in all men. For an immaterial substance is not multiplied in number within one species. But the human soul is an immaterial substance; since it is not composed of matter and form as was shown above (Q. 75, A. 5). Therefore there are not many human souls in one species. But all men are of one species. Therefore there is but one intellect in all men. Obj. 2: Further, when the cause is removed, the effect is also removed. Therefore, if human souls were multiplied according to the number of bodies, it follows that the bodies being removed, the number of souls would not remain; but from all the souls there would be but a single remainder. This is heretical; for it would do away with the distinction of rewards and punishments. Obj. 3: Further, if my intellect is distinct from your intellect, my intellect is an individual, and so is yours; for individuals are things which differ in number but agree in one species. Now whatever is received into anything must be received according to the condition of the receiver. Therefore the species of things would be received individually into my intellect, and also into yours: which is contrary to the nature of the intellect which knows universals. Obj. 4: Further, the thing understood is in the intellect which understands. If, therefore, my intellect is distinct from yours, what is understood by me must be distinct from what is understood by you; and consequently it will be reckoned as something individual, and be only potentially something understood; so that the common intention will have to be abstracted from both; since from things diverse something intelligible common to them may be abstracted. But this is contrary to the nature of the intellect; for then the intellect would seem not to be distinct from the imagination. It seems, therefore, to follow that there is one intellect in all men. Obj. 5: Further, when the disciple receives knowledge from the master, it cannot be said that the master’s knowledge begets knowledge in the disciple, because then also knowledge would be an active form, such as heat is, which is clearly false. It seems, therefore, that the same individual knowledge which is in the master is communicated to

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unus intellectus utriusque. Videtur ergo quod sit unus the disciple; which cannot be, unless there is one intellect in intellectus discipuli et magistri; et per consequens om- both. Seemingly, therefore, the intellect of the disciple and nium hominum. master is but one; and, consequently, the same applies to all men. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Quantitate Obj. 6: Further, Augustine (De Quant. Animae xxxii) Animae, si plures tantum animas humanas dixerim, ipse says: If I were to say that there are many human souls, I me ridebo. Sed maxime videtur anima esse una quantum should laugh at myself. But the soul seems to be one chiefly ad intellectum. Ergo est unus intellectus omnium homi- on account of the intellect. Therefore there is one intellect num. of all men. Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, in II PhyOn the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) sic., quod sicut se habent causae universales ad universa- that the relation of universal causes to universals is like the lia, ita se habent causae particulares ad particularia. Sed relation of particular causes to individuals. But it is imposimpossibile est quod una anima secundum speciem, sit sible that a soul, one in species, should belong to animals of diversorum animalium secundum speciem. Ergo impos- different species. Therefore it is impossible that one individsibile est quod anima intellectiva una numero, sit diver- ual intellectual soul should belong to several individuals. sorum secundum numerum. Respondeo dicendum quod intellectum esse unum I answer that, It is absolutely impossible for one inomnium hominum, omnino est impossibile. Et hoc qui- tellect to belong to all men. This is clear if, as Plato maindem patet, si, secundum Platonis sententiam homo sit tained, man is the intellect itself. For it would follow that ipse intellectus. Sequeretur enim, si Socratis et Platonis Socrates and Plato are one man; and that they are not est unus intellectus tantum, quod Socrates et Plato sint distinct from each other, except by something outside the unus homo; et quod non distinguantur ab invicem nisi essence of each. The distinction between Socrates and Plato per hoc quod est extra essentiam utriusque. Et erit tunc would be no other than that of one man with a tunic and distinctio Socratis et Platonis non alia quam hominis tu- another with a cloak; which is quite absurd. nicati et cappati, quod est omnino absurdum. Similiter etiam patet hoc esse impossibile, si, secunIt is likewise clear that this is impossible if, according dum sententiam Aristotelis, intellectus ponatur pars, seu to the opinion of Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), it is supposed potentia, animae quae est hominis forma. Impossibile that the intellect is a part or a power of the soul which is the est enim plurium numero diversorum esse unam for- form of man. For it is impossible for many distinct individmam, sicut impossibile est quod eorum sit unum esse, uals to have one form, as it is impossible for them to have nam forma est essendi principium. one existence, for the form is the principle of existence. Similiter etiam patet hoc esse impossibile quocumAgain, this is clearly impossible, whatever one may hold que modo quis ponat unionem intellectus ad hunc et ad as to the manner of the union of the intellect to this or that illum hominem. Manifestum est enim quod, si sit unum man. For it is manifest that, supposing there is one prinprincipale agens et duo instrumenta, dici poterit unum cipal agent, and two instruments, we can say that there is agens simpliciter, sed plures actiones, sicut si unus homo one agent absolutely, but several actions; as when one man tangat diversa duabus manibus, erit unus tangens, sed touches several things with his two hands, there will be one duo tactus. Si vero e converso instrumentum sit unum who touches, but two contacts. If, on the contrary, we supet principales agentes diversi, dicentur quidem plures pose one instrument and several principal agents, we might agentes, sed una actio, sicut si multi uno fune trahant say that there are several agents, but one act; for example, navem, erunt multi trahentes, sed unus tractus. Si vero if there be many drawing a ship by means of a rope; there agens principale sit unum et instrumentum unum, dice- will be many drawing, but one pull. If, however, there is one tur unum agens et una actio, sicut cum faber uno mar- principal agent, and one instrument, we say that there is tello percutit, est unus percutiens et una percussio. one agent and one action, as when the smith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and one stroke. Manifestum est autem quod, qualitercumque intelNow it is clear that no matter how the intellect is united lectus seu uniatur seu copuletur huic vel illi homi- or coupled to this or that man, the intellect has the preceni, intellectus inter cetera quae ad hominem pertinent, dence of all the other things which appertain to man; for principalitatem habet, obediunt enim vires sensitivae in- the sensitive powers obey the intellect, and are at its sertellectui, et ei deserviunt. Si ergo poneretur quod essent vice. Therefore, if we suppose two men to have several intelplures intellectus et sensus unus duorum hominum, puta lects and one sense—for instance, if two men had one eye— si duo homines haberent unum oculum; essent quidem there would be several seers, but one sight. But if there is plures videntes, sed una visio. Si vero intellectus est unus, one intellect, no matter how diverse may be all those things quantumcumque diversificentur alia quibus omnibus in- of which the intellect makes use as instruments, in no way is

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tellectus utitur quasi instrumentis, nullo modo Socrates et Plato poterunt dici nisi unus intelligens. Et si addamus quod ipsum intelligere, quod est actio intellectus, non fit per aliquod aliud organum, nisi per ipsum intellectum; sequetur ulterius quod sit et agens unum et actio una; idest quod omnes homines sint unus intelligens, et unum intelligere; dico autem respectu eiusdem intelligibilis. Posset autem diversificari actio intellectualis mea et tua per diversitatem phantasmatum, quia scilicet aliud est phantasma lapidis in me et aliud in te, si ipsum phantasma, secundum quod est aliud in me et aliud in te, esset forma intellectus possibilis, quia idem agens secundum diversas formas producit diversas actiones, sicut secundum diversas formas rerum respectu eiusdem oculi sunt diversae visiones. Sed ipsum phantasma non est forma intellectus possibilis, sed species intelligibilis quae a phantasmatibus abstrahitur. In uno autem intellectu a phantasmatibus diversis eiusdem speciei non abstrahitur nisi una species intelligibilis. Sicut in uno homine apparet, in quo possunt esse diversa phantasmata lapidis, et tamen ab omnibus eis abstrahitur una species intelligibilis lapidis, per quam intellectus unius hominis operatione una intelligit naturam lapidis, non obstante diversitate phantasmatum. Si ergo unus intellectus esset omnium hominum, diversitas phantasmatum quae sunt in hoc et in illo, non posset causare diversitatem intellectualis operationis huius et illius hominis, ut Commentator fingit in III de Anima. Relinquitur ergo quod omnino impossibile et inconveniens est ponere unum intellectum omnium hominum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet anima intellectiva non habeat materiam ex qua sit, sicut nec angelus, tamen est forma materiae alicuius; quod angelo non convenit. Et ideo secundum divisionem materiae sunt multae animae unius speciei, multi autem angeli unius speciei omnino esse non possunt. Ad secundum dicendum quod unumquodque hoc modo habet unitatem, quo habet esse, et per consequens idem est iudicium de multiplicatione rei, et de esse ipsius. Manifestum est autem quod anima intellectualis, secundum suum esse, unitur corpori ut forma; et tamen, destructo corpore, remanet anima intellectualis in suo esse. Et eadem ratione multitudo animarum est secundum multitudinem corporum; et tamen, destructis corporibus, remanent animae in suo esse multiplicatae. Ad tertium dicendum quod individuatio intelligentis, aut speciei per quam intelligit, non excludit intelligentiam universalium, alioquin, cum intellectus separati sint quaedam substantiae subsistentes, et per consequens particulares, non possent universalia intelligere. Sed materialitas cognoscentis et speciei per quam cognoscitur, universalis cognitionem impedit. Si-

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it possible to say that Socrates and Plato are otherwise than one understanding man. And if to this we add that to understand, which is the act of the intellect, is not affected by any organ other than the intellect itself; it will further follow that there is but one agent and one action: that is to say that all men are but one understander, and have but one act of understanding, in regard, that is, of one intelligible object. However, it would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action from yours by the distinction of the phantasms—that is to say, were there one phantasm of a stone in me, and another in you—if the phantasm itself, as it is one thing in me and another in you, were a form of the possible intellect; since the same agent according to diverse forms produces diverse actions; as, according to diverse forms of things with regard to the same eye, there are diverse visions. But the phantasm itself is not a form of the possible intellect; it is the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm that is a form. Now in one intellect, from different phantasms of the same species, only one intelligible species is abstracted; as appears in one man, in whom there may be different phantasms of a stone; yet from all of them only one intelligible species of a stone is abstracted; by which the intellect of that one man, by one operation, understands the nature of a stone, notwithstanding the diversity of phantasms. Therefore, if there were one intellect for all men, the diversity of phantasms which are in this one and that one would not cause a diversity of intellectual operation in this man and that man. It follows, therefore, that it is altogether impossible and unreasonable to maintain that there exists one intellect for all men. Reply Obj. 1: Although the intellectual soul, like an angel, has no matter from which it is produced, yet it is the form of a certain matter; in which it is unlike an angel. Therefore, according to the division of matter, there are many souls of one species; while it is quite impossible for many angels to be of one species. Reply Obj. 2: Everything has unity in the same way that it has being; consequently we must judge of the multiplicity of a thing as we judge of its being. Now it is clear that the intellectual soul, by virtue of its very being, is united to the body as its form; yet, after the dissolution of the body, the intellectual soul retains its own being. In like manner the multiplicity of souls is in proportion to the multiplicity of the bodies; yet, after the dissolution of the bodies, the souls retain their multiplied being. Reply Obj. 3: Individuality of the intelligent being, or of the species whereby it understands, does not exclude the understanding of universals; otherwise, since separate intellects are subsistent substances, and consequently individual, they could not understand universals. But the materiality of the knower, and of the species whereby it knows, impedes the knowledge of the universal. For as every action

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cut enim omnis actio est secundum modum formae qua agens agit, ut calefactio secundum modum caloris; ita cognitio est secundum modum speciei qua cognoscens cognoscit. Manifestum est autem quod natura communis distinguitur et multiplicatur secundum principia individuantia, quae sunt ex parte materiae. Si ergo forma per quam fit cognitio, sit materialis, non abstracta a conditionibus materiae, erit similitudo naturae speciei aut generis, secundum quod est distincta et multiplicata per principia individuantia, et ita non poterit cognosci natura rei in sua communitate. Si vero species sit abstracta a conditionibus materiae individualis, erit similitudo naturae absque iis quae ipsam distinguunt et multiplicant, et ita cognoscetur universale. Nec refert, quantum ad hoc, utrum sit unus intellectus vel plures, quia si etiam esset unus tantum, oporteret ipsum esse aliquem quendam, et speciem per quam intelligit esse aliquam quandam.

Ad quartum dicendum quod, sive intellectus sit unus sive plures, id quod intelligitur est unum. Id enim quod intelligitur non est in intellectu secundum se, sed secundum suam similitudinem, lapis enim non est in anima, sed species lapidis, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Et tamen lapis est id quod intelligitur, non autem species lapidis, nisi per reflexionem intellectus supra seipsum, alioquin scientiae non essent de rebus, sed de speciebus intelligibilibus. Contingit autem eidem rei diversa secundum diversas formas assimilari. Et quia cognitio fit secundum assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam, sequitur quod idem a diversis cognoscentibus cognosci contingit, ut patet in sensu, nam plures vident eundem colorem, secundum diversas similitudines. Et similiter plures intellectus intelligunt unam rem intellectam. Sed hoc tantum interest inter sensum et intellectum, secundum sententiam Aristotelis, quod res sentitur secundum illam dispositionem quam extra animam habet, in sua particularitate, natura autem rei quae intelligitur, est quidem extra animam, sed non habet illum modum essendi extra animam, secundum quem intelligitur. Intelligitur enim natura communis seclusis principiis individuantibus; non autem hunc modum essendi habet extra animam. Sed secundum sententiam Platonis, res intellecta eo modo est extra animam quo intelligitur, posuit enim naturas rerum a materia se paratas.

Ad quintum dicendum quod scientia alia est in discipulo, et alia in magistro. Quomodo autem causetur, in sequentibus ostendetur.

Q. 76, A. 2

is according to the mode of the form by which the agent acts, as heating is according to the mode of the heat; so knowledge is according to the mode of the species by which the knower knows. Now it is clear that common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by reason of the individuating principles which come from the matter. Therefore if the form, which is the means of knowledge, is material—that is, not abstracted from material conditions—its likeness to the nature of a species or genus will be according to the distinction and multiplication of that nature by means of individuating principles; so that knowledge of the nature of a thing in general will be impossible. But if the species be abstracted from the conditions of individual matter, there will be a likeness of the nature without those things which make it distinct and multiplied; thus there will be knowledge of the universal. Nor does it matter, as to this particular point, whether there be one intellect or many; because, even if there were but one, it would necessarily be an individual intellect, and the species whereby it understands, an individual species. Reply Obj. 4: Whether the intellect be one or many, what is understood is one; for what is understood is in the intellect, not according to its own nature, but according to its likeness; for the stone is not in the soul, but its likeness is, as is said, De Anima iii, 8. Yet it is the stone which is understood, not the likeness of the stone; except by a reflection of the intellect on itself: otherwise, the objects of sciences would not be things, but only intelligible species. Now it happens that different things, according to different forms, are likened to the same thing. And since knowledge is begotten according to the assimilation of the knower to the thing known, it follows that the same thing may happen to be known by several knowers; as is apparent in regard to the senses; for several see the same color, according to different likenesses. In the same way several intellects understand one object understood. But there is this difference, according to the opinion of Aristotle, between the sense and the intelligence—that a thing is perceived by the sense according to the disposition which it has outside the soul—that is, in its individuality; whereas the nature of the thing understood is indeed outside the soul, but the mode according to which it exists outside the soul is not the mode according to which it is understood. For the common nature is understood as apart from the individuating principles; whereas such is not its mode of existence outside the soul. But, according to the opinion of Plato, the thing understood exists outside the soul in the same condition as those under which it is understood; for he supposed that the natures of things exist separate from matter. Reply Obj. 5: One knowledge exists in the disciple and another in the master. How it is caused will be shown later on (Q. 117, A. 1).

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Ad sextum dicendum quod Augustinus intelligit Reply Obj. 6: Augustine denies a plurality of souls, animas non esse plures tantum, quin uniantur in una ra- that would involve a plurality of species. tione speciei.

Article 3 Whether besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another, namely, the sensitive and nutritive? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod praeter animam intellectivam sint in homine aliae animae per essentiam differentes, scilicet sensitiva et nutritiva. Corruptibile enim et incorruptibile non sunt unius substantiae. Sed anima intellectiva est incorruptibilis; aliae vero animae, scilicet sensitiva et nutritiva, sunt corruptibiles, ut ex superioribus patet. Ergo in homine non potest esse una essentia animae intellectivae et sensitivae et nutritivae. Si dicatur quod anima sensitiva in homine est incorruptibilis, contra, corruptibile et incorruptibile differunt secundum genus, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed anima sensitiva in equo et leone et aliis brutis animalibus est corruptibilis. Si igitur in homine sit incorruptibilis, non erit eiusdem generis anima sensitiva in homine et bruto. Animal autem dicitur ex eo quod habet animam sensitivam. Neque ergo animal erit unum genus commune hominis et aliorum animalium. Quod est inconveniens. Praeterea, Philosophus dicit, in libro de Generat. Animal., quod embryo prius est animal quam homo. Sed hoc esse non posset, si esset eadem essentia animae sensitivae et intellectivae, est enim animal per animam sensitivam, homo vero per animam intellectivam. Non ergo in homine est una essentia animae sensitivae et intellectivae. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VIII Metaphys., quod genus sumitur a materia, differentia vero a forma. Sed rationale, quod est differentia constitutiva hominis, sumitur ab anima intellectiva; animal vero dicitur ex hoc quod habet corpus animatum anima sensitiva. Anima ergo intellectiva comparatur ad corpus animatum anima sensitiva, sicut forma ad materiam. Non ergo anima intellectiva est eadem per essentiam cum anima sensitiva in homine; sed praesupponit eam sicut materiale suppositum. Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., neque duas animas esse dicimus in homine uno, sicut Iacobus et alii Syrorum scribunt, unam animalem, qua animatur corpus, et immixta sit sanguini, et alteram spiritualem, quae rationi ministret, sed dicimus unam et ean-

Objection 1: It would seem that besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another, such as the sensitive soul and the nutritive soul. For corruptible and incorruptible are not of the same substance. But the intellectual soul is incorruptible; whereas the other souls, as the sensitive and the nutritive, are corruptible, as was shown above (Q. 75, A. 6). Therefore in man the essence of the intellectual soul, the sensitive soul, and the nutritive soul cannot be the same. Obj. 2: Further, if it be said that the sensitive soul in man is incorruptible; on the contrary, corruptible and incorruptible differ generically, says the Philosopher, Metaph. x (Did. ix, 10). But the sensitive soul in the horse, the lion, and other brute animals, is corruptible. If, therefore, in man it be incorruptible, the sensitive soul in man and brute animals will not be of the same genus. Now an animal is so called from its having a sensitive soul; and, therefore, animal will not be one genus common to man and other animals, which is absurd. Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that the embryo is an animal before it is a man. But this would be impossible if the essence of the sensitive soul were the same as that of the intellectual soul; for an animal is such by its sensitive soul, while a man is a man by the intellectual soul. Therefore in man the essence of the sensitive soul is not the same as the essence of the intellectual soul. Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 2), that the genus is taken from the matter, and difference from the form. But rational, which is the difference constituting man, is taken from the intellectual soul; while he is called animal by reason of his having a body animated by a sensitive soul. Therefore the intellectual soul may be compared to the body animated by a sensitive soul, as form to matter. Therefore in man the intellectual soul is not essentially the same as the sensitive soul, but presupposes it as a material subject. On the contrary, It is said in the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus xv: Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man, as James and other Syrians write; one, animal, by which the body is animated, and which is mingled with the blood; the other, spiritual, which obeys the reason; but we say

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dem esse animam in homine, quae et corpus sua societate that it is one and the same soul in man, that both gives life vivificat, et semetipsam sua ratione disponit. to the body by being united to it, and orders itself by its own reasoning. Respondeo dicendum quod Plato posuit diversas I answer that, Plato held that there were several animas esse in corpore uno, etiam secundum organa di- souls in one body, distinct even as to organs, to which souls stinctas, quibus diversa opera vitae attribuebat; dicens he referred the different vital actions, saying that the nutrivim nutritivam esse in hepate, concupiscibilem in cor- tive power is in the liver, the concupiscible in the heart, and de, cognoscitivam in cerebro. Quam quidem opinionem the power of knowledge in the brain. Which opinion is reAristoteles reprobat, in libro de Anima, quantum ad il- jected by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), with regard to those las animae partes quae corporeis organis in suis operi- parts of the soul which use corporeal organs; for this reabus utuntur, ex hoc quod in animalibus quae decisa vi- son, that in those animals which continue to live when they vunt, in qualibet parte inveniuntur diversae operationes have been divided, in each part are observed the operations animae, sicut sensus et appetitus. Hoc autem non esset, of the soul, as sense and appetite. Now this would not be the si diversa principia operationum animae, tanquam per case if the various principles of the soul’s operations were essentiam diversae, diversis partibus corporis distributa essentially different, and distributed in the various parts of essent. Sed de intellectiva sub dubio videtur relinquere the body. But with regard to the intellectual part, he seems utrum sit separata ab aliis partibus animae solum ratio- to leave it in doubt whether it be only logically distinct from ne, an etiam loco. the other parts of the soul, or also locally. Opinio autem Platonis sustineri utique posset, si poThe opinion of Plato might be maintained if, as he held, neretur quod anima unitur corpori, non ut forma, sed ut the soul was supposed to be united to the body, not as its motor, ut posuit Plato. Nihil enim inconveniens sequitur, form, but as its motor. For it involves nothing unreasonable si idem mobile a diversis motoribus moveatur, praeci- that the same movable thing be moved by several motors; pue secundum diversas partes. Sed si ponamus animam and still less if it be moved according to its various parts. If corpori uniri sicut formam, omnino impossibile videtur we suppose, however, that the soul is united to the body as plures animas per essentiam differentes in uno corpore its form, it is quite impossible for several essentially differesse. Quod quidem triplici ratione manifestari potest. ent souls to be in one body. This can be made clear by three different reasons. Primo quidem, quia animal non esset simpliciter In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely one, unum, cuius essent animae plures. Nihil enim est sim- in which there were several souls. For nothing is absolutely pliciter unum nisi per formam unam, per quam habet one except by one form, by which a thing has existence: beres esse, ab eodem enim habet res quod sit ens et quod cause a thing has from the same source both existence and sit una; et ideo ea quae denominantur a diversis formis, unity; and therefore things which are denominated by varnon sunt unum simpliciter, sicut homo albus. Si igitur ious forms are not absolutely one; as, for instance, a white homo ab alia forma haberet quod sit vivum, scilicet ab man. If, therefore, man were living by one form, the vegeanima vegetabili; et ab alia forma quod sit animal, sci- tative soul, and animal by another form, the sensitive soul, licet ab anima sensibili; et ab alia quod sit homo, scili- and man by another form, the intellectual soul, it would folcet ab anima rationali; sequeretur quod homo non esset low that man is not absolutely one. Thus Aristotle argues, unum simpliciter, sicut et Aristoteles argumentatur con- Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6), against Plato, that if the idea of an tra Platonem, in VIII Metaphys., quod si alia esset idea animal is distinct from the idea of a biped, then a biped anianimalis, et alia bipedis, non esset unum simpliciter ani- mal is not absolutely one. For this reason, against those who mal bipes. Et propter hoc, in I de Anima, contra ponen- hold that there are several souls in the body, he asks (De Antes diversas animas in corpore, inquirit quid contineat il- ima i, 5), what contains them?—that is, what makes them las, idest quid faciat ex eis unum. Et non potest dici quod one? It cannot be said that they are united by the one body; uniantur per corporis unitatem, quia magis anima con- because rather does the soul contain the body and make it tinet corpus, et facit ipsum esse unum, quam e converso. one, than the reverse. Secundo, hoc apparet impossibile ex modo praedicaSecond, this is proved to be impossible by the manner tionis. Quae enim sumuntur a diversis formis, praedi- in which one thing is predicated of another. Those things cantur ad invicem vel per accidens, si formae non sint which are derived from various forms are predicated of one ad invicem ordinatae, puta cum dicimus quod album est another, either accidentally, (if the forms are not ordered to dulce, vel, si formae sint ordinatae ad invicem, erit prae- one another, as when we say that something white is sweet), dicatio per se, in secundo modo dicendi per se, quia su- or essentially, in the second manner of essential predicabiectum ponitur in definitione praedicati. Sicut superfi- tion, (if the forms are ordered one to another, the subject cies praeambula est ad colorem, si ergo dicamus quod belonging to the definition of the predicate; as a surface is corpus superficiatum est coloratum, erit secundus mo- presupposed to color; so that if we say that a body with a

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dus praedicationis per se. Si ergo alia forma sit a qua aliquid dicitur animal, et a qua aliquid dicitur homo, sequeretur quod vel unum horum non possit praedicari de altero nisi per accidens, si istae duae formae ad invicem ordinem non habent; vel quod sit ibi praedicatio in secundo modo dicendi per se, si una animarum sit ad aliam praeambula. Utrumque autem horum est manifeste falsum, quia animal per se de homine praedicatur, non per accidens; homo autem non ponitur in definitione animalis, sed e converso. Ergo oportet eandem formam esse per quam aliquid est animal, et per quam aliquid est homo, alioquin homo non vere esset id quod est animal, ut sic animal per se de homine praedicetur.

Tertio, apparet hoc esse impossibile per hoc, quod una operatio animae, cum fuerit intensa, impedit aliam. Quod nullo modo contingeret, nisi principium actionum esset per essentiam unum. Sic ergo dicendum quod eadem numero est anima in homine sensitiva et intellectiva et nutritiva. Quomodo autem hoc contingat, de facili considerari potest, si quis differentias specierum et formarum attendat. Inveniuntur enim rerum species et formae differre ab invicem secundum perfectius et minus perfectum, sicut in rerum ordine animata perfectiora sunt inanimatis, et animalia plantis, et homines animalibus brutis, et in singulis horum generum sunt gradus diversi. Et ideo Aristoteles, in VIII Metaphys., assimilat species rerum numeris, qui differunt specie secundum additionem vel subtractionem unitatis. Et in II de Anima, comparat diversas animas speciebus figurarum, quarum una continet aliam; sicut pentagonum continet tetragonum, et excedit. Sic igitur anima intellectiva continet in sua virtute quidquid habet anima sensitiva brutorum, et nutritiva plantarum. Sicut ergo superficies quae habet figuram pentagonam, non per aliam figuram est tetragona, et per aliam pentagona; quia superflueret figura tetragona, ex quo in pentagona continetur; ita nec per aliam animam Socrates est homo, et per aliam animal, sed per unam et eandem.

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surface is colored, we have the second manner of essential predication.) Therefore, if we have one form by which a thing is an animal, and another form by which it is a man, it follows either that one of these two things could not be predicated of the other, except accidentally, supposing these two forms not to be ordered to one another—or that one would be predicated of the other according to the second manner of essential predication, if one soul be presupposed to the other. But both of these consequences are clearly false: because animal is predicated of man essentially and not accidentally; and man is not part of the definition of an animal, but the other way about. Therefore of necessity by the same form a thing is animal and man; otherwise man would not really be the thing which is an animal, so that animal can be essentially predicated of man. Third, this is shown to be impossible by the fact that when one operation of the soul is intense it impedes another, which could never be the case unless the principle of action were essentially one. We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul. This can easily be explained, if we consider the differences of species and forms. For we observe that the species and forms of things differ from one another, as the perfect and imperfect; as in the order of things, the animate are more perfect than the inanimate, and animals more perfect than plants, and man than brute animals; and in each of these genera there are various degrees. For this reason Aristotle, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 3), compares the species of things to numbers, which differ in species by the addition or subtraction of unity. And (De Anima ii, 3) he compares the various souls to the species of figures, one of which contains another; as a pentagon contains and exceeds a tetragon. Thus the intellectual soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals, and to the nutritive souls of plants. Therefore, as a surface which is of a pentagonal shape, is not tetragonal by one shape, and pentagonal by another—since a tetragonal shape would be superfluous as contained in the pentagonal—so neither is Socrates a man by one soul, and animal by another; but by one and the same soul he is both animal and man. Reply Obj. 1: The sensitive soul is incorruptible, not by reason of its being sensitive, but by reason of its being intellectual. When, therefore, a soul is sensitive only, it is corruptible; but when with sensibility it has also intellectuality, it is incorruptible. For although sensibility does not give incorruptibility, yet it cannot deprive intellectuality of its incorruptibility.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima sensitiva non habet incorruptibilitatem ex hoc quod est sensitiva, sed ex hoc quod est intellectiva, ei incorruptibilitas debetur. Quando ergo anima est sensitiva tantum, corruptibilis est, quando vero cum sensitivo intellectivum habet, est incorruptibilis. Licet enim sensitivum incorruptionem non det, tamen incorruptionem intellectivo auferre non potest. Ad secundum dicendum quod formae non colloReply Obj. 2: Not forms, but composites, are classicantur in genere vel in specie, sed composita. Homo au- fied either generically or specifically. Now man is corrupttem corruptibilis est, sicut et alia animalia. Unde diffe- ible like other animals. And so the difference of corruptible rentia secundum corruptibile et incorruptibile, quae est and incorruptible which is on the part of the forms does not

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ex parte formarum, non facit hominem secundum genus ab aliis animalibus differre. Ad tertium dicendum quod prius embryo habet animam quae est sensitiva tantum; qua abiecta, advenit perfectior anima, quae est simul sensitiva et intellectiva; ut infra plenius ostendetur. Ad quartum dicendum quod non oportet secundum diversas rationes vel intentiones logicas, quae consequuntur modum intelligendi, diversitatem in rebus naturalibus accipere, quia ratio unum et idem secundum diversos modos apprehendere potest. Quia igitur, ut dictum est, anima intellectiva virtute continet id quod sensitiva habet, et adhuc amplius; potest seorsum ratio considerare quod pertinet ad virtutem sensitivae, quasi quoddam imperfectum et materiale. Et quia hoc invenit commune homini et aliis animalibus, ex hoc rationem generis format. Id vero in quo anima intellectiva sensitiva excedit, accipit quasi formale et completivum, et ex eo format differentiam hominis.

Q. 76, A. 4

involve a generic difference between man and the other animals. Reply Obj. 3: The embryo has first of all a soul which is merely sensitive, and when this is removed, it is supplanted by a more perfect soul, which is both sensitive and intellectual: as will be shown further on (Q. 118, A. 2, ad 2). Reply Obj. 4: We must not consider the diversity of natural things as proceeding from the various logical notions or intentions, which flow from our manner of understanding, because reason can apprehend one and the same thing in various ways. Therefore since, as we have said, the intellectual soul contains virtually what belongs to the sensitive soul, and something more, reason can consider separately what belongs to the power of the sensitive soul, as something imperfect and material. And because it observes that this is something common to man and to other animals, it forms thence the notion of the genus; while that wherein the intellectual soul exceeds the sensitive soul, it takes as formal and perfecting; thence it gathers the difference of man.

Article 4 Whether in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in homine sit alia forma praeter animam intellectivam. Dicit enim Philosophus, in II de Anima, quod anima est actus corporis physici potentia vitam habentis. Comparatur igitur anima ad corpus, sicut forma ad materiam. Sed corpus habet aliquam formam substantialem per quam est corpus. Ergo ante animam praecedit in corpore aliqua forma substantialis. Praeterea, homo et quodlibet animal est movens seipsum. Omne autem movens seipsum dividitur in duas partes, quarum una est movens, et alia est mota, ut probatur in VIII Physic. Pars autem movens est anima. Ergo oportet quod alia pars sit talis quae possit esse mota. Sed materia prima non potest moveri, ut dicitur in V Physic., cum sit ens solum in potentia, quinimmo omne quod movetur est corpus. Ergo oportet quod in homine et in quolibet animali sit alia forma substantialis, per quam constituatur corpus. Praeterea, ordo in formis attenditur secundum habitudinem ad materiam primam, prius enim et posterius dicitur per comparationem ad aliquod principium. Si ergo non esset in homine alia forma substantialis praeter animam rationalem, sed immediate materiae primae inhaereret; sequeretur quod esset in ordine imperfectissimarum formarum, quae immediate inhaerent materiae. Praeterea, corpus humanum est corpus mixtum. Mixtio autem non fit secundum materiam tantum, quia

Objection 1: It would seem that in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that the soul is the act of a physical body which has life potentially. Therefore the soul is to the body as a form of matter. But the body has a substantial form by which it is a body. Therefore some other substantial form in the body precedes the soul. Obj. 2: Further, man moves himself as every animal does. Now everything that moves itself is divided into two parts, of which one moves, and the other is moved, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5). But the part which moves is the soul. Therefore the other part must be such that it can be moved. But primary matter cannot be moved (Phys. v, 1), since it is a being only potentially; indeed everything that is moved is a body. Therefore in man and in every animal there must be another substantial form, by which the body is constituted. Obj. 3: Further, the order of forms depends on their relation to primary matter; for before and after apply by comparison to some beginning. Therefore if there were not in man some other substantial form besides the rational soul, and if this were to inhere immediately to primary matter; it would follow that it ranks among the most imperfect forms which inhere to matter immediately. Obj. 4: Further, the human body is a mixed body. Now mingling does not result from matter alone; for then we

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tunc esset corruptio sola. Oportet ergo quod remaneant formae elementorum in corpore mixto, quae sunt formae substantiales. Ergo in corpore humano sunt aliae formae substantiales praeter animam intellectivam. Sed contra, unius rei est unum esse substantiale. Sed forma substantialis dat esse substantiale. Ergo unius rei est una tantum forma substantialis. Anima autem est forma substantialis hominis. Ergo impossibile est quod in homine sit aliqua alia forma substantialis quam anima intellectiva. Respondeo dicendum quod, si poneretur anima intellectiva non uniri corpori ut forma, sed solum ut motor, ut Platonici posuerunt; necesse esset dicere quod in homine esset alia forma substantialis, per quam corpus ab anima mobile in suo esse constitueretur. Sed si anima intellectiva unitur corpori ut forma substantialis, sicut supra iam diximus, impossibile est quod aliqua alia forma substantialis praeter eam inveniatur in homine. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod forma substantialis in hoc a forma accidentali differt, quia forma accidentalis non dat esse simpliciter, sed esse tale, sicut calor facit suum subiectum non simpliciter esse, sed esse calidum. Et ideo cum advenit forma accidentalis, non dicitur aliquid fieri vel generari simpliciter, sed fieri tale aut aliquo modo se habens, et similiter cum recedit forma accidentalis, non dicitur aliquid corrumpi simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Forma autem substantialis dat esse simpliciter, et ideo per eius adventum dicitur aliquid simpliciter generari, et per eius recessum simpliciter corrumpi. Et propter hoc antiqui naturales, qui posuerunt materiam primam esse aliquod ens actu, puta ignem aut aerem aut aliquid huiusmodi, dixerunt quod nihil generatur aut corrumpitur simpliciter, sed omne fieri statuerunt alterari, ut dicitur in I Physic. Si igitur ita esset, quod praeter animam intellectivam praeexisteret quaecumque alia forma substantialis in materia, per quam subiectum animae esset ens actu; sequeretur quod anima non daret esse simpliciter; et per consequens quod non esset forma substantialis; et quod per adventum animae non esset generatio simpliciter, neque per eius abscessum corruptio simpliciter, sed solum secundum quid. Quae sunt manifeste falsa. Unde dicendum est quod nulla alia forma substantialis est in homine, nisi sola anima intellectiva; et quod ipsa, sicut virtute continet animam sensitivam et nutritivam, ita virtute continet omnes inferiores formas, et facit ipsa sola quidquid imperfectiores formae in aliis faciunt. Et similiter est dicendum de Anima sensitiva in brutis, et de nutritiva in plantis, et universaliter de omnibus formis perfectioribus respectu imperfectiorum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Aristoteles non dicit animam esse actum corporis tantum, sed actum corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis, et quod ta-

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should have mere corruption. Therefore the forms of the elements must remain in a mixed body; and these are substantial forms. Therefore in the human body there are other substantial forms besides the intellectual soul. On the contrary, Of one thing there is but one substantial being. But the substantial form gives substantial being. Therefore of one thing there is but one substantial form. But the soul is the substantial form of man. Therefore it is impossible for there to be in man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul. I answer that, If we suppose that the intellectual soul is not united to the body as its form, but only as its motor, as the Platonists maintain, it would necessarily follow that in man there is another substantial form, by which the body is established in its being as movable by the soul. If, however, the intellectual soul be united to the body as its substantial form, as we have said above (A. 1), it is impossible for another substantial form besides the intellectual soul to be found in man. In order to make this evident, we must consider that the substantial form differs from the accidental form in this, that the accidental form does not make a thing to be simply, but to be such, as heat does not make a thing to be simply, but only to be hot. Therefore by the coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or generated simply, but to be made such, or to be in some particular condition; and in like manner, when an accidental form is removed, a thing is said to be corrupted, not simply, but relatively. Now the substantial form gives being simply; therefore by its coming a thing is said to be generated simply; and by its removal to be corrupted simply. For this reason, the old natural philosophers, who held that primary matter was some actual being—for instance, fire or air, or something of that sort—maintained that nothing is generated simply, or corrupted simply; and stated that every becoming is nothing but an alteration, as we read, Phys. i, 4. Therefore, if besides the intellectual soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial form by which the subject of the soul were made an actual being, it would follow that the soul does not give being simply; and consequently that it is not the substantial form: and so at the advent of the soul there would not be simple generation; nor at its removal simple corruption, all of which is clearly false. Whence we must conclude, that there is no other substantial form in man besides the intellectual soul; and that the soul, as it virtually contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so does it virtually contain all inferior forms, and itself alone does whatever the imperfect forms do in other things. The same is to be said of the sensitive soul in brute animals, and of the nutritive soul in plants, and universally of all more perfect forms with regard to the imperfect. Reply Obj. 1: Aristotle does not say that the soul is the act of a body only, but the act of a physical organic body which has life potentially; and that this potentiality does not

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lis potentia non abiicit animam. Unde manifestum est quod in eo cuius anima dicitur actus, etiam anima includitur; eo modo loquendi quo dicitur quod calor est actus calidi, et lumen est actus lucidi; non quod seorsum sit lucidum sine luce, sed quia est lucidum per lucem. Et similiter dicitur quod anima est actus corporis etc., quia per animam et est corpus, et est organicum, et est potentia vitam habens. Sed actus primus dicitur in potentia respectu actus secundi, qui est operatio. Talis enim potentia est non abiiciens, idest non excludens, animam. Ad secundum dicendum quod anima non movet corpus per esse suum, secundum quod unitur corpori ut forma; sed per potentiam motivam, cuius actus praesupponit iam corpus effectum in actu per animam; ut sic anima secundum vim motivam sit pars movens, et corpus animatum sit pars mota. Ad tertium dicendum quod in materia considerantur diversi gradus perfectionis, sicut esse, vivere, sentire, et intelligere. Semper autem secundum superveniens priori, perfectius est. Forma ergo quae dat solum primum gradum perfectionis materiae, est imperfectissima, sed forma quae dat primum et secundum, et tertium, et sic deinceps, est perfectissima; et tamen materiae immediata. Ad quartum dicendum quod Avicenna posuit formas substantiales elementorum integras remanere in mixto, mixtionem autem fieri secundum quod contrariae qualitates elementorum reducuntur ad medium. Sed hoc est impossibile. Quia diversae formae elementorum non possunt esse nisi in diversis partibus materiae; ad quarum diversitatem oportet intelligi dimensiones, sine quibus materia divisibilis esse non potest. Materia autem dimensioni subiecta non invenitur nisi in corpore. Diversa autem corpora non possunt esse in eodem loco. Unde sequitur quod elementa sint in mixto distincta secundum situm. Et ita non erit vera mixtio, quae est secundum totum, sed mixtio ad sensum, quae est secundum minima iuxta se posita. Averroes autem posuit, in III de Caelo, quod formae elementorum, propter sui imperfectionem, sunt mediae inter formas accidentales et substantiales; et ideo recipiunt magis et minus; et ideo remittuntur in mixtione et ad medium reducuntur, et conflatur ex eis una forma. Sed hoc est etiam magis impossibile. Nam esse substantiale cuiuslibet rei in indivisibili consistit; et omnis additio et subtractio variat speciem, sicut in numeris, ut dicitur in VIII Metaphys. Unde impossibile est quod forma substantialis quaecumque recipiat magis et minus. Nec minus est impossibile aliquid esse medium inter substantiam et accidens. Et ideo dicendum est, secundum Philosophum in I de Generat., quod formae elementorum manent in mixto non actu, sed virtute. Manent enim qualitates propriae elementorum, licet remissae, in quibus est virtus

Q. 76, A. 4

reject the soul. Whence it is clear that when the soul is called the act, the soul itself is included; as when we say that heat is the act of what is hot, and light of what is lucid; not as though lucid and light were two separate things, but because a thing is made lucid by the light. In like manner, the soul is said to be the act of a body, etc., because by the soul it is a body, and is organic, and has life potentially. Yet the first act is said to be in potentiality to the second act, which is operation; for such a potentiality does not reject—that is, does not exclude—the soul. Reply Obj. 2: The soul does not move the body by its essence, as the form of the body, but by the motive power, the act of which presupposes the body to be already actualized by the soul: so that the soul by its motive power is the part which moves; and the animate body is the part moved. Reply Obj. 3: We observe in matter various degrees of perfection, as existence, living, sensing, and understanding. Now what is added is always more perfect. Therefore that form which gives matter only the first degree of perfection is the most imperfect; while that form which gives the first, second, and third degree, and so on, is the most perfect: and yet it inheres to matter immediately. Reply Obj. 4: Avicenna held that the substantial forms of the elements remain entire in the mixed body; and that the mixture is made by the contrary qualities of the elements being reduced to an average. But this is impossible, because the various forms of the elements must necessarily be in various parts of matter; for the distinction of which we must suppose dimensions, without which matter cannot be divisible. Now matter subject to dimension is not to be found except in a body. But various bodies cannot be in the same place. Whence it follows that elements in the mixed body would be distinct as to situation. And then there would not be a real mixture which is in respect of the whole; but only a mixture apparent to sense, by the juxtaposition of particles. Averroes maintained that the forms of elements, by reason of their imperfection, are a medium between accidental and substantial forms, and so can be more or less; and therefore in the mixture they are modified and reduced to an average, so that one form emerges from them. But this is even still more impossible. For the substantial being of each thing consists in something indivisible, and every addition and subtraction varies the species, as in numbers, as stated in Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 3); and consequently it is impossible for any substantial form to receive more or less. Nor is it less impossible for anything to be a medium between substance and accident. Therefore we must say, in accordance with the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 10), that the forms of the elements remain in the mixed body, not actually but virtually. For the proper qualities of the elements remain, though modified;

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formarum elementarium. Et huiusmodi qualitas mixtionis est propria dispositio ad formam substantialem corporis mixti, puta formam lapidis, vel animae cuiuscumque.

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and in them is the power of the elementary forms. This quality of the mixture is the proper disposition for the substantial form of the mixed body; for instance, the form of a stone, or of any sort of soul.

Article 5 Whether the intellectual soul is properly united to such a body? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima intellectiva inconvenienter tali corpori uniatur. Materia enim debet esse proportionata formae. Sed anima intellectiva est forma incorruptibilis. Non ergo convenienter unitur corpori corruptibili. Praeterea, anima intellectiva est forma maxime immaterialis, cuius signum est, quod habet operationem in qua non communicat materia corporalis. Sed quanto corpus est subtilius, tanto minus habet de materia. Ergo anima deberet subtilissimo corpori uniri, puta igni; et non corpori mixto, et terrestri magis. Praeterea, cum forma sit principium speciei, ab una forma non proveniunt diversae species. Sed anima intellectiva est una forma. Ergo non debet uniri corpori quod componitur ex partibus dissimilium specierum. Praeterea, perfectioris formae debet esse perfectius susceptibile. Sed anima intellectiva est perfectissima animarum. Cum igitur aliorum animalium corpora habeant naturaliter insita tegumenta, puta pilorum loco vestium, et unguium loco calceamentorum; habeant etiam arma naturaliter sibi data, sicut ungues, dentes et cornua, ergo videtur quod anima intellectiva non debuerit uniri corpori imperfecto tanquam talibus auxiliis privato. Sed contra est quod dicit Philosophus, in II de Anima, quod anima est actus corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum forma non sit propter materiam, sed potius materia propter formam; ex forma oportet rationem accipere quare materia sit talis, et non e converso. Anima autem intellectiva, sicut supra habitum est, secundum naturae ordinem, infimum gradum in substantiis intellectualibus tenet; intantum quod non habet naturaliter sibi inditam notitiam veritatis, sicut angeli, sed oportet quod eam colligat ex rebus divisibilibus per viam sensus, ut Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom. Natura autem nulli deest in necessariis, unde oportuit quod anima intellectiva non solum haberet virtutem intelligendi, sed etiam virtutem sentiendi. Actio autem sensus non fit sine corporeo instrumento. Oportuit igitur animam intellectivam tali corpori uniri, quod possit esse conveniens organum sensus.

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is improperly united to such a body. For matter must be proportionate to the form. But the intellectual soul is incorruptible. Therefore it is not properly united to a corruptible body. Obj. 2: Further, the intellectual soul is a perfectly immaterial form; a proof whereof is its operation in which corporeal matter does not share. But the more subtle is the body, the less has it of matter. Therefore the soul should be united to a most subtle body, to fire, for instance, and not to a mixed body, still less to a terrestrial body. Obj. 3: Further, since the form is the principle of the species, one form cannot produce a variety of species. But the intellectual soul is one form. Therefore, it should not be united to a body which is composed of parts belonging to various species. Obj. 4: Further, what is susceptible of a more perfect form should itself be more perfect. But the intellectual soul is the most perfect of souls. Therefore since the bodies of other animals are naturally provided with a covering, for instance, with hair instead of clothes, and hoofs instead of shoes; and are, moreover, naturally provided with arms, as claws, teeth, and horns; it seems that the intellectual soul should not have been united to a body which is imperfect as being deprived of the above means of protection. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1) that the soul is the act of a physical organic body having life potentially. I answer that, Since the form is not for the matter, but rather the matter for the form, we must gather from the form the reason why the matter is such as it is; and not conversely. Now the intellectual soul, as we have seen above (Q. 55, A. 2) in the order of nature, holds the lowest place among intellectual substances; inasmuch as it is not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth, as the angels are; but has to gather knowledge from individual things by way of the senses, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But nature never fails in necessary things: therefore the intellectual soul had to be endowed not only with the power of understanding, but also with the power of feeling. Now the action of the senses is not performed without a corporeal instrument. Therefore it behooved the intellectual soul to be united to a body fitted to be a convenient organ of sense.

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Omnes autem alii sensus fundantur supra tactum. Ad organum autem tactus requiritur quod sit medium inter contraria, quae sunt calidum et frigidum, humidum et siccum, et similia, quorum est tactus apprehensivus, sic enim est in potentia ad contraria, et potest ea sentire. Unde quanto organum tactus fuerit magis reductum ad aequalitatem complexionis, tanto perceptibilior erit tactus. Anima autem intellectiva habet completissime virtutem sensitivam, quia quod est inferioris praeexistit perfectius in superiori ut dicit Dionysius in libro de Div. Nom. Unde oportuit corpus cui unitur anima intellectiva, esse corpus mixtum, inter omnia alia magis reductum ad aequalitatem complexionis. Et propter hoc homo inter omnia animalia melioris est tactus. Et inter ipsos homines, qui sunt melioris tactus, sunt melioris intellectus. Cuius signum est, quod molles carne bene aptos mente videmus, ut dicitur in II de Anima.

Now all the other senses are based on the sense of touch. But the organ of touch requires to be a medium between contraries, such as hot and cold, wet and dry, and the like, of which the sense of touch has the perception; thus it is in potentiality with regard to contraries, and is able to perceive them. Therefore the more the organ of touch is reduced to an equable complexion, the more sensitive will be the touch. But the intellectual soul has the power of sense in all its completeness; because what belongs to the inferior nature pre-exists more perfectly in the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Therefore the body to which the intellectual soul is united should be a mixed body, above others reduced to the most equable complexion. For this reason among animals, man has the best sense of touch. And among men, those who have the best sense of touch have the best intelligence. A sign of which is that we observe those who are refined in body are well endowed in mind, as stated in De Anima ii, 9. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hanc obiectionem Reply Obj. 1: Perhaps someone might attempt to analiquis forte vellet evadere per hoc, quod diceret corpus swer this by saying that before sin the human body was inhominis ante peccatum incorruptibile fuisse. Sed haec corruptible. This answer does not seem sufficient; because responsio non videtur sufficiens, quia corpus hominis before sin the human body was immortal not by nature, but ante peccatum immortale fuit non per naturam, sed per by a gift of Divine grace; otherwise its immortality would gratiae divinae donum; alioquin immortalitas eius per not be forfeited through sin, as neither was the immortality peccatum sublata non esset, sicut nec immortalitas dae- of the devil.

monis. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod in materia duplex conditio invenitur, una quae eligitur ad hoc quod sit conveniens formae; alia quae ex necessitate consequitur prioris dispositionis. Sicut artifex ad formam serrae eligit materiam ferream, aptam ad secandum dura; sed quod dentes serrae hebetari possint et rubiginem contrahere, sequitur ex necessitate materiae. Sic igitur et animae intellectivae debetur corpus quod sit aequalis complexionis, ex hoc autem de necessitate materiae sequitur quod sit corruptibile. Si quis vero dicat quod Deus potuit hanc necessitatem vitare, dicendum est quod in constitutione rerum naturalium non consideratur quid Deus facere possit, sed quid naturae rerum conveniat, ut Augustinus dicit, II super Gen. ad Litt. Providit tamen Deus adhibendo remedium contra mortem per gratiae donum. Ad secundum dicendum quod animae intellectivae non debetur corpus propter ipsam intellectualem operationem secundum se; sed propter sensitivam virtutem, quae requirit organum aequaliter complexionatum. Et ideo oportuit animam intellectivam tali corpori uniri, et non simplici elemento, vel corpori mixto in quo excederet ignis secundum quantitatem, quia non posset esse aequalitas complexionis, propter excedentem ignis activam virtutem. Habet autem hoc corpus aequaliter complexionatum quandam dignitatem, per hoc quod est remotum a contrariis; in quo quodammodo assimilatur corpori caelesti.

Therefore we answer otherwise by observing that in matter two conditions are to be found; one which is chosen in order that the matter be suitable to the form; the other which follows by force of the first disposition. The artisan, for instance, for the form of the saw chooses iron adapted for cutting through hard material; but that the teeth of the saw may become blunt and rusted, follows by force of the matter itself. So the intellectual soul requires a body of equable complexion, which, however, is corruptible by force of its matter. If, however, it be said that God could avoid this, we answer that in the formation of natural things we do not consider what God might do; but what is suitable to the nature of things, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. ii, 1). God, however, provided in this case by applying a remedy against death in the gift of grace. Reply Obj. 2: A body is not necessary to the intellectual soul by reason of its intellectual operation considered as such; but on account of the sensitive power, which requires an organ of equable temperament. Therefore the intellectual soul had to be united to such a body, and not to a simple element, or to a mixed body, in which fire was in excess; because otherwise there could not be an equability of temperament. And this body of an equable temperament has a dignity of its own by reason of its being remote from contraries, thereby resembling in a way a heavenly body.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod partes animalis, ut oculus, manus, caro et os, et huiusmodi, non sunt in specie, sed totum, et ideo non potest dici, proprie loquendo, quod sint diversarum specierum, sed quod sint diversarum dispositionum. Et hoc competit animae intellectivae, quae quamvis sit una secundum essentiam, tamen propter sui perfectionem est multiplex in virtute; et ideo, ad diversas operationes, indiget diversis dispositionibus in partibus corporis cui unitur. Et propter hoc videmus quod maior est diversitas partium in animalibus perfectis quam in imperfectis, et in his quam in plantis. Ad quartum dicendum quod anima intellectiva, quia est universalium comprehensiva, habet virtutem ad infinita. Et ideo non potuerunt sibi determinari a natura vel determinatae existimationes naturales, vel etiam determinata auxilia vel defensionum vel tegumentorum; sicut aliis animalibus, quorum animae habent apprehensionem et virtutem ad aliqua particularia determinata. Sed loco horum omnium, homo habet naturaliter rationem, et manus, quae sunt organa organorum, quia per eas homo potest sibi praeparare instrumenta infinitorum modorum, et ad infinitos effectus.

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Reply Obj. 3: The parts of an animal, for instance, the eye, hand, flesh, and bones, and so forth, do not make the species; but the whole does, and therefore, properly speaking, we cannot say that these are of different species, but that they are of various dispositions. This is suitable to the intellectual soul, which, although it be one in its essence, yet on account of its perfection, is manifold in power: and therefore, for its various operations it requires various dispositions in the parts of the body to which it is united. For this reason we observe that there is a greater variety of parts in perfect than in imperfect animals; and in these a greater variety than in plants. Reply Obj. 4: The intellectual soul as comprehending universals, has a power extending to the infinite; therefore it cannot be limited by nature to certain fixed natural notions, or even to certain fixed means whether of defense or of clothing, as is the case with other animals, the souls of which are endowed with knowledge and power in regard to fixed particular things. Instead of all these, man has by nature his reason and his hands, which are the organs of organs (De Anima iii), since by their means man can make for himself instruments of an infinite variety, and for any number of purposes.

Article 6 Whether the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental dispositions? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima intellectiva uniatur corpori mediantibus aliquibus dispositionibus accidentalibus. Omnis enim forma est in materia sibi propria et disposita. Sed dispositiones ad formam sunt accidentia quaedam. Ergo oportet praeintelligi accidentia aliqua in materia ante formam substantialem, et ita ante animam, cum anima sit quaedam substantialis forma. Praeterea, diversae formae unius speciei requirunt diversas materiae partes. Partes autem materiae diversae non possunt intelligi nisi secundum divisionem dimensivarum quantitatum. Ergo oportet intelligere dimensiones in materia ante formas substantiales, quae sunt multae unius speciei. Praeterea, spirituale applicatur corporali per contactum virtutis. Virtus autem animae est eius potentia. Ergo videtur quod anima unitur corpori mediante potentia, quae est quoddam accidens. Sed contra est quod accidens est posterius substantia et tempore et ratione, ut dicitur in VII Metaphys. Non ergo forma accidentalis aliqua potest intelligi in materia ante animam, quae est forma substantialis.

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental dispositions. For every form exists in its proper disposed matter. But dispositions to a form are accidents. Therefore we must presuppose accidents to be in matter before the substantial form; and therefore before the soul, since the soul is a substantial form. Obj. 2: Further, various forms of one species require various parts of matter. But various parts of matter are unintelligible without division in measurable quantities. Therefore we must suppose dimensions in matter before the substantial forms, which are many belonging to one species. Obj. 3: Further, what is spiritual is connected with what is corporeal by virtual contact. But the virtue of the soul is its power. Therefore it seems that the soul is united to the body by means of a power, which is an accident. On the contrary, Accident is posterior to substance, both in the order of time and in the order of reason, as the Philosopher says, Metaph. vii (Did. vi, 1). Therefore it is unintelligible that any accidental form exist in matter before the soul, which is the substantial form.

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Respondeo dicendum quod, si anima uniretur corpori solum ut motor, nihil prohiberet, immo magis necessarium esset esse aliquas dispositiones medias inter animam et corpus, potentiam scilicet ex parte animae, per quam moveret corpus; et aliquam habilitatem ex parte corporis, per quam corpus esset ab anima mobile. Sed si anima intellectiva unitur corpori ut forma substantialis, sicut iam supra dictum est, impossibile est quod aliqua dispositio accidentalis cadat media inter corpus et animam, vel inter quamcumque formam substantialem et materiam suam. Et huius ratio est quia, cum materia sit in potentia ad omnes actus ordine quodam, oportet quod id quod est primum simpliciter in actibus, primo in materia intelligatur. Primum autem inter omnes actus est esse. Impossibile est ergo intelligere materiam prius esse calidam vel quantam, quam esse in actu. Esse autem in actu habet per formam substantialem, quae facit esse simpliciter, ut iam dictum est. Unde impossibile est quod quaecumque dispositiones accidentales praeexistant in materia ante formam substantialem; et per consequens neque ante animam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, forma perfectior virtute continet quidquid est inferiorum formarum. Et ideo una et eadem existens, perficit materiam secundum diversos perfectionis gradus. Una enim et eadem forma est per essentiam, per quam homo est ens actu, et per quam est corpus, et per quam est vivum, et per quam est animal, et per quam est homo. Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque genus consequuntur propria accidentia. Sicut ergo materia praeintelligitur perfecta secundum esse ante intellectum corporeitatis, et sic de aliis; ita praeintelliguntur accidentia quae sunt propria entis, ante corporeitatem. Et sic praeintelliguntur dispositiones in materia ante formam, non quantum ad omnem eius effectum, sed quantum ad posteriorem. Ad secundum dicendum quod dimensiones quantitativae sunt accidentia consequentia corporeitatem, quae toti materiae convenit. Unde materia iam intellecta sub corporeitate et dimensionibus, potest intelligi ut distincta in diversas partes, ut sic accipiat diversas formas secundum ulteriores perfectionis gradus. Quamvis enim eadem forma sit secundum essentiam quae diversos perfectionis gradus materiae attribuit, ut dictum est; tamen secundum considerationem rationis differt. Ad tertium dicendum quod substantia spiritualis quae unitur corpori solum ut motor, unitur ei per potentiam vel virtutem. Sed anima intellectiva corpori unitur ut forma per suum esse. Administrat tamen ipsum et movet per suam potentiam et virtutem.

Q. 76, A. 6

I answer that, If the soul were united to the body, merely as a motor, there would be nothing to prevent the existence of certain dispositions mediating between the soul and the body; on the contrary, they would be necessary, for on the part of the soul would be required the power to move the body; and on the part of the body, a certain aptitude to be moved by the soul. If, however, the intellectual soul is united to the body as the substantial form, as we have already said above (A. 1), it is impossible for any accidental disposition to come between the body and the soul, or between any substantial form whatever and its matter. The reason is because since matter is in potentiality to all manner of acts in a certain order, what is absolutely first among the acts must be understood as being first in matter. Now the first among all acts is existence. Therefore, it is impossible for matter to be apprehended as hot, or as having quantity, before it is actual. But matter has actual existence by the substantial form, which makes it to exist absolutely, as we have said above (A. 4). Wherefore it is impossible for any accidental dispositions to pre-exist in matter before the substantial form, and consequently before the soul. Reply Obj. 1: As appears from what has been already said (A. 4), the more perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the inferior forms; therefore while remaining one and the same, it perfects matter according to the various degrees of perfection. For the same essential form makes man an actual being, a body, a living being, an animal, and a man. Now it is clear that to every genus follow its own proper accidents. Therefore as matter is apprehended as perfected in its existence, before it is understood as corporeal, and so on; so those accidents which belong to existence are understood to exist before corporeity; and thus dispositions are understood in matter before the form, not as regards all its effects, but as regards the subsequent effect.

Reply Obj. 2: Dimensions of quantity are accidents consequent to the corporeity which belongs to the whole matter. Wherefore matter, once understood as corporeal and measurable, can be understood as distinct in its various parts, and as receptive of different forms according to the further degrees of perfection. For although it is essentially the same form which gives matter the various degrees of perfection, as we have said (ad 1), yet it is considered as different when brought under the observation of reason. Reply Obj. 3: A spiritual substance which is united to a body as its motor only, is united thereto by power or virtue. But the intellectual soul is united by its very being to the body as a form; and yet it guides and moves the body by its power and virtue.

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Article 7 Whether the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima uniatur corpori animalis mediante aliquo corpore. Dicit enim Augustinus, VII super Gen. ad Litt., quod anima per lucem, idest ignem, et aerem, quae sunt similiora spiritui, corpus administrat. Ignis autem et aer sunt corpora. Ergo anima unitur corpori humano mediante aliquo corpore. Praeterea, id quo subtracto solvitur unio aliquorum unitorum, videtur esse medium inter ea. Sed deficiente spiritu, anima a corpore separatur. Ergo spiritus, qui est quoddam corpus subtile, medium est in unione corporis et animae. Praeterea, ea quae sunt multum distantia, non uniuntur nisi per medium. Sed anima intellectiva distat a corpore et quia est incorporea, et quia est incorruptibilis. Ergo videtur quod uniatur ei mediante aliquo quod sit corpus incorruptibile. Et hoc videtur esse aliqua lux caelestis, quae conciliat elementa et redigit in unum.

Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, in II de Anima, quod non oportet quaerere si unum est anima et corpus, sicut neque ceram et figuram. Sed figura unitur cerae nullo corpore mediante. Ergo et anima corpori. Respondeo dicendum quod si anima, secundum Platonicos, corpori uniretur solum ut motor, conveniens esset dicere quod inter animam hominis, vel cuiuscumque animalis, et corpus aliqua alia corpora media intervenirent, convenit enim motori aliquid distans per media magis propinqua movere. Si vero anima unitur corpori ut forma, sicut iam dictum est, impossibile est quod uniatur ei aliquo corpore mediante. Cuius ratio est, quia sic dicitur aliquid unum, quomodo et ens. Forma autem per seipsam facit rem esse in actu, cum per essentiam suam sit actus; nec dat esse per aliquod medium. Unde unitas rei compositae ex materia et forma est per ipsam formam, quae secundum seipsam unitur materiae ut actus eius. Nec est aliquid aliud uniens nisi agens, quod facit materiam esse in actu, ut dicitur in VIII Metaphys.

Unde patet esse falsas opiniones eorum qui posuerunt aliqua corpora esse media inter animam et corpus hominis. Quorum quidam Platonici dixerunt quod anima intellectiva habet corpus incorruptibile sibi naturaliter unitum, a quo nunquam separatur, et eo mediante unitur corpori hominis corruptibili. Quidam vero dixerunt quod unitur corpori mediante spiritu corporeo.

Objection 1: It seems that the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body. For Augustine says (Gen ad lit. vii, 19), that the soul administers the body by light, that is, by fire, and by air, which is most akin to a spirit. But fire and air are bodies. Therefore the soul is united to the human body by means of a body. Obj. 2: Further, a link between two things seems to be that thing the removal of which involves the cessation of their union. But when breathing ceases, the soul is separated from the body. Therefore the breath, which is a subtle body, is the means of union between soul and body. Obj. 3: Further, things which are very distant from one another, are not united except by something between them. But the intellectual soul is very distant from the body, both because it is incorporeal, and because it is incorruptible. Therefore it seems to be united to the body by means of an incorruptible body, and such would be some heavenly light, which would harmonize the elements, and unite them together. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1): We need not ask if the soul and body are one, as neither do we ask if wax and its shape are one. But the shape is united to the wax without a body intervening. Therefore also the soul is thus united to the body. I answer that, If the soul, according to the Platonists, were united to the body merely as a motor, it would be right to say that some other bodies must intervene between the soul and body of man, or any animal whatever; for a motor naturally moves what is distant from it by means of something nearer. If, however, the soul is united to the body as its form, as we have said (A. 1), it is impossible for it to be united by means of another body. The reason of this is that a thing is one, according as it is a being. Now the form, through itself, makes a thing to be actual since it is itself essentially an act; nor does it give existence by means of something else. Wherefore the unity of a thing composed of matter and form, is by virtue of the form itself, which by reason of its very nature is united to matter as its act. Nor is there any other cause of union except the agent, which causes matter to be in act, as the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6). From this it is clear how false are the opinions of those who maintained the existence of some mediate bodies between the soul and body of man. Of these, certain Platonists said that the intellectual soul has an incorruptible body naturally united to it, from which it is never separated, and by means of which it is united to the corruptible body of man. Others said that the soul is united to the body by means of

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Alii vero dixerunt quod unitur corpori mediante luce, quam dicunt esse corpus, et de natura quintae essentiae, ita quod anima vegetabilis unitur corpori mediante luce caeli siderei; anima vero sensibilis, mediante luce caeli crystallini; anima vero intellectualis, mediante luce caeli Empyrei. Quod fictitium et derisibile apparet, tum quia lux non est corpus; tum quia quinta essentia non venit materialiter in compositionem corporis mixti, cum sit inalterabilis, sed virtualiter tantum; tum etiam quia anima immediate corpori unitur ut forma materiae.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de anima inquantum movet corpus, unde utitur verbo administrationis. Et verum est quod partes grossiores corporis per subtiliores movet. Et primum instrumentum virtutis motivae est spiritus, ut dicit Philosophus in libro de Causa Motus Animalium. Ad secundum dicendum quod, subtracto spiritu, deficit unio animae ad corpus, non quia sit medium; sed quia tollitur dispositio per quam corpus est dispositum ad talem unionem. Est tamen spiritus medium in movendo, sicut primum instrumentum motus. Ad tertium dicendum quod anima distat quidem a corpore plurimum, si utriusque conditiones seorsum considerentur, unde si utrumque ipsorum separatim esse haberet, oporteret quod multa media intervenirent. Sed inquantum anima est forma corporis, non habet esse seorsum ab esse corporis; sed per suum esse corpori unitur immediate. Sic enim et quaelibet forma, si consideretur ut actus, habet magnam distantiam a materia, quae est ens in potentia tantum.

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a corporeal spirit. Others said it is united to the body by means of light, which, they say, is a body and of the nature of the fifth essence; so that the vegetative soul would be united to the body by means of the light of the sidereal heaven; the sensible soul, by means of the light of the crystal heaven; and the intellectual soul by means of the light of the empyrean heaven. Now all this is fictitious and ridiculous: for light is not a body; and the fifth essence does not enter materially into the composition of a mixed body (since it is unchangeable), but only virtually: and lastly, because the soul is immediately united to the body as the form to matter. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine speaks there of the soul as it moves the body; whence he uses the word administration. It is true that it moves the grosser parts of the body by the more subtle parts. And the first instrument of the motive power is a kind of spirit, as the Philosopher says (De mot. animal. x). Reply Obj. 2: The union of soul and body ceases at the cessation of breath, not because this is the means of union, but because of the removal of that disposition by which the body is disposed for such a union. Nevertheless the breath is a means of moving, as the first instrument of motion. Reply Obj. 3: The soul is indeed very distant from the body, if we consider the condition of each separately: so that if each had a separate existence, many means of connection would have to intervene. But inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body, it has not an existence apart from the existence of the body, but by its own existence is united to the body immediately. This is the case with every form which, if considered as an act, is very distant from matter, which is a being only in potentiality.

Article 8 Whether the soul is in each part of the body? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima non sit tota in qualibet parte corporis. Dicit enim Philosophus, in libro de Causa Motus Animalium, non opus est in unaquaque corporis parte esse animam; sed in quodam principio corporis existente, alia vivere; eo quod simul nata sunt facere proprium motum per naturam. Praeterea, anima est in corpore cuius est actus. Sed est actus corporis organici. Ergo non est nisi in corpore organico. Sed non quaelibet pars corporis hominis est corpus organicum. Ergo anima non est in qualibet parte corporis tota. Praeterea, in II de Anima dicitur quod sicut se habet pars animae ad partem corporis, ut visus ad pupillam, ita anima tota ad totum corpus animalis. Si igitur

Objection 1: It would seem that the whole soul is not in each part of the body; for the Philosopher says (De mot. animal. x): It is not necessary for the soul to be in each part of the body; it suffices that it be in some principle of the body causing the other parts to live, for each part has a natural movement of its own. Obj. 2: Further, the soul is in the body of which it is the act. But it is the act of an organic body. Therefore it exists only in an organic body. But each part of the human body is not an organic body. Therefore the whole soul is not in each part. Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1) that the relation of a part of the soul to a part of the body, such as the sight to the pupil of the eye, is the same as the re-

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tota anima est in qualibet parte corporis, sequitur quod lation of the soul to the whole body of an animal. If, therequaelibet pars corporis sit animal. fore, the whole soul is in each part of the body, it follows that each part of the body is an animal. Praeterea, omnes potentiae animae in ipsa essenObj. 4: Further, all the powers of the soul are rooted in tia animae fundantur. Si igitur anima tota est in qualibet the essence of the soul. If, therefore, the whole soul be in parte corporis, sequitur quod omnes potentiae animae each part of the body, it follows that all the powers of the sint in qualibet corporis parte, et ita visus erit in aure, et soul are in each part of the body; thus the sight will be in auditus in oculo. Quod est inconveniens. the ear, and hearing in the eye, and this is absurd. Praeterea, si in qualibet parte corporis esset tota Obj. 5: Further, if the whole soul is in each part of the anima, quaelibet pars corporis immediate dependeret ab body, each part of the body is immediately dependent on anima. Non ergo una pars dependeret ab alia, nec una the soul. Thus one part would not depend on another; nor pars esset principalior quam alia, quod est manifeste fal- would one part be nobler than another; which is clearly unsum. Non ergo anima est in qualibet parte corporis tota. true. Therefore the soul is not in each part of the body. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in VI de On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), Trin., quod anima in quocumque corpore et in toto est to- that in each body the whole soul is in the whole body, and in ta, et in qualibet eius parte tota est. each part is entire. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in aliis iam dicI answer that, As we have said, if the soul were tum est, si anima uniretur corpori solum ut motor, pos- united to the body merely as its motor, we might say that it set dici quod non esset in qualibet parte corporis, sed is not in each part of the body, but only in one part through in una tantum, per quam alias moveret. Sed quia anima which it would move the others. But since the soul is united unitur corpori ut forma, necesse est quod sit in toto, et to the body as its form, it must necessarily be in the whole in qualibet parte corporis. body, and in each part thereof. Non enim est forma corporis accidentalis, sed subFor it is not an accidental form, but the substantial form stantialis. Substantialis autem forma non solum est per- of the body. Now the substantial form perfects not only the fectio totius, sed cuiuslibet partis. Cum enim totum con- whole, but each part of the whole. For since a whole consists sistat ex partibus, forma totius quae non dat esse singulis of parts, a form of the whole which does not give existence partibus corporis, est forma quae est compositio et or- to each of the parts of the body, is a form consisting in comdo, sicut forma domus, et talis forma est accidentalis. position and order, such as the form of a house; and such a Anima vero est forma substantialis, unde oportet quod form is accidental. But the soul is a substantial form; and sit forma et actus non solum totius, sed cuiuslibet par- therefore it must be the form and the act, not only of the tis. Et ideo, recedente anima, sicut non dicitur animal et whole, but also of each part. Therefore, on the withdrawal homo nisi aequivoce, quemadmodum et animal pictum of the soul, as we do not speak of an animal or a man unvel lapideum; ita est de manu et oculo, aut carne et osse, less equivocally, as we speak of a painted animal or a stone ut Philosophus dicit. Cuius signum est, quod nulla pars animal; so is it with the hand, the eye, the flesh and bones, corporis habet proprium opus, anima recedente, cum ta- as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1). A proof of which men omne quod retinet speciem, retineat operationem is, that on the withdrawal of the soul, no part of the body respeciei. Actus autem est in eo cuius est actus. Unde opor- tains its proper action; although that which retains its spetet animam esse in toto corpore, et in qualibet eius parte. cies, retains the action of the species. But act is in that which it actuates: wherefore the soul must be in the whole body, and in each part thereof. Et quod tota sit in qualibet parte eius, hinc consideThat it is entire in each part thereof, may be concluded rari potest, quia, cum totum sit quod dividitur in partes, from this, that since a whole is that which is divided into secundum triplicem divisionem est triplex totalitas. Est parts, there are three kinds of totality, corresponding to enim quoddam totum quod dividitur in partes quantita- three kinds of division. There is a whole which is divided tivas, sicut tota linea vel totum corpus. Est etiam quod- into parts of quantity, as a whole line, or a whole body. dam totum quod dividitur in partes rationis et essentiae; There is also a whole which is divided into logical and essicut definitum in partes definitionis, et compositum re- sential parts: as a thing defined is divided into the parts of solvitur in materiam et formam. Tertium autem totum a definition, and a composite into matter and form. There est potentiale, quod dividitur in partes virtutis. is, further, a third kind of whole which is potential, divided into virtual parts. Primus autem totalitatis modus non convenit formis, The first kind of totality does not apply to forms, except nisi forte per accidens; et illis solis formis, quae habent perhaps accidentally; and then only to those forms, which indifferentem habitudinem ad totum quantitativum et have an indifferent relationship to a quantitative whole and partes eius. Sicut albedo, quantum est de sui ratione, ae- its parts; as whiteness, as far as its essence is concerned, is

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qualiter se habet ut sit in tota superficie et in qualibet superficiei parte; et ideo, divisa superficie, dividitur albedo per accidens. Sed forma quae requirit diversitatem in partibus, sicut est anima, et praecipue animalium perfectorum, non aequaliter se habet ad totum et partes, unde non dividitur per accidens per divisionem quantitatis. Sic ergo totalitas quantitativa non potest attribui animae nec per se nec per accidens. Sed totalitas secunda, quae attenditur secundum rationis et essentiae perfectionem, proprie et per se convenit formis. Similiter autem et totalitas virtutis, quia forma est operationis principium.

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equally disposed to be in the whole surface and in each part of the surface; and, therefore, the surface being divided, the whiteness is accidentally divided. But a form which requires variety in the parts, such as a soul, and specially the soul of perfect animals, is not equally related to the whole and the parts: hence it is not divided accidentally when the whole is divided. So therefore quantitative totality cannot be attributed to the soul, either essentially or accidentally. But the second kind of totality, which depends on logical and essential perfection, properly and essentially belongs to forms: and likewise the virtual totality, because a form is the principle of operation. Therefore if it be asked whether the whole whiteness is in the whole surface and in each part thereof, it is necessary to distinguish. If we mean quantitative totality which whiteness has accidentally, then the whole whiteness is not in each part of the surface. The same is to be said of totality of power: since the whiteness which is in the whole surface moves the sight more than the whiteness which is in a small part thereof. But if we mean totality of species and essence, then the whole whiteness is in each part of a surface. Since, however, the soul has not quantitative totality, neither essentially, nor accidentally, as we have seen; it is enough to say that the whole soul is in each part of the body, by totality of perfection and of essence, but not by totality of power. For it is not in each part of the body, with regard to each of its powers; but with regard to sight, it is in the eye; and with regard to hearing, it is in the ear; and so forth. We must observe, however, that since the soul requires variety of parts, its relation to the whole is not the same as its relation to the parts; for to the whole it is compared primarily and essentially, as to its proper and proportionate perfectible; but to the parts, secondarily, inasmuch as they are ordained to the whole. Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of the motive power of the soul. Reply Obj. 2: The soul is the act of an organic body, as of its primary and proportionate perfectible. Reply Obj. 3: An animal is that which is composed of a soul and a whole body, which is the soul’s primary and proportionate perfectible. Thus the soul is not in a part. Whence it does not follow that a part of an animal is an animal. Reply Obj. 4: Some of the powers of the soul are in it according as it exceeds the entire capacity of the body, namely the intellect and the will; whence these powers are not said to be in any part of the body. Other powers are common to the soul and body; wherefore each of these powers need not be wherever the soul is, but only in that part of the body, which is adapted to the operation of such a power.

Si ergo quaereretur de albedine, utrum esset tota in tota superficie et in qualibet eius parte, distinguere oporteret. Quia si fiat mentio de totalitate quantitativa, quam habet albedo per accidens, non tota esset in qualibet parte superficiei. Et similiter dicendum est de totalitate virtutis, magis enim potest movere visum albedo quae est in tota superficie, quam albedo quae est in aliqua eius particula. Sed si fiat mentio de totalitate speciei et essentiae, tota albedo est in qualibet superficiei parte. Sed quia anima totalitatem quantitativam non habet, nec per se nec per accidens, ut dictum est; sufficit dicere quod anima tota est in qualibet parte corporis secundum totalitatem perfectionis et essentiae; non autem secundum totalitatem virtutis. Quia non secundum quamlibet suam potentiam est in qualibet parte corporis; sed secundum visum in oculo, secundum auditum in aure, et sic de aliis. Tamen attendendum est quod, quia anima requirit diversitatem in partibus, non eodem modo comparatur ad totum et ad partes, sed ad totum quidem primo et per se, sicut ad proprium et proportionatum perfectibile; ad partes autem per posterius, secundum quod habent ordinem ad totum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Philosophus loquitur de potentia motiva animae. Ad secundum dicendum quod anima est actus corporis organici, sicut primi et proportionati perfectibilis. Ad tertium dicendum quod animal est quod componitur ex anima et corpore toto, quod est primum et proportionatum eius perfectibile. Sic autem anima non est in parte. Unde non oportet quod pars animalis sit animal. Ad quartum dicendum quod potentiarum animae quaedam sunt in ea secundum quod excedit totam corporis capacitatem, scilicet intellectus et voluntas, unde huiusmodi potentiae in nulla parte corporis esse dicuntur. Aliae vero potentiae sunt communes animae et corpori, unde talium potentiarum non oportet quod quaelibet sit in quocumque est anima; sed solum in illa parte corporis quae est proportionata ad talis potentiae operationem. Ad quintum dicendum quod una pars corporis diReply Obj. 5: One part of the body is said to be nobler citur esse principalior quam alia, propter potentias di- than another, on account of the various powers, of which

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versas quarum sunt organa partes corporis. Quae enim est principalioris potentiae organum, est principalior pars corporis, vel quae etiam eidem potentiae principalius deservit.

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the parts of the body are the organs. For that part which is the organ of a nobler power, is a nobler part of the body: as also is that part which serves the same power in a nobler manner.

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Question 77 The Powers of the Soul in General Deinde considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad We proceed to consider those things which belong to potentias animae. Et primo, in generali; secundo, in spe- the powers of the soul; first, in general, second, in particciali. ular. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum essentia animae sit eius potentia. (1) Whether the essence of the soul is its power? Secundo, utrum sit una tantum potentia animae, vel (2) Whether there is one power of the soul, or several? plures. Tertio, quomodo potentiae animae distinguantur. (3) How the powers of the soul are distinguished from one another? Quarto, de ordine ipsarum ad invicem. (4) Of the orders of the powers, one to another; Quinto, utrum anima sit subiectum omnium (5) Whether the powers of the soul are in it as in their potentiarum. subject? Sexto, utrum potentiae fluant ab essentia animae. (6) Whether the powers flow from the essence of the soul? Septimo, utrum potentia una oriatur ex alia. (7) Whether one power rises from another? Octavo, utrum omnes potentiae animae remaneant (8) Whether all the powers of the soul remain in the in ea post mortem. soul after death?

Article 1 Whether the essence of the soul is its power? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ipsa essentia animae sit eius potentia. Dicit enim Augustinus, in IX de Trin., quod mens, notitia, et amor sunt substantialiter in anima, vel, ut idem dicam, essentialiter. Et in X dicit quod memoria, intelligentia, et voluntas sunt una vita, una mens, una essentia. Praeterea, anima est nobilior quam materia prima. Sed materia prima est sua potentia. Ergo multo magis anima. Praeterea, forma substantialis est simplicior quam accidentalis, cuius signum est, quod forma substantialis non intenditur vel remittitur, sed in indivisibili consistit. Forma autem accidentalis est ipsa sua virtus. Ergo multo magis forma substantialis, quae est anima. Praeterea, potentia sensitiva est qua sentimus, et potentia intellectiva qua intelligimus. Sed id quo primo sentimus et intelligimus est anima, secundum Philosophum, in II de Anima. Ergo anima est suae potentiae. Praeterea, omne quod non est de essentia rei, est accidens. Si ergo potentia animae est praeter essentiam eius, sequitur quod sit accidens. Quod est contra Augustinum, in IX de Trin., ubi dicit quod praedicta non sunt in anima sicut in subiecto, ut color aut figura in corpore,

Objection 1: It would seem that the essence of the soul is its power. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4), that mind, knowledge, and love are in the soul substantially, or, which is the same thing, essentially: and (De Trin. x, 11), that memory, understanding, and will are one life, one mind, one essence. Obj. 2: Further, the soul is nobler than primary matter. But primary matter is its own potentiality. Much more therefore is the soul its own power. Obj. 3: Further, the substantial form is simpler than the accidental form; a sign of which is that the substantial form is not intensified or relaxed, but is indivisible. But the accidental form is its own power. Much more therefore is that substantial form which is the soul. Obj. 4: Further, we sense by the sensitive power and we understand by the intellectual power. But that by which we first sense and understand is the soul, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 2). Therefore the soul is its own power. Obj. 5: Further, whatever does not belong to the essence is an accident. Therefore if the power of the soul is something else besides the essence thereof, it is an accident, which is contrary to Augustine, who says that the foregoing (see Obj. 1) are not in the soul as in a subject as color

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aut ulla alia qualitas aut quantitas, quidquid enim tale est, or shape, or any other quality, or quantity, are in a body; non excedit subiectum in quo est; mens autem potest etiam for whatever is so, does not exceed the subject in which it is: alia amare et cognoscere. Whereas the mind can love and know other things (De Trin. ix, 4). Praeterea, forma simplex subiectum esse non poObj. 6: Further, a simple form cannot be a subject. But test. Anima autem est forma simplex, cum non sit com- the soul is a simple form; since it is not composed of matter posita ex materia et forma, ut supra dictum est. Non ergo and form, as we have said above (Q. 75, A. 5). Therefore the potentia animae potest esse in ipsa sicut in subiecto. power of the soul cannot be in it as in a subject. Praeterea, accidens non est principium substanObj. 7: Further, an accident is not the principle of a subtialis differentiae. Sed sensibile et rationale sunt substan- stantial difference. But sensitive and rational are substantiales differentiae, et sumuntur a sensu et ratione, quae tial differences; and they are taken from sense and reason, sunt potentiae animae. Ergo potentiae animae non sunt which are powers of the soul. Therefore the powers of the accidentia. Et ita videtur quod potentia animae sit eius soul are not accidents; and so it would seem that the power essentia. of the soul is its own essence. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, XI cap. CaeOn the contrary, Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi) says that lest. Hier., quod caelestes spiritus dividuntur in essentiam, heavenly spirits are divided into essence, power, and operavirtutem, et operationem. Multo igitur magis in anima tion. Much more, then, in the soul is the essence distinct aliud est essentia, et aliud virtus sive potentia. from the virtue or power. Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est diceI answer that, It is impossible to admit that the re quod essentia animae sit eius potentia; licet hoc qui- power of the soul is its essence, although some have maindam posuerint. Et hoc dupliciter ostenditur, quantum ad tained it. For the present purpose this may be proved in two praesens. Primo quia, cum potentia et actus dividant ens ways. First, because, since power and act divide being and et quodlibet genus entis, oportet quod ad idem genus re- every kind of being, we must refer a power and its act to feratur potentia et actus. Et ideo, si actus non est in gene- the same genus. Therefore, if the act be not in the genus of re substantiae, potentia quae dicitur ad illum actum, non substance, the power directed to that act cannot be in the potest esse in genere substantiae. Operatio autem ani- genus of substance. Now the operation of the soul is not mae non est in genere substantiae; sed in solo Deo, cuius in the genus of substance; for this belongs to God alone, operatio est eius substantia. Unde Dei potentia, quae est whose operation is His own substance. Wherefore the Dioperationis principium, est ipsa Dei essentia. Quod non vine power which is the principle of His operation is the Dipotest esse verum neque in anima, neque in aliqua crea- vine Essence itself. This cannot be true either of the soul, or tura; ut supra etiam de angelo dictum est. of any creature; as we have said above when speaking of the angels (Q. 54, A. 3). Secundo, hoc etiam impossibile apparet in anima. Second, this may be also shown to be impossible in the Nam anima secundum suam essentiam est actus. Si er- soul. For the soul by its very essence is an act. Therefore if go ipsa essentia animae esset immediatum operationis the very essence of the soul were the immediate principle of principium, semper habens animam actu haberet ope- operation, whatever has a soul would always have actual vira vitae; sicut semper habens animam actu est vivum. tal actions, as that which has a soul is always an actually livNon enim, inquantum est forma, est actus ordinatus ad ing thing. For as a form, the soul is not an act ordained to ulteriorem actum, sed est ultimus terminus generatio- a further act, but the ultimate term of generation. Wherenis. Unde quod sit in potentia adhuc ad alium actum, fore, for it to be in potentiality to another act, does not behoc non competit ei secundum suam essentiam, inquan- long to it according to its essence, as a form, but according tum est forma; sed secundum suam potentiam. Et sic ip- to its power. So the soul itself, as the subject of its power, is sa anima, secundum quod subest suae potentiae, dicitur called the first act, with a further relation to the second act. actus primus, ordinatus ad actum secundum. Invenitur Now we observe that what has a soul is not always actual autem habens animam non semper esse in actu operum with respect to its vital operations; whence also it is said in vitae. Unde etiam in definitione animae dicitur quod est the definition of the soul, that it is the act of a body having actus corporis potentia vitam habentis, quae tamen po- life potentially; which potentiality, however, does not exclude tentia non abiicit animam. Relinquitur ergo quod essen- the soul. Therefore it follows that the essence of the soul is tia animae non est eius potentia. Nihil enim est in poten- not its power. For nothing is in potentiality by reason of an tia secundum actum, inquantum est actus. act, as act. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquiReply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of the mind as it tur de mente secundum quod noscit se et amat se. Sic er- knows and loves itself. Thus knowledge and love as referred go notitia et amor, inquantum referuntur ad ipsam ut co- to the soul as known and loved, are substantially or essengnitam et amatam, substantialiter vel essentialiter sunt tially in the soul, for the very substance or essence of the

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in anima, quia ipsa substantia vel essentia animae cognoscitur et amatur. Et similiter intelligendum est quod alibi dicit, quod sunt una vita, una mens, una essentia. Vel, sicut quidam dicunt, haec locutio verificatur secundum modum quo totum potestativum praedicatur de suis partibus, quod medium est inter totum universale et totum integrale. Totum enim universale adest cuilibet parti secundum totam suam essentiam et virtutem, ut animal homini et equo, et ideo proprie de singulis partibus praedicatur. Totum vero integrale non est in qualibet parte, neque secundum totam essentiam, neque secundum totam virtutem. Et ideo nullo modo de singulis partibus praedicatur; sed aliquo modo, licet improprie, praedicatur de omnibus simul, ut si dicamus quod paries, tectum, et fundamentum sunt domus. Totum vero potentiale adest singulis partibus secundum totam suam essentiam, sed non secundum totam virtutem. Et ideo quodammodo potest praedicari de qualibet parte; sed non ita proprie sicut totum universale. Et per hunc modum Augustinus dicit quod memoria, intelligentia, et voluntas sunt una animae essentia. Ad secundum dicendum quod actus ad quem est in potentia materia prima, est substantialis forma. Et ideo potentia materiae non est aliud quam eius essentia. Ad tertium dicendum quod actio est compositi, sicut et esse, existentis enim est agere. Compositum autem per formam substantialem habet esse substantialiter; per virtutem autem quae consequitur formam substantialem, operatur. Unde sic se habet forma accidentalis activa ad formam substantialem agentis (ut calor ad formam ignis), sicut se habet potentia animae ad animam. Ad quartum dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod forma accidentalis est actionis principium, habet a forma substantiali. Et ideo forma substantialis est primum actionis principium, sed non proximum. Et secundum hoc Philosophus dicit quod id quo intelligimus et sentimus, est anima. Ad quintum dicendum quod, si accidens accipiatur secundum quod dividitur contra substantiam, sic nihil potest esse medium inter substantiam et accidens, quia dividuntur secundum affirmationem et negationem, scilicet secundum esse in subiecto et non esse in subiecto. Et hoc modo, cum potentia animae non sit eius essentia, oportet quod sit accidens, et est in secunda specie qualitatis. Si vero accipiatur accidens secundum quod ponitur unum quinque universalium, sic aliquid est medium inter substantiam et accidens. Quia ad substantiam pertinet quidquid est essentiale rei, non autem quidquid est extra essentiam, potest sic dici accidens, sed solum id quod non causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei. Proprium enim non est de essentia rei, sed ex principiis essentialibus speciei causatur, unde medium est inter essentiam et accidens sic dictum. Et hoc modo potentiae

Q. 77, A. 1

soul is known and loved. In the same way are we to understand what he says in the other passage, that those things are one life, one mind, one essence. Or, as some say, this passage is true in the sense in which the potential whole is predicated of its parts, being midway between the universal whole, and the integral whole. For the universal whole is in each part according to its entire essence and power; as animal in a man and in a horse; and therefore it is properly predicated of each part. But the integral whole is not in each part, neither according to its whole essence, nor according to its whole power. Therefore in no way can it be predicated of each part; yet in a way it is predicated, though improperly, of all the parts together; as if we were to say that the wall, roof, and foundations are a house. But the potential whole is in each part according to its whole essence, not, however, according to its whole power. Therefore in a way it can be predicated of each part, but not so properly as the universal whole. In this sense, Augustine says that the memory, understanding, and the will are the one essence of the soul. Reply Obj. 2: The act to which primary matter is in potentiality is the substantial form. Therefore the potentiality of matter is nothing else but its essence. Reply Obj. 3: Action belongs to the composite, as does existence; for to act belongs to what exists. Now the composite has substantial existence through the substantial form; and it operates by the power which results from the substantial form. Hence an active accidental form is to the substantial form of the agent (for instance, heat compared to the form of fire) as the power of the soul is to the soul. Reply Obj. 4: That the accidental form is a principle of action is due to the substantial form. Therefore the substantial form is the first principle of action; but not the proximate principle. In this sense the Philosopher says that the soul is that whereby we understand and sense. Reply Obj. 5: If we take accident as meaning what is divided against substance, then there can be no medium between substance and accident; because they are divided by affirmation and negation, that is, according to existence in a subject, and non-existence in a subject. In this sense, as the power of the soul is not its essence, it must be an accident; and it belongs to the second species of accident, that of quality. But if we take accident as one of the five universals, in this sense there is a medium between substance and accident. For the substance is all that belongs to the essence of a thing; whereas whatever is beyond the essence of a thing cannot be called accident in this sense; but only what is not caused by the essential principle of the species. For the ‘proper’ does not belong to the essence of a thing, but is caused by the essential principles of the species; wherefore it is a medium between the essence and accident thus un-

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animae possunt dici mediae inter substantiam et accidens, quasi proprietates animae naturales. Quod autem Augustinus dicit, quod notitia et amor non sunt in anima sicut accidentia in subiecto, intelligitur secundum modum praedictum, prout comparantur ad animam, non sicut ad amantem et cognoscentem; sed prout comparantur ad eam sicut ad amatam et cognitam. Et hoc modo procedit sua probatio, quia si amor esset in anima amata sicut in subiecto, sequeretur quod accidens transcenderet suum subiectum; cum etiam alia sint amata per animam. Ad sextum dicendum quod anima, licet non sit composita ex materia et forma, habet tamen aliquid de potentialitate admixtum, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo potest esse subiectum accidentis. Propositio autem inducta locum habet in Deo, qui est actus purus, in qua materia Boetius eam introducit. Ad septimum dicendum quod rationale et sensibile, prout sunt differentiae, non sumuntur a potentiis sensus et rationis; sed ab ipsa anima sensitiva et rationali. Quia tamen formae substantiales, quae secundum se sunt nobis ignotae, innotescunt per accidentia; nihil prohibet interdum accidentia loco differentiarum substantialium poni.

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derstood. In this sense the powers of the soul may be said to be a medium between substance and accident, as being natural properties of the soul. When Augustine says that knowledge and love are not in the soul as accidents in a subject, this must be understood in the sense given above, inasmuch as they are compared to the soul, not as loving and knowing, but as loved and known. His argument proceeds in this sense; for if love were in the soul loved as in a subject, it would follow that an accident transcends its subject, since even other things are loved through the soul. Reply Obj. 6: Although the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has an admixture of potentiality, as we have said above (Q. 75, A. 5, ad 4); and for this reason it can be the subject of an accident. The statement quoted is verified in God, Who is the Pure Act; in treating of which subject Boethius employs that phrase (De Trin. i). Reply Obj. 7: Rational and sensitive, as differences, are not taken from the powers of sense and reason, but from the sensitive and rational soul itself. But because substantial forms, which in themselves are unknown to us, are known by their accidents; nothing prevents us from sometimes substituting accidents for substantial differences.

Article 2 Whether there are several powers of the soul? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint plures potentiae animae. Anima enim intellectiva maxime ad divinam similitudinem accedit. Sed in Deo est una et simplex potentia. Ergo et in anima intellectiva. Praeterea, quanto virtus est superior, tanto est magis unita. Sed anima intellectiva excedit omnes alias formas in virtute. Ergo maxime debet habere unam virtutem seu potentiam. Praeterea, operari est existentis in actu. Sed per eandem essentiam animae homo habet esse secundum diversos gradus perfectionis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo per eandem potentiam animae operatur diversas operationes diversorum graduum. Sed contra est quod Philosophus, in II de Anima ponit plures animae potentias. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere plures animae potentias. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II de Caelo, quae sunt in rebus infima, non possunt consequi perfectam bonitatem, sed aliquam imperfectam consequuntur paucis motibus; superiora vero his adipiscuntur perfectam bonitatem motibus multis; his autem superiora sunt

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several powers of the soul. For the intellectual soul approaches nearest to the likeness of God. But in God there is one simple power: and therefore also in the intellectual soul. Obj. 2: Further, the higher a power is, the more unified it is. But the intellectual soul excels all other forms in power. Therefore above all others it has one virtue or power. Obj. 3: Further, to operate belongs to what is in act. But by the one essence of the soul, man has actual existence in the different degrees of perfection, as we have seen above (Q. 76, AA. 3, 4). Therefore by the one power of the soul he performs operations of various degrees. On the contrary, The Philosopher places several powers in the soul (De Anima ii, 2,3). I answer that, Of necessity we must place several powers in the soul. To make this evident, we observe that, as the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, 12), the lowest order of things cannot acquire perfect goodness, but they acquire a certain imperfect goodness, by few movements; and those which belong to a higher order acquire perfect goodness by many movements; and those yet higher acquire perfect

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quae adipiscuntur perfectam bonitatem motibus paucis; summa vero perfectio invenitur in his quae absque motu perfectam possident bonitatem. Sicut infime est ad sanitatem dispositus qui non potest perfectam consequi sanitatem, sed aliquam modicam consequitur paucis remediis; melius autem dispositus est qui potest perfectam consequi sanitatem, sed remediis multis; et adhuc melius, qui remediis paucis; optime autem, qui absque remedio perfectam sanitatem habet. Dicendum est ergo quod res quae sunt infra hominem, quaedam particularia bona consequuntur, et ideo quasdam paucas et determinatas operationes habent et virtutes. Homo autem potest consequi universalem et perfectam bonitatem, quia potest adipisci beatitudinem. Est tamen in ultimo gradu, secundum naturam, eorum quibus competit beatitudo, et ideo multis et diversis operationibus et virtutibus indiget anima humana. Angelis vero minor diversitas potentiarum competit. In Deo vero non est aliqua potentia vel actio, praeter eius essentiam. Est et alia ratio quare anima humana abundat diversitate potentiarum, videlicet quia est in confinio spiritualium et corporalium creaturarum, et ideo concurrunt in ipsa virtutes utrarumque creaturarum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in hoc ipso magis ad similitudinem Dei accedit anima intellectiva quam creaturae inferiores, quod perfectam bonitatem consequi potest; licet per multa et diversa; in quo deficit a superioribus. Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus unita est superior, si ad aequalia se extendat. Sed virtus multiplicata est superior, si plura ei subiiciantur. Ad tertium dicendum quod unius rei est unum esse substantiale, sed possunt esse operationes plures. Et ideo est una essentia animae, sed potentiae plures.

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goodness by few movements; and the highest perfection is found in those things which acquire perfect goodness without any movement whatever. Thus he is least of all disposed of health, who can only acquire imperfect health by means of a few remedies; better disposed is he who can acquire perfect health by means of many remedies; and better still, he who can by few remedies; best of all is he who has perfect health without any remedies. We conclude, therefore, that things which are below man acquire a certain limited goodness; and so they have a few determinate operations and powers. But man can acquire universal and perfect goodness, because he can acquire beatitude. Yet he is in the last degree, according to his nature, of those to whom beatitude is possible; therefore the human soul requires many and various operations and powers. But to angels a smaller variety of powers is sufficient. In God there is no power or action beyond His own Essence. There is yet another reason why the human soul abounds in a variety of powers—because it is on the confines of spiritual and corporeal creatures; and therefore the powers of both meet together in the soul. Reply Obj. 1: The intellectual soul approaches to the Divine likeness, more than inferior creatures, in being able to acquire perfect goodness; although by many and various means; and in this it falls short of more perfect creatures. Reply Obj. 2: A unified power is superior if it extends to equal things: but a multiform power is superior to it, if it is over many things. Reply Obj. 3: One thing has one substantial existence, but may have several operations. So there is one essence of the soul, with several powers.

Article 3 Whether the powers are distinguished by their acts and objects? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod potentiae non distinguantur per actus et obiecta. Nihil enim determinatur ad speciem per illud quod posterius, vel extrinsecum est. Actus autem est posterior potentia; obiectum autem est extrinsecum. Ergo per ea potentiae non distinguuntur secundum speciem. Praeterea, contraria sunt quae maxime differunt. Si igitur potentiae distinguerentur penes obiecta, sequeretur quod contrariorum non esset eadem potentia. Quod patet esse falsum fere in omnibus, nam potentia visiva eadem est albi et nigri, et gustus idem est dulcis et amari.

Objection 1: It would seem that the powers of the soul are not distinguished by acts and objects. For nothing is determined to its species by what is subsequent and extrinsic to it. But the act is subsequent to the power; and the object is extrinsic to it. Therefore the soul’s powers are not specifically distinct by acts and objects. Obj. 2: Further, contraries are what differ most from each other. Therefore if the powers are distinguished by their objects, it follows that the same power could not have contrary objects. This is clearly false in almost all the powers; for the power of vision extends to white and black, and the power to taste to sweet and bitter.

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Praeterea, remota causa, removetur effectus. Si igitur potentiarum differentia esset ex differentia obiectorum, idem obiectum non pertineret ad diversas potentias. Quod patet esse falsum, nam idem est quod potentia cognoscitiva cognoscit, et appetitiva appetit.

Obj. 3: Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed. Hence if the difference of powers came from the difference of objects, the same object would not come under different powers. This is clearly false; for the same thing is known by the cognitive power, and desired by the appetitive. Praeterea, id quod per se est causa alicuius, in Obj. 4: Further, that which of itself is the cause of anyomnibus causat illud. Sed quaedam obiecta diversa, quae thing, is the cause thereof, wherever it is. But various obpertinent ad diversas potentias, pertinent etiam ad ali- jects which belong to various powers, belong also to some quam unam potentiam, sicut sonus et color pertinent ad one power; as sound and color belong to sight and hearing, visum et auditum, quae sunt diversae potentiae; et ta- which are different powers, yet they come under the one men pertinent ad unam potentiam sensus communis. power of common sense. Therefore the powers are not disNon ergo potentiae distinguuntur secundum differen- tinguished according to the difference of their objects.

tiam obiectorum. Sed contra, posteriora distinguuntur secundum priora. Sed Philosophus dicit II de Anima, quod priores potentiis actus et operationes secundum rationem sunt; et adhuc his priora sunt opposita, sive obiecta. Ergo potentiae distinguuntur secundum actus et obiecta. Respondeo dicendum quod potentia, secundum illud quod est potentia, ordinatur ad actum. Unde oportet rationem potentiae accipi ex actu ad quem ordinatur, et per consequens oportet quod ratio potentiae diversificetur, ut diversificatur ratio actus. Ratio autem actus diversificatur secundum diversam rationem obiecti. Omnis enim actio vel est potentiae activae, vel passivae. Obiectum autem comparatur ad actum potentiae passivae, sicut principium et causa movens, color enim inquantum movet visum, est principium visionis. Ad actum autem potentiae activae comparatur obiectum ut terminus et finis, sicut augmentativae virtutis obiectum est quantum perfectum, quod est finis augmenti. Ex his autem duobus actio speciem recipit, scilicet ex principio, vel ex fine seu termino, differt enim calefactio ab infrigidatione, secundum quod haec quidem a calido, scilicet activo, ad calidum; illa autem a frigido ad frigidum procedit. Unde necesse est quod potentiae diversificentur secundum actus et obiecta. Sed tamen considerandum est quod ea quae sunt per accidens, non diversificant speciem. Quia enim coloratum accidit animali, non diversificantur species animalis per differentiam coloris, sed per differentiam eius quod per se accidit animali, per differentiam scilicet animae sensitivae, quae quandoque invenitur cum ratione, quandoque sine ratione. Unde rationale et irrationale sunt differentiae divisivae animalis, diversas eius species constituentes. Sic igitur non quaecumque diversitas obiectorum diversificat potentias animae; sed differentia eius ad quod per se potentia respicit. Sicut sensus per se respicit passibilem qualitatem, quae per se dividitur in colorem, sonum et huiusmodi, et ideo alia potentia sensitiva est coloris, scilicet visus, et alia soni, scilicet auditus. Sed passibili qualitati, ut colorato accidit esse

On the contrary, Things that are subsequent are distinguished by what precedes. But the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that acts and operations precede the powers according to reason; and these again are preceded by their opposites, that is their objects. Therefore the powers are distinguished according to their acts and objects. I answer that, A power as such is directed to an act. Wherefore we seek to know the nature of a power from the act to which it is directed, and consequently the nature of a power is diversified, as the nature of the act is diversified. Now the nature of an act is diversified according to the various natures of the objects. For every act is either of an active power or of a passive power. Now, the object is to the act of a passive power, as the principle and moving cause: for color is the principle of vision, inasmuch as it moves the sight. On the other hand, to the act of an active power the object is a term and end; as the object of the power of growth is perfect quantity, which is the end of growth. Now, from these two things an act receives its species, namely, from its principle, or from its end or term; for the act of heating differs from the act of cooling, in this, that the former proceeds from something hot, which is the active principle, to heat; the latter from something cold, which is the active principle, to cold. Therefore the powers are of necessity distinguished by their acts and objects. Nevertheless, we must observe that things which are accidental do not change the species. For since to be colored is accidental to an animal, its species is not changed by a difference of color, but by a difference in that which belongs to the nature of an animal, that is to say, by a difference in the sensitive soul, which is sometimes rational, and sometimes otherwise. Hence rational and irrational are differences dividing animal, constituting its various species. In like manner therefore, not any variety of objects diversifies the powers of the soul, but a difference in that to which the power of its very nature is directed. Thus the senses of their very nature are directed to the passive quality which of itself is divided into color, sound, and the like, and therefore there is one sensitive power with regard to color, namely, the sight, and another with regard to sound, namely, hearing. But it

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musicum vel grammaticum, vel magnum et parvum, aut is accidental to a passive quality, for instance, to something hominem vel lapidem. Et ideo penes huiusmodi diffe- colored, to be a musician or a grammarian, great or small, a rentias potentiae animae non distinguuntur. man or a stone. Therefore by reason of such differences the powers of the soul are not distinct. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod actus, licet sit poReply Obj. 1: Act, though subsequent in existence to sterior potentia in esse, est tamen prior in intentione et power, is, nevertheless, prior to it in intention and logically; secundum rationem, sicut finis agente. Obiectum autem, as the end is with regard to the agent. And the object, allicet sit extrinsecum, est tamen principium vel finis ac- though extrinsic, is, nevertheless, the principle or end of the tionis. Principio autem et fini proportionantur ea quae action; and those conditions which are intrinsic to a thing, sunt intrinseca rei. are proportionate to its principle and end. Ad secundum dicendum quod, si potentia aliqua Reply Obj. 2: If any power were to have one of two per se respiceret unum contrariorum sicut obiectum, contraries as such for its object, the other contrary would oporteret quod contrarium ad aliam potentiam pertine- belong to another power. But the power of the soul does ret. Sed potentia animae non per se respicit propriam not regard the nature of the contrary as such, but rather the rationem contrarii, sed communem rationem utriusque common aspect of both contraries; as sight does not regard contrariorum, sicut visus non respicit per se rationem al- white as such, but as color. This is because of two contraries bi, sed rationem coloris. Et hoc ideo, quia unum contra- one, in a manner, includes the idea of the other, since they riorum est quodammodo ratio alterius, cum se habeant are to one another as perfect and imperfect. sicut perfectum et imperfectum. Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents things which coincide est subiecto idem esse diversum secundum rationem. Et in subject, from being considered under different aspects; ideo potest ad diversas potentias animae pertinere. therefore they can belong to various powers of the soul. Ad quartum dicendum quod potentia superior per Reply Obj. 4: The higher power of itself regards a more se respicit universaliorem rationem obiecti, quam po- universal formality of the object than the lower power; betentia inferior, quia quanto potentia est superior, tanto cause the higher a power is, to a greater number of things ad plura se extendit. Et ideo multa conveniunt in una does it extend. Therefore many things are combined in the ratione obiecti, quam per se respicit superior potentia, one formality of the object, which the higher power considquae tamen differunt secundum rationes quas per se re- ers of itself; while they differ in the formalities regarded by spiciunt inferiores potentiae. Et inde est quod diversa the lower powers of themselves. Thus it is that various obobiecta pertinent ad diversas inferiores potentias, quae jects belong to various lower powers; which objects, howtamen uni superiori potentiae subduntur. ever, are subject to one higher power.

Article 4 Whether there is an order among the soul’s powers? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in potentiis animae non sit ordo. In his enim quae cadunt sub una divisione, non est prius et posterius, sed sunt naturaliter simul. Sed potentiae animae contra se invicem dividuntur. Ergo inter eas non est ordo. Praeterea, potentiae animae comparantur ad obiecta, et ad ipsam animam. Sed ex parte animae, inter eas non est ordo, quia anima est una. Similiter etiam nec ex parte obiectorum, cum sint diversa et penitus disparata, ut patet de colore et sono. In potentiis ergo animae non est ordo. Praeterea, in potentiis ordinatis hoc invenitur, quod operatio unius dependet ab operatione alterius. Sed actus unius potentiae animae non dependet ab actu

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no order among the powers of the soul. For in those things which come under one division, there is no before and after, but all are naturally simultaneous. But the powers of the soul are contradistinguished from one another. Therefore there is no order among them. Obj. 2: Further, the powers of the soul are referred to their objects and to the soul itself. On the part of the soul, there is not order among them, because the soul is one. In like manner the objects are various and dissimilar, as color and sound. Therefore there is no order among the powers of the soul. Obj. 3: Further, where there is order among powers, we find that the operation of one depends on the operation of another. But the action of one power of the soul does

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alterius, potest enim visus exire in actum absque auditu, not depend on that of another; for sight can act indepenet e converso. Non ergo inter potentias animae est ordo. dently of hearing, and conversely. Therefore there is no order among the powers of the soul. Sed contra est quod Philosophus, in II de Anima, On the contrary, The Philosopher (De Anima ii, 3) comparat partes sive potentias animae figuris. Sed figu- compares the parts or powers of the soul to figures. But figrae habent ordinem ad invicem. Ergo et potentiae ani- ures have an order among themselves. Therefore the powers mae. of the soul have order. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum anima sit una, I answer that, Since the soul is one, and the powers potentiae vero plures; ordine autem quodam ab uno are many; and since a number of things that proceed from in multitudinem procedatur; necesse est inter potentias one must proceed in a certain order; there must be some oranimae ordinem esse. Triplex autem ordo inter eas at- der among the powers of the soul. Accordingly we may obtenditur. Quorum duo considerantur secundum depen- serve a triple order among them, two of which correspond dentiam unius potentiae ab altera, tertius autem accipi- to the dependence of one power on another; while the third tur secundum ordinem obiectorum. Dependentia autem is taken from the order of the objects. Now the dependence unius potentiae ab altera dupliciter accipi potest, uno of one power on another can be taken in two ways; accordmodo, secundum naturae ordinem, prout perfecta sunt ing to the order of nature, forasmuch as perfect things are naturaliter imperfectis priora; alio modo, secundum or- by their nature prior to imperfect things; and according to dinem generationis et temporis, prout ex imperfecto ad the order of generation and time; forasmuch as from being perfectum venitur. Secundum igitur primum potentia- imperfect, a thing comes to be perfect. Thus, according to rum ordinem, potentiae intellectivae sunt priores poten- the first kind of order among the powers, the intellectual tiis sensitivis, unde dirigunt eas et imperant eis. Et simili- powers are prior to the sensitive powers; wherefore they diter potentiae sensitivae hoc ordine sunt priores potentiis rect them and command them. Likewise the sensitive powanimae nutritivae. ers are prior in this order to the powers of the nutritive soul. Secundum vero ordinem secundum, e converso se In the second kind of order, it is the other way about. For habet. Nam potentiae animae nutritivae sunt priores, in the powers of the nutritive soul are prior by way of generavia generationis, potentiis animae sensitivae, unde ad tion to the powers of the sensitive soul; for which, therefore, earum actiones praeparant corpus. Et similiter est de po- they prepare the body. The same is to be said of the sensitentiis sensitivis respectu intellectivarum. Secundum au- tive powers with regard to the intellectual. But in the third tem ordinem tertium, ordinantur quaedam vires sensiti- kind of order, certain sensitive powers are ordered among vae ad invicem, scilicet visus, auditus, et olfactus. Nam themselves, namely, sight, hearing, and smelling. For the visibile est prius naturaliter, quia est commune superio- visible naturally comes first; since it is common to higher ribus et inferioribus corporibus. Sonus autem audibilis and lower bodies. But sound is audible in the air, which is fit in aere, qui est naturaliter prior commixtione elemen- naturally prior to the mingling of elements, of which smell torum, quam consequitur odor. is the result. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod alicuius generis Reply Obj. 1: The species of a given genus are to one species se habent secundum prius et posterius, sicut nu- another as before and after, like numbers and figures, if meri et figurae, quantum ad esse; licet simul esse dican- considered in their nature; although they may be said to be tur inquantum suscipiunt communis generis praedica- simultaneous, according as they receive the predication of tionem. the common genus. Ad secundum dicendum quod ordo iste potentiaReply Obj. 2: This order among the powers of the soul rum animae est et ex parte animae, quae secundum or- is both on the part of the soul (which, though it be one acdinem quendam habet aptitudinem ad diversos actus, li- cording to its essence, has a certain aptitude to various acts cet sit una secundum essentiam; et ex parte obiectorum; in a certain order) and on the part of the objects, and furet etiam ex parte actuum, ut dictum est. thermore on the part of the acts, as we have said above. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de Reply Obj. 3: This argument is verified as regards illis potentiis in quibus attenditur ordo solum secundum those powers among which order of the third kind exists. tertium modum. Illae autem potentiae quae ordinantur Those powers among which the two other kinds of order secundum alios duos modos, ita se habent quod actus exist are such that the action of one depends on another. unius dependet ab altera.

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Article 5 Whether all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes potentiae animae sint in anima sicut in subiecto. Sicut enim se habent potentiae corporis ad corpus, ita se habent potentiae animae ad animam. Sed corpus est subiectum corporalium potentiarum. Ergo anima est subiectum potentiarum animae. Praeterea, operationes potentiarum animae attribuuntur corpori propter animam, quia, ut dicitur in II de Anima, anima est quo sentimus et intelligimus primum. Sed propria principia operationum animae sunt potentiae. Ergo potentiae per prius sunt in anima. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod anima quaedam sentit non per corpus, immo sine corpore, ut est timor et huiusmodi; quaedam vero sentit per corpus. Sed si potentia sensitiva non esset in sola anima sicut in subiecto, nihil posset sine corpore sentire. Ergo anima est subiectum potentiae sensitivae; et pari ratione, omnium aliarum potentiarum. Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, in libro de Somno et Vigilia quod sentire non est proprium animae neque corporis, sed coniuncti. Potentia ergo sensitiva est in coniuncto sicut in subiecto. Non ergo sola anima est subiectum omnium potentiarum suarum. Respondeo dicendum quod illud est subiectum operativae potentiae, quod est potens operari, omne enim accidens denominat proprium subiectum. Idem autem est quod potest operari, et quod operatur. Unde oportet quod eius sit potentia sicut subiecti, cuius est operatio; ut etiam Philosophus dicit, in principio de Somno et Vigilia. Manifestum est autem ex supra dictis quod quaedam operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur sine organo corporali, ut intelligere et velle. Unde potentiae quae sunt harum operationum principia, sunt in anima sicut in subiecto. Quaedam vero operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur per organa corporalia; sicut visio per oculum, et auditus per aurem. Et simile est de omnibus aliis operationibus nutritivae et sensitivae partis. Et ideo potentiae quae sunt talium operationum principia, sunt in coniuncto sicut in subiecto, et non in anima sola. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes potentiae dicuntur esse animae, non sicut subiecti, sed sicut principii, quia per animam coniunctum habet quod tales operationes operari possit. Ad secundum dicendum quod omnes huiusmodi potentiae per prius sunt in anima quam in coniuncto, non sicut in subiecto, sed sicut in principio.

Objection 1: It would seem that all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject. For as the powers of the body are to the body; so are the powers of the soul to the soul. But the body is the subject of the corporeal powers. Therefore the soul is the subject of the powers of the soul. Obj. 2: Further, the operations of the powers of the soul are attributed to the body by reason of the soul; because, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2), The soul is that by which we sense and understand primarily. But the natural principles of the operations of the soul are the powers. Therefore the powers are primarily in the soul. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 7,24) that the soul senses certain things, not through the body, but in fact without the body, as fear and such like; and some things through the body. But if the sensitive powers were not in the soul alone as their subject, the soul could not sense anything without the body. Therefore the soul is the subject of the sensitive powers; and for a similar reason, of all the other powers. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigilia i) that sensation belongs neither to the soul, nor to the body, but to the composite. Therefore the sensitive power is in the composite as its subject. Therefore the soul alone is not the subject of all the powers. I answer that, The subject of operative power is that which is able to operate, for every accident denominates its proper subject. Now the same is that which is able to operate, and that which does operate. Wherefore the subject of power is of necessity the subject of operation, as again the Philosopher says in the beginning of De Somno et Vigilia. Now, it is clear from what we have said above (Q. 75, AA. 2, 3; Q. 76, A. 1, ad 1), that some operations of the soul are performed without a corporeal organ, as understanding and will. Hence the powers of these operations are in the soul as their subject. But some operations of the soul are performed by means of corporeal organs; as sight by the eye, and hearing by the ear. And so it is with all the other operations of the nutritive and sensitive parts. Therefore the powers which are the principles of these operations have their subject in the composite, and not in the soul alone. Reply Obj. 1: All the powers are said to belong to the soul, not as their subject, but as their principle; because it is by the soul that the composite has the power to perform such operations. Reply Obj. 2: All such powers are primarily in the soul, as compared to the composite; not as in their subject, but as in their principle.

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Q. 77, A. 6

Man

Ad tertium dicendum quod opinio Platonis fuit quod sentire est operatio animae propria, sicut et intelligere. In multis autem quae ad philosophiam pertinent, Augustinus utitur opinionibus Platonis, non asserendo, sed recitando. Tamen, quantum ad praesens pertinet, hoc quod dicitur anima quaedam sentire cum corpore et quaedam sine corpore, dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, quod hoc quod dico cum corpore vel sine corpore, determinet actum sentiendi secundum quod exit a sentiente. Et sic nihil sentit sine corpore, quia actio sentiendi non potest procedere ab anima nisi per organum corporale. Alio modo potest intelligi ita quod praedicta determinent actum sentiendi ex parte obiecti quod sentitur. Et sic quaedam sentit cum corpore, idest in corpore existentia, sicut cum sentit vulnus vel aliquid huiusmodi, quaedam vero sentit sine corpore, idest non existentia in corpore, sed solum in apprehensione animae, sicut cum sentit se tristari vel gaudere de aliquo audito.

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Reply Obj. 3: Plato’s opinion was that sensation is an operation proper to the soul, just as understanding is. Now in many things relating to Philosophy Augustine makes use of the opinions of Plato, not asserting them as true, but relating them. However, as far as the present question is concerned, when it is said that the soul senses some things with the body, and some without the body, this can be taken in two ways. First, the words with the body or without the body may determine the act of sense in its mode of proceeding from the sentient. Thus the soul senses nothing without the body, because the action of sensation cannot proceed from the soul except by a corporeal organ. Second, they may be understood as determining the act of sense on the part of the object sensed. Thus the soul senses some things with the body, that is, things existing in the body, as when it feels a wound or something of that sort; while it senses some things without the body, that is, which do not exist in the body, but only in the apprehension of the soul, as when it feels sad or joyful on hearing something.

Article 6 Whether the powers of the soul flow from its essence? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod potentiae animae non fluant ab eius essentia. Ab uno enim simplici non procedunt diversa. Essentia autem animae est una et simplex. Cum ergo potentiae animae sint multae et diversae, non possunt procedere ab eius essentia. Praeterea, illud a quo aliud procedit, est causa eius. Sed essentia animae non potest dici causa potentiarum; ut patet discurrenti per singula causarum genera. Ergo potentiae animae non fluunt ab eius essentia. Praeterea, emanatio quendam motum nominat. Sed nihil movetur a seipso, ut probatur in VII libro Physic.; nisi forte ratione partis, sicut animal dicitur moveri a seipso, quia una pars eius est movens et alia mota. Neque etiam anima movetur, ut probatur in I de Anima. Non ergo anima causat in se suas potentias. Sed contra, potentiae animae sunt quaedam proprietates naturales ipsius. Sed subiectum est causa propriorum accidentium, unde et ponitur in definitione accidentis, ut patet in VII Metaphys. Ergo potentiae animae procedunt ab eius essentia sicut a causa. Respondeo dicendum quod forma substantialis et accidentalis partim conveniunt, et partim differunt.

Objection 1: It would seem that the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence. For different things do not proceed from one simple thing. But the essence of the soul is one and simple. Since, therefore, the powers of the soul are many and various, they cannot proceed from its essence. Obj. 2: Further, that from which a thing proceeds is its cause. But the essence of the soul cannot be said to be the cause of the powers; as is clear if one considers the different kinds of causes. Therefore the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence. Obj. 3: Further, emanation involves some sort of movement. But nothing is moved by itself, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vii, 1,2); except, perhaps, by reason of a part of itself, as an animal is said to be moved by itself, because one part thereof moves and another is moved. Neither is the soul moved, as the Philosopher proves (De Anima i, 4). Therefore the soul does not produce its powers within itself. On the contrary, The powers of the soul are its natural properties. But the subject is the cause of its proper accidents; whence also it is included in the definition of accident, as is clear from Metaph. vii (Did. vi, 4). Therefore the powers of the soul proceed from its essence as their cause. I answer that, The substantial and the accidental form partly agree and partly differ. They agree in this, that

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Conveniunt quidem in hoc, quod utraque est actus, et secundum utramque est aliquid quodammodo in actu. Differunt autem in duobus. Primo quidem, quia forma substantialis facit esse simpliciter, et eius subiectum est ens in potentia tantum. Forma autem accidentalis non facit esse simpliciter; sed esse tale, aut tantum, aut aliquo modo se habens, subiectum enim eius est ens in actu. Unde patet quod actualitas per prius invenitur in forma substantiali quam in eius subiecto, et quia primum est causa in quolibet genere, forma substantialis causat esse in actu in suo subiecto. Sed e converso, actualitas per prius invenitur in subiecto formae accidentalis, quam in forma accidentali, unde actualitas formae accidentalis causatur ab actualitate subiecti. Ita quod subiectum, inquantum est in potentia, est susceptivum formae accidentalis, inquantum autem est in actu, est eius productivum. Et hoc dico de proprio et per se accidente, nam respectu accidentis extranei, subiectum est susceptivum tantum; productivum vero talis accidentis est agens extrinsecum. Secundo autem differunt substantialis forma et accidentalis, quia, cum minus principale sit propter principalius, materia est propter formam substantialem; sed e converso, forma accidentalis est propter completionem subiecti. Manifestum est autem ex dictis quod potentiarum animae subiectum est vel ipsa anima sola, quae potest esse subiectum accidentis secundum quod habet aliquid potentialitatis, ut supra dictum est; vel compositum. Compositum autem est in actu per animam. Unde manifestum est quod omnes potentiae animae, sive subiectum earum sit anima sola, sive compositum, fluunt ab essentia animae sicut a principio, quia iam dictum est quod accidens causatur a subiecto secundum quod est actu, et recipitur in eo inquantum est in potentia. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ab uno simplici possunt naturaliter multa procedere ordine quodam. Et iterum propter diversitatem recipientium. Sic igitur ab una essentia animae procedunt multae et diversae potentiae, tum propter ordinem potentiarum, tum etiam secundum diversitatem organorum corporalium. Ad secundum dicendum quod subiectum est causa proprii accidentis et finalis, et quodammodo activa; et etiam ut materialis, inquantum est susceptivum accidentis. Et ex hoc potest accipi quod essentia animae est causa omnium potentiarum sicut finis et sicut principium activum; quarundam autem sicut susceptivum. Ad tertium dicendum quod emanatio propriorum accidentium a subiecto non est per aliquam transmutationem; sed per aliquam naturalem resultationem, sicut ex uno naturaliter aliud resultat, ut ex luce color.

Q. 77, A. 6

each is an act; and that by each of them something is after a manner actual. They differ, however, in two respects. First, because the substantial form makes a thing to exist absolutely, and its subject is something purely potential. But the accidental form does not make a thing to exist absolutely but to be such, or so great, or in some particular condition; for its subject is an actual being. Hence it is clear that actuality is observed in the substantial form prior to its being observed in the subject: and since that which is first in a genus is the cause in that genus, the substantial form causes existence in its subject. On the other hand, actuality is observed in the subject of the accidental form prior to its being observed in the accidental form; wherefore the actuality of the accidental form is caused by the actuality of the subject. So the subject, forasmuch as it is in potentiality, is receptive of the accidental form: but forasmuch as it is in act, it produces it. This I say of the proper and per se accident; for with regard to the extraneous accident, the subject is receptive only, the accident being caused by an extrinsic agent. Second, substantial and accidental forms differ, because, since that which is the less principal exists for the sake of that which is the more principal, matter therefore exists on account of the substantial form; while on the contrary, the accidental form exists on account of the completeness of the subject. Now it is clear, from what has been said (A. 5), that either the subject of the soul’s powers is the soul itself alone, which can be the subject of an accident, forasmuch as it has something of potentiality, as we have said above (A. 1, ad 6); or else this subject is the composite. Now the composite is actual by the soul. Whence it is clear that all the powers of the soul, whether their subject be the soul alone, or the composite, flow from the essence of the soul, as from their principle; because it has already been said that the accident is caused by the subject according as it is actual, and is received into it according as it is in potentiality. Reply Obj. 1: From one simple thing many things may proceed naturally, in a certain order; or again if there be diversity of recipients. Thus, from the one essence of the soul many and various powers proceed; both because order exists among these powers; and also by reason of the diversity of the corporeal organs. Reply Obj. 2: The subject is both the final cause, and in a way the active cause, of its proper accident. It is also as it were the material cause, inasmuch as it is receptive of the accident. From this we may gather that the essence of the soul is the cause of all its powers, as their end, and as their active principle; and of some as receptive thereof. Reply Obj. 3: The emanation of proper accidents from their subject is not by way of transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance; thus one thing results naturally from another, as color from light.

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Q. 77, A. 7

Man

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Article 7 Whether one power of the soul arises from another? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod una potentia animae non oriatur ab alia. Eorum enim quae simul esse incipiunt, unum non oritur ab alio. Sed omnes potentiae animae sunt simul animae concreatae. Ergo una earum ab alia non oritur. Praeterea, potentia animae oritur ab anima sicut accidens a subiecto. Sed una potentia animae non potest esse subiectum alterius, quia accidentis non est accidens. Ergo una potentia non oritur ab alia. Praeterea, oppositum non oritur a suo opposito, sed unumquodque oritur ex simili secundum speciem. Potentiae autem animae ex opposito dividuntur, sicut diversae species. Ergo una earum non procedit ab alia. Sed contra, potentiae cognoscuntur per actus. Sed actus unius potentiae causatur ab alio; sicut actus phantasiae ab actu sensus. Ergo una potentia animae causatur ab alia. Respondeo dicendum quod in his quae secundum ordinem naturalem procedunt ab uno, sicut primum est causa omnium, ita quod est primo propinquius, est quodammodo causa eorum quae sunt magis remota. Ostensum est autem supra quod inter potentias animae est multiplex ordo. Et ideo una potentia animae ab essentia animae procedit mediante alia. Sed quia essentia animae comparatur ad potentias et sicut principium activum et finale, et sicut principium susceptivum, vel seorsum per se vel simul cum corpore; agens autem et finis est perfectius, susceptivum autem principium, inquantum huiusmodi, est minus perfectum, consequens est quod potentiae animae quae sunt priores secundum ordinem perfectionis et naturae, sint principia aliarum per modum finis et activi principii. Videmus enim quod sensus est propter intellectum, et non e converso. Sensus etiam est quaedam deficiens participatio intellectus, unde secundum naturalem originem quodammodo est ab intellectu, sicut imperfectum a perfecto. Sed secundum viam susceptivi principii, e converso potentiae imperfectiores inveniuntur principia respectu aliarum, sicut anima, secundum quod habet potentiam sensitivam, consideratur sicut subiectum et materiale quoddam respectu intellectus. Et propter hoc, imperfectiores potentiae sunt priores in via generationis, prius enim animal generatur quam homo. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut potentia animae ab essentia fluit, non per transmutationem, sed

Objection 1: It would seem that one power of the soul does not arise from another. For if several things arise together, one of them does not arise from another. But all the powers of the soul are created at the same time with the soul. Therefore one of them does not arise from another. Obj. 2: Further, the power of the soul arises from the soul as an accident from the subject. But one power of the soul cannot be the subject of another; because nothing is the accident of an accident. Therefore one power does not arise from another. Obj. 3: Further, one opposite does not arise from the other opposite; but everything arises from that which is like it in species. Now the powers of the soul are oppositely divided, as various species. Therefore one of them does not proceed from another. On the contrary, Powers are known by their actions. But the action of one power is caused by the action of another power, as the action of the imagination by the action of the senses. Therefore one power of the soul is caused by another. I answer that, In those things which proceed from one according to a natural order, as the first is the cause of all, so that which is nearer to the first is, in a way, the cause of those which are more remote. Now it has been shown above (A. 4) that among the powers of the soul there are several kinds of order. Therefore one power of the soul proceeds from the essence of the soul by the medium of another. But since the essence of the soul is compared to the powers both as a principle active and final, and as a receptive principle, either separately by itself, or together with the body; and since the agent and the end are more perfect, while the receptive principle, as such, is less perfect; it follows that those powers of the soul which precede the others, in the order of perfection and nature, are the principles of the others, after the manner of the end and active principle. For we see that the senses are for the sake of the intelligence, and not the other way about. The senses, moreover, are a certain imperfect participation of the intelligence; wherefore, according to their natural origin, they proceed from the intelligence as the imperfect from the perfect. But considered as receptive principles, the more perfect powers are principles with regard to the others; thus the soul, according as it has the sensitive power, is considered as the subject, and as something material with regard to the intelligence. On this account, the more imperfect powers precede the others in the order of generation, for the animal is generated before the man. Reply Obj. 1: As the power of the soul flows from the essence, not by a transmutation, but by a certain natural re-

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per naturalem quandam resultationem, et est simul cum anima; ita est etiam de una potentia respectu alterius. Ad secundum dicendum quod accidens per se non potest esse subiectum accidentis; sed unum accidens per prius recipitur in substantia quam aliud, sicut quantitas quam qualitas. Et hoc modo unum accidens dicitur esse subiectum alterius, ut superficies coloris, inquantum substantia uno accidente mediante recipit aliud. Et similiter potest dici de potentiis animae. Ad tertium dicendum quod potentiae animae opponuntur ad invicem oppositione perfecti et imperfecti; sicut etiam species numerorum et figurarum. Haec autem oppositio non impedit originem unius ab alio, quia imperfecta naturaliter a perfectis procedunt.

Q. 77, A. 8

sultance, and is simultaneous with the soul, so is it the case with one power as regards another. Reply Obj. 2: An accident cannot of itself be the subject of an accident; but one accident is received prior to another into substance, as quantity prior to quality. In this sense one accident is said to be the subject of another; as surface is of color, inasmuch as substance receives an accident through the means of another. The same thing may be said of the powers of the soul. Reply Obj. 3: The powers of the soul are opposed to one another, as perfect and imperfect; as also are the species of numbers and figures. But this opposition does not prevent the origin of one from another, because imperfect things naturally proceed from perfect things.

Article 8 Whether all the powers remain in the soul when separated from the body? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes potentiae animae remaneant in anima a corpore separata. Dicitur enim in libro de Spiritu et Anima, quod anima recedit a corpore, secum trahens sensum et imaginationem, rationem et intellectum et intelligentiam, concupiscibilitatem et irascibilitatem. Praeterea, potentiae animae sunt eius naturales proprietates. Sed proprium semper inest, et nunquam separatur ab eo cuius est proprium. Ergo potentiae animae sunt in ea etiam post mortem. Praeterea, potentiae animae, etiam sensitivae, non debilitantur debilitato corpore, quia, ut dicitur in I de Anima, si senex accipiat oculum iuvenis, videbit utique sicut et iuvenis. Sed debilitas est via ad corruptionem. Ergo potentiae animae non corrumpuntur corrupto corpore, sed manent in anima separata. Praeterea, memoria est potentia animae sensitivae, ut Philosophus probat. Sed memoria manet in anima separata, dicitur enim, Luc. XVI, diviti epuloni in Inferno secundum animam existenti, recordare quia recepisti bona in vita tua. Ergo memoria manet in anima separata; et per consequens aliae potentiae sensitivae partis. Praeterea, gaudium et tristitia sunt in concupiscibili, quae est potentia sensitivae partis. Manifestum est autem animas separatas tristari et gaudere de praemiis vel poenis quas habent. Ergo vis concupiscibilis manet in anima separata. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod sicut anima, cum corpus iacet sine sensu nondum penitus mortuum, videt quaedam secundum imaginariam visionem; ita cum fuerit a corpore penitus

Objection 1: It would seem that all the powers of the soul remain in the soul separated from the body. For we read in the book De Spiritu et Anima that the soul withdraws from the body, taking with itself sense and imagination, reason and intelligence, concupiscibility and irascibility. Obj. 2: Further, the powers of the soul are its natural properties. But properties are always in that to which they belong; and are never separated from it. Therefore the powers of the soul are in it even after death. Obj. 3: Further, the powers even of the sensitive soul are not weakened when the body becomes weak; because, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), If an old man were given the eye of a young man, he would see even as well as a young man. But weakness is the road to corruption. Therefore the powers of the soul are not corrupted when the body is corrupted, but remain in the separated soul. Obj. 4: Further, memory is a power of the sensitive soul, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. 1). But memory remains in the separated soul; for it was said to the rich glutton whose soul was in hell: Remember that thou didst receive good things during thy lifetime (Luke 16:25). Therefore memory remains in the separated soul; and consequently the other powers of the sensitive part. Obj. 5: Further, joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part, which is a power of the sensitive soul. But it is clear that separate souls grieve or rejoice at the pains or rewards which they receive. Therefore the concupiscible power remains in the separated soul. Obj. 6: Further, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 32) that, as the soul, when the body lies senseless, yet not quite dead, sees some things by imaginary vision; so also when by death the soul is quite separate from the body. But the

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Q. 77, A. 8

Man

separata per mortem. Sed imaginatio est potentia sensitivae partis. Ergo potentia sensitivae partis manet in anima separata; et per consequens omnes aliae potentiae. Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., ex duabus tantum substantiis constat homo, anima cum ratione sua, et carne cum sensibus suis. Ergo, defuncta carne, potentiae sensitivae non manent. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, omnes potentiae animae comparantur ad animam solam sicut ad principium. Sed quaedam potentiae comparantur ad animam solam sicut ad subiectum, ut intellectus et voluntas. Et huiusmodi potentiae necesse est quod maneant in anima, corpore destructo. Quaedam vero potentiae sunt in coniuncto sicut in subiecto, sicut omnes potentiae sensitivae partis et nutritivae. Destructo autem subiecto, non potest accidens remanere. Unde, corrupto coniuncto, non manent huiusmodi potentiae actu; sed virtute tantum manent in anima, sicut in principio vel radice. Et sic falsum est, quod quidam dicunt huiusmodi potentias in anima remanere etiam corpore corrupto. Et multo falsius, quod dicunt etiam actus harum potentiarum remanere in anima separata, quia talium potentiarum nulla est actio nisi per organum corporeum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod liber ille auctoritatem non habet. Unde quod ibi scriptum est, eadem facilitate contemnitur, qua dicitur. Tamen potest dici quod trahit secum anima huiusmodi potentias, non actu, sed virtute. Ad secundum dicendum quod huiusmodi potentiae quas dicimus actu in anima separata non manere, non sunt proprietates solius animae, sed coniuncti. Ad tertium dicendum quod dicuntur non debilitari huiusmodi potentiae debilitato corpore, quia anima manet immutabilis, quae est virtuale principium huiusmodi potentiarum. Ad quartum dicendum quod illa recordatio accipitur eo modo quo Augustinus ponit memoriam in mente; non eo modo quo ponitur pars animae sensitivae.

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imagination is a power of the sensitive part. Therefore the power of the sensitive part remains in the separate soul; and consequently all the other powers. On the contrary, It is said (De Eccl. Dogm. xix) that of two substances only does man consist; the soul with its reason, and the body with its senses. Therefore the body being dead, the sensitive powers do not remain. I answer that, As we have said already (AA. 5, 6, 7), all the powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their principle. But some powers belong to the soul alone as their subject; as the intelligence and the will. These powers must remain in the soul, after the destruction of the body. But other powers are subjected in the composite; as all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive parts. Now accidents cannot remain after the destruction of the subject. Wherefore, the composite being destroyed, such powers do not remain actually; but they remain virtually in the soul, as in their principle or root. So it is false that, as some say, these powers remain in the soul even after the corruption of the body. It is much more false that, as they say also, the acts of these powers remain in the separate soul; because these powers have no act apart from the corporeal organ. Reply Obj. 1: That book has no authority, and so what is there written can be despised with the same facility as it was said; although we may say that the soul takes with itself these powers, not actually but virtually.

Reply Obj. 2: These powers, which we say do not actually remain in the separate soul, are not the properties of the soul alone, but of the composite. Reply Obj. 3: These powers are said not to be weakened when the body becomes weak, because the soul remains unchangeable, and is the virtual principle of these powers. Reply Obj. 4: The recollection spoken of there is to be taken in the same way as Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xiv, 7) places memory in the mind; not as a part of the sensitive soul. Ad quintum dicendum quod tristitia et gaudium Reply Obj. 5: In the separate soul, sorrow and joy are sunt in anima separata, non secundum appetitum sen- not in the sensitive, but in the intellectual appetite, as in the sitivum, sed secundum appetitum intellectivum; sicut angels.

etiam in angelis. Ad sextum dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur ibi Reply Obj. 6: Augustine in that passage is speaking as inquirendo, non asserendo. Unde quaedam ibi dicta re- inquiring, not as asserting. Wherefore he retracted some tractat. things which he had said there (Retrac. ii, 24).

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Question 78 The Specific Powers of the Soul Deinde considerandum est de potentiis animae in speciali. Ad considerationem autem theologi pertinet inquirere specialiter solum de potentiis intellectivis et appetitivis, in quibus virtutes inveniuntur. Sed quia cognitio harum potentiarum quodammodo dependet ex aliis, ideo nostra consideratio de potentiis animae in speciali erit tripartita, primo namque considerandum est de his quae sunt praeambula ad intellectum; secundo, de potentiis intellectivis; tertio, de potentiis appetitivis. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, de generibus potentiarum animae. Secundo, de speciebus vegetativae partis. Tertio, de sensibus exterioribus. Quarto, de sensibus interioribus.

We next treat of the powers of the soul specifically. The theologian, however, has only to inquire specifically concerning the intellectual and appetitive powers, in which the virtues reside. And since the knowledge of these powers depends to a certain extent on the other powers, our consideration of the powers of the soul taken specifically will be divided into three parts: first, we shall consider those powers which are a preamble to the intellect; second, the intellectual powers; third, the appetitive powers. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) The powers of the soul considered generally; (2) The various species of the vegetative part; (3) The exterior senses; (4) The interior senses.

Article 1 Whether there are to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint quinque genera potentiarum animae distinguenda, scilicet vegetativum, sensitivum, appetitivum, motivum secundum locum, et intellectivum. Potentiae enim animae dicuntur partes ipsius. Sed tantum tres partes animae communiter ab omnibus assignantur, scilicet anima vegetabilis, anima sensibilis, et anima rationalis. Ergo tantum tria sunt genera potentiarum animae, et non quinque. Praeterea, potentiae animae sunt principia operum vitae. Sed quatuor modis dicitur aliquid vivere. Dicit enim Philosophus, in II de Anima, multipliciter ipso vivere dicto, etsi unum aliquod horum insit solum, aliquid dicimus vivere; ut intellectus, et sensus, motus et status secundum locum, adhuc autem motus secundum alimentum, et decrementum et augmentum. Ergo tantum quatuor sunt genera potentiarum animae, appetitivo excluso. Praeterea, ad illud quod est commune omnibus potentiis, non debet deputari aliquod speciale animae genus. Sed appetere convenit cuilibet potentiae animae. Visus enim appetit visibile conveniens, unde dicitur Eccli. XL, gratiam et speciem desiderabit oculus, et super hoc virides sationes. Et eadem ratione, quaelibet alia potentia

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul—namely, vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, and intellectual. For the powers of the soul are called its parts. But only three parts of the soul are commonly assigned—namely, the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the rational soul. Therefore there are only three genera of powers in the soul, and not five. Obj. 2: Further, the powers of the soul are the principles of its vital operations. Now, in four ways is a thing said to live. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2): In several ways a thing is said to live, and even if only one of these is present, the thing is said to live; as intellect and sense, local movement and rest, and lastly, movement of decrease and increase due to nourishment. Therefore there are only four genera of powers of the soul, as the appetitive is excluded. Obj. 3: Further, a special kind of soul ought not to be assigned as regards what is common to all the powers. Now desire is common to each power of the soul. For sight desires an appropriate visible object; whence we read (Sir 40:22): The eye desireth favor and beauty, but more than these green sown fields. In the same way every other

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desiderat obiectum sibi conveniens. Ergo non debet poni power desires its appropriate object. Therefore the appetiappetitivum unum speciale genus potentiarum animae. tive power should not be made a special genus of the powers of the soul. Praeterea, principium movens in animalibus est Obj. 4: Further, the moving principle in animals is sensus, aut intellectus, aut appetitus, ut dicitur in III de sense, intellect or appetite, as the Philosopher says (De AnAnima. Non ergo motivum debet poni speciale genus ima iii, 10). Therefore the motive power should not be animae praeter praedicta. added to the above as a special genus of soul. Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, in II de On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima Anima, potentias autem dicimus vegetativum sensitivum, ii, 3), The powers are the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetiappetitivum, motivum secundum locum, et intellectivum. tive, the locomotion, and the intellectual. Respondeo dicendum quod quinque sunt genera I answer that, There are five genera of powers of the potentiarum animae, quae numerata sunt. Tres vero di- soul, as above numbered. Of these, three are called souls, cuntur animae. Quatuor vero dicuntur modi vivendi. and four are called modes of living. The reason of this diverEt huius diversitatis ratio est, quia diversae animae di- sity lies in the various souls being distinguished accordingly stinguuntur secundum quod diversimode operatio ani- as the operation of the soul transcends the operation of the mae supergreditur operationem naturae corporalis, tota corporeal nature in various ways; for the whole corporeal enim natura corporalis subiacet animae, et comparatur nature is subject to the soul, and is related to it as its matad ipsam sicut materia et instrumentum. Est ergo quae- ter and instrument. There exists, therefore, an operation of dam operatio animae, quae intantum excedit naturam the soul which so far exceeds the corporeal nature that it is corpoream, quod neque etiam exercetur per organum not even performed by any corporeal organ; and such is the corporale. Et talis est operatio animae rationalis. Est au- operation of the rational soul. Below this, there is another tem alia operatio animae infra istam, quae quidem fit per operation of the soul, which is indeed performed through organum corporale, non tamen per aliquam corpoream a corporeal organ, but not through a corporeal quality, and qualitatem. Et talis est operatio animae sensibilis, quia this is the operation of the sensitive soul; for though hot and etsi calidum et frigidum, et humidum et siccum, et aliae cold, wet and dry, and other such corporeal qualities are rehuiusmodi qualitates corporeae requirantur ad opera- quired for the work of the senses, yet they are not required tionem sensus; non tamen ita quod mediante virtute ta- in such a way that the operation of the senses takes place lium qualitatum operatio animae sensibilis procedat; sed by virtue of such qualities; but only for the proper disposirequiruntur solum ad debitam dispositionem organi. In- tion of the organ. The lowest of the operations of the soul is fima autem operationum animae est, quae fit per or- that which is performed by a corporeal organ, and by virtue ganum corporeum, et virtute corporeae qualitatis. Su- of a corporeal quality. Yet this transcends the operation of pergreditur tamen operationem naturae corporeae, quia the corporeal nature; because the movements of bodies are motiones corporum sunt ab exteriori principio, huius- caused by an extrinsic principle, while these operations are modi autem operationes sunt a principio intrinseco; hoc from an intrinsic principle; for this is common to all the openim commune est omnibus operationibus animae; om- erations of the soul; since every animate thing, in some way, ne enim animatum aliquo modo movet seipsum. Et talis moves itself. Such is the operation of the vegetative soul; for est operatio animae vegetabilis, digestio enim, et ea quae digestion, and what follows, is caused instrumentally by the consequuntur, fit instrumentaliter per actionem caloris, action of heat, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). ut dicitur in II de Anima. Genera vero potentiarum animae distinguuntur seNow the powers of the soul are distinguished genericundum obiecta. Quanto enim potentia est altior, tan- cally by their objects. For the higher a power is, the more to respicit universalius obiectum, ut supra dictum est. universal is the object to which it extends, as we have said Obiectum autem operationis animae in triplici ordine above (Q. 77, A. 3, ad 4). But the object of the soul’s operpotest considerari. Alicuius enim potentiae animae ob- ation may be considered in a triple order. For in the soul iectum est solum corpus animae unitum. Et hoc genus there is a power the object of which is only the body that potentiarum animae dicitur vegetativum, non enim ve- is united to that soul; the powers of this genus are called getativa potentia agit nisi in corpus cui anima unitur. vegetative for the vegetative power acts only on the body Est autem aliud genus potentiarum animae, quod respi- to which the soul is united. There is another genus in the cit universalius obiectum, scilicet omne corpus sensibi- powers of the soul, which genus regards a more universal le; et non solum corpus animae unitum. Est autem aliud object—namely, every sensible body, not only the body to genus potentiarum animae, quod respicit adhuc univer- which the soul is united. And there is yet another genus in salius obiectum, scilicet non solum corpus sensibile, sed the powers of the soul, which genus regards a still more uniuniversaliter omne ens. versal object—namely, not only the sensible body, but all being in universal.

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Ex quo patet quod ista duo secunda genera potentiarum animae habent operationem non solum respectu rei coniunctae, sed etiam respectu rei extrinsecae. Cum autem operans oporteat aliquo modo coniungi suo obiecto circa quod operatur, necesse est extrinsecam rem, quae est obiectum operationis animae, secundum duplicem rationem ad animam comparari. Uno modo, secundum quod nata est animae coniungi et in anima esse per suam similitudinem. Et quantum ad hoc, sunt duo genera potentiarum, scilicet sensitivum, respectu obiecti minus communis, quod est corpus sensibile; et intellectivum, respectu obiecti communissimi, quod est ens universale. Alio vero modo, secundum quod ipsa anima inclinatur et tendit in rem exteriorem. Et secundum hanc etiam comparationem, sunt duo genera potentiarum animae, unum quidem, scilicet appetitivum, secundum quod anima comparatur ad rem extrinsecam ut ad finem, qui est primum in intentione; aliud autem motivum secundum locum, prout anima comparatur ad rem exteriorem sicut ad terminum operationis et motus; ad consequendum enim aliquod desideratum et intentum, omne animal movetur. Modi vero vivendi distinguuntur secundum gradus viventium. Quaedam enim viventia sunt, in quibus est tantum vegetativum, sicut in plantis. Quaedam vero, in quibus cum vegetativo est etiam sensitivum, non tamen motivum secundum locum; sicut sunt immobilia animalia, ut conchilia. Quaedam vero sunt, quae supra hoc habent motivum secundum locum; ut perfecta animalia, quae multis indigent ad suam vitam, et ideo indigent motu, ut vitae necessaria procul posita quaerere possint. Quaedam vero viventia sunt, in quibus cum his est intellectivum, scilicet in hominibus. Appetitivum autem non constituit aliquem gradum viventium, quia in quibuscumque est sensus, est etiam appetitus, ut dicitur in II libro de Anima. Et per hoc solvuntur duo prima obiecta. Ad tertium dicendum quod appetitus naturalis est inclinatio cuiuslibet rei in aliquid, ex natura sua, unde naturali appetitu quaelibet potentia desiderat sibi conveniens. Sed appetitus animalis consequitur formam apprehensam. Et ad huiusmodi appetitum requiritur specialis animae potentia, et non sufficit sola apprehensio. Res enim appetitur prout est in sua natura, non est autem secundum suam naturam in virtute apprehensiva, sed secundum suam similitudinem. Unde patet quod visus appetit naturaliter visibile solum ad suum actum, scilicet ad videndum, animal autem appetit rem visam per vim appetitivam, non solum ad videndum, sed etiam ad alios usus. Si autem non indigeret anima rebus perceptis a sensu, nisi propter actiones sensuum, scilicet ut eas sentiret; non oporteret appetitivum ponere speciale ge-

Q. 78, A. 1

Wherefore it is evident that the latter two genera of the soul’s powers have an operation in regard not merely to that which is united to them, but also to something extrinsic. Now, since whatever operates must in some way be united to the object about which it operates, it follows of necessity that this something extrinsic, which is the object of the soul’s operation, must be related to the soul in a twofold manner. First, inasmuch as this something extrinsic has a natural aptitude to be united to the soul, and to be by its likeness in the soul. In this way there are two kinds of powers—namely, the sensitive in regard to the less common object—the sensible body; and the intellectual, in regard to the most common object—universal being. Second, forasmuch as the soul itself has an inclination and tendency to the something extrinsic. And in this way there are again two kinds of powers in the soul: one—the appetitive—in respect of which the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to an end, which is first in the intention; the other—the locomotive power—in respect of which the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to the term of its operation and movement; for every animal is moved for the purpose of realizing its desires and intentions. The modes of living are distinguished according to the degrees of living things. There are some living things in which there exists only vegetative power, as the plants. There are others in which with the vegetative there exists also the sensitive, but not the locomotive power; such as immovable animals, as shellfish. There are others which besides this have locomotive powers, as perfect animals, which require many things for their life, and consequently movement to seek necessaries of life from a distance. And there are some living things which with these have intellectual power—namely, men. But the appetitive power does not constitute a degree of living things; because wherever there is sense there is also appetite (De Anima ii, 3). Thus the first two objections are hereby solved. Reply Obj. 3: The natural appetite is that inclination which each thing has, of its own nature, for something; wherefore by its natural appetite each power desires something suitable to itself. But the animal appetite results from the form apprehended; this sort of appetite requires a special power of the soul—mere apprehension does not suffice. For a thing is desired as it exists in its own nature, whereas in the apprehensive power it exists not according to its own nature, but according to its likeness. Whence it is clear that sight desires naturally a visible object for the purpose of its act only—namely, for the purpose of seeing; but the animal by the appetitive power desires the thing seen, not merely for the purpose of seeing it, but also for other purposes. But if the soul did not require things perceived by the senses, except on account of the actions of the senses, that is, for the

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nus inter potentias animae, quia sufficeret appetitus na- purpose of sensing them; there would be no need for a speturalis potentiarum. cial genus of appetitive powers, since the natural appetite of the powers would suffice. Ad quartum dicendum quod, quamvis sensus et Reply Obj. 4: Although sense and appetite are prinappetitus sint principia moventia in animalibus perfec- ciples of movement in perfect animals, yet sense and aptis, non tamen sensus et appetitus, inquantum huiusmo- petite, as such, are not sufficient to cause movement, unless di, sufficiunt ad movendum, nisi superadderetur eis ali- another power be added to them; for immovable animals qua virtus, nam in immobilibus animalibus est sensus et have sense and appetite, and yet they have not the power of appetitus, non tamen habent vim motivam. Haec autem motion. Now this motive power is not only in the appetite vis motiva non solum est in appetitu et sensu ut impe- and sense as commanding the movement, but also in the rante motum; sed etiam est in ipsis partibus corporis, ut parts of the body, to make them obey the appetite of the sint habilia ad obediendum appetitui animae moventis. soul which moves them. Of this we have a sign in the fact Cuius signum est, quod quando membra removentur a that when the members are deprived of their natural dissua dispositione naturali, non obediunt appetitui ad mo- position, they do not move in obedience to the appetite. tum.

Article 2 Whether the parts of the vegetative soul are fittingly described as the nutritive, augmentative, and generative? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter partes vegetativae assignentur, scilicet nutritivum, augmentativum, et generativum. Huiusmodi enim vires dicuntur naturales. Sed potentiae animae sunt supra vires naturales. Ergo huiusmodi vires non debent poni potentiae animae. Praeterea, ad id quod est commune viventibus et non viventibus, non debet aliqua potentia animae deputari. Sed generatio est communis omnibus generabilibus et corruptibilibus, tam viventibus quam non viventibus. Ergo vis generativa non debet poni potentia animae. Praeterea, anima potentior est quam natura corporea. Sed natura corporea eadem virtute activa dat speciem et debitam quantitatem. Ergo multo magis anima. Non est ergo alia potentia animae augmentativa a generativa. Praeterea, unaquaeque res conservatur in esse per id per quod esse habet. Sed potentia generativa est per quam acquiritur esse viventis. Ergo per eandem res viva conservatur. Sed ad conservationem rei viventis ordinatur vis nutritiva, ut dicitur in II de Anima, est enim potentia potens salvare suscipiens ipsam. Non debet ergo distingui nutritiva potentia a generativa. Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, in II de Anima, quod opera huius animae sunt generare, et alimento uti, et iterum augmentum facere. Respondeo dicendum quod tres sunt potentiae vegetativae partis. Vegetativum enim, ut dictum est, habet pro obiecto ipsum corpus vivens per animam, ad quod quidem corpus triplex animae operatio est necessaria.

Objection 1: It would seem that the parts of the vegetative soul are not fittingly described—namely, the nutritive, augmentative, and generative. For these are called natural forces. But the powers of the soul are above the natural forces. Therefore we should not class the above forces as powers of the soul. Obj. 2: Further, we should not assign a particular power of the soul to that which is common to living and nonliving things. But generation is common to all things that can be generated and corrupted, whether living or not living. Therefore the generative force should not be classed as a power of the soul. Obj. 3: Further, the soul is more powerful than the body. But the body by the same force gives species and quantity; much more, therefore, does the soul. Therefore the augmentative power of the soul is not distinct from the generative power. Obj. 4: Further, everything is preserved in being by that whereby it exists. But the generative power is that whereby a living thing exists. Therefore by the same power the living thing is preserved. Now the nutritive force is directed to the preservation of the living thing (De Anima ii, 4), being a power which is capable of preserving whatever receives it. Therefore we should not distinguish the nutritive power from the generative. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2,4) that the operations of this soul are generation, the use of food, and (cf. De Anima iii, 9) growth. I answer that, The vegetative part has three powers. For the vegetative part, as we have said (A. 1), has for its object the body itself, living by the soul; for which body a triple operation of the soul is required. One is whereby

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Una quidem, per quam esse acquirat, et ad hoc ordinatur potentia generativa. Alia vero, per quam corpus vivum acquirit debitam quantitatem, et ad hoc ordinatur vis augmentativa. Alia vero, per quam corpus viventis salvatur et in esse, et in quantitate debita, et ad hoc ordinatur vis nutritiva. Est tamen quaedam differentia attendenda inter has potentias. Nam nutritiva et augmentativa habent suum effectum in eo in quo sunt, quia ipsum corpus unitum animae augetur et conservatur per vim augmentativam et nutritivam in eadem anima existentem. Sed vis generativa habet effectum suum, non in eodem corpore, sed in alio, quia nihil est generativum sui ipsius. Et ideo vis generativa quodammodo appropinquat ad dignitatem animae sensitivae, quae habet operationem in res exteriores, licet excellentiori modo et universaliori, supremum enim inferioris naturae attingit id quod est infimum superioris, ut patet per Dionysium, in VII cap. de Div. Nom. Et ideo inter istas tres potentias finalior et principalior et perfectior est generativa, ut dicitur in II de Anima, est enim rei iam perfectae facere alteram qualis ipsa est. Generativae autem deserviunt et augmentativa et nutritiva, augmentativae vero nutritiva.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi vires dicuntur naturales, tum quia habent effectum similem naturae, quae etiam dat esse et quantitatem et conservationem (licet hae vires habeant hoc altiori modo), tum quia hae vires exercent suas actiones instrumentaliter per qualitates activas et passivas, quae sunt naturalium actionum principia. Ad secundum dicendum quod generatio in rebus inanimatis est totaliter ab extrinseco. Sed generatio viventium est quodam altiori modo, per aliquid ipsius viventis, quod est semen, in quo est aliquod principium corporis formativum. Et ideo oportet esse aliquam potentiam rei viventis, per quam semen huiusmodi praeparetur, et haec est vis generativa. Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia generatio viventium est ex aliquo semine, oportet quod in principio animal generetur parvae quantitatis. Et propter hoc necesse est quod habeat potentiam animae, per quam ad debitam quantitatem perducatur. Sed corpus inanimatum generatur ex materia determinata ab agente extrinseco, et ideo simul recipit speciem et quantitatem secundum materiae conditionem. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, operatio vegetativi principii completur mediante calore, cuius est humidum consumere. Et ideo, ad restaurationem humidi deperditi, necesse est habere potentiam nutritivam, per quam alimentum convertatur in substantiam corporis. Quod etiam est necessarium ad actum virtutis augmentativae et generativae.

Q. 78, A. 2

it acquires existence, and to this is directed the generative power. Another is whereby the living body acquires its due quantity; to this is directed the augmentative power. Another is whereby the body of a living thing is preserved in its existence and in its due quantity; to this is directed the nutritive power. We must, however, observe a difference among these powers. The nutritive and the augmentative have their effect where they exist, since the body itself united to the soul grows and is preserved by the augmentative and nutritive powers which exist in one and the same soul. But the generative power has its effect, not in one and the same body but in another; for a thing cannot generate itself. Therefore the generative power, in a way, approaches to the dignity of the sensitive soul, which has an operation extending to extrinsic things, although in a more excellent and more universal manner; for that which is highest in an inferior nature approaches to that which is lowest in the higher nature, as is made clear by Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore, of these three powers, the generative has the greater finality, nobility, and perfection, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4), for it belongs to a thing which is already perfect to produce another like unto itself. And the generative power is served by the augmentative and nutritive powers; and the augmentative power by the nutritive. Reply Obj. 1: Such forces are called natural, both because they produce an effect like that of nature, which also gives existence, quantity and preservation (although the above forces accomplish these things in a more perfect way); and because those forces perform their actions instrumentally, through the active and passive qualities, which are the principles of natural actions. Reply Obj. 2: Generation of inanimate things is entirely from an extrinsic source; whereas the generation of living things is in a higher way, through something in the living thing itself, which is the semen containing the principle productive of the body. Therefore there must be in the living thing a power that prepares this semen; and this is the generative power. Reply Obj. 3: Since the generation of living things is from a semen, it is necessary that in the beginning an animal of small size be generated. For this reason it must have a power in the soul, whereby it is brought to its appropriate size. But the inanimate body is generated from determinate matter by an extrinsic agent; therefore it receives at once its nature and its quantity, according to the condition of the matter. Reply Obj. 4: As we have said above (A. 1), the operation of the vegetative principle is performed by means of heat, the property of which is to consume humidity. Therefore, in order to restore the humidity thus lost, the nutritive power is required, whereby the food is changed into the substance of the body. This is also necessary for the action of the augmentative and generative powers.

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Article 3 Whether the five exterior senses are properly distinguished? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur quinque sensus exteriores. Sensus enim est cognoscitivus accidentium. Sunt autem multa genera accidentium. Cum ergo potentiae distinguantur per obiecta, videtur quod sensus multiplicentur secundum numerum qui est in generibus accidentium. Praeterea, magnitudo et figura, et alia quae dicuntur sensibilia communia, non sunt sensibilia per accidens, sed contra ea dividuntur in II de Anima. Diversitas autem per se obiectorum diversificat potentias. Cum ergo plus differant magnitudo et figura a colore quam sonus; videtur quod multo magis debeat esse alia potentia sensitiva cognoscitiva magnitudinis aut figurae, quam coloris et soni. Praeterea, unus sensus est unius contrarietatis; sicut visus albi et nigri. Sed tactus est cognoscitivus plurium contrarietatum, scilicet calidi et frigidi, humidi et sicci, et huiusmodi. Ergo non est sensus unus, sed plures. Ergo plures sensus sunt quam quinque. Praeterea, species non dividitur contra genus. Sed gustus est tactus quidam. Ergo non debet poni alter sensus praeter tactum. Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, in III de Anima, quod non est alter sensus praeter quinque. Respondeo dicendum quod rationem distinctionis et numeri sensuum exteriorum quidam accipere voluerunt ex parte organorum, in quibus aliquod elementorum dominatur, vel aqua, vel aer, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Quidam autem ex parte medii, quod est vel coniunctum, vel extrinsecum; et hoc vel aer, vel aqua, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Quidam autem ex diversa natura sensibilium qualitatum, secundum quod est qualitas simplicis corporis, vel sequens complexionem. Sed nihil istorum conveniens est. Non enim potentiae sunt propter organa, sed organa propter potentias, unde non propter hoc sunt diversae potentiae, quia sunt diversa organa; sed ideo natura instituit diversitatem in organis, ut congruerent diversitati potentiarum. Et similiter diversa media diversis sensibus attribuit, secundum quod erat conveniens ad actus potentiarum. Naturas autem sensibilium qualitatum cognoscere non est sensus, sed intellectus. Accipienda est ergo ratio numeri et distinctionis exteriorum sensuum, secundum illud quod proprie et per se ad sensum pertinet. Est autem sensus quaedam potentia passiva, quae nata est immutari ab exteriori sensibili. Exterius ergo immutativum est quod per se a sen-

Objection 1: It would seem inaccurate to distinguish five exterior senses. For sense can know accidents. But there are many kinds of accidents. Therefore, as powers are distinguished by their objects, it seems that the senses are multiplied according to the number of the kinds of accidents. Obj. 2: Further, magnitude and shape, and other things which are called common sensibles, are not sensibles by accident, but are contradistinguished from them by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 6). Now the diversity of objects, as such, diversifies the powers. Since, therefore, magnitude and shape are further from color than sound is, it seems that there is much more need for another sensitive power than can grasp magnitude or shape than for that which grasps color or sound. Obj. 3: Further, one sense regards one contrariety; as sight regards white and black. But the sense of touch grasps several contraries; such as hot or cold, damp or dry, and suchlike. Therefore it is not a single sense but several. Therefore there are more than five senses. Obj. 4: Further, a species is not divided against its genus. But taste is a kind of touch. Therefore it should not be classed as a distinct sense of touch. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 1): There is no other besides the five senses. I answer that, The reason of the distinction and number of the senses has been assigned by some to the organs in which one or other of the elements preponderate, as water, air, or the like. By others it has been assigned to the medium, which is either in conjunction or extrinsic and is either water or air, or such like. Others have ascribed it to the various natures of the sensible qualities, according as such quality belongs to a simple body or results from complexity. But none of these explanations is apt. For the powers are not for the organs, but the organs for the powers; wherefore there are not various powers for the reason that there are various organs; on the contrary, for this has nature provided a variety of organs, that they might be adapted to various powers. In the same way nature provided various mediums for the various senses, according to the convenience of the acts of the powers. And to be cognizant of the natures of sensible qualities does not pertain to the senses, but to the intellect. The reason of the number and distinction of the exterior senses must therefore be ascribed to that which belongs to the senses properly and per se. Now, sense is a passive power, and is naturally immuted by the exterior sensible. Wherefore the exterior cause of such immutation is what is

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su percipitur, et secundum cuius diversitatem sensitivae potentiae distinguuntur. Est autem duplex immutatio, una naturalis, et alia spiritualis. Naturalis quidem, secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse naturale, sicut calor in calefacto. Spiritualis autem, secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse spirituale; ut forma coloris in pupilla, quae non fit per hoc colorata. Ad operationem autem sensus requiritur immutatio spiritualis, per quam intentio formae sensibilis fiat in organo sensus. Alioquin, si sola immutatio naturalis sufficeret ad sentiendum, omnia corpora naturalia sentirent dum alterantur.

Sed in quibusdam sensibus invenitur immutatio spiritualis tantum, sicut in visu. In quibusdam autem, cum immutatione spirituali, etiam naturalis; vel ex parte obiecti tantum, vel etiam ex parte organi. Ex parte autem obiecti, invenitur transmutatio naturalis, secundum locum quidem, in sono, qui est obiectum auditus, nam sonus ex percussione causatur et aeris commotione. Secundum alterationem vero, in odore, qui est obiectum olfactus, oportet enim per calidum alterari aliquo modo corpus, ad hoc quod spiret odorem. Ex parte autem organi, est immutatio naturalis in tactu et gustu, nam et manus tangens calida calefit, et lingua humectatur per humiditatem saporum. Organum vero olfactus aut auditus nulla naturali immutatione immutatur in sentiendo, nisi per accidens. Visus autem, quia est absque immutatione naturali et organi et obiecti, est maxime spiritualis, et perfectior inter omnes sensus, et communior. Et post hoc auditus, et deinde olfactus, qui habent immutationem naturalem ex parte obiecti. Motus tamen localis est perfectior et naturaliter prior quam motus alterationis, ut probatur in VIII Physic. Tactus autem et gustus sunt maxime materiales, de quorum distinctione post dicetur. Et inde est quod alii tres sensus non fiunt per medium coniunctum, ne aliqua naturalis transmutatio pertingat ad organum, ut accidit in his duobus sensibus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non omnia accidentia habent vim immutativam secundum se; sed solae qualitates tertiae speciei, secundum quas contingit alteratio. Et ideo solae huiusmodi qualitates sunt obiecta sensuum, quia, ut dicitur in VII Physic., secundum eadem alteratur sensus, secundum quae alterantur corpora inanimata. Ad secundum dicendum quod magnitudo et figura et huiusmodi, quae dicuntur communia sensibilia, sunt media inter sensibilia per accidens et sensibilia propria, quae sunt obiecta sensuum. Nam sensibilia propria primo et per se immutant sensum; cum sint qualita-

Q. 78, A. 3

per se perceived by the sense, and according to the diversity of that exterior cause are the sensitive powers diversified. Now, immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual. Natural immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received according to its natural existence, into the thing immuted, as heat is received into the thing heated. Whereas spiritual immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received, according to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing immuted, as the form of color is received into the pupil which does not thereby become colored. Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual immutation is required, whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected in the sensile organ. Otherwise, if a natural immutation alone sufficed for the sense’s action, all natural bodies would feel when they undergo alteration. But in some senses we find spiritual immutation only, as in sight: while in others we find not only spiritual but also a natural immutation; either on the part of the object only, or likewise on the part of the organ. On the part of the object we find natural immutation, as to place, in sound which is the object of hearing; for sound is caused by percussion and commotion of air: and we find natural immutation by alteration, in odor which is the object of smelling; for in order to exhale an odor, a body must be in a measure affected by heat. On the part of an organ, natural immutation takes place in touch and taste; for the hand that touches something hot becomes hot, while the tongue is moistened by the humidity of the flavored morsel. But the organs of smelling and hearing are not affected in their respective operations by any natural immutation unless indirectly. Now, the sight, which is without natural immutation either in its organ or in its object, is the most spiritual, the most perfect, and the most universal of all the senses. After this comes the hearing and then the smell, which require a natural immutation on the part of the object; while local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior to, the motion of alteration, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 7). Touch and taste are the most material of all: of the distinction of which we shall speak later on (ad 3, 4). Hence it is that the three other senses are not exercised through a medium united to them, to obviate any natural immutation in their organ; as happens as regards these two senses. Reply Obj. 1: Not every accident has in itself a power of immutation but only qualities of the third species, which are the principles of alteration: therefore only suchlike qualities are the objects of the senses; because the senses are affected by the same things whereby inanimate bodies are affected, as stated in Phys. vii, 2. Reply Obj. 2: Size, shape, and the like, which are called common sensibles, are midway between accidental sensibles and proper sensibles, which are the objects of the senses. For the proper sensibles first, and of their very nature, affect the senses; since they are qualities that cause alteration. But

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tes alterantes. Sensibilia vero communia omnia reducuntur ad quantitatem. Et de magnitudine quidem et numero, patet quod sunt species quantitatis. Figura autem est qualitas circa quantitatem; cum consistat ratio figurae in terminatione magnitudinis. Motus autem et quies sentiuntur, secundum quod subiectum uno modo vel pluribus modis se habet secundum magnitudinem subiecti vel localis distantiae, quantum ad motum augmenti et motum localem; vel etiam secundum sensibiles qualitates, ut in motu alterationis, et sic sentire motum et quietem est quodammodo sentire unum et multa. Quantitas autem est proximum subiectum qualitatis alterativae, ut superficies coloris. Et ideo sensibilia communia non movent sensum primo et per se, sed ratione sensibilis qualitatis; ut superficies ratione coloris. Nec tamen sunt sensibilia per accidens, quia huiusmodi sensibilia aliquam diversitatem faciunt in immutatione sensus. Alio enim modo immutatur sensus a magna superficie, et a parva, quia etiam ipsa albedo dicitur magna vel parva, et ideo dividitur secundum proprium subiectum. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus videtur dicere in II de Anima, sensus tactus est unus genere, sed dividitur in multos sensus secundum speciem; et propter hoc est diversarum contrarietatum. Qui tamen non separantur ab invicem secundum organum, sed per totum corpus se concomitantur; et ideo eorum distinctio non apparet. Gustus autem, qui est perceptivus dulcis et amari, concomitatur tactum in lingua, non autem per totum corpus; et ideo de facili a tactu distinguitur. Posset tamen dici quod omnes illae contrarietates, et singulae conveniunt in uno genere proximo, et omnes in uno genere communi, quod est obiectum tactus secundum rationem communem. Sed illud genus commune est innominatum; sicut etiam genus proximum calidi et frigidi est innominatum. Ad quartum dicendum quod sensus gustus, secundum dictum Philosophi, est quaedam species tactus quae est in lingua tantum. Non autem distinguitur a tactu in genere, sed a tactu quantum ad illas species quae per totum corpus diffunduntur. Si vero tactus sit unus sensus tantum, propter unam rationem communem obiecti, dicendum erit quod secundum rationem diversam immutationis, distinguitur gustus a tactu. Nam tactus immutatur naturali immutatione, et non solum spirituali, quantum ad organum suum, secundum qualitatem quae ei proprie obiicitur. Gustus autem organum non immutatur de necessitate naturali immutatione secundum qualitatem quae ei proprie obiicitur, ut scilicet lingua fiat dulcis vel amara; sed secundum praeambulam qualitatem, in qua fundatur sapor, scilicet secundum humorem, qui est obiectum tactus.

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the common sensibles are all reducible to quantity. As to size and number, it is clear that they are species of quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity, since the notion of shape consists of fixing the bounds of magnitude. Movement and rest are sensed according as the subject is affected in one or more ways in the magnitude of the subject or of its local distance, as in the movement of growth or of locomotion, or again, according as it is affected in some sensible qualities, as in the movement of alteration; and thus to sense movement and rest is, in a way, to sense one thing and many. Now quantity is the proximate subject of the qualities that cause alteration, as surface is of color. Therefore the common sensibles do not move the senses first and of their own nature, but by reason of the sensible quality; as the surface by reason of color. Yet they are not accidental sensibles, for they produce a certain variety in the immutation of the senses. For sense is immuted differently by a large and by a small surface: since whiteness itself is said to be great or small, and therefore it is divided according to its proper subject. Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher seems to say (De Anima ii, 11), the sense of touch is generically one, but is divided into several specific senses, and for this reason it extends to various contrarieties; which senses, however, are not separate from one another in their organ, but are spread throughout the whole body, so that their distinction is not evident. But taste, which perceives the sweet and the bitter, accompanies touch in the tongue, but not in the whole body; so it is easily distinguished from touch. We might also say that all those contrarieties agree, each in some proximate genus, and all in a common genus, which is the common and formal object of touch. Such common genus is, however, unnamed, just as the proximate genus of hot and cold is unnamed. Reply Obj. 4: The sense of taste, according to a saying of the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9), is a kind of touch existing in the tongue only. It is not distinct from touch in general, but only from the species of touch distributed in the body. But if touch is one sense only, on account of the common formality of its object: we must say that taste is distinguished from touch by reason of a different formality of immutation. For touch involves a natural, and not only a spiritual, immutation in its organ, by reason of the quality which is its proper object. But the organ of taste is not necessarily immuted by a natural immutation by reason of the quality which is its proper object, so that the tongue itself becomes sweet and bitter: but by reason of a quality which is a preamble to, and on which is based, the flavor, which quality is moisture, the object of touch.

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Q. 78, A. 4

Article 4 Whether the interior senses are suitably distinguished? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod interiores sensus inconvenienter distinguantur. Commune enim non dividitur contra proprium. Ergo sensus communis non debet enumerari inter vires interiores sensitivas, praeter sensus exteriores proprios. Praeterea, ad id ad quod sufficit sensus proprius et exterior, non oportet ponere aliquam vim apprehensivam interiorem. Sed ad iudicandum de sensibilibus, sufficiunt sensus proprii et exteriores, unusquisque enim sensus iudicat de proprio obiecto. Similiter etiam videntur sufficere ad hoc quod percipiant suos actus, quia cum actio sensus sit quodammodo medium inter potentiam et obiectum, videtur quod multo magis visus possit suam visionem, tanquam sibi propinquiorem, percipere, quam colorem; et sic de aliis. Non ergo necessarium fuit ad hoc ponere interiorem potentiam, quae dicatur sensus communis. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum, phantasticum et memorativum sunt passiones primi sensitivi. Sed passio non dividitur contra subiectum. Ergo memoria et phantasia non debent poni aliae potentiae praeter sensum. Praeterea, intellectus minus dependet a sensu, quam quaecumque potentia sensitivae partis. Sed intellectus nihil cognoscit nisi accipiendo a sensu, unde dicitur in I Posteriorum, quod quibus deest unus sensus, deficit una scientia. Ergo multo minus debet poni una potentia sensitivae partis ad percipiendum intentiones quas non percipit sensus, quam vocant aestimativam. Praeterea, actus cogitativae, qui est conferre et componere et dividere, et actus reminiscitivae, qui est quodam syllogismo uti ad inquirendum, non minus distant ab actu aestimativae et memorativae, quam actus aestimativae ab actu phantasiae. Debent ergo vel cogitativa et reminiscitiva poni aliae vires praeter aestimativam et memorativam; vel aestimativa et memorativa non debent poni aliae vires praeter phantasiam.

Praeterea, Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt., ponit tria genera visionum, scilicet corporalem, quae fit per sensum; et spiritualem, quae fit per imaginationem sive phantasiam; et intellectualem, quae fit per intellectum. Non est ergo aliqua vis interior quae sit media inter sensum et intellectum, nisi imaginativa tantum. Sed contra est quod Avicenna, in suo libro de Anima, ponit quinque potentias sensitivas interiores, scili-

Objection 1: It would seem that the interior senses are not suitably distinguished. For the common is not divided against the proper. Therefore the common sense should not be numbered among the interior sensitive powers, in addition to the proper exterior senses. Obj. 2: Further, there is no need to assign an interior power of apprehension when the proper and exterior sense suffices. But the proper and exterior senses suffice for us to judge of sensible things; for each sense judges of its proper object. In like manner they seem to suffice for the perception of their own actions; for since the action of the sense is, in a way, between the power and its object, it seems that sight must be much more able to perceive its own vision, as being nearer to it, than the color; and in like manner with the other senses. Therefore for this there is no need to assign an interior power, called the common sense. Obj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Memor. et Remin. i), the imagination and the memory are passions of the first sensitive. But passion is not divided against its subject. Therefore memory and imagination should not be assigned as powers distinct from the senses. Obj. 4: Further, the intellect depends on the senses less than any power of the sensitive part. But the intellect knows nothing but what it receives from the senses; whence we read (Poster. i, 8), that those who lack one sense lack one kind of knowledge. Therefore much less should we assign to the sensitive part a power, which they call the estimative power, for the perception of intentions which the sense does not perceive. Obj. 5: Further, the action of the cogitative power, which consists in comparing, adding and dividing, and the action of the reminiscence, which consists in the use of a kind of syllogism for the sake of inquiry, is not less distant from the actions of the estimative and memorative powers, than the action of the estimative is from the action of the imagination. Therefore either we must add the cognitive and reminiscitive to the estimative and memorative powers, or the estimative and memorative powers should not be made distinct from the imagination. Obj. 6: Further, Augustine (Gen ad lit. xii, 6, 7, 24) describes three kinds of vision; namely, corporeal, which is the action of the sense; spiritual, which is an action of the imagination or phantasy; and intellectual, which is an action of the intellect. Therefore there is no interior power between the sense and intellect, besides the imagination. On the contrary, Avicenna (De Anima iv, 1) assigns five interior sensitive powers; namely, common sense, phan-

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cet sensum communem, phantasiam, imaginativam, aestimativam, et memorativam. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum natura non deficiat in necessariis, oportet esse tot actiones animae sensitivae, quot sufficiant ad vitam animalis perfecti. Et quaecumque harum actionum non possunt reduci in unum principium, requirunt diversas potentias, cum potentia animae nihil aliud sit quam proximum principium operationis animae. Est autem considerandum quod ad vitam animalis perfecti requiritur quod non solum apprehendat rem apud praesentiam sensibilis, sed etiam apud eius absentiam. Alioquin, cum animalis motus et actio sequantur apprehensionem, non moveretur animal ad inquirendum aliquid absens; cuius contrarium apparet maxime in animalibus perfectis, quae moventur motu processivo; moventur enim ad aliquid absens apprehensum. Oportet ergo quod animal per animam sensitivam non solum recipiat species sensibilium, cum praesentialiter immutatur ab eis; sed etiam eas retineat et conservet. Recipere autem et retinere reducuntur in corporalibus ad diversa principia, nam humida bene recipiunt, et male retinent; e contrario autem est de siccis. Unde, cum potentia sensitiva sit actus organi corporalis, oportet esse aliam potentiam quae recipiat species sensibilium, et quae conservet. Rursus considerandum est quod, si animal moveretur solum propter delectabile et contristabile secundum sensum, non esset necessarium ponere in animali nisi apprehensionem formarum quas percipit sensus, in quibus delectatur aut horret. Sed necessarium est animali ut quaerat aliqua vel fugiat, non solum quia sunt convenientia vel non convenientia ad sentiendum, sed etiam propter aliquas alias commoditates et utilitates, sive nocumenta, sicut ovis videns lupum venientem fugit, non propter indecentiam coloris vel figurae, sed quasi inimicum naturae; et similiter avis colligit paleam, non quia delectet sensum, sed quia est utilis ad nidificandum. Necessarium est ergo animali quod percipiat huiusmodi intentiones, quas non percipit sensus exterior. Et huius perceptionis oportet esse aliquod aliud principium, cum perceptio formarum sensibilium sit ex immutatione sensibilis, non autem perceptio intentionum praedictarum.

Sic ergo ad receptionem formarum sensibilium ordinatur sensus proprius et communis, de quorum distinctione post dicetur. Ad harum autem formarum retentionem aut conservationem ordinatur phantasia, sive imaginatio, quae idem sunt, est enim phantasia sive imaginatio quasi thesaurus quidam formarum per sensum acceptarum. Ad apprehendendum autem intentiones quae per sensum non accipiuntur, ordinatur vis aestima-

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tasy, imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers. I answer that, As nature does not fail in necessary things, there must needs be as many actions of the sensitive soul as may suffice for the life of a perfect animal. If any of these actions cannot be reduced to the same one principle, they must be assigned to diverse powers; since a power of the soul is nothing else than the proximate principle of the soul’s operation. Now we must observe that for the life of a perfect animal, the animal should apprehend a thing not only at the actual time of sensation, but also when it is absent. Otherwise, since animal motion and action follow apprehension, an animal would not be moved to seek something absent: the contrary of which we may observe specially in perfect animals, which are moved by progression, for they are moved towards something apprehended and absent. Therefore an animal through the sensitive soul must not only receive the species of sensible things, when it is actually affected by them, but it must also retain and preserve them. Now to receive and retain are, in corporeal things, reduced to diverse principles; for moist things are apt to receive, but retain with difficulty, while it is the reverse with dry things. Wherefore, since the sensitive power is the act of a corporeal organ, it follows that the power which receives the species of sensible things must be distinct from the power which preserves them. Again we must observe that if an animal were moved by pleasing and disagreeable things only as affecting the sense, there would be no need to suppose that an animal has a power besides the apprehension of those forms which the senses perceive, and in which the animal takes pleasure, or from which it shrinks with horror. But the animal needs to seek or to avoid certain things, not only because they are pleasing or otherwise to the senses, but also on account of other advantages and uses, or disadvantages: just as the sheep runs away when it sees a wolf, not on account of its color or shape, but as a natural enemy: and again a bird gathers together straws, not because they are pleasant to the sense, but because they are useful for building its nest. Animals, therefore, need to perceive such intentions, which the exterior sense does not perceive. And some distinct principle is necessary for this; since the perception of sensible forms comes by an immutation caused by the sensible, which is not the case with the perception of those intentions. Thus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms, the proper sense and the common sense are appointed, and of their distinction we shall speak farther on (ad 1, 2). But for the retention and preservation of these forms, the phantasy or imagination is appointed; which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is as it were a storehouse of forms received through the senses. Furthermore, for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through

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tiva. Ad conservandum autem eas, vis memorativa, quae est thesaurus quidam huiusmodi intentionum. Cuius signum est, quod principium memorandi fit in animalibus ex aliqua huiusmodi intentione, puta quod est nocivum vel conveniens. Et ipsa ratio praeteriti, quam attendit memoria, inter huiusmodi intentiones computatur.

Considerandum est autem quod, quantum ad formas sensibiles, non est differentia inter hominem et alia animalia, similiter enim immutantur a sensibilibus exterioribus. Sed quantum ad intentiones praedictas, differentia est, nam alia animalia percipiunt huiusmodi intentiones solum naturali quodam instinctu, homo autem etiam per quandam collationem. Et ideo quae in aliis animalibus dicitur aestimativa naturalis, in homine dicitur cogitativa, quae per collationem quandam huiusmodi intentiones adinvenit. Unde etiam dicitur ratio particularis, cui medici assignant determinatum organum, scilicet mediam partem capitis, est enim collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio intellectiva intentionum universalium. Ex parte autem memorativae, non solum habet memoriam, sicut cetera animalia, in subita recordatione praeteritorum; sed etiam reminiscentiam, quasi syllogistice inquirendo praeteritorum memoriam, secundum individuales intentiones. Avicenna vero ponit quintam potentiam, mediam inter aestimativam et imaginativam, quae componit et dividit formas imaginatas; ut patet cum ex forma imaginata auri et forma imaginata montis componimus unam formam montis aurei, quem nunquam vidimus. Sed ista operatio non apparet in aliis animalibus ab homine, in quo ad hoc sufficit virtus imaginativa. Cui etiam hanc actionem attribuit Averroes, in libro quodam quem fecit de Sensu et Sensibilibus. Et sic non est necesse ponere nisi quatuor vires interiores sensitivae partis, scilicet sensum communem et imaginationem, aestimativam et memorativam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensus interior non dicitur communis per praedicationem, sicut genus; sed sicut communis radix et principium exteriorum sensuum. Ad secundum dicendum quod sensus proprius iudicat de sensibili proprio, discernendo ipsum ab aliis quae cadunt sub eodem sensu, sicut discernendo album a nigro vel a viridi. Sed discernere album a dulci non potest neque visus neque gustus, quia oportet quod qui inter aliqua discernit, utrumque cognoscat. Unde oportet ad sensum communem pertinere discretionis iudicium, ad quem referantur, sicut ad communem terminum, omnes apprehensiones sensuum; a quo etiam percipiantur intentiones sensuum, sicut cum aliquis videt se videre. Hoc enim non potest fieri per sensum proprium, qui non cognoscit nisi formam sensibilis a

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the senses, the estimative power is appointed: and for the preservation thereof, the memorative power, which is a storehouse of such-like intentions. A sign of which we have in the fact that the principle of memory in animals is found in some such intention, for instance, that something is harmful or otherwise. And the very formality of the past, which memory observes, is to be reckoned among these intentions. Now, we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference between man and other animals; for they are similarly immuted by the extrinsic sensible. But there is a difference as to the above intentions: for other animals perceive these intentions only by some natural instinct, while man perceives them by means of coalition of ideas. Therefore the power by which in other animals is called the natural estimative, in man is called the cogitative, which by some sort of collation discovers these intentions. Wherefore it is also called the particular reason, to which medical men assign a certain particular organ, namely, the middle part of the head: for it compares individual intentions, just as the intellectual reason compares universal intentions. As to the memorative power, man has not only memory, as other animals have in the sudden recollection of the past; but also reminiscence by syllogistically, as it were, seeking for a recollection of the past by the application of individual intentions. Avicenna, however, assigns between the estimative and the imaginative, a fifth power, which combines and divides imaginary forms: as when from the imaginary form of gold, and imaginary form of a mountain, we compose the one form of a golden mountain, which we have never seen. But this operation is not to be found in animals other than man, in whom the imaginative power suffices thereto. To man also does Averroes attribute this action in his book De Sensu et Sensibilibus (viii). So there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the sensitive part— namely, the common sense, the imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers. Reply Obj. 1: The interior sense is called common not by predication, as if it were a genus; but as the common root and principle of the exterior senses. Reply Obj. 2: The proper sense judges of the proper sensible by discerning it from other things which come under the same sense; for instance, by discerning white from black or green. But neither sight nor taste can discern white from sweet: because what discerns between two things must know both. Wherefore the discerning judgment must be assigned to the common sense; to which, as to a common term, all apprehensions of the senses must be referred: and by which, again, all the intentions of the senses are perceived; as when someone sees that he sees. For this cannot be done by the proper sense, which only knows the form of the sensible by which it is immuted,

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quo immutatur; in qua immutatione perficitur visio, et ex qua immutatione sequitur alia immutatio in sensu communi, qui visionem percipit. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut una potentia oritur ab anima, alia mediante, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam anima subiicitur alii potentiae, mediante alia. Et secundum hunc modum, phantasticum et memorativum dicuntur passiones primi sensitivi. Ad quartum dicendum quod, licet intellectus operatio oriatur a sensu, tamen in re apprehensa per sensum intellectus multa cognoscit quae sensus percipere non potest. Et similiter aestimativa, licet inferiori modo.

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in which immutation the action of sight is completed, and from immutation follows another in the common sense which perceives the act of vision. Reply Obj. 3: As one power arises from the soul by means of another, as we have seen above (Q. 77, A. 7), so also the soul is the subject of one power through another. In this way the imagination and the memory are called passions of the first sensitive. Reply Obj. 4: Although the operation of the intellect has its origin in the senses: yet, in the thing apprehended through the senses, the intellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive. In like manner does the estimative power, though in a less perfect manner. Ad quintum dicendum quod illam eminentiam haReply Obj. 5: The cogitative and memorative powers bet cogitativa et memorativa in homine, non per id quod in man owe their excellence not to that which is proper to est proprium sensitivae partis; sed per aliquam affinita- the sensitive part; but to a certain affinity and proximity tem et propinquitatem ad rationem universalem, secun- to the universal reason, which, so to speak, overflows into dum quandam refluentiam. Et ideo non sunt aliae vires, them. Therefore they are not distinct powers, but the same, sed eaedem, perfectiores quam sint in aliis animalibus. yet more perfect than in other animals. Ad sextum dicendum quod Augustinus spiritualem Reply Obj. 6: Augustine calls that vision spiritual visionem dicit esse, quae fit per similitudines corporum which is effected by the images of bodies in the absence of in absentia corporum. Unde patet quod communis est bodies. Whence it is clear that it is common to all interior omnibus interioribus apprehensionibus. apprehensions.

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Question 79 The Intellectual Powers Deinde quaeritur de potentiis intellectivis. Circa The next question concerns the intellectual powers, unquod quaeruntur tredecim. der which head there are thirteen points of inquiry: Primo, utrum intellectus sit potentia animae, vel (1) Whether the intellect is a power of the soul, or its eius essentia. essence? Secundo, si est potentia, utrum sit potentia passiva. (2) If it be a power, whether it is a passive power? Tertio, si est potentia passiva, utrum sit ponere (3) If it is a passive power, whether there is an active aliquem intellectum agentem. intellect? Quarto, utrum sit aliquid animae. (4) Whether it is something in the soul? Quinto, utrum intellectus agens sit unus omnium. (5) Whether the active intellect is one in all? Sexto, utrum memoria sit in intellectu. (6) Whether memory is in the intellect? Septimo, utrum sit alia potentia ab intellectu. (7) Whether the memory be distinct from the intellect? Octavo, utrum ratio sit alia potentia ab intellectu. (8) Whether the reason is a distinct power from the intellect? Nono, utrum ratio superior et inferior sint diversae (9) Whether the superior and inferior reason are potentiae. distinct powers? Decimo, utrum intelligentia sit alia potentia praeter (10) Whether the intelligence is distinct from the intellectum. intellect? Undecimo, utrum intellectus speculativus et (11) Whether the speculative and practical intellect are practicus sint diversae potentiae. distinct powers? Duodecimo, utrum synderesis sit aliqua potentia (12) Whether synderesis is a power of the intellectual intellectivae partis. part? Tertiodecimo, utrum conscientia sit aliqua potentia (13) Whether the conscience is a power of the intellectivae partis. intellectual part?

Article 1 Whether the intellect is a power of the soul, or its very essence? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit aliqua potentia animae, sed sit ipsa eius essentia. Intellectus idem enim videtur esse quod mens. Sed mens non est potentia animae sed essentia, dicit enim Augustinus, IX de Trin., mens et spiritus non relative dicuntur, sed essentiam demonstrant. Ergo intellectus est ipsa essentia animae. Praeterea, diversa genera potentiarum animae non uniuntur in aliqua potentia una, sed in sola essentia animae. Appetitivum autem et intellectivum sunt diversa genera potentiarum animae, ut dicitur in II de Anima; conveniunt autem in mente, quia Augustinus, X de Trin., ponit intelligentiam et voluntatem in mente. Ergo mens et intellectus est ipsa essentia animae, et non aliqua eius potentia. Praeterea, secundum Gregorium, in homilia ascensionis, homo intelligit cum angelis. Sed angeli di-

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not a power of the soul, but the essence of the soul. For the intellect seems to be the same as the mind. Now the mind is not a power of the soul, but the essence; for Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 2): Mind and spirit are not relative things, but denominate the essence. Therefore the intellect is the essence of the soul. Obj. 2: Further, different genera of the soul’s powers are not united in some one power, but only in the essence of the soul. Now the appetitive and the intellectual are different genera of the soul’s powers as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), but they are united in the mind, for Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) places the intelligence and will in the mind. Therefore the mind and intellect of man is of the very essence of the soul and not a power thereof. Obj. 3: Further, according to Gregory, in a homily for the Ascension (xxix in Ev.), man understands with the an-

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cuntur mentes et intellectus. Ergo mens et intellectus ho- gels. But angels are called minds and intellects. Therefore the minis non est aliqua potentia animae, sed ipsa anima. mind and intellect of man are not a power of the soul, but the soul itself. Praeterea, ex hoc convenit alicui substantiae quod Obj. 4: Further, a substance is intellectual by the fact sit intellectiva, quia est immaterialis. Sed anima est im- that it is immaterial. But the soul is immaterial through its materialis per suam essentiam. Ergo videtur quod anima essence. Therefore it seems that the soul must be intellecper suam essentiam sit intellectiva. tual through its essence. Sed contra est quod Philosophus ponit intellectiOn the contrary, The Philosopher assigns the intelvum potentiam animae, ut patet in II de Anima. lectual faculty as a power of the soul (De Anima ii, 3). Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere, seI answer that, In accordance with what has been alcundum praemissa, quod intellectus sit aliqua potentia ready shown (Q. 54, A. 3; Q. 77, A. 1) it is necessary to say animae, et non ipsa animae essentia. Tunc enim solum that the intellect is a power of the soul, and not the very immediatum principium operationis est ipsa essentia rei essence of the soul. For then alone the essence of that which operantis, quando ipsa operatio est eius esse, sicut enim operates is the immediate principle of operation, when oppotentia se habet ad operationem ut ad suum actum, ita eration itself is its being: for as power is to operation as its se habet essentia ad esse. In solo Deo autem idem est in- act, so is the essence to being. But in God alone His actelligere quod suum esse. Unde in solo Deo intellectus tion of understanding is His very Being. Wherefore in God est eius essentia, in aliis autem creaturis intellectualibus alone is His intellect His essence: while in other intellectual intellectus est quaedam potentia intelligentis. creatures, the intellect is a power. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensus accipitur Reply Obj. 1: Sense is sometimes taken for the power, aliquando pro potentia, aliquando vero pro ipsa ani- and sometimes for the sensitive soul; for the sensitive soul ma sensitiva, denominatur enim anima sensitiva nomi- takes its name from its chief power, which is sense. And in ne principalioris suae potentiae, quae est sensus. Et simi- like manner the intellectual soul is sometimes called intelliter anima intellectiva quandoque nominatur nomine lect, as from its chief power; and thus we read (De Anima intellectus, quasi a principaliori sua virtute; sicut dicitur i, 4), that the intellect is a substance. And in this sense also in I de Anima, quod intellectus est substantia quaedam. Augustine says that the mind is spirit and essence (De Trin. Et etiam hoc modo Augustinus dicit quod mens est spi- ix, 2; xiv, 16). ritus, vel essentia. Ad secundum dicendum quod appetitivum et inReply Obj. 2: The appetitive and intellectual powers tellectivum sunt diversa genera potentiarum animae, se- are different genera of powers in the soul, by reason of cundum diversas rationes obiectorum. Sed appetitivum the different formalities of their objects. But the appetitive partim convenit cum intellectivo, et partim cum sensi- power agrees partly with the intellectual power and partly tivo, quantum ad modum operandi per organum cor- with the sensitive in its mode of operation either through porale, vel sine huiusmodi organo, nam appetitus sequi- a corporeal organ or without it: for appetite follows appretur apprehensionem. Et secundum hoc Augustinus ponit hension. And in this way Augustine puts the will in the voluntatem in mente, et Philosophus in ratione. mind; and the Philosopher, in the reason (De Anima iii, 9). Ad tertium dicendum quod in angelis non est alia Reply Obj. 3: In the angels there is no other power bevis nisi intellectiva, et voluntas, quae ad intellectum con- sides the intellect, and the will, which follows the intellect. sequitur. Et propter hoc angelus dicitur mens vel intel- And for this reason an angel is called a mind or an intellect; lectus, quia tota virtus sua in hoc consistit. Anima autem because his whole power consists in this. But the soul has habet multas alias vires, sicut sensitivas et nutritivas, et many other powers, such as the sensitive and nutritive powideo non est simile. ers, and therefore the comparison fails. Ad quartum dicendum quod ipsa immaterialitas Reply Obj. 4: The immateriality of the created intellisubstantiae intelligentis creatae non est eius intellectus; gent substance is not its intellect; but through its immatesed ex immaterialitate habet virtutem ad intelligendum. riality it has the power of intelligence. Wherefore it follows Unde non oportet quod intellectus sit substantia animae, not that the intellect is the substance of the soul, but that it sed eius virtus et potentia. is its virtue and power.

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Article 2 Whether the intellect is a passive power? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit potentia passiva. Patitur enim unumquodque secundum materiam; sed agit ratione formae. Sed virtus intellectiva consequitur immaterialitatem substantiae intelligentis. Ergo videtur quod intellectus non sit potentia passiva. Praeterea, potentia intellectiva est incorruptibilis, ut supra dictum est. Sed intellectus si est passivus, est corruptibilis, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Ergo potentia intellectiva non est passiva. Praeterea, agens est nobilius patiente, ut dicit Augustinus XII super Gen. ad Litt., et Aristoteles in III de Anima. Potentiae autem vegetativae partis omnes sunt activae, quae tamen sunt infimae inter potentias animae. Ergo multo magis potentiae intellectivae, quae sunt supremae, omnes sunt activae. Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, in III de Anima, quod intelligere est pati quoddam. Respondeo dicendum quod pati tripliciter dicitur. Uno modo, propriissime, scilicet quando aliquid removetur ab eo quod convenit sibi secundum naturam, aut secundum propriam inclinationem; sicut cum aqua frigiditatem amittit per calefactionem, et cum homo aegrotat aut tristatur. Secundo modo, minus proprie dicitur aliquis pati ex eo quod aliquid ab ipso abiicitur, sive sit ei conveniens, sive non conveniens. Et secundum hoc dicitur pati non solum qui aegrotat, sed etiam qui sanatur; non solum qui tristatur, sed etiam qui laetatur; vel quocumque modo aliquis alteretur vel moveatur. Tertio modo, dicitur aliquid pati communiter, ex hoc solo quod id quod est in potentia ad aliquid, recipit illud ad quod erat in potentia, absque hoc quod aliquid abiiciatur. Secundum quem modum, omne quod exit de potentia in actum, potest dici pati, etiam cum perficitur. Et sic intelligere nostrum est pati. Quod quidem hac ratione apparet. Intellectus enim, sicut supra dictum est, habet operationem circa ens in universali. Considerari ergo potest utrum intellectus sit in actu vel potentia, ex hoc quod consideratur quomodo intellectus se habeat ad ens universale. Invenitur enim aliquis intellectus qui ad ens universale se habet sicut actus totius entis, et talis est intellectus divinus, qui est Dei essentia, in qua originaliter et virtualiter totum ens praeexistit sicut in prima causa. Et ideo intellectus divinus non est in potentia, sed est actus purus. Nullus autem intellectus creatus potest se habere ut actus respectu totius entis universalis, quia sic oporteret quod esset ens infinitum. Unde omnis intellectus creatus, per hoc ipsum quod est, non est actus omnium intelligibilium,

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not a passive power. For everything is passive by its matter, and acts by its form. But the intellectual power results from the immateriality of the intelligent substance. Therefore it seems that the intellect is not a passive power. Obj. 2: Further, the intellectual power is incorruptible, as we have said above (Q. 79, A. 6). But if the intellect is passive, it is corruptible (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore the intellectual power is not passive. Obj. 3: Further, the agent is nobler than the patient, as Augustine (Gen ad lit. xii, 16) and Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) says. But all the powers of the vegetative part are active; yet they are the lowest among the powers of the soul. Much more, therefore, all the intellectual powers, which are the highest, are active. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that to understand is in a way to be passive. I answer that, To be passive may be taken in three ways. First, in its most strict sense, when from a thing is taken something which belongs to it by virtue either of its nature, or of its proper inclination: as when water loses coolness by heating, and as when a man becomes ill or sad. Second, less strictly, a thing is said to be passive, when something, whether suitable or unsuitable, is taken away from it. And in this way not only he who is ill is said to be passive, but also he who is healed; not only he that is sad, but also he that is joyful; or whatever way he be altered or moved. Third, in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive, from the very fact that what is in potentiality to something receives that to which it was in potentiality, without being deprived of anything. And accordingly, whatever passes from potentiality to act, may be said to be passive, even when it is perfected. And thus with us to understand is to be passive. This is clear from the following reason. For the intellect, as we have seen above (Q. 78, A. 1), has an operation extending to universal being. We may therefore see whether the intellect be in act or potentiality by observing first of all the nature of the relation of the intellect to universal being. For we find an intellect whose relation to universal being is that of the act of all being: and such is the Divine intellect, which is the Essence of God, in which originally and virtually, all being pre-exists as in its first cause. And therefore the Divine intellect is not in potentiality, but is pure act. But no created intellect can be an act in relation to the whole universal being; otherwise it would needs be an infinite being. Wherefore every created intellect is not the act of all things intelligible, by reason of its very existence; but

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sed comparatur ad ipsa intelligibilia sicut potentia ad actum. Potentia autem dupliciter se habet ad actum. Est enim quaedam potentia quae semper est perfecta per actum; sicut diximus de materia corporum caelestium. Quaedam autem potentia est, quae non semper est in actu, sed de potentia procedit in actum; sicut invenitur in generabilibus et corruptibilibus. Intellectus igitur angelicus semper est in actu suorum intelligibilium, propter propinquitatem ad primum intellectum, qui est actus purus, ut supra dictum est. Intellectus autem humanus, qui est infimus in ordine intellectuum, et maxime remotus a perfectione divini intellectus, est in potentia respectu intelligibilium, et in principio est sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum, ut Philosophus dicit in III de Anima. Quod manifeste apparet ex hoc, quod in principio sumus intelligentes solum in potentia, postmodum autem efficimur intelligentes in actu. Sic igitur patet quod intelligere nostrum est quoddam pati, secundum tertium modum passionis. Et per consequens intellectus est potentia passiva. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de primo et secundo modo passionis, qui sunt proprii materiae primae. Tertius autem modus passionis est cuiuscumque in potentia existentis quod in actum reducitur. Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus passivus secundum quosdam dicitur appetitus sensitivus, in quo sunt animae passiones; qui etiam in I Ethic. dicitur rationalis per participationem, quia obedit rationi. Secundum alios autem intellectus passivus dicitur virtus cogitativa, quae nominatur ratio particularis. Et utroque modo passivum accipi potest secundum primos duos modos passionis, inquantum talis intellectus sic dictus, est actus alicuius organi corporalis. Sed intellectus qui est in potentia ad intelligibilia, quem Aristoteles ob hoc nominat intellectum possibilem, non est passivus nisi tertio modo, quia non est actus organi corporalis. Et ideo est incorruptibilis. Ad tertium dicendum quod agens est nobilius patiente, si ad idem actio et passio referantur, non autem semper, si ad diversa. Intellectus autem est vis passiva respectu totius entis universalis. Vegetativum autem est activum respectu cuiusdam entis particularis, scilicet corporis coniuncti. Unde nihil prohibet huiusmodi passivum esse nobilius tali activo.

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is compared to these intelligible things as a potentiality to act. Now, potentiality has a double relation to act. There is a potentiality which is always perfected by its act: as the matter of the heavenly bodies (Q. 58, A. 1). And there is another potentiality which is not always in act, but proceeds from potentiality to act; as we observe in things that are corrupted and generated. Wherefore the angelic intellect is always in act as regards those things which it can understand, by reason of its proximity to the first intellect, which is pure act, as we have said above. But the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote from the perfection of the Divine intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible, and is at first like a clean tablet on which nothing is written, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). This is made clear from the fact, that at first we are only in potentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to understand actually. And so it is evident that with us to understand is in a way to be passive; taking passion in the third sense. And consequently the intellect is a passive power. Reply Obj. 1: This objection is verified of passion in the first and second senses, which belong to primary matter. But in the third sense passion is in anything which is reduced from potentiality to act. Reply Obj. 2: Passive intellect is the name given by some to the sensitive appetite, in which are the passions of the soul; which appetite is also called rational by participation, because it obeys the reason (Ethic. i, 13). Others give the name of passive intellect to the cogitative power, which is called the particular reason. And in each case passive may be taken in the two first senses; forasmuch as this so-called intellect is the act of a corporeal organ. But the intellect which is in potentiality to things intelligible, and which for this reason Aristotle calls the possible intellect (De Anima iii, 4), is not passive except in the third sense: for it is not an act of a corporeal organ. Hence it is incorruptible. Reply Obj. 3: The agent is nobler than the patient, if the action and the passion are referred to the same thing: but not always, if they refer to different things. Now the intellect is a passive power in regard to the whole universal being: while the vegetative power is active in regard to some particular thing, namely, the body as united to the soul. Wherefore nothing prevents such a passive force from being nobler than such an active one.

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Article 3 Whether there is an active intellect? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit ponere intellectum agentem. Sicut enim se habet sensus ad sensibilia, ita se habet intellectus noster ad intelligibilia. Sed quia sensus est in potentia ad sensibilia non ponitur sensus agens, sed sensus patiens tantum. Ergo, cum intellectus noster sit in potentia ad intelligibilia, videtur quod non debeat poni intellectus agens, sed possibilis tantum. Praeterea, si dicatur quod in sensu etiam est aliquod agens, sicut lumen, contra, lumen requiritur ad visum inquantum facit medium lucidum in actu, nam color ipse secundum se est motivus lucidi. Sed in operatione intellectus non ponitur aliquod medium quod necesse sit fieri in actu. Ergo non est necessarium ponere intellectum agentem. Praeterea, similitudo agentis recipitur in patiente secundum modum patientis. Sed intellectus possibilis est virtus immaterialis. Ergo immaterialitas eius sufficit ad hoc quod recipiantur in eo formae immaterialiter. Sed ex hoc ipso aliqua forma est intelligibilis in actu, quod est immaterialis. Ergo nulla necessitas est ponere intellectum agentem, ad hoc quod faciat species intelligibiles in actu. Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, in III de Anima, quod sicut in omni natura ita et in anima est aliquid quo est omnia fieri, et aliquid quo est omnia facere. Est ergo ponere intellectum agentem. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum opinionem Platonis, nulla necessitas erat ponere intellectum agentem ad faciendum intelligibilia in actu; sed forte ad praebendum lumen intelligibile intelligenti, ut infra dicetur. Posuit enim Plato formas rerum naturalium sine materia subsistere, et per consequens eas intelligibiles esse, quia ex hoc est aliquid intelligibile actu, quod est immateriale. Et huiusmodi vocabat species, sive ideas, ex quarum participatione dicebat etiam materiam corporalem formari, ad hoc quod individua naturaliter constituerentur in propriis generibus et speciebus; et intellectus nostros, ad hoc quod de generibus et speciebus rerum scientiam haberent. Sed quia Aristoteles non posuit formas rerum naturalium subsistere sine materia; formae autem in materia existentes non sunt intelligibiles actu, sequebatur quod naturae seu formae rerum sensibilium, quas intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu. Nihil autem reducitur de potentia in actum, nisi per aliquod ens actu, sicut sensus fit in actu per sensibile in actu. Oportebat igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quae faceret intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specierum a con-

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no active intellect. For as the senses are to things sensible, so is our intellect to things intelligible. But because sense is in potentiality to things sensible, the sense is not said to be active, but only passive. Therefore, since our intellect is in potentiality to things intelligible, it seems that we cannot say that the intellect is active, but only that it is passive. Obj. 2: Further, if we say that also in the senses there is something active, such as light: on the contrary, light is required for sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium to be actually luminous; for color of its own nature moves the luminous medium. But in the operation of the intellect there is no appointed medium that has to be brought into act. Therefore there is no necessity for an active intellect. Obj. 3: Further, the likeness of the agent is received into the patient according to the nature of the patient. But the passive intellect is an immaterial power. Therefore its immaterial nature suffices for forms to be received into it immaterially. Now a form is intelligible in act from the very fact that it is immaterial. Therefore there is no need for an active intellect to make the species actually intelligible. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), As in every nature, so in the soul is there something by which it becomes all things, and something by which it makes all things. Therefore we must admit an active intellect. I answer that, According to the opinion of Plato, there is no need for an active intellect in order to make things actually intelligible; but perhaps in order to provide intellectual light to the intellect, as will be explained farther on (A. 4). For Plato supposed that the forms of natural things subsisted apart from matter, and consequently that they are intelligible: since a thing is actually intelligible from the very fact that it is immaterial. And he called such forms species or ideas; from a participation of which, he said that even corporeal matter was formed, in order that individuals might be naturally established in their proper genera and species: and that our intellect was formed by such participation in order to have knowledge of the genera and species of things. But since Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things exist apart from matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible; it follows that the natures or forms of the sensible things which we understand are not actually intelligible. Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the senses as made actual by what is actually sensible. We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the spe-

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ditionibus materialibus. Et haec est necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensibilia inveniuntur actu extra animam, et ideo non oportuit ponere sensum agentem. Et sic patet quod in parte nutritiva omnes potentiae sunt activae; in parte autem sensitiva, omnes passivae; in parte vero intellectiva est aliquid activum, et aliquid passivum. Ad secundum dicendum quod circa effectum luminis est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt quod lumen requiritur ad visum, ut faciat colores actu visibiles. Et secundum hoc, similiter requiritur, et propter idem, intellectus agens ad intelligendum, propter quod lumen ad videndum. Secundum alios vero, lumen requiritur ad videndum, non propter colores, ut fiant actu visibiles; sed ut medium fiat actu lucidum, ut Commentator dicit in II de Anima. Et secundum hoc, similitudo qua Aristoteles assimilat intellectum agentem lumini, attenditur quantum ad hoc, quod sicut hoc est necessarium ad videndum, ita illud ad intelligendum; sed non propter idem. Ad tertium dicendum quod, supposito agente, bene contingit diversimode recipi eius similitudinem in diversis propter eorum dispositionem diversam. Sed si agens non praeexistit, nihil ad hoc faciet dispositio recipientis. Intelligibile autem in actu non est aliquid existens in rerum natura, quantum ad naturam rerum sensibilium, quae non subsistunt praeter materiam. Et ideo ad intelligendum non sufficeret immaterialitas intellectus possibilis, nisi adesset intellectus agens, qui faceret intelligibilia in actu per modum abstractionis.

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cies from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an active intellect. Reply Obj. 1: Sensible things are found in act outside the soul; and hence there is no need for an active sense. Wherefore it is clear that in the nutritive part all the powers are active, whereas in the sensitive part all are passive: but in the intellectual part, there is something active and something passive. Reply Obj. 2: There are two opinions as to the effect of light. For some say that light is required for sight, in order to make colors actually visible. And according to this the active intellect is required for understanding, in like manner and for the same reason as light is required for seeing. But in the opinion of others, light is required for sight; not for the colors to become actually visible; but in order that the medium may become actually luminous, as the Commentator says on De Anima ii. And according to this, Aristotle’s comparison of the active intellect to light is verified in this, that as it is required for understanding, so is light required for seeing; but not for the same reason. Reply Obj. 3: If the agent pre-exist, it may well happen that its likeness is received variously into various things, on account of their dispositions. But if the agent does not preexist, the disposition of the recipient has nothing to do with the matter. Now the intelligible in act is not something existing in nature; if we consider the nature of things sensible, which do not subsist apart from matter. And therefore in order to understand them, the immaterial nature of the passive intellect would not suffice but for the presence of the active intellect which makes things actually intelligible by way of abstraction.

Article 4 Whether the active intellect is something in the soul? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus agens non sit aliquid animae nostrae. Intellectus enim agentis effectus est illuminare ad intelligendum. Sed hoc fit per aliquid quod est altius anima; secundum illud Ioan. I, erat lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. Ergo videtur quod intellectus agens non sit aliquid animae. Praeterea, Philosophus, in III de Anima, attribuit intellectui agenti quod non aliquando intelligit et aliquando non intelligit. Sed anima nostra non semper intelligit; sed aliquando intelligit et aliquando non intelligit. Ergo intellectus agens non est aliquid animae nostrae. Praeterea, agens et patiens sufficiunt ad agendum. Si igitur intellectus possibilis est aliquid animae nostrae, qui est virtus passiva, et similiter intellectus agens, qui

Objection 1: It would seem that the active intellect is not something in the soul. For the effect of the active intellect is to give light for the purpose of understanding. But this is done by something higher than the soul: according to John 1:9, He was the true light that enlighteneth every man coming into this world. Therefore the active intellect is not something in the soul. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says of the active intellect, that it does not sometimes understand and sometimes not understand. But our soul does not always understand: sometimes it understands, sometimes it does not understand. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul. Obj. 3: Further, agent and patient suffice for action. If, therefore, the passive intellect, which is a passive power, is something belonging to the soul; and also the active intel-

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est virtus activa; sequitur quod homo semper poterit in- lect, which is an active power: it follows that a man would telligere cum voluerit, quod patet esse falsum. Non est always be able to understand when he wished, which is ergo intellectus agens aliquid animae nostrae. clearly false. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul. Praeterea, Philosophus dicit, in III de Anima, Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says quod intellectus agens est substantia actu ens. Nihil au- that the active intellect is a substance in actual being. But tem est respectu eiusdem in actu et in potentia. Si ergo nothing can be in potentiality and in act with regard to intellectus possibilis, qui est in potentia ad omnia intel- the same thing. If, therefore, the passive intellect, which is ligibilia, est aliquid animae nostrae; videtur impossibile in potentiality to all things intelligible, is something in the quod intellectus agens sit aliquid animae nostrae. soul, it seems impossible for the active intellect to be also something in our soul. Praeterea, si intellectus agens est aliquid animae Obj. 5: Further, if the active intellect is something in nostrae, oportet quod sit aliqua potentia. Non est enim the soul, it must be a power. For it is neither a passion nor nec passio nec habitus, nam habitus et passiones non ha- a habit; since habits and passions are not in the nature of bent rationem agentis respectu passionum animae; sed agents in regard to the passivity of the soul; but rather pasmagis passio est ipsa actio potentiae passivae, habitus sion is the very action of the passive power; while habit is autem est aliquid quod ex actibus consequitur. Omnis something which results from acts. But every power flows autem potentia fluit ab essentia animae. Sequeretur er- from the essence of the soul. It would therefore follow that go quod intellectus agens ab essentia animae procederet. the active intellect flows from the essence of the soul. And Et sic non inesset animae per participationem ab aliquo thus it would not be in the soul by way of participation from superiori intellectu, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo in- some higher intellect: which is unfitting. Therefore the actellectus agens est aliquid animae nostrae. tive intellect is not something in our soul. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, III de AniOn the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ma quod necesse est in anima has esse differentias, scilicet iii, 5) that it is necessary for these differences, namely, the intellectum possibilem, et agentem. passive and active intellect, to be in the soul. Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus agens de I answer that, The active intellect, of which the quo Philosophus loquitur, est aliquid animae. Ad cuius Philosopher speaks, is something in the soul. In order to evidentiam, considerandum est quod supra animam in- make this evident, we must observe that above the intellectellectivam humanam necesse est ponere aliquem supe- tual soul of man we must needs suppose a superior intelriorem intellectum, a quo anima virtutem intelligendi lect, from which the soul acquires the power of understandobtineat. Semper enim quod participat aliquid, et quod ing. For what is such by participation, and what is mobile, est mobile, et quod est imperfectum, praeexigit ante se and what is imperfect always requires the pre-existence of aliquid quod est per essentiam suam tale, et quod est im- something essentially such, immovable and perfect. Now mobile et perfectum. Anima autem humana intellectiva the human soul is called intellectual by reason of a particdicitur per participationem intellectualis virtutis, cuius ipation in intellectual power; a sign of which is that it is signum est, quod non tota est intellectiva, sed secundum not wholly intellectual but only in part. Moreover it reaches aliquam sui partem. Pertingit etiam ad intelligentiam ve- to the understanding of truth by arguing, with a certain ritatis cum quodam discursu et motu, arguendo. Habet amount of reasoning and movement. Again it has an imetiam imperfectam intelligentiam, tum quia non omnia perfect understanding; both because it does not understand intelligit; tum quia in his quae intelligit, de potentia pro- everything, and because, in those things which it does uncedit ad actum. Oportet ergo esse aliquem altiorem in- derstand, it passes from potentiality to act. Therefore there tellectum, quo anima iuvetur ad intelligendum. must needs be some higher intellect, by which the soul is helped to understand. Posuerunt ergo quidam hunc intellectum secundum Wherefore some held that this intellect, substantially substantiam separatum, esse intellectum agentem, qui separate, is the active intellect, which by lighting up the quasi illustrando phantasmata, facit ea intelligibilia ac- phantasms as it were, makes them to be actually intelligible. tu. Sed, dato quod sit aliquis talis intellectus agens se- But, even supposing the existence of such a separate acparatus, nihilominus tamen oportet ponere in ipsa ani- tive intellect, it would still be necessary to assign to the huma humana aliquam virtutem ab illo intellectu superiori man soul some power participating in that superior intelparticipatam, per quam anima humana facit intelligibi- lect, by which power the human soul makes things actually lia in actu. Sicut et in aliis rebus naturalibus perfectis, intelligible. Just as in other perfect natural things, besides praeter universales causas agentes, sunt propriae virtutes the universal active causes, each one is endowed with its inditae singulis rebus perfectis, ab universalibus agenti- proper powers derived from those universal causes: for the bus derivatae, non enim solus sol generat hominem, sed sun alone does not generate man; but in man is the power

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est in homine virtus generativa hominis; et similiter in aliis animalibus perfectis. Nihil autem est perfectius in inferioribus rebus anima humana. Unde oportet dicere quod in ipsa sit aliqua virtus derivata a superiori intellectu, per quam possit phantasmata illustrare. Et hoc experimento cognoscimus, dum percipimus nos abstrahere formas universales a conditionibus particularibus, quod est facere actu intelligibilia. Nulla autem actio convenit alicui rei, nisi per aliquod principium formaliter ei inhaerens; ut supra dictum est, cum de intellectu possibili ageretur. Ergo oportet virtutem quae est principium huius actionis, esse aliquid in anima. Et ideo Aristoteles comparavit intellectum agentem lumini, quod est aliquid receptum in aere. Plato autem intellectum separatum imprimentem in animas nostras, comparavit soli; ut Themistius dicit in commentario tertii de Anima. Sed intellectus separatus, secundum nostrae fidei documenta, est ipse Deus, qui est creator animae, et in quo solo beatificatur, ut infra patebit. Unde ab ipso anima humana lumen intellectuale participat, secundum illud Psalmi IV, signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa lux vera illuminat sicut causa universalis, a qua anima humana participat quandam particularem virtutem, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod Philosophus illa verba non dicit de intellectu agente, sed de intellectu in actu. Unde supra de ipso praemiserat, idem autem est secundum actum scientia rei. Vel, si intelligatur de intellectu agente, hoc dicitur quia non est ex parte intellectus agentis hoc quod quandoque intelligimus et quandoque non intelligimus; sed ex parte intellectus qui est in potentia. Ad tertium dicendum quod, si intellectus agens compararetur ad intellectum possibilem ut obiectum agens ad potentiam, sicut visibile in actu ad visum; sequeretur quod statim omnia intelligeremus, cum intellectus agens sit quo est omnia facere. Nunc autem non se habet ut obiectum, sed ut faciens obiecta in actu, ad quod requiritur, praeter praesentiam intellectus agentis, praesentia phantasmatum, et bona dispositio virium sensitivarum, et exercitium in huiusmodi opere; quia per unum intellectum fiunt etiam alia intellecta, sicut per terminos propositiones, et per prima principia conclusiones. Et quantum ad hoc, non differt utrum intellectus agens sit aliquid animae, vel aliquid separatum.

Ad quartum dicendum quod anima intellectiva est quidem actu immaterialis, sed est in potentia ad determinatas species rerum. Phantasmata autem, e converso, sunt quidem actu similitudines specierum quarundam, sed sunt potentia immaterialia. Unde nihil prohibet unam et eandem animam, inquantum est immaterialis in actu, habere aliquam virtutem per quam faciat imma-

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of begetting man: and in like manner with other perfect animals. Now among these lower things nothing is more perfect than the human soul. Wherefore we must say that in the soul is some power derived from a higher intellect, whereby it is able to light up the phantasms. And we know this by experience, since we perceive that we abstract universal forms from their particular conditions, which is to make them actually intelligible. Now no action belongs to anything except through some principle formally inherent therein; as we have said above of the passive intellect (Q. 76, A. 1). Therefore the power which is the principle of this action must be something in the soul. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) compared the active intellect to light, which is something received into the air: while Plato compared the separate intellect impressing the soul to the sun, as Themistius says in his commentary on De Anima iii. But the separate intellect, according to the teaching of our faith, is God Himself, Who is the soul’s Creator, and only beatitude; as will be shown later on (Q. 90, A. 3; I-II, Q. 3, A. 7). Wherefore the human soul derives its intellectual light from Him, according to Ps. 4:7, The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us. Reply Obj. 1: That true light enlightens as a universal cause, from which the human soul derives a particular power, as we have explained. Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher says those words not of the active intellect, but of the intellect in act: of which he had already said: Knowledge in act is the same as the thing. Or, if we refer those words to the active intellect, then they are said because it is not owing to the active intellect that sometimes we do, and sometimes we do not understand, but to the intellect which is in potentiality. Reply Obj. 3: If the relation of the active intellect to the passive were that of the active object to a power, as, for instance, of the visible in act to the sight; it would follow that we could understand all things instantly, since the active intellect is that which makes all things (in act). But now the active intellect is not an object, rather is it that whereby the objects are made to be in act: for which, besides the presence of the active intellect, we require the presence of phantasms, the good disposition of the sensitive powers, and practice in this sort of operation; since through one thing understood, other things come to be understood, as from terms are made propositions, and from first principles, conclusions. From this point of view it matters not whether the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, or something separate from the soul. Reply Obj. 4: The intellectual soul is indeed actually immaterial, but it is in potentiality to determinate species. On the contrary, phantasms are actual images of certain species, but are immaterial in potentiality. Wherefore nothing prevents one and the same soul, inasmuch as it is actually immaterial, having one power by which it makes things actually immaterial, by abstraction from the conditions of

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terialia in actu abstrahendo a conditionibus individualis materiae, quae quidem virtus dicitur intellectus agens; et aliam virtutem receptivam huiusmodi specierum, quae dicitur intellectus possibilis, inquantum est in potentia ad huiusmodi species. Ad quintum dicendum quod, cum essentia animae sit immaterialis, a supremo intellectu creata, nihil prohibet virtutem quae a supremo intellectu participatur, per quam abstrahit a materia, ab essentia ipsius procedere, sicut et alias eius potentias.

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individual matter: which power is called the active intellect; and another power, receptive of such species, which is called the passive intellect by reason of its being in potentiality to such species. Reply Obj. 5: Since the essence of the soul is immaterial, created by the supreme intellect, nothing prevents that power which it derives from the supreme intellect, and whereby it abstracts from matter, flowing from the essence of the soul, in the same way as its other powers.

Article 5 Whether the active intellect is one in all? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus agens sit unus in omnibus. Nihil enim quod est separatum a corpore, multiplicatur secundum multiplicationem corporum. Sed intellectus agens est separatus, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Ergo non multiplicatur in multis corporibus hominum, sed est unus in omnibus. Praeterea, intellectus agens facit universale, quod est unum in multis. Sed illud quod est causa unitatis, magis est unum. Ergo intellectus agens est unus in omnibus.

Objection 1: It would seem that there is one active intellect in all. For what is separate from the body is not multiplied according to the number of bodies. But the active intellect is separate, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore it is not multiplied in the many human bodies, but is one for all men. Obj. 2: Further, the active intellect is the cause of the universal, which is one in many. But that which is the cause of unity is still more itself one. Therefore the active intellect is the same in all. Praeterea, omnes homines conveniunt in primis Obj. 3: Further, all men agree in the first intellectual conceptionibus intellectus. His autem assentiunt per in- concepts. But to these they assent by the active intellect. tellectum agentem. Ergo conveniunt omnes in uno intel- Therefore all agree in one active intellect.

lectu agente. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III de Anima, quod intellectus agens est sicut lumen. Non autem est idem lumen in diversis illuminatis. Ergo non est idem intellectus agens in diversis hominibus. Respondeo dicendum quod veritas huius quaestionis dependet ex praemissis. Si enim intellectus agens non esset aliquid animae, sed esset quaedam substantia separata, unus esset intellectus agens omnium hominum. Et hoc intelligunt qui ponunt unitatem intellectus agentis. Si autem intellectus agens sit aliquid animae, ut quaedam virtus ipsius, necesse est dicere quod sint plures intellectus agentes, secundum pluralitatem animarum, quae multiplicantur secundum multiplicationem hominum, ut supra dictum est. Non enim potest esse quod una et eadem virtus numero sit diversarum substantiarum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus probat intellectum agentem esse separatum, per hoc quod possibilis est separatus; quia, ut ipse dicit, agens est honorabilius patiente. Intellectus autem possibilis dicitur separatus, quia non est actus alicuius organi corporalis. Et secundum hunc modum etiam intellectus agens dicitur separatus, non quasi sit aliqua substantia separata.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) that the active intellect is as a light. But light is not the same in the various things enlightened. Therefore the same active intellect is not in various men. I answer that, The truth about this question depends on what we have already said (A. 4). For if the active intellect were not something belonging to the soul, but were some separate substance, there would be one active intellect for all men. And this is what they mean who hold that there is one active intellect for all. But if the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of its powers, we are bound to say that there are as many active intellects as there are souls, which are multiplied according to the number of men, as we have said above (Q. 76, A. 2). For it is impossible that one same power belong to various substances. Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher proves that the active intellect is separate, by the fact that the passive intellect is separate: because, as he says (De Anima iii, 5), the agent is more noble than the patient. Now the passive intellect is said to be separate, because it is not the act of any corporeal organ. And in the same sense the active intellect is also called separate; but not as a separate substance.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus agens causat universale abstrahendo a materia. Ad hoc autem non requiritur quod sit unus in omnibus habentibus intellectum, sed quod sit unus in omnibus secundum habitudinem ad omnia a quibus abstrahit universale, respectu quorum universale est unum. Et hoc competit intellectui agenti inquantum est immaterialis. Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia quae sunt unius speciei, communicant in actione consequente naturam speciei, et per consequens in virtute, quae est actionis principium, non quod sit eadem numero in omnibus. Cognoscere autem prima intelligibilia est actio consequens speciem humanam. Unde oportet quod omnes homines communicent in virtute quae est principium huius actionis, et haec est virtus intellectus agentis. Non tamen oportet quod sit eadem numero in omnibus. Oportet tamen quod ab uno principio in omnibus derivetur. Et sic illa communicatio hominum in primis intelligibilibus, demonstrat unitatem intellectus separati, quem Plato comparat soli; non autem unitatem intellectus agentis, quem Aristoteles comparat lumini.

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Reply Obj. 2: The active intellect is the cause of the universal, by abstracting it from matter. But for this purpose it need not be the same intellect in all intelligent beings; but it must be one in its relationship to all those things from which it abstracts the universal, with respect to which things the universal is one. And this befits the active intellect inasmuch as it is immaterial. Reply Obj. 3: All things which are of one species enjoy in common the action which accompanies the nature of the species, and consequently the power which is the principle of such action; but not so as that power be identical in all. Now to know the first intelligible principles is the action belonging to the human species. Wherefore all men enjoy in common the power which is the principle of this action: and this power is the active intellect. But there is no need for it to be identical in all. Yet it must be derived by all from one principle. And thus the possession by all men in common of the first principles proves the unity of the separate intellect, which Plato compares to the sun; but not the unity of the active intellect, which Aristotle compares to light.

Article 6 Whether memory is in the intellectual part of the soul? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod memoria non sit in parte intellectiva animae. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII de Trin., quod ad partem superiorem animae pertinent quae non sunt hominibus pecoribusque communia. Sed memoria est hominibus pecoribusque communis, dicit enim ibidem quod possunt pecora sentire per corporis sensus corporalia, et ea mandare memoriae. Ergo memoria non pertinet ad partem animae intellectivam. Praeterea, memoria praeteritorum est. Sed praeteritum dicitur secundum aliquod determinatum tempus. Memoria igitur est cognoscitiva alicuius sub determinato tempore; quod est cognoscere aliquid sub hic et nunc. Hoc autem non est intellectus, sed sensus. Memoria igitur non est in parte intellectiva, sed solum in parte sensitiva. Praeterea, in memoria conservantur species rerum quae actu non cogitantur. Sed hoc non est possibile accidere in intellectu, quia intellectus fit in actu per hoc quod informatur specie intelligibili; intellectum autem esse in actu, est ipsum intelligere in actu; et sic intellectus omnia intelligit in actu, quorum species apud se habet. Non ergo memoria est in parte intellectiva. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una mens.

Objection 1: It would seem that memory is not in the intellectual part of the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that to the higher part of the soul belongs those things which are not common to man and beast. But memory is common to man and beast, for he says (De Trin. xii, 2, 3, 8) that beasts can sense corporeal things through the senses of the body, and commit them to memory. Therefore memory does not belong to the intellectual part of the soul. Obj. 2: Further, memory is of the past. But the past is said of something with regard to a fixed time. Memory, therefore, knows a thing under a condition of a fixed time; which involves knowledge under the conditions of here and now. But this is not the province of the intellect, but of the sense. Therefore memory is not in the intellectual part, but only in the sensitive. Obj. 3: Further, in the memory are preserved the species of those things of which we are not actually thinking. But this cannot happen in the intellect, because the intellect is reduced to act by the fact that the intelligible species are received into it. Now the intellect in act implies understanding in act; and therefore the intellect actually understands all things of which it has the species. Therefore the memory is not in the intellectual part. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11) that memory, understanding, and will are one mind.

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Respondeo dicendum quod, cum de ratione memoriae sit conservare species rerum quae actu non apprehenduntur, hoc primum considerari oportet, utrum species intelligibiles sic in intellectu conservari possint. Posuit enim Avicenna hoc esse impossibile. In parte enim sensitiva dicebat hoc accidere, quantum ad aliquas potentias, inquantum sunt actus organorum corporalium, in quibus conservari possunt aliquae species absque actuali apprehensione. In intellectu autem, qui caret organo corporali, nihil existit nisi intelligibiliter. Unde oportet intelligi in actu illud cuius similitudo in intellectu existit. Sic ergo, secundum ipsum, quam cito aliquis actu desinit intelligere aliquam rem, desinit esse illius rei species in intellectu, sed oportet, si denuo vult illam rem intelligere, quod convertat se ad intellectum agentem, quem ponit substantiam separatam, ut ab illo effluant species intelligibiles in intellectum possibilem. Et ex exercitio et usu convertendi se ad intellectum agentem, relinquitur, secundum ipsum, quaedam habilitas in intellectu possibili convertendi se ad intellectum agentem, quam dicebat esse habitum scientiae. Secundum igitur hanc positionem, nihil conservatur in parte intellectiva, quod non actu intelligatur. Unde non poterit poni memoria in parte intellectiva, secundum hunc modum. Sed haec opinio manifeste repugnat dictis Aristotelis. Dicit enim, in III de Anima, quod, cum intellectus possibilis sic fiat singula ut sciens, dicitur qui secundum actum; et quod hoc accidit cum possit operari per seipsum. Est quidem igitur et tunc potentia quodammodo; non tamen similiter ut ante addiscere aut invenire. Dicitur autem intellectus possibilis fieri singula, secundum quod recipit species singulorum. Ex hoc ergo quod recipit species intelligibilium, habet quod possit operari cum voluerit, non autem quod semper operetur, quia et tunc est quodammodo in potentia, licet aliter quam ante intelligere; eo scilicet modo quo sciens in habitu est in potentia ad considerandum in actu. Repugnat etiam praedicta positio rationi. Quod enim recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo secundum modum recipientis. Intellectus autem est magis stabilis naturae et immobilis, quam materia corporalis. Si ergo materia corporalis formas quas recipit, non solum tenet dum per eas agit in actu, sed etiam postquam agere per eas cessaverit; multo fortius intellectus immobiliter et inamissibiliter recipit species intelligibiles, sive a sensibilibus acceptas, sive etiam ab aliquo superiori intellectu effluxas. Sic igitur, si memoria accipiatur solum pro vi conservativa specierum, oportet dicere memoriam esse in intellectiva parte. Si vero de ratione memoriae sit quod eius obiectum sit praeteritum, ut praeteritum; memoria in parte intellectiva non erit, sed sensitiva tantum, quae est apprehensiva particularium. Praeteritum enim,

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I answer that, Since it is of the nature of the memory to preserve the species of those things which are not actually apprehended, we must first of all consider whether the intelligible species can thus be preserved in the intellect: because Avicenna held that this was impossible. For he admitted that this could happen in the sensitive part, as to some powers, inasmuch as they are acts of corporeal organs, in which certain species may be preserved apart from actual apprehension. But in the intellect, which has no corporeal organ, nothing but what is intelligible exists. Wherefore every thing of which the likeness exists in the intellect must be actually understood. Thus, therefore, according to him, as soon as we cease to understand something actually, the species of that thing ceases to be in our intellect, and if we wish to understand that thing anew, we must turn to the active intellect, which he held to be a separate substance, in order that the intelligible species may thence flow again into our passive intellect. And from the practice and habit of turning to the active intellect there is formed, according to him, a certain aptitude in the passive intellect for turning to the active intellect; which aptitude he calls the habit of knowledge. According, therefore, to this supposition, nothing is preserved in the intellectual part that is not actually understood: wherefore it would not be possible to admit memory in the intellectual part. But this opinion is clearly opposed to the teaching of Aristotle. For he says (De Anima iii, 4) that, when the passive intellect is identified with each thing as knowing it, it is said to be in act, and that this happens when it can operate of itself. And, even then, it is in potentiality, but not in the same way as before learning and discovering. Now, the passive intellect is said to be each thing, inasmuch as it receives the intelligible species of each thing. To the fact, therefore, that it receives the species of intelligible things it owes its being able to operate when it wills, but not so that it be always operating: for even then is it in potentiality in a certain sense, though otherwise than before the act of understanding— namely, in the sense that whoever has habitual knowledge is in potentiality to actual consideration. The foregoing opinion is also opposed to reason. For what is received into something is received according to the conditions of the recipient. But the intellect is of a more stable nature, and is more immovable than corporeal nature. If, therefore, corporeal matter holds the forms which it receives, not only while it actually does something through them, but also after ceasing to act through them, much more cogent reason is there for the intellect to receive the species unchangeably and lastingly, whether it receive them from things sensible, or derive them from some superior intellect. Thus, therefore, if we take memory only for the power of retaining species, we must say that it is in the intellectual part. But if in the notion of memory we include its object as something past, then the memory is not in the intellectual, but only in the sensitive part, which apprehends

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ut praeteritum, cum significet esse sub determinato tempore, ad conditionem particularis pertinet. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod memoria, secundum quod est conservativa specierum, non est nobis pecoribusque communis. Species enim conservantur non in parte animae sensitiva tantum, sed magis in coniuncto; cum vis memorativa sit actus organi cuiusdam. Sed intellectus secundum seipsum est conservativus specierum, praeter concomitantiam organi corporalis. Unde philosophus dicit, in III de Anima, quod anima est locus specierum, non tota, sed intellectus. Ad secundum dicendum quod praeteritio potest ad duo referri, scilicet ad obiectum quod cognoscitur; et ad cognitionis actum. Quae quidem duo simul coniunguntur in parte sensitiva, quae est apprehensiva alicuius per hoc quod immutatur a praesenti sensibili, unde simul animal memoratur se prius sensisse in praeterito, et se sensisse quoddam praeteritum sensibile. Sed quantum ad partem intellectivam pertinet, praeteritio accidit, et non per se convenit, ex parte obiecti intellectus. Intelligit enim intellectus hominem, inquantum est homo, homini autem, inquantum est homo, accidit vel in praesenti vel in praeterito vel in futuro esse. Ex parte vero actus, praeteritio per se accipi potest etiam in intellectu, sicut in sensu. Quia intelligere animae nostrae est quidam particularis actus, in hoc vel in illo tempore existens, secundum quod dicitur homo intelligere nunc vel heri vel cras. Et hoc non repugnat intellectualitati, quia huiusmodi intelligere, quamvis sit quoddam particulare, tamen est immaterialis actus, ut supra de intellectu dictum est; et ideo sicut intelligit seipsum intellectus, quamvis ipse sit quidam singularis intellectus, ita intelligit suum intelligere, quod est singularis actus vel in praeterito vel in praesenti vel in futuro existens. Sic igitur salvatur ratio memoriae, quantum ad hoc quod est praeteritorum, in intellectu, secundum quod intelligit se prius intellexisse, non autem secundum quod intelligit praeteritum, prout est hic et nunc. Ad tertium dicendum quod species intelligibilis aliquando est in intellectu in potentia tantum, et tunc dicitur intellectus esse in potentia. Aliquando autem secundum ultimam completionem actus, et tunc intelligit actu. Aliquando medio modo se habet inter potentiam et actum, et tunc dicitur esse intellectus in habitu. Et secundum hunc modum intellectus conservat species, etiam quando actu non intelligit.

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individual things. For past, as past, since it signifies being under a condition of fixed time, is something individual. Reply Obj. 1: Memory, if considered as retentive of species, is not common to us and other animals. For species are not retained in the sensitive part of the soul only, but rather in the body and soul united: since the memorative power is the act of some organ. But the intellect in itself is retentive of species, without the association of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that the soul is the seat of the species, not the whole soul, but the intellect. Reply Obj. 2: The condition of past may be referred to two things—namely, to the object which is known, and to the act of knowledge. These two are found together in the sensitive part, which apprehends something from the fact of its being immuted by a present sensible: wherefore at the same time an animal remembers to have sensed before in the past, and to have sensed some past sensible thing. But as concerns the intellectual part, the past is accidental, and is not in itself a part of the object of the intellect. For the intellect understands man, as man: and to man, as man, it is accidental that he exist in the present, past, or future. But on the part of the act, the condition of past, even as such, may be understood to be in the intellect, as well as in the senses. Because our soul’s act of understanding is an individual act, existing in this or that time, inasmuch as a man is said to understand now, or yesterday, or tomorrow. And this is not incompatible with the intellectual nature: for such an act of understanding, though something individual, is yet an immaterial act, as we have said above of the intellect (Q. 76, A. 1); and therefore, as the intellect understands itself, though it be itself an individual intellect, so also it understands its act of understanding, which is an individual act, in the past, present, or future. In this way, then, the notion of memory, in as far as it regards past events, is preserved in the intellect, forasmuch as it understands that it previously understood: but not in the sense that it understands the past as something here and now. Reply Obj. 3: The intelligible species is sometimes in the intellect only in potentiality, and then the intellect is said to be in potentiality. Sometimes the intelligible species is in the intellect as regards the ultimate completion of the act, and then it understands in act. And sometimes the intelligible species is in a middle state, between potentiality and act: and then we have habitual knowledge. In this way the intellect retains the species, even when it does not understand in act.

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Q. 79, A. 7

Article 7 Whether the intellectual memory is a power distinct from the intellect? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod alia potentia sit memoria intellectiva, et alia intellectus. Augustinus enim, in X de Trin., ponit in mente memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. Manifestum est autem quod memoria est alia potentia a voluntate. Ergo similiter est alia ab intellectu. Praeterea, eadem ratio distinctionis est potentiarum sensitivae partis et intellectivae. Sed memoria in parte sensitiva est alia potentia a sensu, ut supra dictum est. Ergo memoria partis intellectivae est alia potentia ab intellectu. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt sibi invicem aequalia, et unum eorum ab alio oritur. Hoc autem esse non posset, si memoria esset eadem potentia cum intellectu. Non est ergo eadem potentia. Sed contra, de ratione memoriae est, quod sit thesaurus vel locus conservativus specierum. Hoc autem philosophus, in III de Anima, attribuit intellectui, ut dictum est. Non ergo in parte intellectiva est alia potentia memoria ab intellectu. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, potentiae animae distinguuntur secundum diversas rationes obiectorum; eo quod ratio cuiuslibet potentiae consistit in ordine ad id ad quod dicitur, quod est eius obiectum. Dictum est etiam supra quod, si aliqua potentia secundum propriam rationem ordinetur ad aliquod obiectum secundum communem rationem obiecti, non diversificabitur illa potentia secundum diversitates particularium differentiarum, sicut potentia visiva, quae respicit suum obiectum secundum rationem colorati, non diversificatur per diversitatem albi et nigri. Intellectus autem respicit suum obiectum secundum communem rationem entis; eo quod intellectus possibilis est quo est omnia fieri. Unde secundum nullam differentiam entium, diversificatur differentia intellectus possibilis. Diversificatur tamen potentia intellectus agentis, et intellectus possibilis, quia respectu eiusdem obiecti, aliud principium oportet esse potentiam activam, quae facit obiectum esse in actu; et aliud potentiam passivam, quae movetur ab obiecto in actu existente. Et sic potentia activa comparatur ad suum obiectum, ut ens in actu ad ens in potentia, potentia autem passiva comparatur ad suum obiectum e converso, ut ens in potentia ad ens in actu. Sic igitur nulla alia differentia potentiarum in intellectu esse potest, nisi possibilis et agentis. Unde patet quod memoria non est alia potentia ab intellectu, ad rationem enim potentiae passivae pertinet conservare, sicut et recipere.

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual memory is distinct from the intellect. For Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns to the soul memory, understanding, and will. But it is clear that the memory is a distinct power from the will. Therefore it is also distinct from the intellect. Obj. 2: Further, the reason of distinction among the powers in the sensitive part is the same as in the intellectual part. But memory in the sensitive part is distinct from sense, as we have said (Q. 78, A. 4). Therefore memory in the intellectual part is distinct from the intellect. Obj. 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xi, 7), memory, understanding, and will are equal to one another, and one flows from the other. But this could not be if memory and intellect were the same power. Therefore they are not the same power. On the contrary, From its nature the memory is the treasury or storehouse of species. But the Philosopher (De Anima iii) attributes this to the intellect, as we have said (A. 6, ad 1). Therefore the memory is not another power from the intellect. I answer that, As has been said above (Q. 77, A. 3), the powers of the soul are distinguished by the different formal aspects of their objects: since each power is defined in reference to that thing to which it is directed and which is its object. It has also been said above (Q. 59, A. 4) that if any power by its nature be directed to an object according to the common ratio of the object, that power will not be differentiated according to the individual differences of that object: just as the power of sight, which regards its object under the common ratio of color, is not differentiated by differences of black and white. Now, the intellect regards its object under the common ratio of being: since the passive intellect is that in which all are in potentiality. Wherefore the passive intellect is not differentiated by any difference of being. Nevertheless there is a distinction between the power of the active intellect and of the passive intellect: because as regards the same object, the active power which makes the object to be in act must be distinct from the passive power, which is moved by the object existing in act. Thus the active power is compared to its object as a being in act is to a being in potentiality; whereas the passive power, on the contrary, is compared to its object as being in potentiality is to a being in act. Therefore there can be no other difference of powers in the intellect, but that of passive and active. Wherefore it is clear that memory is not a distinct power from the intellect: for it belongs to the nature of a passive power to retain as well as to receive.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis in III dist. I Sent. dicatur quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sint tres vires; tamen hoc non est secundum intentionem Augustini, qui expresse dicit in XIV de Trin., quod si accipiatur memoria, intelligentia et voluntas, secundum quod semper praesto sunt animae, sive cogitentur sive non cogitentur, ad solam memoriam pertinere videntur. Intelligentiam autem nunc dico qua intelligimus cogitantes; et eam voluntatem, sive amorem vel dilectionem, quae istam prolem parentemque coniungit. Ex quo patet quod ista tria non accipit Augustinus pro tribus potentiis; sed memoriam accipit pro habituali animae retentione, intelligentiam autem pro actu intellectus, voluntatem autem pro actu voluntatis. Ad secundum dicendum quod praeteritum et praesens possunt esse propriae differentiae potentiarum sensitivarum diversificativae; non autem potentiarum intellectivarum, ratione supra dicta. Ad tertium dicendum quod intelligentia oritur ex memoria, sicut actus ex habitu. Et hoc modo etiam aequatur ei; non autem sicut potentia potentiae.

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Reply Obj. 1: Although it is said (3 Sent. D, 1) that memory, intellect, and will are three powers, this is not in accordance with the meaning of Augustine, who says expressly (De Trin. xiv) that if we take memory, intelligence, and will as always present in the soul, whether we actually attend to them or not, they seem to pertain to the memory only. And by intelligence I mean that by which we understand when actually thinking; and by will I mean that love or affection which unites the child and its parent. Wherefore it is clear that Augustine does not take the above three for three powers; but by memory he understands the soul’s habit of retention; by intelligence, the act of the intellect; and by will, the act of the will. Reply Obj. 2: Past and present may differentiate the sensitive powers, but not the intellectual powers, for the reason given above. Reply Obj. 3: Intelligence arises from memory, as act from habit; and in this way it is equal to it, but not as a power to a power.

Article 8 Whether the reason is a distinct power from the intellect? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ratio sit alia potentia ab intellectu. In libro enim de Spiritu et Anima dicitur, cum ab inferioribus ad superiora ascendere volumus, prius occurrit nobis sensus, deinde imaginatio, deinde ratio, deinde intellectus. Est ergo alia potentia ratio ab intellectu, sicut imaginatio a ratione. Praeterea, Boetius dicit, in libro de Consol., quod intellectus comparatur ad rationem sicut aeternitas ad tempus. Sed non est eiusdem virtutis esse in aeternitate et esse in tempore. Ergo non est eadem potentia ratio et intellectus. Praeterea, homo communicat cum angelis in intellectu, cum brutis vero in sensu. Sed ratio, quae est propria hominis, qua animal rationale dicitur, est alia potentia a sensu. Ergo pari ratione est alia potentia ab intellectu, qui proprie convenit angelis, unde et intellectuales dicuntur.

Objection 1: It would seem that the reason is a distinct power from the intellect. For it is stated in De Spiritu et Anima that when we wish to rise from lower things to higher, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then the intellect. Therefore the reason is distinct from the intellect, as imagination is from sense. Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6), that intellect is compared to reason, as eternity to time. But it does not belong to the same power to be in eternity and to be in time. Therefore reason and intellect are not the same power.

Obj. 3: Further, man has intellect in common with the angels, and sense in common with the brutes. But reason, which is proper to man, whence he is called a rational animal, is a power distinct from sense. Therefore is it equally true to say that it is distinct from the intellect, which properly belongs to the angel: whence they are called intellectual. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III super On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. iii, 20) Gen. ad Litt., quod illud quo homo irrationabilibus ani- that that in which man excels irrational animals is reason, or malibus antecellit, est ratio, vel mens, vel intelligentia, vel mind, or intelligence or whatever appropriate name we like to si quo alio vocabulo commodius appellatur. Ratio ergo et give it. Therefore, reason, intellect and mind are one power.

intellectus et mens sunt una potentia. Respondeo dicendum quod ratio et intellectus in I answer that, Reason and intellect in man cannot homine non possunt esse diversae potentiae. Quod ma- be distinct powers. We shall understand this clearly if we nifeste cognoscitur, si utriusque actus consideretur. In- consider their respective actions. For to understand is sim-

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telligere enim est simpliciter veritatem intelligibilem apprehendere. Ratiocinari autem est procedere de uno intellecto ad aliud, ad veritatem intelligibilem cognoscendam. Et ideo angeli, qui perfecte possident, secundum modum suae naturae, cognitionem intelligibilis veritatis, non habent necesse procedere de uno ad aliud; sed simpliciter et absque discursu veritatem rerum apprehendunt, ut Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom. Homines autem ad intelligibilem veritatem cognoscendam perveniunt, procedendo de uno ad aliud, ut ibidem dicitur, et ideo rationales dicuntur. Patet ergo quod ratiocinari comparatur ad intelligere sicut moveri ad quiescere, vel acquirere ad habere, quorum unum est perfecti, aliud autem imperfecti. Et quia motus semper ab immobili procedit, et ad aliquid quietum terminatur; inde est quod ratiocinatio humana, secundum viam inquisitionis vel inventionis, procedit a quibusdam simpliciter intellectis, quae sunt prima principia; et rursus, in via iudicii, resolvendo redit ad prima principia, ad quae inventa examinat. Manifestum est autem quod quiescere et moveri non reducuntur ad diversas potentias, sed ad unam et eandem, etiam in naturalibus rebus, quia per eandem naturam aliquid movetur ad locum, et quiescit in loco. Multo ergo magis per eandem potentiam intelligimus et ratiocinamur. Et sic patet quod in homine eadem potentia est ratio et intellectus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa enumeratio fit secundum ordinem actuum, non secundum distinctionem potentiarum. Quamvis liber ille non sit magnae auctoritatis. Ad secundum patet responsio ex dictis. Aeternitas enim comparatur ad tempus, sicut immobile ad mobile. Et ideo Boetius comparavit intellectum aeternitati, rationem vero tempori. Ad tertium dicendum quod alia animalia sunt ita infra hominem, quod non possunt attingere ad cognoscendam veritatem, quam ratio inquirit. Homo vero attingit ad cognoscendam intelligibilem veritatem, quam angeli cognoscunt; sed imperfecte. Et ideo vis cognoscitiva angelorum non est alterius generis a vi cognoscitiva rationis, sed comparatur ad ipsam ut perfectum ad imperfectum.

Q. 79, A. 9

ply to apprehend intelligible truth: and to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another, so as to know an intelligible truth. And therefore angels, who according to their nature, possess perfect knowledge of intelligible truth, have no need to advance from one thing to another; but apprehend the truth simply and without mental discussion, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from one thing to another; and therefore he is called rational. Reasoning, therefore, is compared to understanding, as movement is to rest, or acquisition to possession; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the imperfect. And since movement always proceeds from something immovable, and ends in something at rest; hence it is that human reasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery, advances from certain things simply understood—namely, the first principles; and, again, by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles, in the light of which it examines what it has found. Now it is clear that rest and movement are not to be referred to different powers, but to one and the same, even in natural things: since by the same nature a thing is moved towards a certain place, and rests in that place. Much more, therefore, by the same power do we understand and reason: and so it is clear that in man reason and intellect are the same power. Reply Obj. 1: That enumeration is made according to the order of actions, not according to the distinction of powers. Moreover, that book is not of great authority. Reply Obj. 2: The answer is clear from what we have said. For eternity is compared to time as immovable to movable. And thus Boethius compared the intellect to eternity, and reason to time. Reply Obj. 3: Other animals are so much lower than man that they cannot attain to the knowledge of truth, which reason seeks. But man attains, although imperfectly, to the knowledge of intelligible truth, which angels know. Therefore in the angels the power of knowledge is not of a different genus from that which is in the human reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect.

Article 9 Whether the higher and lower reason are distinct powers? Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ratio Objection 1: It would seem that the higher and lower superior et inferior sint diversae potentiae. Dicit enim reason are distinct powers. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, Augustinus, XII de Trin., quod imago Trinitatis est in su- 4,7), that the image of the Trinity is in the higher part of the periori parte rationis, non autem in inferiori. Sed par- reason, and not in the lower. But the parts of the soul are

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tes animae sunt ipsae eius potentiae. Ergo duae potentiae sunt ratio superior et inferior. Praeterea, nihil oritur a seipso. Sed ratio inferior oritur a superiori, et ab ea regulatur et dirigitur. Ergo ratio superior est alia potentia ab inferiori. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod scientificum animae quo cognoscit anima necessaria, est aliud principium et alia pars animae ab opinativo et ratiocinativo, quo cognoscit contingentia. Et hoc probat per hoc, quia ad ea quae sunt genere altera, altera genere particula animae ordinatur; contingens autem et necessarium sunt altera genere, sicut corruptibile et incorruptibile. Cum autem idem sit necessarium quod aeternum, et temporale idem quod contingens; videtur quod idem sit quod philosophus vocat scientificum, et superior pars rationis, quae secundum Augustinum intendit aeternis conspiciendis et consulendis; et quod idem sit quod philosophus vocat ratiocinativum vel opinativum, et inferior ratio, quae secundum Augustinum intendit temporalibus disponendis. Est ergo alia potentia animae ratio superior, et ratio inferior.

Praeterea, Damascenus dicit quod ex imaginatione fit opinio; deinde mens, diiudicans opinionem sive vera sit sive falsa, diiudicat veritatem; unde et mens dicitur a metiendo. De quibus igitur iudicatum est iam et determinatum vere, dicitur intellectus. Sic igitur opinativum, quod est ratio inferior, est aliud a mente et intellectu, per quod potest intelligi ratio superior.

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., quod ratio superior et inferior non nisi per officia distinguuntur. Non ergo sunt duae potentiae. Respondeo dicendum quod ratio superior et inferior, secundum quod ab Augustino accipiuntur, nullo modo duae potentiae animae esse possunt. Dicit enim quod ratio superior est quae intendit aeternis conspiciendis aut consulendis, conspiciendis quidem, secundum quod ea in seipsis speculatur; consulendis vero, secundum quod ex eis accipit regulas agendorum. Ratio vero inferior ab ipso dicitur, quae intendit temporalibus rebus. Haec autem duo, scilicet temporalia et aeterna, comparantur ad cognitionem nostram hoc modo, quod unum eorum est medium ad cognoscendum alterum. Nam secundum viam inventionis, per res temporales in cognitionem devenimus aeternorum, secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. I, invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur, in via vero iudicii, per aeterna iam cognita de temporalibus iudicamus, et secundum rationes aeternorum temporalia disponimus.

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its powers. Therefore the higher and lower reason are two powers. Obj. 2: Further, nothing flows from itself. Now, the lower reason flows from the higher, and is ruled and directed by it. Therefore the higher reason is another power from the lower. Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 1) that the scientific part of the soul, by which the soul knows necessary things, is another principle, and another part from the opinionative and reasoning part by which it knows contingent things. And he proves this from the principle that for those things which are generically different, generically different parts of the soul are ordained. Now contingent and necessary are generically different, as corruptible and incorruptible. Since, therefore, necessary is the same as eternal, and temporal the same as contingent, it seems that what the Philosopher calls the scientific part must be the same as the higher reason, which, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 7) is intent on the consideration and consultation of things eternal; and that what the Philosopher calls the reasoning or opinionative part is the same as the lower reason, which, according to Augustine, is intent on the disposal of temporal things. Therefore the higher reason is another power than the lower. Obj. 4: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that opinion rises from the imagination: then the mind by judging of the truth or error of the opinion discovers the truth: whence mens (mind) is derived from metiendo (measuring). And therefore the intellect regards those things which are already subject to judgment and true decision. Therefore the opinionative power, which is the lower reason, is distinct from the mind and the intellect, by which we may understand the higher reason. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that the higher and lower reason are only distinct by their functions. Therefore they are not two powers. I answer that, The higher and lower reason, as they are understood by Augustine, can in no way be two powers of the soul. For he says that the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things eternal: forasmuch as in contemplation it sees them in themselves, and in consultation it takes its rules of action from them. But he calls the lower reason that which is intent on the disposal of temporal things. Now these two—namely, eternal and temporal—are related to our knowledge in this way, that one of them is the means of knowing the other. For by way of discovery, we come through knowledge of temporal things to that of things eternal, according to the words of the Apostle (Rom 1:20), The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made: while by way of judgment, from eternal things already known, we judge of temporal things, and according to laws of things eternal we dispose of temporal things.

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Potest autem contingere quod medium, et id ad quod per medium pervenitur, ad diversos habitus pertineant, sicut principia prima indemonstrabilia pertinent ad habitum intellectus, conclusiones vero ex his deductae ad habitum scientiae. Et ideo ex principiis geometriae contingit aliquid concludere in alia scientia, puta in perspectiva. Sed eadem potentia rationis est, ad quam pertinet et medium et ultimum. Est enim actus rationis quasi quidam motus de uno in aliud perveniens, idem autem est mobile quod pertransiens medium pertingit ad terminum. Unde una et eadem potentia rationis est ratio superior et inferior. Sed distinguuntur, secundum Augustinum, per officia actuum, et secundum diversos habitus, nam superiori rationi attribuitur sapientia, inferiori vero scientia. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod secundum quamcumque rationem partitionis potest pars dici. Inquantum ergo ratio dividitur secundum diversa officia, ratio superior et inferior partitiones dicuntur, et non quia sunt diversae potentiae. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio inferior dicitur a superiori deduci, vel ab ea regulari, inquantum principia quibus utitur inferior ratio, deducuntur et diriguntur a principiis superioris rationis. Ad tertium dicendum quod scientificum de quo philosophus loquitur non est idem quod ratio superior, nam necessaria scibilia inveniuntur etiam in rebus temporalibus, de quibus est scientia naturalis et mathematica. Opinativum autem et ratiocinativum in minus est quam ratio inferior, quia est contingentium tantum. Nec tamen est simpliciter dicendum quod sit alia potentia qua intellectus cognoscit necessaria, et alia qua cognoscit contingentia, quia utraque cognoscit secundum eandem rationem obiecti, scilicet secundum rationem entis et veri. Unde et necessaria, quae habent perfectum esse in veritate, perfecte cognoscit; utpote ad eorum quidditatem pertingens, per quam propria accidentia de his demonstrat. Contingentia vero imperfecte cognoscit; sicut et habent imperfectum esse et veritatem. Perfectum autem et imperfectum in actu non diversificant potentiam; sed diversificant actus quantum ad modum agendi, et per consequens principia actuum et ipsos habitus. Et ideo philosophus posuit duas particulas animae, scientificum et ratiocinativum, non quia sunt duae potentiae; sed quia distinguuntur secundum diversam aptitudinem ad recipiendum diversos habitus, quorum diversitatem ibi inquirere intendit. Contingentia enim et necessaria, etsi differant secundum propria genera, conveniunt tamen in communi ratione entis, quam respicit intellectus, ad quam diversimode se habent secundum perfectum et imperfectum.

Q. 79, A. 9

But it may happen that the medium and what is attained thereby belong to different habits: as the first indemonstrable principles belong to the habit of the intellect; whereas the conclusions which we draw from them belong to the habit of science. And so it happens that from the principles of geometry we draw a conclusion in another science—for example, perspective. But the power of the reason is such that both medium and term belong to it. For the act of the reason is, as it were, a movement from one thing to another. But the same movable thing passes through the medium and reaches the end. Wherefore the higher and lower reasons are one and the same power. But according to Augustine they are distinguished by the functions of their actions, and according to their various habits: for wisdom is attributed to the higher reason, science to the lower. Reply Obj. 1: We speak of parts, in whatever way a thing is divided. And so far as reason is divided according to its various acts, the higher and lower reason are called parts; but not because they are different powers.

Reply Obj. 2: The lower reason is said to flow from the higher, or to be ruled by it, as far as the principles made use of by the lower reason are drawn from and directed by the principles of the higher reason. Reply Obj. 3: The scientific part, of which the Philosopher speaks, is not the same as the higher reason: for necessary truths are found even among temporal things, of which natural science and mathematics treat. And the opinionative and ratiocinative part is more limited than the lower reason; for it regards only things contingent. Neither must we say, without any qualification, that a power, by which the intellect knows necessary things, is distinct from a power by which it knows contingent things: because it knows both under the same objective aspect—namely, under the aspect of being and truth. Wherefore it perfectly knows necessary things which have perfect being in truth; since it penetrates to their very essence, from which it demonstrates their proper accidents. On the other hand, it knows contingent things, but imperfectly; forasmuch as they have but imperfect being and truth. Now perfect and imperfect in the action do not vary the power, but they vary the actions as to the mode of acting, and consequently the principles of the actions and the habits themselves. And therefore the Philosopher postulates two lesser parts of the soul—namely, the scientific and the ratiocinative, not because they are two powers, but because they are distinct according to a different aptitude for receiving various habits, concerning the variety of which he inquires. For contingent and necessary, though differing according to their proper genera, nevertheless agree in the common aspect of being, which the intellect considers, and to which they are variously compared as perfect and imperfect. Ad quartum dicendum quod illa distinctio DamaReply Obj. 4: That distinction given by Damascene is sceni est secundum diversitatem actuum, non secun- according to the variety of acts, not according to the vari-

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dum diversitatem potentiarum. Opinio enim significat actum intellectus qui fertur in unam partem contradictionis cum formidine alterius. Diiudicare vero, vel mensurare, est actus intellectus applicantis principia certa ad examinationem propositorum. Et ex hoc sumitur nomen mentis. Intelligere autem est cum quadam approbatione diiudicatis inhaerere.

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ety of powers. For opinion signifies an act of the intellect which leans to one side of a contradiction, whilst in fear of the other. While to judge or measure is an act of the intellect, applying certain principles to examine propositions. From this is taken the word mens. Lastly, to understand is to adhere to the formed judgment with approval.

Article 10 Whether intelligence is a power distinct from intellect? Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intelligentia sit alia potentia ab intellectu. Dicitur enim in libro de Spiritu et Anima, quod cum ab inferioribus ad superiora ascendere volumus, prius occurrit nobis sensus, deinde imaginatio, deinde ratio, postea intellectus, et postea intelligentia. Sed imaginatio et sensus sunt diversae potentiae. Ergo et intellectus et intelligentia. Praeterea, Boetius dicit, in V de Consol., quod ipsum hominem aliter sensus, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio, aliter intelligentia intuetur. Sed intellectus est eadem potentia cum ratione. Ergo videtur quod intelligentia sit alia potentia quam intellectus; sicut ratio est alia potentia quam imaginatio et sensus. Praeterea, actus sunt praevii potentiis, ut dicitur in II de Anima. Sed intelligentia est quidam actus ab aliis actibus qui attribuuntur intellectui divisus. Dicit enim Damascenus quod primus motus intelligentia dicitur; quae vero circa aliquid est intelligentia, intentio vocatur; quae permanens et figurans animam ad id quod intelligitur, excogitatio dicitur; excogitatio vero in eodem manens, et seipsam examinans et diiudicans, phronesis dicitur (idest sapientia); phronesis autem dilatata facit cogitationem, idest interius dispositum sermonem; ex quo aiunt provenire sermonem per linguam enarratum. Ergo videtur quod intelligentia sit quaedam specialis potentia. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III de Anima, quod intelligentia indivisibilium est, in quibus non est falsum. Sed huiusmodi cognoscere pertinet ad intellectum. Ergo intelligentia non est alia potentia praeter intellectum. Respondeo dicendum quod hoc nomen intelligentia proprie significat ipsum actum intellectus qui est intelligere. In quibusdam tamen libris de Arabico translatis, substantiae separatae quas nos angelos dicimus, intelligentiae vocantur; forte propter hoc, quod huiusmodi substantiae semper actu intelligunt. In libris tamen de Graeco translatis, dicuntur intellectus seu mentes. Sic ergo intelligentia ab intellectu non distinguitur sicut potentia a potentia; sed sicut actus a potentia. Invenitur enim talis divisio etiam a philosophis. Quandoque enim

Objection 1: It would seem that the intelligence is another power than the intellect. For we read in De Spiritu et Anima that when we wish to rise from lower to higher things, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then intellect, and afterwards intelligence. But imagination and sense are distinct powers. Therefore also intellect and intelligence are distinct. Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. v, 4) that sense considers man in one way, imagination in another, reason in another, intelligence in another. But intellect is the same power as reason. Therefore, seemingly, intelligence is a distinct power from intellect, as reason is a distinct power from imagination or sense. Obj. 3: Further, actions came before powers, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). But intelligence is an act separate from others attributed to the intellect. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that the first movement is called intelligence; but that intelligence which is about a certain thing is called intention; that which remains and conforms the soul to that which is understood is called invention, and invention when it remains in the same man, examining and judging of itself, is called phronesis (that is, wisdom), and phronesis if dilated makes thought, that is, orderly internal speech; from which, they say, comes speech expressed by the tongue. Therefore it seems that intelligence is some special power. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 6) that intelligence is of indivisible things in which there is nothing false. But the knowledge of these things belongs to the intellect. Therefore intelligence is not another power than the intellect. I answer that, This word intelligence properly signifies the intellect’s very act, which is to understand. However, in some works translated from the Arabic, the separate substances which we call angels are called intelligences, and perhaps for this reason, that such substances are always actually understanding. But in works translated from the Greek, they are called intellects or minds. Thus intelligence is not distinct from intellect, as power is from power; but as act is from power. And such a division is recognized even by the philosophers. For sometimes they assign four

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ponunt quatuor intellectus, scilicet intellectum agentem, possibilem, et in habitu, et adeptum. Quorum quatuor intellectus agens et possibilis sunt diversae potentiae; sicut et in omnibus est alia potentia activa, et alia passiva. Alia vero tria distinguuntur secundum tres status intellectus possibilis, qui quandoque est in potentia tantum, et sic dicitur possibilis; quandoque autem in actu primo, qui est scientia, et sic dicitur intellectus in habitu; quandoque autem in actu secundo, qui est considerare, et sic dicitur intellectus in actu, sive intellectus adeptus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si recipi debet illa auctoritas, intelligentia ponitur pro actu intellectus. Et sic dividitur contra intellectum, sicut actus contra potentiam. Ad secundum dicendum quod Boetius accipit intelligentiam pro actu intellectus qui transcendit actum rationis. Unde ibidem dicit quod ratio tantum humani generis est, sicut intelligentia sola divini, proprium enim Dei est quod absque omni investigatione omnia intelligat. Ad tertium dicendum quod omnes illi actus quos Damascenus enumerat, sunt unius potentiae, scilicet intellectivae. Quae primo quidem simpliciter aliquid apprehendit, et hic actus dicitur intelligentia. Secundo vero, id quod apprehendit, ordinat ad aliquid aliud cognoscendum vel operandum, et hic vocatur intentio. Dum vero persistit in inquisitione illius quod intendit, vocatur excogitatio. Dum vero id quod est excogitatum examinat ad aliqua certa, dicitur scire vel sapere; quod est phronesis, vel sapientiae, nam sapientiae est iudicare, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Ex quo autem habet aliquid pro certo, quasi examinatum, cogitat quomodo possit illud aliis manifestare, et haec est dispositio interioris sermonis; ex qua procedit exterior locutio. Non enim omnis differentia actuum potentias diversificat; sed solum illa quae non potest reduci in idem principium, ut supra dictum est.

Q. 79, A. 11

intellects—namely, the active and passive intellects, the intellect in habit, and the actual intellect. Of which four the active and passive intellects are different powers; just as in all things the active power is distinct from the passive. But three of these are distinct, as three states of the passive intellect, which is sometimes in potentiality only, and thus it is called passive; sometimes it is in the first act, which is knowledge, and thus it is called intellect in habit; and sometimes it is in the second act, which is to consider, and thus it is called intellect in act, or actual intellect. Reply Obj. 1: If this authority is accepted, intelligence there means the act of the intellect. And thus it is divided against intellect as act against power. Reply Obj. 2: Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the intellect which transcends the act of the reason. Wherefore he also says that reason alone belongs to the human race, as intelligence alone belongs to God, for it belongs to God to understand all things without any investigation. Reply Obj. 3: All those acts which Damascene enumerates belong to one power—namely, the intellectual power. For this power first of all only apprehends something; and this act is called intelligence. Second, it directs what it apprehends to the knowledge of something else, or to some operation; and this is called intention. And when it goes on in search of what it intends, it is called invention. When, by reference to something known for certain, it examines what it has found, it is said to know or to be wise, which belongs to phronesis or wisdom; for it belongs to the wise man to judge, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). And when once it has obtained something for certain, as being fully examined, it thinks about the means of making it known to others; and this is the ordering of interior speech, from which proceeds external speech. For every difference of acts does not make the powers vary, but only what cannot be reduced to the one same principle, as we have said above (Q. 78, A. 4).

Article 11 Whether the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers? Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus speculativus et practicus sint diversae potentiae. Apprehensivum enim et motivum sunt diversa genera potentiarum, ut patet in II de Anima. Sed intellectus speculativus est apprehensivus tantum, intellectus autem practicus est motivus. Ergo sunt diversae potentiae. Praeterea, diversa ratio obiecti diversificat potentiam. Sed obiectum speculativi intellectus est verum,

Objection 1: It would seem that the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers. For the apprehensive and motive are different kinds of powers, as is clear from De Anima ii, 3. But the speculative intellect is merely an apprehensive power; while the practical intellect is a motive power. Therefore they are distinct powers. Obj. 2: Further, the different nature of the object differentiates the power. But the object of the speculative intellect

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practici autem bonum; quae differunt ratione. Ergo intellectus speculativus et practicus sunt diversae potentiae. Praeterea, in parte intellectiva intellectus practicus comparatur ad speculativum, sicut aestimativa ad imaginativam in parte sensitiva. Sed aestimativa differt ab imaginativa sicut potentia a potentia, ut supra dictum est. Ergo et intellectus practicus a speculativo. Sed contra est quod dicitur in III de Anima, quod intellectus speculativus per extensionem fit practicus. Una autem potentia non mutatur in aliam. Ergo intellectus speculativus et practicus non sunt diversae potentiae. Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus practicus et speculativus non sunt diversae potentiae. Cuius ratio est quia, ut supra dictum est, id quod accidentaliter se habet ad obiecti rationem quam respicit aliqua potentia, non diversificat potentiam, accidit enim colorato quod sit homo, aut magnum aut parvum; unde omnia huiusmodi eadem visiva potentia apprehenduntur. Accidit autem alicui apprehenso per intellectum, quod ordinetur ad opus, vel non ordinetur. Secundum hoc autem differunt intellectus speculativus et practicus. Nam intellectus speculativus est, qui quod apprehendit, non ordinat ad opus, sed ad solam veritatis considerationem, practicus vero intellectus dicitur, qui hoc quod apprehendit, ordinat ad opus. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit in III de Anima, quod speculativus differt a practico, fine. Unde et a fine denominatur uterque, hic quidem speculativus, ille vero practicus, idest operativus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectus practicus est motivus, non quasi exequens motum, sed quasi dirigens ad motum. Quod convenit ei secundum modum suae apprehensionis. Ad secundum dicendum quod verum et bonum se invicem includunt, nam verum est quoddam bonum, alioquin non esset appetibile; et bonum est quoddam verum, alioquin non esset intelligibile. Sicut igitur obiectum appetitus potest esse verum, inquantum habet rationem boni, sicut cum aliquis appetit veritatem cognoscere; ita obiectum intellectus practici est bonum ordinabile ad opus, sub ratione veri. Intellectus enim practicus veritatem cognoscit, sicut et speculativus; sed veritatem cognitam ordinat ad opus. Ad tertium dicendum quod multae differentiae diversificant sensitivas potentias, quae non diversificant potentias intellectivas, ut supra dictum est.

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is truth, and of the practical is good; which differ in nature. Therefore the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers. Obj. 3: Further, in the intellectual part, the practical intellect is compared to the speculative, as the estimative is to the imaginative power in the sensitive part. But the estimative differs from the imaginative, as power from power, as we have said above (Q. 78, A. 4). Therefore also the speculative intellect differs from the practical. On the contrary, The speculative intellect by extension becomes practical (De Anima iii, 10). But one power is not changed into another. Therefore the speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers. I answer that, The speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers. The reason of which is that, as we have said above (Q. 77, A. 3), what is accidental to the nature of the object of a power, does not differentiate that power; for it is accidental to a thing colored to be man, or to be great or small; hence all such things are apprehended by the same power of sight. Now, to a thing apprehended by the intellect, it is accidental whether it be directed to operation or not, and according to this the speculative and practical intellects differ. For it is the speculative intellect which directs what it apprehends, not to operation, but to the consideration of truth; while the practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends to operation. And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10); that the speculative differs from the practical in its end. Whence each is named from its end: the one speculative, the other practical—i.e., operative. Reply Obj. 1: The practical intellect is a motive power, not as executing movement, but as directing towards it; and this belongs to it according to its mode of apprehension. Reply Obj. 2: Truth and good include one another; for truth is something good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is something true, otherwise it would not be intelligible. Therefore as the object of the appetite may be something true, as having the aspect of good, for example, when some one desires to know the truth; so the object of the practical intellect is good directed to the operation, and under the aspect of truth. For the practical intellect knows truth, just as the speculative, but it directs the known truth to operation. Reply Obj. 3: Many differences differentiate the sensitive powers, which do not differentiate the intellectual powers, as we have said above (A. 7, ad 2; Q. 77, A. 3, ad 4).

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Article 12 Whether synderesis is a special power of the soul distinct from the others? Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod synderesis sit quaedam specialis potentia ab aliis distincta. Ea enim quae cadunt sub una divisione, videntur esse unius generis. Sed in Glossa Hieronymi Ezech. I, dividitur synderesis contra irascibilem et concupiscibilem et rationalem; quae sunt quaedam potentiae. Ergo synderesis est quaedam potentia. Praeterea, opposita sunt unius generis. Sed synderesis et sensualitas opponi videntur, quia synderesis semper inclinat ad bonum, sensualitas autem semper ad malum; unde per serpentem significatur, ut patet per Augustinum, XII de Trin. Videtur ergo quod synderesis sit potentia, sicut et sensualitas.

Objection 1: It would seem that synderesis is a special power, distinct from the others. For those things which fall under one division, seem to be of the same genus. But in the gloss of Jerome on Ezech. 1:6, synderesis is divided against the irascible, the concupiscible, and the rational, which are powers. Therefore synderesis is a power.

Obj. 2: Further, opposite things are of the same genus. But synderesis and sensuality seem to be opposed to one another because synderesis always incites to good; while sensuality always incites to evil: whence it is signified by the serpent, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12,13). It seems, therefore, that synderesis is a power just as sensuality is. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Libero ArObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 10) that bitrio, quod in naturali iudicatorio adsunt quaedam re- in the natural power of judgment there are certain rules and gulae et semina virtutum et vera et incommutabilia, haec seeds of virtue, both true and unchangeable. And this is what autem dicimus synderesim. Cum ergo regulae incom- we call synderesis. Since, therefore, the unchangeable rules mutabiles quibus iudicamus, pertineant ad rationem se- which guide our judgment belong to the reason as to its cundum sui superiorem partem, ut Augustinus dicit XII higher part, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2), it seems that de Trin.; videtur quod synderesis sit idem quod ratio. Et synderesis is the same as reason: and thus it is a power.

ita est quaedam potentia. Sed contra, potentiae rationales se habent ad opposita, secundum philosophum. Synderesis autem non se habet ad opposita, sed ad bonum tantum inclinat. Ergo synderesis non est potentia. Si enim esset potentia, oporteret quod esset rationalis potentia, non enim invenitur in brutis. Respondeo dicendum quod synderesis non est potentia, sed habitus, licet quidam posuerint synderesim esse quandam potentiam ratione altiorem; quidam vero dixerint eam esse ipsam rationem, non ut est ratio, sed ut est natura. Ad huius autem evidentiam, considerandum est quod, sicut supra dictum est, ratiocinatio hominis, cum sit quidam motus, ab intellectu progreditur aliquorum, scilicet naturaliter notorum absque investigatione rationis, sicut a quodam principio immobili, et ad intellectum etiam terminatur, inquantum iudicamus per principia per se naturaliter nota, de his quae ratiocinando invenimus. Constat autem quod, sicut ratio speculativa ratiocinatur de speculativis, ita ratio practica ratiocinatur de operabilibus. Oportet igitur naturaliter nobis esse indita, sicut principia speculabilium, ita et principia operabilium. Prima autem principia speculabilium nobis naturaliter indita, non pertinent ad aliquam specialem potentiam; sed ad quendam specialem habitum, qui dicitur intellectus principiorum, ut patet in VI Ethic. Unde et principia operabilium nobis naturaliter indita, non pertinent ad specialem potentiam; sed ad specialem habitum naturalem, quem dicimus synderesim. Unde et

On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2), rational powers regard opposite things. But synderesis does not regard opposites, but inclines to good only. Therefore synderesis is not a power. For if it were a power it would be a rational power, since it is not found in brute animals. I answer that, Synderesis is not a power but a habit; though some held that it is a power higher than reason; while others said that it is reason itself, not as reason, but as a nature. In order to make this clear we must observe that, as we have said above (A. 8), man’s act of reasoning, since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the understanding of certain things—namely, those which are naturally known without any investigation on the part of reason, as from an immovable principle—and ends also at the understanding, inasmuch as by means of those principles naturally known, we judge of those things which we have discovered by reasoning. Now it is clear that, as the speculative reason argues about speculative things, so that practical reason argues about practical things. Therefore we must have, bestowed on us by nature, not only speculative principles, but also practical principles. Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power, but to a special habit, which is called the understanding of principles, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. vi, 6). Wherefore the first practical principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we call synderesis. Whence synderesis is

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synderesis dicitur instigare ad bonum, et murmurare de malo, inquantum per prima principia procedimus ad inveniendum, et iudicamus inventa. Patet ergo quod synderesis non est potentia, sed habitus naturalis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa divisio Hieronymi attenditur secundum diversitatem actuum, non secundum diversitatem potentiarum. Diversi autem actus possunt esse unius potentiae. Ad secundum dicendum quod similiter oppositio sensualitatis et synderesis attenditur secundum oppositionem actuum; non sicut diversarum specierum unius generis. Ad tertium dicendum quod huiusmodi incommutabiles rationes sunt prima principia operabilium, circa quae non contingit errare; et attribuuntur rationi sicut potentiae, et synderesi sicut habitui. Unde et utroque, scilicet ratione et synderesi, naturaliter iudicamus.

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said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have discovered. It is therefore clear that synderesis is not a power, but a natural habit. Reply Obj. 1: The division given by Jerome is taken from the variety of acts, and not from the variety of powers; and various acts can belong to one power. Reply Obj. 2: In like manner, the opposition of sensuality to synderesis is an opposition of acts, and not of the different species of one genus. Reply Obj. 3: Those unchangeable notions are the first practical principles, concerning which no one errs; and they are attributed to reason as to a power, and to synderesis as to a habit. Wherefore we judge naturally both by our reason and by synderesis.

Article 13 Whether conscience be a power? Ad tertiumdecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod conscientia sit quaedam potentia. Dicit enim Origenes quod conscientia est spiritus corrector et paedagogus animae sociatus, quo separatur a malis et adhaeret bonis. Sed spiritus in anima nominat potentiam aliquam, vel ipsam mentem, secundum illud Ephes. IV, renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae; vel ipsam imaginationem; unde et imaginaria visio spiritualis vocatur, ut patet per Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt. Est ergo conscientia quaedam potentia. Praeterea, nihil est peccati subiectum nisi potentia animae. Sed conscientia est subiectum peccati, dicitur enim ad Tit. I, de quibusdam, quod inquinatae sunt eorum mens et conscientia. Ergo videtur quod conscientia sit potentia. Praeterea, necesse est quod conscientia sit vel actus, vel habitus, vel potentia. Sed non est actus, quia non semper maneret in homine. Nec est habitus, non enim esset unum quid conscientia, sed multa; per multos enim habitus cognoscitivos dirigimur in agendis. Ergo conscientia est potentia. Sed contra, conscientia deponi potest, non autem potentia. Ergo conscientia non est potentia.

Objection 1: It would seem that conscience is a power; for Origen says that conscience is a correcting and guiding spirit accompanying the soul, by which it is led away from evil and made to cling to good. But in the soul, spirit designates a power—either the mind itself, according to the text (Eph 4:13), Be ye renewed in the spirit of your mind— or the imagination, whence imaginary vision is called spiritual, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 7,24). Therefore conscience is a power. Obj. 2: Further, nothing is a subject of sin, except a power of the soul. But conscience is a subject of sin; for it is said of some that their mind and conscience are defiled (Titus 1:15). Therefore it seems that conscience is a power.

Obj. 3: Further, conscience must of necessity be either an act, a habit, or a power. But it is not an act; for thus it would not always exist in man. Nor is it a habit; for conscience is not one thing but many, since we are directed in our actions by many habits of knowledge. Therefore conscience is a power. On the contrary, Conscience can be laid aside. But a power cannot be laid aside. Therefore conscience is not a power. Respondeo dicendum quod conscientia, proprie I answer that, Properly speaking, conscience is not a loquendo, non est potentia, sed actus. Et hoc patet power, but an act. This is evident both from the very name tum ex ratione nominis, tum etiam ex his quae se- and from those things which in the common way of speakcundum communem usum loquendi, conscientiae at- ing are attributed to conscience. For conscience, accordtribuuntur. Conscientia enim, secundum proprietatem ing to the very nature of the word, implies the relation of vocabuli, importat ordinem scientiae ad aliquid, nam knowledge to something: for conscience may be resolved

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conscientia dicitur cum alio scientia. Applicatio autem into cum alio scientia, i.e., knowledge applied to an individscientiae ad aliquid fit per aliquem actum. Unde ex ista ual case. But the application of knowledge to something is ratione nominis patet quod conscientia sit actus. done by some act. Wherefore from this explanation of the name it is clear that conscience is an act. Idem autem apparet ex his quae conscientiae attriThe same is manifest from those things which are atbuuntur. Dicitur enim conscientia testificari, ligare vel tributed to conscience. For conscience is said to witness, to instigare, et etiam accusare vel remordere sive reprehen- bind, or incite, and also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. And dere. Et haec omnia consequuntur applicationem ali- all these follow the application of knowledge or science to cuius nostrae cognitionis vel scientiae ad ea quae agi- what we do: which application is made in three ways. One mus. Quae quidem applicatio fit tripliciter. Uno modo, way in so far as we recognize that we have done or not done secundum quod recognoscimus aliquid nos fecisse vel something; Thy conscience knoweth that thou hast often sponon fecisse, secundum illud Eccle. VII, scit conscientia ken evil of others (Eccl 7:23), and according to this, contua te crebro maledixisse aliis, et secundum hoc, con- science is said to witness. In another way, so far as through scientia dicitur testificari. Alio modo applicatur secun- the conscience we judge that something should be done or dum quod per nostram conscientiam iudicamus aliquid not done; and in this sense, conscience is said to incite or esse faciendum vel non faciendum, et secundum hoc, di- to bind. In the third way, so far as by conscience we judge citur conscientia instigare vel ligare. Tertio modo appli- that something done is well done or ill done, and in this catur secundum quod per conscientiam iudicamus quod sense conscience is said to excuse, accuse, or torment. Now, aliquid quod est factum, sit bene factum vel non bene it is clear that all these things follow the actual application factum, et secundum hoc, conscientia dicitur excusare of knowledge to what we do. Wherefore, properly speakvel accusare, seu remordere. Patet autem quod omnia ing, conscience denominates an act. But since habit is a haec consequuntur actualem applicationem scientiae ad principle of act, sometimes the name conscience is given to ea quae agimus. Unde proprie loquendo, conscientia no- the first natural habit—namely, synderesis: thus Jerome calls minat actum. Quia tamen habitus est principium ac- synderesis conscience (Gloss. Ezech. 1:6); Basil, the natural tus, quandoque nomen conscientiae attribuitur primo power of judgment, and Damascene says that it is the law of habitui naturali, scilicet synderesi, sicut Hieronymus, our intellect. For it is customary for causes and effects to be in Glossa Ezech. I, synderesim conscientiam nominat; called after one another. et Basilius naturale iudicatorium; et Damascenus dicit quod est lex intellectus nostri. Consuetum enim est quod causae et effectus per invicem nominentur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod conscientia diciReply Obj. 1: Conscience is called a spirit, so far as tur spiritus, secundum quod spiritus pro mente ponitur, spirit is the same as mind; because conscience is a certain quia est quoddam mentis dictamen. pronouncement of the mind. Ad secundum dicendum quod inquinatio dicitur Reply Obj. 2: The conscience is said to be defiled, not esse in conscientia, non sicut in subiecto, sed sicut co- as a subject, but as the thing known is in knowledge; so far gnitum in cognitione, inquantum scilicet aliquis scit se as someone knows he is defiled. esse inquinatum. Ad tertium dicendum quod actus, etsi non semper Reply Obj. 3: Although an act does not always remaneat in se, semper tamen manet in sua causa, quae est main in itself, yet it always remains in its cause, which is potentia et habitus. Habitus autem ex quibus conscientia power and habit. Now all the habits by which conscience informatur, etsi multi sint, omnes tamen efficaciam ha- is formed, although many, nevertheless have their efficacy bent ab uno primo, scilicet ab habitu primorum princi- from one first habit, the habit of first principles, which is piorum, qui dicitur synderesis. Unde specialiter hic ha- called synderesis. And for this special reason, this habit is bitus interdum conscientia nominatur, ut supra dictum sometimes called conscience, as we have said above. est.

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Question 80 The Appetitive Powers in General Deinde considerandum est de potentiis appetitivis. Next we consider the appetitive powers, concerning Et circa hoc consideranda sunt quatuor, primo, de ap- which there are four heads of consideration: first, the appetpetitivo in communi; secundo, de sensualitate; tertio, de itive powers in general; second, sensuality; third, the will; voluntate; quarto, de libero arbitrio. fourth, the free-will. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. Under the first there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum debeat poni appetitus aliqua specialis (1) Whether the appetite should be considered a potentia animae. special power of the soul? Secundo, utrum appetitus dividatur in appetitum (2) Whether the appetite should be divided into sensitivum et intellectivum, sicut in potentias intellectual and sensitive as distinct powers? diversas.

Article 1 Whether the appetite is a special power of the soul? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod appetitus non sit aliqua specialis animae potentia. Ad ea enim quae sunt communia animatis et inanimatis, non est aliqua potentia animae assignanda. Sed appetere est commune animatis et inanimatis quia bonum est quod omnia appetunt, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo appetitus non est specialis potentia animae. Praeterea, potentiae distinguuntur secundum obiecta. Sed idem est quod cognoscimus et appetimus. Ergo vim appetitivam non oportet esse aliam praeter vim apprehensivam. Praeterea, commune non distinguitur contra proprium. Sed quaelibet potentia animae appetit quoddam particulare appetibile, scilicet obiectum sibi conveniens. Ergo respectu huius obiecti quod est appetibile in communi, non oportet accipi aliquam potentiam ab aliis distinctam, quae appetitiva dicatur. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II de Anima, distinguit appetitivum ab aliis potentiis. Damascenus etiam, in II libro distinguit vires appetitivas a cognitivis. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere quandam potentiam animae appetitivam. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod quamlibet formam sequitur aliqua inclinatio, sicut ignis ex sua forma inclinatur in superiorem locum, et ad hoc quod generet sibi simile. Forma autem in his quae cognitionem participant, altiori modo invenitur quam in his quae cognitione carent. In his enim quae cognitione carent, invenitur tantummodo forma ad unum esse proprium determinans unumquodque, quod etiam naturale uniu-

Objection 1: It would seem that the appetite is not a special power of the soul. For no power of the soul is to be assigned for those things which are common to animate and to inanimate things. But appetite is common to animate and inanimate things: since all desire good, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore the appetite is not a special power of the soul. Obj. 2: Further, powers are differentiated by their objects. But what we desire is the same as what we know. Therefore the appetitive power is not distinct from the apprehensive power. Obj. 3: Further, the common is not divided from the proper. But each power of the soul desires some particular desirable thing—namely its own suitable object. Therefore, with regard to this object which is the desirable in general, we should not assign some particular power distinct from the others, called the appetitive power. On the contrary, The Philosopher distinguishes (De Anima ii, 3) the appetitive from the other powers. Damascene also (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes the appetitive from the cognitive powers. I answer that, It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul. To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination follows every form: for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to rise, and to generate its like. Now, the form is found to have a more perfect existence in those things which participate knowledge than in those which lack knowledge. For in those which lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its own being—that is, to its nature. Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which is called the nat-

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scuiusque est. Hanc igitur formam naturalem sequitur naturalis inclinatio, quae appetitus naturalis vocatur. In habentibus autem cognitionem, sic determinatur unumquodque ad proprium esse naturale per formam naturalem, quod tamen est receptivum specierum aliarum rerum, sicut sensus recipit species omnium sensibilium, et intellectus omnium intelligibilium, ut sic anima hominis sit omnia quodammodo secundum sensum et intellectum, in quo quodammodo cognitionem habentia ad Dei similitudinem appropinquant, in quo omnia praeexistunt, sicut Dionysius dicit. Sicut igitur formae altiori modo existunt in habentibus cognitionem supra modum formarum naturalium, ita oportet quod in eis sit inclinatio supra modum inclinationis naturalis, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis. Et haec superior inclinatio pertinet ad vim animae appetitivam, per quam animal appetere potest ea quae apprehendit, non solum ea ad quae inclinatur ex forma naturali. Sic igitur necesse est ponere aliquam potentiam animae appetitivam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod appetere invenitur in habentibus cognitionem, supra modum communem quo invenitur in omnibus, ut dictum est. Et ideo oportet ad hoc determinari aliquam potentiam animae. Ad secundum dicendum quod id quod apprehenditur et appetitur, est idem subiecto, sed differt ratione, apprehenditur enim ut est ens sensibile vel intelligibile; appetitur vero ut est conveniens aut bonum. Diversitas autem rationum in obiectis requiritur ad diversitatem potentiarum; non autem materialis diversitas. Ad tertium dicendum quod unaquaeque potentia animae est quaedam forma seu natura, et habet naturalem inclinationem in aliquid. Unde unaquaeque appetit obiectum sibi conveniens naturali appetitu. Supra quem est appetitus animalis consequens apprehensionem, quo appetitur aliquid non ea ratione qua est conveniens ad actum huius vel illius potentiae, utpote visio ad videndum et auditio ad audiendum; sed quia est conveniens simpliciter animali.

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ural appetite. But in those things which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural being by its natural form, in such a manner that it is nevertheless receptive of the species of other things: for example, sense receives the species of all things sensible, and the intellect, of all things intelligible, so that the soul of man is, in a way, all things by sense and intellect: and thereby, those things that have knowledge, in a way, approach to a likeness to God, in Whom all things pre-exist, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).

Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a higher manner and above the manner of natural forms; so must there be in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. And this superior inclination belongs to the appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined by its natural form. And so it is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul. Reply Obj. 1: Appetite is found in things which have knowledge, above the common manner in which it is found in all things, as we have said above. Therefore it is necessary to assign to the soul a particular power. Reply Obj. 2: What is apprehended and what is desired are the same in reality, but differ in aspect: for a thing is apprehended as something sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable or good. Now, it is diversity of aspect in the objects, and not material diversity, which demands a diversity of powers. Reply Obj. 3: Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a natural inclination to something. Wherefore each power desires by the natural appetite that object which is suitable to itself. Above which natural appetite is the animal appetite, which follows the apprehension, and by which something is desired not as suitable to this or that power, such as sight for seeing, or sound for hearing; but simply as suitable to the animal.

Article 2 Whether the sensitive and intellectual appetites are distinct powers? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod appetitus sensitivus et intellectivus non sint diversae potentiae. Potentiae enim non diversificantur per accidentales differentias, ut supra dictum est. Sed accidit appetibili quod sit apprehensum per sensum vel intellectum. Ergo appetitus sensitivus et intellectivus non sunt diversae potentiae.

Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive and intellectual appetites are not distinct powers. For powers are not differentiated by accidental differences, as we have seen above (Q. 77, A. 3). But it is accidental to the appetible object whether it be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Therefore the sensitive and intellectual appetites are not distinct powers.

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Praeterea, cognitio intellectiva est universalium, et secundum hoc distinguitur a sensitiva, quae est singularium. Sed ista distinctio non habet locum ex parte appetitivae, cum enim appetitus sit motus ab anima ad res, quae sunt singulares, omnis appetitus videtur esse rei singularis. Non ergo appetitus intellectivus debet distingui a sensitivo. Praeterea, sicut sub apprehensivo ordinatur appetitivum ut inferior potentia, ita et motivum. Sed non est aliud motivum in homine consequens intellectum, quam in aliis animalibus consequens sensum. Ergo, pari ratione, neque est aliud appetitivum. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in III de Anima, distinguit duplicem appetitum, et dicit quod appetitus superior movet inferiorem. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere appetitum intellectivum esse aliam potentiam a sensitivo. Potentia enim appetitiva est potentia passiva, quae nata est moveri ab apprehenso, unde appetibile apprehensum est movens non motum, appetitus autem movens motum, ut dicitur in III de Anima, et XII Metaphys. Passiva autem et mobilia distinguuntur secundum distinctionem activorum et motivorum, quia oportet motivum esse proportionatum mobili, et activum passivo; et ipsa potentia passiva propriam rationem habet ex ordine ad suum activum. Quia igitur est alterius generis apprehensum per intellectum et apprehensum per sensum, consequens est quod appetitus intellectivus sit alia potentia a sensitivo.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod appetibili non accidit esse apprehensum per sensum vel intellectum, sed per se ei convenit, nam appetibile non movet appetitum nisi inquantum est apprehensum. Unde differentiae apprehensi sunt per se differentiae appetibilis. Unde potentiae appetitivae distinguuntur secundum differentiam apprehensorum, sicut secundum propria obiecta.

Q. 80, A. 2

Obj. 2: Further, intellectual knowledge is of universals; and so it is distinct from sensitive knowledge, which is of individual things. But there is no place for this distinction in the appetitive part: for since the appetite is a movement of the soul to individual things, seemingly every act of the appetite regards an individual thing. Therefore the intellectual appetite is not distinguished from the sensitive. Obj. 3: Further, as under the apprehensive power, the appetitive is subordinate as a lower power, so also is the motive power. But the motive power which in man follows the intellect is not distinct from the motive power which in animals follows sense. Therefore, for a like reason, neither is there distinction in the appetitive part. On the contrary, The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9) distinguishes a double appetite, and says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite moves the lower. I answer that, We must needs say that the intellectual appetite is a distinct power from the sensitive appetite. For the appetitive power is a passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended: wherefore the apprehended appetible is a mover which is not moved, while the appetite is a mover moved, as the Philosopher says in De Anima iii, 10 and Metaph. xii (Did. xi, 7). Now things passive and movable are differentiated according to the distinction of the corresponding active and motive principles; because the motive must be proportionate to the movable, and the active to the passive: indeed, the passive power itself has its very nature from its relation to its active principle. Therefore, since what is apprehended by the intellect and what is apprehended by sense are generically different; consequently, the intellectual appetite is distinct from the sensitive. Reply Obj. 1: It is not accidental to the thing desired to be apprehended by the sense or the intellect; on the contrary, this belongs to it by its nature; for the appetible does not move the appetite except as it is apprehended. Wherefore differences in the thing apprehended are of themselves differences of the appetible. And so the appetitive powers are distinct according to the distinction of the things apprehended, as their proper objects. Reply Obj. 2: The intellectual appetite, though it tends to individual things which exist outside the soul, yet tends to them as standing under the universal; as when it desires something because it is good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhetoric. ii, 4) that hatred can regard a universal, as when we hate every kind of thief. In the same way by the intellectual appetite we may desire the immaterial good, which is not apprehended by sense, such as knowledge, virtue, and suchlike.

Ad secundum dicendum quod appetitus intellectivus, etsi feratur in res quae sunt extra animam singulares, fertur tamen in eas secundum aliquam rationem universalem; sicut cum appetit aliquid quia est bonum. Unde philosophus dicit in sua rhetorica, quod odium potest esse de aliquo universali, puta cum odio habemus omne latronum genus. Similiter etiam per appetitum intellectivum appetere possumus immaterialia bona, quae sensus non apprehendit; sicut scientiam, virtutes, et alia huiusmodi. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in III de Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, Anima, opinio universalis non movet nisi mediante par- 11), a universal opinion does not move except by means of ticulari, et similiter appetitus superior movet mediante a particular opinion; and in like manner the higher appetite

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inferiori. Et ideo non est alia vis motiva consequens in- moves by means of the lower: and therefore there are not tellectum et sensum. two distinct motive powers following the intellect and the sense.

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Question 81 The Power of Sensuality Deinde considerandum est de sensualitate. Circa Next we have to consider the power of sensuality, conquam quaeruntur tria. cerning which there are three points of inquiry: Primo, utrum sensualitas sit vis appetitiva tantum. (1) Whether sensuality is only an appetitive power? Secundo, utrum dividatur sensualitas in irascibilem (2) Whether it is divided into irascible and et concupiscibilem, sicut in diversas potentias. concupiscible as distinct powers? Tertio, utrum irascibilis et concupiscibilis obediant (3) Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers rationi. obey reason?

Article 1 Whether sensuality is only appetitive, or also cognitive? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sensualitas non solum sit appetitiva, sed etiam cognitiva. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII de Trin., quod sensualis animae motus, qui in corporis sensus intenditur, nobis pecoribusque communis est. Sed corporis sensus sub vi cognitiva continentur. Ergo sensualitas est vis cognitiva. Praeterea, quae cadunt sub una divisione, videntur esse unius generis. Sed Augustinus, in XII de Trin., dividit sensualitatem contra rationem superiorem et inferiorem; quae ad cognitionem pertinent. Ergo sensualitas etiam est vis cognitiva. Praeterea, sensualitas in tentatione hominis tenet locum serpentis. Sed serpens in tentatione primorum parentum se habuit ut nuntians et proponens peccatum; quod est vis cognitivae. Ergo sensualitas est vis cognitiva. Sed contra est quod sensualitas definitur esse appetitus rerum ad corpus pertinentium. Respondeo dicendum quod nomen sensualitatis sumptum videtur a sensuali motu, de quo Augustinus loquitur XII de Trin., sicut ab actu sumitur nomen potentiae, ut a visione visus. Motus autem sensualis est appetitus apprehensionem sensitivam consequens. Actus enim apprehensivae virtutis non ita proprie dicitur motus, sicut actio appetitus, nam operatio virtutis apprehensivae perficitur in hoc, quod res apprehensae sunt in apprehendente; operatio autem virtutis appetitivae perficitur in hoc, quod appetens inclinatur in rem appetibilem. Et ideo operatio apprehensivae virtutis assimilatur quieti, operatio autem virtutis appetitivae magis assimilatur motui. Unde per sensualem motum intelligitur operatio

Objection 1: It would seem that sensuality is not only appetitive, but also cognitive. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that the sensual movement of the soul which is directed to the bodily senses is common to us and beasts. But the bodily senses belong to the apprehensive powers. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power. Obj. 2: Further, things which come under one division seem to be of one genus. But Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) divides sensuality against the higher and lower reason, which belong to knowledge. Therefore sensuality also is apprehensive. Obj. 3: Further, in man’s temptations sensuality stands in the place of the serpent. But in the temptation of our first parents, the serpent presented himself as one giving information and proposing sin, which belong to the cognitive power. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power. On the contrary, Sensuality is defined as the appetite of things belonging to the body. I answer that, The name sensuality seems to be taken from the sensual movement, of which Augustine speaks (De Trin. xii, 12, 13), just as the name of a power is taken from its act; for instance, sight from seeing. Now the sensual movement is an appetite following sensitive apprehension. For the act of the apprehensive power is not so properly called a movement as the act of the appetite: since the operation of the apprehensive power is completed in the very fact that the thing apprehended is in the one that apprehends: while the operation of the appetitive power is completed in the fact that he who desires is borne towards the thing desirable. Therefore the operation of the apprehensive power is likened to rest: whereas the opera-

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appetitivae virtutis. Et sic sensualitas est nomen appeti- tion of the appetitive power is rather likened to movement. tus sensitivi. Wherefore by sensual movement we understand the operation of the appetitive power: so that sensuality is the name of the sensitive appetite. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per hoc quod dicit Reply Obj. 1: By saying that the sensual movement of Augustinus quod sensualis animae motus intenditur in the soul is directed to the bodily senses, Augustine does corporis sensus, non datur intelligi quod corporis sensus not give us to understand that the bodily senses are insub sensualitate comprehendantur, sed magis quod mo- cluded in sensuality, but rather that the movement of sentus sensualitatis sit inclinatio quaedam ad sensus corpo- suality is a certain inclination to the bodily senses, since ris, dum scilicet appetimus ea quae per corporis sensus we desire things which are apprehended through the bodily apprehenduntur. Et sic corporis sensus pertinent ad sen- senses. And thus the bodily senses appertain to sensuality sualitatem quasi praeambuli. as a preamble. Ad secundum dicendum quod sensualitas dividitur Reply Obj. 2: Sensuality is divided against higher and contra rationem superiorem et inferiorem, inquantum lower reason, as having in common with them the act of communicant in actu motionis, vis enim cognitiva, ad movement: for the apprehensive power, to which belong the quam pertinet ratio superior et inferior, est motiva, sicut higher and lower reason, is a motive power; as is appetite, to et appetitiva, ad quam pertinet sensualitas. which appertains sensuality. Ad tertium dicendum quod serpens non solum Reply Obj. 3: The serpent not only showed and proostendit et proposuit peccatum, sed etiam, inclinavit in posed sin, but also incited to the commission of sin. And in effectum peccati. Et quantum ad hoc, sensualitas per ser- this, sensuality is signified by the serpent. pentem significatur.

Article 2 Whether the sensitive appetite is divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod appetitus sensitivus non distinguatur in irascibilem et concupiscibilem, sicut in potentias diversas. Eadem enim potentia animae est unius contrarietatis, ut visus albi et nigri, ut dicitur in II de Anima. Sed conveniens et nocivum sunt contraria. Cum ergo concupiscibilis respiciat conveniens, irascibilis vero nocivum, videtur quod eadem potentia animae sit irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Praeterea, appetitus sensitivus non est nisi convenientium secundum sensum. Sed conveniens secundum sensum est obiectum concupiscibilis. Ergo nullus appetitus sensitivus est a concupiscibili differens. Praeterea, odium est in irascibili, dicit enim Hieronymus, super Matth., possideamus in irascibili odium vitiorum. Sed odium, cum contrarietur amori, est in concupiscibili. Ergo eadem vis est concupiscibilis et irascibilis. Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyssenus et Damascenus ponunt duas vires, irascibilem et concupiscibilem, partes appetitus sensitivi. Respondeo dicendum quod appetitus sensitivus est una vis in genere, quae sensualitas dicitur; sed dividitur in duas potentias, quae sunt species appetitus sensitivi, scilicet in irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Ad cuius evi-

Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive appetite is not divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers. For the same power of the soul regards both sides of a contrariety, as sight regards both black and white, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 11). But suitable and harmful are contraries. Since, then, the concupiscible power regards what is suitable, while the irascible is concerned with what is harmful, it seems that irascible and concupiscible are the same power in the soul. Obj. 2: Further, the sensitive appetite regards only what is suitable according to the senses. But such is the object of the concupiscible power. Therefore there is no sensitive appetite differing from the concupiscible. Obj. 3: Further, hatred is in the irascible part: for Jerome says on Matt. 13:33: We ought to have the hatred of vice in the irascible power. But hatred is contrary to love, and is in the concupiscible part. Therefore the concupiscible and irascible are the same powers. On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Natura Hominis) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) assign two parts to the sensitive appetite, the irascible and the concupiscible. I answer that, The sensitive appetite is one generic power, and is called sensuality; but it is divided into two powers, which are species of the sensitive appetite—the irascible and the concupiscible. In order to make this clear,

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dentiam, considerari oportet quod in rebus naturalibus corruptibilibus, non solum oportet esse inclinationem ad consequendum convenientia et refugiendum nociva; sed etiam ad resistendum corrumpentibus et contrariis, quae convenientibus impedimentum praebent et ingerunt nocumenta. Sicut ignis habet naturalem inclinationem non solum ut recedat ab inferiori loco, qui sibi non convenit, et tendat in locum superiorem sibi convenientem; sed etiam quod resistat corrumpentibus et impedientibus. Quia igitur appetitus sensitivus est inclinatio consequens apprehensionem sensitivam, sicut appetitus naturalis est inclinatio consequens formam naturalem; necesse est quod in parte sensitiva sint duae appetitivae potentiae. Una, per quam anima simpliciter inclinatur ad prosequendum ea quae sunt convenientia secundum sensum, et ad refugiendum nociva, et haec dicitur concupiscibilis. Alia vero, per quam animal resistit impugnantibus, quae convenientia impugnant et nocumenta inferunt, et haec vis vocatur irascibilis. Unde dicitur quod eius obiectum est arduum, quia scilicet tendit ad hoc quod superet contraria, et superemineat eis. Hae autem duae inclinationes non reducuntur in unum principium, quia interdum anima tristibus se ingerit, contra inclinationem concupiscibilis, ut secundum inclinationem irascibilis impugnet contraria. Unde etiam passiones irascibilis repugnare videntur passionibus concupiscibilis, nam concupiscentia accensa minuit iram, et ira accensa minuit concupiscentiam, ut in pluribus. Patet etiam ex hoc, quod irascibilis est quasi propugnatrix et defensatrix concupiscibilis, dum insurgit contra ea quae impediunt convenientia, quae concupiscibilis appetit, et ingerunt nociva, quae concupiscibilis refugit. Et propter hoc, omnes passiones irascibilis incipiunt a passionibus concupiscibilis, et in eas terminantur; sicut ira nascitur ex illata tristitia, et vindictam inferens, in laetitiam terminatur. Propter hoc etiam pugnae animalium sunt de concupiscibilibus, scilicet de cibis et venereis, ut dicitur in VIII de Animalibus.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vis concupiscibilis est et convenientis et inconvenientis. Sed irascibilis est ad resistendum inconvenienti quod impugnat. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut in apprehensivis virtutibus in parte sensitiva est aliqua vis aestimativa, scilicet quae est perceptiva eorum quae sensum non immutant, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam in appetitu sensitivo est aliqua vis appetens aliquid quod non est conveniens secundum delectationem sensus, sed secundum quod est utile animali ad suam defensionem. Et haec est vis irascibilis. Ad tertium dicendum quod odium simpliciter pertinet ad concupiscibilem; sed ratione impugnationis quae ex odio causatur, potest ad irascibilem pertinere.

Q. 81, A. 2

we must observe that in natural corruptible things there is needed an inclination not only to the acquisition of what is suitable and to the avoiding of what is harmful, but also to resistance against corruptive and contrary agencies which are a hindrance to the acquisition of what is suitable, and are productive of harm. For example, fire has a natural inclination, not only to rise from a lower position, which is unsuitable to it, towards a higher position which is suitable, but also to resist whatever destroys or hinders its action. Therefore, since the sensitive appetite is an inclination following sensitive apprehension, as natural appetite is an inclination following the natural form, there must needs be in the sensitive part two appetitive powers—one through which the soul is simply inclined to seek what is suitable, according to the senses, and to fly from what is hurtful, and this is called the concupiscible: and another, whereby an animal resists these attacks that hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm, and this is called the irascible. Whence we say that its object is something arduous, because its tendency is to overcome and rise above obstacles. Now these two are not to be reduced to one principle: for sometimes the soul busies itself with unpleasant things, against the inclination of the concupiscible appetite, in order that, following the impulse of the irascible appetite, it may fight against obstacles. Wherefore also the passions of the irascible appetite counteract the passions of the concupiscible appetite: since the concupiscence, on being aroused, diminishes anger; and anger being roused, diminishes concupiscence in many cases. This is clear also from the fact that the irascible is, as it were, the champion and defender of the concupiscible when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition of the suitable things which the concupiscible desires, or against what inflicts harm, from which the concupiscible flies. And for this reason all the passions of the irascible appetite rise from the passions of the concupiscible appetite and terminate in them; for instance, anger rises from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates in joy. For this reason also the quarrels of animals are about things concupiscible—namely, food and sex, as the Philosopher says. Reply Obj. 1: The concupiscible power regards both what is suitable and what is unsuitable. But the object of the irascible power is to resist the onslaught of the unsuitable. Reply Obj. 2: As in the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part there is an estimative power, which perceives those things which do not impress the senses, as we have said above (Q. 78, A. 2); so also in the sensitive appetite there is a certain appetitive power which regards something as suitable, not because it pleases the senses, but because it is useful to the animal for self-defense: and this is the irascible power. Reply Obj. 3: Hatred belongs simply to the concupiscible appetite: but by reason of the strife which arises from hatred, it may belong to the irascible appetite.

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Article 3 Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis non obediant rationi. Irascibilis enim et concupiscibilis sunt partes sensualitatis. Sed sensualitas non obedit rationi, unde per serpentem significatur, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Trin. Ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis non obediunt rationi. Praeterea, quod obedit alicui, non repugnat ei. Sed irascibilis et concupiscibilis repugnant rationi; secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. VII, video aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae. Ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis non obediunt rationi.

Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. For irascible and concupiscible are parts of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason, wherefore it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. Obj. 2: Further, what obeys a certain thing does not resist it. But the irascible and concupiscible appetites resist reason: according to the Apostle (Rom 7:23): I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind. Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. Obj. 3: Further, as the appetitive power is inferior to the rational part of the soul, so also is the sensitive power. But the sensitive part of the soul does not obey reason: for we neither hear nor see just when we wish. Therefore, in like manner, neither do the powers of the sensitive appetite, the irascible and concupiscible, obey reason. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the part of the soul which is obedient and amenable to reason is divided into concupiscence and anger. I answer that, In two ways the irascible and concupiscible powers obey the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the will; first, as to reason, second as to the will. They obey the reason in their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by the estimative power; for instance, a sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In man the estimative power, as we have said above (Q. 78, A. 4), is replaced by the cogitative power, which is called by some the particular reason, because it compares individual intentions. Wherefore in man the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by this particular reason. But this same particular reason is naturally guided and moved according to the universal reason: wherefore in syllogistic matters particular conclusions are drawn from universal propositions. Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the sensitive appetite, which is divided into concupiscible and irascible; and this appetite obeys it. But because to draw particular conclusions from universal principles is not the work of the intellect, as such, but of the reason: hence it is that the irascible and concupiscible are said to obey the reason rather than to obey the intellect. Anyone can experience this in himself: for by applying certain universal considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited.

Praeterea, sicut rationali parte animae inferior est vis appetitiva, ita etiam et vis sensitiva. Sed sensitiva pars animae non obedit rationi, non enim audimus nec videmus quando volumus. Ergo similiter neque vires sensitivi appetitus, scilicet irascibilis et concupiscibilis, obediunt rationi. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, quod obediens et persuasibile rationi dividitur in concupiscentiam et iram. Respondeo dicendum quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis obediunt superiori parti, in qua est intellectus sive ratio et voluntas, dupliciter, uno modo quidem, quantum ad rationem; alio vero modo, quantum ad voluntatem. Rationi quidem obediunt quantum ad ipsos suos actus. Cuius ratio est, quia appetitus sensitivus in aliis quidem animalibus natus est moveri ab aestimativa virtute; sicut ovis aestimans lupum inimicum, timet. Loco autem aestimativae virtutis est in homine, sicut supra dictum est, vis cogitativa; quae dicitur a quibusdam ratio particularis, eo quod est collativa intentionum individualium. Unde ab ea natus est moveri in homine appetitus sensitivus. Ipsa autem ratio particularis nata est moveri et dirigi secundum rationem universalem, unde in syllogisticis ex universalibus propositionibus concluduntur conclusiones singulares. Et ideo patet quod ratio universalis imperat appetitui sensitivo, qui distinguitur per concupiscibilem et irascibilem, et hic appetitus ei obedit. Et quia deducere universalia principia in conclusiones singulares, non est opus simplicis intellectus, sed rationis; ideo irascibilis et concupiscibilis magis dicuntur obedire rationi, quam intellectui. Hoc etiam quilibet experiri potest in seipso, applicando enim aliquas universales considerationes, mitigatur ira aut timor aut aliquid huiusmodi, vel etiam instigatur. Voluntati etiam subiacet appetitus sensitivus, quanTo the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in exetum ad executionem, quae fit per vim motivam. In aliis cution, which is accomplished by the motive power. For in enim animalibus statim ad appetitum concupiscibilis et other animals movement follows at once the concupiscible irascibilis sequitur motus sicut ovis, timens lupum sta- and irascible appetites: for instance, the sheep, fearing the

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tim fugit, quia non est in eis aliquis superior appetitus qui repugnet. Sed homo non statim movetur secundum appetitum irascibilis et concupiscibilis; sed expectatur imperium voluntatis, quod est appetitus superior. In omnibus enim potentiis motivis ordinatis, secundum movens non movet nisi virtute primi moventis, unde appetitus inferior non sufficit movere, nisi appetitus superior consentiat. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit, in III de Anima, quod appetitus superior movet appetitum inferiorem, sicut sphaera superior inferiorem. Hoc ergo modo irascibilis et concupiscibilis rationi subduntur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensualitas significatur per serpentem, quantum ad id quod est proprium sibi ex parte sensitivae partis. Irascibilis autem et concupiscibilis magis nominant sensitivum appetitum ex parte actus, ad quem inducuntur ex ratione, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in I Politicorum, est quidem in animali contemplari et despoticum principatum, et politicum, anima quidem enim corpori dominatur despotico principatu; intellectus autem appetitui, politico et regali. Dicitur enim despoticus principatus, quo aliquis principatur servis, qui non habent facultatem in aliquo resistendi imperio praecipientis, quia nihil sui habent. Principatus autem politicus et regalis dicitur, quo aliquis principatur liberis, qui, etsi subdantur regimini praesidentis, tamen habent aliquid proprium, ex quo possunt reniti praecipientis imperio. Sic igitur anima dicitur dominari corpori despotico principatu, quia corporis membra in nullo resistere possunt imperio animae, sed statim ad appetitum animae movetur manus et pes, et quodlibet membrum quod natum est moveri voluntario motu. Intellectus autem, seu ratio, dicitur principari irascibili et concupiscibili politico principatu, quia appetitus sensibilis habet aliquid proprium, unde potest reniti imperio rationis. Natus est enim moveri appetitus sensitivus, non solum ab aestimativa in aliis animalibus, et cogitativa in homine, quam dirigit universalis ratio; sed etiam ab imaginativa et sensu. Unde experimur irascibilem vel concupiscibilem rationi repugnare, per hoc quod sentimus vel imaginamur aliquod delectabile quod ratio vetat, vel triste quod ratio praecipit. Et sic per hoc quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis in aliquo rationi repugnant, non excluditur quin ei obediant. Ad tertium dicendum quod sensus exteriores indigent ad suos actus exterioribus sensibilibus, quibus immutentur, quorum praesentia non est in potestate rationis. Sed vires interiores, tam appetitivae quam apprehensivae, non indigent exterioribus rebus. Et ideo subduntur imperio rationis, quae potest non solum instigare vel mitigare affectus appetitivae virtutis, sed etiam formare imaginativae virtutis phantasmata.

Q. 81, A. 3

wolf, flees at once, because it has no superior counteracting appetite. On the contrary, man is not moved at once, according to the irascible and concupiscible appetites: but he awaits the command of the will, which is the superior appetite. For wherever there is order among a number of motive powers, the second only moves by virtue of the first: wherefore the lower appetite is not sufficient to cause movement, unless the higher appetite consents. And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), that the higher appetite moves the lower appetite, as the higher sphere moves the lower. In this way, therefore, the irascible and concupiscible are subject to reason. Reply Obj. 1: Sensuality is signified by the serpent, in what is proper to it as a sensitive power. But the irascible and concupiscible powers denominate the sensitive appetite rather on the part of the act, to which they are led by the reason, as we have said. Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2): We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for the soul dominates the body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates the appetite by a politic and royal power. For a power is called despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, since they have nothing of their own. But that power is called politic and royal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands. And so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic power, because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul, but at the soul’s command both hand and foot, and whatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, are moved at once. But the intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power: because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason. For the sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the estimative power in other animals, and in man by the cogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and sense. Whence it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we sense or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the fact that the irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something, we must not conclude that they do not obey. Reply Obj. 3: The exterior senses require for action exterior sensible things, whereby they are affected, and the presence of which is not ruled by reason. But the interior powers, both appetitive and apprehensive, do not require exterior things. Therefore they are subject to the command of reason, which can not only incite or modify the affections of the appetitive power, but can also form the phantasms of the imagination.

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Question 82 The Will Deinde considerandum est de voluntate. Circa quam We next consider the will. Under this head there are five quaeruntur quinque. points of inquiry: Primo, utrum voluntas aliquid ex necessitate (1) Whether the will desires something of necessity? appetat. Secundo, utrum omnia ex necessitate appetat. (2) Whether it desires everything of necessity? Tertio, utrum sit eminentior potentia quam (3) Whether it is a higher power than the intellect? intellectus. Quarto, utrum voluntas moveat intellectum. (4) Whether the will moves the intellect? Quinto, utrum voluntas distinguatur per irascibilem (5) Whether the will is divided into irascible and et concupiscibilem. concupiscible?

Article 1 Whether the will desires something of necessity? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas nihil ex necessitate appetat. Dicit enim Augustinus, in V de Civ. Dei, quod si aliquid est necessarium, non est voluntarium. Sed omne quod voluntas appetit, est voluntarium. Ergo nihil quod voluntas appetit, est necessario desideratum. Praeterea, potestates rationales, secundum philosophum, se habent ad opposita. Sed voluntas est potestas rationalis, quia, ut dicitur in III de Anima, voluntas in ratione est. Ergo voluntas se habet ad opposita. Ad nihil ergo de necessitate determinatur.

Objection 1: It would seem that the will desires nothing of necessity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that if anything is necessary, it is not voluntary. But whatever the will desires is voluntary. Therefore nothing that the will desires is desired of necessity.

Obj. 2: Further, the rational powers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2), extend to opposite things. But the will is a rational power, because, as he says (De Anima iii, 9), the will is in the reason. Therefore the will extends to opposite things, and therefore it is determined to nothing of necessity. Praeterea, secundum voluntatem sumus domini Obj. 3: Further, by the will we are masters of our own nostrorum actuum. Sed eius quod ex necessitate est, non actions. But we are not masters of that which is of necessity. sumus domini. Ergo actus voluntatis non potest de ne- Therefore the act of the will cannot be necessitated.

cessitate esse. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin., quod beatitudinem omnes una voluntate appetunt. Si autem non esset necessarium sed contingens, deficeret ad minus in paucioribus. Ergo voluntas ex necessitate aliquid vult. Respondeo dicendum quod necessitas dicitur multipliciter. Necesse est enim quod non potest non esse. Quod quidem convenit alicui, uno modo ex principio intrinseco, sive materiali, sicut cum dicimus quod omne compositum ex contrariis necesse est corrumpi; sive formali, sicut cum dicimus quod necesse est triangulum habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis. Et haec est necessitas naturalis et absoluta. Alio modo convenit alicui quod non possit non esse, ex aliquo extrinseco, vel fine vel agente. Fine quidem, sicut cum aliquis non potest si-

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 4) that all desire happiness with one will. Now if this were not necessary, but contingent, there would at least be a few exceptions. Therefore the will desires something of necessity. I answer that, The word necessity is employed in many ways. For that which must be is necessary. Now that a thing must be may belong to it by an intrinsic principle— either material, as when we say that everything composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible—or formal, as when we say that it is necessary for the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles. And this is natural and absolute necessity. In another way, that a thing must be, belongs to it by reason of something extrinsic, which is either the end or the agent. On the part of the end, as when without it

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ne hoc consequi, aut bene consequi finem aliquem, ut cibus dicitur necessarius ad vitam, et equus ad iter. Et haec vocatur necessitas finis; quae interdum etiam utilitas dicitur. Ex agente autem hoc alicui convenit, sicut cum aliquis cogitur ab aliquo agente, ita quod non possit contrarium agere. Et haec vocatur necessitas coactionis. Haec igitur coactionis necessitas omnino repugnat voluntati. Nam hoc dicimus esse violentum, quod est contra inclinationem rei. Ipse autem motus voluntatis est inclinatio quaedam in aliquid. Et ideo sicut dicitur aliquid naturale quia est secundum inclinationem naturae, ita dicitur aliquid voluntarium quia est secundum inclinationem voluntatis. Sicut ergo impossibile est quod aliquid simul sit violentum et naturale; ita impossibile est quod aliquid simpliciter sit coactum sive violentum, et voluntarium. Necessitas autem finis non repugnat voluntati, quando ad finem non potest perveniri nisi uno modo, sicut ex voluntate transeundi mare, fit necessitas in voluntate ut velit navem. Similiter etiam nec necessitas naturalis repugnat voluntati. Quinimmo necesse est quod, sicut intellectus ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ex necessitate inhaereat ultimo fini, qui est beatitudo, finis enim se habet in operativis sicut principium in speculativis, ut dicitur in II Physic. Oportet enim quod illud quod naturaliter alicui convenit et immobiliter, sit fundamentum et principium omnium aliorum, quia natura rei est primum in unoquoque, et omnis motus procedit ab aliquo immobili. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum Augustini est intelligendum de necessario necessitate coactionis. Necessitas autem naturalis non aufert libertatem voluntatis, ut ipsemet in eodem libro dicit. Ad secundum dicendum quod voluntas secundum quod aliquid naturaliter vult, magis respondet intellectui naturalium principiorum, quam rationi, quae ad opposita se habet. Unde secundum hoc, magis est intellectualis quam rationalis potestas. Ad tertium dicendum quod sumus domini nostrorum actuum secundum quod possumus hoc vel illud eligere. Electio autem non est de fine, sed de his quae sunt ad finem, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Unde appetitus ultimi finis non est de his quorum domini sumus.

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the end is not to be attained or so well attained: for instance, food is said to be necessary for life, and a horse is necessary for a journey. This is called necessity of end, and sometimes also utility. On the part of the agent, a thing must be, when someone is forced by some agent, so that he is not able to do the contrary. This is called necessity of coercion. Now this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant to the will. For we call that violent which is against the inclination of a thing. But the very movement of the will is an inclination to something. Therefore, as a thing is called natural because it is according to the inclination of nature, so a thing is called voluntary because it is according to the inclination of the will. Therefore, just as it is impossible for a thing to be at the same time violent and natural, so it is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced or violent, and voluntary. But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot be attained except in one way: thus from the will to cross the sea, arises in the will the necessity to wish for a ship. In like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will. Indeed, more than this, for as the intellect of necessity adheres to the first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness: since the end is in practical matters what the principle is in speculative matters. For what befits a thing naturally and immovably must be the root and principle of all else appertaining thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in everything, and every movement arises from something immovable. Reply Obj. 1: The words of Augustine are to be understood of the necessity of coercion. But natural necessity does not take away the liberty of the will, as he says himself (De Civ. Dei v, 10). Reply Obj. 2: The will, so far as it desires a thing naturally, corresponds rather to the intellect as regards natural principles than to the reason, which extends to opposite things. Wherefore in this respect it is rather an intellectual than a rational power. Reply Obj. 3: We are masters of our own actions by reason of our being able to choose this or that. But choice regards not the end, but the means to the end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9). Wherefore the desire of the ultimate end does not regard those actions of which we are masters.

Article 2 Whether the will desires whatever it desires from necessity? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voObjection 1: It would seem that the will desires all luntas ex necessitate omnia velit quaecumque vult. Dicit things of necessity, whatever it desires. For Dionysius says enim Dionysius, IV de Div. Nom., quod malum est prae- (Div. Nom. iv) that evil is outside the scope of the will. There-

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ter voluntatem. Ex necessitate ergo voluntas tendit in bonum sibi propositum. Praeterea, obiectum voluntatis comparatur ad ipsam sicut movens ad mobile. Sed motus mobilis necessario consequitur ex movente. Ergo videtur quod obiectum voluntatis ex necessitate moveat ipsam. Praeterea, sicut apprehensum secundum sensum est obiectum appetitus sensitivi, ita apprehensum secundum intellectum est obiectum intellectivi appetitus, qui dicitur voluntas. Sed apprehensum secundum sensum ex necessitate movet appetitum sensitivum, dicit enim Augustinus, super Gen. ad Litt., quod animalia moventur visis. Ergo videtur quod apprehensum secundum intellectum ex necessitate moveat voluntatem. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, quod voluntas est qua peccatur et recte vivitur, et sic se habet ad opposita. Non ergo ex necessitate vult quaecumque vult.

Q. 82, A. 2

fore the will tends of necessity to the good which is proposed to it. Obj. 2: Further, the object of the will is compared to the will as the mover to the thing movable. But the movement of the movable necessarily follows the mover. Therefore it seems that the will’s object moves it of necessity. Obj. 3: Further, as the thing apprehended by sense is the object of the sensitive appetite, so the thing apprehended by the intellect is the object of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. But what is apprehended by the sense moves the sensitive appetite of necessity: for Augustine says (Gen ad lit. ix, 14) that animals are moved by things seen. Therefore it seems that whatever is apprehended by the intellect moves the will of necessity. On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that it is the will by which we sin and live well, and so the will extends to opposite things. Therefore it does not desire of necessity all things whatsoever it desires. I answer that, The will does not desire of necessity whatsoever it desires. In order to make this evident we must observe that as the intellect naturally and of necessity adheres to the first principles, so the will adheres to the last end, as we have said already (A. 1). Now there are some things intelligible which have not a necessary connection with the first principles; such as contingent propositions, the denial of which does not involve a denial of the first principles. And to such the intellect does not assent of necessity. But there are some propositions which have a necessary connection with the first principles: such as demonstrable conclusions, a denial of which involves a denial of the first principles. And to these the intellect assents of necessity, when once it is aware of the necessary connection of these conclusions with the principles; but it does not assent of necessity until through the demonstration it recognizes the necessity of such connection. It is the same with the will. For there are certain individual goods which have not a necessary connection with happiness, because without them a man can be happy: and to such the will does not adhere of necessity. But there are some things which have a necessary connection with happiness, by means of which things man adheres to God, in Whom alone true happiness consists. Nevertheless, until through the certitude of the Divine Vision the necessity of such connection be shown, the will does not adhere to God of necessity, nor to those things which are of God. But the will of the man who sees God in His essence of necessity adheres to God, just as now we desire of necessity to be happy. It is therefore clear that the will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires.

Respondeo dicendum quod voluntas non ex necessitate vult quaecumque vult. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod sicut intellectus naturaliter et ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ultimo fini, ut iam dictum est. Sunt autem quaedam intelligibilia quae non habent necessariam connexionem ad prima principia; sicut contingentes propositiones, ad quarum remotionem non sequitur remotio primorum principiorum. Et talibus non ex necessitate assentit intellectus. Quaedam autem propositiones sunt necessariae, quae habent connexionem necessariam cum primis principiis; sicut conclusiones demonstrabiles, ad quarum remotionem sequitur remotio primorum principiorum. Et his intellectus ex necessitate assentit, cognita connexione necessaria conclusionum ad principia per demonstrationis deductionem, non autem ex necessitate assentit antequam huiusmodi necessitatem connexionis per demonstrationem cognoscat. Similiter etiam est ex parte voluntatis. Sunt enim quaedam particularia bona, quae non habent necessariam connexionem ad beatitudinem, quia sine his potest aliquis esse beatus, et huiusmodi voluntas non de necessitate inhaeret. Sunt autem quaedam habentia necessariam connexionem ad beatitudinem, quibus scilicet homo Deo inhaeret, in quo solo vera beatitudo consistit. Sed tamen antequam per certitudinem divinae visionis necessitas huiusmodi connexionis demonstretur, voluntas non ex necessitate Deo inhaeret, nec his quae Dei sunt. Sed voluntas videntis Deum per essentiam, de necessitate inhaeret Deo, sicut nunc ex necessitate volumus esse beati. Patet ergo quod voluntas non ex necessitate vult quaecumque vult. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod voluntas in nihil Reply Obj. 1: The will can tend to nothing except unpotest tendere nisi sub ratione boni. Sed quia bonum est der the aspect of good. But because good is of many kinds, multiplex, propter hoc non ex necessitate determinatur for this reason the will is not of necessity determined to one. ad unum.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod movens tunc ex necessitate causat motum in mobili, quando potestas moventis excedit mobile, ita quod tota eius possibilitas moventi subdatur. Cum autem possibilitas voluntatis sit respectu boni universalis et perfecti, non subiicitur eius possibilitas tota alicui particulari bono. Et ideo non ex necessitate movetur ab illo. Ad tertium dicendum quod vis sensitiva non est vis collativa diversorum, sicut ratio, sed simpliciter aliquid unum apprehendit. Et ideo secundum illud unum determinate movet appetitum sensitivum. Sed ratio est collativa plurium, et ideo ex pluribus moveri potest appetitus intellectivus, scilicet voluntas, et non ex uno ex necessitate.

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Reply Obj. 2: The mover, then, of necessity causes movement in the thing movable, when the power of the mover exceeds the thing movable, so that its entire capacity is subject to the mover. But as the capacity of the will regards the universal and perfect good, its capacity is not subjected to any individual good. And therefore it is not of necessity moved by it. Reply Obj. 3: The sensitive power does not compare different things with each other, as reason does: but it simply apprehends some one thing. Therefore, according to that one thing, it moves the sensitive appetite in a determinate way. But the reason is a power that compares several things together: therefore from several things the intellectual appetite—that is, the will—may be moved; but not of necessity from one thing.

Article 3 Whether the will is a higher power than the intellect? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas sit altior potentia quam intellectus. Bonum enim et finis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed finis est prima et altissima causarum. Ergo voluntas est prima et altissima potentiarum. Praeterea, res naturales inveniuntur procedere de imperfectis ad perfecta. Et hoc etiam in potentiis animae apparet, proceditur enim de sensu ad intellectum, qui est nobilior. Sed naturalis processus est de actu intellectus in actum voluntatis. Ergo voluntas est perfectior et nobilior potentia quam intellectus. Praeterea, habitus sunt proportionati potentiis, sicut perfectiones perfectibilibus. Sed habitus quo perficitur voluntas, scilicet caritas, est nobilior habitibus quibus perficitur intellectus, dicitur enim I ad Cor. XIII, si noverim mysteria omnia, et si habuero omnem fidem, caritatem autem non habeam, nihil sum. Ergo voluntas est altior potentia quam intellectus. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in X Ethic., ponit altissimam potentiam animae esse intellectum. Respondeo dicendum quod eminentia alicuius ad alterum potest attendi dupliciter, uno modo, simpliciter; alio modo, secundum quid. Consideratur autem aliquid tale simpliciter, prout est secundum seipsum tale, secundum quid autem, prout dicitur tale secundum respectum ad alterum. Si ergo intellectus et voluntas considerentur secundum se, sic intellectus eminentior invenitur. Et hoc apparet ex comparatione obiectorum ad invicem. Obiectum enim intellectus est simplicius et magis absolutum quam obiectum voluntatis, nam obiectum intellectus est ipsa ratio boni appetibilis; bonum autem

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is a higher power than the intellect. For the object of the will is good and the end. But the end is the first and highest cause. Therefore the will is the first and highest power. Obj. 2: Further, in the order of natural things we observe a progress from imperfect things to perfect. And this also appears in the powers of the soul: for sense precedes the intellect, which is more noble. Now the act of the will, in the natural order, follows the act of the intellect. Therefore the will is a more noble and perfect power than the intellect. Obj. 3: Further, habits are proportioned to their powers, as perfections to what they make perfect. But the habit which perfects the will—namely, charity—is more noble than the habits which perfect the intellect: for it is written (1 Cor 13:2): If I should know all mysteries, and if I should have all faith, and have not charity, I am nothing. Therefore the will is a higher power than the intellect. On the contrary, The Philosopher holds the intellect to be the higher power than the intellect. I answer that, The superiority of one thing over another can be considered in two ways: absolutely and relatively. Now a thing is considered to be such absolutely which is considered such in itself: but relatively as it is such with regard to something else. If therefore the intellect and will be considered with regard to themselves, then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear if we compare their respective objects to one another. For the object of the intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of the will; since the object of the intellect is the very idea of appetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of which is

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appetibile, cuius ratio est in intellectu, est obiectum voluntatis. Quanto autem aliquid est simplicius et abstractius, tanto secundum se est nobilius et altius. Et ideo obiectum intellectus est altius quam obiectum voluntatis. Cum ergo propria ratio potentiae sit secundum ordinem ad obiectum, sequitur quod secundum se et simpliciter intellectus sit altior et nobilior voluntate. Secundum quid autem, et per comparationem ad alterum, voluntas invenitur interdum altior intellectu; ex eo scilicet quod obiectum voluntatis in altiori re invenitur quam obiectum intellectus. Sicut si dicerem auditum esse secundum quid nobiliorem visu, inquantum res aliqua cuius est sonus, nobilior est aliqua re cuius est color, quamvis color sit nobilior et simplicior sono. Ut enim supra dictum est, actio intellectus consistit in hoc quod ratio rei intellectae est in intelligente; actus vero voluntatis perficitur in hoc quod voluntas inclinatur ad ipsam rem prout in se est. Et ideo philosophus dicit, in VI Metaphys., quod bonum et malum, quae sunt obiecta voluntatis, sunt in rebus; verum et falsum, quae sunt obiecta intellectus, sunt in mente. Quando igitur res in qua est bonum, est nobilior ipsa anima, in qua est ratio intellecta; per comparationem ad talem rem, voluntas est altior intellectu. Quando vero res in qua est bonum, est infra animam; tunc etiam per comparationem ad talem rem, intellectus est altior voluntate. Unde melior est amor Dei quam cognitio, e contrario autem melior est cognitio rerum corporalium quam amor. Simpliciter tamen intellectus est nobilior quam voluntas.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio causae accipitur secundum comparationem unius ad alterum, et in tali comparatione ratio boni principalior invenitur, sed verum dicitur magis absolute, et ipsius boni rationem significat. Unde et bonum quoddam verum est. Sed rursus et ipsum verum est quoddam bonum; secundum quod intellectus res quaedam est, et verum finis ipsius. Et inter alios fines iste finis est excellentior; sicut intellectus inter alias potentias. Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod est prius generatione et tempore, est imperfectius, quia in uno et eodem potentia tempore praecedit actum, et imperfectio perfectionem. Sed illud quod est prius simpliciter et secundum naturae ordinem, est perfectius, sic enim actus est prior potentia. Et hoc modo intellectus est prior voluntate, sicut motivum mobili, et activum passivo, bonum enim intellectum movet voluntatem. Ad tertium dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de voluntate secundum comparationem ad id quod supra animam est. Virtus enim caritatis est qua Deum amamus.

Q. 82, A. 3

in the intellect, is the object of the will. Now the more simple and the more abstract a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and therefore the object of the intellect is higher than the object of the will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its order to its object, it follows that the intellect in itself and absolutely is higher and nobler than the will. But relatively and by comparison with something else, we find that the will is sometimes higher than the intellect, from the fact that the object of the will occurs in something higher than that in which occurs the object of the intellect. Thus, for instance, I might say that hearing is relatively nobler than sight, inasmuch as something in which there is sound is nobler than something in which there is color, though color is nobler and simpler than sound. For as we have said above (Q. 16, A. 1; Q. 27, A. 4), the action of the intellect consists in this—that the idea of the thing understood is in the one who understands; while the act of the will consists in this—that the will is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself. And therefore the Philosopher says in Metaph. vi (Did. v, 2) that good and evil, which are objects of the will, are in things, but truth and error, which are objects of the intellect, are in the mind. When, therefore, the thing in which there is good is nobler than the soul itself, in which is the idea understood; by comparison with such a thing, the will is higher than the intellect. But when the thing which is good is less noble than the soul, then even in comparison with that thing the intellect is higher than the will. Wherefore the love of God is better than the knowledge of God; but, on the contrary, the knowledge of corporeal things is better than the love thereof. Absolutely, however, the intellect is nobler than the will. Reply Obj. 1: The aspect of causality is perceived by comparing one thing to another, and in such a comparison the idea of good is found to be nobler: but truth signifies something more absolute, and extends to the idea of good itself: wherefore even good is something true. But, again, truth is something good: forasmuch as the intellect is a thing, and truth its end. And among other ends this is the most excellent: as also is the intellect among the other powers. Reply Obj. 2: What precedes in order of generation and time is less perfect: for in one and in the same thing potentiality precedes act, and imperfection precedes perfection. But what precedes absolutely and in the order of nature is more perfect: for thus act precedes potentiality. And in this way the intellect precedes the will, as the motive power precedes the thing movable, and as the active precedes the passive; for good which is understood moves the will. Reply Obj. 3: This reason is verified of the will as compared with what is above the soul. For charity is the virtue by which we love God.

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Article 4 Whether the will moves the intellect? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non moveat intellectum. Movens enim est nobilius et prius moto, quia movens est agens; agens autem est nobilius patiente, ut Augustinus dicit XII super Gen. ad Litt., et philosophus in III de Anima. Sed intellectus est prior et nobilior voluntate, ut supra dictum est. Ergo voluntas non movet intellectum. Praeterea, movens non movetur a moto, nisi forte per accidens. Sed intellectus movet voluntatem, quia appetibile apprehensum per intellectum est movens non motum; appetitus autem movens motum. Ergo intellectus non movetur a voluntate. Praeterea, nihil velle possumus nisi sit intellectum. Si igitur ad intelligendum movet voluntas volendo intelligere, oportebit quod etiam illud velle praecedat aliud intelligere, et illud intelligere aliud velle, et sic in infinitum, quod est impossibile. Non ergo voluntas movet intellectum. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, quod in nobis est percipere quamcumque volumus artem, et non percipere. In nobis autem est aliquid per voluntatem; percipimus autem artes per intellectum. Voluntas ergo movet intellectum. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid dicitur movere dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum finis; sicut dicitur quod finis movet efficientem. Et hoc modo intellectus movet voluntatem, quia bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis, et movet ipsam ut finis. Alio modo dicitur aliquid movere per modum agentis; sicut alterans movet alteratum, et impellens movet impulsum. Et hoc modo voluntas movet intellectum, et omnes animae vires; ut Anselmus dicit in libro de Similitudinibus. Cuius ratio est, quia in omnibus potentiis activis ordinatis, illa potentia quae respicit finem universalem, movet potentias quae respiciunt fines particulares. Et hoc apparet tam in naturalibus quam in politicis. Caelum enim, quod agit ad universalem conservationem generabilium et corruptibilium, movet omnia inferiora corpora, quorum unumquodque agit ad conservationem propriae speciei, vel etiam individui. Rex etiam, qui intendit bonum commune totius regni, movet per suum imperium singulos praepositos civitatum, qui singulis civitatibus curam regiminis impendunt. Obiectum autem voluntatis est bonum et finis in communi. Quaelibet autem potentia comparatur ad aliquod bonum proprium sibi conveniens; sicut visus ad perceptionem coloris, intellectus ad cognitionem veri. Et ideo voluntas per modum

Objection 1: It would seem that the will does not move the intellect. For what moves excels and precedes what is moved, because what moves is an agent, and the agent is nobler than the patient, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 16), and the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5). But the intellect excels and precedes the will, as we have said above (A. 3). Therefore the will does not move the intellect. Obj. 2: Further, what moves is not moved by what is moved, except perhaps accidentally. But the intellect moves the will, because the good apprehended by the intellect moves without being moved; whereas the appetite moves and is moved. Therefore the intellect is not moved by the will. Obj. 3: Further, we can will nothing but what we understand. If, therefore, in order to understand, the will moves by willing to understand, that act of the will must be preceded by another act of the intellect, and this act of the intellect by another act of the will, and so on indefinitely, which is impossible. Therefore the will does not move the intellect. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 26): It is in our power to learn an art or not, as we list. But a thing is in our power by the will, and we learn art by the intellect. Therefore the will moves the intellect. I answer that, A thing is said to move in two ways: First, as an end; for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way the intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end. Second, a thing is said to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De Similitudinibus). The reason is, because wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that power which regards the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends. And we may observe this both in nature and in things politic. For the heaven, which aims at the universal preservation of things subject to generation and corruption, moves all inferior bodies, each of which aims at the preservation of its own species or of the individual. The king also, who aims at the common good of the whole kingdom, by his rule moves all the governors of cities, each of whom rules over his own particular city. Now the object of the will is good and the end in general, and each power is directed to some suitable good proper to it, as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as agent moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, ex-

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agentis movet omnes animae potentias ad suos actus, praeter vires naturales vegetativae partis, quae nostro arbitrio non subduntur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectus dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, secundum quod intellectus est apprehensivus entis et veri universalis; alio modo, secundum quod est quaedam res, et particularis potentia habens determinatum actum. Et similiter voluntas dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, secundum communitatem sui obiecti, prout scilicet est appetitiva boni communis; alio modo, secundum quod est quaedam determinata animae potentia habens determinatum actum. Si ergo comparentur intellectus et voluntas secundum rationem communitatis obiectorum utriusque, sic dictum est supra quod intellectus est simpliciter altior et nobilior voluntate. Si autem consideretur intellectus secundum communitatem sui obiecti, et voluntas secundum quod est quaedam determinata potentia, sic iterum intellectus est altior et prior voluntate, quia sub ratione entis et veri, quam apprehendit intellectus, continetur voluntas ipsa, et actus eius, et obiectum ipsius. Unde intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et actum eius, et obiectum ipsius, sicut et alia specialia intellecta, ut lapidem aut lignum, quae continentur sub communi ratione entis et veri. Si vero consideretur voluntas secundum communem rationem sui obiecti, quod est bonum, intellectus autem secundum quod est quaedam res et potentia specialis; sic sub communi ratione boni continetur, velut quoddam speciale, et intellectus ipse, et ipsum intelligere, et obiectum eius, quod est verum, quorum quodlibet est quoddam speciale bonum. Et secundum hoc voluntas est altior intellectu, et potest ipsum movere. Ex his ergo apparet ratio quare hae potentiae suis actibus invicem se includunt, quia intellectus intelligit voluntatem velle, et voluntas vult intellectum intelligere. Et simili ratione bonum continetur sub vero, inquantum est quoddam verum intellectum; et verum continetur sub bono, inquantum est quoddam bonum desideratum. Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus alio modo movet voluntatem, quam voluntas intellectum, ut iam dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod non oportet procedere in infinitum, sed statur in intellectu sicut in primo. Omnem enim voluntatis motum necesse est quod praecedat apprehensio, sed non omnem apprehensionem praecedit motus voluntatis; sed principium consiliandi et intelligendi est aliquod intellectivum principium altius intellectu nostro, quod est Deus, ut etiam Aristoteles dicit in VII Ethicae Eudemicae, et per hunc modum ostendit quod non est procedere in infinitum.

Q. 82, A. 4

cept the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our will. Reply Obj. 1: The intellect may be considered in two ways: as apprehensive of universal being and truth, and as a thing and a particular power having a determinate act. In like manner also the will may be considered in two ways: according to the common nature of its object—that is to say, as appetitive of universal good—and as a determinate power of the soul having a determinate act. If, therefore, the intellect and the will be compared with one another according to the universality of their respective objects, then, as we have said above (A. 3), the intellect is simply higher and nobler than the will. If, however, we take the intellect as regards the common nature of its object and the will as a determinate power, then again the intellect is higher and nobler than the will, because under the notion of being and truth is contained both the will itself, and its act, and its object. Wherefore the intellect understands the will, and its act, and its object, just as it understands other species of things, as stone or wood, which are contained in the common notion of being and truth. But if we consider the will as regards the common nature of its object, which is good, and the intellect as a thing and a special power; then the intellect itself, and its act, and its object, which is truth, each of which is some species of good, are contained under the common notion of good. And in this way the will is higher than the intellect, and can move it. From this we can easily understand why these powers include one another in their acts, because the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the intellect to understand. In the same way good is contained in truth, inasmuch as it is an understood truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as it is a desired good.

Reply Obj. 2: The intellect moves the will in one sense, and the will moves the intellect in another, as we have said above. Reply Obj. 3: There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. For every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will; but the principle of counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher than our intellect— namely, God—as also Aristotle says (Eth. Eudemic. vii, 14), and in this way he explains that there is no need to proceed indefinitely.

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Article 5 Whether we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis distingui debeant in appetitu superiori, qui est voluntas. Vis enim concupiscibilis dicitur a concupiscendo; et irascibilis ab irascendo. Sed aliqua concupiscentia est quae non potest pertinere ad appetitum sensitivum, sed solum ad intellectivum, qui est voluntas; sicut concupiscentia sapientiae, de qua dicitur Sap. VI, concupiscentia sapientiae perducit ad regnum perpetuum. Est etiam quaedam ira quae non potest pertinere ad appetitum sensitivum, sed intellectivum tantum; sicut cum irascimur contra vitia. Unde et Hieronymus, super Matth., monet ut odium vitiorum possideamus in irascibili. Ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis distingui debent in appetitu intellectivo, sicut et in sensitivo. Praeterea, secundum quod communiter dicitur, caritas est in concupiscibili, spes autem in irascibili. Non autem possunt esse in appetitu sensitivo, quia non sunt sensibilium obiectorum, sed intelligibilium. Ergo concupiscibilis et irascibilis sunt ponenda in parte intellectiva. Praeterea, in libro de Spiritu et Anima dicitur quod has potentias (scilicet irascibilem et concupiscibilem, et rationalem) habet anima antequam corpori misceatur. Sed nulla potentia sensitivae partis est animae tantum, sed coniuncti, ut supra dictum est. Ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt in voluntate, quae est appetitus intellectivus. Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyssenus, dicit, quod irrationalis pars animae dividitur in desiderativum et irascitivum; et idem dicit Damascenus, in libro II. Et philosophus dicit, in III de Anima quod voluntas in ratione est, in irrationali autem parte animae concupiscentia et ira, vel desiderium et animus. Respondeo dicendum quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis non sunt partes intellectivi appetitus, qui dicitur voluntas. Quia, sicut supra dictum est, potentia quae ordinatur ad aliquod obiectum secundum communem rationem, non diversificatur per differentias speciales sub illa ratione communi contentas. Sicut quia visus respicit visibile secundum rationem colorati, non multiplicantur visivae potentiae secundum diversas species colorum, si autem esset aliqua potentia quae esset albi inquantum est album, et non inquantum est coloratum, diversificaretur a potentia quae esset nigri inquantum est nigrum. Appetitus autem sensitivus non respicit communem rationem boni, quia nec sensus apprehendit universale. Et ideo secundum diversas rationes particularium bonorum, diversificantur partes appetitus sensitivi, nam con-

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite, which is the will. For the concupiscible power is so called from concupiscere (to desire), and the irascible part from irasci (to be angry). But there is a concupiscence which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual, which is the will; as the concupiscence of wisdom, of which it is said (Wis 6:21): The concupiscence of wisdom bringeth to the eternal kingdom. There is also a certain anger which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual; as when our anger is directed against vice. Wherefore Jerome commenting on Matt. 13:33 warns us to have the hatred of vice in the irascible part. Therefore we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts of the intellectual soul as well as in the sensitive. Obj. 2: Further, as is commonly said, charity is in the concupiscible, and hope in the irascible part. But they cannot be in the sensitive appetite, because their objects are not sensible, but intellectual. Therefore we must assign an irascible and concupiscible power to the intellectual part. Obj. 3: Further, it is said (De Spiritu et Anima) that the soul has these powers—namely, the irascible, concupiscible, and rational—‘before it is united to the body.’ But no power of the sensitive part belongs to the soul alone, but to the soul and body united, as we have said above (Q. 78, AA. 5, 8). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible powers are in the will, which is the intellectual appetite. On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) says that the irrational part of the soul is divided into the desiderative and irascible, and Damascene says the same (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). And the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9) that the will is in reason, while in the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and anger, or desire and animus. I answer that, The irascible and concupiscible are not parts of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. Because, as was said above (Q. 59, A. 4; Q. 79, A. 7), a power which is directed to an object according to some common notion is not differentiated by special differences which are contained under that common notion. For instance, because sight regards the visible thing under the common notion of something colored, the visual power is not multiplied according to the different kinds of color: but if there were a power regarding white as white, and not as something colored, it would be distinct from a power regarding black as black. Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common notion of good, because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. And therefore the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by the different notions of

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cupiscibilis respicit propriam rationem boni, inquantum est delectabile secundum sensum, et conveniens naturae; irascibilis autem respicit rationem boni, secundum quod est repulsivum et impugnativum eius quod infert nocumentum. Sed voluntas respicit bonum sub communi ratione boni. Et ideo non diversificantur in ipsa, quae est appetitus intellectivus, aliquae potentiae appetitivae, ut sit in appetitu intellectivo alia potentia irascibilis, et alia concupiscibilis, sicut etiam ex parte intellectus non multiplicantur vires apprehensivae, licet multiplicentur ex parte sensus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod amor, concupiscentia, et huiusmodi, dupliciter accipiuntur. Quandoque quidem secundum quod sunt quaedam passiones, cum quadam scilicet concitatione animi provenientes. Et sic communiter accipiuntur, et hoc modo sunt solum in appetitu sensitivo. Alio modo significant simplicem affectum, absque passione vel animi concitatione. Et sic sunt actus voluntatis. Et hoc etiam modo attribuuntur angelis et Deo. Sed prout sic accipiuntur, non pertinent ad diversas potentias, sed ad unam tantum potentiam, quae dicitur voluntas. Ad secundum dicendum quod ipsa voluntas potest dici irascibilis, prout vult impugnare malum, non ex impetu passionis, sed ex iudicio rationis. Et eodem modo potest dici concupiscibilis, propter desiderium boni. Et sic in irascibili et concupiscibili sunt caritas et spes; idest in voluntate secundum quod habet ordinem ad huiusmodi actus. Sic etiam potest intelligi quod dicitur in libro de Spiritu et Anima, quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt animae antequam uniatur corpori (ut tamen intelligatur ordo naturae, et non temporis), licet non sit necessarium verbis illius libri fidem adhibere. Unde patet solutio ad tertium.

Q. 82, A. 5

particular good: for the concupiscible regards as proper to it the notion of good, as something pleasant to the senses and suitable to nature: whereas the irascible regards the notion of good as something that wards off and repels what is hurtful. But the will regards good according to the common notion of good, and therefore in the will, which is the intellectual appetite, there is no differentiation of appetitive powers, so that there be in the intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from a concupiscible power: just as neither on the part of the intellect are the apprehensive powers multiplied, although they are on the part of the senses. Reply Obj. 1: Love, concupiscence, and the like can be understood in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions—arising, that is, with a certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are commonly understood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive appetite. They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they are simple affections without passion or commotion of the soul, and thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they are attributed to the angels and to God. But if taken in this sense, they do not belong to different powers, but only to one power, which is called the will. Reply Obj. 2: The will itself may be said to be irascible, as far as it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden movement of a passion, but from a judgment of the reason. And in the same way the will may be said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good. And thus in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope—that is, in the will as ordered to such acts. And in this way, too, we may understand the words quoted (De Spiritu et Anima); that the irascible and concupiscible powers are in the soul before it is united to the body (as long as we understand priority of nature, and not of time), although there is no need to have faith in what that book says. Whence the answer to the third objection is clear.

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Question 83 Free Will Deinde quaeritur de libero arbitrio. Et circa hoc We now inquire concerning free-will. Under this head quaeruntur quatuor. there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum homo sit liberi arbitrii. (1) Whether man has free-will? Secundo, quid sit liberum arbitrium, utrum sit (2) What is free-will—a power, an act, or a habit? potentia, vel actus, vel habitus. Tertio si est potentia, utrum sit appetitiva, vel (3) If it is a power, is it appetitive or cognitive? cognitiva. Quarto, si est appetitiva, utrum sit eadem potentia (4) If it is appetitive, is it the same power as the will, or cum voluntate, vel alia. distinct?

Article 1 Whether man has free-will? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non sit liberi arbitrii. Quicumque enim est liberi arbitrii, facit quod vult. Sed homo non facit quod vult, dicitur enim Rom. VII, non enim quod volo bonum, hoc ago; sed quod odi malum, illud facio. Ergo homo non est liberi arbitrii. Praeterea, quicumque est liberi arbitrii, eius est velle et non velle, operari et non operari. Sed hoc non est hominis, dicitur enim ad Rom. IX, non est volentis, scilicet velle, neque currentis, scilicet currere. Ergo homo non est liberi arbitrii. Praeterea, liberum est quod sui causa est, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Quod ergo movetur ab alio, non est liberum. Sed Deus movet voluntatem, dicitur enim Prov. XXI, cor regis in manu Dei, et quocumque voluerit vertet illud; et Philipp. II, Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere. Ergo homo non est liberi arbitrii. Praeterea, quicumque est liberi arbitrii, est dominus suorum actuum. Sed homo non est dominus suorum actuum, quia, ut dicitur Ierem. X, non est in homine via eius, nec viri est ut dirigat gressus suos. Ergo homo non est liberi arbitrii. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei. Sed non est in potestate nostra aliquales esse, sed hoc nobis est a natura. Ergo naturale est nobis quod aliquem finem sequamur. Non ergo ex libero arbitrio.

Objection 1: It would seem that man has not free-will. For whoever has free-will does what he wills. But man does not what he wills; for it is written (Rom 7:19): For the good which I will I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do. Therefore man has not free-will. Obj. 2: Further, whoever has free-will has in his power to will or not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not in man’s power: for it is written (Rom 9:16): It is not of him that willeth—namely, to will—‘nor of him that runneth’— namely, to run. Therefore man has not free-will. Obj. 3: Further, what is free is cause of itself, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). Therefore what is moved by another is not free. But God moves the will, for it is written (Prov 21:1): The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it and (Phil. 2:13): It is God Who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish. Therefore man has not free-will. Obj. 4: Further, whoever has free-will is master of his own actions. But man is not master of his own actions: for it is written (Jer 10:23): The way of a man is not his: neither is it in a man to walk. Therefore man has not free-will.

Obj. 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): According as each one is, such does the end seem to him. But it is not in our power to be of one quality or another; for this comes to us from nature. Therefore it is natural to us to follow some particular end, and therefore we are not free in so doing. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XV, Deus ab iniOn the contrary, It is written (Sir 15:14): God made tio constituit hominem, et reliquit eum in manu consilii man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own sui. Glossa, idest in libertate arbitrii. counsel; and the gloss adds: That is of his free-will.

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Respondeo dicendum quod homo est liberi arbitrii, alioquin frustra essent consilia, exhortationes, praecepta, prohibitiones, praemia et poenae. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod quaedam agunt absque iudicio, sicut lapis movetur deorsum; et similiter omnia cognitione carentia. Quaedam autem agunt iudicio, sed non libero; sicut animalia bruta. Iudicat enim ovis videns lupum, eum esse fugiendum, naturali iudicio, et non libero, quia non ex collatione, sed ex naturali instinctu hoc iudicat. Et simile est de quolibet iudicio brutorum animalium. Sed homo agit iudicio, quia per vim cognoscitivam iudicat aliquid esse fugiendum vel prosequendum. Sed quia iudicium istud non est ex naturali instinctu in particulari operabili, sed ex collatione quadam rationis; ideo agit libero iudicio, potens in diversa ferri. Ratio enim circa contingentia habet viam ad opposita; ut patet in dialecticis syllogismis, et rhetoricis persuasionibus. Particularia autem operabilia sunt quaedam contingentia, et ideo circa ea iudicium rationis ad diversa se habet, et non est determinatum ad unum. Et pro tanto necesse est quod homo sit liberi arbitrii, ex hoc ipso quod rationalis est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, appetitus sensitivus, etsi obediat rationi, tamen potest in aliquo repugnare, concupiscendo contra illud quod ratio dictat. Hoc ergo est bonum quod homo non facit cum vult, scilicet non concupiscere contra rationem, ut Glossa Augustini ibidem dicit. Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum illud apostoli non sic est intelligendum quasi homo non velit et non currat libero arbitrio, sed quia liberum arbitrium ad hoc non est sufficiens, nisi moveatur et iuvetur a Deo. Ad tertium dicendum quod liberum arbitrium est causa sui motus, quia homo per liberum arbitrium seipsum movet ad agendum. Non tamen hoc est de necessitate libertatis, quod sit prima causa sui id quod liberum est, sicut nec ad hoc quod aliquid sit causa alterius, requiritur quod sit prima causa eius. Deus igitur est prima causa movens et naturales causas et voluntarias. Et sicut naturalibus causis, movendo eas, non aufert quin actus earum sint naturales; ita movendo causas voluntarias, non aufert quin actiones earum sint voluntariae, sed potius hoc in eis facit, operatur enim in unoquoque secundum eius proprietatem. Ad quartum dicendum quod dicitur non esse in homine via eius, quantum ad executiones electionum, in quibus homo impediri potest, velit nolit. Electiones autem ipsae sunt in nobis, supposito tamen divino auxilio. Ad quintum dicendum quod qualitas hominis est duplex, una naturalis, et alia superveniens. Naturalis autem qualitas accipi potest vel circa partem intellectivam; vel circa corpus et virtutes corpori annexas. Ex eo igitur quod homo est aliqualis qualitate naturali quae atten-

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I answer that, Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will. Reply Obj. 1: As we have said above (Q. 81, A. 3, ad 2), the sensitive appetite, though it obeys the reason, yet in a given case can resist by desiring what the reason forbids. This is therefore the good which man does not when he wishes—namely, not to desire against reason, as Augustine says. Reply Obj. 2: Those words of the Apostle are not to be taken as though man does not wish or does not run of his free-will, but because the free-will is not sufficient thereto unless it be moved and helped by God. Reply Obj. 3: Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature. Reply Obj. 4: Man’s way is said not to be his in the execution of his choice, wherein he may be impeded, whether he will or not. The choice itself, however, is in us, but presupposes the help of God. Reply Obj. 5: Quality in man is of two kinds: natural and adventitious. Now the natural quality may be in the intellectual part, or in the body and its powers. From the very fact, therefore, that man is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the intellectual part, he naturally desires his

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ditur secundum intellectivam partem, naturaliter homo appetit ultimum finem, scilicet beatitudinem. Qui quidem appetitus naturalis est, et non subiacet libero arbitrio, ut ex supradictis patet. Ex parte vero corporis et virtutum corpori annexarum, potest esse homo aliqualis naturali qualitate, secundum quod est talis complexionis, vel talis dispositionis, ex quacumque impressione corporearum causarum, quae non possunt in intellectivam partem imprimere, eo quod non est alicuius corporis actus. Sic igitur qualis unusquisque est secundum corpoream qualitatem, talis finis videtur ei, quia ex huiusmodi dispositione homo inclinatur ad eligendum aliquid vel repudiandum. Sed istae inclinationes subiacent iudicio rationis, cui obedit inferior appetitus, ut dictum est. Unde per hoc libertati arbitrii non praeiudicatur. Qualitates autem supervenientes sunt sicut habitus et passiones, secundum quae aliquis magis inclinatur in unum quam in alterum. Tamen istae etiam inclinationes subiacent iudicio rationis. Et huiusmodi etiam qualitates ei subiacent, inquantum in nobis est tales qualitates acquirere, vel causaliter vel dispositive, vel a nobis excludere. Et sic nihil est quod libertati arbitrii repugnet.

Q. 83, A. 2

last end, which is happiness. Which desire, indeed, is a natural desire, and is not subject to free-will, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. 82, AA. 1, 2). But on the part of the body and its powers man may be such by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such a temperament or disposition due to any impression whatever produced by corporeal causes, which cannot affect the intellectual part, since it is not the act of a corporeal organ. And such as a man is by virtue of a corporeal quality, such also does his end seem to him, because from such a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject something. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason, which the lower appetite obeys, as we have said (Q. 81, A. 3). Wherefore this is in no way prejudicial to free-will. The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by virtue of which a man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. And yet even these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such qualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is in our power either to acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them, or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is repugnant to free-will.

Article 2 Whether free-will is a power? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod liberum arbitrium non sit potentia. Arbitrium enim liberum nihil est aliud quam liberum iudicium. Iudicium autem non nominat potentiam, sed actum. Ergo liberum arbitrium non est potentia. Praeterea, liberum arbitrium dicitur esse facultas voluntatis et rationis. Facultas autem nominat facilitatem potestatis, quae quidem est per habitum. Ergo liberum arbitrium est habitus. Bernardus etiam dicit quod liberum arbitrium est habitus animae liber sui. Non ergo est potentia. Praeterea, nulla potentia naturalis tollitur per peccatum. Sed liberum arbitrium tollitur per peccatum, Augustinus enim dicit quod homo male utens libero arbitrio, et se perdit et ipsum. Ergo liberum arbitrium non est potentia. Sed contra est quod nihil est subiectum habitus, ut videtur, nisi potentia. Sed liberum arbitrium est subiectum gratiae; qua sibi assistente, bonum eligit. Ergo liberum arbitrium est potentia. Respondeo dicendum quod, quamvis liberum arbitrium nominet quendam actum secundum propriam significationem vocabuli; secundum tamen communem usum loquendi, liberum arbitrium dicimus id quod est huius actus principium, scilicet quo homo libere iudicat.

Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is not a power. For free-will is nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an act, not a power. Therefore freewill is not a power. Obj. 2: Further, free-will is defined as the faculty of the will and reason. But faculty denominates a facility of power, which is due to a habit. Therefore free-will is a habit. Moreover Bernard says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. 1,2) that free-will is the soul’s habit of disposing of itself. Therefore it is not a power. Obj. 3: Further, no natural power is forfeited through sin. But free-will is forfeited through sin; for Augustine says that man, by abusing free-will, loses both it and himself. Therefore free-will is not a power. On the contrary, Nothing but a power, seemingly, is the subject of a habit. But free-will is the subject of grace, by the help of which it chooses what is good. Therefore freewill is a power. I answer that, Although free-will in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of speaking we call free-will, that which is the principle of the act by which man judges freely. Now in us the principle of an act is both power and habit; for we say that we know something both

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Principium autem actus in nobis est et potentia et habitus, dicimur enim aliquid cognoscere et per scientiam, et per intellectivam potentiam. Oportet ergo quod liberum arbitrium vel sit potentia, vel sit habitus, vel sit potentia cum aliquo habitu. Quod autem non sit habitus, neque potentia cum habitu, manifeste apparet ex duobus. Primo quidem, quia si est habitus, oportet quod sit habitus naturalis, hoc enim est naturale homini, quod sit liberi arbitrii. Nullus autem habitus naturalis adest nobis ad ea quae subsunt libero arbitrio, quia ad ea respectu quorum habemus habitus naturales, naturaliter inclinamur, sicut ad assentiendum primis principiis; ea autem ad quae naturaliter inclinamur, non subsunt libero arbitrio, sicut dictum est de appetitu beatitudinis. Unde contra propriam rationem liberi arbitrii est, quod sit habitus naturalis. Contra naturalitatem autem eius est, quod sit habitus non naturalis. Et sic relinquitur quod nullo modo sit habitus. Secundo hoc apparet, quia habitus dicuntur secundum quos nos habemus ad passiones vel ad actus bene vel male, ut dicitur in II Ethic., nam per temperantiam bene nos habemus ad concupiscentias, per intemperantiam autem male; per scientiam etiam bene nos habemus ad actum intellectus, dum verum cognoscimus per habitum autem contrarium male. Liberum autem arbitrium indifferenter se habet ad bene eligendum vel male. Unde impossibile est quod liberum arbitrium sit habitus. Relinquitur ergo quod sit potentia. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod consuetum est potentiam significari nomine actus. Et sic per hunc actum qui est liberum iudicium, nominatur potentia quae est huius actus principium. Alioquin, si liberum arbitrium nominaret actum, non semper maneret in homine. Ad secundum dicendum quod facultas nominat quandoque potestatem expeditam ad operandum. Et sic facultas ponitur in definitione liberi arbitrii. Bernardus autem accipit habitum non secundum quod dividitur contra potentiam, sed secundum quod significat habitudinem quandam, qua aliquo modo se aliquis habet ad actum. Quod quidem est tam per potentiam quam per habitum, nam per potentiam homo se habet ut potens operari, per habitum autem ut aptus ad operandum bene vel male. Ad tertium dicendum quod homo peccando liberum arbitrium dicitur perdidisse, non quantum ad libertatem naturalem, quae est a coactione; sed quantum ad libertatem quae est a culpa et a miseria. De qua infra in tractatu moralium dicetur, in secunda parte huius operis.

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by knowledge and by the intellectual power. Therefore freewill must be either a power or a habit, or a power with a habit. That it is neither a habit nor a power together with a habit, can be clearly proved in two ways. First of all, because, if it is a habit, it must be a natural habit; for it is natural to man to have a free-will. But there is not natural habit in us with respect to those things which come under freewill: for we are naturally inclined to those things of which we have natural habits—for instance, to assent to first principles: while those things to which we are naturally inclined are not subject to free-will, as we have said of the desire of happiness (Q. 82, AA. 1, 2). Wherefore it is against the very notion of free-will that it should be a natural habit. And that it should be a non-natural habit is against its nature. Therefore in no sense is it a habit.

Second, this is clear because habits are defined as that by reason of which we are well or ill disposed with regard to actions and passions (Ethic. ii, 5); for by temperance we are well-disposed as regards concupiscences, and by intemperance ill-disposed: and by knowledge we are well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we know the truth, and by the contrary ill-disposed. But the free-will is indifferent to good and evil choice: wherefore it is impossible for free-will to be a habit. Therefore it is a power. Reply Obj. 1: It is not unusual for a power to be named from its act. And so from this act, which is a free judgment, is named the power which is the principle of this act. Otherwise, if free-will denominated an act, it would not always remain in man. Reply Obj. 2: Faculty sometimes denominates a power ready for operation, and in this sense faculty is used in the definition of free-will. But Bernard takes habit, not as divided against power, but as signifying a certain aptitude by which a man has some sort of relation to an act. And this may be both by a power and by a habit: for by a power man is, as it were, empowered to do the action, and by the habit he is apt to act well or ill.

Reply Obj. 3: Man is said to have lost free-will by falling into sin, not as to natural liberty, which is freedom from coercion, but as regards freedom from fault and unhappiness. Of this we shall treat later in the treatise on Morals in the second part of this work (I-II, Q. 85, seqq.; Q. 109).

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Q. 83, A. 3

Article 3 Whether free-will is an appetitive power, or cognitive? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod liberum arbitrium non sit potentia appetitiva, sed cognitiva. Dicit enim Damascenus quod cum rationali confestim comitatur liberum arbitrium. Sed ratio est potentia cognitiva. Ergo liberum arbitrium est potentia cognitiva. Praeterea, liberum arbitrium dicitur quasi liberum iudicium. Sed iudicare est actus cognitivae virtutis. Ergo liberum arbitrium est cognitiva potentia. Praeterea, ad liberum arbitrium praecipue pertinet electio. Sed electio videtur ad cognitionem pertinere, quia electio importat quandam comparationem unius ad alterum, quod est proprium cognitivae virtutis. Ergo liberum arbitrium est potentia cognitiva. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod electio est desiderium eorum quae sunt in nobis. Sed desiderium est actus appetitivae virtutis. Ergo et electio. Liberum autem arbitrium est secundum quod eligimus. Ergo liberum arbitrium est virtus appetitiva. Respondeo dicendum quod proprium liberi arbitrii est electio, ex hoc enim liberi arbitrii esse dicimur, quod possumus unum recipere, alio recusato, quod est eligere. Et ideo naturam liberi arbitrii ex electione considerare oportet. Ad electionem autem concurrit aliquid ex parte cognitivae virtutis, et aliquid ex parte appetitivae, ex parte quidem cognitivae, requiritur consilium, per quod diiudicatur quid sit alteri praeferendum; ex parte autem appetitivae, requiritur quod appetendo acceptetur id quod per consilium diiudicatur. Et ideo Aristoteles in VI Ethic. sub dubio derelinquit utrum principalius pertineat electio ad vim appetitivam, vel ad vim cognitivam, dicit enim quod electio vel est intellectus appetitivus, vel appetitus intellectivus. Sed in III Ethic. in hoc magis declinat quod sit appetitus intellectivus, nominans electionem desiderium consiliabile. Et huius ratio est, quia proprium obiectum electionis est illud quod est ad finem, hoc autem, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem boni quod dicitur utile, unde cum bonum, inquantum huiusmodi, sit obiectum appetitus, sequitur quod electio sit principaliter actus appetitivae virtutis. Et sic liberum arbitrium est appetitiva potentia. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod potentiae appetitivae concomitantur apprehensivas. Et secundum hoc dicit Damascenus quod cum rationali confestim comitatur liberum arbitrium. Ad secundum dicendum quod iudicium est quasi conclusio et determinatio consilii. Determinatur autem consilium, primo quidem per sententiam rationis, et secundo per acceptationem appetitus, unde philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod ex consiliari iudicantes desidera-

Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is not an appetitive, but a cognitive power. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 27) says that free-will straightway accompanies the rational nature. But reason is a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power. Obj. 2: Further, free-will is so called as though it were a free judgment. But to judge is an act of a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power. Obj. 3: Further, the principal function of free-will is to choose. But choice seems to belong to knowledge, because it implies a certain comparison of one thing to another, which belongs to the cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that choice is the desire of those things which are in us. But desire is an act of the appetitive power: therefore choice is also. But free-will is that by which we choose. Therefore free-will is an appetitive power. I answer that, The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say that we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing another; and this is to choose. Therefore we must consider the nature of free-will, by considering the nature of choice. Now two things concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred to another: and on the part of the appetitive power, it is required that the appetite should accept the judgment of counsel. Therefore Aristotle (Ethic. vi, 2) leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs principally to the appetitive or the cognitive power: since he says that choice is either an appetitive intellect or an intellectual appetite. But (Ethic. iii, 3) he inclines to its being an intellectual appetite when he describes choice as a desire proceeding from counsel. And the reason of this is because the proper object of choice is the means to the end: and this, as such, is in the nature of that good which is called useful: wherefore since good, as such, is the object of the appetite, it follows that choice is principally an act of the appetitive power. And thus free-will is an appetitive power. Reply Obj. 1: The appetitive powers accompany the apprehensive, and in this sense Damascene says that freewill straightway accompanies the rational power. Reply Obj. 2: Judgment, as it were, concludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; second, by the acceptation of the appetite: whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3) says that, having formed a judgment by counsel, we desire in accordance

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Man

mus secundum consilium. Et hoc modo ipsa electio dicitur quoddam iudicium, a quo nominatur liberum arbitrium. Ad tertium dicendum quod ista collatio quae importatur in nomine electionis, pertinet ad consilium praecedens, quod est rationis. Appetitus enim, quamvis non sit collativus, tamen inquantum a vi cognitiva conferente movetur, habet quandam collationis similitudinem, dum unum alteri praeoptat.

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with that counsel. And in this sense choice itself is a judgment from which free-will takes its name. Reply Obj. 3: This comparison which is implied in the choice belongs to the preceding counsel, which is an act of reason. For though the appetite does not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some likeness of comparison by choosing one in preference to another.

Article 4 Whether free-will is a power distinct from the will? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod liberum arbitrium sit alia potentia a voluntate. Dicit enim Damascenus, in libro II, quod aliud est thelesis, aliud vero bulesis, thelesis autem est voluntas; bulesis autem videtur arbitrium liberum, quia bulesis, secundum ipsum, est voluntas quae est circa aliquid quasi unius per comparationem ad alterum. Ergo videtur quod liberum arbitrium sit alia potentia a voluntate. Praeterea, potentiae cognoscuntur per actus. Sed electio, quae est actus liberi arbitrii, est aliud a voluntate, ut dicitur in III Ethic., quia voluntas est de fine, electio autem de iis quae sunt ad finem. Ergo liberum arbitrium est alia potentia a voluntate. Praeterea, voluntas est appetitus intellectivus. Sed ex parte intellectus sunt duae potentiae, scilicet agens et possibilis. Ergo etiam ex parte appetitus intellectivi debet esse alia potentia praeter voluntatem. Et haec non videtur esse nisi liberum arbitrium. Ergo liberum arbitrium est alia potentia praeter voluntatem. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod liberum arbitrium nihil aliud est quam voluntas. Respondeo dicendum quod potentias appetitivas oportet esse proportionatas potentiis apprehensivis, ut supra dictum est. Sicut autem ex parte apprehensionis intellectivae se habent intellectus et ratio, ita ex parte appetitus intellectivi se habent voluntas et liberum arbitrium, quod nihil aliud est quam vis electiva. Et hoc patet ex habitudine obiectorum et actuum. Nam intelligere importat simplicem acceptionem alicuius rei, unde intelligi dicuntur proprie principia, quae sine collatione per seipsa cognoscuntur. Ratiocinari autem proprie est devenire ex uno in cognitionem alterius, unde proprie de conclusionibus ratiocinamur, quae ex principiis innotescunt. Similiter ex parte appetitus, velle importat simplicem appetitum alicuius rei, unde voluntas dicitur esse de fine, qui propter se appetitur. Eligere autem est appetere aliquid propter alterum consequendum, unde proprie est eorum quae sunt ad finem. Sicut autem se ha-

Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is a power distinct from the will. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that thelesis is one thing and boulesis another. But thelesis is the will, while boulesis seems to be the free-will, because boulesis, according to him, is will as concerning an object by way of comparison between two things. Therefore it seems that free-will is a distinct power from the will. Obj. 2: Further, powers are known by their acts. But choice, which is the act of free-will, is distinct from the act of willing, because the act of the will regards the end, whereas choice regards the means to the end (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will. Obj. 3: Further, the will is the intellectual appetite. But in the intellect there are two powers—the active and the passive. Therefore, also on the part of the intellectual appetite, there must be another power besides the will. And this, seemingly, can only be free-will. Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) free-will is nothing else than the will. I answer that, The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above (Q. 64, A. 2). Now, as on the part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite we have will, and free-will which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is clear from their relations to their respective objects and acts. For the act of understanding implies the simple acceptation of something; whence we say that we understand first principles, which are known of themselves without any comparison. But to reason, properly speaking, is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another: wherefore, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions, which are known from the principles. In like manner, on the part of the appetite, to will implies the simple appetite for something: wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself. But to choose is to desire something for the sake

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bet in cognitivis principium ad conclusionem, cui propter principia assentimus; ita in appetitivis se habet finis ad ea quae sunt ad finem, quae propter finem appetuntur. Unde manifestum est quod sicut se habet intellectus ad rationem, ita se habet voluntas ad vim electivam, idest ad liberum arbitrium. Ostensum est autem supra quod eiusdem potentiae est intelligere et ratiocinari, sicut eiusdem virtutis est quiescere et moveri. Unde etiam eiusdem potentiae est velle et eligere. Et propter hoc voluntas et liberum arbitrium non sunt duae potentiae, sed una.

of obtaining something else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means to the end. Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles are related to the conclusion to which we assent on account of the principles: just as, in appetitive matters, the end is related to the means, which is desired on account of the end. Wherefore it is evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is free-will. But it has been shown above (Q. 79, A. 8) that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose: and on this account the will and the free-will are not two powers, but one. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bulesis distinguiReply Obj. 1: Boulesis is distinct from thelesis on actur a thelesi, non propter diversitatem potentiarum, sed count of a distinction, not of powers, but of acts.

propter differentiam actuum. Ad secundum dicendum quod electio et voluntas, idest ipsum velle, sunt diversi actus, sed tamen pertinent ad unam potentiam, sicut etiam intelligere et ratiocinari, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod intellectus comparatur ad voluntatem ut movens. Et ideo non oportet in voluntate distinguere agens et possibile.

Reply Obj. 2: Choice and will—that is, the act of willing—are different acts: yet they belong to the same power, as also to understand and to reason, as we have said. Reply Obj. 3: The intellect is compared to the will as moving the will. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an active and a passive will.

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Question 84 The Soul’s Knowledge When Joined to the Body Consequenter considerandum est de actibus animae, quantum ad potentias intellectivas et appetitivas, aliae enim animae potentiae non pertinent directe ad considerationem theologi. Actus autem appetitivae partis ad considerationem moralis scientiae pertinent, et ideo in secunda parte huius operis de eis tractabitur, in qua considerandum erit de morali materia.

We now have to consider the acts of the soul in regard to the intellectual and the appetitive powers: for the other powers of the soul do not come directly under the consideration of the theologian. Furthermore, the acts of the appetitive part of the soul come under the consideration of the science of morals; wherefore we shall treat of them in the second part of this work, to which the consideration of moral matters belongs. But of the acts of the intellectual part we shall treat now. In treating of these acts we shall proceed in the following order: First, we shall inquire how the soul understands when united to the body; second, how it understands when separated therefrom. The former of these inquiries will be threefold: (1) How the soul understands bodies which are beneath it; (2) How it understands itself and things contained in itself; (3) How it understands immaterial substances, which are above it.

Nunc autem de actibus intellectivae partis agetur. In consideratione vero actuum, hoc modo procedemus, primo namque considerandum est quomodo intelligit anima corpori coniuncta; secundo, quomodo intelligit a corpore separata. Prima autem consideratio erit tripartita, primo namque considerabitur quomodo anima intelligit corporalia, quae sunt infra ipsam; secundo, quomodo intelligit seipsam, et ea quae in ipsa sunt; tertio, quomodo intelligit substantias immateriales, quae sunt supra ipsam. Circa cognitionem vero corporalium, tria consideIn treating of the knowledge of corporeal things there randa occurrunt, primo quidem per quid ea cognoscit; are three points to be considered: (1) Through what does secundo, quomodo et quo ordine; tertio, quid in eis co- the soul know them? (2) How and in what order does it gnoscit. know them? (3) What does it know in them? Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum anima cognoscat corpora per (1) Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellectum. intellect? Secundo, utrum intelligat ea per essentiam suam, vel (2) Whether it understands them through its essence, per aliquas species. or through any species? Tertio, si per aliquas species, utrum species omnium (3) If through some species, whether the species of all intelligibilium sint ei naturaliter innatae. things intelligible are naturally innate in the soul? Quarto, utrum effluant in ipsam ab aliquibus formis (4) Whether these species are derived by the soul from immaterialibus separatis. certain separate immaterial forms? Quinto, utrum anima nostra omnia quae intelligit, (5) Whether our soul sees in the eternal ideas all that it videat in rationibus aeternis. understands? Sexto, utrum cognitionem intelligibilem acquirat a (6) Whether it acquires intellectual knowledge from sensu. the senses? Septimo, utrum intellectus possit actu intelligere per (7) Whether the intellect can, through the species of species intelligibiles quas penes se habet, non which it is possessed, actually understand, without convertendo se ad phantasmata. turning to the phantasms? Octavo, utrum iudicium intellectus impediatur per (8) Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered impedimentum sensitivarum virtutum. by an obstacle in the sensitive powers?

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Article 1 Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima non cognoscat corpora per intellectum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in II Soliloq. quod corpora intellectu comprehendi non possunt; nec aliquod corporeum nisi sensibus videri potest. Dicit etiam, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod visio intellectualis est eorum quae sunt per essentiam suam in anima. Huiusmodi autem non sunt corpora. Ergo anima per intellectum corpora cognoscere non potest. Praeterea, sicut se habet sensus ad intelligibilia, ita se habet intellectus ad sensibilia. Sed anima per sensum nullo modo potest cognoscere spiritualia, quae sunt intelligibilia. Ergo nullo modo per intellectum potest cognoscere corpora, quae sunt sensibilia. Praeterea, intellectus est necessariorum et semper eodem modo se habentium. Sed corpora omnia sunt mobilia, et non eodem modo se habentia. Anima ergo per intellectum corpora cognoscere non potest. Sed contra est quod scientia est in intellectu. Si ergo intellectus non cognoscit corpora, sequitur quod nulla scientia sit de corporibus. Et sic peribit scientia naturalis, quae est de corpore mobili. Respondeo dicendum, ad evidentiam huius quaestionis, quod primi philosophi qui de naturis rerum inquisiverunt, putaverunt nihil esse in mundo praeter corpus. Et quia videbant omnia corpora mobilia esse, et putabant ea in continuo fluxu esse, aestimaverunt quod nulla certitudo de rerum veritate haberi posset a nobis. Quod enim est in continuo fluxu, per certitudinem apprehendi non potest, quia prius labitur quam mente diiudicetur, sicut Heraclitus dixit quod non est possibile aquam fluvii currentis bis tangere, ut recitat philosophus in IV Metaphys. His autem superveniens Plato, ut posset salvare certam cognitionem veritatis a nobis per intellectum haberi, posuit praeter ista corporalia aliud genus entium a materia et motu separatum, quod nominabat species sive ideas, per quarum participationem unumquodque istorum singularium et sensibilium dicitur vel homo vel equus vel aliquid huiusmodi. Sic ergo dicebat scientias et definitiones et quidquid ad actum intellectus pertinet, non referri ad ista corpora sensibilia, sed ad illa immaterialia et separata; ut sic anima non intelligat ista corporalia, sed intelligat horum corporalium species separatas. Sed hoc dupliciter apparet falsum. Primo quidem quia, cum illae species sint immateriales et immobiles, excluderetur a scientiis cognitio motus et materiae (quod est proprium scientiae naturalis) et demonstratio

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul does not know bodies through the intellect. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 4) that bodies cannot be understood by the intellect; nor indeed anything corporeal unless it can be perceived by the senses. He says also (Gen ad lit. xii, 24) that intellectual vision is of those things that are in the soul by their essence. But such are not bodies. Therefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect. Obj. 2: Further, as sense is to the intelligible, so is the intellect to the sensible. But the soul can by no means, through the senses, understand spiritual things, which are intelligible. Therefore by no means can it, through the intellect, know bodies, which are sensible. Obj. 3: Further, the intellect is concerned with things that are necessary and unchangeable. But all bodies are mobile and changeable. Therefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect. On the contrary, Science is in the intellect. If, therefore, the intellect does not know bodies, it follows that there is no science of bodies; and thus perishes natural science, which treats of mobile bodies. I answer that, It should be said in order to elucidate this question, that the early philosophers, who inquired into the natures of things, thought there was nothing in the world save bodies. And because they observed that all bodies are mobile, and considered them to be ever in a state of flux, they were of opinion that we can have no certain knowledge of the true nature of things. For what is in a continual state of flux, cannot be grasped with any degree of certitude, for it passes away ere the mind can form a judgment thereon: according to the saying of Heraclitus, that it is not possible twice to touch a drop of water in a passing torrent, as the Philosopher relates (Metaph. iv, Did. iii, 5). After these came Plato, who, wishing to save the certitude of our knowledge of truth through the intellect, maintained that, besides these things corporeal, there is another genus of beings, separate from matter and movement, which beings he called species or ideas, by participation of which each one of these singular and sensible things is said to be either a man, or a horse, or the like. Wherefore he said that sciences and definitions, and whatever appertains to the act of the intellect, are not referred to these sensible bodies, but to those beings immaterial and separate: so that according to this the soul does not understand these corporeal things, but the separate species thereof. Now this may be shown to be false for two reasons. First, because, since those species are immaterial and immovable, knowledge of movement and matter would be excluded from science (which knowledge is proper to natural sci-

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per causas moventes et materiales. Secundo autem, quia derisibile videtur ut, dum rerum quae nobis manifestae sunt notitiam quaerimus, alia entia in medium afferamus, quae non possunt esse earum substantiae, cum ab eis differant secundum esse, et sic, illis substantiis separatis cognitis, non propter hoc de istis sensibilibus iudicare possemus. Videtur autem in hoc Plato deviasse a veritate, quia, cum aestimaret omnem cognitionem per modum alicuius similitudinis esse, credidit quod forma cogniti ex necessitate sit in cognoscente eo modo quo est in cognito. Consideravit autem quod forma rei intellectae est in intellectu universaliter et immaterialiter et immobiliter, quod ex ipsa operatione intellectus apparet, qui intelligit universaliter et per modum necessitatis cuiusdam; modus enim actionis est secundum modum formae agentis. Et ideo existimavit quod oporteret res intellectas hoc modo in seipsis subsistere, scilicet immaterialiter et immobiliter.

Hoc autem necessarium non est. Quia etiam in ipsis sensibilibus videmus quod forma alio modo est in uno sensibilium quam in altero, puta cum in uno est albedo intensior, in alio remissior, et in uno est albedo cum dulcedine, in alio sine dulcedine. Et per hunc etiam modum forma sensibilis alio modo est in re quae est extra animam, et alio modo in sensu, qui suscipit formas sensibilium absque materia, sicut colorem auri sine auro. Et similiter intellectus species, corporum, quae sunt materiales et mobiles, recipit immaterialiter et immobiliter, secundum modum suum, nam receptum est in recipiente per modum recipientis. Dicendum est ergo quod anima per intellectum cognoscit corpora cognitione immateriali, universali et necessaria.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum Augustini est intelligendum quantum ad ea quibus intellectus cognoscit, non autem quantum ad ea quae cognoscit. Cognoscit enim corpora intelligendo, sed non per corpora, neque per similitudines materiales et corporeas; sed per species immateriales et intelligibiles, quae per sui essentiam in anima esse possunt. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XXII de Civit. Dei, non est dicendum quod, sicut sensus cognoscit sola corporalia, ita intellectus cognoscit sola spiritualia, quia sequeretur quod Deus et angeli corporalia non cognoscerent. Huius autem diversitatis ratio est, quia inferior virtus non se extendit ad ea quae sunt superioris virtutis; sed virtus superior ea quae sunt inferioris virtutis, excellentiori modo operatur.

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ence), and likewise all demonstration through moving and material causes. Second, because it seems ridiculous, when we seek for knowledge of things which are to us manifest, to introduce other beings, which cannot be the substance of those others, since they differ from them essentially: so that granted that we have a knowledge of those separate substances, we cannot for that reason claim to form a judgment concerning these sensible things. Now it seems that Plato strayed from the truth because, having observed that all knowledge takes place through some kind of similitude, he thought that the form of the thing known must of necessity be in the knower in the same manner as in the thing known. Then he observed that the form of the thing understood is in the intellect under conditions of universality, immateriality, and immobility: which is apparent from the very operation of the intellect, whose act of understanding has a universal extension, and is subject to a certain amount of necessity: for the mode of action corresponds to the mode of the agent’s form. Wherefore he concluded that the things which we understand must have in themselves an existence under the same conditions of immateriality and immobility. But there is no necessity for this. For even in sensible things it is to be observed that the form is otherwise in one sensible than in another: for instance, whiteness may be of great intensity in one, and of a less intensity in another: in one we find whiteness with sweetness, in another without sweetness. In the same way the sensible form is conditioned differently in the thing which is external to the soul, and in the senses which receive the forms of sensible things without receiving matter, such as the color of gold without receiving gold. So also the intellect, according to its own mode, receives under conditions of immateriality and immobility, the species of material and mobile bodies: for the received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver. We must conclude, therefore, that through the intellect the soul knows bodies by a knowledge which is immaterial, universal, and necessary. Reply Obj. 1: These words of Augustine are to be understood as referring to the medium of intellectual knowledge, and not to its object. For the intellect knows bodies by understanding them, not indeed through bodies, nor through material and corporeal species; but through immaterial and intelligible species, which can be in the soul by their own essence. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 29), it is not correct to say that as the sense knows only bodies so the intellect knows only spiritual things; for it follows that God and the angels would not know corporeal things. The reason of this diversity is that the lower power does not extend to those things that belong to the higher power; whereas the higher power operates in a more excellent manner those things which belong to the lower power.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod omnis motus supponit aliquid immobile, cum enim transmutatio fit secundum qualitatem, remanet substantia immobilis; et cum transmutatur forma substantialis, remanet materia immobilis. Rerum etiam mutabilium sunt immobiles habitudines, sicut Socrates etsi non semper sedeat, tamen immobiliter est verum quod, quandocumque sedet, in uno loco manet. Et propter hoc nihil prohibet de rebus mobilibus immobilem scientiam habere.

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Reply Obj. 3: Every movement presupposes something immovable: for when a change of quality occurs, the substance remains unmoved; and when there is a change of substantial form, matter remains unmoved. Moreover the various conditions of mutable things are themselves immovable; for instance, though Socrates be not always sitting, yet it is an immovable truth that whenever he does sit he remains in one place. For this reason there is nothing to hinder our having an immovable science of movable things.

Article 2 Whether the soul understands corporeal things through its essence? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima per essentiam suam corporalia intelligat. Dicit enim Augustinus, X de Trin., quod anima imagines corporum convolvit et rapit factas in semetipsa de semetipsa, dat enim eis formandis quiddam substantiae suae. Sed per similitudines corporum corpora intelligit. Ergo per essentiam suam, quam dat formandis talibus similitudinibus, et de qua eas format, cognoscit corporalia. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III de Anima, quod anima quodammodo est omnia. Cum ergo simile simili cognoscatur, videtur quod anima per seipsam corporalia cognoscat. Praeterea, anima est superior corporalibus creaturis. Inferiora autem sunt in superioribus eminentiori modo quam in seipsis, ut Dionysius dicit. Ergo omnes creaturae corporeae nobiliori modo existunt in ipsa substantia animae quam in seipsis. Per suam ergo substantiam potest creaturas corporeas cognoscere. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, IX de Trin., quod mens corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit. Ipsa autem anima non est cognoscibilis per corporis sensus. Non ergo cognoscit corporea per suam substantiam. Respondeo dicendum quod antiqui philosophi posuerunt quod anima per suam essentiam cognoscit corpora. Hoc enim animis omnium communiter inditum fuit, quod simile simili cognoscitur. Existimabant autem quod forma cogniti sit in cognoscente eo modo quo est in re cognita. E contrario tamen Platonici posuerunt. Plato enim, quia perspexit intellectualem animam immaterialem esse et immaterialiter cognoscere, posuit formas rerum cognitarum immaterialiter subsistere. Priores vero naturales, quia considerabant res cognitas esse corporeas et materiales, posuerunt oportere res cognitas etiam in anima cognoscente materialiter esse. Et ideo, ut animae attribuerent omnium cognitionem, posuerunt eam habere naturam communem cum omni-

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul understands corporeal things through its essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 5) that the soul collects and lays hold of the images of bodies which are formed in the soul and of the soul: for in forming them it gives them something of its own substance. But the soul understands bodies by images of bodies. Therefore the soul knows bodies through its essence, which it employs for the formation of such images, and from which it forms them. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 8) that the soul, after a fashion, is everything. Since, therefore, like is known by like, it seems that the soul knows corporeal things through itself. Obj. 3: Further, the soul is superior to corporeal creatures. Now lower things are in higher things in a more eminent way than in themselves, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii). Therefore all corporeal creatures exist in a more excellent way in the soul than in themselves. Therefore the soul can know corporeal creatures through its essence. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3) that the mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the bodily senses. But the soul itself cannot be known through the bodily senses. Therefore it does not know corporeal things through itself. I answer that, The ancient philosophers held that the soul knows bodies through its essence. For it was universally admitted that like is known by like. But they thought that the form of the thing known is in the knower in the same mode as in the thing known. The Platonists however were of a contrary opinion. For Plato, having observed that the intellectual soul has an immaterial nature, and an immaterial mode of knowledge, held that the forms of things known subsist immaterially. While the earlier natural philosophers, observing that things known are corporeal and material, held that things known must exist materially even in the soul that knows them. And therefore, in order to ascribe to the soul a knowledge of all things, they held that it has the same nature in common with all. And

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bus. Et quia natura principiatorum ex principiis constituitur, attribuerunt animae naturam principii, ita quod qui dixit principium omnium esse ignem, posuit animam esse de natura ignis; et similiter de aere et aqua. Empedocles autem, qui posuit quatuor elementa materialia et duo moventia, ex his etiam dixit animam esse constitutam. Et ita, cum res materialiter in anima ponerent, posuerunt omnem cognitionem animae materialem esse, non discernentes inter intellectum et sensum. Sed haec opinio improbatur. Primo quidem, quia in materiali principio, de quo loquebantur, non existunt principiata nisi in potentia. Non autem cognoscitur aliquid secundum quod est in potentia, sed solum secundum quod est actu, ut patet in IX Metaphys., unde nec ipsa potentia cognoscitur nisi per actum. Sic igitur non sufficeret attribuere animae principiorum naturam ad hoc quod omnia cognosceret, nisi inessent ei naturae et formae singulorum effectuum, puta ossis et carnis et aliorum huiusmodi; ut Aristoteles contra Empedoclem argumentatur in I de Anima. Secundo quia, si oporteret rem cognitam materialiter in cognoscente existere, nulla ratio esset quare res quae materialiter extra animam subsistunt, cognitione carerent, puta, si anima igne cognoscit ignem, et ignis etiam qui est extra animam, ignem cognosceret. Relinquitur ergo quod oportet materialia cognita in cognoscente existere non materialiter, sed magis immaterialiter. Et huius ratio est, quia actus cognitionis se extendit ad ea quae sunt extra cognoscentem, cognoscimus enim etiam ea quae extra nos sunt. Per materiam autem determinatur forma rei ad aliquid unum. Unde manifestum est quod ratio cognitionis ex opposito se habet ad rationem materialitatis. Et ideo quae non recipiunt formas nisi materialiter, nullo modo sunt cognoscitiva, sicut plantae; ut dicitur in II libro de Anima. Quanto autem aliquid immaterialius habet formam rei cognitae, tanto perfectius cognoscit. Unde et intellectus, qui abstrahit speciem non solum a materia, sed etiam a materialibus conditionibus individuantibus, perfectius cognoscit quam sensus, qui accipit formam rei cognitae sine materia quidem, sed cum materialibus conditionibus. Et inter ipsos sensus, visus est magis cognoscitivus, quia est minus materialis, ut supra dictum est. Et inter ipsos intellectus, tanto quilibet est perfectior, quanto immaterialior. Ex his ergo patet quod, si aliquis intellectus est qui per essentiam suam cognoscit omnia, oportet quod essentia eius habeat in se immaterialiter omnia; sicut antiqui posuerunt essentiam animae actu componi ex principiis omnium materialium, ut cognosceret omnia. Hoc autem est proprium Dei, ut sua essentia sit immateriali-

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because the nature of a result is determined by its principles, they ascribed to the soul the nature of a principle; so that those who thought fire to be the principle of all, held that the soul had the nature of fire; and in like manner as to air and water. Lastly, Empedocles, who held the existence of our four material elements and two principles of movement, said that the soul was composed of these. Consequently, since they held that things exist in the soul materially, they maintained that all the soul’s knowledge is material, thus failing to discern intellect from sense. But this opinion will not hold. First, because in the material principle of which they spoke, the various results do not exist save in potentiality. But a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but only according as it is in act, as is shown in Metaph. ix (Did. viii, 9): wherefore neither is a power known except through its act. It is therefore insufficient to ascribe to the soul the nature of the principles in order to explain the fact that it knows all, unless we further admit in the soul natures and forms of each individual result, for instance, of bone, flesh, and the like; thus does Aristotle argue against Empedocles (De Anima i, 5). Second, because if it were necessary for the thing known to exist materially in the knower, there would be no reason why things which have a material existence outside the soul should be devoid of knowledge; why, for instance, if by fire the soul knows fire, that fire also which is outside the soul should not have knowledge of fire. We must conclude, therefore, that material things known must needs exist in the knower, not materially, but immaterially. The reason of this is, because the act of knowledge extends to things outside the knower: for we know things even that are external to us. Now by matter the form of a thing is determined to some one thing. Wherefore it is clear that knowledge is in inverse ratio of materiality. And consequently things that are not receptive of forms save materially, have no power of knowledge whatever—such as plants, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 12). But the more immaterially a thing receives the form of the thing known, the more perfect is its knowledge. Therefore the intellect which abstracts the species not only from matter, but also from the individuating conditions of matter, has more perfect knowledge than the senses, which receive the form of the thing known, without matter indeed, but subject to material conditions. Moreover, among the senses, sight has the most perfect knowledge, because it is the least material, as we have remarked above (Q. 78, A. 3): while among intellects the more perfect is the more immaterial. It is therefore clear from the foregoing, that if there be an intellect which knows all things by its essence, then its essence must needs have all things in itself immaterially; thus the early philosophers held that the essence of the soul, that it may know all things, must be actually composed of the principles of all material things. Now this is proper to

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ter comprehensiva omnium, prout effectus virtute praeexistunt in causa. Solus igitur Deus per essentiam suam omnia intelligit; non autem anima humana, neque etiam angelus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de visione imaginaria, quae fit per imagines corporum. Quibus imaginibus formandis dat anima aliquid suae substantiae, sicut subiectum datur ut informetur per aliquam formam. Et sic de seipsa facit huiusmodi imagines, non quod anima vel aliquid animae convertatur, ut sit haec vel illa imago; sed sicut dicitur de corpore fieri aliquid coloratum, prout informatur colore. Et hic sensus apparet ex his quae sequuntur. Dicit enim quod servat aliquid, scilicet non formatum tali imagine, quod libere de specie talium imaginum iudicet, et hoc dicit esse mentem vel intellectum. Partem autem quae informatur huiusmodi imaginibus scilicet imaginativam, dicit esse communem nobis et bestiis. Ad secundum dicendum quod Aristoteles non posuit animam esse actu compositam ex omnibus, sicut antiqui naturales; sed dixit quodammodo animam esse omnia, inquantum est in potentia ad omnia; per sensum quidem ad sensibilia, per intellectum vero ad intelligibilia. Ad tertium dicendum quod quaelibet creatura habet esse finitum et determinatum. Unde essentia superioris creaturae, etsi habeat quandam similitudinem inferioris creaturae prout communicant in aliquo genere, non tamen complete habet similitudinem illius, quia determinatur ad aliquam speciem, praeter quam est species inferioris creaturae. Sed essentia Dei est perfecta similitudo omnium quantum ad omnia quae in rebus inveniuntur, sicut universale principium omnium.

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God, that His Essence comprise all things immaterially as effects pre-exist virtually in their cause. God alone, therefore, understands all things through His Essence: but neither the human soul nor the angels can do so. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine in that passage is speaking of an imaginary vision, which takes place through the image of bodies. To the formation of such images the soul gives part of its substance, just as a subject is given in order to be informed by some form. In this way the soul makes such images from itself; not that the soul or some part of the soul be turned into this or that image; but just as we say that a body is made into something colored because of its being informed with color. That this is the sense, is clear from what follows. For he says that the soul keeps something—namely, not informed with such image—‘which is able freely to judge of the species of these images’: and that this is the mind or intellect. And he says that the part which is informed with these images—namely, the imagination— is common to us and beasts. Reply Obj. 2: Aristotle did not hold that the soul is actually composed of all things, as did the earlier philosophers; he said that the soul is all things, after a fashion, forasmuch as it is in potentiality to all—through the senses, to all things sensible—through the intellect, to all things intelligible. Reply Obj. 3: Every creature has a finite and determinate essence. Wherefore although the essence of the higher creature has a certain likeness to the lower creature, forasmuch as they have something in common generically, yet it has not a complete likeness thereof, because it is determined to a certain species other than the species of the lower creature. But the Divine Essence is a perfect likeness of all, whatsoever may be found to exist in things created, being the universal principle of all.

Article 3 Whether the soul understands all things through innate species? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima intelligat omnia per species sibi naturaliter inditas. Dicit enim Gregorius, in Homilia Ascensionis quod homo habet commune cum angelis intelligere. Sed angeli intelligunt omnia per formas naturaliter inditas, unde in libro de Causis dicitur quod omnis intelligentia est plena formis. Ergo et anima habet species rerum naturaliter inditas, quibus corporalia intelligit. Praeterea, anima intellectiva est nobilior quam materia prima corporalis. Sed materia prima est creata a Deo sub formis ad quas est in potentia. Ergo multo magis anima intellectiva est creata a Deo sub speciebus in-

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul understands all things through innate species. For Gregory says, in a homily for the Ascension (xxix in Ev.), that man has understanding in common with the angels. But angels understand all things through innate species: wherefore in the book De Causis it is said that every intelligence is full of forms. Therefore the soul also has innate species of things, by means of which it understands corporeal things. Obj. 2: Further, the intellectual soul is more excellent than corporeal primary matter. But primary matter was created by God under the forms to which it has potentiality. Therefore much more is the intellectual soul created by

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telligibilibus. Et sic anima intelligit corporalia per species sibi naturaliter inditas. Praeterea, nullus potest verum respondere nisi de eo quod scit. Sed aliquis etiam idiota, non habens scientiam acquisitam, respondet verum de singulis, si tamen ordinate interrogetur, ut narratur in Menone Platonis de quodam. Ergo antequam aliquis acquirat scientiam, habet rerum cognitionem. Quod non esset nisi anima haberet species naturaliter inditas. Intelligit igitur anima res corporeas per species naturaliter inditas. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III de Anima, de intellectu loquens, quod est sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum forma sit principium actionis, oportet ut eo modo se habeat aliquid ad formam quae est actionis principium, quo se habet ad actionem illam, sicut si moveri sursum est ex levitate, oportet quod in potentia tantum sursum fertur, esse leve solum in potentia, quod autem actu sursum fertur, esse leve in actu. Videmus autem quod homo est quandoque cognoscens in potentia tantum, tam secundum sensum quam secundum intellectum. Et de tali potentia in actum reducitur, ut sentiat quidem, per actiones sensibilium in sensum; ut intelligat autem, per disciplinam aut inventionem. Unde oportet dicere quod anima cognoscitiva sit in potentia tam ad similitudines quae sunt principia sentiendi, quam ad similitudines quae sunt principia intelligendi. Et propter hoc Aristoteles posuit quod intellectus, quo anima intelligit, non habet aliquas species naturaliter inditas, sed est in principio in potentia ad huiusmodi species omnes. Sed quia id quod habet actu formam, interdum non potest agere secundum formam propter aliquod impedimentum, sicut leve si impediatur sursum ferri; propter hoc Plato posuit quod intellectus hominis naturaliter est plenus omnibus speciebus intelligibilibus, sed per unionem corporis impeditur ne possit in actum exire. Sed hoc non videtur convenienter dictum. Primo quidem quia, si habet anima naturalem notitiam omnium, non videtur esse possibile quod huius naturalis notitiae tantam oblivionem capiat, quod nesciat se huiusmodi scientiam habere, nullus enim homo obliviscitur ea quae naturaliter cognoscit, sicut quod omne totum sit maius sua parte, et alia huiusmodi. Praecipue autem hoc videtur inconveniens, si ponatur esse animae naturale corpori uniri, ut supra habitum est, inconveniens enim est quod naturalis operatio alicuius rei totaliter impediatur per id quod est sibi secundum naturam. Secundo, manifeste apparet huius positionis falsitas ex hoc quod, deficiente aliquo sensu, deficit scientia eorum, quae apprehenduntur secundum illum sensum; sicut caecus natus nullam potest habere notitiam de coloribus. Quod non esset, si animae essent naturaliter inditae omnium in-

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God under intelligible species. And so the soul understands corporeal things through innate species. Obj. 3: Further, no one can answer the truth except concerning what he knows. But even a person untaught and devoid of acquired knowledge, answers the truth to every question if put to him in orderly fashion, as we find related in the Meno (xv seqq.) of Plato, concerning a certain individual. Therefore we have some knowledge of things even before we acquire knowledge; which would not be the case unless we had innate species. Therefore the soul understands corporeal things through innate species. On the contrary, The Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says (De Anima iii, 4) that it is like a tablet on which nothing is written. I answer that, Since form is the principle of action, a thing must be related to the form which is the principle of an action, as it is to that action: for instance, if upward motion is from lightness, then that which only potentially moves upwards must needs be only potentially light, but that which actually moves upwards must needs be actually light. Now we observe that man sometimes is only a potential knower, both as to sense and as to intellect. And he is reduced from such potentiality to act—through the action of sensible objects on his senses, to the act of sensation— by instruction or discovery, to the act of understanding. Wherefore we must say that the cognitive soul is in potentiality both to the images which are the principles of sensing, and to those which are the principles of understanding. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 4) held that the intellect by which the soul understands has no innate species, but is at first in potentiality to all such species. But since that which has a form actually, is sometimes unable to act according to that form on account of some hindrance, as a light thing may be hindered from moving upwards; for this reason did Plato hold that naturally man’s intellect is filled with all intelligible species, but that, by being united to the body, it is hindered from the realization of its act. But this seems to be unreasonable. First, because, if the soul has a natural knowledge of all things, it seems impossible for the soul so far to forget the existence of such knowledge as not to know itself to be possessed thereof: for no man forgets what he knows naturally; that, for instance, the whole is larger than the part, and such like. And especially unreasonable does this seem if we suppose that it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, as we have established above (Q. 76 , A. 1): for it is unreasonable that the natural operation of a thing be totally hindered by that which belongs to it naturally. Second, the falseness of this opinion is clearly proved from the fact that if a sense be wanting, the knowledge of what is apprehended through that sense is wanting also: for instance, a man who is born blind can have no knowledge of colors. This would not be the case if the soul had innate images of

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telligibilium rationes. Et ideo dicendum est quod anima all intelligible things. We must therefore conclude that the non cognoscit corporalia per species naturaliter inditas. soul does not know corporeal things through innate species. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo quidem Reply Obj. 1: Man indeed has intelligence in common convenit cum angelis in intelligendo, deficit tamen ab with the angels, but not in the same degree of perfection: eminentia intellectus eorum, sicut et corpora inferiora, just as the lower grades of bodies, which merely exist, acquae tantum existunt secundum Gregorium, deficiunt cording to Gregory (Homily on Ascension, xxix In Ev.), have ab existentia superiorum corporum. Nam materia in- not the same degree of perfection as the higher bodies. For feriorum corporum non est completa totaliter per for- the matter of the lower bodies is not totally completed by mam, sed est in potentia ad formas quas non habet, ma- its form, but is in potentiality to forms which it has not: teria autem caelestium corporum est totaliter completa whereas the matter of heavenly bodies is totally completed per formam, ita quod non est in potentia ad aliam for- by its form, so that it is not in potentiality to any other form, mam, ut supra habitum est. Et similiter intellectus ange- as we have said above (Q. 66, A. 2). In the same way the anli est perfectus per species intelligibiles secundum suam gelic intellect is perfected by intelligible species, in accornaturam, intellectus autem humanus est in potentia ad dance with its nature; whereas the human intellect is in pohuiusmodi species. tentiality to such species. Ad secundum dicendum quod materia prima haReply Obj. 2: Primary matter has substantial being bet esse substantiale per formam, et ideo oportuit quod through its form; consequently it had need to be created crearetur sub aliqua forma, alioquin non esset in actu. under some form: else it would not be in act. But when once Sub una tamen forma existens, est in potentia ad alias. it exists under one form it is in potentiality to others. On Intellectus autem non habet esse substantiale per spe- the other hand, the intellect does not receive substantial beciem intelligibilem; et ideo non est simile. ing through the intelligible species; and therefore there is no comparison. Ad tertium dicendum quod ordinata interrogatio Reply Obj. 3: If questions be put in an orderly fashion procedit ex principiis communibus per se notis, ad pro- they proceed from universal self-evident principles to what pria. Per talem autem processum scientia causatur in is particular. Now by such a process knowledge is produced anima addiscentis. Unde cum verum respondet de his in the mind of the learner. Wherefore when he answers the de quibus secundo interrogatur, hoc non est quia prius truth to a subsequent question, this is not because he had ea noverit; sed quia tunc ea de novo addiscit. Nihil enim knowledge previously, but because he thus learns for the refert utrum ille qui docet, proponendo vel interrogan- first time. For it matters not whether the teacher proceed do procedat de principiis communibus ad conclusiones, from universal principles to conclusions by questioning or utrobique enim animus audientis certificatur de poste- by asserting; for in either case the mind of the listener is asrioribus per priora. sured of what follows by that which preceded.

Article 4 Whether the intelligible species are derived by the soul from certain separate forms? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod species intelligibiles effluant in animam ab aliquibus formis separatis. Omne enim quod per participationem est tale, causatur ab eo quod est per essentiam tale; sicut quod est ignitum reducitur sicut in causam in ignem. Sed anima intellectiva, secundum quod est actu intelligens, participat ipsa intelligibilia, intellectus enim in actu, quodammodo est intellectum in actu. Ergo ea quae secundum se et per essentiam suam sunt intellecta in actu, sunt causae animae intellectivae quod actu intelligat. Intellecta autem in actu per essentiam suam, sunt formae sine materia existentes. Species igitur intelligibiles quibus anima intelligit, causantur a formis aliquibus separatis.

Objection 1: It would seem that the intelligible species are derived by the soul from some separate forms. For whatever is such by participation is caused by what is such essentially; for instance, that which is on fire is reduced to fire as the cause thereof. But the intellectual soul forasmuch as it is actually understanding, participates the thing understood: for, in a way, the intellect in act is the thing understood in act. Therefore what in itself and in its essence is understood in act, is the cause that the intellectual soul actually understands. Now that which in its essence is actually understood is a form existing without matter. Therefore the intelligible species, by which the soul understands, are caused by some separate forms.

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Praeterea, intelligibilia se habent ad intellectum, sicut sensibilia ad sensum. Sed sensibilia quae sunt in actu extra animam, sunt causae specierum sensibilium quae sunt in sensu, quibus sentimus. Ergo species intelligibiles quibus intellectus noster intelligit, causantur ab aliquibus actu intelligibilibus extra animam existentibus. Huiusmodi autem non sunt nisi formae a materia separatae. Formae igitur intelligibiles intellectus nostri effluunt ab aliquibus substantiis separatis. Praeterea, omne quod est in potentia, reducitur in actum per id quod est actu. Si ergo intellectus noster, prius in potentia existens, postmodum actu intelligat, oportet quod hoc causetur ab aliquo intellectu qui semper est in actu. Hic autem est intellectus separatus. Ergo ab aliquibus substantiis separatis causantur species intelligibiles quibus actu intelligimus. Sed contra est quia secundum hoc sensibus non indigeremus ad intelligendum. Quod patet esse falsum ex hoc praecipue quod qui caret uno sensu, nullo modo potest habere scientiam de sensibilibus illius sensus. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt species intelligibiles nostri intellectus procedere ab aliquibus formis vel substantiis separatis. Et hoc dupliciter. Plato enim, sicut dictum est, posuit formas rerum sensibilium per se sine materia subsistentes; sicut formam hominis, quam nominabat per se hominem, et formam vel ideam equi, quam nominabat per se equum, et sic de aliis. Has ergo formas separatas ponebat participari et ab anima nostra, et a materia corporali; ab anima quidem nostra ad cognoscendum, a materia vero corporali ad essendum; ut sicut materia corporalis per hoc quod participat ideam lapidis, fit hic lapis, ita intellectus noster per hoc quod participat ideam lapidis, fit intelligens lapidem. Participatio autem ideae fit per aliquam similitudinem ipsius ideae in participante ipsam, per modum quo exemplar participatur ab exemplato. Sicut igitur ponebat formas sensibiles quae sunt in materia corporali, effluere ab ideis sicut quasdam earum similitudines; ita ponebat species intelligibiles nostri intellectus esse similitudines quasdam idearum ab eis effluentes. Et propter hoc, ut supra dictum est, scientias et definitiones ad ideas referebat. Sed quia contra rationem rerum sensibilium est quod earum formae subsistant absque materiis, ut Aristoteles multipliciter probat; ideo Avicenna, hac positione remota, posuit omnium rerum sensibilium intelligibiles species, non quidem per se subsistere absque materia, sed praeexistere immaterialiter in intellectibus separatis; a quorum primo derivantur huiusmodi species in sequentem, et sic de aliis usque ad ultimum intellectum separatum, quem nominat intellectum agentem; a quo, ut ipse dicit, effluunt species intelligibiles in animas nostras, et formae sensibiles in materiam corporalem. Et sic in hoc

Q. 84, A. 4

Obj. 2: Further, the intelligible is to the intellect, as the sensible is to the sense. But the sensible species which are in the senses, and by which we sense, are caused by the sensible object which exists actually outside the soul. Therefore the intelligible species, by which our intellect understands, are caused by some things actually intelligible, existing outside the soul. But these can be nothing else than forms separate from matter. Therefore the intelligible forms of our intellect are derived from some separate substances. Obj. 3: Further, whatever is in potentiality is reduced to act by something actual. If, therefore, our intellect, previously in potentiality, afterwards actually understands, this must needs be caused by some intellect which is always in act. But this is a separate intellect. Therefore the intelligible species, by which we actually understand, are caused by some separate substances. On the contrary, If this were true we should not need the senses in order to understand. And this is proved to be false especially from the fact that if a man be wanting in a sense, he cannot have any knowledge of the sensibles corresponding to that sense. I answer that, Some have held that the intelligible species of our intellect are derived from certain separate forms or substances. And this in two ways. For Plato, as we have said (A. 1), held that the forms of sensible things subsist by themselves without matter; for instance, the form of a man which he called per se man, and the form or idea of a horse which is called per se horse, and so forth. He said therefore that these forms are participated both by our soul and by corporeal matter; by our soul, to the effect of knowledge thereof, and by corporeal matter to the effect of existence: so that, just as corporeal matter by participating the idea of a stone, becomes an individuating stone, so our intellect, by participating the idea of a stone, is made to understand a stone. Now participation of an idea takes place by some image of the idea in the participator, just as a model is participated by a copy. So just as he held that the sensible forms, which are in corporeal matter, are derived from the ideas as certain images thereof: so he held that the intelligible species of our intellect are images of the ideas, derived therefrom. And for this reason, as we have said above (A. 1), he referred sciences and definitions to those ideas. But since it is contrary to the nature of sensible things that their forms should subsist without matter, as Aristotle proves in many ways (Metaph. vi), Avicenna (De Anima v) setting this opinion aside, held that the intelligible species of all sensible things, instead of subsisting in themselves without matter, pre-exist immaterially in the separate intellects: from the first of which, said he, such species are derived by a second, and so on to the last separate intellect which he called the active intelligence, from which, according to him, intelligible species flow into our souls, and sensible species into corporeal matter. And so Avicenna agrees

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Avicenna cum Platone concordat, quod species intelligibiles nostri intellectus effluunt a quibusdam formis separatis, quas tamen Plato dicit per se subsistere, Avicenna vero ponit eas in intelligentia agente. Differunt etiam quantum ad hoc, quod Avicenna ponit species intelligibiles non remanere in intellectu nostro postquam desinit actu intelligere; sed indiget ut iterato se convertat ad recipiendum de novo. Unde non ponit scientiam animae naturaliter inditam, sicut Plato, qui ponit participationes idearum immobiliter in anima permanere. Sed secundum hanc positionem sufficiens ratio assignari non posset quare anima nostra corpori uniretur. Non enim potest dici quod anima intellectiva corpori uniatur propter corpus, quia nec forma est propter materiam, nec motor propter mobile, sed potius e converso. Maxime autem videtur corpus esse necessarium animae intellectivae ad eius propriam operationem, quae est intelligere, quia secundum esse suum a corpore non dependet. Si autem anima species intelligibiles secundum suam naturam apta nata esset recipere per influentiam aliquorum separatorum principiorum tantum, et non acciperet eas ex sensibus, non indigeret corpore ad intelligendum, unde frustra corpori uniretur. Si autem dicatur quod indiget anima nostra sensibus ad intelligendum, quibus quodammodo excitetur ad consideranda ea quorum species intelligibiles a principiis separatis recipit; hoc non videtur sufficere. Quia huiusmodi excitatio non videtur necessaria animae nisi inquantum est consopita, secundum Platonicos, quodammodo et obliviosa propter unionem ad corpus, et sic sensus non proficerent animae intellectivae nisi ad tollendum impedimentum quod animae provenit ex corporis unione. Remanet igitur quaerendum quae sit causa unionis animae ad corpus.

Si autem dicatur, secundum Avicennam, quod sensus sunt animae necessarii, quia per eos excitatur ut convertat se ad intelligentiam agentem, a qua recipit species; hoc quidem non sufficit. Quia si in natura animae est ut intelligat per species ab intelligentia agente effluxas, sequeretur quod quandoque anima possit se convertere ad intelligentiam agentem ex inclinatione suae naturae, vel etiam excitata per alium sensum, ut convertat se ad intelligentiam agentem ad recipiendum species sensibilium quorum sensum aliquis non habet. Et sic caecus natus posset habere scientiam de coloribus, quod est manifeste falsum. Unde dicendum est quod species intelligibiles quibus anima nostra intelligit, non effluunt a formis separatis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod species intelligibiles quas participat noster intellectus, reducuntur sicut

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with Plato in this, that the intelligible species of our intellect are derived from certain separate forms; but these Plato held to subsist of themselves, while Avicenna placed them in the active intelligence. They differ, too, in this respect, that Avicenna held that the intelligible species do not remain in our intellect after it has ceased actually to understand, and that it needs to turn (to the active intellect) in order to receive them anew. Consequently he does not hold that the soul has innate knowledge, as Plato, who held that the participated ideas remain immovably in the soul. But in this opinion no sufficient reason can be assigned for the soul being united to the body. For it cannot be said that the intellectual soul is united to the body for the sake of the body: for neither is form for the sake of matter, nor is the mover for the sake of the moved, but rather the reverse. Especially does the body seem necessary to the intellectual soul, for the latter’s proper operation which is to understand: since as to its being the soul does not depend on the body. But if the soul by its very nature had an inborn aptitude for receiving intelligible species through the influence of only certain separate principles, and were not to receive them from the senses, it would not need the body in order to understand: wherefore to no purpose would it be united to the body. But if it be said that our soul needs the senses in order to understand, through being in some way awakened by them to the consideration of those things, the intelligible species of which it receives from the separate principles: even this seems an insufficient explanation. For this awakening does not seem necessary to the soul, except in as far as it is overcome by sluggishness, as the Platonists expressed it, and by forgetfulness, through its union with the body: and thus the senses would be of no use to the intellectual soul except for the purpose of removing the obstacle which the soul encounters through its union with the body. Consequently the reason of the union of the soul with the body still remains to be sought. And if it be said with Avicenna, that the senses are necessary to the soul, because by them it is aroused to turn to the active intelligence from which it receives the species: neither is this a sufficient explanation. Because if it is natural for the soul to understand through species derived from the active intelligence, it follows that at times the soul of an individual wanting in one of the senses can turn to the active intelligence, either from the inclination of its very nature, or through being roused by another sense, to the effect of receiving the intelligible species of which the corresponding sensible species are wanting. And thus a man born blind could have knowledge of colors; which is clearly untrue. We must therefore conclude that the intelligible species, by which our soul understands, are not derived from separate forms. Reply Obj. 1: The intelligible species which are participated by our intellect are reduced, as to their first cause, to

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in primam causam in aliquod principium per suam essentiam intelligibile, scilicet in Deum. Sed ab illo principio procedunt mediantibus formis rerum sensibilium et materialium, a quibus scientiam colligimus, ut Dionysius dicit. Ad secundum dicendum quod res materiales, secundum esse quod habent extra animam, possunt esse sensibiles actu; non autem actu intelligibiles. Unde non est simile de sensu et intellectu. Ad tertium dicendum quod intellectus noster possibilis reducitur de potentia ad actum per aliquod ens actu, idest per intellectum agentem, qui est virtus quaedam animae nostrae, ut dictum est, non autem per aliquem intellectum separatum, sicut per causam proximam; sed forte sicut per causam remotam.

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a first principle which is by its essence intelligible—namely, God. But they proceed from that principle by means of the sensible forms and material things, from which we gather knowledge, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). Reply Obj. 2: Material things, as to the being which they have outside the soul, may be actually sensible, but not actually intelligible. Wherefore there is no comparison between sense and intellect. Reply Obj. 3: Our passive intellect is reduced from potentiality to act by some being in act, that is, by the active intellect, which is a power of the soul, as we have said (Q. 79, A. 4); and not by a separate intelligence, as proximate cause, although perchance as remote cause.

Article 5 Whether the intellectual soul knows material things in the eternal types? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima intellectiva non cognoscat res materiales in rationibus aeternis. Id enim in quo aliquid cognoscitur, ipsum magis et per prius cognoscitur. Sed anima intellectiva hominis, in statu praesentis vitae, non cognoscit rationes aeternas, quia non cognoscit ipsum Deum, in quo rationes aeternae existunt, sed ei sicut ignoto coniungitur, ut Dionysius dicit in I cap. Mysticae Theologiae. Ergo anima non cognoscit omnia in rationibus aeternis. Praeterea, Rom. I, dicitur quod invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, conspiciuntur. Sed inter invisibilia Dei numerantur rationes aeternae. Ergo rationes aeternae per creaturas materiales cognoscuntur, et non e converso. Praeterea, rationes aeternae nihil aliud sunt quam ideae, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro Octoginta trium Quaest., quod ideae sunt rationes stabiles rerum in mente divina existentes. Si ergo dicatur quod anima intellectiva cognoscit omnia in rationibus aeternis, redibit opinio Platonis, qui posuit omnem scientiam ab ideis derivari. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, XII Confess., si ambo videmus verum esse quod dicis, et ambo videmus verum esse quod dico, ubi quaeso id videmus? Nec ego utique in te, nec tu in me sed ambo in ipsa, quae supra mentes nostras est, incommutabili veritate. Veritas autem incommutabilis in aeternis rationibus continetur. Ergo anima intellectiva omnia vera cognoscit in rationibus aeternis. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in II de Doctr. Christ., philosophi qui vocantur, si qua forte vera et fidei nostrae accommoda dixerunt, ab eis tanquam ab iniustis possessoribus in usum nostrum vindi-

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul does not know material things in the eternal types. For that in which anything is known must itself be known more and previously. But the intellectual soul of man, in the present state of life, does not know the eternal types: for it does not know God in Whom the eternal types exist, but is united to God as to the unknown, as Dionysius says (Myst. Theolog. i). Therefore the soul does not know all in the eternal types. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Rom 1:20) that the invisible things of God are clearly seen . . . by the things that are made. But among the invisible things of God are the eternal types. Therefore the eternal types are known through creatures and not the converse. Obj. 3: Further, the eternal types are nothing else but ideas, for Augustine says (83 Questions, Q. 46) that ideas are permanent types existing in the Divine mind. If therefore we say that the intellectual soul knows all things in the eternal types, we come back to the opinion of Plato who said that all knowledge is derived from them. On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. xii, 25): If we both see that what you say is true, and if we both see that what I say is true, where do we see this, I pray? Neither do I see it in you, nor do you see it in me: but we both see it in the unchangeable truth which is above our minds. Now the unchangeable truth is contained in the eternal types. Therefore the intellectual soul knows all true things in the eternal types. I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 11): If those who are called philosophers said by chance anything that was true and consistent with our faith, we must claim it from them as from unjust possessors. For some of the

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canda sunt. Habent enim doctrinae gentilium quaedam simulata et superstitiosa figmenta, quae unusquisque nostrum de societate gentilium exiens, debet evitare. Et ideo Augustinus, qui doctrinis Platonicorum imbutus fuerat, si qua invenit fidei accommoda in eorum dictis, assumpsit; quae vero invenit fidei nostrae adversa, in melius commutavit. Posuit autem Plato, sicut supra dictum est, formas rerum per se subsistere a materia separatas, quas ideas vocabat, per quarum participationem dicebat intellectum nostrum omnia cognoscere; ut sicut materia corporalis per participationem ideae lapidis fit lapis, ita intellectus noster per participationem eiusdem ideae cognosceret lapidem. Sed quia videtur esse alienum a fide quod formae rerum extra res per se subsistant absque materia, sicut Platonici posuerunt, dicentes per se vitam aut per se sapientiam esse quasdam substantias creatrices, ut Dionysius dicit XI cap. de Div. Nom.; ideo Augustinus, in libro Octoginta trium Quaest., posuit loco harum idearum quas Plato ponebat, rationes omnium creaturarum in mente divina existere, secundum quas omnia formantur, et secundum quas etiam anima humana omnia cognoscit. Cum ergo quaeritur utrum anima humana in rationibus aeternis omnia cognoscat, dicendum est quod aliquid in aliquo dicitur cognosci dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut in obiecto cognito; sicut aliquis videt in speculo ea quorum imagines in speculo resultant. Et hoc modo anima, in statu praesentis vitae, non potest videre omnia in rationibus aeternis; sed sic in rationibus aeternis cognoscunt omnia beati, qui Deum vident et omnia in ipso. Alio modo dicitur aliquid cognosci in aliquo sicut in cognitionis principio; sicut si dicamus quod in sole videntur ea quae videntur per solem. Et sic necesse est dicere quod anima humana omnia cognoscat in rationibus aeternis, per quarum participationem omnia cognoscimus. Ipsum enim lumen intellectuale quod est in nobis, nihil est aliud quam quaedam participata similitudo luminis increati, in quo continentur rationes aeternae. Unde in Psalmo IV, dicitur, multi dicunt, quis ostendit nobis bona? Cui quaestioni Psalmista respondet, dicens, signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine. Quasi dicat, per ipsam sigillationem divini luminis in nobis, omnia nobis demonstrantur. Quia tamen praeter lumen intellectuale in nobis, exiguntur species intelligibiles a rebus acceptae, ad scientiam de rebus materialibus habendam; ideo non per solam participationem rationum aeternarum de rebus materialibus notitiam habemus, sicut Platonici posuerunt quod sola idearum participatio sufficit ad scientiam habendam. Unde Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin., numquid quia philosophi documentis certissimis persuadent aeternis rationibus omnia temporalia fieri, propterea potuerunt in ipsis rationibus perspicere, vel ex ipsis colligere quot sint animalium genera, quae semina singulorum?

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doctrines of the heathens are spurious imitations or superstitious inventions, which we must be careful to avoid when we renounce the society of the heathens. Consequently whenever Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines of the Platonists, found in their teaching anything consistent with faith, he adopted it: and those thing which he found contrary to faith he amended. Now Plato held, as we have said above (A. 4), that the forms of things subsist of themselves apart from matter; and these he called ideas, by participation of which he said that our intellect knows all things: so that just as corporeal matter by participating the idea of a stone becomes a stone, so our intellect, by participating the same idea, has knowledge of a stone. But since it seems contrary to faith that forms of things themselves, outside the things themselves and apart from matter, as the Platonists held, asserting that per se life or per se wisdom are creative substances, as Dionysius relates (Div. Nom. xi); therefore Augustine (83 Questions, Q. 46), for the ideas defended by Plato, substituted the types of all creatures existing in the Divine mind, according to which types all things are made in themselves, and are known to the human soul. When, therefore, the question is asked: Does the human soul know all things in the eternal types? we must reply that one thing is said to be known in another in two ways. First, as in an object itself known; as one may see in a mirror the images of things reflected therein. In this way the soul, in the present state of life, cannot see all things in the eternal types; but the blessed who see God, and all things in Him, thus know all things in the eternal types. Second, one thing is said to be known in another as in a principle of knowledge: thus we might say that we see in the sun what we see by the sun. And thus we must needs say that the human soul knows all things in the eternal types, since by participation of these types we know all things. For the intellectual light itself which is in us, is nothing else than a participated likeness of the uncreated light, in which are contained the eternal types. Whence it is written (Ps 4:6, 7), Many say: Who showeth us good things? which question the Psalmist answers, The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us, as though he were to say: By the seal of the Divine light in us, all things are made known to us. But since besides the intellectual light which is in us, intelligible species, which are derived from things, are required in order for us to have knowledge of material things; therefore this same knowledge is not due merely to a participation of the eternal types, as the Platonists held, maintaining that the mere participation of ideas sufficed for knowledge. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 16): Although the philosophers prove by convincing arguments that all things occur in time according to the eternal types, were they able to see in the eternal types, or to find out from them how many kinds of animals there are and the origin of each?

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Nonne ista omnia per locorum ac temporum historiam quaesierunt? Quod autem Augustinus non sic intellexerit omnia cognosci in rationibus aeternis, vel in incommutabili veritate, quasi ipsae rationes aeternae videantur, patet per hoc quod ipse dicit in libro Octoginta trium Quaest., quod rationalis anima non omnis et quaelibet, sed quae sancta et pura fuerit, asseritur illi visioni, scilicet rationum aeternarum, esse idonea; sicut sunt animae beatorum. Et per haec patet responsio ad obiecta.

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Did they not seek for this information from the story of times and places? But that Augustine did not understand all things to be known in their eternal types or in the unchangeable truth, as though the eternal types themselves were seen, is clear from what he says (83 Questions, Q. 46)—viz. that not each and every rational soul can be said to be worthy of that vision, namely, of the eternal types, but only those that are holy and pure, such as the souls of the blessed. From what has been said the objections are easily solved.

Article 6 Whether intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectiva cognitio non accipiatur a rebus sensibilibus. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro Octoginta trium Quaest., quod non est expectanda sinceritas veritatis a corporis sensibus. Et hoc probat dupliciter. Uno modo, per hoc quod omne quod corporeus sensus attingit, sine ulla intermissione temporis commutatur, quod autem non manet, percipi non potest. Alio modo, per hoc quod omnia quae per corpus sentimus, etiam cum non adsunt sensibus, imagines tamen eorum patimur, ut in somno vel furore; non autem sensibus discernere valemus utrum ipsa sensibilia, vel imagines eorum falsas sentiamus. Nihil autem percipi potest quod a falso non discernitur. Et sic concludit quod non est expectanda veritas a sensibus. Sed cognitio intellectualis est apprehensiva veritatis. Non ergo cognitio intellectualis est expectanda a sensibus. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., non est putandum facere aliquid corpus in spiritum, tanquam spiritus corpori facienti materiae vice subdatur, omni enim modo praestantior est qui facit, ea re de qua aliquid facit. Unde concludit quod imaginem corporis non corpus in spiritu, sed ipse spiritus in seipso facit. Non ergo intellectualis cognitio a sensibilibus derivatur. Praeterea, effectus non se extendit ultra virtutem suae causae. Sed intellectualis cognitio se extendit ultra sensibilia, intelligimus enim quaedam quae sensu percipi non possunt. Intellectualis ergo cognitio non derivatur a rebus sensibilibus. Sed contra est quod philosophus probat, I Metaphys., et in fine Poster., quod principium nostrae cognitionis est a sensu. Respondeo dicendum quod circa istam quaestionem triplex fuit philosophorum opinio. Democritus enim posuit quod nulla est alia causa cuiuslibet nostrae cognitionis, nisi cum ab his corporibus quae cogitamus,

Objection 1: It would seem that intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things. For Augustine says (83 Questions, Q. 9) that we cannot expect to learn the fullness of truth from the senses of the body. This he proves in two ways. First, because whatever the bodily senses reach, is continually being changed; and what is never the same cannot be perceived. Second, because, whatever we perceive by the body, even when not present to the senses, may be present to the imagination, as when we are asleep or angry: yet we cannot discern by the senses, whether what we perceive be the sensible object or the deceptive image thereof. Now nothing can be perceived which cannot be distinguished from its counterfeit. And so he concludes that we cannot expect to learn the truth from the senses. But intellectual knowledge apprehends the truth. Therefore intellectual knowledge cannot be conveyed by the senses. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 16): We must not think that the body can make any impression on the spirit, as though the spirit were to supply the place of matter in regard to the body’s action; for that which acts is in every way more excellent than that which it acts on. Whence he concludes that the body does not cause its image in the spirit, but the spirit causes it in itself. Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things. Obj. 3: Further, an effect does not surpass the power of its cause. But intellectual knowledge extends beyond sensible things: for we understand some things which cannot be perceived by the senses. Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1; Poster. ii, 15) that the principle of knowledge is in the senses. I answer that, On this point the philosophers held three opinions. For Democritus held that all knowledge is caused by images issuing from the bodies we think of and entering into our souls, as Augustine says in his letter to

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veniunt atque intrant imagines in animas nostras; ut Augustinus dicit in epistola sua ad Dioscorum. Et Aristoteles etiam dicit, in libro de Somn. et Vigil., quod Democritus posuit cognitionem fieri per idola et defluxiones. Et huius positionis ratio fuit, quia tam ipse Democritus quam alii antiqui naturales non ponebant intellectum differre a sensu, ut Aristoteles dicit in libro de Anima. Et ideo, quia sensus immutatur a sensibili, arbitrabantur omnem nostram cognitionem fieri per solam immutationem a sensibilibus. Quam quidem immutationem Democritus asserebat fieri per imaginum defluxiones. Plato vero e contrario posuit intellectum differre a sensu; et intellectum quidem esse virtutem immaterialem organo corporeo non utentem in suo actu. Et quia incorporeum non potest immutari a corporeo, posuit quod cognitio intellectualis non fit per immutationem intellectus a sensibilibus, sed per participationem formarum intelligibilium separatarum, ut dictum est. Sensum etiam posuit virtutem quandam per se operantem. Unde nec ipse sensus, cum sit quaedam vis spiritualis, immutatur a sensibilibus, sed organa sensuum a sensibilibus immutantur, ex qua immutatione anima quodammodo excitatur ut in se species sensibilium formet. Et hanc opinionem tangere videtur Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt., ubi dicit quod corpus non sentit, sed anima per corpus, quo velut nuntio utitur ad formandum in seipsa quod extrinsecus nuntiatur. Sic igitur secundum Platonis opinionem, neque intellectualis cognitio a sensibili procedit, neque etiam sensibilis totaliter a sensibilibus rebus; sed sensibilia excitant animam sensibilem ad sentiendum, et similiter sensus excitant animam intellectivam ad intelligendum. Aristoteles autem media via processit. Posuit enim cum Platone intellectum differre a sensu. Sed sensum posuit propriam operationem non habere sine communicatione corporis; ita quod sentire non sit actus animae tantum, sed coniuncti. Et similiter posuit de omnibus operationibus sensitivae partis. Quia igitur non est inconveniens quod sensibilia quae sunt extra animam, causent aliquid in coniunctum, in hoc Aristoteles cum Democrito concordavit, quod operationes sensitivae partis causentur per impressionem sensibilium in sensum, non per modum defluxionis, ut Democritus posuit, sed per quandam operationem. Nam et Democritus omnem actionem fieri posuit per influxionem atomorum, ut patet in I de Generat. Intellectum vero posuit Aristoteles habere operationem absque communicatione corporis. Nihil autem corporeum imprimere potest in rem incorpoream. Et ideo ad causandam intellectualem operationem, secundum Aristotelem, non sufficit sola impressio sensibilium corporum, sed requiritur aliquid nobilius, quia agens est honorabilius patiente, ut ipse dicit. Non tamen ita quod intellectualis operatio causetur in nobis ex sola impressione aliquarum rerum superio-

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Dioscorus (cxviii, 4). And Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.) that Democritus held that knowledge is caused by a discharge of images. And the reason for this opinion was that both Democritus and the other early philosophers did not distinguish between intellect and sense, as Aristotle relates (De Anima iii, 3). Consequently, since the sense is affected by the sensible, they thought that all our knowledge is affected by this mere impression brought about by sensible things. Which impression Democritus held to be caused by a discharge of images. Plato, on the other hand, held that the intellect is distinct from the senses: and that it is an immaterial power not making use of a corporeal organ for its action. And since the incorporeal cannot be affected by the corporeal, he held that intellectual knowledge is not brought about by sensible things affecting the intellect, but by separate intelligible forms being participated by the intellect, as we have said above (AA. 4 ,5). Moreover he held that sense is a power operating of itself. Consequently neither is sense, since it is a spiritual power, affected by the sensible: but the sensible organs are affected by the sensible, the result being that the soul is in a way roused to form within itself the species of the sensible. Augustine seems to touch on this opinion (Gen ad lit. xii, 24) where he says that the body feels not, but the soul through the body, which it makes use of as a kind of messenger, for reproducing within itself what is announced from without. Thus according to Plato, neither does intellectual knowledge proceed from sensible knowledge, nor sensible knowledge exclusively from sensible things; but these rouse the sensible soul to the sentient act, while the senses rouse the intellect to the act of understanding. Aristotle chose a middle course. For with Plato he agreed that intellect and sense are different. But he held that the sense has not its proper operation without the cooperation of the body; so that to feel is not an act of the soul alone, but of the composite. And he held the same in regard to all the operations of the sensitive part. Since, therefore, it is not unreasonable that the sensible objects which are outside the soul should produce some effect in the composite, Aristotle agreed with Democritus in this, that the operations of the sensitive part are caused by the impression of the sensible on the sense: not by a discharge, as Democritus said, but by some kind of operation. For Democritus maintained that every operation is by way of a discharge of atoms, as we gather from De Gener. i, 8. But Aristotle held that the intellect has an operation which is independent of the body’s cooperation. Now nothing corporeal can make an impression on the incorporeal. And therefore in order to cause the intellectual operation according to Aristotle, the impression caused by the sensible does not suffice, but something more noble is required, for the agent is more noble than the patient, as he says (De Gener. i, 5). Not, indeed, in the sense that the intellectual operation is effected

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rum, ut Plato posuit, sed illud superius et nobilius agens quod vocat intellectum agentem, de quo iam supra diximus, facit phantasmata a sensibus accepta intelligibilia in actu, per modum abstractionis cuiusdam. Secundum hoc ergo, ex parte phantasmatum intellectualis operatio a sensu causatur. Sed quia phantasmata non sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem, sed oportet quod fiant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem; non potest dici quod sensibilis cognitio sit totalis et perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis quodammodo est materia causae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per verba illa Augustini datur intelligi quod veritas non sit totaliter a sensibus expectanda. Requiritur enim lumen intellectus agentis, per quod immutabiliter veritatem in rebus mutabilibus cognoscamus, et discernamus ipsas res a similitudinibus rerum. Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus ibi non loquitur de intellectuali cognitione, sed de imaginaria. Et quia, secundum Platonis opinionem, vis imaginaria habet operationem quae est animae solius; eadem ratione usus est Augustinus ad ostendendum quod corpora non imprimunt suas similitudines in vim imaginariam, sed hoc facit ipsa anima, qua utitur Aristoteles ad probandum intellectum agentem esse aliquid separatum, quia scilicet agens est honorabilius patiente. Et procul dubio oportet, secundum hanc positionem, in vi imaginativa ponere non solum potentiam passivam, sed etiam activam. Sed si ponamus, secundum opinionem Aristotelis, quod actio virtutis imaginativae sit coniuncti, nulla sequitur difficultas, quia corpus sensibile est nobilius organo animalis, secundum hoc quod comparatur ad ipsum ut ens in actu ad ens in potentia, sicut coloratum in actu ad pupillam, quae colorata est in potentia. Posset tamen dici quod, quamvis prima immutatio virtutis imaginariae sit per motum sensibilium, quia phantasia est motus factus secundum sensum, ut dicitur in libro de Anima; tamen est quaedam operatio animae in homine quae dividendo et componendo format diversas rerum imagines, etiam quae non sunt a sensibus acceptae. Et quantum ad hoc possunt accipi verba Augustini. Ad tertium dicendum quod sensitiva cognitio non est tota causa intellectualis cognitionis. Et ideo non est mirum si intellectualis cognitio ultra sensitivam se extendit.

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in us by the mere impression of some superior beings, as Plato held; but that the higher and more noble agent which he calls the active intellect, of which we have spoken above (Q. 79, AA. 3, 4), causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelligible, by a process of abstraction. According to this opinion, then, on the part of the phantasms, intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses. But since the phantasms cannot of themselves affect the passive intellect, and require to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect, it cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather that it is in a way the material cause. Reply Obj. 1: Those words of Augustine mean that we must not expect the entire truth from the senses. For the light of the active intellect is needed, through which we achieve the unchangeable truth of changeable things, and discern things themselves from their likeness. Reply Obj. 2: In this passage Augustine speaks not of intellectual but of imaginary knowledge. And since, according to the opinion of Plato, the imagination has an operation which belongs to the soul only, Augustine, in order to show that corporeal images are impressed on the imagination, not by bodies but by the soul, uses the same argument as Aristotle does in proving that the active intellect must be separate, namely, because the agent is more noble than the patient. And without doubt, according to the above opinion, in the imagination there must needs be not only a passive but also an active power. But if we hold, according to the opinion of Aristotle, that the action of the imagination is an action of the composite, there is no difficulty; because the sensible body is more noble than the organ of the animal, in so far as it is compared to it as a being in act to a being in potentiality; even as the object actually colored is compared to the pupil which is potentially colored. It may, however, be said, although the first impression of the imagination is through the agency of the sensible, since fancy is movement produced in accordance with sensation (De Anima iii, 3), that nevertheless there is in man an operation which by synthesis and analysis forms images of various things, even of things not perceived by the senses. And Augustine’s words may be taken in this sense. Reply Obj. 3: Sensitive knowledge is not the entire cause of intellectual knowledge. And therefore it is not strange that intellectual knowledge should extend further than sensitive knowledge.

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Article 7 Whether the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without turning to the phantasms? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus possit actu intelligere per species intelligibiles quas penes se habet, non convertendo se ad phantasmata. Intellectus enim fit in actu per speciem intelligibilem qua informatur. Sed intellectum esse in actu, est ipsum intelligere. Ergo species intelligibiles sufficiunt ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat, absque hoc quod ad phantasmata se convertat. Praeterea, magis dependet imaginatio a sensu, quam intellectus ab imaginatione. Sed imaginatio potest imaginari actu, absentibus sensibilibus. Ergo multo magis intellectus potest intelligere actu, non convertendo se ad phantasmata. Praeterea, incorporalium non sunt aliqua phantasmata, quia imaginatio tempus et continuum non transcendit. Si ergo intellectus noster non posset aliquid intelligere in actu nisi converteretur ad phantasmata, sequeretur quod non posset intelligere incorporeum aliquid. Quod patet esse falsum, intelligimus enim veritatem ipsam, et Deum et angelos. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III de Anima, quod nihil sine phantasmate intelligit anima. Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est intellectum nostrum, secundum praesentis vitae statum, quo passibili corpori coniungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata. Et hoc duobus indiciis apparet. Primo quidem quia, cum intellectus sit vis quaedam non utens corporali organo, nullo modo impediretur in suo actu per laesionem alicuius corporalis organi, si non requireretur ad eius actum actus alicuius potentiae utentis organo corporali. Utuntur autem organo corporali sensus et imaginatio et aliae vires pertinentes ad partem sensitivam. Unde manifestum est quod ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat, non solum accipiendo scientiam de novo, sed etiam utendo scientia iam acquisita, requiritur actus imaginationis et ceterarum virtutum. Videmus enim quod, impedito actu virtutis imaginativae per laesionem organi, ut in phreneticis; et similiter impedito actu memorativae virtutis, ut in lethargicis; impeditur homo ab intelligendo in actu etiam ea quorum scientiam praeaccepit. Secundo, quia hoc quilibet in seipso experiri potest, quod quando aliquis conatur aliquid intelligere, format aliqua phantasmata sibi per modum exemplorum, in quibus quasi inspiciat quod intelligere studet. Et inde est etiam quod quando alium volumus facere aliquid intelligere, proponimus ei exempla, ex quibus sibi phantasmata formare possit ad intelligendum.

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without turning to the phantasms. For the intellect is made actual by the intelligible species by which it is informed. But if the intellect is in act, it understands. Therefore the intelligible species suffices for the intellect to understand actually, without turning to the phantasms. Obj. 2: Further, the imagination is more dependent on the senses than the intellect on the imagination. But the imagination can actually imagine in the absence of the sensible. Therefore much more can the intellect understand without turning to the phantasms. Obj. 3: There are no phantasms of incorporeal things: for the imagination does not transcend time and space. If, therefore, our intellect cannot understand anything actually without turning to the phantasms, it follows that it cannot understand anything incorporeal. Which is clearly false: for we understand truth, and God, and the angels. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that the soul understands nothing without a phantasm. I answer that, In the present state of life in which the soul is united to a passible body, it is impossible for our intellect to understand anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms. First of all because the intellect, being a power that does not make use of a corporeal organ, would in no way be hindered in its act through the lesion of a corporeal organ, if for its act there were not required the act of some power that does make use of a corporeal organ. Now sense, imagination and the other powers belonging to the sensitive part, make use of a corporeal organ. Wherefore it is clear that for the intellect to understand actually, not only when it acquires fresh knowledge, but also when it applies knowledge already acquired, there is need for the act of the imagination and of the other powers. For when the act of the imagination is hindered by a lesion of the corporeal organ, for instance in a case of frenzy; or when the act of the memory is hindered, as in the case of lethargy, we see that a man is hindered from actually understanding things of which he had a previous knowledge. Second, anyone can experience this of himself, that when he tries to understand something, he forms certain phantasms to serve him by way of examples, in which as it were he examines what he is desirous of understanding. For this reason it is that when we wish to help someone to understand something, we lay examples before him, from which he forms phantasms for the purpose of understanding.

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Huius autem ratio est, quia potentia cognoscitiva proportionatur cognoscibili. Unde intellectus angelici, qui est totaliter a corpore separatus, obiectum proprium est substantia intelligibilis a corpore separata; et per huiusmodi intelligibilia materialia cognoscit. Intellectus autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens; et per huiusmodi naturas visibilium rerum etiam in invisibilium rerum aliqualem cognitionem ascendit. De ratione autem huius naturae est, quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non est absque materia corporali, sicut de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit in hoc lapide, et de ratione naturae equi quod sit in hoc equo, et sic de aliis. Unde natura lapidis, vel cuiuscumque materialis rei, cognosci non potest complete et vere, nisi secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens. Particulare autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem. Et ideo necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum obiectum proprium, quod convertat se ad phantasmata, ut speculetur naturam universalem in particulari existentem. Si autem proprium obiectum intellectus nostri esset forma separata; vel si naturae rerum sensibilium subsisterent non in particularibus, secundum Platonicos; non oporteret quod intellectus noster semper intelligendo converteret se ad phantasmata. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod species conservatae in intellectu possibili, in eo existunt habitualiter quando actu non intelligit, sicut supra dictum est. Unde ad hoc quod intelligamus in actu, non sufficit ipsa conservatio specierum; sed oportet quod eis utamur secundum quod convenit rebus quarum sunt species, quae sunt naturae in particularibus existentes. Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam ipsum phantasma est similitudo rei particularis, unde non indiget imaginatio aliqua alia similitudine particularis, sicut indiget intellectus. Ad tertium dicendum quod incorporea, quorum non sunt phantasmata, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad corpora sensibilia, quorum sunt phantasmata. Sicut veritatem intelligimus ex consideratione rei circa quam veritatem speculamur; Deum autem, ut Dionysius dicit, cognoscimus ut causam, et per excessum, et per remotionem; alias etiam incorporeas substantias, in statu praesentis vitae, cognoscere non possumus nisi per remotionem, vel aliquam comparationem ad corporalia. Et ideo cum de huiusmodi aliquid intelligimus, necesse habemus converti ad phantasmata corporum, licet ipsorum non sint phantasmata.

Q. 84, A. 7

Now the reason of this is that the power of knowledge is proportioned to the thing known. Wherefore the proper object of the angelic intellect, which is entirely separate from a body, is an intelligible substance separate from a body. Whereas the proper object of the human intellect, which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter; and through such natures of visible things it rises to a certain knowledge of things invisible. Now it belongs to such a nature to exist in an individual, and this cannot be apart from corporeal matter: for instance, it belongs to the nature of a stone to be in an individual stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in an individual horse, and so forth. Wherefore the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and truly, except in as much as it is known as existing in the individual. Now we apprehend the individual through the senses and the imagination. And, therefore, for the intellect to understand actually its proper object, it must of necessity turn to the phantasms in order to perceive the universal nature existing in the individual. But if the proper object of our intellect were a separate form; or if, as the Platonists say, the natures of sensible things subsisted apart from the individual; there would be no need for the intellect to turn to the phantasms whenever it understands. Reply Obj. 1: The species preserved in the passive intellect exist there habitually when it does not understand them actually, as we have said above (Q. 79, A. 6). Wherefore for us to understand actually, the fact that the species are preserved does not suffice; we need further to make use of them in a manner befitting the things of which they are the species, which things are natures existing in individuals. Reply Obj. 2: Even the phantasm is the likeness of an individual thing; wherefore the imagination does not need any further likeness of the individual, whereas the intellect does. Reply Obj. 3: Incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms, are known to us by comparison with sensible bodies of which there are phantasms. Thus we understand truth by considering a thing of which we possess the truth; and God, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), we know as cause, by way of excess and by way of remotion. Other incorporeal substances we know, in the present state of life, only by way of remotion or by some comparison to corporeal things. And, therefore, when we understand something about these things, we need to turn to phantasms of bodies, although there are no phantasms of the things themselves.

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Article 8 Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered through suspension of the sensitive powers? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iudicium intellectus non impediatur per ligamentum sensus. Superius enim non dependet ab inferiori. Sed iudicium intellectus est supra sensum. Ergo iudicium intellectus non impeditur per ligamentum sensus. Praeterea, syllogizare est actus intellectus. In somno autem ligatur sensus, ut dicitur in libro de Somn. et Vig.; contingit tamen quandoque quod aliquis dormiens syllogizat. Ergo non impeditur iudicium intellectus per ligamentum sensus. Sed contra est quod in dormiendo ea quae contra licitos mores contingunt, non imputantur ad peccatum; ut Augustinus in XII super Gen. ad Litt. dicit. Hoc autem non esset si homo in dormiendo liberum usum rationis et intellectus haberet. Ergo impeditur rationis usus per ligamentum sensus. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, proprium obiectum intellectui nostro proportionatum est natura rei sensibilis. Iudicium autem perfectum de re aliqua dari non potest, nisi ea omnia quae ad rem pertinent cognoscantur, et praecipue si ignoretur id quod est terminus et finis iudicii. Dicit autem philosophus, in III de Caelo, quod sicut finis factivae scientiae est opus, ita naturalis scientiae finis est quod videtur principaliter secundum sensum, faber enim non quaerit cognitionem cultelli nisi propter opus, ut operetur hunc particularem cultellum; et similiter naturalis non quaerit cognoscere naturam lapidis et equi, nisi ut sciat rationes eorum quae videntur secundum sensum. Manifestum est autem quod non posset esse perfectum iudicium fabri de cultello, si opus ignoraret, et similiter non potest esse perfectum iudicium scientiae naturalis de rebus naturalibus, si sensibilia ignorentur. Omnia autem quae in praesenti statu intelligimus, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad res sensibiles naturales. Unde impossibile est quod sit in nobis iudicium intellectus perfectum, cum ligamento sensus, per quem res sensibiles cognoscimus.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis intellectus sit superior sensu, accipit tamen aliquo modo a sensu, et eius obiecta prima et principalia in sensibilibus fundantur. Et ideo necesse est quod impediatur iudicium intellectus ex ligamento sensus. Ad secundum dicendum quod sensus ligatur in dormientibus propter evaporationes quasdam et fumositates resolutas, ut dicitur in libro de Somn. et Vig. Et ideo secundum dispositionem huiusmodi evaporationum, contingit esse ligamentum sensus maius vel minus.

Objection 1: It would seem that the judgment of the intellect is not hindered by suspension of the sensitive powers. For the superior does not depend on the inferior. But the judgment of the intellect is higher than the senses. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered through suspension of the senses. Obj. 2: Further, to syllogize is an act of the intellect. But during sleep the senses are suspended, as is said in De Somn. et Vigil. i and yet it sometimes happens to us to syllogize while asleep. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered through suspension of the senses. On the contrary, What a man does while asleep, against the moral law, is not imputed to him as a sin; as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 15). But this would not be the case if man, while asleep, had free use of his reason and intellect. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is hindered by suspension of the senses. I answer that, As we have said above (A. 7), our intellect’s proper and proportionate object is the nature of a sensible thing. Now a perfect judgment concerning anything cannot be formed, unless all that pertains to that thing’s nature be known; especially if that be ignored which is the term and end of judgment. Now the Philosopher says (De Coel. iii), that as the end of a practical science is action, so the end of natural science is that which is perceived principally through the senses; for the smith does not seek knowledge of a knife except for the purpose of action, in order that he may produce a certain individual knife; and in like manner the natural philosopher does not seek to know the nature of a stone and of a horse, save for the purpose of knowing the essential properties of those things which he perceives with his senses. Now it is clear that a smith cannot judge perfectly of a knife unless he knows the action of the knife: and in like manner the natural philosopher cannot judge perfectly of natural things, unless he knows sensible things. But in the present state of life whatever we understand, we know by comparison to natural sensible things. Consequently it is not possible for our intellect to form a perfect judgment, while the senses are suspended, through which sensible things are known to us. Reply Obj. 1: Although the intellect is superior to the senses, nevertheless in a manner it receives from the senses, and its first and principal objects are founded in sensible things. And therefore suspension of the senses necessarily involves a hindrance to the judgment of the intellect. Reply Obj. 2: The senses are suspended in the sleeper through certain evaporations and the escape of certain exhalations, as we read in De Somn. et Vigil. iii. And, therefore, according to the amount of such evaporation, the senses are more or less suspended. For when the amount

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Quando enim multus fuerit motus vaporum, ligatur non solum sensus, sed etiam imaginatio, ita ut nulla appareant phantasmata; sicut praecipue accidit cum aliquis incipit dormire post multum cibum et potum. Si vero motus vaporum aliquantulum fuerit remissior, apparent phantasmata, sed distorta et inordinata; sicut accidit in febricitantibus. Si vero adhuc magis motus sedetur, apparent phantasmata ordinata; sicut maxime solet contingere in fine dormitionis, et in hominibus sobriis et habentibus fortem imaginationem. Si autem motus vaporum fuerit modicus, non solum imaginatio remanet libera, sed etiam ipse sensus communis ex parte solvitur; ita quod homo iudicat interdum in dormiendo ea quae videt somnia esse, quasi diiudicans inter res et rerum similitudines. Sed tamen ex aliqua parte remanet sensus communis ligatus; et ideo, licet aliquas similitudines discernat a rebus, tamen semper in aliquibus decipitur. Sic igitur per modum quo sensus solvitur et imaginatio in dormiendo, liberatur et iudicium intellectus, non tamen ex toto. Unde illi qui dormiendo syllogizant, cum excitantur, semper recognoscunt se in aliquo defecisse.

Q. 84, A. 8

is considerable, not only are the senses suspended, but also the imagination, so that there are no phantasms; thus does it happen, especially when a man falls asleep after eating and drinking copiously. If, however, the evaporation be somewhat less, phantasms appear, but distorted and without sequence; thus it happens in a case of fever. And if the evaporation be still more attenuated, the phantasms will have a certain sequence: thus especially does it happen towards the end of sleep in sober men and those who are gifted with a strong imagination. If the evaporation be very slight, not only does the imagination retain its freedom, but also the common sense is partly freed; so that sometimes while asleep a man may judge that what he sees is a dream, discerning, as it were, between things, and their images. Nevertheless, the common sense remains partly suspended; and therefore, although it discriminates some images from the reality, yet is it always deceived in some particular. Therefore, while man is asleep, according as sense and imagination are free, so is the judgment of his intellect unfettered, though not entirely. Consequently, if a man syllogizes while asleep, when he wakes up he invariably recognizes a flaw in some respect.

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Question 85 The Mode and Order of Understanding Deinde considerandum est de modo et ordine intelWe come now to consider the mode and order of underligendi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. standing. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum intellectus noster intelligat (1) Whether our intellect understands by abstracting abstrahendo species a phantasmatibus. the species from the phantasms? Secundo, utrum species intelligibiles abstractae a (2) Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasmatibus, se habeant ad intellectum phantasms are what our intellect understands, or nostrum ut quod intelligitur, vel sicut id quo that whereby it understands? intelligitur. Tertio, utrum intellectus noster naturaliter intelligat (3) Whether our intellect naturally first understands prius magis universale. the more universal? Quarto, utrum intellectus noster possit multa simul (4) Whether our intellect can know many things at the intelligere. same time? Quinto, utrum intellectus noster intelligat (5) Whether our intellect understands by the process of componendo et dividendo. composition and division? Sexto, utrum intellectus possit errare. (6) Whether the intellect can err? Septimo, utrum unus possit eandem rem melius (7) Whether one intellect can understand better than intelligere quam alius. another? Octavo, utrum intellectus noster per prius (8) Whether our intellect understands the indivisible cognoscat indivisibile quam divisibile. before the divisible?

Article 1 Whether our intellect understands corporeal and material things by abstraction from phantasms? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster non intelligat res corporeas et materiales per abstractionem a phantasmatibus. Quicumque enim intellectus intelligit rem aliter quam sit, est falsus. Formae autem rerum materialium non sunt abstractae a particularibus, quorum similitudines sunt phantasmata. Si ergo intelligamus res materiales per abstractionem specierum a phantasmatibus, erit falsitas in intellectu nostro. Praeterea, res materiales sunt res naturales, in quarum definitione cadit materia. Sed nihil potest intelligi sine eo quod cadit in definitione eius. Ergo res materiales non possunt intelligi sine materia. Sed materia est individuationis principium. Ergo res materiales non possunt intelligi per abstractionem universalis a particulari, quod est abstrahere species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus.

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect does not understand corporeal and material things by abstraction from the phantasms. For the intellect is false if it understands an object otherwise than as it really is. Now the forms of material things do not exist as abstracted from the particular things represented by the phantasms. Therefore, if we understand material things by abstraction of the species from the phantasm, there will be error in the intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, material things are those natural things which include matter in their definition. But nothing can be understood apart from that which enters into its definition. Therefore material things cannot be understood apart from matter. Now matter is the principle of individualization. Therefore material things cannot be understood by abstraction of the universal from the particular, which is the process whereby the intelligible species is abstracted from the phantasm. Praeterea, in III de Anima dicitur quod phantaObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) smata se habent ad animam intellectivam sicut colores that the phantasm is to the intellectual soul what color is ad visum. Sed visio non fit per abstractionem aliquarum to the sight. But seeing is not caused by abstraction of spespecierum a coloribus, sed per hoc quod colores impri- cies from color, but by color impressing itself on the sight.

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munt in visum. Ergo nec intelligere contingit per hoc quod aliquid abstrahatur a phantasmatibus, sed per hoc quod phantasmata imprimunt in intellectum. Praeterea, ut dicitur in III de Anima, in intellectiva anima sunt duo, scilicet intellectus possibilis, et agens. Sed abstrahere a phantasmatibus species intelligibiles non pertinet ad intellectum possibilem, sed recipere species iam abstractas. Sed nec etiam videtur pertinere ad intellectum agentem, qui se habet ad phantasmata sicut lumen ad colores, quod non abstrahit aliquid a coloribus, sed magis eis influit. Ergo nullo modo intelligimus abstrahendo a phantasmatibus. Praeterea, philosophus, in III de Anima, dicit quod intellectus intelligit species in phantasmatibus. Non ergo eas abstrahendo. Sed contra est quod dicitur in III de Anima, quod sicut res sunt separabiles a materia, sic circa intellectum sunt. Ergo oportet quod materialia intelligantur inquantum a materia abstrahuntur, et a similitudinibus materialibus, quae sunt phantasmata. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, obiectum cognoscibile proportionatur virtuti cognoscitivae. Est autem triplex gradus cognoscitivae virtutis. Quaedam enim cognoscitiva virtus est actus organi corporalis, scilicet sensus. Et ideo obiectum cuiuslibet sensitivae potentiae est forma prout in materia corporali existit. Et quia huiusmodi materia est individuationis principium, ideo omnis potentia sensitivae partis est cognoscitiva particularium tantum. Quaedam autem virtus cognoscitiva est quae neque est actus organi corporalis, neque est aliquo modo corporali materiae coniuncta, sicut intellectus angelicus. Et ideo huius virtutis cognoscitivae obiectum est forma sine materia subsistens, etsi enim materialia cognoscant, non tamen nisi in immaterialibus ea intuentur, scilicet vel in seipsis vel in Deo. Intellectus autem humanus medio modo se habet, non enim est actus alicuius organi, sed tamen est quaedam virtus animae, quae est forma corporis, ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo proprium eius est cognoscere formam in materia quidem corporali individualiter existentem, non tamen prout est in tali materia. Cognoscere vero id quod est in materia individuali, non prout est in tali materia, est abstrahere formam a materia individuali, quam repraesentant phantasmata. Et ideo necesse est dicere quod intellectus noster intelligit materialia abstrahendo a phantasmatibus; et per materialia sic considerata in immaterialium aliqualem cognitionem devenimus, sicut e contra angeli per immaterialia materialia cognoscunt. Plato vero, attendens solum ad immaterialitatem intellectus humani, non autem ad hoc quod est corpori quodammodo unitus, posuit obiectum intellectus ideas

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Therefore neither does the act of understanding take place by abstraction of something from the phantasm, but by the phantasm impressing itself on the intellect. Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) there are two things in the intellectual soul—the passive intellect and the active intellect. But it does not belong to the passive intellect to abstract the intelligible species from the phantasm, but to receive them when abstracted. Neither does it seem to be the function of the active intellect, which is related to the phantasm, as light is to color; since light does not abstract anything from color, but rather streams on to it. Therefore in no way do we understand by abstraction from phantasms. Obj. 5: Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 7) says that the intellect understands the species in the phantasm; and not, therefore, by abstraction. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that things are intelligible in proportion as they are separate from matter. Therefore material things must needs be understood according as they are abstracted from matter and from material images, namely, phantasms. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 84, A. 7), the object of knowledge is proportionate to the power of knowledge. Now there are three grades of the cognitive powers. For one cognitive power, namely, the sense, is the act of a corporeal organ. And therefore the object of every sensitive power is a form as existing in corporeal matter. And since such matter is the principle of individuality, therefore every power of the sensitive part can only have knowledge of the individual. There is another grade of cognitive power which is neither the act of a corporeal organ, nor in any way connected with corporeal matter; such is the angelic intellect, the object of whose cognitive power is therefore a form existing apart from matter: for though angels know material things, yet they do not know them save in something immaterial, namely, either in themselves or in God. But the human intellect holds a middle place: for it is not the act of an organ; yet it is a power of the soul which is the form of the body, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. 76, A. 1). And therefore it is proper to it to know a form existing individually in corporeal matter, but not as existing in this individual matter. But to know what is in individual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to abstract the form from individual matter which is represented by the phantasms. Therefore we must needs say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things, just as, on the contrary, angels know material things through the immaterial. But Plato, considering only the immateriality of the human intellect, and not its being in a way united to the body, held that the objects of the intellect are separate ideas; and

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separatas; et quod intelligimus, non quidem abstrahendo, sed magis abstracta participando, ut supra dictum est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod abstrahere contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum compositionis et divisionis; sicut cum intelligimus aliquid non esse in alio, vel esse separatum ab eo. Alio modo, per modum simplicis et absolutae considerationis; sicut cum intelligimus unum, nihil considerando de alio. Abstrahere igitur per intellectum ea quae secundum rem non sunt abstracta, secundum primum modum abstrahendi, non est absque falsitate. Sed secundo modo abstrahere per intellectum quae non sunt abstracta secundum rem, non habet falsitatem; ut in sensibilibus manifeste apparet. Si enim intelligamus vel dicamus colorem non inesse corpori colorato, vel esse separatum ab eo, erit falsitas in opinione vel in oratione. Si vero consideremus colorem et proprietates eius, nihil considerantes de pomo colorato; vel quod sic intelligimus, etiam voce exprimamus; erit absque falsitate opinionis et orationis. Pomum enim non est de ratione coloris; et ideo nihil prohibet colorem intelligi, nihil intelligendo de pomo. Similiter dico quod ea quae pertinent ad rationem speciei cuiuslibet rei materialis, puta lapidis aut hominis aut equi, possunt considerari sine principiis individualibus, quae non sunt de ratione speciei. Et hoc est abstrahere universale a particulari, vel speciem intelligibilem a phantasmatibus, considerare scilicet naturam speciei absque consideratione individualium principiorum, quae per phantasmata repraesentantur. Cum ergo dicitur quod intellectus est falsus qui intelligit rem aliter quam sit, verum est si ly aliter referatur ad rem intellectam. Tunc enim intellectus est falsus, quando intelligit rem esse aliter quam sit. Unde falsus esset intellectus, si sic abstraheret speciem lapidis a materia, ut intelligeret eam non esse in materia, ut Plato posuit. Non est autem verum quod proponitur, si ly aliter accipiatur ex parte intelligentis. Est enim absque falsitate ut alius sit modus intelligentis in intelligendo, quam modus rei in existendo, quia intellectum est in intelligente immaterialiter, per modum intellectus; non autem materialiter, per modum rei materialis.

Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam putaverunt quod species rei naturalis sit forma solum, et quod materia non sit pars speciei. Sed secundum hoc, in definitionibus rerum naturalium non poneretur materia. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod materia est duplex, scilicet communis, et signata vel individualis, communis quidem, ut caro et os; individualis autem, ut hae carnes et haec ossa. Intellectus igitur abstrahit speciem rei naturalis a materia sensibili individuali, non autem a materia sensibili communi. Sicut speciem hominis abstrahit ab his carnibus et his ossibus, quae non sunt de ratione

Q. 85, A. 1

that we understand not by abstraction, but by participating things abstract, as stated above (Q. 84, A. 1). Reply Obj. 1: Abstraction may occur in two ways: First, by way of composition and division; thus we may understand that one thing does not exist in some other, or that it is separate therefrom. Second, by way of simple and absolute consideration; thus we understand one thing without considering the other. Thus for the intellect to abstract one from another, things which are not really abstract from one another, does, in the first mode of abstraction, imply falsehood. But, in the second mode of abstraction, for the intellect to abstract things which are not really abstract from one another, does not involve falsehood, as clearly appears in the case of the senses. For if we understood or said that color is not in a colored body, or that it is separate from it, there would be error in this opinion or assertion. But if we consider color and its properties, without reference to the apple which is colored; or if we express in word what we thus understand, there is no error in such an opinion or assertion, because an apple is not essential to color, and therefore color can be understood independently of the apple. Likewise, the things which belong to the species of a material thing, such as a stone, or a man, or a horse, can be thought of apart from the individualizing principles which do not belong to the notion of the species. This is what we mean by abstracting the universal from the particular, or the intelligible species from the phantasm; that is, by considering the nature of the species apart from its individual qualities represented by the phantasms. If, therefore, the intellect is said to be false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is, that is so, if the word otherwise refers to the thing understood; for the intellect is false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is; and so the intellect would be false if it abstracted the species of a stone from its matter in such a way as to regard the species as not existing in matter, as Plato held. But it is not so, if the word otherwise be taken as referring to the one who understands. For it is quite true that the mode of understanding, in one who understands, is not the same as the mode of a thing in existing: since the thing understood is immaterially in the one who understands, according to the mode of the intellect, and not materially, according to the mode of a material thing. Reply Obj. 2: Some have thought that the species of a natural thing is a form only, and that matter is not part of the species. If that were so, matter would not enter into the definition of natural things. Therefore it must be said otherwise, that matter is twofold, common, and signate or individual; common, such as flesh and bone; and individual, as this flesh and these bones. The intellect therefore abstracts the species of a natural thing from the individual sensible matter, but not from the common sensible matter; for example, it abstracts the species of man from this flesh and these bones, which do not belong to the species as such, but

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speciei, sed sunt partes individui, ut dicitur in VII Metaphys.; et ideo sine eis considerari potest. Sed species hominis non potest abstrahi per intellectum a carnibus et ossibus. Species autem mathematicae possunt abstrahi per intellectum a materia sensibili non solum individuali, sed etiam communi; non tamen a materia intelligibili communi, sed solum individuali. Materia enim sensibilis dicitur materia corporalis secundum quod subiacet qualitatibus sensibilibus, scilicet calido et frigido, duro et molli, et huiusmodi. Materia vero intelligibilis dicitur substantia secundum quod subiacet quantitati. Manifestum est autem quod quantitas prius inest substantiae quam qualitates sensibiles. Unde quantitates, ut numeri et dimensiones et figurae, quae sunt terminationes quantitatum, possunt considerari absque qualitatibus sensibilibus, quod est eas abstrahi a materia sensibili, non tamen possunt considerari sine intellectu substantiae quantitati subiectae, quod esset eas abstrahi a materia intelligibili communi. Possunt tamen considerari sine hac vel illa substantia; quod est eas abstrahi a materia intelligibili individuali. Quaedam vero sunt quae possunt abstrahi etiam a materia intelligibili communi, sicut ens, unum, potentia et actus, et alia huiusmodi, quae etiam esse possunt absque omni materia, ut patet in substantiis immaterialibus. Et quia Plato non consideravit quod dictum est de duplici modo abstractionis, omnia quae diximus abstrahi per intellectum, posuit abstracta esse secundum rem. Ad tertium dicendum quod colores habent eundem modum existendi prout sunt in materia corporali individuali, sicut et potentia visiva, et ideo possunt imprimere suam similitudinem in visum. Sed phantasmata, cum sint similitudines individuorum, et existant in organis corporeis, non habent eundem modum existendi quem habet intellectus humanus, ut ex dictis patet; et ideo non possunt sua virtute imprimere in intellectum possibilem. Sed virtute intellectus agentis resultat quaedam similitudo in intellectu possibili ex conversione intellectus agentis supra phantasmata, quae quidem est repraesentativa eorum quorum sunt phantasmata, solum quantum ad naturam speciei. Et per hunc modum dicitur abstrahi species intelligibilis a phantasmatibus, non quod aliqua eadem numero forma, quae prius fuit in phantasmatibus, postmodum fiat in intellectu possibili, ad modum quo corpus accipitur ab uno loco et transfertur ad alterum. Ad quartum dicendum quod phantasmata et illuminantur ab intellectu agente; et iterum ab eis, per virtutem intellectus agentis, species intelligibiles abstrahuntur. Illuminantur quidem, quia, sicut pars sensitiva ex coniunctione ad intellectivam efficitur virtuosior, ita phantasmata ex virtute intellectus agentis redduntur habilia ut ab eis intentiones intelligibiles abstrahantur.

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to the individual (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 10), and need not be considered in the species: whereas the species of man cannot be abstracted by the intellect from flesh and bones. Mathematical species, however, can be abstracted by the intellect from sensible matter, not only from individual, but also from common matter; not from common intelligible matter, but only from individual matter. For sensible matter is corporeal matter as subject to sensible qualities, such as being cold or hot, hard or soft, and the like: while intelligible matter is substance as subject to quantity. Now it is manifest that quantity is in substance before other sensible qualities are. Hence quantities, such as number, dimension, and figures, which are the terminations of quantity, can be considered apart from sensible qualities; and this is to abstract them from sensible matter; but they cannot be considered without understanding the substance which is subject to the quantity; for that would be to abstract them from common intelligible matter. Yet they can be considered apart from this or that substance; for that is to abstract them from individual intelligible matter. But some things can be abstracted even from common intelligible matter, such as being, unity, power, act, and the like; all these can exist without matter, as is plain regarding immaterial things. Because Plato failed to consider the twofold kind of abstraction, as above explained (ad 1), he held that all those things which we have stated to be abstracted by the intellect, are abstract in reality. Reply Obj. 3: Colors, as being in individual corporeal matter, have the same mode of existence as the power of sight: therefore they can impress their own image on the eye. But phantasms, since they are images of individuals, and exist in corporeal organs, have not the same mode of existence as the human intellect, and therefore have not the power of themselves to make an impression on the passive intellect. This is done by the power of the active intellect which by turning towards the phantasm produces in the passive intellect a certain likeness which represents, as to its specific conditions only, the thing reflected in the phantasm. It is thus that the intelligible species is said to be abstracted from the phantasm; not that the identical form which previously was in the phantasm is subsequently in the passive intellect, as a body transferred from one place to another.

Reply Obj. 4: Not only does the active intellect throw light on the phantasm: it does more; by its own power it abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm. It throws light on the phantasm, because, just as the sensitive part acquires a greater power by its conjunction with the intellectual part, so by the power of the active intellect the phantasms are made more fit for the abstraction therefrom

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Abstrahit autem intellectus agens species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, inquantum per virtutem intellectus agentis accipere possumus in nostra consideratione naturas specierum sine individualibus conditionibus, secundum quarum similitudines intellectus possibilis informatur. Ad quintum dicendum quod intellectus noster et abstrahit species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, inquantum considerat naturas rerum in universali; et tamen intelligit eas in phantasmatibus, quia non potest intelligere etiam ea quorum species abstrahit, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut supra dictum est.

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of intelligible intentions. Furthermore, the active intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm, forasmuch as by the power of the active intellect we are able to disregard the conditions of individuality, and to take into our consideration the specific nature, the image of which informs the passive intellect. Reply Obj. 5: Our intellect both abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasms, inasmuch as it considers the natures of things in universal, and, nevertheless, understands these natures in the phantasms since it cannot understand even the things of which it abstracts the species, without turning to the phantasms, as we have said above (Q. 84, A. 7).

Article 2 Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus abstractae, se habeant ad intellectum nostrum sicut id quod intelligitur. Intellectum enim in actu est in intelligente, quia intellectum in actu est ipse intellectus in actu. Sed nihil de re intellecta est in intellectu actu intelligente, nisi species intelligibilis abstracta. Ergo huiusmodi species est ipsum intellectum in actu. Praeterea, intellectum in actu oportet in aliquo esse, alioquin nihil esset. Sed non est in re quae est extra animam, quia, cum res extra animam sit materialis, nihil quod est in ea, potest esse intellectum in actu. Relinquitur ergo quod intellectum in actu sit in intellectu. Et ita nihil est aliud quam species intelligibilis praedicta.

Objection 1: It would seem that the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood. For the understood in act is in the one who understands: since the understood in act is the intellect itself in act. But nothing of what is understood is in the intellect actually understanding, save the abstracted intelligible species. Therefore this species is what is actually understood. Obj. 2: Further, what is actually understood must be in something; else it would be nothing. But it is not in something outside the soul: for, since what is outside the soul is material, nothing therein can be actually understood. Therefore what is actually understood is in the intellect. Consequently it can be nothing else than the aforesaid intelligible species. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in I Periherm., quod Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (1 Peri Herm. i) voces sunt notae earum quae sunt in anima passionum. that words are signs of the passions in the soul. But words sigSed voces significant res intellectas, id enim voce signi- nify the things understood, for we express by word what we ficamus quod intelligimus. Ergo ipsae passiones animae, understand. Therefore these passions of the soul—viz. the scilicet species intelligibiles, sunt ea quae intelliguntur in intelligible species, are what is actually understood.

actu. Sed contra, species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum, sicut species sensibilis ad sensum. Sed species sensibilis non est illud quod sentitur, sed magis id quo sensus sentit. Ergo species intelligibilis non est quod intelligitur actu, sed id quo intelligit intellectus.

On the contrary, The intelligible species is to the intellect what the sensible image is to the sense. But the sensible image is not what is perceived, but rather that by which sense perceives. Therefore the intelligible species is not what is actually understood, but that by which the intellect understands. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt I answer that, Some have asserted that our intellecquod vires cognoscitivae quae sunt in nobis, nihil co- tual faculties know only the impression made on them; as, gnoscunt nisi proprias passiones; puta quod sensus non for example, that sense is cognizant only of the impression sentit nisi passionem sui organi. Et secundum hoc, intel- made on its own organ. According to this theory, the intellectus nihil intelligit nisi suam passionem, idest speciem lect understands only its own impression, namely, the inintelligibilem in se receptam. Et secundum hoc, species telligible species which it has received, so that this species huiusmodi est ipsum quod intelligitur. is what is understood.

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Sed haec opinio manifeste apparet falsa ex duobus. Primo quidem, quia eadem sunt quae intelligimus, et de quibus sunt scientiae. Si igitur ea quae intelligimus essent solum species quae sunt in anima, sequeretur quod scientiae omnes non essent de rebus quae sunt extra animam, sed solum de speciebus intelligibilibus quae sunt in anima; sicut secundum Platonicos omnes scientiae sunt de ideis, quas ponebant esse intellecta in actu. Secundo, quia sequeretur error antiquorum dicentium quod omne quod videtur est verum; et sic quod contradictoriae essent simul verae. Si enim potentia non cognoscit nisi propriam passionem, de ea solum iudicat. Sic autem videtur aliquid, secundum quod potentia cognoscitiva afficitur. Semper ergo iudicium potentiae cognoscitivae erit de eo quod iudicat, scilicet de propria passione, secundum quod est; et ita omne iudicium erit verum. Puta si gustus non sentit nisi propriam passionem, cum aliquis habens sanum gustum iudicat mel esse dulce, vere iudicabit; et similiter si ille qui habet gustum infectum, iudicet mel esse amarum, vere iudicabit, uterque enim iudicat secundum quod gustus eius afficitur. Et sic sequitur quod omnis opinio aequaliter erit vera, et universaliter omnis acceptio. Et ideo dicendum est quod species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum ut quo intelligit intellectus. Quod sic patet. Cum enim sit duplex actio, sicut dicitur IX Metaphys., una quae manet in agente, ut videre et intelligere, altera quae transit in rem exteriorem, ut calefacere et secare; utraque fit secundum aliquam formam. Et sicut forma secundum quam provenit actio tendens in rem exteriorem, est similitudo obiecti actionis, ut calor calefacientis est similitudo calefacti; similiter forma secundum quam provenit actio manens in agente, est similitudo obiecti. Unde similitudo rei visibilis est secundum quam visus videt; et similitudo rei intellectae, quae est species intelligibilis, est forma secundum quam intellectus intelligit. Sed quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, secundum eandem reflexionem intelligit et suum intelligere, et speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellectiva secundario est id quod intelligitur. Sed id quod intelligitur primo, est res cuius species intelligibilis est similitudo. Et hoc etiam patet ex antiquorum opinione, qui ponebant simile simili cognosci. Ponebant enim quod anima per terram quae in ipsa erat, cognosceret terram quae extra ipsam erat; et sic de aliis. Si ergo accipiamus speciem terrae loco terrae, secundum doctrinam Aristotelis, qui dicit quod lapis non est in anima, sed species lapidis; sequetur quod anima per species intelligibiles cognoscat res quae sunt extra animam.

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This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons. First, because the things we understand are the objects of science; therefore if what we understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul, it would follow that every science would not be concerned with objects outside the soul, but only with the intelligible species within the soul; thus, according to the teaching of the Platonists all science is about ideas, which they held to be actually understood. Second, it is untrue, because it would lead to the opinion of the ancients who maintained that whatever seems, is true, and that consequently contradictories are true simultaneously. For if the faculty knows its own impression only, it can judge of that only. Now a thing seems according to the impression made on the cognitive faculty. Consequently the cognitive faculty will always judge of its own impression as such; and so every judgment will be true: for instance, if taste perceived only its own impression, when anyone with a healthy taste perceives that honey is sweet, he would judge truly; and if anyone with a corrupt taste perceives that honey is bitter, this would be equally true; for each would judge according to the impression on his taste. Thus every opinion would be equally true; in fact, every sort of apprehension.

Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is related to the intellect as that by which it understands: which is proved thus. There is a twofold action (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8), one which remains in the agent; for instance, to see and to understand; and another which passes into an external object; for instance, to heat and to cut; and each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some form. And as the form from which proceeds an act tending to something external is the likeness of the object of the action, as heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing heated; so the form from which proceeds an action remaining in the agent is the likeness of the object. Hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing; and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species, is the form by which the intellect understands. But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own act of intelligence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily; but that which is primarily understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness. This also appears from the opinion of the ancient philosophers, who said that like is known by like. For they said that the soul knows the earth outside itself, by the earth within itself; and so of the rest. If, therefore, we take the species of the earth instead of the earth, according to Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), who says that a stone is not in the soul, but only the likeness of the stone; it follows that the soul knows external things by means of its intelligible species. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectum est in Reply Obj. 1: The thing understood is in the intellect intelligente per suam similitudinem. Et per hunc mo- by its own likeness; and it is in this sense that we say that the dum dicitur quod intellectum in actu est intellectus in thing actually understood is the intellect in act, because the

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actu, inquantum similitudo rei intellectae est forma intellectus; sicut similitudo rei sensibilis est forma sensus in actu. Unde non sequitur quod species intelligibilis abstracta sit id quod actu intelligitur, sed quod sit similitudo eius. Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur intellectum in actu, duo importantur, scilicet res quae intelligitur, et hoc quod est ipsum intelligi. Et similiter cum dicitur universale abstractum, duo intelliguntur, scilicet ipsa natura rei, et abstractio seu universalitas. Ipsa igitur natura cui accidit vel intelligi vel abstrahi, vel intentio universalitatis, non est nisi in singularibus; sed hoc ipsum quod est intelligi vel abstrahi, vel intentio universalitatis, est in intellectu. Et hoc possumus videre per simile in sensu. Visus enim videt colorem pomi sine eius odore. Si ergo quaeratur ubi sit color qui videtur sine odore manifestum est quod color qui videtur, non est nisi in pomo; sed quod sit sine odore perceptus, hoc accidit ei ex parte visus, inquantum in visu est similitudo coloris et non odoris. Similiter humanitas quae intelligitur, non est nisi in hoc vel in illo homine, sed quod humanitas apprehendatur sine individualibus conditionibus, quod est ipsam abstrahi, ad quod sequitur intentio universalitatis, accidit humanitatis secundum quod percipitur ab intellectu, in quo est similitudo naturae speciei, et non individualium principiorum. Ad tertium dicendum quod in parte sensitiva invenitur duplex operatio. Una secundum solam immutationem, et sic perficitur operatio sensus per hoc quod immutatur a sensibili. Alia operatio est formatio, secundum quod vis imaginativa format sibi aliquod idolum rei absentis, vel etiam nunquam visae. Et utraque haec operatio coniungitur in intellectu. Nam primo quidem consideratur passio intellectus possibilis secundum quod informatur specie intelligibili. Qua quidem formatus, format secundo vel definitionem vel divisionem vel compositionem, quae per vocem significatur. Unde ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio; et enuntiatio significat compositionem et divisionem intellectus. Non ergo voces significant ipsas species intelligibiles; sed ea quae intellectus sibi format ad iudicandum de rebus exterioribus.

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likeness of the thing understood is the form of the intellect, as the likeness of a sensible thing is the form of the sense in act. Hence it does not follow that the intelligible species abstracted is what is actually understood; but rather that it is the likeness thereof. Reply Obj. 2: In these words the thing actually understood there is a double implication—the thing which is understood, and the fact that it is understood. In like manner the words abstract universal imply two things, the nature of a thing and its abstraction or universality. Therefore the nature itself to which it occurs to be understood, abstracted or considered as universal is only in individuals; but that it is understood, abstracted or considered as universal is in the intellect. We see something similar to this is in the senses. For the sight sees the color of the apple apart from its smell. If therefore it be asked where is the color which is seen apart from the smell, it is quite clear that the color which is seen is only in the apple: but that it be perceived apart from the smell, this is owing to the sight, forasmuch as the faculty of sight receives the likeness of color and not of smell. In like manner humanity understood is only in this or that man; but that humanity be apprehended without conditions of individuality, that is, that it be abstracted and consequently considered as universal, occurs to humanity inasmuch as it is brought under the consideration of the intellect, in which there is a likeness of the specific nature, but not of the principles of individuality. Reply Obj. 3: There are two operations in the sensitive part. One, in regard of impression only, and thus the operation of the senses takes place by the senses being impressed by the sensible. The other is formation, inasmuch as the imagination forms for itself an image of an absent thing, or even of something never seen. Both of these operations are found in the intellect. For in the first place there is the passion of the passive intellect as informed by the intelligible species; and then the passive intellect thus informed forms a definition, or a division, or a composition, expressed by a word. Wherefore the concept conveyed by a word is its definition; and a proposition conveys the intellect’s division or composition. Words do not therefore signify the intelligible species themselves; but that which the intellect forms for itself for the purpose of judging of external things.

Article 3 Whether the more universal is first in our intellectual cognition? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod magis universalia non sint priora in nostra cognitione intellectuali. Quia ea quae sunt priora et notiora secundum naturam, sunt posteriora et minus nota secundum nos. Sed universalia sunt priora secundum naturam, quia prius

Objection 1: It would seem that the more universal is not first in our intellectual cognition. For what is first and more known in its own nature, is secondarily and less known in relation to ourselves. But universals come first as regards their nature, because that is first which does not in-

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est a quo non convertitur subsistendi consequentia. Ergo universalia sunt posteriora in cognitione nostri intellectus. Praeterea, composita sunt priora quoad nos quam simplicia. Sed universalia sunt simpliciora. Ergo sunt posterius nota quoad nos. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in I Physic. quod definitum prius cadit in cognitione nostra quam partes definitionis. Sed universaliora sunt partes definitionis minus universalium, sicut animal est pars definitionis hominis. Ergo universalia sunt posterius nota quoad nos. Praeterea, per effectus devenimus in causas et principia. Sed universalia sunt quaedam principia. Ergo universalia sunt posterius nota quoad nos. Sed contra est quod dicitur in I Physic., quod ex universalibus in singularia oportet devenire. Respondeo dicendum quod in cognitione nostri intellectus duo oportet considerare. Primo quidem, quod cognitio intellectiva aliquo modo a sensitiva primordium sumit. Et quia sensus est singularium, intellectus autem universalium; necesse est quod cognitio singularium, quoad nos, prior sit quam universalium cognitio. Secundo oportet considerare quod intellectus noster de potentia in actum procedit. Omne autem quod procedit de potentia in actum, prius pervenit ad actum incompletum, qui est medius inter potentiam et actum, quam ad actum perfectum. Actus autem perfectus ad quem pervenit intellectus, est scientia completa, per quam distincte et determinate res cognoscuntur. Actus autem incompletus est scientia imperfecta, per quam sciuntur res indistincte sub quadam confusione, quod enim sic cognoscitur, secundum quid cognoscitur in actu, et quodammodo in potentia. Unde philosophus dicit, in I Physic., quod sunt primo nobis manifesta et certa confusa magis; posterius autem cognoscimus distinguendo distincte principia et elementa. Manifestum est autem quod cognoscere aliquid in quo plura continentur, sine hoc quod habeatur propria notitia uniuscuiusque eorum quae continentur in illo, est cognoscere aliquid sub confusione quadam. Sic autem potest cognosci tam totum universale, in quo partes continentur in potentia, quam etiam totum integrale, utrumque enim totum potest cognosci in quadam confusione, sine hoc quod partes distincte cognoscantur. Cognoscere autem distincte id quod continetur in toto universali, est habere cognitionem de re minus communi. Sicut cognoscere animal indistincte, est cognoscere animal inquantum est animal, cognoscere autem animal distincte, est cognoscere animal inquantum est animal rationale vel irrationale, quod est cognoscere hominem vel leonem. Prius igitur occurrit intellectui nostro cognoscere animal quam cognoscere hominem, et eadem ratio est si comparemus quodcumque magis universale ad minus universale.

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volve the existence of its correlative (Categor. ix). Therefore the universals are secondarily known as regards our intellect. Obj. 2: Further, the composition precedes the simple in relation to us. But universals are the more simple. Therefore they are known secondarily by us. Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1), that the object defined comes in our knowledge before the parts of its definition. But the more universal is part of the definition of the less universal, as animal is part of the definition of man. Therefore the universals are secondarily known by us. Obj. 4: Further, we know causes and principles by their effects. But universals are principles. Therefore universals are secondarily known by us. On the contrary, We must proceed from the universal to the singular and individual (Phys. i, 1). I answer that, In our knowledge there are two things to be considered. First, that intellectual knowledge in some degree arises from sensible knowledge: and, because sense has singular and individual things for its object, and intellect has the universal for its object, it follows that our knowledge of the former comes before our knowledge of the latter. Second, we must consider that our intellect proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality; and every power thus proceeding from potentiality to actuality comes first to an incomplete act, which is the medium between potentiality and actuality, before accomplishing the perfect act. The perfect act of the intellect is complete knowledge, when the object is distinctly and determinately known; whereas the incomplete act is imperfect knowledge, when the object is known indistinctly, and as it were confusedly. A thing thus imperfectly known, is known partly in act and partly in potentiality, and hence the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1), that what is manifest and certain is known to us at first confusedly; afterwards we know it by distinguishing its principles and elements. Now it is evident that to know an object that comprises many things, without proper knowledge of each thing contained in it, is to know that thing confusedly. In this way we can have knowledge not only of the universal whole, which contains parts potentially, but also of the integral whole; for each whole can be known confusedly, without its parts being known. But to know distinctly what is contained in the universal whole is to know the less common, as to know animal indistinctly is to know it as animal; whereas to know animal distinctly is know it as rational or irrational animal, that is, to know a man or a lion: therefore our intellect knows animal before it knows man; and the same reason holds in comparing any more universal idea with the less universal.

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Et quia sensus exit de potentia in actum sicut et intellectus, idem etiam ordo cognitionis apparet in sensu. Nam prius secundum sensum diiudicamus magis commune quam minus commune, et secundum locum et secundum tempus. Secundum locum quidem, sicut, cum aliquid videtur a remotis, prius deprehenditur esse corpus, quam deprehendatur esse animal; et prius deprehenditur esse animal, quam deprehendatur esse homo; et prius homo, quam Socrates vel Plato. Secundum tempus autem, quia puer a principio prius distinguit hominem a non homine, quam distinguat hunc hominem ab alio homine; et ideo pueri a principio appellant omnes viros patres, posterius autem determinant unumquemque, ut dicitur in I Physic. Et huius ratio manifesta est. Quia qui scit aliquid indistincte, adhuc est in potentia ut sciat distinctionis principium; sicut qui scit genus, est in potentia ut sciat differentiam. Et sic patet quod cognitio indistincta media est inter potentiam et actum. Est ergo dicendum quod cognitio singularium est prior quoad nos quam cognitio universalium, sicut cognitio sensitiva quam cognitio intellectiva. Sed tam secundum sensum quam secundum intellectum, cognitio magis communis est prior quam cognitio minus communis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod universale dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod natura universalis consideratur simul cum intentione universalitatis. Et cum intentio universalitatis, ut scilicet unum et idem habeat habitudinem ad multa, proveniat ex abstractione intellectus, oportet quod secundum hunc modum universale sit posterius. Unde in I de Anima dicitur quod animal universale aut nihil est, aut posterius est. Sed secundum Platonem, qui posuit universalia subsistentia, secundum hanc considerationem universale esset prius quam particularia, quae secundum eum non sunt nisi per participationem universalium subsistentium, quae dicuntur ideae. Alio modo potest considerari quantum ad ipsam naturam, scilicet animalitatis vel humanitatis, prout invenitur in particularibus. Et sic dicendum est quod duplex est ordo naturae. Unus secundum viam generationis et temporis, secundum quam viam, ea quae sunt imperfecta et in potentia, sunt priora. Et hoc modo magis commune est prius secundum naturam, quod apparet manifeste in generatione hominis et animalis; nam prius generatur animal quam homo, ut dicitur in libro de Generat. Animal. Alius est ordo perfectionis, sive intentionis naturae; sicut actus simpliciter est prius secundum naturam quam potentia, et perfectum prius quam imperfectum. Et per hunc modum, minus commune est prius secundum naturam quam magis commune, ut homo quam animal, naturae enim intentio non sistit in generatione animalis, sed intendit generare hominem.

Q. 85, A. 3

Moreover, as sense, like the intellect, proceeds from potentiality to act, the same order of knowledge appears in the senses. For by sense we judge of the more common before the less common, in reference both to place and time; in reference to place, when a thing is seen afar off it is seen to be a body before it is seen to be an animal; and to be an animal before it is seen to be a man, and to be a man before it seen to be Socrates or Plato; and the same is true as regards time, for a child can distinguish man from not man before he distinguishes this man from that, and therefore children at first call men fathers, and later on distinguish each one from the others (Phys. i, 1). The reason of this is clear: because he who knows a thing indistinctly is in a state of potentiality as regards its principle of distinction; as he who knows genus is in a state of potentiality as regards difference. Thus it is evident that indistinct knowledge is midway between potentiality and act. We must therefore conclude that knowledge of the singular and individual is prior, as regards us, to the knowledge of the universal; as sensible knowledge is prior to intellectual knowledge. But in both sense and intellect the knowledge of the more common precedes the knowledge of the less common. Reply Obj. 1: The universal can be considered in two ways. First, the universal nature may be considered together with the intention of universality. And since the intention of universality—viz. the relation of one and the same to many—is due to intellectual abstraction, the universal thus considered is a secondary consideration. Hence it is said (De Anima i, 1) that the universal animal is either nothing or something secondary. But according to Plato, who held that universals are subsistent, the universal considered thus would be prior to the particular, for the latter, according to him, are mere participations of the subsistent universals which he called ideas. Second, the universal can be considered in the nature itself—for instance, animality or humanity as existing in the individual. And thus we must distinguish two orders of nature: one, by way of generation and time; and thus the imperfect and the potential come first. In this way the more common comes first in the order of nature; as appears clearly in the generation of man and animal; for the animal is generated before man, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal ii, 3). The other order is the order of perfection or of the intention of nature: for instance, act considered absolutely is naturally prior to potentiality, and the perfect to the imperfect: thus the less common comes naturally before the more common; as man comes before animal. For the intention of nature does not stop at the generation of animal but goes on to the generation of man.

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Man

Ad secundum dicendum quod universale magis commune comparatur ad minus commune ut totum et ut pars. Ut totum quidem, secundum quod in magis universali non solum continetur in potentia minus universale, sed etiam alia; ut sub animali non solum homo, sed etiam equus. Ut pars autem, secundum quod minus commune continet in sui ratione non solum magis commune, sed etiam alia; ut homo non solum animal, sed etiam rationale. Sic igitur animal consideratum in se, prius est in nostra cognitione quam homo; sed homo est prius in nostra cognitione quam quod animal sit pars rationis eius. Ad tertium dicendum quod pars aliqua dupliciter potest cognosci. Uno modo absolute, secundum quod in se est, et sic nihil prohibet prius cognoscere partes quam totum, ut lapides quam domum. Alio modo, secundum quod sunt partes huius totius, et sic necesse est quod prius cognoscamus totum quam partes; prius enim cognoscimus domum quadam confusa cognitione, quam distinguamus singulas partes eius. Sic igitur dicendum est quod definientia, absolute considerata, sunt prius nota quam definitum, alioquin non notificaretur definitum per ea. Sed secundum quod sunt partes definitionis, sic sunt posterius nota, prius enim cognoscimus hominem quadam confusa cognitione, quam sciamus distinguere omnia quae sunt de hominis ratione. Ad quartum dicendum quod universale, secundum quod accipitur cum intentione universalitatis, est quidem quodammodo principium cognoscendi, prout intentio universalitatis consequitur modum intelligendi qui est per abstractionem. Non autem est necesse quod omne quod est principium cognoscendi, sit principium essendi, ut Plato existimavit, cum quandoque cognoscamus causam per effectum, et substantiam per accidentia. Unde universale sic acceptum, secundum sententiam Aristotelis, non est principium essendi, neque substantia, ut patet in VII Metaphys. Si autem consideremus ipsam naturam generis et speciei prout est in singularibus, sic quodammodo habet rationem principii formalis respectu singularium, nam singulare est propter materiam, ratio autem speciei sumitur ex forma. Sed natura generis comparatur ad naturam speciei magis per modum materialis principii, quia natura generis sumitur ab eo quod est materiale in re, ratio vero speciei ab eo quod est formale; sicut ratio animalis a sensitivo, ratio vero hominis ab intellectivo. Et inde est quod ultima naturae intentio est ad speciem, non autem ad individuum, neque ad genus, quia forma est finis generationis, materia vero est propter formam. Non autem oportet quod cuiuslibet causae vel principii cognitio sit posterior quoad nos, cum quandoque cognoscamus per causas sensibiles, effectus ignotos; quandoque autem e converso.

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Reply Obj. 2: The more common universal may be compared to the less common, as the whole, and as the part. As the whole, considering that in the more universal is potentially contained not only the less universal, but also other things, as in animal is contained not only man but also horse. As part, considering that the less common contains in its idea not only the more common, but also more; as man contains not only animal but also rational. Therefore animal in itself comes into our knowledge before man; but man comes before animal considered as part of the same idea. Reply Obj. 3: A part can be known in two ways. First, absolutely considered in itself; and thus nothing prevents the parts being known before the whole, as stones are known before a house is known. Second as belonging to a certain whole; and thus we must needs know the whole before its parts. For we know a house vaguely before we know its different parts. So likewise principles of definition are known before the thing defined is known; otherwise the thing defined would not be known at all. But as parts of the definition they are known after. For we know man vaguely as man before we know how to distinguish all that belongs to human nature.

Reply Obj. 4: The universal, as understood with the intention of universality, is, indeed, in a way, a principle of knowledge, in so far as the intention of universality results from the mode of understanding by way of abstraction. But what is a principle of knowledge is not of necessity a principle of existence, as Plato thought: since at times we know a cause through its effect, and substance through accidents. Wherefore the universal thus considered, according to the opinion of Aristotle, is neither a principle of existence, nor a substance, as he makes clear (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 13). But if we consider the generic or specific nature itself as existing in the singular, thus in a way it is in the nature of a formal principle in regard to the singulars: for the singular is the result of matter, while the idea of species is from the form. But the generic nature is compared to the specific nature rather after the fashion of a material principle, because the generic nature is taken from that which is material in a thing, while the idea of species is taken from that which is formal: thus the notion of animal is taken from the sensitive part, whereas the notion of man is taken from the intellectual part. Thus it is that the ultimate intention of nature is to the species and not to the individual, or the genus: because the form is the end of generation, while matter is for the sake of the form. Neither is it necessary that, as regards us, knowledge of any cause or principle should be secondary: since at times through sensible causes we become acquainted with unknown effects, and sometimes conversely.

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Q. 85, A. 4

Article 4 Whether we can understand many things at the same time? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod possimus multa simul intelligere. Intellectus enim est supra tempus. Sed prius et posterius ad tempus pertinent. Ergo intellectus non intelligit diversa secundum prius et posterius, sed simul. Praeterea, nihil prohibet diversas formas non oppositas simul eidem actu inesse, sicut odorem et colorem pomo. Sed species intelligibiles non sunt oppositae. Ergo nihil prohibet intellectum unum simul fieri in actu secundum diversas species intelligibiles et sic potest multa simul intelligere. Praeterea, intellectus simul intelligit aliquod totum, ut hominem vel domum. Sed in quolibet toto continentur multae partes. Ergo intellectus simul multa intelligit. Praeterea, non potest cognosci differentia unius ad alterum, nisi simul utrumque apprehendatur, ut dicitur in libro de Anima, et eadem ratio est de quacumque alia comparatione. Sed intellectus noster cognoscit differentiam et comparationem unius ad alterum. Ergo cognoscit multa simul. Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro Topic., quod intelligere est unum solum, scire vero multa. Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus quidem potest multa intelligere per modum unius, non autem multa per modum multorum, dico autem per modum unius vel multorum, per unam vel plures species intelligibiles. Nam modus cuiusque actionis consequitur formam quae est actionis principium. Quaecumque ergo intellectus potest intelligere sub una specie, simul intelligere potest, et inde est quod Deus omnia simul videt, quia omnia videt per unum, quod est essentia sua. Quaecumque vero intellectus per diversas species intelligit, non simul intelligit. Et huius ratio est, quia impossibile est idem subiectum perfici simul pluribus formis unius generis et diversarum specierum, sicut impossibile est quod idem corpus secundum idem simul coloretur diversis coloribus, vel figuretur diversis figuris. Omnes autem species intelligibiles sunt unius generis, quia sunt perfectiones unius intellectivae potentiae; licet res quarum sunt species, sint diversorum generum. Impossibile est ergo quod idem intellectus simul perficiatur diversis speciebus intelligibilibus, ad intelligendum diversa in actu. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectus est supra tempus quod est numerus motus corporalium rerum. Sed ipsa pluralitas specierum intelligibilium causat vicissitudinem quandam intelligibilium operationum, secundum quam una operatio est prior altera. Et hanc

Objection 1: It would seem that we can understand many things at the same time. For intellect is above time, whereas the succession of before and after belongs to time. Therefore the intellect does not understand different things in succession, but at the same time. Obj. 2: Further, there is nothing to prevent different forms not opposed to each other from actually being in the same subject, as, for instance, color and smell are in the apple. But intelligible species are not opposed to each other. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the same intellect being in act as regards different intelligible species, and thus it can understand many things at the same time. Obj. 3: Further, the intellect understands a whole at the same time, such as a man or a house. But a whole contains many parts. Therefore the intellect understands many things at the same time. Obj. 4: Further, we cannot know the difference between two things unless we know both at the same time (De Anima iii, 2), and the same is to be said of any other comparison. But our intellect knows the difference and comparison between one thing and another. Therefore it knows many things at the same time. On the contrary, It is said (Topic. ii, 10) that understanding is of one thing only, knowledge is of many. I answer that, The intellect can, indeed, understand many things as one, but not as many: that is to say by one but not by many intelligible species. For the mode of every action follows the form which is the principle of that action. Therefore whatever things the intellect can understand under one species, it can understand at the same time: hence it is that God sees all things at the same time, because He sees all in one, that is, in His Essence. But whatever things the intellect understands under different species, it does not understand at the same time. The reason of this is that it is impossible for one and the same subject to be perfected at the same time by many forms of one genus and diverse species, just as it is impossible for one and the same body at the same time to have different colors or different shapes. Now all intelligible species belong to one genus, because they are the perfections of one intellectual faculty: although the things which the species represent belong to different genera. Therefore it is impossible for one and the same intellect to be perfected at the same time by different intelligible species so as actually to understand different things. Reply Obj. 1: The intellect is above that time, which is the measure of the movement of corporeal things. But the multitude itself of intelligible species causes a certain vicissitude of intelligible operations, according as one operation succeeds another. And this vicissitude is called time by Au-

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Man

vicissitudinem Augustinus nominat tempus, cum dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., quod Deus movet creaturam spiritualem per tempus. Ad secundum dicendum quod non solum oppositae formae non possunt esse simul in eodem subiecto, sed nec quaecumque formae eiusdem generis, licet non sint oppositae, sicut patet per exemplum inductum de coloribus et figuris. Ad tertium dicendum quod partes possunt intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, sub quadam confusione, prout sunt in toto, et sic cognoscuntur per unam formam totius, et sic simul cognoscuntur. Alio modo, cognitione distincta, secundum quod quaelibet cognoscitur per suam speciem, et sic non simul intelliguntur. Ad quartum dicendum quod quando intellectus intelligit differentiam vel comparationem unius ad alterum, cognoscit utrumque differentium vel comparatorum sub ratione ipsius comparationis vel differentiae; sicut dictum est quod cognoscit partes sub ratione totius.

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gustine, who says (Gen ad lit. viii, 20, 22), that God moves the spiritual creature through time. Reply Obj. 2: Not only is it impossible for opposite forms to exist at the same time in the same subject, but neither can any forms belonging to the same genus, although they be not opposed to one another, as is clear from the examples of colors and shapes. Reply Obj. 3: Parts can be understood in two ways. First, in a confused way, as existing in the whole, and thus they are known through the one form of the whole, and so are known together. In another way they are known distinctly: thus each is known by its species; and so they are not understood at the same time. Reply Obj. 4: If the intellect sees the difference or comparison between one thing and another, it knows both in relation to their difference or comparison; just, as we have said above (ad 3), as it knows the parts in the whole.

Article 5 Whether our intellect understands by composition and division? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster non intelligat componendo et dividendo. Compositio enim et divisio non est nisi multorum. Sed intellectus non potest simul multa intelligere. Ergo non potest intelligere componendo et dividendo. Praeterea, omni compositioni et divisioni adiungitur tempus praesens, praeteritum vel futurum. Sed intellectus abstrahit a tempore, sicut etiam ab aliis particularibus conditionibus. Ergo intellectus non intelligit componendo et dividendo. Praeterea, intellectus intelligit per assimilationem ad res. Sed compositio et divisio nihil est in rebus, nihil enim invenitur in rebus nisi res quae significatur per praedicatum et subiectum, quae est una et eadem si compositio est vera; homo enim est vere id quod est animal. Ergo intellectus non componit et dividit. Sed contra, voces significant conceptiones intellectus, ut dicit philosophus in I Periherm. Sed in vocibus est compositio et divisio; ut patet in propositionibus affirmativis et negativis. Ergo intellectus componit et dividit. Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus humanus necesse habet intelligere componendo et dividendo. Cum enim intellectus humanus exeat de potentia in actum, similitudinem quandam habet cum rebus generabilibus, quae non statim perfectionem suam habent, sed eam successive acquirunt. Et similiter intellectus huma-

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect does not understand by composition and division. For composition and division are only of many; whereas the intellect cannot understand many things at the same time. Therefore it cannot understand by composition and division. Obj. 2: Further, every composition and division implies past, present, or future time. But the intellect abstracts from time, as also from other individual conditions. Therefore the intellect does not understand by composition and division. Obj. 3: Further, the intellect understands things by a process of assimilation to them. But composition and division are not in things, for nothing is in things but what is signified by the predicate and the subject, and which is one and the same, provided that the composition be true, for man is truly what animal is. Therefore the intellect does not act by composition and division. On the contrary, Words signify the conceptions of the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i). But in words we find composition and division, as appears in affirmative and negative propositions. Therefore the intellect acts by composition and division. I answer that, The human intellect must of necessity understand by composition and division. For since the intellect passes from potentiality to act, it has a likeness to things which are generated, which do not attain to perfection all at once but acquire it by degrees: so likewise the human intellect does not acquire perfect knowledge by the

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nus non statim in prima apprehensione capit perfectam rei cognitionem; sed primo apprehendit aliquid de ipsa, puta quidditatem ipsius rei, quae est primum et proprium obiectum intellectus; et deinde intelligit proprietates et accidentia et habitudines circumstantes rei essentiam. Et secundum hoc, necesse habet unum apprehensum alii componere vel dividere; et ex una compositione vel divisione ad aliam procedere, quod est ratiocinari. Intellectus autem angelicus et divinus se habet sicut res incorruptibiles, quae statim a principio habent suam totam perfectionem. Unde intellectus angelicus et divinus statim perfecte totam rei cognitionem habet. Unde in cognoscendo quidditatem rei, cognoscit de re simul quidquid nos cognoscere possumus componendo et dividendo et ratiocinando. Et ideo intellectus humanus cognoscit componendo et dividendo, sicut et ratiocinando. Intellectus autem divinus et angelicus cognoscunt quidem compositionem et divisionem et ratiocinationem, non componendo et dividendo et ratiocinando, sed per intellectum simplicis quidditatis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod compositio et divisio intellectus secundum quandam differentiam vel comparationem fit. Unde sic intellectus cognoscit multa componendo et dividendo, sicut cognoscendo differentiam vel comparationem rerum. Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus et abstrahit a phantasmatibus; et tamen non intelligit actu nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, sicut supra dictum est. Et ex ea parte qua se ad phantasmata convertit, compositioni et divisioni intellectus adiungitur tempus. Ad tertium dicendum quod similitudo rei recipitur in intellectu secundum modum intellectus, et non secundum modum rei. Unde compositioni et divisioni intellectus respondet quidem aliquid ex parte rei; tamen non eodem modo se habet in re, sicut in intellectu. Intellectus enim humani proprium obiectum est quidditas rei materialis, quae sub sensu et imaginatione cadit. Invenitur autem duplex compositio in re materiali. Prima quidem, formae ad materiam, et huic respondet compositio intellectus qua totum universale de sua parte praedicatur; nam genus sumitur a materia communi, differentia vero completiva speciei a forma, particulare vero a materia individuali. Secunda vero compositio est accidentis ad subiectum, et huic reali compositioni respondet compositio intellectus secundum quam praedicatur accidens de subiecto, ut cum dicitur, homo est albus. Tamen differt compositio intellectus a compositione rei, nam ea quae componuntur in re, sunt diversa; compositio autem intellectus est signum identitatis eorum quae componuntur. Non enim intellectus sic componit, ut dicat quod homo est albedo; sed dicit quod homo est albus, idest habens albedinem, idem autem est subiecto quod est homo, et quod est habens albedinem. Et simi-

Q. 85, A. 5

first act of apprehension; but it first apprehends something about its object, such as its quiddity, and this is its first and proper object; and then it understands the properties, accidents, and the various relations of the essence. Thus it necessarily compares one thing with another by composition or division; and from one composition and division it proceeds to another, which is the process of reasoning.

But the angelic and the Divine intellect, like all incorruptible things, have their perfection at once from the beginning. Hence the angelic and the Divine intellect have the entire knowledge of a thing at once and perfectly; and hence also in knowing the quiddity of a thing they know at once whatever we can know by composition, division, and reasoning. Therefore the human intellect knows by composition, division and reasoning. But the Divine intellect and the angelic intellect know, indeed, composition, division, and reasoning, not by the process itself, but by understanding the simple essence. Reply Obj. 1: Composition and division of the intellect are made by differentiating and comparing. Hence the intellect knows many things by composition and division, as by knowing the difference and comparison of things. Reply Obj. 2: Although the intellect abstracts from the phantasms, it does not understand actually without turning to the phantasms, as we have said (A. 1; Q. 84, A. 7). And forasmuch as it turns to the phantasms, composition and division of the intellect involve time. Reply Obj. 3: The likeness of a thing is received into the intellect according to the mode of the intellect, not according to the mode of the thing. Wherefore something on the part of the thing corresponds to the composition and division of the intellect; but it does not exist in the same way in the intellect and in the thing. For the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity of a material thing, which comes under the action of the senses and the imagination. Now in a material thing there is a twofold composition. First, there is the composition of form with matter; and to this corresponds that composition of the intellect whereby the universal whole is predicated of its part: for the genus is derived from common matter, while the difference that completes the species is derived from the form, and the particular from individual matter. The second comparison is of accident with subject: and to this real composition corresponds that composition of the intellect, whereby accident is predicated of subject, as when we say the man is white. Nevertheless composition of the intellect differs from composition of things; for in the latter the things are diverse, whereas composition of the intellect is a sign of the identity of the components. For the above composition of the intellect does not imply that man and whiteness are identical, but

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Man

le est de compositione formae et materiae, nam animal significat id quod habet naturam sensitivam, rationale vero quod habet naturam intellectivam, homo vero quod habet utrumque, Socrates vero quod habet omnia haec cum materia individuali; et secundum hanc identitatis rationem, intellectus noster unum componit alteri praedicando.

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the assertion, the man is white, means that the man is something having whiteness: and the subject, which is a man, is identified with a subject having whiteness. It is the same with the composition of form and matter: for animal signifies that which has a sensitive nature; rational, that which has an intellectual nature; man, that which has both; and Socrates that which has all these things together with individual matter; and according to this kind of identity our intellect predicates the composition of one thing with another.

Article 6 Whether the intellect can be false? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus possit esse falsus. Dicit enim philosophus, in VI Metaphys., quod verum et falsum sunt in mente. Mens autem et intellectus idem sunt, ut supra dictum est. Ergo falsitas est in intellectu. Praeterea, opinio et ratiocinatio ad intellectum pertinent. Sed in utraque istarum invenitur falsitas. Ergo potest esse falsitas in intellectu. Praeterea, peccatum in parte intellectiva est. Sed peccatum cum falsitate est, errant enim qui operantur malum, ut dicitur Prov. XIV. Ergo falsitas potest esse in intellectu. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro Octoginta trium Quaest., quod omnis qui fallitur, id in quo fallitur non intelligit. Et philosophus dicit, in libro de Anima, quod intellectus semper est rectus. Respondeo dicendum quod philosophus, in III de Anima, comparat, quantum ad hoc, intellectum sensui. Sensus enim circa proprium obiectum non decipitur, sicut visus circa colorem; nisi forte per accidens, ex impedimento circa organum contingente, sicut cum gustus febrientium dulcia iudicat amara, propter hoc quod lingua malis humoribus est repleta. Circa sensibilia vero communia decipitur sensus, sicut in diiudicando de magnitudine vel figura; ut cum iudicat solem esse pedalem, qui tamen est maior terra. Et multo magis decipitur circa sensibilia per accidens; ut cum iudicat fel esse mel, propter coloris similitudinem. Et huius ratio est in evidenti. Quia ad proprium obiectum unaquaeque potentia per se ordinatur, secundum quod ipsa. Quae autem sunt huiusmodi, semper eodem modo se habent. Unde manente potentia, non deficit eius iudicium circa proprium obiectum. Obiectum autem proprium intellectus est quidditas rei. Unde circa quidditatem rei, per se loquendo, intellectus non fallitur. Sed circa ea quae circumstant rei essentiam vel quidditatem, intellectus potest falli, dum unum ordinat ad aliud, vel componendo vel dividendo vel etiam ratiocinando. Et propter hoc etiam circa il-

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect can be false; for the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 4) that truth and falsehood are in the mind. But the mind and intellect are the same, as is shown above (Q. 79, A. 1). Therefore falsehood may be in the mind. Obj. 2: Further, opinion and reasoning belong to the intellect. But falsehood exists in both. Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect. Obj. 3: Further, sin is in the intellectual faculty. But sin involves falsehood: for those err that work evil (Prov 14:22). Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect. On the contrary, Augustine says (83 Questions, Q. 32), that everyone who is deceived, does not rightly understand that wherein he is deceived. And the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10), that the intellect is always true. I answer that, The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 6) compares intellect with sense on this point. For sense is not deceived in its proper object, as sight in regard to color, unless accidentally through some hindrance occurring to the sensile organ—for example, the taste of a fever-stricken person judges a sweet thing to be bitter, through his tongue being vitiated by ill humors. Sense, however, may be deceived as regards common sensible objects, as size or figure; when, for example, it judges the sun to be only a foot in diameter, whereas in reality it exceeds the earth in size. Much more is sense deceived concerning accidental sensible objects, as when it judges that vinegar is honey by reason of the color being the same. The reason of this is evident; for every faculty, as such, is per se directed to its proper object; and things of this kind are always the same. Hence, as long as the faculty exists, its judgment concerning its own proper object does not fail. Now the proper object of the intellect is the quiddity of a material thing; and hence, properly speaking, the intellect is not at fault concerning this quiddity; whereas it may go astray as regards the surroundings of the thing in its essence or quiddity, in referring one thing to another, as regards composition or division, or also in the pro-

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las propositiones errare non potest, quae statim cognoscuntur cognita terminorum quidditate, sicut accidit circa prima principia, ex quibus etiam accidit infallibilitas veritatis, secundum certitudinem scientiae, circa conclusiones. Per accidens tamen contingit intellectum decipi circa quod quid est in rebus compositis; non ex parte organi, quia intellectus non est virtus utens organo; sed ex parte compositionis intervenientis circa definitionem, dum vel definitio unius rei est falsa de alia, sicut definitio circuli de triangulo, vel dum aliqua definitio in seipsa est falsa, implicans compositionem impossibilium, ut si accipiatur hoc ut definitio alicuius rei, animal rationale alatum. Unde in rebus simplicibus, in quarum definitionibus compositio intervenire non potest, non possumus decipi; sed deficimus in totaliter non attingendo, sicut dicitur in IX Metaphys. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod falsitatem dicit esse philosophus in mente secundum compositionem et divisionem. Et similiter dicendum est ad secundum, de opinione et ratiocinatione. Et ad tertium, de errore peccantium, qui consistit in applicatione ad appetibile. Sed in absoluta consideratione quidditatis rei, et eorum quae per eam cognoscuntur, intellectus nunquam decipitur. Et sic loquuntur auctoritates in contrarium inductae.

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cess of reasoning. Therefore, also in regard to those propositions, which are understood, the intellect cannot err, as in the case of first principles from which arises infallible truth in the certitude of scientific conclusions. The intellect, however, may be accidentally deceived in the quiddity of composite things, not by the defect of its organ, for the intellect is a faculty that is independent of an organ; but on the part of the composition affecting the definition, when, for instance, the definition of a thing is false in relation to something else, as the definition of a circle applied to a triangle; or when a definition is false in itself as involving the composition of things incompatible; as, for instance, to describe anything as a rational winged animal. Hence as regards simple objects not subject to composite definitions we cannot be deceived unless, indeed, we understand nothing whatever about them, as is said Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 10. Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher says that falsehood is in the intellect in regard to composition and division. The same answer applies to the Second Objection concerning opinion and reasoning, and to the Third Objection, concerning the error of the sinner, who errs in the practical judgment of the appetible object. But in the absolute consideration of the quiddity of a thing, and of those things which are known thereby, the intellect is never deceived. In this sense are to be understood the authorities quoted in proof of the opposite conclusion.

Article 7 Whether one person can understand one and the same thing better than another can? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unam et eandem rem unus alio melius intelligere non possit. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro Octoginta trium Quaest., quisquis ullam rem aliter quam est intelligit non eam intelligit. Quare non est dubitandum esse perfectam intelligentiam, qua praestantior esse non possit; et ideo non per infinitum ire quod quaelibet res intelligitur; nec eam posse alium alio plus intelligere. Praeterea, intellectus intelligendo verus est. Veritas autem, cum sit aequalitas quaedam intellectus et rei, non recipit magis et minus, non enim proprie dicitur aliquid magis et minus aequale. Ergo neque magis et minus aliquid intelligi dicitur. Praeterea, intellectus est id quod est formalissimum in homine. Sed differentia formae causat differentiam speciei. Si igitur unus homo magis alio intelligit, videtur quod non sint unius speciei.

Objection 1: It would seem that one person cannot understand one and the same thing better than another can. For Augustine says (83 Questions, Q. 32), Whoever understands a thing otherwise than as it is, does not understand it at all. Hence it is clear that there is a perfect understanding, than which none other is more perfect: and therefore there are not infinite degrees of understanding a thing: nor can one person understand a thing better than another can. Obj. 2: Further, the intellect is true in its act of understanding. But truth, being a certain equality between thought and thing, is not subject to more or less; for a thing cannot be said to be more or less equal. Therefore a thing cannot be more or less understood. Obj. 3: Further, the intellect is the most formal of all that is in man. But different forms cause different species. Therefore if one man understands better than another, it would seem that they do not belong to the same species.

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Sed contra est quod per experimentum inveniuntur aliqui aliis profundius intelligentes; sicut profundius intelligit qui conclusionem aliquam potest reducere in prima principia et causas primas, quam qui potest reducere solum in causas proximas. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquem intelligere unam et eandem rem magis quam alium, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, sic quod ly magis determinet actum intelligendi ex parte rei intellectae. Et sic non potest unus eandem rem magis intelligere quam alius, quia si intelligeret eam aliter esse quam sit, vel melius vel peius, falleretur, et non intelligeret ut arguit Augustinus. Alio modo potest intelligi ut determinet actum intelligendi ex parte intelligentis. Et sic unus alio potest eandem rem melius intelligere, quia est melioris virtutis in intelligendo; sicut melius videt visione corporali rem aliquam qui est perfectioris virtutis, et in quo virtus visiva est perfectior. Hoc autem circa intellectum contingit dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, ex parte ipsius intellectus, qui est perfectior. Manifestum est enim quod quanto corpus est melius dispositum, tanto meliorem sortitur animam, quod manifeste apparet in his quae sunt secundum speciem diversa. Cuius ratio est, quia actus et forma recipitur in materia secundum materiae capacitatem. Unde cum etiam in hominibus quidam habeant corpus melius dispositum, sortiuntur animam maioris virtutis in intelligendo, unde dicitur in II de Anima quod molles carne bene aptos mente videmus. Alio modo contingit hoc ex parte inferiorum virtutum, quibus intellectus indiget ad sui operationem, illi enim in quibus virtus imaginativa et cogitativa et memorativa est melius disposita, sunt melius dispositi ad intelligendum. Ad primum ergo patet solutio ex dictis. Et similiter ad secundum, veritas enim intellectus in hoc consistit, quod intelligatur res esse sicuti est. Ad tertium dicendum quod differentia formae quae non provenit nisi ex diversa dispositione materiae, non facit diversitatem secundum speciem, sed solum secundum numerum; sunt enim diversorum individuorum diversae formae, secundum materiam diversificatae.

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On the contrary, Experience shows that some understand more profoundly than do others; as one who carries a conclusion to its first principles and ultimate causes understands it better than the one who reduces it only to its proximate causes. I answer that, A thing being understood more by one than by another may be taken in two senses. First, so that the word more be taken as determining the act of understanding as regards the thing understood; and thus, one cannot understand the same thing more than another, because to understand it otherwise than as it is, either better or worse, would entail being deceived, and such a one would not understand it, as Augustine argues (83 Questions, Q. 32). In another sense the word more can be taken as determining the act of understanding on the part of him who understands; and so one may understand the same thing better than someone else, through having a greater power of understanding: just as a man may see a thing better with his bodily sight, whose power is greater, and whose sight is more perfect. The same applies to the intellect in two ways. First, as regards the intellect itself, which is more perfect. For it is plain that the better the disposition of a body, the better the soul allotted to it; which clearly appears in things of different species: and the reason thereof is that act and form are received into matter according to matter’s capacity: thus because some men have bodies of better disposition, their souls have a greater power of understanding, wherefore it is said (De Anima ii, 9), that it is to be observed that those who have soft flesh are of apt mind. Second, this occurs in regard to the lower powers of which the intellect has need in its operation: for those in whom the imaginative, cogitative, and memorative powers are of better disposition, are better disposed to understand. The reply to the First Objection is clear from the above; likewise the reply to the Second, for the truth of the intellect consists in the intellect understanding a thing as it is. Reply Obj. 3: The difference of form which is due only to the different disposition of matter, causes not a specific but only a numerical difference: for different individuals have different forms, diversified according to the difference of matter.

Article 8 Whether the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inObjection 1: It would seem that the intellect undertellectus noster per prius cognoscat indivisibile quam stands the indivisible before the divisible. For the Philosodivisibile. Dicit enim philosophus, in I Physic., quod in- pher says (Phys. i, 1) that we understand and know from the telligimus et scimus ex principiorum et elementorum co- knowledge of principles and elements. But principles are in-

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gnitione. Sed indivisibilia sunt principia et elementa divisibilium. Ergo per prius sunt nobis nota indivisibilia quam divisibilia. Praeterea, id quod ponitur in definitione alicuius, per prius cognoscitur a nobis, quia definitio est ex prioribus et notioribus, ut dicitur in VI Topic. Sed indivisibile ponitur in definitione divisibilis, sicut linea enim, ut Euclides dicit, est longitudo sine latitudine, cuius extremitates sunt duo puncta. Et unitas ponitur in definitione numeri, quia numerus est multitudo mensurata per unum, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Ergo intellectus noster per prius intelligit indivisibile quam divisibile. Praeterea, simile simili cognoscitur. Sed indivisibile est magis simile intellectui quam divisibile, quia intellectus est simplex, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Ergo intellectus noster prius cognoscit indivisibile. Sed contra est quod dicitur in III de Anima, quod indivisibile monstratur sicut privatio. Sed privatio per posterius cognoscitur. Ergo et indivisibile. Respondeo dicendum quod obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum praesentem statum, est quidditas rei materialis, quam a phantasmatibus abstrahit, ut ex praemissis patet. Et quia id quod est primo et per se cognitum a virtute cognoscitiva, est proprium eius obiectum, considerari potest quo ordine indivisibile intelligatur a nobis, ex eius habitudine ad huiusmodi quidditatem. Dicitur autem indivisibile tripliciter, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Uno modo, sicut continuum est indivisibile, quia est indivisum in actu, licet sit divisibile in potentia. Et huiusmodi indivisibile prius est intellectum a nobis quam eius divisio, quae est in partes, quia cognitio confusa est prior quam distincta, ut dictum est. Alio modo dicitur indivisibile secundum speciem, sicut ratio hominis est quoddam indivisibile. Et hoc etiam modo indivisibile est prius intellectum quam divisio eius in partes rationis, ut supra dictum est, et iterum prius quam intellectus componat et dividat, affirmando vel negando. Et huius ratio est, quia huiusmodi duplex indivisibile intellectus secundum se intelligit, sicut proprium obiectum. Tertio modo dicitur indivisibile quod est omnino indivisibile, ut punctus et unitas, quae nec actu nec potentia dividuntur. Et huiusmodi indivisibile per posterius cognoscitur, per privationem divisibilis. Unde punctum privative definitur, punctum est cuius pars non est, et similiter ratio unius est quod sit indivisibile, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Et huius ratio est, quia tale indivisibile habet quandam oppositionem ad rem corporalem, cuius quidditatem primo et per se intellectus accipit. Si autem intellectus noster intelligeret per participationem indivisibilium separatorum, ut Platonici posuerunt, sequeretur quod indivisibile huiusmodi esset primo intellectum, quia secundum Platonicos, priora prius participantur a rebus.

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divisible, and elements are of divisible things. Therefore the indivisible is known to us before the divisible. Obj. 2: Further, the definition of a thing contains what is known previously, for a definition proceeds from the first and more known, as is said Topic. vi, 4. But the indivisible is part of the definition of the divisible; as a point comes into the definition of a line; for as Euclid says, a line is length without breadth, the extremities of which are points; also unity comes into the definition of number, for number is multitude measured by one, as is said Metaph. x, Did. ix, 6. Therefore our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible. Obj. 3: Further, Like is known by like. But the indivisible is more like to the intellect than is the divisible; because the intellect is simple (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore our intellect first knows the indivisible. On the contrary, It is said (De Anima iii, 6) that the indivisible is expressed as a privation. But privation is known secondarily. Therefore likewise is the indivisible. I answer that, The object of our intellect in its present state is the quiddity of a material thing, which it abstracts from the phantasms, as above stated (Q. 84, A. 7). And since that which is known first and of itself by our cognitive power is its proper object, we must consider its relationship to that quiddity in order to discover in what order the indivisible is known. Now the indivisible is threefold, as is said De Anima iii, 6. First, the continuous is indivisible, since actually it is undivided, although potentially divisible: and this indivisible is known to us before its division, which is a division into parts: because confused knowledge is prior to distinct knowledge, as we have said above (A. 3). Second, the indivisible is so called in relation to species, as man’s reason is something indivisible. This way, also, the indivisible is understood before its division into logical parts, as we have said above (De Anima iii, 6); and again before the intellect disposes and divides by affirmation and negation. The reason of this is that both these kinds of indivisible are understood by the intellect of itself, as being its proper object. The third kind of indivisible is what is altogether indivisible, as a point and unity, which cannot be divided either actually or potentially. And this indivisible is known secondarily, through the privation of divisibility. Wherefore a point is defined by way of privation as that which has no parts; and in like manner the notion of one is that which is indivisible, as stated in Metaph. x, Did. ix, 1. And the reason of this is that this indivisible has a certain opposition to a corporeal being, the quiddity of which is the primary and proper object of the intellect. But if our intellect understood by participation of certain separate indivisible (forms), as the Platonists maintained, it would follow that a like indivisible is understood primarily; for according to the Platonists what is first is first participated by things.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in accipiendo scientiam, non semper principia et elementa sunt priora, quia quandoque ex effectibus sensibilibus devenimus in cognitionem principiorum et causarum intelligibilium. Sed in complemento scientiae, semper scientia effectuum dependet ex cognitione principiorum et elementorum, quia, ut ibidem dicit philosophus, tunc opinamur nos scire, cum principiata possumus in causas resolvere. Ad secundum dicendum quod punctum non ponitur in definitione lineae communiter sumptae, manifestum est enim quod in linea infinita, et etiam in circulari, non est punctum nisi in potentia. Sed Euclides definit lineam finitam rectam, et ideo posuit punctum in definitione lineae, sicut terminum in definitione terminati. Unitas vero est mensura numeri, et ideo ponitur in definitione numeri mensurati. Non autem ponitur in definitione divisibilis, sed magis e converso. Ad tertium dicendum quod similitudo per quam intelligimus, est species cogniti in cognoscente. Et ideo non secundum similitudinem naturae ad potentiam cognoscitivam est aliquid prius cognitum, sed per convenientiam ad obiectum, alioquin magis visus cognosceret auditum quam colorem.

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Reply Obj. 1: In the acquisition of knowledge, principles and elements are not always (known) first: for sometimes from sensible effects we arrive at the knowledge of principles and intelligible causes. But in perfect knowledge, the knowledge of effects always depends on the knowledge of principles and elements: for as the Philosopher says in the same passage: Then do we consider that we know, when we can resolve principles into their causes. Reply Obj. 2: A point is not included in the definition of a line in general: for it is manifest that in a line of indefinite length, and in a circular line, there is no point, save potentially. Euclid defines a finite straight line: and therefore he mentions a point in the definition, as the limit in the definition of that which is limited. Unity is the measure of number: wherefore it is included in the definition of a measured number. But it is not included in the definition of the divisible, but rather conversely. Reply Obj. 3: The likeness through which we understand is the species of the known in the knower; therefore a thing is known first, not on account of its natural likeness to the cognitive power, but on account of the power’s aptitude for the object: otherwise sight would perceive hearing rather than color.

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Question 86 What Our Intellect Knows In Material Things Deinde considerandum est quid intellectus noster in We now have to consider what our intellect knows in rebus materialibus cognoscat. Et circa hoc quaeruntur material things. Under this head there are four points of inquatuor. quiry: Primo, utrum cognoscat singularia. (1) Whether it knows singulars? Secundo, utrum cognoscat infinita. (2) Whether it knows the infinite? Tertio, utrum cognoscat contingentia. (3) Whether it knows contingent things? Quarto, utrum cognoscat futura. (4) Whether it knows future things?

Article 1 Whether our intellect knows singulars? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster cognoscat singularia. Quicumque enim cognoscit compositionem, cognoscit extrema compositionis. Sed intellectus noster cognoscit hanc compositionem. Socrates est homo, eius enim est propositionem formare. Ergo intellectus noster cognoscit hoc singulare quod est Socrates. Praeterea, intellectus practicus dirigit ad agendum. Sed actus sunt circa singularia. Ergo cognoscit singularia. Praeterea, intellectus noster intelligit seipsum. Ipse autem est quoddam singulare, alioquin non haberet aliquem actum; actus enim singularium sunt. Ergo intellectus noster cognoscit singulare. Praeterea, quidquid potest virtus inferior, potest superior. Sed sensus cognoscit singulare. Ergo multo magis intellectus. Sed contra est quod dicit philosophus, in I Physic., quod universale secundum rationem est notum, singulare autem secundum sensum. Respondeo dicendum quod singulare in rebus materialibus intellectus noster directe et primo cognoscere non potest. Cuius ratio est, quia principium singularitatis in rebus materialibus est materia individualis, intellectus autem noster, sicut supra dictum est, intelligit abstrahendo speciem intelligibilem ab huiusmodi materia. Quod autem a materia individuali abstrahitur, est universale. Unde intellectus noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi universalium. Indirecte autem, et quasi per quandam reflexionem, potest cognoscere singulare, quia, sicut supra dictum est, etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxit, non potest secundum eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles intelligit, ut dicitur in III de Anima.

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows singulars. For whoever knows composition, knows the terms of composition. But our intellect knows this composition; Socrates is a man: for it belongs to the intellect to form a proposition. Therefore our intellect knows this singular, Socrates. Obj. 2: Further, the practical intellect directs to action. But action has relation to singular things. Therefore the intellect knows the singular. Obj. 3: Further, our intellect understands itself. But in itself it is a singular, otherwise it would have no action of its own; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore our intellect knows singulars. Obj. 4: Further, a superior power can do whatever is done by an inferior power. But sense knows the singular. Much more, therefore, can the intellect know it. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. i, 5), that the universal is known by reason; and the singular is known by sense. I answer that, Our intellect cannot know the singular in material things directly and primarily. The reason of this is that the principle of singularity in material things is individual matter, whereas our intellect, as have said above (Q. 85, A. 1), understands by abstracting the intelligible species from such matter. Now what is abstracted from individual matter is the universal. Hence our intellect knows directly the universal only. But indirectly, and as it were by a kind of reflection, it can know the singular, because, as we have said above (Q. 85, A. 7), even after abstracting the intelligible species, the intellect, in order to understand, needs to turn to the phantasms in which it understands the species, as is said De Anima iii, 7. Therefore it understands the universal directly through the intelligible species, and indi-

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Man

Sic igitur ipsum universale per speciem intelligibilem directe intelligit; indirecte autem singularia, quorum sunt phantasmata. Et hoc modo format hanc propositionem, Socrates est homo. Unde patet solutio ad primum. Ad secundum dicendum quod electio particularis operabilis est quasi conclusio syllogismi intellectus practici, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ex universali autem propositione directe non potest concludi singularis, nisi mediante aliqua singulari propositione assumpta. Unde universalis ratio intellectus practici non movet nisi mediante particulari apprehensione sensitivae partis, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Ad tertium dicendum quod singulare non repugnat intelligibilitati inquantum est singulare, sed inquantum est materiale, quia nihil intelligitur nisi immaterialiter. Et ideo si sit aliquod singulare immateriale, sicut est intellectus, hoc non repugnat intelligibilitati. Ad quartum dicendum quod virtus superior potest illud quod potest virtus inferior, sed eminentiori modo. Unde id quod cognoscit sensus materialiter et concrete, quod est cognoscere singulare directe, hoc cognoscit intellectus immaterialiter et abstracte, quod est cognoscere universale.

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rectly the singular represented by the phantasm. And thus it forms the proposition Socrates is a man.

Wherefore the reply to the first objection is clear. Reply Obj. 2: The choice of a particular thing to be done is as the conclusion of a syllogism formed by the practical intellect, as is said in Ethic. vii, 3. But a singular proposition cannot be directly concluded from a universal proposition, except through the medium of a singular proposition. Therefore the universal principle of the practical intellect does not move save through the medium of the particular apprehension of the sensitive part, as is said in De Anima iii, 11. Reply Obj. 3: Intelligibility is incompatible with the singular not as such, but as material, for nothing can be understood otherwise than immaterially. Therefore if there be an immaterial singular such as the intellect, there is no reason why it should not be intelligible. Reply Obj. 4: The higher power can do what the lower power can, but in a more eminent way. Wherefore what the sense knows materially and concretely, which is to know the singular directly, the intellect knows immaterially and in the abstract, which is to know the universal.

Article 2 Whether our intellect can know the infinite? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster possit cognoscere infinita. Deus enim excedit omnia infinita. Sed intellectus noster potest cognoscere Deum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo multo magis potest cognoscere omnia alia infinita. Praeterea, intellectus noster natus est cognoscere genera et species. Sed quorundam generum sunt infinitae species, sicut numeri, proportionis et figurae. Ergo intellectus noster potest cognoscere infinita. Praeterea, si unum corpus non impediret aliud ab existendo in uno et eodem loco, nihil prohiberet infinita corpora in uno loco esse. Sed una species intelligibilis non prohibet aliam ab existendo simul in eodem intellectu, contingit enim multa scire in habitu. Ergo nihil prohibet intellectum nostrum infinitorum scientiam habere in habitu. Praeterea, intellectus, cum non sit virtus materiae corporalis, ut supra dictum est, videtur esse potentia infinita. Sed virtus infinita potest super infinita. Ergo intellectus noster potest cognoscere infinita. Sed contra est quod dicitur in I Physic., quod infinitum, inquantum est infinitum, est ignotum.

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect can know the infinite. For God excels all infinite things. But our intellect can know God, as we have said above (Q. 12, A. 1). Much more, therefore, can our intellect know all other infinite things. Obj. 2: Further, our intellect can naturally know genera and species. But there is an infinity of species in some genera, as in number, proportion, and figure. Therefore our intellect can know the infinite. Obj. 3: Further, if one body can coexist with another in the same place, there is nothing to prevent an infinite number of bodies being in one place. But one intelligible species can exist with another in the same intellect, for many things can be habitually known at the same time. Therefore our intellect can have an habitual knowledge of an infinite number of things. Obj. 4: Further, as the intellect is not a corporeal faculty, as we have said (Q. 76, A. 1), it appears to be an infinite power. But an infinite power has a capacity for an infinite object. Therefore our intellect can know the infinite. On the contrary, It is said (Phys. i, 4) that the infinite, considered as such, is unknown.

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Respondeo dicendum quod, cum potentia proportionetur suo obiecto, oportet hoc modo se habere intellectum ad infinitum, sicut se habet eius obiectum, quod est quidditas rei materialis. In rebus autem materialibus non invenitur infinitum in actu, sed solum in potentia, secundum quod unum succedit alteri, ut dicitur in III Physic. Et ideo in intellectu nostro invenitur infinitum in potentia, in accipiendo scilicet unum post aliud, quia nunquam intellectus noster tot intelligit, quin possit plura intelligere. Actu autem vel habitu non potest cognoscere infinita intellectus noster. Actu quidem non, quia intellectus noster non potest simul actu cognoscere nisi quod per unam speciem cognoscit. Infinitum autem non habet unam speciem, alioquin haberet rationem totius et perfecti. Et ideo non potest intelligi nisi accipiendo partem post partem, ut ex eius definitione patet in III Physic., est enim infinitum cuius quantitatem accipientibus semper est aliquid extra accipere, et sic infinitum cognosci non posset actu, nisi omnes partes eius numerarentur, quod est impossibile.

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I answer that, Since a faculty and its object are proportional to each other, the intellect must be related to the infinite, as is its object, which is the quiddity of a material thing. Now in material things the infinite does not exist actually, but only potentially, in the sense of one succeeding another, as is said Phys. iii, 6. Therefore infinity is potentially in our mind through its considering successively one thing after another: because never does our intellect understand so many things, that it cannot understand more. On the other hand, our intellect cannot understand the infinite either actually or habitually. Not actually, for our intellect cannot know actually at the same time, except what it knows through one species. But the infinite is not represented by one species, for if it were it would be something whole and complete. Consequently it cannot be understood except by a successive consideration of one part after another, as is clear from its definition (Phys. iii, 6): for the infinite is that from which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken. Thus the infinite could not be known actually, unless all its parts were counted: which is impossible. For the same reason we cannot have habitual knowledge of the infinite: because in us habitual knowledge results from actual consideration: since by understanding we acquire knowledge, as is said Ethic. ii, 1. Wherefore it would not be possible for us to have a habit of an infinity of things distinctly known, unless we had already considered the entire infinity thereof, counting them according to the succession of our knowledge: which is impossible. And therefore neither actually nor habitually can our intellect know the infinite, but only potentially as explained above. Reply Obj. 1: As we have said above (Q. 7, A. 1), God is called infinite, because He is a form unlimited by matter; whereas in material things, the term infinite is applied to that which is deprived of any formal term. And form being known in itself, whereas matter cannot be known without form, it follows that the material infinite is in itself unknowable. But the formal infinite, God, is of Himself known; but He is unknown to us by reason of our feeble intellect, which in its present state has a natural aptitude for material objects only. Therefore we cannot know God in our present life except through material effects. In the future life this defect of intellect will be removed by the state of glory, when we shall be able to see the Essence of God Himself, but without being able to comprehend Him.

Et eadem ratione non possumus intelligere infinita in habitu. In nobis enim habitualis cognitio causatur ex actuali consideratione, intelligendo enim efficimur scientes, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Unde non possemus habere habitum infinitorum secundum distinctam cognitionem, nisi consideravissemus omnia infinita, numerando ea secundum cognitionis successionem, quod est impossibile. Et ita nec actu nec habitu intellectus noster potest cognoscere infinita, sed in potentia tantum, ut dictum est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Deus dicitur infinitus sicut forma quae non est terminata per aliquam materiam, in rebus autem materialibus aliquid dicitur infinitum per privationem formalis terminationis. Et quia forma secundum se nota est, materia autem sine forma ignota, inde est quod infinitum materiale est secundum se ignotum. Infinitum autem formale, quod est Deus, est secundum se notum, ignotum autem quoad nos, propter defectum intellectus nostri, qui secundum statum praesentis vitae habet naturalem aptitudinem ad materialia cognoscenda. Et ideo in praesenti Deum cognoscere non possumus nisi per materiales effectus. In futuro autem tolletur defectus intellectus nostri per gloriam, et tunc ipsum Deum in sua essentia videre poterimus, tamen absque comprehensione. Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus noster Reply Obj. 2: The nature of our mind is to know spenatus est cognoscere species per abstractionem a phan- cies abstracted from phantasms; therefore it cannot know tasmatibus. Et ideo illas species numerorum et figura- actually or habitually species of numbers or figures that are rum quas quis non est imaginatus, non potest cognosce- not in the imagination, except in a general way and in their

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re nec actu nec habitu, nisi forte in genere et in principiis universalibus; quod est cognoscere in potentia et confuse. Ad tertium dicendum quod, si duo corpora essent in uno loco, vel plura, non oporteret quod successive subintrarent locum, ut sic per ipsam subintrationis successionem numerarentur locata. Sed species intelligibiles ingrediuntur intellectum nostrum successive, quia non multa simul actu intelliguntur. Et ideo oportet numeratas, et non infinitas species esse in intellectu nostro.

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universal principles; and this is to know them potentially and confusedly.

Reply Obj. 3: If two or more bodies were in the same place, there would be no need for them to occupy the place successively, in order for the things placed to be counted according to this succession of occupation. On the other hand, the intelligible species enter into our intellect successively; since many things cannot be actually understood at the same time: and therefore there must be a definite and not an infinite number of species in our intellect. Ad quartum dicendum quod sicut intellectus noReply Obj. 4: As our intellect is infinite in power, so ster est infinitus virtute, ita infinitum cognoscit. Est enim does it know the infinite. For its power is indeed infinite virtus eius infinita, secundum quod non terminatur per inasmuch as it is not terminated by corporeal matter. Moremateriam corporalem. Et est cognoscitivus universalis, over it can know the universal, which is abstracted from inquod est abstractum a materia individuali, et per conse- dividual matter, and which consequently is not limited to quens non finitur ad aliquod individuum, sed, quantum one individual, but, considered in itself, extends to an infiest de se, ad infinita individua se extendit. nite number of individuals.

Article 3 Whether our intellect can know contingent things? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit cognoscitivus contingentium. Quia, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., intellectus et sapientia et scientia non sunt contingentium, sed necessariorum. Praeterea, sicut dicitur in IV Physic., ea quae quandoque sunt et quandoque non sunt, tempore mensurantur. Intellectus autem a tempore abstrahit, sicut et ab aliis conditionibus materiae. Cum igitur proprium contingentium sit quandoque esse et quandoque non esse, videtur quod contingentia non cognoscantur ab intellectu. Sed contra, omnis scientia est in intellectu. Sed quaedam scientiae sunt de contingentibus; sicut scientiae morales, quae sunt de actibus humanis subiectis libero arbitrio; et etiam scientiae naturales, quantum ad partem quae tractat de generabilibus et corruptibilibus. Ergo intellectus est cognoscitivus contingentium. Respondeo dicendum quod contingentia dupliciter possunt considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod contingentia sunt. Alio modo, secundum quod in eis aliquid necessitatis invenitur, nihil enim est adeo contingens, quin in se aliquid necessarium habeat. Sicut hoc ipsum quod est Socratem currere, in se quidem contingens est; sed habitudo cursus ad motum est necessaria, necessarium enim est Socratem moveri, si currit. Est autem unumquodque contingens ex parte materiae, quia contingens est quod potest esse et non esse; potentia autem pertinet ad materiam. Necessitas autem consequitur rationem formae, quia ea quae consequuntur ad formam, ex necessitate insunt. Materia autem est indivi-

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect cannot know contingent things: because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 6), the objects of understanding, wisdom and knowledge are not contingent, but necessary things. Obj. 2: Further, as stated in Phys. iv, 12, what sometimes is and sometimes is not, is measured by time. Now the intellect abstracts from time, and from other material conditions. Therefore, as it is proper to a contingent thing sometime to be and sometime not to be, it seems that contingent things are not known by the intellect. On the contrary, All knowledge is in the intellect. But some sciences are of the contingent things, as the moral sciences, the objects of which are human actions subject to free-will; and again, the natural sciences in as far as they relate to things generated and corruptible. Therefore the intellect knows contingent things. I answer that, Contingent things can be considered in two ways; either as contingent, or as containing some element of necessity, since every contingent thing has in it something necessary: for example, that Socrates runs, is in itself contingent; but the relation of running to motion is necessary, for it is necessary that Socrates move if he runs. Now contingency arises from matter, for contingency is a potentiality to be or not to be, and potentiality belongs to matter; whereas necessity results from form, because whatever is consequent on form is of necessity in the subject. But matter is the individualizing principle: whereas the universal comes from the abstraction of the form from the particular matter. Moreover it was laid down above (A. 1) that

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duationis principium, ratio autem universalis accipitur secundum abstractionem formae a materia particulari. Dictum autem est supra quod per se et directe intellectus est universalium; sensus autem singularium, quorum etiam indirecte quodammodo est intellectus, ut supra dictum est. Sic igitur contingentia, prout sunt contingentia, cognoscuntur directe quidem sensu, indirecte autem ab intellectu, rationes autem universales et necessariae contingentium cognoscuntur per intellectum. Unde si attendantur rationes universales scibilium, omnes scientiae sunt de necessariis. Si autem attendantur ipsae res, sic quaedam scientia est de necessariis, quaedam vero de contingentibus. Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta.

Q. 86, A. 4

the intellect of itself and directly has the universal for its object; while the object of sense is the singular, which in a certain way is the indirect object of the intellect, as we have said above (A. 1). Therefore the contingent, considered as such, is known directly by sense and indirectly by the intellect; while the universal and necessary principles of contingent things are known only by the intellect. Hence if we consider the objects of science in their universal principles, then all science is of necessary things. But if we consider the things themselves, thus some sciences are of necessary things, some of contingent things.

From which the replies to the objections are clear.

Article 4 Whether our intellect can know the future? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster cognoscat futura. Intellectus enim noster cognoscit per species intelligibiles, quae abstrahunt ab hic et nunc, et ita se habent indifferenter ad omne tempus. Sed potest cognoscere praesentia. Ergo potest cognoscere futura. Praeterea, homo quando alienatur a sensibus, aliqua futura cognoscere potest; ut patet in dormientibus et phreneticis. Sed quando alienatur a sensibus, magis viget intellectu. Ergo intellectus, quantum est de se, est cognoscitivus futurorum. Praeterea, cognitio intellectiva hominis efficacior est quam cognitio quaecumque brutorum animalium. Sed quaedam animalia sunt quae cognoscunt quaedam futura; sicut corniculae frequenter crocitantes significant pluviam mox futuram. Ergo multo magis intellectus humanus potest futura cognoscere. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccle. VIII, multa hominis afflictio, qui ignorat praeterita, et futura nullo potest scire nuntio. Respondeo dicendum quod de cognitione futurorum eodem modo distinguendum est, sicut de cognitione contingentium. Nam ipsa futura ut sub tempore cadunt, sunt singularia, quae intellectus humanus non cognoscit nisi per reflexionem, ut supra dictum est. Rationes autem futurorum possunt esse universales, et intellectu perceptibiles, et de eis etiam possunt esse scientiae. Ut tamen communiter de cognitione futurorum loquamur, sciendum est quod futura dupliciter cognosci possunt, uno modo, in seipsis; alio modo, in suis causis. In seipsis quidem futura cognosci non possunt nisi a Deo; cui etiam sunt praesentia dum in cursu rerum sunt

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows the future. For our intellect knows by means of intelligible species abstracted from the here and now, and related indifferently to all time. But it can know the present. Therefore it can know the future. Obj. 2: Further, man, while his senses are in suspense, can know some future things, as in sleep, and in frenzy. But the intellect is freer and more vigorous when removed from sense. Therefore the intellect of its own nature can know the future. Obj. 3: The intellectual knowledge of man is superior to any knowledge of brutes. But some animals know the future; thus crows by their frequent cawing foretell rain. Therefore much more can the intellect know the future.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccl 8:6, 7), There is a great affliction for man, because he is ignorant of things past; and things to come he cannot know by any messenger. I answer that, We must apply the same distinction to future things, as we applied above (A. 3) to contingent things. For future things considered as subject to time are singular, and the human intellect knows them by reflection only, as stated above (A. 1). But the principles of future things may be universal; and thus they may enter the domain of the intellect and become the objects of science. Speaking, however, of the knowledge of the future in a general way, we must observe that the future may be known in two ways: either in itself, or in its cause. The future cannot be known in itself save by God alone; to Whom even that is present which in the course of events is future,

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futura, inquantum eius aeternus intuitus simul fertur supra totum temporis cursum, ut supra dictum est cum de Dei scientia ageretur. Sed prout sunt in suis causis, cognosci possunt etiam a nobis. Et si quidem in suis causis sint ut ex quibus ex necessitate proveniant, cognoscuntur per certitudinem scientiae; sicut astrologus praecognoscit eclipsim futuram. Si autem sic sint in suis causis ut ab eis proveniant ut in pluribus, sic cognosci possunt per quandam coniecturam vel magis vel minus certam, secundum quod causae sunt vel magis vel minus inclinatae ad effectus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de cognitione quae fit per rationes universales causarum, ex quibus futura cognosci possunt secundum modum ordinis effectus ad causam. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XII Confess., anima habet quandam vim sortis, ut ex sui natura possit futura cognoscere, et ideo quando retrahitur a corporeis sensibus, et quodammodo revertitur ad seipsam, fit particeps notitiae futurorum. Et haec quidem opinio rationabilis esset, si poneremus quod anima acciperet cognitionem rerum secundum participationem idearum, sicut Platonici posuerunt, quia sic anima ex sui natura cognosceret universales causas omnium effectuum, sed impeditur per corpus; unde quando a corporis sensibus abstrahitur, futura cognoscit. Sed quia iste modus cognoscendi non est connaturalis intellectui nostro, sed magis ut cognitionem a sensibus accipiat; ideo non est secundum naturam animae quod futura cognoscat cum a sensibus alienatur; sed magis per impressionem aliquarum causarum superiorum spiritualium et corporalium. Spiritualium quidem, sicut cum virtute divina ministerio angelorum intellectus humanus illuminatur, et phantasmata ordinantur ad futura aliqua cognoscenda; vel etiam cum per operationem daemonum fit aliqua commotio in phantasia ad praesignandum aliqua futura quae daemones cognoscunt, ut supra dictum est. Huiusmodi autem impressiones spiritualium causarum magis nata est anima humana suscipere cum a sensibus alienatur, quia per hoc propinquior fit substantiis spiritualibus, et magis libera ab exterioribus inquietudinibus. Contingit autem et hoc per impressionem superiorum causarum corporalium. Manifestum est enim quod corpora superiora imprimunt in corpora inferiora. Unde cum vires sensitivae sint actus corporalium organorum, consequens est quod ex impressione caelestium corporum immutetur quodammodo phantasia. Unde cum caelestia corpora sint causa multorum futurorum, fiunt in imaginatione aliqua signa quorundam futurorum. Haec autem signa magis percipiuntur in nocte et a dormientibus, quam de die et a vigilantibus, quia, ut dicitur in libro de Somn. et Vigil., quae deferuntur de die, dissolvuntur magis; plus est enim

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forasmuch as from eternity His glance embraces the whole course of time, as we have said above when treating of God’s knowledge (Q. 14, A. 13). But forasmuch as it exists in its cause, the future can be known by us also. And if, indeed, the cause be such as to have a necessary connection with its future result, then the future is known with scientific certitude, just as the astronomer foresees the future eclipse. If, however, the cause be such as to produce a certain result more frequently than not, then can the future be known more or less conjecturally, according as its cause is more or less inclined to produce the effect. Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers that knowledge which is drawn from universal causal principles; from these the future may be known, according to the order of the effects to the cause. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Confess. xii), the soul has a certain power of forecasting, so that by its very nature it can know the future; hence when withdrawn from corporeal sense, and, as it were, concentrated on itself, it shares in the knowledge of the future. Such an opinion would be reasonable if we were to admit that the soul receives knowledge by participating the ideas as the Platonists maintained, because in that case the soul by its nature would know the universal causes of all effects, and would only be impeded in its knowledge by the body, and hence when withdrawn from the corporeal senses it would know the future. But since it is connatural to our intellect to know things, not thus, but by receiving its knowledge from the senses; it is not natural for the soul to know the future when withdrawn from the senses: rather does it know the future by the impression of superior spiritual and corporeal causes; of spiritual causes, when by Divine power the human intellect is enlightened through the ministry of angels, and the phantasms are directed to the knowledge of future events; or, by the influence of demons, when the imagination is moved regarding the future known to the demons, as explained above (Q. 57, A. 3). The soul is naturally more inclined to receive these impressions of spiritual causes when it is withdrawn from the senses, as it is then nearer to the spiritual world, and freer from external distractions. The same may also come from superior corporeal causes. For it is clear that superior bodies influence inferior bodies. Hence, in consequence of the sensitive faculties being acts of corporeal organs, the influence of the heavenly bodies causes the imagination to be affected, and so, as the heavenly bodies cause many future events, the imagination receives certain images of some such events. These images are perceived more at night and while we sleep than in the daytime and while we are awake, because, as stated in De Somn. et Vigil. ii, impressions made by day are evanescent. The night air is calmer, when silence reigns, hence bodily impressions are made in sleep, when slight internal movements are felt more than in wakefulness, and such movements produce in

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sine turbatione aer noctis, eo quod silentiores sunt noctes. Et in corpore faciunt sensum propter somnum, quia parvi motus interiores magis sentiuntur a dormientibus quam a vigilantibus. Hi vero motus faciunt phantasmata, ex quibus praevidentur futura. Ad tertium dicendum quod animalia bruta non habent aliquid supra phantasiam quod ordinet phantasmata, sicut habent homines rationem; et ideo phantasia brutorum animalium totaliter sequitur impressionem caelestem. Et ideo ex motibus huiusmodi animalium magis possunt cognosci quaedam futura, ut pluvia et huiusmodi, quam ex motibus hominum, qui moventur per consilium rationis. Unde philosophus dicit, in libro de Somn. et Vigil., quod quidam imprudentissimi sunt maxime praevidentes, nam intelligentia horum non est curis affecta, sed tanquam deserta et vacua ab omnibus, et mota secundum movens ducitur.

Q. 86, A. 4

the imagination images from which the future may be foreseen.

Reply Obj. 3: Brute animals have no power above the imagination wherewith to regulate it, as man has his reason, and therefore their imagination follows entirely the influence of the heavenly bodies. Thus from such animals’ movements some future things, such as rain and the like, may be known rather than from human movements directed by reason. Hence the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vig.), that some who are most imprudent are most far-seeing; for their intelligence is not burdened with cares, but is as it were barren and bare of all anxiety moving at the caprice of whatever is brought to bear on it.

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Question 87 The Soul’s Knowledge of Itself and All Within Itself Deinde considerandum est quomodo anima intellecWe have now to consider how the intellectual soul tiva cognoscat seipsam, et ea quae in se sunt. Et circa hoc knows itself and all within itself. Under this head there are quaeruntur quatuor. four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum cognoscat seipsam per suam (1) Whether the soul knows itself by its own essence? essentiam. Secundo, quomodo cognoscat habitus in se (2) Whether it knows its own habits? existentes. Tertio, quomodo intellectus cognoscat proprium (3) How does the intellect know its own act? actum. Quarto, quomodo cognoscat actum voluntatis. (4) How does it know the act of the will?

Article 1 Whether the intellectual soul knows itself by its essence? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima intellectiva seipsam cognoscat per suam essentiam. Dicit enim Augustinus, IX de Trin., quod mens seipsam novit per seipsam, quoniam est incorporea. Praeterea, angelus et anima humana conveniunt in genere intellectualis substantiae. Sed angelus intelligit seipsum per essentiam suam. Ergo et anima humana. Praeterea, in his quae sunt sine materia, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur, ut dicitur III de Anima. Sed mens humana est sine materia, non enim est actus corporis alicuius, ut supra dictum est. Ergo in mente humana est idem intellectus et quod intelligitur. Ergo intelligit se per essentiam suam. Sed contra est quod dicitur in III de Anima, quod intellectus intelligit seipsum sicut et alia. Sed alia non intelligit per essentias eorum, sed per eorum similitudines. Ergo neque se intelligit per essentiam suam. Respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque cognoscibile est secundum quod est in actu, et non secundum quod est in potentia, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys., sic enim aliquid est ens et verum, quod sub cognitione cadit, prout actu est. Et hoc quidem manifeste apparet in rebus sensibilibus, non enim visus percipit coloratum in potentia, sed solum coloratum in actu. Et similiter intellectus manifestum est quod, inquantum est cognoscitivus rerum materialium, non cognoscit nisi quod est actu, et inde est quod non cognoscit materiam primam nisi se-

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul knows itself by its own essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), that the mind knows itself, because it is incorporeal. Obj. 2: Further, both angels and human souls belong to the genus of intellectual substance. But an angel understands itself by its own essence. Therefore likewise does the human soul. Obj. 3: Further, in things void of matter, the intellect and that which is understood are the same (De Anima iii, 4). But the human mind is void of matter, not being the act of a body as stated above (Q. 76, A. 1). Therefore the intellect and its object are the same in the human mind; and therefore the human mind understands itself by its own essence. On the contrary, It is said (De Anima iii, 4) that the intellect understands itself in the same way as it understands other things. But it understands other things, not by their essence, but by their similitudes. Therefore it does not understand itself by its own essence. I answer that, Everything is knowable so far as it is in act, and not, so far as it is in potentiality (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 9): for a thing is a being, and is true, and therefore knowable, according as it is actual. This is quite clear as regards sensible things, for the eye does not see what is potentially, but what is actually colored. In like manner it is clear that the intellect, so far as it knows material things, does not know save what is in act: and hence it does not know primary matter except as proportionate to form, as is stated Phys. i, 7. Consequently immaterial substances are intelli-

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cundum proportionem ad formam, ut dicitur in I Physic. Unde et in substantiis immaterialibus, secundum quod unaquaeque earum se habet ad hoc quod sit in actu per essentiam suam, ita se habet ad hoc quod sit per suam essentiam intelligibilis. Essentia igitur Dei, quae est actus purus et perfectus, est simpliciter et perfecte secundum seipsam intelligibilis. Unde Deus per suam essentiam non solum seipsum, sed etiam omnia intelligit. Angeli autem essentia est quidem in genere intelligibilium ut actus, non tamen ut actus purus neque completus. Unde eius intelligere non completur per essentiam suam, etsi enim per essentiam suam se intelligat angelus, tamen non omnia potest per essentiam suam cognoscere, sed cognoscit alia a se per eorum similitudines. Intellectus autem humanus se habet in genere rerum intelligibilium ut ens in potentia tantum, sicut et materia prima se habet in genere rerum sensibilium, unde possibilis nominatur. Sic igitur in sua essentia consideratus, se habet ut potentia intelligens. Unde ex seipso habet virtutem ut intelligat, non autem ut intelligatur, nisi secundum id quod fit actu. Sic enim etiam Platonici posuerunt ordinem entium intelligibilium supra ordinem intellectuum, quia intellectus non intelligit nisi per participationem intelligibilis; participans autem est infra participatum, secundum eos. Si igitur intellectus humanus fieret actu per participationem formarum intelligibilium separatarum, ut Platonici posuerunt per huiusmodi participationem rerum incorporearum intellectus humanus seipsum intelligeret. Sed quia connaturale est intellectui nostro, secundum statum praesentis vitae, quod ad materialia et sensibilia respiciat, sicut supra dictum est; consequens est ut sic seipsum intelligat intellectus noster, secundum quod fit actu per species a sensibilibus abstractas per lumen intellectus agentis, quod est actus ipsorum intelligibilium, et eis mediantibus intellectus possibilis. Non ergo per essentiam suam, sed per actum suum se cognoscit intellectus noster. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, particulariter, secundum quod Socrates vel Plato percipit se habere animam intellectivam, ex hoc quod percipit se intelligere. Alio modo, in universali, secundum quod naturam humanae mentis ex actu intellectus consideramus. Sed verum est quod iudicium et efficacia huius cognitionis per quam naturam animae cognoscimus, competit nobis secundum derivationem luminis intellectus nostri a veritate divina, in qua rationes omnium rerum continentur, sicut supra dictum est. Unde et Augustinus dicit, in IX de Trin., intuemur inviolabilem veritatem, ex qua perfecte, quantum possumus, definimus non qualis sit uniuscuiusque hominis mens, sed qualis esse sempiternis rationibus debeat. Est autem differentia inter has duas cognitiones. Nam ad primam cognitionem de mente habendam, sufficit ipsa mentis praesentia, quae est principium actus ex quo mens percipit seipsam. Et ideo

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gible by their own essence according as each one is actual by its own essence.

Therefore it is that the Essence of God, the pure and perfect act, is simply and perfectly in itself intelligible; and hence God by His own Essence knows Himself, and all other things also. The angelic essence belongs, indeed, to the genus of intelligible things as act, but not as a pure act, nor as a complete act, and hence the angel’s act of intelligence is not completed by his essence. For although an angel understands himself by his own essence, still he cannot understand all other things by his own essence; for he knows things other than himself by their likenesses. Now the human intellect is only a potentiality in the genus of intelligible beings, just as primary matter is a potentiality as regards sensible beings; and hence it is called possible. Therefore in its essence the human mind is potentially understanding. Hence it has in itself the power to understand, but not to be understood, except as it is made actual. For even the Platonists asserted that an order of intelligible beings existed above the order of intellects, forasmuch as the intellect understands only by participation of the intelligible; for they said that the participator is below what it participates. If, therefore, the human intellect, as the Platonists held, became actual by participating separate intelligible forms, it would understand itself by such participation of incorporeal beings. But as in this life our intellect has material and sensible things for its proper natural object, as stated above (Q. 84, A. 7), it understands itself according as it is made actual by the species abstracted from sensible things, through the light of the active intellect, which not only actuates the intelligible things themselves, but also, by their instrumentality, actuates the passive intellect. Therefore the intellect knows itself not by its essence, but by its act. This happens in two ways: In the first place, singularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives that he has an intellectual soul because he perceives that he understands. In the second place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the human mind from knowledge of the intellectual act. It is true, however, that the judgment and force of this knowledge, whereby we know the nature of the soul, comes to us according to the derivation of our intellectual light from the Divine Truth which contains the types of all things as above stated (Q. 84, A. 5). Hence Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 6): We gaze on the inviolable truth whence we can as perfectly as possible define, not what each man’s mind is, but what it ought to be in the light of the eternal types. There is, however, a difference between these two kinds of knowledge, and it consists in this, that the mere presence of the mind suffices for the first; the mind itself being the principle of action whereby it perceives itself, and hence it is said to know itself by its own presence. But as regards the second kind of

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dicitur se cognoscere per suam praesentiam. Sed ad secundam cognitionem de mente habendam, non sufficit eius praesentia, sed requiritur diligens et subtilis inquisitio. Unde et multi naturam animae ignorant, et multi etiam circa naturam animae erraverunt. Propter quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., de tali inquisitione mentis, non velut absentem se quaerat mens cernere; sed praesentem quaerat discernere, idest cognoscere differentiam suam ab aliis rebus, quod est cognoscere quidditatem et naturam suam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod mens seipsam per seipsam novit, quia tandem in sui ipsius cognitionem pervenit, licet per suum actum, ipsa enim est quae cognoscitur, quia ipsa seipsam amat, ut ibidem subditur. Potest enim aliquid dici per se notum dupliciter, vel quia per nihil aliud in eius notitiam devenitur, sicut dicuntur prima principia per se nota; vel quia non sunt cognoscibilia per accidens, sicut color est per se visibilis, substantia autem per accidens. Ad secundum dicendum quod essentia angeli est sicut actus in genere intelligibilium, et ideo se habet et ut intellectus, et ut intellectum. Unde angelus suam essentiam per seipsum apprehendit. Non autem intellectus humanus, qui vel est omnino in potentia respectu intelligibilium, sicut intellectus possibilis; vel est actus intelligibilium quae abstrahuntur a phantasmatibus, sicut intellectus agens. Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi universaliter verum est in omni intellectu. Sicut enim sensus in actu est sensibile, propter similitudinem sensibilis, quae est forma sensus in actu; ita intellectus in actu est intellectum in actu, propter similitudinem rei intellectae, quae est forma intellectus in actu. Et ideo intellectus humanus, qui fit in actu per speciem rei intellectae, per eandem speciem intelligitur, sicut per formam suam. Idem autem est dicere quod in his quae sunt sine materia, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur, ac si diceretur quod in his quae sunt intellecta in actu, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur, per hoc enim aliquid est intellectum in actu, quod est sine materia. Sed in hoc est differentia, quia quorundam essentiae sunt sine materia, sicut substantiae separatae quas angelos dicimus, quarum unaquaeque et est intellecta et est intelligens, sed quaedam res sunt quarum essentiae non sunt sine materia, sed solum similitudines ab eis abstractae. Unde et Commentator dicit, in III de Anima, quod propositio inducta non habet veritatem nisi in substantiis separatis, verificatur enim quodammodo in eis quod non verificatur in aliis, ut dictum est.

Q. 87, A. 1

knowledge, the mere presence of the mind does not suffice, and there is further required a careful and subtle inquiry. Hence many are ignorant of the soul’s nature, and many have erred about it. So Augustine says (De Trin. x, 9), concerning such mental inquiry: Let the mind strive not to see itself as if it were absent, but to discern itself as present—i.e., to know how it differs from other things; which is to know its essence and nature.

Reply Obj. 1: The mind knows itself by means of itself, because at length it acquires knowledge of itself, though led thereto by its own act: because it is itself that it knows, since it loves itself, as he says in the same passage. For a thing can be called self-evident in two ways, either because we can know it by nothing else except itself, as first principles are called self-evident; or because it is not accidentally knowable, as color is visible of itself, whereas substance is visible by its accident. Reply Obj. 2: The essence of an angel is an act in the genus of intelligible things, and therefore it is both intellect and the thing understood. Hence an angel apprehends his own essence through itself: not so the human mind, which is either altogether in potentiality to intelligible things—as is the passive intellect—or is the act of intelligible things abstracted from the phantasms—as is the active intellect. Reply Obj. 3: This saying of the Philosopher is universally true in every kind of intellect. For as sense in act is the sensible in act, by reason of the sensible likeness which is the form of sense in act, so likewise the intellect in act is the object understood in act, by reason of the likeness of the thing understood, which is the form of the intellect in act. So the human intellect, which becomes actual by the species of the object understood, is itself understood by the same species as by its own form. Now to say that in things without matter the intellect and what is understood are the same, is equal to saying that as regards things actually understood the intellect and what is understood are the same. For a thing is actually understood in that it is immaterial. But a distinction must be drawn: since the essences of some things are immaterial—as the separate substances called angels, each of which is understood and understands, whereas there are other things whose essences are not wholly immaterial, but only the abstract likenesses thereof. Hence the Commentator says (De Anima iii) that the proposition quoted is true only of separate substances; because in a sense it is verified in their regard, and not in regard of other substances, as already stated (Reply Obj. 2).

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Article 2 Whether our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster cognoscat habitus animae per essentiam eorum. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIII de Trin., non sic videtur fides in corde in quo est, sicut anima alterius hominis ex motibus corporis videtur; sed eam tenet certissima scientia, clamatque conscientia. Et eadem ratio est de aliis habitibus animae. Ergo habitus animae non cognoscuntur per actus, sed per seipsos. Praeterea, res materiales, quae sunt extra animam, cognoscuntur per hoc quod similitudines earum sunt praesentialiter in anima; et ideo dicuntur per suas similitudines cognosci. Sed habitus animae praesentialiter per suam essentiam sunt in anima. Ergo per suam essentiam cognoscuntur. Praeterea, propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis. Sed res aliae cognoscuntur ab anima propter habitus et species intelligibiles. Ergo ista magis per seipsa ab anima cognoscuntur. Sed contra, habitus sunt principia actuum, sicut et potentiae. Sed sicut dicitur II de Anima, priores potentiis, secundum rationem, actus et operationes sunt. Ergo eadem ratione sunt priores habitibus. Et ita habitus per actus cognoscuntur, sicut et potentiae. Respondeo dicendum quod habitus quodammodo est medium inter potentiam puram et purum actum. Iam autem dictum est quod nihil cognoscitur nisi secundum quod est actu. Sic ergo inquantum habitus deficit ab actu perfecto, deficit ab hoc, ut non sit per seipsum cognoscibilis, sed necesse est quod per actum suum cognoscatur, sive dum aliquis percipit se habere habitum, per hoc quod percipit se producere actum proprium habitus; sive dum aliquis inquirit naturam et rationem habitus, ex consideratione actus. Et prima quidem cognitio habitus fit per ipsam praesentiam habitus, quia ex hoc ipso quod est praesens, actum causat, in quo statim percipitur. Secunda autem cognitio habitus fit per studiosam inquisitionem, sicut supra dictum est de mente. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, etsi fides non cognoscatur per exteriores corporis motus, percipitur tamen etiam ab eo in quo est, per interiorem actum cordis. Nullus enim fidem se habere scit, nisi per hoc quod se credere percipit. Ad secundum dicendum quod habitus sunt praesentes in intellectu nostro, non sicut obiecta intellectus (quia obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est natura rei materialis, ut supra dictum est); sed sunt praesentes in intellectu ut quibus intellectus intelligit.

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 1): Faith is not seen in the heart wherein it abides, as the soul of a man may be seen by another from the movement of the body; but we know most certainly that it is there, and conscience proclaims its existence; and the same principle applies to the other habits of the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are not known by their acts, but by themselves. Obj. 2: Further, material things outside the soul are known by their likeness being present in the soul, and are said therefore to be known by their likenesses. But the soul’s habits are present by their essence in the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are known by their essence. Obj. 3: Further, whatever is the cause of a thing being such is still more so. But habits and intelligible species cause things to be known by the soul. Therefore they are still more known by the soul in themselves. On the contrary, Habits like powers are the principles of acts. But as is said (De Anima ii, 4), acts and operations are logically prior to powers. Therefore in the same way they are prior to habits; and thus habits, like the powers, are known by their acts. I answer that, A habit is a kind of medium between mere power and mere act. Now, it has been said (A. 1) that nothing is known but as it is actual: therefore so far as a habit fails in being a perfect act, it falls short in being of itself knowable, and can be known only by its act; thus, for example, anyone knows he has a habit from the fact that he can produce the act proper to that habit; or he may inquire into the nature and idea of the habit by considering the act. The first kind of knowledge of the habit arises from its being present, for the very fact of its presence causes the act whereby it is known. The second kind of knowledge of the habit arises from a careful inquiry, as is explained above of the mind (A. 1). Reply Obj. 1: Although faith is not known by external movement of the body, it is perceived by the subject wherein it resides, by the interior act of the heart. For no one knows that he has faith unless he knows that he believes. Reply Obj. 2: Habits are present in our intellect, not as its object, since, in the present state of life, our intellect’s object is the nature of a material thing as stated above (Q. 84, A. 7), but as that by which it understands.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum dicitur, propter quod unumquodque, illud magis, veritatem habet, si intelligatur in his quae sunt unius ordinis, puta in uno genere causae, puta si dicatur quod sanitas est propter vitam, sequitur quod vita sit magis desiderabilis. Si autem accipiantur ea quae sunt diversorum ordinum, non habet veritatem, ut si dicatur quod sanitas est propter medicinam, non ideo sequitur quod medicina sit magis desiderabilis, quia sanitas est in ordine finium, medicina autem in ordine causarum efficientium. Sic igitur si accipiamus duo, quorum utrumque sit per se in ordine obiectorum cognitionis; illud propter quod aliud cognoscitur, erit magis notum, sicut principia conclusionibus. Sed habitus non est de ordine obiectorum, inquantum est habitus; nec propter habitum aliqua cognoscuntur sicut propter obiectum cognitum, sed sicut propter dispositionem vel formam qua cognoscens cognoscit, et ideo ratio non sequitur.

Q. 87, A. 3

Reply Obj. 3: The axiom, whatever is the cause of a thing being such, is still more so, is true of things that are of the same order, for instance, of the same kind of cause; for example, we may say that health is desirable on account of life, and therefore life is more desirable still. But if we take things of different orders the axiom is not true: for we may say that health is caused by medicine, but it does not follow that medicine is more desirable than health, for health belongs to the order of final causes, whereas medicine belongs to the order of efficient causes. So of two things belonging essentially to the order of the objects of knowledge, the one which is the cause of the other being known, is the more known, as principles are more known than conclusions. But habit as such does not belong to the order of objects of knowledge; nor are things known on account of the habit, as on account of an object known, but as on account of a disposition or form whereby the subject knows: and therefore the argument does not prove.

Article 3 Whether our intellect knows its own act? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non cognoscat proprium actum. Illud enim proprie cognoscitur, quod est obiectum cognoscitivae virtutis. Sed actus differt ab obiecto. Ergo intellectus non cognoscit suum actum. Praeterea, quidquid cognoscitur, aliquo actu cognoscitur. Si igitur intellectus cognoscit actum suum, aliquo actu cognoscit illum; et iterum illum actum alio actu. Erit ergo procedere in infinitum, quod videtur impossibile. Praeterea, sicut se habet sensus ad actum suum, ita et intellectus. Sed sensus proprius non sentit actum suum, sed hoc pertinet ad sensum communem, ut dicitur in libro de Anima. Ergo neque intellectus intelligit actum suum. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., intelligo me intelligere. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, unumquodque cognoscitur secundum quod est actu. Ultima autem perfectio intellectus est eius operatio, non enim est sicut actio tendens in alterum, quae sit perfectio operati, sicut aedificatio aedificati; sed manet in operante ut perfectio et actus eius, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. Hoc igitur est primum quod de intellectu intelligitur, scilicet ipsum eius intelligere. Sed circa hoc diversi intellectus diversimode se habent. Est enim aliquis intellectus, scilicet divinus, qui est ipsum suum intelligere. Et sic in Deo idem est quod intelligat se intelligere et quod intelligat suam essentiam, quia sua essentia est suum intelligere. Est autem alius intellectus, scilicet angelicus, qui non

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect does not know its own act. For what is known is the object of the knowing faculty. But the act differs from the object. Therefore the intellect does not know its own act. Obj. 2: Further, whatever is known is known by some act. If, then, the intellect knows its own act, it knows it by some act, and again it knows that act by some other act; this is to proceed indefinitely, which seems impossible. Obj. 3: Further, the intellect has the same relation to its act as sense has to its act. But the proper sense does not feel its own act, for this belongs to the common sense, as stated De Anima iii, 2. Therefore neither does the intellect understand its own act. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), I understand that I understand. I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 2) a thing is intelligible according as it is in act. Now the ultimate perfection of the intellect consists in its own operation: for this is not an act tending to something else in which lies the perfection of the work accomplished, as building is the perfection of the thing built; but it remains in the agent as its perfection and act, as is said Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8. Therefore the first thing understood of the intellect is its own act of understanding. This occurs in different ways with different intellects. For there is an intellect, namely, the Divine, which is Its own act of intelligence, so that in God the understanding of His intelligence, and the understanding of His Essence, are one and the same act, because His Essence

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est suum intelligere, sicut supra dictum est, sed tamen primum obiectum sui intelligere est eius essentia. Unde etsi aliud sit in angelo, secundum rationem, quod intelligat se intelligere, et quod intelligat suam essentiam, tamen simul et uno actu utrumque intelligit, quia hoc quod est intelligere suam essentiam, est propria perfectio suae essentiae; simul autem et uno actu intelligitur res cum sua perfectione. Est autem alius intellectus, scilicet humanus, qui nec est suum intelligere, nec sui intelligere est obiectum primum ipsa eius essentia, sed aliquid extrinsecum, scilicet natura materialis rei. Et ideo id quod primo cognoscitur ab intellectu humano, est huiusmodi obiectum; et secundario cognoscitur ipse actus quo cognoscitur obiectum; et per actum cognoscitur ipse intellectus, cuius est perfectio ipsum intelligere. Et ideo philosophus dicit quod obiecta praecognoscuntur actibus, et actus potentiis.

is His act of understanding. But there is another intellect, the angelic, which is not its own act of understanding, as we have said above (Q. 79, A. 1), and yet the first object of that act is the angelic essence. Wherefore although there is a logical distinction between the act whereby he understands that he understands, and that whereby he understands his essence, yet he understands both by one and the same act; because to understand his own essence is the proper perfection of his essence, and by one and the same act is a thing, together with its perfection, understood. And there is yet another, namely, the human intellect, which neither is its own act of understanding, nor is its own essence the first object of its act of understanding, for this object is the nature of a material thing. And therefore that which is first known by the human intellect is an object of this kind, and that which is known secondarily is the act by which that object is known; and through the act the intellect itself is known, the perfection of which is this act of understanding. For this reason did the Philosopher assert that objects are known before acts, and acts before powers (De Anima ii, 4). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectum intellecReply Obj. 1: The object of the intellect is something tus est commune quoddam, scilicet ens et verum, sub universal, namely, being and the true, in which the act also quo comprehenditur etiam ipse actus intelligendi. Unde of understanding is comprised. Wherefore the intellect can intellectus potest suum actum intelligere. Sed non pri- understand its own act. But not primarily, since the first obmo, quia nec primum obiectum intellectus nostri, secun- ject of our intellect, in this state of life, is not every being dum praesentem statum, est quodlibet ens et verum; sed and everything true, but being and true, as considered in ens et verum consideratum in rebus materialibus, ut dic- material things, as we have said above (Q. 84, A. 7), from tum est; ex quibus in cognitionem omnium aliorum de- which it acquires knowledge of all other things.

venit. Ad secundum dicendum quod ipsum intelligere humanum non est actus et perfectio naturae intellectae materialis, ut sic possit uno actu intelligi natura rei materialis et ipsum intelligere, sicut uno actu intelligitur res cum sua perfectione. Unde alius est actus quo intellectus intelligit lapidem, et alius est actus quo intelligit se intelligere lapidem, et sic inde. Nec est inconveniens in intellectu esse infinitum in potentia, ut supra dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod sensus proprius sentit secundum immutationem materialis organi a sensibili exteriori. Non est autem possibile quod aliquid materiale immutet seipsum; sed unum immutatur ab alio. Et ideo actus sensus proprii percipitur per sensum communem. Sed intellectus non intelligit per materialem immutationem organi, et ideo non est simile.

Reply Obj. 2: The intelligent act of the human intellect is not the act and perfection of the material nature understood, as if the nature of the material thing and intelligent act could be understood by one act; just as a thing and its perfection are understood by one act. Hence the act whereby the intellect understands a stone is distinct from the act whereby it understands that it understands a stone; and so on. Nor is there any difficulty in the intellect being thus potentially infinite, as explained above (Q. 86, A. 2). Reply Obj. 3: The proper sense feels by reason of the immutation in the material organ caused by the external sensible. A material object, however, cannot immute itself; but one is immuted by another, and therefore the act of the proper sense is perceived by the common sense. The intellect, on the contrary, does not perform the act of understanding by the material immutation of an organ; and so there is no comparison.

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Q. 87, A. 4

Article 4 Whether the intellect understands the act of the will? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non intelligat actum voluntatis. Nihil enim cognoscitur ab intellectu, nisi sit aliquo modo praesens in intellectu. Sed actus voluntatis non est praesens in intellectu, cum sint diversae potentiae. Ergo actus voluntatis non cognoscitur ab intellectu. Praeterea, actus habet speciem ab obiecto. Sed obiectum voluntatis differt ab obiecto intellectus. Ergo et actus voluntatis speciem habet diversam ab obiecto intellectus. Non ergo cognoscitur ab intellectu.

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect does not understand the act of the will. For nothing is known by the intellect, unless it be in some way present in the intellect. But the act of the will is not in the intellect; since the will and the intellect are distinct. Therefore the act of the will is not known by the intellect. Obj. 2: Further, the act is specified by the object. But the object of the will is not the same as the object of the intellect. Therefore the act of the will is specifically distinct from the object of the intellect, and therefore the act of the will is not known by the intellect. Obj. 3: Augustine (Confess. x, 17) says of the soul’s affections that they are known neither by images as bodies are known; nor by their presence, like the arts; but by certain notions. Now it does not seem that there can be in the soul any other notions of things but either the essences of things known or the likenesses thereof. Therefore it seems impossible for the intellect to know such affections of the soul as the acts of the will. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), I understand that I will. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 59, A. 1), the act of the will is nothing but an inclination consequent on the form understood; just as the natural appetite is an inclination consequent on the natural form. Now the inclination of a thing resides in it according to its mode of existence; and hence the natural inclination resides in a natural thing naturally, and the inclination called the sensible appetite is in the sensible thing sensibly; and likewise the intelligible inclination, which is the act of the will, is in the intelligent subject intelligibly as in its principle and proper subject. Hence the Philosopher expresses himself thus (De Anima iii, 9)—that the will is in the reason. Now whatever is intelligibly in an intelligent subject, is understood by that subject. Therefore the act of the will is understood by the intellect, both inasmuch as one knows that one wills; and inasmuch as one knows the nature of this act, and consequently, the nature of its principle which is the habit or power. Reply Obj. 1: This argument would hold good if the will and the intellect were in different subjects, as they are distinct powers; for then whatever was in the will would not be in the intellect. But as both are rooted in the same substance of the soul, and since one is in a certain way the principle of the other, consequently what is in the will is, in a certain way, also in the intellect.

Praeterea, Augustinus, in libro X Confess., attribuit affectionibus animae quod cognoscuntur neque per imagines, sicut corpora; neque per praesentiam, sicut artes, sed per quasdam notiones. Non videtur autem quod possint esse aliae notiones rerum in anima nisi vel essentiae rerum cognitarum, vel earum similitudines. Ergo impossibile videtur quod intellectus cognoscat affectiones animae, quae sunt actus voluntatis. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., intelligo me velle. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, actus voluntatis nihil aliud est quam inclinatio quaedam consequens formam intellectam, sicut appetitus naturalis est inclinatio consequens formam naturalem. Inclinatio autem cuiuslibet rei est in ipsa re per modum eius. Unde inclinatio naturalis est naturaliter in re naturali; et inclinatio quae est appetitus sensibilis, est sensibiliter in sentiente; et similiter inclinatio intelligibilis, quae est actus voluntatis, est intelligibiliter in intelligente, sicut in principio et in proprio subiecto. Unde et philosophus hoc modo loquendi utitur in III de Anima, quod voluntas in ratione est. Quod autem intelligibiliter est in aliquo intelligente, consequens est ut ab eo intelligatur. Unde actus voluntatis intelligitur ab intellectu, et inquantum aliquis percipit se velle; et inquantum aliquis cognoscit naturam huius actus, et per consequens naturam eius principii, quod est habitus vel potentia. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si voluntas et intellectus, sicut sunt diversae potentiae, ita etiam subiecto differrent, sic enim quod est in voluntate, esset absens ab intellectu. Nunc autem, cum utrumque radicetur in una substantia animae, et unum sit quodammodo principium alterius, consequens est ut quod est in voluntate, sit etiam quodammodo in intellectu. Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum et verum, Reply Obj. 2: The good and the true which are the obquae sunt obiecta voluntatis et intellectus, differunt qui- jects of the will and of the intellect, differ logically, but one dem ratione, verumtamen unum eorum continetur sub is contained in the other, as we have said above (Q. 82, A. 4, alio, ut supra dictum est, nam verum est quoddam bo- ad 1; Q. 16, A. 4, ad 1); for the true is good and the good is

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num, et bonum est quoddam verum. Et ideo quae sunt voluntatis cadunt sub intellectu; et quae sunt intellectus possunt cadere sub voluntate. Ad tertium dicendum quod affectus animae non sunt in intellectu neque per similitudinem tantum, sicut corpora; neque per praesentiam ut in subiecto, sicut artes; sed sicut principiatum in principio, in quo habetur notio principiati. Et ideo Augustinus dicit affectus animae esse in memoria per quasdam notiones.

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true. Therefore the objects of the will fall under the intellect, and those of the intellect can fall under the will. Reply Obj. 3: The affections of the soul are in the intellect not by similitude only, like bodies; nor by being present in their subject, as the arts; but as the thing caused is in its principle, which contains some notion of the thing caused. And so Augustine says that the soul’s affections are in the memory by certain notions.

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Question 88 How the Human Soul Knows What is Above Itself Deinde considerandum est quomodo anima humaWe must now consider how the human soul knows what na cognoscat ea quae supra se sunt, scilicet immateriales is above itself, viz. immaterial substances. Under this head substantias. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. there are three points of inquiry: Primo, utrum anima humana, secundum statum (1) Whether the human soul in the present state of life praesentis vitae, possit intelligere substantias can understand the immaterial substances called immateriales quas angelos dicimus, per seipsas. angels, in themselves? Secundo, utrum possit ad earum notitiam pervenire (2) Whether it can arrive at the knowledge thereof by per cognitionem rerum materialium. the knowledge of material things? Tertio, utrum Deus sit id quod primo a nobis (3) Whether God is the first object of our knowledge? cognoscitur.

Article 1 Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand immaterial substances in themselves? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima humana, secundum statum vitae praesentis, possit intelligere substantias immateriales per seipsas. Dicit enim Augustinus, in IX de Trin., mens ipsa, sicut corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit, sic incorporearum rerum per semetipsam. Huiusmodi autem sunt substantiae immateriales. Ergo mens substantias immateriales intelligit. Praeterea, simile simili cognoscitur. Sed magis assimilatur mens humana rebus immaterialibus quam materialibus, cum ipsa mens sit immaterialis, ut ex supradictis patet. Cum ergo mens nostra intelligat res materiales, multo magis intelligit res immateriales. Praeterea, quod ea quae sunt secundum se maxime sensibilia, non maxime sentiantur a nobis, provenit ex hoc quod excellentiae sensibilium corrumpunt sensum. Sed excellentiae intelligibilium non corrumpunt intellectum, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Ergo ea quae sunt secundum se maxime intelligibilia, sunt etiam maxime intelligibilia nobis. Sed cum res materiales non sint intelligibiles nisi quia facimus eas intelligibiles actu, abstrahendo a materia; manifestum est quod magis sint secundum se intelligibiles substantiae quae secundum suam naturam sunt immateriales. Ergo multo magis intelliguntur a nobis quam res materiales. Praeterea, Commentator dicit, in II Metaphys., quod si substantiae abstractae non possent intelligi a nobis, tunc natura otiose egisset, quia fecit illud quod est naturaliter in se intellectum, non intellectum ab aliquo. Sed

Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul in the present state of life can understand immaterial substances in themselves. For Augustine (De Trin. ix, 3) says: As the mind itself acquires the knowledge of corporeal things by means of the corporeal senses, so it gains from itself the knowledge of incorporeal things. But these are the immaterial substances. Therefore the human mind understands immaterial substances. Obj. 2: Further, like is known by like. But the human mind is more akin to immaterial than to material things; since its own nature is immaterial, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. 76, A. 1). Since then our mind understands material things, much more is it able to understand immaterial things. Obj. 3: Further, the fact that objects which are in themselves most sensible are not most felt by us, comes from sense being corrupted by their very excellence. But the intellect is not subject to such a corrupting influence from its object, as is stated De Anima iii, 4. Therefore things which are in themselves in the highest degree of intelligibility, are likewise to us most intelligible. As material things, however, are intelligible only so far as we make them actually so by abstracting them from material conditions, it is clear that those substances are more intelligible in themselves whose nature is immaterial. Therefore they are much more known to us than are material things. Obj. 4: Further, the Commentator says (Metaph. ii) that nature would be frustrated in its end were we unable to understand abstract substances, because it would have made what in itself is naturally intelligible not to be understood at

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nihil est otiosum sive frustra in natura. Ergo substantiae immateriales possunt intelligi a nobis. Praeterea, sicut se habet sensus ad sensibilia, ita se habet intellectus ad intelligibilia. Sed visus noster potest videre omnia corpora, sive sint superiora et incorruptibilia, sive sint inferiora et corruptibilia. Ergo intellectus noster potest intelligere omnes substantias intelligibiles, et superiores et immateriales. Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. IX, quae in caelis sunt, quis investigabit? In caelis autem dicuntur huiusmodi substantiae esse; secundum illud Matth. XVIII, Angeli eorum in caelis et cetera. Ergo non possunt substantiae immateriales per investigationem humanam cognosci. Respondeo dicendum quod secundum opinionem Platonis, substantiae immateriales non solum a nobis intelliguntur, sed etiam sunt prima a nobis intellecta. Posuit enim Plato formas immateriales subsistentes, quas ideas vocabat, esse propria obiecta nostri intellectus, et ita primo et per se intelliguntur a nobis. Applicatur tamen animae cognitio rebus materialibus, secundum quod intellectui permiscetur phantasia et sensus. Unde quanto magis intellectus fuerit depuratus, tanto magis percipit immaterialium intelligibilem veritatem. Sed secundum Aristotelis sententiam, quam magis experimur, intellectus noster, secundum statum praesentis vitae, naturalem respectum habet ad naturas rerum materialium; unde nihil intelligit nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut ex dictis patet. Et sic manifestum est quod substantias immateriales, quae sub sensu et imaginatione non cadunt, primo et per se, secundum modum cognitionis nobis expertum, intelligere non possumus. Sed tamen Averroes, in Comment. tertii de Anima, ponit quod in fine in hac vita homo pervenire potest ad hoc quod intelligat substantias separatas, per continuationem vel unionem cuiusdam substantiae separatae nobis, quam vocat intellectum agentem, qui quidem, cum sit substantia separata, naturaliter substantias separatas intelligit. Unde cum fuerit nobis perfecte unitus, sic ut per eum perfecte intelligere possimus, intelligemus et nos substantias separatas; sicut nunc per intellectum possibilem nobis unitum intelligimus res materiales. Ponit autem intellectum agentem sic nobis uniri. Cum enim nos intelligamus per intellectum agentem et per intelligibilia speculata, ut patet cum conclusiones intelligimus per principia intellecta; necesse est quod intellectus agens comparetur ad intellecta speculata vel sicut agens principale ad instrumenta, vel sicut forma ad materiam. His enim duobus modis attribuitur actio aliqua duobus principiis, principali quidem agenti et instrumento, sicut sectio artifici et serrae; formae autem et subiecto, sicut calefactio calori et igni. Sed utroque modo intellectus agens comparabitur ad intelligibilia speculata sicut per-

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all. But in nature nothing is idle or purposeless. Therefore immaterial substances can be understood by us. Obj. 5: Further, as sense is to the sensible, so is intellect to the intelligible. But our sight can see all things corporeal, whether superior and incorruptible; or lower and corruptible. Therefore our intellect can understand all intelligible substances, even the superior and immaterial. On the contrary, It is written (Wis 9:16): The things that are in heaven, who shall search out? But these substances are said to be in heaven, according to Matt. 18:10, Their angels in heaven, etc. Therefore immaterial substances cannot be known by human investigation. I answer that, In the opinion of Plato, immaterial substances are not only understood by us, but are the objects we understand first of all. For Plato taught that immaterial subsisting forms, which he called Ideas, are the proper objects of our intellect, and thus first and per se understood by us; and, further, that material objects are known by the soul inasmuch as phantasy and sense are mixed up with the mind. Hence the purer the intellect is, so much the more clearly does it perceive the intelligible truth of immaterial things. But in Aristotle’s opinion, which experience corroborates, our intellect in its present state of life has a natural relationship to the natures of material things; and therefore it can only understand by turning to the phantasms, as we have said above (Q. 84, A. 7). Thus it clearly appears that immaterial substances which do not fall under sense and imagination, cannot first and per se be known by us, according to the mode of knowledge which experience proves us to have. Nevertheless Averroes (Comment. De Anima iii) teaches that in this present life man can in the end arrive at the knowledge of separate substances by being coupled or united to some separate substance, which he calls the active intellect, and which, being a separate substance itself, can naturally understand separate substances. Hence, when it is perfectly united to us so that by its means we are able to understand perfectly, we also shall be able to understand separate substances, as in the present life through the medium of the passive intellect united to us, we can understand material things. Now he said that the active intellect is united to us, thus. For since we understand by means of both the active intellect and intelligible objects, as, for instance, we understand conclusions by principles understood; it is clear that the active intellect must be compared to the objects understood, either as the principal agent is to the instrument, or as form to matter. For an action is ascribed to two principles in one of these two ways; to a principal agent and to an instrument, as cutting to the workman and the saw; to a form and its subject, as heating to heat and fire. In both these ways the active intellect can be compared to the intel-

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fectio ad perfectibile, et actus ad potentiam. Simul autem recipitur in aliquo perfectum et perfectio; sicut visibile in actu et lumen in pupilla. Simul igitur in intellectu possibili recipiuntur intellecta speculata et intellectus agens. Et quanto plura intellecta speculata recipimus, tanto magis appropinquamus ad hoc quod intellectus agens perfecte uniatur nobis. Ita quod cum omnia intellecta speculata cognoverimus, intellectus agens perfecte unietur nobis; et poterimus per eum omnia cognoscere materialia et immaterialia. Et in hoc ponit ultimam hominis felicitatem. Nec refert, quantum ad propositum pertinet, utrum in illo statu felicitatis intellectus possibilis intelligat substantias separatas per intellectum agentem, ut ipse sentit, vel, ut ipse imponit Alexandro, intellectus possibilis nunquam intelligat substantias separatas (propter hoc quod ponit intellectum possibilem corruptibilem), sed homo intelligat substantias separatas per intellectum agentem.

Sed praedicta stare non possunt. Primo quidem quia, si intellectus agens est substantia separata, impossibile est quod per ipsam formaliter intelligamus, quia id quo formaliter agens agit, est forma et actus agentis; cum omne agens agat inquantum est actu. Sicut etiam supra dictum est circa intellectum possibilem. Secundo quia, secundum modum praedictum, intellectus agens, si est substantia separata, non uniretur nobis secundum suam substantiam; sed solum lumen eius, secundum quod participatur in intellectis speculatis; et non quantum ad alias actiones intellectus agentis, ut possimus per hoc intelligere substantias immateriales. Sicut dum videmus colores illuminatos a sole, non unitur nobis substantia solis, ut possimus actiones solis agere; sed solum nobis unitur lumen solis ad visionem colorum. Tertio, quia dato quod secundum modum praedictum uniretur nobis substantia intellectus agentis, tamen ipsi non ponunt quod intellectus agens totaliter uniatur nobis secundum unum intelligibile vel duo, sed secundum omnia intellecta speculata. Sed omnia intellecta speculata deficiunt a virtute intellectus agentis, quia multo plus est intelligere substantias separatas, quam intelligere omnia materialia. Unde manifestum est quod etiam intellectis omnibus materialibus, non sic uniretur intellectus agens nobis, ut possemus intelligere per eum substantias separatas. Quarto, quia intelligere omnia intellecta materialia vix contingit alicui in hoc mundo; et sic nullus, vel pauci ad felicitatem pervenirent. Quod est contra philosophum, in I Ethic., qui dicit quod felicitas est quoddam bonum commune, quod potest pervenire omnibus non or-

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ligible object as perfection is to the perfectible, and as act is to potentiality. Now a subject is made perfect and receives its perfection at one and the same time, as the reception of what is actually visible synchronizes with the reception of light in the eye. Therefore the passive intellect receives the intelligible object and the active intellect together; and the more numerous the intelligible objects received, so much the nearer do we come to the point of perfect union between ourselves and the active intellect; so much so that when we understand all the intelligible objects, the active intellect becomes one with us, and by its instrumentality we can understand all things material and immaterial. In this he makes the ultimate happiness of man to consist. Nor, as regards the present inquiry, does it matter whether the passive intellect in that state of happiness understands separate substances by the instrumentality of the active intellect, as he himself maintains, or whether (as he says Alexander holds) the passive intellect can never understand separate substances (because according to him it is corruptible), but man understands separate substances by means of the active intellect. This opinion, however, is untrue. First, because, supposing the active intellect to be a separate substance, we could not formally understand by its instrumentality, for the medium of an agent’s formal action consists in its form and act, since every agent acts according to its actuality, as was said of the passive intellect (Q. 70, A. 1). Second, this opinion is untrue, because in the above explanation, the active intellect, supposing it to be a separate substance, would not be joined to us in its substance, but only in its light, as participated in things understood; and would not extend to the other acts of the active intellect so as to enable us to understand immaterial substances; just as when we see colors set off by the sun, we are not united to the substance of the sun so as to act like the sun, but its light only is united to us, that we may see the colors. Third, this opinion is untrue, because granted that, as above explained, the active intellect were united to us in substance, still it is not said that it is wholly so united in regard to one intelligible object, or two; but rather in regard to all intelligible objects. But all such objects together do not equal the force of the active intellect, as it is a much greater thing to understand separate substances than to understand all material things. Hence it clearly follows that the knowledge of all material things would not make the active intellect to be so united to us as to enable us by its instrumentality to understand separate substances. Fourth, this opinion is untrue, because it is hardly possible for anyone in this world to understand all material things: and thus no one, or very few, could reach to perfect felicity; which is against what the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9), that happiness is a kind of common good, communicable

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batis ad virtutem. Est etiam contra rationem quod finem alicuius speciei ut in paucioribus consequantur ea quae continentur sub specie. Quinto, quia philosophus dicit expresse, in I Ethic., quod felicitas est operatio secundum perfectam virtutem. Et enumeratis multis virtutibus, in decimo, concludit quod felicitas ultima, consistens in cognitione maximorum intelligibilium, est secundum virtutem sapientiae, quam posuerat in sexto esse caput scientiarum speculativarum. Unde patet quod Aristoteles posuit ultimam felicitatem hominis in cognitione substantiarum separatarum, qualis potest haberi per scientias speculativas, et non per continuationem intellectus agentis a quibusdam confictam. Sexto, quia supra ostensum est quod intellectus agens non est substantia separata, sed virtus quaedam animae, ad eadem active se extendens, ad quae se extendit intellectus possibilis receptive, quia, ut dicitur in III de Anima, intellectus possibilis est quo est omnia fieri, intellectus agens quo est omnia facere. Uterque ergo intellectus se extendit, secundum statum praesentis vitae, ad materialia sola; quae intellectus agens facit intelligibilia actu, et recipiuntur in intellectu possibili. Unde secundum statum praesentis vitae, neque per intellectum possibilem, neque per intellectum agentem, possumus intelligere substantias immateriales secundum seipsas. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex illa auctoritate Augustini haberi potest quod illud quod mens nostra de cognitione incorporalium rerum accipere potest, per seipsam cognoscere possit. Et hoc adeo verum est, ut etiam apud philosophos dicatur quod scientia de anima est principium quoddam ad cognoscendum substantias separatas. Per hoc enim quod anima nostra cognoscit seipsam, pertingit ad cognitionem aliquam habendam de substantiis incorporeis, qualem eam contingit habere, non quod simpliciter et perfecte eas cognoscat, cognoscendo seipsam. Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo naturae non est ratio sufficiens ad cognitionem, alioquin oporteret dicere quod Empedocles dixit, quod anima esset de natura omnium, ad hoc quod omnia cognosceret. Sed requiritur ad cognoscendum, ut sit similitudo rei cognitae in cognoscente quasi quaedam forma ipsius. Intellectus autem noster possibilis, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est natus informari similitudinibus rerum materialium a phantasmatibus abstractis, et ideo cognoscit magis materialia quam substantias immateriales. Ad tertium dicendum quod requiritur aliqua proportio obiecti ad potentiam cognoscitivam, ut activi ad passivum, et perfectionis ad perfectibile. Unde quod excellentia sensibilia non capiantur a sensu, non sola ratio est quia corrumpunt organa sensibilia; sed etiam quia sunt improportionata potentiis sensitivis. Et hoc modo substantiae immateriales sunt improportionatae intel-

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to all capable of virtue. Further, it is unreasonable that only the few of any species attain to the end of the species. Fifth, the Philosopher expressly says (Ethic. i, 10), that happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue; and after enumerating many virtues in the tenth book, he concludes (Ethic. i, 7) that ultimate happiness consisting in the knowledge of the highest things intelligible is attained through the virtue of wisdom, which in the sixth chapter he had named as the chief of speculative sciences. Hence Aristotle clearly places the ultimate felicity of man in the knowledge of separate substances, obtainable by speculative science; and not by being united to the active intellect as some imagined. Sixth, as was shown above (Q. 79, A. 4), the active intellect is not a separate substance; but a faculty of the soul, extending itself actively to the same objects to which the passive intellect extends receptively; because, as is stated (De Anima iii, 5), the passive intellect is all things potentially, and the active intellect is all things in act. Therefore both intellects, according to the present state of life, extend to material things only, which are made actually intelligible by the active intellect, and are received in the passive intellect. Hence in the present state of life we cannot understand separate immaterial substances in themselves, either by the passive or by the active intellect. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine may be taken to mean that the knowledge of incorporeal things in the mind can be gained by the mind itself. This is so true that philosophers also say that the knowledge concerning the soul is a principle for the knowledge of separate substances. For by knowing itself, it attains to some knowledge of incorporeal substances, such as is within its compass; not that the knowledge of itself gives it a perfect and absolute knowledge of them.

Reply Obj. 2: The likeness of nature is not a sufficient cause of knowledge; otherwise what Empedocles said would be true—that the soul needs to have the nature of all in order to know all. But knowledge requires that the likeness of the thing known be in the knower, as a kind of form thereof. Now our passive intellect, in the present state of life, is such that it can be informed with similitudes abstracted from phantasms: and therefore it knows material things rather than immaterial substances. Reply Obj. 3: There must needs be some proportion between the object and the faculty of knowledge; such as of the active to the passive, and of perfection to the perfectible. Hence that sensible objects of great power are not grasped by the senses, is due not merely to the fact that they corrupt the organ, but also to their being improportionate to the sensitive power. And thus it is that immaterial substances

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lectui nostro, secundum praesentem statum, ut non possint ab eo intelligi. Ad quartum dicendum quod illa ratio Commentatoris multipliciter deficit. Primo quidem, quia non sequitur quod, si substantiae separatae non intelliguntur a nobis, non intelligantur ab aliquo intellectu, intelliguntur enim a seipsis, et a se invicem. Secundo, quia non est finis substantiarum separatarum ut intelligantur a nobis. Illud autem otiose et frustra esse dicitur, quod non consequitur finem ad quem est. Et sic non sequitur substantias immateriales esse frustra, etiam si nullo modo intelligerentur a nobis. Ad quintum dicendum quod eodem modo sensus cognoscit et superiora et inferiora corpora, scilicet per immutationem organi a sensibili. Non autem eodem modo intelliguntur a nobis substantiae materiales, quae intelliguntur per modum abstractionis; et substantiae immateriales, quae non possunt sic a nobis intelligi, quia non sunt earum aliqua phantasmata.

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are improportionate to our intellect, in our present state of life, so that it cannot understand them. Reply Obj. 4: This argument of the Commentator fails in several ways. First, because if separate substances are not understood by us, it does not follow that they are not understood by any intellect; for they are understood by themselves, and by one another. Second, to be understood by us is not the end of separate substances: while only that is vain and purposeless, which fails to attain its end. It does not follow, therefore, that immaterial substances are purposeless, even if they are not understood by us at all. Reply Obj. 5: Sense knows bodies, whether superior or inferior, in the same way, that is, by the sensible acting on the organ. But we do not understand material and immaterial substances in the same way. The former we understand by a process of abstraction, which is impossible in the case of the latter, for there are no phantasms of what is immaterial.

Article 2 Whether our intellect can understand immaterial substances through its knowledge of material things? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster per cognitionem rerum materialium possit pervenire ad intelligendum substantias immateriales. Dicit enim Dionysius, I cap. Cael. Hier., quod non est possibile humanae menti ad immaterialem illam sursum excitari caelestium hierarchiarum contemplationem, nisi secundum se materiali manuductione utatur. Relinquitur ergo quod per materialia manuduci possumus ad intelligendum substantias immateriales. Praeterea, scientia est in intellectu. Sed scientiae et definitiones sunt de substantiis immaterialibus, definit enim Damascenus angelum; et de angelis aliqua documenta traduntur tam in theologicis quam in philosophicis disciplinis. Ergo substantiae immateriales intelligi possunt a nobis. Praeterea, anima humana est de genere substantiarum immaterialium. Sed ipsa intelligi potest a nobis per actum suum, quo intelligit materialia. Ergo et aliae substantiae immateriales intelligi possunt a nobis per suos effectus in rebus materialibus. Praeterea, illa sola causa per suos effectus comprehendi non potest, quae in infinitum distat a suis effectibus. Hoc autem solius Dei est proprium. Ergo aliae substantiae immateriales creatae intelligi possunt a nobis per res materiales.

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect can know immaterial substances through the knowledge of material things. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that the human mind cannot be raised up to immaterial contemplation of the heavenly hierarchies, unless it is led thereto by material guidance according to its own nature. Therefore we can be led by material things to know immaterial substances.

Obj. 2: Further, science resides in the intellect. But there are sciences and definitions of immaterial substances; for Damascene defines an angel (De Fide Orth. ii, 3); and we find angels treated of both in theology and philosophy. Therefore immaterial substances can be understood by us. Obj. 3: Further, the human soul belongs to the genus of immaterial substances. But it can be understood by us through its act by which it understands material things. Therefore also other immaterial substances can be understood by us, through their material effects. Obj. 4: Further, the only cause which cannot be comprehended through its effects is that which is infinitely distant from them, and this belongs to God alone. Therefore other created immaterial substances can be understood by us through material things.

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Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, I cap. de Div. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that Nom., quod sensibilibus intelligibilia, et compositis simpli- intelligible things cannot be understood through sensible cia, et corporalibus incorporalia apprehendi non possunt. things, nor composite things through simple, nor incorporeal through corporeal. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Averroes narI answer that, Averroes says (De Anima iii) that a rat in III de Anima, quidam Avempace nomine, posuit philosopher named Avempace taught that by the underquod per intellectum substantiarum materialium perve- standing of natural substances we can be led, according nire possumus, secundum vera philosophiae principia, to true philosophical principles, to the knowledge of imad intelligendum substantias immateriales. Cum enim material substances. For since the nature of our intellect intellectus noster natus sit abstrahere quidditatem rei is to abstract the quiddity of material things from matter, materialis a materia, si iterum in illa quidditate sit ali- anything material residing in that abstracted quiddity can quid materiae, poterit iterato abstrahere, et cum hoc in again be made subject to abstraction; and as the process of infinitum non procedat, tandem pervenire poterit ad in- abstraction cannot go on forever, it must arrive at length at telligendum aliquam quidditatem quae sit omnino sine some immaterial quiddity, absolutely without matter; and materia. Et hoc est intelligere substantiam immateria- this would be the understanding of immaterial substance. lem. Quod quidem efficaciter diceretur, si substantiae imNow this opinion would be true, were immaterial submateriales essent formae et species horum materialium, stances the forms and species of these material things; as ut Platonici posuerunt. Hoc autem non posito, sed sup- the Platonists supposed. But supposing, on the contrary, posito quod substantiae immateriales sint omnino alte- that immaterial substances differ altogether from the quidrius rationis a quidditatibus materialium rerum; quan- dity of material things, it follows that however much our intumcumque intellectus noster abstrahat quidditatem rei tellect abstract the quiddity of material things from matter, materialis a materia, nunquam perveniet ad aliquid si- it could never arrive at anything akin to immaterial submile substantiae immateriali. Et ideo per substantias stance. Therefore we are not able perfectly to understand materiales non possumus perfecte substantias immate- immaterial substances through material substances. riales intelligere. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex rebus materiaReply Obj. 1: From material things we can rise to some libus ascendere possumus in aliqualem cognitionem im- kind of knowledge of immaterial things, but not to the permaterialium rerum, non tamen in perfectam, quia non fect knowledge thereof; for there is no proper and adeest sufficiens comparatio rerum materialium ad immate- quate proportion between material and immaterial things, riales, sed similitudines si quae a materialibus accipiun- and the likenesses drawn from material things for the untur ad immaterialia intelligenda, sunt multum dissimi- derstanding of immaterial things are very dissimilar thereles, ut Dionysius dicit, II cap. Cael. Hier. from, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii). Ad secundum dicendum quod de superioribus reReply Obj. 2: Science treats of higher things princibus in scientiis maxime tractatur per viam remotionis, pally by way of negation. Thus Aristotle (De Coel. i, 3) sic enim corpora caelestia notificat Aristoteles per nega- explains the heavenly bodies by denying to them inferior tionem proprietatum inferiorum corporum. Unde mul- corporeal properties. Hence it follows that much less can to magis immateriales substantiae a nobis cognosci non immaterial substances be known by us in such a way as to possunt, ut earum quidditates apprehendamus, sed de make us know their quiddity; but we may have a scientific eis nobis in scientiis documenta traduntur per viam re- knowledge of them by way of negation and by their relation motionis et alicuius habitudinis ad res materiales. to material things. Ad tertium dicendum quod anima humana intelReply Obj. 3: The human soul understands itself ligit seipsam per suum intelligere, quod est actus pro- through its own act of understanding, which is proper to it, prius eius, perfecte demonstrans virtutem eius et natu- showing perfectly its power and nature. But the power and ram. Sed neque per hoc, neque per alia quae in rebus nature of immaterial substances cannot be perfectly known materialibus inveniuntur, perfecte cognosci potest im- through such act, nor through any other material thing, materialium substantiarum virtus et natura, quia huius- because there is no proportion between the latter and the modi non adaequant earum virtutes. power of the former. Ad quartum dicendum quod substantiae immateReply Obj. 4: Created immaterial substances are not riales creatae in genere quidem naturali non conveniunt in the same natural genus as material substances, for they cum substantiis materialibus, quia non est in eis eadem do not agree in power or in matter; but they belong to ratio potentiae et materiae, conveniunt tamen cum eis in the same logical genus, because even immaterial substances genere logico, quia etiam substantiae immateriales sunt are in the predicament of substance, as their essence is in praedicamento substantiae, cum earum quidditas non distinct from their existence. But God has no connection

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sit earum esse. Sed Deus non convenit cum rebus materialibus neque secundum genus naturale, neque secundum genus logicum, quia Deus nullo modo est in genere, ut supra dictum est. Unde per similitudines rerum materialium aliquid affirmative potest cognosci de angelis secundum rationem communem, licet non secundum rationem speciei; de Deo autem nullo modo.

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with material things, as regards either natural genus or logical genus; because God is in no genus, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 5). Hence through the likeness derived from material things we can know something positive concerning the angels, according to some common notion, though not according to the specific nature; whereas we cannot acquire any such knowledge at all about God.

Article 3 Whether God is the first object known by the human mind? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit primum quod a mente humana cognoscitur. Illud enim in quo omnia alia cognoscuntur, et per quod de aliis iudicamus, est primo cognitum a nobis; sicut lux ab oculo, et principia prima ab intellectu. Sed omnia in luce primae veritatis cognoscimus, et per eam de omnibus iudicamus; ut dicit Augustinus in libro de Trin., et in libro de Vera Relig. Ergo Deus est id quod primo cognoscitur a nobis. Praeterea, propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis. Sed Deus est causa omnis nostrae cognitionis, ipse enim est lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum, ut dicitur Ioan. I. Ergo Deus est id quod primo et maxime est cognitum nobis. Praeterea, id quod primo cognoscitur in imagine, est exemplar quo imago formatur. Sed in mente nostra est Dei imago, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo id quod primo cognoscitur in mente nostra est Deus. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. I, Deum nemo vidit unquam. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum intellectus humanus, secundum statum praesentis vitae, non possit intelligere substantias immateriales creatas, ut dictum est; multo minus potest intelligere essentiam substantiae increatae. Unde simpliciter dicendum est quod Deus non est primum quod a nobis cognoscitur; sed magis per creaturas in Dei cognitionem pervenimus, secundum illud apostoli ad Rom. I, invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur. Primum autem quod intelligitur a nobis secundum statum praesentis vitae, est quidditas rei materialis, quae est nostri intellectus obiectum, ut multoties supra dictum est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in luce primae veritatis omnia intelligimus et iudicamus, inquantum ipsum lumen intellectus nostri, sive naturale sive gratuitum, nihil aliud est quam quaedam impressio veritatis primae, ut supra dictum est. Unde cum ipsum lumen

Objection 1: It would seem that God is the first object known by the human mind. For that object in which all others are known, and by which we judge others, is the first thing known to us; as light is to the eye, and first principles to the intellect. But we know all things in the light of the first truth, and thereby judge of all things, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2; De Vera Relig. xxxi);. Therefore God is the first object known to us. Obj. 2: Further, whatever causes a thing to be such is more so. But God is the cause of all our knowledge; for He is the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world (John 1:9). Therefore God is our first and most known object. Obj. 3: Further, what is first known in the image is the exemplar to which it is made. But in our mind is the image of God, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4,7). Therefore God is the first object known to our mind. On the contrary, No man hath seen God at any time (John 1:18). I answer that, Since the human intellect in the present state of life cannot understand even immaterial created substances (A. 1), much less can it understand the essence of the uncreated substance. Hence it must be said simply that God is not the first object of our knowledge. Rather do we know God through creatures, according to the Apostle (Rom 1:20): the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made: while the first object of our knowledge in this life is the quiddity of a material thing, which is the proper object of our intellect, as appears above in many passages (Q. 84, A. 7; Q. 85, A. 8; Q. 87, A. 2, ad 2) Reply Obj. 1: We see and judge of all things in the light of the first truth, forasmuch as the light itself of our mind, whether natural or gratuitous, is nothing else than the impression of the first truth upon it, as stated above (Q. 12, A. 2). Hence, as the light itself of our intellect is not

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intellectus nostri non se habeat ad intellectum nostrum sicut quod intelligitur, sed sicut quo intelligitur; multo minus Deus est id quod primo a nostro intellectu intelligitur. Ad secundum dicendum quod propter quod unumquodque, illud magis, intelligendum est in his quae sunt unius ordinis, ut supra dictum est. Propter Deum autem alia cognoscuntur, non sicut propter primum cognitum, sed sicut propter primam cognoscitivae virtutis causam. Ad tertium dicendum quod, si in anima nostra esset perfecta imago Dei, sicut filius est perfecta imago patris, statim mens nostra intelligeret Deum. Est autem imago imperfecta. Unde ratio non sequitur.

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the object it understands, much less can it be said that God is the first object known by our intellect.

Reply Obj. 2: The axiom, Whatever causes a thing to be such is more so, must be understood of things belonging to one and the same order, as explained above (Q. 81, A. 2, ad 3). Other things than God are known because of God; not as if He were the first known object, but because He is the first cause of our faculty of knowledge. Reply Obj. 3: If there existed in our souls a perfect image of God, as the Son is the perfect image of the Father, our mind would know God at once. But the image in our mind is imperfect; hence the argument does not prove.

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Question 89 The Knowledge of the Separated Soul Deinde considerandum est de cognitione animae seWe must now consider the knowledge of the separated paratae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. soul. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum anima separata a corpore possit (1) Whether the soul separated from the body can intelligere. understand? Secundo, utrum intelligat substantias separatas. (2) Whether it understands separate substances? Tertio, utrum intelligat omnia naturalia. (3) Whether it understands all natural things? Quarto, utrum cognoscat singularia. (4) Whether it understands individuals and singulars? Quinto, utrum habitus scientiae hic acquisitae (5) Whether the habits of knowledge acquired in this remaneat in anima separata. life remain? Sexto, utrum possit uti habitu scientiae hic (6) Whether the soul can use the habit of knowledge acquisitae. here acquired? Septimo, utrum distantia localis impediat (7) Whether local distance impedes the separated soul’s cognitionem animae separatae. knowledge? Octavo, utrum animae separatae a corporibus (8) Whether souls separated from the body know what cognoscant ea quae hic aguntur. happens here?

Article 1 Whether the separated soul can understand nothing at all? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima separata nihil omnino intelligere possit. Dicit enim philosophus, in I de Anima, quod intelligere corrumpitur, interius quodam corrupto. Sed omnia interiora hominis corrumpuntur per mortem. Ergo et ipsum intelligere corrumpitur. Praeterea, anima humana impeditur ab intelligendo per ligamentum sensus, et perturbata imaginatione, sicut supra dictum est. Sed morte totaliter sensus et imaginatio corrumpuntur, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo anima post mortem nihil intelligit. Praeterea, si anima separata intelligit, oportet quod per aliquas species intelligat. Sed non intelligit per species innatas, quia a principio est sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum. Neque per species quas abstrahat a rebus, quia non habet organa sensus et imaginationis, quibus mediantibus species intelligibiles abstrahuntur a rebus. Neque etiam per species prius abstractas, et in anima conservatas, quia sic anima pueri nihil intelligeret post mortem. Neque etiam per species intelligibiles divinitus influxas, haec enim cognitio non esset naturalis, de qua nunc agitur, sed gratiae. Ergo anima separata a corpore nihil intelligit.

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul separated from the body can understand nothing at all. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4) that the understanding is corrupted together with its interior principle. But by death all human interior principles are corrupted. Therefore also the intellect itself is corrupted. Obj. 2: Further, the human soul is hindered from understanding when the senses are tied, and by a distracted imagination, as explained above (Q. 84, AA. 7,8). But death destroys the senses and imagination, as we have shown above (Q. 77, A. 8). Therefore after death the soul understands nothing. Obj. 3: Further, if the separated soul can understand, this must be by means of some species. But it does not understand by means of innate species, because it has none such; being at first like a tablet on which nothing is written: nor does it understand by species abstracted from things, for it does not then possess organs of sense and imagination which are necessary for the abstraction of species: nor does it understand by means of species, formerly abstracted and retained in the soul; for if that were so, a child’s soul would have no means of understanding at all: nor does it understand by means of intelligible species divinely infused, for such knowledge would not be natural, such as we treat of now, but the effect of grace. Therefore the soul apart from the body understands nothing.

387

Q. 89, A. 1

Man

Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in I de Anima, quod si non est aliqua operationum animae propria, non contingit ipsam separari. Contingit autem ipsam separari. Ergo habet aliquam operationem propriam; et maxime eam quae est intelligere. Intelligit ergo sine corpore existens. Respondeo dicendum quod ista quaestio difficultatem habet ex hoc quod anima, quandiu est corpori coniuncta, non potest aliquid intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut per experimentum patet. Si autem hoc non est ex natura animae, sed per accidens hoc convenit ei ex eo quod corpori alligatur, sicut Platonici posuerunt, de facili quaestio solvi posset. Nam remoto impedimento corporis, rediret anima ad suam naturam, ut intelligeret intelligibilia simpliciter, non convertendo se ad phantasmata, sicut est de aliis substantiis separatis. Sed secundum hoc, non esset anima corpori unita propter melius animae, si peius intelligeret corpori unita quam separata; sed hoc esset solum propter melius corporis, quod est irrationabile, cum materia sit propter formam, et non e converso. Si autem ponamus quod anima ex sua natura habeat ut intelligat convertendo se ad phantasmata, cum natura animae per mortem corporis non mutetur, videtur quod anima naturaliter nihil possit intelligere, cum non sint ei praesto phantasmata ad quae convertatur. Et ideo ad hanc difficultatem tollendam, considerandum est quod, cum nihil operetur nisi inquantum est actu, modus operandi uniuscuiusque rei sequitur modum essendi ipsius. Habet autem anima alium modum essendi cum unitur corpori, et cum fuerit a corpore separata, manente tamen eadem animae natura; non ita quod uniri corpori sit ei accidentale, sed per rationem suae naturae corpori unitur; sicut nec levis natura mutatur cum est in loco proprio, quod est ei naturale, et cum est extra proprium locum, quod est ei praeter naturam. Animae igitur secundum illum modum essendi quo corpori est unita, competit modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata corporum, quae in corporeis organis sunt, cum autem fuerit a corpore separata, competit ei modus intelligendi per conversionem ad ea quae sunt intelligibilia simpliciter, sicut et aliis substantiis separatis. Unde modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata est animae naturalis, sicut et corpori uniri, sed esse separatum a corpore est praeter rationem suae naturae, et similiter intelligere sine conversione ad phantasmata est ei praeter naturam. Et ideo ad hoc unitur corpori, ut sit et operetur secundum naturam suam. Sed hoc rursus habet dubitationem. Cum enim natura semper ordinetur ad id quod melius est; est autem melior modus intelligendi per conversionem ad intelligibilia simpliciter, quam per conversionem ad phantasmata, debuit sic a Deo institui animae natura, ut modus intelligendi no-

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On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1), If the soul had no proper operation, it could not be separated from the body. But the soul is separated from the body; therefore it has a proper operation and above all, that which consists in intelligence. Therefore the soul can understand when it is apart from the body. I answer that, The difficulty in solving this question arises from the fact that the soul united to the body can understand only by turning to the phantasms, as experience shows. Did this not proceed from the soul’s very nature, but accidentally through its being bound up with the body, as the Platonists said, the difficulty would vanish; for in that case when the body was once removed, the soul would at once return to its own nature, and would understand intelligible things simply, without turning to the phantasms, as is exemplified in the case of other separate substances. In that case, however, the union of soul and body would not be for the soul’s good, for evidently it would understand worse in the body than out of it; but for the good of the body, which would be unreasonable, since matter exists on account of the form, and not the form for the sake of matter. But if we admit that the nature of the soul requires it to understand by turning to the phantasms, it will seem, since death does not change its nature, that it can then naturally understand nothing; as the phantasms are wanting to which it may turn. To solve this difficulty we must consider that as nothing acts except so far as it is actual, the mode of action in every agent follows from its mode of existence. Now the soul has one mode of being when in the body, and another when apart from it, its nature remaining always the same; but this does not mean that its union with the body is an accidental thing, for, on the contrary, such union belongs to its very nature, just as the nature of a light object is not changed, when it is in its proper place, which is natural to it, and outside its proper place, which is beside its nature. The soul, therefore, when united to the body, consistently with that mode of existence, has a mode of understanding, by turning to corporeal phantasms, which are in corporeal organs; but when it is separated from the body, it has a mode of understanding, by turning to simply intelligible objects, as is proper to other separate substances. Hence it is as natural for the soul to understand by turning to the phantasms as it is for it to be joined to the body; but to be separated from the body is not in accordance with its nature, and likewise to understand without turning to the phantasms is not natural to it; and hence it is united to the body in order that it may have an existence and an operation suitable to its nature. But here again a difficulty arises. For since nature is always ordered to what is best, and since it is better to understand by turning to simply intelligible objects than by turning to the phantasms; God should have ordered the soul’s nature so that the nobler way of understanding would

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bilior ei esset naturalis, et non indigeret corpori propter hoc uniri. Considerandum est igitur quod, etsi intelligere per conversionem ad superiora sit simpliciter nobilius quam intelligere per conversionem ad phantasmata; tamen ille modus intelligendi, prout erat possibilis animae, erat imperfectior. Quod sic patet. In omnibus enim substantiis intellectualibus invenitur virtus intellectiva per influentiam divini luminis. Quod quidem in primo principio est unum et simplex; et quanto magis creaturae intellectuales distant a primo principio, tanto magis dividitur illud lumen et diversificatur, sicut accidit in lineis a centro egredientibus. Et inde est quod Deus per unam suam essentiam omnia intelligit; superiores autem intellectualium substantiarum, etsi per plures formas intelligant, tamen intelligunt per pauciores, et magis universales, et virtuosiores ad comprehensionem rerum, propter efficaciam virtutis intellectivae quae est in eis; in inferioribus autem sunt formae plures, et minus universales, et minus efficaces ad comprehensionem rerum, inquantum deficiunt a virtute intellectiva superiorum. Si ergo inferiores substantiae haberent formas in illa universalitate in qua habent superiores, quia non sunt tantae efficaciae in intelligendo, non acciperent per eas perfectam cognitionem de rebus, sed in quadam communitate et confusione. Quod aliqualiter apparet in hominibus, nam qui sunt debilioris intellectus, per universales conceptiones magis intelligentium non accipiunt perfectam cognitionem, nisi eis singula in speciali explicentur. Manifestum est autem inter substantias intellectuales, secundum naturae ordinem, infimas esse animas humanas. Hoc autem perfectio universi exigebat, ut diversi gradus in rebus essent. Si igitur animae humanae sic essent institutae a Deo ut intelligerent per modum qui competit substantiis separatis, non haberent cognitionem perfectam, sed confusam in communi. Ad hoc ergo quod perfectam et propriam cognitionem de rebus habere possent, sic naturaliter sunt institutae ut corporibus uniantur, et sic ab ipsis rebus sensibilibus propriam de eis cognitionem accipiant; sicut homines rudes ad scientiam induci non possunt nisi per sensibilia exempla.

Sic ergo patet quod propter melius animae est ut corpori uniatur, et intelligat per conversionem ad phantasmata; et tamen esse potest separata, et alium modum intelligendi habere. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si diligenter verba philosophi discutiantur, philosophus hoc dixit ex quadam suppositione prius facta, scilicet quod intelligere sit quidam motus coniuncti, sicut et sentire, nondum enim differentiam ostenderat inter intellectum et sensum. Vel

Q. 89, A. 1

have been natural to it, and it would not have needed the body for that purpose. In order to resolve this difficulty we must consider that while it is true that it is nobler in itself to understand by turning to something higher than to understand by turning to phantasms, nevertheless such a mode of understanding was not so perfect as regards what was possible to the soul. This will appear if we consider that every intellectual substance possesses intellective power by the influence of the Divine light, which is one and simple in its first principle, and the farther off intellectual creatures are from the first principle so much the more is the light divided and diversified, as is the case with lines radiating from the centre of a circle. Hence it is that God by His one Essence understands all things; while the superior intellectual substances understand by means of a number of species, which nevertheless are fewer and more universal and bestow a deeper comprehension of things, because of the efficaciousness of the intellectual power of such natures: whereas the inferior intellectual natures possess a greater number of species, which are less universal, and bestow a lower degree of comprehension, in proportion as they recede from the intellectual power of the higher natures. If, therefore, the inferior substances received species in the same degree of universality as the superior substances, since they are not so strong in understanding, the knowledge which they would derive through them would be imperfect, and of a general and confused nature. We can see this to a certain extent in man, for those who are of weaker intellect fail to acquire perfect knowledge through the universal conceptions of those who have a better understanding, unless things are explained to them singly and in detail. Now it is clear that in the natural order human souls hold the lowest place among intellectual substances. But the perfection of the universe required various grades of being. If, therefore, God had willed souls to understand in the same way as separate substances, it would follow that human knowledge, so far from being perfect, would be confused and general. Therefore to make it possible for human souls to possess perfect and proper knowledge, they were so made that their nature required them to be joined to bodies, and thus to receive the proper and adequate knowledge of sensible things from the sensible things themselves; thus we see in the case of uneducated men that they have to be taught by sensible examples. It is clear then that it was for the soul’s good that it was united to a body, and that it understands by turning to the phantasms. Nevertheless it is possible for it to exist apart from the body, and also to understand in another way. Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher’s words carefully examined will show that he said this on the previous supposition that understanding is a movement of body and soul as united, just as sensation is, for he had not as yet explained the difference between intellect and sense. We may also say

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Q. 89, A. 2

Man

potest dici quod loquitur de illo modo intelligendi qui est per conversionem ad phantasmata. De quo etiam procedit secunda ratio. Ad tertium dicendum quod anima separata non intelligit per species innatas; nec per species quas tunc abstrahit; nec solum per species conservatas, ut obiectio probat, sed per species ex influentia divini luminis participatas, quarum anima fit particeps sicut et aliae substantiae separatae, quamvis inferiori modo. Unde tam cito cessante conversione ad corpus, ad superiora convertitur. Nec tamen propter hoc cognitio non est naturalis, quia Deus est auctor non solum influentiae gratuiti luminis, sed etiam naturalis.

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that he is referring to the way of understanding by turning to phantasms. This is also the meaning of the second objection. Reply Obj. 3: The separated soul does not understand by way of innate species, nor by species abstracted then, nor only by species retained, and this the objection proves; but the soul in that state understands by means of participated species arising from the influence of the Divine light, shared by the soul as by other separate substances; though in a lesser degree. Hence as soon as it ceases to act by turning to corporeal (phantasms), the soul turns at once to the superior things; nor is this way of knowledge unnatural, for God is the author of the influx of both the light of grace and the light of nature.

Article 2 Whether the separated soul understands separate substances? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima separata non intelligat substantias separatas. Perfectior enim est anima corpori coniuncta, quam a corpore separata, cum anima sit naturaliter pars humanae naturae; quaelibet autem pars perfectior est in suo toto. Sed anima coniuncta corpori non intelligit substantias separatas, ut supra habitum est. Ergo multo minus cum fuerit a corpore separata. Praeterea, omne quod cognoscitur, vel cognoscitur per sui praesentiam, vel per suam speciem. Sed substantiae separatae non possunt cognosci ab anima per suam praesentiam, quia nihil illabitur animae nisi solus Deus. Neque etiam per aliquas species quas anima ab angelo abstrahere possit, quia angelus simplicior est quam anima. Ergo nullo modo anima separata potest cognoscere substantias separatas. Praeterea, quidam philosophi posuerunt in cognitione separatarum substantiarum consistere ultimam hominis felicitatem. Si ergo anima separata potest intelligere substantias separatas, ex sola sua separatione consequitur felicitatem. Quod est inconveniens. Sed contra est quod animae separatae cognoscunt alias animas separatas; sicut dives in Inferno positus vidit Lazarum et Abraham, Luc. XVI. Ergo vident etiam et daemones et angelos animae separatae. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in IX de Trin., mens nostra cognitionem rerum incorporearum per seipsam accipit, idest cognoscendo seipsam, sicut supra dictum est. Per hoc ergo quod anima separata cognoscit seipsam, accipere possumus qualiter cognoscit alias substantias separatas. Dictum est autem quod quandiu anima corpori est unita, intelligit convertendo se ad phantasmata. Et ideo nec seipsam potest intelligere

Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul does not understand separate substances. For the soul is more perfect when joined to the body than when existing apart from it, being an essential part of human nature; and every part of a whole is more perfect when it exists in that whole. But the soul in the body does not understand separate substances as shown above (Q. 88, A. 1). Therefore much less is it able to do so when apart from the body. Obj. 2: Further, whatever is known is known either by its presence or by its species. But separate substances cannot be known to the soul by their presence, for God alone can enter into the soul; nor by means of species abstracted by the soul from an angel, for an angel is more simple than a soul. Therefore the separated soul cannot at all understand separate substances. Obj. 3: Further, some philosophers said that the ultimate happiness of man consists in the knowledge of separate substances. If, therefore, the separated soul can understand separate substances, its happiness would be secured by its separation alone; which cannot be reasonably be said. On the contrary, Souls apart from the body know other separated souls; as we see in the case of the rich man in hell, who saw Lazarus and Abraham (Luke 16:23). Therefore separated souls see the devils and the angels. I answer that, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), our mind acquires the knowledge of incorporeal things by itself — i.e., by knowing itself (Q. 88, A. 1, ad 1). Therefore from the knowledge which the separated soul has of itself, we can judge how it knows other separate things. Now it was said above (A. 1), that as long as it is united to the body the soul understands by turning to phantasms, and therefore it does not understand itself save through becoming actually

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nisi inquantum fit actu intelligens per speciem a phantasmatibus abstractam, sic enim per actum suum intelligit seipsam, ut supra dictum est. Sed cum fuerit a corpore separata, intelliget non convertendo se ad phantasmata, sed ad ea quae sunt secundum se intelligibilia, unde seipsam per seipsam intelliget. Est autem commune omni substantiae separatae quod intelligat id quod est supra se, et id quod est infra se, per modum suae substantiae, sic enim intelligitur aliquid secundum quod est in intelligente; est autem aliquid in altero per modum eius in quo est. Modus autem substantiae animae separatae est infra modum substantiae angelicae, sed est conformis modo aliarum animarum separatarum. Et ideo de aliis animabus separatis perfectam cognitionem habet; de angelis autem imperfectam et deficientem, loquendo de cognitione naturali animae separatae. De cognitione autem gloriae est alia ratio. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima separata est quidem imperfectior, si consideretur natura qua communicat cum natura corporis, sed tamen quodammodo est liberior ad intelligendum, inquantum per gravedinem et occupationem corporis a puritate intelligentiae impeditur. Ad secundum dicendum quod anima separata intelligit angelos per similitudines divinitus impressas. Quae tamen deficiunt a perfecta repraesentatione eorum, propter hoc quod animae natura est inferior quam angeli. Ad tertium dicendum quod in cognitione substantiarum separatarum non quarumcumque, consistit ultima hominis felicitas, sed solius Dei, qui non potest videri nisi per gratiam. In cognitione vero aliarum substantiarum separatarum est magna felicitas, etsi non ultima, si tamen perfecte intelligantur. Sed anima separata naturali cognitione non perfecte eas intelligit, ut dictum est.

Q. 89, A. 3

intelligent by means of ideas abstracted from phantasms; for thus it understands itself through its own act, as shown above (Q. 87, A. 1). When, however, it is separated from the body, it understands no longer by turning to phantasms, but by turning to simply intelligible objects; hence in that state it understands itself through itself. Now, every separate substance understands what is above itself and what is below itself, according to the mode of its substance (De Causis viii): for a thing is understood according as it is in the one who understands; while one thing is in another according to the nature of that in which it is. And the mode of existence of a separated soul is inferior to that of an angel, but is the same as that of other separated souls. Therefore the soul apart from the body has perfect knowledge of other separated souls, but it has an imperfect and defective knowledge of the angels so far as its natural knowledge is concerned. But the knowledge of glory is otherwise. Reply Obj. 1: The separated soul is, indeed, less perfect considering its nature in which it communicates with the nature of the body: but it has a greater freedom of intelligence, since the weight and care of the body is a clog upon the clearness of its intelligence in the present life. Reply Obj. 2: The separated soul understands the angels by means of divinely impressed ideas; which, however, fail to give perfect knowledge of them, forasmuch as the nature of the soul is inferior to that of an angel. Reply Obj. 3: Man’s ultimate happiness consists not in the knowledge of any separate substances; but in the knowledge of God, Who is seen only by grace. The knowledge of other separate substances if perfectly understood gives great happiness—not final and ultimate happiness. But the separated soul does not understand them perfectly, as was shown above in this article.

Article 3 Whether the separated soul knows all natural things? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima separata omnia naturalia cognoscat. In substantiis enim separatis sunt rationes omnium rerum naturalium. Sed animae separatae cognoscunt substantias separatas. Ergo cognoscunt omnia naturalia. Praeterea, qui intelligit magis intelligibile, multo magis potest intelligere minus intelligibile. Sed anima separata intelligit substantias separatas, quae sunt maxima intelligibilium. Ergo multo magis potest intelligere omnia naturalia, quae sunt minus intelligibilia.

Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul knows all natural things. For the types of all natural things exist in separate substances. Therefore, as separated souls know separate substances, they also know all natural things. Obj. 2: Further, whoever understands the greater intelligible, will be able much more to understand the lesser intelligible. But the separated soul understands immaterial substances, which are in the highest degree of intelligibility. Therefore much more can it understand all natural things which are in a lower degree of intelligibility.

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Q. 89, A. 3

Man

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Sed contra, in daemonibus magis viget naturalis cognitio quam in anima separata. Sed daemones non omnia naturalia cognoscunt; sed multa addiscunt per longi temporis experientiam, ut Isidorus dicit. Ergo neque animae separatae omnia naturalia cognoscunt. Praeterea, si anima statim cum est separata, omnia naturalia cognosceret, frustra homines studerent ad rerum scientiam capessendam. Hoc autem est inconveniens. Non ergo anima separata omnia naturalia cognoscit. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, anima separata intelligit per species quas recipit ex influentia divini luminis, sicut et angeli, sed tamen, quia natura animae est infra naturam angeli, cui iste modus cognoscendi est connaturalis, anima separata per huiusmodi species non accipit perfectam rerum cognitionem, sed quasi in communi et confusam. Sicut igitur se habent angeli ad perfectam cognitionem rerum naturalium per huiusmodi species, ita animae separatae ad imperfectam et confusam. Angeli autem per huiusmodi species cognoscunt cognitione perfecta omnia naturalia, quia omnia quae Deus fecit in propriis naturis, fecit in intelligentia angelica, ut dicit Augustinus, super Gen. ad Litt. Unde et animae separatae de omnibus naturalibus cognitionem habent, non certam et propriam, sed communem et confusam.

On the contrary, The devils have greater natural knowledge than the separated soul; yet they do not know all natural things, but have to learn many things by long experience, as Isidore says (De Summo Bono i). Therefore neither can the separated soul know all natural things. Further, if the soul as soon as separated gained knowledge of all natural things, the efforts of men to know would be vain and profitless. But this would be unreasonable. Therefore the separated soul does not know all natural things. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the separated soul, like the angels, understands by means of species, received from the influence of the Divine light. Nevertheless, as the soul by nature is inferior to an angel, to whom this kind of knowledge is natural, the soul apart from the body through such species does not receive perfect knowledge, but only a general and confused kind of knowledge. Separated souls, therefore, have the same relation through such species to imperfect and confused knowledge of natural things as the angels have to the perfect knowledge thereof. Now angels through such species know all natural things perfectly; because all that God has produced in the respective natures of natural things has been produced by Him in the angelic intelligence, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. ii, 8). Hence it follows that separated souls know all natural things not with a certain and proper knowledge, but in a general and confused manner. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nec ipse angelus Reply Obj. 1: Even an angel does not understand all per suam substantiam cognoscit omnia naturalia, sed natural things through his substance, but through certain per species quasdam, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non species, as stated above (Q. 87, A. 1). So it does not follow propter hoc sequitur quod anima cognoscat omnia na- that the soul knows all natural things because it knows septuralia, quia cognoscit quoquo modo substantiam sepa- arate substances after a fashion.

ratam. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut anima separata non perfecte intelligit substantias separatas ita nec omnia naturalia perfecte cognoscit, sed sub quadam confusione, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod Isidorus loquitur de cognitione futurorum; quae nec angeli nec daemones nec animae separatae cognoscunt, nisi vel in suis causis, vel per revelationem divinam. Nos autem loquimur de cognitione naturalium. Ad quartum dicendum quod cognitio quae acquiritur hic per studium, est propria et perfecta; illa autem est confusa. Unde non sequitur quod studium addiscendi sit frustra.

Reply Obj. 2: As the soul separated from the body does not perfectly understand separate substances, so neither does it know all natural things perfectly; but it knows them confusedly, as above explained in this article. Reply Obj. 3: Isidore speaks of the knowledge of the future which neither angels, nor demons, nor separated souls, know except so far as future things pre-exist in their causes or are known by Divine revelation. But we are here treating of the knowledge of natural things. Reply Obj. 4: Knowledge acquired here by study is proper and perfect; the knowledge of which we speak is confused. Hence it does not follow that to study in order to learn is useless.

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Knowledge of the Separated Soul

Q. 89, A. 4

Article 4 Whether the separated soul knows singulars? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima separata non cognoscat singularia. Nulla enim potentia cognoscitiva remanet in anima separata nisi intellectus, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed intellectus non est cognoscitivus singularium, ut supra habitum est. Ergo anima separata singularia non cognoscit. Praeterea, magis est determinata cognitio qua cognoscitur aliquid in singulari, quam illa qua cognoscitur aliquid in universali. Sed anima separata non habet determinatam cognitionem de speciebus rerum naturalium. Multo igitur minus cognoscit singularia. Praeterea, si cognoscit singularia, et non per sensum, pari ratione omnia singularia cognosceret. Sed non cognoscit omnia singularia. Ergo nulla cognoscit. Sed contra est quod dives in Inferno positus dixit, habeo quinque fratres, ut habetur Luc. XVI. Respondeo dicendum quod animae separatae aliqua singularia cognoscunt, sed non omnia, etiam quae sunt praesentia. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod duplex est modus intelligendi. Unus per abstractionem a phantasmatibus, et secundum istum modum singularia per intellectum cognosci non possunt directe, sed indirecte, sicut supra dictum est. Alius modus intelligendi est per influentiam specierum a Deo, et per istum modum intellectus potest singularia cognoscere. Sicut enim ipse Deus per suam essentiam, inquantum est causa universalium et individualium principiorum, cognoscit omnia et universalia et singularia, ut supra dictum est; ita substantiae separatae per species, quae sunt quaedam participatae similitudines illius divinae essentiae, possunt singularia cognoscere. In hoc tamen est differentia inter angelos et animas separatas, quia angeli per huiusmodi species habent perfectam et propriam cognitionem de rebus, animae vero separatae confusam. Unde angeli, propter efficaciam sui intellectus per huiusmodi species non solum naturas rerum in speciali cognoscere possunt, sed etiam singularia sub speciebus contenta. Animae vero separatae non possunt cognoscere per huiusmodi species nisi solum singularia illa ad quae quodammodo determinantur, vel per praecedentem cognitionem, vel per aliquam affectionem, vel per naturalem habitudinem, vel per divinam ordinationem, quia omne quod recipitur in aliquo, determinatur in eo secundum modum recipientis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectus per viam abstractionis non est cognoscitivus singularium. Sic autem anima separata non intelligit, sed sicut dictum est.

Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul does not know singulars. For no cognitive power besides the intellect remains in the separated soul, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. 77, A. 8). But the intellect cannot know singulars, as we have shown (Q. 86, A. 1). Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars. Obj. 2: Further, the knowledge of the singular is more determinate than knowledge of the universal. But the separated soul has no determinate knowledge of the species of natural things, therefore much less can it know singulars. Obj. 3: Further, if it knew the singulars, yet not by sense, for the same reason it would know all singulars. But it does not know all singulars. Therefore it knows none. On the contrary, The rich man in hell said: I have five brethren (Luke 16:28). I answer that, Separated souls know some singulars, but not all, not even all present singulars. To understand this, we must consider that there is a twofold way of knowing things, one by means of abstraction from phantasms, and in this way singulars cannot be directly known by the intellect, but only indirectly, as stated above (Q. 86, A. 1). The other way of understanding is by the infusion of species by God, and in that way it is possible for the intellect to know singulars. For as God knows all things, universal and singular, by His Essence, as the cause of universal and individual principles (Q. 14, A. 2), so likewise separate substances can know singulars by species which are a kind of participated similitude of the Divine Essence. There is a difference, however, between angels and separated souls in the fact that through these species the angels have a perfect and proper knowledge of things; whereas separated souls have only a confused knowledge. Hence the angels, by reason of their perfect intellect, through these species, know not only the specific natures of things, but also the singulars contained in those species; whereas separated souls by these species know only those singulars to which they are determined by former knowledge in this life, or by some affection, or by natural aptitude, or by the disposition of the Divine order; because whatever is received into anything is conditioned according to the mode of the recipient.

Reply Obj. 1: The intellect does not know the singular by way of abstraction; neither does the separated soul know it thus; but as explained above.

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Q. 89, A. 5

Man

Ad secundum dicendum quod ad illarum rerum species vel individua cognitio animae separatae determinatur, ad quae anima separata habet aliquam determinatam habitudinem, sicut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod anima separata non se habet aequaliter ad omnia singularia, sed ad quaedam habet aliquam habitudinem quam non habet ad alia. Et ideo non est aequalis ratio ut omnia singularia cognoscat.

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Reply Obj. 2: The knowledge of the separated soul is confined to those species or individuals to which the soul has some kind of determinate relation, as we have said. Reply Obj. 3: The separated soul has not the same relation to all singulars, but one relation to some, and another to others. Therefore there is not the same reason why it should know all singulars.

Article 5 Whether the habit of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus scientiae hic acquisitae non remaneat in anima separata. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XIII, scientia destruetur. Praeterea, quidam minus boni in hoc mundo scientia pollent, aliis magis bonis carentibus scientia. Si ergo habitus scientiae permaneret etiam post mortem in anima, sequeretur quod aliqui minus boni etiam in futuro statu essent potiores aliquibus magis bonis. Quod videtur inconveniens. Praeterea, animae separatae habebunt scientiam per influentiam divini luminis. Si igitur scientia hic acquisita in anima separata remaneat, sequetur quod duae erunt formae unius speciei in eodem subiecto. Quod est impossibile. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in libro Praedicament., quod habitus est qualitas difficile mobilis; sed ab aegritudine, vel ab aliquo huiusmodi, quandoque corrumpitur scientia. Sed nulla est ita fortis immutatio in hac vita, sicut immutatio quae est per mortem. Ergo videtur quod habitus scientiae per mortem corrumpatur. Sed contra est quod Hieronymus dicit, in epistola ad Paulinum, discamus in terris, quorum scientia nobis perseveret in caelo. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt habitum scientiae non esse in ipso intellectu, sed in viribus sensitivis, scilicet imaginativa, cogitativa et memorativa; et quod species intelligibiles non conservantur in intellectu possibili. Et si haec opinio vera esset, sequeretur quod, destructo corpore, totaliter habitus scientiae hic acquisitae destrueretur. Sed quia scientia est in intellectu, qui est locus specierum, ut dicitur in III de Anima; oportet quod habitus scientiae hic acquisitae partim sit in praedictis viribus sensitivis, et partim in ipso intellectu. Et hoc potest considerari ex ipsis actibus ex quibus habitus scientiae acquiritur, nam habitus sunt similes actibus ex quibus acquiruntur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Actus autem intellectus ex quibus in praesenti vita scientia acquiritur, sunt

Objection 1: It would seem that the habit of knowledge acquired in this life does not remain in the soul separated from the body: for the Apostle says: Knowledge shall be destroyed (1 Cor 13:8). Obj. 2: Further, some in this world who are less good enjoy knowledge denied to others who are better. If, therefore, the habit of knowledge remained in the soul after death, it would follow that some who are less good would, even in the future life, excel some who are better; which seems unreasonable. Obj. 3: Further, separated souls will possess knowledge by influence of the Divine light. Supposing, therefore, that knowledge here acquired remained in the separated soul, it would follow that two forms of the same species would coexist in the same subject, which cannot be. Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Praedic. vi, 4, 5), that a habit is a quality hard to remove: yet sometimes knowledge is destroyed by sickness or the like. But in this life there is no change so thorough as death. Therefore it seems that the habit of knowledge is destroyed by death. On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. liii, ad Paulinum), Let us learn on earth that kind of knowledge which will remain with us in heaven. I answer that, Some say that the habit of knowledge resides not in the intellect itself, but in the sensitive powers, namely, the imaginative, cogitative, and memorative, and that the intelligible species are not kept in the passive intellect. If this were true, it would follow that when the body is destroyed by death, knowledge here acquired would also be entirely destroyed. But, since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is the abode of species, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4), the habit of knowledge here acquired must be partly in the aforesaid sensitive powers and partly in the intellect. This can be seen by considering the very actions from which knowledge arises. For habits are like the actions whereby they are acquired (Ethic. ii, 1). Now the actions of the intellect, by which knowledge is here acquired, are per-

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per conversionem intellectus ad phantasmata, quae sunt in praedictis viribus sensitivis. Unde per tales actus et ipsi intellectui possibili acquiritur facultas quaedam ad considerandum per species susceptas; et in praedictis inferioribus viribus acquiritur quaedam habilitas ut facilius per conversionem ad ipsas intellectus possit intelligibilia speculari. Sed sicut actus intellectus principaliter quidem et formaliter est in ipso intellectu, materialiter autem et dispositive in inferioribus viribus, idem etiam dicendum est de habitu. Quantum ergo ad id quod aliquis praesentis scientiae habet in inferioribus viribus, non remanebit in anima separata, sed quantum ad id quod habet in ipso intellectu, necesse est ut remaneat. Quia, ut dicitur in libro de Longitudine et Brevitate Vitae, dupliciter corrumpitur aliqua forma, uno modo, per se, quando corrumpitur a suo contrario, ut calidum a frigido; alio modo, per accidens, scilicet per corruptionem subiecti. Manifestum est autem quod per corruptionem subiecti, scientia quae est in intellectu humano, corrumpi non potest, cum intellectus sit incorruptibilis, ut supra ostensum est. Similiter etiam nec per contrarium corrumpi possunt species intelligibiles quae sunt in intellectu possibili, quia intentioni intelligibili nihil est contrarium; et praecipue quantum ad simplicem intelligentiam, qua intelligitur quod quid est. Sed quantum ad operationem qua intellectus componit et dividit, vel etiam ratiocinatur, sic invenitur contrarietas in intellectu, secundum quod falsum in propositione vel in argumentatione est contrarium vero. Et hoc modo interdum scientia corrumpitur per contrarium, dum scilicet aliquis per falsam argumentationem abducitur a scientia veritatis. Et ideo philosophus, in libro praedicto, ponit duos modos quibus scientia per se corrumpitur, scilicet oblivionem, ex parte memorativae, et deceptionem, ex parte argumentationis falsae. Sed hoc non habet locum in anima separata. Unde dicendum est quod habitus scientiae, secundum quod est in intellectu manet in anima separata. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus non loquitur ibi de scientia quantum ad habitum, sed quantum ad cognitionis actum. Unde ad huius probationem inducit, nunc cognosco ex parte. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut secundum staturam corporis aliquis minus bonus erit maior aliquo magis bono; ita nihil prohibet aliquem minus bonum habere aliquem scientiae habitum in futuro, quem non habet aliquis magis bonus. Sed tamen hoc quasi nullius momenti est in comparatione ad alias praerogativas quas meliores habebunt. Ad tertium dicendum quod utraque scientia non est unius rationis. Unde nullum inconveniens sequitur. Ad quartum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de corruptione scientiae quantum ad id quod habet ex parte sensitivarum virium.

Q. 89, A. 5

formed by the mind turning to the phantasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers. Hence through such acts the passive intellect acquires a certain facility in considering the species received: and the aforesaid sensitive powers acquire a certain aptitude in seconding the action of the intellect when it turns to them to consider the intelligible object. But as the intellectual act resides chiefly and formally in the intellect itself, whilst it resides materially and dispositively in the inferior powers, the same distinction is to be applied to habit. Knowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life does not remain in the separated soul, as regards what belongs to the sensitive powers; but as regards what belongs to the intellect itself, it must remain; because, as the Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii), a form may be corrupted in two ways; first, directly, when corrupted by its contrary, as heat, by cold; and second, indirectly, when its subject is corrupted. Now it is evident that human knowledge is not corrupted through corruption of the subject, for the intellect is an incorruptible faculty, as above stated (Q. 79, A. 2, ad 2). Neither can the intelligible species in the passive intellect be corrupted by their contrary; for there is no contrary to intelligible intentions, above all as regards simple intelligence of what a thing is. But contrariety may exist in the intellect as regards mental composition and division, or also reasoning; so far as what is false in statement or argument is contrary to truth. And thus knowledge may be corrupted by its contrary when a false argument seduces anyone from the knowledge of truth. For this reason the Philosopher in the above work mentions two ways in which knowledge is corrupted directly: namely, forgetfulness on the part of the memorative power, and deception on the part of a false argument. But these have no place in the separated soul. Therefore we must conclude that the habit of knowledge, so far as it is in the intellect, remains in the separated soul.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is not speaking of knowledge as a habit, but as to the act of knowing; and hence he says, in proof of the assertion quoted, Now, I know in part. Reply Obj. 2: As a less good man may exceed a better man in bodily stature, so the same kind of man may have a habit of knowledge in the future life which a better man may not have. Such knowledge, however, cannot be compared with the other prerogatives enjoyed by the better man. Reply Obj. 3: These two kinds of knowledge are not of the same species, so there is no impossibility. Reply Obj. 4: This objection considers the corruption of knowledge on the part of the sensitive powers.

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Q. 89, A. 6

Man

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Article 6 Whether the act of knowledge acquired here remains in the separated soul? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus scientiae hic acquisitae non maneat in anima separata. Dicit enim philosophus, in I de Anima, quod corrupto corpore, anima neque reminiscitur neque amat. Sed considerare ea quae prius aliquis novit, est reminisci. Ergo anima separata non potest habere actum scientiae quam hic acquisivit. Praeterea, species intelligibiles non erunt potentiores in anima separata quam sint in anima corpori unita. Sed per species intelligibiles non possumus modo intelligere, nisi convertendo nos super phantasmata, sicut supra habitum est. Ergo nec anima separata hoc poterit. Et ita nullo modo per species intelligibiles hic acquisitas anima separata intelligere poterit. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod habitus similes actus reddunt actibus per quos acquiruntur. Sed habitus scientiae hic acquiritur per actus intellectus convertentis se supra phantasmata. Ergo non potest alios actus reddere. Sed tales actus non competunt animae separatae. Ergo anima separata non habebit aliquem actum scientiae hic acquisitae. Sed contra est quod Luc. XVI, dicitur ad divitem in Inferno positum, recordare quia recepisti bona in vita tua. Respondeo dicendum quod in actu est duo considerare, scilicet speciem actus, et modum ipsius. Et species quidem actus consideratur ex obiecto in quod actus cognoscitivae virtutis dirigitur per speciem, quae est obiecti similitudo, sed modus actus pensatur ex virtute agentis. Sicut quod aliquis videat lapidem, contingit ex specie lapidis quae est in oculo, sed quod acute videat, contingit ex virtute visiva oculi. Cum igitur species intelligibiles maneant in anima separata, sicut dictum est; status autem animae separatae non sit idem sicut modo est, sequitur quod secundum species intelligibiles hic acquisitas, anima separata intelligere possit quae prius intellexit; non tamen eodem modo, scilicet per conversionem ad phantasmata, sed per modum convenientem animae separatae. Et ita manet quidem in anima separata actus scientiae hic acquisitae, sed non secundum eundem modum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de reminiscentia, secundum quod memoria pertinet ad partem sensitivam, non autem secundum quod memoria est quodammodo in intellectu, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod diversus modus intelligendi non provenit ex diversa virtute specierum, sed ex diverso statu animae intelligentis.

Objection 1: It would seem that the act of knowledge here acquired does not remain in the separated soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), that when the body is corrupted, the soul neither remembers nor loves. But to consider what is previously known is an act of memory. Therefore the separated soul cannot retain an act of knowledge here acquired. Obj. 2: Further, intelligible species cannot have greater power in the separated soul than they have in the soul united to the body. But in this life we cannot understand by intelligible species without turning to phantasms, as shown above (Q. 84, A. 7). Therefore the separated soul cannot do so, and thus it cannot understand at all by intelligible species acquired in this life. Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), that habits produce acts similar to those whereby they are acquired. But the habit of knowledge is acquired here by acts of the intellect turning to phantasms: therefore it cannot produce any other acts. These acts, however, are not adapted to the separated soul. Therefore the soul in the state of separation cannot produce any act of knowledge acquired in this life. On the contrary, It was said to Dives in hell (Luke 16:25): Remember thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime. I answer that, Action offers two things for our consideration—its species and its mode. Its species comes from the object, whereto the faculty of knowledge is directed by the (intelligible) species, which is the object’s similitude; whereas the mode is gathered from the power of the agent. Thus that a person see a stone is due to the species of the stone in his eye; but that he see it clearly, is due to the eye’s visual power. Therefore as the intelligible species remain in the separated soul, as stated above (A. 5), and since the state of the separated soul is not the same as it is in this life, it follows that through the intelligible species acquired in this life the soul apart from the body can understand what it understood formerly, but in a different way; not by turning to phantasms, but by a mode suited to a soul existing apart from the body. Thus the act of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul, but in a different way. Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher speaks of remembrance, according as memory belongs to the sensitive part, but not as belonging in a way to the intellect, as explained above (Q. 79, A. 6). Reply Obj. 2: The different mode of intelligence is produced by the different state of the intelligent soul; not by diversity of species.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod actus per quos acquiritur habitus, sunt similes actibus quos habitus causant, quantum ad speciem actus, non autem quantum ad modum agendi. Nam operari iusta, sed non iuste, idest delectabiliter, causat habitum iustitiae politicae, per quem delectabiliter operamur.

Q. 89, A. 7

Reply Obj. 3: The acts which produce a habit are like the acts caused by that habit, in species, but not in mode. For example, to do just things, but not justly, that is, pleasurably, causes the habit of political justice, whereby we act pleasurably. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethic. v, 8: Magn. Moral. i, 34).

Article 7 Whether local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod distantia localis impediat cognitionem animae separatae. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Cura pro Mortuis Agenda, quod animae mortuorum ibi sunt, ubi ea quae hic fiunt scire non possunt. Sciunt autem ea quae apud eos aguntur. Ergo distantia localis impedit cognitionem animae separatae. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Divinatione Daemonum, quod daemones, propter celeritatem motus, aliqua nobis ignota denuntiant. Sed agilitas motus ad hoc nihil faceret, si distantia localis cognitionem daemonis non impediret. Multo igitur magis distantia localis impedit cognitionem animae separatae, quae est inferior secundum naturam quam daemon. Praeterea, sicut distat aliquis secundum locum, ita secundum tempus sed distantia temporis impedit cognitionem animae separatae, non enim cognoscunt futura. Ergo videtur quod etiam distantia secundum locum animae separatae cognitionem impediat. Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. XVI, quod dives cum esset in tormentis, elevans oculos suos, vidit Abraham a longe. Ergo distantia localis non impedit animae separatae cognitionem. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt quod anima separata cognosceret singularia abstrahendo a sensibilibus. Quod si esset verum, posset dici quod distantia localis impediret animae separatae cognitionem, requireretur enim quod vel sensibilia agerent in animam separatam, vel anima separata in sensibilia; et quantum ad utrumque, requireretur distantia determinata. Sed praedicta positio est impossibilis, quia abstractio specierum a sensibilibus fit mediantibus sensibus et aliis potentiis sensitivis, quae in anima separata actu non manent. Intelligit autem anima separata singularia per influxum specierum ex divino lumine, quod quidem lumen aequaliter se habet ad propinquum et distans. Unde distantia localis nullo modo impedit animae separatae cognitionem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus non dicit quod propter hoc quod ibi sunt animae mortuo-

Objection 1: It would seem that local distance impedes the separated soul’s knowledge. For Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), that the souls of the dead are where they cannot know what is done here. But they know what is done among themselves. Therefore local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Divin. Daemon. iii), that the demons’ rapidity of movement enables them to tell things unknown to us. But agility of movement would be useless in that respect unless their knowledge was impeded by local distance; which, therefore, is a much greater hindrance to the knowledge of the separated soul, whose nature is inferior to the demon’s. Obj. 3: Further, as there is distance of place, so is there distance of time. But distance of time impedes knowledge in the separated soul, for the soul is ignorant of the future. Therefore it seems that distance of place also impedes its knowledge. On the contrary, It is written (Luke 16:23), that Dives, lifting up his eyes when he was in torment, saw Abraham afar off. Therefore local distance does not impede knowledge in the separated soul. I answer that, Some have held that the separated soul knows the singular by abstraction from the sensible. If that were so, it might be that local distance would impede its knowledge; for either the sensible would need to act upon the soul, or the soul upon the sensible, and in either case a determinate distance would be necessary. This is, however, impossible because abstraction of the species from the sensible is done through the senses and other sensible faculties which do not remain actually in the soul apart from the body. But the soul when separated understands singulars by species derived from the Divine light, which is indifferent to what is near or distant. Hence knowledge in the separated soul is not hindered by local distance. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine says that the souls of the departed cannot see what is done here, not because they are

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Q. 89, A. 8

Man

rum, ea quae hic sunt videre non possunt, ut localis distantia huius ignorantiae causa esse credatur, sed hoc potest propter aliquid aliud contingere, ut infra dicetur. Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur secundum opinionem illam qua aliqui posuerunt quod daemones habent corpora naturaliter sibi unita, secundum quam positionem, etiam potentias sensitivas habere possunt, ad quarum cognitionem requiritur determinata distantia. Et hanc opinionem etiam in eodem libro Augustinus expresse tangit, licet eam magis recitando quam asserendo tangere videatur, ut patet per ea quae dicit XXI libro de Civ. Dei. Ad tertium dicendum quod futura, quae distant secundum tempus, non sunt entia in actu. Unde in seipsis non sunt cognoscibilia, quia sicut deficit aliquid ab entitate, ita deficit a cognoscibilitate. Sed ea quae sunt distantia secundum locum, sunt entia in actu, et secundum se cognoscibilia. Unde non est eadem ratio de distantia locali, et de distantia temporis.

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there, as if impeded by local distance; but for some other cause, as we shall explain (A. 8). Reply Obj. 2: Augustine speaks there in accordance with the opinion that demons have bodies naturally united to them, and so have sensitive powers, which require local distance. In the same book he expressly sets down this opinion, though apparently rather by way of narration than of assertion, as we may gather from De Civ. Dei xxi, 10.

Reply Obj. 3: The future, which is distant in time, does not actually exist, and therefore is not knowable in itself, because so far as a thing falls short of being, so far does it fall short of being knowable. But what is locally distant exists actually, and is knowable in itself. Hence we cannot argue from distance of time to distance of place.

Article 8 Whether separated souls know what takes place on earth? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod animae separatae cognoscant ea quae hic aguntur. Nisi enim ea cognoscerent, de eis curam non haberent. Sed habent curam de his quae hic aguntur; secundum illud Luc. XVI, habeo quinque fratres, ut testificetur illis, ne et ipsi veniant in hunc locum tormentorum. Ergo animae separatae cognoscunt ea quae hic aguntur. Praeterea, frequenter mortui vivis apparent, vel dormientibus vel vigilantibus, et eos admonent de iis quae hic aguntur; sicut Samuel apparuit Sauli, ut habetur I Reg. XXVIII. Sed hoc non esset si ea quae hic sunt non cognoscerent. Ergo ea quae hic aguntur cognoscunt. Praeterea, animae separatae cognoscunt ea quae apud eas aguntur. Si ergo quae apud nos aguntur non cognoscerent, impediretur earum cognitio per localem distantiam. Quod supra negatum est. Sed contra est quod dicitur Iob XIV, sive fuerint filii eius nobiles, sive ignobiles, non intelliget. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum naturalem cognitionem, de qua nunc hic agitur, animae mortuorum nesciunt quae hic aguntur. Et huius ratio ex dictis accipi potest. Quia anima separata cognoscit singularia per hoc quod quodammodo determinata est ad illa, vel per vestigium alicuius praecedentis cognitionis seu affectionis, vel per ordinationem divinam. Animae autem mortuorum, secundum ordinationem divinam, et secundum modum essendi, segregatae sunt a conversatione viventium, et coniunctae conversationi spiritua-

Objection 1: It would seem that separated souls know what takes place on earth; for otherwise they would have no care for it, as they have, according to what Dives said (Luke 16:27, 28), I have five brethren . . . he may testify unto them, lest they also come into the place of torments. Therefore separated souls know what passes on earth. Obj. 2: Further, the dead often appear to the living, asleep or awake, and tell them of what takes place there; as Samuel appeared to Saul (1 Kgs 28:11). But this could not be unless they knew what takes place here. Therefore they know what takes place on earth. Obj. 3: Further, separated souls know what happens among themselves. If, therefore, they do not know what takes place among us, it must be by reason of local distance; which has been shown to be false (A. 7). On the contrary, It is written (Job 14:21): He will not understand whether his children come to honor or dishonor. I answer that, By natural knowledge, of which we are treating now, the souls of the dead do not know what passes on earth. This follows from what has been laid down (A. 4), since the separated soul has knowledge of singulars, by being in a way determined to them, either by some vestige of previous knowledge or affection, or by the Divine order. Now the souls departed are in a state of separation from the living, both by Divine order and by their mode of existence, whilst they are joined to the world of incorporeal spiritual substances; and hence they are ignorant of what

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lium substantiarum quae sunt a corpore separatae. Unde ea quae apud nos aguntur ignorant. Et hanc rationem assignat Gregorius in XII Moralium, dicens, mortui vita in carne viventium post eos, qualiter disponatur, nesciunt, quia vita spiritus longe est a vita carnis; et sicut corporea atque incorporea diversa sunt genere, ita sunt distincta cognitione. Et hoc etiam Augustinus videtur tangere in libro de Cura pro Mortuis Agenda, dicens quod animae mortuorum rebus viventium non intersunt. Sed quantum ad animas beatorum, videtur esse differentia inter Gregorium et Augustinum. Nam Gregorius ibidem subdit, quod tamen de animabus sanctis sentiendum non est, quia quae intus omnipotentis Dei claritatem vident, nullo modo credendum est quod sit foris aliquid quod ignorent. Augustinus vero, in libro de Cura pro Mortuis Agenda, expresse dicit quod nesciunt mortui, etiam sancti, quid agant vivi et eorum filii, ut habetur in Glossa, super illud, Abraham nescivit nos, Isaiae LXIII. Quod quidem confirmat per hoc quod a matre sua non visitabatur, nec in tristitiis consolabatur, sicut quando vivebat; nec est probabile ut sit facta vita feliciore crudelior. Et per hoc quod dominus promisit Iosiae regi quod prius moreretur ne videret mala quae erant populo superventura, ut habetur IV Reg. XXII. Sed Augustinus hoc dubitando dicit, unde praemittit, ut volet, accipiat quisque quod dicam. Gregorius autem assertive, quod patet per hoc quod dicit, nullo modo credendum est. Magis tamen videtur, secundum sententiam Gregorii, quod animae sanctorum Deum videntes, omnia praesentia quae hic aguntur cognoscant. Sunt enim angelis aequales, de quibus etiam Augustinus asserit quod ea quae apud vivos aguntur non ignorant. Sed quia sanctorum animae sunt perfectissime iustitiae divinae coniunctae, nec tristantur, nec rebus viventium se ingerunt, nisi secundum quod iustitiae divinae dispositio exigit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod animae mortuorum possunt habere curam de rebus viventium, etiam si ignorent eorum statum; sicut nos curam habemus de mortuis, eis suffragia impendendo, quamvis eorum statum ignoremus. Possunt etiam facta viventium non per seipsos cognoscere, sed vel per animas eorum qui hinc ad eos accedunt; vel per angelos seu daemones; vel etiam spiritu Dei revelante, sicut Augustinus in eodem libro dicit. Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc quod mortui viventibus apparent qualitercumque, vel contingit per specialem Dei dispensationem, ut animae mortuorum rebus viventium intersint, et est inter divina miracula computandum. Vel huiusmodi apparitiones fiunt per operationes angelorum bonorum vel malorum, etiam ignorantibus mortuis, sicut etiam vivi ignorantes aliis viventibus apparent in somnis, ut Augustinus dicit in libro praedicto. Unde et de Samuele dici potest quod ipse apparuit per revelationem divinam; secundum hoc quod

Q. 89, A. 8

goes on among us. Whereof Gregory gives the reason thus: The dead do not know how the living act, for the life of the spirit is far from the life of the flesh; and so, as corporeal things differ from incorporeal in genus, so they are distinct in knowledge (Moral. xii). Augustine seems to say the same (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), when he asserts that, the souls of the dead have no concern in the affairs of the living.

Gregory and Augustine, however, seem to be divided in opinion as regards the souls of the blessed in heaven, for Gregory continues the passage above quoted: The case of the holy souls is different, for since they see the light of Almighty God, we cannot believe that external things are unknown to them. But Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xiii) expressly says: The dead, even the saints do not know what is done by the living or by their own children, as a gloss quotes on the text, Abraham hath not known us (Isa 63:16). He confirms this opinion by saying that he was not visited, nor consoled in sorrow by his mother, as when she was alive; and he could not think it possible that she was less kind when in a happier state; and again by the fact that the Lord promised to king Josias that he should die, lest he should see his people’s afflictions (4 Kgs 22:20). Yet Augustine says this in doubt; and premises, Let every one take, as he pleases, what I say. Gregory, on the other hand, is positive, since he says, We cannot believe. His opinion, indeed, seems to be the more probable one—that the souls of the blessed who see God do know all that passes here. For they are equal to the angels, of whom Augustine says that they know what happens among those living on earth. But as the souls of the blessed are most perfectly united to Divine justice, they do not suffer from sorrow, nor do they interfere in mundane affairs, except in accordance with Divine justice. Reply Obj. 1: The souls of the departed may care for the living, even if ignorant of their state; just as we care for the dead by pouring forth prayer on their behalf, though we are ignorant of their state. Moreover, the affairs of the living can be made known to them not immediately, but the souls who pass hence thither, or by angels and demons, or even by the revelation of the Holy Spirit, as Augustine says in the same book. Reply Obj. 2: That the dead appear to the living in any way whatever is either by the special dispensation of God; in order that the souls of the dead may interfere in affairs of the living—and this is to be accounted as miraculous. Or else such apparitions occur through the instrumentality of bad or good angels, without the knowledge of the departed; as may likewise happen when the living appear, without their own knowledge, to others living, as Augustine says in the same book. And so it may be said of Samuel that he appeared through Divine revelation; according to

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Q. 89, A. 8

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dicitur Eccli. XLVI, quod dormivit, et notum fecit regi finem vitae suae. Vel illa apparitio fuit procurata per daemones, si tamen Ecclesiastici auctoritas non recipiatur, propter hoc quod inter canonicas Scripturas apud Hebraeos non habetur. Ad tertium dicendum quod ignorantia huiusmodi non contingit ex locali distantia, sed propter causam praedictam.

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Ecclus. 46:23, he slept, and told the king the end of his life. Or, again, this apparition was procured by the demons; unless, indeed, the authority of Ecclesiasticus be set aside through not being received by the Jews as canonical Scripture. Reply Obj. 3: This kind of ignorance does not proceed from the obstacle of local distance, but from the cause mentioned above.

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Question 90 The First Production of Man’s Soul Post praemissa considerandum est de prima hominis productione. Et circa hoc consideranda sunt quatuor, primo considerandum est de productione ipsius hominis; secundo, de fine productionis; tertio, de statu et conditione hominis primo producti; quarto, de loco eius. Circa productionem autem consideranda sunt tria, primo, de productione hominis quantum ad animam; secundo, quantum ad corpus viri; tertio, quantum ad productionem mulieris. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum anima humana sit aliquid factum, vel sit de substantia ipsius Dei. Secundo, supposito quod sit facta, utrum sit creata. Tertio, utrum sit facta mediantibus angelis. Quarto, utrum sit facta ante corpus.

After the foregoing we must consider the first production of man, concerning which there are four subjects of treatment: (1) the production of man himself; (2) the end of this production; (3) the state and condition of the first man; (4) the place of his abode. Concerning the production of man, there are three things to be considered: (1) the production of man’s soul; (2) the production of man’s body; (3) the production of the woman. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether man’s soul was something made, or was of the Divine substance? (2) Whether, if made, it was created? (3) Whether it was made by angelic instrumentality? (4) Whether it was made before the body?

Article 1 Whether the soul was made or was of God’s substance? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima non sit facta, sed sit de substantia Dei. Dicitur enim Gen. II, formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae, et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae, et factus est homo in animam viventem. Sed ille qui spirat, aliquid a se emittit. Ergo anima qua homo vivit, est aliquid de substantia Dei. Praeterea, sicut supra habitum est, anima est forma simplex. Sed forma est actus. Ergo anima est actus purus, quod est solius Dei. Ergo anima est de substantia Dei. Praeterea, quaecumque sunt, et nullo modo differunt, sunt idem. Sed Deus et mens sunt, et nullo modo differunt, quia oporteret quod aliquibus differentiis differrent, et sic essent composita. Ergo Deus et mens humana idem sunt. Sed contra est quod Augustinus, in libro de Origine Animae, enumerat quaedam quae dicit esse multum aperteque perversa, et fidei Catholicae adversa; inter quae primum est, quod quidam dixerunt Deum animam non de nihilo, sed de seipso fecisse. Respondeo dicendum quod dicere animam esse de substantia Dei, manifestam improbabilitatem continet. Ut enim ex dictis patet, anima humana est quandoque intelligens in potentia, et scientiam quodammodo a rebus acquirit, et habet diversas potentias, quae omnia

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul was not made, but was God’s substance. For it is written (Gen 2:7): God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man was made a living soul. But he who breathes sends forth something of himself. Therefore the soul, whereby man lives, is of the Divine substance. Obj. 2: Further, as above explained (Q. 75, A. 5), the soul is a simple form. But a form is an act. Therefore the soul is a pure act; which applies to God alone. Therefore the soul is of God’s substance. Obj. 3: Further, things that exist and do not differ are the same. But God and the mind exist, and in no way differ, for they could only be differentiated by certain differences, and thus would be composite. Therefore God and the human mind are the same. On the contrary, Augustine (De Orig. Animae iii, 15) mentions certain opinions which he calls exceedingly and evidently perverse, and contrary to the Catholic Faith, among which the first is the opinion that God made the soul not out of nothing, but from Himself. I answer that, To say that the soul is of the Divine substance involves a manifest improbability. For, as is clear from what has been said (Q. 77, A. 2; Q. 79, A. 2; Q. 84, A. 6), the human soul is sometimes in a state of potentiality to the act of intelligence —acquires its knowledge somehow

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aliena sunt a Dei natura, qui est actus purus, et nihil ab from things—and thus has various powers; all of which are alio accipiens, et nullam in se diversitatem habens, ut su- incompatible with the Divine Nature, Which is a pure act— pra probatum est. receives nothing from any other—and admits of no variety in itself, as we have proved (Q. 3, AA. 1, 7; Q. 9, A. 1). Sed hic error principium habuisse videtur ex duaThis error seems to have originated from two statebus positionibus antiquorum. Primi enim qui naturas ments of the ancients. For those who first began to observe rerum considerare incoeperunt, imaginationem tran- the nature of things, being unable to rise above their imagscendere non valentes, nihil praeter corpora esse po- ination, supposed that nothing but bodies existed. Theresuerunt. Et ideo Deum dicebant esse quoddam corpus, fore they said that God was a body, which they considered quod aliorum corporum iudicabant esse principium. Et to be the principle of other bodies. And since they held that quia animam ponebant esse de natura illius corporis the soul was of the same nature as that body which they requod dicebant esse principium, ut dicitur in I de Anima, garded as the first principle, as is stated in De Anima i, 2, it per consequens sequebatur quod anima esset de natu- followed that the soul was of the nature of God Himself. Acra Dei. Iuxta quam positionem etiam Manichaei, Deum cording to this supposition, also, the Manichaeans, thinkesse quandam lucem corpoream existimantes, quandam ing that God was corporeal light, held that the soul was part partem illius lucis animam esse posuerunt corpori alli- of that light bound up with the body. gatam. Secundo vero processum fuit ad hoc, quod aliqui aliThen a further step in advance was made, and some quid incorporeum esse apprehenderunt, non tamen a surmised the existence of something incorporeal, not apart corpore separatum, sed corporis formam. Unde et Var- from the body, but the form of a body; so that Varro said, ro dixit quod Deus est anima mundum motu et ratione God is a soul governing the world by movement and reason, gubernans; ut Augustinus narrat, VII de Civ. Dei. Sic igi- as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 6). So some supposed tur illius totalis animae partem aliqui posuerunt animam man’s soul to be part of that one soul, as man is a part of hominis, sicut homo est pars totius mundi; non valentes the whole world; for they were unable to go so far as to unintellectu pertingere ad distinguendos spiritualium sub- derstand the different degrees of spiritual substance, except stantiarum gradus, nisi secundum distinctiones corpo- according to the distinction of bodies. rum. Haec autem omnia sunt impossibilia, ut supra probaBut, all these theories are impossible, as proved above tum est. Unde manifeste falsum est animam esse de sub- (Q. 3, AA. 1, 8; Q. 75, A. 1), wherefore it is evidently false stantia Dei. that the soul is of the substance of God. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod inspirare non est Reply Obj. 1: The term breathe is not to be taken in accipiendum corporaliter, sed idem est Deum inspirare, the material sense; but as regards the act of God, to breathe quod spiritum facere. Quamvis et homo corporaliter spi- (spirare), is the same as to make a spirit. Moreover, in the rans non emittat aliquid de sua substantia, sed de natura material sense, man by breathing does not send forth anyextranea. thing of his own substance, but an extraneous thing. Ad secundum dicendum quod anima, etsi sit forma Reply Obj. 2: Although the soul is a simple form in its simplex secundum suam essentiam, non tamen est suum essence, yet it is not its own existence, but is a being by paresse, sed est ens per participationem; ut ex supra dictis ticipation, as above explained (Q. 75, A. 5, ad 4). Therefore patet. Et ideo non est actus purus, sicut Deus. it is not a pure act like God. Ad tertium dicendum quod differens, proprie acReply Obj. 3: That which differs, properly speakceptum, aliquo differt, unde ibi quaeritur differentia, ubi ing, differs in something; wherefore we seek for difference est convenientia. Et propter hoc oportet differentia es- where we find also resemblance. For this reason things se composita quodammodo, cum in aliquo differant, et which differ must in some way be compound; since they in aliquo conveniant. Sed secundum hoc, licet omne dif- differ in something, and in something resemble each other. ferens sit diversum, non tamen omne diversum est dif- In this sense, although all that differ are diverse, yet all ferens; ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Nam simplicia diversa things that are diverse do not differ. For simple things are sunt seipsis, non autem differunt aliquibus differentiis, diverse; yet do not differ from one another by differences ex quibus componantur. Sicut homo et asinus differunt which enter into their composition. For instance, a man rationali et irrationali differentia, de quibus non est di- and a horse differ by the difference of rational and irracere quod ulterius aliis differentiis differant. tional; but we cannot say that these again differ by some further difference.

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Q. 90, A. 2

Article 2 Whether the soul was produced by creation? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima non sit producta in esse per creationem. Quod enim in se habet aliquid materiale, fit ex materia. Sed anima habet in se aliquid materiale, cum non sit actus purus. Ergo anima est facta ex materia. Non ergo est creata. Praeterea, omnis actus materiae alicuius videtur educi de potentia materiae, cum enim materia sit in potentia ad actum, actus quilibet praeexistit in materia in potentia. Sed anima est actus materiae corporalis, ut ex eius definitione apparet. Ergo anima educitur de potentia materiae. Praeterea, anima est forma quaedam. Si igitur anima fit per creationem, pari ratione omnes aliae formae. Et sic nulla forma exibit in esse per generationem. Quod est inconveniens. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam. Est autem homo ad imaginem Dei secundum animam. Ergo anima exivit in esse per creationem. Respondeo dicendum quod anima rationalis non potest fieri nisi per creationem, quod non est verum de aliis formis. Cuius ratio est quia, cum fieri sit via ad esse, hoc modo alicui competit fieri, sicut ei competit esse. Illud autem proprie dicitur esse, quod ipsum habet esse, quasi in suo esse subsistens, unde solae substantiae proprie et vere dicuntur entia. Accidens vero non habet esse, sed eo aliquid est, et hac ratione ens dicitur; sicut albedo dicitur ens, quia ea aliquid est album. Et propter hoc dicitur in VII Metaphys., quod accidens dicitur magis entis quam ens. Et eadem ratio est de omnibus aliis formis non subsistentibus. Et ideo nulli formae non subsistenti proprie competit fieri, sed dicuntur fieri per hoc quod composita subsistentia fiunt. Anima autem rationalis est forma subsistens, ut supra habitum est. Unde sibi proprie competit esse et fieri. Et quia non potest fieri ex materia praeiacente, neque corporali, quia sic esset naturae corporeae; neque spirituali, quia sic substantiae spirituales in invicem transmutarentur, necesse est dicere quod non fiat nisi per creationem.

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul was not produced by creation. For that which has in itself something material is produced from matter. But the soul is in part material, since it is not a pure act. Therefore the soul was made of matter; and hence it was not created. Obj. 2: Further, every actuality of matter is educed from the potentiality of that matter; for since matter is in potentiality to act, any act pre-exists in matter potentially. But the soul is the act of corporeal matter, as is clear from its definition. Therefore the soul is educed from the potentiality of matter. Obj. 3: Further, the soul is a form. Therefore, if the soul is created, all other forms also are created. Thus no forms would come into existence by generation; which is not true. On the contrary, It is written (Gen 1:27): God created man to His own image. But man is like to God in his soul. Therefore the soul was created.

I answer that, The rational soul can be made only by creation; which, however, is not true of other forms. The reason is because, since to be made is the way to existence, a thing must be made in such a way as is suitable to its mode of existence. Now that properly exists which itself has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own existence. Wherefore only substances are properly and truly called beings; whereas an accident has not existence, but something is (modified) by it, and so far is it called a being; for instance, whiteness is called a being, because by it something is white. Hence it is said in Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 1 that an accident should be described as of something rather than as something. The same is to be said of all non-subsistent forms. Therefore, properly speaking, it does not belong to any non-existing form to be made; but such are said to be made through the composite substances being made. On the other hand, the rational soul is a subsistent form, as above explained (Q. 75, A. 2). Wherefore it is competent to be and to be made. And since it cannot be made of preexisting matter—whether corporeal, which would render it a corporeal being—or spiritual, which would involve the transmutation of one spiritual substance into another, we must conclude that it cannot exist except by creation. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in anima est sicut Reply Obj. 1: The soul’s simple essence is as the mamateriale ipsa simplex essentia, formale autem in ipsa terial element, while its participated existence is its formal est esse participatum, quod quidem ex necessitate simul element; which participated existence necessarily co-exists est cum essentia animae, quia esse per se consequitur ad with the soul’s essence, because existence naturally follows formam. Et eadem ratio esset, si poneretur composita ex the form. The same reason holds if the soul is supposed to quadam materia spirituali, ut quidam dicunt. Quia illa be composed of some spiritual matter, as some maintain; materia non est in potentia ad aliam formam, sicut nec because the said matter is not in potentiality to another materia caelestis corporis, alioquin anima esset corrup- form, as neither is the matter of a celestial body; otherwise

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Q. 90, A. 3

Man

tibilis. Unde nullo modo anima potest fieri ex materia praeiacente. Ad secundum dicendum quod actum extrahi de potentia materiae, nihil aliud est quam aliquid fieri actu, quod prius erat in potentia. Sed quia anima rationalis non habet esse suum dependens a materia corporali, sed habet esse subsistens, et excedit capacitatem materiae corporalis, ut supra dictum est; propterea non educitur de potentia materiae. Ad tertium dicendum quod non est simile de anima rationali, et de aliis formis, ut dictum est.

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the soul would be corruptible. Wherefore the soul cannot in any way be made of pre-existent matter. Reply Obj. 2: The production of act from the potentiality of matter is nothing else but something becoming actually that previously was in potentiality. But since the rational soul does not depend in its existence on corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and exceeds the capacity of corporeal matter, as we have seen (Q. 75, A. 2), it is not educed from the potentiality of matter. Reply Obj. 3: As we have said, there is no comparison between the rational soul and other forms.

Article 3 Whether the rational soul is produced by God immediately, or by the instrumentality of the angels? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima rationalis non sit producta a Deo immediate, sed mediantibus angelis. Maior enim ordo est in spiritualibus quam in corporalibus. Sed corpora inferiora producuntur per corpora superiora, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo et inferiores spiritus, qui sunt animae rationales, producuntur per spiritus superiores, qui sunt angeli. Praeterea, finis rerum respondet principio, Deus enim est principium et finis rerum. Ergo et exitus rerum a principio respondet reductioni rerum in finem. Sed infima reducuntur per prima, ut Dionysius dicit. Ergo et infima procedunt in esse per prima, scilicet animae per angelos. Praeterea, perfectum est quod potest sibi simile facere, ut dicitur in IV Meteor. Sed spirituales substantiae sunt multo magis perfectae quam corporales. Cum ergo corpora faciant sibi similia secundum speciem, multo magis angeli poterunt facere aliquid infra se secundum speciem naturae, scilicet animam rationalem. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, quod Deus ipse inspiravit in faciem hominis spiraculum vitae. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt quod angeli, secundum quod operantur in virtute Dei, causant animas rationales. Sed hoc est omnino impossibile, et a fide alienum. Ostensum est enim quod anima rationalis non potest produci nisi per creationem. Solus autem Deus potest creare. Quia solius primi agentis est agere, nullo praesupposito, cum semper agens secundum praesupponat aliquid a primo agente, ut supra habitum est. Quod autem agit aliquid ex aliquo praesupposito, agit transmutando. Et ideo nullum aliud agens agit nisi transmutando; sed solus Deus agit creando. Et quia anima rationalis non potest produci per transmutationem alicuius materiae, ideo non potest produci nisi a Deo immediate.

Objection 1: It would seem that the rational soul is not immediately made by God, but by the instrumentality of the angels. For spiritual things have more order than corporeal things. But inferior bodies are produced by means of the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore also the inferior spirits, who are the rational souls, are produced by means of the superior spirits, the angels. Obj. 2: Further, the end corresponds to the beginning of things; for God is the beginning and end of all. Therefore the issue of things from their beginning corresponds to the forwarding of them to their end. But inferior things are forwarded by the higher, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v); therefore also the inferior are produced into existence by the higher, and souls by angels. Obj. 3: Further, perfect is that which can produce its like, as is stated Metaph. v. But spiritual substances are much more perfect than corporeal. Therefore, since bodies produce their like in their own species, much more are angels able to produce something specifically inferior to themselves; and such is the rational soul. On the contrary, It is written (Gen 2:7) that God Himself breathed into the face of man the breath of life. I answer that, Some have held that angels, acting by the power of God, produce rational souls. But this is quite impossible, and is against faith. For it has been proved that the rational soul cannot be produced except by creation. Now, God alone can create; for the first agent alone can act without presupposing the existence of anything; while the second cause always presupposes something derived from the first cause, as above explained (Q. 75, A. 3): and every agent, that presupposes something to its act, acts by making a change therein. Therefore everything else acts by producing a change, whereas God alone acts by creation. Since, therefore, the rational soul cannot be produced by a change in matter, it cannot be produced, save immediately by God.

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First Production of Man’s Soul

Q. 90, A. 4

Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta. Nam quod corThus the replies to the objections are clear. For that pora causant vel sibi similia vel inferiora, et quod supe- bodies produce their like or something inferior to themriora reducunt inferiora, totum hoc provenit per quan- selves, and that the higher things lead forward the infedam transmutationem. rior—all these things are effected through a certain transmutation.

Article 4 Whether the human soul was produced before the body? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima humana fuerit producta ante corpus. Opus enim creationis praecessit opus distinctionis et ornatus, ut supra habitum est. Sed anima producta est in esse per creationem; corpus autem factum est in fine ornatus. Ergo anima hominis producta est ante corpus. Praeterea, anima rationalis magis convenit cum angelis quam cum animalibus brutis. Sed angeli creati fuerunt ante corpora, vel statim a principio cum corporali materia; corpus autem hominis formatum est sexto die, quando et bruta animalia sunt producta. Ergo anima hominis fuit creata ante corpus. Praeterea, finis proportionatur principio. Sed anima in fine remanet post corpus. Ergo et in principio fuit creata ante corpus. Sed contra est quod actus proprius fit in potentia propria. Cum ergo anima sit proprius actus corporis, anima producta est in corpore. Respondeo dicendum quod Origenes posuit non solum animam primi hominis, sed animas omnium hominum ante corpora simul cum angelis creatas; propter hoc quod credidit omnes spirituales substantias, tam animas quam angelos, aequales esse secundum suae naturae conditionem, sed solum merito distare; sic ut quaedam earum corporibus alligarentur, quae sunt animae hominum vel caelestium corporum; quaedam vero in sui puritate, secundum diversos ordines, remanerent. De qua opinione supra iam diximus, et ideo relinquatur ad praesens. Augustinus vero, in VII super Gen. ad Litt., dicit quod anima primi hominis ante corpus cum angelis est creata, propter aliam rationem. Quia scilicet ponit quod corpus hominis in illis operibus sex dierum non fuit productum in actu, sed solum secundum causales rationes, quod non potest de anima dici; quia nec ex aliqua materia corporali aut spirituali praeexistente facta fuit, nec ex aliqua virtute creata produci potuit. Et ideo videtur quod ipsamet anima in operibus sex dierum, in quibus omnia facta fuerunt, simul cum angelis fuerit creata; et quod postmodum propria voluntate inclinata fuit ad corpus administrandum. Sed hoc non dicit asserendo, ut eius verba demonstrant. Dicit enim, credatur, si nulla Scriptu-

Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul was made before the body. For the work of creation preceded the work of distinction and adornment, as shown above (Q. 66, A. 1; Q. 70, A. 1). But the soul was made by creation; whereas the body was made at the end of the work of adornment. Therefore the soul of man was made before the body. Obj. 2: Further, the rational soul has more in common with the angels than with the brute animals. But angels were created before bodies, or at least, at the beginning with corporeal matter; whereas the body of man was formed on the sixth day, when also the animals were made. Therefore the soul of man was created before the body. Obj. 3: Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. But in the end the soul outlasts the body. Therefore in the beginning it was created before the body. On the contrary, The proper act is produced in its proper potentiality. Therefore since the soul is the proper act of the body, the soul was produced in the body. I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8) held that not only the soul of the first man, but also the souls of all men were created at the same time as the angels, before their bodies: because he thought that all spiritual substances, whether souls or angels, are equal in their natural condition, and differ only by merit; so that some of them— namely, the souls of men or of heavenly bodies—are united to bodies while others remain in their different orders entirely free from matter. Of this opinion we have already spoken (Q. 47, A. 2); and so we need say nothing about it here. Augustine, however (Gen ad lit. vii, 24), says that the soul of the first man was created at the same time as the angels, before the body, for another reason; because he supposes that the body of man, during the work of the six days, was produced, not actually, but only as to some causal virtues; which cannot be said of the soul, because neither was it made of any pre-existing corporeal or spiritual matter, nor could it be produced from any created virtue. Therefore it seems that the soul itself, during the work of the six days, when all things were made, was created, together with the angels; and that afterwards, by its own will, was joined to the service of the body. But he does not say this by way of assertion; as his words prove. For he says (Gen ad

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rarum auctoritas seu veritatis ratio contradicit, hominem lit. vii, 29): We may believe, if neither Scripture nor reason ita factum sexto die, ut corporis quidem humani ratio cau- forbid, that man was made on the sixth day, in the sense that salis in elementis mundi, anima vero iam ipsa crearetur. his body was created as to its causal virtue in the elements of the world, but that the soul was already created. Posset autem hoc utique tolerari secundum eos qui Now this could be upheld by those who hold that the ponunt quod anima habet per se speciem et naturam soul has of itself a complete species and nature, and that it is completam, et quod non unitur corpori ut forma, sed so- not united to the body as its form, but as its administrator. lum ad ipsum administrandum. Si autem anima unitur But if the soul is united to the body as its form, and is natucorpori ut forma, et est naturaliter pars humanae natu- rally a part of human nature, the above supposition is quite rae, hoc omnino esse non potest. Manifestum est enim impossible. For it is clear that God made the first things in quod Deus primas res instituit in perfecto statu suae na- their perfect natural state, as their species required. Now turae, secundum quod uniuscuiusque rei species exige- the soul, as a part of human nature, has its natural perfecbat. Anima autem, cum sit pars humanae naturae, non tion only as united to the body. Therefore it would have habet naturalem perfectionem nisi secundum quod est been unfitting for the soul to be created without the body. corpori unita. Unde non fuisset conveniens animam sine corpore creari. Sustinendo ergo opinionem Augustini de operibus Therefore, if we admit the opinion of Augustine about sex dierum, dici poterit quod anima humana praecessit the work of the six days (Q. 74, A. 2), we may say that the in operibus sex dierum secundum quandam similitudi- human soul preceded in the work of the six days by a cernem generis, prout convenit cum angelis in intellectuali tain generic similitude, so far as it has intellectual nature in natura; ipsa vero fuit creata simul cum corpore. Secun- common with the angels; but was itself created at the same dum alios vero sanctos, tam anima quam corpus primi time as the body. According to the other saints, both the hominis in operibus sex dierum sunt producta. body and soul of the first man were produced in the work of the six days. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si natura animae Reply Obj. 1: If the soul by its nature were a complete haberet integram speciem, ita quod secundum se creare- species, so that it might be created as to itself, this reason tur, ratio illa procederet, ut per se in principio crearetur. would prove that the soul was created by itself in the beginSed quia naturaliter est forma corporis, non fuit seorsum ning. But as the soul is naturally the form of the body, it was creanda, sed debuit creari in corpore. necessarily created, not separately, but in the body. Et similiter est dicendum ad secundum. Nam aniReply Obj. 2: The same observation applies to the secma si per se speciem haberet, magis conveniret cum an- ond objection. For if the soul had a species of itself it would gelis. Sed inquantum est forma corporis, pertinet ad ge- have something still more in common with the angels. But, nus animalium, ut formale principium. as the form of the body, it belongs to the animal genus, as a formal principle. Ad tertium dicendum quod animam remanere Reply Obj. 3: That the soul remains after the body, is post corpus, accidit per defectum corporis, qui est mors. due to a defect of the body, namely, death. Which defect was Qui quidem defectus in principio creationis animae, esse not due when the soul was first created. non debuit.

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Question 91 The Production of the First Man’s Body Deinde considerandum est de productione corporis We have now to consider the production of the first primi hominis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. man’s body. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, de materia ex qua productum est. (1) The matter from which it was produced; Secundo, de auctore a quo productum est. (2) The author by whom it was produced; Tertio, de dispositione quae ei per productionem est (3) The disposition it received in its production; attributa. Quarto, de modo et ordine productionis ipsius. (4) The mode and order of its production.

Article 1 Whether the body of the first man was made of the slime of the earth? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpus primi hominis non sit factum de limo terrae. Maioris enim virtutis est facere aliquid ex nihilo, quam ex aliquo, quia plus distat ab actu non ens quam ens in potentia. Sed cum homo sit dignissima creaturarum inferiorum, decuit ut virtus Dei maxime ostenderetur in productione corporis eius. Ergo non debuit fieri ex limo terrae, sed ex nihilo. Praeterea, corpora caelestia sunt nobiliora terrenis. Sed corpus humanum habet maximam nobilitatem, cum perficiatur a nobilissima forma, quae est anima rationalis. Ergo non debuit fieri de corpore terrestri, sed magis de corpore caelesti. Praeterea, ignis et aer sunt nobiliora corpora quam terra et aqua, quod ex eorum subtilitate apparet. Cum igitur corpus humanum sit dignissimum, magis debuit fieri ex igne et ex aere quam ex limo terrae. Praeterea, corpus humanum est compositum ex quatuor elementis. Non ergo est factum ex limo terrae, sed ex omnibus elementis. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum Deus perfectus sit, operibus suis perfectionem dedit secundum eorum modum; secundum illud Deut. XXXII, Dei perfecta sunt opera. Ipse autem simpliciter perfectus est, ex hoc quod omnia in se praehabet, non per modum compositionis, sed simpliciter et unite, ut Dionysius dicit, eo modo quo diversi effectus praeexistunt in causa, secundum unam eius essentiam. Ista autem perfectio ad angelos quidem derivatur, secundum quod omnia sunt in eorum cognitione quae sunt a Deo in natura producta, per formas

Objection 1: It would seem that the body of the first man was not made of the slime of the earth. For it is an act of greater power to make something out of nothing than out of something; because not being is farther off from actual existence than being in potentiality. But since man is the most honorable of God’s lower creatures, it was fitting that in the production of man’s body, the power of God should be most clearly shown. Therefore it should not have been made of the slime of the earth, but out of nothing. Obj. 2: Further, the heavenly bodies are nobler than earthly bodies. But the human body has the greatest nobility; since it is perfected by the noblest form, which is the rational soul. Therefore it should not be made of an earthly body, but of a heavenly body. Obj. 3: Further, fire and air are nobler than earth and water, as is clear from their subtlety. Therefore, since the human body is most noble, it should rather have been made of fire and air than of the slime of the earth. Obj. 4: Further, the human body is composed of the four elements. Therefore it was not made of the slime of the earth, but of the four elements. On the contrary, It is written (Gen 2:7): God made man of the slime of the earth. I answer that, As God is perfect in His works, He bestowed perfection on all of them according to their capacity: God’s works are perfect (Deut 32:4). He Himself is simply perfect by the fact that all things are pre-contained in Him, not as component parts, but as united in one simple whole, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v); in the same way as various effects pre-exist in their cause, according to its one virtue. This perfection is bestowed on the angels, inasmuch as all things which are produced by God in nature through various forms come under their knowledge. But on man

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diversas. Ad hominem vero derivatur inferiori modo huiusmodi perfectio. Non enim in sua cognitione naturali habet omnium naturalium notitiam; sed est ex rebus omnibus quodammodo compositus, dum de genere spiritualium substantiarum habet in se animam rationalem, de similitudine vero caelestium corporum habet elongationem a contrariis per maximam aequalitatem complexionis, elementa vero secundum substantiam. Ita tamen quod superiora elementa praedominantur in eo secundum virtutem, scilicet ignis et aer, quia vita praecipue consistit in calido, quod est ignis, et humido, quod est aeris. Inferiora vero elementa abundant in eo secundum substantiam, aliter enim non posset esse mixtionis aequalitas, nisi inferiora elementa, quae sunt minoris virtutis, secundum quantitatem in homine abundarent. Et ideo dicitur corpus hominis de limo terrae formatum, quia limus dicitur terra aquae permixta. Et propter hoc homo dicitur minor mundus, quia omnes creaturae mundi quodammodo inveniuntur in eo. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus Dei creantis manifestata est in corpore hominis, dum eius materia est per creationem producta. Oportuit autem ut ex materia quatuor elementorum fieret corpus humanum, ut homo haberet convenientiam cum inferioribus corporibus, quasi medium quoddam existens inter spirituales et corporales substantias. Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis corpus caeleste sit simpliciter nobilius terrestri corpore, tamen quantum ad actus animae rationalis, est minus conveniens. Nam anima rationalis accipit notitiam veritatis quodammodo per sensus; quorum organa formari non possunt ex corpore caelesti, cum sit impassibile. Nec est verum quod quidam dicunt aliquid de quinta essentia materialiter ad compositionem humani corporis advenire, ponentes animam uniri corpori mediante quadam luce. Primo enim, falsum est quod dicunt, lucem esse corpus. Secundo vero, impossibile est aliquid de quinta essentia vel a corpore caelesti dividi, vel elementis permisceri, propter caelestis corporis impassibilitatem. Unde non venit in compositionem mixtorum corporum, nisi secundum suae virtutis effectum. Ad tertium dicendum quod, si ignis et aer, quae sunt maioris virtutis in agendo, etiam secundum quantitatem in compositione humani corporis abundarent, omnino ad se traherent alia, et non posset fieri aequalitas commixtionis, quae est necessaria in compositione hominis ad bonitatem sensus tactus, qui est fundamentum sensuum aliorum. Oportet enim organum cuiuslibet sensus non habere in actu contraria quorum sensus est perceptivus, sed in potentia tantum. Vel ita quod omnino careat toto genere contrariorum, sicut pupilla caret colore, ut sit in potentia ad omnes colores, quod in organo tactus non erat possibile, cum sit compositum ex elementis, quorum qualitates percipit tactus. Vel ita quod

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this perfection is bestowed in an inferior way. For he does not possess a natural knowledge of all natural things, but is in a manner composed of all things, since he has in himself a rational soul of the genus of spiritual substances, and in likeness to the heavenly bodies he is removed from contraries by an equable temperament. As to the elements, he has them in their very substance, yet in such a way that the higher elements, fire and air, predominate in him by their power; for life is mostly found where there is heat, which is from fire; and where there is humor, which is of the air. But the inferior elements abound in man by their substance; otherwise the mingling of elements would not be evenly balanced, unless the inferior elements, which have the less power, predominated in quantity. Therefore the body of man is said to have been formed from the slime of the earth; because earth and water mingled are called slime, and for this reason man is called a little world, because all creatures of the world are in a way to be found in him. Reply Obj. 1: The power of the Divine Creator was manifested in man’s body when its matter was produced by creation. But it was fitting that the human body should be made of the four elements, that man might have something in common with the inferior bodies, as being something between spiritual and corporeal substances. Reply Obj. 2: Although the heavenly body is in itself nobler than the earthly body, yet for the acts of the rational soul the heavenly body is less adapted. For the rational soul receives the knowledge of truth in a certain way through the senses, the organs of which cannot be formed of a heavenly body which is impassible. Nor is it true that something of the fifth essence enters materially into the composition of the human body, as some say, who suppose that the soul is united to the body by means of light. For, first of all, what they say is false—that light is a body. Second, it is impossible for something to be taken from the fifth essence, or from a heavenly body, and to be mingled with the elements, since a heavenly body is impassible; wherefore it does not enter into the composition of mixed bodies, except as in the effects of its power. Reply Obj. 3: If fire and air, whose action is of greater power, predominated also in quantity in the human body, they would entirely draw the rest into themselves, and there would be no equality in the mingling, such as is required in the composition of man, for the sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses. For the organ of any particular sense must not actually have the contraries of which that sense has the perception, but only potentially; either in such a way that it is entirely void of the whole genus of such contraries—thus, for instance, the pupil of the eye is without color, so as to be in potentiality as regards all colors; which is not possible in the organ of touch, since it is composed of the very elements, the qualities of which are

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organum sit medium inter contraria, ut necesse est in perceived by that sense—or so that the organ is a medium tactu accidere, medium enim est quodammodo in po- between two contraries, as much needs be the case with retentia ad extrema. gard to touch; for the medium is in potentiality to the extremes. Ad quartum dicendum quod in limo terrae est terReply Obj. 4: In the slime of the earth are earth, and ra, et aqua conglutinans partes terrae. De aliis autem ele- water binding the earth together. Of the other elements, mentis Scriptura mentionem non fecit, tum quia minus Scripture makes no mention, because they are less in quanabundant secundum quantitatem in corpore hominis, ut tity in the human body, as we have said; and because also in dictum est; tum etiam quia in tota rerum productione, the account of the Creation no mention is made of fire and de igne et aere, quae sensu non percipiuntur a rudibus air, which are not perceived by senses of uncultured men mentionem non fecit Scriptura, quae rudi populo trade- such as those to whom the Scripture was immediately adbatur. dressed.

Article 2 Whether the human body was immediately produced by God? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpus humanum non sit immediate a Deo productum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in III de Trin., quod corporalia disponuntur a Deo per angelicam creaturam. Sed corpus humanum formatum fuit ex materia corporali, ut dictum est. Ergo debuit produci mediantibus angelis, et non immediate a Deo. Praeterea, quod fieri potest virtute creata, non est necessarium quod immediate producatur a Deo. Sed corpus humanum produci potest per virtutem creatam caelestis corporis, nam et quaedam animalia ex putrefactione generantur per virtutem activam corporis caelestis; et Albumasar dicit quod in locis in quibus nimis abundat calor aut frigus, homines non generantur, sed in locis temperatis tantum. Ergo non oportuit quod immediate corpus humanum formaretur a Deo. Praeterea, nihil fit ex materia corporali nisi per aliquam materiae transmutationem. Sed omnis transmutatio corporalis causatur ex motu caelestis corporis, qui est primus motuum. Cum igitur corpus humanum sit productum ex materia corporali, videtur quod ad eius formationem aliquid operatum fuerit corpus caeleste. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, super Gen. ad Litt., quod homo factus est secundum corpus, in operibus sex dierum, secundum causales rationes quas Deus inseruit creaturae corporali; postmodum vero fuit formatum in actu. Sed quod praeexistit in corporali creatura secundum causales rationes, per aliquam virtutem corpoream produci potest. Ergo corpus humanum productum est aliqua virtute creata, et non immediate a Deo. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XVII, Deus de terra creavit hominem. Respondeo dicendum quod prima formatio humani corporis non potuit esse per aliquam virtutem creatam, sed immediate a Deo. Posuerunt siquidem aliqui formas quae sunt in materia corporali, a quibusdam for-

Objection 1: It would seem that the human body was not produced by God immediately. For Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), that corporeal things are disposed by God through the angels. But the human body was made of corporeal matter, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it was produced by the instrumentality of the angels, and not immediately by God. Obj. 2: Further, whatever can be made by a created power, is not necessarily produced immediately by God. But the human body can be produced by the created power of a heavenly body; for even certain animals are produced from putrefaction by the active power of a heavenly body; and Albumazar says that man is not generated where heat and cold are extreme, but only in temperate regions. Therefore the human body was not necessarily produced immediately by God. Obj. 3: Further, nothing is made of corporeal matter except by some material change. But all corporeal change is caused by a movement of a heavenly body, which is the first movement. Therefore, since the human body was produced from corporeal matter, it seems that a heavenly body had part in its production. Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. vii, 24) that man’s body was made during the work of the six days, according to the causal virtues which God inserted in corporeal creatures; and that afterwards it was actually produced. But what pre-exists in the corporeal creature by reason of causal virtues can be produced by some corporeal body. Therefore the human body was produced by some created power, and not immediately by God. On the contrary, It is written (Sir 17:1): God created man out of the earth. I answer that, The first formation of the human body could not be by the instrumentality of any created power, but was immediately from God. Some, indeed, supposed that the forms which are in corporeal matter are derived

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mis immaterialibus derivari. Sed hanc opinionem repellit philosophus, in VII Metaphys., per hoc quod formis non competit per se fieri, sed composito, ut supra expositum est; et quia oportet agens esse simile facto non convenit quod forma pura, quae est sine materia, producat formam quae est in materia, quae non fit nisi per hoc quod compositum fit. Et ideo oportet quod forma quae est in materia, sit causa formae quae est in materia, secundum quod compositum a composito generatur. Deus autem, quamvis omnino sit immaterialis, tamen solus est qui sua virtute materiam producere potest creando. Unde ipsius solius est formam producere in materia absque adminiculo praecedentis formae materialis. Et propter hoc, angeli non possunt transmutare corpora ad formam aliquam, nisi adhibitis seminibus quibusdam, ut Augustinus dicit in III de Trin. Quia igitur corpus humanum nunquam formatum fuerat, cuius virtute per viam generationis aliud simile in specie formaretur, necesse fuit quod primum corpus hominis immediate formaretur a Deo. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, etsi angeli aliquod ministerium Deo exhibeant in his quae circa corpora operatur; aliqua tamen Deus in creatura corporea facit, quae nullo modo angeli facere possunt; sicut quod suscitat mortuos, et illuminat caecos. Secundum quam virtutem etiam corpus primi hominis de limo terrae formavit. Potuit tamen fieri ut aliquod ministerium in formatione corporis primi hominis angeli exhiberent; sicut exhibebunt in ultima resurrectione, pulveres colligendo. Ad secundum dicendum quod animalia perfecta, quae generantur ex semine, non possunt generari per solam virtutem caelestis corporis, ut Avicenna fingit; licet ad eorum generationem naturalem cooperetur virtus caelestis corporis, prout philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod homo generat hominem ex materia, et sol. Et exinde est quod exigitur locus temperatus ad generationem hominum et aliorum animalium perfectorum. Sufficit autem virtus caelestium corporum ad generandum quaedam animalia imperfectiora ex materia disposita, manifestum est enim quod plura requiruntur ad productionem rei perfectae, quam ad productionem rei imperfectae. Ad tertium dicendum quod motus caeli est causa transmutationum naturalium, non tamen transmutationum quae fiunt praeter naturae ordinem, et sola virtute divina, sicut quod mortui resuscitantur, quod caeci illuminantur. Quibus est simile quod homo ex limo terrae formatur. Ad quartum dicendum quod secundum rationes causales in creaturis dicitur aliquid praeexistere dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum potentiam activam et passivam, ut non solum ex materia praeexistenti fieri possit, sed etiam ut aliqua praeexistens creatura hoc facere possit. Alio modo, secundum potentiam passivam tantum,

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from some immaterial forms; but the Philosopher refutes this opinion (Metaph. vii), for the reason that forms cannot be made in themselves, but only in the composite, as we have explained (Q. 65, A. 4); and because the agent must be like its effect, it is not fitting that a pure form, not existing in matter, should produce a form which is in matter, and which form is only made by the fact that the composite is made. So a form which is in matter can only be the cause of another form that is in matter, according as composite is made by composite. Now God, though He is absolutely immaterial, can alone by His own power produce matter by creation: wherefore He alone can produce a form in matter, without the aid of any preceding material form. For this reason the angels cannot transform a body except by making use of something in the nature of a seed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 19). Therefore as no pre-existing body has been formed whereby another body of the same species could be generated, the first human body was of necessity made immediately by God. Reply Obj. 1: Although the angels are the ministers of God, as regards what He does in bodies, yet God does something in bodies beyond the angels’ power, as, for instance, raising the dead, or giving sight to the blind: and by this power He formed the body of the first man from the slime of the earth. Nevertheless the angels could act as ministers in the formation of the body of the first man, in the same way as they will do at the last resurrection by collecting the dust. Reply Obj. 2: Perfect animals, produced from seed, cannot be made by the sole power of a heavenly body, as Avicenna imagined; although the power of a heavenly body may assist by co-operation in the work of natural generation, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 26), man and the sun beget man from matter. For this reason, a place of moderate temperature is required for the production of man and other animals. But the power of heavenly bodies suffices for the production of some imperfect animals from properly disposed matter: for it is clear that more conditions are required to produce a perfect than an imperfect thing.

Reply Obj. 3: The movement of the heavens causes natural changes; but not changes that surpass the order of nature, and are caused by the Divine Power alone, as for the dead to be raised to life, or the blind to see: like to which also is the making of man from the slime of the earth. Reply Obj. 4: An effect may be said to pre-exist in the causal virtues of creatures, in two ways. First, both in active and in passive potentiality, so that not only can it be produced out of pre-existing matter, but also that some preexisting creature can produce it. Second, in passive potentiality only; that is, that out of pre-existing matter it can be

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ut scilicet de materia praeexistenti fieri possit a Deo. produced by God. In this sense, according to Augustine, Et hoc modo, secundum Augustinum, corpus hominis the human body pre-existed in the previous work in their praeextitit in operibus productis secundum causales ra- causal virtues. tiones.

Article 3 Whether the body of man was given an apt disposition? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpus hominis non habuerit convenientem dispositionem. Cum enim homo sit nobilissimum animalium, corpus hominis debuit esse dispositum optime ad ea quae sunt propria animalis, scilicet ad sensum et motum. Sed quaedam animalia inveniuntur acutioris sensus quam homo, et velocioris motus; sicut canes melius odorant, et aves velocius moventur. Ergo corpus hominis non est convenienter dispositum. Praeterea, perfectum est cui nihil deest. Sed plura desunt humano corpori quam corporibus aliorum animalium, quae habent tegumenta et arma naturalia ad sui protectionem, quae homini desunt. Ergo corpus humanum est imperfectissime dispositum. Praeterea, homo plus distat a plantis quam ab animalibus brutis. Sed plantae habent staturam rectam; animalia autem bruta pronam. Ergo homo non debuit habere staturam rectam. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccle. VII, Deus fecit hominem rectum. Respondeo dicendum quod omnes res naturales productae sunt ab arte divina, unde sunt quodammodo artificiata ipsius Dei. Quilibet autem artifex intendit suo operi dispositionem optimam inducere, non simpliciter, sed per comparationem ad finem. Et si talis dispositio habet secum adiunctum aliquem defectum, artifex non curat. Sicut artifex qui facit serram ad secandum, facit eam ex ferro, ut sit idonea ad secandum; nec curat eam facere ex vitro, quae est pulchrior materia, quia talis pulchritudo esset impedimentum finis. Sic igitur Deus unicuique rei naturali dedit optimam dispositionem, non quidem simpliciter, sed secundum ordinem ad proprium finem. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit, in II Physic., et quia dignius est sic, non tamen simpliciter, sed ad uniuscuiusque substantiam. Finis autem proximus humani corporis est anima rationalis et operationes ipsius, materia enim est propter formam, et instrumenta propter actiones agentis. Dico ergo quod Deus instituit corpus humanum in optima dispositione secundum convenientiam ad talem formam et ad tales operationes. Et si aliquis defectus in dispositione humani corporis esse videtur, considerandum est quod talis defectus sequitur ex necessitate materiae, ad

Objection 1: It would seem that the body of man was not given an apt disposition. For since man is the noblest of animals, his body ought to be the best disposed in what is proper to an animal, that is, in sense and movement. But some animals have sharper senses and quicker movement than man; thus dogs have a keener smell, and birds a swifter flight. Therefore man’s body was not aptly disposed.

Obj. 2: Further, perfect is what lacks nothing. But the human body lacks more than the body of other animals, for these are provided with covering and natural arms of defense, in which man is lacking. Therefore the human body is very imperfectly disposed. Obj. 3: Further, man is more distant from plants than he is from the brutes. But plants are erect in stature, while brutes are prone in stature. Therefore man should not be of erect stature. On the contrary, It is written (Eccl 7:30): God made man right. I answer that, All natural things were produced by the Divine art, and so may be called God’s works of art. Now every artist intends to give to his work the best disposition; not absolutely the best, but the best as regards the proposed end; and even if this entails some defect, the artist cares not: thus, for instance, when man makes himself a saw for the purpose of cutting, he makes it of iron, which is suitable for the object in view; and he does not prefer to make it of glass, though this be a more beautiful material, because this very beauty would be an obstacle to the end he has in view. Therefore God gave to each natural being the best disposition; not absolutely so, but in the view of its proper end. This is what the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 7): And because it is better so, not absolutely, but for each one’s substance. Now the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its operations; since matter is for the sake of the form, and instruments are for the action of the agent. I say, therefore, that God fashioned the human body in that disposition which was best, as most suited to such a form and to such operations. If defect exists in the disposition of the human body, it is well to observe that such defect arises as a necessary result of the matter, from the conditions required

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ea quae requiruntur in corpore ut sit debita proportio ipsius ad animam et ad animae operationes. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod tactus, qui est fundamentum aliorum sensuum, est perfectior in homine quam in aliquo alio animali, et propter hoc oportuit quod homo haberet temperatissimam complexionem inter omnia animalia. Praecedit etiam homo omnia alia animalia, quantum ad vires sensitivas interiores; sicut ex supra dictis apparet. Ex quadam autem necessitate contingit quod, quantum ad aliquos exteriores sensus, homo ab aliis animalibus deficiat. Sicut homo, inter omnia animalia, habet pessimum olfactum. Necessarium enim fuit quod homo, inter omnia animalia, respectu sui corporis haberet maximum cerebrum, tum ut liberius in eo perficerentur operationes interiorum virium sensitivarum, quae sunt necessariae ad intellectus operationem, ut supra dictum est; tum etiam ut frigiditas cerebri temperaret calorem cordis, quem necesse est in homine abundare, ad hoc quod homo sit rectae staturae. Magnitudo autem cerebri, propter eius humiditatem, est impedimentum olfactus, qui requirit siccitatem. Et similiter potest assignari ratio quare quaedam animalia sunt acutioris visus et subtilioris auditus quam homo, propter impedimentum horum sensuum quod necesse est consequi in homine ex perfecta complexionis aequalitate. Et eadem etiam ratio est assignanda de hoc quod quaedam animalia sunt homine velociora, cui excellentiae velocitatis repugnat aequalitas humanae complexionis. Ad secundum dicendum quod cornua et ungulae, quae sunt quorundam animalium arma, et spissitudo corii, et multitudo pilorum aut plumarum, quae sunt tegumenta animalium, attestantur abundantiae terrestris elementi; quae repugnat aequalitati et teneritudini complexionis humanae. Et ideo haec homini non competebant. Sed loco horum habet rationem et manus, quibus potest parare sibi arma et tegumenta et alia vitae necessaria, infinitis modis. Unde et manus, in III de Anima, dicitur organum organorum. Et hoc etiam magis competebat rationali naturae, quae est infinitarum conceptionum, ut haberet facultatem infinita instrumenta sibi parandi. Ad tertium dicendum quod habere staturam rectam conveniens fuit homini propter quatuor. Primo quidem, quia sensus sunt dati homini non solum ad vitae necessaria procuranda, sicut aliis animalibus; sed etiam ad cognoscendum. Unde, cum cetera animalia non delectentur in sensibilibus nisi per ordinem ad cibos et venerea, solus homo delectatur in ipsa pulchritudine sensibilium secundum seipsam. Et ideo, quia sensus praecipue vigent in facie, alia animalia habent faciem pronam ad terram, quasi ad cibum quaerendum et providendum sibi de victu, homo vero habet faciem erectam, ut per sensus, et praecipue per visum, qui est subtilior et plures differentias rerum ostendit,

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in the body, in order to make it suitably proportioned to the soul and its operations. Reply Obj. 1: The sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses, is more perfect in man than in any other animal; and for this reason man must have the most equable temperament of all animals. Moreover man excels all other animals in the interior sensitive powers, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. 78, A. 4). But by a kind of necessity, man falls short of the other animals in some of the exterior senses; thus of all animals he has the least sense of smell. For man needs the largest brain as compared to the body; both for his greater freedom of action in the interior powers required for the intellectual operations, as we have seen above (Q. 84, A. 7); and in order that the low temperature of the brain may modify the heat of the heart, which has to be considerable in man for him to be able to stand erect. So that size of the brain, by reason of its humidity, is an impediment to the smell, which requires dryness. In the same way, we may suggest a reason why some animals have a keener sight, and a more acute hearing than man; namely, on account of a hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the perfect equability of his temperament. The same reason suffices to explain why some animals are more rapid in movement than man, since this excellence of speed is inconsistent with the equability of the human temperament.

Reply Obj. 2: Horns and claws, which are the weapons of some animals, and toughness of hide and quantity of hair or feathers, which are the clothing of animals, are signs of an abundance of the earthly element; which does not agree with the equability and softness of the human temperament. Therefore such things do not suit the nature of man. Instead of these, he has reason and hands whereby he can make himself arms and clothes, and other necessaries of life, of infinite variety. Wherefore the hand is called by Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), the organ of organs. Moreover this was more becoming to the rational nature, which is capable of conceiving an infinite number of things, so as to make for itself an infinite number of instruments. Reply Obj. 3: An upright stature was becoming to man for four reasons. First, because the senses are given to man, not only for the purpose of procuring the necessaries of life, which they are bestowed on other animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence, whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses only as ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the beauty of sensible objects for its own sake. Therefore, as the senses are situated chiefly in the face, other animals have the face turned to the ground, as it were for the purpose of seeking food and procuring a livelihood; whereas man has his face erect, in order that by the senses, and chiefly by sight, which is more subtle and penetrates further into the differences of things,

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libere possit ex omni parte sensibilia cognoscere, et caelestia et terrena, ut ex omnibus intelligibilem colligat veritatem. Secundo, ut interiores vires liberius suas operationes habeant, dum cerebrum, in quo quodammodo perficiuntur, non est depressum, sed super omnes partes corporis elevatum. Tertio, quia oporteret quod, si homo haberet pronam staturam, uteretur manibus loco anteriorum pedum. Et sic utilitas manuum ad diversa opera perficienda cessaret. Quarto, quia, si haberet pronam staturam, et uteretur manibus loco anteriorum pedum, oporteret quod cibum caperet ore. Et ita haberet os oblongum, et labia dura et grossa, et linguam etiam duram, ne ab exterioribus laederetur, sicut patet in aliis animalibus. Et talis dispositio omnino impediret locutionem, quae est proprium opus rationis. Et tamen homo staturam rectam habens, maxime distat a plantis. Nam homo habet superius sui, idest caput, versus superius mundi, et inferius sui versus inferius mundi, et ideo est optime dispositus secundum dispositionem totius. Plantae vero habent superius sui versus inferius mundi (nam radices sunt ori proportionales), inferius autem sui versus superius mundi. Animalia vero bruta medio modo, nam superius animalis est pars qua accipit alimentum, inferius autem est pars qua emittit superfluum.

Q. 91, A. 4

he may freely survey the sensible objects around him, both heavenly and earthly, so as to gather intelligible truth from all things. Second, for the greater freedom of the acts of the interior powers; the brain, wherein these actions are, in a way, performed, not being low down, but lifted up above other parts of the body. Third, because if man’s stature were prone to the ground he would need to use his hands as forefeet; and thus their utility for other purposes would cease. Fourth, because if man’s stature were prone to the ground, and he used his hands as fore-feet, he would be obliged to take hold of his food with his mouth. Thus he would have a protruding mouth, with thick and hard lips, and also a hard tongue, so as to keep it from being hurt by exterior things; as we see in other animals. Moreover, such an attitude would quite hinder speech, which is reason’s proper operation. Nevertheless, though of erect stature, man is far above plants. For man’s superior part, his head, is turned towards the superior part of the world, and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior world; and therefore he is perfectly disposed as to the general situation of his body. Plants have the superior part turned towards the lower world, since their roots correspond to the mouth; and their inferior part towards the upper world. But brute animals have a middle disposition, for the superior part of the animal is that by which it takes food, and the inferior part that by which it rids itself of the surplus.

Article 4 Whether the production of the human body is fittingly described in Scripture? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter corporis humani productio in Scriptura describatur. Sicut enim corpus humanum est factum a Deo, ita et alia opera sex dierum. Sed in aliis operibus dicitur, dixit Deus, fiat, et factum est. Ergo similiter dici debuit de hominis productione. Praeterea, corpus humanum a Deo immediate est factum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur, faciamus hominem. Praeterea, forma humani corporis est ipsa anima, quae est spiraculum vitae. Inconvenienter ergo, postquam dixerat, formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae, subiunxit, et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae. Praeterea, anima, quae est spiraculum vitae, est in toto corpore, et principaliter in corde. Non ergo debuit dicere, quod inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae. Praeterea, sexus masculinus et femininus pertinent ad corpus, imago vero Dei ad animam. Sed anima, secundum Augustinum, fuit facta ante corpus. Inconve-

Objection 1: It would seem that the production of the human body is not fittingly described in Scripture. For, as the human body was made by God, so also were the other works of the six days. But in the other works it is written, God said; Let it be made, and it was made. Therefore the same should have been said of man. Obj. 2: Further, the human body was made by God immediately, as explained above (A. 2). Therefore it was not fittingly said, Let us make man. Obj. 3: Further, the form of the human body is the soul itself which is the breath of life. Therefore, having said, God made man of the slime of the earth, he should not have added: And He breathed into him the breath of life. Obj. 4: Further, the soul, which is the breath of life, is in the whole body, and chiefly in the heart. Therefore it was not fittingly said: He breathed into his face the breath of life. Obj. 5: Further, the male and female sex belong to the body, while the image of God belongs to the soul. But the soul, according to Augustine (Gen ad lit. vii, 24), was made

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nienter ergo cum dixisset, ad imaginem suam fecit illum, before the body. Therefore having said: To His image He addidit, masculum et feminam creavit eos. made them, he should not have added, male and female He created them. In contrarium est auctoritas Scripturae. On the contrary, Is the authority of Scripture. Respondeo dicendum ad primum quod, sicut AuReply Obj. 1: As Augustine observes (Gen ad lit. vi, gustinus dicit in VI super Gen. ad Litt., non in hoc 12), man surpasses other things, not in the fact that God praeeminet homo aliis rebus, quod Deus ipse fecit homi- Himself made man, as though He did not make other nem, quasi alia ipse non fecerit; cum scriptum sit, opera things; since it is written (Ps 101:26), The work of Thy hands manuum tuarum sunt caeli, et alibi, aridam fundaverunt is the heaven, and elsewhere (Ps 94:5), His hands laid down manus eius, sed in hoc quod ad imaginem Dei factus the dry land; but in this, that man is made to God’s image. est homo. Utitur tamen Scriptura in productione homi- Yet in describing man’s production, Scripture uses a special nis speciali modo loquendi, ad ostendendum quod alia way of speaking, to show that other things were made for propter hominem facta sunt. Ea enim quae principaliter man’s sake. For we are accustomed to do with more delibintendimus, cum maiori deliberatione et studio consue- eration and care what we have chiefly in mind. vimus facere. Ad secundum dicendum quod non est intelligenReply Obj. 2: We must not imagine that when God dum Deum angelis dixisse, faciamus hominem; ut qui- said Let us make man, He spoke to the angels, as some were dam perverse intellexerunt. Sed hoc dicitur ad signifi- perverse enough to think. But by these words is signified candum pluralitatem divinarum personarum, quarum the plurality of the Divine Person, Whose image is more imago expressius invenitur in homine. clearly expressed in man. Ad tertium dicendum quod quidam intellexerunt Reply Obj. 3: Some have thought that man’s body was corpus hominis prius tempore formatum, et postmo- formed first in priority of time, and that afterwards the soul dum Deum formato iam corpori animam infudisse. Sed was infused into the formed body. But it is inconsistent with contra rationem perfectionis primae institutionis rerum the perfection of the production of things, that God should est, quod Deus vel corpus sine anima, vel animam si- have made either the body without the soul, or the soul ne corpore fecerit, cum utrumque sit pars humanae na- without the body, since each is a part of human nature. This turae. Et hoc etiam est magis inconveniens de corpore, is especially unfitting as regards the body, for the body dequod dependet ex anima, et non e converso. pends on the soul, and not the soul on the body. Et ideo ad hoc excludendum, quidam posuerunt To remove the difficulty some have said that the words, quod, cum dicitur, formavit Deus hominem, intelligitur God made man, must be understood of the production of productio corporis simul cum anima; quod autem addi- the body with the soul; and that the subsequent words, and tur, et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae, intel- He breathed into his face the breath of life, should be underligitur de spiritu sancto; sicut et dominus insufflavit in stood of the Holy Spirit; as the Lord breathed on His Aposapostolos, dicens, accipite spiritum sanctum, Ioan. XX. tles, saying, Receive ye the Holy Spirit (John 20:22). But this Sed haec expositio, ut dicit Augustinus in libro de Civ. explanation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 24), is exDei, excluditur per verba Scripturae. Nam subditur ad cluded by the very words of Scripture. For we read farther praedicta, et factus est homo in animam viventem, quod on, And man was made a living soul; which words the Aposapostolus, I ad Cor. XV, non ad vitam spiritualem, sed ad tle (1 Cor 15:45) refers not to spiritual life, but to animal life. vitam animalem refert. Per spiraculum ergo vitae intelli- Therefore, by breath of life we must understand the soul, so gitur anima, ut sic quod dicitur, inspiravit in faciem eius that the words, He breathed into his face the breath of life, are spiraculum vitae, sit quasi expositio eius quod praemise- a sort of exposition of what goes before; for the soul is the rat; nam anima est corporis forma. form of the body. Ad quartum dicendum quod, quia operationes viReply Obj. 4: Since vital operations are more clearly tae magis manifestantur in facie hominis, propter sen- seen in man’s face, on account of the senses which are there sus ibi existentes; ideo dicit in faciem hominis inspira- expressed; therefore Scripture says that the breath of life tum esse spiraculum vitae. was breathed into man’s face. Ad quintum dicendum quod, secundum AugustiReply Obj. 5: According to Augustine (Gen ad lit. iv, num, omnia opera sex dierum simul sunt facta. Unde 34), the works of the six days were done all at one time; animam primi hominis, quam ponit simul factam cum wherefore according to him man’s soul, which he holds to angelis, non ponit factam ante sextum diem; sed in ipso have been made with the angels, was not made before the sexto die ponit esse factam et animam primi hominis in sixth day; but on the sixth day both the soul of the first man actu, et corpus eius secundum rationes causales. Alii ve- was made actually, and his body in its causal elements. But ro doctores ponunt et animam et corpus hominis factum other doctors hold that on the sixth day both body and soul sexto die in actu. of man were actually made.

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Question 92 The Production of the Woman Deinde considerandum est de productione mulieris. We must next consider the production of the woman. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum in illa rerum productione debuerit (1) Whether the woman should have been made in that mulier produci. first production of things? Secundo, utrum debuerit fieri de viro. (2) Whether the woman should have been made from man? Tertio, utrum de costa viri. (3) Whether of man’s rib? Quarto, utrum facta fuerit immediate a Deo. (4) Whether the woman was made immediately by God?

Article 1 Whether the woman should have been made in the first production of things? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mulier non debuit produci in prima rerum productione. Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de Generat. Animal., quod femina est mas occasionatus. Sed nihil occasionatum et deficiens debuit esse in prima rerum institutione. Ergo in illa prima rerum institutione mulier producenda non fuit. Praeterea, subiectio et minoratio ex peccato est subsecuta, nam, ad mulierem dictum est post peccatum, Gen. III, sub viri potestate eris; et Gregorius dicit quod, ubi non delinquimus, omnes pares sumus. Sed mulier naturaliter est minoris virtutis et dignitatis quam vir, semper enim honorabilius est agens patiente, ut dicit Augustinus XII super Gen. ad Litt. Ergo non debuit mulier produci in prima rerum productione ante peccatum. Praeterea, occasiones peccatorum sunt amputandae. Sed Deus praescivit quod mulier esset futura viro in occasionem peccati. Ergo non debuit mulierem producere. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, non est bonum hominem esse solum; faciamus ei adiutorium simile sibi. Respondeo dicendum quod necessarium fuit feminam fieri, sicut Scriptura dicit, in adiutorium viri, non quidem in adiutorium alicuius alterius operis, ut quidam dixerunt, cum ad quodlibet aliud opus convenientius iuvari possit vir per alium virum quam per mulierem; sed in adiutorium generationis. Quod manifestius videri potest, si in viventibus modus generationis consideretur. Sunt enim quaedam viventia, quae in seipsis non habent virtutem activam generationis, sed ab agente alterius speciei generantur; sicut plantae et animalia

Objection 1: It would seem that the woman should not have been made in the first production of things. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 3), that the female is a misbegotten male. But nothing misbegotten or defective should have been in the first production of things. Therefore woman should not have been made at that first production. Obj. 2: Further, subjection and limitation were a result of sin, for to the woman was it said after sin (Gen 3:16): Thou shalt be under the man’s power; and Gregory says that, Where there is no sin, there is no inequality. But woman is naturally of less strength and dignity than man; for the agent is always more honorable than the patient, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore woman should not have been made in the first production of things before sin. Obj. 3: Further, occasions of sin should be cut off. But God foresaw that the woman would be an occasion of sin to man. Therefore He should not have made woman. On the contrary, It is written (Gen 2:18): It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself. I answer that, It was necessary for woman to be made, as the Scripture says, as a helper to man; not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works, as some say, since man can be more efficiently helped by another man in other works; but as a helper in the work of generation. This can be made clear if we observe the mode of generation carried out in various living things. Some living things do not possess in themselves the power of generation, but are generated by some other specific agent, such as some plants and animals by the influence of the heavenly bodies, from some fitting

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quae generantur sine semine ex materia convenienti per virtutem activam caelestium corporum. Quaedam vero habent virtutem generationis activam et passivam coniunctam; sicut accidit in plantis quae generantur ex semine. Non enim est in plantis aliquod nobilius opus vitae quam generatio, unde convenienter omni tempore in eis virtuti passivae coniungitur virtus activa generationis. Animalibus vero perfectis competit virtus activa generationis secundum sexum masculinum, virtus vero passiva secundum sexum femininum. Et quia est aliquod opus vitae nobilius in animalibus quam generatio, ad quod eorum vita principaliter ordinatur; ideo non omni tempore sexus masculinus feminino coniungitur in animalibus perfectis, sed solum tempore coitus; ut imaginemur per coitum sic fieri unum ex mare et femina, sicut in planta omni tempore coniunguntur vis masculina et feminina, etsi in quibusdam plus abundet una harum, in quibusdam plus altera. Homo autem adhuc ordinatur ad nobilius opus vitae, quod est intelligere. Et ideo adhuc in homine debuit esse maiori ratione distinctio utriusque virtutis, ut seorsum produceretur femina a mare, et tamen carnaliter coniungerentur in unum ad generationis opus. Et ideo statim post formationem mulieris, dicitur Gen. II, erunt duo in carne una. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per respectum ad naturam particularem, femina est aliquid deficiens et occasionatum. Quia virtus activa quae est in semine maris, intendit producere sibi simile perfectum, secundum masculinum sexum, sed quod femina generetur, hoc est propter virtutis activae debilitatem, vel propter aliquam materiae indispositionem, vel etiam propter aliquam transmutationem ab extrinseco, puta a ventis Australibus, qui sunt humidi, ut dicitur in libro de Generat. Animal. Sed per comparationem ad naturam universalem, femina non est aliquid occasionatum, sed est de intentione naturae ad opus generationis ordinata. Intentio autem naturae universalis dependet ex Deo, qui est universalis auctor naturae. Et ideo instituendo naturam, non solum marem, sed etiam feminam produxit. Ad secundum dicendum quod duplex est subiectio. Una servilis, secundum quam praesidens utitur subiecto ad sui ipsius utilitatem et talis subiectio introducta est post peccatum. Est autem alia subiectio oeconomica vel civilis, secundum quam praesidens utitur subiectis ad eorum utilitatem et bonum. Et ista subiectio fuisset etiam ante peccatum, defuisset enim bonum ordinis in humana multitudine, si quidam per alios sapientiores gubernati non fuissent. Et sic ex tali subiectione naturaliter femina subiecta est viro, quia naturaliter in homine magis abundat discretio rationis. Nec inaequalitas hominum excluditur per innocentiae statum, ut infra dicetur.

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matter and not from seed: others possess the active and passive generative power together; as we see in plants which are generated from seed; for the noblest vital function in plants is generation. Wherefore we observe that in these the active power of generation invariably accompanies the passive power. Among perfect animals the active power of generation belongs to the male sex, and the passive power to the female. And as among animals there is a vital operation nobler than generation, to which their life is principally directed; therefore the male sex is not found in continual union with the female in perfect animals, but only at the time of coition; so that we may consider that by this means the male and female are one, as in plants they are always united; although in some cases one of them preponderates, and in some the other. But man is yet further ordered to a still nobler vital action, and that is intellectual operation. Therefore there was greater reason for the distinction of these two forces in man; so that the female should be produced separately from the male; although they are carnally united for generation. Therefore directly after the formation of woman, it was said: And they shall be two in one flesh (Gen 2:24).

Reply Obj. 1: As regards the individual nature, woman is defective and misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends to the production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex; while the production of woman comes from defect in the active force or from some material indisposition, or even from some external influence; such as that of a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher observes (De Gener. Animal. iv, 2). On the other hand, as regards human nature in general, woman is not misbegotten, but is included in nature’s intention as directed to the work of generation. Now the general intention of nature depends on God, Who is the universal Author of nature. Therefore, in producing nature, God formed not only the male but also the female.

Reply Obj. 2: Subjection is twofold. One is servile, by virtue of which a superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit; and this kind of subjection began after sin. There is another kind of subjection which is called economic or civil, whereby the superior makes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good; and this kind of subjection existed even before sin. For good order would have been wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others wiser than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason predominates. Nor is inequality among men excluded by the state of innocence, as we shall prove (Q. 96, A. 3). Ad tertium dicendum quod, si omnia ex quibus Reply Obj. 3: If God had deprived the world of all homo sumpsit occasionem peccandi, Deus subtraxisset those things which proved an occasion of sin, the universe

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a mundo, remansisset universum imperfectum. Nec debuit bonum commune tolli, ut vitaretur particulare malum, praesertim cum Deus sit adeo potens, ut quodlibet malum possit ordinare in bonum.

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would have been imperfect. Nor was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in order that individual evil might be avoided; especially as God is so powerful that He can direct any evil to a good end.

Article 2 Whether woman should have been made from man? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mulier non debuit fieri ex viro. Sexus enim communis est homini et aliis animalibus. Sed in aliis animalibus feminae non sunt factae ex maribus. Ergo nec in homine fieri debuit. Praeterea, eorum quae sunt eiusdem speciei, eadem est materia. Sed mas et femina sunt eiusdem speciei. Cum igitur vir fuerit factus ex limo terrae, ex eodem debuit fieri femina, et non ex viro. Praeterea, mulier facta est in adiutorium viro ad generationem. Sed nimia propinquitas reddit personam ad hoc ineptam, unde personae propinquae a matrimonio excluduntur, ut patet Levit. XVIII. Ergo mulier non debuit fieri ex viro. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XVII, creavit ex ipso, scilicet viro, adiutorium sibi simile, idest mulierem. Respondeo dicendum quod conveniens fuit mulierem, in prima rerum institutione, ex viro formari, magis quam in aliis animalibus. Primo quidem, ut in hoc quaedam dignitas primo homini servaretur, ut, secundum Dei similitudinem, esset ipse principium totius suae speciei, sicut Deus est principium totius universi. Unde et Paulus dicit, Act. XVII, quod Deus fecit ex uno omne genus hominum. Secundo, ut vir magis diligeret mulierem, et ei inseparabilius inhaereret, dum cognosceret eam ex se esse productam. Unde dicitur Gen. II, de viro sumpta est, quamobrem relinquet homo patrem et matrem, et adhaerebit uxori suae. Et hoc maxime necessarium fuit in specie humana, in qua mas et femina commanent per totam vitam, quod non contingit in aliis animalibus. Tertio quia, ut philosophus dicit in VIII Ethic., mas et femina coniunguntur in hominibus non solum propter necessitatem generationis, ut in aliis animalibus; sed etiam propter domesticam vitam, in qua sunt alia opera viri et feminae, et in qua vir est caput mulieris. Unde convenienter ex viro formata est femina, sicut ex suo principio. Quarto est ratio sacramentalis; figuratur enim per hoc quod Ecclesia a Christo sumit principium. Unde apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. V, sacramentum hoc magnum est, ego autem dico in Christo et in Ecclesia.

Objection 1: It would seem that woman should not have been made from man. For sex belongs both to man and animals. But in the other animals the female was not made from the male. Therefore neither should it have been so with man. Obj. 2: Further, things of the same species are of the same matter. But male and female are of the same species. Therefore, as man was made of the slime of the earth, so woman should have been made of the same, and not from man. Obj. 3: Further, woman was made to be a helpmate to man in the work of generation. But close relationship makes a person unfit for that office; hence near relations are debarred from intermarriage, as is written (Lev 18:6). Therefore woman should not have been made from man. On the contrary, It is written (Sir 17:5): He created of him, that is, out of man, a helpmate like to himself, that is, woman. I answer that, When all things were first formed, it was more suitable for the woman to be made from man than (for the female to be from the male) in other animals. First, in order thus to give the first man a certain dignity consisting in this, that as God is the principle of the whole universe, so the first man, in likeness to God, was the principle of the whole human race. Wherefore Paul says that God made the whole human race from one (Acts 17:26). Second, that man might love woman all the more, and cleave to her more closely, knowing her to be fashioned from himself. Hence it is written (Gen 2:23, 24): She was taken out of man, wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife. This was most necessary as regards the human race, in which the male and female live together for life; which is not the case with other animals. Third, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12), the human male and female are united, not only for generation, as with other animals, but also for the purpose of domestic life, in which each has his or her particular duty, and in which the man is the head of the woman. Wherefore it was suitable for the woman to be made out of man, as out of her principle. Fourth, there is a sacramental reason for this. For by this is signified that the Church takes her origin from Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says (Eph 5:32): This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church.

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Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. Ad secundum dicendum quod materia est ex qua aliquid fit. Natura autem creata habet determinatum principium; et, cum sit determinata ad unum, etiam habet determinatum processum, unde ex determinata materia producit aliquid in determinata specie. Sed virtus divina, cum sit infinita, potest idem secundum speciem ex quacumque materia facere; sicut virum ex limo terrae, et mulierem ex viro. Ad tertium dicendum quod ex naturali generatione contrahitur quaedam propinquitas quae matrimonium impedit. Sed mulier non est producta a viro per naturalem generationem, sed sola virtute divina, unde Eva non dicitur filia Adae. Et propter hoc, ratio non sequitur.

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Reply Obj. 1 is clear from the foregoing. Reply Obj. 2: Matter is that from which something is made. Now created nature has a determinate principle; and since it is determined to one thing, it has also a determinate mode of proceeding. Wherefore from determinate matter it produces something in a determinate species. On the other hand, the Divine Power, being infinite, can produce things of the same species out of any matter, such as a man from the slime of the earth, and a woman from out of man. Reply Obj. 3: A certain affinity arises from natural generation, and this is an impediment to matrimony. Woman, however, was not produced from man by natural generation, but by the Divine Power alone. Wherefore Eve is not called the daughter of Adam; and so this argument does not prove.

Article 3 Whether the woman was fittingly made from the rib of man? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod mulier non debuerit formari de costa viri. Costa enim viri fuit multo minor quam corpus mulieris. Sed ex minori non potest fieri maius, nisi vel per additionem, quod si fuisset, magis ex illo addito mulier formata diceretur quam de costa; vel etiam per rarefactionem, quia, ut dicit Augustinus, super Gen. ad Litt., non est possibile ut aliquod corpus crescat, nisi rarescat. Non autem invenitur corpus mulieris rarius quam viri, ad minus in ea proportione quam habet costa ad corpus Evae. Ergo Eva non fuit formata de costa Adae. Praeterea, in operibus primo creatis non fuit aliquid superfluum. Costa ergo Adae fuit de perfectione corporis eius. Ergo, ea subtracta, remansit imperfectum. Quod videtur inconveniens. Praeterea, costa non potest separari ab homine sine dolore. Sed dolor non fuit ante peccatum. Ergo costa non debuit separari a viro, ut ex ea mulier formaretur. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, aedificavit dominus Deus costam quam tulerat de Adam, in mulierem. Respondeo dicendum quod conveniens fuit mulierem formari de costa viri. Primo quidem, ad significandum quod inter virum et mulierem debet esse socialis coniunctio. Neque enim mulier debet dominari in virum, et ideo non est formata de capite. Neque debet a viro despici, tanquam serviliter subiecta, et ideo non est formata de pedibus. Secundo, propter sacramentum, quia de latere Christi dormientis in cruce fluxerunt sacramenta, idest sanguis et aqua, quibus est Ecclesia instituta.

Objection 1: It would seem that the woman should not have been formed from the rib of man. For the rib was much smaller than the woman’s body. Now from a smaller thing a larger thing can be made only—either by addition (and then the woman ought to have been described as made out of that which was added, rather than out of the rib itself)—or by rarefaction, because, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. x): A body cannot increase in bulk except by rarefaction. But the woman’s body is not more rarefied than man’s—at least, not in the proportion of a rib to Eve’s body. Therefore Eve was not formed from a rib of Adam. Obj. 2: Further, in those things which were first created there was nothing superfluous. Therefore a rib of Adam belonged to the integrity of his body. So, if a rib was removed, his body remained imperfect; which is unreasonable to suppose. Obj. 3: Further, a rib cannot be removed from man without pain. But there was no pain before sin. Therefore it was not right for a rib to be taken from the man, that Eve might be made from it. On the contrary, It is written (Gen 2:22): God built the rib, which He took from Adam, into a woman. I answer that, It was right for the woman to be made from a rib of man. First, to signify the social union of man and woman, for the woman should neither use authority over man, and so she was not made from his head; nor was it right for her to be subject to man’s contempt as his slave, and so she was not made from his feet. Second, for the sacramental signification; for from the side of Christ sleeping on the Cross the Sacraments flowed—namely, blood and water—on which the Church was established.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quidam dicunt per multiplicationem materiae absque alterius additione, formatum fuisse corpus mulieris; ad modum quo dominus quinque panes multiplicavit. Sed hoc est omnino impossibile. Multiplicatio enim praedicta aut accidit secundum transmutationem substantiae ipsius materiae; aut secundum transmutationem dimensionum eius. Non autem secundum transmutationem substantiae ipsius materiae, tum quia materia in se considerata, est omnino intransmutabilis, utpote existens in potentia, et habens solum rationem subiecti; tum etiam quia multitudo et magnitudo sunt praeter essentiam ipsius materiae. Et ideo nullo modo potest multiplicatio materiae intelligi, eadem materia manente absque additione, nisi per hoc quod maiores dimensiones accipiat. Hoc autem est rarefieri, scilicet materiam eandem accipere maiores dimensiones, ut philosophus dicit in IV Physic. Dicere ergo materiam multiplicari absque rarefactione, est ponere contradictoria simul, scilicet definitionem absque definito. Unde, cum non appareat rarefactio in talibus multiplicationibus, necesse est ponere additionem materiae, vel per creationem; vel, quod probabilius est, per conversionem. Unde Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., quod hoc modo Christus ex quinque panibus satiavit quinque millia hominum, quomodo ex paucis granis producit multitudinem segetum; quod fit per conversionem alimenti. Dicitur tamen vel ex quinque panibus turbas pavisse, vel ex costa mulierem formasse, quia additio facta est ad materiam praeexistentem costae vel panum. Ad secundum dicendum quod costa illa fuit de perfectione Adae, non prout erat individuum quoddam, sed prout erat principium speciei, sicut semen est de perfectione generantis, quod operatione naturali cum delectatione resolvitur. Unde multo magis virtute divina corpus mulieris potuit de costa viri formari absque dolore. Et per hoc patet solutio ad tertium.

Q. 92, A. 4

Reply Obj. 1: Some say that the woman’s body was formed by a material increase, without anything being added; in the same way as our Lord multiplied the five loaves. But this is quite impossible. For such an increase of matter would either be by a change of the very substance of the matter itself, or by a change of its dimensions. Not by change of the substance of the matter, both because matter, considered in itself, is quite unchangeable, since it has a potential existence, and has nothing but the nature of a subject, and because quantity and size are extraneous to the essence of matter itself. Wherefore multiplication of matter is quite unintelligible, as long as the matter itself remains the same without anything added to it; unless it receives greater dimensions. This implies rarefaction, which is for the same matter to receive greater dimensions, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv). To say, therefore, that the same matter is enlarged, without being rarefied, is to combine contradictories—viz. the definition with the absence of the thing defined. Wherefore, as no rarefaction is apparent in such multiplication of matter, we must admit an addition of matter: either by creation, or which is more probable, by conversion. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in Joan.) that Christ filled five thousand men with five loaves, in the same way as from a few seeds He produces the harvest of corn—that is, by transformation of the nourishment. Nevertheless, we say that the crowds were fed with five loaves, or that woman was made from the rib, because an addition was made to the already existing matter of the loaves and of the rib. Reply Obj. 2: The rib belonged to the integral perfection of Adam, not as an individual, but as the principle of the human race; just as the semen belongs to the perfection of the begetter, and is released by a natural and pleasurable operation. Much more, therefore, was it possible that by the Divine power the body of the woman should be produced from the man’s rib. From this it is clear how to answer the third objection.

Article 4 Whether the woman was formed immediately by God? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mulier non fuerit immediate formata a Deo. Nullum enim individuum ex simili secundum speciem productum, fit immediate a Deo. Sed mulier facta est de viro, qui est eiusdem speciei cum ipsa. Ergo non est facta immediate a Deo. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod corporalia dispensantur a Deo per angelos. Sed corpus mu-

Objection 1: It would seem that the woman was not formed immediately by God. For no individual is produced immediately by God from another individual alike in species. But the woman was made from a man who is of the same species. Therefore she was not made immediately by God. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) says that corporeal things are governed by God through the angels.

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lieris ex materia corporali est formatum. Ergo est factum But the woman’s body was formed from corporeal matter. per ministerium angelorum, et non immediate a Deo. Therefore it was made through the ministry of the angels, and not immediately by God. Praeterea, ea quae praeextiterunt in creaturis seObj. 3: Further, those things which pre-exist in creacundum rationes causales, producuntur virtute alicuius tures as to their causal virtues are produced by the power creaturae, et non immediate a Deo. Sed secundum cau- of some creature, and not immediately by God. But the sales rationes corpus mulieris in primis operibus pro- woman’s body was produced in its causal virtues among the ductum fuit, ut Augustinus dicit IX super Gen. ad Litt. first created works, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. ix, 15). Ergo non fuit producta mulier immediate a Deo. Therefore it was not produced immediately by God. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in eodem liOn the contrary, Augustine says, in the same work: bro, formare vel aedificare costam ut mulier esset, non po- God alone, to Whom all nature owes its existence, could form tuit nisi Deus, a quo universa natura subsistit. or build up the woman from the man’s rib. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, I answer that, As was said above (A. 2, ad 2), the uniuscuiusque speciei generatio naturalis est ex determi- natural generation of every species is from some determinata materia. Materia autem ex qua naturaliter genera- nate matter. Now the matter whence man is naturally betur homo, est semen humanum viri vel feminae. Unde gotten is the human semen of man or woman. Wherefore ex alia quacumque materia individuum humanae speciei from any other matter an individual of the human species generari non potest naturaliter. Solus autem Deus, qui cannot naturally be generated. Now God alone, the Author est naturae institutor, potest praeter naturae ordinem res of nature, can produce an effect into existence outside the in esse producere. Et ideo solus Deus potuit vel virum de ordinary course of nature. Therefore God alone could prolimo terrae, vel mulierem de costa viri formare. duce either a man from the slime of the earth, or a woman from the rib of man. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit, Reply Obj. 1: This argument is verified when an indiquando individuum generatur ex simili secundum spe- vidual is begotten, by natural generation, from that which ciem, generatione naturali. is like it in the same species. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Gen ad lit. ix, 15), we dicit IX super Gen. ad Litt., an ministerium angeli exhi- do not know whether the angels were employed by God in buerint Deo in formatione mulieris, nescimus, certum the formation of the woman; but it is certain that, as the tamen est quod, sicut corpus viri de limo non fuit for- body of man was not formed by the angels from the slime matum per angelos, ita nec corpus mulieris de costa viri. of the earth, so neither was the body of the woman formed by them from the man’s rib. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus in Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Gen ad lit. ix, 18): The eodem libro dicit, non habuit prima rerum conditio ut fe- first creation of things did not demand that woman should be mina omnino sic fieret; sed tantum hoc habuit, ut sic fie- made thus; it made it possible for her to be thus made. Thereri posset. Et ideo secundum causales rationes praeexti- fore the body of the woman did indeed pre-exist in these tit corpus mulieris in primis operibus, non secundum causal virtues, in the things first created; not as regards acpotentiam activam, sed secundum potentiam passivam tive potentiality, but as regards a potentiality passive in retantum, in ordine ad potentiam activam creatoris. lation to the active potentiality of the Creator.

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Question 93 The End or Term of the Production of Man, As to the Image and Likeness of God Deinde considerandum est de fine sive termino proWe now treat of the end or term of man’s production, ductionis hominis, prout dicitur factus ad imaginem et inasmuch as he is said to be made to the image and likeness similitudinem Dei. Et circa hoc quaeruntur novem. of God. There are under this head nine points of inquiry: Primo, utrum in homine sit imago Dei. (1) Whether the image of God is in man? Secundo, utrum imago Dei sit in irrationalibus (2) Whether the image of God is in irrational creaturis. creatures? Tertio, utrum imago Dei sit magis in angelo quam in (3) Whether the image of God is in the angels more homine. than in man? Quarto, utrum imago Dei sit in omni homine. (4) Whether the image of God is in every man? Quinto, utrum in homine sit imago Dei per (5) Whether the image of God is in man by comparationem ad essentiam, vel ad personas comparison with the Essence, or with all the Divine divinas omnes, aut unam earum. Persons, or with one of them? Sexto, utrum imago Dei inveniatur in homine solum (6) Whether the image of God is in man, as to his mind secundum mentem. only? Septimo, utrum imago Dei sit in homine secundum (7) Whether the image of God is in man’s power or in potentias, aut secundum habitus, aut actus. his habits and acts? Octavo, utrum per comparationem ad omnia (8) Whether the image of God is in man by obiecta. comparison with every object? Nono, de differentia imaginis et similitudinis. (9) Of the difference between image and likeness.

Article 1 Whether the image of God is in man? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non sit in homine. Dicitur enim Isaiae XL, cui similem fecistis Deum; aut quam imaginem ponetis ei? Praeterea, esse Dei imaginem est proprium primogeniti, de quo dicit apostolus, ad Colos. I, qui est imago Dei invisibilis, primogenitus omnis creaturae. Non ergo in homine invenitur Dei imago. Praeterea, Hilarius dicit, in libro de Synod., quod imago est eius rei ad quam imaginatur, species indifferens; et iterum dicit quod imago est rei ad rem coaequandam indiscreta et unita similitudo. Sed non est species indifferens Dei et hominis; nec potest esse aequalitas hominis ad Deum. Ergo in homine non potest esse imago Dei. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro Octoginta trium Quaest., ubi est imago, continuo est et similitudo; sed ubi est similitudo, non continuo est

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not in man. For it is written (Isa 40:18): To whom have you likened God? or what image will you make for Him? Obj. 2: Further, to be the image of God is the property of the First-Begotten, of Whom the Apostle says (Col 1:15): Who is the image of the invisible God, the First-Born of every creature. Therefore the image of God is not to be found in man. Obj. 3: Further, Hilary says (De Synod. Synod. Ancyr.) that an image is of the same species as that which it represents; and he also says that an image is the undivided and united likeness of one thing adequately representing another. But there is no species common to both God and man; nor can there be a comparison of equality between God and man. Therefore there can be no image of God in man. On the contrary, It is written (Gen 1:26): Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness. I answer that, As Augustine says (83 Questions, Q. 74): Where an image exists, there forthwith is likeness; but where there is likeness, there is not necessarily an image.

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imago. Ex quo patet quod similitudo est de ratione imaginis, et quod imago aliquid addit supra rationem similitudinis, scilicet quod sit ex alio expressum, imago enim dicitur ex eo quod agitur ad imitationem alterius. Unde ovum, quantumcumque sit alteri ovo simile et aequale, quia tamen non est expressum ex illo, non dicitur imago eius. Aequalitas autem non est de ratione imaginis, quia, ut Augustinus ibidem dicit, ubi est imago, non continuo est aequalitas; ut patet in imagine alicuius in speculo relucente. Est tamen de ratione perfectae imaginis, nam in perfecta imagine non deest aliquid imagini, quod insit illi de quo expressa est. Manifestum est autem quod in homine invenitur aliqua Dei similitudo, quae deducitur a Deo sicut ab exemplari, non tamen est similitudo secundum aequalitatem, quia in infinitum excedit exemplar hoc tale exemplatum. Et ideo in homine dicitur esse imago Dei, non tamen perfecta, sed imperfecta. Et hoc significat Scriptura, cum dicit hominem factum ad imaginem Dei, praepositio enim ad accessum quendam significat, qui competit rei distanti. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod propheta loquitur de corporalibus imaginibus ab homine fabricatis, et ideo signanter dicit, quam imaginem ponetis ei? Sed Deus ipse sibi in homine posuit spiritualem imaginem. Ad secundum dicendum quod primogenitus omnis creaturae est imago Dei perfecta, perfecte implens illud cuius imago est, et ideo dicitur imago, et nunquam ad imaginem. Homo vero et propter similitudinem dicitur imago; et propter imperfectionem similitudinis, dicitur ad imaginem. Et quia similitudo perfecta Dei non potest esse nisi in identitate naturae, imago Dei est in filio suo primogenito sicut imago regis in filio sibi connaturali; in homine autem sicut in aliena natura, sicut imago regis in nummo argenteo; ut patet per Augustinum in libro de Decem Chordis.

Hence it is clear that likeness is essential to an image; and that an image adds something to likeness—namely, that it is copied from something else. For an image is so called because it is produced as an imitation of something else; wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like and equal to another egg, is not called an image of the other egg, because it is not copied from it. But equality does not belong to the essence of an image; for as Augustine says (83 Questions, Q. 74): Where there is an image there is not necessarily equality, as we see in a person’s image reflected in a glass. Yet this is of the essence of a perfect image; for in a perfect image nothing is wanting that is to be found in that of which it is a copy. Now it is manifest that in man there is some likeness to God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not one of equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy. Therefore there is in man a likeness to God; not, indeed, a perfect likeness, but imperfect. And Scripture implies the same when it says that man was made to God’s likeness; for the preposition to signifies a certain approach, as of something at a distance. Reply Obj. 1: The Prophet speaks of bodily images made by man. Therefore he says pointedly: What image will you make for Him? But God made a spiritual image to Himself in man. Reply Obj. 2: The First-Born of creatures is the perfect Image of God, reflecting perfectly that of which He is the Image, and so He is said to be the Image, and never to the image. But man is said to be both image by reason of the likeness; and to the image by reason of the imperfect likeness. And since the perfect likeness to God cannot be except in an identical nature, the Image of God exists in His first-born Son; as the image of the king is in his son, who is of the same nature as himself: whereas it exists in man as in an alien nature, as the image of the king is in a silver coin, as Augustine explains in De Decem Chordis (Serm. ix, al, xcvi, De Tempore). Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum unum sit ens inReply Obj. 3: As unity means absence of division, a divisum, eo modo dicitur species indifferens, quo una. species is said to be the same as far as it is one. Now a thing Unum autem dicitur aliquid non solum numero aut spe- is said to be one not only numerically, specifically, or genercie aut genere, sed etiam secundum analogiam vel pro- ically, but also according to a certain analogy or proportion. portionem quandam, et sic est unitas vel convenientia In this sense a creature is one with God, or like to Him; but creaturae ad Deum. Quod autem dicit rei ad rem coae- when Hilary says of a thing which adequately represents anquandam, pertinet ad rationem perfectae imaginis. other, this is to be understood of a perfect image.

Article 2 Whether the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is imago Dei inveniatur in irrationalibus creaturis. Dicit to be found in irrational creatures. For Dionysius says (Div. enim Dionysius, in libro de Div. Nom., habent causata Nom. ii): Effects are contingent images of their causes. But

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End or Term of the Production of Man, As to the Image and Likeness of God Q. 93, A. 2

causarum suarum contingentes imagines. Sed Deus est causa non solum rationalium creaturarum, sed etiam irrationalium. Ergo imago Dei invenitur in irrationalibus creaturis. Praeterea, quanto est expressior similitudo in aliquo, tanto magis accedit ad rationem imaginis. Sed Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod radius solaris maxime habet similitudinem divinae bonitatis. Ergo est ad imaginem Dei. Praeterea, quanto aliquid est magis perfectum in bonitate, tanto magis est Deo simile. Sed totum universum est perfectius in bonitate quam homo, quia etsi bona sint singula, tamen simul omnia dicuntur valde bona, Gen. I. Ergo totum universum est ad imaginem Dei, et non solum homo. Praeterea, Boetius in libro de Consol., dicit de Deo, Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans. Ergo totus mundus est ad imaginem Dei, et non solum rationalis creatura. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, VI super Gen. ad Litt., Hoc excellit in homine, quia Deus ad imaginem suam hominem fecit, propter hoc quod dedit ei mentem intellectualem, qua praestat pecoribus. Ea ergo quae non habent intellectum, non sunt ad imaginem Dei. Respondeo dicendum quod non quaelibet similitudo, etiam si sit expressa ex altero, sufficit ad rationem imaginis. Si enim similitudo sit secundum genus tantum, vel secundum aliquod accidens commune, non propter hoc dicetur aliquid esse ad imaginem alterius, non enim posset dici quod vermis qui oritur ex homine, sit imago hominis propter similitudinem generis; neque iterum potest dici quod, si aliquid fiat album ad similitudinem alterius, quod propter hoc sit ad eius imaginem, quia album est accidens commune pluribus speciebus. Requiritur autem ad rationem imaginis quod sit similitudo secundum speciem, sicut imago regis est in filio suo, vel ad minus secundum aliquod accidens proprium speciei, et praecipue secundum figuram, sicut hominis imago dicitur esse in cupro. Unde signanter Hilarius dicit quod imago est species indifferens. Manifestum est autem quod similitudo speciei attenditur secundum ultimam differentiam. Assimilantur autem aliqua Deo, primo quidem, et maxime communiter, inquantum sunt; secundo vero, inquantum vivunt; tertio vero, inquantum sapiunt vel intelligunt. Quae, ut Augustinus dicit in libro Octoginta trium Quaest., ita sunt Deo similitudine proxima, ut in creaturis nihil sit propinquius. Sic ergo patet quod solae intellectuales creaturae, proprie loquendo, sunt ad imaginem Dei. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omne imperfectum est quaedam participatio perfecti. Et ideo etiam ea quae deficiunt a ratione imaginis, inquantum tamen aliqualem Dei similitudinem habent, participant aliquid de ratione imaginis. Et ideo Dionysius dicit quod causata

God is the cause not only of rational, but also of irrational creatures. Therefore the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures. Obj. 2: Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the solar ray has a very great similitude to the Divine goodness. Therefore it is made to the image of God. Obj. 3: Further, the more perfect anything is in goodness, the more it is like God. But the whole universe is more perfect in goodness than man; for though each individual thing is good, all things together are called very good (Gen 1:31). Therefore the whole universe is to the image of God, and not only man. Obj. 4: Further, Boethius (De Consol. iii) says of God: Holding the world in His mind, and forming it into His image. Therefore the whole world is to the image of God, and not only the rational creature. On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. vi, 12): Man’s excellence consists in the fact that God made him to His own image by giving him an intellectual soul, which raises him above the beasts of the field. Therefore things without intellect are not made to God’s image. I answer that, Not every likeness, not even what is copied from something else, is sufficient to make an image; for if the likeness be only generic, or existing by virtue of some common accident, this does not suffice for one thing to be the image of another. For instance, a worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called man’s image, merely because of the generic likeness. Nor, if anything is made white like something else, can we say that it is the image of that thing; for whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. But the nature of an image requires likeness in species; thus the image of the king exists in his son: or, at least, in some specific accident, and chiefly in the shape; thus, we speak of a man’s image in copper. Whence Hilary says pointedly that an image is of the same species.

Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate difference. But some things are like to God first and most commonly because they exist; second, because they live; and third because they know or understand; and these last, as Augustine says (83 Questions, Q. 51) approach so near to God in likeness, that among all creatures nothing comes nearer to Him. It is clear, therefore, that intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God’s image. Reply Obj. 1: Everything imperfect is a participation of what is perfect. Therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image, so far as it possesses any sort of likeness to God, participates in some degree the nature of an image. So Dionysius says that effects are contingent images of their

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habent causarum contingentes imagines, idest quantum contingit ea habere, et non simpliciter. Ad secundum dicendum quod Dionysius assimilat radium solarem divinae bonitati quantum ad causalitatem; non secundum dignitatem naturae, quae requiritur ad rationem imaginis. Ad tertium dicendum quod universum est perfectius in bonitate quam intellectualis creatura extensive et diffusive. Sed intensive et collective similitudo divinae perfectionis magis invenitur in intellectuali creatura, quae est capax summi boni. Vel dicendum quod pars non dividitur contra totum, sed contra aliam partem. Unde cum dicitur quod sola natura intellectualis est ad imaginem Dei, non excluditur quin universum, secundum aliquam sui partem, sit ad imaginem Dei; sed excluduntur aliae partes universi. Ad quartum dicendum quod imago accipitur a Boetio secundum rationem similitudinis qua artificiatum imitatur speciem artis quae est in mente artificis, sic autem quaelibet creatura est imago rationis exemplaris quam habet in mente divina. Sic autem non loquimur nunc de imagine, sed secundum quod attenditur secundum similitudinem in natura; prout scilicet primo enti assimilantur omnia, inquantum sunt entia; et primae vitae inquantum sunt viventia; et summae sapientiae, inquantum sunt intelligentia.

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causes; that is, as much as they happen (contingit) to be so, but not absolutely. Reply Obj. 2: Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine goodness, as regards its causality; not as regards its natural dignity which is involved in the idea of an image. Reply Obj. 3: The universe is more perfect in goodness than the intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but intensively and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is found rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for the highest good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly divided against the whole, but only against another part. Wherefore, when we say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of God, we do not mean that the universe in any part is not to God’s image, but that the other parts are excluded. Reply Obj. 4: Boethius here uses the word image to express the likeness which the product of an art bears to the artistic species in the mind of the artist. Thus every creature is an image of the exemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. We are not, however, using the word image in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in nature, that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are like to the First Being; as living, like to the First Life; and as intelligent, like to the Supreme Wisdom.

Article 3 Whether the angels are more to the image of God than man is? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus non sit magis ad imaginem Dei quam homo. Dicit enim Augustinus, in sermone de Imagine, quod Deus nulli alii creaturae dedit quod sit ad imaginem suam, nisi homini. Non ergo verum est quod angelus magis dicatur ad imaginem Dei quam homo. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, in libro Octoginta trium Quaest., homo ita est ad imaginem Dei, ut, nulla interposita creatura, formetur a Deo. Et ideo nihil est illi coniunctius. Sed imago Dei dicitur aliqua creatura, inquantum Deo coniungitur. Ergo angelus non est magis ad imaginem Dei quam homo. Praeterea, creatura dicitur ad imaginem Dei, inquantum est intellectualis naturae. Sed intellectualis natura non intenditur nec remittitur, non enim est de genere accidentis, cum sit in genere substantiae. Ergo angelus non est magis ad imaginem Dei quam homo. Sed contra est quod dicit Gregorius, in quadam Homilia, quod angelus dicitur signaculum similitudinis, quia in eo similitudo divinae imaginis magis insinuatur expressa.

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not more to the image of God than man is. For Augustine says in a sermon de Imagine xliii (de verbis Apost. xxvii) that God granted to no other creature besides man to be to His image. Therefore it is not true to say that the angels are more than man to the image of God. Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (83 Questions, Q. 51), man is so much to God’s image that God did not make any creature to be between Him and man: and therefore nothing is more akin to Him. But a creature is called God’s image so far as it is akin to God. Therefore the angels are not more to the image of God than man. Obj. 3: Further, a creature is said to be to God’s image so far as it is of an intellectual nature. But the intellectual nature does not admit of intensity or remissness; for it is not an accidental thing, since it is a substance. Therefore the angels are not more to the image of God than man. On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv): The angel is called a ‘seal of resemblance’ (Ezek 28:12) because in him the resemblance of the Divine image is wrought with greater expression.

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Respondeo dicendum quod de imagine Dei loqui dupliciter possumus. Uno modo, quantum ad id in quo primo consideratur ratio imaginis, quod est intellectualis natura. Et sic imago Dei est magis in angelis quam sit in hominibus, quia intellectualis natura perfectior est in eis, ut ex supra dictis patet. Secundo potest considerari imago Dei in homine, quantum ad id in quo secundario consideratur, prout scilicet in homine invenitur quaedam Dei imitatio, inquantum scilicet homo est de homine, sicut Deus de Deo; et inquantum anima hominis est tota in toto corpore eius, et iterum tota in qualibet parte ipsius, sicut Deus se habet ad mundum. Et secundum haec et similia, magis invenitur Dei imago in homine quam in angelo. Sed quantum ad hoc non attenditur per se ratio divinae imaginis in homine, nisi praesupposita prima imitatione, quae est secundum intellectualem naturam, alioquin etiam animalia bruta essent ad imaginem Dei. Et ideo, cum quantum ad intellectualem naturam angelus sit magis ad imaginem Dei quam homo, simpliciter concedendum est angelum magis esse ad imaginem Dei; hominem autem secundum quid. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus excludit a Dei imagine alias inferiores creaturas intellectu carentes, non autem angelos. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut ignis dicitur esse subtilissimum corporum secundum suam speciem, cum tamen unus ignis sit alio subtilior; ita dicitur quod nihil est coniunctius Deo quam mens humana, secundum genus intellectualis naturae; quia, sicut ipse supra praemiserat, quae sapiunt, ita sunt illi similitudine proxima, ut in creaturis nihil sit propinquius. Unde per hoc non excluditur quin angelus sit magis ad Dei imaginem. Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod substantia non recipit magis et minus, non intelligitur quod una species substantiae non sit perfectior quam alia, sed quod unum et idem individuum non participet suam speciem quandoque magis, quandoque minus. Nec etiam a diversis individuis participatur species substantiae secundum magis et minus.

I answer that, We may speak of God’s image in two ways. First, we may consider in it that in which the image chiefly consists, that is, the intellectual nature. Thus the image of God is more perfect in the angels than in man, because their intellectual nature is more perfect, as is clear from what has been said (Q. 58, A. 3; Q. 79, A. 8). Second, we may consider the image of God in man as regards its accidental qualities, so far as to observe in man a certain imitation of God, consisting in the fact that man proceeds from man, as God from God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body, and again, in every part, as God is in regard to the whole world. In these and the like things the image of God is more perfect in man than it is in the angels. But these do not of themselves belong to the nature of the Divine image in man, unless we presuppose the first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature; otherwise even brute animals would be to God’s image. Therefore, as in their intellectual nature, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, we must grant that, absolutely speaking, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, but that in some respects man is more like to God. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine excludes the inferior creatures bereft of reason from the image of God; but not the angels. Reply Obj. 2: As fire is said to be specifically the most subtle of bodies, while, nevertheless, one kind of fire is more subtle than another; so we say that nothing is more like to God than the human soul in its generic and intellectual nature, because as Augustine had said previously, things which have knowledge, are so near to Him in likeness that of all creatures none are nearer. Wherefore this does not mean that the angels are not more to God’s image. Reply Obj. 3: When we say that substance does not admit of more or less, we do not mean that one species of substance is not more perfect than another; but that one and the same individual does not participate in its specific nature at one time more than at another; nor do we mean that a species of substance is shared among different individuals in a greater or lesser degree.

Article 4 Whether the image of God is found in every man? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non inveniatur in quolibet homine. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XI, quod vir est imago Dei, mulier autem est imago viri. Cum ergo mulier sit individuum humanae speciei, non cuilibet individuo convenit esse imaginem Dei. Praeterea, apostolus dicit, Rom. VIII, quod illos quos Deus praescivit conformes fieri imagini filii sui, hos

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not found in every man. For the Apostle says that man is the image of God, but woman is the image of man (1 Cor 11:7). Therefore, as woman is an individual of the human species, it is clear that every individual is not an image of God. Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom 8:29): Whom God foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable

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praedestinavit. Sed non omnes homines praedestinati sunt. Ergo non omnes homines habent conformitatem imaginis. Praeterea, similitudo est de ratione imaginis, ut supra dictum est. Sed per peccatum fit homo Deo dissimilis. Ergo amittit Dei imaginem. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo XXXVIII, veruntamen in imagine pertransit homo. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum homo secundum intellectualem naturam ad imaginem Dei esse dicatur, secundum hoc est maxime ad imaginem Dei, secundum quod intellectualis natura Deum maxime imitari potest. Imitatur autem intellectualis natura maxime Deum quantum ad hoc, quod Deus seipsum intelligit et amat. Unde imago Dei tripliciter potest considerari in homine. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo habet aptitudinem naturalem ad intelligendum et amandum Deum, et haec aptitudo consistit in ipsa natura mentis, quae est communis omnibus hominibus. Alio modo, secundum quod homo actu vel habitu Deum cognoscit et amat, sed tamen imperfecte, et haec est imago per conformitatem gratiae. Tertio modo, secundum quod homo Deum actu cognoscit et amat perfecte, et sic attenditur imago secundum similitudinem gloriae. Unde super illud Psalmi IV, signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine, Glossa distinguit triplicem imaginem, scilicet creationis, recreationis et similitudinis. Prima ergo imago invenitur in omnibus hominibus; secunda in iustis tantum; tertia vero solum in beatis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod tam in viro quam in muliere invenitur Dei imago quantum ad id in quo principaliter ratio imaginis consistit, scilicet quantum ad intellectualem naturam. Unde Gen. I, cum dixisset, ad imaginem Dei creavit illum, scilicet hominem, subdidit, masculum et feminam creavit eos, et dixit pluraliter eos, ut Augustinus dicit, ne intelligatur in uno individuo uterque sexus fuisse coniunctus. Sed quantum ad aliquid secundario imago Dei invenitur in viro, secundum quod non invenitur in muliere, nam vir est principium mulieris et finis, sicut Deus est principium et finis totius creaturae. Unde cum apostolus dixisset quod vir imago et gloria est Dei, mulier autem est gloria viri; ostendit quare hoc dixerit, subdens, non enim vir est ex muliere, sed mulier ex viro; et vir non est creatus propter mulierem, sed mulier propter virum. Ad secundum et tertium dicendum quod illae rationes procedunt de imagine quae est secundum conformitatem gratiae et gloriae.

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to the image of His Son. But all men are not predestined. Therefore all men have not the conformity of image. Obj. 3: Further, likeness belongs to the nature of the image, as above explained (A. 1). But by sin man becomes unlike God. Therefore he loses the image of God. On the contrary, It is written (Ps 38:7): Surely man passeth as an image. I answer that, Since man is said to be the image of God by reason of his intellectual nature, he is the most perfectly like God according to that in which he can best imitate God in his intellectual nature. Now the intellectual nature imitates God chiefly in this, that God understands and loves Himself. Wherefore we see that the image of God is in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men. Second, inasmuch as man actually and habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in the conformity of grace. Third, inasmuch as man knows and loves God perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of glory. Wherefore on the words, The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us (Ps 4:7), the gloss distinguishes a threefold image of creation, of re-creation, and of likeness. The first is found in all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the blessed.

Reply Obj. 1: The image of God, in its principal signification, namely the intellectual nature, is found both in man and in woman. Hence after the words, To the image of God He created him, it is added, Male and female He created them (Gen 1:27). Moreover it is said them in the plural, as Augustine (Gen ad lit. iii, 22) remarks, lest it should be thought that both sexes were united in one individual. But in a secondary sense the image of God is found in man, and not in woman: for man is the beginning and end of woman; as God is the beginning and end of every creature. So when the Apostle had said that man is the image and glory of God, but woman is the glory of man, he adds his reason for saying this: For man is not of woman, but woman of man; and man was not created for woman, but woman for man.

Reply Obj. 2 and 3: These reasons refer to the image consisting in the conformity of grace and glory.

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End or Term of the Production of Man, As to the Image and Likeness of God Q. 93, A. 5

Article 5 Whether the image of God is in man according to the Trinity of Persons? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in homine non sit imago Dei quantum ad Trinitatem divinarum personarum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Fide ad Petrum, una est sanctae Trinitatis essentialiter divinitas, et imago ad quam factus est homo. Et Hilarius, in V de Trin., dicit quod homo fit ad communem Trinitatis imaginem. Est ergo in homine imago Dei quantum ad essentiam, et non quantum ad Trinitatem personarum. Praeterea, in libro de Eccles. Dogmat. dicitur quod imago Dei attenditur in homine secundum aeternitatem. Damascenus etiam dicit quod hominem esse ad imaginem Dei, significat intellectuale, et arbitrio liberum, et per se potestativum. Gregorius etiam Nyssenus dicit quod, cum Scriptura dixit hominem factum ad imaginem Dei, aequale est ac si diceret humanam naturam omnis boni factam esse participem; bonitatis enim plenitudo divinitas est. Haec autem omnia non pertinent ad distinctionem personarum, sed magis ad essentiae unitatem. Ergo in homine est imago Dei, non secundum Trinitatem personarum, sed secundum essentiae unitatem. Praeterea, imago ducit in cognitionem eius cuius est imago. Si igitur in homine est imago Dei secundum Trinitatem personarum, cum homo per naturalem rationem seipsum cognoscere possit, sequeretur quod per naturalem cognitionem posset homo cognoscere Trinitatem divinarum personarum. Quod est falsum, ut supra ostensum est. Praeterea, nomen imaginis non cuilibet trium personarum convenit, sed soli filio, dicit enim Augustinus, in VI de Trin., quod solus filius est imago patris. Si igitur in homine attenderetur Dei imago secundum personam, non esset in homine imago totius Trinitatis, sed filii tantum. Sed contra est quod Hilarius, in IV de Trin., per hoc quod homo dicitur ad imaginem Dei factus, ostendit pluralitatem divinarum personarum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra habitum est, distinctio divinarum personarum non est nisi secundum originem, vel potius secundum relationes originis. Non autem est idem modus originis in omnibus, sed modus originis uniuscuiusque est secundum convenientiam suae naturae, aliter enim producuntur animata, aliter inanimata; aliter animalia, atque aliter plantae. Unde manifestum est quod distinctio divinarum personarum est secundum quod divinae naturae convenit. Unde esse ad imaginem Dei secundum imitationem divinae naturae, non excludit hoc quod est esse ad imaginem Dei secundum repraesentationem trium personarum; sed magis unum ad alterum sequitur. Sic igitur dicendum est in

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God does not exist in man as to the Trinity of Persons. For Augustine says (Fulgentius De Fide ad Petrum i): One in essence is the Godhead of the Holy Trinity; and one is the image to which man was made. And Hilary (De Trin. v) says: Man is made to the image of that which is common in the Trinity. Therefore the image of God in man is of the Divine Essence, and not of the Trinity of Persons. Obj. 2: Further, it is said (De Eccl. Dogmat.) that the image of God in man is to be referred to eternity. Damascene also says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image of God in man belongs to him as an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement. Gregory of Nyssa (De Homin. Opificio xvi) also asserts that, when Scripture says that man was made to the image of God, it means that human nature was made a participator of all good: for the Godhead is the fullness of goodness. Now all these things belong more to the unity of the Essence than to the distinction of the Persons. Therefore the image of God in man regards, not the Trinity of Persons, but the unity of the Essence. Obj. 3: Further, an image leads to the knowledge of that of which it is the image. Therefore, if there is in man the image of God as to the Trinity of Persons; since man can know himself by his natural reason, it follows that by his natural knowledge man could know the Trinity of the Divine Persons; which is untrue, as was shown above (Q. 32, A. 1). Obj. 4: Further, the name of Image is not applicable to any of the Three Persons, but only to the Son; for Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 2) that the Son alone is the image of the Father. Therefore, if in man there were an image of God as regards the Person, this would not be an image of the Trinity, but only of the Son. On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): The plurality of the Divine Persons is proved from the fact that man is said to have been made to the image of God. I answer that, as we have seen (Q. 40, A. 2), the distinction of the Divine Persons is only according to origin, or, rather, relations of origin. Now the mode of origin is not the same in all things, but in each thing is adapted to the nature thereof; animated things being produced in one way, and inanimate in another; animals in one way, and plants in another. Wherefore it is manifest that the distinction of the Divine Persons is suitable to the Divine Nature; and therefore to be to the image of God by imitation of the Divine Nature does not exclude being to the same image by the representation of the Divine Persons: but rather one follows from the other. We must, therefore, say that in man there exists the image of God, both as regards the Divine Nature

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homine esse imaginem Dei et quantum ad naturam divinam, et quantum ad Trinitatem personarum, nam et in ipso Deo in tribus personis una existit natura. Et per hoc patet responsio ad duo prima. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si imago Dei esset in homine perfecte repraesentans Deum. Sed, sicut Augustinus dicit in XV de Trin., maxima est differentia huius Trinitatis quae est in nobis, ad Trinitatem divinam. Et ideo, ut ipse ibidem dicit, Trinitatem quae in nobis est, videmus potius quam credimus, Deum vero esse Trinitatem, credimus potius quam videmus. Ad quartum dicendum quod quidam dixerunt in homine esse solum imaginem filii. Sed hoc improbat Augustinus, in XII de Trin. Primo quidem, per hoc quod, cum secundum aequalitatem essentiae filius sit patri similis, necesse est, si homo sit factus ad similitudinem filii, quod sit factus ad similitudinem patris. Secundo quia, si homo esset factus solum ad imaginem filii, non diceret pater, faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, sed tuam. Cum ergo dicitur, ad imaginem Dei fecit illum, non est intelligendum quod pater fecerit hominem solum ad imaginem filii, qui est Deus, ut quidam exposuerunt, sed intelligendum est quod Deus Trinitas fecit hominem ad imaginem suam, idest totius Trinitatis. Cum autem dicitur quod Deus fecit hominem ad imaginem suam, dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, quod haec praepositio ad designet terminum factionis, ut sit sensus, faciamus hominem taliter, ut sit in eo imago. Alio modo, haec praepositio ad potest designare causam exemplarem; sicut cum dicitur, iste liber est factus ad illum. Et sic imago Dei est ipsa essentia divina, quae abusive imago dicitur, secundum quod imago ponitur pro exemplari. Vel, secundum quod quidam dicunt, divina essentia dicitur imago, quia secundum eam una persona aliam imitatur.

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and as regards the Trinity of Persons; for also in God Himself there is one Nature in Three Persons. Thus it is clear how to solve the first two objections. Reply Obj. 3: This argument would avail if the image of God in man represented God in a perfect manner. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 6), there is a great difference between the trinity within ourselves and the Divine Trinity. Therefore, as he there says: We see, rather than believe, the trinity which is in ourselves; whereas we believe rather than see that God is Trinity. Reply Obj. 4: Some have said that in man there is an image of the Son only. Augustine rejects this opinion (De Trin. xii, 5,6). First, because as the Son is like to the Father by a likeness of essence, it would follow of necessity if man were made in likeness to the Son, that he is made to the likeness of the Father. Second, because if man were made only to the image of the Son, the Father would not have said, Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness; but to Thy image. When, therefore, it is written, He made him to the image of God, the sense is not that the Father made man to the image of the Son only, Who is God, as some explained it, but that the Divine Trinity made man to Its image, that is, of the whole Trinity. When it is said that God made man to His image, this can be understood in two ways: first, so that this preposition to points to the term of the making, and then the sense is, Let Us make man in such a way that Our image may be in him. Second, this preposition ‘to’ may point to the exemplar cause, as when we say, This book is made (like) to that one. Thus the image of God is the very Essence of God, Which is incorrectly called an image forasmuch as image is put for the exemplar. Or, as some say, the Divine Essence is called an image because thereby one Person imitates another.

Article 6 Whether the image of God is in man as regards the mind only? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non sit in homine solum secundum mentem. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XI, quod vir est imago Dei. Sed vir non est solum mens. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur solum secundum mentem. Praeterea, Gen. I, creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam, ad imaginem Dei creavit illum, masculum et feminam creavit eos. Sed distinctio masculi et feminae est secundum corpus. Ergo etiam secundum corpus attenditur Dei imago in homine, et non secundum mentem tantum.

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not only in man’s mind. For the Apostle says (1 Cor 11:7) that the man is the image . . . of God. But man is not only mind. Therefore the image of God is to be observed not only in his mind. Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Gen 1:27): God created man to His own image; to the image of God He created him; male and female He created them. But the distinction of male and female is in the body. Therefore the image of God is also in the body, and not only in the mind.

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Praeterea, imago praecipue videtur attendi secundum figuram. Sed figura ad corpus pertinet. Ergo imago Dei attenditur in homine etiam secundum corpus, et non secundum mentem tantum. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt., triplex visio invenitur in nobis, scilicet corporalis, spiritualis sive imaginaria, et intellectualis. Si ergo secundum visionem intellectualem, quae ad mentem pertinet, est aliqua Trinitas in nobis, secundum quam sumus ad imaginem Dei; pari ratione et in aliis visionibus. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Eph. IV, renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae, et induite novum hominem, ex quo datur intelligi quod renovatio nostra, quae fit secundum novi hominis indumentum, ad mentem pertinet. Sed ad Col. III, dicit, induentes novum hominem, qui renovatur in agnitionem Dei, secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum, ubi renovationem quae est secundum novi hominis indumentum, attribuit imagini Dei. Esse ergo ad imaginem Dei pertinet solum ad mentem. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum in omnibus creaturis sit aliqualis Dei similitudo, in sola creatura rationali invenitur similitudo Dei per modum imaginis, ut supra dictum est, in aliis autem creaturis per modum vestigii. Id autem in quo creatura rationalis excedit alias creaturas, est intellectus sive mens. Unde relinquitur quod nec in ipsa rationali creatura invenitur Dei imago, nisi secundum mentem. In aliis vero partibus, si quas habet rationalis creatura, invenitur similitudo vestigii; sicut et in ceteris rebus quibus secundum partes huiusmodi assimilatur. Cuius ratio manifeste cognosci potest, si attendatur modus quo repraesentat vestigium, et quo repraesentat imago. Imago enim repraesentat secundum similitudinem speciei, ut dictum est. Vestigium autem repraesentat per modum effectus qui sic repraesentat suam causam, quod tamen ad speciei similitudinem non pertingit, impressiones enim quae ex motu animalium relinquuntur, dicuntur vestigia; et similiter cinis dicitur vestigium ignis; et desolatio terrae, vestigium hostilis exercitus. Potest ergo huiusmodi differentia attendi inter creaturas rationales et alias creaturas, et quantum ad hoc quod in creaturis repraesentatur similitudo divinae naturae, et quantum ad hoc quod in eis repraesentatur similitudo Trinitatis increatae. Nam quantum ad similitudinem divinae naturae pertinet, creaturae rationales videntur quodammodo ad repraesentationem speciei pertingere, inquantum imitantur Deum non solum in hoc quod est et vivit, sed etiam in hoc quod intelligit, ut supra dictum est. Aliae vero creaturae non intelligunt; sed apparet in eis quoddam vestigium intellectus producentis, si earum dispositio consideretur. Similiter, cum increata Trinitas distinguatur secundum proces-

Obj. 3: Further, an image seems to apply principally to the shape of a thing. But shape belongs to the body. Therefore the image of God is to be seen in man’s body also, and not in his mind. Obj. 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen ad lit. xii, 7,24), there is a threefold vision in us, corporeal, spiritual, or imaginary, and intellectual. Therefore, if in the intellectual vision that belongs to the mind there exists in us a trinity by reason of which we are made to the image of God, for the like reason there must be another trinity in the others. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph 4:23,24): Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man. Whence we are given to understand that our renewal which consists in putting on the new man, belongs to the mind. Now, he says (Col 3:10): Putting on the new man; him who is renewed unto knowledge of God, according to the image of Him that created him, where the renewal which consists in putting on the new man is ascribed to the image of God. Therefore to be to the image of God belongs to the mind only. I answer that, While in all creatures there is some kind of likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness of image as we have explained above (AA. 1,2); whereas in other creatures we find a likeness by way of a trace. Now the intellect or mind is that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures; wherefore this image of God is not found even in the rational creature except in the mind; while in the other parts, which the rational creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a trace, as in other creatures to which, in reference to such parts, the rational creature can be likened. We may easily understand the reason of this if we consider the way in which a trace, and the way in which an image, represents anything. An image represents something by likeness in species, as we have said; while a trace represents something by way of an effect, which represents the cause in such a way as not to attain to the likeness of species. For imprints which are left by the movements of animals are called traces: so also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the land a trace of a hostile army. Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures and others, both as to the representation of the likeness of the Divine Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of the uncreated Trinity. For as to the likeness of the Divine Nature, rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the representation of the species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only in being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained (A. 2); whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, if we consider their disposition. Likewise as the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of Love from both of these, as we have

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sionem verbi a dicente, et amoris ab utroque, ut supra habitum est; in creatura rationali, in qua invenitur processio verbi secundum intellectum, et processio amoris secundum voluntatem, potest dici imago Trinitatis increatae per quandam repraesentationem speciei. In aliis autem creaturis non invenitur principium verbi, et verbum, et amor; sed apparet in eis quoddam vestigium quod haec inveniantur in causa producente. Nam hoc ipsum quod creatura habet substantiam modificatam et finitam, demonstrat quod sit a quodam principio; species vero eius demonstrat verbum facientis, sicut forma domus demonstrat conceptionem artificis; ordo vero demonstrat amorem producentis, quo effectus ordinatur ad bonum, sicut usus aedificii demonstrat artificis voluntatem. Sic igitur in homine invenitur Dei similitudo per modum imaginis secundum mentem; sed secundum alias partes eius, per modum vestigii. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo dicitur imago Dei, non quia ipse essentialiter sit imago, sed quia in eo est Dei imago impressa secundum mentem; sicut denarius dicitur imago Caesaris, inquantum habet Caesaris imaginem. Unde non oportet quod secundum quamlibet partem hominis accipiatur Dei imago. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XII de Trin., quidam imaginem Trinitatis in homine posuerunt, non secundum unum individuum, sed secundum plura; dicentes quod vir patris personam intimat; filii vero personam, quod de viro ita processit ut de illo nasceretur; atque ita tertiam personam, velut spiritum sanctum, dicunt esse mulierem, quae ita de viro processit ut non ipsa esset filius aut filia. Quod prima facie absurdum videtur. Primo quidem, quia sequeretur quod Spiritus Sanctus esset principium filii, sicut mulier est principium prolis quae nascitur de viro. Secundo, quia unus homo non esset nisi ad imaginem unius personae. Tertio, quia secundum hoc Scriptura de imagine Dei in homine mentionem facere non debuisset, nisi producta iam prole. Et ideo dicendum est quod Scriptura, postquam dixerat, ad imaginem Dei creavit illum, addidit, masculum et feminam creavit eos, non ut imago Dei secundum distinctiones sexuum attendatur; sed quia imago Dei utrique sexui est communis, cum sit secundum mentem, in qua non est distinctio sexuum. Unde apostolus, ad Col. III, postquam dixerat, secundum imaginem eius qui creavit illum, subdit, ubi non est masculus et femina. Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis imago Dei in homine non accipiatur secundum figuram corpoream, tamen corpus hominis, quia solum inter terrenorum animalium corpora non pronum in alvum prostratum est, sed tale est ut ad contemplandum caelum sit aptius, magis in hoc ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, quam cetera corpora animalium, factum iure videri potest; ut Augustinus dicit in libro Octoginta trium Quaest. Quod tamen non

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seen (Q. 28, A. 3); so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word in the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will, there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation of the species. In other creatures, however, we do not find the principle of the word, and the word and love; but we do see in them a certain trace of the existence of these in the Cause that produced them. For in the fact that a creature has a modified and finite nature, proves that it proceeds from a principle; while its species points to the (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a house points to the idea of the architect; and order points to the maker’s love by reason of which he directs the effect to a good end; as also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. So we find in man a likeness to God by way of an image in his mind; but in the other parts of his being by way of a trace. Reply Obj. 1: Man is called to the image of God; not that he is essentially an image; but that the image of God is impressed on his mind; as a coin is an image of the king, as having the image of the king. Wherefore there is no need to consider the image of God as existing in every part of man. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 5), some have thought that the image of God was not in man individually, but severally. They held that the man represents the Person of the Father; those born of man denote the person of the Son; and that the woman is a third person in likeness to the Holy Spirit, since she so proceeded from man as not to be his son or daughter. All of this is manifestly absurd; first, because it would follow that the Holy Spirit is the principle of the Son, as the woman is the principle of the man’s offspring; second, because one man would be only the image of one Person; third, because in that case Scripture should not have mentioned the image of God in man until after the birth of the offspring. Therefore we must understand that when Scripture had said, to the image of God He created him, it added, male and female He created them, not to imply that the image of God came through the distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction. Wherefore the Apostle (Col 3:10), after saying, According to the image of Him that created him, added, Where there is neither male nor female (Vulg. neither Gentile nor Jew). Reply Obj. 3: Although the image of God in man is not to be found in his bodily shape, yet because the body of man alone among terrestrial animals is not inclined prone to the ground, but is adapted to look upward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say that it is made to God’s image and likeness, rather than the bodies of other animals, as Augustine remarks (83 Questions, Q. 51). But this is not to be understood as though the image of God were in man’s body;

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est sic intelligendum, quasi in corpore hominis sit imago Dei, sed quia ipsa figura humani corporis repraesentat imaginem Dei in anima, per modum vestigii. Ad quartum dicendum quod tam in visione corporali quam in visione imaginaria invenitur quaedam Trinitas, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de Trin. In visione enim corporali est quidem primo species exterioris corporis; secundo vero ipsa visio, quae fit per impressionem cuiusdam similitudinis praedictae speciei in visum; tertio est ibi intentio voluntatis applicans visum ad videndum, et eum in re visa detinens. Similiter etiam in visione imaginaria invenitur primo quidem species in memoria reservata; secundo ipsa imaginaria visio, quae provenit ex hoc quod acies animae, idest ipsa vis imaginaria, informatur secundum praedictam speciem; tertio vero invenitur intentio voluntatis coniungens utrumque. Sed utraque Trinitas deficit a ratione divinae imaginis. Nam ipsa species exterioris corporis est extra naturam animae, species autem quae est in memoria, etsi non sit extra animam, est tamen adventitia animae, et ita utrobique deficit repraesentatio connaturalitatis et coaeternitatis divinarum personarum. Visio vero corporalis non procedit tantum a specie exterioris corporis, sed simul cum hoc a sensu videntis, et similiter visio imaginaria non solum procedit a specie quae in memoria conservatur, sed etiam a virtute imaginativa, et ita per hoc non repraesentatur convenienter processio filii a solo patre. Intentio vero voluntatis, quae coniungit duo praedicta, non ex eis procedit, neque in visione corporea neque in spirituali, unde non convenienter repraesentatur processio spiritus sancti a patre et filio.

but in the sense that the very shape of the human body represents the image of God in the soul by way of a trace. Reply Obj. 4: Both in the corporeal and in the imaginary vision we may find a trinity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 2). For in corporeal vision there is first the species of the exterior body; second, the act of vision, which occurs by the impression on the sight of a certain likeness of the said species; third, the intention of the will applying the sight to see, and to rest on what is seen. Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species kept in the memory; second, the vision itself, which is caused by the penetrative power of the soul, that is, the faculty of imagination, informed by the species; and third, we find the intention of the will joining both together. But each of these trinities falls short of the Divine image. For the species of the external body is extrinsic to the essence of the soul; while the species in the memory, though not extrinsic to the soul, is adventitious to it; and thus in both cases the species falls short of representing the connaturality and co-eternity of the Divine Persons. The corporeal vision, too, does not proceed only from the species of the external body, but from this, and at the same time from the sense of the seer; in like manner imaginary vision is not from the species only which is preserved in the memory, but also from the imagination. For these reasons the procession of the Son from the Father alone is not suitably represented. Lastly the intention of the will joining the two together, does not proceed from them either in corporeal or spiritual vision. Wherefore the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son is not thus properly represented.

Article 7 Whether the image of God is to be found in the acts of the soul? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non inveniatur in anima secundum actus. Dicit enim Augustinus, XI de Civ. Dei, quod homo factus est ad imaginem Dei, secundum quod sumus, et nos esse novimus, et id esse ac nosse diligimus. Sed esse non significat actum. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur in anima secundum actus. Praeterea, Augustinus, in IX de Trin., assignat imaginem Dei in anima secundum haec tria, quae sunt mens, notitia et amor. Mens autem non significat actum; sed magis potentiam, vel etiam essentiam intellectivae animae. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur secundum actus. Praeterea, Augustinus, X de Trin., assignat imaginem Trinitatis in anima secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. Sed haec tria sunt vires naturales

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not found in the acts of the soul. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 26), that man was made to God’s image, inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist, and love this existence and knowledge. But to exist does not signify an act. Therefore the image of God is not to be found in the soul’s acts. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. ix, 4) assigns God’s image in the soul to these three things—mind, knowledge, and love. But mind does not signify an act, but rather the power or the essence of the intellectual soul. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts of the soul. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns the image of the Trinity in the soul to memory, understanding, and will. But these three are natural powers of the soul, as

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animae, ut Magister dicit, III distinctione I libri Sent. Ergo imago attenditur secundum potentias, et non secundum actus. Praeterea, imago Trinitatis semper manet in anima. Sed actus non semper manet. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur in anima secundum actus. Sed contra est quod Augustinus, XI de Trin., assignat Trinitatem in inferioribus animae partibus secundum actualem visionem sensibilem et imaginariam. Ergo et Trinitas quae est in mente, secundum quam homo est ad imaginem Dei, debet attendi secundum actualem visionem. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad rationem imaginis pertinet aliqualis repraesentatio speciei. Si ergo imago Trinitatis divinae debet accipi in anima, oportet quod secundum illud principaliter attendatur, quod maxime accedit, prout possibile est, ad repraesentandum speciem divinarum personarum. Divinae autem personae distinguuntur secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et amoris connectentis utrumque. Verbum autem in anima nostra sine actuali cogitatione esse non potest, ut Augustinus dicit XIV de Trin. Et ideo primo et principaliter attenditur imago Trinitatis in mente secundum actus, prout scilicet ex notitia quam habemus, cogitando interius verbum formamus, et ex hoc in amorem prorumpimus. Sed quia principia actuum sunt habitus et potentiae; unumquodque autem virtualiter est in suo principio, secundario, et quasi ex consequenti, imago Trinitatis potest attendi in anima secundum potentias, et praecipue secundum habitus, prout in eis scilicet actus virtualiter existunt. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod esse nostrum ad imaginem Dei pertinet, quod est nobis proprium supra alia animalia; quod quidem esse competit nobis inquantum mentem habemus. Et ideo eadem est haec Trinitas cum illa quam Augustinus ponit in IX de Trin., quae consistit in mente, notitia et amore. Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus hanc Trinitatem primo adinvenit in mente. Sed quia mens, etsi se totam quodammodo cognoscat, etiam quodammodo se ignorat, prout scilicet est ab aliis distincta; et sic etiam se quaerit, ut Augustinus consequenter probat in X de Trin., ideo, quasi notitia non totaliter menti coaequetur, accipit in anima tria quaedam propria mentis, scilicet memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, quae nullus ignorat se habere, et in istis tribus potius imaginem Trinitatis assignat, quasi prima assignatio sit quodammodo deficiens.

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the Master of the Sentences says (1 Sent. D iii). Therefore the image of God is in the powers, and does not extend to the acts of the soul. Obj. 4: Further, the image of the Trinity always remains in the soul. But an act does not always remain. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts. On the contrary, Augustine (De Trin. xi, 2 seqq.) assigns the trinity in the lower part of the soul, in relation to the actual vision, whether sensible or imaginative. Therefore, also, the trinity in the mind, by reason of which man is like to God’s image, must be referred to actual vision.

I answer that, As above explained (A. 2), a certain representation of the species belongs to the nature of an image. Hence, if the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look for it where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the species of the Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct from each other by reason of the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and the procession of Love connecting Both. But in our soul word cannot exist without actual thought, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 7). Therefore, first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal word; and thence break forth into love. But, since the principles of acts are the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in its principle, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image of the Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein. Reply Obj. 1: Our being bears the image of God so far as it is proper to us, and excels that of the other animals, that is to say, in so far as we are endowed with a mind. Therefore, this trinity is the same as that which Augustine mentions (De Trin. ix, 4), and which consists in mind, knowledge, and love. Reply Obj. 2: Augustine observed this trinity, first, as existing in the mind. But because the mind, though it knows itself entirely in a certain degree, yet also in a way does not know itself—namely, as being distinct from others (and thus also it searches itself, as Augustine subsequently proves—De Trin. x, 3,4); therefore, as though knowledge were not in equal proportion to mind, he takes three things in the soul which are proper to the mind, namely, memory, understanding, and will; which everyone is conscious of possessing; and assigns the image of the Trinity preeminently to these three, as though the first assignation were in part deficient. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus proReply Obj. 3: As Augustine proves (De Trin. xiv, 7), we bat XIV de Trin., intelligere dicimur et velle seu ama- may be said to understand, will, and to love certain things, re aliqua, et quando de his cogitamus, et quando de his both when we actually consider them, and when we do not non cogitamus. Sed quando sine cogitatione sunt, ad so- think of them. When they are not under our actual considlam memoriam pertinent; quae nihil est aliud, secun- eration, they are objects of our memory only, which, in his

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dum ipsum, quam habitualis retentio notitiae et amoris. Sed quia, ut ipse dicit, verbum ibi esse sine cogitatione non potest (cogitamus enim omne quod dicimus etiam illo interiori verbo quod ad nullius gentis pertinet linguam), in tribus potius illis imago ista cognoscitur, memoria scilicet, intelligentia et voluntate. Hanc autem nunc dico intelligentiam, qua intelligimus cogitantes; et eam voluntatem sive amorem vel dilectionem, quae istam prolem parentemque coniungit. Ex quo patet quod imaginem divinae Trinitatis potius ponit in intelligentia et voluntate actuali, quam secundum quod sunt in habituali retentione memoriae, licet etiam quantum ad hoc, aliquo modo sit imago Trinitatis in anima, ut ibidem dicitur. Et sic patet quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas non sunt tres vires, ut in sententiis dicitur. Ad quartum dicendum quod aliquis respondere posset per hoc quod Augustinus dicit XIV de Trin., quod mens semper sui meminit, semper se intelligit et amat. Quod quidam sic intelligunt, quasi animae adsit actualis intelligentia et amor sui ipsius. Sed hunc intellectum excludit per hoc quod subdit, quod non semper se cogitat discretam ab his quae non sunt quod ipsa. Et sic patet quod anima semper intelligit et amat se, non actualiter, sed habitualiter. Quamvis etiam dici possit quod, percipiendo actum suum, seipsam intelligit quandocumque aliquid intelligit. Sed quia non semper est actu intelligens, ut patet in dormiente, ideo oportet dicere quod actus, etsi non semper maneant in seipsis, manent tamen semper in suis principiis, scilicet potentiis et habitibus. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin., si secundum hoc facta est ad imaginem Dei anima rationalis, quod uti ratione atque intellectu ad intelligendum et conspiciendum Deum potest, ab initio quo esse coepit, fuit in ea Dei imago.

opinion, is nothing else than habitual retention of knowledge and love. But since, as he says, a word cannot be there without actual thought (for we think everything that we say, even if we speak with that interior word belonging to no nation’s tongue), this image chiefly consists in these three things, memory, understanding, and will. And by understanding I mean here that whereby we understand with actual thought; and by will, love, or dilection I mean that which unites this child with its parent. From which it is clear that he places the image of the Divine Trinity more in actual understanding and will, than in these as existing in the habitual retention of the memory; although even thus the image of the Trinity exists in the soul in a certain degree, as he says in the same place. Thus it is clear that memory, understanding, and will are not three powers as stated in the Sentences. Reply Obj. 4: Someone might answer by referring to Augustine’s statement (De Trin. xiv, 6), that the mind ever remembers itself, ever understands itself, ever loves itself ; which some take to mean that the soul ever actually understands, and loves itself. But he excludes this interpretation by adding that it does not always think of itself as actually distinct from other things. Thus it is clear that the soul always understands and loves itself, not actually but habitually; though we might say that by perceiving its own act, it understands itself whenever it understands anything. But since it is not always actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must say that these acts, although not always actually existing, yet ever exist in their principles, the habits and powers. Wherefore, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 4): If the rational soul is made to the image of God in the sense that it can make use of reason and intellect to understand and consider God, then the image of God was in the soul from the beginning of its existence.

Article 8 Whether the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul only by comparison with God as its object? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago divinae Trinitatis sit in anima non solum per comparationem ad obiectum quod est Deus. Imago enim divinae Trinitatis invenitur in anima, sicut dictum est, secundum quod verbum in nobis procedit a dicente et amor ab utroque. Sed hoc invenitur in nobis secundum quodcumque obiectum. Ergo secundum quodcumque obiectum invenitur in mente nostra imago divinae Trinitatis. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in XII de Trin., quod cum quaerimus in anima Trinitatem, in tota quaerimus, non separantes actionem rationalem in temporalibus a

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul not only by comparison with God as its object. For the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, as shown above (A. 7), according as the word in us proceeds from the speaker; and love from both. But this is to be found in us as regards any object. Therefore the image of the Divine Trinity is in our mind as regards any object. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that when we seek trinity in the soul, we seek it in the whole of the soul, without separating the process of reasoning in tem-

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contemplatione aeternorum. Ergo etiam secundum tem- poral matters from the consideration of things eternal. Thereporalia obiecta invenitur imago Trinitatis in anima. fore the image of the Trinity is to be found in the soul, even as regards temporal objects. Praeterea, quod Deum intelligamus et amemus, Obj. 3: Further, it is by grace that we can know and love convenit nobis secundum gratiae donum. Si igitur se- God. If, therefore, the image of the Trinity is found in the cundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem seu soul by reason of the memory, understanding, and will or dilectionem Dei, attendatur imago Trinitatis in anima, love of God, this image is not in man by nature but by grace, non erit imago Dei in homine secundum naturam, sed and thus is not common to all. secundum gratiam. Et sic non erit omnibus communis. Praeterea, sancti qui sunt in patria, maxime conObj. 4: Further, the saints in heaven are most performantur imagini Dei secundum gloriae visionem, un- fectly conformed to the image of God by the beatific vide dicitur, II ad Cor. III, in eandem imaginem transfor- sion; wherefore it is written (2 Cor 3:18): We . . . are transmamur, a claritate in claritatem. Sed secundum visionem formed into the same image from glory to glory. But temporal gloriae temporalia cognoscuntur. Ergo etiam per com- things are known by the beatific vision. Therefore the image parationem ad temporalia, Dei imago attenditur in no- of God exists in us even according to temporal things. bis. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 12): Trin., quod non propterea est Dei imago in mente, quia sui The image of God exists in the mind, not because it has a rememinit, et intelligit et diligit se, sed quia potest etiam me- membrance of itself, loves itself, and understands itself; but minisse, intelligere et amare Deum, a quo facta est. Mul- because it can also remember, understand, and love God by to igitur minus secundum alia obiecta attenditur imago Whom it was made. Much less, therefore, is the image of Dei in mente. God in the soul, in respect of other objects. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, I answer that, As above explained (AA. 2, 7), image imago importat similitudinem utcumque pertingentem means a likeness which in some degree, however small, atad speciei repraesentationem. Unde oportet quod ima- tains to a representation of the species. Wherefore we need go divinae Trinitatis attendatur in anima secundum ali- to seek in the image of the Divine Trinity in the soul some quid quod repraesentat divinas personas repraesentatio- kind of representation of species of the Divine Persons, so ne speciei, sicut est possibile creaturae. Distinguuntur far as this is possible to a creature. Now the Divine Perautem divinae personae, ut dictum est, secundum pro- sons, as above stated (AA. 6, 7), are distinguished from cessionem verbi a dicente, et amoris ab utroque. Verbum each other according to the procession of the word from autem Dei nascitur de Deo secundum notitiam sui ip- the speaker, and the procession of love from both. Moresius, et amor procedit a Deo secundum quod seipsum over the Word of God is born of God by the knowledge amat. Manifestum est autem quod diversitas obiectorum of Himself; and Love proceeds from God according as He diversificat speciem verbi et amoris, non enim idem est loves Himself. But it is clear that diversity of objects diverspecie in corde hominis verbum conceptum de lapide et sifies the species of word and love; for in the human mind de equo, nec idem specie amor. Attenditur igitur divina the species of a stone is specifically different from that of a imago in homine secundum verbum conceptum de Dei horse, which also the love regarding each of them is specifnotitia, et amorem exinde derivatum. Et sic imago Dei ically different. Hence we refer the Divine image in man to attenditur in anima secundum quod fertur, vel nata est the verbal concept born of the knowledge of God, and to ferri in Deum. Fertur autem in aliquid mens dupliciter, the love derived therefrom. Thus the image of God is found uno modo, directe et immediate; alio modo, indirecte et in the soul according as the soul turns to God, or possesses mediate, sicut cum aliquis, videndo imaginem hominis a nature that enables it to turn to God. Now the mind may in speculo, dicitur ferri in ipsum hominem. Et ideo Au- turn towards an object in two ways: directly and immegustinus dicit, in XIV de Trin., quod mens meminit sui, diately, or indirectly and mediately; as, for instance, when intelligit se, et diligit se, hoc si cernimus, cernimus Trinita- anyone sees a man reflected in a looking-glass he may be tem; nondum quidem Deum, sed iam imaginem Dei. Sed said to be turned towards that man. So Augustine says (De hoc est, non quia fertur mens in seipsam absolute, sed Trin. xiv, 8), that the mind remembers itself, understands itprout per hoc ulterius potest ferri in Deum; ut patet per self, and loves itself. If we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, auctoritatem supra inductam. not, indeed, God, but, nevertheless, rightly called the image of God. But this is due to the fact, not that the mind reflects on itself absolutely, but that thereby it can furthermore turn to God, as appears from the authority quoted above (Arg. On the contrary).

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad rationem imaReply Obj. 1: For the notion of an image it is not ginis, non solum oportet attendere quod aliquid proce- enough that something proceed from another, but it is also dat ab aliquo; sed etiam quid a quo procedat, scilicet necessary to observe what proceeds and whence it proquod verbum Dei procedit a notitia de Deo. ceeds; namely, that what is Word of God proceeds from knowledge of God. Ad secundum dicendum quod in tota quidem aniReply Obj. 2: In all the soul we may see a kind of trinma invenitur aliqua Trinitas, non quidem ita quod prae- ity, not, however, as though besides the action of temporal ter actionem temporalium et contemplationem aeterno- things and the contemplation of eternal things, any third rum, quaeratur aliquod tertium quo Trinitas impleatur, thing should be required to make up the trinity, as he adds prout ibidem subditur. Sed in illa parte rationis quae in the same passage. But in that part of the reason which derivatur a parte temporalium, etsi Trinitas inveniri pos- is concerned with temporal things, although a trinity may sit, non tamen imago Dei potest inveniri, ut postea dici- be found; yet the image of God is not to be seen there, as tur, quia huiusmodi temporalium notitia adventitia est he says farther on; forasmuch as this knowledge of temanimae. Et habitus etiam ipsi quibus temporalia cogno- poral things is adventitious to the soul. Moreover even the scuntur, non semper adsunt; sed quandoque quidem habits whereby temporal things are known are not always praesentialiter adsunt, quandoque autem secundum me- present; but sometimes they are actually present, and somemoriam tantum, etiam postquam adesse incipiunt. Sicut times present only in memory even after they begin to exist patet de fide, quae temporaliter nobis advenit in praesen- in the soul. Such is clearly the case with faith, which comes ti, in statu autem futurae beatitudinis iam non erit fides, to us temporally for this present life; while in the future life sed memoria fidei. faith will no longer exist, but only the remembrance of faith. Ad tertium dicendum quod meritoria Dei cogniReply Obj. 3: The meritorious knowledge and love of tio et dilectio non est nisi per gratiam. Est tamen ali- God can be in us only by grace. Yet there is a certain natuqua Dei cognitio et dilectio naturalis, ut supra habitum ral knowledge and love as seen above (Q. 12, A. 12; Q. 56, est. Et hoc etiam ipsum naturale est, quod mens ad in- A. 3; Q. 60, A. 5). This, too, is natural that the mind, in order telligendum Deum ratione uti potest, secundum quod to understand God, can make use of reason, in which sense imaginem Dei semper diximus permanere in mente, si- we have already said that the image of God abides ever in ve haec imago Dei ita sit obsoleta, quasi obumbrata, ut the soul; whether this image of God be so obsolete, as it were pene nulla sit, ut in his qui non habent usum rationis; si- clouded, as almost to amount to nothing, as in those who ve sit obscura atque deformis, ut in peccatoribus; sive sit have not the use of reason; or obscured and disfigured, as in clara et pulchra, ut in iustis, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIV sinners; or clear and beautiful, as in the just; as Augustine de Trin. says (De Trin. xiv, 6). Ad quartum dicendum quod secundum visionem Reply Obj. 4: By the vision of glory temporal things gloriae, temporalia videbuntur in ipso Deo; et ideo hu- will be seen in God Himself; and such a vision of things iusmodi temporalium visio ad Dei imaginem pertinebit. temporal will belong to the image of God. This is what AuEt hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin., quod in gustine means (De Trin. xiv, 6), when he says that in that illa natura cui mens feliciter adhaerebit, immutabile vide- nature to which the mind will blissfully adhere, whatever it bit omne quod viderit. Nam et in ipso verbo increato sunt sees it will see as unchangeable; for in the Uncreated Word rationes omnium creaturarum. are the types of all creatures.

Article 9 Whether ‘likeness’ is properly distinguished from ‘image’? Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod similitudo ab imagine non convenienter distinguatur. Genus enim non convenienter distinguitur a specie. Sed similitudo comparatur ad imaginem, ut genus ad speciem, quia ubi est imago, ibi est continuo similitudo, sed non convertitur, ut dicitur in libro Octoginta trium Quaest. Ergo inconvenienter similitudo ab imagine distinguitur. Praeterea, ratio imaginis attenditur non solum secundum repraesentationem divinarum personarum, sed

Objection 1: It would seem that likeness is not properly distinguished from image. For genus is not properly distinguished from species. Now, likeness is to image as genus to species: because, where there is image, forthwith there is likeness, but not conversely, as Augustine says (83 Questions, Q. 74). Therefore likeness is not properly to be distinguished from image. Obj. 2: Further, the nature of the image consists not only in the representation of the Divine Persons, but also

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etiam secundum repraesentationem divinae essentiae, ad quam repraesentationem pertinet immortalitas et indivisibilitas. Non ergo convenienter dicitur quod similitudo est in essentia, quia est immortalis et indivisibilis; imago autem in aliis. Praeterea, imago Dei in homine est triplex, scilicet naturae, gratiae et gloriae, ut supra habitum est. Sed innocentia et iustitia ad gratiam pertinent. Inconvenienter ergo dicitur quod imago accipitur secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem; similitudo autem secundum innocentiam et iustitiam. Praeterea, cognitio veritatis ad intelligentiam pertinet, amor autem virtutis ad voluntatem, quae sunt duae partes imaginis. Non ergo convenienter dicitur quod imago sit in cognitione veritatis, similitudo in dilectione virtutis. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., sunt qui non frustra intelligunt duo dicta esse ad imaginem et similitudinem; cum, si una res esset, unum nomen sufficere potuisset. Respondeo dicendum quod similitudo quaedam unitas est, unum enim in qualitate similitudinem causat, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Unum autem, cum sit de transcendentibus, et commune est omnibus, et ad singula potest aptari; sicut et bonum et verum. Unde, sicut bonum alicui rei particulari potest comparari ut praeambulum ad ipsam, et ut subsequens, prout designat aliquam perfectionem ipsius; ita etiam est de comparatione similitudinis ad imaginem. Est enim bonum praeambulum ad hominem, secundum quod homo est quoddam particulare bonum, et rursus bonum subsequitur ad hominem, inquantum aliquem hominem specialiter dicimus esse bonum, propter perfectionem virtutis. Et similiter similitudo consideratur ut praeambulum ad imaginem, inquantum est communius quam imago, ut supra dictum est, consideratur etiam ut subsequens ad imaginem, inquantum significat quandam imaginis perfectionem; dicimus enim imaginem alicuius esse similem vel non similem ei cuius est imago, inquantum perfecte vel imperfecte repraesentat ipsum. Sic ergo similitudo potest ab imagine distingui dupliciter. Uno modo, prout est praeambula ad ipsam, et in pluribus existens. Et sic similitudo attenditur secundum ea quae sunt communiora proprietatibus naturae intellectualis, secundum quas proprie attenditur imago. Et secundum hoc dicitur in libro Octoginta trium Quaest., quod spiritus, idest mens, ad imaginem Dei, nullo dubitante, factus est, cetera autem hominis, scilicet quae pertinent ad inferiores partes animae, vel etiam ad ipsum corpus, ad similitudinem facta esse aliqui volunt. Secundum hoc etiam in libro de Quantitate Animae dicitur quod similitudo Dei attenditur in anima, inquantum est incorruptibilis, nam corruptibile et incorruptibile sunt differentiae en-

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in the representation of the Divine Essence, to which representation belong immortality and indivisibility. So it is not true to say that the likeness is in the essence because it is immortal and indivisible; whereas the image is in other things (Sent. ii, D, xvi). Obj. 3: Further, the image of God in man is threefold— the image of nature, of grace, and of glory, as above explained (A. 4). But innocence and righteousness belong to grace. Therefore it is incorrectly said (Sent. ii, D, xvi) that the image is taken from the memory, the understanding and the will, while the likeness is from innocence and righteousness. Obj. 4: Further, knowledge of truth belongs to the intellect, and love of virtue to the will; which two things are parts of the image. Therefore it is incorrect to say (Sent. ii, D, xvi) that the image consists in the knowledge of truth, and the likeness in the love of virtue. On the contrary, Augustine says (83 Questions, Q. 51): Some consider that these two were mentioned not without reason, namely ‘image’ and likeness, since, if they meant the same, one would have sufficed.’ I answer that, Likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality causes likeness, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 15). Now, since one is a transcendental, it is both common to all, and adapted to each single thing, just as the good and the true. Wherefore, as the good can be compared to each individual thing both as its preamble, and as subsequent to it, as signifying some perfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind of comparison between likeness and image. For the good is a preamble to man, inasmuch as man is an individual good; and, again, the good is subsequent to man, inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he is good, by reason of his perfect virtue. In like manner, likeness may be considered in the light of a preamble to image, inasmuch as it is something more general than image, as we have said above (A. 1): and, again, it may be considered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as it signifies a certain perfection of image. For we say that an image is like or unlike what it represents, according as the representation is perfect or imperfect. Thus likeness may be distinguished from image in two ways: first as its preamble and existing in more things, and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than the intellectual properties, wherein the image is properly to be seen. In this sense it is stated (83 Questions, qu. 51) that the spirit (namely, the mind) without doubt was made to the image of God. But the other parts of man, belonging to the soul’s inferior faculties, or even to the body, are in the opinion of some made to God’s likeness. In this sense he says (De Quant. Animae ii) that the likeness of God is found in the soul’s incorruptibility; for corruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings. But likeness may be considered in another way, as signifying the expression and perfection of the image. In this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth.

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tis communis. Alio modo potest considerari similitudo, secundum quod significat imaginis expressionem et perfectionem. Et secundum hoc Damascenus dicit quod id quod est secundum imaginem, intellectuale significat, et arbitrio liberum per se potestativum, quod autem secundum similitudinem, virtutis, secundum quod homini possibile est inesse, similitudinem. Et ad idem refertur quod similitudo dicitur ad dilectionem virtutis pertinere, non enim est virtus sine dilectione virtutis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod similitudo non distinguitur ab imagine secundum communem rationem similitudinis (sic enim includitur in ratione ipsius imaginis), sed secundum quod aliqua similitudo deficit a ratione imaginis, vel etiam est imaginis perfectiva. Ad secundum dicendum quod essentia animae pertinet ad imaginem, prout repraesentat divinam essentiam secundum ea quae sunt propria intellectualis naturae, non autem secundum conditiones consequentes ens in communi, ut est esse simplicem et indissolubilem. Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam virtutes quaedam naturaliter insunt animae, ad minus secundum quaedam earum semina, et secundum has posset attendi similitudo naturalis. Quamvis non sit inconveniens ut id quod secundum assignationem unam dicitur imago, secundum aliam dicatur similitudo. Ad quartum dicendum quod dilectio verbi, quod est amata notitia, pertinet ad rationem imaginis, sed dilectio virtutis pertinet ad similitudinem, sicut et virtus.

ii, 12) that the image implies an intelligent being, endowed with free-will and self-movement, whereas likeness implies a likeness of power, as far as this may be possible in man. In the same sense likeness is said to belong to the love of virtue: for there is no virtue without love of virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Likeness is not distinct from image in the general notion of likeness (for thus it is included in image); but so far as any likeness falls short of image, or again, as it perfects the idea of image. Reply Obj. 2: The soul’s essence belongs to the image, as representing the Divine Essence in those things which belong to the intellectual nature; but not in those conditions subsequent to general notions of being, such as simplicity and indissolubility. Reply Obj. 3: Even certain virtues are natural to the soul, at least, in their seeds, by reason of which we may say that a natural likeness exists in the soul. Nor it is unfitting to use the term image from one point of view and from another the term likeness. Reply Obj. 4: Love of the word, which is knowledge loved, belongs to the nature of image; but love of virtue belongs to likeness, as virtue itself belongs to likeness.

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Question 94 The State or Condition of the First Man as to His Intellect Deinde considerandum est de statu vel conditione We next consider the state or condition of the first man; primi hominis. Et primo, quantum ad animam; secun- first, as regards his soul; second, as regards his body. do, quantum ad corpus. Circa primum consideranda sunt duo, primo, de Concerning the first there are two things to be considconditione hominis quantum ad intellectum; secundo, ered: (1) The condition of man as to his intellect; (2) the de conditione hominis quantum ad voluntatem. condition of man as to his will. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum primus homo viderit Deum per (1) Whether the first man saw the Essence of God? essentiam. Secundo, utrum videre potuerit substantias (2) Whether he could see the separate substances, that separatas, idest angelos. is, the angels? Tertio, utrum habuerit omnium scientiam. (3) Whether he possessed all knowledge? Quarto, utrum potuerit errare vel decipi. (4) Whether he could err or be deceived?

Article 1 Whether the first man saw God through his essence? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod primus homo per essentiam Deum viderit. Beatitudo enim hominis in visione divinae essentiae consistit. Sed primus homo, in Paradiso conversans, beatam et omnium divitem habuit vitam, ut Damascenus dicit in II libro. Et Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, si homines habebant affectus suos quales nunc habemus, quomodo erant beati in illo inenarrabilis beatitudinis loco, idest Paradiso? Ergo primus homo in Paradiso vidit Deum per essentiam. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod primo homini non aberat quidquam quod bona voluntas adipisceretur. Sed nihil melius bona voluntas adipisci potest quam divinae essentiae visionem. Ergo homo per essentiam Deum videbat. Praeterea, visio Dei per essentiam est qua videtur Deus sine medio et sine aenigmate. Sed homo in statu innocentiae vidit Deum sine medio; ut Magister dicit in I distinctione IV libri Sent. Vidit etiam sine aenigmate, quia aenigma obscuritatem importat, ut Augustinus dicit, XV de Trin.; obscuritas autem introducta est per peccatum. Ergo homo in primo statu vidit Deum per essentiam. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XV, quod non prius quod spirituale est, sed quod animale. Sed maxime spirituale est videre Deum per essentiam. Ergo primus homo, in primo statu animalis vitae, Deum per essentiam non vidit.

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man saw God through His Essence. For man’s happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. But the first man, while established in paradise, led a life of happiness in the enjoyment of all things, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11). And Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): If man was gifted with the same tastes as now, how happy must he have been in paradise, that place of ineffable happiness! Therefore the first man in paradise saw God through His Essence. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, loc. cit.) that the first man lacked nothing which his good-will might obtain. But our good-will can obtain nothing better than the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore man saw God through His Essence. Obj. 3: Further, the vision of God in His Essence is whereby God is seen without a medium or enigma. But man in the state of innocence saw God immediately, as the Master of the Sentences asserts (Sent. iv, D, i). He also saw without an enigma, for an enigma implies obscurity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 9). Now, obscurity resulted from sin. Therefore man in the primitive state saw God through His Essence. On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor 15:46): That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural. But to see God through His Essence is most spiritual. Therefore the first man in the primitive state of his natural life did not see God through His Essence.

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Respondeo dicendum quod primus homo Deum per essentiam non vidit, secundum communem statum illius vitae; nisi forte dicatur quod viderit eum in raptu, quando Deus immisit soporem in Adam, ut dicitur Gen. II. Et huius ratio est quia, cum divina essentia sit ipsa beatitudo, hoc modo se habet intellectus videntis divinam essentiam ad Deum, sicut se habet quilibet homo ad beatitudinem. Manifestum est autem quod nullus homo potest per voluntatem a beatitudine averti, naturaliter enim, et ex necessitate, homo vult beatitudinem, et fugit miseriam. Unde nullus videns Deum per essentiam, potest voluntate averti a Deo, quod est peccare. Et propter hoc, omnes videntes Deum per essentiam, sic in amore Dei stabiliuntur, quod in aeternum peccare non possunt. Cum ergo Adam peccaverit, manifestum est quod Deum per essentiam non videbat. Cognoscebat tamen Deum quadam altiori cognitione quam nos cognoscamus, et sic quodammodo eius cognitio media erat inter cognitionem praesentis status, et cognitionem patriae, qua Deus per essentiam videtur. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod visio Dei per essentiam dividitur contra visionem Dei per creaturam. Quanto autem aliqua creatura est altior et Deo similior, tanto per eam Deus clarius videtur, sicut homo perfectius videtur per speculum in quo expressius imago eius resultat. Et sic patet quod multo eminentius videtur Deus per intelligibiles effectus, quam per sensibiles et corporeos. A consideratione autem plena et lucida intelligibilium effectuum impeditur homo in statu praesenti, per hoc quod distrahitur a sensibilibus, et circa ea occupatur. Sed, sicut dicitur Eccle. VII, Deus fecit hominem rectum. Haec autem fuit rectitudo hominis divinitus instituti, ut inferiora superioribus subderentur, et superiora ab inferioribus non impedirentur. Unde homo primus non impediebatur per res exteriores a clara et firma contemplatione intelligibilium effectuum, quos ex irradiatione primae veritatis percipiebat, sive naturali cognitione sive gratuita. Unde dicit Augustinus, in XI super Gen. ad Litt., quod fortassis Deus primis hominibus antea loquebatur, sicut cum angelis loquitur, ipsa incommutabili veritate illustrans mentes eorum; etsi non tanta participatione divinae essentiae, quantam capiunt angeli. Sic igitur per huiusmodi intelligibiles effectus Dei, Deum clarius cognoscebat quam modo cognoscamus.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo in Paradiso beatus fuit, non illa perfecta beatitudine in quam transferendus erat, quae in divinae essentiae visione consistit, habebat tamen beatam vitam secundum quendam modum, ut Augustinus dicit XI super Gen. ad Litt., inquantum habebat integritatem et perfectionem quandam naturalem.

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I answer that, The first man did not see God through His Essence if we consider the ordinary state of that life; unless, perhaps, it be said that he saw God in a vision, when God cast a deep sleep upon Adam (Gen 2:21). The reason is because, since in the Divine Essence is beatitude itself, the intellect of a man who sees the Divine Essence has the same relation to God as a man has to beatitude. Now it is clear that man cannot willingly be turned away from beatitude, since naturally and necessarily he desires it, and shuns unhappiness. Wherefore no one who sees the Essence of God can willingly turn away from God, which means to sin. Hence all who see God through His Essence are so firmly established in the love of God, that for eternity they can never sin. Therefore, as Adam did sin, it is clear that he did not see God through His Essence. Nevertheless he knew God with a more perfect knowledge than we do now. Thus in a sense his knowledge was midway between our knowledge in the present state, and the knowledge we shall have in heaven, when we see God through His Essence. To make this clear, we must consider that the vision of God through His Essence is contradistinguished from the vision of God through His creatures. Now the higher the creature is, and the more like it is to God, the more clearly is God seen in it; for instance, a man is seen more clearly through a mirror in which his image is the more clearly expressed. Thus God is seen in a much more perfect manner through His intelligible effects than through those which are only sensible or corporeal. But in his present state man is impeded as regards the full and clear consideration of intelligible creatures, because he is distracted by and occupied with sensible things. Now, it is written (Eccl 7:30): God made man right. And man was made right by God in this sense, that in him the lower powers were subjected to the higher, and the higher nature was made so as not to be impeded by the lower. Wherefore the first man was not impeded by exterior things from a clear and steady contemplation of the intelligible effects which he perceived by the radiation of the first truth, whether by a natural or by a gratuitous knowledge. Hence Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xi, 33) that, perhaps God used to speak to the first man as He speaks to the angels; by shedding on his mind a ray of the unchangeable truth, yet without bestowing on him the experience of which the angels are capable in the participation of the Divine Essence. Therefore, through these intelligible effects of God, man knew God then more clearly than we know Him now. Reply Obj. 1: Man was happy in paradise, but not with that perfect happiness to which he was destined, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. He was, however, endowed with a life of happiness in a certain measure, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xi, 18), so far as he was gifted with natural integrity and perfection.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod bona voluntas est ordinata voluntas. Non autem fuisset primi hominis ordinata voluntas, si in statu meriti habere voluisset quod ei promittebatur pro praemio. Ad tertium dicendum quod duplex est medium. Quoddam, in quo simul videtur quod per medium videri dicitur; sicut cum homo videtur per speculum, et simul videtur cum ipso speculo. Aliud medium est, per cuius notitiam in aliquid ignotum devenimus; sicut est medium demonstrationis. Et sine tali medio Deus videbatur, non tamen sine primo medio. Non enim oportebat primum hominem pervenire in Dei cognitionem per demonstrationem sumptam ab aliquo effectu, sicut nobis est necessarium; sed simul in effectibus, praecipue intelligibilibus, suo modo Deum cognoscebat. Similiter etiam est considerandum quod obscuritas quae importatur in nomine aenigmatis, dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo, secundum quod quaelibet creatura est quoddam obscurum, si comparetur ad immensitatem divinae claritatis, et sic Adam videbat Deum in aenigmate, quia videbat Deum per effectum creatum. Alio modo potest accipi obscuritas quae consecuta est ex peccato, prout scilicet impeditur homo a consideratione intelligibilium per sensibilium occupationem, et secundum hoc, non vidit Deum in aenigmate.

Q. 94, A. 2

Reply Obj. 2: A good will is a well-ordered will; but the will of the first man would have been ill-ordered had he wished to have, while in the state of merit, what had been promised to him as a reward. Reply Obj. 3: A medium (of knowledge) is twofold; one through which, and, at the same time, in which, something is seen, as, for example, a man is seen through a mirror, and is seen with the mirror: another kind of medium is that whereby we attain to the knowledge of something unknown; such as the medium in a demonstration. God was seen without this second kind of medium, but not without the first kind. For there was no need for the first man to attain to the knowledge of God by demonstration drawn from an effect, such as we need; since he knew God simultaneously in His effects, especially in the intelligible effects, according to His capacity. Again, we must remark that the obscurity which is implied in the word enigma may be of two kinds: first, so far as every creature is something obscure when compared with the immensity of the Divine light; and thus Adam saw God in an enigma, because he saw Him in a created effect: second, we may take obscurity as an effect of sin, so far as man is impeded in the consideration of intelligible things by being preoccupied with sensible things; in which sense Adam did not see God in an enigma.

Article 2 Whether Adam in the state of innocence saw the angels through their essence? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Adam in statu innocentiae angelos per essentiam viderit. Dicit enim Gregorius, in IV Dialog., in Paradiso quippe assueverat homo verbis Dei perfrui, beatorum angelorum spiritibus cordis munditia et celsitudine visionis interesse. Praeterea, anima in statu praesenti impeditur a cognitione substantiarum separatarum, ex hoc quod est unita corpori corruptibili, quod aggravat animam, ut dicitur Sap. IX. Unde et anima separata substantias separatas videre potest, ut supra dictum est. Sed anima primi hominis non aggravabatur a corpore, cum non esset corruptibile. Ergo poterat videre substantias separatas.

Objection 1: It would seem that Adam, in the state of innocence, saw the angels through their essence. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv, 1): In paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of God; and by purity of heart and loftiness of vision to have the company of the good angels. Obj. 2: Further, the soul in the present state is impeded from the knowledge of separate substances by union with a corruptible body which is a load upon the soul, as is written Wis. 9:15. Wherefore the separate soul can see separate substances, as above explained (Q. 89, A. 2). But the body of the first man was not a load upon his soul; for the latter was not corruptible. Therefore he was able to see separate substances. Praeterea, una substantia separata cognoscit Obj. 3: Further, one separate substance knows another aliam cognoscendo seipsam, ut dicitur in libro de Cau- separate substance, by knowing itself (De Causis xiii). But sis. Sed anima primi hominis cognoscebat seipsam. Ergo the soul of the first man knew itself. Therefore it knew sepcognoscebat substantias separatas. arate substances. Sed contra, anima Adae fuit eiusdem naturae cum On the contrary, The soul of Adam was of the same animabus nostris. Sed animae nostrae non possunt nunc nature as ours. But our souls cannot now understand sepaintelligere substantias separatas. Ergo nec anima primi rate substances. Therefore neither could Adam’s soul.

hominis potuit.

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Q. 94, A. 2

Man

Respondeo dicendum quod status animae hominis distingui potest dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum diversum modum naturalis esse, et hoc modo distinguitur status animae separatae, a statu animae coniunctae corpori. Alio modo distinguitur status animae secundum integritatem et corruptionem, servato eodem modo essendi secundum naturam, et sic status innocentiae distinguitur a statu hominis post peccatum. Anima enim hominis in statu innocentiae erat corpori perficiendo et gubernando accommodata, sicut et nunc, unde dicitur primus homo factus fuisse in animam viventem, idest corpori vitam dantem, scilicet animalem. Sed huius vitae integritatem habebat, inquantum corpus erat totaliter animae subditum, in nullo ipsam impediens, ut supra dictum est. Manifestum est autem ex praemissis quod ex hoc quod anima est accommodata ad corporis gubernationem et perfectionem secundum animalem vitam, competit animae nostrae talis modus intelligendi, qui est per conversionem ad phantasmata. Unde et hic modus intelligendi etiam animae primi hominis competebat. Secundum autem hunc modum intelligendi, motus quidam invenitur in anima, ut Dionysius dicit IV cap. de Div. Nom., secundum tres gradus. Quorum primus est, secundum quod a rebus exterioribus congregatur anima ad seipsam; secundus autem est, prout anima ascendit ad hoc quod uniatur virtutibus superioribus unitis, scilicet angelis; tertius autem gradus est, secundum quod ulterius manuducitur ad bonum quod est supra omnia, scilicet Deum. Secundum igitur primum processum animae, qui est a rebus exterioribus ad seipsam, perficitur animae cognitio. Quia scilicet intellectualis operatio animae naturalem ordinem habet ad ea quae sunt extra, ut supra dictum est, et ita per eorum cognitionem perfecte cognosci potest nostra intellectualis operatio, sicut actus per obiectum. Et per ipsam intellectualem operationem perfecte potest cognosci humanus intellectus, sicut potentia per proprium actum. Sed in secundo processu non invenitur perfecta cognitio. Quia, cum angelus non intelligat per conversionem ad phantasmata, sed longe eminentiori modo, ut supra dictum est; praedictus modus cognoscendi, quo anima cognoscit seipsam, non sufficienter ducit in angeli cognitionem. Multo autem minus tertius processus ad perfectam notitiam terminatur, quia etiam ipsi angeli, per hoc quod cognoscunt seipsos, non possunt pertingere ad cognitionem divinae substantiae propter eius excessum. Sic igitur anima primi hominis non poterat videre angelos per essentiam. Sed tamen excellentiorem modum cognitionis habebat de eis, quam nos habeamus, quia eius cognitio erat magis certa et fixa circa interiora intelligibilia, quam cognitio nostra. Et propter tantam eminentiam dicit Gregorius quod intererat angelorum spiritibus.

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I answer that, The state of the human soul may be distinguished in two ways. First, from a diversity of mode in its natural existence; and in this point the state of the separate soul is distinguished from the state of the soul joined to the body. Second, the state of the soul is distinguished in relation to integrity and corruption, the state of natural existence remaining the same: and thus the state of innocence is distinct from the state of man after sin. For man’s soul, in the state of innocence, was adapted to perfect and govern the body; wherefore the first man is said to have been made into a living soul; that is, a soul giving life to the body— namely animal life. But he was endowed with integrity as to this life, in that the body was entirely subject to the soul, hindering it in no way, as we have said above (A. 1). Now it is clear from what has been already said (Q. 84, A. 7; Q. 85, A. 1; Q. 89, A. 1) that since the soul is adapted to perfect and govern the body, as regards animal life, it is fitting that it should have that mode of understanding which is by turning to phantasms. Wherefore this mode of understanding was becoming to the soul of the first man also. Now, in virtue of this mode of understanding, there are three degrees of movement in the soul, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The first is by the soul passing from exterior things to concentrate its powers on itself ; the second is by the soul ascending so as to be associated with the united superior powers, namely the angels; the third is when the soul is led on yet further to the supreme good, that is, to God.

In virtue of the first movement of the soul from exterior things to itself, the soul’s knowledge is perfected. This is because the intellectual operation of the soul has a natural order to external things, as we have said above (Q. 87, A. 3): and so by the knowledge thereof, our intellectual operation can be known perfectly, as an act through its object. And through the intellectual operation itself, the human intellect can be known perfectly, as a power through its proper act. But in the second movement we do not find perfect knowledge. Because, since the angel does not understand by turning to phantasms, but by a far more excellent process, as we have said above (Q. 55, A. 2); the abovementioned mode of knowledge, by which the soul knows itself, is not sufficient to lead it to the knowledge of an angel. Much less does the third movement lead to perfect knowledge: for even the angels themselves, by the fact that they know themselves, are not able to arrive at the knowledge of the Divine Substance, by reason of its surpassing excellence. Therefore the soul of the first man could not see the angels in their essence. Nevertheless he had a more excellent mode of knowledge regarding the angels than we possess, because his knowledge of intelligible things within him was more certain and fixed than our knowledge. And it was on account of this excellence of knowledge that Gregory says that he enjoyed the company of the angelic spirits.

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Unde patet solutio ad primum. Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc quod anima primi hominis deficiebat ab intellectu substantiarum separatarum, non erat ex aggravatione corporis; sed ex hoc quod obiectum ei connaturale erat deficiens ab excellentia substantiarum separatarum. Nos autem deficimus propter utrumque. Ad tertium dicendum quod anima primi hominis non poterat per cognitionem sui ipsius pertingere ad cognoscendas substantias separatas, ut supra dictum est, quia etiam unaquaeque substantia separata cognoscit aliam per modum sui ipsius.

Q. 94, A. 3

This makes clear the reply to the first objection. Reply Obj. 2: That the soul of the first man fell short of the knowledge regarding separate substances, was not owing to the fact that the body was a load upon it; but to the fact that its connatural object fell short of the excellence of separate substances. We, in our present state, fall short on account of both these reasons. Reply Obj. 3: The soul of the first man was not able to arrive at knowledge of separate substances by means of its self-knowledge, as we have shown above; for even each separate substance knows others in its own measure.

Article 3 Whether the first man knew all things? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod primus homo non habuerit scientiam omnium. Aut enim habuit talem scientiam per species acquisitas, aut per species connaturales, aut per species infusas. Non autem per species acquisitas, huiusmodi enim cognitio ab experientia causatur, ut dicitur in I Metaphys.; ipse autem non tunc fuerat omnia expertus. Similiter etiam nec per species connaturales, quia erat eiusdem naturae nobiscum; anima autem nostra est sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Si autem per species infusas, ergo scientia eius quam habebat de rebus, non erat eiusdem rationis cum scientia nostra, quam a rebus acquirimus. Praeterea, in omnibus individuis eiusdem speciei est idem modus consequendi perfectionem. Sed alii homines non statim in sui principio habent omnium scientiam, sed eam per temporis successionem acquirunt secundum suum modum. Ergo nec Adam, statim formatus, habuit omnium scientiam. Praeterea, status praesentis vitae homini conceditur ut in eo proficiat anima et quantum ad cognitionem, et quantum ad meritum; propter hoc enim anima corpori videtur esse unita. Sed homo in statu illo profecisset quantum ad meritum. Ergo etiam profecisset quantum ad cognitionem rerum. Non ergo habuit omnium rerum scientiam. Sed contra est quod ipse imposuit nomina animalibus, ut dicitur Gen. II. Nomina autem debent naturis rerum congruere. Ergo Adam scivit naturas omnium animalium, et pari ratione, habuit omnium aliorum scientiam. Respondeo dicendum quod naturali ordine perfectum praecedit imperfectum, sicut et actus potentiam, quia ea quae sunt in potentia, non reducuntur ad actum nisi per aliquod ens actu. Et quia res primitus a Deo in-

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man did not know all things. For if he had such knowledge it would be either by acquired species, or by connatural species, or by infused species. Not, however, by acquired species; for this kind of knowledge is acquired by experience, as stated in Metaph. i, 1; and the first man had not then gained experience of all things. Nor through connatural species, because he was of the same nature as we are; and our soul, as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4), is like a clean tablet on which nothing is written. And if his knowledge came by infused species, it would have been of a different kind from ours, which we acquire from things themselves. Obj. 2: Further, individuals of the same species have the same way of arriving at perfection. Now other men have not, from the beginning, knowledge of all things, but they acquire it in the course of time according to their capacity. Therefore neither did Adam know all things when he was first created. Obj. 3: Further, the present state of life is given to man in order that his soul may advance in knowledge and merit; indeed, the soul seems to be united to the body for that purpose. Now man would have advanced in merit in that state of life; therefore also in knowledge. Therefore he was not endowed with knowledge of all things. On the contrary, Man named the animals (Gen 2:20). But names should be adapted to the nature of things. Therefore Adam knew the animals’ natures; and in like manner he was possessed of the knowledge of all other things. I answer that, In the natural order, perfection comes before imperfection, as act precedes potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality is made actual only by something actual. And since God created things not only for their own

443

Q. 94, A. 3

Man

stitutae sunt, non solum ut in seipsis essent, sed etiam ut essent aliorum principia; ideo productae sunt in statu perfecto, in quo possent esse principia aliorum. Homo autem potest esse principium alterius non solum per generationem corporalem, sed etiam per instructionem et gubernationem. Et ideo, sicut primus homo institutus est in statu perfecto quantum ad corpus, ut statim posset generare; ita etiam institutus est in statu perfecto quantum ad animam, ut statim posset alios instruere et gubernare. Non potest autem aliquis instruere, nisi habeat scientiam. Et ideo primus homo sic institutus est a Deo, ut haberet omnium scientiam in quibus homo natus est instrui. Et haec sunt omnia illa quae virtualiter existunt in primis principiis per se notis, quaecumque scilicet naturaliter homines cognoscere possunt. Ad gubernationem autem vitae propriae et aliorum, non solum requiritur cognitio eorum quae naturaliter sciri possunt, sed etiam cognitio eorum quae naturalem cognitionem excedunt; eo quod vita hominis ordinatur ad quendam finem supernaturalem; sicut nobis, ad gubernationem vitae nostrae, necessarium est cognoscere quae fidei sunt. Unde et de his supernaturalibus tantam cognitionem primus homo accepit, quanta erat necessaria ad gubernationem vitae humanae secundum statum illum. Alia vero, quae nec naturali hominis studio cognosci possunt, nec sunt necessaria ad gubernationem vitae humanae, primus homo non cognovit; sicut sunt cogitationes hominum, futura contingentia, et quaedam singularia, puta quot lapilli iaceant in flumine, et alia huiusmodi. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod primus homo habuit scientiam omnium per species a Deo infusas. Nec tamen scientia illa fuit alterius rationis a scientia nostra; sicut nec oculi quos caeco nato Christus dedit, fuerunt alterius rationis ab oculis quos natura produxit. Ad secundum dicendum quod Adam debebat aliquid habere perfectionis, inquantum erat primus homo, quod ceteris hominibus non competit; ut ex dictis patet. Ad tertium dicendum quod Adam in scientia naturalium scibilium non profecisset quantum ad numerum scitorum, sed quantum ad modum sciendi, quia quae sciebat intellectualiter, scivisset postmodum per experimentum. Quantum vero ad supernaturalia cognita, profecisset etiam quantum ad numerum, per novas revelationes; sicut et angeli proficiunt per novas illuminationes. Nec tamen est simile de profectu meriti, et scientiae, quia unus homo non est alteri principium merendi, sicut est sciendi.

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existence, but also that they might be the principles of other things; so creatures were produced in their perfect state to be the principles as regards others. Now man can be the principle of another man, not only by generation of the body, but also by instruction and government. Hence, as the first man was produced in his perfect state, as regards his body, for the work of generation, so also was his soul established in a perfect state to instruct and govern others.

Now no one can instruct others unless he has knowledge, and so the first man was established by God in such a manner as to have knowledge of all those things for which man has a natural aptitude. And such are whatever are virtually contained in the first self-evident principles, that is, whatever truths man is naturally able to know. Moreover, in order to direct his own life and that of others, man needs to know not only those things which can be naturally known, but also things surpassing natural knowledge; because the life of man is directed to a supernatural end: just as it is necessary for us to know the truths of faith in order to direct our own lives. Wherefore the first man was endowed with such a knowledge of these supernatural truths as was necessary for the direction of human life in that state. But those things which cannot be known by merely human effort, and which are not necessary for the direction of human life, were not known by the first man; such as the thoughts of men, future contingent events, and some individual facts, as for instance the number of pebbles in a stream; and the like. Reply Obj. 1: The first man had knowledge of all things by divinely infused species. Yet his knowledge was not different from ours; as the eyes which Christ gave to the man born blind were not different from those given by nature. Reply Obj. 2: To Adam, as being the first man, was due a degree of perfection which was not due to other men, as is clear from what is above explained. Reply Obj. 3: Adam would have advanced in natural knowledge, not in the number of things known, but in the manner of knowing; because what he knew speculatively he would subsequently have known by experience. But as regards supernatural knowledge, he would also have advanced as regards the number of things known, by further revelation; as the angels advance by further enlightenment. Moreover there is no comparison between advance in knowledge and advance in merit; since one man cannot be a principle of merit to another, although he can be to another a principle of knowledge.

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Q. 94, A. 4

Article 4 Whether man in his first state could be deceived? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in primo statu decipi potuisset. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Tim. II, quod mulier seducta in praevaricatione fuit. Praeterea, Magister dicit, XXI dist. II Sent., quod ideo mulier non horruit serpentem loquentem, quia officium loquendi eum accepisse a Deo putavit. Sed hoc falsum erat. Ergo mulier decepta fuit ante peccatum. Praeterea, naturale est quod quanto aliquid remotius videtur, tanto minus videtur. Sed natura oculi non est contracta per peccatum. Ergo hoc idem in statu innocentiae contigisset. Fuisset ergo homo deceptus circa quantitatem rei visae, sicut et modo. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod in somno adhaeret anima similitudini tanquam ipsi rei. Sed homo in statu innocentiae comedisset, et per consequens dormivisset et somniasset. Ergo deceptus fuisset, adhaerendo similitudinibus tanquam rebus. Praeterea, primus homo nescivisset cogitationes hominum et futura contingentia, ut dictum est. Si igitur aliquis super his sibi falsum diceret, deceptus fuisset. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, approbare vera pro falsis, non est natura instituti hominis, sed poena damnati. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod in nomine deceptionis duo possunt intelligi, scilicet qualiscumque existimatio levis, qua aliquis adhaeret falso tanquam vero, sine assensu credulitatis; et iterum firma credulitas. Quantum ergo ad ea quorum scientiam Adam habebat, neutro istorum modorum homo decipi poterat ante peccatum. Sed quantum ad ea quorum scientiam non habebat, decipi poterat, large accepta deceptione pro existimatione qualicumque sine assensu credulitatis. Quod ideo dicunt, quia existimare falsum in talibus, non est noxium homini; et ex quo temere assensus non adhibetur, non est culpabile. Sed haec positio non convenit integritati primi status, quia, ut Augustinus dicit XIV de Civit. Dei, in illo statu erat devitatio tranquilla peccati, qua manente, nullum malum omnino esse poterat. Manifestum est autem quod, sicut verum est bonum intellectus, ita falsum est malum eius, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Unde non poterat esse quod, innocentia manente, intellectus hominis alicui falso acquiesceret quasi vero. Sicut enim in membris corporis primi hominis erat quidem carentia perfectionis

Objection 1: It would seem that man in his primitive state could have been deceived. For the Apostle says (1 Tim 2:14) that the woman being seduced was in the transgression. Obj. 2: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxi) that, the woman was not frightened at the serpent speaking, because she thought that he had received the faculty of speech from God. But this was untrue. Therefore before sin the woman was deceived. Obj. 3: Further, it is natural that the farther off anything is from us, the smaller it seems to be. Now, the nature of the eyes is not changed by sin. Therefore this would have been the case in the state of innocence. Wherefore man would have been deceived in the size of what he saw, just as he is deceived now. Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 2) that, in sleep the soul adheres to the images of things as if they were the things themselves. But in the state of innocence man would have eaten and consequently have slept and dreamed. Therefore he would have been deceived, adhering to images as to realities. Obj. 5: Further, the first man would have been ignorant of other men’s thoughts, and of future contingent events, as stated above (A. 3). So if anyone had told him what was false about these things, he would have been deceived. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): To regard what is true as false, is not natural to man as created; but is a punishment of man condemned. I answer that, in the opinion of some, deception may mean two things; namely, any slight surmise, in which one adheres to what is false, as though it were true, but without the assent of belief—or it may mean a firm belief. Thus before sin Adam could not be deceived in either of these ways as regards those things to which his knowledge extended; but as regards things to which his knowledge did not extend, he might have been deceived, if we take deception in the wide sense of the term for any surmise without assent of belief. This opinion was held with the idea that it is not derogatory to man to entertain a false opinion in such matters, and that provided he does not assent rashly, he is not to be blamed. Such an opinion, however, is not fitting as regards the integrity of the primitive state of life; because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), in that state of life sin was avoided without struggle, and while it remained so, no evil could exist. Now it is clear that as truth is the good of the intellect, so falsehood is its evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2). So that, as long as the state of innocence continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to assent to falsehood as if it were truth. For as some perfections, such as clarity, were

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Q. 94, A. 4

Man

alicuius, puta claritatis, non tamen aliquod malum inesse poterat; ita in intellectu poterat esse carentia notitiae alicuius, nulla tamen poterat ibi esse existimatio falsi. Quod etiam ex ipsa rectitudine primi status apparet, secundum quam, quandiu anima maneret Deo subdita, tandiu in homine inferiora superioribus subderentur, nec superiora per inferiora impedirentur. Manifestum est autem ex praemissis quod intellectus circa proprium obiectum semper verus est. Unde ex seipso nunquam decipitur, sed omnis deceptio accidit in intellectu ex aliquo inferiori, puta phantasia vel aliquo huiusmodi. Unde videmus quod, quando naturale iudicatorium non est ligatum, non decipimur per huiusmodi apparitiones, sed solum quando ligatur, ut patet in dormientibus. Unde manifestum est quod rectitudo primi status non compatiebatur aliquam deceptionem circa intellectum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa seductio mulieris, etsi praecesserit peccatum operis, subsecuta tamen est peccatum internae elationis. Dicit enim Augustinus, XI super Gen. ad Litt., quod mulier verbis serpentis non crederet, nisi iam inesset menti eius amor propriae potestatis, et quaedam de se superba praesumptio. Ad secundum dicendum quod mulier putavit serpentem hoc accepisse loquendi officium, non per naturam, sed aliqua supernaturali operatione. Quamvis non sit necessarium auctoritatem Magistri sententiarum sequi in hac parte. Ad tertium dicendum quod, si aliquid repraesentatum fuisset sensui vel phantasiae primi hominis aliter quam sit in rerum natura, non tamen deciperetur, quia per rationem veritatem diiudicaret. Ad quartum dicendum quod id quod accidit in somno, non imputatur homini, quia non habet usum rationis, qui est proprius hominis actus. Ad quintum dicendum quod alicui dicenti falsum de contingentibus futuris vel cogitationibus cordium, homo in statu innocentiae non credidisset ita esse, sed credidisset quod hoc esset possibile, et hoc non esset existimare falsum. Vel potest dici quod divinitus ei subventum fuisset, ne deciperetur in his quorum scientiam non habebat.

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lacking in the bodily members of the first man, though no evil could be therein; so there could be in his intellect the absence of some knowledge, but no false opinion. This is clear also from the very rectitude of the primitive state, by virtue of which, while the soul remained subject to God, the lower faculties in man were subject to the higher, and were no impediment to their action. And from what has preceded (Q. 85, A. 6), it is clear that as regards its proper object the intellect is ever true; and hence it is never deceived of itself; but whatever deception occurs must be ascribed to some lower faculty, such as the imagination or the like. Hence we see that when the natural power of judgment is free we are not deceived by such images, but only when it is not free, as is the case in sleep. Therefore it is clear that the rectitude of the primitive state was incompatible with deception of the intellect. Reply Obj. 1: Though the woman was deceived before she sinned in deed, still it was not till she had already sinned by interior pride. For Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xi, 30) that the woman could not have believed the words of the serpent, had she not already acquiesced in the love of her own power, and in a presumption of self-conceit. Reply Obj. 2: The woman thought that the serpent had received this faculty, not as acting in accordance with nature, but by virtue of some supernatural operation. We need not, however, follow the Master of the Sentences in this point. Reply Obj. 3: Were anything presented to the imagination or sense of the first man, not in accordance with the nature of things, he would not have been deceived, for his reason would have enabled him to judge the truth. Reply Obj. 4: A man is not accountable for what occurs during sleep; as he has not then the use of his reason, wherein consists man’s proper action. Reply Obj. 5: If anyone had said something untrue as regards future contingencies, or as regards secret thoughts, man in the primitive state would not have believed it was so: but he might have believed that such a thing was possible; which would not have been to entertain a false opinion. It might also be said that he would have been divinely guided from above, so as not to be deceived in a matter to which his knowledge did not extend. Nec est instantia, quam quidam afferunt, quod in If any object, as some do, that he was not guided, when tentatione non fuit ei subventum ne deciperetur, licet tempted, though he was then most in need of guidance, we tunc maxime indigeret. Quia iam praecesserat peccatum reply that man had already sinned in his heart, and that he in animo, et ad divinum auxilium recursum non habuit. failed to have recourse to the Divine aid.

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Question 95 Things Pertaining to the First Man’s Will Deinde considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad We next consider what belongs to the will of the first voluntatem primi hominis. Et circa hoc consideranda man; concerning which there are two points of treatment: sunt duo, primo quidem, de gratia et iustitia primi ho- (1) the grace and righteousness of the first man; (2) the use minis; secundo, de usu iustitiae quantum ad dominium of righteousness as regards his dominion over other things. super alia. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum primus homo creatus fuerit in gratia. (1) Whether the first man was created in grace? Secundo, utrum in statu innocentiae habuerit (2) Whether in the state of innocence he had passions animae passiones. of the soul? Tertio, utrum habuit virtutes omnes. (3) Whether he had all virtues? Quarto, utrum opera eius fuissent aeque efficacia ad (4) Whether what he did would have been as merendum, sicut modo sunt. meritorious as now?

Article 1 Whether the first man was created in grace? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod primus homo non fuerit creatus in gratia. Apostolus enim, I Cor. XV, distinguens Adam a Christo, dicit, Factus est primus Adam in animam viventem; novissimus autem in spiritum vivificantem. Sed vivificatio spiritus est per gratiam. Ergo hoc est proprium Christi, quod fuerit factus in gratia. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Quaestionibus Veteris et Novi Testamenti, quod Adam non habuit spiritum sanctum. Sed quicumque habet gratiam, habet spiritum sanctum. Ergo Adam non fuit creatus in gratia. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Correptione et Gratia, quod Deus sic ordinavit angelorum et hominum vitam, ut prius in eis ostenderet quid posset eorum liberum arbitrium, deinde quid posset suae gratiae beneficium, iustitiaeque iudicium. Primo ergo condidit hominem et angelum in sola naturali arbitrii libertate, et postmodum eis gratiam contulit. Praeterea, Magister dicit, in XXIV distinctione libri II Sent., quod homini in creatione datum est auxilium per quod stare poterat, sed non poterat proficere. Quicumque autem habet gratiam, potest proficere per meritum. Ergo primus homo non fuit creatus in gratia. Praeterea, ad hoc quod aliquis accipiat gratiam, requiritur consensus ex parte recipientis, cum per hoc perficiatur matrimonium quoddam spirituale inter Deum et animam. Sed consensus in gratiam esse non potest nisi prius existentis. Ergo homo non accepit gratiam in primo instanti suae creationis.

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man was not created in grace. For the Apostle, distinguishing between Adam and Christ, says (1 Cor 15:45): The first Adam was made into a living soul; the last Adam into a quickening spirit. But the spirit is quickened by grace. Therefore Christ alone was made in grace. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., Q. 123) that Adam did not possess the Holy Spirit. But whoever possesses grace has the Holy Spirit. Therefore Adam was not created in grace. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. x) that God so ordered the life of the angels and men, as to show first what they could do by free-will, then what they could do by His grace, and by the discernment of righteousness. God thus first created men and angels in the state of natural freewill only; and afterwards bestowed grace on them. Obj. 4: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxiv): When man was created he was given sufficient help to stand, but not sufficient to advance. But whoever has grace can advance by merit. Therefore the first man was not created in grace. Obj. 5: Further, the reception of grace requires the consent of the recipient, since thereby a kind of spiritual marriage takes place between God and the soul. But consent presupposes existence. Therefore man did not receive grace in the first moment of his creation.

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Praeterea, natura plus distat a gratia quam gratia a gloria, quae nihil est aliud quam gratia consummata. Sed in homine gratia praecessit gloriam. Ergo multo magis natura praecessit gratiam. Sed contra, homo et angelus aequaliter ordinantur ad gratiam. Sed angelus est creatus in gratia, dicit enim Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei, quod Deus simul erat in eis condens naturam et largiens gratiam. Ergo et homo creatus fuit in gratia. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod primus homo non fuit quidem creatus in gratia, sed tamen postmodum gratia fuit sibi collata antequam peccasset, plurimae enim sanctorum auctoritates attestantur hominem in statu innocentiae gratiam habuisse. Sed quod etiam fuerit conditus in gratia, ut alii dicunt, videtur requirere ipsa rectitudo primi status, in qua Deus hominem fecit, secundum illud Eccle. VII, Deus fecit hominem rectum. Erat enim haec rectitudo secundum hoc, quod ratio subdebatur Deo, rationi vero inferiores vires, et animae corpus. Prima autem subiectio erat causa et secundae et tertiae, quandiu enim ratio manebat Deo subiecta, inferiora ei subdebantur, ut Augustinus dicit. Manifestum est autem quod illa subiectio corporis ad animam, et inferiorum virium ad rationem, non erat naturalis, alioquin post peccatum mansisset, cum etiam in daemonibus data naturalia post peccatum permanserint, ut Dionysius dicit cap. IV de Div. Nom. Unde manifestum est quod et illa prima subiectio, qua ratio Deo subdebatur, non erat solum secundum naturam, sed secundum supernaturale donum gratiae, non enim potest esse quod effectus sit potior quam causa. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIII de Civ. Dei, quod posteaquam praecepti facta transgressio est, confestim, gratia deserente divina, de corporum suorum nuditate confusi sunt, senserunt enim motum inobedientis carnis suae, tanquam reciprocam poenam inobedientiae suae. Ex quo datur intelligi, si deserente gratia soluta est obedientia carnis ad animam, quod per gratiam in anima existentem inferiora ei subdebantur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus illa verba inducit ad ostendendum esse corpus spirituale, si est corpus animale, quia vita spiritualis corporis incoepit in Christo, qui est primogenitus ex mortuis, sicut vita corporis animalis incoepit in Adam. Non ergo ex verbis apostoli habetur quod Adam non fuit spiritualis secundum animam; sed quod non fuit spiritualis secundum corpus. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in eodem loco, non negatur quin aliquo modo fuerit in Adam Spiritus Sanctus, sicut et in aliis iustis, sed quod non sic fuerit in eo, sicut nunc est in fidelibus, qui admittuntur ad perceptionem haereditatis aeternae statim post mortem.

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Obj. 6: Further, nature is more distant from grace than grace is from glory, which is but grace consummated. But in man grace precedes glory. Therefore much more did nature precede grace. On the contrary, Man and angel are both ordained to grace. But the angels were created in grace, for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9): God at the same time fashioned their nature and endowed them with grace. Therefore man also was created in grace. I answer that, Some say that man was not created in grace; but that it was bestowed on him subsequently before sin: and many authorities of the Saints declare that man possessed grace in the state of innocence. But the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was endowed by God, seems to require that, as others say, he was created in grace, according to Eccles. 7:30, God made man right. For this rectitude consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul: and the first subjection was the cause of both the second and the third; since while reason was subject to God, the lower powers remained subject to reason, as Augustine says. Now it is clear that such a subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it would have remained after sin; since even in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declared (Div. Nom. iv). Hence it is clear that also the primitive subjection by virtue of which reason was subject to God, was not a merely natural gift, but a supernatural endowment of grace; for it is not possible that the effect should be of greater efficiency than the cause. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13) that, as soon as they disobeyed the Divine command, and forfeited Divine grace, they were ashamed of their nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh, as though it were a punishment corresponding to their own disobedience. Hence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the soul through grace existing therein. Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle in these words means to show that there is a spiritual body, if there is an animal body, inasmuch as the spiritual life of the body began in Christ, who is the firstborn of the dead, as the body’s animal life began in Adam. From the Apostle’s words, therefore, we cannot gather that Adam had no spiritual life in his soul; but that he had not spiritual life as regards the body. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says in the same passage, it is not disputed that Adam, like other just souls, was in some degree gifted with the Holy Spirit; but he did not possess the Holy Spirit, as the faithful possess Him now, who are admitted to eternal happiness directly after death.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod ex illa auctoritate Augustini non habetur quod angelus vel homo prius fuerit creatus in naturali libertate arbitrii, quam habuisset gratiam, sed quod prius ostendit quid in eis posset liberum arbitrium ante confirmationem, et quid postmodum consecuti sunt per auxilium gratiae confirmantis. Ad quartum dicendum quod Magister loquitur secundum opinionem illorum qui posuerunt hominem non esse creatum in gratia, sed in naturalibus tantum. Vel potest dici quod, etsi homo fuerit creatus in gratia, non tamen habuit ex creatione naturae quod posset proficere per meritum, sed ex superadditione gratiae. Ad quintum dicendum quod, cum motus voluntatis non sit continuus, nihil prohibet etiam in primo instanti suae creationis primum hominem gratiae consensisse. Ad sextum dicendum quod gloriam meremur per actum gratiae, non autem gratiam per actum naturae. Unde non est similis ratio.

Q. 95, A. 2

Reply Obj. 3: This passage from Augustine does not assert that angels or men were created with natural free-will before they possessed grace; but that God shows first what their free-will could do before being confirmed in grace, and what they acquired afterwards by being so confirmed. Reply Obj. 4: The Master here speaks according to the opinion of those who held that man was not created in grace, but only in a state of nature. We may also say that, though man was created in grace, yet it was not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created that he could advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added. Reply Obj. 5: As the motion of the will is not continuous there is nothing against the first man having consented to grace even in the first moment of his existence. Reply Obj. 6: We merit glory by an act of grace; but we do not merit grace by an act of nature; hence the comparison fails.

Article 2 Whether passions existed in the soul of the first man? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in primo homine non fuerint animae passiones. Secundum enim passiones animae contingit quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum. Sed hoc non erat in statu innocentiae. Ergo in statu innocentiae non erant animae passiones. Praeterea, anima Adae erat nobilior quam corpus. Sed corpus Adae fuit impassibile. Ergo nec in anima eius fuerunt passiones. Praeterea, per virtutem moralem comprimuntur animae passiones. Sed in Adam fuit virtus moralis perfecta. Ergo totaliter passiones excludebantur ab eo. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod erat in eis amor imperturbatus in Deum, et quaedam aliae animae passiones. Respondeo dicendum quod passiones animae sunt in appetitu sensuali, cuius obiectum est bonum et malum. Unde omnium passionum animae quaedam ordinantur ad bonum, ut amor et gaudium; quaedam ad malum, ut timor et dolor. Et quia in primo statu nullum malum aderat nec imminebat; nec aliquod bonum aberat, quod cuperet bona voluntas pro tempore illo habendum, ut patet per Augustinum XIV de Civ. Dei, omnes illae passiones quae respiciunt malum, in Adam non erant ut timor et dolor et huiusmodi; similiter nec illae passiones quae respiciunt bonum non habitum et nunc habendum, ut cupiditas aestuans. Illae vero passiones quae possunt esse boni praesentis, ut gaudium et amor; vel quae sunt futuri boni ut suo tempore ha-

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man’s soul had no passions. For by the passions of the soul the flesh lusteth against the spirit (Gal 5:7). But this did not happen in the state of innocence. Therefore in the state of innocence there were no passions of the soul. Obj. 2: Further, Adam’s soul was nobler than his body. But his body was impassible. Therefore no passions were in his soul. Obj. 3: Further, the passions of the soul are restrained by the moral virtues. But in Adam the moral virtues were perfect. Therefore the passions were entirely excluded from him. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10) that in our first parents there was undisturbed love of God, and other passions of the soul. I answer that, The passions of the soul are in the sensual appetite, the object of which is good and evil. Wherefore some passions of the soul are directed to what is good, as love and joy; others to what is evil, as fear and sorrow. And since in the primitive state, evil was neither present nor imminent, nor was any good wanting which a goodwill could desire to have then, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), therefore Adam had no passion with evil as its object; such as fear, sorrow, and the like; neither had he passions in respect of good not possessed, but to be possessed then, as burning concupiscence. But those passions which regard present good, as joy and love; or which regard future good to be had at the proper time, as desire and hope that casteth not down, existed in the state of inno-

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Q. 95, A. 3

Man

bendi, ut desiderium et spes non affligens; fuerunt in statu innocentiae. Aliter tamen quam in nobis. Nam in nobis appetitus sensualis, in quo sunt passiones, non totaliter subest rationi, unde passiones quandoque sunt in nobis praevenientes iudicium rationis, et impedientes; quandoque vero ex iudicio rationis consequentes, prout sensualis appetitus aliqualiter rationi obedit. In statu vero innocentiae inferior appetitus erat rationi totaliter subiectus, unde non erant in eo passiones animae, nisi ex rationis iudicio consequentes. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, per hoc quod passiones rationi repugnant, quod in statu innocentiae non erat. Ad secundum dicendum quod corpus humanum in statu innocentiae erat impassibile quantum ad passiones quae removent dispositionem naturalem, ut infra dicetur. Et similiter anima fuit impassibilis quantum ad passiones quae impediunt rationem. Ad tertium dicendum quod perfecta virtus moralis non totaliter tollit passiones, sed ordinat eas, temperati enim est concupiscere sicut oportet, et quae oportet, ut dicitur in III Ethic.

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cence; otherwise, however, than as they exist in ourselves. For our sensual appetite, wherein the passions reside, is not entirely subject to reason; hence at times our passions forestall and hinder reason’s judgment; at other times they follow reason’s judgment, accordingly as the sensual appetite obeys reason to some extent. But in the state of innocence the inferior appetite was wholly subject to reason: so that in that state the passions of the soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason. Reply Obj. 1: The flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of the passions against reason; which could not occur in the state of innocence. Reply Obj. 2: The human body was impassible in the state of innocence as regards the passions which alter the disposition of nature, as will be explained later on (Q. 97, A. 2); likewise the soul was impassible as regards the passions which impede the free use of reason. Reply Obj. 3: Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away the passions, but regulates them; for the temperate man desires as he ought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated in Ethic. iii, 11.

Article 3 Whether Adam had all the virtues? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Adam non habuerit omnes virtutes. Quaedam enim virtutes ordinantur ad refraenandam immoderantiam passionum; sicut per temperantiam refraenatur immoderata concupiscentia, et per fortitudinem immoderatus timor. Sed immoderantia passionum non erat in statu innocentiae. Ergo nec dictae virtutes. Praeterea, quaedam virtutes sunt circa passiones respicientes malum; ut mansuetudo circa iras, et fortitudo circa timores. Sed tales passiones non erant in statu innocentiae, ut dictum est. Ergo nec huiusmodi virtutes.

Objection 1: It would seem that Adam had not all the virtues. For some virtues are directed to curb passions: thus immoderate concupiscence is restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by fortitude. But in the state of innocence no immoderation existed in the passions. Therefore neither did these virtues then exist.

Obj. 2: Further, some virtues are concerned with the passions which have evil as their object; as meekness with anger; fortitude with fear. But these passions did not exist in the state of innocence, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore neither did those virtues exist then. Praeterea, poenitentia est quaedam virtus respiObj. 3: Further, penance is a virtue that regards sin ciens peccatum prius commissum. Misericordia etiam committed. Mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with unhapest quaedam virtus respiciens miseriam. Sed in statu in- piness. But in the state of innocence neither sin nor unhapnocentiae non erat peccatum nec miseria. Ergo neque piness existed. Therefore neither did those virtues exist.

huiusmodi virtutes. Praeterea, perseverantia est quaedam virtus. Sed hanc Adam non habuit; ut sequens peccatum ostendit. Ergo non habuit omnes virtutes. Praeterea, fides quaedam virtus est. Sed haec in statu innocentiae non fuit, importat enim aenigmaticam cognitionem, quae perfectioni primi status repugnare videtur. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in quadam Homilia, princeps vitiorum devicit Adam de limo terrae

Obj. 4: Further, perseverance is a virtue. But Adam possessed it not; as proved by his subsequent sin. Therefore he possessed not every virtue. Obj. 5: Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state of innocence; for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which seems to be incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state. On the contrary, Augustine says, in a homily (Serm. contra Judaeos): The prince of sin overcame Adam who

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Q. 95, A. 3

ad imaginem Dei factum, pudicitia armatum, temperan- was made from the slime of the earth to the image of God, tia compositum, claritate splendidum. adorned with modesty, restrained by temperance, refulgent with brightness. Respondeo dicendum quod homo in statu innoI answer that, in the state of innocence man in a cercentiae aliqualiter habuit omnes virtutes. Et hoc ex dic- tain sense possessed all the virtues; and this can be proved tis potest esse manifestum. Dictum est enim supra quod from what precedes. For it was shown above (A. 1) that talis erat rectitudo primi status, quod ratio erat Deo su- such was the rectitude of the primitive state, that reason was biecta, inferiores autem vires rationi. Virtutes autem ni- subject to God, and the lower powers to reason. Now the hil aliud sunt quam perfectiones quaedam, quibus ratio virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby reason is ordinatur in Deum, et inferiores vires disponuntur se- directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated accordcundum regulam rationis; ut magis patebit cum de vir- ing to the dictate of reason, as will be explained in the Treatutibus agetur. Unde rectitudo primi status exigebat ut tise on the Virtues (I-II, Q. 63, A. 2). Wherefore the rectihomo aliqualiter omnes virtutes haberet. tude of the primitive state required that man should in a sense possess every virtue. Sed considerandum est quod virtutum quaedam It must, however, be noted that some virtues of their sunt, quae de sui ratione nullam imperfectionem impor- very nature do not involve imperfection, such as charity tant, ut caritas et iustitia. Et huiusmodi virtutes fuerunt and justice; and these virtues did exist in the primitive state in statu innocentiae simpliciter, et quantum ad habitum absolutely, both in habit and in act. But other virtues are of et quantum ad actum. Quaedam vero sunt, quae de sui such a nature as to imply imperfection either in their act, ratione imperfectionem important, vel ex parte actus vel or on the part of the matter. If such imperfection be consisex parte materiae. Et si huiusmodi imperfectio non re- tent with the perfection of the primitive state, such virtues pugnat perfectioni primi status, nihilominus huiusmodi necessarily existed in that state; as faith, which is of things virtutes poterant esse in primo statu; sicut fides, quae est not seen, and hope, which is of things not yet possessed. For eorum quae non videntur, et spes, quae est eorum quae the perfection of that state did not extend to the vision of non habentur. Perfectio enim primi status non se exten- the Divine Essence, and the possession of God with the endebat ad hoc, ut videret Deum per essentiam, et ut ha- joyment of final beatitude. Hence faith and hope could exberet eum cum fruitione finalis beatitudinis, unde fides ist in the primitive state, both as to habit and as to act. But et spes esse poterant in primo statu, et quantum ad habi- any virtue which implies imperfection incompatible with tum et quantum ad actum. Si vero imperfectio quae est the perfection of the primitive state, could exist in that state de ratione virtutis alicuius, repugnat perfectioni primi as a habit, but not as to the act; for instance, penance, which status, poterat huiusmodi virtus ibi esse secundum habi- is sorrow for sin committed; and mercy, which is sorrow tum, sed non secundum actum, ut patet de poenitentia, for others’ unhappiness; because sorrow, guilt, and unhapquae est dolor de peccato commisso, et de misericordia, piness are incompatible with the perfection of the primitive quae est dolor de miseria aliena; perfectioni enim primi state. Wherefore such virtues existed as habits in the first status repugnat tam dolor, quam culpa et miseria. Un- man, but not as to their acts; for he was so disposed that he de huiusmodi virtutes erant in primo homine secundum would repent, if there had been a sin to repent for; and had habitum, sed non secundum actum, erat enim primus he seen unhappiness in his neighbor, he would have done homo sic dispositus, ut si peccatum praecessisset, dole- his best to remedy it. This is in accordance with what the ret; et similiter si miseriam in alio videret, eam pro pos- Philosopher says, Shame, which regards what is ill done, may se repelleret. Sicut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod be found in a virtuous man, but only conditionally; as being verecundia, quae est de turpi facto, contingit studioso so- so disposed that he would be ashamed if he did wrong (Ethic. lum sub conditione, est enim sic dispositus, quod verecun- iv, 9). daretur si turpe aliquid committeret. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod accidit temperanReply Obj. 1: It is accidental to temperance and fortiae et fortitudini quod superabundantiam passionum titude to subdue superabundant passion, in so far as they repellat, inquantum invenit passiones superabundantes are in a subject which happens to have superabundant pasin subiecto. Sed per se convenit huiusmodi virtutibus sions, and yet those virtues are per se competent to moderpassiones moderari. ate the passions. Ad secundum dicendum quod illae passiones ad Reply Obj. 2: Passions which have evil for their obmalum ordinatae, repugnant perfectioni primi status, ject were incompatible with the perfection of the primitive quae habent respectum ad malum in ipso qui afficitur state, if that evil be in the one affected by the passion; such passione, ut timor et dolor. Sed passiones quae respiciunt as fear and sorrow. But passions which relate to evil in anmalum in altero, non repugnant perfectioni primi sta- other are not incompatible with the perfection of the primtus, poterat enim homo in primo statu habere odio ma- itive state; for in that state man could hate the demons’ mal-

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litiam daemonum, sicut et diligere bonitatem Dei. Unde et virtutes quae circa tales passiones essent, possent esse in primo statu, et quantum ad habitum et quantum ad actum. Quae vero sunt circa passiones respicientes malum in eodem subiecto, si circa huiusmodi solas passiones sunt, non poterant esse in primo statu secundum actum, sed solum secundum habitum; sicut de poenitentia et misericordia dictum est. Sed sunt quaedam virtutes quae non sunt circa has passiones solum, sed etiam circa alias; sicut temperantia, quae non solum est circa tristitias, sed etiam circa delectationes; et fortitudo, quae non solum est circa timores, sed etiam circa audaciam et spem. Unde poterat esse in primo statu actus temperantiae, secundum quod est moderativa delectationum; et similiter fortitudo, secundum quod est moderativa audaciae sive spei; non autem secundum quod moderantur tristitiam et timorem. Ad tertium patet solutio ex his quae dicta sunt. Ad quartum dicendum quod perseverantia dupliciter sumitur. Uno modo, prout est quaedam virtus, et sic significat quendam habitum, quo quis eligit perseverare in bono. Et sic Adam perseverantiam habuit. Alio modo, prout est circumstantia virtutis, et sic significat continuationem quandam virtutis absque interruptione. Et hoc modo Adam perseverantiam non habuit. Ad quintum patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt.

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ice, as he could love God’s goodness. Thus the virtues which relate to such passions could exist in the primitive state, in habit and in act. Virtues, however, relating to passions which regard evil in the same subject, if relating to such passions only, could not exist in the primitive state in act, but only in habit, as we have said above of penance and of mercy. But other virtues there are which have relation not to such passions only, but to others; such as temperance, which relates not only to sorrow, but also to joy; and fortitude, which relates not only to fear, but also to daring and hope. Thus the act of temperance could exist in the primitive state, so far as it moderates pleasure; and in like manner, fortitude, as moderating daring and hope, but not as moderating sorrow and fear.

Reply Obj. 3: appears from what has been said above. Reply Obj. 4: Perseverance may be taken in two ways: in one sense as a particular virtue, signifying a habit whereby a man makes a choice of persevering in good; in that sense Adam possessed perseverance. In another sense it is taken as a circumstance of virtue; signifying a certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue; in which sense Adam did not possess perseverance. Reply Obj. 5: appears from what has been said above.

Article 4 Whether the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod opera primi hominis fuerint minus efficacia ad merendum quam opera nostra. Gratia enim ex Dei misericordia datur, quae magis indigentibus subvenit magis. Sed nos indigemus magis gratia quam primus homo in statu innocentiae. Ergo copiosius infunditur nobis gratia. Quae cum sit radix meriti, opera nostra efficaciora ad merendum redduntur. Praeterea, ad meritum requiritur pugna quaedam et difficultas. Dicitur enim II ad Tim. II, non coronabitur nisi qui legitime certaverit. Et philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod virtus est circa difficile et bonum. Sed nunc est maior pugna et difficultas. Ergo et maior efficacia ad merendum. Praeterea, Magister dicit, XXIV distinctione II libri Sent., quod homo non meruisset, tentationi resistendo; nunc autem meretur qui tentationi resistit. Ergo efficaciora sunt opera nostra ad merendum quam in primo statu. Sed contra est quia secundum hoc, homo esset melioris conditionis post peccatum.

Objection 1: It would seem that the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are. For grace is given to us through the mercy of God, Who succors most those who are most in need. Now we are more in need of grace than was man in the state of innocence. Therefore grace is more copiously poured out upon us; and since grace is the source of merit, our actions are more meritorious. Obj. 2: Further, struggle and difficulty are required for merit; for it is written (2 Tim 2:5): He . . . is not crowned except he strive lawfully, and the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3): The object of virtue is the difficult and the good. But there is more strife and difficulty now. Therefore there is greater efficacy for merit. Obj. 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii., D, xxiv) that man would not have merited in resisting temptation; whereas he does merit now, when he resists. Therefore our actions are more meritorious than in the primitive state. On the contrary, if such were the case, man would be better off after sinning.

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Respondeo dicendum quod quantitas meriti ex duobus potest pensari. Uno modo, ex radice caritatis et gratiae. Et talis quantitas meriti respondet praemio essentiali, quod consistit in Dei fruitione, qui enim ex maiori caritate aliquid facit, perfectius Deo fruetur. Alio modo pensari potest quantitas meriti ex quantitate operis. Quae quidem est duplex, scilicet absoluta, et proportionalis. Vidua enim quae misit duo aera minuta in gazophylacium; minus opus fecit quantitate absoluta, quam illi qui magna munera posuerunt, sed quantitate proportionali vidua plus fecit, secundum sententiam domini, quia magis eius facultatem superabat. Utraque tamen quantitas meriti respondet praemio accidentali; quod est gaudium de bono creato. Sic igitur dicendum quod efficaciora fuissent hominis opera ad merendum in statu innocentiae quam post peccatum, si attendatur quantitas meriti ex parte gratiae; quae tunc copiosior fuisset, nullo obstaculo in natura humana invento. Similiter etiam, si consideretur absoluta quantitas operis, quia, cum homo esset maioris virtutis, maiora opera fecisset. Sed si consideretur quantitas proportionalis, maior invenitur ratio meriti post peccatum, propter hominis imbecillitatem, magis enim excedit parvum opus potestatem eius qui cum difficultate operatur illud, quam opus magnum potestatem eius qui sine difficultate operatur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo post peccatum ad plura indiget gratia quam ante peccatum, sed non magis. Quia homo, etiam ante peccatum, indigebat gratia ad vitam aeternam consequendam, quae est principalis necessitas gratiae. Sed homo post peccatum, super hoc, indiget gratia etiam ad peccati remissionem, et infirmitatis sustentationem. Ad secundum dicendum quod difficultas et pugna pertinent ad quantitatem meriti, secundum quantitatem operis proportionalem, ut dictum est. Et est signum promptitudinis voluntatis, quae conatur ad id quod est sibi difficile, promptitudo autem voluntatis causatur ex magnitudine caritatis. Et tamen potest contingere quod aliquis ita prompta voluntate faciat opus aliquod facile, sicut alius difficile, quia paratus esset facere etiam quod sibi esset difficile. Difficultas tamen actualis, inquantum est poenalis, habet etiam quod sit satisfactoria pro peccato. Ad tertium dicendum quod resistere tentationi primo homini non fuisset meritorium, secundum opinionem ponentium quod gratiam non haberet; sicut nec modo est meritorium non habenti gratiam. Sed in hoc est differentia, quia in primo statu nihil erat interius impellens ad malum, sicut modo est, unde magis tunc poterat homo resistere tentationi sine gratia, quam modo.

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I answer that, Merit as regards degree may be gauged in two ways. First, in its root, which is grace and charity. Merit thus measured corresponds in degree to the essential reward, which consists in the enjoyment of God; for the greater the charity whence our actions proceed, the more perfectly shall we enjoy God. Second, the degree of merit is measured by the degree of the action itself. This degree is of two kinds, absolute and proportional. The widow who put two mites into the treasury performed a deed of absolutely less degree than the others who put great sums therein. But in proportionate degree the widow gave more, as Our Lord said; because she gave more in proportion to her means. In each of these cases the degree of merit corresponds to the accidental reward, which consists in rejoicing for created good. We conclude therefore that in the state of innocence man’s works were more meritorious than after sin was committed, if we consider the degree of merit on the part of grace, which would have been more copious as meeting with no obstacle in human nature: and in like manner, if we consider the absolute degree of the work done; because, as man would have had greater virtue, he would have performed greater works. But if we consider the proportionate degree, a greater reason for merit exists after sin, on account of man’s weakness; because a small deed is more beyond the capacity of one who works with difficulty than a great deed is beyond one who performs it easily. Reply Obj. 1: After sin man requires grace for more things than before sin; but he does not need grace more; forasmuch as man even before sin required grace to obtain eternal life, which is the chief reason for the need of grace. But after sin man required grace also for the remission of sin, and for the support of his weakness. Reply Obj. 2: Difficulty and struggle belong to the degree of merit according to the proportionate degree of the work done, as above explained. It is also a sign of the will’s promptitude striving after what is difficult to itself: and the promptitude of the will is caused by the intensity of charity. Yet it may happen that a person performs an easy deed with as prompt a will as another performs an arduous deed; because he is ready to do even what may be difficult to him. But the actual difficulty, by its penal character, enables the deed to satisfy for sin. Reply Obj. 3: The first man would not have gained merit in resisting temptation, according to the opinion of those who say that he did not possess grace; even as now there is no merit to those who have not grace. But in this point there is a difference, inasmuch as in the primitive state there was no interior impulse to evil, as in our present state. Hence man was more able then than now to resist temptation even without grace.

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Question 96 The Mastership Belonging to Man in the State of Innocence Deinde considerandum est de dominio quod compeWe next consider the mastership which belonged to tebat homini in statu innocentiae. Et circa hoc quaerun- man in the state of innocence. Under this head there are tur quatuor. four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum homo in statu innocentiae animalibus (1) Whether man in the state of innocence was master dominaretur. over the animals? Secundo, utrum dominaretur omni creaturae. (2) Whether he was master over all creatures? Tertio, utrum in statu innocentiae omnes homines (3) Whether in the state of innocence all men were fuissent aequales. equal? Quarto, utrum in illo statu homo hominibus (4) Whether in that state man would have been master dominaretur. over men?

Article 1 Whether Adam in the state of innocence had mastership over the animals? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Adam in statu innocentiae animalibus non dominabatur. Dicit enim Augustinus, IX super Gen. ad Litt., quod ministerio angelorum animalia sunt adducta ad Adam, ut eis nomina imponeret. Non autem fuisset ibi necessarium angelorum ministerium, si homo per seipsum animalibus dominabatur. Non ergo in statu innocentiae habuit dominium homo super alia animalia. Praeterea, ea quae ad invicem discordant, non recte sub uno dominio congregantur. Sed multa animalia naturaliter ad invicem discordant, sicut ovis et lupus. Ergo omnia animalia sub hominis dominio non continebantur. Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit quod homini ante peccatum non indigenti, Deus animalium dominationem dedit, praesciebat enim hominem adminiculo animalium adiuvandum fore post lapsum. Ergo ad minus usus dominii super animalia non competebat homini ante peccatum. Praeterea, proprium domini esse videtur praecipere. Sed praeceptum non recte fertur nisi ad habentem rationem. Ergo homo non habebat dominium super animalia irrationalia. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, de homine, praesit piscibus maris, et volatilibus caeli, et bestiis terrae. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, inobedientia ad hominem eorum quae ei debent esse subiecta, subsecuta est in poenam eius, eo quod ipse fuit inobediens Deo. Et ideo in statu innocentiae, ante inobedientiam praedictam, nihil ei repugnabat quod natu-

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence Adam had no mastership over the animals. For Augustine says (Gen ad lit. ix, 14), that the animals were brought to Adam, under the direction of the angels, to receive their names from him. But the angels need not have intervened thus, if man himself were master over the animals. Therefore in the state of innocence man had no mastership of the animals. Obj. 2: Further, it is unfitting that elements hostile to one another should be brought under the mastership of one. But many animals are hostile to one another, as the sheep and the wolf. Therefore all animals were not brought under the mastership of man. Obj. 3: Further, Jerome says: God gave man mastership over the animals, although before sin he had no need of them: for God foresaw that after sin animals would become useful to man. Therefore, at least before sin, it was unfitting for man to make use of his mastership. Obj. 4: Further, it is proper to a master to command. But a command is not given rightly save to a rational being. Therefore man had no mastership over the irrational animals. On the contrary, It is written (Gen 1:26): Let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of the air, and the beasts of the earth. I answer that, As above stated (Q. 95, A. 1), for his disobedience to God, man was punished by the disobedience of those creatures which should be subject to him. Therefore in the state of innocence, before man had disobeyed, nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject

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raliter deberet ei esse subiectum. Omnia autem animalia sunt homini naturaliter subiecta. Quod apparet ex tribus. Primo quidem, ex ipso naturae processu. Sicut enim in generatione rerum intelligitur quidam ordo quo proceditur de imperfecto ad perfectum (nam materia est propter formam, et forma imperfectior propter perfectiorem), ita etiam est in usu rerum naturalium, nam imperfectiora cedunt in usum perfectorum; plantae enim utuntur terra ad sui nutrimentum, animalia vero plantis, et homines plantis et animalibus. Unde naturaliter homo dominatur animalibus. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in I Politic., quod venatio sylvestrium animalium est iusta et naturalis, quia per eam homo vindicat sibi quod est naturaliter suum. Secundo apparet hoc ex ordine divinae providentiae, quae semper inferiora per superiora gubernat. Unde, cum homo sit supra cetera animalia, utpote ad imaginem Dei factus, convenienter eius gubernationi alia animalia subduntur. Tertio apparet idem ex proprietate hominis, et aliorum animalium. In aliis enim animalibus invenitur, secundum aestimationem naturalem, quaedam participatio prudentiae ad aliquos particulares actus, in homine autem invenitur universalis prudentia, quae est ratio omnium agibilium. Omne autem quod est per participationem, subditur ei quod est per essentiam et universaliter. Unde patet quod naturalis est subiectio aliorum animalium ad hominem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in subiectos multa potest facere superior potestas, quae non potest facere inferior. Angelus autem est naturaliter superior homine. Unde aliquis effectus poterat fieri circa animalia virtute angelica, qui non poterat fieri potestate humana; scilicet quod statim omnia animalia congregarentur. Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod animalia quae nunc sunt ferocia et occidunt alia animalia, in statu illo fuissent mansueta non solum circa hominem, sed etiam circa alia animalia. Sed hoc est omnino irrationabile. Non enim per peccatum hominis natura animalium est mutata, ut quibus nunc naturale est comedere aliorum animalium carnes, tunc vixissent de herbis, sicut leones et falcones. Nec Glossa Bedae dicit, Gen. I, quod ligna et herbae datae sunt omnibus animalibus et avibus in cibum, sed quibusdam. Fuisset ergo naturalis discordia inter quaedam animalia. Nec tamen propter hoc subtraherentur dominio hominis; sicut nec nunc propter hoc subtrahuntur dominio Dei, cuius providentia hoc totum dispensatur. Et huius providentiae homo executor fuisset, ut etiam nunc apparet in animalibus domesticis, ministrantur enim falconibus domesticis per homines gallinae in cibum. Ad tertium dicendum quod homines in statu innocentiae non indigebant animalibus ad necessitatem corporalem, neque ad tegumentum, quia nudi erant, et non erubescebant, nullo instante inordinatae concupiscentiae motu; neque ad cibum, quia lignis Paradisi ve-

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to him. Now all animals are naturally subject to man. This can be proved in three ways. First, from the order observed by nature; for just as in the generation of things we perceive a certain order of procession of the perfect from the imperfect (thus matter is for the sake of form; and the imperfect form, for the sake of the perfect), so also is there order in the use of natural things; thus the imperfect are for the use of the perfect; as the plants make use of the earth for their nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and man makes use of both plants and animals. Therefore it is in keeping with the order of nature, that man should be master over animals. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5) that the hunting of wild animals is just and natural, because man thereby exercises a natural right. Second, this is proved by the order of Divine Providence which always governs inferior things by the superior. Wherefore, as man, being made to the image of God, is above other animals, these are rightly subject to his government. Third, this is proved from a property of man and of other animals. For we see in the latter a certain participated prudence of natural instinct, in regard to certain particular acts; whereas man possesses a universal prudence as regards all practical matters. Now whatever is participated is subject to what is essential and universal. Therefore the subjection of other animals to man is proved to be natural. Reply Obj. 1: A higher power can do many things that an inferior power cannot do to those which are subject to them. Now an angel is naturally higher than man. Therefore certain things in regard to animals could be done by angels, which could not be done by man; for instance, the rapid gathering together of all the animals. Reply Obj. 2: In the opinion of some, those animals which now are fierce and kill others, would, in that state, have been tame, not only in regard to man, but also in regard to other animals. But this is quite unreasonable. For the nature of animals was not changed by man’s sin, as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of others, would then have lived on herbs, as the lion and falcon. Nor does Bede’s gloss on Gen. 1:30, say that trees and herbs were given as food to all animals and birds, but to some. Thus there would have been a natural antipathy between some animals. They would not, however, on this account have been excepted from the mastership of man: as neither at present are they for that reason excepted from the mastership of God, Whose Providence has ordained all this. Of this Providence man would have been the executor, as appears even now in regard to domestic animals, since fowls are given by men as food to the trained falcon. Reply Obj. 3: In the state of innocence man would not have had any bodily need of animals—neither for clothing, since then they were naked and not ashamed, there being no inordinate motions of concupiscence—nor for food, since they fed on the trees of paradise—nor to carry him

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scebantur; neque ad vehiculum, propter corporis robur. Indigebant tamen eis ad experimentalem cognitionem sumendam de naturis eorum. Quod significatum est per hoc, quod Deus ad eum animalia adduxit, ut eis nomina imponeret, quae eorum naturas designant. Ad quartum dicendum quod alia animalia habent quandam participationem prudentiae et rationis secundum aestimationem naturalem; ex qua contingit quod grues sequuntur ducem, et apes obediunt regi. Et sic tunc omnia animalia per seipsa homini obedivissent, sicut nunc quaedam domestica ei obediunt.

Q. 96, A. 2

about, his body being strong enough for that purpose. But man needed animals in order to have experimental knowledge of their natures. This is signified by the fact that God led the animals to man, that he might give them names expressive of their respective natures. Reply Obj. 4: All animals by their natural instinct have a certain participation of prudence and reason: which accounts for the fact that cranes follow their leader, and bees obey their queen. So all animals would have obeyed man of their own accord, as in the present state some domestic animals obey him.

Article 2 Whether man had mastership over all other creatures? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non habuisset dominium super omnes alias creaturas. Angelus enim naturaliter est maioris potestatis quam homo. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus III de Trin., materia corporalis non obedivisset ad nutum etiam sanctis angelis. Ergo multo minus homini in statu innocentiae. Praeterea, in plantis non sunt de viribus animae nisi nutritiva et augmentativa et generativa. Hae autem non sunt natae obedire rationi; ut in uno et eodem homine apparet. Ergo, cum dominium competat homini secundum rationem, videtur quod plantis homo in statu innocentiae non dominaretur. Praeterea, quicumque dominatur alicui rei, potest illam rem mutare. Sed homo non potuisset mutare cursum caelestium corporum, hoc enim solius Dei est, ut Dionysius dicit in epistola ad Polycarpum. Ergo non dominabatur eis. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, de homine, praesit universae creaturae. Respondeo dicendum quod in homine quodammodo sunt omnia, et ideo secundum modum quo dominatur his quae in seipso sunt, secundum hunc modum competit ei dominari aliis. Est autem in homine quatuor considerare, scilicet rationem, secundum quam convenit cum angelis; vires sensitivas, secundum quas convenit cum animalibus; vires naturales, secundum quas convenit cum plantis; et ipsum corpus, secundum quod convenit cum rebus inanimatis. Ratio autem in homine habet locum dominantis, et non subiecti dominio. Unde homo angelis non dominabatur in primo statu, et quod dicitur omni creaturae, intelligitur quae non est ad imaginem Dei. Viribus autem sensitivis, sicut irascibili et concupiscibili, quae aliqualiter obediunt rationi, dominatur anima imperando. Unde et in statu innocentiae animalibus aliis per imperium dominabatur. Viribus autem na-

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have had mastership over all other creatures. For an angel naturally has a greater power than man. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8), corporeal matter would not have obeyed even the holy angels. Much less therefore would it have obeyed man in the state of innocence. Obj. 2: Further, the only powers of the soul existing in plants are nutritive, augmentative, and generative. Now these do not naturally obey reason; as we can see in the case of any one man. Therefore, since it is by his reason that man is competent to have mastership, it seems that in the state of innocence man had no dominion over plants. Obj. 3: Further, whosoever is master of a thing, can change it. But man could not have changed the course of the heavenly bodies; for this belongs to God alone, as Dionysius says (Ep. ad Polycarp. vii). Therefore man had no dominion over them. On the contrary, It is written (Gen 1:26): That he may have dominion over . . . every creature. I answer that, Man in a certain sense contains all things; and so according as he is master of what is within himself, in the same way he can have mastership over other things. Now we may consider four things in man: his reason, which makes him like to the angels; his sensitive powers, whereby he is like the animals; his natural forces, which liken him to the plants; and the body itself, wherein he is like to inanimate things. Now in man reason has the position of a master and not of a subject. Wherefore man had no mastership over the angels in the primitive state; so when we read all creatures, we must understand the creatures which are not made to God’s image. Over the sensitive powers, as the irascible and concupiscible, which obey reason in some degree, the soul has mastership by commanding. So in the state of innocence man had mastership over the animals by commanding them. But of the natural pow-

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turalibus, et ipsi corpori, homo dominatur non quidem imperando, sed utendo. Et sic etiam homo in statu innocentiae dominabatur plantis et rebus inanimatis, non per imperium vel immutationem, sed absque impedimento utendo eorum auxilio. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.

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ers and the body itself man is master not by commanding, but by using them. Thus also in the state of innocence man’s mastership over plants and inanimate things consisted not in commanding or in changing them, but in making use of them without hindrance. The answers to the objections appear from the above.

Article 3 Whether men were equal in the state of innocence? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homines in statu innocentiae omnes fuissent aequales. Dicit enim Gregorius quod, ubi non delinquimus, omnes pares sumus. Sed in statu innocentiae non erat delictum. Ergo omnes erant pares. Praeterea, similitudo et aequalitas est ratio mutuae dilectionis; secundum illud Eccli. XIII, omne animal diligit sibi simile, sic et omnis homo proximum sibi. In illo autem statu inter homines abundabat dilectio, quae est vinculum pacis. Ergo omnes fuissent pares in statu innocentiae. Praeterea, cessante causa, cessat effectus. Sed causa inaequalitatis inter homines videtur nunc esse, ex parte quidem Dei, quod quosdam pro meritis praemiat, quosdam vero punit, ex parte vero naturae, quia propter naturae defectum quidam nascuntur debiles et orbati, quidam autem fortes et perfecti. Quae in primo statu non fuissent. Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. XIII, quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt. Ordo autem maxime videtur in disparitate consistere, dicit enim Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio. Ergo in primo statu, qui decentissimus fuisset, disparitas inveniretur. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere aliquam disparitatem in primo statu fuisse, ad minus quantum ad sexum, quia sine diversitate sexus, generatio non fuisset. Similiter etiam quantum ad aetatem, sic enim quidam ex aliis nascebantur; nec illi qui miscebantur, steriles erant. Sed et secundum animam diversitas fuisset, et quantum ad iustitiam et quantum ad scientiam. Non enim ex necessitate homo operabatur, sed per liberum arbitrium; ex quo homo habet quod possit magis et minus animum applicare ad aliquid faciendum vel volendum vel cognoscendum. Unde quidam magis profecissent in iustitia et scientia quam alii. Ex parte etiam corporis, poterat esse disparitas. Non enim erat exemptum corpus humanum totaliter a legibus naturae, quin ex exterioribus agentibus aliquod

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence all would have been equal. For Gregory says (Moral. xxi): Where there is no sin, there is no inequality. But in the state of innocence there was no sin. Therefore all were equal. Obj. 2: Further, likeness and equality are the basis of mutual love, according to Ecclus. 13:19, Every beast loveth its like; so also every man him that is nearest to himself. Now in that state there was among men an abundance of love, which is the bond of peace. Therefore all were equal in the state of innocence. Obj. 3: Further, the cause ceasing, the effect also ceases. But the cause of present inequality among men seems to arise, on the part of God, from the fact that He rewards some and punishes others; and on the part of nature, from the fact that some, through a defect of nature, are born weak and deficient, others strong and perfect, which would not have been the case in the primitive state. Therefore, etc. On the contrary, It is written (Rom 13:1): The things which are of God, are well ordered. But order chiefly consists in inequality; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): Order disposes things equal and unequal in their proper place. Therefore in the primitive state, which was most proper and orderly, inequality would have existed. I answer that, We must needs admit that in the primitive state there would have been some inequality, at least as regards sex, because generation depends upon diversity of sex: and likewise as regards age; for some would have been born of others; nor would sexual union have been sterile. Moreover, as regards the soul, there would have been inequality as to righteousness and knowledge. For man worked not of necessity, but of his own free-will, by virtue of which man can apply himself, more or less, to action, desire, or knowledge; hence some would have made a greater advance in virtue and knowledge than others. There might also have been bodily disparity. For the human body was not entirely exempt from the laws of nature, so as not to receive from exterior sources more or less ad-

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commodum aut auxilium reciperet magis et minus, cum etiam et cibis eorum vita sustentaretur. Et sic nihil prohibet dicere quin secundum diversam dispositionem aeris et diversum situm stellarum, aliqui robustiores corpore generarentur quam alii, et maiores et pulchriores et melius complexionati. Ita tamen quod in illis qui excederentur, nullus esset defectus sive peccatum, sive circa animam sive circa corpus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Gregorius per verba illa intendit excludere disparitatem quae est secundum differentiam iustitiae et peccati; ex qua contingit quod aliqui poenaliter sunt sub aliis coercendi. Ad secundum dicendum quod aequalitas est causa quod dilectio mutua sit aequalis. Sed tamen inter inaequales potest esse maior dilectio quam inter aequales, licet non aequaliter utrinque respondeat. Pater enim plus diligit filium naturaliter, quam frater fratrem; licet filius non tantundem diligat patrem, sicut ab eo diligitur. Ad tertium dicendum quod causa disparitatis poterat esse et ex parte Dei, non quidem ut puniret quosdam et quosdam praemiaret; sed ut quosdam plus, quosdam minus sublimaret, ut pulchritudo ordinis magis in hominibus reluceret. Et etiam ex parte naturae poterat disparitas causari secundum praedictum modum, absque aliquo defectu naturae.

Q. 96, A. 4

vantage and help: since indeed it was dependent on food wherewith to sustain life. So we may say that, according to the climate, or the movement of the stars, some would have been born more robust in body than others, and also greater, and more beautiful, and all ways better disposed; so that, however, in those who were thus surpassed, there would have been no defect or fault either in soul or body. Reply Obj. 1: By those words Gregory means to exclude such inequality as exists between virtue and vice; the result of which is that some are placed in subjection to others as a penalty. Reply Obj. 2: Equality is the cause of equality in mutual love. Yet between those who are unequal there can be a greater love than between equals; although there be not an equal response: for a father naturally loves his son more than a brother loves his brother; although the son does not love his father as much as he is loved by him. Reply Obj. 3: The cause of inequality could be on the part of God; not indeed that He would punish some and reward others, but that He would exalt some above others; so that the beauty of order would the more shine forth among men. Inequality might also arise on the part of nature as above described, without any defect of nature.

Article 4 Whether in the state of innocence man would have been master over man? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae homini non dominabatur. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, hominem rationalem, ad imaginem suam factum, non voluit Deus nisi irrationabilibus dominari; non hominem homini, sed hominem pecori. Praeterea, illud quod est introductum in poenam peccati, non fuisset in statu innocentiae. Sed hominem subesse homini, introductum est in poenam peccati, dictum est enim mulieri post peccatum, sub potestate viri eris, ut dicitur Gen. III. Ergo in statu innocentiae non erat homo homini subiectus. Praeterea, subiectio libertati opponitur. Sed libertas est unum de praecipuis bonis, quod in statu innocentiae non defuisset, quando nihil aberat quod bona voluntas cupere posset, ut Augustinus dicit XIV de Civ. Dei. Ergo homo homini in statu innocentiae non dominabatur. Sed contra, conditio hominum in statu innocentiae non erat dignior quam conditio angelorum. Sed inter angelos quidam aliis dominantur, unde et unus ordo

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have been master over man. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): God willed that man, who was endowed with reason and made to His image, should rule over none but irrational creatures; not over men, but over cattle. Obj. 2: Further, what came into the world as a penalty for sin would not have existed in the state of innocence. But man was made subject to man as a penalty; for after sin it was said to the woman (Gen 3:16): Thou shalt be under thy husband’s power. Therefore in the state of innocence man would not have been subject to man. Obj. 3: Further, subjection is opposed to liberty. But liberty is one of the chief blessings, and would not have been lacking in the state of innocence, where nothing was wanting that man’s good-will could desire, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10). Therefore man would not have been master over man in the state of innocence. On the contrary, The condition of man in the state of innocence was not more exalted than the condition of the angels. But among the angels some rule over others; and

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dominationum vocatur. Ergo non est contra dignitatem so one order is called that of Dominations. Therefore it was status innocentiae, quod homo homini dominaretur. not beneath the dignity of the state of innocence that one man should be subject to another. Respondeo dicendum quod dominium accipitur I answer that, Mastership has a twofold meaning. dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod opponitur servi- First, as opposed to slavery, in which sense a master means tuti, et sic dominus dicitur cui aliquis subditur ut ser- one to whom another is subject as a slave. In another sense vus. Alio modo accipitur dominium, secundum quod mastership is referred in a general sense to any kind of subcommuniter refertur ad subiectum qualitercumque, et ject; and in this sense even he who has the office of governsic etiam ille qui habet officium gubernandi et dirigen- ing and directing free men, can be called a master. In the di liberos, dominus dici potest. Primo ergo modo accep- state of innocence man could have been a master of men, to dominio, in statu innocentiae homo homini non do- not in the former but in the latter sense. This distinction is minaretur, sed secundo modo accepto dominio, in statu founded on the reason that a slave differs from a free man in innocentiae homo homini dominari potuisset. Cuius ra- that the latter has the disposal of himself, as is stated in the tio est, quia servus in hoc differt a libero, quod liber est beginning of the Metaphysics, whereas a slave is ordered to causa sui, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys.; servus autem another. So that one man is master of another as his slave ordinatur ad alium. Tunc ergo aliquis dominatur alicui when he refers the one whose master he is, to his own— ut servo, quando eum cui dominatur ad propriam utili- namely the master’s use. And since every man’s proper good tatem sui, scilicet dominantis, refert. Et quia unicuique is desirable to himself, and consequently it is a grievous est appetibile proprium bonum, et per consequens con- matter to anyone to yield to another what ought to be one’s tristabile est unicuique quod illud bonum quod debe- own, therefore such dominion implies of necessity a pain ret esse suum, cedat alteri tantum; ideo tale dominium inflicted on the subject; and consequently in the state of innon potest esse sine poena subiectorum. Propter quod, nocence such a mastership could not have existed between in statu innocentiae non fuisset tale dominium hominis man and man. ad hominem. Tunc vero dominatur aliquis alteri ut libero, quando But a man is the master of a free subject, by directing dirigit ipsum ad proprium bonum eius qui dirigitur, vel him either towards his proper welfare, or to the common ad bonum commune. Et tale dominium hominis, ad ho- good. Such a kind of mastership would have existed in the minem in statu innocentiae fuisset, propter duo. Primo state of innocence between man and man, for two reasons. quidem, quia homo naturaliter est animal sociale, un- First, because man is naturally a social being, and so in the de homines in statu innocentiae socialiter vixissent. So- state of innocence he would have led a social life. Now a socialis autem vita multorum esse non posset, nisi aliquis cial life cannot exist among a number of people unless unpraesideret, qui ad bonum commune intenderet, multi der the presidency of one to look after the common good; enim per se intendunt ad multa, unus vero ad unum. Et for many, as such, seek many things, whereas one attends ideo philosophus dicit, in principio Politic., quod quan- only to one. Wherefore the Philosopher says, in the begindocumque multa ordinantur ad unum, semper inveni- ning of the Politics, that wherever many things are directed tur unum ut principale et dirigens. Secundo quia, si unus to one, we shall always find one at the head directing them. homo habuisset super alium supereminentiam scientiae Second, if one man surpassed another in knowledge and et iustitiae, inconveniens fuisset nisi hoc exequeretur in virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these gifts utilitatem aliorum; secundum quod dicitur I Petr. IV, conduced to the benefit of others, according to 1 Pet. 4:10, unusquisque gratiam quam accepit, in alterutrum illam As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one administrantes. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, to another. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 14): quod iusti non dominandi cupiditate imperant, sed officio Just men command not by the love of domineering, but by the consulendi, hoc naturalis ordo praescribit, ita Deus homi- service of counsel: and (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): The natural ornem condidit. der of things requires this; and thus did God make man. Et per hoc patet responsio ad omnia obiecta, quae From this appear the replies to the objections, which procedunt de primo modo dominii. are founded on the first-mentioned mode of mastership.

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Question 97 The Bodily Condition of the First Man, as to the Preservation of the Individual Deinde considerandum est de his quae pertinent We next consider what belongs to the bodily state of the ad statum primi hominis secundum corpus. Et primo, first man: first, as regards the preservation of the individual; quantum ad conservationem individui; secundo, quan- second, as regards the preservation of the species. tum ad conservationem speciei. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum homo in statu innocentiae esset (1) Whether man in the state of innocence was immortalis. immortal? Secundo, utrum esset impassibilis. (2) Whether he was impassible? Tertio, utrum indigeret cibis. (3) Whether he stood in need of food? Quarto, utrum per lignum vitae immortalitatem (4) Whether he would have obtained immortality by consequeretur. the tree of life?

Article 1 Whether in the state of innocence man would have been immortal? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae non erat immortalis. Mortale enim ponitur in definitione hominis. Sed remota definitione, aufertur definitum. Ergo si homo erat, non poterat esse immortalis. Praeterea, corruptibile et incorruptibile genere differunt, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed eorum quae differunt genere, non est transmutatio in invicem. Si ergo primus homo fuit incorruptibilis, non posset homo in statu isto esse corruptibilis. Praeterea, si homo in statu innocentiae fuit immortalis, aut hoc habuit per naturam, aut per gratiam. Sed non per naturam, quia, cum natura eadem maneat secundum speciem, nunc quoque esset immortalis. Similiter nec per gratiam, quia primus homo gratiam per poenitentiam recuperavit, secundum illud Sap. X, eduxit illum a delicto suo; ergo immortalitatem recuperasset; quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo homo erat immortalis in statu innocentiae. Praeterea, immortalitas promittitur homini in praemium; secundum illud Apoc. XXI, mors ultra non erit. Sed homo non fuit conditus in statu praemii, sed ut praemium mereretur. Ergo homo in statu innocentiae non fuit immortalis. Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Rom. V, quod per peccatum intravit mors in mundum. Ergo ante peccatum homo erat immortalis.

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man was not immortal. For the term mortal belongs to the definition of man. But if you take away the definition, you take away the thing defined. Therefore as long as man was man he could not be immortal. Obj. 2: Further, corruptible and incorruptible are generically distinct, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, Did. ix, 10). But there can be no passing from one genus to another. Therefore if the first man was incorruptible, man could not be corruptible in the present state. Obj. 3: Further, if man were immortal in the state of innocence, this would have been due either to nature or to grace. Not to nature, for since nature does not change within the same species, he would also have been immortal now. Likewise neither would this be owing to grace; for the first man recovered grace by repentance, according to Wis. 10:2: He brought him out of his sins. Hence he would have regained his immortality; which is clearly not the case. Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence. Obj. 4: Further, immortality is promised to man as a reward, according to Apoc. 21:4: Death shall be no more. But man was not created in the state of reward, but that he might deserve the reward. Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence. On the contrary, It is written (Rom 5:12): By sin death came into the world. Therefore man was immortal before sin.

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Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid potest dici incorruptibile tripliciter. Uno modo, ex parte materiae, eo scilicet quod vel non habet materiam, sicut angelus; vel habet materiam quae non est in potentia nisi ad unam formam, sicut corpus caeleste. Et hoc dicitur secundum naturam incorruptibile. Alio modo dicitur aliquid incorruptibile ex parte formae, quia scilicet rei corruptibili per naturam, inhaeret aliqua dispositio per quam totaliter a corruptione prohibetur. Et hoc dicitur incorruptibile secundum gloriam, quia, ut dicit Augustinus in epistola ad Dioscorum, tam potenti natura Deus fecit animam, ut ex eius beatitudine redundet in corpus plenitudo sanitatis, idest incorruptionis vigor. Tertio modo dicitur aliquid incorruptibile ex parte causae efficientis. Et hoc modo homo in statu innocentiae fuisset incorruptibilis et immortalis. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de Quaest. Vet. et Nov. Test., Deus hominem fecit, qui quandiu non peccaret, immortalitate vigeret, ut ipse sibi auctor esset aut ad vitam aut ad mortem. Non enim corpus eius erat indissolubile per aliquem immortalitatis vigorem in eo existentem; sed inerat animae vis quaedam supernaturaliter divinitus data, per quam poterat corpus ab omni corruptione praeservare, quandiu ipsa Deo subiecta mansisset. Quod rationabiliter factum est. Quia enim anima rationalis excedit proportionem corporalis materiae, ut supra dictum est. Conveniens fuit ut in principio ei virtus daretur, per quam corpus conservare posset supra naturam corporalis materiae. Ad primum ergo et secundum dicendum quod rationes illae procedunt de incorruptibili et immortali per naturam. Ad tertium dicendum quod vis illa praeservandi corpus a corruptione, non erat animae humanae naturalis, sed per donum gratiae. Et quamvis gratiam recuperaverit ad remissionem culpae et meritum gloriae, non tamen ad amissae immortalitatis effectum. Hoc enim reservabatur Christo, per quem naturae defectus in melius reparandus erat, ut infra dicetur.

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I answer that, A thing may be incorruptible in three ways. First, on the part of matter—that is to say, either because it possesses no matter, like an angel; or because it possesses matter that is in potentiality to one form only, like the heavenly bodies. Such things as these are incorruptible by their very nature. Second, a thing is incorruptible in its form, inasmuch as being by nature corruptible, yet it has an inherent disposition which preserves it wholly from corruption; and this is called incorruptibility of glory; because as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.): God made man’s soul of such a powerful nature, that from its fullness of beatitude, there redounds to the body a fullness of health, with the vigor of incorruption. Third, a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient cause; in this sense man was incorruptible and immortal in the state of innocence. For, as Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. Q. 19): God made man immortal as long as he did not sin; so that he might achieve for himself life or death. For man’s body was indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, but by reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long as it remained itself subject to God. This entirely agrees with reason; for since the rational soul surpasses the capacity of corporeal matter, as above explained (Q. 76, A. 1), it was most properly endowed at the beginning with the power of preserving the body in a manner surpassing the capacity of corporeal matter. Reply Obj. 1 and 2: These objections are founded on natural incorruptibility and immortality.

Reply Obj. 3: This power of preserving the body was not natural to the soul, but was the gift of grace. And though man recovered grace as regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not recover immortality, the loss of which was an effect of sin; for this was reserved for Christ to accomplish, by Whom the defect of nature was to be restored into something better, as we shall explain further on (III, Q. 14, A. 4, ad 1). Ad quartum dicendum quod differt immortalitas Reply Obj. 4: The promised reward of the immortality gloriae, quae promittitur in praemium, ab immortalitate of glory differs from the immortality which was bestowed quae fuit homini collata in statu innocentiae. on man in the state of innocence.

Article 2 Whether in the state of innocence man would have been passible? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoObjection 1: It would seem that in the state of innomo in statu innocentiae fuisset passibilis. Sentire enim cence man was passible. For sensation is a kind of passion. est pati quoddam. Sed homo in statu innocentiae fuisset But in the state of innocence man would have been sensisensibilis. Ergo fuisset passibilis. tive. Therefore he would have been passible.

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Praeterea, somnus passio quaedam est. Sed homo in statu innocentiae dormivisset; secundum illud Gen. II, immisit Deus soporem in Adam. Ergo fuisset passibilis. Praeterea, ibidem subditur quod tulit unam de costis eius. Ergo fuisset passibilis etiam per abscissionem partis. Praeterea, corpus hominis molle fuit. Sed molle naturaliter passivum est a duro. Ergo si corpori primi hominis obvium fuisset aliquod corpus durum, ab eo passum fuisset. Et sic primus homo fuit passibilis. Sed contra est quia, si fuit passibilis, fuit etiam corruptibilis, quia passio, magis facta, abiicit a substantia. Respondeo dicendum quod passio dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, proprie, et sic pati dicitur quod a sua naturali dispositione removetur. Passio enim est effectus actionis, in rebus autem naturalibus contraria agunt et patiuntur ad invicem, quorum unum removet alterum a sua naturali dispositione. Alio modo, dicitur passio communiter, secundum quamcumque mutationem, etiam si pertineat ad perfectionem naturae; sicut intelligere vel sentire dicitur pati quoddam. Hoc igitur secundo modo, homo in statu innocentiae passibilis erat, et patiebatur, et secundum animam et secundum corpus. Primo autem modo dicta passione, erat impassibilis et secundum animam et secundum corpus, sicut et immortalis, poterat enim passionem prohibere, sicut et mortem, si absque peccato perstitisset. Et per hoc patet responsio ad duo prima. Nam sentire et dormire non removent hominem a naturali dispositione, sed ad bonum naturae ordinantur. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, costa illa fuit in Adam, inquantum erat principium humani generis; sicut semen est in homine, inquantum est principium per generationem. Sicut igitur decisio seminis non est cum passione quae removeat hominem a naturali dispositione, ita etiam est dicendum de separatione illius costae. Ad quartum dicendum quod corpus hominis in statu innocentiae poterat praeservari ne pateretur laesionem ab aliquo duro, partim quidem per propriam rationem, per quam poterat nociva vitare; partim etiam per divinam providentiam, quae sic ipsum tuebatur, ut nihil ei occurreret ex improviso, a quo laederetur.

Obj. 2: Further, sleep is a kind of passion. Now, man slept in the state of innocence, according to Gen. 2:21, God cast a deep sleep upon Adam. Therefore he would have been passible. Obj. 3: Further, the same passage goes on to say that He took a rib out of Adam. Therefore he was passible even to the degree of the cutting out of part of his body. Obj. 4: Further, man’s body was soft. But a soft body is naturally passible as regards a hard body; therefore if a hard body had come in contact with the soft body of the first man, the latter would have suffered from the impact. Therefore the first man was passible. On the contrary, Had man been passible, he would have been also corruptible, because, as the Philosopher says (Top. vi, 3): Excessive suffering wastes the very substance. I answer that, Passion may be taken in two senses. First, in its proper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer when changed from its natural disposition. For passion is the effect of action; and in nature contraries are mutually active or passive, according as one thing changes another from its natural disposition. Second, passion can be taken in a general sense for any kind of change, even if belonging to the perfecting process of nature. Thus understanding and sensation are said to be passions. In this second sense, man was passible in the state of innocence, and was passive both in soul and body. In the first sense, man was impassible, both in soul and body, as he was likewise immortal; for he could curb his passion, as he could avoid death, so long as he refrained from sin. Thus it is clear how to reply to the first two objections; since sensation and sleep do not remove from man his natural disposition, but are ordered to his natural welfare. Reply Obj. 3: As already explained (Q. 92, A. 3, ad 2), the rib was in Adam as the principle of the human race, as the semen in man, who is a principle through generation. Hence as man does not suffer any natural deterioration by seminal issue; so neither did he through the separation of the rib. Reply Obj. 4: Man’s body in the state of innocence could be preserved from suffering injury from a hard body; partly by the use of his reason, whereby he could avoid what was harmful; and partly also by Divine Providence, so preserving him, that nothing of a harmful nature could come upon him unawares.

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Article 3 Whether in the state of innocence man needed food? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae non indigebat cibis. Cibus enim necessarius est homini ad restaurationem deperditi. Sed in corpore Adae, ut videtur, nulla fiebat deperditio, quia incorruptibile erat. Ergo non erat ei cibus necessarius. Praeterea, cibus est necessarius ad nutriendum. Sed nutritio non est sine passione. Cum ergo corpus hominis esset impassibile, non erat ei cibus necessarius, ut videtur. Praeterea, cibus dicitur esse nobis necessarius ad vitae conservationem. Sed Adam aliter vitam poterat conservare, quia si non peccaret, non moreretur. Ergo cibus non erat ei necessarius. Praeterea, ad sumptionem cibi sequitur emissio superfluitatum, quae habent quandam turpitudinem non convenientem dignitati primi status. Ergo videtur quod homo in primo statu cibis non uteretur. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, de omni ligno quod est in Paradiso, comedetis. Respondeo dicendum quod homo in statu innocentiae habuit vitam animalem cibis indigentem; post resurrectionem vero habebit vitam spiritualem cibis non indigentem. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod anima rationalis et anima est et spiritus. Dicitur autem esse anima secundum illud quod est sibi commune et aliis animabus, quod est vitam corpori dare, unde dicitur Gen. II, factus est homo in animam viventem, idest vitam corpori dantem. Sed spiritus dicitur secundum illud quod est proprium sibi et non aliis animabus, quod scilicet habeat virtutem intellectivam immaterialem. In primo igitur statu anima rationalis communicabat corpori id quod competit ei inquantum est anima, et ideo corpus illud dicebatur animale, inquantum scilicet habebat vitam ab anima. Primum autem principium vitae in istis inferioribus, ut dicitur in libro de Anima, est anima vegetabilis, cuius opera sunt alimento uti et generare et augeri. Et ideo haec opera homini in primo statu competebant. In ultimo vero statu post resurrectionem, anima communicabit quodammodo corpori ea quae sunt sibi propria inquantum est spiritus, immortalitatem quidem, quantum ad omnes; impassibilitatem vero et gloriam et virtutem, quantum ad bonos, quorum corpora spiritualia dicentur. Unde post resurrectionem homines cibis non indigebunt, sed in statu innocentiae eis indigebant. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Quaest. Vet. et Nov. Test., quomodo immortale corpus habebat, quod cibo sustentabatur? Immortale enim non eget esca neque potu. Dictum est

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man did not require food. For food is necessary for man to restore what he has lost. But Adam’s body suffered no loss, as being incorruptible. Therefore he had no need of food. Obj. 2: Further, food is needed for nourishment. But nourishment involves passibility. Since, then, man’s body was impassible; it does not appear how food could be needful to him. Obj. 3: Further, we need food for the preservation of life. But Adam could preserve his life otherwise; for had he not sinned, he would not have died. Therefore he did not require food. Obj. 4: Further, the consumption of food involves voiding of the surplus, which seems unsuitable to the state of innocence. Therefore it seems that man did not take food in the primitive state. On the contrary, It is written (Gen 2:16): Of every tree in paradise ye shall eat. I answer that, In the state of innocence man had an animal life requiring food; but after the resurrection he will have a spiritual life needing no food. In order to make this clear, we must observe that the rational soul is both soul and spirit. It is called a soul by reason of what it possesses in common with other souls—that is, as giving life to the body; whence it is written (Gen 2:7): Man was made into a living soul; that is, a soul giving life to the body. But the soul is called a spirit according to what properly belongs to itself, and not to other souls, as possessing an intellectual immaterial power. Thus in the primitive state, the rational soul communicated to the body what belonged to itself as a soul; and so the body was called animal, through having its life from the soul. Now the first principle of life in these inferior creatures as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) is the vegetative soul: the operations of which are the use of food, generation, and growth. Wherefore such operations befitted man in the state of innocence. But in the final state, after the resurrection, the soul will, to a certain extent, communicate to the body what properly belongs to itself as a spirit; immortality to everyone, impassibility, glory, and power to the good, whose bodies will be called spiritual. So, after the resurrection, man will not require food; whereas he required it in the state of innocence. Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. Q. 19): How could man have an immortal body, which was sustained by food? Since an immortal being needs neither food nor drink. For we have explained (A. 1) that the im-

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Bodily Condition of the First Man, as to the Preservation of the Individual Q. 97, A. 4

enim supra quod immortalitas primi status erat secundum vim quandam supernaturalem in anima residentem; non autem secundum aliquam dispositionem corpori inhaerentem. Unde per actionem caloris aliquid de humido illius corporis poterat deperdi; et ne totaliter consumeretur, necesse erat per assumptionem cibi homini subveniri. Ad secundum dicendum quod in nutritione est quaedam passio et alteratio, scilicet ex parte alimenti, quod convertitur in substantiam eius quod alitur. Unde ex hoc non potest concludi quod corpus hominis fuerit passibile, sed quod cibus assumptus erat passibilis. Quamvis etiam talis passio esset ad perfectionem naturae. Ad tertium dicendum quod, si homo sibi non subveniret de cibo, peccaret; sicut peccavit sumendo vetitum cibum. Simul enim sibi praeceptum fuit ut a ligno scientiae boni et mali abstineret, et ut de omni alio ligno Paradisi vesceretur. Ad quartum dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod homo in statu innocentiae non assumpsisset de cibo nisi quantum fuisset ei necessarium, unde non fuisset ibi superfluitatum emissio. Sed hoc irrationabile videtur, quod in cibo assumpto non esset aliqua faeculentia, quae non esset apta ut converteretur in hominis nutrimentum. Unde oportebat superfluitates emitti. Tamen fuisset divinitus provisum ut nulla ex hoc indecentia esset.

mortality of the primitive state was based on a supernatural force in the soul, and not on any intrinsic disposition of the body: so that by the action of heat, the body might lose part of its humid qualities; and to prevent the entire consumption of the humor, man was obliged to take food.

Reply Obj. 2: A certain passion and alteration attends nutriment, on the part of the food changed into the substance of the thing nourished. So we cannot thence conclude that man’s body was passible, but that the food taken was passible; although this kind of passion conduced to the perfection of the nature. Reply Obj. 3: If man had not taken food he would have sinned; as he also sinned by taking the forbidden fruit. For he was told at the same time, to abstain from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and to eat of every other tree of Paradise. Reply Obj. 4: Some say that in the state of innocence man would not have taken more than necessary food, so that there would have been nothing superfluous; which, however, is unreasonable to suppose, as implying that there would have been no faecal matter. Wherefore there was need for voiding the surplus, yet so disposed by God as to be decorous and suitable to the state.

Article 4 Whether the tree of life could have been the cause of immortality? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lignum vitae non poterat esse causa immortalitatis. Nihil enim potest agere ultra suam speciem, effectus enim non excedit causam. Sed lignum vitae erat corruptibile, alioquin non potuisset in nutrimentum assumi, quia alimentum convertitur in substantiam nutriti, ut dictum est. Ergo lignum vitae incorruptibilitatem seu immortalitatem conferre non poterat. Praeterea, effectus qui causantur a virtutibus plantarum et aliarum naturalium rerum, sunt naturales. Si ergo lignum vitae immortalitatem causasset, fuisset illa immortalitas naturalis. Praeterea, hoc videtur redire in fabulas antiquorum, qui dixerunt quod dii qui comedebant de quodam cibo, facti sunt immortales, quos irridet philosophus in III Metaphys. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. III, ne forte mittat manum suam et sumat de ligno vitae, et comedat et vivat in aeternum.

Objection 1: It would seem that the tree of life could not be the cause of immortality. For nothing can act beyond its own species; as an effect does not exceed its cause. But the tree of life was corruptible, otherwise it could not be taken as food; since food is changed into the substance of the thing nourished. Therefore the tree of life could not give incorruptibility or immortality. Obj. 2: Further, effects caused by the forces of plants and other natural agencies are natural. If therefore the tree of life caused immortality, this would have been natural immortality. Obj. 3: Further, this would seem to be reduced to the ancient fable, that the gods, by eating a certain food, became immortal; which the Philosopher ridicules (Metaph. iii, Did. ii, 4). On the contrary, It is written (Gen 3:22): Lest perhaps he put forth his hand, and take of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever.

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Praeterea, Augustinus in libro de Quaest. Vet. et Nov. Test., dicit, gustus arboris vitae corruptionem corporis inhibebat, denique etiam post peccatum potuit insolubilis manere, si permissum esset illi edere de arbore vitae. Respondeo dicendum quod lignum vitae quodammodo immortalitatem causabat, non autem simpliciter. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod duo remedia ad conservationem vitae habebat homo in primo statu, contra duos defectus. Primus enim defectus est deperditio humidi per actionem caloris naturalis, qui est animae instrumentum. Et contra hunc defectum subveniebatur homini per esum aliorum lignorum Paradisi, sicut et nunc subvenitur nobis, per cibos quos sumimus. Secundus autem defectus est quia, ut philosophus dicit I de Generat., illud quod generatur ex aliquo extraneo, adiunctum ei quod prius erat humido praeexistenti, imminuit virtutem activam speciei, sicut aqua adiuncta vino, primo quidem convertitur in saporem vini, sed secundum quod magis et magis additur, diminuit vini fortitudinem, et tandem vinum fit aquosum. Sic igitur videmus quod in principio virtus activa speciei est adeo fortis, quod potest convertere de alimento non solum quod sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, sed etiam quod sufficit ad augmentum. Postmodum vero quod aggeneratur non sufficit ad augmentum, sed solum ad restaurationem deperditi. Tandem vero, in statu senectutis, nec ad hoc sufficit, unde sequitur decrementum, et finaliter naturalis dissolutio corporis. Et contra hunc defectum subveniebatur homini per lignum vitae, habebat enim virtutem fortificandi virtutem speciei contra debilitatem provenientem ex admixtione extranei. Unde Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod cibus aderat homini ne esuriret, potus ne sitiret, et lignum vitae ne senectus eum dissolveret. Et in libro de Quaest. Vet. et Nov. Test., dicit quod vitae arbor medicinae modo corruptionem hominum prohibebat. Non tamen simpliciter immortalitatem causabat. Quia neque virtus quae inerat animae ad conservandum corpus, causabatur ex ligno vitae, neque etiam poterat immortalitatis dispositionem corpori praestare, ut nunquam dissolvi posset. Quod ex hoc patet, quia virtus cuiuscumque corporis est finita. Unde non poterat virtus ligni vitae ad hoc se extendere ut daret corpori virtutem Durandi tempore infinito, sed usque ad determinatum tempus. Manifestum est enim quod, quanto aliqua virtus est maior, tanto imprimit durabiliorem effectum. Unde cum virtus ligni vitae esset finita, semel sumptum praeservabat a corruptione usque ad determinatum tempus; quo finito, vel homo translatus fuisset ad spiritualem vitam, vel indiguisset iterum sumere de ligno vitae. Et per hoc patet responsio ab obiecta. Nam primae rationes concludunt quod non causabat incorruptibilitatem simpliciter. Aliae vero concludunt quod causabat in-

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Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. Q. 19): A taste of the tree of life warded off corruption of the body; and even after sin man would have remained immortal, had he been allowed to eat of the tree of life. I answer that, The tree of life in a certain degree was the cause of immortality, but not absolutely. To understand this, we must observe that in the primitive state man possessed, for the preservation of life, two remedies, against two defects. One of these defects was the loss of humidity by the action of natural heat, which acts as the soul’s instrument: as a remedy against such loss man was provided with food, taken from the other trees of paradise, as now we are provided with the food, which we take for the same purpose. The second defect, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), arises from the fact that the humor which is caused from extraneous sources, being added to the humor already existing, lessens the specific active power: as water added to wine takes at first the taste of wine, then, as more water is added, the strength of the wine is diminished, till the wine becomes watery. In like manner, we may observe that at first the active force of the species is so strong that it is able to transform so much of the food as is required to replace the lost tissue, as well as what suffices for growth; later on, however, the assimilated food does not suffice for growth, but only replaces what is lost. Last of all, in old age, it does not suffice even for this purpose; whereupon the body declines, and finally dies from natural causes. Against this defect man was provided with a remedy in the tree of life; for its effect was to strengthen the force of the species against the weakness resulting from the admixture of extraneous nutriment. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): Man had food to appease his hunger, drink to slake his thirst; and the tree of life to banish the breaking up of old age; and (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. Q. 19) The tree of life, like a drug, warded off all bodily corruption. Yet it did not absolutely cause immortality; for neither was the soul’s intrinsic power of preserving the body due to the tree of life, nor was it of such efficiency as to give the body a disposition to immortality, whereby it might become indissoluble; which is clear from the fact that every bodily power is finite; so the power of the tree of life could not go so far as to give the body the prerogative of living for an infinite time, but only for a definite time. For it is manifest that the greater a force is, the more durable is its effect; therefore, since the power of the tree of life was finite, man’s life was to be preserved for a definite time by partaking of it once; and when that time had elapsed, man was to be either transferred to a spiritual life, or had need to eat once more of the tree of life. From this the replies to the objections clearly appear. For the first proves that the tree of life did not absolutely cause immortality; while the others show that it caused in-

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corruptibilitatem impediendo corruptionem, secundum corruption by warding off corruption, according to the exmodum praedictum. planation above given.

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Question 98 The Preservation of the Species Deinde considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad We next consider what belongs to the preservation of conservationem speciei. Et primo, de ipsa generatione; the species; and, first, of generation; second, of the state of secundo, de conditione prolis genitae. the offspring. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum in statu innocentiae fuisset generatio. (1) Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation? Secundo, utrum fuisset generatio per coitum. (2) Whether generation would have been through coition?

Article 1 Whether generation existed in the state of innocence? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in statu innocentiae non fuisset generatio. Generationi enim corruptio est contraria, ut dicitur in V Physic. Contraria autem sunt circa idem. In statu autem innocentiae non fuisset corruptio. Ergo neque generatio. Praeterea, generatio ordinatur ad hoc quod conservetur in specie quod secundum individuum conservari non potest, unde et in illis individuis quae in perpetuum durant, generatio non invenitur. Sed in statu innocentiae homo in perpetuum absque morte vixisset. Ergo in statu innocentiae generatio, non fuisset. Praeterea, per generationem homines multiplicantur. Sed multiplicatis dominis, necesse est fieri possessionum divisionem, ad evitandam confusionem dominii. Ergo, cum homo sit institutus dominus animalium, facta multiplicatione humani generis per generationem, secuta fuisset divisio dominii. Quod videtur esse contrarium iuri naturali, secundum quod omnia sunt communia, ut Isidorus dicit. Non ergo fuisset generatio in statu innocentiae. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, crescite et multiplicamini, et replete terram. Huiusmodi autem multiplicatio absque nova generatione fieri non potuisset, cum duo tantum fuerint primitus instituti. Ergo in primo statu generatio fuisset. Respondeo dicendum quod in statu innocentiae fuisset generatio ad multiplicationem humani generis, alioquin peccatum hominis fuisset valde necessarium, ex quo tantum bonum consecutum est. Est ergo considerandum quod homo, secundum suam naturam, est constitutus quasi medium quoddam inter creaturas corruptibiles et incorruptibiles, nam anima eius est natura-

Objection 1: It would seem there would have been no generation in the state of innocence. For, as stated in Phys. v, 5, corruption is contrary to generation. But contraries affect the same subject: also there would have been no corruption in the state of innocence. Therefore neither would there have been generation. Obj. 2: Further, the object of generation is the preservation in the species of that which is corruptible in the individual. Wherefore there is no generation in those individual things which last for ever. But in the state of innocence man would have lived for ever. Therefore in the state of innocence there would have been no generation. Obj. 3: Further, by generation man is multiplied. But the multiplication of masters requires the division of property, to avoid confusion of mastership. Therefore, since man was made master of the animals, it would have been necessary to make a division of rights when the human race increased by generation. This is against the natural law, according to which all things are in common, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 4). Therefore there would have been no generation in the state of innocence. On the contrary, It is written (Gen 1:28): Increase and multiply, and fill the earth. But this increase could not come about save by generation, since the original number of mankind was two only. Therefore there would have been generation in the state of innocence. I answer that, In the state of innocence there would have been generation of offspring for the multiplication of the human race; otherwise man’s sin would have been very necessary, for such a great blessing to be its result. We must, therefore, observe that man, by his nature, is established, as it were, midway between corruptible and incorruptible creatures, his soul being naturally incorruptible, while his

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liter incorruptibilis, corpus vero naturaliter corruptibile. Est autem considerandum quod alio modo intentio naturae fertur ad corruptibiles, et incorruptibiles creaturas. Id enim per se videtur esse de intentione naturae, quod est semper et perpetuum. Quod autem est solum secundum aliquod tempus, non videtur esse principaliter de intentione naturae, sed quasi ad aliud ordinatum, alioquin, eo corrupto, naturae intentio cassaretur. Quia igitur in rebus corruptibilibus nihil est perpetuum et semper manens nisi species, bonum speciei est de principali intentione naturae, ad cuius conservationem naturalis generatio ordinatur. Substantiae vero incorruptibiles manent semper non solum secundum speciem, sed etiam secundum individua, et ideo etiam ipsa individua sunt de principali intentione naturae. Sic igitur homini ex parte corporis, quod corruptibile est secundum naturam suam, competit generatio. Ex parte vero animae, quae incorruptibilis est, competit ei quod multitudo individuorum sit per se intenta a natura, vel potius a naturae auctore, qui solus est humanarum animarum creator. Et ideo, ad multiplicationem humani generis, generationem in humano genere statuit, etiam in statu innocentiae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod corpus hominis in statu innocentiae, quantum erat de se, corruptibile erat, sed potuit praeservari a corruptione per animam. Et ideo non fuit homini subtrahenda generatio, quae debetur corruptibilibus rebus. Ad secundum dicendum quod generatio in statu innocentiae, etsi non fuisset propter conservationem speciei, fuisset tamen propter multiplicationem individuorum. Ad tertium dicendum quod in statu isto, multiplicatis dominis, necesse est fieri divisionem possessionum, quia communitas possessionis est occasio discordiae, ut philosophus dicit in II Politic. Sed in statu innocentiae fuissent voluntates hominum sic ordinatae, quod absque omni periculo discordiae communiter usi fuissent, secundum quod unicuique eorum competeret, rebus quae eorum dominio subdebantur, cum hoc etiam modo apud multos bonos viros observetur.

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body is naturally corruptible. We must also observe that nature’s purpose appears to be different as regards corruptible and incorruptible things. For that seems to be the direct purpose of nature, which is invariable and perpetual; while what is only for a time is seemingly not the chief purpose of nature, but as it were, subordinate to something else; otherwise, when it ceased to exist, nature’s purpose would become void. Therefore, since in things corruptible none is everlasting and permanent except the species, it follows that the chief purpose of nature is the good of the species; for the preservation of which natural generation is ordained. On the other hand, incorruptible substances survive, not only in the species, but also in the individual; wherefore even the individuals are included in the chief purpose of nature. Hence it belongs to man to beget offspring, on the part of the naturally corruptible body. But on the part of the soul, which is incorruptible, it is fitting that the multitude of individuals should be the direct purpose of nature, or rather of the Author of nature, Who alone is the Creator of the human soul. Wherefore, to provide for the multiplication of the human race, He established the begetting of offspring even in the state of innocence. Reply Obj. 1: In the state of innocence the human body was in itself corruptible, but it could be preserved from corruption by the soul. Therefore, since generation belongs to things corruptible, man was not to be deprived thereof. Reply Obj. 2: Although generation in the state of innocence might not have been required for the preservation of the species, yet it would have been required for the multiplication of the individual. Reply Obj. 3: In our present state a division of possessions is necessary on account of the multiplicity of masters, inasmuch as community of possession is a source of strife, as the Philosopher says (Politic. ii, 5). In the state of innocence, however, the will of men would have been so ordered that without any danger of strife they would have used in common, according to each one’s need, those things of which they were masters—a state of things to be observed even now among many good men.

Article 2 Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation by coition? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in statu innocentiae non fuisset generatio per coitum. Quia, ut Damascenus dicit, primus homo erat in Paradiso terrestri sicut angelus quidam. Sed in futuro resurrectionis statu, quando erunt homines angelis similes, ne-

Objection 1: It would seem that generation by coition would not have existed in the state of innocence. For, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11; iv, 25), the first man in the terrestrial Paradise was like an angel. But in the future state of the resurrection, when men will be like the an-

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que nubent neque nubentur, ut dicitur Matth. XXII. Ergo gels, they shall neither marry nor be married, as is written neque in Paradiso fuisset generatio per coitum. Matt. 22:30. Therefore neither in paradise would there have been generation by coition. Praeterea, primi homines in perfecta aetate conObj. 2: Further, our first parents were created at the age diti fuerunt. Si igitur in eis ante peccatum generatio fuis- of perfect development. Therefore, if generation by coition set per coitum, fuissent etiam in Paradiso carnaliter con- had existed before sin, they would have had intercourse iuncti. Quod patet esse falsum, secundum Scripturam. while still in paradise: which was not the case according to Scripture (Gen 4:1). Praeterea, in coniunctione carnali maxime efficiObj. 3: Further, in carnal intercourse, more than at any tur homo similis bestiis, propter vehementiam delecta- other time, man becomes like the beasts, on account of tionis, unde etiam continentia laudatur, per quam homi- the vehement delight which he takes therein; whence connes ab huiusmodi delectationibus abstinent. Sed bestiis tingency is praiseworthy, whereby man refrains from such homo comparatur propter peccatum, secundum illud pleasures. But man is compared to beasts by reason of sin, Psalmi XLVIII, homo cum in honore esset, non intellexit, according to Ps. 48:13: Man, when he was in honor, did not comparatus est iumentis insipientibus, et similis factus est understand; he is compared to senseless beasts, and is become illis. Ergo ante peccatum non fuisset maris et feminae like to them. Therefore, before sin, there would have been carnalis coniunctio. no such intercourse of man and woman. Praeterea, in statu innocentiae nulla fuisset corObj. 4: Further, in the state of innocence there would ruptio. Sed per coitum corrumpitur integritas virginalis. have been no corruption. But virginal integrity is corrupted Ergo coitus in statu innocentiae non fuisset. by intercourse. Therefore there would have been no such thing in the state of innocence. Sed contra est quod Deus ante peccatum mascuOn the contrary, God made man and woman belum et feminam fecit, ut dicitur Gen. I et II. Nihil autem fore sin (Gen 1, 2). But nothing is void in God’s works. est frustra in operibus Dei. Ergo etiam si homo non pec- Therefore, even if man had not sinned, there would have casset, fuisset coitus, ad quem distinctio sexuum ordina- been such intercourse, to which the distinction of sex is ortur. dained. Praeterea, Gen. II, dicitur mulier esse facta in Moreover, we are told that woman was made to be adiutorium viri. Sed non ad aliud nisi ad generationem a help to man (Gen 2:18, 20). But she is not fitted to help quae fit per coitum, quia ad quodlibet aliud opus, con- man except in generation, because another man would venientius adiuvari posset vir per virum quam per femi- have proved a more effective help in anything else. Therenam. Ergo etiam in statu innocentiae fuisset generatio fore there would have been such generation also in the state per coitum. of innocence. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam antiquorum I answer that, Some of the earlier doctors, considdoctorum, considerantes concupiscentiae foeditatem ering the nature of concupiscence as regards generation in quae invenitur in coitu in isto statu, posuerunt quod in our present state, concluded that in the state of innocence statu innocentiae non fuisset generatio per coitum. Un- generation would not have been effected in the same way. de Gregorius Nyssenus dicit in libro quem fecit de Homi- Thus Gregory of Nyssa says (De Hom. Opif. xvii) that in ne, quod in Paradiso aliter fuisset multiplicatum genus paradise the human race would have been multiplied by humanum, sicut multiplicati sunt angeli, absque con- some other means, as the angels were multiplied without cubitu, per operationem divinae virtutis. Et dicit quod coition by the operation of the Divine Power. He adds that Deus ante peccatum fecit masculum et feminam, respi- God made man male and female before sin, because He ciens ad modum generationis qui futurus erat post pec- foreknew the mode of generation which would take place catum, cuius Deus praescius erat. Sed hoc non dicitur ra- after sin, which He foresaw. But this is unreasonable. For tionabiliter. Ea enim quae sunt naturalia homini, neque what is natural to man was neither acquired nor forfeited subtrahuntur neque dantur homini per peccatum. Ma- by sin. Now it is clear that generation by coition is natunifestum est autem quod homini, secundum animalem ral to man by reason of his animal life, which he possessed vitam, quam etiam ante peccatum habebat, ut supra dic- even before sin, as above explained (Q. 97, A. 3), just as it tum est, naturale est generare per coitum, sicut et ceteris is natural to other perfect animals, as the corporeal memanimalibus perfectis. Et hoc declarant naturalia mem- bers make it clear. So we cannot allow that these members bra ad hunc usum deputata. Et ideo non est dicendum would not have had a natural use, as other members had, quod usus horum membrorum naturalium non fuisset before sin. ante peccatum, sicut et ceterorum membrorum. Sunt igitur in coitu duo consideranda, secundum Thus, as regards generation by coition, there are, in praesentem statum. Unum quod naturae est, scilicet the present state of life, two things to be considered. One,

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coniunctio maris et feminae ad generandum. In omni enim generatione requiritur virtus activa et passiva. Unde, cum in omnibus in quibus est distinctio sexuum, virtus activa sit in mare, virtus vero passiva in femina; naturae ordo exigit ut ad generandum conveniant per coitum mas et femina. Aliud autem quod considerari potest, est quaedam deformitas immoderatae concupiscentiae. Quae in statu innocentiae non fuisset quando inferiores vires omnino rationi subdebantur. Unde Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei : Absit ut suspicemur non potuisse prolem seri sine libidinis morbo. Sed eo voluntatis nutu moverentur illa membra quo cetera, et sine ardore et illecebroso stimulo, cum tranquillitate animi et corporis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo in Paradiso fuisset sicut angelus per spiritualem mentem, cum tamen haberet, vitam animalem quantum ad corpus. Sed post resurrectionem erit homo similis angelo, spiritualis effectus et secundum animam et secundum corpus. Unde non est similis ratio. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit IX super Gen. ad Litt., ideo primi parentes in Paradiso non coierunt, quia, formata muliere, post modicum propter peccatum de Paradiso eiecti sunt, vel quia expectabatur divina auctoritas ad determinatum tempus commixtionis, a qua acceperunt universale mandatum. Ad tertium dicendum quod bestiae carent ratione. Unde secundum hoc homo in coitu bestialis efficitur, quod delectationem coitus et fervorem concupiscentiae ratione moderari non potest. Sed in statu innocentiae nihil huiusmodi fuisset quod ratione non moderaretur, non quia esset minor delectatio secundum sensum, ut quidam dicunt (fuisset enim tanto maior delectatio sensibilis, quanto esset purior natura, et corpus magis sensibile); sed quia vis concupiscibilis non ita inordinate se effudisset super huiusmodi delectatione, regulata per rationem, ad quam non pertinet ut sit minor delectatio in sensu, sed ut vis concupiscibilis non immoderate delectationi inhaereat; et dico immoderate, praeter mensuram rationis. Sicut sobrius in cibo moderate assumpto non minorem habet delectationem quam gulosus; sed minus eius concupiscibilis super huiusmodi delectatione requiescit. Et hoc sonant verba Augustini, quae a statu innocentiae non excludunt magnitudinem delectationis, sed ardorem libidinis et inquietudinem animi. Et ideo continentia in statu innocentiae non fuisset laudabilis, quae in tempore isto laudatur non propter defectum fecunditatis, sed propter remotionem inordinatae libidinis. Tunc autem fuisset fecunditas absque libidine. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XIV de Civ. Dei, in illo statu nulla corruptione integritatis infunderetur gremio maritus uxoris. Ita enim potuit utero coniugis, salva integritate feminei genitalis, virile semen immitti, sicut nunc potest, eadem integritate salva, ex

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which comes from nature, is the union of man and woman; for in every act of generation there is an active and a passive principle. Wherefore, since wherever there is distinction of sex, the active principle is male and the passive is female; the order of nature demands that for the purpose of generation there should be concurrence of male and female. The second thing to be observed is a certain deformity of excessive concupiscence, which in the state of innocence would not have existed, when the lower powers were entirely subject to reason. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): We must be far from supposing that offspring could not be begotten without concupiscence. All the bodily members would have been equally moved by the will, without ardent or wanton incentive, with calmness of soul and body. Reply Obj. 1: In paradise man would have been like an angel in his spirituality of mind, yet with an animal life in his body. After the resurrection man will be like an angel, spiritualized in soul and body. Wherefore there is no parallel. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Gen ad lit. ix, 4), our first parents did not come together in paradise, because on account of sin they were ejected from paradise shortly after the creation of the woman; or because, having received the general Divine command relative to generation, they awaited the special command relative to time. Reply Obj. 3: Beasts are without reason. In this way man becomes, as it were, like them in coition, because he cannot moderate concupiscence. In the state of innocence nothing of this kind would have happened that was not regulated by reason, not because delight of sense was less, as some say (rather indeed would sensible delight have been the greater in proportion to the greater purity of nature and the greater sensibility of the body), but because the force of concupiscence would not have so inordinately thrown itself into such pleasure, being curbed by reason, whose place it is not to lessen sensual pleasure, but to prevent the force of concupiscence from cleaving to it immoderately. By immoderately I mean going beyond the bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the glutton, but his concupiscence lingers less in such pleasures. This is what Augustine means by the words quoted, which do not exclude intensity of pleasure from the state of innocence, but ardor of desire and restlessness of the mind. Therefore continence would not have been praiseworthy in the state of innocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our present state, not because it removes fecundity, but because it excludes inordinate desire. In that state fecundity would have been without lust. Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): In that state intercourse would have been without prejudice to virginal integrity; this would have remained intact, as it does in the menses. And just as in giving birth the mother was then relieved, not by groans of pain, but by the instigations of

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Preservation of the Species

Q. 98, A. 2

utero virginis fluxus menstrui cruoris emitti. Ut enim ad maturity; so in conceiving, the union was one, not of lustful pariendum non doloris gemitus, sed maturitatis impulsus desire, but of deliberate action. feminea viscera relaxaret; sic ad concipiendum non libidinis appetitus, sed voluntarius usus naturam utramque coniungeret.

473

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Question 99 The Condition of the Offspring as to the Body Deinde considerandum est de conditione prolis geWe must now consider the condition of the offspring— nerandae. Et primo, quantum ad corpus; secundo, quan- first, as regards the body; second, as regards virtue; third, in tum ad iustitiam; tertio, quantum ad scientiam. knowledge. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum in statu innocentiae pueri mox geniti (1) Whether in the state of innocence children would habuissent perfectam virtutem corpoream. have had full powers of the body immediately after birth? Secundo, utrum omnes fuissent nati in sexu (2) Whether all infants would have been of the male masculino. sex?

Article 1 Whether in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of body, as to the use of its members, immediately after birth? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pueri in statu innocentiae, mox nati, virtutem perfectam habuissent ad motum membrorum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Bapt. Parvul., quod infirmitati mentis congruit haec infirmitas corporis, quae scilicet in pueris apparet. Sed in statu innocentiae nulla fuisset infirmitas mentis. Ergo neque talis infirmitas corporis fuisset in parvulis. Praeterea, quaedam animalia statim cum nascuntur, habent virtutem sufficientem ad usum membrorum. Sed homo est nobilior aliis animalibus. Ergo multo magis est naturale homini quod statim natus virtutem habeat ad usum membrorum. Et ita videtur esse poena ex peccato consequens. Praeterea, non posse consequi delectabile propositum, afflictionem inducit. Sed si pueri non habuissent virtutem ad movendum membra, frequenter accidisset quod non possent consequi aliquod delectabile eis propositum. Ergo fuisset in eis afflictio; quae non poterat esse ante peccatum. Non ergo in statu innocentiae defuisset pueris virtus ad movendum membra. Praeterea, defectus senectutis videtur correspondere defectui pueritiae. Sed in statu innocentiae non fuisset defectus senectutis. Ergo neque etiam defectus pueritiae. Sed contra est quod omne generatum prius est imperfectum quam perficiatur. Sed pueri in statu innocentiae fuissent per generationem producti. Ergo a principio imperfecti fuissent et quantitate et virtute corporis. Respondeo dicendum quod ea quae sunt supra naturam, sola fide tenemus; quod autem credimus, aucto-

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of the body, as to the use of its members, immediately after birth. For Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 38): This weakness of the body befits their weakness of mind. But in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness of mind. Therefore neither would there have been weakness of body in infants. Obj. 2: Further, some animals at birth have sufficient strength to use their members. But man is nobler than other animals. Therefore much more is it natural to man to have strength to use his members at birth; and thus it appears to be a punishment of sin that he has not that strength. Obj. 3: Further, inability to secure a proffered pleasure causes affliction. But if children had not full strength in the use of their limbs, they would often have been unable to procure something pleasurable offered to them; and so they would have been afflicted, which was not possible before sin. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have been deprived of the use of their limbs. Obj. 4: Further, the weakness of old age seems to correspond to that of infancy. But in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness of old age. Therefore neither would there have been such weakness in infancy. On the contrary, Everything generated is first imperfect. But in the state of innocence children would have been begotten by generation. Therefore from the first they would have been imperfect in bodily size and power. I answer that, By faith alone do we hold truths which are above nature, and what we believe rests on authority.

475

Q. 99, A. 1

Man

ritati debemus. Unde in omnibus asserendis sequi debemus naturam rerum, praeter ea quae auctoritate divina traduntur, quae sunt supra naturam. Manifestum est autem naturale hoc esse, utpote et principiis humanae naturae competens, quod pueri mox nati non habeant sufficientem virtutem ad movendum membra. Quia homo naturaliter habet cerebrum maius in quantitate, secundum proportionem sui corporis, quam cetera animalia. Unde naturale est quod, propter maximam humiditatem cerebri in pueris, nervi, qui sunt instrumenta motus, non sunt idonei ad movendum membra. Ex alia vero parte nulli Catholico dubium est quin divina virtute fieri possit, ut pueri mox nati perfectam virtutem habeant ad motum membrorum. Constat autem per auctoritatem Scripturae, quod Deus fecit hominem rectum, et haec rectitudo consistit, ut Augustinus dicit, in perfecta subiectione corporis ad animam. Sicut ergo in primo statu non poterat esse in membris hominis aliquid quod repugnaret ordinatae hominis voluntati, ita membra hominis deficere non poterant humanae voluntati. Voluntas autem hominis ordinata est quae tendit in actus sibi convenientes. Non sunt autem iidem actus convenientes homini secundum quamlibet aetatem. Dicendum est ergo quod pueri mox nati non habuissent sufficientem virtutem ad movendum membra ad quoslibet actus; sed ad actus pueritiae convenientes, puta ad sugendum ubera, et ad alia huiusmodi. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de ista infirmitate quae nunc in pueris apparet etiam quantum ad actus eorum pueritiae convenientes; ut patet per ea quae praemittit, quod iuxta se iacentibus mammis, magis possunt esurientes flere quam sugere. Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc quod quaedam animalia statim nata habent usum membrorum, non est ex eorum nobilitate, cum quaedam animalia perfectiora hoc non habeant, sed hoc eis contingit ex siccitate cerebri, et quia actus proprii talium animalium sunt imperfecti, ad quos etiam parva virtus sufficere potest. Ad tertium patet solutio per ea quae dicta sunt in corpore. Vel potest dici quod nihil appetivissent, nisi ordinata voluntate convenisset res secundum statum suum. Ad quartum dicendum quod homo in statu innocentiae generatus fuisset, sed non fuisset corruptus. Et ideo in statu illo potuissent esse aliqui defectus pueriles, qui consequuntur generationem; non autem defectus seniles, qui ordinantur ad corruptionem.

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Wherefore, in making any assertion, we must be guided by the nature of things, except in those things which are above nature, and are made known to us by Divine authority. Now it is clear that it is as natural as it is befitting to the principles of human nature that children should not have sufficient strength for the use of their limbs immediately after birth. Because in proportion to other animals man has naturally a larger brain. Wherefore it is natural, on account of the considerable humidity of the brain in children, that the nerves which are instruments of movement, should not be apt for moving the limbs. On the other hand, no Catholic doubts it possible for a child to have, by Divine power, the use of its limbs immediately after birth. Now we have it on the authority of Scripture that God made man right (Eccl 7:30), which rightness, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 11), consists in the perfect subjection of the body to the soul. As, therefore, in the primitive state it was impossible to find in the human limbs anything repugnant to man’s well-ordered will, so was it impossible for those limbs to fail in executing the will’s commands. Now the human will is well ordered when it tends to acts which are befitting to man. But the same acts are not befitting to man at every season of life. We must, therefore, conclude that children would not have had sufficient strength for the use of their limbs for the purpose of performing every kind of act; but only for the acts befitting the state of infancy, such as suckling, and the like. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of the weakness which we observe in children even as regards those acts which befit the state of infancy; as is clear from his preceding remark that even when close to the breast, and longing for it, they are more apt to cry than to suckle. Reply Obj. 2: The fact that some animals have the use of their limbs immediately after birth, is due, not to their superiority, since more perfect animals are not so endowed; but to the dryness of the brain, and to the operations proper to such animals being imperfect, so that a small amount of strength suffices them. Reply Obj. 3 is clear from what we have said above. We may add that they would have desired nothing except with an ordinate will; and only what was befitting to their state of life. Reply Obj. 4: In the state of innocence man would have been born, yet not subject to corruption. Therefore in that state there could have been certain infantile defects which result from birth; but not senile defects leading to corruption.

476

Ia

Condition of the Offspring as to the Body

Q. 99, A. 2

Article 2 Whether, in the primitive state, women would have been born? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in primo statu feminae natae non fuissent. Dicit enim philosophus, in libro II de Generat. Animal., quod femina est mas occasionatus, quasi praeter intentionem naturae proveniens. Sed in statu illo nihil evenisset innaturale in hominis generatione. Ergo feminae natae non fuissent.

Objection 1: It would seem that in the primitive state woman would not have been born. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that woman is a misbegotten male, as though she were a product outside the purpose of nature. But in that state nothing would have been unnatural in human generation. Therefore in that state women would not have been born. Praeterea, omne agens generat sibi simile, nisi imObj. 2: Further, every agent produces its like, unless pediatur vel propter defectum virtutis, vel propter in- prevented by insufficient power or ineptness of matter: thus dispositionem materiae, sicut parvus ignis non potest a small fire cannot burn green wood. But in generation the comburere ligna viridia. In generatione autem vis acti- active force is in the male. Since, therefore, in the state of va est in mare. Cum igitur in statu innocentiae nullus innocence man’s active force was not subject to defect, nor fuisset defectus virtutis ex parte maris, nec indispositio was there inept matter on the part of the woman, it seems materiae ex parte feminae, videtur quod semper mascu- that males would always have been born.

li nati fuissent. Praeterea, in statu innocentiae generatio ad multiplicationem hominum ordinabatur. Sed sufficienter homines multiplicari potuissent per primum hominem et per primam feminam, ex quo in perpetuum victuri erant. Ergo non fuit necessarium quod in statu innocentiae feminae nascerentur. Sed contra est quod sic natura processisset in generando, sicut eam Deus instituit. Sed Deus instituit marem et feminam in natura humana, ut dicitur Gen. I et II. Ergo etiam in statu illo fuissent mares et feminae generati.

Obj. 3: Further, in the state of innocence generation is ordered to the multiplication of the human race. But the race would have been sufficiently multiplied by the first man and woman, from the fact that they would have lived for ever. Therefore, in the state of innocence, there was no need for women to be born. On the contrary, Nature’s process in generation would have been in harmony with the manner in which it was established by God. But God established male and female in human nature, as it is written (Gen 1, 2). Therefore also in the state of innocence male and female would have been born. Respondeo dicendum quod nihil eorum quae ad I answer that, Nothing belonging to the completecomplementum humanae naturae pertinent, in statu in- ness of human nature would have been lacking in the state nocentiae defuisset. Sicut autem ad perfectionem uni- of innocence. And as different grades belong to the perfecversi pertinent diversi gradus rerum, ita etiam diversitas tion of the universe, so also diversity of sex belongs to the sexus est ad perfectionem humanae naturae. Et ideo in perfection of human nature. Therefore in the state of innostatu innocentiae uterque sexus per generationem pro- cence, both sexes would have been begotten.

ductus fuisset. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod femina dicitur mas occasionatus, quia est praeter intentionem naturae particularis, non autem praeter intentionem naturae universalis, ut supra dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod generatio feminae non solum contingit ex defectu virtutis activae vel indispositione materiae, ut obiectio tangit. Sed quandoque quidem ex aliquo accidenti extrinseco; sicut philosophus dicit, in libro de Animalibus, quod ventus Septentrionalis coadiuvat ad generationem masculorum, Australis vero ad generationem feminarum. Quandoque etiam ex conceptione animae, ad quam de facili immutatur corpus. Et praecipue in statu innocentiae hoc esse poterat, quando corpus magis erat animae subiectum; ut scilicet secundum voluntatem generantis, distingueretur sexus in prole.

Reply Obj. 1: Woman is said to be a misbegotten male, as being a product outside the purpose of nature considered in the individual case: but not against the purpose of universal nature, as above explained (Q. 92, A. 1, ad 2). Reply Obj. 2: The generation of woman is not occasioned either by a defect of the active force or by inept matter, as the objection proposes; but sometimes by an extrinsic accidental cause; thus the Philosopher says (De Animal. Histor. vi, 19): The northern wind favors the generation of males, and the southern wind that of females: sometimes also by some impression in the soul (of the parents), which may easily have some effect on the body (of the child). Especially was this the case in the state of innocence, when the body was more subject to the soul; so that by the mere will of the parent the sex of the offspring might be diversified.

477

Q. 99, A. 2

Man

Ad tertium dicendum quod proles fuisset genita vivens vita animali, ad quam sicut pertinet alimento uti, sic etiam generare. Unde conveniebat quod omnes generarent, et non solum primi parentes. Ad quod consequens videtur quod tot fuissent generatae feminae, quot et mares.

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Reply Obj. 3: The offspring would have been begotten to an animal life, as to the use of food and generation. Hence it was fitting that all should generate, and not only the first parents. From this it seems to follow that males and females would have been in equal number.

478

Question 100 The Condition of the Offspring as Regards Righteousness Deinde considerandum est de conditione prolis geWe now have to consider the condition of the offspring nerandae quantum ad iustitiam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur as to righteousness. Under this head there are two points of duo. inquiry: Primo, utrum homines fuissent nati cum iustitia. (1) Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness? Secundo, utrum nascerentur in iustitia confirmati. (2) Whether they would have been born confirmed in righteousness?

Article 1 Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homines non fuissent cum iustitia nati. Dicit enim Hugo de sancto Victore quod primus homo ante peccatum generaret quidem filios sine peccato, sed non paternae iustitiae haeredes. Praeterea, iustitia est per gratiam, ut apostolus dicit ad Rom. V. Sed gratia non transfunditur, quia sic esset naturalis; sed a solo Deo infunditur. Ergo pueri cum iustitia nati non fuissent. Praeterea, iustitia in anima est. Sed anima non est ex traduce. Ergo nec iustitia traducta fuisset a parentibus in filios. Sed contra est quod Anselmus dicit, in libro de Conceptu Virg., quod simul cum rationalem haberent animam, iusti essent quos generaret homo, si non peccaret. Respondeo dicendum quod naturaliter homo generat sibi simile secundum speciem. Unde quaecumque accidentia consequuntur naturam speciei, in his necesse est quod filii parentibus similentur, nisi sit error in operatione naturae, qui in statu innocentiae non fuisset. In accidentibus autem individualibus non est necesse quod filii parentibus similentur. Iustitia autem originalis, in qua primus homo conditus fuit, fuit accidens naturae speciei, non quasi ex principiis speciei causatum, sed sicut quoddam donum divinitus datum toti naturae. Et hoc apparet, quia opposita sunt unius generis, peccatum autem originale, quod opponitur illi iustitiae, dicitur esse peccatum naturae; unde traducitur a parente in posteros. Et propter hoc etiam filii parentibus assimilati fuissent quantum ad originalem iustitiam.

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence men would not have been born in a state of righteousness. For Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. i): Before sin the first man would have begotten children sinless; but not heirs to their father’s righteousness. Obj. 2: Further, righteousness is effected by grace, as the Apostle says (Rom 5:16, 21). Now grace is not transfused from one to another, for thus it would be natural; but is infused by God alone. Therefore children would not have been born righteous. Obj. 3: Further, righteousness is in the soul. But the soul is not transmitted from the parent. Therefore neither would righteousness have been transmitted from parents, to the children. On the contrary, Anselm says (De Concep. Virg. x): As long as man did not sin, he would have begotten children endowed with righteousness together with the rational soul. I answer that, Man naturally begets a specific likeness to himself. Hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the species, must be alike in parent and child, unless nature fails in its operation, which would not have occurred in the state of innocence. But individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in parent and child. Now original righteousness, in which the first man was created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species, not as caused by the principles of the species, but as a gift conferred by God on the entire human nature. This is clear from the fact that opposites are of the same genus; and original sin, which is opposed to original righteousness, is called the sin of nature, wherefore it is transmitted from the parent to the offspring; and for this reason also, the children would have been assimilated to their parents as regards original righteousness.

479

Q. 100, A. 2

Man

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum Hugonis est intelligendum non quantum ad habitum iustitiae, sed quantum ad executionem actus. Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod pueri non fuissent nati cum iustitia gratuita, quae est merendi principium, sed cum iustitia originali. Sed cum radix originalis iustitiae, in cuius rectitudine factus est homo, consistat in subiectione supernaturali rationis ad Deum, quae est per gratiam gratum facientem, ut supra dictum est; necesse est dicere quod, si pueri nati fuissent in originali iustitia, quod etiam nati fuissent cum gratia; sicut et de primo homine supra diximus quod fuit cum gratia conditus. Non tamen fuisset propter hoc gratia naturalis, quia non fuisset transfusa per virtutem seminis, sed fuisset collata homini statim cum habuisset animam rationalem. Sicut etiam statim cum corpus est dispositum infunditur a Deo anima rationalis, quae tamen non est ex traduce.

Unde patet solutio ad tertium.

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Reply Obj. 1: These words of Hugh are to be understood as referring, not to the habit of righteousness, but to the execution of the act thereof. Reply Obj. 2: Some say that children would have been born, not with the righteousness of grace, which is the principle of merit, but with original righteousness. But since the root of original righteousness, which conferred righteousness on the first man when he was made, consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which subjection results from sanctifying grace, as above explained (Q. 95, A. 1), we must conclude that if children were born in original righteousness, they would also have been born in grace; thus we have said above that the first man was created in grace (Q. 95, A. 1). This grace, however, would not have been natural, for it would not have been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would have been conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational soul. In the same way the rational soul, which is not transmitted by the parent, is infused by God as soon as the human body is apt to receive it. From this the reply to the third objection is clear.

Article 2 Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pueri in statu innocentiae nati fuissent in iustitia confirmati. Dicit enim Gregorius, IV Moralium, super illud, somno meo requiescerem etc., si parentem primum nulla putredo peccati corrumperet, nequaquam ex se filios Gehennae generaret; sed hi qui nunc per redemptorem salvandi sunt, soli ab illo electi nascerentur. Ergo nascerentur omnes in iustitia confirmati. Praeterea, Anselmus dicit, in libro cur Deus homo, quod si primi parentes sic vixissent ut tentati non peccassent, ita confirmarentur cum omni propagine sua, ut ultra peccare non possent. Ergo pueri nascerentur in iustitia confirmati. Praeterea, bonum est potentius quam malum. Sed propter peccatum primi hominis consecuta est necessitas peccandi in his qui nascuntur ex eo. Ergo si primus homo in iustitia perstitisset, derivaretur ad posteros necessitas observandi iustitiam. Praeterea, angelus adhaerens Deo aliis peccantibus, statim est in iustitia confirmatus, ut ulterius peccare non posset. Ergo similiter et homo, si tentationi restitisset, confirmatus fuisset. Sed qualis ipse fuit, tales alios

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For Gregory says (Moral. iv) on the words of Job 3:13: For now I should have been asleep, etc.: If no sinful corruption had infected our first parent, he would not have begotten ‘children of hell’; no children would have been born of him but such as were destined to be saved by the Redeemer. Therefore all would have been born confirmed in righteousness. Obj. 2: Further, Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo i, 18): If our first parents had lived so as not to yield to temptation, they would have been confirmed in grace, so that with their offspring they would have been unable to sin any more. Therefore the children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. Obj. 3: Further, good is stronger than evil. But by the sin of the first man there resulted, in those born of him, the necessity of sin. Therefore, if the first man had persevered in righteousness, his descendants would have derived from him the necessity of preserving righteousness. Obj. 4: Further, the angels who remained faithful to God, while the others sinned, were at once confirmed in grace, so as to be unable henceforth to sin. In like manner, therefore, man would have been confirmed in grace

480

Ia

Condition of the Offspring as Regards Righteousness

Q. 100, A. 2

generasset. Ergo et eius filii confirmati in iustitia nasce- if he had persevered. But he would have begotten children rentur. like himself. Therefore they also would have been born confirmed in righteousness. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, Dei: Tam felix universa esset humana societas si nec illi, 10): Happy would have been the whole human race if neiscilicet primi parentes, malum quod in posteros traiice- ther they—that is our first parents—had committed any evil rent, nec quisquam ex stirpe eorum iniquitatem commit- to be transmitted to their descendants, nor any of their race teret, quae damnationem reciperet. Ex quo datur intelli- had committed any sin for which they would have been congi quod, etiam si primi homines non peccassent, aliqui demned. From which words we gather that even if our first ex eorum stirpe potuissent iniquitatem committere. Non parents had not sinned, any of their descendants might ergo nascerentur in iustitia confirmati. have done evil; and therefore they would not have been born confirmed in righteousness. Respondeo dicendum quod non videtur possibile I answer that, It does not seem possible that in the quod pueri in statu innocentiae nascerentur in iustitia state of innocence children would have been born conconfirmati. Manifestum est enim quod pueri in sua na- firmed in righteousness. For it is clear that at their birth tivitate non habuissent plus perfectionis quam eorum they would not have had greater perfection than their parparentes in statu generationis. Parentes autem, quandiu ents at the time of begetting. Now the parents, as long generassent, non fuissent confirmati in iustitia. Ex hoc as they begot children, would not have been confirmed enim creatura rationalis in iustitia confirmatur, quod ef- in righteousness. For the rational creature is confirmed in ficitur beata per apertam Dei visionem, cui viso non righteousness through the beatitude given by the clear vipotest non inhaerere, cum ipse sit ipsa essentia bonita- sion of God; and when once it has seen God, it cannot but tis, a qua nullus potest averti, cum nihil desideretur et cleave to Him Who is the essence of goodness, wherefrom ametur nisi sub ratione boni. Et hoc dico secundum le- no one can turn away, since nothing is desired or loved but gem communem, quia ex aliquo privilegio speciali se- under the aspect of good. I say this according to the gencus accidere potest, sicut creditur de virgine matre Dei. eral law; for it may be otherwise in the case of special privQuam cito autem Adam ad illam beatitudinem perve- ilege, such as we believe was granted to the Virgin Mother nisset quod Deum per essentiam videret, efficeretur spi- of God. And as soon as Adam had attained to that happy ritualis et mente et corpore, et animalis vita cessaret, in state of seeing God in His Essence, he would have become qua sola generationis usus fuisset. Unde manifestum est spiritual in soul and body; and his animal life would have quod parvuli non nascerentur in iustitia confirmati. ceased, wherein alone there is generation. Hence it is clear that children would not have been born confirmed in righteousness. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si Adam non pecReply Obj. 1: If Adam had not sinned, he would not casset, non generaret ex se filios Gehennae, ita scilicet have begotten children of hell in the sense that they would quod ab ipso peccatum contraherent, quod est causa Ge- contract from him sin which is the cause of hell: yet by sinhennae. Possent tamen fieri filii Gehennae per liberum ning of their own free-will they could have become children arbitrium peccando. Vel, si filii Gehennae non fierent per of hell. If, however, they did not become children of hell by peccatum, hoc non esset propter hoc, quia essent in iu- falling into sin, this would not have been owing to their bestitia confirmati; sed propter divinam providentiam, per ing confirmed in righteousness, but to Divine Providence quam a peccato conservarentur immunes. preserving them free from sin. Ad secundum dicendum quod Anselmus hoc non Reply Obj. 2: Anselm does not say this by way of asserdicit asserendo, sed opinando. Quod patet ex ipso modo tion, but only as an opinion, which is clear from his mode loquendi, cum dicit, videtur quod, si vixissent et cetera. of expression as follows: It seems that if they had lived, etc. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio ista non est effiReply Obj. 3: This argument is not conclusive, though cax, quamvis per eam Anselmus motus fuisse videatur, Anselm seems to have been influenced by it, as appears ut ex eius verbis apparet. Non enim sic per peccatum from his words above quoted. For the necessity of sin inprimi parentis eius posteri necessitatem peccandi incur- curred by the descendants would not have been such that runt, ut ad iustitiam redire non possint, quod est tan- they could not return to righteousness, which is the case tum in damnatis. Unde nec ita necessitatem non peccan- only with the damned. Wherefore neither would the pardi transmisisset ad posteros, quod omnino peccare non ents have transmitted to their descendants the necessity of possent, quod est tantum in beatis. not sinning, which is only in the blessed. Ad quartum dicendum quod non est simile de hoReply Obj. 4: There is no comparison between man mine et angelo. Nam homo habet liberum arbitrium ver- and the angels; for man’s free-will is changeable, both be-

481

Q. 100, A. 2

Man

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tibile et ante electionem et post, non autem angelus, sicut fore and after choice; whereas the angel’s is not changeable, supra dictum est, cum de angelis ageretur. as we have said above in treating of the angels (Q. 64, A. 2).

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Question 101 The Condition of the Offspring as Regards Knowledge Deinde considerandum est de conditione prolis geWe next consider the condition of the offspring as to nerandae quantum ad scientiam. Et circa hoc quaerun- knowledge. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: tur duo. Primo, utrum pueri nascerentur in scientia perfecti. (1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge? Secundo, utrum statim post nativitatem habuissent (2) Whether they would have had perfect use of reason perfectum usum rationis. at the moment of birth?

Article 1 Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in statu innocentiae pueri nati fuissent in scientia perfecti. Qualis enim fuit Adam, tales filios generasset. Sed Adam fuit in scientia perfectus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo filii nascerentur ab eo in scientia perfecti. Praeterea, ignorantia ex peccato causatur, ut Beda dicit. Sed ignorantia est privatio scientiae. Ergo ante peccatum pueri mox nati omnem scientiam habuissent. Praeterea, pueri mox nati iustitiam habuissent. Sed ad iustitiam requiritur scientia, quae dirigit in agendis. Ergo etiam scientiam habuissent. Sed contra est quod anima nostra per naturam est sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Sed eadem animae natura est modo, quae tunc fuisset. Ergo animae puerorum in principio scientia caruissent. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, de his quae sunt supra naturam, soli auctoritati creditur, unde ubi auctoritas deficit, sequi debemus naturae conditionem. Est autem naturale homini ut scientiam per sensus acquirat, sicut supra dictum est, et ideo anima unitur corpori, quia indiget eo ad suam propriam operationem; quod non esset, si statim a principio scientiam haberet non acquisitam per sensitivas virtutes. Et ideo dicendum est quod pueri in statu innocentiae non nascerentur perfecti in scientia; sed eam in processu temporis absque difficultate acquisivissent, inveniendo vel addiscendo.

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge. For Adam would have begotten children like himself. But Adam was gifted with perfect knowledge (Q. 94, A. 3). Therefore children would have been born of him with perfect knowledge. Obj. 2: Further, ignorance is a result of sin, as Bede says (Cf. I-II, Q. 85, A. 3). But ignorance is privation of knowledge. Therefore before sin children would have had perfect knowledge as soon as they were born. Obj. 3: Further, children would have been gifted with righteousness from birth. But knowledge is required for righteousness, since it directs our actions. Therefore they would also have been gifted with knowledge. On the contrary, The human soul is naturally like a blank tablet on which nothing is written, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). But the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been in the state of innocence. Therefore the souls of children would have been without knowledge at birth. I answer that, As above stated (Q. 99, A. 1), as regards belief in matters which are above nature, we rely on authority alone; and so, when authority is wanting, we must be guided by the ordinary course of nature. Now it is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the senses, as above explained (Q. 55, A. 2; Q. 84, A. 6); and for this reason is the soul united to the body, that it needs it for its proper operation; and this would not be so if the soul were endowed at birth with knowledge not acquired through the sensitive powers. We must conclude then, that, in the state of innocence, children would not have been born with perfect knowledge; but in course of time they would have acquired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or learning.

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Q. 101, A. 2

Man

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod esse perfectum in scientia fuit individuale accidens primi parentis, inquantum scilicet ipse instituebatur ut pater et instructor totius humani generis. Et ideo quantum ad hoc, non generabat filios similes sibi; sed solum quantum ad accidentia naturalia vel gratuita totius naturae. Ad secundum dicendum quod ignorantia est privatio scientiae quae debet haberi pro tempore illo. Quod in pueris mox natis non fuisset, habuissent enim scientiam quae eis competebat secundum tempus illud. Unde ignorantia in eis non fuisset, sed nescientia respectu aliquorum. Quam etiam Dionysius ponit in angelis sanctis, in VII Cael. Hier. Ad tertium dicendum quod pueri habuissent sufficientem scientiam ad dirigendum eos in operibus iustitiae in quibus homines diriguntur per universalia principia iuris; quam multo plenius tunc habuissent quam nunc naturaliter habemus, et similiter aliorum universalium principiorum.

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Reply Obj. 1: The perfection of knowledge was an individual accident of our first parent, so far as he was established as the father and instructor of the whole human race. Therefore he begot children like himself, not in that respect, but only in those accidents which were natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature. Reply Obj. 2: Ignorance is privation of knowledge due at some particular time; and this would not have been in children from their birth, for they would have possessed the knowledge due to them at that time. Hence, no ignorance would have been in them, but only nescience in regard to certain matters. Such nescience was even in the holy angels, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). Reply Obj. 3: Children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by universal principles of right; and this knowledge of theirs would have been much more complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise their knowledge of other universal principles.

Article 2 Whether children would have had perfect use of reason at birth? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pueri in statu innocentiae mox nati habuissent perfectum usum rationis. Nunc enim pueri perfectum usum rationis non habent propter hoc, quod anima per corpus aggravatur. Hoc autem tunc non erat, quia, ut dicitur Sap. IX, corpus quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam. Ergo ante peccatum et corruptionem a peccato subsecutam, pueri mox nati perfectum usum rationis habuissent. Praeterea, quaedam alia animalia mox nata habent naturalis industriae usum, sicut agnus statim fugit lupum. Multo ergo magis homines in statu innocentiae mox nati habuissent usum perfectum rationis. Sed contra est quod natura procedit ab imperfecto ad perfectum in omnibus generatis. Ergo pueri non statim a principio habuissent perfectum usum rationis. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, usus rationis dependet quodammodo ex usu virium sensitivarum, unde ligato sensu, et impeditis interioribus viribus sensitivis, homo perfectum usum rationis non habet, ut patet in dormientibus et phreneticis. Vires autem sensitivae sunt virtutes quaedam corporalium organorum, et ideo, impeditis earum organis, necesse est quod earum actus impediantur, et per consequens rationis usus. In pueris autem est impedimentum harum virium, propter nimiam humiditatem cerebri. Et ideo in eis non est perfectus usus rationis, sicut nec alio-

Objection 1: It would seem that children would have had perfect use of reason at birth. For that children have not perfect use of reason in our present state, is due to the soul being weighed down by the body; which was not the case in paradise, because, as it is written, The corruptible body is a load upon the soul (Wis 9:15). Therefore, before sin and the corruption which resulted therefrom, children would have had the perfect use of reason at birth. Obj. 2: Further, some animals at birth have the use of their natural powers, as the lamb at once flees from the wolf. Much more, therefore, would men in the state of innocence have had perfect use of reason at birth. On the contrary, In all things produced by generation, nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore children would not have had the perfect use of reason from the very outset. I answer that, As above stated (Q. 84, A. 7), the use of reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers; wherefore, while the senses are tired and the interior sensitive powers hampered, man has not the perfect use of reason, as we see in those who are asleep or delirious. Now the sensitive powers are situated in corporeal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are hindered, the action of the former is of necessity hindered also; and likewise, consequently, the use of reason. Now children are hindered in the use of these powers on account of the humidity of the brain; wherefore they have perfect use nei-

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rum membrorum. Et ideo pueri in statu innocentiae non habuissent perfectum usum rationis, sicut habituri erant in perfecta aetate. Habuissent tamen perfectiorem quam nunc, quantum ad ea quae ad eos pertinebant quantum ad statum illum; sicut et de usu membrorum superius est dictum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aggravatio additur ex corruptione corporis in hoc, quod usus rationis impeditur quantum ad ea etiam quae pertinent ad hominem secundum quamcumque aetatem. Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam alia animalia non habent ita perfectum usum industriae naturalis statim a principio, sicut postea. Quod ex hoc patet, quod aves docent volare pullos suos, et similia in aliis generibus animalium inveniuntur. Et tamen in homine est speciale impedimentum propter abundantiam humiditatis cerebri, ut supra dictum est.

Q. 101, A. 2

ther of these powers nor of reason. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have had the perfect use of reason, which they would have enjoyed later on in life. Yet they would have had a more perfect use than they have now, as to matters regarding that particular state, as explained above regarding the use of their limbs (Q. 99, A. 1). Reply Obj. 1: The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, because it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to man at all ages. Reply Obj. 2: Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use of their natural powers as they have later on. This is clear from the fact that birds teach their young to fly; and the like may be observed in other animals. Moreover a special impediment exists in man from the humidity of the brain, as we have said above (Q. 99, A. 1).

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Question 102 Man’s Abode, Which is Paradise Deinde considerandum est de loco hominis, qui est We next consider man’s abode, which is paradise. Under Paradisus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. this head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum Paradisus sit locus corporeus. (1) Whether paradise is a corporeal place? Secundo, utrum sit conveniens locus habitationis (2) Whether it is a place apt for human habitation? humanae. Tertio, ad quid homo in Paradiso positus fuit. (3) For what purpose was man placed in paradise? Quarto, utrum in Paradiso debuit fieri. (4) Whether he should have been created in paradise?

Article 1 Whether paradise is a corporeal place? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Paradisus non sit locus corporeus. Dicit enim Beda quod Paradisus pertingit usque ad lunarem circulum. Sed nullus locus terrenus talis esse potest, tum quia contra naturam terrae esset quod tantum elevaretur; tum etiam quia sub globo lunari est regio ignis, qui terram consumeret. Non est ergo Paradisus locus corporeus. Praeterea, Scriptura commemorat quatuor flumina in Paradiso oriri, ut patet Gen. II. Illa autem flumina quae ibi nominantur, alibi habent manifestas origines; ut patet etiam per philosophum in libro Meteor. Ergo Paradisus non est locus corporeus. Praeterea, aliqui diligentissime inquisierunt omnia loca terrae habitabilis, qui tamen nullam mentionem faciunt de loco Paradisi. Ergo non videtur esse locus corporeus. Praeterea, in Paradiso describitur lignum vitae esse. Sed lignum vitae est aliquid spirituale, dicitur enim Prov. III, de sapientia, quod est lignum vitae his qui apprehendunt eam. Ergo et Paradisus non est locus corporeus, sed spiritualis. Praeterea, si Paradisus est locus corporalis, oportet quod et ligna Paradisi sint corporalia. Sed hoc non videtur, cum corporalia ligna sint producta tertio die; de plantatione autem lignorum Paradisi legitur Gen. II, post opera sex dierum. Ergo Paradisus non est locus corporeus. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt. : Tres sunt de Paradiso generales sententiae, una eorum qui tantummodo corporaliter Paradisum intelligi volunt; alia eorum qui spiritualiter tantum; tertia eorum qui utroque modo Paradisum accipiunt, quam mihi fateor placere sententiam.

Objection 1: It would seem that paradise is not a corporeal place. For Bede says that paradise reaches to the lunar circle. But no earthly place answers that description, both because it is contrary to the nature of the earth to be raised up so high, and because beneath the moon is the region of fire, which would consume the earth. Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place. Obj. 2: Further, Scripture mentions four rivers as rising in paradise (Gen 2:10). But the rivers there mentioned have visible sources elsewhere, as is clear from the Philosopher (Meteor. i). Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place. Obj. 3: Further, although men have explored the entire habitable world, yet none have made mention of the place of paradise. Therefore apparently it is not a corporeal place. Obj. 4: Further, the tree of life is described as growing in paradise. But the tree of life is a spiritual thing, for it is written of Wisdom that She is a tree of life to them that lay hold on her (Prov 3:18). Therefore paradise also is not a corporeal, but a spiritual place. Obj. 5: Further, if paradise be a corporeal place, the trees also of paradise must be corporeal. But it seems they were not; for corporeal trees were produced on the third day, while the planting of the trees of paradise is recorded after the work of the six days. Therefore paradise was not a corporeal place. On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. viii, 1): Three general opinions prevail about paradise. Some understand a place merely corporeal; others a place entirely spiritual; while others, whose opinion, I confess, pleases me, hold that paradise was both corporeal and spiritual.

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Q. 102, A. 1

Man

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XIII de Civ. Dei, quae commode dici possunt de intelligendo spiritualiter Paradiso, nemine prohibente dicantur; dum tamen et illius historiae fidelissima veritas rerum gestarum narratione commendata credatur. Ea enim quae de Paradiso in Scriptura dicuntur, per modum narrationis historicae proponuntur, in omnibus autem quae sic Scriptura tradit, est pro fundamento tenenda veritas historiae, et desuper spirituales expositiones fabricandae. Est ergo Paradisus, ut Isidorus dicit in libro Etymol., locus in orientis partibus constitutus, cuius vocabulum a Graeco in Latinum vertitur hortus. Convenienter autem in parte Orientali dicitur situs. Quia credendum est quod in nobilissimo loco totius terrae sit constitutus. Cum autem oriens sit dextera caeli, ut patet per philosophum in II I; dextera autem est nobilior quam sinistra; conveniens fuit ut in Orientali parte Paradisus terrenus institueretur a Deo. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Bedae verbum non est verum, si secundum sensum manifestum intelligatur. Potest tamen exponi quod usque ad locum lunaris globi ascendit, non secundum situs eminentiam, sed secundum similitudinem, quia est ibi perpetua aeris temperies, ut Isidorus dicit, et in hoc assimilatur corporibus caelestibus, quae sunt absque contrarietate. Magis tamen fit mentio de lunari globo quam de aliis sphaeris, quia lunaris globus est terminus caelestium corporum versus nos; et luna etiam est magis terrae affinis inter omnia corpora caelestia; unde et quasdam tenebras nebulosas habet, quasi accedens ad opacitatem. Quidam autem dicunt quod Paradisus pertingebat usque ad lunarem globum, idest usque ad medium aeris interstitium, in quo generantur pluviae et venti et huiusmodi, quia dominium super huiusmodi evaporationes maxime attribuitur lunae. Sed secundum hoc, locus ille non esset conveniens habitationi humanae, tum quia ibi est maxima intemperies; tum quia non est contemperatus complexioni humanae, sicut aer inferior magis terrae vicinus. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit VIII super Gen. ad Litt., credendum est, quoniam locus Paradisi a cognitione hominum est remotissimus, flumina, quorum fontes noti esse dicuntur, alicubi isse sub terras, et post tractus prolixarum regionum, locis aliis erupisse. Nam hoc solere nonnullas aquas facere, quis ignorat? Ad tertium dicendum quod locus ille seclusus est a nostra habitatione aliquibus impedimentis vel montium, vel marium, vel alicuius aestuosae regionis, quae pertransiri non potest. Et ideo scriptores locorum de hoc loco mentionem non fecerunt. Ad quartum dicendum quod lignum vitae est quaedam materialis arbor, sic dicta quia eius fructus habebat virtutem conservandi vitam, ut supra dictum est.

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I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 21): Nothing prevents us from holding, within proper limits, a spiritual paradise; so long as we believe in the truth of the events narrated as having there occurred. For whatever Scripture tells us about paradise is set down as matter of history; and wherever Scripture makes use of this method, we must hold to the historical truth of the narrative as a foundation of whatever spiritual explanation we may offer. And so paradise, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), is a place situated in the east, its name being the Greek for garden. It was fitting that it should be in the east; for it is to be believed that it was situated in the most excellent part of the earth. Now the east is the right hand on the heavens, as the Philosopher explains (De Coel. ii, 2); and the right hand is nobler than the left: hence it was fitting that God should place the earthly paradise in the east.

Reply Obj. 1: Bede’s assertion is untrue, if taken in its obvious sense. It may, however, be explained to mean that paradise reaches to the moon, not literally, but figuratively; because, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), the atmosphere there is a continually even temperature; and in this respect it is like the heavenly bodies, which are devoid of opposing elements. Mention, however, is made of the moon rather than of other bodies, because, of all the heavenly bodies, the moon is nearest to us, and is, moreover, the most akin to the earth; hence it is observed to be overshadowed by clouds so as to be almost obscured. Others say that paradise reached to the moon—that is, to the middle space of the air, where rain, and wind, and the like arise; because the moon is said to have influence on such changes. But in this sense it would not be a fit place for human dwelling, through being uneven in temperature, and not attuned to the human temperament, as is the lower atmosphere in the neighborhood of the earth.

Reply Obj. 2: Augustine says (Gen ad lit. viii, 7): It is probable that man has no idea where paradise was, and that the rivers, whose sources are said to be known, flowed for some distance underground, and then sprang up elsewhere. For who is not aware that such is the case with some other streams? Reply Obj. 3: The situation of paradise is shut off from the habitable world by mountains, or seas, or some torrid region, which cannot be crossed; and so people who have written about topography make no mention of it. Reply Obj. 4: The tree of life is a material tree, and so called because its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving power as above stated (Q. 97, A. 4). Yet it had a spiritual

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Et tamen aliquid significabat spiritualiter, sicut et petra in deserto fuit aliquod materiale, et tamen significavit Christum. Similiter etiam lignum scientiae boni et mali materialis arbor fuit, sic nominata propter eventum futurum, quia post eius esum homo, per experimentum poenae, didicit quid interesset inter obedientiae bonum et inobedientiae malum. Et tamen spiritualiter potuit significare liberum arbitrium, ut quidam dicunt. Ad quintum dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum, tertio die productae sunt plantae non in actu, sed secundum quasdam rationes seminales; sed post opera sex dierum productae sunt plantae tam Paradisi quam aliae in actu. Secundum alios vero sanctos, oportet dicere quod omnes plantae productae sunt in actu tertio die, et etiam ligna Paradisi, sed quod dicitur de plantatione lignorum Paradisi post opera sex dierum, intelligitur per recapitulationem esse dictum. Unde littera nostra habet, plantaverat dominus Deus Paradisum voluptatis a principio.

Q. 102, A. 2

signification; as the rock in the desert was of a material nature, and yet signified Christ. In like manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a material tree, so called in view of future events; because, after eating of it, man was to learn, by experience of the consequent punishment, the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of rebellion. It may also be said to signify spiritually the free-will as some say. Reply Obj. 5: According to Augustine (Gen ad lit. v, 5, viii, 3), the plants were not actually produced on the third day, but in their seminal virtues; whereas, after the work of the six days, the plants, both of paradise and others, were actually produced. According to other holy writers, we ought to say that all the plants were actually produced on the third day, including the trees of paradise; and what is said of the trees of paradise being planted after the work of the six days is to be understood, they say, by way of recapitulation. Whence our text reads: The Lord God had planted a paradise of pleasure from the beginning (Gen 2:8).

Article 2 Whether paradise was a place adapted to be the abode of man? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Paradisus non fuerit locus conveniens habitationi humanae. Homo enim et angelus similiter ad beatitudinem ordinantur. Sed angelus statim a principio factus est habitator loci beatorum, scilicet caeli Empyrei. Ergo etiam ibi debuit institui habitatio hominis. Praeterea, si locus aliquis debetur homini, aut debetur ei ratione animae, aut ratione corporis. Si ratione animae, debetur ei pro loco caelum, qui videtur esse locus naturalis animae, cum omnibus insitus sit appetitus caeli. Ratione autem corporis, non debetur ei alius locus quam aliis animalibus. Ergo Paradisus nullo modo fuit locus conveniens habitationi humanae. Praeterea, frustra est locus in quo nullum locatum continetur. Sed post peccatum Paradisus non est locus habitationis humanae. Ergo, si est locus habitationi humanae congruus, in vanum videtur a Deo institutus fuisse. Praeterea, homini, cum sit temperatae complexionis congruus est locus temperatus. Sed locus Paradisi non est locus temperatus, dicitur enim esse sub aequinoctiali circulo, qui locus videtur esse calidissimus, cum bis in anno sol pertranseat super summitatem capitum eorum qui ibi habitant. Ergo Paradisus non est locus congruus habitationi humanae.

Objection 1: It would seem that paradise was not a place adapted to be the abode of man. For man and angels are similarly ordered to beatitude. But the angels from the very beginning of their existence were made to dwell in the abode of the blessed—that is, the empyrean heaven. Therefore the place of man’s habitation should have been there also. Obj. 2: Further, if some definite place were required for man’s abode, this would be required on the part either of the soul or of the body. If on the part of the soul, the place would be in heaven, which is adapted to the nature of the soul; since the desire of heaven is implanted in all. On the part of the body, there was no need for any other place than the one provided for other animals. Therefore paradise was not at all adapted to be the abode of man. Obj. 3: Further, a place which contains nothing is useless. But after sin, paradise was not occupied by man. Therefore if it were adapted as a dwelling-place for man, it seems that God made paradise to no purpose. Obj. 4: Further, since man is of an even temperament, a fitting place for him should be of even temperature. But paradise was not of an even temperature; for it is said to have been on the equator—a situation of extreme heat, since twice in the year the sun passes vertically over the heads of its inhabitants. Therefore paradise was not a fit dwelling-place for man.

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Man

Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit de Paradiso, quod est divina regio, et digna eius qui secundum imaginem Dei erat, conversatio. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, homo sic erat incorruptibilis et immortalis, non quia corpus eius dispositionem incorruptibilitatis haberet, sed quia inerat animae vis quaedam ad praeservandum corpus a corruptione. Corrumpi autem potest corpus humanum et ab interiori et ab exteriori. Ab interiori quidem corrumpitur per consumptionem humidi, et per senectutem, ut supra dictum est, cui corruptioni occurrere poterat primus homo per esum ciborum. Inter ea vero quae exterius corrumpunt, praecipuum videtur esse distemperatus aer, unde huic corruptioni maxime occurritur per temperiem aeris. In Paradiso autem utrumque invenitur, quia, ut Damascenus dicit, est locus temperato et tenuissimo et purissimo aere circumfulgens, plantis semper floridis comatus. Unde manifestum est quod Paradisus est locus conveniens habitationi humanae, secundum primae immortalitatis statum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caelum Empyreum est supremum corporalium locorum, et est extra omnem mutabilitatem. Et quantum ad primum horum, est locus congruus naturae angelicae, quia, sicut Augustinus dicit in III de Trin., Deus regit creaturam corporalem per spiritualem; unde conveniens est quod spiritualis natura sit supra omnem corporalem constituta, sicut ei praesidens. Quantum autem ad secundum, convenit statui beatitudinis, qui est firmatus in summa stabilitate. Sic igitur locus beatitudinis congruit angelo secundum naturam suam, unde ibi creatus est. Non autem congruit homini secundum suam naturam, cum non praesideat toti corporali creaturae per modum gubernationis, sed competit ei solum ratione beatitudinis. Unde non est positus a principio in caelo Empyreo; sed illuc transferendus erat in statu finalis beatitudinis. Ad secundum dicendum quod ridiculum est dicere quod animae, aut alicui spirituali substantiae, sit aliquis locus naturalis, sed per congruentiam quandam aliquis specialis locus creaturae incorporali attribuitur. Paradisus ergo terrestris erat locus congruens homini et quantum ad animam et quantum ad corpus, inquantum scilicet in anima erat vis praeservandi corpus humanum a corruptione. Quod non competebat aliis animalibus. Et ideo, ut Damascenus dicit, in Paradiso nullum irrationalium habitabat, licet ex quadam dispensatione animalia fuerint illuc divinitus adducta ad Adam, et serpens illuc accesserit per operationem Diaboli. Ad tertium dicendum quod non propter hoc locus est frustra, quia non est ibi hominum habitatio post peccatum, sicut etiam non frustra fuit homini attributa immortalitas quaedam, quam conservaturus non erat.

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On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): Paradise was a divinely ordered region, and worthy of him who was made to God’s image. I answer that, As above stated (Q. 97, A. 1), Man was incorruptible and immortal, not because his body had a disposition to incorruptibility, but because in his soul there was a power preserving the body from corruption. Now the human body may be corrupted from within or from without. From within, the body is corrupted by the consumption of the humors, and by old age, as above explained (Q. 97, A. 4), and man was able to ward off such corruption by food. Among those things which corrupt the body from without, the chief seems to be an atmosphere of unequal temperature; and to such corruption a remedy is found in an atmosphere of equable nature. In paradise both conditions were found; because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): Paradise was permeated with the all pervading brightness of a temperate, pure, and exquisite atmosphere, and decked with ever-flowering plants. Whence it is clear that paradise was most fit to be a dwelling-place for man, and in keeping with his original state of immortality. Reply Obj. 1: The empyrean heaven is the highest of corporeal places, and is outside the region of change. By the first of these two conditions, it is a fitting abode for the angelic nature: for, as Augustine says (De Trin. ii), God rules corporeal creatures through spiritual creatures. Hence it is fitting that the spiritual nature should be established above the entire corporeal nature, as presiding over it. By the second condition, it is a fitting abode for the state of beatitude, which is endowed with the highest degree of stability. Thus the abode of beatitude was suited to the very nature of the angel; therefore he was created there. But it is not suited to man’s nature, since man is not set as a ruler over the entire corporeal creation: it is a fitting abode for man in regard only to his beatitude. Wherefore he was not placed from the beginning in the empyrean heaven, but was destined to be transferred thither in the state of his final beatitude. Reply Obj. 2: It is ridiculous to assert that any particular place is natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances, though some particular place may have a certain fitness in regard to spiritual substances. For the earthly paradise was a place adapted to man, as regards both his body and his soul—that is, inasmuch as in his soul was the force which preserved the human body from corruption. This could not be said of the other animals. Therefore, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): No irrational animal inhabited paradise; although, by a certain dispensation, the animals were brought thither by God to Adam; and the serpent was able to trespass therein by the complicity of the devil. Reply Obj. 3: Paradise did not become useless through being unoccupied by man after sin, just as immortality was not conferred on man in vain, though he was to lose it. For thereby we learn God’s kindness to man, and what man lost

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Per huiusmodi enim ostenditur benignitas Dei ad hominem, et quid homo peccando amiserit. Quamvis, ut dicitur, nunc Enoch et Elias in illo Paradiso habitent. Ad quartum dicendum quod illi qui dicunt Paradisum esse sub circulo aequinoctiali, opinantur sub circulo illo esse locum temperatissimum, propter aequalitatem dierum et noctium omni tempore; et quia sol nunquam multum ab eis elongatur, ut sit apud eos superabundantia frigoris; nec iterum est apud eos, ut dicunt, superabundantia caloris, quia etsi sol pertranseat super eorum capita, non tamen diu moratur ibi in hac dispositione. Aristoteles tamen, in libro Meteor., expresse dicit quod regio illa est inhabitabilis propter aestum. Quod videtur probabilius, quia terrae per quas nunquam sol pertransit in directum capitis, sunt intemperatae in calore propter solam vicinitatem solis. Quidquid autem de hoc sit, credendum est Paradisum in loco temperatissimo constitutum esse, vel sub aequinoctiali vel alibi.

Q. 102, A. 3

by sin. Moreover, some say that Enoch and Elias still dwell in that paradise. Reply Obj. 4: Those who say that paradise was on the equinoctial line are of opinion that such a situation is most temperate, on account of the unvarying equality of day and night; that it is never too cold there, because the sun is never too far off; and never too hot, because, although the sun passes over the heads of the inhabitants, it does not remain long in that position. However, Aristotle distinctly says (Meteor. ii, 5) that such a region is uninhabitable on account of the heat. This seems to be more probable; because, even those regions where the sun does not pass vertically overhead, are extremely hot on account of the mere proximity of the sun. But whatever be the truth of the matter, we must hold that paradise was situated in a most temperate situation, whether on the equator or elsewhere.

Article 3 Whether man was placed in paradise to dress it and keep it? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non sit positus in Paradiso ut operaretur et custodiret illum. Quod enim introductum est in poenam peccati, non fuisset in Paradiso in statu innocentiae. Sed agricultura introducta est in poenam peccati, ut dicitur Gen. III. Ergo homo non fuit positus in Paradiso ut operaretur ipsum. Praeterea, custodia non est necessaria, ubi non timetur violentus invasor. Sed in Paradiso nullus timebatur violentus invasor. Ergo non erat necessarium ut Paradisum custodiret. Praeterea, si homo positus est in Paradiso ut operaretur et custodiret ipsum, videtur sequi quod homo factus sit propter Paradisum, et non e converso, quod videtur esse falsum. Ergo homo non est positus in Paradiso ut operaretur et custodiret illum. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, tulit dominus Deus hominem, et posuit illum in Paradiso voluptatis, ut operaretur et custodiret illum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit VIII super Gen. ad Litt., verbum istud Genesis dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo sic, quod Deus posuit hominem in Paradiso, ut ipse Deus operaretur et custodiret hominem, operaretur, inquam, iustificando ipsum, cuius operatio si ab homine cesset, continuo obtenebratur, sicut aer obtenebratur si cesset influentia luminis; ut custodiret vero ab omni corruptione et malo. Alio modo potest intelligi, ut homo operaretur et custodiret Paradisum. Nec tamen illa operatio esset laboriosa, sicut post

Objection 1: It would seem that man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. For what was brought on him as a punishment of sin would not have existed in paradise in the state of innocence. But the cultivation of the soil was a punishment of sin (Gen 3:17). Therefore man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. Obj. 2: Further, there is no need of a keeper when there is no fear of trespass with violence. But in paradise there was no fear of trespass with violence. Therefore there was no need for man to keep paradise. Obj. 3: Further, if man was placed in paradise to dress and keep it, man would apparently have been made for the sake of paradise, and not contrariwise; which seems to be false. Therefore man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. On the contrary, It is written (Gen 2: 15): The Lord God took man and placed him in the paradise of pleasure, to dress and keep it. I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen ad lit. viii, 10), these words in Genesis may be understood in two ways. First, in the sense that God placed man in paradise that He might Himself work in man and keep him, by sanctifying him (for if this work cease, man at once relapses into darkness, as the air grows dark when the light ceases to shine); and by keeping man from all corruption and evil. Second, that man might dress and keep paradise, which dressing would not have involved labor, as it did after sin; but would have been pleasant on account of man’s practical knowl-

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peccatum, sed fuisset iucunda, propter experientiam virtutis naturae. Custodia etiam illa non esset contra invasores, sed esset ad hoc quod homo sibi Paradisum custodiret, ne ipsum peccando amitteret. Et hoc totum in bonum hominis cedebat, et sic Paradisus ordinatur ad bonum hominis, et non e converso. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.

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edge of the powers of nature. Nor would man have kept paradise against a trespasser; but he would have striven to keep paradise for himself lest he should lose it by sin. All of which was for man’s good; wherefore paradise was ordered to man’s benefit, and not conversely. Whence the Replies to the Objections are made clear.

Article 4 Whether man was created in paradise? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo factus fuerit in Paradiso. Angelus enim in loco suae habitationis creatus fuit, scilicet in caelo Empyreo. Sed Paradisus fuit locus congruus habitationi humanae ante peccatum. Ergo videtur quod in Paradiso homo debuit fieri. Praeterea, alia animalia conservantur in loco suae generationis; sicut pisces in aquis, et animalia gressibilia in terra, unde producta sunt. Homo autem conservatus fuisset in Paradiso, ut dictum est. Ergo in Paradiso fieri debuit. Praeterea, mulier in Paradiso facta fuit. Sed vir dignior est muliere. Ergo multo magis vir debuit fieri in Paradiso. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, tulit Deus hominem, et posuit eum in Paradiso. Respondeo dicendum quod Paradisus fuit locus congruus habitationi humanae, quantum ad incorruptionem primi status. Incorruptio autem illa non erat hominis secundum naturam, sed ex supernaturali Dei dono. Ut ergo hoc gratiae Dei imputaretur, non humanae naturae, Deus hominem extra Paradisum fecit, et postea ipsum in Paradiso posuit, ut habitaret ibi toto tempore animalis vitae, postmodum, cum spiritualem vitam adeptus esset, transferendus in caelum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caelum Empyreum est locus congruus angelis etiam quantum ad eorum naturam, et ideo ibi sunt creati. Et similiter dicendum ad secundum. Loca enim illa congruunt animalibus secundum suam naturam. Ad tertium dicendum quod mulier facta fuit in Paradiso non propter dignitatem suam, sed propter dignitatem principii ex quo corpus eius formabatur. Quia similiter et filii in Paradiso fuissent nati, in quo parentes iam erant positi.

Objection 1: It would seem that man was created in paradise. For the angel was created in his dwelling-place— namely, the empyrean heaven. But before sin paradise was a fitting abode for man. Therefore it seems that man was created in paradise. Obj. 2: Further, other animals remain in the place where they are produced, as the fish in the water, and walking animals on the earth from which they were made. Now man would have remained in paradise after he was created (Q. 97, A. 4). Therefore he was created in paradise. Obj. 3: Further, woman was made in paradise. But man is greater than woman. Therefore much more should man have been made in paradise. On the contrary, It is written (Gen 2:15): God took man and placed him in paradise. I answer that, Paradise was a fitting abode for man as regards the incorruptibility of the primitive state. Now this incorruptibility was man’s, not by nature, but by a supernatural gift of God. Therefore that this might be attributed to God, and not to human nature, God made man outside of paradise, and afterwards placed him there to live there during the whole of his animal life; and, having attained to the spiritual life, to be transferred thence to heaven. Reply Obj. 1: The empyrean heaven was a fitting abode for the angels as regards their nature, and therefore they were created there. In the same way I reply to the second objection, for those places befit those animals in their nature. Reply Obj. 3: Woman was made in paradise, not by reason of her own dignity, but on account of the dignity of the principle from which her body was formed. For the same reason the children would have been born in paradise, where their parents were already.

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Question 103 The Government of Things in General Postquam praemissum est de creatione rerum et diHaving considered the creation of things and their disstinctione earum, restat nunc tertio considerandum de tinction, we now consider in the third place the governrerum gubernatione. Et primo, in communi; secundo, in ment thereof, and (1) the government of things in general; speciali de effectibus gubernationis. (2) in particular, the effects of this government. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum mundus ab aliquo gubernetur. (1) Whether the world is governed by someone? Secundo, quis sit finis gubernationis ipsius. (2) What is the end of this government? Tertio, utrum gubernetur ab uno. (3) Whether the world is governed by one? Quarto, de effectibus gubernationis. (4) Of the effects of this government? Quinto, utrum omnia divinae gubernationi subsint. (5) Whether all things are subject to Divine government? Sexto, utrum omnia immediate gubernentur a Deo. (6) Whether all things are immediately governed by God? Septimo, utrum divina gubernatio cassetur in (7) Whether the Divine government is frustrated in aliquo. anything? Octavo, utrum aliquid divinae providentiae (8) Whether anything is contrary to the Divine contranitatur. Providence?

Article 1 Whether the world is governed by anyone? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mundus non gubernetur ab aliquo. Illorum enim est gubernari, quae moventur vel operantur propter finem. Sed res naturales, quae sunt magna pars mundi, non moventur aut operantur propter finem, quia non cognoscunt finem. Ergo mundus non gubernatur. Praeterea, eorum est proprie gubernari, quae ad aliquid moventur. Sed mundus non videtur ad aliquid moveri, sed in se stabilitatem habet. Ergo non gubernatur. Praeterea, id quod in se habet necessitatem qua determinatur ad unum, non indiget exteriori gubernante. Sed principaliores mundi partes quadam necessitate determinantur ad unum in suis actibus et motibus. Ergo mundus gubernatione non indiget. Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. XIV, tu autem, pater, gubernas omnia providentia. Et Boetius dicit, in libro de Consol.: O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam antiqui philosophi gubernationem mundo subtraxerunt, dicentes omnia fortuito agi. Sed haec positio ostenditur esse impossibilis ex duobus. Primo quidem, ex eo quod apparet

Objection 1: It would seem that the world is not governed by anyone. For it belongs to those things to be governed, which move or work for an end. But natural things which make up the greater part of the world do not move, or work for an end; for they have no knowledge of their end. Therefore the world is not governed. Obj. 2: Further, those things are governed which are moved towards an object. But the world does not appear to be so directed, but has stability in itself. Therefore it is not governed. Obj. 3: Further, what is necessarily determined by its own nature to one particular thing, does not require any external principle of government. But the principal parts of the world are by a certain necessity determined to something particular in their actions and movements. Therefore the world does not require to be governed. On the contrary, It is written (Wis 14:3): But Thou, O Father, governest all things by Thy Providence. And Boethius says (De Consol. iii): Thou Who governest this universe by mandate eternal. I answer that, Certain ancient philosophers denied the government of the world, saying that all things happened by chance. But such an opinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways. First, by observation of things them-

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Q. 103, A. 1

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in ipsis rebus. Videmus enim in rebus naturalibus provenire quod melius est, aut semper aut in pluribus, quod non contingeret, nisi per aliquam providentiam res naturales dirigerentur ad finem boni, quod est gubernare. Unde ipse ordo certus rerum manifeste demonstrat gubernationem mundi, sicut si quis intraret domum bene ordinatam, ex ipsa domus ordinatione ordinatoris rationem perpenderet; ut, ab Aristotele dictum, Tullius introducit in libro de Natura Deorum. Secundo autem apparet idem ex consideratione divinae bonitatis, per quam res in esse productae sunt, ut ex supra dictis patet. Cum enim optimi sit optima producere, non convenit summae Dei bonitati quod res productas ad perfectum non perducat. Ultima autem perfectio uniuscuiusque est in consecutione finis. Unde ad divinam bonitatem pertinet ut, sicut produxit res in esse, ita etiam eas ad finem perducat. Quod est gubernare. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquid movetur vel operatur propter finem dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut agens seipsum in finem, ut homo et aliae creaturae rationales, et talium est cognoscere rationem finis, et eorum quae sunt ad finem. Aliquid autem dicitur moveri vel operari propter finem, quasi ab alio actum vel directum in finem, sicut sagitta movetur ad signum directa a sagittante, qui cognoscit finem, non autem sagitta. Unde sicut motus sagittae ad determinatum finem demonstrat aperte quod sagitta dirigitur ab aliquo cognoscente; ita certus cursus naturalium rerum cognitione carentium, manifeste declarat mundum ratione aliqua gubernari. Ad secundum dicendum quod in omnibus rebus creatis est aliquid stabile, ad minus prima materia; et aliquid ad motum pertinens, ut sub motu etiam operationem comprehendamus. Et quantum ad utrumque, res indiget gubernatione, quia hoc ipsum quod in rebus est stabile, in nihilum decideret (quia ex nihilo est), nisi manu gubernatoris servaretur, ut infra patebit. Ad tertium dicendum quod necessitas naturalis inhaerens rebus quae determinantur ad unum, est impressio quaedam Dei dirigentis ad finem, sicut necessitas qua sagitta agitur ut ad certum signum tendat, est impressio sagittantis, et non sagittae. Sed in hoc differt, quia id quod creaturae a Deo recipiunt, est earum natura; quod autem ab homine rebus naturalibus imprimitur praeter earum naturam, ad violentiam pertinet. Unde sicut necessitas violentiae in motu sagittae demonstrat sagittantis directionem; ita necessitas naturalis creaturarum demonstrat divinae providentiae gubernationem.

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selves: for we observe that in nature things happen always or nearly always for the best; which would not be the case unless some sort of providence directed nature towards good as an end; which is to govern. Wherefore the unfailing order we observe in things is a sign of their being governed; for instance, if we enter a well-ordered house we gather therefrom the intention of him that put it in order, as Tullius says (De Nat. Deorum ii), quoting Aristotle. Second, this is clear from a consideration of Divine goodness, which, as we have said above (Q. 44, A. 4; Q. 65, A. 2), was the cause of the production of things in existence. For as it belongs to the best to produce the best, it is not fitting that the supreme goodness of God should produce things without giving them their perfection. Now a thing’s ultimate perfection consists in the attainment of its end. Therefore it belongs to the Divine goodness, as it brought things into existence, so to lead them to their end: and this is to govern. Reply Obj. 1: A thing moves or operates for an end in two ways. First, in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational creatures; and such things have knowledge of their end, and of the means to the end. Second, a thing is said to move or operate for an end, as though moved or directed by another thereto, as an arrow directed to the target by the archer, who knows the end unknown to the arrow. Wherefore, as the movement of the arrow towards a definite end shows clearly that it is directed by someone with knowledge, so the unvarying course of natural things which are without knowledge, shows clearly that the world is governed by some reason. Reply Obj. 2: In all created things there is a stable element, at least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under movement we include operation. And things need governing as to both: because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing, would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand, as will be explained later (Q. 104, A. 1). Reply Obj. 3: The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression from God, directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference, inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their nature, while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their nature is somewhat violent. Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer, so the natural necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence.

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Q. 103, A. 2

Article 2 Whether the end of the government of the world is something outside the world? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod finis gubernationis mundi non sit aliquid extra mundum existens. Illud enim est finis gubernationis rei, ad quod res gubernata perducitur. Sed illud ad quod res aliqua perducitur, est aliquod bonum in ipsa re, sicut infirmus perducitur ad sanitatem, quae est aliquod bonum in ipso. Ergo finis gubernationis rerum non est aliquod bonum extrinsecum, sed aliquod bonum in ipsis rebus existens. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, I Ethic., quod finium quidam sunt operationes, quidam opera, idest operata. Sed nihil extrinsecum a toto universo potest esse operatum, operatio autem est in ipsis operantibus. Ergo nihil extrinsecum potest esse finis gubernationis rerum. Praeterea, bonum multitudinis videtur esse ordo et pax, quae est tranquillitas ordinis, ut Augustinus dicit XIX de Civ. Dei. Sed mundus in quadam rerum multitudine consistit. Ergo finis gubernationis mundi est pacificus ordo, qui est in ipsis rebus. Non ergo finis gubernationis rerum est quoddam bonum extrinsecum. Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. XVI, universa propter se operatus est dominus. Ipse autem est extra totum ordinem universi. Ergo finis rerum est quoddam bonum extrinsecum. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum finis respondeat principio, non potest fieri ut, principio cognito, quid sit rerum finis ignoretur. Cum igitur principium rerum sit aliquid extrinsecum a toto universo, scilicet Deus, ut ex supra dictis patet; necesse est quod etiam finis rerum sit quoddam bonum extrinsecum. Et hoc ratione apparet. Manifestum est enim quod bonum habet rationem finis. Unde finis particularis alicuius rei est quoddam bonum particulare, finis autem universalis rerum omnium est quoddam bonum universale. Bonum autem universale est quod est per se et per suam essentiam bonum, quod est ipsa essentia bonitatis, bonum autem particulare est quod est participative bonum. Manifestum est autem quod in tota universitate creaturarum nullum est bonum quod non sit participative bonum. Unde illud bonum quod est finis totius universi, oportet quod sit extrinsecum a toto universo. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bonum aliquod consequimur multipliciter, uno modo, sicut formam in nobis existentem, ut sanitatem aut scientiam; alio modo, ut aliquid per nos operatum, sicut aedificator consequitur finem faciendo domum; alio modo, sicut aliquod bonum habitum vel possessum, ut ille qui emit, consequi-

Objection 1: It would seem that the end of the government of the world is not something existing outside the world. For the end of the government of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought. But that whereto a thing is brought is some good in the thing itself; thus a sick man is brought back to health, which is something good in him. Therefore the end of government of things is some good not outside, but within the things themselves. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1): Some ends are an operation; some are a work—i.e., produced by an operation. But nothing can be produced by the whole universe outside itself; and operation exists in the agent. Therefore nothing extrinsic can be the end of the government of things. Obj. 3: Further, the good of the multitude seems to consist in order, and peace which is the tranquillity of order, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). But the world is composed of a multitude of things. Therefore the end of the government of the world is the peaceful order in things themselves. Therefore the end of the government of the world is not an extrinsic good. On the contrary, It is written (Prov 16:4): The Lord hath made all things for Himself. But God is outside the entire order of the universe. Therefore the end of all things is something extrinsic to them. I answer that, As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning, it is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know their beginning. Therefore, since the beginning of all things is something outside the universe, namely, God, it is clear from what has been expounded above (Q. 44, AA. 1, 2), that we must conclude that the end of all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved by reason. For it is clear that good has the nature of an end; wherefore, a particular end of anything consists in some particular good; while the universal end of all things is the Universal Good; Which is good of Itself by virtue of Its Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness; whereas a particular good is good by participation. Now it is manifest that in the whole created universe there is not a good which is not such by participation. Wherefore that good which is the end of the whole universe must be a good outside the universe. Reply Obj. 1: We may acquire some good in many ways: first, as a form existing in us, such as health or knowledge; second, as something done by us, as a builder attains his end by building a house; third, as something good possessed or acquired by us, as the buyer of a field attains his end when he enters into possession. Wherefore nothing

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Government of Creatures

tur finem possidendo agrum. Unde nihil prohibet illud ad quod perducitur universum, esse quoddam bonum extrinsecum. Ad secundum dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de finibus artium, quarum quaedam habent pro finibus operationes ipsas, sicut citharistae finis est citharizare; quaedam vero habent pro fine quoddam operatum, sicut aedificatoris finis non est aedificare, sed domus. Contingit autem aliquid extrinsecum esse finem non solum sicut operatum, sed etiam sicut possessum seu habitum, vel etiam sicut repraesentatum, sicut si dicamus quod Hercules est finis imaginis, quae fit ad eum repraesentandum. Sic igitur potest dici quod bonum extrinsecum a toto universo est finis gubernationis rerum sicut habitum et repraesentatum, quia ad hoc unaquaeque res tendit, ut participet ipsum, et assimiletur ei, quantum potest. Ad tertium dicendum quod finis quidem universi est aliquod bonum in ipso existens, scilicet ordo ipsius universi, hoc autem bonum non est ultimus finis, sed ordinatur ad bonum extrinsecum ut ad ultimum finem; sicut etiam ordo exercitus ordinatur ad ducem, ut dicitur in XII Metaphys.

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prevents something outside the universe being the good to which it is directed. Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher is speaking of the ends of various arts; for the end of some arts consists in the operation itself, as the end of a harpist is to play the harp; whereas the end of other arts consists in something produced, as the end of a builder is not the act of building, but the house he builds. Now it may happen that something extrinsic is the end not only as made, but also as possessed or acquired or even as represented, as if we were to say that Hercules is the end of the statue made to represent him. Therefore we may say that some good outside the whole universe is the end of the government of the universe, as something possessed and represented; for each thing tends to a participation thereof, and to an assimilation thereto, as far as is possible. Reply Obj. 3: A good existing in the universe, namely, the order of the universe, is an end thereof; this, however, is not its ultimate end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the order in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10.

Article 3 Whether the world is governed by one? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod mundus non gubernetur ab uno. De causa enim per effectus iudicamus. Sed in gubernatione rerum apparet quod res non uniformiter moventur et operantur, quaedam enim contingenter, quaedam vero ex necessitate, et secundum alias diversitates. Ergo mundus non gubernatur ab uno. Praeterea, ea quae gubernantur ab uno, a se invicem non dissentiunt nisi propter imperitiam aut impotentiam gubernantis, quae a Deo sunt procul. Sed res creatae a se invicem dissentiunt, et contra se invicem pugnant; ut in contrariis apparet. Non ergo mundus gubernatur ab uno. Praeterea, in natura semper invenitur quod melius est. Sed melius est simul esse duos quam unum, ut dicitur Eccle. IV. Ergo mundus non gubernatur ab uno, sed a pluribus. Sed contra est quod unum Deum et unum dominum confitemur; secundum illud apostoli I ad Cor. VIII, nobis est unus Deus, pater, et dominus unus. Quorum utrumque ad gubernationem pertinet, nam ad dominum pertinet gubernatio subditorum; et Dei nomen ex providentia sumitur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo mundus gubernatur ab uno.

Objection 1: It would seem that the world is not governed by one. For we judge the cause by the effect. Now, we see in the government of the universe that things are not moved and do not operate uniformly, but some contingently and some of necessity in variously different ways. Therefore the world is not governed by one. Obj. 2: Further, things which are governed by one do not act against each other, except by the incapacity or unskillfulness of the ruler; which cannot apply to God. But created things agree not together, and act against each other; as is evident in the case of contraries. Therefore the world is not governed by one. Obj. 3: Further, in nature we always find what is the better. But it is better that two should be together than one (Eccl 4:9). Therefore the world is not governed by one, but by many. On the contrary, We confess our belief in one God and one Lord, according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor 8:6): To us there is but one God, the Father . . . and one Lord: and both of these pertain to government. For to the Lord belongs dominion over subjects; and the name of God is taken from Providence as stated above (Q. 13, A. 8). Therefore the world is governed by one.

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Q. 103, A. 4

Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere quod mundus ab uno gubernetur. Cum enim finis gubernationis mundi sit quod est essentialiter bonum, quod est optimum, necesse est quod mundi gubernatio sit optima. Optima autem gubernatio est quae fit per unum. Cuius ratio est, quia gubernatio nihil aliud est quam directio gubernatorum ad finem, qui est aliquod bonum. Unitas autem pertinet ad rationem bonitatis; ut Boetius probat, in III de Consol., per hoc quod. Sicut omnia desiderant bonum, ita desiderant unitatem, sine qua esse non possunt. Nam unumquodque intantum est, inquantum unum est, unde videmus quod res repugnant suae divisioni quantum possunt, et quod dissolutio uniuscuiusque rei provenit ex defectu illius rei. Et ideo id ad quod tendit intentio multitudinem gubernantis, est unitas sive pax. Unitatis autem causa per se est unum. Manifestum est enim quod plures multa unire et concordare non possunt, nisi ipsi aliquo modo uniantur. Illud autem quod est per se unum, potest convenientius et melius esse causa unitatis, quam multi uniti. Unde multitudo melius gubernatur per unum quam per plures. Relinquitur ergo quod gubernatio mundi, quae est optima, sit ab uno gubernante. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit in XII Metaphys.: Entia nolunt disponi male, nec bonum pluralitas principatuum, unus ergo princeps. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod motus est actus mobilis a movente. Difformitas ergo motuum est ex diversitate mobilium, quam requirit perfectio universi, ut supra dictum est; non ex diversitate gubernantium.

I answer that, We must of necessity say that the world is governed by one. For since the end of the government of the world is that which is essentially good, which is the greatest good; the government of the world must be the best kind of government. Now the best government is the government by one. The reason of this is that government is nothing but the directing of the things governed to the end; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to the idea of goodness, as Boethius proves (De Consol. iii, 11) from this, that, as all things desire good, so do they desire unity; without which they would cease to exist. For a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence we observe that things resist division, as far as they can; and the dissolution of a thing arises from defect therein. Therefore the intention of a ruler over a multitude is unity, or peace. Now the proper cause of unity is one. For it is clear that several cannot be the cause of unity or concord, except so far as they are united. Furthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause of unity than several things united. Therefore a multitude is better governed by one than by several. From this it follows that the government of the world, being the best form of government, must be by one. This is expressed by the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10): Things refuse to be ill governed; and multiplicity of authorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be one ruler. Reply Obj. 1: Movement is the act of a thing moved, caused by the mover. Wherefore dissimilarity of movements is caused by diversity of things moved, which diversity is essential to the perfection of the universe (Q. 47, AA. 1,2; Q. 48, A. 2), and not by a diversity of governors. Ad secundum dicendum quod contraria, etsi disReply Obj. 2: Although contraries do not agree with sentiant quantum ad fines proximos, conveniunt tamen each other in their proximate ends, nevertheless they agree quantum ad finem ultimum, prout concluduntur sub in the ultimate end, so far as they are included in the one uno ordine universi. order of the universe. Ad tertium dicendum quod in particularibus boReply Obj. 3: If we consider individual goods, then nis duo sunt meliora quam unum, sed ei quod est essen- two are better than one. But if we consider the essential tialiter bonum, non potest fieri aliqua additio bonitatis. good, then no addition is possible.

Article 4 Whether the effect of government is one or many? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod effectus gubernationis mundi sit unus tantum, et non plures. Effectus enim gubernationis esse videtur id quod per gubernationem in rebus gubernatis causatur. Hoc autem est unum, scilicet bonum ordinis; ut in exercitu patet. Ergo gubernationis mundi est unus effectus. Praeterea, ab uno natum est unum tantum procedere. Sed mundus gubernatur ab uno, ut ostensum est. Ergo et gubernationis effectus est unus tantum.

Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one effect of the government of the world and not many. For the effect of government is that which is caused in the things governed. This is one, namely, the good which consists in order; as may be seen in the example of an army. Therefore the government of the world has but one effect. Obj. 2: Further, from one there naturally proceeds but one. But the world is governed by one as we have proved (A. 3). Therefore also the effect of this government is but one.

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Q. 103, A. 5

Government of Creatures

Praeterea, si effectus gubernationis non est unus tantum propter unitatem gubernantis, oportet quod multiplicetur secundum multitudinem gubernatorum. Haec autem sunt nobis innumerabilia. Ergo gubernationis effectus non possunt comprehendi sub aliquo certo numero. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, quod deitas providentia et bonitate perfecta omnia continet, et seipsa implet. Gubernatio autem ad providentiam pertinet. Ergo gubernationis divinae sunt aliqui determinati effectus. Respondeo dicendum quod effectus cuiuslibet actionis ex fine eius pensari potest, nam per operationem efficitur ut pertingatur ad finem. Finis autem gubernationis mundi est bonum essentiale, ad cuius participationem et assimilationem omnia tendunt. Effectus igitur gubernationis potest accipi tripliciter. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius finis, et sic est unus effectus gubernationis, scilicet assimilari summo bono. Alio modo potest considerari effectus gubernationis secundum ea quibus ad Dei assimilationem creatura perducitur. Et sic in generali sunt duo effectus gubernationis. Creatura enim assimilatur Deo quantum ad duo, scilicet quantum ad id quod Deus bonus est, inquantum creatura est bona; et quantum ad hoc quod Deus est aliis causa bonitatis, inquantum una creatura movet aliam ad bonitatem. Unde duo sunt effectus gubernationis, scilicet conservatio rerum in bono, et motio earum ad bonum. Tertio modo potest considerari effectus gubernationis in particulari, et sic sunt nobis innumerabiles.

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Obj. 3: Further, if the effect of government is not one by reason of the unity of the Governor, it must be many by reason of the many things governed. But these are too numerous to be counted. Therefore we cannot assign any definite number to the effects of government. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): God contains all and fills all by His providence and perfect goodness. But government belongs to providence. Therefore there are certain definite effects of the Divine government.

I answer that, The effect of any action may be judged from its end; because it is by action that the attainment of the end is effected. Now the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to the participation and similarity of which all things tend. Consequently the effect of the government of the world may be taken in three ways. First, on the part of the end itself; and in this way there is but one effect, that is, assimilation to the supreme good. Second, the effect of the government of the world may be considered on the part of those things by means of which the creature is made like to God. Thus there are, in general, two effects of the government. For the creature is assimilated to God in two things; first, with regard to this, that God is good; and so the creature becomes like Him by being good; and second, with regard to this, that God is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to be good. Wherefore there are two effects of government, the preservation of things in their goodness, and the moving of things to good. Third, we may consider in the individual the effects of the government of the world; and in this way they are without number. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ordo universi inReply Obj. 1: The order of the universe includes both cludit in se et conservationem rerum diversarum a Deo the preservation of things created by God and their moveinstitutarum, et motionem earum, quia secundum haec ment. As regards these two things we find order among duo invenitur ordo in rebus, secundum scilicet quod una them, inasmuch as one is better than another; and one is est melior alia, et secundum quod una ab alia movetur. moved by another. Ad alia duo patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt. From what has been said above, we can gather the replies to the other two objections.

Article 5 Whether all things are subject to the divine government? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia divinae gubernationi subdantur. Dicitur enim Eccle. IX, vidi sub sole nec velocium esse cursum, nec fortium bellum, nec sapientium panem, nec doctorum divitias, nec artificum gratiam, sed tempus casumque in omnibus. Quae autem gubernationi alicuius subsunt, non sunt casualia. Ergo ea quae sunt sub sole, non subduntur divinae gubernationi.

Objection 1: It would seem that not all things are subject to the Divine government. For it is written (Eccl 9:11): I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the learned, nor favor to the skillful, but time and chance in all. But things subject to the Divine government are not ruled by chance. Therefore those things which are under the sun are not subject to the Divine government.

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Praeterea, apostolus, I ad Cor. IX, dicit quod non est Deo cura de bobus. Sed unicuique est cura eorum quae gubernantur ab ipso. Non ergo omnia subduntur divinae gubernationi. Praeterea, illud quod seipsum gubernare potest, non videtur alterius gubernatione indigere. Sed creatura rationalis seipsam gubernare potest, cum habeat dominium sui actus, et per se agat; et non solum agatur ab alio, quod videtur esse eorum quae gubernantur. Ergo non omnia subsunt divinae gubernationi. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, V de Civ. Dei, quod Deus non solum caelum et terram, nec solum hominem et angelum, sed nec exigui et contemptibilis animantis viscera, nec avis pennulam, nec herbae flosculum, nec arboris folium, sine suarum partium convenientia dereliquit. Omnia ergo eius gubernationi subduntur. Respondeo dicendum quod secundum eandem rationem competit Deo esse gubernatorem rerum, et causam earum, quia eiusdem est rem producere, et ei perfectionem dare, quod ad gubernantem pertinet. Deus autem est causa non quidem particularis unius generis rerum, sed universalis totius entis, ut supra ostensum est. Unde sicut nihil potest esse quod non sit a Deo creatum, ita nihil potest esse quod eius gubernationi non subdatur. Patet etiam hoc idem ex ratione finis. Intantum enim alicuius gubernatio se extendit, inquantum se extendere potest finis gubernationis. Finis autem divinae gubernationis est ipsa sua bonitas, ut supra ostensum est. Unde cum nihil esse possit quod non ordinetur in divinam bonitatem sicut in finem, ut ex supra dictis patet; impossibile est quod aliquod entium subtrahatur gubernationi divinae. Stulta igitur fuit opinio dicentium quod haec inferiora corruptibilia, vel etiam singularia, aut etiam res humanae non gubernantur a Deo. Ex quorum persona dicitur Ezech. IX, dereliquit dominus terram. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sub sole dicuntur esse ea quae secundum motum solis generantur et corrumpuntur. In quibus omnibus casus invenitur; non ita quod omnia quae in eis fiunt, sint casualia; sed quia in quolibet eorum aliquid casuale inveniri potest. Et hoc ipsum quod aliquid casuale invenitur in huiusmodi rebus, demonstrat ea alicuius gubernationi esse subiecta. Nisi enim huiusmodi corruptibilia ab aliquo superiori gubernarentur, nihil intenderent, maxime quae non cognoscunt, et sic non eveniret in eis aliquid praeter intentionem, quod facit rationem casus. Unde ad ostendendum quod casualia secundum ordinem alicuius superioris causae proveniunt, non dicit simpliciter quod vidit casum esse in omnibus, sed dicit tempus et casum; quia scilicet secundum aliquem ordinem temporis, casuales defectus inveniuntur in his rebus.

Q. 103, A. 5

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor 9:9): God hath no care for oxen. But he that governs has care for the things he governs. Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government. Obj. 3: Further, what can govern itself needs not to be governed by another. But the rational creature can govern itself; since it is master of its own act, and acts of itself; and is not made to act by another, which seems proper to things which are governed. Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 11): Not only heaven and earth, not only man and angel, even the bowels of the lowest animal, even the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant, the leaf of the tree, hath God endowed with every fitting detail of their nature. Therefore all things are subject to His government. I answer that, For the same reason is God the ruler of things as He is their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection; and this belongs to government. Now God is the cause not indeed only of some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal being, as proved above (Q. 44, AA. 1, 2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not subject to His government. This can also be proved from the nature of the end of government. For a man’s government extends over all those things which come under the end of his government. Now the end of the Divine government is the Divine goodness; as we have shown (A. 2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine goodness as its end, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. 44, A. 4; Q. 65, A. 2), so it is impossible for anything to escape from the Divine government. Foolish therefore was the opinion of those who said that the corruptible lower world, or individual things, or that even human affairs, were not subject to the Divine government. These are represented as saying, God hath abandoned the earth (Ezek 9:9). Reply Obj. 1: These things are said to be under the sun which are generated and corrupted according to the sun’s movement. In all such things we find chance: not that everything is casual which occurs in such things; but that in each one there is an element of chance. And the very fact that an element of chance is found in those things proves that they are subject to government of some kind. For unless corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would tend to nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of knowledge. So nothing would happen unintentionally; which constitutes the nature of chance. Wherefore to show how things happen by chance and yet according to the ordering of a higher cause, he does not say absolutely that he observes chance in all things, but time and chance, that is to say, that defects may be found in these things according to some order of time.

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Q. 103, A. 6

Government of Creatures

Ad secundum dicendum quod gubernatio est quaedam mutatio gubernatorum a gubernante. Omnis autem motus est actus mobilis a movente, ut dicitur in III Physic. Omnis autem actus proportionatur ei cuius est actus. Et sic oportet quod diversa mobilia diversimode moveantur, etiam secundum motionem unius motoris. Sic igitur secundum unam artem Dei gubernantis, res diversimode gubernantur, secundum earum diversitatem. Quaedam enim secundum suam naturam sunt per se agentia, tanquam habentia dominium sui actus, et ista gubernantur a Deo non solum per hoc quod moventur ab ipso Deo in eis interius operante, sed etiam per hoc quod ab eo inducuntur ad bonum et retrahuntur a malo per praecepta et prohibitiones, praemia et poenas. Hoc autem modo non gubernantur a Deo creaturae irrationales, quae tantum aguntur, et non agunt. Cum ergo apostolus dicit quod Deo non est cura de bobus, non totaliter subtrahit boves a cura gubernationis divinae; sed solum quantum ad modum qui proprie competit rationali creaturae. Ad tertium dicendum quod creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam per intellectum et voluntatem, quorum utrumque indiget regi et perfici ab intellectu et voluntate Dei. Et ideo supra gubernationem qua creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam tanquam domina sui actus, indiget gubernari a Deo.

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Reply Obj. 2: Government implies a certain change effected by the governor in the things governed. Now every movement is the act of a movable thing, caused by the moving principle, as is laid down Phys. iii, 3. And every act is proportionate to that of which it is an act. Consequently, various movable things must be moved variously, even as regards movement by one and the same mover. Thus by the one art of the Divine governor, various things are variously governed according to their variety. Some, according to their nature, act of themselves, having dominion over their actions; and these are governed by God, not only in this, that they are moved by God Himself, Who works in them interiorly; but also in this, that they are induced by Him to do good and to fly from evil, by precepts and prohibitions, rewards and punishments. But irrational creatures which do not act but are acted upon, are not thus governed by God. Hence, when the Apostle says that God hath no care for oxen, he does not wholly withdraw them from the Divine government, but only as regards the way in which rational creatures are governed. Reply Obj. 3: The rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own act, it requires to be governed by God.

Article 6 Whether all things are immediately governed by God? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia immediate gubernentur a Deo. Gregorius enim Nyssenus reprehendit opinionem Platonis, qui divisit providentiam in tria, primam quidem primi Dei, qui providet rebus caelestibus, et universalibus omnibus; secundam vero providentiam esse dixit secundorum deorum, qui caelum circumeunt, scilicet respectu eorum quae sunt in generatione et corruptione; tertiam vero providentiam dixit quorundam daemonum, qui sunt custodes circa terram humanarum actionum. Ergo videtur quod omnia immediate a Deo gubernentur. Praeterea, melius est aliquid fieri per unum quam per multa, si sit possibile, ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Sed Deus potest per seipsum absque mediis causis omnia gubernare. Ergo videtur quod omnia immediate gubernet.

Objection 1: It would seem that all things are governed by God immediately. For Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves the opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts. The first he ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly things and all universals; the second providence he attributes to the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to watch over generation and corruption; while he ascribes a third providence to certain spirits who are guardians on earth of human actions. Therefore it seems that all things are immediately governed by God. Obj. 2: Further, it is better that a thing be done by one, if possible, than by many, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 6). But God can by Himself govern all things without any intermediary cause. Therefore it seems that He governs all things immediately. Praeterea, nihil in Deo est deficiens et imperfecObj. 3: Further, in God nothing is defective or impertum. Sed ad defectum gubernatoris pertinere videtur fect. But it seems to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by quod mediantibus aliquibus gubernet, sicut rex terrenus, means of others; thus an earthly king, by reason of his not quia non sufficit ad omnia agenda, nec ubique est prae- being able to do everything himself, and because he cansens in suo regno, propter hoc oportet quod habeat suae not be everywhere at the same time, requires to govern by

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gubernationis ministros. Ergo Deus immediate omnia gubernat. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Trin., quemadmodum corpora crassiora et inferiora per subtiliora et potentiora quodam ordine reguntur; ita omnia corpora per spiritum vitae rationalem, et spiritus vitae rationalis desertor atque peccator per spiritum vitae rationalem pium et iustum, et ille per ipsum Deum. Respondeo dicendum quod in gubernatione duo sunt consideranda, scilicet ratio gubernationis, quae est ipsa providentia; et executio. Quantum igitur ad rationem gubernationis pertinet, Deus immediate omnia gubernat, quantum autem pertinet ad executionem gubernationis, Deus gubernat quaedam mediantibus aliis. Cuius ratio est quia, cum Deus sit ipsa essentia bonitatis, unumquodque attribuendum est Deo secundum sui optimum. Optimum autem in omni genere vel ratione vel cognitione practica, qualis est ratio gubernationis, in hoc consistit, quod particularia cognoscantur, in quibus est actus, sicut optimus medicus est, non qui considerat sola universalia, sed qui potest etiam considerare minima particularium; et idem patet in ceteris. Unde oportet dicere quod Deus omnium etiam minimorum particularium rationem gubernationis habeat. Sed cum per gubernationem res quae gubernantur sint ad perfectionem perducendae; tanto erit melior gubernatio, quanto maior perfectio a gubernante rebus gubernatis communicatur. Maior autem perfectio est quod aliquid in se sit bonum, et etiam sit aliis causa bonitatis, quam si esset solummodo in se bonum. Et ideo sic Deus gubernat res, ut quasdam aliarum in gubernando causas instituat, sicut si aliquis magister discipulos suos non solum scientes faceret, sed etiam aliorum doctores. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod opinio Platonis reprehenditur, quia etiam quantum ad rationem gubernationis, posuit Deum non immediate omnia gubernare. Quod patet per hoc, quod divisit in tria providentiam, quae est ratio gubernationis. Ad secundum dicendum quod, si solus Deus gubernaret, subtraheretur perfectio causalis a rebus. Unde non totum fieret per unum, quod fit per multa. Ad tertium dicendum quod non solum pertinet ad imperfectionem regis terreni quod executores habeat suae gubernationis, sed etiam ad regis dignitatem, quia ex ordine ministrorum potestas regia praeclarior redditur.

Q. 103, A. 6

means of ministers. Therefore God governs all things immediately. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): As the lower and grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater subtlety and power; so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled by the good and just spirit of life; and this spirit by God Himself. I answer that, In government there are two things to be considered; the design of government, which is providence itself; and the execution of the design. As to the design of government, God governs all things immediately; whereas in its execution, He governs some things by means of others. The reason of this is that as God is the very essence of goodness, so everything must be attributed to God in its highest degree of goodness. Now the highest degree of goodness in any practical order, design or knowledge (and such is the design of government) consists in knowing the individuals acted upon; as the best physician is not the one who can only give his attention to general principles, but who can consider the least details; and so on in other things. Therefore we must say that God has the design of the government of all things, even of the very least. But since things which are governed should be brought to perfection by government, this government will be so much the better in the degree the things governed are brought to perfection. Now it is a greater perfection for a thing to be good in itself and also the cause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself. Therefore God so governs things that He makes some of them to be causes of others in government; as a master, who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils, but gives also the faculty of teaching others. Reply Obj. 1: Plato’s opinion is to be rejected, because he held that God did not govern all things immediately, even in the design of government; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence, which is the design of government, into three parts. Reply Obj. 2: If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the perfection of causality. Wherefore all that is effected by many would not be accomplished by one. Reply Obj. 3: That an earthly king should have ministers to execute his laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect, but also of his dignity; because by the ordering of ministers the kingly power is brought into greater evidence.

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Q. 103, A. 7

Government of Creatures

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Article 7 Whether anything can happen outside the order of the divine government? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis contingere possit. Dicit enim Boetius, in III de Consol., quod Deus per bonum cuncta disponit. Si ergo nihil in rebus contingit praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis, sequeretur quod nihil esset malum in rebus. Praeterea, nihil est casuale quod evenit secundum praeordinationem alicuius gubernantis. Si igitur nihil accidit in rebus praeter ordinem gubernationis divinae, sequitur quod nihil in rebus sit fortuitum et casuale. Praeterea, ordo divinae gubernationis est certus et immutabilis, quia est secundum rationem aeternam. Si igitur nihil possit contingere in rebus praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis, sequitur quod omnia ex necessitate eveniant, et nihil sit in rebus contingens, quod est inconveniens. Potest igitur in rebus aliquid contingere praeter ordinem gubernationis divinae. Sed contra est quod dicitur Esther XIII, domine Deus, rex omnipotens, in ditione tua cuncta sunt posita, et non est qui possit resistere tuae voluntati. Respondeo dicendum quod praeter ordinem alicuius particularis causae, aliquis effectus evenire potest; non autem praeter ordinem causae universalis. Cuius ratio est, quia praeter ordinem particularis causae nihil provenit nisi ex aliqua alia causa impediente, quam quidem causam necesse est reducere in primam causam universalem, sicut indigestio contingit praeter ordinem virtutis nutritivae, ex aliquo impedimento, puta ex grossitie cibi, quam necesse est reducere in aliquam aliam causam, et sic usque ad causam primam universalem. Cum igitur Deus sit prima causa universalis non unius generis tantum, sed universaliter totius entis; impossibile est quod aliquid contingat praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis, sed ex hoc ipso quod aliquid ex una parte videtur exire ab ordine divinae providentiae qui consideratur secundum aliquam particularem causam, necesse est quod in eundem ordinem relabatur secundum aliam causam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil invenitur in mundo quod sit totaliter malum, quia malum semper fundatur in bono, ut supra ostensum est. Et ideo res aliqua dicitur mala, per hoc quod exit ab ordine alicuius particularis boni. Si autem totaliter exiret ab ordine gubernationis divinae, totaliter nihil esset. Ad secundum dicendum quod aliqua dicuntur esse casualia in rebus, per ordinem ad causas particulares, extra quarum ordinem fiunt. Sed quantum ad divinam providentiam pertinet, nihil fit casu in mundo, ut Augustinus dicit in libro Octoginta trium Quaest.

Objection 1: It would seem possible that something may occur outside the order of the Divine government. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that God disposes all for good. Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it would follow that no evil exists. Obj. 2: Further, nothing that is in accordance with the pre-ordination of a ruler occurs by chance. Therefore, if nothing occurs outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that there is nothing fortuitous and casual. Obj. 3: Further, the order of Divine Providence is certain and unchangeable; because it is in accordance with the eternal design. Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that all things happen by necessity, and nothing is contingent; which is false. Therefore it is possible for something to occur outside the order of the Divine government. On the contrary, It is written (Esther 13:9): O Lord, Lord, almighty King, all things are in Thy power, and there is none that can resist Thy will. I answer that, It is possible for an effect to result outside the order of some particular cause; but not outside the order of the universal cause. The reason of this is that no effect results outside the order of a particular cause, except through some other impeding cause; which other cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause; as indigestion may occur outside the order of the nutritive power by some such impediment as the coarseness of the food, which again is to be ascribed to some other cause, and so on till we come to the first universal cause. Therefore as God is the first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all being in general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of the Divine government; but from the very fact that from one point of view something seems to evade the order of Divine providence considered in regard to one particular cause, it must necessarily come back to that order as regards some other cause. Reply Obj. 1: There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown above (Q. 48, A. 3). Therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular good. If it wholly escaped from the order of the Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist. Reply Obj. 2: Things are said to be fortuitous as regards some particular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the order of Divine providence, nothing in the world happens by chance, as Augustine declares (83 Questions, Q. 24).

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Ad tertium dicendum quod dicuntur aliqui effectus contingentes, per comparationem ad proximas causas, quae in suis effectibus deficere possunt, non propter hoc quod aliquid fieri possit extra totum ordinem gubernationis divinae. Quia hoc ipsum quod aliquid contingit praeter ordinem causae proximae, est ex aliqua causa subiecta gubernationi divinae.

Q. 103, A. 8

Reply Obj. 3: Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; and not as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of Divine government. The very fact that something occurs outside the order of some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to the Divine government.

Article 8 Whether anything can resist the order of the divine government? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid possit reniti contra ordinem gubernationis divinae. Dicitur enim Isaiae III, lingua eorum et adinventiones eorum contra dominum. Praeterea, nullus rex iuste punit eos qui eius ordinationi non repugnant. Si igitur nihil contraniteretur divinae ordinationi, nullus iuste puniretur a Deo. Praeterea, quaelibet res est subiecta ordini divinae gubernationis. Sed una res ab alia impugnatur. Ergo aliqua sunt quae contranituntur divinae gubernationi. Sed contra est quod dicit Boetius, in III de Consol., non est aliquid quod summo huic bono vel velit vel possit obsistere. Est igitur summum bonum quod regit cuncta fortiter, suaviterque disponit; ut dicitur Sap. VIII, de divina sapientia. Respondeo dicendum quod ordo divinae providentiae dupliciter potest considerari, uno modo in generali, secundum scilicet quod progreditur a causa gubernativa totius; alio modo in speciali, secundum scilicet quod progreditur ex aliqua causa particulari, quae est executiva divinae gubernationis. Primo igitur modo, nihil contranititur ordini divinae gubernationis. Quod ex duobus patet. Primo quidem, ex hoc quod ordo divinae gubernationis totaliter in bonum tendit, et unaquaeque res in sua operatione et conatu non tendit nisi ad bonum, nullus enim respiciens ad malum operatur, ut Dionysius dicit. Alio modo apparet idem ex hoc quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnis inclinatio alicuius rei vel naturalis vel voluntaria, nihil est aliud quam quaedam impressio a primo movente, sicut inclinatio sagittae ad signum determinatum, nihil aliud est quam quaedam impressio a sagittante. Unde omnia quae agunt vel naturaliter vel voluntarie, quasi propria sponte perveniunt in id ad quod divinitus ordinantur. Et ideo dicitur Deus omnia disponere suaviter. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dicuntur aliqui vel cogitare vel loqui vel agere contra Deum, non quia totaliter renitantur ordini divinae gubernationis, quia etiam

Objection 1: It would seem possible that some resistance can be made to the order of the Divine government. For it is written (Isa 3:8): Their tongue and their devices are against the Lord. Obj. 2: Further, a king does not justly punish those who do not rebel against his commands. Therefore if no one rebelled against God’s commands, no one would be justly punished by God. Obj. 3: Further, everything is subject to the order of the Divine government. But some things oppose others. Therefore some things rebel against the order of the Divine government. On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii): There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly, as is said (Wis 8) of Divine wisdom. I answer that, We may consider the order of Divine providence in two ways: in general, inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing cause of all; and in particular, inasmuch as it proceeds from some particular cause which executes the order of the Divine government. Considered in the first way, nothing can resist the order of the Divine government. This can be proved in two ways: first from the fact that the order of the Divine government is wholly directed to good, and everything by its own operation and effort tends to good only, for no one acts intending evil, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): second from the fact that, as we have said above (A. 1, ad 3; A. 5, ad 2), every inclination of anything, whether natural or voluntary, is nothing but a kind of impression from the first mover; as the inclination of the arrow towards a fixed point is nothing but an impulse received from the archer. Wherefore every agent, whether natural or free, attains to its divinely appointed end, as though of its own accord. For this reason God is said to order all things sweetly. Reply Obj. 1: Some are said to think or speak, or act against God: not that they entirely resist the order of the Divine government; for even the sinner intends the attain-

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Q. 103, A. 8

Government of Creatures

peccantes intendunt aliquod bonum, sed quia contranituntur cuidam determinato bono, quod est eis conveniens secundum suam naturam aut statum. Et ideo puniuntur iuste a Deo. Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum. Ad tertium dicendum quod ex hoc quod una res alteri contrapugnat, ostenditur quod aliquid reniti potest ordini qui est ex aliqua causa particulari, non autem ordini qui dependet a causa universali totius.

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ment of a certain good: but because they resist some particular good, which belongs to their nature or state. Therefore they are justly punished by God. Reply Obj. 2 is clear from the above. Reply Obj. 3: From the fact that one thing opposes another, it follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause; but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all things.

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Question 104 The Special Effects of the Divine Government Deinde considerandum est de effectibus divinae guWe next consider the effects of the Divine governbernationis in speciali. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. ment in particular; concerning which four points of inquiry arise: Primo, utrum creaturae indigeant ut conserventur (1) Whether creatures need to be kept in existence by in esse a Deo. God? Secundo, utrum conserventur a Deo immediate. (2) Whether they are immediately preserved by God? Tertio, utrum Deus possit aliquid redigere in (3) Whether God can reduce anything to nothingness? nihilum. Quarto, utrum aliquid in nihilum redigatur. (4) Whether anything is reduced to nothingness?

Article 1 Whether creatures need to be kept in being by God? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod creaturae non indigeant ut a Deo conserventur in esse. Quod enim non potest non esse, non indiget ut conservetur in esse, sicut quod non potest abscedere, non indiget ut conservetur ne abscedat. Sed quaedam creaturae sunt quae secundum sui naturam non possunt non esse. Ergo non omnes creaturae indigent ut a Deo conserventur in esse. Probatio mediae. Quod per se inest alicui, necesse est ei inesse, et oppositum eius impossibile est ei inesse, sicut necessarium est binarium esse parem, et impossibile est eum esse imparem. Esse autem per se consequitur ad formam, quia unumquodque secundum hoc est ens actu, quod habet formam. Quaedam autem creaturae sunt, quae sunt formae quaedam subsistentes, sicut de angelis dictum est; et sic per se inest eis esse. Et eadem ratio est de illis quorum materia non est in potentia nisi ad unam formam, sicut supra dictum est de corporibus caelestibus. Huiusmodi ergo creaturae secundum suam naturam ex necessitate sunt, et non possunt non esse, potentia enim ad non esse non potest fundari neque in forma, quam per se sequitur esse; neque in materia existente sub forma quam non potest amittere, cum non sit in potentia ad aliam formam. Praeterea, Deus est potentior quolibet creato agente. Sed aliquod creatum agens potest communicare suo effectui ut conservetur in esse, etiam eius operatione cessante, sicut cessante actione aedificatoris, remanet domus; et cessante actione ignis, remanet aqua calefacta per aliquod tempus. Ergo multo magis Deus potest suae creaturae conferre quod conservetur in esse, sua operatione cessante.

Objection 1: It would seem that creatures do not need to be kept in being by God. For what cannot not-be, does not need to be kept in being; just as that which cannot depart, does not need to be kept from departing. But some creatures by their very nature cannot not-be. Therefore not all creatures need to be kept in being by God. The middle proposition is proved thus. That which is included in the nature of a thing is necessarily in that thing, and its contrary cannot be in it; thus a multiple of two must necessarily be even, and cannot possibly be an odd number. Now form brings being with itself, because everything is actually in being, so far as it has form. But some creatures are subsistent forms, as we have said of the angels (Q. 50, AA. 2, 5): and thus to be is in them of themselves. The same reasoning applies to those creatures whose matter is in potentiality to one form only, as above explained of heavenly bodies (Q. 66, A. 2). Therefore such creatures as these have in their nature to be necessarily, and cannot not-be; for there can be no potentiality to not-being, either in the form which has being of itself, or in matter existing under a form which it cannot lose, since it is not in potentiality to any other form.

Obj. 2: Further, God is more powerful than any created agent. But a created agent, even after ceasing to act, can cause its effect to be preserved in being; thus the house continues to stand after the builder has ceased to build; and water remains hot for some time after the fire has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can God cause His creature to be kept in being, after He has ceased to create it.

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Q. 104, A. 1

Government of Creatures

Praeterea, nullum violentum potest contingere absque aliqua causa agente. Sed tendere ad non esse est innaturale et violentum cuilibet creaturae, quia quaelibet creatura naturaliter appetit esse. Ergo nulla creatura potest tendere in non esse, nisi aliquo agente ad corruptionem. Sed quaedam sunt ad quorum corruptionem nihil agere potest; sicut spirituales substantiae, et corpora caelestia. Ergo huiusmodi creaturae non possunt tendere in non esse, etiam Dei operatione cessante. Praeterea, si Deus conservat res in esse, hoc erit per aliquam actionem. Per quamlibet autem actionem agentis, si sit efficax, aliquid fit in effectu. Oportet igitur quod per actionem Dei conservantis aliquid fiat in creatura. Sed hoc non videtur. Non enim per huiusmodi actionem fit ipsum esse creaturae, quia quod iam est, non fit. Neque iterum aliquid aliud superadditum, quia vel non continue Deus conservaret creaturam in esse, vel continue aliquid adderetur creaturae, quod est inconveniens. Non igitur creaturae conservantur in esse a Deo.

Sed contra est quod dicitur Heb. I, portans omnia verbo virtutis suae. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere, et secundum fidem et secundum rationem, quod creaturae conservantur in esse a Deo. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod aliquid conservatur ab altero dupliciter. Uno modo, indirecte et per accidens, sicut ille dicitur rem conservare, qui removet corrumpens; puta si aliquis puerum custodiat ne cadat in ignem, dicitur eum conservare. Et sic etiam Deus dicitur aliqua conservare, sed non omnia, quia quaedam sunt quae non habent corrumpentia, quae necesse sit removere ad rei conservationem. Alio modo dicitur aliquid rem aliquam conservare per se et directe, inquantum scilicet illud quod conservatur, dependet a conservante, ut sine eo esse non possit. Et hoc modo omnes creaturae indigent divina conservatione. Dependet enim esse cuiuslibet creaturae a Deo, ita quod nec ad momentum subsistere possent, sed in nihilum redigerentur, nisi operatione divinae virtutis conservarentur in esse, sicut Gregorius dicit. Et hoc sic perspici potest. Omnis enim effectus dependet a sua causa, secundum quod est causa eius. Sed considerandum est quod aliquod agens est causa sui effectus secundum fieri tantum, et non directe secundum esse eius. Quod quidem contingit et in artificialibus, et in rebus naturalibus. Aedificator enim est causa domus quantum ad eius fieri, non autem directe quantum ad esse eius. Manifestum est enim quod esse domus consequitur formam eius, forma autem domus est compositio et ordo, quae quidem forma consequitur naturalem virtutem quarundam rerum. Sicut enim coquus coquit cibum adhibendo aliquam virtutem naturalem activam, scilicet ignis; ita aedificator facit domum adhibendo cae-

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Obj. 3: Further, nothing violent can occur, except there be some active cause thereof. But tendency to not-being is unnatural and violent to any creature, since all creatures naturally desire to be. Therefore no creature can tend to not-being, except through some active cause of corruption. Now there are creatures of such a nature that nothing can cause them to corrupt; such are spiritual substances and heavenly bodies. Therefore such creatures cannot tend to not-being, even if God were to withdraw His action. Obj. 4: Further, if God keeps creatures in being, this is done by some action. Now every action of an agent, if that action be efficacious, produces something in the effect. Therefore the preserving power of God must produce something in the creature. But this is not so; because this action does not give being to the creature, since being is not given to that which already is: nor does it add anything new to the creature; because either God would not keep the creature in being continually, or He would be continually adding something new to the creature; either of which is unreasonable. Therefore creatures are not kept in being by God. On the contrary, It is written (Heb 1:3): Upholding all things by the word of His power. I answer that, Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures are kept in being by God. To make this clear, we must consider that a thing is preserved by another in two ways. First, indirectly, and accidentally; thus a person is said to preserve anything by removing the cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to preserve a child, whom he guards from falling into the fire. In this way God preserves some things, but not all, for there are some things of such a nature that nothing can corrupt them, so that it is not necessary to keep them from corruption. Second, a thing is said to preserve another per se and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that it cannot exist without it. In this manner all creatures need to be preserved by God. For the being of every creature depends on God, so that not for a moment could it subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of the Divine power, as Gregory says (Moral. xvi). This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on its cause, so far as it is its cause. But we must observe that an agent may be the cause of the becoming of its effect, but not directly of its being. This may be seen both in artificial and in natural beings: for the builder causes the house in its becoming, but he is not the direct cause of its being. For it is clear that the being of the house is a result of its form, which consists in the putting together and arrangement of the materials, and results from the natural qualities of certain things. Thus a cook dresses the food by applying the natural activity of fire; thus a builder constructs a house, by making use of cement, stones, and wood which are able to be put together in a certain order and to preserve it. There-

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mentum, lapides et ligna, quae sunt susceptiva et conservativa talis compositionis et ordinis. Unde esse domus dependet ex naturis harum rerum, sicut fieri domus dependet ex actione aedificatoris. Et simili ratione est considerandum in rebus naturalibus. Quia si aliquod agens non est causa formae inquantum huiusmodi, non erit per se causa esse quod consequitur ad talem formam, sed erit causa effectus secundum fieri tantum. Manifestum est autem quod, si aliqua duo sunt eiusdem speciei, unum non potest esse per se causa formae alterius, inquantum est talis forma, quia sic esset causa formae propriae, cum sit eadem ratio utriusque. Sed potest esse causa huiusmodi formae secundum quod est in materia, idest quod haec materia acquirat hanc formam. Et hoc est esse causa secundum fieri; sicut cum homo generat hominem, et ignis ignem. Et ideo quandocumque naturalis effectus est natus impressionem agentis recipere secundum eandem rationem secundum quam est in agente, tunc fieri effectus dependet ab agente, non autem esse ipsius. Sed aliquando effectus non est natus recipere impressionem agentis secundum eandem rationem secundum quam est in agente, sicut patet in omnibus agentibus quae non agunt simile secundum speciem; sicut caelestia corpora sunt causa generationis inferiorum corporum dissimilium secundum speciem. Et tale agens potest esse causa formae secundum rationem talis formae, et non solum secundum quod acquiritur in hac materia, et ideo est causa non solum fiendi, sed essendi. Sicut igitur fieri rei non potest remanere, cessante actione agentis quod est causa effectus secundum fieri; ita nec esse rei potest remanere, cessante actione agentis quod est causa effectus non solum secundum fieri, sed etiam secundum esse. Et haec est ratio quare aqua calefacta retinet calorem, cessante actione ignis; non autem remanet aer illuminatus, nec ad momentum, cessante actione solis. Quia scilicet materia aquae susceptiva est caloris ignis secundum eandem rationem qua est in igne, unde si perfecte perducatur ad formam ignis, retinebit calorem semper; si autem imperfecte participet aliquid de forma ignis secundum quandam inchoationem, calor non semper remanebit, sed ad tempus, propter debilem participationem principii caloris. Aer autem nullo modo natus est recipere lumen secundum eandem rationem secundum quam est in sole, ut scilicet recipiat formam solis, quae est principium luminis, et ideo, quia non habet radicem in aere, statim cessat lumen, cessante actione solis. Sic autem se habet omnis creatura ad Deum, sicut aer ad solem illuminantem. Sicut enim sol est lucens per suam naturam, aer autem fit luminosus participando lumen a sole, non tamen participando naturam solis; ita solus Deus est ens per essentiam suam, quia eius essentia est suum esse; omnis autem creatura est ens parti-

Q. 104, A. 1

fore the being of a house depends on the nature of these materials, just as its becoming depends on the action of the builder. The same principle applies to natural things. For if an agent is not the cause of a form as such, neither will it be directly the cause of being which results from that form; but it will be the cause of the effect, in its becoming only.

Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot directly cause the other’s form as such, since it would then be the cause of its own form, which is essentially the same as the form of the other; but it can be the cause of this form for as much as it is in matter—in other words, it may be the cause that this matter receives this form. And this is to be the cause of becoming, as when man begets man, and fire causes fire. Thus whenever a natural effect is such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active cause an impression specifically the same as in that active cause, then the becoming of the effect, but not its being, depends on the agent. Sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to receive the impression of its cause, in the same way as it exists in the agent: as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect of the same species as themselves: thus the heavenly bodies cause the generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. Such an agent can be the cause of a form as such, and not merely as existing in this matter; consequently it is not merely the cause of becoming but also the cause of being. Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action of the agent ceases which causes the becoming of the effect: so neither can the being of a thing continue after that action of the agent has ceased, which is the cause of the effect not only in becoming but also in being. This is why hot water retains heat after the cessation of the fire’s action; while, on the contrary, the air does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun ceases to act upon it, because water is a matter susceptive of the fire’s heat in the same way as it exists in the fire. Wherefore if it were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire, it would retain that form always; whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly and inchoately, the heat will remain for a time only, by reason of the imperfect participation of the principle of heat. On the other hand, air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it exists in the sun, which is the principle of light. Therefore, since it has not root in the air, the light ceases with the action of the sun. Now every creature may be compared to God, as the air is to the sun which enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by its nature, and as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun’s nature; so God alone is Being in virtue of His own Essence, since His Essence is His existence; whereas every creature has being by participation, so that its essence is

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Q. 104, A. 2

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cipative, non quod sua essentia sit eius esse. Et ideo, ut Augustinus dicit IV super Gen. ad Litt., virtus Dei ab eis quae creata sunt regendis si cessaret aliquando, simul et illorum cessaret species, omnisque natura concideret. Et in VIII eiusdem libri dicit quod, sicut aer praesente lumine fit lucidus, sic homo, Deo sibi praesente, illuminatur, absente autem, continuo tenebratur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod esse per se consequitur formam creaturae, supposito tamen influxu Dei, sicut lumen sequitur diaphanum aeris, supposito influxu solis. Unde potentia ad non esse in spiritualibus creaturis et corporibus caelestibus, magis est in Deo, qui potest subtrahere suum influxum, quam in forma vel in materia talium creaturarum. Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus non potest communicare alicui creaturae ut conservetur in esse, sua operatione cessante; sicut non potest ei communicare quod non sit causa esse illius. Intantum enim indiget creatura conservari a Deo, inquantum esse effectus dependet a causa essendi. Unde non est simile de agente quod non est causa essendi, sed fieri tantum. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de conservatione quae est per remotionem corrumpentis; qua non indigent omnes creaturae, ut dictum est.

not its existence. Therefore, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. iv, 12): If the ruling power of God were withdrawn from His creatures, their nature would at once cease, and all nature would collapse. In the same work (Gen ad lit. viii, 12) he says: As the air becomes light by the presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by the presence of God, and in His absence returns at once to darkness. Reply Obj. 1: Being naturally results from the form of a creature, given the influence of the Divine action; just as light results from the diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the sun. Wherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures and heavenly bodies is rather something in God, Who can withdraw His influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures. Reply Obj. 2: God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in being after the cessation of the Divine influence: as neither can He make it not to have received its being from Himself. For the creature needs to be preserved by God in so far as the being of an effect depends on the cause of its being. So that there is no comparison with an agent that is not the cause of being but only of becoming. Reply Obj. 3: This argument holds in regard to that preservation which consists in the removal of corruption: but all creatures do not need to be preserved thus, as stated above. Ad quartum dicendum quod conservatio rerum a Reply Obj. 4: The preservation of things by God is Deo non est per aliquam novam actionem; sed per con- a continuation of that action whereby He gives existence, tinuationem actionis qua dat esse, quae quidem actio est which action is without either motion or time; so also the sine motu et tempore. Sicut etiam conservatio luminis in preservation of light in the air is by the continual influence aere est per continuatum influxum a sole. of the sun.

Article 2 Whether God preserves every creature immediately? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus immediate omnem creaturam conservet. Eadem enim actione Deus est conservator rerum, qua et creator, ut dictum est. Sed Deus immediate est creator omnium. Ergo immediate est etiam conservator. Praeterea, unaquaeque res magis est proxima sibi, quam rei alteri. Sed non potest communicari alicui creaturae quod conservet seipsam. Ergo multo minus potest ei communicari quod conservet aliam. Ergo Deus omnia conservat absque aliqua media causa conservante. Praeterea, effectus conservatur in esse ab eo quod est causa eius non solum secundum fieri, sed etiam secundum esse. Sed omnes causae creatae, ut videtur, non sunt causae suorum effectuum nisi secundum fieri, non sunt enim causae nisi movendo, ut supra habitum est. Ergo non sunt causae conservantes suos effectus in esse.

Objection 1: It would seem that God preserves every creature immediately. For God creates and preserves things by the same action, as above stated (A. 1, ad 4). But God created all things immediately. Therefore He preserves all things immediately. Obj. 2: Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another. But it cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less therefore can it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore God preserves all things without any intermediate cause preserving them. Obj. 3: Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only of its becoming, but also of its being. But all created causes do not seem to cause their effects except in their becoming, for they cause only by moving, as above stated (Q. 45, A. 3). Therefore they do not cause so as to keep their effects in being.

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Sed contra est quod per idem conservatur res, per quod habet esse. Sed Deus dat esse rebus mediantibus aliquibus causis mediis. Ergo etiam res in esse conservat mediantibus aliquibus causis. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, dupliciter aliquid rem aliquam in esse conservat, uno modo, indirecte et per accidens, per hoc quod removet vel impedit actionem corrumpentis; alio modo, directe et per se, quia ab eo dependet esse alterius, sicut a causa dependet esse effectus. Utroque autem modo aliqua res creata invenitur esse alterius conservativa. Manifestum est enim quod etiam in rebus corporalibus multa sunt quae impediunt actiones corrumpentium, et per hoc dicuntur rerum conservativa; sicut sal impedit carnes a putrefactione, et simile est in multis aliis. Invenitur etiam quod ab aliqua creatura dependet aliquis effectus secundum suum esse. Cum enim sunt multae causae ordinatae, necesse est quod effectus dependeat primo quidem et principaliter a causa prima; secundario vero ab omnibus causis mediis. Et ideo principaliter quidem prima causa est effectus conservativa; secundario vero omnes mediae causae, et tanto magis quanto causa fuerit altior et primae causae proximior. Unde superioribus causis, etiam in corporalibus rebus, attribuitur conservatio et permanentia rerum, sicut philosophus dicit, in XII Metaphys., quod primus motus, scilicet diurnus, est causa continuitatis generationis; secundus autem motus, qui est per zodiacum, est causa diversitatis quae est secundum generationem et corruptionem. Et similiter astrologi, attribuunt Saturno, qui est supremus planetarum; res fixas et permanentes. Sic igitur dicendum est quod Deus conservat res quasdam in esse, mediantibus aliquibus causis. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus immediate omnia creavit, sed in ipsa rerum creatione ordinem in rebus instituit, ut quaedam ab aliis dependerent, per quas secundario conservarentur in esse; praesupposita tamen principali conservatione, quae est ab ipso. Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum propria causa sit conservativa effectus ab ea dependentis; sicut nulli effectui praestari potest quod sit causa sui ipsius, potest tamen ei praestari quod sit causa alterius; ita etiam nulli effectui praestari potest quod sit sui ipsius conservativus, potest tamen ei praestari quod sit conservativus alterius. Ad tertium dicendum quod nulla creatura potest esse causa alterius, quantum ad hoc quod acquirat novam formam vel dispositionem, nisi per modum alicuius mutationis, quia semper agit praesupposito aliquo subiecto. Sed postquam formam vel dispositionem induxit in effectu, absque alia immutatione effectus, huiusmodi formam vel dispositionem conservat. Sicut in aere, prout illuminatur de novo, intelligitur quaedam mutatio; sed

Q. 104, A. 2

On the contrary, A thing is kept in being by that which gives it being. But God gives being by means of certain intermediate causes. Therefore He also keeps things in being by means of certain causes. I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), a thing keeps another in being in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally, by removing or hindering the action of a corrupting cause; second, directly and per se, by the fact that that on it depends the other’s being, as the being of the effect depends on the cause. And in both ways a created thing keeps another in being. For it is clear that even in corporeal things there are many causes which hinder the action of corrupting agents, and for that reason are called preservatives; just as salt preserves meat from putrefaction; and in like manner with many other things. It happens also that an effect depends on a creature as to its being. For when we have a series of causes depending on one another, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first and principally on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way on all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the principal cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the middle causes in a secondary way; and all the more so, as the middle cause is higher and nearer to the first cause. For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes: thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 6), that the first, namely the diurnal movement is the cause of the continuation of things generated; whereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of diversity owing to generation and corruption. In like manner astrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the planets, those things which are permanent and fixed. So we conclude that God keeps certain things in being, by means of certain causes. Reply Obj. 1: God created all things immediately, but in the creation itself He established an order among things, so that some depend on others, by which they are preserved in being, though He remains the principal cause of their preservation. Reply Obj. 2: Since an effect is preserved by its proper cause on which it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can only produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving another. Reply Obj. 3: No created nature can be the cause of another, as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by virtue of some change; for the created nature acts always on something presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in the effect, without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form or disposition; as in the air, when it is lit up anew, we must allow some change to have taken place, while the preserva-

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Q. 104, A. 3

Government of Creatures

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conservatio luminis est absque aeris immutatione, ex so- tion of the light is without any further change in the air due la praesentia illuminantis. to the presence of the source of light.

Article 3 Whether God can annihilate anything? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit aliquid in nihilum redigere. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro Octoginta trium Quaest., quod Deus non est causa tendendi in non esse. Hoc autem contingeret, si aliquam creaturam redigeret in nihilum. Ergo Deus non potest aliquid in nihilum redigere. Praeterea, Deus est causa rerum ut sint, per suam bonitatem, quia, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de Doct. Christ., inquantum Deus bonus est, sumus. Sed Deus non potest non esse bonus. Ergo non potest facere ut res non sint. Quod faceret, si eas in nihilum redigeret. Praeterea, si Deus in nihilum aliqua redigeret, oporteret quod hoc fieret per aliquam actionem. Sed hoc non potest esse, quia omnis actio terminatur ad aliquod ens; unde etiam actio corrumpentis terminatur ad aliquid generatum, quia generatio unius est corruptio alterius. Ergo Deus non potest aliquid in nihilum redigere. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ierem. X, corripe me, domine, verumtamen in iudicio, et non in furore tuo, ne forte ad nihilum redigas me. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt quod Deus res in esse produxit agendo de necessitate naturae. Quod si esset verum, Deus non posset rem aliquam in nihilum redigere; sicut non potest a sua natura mutari. Sed, sicut supra est habitum, haec positio est falsa, et a fide Catholica penitus aliena, quae confitetur Deum res libera voluntate produxisse in esse, secundum illud Psalmi, omnia quaecumque voluit dominus, fecit. Hoc igitur quod Deus creaturae esse communicat, ex Dei voluntate dependet. Nec aliter res in esse conservat, nisi inquantum eis continue influit esse. Ut dictum est. Sicut ergo antequam res essent, potuit eis non communicare esse, et sic eas non facere; ita postquam iam factae sunt, potest eis non influere esse, et sic esse desisterent. Quod est eas in nihilum redigere. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non esse non habet causam per se, quia nihil potest esse causa nisi inquantum est ens; ens autem, per se loquendo, est causa essendi. Sic igitur Deus non potest esse causa tendendi in non esse; sed hoc habet creatura ex seipsa, inquantum est de nihilo. Sed per accidens Deus potest esse causa quod res in nihilum redigantur, subtrahendo scilicet suam actionem a rebus. Ad secundum dicendum quod bonitas Dei est causa rerum, non quasi ex necessitate naturae, quia divina

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot annihilate anything. For Augustine says (83 Questions, Q. 21) that God is not the cause of anything tending to non-existence. But He would be such a cause if He were to annihilate anything. Therefore He cannot annihilate anything. Obj. 2: Further, by His goodness God is the cause why things exist, since, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32): Because God is good, we exist. But God cannot cease to be good. Therefore He cannot cause things to cease to exist; which would be the case were He to annihilate anything. Obj. 3: Further, if God were to annihilate anything it would be by His action. But this cannot be; because the term of every action is existence. Hence even the action of a corrupting cause has its term in something generated; for when one thing is generated another undergoes corruption. Therefore God cannot annihilate anything. On the contrary, It is written (Jer 10:24): Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing. I answer that, Some have held that God, in giving existence to creatures, acted from natural necessity. Were this true, God could not annihilate anything, since His nature cannot change. But, as we have said above (Q. 19, A. 4), such an opinion is entirely false, and absolutely contrary to the Catholic faith, which confesses that God created things of His own free-will, according to Ps. 134:6: Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done. Therefore that God gives existence to a creature depends on His will; nor does He preserve things in existence otherwise than by continually pouring out existence into them, as we have said. Therefore, just as before things existed, God was free not to give them existence, and not to make them; so after they are made, He is free not to continue their existence; and thus they would cease to exist; and this would be to annihilate them. Reply Obj. 1: Non-existence has no direct cause; for nothing is a cause except inasmuch as it has existence, and a being essentially as such is a cause of something existing. Therefore God cannot cause a thing to tend to nonexistence, whereas a creature has this tendency of itself, since it is produced from nothing. But indirectly God can be the cause of things being reduced to non-existence, by withdrawing His action therefrom. Reply Obj. 2: God’s goodness is the cause of things, not as though by natural necessity, because the Divine good-

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Special Effects of the Divine Government

bonitas non dependet ex rebus creatis; sed per liberam voluntatem. Unde sicut potuit sine praeiudicio bonitatis suae, res non producere in esse; ita absque detrimento suae bonitatis, potest res in esse non conservare. Ad tertium dicendum quod, si Deus rem aliquam redigeret in nihilum, hoc non esset per aliquam actionem; sed per hoc quod ab agendo cessaret.

Q. 104, A. 4

ness does not depend on creatures; but by His free-will. Wherefore, as without prejudice to His goodness, He might not have produced things into existence, so, without prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve things in existence. Reply Obj. 3: If God were to annihilate anything, this would not imply an action on God’s part; but a mere cessation of His action.

Article 4 Whether anything is annihilated? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid in nihilum redigatur. Finis enim respondet principio. Sed a principio nihil erat nisi Deus. Ergo ad hunc finem res perducentur, ut nihil sit nisi Deus. Et ita creaturae in nihilum redigentur. Praeterea, omnis creatura habet potentiam finitam. Sed nulla potentia finita se extendit ad infinitum, unde in VIII Physic. probatur quod potentia finita non potest movere tempore infinito. Ergo nulla creatura potest durare in infinitum. Et ita quandoque in nihilum redigetur. Praeterea, forma et accidentia non habent materiam partem sui. Sed quandoque desinunt esse. Ergo in nihilum rediguntur. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccle. III. Didici quod omnia opera quae fecit Deus, perseverant in aeternum. Respondeo dicendum quod eorum quae a Deo fiunt circa creaturam, quaedam proveniunt secundum naturalem cursum rerum; quaedam vero miraculose operatur praeter ordinem naturalem creaturis inditum, ut infra dicetur. Quae autem facturus est Deus secundum ordinem naturalem rebus inditum, considerari possunt ex ipsis rerum naturis, quae vero miraculose fiunt, ordinantur ad gratiae manifestationem, secundum illud apostoli I ad Cor. XII, unicuique datur manifestatio spiritus ad utilitatem; et postmodum, inter cetera, subdit de miraculorum operatione. Creaturarum autem naturae hoc demonstrant, ut nulla earum in nihilum redigatur, quia vel sunt immateriales, et sic in eis non est potentia ad non esse; vel sunt materiales, et sic saltem remanent semper secundum materiam, quae incorruptibilis est, utpote subiectum existens generationis et corruptionis. Redigere etiam aliquid in nihilum, non pertinet ad gratiae manifestationem, cum magis per hoc divina potentia et bonitas ostendatur, quod res in esse conservat. Unde simpliciter dicendum est quod nihil omnino in nihilum redigetur.

Objection 1: It would seem that something is annihilated. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But in the beginning there was nothing but God. Therefore all things must tend to this end, that there shall be nothing but God. Therefore creatures will be reduced to nothing. Obj. 2: Further, every creature has a finite power. But no finite power extends to the infinite. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that, a finite power cannot move in infinite time. Therefore a creature cannot last for an infinite duration; and so at some time it will be reduced to nothing. Obj. 3: Further, forms and accidents have no matter as part of themselves. But at some time they cease to exist. Therefore they are reduced to nothing. On the contrary, It is written (Eccl 3:14): I have learned that all the works that God hath made continue for ever. I answer that, Some of those things which God does in creatures occur in accordance with the natural course of things; others happen miraculously, and not in accordance with the natural order, as will be explained (Q. 105, A. 6). Now whatever God wills to do according to the natural order of things may be observed from their nature; but those things which occur miraculously, are ordered for the manifestation of grace, according to the Apostle, To each one is given the manifestation of the Spirit, unto profit (1 Cor 12:7); and subsequently he mentions, among others, the working of miracles. Now the nature of creatures shows that none of them is annihilated. For, either they are immaterial, and therefore have no potentiality to non-existence; or they are material, and then they continue to exist, at least in matter, which is incorruptible, since it is the subject of generation and corruption. Moreover, the annihilation of things does not pertain to the manifestation of grace; since rather the power and goodness of God are manifested by the preservation of things in existence. Wherefore we must conclude by denying absolutely that anything at all will be annihilated.

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Q. 104, A. 4

Government of Creatures

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc quod res in esse productae sunt, postquam non fuerunt, declarat potentiam producentis. Sed quod in nihilum redigerentur, huiusmodi manifestationem impediret, cum Dei potentia in hoc maxime ostendatur, quod res in esse conservat, secundum illud apostoli Heb. I, portans omnia verbo virtutis suae. Ad secundum dicendum quod potentia creaturae ad essendum est receptiva tantum; sed potentia activa est ipsius Dei, a quo est influxus essendi. Unde quod res in infinitum durent, sequitur infinitatem divinae virtutis. Determinatur tamen quibusdam rebus virtus ad manendum tempore determinato, inquantum impediri possunt ne percipiant influxum essendi qui est ab eo, ex aliquo contrario agente, cui finita virtus non potest resistere tempore infinito, sed solum tempore determinato. Et ideo ea quae non habent contrarium, quamvis habeant finitam virtutem, perseverant in aeternum. Ad tertium dicendum quod formae et accidentia non sunt entia completa, cum non subsistant, sed quodlibet eorum est aliquid entis, sic enim ens dicitur, quia eo aliquid est. Et tamen eo modo quo sunt, non omnino in nihilum rediguntur; non quia aliqua pars eorum remaneat, sed remanent in potentia materiae vel subiecti.

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Reply Obj. 1: That things are brought into existence from a state of non-existence, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them; but that they should be reduced to nothing would hinder that manifestation, since the power of God is conspicuously shown in His preserving all things in existence, according to the Apostle: Upholding all things by the word of His power (Heb 1:3). Reply Obj. 2: A creature’s potentiality to existence is merely receptive; the active power belongs to God Himself, from Whom existence is derived. Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a consequence of the infinity of the Divine power. To some things, however, is given a determinate power of duration for a certain time, so far as they may be hindered by some contrary agent from receiving the influx of existence which comes from Him Whom finite power cannot resist, for an infinite, but only for a fixed time. So things which have no contrary, although they have a finite power, continue to exist for ever. Reply Obj. 3: Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they do not subsist: but each one of them is something of a being; for it is called a being, because something is by it. Yet so far as their mode of existence is concerned, they are not entirely reduced to nothingness; not that any part of them survives, but that they remain in the potentiality of the matter, or of the subject.

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Question 105 The Change of Creatures by God Deinde considerandum est de secundo effectu guberWe now consider the second effect of the Divine govnationis divinae qui est mutatio creaturarum. Et primo, ernment, i.e., the change of creatures; and first, the change de mutatione creaturarum a Deo; secundo, de mutatione of creatures by God; second, the change of one creature by unius creaturae ab alia. another. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum Deus immediate possit movere (1) Whether God can move immediately the matter to materiam ad formam. the form? Secundo, utrum immediate possit movere aliquod (2) Whether He can immediately move a body? corpus. Tertio, utrum possit movere intellectum. (3) Whether He can move the intellect? Quarto, utrum possit movere voluntatem. (4) Whether He can move the will? Quinto, utrum Deus operetur in omni operante. (5) Whether God works in every worker? Sexto, utrum possit aliquid facere praeter ordinem (6) Whether He can do anything outside the order rebus inditum. imposed on things? Septimo, utrum omnia quae sic Deus facit, sint (7) Whether all that God does is miraculous? miracula. Octavo, de diversitate miraculorum. (8) Of the diversity of miracles.

Article 1 Whether God can move the matter immediately to the form? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit immediate movere materiam ad formam. Sicut enim probat philosophus in VII Metaphys., formam in hac materia nihil facere potest nisi forma quae est in materia, quia simile facit sibi simile. Sed Deus non est forma in materia. Ergo non potest causare formam in materia. Praeterea, si aliquod agens se habeat ad multa, nullum eorum producet, nisi determinetur ad ipsum per aliquid aliud, ut enim in III de Anima dicitur, universalis opinio non movet nisi mediante aliqua particulari apprehensione. Sed virtus divina est universalis causa omnium. Ergo non potest producere aliquam particularem formam, nisi mediante aliquo particulari agente. Praeterea, sicut esse commune dependet a prima causa universali, ita esse determinatum dependet a determinatis causis particularibus, ut supra habitum est. Sed determinatum esse alicuius rei est per propriam eius formam. Ergo propriae rerum formae non producuntur a Deo, nisi mediantibus causis particularibus. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae.

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move the matter immediately to receive the form. For as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), nothing can bring a form into any particular matter, except that form which is in matter; because, like begets like. But God is not a form in matter. Therefore He cannot cause a form in matter. Obj. 2: Further, any agent inclined to several effects will produce none of them, unless it is determined to a particular one by some other cause; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), a general assertion does not move the mind, except by means of some particular apprehension. But the Divine power is the universal cause of all things. Therefore it cannot produce any particular form, except by means of a particular agent. Obj. 3: As universal being depends on the first universal cause, so determinate being depends on determinate particular causes; as we have seen above (Q. 104, A. 2). But the determinate being of a particular thing is from its own form. Therefore the forms of things are produced by God, only by means of particular causes. On the contrary, It is written (Gen 2:7): God formed man of the slime of the earth.

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Q. 105, A. 2

Government of Creatures

Respondeo dicendum quod Deus immediate potest movere materiam ad formam. Quia ens in potentia passiva reduci potest in actum, a potentia activa quae eam sub sua potestate continet. Cum igitur materia contineatur sub potestate divina, utpote a Deo producta, potest reduci in actum per divinam potentiam. Et hoc est moveri materiam ad formam, quia forma nihil aliud est quam actus materiae. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod effectus aliquis invenitur assimilari causae agenti dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum eandem speciem; ut homo generatur ab homine, et ignis ab igne. Alio modo, secundum virtualem continentiam, prout scilicet forma effectus virtualiter continetur in causa, et sic animalia ex putrefactione generata, et plantae et corpora mineralia assimilantur soli et stellis, quorum virtute generantur. Sic igitur effectus causae agenti similatur secundum totum illud ad quod se extendit virtus agentis. Virtus autem Dei se extendit ad formam et materiam, ut supra habitum est. Unde compositum quod generatur, similatur Deo secundum virtualem continentiam, sicut similatur composito generanti per similitudinem speciei. Unde sicut compositum generans potest movere materiam ad formam generando compositum sibi simile, ita et Deus. Non autem aliqua alia forma non in materia existens, quia materia non continetur in virtute alterius substantiae separatae. Et ideo daemones et angeli operantur circa haec visibilia, non quidem imprimendo formas, sed adhibendo corporalia semina. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si Deus ageret, ex necessitate naturae. Sed quia agit per voluntatem et intellectum, qui cognoscit rationes proprias omnium formarum, et non solum universales; inde est quod potest determinate hanc vel illam formam materiae imprimere. Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod causae secundae ordinantur ad determinatos effectus est illis a Deo. Unde Deus, quia alias causas ordinat ad determinatos effectus, potest etiam determinatos effectus producere per seipsum.

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I answer that, God can move matter immediately to form; because whatever is in passive potentiality can be reduced to act by the active power which extends over that potentiality. Therefore, since the Divine power extends over matter, as produced by God, it can be reduced to act by the Divine power: and this is what is meant by matter being moved to a form; for a form is nothing else but the act of matter. Reply Obj. 1: An effect is assimilated to the active cause in two ways. First, according to the same species; as man is generated by man, and fire by fire. Second, by being virtually contained in the cause; as the form of the effect is virtually contained in its cause: thus animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and minerals are like the sun and stars, by whose power they are produced. In this way the effect is like its active cause as regards all that over which the power of that cause extends. Now the power of God extends to both matter and form; as we have said above (Q. 14, A. 2; Q. 44, A. 2); wherefore if a composite thing be produced, it is likened to God by way of a virtual inclusion; or it is likened to the composite generator by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite generator can move matter to a form by generating a composite thing like itself; so also can God. But no other form not existing in matter can do this; because the power of no other separate substance extends over matter. Hence angels and demons operate on visible matter; not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of corporeal seeds. Reply Obj. 2: This argument would hold if God were to act of natural necessity. But since He acts by His will and intellect, which knows the particular and not only the universal natures of all forms, it follows that He can determinately imprint this or that form on matter. Reply Obj. 3: The fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate effects is due to God; wherefore since God ordains other causes to certain effects He can also produce certain effects by Himself without any other cause.

Article 2 Whether God can move a body immediately? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit immediate movere aliquod corpus. Cum enim movens et motum oporteat esse simul, ut probatur in VII Physic., oportet esse contactum quendam moventis et moti. Sed non potest esse contactus

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move a body immediately. For as the mover and the moved must exist simultaneously, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 2), it follows that there must be some contact between the mover and moved. But there can be no contact between God and

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Change of Creatures by God

Dei, et corporis alicuius, dicit enim Dionysius, in I cap. de Div. Nom., quod Dei non est aliquis tactus. Ergo Deus non potest immediate movere aliquod corpus. Praeterea, Deus est movens non motum. Tale autem est appetibile apprehensum. Movet igitur Deus sicut desideratum et apprehensum. Sed non apprehenditur nisi ab intellectu, qui non est corpus, nec virtus corporis. Ergo Deus non potest movere aliquod corpus immediate. Praeterea, philosophus probat in VIII Physic., quod potentia infinita movet in instanti. Sed impossibile est aliquod corpus in instanti moveri, quia, cum omnis motus sit inter opposita, sequeretur quod duo opposita simul inessent eidem; quod est impossibile. Ergo corpus non potest immediate moveri a potentia infinita. Potentia autem Dei est infinita, ut supra habitum est. Ergo Deus non potest immediate movere aliquod corpus. Sed contra, opera sex dierum Deus fecit immediate; in quibus continetur motus corporum, ut patet per hoc quod dicitur Gen. I, congregentur aquae in locum unum. Ergo Deus immediate potest movere corpus. Respondeo dicendum quod erroneum est dicere Deum non posse facere per seipsum omnes determinatos effectus qui fiunt per quamcumque causam creatam. Unde cum corpora moveantur immediate a causis creatis, nulli debet venire in dubium quin Deus possit movere immediate quodcumque corpus. Et hoc quidem consequens est ad ea quae supra dicta sunt. Nam omnis motus corporis cuiuscumque vel consequitur ad aliquam formam, sicut motus localis gravium et levium consequitur formam quae datur a generante, ratione cuius generans dicitur movens, vel est via ad formam aliquam, sicut calefactio est via ad formam ignis. Eiusdem autem est imprimere formam, et disponere ad formam, et dare motum consequentem formam, ignis enim non solum generat alium ignem, sed etiam calefacit, et sursum movet. Cum igitur Deus possit immediate formam materiae imprimere, consequens est ut possit, secundum quemcumque motum, corpus quodcumque movere. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod duplex est tactus, scilicet corporalis, sicut duo corpora se tangunt; et virtualis, sicut dicitur quod contristans tangit contristatum. Secundum igitur primum contactum, Deus, cum sit incorporeus, nec tangit nec tangitur. Secundum autem virtualem contactum, tangit quidem movendo creaturas, sed non tangitur, quia nullius creaturae virtus naturalis potest ad ipsum pertingere. Et sic intellexit Dionysius quod non est tactus Dei, ut scilicet tangatur. Ad secundum dicendum quod movet Deus sicut desideratum et intellectum. Sed non oportet quod semper moveat sicut desideratum et intellectum ab eo quod

Q. 105, A. 2

a body; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): There is no contact with God. Therefore God cannot move a body immediately. Obj. 2: Further, God is the mover unmoved. But such also is the desirable object when apprehended. Therefore God moves as the object of desire and apprehension. But He cannot be apprehended except by the intellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal power. Therefore God cannot move a body immediately. Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that an infinite power moves instantaneously. But it is impossible for a body to be moved in one instant; for since every movement is between opposites, it follows that two opposites would exist at once in the same subject, which is impossible. Therefore a body cannot be moved immediately by an infinite power. But God’s power is infinite, as we have explained (Q. 25, A. 2). Therefore God cannot move a body immediately. On the contrary, God produced the works of the six days immediately, among which is included the movements of bodies, as is clear from Gen. 1:9 Let the waters be gathered together into one place. Therefore God alone can move a body immediately. I answer that, It is erroneous to say that God cannot Himself produce all the determinate effects which are produced by any created cause. Wherefore, since bodies are moved immediately by created causes, we cannot possibly doubt that God can move immediately any bodies whatever. This indeed follows from what is above stated (A. 1). For every movement of any body whatever, either results from a form, as the movements of things heavy and light result from the form which they have from their generating cause, for which reason the generator is called the mover; or else tends to a form, as heating tends to the form of heat. Now it belongs to the same cause, to imprint a form, to dispose to that form, and to give the movement which results from that form; for fire not only generates fire, but it also heats and moves things upwards. Therefore, as God can imprint form immediately in matter, it follows that He can move any body whatever in respect of any movement whatever. Reply Obj. 1: There are two kinds of contact; corporeal contact, when two bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the cause of sadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the first kind of contact, God, as being incorporeal, neither touches, nor is touched; but according to virtual contact He touches creatures by moving them; but He is not touched, because the natural power of no creature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius understand the words, There is no contact with God; that is, so that God Himself be touched. Reply Obj. 2: God moves as the object of desire and apprehension; but it does not follow that He always moves as being desired and apprehended by that which is moved;

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movetur; sed sicut desideratum et notum a seipso; quia omnia operatur propter suam bonitatem. Ad tertium dicendum quod philosophus in VIII Physic. intendit probare quod virtus primi motoris non sit virtus in magnitudine, tali ratione, virtus primi motoris est infinita (quod probat per hoc quod potest movere tempore infinito); virtus autem infinita, si esset in aliqua magnitudine, moveret in non tempore, quod est impossibile; ergo oportet quod infinita virtus primi motoris sit non in magnitudine. Ex quo patet quod corpus moveri in non tempore, non consequitur nisi virtutem infinitam in magnitudine. Cuius ratio est, quia omnis virtus quae est in magnitudine, movet secundum se totam, cum moveat per necessitatem naturae. Potentia autem infinita improportionabiliter excedit quamlibet potentiam finitam. Quanto autem maior est potentia moventis, tanto est maior velocitas motus. Cum igitur potentia finita moveat tempore determinato, sequitur quod potentia infinita non moveat in aliquo tempore, quia cuiuscumque temporis ad aliud tempus est aliqua proportio. Sed virtus quae non est in magnitudine, est virtus alicuius intelligentis, qui operatur in effectibus secundum quod eis convenit. Et ideo, cum corpori non possit esse conveniens moveri in non tempore, non sequitur quod moveat in non tempore.

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but as being desired and known by Himself; for He does all things for His own goodness. Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 10) intends to prove that the power of the first mover is not a power of the first mover of bulk, by the following argument. The power of the first mover is infinite (which he proves from the fact that the first mover can move in infinite time). Now an infinite power, if it were a power of bulk, would move without time, which is impossible; therefore the infinite power of the first mover must be in something which is not measured by its bulk. Whence it is clear that for a body to be moved without time can only be the result of an infinite power. The reason is that every power of bulk moves in its entirety; since it moves by the necessity of its nature. But an infinite power surpasses out of all proportion any finite power. Now the greater the power of the mover, the greater is the velocity of the movement. Therefore, since a finite power moves in a determinate time, it follows that an infinite power does not move in any time; for between one time and any other time there is some proportion. On the other hand, a power which is not in bulk is the power of an intelligent being, which operates in its effects according to what is fitting to them; and therefore, since it cannot be fitting for a body to be moved without time, it does not follow that it moves without time.

Article 3 Whether God moves the created intellect immediately? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non moveat immediate intellectum creatum. Actio enim intellectus est ab eo in quo est, non enim transit in exteriorem materiam, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. Actio autem eius quod movetur ab alio, non est ab eo in quo est, sed a movente. Non ergo intellectus movetur ab alio. Et ita videtur quod Deus non possit movere intellectum. Praeterea, id quod habet in se principium sufficiens sui motus, non movetur ab alio. Sed motus intellectus est ipsum intelligere eius, sicut dicitur quod intelligere vel sentire est motus quidam, secundum philosophum, in III de Anima. Sufficiens autem principium intelligendi est lumen intelligibile inditum intellectui. Ergo non movetur ab alio. Praeterea, sicut sensus movetur a sensibili, ita intellectus ab intelligibili. Sed Deus non est intelligibilis nobis, sed nostrum intellectum excedit. Ergo Deus non potest movere nostrum intellectum.

Objection 1: It would seem that God does not immediately move the created intellect. For the action of the intellect is governed by its own subject; since it does not pass into external matter; as stated in Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8. But the action of what is moved by another does not proceed from that wherein it is; but from the mover. Therefore the intellect is not moved by another; and so apparently God cannot move the created intellect. Obj. 2: Further, anything which in itself is a sufficient principle of movement, is not moved by another. But the movement of the intellect is its act of understanding; in the sense in which we say that to understand or to feel is a kind of movement, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7). But the intellectual light which is natural to the soul, is a sufficient principle of understanding. Therefore it is not moved by another. Obj. 3: Further, as the senses are moved by the sensible, so the intellect is moved by the intelligible. But God is not intelligible to us, and exceeds the capacity of our intellect. Therefore God cannot move our intellect.

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Sed contra, docens movet intellectum addiscentis. Sed Deus docet hominem scientiam, sicut dicitur in Psalmo. Ergo Deus movet intellectum hominis. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in motibus corporalibus movens dicitur quod dat formam quae est principium motus; ita dicitur movere intellectum, quod causat formam quae est principium intellectualis operationis, quae dicitur motus intellectus. Operationis autem intellectus est duplex principium in intelligente, unum scilicet quod est ipsa virtus intellectualis, quod quidem principium est etiam in intelligente in potentia; aliud autem est principium intelligendi in actu, scilicet similitudo rei intellectae in intelligente. Dicitur ergo aliquid movere intellectum, sive det intelligenti virtutem ad intelligendum, sive imprimat ei similitudinem rei intellectae. Utroque autem modo Deus movet intellectum creatum. Ipse enim est primum ens immateriale. Et quia intellectualitas consequitur immaterialitatem, sequitur quod ipse sit primum intelligens. Unde cum primum in quolibet ordine sit causa eorum quae consequuntur, sequitur quod ab ipso sit omnis virtus intelligendi. Similiter cum ipse sit primum ens, et omnia entia praeexistant in ipso sicut in prima causa, oportet quod sint in eo intelligibiliter secundum modum eius. Sicut enim omnes rationes rerum intelligibiles primo existunt in Deo, et ab derivantur in alios intellectus, ut actu intelligant; sic etiam derivantur in creaturas ut subsistant. Sic igitur Deus movet intellectum creatum, inquantum dat ei virtutem ad intelligendum, vel naturalem vel superadditam; et inquantum imprimit ei species intelligibiles; et utrumque tenet et conservat in esse. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod operatio intellectualis est quidem ab intellectu in quo est, sicut a causa secunda, sed a Deo sicut a causa prima. Ab ipso enim datur intelligenti quod intelligere possit. Ad secundum dicendum quod lumen intellectuale, simul cum similitudine rei intellectae, est sufficiens principium intelligendi; secundarium tamen, et a primo principio dependens. Ad tertium dicendum quod intelligibile movet intellectum nostrum, inquantum quodammodo imprimit ei suam similitudinem, per quam intelligi potest. Sed similitudines quas Deus imprimit intellectui creato, non sufficiunt ad ipsum Deum intelligendum per essentiam, ut supra habitum est. Unde movet intellectum creatum, cum tamen non sit ei intelligibilis, ut dictum est.

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On the contrary, The teacher moves the intellect of the one taught. But it is written (Ps 93:10) that God teaches man knowledge. Therefore God moves the human intellect. I answer that, As in corporeal movement that is called the mover which gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is said to move the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is the principle of the intellectual operation, called the movement of the intellect. Now there is a twofold principle of intellectual operation in the intelligent being; one which is the intellectual power itself, which principle exists in the one who understands in potentiality; while the other is the principle of actual understanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood in the one who understands. So a thing is said to move the intellect, whether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding; or impresses on him the likeness of the thing understood. Now God moves the created intellect in both ways. For He is the First immaterial Being; and as intellectuality is a result of immateriality, it follows that He is the First intelligent Being. Therefore since in each order the first is the cause of all that follows, we must conclude that from Him proceeds all intellectual power. In like manner, since He is the First Being, and all other beings pre-exist in Him as in their First Cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly in Him, after the mode of His own Nature. For as the intelligible types of everything exist first of all in God, and are derived from Him by other intellects in order that these may actually understand; so also are they derived by creatures that they may subsist. Therefore God so moves the created intellect, inasmuch as He gives it the intellectual power, whether natural, or superadded; and impresses on the created intellect the intelligible species, and maintains and preserves both power and species in existence. Reply Obj. 1: The intellectual operation is performed by the intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds from God as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand is given to the one who understands. Reply Obj. 2: The intellectual light together with the likeness of the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle. Reply Obj. 3: The intelligible object moves our human intellect, so far as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of which the intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses which God impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient to enable the created intellect to understand Him through His Essence, as we have seen above (Q. 12, A. 2; Q. 56, A. 3). Hence He moves the created intellect, and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, as we have explained (Q. 12, A. 4).

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Article 4 Whether God can move the created will? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit movere voluntatem creatam. Omne enim quod movetur ab extrinseco, cogitur. Sed voluntas non potest cogi. Ergo non movetur ab aliquo extrinseco. Et ita non potest moveri a Deo. Praeterea, Deus non potest facere quod contradictoria sint simul vera. Hoc autem sequeretur, si voluntatem moveret, nam voluntarie moveri est ex se moveri, et non ab alio. Ergo Deus non potest voluntatem movere. Praeterea, motus magis attribuitur moventi quam mobili, unde homicidium non attribuitur lapidi, sed proiicienti. Si igitur Deus moveat voluntatem, sequitur quod opera voluntaria non imputentur homini ad meritum vel demeritum. Hoc autem est falsum. Non igitur Deus movet voluntatem. Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Philipp. II, Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut intellectus, ut dictum est, movetur ab obiecto, et ab eo qui dedit virtutem intelligendi; ita voluntas movetur ab obiecto, quod est bonum, et ab eo qui creat virtutem volendi. Potest autem voluntas moveri sicut ab obiecto, a quocumque bono; non tamen sufficienter et efficaciter nisi a Deo. Non enim sufficienter aliquid potest movere aliquod mobile, nisi virtus activa moventis excedat, vel saltem adaequet virtutem passivam mobilis. Virtus autem passiva voluntatis se extendit ad bonum in universali, est enim eius obiectum bonum universale, sicut et intellectus obiectum est ens universale. Quodlibet autem bonum creatum est quoddam particulare bonum, solus autem Deus est bonum universale. Unde ipse solus implet voluntatem, et sufficienter eam movet ut obiectum. Similiter autem et virtus volendi a solo Deo causatur. Velle enim nihil aliud est quam inclinatio quaedam in obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum universale. Inclinare autem in bonum universale est primi moventis cui proportionatur ultimus finis, sicut in rebus humanis dirigere ad bonum commune est eius qui praeest multitudini. Unde utroque modo proprium est Dei movere voluntatem, sed maxime secundo modo, interius eam inclinando. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud quod movetur ab altero dicitur cogi, si moveatur contra inclinationem propriam, sed si moveatur ab alio quod sibi dat propriam inclinationem, non dicitur cogi; sicut grave, cum movetur deorsum a generante, non cogitur. Sic igitur Deus, movendo voluntatem, non cogit ipsam, quia dat ei eius propriam inclinationem. Ad secundum dicendum quod moveri voluntarie est moveri ex se, idest a principio intrinseco, sed illud

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move the created will. For whatever is moved from without, is forced. But the will cannot be forced. Therefore it is not moved from without; and therefore cannot be moved by God. Obj. 2: Further, God cannot make two contradictories to be true at the same time. But this would follow if He moved the will; for to be voluntarily moved means to be moved from within, and not by another. Therefore God cannot move the will. Obj. 3: Further, movement is attributed to the mover rather than to the one moved; wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone, but to the thrower. Therefore, if God moves the will, it follows that voluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward or blame. But this is false. Therefore God does not move the will. On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:13): It is God who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish. I answer that, As the intellect is moved by the object and by the Giver of the power of intelligence, as stated above (A. 3), so is the will moved by its object, which is good, and by Him who creates the power of willing. Now the will can be moved by good as its object, but by God alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move a movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover surpasses or at least equals the potentiality of the thing movable. Now the potentiality of the will extends to the universal good; for its object is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal being. But every created good is some particular good; God alone is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills the capacity of the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object. In like manner the power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will is nothing but to be inclined towards the object of the will, which is universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate end is proportionate; just as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs the directing of his subjects to the common weal. Wherefore in both ways it belongs to God to move the will; but especially in the second way by an interior inclination of the will. Reply Obj. 1: A thing moved by another is forced if moved against its natural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving to it the proper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is made to move downwards by that which produced it, then it is not forced. In like manner God, while moving the will, does not force it, because He gives the will its own natural inclination. Reply Obj. 2: To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet this in-

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principium intrinsecum potest esse ab alio principio extrinseco. Et sic moveri ex se non repugnat ei quod movetur ab alio. Ad tertium dicendum quod, si voluntas ita moveretur ab alio quod ex se nullatenus moveretur, opera voluntatis non imputarentur ad meritum vel demeritum. Sed quia per hoc quod movetur ab alio, non excluditur quin moveatur ex se, ut dictum est; ideo per consequens non tollitur ratio meriti vel demeriti.

Q. 105, A. 5

terior principle may be caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another. Reply Obj. 3: If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated (ad 2), it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.

Article 5 Whether God works in every agent? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non operetur in omni operante. Nulla enim insufficientia est Deo attribuenda. Si igitur Deus operatur in omni operante, sufficienter in quolibet operatur. Superfluum igitur esset quod agens creatum aliquid operaretur. Praeterea, una operatio non est simul a duobus operantibus, sicut nec unus numero motus potest esse duorum mobilium. Si igitur operatio creaturae est a Deo in creatura operante, non potest esse simul a creatura. Et ita nulla creatura aliquid operatur. Praeterea, faciens dicitur esse causa operationis facti, inquantum dat ei formam qua operatur. Si igitur Deus est causa operationis rerum factarum ab ipso, hoc erit inquantum dat eis virtutem operandi. Sed hoc est a principio, quando rem facit. Ergo videtur quod ulterius non operetur in creatura operante. Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae XXVI, omnia opera nostra operatus es in nobis, domine. Respondeo dicendum quod Deum operari in quolibet operante aliqui sic intellexerunt, quod nulla virtus creata aliquid operaretur in rebus, sed solus Deus immediate omnia operaretur; puta quod ignis non calefaceret, sed Deus in igne, et similiter de omnibus aliis. Hoc autem est impossibile. Primo quidem, quia sic subtraheretur ordo causae et causati a rebus creatis. Quod pertinet ad impotentiam creantis, ex virtute enim agentis est, quod suo effectui det virtutem agendi. Secundo, quia virtutes operativae quae in rebus inveniuntur, frustra essent rebus attributae, si per eas nihil operarentur. Quinimmo omnes res creatae viderentur quodammodo esse frustra, si propria operatione destituerentur, cum omnis res sit propter suam operationem. Semper enim imperfectum est propter perfectius, sicut igitur materia est propter formam, ita forma, quae est actus primus, est propter suam operationem, quae est actus secundus; et sic operatio est finis rei creatae. Sic igitur intelligendum est Deum

Objection 1: It would seem that God does not work in every agent. For we must not attribute any insufficiency to God. If therefore God works in every agent, He works sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be superfluous for the created agent to work at all. Obj. 2: Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from two sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong to two movable things. Therefore if the creature’s operation is from God operating in the creature, it cannot at the same time proceed from the creature; and so no creature works at all. Obj. 3: Further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the thing made, as giving it the form whereby it operates. Therefore, if God is the cause of the operation of things made by Him, this would be inasmuch as He gives them the power of operating. But this is in the beginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that God does not operate any further in the operating creature. On the contrary, It is written (Isa 26:12): Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in us. I answer that, Some have understood God to work in every agent in such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that God alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance, that it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, and so forth. But this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect would be taken away from created things: and this would imply lack of power in the Creator: for it is due to the power of the cause, that it bestows active power on its effect. Second, because the active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be bestowed on things to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way, to be purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the purpose of everything is its operation. For the less perfect is always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the matter is for the sake of the form, so the form which is the first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act; and thus

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operari in rebus, quod tamen ipsae res propriam habeant operation is the end of the creature. We must therefore unoperationem. derstand that God works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod, cum In order to make this clear, we must observe that as sint causarum quatuor genera, materia quidem non est there are few kinds of causes; matter is not a principle of acprincipium actionis, sed se habet ut subiectum recipiens tion, but is the subject that receives the effect of action. On actionis effectum. Finis vero et agens et forma se ha- the other hand, the end, the agent, and the form are princibent ut actionis principium, sed ordine quodam. Nam ples of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle primo quidem, principium actionis est finis, qui movet of action is the end which moves the agent; the second is agentem; secundo vero, agens; tertio autem, forma eius the agent; the third is the form of that which the agent apquod ab agente applicatur ad agendum (quamvis et ip- plies to action (although the agent also acts through its own sum agens per formam suam agat); ut patet in artificia- form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art. For the libus. Artifex enim movetur ad agendum a fine, qui est craftsman is moved to action by the end, which is the thing ipsum operatum, puta arca vel lectus; et applicat ad ac- wrought, for instance a chest or a bed; and applies to action tionem securim quae incidit per suum acumen. the axe which cuts through its being sharp. Sic igitur secundum haec tria Deus in quolibet opeThus then does God work in every worker, according to rante operatur. Primo quidem, secundum rationem fi- these three things. First as an end. For since every operation nis. Cum enim omnis operatio sit propter aliquod bo- is for the sake of some good, real or apparent; and nothing num verum vel apparens; nihil autem est vel apparet is good either really or apparently, except in as far as it parbonum, nisi secundum quod participat aliquam simi- ticipates in a likeness to the Supreme Good, which is God; it litudinem summi boni, quod est Deus; sequitur quod follows that God Himself is the cause of every operation as ipse Deus sit cuiuslibet operationis causa ut finis. Simili- its end. Again it is to be observed that where there are sevter etiam considerandum est quod, si sint multa agentia eral agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the ordinata, semper secundum agens agit in virtute pri- first; for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus mi, nam primum agens movet secundum ad agendum. all agents act in virtue of God Himself: and therefore He is Et secundum hoc, omnia agunt in virtute ipsius Dei; the cause of action in every agent. Third, we must observe et ita ipse est causa actionum omnium agentium. Ter- that God not only moves things to operate, as it were applytio, considerandum est quod Deus movet non solum res ing their forms and powers to operation, just as the workad operandum, quasi applicando formas et virtutes re- man applies the axe to cut, who nevertheless at times does rum ad operationem, sicut etiam artifex applicat secu- not give the axe its form; but He also gives created agents rim ad scindendum, qui tamen interdum formam securi their forms and preserves them in being. Therefore He is non tribuit; sed etiam dat formam creaturis agentibus, the cause of action not only by giving the form which is the et eas tenet in esse. Unde non solum est causa actio- principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause num inquantum dat formam quae est principium ac- of movement in things heavy and light; but also as preservtionis, sicut generans dicitur esse causa motus gravium ing the forms and powers of things; just as the sun is said et levium; sed etiam sicut conservans formas et virtu- to be the cause of the manifestation of colors, inasmuch as tes rerum; prout sol dicitur esse causa manifestationis it gives and preserves the light by which colors are made colorum, inquantum dat et conservat lumen, quo ma- manifest. And since the form of a thing is within the thing, nifestantur colores. Et quia forma rei est intra rem, et and all the more, as it approaches nearer to the First and tanto magis quanto consideratur ut prior et universalior; Universal Cause; and because in all things God Himself is et ipse Deus est proprie causa ipsius esse universalis in properly the cause of universal being which is innermost in rebus omnibus, quod inter omnia est magis intimum re- all things; it follows that in all things God works intimately. bus; sequitur quod Deus in omnibus intime operetur. Et For this reason in Holy Scripture the operations of nature propter hoc in sacra Scriptura operationes naturae Deo are attributed to God as operating in nature, according to attribuuntur quasi operanti in natura; secundum illud Job 10:11: Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: Thou Iob X, pelle et carnibus vestisti me, ossibus et nervis com- hast put me together with bones and sinews. pegisti me. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus sufficienter Reply Obj. 1: God works sufficiently in things as First operatur in rebus ad modum primi agentis, nec propter Agent, but it does not follow from this that the operation of hoc superfluit operatio secundorum agentium. secondary agents is superfluous. Ad secundum dicendum quod una actio non proReply Obj. 2: One action does not proceed from two cedit a duobus agentibus unius ordinis, sed nihil prohi- agents of the same order. But nothing hinders the same bet quin una et eadem actio procedat a primo et secundo action from proceeding from a primary and a secondary agente. agent.

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Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus non solum dat Reply Obj. 3: God not only gives things their form, but formas rebus, sed etiam conservat eas in esse, et applicat He also preserves them in existence, and applies them to eas ad agendum, et est finis omnium actionum, ut dic- act, and is moreover the end of every action, as above extum est. plained.

Article 6 Whether God can do anything outside the established order of nature? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit facere aliquid praeter ordinem rebus inditum. Dicit enim Augustinus, XXVI Contra Faustum: Deus, conditor et creator omnium naturarum, nihil contra naturam facit. Sed hoc videtur esse contra naturam, quod est praeter ordinem naturaliter rebus inditum. Ergo Deus non potest facere aliquid praeter ordinem rebus inditum. Praeterea, sicut ordo iustitiae est a Deo, ita et ordo naturae. Sed Deus non potest facere aliquid praeter ordinem iustitiae, faceret enim tunc aliquid iniustum. Ergo non potest facere aliquid praeter ordinem naturae. Praeterea, ordinem naturae Deus instituit. Si igitur praeter ordinem naturae Deus aliquid faciat, videtur quod ipse sit mutabilis. Quod est inconveniens. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XXVI Contra Faustum, quod Deus aliquando aliquid facit contra solitum cursum naturae. Respondeo dicendum quod a qualibet causa derivatur aliquis ordo in suos effectus, cum quaelibet causa habeat rationem principii. Et ideo secundum multiplicationem causarum, multiplicantur et ordines, quorum unus continetur sub altero, sicut et causa continetur sub causa. Unde causa superior non continetur sub ordine causae inferioris, sed e converso. Cuius exemplum apparet in rebus humanis, nam ex patrefamilias dependet ordo domus, qui continetur sub ordine civitatis, qui procedit a civitatis rectore, cum et hic contineatur sub ordine regis, a quo totum regnum ordinatur. Si ergo ordo rerum consideretur prout dependet a prima causa, sic contra rerum ordinem Deus facere non potest, sic enim si faceret, faceret contra suam praescientiam aut voluntatem aut bonitatem. Si vero consideretur rerum ordo prout dependet a qualibet secundarum causarum, sic Deus potest facere praeter ordinem rerum. Quia ordini secundarum causarum ipse non est subiectus, sed talis ordo ei subiicitur, quasi ab eo procedens non per necessitatem naturae, sed per arbitrium voluntatis, potuisset enim et alium ordinem rerum instituere. Unde et potest praeter hunc ordinem institutum agere, cum voluerit; puta agendo effectus secundarum causarum sine ipsis, vel producendo aliquos effectus ad quos causae secundae non se extendunt. Unde et Augustinus

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot do anything outside the established order of nature. For Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3) says: God the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against nature. But that which is outside the natural order seems to be against nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural order. Obj. 2: Further, as the order of justice is from God, so is the order of nature. But God cannot do anything outside the order of justice; for then He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do anything outside the order of nature. Obj. 3: Further, God established the order of nature. Therefore if God does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that He is changeable; which cannot be said. On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): God sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature. I answer that, From each cause there results a certain order to its effects, since every cause is a principle; and so, according to the multiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders, subjected one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause. Wherefore a higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order; but conversely. An example of this may be seen in human affairs. On the father of a family depends the order of the household; which order is contained in the order of the city; which order again depends on the ruler of the city; while this last order depends on that of the king, by whom the whole kingdom is ordered. If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first cause, God cannot do anything against this order; for, if He did so, He would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness. But if we consider the order of things depending on any secondary cause, thus God can do something outside such order; for He is not subject to the order of secondary causes; but, on the contrary, this order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural necessity, but by the choice of His own will; for He could have created another order of things. Wherefore God can do something outside this order created by Him, when He chooses, for instance by producing the effects of secondary causes without them, or by producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend. So Augus-

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dicit, XXVI Contra Faustum, quod Deus contra solitum cursum naturae facit; sed contra summam legem tam nullo modo facit, quam contra seipsum non facit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum aliquid contingit in rebus naturalibus praeter naturam inditam, hoc potest dupliciter contingere. Uno modo, per actionem agentis qui inclinationem naturalem non dedit, sicut cum homo movet corpus grave sursum, quod non habet ab eo ut moveatur deorsum, et hoc est contra naturam. Alio modo, per actionem illius agentis a quo dependet actio naturalis. Et hoc non est contra naturam, ut patet in fluxu et refluxu maris, qui non est contra naturam, quamvis sit praeter motum naturalem aquae, quae movetur deorsum; est enim ex impressione caelestis corporis, a quo dependet naturalis inclinatio inferiorum corporum. Cum igitur naturae ordo sit a Deo rebus inditus, si quid praeter hunc ordinem faciat, non est contra naturam. Unde Augustinus dicit, XXVI Contra Faustum, quod id est cuique rei naturale, quod ille fecerit a quo est omnis modus, numerus et ordo naturae.

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tine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): God acts against the wonted course of nature, but by no means does He act against the supreme law; because He does not act against Himself. Reply Obj. 1: In natural things something may happen outside this natural order, in two ways. It may happen by the action of an agent which did not give them their natural inclination; as, for example, when a man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to him its natural inclination to move downwards; and that would be against nature. It may also happen by the action of the agent on whom the natural inclination depends; and this is not against nature, as is clear in the ebb and flow of the tide, which is not against nature; although it is against the natural movement of water in a downward direction; for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly body, on which the natural inclination of lower bodies depends. Therefore since the order of nature is given to things by God, if He does anything outside this order, it is not against nature. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): That is natural to each thing which is caused by Him from Whom is all mode, number, and order in nature. Reply Obj. 2: The order of justice arises by relation to the First Cause, Who is the rule of all justice; and therefore God can do nothing against such order.

Ad secundum dicendum quod ordo iustitiae est secundum relationem ad causam primam, quae est regula omnis iustitiae. Et ideo praeter hunc ordinem, Deus nihil facere potest. Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus sic rebus certum Reply Obj. 3: God fixed a certain order in things in ordinem indidit, ut tamen sibi reservaret quid ipse ali- such a way that at the same time He reserved to Himself quando aliter ex causa esset facturus. Unde cum praeter whatever he intended to do otherwise than by a particuhunc ordinem agit, non mutatur. lar cause. So when He acts outside this order, He does not change.

Article 7 Whether whatever God does outside the natural order is miraculous? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia quae Deus facit praeter ordinem naturalem rerum, sint miracula. Creatio enim mundi, et etiam animarum, et iustificatio impii fiunt a Deo praeter ordinem naturalem, non enim fiunt per actionem alicuius causae naturalis. Et tamen haec miracula non dicuntur. Ergo non omnia quae facit Deus praeter ordinem naturalem rerum, sunt miracula. Praeterea, miraculum dicitur aliquid arduum et insolitum supra facultatem naturae et spem admirantis proveniens. Sed quaedam fiunt praeter naturae ordinem, quae tamen non sunt ardua, sunt enim in minimis rebus, sicut in restauratione gemmarum, vel sanatione aegrorum. Nec etiam sunt insolita, cum frequenter eveniant, sicut cum infirmi in plateis ponebantur ut ad umbram Petri sanarentur. Nec etiam sunt supra facultatem naturae, ut cum aliqui sanantur a febribus. Nec etiam supra spem, sicut resurrectionem mortuorum omnes spe-

Objection 1: It would seem that not everything which God does outside the natural order of things, is miraculous. For the creation of the world, and of souls, and the justification of the unrighteous, are done by God outside the natural order; as not being accomplished by the action of any natural cause. Yet these things are not called miracles. Therefore not everything that God does outside the natural order is a miracle. Obj. 2: Further, a miracle is something difficult, which seldom occurs, surpassing the faculty of nature, and going so far beyond our hopes as to compel our astonishment. But some things outside the order of nature are not arduous; for they occur in small things, such as the recovery and healing of the sick. Nor are they of rare occurrence, since they happen frequently; as when the sick were placed in the streets, to be healed by the shadow of Peter (Acts 5:15). Nor do they surpass the faculty of nature; as when people are cured of a fever. Nor are they beyond our hopes, since we all hope for

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ramus, quae tamen fiet praeter ordinem naturae. Ergo non omnia quae fiunt praeter naturae ordinem, sunt miracula. Praeterea, miraculi nomen ab admiratione sumitur. Sed admiratio est de rebus sensui manifestis. Sed quandoque aliqua accidunt praeter ordinem naturalem in rebus sensui non manifestis, sicut cum apostoli facti sunt scientes, neque invenientes neque discentes. Ergo non omnia quae fiunt praeter ordinem naturae, sunt miracula. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XXVI Contra Faustum, quod cum Deus aliquid facit contra cognitum nobis cursum solitumque naturae, magnalia, vel mirabilia nominantur. Respondeo dicendum quod nomen miraculi ab admiratione sumitur. Admiratio autem consurgit, cum effectus sunt manifesti et causa occulta; sicut aliquis admiratur cum videt eclipsim solis et ignorat causam, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Potest autem causa effectus alicuius apparentis alicui esse nota, quae tamen est aliis incognita. Unde aliquid est mirum uni, quod non est mirum aliis; sicut eclipsim solis miratur rusticus, non autem astrologus. Miraculum autem dicitur quasi admiratione plenum, quod scilicet habet causam simpliciter et omnibus occultam. Haec autem est Deus. Unde illa quae a Deo fiunt praeter causas nobis notas, miracula dicuntur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod creatio, et iustificatio impii, etsi a solo Deo fiant, non tamen, proprie loquendo, miracula dicuntur. Quia non sunt nata fieri per alias causas, et ita non contingunt praeter ordinem naturae, cum haec ad ordinem naturae non pertineant. Ad secundum dicendum quod arduum dicitur miraculum, non propter dignitatem rei in qua fit; sed quia excedit facultatem naturae. Similiter etiam insolitum dicitur, non quia frequenter non eveniat sed quia est praeter naturalem consuetudinem. Supra facultatem autem naturae dicitur aliquid, non solum propter substantiam facti sed etiam propter modum et ordinem faciendi. Supra spem etiam naturae miraculum esse dicitur; non supra spem gratiae, quae est ex fide, per quam credimus resurrectionem futuram.

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the resurrection of the dead, which nevertheless will be outside the course of nature. Therefore not all things are outside the course of nature are miraculous. Obj. 3: Further, the word miracle is derived from admiration. Now admiration concerns things manifest to the senses. But sometimes things happen outside the order of nature, which are not manifest to the senses; as when the Apostles were endowed with knowledge without studying or being taught. Therefore not everything that occurs outside the order of nature is miraculous. On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): Where God does anything against that order of nature which we know and are accustomed to observe, we call it a miracle. I answer that, The word miracle is derived from admiration, which arises when an effect is manifest, whereas its cause is hidden; as when a man sees an eclipse without knowing its cause, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of his Metaphysics. Now the cause of a manifest effect may be known to one, but unknown to others. Wherefore a thing is wonderful to one man, and not at all to others: as an eclipse is to a rustic, but not to an astronomer. Now a miracle is so called as being full of wonder, as having a cause absolutely hidden from all: and this cause is God. Wherefore those things which God does outside those causes which we know, are called miracles.

Reply Obj. 1: Creation, and the justification of the unrighteous, though done by God alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles, because they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do not belong to that order. Reply Obj. 2: An arduous thing is called a miracle, not on account of the excellence of the thing wherein it is done, but because it surpasses the faculty of nature: likewise a thing is called unusual, not because it does not often happen, but because it is outside the usual natural course of things. Furthermore, a thing is said to be above the faculty of nature, not only by reason of the substance of the thing done, but also on account of the manner and order in which it is done. Again, a miracle is said to go beyond the hope of nature, not above the hope of grace, which hope comes from faith, whereby we believe in the future resurrection. Ad tertium dicendum quod scientia apostolorum, Reply Obj. 3: The knowledge of the Apostles, although quamvis secundum se non fuerit manifesta, manifesta- not manifest in itself, yet was made manifest in its effect, batur tamen in effectibus, ex quibus mirabilis apparebat. from which it was shown to be wonderful.

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Article 8 Whether one miracle is greater than another? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unum miraculum non sit maius alio. Dicit enim Augustinus, in Epistola ad Volusianum: In rebus mirabiliter factis tota ratio facti est potentia facientis. Sed eadem potentia, scilicet Dei, fiunt omnia miracula. Ergo unum non est maius alio. Praeterea, potentia Dei est infinita. Sed infinitum improportionabiliter excedit omne finitum. Ergo non magis est mirandum quod faciat hunc effectum, quam illum. Ergo unum miraculum non est maius altero.

Objection 1: It would seem that one miracle is not greater than another. For Augustine says (Epist. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): In miraculous deeds, the whole measure of the deed is the power of the doer. But by the same power of God all miracles are done. Therefore one miracle is not greater than another. Obj. 2: Further, the power of God is infinite. But the infinite exceeds the finite beyond all proportion; and therefore no more reason exists to wonder at one effect thereof than at another. Therefore one miracle is not greater than another. On the contrary, The Lord says, speaking of miraculous works (John 14:12): The works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than these shall he do. I answer that, Nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the Divine Power; because no action is of any account compared with the power of God, according to Isa. 40:15: Behold the Gentiles are as a drop from a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance. But a thing is called a miracle by comparison with the power of nature which it surpasses. So the more the power of nature is surpassed, the greater the miracle. Now the power of nature is surpassed in three ways: first, in the substance of the deed, for instance, if two bodies occupy the same place, or if the sun goes backwards; or if a human body is glorified: such things nature is absolutely unable to do; and these hold the highest rank among miracles. Second, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not in the deed, but in that wherein it is done; as the raising of the dead, and giving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature can give life, but not to the dead; and such hold the second rank in miracles. Third, a thing surpasses nature’s power in the measure and order in which it is done; as when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without treatment or the usual process of nature; or as when the air is suddenly condensed into rain, by Divine power without a natural cause, as occurred at the prayers of Samuel and Elias; and these hold the lowest place in miracles. Moreover, each of these kinds has various degrees, according to the different ways in which the power of nature is surpassed.

Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. XIV, de operibus miraculosis loquens, opera quae ego facio, et ipse faciet, et maiora horum faciet. Respondeo dicendum quod nihil potest dici miraculum ex comparatione potentiae divinae, quia quodcumque factum, divinae potentiae comparatum, est minimum; secundum illud Isaiae XL, ecce gentes quasi stilla situlae, et quasi momentum staterae reputatae sunt. Sed dicitur aliquid miraculum per comparationem ad facultatem naturae, quam excedit. Et ideo secundum quod magis excedit facultatem naturae, secundum hoc maius miraculum dicitur. Excedit autem aliquid facultatem naturae tripliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad substantiam facti, sicut quod duo corpora sint simul, vel quod sol retrocedat, aut quod corpus humanum glorificetur; quod nullo modo natura facere potest. Et ista tenent summum gradum in miraculis. Secundo aliquid excedit facultatem naturae, non quantum ad id quod fit, sed quantum ad id in quo fit, sicut resuscitatio mortuorum, et illuminatio caecorum, et similia. Potest enim natura causare vitam, sed non in mortuo, et potest praestare visum, sed non caeco. Et haec tenent secundum locum in miraculis. Tertio modo excedit aliquid facultatem naturae, quantum ad modum et ordinem faciendi, sicut cum aliquis subito per virtutem divinam a febre curatur absque curatione et consueto processu naturae in talibus, et cum statim aer divina virtute in pluvias densatur absque naturalibus causis, sicut factum est ad preces Samuelis et Eliae. Et huiusmodi tenent infimum locum in miraculis. Quaelibet tamen horum habent diversos gradus, secundum quod diversimode excedunt facultatem naturae. Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta, quae procedunt From this is clear how to reply to the objections, arguex parte divinae potentiae. ing as they do from the Divine power.

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Question 106 How One Creature Moves Another Deinde considerandum est quomodo una creatura moveat aliam. Erit autem haec consideratio tripartita, ut primo consideremus quomodo angeli moveant, qui sunt creaturae pure spirituales; secundo, quomodo corpora moveant; tertio, quomodo homines, qui sunt ex spirituali et corporali natura compositi. Circa primum tria consideranda occurrunt, primo, quomodo angelus agat in angelum; secundo, quomodo in creaturam corporalem; tertio, quomodo in homines.

We next consider how one creature moves another. This consideration will be threefold: (1) How the angels move, who are purely spiritual creatures; (2) How bodies move; (3) How man moves, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature.

Concerning the first point, there are three things to be considered: (1) How an angel acts on an angel; (2) How an angel acts on a corporeal nature; (3) How an angel acts on man. Circa primum, considerare oportet de illuminatione, The first of these raises the question of the enlightenet locutione angelorum, et ordinatione eorum ad invi- ment and speech of the angels; and of their mutual coordicem, tam bonorum, quam malorum. nation, both of the good and of the bad angels. Circa illuminationem quaeruntur quatuor. Concerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum unus angelus moveat intellectum (1) Whether one angel moves the intellect of another alterius illuminando. by enlightenment? Secundo, utrum unus moveat voluntatem alterius. (2) Whether one angel moves the will of another? Tertio, utrum inferior angelus possit illuminare (3) Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior superiorem. angel? Quarto, utrum superior angelus illuminet (4) Whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior inferiorem de omnibus quae cognoscit. angel in all that he knows himself?

Article 1 Whether one angel enlightens another? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus angelus non illuminet alium. Angeli enim eandem beatitudinem possident nunc, quam nos in futuro expectamus. Sed tunc unus homo non illuminabit alium; secundum illud Ierem. XXXI, non docebit ultra vir proximum suum, et vir fratrem suum. Ergo etiam neque nunc unus angelus illuminat alium. Praeterea, triplex est lumen in angelis, naturae, gratiae et gloriae. Sed angelus illuminatur lumine naturae, a creante; lumine gratiae, a iustificante; lumine gloriae, a beatificante; quod totum Dei est. Ergo unus angelus non illuminat alium.

Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not enlighten another. For the angels possess now the same beatitude which we hope to obtain. But one man will not then enlighten another, according to Jer. 31:34: They shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother. Therefore neither does an angel enlighten another now. Obj. 2: Further, light in the angels is threefold; of nature, of grace, and of glory. But an angel is enlightened in the light of nature by the Creator; in the light of grace by the Justifier; in the light of glory by the Beatifier; all of which comes from God. Therefore one angel does not enlighten another. Praeterea, lumen est forma quaedam mentis. Sed Obj. 3: Further, light is a form in the mind. But the ramens rationalis a solo Deo formatur, nulla interposita tional mind is informed by God alone, without created intercreatura, ut Augustinus dicit in libro Octoginta trium vention, as Augustine says (83 Questions, Q. 51). Therefore Quaest. Ergo unus angelus non illuminat mentem alte- one angel does not enlighten the mind of another.

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Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, VIII cap. Cael. Hier., quod angeli secundae hierarchiae purgantur et illuminantur et perficiuntur per angelos primae hierarchiae. Respondeo dicendum quod unus angelus illuminat alium. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod lumen, secundum quod ad intellectum pertinet, nihil est aliud quam quaedam manifestatio veritatis; secundum illud ad Ephes. V, omne quod manifestatur, lumen est. Unde illuminare nihil aliud est quam manifestationem cognitae veritatis alteri tradere; secundum quem modum apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. III, mihi, omnium sanctorum minimo, data est gratia haec, illuminare omnes quae sit dispensatio sacramenti absconditi a saeculis in Deo. Sic igitur unus angelus dicitur illuminare alium, inquantum ei manifestat veritatem quam ipse cognoscit. Unde Dionysius dicit, VII cap. Cael. Hier., quod theologi plane monstrant caelestium substantiarum ornatus a supremis mentibus doceri deificas scientias. Cum autem ad intelligendum duo concurrant, ut supra diximus, scilicet virtus intellectiva, et similitudo rei intellectae; secundum haec duo unus angelus alteri veritatem notam notificare potest. Primo quidem, fortificando virtutem intellectivam eius. Sicut enim virtus imperfectioris corporis confortatur ex situali propinquitate perfectioris corporis, ut minus calidum crescit in calore ex praesentia magis calidi; ita virtus intellectiva inferioris angeli confortatur ex conversione superioris angeli ad ipsum. Hoc enim facit in spiritualibus ordo conversionis, quod facit in corporalibus ordo localis propinquitatis. Secundo autem unus angelus alteri manifestat veritatem, ex parte similitudinis intellectae. Superior enim angelus notitiam veritatis accipit in universali quadam conceptione, ad quam capiendam inferioris angeli intellectus non esset sufficiens, sed est ei connaturale ut magis particulariter veritatem accipiat. Superior ergo angelus veritatem quam universaliter concipit, quodammodo distinguit, ut ab inferiori capi possit; et sic eam cognoscendam illi proponit. Sicut etiam apud nos, doctores, quod in summa capiunt, multipliciter distinguunt, providentes capacitati aliorum. Et hoc est quod Dionysius dicit, XV cap. Cael. Hier.: Unaquaeque substantia intellectualis datam sibi a diviniore uniformem intelligentiam, provida virtute dividit et multiplicat, ad inferioris sursum ductricem analogiam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes angeli, tam superiores quam inferiores, immediate vident Dei essentiam; et quantum ad hoc, unus non docet alium. De hac enim doctrina propheta loquitur, unde dicit non docebit vir fratrem suum, dicens, cognosce dominum. Omnes enim cognoscent me, a minimo eorum usque ad maximum. Sed rationes divinorum operum, quae in Deo cognoscuntur sicut in causa, omnes quidem Deus in seip-

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On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the angels of the second hierarchy are cleansed, enlightened and perfected by the angels of the first hierarchy. I answer that, One angel enlightens another. To make this clear, we must observe that intellectual light is nothing else than a manifestation of truth, according to Eph. 5:13: All that is made manifest is light. Hence to enlighten means nothing else but to communicate to others the manifestation of the known truth; according to the Apostle (Eph 3:8): To me the least of all the saints is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in God. Therefore one angel is said to enlighten another by manifesting the truth which he knows himself. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): Theologians plainly show that the orders of the heavenly beings are taught Divine science by the higher minds. Now since two things concur in the intellectual operation, as we have said (Q. 105, A. 3), namely, the intellectual power, and the likeness of the thing understood; in both of these one angel can notify the known truth to another. First, by strengthening his intellectual power; for just as the power of an imperfect body is strengthened by the neighborhood of a more perfect body—for instance, the less hot is made hotter by the presence of what is hotter; so the intellectual power of an inferior angel is strengthened by the superior angel turning to him: since in spiritual things, for one thing to turn to another, corresponds to neighborhood in corporeal things. Second, one angel manifests the truth to another as regards the likeness of the thing understood. For the superior angel receives the knowledge of truth by a kind of universal conception, to receive which the inferior angel’s intellect is not sufficiently powerful, for it is natural to him to receive truth in a more particular manner. Therefore the superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth which he conceives universally, so that it can be grasped by the inferior angel; and thus he proposes it to his knowledge. Thus it is with us that the teacher, in order to adapt himself to others, divides into many points the knowledge which he possesses in the universal. This is thus expressed by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xv): Every intellectual substance with provident power divides and multiplies the uniform knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as to lead its inferiors upwards by analogy. Reply Obj. 1: All the angels, both inferior and superior, see the Essence of God immediately, and in this respect one does not teach another. It is of this truth that the prophet speaks; wherefore he adds: They shall teach no more every man his brother, saying: ‘Know the Lord’: for all shall know Me, from the least of them even to the greatest. But all the types of the Divine works, which are known in God as in their cause, God knows in Himself, because He compre-

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so cognoscit, quia seipsum comprehendit, aliorum vero Deum videntium tanto unusquisque in Deo plures rationes cognoscit, quanto eum perfectius videt. Unde superior angelus plura in Deo de rationibus divinorum operum cognoscit quam inferior; et de his eum illuminat. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod angeli existentium illuminantur rationibus. Ad secundum dicendum quod unus angelus non illuminat alium tradendo ei lumen naturae vel gratiae vel gloriae; sed confortando lumen naturale ipsius, et manifestando ei veritatem de his quae pertinent ad statum naturae, gratiae et gloriae, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod rationalis mens formatur immediate a Deo, vel sicut imago ab exemplari, quia non est facta ad alterius imaginem quam Dei, vel sicut subiectum ab ultima forma completiva, quia semper mens creata reputatur informis, nisi ipsi primae veritati inhaereat. Aliae vero illuminationes, quae sunt ab homine vel angelo, sunt quasi dispositiones ad ultimam formam.

Q. 106, A. 2

hends Himself; but of others who see God, each one knows the more types, the more perfectly he sees God. Hence a superior angel knows more about the types of the Divine works than an inferior angel, and concerning these the former enlightens the latter; and as to this Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the angels are enlightened by the types of existing things. Reply Obj. 2: An angel does not enlighten another by giving him the light of nature, grace, or glory; but by strengthening his natural light, and by manifesting to him the truth concerning the state of nature, of grace, and of glory, as explained above. Reply Obj. 3: The rational mind is formed immediately by God, either as the image from the exemplar, forasmuch as it is made to the image of God alone; or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form: for the created mind is always considered to be unformed, except it adhere to the first truth; while the other kinds of enlightenment that proceed from man or angel, are, as it were, dispositions to this ultimate form.

Article 2 Whether one angel moves another angel’s will? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus angelus possit movere voluntatem alterius. Quia secundum Dionysium, sicut unus angelus illuminat alium, ita purgat et perficit; ut patet ex auctoritate supra inducta. Sed purgatio et perfectio videntur pertinere ad voluntatem, nam purgatio videtur esse a sordibus culpae, quae pertinet ad voluntatem; perfectio autem videtur esse per consecutionem finis, qui est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo unus angelus potest movere voluntatem alterius. Praeterea, sicut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier., nomina angelorum designant eorum proprietates. Seraphim autem incendentes dicuntur, aut calefacientes, quod est per amorem, qui ad voluntatem pertinet. Unus ergo angelus movet voluntatem alterius. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III de Anima, quod appetitus superior movet appetitum inferiorem. Sed sicut intellectus angeli superioris superior est, ita etiam appetitus. Ergo videtur quod superior angelus possit immutare voluntatem alterius. Sed contra, eius est immutare voluntatem, cuius est iustificare, cum iustitia sit rectitudo voluntatis. Sed solus Deus est qui iustificat. Ergo unus angelus non potest mutare voluntatem alterius.

Objection 1: It would seem that one angel can move another angel’s will. Because, according to Dionysius quoted above (A. 1), as one angel enlightens another, so does he cleanse and perfect another. But cleansing and perfecting seem to belong to the will: for the former seems to point to the stain of sin which appertains to will; while to be perfected is to obtain an end, which is the object of the will. Therefore an angel can move another angel’s will.

Obj. 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): The names of the angels designate their properties. Now the Seraphim are so called because they kindle or give heat: and this is by love which belongs to the will. Therefore one angel moves another angel’s will. Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite moves the lower. But as the intellect of the superior angel is higher, so also is his will. It seems, therefore, that the superior angel can change the will of another angel. On the contrary, To him it belongs to change the will, to whom it belongs to bestow righteousness: for righteousness is the rightness of the will. But God alone bestows righteousness. Therefore one angel cannot change another angel’s will. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, I answer that, As was said above (Q. 105, A. 4), the voluntas immutatur dupliciter, uno modo, ex parte ob- will is changed in two ways; on the part of the object, and iecti; alio modo ex parte ipsius potentiae. Ex parte qui- on the part of the power. On the part of the object, both the

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dem obiecti, movet voluntatem et ipsum bonum quod est voluntatis obiectum, sicut appetibile movet appetitum; et ille qui demonstrat obiectum, puta qui demonstrat aliquid esse bonum. Sed sicut supra dictum est, alia quidem bona aliqualiter inclinant voluntatem; sed nihil sufficienter movet voluntatem, nisi bonum universale, quod est Deus. Et hoc bonum solus ipse ostendit, ut per essentiam videatur a beatis, qui dicenti Moysi, ostende mihi gloriam tuam, respondit, ego ostendam tibi omne bonum, ut habetur Exod. XXXIII. Angelus ergo non sufficienter movet voluntatem, neque ut obiectum, neque ut ostendens obiectum. Sed inclinat eam, ut amabile quoddam, et ut manifestans aliqua bona creata ordinata in Dei bonitatem. Et per hoc inclinare potest ad amorem creaturae vel Dei, per modum suadentis. Ex parte vero ipsius potentiae, voluntas nullo modo potest moveri nisi a Deo. Operatio enim voluntatis est inclinatio quaedam volentis in volitum. Hanc autem inclinationem solus ille immutare potest, qui virtutem volendi creaturae contulit, sicut et naturalem inclinationem solum illud agens potest mutare, quod potest dare virtutem quam consequitur inclinatio naturalis. Solus autem Deus est qui potentiam volendi tribuit creaturae, quia ipse solus est auctor intellectualis naturae. Unde unus angelus voluntatem alterius movere non potest. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod secundum modum illuminationis, est accipienda et purgatio et perfectio. Et quia Deus illuminat immutando intellectum et voluntatem, purgat a defectibus intellectus et voluntatis, et perficit in finem intellectus et voluntatis. Angeli autem illuminatio refertur ad intellectum, ut dictum est. Et ideo etiam purgatio angeli intelligitur a defectu intellectus, qui est nescientia; perfectio autem est consummatio in finem intellectus, qui est veritas cognita. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius, VI cap. Eccl. Hier., quod in caelesti hierarchia purgatio est in subiectis essentiis tanquam ignotorum illuminatio in perfectiorem eas scientiam ducens. Sicut si dicamus visum corporalem purgari, inquantum removentur tenebrae; illuminari vero, inquantum perfunditur lumine; perfici vero, secundum quod perducitur ad cognitionem colorati.

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good itself which is the object of the will, moves the will, as the appetible moves the appetite; and he who points out the object, as, for instance, one who proves something to be good. But as we have said above (Q. 105, A. 4), other goods in a measure incline the will, yet nothing sufficiently moves the will save the universal good, and that is God. And this good He alone shows, that it may be seen by the blessed, Who, when Moses asked: Show me Thy glory, answered: I will show thee all good (Exod 33:18, 19). Therefore an angel does not move the will sufficiently, either as the object or as showing the object. But he inclines the will as something lovable, and as manifesting some created good ordered to God’s goodness. And thus he can incline the will to the love of the creature or of God, by way of persuasion.

But on the part of the power, the will cannot be moved at all save by God. For the operation of the will is a certain inclination of the willer to the thing willed. And He alone can change this inclination, Who bestowed on the creature the power to will: just as that agent alone can change the natural inclination, which can give the power to which follows that natural inclination. Now God alone gave to the creature the power to will, because He alone is the author of the intellectual nature. Therefore an angel cannot move another angel’s will. Reply Obj. 1: Cleansing and perfecting are to be understood according to the mode of enlightenment. And since God enlightens by changing the intellect and will, He cleanses by removing defects of intellect and will, and perfects unto the end of the intellect and will. But the enlightenment caused by an angel concerns the intellect, as explained above (A. 1); therefore an angel is to be understood as cleansing from the defect of nescience in the intellect; and as perfecting unto the consummate end of the intellect, and this is the knowledge of truth. Thus Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi): that in the heavenly hierarchy the chastening of the inferior essence is an enlightening of things unknown, that leads them to more perfect knowledge. For instance, we might say that corporeal sight is cleansed by the removal of darkness; enlightened by the diffusion of light; and perfected by being brought to the perception of the colored object. Ad secundum dicendum quod unus angelus potest Reply Obj. 2: One angel can induce another to love inducere alium ad amorem Dei per modum persuaden- God by persuasion as explained above.

tis, ut supra dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de appetitu inferiori sensitivo, qui potest moveri a superiori intellectivo, quia pertinet ad eandem naturam animae, et quia inferior appetitus est virtus in organo corporali. Quod in angelis locum non habet.

Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher speaks of the lower sensitive appetite which can be moved by the superior intellectual appetite, because it belongs to the same nature of the soul, and because the inferior appetite is a power in a corporeal organ. But this does not apply to the angels.

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Q. 106, A. 3

Article 3 Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus inferior superiorem illuminare possit. Ecclesiastica enim hierarchia derivata est a caelesti, et eam repraesentat, unde et superna Ierusalem dicitur mater nostra, Gal. IV. Sed in Ecclesia etiam superiores illuminantur ab inferioribus et docentur; secundum illud apostoli, I ad Cor. XIV, potestis omnes per singulos prophetare, ut omnes discant, et omnes exhortentur. Ergo et in caelesti hierarchia superiores ab inferioribus possunt illuminari. Praeterea, sicut ordo corporalium substantiarum dependet ex Dei voluntate, ita et ordo substantiarum spiritualium. Sed sicut dictum est, Deus quandoque praeter ordinem substantiarum corporalium operatur. Ergo quandoque etiam operatur praeter ordinem spiritualium substantiarum, illuminando inferiores non per medios superiores. Sic ergo inferiores illuminati a Deo, possunt superiores illuminare. Praeterea, unus angelus alium illuminat, ad quem se convertit, ut supra dictum est. Sed cum ista conversio sit voluntaria, potest supremus angelus ad infimum se convertere, mediis praetermissis. Ergo potest eum immediate illuminare, et ita potest illuminare superiores.

Objection 1: It would seem that an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel. For the ecclesiastical hierarchy is derived from, and represents the heavenly hierarchy; and hence the heavenly Jerusalem is called our mother (Gal 4:26). But in the Church even superiors are enlightened and taught by their inferiors, as the Apostle says (1 Cor 14:31): You may all prophesy one by one, that all may learn and all may be exhorted. Therefore, likewise in the heavenly hierarchy, the superiors can be enlightened by inferiors. Obj. 2: Further, as the order of corporeal substances depends on the will of God, so also does the order of spiritual substances. But, as was said above (Q. 105, A. 6), God sometimes acts outside the order of corporeal substances. Therefore He also sometimes acts outside the order of spiritual substances, by enlightening inferiors otherwise than through their superiors. Therefore in that way the inferiors enlightened by God can enlighten superiors. Obj. 3: Further, one angel enlightens the other to whom he turns, as was above explained (A. 1). But since this turning to another is voluntary, the highest angel can turn to the lowest passing over the others. Therefore he can enlighten him immediately; and thus the latter can enlighten his superiors. On the contrary, Dionysius says that this is the Divine unalterable law, that inferior things are led to God by the superior (Coel. Hier. iv; Eccl. Hier. v). I answer that, The inferior angels never enlighten the superior, but are always enlightened by them. The reason is, because, as above explained (Q. 105, A. 6), one order is under another, as cause is under cause; and hence as cause is ordered to cause, so is order to order. Therefore there is no incongruity if sometimes anything is done outside the order of the inferior cause, to be ordered to the superior cause, as in human affairs the command of the president is passed over from obedience to the prince. So it happens that God works miraculously outside the order of corporeal nature, that men may be ordered to the knowledge of Him. But the passing over of the order that belongs to spiritual substances in no way belongs to the ordering of men to God; since the angelic operations are not made known to us; as are the operations of sensible bodies. Thus the order which belongs to spiritual substances is never passed over by God; so that the inferiors are always moved by the superior, and not conversely.

Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit hanc legem esse divinitatis immobiliter firmatam, ut inferiora reducantur in Deum per superiora. Respondeo dicendum quod inferiores angeli nunquam illuminant superiores, sed semper ab eis illuminantur. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut supra dictum est, ordo continetur sub ordine, sicut causa continetur sub causa. Unde sicut ordinatur causa ad causam, ita ordo ad ordinem. Et ideo non est inconveniens, si aliquando aliquid fiat praeter ordinem inferioris causae, ad ordinandum in superiorem causam, sicut in rebus humanis praetermittitur mandatum praesidis, ut obediatur principi. Et ita contingit ut praeter ordinem naturae corporalis, aliquid Deus miraculose operetur, ad ordinandum homines in eius cognitionem. Sed praetermissio ordinis qui debetur spiritualibus substantiis, in nullo pertinet ad ordinationem hominum in Deum, cum operationes angelorum non sint nobis manifestae, sicut operationes visibilium corporum. Et ideo ordo qui convenit spiritualibus substantiis, nunquam a Deo praetermittitur, quin semper inferiora moveantur per superiora, et non e converso. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ecclesiastica hieReply Obj. 1: The ecclesiastical hierarchy imitates the rarchia imitatur caelestem aliqualiter, sed non perfecte heavenly in some degree, but not by a perfect likeness. For consequitur eius similitudinem. In caelesti enim hierar- in the heavenly hierarchy the perfection of the order is in chia tota ratio ordinis est ex propinquitate ad Deum. Et proportion to its nearness to God; so that those who are

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ideo illi qui sunt Deo propinquiores, sunt et gradu sublimiores, et scientia clariores, et propter hoc superiores nunquam ab inferioribus illuminantur. Sed in ecclesiastica hierarchia, interdum qui sunt Deo per sanctitatem propinquiores, sunt gradu infimi, et scientia non eminentes, et quidam in uno etiam secundum scientiam eminent, et in alio deficiunt. Et propter hoc superiores ab inferioribus doceri possunt. Ad secundum dicendum quod non est similis ratio de hoc quod Deus agat praeter ordinem naturae corporalis, et naturae spiritualis, ut dictum est. Unde ratio non sequitur. Ad tertium dicendum quod angelus voluntate convertitur ad alium angelum illuminandum; sed voluntas angeli semper regulatur lege divina, quae ordinem in angelis instituit.

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the nearer to God are the more sublime in grade, and more clear in knowledge; and on that account the superiors are never enlightened by the inferiors, whereas in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, sometimes those who are the nearer to God in sanctity, are in the lowest grade, and are not conspicuous for science; and some also are eminent in one kind of science, and fail in another; and on that account superiors may be taught by inferiors. Reply Obj. 2: As above explained, there is no similarity between what God does outside the order of corporeal nature, and that of spiritual nature. Hence the argument does not hold. Reply Obj. 3: An angel turns voluntarily to enlighten another angel, but the angel’s will is ever regulated by the Divine law which made the order in the angels.

Article 4 Whether the superior angel enlightens the inferior as regards all he himself knows? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus superior non illuminet inferiorem de omnibus quae ipse novit. Dicit enim Dionysius, XII cap. Cael. Hier., quod angeli superiores habent scientiam magis universalem, inferiores vero magis particularem et subiectam. Sed plura continentur sub scientia universali quam sub particulari. Ergo non omnia quae sciunt superiores angeli, cognoscunt inferiores per superiorum illuminationem. Praeterea, Magister dicit, in XI distinctione II Sent., quod superiores angeli cognoverunt a saeculis mysterium incarnationis, inferioribus vero ignotum fuit usquequo completum est. Quod videtur per hoc quod, quibusdam angelis quaerentibus, quis est iste rex gloriae? Quasi ignorantibus, alii respondent, quasi scientes, Dominus virtutum ipse est rex gloriae, ut Dionysius exponit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Hoc autem non esset, si superiores angeli illuminarent inferiores de omnibus quae ipsi cognoscunt. Non ergo eos illuminant de omnibus sibi notis. Praeterea, si omnia superiores angeli inferioribus annuntiant quae cognoscunt, nihil inferioribus ignotum remanet, quod superiores cognoscant. Non ergo de cetero superiores poterunt illuminare inferiores. Quod videtur inconveniens. Non ergo superiores de omnibus inferiores illuminant. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, quod in illa caelesti patria, licet quaedam data sint excellenter, nihil tamen possidetur singulariter. Et Dionysius dicit, XV cap.

Objection 1: It would seem that the superior angel does not enlighten the inferior concerning all he himself knows. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii) that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge; and the inferior a more particular and individual knowledge. But more is contained under a universal knowledge than under a particular knowledge. Therefore not all that the superior angels know, is known by the inferior, through these being enlightened by the former. Obj. 2: Further, the Master of the Sentences (ii, D, 11) says that the superior angels had long known the Mystery of the Incarnation, whereas the inferior angels did not know it until it was accomplished. Thus we find that on some of the angels inquiring, as it were, in ignorance: Who is this King of glory? other angels, who knew, answered: The Lord of Hosts, He is the King of glory, as Dionysius expounds (Coel. Hier. vii). But this would not apply if the superior angels enlightened the inferior concerning all they know themselves. Therefore they do not do so. Obj. 3: Further, if the superior angels enlighten the inferior about all they know, nothing that the superior angels know would be unknown to the inferior angels. Therefore the superior angels could communicate nothing more to the inferior; which appears open to objection. Therefore the superior angels enlighten the inferior in all things. On the contrary, Gregory says: In that heavenly country, though there are some excellent gifts, yet nothing is held individually. And Dionysius says: Each heavenly

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Cael. Hier., quod unaquaeque caelestis essentia intelligentiam sibi a superiori datam, inferiori communicat; ut patet ex auctoritate supra inducta. Respondeo dicendum quod omnes creaturae ex divina bonitate participant ut bonum quod habent, in alia diffundant, nam de ratione boni est quod se aliis communicet. Et inde est etiam quod agentia corporalia similitudinem suam aliis tradunt, quantum possibile est. Quanto igitur aliqua agentia magis in participatione divinae bonitatis constituuntur, tanto magis perfectiones suas nituntur in alios transfundere, quantum possibile est. Unde beatus Petrus monet eos qui divinam bonitatem per gratiam participant, dicens, I Petr. IV, unusquisque, sicut accepit gratiam, in alterutrum illam administrantes, sicut boni dispensatores multiformis gratiae Dei. Multo igitur magis sancti angeli, qui sunt in plenissima participatione divinae bonitatis, quidquid a Deo percipiunt, subiectis impartiuntur. Non tamen recipitur ab inferioribus ita excellenter sicut est in superioribus. Et ideo superiores semper remanent in altiori ordine, et perfectiorem scientiam habentes. Sicut unam et eandem rem plenius intelligit magister, quam discipulus qui ab eo addiscit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod superiorum angelorum scientia dicitur esse universalior, quantum ad eminentiorem modum intelligendi. Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum Magistri non sic est intelligendum, quod inferiores angeli penitus ignoraverint mysterium incarnationis; sed quia non ita plene cognoverunt sicut superiores, et in eius cognitione postmodum profecerunt, dum illud mysterium impleretur. Ad tertium dicendum quod, usque ad diem iudicii, semper nova aliqua supremis angelis revelantur divinitus de his quae pertinent ad dispositionem mundi, et praecipue ad salutem electorum. Unde semper remanet unde superiores angeli inferiores illuminent.

Q. 106, A. 4

essence communicates to the inferior the gift derived from the superior (Coel. Hier. xv), as quoted above (A. 1). I answer that, Every creature participates in the Divine goodness, so as to diffuse the good it possesses to others; for it is of the nature of good to communicate itself to others. Hence also corporeal agents give their likeness to others so far as they can. So the more an agent is established in the share of the Divine goodness, so much the more does it strive to transmit its perfections to others as far as possible. Hence the Blessed Peter admonishes those who by grace share in the Divine goodness; saying: As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another; as good stewards of the manifold grace of God (1 Pet 4:10). Much more therefore do the holy angels, who enjoy the plenitude of participation of the Divine goodness, impart the same to those below them. Nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by the inferior as by the superior angels; and therefore the superior ever remain in a higher order, and have a more perfect knowledge; as the master understands the same thing better than the pupil who learns from him. Reply Obj. 1: The knowledge of the superior angels is said to be more universal as regards the more eminent mode of knowledge. Reply Obj. 2: The Master’s words are not to be understood as if the inferior angels were entirely ignorant of the Mystery of the Incarnation but that they did not know it as fully as the superior angels; and that they progressed in the knowledge of it afterwards when the Mystery was accomplished. Reply Obj. 3: Till the Judgment Day some new things are always being revealed by God to the highest angels, concerning the course of the world, and especially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is always something for the superior angels to make known to the inferior.

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Question 107 The Speech of the Angels Deinde considerandum est de locutionibus angeloWe next consider the speech of the angels. Here there rum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. are five points of inquiry: Primo, utrum unus angelus loquatur alii. (1) Whether one angel speaks to another? Secundo, utrum inferior superiori. (2) Whether the inferior speaks to the superior? Tertio, utrum angelus Deo. (3) Whether an angel speaks to God? Quarto, utrum in locutione angeli aliquid distantia (4) Whether the angelic speech is subject to local localis operetur. distance? Quinto, utrum locutionem unius angeli ad alterum (5) Whether all the speech of one angel to another is omnes cognoscant. known to all?

Article 1 Whether one angel speaks to another? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus angelus alteri non loquatur. Dicit enim Gregorius, XVIII Moral., quod in statu resurrectionis uniuscuiusque mentem ab alterius oculis membrorum corpulentia non abscondit. Multo igitur minus mens unius angeli absconditur ab altero. Sed locutio est ad manifestandum alteri quod latet in mente. Non igitur oportet quod unus angelus alteri loquatur. Praeterea, duplex est locutio, interior, per quam aliquis sibi ipsi loquitur; et exterior, per quam aliquis loquitur alteri. Exterior autem locutio fit per aliquod sensibile signum, puta voce vel nutu vel aliquo corporis membro, puta lingua vel digito, quae angelis competere non possunt. Ergo unus angelus alteri non loquitur. Praeterea, loquens excitat audientem ut attendat suae locutioni. Sed non videtur per quid unus angelus excitet alium ad attendendum, hoc enim fit apud nos aliquo sensibili signo. Ergo unus angelus non loquitur alteri. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Cor. XIII, si linguis hominum loquar et angelorum. Respondeo dicendum quod in angelis est aliqua locutio, sed, sicut dicit Gregorius II Moral., dignum est ut mens nostra, qualitatem corporeae locutionis excedens, ad sublimes atque incognitos modos locutionis intimae suspendatur. Ad intelligendum igitur qualiter unus angelus alii loquatur, considerandum est quod, sicut supra diximus cum de actibus et potentiis animae ageretur, voluntas movet intellectum ad suam operationem. Intelligibile autem est in intellectu tripliciter, primo quidem, habitualiter, vel secundum memoriam, ut Augustinus dicit;

Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not speak to another. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that, in the state of the resurrection each one’s body will not hide his mind from his fellows. Much less, therefore, is one angel’s mind hidden from another. But speech manifests to another what lies hidden in the mind. Therefore it is not necessary that one angel should speak to another. Obj. 2: Further, speech is twofold; interior, whereby one speaks to oneself; and exterior, whereby one speaks to another. But exterior speech takes place by some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or some bodily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and this cannot apply to the angels. Therefore one angel does not speak to another. Obj. 3: Further, the speaker incites the hearer to listen to what he says. But it does not appear that one angel incites another to listen; for this happens among us by some sensible sign. Therefore one angel does not speak to another. On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor 13:1): If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels. I answer that, The angels speak in a certain way. But, as Gregory says (Moral. ii): It is fitting that our mind, rising above the properties of bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and unknown methods of interior speech. To understand how one angel speaks to another, we must consider that, as we explained above (Q. 82, A. 4), when treating of the actions and powers of the soul, the will moves the intellect to its operation. Now an intelligible object is present to the intellect in three ways; first, habitually, or in the memory, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 6, 7); sec-

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Q. 107, A. 1

Government of Creatures

secundo autem, ut in actu consideratum vel conceptum; tertio, ut ad aliud relatum. Manifestum est autem quod de primo gradu in secundum transfertur intelligibile per imperium voluntatis, unde in definitione habitus dicitur, quo quis utitur cum voluerit. Similiter autem et de secundo gradu transfertur in tertium per voluntatem, nam per voluntatem conceptus mentis ordinatur ad alterum, puta vel ad agendum aliquid, vel ad manifestandum alteri. Quando autem mens convertit se ad actu considerandum quod habet in habitu, loquitur aliquis sibi ipsi, nam ipse conceptus mentis interius verbum vocatur. Ex hoc vero quod conceptus mentis angelicae ordinatur ad manifestandum alteri, per voluntatem ipsius angeli, conceptus mentis unius angeli innotescit alteri, et sic loquitur unus angelus alteri. Nihil est enim aliud loqui ad alterum, quam conceptum mentis alteri manifestare. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in nobis interior mentis conceptus quasi duplici obstaculo clauditur. Primo quidem, ipsa voluntate, quae conceptum intellectus potest retinere interius, vel ad extra ordinare. Et quantum ad hoc, mentem unius nullus alius potest videre nisi solus Deus; secundum illud I Cor. II, quae sunt hominis, nemo novit nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est. Secundo autem clauditur mens hominis ab alio homine per grossitiem corporis. Unde cum etiam voluntas ordinat conceptum mentis ad manifestandum alteri, non statim cognoscitur ab alio, sed oportet aliquod signum sensibile adhibere. Et hoc est quod Gregorius dicit, II Moral., alienis oculis intra secretum mentis, quasi post parietem corporis stamus, sed cum manifestare nosmetipsos cupimus, quasi per linguae ianuam egredimur, ut quales sumus intrinsecus, ostendamus. Hoc autem obstaculum non habet angelus. Et ideo quam cito vult manifestare suum conceptum, statim alius cognoscit. Ad secundum dicendum quod locutio exterior quae fit per vocem, est nobis necessaria propter obstaculum corporis. Unde non convenit angelo, sed sola locutio interior; ad quam pertinet non solum quod loquatur sibi interius concipiendo, sed etiam quod ordinet per voluntatem ad alterius manifestationem. Et sic lingua angelorum metaphorice dicitur ipsa virtus angeli, qua conceptum suum manifestat. Ad tertium dicendum quod, quantum ad angelos bonos, qui semper se invicem vident in verbo, non esset necessarium ponere aliquid excitativum, quia sicut unus semper videt alium, ita semper videt quidquid in eo est ad se ordinatum. Sed quia etiam in statu naturae conditae sibi invicem loqui poterant, et mali angeli etiam nunc sibi invicem loquuntur; dicendum est quod, sicut sensus movetur a sensibili, ita intellectus movetur ab intelligibili. Sicut ergo per signum sensibile excitatur sensus, ita per aliquam virtutem intelligibilem potest excitari mens angeli ad attendendum.

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ond, as actually considered or conceived; third, as related to something else. And it is clear that the intelligible object passes from the first to the second stage by the command of the will, and hence in the definition of habit these words occur, which anyone uses when he wills. So likewise the intelligible object passes from the second to the third stage by the will; for by the will the concept of the mind is ordered to something else, as, for instance, either to the performing of an action, or to being made known to another. Now when the mind turns itself to the actual consideration of any habitual knowledge, then a person speaks to himself; for the concept of the mind is called the interior word. And by the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is ordered to be made known to another by the will of the angel himself, the concept of one angel is made known to another; and in this way one angel speaks to another; for to speak to another only means to make known the mental concept to another. Reply Obj. 1: Our mental concept is hidden by a twofold obstacle. The first is in the will, which can retain the mental concept within, or can direct it externally. In this way God alone can see the mind of another, according to 1 Cor. 2:11: What man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him? The other obstacle whereby the mental concept is excluded from another one’s knowledge, comes from the body; and so it happens that even when the will directs the concept of the mind to make itself known, it is not at once make known to another; but some sensible sign must be used. Gregory alludes to this fact when he says (Moral. ii): To other eyes we seem to stand aloof as it were behind the wall of the body; and when we wish to make ourselves known, we go out as it were by the door of the tongue to show what we really are. But an angel is under no such obstacle, and so he can make his concept known to another at once. Reply Obj. 2: External speech, made by the voice, is a necessity for us on account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does not befit an angel; but only interior speech belongs to him, and this includes not only the interior speech by mental concept, but also its being ordered to another’s knowledge by the will. So the tongue of an angel is called metaphorically the angel’s power, whereby he manifests his mental concept. Reply Obj. 3: There is no need to draw the attention of the good angels, inasmuch as they always see each other in the Word; for as one ever sees the other, so he ever sees what is ordered to himself. But because by their very nature they can speak to each other, and even now the bad angels speak to each other, we must say that the intellect is moved by the intelligible object just as sense is affected by the sensible object. Therefore, as sense is aroused by the sensible object, so the mind of an angel can be aroused to attention by some intelligible power.

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Q. 107, A. 2

Article 2 Whether the inferior angel speaks to the superior? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inferior angelus superiori non loquatur. Quia super illud I Cor. XIII, si linguis hominum loquar et angelorum, dicit Glossa quod locutiones angelorum sunt illuminationes, quibus superiores illuminant inferiores. Sed inferiores nunquam illuminant superiores, ut supra dictum est. Ergo nec inferiores superioribus loquuntur. Praeterea, supra dictum est quod illuminare nihil est aliud quam illud quod est alicui manifestum, alteri manifestare. Sed hoc idem est loqui. Ergo idem est loqui, et illuminare, et sic idem quod prius. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, II Moral., quod Deus ad angelos loquitur, eo ipso quod eorum cordibus occulta sua invisibilia ostendit. Sed hoc ipsum est illuminare. Ergo omnis Dei locutio est illuminatio. Pari ergo ratione, omnis angeli locutio est illuminatio. Nullo ergo modo angelus inferior superiori loqui potest. Sed contra est quod, sicut Dionysius exponit VII Cael. Hier., inferiores angeli superioribus dixerunt, quis est iste rex gloriae? Respondeo dicendum quod angeli inferiores superioribus loqui possunt. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod omnis illuminatio est locutio in angelis, sed non omnis locutio est illuminatio. Quia sicut dictum est, angelum loqui angelo nihil aliud est quam conceptum suum ordinare ad hoc ut ei innotescat, per propriam voluntatem. Ea vero quae mente concipiuntur, ad duplex principium referri possunt, scilicet ad ipsum Deum, qui est prima veritas; et ad voluntatem intelligentis, per quam aliquid actu consideramus. Quia vero veritas est lumen intellectus, et regula omnis veritatis est ipse Deus; manifestatio eius quod mente concipitur, secundum quod dependet a prima veritate, et locutio est et illuminatio; puta si unus homo dicat alii, caelum est a Deo creatum, vel, homo est animal. Sed manifestatio eorum quae dependent ex voluntate intelligentis, non potest dici illuminatio, sed locutio tantum; puta si aliquis alteri dicat, volo hoc addiscere, volo hoc vel illud facere. Cuius ratio est, quia voluntas creata non est lux, nec regula veritatis, sed participans lucem, unde communicare ea quae sunt a voluntate creata, inquantum huiusmodi, non est illuminare. Non enim pertinet ad perfectionem intellectus mei, quid tu velis, vel quid tu intelligas, cognoscere, sed solum quid rei veritas habeat.

Objection 1: It would seem that the inferior angel does not speak to the superior. For on the text (1 Cor 13:1), If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, a gloss remarks that the speech of the angels is an enlightenment whereby the superior enlightens the inferior. But the inferior never enlightens the superior, as was above explained (Q. 106, A. 3). Therefore neither do the inferior speak to the superior. Obj. 2: Further, as was said above (Q. 106, A. 1), to enlighten means merely to acquaint one man of what is known to another; and this is to speak. Therefore to speak and to enlighten are the same; so the same conclusion follows. Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii): God speaks to the angels by the very fact that He shows to their hearts His hidden and invisible things. But this is to enlighten them. Therefore, whenever God speaks, He enlightens. In the same way every angelic speech is an enlightening. Therefore an inferior angel can in no way speak to a superior angel. On the contrary, According to the exposition of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), the inferior angels said to the superior: Who is this King of Glory? I answer that, The inferior angels can speak to the superior. To make this clear, we must consider that every angelic enlightening is an angelic speech; but on the other hand, not every speech is an enlightening; because, as we have said (A. 1), for one angel to speak to another angel means nothing else, but that by his own will he directs his mental concept in such a way, that it becomes known to the other. Now what the mind conceives may be reduced to a twofold principle; to God Himself, Who is the primal truth; and to the will of the one who understands, whereby we actually consider anything. But because truth is the light of the intellect, and God Himself is the rule of all truth; the manifestation of what is conceived by the mind, as depending on the primary truth, is both speech and enlightenment; for example, when one man says to another: Heaven was created by God; or, Man is an animal. The manifestation, however, of what depends on the will of the one who understands, cannot be called an enlightenment, but is only a speech; for instance, when one says to another: I wish to learn this; I wish to do this or that. The reason is that the created will is not a light, nor a rule of truth; but participates of light. Hence to communicate what comes from the created will is not, as such, an enlightening. For to know what you may will, or what you may understand does not belong to the perfection of my intellect; but only to know the truth in reality.

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Q. 107, A. 3

Government of Creatures

Manifestum est autem quod angeli dicuntur superiores vel inferiores per comparationem ad hoc principium quod est Deus. Et ideo illuminatio, quae dependet a principio quod est Deus, solum per superiores angelos ad inferiores deducitur. Sed in ordine ad principium quod est voluntas, ipse volens est primus et supremus. Et ideo manifestatio eorum quae ad voluntatem pertinent, per ipsum volentem deducitur ad alios quoscumque. Et quantum ad hoc, et superiores inferioribus, et inferiores superioribus loquuntur. Et per hoc patet solutio ad primum, et ad secundum. Ad tertium dicendum quod omnis Dei locutio ad angelos est illuminatio, quia cum voluntas Dei sit regula veritatis, etiam scire quid Deus velit, pertinet ad perfectionem et illuminationem mentis creatae. Sed non est eadem ratio de voluntate angeli, ut dictum est.

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Now it is clear that the angels are called superior or inferior by comparison with this principle, God; and therefore enlightenment, which depends on the principle which is God, is conveyed only by the superior angels to the inferior. But as regards the will as the principle, he who wills is first and supreme; and therefore the manifestation of what belongs to the will, is conveyed to others by the one who wills. In that manner both the superior angels speak to the inferior, and the inferior speak to the superior. From this clearly appear the replies to the first and second objections. Reply Obj. 3: Every speech of God to the angels is an enlightening; because since the will of God is the rule of truth, it belongs to the perfection and enlightenment of the created mind to know even what God wills. But the same does not apply to the will of the angels, as was explained above.

Article 3 Whether an angel speaks to God? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeObjection 1: It would seem that an angel does not lus Deo non loquatur. Locutio enim est ad manifestan- speak to God. For speech makes known something to andum aliquid alteri. Sed angelus nihil potest manifestare other. But an angel cannot make known anything to God, Deo, qui omnia novit. Ergo angelus non loquitur Deo. Who knows all things. Therefore an angel does not speak to God. Praeterea, loqui est ordinare conceptum intellecObj. 2: Further, to speak is to order the mental concept tus ad alterum, ut dictum est. Sed angelus semper con- in reference to another, as was shown above (A. 1). But an ceptum suae mentis ordinat in Deum. Si ergo aliquando angel ever orders his mental concept to God. So if an anDeo loquitur, semper Deo loquitur, quod potest videri gel speaks to God, he ever speaks to God; which in some alicui inconveniens, cum aliquando angelus angelo lo- ways appears to be unreasonable, since an angel sometimes quatur. Videtur ergo quod angelus nunquam loquatur speaks to another angel. Therefore it seems that an angel Deo. never speaks to God. Sed contra est quod dicitur Zachar. I, respondit anOn the contrary, It is written (Zech 1:12): The angelus domini, et dixit, domine exercituum, usquequo non gel of the Lord answered and said: O Lord of hosts, how long misereberis Ierusalem? Loquitur ergo angelus Deo. wilt Thou not have mercy on Jerusalem. Therefore an angel speaks to God. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, locuI answer that, As was said above (AA. 1, 2), the angel tio angeli est per hoc, quod conceptus mentis ordinatur speaks by ordering his mental concept to something else. ad alterum. Sed aliquid ordinatur ad alterum dupliciter. Now one thing is ordered to another in a twofold manner. Uno modo, ad hoc quod communicet alteri; sicut in re- In one way for the purpose of giving one thing to another, bus naturalibus agens ordinatur ad patiens et in locutio- as in natural things the agent is ordered to the patient, and ne humana doctor ordinatur ad discipulum. Et quantum in human speech the teacher is ordered to the learner; and ad hoc, nullo modo angelus loquitur Deo, neque de his in this sense an angel in no way speaks to God either of quae ad rerum veritatem pertinent, neque de his quae what concerns the truth, or of whatever depends on the dependent a voluntate creata, quia Deus est omnis ve- created will; because God is the principle and source of all ritatis et omnis voluntatis principium et conditor. Alio truth and of all will. In another way one thing is ordered modo ordinatur aliquid ad alterum, ut ab eo aliquid ac- to another to receive something, as in natural things the cipiat; sicut in rebus naturalibus passivum ad agens, et in passive is ordered to the agent, and in human speech the locutione humana discipulus ad magistrum. Et hoc mo- disciple to the master; and in this way an angel speaks to do angelus loquitur Deo, vel consultando divinam vo- God, either by consulting the Divine will of what ought to

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luntatem de agendis; vel eius excellentiam, quam nunquam comprehendit, admirando; sicut Gregorius dicit, II Moral., quod angeli loquuntur Deo, cum per hoc quod super semetipsos respiciunt, in motum admirationis surgunt. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod locutio non semper est ad manifestandum alteri; sed quandoque ad hoc ordinatur finaliter, ut loquenti aliquid manifestetur; sicut cum discipulus quaerit aliquid a magistro.

Q. 107, A. 4

be done, or by admiring the Divine excellence which he can never comprehend; thus Gregory says (Moral. ii) that the angels speak to God, when by contemplating what is above themselves they rise to emotions of admiration.

Reply Obj. 1: Speech is not always for the purpose of making something known to another; but is sometimes finally ordered to the purpose of manifesting something to the speaker himself; as when the disciples ask instruction from the master. Ad secundum dicendum quod locutione qua angeReply Obj. 2: The angels are ever speaking to God in li loquuntur Deo laudantes ipsum et admirantes, semper the sense of praising and admiring Him and His works; but angeli Deo loquuntur. Sed locutione qua eius sapientiam they speak to Him by consulting Him about what ought to consulunt super agendis, tunc ei loquuntur, quando ali- be done whenever they have to perform any new work, conquod novum per eos agendum occurrit, super quo desi- cerning which they desire enlightenment.

derant illuminari.

Article 4 Whether local distance influences the angelic speech? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod localis distantia operetur aliquid in locutione angelica. Sicut enim dicit Damascenus, Angelus ubi est, ibi operatur. Locutio autem est quaedam operatio angeli. Cum ergo angelus sit in determinato loco, videtur quod usque ad determinatam loci distantiam angelus loqui possit. Praeterea, clamor loquentis fit propter distantiam audientis. Sed Isaiae VI dicitur de Seraphim, quod clamabat alter ad alterum. Ergo videtur quod in locutione angelorum aliquid operetur localis distantia. Sed contra est quod, sicut dicitur Luc. XVI, dives in Inferno positus loquebatur Abrahae, non impediente locali distantia. Multo igitur minus localis distantia potest impedire locutionem unius angeli ad alterum. Respondeo dicendum quod locutio angeli in intellectuali operatione consistit, ut ex dictis patet. Intellectualis autem operatio angeli omnino abstracta est a loco et tempore, nam etiam nostra intellectualis operatio est per abstractionem ab hic et nunc, nisi per accidens ex parte phantasmatum, quae in angelis nulla sunt. In eo autem quod est omnino abstractum a loco et tempore, nihil operatur neque temporis diversitas, neque loci distantia. Unde in locutione angeli nullum impedimentum facit distantia loci. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod locutio angeli, sicut dictum est, est locutio interior, quae tamen ab alio percipitur, et ideo est in angelo loquente, et per consequens ubi est angelus loquens. Sed sicut distantia localis non impedit quin unus angelus alium videre possit; ita etiam non impedit quin percipiat quod in eo ad se ordinatur, quod est eius locutionem percipere.

Objection 1: It would seem that local distance affects the angelic speech. For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 13): An angel works where he is. But speech is an angelic operation. Therefore, as an angel is in a determinate place, it seems that an angel’s speech is limited by the bounds of that place. Obj. 2: Further, a speaker cries out on account of the distance of the hearer. But it is said of the Seraphim that they cried one to another (Isa 6:3). Therefore in the angelic speech local distance has some effect. On the contrary, It is said that the rich man in hell spoke to Abraham, notwithstanding the local distance (Luke 16:24). Much less therefore does local distance impede the speech of one angel to another. I answer that, The angelic speech consists in an intellectual operation, as explained above (AA. 1, 2, 3). And the intellectual operation of an angel abstracts from the here and now. For even our own intellectual operation takes place by abstraction from the here and now, except accidentally on the part of the phantasms, which do not exist at all in an angel. But as regards whatever is abstracted from here and now, neither difference of time nor local distance has any influence whatever. Hence in the angelic speech local distance is no impediment. Reply Obj. 1: The angelic speech, as above explained (A. 1, ad 2), is interior; perceived, nevertheless, by another; and therefore it exists in the angel who speaks, and consequently where the angel is who speaks. But as local distance does not prevent one angel seeing another, so neither does it prevent an angel perceiving what is ordered to him on the part of another; and this is to perceive his speech.

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Q. 107, A. 5

Government of Creatures

Ad secundum dicendum quod clamor ille non est vocis corporeae, qui fit propter distantiam loci; sed significat magnitudinem rei quae dicebatur, vel magnitudinem affectus, secundum quod dicit Gregorius, II Moral., tanto quisque minus clamat, quanto minus desiderat.

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Reply Obj. 2: The cry mentioned is not a bodily voice raised by reason of the local distance; but is taken to signify the magnitude of what is said, or the intensity of the affection, according to what Gregory says (Moral. ii): The less one desires, the less one cries out.

Article 5 Whether all the angels know what one speaks to another? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod locutionem unius angeli ad alterum omnes cognoscant. Quod enim unius hominis locutionem non omnes audiant, facit inaequalis loci distantia. Sed in locutione angeli nihil operatur localis distantia, ut dictum est. Ergo uno angelo loquente ad alterum, omnes percipiunt. Praeterea, omnes angeli communicant in virtute intelligendi. Si ergo conceptus mentis unius ordinatus ad alterum cognoscitur ab uno, pari ratione cognoscitur ab aliis. Praeterea, illuminatio est quaedam species locutionis. Sed illuminatio unius angeli ab altero, pervenit ad omnes angelos, quia, ut Dionysius dicit XV cap. Cael. Hier., unaquaeque caelestis essentia intelligentiam sibi traditam aliis communicat. Ergo et locutio unius angeli ad alterum, ad omnes perducitur. Sed contra est quod unus homo potest alteri soli loqui. Multo igitur magis hoc in angelis esse potest. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, conceptus mentis unius angeli percipi potest ab altero, per hoc quod ille cuius est conceptus, sua voluntate ordinat ipsum ad alterum. Potest autem ex aliqua causa ordinari aliquid ad unum, et non ad alterum. Et ideo potest conceptus unius ab aliquo uno cognosci, et non ab aliis. Et sic locutionem unius angeli ad alterum potest percipere unus absque aliis, non quidem impediente distantia locali, sed hoc faciente voluntaria ordinatione, ut dictum est. Unde patet responsio ad primum et secundum. Ad tertium dicendum quod illuminatio est de his quae emanant a prima regula veritatis, quae est principium commune omnium angelorum, et ideo illuminationes sunt omnibus communes. Sed locutio potest esse de his quae ordinantur ad principium voluntatis creatae, quod est proprium unicuique angelo, et ideo non oportet quod huiusmodi locutiones sint omnibus communes.

Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels know what one speaks to another. For unequal local distance is the reason why all men do not know what one man says to another. But in the angelic speech local distance has no effect, as above explained (A. 4). Therefore all the angels know what one speaks to another. Obj. 2: Further, all the angels have the intellectual power in common. So if the mental concept of one ordered to another is known by one, it is for the same reason known by all. Obj. 3: Further, enlightenment is a kind of speech. But the enlightenment of one angel by another extends to all the angels, because, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv): Each one of the heavenly beings communicates what he learns to the others. Therefore the speech of one angel to another extends to all. On the contrary, One man can speak to another alone; much more can this be the case among the angels. I answer that, As above explained (AA. 1, 2), the mental concept of one angel can be perceived by another when the angel who possesses the concept refers it by his will to another. Now a thing can be ordered through some cause to one thing and not to another; consequently the concept of one (angel) may be known by one and not by another; and therefore an angel can perceive the speech of one angel to another; whereas others do not, not through the obstacle of local distance, but on account of the will so ordering, as explained above. From this appear the replies to the first and second objections. Reply Obj. 3: Enlightenment is of those truths that emanate from the first rule of truth, which is the principle common to all the angels; and in that way all enlightenments are common to all. But speech may be of something ordered to the principle of the created will, which is proper to each angel; and in this way it is not necessary that these speeches should be common to all.

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Question 108 The Angelic Degrees of Hierarchies and Orders Deinde considerandum est de ordinatione angeloWe next consider the degrees of the angels in their hirum secundum hierarchias et ordines, dictum est enim erarchies and orders; for it was said above (Q. 106, A. 3), quod superiores inferiores illuminant, et non e conver- that the superior angels enlighten the inferior angels; and so. not conversely. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum omnes angeli sint unius hierarchiae. (1) Whether all the angels belong to one hierarchy? Secundo, utrum in una hierarchia sit unus tantum (2) Whether in one hierarchy there is only one order? ordo. Tertio, utrum in uno ordine sint plures angeli. (3) Whether in one order there are many angels? Quarto, utrum distinctio hierarchiarum et ordinum (4) Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders is sit a natura. natural? Quinto, de nominibus et proprietatibus singulorum (5) Of the names and properties of each order. ordinum. Sexto, de comparatione ordinum ad invicem. (6) Of the comparison of the orders to one another. Septimo, utrum ordines durent post diem iudicii. (7) Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment? Octavo, utrum homines assumantur ad ordines (8) Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders? angelorum.

Article 1 Whether all the angels are of one hierarchy? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes angeli sint unius hierarchiae. Cum enim angeli sint supremi inter creaturas, oportet dicere quod sint optime dispositi. Sed optima dispositio est multitudinis secundum quod continetur sub uno principatu; ut patet per philosophum, XII Metaphys., et in III Politic. Cum ergo hierarchia nihil sit aliud quam sacer principatus, videtur quod omnes angeli sint unius hierarchiae. Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, in III cap. Cael. Hier., quod hierarchia est ordo, scientia et actio. Sed omnes angeli conveniunt in uno ordine ad Deum, quem cognoscunt, et a quo in suis actionibus regulantur. Ergo omnes angeli sunt unius hierarchiae. Praeterea, sacer principatus, qui dicitur hierarchia, invenitur in hominibus et angelis. Sed omnes homines sunt unius hierarchiae. Ergo etiam omnes angeli sunt unius hierarchiae. Sed contra est quod Dionysius, VI cap. Cael. Hier., distinguit tres hierarchias angelorum. Respondeo dicendum quod hierarchia est sacer principatus, ut dictum est. In nomine autem principatus duo intelliguntur, scilicet ipse princeps, et multitudo ordinata sub principe. Quia igitur unus est Deus princeps

Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels belong to one hierarchy. For since the angels are supreme among creatures, it is evident that they are ordered for the best. But the best ordering of a multitude is for it to be governed by one authority, as the Philosopher shows (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10; Polit. iii, 4). Therefore as a hierarchy is nothing but a sacred principality, it seems that all the angels belong to one hierarchy. Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii) that hierarchy is order, knowledge, and action. But all the angels agree in one order towards God, Whom they know, and by Whom in their actions they are ruled. Therefore all the angels belong to one hierarchy. Obj. 3: Further, the sacred principality called hierarchy is to be found among men and angels. But all men are of one hierarchy. Therefore likewise all the angels are of one hierarchy. On the contrary, Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vi) distinguishes three hierarchies of angels. I answer that, Hierarchy means a sacred principality, as above explained. Now principality includes two things: the prince himself and the multitude ordered under the prince. Therefore because there is one God, the Prince not

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non solum omnium angelorum, sed etiam hominum, et totius creaturae; ideo non solum omnium angelorum, sed etiam totius rationalis creaturae, quae sacrorum particeps esse potest, una est hierarchia, secundum quod Augustinus dicit, in XII de Civ. Dei, duas esse civitates, hoc est societates, unam in bonis angelis et hominibus, alteram in malis. Sed si consideretur principatus ex parte multitudinis ordinatae sub principe, sic unus principatus dicitur secundum quod multitudo uno et eodem modo potest gubernationem principis recipere. Quae vero non possunt secundum eundem modum gubernari a principe, ad diversos principatus pertinent, sicut sub uno rege sunt diversae civitates, quae diversis reguntur legibus et ministris. Manifestum est autem quod homines alio modo divinas illuminationes percipiunt quam angeli, nam angeli percipiunt eas in intelligibili puritate, homines vero percipiunt eas sub sensibilium similitudinibus, ut Dionysius dicit I cap. Cael. Hier. Et ideo oportuit distingui humanam hierarchiam ab angelica. Et per eundem modum in angelis tres hierarchiae distinguuntur. Dictum est enim supra, dum de cognitione angelorum ageretur, quod superiores angeli habent universaliorem cognitionem veritatis quam inferiores. Huiusmodi autem universalis acceptio cognitionis secundum tres gradus in angelis distingui potest. Possunt enim rationes rerum de quibus angeli illuminantur, considerari tripliciter. Primo quidem, secundum quod procedunt a primo principio universali, quod est Deus, et iste modus convenit primae hierarchiae, quae immediate ad Deum extenditur, et quasi in vestibulis Dei collocatur, ut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Secundo vero, prout huiusmodi rationes dependent ab universalibus causis creatis, quae iam aliquo modo multiplicantur, et hic modus convenit secundae hierarchiae. Tertio autem modo, secundum quod huiusmodi rationes applicantur singulis rebus, et prout dependent a propriis causis, et hic modus convenit infimae hierarchiae. Quod plenius patebit, cum de singulis ordinibus agetur. Sic igitur distinguuntur hierarchiae ex parte multitudinis subiectae. Unde manifestum est eos errare, et contra intentionem Dionysii loqui, qui ponunt in divinis personis hierarchiam quam vocant supercaelestem. In divinis enim personis est quidam ordo naturae, sed non hierarchiae. Nam, ut Dionysius dicit III cap. Cael. Hier., ordo hierarchiae est alios quidem purgari et illuminari et perfici, alios autem purgare et illuminare et perficere. Quod absit ut in divinis personis ponamus.

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only of all the angels but also of men and all creatures; so there is one hierarchy, not only of all the angels, but also of all rational creatures, who can be participators of sacred things; according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xii, 1): There are two cities, that is, two societies, one of the good angels and men, the other of the wicked. But if we consider the principality on the part of the multitude ordered under the prince, then principality is said to be one accordingly as the multitude can be subject in one way to the government of the prince. And those that cannot be governed in the same way by a prince belong to different principalities: thus, under one king there are different cities, which are governed by different laws and administrators. Now it is evident that men do not receive the Divine enlightenments in the same way as do the angels; for the angels receive them in their intelligible purity, whereas men receive them under sensible signs, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i). Therefore there must needs be a distinction between the human and the angelic hierarchy. In the same manner we distinguish three angelic hierarchies. For it was shown above (Q. 55, A. 3), in treating of the angelic knowledge, that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge of the truth than the inferior angels. This universal knowledge has three grades among the angels. For the types of things, concerning which the angels are enlightened, can be considered in a threefold manner. First as preceding from God as the first universal principle, which mode of knowledge belongs to the first hierarchy, connected immediately with God, and, as it were, placed in the vestibule of God, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). Second, forasmuch as these types depend on the universal created causes which in some way are already multiplied; which mode belongs to the second hierarchy. Third, forasmuch as these types are applied to particular things as depending on their causes; which mode belongs to the lowest hierarchy. All this will appear more clearly when we treat of each of the orders (A. 6). In this way are the hierarchies distinguished on the part of the multitude of subjects.

Hence it is clear that those err and speak against the opinion of Dionysius who place a hierarchy in the Divine Persons, and call it the supercelestial hierarchy. For in the Divine Persons there exists, indeed, a natural order, but there is no hierarchical order, for as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii): The hierarchical order is so directed that some be cleansed, enlightened, and perfected; and that others cleanse, enlighten, and perfect; which far be it from us to apply to the Divine Persons. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa proceReply Obj. 1: This objection considers principality on dit de principatu ex parte principis, quia optimum est the part of the ruler, inasmuch as a multitude is best ruled quod multitudo regatur ab uno principe, ut philosophus by one ruler, as the Philosopher asserts in those passages.

in praedictis locis intendit. Ad secundum dicendum quod, quantum ad cogniReply Obj. 2: As regards knowing God Himself, tionem ipsius Dei, quem omnes uno modo, scilicet per Whom all see in one way—that is, in His essence—there is

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essentiam, vident, non distinguuntur in angelis hierarchiae, sed quantum ad rationes rerum creatarum, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod omnes homines sunt unius speciei, et unus modus intelligendi est eis connaturalis, non sic autem est in angelis. Unde non est similis ratio.

Q. 108, A. 2

no hierarchical distinction among the angels; but there is such a distinction as regards the types of created things, as above explained. Reply Obj. 3: All men are of one species, and have one connatural mode of understanding; which is not the case in the angels: and hence the same argument does not apply to both.

Article 2 Whether there are several orders in one hierarchy? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in una hierarchia non sint plures ordines. Multiplicata enim definitione, multiplicatur et definitum. Sed hierarchia, ut Dionysius dicit, est ordo. Si ergo sunt multi ordines, non erit una hierarchia, sed multae. Praeterea, diversi ordines sunt diversi gradus. Sed gradus in spiritualibus constituuntur secundum diversa dona spiritualia. Sed in angelis omnia dona spiritualia sunt communia, quia nihil ibi singulariter possidetur. Ergo non sunt diversi ordines angelorum. Praeterea, in ecclesiastica hierarchia distinguuntur ordines secundum purgare, illuminare et perficere, nam ordo diaconorum est purgativus, sacerdotum illuminativus, episcoporum perfectivus, ut Dionysius dicit V cap. Eccles. Hier. Sed quilibet angelus purgat, illuminat et perficit. Non ergo est distinctio ordinum in angelis. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit ad Ephes. I, quod Deus constituit Christum hominem supra omnem principatum et potestatem et virtutem et dominationem; qui sunt diversi ordines angelorum, et quidam eorum ad unam hierarchiam pertinent, ut infra patebit. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, una hierarchia est unus principatus, idest una multitudo ordinata uno modo sub principis gubernatione. Non autem esset multitudo ordinata, sed confusa, si in multitudine diversi ordines non essent. Ipsa ergo ratio hierarchiae requirit ordinum diversitatem. Quae quidem diversitas ordinum secundum diversa officia et actus consideratur. Sicut patet quod in una civitate sunt diversi ordines secundum diversos actus, nam alius est ordo iudicantium, alius pugnantium, alius laborantium in agris, et sic de aliis. Sed quamvis multi sint unius civitatis ordines, omnes tamen ad tres possunt reduci, secundum quod quaelibet multitudo perfecta habet principium, medium et finem. Unde et in civitatibus triplex ordo hominum invenitur, quidam enim sunt supremi, ut optimates; quidam autem sunt infimi, ut vilis populus; quidam autem sunt medii, ut populus honorabilis. Sic igitur et in qualibet hierarchia angelica ordines distinguuntur secundum diversos

Objection 1: It would seem that in the one hierarchy there are not several orders. For when a definition is multiplied, the thing defined is also multiplied. But hierarchy is order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii). Therefore, if there are many orders, there is not one hierarchy only, but many. Obj. 2: Further, different orders are different grades, and grades among spirits are constituted by different spiritual gifts. But among the angels all the spiritual gifts are common to all, for nothing is possessed individually (Sent. ii, D, ix). Therefore there are not different orders of angels. Obj. 3: Further, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy the orders are distinguished according to the actions of cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting. For the order of deacons is cleansing, the order of priests, is enlightening, and of bishops perfecting, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v). But each of the angels cleanses, enlightens, and perfects. Therefore there is no distinction of orders among the angels. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph 1:20,21) that God has set the Man Christ above all principality and power, and virtue, and dominion: which are the various orders of the angels, and some of them belong to one hierarchy, as will be explained (A. 6). I answer that, As explained above, one hierarchy is one principality—that is, one multitude ordered in one way under the rule of a prince. Now such a multitude would not be ordered, but confused, if there were not in it different orders. So the nature of a hierarchy requires diversity of orders. This diversity of order arises from the diversity of offices and actions, as appears in one city where there are different orders according to the different actions; for there is one order of those who judge, and another of those who fight, and another of those who labor in the fields, and so forth. But although one city thus comprises several orders, all may be reduced to three, when we consider that every multitude has a beginning, a middle, and an end. So in every city, a threefold order of men is to be seen, some of whom are supreme, as the nobles; others are the last, as the common people, while others hold a place between these, as the middle-class. In the same way we find in each angelic hierarchy the orders distinguished according to their ac-

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actus et officia; et omnis ista diversitas ad tria reduci- tions and offices, and all this diversity is reduced to three— tur, scilicet ad summum, medium et infimum. Et propter namely, to the summit, the middle, and the base; and so in hoc in qualibet hierarchia Dionysius ponit tres ordines. every hierarchy Dionysius places three orders (Coel. Hier. vi). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ordo dupliciter diReply Obj. 1: Order is twofold. In one way it is taken citur. Uno modo, ipsa ordinatio comprehendens sub se as the order comprehending in itself different grades; and in diversos gradus, et hoc modo hierarchia dicitur ordo. that way a hierarchy is called an order. In another way one Alio modo dicitur ordo gradus unus, et sic dicuntur plu- grade is called an order; and in that sense the several orders res ordines unius hierarchiae. of one hierarchy are so called. Ad secundum dicendum quod in societate angeloReply Obj. 2: All things are possessed in common by rum omnia possidentur communiter; sed tamen quae- the angelic society, some things, however, being held more dam excellentius habentur a quibusdam quam ab aliis. excellently by some than by others. Each gift is more perUnumquodque autem perfectius habetur ab eo qui po- fectly possessed by the one who can communicate it, than test illud communicare, quam ab eo qui non potest, si- by the one who cannot communicate it; as the hot thing cut perfectius est calidum quod potest calefacere, quam which can communicate heat is more perfect that what is quod non potest; et perfectius scit qui potest docere, unable to give heat. And the more perfectly anyone can quam qui non potest. Et quanto perfectius donum ali- communicate a gift, the higher grade he occupies, as he is quis communicare potest, tanto in perfectiori gradu est, in the more perfect grade of mastership who can teach a sicut in perfectiori gradu magisterii est qui potest doce- higher science. By this similitude we can reckon the diverre altiorem scientiam. Et secundum hanc similitudinem sity of grades or orders among the angels, according to their consideranda est diversitas graduum vel ordinum in an- different offices and actions. gelis, secundum diversa officia et actus. Ad tertium dicendum quod inferior angelus est suReply Obj. 3: The inferior angel is superior to the highperior supremo homine nostrae hierarchiae; secundum est man of our hierarchy, according to the words, He that illud Matth. XI, qui minor est in regno caelorum, maior is the lesser in the kingdom of heaven, is greater than he— est illo, scilicet Ioanne Baptista, quo nullus maior inter namely, John the Baptist, than whom there hath not risen natos mulierum surrexit. Unde minor angelus caelestis a greater among them that are born of women (Matt 11:11). hierarchiae potest non solum purgare sed illuminare et Hence the lesser angel of the heavenly hierarchy can not perficere, et altiori modo quam ordines nostrae hierar- only cleanse, but also enlighten and perfect, and in a higher chiae. Et sic secundum distinctionem harum actionum way than can the orders of our hierarchy. Thus the heavenly non distinguuntur caelestes ordines; sed secundum alias orders are not distinguished by reason of these, but by readifferentias actionum. son of other different acts.

Article 3 Whether there are many angels in one order? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in uno ordine non sint plures angeli. Dictum est enim supra omnes angelos inaequales esse ad invicem. Sed unius ordinis esse dicuntur quae sunt aequalia. Ergo plures angeli non sunt unius ordinis. Praeterea, quod potest sufficienter fieri per unum, superfluum est quod fiat per multa. Sed illud quod pertinet ad unum officium angelicum, sufficienter potest fieri per unum angelum; multo magis quam per unum solem sufficienter fit quod pertinet ad officium solis, quanto perfectior est angelus caelesti corpore. Si ergo ordines distinguuntur secundum officia, ut dictum est, superfluum est quod sint plures angeli unius ordinis. Praeterea, supra dictum est quod omnes angeli sunt inaequales. Si ergo plures angeli sint unius ordinis, puta tres vel quatuor, infimus superioris ordinis magis

Objection 1: It seems that there are not many angels in one order. For it was shown above (Q. 50, A. 4), that all the angels are unequal. But equals belong to one order. Therefore there are not many angels in one order. Obj. 2: Further, it is superfluous for a thing to be done by many, which can be done sufficiently by one. But that which belongs to one angelic office can be done sufficiently by one angel; so much more sufficiently than the one sun does what belongs to the office of the sun, as the angel is more perfect than a heavenly body. If, therefore, the orders are distinguished by their offices, as stated above (A. 2), several angels in one order would be superfluous. Obj. 3: Further, it was said above (Obj. 1) that all the angels are unequal. Therefore, if several angels (for instance, three or four), are of one order, the lowest one of the supe-

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conveniet cum supremo inferioris quam cum supremo sui ordinis. Et sic non videtur quod magis sit unius ordinis cum hoc, quam cum illo. Non igitur sunt plures angeli unius ordinis. Sed contra est quod Isaiae VI dicitur, quod Seraphim clamabant alter ad alterum. Sunt ergo plures angeli in uno ordine Seraphim. Respondeo dicendum quod ille qui perfecte cognoscit res aliquas, potest usque ad minima et actus et virtutes et naturas earum distinguere. Qui autem cognoscit eas imperfecte, non potest distinguere nisi in universali, quae quidem distinctio fit per pauciora. Sicut qui imperfecte cognoscit res naturales, distinguit earum ordines in universali, ponens in uno ordine caelestia corpora, in alio corpora inferiora inanimata, in alio plantas, in alio animalia, qui autem perfectius cognosceret res naturales, posset distinguere et in ipsis corporibus caelestibus diversos ordines, et in singulis aliorum. Nos autem imperfecte angelos cognoscimus, et eorum officia, ut Dionysius dicit VI cap. Cael. Hier. Unde non possumus distinguere officia et ordines angelorum, nisi in communi; secundum quem modum, multi angeli sub uno ordine continentur. Si autem perfecte cognosceremus officia angelorum, et eorum distinctiones, perfecte sciremus quod quilibet angelus habet suum proprium officium et suum proprium ordinem in rebus, multo magis quam quaelibet stella, etsi nos lateat. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes angeli unius ordinis sunt aliquo modo aequales, quantum ad communem similitudinem secundum quam constituuntur in uno ordine, sed simpliciter non sunt aequales. Unde Dionysius dicit, X cap. Cael. Hier., quod in uno et eodem ordine angelorum, est accipere primos, medios et ultimos. Ad secundum dicendum quod illa specialis distinctio ordinum et officiorum secundum quam quilibet angelus habet proprium officium et ordinem, est nobis ignota. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut in superficie quae partim est alba et partim nigra, duae partes quae sunt in confinio albi et nigri, magis conveniunt secundum situm quam aliquae duae partes albae, minus tamen secundum qualitatem; ita duo angeli qui sunt in terminis duorum ordinum, magis secum conveniunt secundum propinquitatem naturae, quam unus eorum cum aliquibus aliis sui ordinis; minus autem secundum idoneitatem ad similia officia, quae quidem idoneitas usque ad aliquem certum terminum protenditur.

Q. 108, A. 3

rior order will be more akin to the highest of the inferior order than with the highest of his own order; and thus he does not seem to be more of one order with the latter than with the former. Therefore there are not many angels of one order. On the contrary, It is written: The Seraphim cried to one another (Isa 6:3). Therefore there are many angels in the one order of the Seraphim. I answer that, Whoever knows anything perfectly, is able to distinguish its acts, powers, and nature, down to the minutest details, whereas he who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only distinguish it in a general way, and only as regards a few points. Thus, one who knows natural things imperfectly, can distinguish their orders in a general way, placing the heavenly bodies in one order, inanimate inferior bodies in another, plants in another, and animals in another; whilst he who knows natural things perfectly, is able to distinguish different orders in the heavenly bodies themselves, and in each of the other orders. Now our knowledge of the angels is imperfect, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi). Hence we can only distinguish the angelic offices and orders in a general way, so as to place many angels in one order. But if we knew the offices and distinctions of the angels perfectly, we should know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own order among things, and much more so than any star, though this be hidden from us. Reply Obj. 1: All the angels of one order are in some way equal in a common similitude, whereby they are placed in that order; but absolutely speaking they are not equal. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) that in one and the same order of angels there are those who are first, middle, and last. Reply Obj. 2: That special distinction of orders and offices wherein each angel has his own office and order, is hidden from us. Reply Obj. 3: As in a surface which is partly white and partly black, the two parts on the borders of white and black are more akin as regards their position than any other two white parts, but are less akin in quality; so two angels who are on the boundary of two orders are more akin in propinquity of nature than one of them is akin to the others of its own order, but less akin in their fitness for similar offices, which fitness, indeed, extends to a definite limit.

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Article 4 Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders comes from the angelic nature? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod distinctio hierarchiarum et ordinum non sit a natura in angelis. Hierarchia enim dicitur sacer principatus, et in definitione eius Dionysius ponit quod deiforme, quantum possibile est, similat. Sed sanctitas et deiformitas est in angelis per gratiam, non per naturam. Ergo distinctio hierarchiarum et ordinum in angelis est per gratiam, non per naturam. Praeterea, Seraphim dicuntur ardentes, vel incendentes, ut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Hoc autem videtur ad caritatem pertinere, quae non est a natura, sed a gratia, diffunditur enim in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis, ut dicitur ad Rom. V. Quod non solum ad sanctos homines pertinet, sed etiam de sanctis angelis dici potest, ut Augustinus dicit XII de Civ. Dei. Ergo ordines in angelis non sunt a natura, sed a gratia. Praeterea, hierarchia ecclesiastica exemplatur a caelesti. Sed ordines in hominibus non sunt per naturam, sed per donum gratiae, non enim est a natura quod unus est episcopus, et alius est sacerdos, et alius diaconus. Ergo neque in angelis sunt ordines a natura, sed a gratia tantum. Sed contra est quod Magister dicit, IX dist. II Sent., quod ordo angelorum dicitur multitudo caelestium spirituum, qui inter se aliquo munere gratiae similantur, sicut et naturalium datorum participatione conveniunt. Distinctio ergo ordinum in angelis est non solum secundum dona gratuita, sed etiam secundum dona naturalia. Respondeo dicendum quod ordo gubernationis, qui est ordo multitudinis sub principatu existentis, attenditur per respectum ad finem. Finis autem angelorum potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum facultatem suae naturae, ut scilicet cognoscant et ament Deum naturali cognitione et amore. Et secundum respectum ad hunc finem, distinguuntur ordines angelorum secundum naturalia dona. Alio modo potest accipi finis angelicae multitudinis supra naturalem facultatem eorum, qui consistit in visione divinae essentiae, et in immobili fruitione bonitatis ipsius; ad quem finem pertingere non possunt nisi per gratiam. Unde secundum respectum ad hunc finem, ordines distinguuntur in angelis completive quidem secundum dona gratuita, dispositive autem secundum dona naturalia, quia angelis data sunt dona gratuita secundum capacitatem naturalium, quod non est in hominibus, ut supra dictum est. Unde in hominibus distinguuntur ordines secundum dona gratuita tantum, et non secundum naturam. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.

Objection 1: It would seem that the distinction of hierarchies and of orders is not from the nature of the angels. For hierarchy is a sacred principality, and Dionysius places in its definition that it approaches a resemblance to God, as far as may be (Coel. Hier. iii). But sanctity and resemblance to God is in the angels by grace, and not by nature. Therefore the distinction of hierarchies and orders in the angels is by grace, and not by nature. Obj. 2: Further, the Seraphim are called burning or kindling, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). This belongs to charity which comes not from nature but from grace; for it is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit Who is given to us (Rom 5:5): which is said not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore the angelic orders are not from nature, but from grace. Obj. 3: Further, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is copied from the heavenly. But the orders among men are not from nature, but by the gift of grace; for it is not a natural gift for one to be a bishop, and another a priest, and another a deacon. Therefore neither in the angels are the orders from nature, but from grace only. On the contrary, The Master says (ii, D. 9) that an angelic order is a multitude of heavenly spirits, who are likened to each other by some gift of grace, just as they agree also in the participation of natural gifts. Therefore the distinction of orders among the angels is not only by gifts of grace, but also by gifts of nature. I answer that, The order of government, which is the order of a multitude under authority, is derived from its end. Now the end of the angels may be considered in two ways. First, according to the faculty of nature, so that they may know and love God by natural knowledge and love; and according to their relation to this end the orders of the angels are distinguished by natural gifts. Second, the end of the angelic multitude can be taken from what is above their natural powers, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, and in the unchangeable fruition of His goodness; to which end they can reach only by grace; and hence as regards this end, the orders in the angels are adequately distinguished by the gifts of grace, but dispositively by natural gifts, forasmuch as to the angels are given gratuitous gifts according to the capacity of their natural gifts; which is not the case with men, as above explained (Q. 62, A. 6). Hence among men the orders are distinguished according to the gratuitous gifts only, and not according to natural gifts. From the above the replies to the objections are evident.

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Q. 108, A. 5

Article 5 Whether the orders of the angels are properly named? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ordines angelorum non convenienter nominentur. Omnes enim caelestes spiritus dicuntur et angeli et virtutes caelestes. Sed nomina communia inconvenienter aliquibus appropriantur. Ergo inconvenienter nominatur unus ordo angelorum, et alius virtutum. Praeterea, esse dominum est proprium Dei; secundum illud Psal. XCIX scitote quoniam dominus ipse est Deus. Ergo inconvenienter unus ordo caelestium spirituum dominationes vocatur. Praeterea, nomen dominationis ad gubernationem pertinere videtur. Similiter autem et nomen principatuum, et potestatum. Inconvenienter ergo tribus ordinibus haec tria nomina imponuntur. Praeterea, Archangeli dicuntur quasi Principes Angeli. Non ergo hoc nomen debet imponi alii ordini quam ordini Principatuum. Praeterea, nomen Seraphim imponitur ab ardore qui ad caritatem pertinet, nomen autem Cherubim imponitur a scientia. Caritas autem et scientia sunt dona communia omnibus angelis. Non ergo debent esse nomina specialium ordinum. Praeterea, throni dicuntur sedes. Sed ex hoc ipso Deus in creatura rationali sedere dicitur, quod ipsum cognoscit et amat. Non ergo debet esse alius ordo thronorum ab ordine Cherubim et Seraphim. Sic igitur videtur quod inconvenienter ordines angelorum nominentur. Sed contra est auctoritas sacrae Scripturae, quae sic eos nominat. Nomen enim Seraphim ponitur Isaiae VI; nomen Cherubim Ezech. I; nomen thronorum, Coloss. I; dominationes autem et virtutes et potestates et principatus ponuntur Ephes. I; nomen autem Archangeli ponitur in canonica Iudae, nomina autem angelorum in pluribus Scripturae locis. Respondeo dicendum quod in nominatione angelicorum ordinum, considerare oportet quod propria nomina singulorum ordinum proprietates eorum designant, ut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Ad videndum autem quae sit proprietas cuiuslibet ordinis, considerare oportet quod in rebus ordinatis tripliciter aliquid esse contingit, scilicet per proprietatem, per excessum, et per participationem. Per proprietatem autem dicitur esse aliquid in re aliqua, quod adaequatur et proportionatur naturae ipsius. Per excessum autem, quando illud quod attribuitur alicui, est minus quam res cui attribuitur, sed tamen convenit illi rei per quendam excessum; sicut dictum est de omnibus nominibus quae attribuuntur Deo. Per participationem autem, quando illud quod attribuitur alicui, non plenarie invenitur in eo, sed deficienter; sicut sancti homines participative dicuntur dii.

Objection 1: It would seem that the orders of the angels are not properly named. For all the heavenly spirits are called angels and heavenly virtues. But common names should not be appropriated to individuals. Therefore the orders of the angels and virtues are ineptly named. Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to God alone to be Lord, according to the words, Know ye that the Lord He is God (Ps 99:3). Therefore one order of the heavenly spirits is not properly called Dominations. Obj. 3: Further, the name Domination seems to imply government and likewise the names Principalities and Powers. Therefore these three names do not seem to be properly applied to three orders. Obj. 4: Further, archangels are as it were angel princes. Therefore this name ought not to be given to any other order than to the Principalities. Obj. 5: Further, the name Seraphim is derived from ardor, which pertains to charity; and the name Cherubim from knowledge. But charity and knowledge are gifts common to all the angels. Therefore they ought not to be names of any particular orders. Obj. 6: Further, Thrones are seats. But from the fact that God knows and loves the rational creature He is said to sit within it. Therefore there ought not to be any order of Thrones besides the Cherubim and Seraphim. Therefore it appears that the orders of angels are not properly styled. On the contrary is the authority of Holy Scripture wherein they are so named. For the name Seraphim is found in Isa. 6:2; the name Cherubim in Ezech. 1 (Cf. 10:15,20); Thrones in Col. 1:16; Dominations, Virtues, Powers, and Principalities are mentioned in Eph. 1:21; the name Archangels in the canonical epistle of St. Jude (9), and the name Angels is found in many places of Scripture. I answer that, As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), in the names of the angelic orders it is necessary to observe that the proper name of each order expresses its property. Now to see what is the property of each order, we must consider that in coordinated things, something may be found in a threefold manner: by way of property, by way of excess, and by way of participation. A thing is said to be in another by way of property, if it is adequate and proportionate to its nature: by excess when an attribute is less than that to which it is attributed, but is possessed thereby in an eminent manner, as we have stated (Q. 13, A. 2) concerning all the names which are attributed to God: by participation, when an attribute is possessed by something not fully but partially; thus holy men are called gods by participation. Therefore, if anything is to be called by a name designating its property, it ought not to be named from what it

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Si ergo aliquid nominari debeat nomine designante proprietatem ipsius, non debet nominari ab eo quod imperfecte participat, neque ab eo quod excedenter habet; sed ab eo quod est sibi quasi coaequatum. Sicut si quis velit proprie nominare hominem, dicet eum substantiam rationalem, non autem substantiam intellectualem, quod est proprium nomen angeli, quia simplex intelligentia convenit angelo per proprietatem, homini vero per participationem; neque substantiam sensibilem, quod est nomen bruti proprium, quia sensus est minus quam id quod est proprium homini, et convenit homini excedenter prae aliis animalibus. Sic igitur considerandum est in ordinibus angelorum, quod omnes spirituales perfectiones sunt omnibus angelis communes et quod omnes abundantius existunt in superioribus quam in inferioribus. Sed cum in ipsis etiam perfectionibus sit quidam gradus, superior perfectio attribuitur superiori ordini per proprietatem, inferiori vero per participationem, e converso autem inferior attribuitur inferiori per proprietatem, superiori autem per excessum. Et ita superior ordo a superiori perfectione nominatur. Sic igitur Dionysius exponit ordinum nomina secundum convenientiam ad spirituales perfectiones eorum. Gregorius vero, in expositione horum nominum, magis attendere videtur exteriora ministeria. Dicit enim, quod angeli dicuntur qui minima nuntiant; Archangeli, qui summa; virtutes per quas miracula fiunt; potestates quibus adversae potestates repelluntur; principatus, qui ipsis bonis spiritibus praesunt. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod angelus nuntius dicitur. Omnes ergo caelestes spiritus, inquantum sunt manifestatores divinorum, angeli vocantur. Sed superiores angeli habent quandam excellentiam in hac manifestatione, a qua superiores ordines nominantur. Infimus autem angelorum ordo nullam excellentiam supra communem manifestationem addit, et ideo a simplici manifestatione nominatur. Et sic nomen commune remanet infimo ordini quasi proprium, ut dicit Dionysius V cap. Cael. Hier. Vel potest dici quod infimus ordo specialiter dicitur ordo angelorum, quia immediate nobis annuntiant. Virtus autem dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, communiter, secundum quod est media inter essentiam et operationem, et sic omnes caelestes spiritus nominantur caelestes virtutes, sicut et caelestes essentiae. Alio modo, secundum quod importat quendam excessum fortitudinis, et sic est proprium nomen ordinis. Unde Dionysius dicit, VIII cap. Cael. Hier., quod nomen virtutum significat quandam virilem et inconcussam fortitudinem, primo quidem ad omnes operationes divinas eis convenientes; secundo, ad suscipiendum divina. Et

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participates imperfectly, nor from that which it possesses in excess, but from that which is adequate thereto; as, for instance, when we wish properly to name a man, we should call him a rational substance, but not an intellectual substance, which latter is the proper name of an angel; because simple intelligence belongs to an angel as a property, and to man by participation; nor do we call him a sensible substance, which is the proper name of a brute; because sense is less than the property of a man, and belongs to man in a more excellent way than to other animals.

So we must consider that in the angelic orders all spiritual perfections are common to all the angels, and that they are all more excellently in the superior than in the inferior angels. Further, as in these perfections there are grades, the superior perfection belongs to the superior order as its property, whereas it belongs to the inferior by participation; and conversely the inferior perfection belongs to the inferior order as its property, and to the superior by way of excess; and thus the superior order is denominated from the superior perfection. So in this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the names of the orders accordingly as they befit the spiritual perfections they signify. Gregory, on the other hand, in expounding these names (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) seems to regard more the exterior ministrations; for he says that angels are so called as announcing the least things; and the archangels in the greatest; by the virtues miracles are wrought; by the powers hostile powers are repulsed; and the principalities preside over the good spirits themselves. Reply Obj. 1: Angel means messenger. So all the heavenly spirits, so far as they make known Divine things, are called angels. But the superior angels enjoy a certain excellence, as regards this manifestation, from which the superior orders are denominated. The lowest order of angels possess no excellence above the common manifestation; and therefore it is denominated from manifestation only; and thus the common name remains as it were proper to the lowest order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. v). Or we may say that the lowest order can be specially called the order of angels, forasmuch as they announce things to us immediately. Virtue can be taken in two ways. First, commonly, considered as the medium between the essence and the operation, and in that sense all the heavenly spirits are called heavenly virtues, as also heavenly essences. Second, as meaning a certain excellence of strength; and thus it is the proper name of an angelic order. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name ‘virtues’ signifies a certain virile and immovable strength; first, in regard of those Divine operations which befit them; second, in regard to receiving Divine gifts. Thus it signifies that they undertake fearlessly

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Angelic Degrees of Hierarchies and Orders

ita significat quod sine aliquo timore aggrediuntur divina quae ad eos pertinent, quod videtur ad fortitudinem animi pertinere. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Dionysius XII cap. de Div. Nom., dominatio laudatur in Deo singulariter per quendam excessum, sed per participationem, divina eloquia vocant dominos principaliores ornatus, per quos inferiores ex donis eius accipiunt. Unde et Dionysius dicit in VIII cap. Cael. Hier., quod nomen dominationum primo quidem significat quandam libertatem, quae est a servili conditione et pedestri subiectione, sicut plebs subiicitur, et a tyrannica oppressione, quam interdum etiam maiores patiuntur. Secundo significat quandam rigidam et inflexibilem gubernationem, quae ad nullum servilem actum inclinatur, neque ad aliquem actum subiectorum vel oppressorum a tyrannis. Tertio significat appetitum et participationem veri dominii, quod est in Deo. Et similiter nomen cuiuslibet ordinis significat participationem eius quod est in Deo; sicut nomen virtutum significat participationem divinae virtutis; et sic de aliis. Ad tertium dicendum quod nomen dominationis, et potestatis, et principatus, diversimode ad gubernationem pertinet. Nam domini est solummodo praecipere de agendis. Et ideo Gregorius dicit quod quaedam angelorum agmina, pro eo quod eis cetera ad obediendum subiecta sunt, dominationes vocantur. Nomen vero potestatis ordinationem quandam designat; secundum illud apostoli ad Rom. XIII, qui potestati resistit, Dei ordinationi resistit. Et ideo Dionysius dicit quod nomen potestatis significat quandam ordinationem et circa susceptionem divinorum, et circa actiones divinas quas superiores in inferiores agunt, eas sursum ducendo. Ad ordinem ergo potestatum pertinet ordinare quae a subditis sint agenda. Principari vero, ut Gregorius dicit, est inter reliquos priorem existere, quasi primi sint in executione eorum quae imperantur. Et ideo Dionysius dicit, IX cap. Cael. Hier., quod nomen principatuum significat ductivum cum ordine sacro. Illi enim qui alios ducunt, primi inter eos existentes, principes proprie vocantur secundum illud Psalmi LXVII, praevenerunt principes coniuncti psallentibus. Ad quartum dicendum quod Archangeli, secundum Dionysium, medii sunt inter principatus et angelos. Medium autem comparatum uni extremo, videtur alterum, inquantum participat naturam utriusque, sicut tepidum respectu calidi est frigidum, respectu vero frigidi est calidum. Sic et Archangeli dicuntur quasi principes angeli, quia respectu angelorum sunt principes, respectu vero principatuum sunt angeli. Secundum Gregorium autem, dicuntur Archangeli ex eo quod principantur soli ordini angelorum, quasi magna nuntiantes. Principatus

Q. 108, A. 5

the Divine behests appointed to them; and this seems to imply strength of mind. Reply Obj. 2: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): Dominion is attributed to God in a special manner, by way of excess: but the Divine word gives the more illustrious heavenly princes the name of Lord by participation, through whom the inferior angels receive the Divine gifts. Hence Dionysius also states (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name Domination means first a certain liberty, free from servile condition and common subjection, such as that of plebeians, and from tyrannical oppression, endured sometimes even by the great. Second, it signifies a certain rigid and inflexible supremacy which does not bend to any servile act, or to the act of those who are subject to or oppressed by tyrants. Third, it signifies the desire and participation of the true dominion which belongs to God. Likewise the name of each order signifies the participation of what belongs to God; as the name Virtues signifies the participation of the Divine virtue; and the same principle applies to the rest. Reply Obj. 3: The names Domination, Power, and Principality belong to government in different ways. The place of a lord is only to prescribe what is to be done. So Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Evang.), that some companies of the angels, because others are subject to obedience to them, are called dominations. The name Power points out a kind of order, according to what the Apostle says, He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordination of God (Rom 13:2). And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name Power signifies a kind of ordination both as regards the reception of Divine things, and as regards the Divine actions performed by superiors towards inferiors by leading them to things above. Therefore, to the order of Powers it belongs to regulate what is to be done by those who are subject to them. To preside as Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) is to be first among others, as being first in carrying out what is ordered to be done. And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that the name of Principalities signifies one who leads in a sacred order. For those who lead others, being first among them, are properly called princes, according to the words, Princes went before joined with singers (Ps 67:26). Reply Obj. 4: The Archangels, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ix), are between the Principalities and the Angels. A medium compared to one extreme seems like the other, as participating in the nature of both extremes; thus tepid seems cold compared to hot, and hot compared to cold. So the Archangels are called the angel princes; forasmuch as they are princes as regards the Angels, and angels as regards the Principalities. But according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) they are called Archangels, because they preside over the one order of the Angels; as it were, an-

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autem dicuntur ex eo quod principantur omnibus caele- nouncing greater things: and the Principalities are so called stibus virtutibus divinas iussiones explentibus. as presiding over all the heavenly Virtues who fulfill the Divine commands. Ad quintum dicendum quod nomen Seraphim non Reply Obj. 5: The name Seraphim does not come from imponitur tantum a caritate, sed a caritatis excessu, charity only, but from the excess of charity, expressed by quem importat nomen ardoris vel incendii. Unde Dio- the word ardor or fire. Hence Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) exnysius, VII cap. Cael. Hier., exponit nomen Seraphim se- pounds the name Seraphim according to the properties of cundum proprietates ignis, in quo est excessus calidi- fire, containing an excess of heat. Now in fire we may contatis. In igne autem tria possumus considerare. Primo sider three things. First, the movement which is upwards quidem, motum, qui est sursum, et qui est continuus. and continuous. This signifies that they are borne inflexPer quod significatur quod indeclinabiliter moventur in ibly towards God. Second, the active force which is heat, Deum. Secundo vero, virtutem activam eius, quae est ca- which is not found in fire simply, but exists with a certain lidum. Quod quidem non simpliciter invenitur in igne, sharpness, as being of most penetrating action, and reachsed cum quadam acuitate, quia maxime est penetrati- ing even to the smallest things, and as it were, with supervus in agendo, et pertingit usque ad minima; et iterum abundant fervor; whereby is signified the action of these cum quodam superexcedenti fervore. Et per hoc signifi- angels, exercised powerfully upon those who are subject to catur actio huiusmodi angelorum, quam in subditos po- them, rousing them to a like fervor, and cleansing them tenter exercent, eos in similem fervorem excitantes, et wholly by their heat. Third we consider in fire the quality of totaliter eos per incendium purgantes. Tertio considera- clarity, or brightness; which signifies that these angels have tur in igne claritas eius. Et hoc significat quod huiusmodi in themselves an inextinguishable light, and that they also angeli in seipsis habent inextinguibilem lucem, et quod perfectly enlighten others. alios perfecte illuminant. Similiter etiam nomen Cherubim imponitur a quoIn the same way the name Cherubim comes from a cerdam excessu scientiae, unde interpretatur plenitudo tain excess of knowledge; hence it is interpreted fullness of scientiae. Quod Dionysius exponit quantum ad quatuor, knowledge, which Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds in primo quidem, quantum ad perfectam Dei visionem; se- regard to four things: the perfect vision of God; the full recundo, quantum ad plenam susceptionem divini lumi- ception of the Divine Light; their contemplation in God of nis; tertio, quantum ad hoc, quod in ipso Deo contem- the beauty of the Divine order; and in regard to the fact that plantur pulchritudinem ordinis rerum a Deo derivatam; possessing this knowledge fully, they pour it forth copiously quarto, quantum ad hoc, quod ipsi pleni existentes hu- upon others. iusmodi cognitione, eam copiose in alios effundunt. Ad sextum dicendum quod ordo thronorum habet Reply Obj. 6: The order of the Thrones excels the infeexcellentiam prae inferioribus ordinibus in hoc, quod rior orders as having an immediate knowledge of the types immediate in Deo rationes divinorum operum cogno- of the Divine works; whereas the Cherubim have the excelscere possunt. Sed Cherubim habent excellentiam scien- lence of knowledge and the Seraphim the excellence of artiae; Seraphim vero excellentiam ardoris. Et licet in his dor. And although these two excellent attributes include the duabus excellentiis includatur tertia, non tamen in illa third, yet the gift belonging to the Thrones does not include quae est thronorum, includuntur aliae duae. Et ideo or- the other two; and so the order of the Thrones is distindo thronorum distinguitur ab ordine Cherubim et Se- guished from the orders of the Cherubim and the Seraphim. raphim. Hoc enim est commune in omnibus, quod ex- For it is a common rule in all things that the excellence cellentia inferioris continetur in excellentia superioris, et of the inferior is contained in the superior, but not connon e converso. Exponit autem Dionysius nomen thro- versely. But Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the name norum, per convenientiam ad materiales sedes. In qui- Thrones by its relation to material seats, in which we may bus est quatuor considerare. Primo quidem, situm, quia consider four things. First, the site; because seats are raised sedes supra terram elevantur. Et sic ipsi angeli qui throni above the earth, and to the angels who are called Thrones dicuntur, elevantur usque ad hoc, quod in Deo imme- are raised up to the immediate knowledge of the types of diate rationes rerum cognoscant. Secundo in materia- things in God. Second, because in material seats is dislibus sedibus consideratur firmitas, quia in ipsis aliquis played strength, forasmuch as a person sits firmly on them. firmiter sedet. Hic autem est e converso, nam ipsi angeli But here the reverse is the case; for the angels themselves firmantur per Deum. Tertio, quia sedes suscipit seden- are made firm by God. Third, because the seat receives him tem, et in ea deferri potest. Sic et isti angeli suscipiunt who sits thereon, and he can be carried thereupon; and so Deum in seipsis, et eum quodammodo ad inferiores fe- the angels receive God in themselves, and in a certain way runt. Quarto, ex figura, quia sedes ex una parte est aper- bear Him to the inferior creatures. Fourth, because in its ta ad suscipiendum sedentem. Ita et isti angeli sunt per shape, a seat is open on one side to receive the sitter; and

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Angelic Degrees of Hierarchies and Orders

Q. 108, A. 6

promptitudinem aperti ad suscipiendum Deum, et fa- thus are the angels promptly open to receive God and to mulandum ipsi. serve Him.

Article 6 Whether the grades of the orders are properly assigned? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter gradus ordinum assignentur. Ordo enim praelatorum videtur esse supremus. Sed dominationes, principatus et potestates ex ipsis nominibus praelationem quandam habent. Ergo isti ordines debent esse inter omnes supremi. Praeterea, quanto aliquis ordo est Deo propinquior, tanto est superior. Sed ordo thronorum videtur esse Deo propinquissimus, nihil enim coniungitur propinquius sedenti, quam sua sedes. Ergo ordo thronorum est altissimus. Praeterea, scientia est prior quam amor; et intellectus videtur esse altior quam voluntas. Ergo et ordo Cherubim videtur esse altior quam ordo Seraphim. Praeterea, Gregorius ponit principatus supra potestates. Non ergo collocantur immediate supra Archangelos, ut Dionysius dicit. Sed contra est quod Dionysius ponit, in prima quidem hierarchia. Seraphim ut primos, Cherubim ut medios, thronos ut ultimos; in media vero, dominationes ut primos, virtutes ut medios, potestates ut ultimos; in ultima, principatus ut primos, Archangelos ut medios, Angelos ut ultimos. Respondeo dicendum quod gradus angelicorum ordinum assignant et Gregorius et Dionysius, quantum ad alia quidem convenienter, sed quantum ad principatus et virtutes differenter. Nam Dionysius collocat virtutes sub dominationibus et supra potestates, principatus autem sub potestatibus et supra Archangelos, Gregorius autem ponit principatus in medio dominationum et potestatum, virtutes vero in medio potestatum et Archangelorum. Et utraque assignatio fulcimentum habere potest ex auctoritate apostoli. Qui, medios ordines ascendendo enumerans, dicit, Ephes. I, quod Deus constituit illum, scilicet Christum, ad dexteram suam in caelestibus, supra omnem principatum et potestatem et virtutem et dominationem, ubi virtutem ponit inter potestatem et dominationem, secundum assignationem Dionysii. Sed ad Coloss. I, enumerans eosdem ordines descendendo, dicit, sive throni, sive dominationes, sive principatus, sive potestates, omnia per ipsum et in ipso creata sunt, ubi principatus ponit medios inter dominationes et potestates, secundum assignationem Gregorii.

Objection 1: It would seem that the grades of the orders are not properly assigned. For the order of prelates is the highest. But the names of Dominations, Principalities, and Powers of themselves imply prelacy. Therefore these orders ought not to be supreme. Obj. 2: Further, the nearer an order is to God, the higher it is. But the order of Thrones is the nearest to God; for nothing is nearer to the sitter than the seat. Therefore the order of the Thrones is the highest. Obj. 3: Further, knowledge comes before love, and intellect is higher than will. Therefore the order of Cherubim seems to be higher than the Seraphim. Obj. 4: Further, Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Evang.) places the Principalities above the Powers. These therefore are not placed immediately above the Archangels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix). On the contrary, Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), places in the highest hierarchy the Seraphim as the first, the Cherubim as the middle, the Thrones as the last; in the middle hierarchy he places the Dominations, as the first, the Virtues in the middle, the Powers last; in the lowest hierarchy the Principalities first, then the Archangels, and lastly the Angels. I answer that, The grades of the angelic orders are assigned by Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), who agree as regards all except the Principalities and Virtues. For Dionysius places the Virtues beneath the Dominations, and above the Powers; the Principalities beneath the Powers and above the Archangels. Gregory, however, places the Principalities between the Dominations and the Powers; and the Virtues between the Powers and the Archangels. Each of these placings may claim authority from the words of the Apostle, who (Eph 1:20,21) enumerates the middle orders, beginning from the lowest saying that God set Him, i.e., Christ, on His right hand in the heavenly places above all Principality and Power, and Virtue, and Dominion. Here he places Virtues between Powers and Dominations, according to the placing of Dionysius. Writing however to the Colossians (1:16), numbering the same orders from the highest, he says: Whether Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities, or Powers, all things were created by Him and in Him. Here he places the Principalities between Dominations and Powers, as does also Gregory.

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Primo igitur videamus rationem assignationis Dionysii. In qua considerandum est quod, sicut supra dictum est, prima hierarchia accipit rationes rerum in ipso Deo; secunda vero in causis universalibus; tertia vero secundum determinationem ad speciales effectus. Et quia Deus est finis non solum angelicorum ministeriorum, sed etiam totius creaturae, ad primam hierarchiam pertinet consideratio finis; ad mediam vero dispositio universalis de agendis; ad ultimam autem applicatio dispositionis ad effectum, quae est operis executio; haec enim tria manifestum est in qualibet operatione inveniri. Et ideo Dionysius, ex nominibus ordinum proprietates illorum considerans, illos ordines in prima hierarchia posuit, quorum nomina imponuntur per respectum ad Deum, scilicet Seraphim et Cherubim et thronos. Illos vero ordines posuit in media hierarchia, quorum nomina designant communem quandam gubernationem sive dispositionem, scilicet dominationes, virtutes et potestates. Illos vero ordines posuit in tertia hierarchia, quorum nomina designant operis executionem, scilicet principatus, Angelos et Archangelos. In respectu autem ad finem, tria considerari possunt, nam primo, aliquis considerat finem; secundo vero, perfectam finis cognitionem accipit; tertio vero, intentionem suam in ipso defigit; quorum secundum ex additione se habet ad primum, et tertium ad utrumque. Et quia Deus est finis creaturarum sicut dux est finis exercitus, ut dicitur in XII Metaphys., potest aliquid simile huius ordinis considerari in rebus humanis, nam quidam sunt qui hoc habent dignitatis, ut per seipsos familiariter accedere possunt ad regem vel ducem; quidam vero super hoc habent, ut etiam secreta eius cognoscant; alii vero insuper circa ipsum semper inhaerent, quasi ei coniuncti. Et secundum hanc similitudinem accipere possumus dispositionem ordinum primae hierarchiae. Nam throni elevantur ad hoc, quod Deum familiariter in seipsis recipiant, secundum quod rationes rerum in ipso immediate cognoscere possunt, quod est proprium totius primae hierarchiae. Cherubim vero supereminenter divina secreta cognoscunt. Seraphim vero excellunt in hoc quod est omnium supremum, scilicet Deo ipsi uniri. Ut sic ab eo quod est commune toti hierarchiae, denominetur ordo thronorum; sicut ab eo quod est commune omnibus caelestibus spiritibus, denominatur ordo Angelorum. Ad gubernationis autem rationem tria pertinent. Quorum primum est definitio eorum quae agenda sunt, quod est proprium dominationum. Secundum autem est praebere facultatem ad implendum, quod pertinet ad virtutes. Tertium autem est ordinare qualiter ea quae praecepta vel definita sunt, impleri possint, ut aliqui exequantur, et hoc pertinet ad potestates. Executio autem angelicorum ministeriorum consistit in annuntiando divina. In executione autem cuiuslibet actus, sunt quidam quasi incipientes actionem et alios

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Let us then first examine the reason for the ordering of Dionysius, in which we see, that, as said above (A. 1), the highest hierarchy contemplates the ideas of things in God Himself; the second in the universal causes; and third in their application to particular effects. And because God is the end not only of the angelic ministrations, but also of the whole creation, it belongs to the first hierarchy to consider the end; to the middle one belongs the universal disposition of what is to be done; and to the last belongs the application of this disposition to the effect, which is the carrying out of the work; for it is clear that these three things exist in every kind of operation. So Dionysius, considering the properties of the orders as derived from their names, places in the first hierarchy those orders the names of which are taken from their relation to God, the Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones; and he places in the middle hierarchy those orders whose names denote a certain kind of common government or disposition—the Dominations, Virtues, and Powers; and he places in the third hierarchy the orders whose names denote the execution of the work, the Principalities, Angels, and Archangels. As regards the end, three things may be considered. For first we consider the end; then we acquire perfect knowledge of the end; third, we fix our intention on the end; of which the second is an addition to the first, and the third an addition to both. And because God is the end of creatures, as the leader is the end of an army, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10); so a somewhat similar order may be seen in human affairs. For there are some who enjoy the dignity of being able with familiarity to approach the king or leader; others in addition are privileged to know his secrets; and others above these ever abide with him, in a close union. According to this similitude, we can understand the disposition in the orders of the first hierarchy; for the Thrones are raised up so as to be the familiar recipients of God in themselves, in the sense of knowing immediately the types of things in Himself; and this is proper to the whole of the first hierarchy. The Cherubim know the Divine secrets supereminently; and the Seraphim excel in what is the supreme excellence of all, in being united to God Himself; and all this in such a manner that the whole of this hierarchy can be called the Thrones; as, from what is common to all the heavenly spirits together, they are all called Angels. As regards government, three things are comprised therein, the first of which is to appoint those things which are to be done, and this belongs to the Dominations; the second is to give the power of carrying out what is to be done, which belongs to the Virtues; the third is to order how what has been commanded or decided to be done can be carried out by others, which belongs to the Powers. The execution of the angelic ministrations consists in announcing Divine things. Now in the execution of any action there are beginners and leaders; as in singing, the pre-

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ducentes, sicut in cantu praecentores, et in bello illi qui alios ducunt et dirigunt, et hoc pertinet ad principatus. Alii vero sunt qui simpliciter exequuntur, et hoc pertinet ad Angelos. Alii vero medio modo se habent, quod ad Archangelos pertinet, ut supra dictum est. Invenitur autem congrua haec ordinum assignatio. Nam semper summum inferioris ordinis affinitatem habet cum ultimo superioris; sicut infima animalia parum distant a plantis. Primus autem ordo est divinarum personarum, qui terminatur ad spiritum sanctum, qui est amor procedens, cum quo affinitatem habet supremus ordo primae hierarchiae, ab incendio amoris denominatus. Infimus autem ordo primae hierarchiae est thronorum, qui ex suo nomine habent quandam affinitatem cum dominationibus, nam throni dicuntur, secundum Gregorium, per quos Deus sua iudicia exercet; accipiunt enim divinas illuminationes per convenientiam ad immediate illuminandum secundam hierarchiam, ad quam pertinet dispositio divinorum ministeriorum. Ordo vero potestatum affinitatem habet cum ordine principatuum, nam cum potestatum sit ordinationem subiectis imponere, haec ordinatio statim in nomine principatuum designatur, qui sunt primi in executione divinorum ministeriorum, utpote praesidentes gubernationi gentium et regnorum, quod est primum et praecipuum in divinis ministeriis; nam bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius hominis. Unde dicitur Dan. X, princeps regni Persarum restitit mihi. Dispositio etiam ordinum quam Gregorius ponit, congruitatem habet. Nam cum dominationes sint definientes et praecipientes ea quae ad divina ministeria pertinent, ordines eis subiecti disponuntur secundum dispositionem eorum in quos divina ministeria exercentur ut autem Augustinus dicit in III de Trin., corpora quodam ordine reguntur, inferiora per superiora, et omnia per spiritualem creaturam; et spiritus malus per spiritum bonum. Primus ergo ordo post dominationes dicitur principatuum, qui etiam bonis spiritibus principantur. Deinde potestates, per quas arcentur mali spiritus, sicut per potestates terrenas arcentur malefactores, ut habetur Rom. XIII. Post quas sunt virtutes, quae habent potestatem super corporalem naturam in operatione miraculorum. Post quas sunt Archangeli et Angeli, qui nuntiant hominibus vel magna, quae sunt supra rationem; vel parva, ad quae ratio se extendere potest. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in angelis potius est quod subiiciuntur Deo, quam quod inferioribus praesident, et hoc derivatur ex illo. Et ideo ordines nominati a praelatione non sunt supremi, sed magis ordines nominati a conversione ad Deum.

Q. 108, A. 6

centors; and in war, generals and officers; this belongs to the Principalities. There are others who simply execute what is to be done; and these are the Angels. Others hold a middle place; and these are the Archangels, as above explained. This explanation of the orders is quite a reasonable one. For the highest in an inferior order always has affinity to the lowest in the higher order; as the lowest animals are near to the plants. Now the first order is that of the Divine Persons, which terminates in the Holy Spirit, Who is Love proceeding, with Whom the highest order of the first hierarchy has affinity, denominated as it is from the fire of love. The lowest order of the first hierarchy is that of the Thrones, who in their own order are akin to the Dominations; for the Thrones, according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.), are so called because through them God accomplishes His judgments, since they are enlightened by Him in a manner adapted to the immediate enlightening of the second hierarchy, to which belongs the disposition of the Divine ministrations. The order of the Powers is akin to the order of the Principalities; for as it belongs to the Powers to impose order on those subject to them, this ordering is plainly shown at once in the name of Principalities, who, as presiding over the government of peoples and kingdoms (which occupies the first and principal place in the Divine ministrations), are the first in the execution thereof; for the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one man (Ethic. i, 2); and hence it is written, The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me (Dan 10:13). The disposition of the orders which is mentioned by Gregory is also reasonable. For since the Dominations appoint and order what belongs to the Divine ministrations, the orders subject to them are arranged according to the disposition of those things in which the Divine ministrations are effected. Still, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii), bodies are ruled in a certain order; the inferior by the superior; and all of them by the spiritual creature, and the bad spirit by the good spirit. So the first order after the Dominations is called that of Principalities, who rule even over good spirits; then the Powers, who coerce the evil spirits; even as evil-doers are coerced by earthly powers, as it is written (Rom 13:3,4). After these come the Virtues, which have power over corporeal nature in the working of miracles; after these are the Angels and the Archangels, who announce to men either great things above reason, or small things within the purview of reason. Reply Obj. 1: The angels’ subjection to God is greater than their presiding over inferior things; and the latter is derived from the former. Thus the orders which derive their name from presiding are not the first and highest; but rather the orders deriving their name from their nearness and relation to God.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod illa propinquitas ad Deum quae designatur nomine thronorum, convenit etiam Cherubim et Seraphim, et excellentius, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cognitio est secundum quod cognita sunt in cognoscente; amor autem secundum quod amans unitur rei amatae. Superiora autem nobiliori modo sunt in seipsis quam in inferioribus, inferiora vero nobiliori modo in superioribus quam in seipsis. Et ideo inferiorum quidem cognitio praeeminet dilectioni, superiorum autem dilectio, et praecipue Dei, praeeminet cognitioni. Ad quartum dicendum quod, si quis diligenter consideret dispositiones ordinum secundum Dionysium et Gregorium, parum vel nihil differunt, si ad rem referantur. Exponit enim Gregorius principatuum nomen ex hoc, quod bonis spiritibus praesunt, et hoc convenit virtutibus, secundum quod in nomine virtutum intelligitur quaedam fortitudo dans efficaciam inferioribus spiritibus ad exequenda divina ministeria. Rursus virtutes, secundum Gregorium, videntur esse idem quod principatus secundum Dionysium. Nam hoc est primum in divinis ministeriis, miracula facere, per hoc enim paratur via Annuntiationi Archangelorum et Angelorum.

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Reply Obj. 2: The nearness to God designated by the name of the Thrones, belongs also to the Cherubim and Seraphim, and in a more excellent way, as above explained. Reply Obj. 3: As above explained (Q. 27, A. 3), knowledge takes place accordingly as the thing known is in the knower; but love as the lover is united to the object loved. Now higher things are in a nobler way in themselves than in lower things; whereas lower things are in higher things in a nobler way than they are in themselves. Therefore to know lower things is better than to love them; and to love the higher things, God above all, is better than to know them. Reply Obj. 4: A careful comparison will show that little or no difference exists in reality between the dispositions of the orders according to Dionysius and Gregory. For Gregory expounds the name Principalities from their presiding over good spirits, which also agrees with the Virtues accordingly as this name expressed a certain strength, giving efficacy to the inferior spirits in the execution of the Divine ministrations. Again, according to Gregory, the Virtues seem to be the same as Principalities of Dionysius. For to work miracles holds the first place in the Divine ministrations; since thereby the way is prepared for the announcements of the Archangels and the Angels.

Article 7 Whether the orders will outlast the day of judgment? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ordines non remanebunt post diem iudicii. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XV, quod Christus evacuabit omnem principatum et potestatem, cum tradiderit regnum Deo et patri, quod erit in ultima consummatione. Pari ergo ratione, in illo statu omnes alii ordines evacuabuntur. Praeterea, ad officium angelicorum ordinum pertinet purgare, illuminare et perficere. Sed post diem iudicii unus angelus non purgabit aut illuminabit aut perficiet alium, quia non proficient amplius in scientia. Ergo frustra ordines angelici remanerent. Praeterea, apostolus dicit, ad Heb. I, de angelis, quod omnes sunt administratorii spiritus, in ministerium missi propter eos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis, ex quo patet quod officia angelorum ordinantur ad hoc, quod homines ad salutem adducantur. Sed omnes electi usque ad diem iudicii salutem consequuntur. Non ergo post diem iudicii remanebunt officia et ordines angelorum.

Objection 1: It would seem that the orders of angels will not outlast the Day of Judgment. For the Apostle says (1 Cor 15:24), that Christ will bring to naught all principality and power, when He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father, and this will be in the final consummation. Therefore for the same reason all others will be abolished in that state. Obj. 2: Further, to the office of the angelic orders it belongs to cleanse, enlighten, and perfect. But after the Day of Judgment one angel will not cleanse, enlighten, or perfect another, because they will not advance any more in knowledge. Therefore the angelic orders would remain for no purpose. Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says of the angels (Heb 1:14), that they are all ministering spirits, sent to minister to them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation; whence it appears that the angelic offices are ordered for the purpose of leading men to salvation. But all the elect are in pursuit of salvation until the Day of Judgment. Therefore the angelic offices and orders will not outlast the Day of Judgment.

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Sed contra est quod dicitur Iudic. V, stellae manentes in ordine et cursu suo, quod exponitur de angelis. Ergo angeli semper in suis ordinibus remanebunt. Respondeo dicendum quod in ordinibus angelicis duo possunt considerari, scilicet distinctio graduum, et executio officiorum. Distinctio autem graduum est in angelis secundum differentiam gratiae et naturae, ut supra dictum est. Et utraque differentia semper in angelis remanebit. Non enim posset naturarum differentia ab eis auferri, nisi eis corruptis, differentia etiam gloriae erit in eis semper, secundum differentiam meriti praecedentis. Executio autem officiorum angelicorum aliquo modo remanebit post diem iudicii, et aliquo modo cessabit. Cessabit quidem, secundum quod eorum officia ordinantur ad perducendum aliquos ad finem, remanebit autem, secundum quod convenit in ultima finis consecutione. Sicut etiam alia sunt officia militarium ordinum in pugna, et in triumpho. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod principatus et potestates evacuabuntur in illa finali consummatione quantum ad hoc, quod alios ad finem perducant, quia consecuto iam fine, non est necessarium tendere in finem. Et haec ratio intelligitur ex verbis apostoli, dicentis, cum tradiderit regnum Deo et patri, idest, cum perduxerit fideles ad fruendum ipso Deo.

Q. 108, A. 7

On the contrary, It is written (Judg 5:20): Stars remaining in their order and courses, which is applied to the angels. Therefore the angels will ever remain in their orders. I answer that, In the angelic orders we may consider two things; the distinction of grades, and the execution of their offices. The distinction of grades among the angels takes place according to the difference of grace and nature, as above explained (A. 4); and these differences will ever remain in the angels; for these differences of natures cannot be taken from them unless they themselves be corrupted. The difference of glory will also ever remain in them according to the difference of preceding merit. As to the execution of the angelic offices, it will to a certain degree remain after the Day of Judgment, and to a certain degree will cease. It will cease accordingly as their offices are directed towards leading others to their end; but it will remain, accordingly as it agrees with the attainment of the end. Thus also the various ranks of soldiers have different duties to perform in battle and in triumph. Reply Obj. 1: The principalities and powers will come to an end in that final consummation as regards their office of leading others to their end; because when the end is attained, it is no longer necessary to tend towards the end. This is clear from the words of the Apostle, When He shall have delivered up the kingdom of God and the Father, i.e., when He shall have led the faithful to the enjoyment of God Himself. Reply Obj. 2: The actions of angels over the other angels are to be considered according to a likeness to our own intellectual actions. In ourselves we find many intellectual actions which are ordered according to the order of cause and effect; as when we gradually arrive at one conclusion by many middle terms. Now it is manifest that the knowledge of a conclusion depends on all the preceding middle terms not only in the new acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the keeping of the knowledge acquired. A proof of this is that when anyone forgets any of the preceding middle terms he can have opinion or belief about the conclusion, but not knowledge; as he is ignorant of the order of the causes. So, since the inferior angels know the types of the Divine works by the light of the superior angels, their knowledge depends on the light of the superior angels not only as regards the acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the preserving of the knowledge possessed. So, although after the Judgment the inferior angels will not progress in the knowledge of some things, still this will not prevent their being enlightened by the superior angels.

Ad secundum dicendum quod actiones angelorum super alios angelos considerandae sunt secundum similitudinem actionum intelligibilium quae sunt in nobis. Inveniuntur autem in nobis multae intelligibiles actiones quae sunt ordinatae secundum ordinem causae et causati; sicut cum per multa media gradatim in unam conclusionem devenimus. Manifestum est autem quod cognitio conclusionis dependet ex omnibus mediis praecedentibus, non solum quantum ad novam acquisitionem scientiae, sed etiam quantum ad scientiae conservationem. Cuius signum est quod, si quis oblivisceretur aliquod praecedentium mediorum, opinionem quidem vel fidem de conclusione posset habere, sed non scientiam, ordine causarum ignorato. Sic igitur, cum inferiores angeli rationes divinorum operum cognoscant per lumen superiorum angelorum, dependet eorum cognitio ex lumine superiorum, non solum quantum ad novam acquisitionem scientiae, sed etiam quantum ad cognitionis conservationem. Licet ergo post iudicium non proficiant inferiores Aangeli in cognitione aliquarum rerum, non tamen propter hoc excluditur quin a superioribus illuminentur. Ad tertium dicendum quod, etsi post diem iudicii Reply Obj. 3: Although after the Day of Judgment men homines non sint ulterius ad salutem adducendi per mi- will not be led any more to salvation by the ministry of the nisterium angelorum; tamen illi qui iam salutem erunt angels, still those who are already saved will be enlightened consecuti, aliquam illustrationem habebunt per angelo- through the angelic ministry. rum officia.

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Article 8 Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homines non assumantur ad ordines angelorum. Hierarchia enim humana continetur sub infima hierarchiarum caelestium, sicut infima sub media, et media sub prima. Sed angeli infimae hierarchiae nunquam transferentur in mediam aut in primam. Ergo neque homines transferentur ad ordines angelorum. Praeterea, ordinibus angelorum aliqua officia competunt, utpote custodire, miracula facere, daemones arcere, et huiusmodi, quae non videntur convenire animabus sanctorum. Ergo non transferentur ad ordines angelorum. Praeterea, sicut boni angeli inducunt ad bonum, ita daemones inducunt ad malum. Sed erroneum est dicere quod animae hominum malorum convertantur in daemones, hoc enim Chrysostomus reprobat, super Matth. Ergo non videtur quod animae sanctorum transferantur ad ordines angelorum. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Matth. XXII, de sanctis, quod erunt sicut angeli Dei in caelo. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ordines angelorum distinguuntur et secundum conditionem naturae, et secundum dona gratiae. Si ergo considerentur angelorum ordines solum quantum ad gradum naturae, sic homines nullo modo assumi possunt ad ordines angelorum, quia semper remanebit naturarum distinctio. Quam quidam considerantes, posuerunt quod nullo modo homines transferri possunt ad aequalitatem angelorum. Quod est erroneum, repugnat enim promissioni Christi, dicentis, Lucae XX, quod filii resurrectionis erunt aequales angelis in caelis. Illud enim quod est ex parte naturae, se habet ut materiale in ratione ordinis, completivum vero est quod est ex dono gratiae, quae dependet ex liberalitate Dei, non ex ordine naturae. Et ideo per donum gratiae homines mereri possunt tantam gloriam, ut angelis aequentur secundum singulos angelorum gradus. Quod est homines ad ordines angelorum assumi. Quidam tamen dicunt quod ad ordines angelorum non assumuntur omnes qui salvantur, sed soli virgines vel perfecti; alii vero suum ordinem constituent, quasi condivisum toti societati angelorum. Sed hoc est contra Augustinum, qui dicit XII de Civ. Dei, quod non erunt duae societates hominum et angelorum, sed una, quia omnium beatitudo est adhaerere uni Deo. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod gratia angelis datur secundum proportionem naturalium; non autem sic est de hominibus, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo sicut inferiores angeli non possunt transferri ad naturalem gradum superiorum, ita nec ad gratuitum. Homines vero

Objection 1: It would seem that men are not taken up into the orders of the angels. For the human hierarchy is stationed beneath the lowest heavenly hierarchy, as the lowest under the middle hierarchy and the middle beneath the first. But the angels of the lowest hierarchy are never transferred into the middle, or the first. Therefore neither are men transferred to the angelic orders. Obj. 2: Further, certain offices belong to the orders of the angels, as to guard, to work miracles, to coerce the demons, and the like; which do not appear to belong to the souls of the saints. Therefore they are not transferred to the angelic orders. Obj. 3: Further, as the good angels lead on to good, so do the demons to what is evil. But it is erroneous to say that the souls of bad men are changed into demons; for Chrysostom rejects this (Hom. xxviii in Matt.). Therefore it does not seem that the souls of the saints will be transferred to the orders of angels. On the contrary, The Lord says of the saints that, they will be as the angels of God (Matt 22:30). I answer that, As above explained (AA. 4,7), the orders of the angels are distinguished according to the conditions of nature and according to the gifts of grace. Considered only as regards the grade of nature, men can in no way be assumed into the angelic orders; for the natural distinction will always remain. In view of this distinction, some asserted that men can in no way be transferred to an equality with the angels; but this is erroneous, contradicting as it does the promise of Christ saying that the children of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in heaven (Luke 20:36). For whatever belongs to nature is the material part of an order; whilst that which perfects is from grace which depends on the liberality of God, and not on the order of nature. Therefore by the gift of grace men can merit glory in such a degree as to be equal to the angels, in each of the angelic grades; and this implies that men are taken up into the orders of the angels. Some, however, say that not all who are saved are assumed into the angelic orders, but only virgins or the perfect; and that the other will constitute their own order, as it were, corresponding to the whole society of the angels. But this is against what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), that there will not be two societies of men and angels, but only one; because the beatitude of all is to cleave to God alone. Reply Obj. 1: Grace is given to the angels in proportion to their natural gifts. This, however, does not apply to men, as above explained (A. 4; Q. 62, A. 6). So, as the inferior angels cannot be transferred to the natural grade of the superior, neither can they be transferred to the supe-

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possunt ad gratuitum conscendere, sed non ad naturalem. Ad secundum dicendum quod angeli, secundum naturae ordinem, medii sunt inter nos et Deum. Et ideo, secundum legem communem, per eos administrantur non solum res humanae, sed etiam omnia corporalia. Homines autem sancti, etiam post hanc vitam, sunt eiusdem naturae nobiscum. Unde secundum legem communem, non administrant humana, nec rebus vivorum intersunt, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de Cura pro Mortuis Agenda. Ex quadam tamen speciali dispensatione interdum aliquibus sanctis conceditur, vel vivis vel mortuis, huiusmodi officia exercere, vel miracula faciendo, vel daemones arcendo, vel aliquid huiusmodi; sicut Augustinus in eodem libro dicit. Ad tertium dicendum quod homines ad poenam daemonum transferri, non est erroneum, sed quidam erronee posuerunt daemones nihil aliud esse quam animas defunctorum. Et hoc Chrysostomus reprobat.

Q. 108, A. 8

rior grade of grace; whereas men can ascend to the grade of grace, but not of nature. Reply Obj. 2: The angels according to the order of nature are between us and God; and therefore according to the common law not only human affairs are administered by them, but also all corporeal matters. But holy men even after this life are of the same nature with ourselves; and hence according to the common law they do not administer human affairs, nor do they interfere in the things of the living, as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xiii, xvi). Still, by a certain special dispensation it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to exercise these offices; by working miracles, by coercing the demons, or by doing something of that kind, as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xvi). Reply Obj. 3: It is not erroneous to say that men are transferred to the penalty of demons; but some erroneously stated that the demons are nothing but souls of the dead; and it is this that Chrysostom rejects.

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Question 109 The Ordering of the Bad Angels Deinde considerandum est de ordinatione malorum We now consider the ordering of the bad angels; conangelorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. cerning which there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum ordines sint in daemonibus. (1) Whether there are orders among the demons? Secundo, utrum in eis sit praelatio. (2) Whether among them there is precedence? Tertio, utrum unus illuminet alium. (3) Whether one enlightens another? Quarto, utrum subiiciantur praelationi bonorum (4) Whether they are subject to the precedence of the angelorum. good angels?

Article 1 Whether there are orders among the demons? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ordines non sint in daemonibus. Ordo enim pertinet ad rationem boni, sicut et modus et species, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de Natura Boni; et e contrario inordinatio pertinet ad rationem mali. Sed in bonis angelis nihil est inordinatum. Ergo in malis angelis non sunt aliqui ordines. Praeterea, ordines angelici sub aliqua hierarchia continentur. Sed daemones non sunt sub aliqua hierarchia, quae est sacer principatus, cum ab omni sanctitate sint vacui. Ergo in daemonibus non sunt ordines. Praeterea, daemones de singulis ordinibus angelorum ceciderunt, ut communiter dicitur. Si ergo aliqui daemones dicuntur esse alicuius ordinis, quia de illo ordine ceciderunt; videtur quod deberent eis attribui nomina singulorum ordinum. Nunquam autem invenitur quod dicantur Seraphim, vel throni, vel dominationes. Ergo, pari ratione, non sunt in aliquibus ordinibus. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. ult., quod est nobis colluctatio adversus principes et potestates, adversus mundi rectores tenebrarum harum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, ordo angelicus consideratur et secundum gradum naturae, et secundum gradum gratiae. Gratia vero habet duplicem statum, scilicet imperfectum, qui est status merendi; et perfectum, qui est status gloriae consummatae. Si ergo considerentur ordines angelici quantum ad perfectionem gloriae, sic daemones neque sunt in ordinibus angelicis, neque unquam fuerunt. Si autem considerentur quantum ad id quod est gratiae imperfectae, sic daemones fuerunt quidem aliquando in ordinibus angelorum, sed ab eis ceciderunt; secundum illud quod supra posuimus, omnes angelos in gratia creatos fuisse. Si au-

Objection 1: It would seem that there are no orders among the demons. For order belongs to good, as also mode, and species, as Augustine says (De Nat. Boni iii); and on the contrary, disorder belongs to evil. But there is nothing disorderly in the good angels. Therefore in the bad angels there are no orders. Obj. 2: Further, the angelic orders are contained under a hierarchy. But the demons are not in a hierarchy, which is defined as a holy principality; for they are void of all holiness. Therefore among the demons there are no orders. Obj. 3: Further, the demons fell from every one of the angelic orders; as is commonly supposed. Therefore, if some demons are said to belong to an order, as falling from that order, it would seem necessary to give them the names of each of those orders. But we never find that they are called Seraphim, or Thrones, or Dominations. Therefore on the same ground they are not to be placed in any other order. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph 6:12): Our wrestling . . . is against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness. I answer that, As explained above (Q. 108, AA. 4, 7, 8), order in the angels is considered both according to the grade of nature; and according to that of grace. Now grace has a twofold state, the imperfect, which is that of merit; and the perfect, which is that of consummate glory. If therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the angelic orders, and never were. But if we consider them in relation to imperfect grace, in that view the demons were at the time in the orders of angels, but fell away from them, according to what was said above (Q. 62, A. 3), that all the angels were created in grace. But if we consider them in the

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tem considerentur quantum ad id quod est naturae, sic adhuc sunt in ordinibus, quia data naturalia non amiserunt, ut Dionysius dicit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bonum potest inveniri sine malo; sed malum non potest inveniri sine bono, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo daemones, inquantum habent naturam bonam, ordinati sunt. Ad secundum dicendum quod ordinatio daemonum, si consideretur ex parte Dei ordinantis, est sacra, utitur enim daemonibus propter seipsum. Sed ex parte voluntatis daemonum, non est sacra, quia abutuntur sua natura ad malum. Ad tertium dicendum quod nomen Seraphim imponitur ab ardore caritatis, nomen autem thronorum ab inhabitatione divina, nomen autem dominationum importat libertatem quandam, quae omnia opponuntur peccato. Et ideo peccantibus angelis huiusmodi nomina non attribuuntur.

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light of nature, in that view they are still in those orders; because they have not lost their natural gifts; as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Reply Obj. 1: Good can exist without evil; whereas evil cannot exist without good (Q. 49, A. 3); so there is order in the demons, as possessing a good nature. Reply Obj. 2: If we consider the ordering of the demons on the part of God Who orders them, it is sacred; for He uses the demons for Himself; but on the part of the demons’ will it is not a sacred thing, because they abuse their nature for evil. Reply Obj. 3: The name Seraphim is given from the ardor of charity; and the name Thrones from the Divine indwelling; and the name Dominations imports a certain liberty; all of which are opposed to sin; and therefore these names are not given to the angels who sinned.

Article 2 Whether among the demons there is precedence? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Objection 1: It would seem that there is no precedaemonibus non sit praelatio. Omnis enim praelatio est dence among the demons. For every precedence is accordsecundum aliquem ordinem iustitiae. Sed daemones to- ing to some order of justice. But the demons are wholly taliter a iustitia ceciderunt. Ergo in eis non est praelatio. fallen from justice. Therefore there is no precedence among them. Praeterea, ubi non est obedientia et subiectio, non Obj. 2: Further, there is no precedence where obediest praelatio. Haec autem sine concordia esse non pos- ence and subjection do not exist. But these cannot be withsunt; quae in daemonibus nulla est, secundum illud out concord; which is not to be found among the demons, Prov. XIII, inter superbos semper sunt iurgia. Ergo in dae- according to the text, Among the proud there are always monibus non est praelatio. contentions (Prov 13:10). Therefore there is no precedence among the demons. Praeterea, si in eis est aliqua praelatio, aut hoc Obj. 3: If there be precedence among them it is either pertinet ad eorum naturam, aut ad eorum culpam vel according to nature, or according to their sin or punishpoenam. Sed non ad eorum naturam, quia subiectio et ment. But it is not according to their nature, for subjection servitus non est ex natura, sed est ex peccato subsecu- and service do not come from nature but from subsequent ta. Nec pertinet ad culpam vel poenam, quia sic superio- sin; neither is it according to sin or punishment, because in res daemones, qui magis peccaverunt, inferioribus sub- that case the superior demons who have sinned the most derentur. Non ergo est praelatio in daemonibus. grievously, would be subject to the inferior. Therefore there is no precedence among the demons. Sed contra est quod dicit Glossa, I ad Cor. XV, On the contrary, On 1 Cor. 15:24 the gloss says: quandiu durat mundus, angeli angelis, homines homini- While the world lasts, angels will preside over angels, men bus, et daemones daemonibus praesunt. over men, and demons over demons. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum actio sequatur I answer that, Since action follows the nature of a naturam rei, quorumcumque naturae sunt ordinatae, thing, where natures are subordinate, actions also must be oportet quod etiam actiones sub invicem ordinentur. Si- subordinate to each other. Thus it is in corporeal things, cut patet in rebus corporalibus, quia enim inferiora cor- for as the inferior bodies by natural order are below the pora naturali ordine sunt infra corpora caelestia actiones heavenly bodies, their actions and movements are subject et motus eorum subduntur actionibus et motibus cae- to the actions and movements of the heavenly bodies. Now lestium corporum. Manifestum est autem ex praemissis it is plain from what we have said (A. 1), that the demons quod daemonum quidam naturali ordine sub aliis con- are by natural order subject to others; and hence their ac-

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stituuntur. Unde et actiones eorum sub actionibus superiorum sunt. Et hoc est quod rationem praelationis facit, ut scilicet actio subditi subdatur actioni praelati. Sic igitur ipsa naturalis dispositio daemonum requirit quod sit in eis praelatio. Convenit etiam hoc divinae sapientiae, quae nihil in universo inordinatum relinquit, quae attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter, ut dicitur Sap. VIII. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praelatio daemonum non fundatur super eorum iustitia, sed super iustitia Dei cuncta ordinantis. Ad secundum dicendum quod concordia daemonum, qua quidam aliis obediunt, non est ex amicitia quam inter se habeant; sed ex communi nequitia, qua homines odiunt, et Dei iustitiae repugnant. Est enim proprium hominum impiorum, ut eis se adiungant et subiiciant, ad propriam nequitiam exequendam, quos potiores viribus vident. Ad tertium dicendum quod daemones non sunt aequales secundum naturam, unde in eis est naturalis praelatio. Quod in hominibus non contingit, qui natura sunt pares. Quod autem superioribus inferiores subdantur, non est ad bonum superiorum, sed magis ad malum eorum; quia cum mala facere maxime ad miseriam pertineat, praeesse in malis est esse magis miserum.

Q. 109, A. 3

tions are subject to the action of those above them, and this is what we mean by precedence—that the action of the subject should be under the action of the prelate. So the very natural disposition of the demons requires that there should be authority among them. This agrees too with Divine wisdom, which leaves nothing inordinate, which reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly (Wis 8:1). Reply Obj. 1: The authority of the demons is not founded on their justice, but on the justice of God ordering all things. Reply Obj. 2: The concord of the demons, whereby some obey others, does not arise from mutual friendships, but from their common wickedness whereby they hate men, and fight against God’s justice. For it belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those whom they see to be stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness. Reply Obj. 3: The demons are not equal in nature; and so among them there exists a natural precedence; which is not the case with men, who are naturally equal. That the inferior are subject to the superior, is not for the benefit of the superior, but rather to their detriment; because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to unhappiness, it follows that to preside in evil is to be more unhappy.

Article 3 Whether there is enlightenment in the demons? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in daemonibus sit illuminatio. Illuminatio enim consistit in manifestatione veritatis. Sed unus daemon potest alteri veritatem manifestare, quia superiores magis acumine naturalis scientiae vigent. Ergo superiores daemones possunt inferiores illuminare. Praeterea, corpus quod superabundat in lumine, potest illuminare corpus quod in lumine deficit; sicut sol lunam. Sed superiores daemones magis abundant in participatione luminis naturalis. Ergo videtur quod superiores daemones possunt inferiores illuminare. Sed contra, illuminatio cum purgatione est et perfectione, ut supra dictum est. Sed purgare non convenit daemonibus; secundum illud Eccli. XXXIV, ab immundo quid mundabitur? Ergo etiam neque illuminare. Respondeo dicendum quod in daemonibus non potest esse illuminatio proprie. Dictum est enim supra quod illuminatio proprie est manifestatio veritatis, secundum quod habet ordinem ad Deum, qui illuminat omnem intellectum. Alia autem manifestatio veritatis potest esse locutio; sicut cum unus angelus alteri

Objection 1: It would seem that enlightenment is in the demons. For enlightenment means the manifestation of the truth. But one demon can manifest truth to another, because the superior excel in natural knowledge. Therefore the superior demons can enlighten the inferior. Obj. 2: Further, a body abounding in light can enlighten a body deficient in light, as the sun enlightens the moon. But the superior demons abound in the participation of natural light. Therefore it seems that the superior demons can enlighten the inferior. On the contrary, Enlightenment is not without cleansing and perfecting, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 1). But to cleanse does not befit the demons, according to the words: What can be made clean by the unclean? (Sir 34:4). Therefore neither can they enlighten. I answer that, There can be no enlightenment properly speaking among the demons. For, as above explained (Q. 107, A. 2), enlightenment properly speaking is the manifestation of the truth in reference to God, Who enlightens every intellect. Another kind of manifestation of the truth is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to another.

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suum conceptum manifestat. Perversitas autem daemonum hoc habet, quod unus alium non intendit ordinare ad Deum, sed magis ab ordine divino abducere. Et ideo unus daemon alium non illuminat; sed unus alii suum conceptum per modum locutionis intimare potest. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non quaelibet veritatis manifestatio habet rationem illuminationis, sed solum quae dicta est. Ad secundum dicendum quod secundum ea quae ad naturalem cognitionem pertinent, non est necessaria manifestatio veritatis neque in angelis neque in daemonibus, quia, sicut supra dictum est, statim a principio suae conditionis omnia cognoverunt quae ad naturalem cognitionem pertinent. Et ideo maior plenitudo naturalis luminis quae est in superioribus daemonibus, non potest esse ratio illuminationis.

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Now the demon’s perversity does not lead one to order another to God, but rather to lead away from the Divine order; and so one demon does not enlighten another; but one can make known his mental concept to another by way of speech. Reply Obj. 1: Not every kind of manifestation of the truth is enlightenment, but only that which is above described. Reply Obj. 2: According to what belongs to natural knowledge, there is no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels, or in the demons, because, as above explained (Q. 55, A. 2; Q. 58, A. 2; Q. 79, A. 2), they know from the first all that belongs to their natural knowledge. So the greater fullness of natural light in the superior demons does not prove that they can enlighten others.

Article 4 Whether the good angels have precedence over the bad angels? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod boni angeli non habeant praelationem super malos. Praelatio enim angelorum praecipue attenditur secundum illuminationes. Sed mali angeli, cum sint tenebrae, non illuminantur a bonis. Ergo boni angeli non habent praelationem super malos. Praeterea, ad negligentiam praesidentis pertinere videntur ea quae per subditos male fiunt. Sed daemones multa mala faciunt. Si igitur subsunt praelationi bonorum angelorum, videtur in angelis bonis esse aliqua negligentia. Quod est inconveniens. Praeterea, praelatio angelorum sequitur naturae ordinem, ut supra dictum est. Sed si daemones de singulis ordinibus ceciderunt, ut communiter dicitur, multi daemones multis bonis angelis sunt superiores ordine naturae. Non ergo boni angeli praelationem habent super omnes malos. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod spiritus vitae desertor atque peccator regitur per spiritum vitae rationalem, pium et iustum. Et Gregorius dicit quod potestates dicuntur angeli quorum ditioni virtutes adversae subiectae sunt. Respondeo dicendum quod totus ordo praelationis primo et originaliter est in Deo, et participatur a creaturis secundum quod Deo magis appropinquant, illae enim creaturae super alias influentiam habent, quae sunt perfectiores et Deo propinquiores. Maxima autem perfectio, et per quam maxime Deo appropinquatur, est creaturarum fruentium Deo, sicut sunt sancti angeli, qua perfectione daemones privantur. Et ideo boni angeli super malos praelationem habent, et per eos reguntur.

Objection 1: It would seem that the good angels have no precedence over the bad angels. For the angels’ precedence is especially connected with enlightenment. But the bad angels, being darkness, are not enlightened by the good angels. Therefore the good angels do not rule over the bad. Obj. 2: Further, superiors are responsible as regards negligence for the evil deeds of their subjects. But the demons do much evil. Therefore if they are subject to the good angels, it seems that negligence is to be charged to the good angels; which cannot be admitted. Obj. 3: Further, the angels’ precedence follows upon the order of nature, as above explained (A. 2). But if the demons fell from every order, as is commonly said, many of the demons are superior to many good angels in the natural order. Therefore the good angels have no precedence over all the bad angels. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii), that the treacherous and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the rational, pious, and just spirit of life; and Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv) that the Powers are the angels to whose charge are subjected the hostile powers. I answer that, The whole order of precedence is first and originally in God; and it is shared by creatures accordingly as they are the nearer to God. For those creatures, which are more perfect and nearer to God, have the power to act on others. Now the greatest perfection and that which brings them nearest to God belongs to the creatures who enjoy God, as the holy angels; of which perfection the demons are deprived; and therefore the good angels have precedence over the bad, and these are ruled by them.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per sanctos angelos multa de divinis mysteriis daemonibus revelantur, cum divina iustitia exigit ut per daemones aliqua fiant vel ad punitionem malorum, vel ad exercitationem bonorum, sicut in rebus humanis assessores iudicis revelant tortoribus eius sententiam. Huiusmodi autem revelationes, si ad angelos revelantes comparentur, illuminationes sunt, quia ordinant eas ad Deum. Ex parte vero daemonum, non sunt illuminationes, quia eas in Deum non ordinant, sed ad expletionem propriae iniquitatis. Ad secundum dicendum quod sancti angeli sunt ministri divinae sapientiae. Unde sicut divina sapientia permittit aliqua mala fieri per malos angelos vel homines, propter bona quae ex eis elicit; ita et boni angeli non totaliter cohibent malos a nocendo. Ad tertium dicendum quod angelus qui est inferior ordine naturae, praeest daemonibus, quamvis superioribus ordine naturae; quia virtus divinae iustitiae, cui inhaerent boni angeli, potior est quam virtus naturalis angelorum. Unde et apud homines, spiritualis iudicat omnia, ut dicitur I ad Cor. II. Et philosophus dicit, in libro Ethic., quod virtuosus est regula et mensura omnium humanorum actuum.

Q. 109, A. 4

Reply Obj. 1: Many things concerning Divine mysteries are made known by the holy angels to the bad angels, whenever the Divine justice requires the demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil; or for the trial of the good; as in human affairs the judge’s assessors make known his sentence to the executioners. This revelation, if compared to the angelic revealers, can be called an enlightenment, forasmuch as they direct it to God; but it is not an enlightenment on the part of the demons, for these do not direct it to God; but to the fulfilment of their own wickedness. Reply Obj. 2: The holy angels are the ministers of the Divine wisdom. Hence as the Divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad angels or men, for the sake of the good that follows; so also the good angels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm. Reply Obj. 3: An angel who is inferior in the natural order presides over demons, although these may be naturally superior; because the power of Divine justice to which the good angels cleave, is stronger than the natural power of the angels. Hence likewise among men, the spiritual man judgeth all things (1 Cor 2:15), and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 4; x, 5) that the virtuous man is the rule and measure of all human acts.

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Question 110 How Angels Preside Over Corporeal Creatures Deinde considerandum est de praesidentia angeloWe now consider how the angels preside over the corrum super creaturam corporalem. Et circa hoc quaerun- poreal creatures. Under this head there are four points of tur quatuor. inquiry: Primo, utrum creatura corporalis administretur per (1) Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angelos. angels? Secundo, utrum creatura corporalis obediat angelis (2) Whether the corporeal creature obeys the mere will ad nutum. of the angels? Tertio, utrum angeli sua virtute possint immediate (3) Whether the angels by their own power can movere corpora localiter. immediately move bodies locally? Quarto, utrum angeli boni vel mali possint facere (4) Whether the good or bad angels can work miracles? miracula.

Article 1 Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod creatura corporalis non administretur per angelos. Res enim quae habent determinatum modum operandi, non indigent gubernari ab aliquo praesidente, ideo enim indigemus gubernari, ne aliter operemur quam oporteat. Sed res corporales habent determinatas actiones ex naturis sibi divinitus datis. Non ergo indigent gubernatione angelorum. Praeterea, inferiora in entibus gubernantur per superiora. Sed in corporibus quaedam dicuntur inferiora, quaedam superiora. Inferiora igitur gubernantur per superiora. Non ergo est necessarium quod gubernentur per angelos. Praeterea, diversi ordines angelorum distinguuntur secundum diversa officia. Sed si creaturae corporales administrantur per angelos, tot erunt officia angelorum, quot sunt species rerum. Ergo etiam tot erunt ordines angelorum, quot sunt species rerum. Quod est contra supra dicta. Non ergo corporalis creatura administratur per angelos. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod omnia corpora reguntur per spiritum vitae rationalem. Et Gregorius dicit, in IV Dial., quod in hoc mundo visibili nihil nisi per creaturam invisibilem disponi potest. Respondeo dicendum quod tam in rebus humanis quam in rebus naturalibus, hoc communiter invenitur, quod potestas particularis gubernatur et regitur a potestate universali; sicut potestas ballivi gubernatur per potestatem regis. Et in angelis etiam est dictum quod superiores angeli, qui praesunt inferioribus, habent scientiam

Objection 1: It would seem that the corporeal creature is not governed by angels. For whatever possesses a determinate mode of action, needs not to be governed by any superior power; for we require to be governed lest we do what we ought not. But corporeal things have their actions determined by the nature divinely bestowed upon them. Therefore they do not need the government of angels. Obj. 2: Further, the lowest things are ruled by the superior. But some corporeal things are inferior, and others are superior. Therefore they need not be governed by the angels. Obj. 3: Further, the different orders of the angels are distinguished by different offices. But if corporeal creatures were ruled by the angels, there would be as many angelic offices as there are species of things. So also there would be as many orders of angels as there are species of things; which is against what is laid down above (Q. 108, A. 2). Therefore the corporeal creature is not governed by angels. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life; and Gregory says (Dial. iv, 6), that in this visible world nothing takes place without the agency of the invisible creature. I answer that, It is generally found both in human affairs and in natural things that every particular power is governed and ruled by the universal power; as, for example, the bailiff ’s power is governed by the power of the king. Among the angels also, as explained above (Q. 55, A. 3; Q. 108, A. 1), the superior angels who preside over the infe-

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magis universalem. Manifestum est autem quod virtus cuiuslibet corporis est magis particularis quam virtus spiritualis substantiae, nam omnis forma corporalis est forma individuata per materiam, et determinata ad hic et nunc; formae autem immateriales sunt absolutae et intelligibiles. Et ideo sicut inferiores angeli, qui habent formas minus universales, reguntur per superiores; ita omnia corporalia reguntur per angelos et hoc non solum a sanctis doctoribus ponitur, sed etiam ab omnibus philosophis qui incorporeas substantias posuerunt. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod res corporales habent determinatas actiones, sed has actiones non exercent nisi secundum quod moventur, quia proprium corporis est quod non agat nisi motum. Et ideo oportet quod creatura corporalis a spirituali moveatur. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio ista procedit secundum opinionem Aristotelis, qui posuit quod corpora caelestia moventur a substantiis spiritualibus; quarum numerum conatus fuit assignare secundum numerum motuum qui apparent in corporibus caelestibus. Sed non posuit quod essent aliquae substantiae spirituales quae haberent immediatam praesidentiam supra inferiora corpora, nisi forte animas humanas. Et hoc ideo, quia non consideravit aliquas operationes in inferioribus corporibus exerceri nisi naturales, ad quas sufficiebat motus corporum caelestium. Sed quia nos ponimus multa in corporibus inferioribus fieri praeter naturales actiones corporum, ad quae non sufficiunt virtutes caelestium corporum; ideo secundum nos, necesse est ponere quod angeli habeant immediatam praesidentiam non solum supra caelestia corpora, sed etiam supra corpora inferiora. Ad tertium dicendum quod de substantiis immaterialibus diversimode philosophi sunt locuti. Plato enim posuit substantias immateriales esse rationes et species sensibilium corporum, et quasdam aliis universaliores, et ideo posuit substantias immateriales habere praesidentiam immediatam circa omnia sensibilia corpora, et diversas circa diversa. Aristoteles autem posuit quod substantiae immateriales non sunt species corporum sensibilium, sed aliquid altius et universalius, et ideo non attribuit eis immediatam praesidentiam supra singula corpora, sed solum supra universalia agentia, quae sunt corpora caelestia. Avicenna vero mediam viam secutus est. Posuit enim cum Platone, aliquam substantiam spiritualem praesidentem immediate sphaerae activorum et passivorum; eo quod, sicut Plato ponebat quod formae horum sensibilium derivantur a substantiis immaterialibus, ita etiam Avicenna hoc posuit. Sed in hoc a Platone differt, quod posuit unam tantum substantiam immaterialem praesidentem omnibus corporibus inferioribus, quam vocavit intelligentiam agentem. Doctores autem sancti posuerunt, sicut et Platonici, diversis rebus corporeis diversas substantias spirituales

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rior possess a more universal knowledge. Now it is manifest that the power of any individual body is more particular than the power of any spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is a form individualized by matter, and determined to the here and now; whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible. Therefore, as the inferior angels who have the less universal forms, are ruled by the superior; so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels. This is not only laid down by the holy doctors, but also by all philosophers who admit the existence of incorporeal substances. Reply Obj. 1: Corporeal things have determinate actions; but they exercise such actions only according as they are moved; because it belongs to a body not to act unless moved. Hence a corporeal creature must be moved by a spiritual creature. Reply Obj. 2: The reason alleged is according to the opinion of Aristotle who laid down (Metaph. xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual substances; the number of which he endeavored to assign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly bodies. But he did not say that there were any spiritual substances with immediate rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps human souls; and this was because he did not consider that any operations were exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for which the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed. But because we assert that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the natural corporeal actions, for which the movements of the heavenly bodies are not sufficient; therefore in our opinion we must assert that the angels possess an immediate presidency not only over the heavenly bodies, but also over the inferior bodies. Reply Obj. 3: Philosophers have held different opinions about immaterial substances. For Plato laid down that immaterial substances were types and species of sensible bodies; and that some were more universal than others; and so he held that immaterial substances preside immediately over all sensible bodies, and different ones over different bodies. But Aristotle held that immaterial substances are not the species of sensible bodies, but something higher and more universal; and so he did not attribute to them any immediate presiding over single bodies, but only over the universal agents, the heavenly bodies. Avicenna followed a middle course. For he agreed with Plato in supposing some spiritual substance to preside immediately in the sphere of active and passive elements; because, as Plato also said, he held that the forms of these sensible things are derived from immaterial substances. But he differed from Plato because he supposed only one immaterial substance to preside over all inferior bodies, which he called the active intelligence.

The holy doctors held with the Platonists that different spiritual substances were placed over corporeal things. For

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esse praepositas. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro Octoginta trium Quaest., unaquaeque res visibilis in hoc mundo habet angelicam potestatem sibi praepositam. Et Damascenus dicit, Diabolus erat ex iis angelicis virtutibus quae praeerant terrestri ordini. Et Origenes dicit, super illud Num. XXII, cum vidisset asina angelum, quod opus est mundo angelis, qui praesunt super bestias, et praesunt animalium nativitati, et virgultorum et plantationum et ceterarum rerum incrementis. Sed hoc non est ponendum propter hoc, quod secundum suam naturam unus angelus magis se habeat ad praesidendum animalibus quam plantis, quia quilibet angelus, etiam minimus, habet altiorem virtutem et universaliorem quam aliquod genus corporalium. Sed est ex ordine divinae sapientiae, quae diversis rebus diversos rectores praeposuit. Nec tamen propter hoc sequitur quod sint plures ordines angelorum quam novem, quia, sicut supra dictum est, ordines distinguuntur secundum generalia officia. Unde sicut, secundum Gregorium, ad ordinem potestatum pertinent omnes angeli qui habent proprie praesidentiam super daemones; ita ad ordinem virtutum pertinere videntur omnes angeli qui habent praesidentiam super res pure corporeas; horum enim ministerio interdum etiam miracula fiunt.

Q. 110, A. 2

Augustine says (83 Questions, Q. 79): Every visible thing in this world has an angelic power placed over it; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4): The devil was one of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial order; and Origen says on the text, When the ass saw the angel (Num 22:23), that the world has need of angels who preside over beasts, and over the birth of animals, and trees, and plants, and over the increase of all other things (Hom. xiv in Num.). The reason of this, however, is not that an angel is more fitted by his nature to preside over animals than over plants; because each angel, even the least, has a higher and more universal power than any kind of corporeal things: the reason is to be sought in the order of Divine wisdom, Who places different rulers over different things. Nor does it follow that there are more than nine orders of angels, because, as above expounded (Q. 108, A. 2), the orders are distinguished by their general offices. Hence as according to Gregory all the angels whose proper office it is to preside over the demons are of the order of the powers; so to the order of the virtues do those angels seem to belong who preside over purely corporeal creatures; for by their ministration miracles are sometimes performed.

Article 2 Whether corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod materia corporalis obediat angelis ad nutum. Maior est enim virtus angeli quam virtus animae. Sed conceptioni animae obedit materia corporalis, immutatur enim corpus hominis ex conceptione animae, ad calorem et frigus, et quandoque usque ad sanitatem et aegritudinem. Ergo multo magis secundum conceptionem angeli, materia corporalis transmutatur. Praeterea, quidquid potest virtus inferior, potest virtus superior. Sed virtus angeli est superior quam virtus corporalis. Corpus autem sua virtute potest transmutare materiam corporalem ad formam aliquam; sicut cum ignis generat ignem. Ergo multo fortius virtute sua angeli possunt materiam corporalem transmutare ad aliquam formam. Praeterea, tota natura corporalis administratur per angelos, ut dictum est, et sic videtur quod corpora se habet ad angelos sicut instrumenta; nam ratio instrumenti est quod sit movens motum. Sed in effectibus aliquid invenitur ex virtute principalium agentium, quod non potest esse per virtutem instrumenti; et hoc est id quod est principalius in effectu. Sicut digestio nutrimenti est per virtutem caloris naturalis, qui est instrumentum animae nutritivae; sed quod generetur caro viva, est ex

Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel. For the power of an angel excels the power of the soul. But corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul; for the body of man is changed by a conception of the soul as regards heat and cold, and sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore much more is corporeal matter changed by a conception of an angel. Obj. 2: Further, whatever can be done by an inferior power, can be done by a superior power. Now the power of an angel is superior to corporeal power. But a body by its power is able to transform corporeal matter; as appears when fire begets fire. Therefore much more efficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal matter. Obj. 3: Further, all corporeal nature is under angelic administration, as appears above (A. 1), and thus it appears that bodies are as instruments to the angels, for an instrument is essentially a mover moved. Now in effects there is something that is due to the power of their principal agents, and which cannot be due to the power of the instrument; and this it is that takes the principal place in the effect. For example, digestion is due to the force of natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul: but that liv-

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virtute animae. Similiter quod secetur lignum, pertinet ad serram; sed quod perveniatur ad formam lecti, est ex ratione artis. Ergo forma substantialis, quae est principalius in effectibus corporalibus, est ex virtute angelorum. Materia ergo obedit, ad sui informationem, angelis.

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., non est putandum istis transgressoribus angelis ad nutum servire hanc visibilium rerum materiam, sed soli Deo. Respondeo dicendum quod Platonici posuerunt formas quae sunt in materia, causari ex immaterialibus formis, quia formas materiales ponebant esse participationes quasdam immaterialium formarum. Et hos, quantum ad aliquid, secutus est Avicenna, qui posuit omnes formas quae sunt in materia, procedere a conceptione intelligentiae, et quod agentia corporalia sunt solum disponentia ad formas. Qui in hoc videntur fuisse decepti, quia existimaverunt formam quasi aliquid per se factum, ut sic ab aliquo formali principio procederet. Sed sicut philosophus probat in VII Metaphys., hoc quod proprie fit, est compositum, hoc enim proprie est quasi subsistens. Forma autem non dicitur ens quasi ipsa sit, sed sicut quo aliquid est, et sic per consequens nec forma proprie fit; eius enim est fieri, cuius est esse, cum fieri nihil aliud sit quam via in esse. Manifestum est autem quod factum est simile facienti, quia omne agens agit sibi simile. Et ideo id quod facit res naturales, habet similitudinem cum composito, vel quia est compositum, sicut ignis generat ignem; vel quia totum compositum, et quantum ad materiam et quantum ad formam, est in virtute ipsius; quod est proprium Dei. Sic igitur omnis informatio materiae vel est a Deo immediate, vel ab aliquo agente corporali; non autem immediate ab angelo. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima nostra unitur corpori ut forma; et sic non est mirum, si formaliter transmutatur ex conceptione ipsius; praesertim cum motus sensitivi appetitus, qui fit cum quadam transmutatione corporali, subdatur imperio rationis. Angelus autem non sic se habet ad corpora naturalia. Unde ratio non sequitur. Ad secundum dicendum quod id quod potest virtus inferior, potest superior non eodem, sed excellentiori modo, sicut intellectus cognoscit sensibilia excellentiori modo quam sensus. Et sic angelus excellentiori modo transmutat materiam corporalem quam agentia corporalia, scilicet movendo ipsa agentia corporalia, tanquam causa superior. Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet ex virtute angelorum aliquos effectus sequi in rebus naturalibus, ad quae agentia corporalia non sufficerent. Sed hoc non est obedire materiam angelis ad nutum; sicut nec coquis obedit materia ad nutum, quia aliquem modum

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ing flesh is thus generated is due to the power of the soul. Again the cutting of the wood is from the saw; but that it assumes at length the form of a bed is from the design of the joiner’s art. Therefore the substantial form which takes the principal place in the corporeal effects, is due to the angelic power. Therefore matter obeys the angels in receiving its form. On the contrary, Augustine says It is not to be thought, that this visible matter obeys these rebel angels; for it obeys God alone. I answer that, The Platonists asserted that the forms which are in matter are caused by immaterial forms, because they said that the material forms are participations of immaterial forms. Avicenna followed them in this opinion to some extent, for he said that all forms which are in matter proceed from the concept of the intellect; and that corporeal agents only dispose for the forms. They seem to have been deceived on this point, through supposing a form to be something made per se, so that it would be the effect of a formal principle. But, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), what is made, properly speaking, is the composite: for this properly speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. Whereas the form is called a being, not as that which is, but as that by which something is; and consequently neither is a form, properly speaking, made; for that is made which is; since to be is nothing but the way to existence. Now it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker, forasmuch as every agent makes its like. So whatever makes natural things, has a likeness to the composite; either because it is composite itself, as when fire begets fire, or because the whole composite as to both matter and form is within its power; and this belongs to God alone. Therefore every informing of matter is either immediately from God, or form some corporeal agent; but not immediately from an angel. Reply Obj. 1: Our soul is united to the body as the form; and so it is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the soul’s concept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite, which is accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject to the command of reason. An angel, however, has not the same connection with natural bodies; and hence the argument does not hold. Reply Obj. 2: Whatever an inferior power can do, that a superior power can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent way; for example, the intellect knows sensible things in a more excellent way than sense knows them. So an angel can change corporeal matter in a more excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is by moving the corporeal agents themselves, as being the superior cause. Reply Obj. 3: There is nothing to prevent some natural effect taking place by angelic power, for which the power of corporeal agents would not suffice. This, however, is not to obey an angel’s will (as neither does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by regulating the fire according to the

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decoctionis operantur per ignem secundum aliquam artis moderationem, quam ignis per se non faceret, cum reducere materiam in actum formae substantialis, non excedat virtutem corporalis agentis, quia simile natum est sibi simile facere.

Q. 110, A. 3

prescription of his art he produces a dish that the fire could not have produced by itself); since to reduce matter to the act of the substantial form does not exceed the power of a corporeal agent; for it is natural for like to make like.

Article 3 Whether bodies obey the angels as regards local motion? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpora non obediant angelis ad motum localem. Motus enim localis corporum naturalium sequitur formas eorum. Sed angeli non causant formas corporum naturalium, ut dictum est. Ergo neque possunt causare in eis motum localem. Praeterea, in VIII Physic. probatur quod motus localis est primus motuum. Sed angeli non possunt causare alios motus, transmutando materiam formaliter. Ergo neque etiam possunt causare motum localem. Praeterea, membra corporalia obediunt conceptioni animae ad motum localem, inquantum habent in seipsis aliquod principium vitae. In corporibus autem naturalibus non est aliquod principium vitae. Ergo non obediunt angelis ad motum localem. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod angeli adhibent semina corporalia ad aliquos effectus producendos. Sed hoc non possunt facere nisi localiter movendo. Ergo corpora obediunt eis ad motum localem. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Dionysius dicit VII cap. de Div. Nom., divina sapientia coniungit fines primorum principiis secundorum, ex quo patet quod natura inferior in sui supremo attingitur a natura superiori. Natura autem corporalis est infra naturam spiritualem. Inter omnes autem motus corporeos perfectior est motus localis, ut probatur in VIII Physic., cuius ratio est, quia mobile secundum locum non est in potentia ad aliquid intrinsecum, inquantum huiusmodi, sed solum ad aliquid extrinsecum, scilicet ad locum. Et ideo natura corporalis nata est moveri immediate a natura spirituali secundum locum. Unde et philosophi posuerunt suprema corpora moveri localiter a spiritualibus substantiis. Unde videmus quod anima movet corpus primo et principaliter locali motu. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in corporibus sunt alii motus locales praeter eos qui consequuntur formas, sicut fluxus et refluxus maris non consequitur formam substantialem aquae, sed virtutem lunae. Et multo magis aliqui motus locales consequi possunt virtutem spiritualium substantiarum. Ad secundum dicendum quod angeli, causando motum localem tanquam priorem, per eum causare pos-

Objection 1: It would seem that bodies do not obey the angels in local motion. For the local motion of natural bodies follows on their forms. But the angels do not cause the forms of natural bodies, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore neither can they cause in them local motion. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 7) proves that local motion is the first of all movements. But the angels cannot cause other movements by a formal change of the matter. Therefore neither can they cause local motion. Obj. 3: Further, the corporeal members obey the concept of the soul as regards local movement, as having in themselves some principle of life. In natural bodies, however, there is no vital principle. Therefore they do not obey the angels in local motion. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9) that the angels use corporeal seed to produce certain effects. But they cannot do this without causing local movement. Therefore bodies obey them in local motion. I answer that, As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): Divine wisdom has joined the ends of the first to the principles of the second. Hence it is clear that the inferior nature at its highest point is in conjunction with superior nature. Now corporeal nature is below the spiritual nature. But among all corporeal movements the most perfect is local motion, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 7). The reason of this is that what is moved locally is not as such in potentiality to anything intrinsic, but only to something extrinsic—that is, to place. Therefore the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved immediately by the spiritual nature as regards place. Hence also the philosophers asserted that the supreme bodies are moved locally by the spiritual substances; whence we see that the soul moves the body first and chiefly by a local motion. Reply Obj. 1: There are in bodies other local movements besides those which result from the forms; for instance, the ebb and flow of the sea does not follow from the substantial form of the water, but from the influence of the moon; and much more can local movements result from the power of spiritual substances. Reply Obj. 2: The angels, by causing local motion, as the first motion, can thereby cause other movements; that

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sunt alios motus, adhibendo scilicet agentia corporalia ad huiusmodi effectus producendos; sicut faber adhibet ignem ad emollitionem ferri. Ad tertium dicendum quod angeli habent virtutem minus contractam quam animae. Unde virtus motiva animae contrahitur ad corpus unitum, quod per eam vivificatur, quo mediante alia potest movere. Sed virtus angeli non est contracta ad aliquod corpus. Unde potest corpora non coniuncta localiter movere.

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is, by employing corporeal agents to produce these effects, as a workman employs fire to soften iron. Reply Obj. 3: The power of an angel is not so limited as is the power of the soul. Hence the motive power of the soul is limited to the body united to it, which is vivified by it, and by which it can move other things. But an angel’s power is not limited to any body; hence it can move locally bodies not joined to it.

Article 4 Whether angels can work miracles? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli possunt facere miracula. Dicit enim Gregorius, virtutes vocantur illi spiritus, per quos signa et miracula frequentius fiunt. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum, quod magi faciunt miracula per privatos contractus, boni Christiani per publicam iustitiam, mali Christiani per signa publicae iustitiae. Sed magi faciunt miracula per hoc quod exaudiuntur a daemonibus, ut ipse alibi in eodem libro dicit. Ergo daemones miracula possunt facere. Ergo multo magis angeli boni. Praeterea, Augustinus in eodem libro dicit quod omnia quae visibiliter fiunt, etiam per inferiores potestates aeris huius non absurde fieri posse creduntur. Sed quando effectus aliquis naturalium causarum producitur absque ordine naturalis causae, hoc dicimus esse miraculum; puta cum aliquis sanatur a febre, non per operationem naturae. Ergo angeli et daemones possunt facere miracula. Praeterea, virtus superior non subditur ordini inferioris causae. Sed natura corporalis est inferior angelo. Ergo angelus potest operari praeter ordinem corporalium agentium. Quod est miracula facere. Sed contra est quod de Deo dicitur in Psalmo, qui facit mirabilia magna solus. Respondeo dicendum quod miraculum proprie dicitur, cum aliquid fit praeter ordinem naturae. Sed non sufficit ad rationem miraculi si aliquid fiat praeter ordinem naturae alicuius particularis, quia sic, cum aliquis proiicit lapidem sursum, miraculum faceret, cum hoc sit praeter ordinem naturae lapidis. Ex hoc ergo aliquid dicitur esse miraculum, quod fit praeter ordinem totius naturae creatae. Hoc autem non potest facere nisi Deus, quia quidquid facit angelus, vel quaecumque alia creatura, propria virtute, hoc fit secundum ordinem naturae creatae; et sic non est miraculum. Unde relinquitur quod solus Deus miracula facere possit.

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels can work miracles. For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): Those spirits are called virtues by whom signs and miracles are usually done. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (83 Questions, Q. 79) that magicians work miracles by private contracts; good Christians by public justice, bad Christians by the signs of public justice. But magicians work miracles because they are heard by the demons, as he says elsewhere in the same work. Therefore the demons can work miracles. Therefore much more can the good angels. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says in the same work that it is not absurd to believe that all the things we see happen may be brought about by the lower powers that dwell in our atmosphere. But when an effect of natural causes is produced outside the order of the natural cause, we call it a miracle, as, for instance, when anyone is cured of a fever without the operation of nature. Therefore the angels and demons can work miracles. Obj. 4: Further, superior power is not subject to the order of an inferior cause. But corporeal nature is inferior to an angel. Therefore an angel can work outside the order of corporeal agents; which is to work miracles. On the contrary, It is written of God (Ps 135:4): Who alone doth great wonders. I answer that, A miracle properly so called is when something is done outside the order of nature. But it is not enough for a miracle if something is done outside the order of any particular nature; for otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone upwards, as such a thing is outside the order of the stone’s nature. So for a miracle is required that it be against the order of the whole created nature. But God alone can do this, because, whatever an angel or any other creature does by its own power, is according to the order of created nature; and thus it is not a miracle. Hence God alone can work miracles.

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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod angeli aliqui dicuntur miracula facere, vel quia ad eorum desiderium Deus miracula facit, sicut et sancti homines dicuntur miracula facere. Vel quia aliquod ministerium exhibent in miraculis quae fiunt; sicut colligendo pulveres in resurrectione communi, vel huiusmodi aliquid agendo. Ad secundum dicendum quod miracula simpliciter loquendo, dicuntur, ut dictum est, cum aliqua fiunt praeter ordinem totius naturae creatae. Sed quia non omnis virtus naturae creatae est nota nobis, ideo cum aliquid fit praeter ordinem naturae creatae nobis notae, per virtutem creatam nobis ignotam, est miraculum quoad nos. Sic igitur cum daemones aliquid faciunt sua virtute naturali, miracula dicuntur non simpliciter, sed quoad nos. Et hoc modo magi per daemones miracula faciunt. Et dicuntur fieri per privatos contractus, quia quaelibet virtus creaturae in universo se habet ut virtus alicuius privatae personae in civitate; unde cum magus aliquid facit per pactum initum cum daemone, hoc fit quasi per quendam privatum contractum. Sed iustitia divina est in toto universo sicut lex publica in civitate. Et ideo boni Christiani, inquantum per iustitiam divinam miracula faciunt, dicuntur facere miracula per publicam iustitiam. Mali autem Christiani per signa publicae iustitiae, sicut invocando nomen Christi, vel exhibendo aliqua sacramenta. Ad tertium dicendum quod spirituales potestates possunt facere ea quae visibiliter fiunt in hoc mundo, adhibendo corporalia semina per motum localem. Ad quartum dicendum quod, licet angeli possint aliquid facere praeter ordinem naturae corporalis, non tamen possunt aliquid facere praeter ordinem totius creaturae, quod exigitur ad rationem miraculi, ut dictum est.

Q. 110, A. 4

Reply Obj. 1: Some angels are said to work miracles; either because God works miracles at their request, in the same way as holy men are said to work miracles; or because they exercise a kind of ministry in the miracles which take place; as in collecting the dust in the general resurrection, or by doing something of that kind. Reply Obj. 2: Properly speaking, as said above, miracles are those things which are done outside the order of the whole created nature. But as we do not know all the power of created nature, it follows that when anything is done outside the order of created nature by a power unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards ourselves. So when the demons do anything of their own natural power, these things are called miracles not in an absolute sense, but in reference to ourselves. In this way the magicians work miracles through the demons; and these are said to be done by private contracts, forasmuch as every power of the creature, in the universe, may be compared to the power of a private person in a city. Hence when a magician does anything by compact with the devil, this is done as it were by private contract. On the other hand, the Divine justice is in the whole universe as the public law is in the city. Therefore good Christians, so far as they work miracles by Divine justice, are said to work miracles by public justice: but bad Christians by the signs of public justice, as by invoking the name of Christ, or by making use of other sacred signs. Reply Obj. 3: Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local movement. Reply Obj. 4: Although the angels can do something which is outside the order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do anything outside the whole created order, which is essential to a miracle, as above explained.

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Question 111 The Action of the Angels on Man Deinde considerandum est de actione angelorum in We now consider the action of the angels on man, and homines. Et primo, quantum possint eos immutare sua inquire: (1) How far they can change them by their own virtute naturali; secundo, quomodo mittantur a Deo ad natural power; (2) How they are sent by God to the minministerium hominum; tertio, quomodo custodiant ho- istry of men; (3) How they guard and protect men. mines. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum angelus possit illuminare intellectum (1) Whether an angel can enlighten the human hominis. intellect? Secundo, utrum possit immutare affectum eius. (2) Whether he can change man’s will? Tertio, utrum possit immutare imaginationem eius. (3) Whether he can change man’s imagination? Quarto, utrum possit immutare sensum eius. (4) Whether he can change man’s senses?

Article 1 Whether an angel can enlighten man? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus non possit illuminare hominem. Homo enim illuminatur per fidem, unde Dionysius, in Eccles. Hier., illuminationem attribuit Baptismo, qui est fidei sacramentum. Sed fides immediate est a Deo; secundum illud ad Ephes. II, gratia estis salvati per fidem, et non ex vobis; Dei enim donum est. Ergo homo non illuminatur ab angelo, sed immediate a Deo. Praeterea, super illud Rom. I, Deus illis manifestavit, dicit Glossa quod non solum ratio naturalis ad hoc profuit ut divina hominibus manifestarentur, sed etiam Deus illis revelavit per opus suum, scilicet per creaturam. Sed utrumque est a Deo immediate, scilicet ratio naturalis, et creatura. Ergo Deus immediate illuminat hominem. Praeterea, quicumque illuminatur, cognoscit suam illuminationem. Sed homines non percipiunt se ab angelis illuminari. Ergo non illuminantur ab eis. Sed contra est quod Dionysius probat, in IV cap. Cael. Hier., quod revelationes divinorum perveniunt ad homines mediantibus angelis. Huiusmodi autem revelationes sunt illuminationes, ut supra dictum est. Ergo homines illuminantur per angelos. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum divinae providentiae ordo habeat ut actionibus superiorum inferiora subdantur, ut supra dictum est; sicut inferiores angeli illuminantur per superiores, ita homines qui sunt angelis inferiores, per eos illuminantur.

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot enlighten man. For man is enlightened by faith; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii) attributes enlightenment to baptism, as the sacrament of faith. But faith is immediately from God, according to Eph. 2:8: By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God. Therefore man is not enlightened by an angel; but immediately by God. Obj. 2: Further, on the words, God hath manifested it to them (Rom 1:19), the gloss observes that not only natural reason availed for the manifestation of Divine truths to men, but God also revealed them by His work, that is, by His creature. But both are immediately from God—that is, natural reason and the creature. Therefore God enlightens man immediately. Obj. 3: Further, whoever is enlightened is conscious of being enlightened. But man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels. Therefore he is not enlightened by them. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that the revelation of Divine things reaches men through the ministry of the angels. But such revelation is an enlightenment as we have stated (Q. 106, A. 1; Q. 107, A. 2). Therefore men are enlightened by the angels. I answer that, Since the order of Divine Providence disposes that lower things be subject to the actions of higher, as explained above (Q. 109, A. 2); as the inferior angels are enlightened by the superior, so men, who are inferior to the angels, are enlightened by them.

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Sed modus utriusque illuminationis quodammodo est similis, et quodammodo diversus. Dictum est enim supra quod illuminatio, quae est manifestatio divinae veritatis, secundum duo attenditur, scilicet secundum quod intellectus inferior confortatur per actionem intellectus superioris; et secundum quod proponuntur intellectui inferiori species intelligibiles quae sunt in superiori, ut capi possint ab inferiori. Et hoc quidem in angelis fit, secundum quod superior angelus veritatem universalem conceptam dividit secundum capacitatem inferioris angeli, ut supra dictum est. Sed intellectus humanus non potest ipsam intelligibilem veritatem nudam capere, quia connaturale est ei ut intelligat per conversionem ad phantasmata, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo intelligibilem veritatem proponunt angeli hominibus sub similitudinibus sensibilium; secundum illud quod dicit Dionysius, I cap. Cael. Hier., quod impossibile est aliter nobis lucere divinum radium, nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvelatum. Ex alia vero parte, intellectus humanus, tanquam inferior, fortificatur per actionem intellectus angelici. Et secundum haec duo attenditur illuminatio qua homo illuminatur ab angelo. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad fidem duo concurrunt. Primo quidem habitus intellectus, quo disponitur ad obediendum voluntati tendenti in divinam veritatem, intellectus enim assentit veritati fidei, non quasi convictus ratione, sed quasi imperatus a voluntate; nullus enim credit nisi volens, ut Augustinus dicit. Et quantum ad hoc, fides est a solo Deo. Secundo requiritur ad fidem, quod credibilia proponantur credenti. Et hoc quidem fit per hominem, secundum quod fides est ex auditu, ut dicitur Rom. X; sed per angelos principaliter, per quos hominibus revelantur divina. Unde angeli operantur aliquid ad illuminationem fidei. Et tamen homines illuminantur ab angelis non solum de credendis, sed etiam de agendis. Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio naturalis, quae est immediate a Deo, potest per angelum confortari, ut dictum est. Et similiter ex speciebus a creaturis acceptis, tanto altior elicitur intelligibilis veritas, quanto intellectus humanus fuerit fortior. Et sic per angelum adiuvatur homo, ut ex creaturis perfectius in divinam cognitionem deveniat. Ad tertium dicendum quod operatio intellectualis, et illuminatio, dupliciter possunt considerari. Uno modo, ex parte rei intellectae, et sic quicumque intelligit vel illuminatur, cognoscit se intelligere vel illuminari; quia cognoscit rem sibi esse manifestam. Alio modo, ex parte principii, et sic non quicumque intelligit aliquam veritatem, cognoscit quid sit intellectus, qui est principium intellectualis operationis. Et similiter non quicumque illuminatur ab angelo, cognoscit se ab angelo illuminari.

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The modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment are in one way alike and in another way unlike. For, as was shown above (Q. 106, A. 1), the enlightenment which consists in making known Divine truth has two functions; namely, according as the inferior intellect is strengthened by the action of the superior intellect, and according as the intelligible species which are in the superior intellect are proposed to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby. This takes place in the angels when the superior angel divides his universal concept of the truth according to the capacity of the inferior angel, as explained above (Q. 106, A. 1). The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand by turning to the phantasms, as above explained (Q. 84, A. 7). So the angels propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of sensible things, according to what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), that, It is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise than shrouded by the variety of the sacred veils. On the other hand, the human intellect as the inferior, is strengthened by the action of the angelic intellect. And in these two ways man is enlightened by an angel. Reply Obj. 1: Two dispositions concur in the virtue of faith; first, the habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed to obey the will tending to Divine truth. For the intellect assents to the truth of faith, not as convinced by the reason, but as commanded by the will; hence Augustine says, No one believes except willingly. In this respect faith comes from God alone. Second, faith requires that what is to be believed be proposed to the believer; which is accomplished by man, according to Rom. 10:17, Faith cometh by hearing; principally, however, by the angels, by whom Divine things are revealed to men. Hence the angels have some part in the enlightenment of faith. Moreover, men are enlightened by the angels not only concerning what is to be believed; but also as regards what is to be done. Reply Obj. 2: Natural reason, which is immediately from God, can be strengthened by an angel, as we have said above. Again, the more the human intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible truth can be elicited from the species derived from creatures. Thus man is assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more perfect knowledge of God. Reply Obj. 3: Intellectual operation and enlightenment can be understood in two ways. First, on the part of the object understood; thus whoever understands or is enlightened, knows that he understands or is enlightened, because he knows that the object is made known to him. Second, on the part of the principle; and thus it does not follow that whoever understands a truth, knows what the intellect is, which is the principle of the intellectual operation. In like manner not everyone who is enlightened by an angel, knows that he is enlightened by him.

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Q. 111, A. 2

Article 2 Whether the angels can change the will of man? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli possint immutare voluntatem hominis. Quia super illud Heb. I, qui facit angelos suos spiritus, et ministros suos flammam ignis, dicit Glossa quod ignis sunt, dum spiritu fervent, et vitia nostra urunt. Sed hoc non esset, nisi voluntatem immutarent. Ergo angeli possunt immutare voluntatem. Praeterea, Beda dicit quod Diabolus non est immissor malarum cogitationum, sed incensor. Damascenus autem ulterius dicit quod etiam est immissor, dicit enim in II libro, quod omnis malitia et immundae passiones ex daemonibus excogitatae sunt, et immittere homini sunt concessi. Et pari ratione, angeli boni immittunt et incendunt bonas cogitationes. Sed hoc non possent facere, nisi immutarent voluntatem. Ergo immutant voluntatem. Praeterea, angelus, sicut est dictum, illuminat intellectum hominis mediantibus phantasmatibus. Sed sicut phantasia, quae deservit intellectui, potest immutari ab angelo; ita et appetitus sensitivus qui deservit voluntati, quia et ipse etiam est vis utens organo corporali. Ergo sicut illuminat intellectum, ita potest immutare voluntatem. Sed contra est quod immutare voluntatem est proprium Dei; secundum illud Prov. XXI, cor regis in manu domini; quocumque voluerit, vertet illud. Respondeo dicendum quod voluntas potest immutari dupliciter. Uno modo, ab interiori. Et sic cum motus voluntatis non sit aliud quam inclinatio voluntatis in rem volitam, solius Dei est sic immutare voluntatem, qui dat naturae intellectuali virtutem talis inclinationis. Sicut enim inclinatio naturalis non est nisi a Deo qui dat naturam; ita inclinatio voluntaria non est nisi a Deo, qui causat voluntatem. Alio modo movetur voluntas ab exteriori. Et hoc in angelo est quidem uno modo tantum, scilicet a bono apprehenso per intellectum. Unde secundum quod aliquis est causa quod aliquid apprehendatur ut bonum ad appetendum, secundum hoc movet voluntatem. Et sic etiam solus Deus efficaciter potest movere voluntatem; angelus autem et homo per modum suadentis, ut supra dictum est. Sed praeter hunc modum, etiam aliter movetur in hominibus voluntas ab exteriori, scilicet ex passione existente circa appetitum sensitivum; sicut ex concupiscentia vel ira inclinatur voluntas ad aliquid volendum. Et sic etiam angeli, inquantum possunt concitare huiusmodi passiones, possunt voluntatem movere. Non tamen ex necessitate, quia voluntas semper remanet libera ad consentiendum vel resistendum passioni.

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels can change the will of man. For, upon the text, Who maketh His angels spirits and His ministers a flame of fire (Heb 1:7), the gloss notes that they are fire, as being spiritually fervent, and as burning away our vices. This could not be, however, unless they changed the will. Therefore the angels can change the will. Obj. 2: Further, Bede says (Super Matth. xv, 11), that, the devil does not send wicked thoughts, but kindles them. Damascene, however, says that he also sends them; for he remarks that every malicious act and unclean passion is contrived by the demons and put into men (De Fide Orth. ii, 4); in like manner also the good angels introduce and kindle good thoughts. But this could only be if they changed the will. Therefore the will is changed by them. Obj. 3: Further, the angel, as above explained, enlightens the human intellect by means of the phantasms. But as the imagination which serves the intellect can be changed by an angel, so can the sensitive appetite which serves the will, because it also is a faculty using a corporeal organ. Therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so can he change the will. On the contrary, To change the will belongs to God alone, according to Prov. 21:1: The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, whithersoever He will He shall turn it. I answer that, The will can be changed in two ways. First, from within; in which way, since the movement of the will is nothing but the inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus change the will, because He gives the power of such an inclination to the intellectual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God alone Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the will is from God alone, Who causes the will. Second, the will is moved from without. As regards an angel, this can be only in one way—by the good apprehended by the intellect. Hence in as far as anyone may be the cause why anything be apprehended as an appetible good, so far does he move the will. In this way also God alone can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and man move the will by way of persuasion, as above explained (Q. 106, A. 2). In addition to this mode the human will can be moved from without in another way; namely, by the passion residing in the sensitive appetite: thus by concupiscence or anger the will is inclined to will something. In this manner the angels, as being able to rouse these passions, can move the will, not however by necessity, for the will ever remains free to consent to, or to resist, the passion.

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Government of Creatures

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ministri Dei, vel homines vel angeli, dicuntur urere vitia, et inflammare ad virtutes, per modum persuasionis. Ad secundum dicendum quod daemones non possunt immittere cogitationes, interius eas causando, cum usus cogitativae virtutis subiaceat voluntati. Dicitur tamen Diabolus incensor cogitationum, inquantum incitat ad cogitandum, vel ad appetendum cogitata, per modum persuadentis, vel passionem concitantis. Et hoc ipsum incendere Damascenus vocat immittere, quia talis operatio interius fit. Sed bonae cogitationes attribuuntur altiori principio, scilicet Deo; licet angelorum ministerio procurentur. Ad tertium dicendum quod intellectus humanus, secundum praesentem statum, non potest intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata; sed voluntas humana potest aliquid velle ex iudicio rationis, non sequendo passionem appetitus sensitivi. Unde non est simile.

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Reply Obj. 1: Those who act as God’s ministers, either men or angels, are said to burn away vices, and to incite to virtue by way of persuasion. Reply Obj. 2: The demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by causing them from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is subject to the will; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of thoughts, inasmuch as he incites to thought, by the desire of the things thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the passions. Damascene calls this kindling a putting in because such a work is accomplished within. But good thoughts are attributed to a higher principle, namely, God, though they may be procured by the ministry of the angels. Reply Obj. 3: The human intellect in its present state can understand only by turning to the phantasms; but the human will can will something following the judgment of reason rather than the passion of the sensitive appetite. Hence the comparison does not hold.

Article 3 Whether an angel can change man’s imagination? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus non possit immutare imaginationem hominis. Phantasia enim, ut dicitur in libro de Anima, est motus factus a sensu secundum actum. Sed si fieret per immutationem angeli, non fieret a sensu secundum actum. Ergo est contra rationem phantasiae, quae est actus imaginativae virtutis, ut sit per immutationem angeli. Praeterea, formae quae sunt in imaginatione, cum sint spirituales, sunt nobiliores formis quae sunt in materia sensibili. Sed angelus non potest imprimere formas in materia sensibili, ut dictum est. Ergo non potest imprimere formas in imaginatione. Et ita non potest eam immutare. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt., commixtione alterius spiritus fieri potest ut ea quae ipse scit, per huiusmodi imagines ei cui miscetur ostendat, sive intelligenti, sive ut ab alio intellecta pandantur. Sed non videtur quod angelus possit misceri imaginationi humanae; neque quod imaginatio possit capere intelligibilia, quae angelus cognoscit. Ergo videtur quod angelus non possit mutare imaginationem. Praeterea, in visione imaginaria homo adhaeret similitudinibus rerum quasi ipsis rebus. Sed in hoc est quaedam deceptio. Cum ergo angelus bonus non possit esse causa deceptionis, videtur quod non possit causare imaginariam visionem, imaginationem immutando. Sed contra est quod ea quae apparent in somnis, videntur imaginaria visione. Sed angeli revelant aliqua in somnis; ut patet Matth. I et II, de angelo qui Ioseph

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot change man’s imagination. For the phantasy, as is said in De Anima iii, is a motion caused by the sense in act. But if this motion were caused by an angel, it would not be caused by the sense in act. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of the phantasy, which is the act of the imaginative faculty, to be changed by an angel. Obj. 2: Further, since the forms in the imagination are spiritual, they are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter. But an angel cannot impress forms upon sensible matter (Q. 110, A. 2). Therefore he cannot impress forms on the imagination, and so he cannot change it. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 12): One spirit by intermingling with another can communicate his knowledge to the other spirit by these images, so that the latter either understands it himself, or accepts it as understood by the other. But it does not seem that an angel can be mingled with the human imagination, nor that the imagination can receive the knowledge of an angel. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot change the imagination. Obj. 4: Further, in the imaginative vision man cleaves to the similitudes of the things as to the things themselves. But in this there is deception. So as a good angel cannot be the cause of deception, it seems that he cannot cause the imaginative vision, by changing the imagination. On the contrary, Those things which are seen in dreams are seen by imaginative vision. But the angels reveal things in dreams, as appears from Matt. 1:20; 2:13, 19 in re-

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in somnis apparuit. Ergo angelus potest imaginationem movere. Respondeo dicendum quod angelus, tam bonus quam malus, virtute naturae suae potest movere imaginationem hominis. Quod quidem sic considerari potest. Dictum est enim supra quod natura corporalis obedit angelo ad motum localem. Illa ergo quae ex motu locali aliquorum corporum possunt causari, subsunt virtuti naturali angelorum. Manifestum est autem quod apparitiones imaginariae causantur interdum in nobis ex locali mutatione corporalium spirituum et humorum. Unde Aristoteles, in Lib. de Somn. et Vig., assignans causam apparitionis somniorum, dicit quod, cum animal dormit, descendente plurimo sanguine ad principium sensitivum, simul descendunt motus, idest impressiones relictae ex sensibilium motionibus, quae in spiritibus sensualibus conservantur, et movent principium sensitivum, ita quod fit quaedam apparitio, ac si tunc principium sensitivum a rebus ipsis exterioribus mutaretur. Et tanta potest esse commotio spirituum et humorum, quod huiusmodi apparitiones etiam vigilantibus fiant; sicut patet in phreneticis, et in aliis huiusmodi. Sicut igitur hoc fit per naturalem commotionem humorum; et quandoque etiam per voluntatem hominis, qui voluntarie imaginatur quod prius senserat, ita etiam hoc potest fieri virtute angeli boni vel mali, quandoque quidem cum alienatione a corporeis sensibus, quandoque autem absque tali alienatione. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod primum principium phantasiae est a sensu secundum actum, non enim possumus imaginari quae nullo modo sensimus, vel secundum totum vel secundum partem; sicut caecus natus non potest imaginari colorem. Sed aliquando imaginatio informatur, ut actus phantastici motus consurgat, ab impressionibus interius conservatis, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod angelus transmutat imaginationem, non quidem imprimendo aliquam formam imaginariam nullo modo per sensum prius acceptam (non enim posset facere quod caecus imaginaretur colores), sed hoc facit per motum localem spirituum et humorum, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod commixtio illa spiritus angelici ad imaginationem humanam, non est per essentiam, sed per effectum quem praedicto modo in imaginatione facit; cui demonstrat quae ipse novit, non tamen eo modo quo ipse novit. Ad quartum dicendum quod angelus causans aliquam imaginariam visionem, quandoque quidem simul intellectum illuminat, ut cognoscat quid per huiusmodi similitudines significetur, et tunc nulla est deceptio. Quandoque vero per operationem angeli solummodo similitudines rerum apparent in imaginatione, nec tamen tunc causatur deceptio ab angelo, sed ex defectu intellec-

Q. 111, A. 3

gard to the angel who appeared to Joseph in dreams. Therefore an angel can move the imagination. I answer that, Both a good and a bad angel by their own natural power can move the human imagination. This may be explained as follows. For it was said above (Q. 110, A. 3), that corporeal nature obeys the angel as regards local movement, so that whatever can be caused by the local movement of bodies is subject to the natural power of the angels. Now it is manifest that imaginative apparitions are sometimes caused in us by the local movement of animal spirits and humors. Hence Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.), when assigning the cause of visions in dreams, that when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and movements descend with it, that is, the impressions left from the movements are preserved in the animal spirits, and move the sensitive principle; so that a certain appearance ensues, as if the sensitive principle were being then changed by the external objects themselves. Indeed, the commotion of the spirits and humors may be so great that such appearances may even occur to those who are awake, as is seen in mad people, and the like. So, as this happens by a natural disturbance of the humors, and sometimes also by the will of man who voluntarily imagines what he previously experienced, so also the same may be done by the power of a good or a bad angel, sometimes with alienation from the bodily senses, sometimes without such alienation. Reply Obj. 1: The first principle of the imagination is from the sense in act. For we cannot imagine what we have never perceived by the senses, either wholly or partly; as a man born blind cannot imagine color. Sometimes, however, the imagination is informed in such a way that the act of the imaginative movement arises from the impressions preserved within. Reply Obj. 2: An angel changes the imagination, not indeed by the impression of an imaginative form in no way previously received from the senses (for he cannot make a man born blind imagine color), but by local movement of the spirits and humors, as above explained. Reply Obj. 3: The commingling of the angelic spirit with the human imagination is not a mingling of essences, but by reason of an effect which he produces in the imagination in the way above stated; so that he shows man what he knows, but not in the way he knows. Reply Obj. 4: An angel causing an imaginative vision, sometimes enlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what these images signify; and then there is no deception. But sometimes by the angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear in the imagination; but neither then is deception caused by the angel, but by the defect in the intellect to whom such things appear. Thus neither was

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Government of Creatures

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tus eius cui talia apparent. Sicut nec Christus fuit causa Christ a cause of deception when He spoke many things to deceptionis in hoc quod multa turbis in parabolis propo- the people in parables, which He did not explain to them. suit, quae non exposuit eis.

Article 4 Whether an angel can change the human senses? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus non possit immutare sensum humanum. Operatio enim sensitiva est operatio vitae. Huiusmodi autem operatio non est a principio extrinseco. Non ergo operatio sensitiva potest causari ab angelo. Praeterea, virtus sensitiva est nobilior quam nutritiva. Sed angelus, ut videtur, non potest mutare virtutem nutritivam; sicut nec alias formas naturales. Ergo neque virtutem sensitivam immutare potest. Praeterea, sensus naturaliter movetur a sensibili. Sed angelus non potest immutare naturae ordinem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo angelus non potest immutare sensum, sed semper sensus a sensibili immutatur. Sed contra est quod angeli qui subverterunt Sodomam, percusserunt Sodomitas caecitate (vel aorasia), ut ostium domus invenire non possent, ut dicitur Gen. XIX. Et simile legitur IV Reg. VI, de Syris quos Elisaeus duxit in Samariam. Respondeo dicendum quod sensus immutatur dupliciter. Uno modo, ab exteriori; sicut cum mutatur a sensibili. Alio modo, ab interiori, videmus enim quod, perturbatis spiritibus et humoribus immutatur sensus; lingua enim infirmi, quia plena est cholerico humore, omnia sentit ut amara; et simile contingit in aliis sensibus. Utroque autem modo angelus potest immutare sensum hominis sua naturali virtute. Potest enim angelus opponere exterius sensui sensibile aliquod, vel a natura formatum, vel aliquod de novo formando; sicut facit dum corpus assumit, ut supra dictum est. Similiter etiam potest interius commovere spiritus et humores, ut supra dictum est, ex quibus sensus diversimode immutentur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod principium sensitivae operationis non potest esse absque principio interiori, quod est potentia sensitiva, sed illud interius principium potest multipliciter ab exteriori principio commoveri, ut dictum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam per commotionem interiorem spirituum et humorum, potest angelus aliquid operari ad immutandum actum potentiae nutritivae. Et similiter potentiae appetitivae, et sensitivae, et cuiuscumque potentiae corporali organo utentis. Ad tertium dicendum quod praeter ordinem totius creaturae angelus facere non potest, sed praeter ordinem alicuius particularis naturae facere potest, cum tali ordi-

Objection 1: It seems that an angel cannot change the human senses. For the sensitive operation is a vital operation. But such an operation does not come from an extrinsic principle. Therefore the sensitive operation cannot be caused by an angel. Obj. 2: Further, the sensitive operation is nobler than the nutritive. But the angel cannot change the nutritive power, nor other natural forms. Therefore neither can he change the sensitive power. Obj. 3: Further, the senses are naturally moved by the sensible objects. But an angel cannot change the order of nature (Q. 110, A. 4). Therefore an angel cannot change the senses; but these are changed always by the sensible object. On the contrary, The angels who overturned Sodom, struck the people of Sodom with blindness or aorasia, so that they could not find the door (Gen 19:11). The same is recorded of the Syrians whom Eliseus led into Samaria (4 Kgs 6:18). I answer that, The senses may be changed in a twofold manner; from without, as when affected by the sensible object: and from within, for we see that the senses are changed when the spirits and humors are disturbed; as for example, a sick man’s tongue, charged with choleric humor, tastes everything as bitter, and the like with the other senses. Now an angel, by his natural power, can work a change in the senses both ways. For an angel can offer the senses a sensible object from without, formed by nature or by the angel himself, as when he assumes a body, as we have said above (Q. 51, A. 2). Likewise he can move the spirits and humors from within, as above remarked, whereby the senses are changed in various ways. Reply Obj. 1: The principle of the sensitive operation cannot be without the interior principle which is the sensitive power; but this interior principle can be moved in many ways by the exterior principle, as above explained. Reply Obj. 2: By the interior movement of the spirits and humors an angel can do something towards changing the act of the nutritive power, and also of the appetitive and sensitive power, and of any other power using a corporeal organ. Reply Obj. 3: An angel can do nothing outside the entire order of creatures; but he can outside some particular order of nature, since he is not subject to that order; thus in

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ni non subdatur. Et sic quodam singulari modo potest some special way an angel can work a change in the senses sensum immutare, praeter modum communem. outside the common mode of nature.

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Question 112 The Mission of the Angels Deinde considerandum est de missione angelorum. We next consider the mission of the angels. Under this Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. head arise four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum aliqui angeli mittantur in (1) Whether any angels are sent on works of ministry? ministerium. Secundo, utrum omnes mittantur. (2) Whether all are sent? Tertio, utrum illi qui mittuntur, assistant. (3) Whether those who are sent, assist? Quarto, de quibus ordinibus mittantur. (4) From what orders they are sent.

Article 1 Whether the angels are sent on works of ministry? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli in ministerium non mittantur. Omnis enim missio est ad aliquem determinatum locum. Sed actiones intellectuales non determinant aliquem locum, quia intellectus abstrahit ab hic et nunc. Cum igitur actiones angelicae sint intellectuales, videtur quod angeli ad suas actiones agendas non mittantur. Praeterea, caelum Empyreum est locus pertinens ad dignitatem angelorum. Si igitur ad nos mittantur in ministerium, videtur quod eorum dignitati aliquid depereat. Quod est inconveniens. Praeterea, exterior occupatio impedit sapientiae contemplationem, unde dicitur Eccli. XXXVIII, qui minoratur actu, percipiet sapientiam. Si igitur angeli aliqui mittuntur ad exteriora ministeria, videtur quod retardentur a contemplatione. Sed tota eorum beatitudo in contemplatione Dei consistit. Si ergo mitterentur, eorum beatitudo minueretur. Quod est inconveniens. Praeterea, ministrare est inferioris, unde dicitur Lucae XXII, quis maior est, qui recumbit, an ille qui ministrat? Nonne qui recumbit? Sed angeli sunt maiores nobis ordine naturae. Ergo non mittuntur in ministerium nostrum. Sed contra est quod dicitur Exod. XXIII, ecce ego mittam angelum meum, qui praecedat te. Respondeo dicendum quod ex supra dictis manifestum esse potest quod aliqui angeli in ministerium mittuntur a Deo. Ut enim supra dictum est, cum de missione divinarum personarum ageretur, ille mitti dicitur, qui aliquo modo ab alio procedit, ut incipiat esse ubi prius non erat, vel ubi prius erat, per alium modum. Filius enim aut Spiritus Sanctus mitti dicitur, ut a patre procedens per originem; et incipit esse novo modo, idest per gratiam vel per naturam assumptam, ubi prius erat per

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not sent on works of ministry. For every mission is to some determinate place. But intellectual actions do not determine a place, for intellect abstracts from the here and now. Since therefore the angelic actions are intellectual, it appears that the angels are not sent to perform their own actions. Obj. 2: Further, the empyrean heaven is the place that beseems the angelic dignity. Therefore if they are sent to us in ministry, it seems that something of their dignity would be lost; which is unseemly. Obj. 3: Further, external occupation hinders the contemplation of wisdom; hence it is said: He that is less in action, shall receive wisdom (Sir 38:25). So if some angels are sent on external ministrations, they would seemingly be hindered from contemplation. But the whole of their beatitude consists in the contemplation of God. So if they were sent, their beatitude would be lessened; which is unfitting. Obj. 4: Further, to minister is the part of an inferior; hence it is written (Luke 22:27): Which is the greater, he that sitteth at table, or he that serveth? is not he that sitteth at table? But the angels are naturally greater than we are. Therefore they are not sent to administer to us. On the contrary, It is written (Exod 23:20): Behold I will send My angels who shall go before thee. I answer that, From what has been said above (Q. 108, A. 6), it may be shown that some angels are sent in ministry by God. For, as we have already stated (Q. 43, A. 1), in treating of the mission of the Divine Persons, he is said to be sent who in any way proceeds from another so as to begin to be where he was not, or to be in another way, where he already was. Thus the Son, or the Holy Spirit is said to be sent as proceeding from the Father by origin; and begins to be in a new way, by grace or by the na-

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Q. 112, A. 1

Government of Creatures

deitatis praesentiam. Dei enim proprium est ubique esse, quia cum sit universale agens, eius virtus attingit omnia entia; unde est in omnibus rebus, ut supra dictum est. Virtus autem angeli, cum sit particulare agens, non attingit totum universum; sed sic attingit unum, quod non attingit aliud. Et ideo ita est hic, quod non alibi. Manifestum est autem per supra dicta, quod creatura corporalis per angelos administratur. Cum igitur aliquid est fiendum per aliquem angelum circa aliquam creaturam corpoream, de novo applicatur angelus illi corpori sua virtute; et sic angelus de novo incipit ibi esse. Et hoc totum procedit ex imperio divino. Unde sequitur, secundum praemissa, quod angelus a Deo mittatur.

Sed actio quam angelus missus exercet, procedit a Deo sicut a primo principio, cuius nutu et auctoritate angeli operantur; et in Deum reducitur sicut in ultimum finem. Et hoc facit rationem ministri, nam minister est sicut instrumentum intelligens; instrumentum autem ab alio movetur, et eius actio ad aliud ordinatur. Unde actiones angelorum ministeria vocantur; et propter hoc dicuntur in ministerium mitti. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliqua operatio dupliciter dicitur intellectualis. Uno modo, quasi in ipso intellectu consistens, ut contemplatio. Et talis operatio non determinat sibi locum, immo, ut Augustinus dicit IV de Trin., etiam nos, secundum quod aliquid aeternum mente sapimus, non in hoc mundo sumus. Alio modo dicitur aliqua actio intellectualis, quia est ab aliquo intellectu regulata et imperata. Et sic manifestum est quod operationes intellectuales interdum determinant sibi loca. Ad secundum dicendum quod caelum Empyreum pertinet ad dignitatem angeli secundum congruentiam quandam, quia congruum est ut supremum corporum naturae quae est supra omnia corpora, attribuatur. Non tamen angelus aliquid dignitatis accipit a caelo Empyreo. Et ideo quando actu non est in caelo Empyreo, nihil eius dignitati subtrahitur, sicut nec regi, quando non actu sedet in regali solio, quod congruit eius dignitati. Ad tertium dicendum quod in nobis exterior occupatio puritatem contemplationis impedit, quia actioni insistimus secundum sensitivas vires, quarum actiones cum intenduntur, retardantur actiones intellectivae virtutis. Sed angelus per solam intellectualem operationem regulat suas actiones exteriores. Unde actiones exteriores in nullo impediunt eius contemplationem, quia duarum actionum quarum una est regula et ratio alterius, una non impedit, sed iuvat aliam. Unde Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., quod angeli non sic foris exeunt, ut internae contemplationis gaudiis priventur.

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ture assumed, where He was before by the presence of His Godhead; for it belongs to God to be present everywhere, because, since He is the universal agent, His power reaches to all being, and hence He exists in all things (Q. 8, A. 1). An angel’s power, however, as a particular agent, does not reach to the whole universe, but reaches to one thing in such a way as not to reach another; and so he is here in such a manner as not to be there. But it is clear from what was above stated (Q. 110, A. 1), that the corporeal creature is governed by the angels. Hence, whenever an angel has to perform any work concerning a corporeal creature, the angel applies himself anew to that body by his power; and in that way begins to be there afresh. Now all this takes place by Divine command. Hence it follows that an angel is sent by God. Yet the action performed by the angel who is sent, proceeds from God as from its first principle, at Whose nod and by Whose authority the angels work; and is reduced to God as to its last end. Now this is what is meant by a minister: for a minister is an intelligent instrument; while an instrument is moved by another, and its action is ordered to another. Hence angels’ actions are called ministries; and for this reason they are said to be sent in ministry. Reply Obj. 1: An operation can be intellectual in two ways. In one way, as dwelling in the intellect itself, as contemplation; such an operation does not demand to occupy a place; indeed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): Even we ourselves as mentally tasting something eternal, are not in this world. In another sense an action is said to be intellectual because it is regulated and commanded by some intellect; in that sense the intellectual operations evidently have sometimes a determinate place. Reply Obj. 2: The empyrean heaven belongs to the angelic dignity by way of congruity; forasmuch as it is congruous that the higher body should be attributed to that nature which occupies a rank above bodies. Yet an angel does not derive his dignity from the empyrean heaven; so when he is not actually in the empyrean heaven, nothing of his dignity is lost, as neither does a king lessen his dignity when not actually sitting on his regal throne, which suits his dignity. Reply Obj. 3: In ourselves the purity of contemplation is obscured by exterior occupation; because we give ourselves to action through the sensitive faculties, the action of which when intense impedes the action of the intellectual powers. An angel, on the contrary, regulates his exterior actions by intellectual operation alone. Hence it follows that his external occupations in no respect impede his contemplation; because given two actions, one of which is the rule and the reason of the other, one does not hinder but helps the other. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. ii) that the angels do not go abroad in such a manner as to lose the delights of inward contemplation.

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Ad quartum dicendum quod angeli in suis actionibus exterioribus ministrant principaliter Deo, et secundario nobis. Non quia nos sumus superiores eis, simpliciter loquendo, sed quilibet homo vel angelus, inquantum adhaerendo Deo fit unus spiritus cum Deo, est superior omni creatura. Unde apostolus, ad Philipp. II, dicit, superiores sibi invicem arbitrantes.

Q. 112, A. 2

Reply Obj. 4: In their external actions the angels chiefly minister to God, and secondarily to us; not because we are superior to them, absolutely speaking, but because, since every man or angel by cleaving to God is made one spirit with God, he is thereby superior to every creature. Hence the Apostle says (Phil. 2:3): Esteeming others better than themselves.

Article 2 Whether all the angels are sent in ministry? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes angeli in ministerium mittantur. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Heb. I, omnes sunt administratorii spiritus, in ministerium missi. Praeterea, inter ordines supremus est ordo Seraphim, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed Seraphim est missus ad purgandum labia prophetae, ut habetur Isaiae VI. Ergo multo magis inferiores angeli mittuntur. Praeterea, divinae personae in infinitum excedunt omnes ordines angelorum. Sed divinae personae mittuntur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo multo magis quicumque supremi angeli. Praeterea, si superiores angeli non mittuntur ad exterius ministerium, hoc non est nisi quia superiores angeli exequuntur divina ministeria per inferiores. Sed cum omnes angeli sint inaequales, ut supra dictum est, quilibet angelus habet inferiorem angelum, praeter ultimum. Ergo unus angelus solus ministraret in ministerium missus. Quod est contra id quod dicitur Daniel VII, millia millium ministrabant ei. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, referens sententiam Dionysii, superiora agmina usum exterioris ministerii nequaquam habent. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, hoc habet ordo divinae providentiae, non solum in angelis, sed etiam in toto universo, quod inferiora per superiora administrantur, sed ab hoc ordine in rebus corporalibus aliquando ex divina dispensatione receditur, propter altiorem ordinem, secundum scilicet quod expedit ad gratiae manifestationem. Quod enim caecus natus fuit illuminatus, quod Lazarus fuit suscitatus, immediate a Deo factum est, absque aliqua actione caelestium corporum. Sed et angeli boni et mali possunt aliquid in istis corporibus operari praeter actionem caelestium corporum, condensando nubes in pluvias, et aliqua huiusmodi faciendo. Neque alicui debet esse dubium quin Deus immediate hominibus aliqua revelare posset, non mediantibus angelis; et superiores angeli, non mediantibus inferioribus. Et secundum hanc considerationem, quidam dixerunt quod, secundum commu-

Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels are sent in ministry. For the Apostle says (Heb 1:14): All are ministering spirits, sent to minister. Obj. 2: Further, among the orders, the highest is that of the Seraphim, as stated above (Q. 108, A. 6). But a Seraph was sent to purify the lips of the prophet (Isa 6:6, 7). Therefore much more are the inferior orders sent. Obj. 3: Further, the Divine Persons infinitely excel all the angelic orders. But the Divine Persons are sent. Therefore much more are even the highest angels sent. Obj. 4: Further, if the superior angels are not sent to the external ministries, this can only be because the superior angels execute the Divine ministries by means of the inferior angels. But as all the angels are unequal, as stated above (Q. 50, A. 4), each angel has an angel inferior to himself except the last one. Therefore only the last angel would be sent in ministry; which contradicts the words, Thousands of thousands ministered to Him (Dan 7:10). On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), quoting the statement of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), that the higher ranks fulfill no exterior service. I answer that, As appears from what has been said above (Q. 106, A. 3; Q. 110, A. 1), the order of Divine Providence has so disposed not only among the angels, but also in the whole universe, that inferior things are administered by the superior. By the Divine dispensation, however, this order is sometimes departed from as regards corporeal things, for the sake of a higher order, that is, according as it is suitable for the manifestation of grace. That the man born blind was enlightened, that Lazarus was raised from the dead, was accomplished immediately by God without the action of the heavenly bodies. Moreover both good and bad angels can work some effect in these bodies independently of the heavenly bodies, by the condensation of the clouds to rain, and by producing some such effects. Nor can anyone doubt that God can immediately reveal things to men without the help of the angels, and the superior angels without the inferior. From this standpoint some have

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Q. 112, A. 2

Government of Creatures

nem legem, superiores non mittuntur, sed inferiores tantum; sed ex aliqua dispensatione divina, interdum etiam superiores mittuntur. Sed hoc non videtur rationabile. Quia ordo angelicus attenditur secundum dona gratiarum. Ordo autem gratiae non habet alium superiorem ordinem, propter quem praetermitti debeat, sicut praetermittitur ordo naturae propter ordinem gratiae. Considerandum est etiam quod ordo naturae in operationibus miraculorum praetermittitur, propter fidei confirmationem. Ad quam nihil valeret, si praetermitteretur ordo angelicus, quia hoc a nobis percipi non posset. Nihil etiam est ita magnum in ministeriis divinis, quod per inferiores ordines exerceri non possit. Unde Gregorius dicit quod qui summa annuntiant, Archangeli vocantur. Hinc est quod ad virginem Mariam Gabriel Archangelus mittitur. Quod tamen fuit summum inter omnia divina ministeria, ut ibidem subditur. Et ideo simpliciter dicendum est, cum Dionysio, quod superiores angeli nunquam ad exterius ministerium mittuntur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut in missionibus divinarum personarum aliqua est visibilis, quae attenditur secundum creaturam corpoream; aliqua invisibilis, quae fit secundum spiritualem effectum, ita in missionibus angelorum aliqua dicitur exterior, quae scilicet est ad aliquod ministerium circa corporalia exhibendum, et secundum hanc missionem non omnes mittuntur; alia est interior, secundum intellectuales effectus, prout scilicet unus angelus illuminat alium, et sic omnes angeli mittuntur. Vel aliter dicendum quod apostolus inducit illud ad probandum quod Christus sit maior angelis per quos data est lex; ut sic ostendat excellentiam novae legis ad veterem. Unde non oportet quod intelligatur nisi de angelis ministerii, per quos data est lex. Ad secundum dicendum, secundum Dionysium, quod ille angelus qui missus est ad purgandum labia prophetae, fuit de inferioribus angelis; sed dictus est Seraphim, idest incendens, aequivoce, propter hoc quod venerat ad incendendum labia prophetae. Vel dicendum quod superiores angeli communicant propria dona, a quibus denominantur, mediantibus inferioribus angelis. Sic igitur unus de Seraphim dictus est purgasse incendio labia prophetae, non quia hoc ipse immediate fecerit, sed quia inferior angelus virtute eius hoc fecit. Sicut Papa dicitur absolvere aliquem, etiam si per alium officium absolutionis impendat. Ad tertium dicendum quod divinae personae non mittuntur in ministerium, sed aequivoce mitti dicuntur; ut ex praedictis patet. Ad quartum dicendum quod in divinis ministeriis est multiplex gradus. Unde nihil prohibet etiam inae-

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said that according to the general law the superior angels are not sent, but only the inferior; yet that sometimes, by Divine dispensation, the superior angels also are sent. This, however, does not seem to be reasonable; because the angelic order is according to the gifts of grace. Now the order of grace has no order above itself for the sake of which it should be passed over; as the order of nature is passed over for the sake of grace. It may likewise be observed that the order of nature in the working of miracles is passed over for the confirmation of faith; which purpose would receive no additional strength if the angelic order were passed over, since this could not be perceived by us. Further, there is nothing in the Divine ministries above the capacity of the inferior orders. Hence Gregory says (loc. cit.) that those who announce the highest things are called archangels. For this reason the archangel Gabriel was sent to the Virgin Mary: and yet, as he says further on, this was the greatest of all the Divine ministries. Thus with Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii) we must say, without any distinction, that the superior angels are never sent to the external ministry. Reply Obj. 1: As in the missions of the Divine Persons there is a visible mission, in regard to the corporeal creature, and an invisible mission, in regard to a spiritual effect; so likewise in the angelic missions, there is an external mission, in respect of some administration of corporeal things—and on such a mission not all the angels are sent— and an interior mission, in respect of some intellectual effect, just as one angel enlightens another—and in this way all the angels are sent. It may also be said that the Apostle wishes to prove that Christ is greater than the angels who were chosen as the messengers of the law; in order that He might show the excellence of the new over the old law. Hence there is no need to apply this to any other angels besides those who were sent to give the law. Reply Obj. 2: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), the angel who was sent to purify the prophet’s lips was one of the inferior order; but was called a Seraph, that is, kindling in an equivocal sense, because he came to kindle the lips of the prophet. It may also be said that the superior angels communicate their own proper gifts whereby they are denominated, through the ministry of the inferior angels. Thus one of the Seraphim is described as purifying by fire the prophet’s lips, not as if he did so immediately, but because an inferior angel did so by his power; as the Pope is said to absolve a man when he gives absolution by means of someone else. Reply Obj. 3: The Divine Persons are not sent in ministry, but are said to be sent in an equivocal sense, as appears from what has been said (Q. 43, A. 1). Reply Obj. 4: A manifold grade exists in the Divine ministries. Hence there is nothing to prevent angels though

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Q. 112, A. 3

quales angelos immediate ad ministeria mitti; ita tamen unequal from being sent immediately in ministry, in such quod superiores mittantur ad altiora ministeria, inferio- a manner however that the superior are sent to the higher res vero ad inferiora. ministries, and the lower to the inferior ministries.

Article 3 Whether all the angels who are sent, assist? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod etiam angeli qui mittuntur, assistant. Dicit enim Gregorius, in Homilia, et mittuntur igitur angeli, et assistunt, quia etsi circumscriptus est angelicus spiritus, summus tamen spiritus ipse, qui Deus est, circumscriptus non est. Praeterea, angelus Tobiae in ministerium missus fuit. Sed tamen ipse dixit, ego sum Raphael angelus, unus ex septem qui adstamus ante Deum, ut habetur Tobiae XII. Ergo angeli qui mittuntur, assistunt. Praeterea, quilibet angelus beatus propinquior est Deo quam Satan. Sed Satan assistit Deo; secundum quod dicitur Iob I, cum assisterent filii Dei coram domino, affuit inter eos et Satan. Ergo multo magis angeli qui mittuntur in ministerium, assistunt. Praeterea, si inferiores angeli non assistunt, hoc non est nisi quia non immediate, sed per superiores angelos divinas illuminationes recipiunt. Sed quilibet angelus per superiorem divinas illuminationes suscipit, excepto eo qui est inter omnes supremus. Ergo solus supremus angelus assisteret. Quod est contra illud quod habetur Dan. VII, decies millies centena millia assistebant ei. Ergo etiam illi qui ministrant, assistunt. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, XVII Moral., super illud Iob, numquid est numerus militum eius? Assistunt, inquit, illae potestates, quae ad quaedam hominibus nuntianda non exeunt. Ergo illi qui in ministerium mittuntur, non assistunt. Respondeo dicendum quod angeli introducuntur assistentes et administrantes, ad similitudinem eorum qui alicui regi famulantur. Quorum aliqui semper ei assistunt, et eius praecepta immediate audiunt. Alii vero sunt, ad quos praecepta regalia per assistentes nuntiantur, sicut illi qui administrationi civitatum praeficiuntur, et hi dicuntur ministrantes, sed non assistentes. Considerandum est ergo quod omnes angeli divinam essentiam immediate vident, et quantum ad hoc, omnes etiam qui ministrant, assistere dicuntur. Unde Gregorius dicit in II Moral., quod semper assistere, aut videre faciem patris possunt, qui ad ministerium exterius mittuntur pro nostra salute. Sed non omnes angeli secreta divinorum mysteriorum in ipsa claritate divinae essentiae percipere possunt; sed soli superiores, per quos inferioribus denuntiantur. Et secundum hoc, soli superiores, qui sunt

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels who are sent also assist. For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): So the angels are sent, and assist; for, though the angelic spirit is limited, yet the supreme Spirit, God, is not limited. Obj. 2: Further, the angel was sent to administer to Tobias. Yet he said, I am the angel Raphael, one of the seven who stand before the Lord (Tob 12:15). Therefore the angels who are sent, assist. Obj. 3: Further, every holy angel is nearer to God than Satan is. Yet Satan assisted God, according to Job 1:6: When the sons of God came to stand before the Lord, Satan also was present among them. Therefore much more do the angels, who are sent to minister, assist. Obj. 4: Further, if the inferior angels do not assist, the reason is because they receive the Divine enlightenment, not immediately, but through the superior angels. But every angel receives the Divine enlightenment from a superior, except the one who is highest of all. Therefore only the highest angel would assist; which is contrary to the text of Dan. 7:10: Ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him. Therefore the angels who are sent also assist. On the contrary, Gregory says, on Job 25:3: Is there any numbering of His soldiers? (Moral. xvii): Those powers assist, who do not go forth as messengers to men. Therefore those who are sent in ministry do not assist. I answer that, The angels are spoken of as assisting and administering, after the likeness of those who attend upon a king; some of whom ever wait upon him, and hear his commands immediately; while others there are to whom the royal commands are conveyed by those who are in attendance—for instance, those who are placed at the head of the administration of various cities; these are said to administer, not to assist. We must therefore observe that all the angels gaze upon the Divine Essence immediately; in regard to which all, even those who minister, are said to assist. Hence Gregory says (Moral. ii) that those who are sent on the external ministry of our salvation can always assist and see the face of the Father. Yet not all the angels can perceive the secrets of the Divine mysteries in the clearness itself of the Divine Essence; but only the superior angels who announce them to the inferior: and in that respect only the superior angels

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Q. 112, A. 4

Government of Creatures

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primae hierarchiae, assistere dicuntur, cuius proprium belonging to the highest hierarchy are said to assist, whose dicit esse Dionysius immediate a Deo illuminari. special prerogative it is to be enlightened immediately by God. Et per hoc patet solutio ad primum et secundum, From this may be deduced the reply to the first and quae procedunt de primo modo assistendi. second objections, which are based on the first mode of assisting. Ad tertium dicendum quod Satan non dicitur astiReply Obj. 3: Satan is not described as having assisted, tisse, sed inter assistentes affuisse describitur, quia, ut but as present among the assistants; for, as Gregory says Gregorius dicit II Moral., etsi beatitudinem perdidit, na- (Moral. ii), though he has lost beatitude, still he has retained turam tamen angelis similem non amisit. a nature like to the angels. Ad quartum dicendum quod omnes assistentes aliReply Obj. 4: All the assistants see some things immequa immediate vident in claritate divinae essentiae; et diately in the glory of the Divine Essence; and so it may be ideo totius primae hierarchiae proprium esse dicitur im- said that it is the prerogative of the whole of the highest himediate illuminari a Deo. Sed superiores eorum plura erarchy to be immediately enlightened by God; while the percipiunt quam inferiores, de quibus illuminant alios, higher ones among them see more than is seen by the infesicut etiam inter eos qui assistunt regi, plura scit de se- rior; some of whom enlighten others: as also among those cretis regis unus quam alius. who assist the king, one knows more of the king’s secrets than another.

Article 4 Whether all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli secundae hierarchiae omnes mittantur. Angeli enim omnes vel assistunt vel ministrant; secundum quod habetur Dan. VII. Sed angeli secundae hierarchiae non assistunt, illuminantur enim per angelos primae hierarchiae, sicut dicit Dionysius VIII cap. Cael. Hier. Omnes ergo angeli secundae hierarchiae in ministerium mittuntur. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, XVII Moral., quod plures sunt qui ministrant, quam qui assistunt. Sed hoc non esset, si angeli secundae hierarchiae in ministerium non mitterentur. Ergo omnes angeli secundae hierarchiae in ministerium mittuntur. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, quod dominationes sunt maiores omni subiectione. Sed mitti in ministerium, ad subiectionem pertinet. Ergo dominationes in ministerium non mittuntur. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, mitti ad exterius ministerium proprie convenit angelo, secundum quod ex divino imperio operatur circa aliquam creaturam corporalem; quod quidem pertinet ad executionem divini ministerii. Proprietates autem angelorum ex eorum nominibus manifestantur, ut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Et ideo angeli illorum ordinum ad exterius ministerium mittuntur, ex quorum nominibus aliqua executio datur intelligi. In nomine autem dominationum non importatur aliqua executio, sed sola dispositio et imperium de exequendis. Sed in nominibus inferiorum ordinum intelligitur aliqua executio, nam angeli et Archangeli denominantur a denuntiando;

Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent. For all the angels either assist, or minister, according to Dan. 7:10. But the angels of the second hierarchy do not assist; for they are enlightened by the angels of the first hierarchy, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii). Therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent in ministry. Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xvii) that there are more who minister than who assist. This would not be the case if the angels of the second hierarchy were not sent in ministry. Therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent to minister. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the Dominations are above all subjection. But to be sent implies subjection. Therefore the dominations are not sent to minister. I answer that, As above stated (A. 1), to be sent to external ministry properly belongs to an angel according as he acts by Divine command in respect of any corporeal creature; which is part of the execution of the Divine ministry. Now the angelic properties are manifested by their names, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii); and therefore the angels of those orders are sent to external ministry whose names signify some kind of administration. But the name dominations does not signify any such administration, but only disposition and command in administering. On the other hand, the names of the inferior orders imply administration, for the Angels and Archangels are so called from announcing; the Virtues and Powers are so called in respect

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virtutes et potestates dicuntur per respectum ad aliquem actum; principis etiam est, ut Gregorius dicit, inter alios operantes priorem existere. Unde ad hos quinque ordines pertinet in exterius ministerium mitti, non autem ad quatuor superiores. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominationes computantur quidem inter angelos ministrantes, non sicut exequentes ministerium, sed sicut disponentes et mandantes quid per alios fieri debeat. Sicut architectores in artificiis nihil manu operantur, sed solum disponunt et praecipiunt quid alii debeant operari. Ad secundum dicendum quod de numero assistentium et ministrantium duplex ratio haberi potest. Gregorius enim dicit plures esse ministrantes quam assistentes. Intelligit enim quod dicitur, millia millium ministrabant ei, non esse dictum multiplicative, sed partitive; ac si diceretur, millia de numero millium. Et sic ministrantium numerus ponitur indefinitus, ad significandum excessum; assistentium vero finitus, cum subditur, et decies millies centena millia assistebant ei. Et hoc procedit secundum rationem Platonicorum, qui dicebant quod quanto aliqua sunt uni primo principio propinquiora, tanto sunt minoris multitudinis, sicut quanto numerus est propinquior unitati, tanto est multitudine minor. Et haec opinio salvatur quantum ad numerum ordinum, dum sex ministrant, et tres assistunt. Sed Dionysius ponit, XIV cap. Cael. Hier., quod multitudo angelorum transcendit omnem materialem multitudinem; ut scilicet, sicut corpora superiora transcendunt corpora inferiora magnitudine quasi in immensum, ita superiores naturae incorporeae transcendunt multitudine omnes naturas corporeas; quia quod est melius, est magis a Deo intentum et multiplicatum. Et secundum hoc, cum assistentes sint superiores ministrantibus, plures erunt assistentes quam ministrantes. Unde secundum hoc, millia millium legitur multiplicativae, ac si diceretur, millies millia. Et quia decies centum sunt mille, si diceretur, decies centena millia, daretur intelligi quod tot essent assistentes, quot ministrantes, sed quia dicitur, decies millies centena millia, multo plures dicuntur esse assistentes quam ministrantes. Nec tamen hoc pro tanto dicitur, quia tantus solum sit angelorum numerus, sed multo maior, quia omnem materialem multitudinem excedit. Quod significatur per multiplicationem maximorum numerorum supra seipsos, scilicet denarii, centenarii et millenarii; ut Dionysius ibidem dicit.

Q. 112, A. 4

of some act; and it is right that the Prince, according to what Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), be first among the workers. Hence it belongs to these five orders to be sent to external ministry; not to the four superior orders. Reply Obj. 1: The Dominations are reckoned among the ministering angels, not as exercising but as disposing and commanding what is to be done by others; thus an architect does not put his hands to the production of his art, but only disposes and orders what others are to do. Reply Obj. 2: A twofold reason may be given in assigning the number of the assisting and ministering angels. For Gregory says that those who minister are more numerous than those who assist; because he takes the words (Dan 7:10) thousands of thousands ministered to Him, not in a multiple but in a partitive sense, to mean thousands out of thousands; thus the number of those who minister is indefinite, and signifies excess; while the number of assistants is finite as in the words added, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand assisted Him. This explanation rests on the opinion of the Platonists, who said that the nearer things are to the one first principle, the smaller they are in number; as the nearer a number is to unity, the lesser it is than multitude. This opinion is verified as regards the number of orders, as six administer and three assist. Dionysius, however, (Coel. Hier. xiv) declares that the multitude of angels surpasses all the multitude of material things; so that, as the superior bodies exceed the inferior in magnitude to an immeasurable degree, so the superior incorporeal natures surpass all corporeal natures in multitude; because whatever is better is more intended and more multiplied by God. Hence, as the assistants are superior to the ministers there will be more assistants than ministers. In this way, the words thousands of thousands are taken by way of multiplication, to signify a thousand times a thousand. And because ten times a hundred is a thousand, if it were said ten times a hundred thousand it would mean that there are as many assistants as ministers: but since it is written ten thousand times a hundred thousand, we are given to understand that the assistants are much more numerous than the ministers. Nor is this said to signify that this is the precise number of angels, but rather that it is much greater, in that it exceeds all material multitude. This is signified by the multiplication together of all the greatest numbers, namely ten, a hundred, and a thousand, as Dionysius remarks in the same passage.

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Question 113 The Guardianship of the Good Angels Deinde considerandum est de custodia bonorum anWe next consider the guardianship exercised by the gelorum, et de impugnatione malorum. Et circa primum good angels; and their warfare against the bad angels. Unquaeruntur octo. der the first head eight points of inquiry arise: Primo, utrum homines ab angelis custodiantur. (1) Whether men are guarded by the angels? Secundo, utrum singulis hominibus singuli angeli (2) Whether to each man is assigned a single guardian ad custodiam deputentur. angel? Tertio, utrum custodia pertineat solum ad ultimum (3) Whether the guardianship belongs only to the ordinem angelorum. lowest order of angels? Quarto, utrum omni homini conveniat habere (4) Whether it is fitting for each man to have an angel angelum custodem. guardian? Quinto, quando incipiat custodia angeli circa (5) When does an angel’s guardianship of a man begin? hominem. Sexto, utrum angelus semper custodiat hominem. (6) Whether the angel guardians always watch over men? Septimo, utrum doleat de perditione custoditi. (7) Whether the angel grieves over the loss of the one guarded? Octavo, utrum inter angelos sit pugna ratione (8) Whether rivalry exists among the angels as regards custodiae. their guardianship?

Article 1 Whether men are guarded by the angels? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homines non custodiantur ab angelis. Custodes enim deputantur aliquibus vel quia nesciunt, vel quia non possunt custodire seipsos; sicut pueris et infirmis. Sed homo potest custodire seipsum per liberum arbitrium; et scit, per naturalem cognitionem legis naturalis. Ergo homo non custoditur ab angelo. Praeterea, ubi adest fortior custodia, infirmior superfluere videtur. Sed homines custodiuntur a Deo; secundum illud Psalmi CXX, non dormitabit neque dormiet qui custodit Israel. Ergo non est necessarium quod homo custodiatur ab angelo. Praeterea, perditio custoditi redundat in negligentiam custodis, unde dicitur cuidam, III Reg. XX, custodi virum istum, qui si lapsus fuerit, erit anima tua pro anima eius. Sed multi homines quotidie pereunt, in peccatum cadentes, quibus angeli subvenire possent vel visibiliter apparendo, vel miracula faciendo, vel aliquo simili modo. Essent ergo negligentes angeli, si eorum custodiae homines essent commissi, quod patet esse falsum. Non igitur angeli sunt hominum custodes. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo, Angelis suis mandavit de te, ut custodiant te in omnibus viis tuis.

Objection 1: It would seem that men are not guarded by the angels. For guardians are deputed to some because they either know not how, or are not able, to guard themselves, as children and the sick. But man is able to guard himself by his free-will; and knows how by his natural knowledge of natural law. Therefore man is not guarded by an angel. Obj. 2: Further, a strong guard makes a weaker one superfluous. But men are guarded by God, according to Ps. 120:4: He shall neither slumber nor sleep, that keepeth Israel. Therefore man does not need to be guarded by an angel. Obj. 3: Further, the loss of the guarded redounds to the negligence of the guardian; hence it was said to a certain one: Keep this man; and if he shall slip away, thy life shall be for his life (3 Kgs 20:39). Now many perish daily through falling into sin; whom the angels could help by visible appearance, or by miracles, or in some such-like way. The angels would therefore be negligent if men are given to their guardianship. But that is clearly false. Therefore the angels are not the guardians of men. On the contrary, It is written (Ps 90:11): He hath given His angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways.

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Q. 113, A. 1

Government of Creatures

Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum rationem divinae providentiae, hoc in rebus omnibus invenitur, quod mobilia et variabilia per immobilia et invariabilia moventur et regulantur; sicut omnia corporalia per substantias spirituales immobiles, et corpora inferiora per corpora superiora, quae sunt invariabilia secundum substantiam. Sed et nos ipsi regulamur circa conclusiones in quibus possumus diversimode opinari, per principia quae invariabiliter tenemus. Manifestum est autem quod in rebus agendis cognitio et affectus hominis multipliciter variari et deficere possunt a bono. Et ideo necessarium fuit quod hominibus angeli ad custodiam deputarentur, per quos regularentur et moverentur ad bonum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per liberum arbitrium potest homo aliqualiter malum vitare, sed non sufficienter, quia infirmatur circa affectum boni, propter multiplices animae passiones. Similiter etiam universalis cognitio naturalis legis, quae homini naturaliter adest, aliqualiter dirigit hominem ad bonum, sed non sufficienter, quia in applicando universalia principia iuris ad particularia opera, contingit hominem multipliciter deficere. Unde dicitur Sap. IX, cogitationes mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae. Et ideo necessaria fuit homini custodia angelorum. Ad secundum dicendum quod ad bene operandum duo requiruntur. Primo quidem, quod affectus inclinetur ad bonum, quod quidem fit in nobis per habitum virtutis moralis. Secundo autem, quod ratio inveniat congruas vias ad perficiendum bonum virtutis, quod quidem philosophus attribuit prudentiae. Quantum ergo ad primum, Deus immediate custodit hominem, infundendo ei gratiam et virtutes. Quantum autem ad secundum, Deus custodit hominem sicut universalis instructor, cuius instructio ad hominem provenit mediantibus angelis, ut supra habitum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut homines a naturali instinctu boni discedunt propter passionem peccati; ita etiam discedunt ab instigatione bonorum angelorum, quae fit invisibiliter per hoc quod homines illuminant ad bene agendum. Unde quod homines pereunt, non est imputandum negligentiae angelorum, sed malitiae hominum. Quod autem aliquando, praeter legem communem, hominibus visibiliter apparent, ex speciali Dei gratia est, sicut etiam quod praeter ordinem naturae miracula fiunt.

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I answer that, According to the plan of Divine Providence, we find that in all things the movable and variable are moved and regulated by the immovable and invariable; as all corporeal things by immovable spiritual substances, and the inferior bodies by the superior which are invariable in substance. We ourselves also are regulated as regards conclusions, about which we may have various opinions, by the principles which we hold in an invariable manner. It is moreover manifest that as regards things to be done, human knowledge and affection can vary and fail from good in many ways; and so it was necessary that angels should be deputed for the guardianship of men, in order to regulate them and move them to good. Reply Obj. 1: By free-will man can avoid evil to a certain degree, but not in any sufficient degree; forasmuch as he is weak in affection towards good on account of the manifold passions of the soul. Likewise universal natural knowledge of the law, which by nature belongs to man, to a certain degree directs man to good, but not in a sufficient degree; because in the application of the universal principles of law to particular actions man happens to be deficient in many ways. Hence it is written (Wis 9:14): The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain. Thus man needs to be guarded by the angels. Reply Obj. 2: Two things are required for a good action; first, that the affection be inclined to good, which is effected in us by the habit of mortal virtue. Second, that reason should discover the proper methods to make perfect the good of virtue; this the Philosopher (Ethic. vi) attributes to prudence. As regards the first, God guards man immediately by infusing into him grace and virtues; as regards the second, God guards man as his universal instructor, Whose precepts reach man by the medium of the angels, as above stated (Q. 111, A. 1). Reply Obj. 3: As men depart from the natural instinct of good by reason of a sinful passion, so also do they depart from the instigation of the good angels, which takes place invisibly when they enlighten man that he may do what is right. Hence that men perish is not to be imputed to the negligence of the angels but to the malice of men. That they sometimes appear to men visibly outside the ordinary course of nature comes from a special grace of God, as likewise that miracles occur outside the order of nature.

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Q. 113, A. 2

Article 2 Whether each man is guarded by an angel? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non singuli homines a singulis angelis custodiantur. Angelus enim est virtuosior quam homo. Sed unus homo sufficit ad custodiam multorum hominum. Ergo multo magis unus angelus multos homines potest custodire. Praeterea, inferiora reducuntur in Deum a superioribus per media, ut Dionysius dicit. Sed cum omnes angeli sint inaequales, ut supra dictum est, solus unus angelus est inter quem et homines non est aliquis medius. Ergo unus angelus solus est qui immediate custodit homines. Praeterea, maiores angeli maioribus officiis deputantur. Sed non est maius officium custodire unum hominem quam alium, cum omnes homines natura sint pares. Cum ergo omnium angelorum sit unus maior alio, secundum Dionysium, videtur quod diversi homines non custodiantur a diversis angelis. Sed contra est quod Hieronymus, exponens illud Matth. XVIII, Angeli eorum in caelis, dicit, magna est dignitas animarum, ut unaquaeque habeat, ab ortu nativitatis, in custodiam sui angelum delegatum. Respondeo dicendum quod singulis hominibus singuli angeli ad custodiam deputantur. Cuius ratio est, quia angelorum custodia est quaedam executio divinae providentiae circa homines. Providentia autem Dei aliter se habet ad homines, et ad alias corruptibiles creaturas, quia aliter se habent ad incorruptibilitatem. Homines enim non solum sunt incorruptibiles quantum ad communem speciem, sed etiam quantum ad proprias formas singulorum, quae sunt animae rationales, quod de aliis rebus corruptibilibus dici non potest. Manifestum est autem quod providentia Dei principaliter est circa illa quae perpetuo manent, circa ea vero quae transeunt, providentia Dei est inquantum ordinat ipsa ad res perpetuas. Sic igitur providentia Dei comparatur ad singulos homines, sicut comparatur ad singula genera vel species corruptibilium rerum. Sed secundum Gregorium, diversi ordines deputantur diversis rerum generibus; puta potestates ad arcendos daemones, virtutes ad miracula facienda in rebus corporeis. Et probabile est quod diversis speciebus rerum diversi angeli eiusdem ordinis praeficiantur. Unde etiam rationabile est ut diversis hominibus diversi angeli ad custodiam deputentur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod alicui homini adhibetur custos dupliciter. Uno modo, inquantum est homo singularis, et sic uni homini debetur unus custos, et interdum plures deputantur ad custodiam unius. Alio modo, inquantum est pars alicuius collegii, et sic toti collegio unus homo ad custodiam praeponitur, ad quem

Objection 1: It would seem that each man is not guarded by an angel. For an angel is stronger than a man. But one man suffices to guard many men. Therefore much more can one angel guard many men. Obj. 2: Further, the lower things are brought to God through the medium of the higher, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, xiii). But as all the angels are unequal (Q. 50, A. 4), there is only one angel between whom and men there is no medium. Therefore there is only one angel who immediately keeps men. Obj. 3: Further, the greater angels are deputed to the greater offices. But it is not a greater office to keep one man more than another; since all men are naturally equal. Since therefore of all the angels one is greater than another, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x), it seems that different men are not guarded by different angels. On the contrary, On the text, Their angels in heaven, etc. (Matt 8:10), Jerome says: Great is the dignity of souls, for each one to have an angel deputed to guard it from its birth. I answer that, Each man has an angel guardian appointed to him. This rests upon the fact that the guardianship of angels belongs to the execution of Divine providence concerning men. But God’s providence acts differently as regards men and as regards other corruptible creatures, for they are related differently to incorruptibility. For men are not only incorruptible in the common species, but also in the proper forms of each individual, which are the rational souls, which cannot be said of other incorruptible things. Now it is manifest that the providence of God is chiefly exercised towards what remains for ever; whereas as regards things which pass away, the providence of God acts so as to order their existence to the things which are perpetual. Thus the providence of God is related to each man as it is to every genus or species of things corruptible. But, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), the different orders are deputed to the different genera of things, for instance, the Powers to coerce the demons, the Virtues to work miracles in things corporeal; while it is probable that the different species are presided over by different angels of the same order. Hence it is also reasonable to suppose that different angels are appointed to the guardianship of different men. Reply Obj. 1: A guardian may be assigned to a man for two reasons: first, inasmuch as a man is an individual, and thus to one man one guardian is due; and sometimes several are appointed to guard one. Second, inasmuch as a man is part of a community, and thus one man is appointed as guardian of a whole community; to whom it belongs to

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Q. 113, A. 3

Government of Creatures

pertinet providere ea quae pertinent ad unum hominem in ordine ad totum collegium; sicut sunt ea quae exterius aguntur, de quibus alii aedificantur vel scandalizantur. angelorum autem custodia deputatur hominibus etiam quantum ad invisibilia et occulta, quae pertinent ad singulorum salutem secundum seipsos. Unde singulis hominibus singuli angeli deputantur ad custodiam. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, angeli primae hierarchiae omnes quantum ad aliqua illuminantur immediate a Deo, sed quaedam sunt de quibus illuminantur superiores tantum immediate a Deo, quae inferioribus revelant. Et idem etiam in inferioribus ordinibus considerandum est, nam aliquis infimus angelus illuminatur quantum ad quaedam ab aliquo supremo, et quantum ad aliqua ab eo qui immediate sibi praefertur. Et sic etiam possibile est quod aliquis angelus immediate illuminet hominem, qui tamen habet aliquos angelos sub se, quos illuminat. Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis homines natura sint pares, tamen inaequalitas in eis invenitur, secundum quod ex divina providentia quidam ordinantur ad maius, et quidam ad minus; secundum illud quod dicitur Eccli. XXXIII, in multitudine disciplinae domini separavit eos, ex ipsis benedixit et exaltavit, ex ipsis maledixit et humiliavit. Et sic maius officium est custodire unum hominem quam alium.

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provide what concerns one man in his relation to the whole community, such as external works, which are sources of strength or weakness to others. But angel guardians are given to men also as regards invisible and occult things, concerning the salvation of each one in his own regard. Hence individual angels are appointed to guard individual men. Reply Obj. 2: As above stated (Q. 112, A. 3, ad 4), all the angels of the first hierarchy are, as to some things, enlightened by God directly; but as to other things, only the superior are directly enlightened by God, and these reveal them to the inferior. And the same also applies to the inferior orders: for a lower angel is enlightened in some respects by one of the highest, and in other respects by the one immediately above him. Thus it is possible that some one angel enlightens a man immediately, and yet has other angels beneath him whom he enlightens. Reply Obj. 3: Although men are equal in nature, still inequality exists among them, according as Divine Providence orders some to the greater, and others to the lesser things, according to Ecclus. 33:11, 12: With much knowledge the Lord hath divided them, and diversified their ways: some of them hath He blessed and exalted, and some of them hath He cursed and brought low. Thus it is a greater office to guard one man than another.

Article 3 Whether to guard men belongs only to the lowest order of angels? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod custodire homines non pertineat solum ad infimum ordinem angelorum. Dicit enim Chrysostomus quod hoc quod dicitur Matth. XVIII, angeli eorum in caelo etc., intelligitur non de quibuscumque angelis, sed de supereminentibus. Ergo supereminentes angeli custodiunt homines. Praeterea, apostolus, ad Heb. I, dicit quod angeli sunt in ministerium missi propter eos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis, et sic videtur quod missio angelorum ad custodiam hominum ordinetur. Sed quinque ordines in exterius ministerium mittuntur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo omnes angeli quinque ordinum custodiae hominum deputantur. Praeterea, ad custodiam hominum maxime videtur esse necessarium arcere daemones, quod pertinet ad potestates, secundum Gregorium; et miracula facere, quod pertinet ad virtutes. Ergo illi etiam ordines deputantur ad custodiam, et non solum infimus.

Objection 1: It would seem that the guardianship of men does not belong only to the lowest order of the angels. For Chrysostom says that the text (Matt 18:10), Their angels in heaven, etc. is to be understood not of any angels but of the highest. Therefore the superior angels guard men.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says that angels are sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation (Heb 1:14); and thus it seems that the mission of the angels is directed to the guardianship of men. But five orders are sent in external ministry (Q. 112, A. 4). Therefore all the angels of the five orders are deputed to the guardianship of men. Obj. 3: Further, for the guardianship of men it seems especially necessary to coerce the demons, which belongs most of all to the Powers, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.); and to work miracles, which belongs to the Virtues. Therefore these orders are also deputed to the work of guardianship, and not only the lowest order.

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Sed contra est quod in Psalmo custodia hominum attribuitur angelis; quorum ordo est infimus, secundum Dionysium. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, homini custodia dupliciter adhibetur. Uno modo custodia particularis, secundum quod singulis hominibus singuli angeli ad custodiam deputantur. Et talis custodia pertinet ad infimum ordinem angelorum, quorum, secundum Gregorium, est minima nuntiare; hoc autem videtur esse minimum in officiis angelorum, procurare ea quae ad unius hominis tantum salutem pertinent. Alia vero est custodia universalis. Et haec multiplicatur secundum diversos ordines, nam quanto agens fuerit universalius, tanto est superius. Sic igitur custodia humanae multitudinis pertinet ad ordinem principatuum, vel forte ad Archangelos, qui dicuntur principes angeli, unde et Michael, quem Archangelum dicimus, unus de principibus dicitur Dan. X. Ulterius autem super omnes naturas corporeas habent custodiam virtutes. Et ulterius etiam super daemones habent custodiam potestates. Et ulterius etiam super bonos spiritus habent custodiam principatus, secundum Gregorium. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum Chrysostomi potest intelligi, ut loquatur de supremis in ordine infimo angelorum, quia, ut Dionysius dicit, in quolibet ordine sunt primi, medii et ultimi. Est autem probabile quod maiores angeli deputentur ad custodiam eorum qui sunt ad maiorem gradum gloriae a Deo electi. Ad secundum dicendum quod non omnes angeli qui mittuntur, habent particularem custodiam super singulos homines; sed quidam ordines habent universalem custodiam, magis vel minus, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam inferiores angeli exercent officia superiorum, inquantum aliquid de dono eorum participant, et se habent ad superiores sicut executores virtutis eorum. Et per hunc modum etiam angeli infimi ordinis possunt et arcere daemones, et miracula facere.

Q. 113, A. 4

On the contrary, In the Psalm (90) the guardianship of men is attributed to the angels; who belong to the lowest order, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. v, ix). I answer that, As above stated (A. 2), man is guarded in two ways; in one way by particular guardianship, according as to each man an angel is appointed to guard him; and such guardianship belongs to the lowest order of the angels, whose place it is, according to Gregory, to announce the lesser things; for it seems to be the least of the angelic offices to procure what concerns the salvation of only one man. The other kind of guardianship is universal, multiplied according to the different orders. For the more universal an agent is, the higher it is. Thus the guardianship of the human race belongs to the order of Principalities, or perhaps to the Archangels, whom we call the angel princes. Hence, Michael, whom we call an archangel, is also styled one of the princes (Dan 10:13). Moreover all corporeal creatures are guarded by the Virtues; and likewise the demons by the Powers, and the good spirits by the Principalities, according to Gregory’s opinion (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.).

Reply Obj. 1: Chrysostom can be taken to mean the highest in the lowest order of angels; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) in each order there are first, middle, and last. It is, however, probable that the greater angels are deputed to keep those chosen by God for the higher degree of glory. Reply Obj. 2: Not all the angels who are sent have guardianship of individual men; but some orders have a universal guardianship, greater or less, as above explained. Reply Obj. 3: Even inferior angels exercise the office of the superior, as they share in their gifts, and they are executors of the superiors’ power; and in this way all the angels of the lowest order can coerce the demons, and work miracles.

Article 4 Whether angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnibus hominibus angeli ad custodiam deputentur. Dicitur enim de Christo, Philipp. II, quod est in similitudinem hominum factus, et habitu inventus ut homo. Si igitur omnibus hominibus angeli ad custodiam deputantur, etiam Christus angelum custodem habuisset. Sed hoc videtur inconveniens, cum Christus sit maior omnibus angelis. Non ergo omnibus hominibus angeli ad custodiam deputantur.

Objection 1: It would seem that angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men. For it is written of Christ (Phil. 2:7) that He was made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man. If therefore angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men, Christ also would have had an angel guardian. But this is unseemly, for Christ is greater than all the angels. Therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men.

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Q. 113, A. 4

Government of Creatures

Praeterea, omnium hominum primus fuit Adam. Sed sibi non competebat habere angelum custodem, ad minus in statu innocentiae, quia tunc nullis periculis angustiabatur. Ergo angeli non praeficiuntur ad custodiam omnibus hominibus. Praeterea, hominibus angeli ad custodiam deputantur, ut per eos manuducantur ad vitam aeternam, et incitentur ad bene operandum, et muniantur contra insultus daemonum. Sed homines praesciti ad damnationem, nunquam perveniunt ad vitam aeternam. Infideles etiam, etsi interdum bona opera faciant, non tamen bene faciunt, quia non recta intentione faciunt, fides enim intentionem dirigit, ut Augustinus dicit. Antichristi etiam adventus erit secundum operationem Satanae, ut dicitur II ad Thessal. II. Non ergo omnibus hominibus angeli ad custodiam deputantur. Sed contra est auctoritas Hieronymi supra inducta, qui dicit quod unaquaeque anima ad sui custodiam habet angelum deputatum. Respondeo dicendum quod homo in statu vitae istius constitutus, est quasi in quadam via, qua debet tendere ad patriam. In qua quidem via multa pericula homini imminent, tum ab interiori, tum ab exteriori; secundum illud Psalmi CXLI, in via hac qua ambulabam, absconderunt laqueum mihi. Et ideo sicut hominibus per viam non tutam ambulantibus dantur custodes, ita et cuilibet homini, quandiu viator est, custos angelus deputatur. Quando autem iam ad terminum viae pervenerit, iam non habebit angelum custodem; sed habebit in regno angelum conregnantem, in Inferno daemonem punientem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus, secundum quod homo, immediate regulabatur a verbo Dei, unde non indigebat custodia angelorum. Et iterum secundum animam erat comprehensor; sed ratione passibilitatis corporis, erat viator. Et secundum hoc, non debebatur ei angelus custos, tanquam superior; sed angelus minister, tanquam inferior. Unde dicitur Matth. IV, quod accesserunt angeli et ministrabant ei. Ad secundum dicendum quod homo in statu innocentiae non patiebatur aliquod periculum ab interiori, quia interius erant omnia ordinata, ut supra dictum est, sed imminebat ei periculum ab exteriori, propter insidias daemonum; ut rei probavit eventus. Et ideo indigebat custodia angelorum. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut praesciti et infideles, et etiam Antichristus, non privantur interiori auxilio naturalis rationis; ita etiam non privantur exteriori auxilio toti naturae humanae divinitus concesso, scilicet custodia angelorum. Per quam etsi non iuventur quantum ad hoc quod vitam aeternam bonis operibus mereantur, iuvantur tamen quantum ad hoc, quod ab aliquibus malis retrahuntur, quibus et sibi ipsis et aliis

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Obj. 2: Further, Adam was the first of all men. But it was not fitting that he should have an angel guardian, at least in the state of innocence: for then he was not beset by any dangers. Therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men. Obj. 3: Further, angels are appointed to the guardianship of men, that they may take them by the hand and guide them to eternal life, encourage them to good works, and protect them against the assaults of the demons. But men who are foreknown to damnation, never attain to eternal life. Infidels, also, though at times they perform good works, do not perform them well, for they have not a right intention: for faith directs the intention as Augustine says (Enarr. ii in Ps. 31). Moreover, the coming of Antichrist will be according to the working of Satan, as it is written (2 Thess 2:9). Therefore angels are not deputed to the guardianship of all men. On the contrary, is the authority of Jerome quoted above (A. 2), for he says that each soul has an angel appointed to guard it. I answer that, Man while in this state of life, is, as it were, on a road by which he should journey towards heaven. On this road man is threatened by many dangers both from within and from without, according to Ps. 159:4: In this way wherein I walked, they have hidden a snare for me. And therefore as guardians are appointed for men who have to pass by an unsafe road, so an angel guardian is assigned to each man as long as he is a wayfarer. When, however, he arrives at the end of life he no longer has a guardian angel; but in the kingdom he will have an angel to reign with him, in hell a demon to punish him. Reply Obj. 1: Christ as man was guided immediately by the Word of God: wherefore He needed not be guarded by an angel. Again as regards His soul, He was a comprehensor, although in regard to His passible body, He was a wayfarer. In this latter respect it was right that He should have not a guardian angel as superior to Him, but a ministering angel as inferior to Him. Whence it is written (Matt 4:11) that angels came and ministered to Him. Reply Obj. 2: In the state of innocence man was not threatened by any peril from within: because within him all was well ordered, as we have said above (Q. 95, AA. 1, 3). But peril threatened from without on account of the snares of the demons; as was proved by the event. For this reason he needed a guardian angel. Reply Obj. 3: Just as the foreknown, the infidels, and even Antichrist, are not deprived of the interior help of natural reason; so neither are they deprived of that exterior help granted by God to the whole human race—namely the guardianship of the angels. And although the help which they receive therefrom does not result in their deserving eternal life by good works, it does nevertheless conduce to their being protected from certain evils which would hurt

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Q. 113, A. 5

nocere possunt. Nam et ipsi daemones arcentur per bo- both themselves and others. For even the demons are held nos angelos, ne noceant quantum volunt. Et similiter off by the good angels, lest they hurt as much as they would. Antichristus non tantum nocebit, quantum vellet. In like manner Antichrist will not do as much harm as he would wish.

Article 5 Whether an angel is appointed to guard a man from his birth? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus non deputetur homini ad custodiam a sua nativitate. Angeli enim mittuntur in ministerium, propter eos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis, ut apostolus, ad Heb. dicit. Sed homines incipiunt haereditatem capere salutis, quando baptizantur. Ergo angelus deputatur homini ad custodiam a tempore Baptismi, et non a tempore nativitatis. Praeterea, homines ab angelis custodiuntur, inquantum ab eis illuminantur per modum doctrinae. Sed pueri mox nati non sunt capaces doctrinae, quia non habent usum rationis. Ergo pueris mox natis non deputantur angeli custodes. Praeterea, pueri in materno utero existentes habent animam rationalem aliquo tempore, sicut et post nativitatem ex utero. Sed cum sunt in materno utero, non deputantur eis angeli ad custodiam, ut videtur, quia neque etiam ministri Ecclesiae eos sacramentis imbuunt. Non ergo statim a nativitate hominibus angeli ad custodiam deputantur. Sed contra est quod Hieronymus dicit, quod unaquaeque anima, ab ortu nativitatis, habet in custodiam sui angelum deputatum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Origenes dicit super Matthaeum, super hoc est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dixerunt quod angelus ad custodiam homini deputatur a tempore Baptismi, alii vero quod a tempore nativitatis. Et hanc opinionem Hieronymus approbat; et rationabiliter. Beneficia enim quae dantur homini divinitus ex eo quod est Christianus, incipiunt a tempore Baptismi; sicut perceptio Eucharistiae, et alia huiusmodi. Sed ea quae providentur homini a Deo, inquantum habet naturam rationalem, ex tunc ei exhibentur, ex quo nascendo talem naturam accipit. Et tale beneficium est custodia angelorum, ut ex praemissis patet. Unde statim a nativitate habet homo angelum ad sui custodiam deputatum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod angeli mittuntur in ministerium, efficaciter quidem propter eos solos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis, si consideretur ultimus effectus custodiae, qui est perceptio haereditatis. Nihilominus tamen et aliis ministerium angelorum non subtrahitur, quamvis in eis hanc efficaciam non habeat,

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not appointed to guard a man from his birth. For angels are sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation, as the Apostle says (Heb 1:14). But men begin to receive the inheritance of salvation, when they are baptized. Therefore an angel is appointed to guard a man from the time of his baptism, not of his birth. Obj. 2: Further, men are guarded by angels in as far as angels enlighten and instruct them. But children are not capable of instruction as soon as they are born, for they have not the use of reason. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard children as soon as they are born. Obj. 3: Further, a child has a rational soul for some time before birth, just as well as after. But it does not appear that an angel is appointed to guard a child before its birth, for they are not then admitted to the sacraments of the Church. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard men from the moment of their birth. On the contrary, Jerome says (vide A. 4) that each soul has an angel appointed to guard it from its birth. I answer that, as Origen observes (Tract. v, super Matt.) there are two opinions on this matter. For some have held that the angel guardian is appointed at the time of baptism, others, that he is appointed at the time of birth. The latter opinion Jerome approves (loc. cit.), and with reason. For those benefits which are conferred by God on man as a Christian, begin with his baptism; such as receiving the Eucharist, and the like. But those which are conferred by God on man as a rational being, are bestowed on him at his birth, for then it is that he receives that nature. Among the latter benefits we must count the guardianship of angels, as we have said above (AA. 1, 4). Wherefore from the very moment of his birth man has an angel guardian appointed to him. Reply Obj. 1: Angels are sent to minister, and that efficaciously indeed, for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation, if we consider the ultimate effect of their guardianship, which is the realizing of that inheritance. But for all that, the angelic ministrations are not withdrawn from others although they are not so efficacious as to bring

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quod perducantur ad salutem. Efficax tamen est circa eos angelorum ministerium, inquantum a multis malis retrahuntur. Ad secundum dicendum quod officium custodiae ordinatur quidem ad illuminationem doctrinae, sicut ad ultimum et principalem effectum. Nihilominus tamen multos alios effectus habet, qui pueris competunt, scilicet arcere daemones, et alia nocumenta tam corporalia quam spiritualia prohibere. Ad tertium dicendum quod puer quandiu est in materno utero, non totaliter est a matre separatus, sed per quandam colligationem est quodammodo adhuc aliquid eius, sicut et fructus pendens in arbore, est aliquid arboris. Et ideo probabiliter dici potest quod angelus qui est in custodia matris, custodiat prolem in matris utero existentem. Sed in nativitate, quando separatur a matre, angelus ei ad custodiam deputatur, ut Hieronymus dicit.

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them to salvation: efficacious, nevertheless, they are, inasmuch as they ward off many evils. Reply Obj. 2: Guardianship is ordained to enlightenment by instruction, as to its ultimate and principal effect. Nevertheless it has many other effects consistent with childhood; for instance to ward off the demons, and to prevent both bodily and spiritual harm. Reply Obj. 3: As long as the child is in the mother’s womb it is not entirely separate, but by reason of a certain intimate tie, is still part of her: just as the fruit while hanging on the tree is part of the tree. And therefore it can be said with some degree of probability, that the angel who guards the mother guards the child while in the womb. But at its birth, when it becomes separate from the mother, an angel guardian is appointed to it; as Jerome, above quoted, says.

Article 6 Whether a guardian angel ever forsakes a man whom he is appointed to guard? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus custos quandoque deserat hominem cuius custodiae deputatur. Dicitur enim Ierem. li, ex persona angelorum, curavimus Babylonem, et non est curata, derelinquamus ergo eam. Et Isaiae V, auferam sepem eius, et erit in conculcationem; Glossa, idest angelorum custodiam. Praeterea, principalius custodit Deus quam angelus. Sed Deus aliquando hominem derelinquit; secundum illud Psalmi XXI, Deus, Deus meus, respice in me, quare me dereliquisti? Ergo multo magis angelus custos hominem derelinquit. Praeterea, sicut dicit Damascenus, Angeli, cum sunt hic nobiscum, non sunt in caelo. Sed aliquando sunt in caelo. Ergo aliquando nos derelinquunt. Sed contra, daemones nos semper impugnant; secundum illud I Petri V, adversarius vester Diabolus tanquam leo rugiens circuit, quaerens quem devoret. Ergo multo magis boni angeli semper nos custodiunt. Respondeo dicendum quod custodia angelorum, ut ex supra dictis patet, est quaedam executio divinae providentiae circa homines facta. Manifestum est autem quod nec homo, nec res aliqua, totaliter divinae providentiae subtrahitur, inquantum enim aliquid participat de esse, intantum subditur universali providentiae entium. Sed intantum Deus, secundum ordinem suae providentiae, dicitur hominem derelinquere, inquantum permittit hominem pati aliquem defectum vel poenae

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel guardian sometimes forsakes the man whom he is appointed to guard. For it is said (Jer 51:9) in the person of the angels: We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed: let us forsake her. And (Isa 5:5) it is written: I will take away the hedge—that is, the guardianship of the angels—and it shall be wasted. Obj. 2: Further, God’s guardianship excels that of the angels. But God forsakes man at times, according to Ps. 21:2: O God, my God, look upon me: why hast Thou forsaken me? Much rather therefore does an angel guardian forsake man. Obj. 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 3), When the angels are here with us, they are not in heaven. But sometimes they are in heaven. Therefore sometimes they forsake us. On the contrary, The demons are ever assailing us, according to 1 Pet. 5:8: Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour. Much more therefore do the good angels ever guard us. I answer that, As appears above (A. 2), the guardianship of the angels is an effect of Divine providence in regard to man. Now it is evident that neither man, nor anything at all, is entirely withdrawn from the providence of God: for in as far as a thing participates being, so far is it subject to the providence that extends over all being. God indeed is said to forsake man, according to the ordering of His providence, but only in so far as He allows man to suffer some defect of punishment or of fault. In like manner it

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vel culpae. Similiter etiam dicendum est quod angelus custos nunquam totaliter dimittit hominem, sed ad aliquid interdum eum dimittit; prout scilicet non impedit quin subdatur alicui tribulationi, vel etiam quin cadat in peccatum, secundum ordinem divinorum iudiciorum. Et secundum hoc Babylon et domus Israel ab angelis derelictae dicuntur, quia angeli earum custodes non impediverunt quin tribulationibus subderentur. Et per hoc patet solutio ad primum et secundum.

must be said that the angel guardian never forsakes a man entirely, but sometimes he leaves him in some particular, for instance by not preventing him from being subject to some trouble, or even from falling into sin, according to the ordering of Divine judgments. In this sense Babylon and the House of Israel are said to have been forsaken by the angels, because their angel guardians did not prevent them from being subject to tribulation. From this the answers are clear to the first and second objections. Ad tertium dicendum quod angelus, etsi interdum Reply Obj. 3: Although an angel may forsake a man derelinquat hominem loco, non tamen derelinquit eum sometimes locally, he does not for that reason forsake him quantum ad effectum custodiae, quia etiam cum est in as to the effect of his guardianship: for even when he is in caelo, cognoscit quid circa hominem agatur; nec indi- heaven he knows what is happening to man; nor does he get mora temporis ad motum localem, sed statim potest need time for his local motion, for he can be with man in adesse. an instant.

Article 7 Whether angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angeli doleant de malis eorum quos custodiunt. Dicitur enim Isaiae XXXIII, Angeli pacis amare flebunt. Sed fletus est signum doloris et tristitiae. Ergo angeli tristantur de malis hominum quos custodiunt. Praeterea, tristitia est, ut Augustinus dicit, de his quae nobis nolentibus accidunt. Sed perditio hominis custoditi est contra voluntatem angeli custodis. Ergo tristantur angeli de perditione hominum. Praeterea, sicut gaudio contrariatur tristitia, ita poenitentiae contrariatur peccatum. Sed angeli gaudent de peccatore poenitentiam agente, ut habetur Lucae XV. Ergo tristantur de iusto in peccatum cadente. Praeterea, super illud Num. XVIII; quidquid offerunt primitiarum etc., dicit Glossa Origenis; trahuntur angeli in iudicium, utrum ex ipsorum negligentia, an hominum ignavia lapsi sint. Sed quilibet rationabiliter dolet de malis propter quae in iudicium tractus est. Ergo angeli dolent de peccatis hominum. Sed contra, ubi est tristitia et dolor, non est perfecta felicitas, unde dicitur Apoc. XXI, mors ultra non erit, neque luctus, neque clamor, neque ullus dolor. Sed angeli sunt perfecte beati. Ergo de nullo dolent. Respondeo dicendum quod angeli non dolent neque de peccatis, neque de poenis hominum. Tristitia enim et dolor, secundum Augustinum, non est nisi de his quae contrariantur voluntati. Nihil autem accidit in mundo quod sit contrarium voluntati angelorum et aliorum beatorum, quia voluntas eorum totaliter inhaeret ordini divinae iustitiae; nihil autem fit in mundo, nisi

Objection 1: It would seem that angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard. For it is written (Isa 33:7): The angels of peace shall weep bitterly. But weeping is a sign of grief and sorrow. Therefore angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard. Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), sorrow is for those things that happen against our will. But the loss of the man whom he has guarded is against the guardian angel’s will. Therefore angels grieve for the loss of men. Obj. 3: Further, as sorrow is contrary to joy, so penance is contrary to sin. But angels rejoice about one sinner doing penance, as we are told, Luke 15:7. Therefore they grieve for the just man who falls into sin. Obj. 4: Further, on Numbers 18:12: Whatsoever firstfruits they offer, etc. the gloss of Origen says: The angels are brought to judgment as to whether men have fallen through their negligence or through their own fault. But it is reasonable for anyone to grieve for the ills which have brought him to judgment. Therefore angels grieve for men’s sins. On the contrary, Where there is grief and sorrow, there is not perfect happiness: wherefore it is written (Rev 21:4): Death shall be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow. But the angels are perfectly happy. Therefore they have no cause for grief. I answer that, Angels do not grieve, either for sins or for the pains inflicted on men. For grief and sorrow, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15) are for those things which occur against our will. But nothing happens in the world contrary to the will of the angels and the other blessed, because their will cleaves entirely to the ordering of Divine justice; while nothing happens in the world save

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quod per divinam iustitiam fit aut permittitur. Et ideo, simpliciter loquendo, nihil fit in mundo contra voluntatem beatorum. Ut enim philosophus dicit in III Ethic. illud dicitur simpliciter voluntarium, quod aliquis vult in particulari, secundum quod agitur, consideratis scilicet omnibus quae circumstant, quamvis in universali consideratum non esset voluntarium, sicut nauta non vult proiectionem mercium in mare, absolute et universaliter considerando, sed imminente periculo salutis hoc vult. Unde magis est hoc voluntarium quam involuntarium, ut ibidem dicitur. Sic igitur angeli peccata et poenas hominum, universaliter et absolute loquendo, non volunt, volunt tamen quod circa hoc ordo divinae iustitiae servetur, secundum quem quidam poenis subduntur, et peccare permittuntur. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum illud Isaiae potest intelligi de angelis, idest nuntiis, Ezechiae, qui fleverunt propter verba Rabsacis; de quibus habetur Isaiae XXXVII. Et hoc secundum litteralem sensum. Secundum vero allegoricum, angeli pacis sunt apostoli et alii praedicatores, qui flent pro peccatis hominum. Si vero secundum sensum anagogicum exponatur de angelis beatis, tunc metaphorica erit locutio, ad designandum quod angeli volunt in universali hominum salutem. Sic enim Deo et angelis huiusmodi passiones attribuuntur. Ad secundum patet solutio per ea quae dicta sunt. Ad tertium dicendum quod tam in poenitentia hominum, quam in peccato, manet una ratio gaudii angelis, scilicet impletio ordinis divinae providentiae. Ad quartum dicendum quod angeli ducuntur in iudicium pro peccatis hominum, non quasi rei, sed quasi testes, ad convincendum homines de eorum ignavia.

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what is effected or permitted by Divine justice. Therefore simply speaking, nothing occurs in the world against the will of the blessed. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that is called simply voluntary, which a man wills in a particular case, and at a particular time, having considered all the circumstances; although universally speaking, such a thing would not be voluntary: thus the sailor does not will the casting of his cargo into the sea, considered universally and absolutely, but on account of the threatened danger of his life, he wills it. Wherefore this is voluntary rather than involuntary, as stated in the same passage. Therefore universally and absolutely speaking the angels do not will sin and the pains inflicted on its account: but they do will the fulfilment of the ordering of Divine justice in this matter, in respect of which some are subjected to pains and are allowed to fall into sin. Reply Obj. 1: These words of Isaias may be understood of the angels, i.e., the messengers, of Ezechias, who wept on account of the words of Rabsaces, as related Isa. 37:2 seqq.: this would be the literal sense. According to the allegorical sense the angels of peace are the apostles and preachers who weep for men’s sins. If according to the anagogical sense this passage be expounded of the blessed angels, then the expression is metaphorical, and signifies that universally speaking the angels will the salvation of mankind: for in this sense we attribute passions to God and the angels. The reply to the second objection appears from what has been said. Reply Obj. 3: Both in man’s repentance and in man’s sin there is one reason for the angel’s joy, namely the fulfilment of the ordering of the Divine Providence. Reply Obj. 4: The angels are brought into judgment for the sins of men, not as guilty, but as witnesses to convict man of weakness.

Article 8 Whether there can be strife or discord among the angels? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inter angelos non possit esse pugna seu discordia. Dicitur enim Iob XXV, qui facit concordiam in sublimibus. Sed pugna opponitur concordiae. Ergo in sublimibus angelis non est pugna. Praeterea, ubi est perfecta caritas et iusta praelatio, non potest esse pugna. Sed hoc totum est in angelis. Ergo in angelis non est pugna. Praeterea, si angeli dicuntur pugnare pro eis quos custodiunt, necesse est quod unus angelus foveat unam partem, et alius aliam. Sed si una pars habet iustitiam, e contra alia pars habet iniustitiam. Ergo sequitur quod

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no strife or discord among the angels. For it is written (Job 25:2): Who maketh peace in His high places. But strife is opposed to peace. Therefore among the high angels there is no strife. Obj. 2: Further, where there is perfect charity and just authority there can be no strife. But all this exists among the angels. Therefore there is no strife among the angels. Obj. 3: Further, if we say that angels strive for those whom they guard, one angel must needs take one side, and another angel the opposite side. But if one side is in the right the other side is in the wrong. It will follow therefore,

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angelus bonus sit fautor iniustitiae, quod est inconveniens. Ergo inter bonos angelos non est pugna. Sed contra est quod dicitur Dan. X, ex persona Gabrielis, princeps regni Persarum restitit mihi viginti et uno diebus. Hic autem princeps Persarum erat angelus regno Persarum in custodiam deputatus. Ergo unus bonus angelus resistit alii, et sic inter eos est pugna. Respondeo dicendum quod ista quaestio movetur occasione horum verborum Danielis. Quae quidem Hieronymus exponit, dicens principem regni Persarum esse angelum qui se opposuit liberationi populi Israelitici, pro quo Daniel orabat, Gabriele preces eius Deo praesentante. Haec autem resistentia potuit fieri, quia princeps aliquis daemonum Iudaeos in Persidem ductos ad peccatum induxerat, per quod impedimentum praestabatur orationi Danielis, pro eodem populo deprecantis. Sed secundum Gregorium, XVII Moral., princeps regni Persarum bonus angelus fuit, custodiae regni illius deputatus. Ad videndum igitur qualiter unus angelus alteri resistere dicitur, considerandum est quod divina iudicia circa diversa regna et diversos homines, per angelos exercentur. In suis autem actionibus angeli secundum divinam sententiam regulantur. Contingit autem quandoque quod in diversis regnis, vel in diversis hominibus, contraria merita vel demerita inveniuntur, ut unus alteri subdatur aut praesit. Quid autem super hoc ordo divinae sapientiae habeat, cognoscere non possunt nisi Deo revelante, unde necesse habent super his sapientiam Dei consulere. Sic igitur inquantum de contrariis meritis et sibi repugnantibus, divinam consulunt voluntatem, resistere sibi invicem dicuntur, non quia sint eorum contrariae voluntates, cum in hoc omnes concordent, quod Dei sententia impleatur; sed quia ea de quibus consulunt, sunt repugnantia. Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta.

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that a good angel is a compounder of wrong; which is unseemly. Therefore there is no strife among good angels. On the contrary, It is written (Dan 10:13): The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one and twenty days. But this prince of the Persians was the angel deputed to the guardianship of the kingdom of the Persians. Therefore one good angel resists the others; and thus there is strife among them. I answer that, The raising of this question is occasioned by this passage of Daniel. Jerome explains it by saying that the prince of the kingdom of the Persians is the angel who opposed the setting free of the people of Israel, for whom Daniel was praying, his prayers being offered to God by Gabriel. And this resistance of his may have been caused by some prince of the demons having led the Jewish captives in Persia into sin; which sin was an impediment to the efficacy of the prayer which Daniel put up for that same people. But according to Gregory (Moral. xvii), the prince of the kingdom of Persia was a good angel appointed to the guardianship of that kingdom. To see therefore how one angel can be said to resist another, we must note that the Divine judgments in regard to various kingdoms and various men are executed by the angels. Now in their actions, the angels are ruled by the Divine decree. But it happens at times in various kingdoms or various men there are contrary merits or demerits, so that one of them is subject to or placed over another. As to what is the ordering of Divine wisdom on such matters, the angels cannot know it unless God reveal it to them: and so they need to consult Divine wisdom thereupon. Wherefore forasmuch as they consult the Divine will concerning various contrary and opposing merits, they are said to resist one another: not that their wills are in opposition, since they are all of one mind as to the fulfilment of the Divine decree; but that the things about which they seek knowledge are in opposition. From this the answers to the objections are clear.

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Question 114 The Assaults of the Demons Deinde considerandum est de impugnatione daemoWe now consider the assaults of the demons. Under this num. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. head there are five points of inquiry: Primo, utrum homines a daemonibus impugnentur. (1) Whether men are assailed by the demons? Secundo, utrum tentare sit proprium Diaboli. (2) Whether to tempt is proper to the devil? Tertio, utrum omnia peccata hominum ex (3) Whether all the sins of men are to be set down to impugnatione sive tentatione daemonum the assaults or temptations of the demons? proveniant. Quarto, utrum possint vera miracula facere ad (4) Whether they can work real miracles for the seducendum. purpose of leading men astray? Quinto, utrum daemones qui ab hominibus (5) Whether the demons who are overcome by men, superantur, ab impugnatione hominum are hindered from making further assaults? arceantur.

Article 1 Whether men are assailed by the demons? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homines non impugnentur a daemonibus. Angeli enim deputantur ad hominum custodiam, missi a Deo. Sed daemones non mittuntur a Deo, cum daemonum intentio sit perdere animas, Dei autem salvare. Ergo daemones non deputantur ad hominum impugnationem. Praeterea, non est aequa conditio pugnae, ut infirmus contra fortem, ignarus contra astutum exponatur ad bellum. Sed homines sunt infirmi et ignari; daemones autem potentes et astuti. Non est ergo permittendum a Deo, qui est omnis iustitiae auctor, ut homines a daemonibus impugnentur. Praeterea, ad exercitium hominum sufficit impugnatio carnis et mundi. Sed Deus permittit electos suos impugnari propter eorum exercitium. Ergo non videtur necessarium quod a daemonibus impugnentur. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. VI, quod non est nobis colluctatio adversus carnem et sanguinem, sed adversus principes et potestates, adversus mundi rectores tenebrarum harum, contra spiritualia nequitiae in caelestibus. Respondeo dicendum quod circa impugnationem daemonum duo est considerare, scilicet ipsam impugnationem, et impugnationis ordinem. Impugnatio quidem ipsa ex daemonum malitia procedit, qui propter invidiam profectum hominum impedire nituntur; et propter superbiam divinae potestatis similitudinem usurpant, deputando sibi ministros determinatos ad hominum impugnationem, sicut et angeli Deo ministrant in determi-

Objection 1: It would seem that men are not assailed by the demons. For angels are sent by God to guard man. But demons are not sent by God: for the demons’ intention is the loss of souls; whereas God’s is the salvation of souls. Therefore demons are not deputed to assail man. Obj. 2: Further, it is not a fair fight, for the weak to be set against the strong, and the ignorant against the astute. But men are weak and ignorant, whereas the demons are strong and astute. It is not therefore to be permitted by God, the author of all justice, that men should be assailed by demons. Obj. 3: Further, the assaults of the flesh and the world are enough for man’s exercise. But God permits His elect to be assailed that they may be exercised. Therefore there is no need for them to be assailed by the demons. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph 6:12): Our wrestling is not against flesh and blood; but against Principalities and Powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the high places. I answer that, Two things may be considered in the assault of the demons—the assault itself, and the ordering thereof. The assault itself is due to the malice of the demons, who through envy endeavor to hinder man’s progress; and through pride usurp a semblance of Divine power, by deputing certain ministers to assail man, as the angels of God in their various offices minister to man’s salvation. But the ordering of the assault is from God, Who

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natis officiis ad hominum salutem. Sed ordo impugnationis ipsius est a Deo, qui ordinate novit malis uti, ad bona ea ordinando. Sed ex parte angelorum, tam ipsa custodia quam ordo custodiae reducitur ad Deum, sicut ad primum auctorem. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod mali angeli impugnant homines dupliciter. Uno modo, instigando ad peccatum. Et sic non mittuntur a Deo ad impugnandum, sed aliquando permittuntur, secundum Dei iusta iudicia. Aliquando autem impugnant homines puniendo. Et sic mittuntur a Deo; sicut missus est spiritus mendax ad puniendum Achab regem Israel, ut dicitur III Reg. ult. Poena enim refertur in Deum, sicut in primum auctorem. Et tamen daemones ad puniendum missi, alia intentione puniunt, quam mittantur, nam ipsi puniunt ex odio vel invidia; mittuntur autem a Deo propter eius iustitiam. Ad secundum dicendum quod ad hoc quod non sit inaequalis pugnae conditio, fit ex parte hominis recompensatio, principaliter quidem per auxilium divinae gratiae; secundario autem per custodiam angelorum. Unde IV Reg., Elisaeus dixit ad ministrum suum, noli timere, plures enim nobiscum sunt, quam cum illis. Ad tertium dicendum quod infirmitati humanae sufficeret ad exercitium impugnatio quae est a carne et mundo, sed malitiae daemonum non sufficit, quae utroque utitur ad hominum impugnationem. Sed tamen ex divina ordinatione hoc provenit in gloriam electorum.

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knows how to make orderly use of evil by ordering it to good. On the other hand, in regard to the angels, both their guardianship and the ordering thereof are to be referred to God as their first author. Reply Obj. 1: The wicked angels assail men in two ways. First by instigating them to sin; and thus they are not sent by God to assail us, but are sometimes permitted to do so according to God’s just judgments. But sometimes their assault is a punishment to man: and thus they are sent by God; as the lying spirit was sent to punish Achab, King of Israel, as is related in 3 Kings 22:20. For punishment is referred to God as its first author. Nevertheless the demons who are sent to punish, do so with an intention other than that for which they are sent; for they punish from hatred or envy; whereas they are sent by God on account of His justice. Reply Obj. 2: In order that the conditions of the fight be not unequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be gained principally through the grace of God, secondarily through the guardianship of the angels. Wherefore (4 Kgs 6:16), Eliseus said to his servant: Fear not, for there are more with us than with them. Reply Obj. 3: The assault of the flesh and the world would suffice for the exercise of human weakness: but it does not suffice for the demon’s malice, which makes use of both the above in assailing men. But by the Divine ordinance this tends to the glory of the elect.

Article 2 Whether to tempt is proper to the devil? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod tentare non sit proprium Diaboli. Dicitur enim Deus tentare; secundum illud Gen. XXII, tentavit Deus Abraham. Tentat etiam caro, et mundus. Et etiam homo dicitur tentare Deum, et hominem. Ergo non est proprium daemonis tentare. Praeterea, tentare est ignorantis. Sed daemones sciunt quid circa homines agatur. Ergo daemones non tentant. Praeterea, tentatio est via in peccatum. Peccatum autem in voluntate consistit. Cum ergo daemones non possint voluntatem hominis immutare, ut per supra dicta patet; videtur quod ad eos non pertineat tentare.

Objection 1: It would seem that to tempt is not proper to the devil. For God is said to tempt, according to Gen. 22:1, God tempted Abraham. Moreover man is tempted by the flesh and the world. Again, man is said to tempt God, and to tempt man. Therefore it is not proper to the devil to tempt. Obj. 2: Further, to tempt is a sign of ignorance. But the demons know what happens among men. Therefore the demons do not tempt. Obj. 3: Further, temptation is the road to sin. Now sin dwells in the will. Since therefore the demons cannot change man’s will, as appears from what has been said above (Q. 111, A. 2), it seems that it is not in their province to tempt. Sed contra est quod dicitur I ad Thessal. III, ne On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess 3:5): Lest perforte tentaverit vos is qui tentat; Glossa, idest Diabolus, haps he that tempteth should have tempted you: to which the cuius officium est tentare. gloss adds, that is, the devil, whose office it is to tempt. Respondeo dicendum quod tentare est proprie exI answer that, To tempt is, properly speaking, to perimentum sumere de aliquo. Experimentum autem make trial of something. Now we make trial of something

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sumitur de aliquo, ut sciatur aliquid circa ipsum, et ideo proximus finis cuiuslibet tentantis est scientia. Sed quandoque ulterius ex scientia quaeritur aliquis alius finis, vel bonus vel malus, bonus quidem, sicut cum aliquis vult scire qualis aliquis sit, vel quantum ad scientiam vel quantum ad virtutem, ut eum promoveat; malus autem, quando hoc scire vult, ut eum decipiat vel subvertat. Et per hunc modum potest accipi quomodo tentare diversis diversimode attribuatur. Homo enim tentare dicitur, quandoque quidem ut sciat tantum, et propter hoc, tentare Deum dicitur esse peccatum; quia homo, quasi incertus, experiri praesumit Dei virtutem. Quandoque vero tentat ut iuvet, quandoque vero, ut noceat. Diabolus autem semper tentat ut noceat, in peccatum praecipitando. Et secundum hoc, dicitur proprium officium eius tentare, nam etsi homo aliquando sic tentet, hoc agit inquantum est minister Diaboli. Deus autem tentare dicitur ut sciat, eo modo loquendi quo dicitur scire quod facit alios scire. Unde dicitur Deut. XII, tentat vos dominus Deus vester, ut palam fiat utrum diligatis eum. Caro autem et mundus dicuntur tentare instrumentaliter, seu materialiter, inquantum scilicet potest cognosci qualis sit homo, ex hoc quod sequitur vel repugnat concupiscentiis carnis, et ex hoc quod contemnit prospera mundi et adversa; quibus etiam Diabolus utitur ad tentandum. Et sic patet solutio ad primum. Ad secundum dicendum quod daemones sciunt ea quae exterius aguntur circa homines, sed interiorem hominis conditionem solus Deus novit, qui est spirituum ponderator, ex qua aliqui sunt magis proni ad unum vitium quam ad aliud. Et ideo Diabolus tentat explorando interiorem conditionem hominis, ut de illo vitio tentet, ad quod homo magis pronus est. Ad tertium dicendum quod daemon, etsi non possit immutare voluntatem, potest tamen, ut supra dictum est, aliqualiter immutare inferiores hominis vires; ex quibus etsi non cogitur voluntas, tamen inclinatur.

Q. 114, A. 3

in order to know something about it: hence the immediate end of every tempter is knowledge. But sometimes another end, either good or bad, is sought to be acquired through that knowledge; a good end, when, for instance, one desires to know of someone, what sort of a man he is as to knowledge, or virtue, with a view to his promotion; a bad end, when that knowledge is sought with the purpose of deceiving or ruining him. From this we can gather how various beings are said to tempt in various ways. For man is said to tempt, sometimes indeed merely for the sake of knowing something; and for this reason it is a sin to tempt God; for man, being uncertain as it were, presumes to make an experiment of God’s power. Sometimes too he tempts in order to help, sometimes in order to hurt. The devil, however, always tempts in order to hurt by urging man into sin. In this sense it is said to be his proper office to tempt: for though at times man tempts thus, he does this as minister of the devil. God is said to tempt that He may know, in the same sense as that is said to know which makes others to know. Hence it is written (Deut 13:3): The Lord your God trieth you, that it may appear whether you love him. The flesh and the world are said to tempt as the instruments or matter of temptations; inasmuch as one can know what sort of man someone is, according as he follows or resists the desires of the flesh, and according as he despises worldly advantages and adversity: of which things the devil also makes use in tempting. Thus the reply to the first objection is clear. Reply Obj. 2: The demons know what happens outwardly among men; but the inward disposition of man God alone knows, Who is the weigher of spirits (Prov 16:2). It is this disposition that makes man more prone to one vice than to another: hence the devil tempts, in order to explore this inward disposition of man, so that he may tempt him to that vice to which he is most prone. Reply Obj. 3: Although a demon cannot change the will, yet, as stated above (Q. 111, A. 3), he can change the inferior powers of man, in a certain degree: by which powers, though the will cannot be forced, it can nevertheless be inclined.

Article 3 Whether all sins are due to the temptation of the devil? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia peccata procedant ex tentatione Diaboli. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod multitudo daemonum est causa omnium malorum et sibi et aliis. Et Damascenus dicit quod omnis malitia et omnis immunditia a Diabolo excogitatae sunt.

Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are due to the temptation of the devil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the multitude of demons is the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others. And Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that all malice and all uncleanness have been devised by the devil.

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Praeterea, de quolibet peccatore dici posset quod dominus de Iudaeis dicit, Ioan. VIII, vos ex patre Diabolo estis. Hoc autem est inquantum ipsi ex Diaboli suggestione peccabant. Omne ergo peccatum est ex suggestione Diaboli. Praeterea, sicut angeli deputantur ad custodiam hominum, ita daemones ad impugnationem. Sed omnia bona quae facimus, ex suggestione bonorum angelorum procedunt, quia divina ad nos mediantibus angelis perferuntur. Ergo et omnia mala quae facimus, proveniunt ex suggestione Diaboli. Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., non omnes cogitationes nostrae malae a Diabolo excitantur, sed aliquoties ex nostri arbitrii motu emergunt. Respondeo dicendum quod causa alicuius potest dici aliquid dupliciter, uno modo, directe, alio modo, indirecte. Indirecte quidem, sicut cum aliquod agens causans aliquam dispositionem ad aliquem effectum, dicitur esse occasionaliter et indirecte causa illius effectus; sicut si dicatur quod ille qui siccat ligna, est causa combustionis eorum. Et hoc modo dicendum est quod Diabolus est causa omnium peccatorum nostrorum, quia ipse instigavit primum hominem ad peccandum, ex cuius peccato consecuta est in toto genere humano quaedam pronitas ad omnia peccata. Et per hunc modum intelligenda sunt verba Damasceni et Dionysii. Directe autem dicitur esse aliquid causa alicuius, quod operatur directe ad illud. Et hoc modo Diabolus non est causa omnis peccati non enim omnia peccata committuntur Diabolo instigante, sed quaedam ex libertate arbitrii et carnis corruptione. Quia, ut Origenes dicit, etiam si Diabolus non esset, homines haberent appetitum ciborum et venereorum et huiusmodi; circa quae multa inordinatio contingit, nisi per rationem talis appetitus refraenetur; et maxime, supposita corruptione naturae. Refraenare autem et ordinare huiusmodi appetitum, subiacet libero arbitrio. Sic ergo non est necessarium omnia peccata ex instinctu Diaboli provenire. Si qua tamen ex instinctu eius proveniunt, ad ea complenda eo blandimento decipiuntur homines nunc, quo primi parentes, ut Isidorus dicit. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. Ad secundum dicendum quod, si qua peccata absque instinctu Diaboli perpetrantur, per ea tamen fiunt homines filii Diaboli, inquantum ipsum primo peccantem imitantur. Ad tertium dicendum quod homo potest per seipsum ruere in peccatum, sed ad meritum proficere non potest nisi auxilio divino, quod homini exhibetur mediante ministerio angelorum. Et ideo ad omnia bona nostra cooperantur angeli, non tamen omnia nostra

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Obj. 2: Further, of every sinner can be said what the Lord said of the Jews (John 8:44): You are of your father the devil. But this was in as far as they sinned through the devil’s instigation. Therefore every sin is due to the devil’s instigation. Obj. 3: Further, as angels are deputed to guard men, so demons are deputed to assail men. But every good thing we do is due to the suggestion of the good angels: because the Divine gifts are borne to us by the angels. Therefore all the evil we do, is due to the instigation of the devil. On the contrary, It is written (De Eccl. Dogmat. xlix): Not all our evil thoughts are stirred up by the devil, but sometimes they arise from the movement of our free-will. I answer that, One thing can be the cause of another in two ways; directly and indirectly. Indirectly as when an agent is the cause of a disposition to a certain effect, it is said to be the occasional and indirect cause of that effect: for instance, we might say that he who dries the wood is the cause of the wood burning. In this way we must admit that the devil is the cause of all our sins; because he it was who instigated the first man to sin, from whose sin there resulted a proneness to sin in the whole human race: and in this sense we must take the words of Damascene and Dionysius.

But a thing is said to be the direct cause of something, when its action tends directly thereunto. And in this way the devil is not the cause of every sin: for all sins are not committed at the devil’s instigation, but some are due to the free-will and the corruption of the flesh. For, as Origen says (Peri Archon iii), even if there were no devil, men would have the desire for food and love and such like pleasures; with regard to which many disorders may arise unless those desires are curbed by reason, especially if we presuppose the corruption of our natures. Now it is in the power of the free-will to curb this appetite and keep it in order. Consequently there is no need for all sins to be due to the instigation of the devil. But those sins which are due thereto man perpetrates through being deceived by the same blandishments as were our first parents, as Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii). Thus the answer to the first objection is clear. Reply Obj. 2: When man commits sin without being thereto instigated by the devil, he nevertheless becomes a child of the devil thereby, in so far as he imitates him who was the first to sin. Reply Obj. 3: Man can of his own accord fall into sin: but he cannot advance in merit without the Divine assistance, which is borne to man by the ministry of the angels. For this reason the angels take part in all our good works: whereas all our sins are not due to the demons’ instigation.

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peccata procedunt ex daemonum suggestione. Quamvis Nevertheless there is no kind of sin which is not sometimes nullum genus peccati sit, quod non interdum ex daemo- due to the demons’ suggestion. num suggestione proveniat.

Article 4 Whether demons can lead men astray by means of real miracles? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod daemones non possint homines seducere per aliqua miracula vera. Operatio enim daemonum maxime vigebit in operibus Antichristi. Sed sicut apostolus dicit II ad Thessal. II, eius adventus est secundum operationem Satanae, in omni virtute et signis et prodigiis mendacibus. Ergo multo magis alio tempore per daemones non fiunt nisi signa mendacia. Praeterea, vera miracula per aliquam corporum immutationem fiunt. Sed daemones non possunt immutare corpus in aliam naturam, dicit enim Augustinus, XVIII de Civ. Dei, nec corpus quidem humanum ulla ratione crediderim daemonum arte vel potestate in membra bestialia posse converti. Ergo daemones vera miracula facere non possunt. Praeterea, argumentum efficaciam non habet, quod se habet ad opposita. Si ergo miracula vera possunt fieri a daemonibus ad falsitatem persuadendam, non erunt efficacia ad veritatem fidei confirmandam. Quod est inconveniens, cum dicatur Marci ult., domino cooperante, et sermonem confirmante sequentibus signis. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, libro Octoginta trium Quaest., quod magicis artibus fiunt miracula plerumque similia illis miraculis quae fiunt per servos Dei. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, si miraculum proprie accipiatur, daemones miracula facere non possunt, nec aliqua creatura, sed solus Deus, quia miraculum proprie dicitur quod fit praeter ordinem totius naturae creatae, sub quo ordine continetur omnis virtus creaturae. Dicitur tamen quandoque miraculum large, quod excedit humanam facultatem et considerationem. Et sic daemones possunt facere miracula, quae scilicet homines mirantur, inquantum eorum facultatem et cognitionem excedunt. Nam et unus homo, inquantum facit aliquid quod est supra facultatem et cognitionem alterius, ducit alium in admirationem sui operis, ut quodammodo miraculum videatur operari. Sciendum est tamen quod, quamvis huiusmodi opera daemonum, quae nobis miracula videntur, ad veram rationem miraculi non pertingant; sunt tamen quandoque verae res. Sicut magi Pharaonis per virtutem daemonum veros serpentes et ranas fecerunt. Et quando ignis de caelo cecidit et familiam Iob cum gregibus pecorum uno

Objection 1: It would seem that the demons cannot lead men astray by means of real miracles. For the activity of the demons will show itself especially in the works of Antichrist. But as the Apostle says (2 Thess 2:9), his coming is according to the working of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders. Much more therefore at other times do the demons perform lying wonders. Obj. 2: Further, true miracles are wrought by some corporeal change. But demons are unable to change the nature of a body; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): I cannot believe that the human body can receive the limbs of a beast by means of a demon’s art or power. Therefore the demons cannot work real miracles. Obj. 3: Further, an argument is useless which may prove both ways. If therefore real miracles can be wrought by demons, to persuade one of what is false, they will be useless to confirm the teaching of the faith. This is unfitting; for it is written (Mark 16:20): The Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed. On the contrary, Augustine says (83 Questions): Often by means of the magic art miracles are wrought like those which are wrought by the servants of God. I answer that, As is clear from what has been said above (Q. 110, A. 4), if we take a miracle in the strict sense, the demons cannot work miracles, nor can any creature, but God alone: since in the strict sense a miracle is something done outside the order of the entire created nature, under which order every power of a creature is contained. But sometimes miracle may be taken in a wide sense, for whatever exceeds the human power and experience. And thus demons can work miracles, that is, things which rouse man’s astonishment, by reason of their being beyond his power and outside his sphere of knowledge. For even a man by doing what is beyond the power and knowledge of another, leads him to marvel at what he has done, so that in a way he seems to that man to have worked a miracle. It is to be noted, however, that although these works of demons which appear marvelous to us are not real miracles, they are sometimes nevertheless something real. Thus the magicians of Pharaoh by the demons’ power produced real serpents and frogs. And when fire came down from heaven and at one blow consumed Job’s servants and sheep; when the

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impetu consumpsit, et turbo domum deiiciens filios eius occidit, quae fuerunt opera Satanae, phantasmata non fuerunt, ut Augustinus dicit, XX de Civ. Dei. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit ibidem, Antichristi opera possunt dici esse signa mendacii, vel quia mortales sensus per phantasmata decepturus est, ut quod non facit, videatur facere, vel quia, si sint vera prodigia, ad mendacium tamen pertrahent credituros. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, materia corporalis non obedit angelis bonis seu malis ad nutum, ut daemones sua virtute possint transmutare materiam de forma in formam, sed possunt adhibere quaedam semina quae in elementis mundi inveniuntur, ad huiusmodi effectus complendos, ut Augustinus dicit III de Trin. Et ideo dicendum est quod omnes transmutationes corporalium rerum quae possunt fieri per aliquas virtutes naturales, ad quas pertinent praedicta semina, possunt fieri per operationem daemonum, huiusmodi seminibus adhibitis; sicut cum aliquae res transmutantur in serpentes vel ranas, quae per putrefactionem generari possunt. Illae vero transmutationes corporalium rerum quae non possunt virtute naturae fieri, nullo modo operatione daemonum, secundum rei veritatem, perfici possunt; sicut quod corpus humanum mutetur in corpus bestiale, aut quod corpus hominis mortuum reviviscat. Et si aliquando aliquid tale operatione daemonum fieri videatur, hoc non est secundum rei veritatem, sed secundum apparentiam tantum. Quod quidem potest dupliciter contingere. Uno modo, ab interiori; secundum quod daemon potest mutare phantasiam hominis, et etiam sensus corporeos, ut aliquid videatur aliter quam sit, sicut supra dictum est. Et hoc etiam interdum fieri dicitur virtute aliquarum rerum corporalium. Alio modo, ab exteriori. Cum enim ipse possit formare corpus ex aere cuiuscumque formae et figurae, ut illud assumens in eo visibiliter appareat; potest eadem ratione circumponere cuicumque rei corporeae quamcumque formam corpoream, ut in eius specie videatur. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit XVIII de Civ. Dei, quod phantasticum hominis, quod etiam cogitando sive somniando per rerum innumerabilium genera variatur, velut corporatum in alicuius animalis effigie, sensibus apparet alienis. Quod non est sic intelligendum, quod ipsa vis phantastica hominis, aut species eius, eadem numero incorporata alterius sensibus ostendatur, sed quia daemon qui in phantasia unius hominis format aliquam speciem, ipse etiam potest similem speciem alterius sensibus offerre. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro Octoginta trium Quaest., cum talia faciunt magi qualia sancti, diverso fine et diverso iure fiunt. Illi enim faciunt, quaerentes gloriam suam, isti, quaerentes gloriam

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storm struck down his house and with it his children—these were the work of Satan, not phantoms; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 19). Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says in the same place, the works of Antichrist may be called lying wonders, either because he will deceive men’s senses by means of phantoms, so that he will not really do what he will seem to do; or because, if he work real prodigies, they will lead those into falsehood who believe in him. Reply Obj. 2: As we have said above (Q. 110, A. 2), corporeal matter does not obey either good or bad angels at their will, so that demons be able by their power to transmute matter from one form to another; but they can employ certain seeds that exist in the elements of the world, in order to produce these effects, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8, 9). Therefore it must be admitted that all the transformation of corporeal things which can be produced by certain natural powers, to which we must assign the seeds above mentioned, can alike be produced by the operation of the demons, by the employment of these seeds; such as the transformation of certain things into serpents or frogs, which can be produced by putrefaction. On the contrary, those transformations which cannot be produced by the power of nature, cannot in reality be effected by the operation of the demons; for instance, that the human body be changed into the body of a beast, or that the body of a dead man return to life. And if at times something of this sort seems to be effected by the operation of demons, it is not real but a mere semblance of reality. Now this may happen in two ways. First, from within; in this way a demon can work on man’s imagination and even on his corporeal senses, so that something seems otherwise that it is, as explained above (Q. 111, AA. 3,4). It is said indeed that this can be done sometimes by the power of certain bodies. Second, from without: for just as he can from the air form a body of any form and shape, and assume it so as to appear in it visibly: so, in the same way he can clothe any corporeal thing with any corporeal form, so as to appear therein. This is what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): Man’s imagination, which whether thinking or dreaming, takes the forms of an innumerable number of things, appears to other men’s senses, as it were embodied in the semblance of some animal. This is not to be understood as though the imagination itself or the images formed therein were identified with that which appears embodied to the senses of another man: but that the demon, who forms an image in a man’s imagination, can offer the same picture to another man’s senses. Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (83 Questions, Q. 79): When magicians do what holy men do, they do it for a different end and by a different right. The former do it for their own glory; the latter, for the glory of God: the former, by cer-

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Dei. Et illi faciunt per quaedam privata commercia; isti tain private compacts; the latter by the evident assistance and autem publica administratione, et iussu Dei, cui cuncta command of God, to Whom every creature is subject. creatura subiecta est.

Article 5 Whether a demon who is overcome by man, is for this reason hindered from making further assaults? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod daemon qui superatur ab aliquo, non propter hoc ab impugnatione arceatur. Christus enim efficacissime suum tentatorem vicit. Sed tamen postea eum impugnavit, ad occisionem eius Iudaeos incitando. Ergo non est verum quod Diabolus victus ab impugnatione cesset. Praeterea, infligere poenam ei qui in pugna succumbit, est incitare ad acrius impugnandum. Hoc autem non pertinet ad Dei misericordiam. Ergo daemones superati non arcentur. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. IV, tunc reliquit eum Diabolus, scilicet Christum superantem. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod daemon superatus nullum hominum potest de cetero tentare, nec de eodem nec de alio peccato. Quidam autem dicunt quod potest alios tentare, sed non eundem. Et hoc probabilius dicitur, si tamen intelligatur usque ad aliquod tempus, unde et Lucae IV dicitur quod, consummata omni tentatione, Diabolus recessit a Christo usque ad tempus. Et huius ratio est duplex. Una est ex parte divinae clementiae, quia, ut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., non tandiu homines Diabolus tentat, quandiu vult, sed quandiu Deus permittit; quia etsi permittat paulisper tentare, tamen repellit, propter infirmam naturam. Alia ratio sumitur ex astutia Diaboli, unde Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, quod Diabolus instare formidat, quia frequentius refugit triumphari. Quod tamen aliquando Diabolus redeat ad eum quem dimisit, patet per illud quod dicitur Matth. XII, revertar in domum meam, unde exivi. Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta.

Objection 1: It would seem that a demon who is overcome by a man, is not for that reason hindered from any further assault. For Christ overcame the tempter most effectively. Yet afterwards the demon assailed Him by instigating the Jews to kill Him. Therefore it is not true that the devil when conquered ceases his assaults. Obj. 2: Further, to inflict punishment on one who has been worsted in a fight, is to incite him to a sharper attack. But this is not befitting God’s mercy. Therefore the conquered demons are not prevented from further assaults. On the contrary, It is written (Matt 4:11): Then the devil left Him, i.e., Christ Who overcame. I answer that, Some say that when once a demon has been overcome he can no more tempt any man at all, neither to the same nor to any other sin. And others say that he can tempt others, but not the same man. This seems more probable as long as we understand it to be so for a certain definite time: wherefore (Luke 4:13) it is written: All temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him for a time. There are two reasons for this. One is on the part of God’s clemency; for as Chrysostom says (Super Matt. Hom. v), the devil does not tempt man for just as long as he likes, but for as long as God allows; for although He allows him to tempt for a short time, He orders him off on account of our weakness. The other reason is taken from the astuteness of the devil. As to this, Ambrose says on Luke 4:13: The devil is afraid of persisting, because he shrinks from frequent defeat. That the devil does nevertheless sometimes return to the assault, is apparent from Matt. 12:44: I will return into my house from whence I came out. From what has been said, the objections can easily be solved.

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Question 115 The Action of the Corporeal Creature Consequenter considerandum est de actione corpoWe have now to consider the action of the corporeal ralis creaturae; et fato, quod aliquibus corporibus attri- creature; and fate, which is ascribed to certain bodies. Conbuitur. Circa actiones corporales quaeruntur sex. cerning corporeal actions there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum aliquod corpus sit activum. (1) Whether a body can be active? Secundo, utrum in corporibus sint aliquae (2) Whether there exist in bodies certain seminal seminales rationes. virtues? Tertio, utrum corpora caelestia sint causa eorum (3) Whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what quae hic per inferiora corpora fiunt. is done here by the inferior bodies? Quarto, utrum sint causa humanorum actuum. (4) Whether they are the cause of human acts? Quinto, utrum eorum actionibus daemones (5) Whether demons are subject to their influence? subdantur. Sexto, utrum caelestia corpora imponant (6) Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on necessitatem his quae eorum actionibus those things which are subject to their influence? subduntur.

Article 1 Whether a body can be active? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullum corpus sit activum. Dicit enim Augustinus quod in rebus invenitur aliquid actum et non agens, sicut sunt corpora; aliquid agens et non actum, sicut Deus; aliquid agens et actum, sicut substantiae spirituales. Praeterea, omne agens, excepto primo agente, in suo opere indiget subiecto quod sit susceptibile suae actionis. Sed infra substantiam corporalem non est substantia quae sit susceptibilis suae actionis, quia haec substantia tenet infimum gradum in entibus. Ergo substantia corporalis non est activa. Praeterea, omnis substantia corporalis concluditur quantitate. Sed quantitas impedit substantiam a motu et actione, quia comprehendit eam, et mergitur in ea, sicut impeditur aer nubilosus a perceptione luminis. Et huius signum est, quod quanto magis accreverit quantitas corporis, tanto est ponderosius et gravius ad hoc quod moveatur. Ergo nulla substantia corporalis est activa. Praeterea, omne agens habet virtutem agendi ex propinquitate ad primum activum. Sed a primo activo, quod est simplicissimum, remotissima sunt corpora, quae sunt maxime composita. Ergo nullum corpus est agens. Praeterea, si aliquod corpus est agens, aut agit ad formam substantialem; aut ad formam accidentalem.

Objection 1: It would seem that no bodies are active. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 9): There are things that are acted upon, but do not act; such are bodies: there is one Who acts but is not acted upon; this is God: there are things that both act and are acted upon; these are the spiritual substances. Obj. 2: Further, every agent except the first agent requires in its work a subject susceptible of its action. But there is not substance below the corporeal substance which can be susceptible of the latter’s action; since it belongs to the lowest degree of beings. Therefore corporeal substance is not active. Obj. 3: Further, every corporeal substance is limited by quantity. But quantity hinders substance from movement and action, because it surrounds it and penetrates it: just as a cloud hinders the air from receiving light. A proof of this is that the more a body increases in quantity, the heavier it is and the more difficult to move. Therefore no corporeal substance is active. Obj. 4: Further, the power of action in every agent is according to its propinquity to the first active cause. But bodies, being most composite, are most remote from the first active cause, which is most simple. Therefore no bodies are active. Obj. 5: Further, if a body is an agent, the term of its action is either a substantial, or an accidental form. But it is

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Sed non ad formam substantialem, quia non invenitur in corporibus principium actionis nisi aliqua qualitas activa, quae est accidens; accidens autem non potest esse causa formae substantialis, cum causa sit potior quam effectus. Similiter etiam neque ad formam accidentalem, quia accidens non se extendit ultra suum subiectum, ut Augustinus dicit IX de Trin. Ergo nullum corpus est activum. Sed contra est quod Dionysius, XV cap. Cael. Hier., inter ceteras proprietates corporei ignis, dicit quod ad susceptas materias manifestat sui ipsius magnitudinem activus et potens. Respondeo dicendum quod sensibiliter apparet aliqua corpora esse activa. Sed circa corporum actiones tripliciter aliqui erraverunt. Fuerunt enim aliqui qui totaliter corporibus actiones subtraxerunt. Et haec est opinio Avicebron in libro Fontis Vitae, ubi per rationes quae tactae sunt, probare nititur quod nullum corpus agit, sed omnes actiones quae videntur esse corporum, sunt actiones cuiusdam virtutis spiritualis quae penetrat per omnia corpora; ita quod ignis, secundum eum, non calefacit, sed virtus spiritualis penetrans per ipsum. Et videtur haec opinio derivata esse ab opinione Platonis. Nam Plato posuit omnes formas quae sunt in materia corporali, esse participatas et determinatas et contractas ad hanc materiam; formas vero separatas esse absolutas et quasi universales; et ideo illas formas separatas dicebat esse causas formarum quae sunt in materia. Secundum hoc ergo quod forma quae est in materia corporali, determinata est ad hanc materiam individuatam per quantitatem, ponebat Avicebron quod a quantitate, prout est individuationis principium, retinetur et arcetur forma corporalis, ne possit se extendere per actionem in aliam materiam; sed solum forma spiritualis et immaterialis, quae non est coarctata per quantitatem, potest effluere per actionem in aliud. Sed ista ratio non concludit quod forma corporalis non sit agens, sed quod non sit agens universale. Secundum enim quod participatur aliquid, secundum hoc est necessarium quod participetur id quod est proprium ei, sicut quantum participatur de lumine, tantum participatur de ratione visibilis. Agere autem, quod nihil est aliud quam facere aliquid actu, est per se proprium actus, inquantum est actus, unde et omne agens agit sibi simile. Sic ergo ex hoc quod aliquid est forma non determinata per materiam quantitati subiectam, habet quod sit agens indeterminatum et universale, ex hoc vero quod est determinata ad hanc materiam, habet quod sit agens contractum et particulare. Unde si esset forma ignis separata, ut Platonici posuerunt, esset aliquo modo causa omnis ignitionis. Sed haec forma ignis quae est in hac materia corporali, est causa huius ignitionis quae est ab hoc corpore in hoc corpus. Unde et fit talis actio per contactum duorum corporum.

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not a substantial form; for it is not possible to find in a body any principle of action, save an active quality, which is an accident; and an accident cannot be the cause of a substantial form, since the cause is always more excellent than the effect. Likewise, neither is it an accidental form, for an accident does not extend beyond its subject, as Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4). Therefore no bodies are active. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv) that among other qualities of corporeal fire, it shows its greatness in its action and power on that of which it lays hold. I answer that, It is apparent to the senses that some bodies are active. But concerning the action of bodies there have been three errors. For some denied all action to bodies. This is the opinion of Avicebron in his book on The Fount of Life, where, by the arguments mentioned above, he endeavors to prove that no bodies act, but that all the actions which seem to be the actions of bodies, are the actions of some spiritual power that penetrates all bodies: so that, according to him, it is not fire that heats, but a spiritual power which penetrates, by means of the fire. And this opinion seems to be derived from that of Plato. For Plato held that all forms existing in corporeal matter are participated thereby, and determined and limited thereto; and that separate forms are absolute and as it were universal; wherefore he said that these separate forms are the causes of forms that exist in matter. Therefore inasmuch as the form which is in corporeal matter is determined to this matter individualized by quantity, Avicebron held that the corporeal form is held back and imprisoned by quantity, as the principle of individuality, so as to be unable by action to extend to any other matter: and that the spiritual and immaterial form alone, which is not hedged in by quantity, can issue forth by acting on something else. But this does not prove that the corporeal form is not an agent, but that it is not a universal agent. For in proportion as a thing is participated, so, of necessity, must that be participated which is proper thereto; thus in proportion to the participation of light is the participation of visibility. But to act, which is nothing else than to make something to be in act, is essentially proper to an act as such; wherefore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the fact of its being a form not determined by matter subject to quantity, a thing owes its being an agent indeterminate and universal: but to the fact that it is determined to this matter, it owes its being an agent limited and particular. Wherefore if the form of fire were separate, as the Platonists supposed, it would be, in a fashion, the cause of every ignition. But this form of fire which is in this corporeal matter, is the cause of this ignition which passes from this body to that. Hence such an action is effected by the contact of two bodies.

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Sed tamen haec opinio Avicebron superexcedit opinionem Platonis. Nam Plato ponebat solum formas substantiales separatas; accidentia vero reducebat ad principia materialia quae sunt magnum et parvum, quae ponebat esse prima contraria, sicut et alii rarum et densum. Et ideo tam Plato quam Avicenna, in aliquo ipsum sequens, ponebant quod agentia corporalia agunt secundum formas accidentales, disponendo materiam ad formam substantialem; sed ultima perfectio, quae est per introductionem formae substantialis est a principio immateriali. Et haec est secunda opinio de actione corporum, de qua supra dictum est, cum de creatione ageretur. Tertia vero opinio fuit Democriti, qui ponebat actionem esse per effluxionem atomorum a corpore agente, et passionem esse per receptionem eorundem in poris corporis patientis. Quam opinionem improbat Aristoteles in I de Generat. Sequeretur enim quod corpus non pateretur per totum, et quod quantitas corporis agentis diminueretur ex hoc quod agit, quae sunt manifeste falsa.

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But this opinion of Avicebron goes further than that of Plato. For Plato held only substantial forms to be separate; while he referred accidents to the material principles which are the great and the small, which he considered to be the first contraries, by others considered to the the rare and the dense. Consequently both Plato and Avicenna, who follows him to a certain extent, held that corporeal agents act through their accidental forms, by disposing matter for the substantial form; but that the ultimate perfection attained by the introduction of the substantial form is due to an immaterial principle. And this is the second opinion concerning the action of bodies; of which we have spoken above when treating of the creation (Q. 45, A. 8). The third opinion is that of Democritus, who held that action takes place through the issue of atoms from the corporeal agent, while passion consists in the reception of the atoms in the pores of the passive body. This opinion is disproved by Aristotle (De Gener. i, 8, 9). For it would follow that a body would not be passive as a whole, and the quantity of the active body would be diminished through its action; which things are manifestly untrue. We must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as it is in act, on a body forasmuch as it is in potentiality. Reply Obj. 1: This passage of Augustine is to be understood of the whole corporeal nature considered as a whole, which thus has no nature inferior to it, on which it can act; as the spiritual nature acts on the corporeal, and the uncreated nature on the created. Nevertheless one body is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in potentiality to that which the other has in act. From this follows the solution of the second objection. But it must be observed, when Avicebron argues thus, There is a mover who is not moved, to wit, the first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand, there exists something moved which is purely passive, that this is to be conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a pure potentiality, just as God is pure act. Now a body is composed of potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and passive. Reply Obj. 3: Quantity does not entirely hinder the corporeal form from action, as stated above; but from being a universal agent, forasmuch as a form is individualized through being in matter subject to quantity. The proof taken from the weight of bodies is not to the purpose. First, because addition of quantity does not cause weight; as is proved (De Coelo et Mundo iv, 2). Second, it is false that weight retards movement; on the contrary, the heavier a thing, the greater its movement, if we consider the movement proper thereto. Third, because action is not effected by local movement, as Democritus held: but by something being reduced from potentiality to act.

Dicendum est ergo quod corpus agit secundum quod est actu, in aliud corpus secundum quod est in potentia. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dictum Augustini est intelligendum de tota natura corporali simul accepta, quae non habet aliquam inferiorem naturam infra se, in quam agat, sicut natura spiritualis in corporalem, et natura increata in creatam. Sed tamen unum corpus est infra alterum, inquantum est in potentia ad id quod habet aliud in actu. Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum. Sciendum est tamen quod, cum Avicebron sic argumentatur, est aliquid quod est movens non motum, scilicet primus factor rerum, ergo, ex opposito, est aliquid quod est motum et patiens tantum, quod concedendum est. Sed hoc est materia prima, quae est potentia pura, sicut Deus est actus purus. Corpus autem componitur ex potentia et actu, et ideo est agens et patiens. Ad tertium dicendum quod quantitas non impedit formam corporalem omnino ab actione, sicut dictum est, sed impedit eam ne sit agens universale, inquantum forma individuatur prout est in materia quantitati subiecta. Signum tamen quod inducitur de ponderositate corporum, non est ad propositum. Primo quidem, quia additio quantitatis non est causa gravitatis; ut probatur in IV de Caelo et Mundo. Secundo, quia falsum est quod ponderositas facit tardiorem motum, immo quanto aliquid est gravius, tanto magis movetur motu proprio. Tertio, quia actio non fit per motum localem, ut Democritus posuit; sed per hoc quod aliquid reducitur de potentia in actum. Ad quartum dicendum quod corpus non est id Reply Obj. 4: A body is not that which is most disquod maxime distat a Deo, participat enim aliquid de si- tant from God; for it participates something of a likeness militudine divini esse, secundum formam quam habet. to the Divine Being, forasmuch as it has a form. That which

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Sed id quod maxime distat a Deo, est materia prima; quae nullo modo est agens, cum sit in potentia tantum. Ad quintum dicendum quod corpus agit et ad formam accidentalem, et ad formam substantialem. Qualitas enim activa, ut calor, etsi sit accidens, agit tamen in virtute formae substantialis, sicut eius instrumentum; et ideo potest agere ad formam substantialem; sicut et calor naturalis, inquantum est instrumentum animae, agit ad generationem carnis. Ad accidens vero agit propria virtute. Nec est contra rationem accidentis, quod excedat suum subiectum in agendo, sed quod excedat in essendo, nisi forsan quis imaginetur idem accidens numero defluere ab agente in patiens, sicut Democritus ponebat fieri actionem per defluxum atomorum.

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is most distant from God is primary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure potentiality. Reply Obj. 5: The term of a body’s action is both an accidental form and a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat, although itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the substantial form, as its instrument: wherefore its action can terminate in a substantial form; thus natural heat, as the instrument of the soul, has an action terminating in the generation of flesh. But by its own virtue it produces an accident. Nor is it against the nature of an accident to surpass its subject in acting, but it is to surpass it in being; unless indeed one were to imagine that an accident transfers its identical self from the agent to the patient; thus Democritus explained action by an issue of atoms.

Article 2 Whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in materia corporali non sint aliquae rationes seminales. Ratio enim importat aliquid secundum esse spirituale. Sed in materia corporali non est aliquid spiritualiter, sed materialiter tantum, secundum scilicet modum eius in quo est. Ergo in materia corporali non sunt seminales rationes. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod daemones quaedam opera faciunt adhibendo occultis motibus quaedam semina, quae in elementis cognoscunt. Sed ea quae per motum localem adhibentur, sunt corpora, non rationes. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur quod sunt in corporali materia seminales rationes. Praeterea, semen est principium activum. Sed in materia corporali non est aliquod principium activum, cum materiae non competat agere, ut dictum est. Ergo in materia corporali non sunt seminales rationes. Praeterea, in materia corporali dicuntur esse quaedam causales rationes, quae videntur sufficere ad rerum productionem. Sed seminales rationes sunt aliae a causalibus, quia praeter seminales rationes fiunt miracula, non autem praeter causales. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur quod seminales rationes sunt in materia corporali.

Objection 1: It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. For virtue (ratio) implies something of a spiritual order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually, but only materially, that is, according to the mode of that in which it is. Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8, 9) says that demons produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain seeds, which they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues, can be employed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter. Obj. 3: Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no active principles in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above, matter is not competent to act (A. 1, ad 2, 4). Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. Obj. 4: Further, there are said to be certain causal virtues (Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. v, 4) which seem to suffice for the production of things. But seminal virtues are not causal virtues: for miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal virtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): Of omnium rerum quae corporaliter visibiliterque nascuntur, all the things which are generated in a corporeal and visible occulta quaedam semina in istis corporeis mundi huius fashion, certain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal things of this elementis latent. world. Respondeo dicendum quod denominationes conI answer that, It is customary to name things after sueverunt fieri a perfectiori, ut dicitur in II de Anima. what is more perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima In tota autem natura corporea perfectiora sunt corpo- ii, 4). Now in the whole corporeal nature, living bodies are ra viva, unde et ipsum nomen naturae translatum est a the most perfect: wherefore the word nature has been transrebus viventibus ad omnes res naturales. Nam ipsum no- ferred from living things to all natural things. For the word

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men naturae, ut philosophus dicit in V Metaphys., primo impositum fuit ad significandum generationem viventium, quae nativitas dicitur, et quia viventia generantur ex principio coniuncto, sicut fructus ex arbore, et foetus ex matre, cui colligatur, consequenter tractum est nomen naturae ad omne principium motus quod est in eo quod movetur. Manifestum est autem quod principium activum et passivum generationis rerum viventium sunt semina ex quibus viventia generantur. Et ideo convenienter Augustinus omnes virtutes activas et passivas quae sunt principia generationum et motuum naturalium, seminales rationes vocat. Huiusmodi autem virtutes activae et passivae in multiplici ordine considerari possunt. Nam primo quidem, ut Augustinus dicit VI super Gen. ad Litt., sunt principaliter et originaliter in ipso verbo Dei, secundum rationes ideales. Secundo vero, sunt in elementis mundi, ubi simul a principio productae sunt, sicut in universalibus causis. Tertio vero modo, sunt in iis quae ex universalibus causis secundum successiones temporum producuntur, sicut in hac planta et in hoc animali, tanquam in particularibus causis. Quarto modo, sunt in seminibus quae ex animalibus et plantis producuntur. Quae iterum comparantur ad alios effectus particulares, sicut primordiales causae universales ad primos effectus productos. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi virtutes activae et passivae rerum naturalium, etsi non possint dici rationes secundum quod sunt in materia corporali; possunt tamen dici rationes per comparationem ad suam originem, secundum quod deducuntur a rationibus idealibus. Ad secundum dicendum quod huiusmodi virtutes activae vel passivae sunt in aliquibus partibus corporalibus; quae dum adhibentur per motum localem ad aliquos effectus complendos, dicuntur semina adhiberi per daemones. Ad tertium dicendum quod semen maris est principium activum in generatione animalis. Sed potest etiam dici semen id quod est ex parte feminae, quod est principium passivum. Et sic sub semine comprehendi possunt vires activae et passivae. Ad quartum dicendum quod ex verbis Augustini de huiusmodi rationibus seminalibus loquentis, satis accipi potest quod ipsae rationes seminales sunt etiam rationes causales, sicut et semen est quaedam causa, dicit enim in III de Trin., quod sicut matres gravidae sunt foetibus, sic ipse mundus est gravidus causis nascentium. Sed tamen rationes ideales possunt dici causales, non autem proprie loquendo seminales, quia semen non est principium separatum, et praeter huiusmodi rationes non fiunt miracula. Similiter etiam neque praeter virtutes passivas creaturae inditas, ut ex ea fieri possit quidquid Deus mandaverit. Sed praeter virtutes activas naturales,

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itself, nature, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation of living things, which is called nativity: and because living things are generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united, consequently the word nature has been applied to every principle of movement existing in that which is moved. Now it is manifest that the active and passive principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which living things are generated. Therefore Augustine fittingly gave the name of seminal virtues to all those active and passive virtues which are the principles of natural generation and movement. These active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders. For in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. vi, 10), they are principally and originally in the Word of God, as typal ideas. Second, they are in the elements of the world, where they were produced altogether at the beginning, as in universal causes. Third, they are in those things which, in the succession of time, are produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that animal, as in particular causes. Fourth, they are in the seeds produced from animals and plants. And these again are compared to further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to the first effects produced. Reply Obj. 1: These active and passive virtues of natural things, though not called virtues (rationes) by reason of their being in corporeal matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their origin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas. Reply Obj. 2: These active and passive virtues are in certain parts of corporeal things: and when they are employed with local movement for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons as employing seeds. Reply Obj. 3: The seed of the male is the active principle in the generation of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the female contributes as the passive principle. And thus the word seed covers both active and passive principles. Reply Obj. 4: From the words of Augustine when speaking of these seminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal virtues, just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii, 9) that, as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things. Nevertheless, the typal ideas can be called causal virtues, but not, strictly speaking, seminal virtues, because seed is not a separate principle; and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of causal virtues. Likewise neither are miracles wrought outside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that God com-

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et potentias passivas quae ordinantur ad huiusmodi vir- mands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the tutes activas, dicuntur fieri miracula, dum dicitur quod scope of the natural active virtues, and the passive potenfiunt praeter rationes seminales. tialities which are ordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the scope of seminal virtues.

Article 3 Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of what is produced in bodies here below? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia non sint causa eorum quae hic in inferioribus corporibus fiunt. Dicit enim Damascenus, nos autem dicimus quoniam ipsa, scilicet corpora caelestia, non sunt causa alicuius eorum quae fiunt, neque corruptionis eorum quae corrumpuntur, signa autem sunt magis imbrium et aeris transmutationis. Praeterea, ad faciendum aliquid, sufficit agens et materia. Sed in istis inferioribus invenitur materia patiens, inveniuntur etiam contraria agentia, scilicet calidum et frigidum et huiusmodi. Ergo non est necessarium, ad causandum ea quae hic inferius fiunt, causalitatem caelestibus corporibus attribuere. Praeterea, agens agit sibi simile. Sed videmus quod omnia quae fiunt hic inferius, fiunt per hoc quod calefiunt et frigidantur, et humectantur et desiccantur, et aliis huiusmodi qualitatibus alterantur, quae non inveniuntur in corporibus caelestibus. Ergo corpora caelestia non sunt causa eorum quae hic fiunt. Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit V de Civ. Dei, nihil est magis corporeum quam corporis sexus. Sed corporis sexus non causatur ex corporibus caelestibus, cuius signum esse videtur, quod duorum geminorum sub una constellatione natorum, unus est masculus et alter est femina. Ergo corpora caelestia non sunt causa rerum corporalium quae hic fiunt. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod corpora crassiora et inferiora per subtiliora et potentiora quodam ordine reguntur. Et Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod lumen solis ad generationem sensibilium corporum confert, et ad vitam ipsa movet, et nutrit et auget et perficit. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum omnis multitudo ab unitate procedat; quod autem immobile est, uno modo se habet, quod vero movetur, multiformiter, considerandum est, in tota natura, quod omnis motus ab immobili procedit. Et ideo quanto aliqua sunt immobiliora, tanto sunt magis causa eorum quae sunt magis mobilia. Corpora autem caelestia sunt inter alia corpora magis immobilia, non enim moventur nisi motu locali. Et ideo motus horum inferiorum corporum qui sunt varii

Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced in bodies here below. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7): We say that they— namely, the heavenly bodies—are not the cause of generation or corruption: they are rather signs of storms and atmospheric changes. Obj. 2: Further, for the production of anything, an agent and matter suffice. But in things here below there is passive matter; and there are contrary agents—heat and cold, and the like. Therefore for the production of things here below, there is no need to ascribe causality to the heavenly bodies. Obj. 3: Further, the agent produces its like. Now it is to be observed that everything which is produced here below is produced through the action of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and other such qualities, which do not exist in heavenly bodies. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced here below. Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 6): Nothing is more corporeal than sex. But sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies: a sign of this is that of twins born under the same constellation, one may be male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not the cause of things produced in bodies here below. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): Bodies of a grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of a more subtle and powerful nature. And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible bodies, moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfection. I answer that, Since every multitude proceeds from unity; and since what is immovable is always in the same way of being, whereas what is moved has many ways of being: it must be observed that throughout the whole of nature, all movement proceeds from the immovable. Therefore the more immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of those things which are most movable. Now the heavenly bodies are of all bodies the most immovable, for they are not moved save locally. Therefore the

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Q. 115, A. 3

et multiformes, reducuntur in motum corporis caelestis, movements of bodies here below, which are various and sicut in causam. multiform, must be referred to the movement of the heavenly bodies, as to their cause. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dictum DamasceReply Obj. 1: These words of Damascene are to be unni intelligendum est, quod corpora caelestia non sunt derstood as denying that the heavenly bodies are the first prima causa generationis et corruptionis eorum quae hic cause of generation and corruption here below; for this was fiunt; sicut dicebant illi qui ponebant corpora caelestia affirmed by those who held that the heavenly bodies are esse deos. gods. Ad secundum dicendum quod principia activa in Reply Obj. 2: The active principles of bodies here beistis inferioribus corporibus non inveniuntur nisi qua- low are only the active qualities of the elements, such as hot litates activae elementorum, quae sunt calidum et frigi- and cold and the like. If therefore the substantial forms of dum et huiusmodi. Et si sic esset quod formae substan- inferior bodies were not diversified save according to accitiales inferiorum corporum non diversificarentur nisi dents of that kind, the principles of which the early natural secundum huiusmodi accidentia, quorum principia ra- philosophers held to be the rare and the dense; there would rum et densum antiqui naturales posuerunt; non oporte- be no need to suppose some principle above these inferior ret super haec inferiora corpora aliquod principium ac- bodies, for they would be of themselves sufficient to act. But tivum ponere, sed ipsa sufficerent ad agendum. Sed recte to anyone who considers the matter aright, it is clear that considerantibus apparet quod huiusmodi accidentia se those accidents are merely material dispositions in regard habent sicut materiales dispositiones ad formas substan- to the substantial forms of natural bodies. Now matter is tiales naturalium corporum. Materia autem non sufficit not of itself sufficient to act. And therefore it is necessary ad agendum. Et ideo oportet super has materiales dispo- to suppose some active principle above these material dissitiones ponere aliquod principium activum. positions. Unde Platonici posuerunt species separatas, secunThis is why the Platonists maintained the existence of dum quarum participationem inferiora corpora sub- separate species, by participation of which the inferior bodstantiales formas consequuntur. Sed hoc non videtur ies receive their substantial forms. But this does not seem sufficere. Quia species separatae semper eodem modo enough. For the separate species, since they are supposed se haberent, cum ponantur immobiles, et sic sequere- to be immovable, would always have the same mode of betur quod non esset aliqua variatio circa generationem ing: and consequently there would be no variety in the genet corruptionem inferiorum corporum; quod patet esse eration and corruption of inferior bodies: which is clearly falsum. false. Unde secundum philosophum, in II de Gen., necesTherefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De se est ponere aliquod principium activum mobile, quod Gener. ii, 10), to suppose a movable principle, which by reaper sui praesentiam et absentiam causet varietatem cir- son of its presence or absence causes variety in the generaca generationem et corruptionem inferiorum corporum. tion and corruption of inferior bodies. Such are the heavEt huiusmodi sunt corpora caelestia. Et ideo quidquid in enly bodies. Consequently whatever generates here below, istis inferioribus generat, movet ad speciem sicut instru- moves to the production of the species, as the instrument mentum caelestis corporis; secundum quod dicitur in II of a heavenly body: thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2) Physic., quod homo generat hominem, et sol. that man and the sun generate man. Ad tertium dicendum quod corpora caelestia inReply Obj. 3: The heavenly bodies have not a specific ferioribus corporibus non sunt similia similitudine spe- likeness to the bodies here below. Their likeness consists in ciei; sed inquantum sua universali virtute continent in this, that by reason of their universal power, whatever is se quidquid in inferioribus corporibus generatur; secun- generated in inferior bodies, is contained in them. In this dum quem modum dicimus etiam omnia esse Deo simi- way also we say that all things are like God. lia. Ad quartum dicendum quod actiones corporum Reply Obj. 4: The actions of heavenly bodies are varicaelestium diversimode recipiuntur in inferioribus cor- ously received in inferior bodies, according to the various poribus secundum diversam materiae dispositionem. dispositions of matter. Now it happens at times that the Contingit autem quandoque quod materia conceptus matter in the human conception is not wholly disposed to humani non est disposita totaliter ad masculinum se- the male sex; wherefore it is formed sometimes into a male, xum; unde partim formatur in masculum, partim in fe- sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this as an arguminam. Unde ad hoc introducitur ab Augustino, ad re- ment against divination by stars: because the effects of the pellendum scilicet divinationem quae fit per astra, quia stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the effectus astrorum variantur etiam in rebus corporeis, se- various dispositions of matter. cundum diversam materiae dispositionem.

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Article 4 Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia sint causa humanorum actuum. Corpora enim caelestia, cum moveantur a spiritualibus substantiis, sicut supra dictum est, agunt in virtute earum quasi instrumenta. Sed illae substantiae spirituales sunt superiores animabus nostris. Ergo videtur quod possint imprimere in animas nostras, et sic causare actus humanos. Praeterea, omne multiforme reducitur in aliquod uniforme principium. Sed actus humani sunt varii et multiformes. Ergo videtur quod reducantur in uniformes motus caelestium corporum, sicut in sua principia. Praeterea, astrologi frequenter vera annuntiant de eventibus bellorum, et aliis humanis actibus, quorum principia sunt intellectus et voluntas. Quod facere non possent secundum caelestia corpora, nisi essent humanorum actuum causa. Sunt ergo corpora caelestia humanorum actuum causa. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, quod corpora caelestia humanorum actuum nequaquam sunt causa. Respondeo dicendum quod corpora caelestia in corpora quidem imprimunt directe et per se, sicut iam dictum est. In vires autem animae quae sunt actus organorum corporeorum, directe quidem, sed per accidens, quia necesse est huiusmodi actus harum potentiarum impediri secundum impedimenta organorum, sicut oculus turbatus non bene videt. Unde si intellectus et voluntas essent vires corporeis organis alligatae, sicut posuerunt aliqui, dicentes quod intellectus non differt a sensu; ex necessitate sequeretur quod corpora caelestia essent causa electionum et actuum humanorum. Et ex hoc sequeretur quod homo naturali instinctu ageretur ad suas actiones, sicut cetera animalia, in quibus non sunt nisi vires animae corporeis organis alligatae, nam illud quod fit in istis inferioribus ex impressione corporum caelestium, naturaliter agitur. Et ita sequeretur quod homo non esset liberi arbitrii, sed haberet actiones determinatas, sicut et ceterae res naturales. Quae manifeste sunt falsa, et conversationi humanae contraria. Sciendum est tamen quod indirecte et per accidens impressiones corporum caelestium ad intellectum et voluntatem pertingere possunt; inquantum scilicet tam intellectus quam voluntas aliquo modo ab inferioribus viribus accipiunt, quae organis corporeis alligantur. Sed circa hoc diversimode se habent intellectus et voluntas. Nam intellectus ex necessitate accipit ab inferioribus viribus apprehensivis, unde turbata vi imaginativa vel cogitativa vel memorativa, ex necessitate turbatur actio intellectus. Sed voluntas non ex necessitate sequitur inclinationem appetitus inferioris, licet enim passiones

Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions. For since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual substances, as stated above (Q. 110, A. 3), they act by virtue thereof as their instruments. But those spiritual substances are superior to our souls. Therefore it seems that they can cause impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions. Obj. 2: Further, every multiform is reducible to a uniform principle. But human actions are various and multiform. Therefore it seems that they are reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly bodies, as to their principles. Obj. 3: Further, astrologers often foretell the truth concerning the outcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the intellect and will are the principles. But they could not do this by means of the heavenly bodies, unless these were the cause of human actions. Therefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that the heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions. I answer that, The heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves act on bodies, as stated above (A. 3). They can act directly indeed on those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs, but accidentally: because the acts of such powers must needs be hindered by obstacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot see well. Wherefore if the intellect and will were powers affixed to corporeal organs, as some maintained, holding that intellect does not differ from sense; it would follow of necessity that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human choice and action. It would also follow that man is led by natural instinct to his actions, just as other animals, in which there are powers other than those which are affixed to corporeal organs: for whatever is done here below in virtue of the action of heavenly bodies, is done naturally. It would therefore follow that man has no free-will, and that he would have determinate actions, like other natural things. All of which is manifestly false, and contrary to human habit. It must be observed, however, that indirectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can reach the intellect and will, forasmuch, namely, as both intellect and will receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to corporeal organs. But in this the intellect and will are differently situated. For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior apprehensive powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of necessity, disturbed also. The will, on the contrary, does not, of necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for although the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a certain force

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quae sunt in irascibili et concupiscibili, habeant quandam vim ad inclinandam voluntatem; tamen in potestate voluntatis remanet sequi passiones, vel eas refutare. Et ideo impressio caelestium corporum, secundum quam immutari possunt inferiores vires, minus pertingit ad voluntatem, quae est proxima causa humanorum actuum, quam ad intellectum. Ponere igitur caelestia corpora esse causam humanorum actuum, est proprium illorum qui dicunt intellectum non differre a sensu. Unde quidam eorum dicebant quod talis est voluntas in hominibus, qualem in diem inducit pater virorum deorumque. Quia ergo constat intellectum et voluntatem non esse actus organorum corporeorum, impossibile est quod corpora caelestia sint causa humanorum actuum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod spirituales substantiae quae caelestia corpora movent, in corporalia quidem agunt mediantibus caelestibus corporibus, sed in intellectum humanum agunt immediate illuminando. Voluntatem autem immutare non possunt, ut supra habitum est. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut multiformitas corporalium motuum reducitur sicut in causam in uniformitatem motuum caelestium; ita multiformitas actuum qui sunt ab intellectu et voluntate, reducitur in principium uniforme quod est intellectus et voluntas divina. Ad tertium dicendum quod plures hominum sequuntur passiones, quae sunt motus sensitivi appetitus, ad quas cooperari possunt corpora caelestia, pauci autem sunt sapientes, qui huiusmodi passionibus resistant. Et ideo astrologi ut in pluribus vera possunt praedicere, et maxime in communi. Non autem in speciali, quia nihil prohibet aliquem hominem per liberum arbitrium passionibus resistere. Unde et ipsi astrologi dicunt quod sapiens homo dominatur astris, inquantum scilicet dominatur suis passionibus.

Q. 115, A. 5

in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains the power of following the passions or repressing them. Therefore the impressions of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior powers can be changed, has less influence on the will, which is the proximate cause of human actions, than on the intellect. To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does not differ from sense. Wherefore some of these said that such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on (Odyssey xviii 135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect and will are not acts of corporeal organs, it is impossible that heavenly bodies be the cause of human actions. Reply Obj. 1: The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly bodies; but they act immediately on the human intellect by enlightening it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will, as stated above (Q. 111, A. 2). Reply Obj. 2: Just as the multiformity of corporeal movements is reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its cause: so the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and the will is reduced to a uniform principle which is the Divine intellect and will. Reply Obj. 3: The majority of men follow their passions, which are movements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements of the heavenly bodies can cooperate: but few are wise enough to resist these passions. Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the truth in the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not in particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting his passions by his free-will. Wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to say that the wise man is stronger than the stars, forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions.

Article 5 Whether heavenly bodies can act on the demons? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia possint imprimere in ipsos daemones. Daemones enim secundum certa augmenta lunae aliquos homines vexant, qui et propter hoc lunatici dicuntur; ut patet Matth. IV et XVII. Sed hoc non esset, nisi corporibus caelestibus subiacerent. Ergo daemones subiacent actionibus caelestium corporum. Praeterea, necromantici observant certas constellationes ad invocandos daemones. Non autem per cor-

Objection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies can act on the demons. For the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, can harass men, who on that account are called lunatics, as appears from Matt. 4:24 and 17:14. But this would not be if they were not subject to the heavenly bodies. Therefore the demons are subject to them. Obj. 2: Further, necromancers observe certain constellations in order to invoke the demons. But these would not

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pora caelestia invocarentur, si non eis subiacerent. Ergo daemones subiacent actionibus caelestium corporum. Praeterea, corpora caelestia virtuosiora sunt quam corpora inferiora. Sed quibusdam inferioribus corporibus daemones arcentur, scilicet herbis et lapidibus et animantibus, et quibusdam sonis certis ac vocibus, et figurationibus atque figmentis, ut a Porphyrio dictum Augustinus introducit in X de Civ. Dei. Ergo multo magis daemones subduntur actioni caelestium corporum. Sed contra est quod daemones sunt superiores ordine naturae quam corpora caelestia. Agens autem est superius patiente, ut Augustinus dicit XII super Gen. ad Litt. Ergo daemones non subiiciuntur actioni corporum caelestium. Respondeo dicendum quod circa daemones fuit triplex opinio. Prima Peripateticorum, qui posuerunt daemones non esse; sed ea quae attribuuntur daemonibus, secundum artem necromanticam, fiunt virtute caelestium corporum. Et hoc est quod Augustinus, X de Civ. Dei, introducit dictum a Porphyrio, quod fabricantur in terra ab hominibus potestates idoneae siderum variis effectibus exequendis. Sed haec positio est manifeste falsa. Experimento enim scitur multa per daemones fieri, ad quae nullo modo virtus caelestium corporum sufficeret; puta quod arreptitii loquuntur lingua ignota, quod recitant versus et auctoritates quas nunquam sciverunt, quod necromantici faciunt statuas loqui et moveri, et similia. Ex quibus Platonici moti fuerunt ut ponerent daemones esse animalia corpore aerea, animo passiva; ut ab Apuleio dictum Augustinus introducit VIII de Civ. Dei. Et haec est secunda opinio, secundum quam dici posset quod daemones hoc modo subduntur corporibus caelestibus, sicut et de hominibus dictum est. Sed haec opinio ex superioribus patet esse falsa, dicimus enim daemones esse substantias intellectuales corporibus non unitas. Unde patet quod non subduntur actioni caelestium corporum, nec per se nec per accidens, nec directe nec indirecte. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc quod daemones secundum certa augmenta lunae homines vexant, contingit propter duo. Primo quidem, ad hoc quod infament creaturam Dei, scilicet lunam, ut Hieronymus et Chrysostomus dicunt. Secundo quia, cum non possint operari nisi mediantibus naturalibus virtutibus, ut supra dictum est; in suis operibus considerant corporum aptitudines ad effectus intentos. Manifestum est autem quod cerebrum humidissimum est omnium partium corporis, ut Aristoteles dicit, et ideo maxime subiicitur operationi lunae, quae ex sua proprietate habet movere humorem. In cerebro autem perficiuntur vires animales, et ideo daemones secundum certa augmenta lunae perturbant ho-

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be invoked through the heavenly bodies unless they were subject to them. Therefore they are subject to them. Obj. 3: Further, heavenly bodies are more powerful than inferior bodies. But the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies, namely, herbs, stones, animals, and to certain sounds and words, forms and figures, as Porphyry says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11). Much more therefore are the demons subject to the action of heavenly bodies. On the contrary, The demons are superior in the order of nature, to the heavenly bodies. But the agent is superior to the patient, as Augustine says (Gen ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore the demons are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies. I answer that, There have been three opinions about the demons. In the first place the Peripatetics denied the existence of demons; and held that what is ascribed to the demons, according to the necromantic art, is effected by the power of the heavenly bodies. This is what Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) relates as having been held by Porphyry, namely, that on earth men fabricate certain powers useful in producing certain effects of the stars. But this opinion is manifestly false. For we know by experience that many things are done by demons, for which the power of heavenly bodies would in no way suffice: for instance, that a man in a state of delirium should speak an unknown tongue, recite poetry and authors of whom he has no previous knowledge; that necromancers make statues to speak and move, and other like things. For this reason the Platonists were led to hold that demons are animals with an aerial body and a passive soul, as Apuleius says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei viii, 16). And this is the second of the opinions mentioned above: according to which it could be said that demons are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we have said man is subject thereto (A. 4). But this opinion is proved to be false from what we have said above (Q. 51, A. 1): for we hold that demons are spiritual substances not united to bodies. Hence it is clear that they are subject to the action of heavenly bodies neither essentially nor accidentally, neither directly nor indirectly. Reply Obj. 1: That demons harass men, according to certain phases of the moon, happens in two ways. First, they do so in order to defame God’s creature, namely, the moon; as Jerome (In Matt. iv, 24) and Chrysostom (Hom. lvii in Matt.) say. Second, because as they are unable to effect anything save by means of the natural forces, as stated above (Q. 114, A. 4, ad 2) they take into account the aptitude of bodies for the intended result. Now it is manifest that the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body, as Aristotle says: wherefore it is the most subject to the action of the moon, the property of which is to move what is moist. And it is precisely in the brain that animal forces culminate: wherefore the demons, according to certain phases

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minis phantasiam, quando considerant cerebrum ad hoc esse dispositum. Ad secundum dicendum quod daemones advocati in certis constellationibus, propter duo veniunt. Primo quidem, ut homines in hunc errorem inducant, quod credant aliquod numen esse in stellis. Secundo, quia considerant secundum aliquas certas constellationes materiam corporalem magis esse dispositam ad effectus pro quibus advocantur. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XXI de Civ. Dei, daemones alliciuntur per varia genera lapidum, herbarum, lignorum, animalium, carminum, rituum, non ut animalia cibis, sed ut spiritus signis; inquantum scilicet haec eis exhibentur in signum divini honoris, cuius ipsi sunt cupidi.

Q. 115, A. 6

of the moon, disturb man’s imagination, when they observe that the brain is thereto disposed. Reply Obj. 2: Demons when summoned through certain constellations, come for two reasons. First, in order to lead man into the error of believing that there is some Divine power in the stars. Second, because they consider that under certain constellations corporeal matter is better disposed for the result for which they are summoned. Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6), the demons are enticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs, rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a spirit by signs; that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered to them in token of the honor due to God, of which they are covetous.

Article 6 Whether heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia imponant necessitatem iis quae eorum actioni subduntur. Causa enim sufficienti posita, necesse est effectum poni. Sed corpora caelestia sunt sufficiens causa suorum effectuum. Cum igitur corpora caelestia, cum suis motibus et dispositionibus, ponantur sicut ex necessitate entia; videtur quod effectus eorum ex necessitate consequantur. Praeterea, effectus agentis ex necessitate sequitur in materia, quando virtus agentis tanta fuerit quod possit sibi subiicere totaliter materiam. Sed tota materia inferiorum corporum subiicitur virtuti caelestium corporum, tanquam excellentiori. Ergo ex necessitate effectus caelestium corporum recipitur in materia corporali. Praeterea, si effectus caelestis corporis non ex necessitate proveniat, hoc est propter aliquam causam impedientem. Sed quamlibet causam corpoream quae impedire posset effectum caelestis corporis, necesse est reduci in aliquod caeleste principium, cum caelestia corpora sint causa omnium quae hic fiunt. Ergo, cum et illud caeleste principium sit necessarium, sequitur quod necesse sit impediri effectum alterius corporis caelestis. Et sic omnia quae hic contingunt, ex necessitate eveniunt. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in libro de Somn. et Vigil., quod neque eorum quae in corporibus sunt signorum caelestium, velut aquarum et ventorum, inconveniens est multa non evenire. Sic ergo non omnes effectus caelestium corporum ex necessitate eveniunt. Respondeo dicendum quod ista quaestio partim quidem absoluta est, secundum praemissa; partim au-

Objection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action. For given a sufficient cause, the effect follows of necessity. But heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause of their effects. Since, therefore, heavenly bodies, with their movements and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their effects follow of necessity. Obj. 2: Further, an agent’s effect results of necessity in matter, when the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter to itself entirely. But the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to the power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher power than theirs. Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity received in corporeal matter. Obj. 3: Further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not follow of necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. But any corporeal cause, that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly body, must of necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle: since the heavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below. Therefore, since also that heavenly principle is necessary, it follows that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered. Consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below happens of necessity. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil.): It is not incongruous that many of the signs observed in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and wind, should not be fulfilled. Therefore not all the effects of heavenly bodies take place of necessity. I answer that, This question is partly solved by what was said above (A. 4); and in part presents some difficulty.

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tem difficultatem habet. Ostensum enim est quod, quamvis ex impressione corporum caelestium fiant aliquae inclinationes in natura corporali, voluntas tamen non ex necessitate sequitur has inclinationes. Et ideo nihil prohibet per voluntariam actionem impediri effectum caelestium corporum, non solum in ipso homine, sed etiam in aliis rebus ad quas hominum operatio se extendit. Sed nullum tale principium invenitur in rebus naturalibus, quod habeat libertatem sequendi vel non sequendi impressiones caelestes. Unde videtur quod in talibus, ad minus, omnia ex necessitate proveniant, secundum antiquam quorundam rationem, qui, supponentes omne quod est causam habere, et quod, posita causa, ex necessitate ponitur effectus, concludebant, quod omnia ex necessitate contingant. Quam quidem opinionem repellit Aristoteles in VI Metaphys., secundum duo quae ipsi supponunt. Primo enim, non est verum quod, posita quacumque causa, necesse sit effectum poni. Sunt enim quaedam causae quae ordinantur ad suos effectus non ex necessitate, sed ut in pluribus, quae quandoque deficiunt in minori parte. Sed quia huiusmodi causae non deficiunt in minori parte, nisi propter aliquam causam impedientem, videtur adhuc praedictum inconveniens non vitari, quia et ipsum impedimentum talis causae ex necessitate contingit. Et ideo, secundo, oportet dicere quod omne quod est per se, habet causam, quod autem est per accidens, non habet causam, quia non est vere ens, cum non sit vere unum. Album enim causam habet, similiter et musicum; sed album musicum non habet causam, quia non est vere ens, neque vere unum. Manifestum est autem quod causa impediens actionem alicuius causae ordinatae ad suum effectum ut in pluribus, concurrit ei interdum per accidens, unde talis concursus non habet causam, inquantum est per accidens. Et propter hoc, id quod ex tali concursu sequitur, non reducitur in aliquam causam praeexistentem, ex qua ex necessitate sequatur. Sicut quod aliquod corpus terrestre ignitum in superiori parte aeris generetur et deorsum cadat, habet causam aliquam virtutem caelestem, et similiter etiam quod in superficie terrae sit aliqua materia combustibilis, potest reduci in aliquod caeleste principium. Sed quod ignis cadens huic materiae occurrat et comburat eam, non habet causam aliquod caeleste corpus, sed est per accidens. Et sic patet quod non omnes effectus caelestium corporum sunt ex necessitate. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod corpora caelestia sunt causa inferiorum effectuum mediantibus causis particularibus inferioribus, quae deficere possunt in minori parte. Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus corporis caelestis non est infinita. Unde requirit determinatam di-

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For it was shown that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain inclinations in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of necessity follow these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of the will, not only in man himself, but also in other things to which human action extends. But in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with freedom to follow or not to follow the impressions produced by heavenly agents. Wherefore it seems that in such things at least, everything happens of necessity; according to the reasoning of some of the ancients who, supposing that everything that is, has a cause; and that, given the cause, the effect follows of necessity; concluded that all things happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by Aristotle (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 3) as to this double supposition. For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever, the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes are so ordered to their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the majority of cases, and in the minority to fail in producing them. But that such causes do fail in the minority of cases is due to some hindering cause; consequently the above-mentioned difficulty seems not to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of necessity. Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is a being per se, has a cause; but what is accidentally, has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one. For (that a thing is) white has a cause, likewise (that a man is) musical has a cause, but (that a being is) white-musical has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, nor truly one. Now it is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to its effect as to produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and the clashing of these two causes, inasmuch as it is accidental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this clashing of causes is not to be reduced to a further pre-existing cause, from which it follows of necessity. For instance, that some terrestrial body take fire in the higher regions of the air and fall to the earth, is caused by some heavenly power: again, that there be on the surface of the earth some combustible matter, is reducible to some heavenly principle. But that the burning body should alight on this matter and set fire to it, is not caused by a heavenly body, but is accidental. Consequently not all the effects of heavenly bodies result of necessity. Reply Obj. 1: The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes, which can fail in their effects in the minority of cases. Reply Obj. 2: The power of a heavenly body is not infinite. Wherefore it requires a determinate disposition in

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spositionem in materia ad inducendum suum effectum, et quantum ad distantiam loci, et quantum ad alias conditiones. Et ideo sicut distantia loci impedit effectum caelestis corporis (non enim sol eundem caloris effectum habet in Dacia, quem habet in Aethiopia); ita et grossities materiae, vel frigiditas aut caliditas, aut alia huiusmodi dispositio, impedire potest effectum corporis caelestis. Ad tertium dicendum quod licet causa impediens effectum alterius causae, reducatur in aliquod caeleste corpus sicut in causam; tamen concursus duarum causarum, cum sit per accidens, non reducitur in causam caelestem, ut dictum est.

Q. 115, A. 6

matter, both as to local distance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its effect. Therefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly body (for the sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in Ethiopia); so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature or other such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly body.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the cause that hinders the effect of another cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause; nevertheless the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the causality of a heavenly body, as stated above.

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Question 116 Fate Deinde considerandum est de fato. Et circa hoc quaeWe come now to the consideration of fate. Under this runtur quatuor. head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, an fatum sit. (1) Is there such a thing as fate? Secundo, in quo sit. (2) Where is it? Tertio, utrum sit immobile. (3) Is it unchangeable? Quarto, utrum omnia subsint fato. (4) Are all things subject to fate?

Article 1 Whether fate exists? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fatum Objection 1: It would seem that fate is nothing. For nihil sit. Dicit enim Gregorius, in homilia Epiphaniae, Gregory says in a homily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in absit a fidelium cordibus ut fatum esse aliquid dicant. Evang.): Far be it from the hearts of the faithful to think that fate is anything real. Praeterea, ea quae fato aguntur, non sunt improObj. 2: Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, visa, quia, ut Augustinus dicit V de Civ. Dei, fatum a fan- for as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), fate is understood do dictum intelligimus, idest a loquendo; ut ea fato fieri to be derived from the verb ‘fari’ which means to speak; as dicantur, quae ab aliquo determinante sunt ante prae- though things were said to happen by fate, which are forelocuta. Quae autem sunt provisa, non sunt fortuita ne- spoken by one who decrees them to happen. Now what is que casualia. Si igitur res fato aguntur, excludetur casus foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. If therefore things et fortuna a rebus. happen by fate, there will be neither luck nor chance in the world. Sed contra quod non est, non definitur. Sed BoeOn the contrary, What does not exist cannot be detius, in IV de Consol., definit fatum, dicens quod fatum fined. But Boethius (De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: Fate is est inhaerens rebus mobilibus dispositio, per quam provi- a disposition inherent to changeable things, by which Providentia suis quaeque nectit ordinibus. Ergo fatum aliquid dence connects each one with its proper order. est. Respondeo dicendum quod in rebus inferioribus I answer that, In this world some things seem to videntur quaedam a fortuna vel casu provenire. Contin- happen by luck or chance. Now it happens sometimes that git autem quandoque quod aliquid, ad inferiores causas something is lucky or chance-like as compared to inferior relatum, est fortuitum vel casuale, quod tamen, relatum causes, which, if compared to some higher cause, is directly ad causam aliquam superiorem, invenitur esse per se in- intended. For instance, if two servants are sent by their tentum. Sicut si duo servi alicuius domini mittantur ab master to the same place; the meeting of the two servants eo ad eundem locum, uno de altero ignorante; concursus in regard to themselves is by chance; but as compared to the duorum servorum, si ad ipsos servos referatur, casualis master, who had ordered it, it is directly intended. est, quia accidit praeter utriusque intentionem; si autem referatur ad dominum, qui hoc praeordinavit, non est casuale, sed per se intentum. Fuerunt igitur aliqui qui huiusmodi casualia et forSo there were some who refused to refer to a higher tuita, quae in his inferioribus accidunt, in nullam supe- cause such events which by luck or chance take place here riorem causam reducere voluerunt. Et hi fatum et pro- below. These denied the existence of fate and Providence, videntiam negaverunt; ut de Tullio Augustinus recitat in as Augustine relates of Tully (De Civ. Dei v, 9). And this V de Civ. Dei. Quod est contra ea quae superius de pro- is contrary to what we have said above about Providence videntia dicta sunt. (Q. 22, A. 2).

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Quidam vero omnia fortuita et casualia quae in istis inferioribus accidunt, sive in rebus naturalibus sive in rebus humanis, reducere voluerunt in superiorem causam, idest in caelestia corpora. Et secundum hos, fatum nihil aliud est quam dispositio siderum in qua quisque conceptus est vel natus. Sed hoc stare non potest, propter duo. Primo quidem, quantum ad res humanas. Quia iam ostensum est quod humani actus non subduntur actioni caelestium corporum, nisi per accidens et indirecte. Causa autem fatalis, cum habeat ordinationem super ea quae fato aguntur, necesse est quod sit directe et per se causa eius quod agitur. Secundo, quantum ad omnia quae per accidens aguntur. Dictum est enim supra quod id quod est per accidens, non est proprie ens neque unum. Omnis autem naturae actio terminatur ad aliquid unum. Unde impossibile est quod id quod est per accidens, sit effectus per se alicuius naturalis principii agentis. Nulla ergo natura per se hoc facere potest, quod intendens fodere sepulcrum, inveniat thesaurum. Manifestum est autem quod corpus caeleste agit per modum naturalis principii, unde et effectus eius in hoc mundo sunt naturales. Impossibile est ergo quod aliqua virtus activa caelestis corporis sit causa eorum quae hic aguntur per accidens, sive a casu sive a fortuna. Et ideo dicendum est quod ea quae hic per accidens aguntur, sive in rebus naturalibus sive in rebus humanis, reducuntur in aliquam causam praeordinantem, quae est providentia divina. Quia nihil prohibet id quod est per accidens, accipi ut unum ab aliquo intellectu, alioquin intellectus formare non posset hanc propositionem, fodiens sepulcrum invenit thesaurum. Et sicut hoc potest intellectus apprehendere, ita potest efficere, sicut si aliquis sciens in quo loco sit thesaurus absconditus, instiget aliquem rusticum hoc ignorantem, ut ibi fodiat sepulcrum. Et sic nihil prohibet ea quae hic per accidens aguntur, ut fortuita vel casualia, reduci in aliquam causam ordinantem, quae per intellectum agat; et praecipue intellectum divinum. Nam solus Deus potest voluntatem immutare, ut supra habitum est. Et per consequens ordinatio humanorum actuum, quorum principium est voluntas, soli Deo attribui debet. Sic igitur inquantum omnia quae hic aguntur, divinae providentiae subduntur, tanquam per eam praeordinata et quasi praelocuta, fatum ponere possumus, licet hoc nomine sancti doctores uti recusaverint, propter eos qui ad vim positionis siderum hoc nomen retorquebant. Unde Augustinus dicit, in V de Civ. Dei, si propterea quisquam res humanas fato tribuit, quia ipsam Dei voluntatem vel potestatem fati nomine appellat, sententiam teneat, linguam corrigat. Et sic etiam Gregorius fatum esse negat. Unde patet solutio ad primum. Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliqua esse fortuita vel casualia per comparationem ad causas

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On the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes place here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural things or in human affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the heavenly bodies. According to these fate is nothing else than a disposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born. But this will not hold. First, as to human affairs: because we have proved above (Q. 115, A. 4) that human actions are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies, save accidentally and indirectly. Now the cause of fate, since it has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of necessity be directly and of itself the cause of what takes place. Second, as to all things that happen accidentally: for it has been said (Q. 115, A. 6) that what is accidental, is properly speaking neither a being, nor a unity. But every action of nature terminates in some one thing. Wherefore it is impossible for that which is accidental to be the proper effect of an active natural principle. No natural cause can therefore have for its proper effect that a man intending to dig a grave finds a treasure. Now it is manifest that a heavenly body acts after the manner of a natural principle: wherefore its effects in this world are natural. It is therefore impossible that any active power of a heavenly body be the cause of what happens by accident here below, whether by luck or by chance. We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect: otherwise the intellect could not form this proposition: The digger of a grave found a treasure. And just as an intellect can apprehend this so can it effect it; for instance, someone who knows a place where a treasure is hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave there. Consequently, nothing hinders what happens here by accident, by luck or by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which acts by the intellect, especially the Divine intellect. For God alone can change the will, as shown above (Q. 105, A. 4). Consequently the ordering of human actions, the principle of which is the will, must be ascribed to God alone. So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were fore-spoken, we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy doctors avoided the use of this word, on account of those who twisted its application to a certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1): If anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of God, let him keep to his opinion, but hold his tongue. For this reason Gregory denies the existence of fate. Wherefore the first objection’s solution is manifest. Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck or by chance, if compared to their proximate

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Q. 116, A. 2

proximas, non tamen per comparationem ad divinam causes: but not if compared to Divine Providence, whereby providentiam, sic enim nihil temere fit in mundo, ut Au- nothing happens at random in the world, as Augustine says gustinus dicit in libro Octoginta trium Quaest. (83 Questions, Q. 24).

Article 2 Whether fate is in created things? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fatum non sit in rebus creatis. Dicit enim Augustinus, V de Civ. Dei, quod ipsa Dei voluntas vel potestas fati nomine appellatur. Sed voluntas et potestas Dei non est in creaturis, sed in Deo. Ergo fatum non est in rebus creatis, sed in Deo. Praeterea, fatum comparatur ad ea quae ex fato aguntur, ut causa; ut ipse modus loquendi ostendit. Sed causa universalis per se eorum quae hic per accidens aguntur, est solus Deus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo fatum est in Deo, et non in rebus creatis. Praeterea, si fatum est in creaturis, aut est substantia, aut accidens, et quodcumque horum detur, oportet quod multiplicetur secundum creaturarum multitudinem. Cum ergo fatum videatur esse unum tantum, videtur quod fatum non sit in creaturis, sed in Deo. Sed contra est quod Boetius dicit, in IV de Consol. quod fatum est dispositio rebus mobilibus inhaerens. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, divina providentia per causas medias suos effectus exequitur. Potest ergo ipsa ordinatio effectuum dupliciter considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod est in ipso Deo, et sic ipsa ordinatio effectuum vocatur providentia. Secundum vero quod praedicta ordinatio consideratur in mediis causis a Deo ordinatis ad aliquos effectus producendos, sic habet rationem fati. Et hoc est quod Boetius dicit, IV de Consol., sive famulantibus quibusdam providentiae divinae spiritibus fatum exercetur; seu anima, seu tota inserviente natura, sive caelestibus siderum motibus, seu angelica virtute, seu daemonum varia solertia, seu aliquibus eorum, seu omnibus, fatalis series texitur, de quibus omnibus per singula in praecedentibus dictum est. Sic ergo est manifestum quod fatum est in ipsis causis creatis, inquantum sunt ordinatae a Deo ad effectus producendos.

Objection 1: It would seem that fate is not in created things. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the Divine will or power is called fate. But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but in God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God.

Obj. 2: Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate, as their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below, is God alone, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore fate is in God, and not in creatures. Obj. 3: Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance or an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according to the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but in God. On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv): Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things. I answer that, As is clear from what has been stated above (Q. 22, A. 3; Q. 103, A. 6), Divine Providence produces effects through mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects in two ways. First, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering of the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this ordering as being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of certain effects, thus it has the nature of fate. This is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv): Fate is worked out when Divine Providence is served by certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements of the stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain of fate is forged. Of each of these things we have spoken above (A. 1; Q. 104, A. 2; Q. 110, A. 1; Q. 113; Q. 114). It is therefore manifest that fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the production of their effects. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ipsa ordinatio Reply Obj. 1: The ordering itself of second causes, causarum secundarum, quam Augustinus seriem causa- which Augustine (De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the series of causes, rum nominat, non habet rationem fati, nisi secundum has not the nature of fate, except as dependent on God. quod dependet a Deo. Et ideo causaliter Dei potestas vel Wherefore the Divine power or will can be called fate, as voluntas dici potest fatum. Essentialiter vero fatum est being the cause of fate. But essentially fate is the very disipsa dispositio seu series, idest ordo, causarum secunda- position or series, i.e., order, of second causes.

rum.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod intantum fatum habet rationem causae, inquantum et ipsae causae secundae, quarum ordinatio fatum vocatur. Ad tertium dicendum quod fatum dicitur dispositio, non quae est in genere qualitatis; sed secundum quod dispositio designat ordinem, qui non est substantia, sed relatio. Qui quidem ordo, si consideretur per comparationem ad suum principium, est unus, et sic dicitur unum fatum. Si autem consideretur per comparationem ad effectus, vel ad ipsas causas medias, sic multiplicatur, per quem modum poeta dixit, te tua fata trahunt.

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Reply Obj. 2: Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate. Reply Obj. 3: Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one; and thus fate is one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to the mediate causes, this fate is multiple. In this sense the poet wrote: Thy fate draws thee.

Article 3 Whether fate is unchangeable? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod fatum non sit immobile. Dicit enim Boetius, in IV de Consol., uti est ad intellectum ratiocinatio, ad id quod est id quod gignitur, ad aeternitatem tempus, ad punctum medium circulus; ita est fati series mobilis ad providentiae stabilem simplicitatem. Praeterea, sicut philosophus dicit in II Topic., motis nobis, moventur ea quae in nobis sunt. Sed fatum est dispositio inhaerens rebus mobilibus, ut Boetius dicit. Ergo fatum est mobile. Praeterea, si fatum est immobile, ea quae subduntur fato, immobiliter et ex necessitate eveniunt. Sed talia maxime videntur esse contingentia, quae fato attribuuntur. Ergo nihil erit contingens in rebus, sed omnia ex necessitate evenient. Sed contra est quod Boetius dicit, quod fatum est immobilis dispositio. Respondeo dicendum quod dispositio secundarum causarum, quam fatum dicimus, potest dupliciter considerari, uno modo, secundum ipsas causas secundas, quae sic disponuntur seu ordinantur; alio modo, per relationem ad primum principium a quo ordinantur, scilicet Deum. Quidam ergo posuerunt ipsam seriem seu dispositionem causarum esse secundum se necessariam, ita quod omnia ex necessitate contingerent; propter hoc, quod quilibet effectus habet causam, et causa posita necesse est effectum poni. Sed hoc patet esse falsum, per ea quae supra dicta sunt. Alii vero e contrario posuerunt fatum esse mobile, etiam secundum quod a divina providentia dependet. Unde Aegyptii dicebant quibusdam sacrificiis fatum posse mutari, ut Gregorius Nyssenus dicit. Sed hoc supra exclusum est, quia immobilitati divinae providentiae repugnat. Et ideo dicendum est quod fatum, secundum considerationem secundarum causarum, mobile est, sed se-

Objection 1: It seems that fate is not unchangeable. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): As reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten is to that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre; so is the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity of Providence. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7): If we be moved, what is in us is moved. But fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things, as Boethius says (De Consol. iv). Therefore fate is changeable. Obj. 3: Further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate happens unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate seem principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no contingencies in the world, but all things would happen of necessity. On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate is an unchangeable disposition. I answer that, The disposition of second causes which we call fate, can be considered in two ways: first, in regard to the second causes, which are thus disposed or ordered; second, in regard to the first principle, namely, God, by Whom they are ordered. Some, therefore, have held that the series itself of dispositions of causes is in itself necessary, so that all things would happen of necessity; for this reason that each effect has a cause, and given a cause the effect must follow of necessity. But this is false, as proved above (Q. 115, A. 6). Others, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, even as dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the Egyptians said that fate could be changed by certain sacrifices, as Gregory of Nyssa says (Nemesius, De Homine). This too has been disproved above for the reason that it is repugnant to Divine Providence. We must therefore say that fate, considered in regard to second causes, is changeable; but as subject to Divine Prov-

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cundum quod subest divinae providentiae, immobilitatem sortitur, non quidem absolutae necessitatis, sed conditionatae; secundum quod dicimus hanc conditionalem esse veram vel necessariam, si Deus praescivit hoc futurum, erit. Unde cum Boetius dixisset fati seriem esse mobilem, post pauca subdit, quae cum ab immobilis providentiae proficiscatur exordiis, ipsam quoque immutabilem esse necesse est. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.

Q. 116, A. 4

idence, it derives a certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but of conditional necessity. In this sense we say that this conditional is true and necessary: If God foreknew that this would happen, it will happen. Wherefore Boethius, having said that the chain of fate is fickle, shortly afterwards adds—which, since it is derived from an unchangeable Providence must also itself be unchangeable. From this the answers to the objections are clear.

Article 4 Whether all things are subject to fate? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia fato subdantur. Dicit enim Boetius, in IV de Consol., series fati caelum et sidera movet, elementa in se invicem temperat, et alterna format transmutatione; eadem nascentia occidentiaque omnia per similes foetuum seminumque renovat progressus; haec actus fortunasque hominum indissolubili causarum connexione constringit. Nihil ergo excipi videtur, quod sub fati serie non contineatur. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in V de Civ. Dei, quod fatum aliquid est, secundum quod ad voluntatem et potestatem Dei refertur. Sed voluntas Dei est causa omnium quae fiunt, ut Augustinus dicit in III de Trin. Ergo omnia subduntur fato. Praeterea, fatum, secundum Boetium, est dispositio rebus mobilibus inhaerens. Sed omnes creaturae sunt mutabiles, et solus Deus vere immutabilis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo in omnibus creaturis est fatum. Sed contra est quod Boetius dicit, in IV de Consol., quod quaedam quae sub providentia locata sunt, fati seriem superant. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, fatum est ordinatio secundarum causarum ad effectus divinitus provisos. Quaecumque igitur causis secundis subduntur, ea subduntur et fato. Si qua vero sunt quae immediate a Deo fiunt, cum non subdantur secundis causis, non subduntur fato; sicut creatio rerum, glorificatio spiritualium substantiarum, et alia huiusmodi. Et hoc est quod Boetius dicit, quod ea quae sunt primae divinitati propinqua, stabiliter fixa, fatalis ordinem mobilitatis excedunt. Ex quo etiam patet quod quanto aliquid longius a prima mente discedit, nexibus fati maioribus implicatur; quia magis subiicitur necessitati secundarum causarum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnia illa quae ibi tanguntur, fiunt a Deo mediantibus causis secundis; et ideo sub fati serie continentur. Sed non est eadem ratio de omnibus aliis, ut supra dictum est.

Objection 1: It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): The chain of fate moves the heaven and the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are born into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed. Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from the domain of fate. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). Therefore all things are subject to fate. Obj. 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things. But all creatures are changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 2). Therefore fate is in all things. On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that some things subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate. I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), fate is the ordering of second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is subject to second causes, is subject also to fate. But whatever is done immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes, neither is it subject to fate; such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv): viz. that those things which are nigh to God have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate. Hence it is clear that the further a thing is from the First Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of fate; since so much the more it is bound up with second causes. Reply Obj. 1: All the things mentioned in this passage are done by God by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as stated above.

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Ad secundum dicendum quod fatum refertur ad voluntatem et potestatem Dei, sicut ad primum principium. Unde non oportet quod quidquid subiicitur voluntati divinae vel potestati, subiiciatur fato, ut dictum est. Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis omnes creaturae sint aliquo modo mutabiles, tamen aliquae earum non procedunt a causis creatis mutabilibus. Et ideo non subiiciuntur fato, ut dictum est.

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Reply Obj. 2: Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as already stated. Reply Obj. 3: Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet some of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And these, therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above.

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Question 117 Things Pertaining to the Action of Man Postea considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad actionem hominis, qui est compositus ex spirituali et corporali creatura. Et primo considerandum est de actione hominis; secundo, de propagatione hominis ex homine. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum unus homo possit docere alium, causando in ipso scientiam. Secundo, utrum homo possit docere angelum. Tertio, utrum homo per virtutem suae animae possit immutare materiam corporalem. Quarto, utrum anima hominis separata possit movere corpora motu locali.

We have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of man, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual nature. In the first place we shall consider that action (in general) and second in regard to the propagation of man from man. As to the first, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his knowledge? (2) Whether man can teach an angel? (3) Whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter? (4) Whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local movement?

Article 1 Whether one man can teach another? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non possit alium docere. Dicit enim dominus, Matth. XXIII, nolite vocari Rabbi; ubi dicit Glossa Hieronymi, ne divinum honorem hominibus tribuatis. Esse ergo magistrum pertinet proprie ad divinum honorem. Sed docere est proprium magistri. Homo ergo non potest docere, sed hoc est proprium Dei. Praeterea, si homo alium docet, hoc non est nisi inquantum agit per scientiam suam ad causandum scientiam in alio. Sed qualitas per quam aliquis agit ad faciendum sibi simile, est qualitas activa. Ergo sequitur quod scientia sit qualitas activa, sicut et calor.

Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For the Lord says (Matt 22:8): Be not you called Rabbi: on which the gloss of Jerome says, Lest you give to men the honor due to God. Therefore to be a master is properly an honor due to God. But it belongs to a master to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is proper to God. Obj. 2: Further, if one man teaches another this is only inasmuch as he acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge in the other. But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his like, is an active quality. Therefore it follows that knowledge is an active quality just as heat is. Praeterea, ad scientiam requiritur lumen intelligiObj. 3: Further, for knowledge we require intellectual bile, et species rei intellectae. Sed neutrum istorum po- light, and the species of the thing understood. But a man test causare unus homo in alio. Ergo unus homo non po- cannot cause either of these in another man. Therefore a test docendo causare scientiam in alio. man cannot by teaching cause knowledge in another man. Praeterea, doctor nihil agit ad discipulum nisi Obj. 4: Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a quod proponit ei quaedam signa, vel vocibus aliquid si- disciple save to propose to him certain signs, so as to siggnificando, vel nutibus. Sed proponendo signa non po- nify something by words or gestures. But it is not possible test aliquis alium docere, causando in eo scientiam. Quia to teach anyone so as to cause knowledge in him, by putting aut proponit signa rerum notarum; aut rerum ignota- signs before him. For these are signs either of things that he rum. Si rerum notarum, ille ergo cui signa proponun- knows, or of things he does not know. If of things that he tur, iam habet scientiam, et eam non acquirit a magistro. knows, he to whom these signs are proposed is already in Si autem rerum ignotarum, per huiusmodi signa nihil the possession of knowledge, and does not acquire it from addiscit, sicut si aliquis proponeret alicui Latino verba the master. If they are signs of things that he does not know, Graeca, quorum significationem ignoraret, per hoc eum he can learn nothing therefrom: for instance, if one were

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docere non posset. Nullo ergo modo unus homo potest, to speak Greek to a man who only knows Latin, he would alium docendo, scientiam in eo causare. learn nothing thereby. Therefore in no way can a man cause knowledge in another by teaching him. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. II, in On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim 2:7): quo positus sum ego praedicator et apostolus, doctor gen- Whereunto I am appointed a preacher and an apostle . . . a tium in fide et veritate. doctor of the Gentiles in faith and truth. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc diversae fueI answer that, On this question there have been varrunt opiniones. Averroes enim, in Comment. III de Ani- ious opinions. For Averroes, commenting on De Anima iii, ma, posuit unum intellectum possibilem esse omnium maintains that all men have one passive intellect in comhominum, ut supra dictum est. Et ex hoc sequebatur mon, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 2). From this it follows quod eaedem species intelligibiles sint omnium homi- that the same intelligible species belong to all men. Connum. Et secundum hoc, ponit quod unus homo per doc- sequently he held that one man does not cause another to trinam non causat aliam scientiam in altero ab ea quam have a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; ipse habet; sed communicat ei eandem scientiam quam but that he communicates the identical knowledge which ipse habet, per hoc quod movet eum ad ordinandum he has himself, by moving him to order rightly the phanphantasmata in anima sua, ad hoc quod sint disposi- tasms in his soul, so that they be rightly disposed for intelta convenienter ad intelligibilem apprehensionem. Quae ligible apprehension. This opinion is true so far as knowlquidem opinio quantum ad hoc vera est, quod est eadem edge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the scientia in discipulo et magistro, si consideretur identi- identity of the thing known: for the same objective truth is tas secundum unitatem rei scitae, eadem enim rei veritas known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that all est quam cognoscit et discipulus et magister. Sed quan- men have but one passive intellect, and the same intelligible tum ad hoc quod ponit esse unum intellectum possibi- species, differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion lem omnium hominum, et easdem species intelligibiles, is false, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 2). differentes solum secundum diversa phantasmata; falsa est eius opinio, ut supra habitum est. Alia est opinio Platonicorum, qui posuerunt quod Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, scientia inest a principio animabus nostris per participa- who held that our souls are possessed of knowledge from tionem formarum separatarum, sicut supra habitum est; the very beginning, through the participation of separate sed anima ex unione corporis impeditur ne possit con- forms, as stated above (Q. 84, AA. 3, 4); but that the soul siderare libere ea quorum scientiam habet. Et secundum is hindered, through its union with the body, from the free hoc, discipulus a magistro non acquirit scientiam de no- consideration of those things which it knows. According to vo, sed ab eo excitatur ad considerandum ea quorum this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his scientiam habet; ut sic addiscere nihil aliud sit quam re- master, but is roused by him to consider what he knows; minisci. Sicut etiam ponebant quod agentia naturalia so- so that to learn would be nothing else than to remember. lummodo disponunt ad susceptionem formarum, quas In the same way they held that natural agents only dispose acquirit materia corporalis per participationem specie- (matter) to receive forms, which matter acquires by a parrum separatarum. Sed contra hoc supra ostensum est ticipation of separate substances. But against this we have quod intellectus possibilis animae humanae est in poten- proved above (Q. 79, A. 2; Q. 84, A. 3) that the passive inteltia pura ad intelligibilia, secundum quod Aristoteles di- lect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible cit in III de Anima. (species), as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4). Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod docens causat We must therefore decide the question differently, by scientiam in addiscente, reducendo ipsum de potentia in saying that the teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by actum, sicut dicitur in VIII Physic. Ad cuius evidentiam, reducing him from potentiality to act, as the Philosopher considerandum est quod effectuum qui sunt ab exteriori says (Phys. viii, 4). In order to make this clear, we must obprincipio, aliquis est ab exteriori principio tantum; sicut serve that of effects proceeding from an exterior principle, forma domus causatur in materia solum ab arte. Aliquis some proceed from the exterior principle alone; as the form autem effectus est quandoque quidem ab exteriori prin- of a house is caused to be in matter by art alone: whereas cipio, quandoque autem ab interiori; sicut sanitas cau- other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle, satur in infirmo quandoque ab exteriori principio, sci- sometimes from an interior principle: thus health is caused licet ab arte medicinae; quandoque autem ab interiori in a sick man, sometimes by an exterior principle, namely principio ut cum aliquis sanatur per virtutem naturae. by the medical art, sometimes by an interior principle, as Et in talibus effectibus sunt duo attendenda. Primo qui- when a man is healed by the force of nature. In these latter dem, quod ars imitatur naturam in sua operatione, sicut effects two things must be noticed. First, that art in its work enim natura sanat infirmum alterando, digerendo, et ex- imitates nature for just as nature heals a man by alteration,

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pellendo materiam quae causat morbum, ita et ars. Secundo attendendum est, quod principium exterius, scilicet ars, non operatur sicut principale agens, sed sicut coadiuvans agens principale, quod est principium interius, confortando ipsum, et ministrando ei instrumenta et auxilia, quibus utatur ad effectum producendum, sicut medicus confortat naturam, et adhibet ei cibos et medicinas, quibus natura utatur ad finem intentum. Scientia autem acquiritur in homine et ab interiori principio, ut patet in eo qui per inventionem propriam scientiam acquirit; et a principio exteriori, ut patet in eo qui addiscit. Inest enim unicuique homini quoddam principium scientiae, scilicet lumen intellectus agentis, per quod cognoscuntur statim a principio naturaliter quaedam universalia principia omnium scientiarum. Cum autem aliquis huiusmodi universalia principia applicat ad aliqua particularia, quorum memoriam et experimentum per sensum accipit; per inventionem propriam acquirit scientiam eorum quae nesciebat, ex notis ad ignota procedens. Unde et quilibet docens, ex his quae discipulus novit, ducit eum in cognitionem eorum quae ignorabat; secundum quod dicitur in I Poster., quod omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina ex praeexistenti fit cognitione. Ducit autem magister discipulum ex praecognitis in cognitionem ignotorum, dupliciter. Primo quidem, proponendo ei aliqua auxilia vel instrumenta, quibus intellectus eius utatur ad scientiam acquirendam, puta cum proponit ei aliquas propositiones minus universales, quas tamen ex praecognitis discipulus diiudicare potest; vel cum proponit ei aliqua sensibilia exempla, vel similia, vel opposita, vel aliqua huiusmodi ex quibus intellectus addiscentis manuducitur in cognitionem veritatis ignotae. Alio modo, cum confortat intellectum addiscentis; non quidem aliqua virtute activa quasi superioris naturae, sicut supra dictum est de angelis illuminantibus, quia omnes humani intellectus sunt unius gradus in ordine naturae; sed inquantum proponit discipulo ordinem principiorum ad conclusiones, qui forte per seipsum non haberet tantam virtutem collativam, ut ex principiis posset conclusiones deducere. Et ideo dicitur in I Poster., quod demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire. Et per hunc modum ille qui demonstrat, auditorem scientem facit. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, homo docens solummodo exterius ministerium adhibet, sicut medicus sanans, sed sicut natura interior est principalis causa sanationis, ita et interius lumen intellectus est principalis causa scientiae. Utrumque autem horum est a Deo. Et ideo sicut de Deo dicitur, qui sanat omnes infirmitates tuas; ita de eo dicitur, qui docet homi-

Q. 117, A. 1

digestion, rejection of the matter that caused the sickness, so does art. Second, we must remark that the exterior principle, art, acts, not as principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the interior principle, by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use in producing the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended end. Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research; and from an exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by instruction). For in every man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which certain universal principles of all the sciences are naturally understood as soon as proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone applies these universal principles to certain particular things, the memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses; then by his own research advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains knowledge of what he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches, leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of things previously unknown to him; according to what the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1): All teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge. Now the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of the unknown, in a twofold manner. First, by proposing to him certain helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use for the acquisition of science: for instance, he may put before him certain less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able to judge from previous knowledge: or he may propose to him some sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of opposition, or something of the sort, from which the intellect of the learner is led to the knowledge of truth previously unknown. Second, by strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed, by some active power as of a higher nature, as explained above (Q. 106, A. 1; Q. 111, A. 1) of the angelic enlightenment, because all human intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch as he proposes to the disciple the order of principles to conclusions, by reason of his not having sufficient collating power to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles. Hence the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that a demonstration is a syllogism that causes knowledge. In this way a demonstrator causes his hearer to know. Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, the teacher only brings exterior help, as the physician who heals: but just as the interior nature is the principal cause of the healing, so the interior light of the intellect is the principal cause of knowledge. But both of these are from God. Therefore as of God is it written: Who healeth all thy diseases (Ps 102:3); so of Him is it written: He that teacheth man knowledge (Ps 93:10),

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Q. 117, A. 2

Government of Creatures

nem scientiam, inquantum lumen vultus eius super nos signatur, per quod nobis omnia ostenduntur. Ad secundum dicendum quod doctor non causat scientiam in discipulo per modum agentis naturalis, ut Averroes obiicit. Unde non oportet quod scientia sit qualitas activa, sed est principium quo aliquis dirigitur in docendo, sicut ars est principium quo aliquis dirigitur in operando. Ad tertium dicendum quod magister non causat lumen intelligibile in discipulo, nec directe species intelligibiles, sed movet discipulum per suam doctrinam ad hoc, quod ipse per virtutem sui intellectus formet intelligibiles conceptiones, quarum signa sibi proponit exterius. Ad quartum dicendum quod signa quae magister discipulo proponit, sunt rerum notarum in universali, et sub quadam confusione; sed ignotarum in particulari, et sub quadam distinctione. Et ideo cum quisque per seipsum scientiam acquirit, non potest dici docere seipsum, vel esse sui ipsius magister, quia non praeexistit in eo scientia completa, qualis requiritur in magistro.

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inasmuch as the light of His countenance is signed upon us (Ps 4:7), through which light all things are shown to us. Reply Obj. 2: As Averroes argues, the teacher does not cause knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause. Wherefore knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the principle by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle by which one is directed in working. Reply Obj. 3: The master does not cause the intellectual light in the disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly: but he moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power of his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs of which are proposed to him from without. Reply Obj. 4: The signs proposed by the master to the disciple are of things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in detail and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have his own master because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is required in a master.

Article 2 Whether man can teach the angels? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homines possint docere angelos. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Ephes. III, ut innotescat principibus et potestatibus in caelestibus per Ecclesiam multiformis sapientia Dei. Sed Ecclesia est congregatio hominum fidelium. Ergo angelis per homines aliqua innotescunt. Praeterea, angeli superiores, qui immediate de divinis a Deo illuminantur, inferiores angelos instruere possunt, ut supra dictum est. Sed aliqui homines immediate de divinis per Dei verbum sunt instructi; sicut maxime patet de apostolis, secundum illud ad Heb. I, novissime, diebus istis, locutus est nobis in filio. Ergo aliqui homines aliquos angelos docere potuerunt. Praeterea, inferiores angeli a superioribus instruuntur. Sed quidam homines superiores sunt aliquibus angelis, cum ad supremos ordines angelorum aliqui homines assumantur, ut Gregorius dicit in quadam homilia. Ergo aliqui inferiores angeli per aliquos homines de divinis instrui possunt. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod omnes divinae illuminationes perferuntur ad homines mediantibus angelis. Non ergo angeli instruuntur per homines de divinis. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra habitum est, inferiores angeli loqui quidem possunt superioribus

Objection 1: It would seem that men teach angels. For the Apostle says (Eph 3:10): That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the Church. But the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some things are made known to angels through men. Obj. 2: Further, the superior angels, who are enlightened immediately concerning Divine things by God, can instruct the inferior angels, as stated above (Q. 116, A. 1; Q. 112, A. 3). But some men are instructed immediately concerning Divine things by the Word of God; as appears principally of the apostles from Heb. 1:1, 2: Last of all, in these days (God) hath spoken to us by His Son. Therefore some men have been able to teach the angels. Obj. 3: Further, the inferior angels are instructed by the superior. But some men are higher than some angels; since some men are taken up to the highest angelic orders, as Gregory says in a homily (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.). Therefore some of the inferior angels can be instructed by men concerning Divine things. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every Divine enlightenment is borne to men by the ministry of the angels. Therefore angels are not instructed by men concerning Divine things. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 107, A. 2), the inferior angels can indeed speak to the superior angels, by

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angelis, manifestando eis suas cogitationes; sed de rebus divinis superiores ab inferioribus nunquam illuminantur. Manifestum est autem quod eo modo quo inferiores angeli superioribus subduntur, supremi homines subduntur etiam infimis angelorum. Quod patet per id quod dominus dicit, Matth. XI, inter natos mulierum non surrexit maior Ioanne Baptista; sed qui minor est in regno caelorum, maior est illo. Sic igitur de rebus divinis ab hominibus angeli nunquam illuminantur. Cogitationes tamen suorum cordium homines angelis per modum locutionis manifestare possunt, quia secreta cordium scire solius Dei est. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus, V super Gen. ad Litt., sic exponit illam apostoli auctoritatem. Praemiserat enim apostolus, mihi, omnium sanctorum minimo, data est gratia haec, illuminare omnes quae sit dispensatio sacramenti absconditi a saeculis in Deo. Ita dico absconditi, ut tamen innotesceret principibus et potestatibus in caelestibus, per Ecclesiam scilicet, multiformis sapientia Dei. Quasi dicat, ita hoc sacramentum erat absconditum hominibus, ut tamen Ecclesiae caelesti, quae continetur in principibus et potestatibus, hoc sacramentum notum esset a saeculis, non ante saecula, quia ibi primitus Ecclesia fuit, quo post resurrectionem et ista Ecclesia hominum congreganda est. Potest tamen et aliter dici, quod illud quod absconditum est, non tantum in Deo innotescit angelis, verum etiam hic eis apparet, cum efficitur atque propalatur, ut Augustinus ibidem subdit. Et sic dum per apostolos impleta sunt Christi et Ecclesiae mysteria, angelis aliqua apparuerunt de huiusmodi mysteriis, quae ante erant eis occulta. Et per hunc modum potest intelligi quod Hieronymus dicit, quod, apostolis praedicantibus, angeli aliqua mysteria cognoverunt, quia scilicet per praedicationem apostolorum huiusmodi mysteria explebantur in rebus ipsis, sicut praedicante Paulo convertebantur gentes; de quo apostolus ibi loquitur.

Ad secundum dicendum quod apostoli instruebantur immediate a verbo Dei, non secundum eius divinitatem, sed inquantum eius humanitas loquebatur. Unde ratio non sequitur. Ad tertium dicendum quod aliqui homines, etiam in statu viae, sunt maiores aliquibus angelis, non quidem actu, sed virtute; inquantum scilicet habent caritatem tantae virtutis, ut possint mereri maiorem beatitudinis gradum quam quidam angeli habeant. Sicut si dicamus semen alicuius magnae arboris esse maius virtute quam aliquam parvam arborem, cum tamen multo minus sit in actu.

Q. 117, A. 2

making their thoughts known to them; but concerning Divine things superior angels are never enlightened by inferior angels. Now it is manifest that in the same way as inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men are subject even to the lowest angels. This is clear from Our Lord’s words (Matt 11:11): There hath not risen among them that are born of woman a greater than John the Baptist; yet he that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he. Therefore angels are never enlightened by men concerning Divine things. But men can by means of speech make known to angels the thoughts of their hearts: because it belongs to God alone to know the heart’s secrets. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine (Gen ad lit. v, 19) thus explains this passage of the Apostle, who in the preceding verses says: To me, the least of all the saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in God. Hidden, yet so that the multiform wisdom of God was made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places—that is, through the Church. As though he were to say: This mystery was hidden from men, but not from the Church in heaven, which is contained in the principalities and powers who knew it from all ages, but not before all ages: because the Church was at first there, where after the resurrection this Church composed of men will be gathered together. It can also be explained otherwise that what is hidden, is known by the angels, not only in God, but also here where when it takes place and is made public, as Augustine says further on (Gen ad lit. v, 19). Thus when the mysteries of Christ and the Church were fulfilled by the apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became apparent to the angels, which were hidden from them before. In this way we can understand what Jerome says (Comment. in Ep. ad Eph.)—that from the preaching of the apostles the angels learned certain mysteries; that is to say, through the preaching of the apostles, the mysteries were realized in the things themselves: thus by the preaching of Paul the Gentiles were converted, of which mystery the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted. Reply Obj. 2: The apostles were instructed immediately by the Word of God, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke in His human nature. Hence the argument does not prove. Reply Obj. 3: Certain men in this state of life are greater than certain angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they have such great charity that they can merit a higher degree of beatitude than that possessed by certain angels. In the same way we might say that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree, though actually it is much smaller.

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Article 3 Whether man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo per virtutem animae possit corporalem materiam immutare. Dicit enim Gregorius, II Dialog., quod sancti miracula aliquando ex prece faciunt, aliquando ex potestate, sicut Petrus, qui Tabitham mortuam orando suscitavit, Ananiam et Saphiram mentientes morti increpando tradidit. Sed in operatione miraculorum fit aliqua immutatio materiae corporalis. Ergo homines virtute suae animae possunt materiam corporalem immutare. Praeterea, super illud ad Gal. III, quis vos fascinavit veritati non obedire? Dicit Glossa quod quidam habent oculos urentes, qui solo aspectu inficiunt alios, et maxime pueros. Sed hoc non esset, nisi virtus animae posset materiam corporalem immutare. Ergo homo per virtutem suae animae potest materiam corporalem immutare. Praeterea, corpus humanum est nobilius quam alia inferiora corpora. Sed per apprehensionem animae humanae immutatur corpus humanum ad calorem et frigus, ut patet in irascentibus et timentibus; et quandoque etiam haec immutatio pervenit usque ad aegritudinem et mortem. Ergo multo magis anima hominis potest sua virtute materiam corporalem immutare. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in III de Trin., quod materia corporalis soli Deo obedit ad nutum. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est materia corporalis non immutatur ad formam, nisi vel ab agente aliquo composito ex materia et forma; vel ab ipso Deo, in quo virtualiter et materia et forma praeexistit, sicut in primordiali causa utriusque. Unde et de angelis supra dictum est quod materiam corporalem immutare non possunt naturali virtute, nisi applicando corporalia agentia ad effectus aliquos producendos. Multo igitur minus anima sua virtute naturali potest immutare materiam corporalem, nisi mediantibus aliquibus corporibus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sancti dicuntur miracula facere ex potestate gratiae, non naturae. Quod patet per illud quod Gregorius ibidem dicit, qui filii Dei ex potestate sunt, ut dicit Ioannes, quid mirum si signa facere ex potestate valeant? Ad secundum dicendum quod fascinationis causam assignavit Avicenna ex hoc, quod materia corporalis nata est obedire spirituali substantiae magis quam contrariis agentibus in natura. Et ideo quando anima fuerit fortis in sua imaginatione, corporalis materia immutatur secundum eam. Et hanc dicit esse causam oculi fascinantis. Sed supra ostensum est quod materia corporalis non obedit substantiae spirituali ad nutum, nisi soli creato-

Objection 1: It would seem that man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter. For Gregory says (Dialog. ii, 30): Saints work miracles sometimes by prayer, sometimes by their power: thus Peter, by prayer, raised the dead Tabitha to life, and by his reproof delivered to death the lying Ananias and Saphira. But in the working of miracles a change is wrought in corporeal matter. Therefore men, by the power of the soul, can change corporeal matter. Obj. 2: Further, on these words (Gal 3:1): Who hath bewitched you, that you should not obey the truth? the gloss says that some have blazing eyes, who by a single look bewitch others, especially children. But this would not be unless the power of the soul could change corporeal matter. Therefore man can change corporeal matter by the power of his soul. Obj. 3: Further, the human body is nobler than other inferior bodies. But by the apprehension of the human soul the human body is changed to heat and cold, as appears when a man is angry or afraid: indeed this change sometimes goes so far as to bring on sickness and death. Much more, then, can the human soul by its power change corporeal matter. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): Corporeal matter obeys God alone at will. I answer that, As stated above (Q. 110, A. 2), corporeal matter is not changed to (the reception of) a form save either by some agent composed of matter and form, or by God Himself, in whom both matter and form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both. Wherefore of the angels also we have stated (Q. 110, A. 2) that they cannot change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by employing corporeal agents for the production of certain effects. Much less therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change corporeal matter, except by means of bodies. Reply Obj. 1: The saints are said to work miracles by the power of grace, not of nature. This is clear from what Gregory says in the same place: Those who are sons of God, in power, as John says—what wonder is there that they should work miracles by that power? Reply Obj. 2: Avicenna assigns the cause of bewitchment to the fact that corporeal matter has a natural tendency to obey spiritual substance rather than natural contrary agents. Therefore when the soul is of strong imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This he says is the cause of the evil eye. But it has been shown above (Q. 110, A. 2) that corporeal matter does not obey spiritual substances at will,

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ri. Et ideo melius dicendum est, quod ex forti imaginatione animae immutantur spiritus corporis coniuncti. Quae quidem immutatio spirituum maxime fit in oculis, ad quos subtiliores spiritus perveniunt. Oculi autem inficiunt aerem continuum usque ad determinatum spatium, per quem modum specula, si fuerint nova et pura, contrahunt quandam impuritatem ex aspectu mulieris menstruatae, ut Aristoteles dicit in libro de Somn. et Vig. Sic igitur cum aliqua anima fuerit vehementer commota ad malitiam, sicut maxime in vetulabus contingit, efficitur secundum modum praedictum aspectus eius venenosus et noxius, et maxime pueris, qui habent corpus tenerum, et de facili receptivum impressionis. Possibile est etiam quod ex Dei permissione, vel etiam ex aliquo facto occulto, cooperetur ad hoc malignitas daemonum, cum quibus vetulae sortilegae aliquod foedus habent. Ad tertium dicendum quod anima corpori humano unitur ut forma, et appetitus sensitivus, qui obedit aliqualiter rationi, ut supra dictum est, est actus alicuius organi corporalis. Et ideo oportet quod ad apprehensionem animae humanae, commoveatur appetitus sensitivus cum aliqua operatione corporali. Ad exteriora vero corpora immutanda apprehensio animae humanae non sufficit, nisi mediante immutatione proprii corporis, ut dictum est.

Q. 117, A. 4

but the Creator alone. Therefore it is better to say, that by a strong imagination the (corporeal) spirits of the body united to that soul are changed, which change in the spirits takes place especially in the eyes, to which the more subtle spirits can reach. And the eyes infect the air which is in contact with them to a certain distance: in the same way as a new and clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the look of a menstruata, as Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.). Hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation, the countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who have a tender and most impressionable body. It is also possible that by God’s permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons co-operate in this, as the witches may have some compact with them. Reply Obj. 3: The soul is united to the body as its form; and the sensitive appetite, which obeys the reason in a certain way, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 3), it is the act of a corporeal organ. Therefore at the apprehension of the human soul, the sensitive appetite must needs be moved with an accompanying corporeal operation. But the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice to work a change in exterior bodies, except by means of a change in the body united to it, as stated above (ad 2).

Article 4 Whether the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima hominis separata possit corpora saltem localiter movere. Substantiae enim spirituali naturaliter obedit corpus ad motum localem, ut supra dictum est. Sed anima separata est substantia spiritualis. Ergo suo imperio potest exteriora corpora movere. Praeterea, in itinerario Clementis dicitur, narrante Niceta ad Petrum, quod Simon magus per magicas artes pueri a se interfecti animam retinebat, per quam magicas operationes efficiebat. Sed hoc esse non potuisset sine aliqua corporum transmutatione, ad minus locali. Ergo anima separata habet virtutem localiter movendi corpora. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in libro de Anima quod anima non potest movere quodcumque corpus, sed solummodo proprium. Respondeo dicendum quod anima separata sua naturali virtute non potest movere aliquod corpus. Manifestum est enim quod, cum anima est corpori unita, non movet corpus nisi vivificatum, unde si aliquod mem-

Objection 1: It seems that the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally. For a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance as to local motion, as stated above (Q. 110, A. 5). But the separate soul is a spiritual substance. Therefore it can move exterior bodies by its command. Obj. 2: Further, in the Itinerary of Clement it is said in the narrative of Nicetas to Peter, that Simon Magus, by sorcery retained power over the soul of a child that he had slain, and that through this soul he worked magical wonders. But this could not have been without some corporeal change at least as to place. Therefore, the separate soul has the power to move bodies locally. On the contrary, the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 3) that the soul cannot move any other body whatsoever but its own. I answer that, The separate soul cannot by its natural power move a body. For it is manifest that, even while the soul is united to the body, it does not move the body except as endowed with life: so that if one of the members

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Government of Creatures

brum corporis mortificetur, non obedit animae ad motum localem. Manifestum est autem quod ab anima separata nullum corpus vivificatur. Unde nullum corpus obedit ei ad motum localem, quantum est ex virtute suae naturae, supra quam potest aliquid ei conferri virtute divina. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod substantiae quaedam spirituales sunt, quarum virtutes non determinantur ad aliqua corpora, sicut sunt angeli, qui sunt naturaliter a corporibus absoluti, et ideo diversa corpora eis possunt obedire ad motum. Si tamen alicuius substantiae separatae virtus motiva determinetur naturaliter ad movendum aliquod corpus, non poterit illa substantia movere aliquod corpus maius, sed minus, sicut, secundum philosophos, motor inferioris caeli non posset movere caelum superius. Unde cum anima secundum suam naturam determinetur ad movendum corpus cuius est forma, nullum aliud corpus sua naturali virtute movere potest. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus X de Civ. Dei, et Chrysostomus super Matth., frequenter daemones simulant se esse animas mortuorum, ad confirmandum gentilium errorem, qui hoc credebant. Et ideo credibile est quod Simon magus illudebatur ab aliquo daemone, qui simulabat se esse animam pueri quem ipse occiderat.

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become lifeless, it does not obey the soul as to local motion. Now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by the separate soul. Therefore within the limits of its natural power the separate soul cannot command the obedience of a body; though, by the power of God, it can exceed those limits. Reply Obj. 1: There are certain spiritual substances whose powers are not determinate to certain bodies; such are the angels who are naturally unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may obey them as to movement. But if the motive power of a separate substance is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that substance will not be able to move a body of higher degree, but only one of lower degree: thus according to philosophers the mover of the lower heaven cannot move the higher heaven. Wherefore, since the soul is by its nature determinate to move the body of which it is the form, it cannot by its natural power move any other body. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) and Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matt.) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of the dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition. It is therefore credible that Simon Magus was deceived by some demon who pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain.

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Question 118 The Production of Man from Man as to the Soul Deinde considerandum est de traductione hominis We next consider the production of man from man: ex homine. Et primo, quantum ad animam; secundo, first, as to the soul; second, as to the body. quantum ad corpus. Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: Primo, utrum anima sensitiva traducatur cum (1) Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semine. semen? Secundo, utrum anima intellectiva. (2) Whether the intellectual soul is thus transmitted? Tertio, utrum omnes animae fuerint simul creatae. (3) Whether all souls were created at the same time?

Article 1 Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen, or created by God? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima sensitiva non traducatur cum semine, sed sit per creationem a Deo. Omnis enim substantia perfecta quae non est composita ex materia et forma, si esse incipiat, hoc non est per generationem, sed per creationem, quia nihil generatur nisi ex materia. Sed anima sensitiva est substantia perfecta, alioquin non posset movere corpus, et cum sit forma corporis, non est ex materia et forma composita. Ergo non incipit esse per generationem, sed per creationem. Praeterea, principium generationis in rebus viventibus est per potentiam generativam; quae, cum numeretur inter vires animae vegetabilis, est infra animam sensitivam. Nihil autem agit ultra suam speciem. Ergo anima sensitiva non potest causari per vim generativam animalis. Praeterea, generans generat sibi simile, et sic oportet quod forma generati sit actu in causa generationis. Sed anima sensitiva non est actu in semine, nec ipsa nec aliqua pars eius, quia nulla pars animae sensitivae est nisi in aliqua parte corporis; in semine autem non est aliqua corporis particula, quia nulla particula corporis est quae non fiat ex semine, et per virtutem seminis. Ergo anima sensitiva non causatur ex semine. Praeterea, si in semine est aliquod principium activum animae sensitivae, aut illud principium manet, generato iam animali; aut non manet. Sed manere non potest. Quia vel esset idem cum anima sensitiva animalis generati, et hoc est impossibile, quia sic esset idem generans et generatum, faciens et factum. Vel esset aliquid aliud, et hoc etiam est impossibile, quia supra ostensum est quod in uno animali non est nisi unum principium

Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive soul is not transmitted with the semen, but created by God. For every perfect substance, not composed of matter and form, that begins to exist, acquires existence not by generation, but by creation: for nothing is generated save from matter. But the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise it could not move the body; and since it is the form of a body, it is not composed of matter and form. Therefore it begins to exist not by generation but by creation. Obj. 2: Further, in living things the principle of generation is the generating power; which, since it is one of the powers of the vegetative soul, is of a lower order than the sensitive soul. Now nothing acts beyond its species. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot be caused by the animal’s generating power. Obj. 3: Further, the generator begets its like: so that the form of the generator must be actually in the cause of generation. But neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in the semen, for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere than in some part of the body; while in the semen there is not even a particle of the body, because there is not a particle of the body which is not made from the semen and by the power thereof. Therefore the sensitive soul is not produced through the semen. Obj. 4: Further, if there be in the semen any principle productive of the sensitive soul, this principle either remains after the animal is begotten, or it does not remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it would be identified with the sensitive soul of the begotten animal; which is impossible, for thus there would be identity between begetter and begotten, maker and made: or it would be distinct therefrom; and again this is impossible, for it has been proved

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formale, quod est una anima. Si autem non manet, hoc etiam videtur impossibile, quia sic aliquod agens ageret ad corruptionem sui ipsius, quod est impossibile. Non ergo anima sensitiva potest generari ex semine.

above (Q. 76, A. 4) that in one animal there is but one formal principle, which is the soul. If on the other hand the aforesaid principle does not remain, this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent would act to its own destruction, which cannot be. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen. Sed contra, ita se habet virtus quae est in semine, On the contrary, The power in the semen is to the ad animalia quae ex semine generantur, sicut se habet animal seminally generated, as the power in the elements of virtus quae est in elementis mundi, ad animalia quae the world is to animals produced from these elements—for ex elementis mundi producuntur, sicut quae ex putre- instance by putrefaction. But in the latter animals the soul factione generantur. Sed in huiusmodi animalibus ani- is produced by the elemental power, according to Gen. 1:20: mae producuntur ex virtute quae est in elementis; se- Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having life. cundum illud Gen. I, producant aquae reptile animae Therefore also the souls of animals seminally generated are viventis. Ergo et animalium quae generantur ex semine, produced by the seminal power.

animae producuntur ex virtute quae est in semine. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt animas sensitivas animalium a Deo creari. Quae quidem positio conveniens esset, si anima sensitiva esset res subsistens, habens per se esse et operationem. Sic enim, sicut per se haberet esse et operationem, ita per se deberetur ei fieri. Et cum res simplex et subsistens non possit fieri nisi per creationem, sequeretur quod anima sensitiva procederet in esse per creationem. Sed ista radix est falsa, scilicet quod anima sensitiva per se habeat esse et operationem, ut ex superioribus patet, non enim corrumperetur, corrupto corpore. Et ideo, cum non sit forma subsistens, habet se in essendo ad modum aliarum formarum corporalium, quibus per se non debetur esse, sed esse dicuntur inquantum composita subsistentia per eas sunt. Unde et ipsis compositis debetur fieri. Et quia generans est simile generato, necesse est quod naturaliter tam anima sensitiva, quam aliae huiusmodi formae, producantur in esse ab aliquibus corporalibus agentibus transmutantibus materiam de potentia in actum, per aliquam virtutem corpoream quae est in eis. Quanto autem aliquod agens est potentius, tanto potest suam actionem diffundere ad magis distans, sicut quanto aliquod corpus est magis calidum, tanto ad remotius calefactionem producit. Corpora igitur non viventia, quae sunt inferiora naturae ordine, generant quidem sibi simile, non per aliquod medium, sed per seipsa; sicut ignis per seipsum generat ignem. Sed corpora viventia, tanquam potentiora, agunt ad generandum sibi simile et sine medio, et per medium. Sine medio quidem, in opere nutritionis, in quo caro generat carnem, cum medio vero, in actu generationis, quia ex anima generantis derivatur quaedam virtus activa ad ipsum semen animalis vel plantae, sicut et a principali agente derivatur quaedam vis motiva ad instrumentum. Et sicut non refert dicere quod aliquid moveatur ab instrumento, vel a principali agente; ita non refert dicere quod anima gene-

I answer that, Some have held that the sensitive souls of animals are created by God (Q. 65, A. 4). This opinion would hold if the sensitive soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself. For thus, as having being and operation of itself, to be made would needs be proper to it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot be made except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul would arrive at existence by creation. But this principle is false—namely, that being and operation are proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above (Q. 75, A. 3): for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. Since, therefore, it is not a subsistent form, its relation to existence is that of the corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as proper to them, but which are said to exist forasmuch as the subsistent composites exist through them. Wherefore to be made is proper to composites. And since the generator is like the generated, it follows of necessity that both the sensitive soul, and all other like forms are naturally brought into existence by certain corporeal agents that reduce the matter from potentiality to act, through some corporeal power of which they are possessed. Now the more powerful an agent, the greater scope its action has: for instance, the hotter a body, the greater the distance to which its heat carries. Therefore bodies not endowed with life, which are the lowest in the order of nature, generate their like, not through some medium, but by themselves; thus fire by itself generates fire. But living bodies, as being more powerful, act so as to generate their like, both without and with a medium. Without a medium—in the work of nutrition, in which flesh generates flesh: with a medium—in the act of generation, because the semen of the animal or plant derives a certain active force from the soul of the generator, just as the instrument derives a certain motive power from the principal agent. And as it matters not whether we say that something is moved by the instrument or by the principal agent, so neither does it matter whether we say that the soul of the generated is caused by

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rati causetur ab anima generantis, vel a virtute derivata ab ipsa, quae est in semine. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima sensitiva non est substantia perfecta per se subsistens. Et de hoc supra dictum est, nec oportet hic iterare. Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus generativa non generat solum in virtute propria, sed in virtute totius animae, cuius est potentia. Et ideo virtus generativa plantae generat plantam; virtus vero generativa animalis generat animal. Quanto enim anima fuerit perfectior, tanto virtus eius generativa ordinatur ad perfectiorem effectum. Ad tertium dicendum quod illa vis activa quae est in semine, ex anima generantis derivata, est quasi quaedam motio ipsius animae generantis, nec est anima, aut pars animae, nisi in virtute; sicut in serra vel securi non est forma lecti, sed motio quaedam ad talem formam. Et ideo non oportet quod ista vis activa habeat aliquod organum in actu; sed fundatur in ipso spiritu incluso in semine, quod est spumosum, ut attestatur eius albedo. In quo etiam spiritu est quidam calor ex virtute caelestium corporum, quorum etiam virtute agentia inferiora agunt ad speciem, ut supra dictum est. Et quia in huiusmodi spiritu concurrit virtus animae cum virtute caelesti, dicitur quod homo generat hominem, et sol. Calidum autem elementare se habet instrumentaliter ad virtutem animae, sicut etiam ad virtutem nutritivam, ut dicitur in II de Anima. Ad quartum dicendum quod in animalibus perfectis, quae generantur ex coitu, virtus activa est in semine maris, secundum philosophum in libro de Generat. Animal.; materia autem foetus est illud quod ministratur a femina. In qua quidem materia statim a principio est anima vegetabilis, non quidem secundum actum secundum, sed secundum actum primum, sicut anima sensitiva est in dormientibus. Cum autem incipit attrahere alimentum, tunc iam actu operatur. Huiusmodi igitur materia transmutatur a virtute quae est in semine maris, quousque perducatur in actum animae sensitivae, non ita quod ipsamet vis quae erat in semine, fiat anima sensitiva; quia sic idem esset generans et generatum; et hoc magis esset simile nutritioni et augmento, quam generationi, ut philosophus dicit. Postquam autem per virtutem principii activi quod erat in semine, producta est anima sensitiva in generato quantum ad aliquam partem eius principalem, tunc iam illa anima sensitiva prolis incipit operari ad complementum proprii corporis, per modum nutritionis et augmenti. Virtus autem activa quae erat in semine, esse desinit, dissoluto semine, et evanescente spiritu qui inerat. Nec hoc est inconveniens, quia vis ista non est principale agens, sed instrumentale; motio autem instrumenti cessat, effectu iam producto in esse.

Q. 118, A. 1

the soul of the generator, or by some seminal power derived therefrom. Reply Obj. 1: The sensitive soul is not a perfect selfsubsistent substance. We have said enough (Q. 25, A. 3) on this point, nor need we repeat it here. Reply Obj. 2: The generating power begets not only by its own virtue but by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. Therefore the generating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an animal begets an animal. For the more perfect the soul is, to so much a more perfect effect is its generating power ordained. Reply Obj. 3: This active force which is in the semen, and which is derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a certain movement of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of the soul, save virtually; thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or the axe, but a certain movement towards that form. Consequently there is no need for this active force to have an actual organ; but it is based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy, as is attested by its whiteness. In which spirit, moreover, there is a certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the species as stated above (Q. 115, A. 3, ad 2). And since in this (vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of a heavenly body, it has been said that man and the sun generate man. Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the soul’s power, as also by the nutritive power, as stated (De Anima ii, 4). Reply Obj. 4: In perfect animals, generated by coition, the active force is in the semen of the male, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3); but the foetal matter is provided by the female. In this matter, the vegetative soul exists from the very beginning, not as to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul is in one who sleeps. But as soon as it begins to attract nourishment, then it already operates in act. This matter therefore is transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male, until it is actually informed by the sensitive soul; not as though the force itself which was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul; for thus, indeed, the generator and generated would be identical; moreover, this would be more like nourishment and growth than generation, as the Philosopher says. And after the sensitive soul, by the power of the active principle in the semen, has been produced in one of the principal parts of the thing generated, then it is that the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to work towards the perfection of its own body, by nourishment and growth. As to the active power which was in the semen, it ceases to exist, when the semen is dissolved and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes. Nor is there anything unreasonable in this, because this force is not the principal but the instrumental agent; and the movement of an instrument ceases when once the effect has been produced.

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Article 2 Whether the intellectual soul is produced from the semen? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima intellectiva causetur ex semine. Dicitur enim Gen. XLVI, cunctae animae quae egressae sunt de femore Iacob, sexaginta sex. Sed nihil egreditur de femore hominis, nisi inquantum causatur ex semine. Ergo anima intellectiva causatur ex semine. Praeterea, sicut supra ostensum est, in homine est una et eadem anima secundum substantiam, intellectiva, sensitiva et nutritiva. Sed anima sensitiva in homine generatur ex semine, sicut in aliis animalibus, unde et philosophus dicit in libro de Generat. Animal., quod non simul fit animal et homo, sed prius fit animal habens animam sensitivam. Ergo et anima intellectiva causatur ex semine. Praeterea, unum et idem agens, est cuius actio terminatur ad formam, et materiam, alioquin ex forma et materia non fieret unum simpliciter. Sed anima intellectiva est forma corporis humani, quod formatur per virtutem seminis. Ergo et anima intellectiva per virtutem seminis causatur. Praeterea, homo generat sibi simile secundum speciem. Sed species humana constituitur per animam rationalem. Ergo anima rationalis est a generante. Praeterea, inconveniens est dicere quod Deus cooperetur peccantibus. Sed si animae rationales crearentur a Deo, Deus interdum cooperaretur adulteris, de quorum illicito coitu proles interdum generatur. Non ergo animae rationales creantur a Deo. Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., quod animae rationales non seminantur per coitum. Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est virtutem activam quae est in materia, extendere suam actionem ad producendum immaterialem effectum. Manifestum est autem quod principium intellectivum in homine est principium transcendens materiam, habet enim operationem in qua non communicat corpus. Et ideo impossibile est quod virtus quae est in semine, sit productiva intellectivi principii. Similiter etiam quia virtus quae est in semine agit in virtute animae generantis, secundum quod anima generantis est actus corporis, utens ipso corpore in sua operatione. In operatione autem intellectus non communicat corpus. Unde virtus intellectivi principii, prout intellectivum est, non potest ad semen pervenire. Et ideo philosophus, in libro de Generat. Animal., dicit, relinquitur intellectus solus de foris advenire. Similiter etiam anima intellectiva, cum habeat operationem sine corpore, est subsistens, ut supra habitum est, et ita sibi debetur esse et fieri. Et cum sit immateria-

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is produced from the semen. For it is written (Gen 46:26): All the souls that came out of Jacob’s thigh, sixty-six. But nothing is produced from the thigh of a man, except from the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul is produced from the semen. Obj. 2: Further, as shown above (Q. 76, A. 3), the intellectual, sensitive, and nutritive souls are, in substance, one soul in man. But the sensitive soul in man is generated from the semen, as in other animals; wherefore the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that the animal and the man are not made at the same time, but first of all the animal is made having a sensitive soul. Therefore also the intellectual soul is produced from the semen. Obj. 3: Further, it is one and the same agent whose action is directed to the matter and to the form: else from the matter and the form there would not result something simply one. But the intellectual soul is the form of the human body, which is produced by the power of the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul also is produced by the power of the semen. Obj. 4: Further, man begets his like in species. But the human species is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore the rational soul is from the begetter. Obj. 5: Further, it cannot be said that God concurs in sin. But if the rational soul be created by God, sometimes God concurs in the sin of adultery, since sometimes offspring is begotten of illicit intercourse. Therefore the rational soul is not created by God. On the contrary, It is written in De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv that the rational soul is not engendered by coition. I answer that, It is impossible for an active power existing in matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial effect. Now it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man transcends matter; for it has an operation in which the body takes no part whatever. It is therefore impossible for the seminal power to produce the intellectual principle. Again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter according as the soul of the begetter is the act of the body, making use of the body in its operation. Now the body has nothing whatever to do in the operation of the intellect. Therefore the power of the intellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen. Hence the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3): It follows that the intellect alone comes from without. Again, since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of the body, it is subsistent, as proved above (Q. 75, A. 2): therefore to be and to be made are proper to

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lis substantia, non potest causari per generationem, sed solum per creationem a Deo. Ponere ergo animam intellectivam a generante causari, nihil est aliud quam ponere eam non subsistentem; et per consequens corrumpi eam cum corpore. Et ideo haereticum est dicere quod anima intellectiva traducatur cum semine. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in auctoritate illa ponitur per synecdochen pars pro toto, idest anima pro toto homine. Ad secundum dicendum quod aliqui dixerunt quod operationes vitae quae apparent in embryone, non sunt ab anima eius, sed ab anima matris; vel a virtute formativa quae est in semine. Quorum utrumque falsum est, opera enim vitae non possunt esse a principio extrinseco, sicut sentire, nutriri et augeri. Et ideo dicendum est quod anima praeexistit in embryone a principio quidem nutritiva, postmodum autem sensitiva, et tandem intellectiva. Dicunt ergo quidam quod supra animam vegetabilem quae primo inerat, supervenit alia anima, quae est sensitiva; et supra illam iterum alia, quae est intellectiva. Et sic sunt in homine tres animae, quarum una est in potentia ad aliam. Quod supra improbatum est. Et ideo alii dicunt quod illa eadem anima quae primo fuit vegetativa tantum, postmodum, per actionem virtutis quae est in semine, perducitur ad hoc quod fiat etiam sensitiva; et tandem perducitur ad hoc ut ipsa eadem fiat intellectiva, non quidem per virtutem activam seminis, sed per virtutem superioris agentis, scilicet Dei deforis illustrantis. Et propter hoc dicit philosophus quod intellectus venit ab extrinseco. Sed hoc stare non potest. Primo quidem, quia nulla forma substantialis recipit magis et minus; sed superadditio maioris perfectionis facit aliam speciem, sicut additio unitatis facit aliam speciem in numeris. Non est autem possibile ut una et eadem forma numero sit diversarum specierum. Secundo, quia sequeretur quod generatio animalis esset motus continuus, paulatim procedens de imperfecto ad perfectum; sicut accidit in alteratione. Tertio, quia sequeretur quod generatio hominis aut animalis non sit generatio simpliciter, quia subiectum eius esset ens actu. Si enim a principio in materia prolis est anima vegetabilis, et postmodum usque ad perfectum paulatim perducitur; erit semper additio perfectionis sequentis sine corruptione perfectionis praecedentis. Quod est contra rationem generationis simpliciter. Quarto, quia aut id quod causatur ex actione Dei, est aliquid subsistens, et ita oportet quod sit aliud per essentiam a forma praeexistente, quae non erat subsistens; et sic redibit opinio ponentium plures animas in corpore. Aut non est aliquid subsistens, sed quaedam perfectio animae praeexistentis, et sic ex ne-

Q. 118, A. 2

it. Moreover, since it is an immaterial substance it cannot be caused through generation, but only through creation by God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul is caused by the begetter, is nothing else than to hold the soul to be nonsubsistent and consequently to perish with the body. It is therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted with the semen. Reply Obj. 1: In the passage quoted, the part is put instead of the whole, the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche. Reply Obj. 2: Some say that the vital functions observed in the embryo are not from its soul, but from the soul of the mother; or from the formative power of the semen. Both of these explanations are false; for vital functions such as feeling, nourishment, and growth cannot be from an extrinsic principle. Consequently it must be said that the soul is in the embryo; the nutritive soul from the beginning, then the sensitive, lastly the intellectual soul. Therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which existed first, another, namely the sensitive, soul supervenes; and in addition to this, again another, namely the intellectual soul. Thus there would be in man three souls of which one would be in potentiality to another. This has been disproved above (Q. 76, A. 3). Therefore others say that the same soul which was at first merely vegetative, afterwards through the action of the seminal power, becomes a sensitive soul; and finally this same soul becomes intellectual, not indeed through the active seminal power, but by the power of a higher agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from without. For this reason the Philosopher says that the intellect comes from without. But this will not hold. First, because no substantial form is susceptible of more or less; but addition of greater perfection constitutes another species, just as the addition of unity constitutes another species of number. Now it is not possible for the same identical form to belong to different species. Second, because it would follow that the generation of an animal would be a continuous movement, proceeding gradually from the imperfect to the perfect, as happens in alteration. Third, because it would follow that the generation of a man or an animal is not generation simply, because the subject thereof would be a being in act. For if the vegetative soul is from the beginning in the matter of offspring, and is subsequently gradually brought to perfection; this will imply addition of further perfection without corruption of the preceding perfection. And this is contrary to the nature of generation properly so called. Fourth, because either that which is caused by the action of God is something subsistent: and thus it must needs be essentially distinct from the pre-existing form, which was non-subsistent; and we shall then come back to the opinion of those who held the existence of several souls in the body—or else it

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cessitate sequitur quod anima intellectiva corrumpatur, is not subsistent, but a perfection of the pre-existing soul: corrupto corpore; quod est impossibile. and from this it follows of necessity that the intellectual soul perishes with the body, which cannot be admitted. Est autem et alius modus dicendi, secundum eos qui There is again another explanation, according to those ponunt unum intellectum in omnibus. Quod supra im- who held that all men have but one intellect in common: probatum est. but this has been disproved above (Q. 76, A. 2). Et ideo dicendum est quod, cum generatio unius We must therefore say that since the generation of one semper sit corruptio alterius, necesse est dicere quod thing is the corruption of another, it follows of necessity tam in homine quam in animalibus aliis, quando perfec- that both in men and in other animals, when a more perfect tior forma advenit, fit corruptio prioris, ita tamen quod form supervenes the previous form is corrupted: yet so that sequens forma habet quidquid habebat prima, et adhuc the supervening form contains the perfection of the previamplius. Et sic per multas generationes et corruptiones ous form, and something in addition. It is in this way that pervenitur ad ultimam formam substantialem, tam in through many generations and corruptions we arrive at the homine quam in aliis animalibus. Et hoc ad sensum ap- ultimate substantial form, both in man and other animals. paret in animalibus ex putrefactione generatis. Sic igitur This indeed is apparent to the senses in animals generated dicendum est quod anima intellectiva creatur a Deo in from putrefaction. We conclude therefore that the intellecfine generationis humanae, quae simul est et sensitiva et tual soul is created by God at the end of human generation, nutritiva, corruptis formis praeexistentibus. and this soul is at the same time sensitive and nutritive, the pre-existing forms being corrupted. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa locum haReply Obj. 3: This argument holds in the case of dibet in diversis agentibus non ordinatis ad invicem. Sed verse agents not ordered to one another. But where there si sint multa agentia ordinata, nihil prohibet virtutem are many agents ordered to one another, nothing hinders superioris agentis pertingere ad ultimam formam; vir- the power of the higher agent from reaching to the ultimate tutes autem inferiorum agentium pertingere solum ad form; while the powers of the inferior agents extend only to aliquam materiae dispositionem; sicut virtus seminis di- some disposition of matter: thus in the generation of an ansponit materiam, virtus autem animae dat formam, in imal, the seminal power disposes the matter, but the power generatione animalis. Manifestum est autem ex praemis- of the soul gives the form. Now it is manifest from what has sis quod tota natura corporalis agit ut instrumentum spi- been said above (Q. 105, A. 5; Q. 110, A. 1) that the whole of ritualis virtutis; et praecipue Dei. Et ideo nihil prohibet corporeal nature acts as the instrument of a spiritual power, quin formatio corporis sit ab aliqua virtute corporali, especially of God. Therefore nothing hinders the formation anima autem intellectiva sit a solo Deo. of the body from being due to a corporeal power, while the intellectual soul is from God alone. Ad quartum dicendum quod homo generat sibi siReply Obj. 4: Man begets his like, forasmuch as by his mile, inquantum per virtutem seminis eius disponitur seminal power the matter is disposed for the reception of a materia ad susceptionem talis formae. certain species of form. Ad quintum dicendum quod in actione adulteroReply Obj. 5: In the action of the adulterer, what is of rum, illud quod est naturae, bonum est, et huic coopera- nature is good; in this God concurs. But what there is of intur Deus. Quod vero est inordinatae voluptatis, malum ordinate lust is evil; in this God does not concur. est, et huic Deus non cooperatur.

Article 3 Whether human souls were created together at the beginning of the world? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod animae humanae fuerint creatae simul a principio mundi. Dicitur enim Gen. II, requievit Deus ab omni opere quod patrarat. Hoc autem non esset, si quotidie novas animas crearet. Ergo omnes animae sunt simul creatae. Praeterea, ad perfectionem universi maxime pertinent substantiae spirituales. Si igitur animae simul crearentur cum corporibus, quotidie innumerabiles spi-

Objection 1: It would seem that human souls were created together at the beginning of the world. For it is written (Gen 2:2): God rested Him from all His work which He had done. This would not be true if He created new souls every day. Therefore all souls were created at the same time. Obj. 2: Further, spiritual substances before all others belong to the perfection of the universe. If therefore souls were created with the bodies, every day innumerable spir-

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rituales substantiae perfectioni universi adderentur, et sic universum a principio fuisset imperfectum. Quod est contra illud quod dicitur Gen. II, Deum omne opus suum complesse. Praeterea, finis rei respondet eius principio. Sed anima intellectiva remanet, destructo corpore. Ergo incoepit esse ante corpus. Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., quod simul anima creatur cum corpore. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt quod animae intellectivae accidat uniri corpori, ponentes eam esse eiusdem conditionis cum substantiis spiritualibus quae corpori non uniuntur. Et ideo posuerunt animas hominum simul a principio cum angelis creatas. Sed haec opinio falsa est. Primo quidem, quantum ad radicem. Si enim accidentaliter conveniret animae corpori uniri, sequeretur quod homo, qui ex ista unione constituitur, esset ens per accidens; vel quod anima esset homo, quod falsum est, ut supra ostensum est. Quod etiam anima humana non sit eiusdem naturae cum angelis, ipse diversus modus intelligendi ostendit, ut supra ostensum est, homo enim intelligit a sensibus accipiendo, et convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut supra ostensum est. Et ideo indiget uniri corpori, quo indiget ad operationem sensitivae partis. Quod de angelo dici non potest.

Secundo apparet falsitas in ipsa positione. Si enim animae naturale est corpori uniri, esse sine corpore est sibi contra naturam, et sine corpore existens non habet suae naturae perfectionem. Non fuit autem conveniens ut Deus ab imperfectis suum opus inchoaret, et ab his quae sunt praeter naturam, non enim fecit hominem sine manu aut sine pede, quae sunt partes naturales hominis. Multo igitur minus fecit animam sine corpore. Si vero aliquis dicat quod non est naturale animae corpori uniri, oportet inquirere causam quare sint corporibus unitae. Oportet autem dicere quod aut hoc sit factum ex eius voluntate; aut ex alia causa. Si ex eius voluntate, videtur hoc esse inconveniens. Primo quidem, quia haec voluntas irrationabilis esset, si non indigeret corpore, et vellet ei uniri, si enim eo indigeret, naturale esset ei quod corpori uniretur, quia natura non deficit in necessariis. Secundo, quia nulla ratio esset quare animae a principio mundi creatae, post tot tempora voluntas accesserit ut nunc corpori uniatur. Est enim substantia spiritualis supra tempus, utpote revolutiones caeli excedens. Tertio quia videretur a casu esse quod haec anima huic corpori uniretur, cum ad hoc requiratur concursus duarum voluntatum, scilicet animae advenientis, et hominis generantis. Si autem praeter voluntatem ipsius corpori unitur, et praeter eius naturam; oportet quod hoc sit ex causa violentiam inferente, et sic erit ei

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itual substances would be added to the perfection of the universe: consequently at the beginning the universe would have been imperfect. This is contrary to Gen. 2:2, where it is said that God ended all His work. Obj. 3: Further, the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning. But the intellectual soul remains, when the body perishes. Therefore it began to exist before the body. On the contrary, It is said (De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv, xviii) that the soul is created together with the body. I answer that, Some have maintained that it is accidental to the intellectual soul to be united to the body, asserting that the soul is of the same nature as those spiritual substances which are not united to a body. These, therefore, stated that the souls of men were created together with the angels at the beginning. But this statement is false. First, in the very principle on which it is based. For if it were accidental to the soul to be united to the body, it would follow that man who results from this union is a being by accident; or that the soul is a man, which is false, as proved above (Q. 75, A. 4). Moreover, that the human soul is not of the same nature as the angels, is proved from the different mode of understanding, as shown above (Q. 55, A. 2; Q. 85, A. 1): for man understands through receiving from the senses, and turning to phantasms, as stated above (Q. 84, AA. 6, 7; Q. 85, A. 1). For this reason the soul needs to be united to the body, which is necessary to it for the operation of the sensitive part: whereas this cannot be said of an angel. Second, this statement can be proved to be false in itself. For if it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, it is unnatural to it to be without a body, and as long as it is without a body it is deprived of its natural perfection. Now it was not fitting that God should begin His work with things imperfect and unnatural, for He did not make man without a hand or a foot, which are natural parts of a man. Much less, therefore, did He make the soul without a body. But if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to be united to the body, he must give the reason why it is united to a body. And the reason must be either because the soul so willed, or for some other reason. If because the soul willed it—this seems incongruous. First, because it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united to the body, if it did not need the body: for if it did need it, it would be natural for it to be united to it, since nature does not fail in what is necessary. Second, because there would be no reason why, having been created from the beginning of the world, the soul should, after such a long time, come to wish to be united to the body. For a spiritual substance is above time, and superior to the heavenly revolutions. Third, because it would seem that this body was united to this soul by chance: since for this union to take place two wills would have to concur—to wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of the begetter. If, however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural on the part of the soul, then it must be the result

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poenale et triste. Quod est secundum errorem Origenis, qui posuit animas incorporari propter poenam peccati. Unde cum haec omnia sint inconvenientia, simpliciter confitendum est quod animae non sunt creatae ante corpora, sed simul creantur cum corporibus infunduntur.

of some violent cause, and to the soul would have something of a penal and afflicting nature. This is in keeping with the opinion of Origen, who held that souls were embodied in punishment of sin. Since, therefore, all these opinions are unreasonable, we must simply confess that souls were not created before bodies, but are created at the same time as they are infused into them. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus dicitur cesReply Obj. 1: God is said to have rested on the seventh sasse die septimo, non quidem ab omni opere, cum dica- day, not from all work, since we read (John 5:17): My Father tur Ioan. V, pater meus usque modo operatur; sed a novis worketh until now; but from the creation of any new genera rerum generibus et speciebus condendis, quae in ope- and species, which may not have already existed in the first ribus primis non aliquo modo praeextiterint. Sic enim works. For in this sense, the souls which are created now, animae quae nunc creantur, praeextiterunt secundum si- existed already, as to the likeness of the species, in the first militudinem speciei in primis operibus, in quibus anima works, which included the creation of Adam’s soul.

Adae creata fuit. Ad secundum dicendum quod perfectioni universi, quantum ad numerum individuorum, quotidie potest addi aliquid, non autem quantum ad numerum specierum. Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc quod anima remanet sine corpore, contingit per corporis corruptionem, quae consecuta est ex peccato. Unde non fuit conveniens quod ab hoc inciperent Dei opera, quia, sicut scriptum est Sap. I, Deus mortem non fecit, sed impii manibus et verbis accersierunt eam.

Reply Obj. 2: Something can be added every day to the perfection of the universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as to the number of species. Reply Obj. 3: That the soul remains without the body is due to the corruption of the body, which was a result of sin. Consequently it was not fitting that God should make the soul without the body from the beginning: for as it is written (Wis 1:13, 16): God made not death . . . but the wicked with works and words have called it to them.

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Question 119 The Propagation of Man as to the Body Deinde considerandum est de propagatione hominis We now consider the propagation of man, as to the quantum ad corpus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. body. Concerning this there are two points of inquiry: Primo, utrum aliquid de alimento convertatur in (1) Whether any part of the food is changed into true veritatem humanae naturae. human nature? Secundo, utrum semen, quod est humanae (2) Whether the semen, which is the principle of generationis principium, sit de superfluo human generation, is produced from the surplus alimenti. food?

Article 1 Whether some part of the food is changed into true human nature? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nihil de alimento transeat in veritatem humanae naturae. Dicitur enim Matth. XV, omne quod in os intrat, in ventrem vadit, et per secessum emittitur. Sed quod emittitur, non transit in veritatem humanae naturae. Ergo nihil de alimento in veritatem humanae naturae transit. Praeterea, philosophus, in I de Generat., distinguit carnem secundum speciem, et secundum materiam; et dicit quod caro secundum materiam advenit et recedit. Quod autem ex alimento generatur, advenit et recedit. Ergo id in quod alimentum convertitur, est caro secundum materiam, non autem caro secundum speciem. Sed hoc pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae, quod pertinet ad speciem eius. Ergo alimentum non transit in veritatem humanae naturae. Praeterea, ad veritatem humanae naturae pertinere videtur humidum radicale; quod si deperdatur, restitui non potest, ut medici dicunt. Posset autem restitui, si alimentum converteretur in ipsum humidum. Ergo nutrimentum non convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae. Praeterea, si alimentum transiret in veritatem humanae naturae, quidquid in homine deperditur, restaurari posset. Sed mors hominis non accidit nisi per deperditionem alicuius. Posset igitur homo per sumptionem alimenti in perpetuum se contra mortem tueri. Praeterea, si alimentum in veritatem humanae naturae transiret, nihil esset in homine quod non posset recedere et reparari, quia id quod in homine generatur ex alimento, et recedere et reparari potest. Si ergo homo diu viveret, sequeretur quod nihil quod in eo fuit materialiter in principio suae generationis, finaliter remaneret in ipso. Et sic non esset idem homo numero per totam vitam suam, cum ad hoc quod aliquid sit idem nume-

Objection 1: It would seem that none of the food is changed into true human nature. For it is written (Matt 15:17): Whatsoever entereth into the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the privy. But what is cast out is not changed into the reality of human nature. Therefore none of the food is changed into true human nature. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 5) distinguishes flesh belonging to the species from flesh belonging to matter; and says that the latter comes and goes. Now what is formed from food comes and goes. Therefore what is produced from food is flesh belonging to matter, not to the species. But what belongs to true human nature belongs to the species. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature. Obj. 3: Further, the radical humor seems to belong to the reality of human nature; and if it be lost, it cannot be recovered, according to physicians. But it could be recovered if the food were changed into the humor. Therefore food is not changed into true human nature. Obj. 4: Further, if the food were changed into true human nature, whatever is lost in man could be restored. But man’s death is due only to the loss of something. Therefore man would be able by taking food to insure himself against death in perpetuity. Obj. 5: Further, if the food is changed into true human nature, there is nothing in man which may not recede or be repaired: for what is generated in a man from his food can both recede and be repaired. If therefore a man lived long enough, it would follow that in the end nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at the beginning. Consequently he would not be numerically the same man throughout his life; since for the thing to be numerically the

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ro, requiratur identitas materiae. Hoc autem est inconveniens. Non ergo alimentum transit in veritatem humanae naturae. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de Vera Relig., alimenta carnis corrupta, idest amittentia formam suam, in membrorum fabricam migrant. Sed fabrica membrorum pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae. Ergo alimenta transeunt in veritatem humanae naturae. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, II Metaphys., hoc modo se habet unumquodque ad veritatem, sicut se habet ad esse. Illud ergo pertinet ad veritatem naturae alicuius, quod est de constitutione naturae ipsius. Sed natura dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, in communi, secundum rationem speciei; alio modo, secundum quod est in hoc individuo. Ad veritatem igitur naturae alicuius in communi consideratae, pertinet forma et materia eius in communi accepta, ad veritatem autem naturae in hoc particulari consideratae, pertinet materia individualis signata, et forma per huiusmodi materiam individuata. Sicut de veritate humanae naturae in communi, est anima humana et corpus, sed de veritate humanae naturae in Petro et Martino, est haec anima et hoc corpus. Sunt autem quaedam, quorum formae non possunt salvari nisi in una materia signata, sicut forma solis non potest salvari nisi in materia quae actu sub ea continetur. Et secundum hunc modum, aliqui posuerunt quod forma humana non potest salvari nisi in materia quadam signata, quae scilicet a principio fuit tali forma formata in primo homine. Ita quod quidquid aliud praeter illud quod ex primo parente in posteros derivatur, additum fuerit, non pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae, quasi non vere accipiat formam humanae naturae. Sed illa materia quae in primo homine formae humanae fuit subiecta, in seipsa multiplicatur, et hoc modo multitudo humanorum corporum a corpore primi hominis derivatur. Et secundum hos, alimentum non convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae, sed dicunt quod alimentum accipitur ut quoddam fomentum naturae, idest ut resistat actioni caloris naturalis, ne consumat humidum radicale; sicut plumbum vel stannum adiungitur argento, ne consumatur per ignem. Sed haec positio est multipliciter irrationabilis. Primo quidem, quia eiusdem rationis est quod aliqua forma possit fieri in alia materia, et quod possit propriam materiam deserere, et ideo omnia generabilia sunt corruptibilia, et e converso. Manifestum est autem quod forma humana potest deficere ab hac materia quae ei subiicitur, alioquin corpus humanum corruptibile non esset. Unde relinquitur quod et alii materiae advenire possit, aliquo alio in veritatem humanae naturae transeunte. Secundo, quia in omnibus quorum materia invenitur tota sub uno individuo, non est nisi unum individuum in una specie, sicut patet in sole et luna, et huiusmodi. Sic igi-

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same, identity of matter is necessary. But this is incongruous. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xi): The bodily food when corrupted, that is, having lost its form, is changed into the texture of the members. But the texture of the members belongs to true human nature. Therefore the food is changed into the reality of human nature. I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), The relation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being. Therefore that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the constitution of that nature. But nature can be considered in two ways: first, in general according to the species; second, as in the individual. And whereas the form and the common matter belong to a thing’s true nature considered in general; individual signate matter, and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true nature considered in this particular individual. Thus a soul and body belong to the true human nature in general, but to the true human nature of Peter and Martin belong this soul and this body.

Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist save in the matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that the human form cannot exist but in a certain individual matter, which, they said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man. So that whatever may have been added to that which was derived by posterity from the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human nature, as not receiving in truth the form of human nature. But, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject of the human form, was multiplied in itself: and in this way the multitude of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man. According to these, the food is not changed into true human nature; we take food, they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action of natural heat, and prevent the consumption of the radical humor; just as lead or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed by fire. But this is unreasonable in many ways. First, because it comes to the same that a form can be produced in another matter, or that it can cease to be in its proper matter; wherefore all things that can be generated are corruptible, and conversely. Now it is manifest that the human form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which is its subject: else the human body would not be corruptible. Consequently it can begin to exist in another matter, so that something else be changed into true human nature. Second, because in all beings whose entire matter is contained in one individual there is only one individual in the species: as is clearly the case with the sun, moon and such like. Thus

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tur non esset nisi unum individuum humanae speciei. Tertio, quia non est possibile quod multiplicatio materiae attendatur nisi vel secundum quantitatem tantum, sicut accidit in rarefactis, quorum materia suscipit maiores dimensiones; vel etiam secundum substantiam materiae. Sola autem eadem substantia materiae manente, non potest dici quod sit multiplicata, quia idem ad seipsum non constituit multitudinem, cum necesse sit omnem multitudinem ex aliqua divisione causari. Unde oportet quod aliqua alia substantia materiae adveniat, vel per creationem, vel per conversionem alterius in ipsam. Unde relinquitur quod non potest aliqua materia multiplicari, nisi vel per rarefactionem, sicut cum ex aqua fit aer; vel per conversionem alterius rei, sicut multiplicatur ignis per additionem lignorum; vel per creationem materiae. Sed manifestum est multiplicationem materiae in humanis corporibus non accidere per rarefactionem, quia sic corpora hominum perfectae aetatis essent imperfectiora quam corpora puerorum. Nec iterum per creationem novae materiae, quia secundum Gregorium, omnia sunt simul creata secundum substantiam materiae, licet non secundum speciem formae. Unde relinquitur quod multiplicatio corporis humani non fit nisi per hoc, quod alimentum convertitur in veritatem humani corporis. Quarto, quia cum homo non differat ab animalibus et plantis secundum animam vegetabilem, sequeretur quod etiam corpora animalium et plantarum non multiplicarentur per conversionem alimenti in corpus nutritum, sed per quandam multiplicationem. Quae non potest esse naturalis, cum materia secundum naturam non extendatur nisi usque ad certam quantitatem; nec iterum inveniatur aliquid naturaliter crescere, nisi per rarefactionem, vel conversionem alterius in ipsum. Et sic totum opus generativae et nutritivae, quae dicuntur vires naturales, esset miraculosum. Quod est omnino inconveniens. Unde alii dixerunt quod forma humana potest quidem fieri de novo in aliqua alia materia, si consideretur natura humana in communi, non autem si accipiatur prout est in hoc individuo, in quo forma humana fixa manet in quadam materia determinata, cui primo imprimitur in generatione huius individui, ita quod illam materiam nunquam deserit usque ad ultimam individui corruptionem. Et hanc materiam dicunt principaliter pertinere ad veritatem humanae naturae. Sed quia huiusmodi materia non sufficit ad quantitatem debitam, requiritur ut adveniat alia materia per conversionem alimenti in substantiam nutriti, quantum sufficiat ad debitum augmentum. Et hanc materiam dicunt secundario pertinere ad veritatem humanae naturae, quia non requiritur ad primum esse individui, sed ad quantitatem eius. Iam vero si quid aliud advenit ex alimento, non pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae, proprie loquendo. Sed hoc etiam est inconveniens. Primo quidem, quia

Q. 119, A. 1

there would only be one individual of the human species. Third, because multiplication of matter cannot be understood otherwise than either in respect of quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so that their matter increases in dimensions; or in respect of the substance itself of the matter. But as long as the substance alone of matter remains, it cannot be said to be multiplied; for multitude cannot consist in the addition of a thing to itself, since of necessity it can only result from division. Therefore some other substance must be added to matter, either by creation, or by something else being changed into it. Consequently no matter can be multiplied save either by rarefaction as when air is made from water; or by the change of some other things, as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood; or lastly by creation. Now it is manifest that the multiplication of matter in the human body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the body of a man of perfect age would be more imperfect than the body of a child. Nor does it occur by creation of fresh matter: for, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxii): All things were created together as to the substance of matter, but not as to the specific form. Consequently the multiplication of the human body can only be the result of the food being changed into the true human nature. Fourth, because, since man does not differ from animals and plants in regard to the vegetative soul, it would follow that the bodies of animals and plants do not increase through a change of nourishment into the body so nourished, but through some kind of multiplication. Which multiplication cannot be natural: since the matter cannot naturally extend beyond a certain fixed quantity; nor again does anything increase naturally, save either by rarefaction or the change of something else into it. Consequently the whole process of generation and nourishment, which are called natural forces, would be miraculous. Which is altogether inadmissible. Wherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to exist in some other matter, if we consider the human nature in general: but not if we consider it as in this individual. For in the individual the form remains confined to a certain determinate matter, on which it is first imprinted at the generation of that individual, so that it never leaves that matter until the ultimate dissolution of the individual. And this matter, say they, principally belongs to the true human nature. But since this matter does not suffice for the requisite quantity, some other matter must be added, through the change of food into the substance of the individual partaking thereof, in such a quantity as suffices for the increase required. And this matter, they state, belongs secondarily to the true human nature: because it is not required for the primary existence of the individual, but for the quantity due to him. And if anything further is produced from the food, this does not belong to true human nature, properly speaking. However,

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haec opinio iudicat de materia corporum viventium, ad modum corporum inanimatorum; in quibus etsi sit virtus ad generandum simile in specie, non tamen est virtus in eis ad generandum aliquid sibi simile secundum individuum; quae quidem virtus in corporibus viventibus est virtus nutritiva. Nihil ergo per virtutem nutritivam adderetur corporibus viventibus, si alimentum in veritatem naturae ipsorum non converteretur. Secundo quia virtus activa quae est in semine, est quaedam impressio derivata ab anima generantis, sicut supra dictum est. Unde non potest esse maioris virtutis in agendo, quam ipsa anima a qua derivatur. Si ergo ex virtute seminis vere assumit aliqua materia formam naturae humanae, multo magis anima in nutrimentum coniunctum poterit veram formam naturae humanae imprimere per potentiam nutritivam. Tertio, quia nutrimento indigetur non solum ad augmentum, alioquin terminato augmento necessarium non esset, sed etiam ad restaurandum illud quod deperditur per actionem caloris naturalis. Non autem esset restauratio, nisi id quod ex alimento generatur, succederet in locum deperditi. Unde sicut id quod primo inerat, est de veritate humanae naturae, ita et id quod ex alimento generatur. Et ideo, secundum alios, dicendum est quod alimentum vere convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae, inquantum vere accipit speciem carnis et ossis et huiusmodi partium. Et hoc est quod dicit philosophus in II de Anima, quod alimentum nutrit inquantum est potentia caro. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus non dicit quod totum quod in os intrat, per secessum emittatur, sed omne, quia de quolibet cibo aliquid impurum per secessum emittitur. Vel potest dici quod quidquid ex alimento generatur, potest etiam per calorem naturalem resolvi, et per poros quosdam occultos emitti, ut Hieronymus exponit. Ad secundum dicendum quod aliqui per carnem secundum speciem intellexerunt id quod primo accipit speciem humanam, quod sumitur a generante, et hoc dicunt semper manere, quousque individuum durat. Carnem vero secundum materiam dicunt esse quae generatur ex alimento, et hanc dicunt non semper permanere, sed quod sicut advenit, ita abscedit. Sed hoc est contra intentionem Aristotelis. Dicit enim ibi quod, sicut in unoquoque habentium speciem in materia, puta in ligno et lapide, ita et in carne hoc est secundum speciem, et illud secundum materiam. Manifestum est autem quod praedicta distinctio locum non habet in rebus inanimatis, quae non generantur ex semine, nec nutriuntur. Et iterum, cum id quod ex alimento generatur, adiungatur corpori nutrito per modum mixtionis, sicut aqua miscetur vino, ut ponit exemplum ibidem philosophus; non potest alia esse natura eius quod advenit, et eius cui advenit, cum iam sit factum unum per veram mixtionem.

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this also is inadmissible. First, because this opinion judges of living bodies as of inanimate bodies; in which, although there be a power of generating their like in species, there is not the power of generating their like in the individual; which power in living bodies is the nutritive power. Nothing, therefore, would be added to living bodies by their nutritive power, if their food were not changed into their true nature. Second, because the active seminal power is a certain impression derived from the soul of the begetter, as stated above (Q. 118, A. 1). Hence it cannot have a greater power in acting, than the soul from which it is derived. If, therefore, by the seminal power a certain matter truly assumes the form of human nature, much more can the soul, by the nutritive power, imprint the true form of human nature on the food which is assimilated. Third, because food is needed not only for growth, else at the term of growth, food would be needful no longer; but also to renew that which is lost by the action of natural heat. But there would be no renewal, unless what is formed from the food, took the place of what is lost. Wherefore just as that which was there previously belonged to true human nature, so also does that which is formed from the food. Therefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is really changed into the true human nature by reason of its assuming the specific form of flesh, bones and such like parts. This is what the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4): Food nourishes inasmuch as it is potentially flesh. Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord does not say that the whole of what enters into the mouth, but all—because something from every kind of food is cast out into the privy. It may also be said that whatever is generated from food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and be cast aside through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage. Reply Obj. 2: By flesh belonging to the species, some have understood that which first receives the human species, which is derived from the begetter: this, they say, lasts as long as the individual does. By flesh belonging to the matter these understand what is generated from food: and this, they say, does not always remain, but as it comes so it goes. But this is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For he says there, that just as in things which have their species in matter—for instance, wood or stone—’so in flesh, there is something belonging to the species, and something belonging to matter.’ Now it is clear that this distinction has no place in inanimate things, which are not generated seminally, or nourished. Again, since what is generated from food is united to, by mixing with, the body so nourished, just as water is mixed with wine, as the Philosopher says there by way of example: that which is added, and that to which it is added, cannot be different natures, since they are already made one by being mixed together. Therefore there

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Unde nulla ratio est quod unum consumatur per calorem naturalem, et alterum maneat. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod haec distinctio philosophi non est secundum diversas carnes, sed est eiusdem carnis secundum diversam considerationem. Si enim consideretur caro secundum speciem, idest secundum id quod est formale in ipsa, sic semper manet, quia semper manet natura carnis, et dispositio naturalis ipsius. Sed si consideretur caro secundum materiam, sic non manet, sed paulatim consumitur et restauratur, sicut patet in igne fornacis, cuius forma manet, sed materia paulatim consumitur, et alia in locum eius substituitur. Ad tertium dicendum quod ad humidum radicale intelligitur pertinere totum id in quo fundatur virtus speciei. Quod si subtrahatur, restitui non potest, sicut si amputetur manus aut pes, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Sed humidum nutrimentale est quod nondum pervenit ad suscipiendum perfecte naturam speciei, sed est in via ad hoc; sicut est sanguis, et alia huiusmodi. Unde si talia subtrahantur, remanet adhuc virtus speciei in radice, quae non tollitur. Ad quartum dicendum quod omnis virtus in corpore passibili per continuam actionem debilitatur, quia huiusmodi agentia etiam patiuntur. Et ideo virtus conversiva in principio quidem tam fortis est, ut possit convertere non solum quod sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, sed etiam ad augmentum. Postea vero non potest convertere nisi quantum sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, et tunc cessat augmentum. Demum nec hoc potest, et tunc fit diminutio. Deinde, deficiente huiusmodi virtute totaliter, animal moritur. Sicut virtus vini convertentis aquam admixtam, paulatim per admixtionem aquae debilitatur, ut tandem totum fiat aquosum, ut philosophus exemplificat in I de Generat. Ad quintum dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in I de Generat. quando aliqua materia per se convertitur in ignem, tunc dicitur ignis de novo generari, quando vero aliqua materia convertitur in ignem praeexistentem, dicitur ignis nutriri. Unde si tota materia simul amittat speciem ignis, et alia materia convertatur in ignem, erit alius ignis numero. Si vero, paulatim combusto uno ligno, aliud substituatur, et sic deinceps quousque omnia prima consumantur, semper remanet idem ignis numero, quia semper quod additur, transit in praeexistens. Et similiter est intelligendum in corporibus viventibus, in quibus ex nutrimento restauratur id quod per calorem naturalem consumitur.

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is no reason for saying that one is destroyed by natural heat, while the other remains. It must therefore be said that this distinction of the Philosopher is not of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh considered from different points of view. For if we consider the flesh according to the species, that is, according to that which is formed therein, thus it remains always: because the nature of flesh always remains together with its natural disposition. But if we consider flesh according to matter, then it does not remain, but is gradually destroyed and renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace, the form of fire remains, but the matter is gradually consumed, and other matter is substituted in its place. Reply Obj. 3: The radical humor is said to comprise whatever the virtue of the species is founded on. If this be taken away it cannot be renewed; as when a man’s hand or foot is amputated. But the nutritive humor is that which has not yet received perfectly the specific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood, and the like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue of the species remains in its root, which is not destroyed. Reply Obj. 4: Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore the transforming virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth. Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this; and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether, the animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water added to it, is weakened by further additions of water, so as to become at length watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example (De Gener. i, 5). Reply Obj. 5: As the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), when a certain matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said to be generated anew: but when matter is transformed into a fire already existing, then fire is said to be fed. Wherefore if the entire matter together loses the form of fire, and another matter transformed into fire, there will be another distinct fire. But if, while one piece of wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on until the first piece is entirely consumed, the same identical fire will remain all the time: because that which is added passes into what pre-existed. It is the same with living bodies, in which by means of nourishment that is renewed which was consumed by natural heat.

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Article 2 Whether the semen is produced from surplus food or from the substance of the begetter? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod semen non sit de superfluo alimenti, sed de substantia generantis. Dicit enim Damascenus quod generatio est opus naturae ex substantia generantis producens quod generatur. Sed id quod generatur, generatur ex semine. Ergo semen est de substantia generantis. Praeterea, secundum hoc filius assimilatur patri, quod ab eo aliquid accipit. Sed si semen ex quo aliquid generatur, sit de superfluo alimenti; nihil acciperet aliquis ab avo et praecedentibus, in quibus hoc alimentum nullo modo fuit. Ergo non assimilaretur aliquis avo et praecedentibus, magis quam aliis hominibus. Praeterea, alimentum hominis generantis quandoque est ex carnibus bovis, vel porci, et aliorum huiusmodi. Si igitur semen esset de superfluo alimenti, homo generatus ex semine maiorem affinitatem haberet cum bove et porco, quam cum patre et aliis consanguineis. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, X super Gen. ad Litt., quod nos fuimus in Adam non solum secundum seminalem rationem, sed etiam secundum corpulentam substantiam. Hoc autem non esset, si semen esset ex superfluo alimenti. Ergo semen non est superfluo alimenti. Sed contra est quod philosophus probat multipliciter, in libro de Generat. Animal., quod semen est superfluum alimenti. Respondeo dicendum quod ista quaestio aliqualiter dependet ex praemissis. Si enim in natura humana est virtus ad communicandum suam formam materiae alienae non solum in alio, sed etiam in ipso; manifestum est quod alimentum, quod est in principio dissimile, in fine fit simile per formam communicatam. Est autem naturalis ordo ut aliquid gradatim de potentia reducatur in actum, et ideo in his quae generantur, invenimus quod primo unumquodque est imperfectum, et postea perficitur. Manifestum est autem quod commune se habet ad proprium et determinatum, ut imperfectum ad perfectum, et ideo videmus quod in generatione animalis prius generatur animal, quam homo vel equus. Sic igitur et ipsum alimentum primo quidem accipit quandam virtutem communem respectu omnium partium corporis, et in fine determinatur ad hanc partem vel ad illam. Non autem est possibile quod accipiatur pro semine id quod iam conversum est in substantiam membrorum, per quandam resolutionem. Quia illud resolutum, si non retineret naturam eius a quo resolvitur, tunc iam esset recedens a natura generantis, quasi in via corruptionis existens; et sic non haberet virtutem convertendi aliud in similem naturam. Si vero retineret naturam eius a quo

Objection 1: It would seem that the semen is not produced from the surplus food, but from the substance of the begetter. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 8) that generation is a work of nature, producing, from the substance of the begetter, that which is begotten. But that which is generated is produced from the semen. Therefore the semen is produced from the substance of the begetter. Obj. 2: Further, the son is like his father, in respect of that which he receives from him. But if the semen from which something is generated, is produced from the surplus food, a man would receive nothing from his grandfather and his ancestors in whom the food never existed. Therefore a man would not be more like to his grandfather or ancestors, than to any other men. Obj. 3: Further, the food of the generator is sometimes the flesh of cows, pigs and suchlike. If therefore, the semen were produced from surplus food, the man begotten of such semen would be more akin to the cow and the pig, than to his father or other relations. Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. x, 20) that we were in Adam not only by seminal virtue, but also in the very substance of the body. But this would not be, if the semen were produced from surplus food. Therefore the semen is not produced therefrom. On the contrary, The Philosopher proves in many ways (De Gener. Animal. i, 18) that the semen is surplus food. I answer that, This question depends in some way on what has been stated above (A. 1; Q. 118, A. 1). For if human nature has a virtue for the communication of its form to alien matter not only in another, but also in its own subject; it is clear that the food which at first is dissimilar, becomes at length similar through the form communicated to it. Now it belongs to the natural order that a thing should be reduced from potentiality to act gradually: hence in things generated we observe that at first each is imperfect and is afterwards perfected. But it is clear that the common is to the proper and determinate, as imperfect is to perfect: therefore we see that in the generation of an animal, the animal is generated first, then the man or the horse. So therefore food first of all receives a certain common virtue in regard to all the parts of the body, which virtue is subsequently determinate to this or that part. Now it is not possible that the semen be a kind of solution from what is already transformed into the substance of the members. For this solution, if it does not retain the nature of the member it is taken from, would no longer be of the nature of the begetter, and would be due to a process of corruption; and consequently it would not have the power of transforming something else into the likeness of that na-

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resolvitur, tunc, cum esset contractum ad determinatam partem, non haberet virtutem movendi ad naturam totius, sed solum ad naturam partis. Nisi forte quis dicat quod esset resolutum ab omnibus partibus corporis, et quod retineat naturam omnium partium. Et sic semen esset quasi quoddam parvum animal in actu; et generatio animalis ex animali non esset nisi per divisionem, sicut lutum generatur ex luto, et sicut accidit in animalibus quae decisa vivunt. Hoc autem est inconveniens. Relinquitur ergo quod semen non sit decisum ab eo quod erat actu totum; sed magis sit in potentia totum, habens virtutem ad productionem totius corporis, derivatam an anima generantis, ut supra dictum est. Hoc autem quod est in potentia ad totum, est illud quod generatur ex alimento, antequam convertatur in substantiam membrorum. Et ideo ex hoc semen accipitur. Et secundum hoc, virtus nutritiva dicitur deservire generativae, quia id quod est conversum per virtutem nutritivam, accipitur a virtute generativa ut semen. Et huius signum ponit philosophus, quod animalia magni corporis, quae indigent multo nutrimento, sunt pauci seminis secundum quantitatem sui corporis, et paucae generationis; et similiter homines pingues sunt pauci seminis, propter eandem causam. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod generatio est de substantia generantis in animalibus et plantis, inquantum semen habet virtutem ex forma generantis, et inquantum est in potentia ad substantiam ipsius. Ad secundum dicendum quod assimilatio generantis ad genitum non fit propter materiam, sed propter formam agentis, quod generat sibi simile. Unde non oportet ad hoc quod aliquis assimiletur avo, quod materia corporalis seminis fuerit in avo; sed quod sit in semine aliqua virtus derivata ab anima avi, mediante patre. Et similiter dicendum est ad tertium. Nam affinitas non attenditur secundum materiam, sed magis secundum derivationem formae. Ad quartum dicendum quod verbum Augustini non est sic intelligendum, quasi in Adam actu fuerit aut seminalis ratio huius hominis propinqua, aut corpulenta eius substantia, sed utrumque fuit in Adam secundum originem. Nam et materia corporalis, quae ministrata est a matre, quam vocat corpulentam substantiam, derivatur originaliter ab Adam, et similiter virtus activa existens in semine patris, quae est huius hominis propinqua ratio seminalis. Sed Christus dicitur fuisse in Adam secundum corpulentam substantiam, sed non secundum seminalem rationem. Quia materia corporis eius, quae ministrata est a matre virgine, derivata est ab Adam, sed virtus activa non est derivata ab Adam, quia corpus eius non est formatum per virtutem virilis seminis, sed operatione

Q. 119, A. 2

ture. But if it retained the nature of the member it is taken from, then, since it is limited to a certain part of the body, it would not have the power of moving towards (the production of) the whole nature, but only the nature of that part. Unless one were to say that the solution is taken from all the parts of the body, and that it retains the nature of each part. Thus the semen would be a small animal in act; and generation of animal from animal would be a mere division, as mud is generated from mud, and as animals which continue to live after being cut in two: which is inadmissible. It remains to be said, therefore, that the semen is not something separated from what was before the actual whole; rather is it the whole, though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of the begetter, to produce the whole body, as stated above (A. 1; Q. 108, A. 1). Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is that which is generated from the food, before it is transformed into the substance of the members. Therefore the semen is taken from this. In this sense the nutritive power is said to serve the generative power: because what is transformed by the nutritive power is employed as semen by the generative power. A sign of this, according to the Philosopher, is that animals of great size, which require much food, have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies, and generate seldom; in like manner fat men, and for the same reason. Reply Obj. 1: Generation is from the substance of the begetter in animals and plants, inasmuch as the semen owes its virtue to the form of the begetter, and inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the substance. Reply Obj. 2: The likeness of the begetter to the begotten is on account not of the matter, but of the form of the agent that generates its like. Wherefore in order for a man to be like his grandfather, there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter should have been in the grandfather; but that there be in the semen a virtue derived from the soul of the grandfather through the father. In like manner the third objection is answered. For kinship is not in relation to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms. Reply Obj. 4: These words of Augustine are not to be understood as though the immediate seminal virtue, or the corporeal substance from which this individual was formed were actually in Adam: but so that both were in Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal matter, which is supplied by the mother, and which he calls the corporeal substance, is originally derived from Adam: and likewise the active seminal power of the father, which is the immediate seminal virtue (in the production) of this man. But Christ is said to have been in Adam according to the corporeal substance, not according to the seminal virtue. Because the matter from which His Body was formed, and which was supplied by the Virgin Mother, was derived from Adam; whereas the active virtue was not derived from Adam, because His Body was not formed by the seminal

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Q. 119, A. 2

Government of Creatures

Ia

spiritus sancti. Talis enim partus decebat eum, qui est su- virtue of a man, but by the operation of the Holy Spirit. For per omnia benedictus Deus in saecula. Amen. such a birth was becoming to Him, Who is above all God forever Blessed. Amen.

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